Filed 7/26/22 In re G.S. CA2/4

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for 

publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for 

publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF 

CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION FOUR

In re G.S., A Person Coming Under 

Juvenile Court Law.

 B314378

 (Los Angeles County

 Super. Ct. No. 20CCJP03271)

LOS ANGELES COUNTY 

DEPARTMENT OF CHILDREN 

AND FAMILY SERVICES,

Plaintiff and Respondent,

v.

MARISA M.,

Defendant and Appellant.

APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of Los 

Angeles County, Nichelle L. Blackwell, Judge Pro Tempore. 

Affirmed.
2

Emery El Habiby, under appointment by the Court of 

Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.

Office of the County Counsel, Rodrigo A. Castro-Silva, 

County Counsel, Kim Nemoy, Assistant County Counsel, 

and Brian Mahler, Deputy County Counsel, for Plaintiff and 

Respondent.

_________________________________________________

INTRODUCTION

Appellant Marisa M. appeals from the juvenile court’s 

order terminating her parental rights to her daughter G.S. 

(born in June 2020). G.S.’s alleged father, Harold S. (Alleged 

Father), is not a party to this appeal; his whereabouts and 

contact information remained unknown throughout the 

proceedings below, despite diligent efforts to locate him by 

the Los Angeles County Department of Children and Family 

Services (DCFS). Appellant attested to DCFS and the 

juvenile court that she and Alleged Father had no Indian 

ancestry, and denied that G.S. was or might have been an 

Indian child. Nevertheless, on appeal, appellant contends

DCFS and the court prejudicially failed to comply with the 

inquiry requirements of state law related to the Indian Child 

Welfare Act (ICWA), because DCFS failed to ask unspecified 

extended family members whether -- contrary to appellant’s 

own representations -- appellant or Alleged Father had 

Indian ancestry. Appellant does not claim the record 

contains any information suggesting a reason to believe G.S. 

may be an Indian child. Nor does appellant proffer any such 
3

information that might be forthcoming were we to order a 

remand, at the cost of further delaying permanence and 

stability for the child. We conclude any error was harmless 

under the reason-to-believe rule adopted by our colleagues in 

Division Two,for reasons we find persuasive, in In re Dezi C.

(2022) 79 Cal.App.5th 769 (Dezi C.). Accordingly, we affirm.

PROCEEDINGS BELOW

On June 9, 2020, DCFS received a child welfare 

referral alleging appellant neglected her newborn daughter

G.S., who had tested positive for methamphetamine and 

amphetamine at birth. The same day, a social worker spoke 

with both appellant and G.H., G.S.’s maternal grandmother 

(Grandmother). Appellant was living with Grandmother, 

whom she identified as her support in times of need. 

Appellant told the social worker that Alleged Father, whom 

she identified as G.S.’s biological father, was homeless, 

unemployed, and “in and out of jail.” Subsequently, 

appellant told DCFS she had no contact information for 

Alleged Father or his relatives. DCFS exercised due 

diligence in attempting to locate Alleged Father, without 

success. 

On June 17, 2020, a social worker phoned both 

Sebastian C., G.S.’s maternal uncle (Uncle), and Veronica C.,

G.S.’s maternal great-aunt (Great-Aunt), each of whom 

expressed willingness to care for G.S. temporarily. On June 

18, DCFS filed a petition under Welfare and Institutions 

Code section 300, subdivision (b)(1), containing two counts 
4

based on allegations that appellant’s substance abuse

endangered G.S.1

On June 23, 2020, appellant filed an ICWA-020 form 

declaring, under penalty of perjury,“I have no Indian 

ancestry as far as I know.” By declining to check the

corresponding box on the form, appellant denied that “[t]he 

child is or may be a member of, or eligible for membership 

in, a federally recognized Indian tribe.”2

At the detention hearing,the juvenile court addressed 

appellant as follows: “In looking at the mother’s [ICWA-020 

form], which is signed under penalty of perjury, you indicate 

that you have no Native American Indian heritage, as far as 

you know. [¶] Is that correct, ma’am?” Appellant confirmed, 

“Yes.” The court proceeded to ask appellant if she knew 

whether Alleged Father had Indian heritage. Appellant

responded, “He does not.” In light of appellant’s denials of 

Indian ancestry, the court found it had no reason to know 

G.S. was an Indian child, and ICWA did not apply. 

At the conclusion of the detention hearing, the court 

ordered G.S. detained from appellant and placed in foster 

1 Undesignated statutory references are to the Welfare and 

Institutions Code.

2 In the same manner, appellant denied the following 

statements: (1) “I am or may be a member of, or eligible for 

membership in, a federally recognized Indian tribe”; (2) “I may 

have Indian ancestry”; and (3) “One or more of my parents, 

grandparents, or other lineal ancestors is or was a member of a 

federally recognized tribe.” 
5

care. In August 2020, the court sustained the petition on 

both counts. In January 2021, G.S. was placed with GreatAunt and her husband. In April 2021, the court terminated

appellant’s reunification services, citing appellant’s 

noncompliance. In August 2021, at a contested permanency 

hearing, the court terminated appellant’s and Alleged 

Father’s parental rights and selected adoption as G.S.’s 

permanent plan, designating Great-Aunt and her husband 

as the prospective adoptive parents. Appellant timely 

appealed. 

DISCUSSION

Appellant contends DCFS and the juvenile court

prejudicially failed to comply with the inquiry requirements 

of state law related to ICWA, because DCFS failed to ask 

unspecified extended family members whether appellant or 

Alleged Father had Indian ancestry. We conclude any error

was harmless.

A. Inquiry Error

ICWA defines “‘Indian child’” to mean any unmarried 

minor who “is either (a) a member of an Indian tribe or (b) is 

eligible for membership in an Indian tribe and is the 

biological child of a member of an Indian tribe.” (25 U.S.C. 

§ 1903, subd. (4); see also § 224.1, subd. (a).) “‘“ICWA itself 

does not impose a duty on courts or child welfare agencies to 

inquire as to whether a child in a dependency proceeding is 

an Indian child.”’” (In re Y.W. (2021) 70 Cal.App.5th 542, 
6

551.) The federal regulations implementing ICWA require 

such inquiry only of participants in the proceedings. (Ibid.; 

see also Dezi C., supra, 79 Cal.App.5th at 779, fn. 5.) Under

state law, however,the juvenile court and county welfare 

department have an “affirmative and continuing duty to 

inquire whether a child for whom a petition under Section 

300 . . . has been filed, is or may be an Indian child.” 

(§ 224.2, subd. (a).) A duty of initial inquiry is triggered 

upon placement of a child in the department’s custody, and 

“includes, but is not limited to, asking the . . . parents, . . .

extended family members, [and] others who have an interest 

in the child . . . whether the child is, or may be, an Indian 

child.”3 (§ 224.2, subd. (b).)

Here, DCFSwas in contact with Grandmother, Uncle, 

and Great-Aunt, but admittedly did not ask them whether 

G.S. was or might have been an Indian child. We assume,

arguendo, DCFS erred in discharging its duty of initial 

inquiry under section 224.2.4 

3 A requirement for “further” inquiry is triggered if the 

department receives information establishing reason to believe 

the child is an Indian child. (§ 224.2, subd. (e).) If the 

department receives information establishing reason to know the 

child is an Indian child, notice must be given to the child’s 

potential tribes, and the department must exercise due diligence 

in verifying whether the child is, in fact, an Indian child. 

(§§ 224.2, subds. (f)-(g), 224.3, subds. (a)-(b); see also 25 U.S.C. 

§ 1912, subd. (a).)

4 Absent an applicable tribal law or custom, ICWA’s 

definition of “‘extended family member’” includes a grandmother 

(Fn. is continued on the next page.)
7

B. Absence of Prejudice

Appellant contends DCFS’s inquiry error was 

prejudicial, relying on a proposed rule that would require 

reversal where the record indicates there was readily 

obtainable informationlikely to bear meaningfully upon 

whether the child is an Indian child (the readily-obtainableinformation rule). (See In re Benjamin M. (2021) 70 

Cal.App.5th 735, 744.) DCFS disagrees, relying on an 

alternativerule that would presumptively favor affirmance, 

requiring reversal only where a parent, on appeal, proffers a 

reason to believe the child is or may be an Indian child (the 

presumptive-affirmance rule). (See In re A.C. (2022) 75 

Cal.App.5th 1009, 1021, 1024 (conc. & dis. opn. of Crandall, 

J.).) Below, we reject both proposed rules, and adopt the 

reason-to-believe rule set forth by our colleagues in Division 

Two in Dezi C. (See Dezi C., supra, 79 Cal.App.5th at 778-

782, 784-785.) Applying that rule to the record before us, we 

conclude any error was harmless.

1. Reason-to-Believe Rule

“‘[W]e review the juvenile court’s ICWA findings under 

the substantial evidence test, which requires us to determine 

if reasonable, credible evidence of solid value supports’ the 

court’s ICWA finding. [Citation.] Where . . . the 

and an uncle, but does not include a great-aunt. (25 U.S.C. 

§ 1903, subd. (2); see also § 224.1, subd. (c).) We assume, but do 

not decide, Great-Aunt was a person who had “an interest in the 

child” within the meaning of section 224.2. (§ 224.2, subd. (b).)
8

Department’s inquiry was erroneous, our examination as to 

whether substantial evidence supports the juvenile court’s 

ICWA finding ends up turning on whether that error by the 

Department was harmless -- in other words, we must assess 

whether it is reasonably probable that the juvenile court 

would have made the same ICWA finding had the inquiry 

been done properly. (People v. Watson (1956) 46 Cal.2d 818, 

836, [299 P.2d 243] (Watson). If so, the error is harmless and 

we should affirm; otherwise, we must send it back for the 

Department to conduct a more comprehensive inquiry.’” 

(Dezi C., supra, 79 Cal.App.5th at 777.)

We adopt the reason-to-believe rule set forth in Dezi C.

as follows: “An agency’s failure to discharge its statutory 

duty of initial inquiry is harmless unless the record contains 

information suggesting a reason to believe that the children 

at issue may be ‘Indian child[ren],’in which case further 

inquiry may lead to a different ICWA finding by the juvenile 

court. For these purposes, the ‘record’ means not only the

record of proceedings before the juvenile court but also any 

further proffer the appealing parent makes on appeal.” (Dezi 

C., supra, 79 Cal.App.5th at 774.) There is “reason to 

believe”if the record contains “information suggesting that 

either the parent of the child or the child is a member or may 

be eligible for membership in an Indian tribe.” (§ 224.2, 

subd. (e)(1); see also Dezi C., at 780-781.) We agree with our 

colleagues in Division Two that this reason-to-believe rule is 

proper because it (1) logically incorporates the statutory 

reason-to-believe standard, which “reserves further inquiry 
9

for those cases in which such inquiry may affect the juvenile 

court’s ultimate ICWA determination,” into the outcomefocused test for prejudice compelled by our state’s 

Constitution; (2) “effectuates the rights of [Indian]tribes in 

those instances in which those rights are most likely at risk,

. . . removes the incentive [for parents]to use ICWA as a 

thirteenth-hour delay tactic[,] and . . . still sends a ‘message’

to agencies that ICWA’s mandates are not to be ignored”; 

and (3) properly focuses on what is in the record. (Dezi C., at 

779-782.)

We also agree with our colleagues’ reasons for rejecting 

the alternative rules advanced here by DCFS and appellant, 

viz., the presumptive-affirmance rule and the readilyobtainable-information rule. The presumptive-affirmance 

rule improperly focuses on what, if anything, a parent 

proffers on appeal, to the exclusion of information in the 

appellate record. (Dezi C., supra, 79 Cal.App.5th at 784-

785.) The readily-obtainable-information rule, in turn,

“lacks the outcome-focus that is the hallmark of usual 

harmlessness review,” and appears to be “so flexible and 

malleable” that it “functions as a type of automatic reversal 

rule.” (Id. at 785-786.) Appellant does not argue an

automatic-reversal rule would be proper. In any event, Dezi 

C. persuasively rejected an automatic-reversal rule, because 

it would (1) confer on parents a perverse incentive notto 

object to perceived deficiencies in the department’s inquiry, 

in order to “guarantee [on appeal] a remand that forestalls 

the finality of the final judgment in the dependency case 
10

and, indeed, may even derail arranged adoption of the 

dependent children,” giving rise to the “‘very evil the 

Legislature intended to correct’ -- namely, ‘lengthy and 

unnecessary delay in providing permanency for children’”; 

(2) yield yet more delay on a successive appeal following the 

department’s inquiry on remand, by empowering a parent to 

obtain another remand merely because the departmentleft 

even a single stone unturned in section 224.2’s “open-ended 

universe of stones”; and (3) elevate statutory provisions

above “the constitutional mandate that reversal is only 

required when there would be a miscarriage of justice.” (Id.

at 784-785.) The reason-to-believe rule suffers from none of 

these defects. We adopt it.

2. Application

Applying the reason-to-believe rule to the record before 

us, we conclude any inquiry error was harmless. Appellant 

does not proffer any information suggesting a reason to 

believe G.S. may be an Indian child -- in other words, 

information suggesting that appellant, Alleged Father, or 

G.S. is a member of an Indian tribe or may be eligible for 

membership. (See § 224.2, subd. (e)(1); Dezi C., supra, 79

Cal.App.5th at 780-784.) The record contains no such

information. On the contrary, the record contains 

information strongly suggesting G.S. and her parents are not

tribal members or eligible for membership, viz., appellant’s 

denials that either she or Alleged Father had Indian 

ancestry, and that G.S. might have been a tribal member or 
11

eligible for membership. (See Dezi C., at 786 [“The record in 

this case does not provide a ‘reason to believe’that [the 

children] are Indian children. Both mother and father 

attested -- to the Department, on an official form, and to the 

juvenile court during their initial appearances -- that they 

had no Indian heritage. . . . Mother points to nothing else in 

the juvenile court’s record indicating that she or father has 

any American Indian heritage. And mother makes no 

proffer on appeal that either parent has any such 

heritage”].)5

We are not persuaded by appellant’s reliance on In re 

Y.W., supra, 70 Cal.App.5th 542. There, the appellate court 

concluded DCFS erred in failing to interview the mother’s 

biological parents (the mother had been adopted at age two),

notwithstanding the mother’s denial of Indian ancestry, 

because “parents may not know their possible relationship 

with or connection to an Indian tribe.” (Id. at 548, 552-554.) 

The court further concluded the error was prejudicial, 

applying an automatic-reversal rule. (See id. at 556.) We 

reject that rule for the reasons explained above. (See Dezi 

C., supra, 79 Cal.App.5th at 782-784;id. at 777, citing In re 

5 The record’s omission of any statement from Alleged Father 

himself is not attributable to any error on the part of DCFS, 

which exercised due diligence in attempting to locate him. 

Appellant told DCFS she had no contact information for Alleged 

Father or his relatives. “[W]e cannot ask the agency to intuit the 

names of unidentified family members or to interview individuals 

for whom no contact information has been provided.” (In re 

Q.M. (2022) 79 Cal.App.5th 1068, 1082.)
12

Y.W., at 556.) Moreover, in determining whether there is 

reason to believe the parents may be tribal members or 

eligible for membership,“[w]e decline to adopt a rule that 

obligates us to view with a jaundiced eye whatever parents 

report about their heritage, at least in the usual case where 

the parents were not adopted and thus can be presumed to 

be knowledgeable.” (Dezi C., at 784.) Here, appellant was 

not adopted. Further, she relied on and lived with her 

mother (Grandmother), through whom she presumably 

wouldhave obtained knowledge about any connection to an 

Indian tribe -- the very type of connection she repeatedly 

denied. In sum, because appellant neither proffers nor 

identifies in the record any reason to believe G.S. may be an 

Indian child, we conclude any inquiry error was harmless.
13

DISPOSITION

The order terminating appellant’s parental rights is 

affirmed.

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

 MANELLA, P. J.

We concur:

WILLHITE, J.

CURREY, J.