32600 Federal Register / Vol. 63, No. 114 / Monday, June 15, 1998 /Rules and Regulations

relatively insignificant impact on the

Idaho-Eastern Oregon onion industry.

This action decreases the assessment

obligation imposed on handlers. While

assessments impose some additional

costs on handlers, the costs are minimal

and uniform on all handlers. Some of

the additional costs may be passed on

to producers. However, these costs will

be offset by the benefits derived by the

operation of the order. In addition, the

Committee’s meeting was widely

publicized throughout the Idaho-Eastern

Oregon onion industry and all

interested persons were invited to

attend the meeting and participate in

Committee deliberations on all issues.

Like all Committee meetings, the April

2, 1998, meeting was a public meeting

and all entities, both large and small,

were able to express views on this issue.

This rule imposes no additional

reporting or recordkeeping requirements

on either small or large onion handlers.

As with all Federal marketing order

programs, reports and forms are

periodically reviewed to reduce

information requirements and

duplication by industry and public

sector agencies.

The Department has not identified

any relevant Federal rules that

duplicate, overlap, or conflict with this

rule.

A proposed rule concerning this

action was published in the Federal

Register on May 15, 1998 (63 FR 26999).

A copy of the proposed rule was also

sent via facsimile transmission to the

administrative office of the Committee,

which in turn notified Committee

members and industry members. The

proposal was also made available

through the Internet by the Government

Printing Office.

A 15-day comment period ending

June 1, 1998, was provided to allow

interested persons the opportunity to

respond to the request for information

and comments. No comments were

received in response to the proposal.

After consideration of all relevant

material presented, including the

information and recommendation

submitted by the Committee and other

available information, it is hereby found

that this rule, as hereinafter set forth,

will tend to effectuate the declared

policy of the Act.

Pursuant to 5 U.S.C. 553, it is also

found and determined that good cause

exists for not postponing the effective

date of this rule until 30 days after

publication in the Federal Register

because: (1) The Committee needs to

have sufficient funds to pay its expenses

which are incurred on a continuous

basis; (2) the 1998–99 fiscal period

begins on July 1, 1998, and the order

requires that the rate of assessment for

each fiscal period apply to all assessable

onions handled during such fiscal

period; (3) handlers are aware of this

action which was recommended by the

Committee at a public meeting; and (4)

a 15-day comment period was provided

for in the proposed rule, and no

comments were received.

List of Subjects in 7 CFR Part 958

Marketing agreements, Onions,

Reporting and recordkeeping

requirements.

For the reasons set forth in the

preamble, 7 CFR part 958 is amended as

follows:

PART 958—ONIONS GROWN IN

CERTAIN DESIGNATED COUNTIES IN

IDAHO, AND MALHEUR COUNTY,

OREGON

1. The authority citation for 7 CFR

part 958 continues to read as follows:

Authority: 7 U.S.C. 601–674.

2. Section 958.240 is revised to read

as follows:

§ 958.240 Assessment rate.

On and after July 1, 1998, an

assessment rate of $0.09 per

hundredweight is established for IdahoEastern Oregon onions.

Dated: June 10, 1998.

Robert C. Keeney,

Deputy Administrator, Fruit and Vegetable

Programs.

[FR Doc. 98–15835 Filed 6–12–98; 8:45 am]

BILLING CODE 3410–02–P

NUCLEAR REGULATORY

COMMISSION

10 CFR Part 71

RIN 3150–AF59

Requirements for Shipping Packages

Used To Transport Vitrified High-Level

Waste

AGENCY: Nuclear Regulatory

Commission.

ACTION: Final rule.

SUMMARY: The Nuclear Regulatory

Commission (NRC) is amending its

regulations to add vitrified high-level

waste (HLW) contained in a sealed

canister designed to maintain waste

containment during handling activities

associated with transport to the forms of

plutonium which are exempt from the

double-containment packaging

requirements for transportation of

plutonium. This amendment responds

to a petition for rulemaking submitted

by the Department of Energy, Office of

Civilian Radioactive Waste Management

(DOE/OCRWM). This final rule grants

the petition for rulemaking, with

modifications, and completes NRC

action on the petition. This final rule

also will make a minor correction

regarding the usage of metric and

English units, to be consistent with

existing NRC policy on such use.

DATES: The effective date is July 15,

1998. The incorporation by reference of

the American Society of Mechanical

Engineers (ASME) Boiler and Pressure

Vessel Code, Section VIII, editions

through the 1995 Edition, is approved

by the Director of the Federal Register

as of July 15, 1998.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Earl

Easton [telephone (301) 415–8520, email EXE@nrc.gov] or Mark Haisfield

[telephone (301) 415–6196, e-mail

MFH@nrc.gov] of the Office of Nuclear

Material Safety and Safeguards, U.S.

Nuclear Regulatory Commission,

Washington, DC 20555–0001.

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:

Background

In 1974, the Atomic Energy

Commission (AEC) adopted the special

requirements in 10 CFR 71.63 that

regulate the shipment of plutonium in

excess of 0.74 terabecquerels (TBq) [20

Curies] per package. These requirements

specify that plutonium must be in solid

form and that packages used to transport

plutonium must provide a separate

inner containment (the ‘‘doublecontainment’’ requirement). In adopting

these requirements, the AEC specifically

excluded from the double-containment

requirement plutonium in the form of

reactor fuel elements, metal or metal

alloys, and, on a case-by-case basis,

other plutonium-bearing solids that the

agency determines do not require

double containment. The Statement of

Consideration for the original rule (39

FR 20960; June 17, 1974), specifies that

‘‘* * * solid forms of plutonium that

are essentially nonrespirable should be

exempted from the double-containment

requirement.’’

On November 30, 1993, DOE/OCRWM

petitioned the NRC to amend § 71.63(b)

to add vitrified HLW contained in a

sealed canister to the forms of

plutonium which are exempt from the

double-containment packaging

requirements of Part 71. The NRC

published a notice of receipt for the

petition, docketed as PRM–71–11, in the

Federal Register on February 18, 1994

(59 FR 8143). Three comments were

received on the petition.

Pursuant to the Nuclear Waste Policy

Act of 1982, as amended (NWPA), DOE
Federal Register / Vol. 63, No. 114 / Monday, June 15, 1998 /Rules and Regulations 32601

is the Federal agency responsible for

developing and administering a geologic

repository for the deep disposal of HLW

and spent nuclear fuel. DOE plans to

ship the vitrified HLW in sealed

canisters from four storage locations:

Aiken, South Carolina; Hanford,

Washington; West Valley, New York

and Idaho Falls, Idaho; directly to the

geologic repository in transportation

packages certified by the NRC.

Currently, this HLW exists mostly in the

form of liquid and sludge resulting from

the reprocessing of defense reactor fuels.

DOE proposes to encapsulate the HLW

in a borosilicate glass matrix. The HLW

is added to molten glass and the mixture

is then poured into a stainless steel

canister and allowed to solidify (i.e.,

vitrify). The canister is then seal-welded

shut. The canisters will eventually be

placed inside Type B transportation

packages for transport to the geologic

repository or an interim storage facility.

The beneficial aspect of this

amendment would be the elimination of

an unnecessary requirement that DOE

transport vitrified HLW in a separate

inner container (i.e., a second barrier

which is subject to the leak testing

requirements of § 71.63(b)). The

Commission believes that the vitrified

HLW form in its sealed canister

provides sufficient defense-in-depth for

protection of public health and safety

and the environment, when transported

inside an NRC-certified Type B

transportation package. The

Commission agrees with DOE’s

assertion that shipments of this form of

plutonium are comparable to shipments

of (irradiated) reactor fuel elements

which are exempt from the doublecontainment requirement. Therefore, the

Commission agrees that the doublecontainment requirement is

unnecessary. Additional beneficial

aspects of this amendment would be a

reduction in DOE’s costs associated

with the transportation of HLW from

production sites to the geologic

repository or an interim storage facility;

and the simplification of the NRC staff’s

review of DOE’s application for

certification of a transportation package.

Although, in most other types of

shipments, DOE is not subject to the

requirements of Part 71, the NWPA

requires that DOE’s transport of spent

nuclear fuel or HLW to a geologic

repository or a monitored retrievable

storage facility be in packages certified

by the NRC. The packages used to

transport vitrified HLW contained in

sealed canisters will be certified by the

NRC as Type B packages. Type B

packages are designed to withstand the

normal and hypothetical accident

conditions specified in Part 71. The

canistered vitrified HLW also will be

subject to the special transport controls

for a ‘‘Highway Route Controlled

Quantity’’ pursuant to U.S. Department

of Transportation regulations contained

in 49 CFR Part 397. In addition, the

NWPA requires DOE to provide

technical assistance and funds to train

emergency responders along the

planned routes.

DOE asserted that shipments of

vitrified HLW contained in a sealed

canister will not adversely affect public

health and safety and the environment

if shipped without double containment.

DOE stated that a separate inner

container is unnecessary because of the

high degree of confinement provided by

the stainless steel waste canister and the

essential nonrespirability of the solid,

plutonium-bearing waste form. In

addition, DOE argued that vitrified HLW

in sealed canisters provides a

comparable level of protection to that of

irradiated reactor fuel elements, which

the Commission previously determined

should be exempt from the doublecontainment requirement (39 FR 20960).

On June 1, 1995, the NRC staff met

with DOE in a public meeting to discuss

the petitioner’s request and the possible

alternative of requesting an NRC

determination under § 71.63(b)(3) to

exempt vitrified HLW contained in a

sealed canister from the doublecontainment requirement. DOE

informed the NRC in a letter dated

January 25, 1996, of its intent to seek an

exemption under § 71.63(b)(3). The NRC

received DOE’s exemption request on

July 16, 1996, in which DOE also

requested that the original petition for

rulemaking be held in abeyance until a

decision was reached on the exemption

request. In response to DOE’s request,

the NRC staff prepared a Commission

paper (SECY–96–215, dated October 8,

1996) outlining and requesting

Commission approval of the NRC staff’s

proposed approach for making an

exemption under § 71.63(b)(3).

However, in a staff requirements

memorandum (SRM) dated October 31,

1996, the Commission disapproved the

NRC staff’s plan and directed that this

policy issue be addressed by rulemaking

rather than by exemption.

The NRC published a proposed rule

in the Federal Register on May 8, 1997

(62 FR 25146) in response to DOE’s

petition. The Statement of

Considerations for the proposed rule

contains a complete discussion of DOE’s

petition, comments received on the

petition, and the NRC’s analysis of those

comments.

Discussion

The NRC is amending 10 CFR 71.63

based on its evaluation of the petition

submitted by the DOE; the attachment to

the petition, ‘‘Technical Justification to

Support the PRM by the DOE to Exempt

HLW Canisters from 10 CFR 71.63(b)’’

(Technical Justification); the three

public comments received on the

petition after its publication in the

Federal Register; and the seven

comments on the proposed rule. In

amending § 71.63, the NRC is accepting,

with modifications, the petition

submitted by DOE, for the reasons set

forth in the following paragraphs.

In the early 1970’s, the AEC

anticipated that a large number of

shipments of plutonium nitrate liquids

could result from the spent fuel

reprocessing anticipated at that time.

This raised a concern about leakage of

liquids because of the potential for a

large number of packages (probably of

more complex design) to be shipped due

to reprocessing and the increased

possibility of human error resulting

from handling this expanded shipping

load.

In 1973, the AEC proposed a rule

which would deal with this problem by

(a) requiring that shipments of

plutonium containing greater than 20

curies be shipped in solid form, and (b)

requiring that the solid plutonium be

shipped in an inner container which

would meet ‘‘special form’’

requirements as they then existed; i.e.,

not only would the whole package have

to meet Part 71 requirements but the

inner container would separately have

to meet stringent requirements. One

alternative to the proposed rule the AEC

considered was to require that

shipments of plutonium be in

nonrespirable form, either in a single or

double containment. This alternative

was rejected, apparently because fuel

fabricators did not have the technology

to use plutonium in a nonrespirable

form.

In 1974, the AEC published a final

rule which contained two significant

changes from the proposed rule:

(1) The AEC abandoned the ‘‘special form’’

requirement and instead simply required

‘‘double containment’; i.e., the inner

container was required not to release

plutonium when the whole package was

subjected to the normal and hypothetical

accident tests of Part 71, but no separate tests

were required for the inner container. Double

containment was required to take account of

the fact that the AEC had decided not to

require that the plutonium be in a

nonrespirable form; and

(2) The AEC exempted two forms of

plutonium altogether—reactor fuel elements

and metal or metal alloy—on the basis that
32602 Federal Register / Vol. 63, No. 114 / Monday, June 15, 1998 /Rules and Regulations

these forms were ‘‘essentially nonrespirable’’

and therefore did not require double

containment. The exemption provision

placed in the regulation also indicates that

the AEC saw the possibility that other forms

of plutonium would be similar enough to

these two forms to also qualify for exemption

from the double-containment requirement

because they were also essentially

nonrespirable. In the statement of

considerations accompanying the final rule,

the AEC stated that ‘‘* * * solid forms of

plutonium that are essentially nonrespirable

should be exempt from the double

containment requirements’’ (39 FR 20960).

DOE’s petition argues that a particular

form of plutonium-vitrified high-level

waste contained in a sealed canister—is

similar enough to irradiated reactor fuel

elements to qualify for its own

exemption from the double-containment

requirement. This is because of (1) the

material properties of the vitrified HLW,

(2) the high degree of confinement

provided by the stainless steel waste

canister, and (3) the NRC-approved

quality assurance program implemented

by DOE makes it highly unlikely that

any plutonium would be released from

an NRC-certified transportation package

under the normal or hypothetical

accident conditions of part 71. The NRC

is required to certify the transportation

packages used for vitrified HLW

pursuant to Section 180 of the NWPA

and every transportation package for

vitrified HLW will be required to meet

the standards for accident-resistant

packages (i.e., Type B packages) set

forth in part 71.

The tests described in DOE’s

Technical Justification demonstrate that

the canisters containing the vitrified

HLW provide an additional barrier to

the release of radionuclides and

compare favorably to the cladding

surrounding spent fuel pellets in reactor

fuel elements. The comparison is based

upon physical drop tests, upon the

material properties and dimensions of

the sealed canisters, and the effects of

radiation damage to materials.

DOE’s analysis demonstrates much

lower concentrations of plutonium in

the HLW canisters than in irradiated

reactor fuel elements. However, the DOE

has not established an upper limit on

plutonium concentration for these

vitrified HLW canisters, and the NRC is

not basing its decision to remove these

canisters from the double-containment

requirement based on the plutonium’s

concentration.

In its Technical Justification, DOE

described the physical characteristics

and acceptance standards of the

canisters of vitrified HLW, including

that the canistered waste form be

capable of withstanding a 7-meter drop

onto a flat, essentially unyielding

surface, without breaching or dispersing

radionuclides. This requirement is

imposed by the DOE’s ‘‘Waste

Acceptance System Requirements

Document (WASRD),’’ Rev. 0, which is

referenced in the Technical

Justification. This test should not be

confused with the 9-meter drop test,

onto an essentially unyielding surface,

which is required by the hypothetical

accident conditions of § 71.73. The 9-

meter drop test is performed on the

entire transportation package under the

Part 71 certification process. The 7-

meter drop test standard only applies to

the canistered HLW.

The NRC agrees that the 7-meter drop

test requirement is relevant to the

demonstration that the canistered HLW

represents an essentially nonrespirable

form for shipping plutonium. The NRC

believes that the 7-meter canister drop

test is a more severe challenge than the

9-meter drop test for an NRC-approved

Type B package. This is because the

Type B package and the impact limiters

will absorb much of the energy which

would otherwise be expended against

the canister.

In some of DOE’s tests, the HLW

canisters were dropped from 9 meters—

2 meters above DOE’s 7-meter design

standard—and portions of the testing

included deliberately introducing flaws

(0.95 cm holes) in the canisters’ walls.

For those HLW canisters tested with the

0.95 cm holes, the quantity of respirable

plutonium released through these holes

was less than 0.74 TBq (20 curies). This

review of DOE’s Technical Justification

has provided the NRC staff confidence

that DOE’s petition is supportable and

that vitrified HLW in a sealed canister

is essentially nonrespirable.

The NRC does not control the

requirements in, or changes to, DOE’s

WASRD. Because of concerns that

DOE’s WASRD could be changed in the

future, the NRC added the requirement

in the proposed rule that vitrified HLW

contained in a sealed canister meet the

design criteria of § 60.135 (b) and (c).

However, in response to comments

received on the proposed rulemaking,

the Commission has reconsidered its

proposed imposition of referencing Part

60 design criteria. The final rule,

instead, incorporates one of the design

requirements from Part 60 into this rule.

The other Part 60 design requirements

are satisfied by other existing Part 71

requirements and other language in the

final rule. Additionally, the Commission

has included one acceptable method for

meeting these design requirements for

handling by referencing appropriate

American Society of Mechanical

Engineers Boiler and Pressure Vessel

Code criteria. The explanation for this

change is discussed below. Further, the

NRC staff does perform technical

reviews to certify package designs. For

a HLW package, the review would

include the sealed canister as well as

the radioactive contents in the form of

vitrified HLW. It is expected that an

application for approval of a HLW

package design would include a canister

design and vitrified HLW contents with

characteristics and attributes

comparable to those described in the

Technical Justification.

Comments on the Proposed Rule

This section presents a summary of

the principal comments received on the

proposed rule, the NRC’s response to

the comments, and changes made to the

final rule as a result of these comments.

The Commission received seven

comment letters from six commenters

on the proposed rule. One was from a

member of the public, two were from

national laboratories, one was from a

transportation cask designer, one was

from a consulting company, and one

was from DOE. In addition, DOE

submitted a subsequent letter

commenting on one of the other

comments. Overall, five of the six

commenters supported the proposed

rule and the remaining commenter,

while not specifically opposing the rule,

proposed changes regarding the

performance of the canister and limiting

its contents. Copies of these letters are

available for public inspection and

copying for a fee at the Commission’s

Public Document Room, located at 2120

L Street, NW (Lower Level),

Washington, DC.

Comment. DOE and another

commenter objected to the proposed

rule’s use of design criteria from Part 60.

DOE noted that basing canistered waste

approved for transport under § 71.63

upon the rules for disposal of HLW

under § 60.135(b) and (c) assumes that

certification approval for transport

packages will not take place until a

repository or interim storage facility

becomes available; and that this may not

be the case. The commenters are

concerned that if certification for

transport packages under the proposed

rule is sought before a license

application for a repository or interim

storage facility is submitted, this

situation could complicate and impede

progress on the HLW cask certification

process. One commenter supported the

use of Part 60 criteria.

Response. The Commission has

reconsidered the need to reference Part

60 criteria for canistered vitrified HLW

in the amended regulation. The

Commission agrees that it is best to

avoid incorporating into Part 71—which
Federal Register / Vol. 63, No. 114 / Monday, June 15, 1998 /Rules and Regulations 32603

contains standards for the packaging

and transportation of radioactive

materials—requirements referenced

from Part 60 which are intended for the

permanent disposal of HLW in a

geologic repository. The NRC staff has

analyzed the requirements contained in

§ 60.135(b) and (c) and has determined

that the intended requirement—that the

canistered vitrified HLW maintain its

integrity—can be achieved by reliance

on existing Part 71 requirements and

language from the proposed rule for all

of the Part 60 requirements, but one.

That one requirement is to design the

canister to maintain waste containment

during handling activities associated

with transport. This has been added to

the final rule. Additionally, the

Commission has included one

acceptable method for meeting these

design requirements by referencing

appropriate American Society of

Mechanical Engineers Boiler and

Pressure Vessel Code criteria.

The design criteria in § 60.135(b)

require that the waste package shall not

contain explosive, pyrophoric, or

chemically reactive materials or free

liquids in amounts that could cause

harm; that waste packages shall be

designed to maintain waste containment

during handling; and that waste

packages have unique identification

numbers. The design criteria in

§ 60.135(c) require that the waste be in

solid form and placed in a sealed

container; that any particulate waste

forms be consolidated into an

encapsulating matrix; and that any

combustible radioactive waste be

reduced to noncombustible form. As

noted, the Commission believed that by

referencing these criteria in the

proposed rule, it could assure the

integrity of the canistered vitrified

HLW.

The Commission now believes that

the integrity objective can be achieved

by relying on requirements in the final

rule and other requirements in Part 71.

First, as stated above, the final rule has

added language that the canister be

designed to maintain waste containment

during handling activities associated

with transport. Second the rule requires

that the HLW be vitrified, and thus be

in a solid form for encapsulation.

Vitrification of HLW uses molten glass

and this high temperature process will

reduce any combustible radioactive

waste into a noncombustible form.

Finally, the Part 60 requirement that a

unique identification number be

attached to the HLW canister is not

relevant for transportation. Third, the Commission believes the

integrity objective can be achieved by

relying on other requirements in Part 71.

Part 71 already requires that the

transportation packages must not

contain explosive, pyrophoric, or

chemically reactive materials or free

liquids. Section 71.43(d) requires that:

A package must be made of materials and

construction that assure that there will be no

significant chemical, galvanic, or other

reaction among the packaging components,

among package contents, or between the

packaging components and the package

contents, including possible reaction

resulting from inleakage of water, to the

maximum credible extent. Account must be

taken of the behavior of materials under

irradiation.

The existing requirement in § 71.63(a)

that the plutonium be in a solid form

also will assure that the waste will be

in solid form and that the waste package

will be free of liquids.

Additionally, the Commission has

included one acceptable method for

meeting the canister design

requirements for handling by

referencing appropriate American

Society of Mechanical Engineers Boiler

and Pressure Vessel Code criteria. Use

of the ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel

Code would ensure that the canister

would be designed to maintain waste

containment during handling, including

normal loading and unloading activities.

Certain criteria of the ASME Boiler and

Pressure Vessel Code, Section VIII, are

excluded because they are not

appropriate for a sealed canister

containing vitrified HLW. For example,

the criteria to include a pressure relief

device and openings to inspect the

interior are unnecessary and could

compromise the long term integrity of

the canister. Specific alternatives to the

ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code

criteria may be considered and

approved without resorting to

exemptions from the regulation.

Final Rule. The final rule has been

revised to read as follows: Vitrified

high-level waste contained in a sealed

canister designed to maintain waste

containment during handling activities

associated with transport. As one

method of meeting these design

requirements, the NRC will consider

acceptable a canister which is designed

in accordance with the American

Society of Mechanical Engineers

(ASME) Boiler and Pressure Vessel

Code, Section VIII, editions through the

1995 Edition. However, this canister

need not be designed in accordance

with the requirements of Section VIII,

Parts UG–46, UG–115 through UG–120,

UG–125 through UG–136, UW–60, UW–

65, UHA–60, and UHA–65 and the

canister’s final closure weld need not be

designed in accordance with the

requirements of Section VIII, Parts UG–

99 and UW–11. Necessary language to

incorporate by reference the ASME

Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code has

also been added.

Comment. Four of the six commenters

stated that the NRC should evaluate the

technical bases for § 71.63, or referred to

a Commission SRM to SECY–96–215,

dated October 31, 1996, which directed

the NRC staff to ‘‘address whether the

technical basis for 10 CFR 71.63 remains

valid, or whether a revision or

elimination of portions of 10 CFR 71.63

is needed to provide flexibility for

current and future technologies.’’ One of

the commenters noted that the

International Atomic Energy Agency

standards do not impose a doublecontainment requirement. Four of the

commenters recommended that if the

NRC retained the double containment

provision, that the rule use

performance-based criteria for

dispersibility and respirability as a basis

for exemption, or that double

containment only be required for

‘‘highly dispersible materials.’’ One of

the commenters recommended that

§ 71.63 be eliminated entirely. One

commenter expressed an interest in any

Commission action on § 71.63, and

recommended that the evaluation of

§ 71.63 take the form of an Advanced

Notice of Proposed Rulemaking. Response. The Commission believes

that those comments to evaluate the

technical basis for § 71.63, to revise

§ 71.63 (other than for vitrified HLW in

canisters), or to eliminate the rule, are

beyond the scope of this rulemaking.

The NRC staff recently reviewed the

technical bases for § 71.63, as directed

in the SRM to SECY–96–215. The NRC

staff concluded, in SECY–97–218, dated

September 29, 1997, that the technical

bases remain valid, and that the

provisions provide adequate flexibility

for current and future technologies.

Except for the changes made in this

rulemaking for vitrified HLW in

canisters, the NRC staff concluded that

the provisions in § 71.63 should remain

unchanged. The NRC staff will further

consider potential modifications to

§ 71.63 in its response to a petition for

rulemaking, dated September 25, 1997,

(Docket No. PRM–71–12). The NRC

published a notice of receipt for the

petition in the Federal Register (63 FR

8362, dated February 19, 1998). Comment. One commenter suggested

that the proposed rule be changed to

require that HLW canister design,

fabrication, test, and fill be conducted

under a quality assurance program that

meets, to the satisfaction of the NRC, the

requirements of Part 71, Subpart H. This commenter also suggested that

the proposed rule be changed to require

that the exemption will only apply to

canisters of HLW in shipping packages

which have been demonstrated by

analysis or test to adequately contain

the HLW canisters without allowing

canister failure under the hypothetical
32604 Federal Register / Vol. 63, No. 114 / Monday, June 15, 1998 /Rules and Regulations

accident conditions of Part 71, Subpart

F, when considered as a transportation

system.

Response. The technical basis given

in the DOE petition for an exemption is

that a separate inner container is

unnecessary because of the high degree

of confinement provided by the

stainless steel waste canister and the

non-respirability of the solid,

plutonium-bearing waste form. In

support of its petition, DOE submitted a

Technical Justification which included

a description of a representative HLW

canister together with the results of 7-

meter and 9-meter drop testing of the

canisters and a description of the

standards used for canister fabrication

and filling.

The technical review performed by

the NRC staff to certify a HLW package

would include the sealed canister as

well as the radioactive contents in the

form of vitrified HLW. It is expected

that an application for approval of a

HLW package design would include a

canister design and vitrified HLW

contents with characteristics and

integrity comparable to those described

in the DOE petition. The DOE HLW

canisters will be subject to an NRC

approved quality assurance plan.

The final rule has been revised to

specify that the vitrified high-level

waste be contained in a sealed canister

designed to maintain waste containment

during handling activities associated

with transport. These standards would

apply to all canisters containing

vitrified HLW transported under this

provision and will provide reasonable

assurance that the package design

adequately protects public health and

safety.

Comment. One commenter suggested

that the proposed rule be changed to

require that the exemption will only

apply to vitrified HLW from which

plutonium has been removed prior to

transfer to HLW storage tanks. The

commenter suggested the vitrified HLW

be restricted to no more than 3.7 TBq

(100 Ci) of plutonium.

Response. The Statement of

Considerations for the original rule (39

FR 20960) did not discuss activity limits

(quantity limits); nor did the

Commission adopt activity limits on the

other forms of plutonium that are

exempt from § 71.63(b). Rather, any

limitations on the quantity of plutonium

that can be shipped in a transportation

package—for any exempt form of

plutonium—are due to the inherent

design features of the specific

transportation package being used.

These design features are reviewed by

the NRC as part of the package

certification process. The commenter

has not provided any technical basis for

requiring activity limits on this form of

plutonium. The final rule does not

specify a quantity limit for this

exemption.

Regulatory Action

The NRC is amending 10 CFR 71.63

based on its evaluation of the petition

submitted by DOE; the attachment to the

petition, ‘‘Technical Justification to

Support the PRM by the DOE to Exempt

HLW Canisters from 10 CFR 71.63(b),’’

the three comments received on the

petition; and the seven comments

received on the proposed rule. Section

71.63(b) specifies special provisions for

shipping plutonium in excess of 0.74

TBq (20 curies) per package, including

a separate inner containment system,

except when plutonium is in solid form

of reactor fuel elements, metal, or metal

alloys. In amending § 71.63(b), the NRC

is granting, with modification, the

petition submitted by DOE to eliminate

these special provisions when

transporting vitrified HLW contained in

a sealed canister designed to maintain

waste containment during handling

activities associated with transport. The

final rule completes NRC action on

PRM–71–11. In the proposed rule, the

NRC would have required that the HLW

canister meet design criteria contained

in § 60.135(b) and (c). The final rule,

instead, incorporates these requirements

into Part 71.

In addition, the NRC has corrected the

usage of units in § 71.63. The metric

units are used first with the English

units in parenthesis.

Criminal Penalties

For the purposes of Section 223 of the

Atomic Energy Act (AEA), the

Commission is issuing the final rule

under one or more of sections 161b,

161i, or 161o of the AEA. Willful

violations of the rule will be subject to

criminal enforcement.

Compatibility of Agreement State

Regulations

Under the ‘‘Policy Statement on

Adequacy and Compatibility of

Agreement State Programs’’ approved by

the Commission on June 30, 1997 (62 FR

46517), this rule is classified as

compatibility category ‘‘NRC.’’ This

regulation addresses areas of exclusive

NRC authority. However, a State may

adopt these provisions for the purposes

of clarity and communication, as long as

the State does not adopt regulations or

program elements that would cause the

State to regulate these areas.

Finding of No Significant

Environmental Impact: Availability

The Commission has determined

under the National Environmental

Policy Act of 1969, as amended, and the

Commission’s regulations in Subpart A

of 10 CFR Part 51, that this rule will not

be a major Federal action significantly

affecting the quality of the human

environment, and therefore, an

environmental impact statement is not

required. The final rule change exempts

shipments of vitrified HLW contained in

a sealed canister designed to maintain

waste containment during handling

activities associated with transport. The

purpose of the double containment rule

is to ensure safety by requiring

plutonium to be shipped as a solid,

under double containment, thereby

minimizing the likelihood of leakage

during transport as a result of possible

packaging errors. The Commission

believes that the plutonium within

vitrified HLW contained in a sealed

canister is essentially nonrespirable and

this form of plutonium provides a level

of protection comparable to irradiated

reactor fuel elements—which are

exempt from the double-containment

requirement. Therefore, double

containment is unnecessary for vitrified

HLW contained in a sealed canister

designed to maintain waste containment

during handling activities associated

with transport.

The final environmental assessment

and finding of no significant impact on

which this determination is based are

available for inspection at the NRC

Public Document Room, 2120 L Street

NW. (Lower Level), Washington, DC.

Single copies of the environmental

assessment and the finding of no

significant impact are available from

Mark Haisfield, Office of Nuclear

Material Safety and Safeguards, U.S.

Nuclear Regulatory Commission,

Washington, DC 20555-0001, telephone

(301) 415–6196.

Paperwork Reduction Act Statement

This final rule does not contain a new

or amended information collection

requirement subject to the Paperwork

Reduction Act of 1995 (44 U.S.C. 3501

et seq.). Existing requirements were

approved by the Office of Management

and Budget, approval number 3150–

0008.

Public Protection Notification

If an information collection does not

display a currently valid OMB control

number, the NRC may not conduct or

sponsor, and a person is not required to

respond to, the information collection.
Federal Register / Vol. 63, No. 114 / Monday, June 15, 1998 /Rules and Regulations 32605

Regulatory Analysis

The Commission has prepared a final

regulatory analysis on this final

regulation. The analysis examines the

costs and benefits of the alternatives

considered by the Commission. The

analysis is available for inspection in

the NRC Public Document Room, 2120

L Street NW. (Lower Level),

Washington, DC. Single copies of the

analysis may be obtained from Mark

Haisfield, Office of Nuclear Material

Safety and Safeguards, U.S. Nuclear

Regulatory Commission, Washington,

DC 20555–0001, telephone (301) 415–

6196.

Regulatory Flexibility Certification

As required by the Regulatory

Flexibility Act of 1980 (5 U.S.C. 605(b)),

the Commission certifies that this rule

does not have a significant economic

impact on a substantial number of small

entities. DOE is the only transporter of

vitrified HLW. No other entities are

involved. DOE is not a small entity as

defined in 10 CFR 2.810.

Small Business Regulatory Enforcement

Fairness Act

In accordance with the Small

Business Regulatory Enforcement

Fairness Act of 1996, the NRC has

determined that this action is not a

major rule and has verified this

determination with the Office of

Information and Regulatory Affairs,

Office of Management and Budget.

Backfit Analysis

The NRC has determined that the

backfit rule, 10 CFR 50.109, does not

apply to this rule, and therefore, a

backfit analysis is not required because

these amendments do not involve any

provisions that would impose backfits

as defined in 10 CFR 50.109(a)(1).

List of Subjects in 10 CFR Part 71

Criminal penalties, Hazardous

materials transportation, Incorporation

by reference, Nuclear materials,

Packaging and containers, Reporting

and recordkeeping requirements.

For the reasons set out in the

preamble and under the authority of the

Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended;

the Energy Reorganization Act of 1974,

as amended; and 5 U.S.C. 552 and 553;

the NRC is adopting the following

amendments to 10 CFR part 71.

PART 71—PACKAGING AND

TRANSPORTATION OF RADIOACTIVE

MATERIAL

1. The authority citation for Part 71

continues to read as follows:

Authority: Secs. 53, 57, 62, 63, 81, 161,

182, 183, 68 Stat. 930, 932, 933, 935, 948,

953, 954, as amended, sec. 1701, 106 Stat.

2951, 2952, 2953 (42 U.S.C. 2073, 2077, 2092,

2093, 2111, 2201, 2232, 2233, 2297f); secs.

201, as amended, 202, 206, 88 Stat. 1242, as

amended, 1244, 1246 (42 U.S.C. 5841, 5842,

5846).

Section 71.97 also issued under sec. 301,

Pub. L. 96–295, 94 Stat. 789–790.

2. Section 71.63 is revised to read as

follows:

§ 71.63 Special requirements for

plutonium shipments.

(a) Plutonium in excess of 0.74 TBq

(20 Ci) per package must be shipped as

a solid.

(b) Plutonium in excess of 0.74 TBq

(20 Ci) per package must be packaged in

a separate inner container placed within

outer packaging that meets the

requirements of Subparts E and F of this

part for packaging of material in normal

form. If the entire package is subjected

to the tests specified in § 71.71

(‘‘Normal conditions of transport’’), the

separate inner container must not

release plutonium as demonstrated to a

sensitivity of 10¥6 A2/h. If the entire

package is subjected to the tests

specified in § 71.73 (‘‘Hypothetical

accident conditions’’), the separate

inner container must restrict the loss of

plutonium to not more than A2 in 1

week. Solid plutonium in the following

forms is exempt from the requirements

of this paragraph:

(1) Reactor fuel elements;

(2) Metal or metal alloy;

(3) Vitrified high-level waste

contained in a sealed canister designed

to maintain waste containment during

handling activities associated with

transport. As one method of meeting

these design requirements, the NRC will

consider acceptable a canister which is

designed in accordance with the

American Society of Mechanical

Engineers (ASME) Boiler and Pressure

Vessel Code, Section VIII, 1995 Edition

(earlier editions may be used in lieu of

the 1995 Edition). However, this

canister need not be designed in

accordance with the requirements of

Section VIII, Parts UG–46, UG–115

through UG–120, UG–125 through UG–

136, UW–60, UW–65, UHA–60, and

UHA–65 and the canister’s final closure

weld need not be designed in

accordance with the requirements of

Section VIII, Parts UG–99 and UW–11.

The Director of the Federal Register

approves this incorporation by reference

in accordance with 5 U.S.C. 552(a) and

1 CFR Part 51. Copies of the ASME

Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code,

Section VIII, 1995 Edition, may be

purchased from the American Society of

Mechanical Engineers, Service Center,

22 Law Drive, P.O. Bos 2900, Fairfield,

NJ 07007. It is also available for

inspection at the NRC Library, 11545

Rockville Pike, Rockville, MD 20852–

2738 or at the Office of the Federal

Register, 800 North Capitol Street, NW.,

Suite 700, Washington, DC.; and

(4) Other plutonium bearing solids

that the Commission determines should

be exempt from the requirements of this

section.

Dated at Rockville, Maryland, this 20th day

of May, 1998.

For the Nuclear Regulatory Commission.

John C. Hoyle,

Secretary of the Commission.

[FR Doc. 98–14097 Filed 6–14–98; 8:45 am]

BILLING CODE 7590–01–P

DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION

Federal Aviation Administration

14 CFR Part 39

[Docket No. 98–NM–85–AD; Amendment

39–10587; AD 98–12–34]

RIN 2120–AA64

Airworthiness Directives;

Construcciones Aeronauticas, S.A.

(CASA) Model CN–235 Series

Airplanes

AGENCY: Federal Aviation

Administration, DOT.

ACTION: Final rule.

SUMMARY: This amendment adopts a

new airworthiness directive (AD),

applicable to certain CASA Model CN–

235 series airplanes, that requires

modification of the forward beam of the

vertical stabilizer by the installation of

a structural reinforcement plate. This

amendment is prompted by issuance of

mandatory continuing airworthiness

information by a foreign civil

airworthiness authority. The actions

specified by this AD are intended to

prevent in-flight structural deformation

or failure of the vertical stabilizer,

resulting in reduced controllability of

the airplane.

DATES: Effective July 20, 1998.

The incorporation by reference of

certain publications listed in the

regulations is approved by the Director

of the Federal Register as of July 20,

1998.

ADDRESSES: The service information

referenced in this AD may be obtained

from Construcciones Aeronauticas, S.A.,

Getafe, Madrid, Spain. This information

may be examined at the Federal

Aviation Administration (FAA),