Pursuant to Ind.Appellate Rule 65(D), 

this Memorandum Decision shall not 

be regarded as precedent or cited 

before any court except for the purpose 

of establishing the defense of res 

judicata, collateral estoppel, or the law 

of the case.

ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT: ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE:

JOHN P. DALY, JR. SCOTT L. BUNNELL

Golitko & Daly, P.C. ANDREW S. WILLIAMS

Indianapolis, Indiana Fort Wayne, Indiana

IN THE

COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA

JOHN ADAMS, )

)

Appellant, )

)

vs. ) No. 08A04-1406-CT-256

)

CTB, INC., Individually and d/b/a, )

BROCK GRAIN SYSTEMS, )

)

Appellee. )

APPEAL FROM THE CARROLL CIRCUIT COURT

The Honorable Benjamin A. Diener, Judge

Cause No. 08C01-1106-CT-6

October 10, 2014

MEMORANDUM DECISION – NOT FOR PUBLICATION

BARNES, Judge
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Case Summary

John Adams appeals the trial court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of CTB, 

Inc., individually and d/b/a Brock Grain Systems (collectively “Brock”). We affirm.

Issue

Adams raises one issue, which we restate as whether are genuine issues of material 

fact relating to breach that preclude the entry of summary judgment for Brock. 

Facts

Brock manufactures grain dryers. Indiana Farm Systems (“IFS”) sells and installs 

Brock’s grain dryers. Adams was employed by IFS as a farm equipment installer. When 

IFS installed a Brock grain dryer, it had the choice of having Brock deliver the grain 

dryer to the site, in which case Brock would use its own custom jacks to lift the grain 

dryer from the bed of the truck, or IFS could transport the grain dryer to the site using a 

large truck and use its own jacks during the installation. Brock charged an additional 

delivery fee if IFS chose to have Brock deliver the grain dryer. 

In June 2010, Adams was installing a Brock grain dryer in Camden. The grain 

dryer had previously been transported to the site by IFS. During the installation process, 

the grain dryer fell off the jacks and onto Adams, causing severe and permanent injuries. 

In 2011, Adams filed a complaint against Brock alleging that it negligently failed 

to provide its custom jacks to IFS. In 2013, Brock filed a motion for summary judgment, 

and Adams responded and filed a cross-motion for partial summary judgment on the 

issue of duty. Brock responded and replied to Adams’s cross-motion for summary 

judgment, and Adams replied. On April 4, 2014, following a hearing, the trial court 
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granted Adams’s motion for partial summary judgment, concluding that Brock owed 

Adams a duty of reasonable care. The trial court also concluded there were no genuine 

issues of material fact and granted Brock’s motion for summary judgment. Adams filed a 

motion to correct error, which the trial court denied. Adams now appeals.

Analysis

Adams argues that the trial court erroneously granted Brock’s motion for summary 

judgment. “We review an appeal of a trial court’s ruling on a motion for summary 

judgment using the same standard applicable to the trial court.” Perdue v. Gargano, 964 

N.E.2d 825, 831 (Ind. 2012). “Therefore, summary judgment is appropriate only if the 

designated evidence reveals ‘no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving 

party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.’” Id. (quoting Ind. Trial Rule 56(C)). 

Our review of summary judgment is limited to evidence designated to the trial court. Id.

(citing T.R. 56(H)). All facts and reasonable inferences drawn from the evidence 

designated by the parties are construed in a light most favorable to the non-moving party, 

and we do not defer to the trial court’s legal determinations. Id. 

To recover on a common law negligence claim, Adams was required to establish a 

duty on the part of Brock to conform its conduct to a standard of care arising out of its 

relationship with him, a failure on the part of Brock to conform its conduct to the 

requisite standard of care, and an injury to Adams that was proximately caused by the 

breach. See Vaughn v. Daniels Co. (W. Virginia), 841 N.E.2d 1133, 1143 (Ind. 2006). 

“Summary judgment is appropriate when the undisputed material evidence negates one 

element of a claim.” Estate of Mintz v. Connecticut Gen. Life Ins. Co., 905 N.E.2d 994, 
4

998 (Ind. 2009). Here, Adams moved for and was granted partial summary judgment on 

the basis that Brock owed him a duty of care. That issue is not challenged on appeal. 

Rather, the issue is whether Brock breached its duty to Adams by not providing custom 

jacks for IFS to use during installation, proximately causing Adams’s injuries. 

Adams argues that the designated evidence established that the custom jacks were 

not provided to Adams or IFS at the time of installation. This, however, does not create a 

genuine issue of material fact for trial because it was undisputed that the custom jacks 

would be provided only if Brock delivered the grain dryer and IFS chose to transport the 

grain dryer itself. 

IFS’s owner and president, Daniel Trost, testified in a deposition that in June 

2010, Brock could deliver the grain dryer or IFS could transport it to the site. If Brock 

delivered the grain dryer, Brock provided its custom jacks but, if IFS transported the 

grain dryer, its own jacks were used. Trost stated that the decision whether to have Brock 

deliver a grain dryer was based on the size of the grain dryer and that IFS always 

transported grain dryers the same size as or smaller than the one that injured Adams to 

the site itself. Trost stated that IFS delivered the grain dryer that day because “[w]e had 

the ability, we had the equipment, and we’d figured from the cost based on us delivering

it from the store. It costs us less than it does to have Brock deliver it.” App. p. 49. A 

Brock representative testified that it is the dealer’s choice whether the dealer will 

transport a grain dryer or whether Brock will deliver it. Thus, the custom jacks were 

available if IFS chose to have Brock deliver the grain dryer.
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Although it is disputed whether Brock indicated that it would make the custom 

jacks available to installers, this is not an issue of material dispute because it does not 

bear on the ultimate resolution of a relevant issue. See Bushong v. Williamson, 790 

N.E.2d 467, 474 (Ind. 2003) (“A factual issue is material for the purposes of Trial Rule 

56(C) if it bears on the ultimate resolution of a relevant issue.”). Quite simply, it was 

undisputed that the custom jacks would not be provided by Brock that day. In fact, Trost 

testified that IFS knew the custom jacks would not be provided that day. See App. p. 50. 

We are also unpersuaded that the distinction between delivery and installation creates 

genuine issue of material fact for trial. It is undisputed that the custom jacks were 

available only if Brock delivered the grain dryer, that IFS chose to transport the grain 

dryer itself, and that IFS knew the custom jacks would not be available on the day of the 

accident. This undisputed evidence leads to the single conclusion that Brock did not 

breach its duty to Adams. See Kroger Co. v. Plonski, 930 N.E.2d 1, 9 (Ind. 2010) (“Only 

where the facts are undisputed and lead to but a single inference or conclusion may the 

court as a matter of law determine whether a breach of duty has occurred.”). The trial 

court properly granted Brock’s motion for summary judgment.

Conclusion

Because there are no genuine issues of material fact for trial, the trial court 

properly granted summary judgment for Brock. We affirm.

Affirmed.

BRADFORD, J., and BROWN, J., concur.