Filed 3/17/22 Herriott v. Wershoven CA2/2

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions 

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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION TWO

PAULA HERRIOTT,

Plaintiff and Appellant,

v.

MARK WERSHOVEN et al.,

Defendants and 

Respondents.

 B312079

 (Los Angeles County

 Super. Ct. No. 

 20TRRO00821)

APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of Los 

Angeles County, Glenda Veasey, Commissioner. Affirmed.

Paula Herriott, in pro. per., for Plaintiff and Appellant. 

No appearance for Defendants and Respondents. 
2

* * * * * *

Paula Herriott (Paula)1 appeals from the trial court’s ruling

denying her applications for civil harassment restraining orders 

against her uncle and two neighbors. The trial court’s ruling was 

correct, so we affirm.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

I. Facts

Paula, her mother, and her adult sister live in two 

neighboring apartment buildings in Hermosa Beach. 

Both buildings are owned by a trust created by Paula’s 

now-deceased father. The current trustee is Paula’s uncle, 

Parker Herriott (Parker).

The administration of the trust is currently in litigation 

before the probate court. At some point in the past, Paula and 

her mother started collecting rent from the buildings’ other 

tenants, and keeping that money for themselves rather than 

handing it over to the trustee. The probate court enjoined 

Paula’s mother from engaging in such behavior.

Parker asked Mark Wershoven (Wershoven) and Laurie 

Thibodeoux (Thibodeoux) to do repairs for the buildings’ tenants 

as well as to keep an eye on the buildings. Wershoven and 

Thibodeoux, who are dating, were Paula’s upstairs neighbors. In 

July 2020, Paula asked Wershoven to repair a plumbing issue in 

her apartment; Thibodeoux accompanied Wershoven while he did 

the repairs. In August 2020, an unknown person turned down 

the thermostat for the hot water heater for Paula’s building, and 

Paula and her mother suspected it was Wershoven. In 

1 Because some of the individuals involved in this case share 

the same surname, we will use their first names; we mean no 

disrespect. 
3

September 2020, Wershoven and Thibodeoux told Parker that 

Paula’s mother was having awnings installed; Parker showed up 

to stop the installation because it was without his permission. In 

October 2020, Wershoven and Thibodeoux told Parker that Paula 

had hired tree trimmers; Parker showed up to stop the trimming 

because, again, it was without his permission. 

II. Procedural Background

In December 2020, Paula filed an application for a civil 

harassment restraining order against Wershoven. She 

subsequently filed separate applications for similar orders 

against Thibodeoux and Parker. All three applications were 

originally filed by Paula’s mother, but were rejected for filing 

because Paula’s mother has been deemed a vexatious litigant. 

Paula thereafter filed the exact same applications herself. The 

trial court consolidated all three requests for hearing. In her 

application for an order against Wershoven,2 Paula complains 

that Wershoven, Thibodeoux, and Parker engaged in 

“harassment” because (1) Thibodeoux “trespassed” when she 

came with Wershoven to fix the plumbing problem in her 

apartment; (2) Wershoven and Thibodeoux “touched” the water 

heater “applicance[] without consent”; (3) Wershoven and 

Thibodeoux told Parker about Paula’s and her mother’s efforts to 

install an awning and trim trees because they were “hired to spy 

on [Paula’s] family” and likely installed a camera that could look 

across the way into Paula’s mother’s apartment; and (4) 

Wershoven and Thibodeoux tampered with Paula’s car. 

On February 26, 2021, the trial court held a hearing on 

Paula’s applications. After being sworn in, Paula reaffirmed the 

2 On appeal, Paula did not include the applications 

pertaining to Thibodeoux or Parker.
4

contents of her application. The trial court asked Paula if she 

had any evidence to offer from a disinterested witness regarding 

the tampering with cars that she alleged; Paula said she did not. 

Paula provided no evidence that Wershoven, Thibodeoux, or 

Parker had been the person who touched the water heater. And 

the court found that Paula’s allegations regarding Thibodeoux 

accompanying Wershoven to conduct repairs and her allegations 

that Wershoven and Thibodeoux were reporting what they saw to 

Parker did not constitute “harassment” because the latter acts 

had a legitimate purpose—namely, that Parker, as the trustee 

over the buildings, has the duty to “manag[e] the property that 

he’s the trustee of” and the “absolute right” to “keep an eye out” 

on that property. Accordingly, the court found that Paula “did 

not sustain the applicable burden of proof” to obtain civil 

harassment restraining orders. 

Paula filed this timely appeal. 

DISCUSSION

Paula argues that the trial court erred in denying her 

applications for civil harassment restraining orders. A trial court 

may issue a civil harassment restraining order only upon a 

finding, by clear and convincing evidence, of “harassment”—that 

is, upon a finding of “unlawful violence, a credible threat of 

violence, or a knowing and willful course of conduct directed at a 

specific person that seriously alarms, annoys, or harasses the 

person, and that serves no legitimate purpose.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 

527.6, subds. (a)(1), (b)(3), & (i), italics added.) We review an 

order denying a restraining order for abuse of discretion 

(Gonzalez v. Munoz (2007) 156 Cal.App.4th 413, 420), and any 

subsidiary factual findings for substantial evidence (Harris v. 

Stampolis (2016) 248 Cal.App.4th 484, 497). Where, as here, the 
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trial court finds that the party seeking a restraining order did not 

carry her burden of proof, “‘the question for [us] becomes whether 

the evidence compels a finding in favor of [that party] as a matter 

of law.’” (Juen v. Alain Pinel Realtors, Inc. (2019) 32 Cal.App.5th 

972, 978-979.)

We conclude that the evidence presented does not compel a 

finding that Paula is entitled to civil harassment restraining 

orders against Parker, Wershoven, and Thibodeoux as a matter of 

law. Paula frankly admitted that she had no evidence from a 

disinterested party that any of these three individuals had 

vandalized any cars; and the trial court had ample basis to 

disbelieve any evidence from Paula or her mother given that they 

were embroiled in “a big conflict . . . in probate court” over 

management of the property. Paula never presented anything 

beyond speculation that Wershoven or Thibodeoux had adjusted 

the thermostat on the heater. (See Wise v. DLA Piper LLP (US)

(2013) 220 Cal.App.4th 1180, 1188 [“speculation is not 

evidence”].) Thibodeoux’s act of accompanying Wershoven while 

he did repairs was a one-time incident that was not a willful 

course of conduct that could seriously alarm, annoy or harass 

Paula. And Parker’s conduct in stopping unauthorized activity 

on the property he was charged with overseeing, and 

Wershoven’s and Thibodeoux’s conduct in acting as Parker’s eyes 

and ears in doing so, are undoubtedly a “legitimate purpose”; as 

such, their conduct falls outside the definition of “harassment.” 

(Code Civ. Proc., § 527.6, subd. (b)(3); Yost v. Forestiere (2020) 51 

Cal.App.5th 509, 521-522.)

Paula responds with what boils down to four arguments.

First, she challenges the factual support for the trial court’s 

findings. Specifically, she asserts that she suffered “harassment” 
6

because there was evidence of surveillance and damage to the 

cars. In so asserting, she is asking us to reweigh the trial court’s 

factual findings, including its credibility findings. This we may 

not do. (Curcio v. Pels (2020) 47 Cal.App.5th 1, 12 [in reviewing 

trial court’s order on application for restraining order, “[w]e do 

not determine credibility or reweigh the evidence”].) Further, she 

argues that Parker’s conduct violated his duties as trustee over 

the property. But whether Parker adhered to those duties is a 

question for the probate court; it is not a basis for granting a civil 

harassment restraining order because, for purposes of Paula’s 

applications, a trial court “may enjoin only ‘harassment’ as 

defined” (Byers v. Cathcart (1997) 57 Cal.App.4th 805, 812), and 

until the probate court determines that Parker has violated his 

duties, Parker’s legitimate interest in acting as trustee puts his 

conduct squarely outside of the definition of “harassment.”

Second, Paula contends that the trial court denied her due 

process because it refused to hear her testimony and found her 

not to be credible. This contention is unsupported by the record. 

The trial court asked Paula to reaffirm the statements in her 

application while under oath, and proceeded to ask her for 

evidence in support of some of those statements. Thus, this case 

is unlike Nora v. Kaddo (2004) 116 Cal.App.4th 1026, cited by 

Paula, where the trial court insisted upon deciding the motion 

“on the papers” and refused to entertain any testimony or other 

evidence. (Id. at pp. 1028-1029.) As noted above, we may not 

gainsay the trial court’s implicit credibility finding. 

Third, Paula argues that the trial court is biased against 

her. We discern no bias. Contrary to what Paula suggests, the 

trial court acted appropriately in taking judicial notice of the 

ongoing probate proceedings to understand how Paula’s 
7

application fit into those proceedings. (Evid. Code, § 452, subd. 

(d).) The court’s efforts to keep Paula focused on the factual 

issues on which her applications turn was also appropriate, even 

if the court was very direct with Paula in those efforts. It is well 

settled that judicial conduct becomes impermissible bias only 

when it is “‘“so prejudicial that it denie[s] [a party] a fair, as 

opposed to a perfect”’” hearing (Arave v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, 

Fenner & Smith, Inc. (2018) 19 Cal.App.5th 525, 536-537); 

“expressions of impatience, dissatisfaction, annoyance, and even 

anger” are not enough (Liteky v. United States (1994) 510 U.S. 

540, 555-556). The trial court’s efforts in this case came nowhere 

near the line of impermissible bias. And Paula’s dissatisfaction 

with the substance of the court’s rulings also does not constitute 

bias. (People v. Guerra (2006) 37 Cal. 4th 1067, 1112, overruled 

on another ground in People v. Rundle (2008) 43 Cal.4th 76, 151.) 

Lastly, Paula complains that the trial court did not address 

her suspicion that Parker had somehow engaged in a “possible 

crime” by duping the court clerk into thinking that Paula was a 

vexatious litigant rather than her mother. Although the trial 

court acknowledged that the court clerk initially labored under 

the mistaken belief that Paula was a vexatious litigant, the clerk 

realized the mistake and allowed Paula to file the applications. 

What is more, the court clerk’s momentary mistake could not 

possibly have any effect on the trial court’s ruling on the merits. 
8

DISPOSITION

The order is affirmed. 

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS.

______________________, J.

HOFFSTADT

We concur:

_________________________, P. J.

LUI

_________________________, J.

ASHMANN-GERST