UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

LARRY KLAYMAN,

Plaintiff,

v.

ESTHER LIM, et al.,

Defendants.

Civil Action No. 18-2209 (RDM)

 

MEMORANDUM OPINION

The matter is before the Court on Plaintiff Larry Klayman’s motion for reconsideration of 

the Court’s order dismissing the complaint and motion for recusal or disqualification. Dkt. 25. 

Having reviewed Plaintiff’s motion for reconsideration, id., Defendants opposition, Dkt. 26, and 

Plaintiff’s reply, Dkt. 27, the Court concludes that Plaintiff’s motion merely rehashes his prior 

arguments. The Court will, accordingly, deny the motion for the same reasons set forth in the 

Court’s June 5, 2019 Memorandum Opinion, Dkt. 22. To the extent that Plaintiff seeks to bring 

the Court’s attention additional examples of alleged misconduct by the Office of Disciplinary 

Counsel (“ODC”), see Dkt. 27 at 1–2 (referring the Court to a “whistleblower report”); Dkt. 27-1 

(Ex. 1) (“Whistleblower Report”), that information is irrelevant for present purposes. The Court 

dismissed Plaintiff’s complaint based on the legal insufficiency of the allegations contained in 

the complaint. Plaintiff cannot supplement those allegations by attaching an exhibit to a motion 

for reconsideration.

The Court will also deny Plaintiff’s motion for recusal or disqualification pursuant to 28 

U.S.C. §§ 144 and 455. Under 28 U.S.C. § 144, a litigant must submit an affidavit stating “the 

facts and the reasons for his belief that bias or prejudice exists . . . not less than ten days before 
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the beginning of the term at which the proceeding is to be heard, or good cause shall be shown 

for failure to file it within such a time.” Id. Similarly, although 28 U.S.C. § 455(a) “contains no 

express timeliness provision, most circuits considering the matter have concluded that a litigant 

must raise the disqualification issue within a reasonable time after the grounds for it are known.” 

United States v. Barrett, 111 F.3d 947, 951 (D.C. Cir.1997) (citations omitted). Plaintiff did not 

seek recusal or disqualification in this case until after the Court had granted Defendants’ motion 

to dismiss. Absent some intervening development, that is too late. See SEC v. Loving Spirit 

Found. Inc., 392 F.3d 486, 492 (D.C. Cir. 2004) (“Crucial to the integrity of the judicial process, 

the timeliness requirement ensures that a party may not wait and decide whether to file based on 

‘whether he likes subsequent treatment that he receives.’” (quoting In re United Shoe Mach. 

Corp., 276 F.2d 77, 79 (1st Cir. 1960))); see also Klayman v. Judicial Watch, Inc., 278 F. Supp. 

3d 252, 258 (D.D.C. 2017) (“[M]ere dissatisfy action with a ruling of this Court is insufficient to 

warrant recusal or disqualification.”). Here, the only new fact that Plaintiff identifies is the 

Court’s decision dismissing the complaint. His disagreement with that decision does not warrant 

recusal.

In any event, Plaintiff’s motion also fails on the merits for the reasons set forth in the 

Court’s opinion denying Plaintiff’s motion for recusal in Klayman v. Fox, No. 18-1579 (D.D.C.) 

(ECF 5). In short, “[t]he fact of past political activity alone will rarely require recusal.” 

Higganbotham v. Oklahoma ex rel. Okla. Transp. Comm’n, 328 F.3d 638, 645 (10th Cir. 2003). 

That is because judges “separate themselves from politics when going on the bench.” MacDraw, 

Inc. v. CIT Grp. Equip. Fin., Inc., 138 F.3d 33, 38 (2d Cir. 1998). Recusal in a case such as this 

would not only be unwarranted but would foster the erroneous—and corrosive—perception that 

judicial decisions are based on politics, rather than the relevant law and facts. Plaintiff’s only 
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new argument in this case is that the Court is clearly biased because “Judge Moss dismissed [the 

complaint] without prejudice,” thus revealing that “[he] knew that his order was wrong.” Dkt. 25 

at 3–4. The Court does not follow the logic of that contention. It may be that Plaintiff would 

face substantial—and, perhaps, insurmountable—hurdles in attempting to file an amended 

complaint that would overcome the deficiencies the Court identified in his original complaint. 

But providing him with the opportunity to try to do so hardly reflects judicial bias. 

For the reasons stated above, the Court will DENY Plaintiff’s motion for reconsideration 

and for recusal or disqualification, Dkt. 25.

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 Because Plaintiff has indicated that he does not 

intend to file an amended complaint, see id. at 6, the Court will now enter final judgment. 

A separate order will issue.

/s/ Randolph D. Moss 

 RANDOLPH D. MOSS 

 United States District Judge

Date: August 8, 2019

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 The Court will also DENY Plaintiff’s “Renewed Motion for Oral Argument,” Dkt. 28, on the 

ground that oral argument would not assist in the resolution of the Plaintiff’s motions.