14-4612 Jiang v. Lynch BIA A200 601 917 

### UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS **FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT** 

## SUMMARY ORDER

**RULINGS BY SUMMARY ORDER DO NOT HAVE PRECEDENTIAL EFFECT. CITATION TO A SUMMARY ORDER FILED**  **ON OR AFTER JANUARY 1, 2007, IS PERMITTED AND IS GOVERNED BY FEDERAL RULE OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE 32.1 AND THIS COURT**  = **S LOCAL RULE 32.1.1. WHEN CITING A SUMMARY ORDER IN A DOCUMENT FILED**  **WITH THIS**  **COURT, A**  **PARTY MUST**  **CITE EITHER**  **THE FEDERAL**  **APPENDIX OR**  **AN ELECTRONIC**  **DATABASE (WITH THE NOTATION “SUMMARY ORDER”). A PARTY CITING TO A SUMMARY ORDER MUST SERVE A COPY**  **OF IT ON ANY PARTY NOT REPRESENTED BY COUNSEL. At a stated term of the United States Court of Appeals for**  1 **the Second Circuit, held at the Thurgood Marshall United States** 2 **Courthouse, 40 Foley Square, in the City of New York, on the** 3 **22 nd**  **day of August, two thousand sixteen.** 4 5 **PRESENT:** 6 **JOHN M. WALKER, JR.,** 7 **DENNIS JACOBS,** 8 **CHRISTOPHER F. DRONEY,** 9 Circuit Judges. 10

**_____________________________________** 11 12 **LING LING JIANG,** 13 Petitioner **,** 14 15 **v. 14-4612** 16 **NAC** 17 **LORETTA E. LYNCH, UNITED STATES** 18 **ATTORNEY GENERAL,** 19 Respondent **.** 20

**_____________________________________** 21 22 **FOR PETITIONER:** Mona Liza Fabular Lao, New York, New 23 York. 24 25 **FOR RESPONDENT:** Benjamin C. Mizer, Principal Deputy 26 Assistant Attorney General; 27 Jennifer P. Levings, Senior 28 Litigation Counsel; Jennifer R. 29 Khouri, Trial Attorney, Office of 302 Immigration Litigation, United 1 States Department of Justice, 2 Washington, D.C. 3 4 UPON DUE CONSIDERATION of this petition for review of a 5 Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) decision, it is hereby 6 ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED that the petition for review is 7

DENIED. 8 Petitioner Ling Ling Jiang, a nativ e and citizen of the 9 People’s Republic of China, seeks review of a November 20, 2014, 10 decision of the BIA denying her motion to reopen. In re Ling 11 Ling Jiang, No. A200 601 917 (B.I.A. Nov. 20, 2014). We assume 12 the parties’ familiarity with the underlying facts and 13 procedural history in this case. 14 “We review the denial of motions to reopen immigration 15 proceedings for abuse of discretion, mindful that motions to 16 reopen ‘are disfavored.’” Ali v. Gonzales , 448 F.3d 515, 517 17 (2d Cir. 2006) (quoting INS v. Doherty , 502 U.S. 314, 323 18 (1992)). A movant’s failure to establish a prima facie case 19 for the underlying substantive relief sought is a proper basis 20 for declining to reopen. See INS v. Abudu , 485 U.S. 94, 104 21 (1988). 223 The BIA did not abuse its discretion. The BIA reasonably 1 gave diminished weight to the unsworn letters from Jiang’s 2

father and uncle and to the unsigned and unauthenticated village 3 committee announcement. See Y.C. v. Holder , 741 F.3d 324, 334 4 (2d Cir. 2013) (deferring to agency’s decision to afford little 5 weight to letter stating that Chinese authorities were looking 6 for petitioner because the letter was unsworn and from an 7 interested witness); Xiao Ji Chen v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice , 471 8 F.3d 315, 342 (2d Cir. 2006) (the weight accorded to documentary 9 evidence is largely within agency’s discretion); In re H-L-H10

& Z-Y-Z- , 25 I. & N. Dec. 209, 215 (BIA 2010) (giving diminished 11 weight to letters from relatives because they were from 12 interested witnesses not subject to cross-examination), rev’d 13 on other grounds by Hui Lin Huang v. Holder , 677 F.3d 130 (2d 14 Cir. 2012). Further, the village committee notice is 15 handwritten, it is not signed by any official, and it is unclear 16 why or how a notary public (as opposed to the issuing office 17 or officer) would be able to authenticate that document after 18 the fact. Accordingly, Jiang failed to sustain her burden of 19 demonstrating that she would be individually targeted because 204 of her religion. See 8 C.F.R. § 1208.13(b)(2)(iii); Hongsheng 1 Leng v. Mukasey , 528 F.3d 135, 142-43 (2d Cir. 2008). 2 Absent reliable evidence that she would be singled out for 3 persecution, Jiang had to demonstrate a pattern or practice of 4 persecution of Christians in China. 8 C.F.R. 5 § 1208.13(b)(2)(iii). The remaining country conditions 6 evidence did not establish that Jiang’s alleged fear was 7 objectively reasonable. Ramsameachire v. Ashcroft , 357 F.3d 8 169, 178 (2d Cir. 2004) (setting forth requirement that fear 9 be objectively reasonable). The country conditions reports 10 reflected a large number of Christians practicing in China and 11 that the treatment of those practitioners varies by region. 12 Accordingly, the agency did not err in determining that Jiang 13 failed to demonstrate systemic or pervasive persecution of 14 similarly situated Christians sufficient to demonstrate a 15 pattern or practice of persecution in China. See 8 C.F.R. 16 § 1208.13(b)(2)(iii); Hongsheng Leng , 528 F.3d at 142-43; In 17

re A-M- , 23 I. & N. Dec. 737, 741 (BIA 2005). 18 Because Jiang failed to demonstrate her prima facie 19 eligibility for relief, the BIA did not abuse its discretion 20 in denying her motion to reopen. See Abudu , 485 U.S. at 104. 215 For the foregoing reasons, the petition for review is 1 DENIED. As we have completed our rev iew, any stay of removal 2 that the Court previously granted in this petition is VACATED, 3 and any pending motion for a stay of removal in this petition 4 is DISMISSED as moot. Any pending request for oral argument 5 in this petition is DENIED in accordance with Federal Rule of 6 Appellate Procedure 34(a)(2), and S econd Circuit Local Rule 7 34.1(b). 8

FOR THE COURT: 9 Catherine O’Hagan Wolfe, Clerk 10