NOTICE: NOT FOR OFFICIAL PUBLICATION.

UNDER ARIZONA RULE OF THE SUPREME COURT 111(c), THIS DECISION IS NOT PRECEDENTIAL

AND MAY BE CITED ONLY AS AUTHORIZED BY RULE.

IN THE

ARIZONA COURT OF APPEALS

DIVISION ONE

KRISTI LATTIN, Plaintiff/Appellant,

v.

SHAMROCK MATERIALS, LLC, et al., Defendants/Appellees.

No. 1 CA-CV 22-0639

Appeal from the Superior Court in Maricopa County

No. CV2017-011398

The Honorable Mary C. Cronin, Judge Pro Tempore

The Honorable Lindsay Abramson, Judge Pro Tempore (retired)

AFFIRMED

COUNSEL

Brier, Irish & Hubbard P.L.C., Phoenix

By Teresa H. Foster

Counsel for Plaintiff/Appellant

Sacks Tierney P.A., Scottsdale

By Patrick J. Van Zanen & Michael L. Kitchen

Counsel for Defendants/Appellees

FILED 7-20-2023
LATTIN v. SHAMROCK, et al.

Decision of the Court

2

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Judge Paul J. McMurdie delivered the Court’s decision, in which Presiding 

Judge D. Steven Williams and Judge Samuel A. Thumma joined.

M c M U R D I E, Judge:

¶1 Kristi Lattin appeals from a judgment awarding Shamrock 

Materials, LLC (“Shamrock”) attorney’s fees and costs against the marital 

community property. We affirm because the community funded the 

lawsuit at issue, Lattin pursued the suit for the community’s benefit, and 

the fees were reasonable.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

¶2 In 2005, Lattin, her husband, Robert DeRuiter, and two other

married couples “met on approximately 3 occasions” to discuss the need 

for shipping in the concrete industry and plan the formation of a business 

together. The three wives formed Shamrock, a concrete shipping business.

The couples named the three wives as the members “to take advantage of 

State and Federal disadvantaged business opportunities, like Woman 

Owned Business.” Lattin then decided she preferred to have the option to 

later become a member rather than retain membership, and she and the 

other members signed a profit participation agreement (“Agreement”)

granting her that option. Lattin and the other women signed the Agreement 

as “married women dealing with their sole and separate property.”

¶3 The business partners ultimately had a falling out, and in

2017, Lattin sued Shamrock. But Lattin lost in the superior court and on 

appeal. See generally Lattin v. Shamrock Materials LLC, No. 1 CA-CV 19-0761, 

2020 WL 6140626 (Ariz. App. Oct. 20, 2020) (mem. decision). The judgment 

in that proceeding awarded Shamrock its costs and attorney’s fees under 

the Agreement. Shamrock then executed on the judgment by serving a writ 

of garnishment on the bank managing DeRuiter and Lattin’s joint bank 

account. Lattin challenged the garnishment, arguing that Shamrock needed 

to join DeRuiter in the suit to collect against the marital community. See 

A.R.S. § 25-215(D) (“In an action on [a community] debt or obligation, the 

spouses shall be sued jointly.”). On that basis, the superior court quashed 

the garnishment, and this court affirmed. Lattin v. Shamrock Materials LLC

(Lattin II), No. 1 CA-CV 20-0245, 2021 WL 58137, at *1, ¶ 1 (Ariz. App. Jan. 
LATTIN v. SHAMROCK, et al.

Decision of the Court

3

7, 2021) (mem. decision). But the Arizona Supreme Court reversed. Lattin v.

Shamrock Materials, LLC (Lattin III), 252 Ariz. 352, 353, ¶ 1 (2022).

¶4 The supreme court acknowledged that under A.R.S. 

§ 25-215(D), “a party seeking damages from community assets for an 

unpaid debt or breach of an obligation must join both spouses when 

asserting a cause of action.” Lattin III, 252 Ariz. at 355, ¶ 10. But it concluded 

that “a request for attorney fees and costs after successfully defending a 

lawsuit is not itself a cause of action.” Id. at 355, ¶ 12. Thus, the court held,

“neither § 25-215(D) nor due process requires a defendant seeking an award 

of attorney fees and costs from a married plaintiff to join the plaintiff’s 

spouse in the lawsuit to entitle it to later execute a judgment against 

community assets.” Id. at 356, ¶ 15. The court remanded the case for the 

superior court to “rule on Lattin’s argument that the judgment is her sole 

and separate obligation,” ordering that her husband may intervene “to 

contest the judgment’s character as a community obligation.” Id. at 356, 

¶ 16.

¶5 On remand, Lattin’s husband intervened and filed an 

affidavit. The superior court heard oral argument on whether the judgment 

is Lattin’s “sole and separate obligation.” Lattin did not request an 

evidentiary hearing or suggest she had more evidence beyond her 

husband’s affidavit. The court ruled that “the judgment awarding 

attorney’s fees and costs is a community obligation and not a separate 

obligation.” 

¶6 Lattin moved for reconsideration, and the court ordered 

briefing and held a second oral argument. On the record presented, the 

court determined that Lattin had no “sole and separate” assets other than 

her membership interest in Shamrock. Though Lattin had sued as an 

individual, “the lawsuit was funded by the community.” Finally, the court 

noted that “just because you say something [is] sole and separate property 

does not make it sole and separate property.”

¶7 Because the suit was funded by the community and “pursued 

to the benefit of the community,” the court ruled that “the attorney’s fees 

award . . . is an obligation of the marital community.” The court entered a 
LATTIN v. SHAMROCK, et al.

Decision of the Court

4

signed judgment reaffirming the attorney’s fees judgment subject to the 

supreme court remand.1

¶8 Lattin appealed the attorney’s fees judgment. We have 

jurisdiction under A.R.S. § 12-2101(A)(1).

DISCUSSION

A. We Review the Characterization of a Debt De Novo.

¶9 The parties disagree on how to frame the central issue, urging

us to adopt different review standards.

¶10 Lattin contends that this case is about distinguishing “sole 

and separate” property from community property. She cites a dissolution 

case, identifying that we review de novo the superior court’s community 

property characterization. See In re Marriage of Foster, 240 Ariz. 99, 101, ¶ 5 

(App. 2016). Thus, Lattin argues the superior court’s ruling that the 

judgment obligation applies to the community is an issue subject to de novo

review.

¶11 Shamrock counters that “the key inquiry is whether, as a 

matter of fact, Appellant pursued the litigation for and on behalf of her 

marital community.” Claiming this determination is a factual finding, 

Shamrock argues that our review is whether the superior court’s findings 

are clearly erroneous. Shamrock also distinguishes this case from Foster 

because this case is not a matter of equity arising from the family court.

¶12 We determine that de novo review is appropriate. The superior 

court was commanded to “rule on Lattin’s argument that the judgment is 

her sole and separate obligation.” Lattin III, 252 Ariz. at 356, ¶ 16. While we 

must defer to findings of fact made by the superior court, a ruling on the 

character of a debt obligation is a mixed question of fact and law. See Calisi 

v. Unified Fin. Servs., LLC, 232 Ariz. 103, 106, ¶ 13 (App. 2013) (citing Enter.

Leasing Co. of Phoenix v. Ehmke, 197 Ariz. 144, 148, ¶ 11 (App. 1999)) (For 

mixed questions, we accept the superior court’s findings of fact unless they 

are clearly erroneous, but we review conclusions of law de novo.). And the 

1 While other proceedings remained pending, the judgment stated 

there was “no just reason for delay” but cited Arizona Rule of Civil 

Procedure 54(c) rather than 54(b). Because Rule 54(b) is the appropriate

vehicle to appeal, and the correct language was present, we overlook the 

typographical error between (b) and (c) and exercise appellate jurisdiction.
LATTIN v. SHAMROCK, et al.

Decision of the Court

5

superior court received no testimony on which it based its decision and 

made no credibility determinations. The superior court’s conclusion that it 

was a community obligation is subject to de novo review.

B. Lattin’s Attorney’s Fees Obligation Is a Community Obligation 

Because the Community Funded the Litigation to Benefit the 

Community.

¶13 In Arizona, a creditor may not garnish community property 

for separate debts incurred during the marriage. A.R.S. § 25-215(A)–(B); see 

also Schilling v. Embree, 118 Ariz. 236, 238–39 (App. 1977). “However, when

. . . only one spouse enters into a debt-creating agreement, it does not 

necessarily follow that the debt is the separate obligation of that spouse.” 

Lorenz-Auxier Fin. Grp. v. Bidewell, 160 Ariz. 218, 220 (App. 1989).

¶14 “[S]pouses have equal management, control and disposition 

rights over their community property and have equal power to bind the 

community.” A.R.S. § 25-214(B) (emphasis added). As A.R.S. § 25-215(D) 

elaborates, “either spouse may contract debts and otherwise act for the 

benefit of the community,” creating a community debt. Thus, though a 

married person can incur a separate obligation, “debts incurred during 

marriage are presumed to be community debts.” Lorenz-Auxier Fin. Grp., 

160 Ariz. at 220 (citing Morgan v. Bruce, 76 Ariz. 121 (1953)). Here, the 

burden was on Lattin and her husband to prove by clear and convincing 

evidence that the debt was not a community obligation. Id.

¶15 Lattin failed to carry her burden. She repeatedly states that 

she signed the Agreement as “a married woman dealing with her sole and 

separate property.” But this fact is not dispositive. If it were, the supreme 

court would have ruled on that basis in its decision. See Lattin III, 252 Ariz. 

352. Instead, it remanded for the superior court to allow Lattin and her 

husband to present evidence and argue whether the debt was Lattin’s sole 

and separate obligation. Id. at 356, ¶ 16.

¶16 Lattin did not request an evidentiary hearing nor suggest that 

she had other evidence to support her position. Her husband’s affidavit was 

the only new evidence provided to the superior court on remand. Though 

his affidavit affirmed Lattin’s claim that her interest in the LLC was her sole 

and separate property, it did not establish or allege that the litigation was 

separate. Instead, his affidavit stated, “[t]he only sole and separate property 

owned by my spouse is her ownership interest in [Shamrock].” His 

statement does not support the argument that the litigation was pursued as 

a sole and separate matter. It does, however, support the superior court’s 
LATTIN v. SHAMROCK, et al.

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conclusion that had Lattin prevailed, a monetary award would have 

benefitted the community. It likewise supports Shamrock’s argument that 

the community funded the litigation.

¶17 Lattin highlights Shamrock’s statement that it planned to add 

her husband as a necessary party, urging that this was a tacit admission that 

Shamrock could not otherwise recover from the community property. But 

the supreme court’s ruling disposed of this argument. Lattin’s husband did 

not need to be added to recover attorney’s fees from the community 

because a request for attorney’s fees “is not itself a cause of action.” Lattin

III, 252 Ariz. at 355, ¶ 12.

¶18 Lattin provides little legal support that her debt is not a 

community debt. She cites Bourne v. Lord as an example in which 

community funds were spent on separate property, but the property did 

not become a community asset. 19 Ariz. App. 228 (1973). But Bourne does 

not apply. Bourne addressed the characterization of an asset as community 

or separate, see id. at 229, while the analysis here is not centered on the 

asset’s character. No one disputes that Lattin’s interest under the 

Agreement is her sole and separate property. Instead, at issue is the nature 

of a debt arising from litigation pursued by one spouse. And, as explained, 

spouses individually have the power to bind the community. See A.R.S. 

§§ 25-214, 25-215(D).

¶19 On the other hand, Shamrock identifies that “[d]ebt incurred 

by one spouse while acting for the benefit of the marital community is a 

community obligation whether or not the other spouse approves it.”

Lorenz-Auxier Fin. Grp., 160 Ariz. at 220. Lattin presented no evidence that 

she pursued the litigation with separate funds or that her success would 

have only benefited her separately rather than the community. As the 

superior court noted, the evidence suggests “the community was clearly 

benefiting or would have benefited had they prevailed in this lawsuit.” 

Thus, Lattin’s accrued attorney’s fees are a community debt because the 

debt arose from “one spouse . . . acting for the benefit of the marital 

community.” Id. at 220.

ATTORNEY’S FEES AND COSTS

¶20 Both parties request costs and an award of attorney’s fees

under the Agreement and A.R.S. § 12-341.01. The Agreement requires a fee 

award for the party prevailing in “any legal proceedings for the 

enforcement of [the] Agreement.” As the prevailing party, we award 
LATTIN v. SHAMROCK, et al.

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7

reasonable attorney’s fees and taxable costs to Shamrock upon compliance 

with ARCAP 21.

CONCLUSION

¶21 We affirm.