J-S15014-20

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

IN THE INTEREST OF: D.S.

APPEAL OF: L.L., NATURAL MOTHER

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IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

PENNSYLVANIA

No. 1602 WDA 2019

Appeal from the Order Entered September 26, 2019

In the Court of Common Pleas of McKean County Orphans’ Court at

No(s): NO. 42-18-292

IN THE INTEREST OF: C.L.

APPEAL OF: L.L., NATURAL MOTHER

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IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

PENNSYLVANIA

No. 1603 WDA 2019

Appeal from the Order Entered September 26, 2019

In the Court of Common Pleas of McKean County Orphans’ Court at

No(s): 42-17-286

BEFORE: BENDER, P.J.E., OLSON, J., and STEVENS, P.J.E.* MEMORANDUM BY BENDER, P.J.E.: FILED MAY 27, 2020

L.L. (“Mother”) appeals from the orders dated September 20, 2019 and

entered September 26, 2019, which granted the petitions filed by McKean

County Children and Youth Services (“CYS”) to involuntarily terminate her

parental rights to her minor son, C.L. (born in June of 2013), and her minor

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* Former Justice specially assigned to the Superior Court.
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daughter, D.S. (born in February of 2017) (collectively “Children”), pursuant

to sections 2511(a)(1), (2), (5), (8), and (b) of the Adoption Act, 23 Pa.C.S.

§§ 2101-2938.1, 2 After careful review of the record and applicable law, we

affirm.

C.L.’s case was initiated by CYS on March 8, 2016, with the filing of a

request for emergency custody and a dependency petition. C.L. was

adjudicated dependent on May 9, 2016, and was placed into foster care with

S.L. (“Foster Mother”) and M.L. (“Foster Father”) (collectively “Foster

Parents”). Following numerous permanency review hearings, CYS filed its

petition for involuntary termination of Mother’s parental rights to C.L. on

December 13, 2017. The following findings from the Master’s

Recommendation in the dependency action were adopted by the orphans’

court and incorporated in its memorandum regarding the termination of

Mother’s parental rights of C.L.:

[C.L.] has resided exclusively with [Mother and Father] and

his 4 year old half[-]brother since birth. [Mother and Father]

moved into their current residence in November [of] 2015. [They]

admit to locking [C.L.] and his 4 year old sibling [(collectively “the

boys”)] into their bedroom for periods of time during the moving

process so that the [boys] could not get into unsafe items or hurt

themselves while the parents were moving items. In fact,

[F]ather testified that they bought the locks for this purpose.

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1 By per curiam order entered November 12, 2019, this Court sua sponte

consolidated the appeals at Nos. 1602 and 1603 WDA 2019.

2 The parental rights of S.L. (“Father”) were also terminated; however, he filed

separate appeals at Nos. 1586 and 1587 WDA 2019.
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On January 6, 2016, [CYS] received a report regarding the

[boys] being locked in their room. On January 8, 2016,

[c]aseworker[,] Lindsey Johnston[,] was able to get into the

home. She arrived around 1:30 p.m.[,] and the [boys] were

upstairs in their bedroom at that time. There was feces on the

wall and the floor of the boys’ room[,] and the room smelled of

feces. There were also dirty diapers under the beds. Mother

explained to her that [the] boys were going through a phase

where they were smearing their feces on the wall. Both boys were

in diapers and were not toilet trained. There were no locks on

[the] outside of [the] door, but [she] could see holes where a lock

would have been. Ms. Johnston discussed at various times

possible service providers with [Mother and Father], but they were

not willing to accept services due to an issue that they previously

had with Parents as Teachers until after the [boys] were removed

from the home. To her knowledge[,] when she was in the home,

[Mother and Father] were closing both doors to the stairs when

the [boys] were upstairs[,] prior to the safety plan being put into

place on February 17, 2016. At other times throughout [CYS’s]

involvement with the family[,] both before and after the safety

plan was put in place, caseworkers took pictures of the [boys] in

their bedroom window at various times throughout the day. On

at least one occasion after [implementation of] the safety plan, a

picture was taken at one time and then another taken

approximately an hour later[,] and the [boys] were still in their

upstairs bedroom window. On January 29, 2016, two caseworkers

(Ms. Dunkle and Ms. Little) were in the home for a home check

and watched the [boys] change their own diapers.

Two other adults, Shelby Hagen and Matthew Carlson, who

resided in the same residence with the family from approximately

December [of] 2015 until late February [of] 2016, both testified

that [Mother and Father] kept the [boys] in their rooms for

extended periods of the day and that the [boys] were up typically

before their parents. Also, Ms. Hagen, Mr. Carlson, and [M]other

acknowledged that the [boys] actually played in their feces and

smeared it on themselves four to five times. Mother characterized

the boys[’] doing this as a “habit” during testimony and [as] a

“phase” to caseworker Johnston, which would connote more than

a limited number of times. Ms. Hagen and Mr. Carlson assisted

[Mother and Father] with the [boys] at least a few times per week

when [they] were sleeping. [CYS] witnessed Mr. Carlson

attending to the [boys] on at least one occasion while [Mother and

Father] slept. The [boys] woke between 6:00 a.m. and 7:00 a.m.
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each day and were allowed to be awake for a couple hours, then

took a nap upstairs in their room with the door shut, as well as

the two doors on the steps being closed. The [boys] also often

took “naps” in the afternoon and were often shut in their room in

the afternoon as well. The bedroom was devoid of toys or

anything with which the [boys] could occupy themselves.

On February 16, 2016, Jerry Prosser[,] who owns a home

next to where [Mother and Father] reside[,] was in the garage of

his property when he heard glass break and went to see what was

happening. He saw two little boys, both naked, swinging from the

curtains hanging out one of the upstairs windows of the family’s

residence. He went running and hollering[,] afraid he would have

to catch one or both of them. However, both boys fell into the

room. He heard one boy yell[,] “he’s bleeding.” He started

banging on the door to [the] residence[,] and after 45 to 50

seconds[,] he heard a woman’s voice asking what’s going on in

there. He told the woman through the window he was an EMT and

asked to check [on] the child. Eventually, he was let in the door[,]

and [he] went upstairs. [Father] did not know why he was in the

house and had not even gotten upstairs until approximately the

same time as Mr. Prosser. The child was taken to the [e]mergency

[r]oom in the family’s vehicle and received stitches to his leg. On

that date, Mr. Prosser observed the house to not be kept and

stated [that] it was quite a bit cooler upstairs than downstairs.

The next day, February 17, 2016, [CYS] put in place a safety

plan, which was signed by both [Mother and Father], to address

supervision of the [boys].... [O]ne of the requirements of this

safety plan was that the doors between the upstairs and

downstairs needed to remain open, as did the door to the [boys’]

bedroom. However, on multiple occasions after the safety plan

was in place[,] the doors were observed to be closed[,] and

[Mother and Father] admitted to closing the doors occasionally[,]

even after the safety plan.

On March 3, 2016, [c]aseworker[,] Brittani Falconi, went to

the family’s home to see Ms. Hagen and Mr. Carlson on an

unrelated matter. When she arrived, she found out the boys were

in their room. There was a pile of soiled[,] torn[-]up diapers in

the upstairs hallway[,] and the door to the upstairs was closed.

When she checked on the boys, their room had a strong odor and

there was vomit on the comforters. She took a picture of the

diapers in the hallway at 4:06 p.m. Ms. Falconi witnessed

[M]other come up and then go back downstairs while she was with
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her clients before she checked on the boys herself. Ms. Falconi,

based on the room conditions, called her supervisor. This

prompted [an] on-call [caseworker] to respond, as well as law

enforcement. Mother indicated [during her] testimony that the

[boys] went for a nap at 4:00 p.m.; however, she told

caseworker[,] Danielle Little[,] who was on call that day[,] that

the [boys] had gone down for a nap at 11:00 a.m.[,] and it was

between 5:00 p.m. and 5:30 p.m. when Ms. Little arrived at the

house. Ms. Little and Officer Jason Putt of the Bradford City Police

Department both saw vomit and human feces in the boys’ room

on the wall, floor, and bed[,] and on the [boys]. The door to the

upstairs was shut when Officer Putt and Ms. Little arrived. No one

could explain why the [boys] were vomiting, so Ms. Little took

them to the [e]mergency [r]oom. Upon arrival [at] the

[e]mergency [r]oom, one child was wearing shoes, on which

human feces was caked[,] and when he took off his shoes, he also

had human feces caked on his feet and under his toenails. The

other child was wearing footie pajamas[,] on which human feces

was caked on the bottoms. Both [boys] had human feces caked

under their fingernails.

Mother suffers from bipolar disorder and anxiety and has

partial complex seizures. She treats with The Guidance Center[,]

and is prescribed medications. Father is diagnosed with

intermittent explosive disorder, is treated through The Guidance

Center[,] and is prescribed medication.

The Master specifically finds that ... [M]other and [F]ather

were not providing adequate supervision to [C.L.] or his 4[-]year[-

]old sibling by keeping them contained in their bedroom for

extended periods of the day. Neither [M]other nor [F]ather

acknowledge that there is anything inappropriate about keeping

children ages 2 and 4 in a bedroom with a door shut upstairs[,

and] with two additional doors shut between the [boys] and the

downstairs. This is clearly a lack of appropriate supervision which

led to the [boys] doing things[,] such as smearing their own feces

all over their room and themselves[,] ... breaking the upstairs

window[,] and swinging on the curtains. It is specifically found

that [M]other[’s] and [F]ather’s testimony that the [boys] were

unattended for limited periods of time is not credible[,] as

otherwise the adults would have noticed the condition of the

[boys] and their room[,] and the [boys] could not have gotten

human feces under their fingernails and toenails and caked on

their feet and shoes in a brief period of time. Even if [M]other[’s]

and [F]ather’s testimony were credible and the [boys] were left
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completely unattended upstairs with all the doors shut for shorter

periods of time, this still evidences an extreme lack of supervision

on [M]other[’s] and [F]ather’s part[,] as these [boys] are 2 and 4

years of age.

Orphans’ Court Memorandum (“OCM I”), 9/26/19, at 2-4 (1603 WDA 2019)

(quoting Master’s Recommendation, 5/19/16).

CYS received a referral regarding D.S. on the date of her birth. Two

days later, she was placed in the same foster home as C.L. and their half- brother, pending adjudication. C.L. was adjudicated dependent on December

6, 2017. On November 9, 2018, CYS filed its petition for involuntary

termination of Mother’s parental rights of D.S. The orphans’ court

incorporated the following findings with respect to D.S. from the dependency

hearing in its memorandum regarding the termination of Mother’s parental

rights of D.S.:

At the time [D.S.] was born[,] Mother and Father were separated.

Mother had a different paramour who she was residing with and

her relationship with Father at the time was hostile.... Paternity

testing has confirmed that [Father] is [D.S.’s] biological [f]ather.

After [D.S.’s] birth[,] Mother and Father reconciled. They

have a multi[-]bedroom home. It has been kept clean and neat

and appropriate for [D.S.] to reside in. [Mother and Father] have

a crib there and other appropriate supplies. Concerns were

expressed regarding fleas in the home and cat feces and/or vomit.

However, other credible witnesses’ testimony demonstrated that

this is not a significant concern. Concerns were also raised

regarding Mother[’s] operating a vehicle. The assertion is that she

has a seizure disorder and that it is, therefore, a danger to her, ...

[C]hildren (if they are in the car with her)[,] and to the general

public[,] if she operates a motor vehicle. However, ... the initial

assertion that Mother has a seizure disorder is based solely on

limited prior statements that she does have such a disorder.

There is no medical evidence to support this assertion. CYS did

submit a [c]ertified [h]istory of Mother’s [d]riving [h]istory[,] and
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it does contain several convictions for “Drive While Re. Susp/Rev”

and “No License.” However, there are no medical restrictions

listed regarding Mother’s license status.... Father is employed and there are times that[,] if [D.S. were]

in [Mother and Father’s] care, Mother would be the primary

caretaker for [D.S.] There have been times during visits with

[D.S.] that [Mother and Father] have failed to provide appropriate

attention regarding [D.S.’s] care. She has been left in her swing

somewhat longer than was appropriate without [Mother or Father]

taking her out and directly interacting with her. [Mother and

Father] have also inappropriately relied on case aides to watch

[D.S.] when they go outside to smoke.... [T]he testimony of other

credible witnesses did not completely eliminate concerns

regarding the lack of interaction[,] but did diminish concerns. For

example, Kelly Zetwick, who is employed by [T]he Guidance

Center and works with the ... family, testified. She stated that she

is working with this family as part of the Parent[s] as Teacher[s]

program. She has worked with [them] since September of

2017[,] and attends visits at [their] home. She testified that the

visits “are going very well,” and “[Mother and Father] are

participating in the visits.” She indicated that [they] both ... ask

appropriate questions and respond to her suggestions. There

were issues regarding missed visits in [their] home. Caseworker

Joshua Blotzer testified that several visits were cancelled when he

arrived at [Mother and Father’s] home and no one answered the

door. These visits were scheduled to commence in the morning,

[with a] 7:30 a.m. to 8:30 a.m. start time. Although [Mother and

Father] certainly should have been awake and prepared for the

visits, it is unclear why greater efforts weren’t made to wake

[them] and to address the problem[.] Caseworker Blotzer

testified that he knocked for two or three minutes[,] and when no

one responded[,] he left. It was unclear how loud[ly] he

knocked....

Mother was ordered as part of a dependency action for a

sibling of [D.S.] to obtain an updated mental health evaluation

and [to] follow through with recommend[ed] treatment. She was

also ordered to complete Parent Child Interactive Therapy (PCIT).

Mother has not obtained the evaluation and has refused to

complete the PCIT program.... [Her] only explanation for why she

did not complete the PCIT program was that she dislikes the

therapist who administers the program. This is a very negative

development[,] as Mother should put her child’s interest first and

not her own personal feelings. [Mother and Father] have also had
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an issue with signing requested releases for CYS to obtain

information regarding their progress or lack of progress. Both

[Mother and Father] have argued over small details, like a name

being misspelled, and used this as an excuse not to sign requested

releases or paperwork. This attitude, which doesn’t occur all the

time, is still troubling and counterproductive. It reflects [their]

attempt to battle and nitpick instead of focusing on what needs to

be done to get ... [C]hildren back into their care.

Orphans’ Court Memorandum (“OCM II”), 9/26/19, at 2-4 (1602 WDA 2019)

(quoting Orphans’ Court’s Findings, 12/6/17).

Additionally, the orphans’ court issued the following findings regarding

both Children:

In both C.L.’s and D.S.[’s] dependency proceedings[,]

[Mother and Father] were ordered to: 1) follow through with the

Parents as Teachers [p]rogram; 2) keep their home clean and

neat and appropriate for the return of [Children] at any time; 3)

fully cooperate with service providers and CYS at all times; 4) sign

releases requested by CYS for the release of information regarding

[Mother’s and Father’s] progress in services and treatment and

[with] [C]hildren; 5) attend all medical appointments for ...

[C]hildren; 6) be awake and ready for visits when CYS and/or

service providers arrive at their home with ... [C]hildren; and[] 7)

provide urine screens when requested by CYS. Visits were set for

[twice per] week, 4 hours each.

At a review hearing held on June 21, 2018[,] the court found

that [Children] were doing well in the [Foster Parents’] home.

However, [C.L.] was experiencing some behavioral difficulties.

Mother had made some progress regarding the reunification plan.

She was fully cooperating with the Parents as Teachers [p]rogram.

[Mother and Father] had missed some of D.S.[’s] medical

appointments[,] but there was a reasonable explanation [as to]

why they had missed several of them. [Mother and Father] did

not sign releases as ordered by the court. They would sign some

of them but argued ... regarding the release of all relevant

information, particularly regarding their progress in treatment.

The court specifically indicated at the hearing and in the review

order for the hearing: “If Mother and Father won’t allow the court

and CYS to see how things are going[,] the court will assume there

is something that [Mother and Father] do not want us to see.”
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The court also found: “Mother’s reluctance (regarding the

releases and following the plan in general) is motivated, maybe

even mandated, by Father.” Meetings and discussions with Father

and CYS were unproductive.... Father was ordered to complete

anger management therapy/counseling. [Mother and Father]

were again ordered to sign requested releases and [to] follow the

disposition plan. The [f]indings and [o]rder from the June 21,

2018[] review hearing [were] admitted as part of the permanency

hearing record.

At the time of the August 13, 2018[] [review] hearing[,]

Mother and Father had separated.... Based on the lack of progress

regarding the reunification plan and the turmoil in [Mother and

Father’s] current situation/relationship[,] the visitation schedule

was modified to one supervised visit between Father and ...

[C]hildren each week[,] and one (separated from that with Father)

with Mother. [Mother and Father] had also missed several

appointments for themselves and ... [C]hildren and were not

attending their mental health appointments.

OCM I at 14-17.

The orphans’ court held hearings on the termination petitions on April

5, June 11, and August 30, 2019. Multiple witnesses were called by CYS;

however, Mother and Father did not testify. See OCM I at 17-37 (summarizing

the witnesses’ testimony). On September 26, 2019, the orphans’ court

entered its memoranda and orders terminating Mother’s parental rights to

Children, pursuant to 23 Pa.C.S. §§ 2511(a)(1), (2), (5), (8), and (b). See

OCM I; OCM II.

On October 25, 2019, Mother filed timely notices of appeal, along with

concise statements of matters complained of on appeal, pursuant to 23

Pa.C.S. § 2511(a)(2)(i). Mother now presents the following issue for our

review: “Whether the [orphans’] court abused its discretion in finding that

[CYS] produced clear and convincing evidence to support an involuntary
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termination, under 23 Pa.C.S.[] [§§] 2511(a)(1), (a)(2), (a)(5) and (a)(8)[,]

of [Mother’s] parental rights[?]” Mother’s Brief at 9.

We review an order terminating parental rights in accordance with the

following standard:

When reviewing an appeal from a decree terminating

parental rights, we are limited to determining whether the

decision of the trial court is supported by competent evidence.

Absent an abuse of discretion, an error of law, or insufficient

evidentiary support for the trial court’s decision, the decree must

stand. Where a trial court has granted a petition to involuntarily

terminate parental rights, this Court must accord the hearing

judge’s decision the same deference that we would give to a jury

verdict. We must employ a broad, comprehensive review of the

record in order to determine whether the trial court’s decision is

supported by competent evidence.

In re R.N.J., 985 A.2d 273, 276 (Pa. Super. 2009) (quoting In re S.H., 879

A.2d 802, 805 (Pa. Super. 2005)). Moreover, we have explained that:

The standard of clear and convincing evidence is defined as

testimony that is so “clear, direct, weighty and convincing as to

enable the trier of fact to come to a clear conviction, without

hesitance, of the truth of the precise facts in issue.”

Id. (quoting In re J.L.C. & J.R.C., 837 A.2d 1247, 1251 (Pa. Super. 2003)).

The trial court is free to believe all, part, or none of the evidence presented

and is likewise free to make all credibility determinations and resolve conflicts

in the evidence. In re M.G., 855 A.2d 68, 73-74 (Pa. Super. 2004). If

competent evidence supports the trial court’s findings, we will affirm even if

the record could also support the opposite result. In re Adoption of T.B.B., 835 A.2d 387, 394 (Pa. Super. 2003).
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We are guided further by the following: Termination of parental rights

is governed by section 2511 of the Adoption Act, which requires a bifurcated

analysis.

Our case law has made clear that under [s]ection 2511, the court

must engage in a bifurcated process prior to terminating parental

rights. Initially, the focus is on the conduct of the parent. The

party seeking termination must prove by clear and convincing

evidence that the parent’s conduct satisfies the statutory grounds

for termination delineated in [s]ection 2511(a). Only if the court

determines that the parent’s conduct warrants termination of his

or her parental rights does the court engage in the second part of

the analysis pursuant to [s]ection 2511(b): determination of the

needs and welfare of the child under the standard of best interests

of the child. One major aspect of the needs and welfare analysis

concerns the nature and status of the emotional bond between

parent and child, with close attention paid to the effect on the child

of permanently severing any such bond.

In re L.M., 923 A.2d 505, 511 (Pa. Super. 2007) (citing 23 Pa.C.S. § 2511,

other citations omitted). The burden is upon the petitioner to prove by clear

and convincing evidence that the asserted grounds for seeking the termination

of parental rights are valid. R.N.J., 985 A.2d at 276.

With regard to section 2511(b), we direct our analysis to the facts

relating to that section. This Court has explained that:

Subsection 2511(b) focuses on whether termination of parental

rights would best serve the developmental, physical, and

emotional needs and welfare of the child. In In re C.M.S., 884

A.2d 1284, 1287 (Pa. Super. 2005), this Court stated, “Intangibles

such as love, comfort, security, and stability are involved in the

inquiry into the needs and welfare of the child.” In addition, we

instructed that the trial court must also discern the nature and

status of the parent-child bond, with utmost attention to the effect

on the child of permanently severing that bond. Id. However, in

cases where there is no evidence of a bond between a parent and

child, it is reasonable to infer that no bond exists. In re K.Z.S.,
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946 A.2d 753, 762-63 (Pa. Super. 2008). Accordingly, the extent

of the bond-effect analysis necessarily depends on the

circumstances of the particular case. Id. at 763.

In re Adoption of J.M., 991 A.2d 321, 324 (Pa. Super. 2010).

In this case, the trial court terminated Mother’s parental rights pursuant

to sections 2511(a)(1), (2), (5), (8), and (b). We need only agree with the

trial court as to any one subsection of section 2511(a), as well as section

2511(b), in order to affirm. In re B.L.W., 843 A.2d 380, 384 (Pa. Super.

2004) (en banc). Here, we analyze the court’s decision to terminate under

section 2511(a)(8) and (b), which provide as follows:

(a) General rule.--The rights of a parent in regard to a child may

be terminated after a petition filed on any of the following

grounds: ***

(8) The child has been removed from the care of the parent

by the court or under a voluntary agreement with an

agency, 12 months or more have elapsed from the date of

removal or placement, the conditions which led to the

removal or placement of the child continue to exist and

termination of parental rights would best serve the needs

and welfare of the child. ***

(b) Other considerations.--The court in terminating the rights

of a parent shall give primary consideration to the developmental,

physical and emotional needs and welfare of the child. The rights

of a parent shall not be terminated solely on the basis of

environmental factors such as inadequate housing, furnishings,

income, clothing and medical care if found to be beyond the

control of the parent. With respect to any petition filed pursuant

to subsection (a)(1), (6) or (8), the court shall not consider any

efforts by the parent to remedy the conditions described therein

which are first initiated subsequent to the giving of notice of the

filing of the petition.
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23 Pa.C.S. § 2511(a)(8), (b).

We first address whether the orphans’ court abused its discretion by

terminating Mother’s parental rights pursuant to section 2511(a)(8).

“[T]o terminate parental rights pursuant to 23 Pa.C.S.[] §

2511(a)(8), the following factors must be demonstrated: (1) the

child has been removed from parental care for 12 months or more

from the date of removal; (2) the conditions which led to the

removal or placement of the child continue to exist; and (3)

termination of parental rights would best serve the needs and

welfare of the child.” In re Adoption of M.E.P., 825 A.2d 1226,

1275-76 (Pa. Super. 2003); 23 Pa.C.S.[] § 2511(a)(8). “Section

2511(a)(8) sets a 12-month time frame for a parent to remedy

the conditions that led to the children’s removal by the court.” In

re A.R., 837 A.2d 560, 564 (Pa. Super. 2003). Once the 12- month period has been established, the court must next

determine whether the conditions that led to the child’s removal

continue to exist, despite the reasonable good faith efforts of the

Agency supplied over a realistic time period. Id. Termination

under Section 2511(a)(8) does not require the court to evaluate

a parent’s current willingness or ability to remedy the conditions

that initially caused placement or the availability or efficacy of

Agency services. In re Adoption of T.B.B., 835 A.2d 387, 396

(Pa. Super. 2003); In re Adoption of M.E.P., supra. In re Z.P., 994 A.2d 1108, 1118 (Pa. Super. 2010) (emphasis added). Here, Mother argues that the orphans’ court erred in terminating her

parental rights pursuant to section 2511(a)(8). Mother’s Brief at 18. She

avers that the conditions which led to Children’s removal “were remedied, and

to the extent that they were not, [Mother] was continually engaging in

services reasonably likely to remedy the conditions[.]” Id. Mother claims

that she “maintained an appropriate home with no safety concerns and had

appropriate parenting skills.” Id. at 22. She further contends that she had a

plan in place for Children’s return home. Id. With regards to her mental
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health, Mother admits that she was inconsistent with her mental health

treatment, but asserts that CYS “completely failed to establish that there was

ever any ongoing mental health concerns as it relates to [Mother’s]

cooperation with services or [the] ability to parent her [C]hildren.” Id. at 24- 25. Regarding the needs and welfare of Children, Mother states that the

orphans’ court “completely ignored [her] progress and [C.L.’s] continued

stated preference that [he] wished to return to [Mother’s] care.” Id. at 25.

In sum, Mother argues that she rectified the conditions that led to placement,

and that CYS presented insufficient evidence to terminate her parental rights.

The record belies her claims.

As to the first element of section 2511(a)(8), concerning whether

Children have been removed from parental care for twelve months or more,

the orphans’ court explained that C.L. has been in placement with his Foster

Parents for over 31⁄2 years, and D.S. has never resided with Mother and Father.

She was placed with Foster Parents two days after her birth in February of

2017. Thus, the statutory period of twelve months has clearly been met.

As to the second element of section 2511(a)(8), regarding whether the

conditions which led to Children’s removal continue to exist, the orphans’ court

found that the reason Children were placed into foster care was Mother’s (and

Father’s) “inability to provide stable, safe and appropriate care for [them].”

OCM I at 41; OCM II at 47. In support of its determination that these

conditions still exist, the orphans’ court opined:
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Time after time after time[,] witnesses testified to Father’s

explosive anger and confrontational approach. Instead of focusing

on the care ... [C]hildren need and improving their parenting skills,

[Mother and Father] are focused on the immediate fight, creating

a fight regarding just about everything.... Although she has not

shown the same level of anger and hostility as Father (but still

demonstrating a greater level of hostility than is justified), Mother

completely defers to Father in everything. She accepts his anger

and outrage as appropriate, defending it instead of stepping up

and acting as a parent when it is clear that Father can’t or won’t.

Even though [Mother and Father] have refused to share

information and sign releases, there is still evidence in the record

that demonstrates that [they] both ... have a long, significant[,]

and concerning mental health history/conditions. The Guidance

Center records reflect that [Mother and Father] have been

involved in mental treatment for some time, with sporadic

attendance and limited motivation to address their mental

health.... Mother outlined her very traumatic childhood to Dr.

[Peter] von Korf,

[3]

including being removed from her biological

parents. She indicated that she suffers from depression. She has

been involved in “medication management appointments” at

times, but has also indicated that she hasn’t been taking her

prescribed medications. With this known history in mind[,] it is

very troubling that [Mother and Father] are refusing to allow CYS

and ... the court additional information regarding their mental

health situations. Mother has directly stated that she “did not

want her mental health records to be reviewed by CYS....”

In addition to their very negative attitude preventing progress

when they do actually appear for appointments, services, etc.,

[Mother and Father] have a consistent pattern of not showing up

at all. The number of missed and late appointments by [Mother

and Father] is so substantial it demonstrates: 1) they are

intentionally missing them just to be difficult; or[] 2) they have

an engrained psychological flaw or condition that prevents them

from being able to understand and make meaningful efforts to

appear for appointments. They have been late for or failed to

appear for: court proceedings, the evaluation with Dr. von Korf ____________________________________________

3 Dr. von Korf is a clinical psychologist who specializes in the field of bonding

and assessment. He met with Mother, Father, C.L., and Foster Parents and

conducted several clinical psychology tests. The orphans’ court found Dr. von

Korf’s testimony and opinions “highly credible.” OCM I at 19.
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(caused him to have to change his schedule for the evaluation),

mental health counseling appointments, important school

meetings, visits with ... [C]hildren, medical appointments, and[]

appointments with service providers. [Mother and Father] have

been substantially late or failed to attend more appointments,

etc., than they have appeared for.

OCM I at 41-43; OCM II at 47-49. The court further observed that since the

beginning of the dependency proceedings, the only thing that has changed is

“an increase in Mother’s ... hostility to services and an increase in the list of

those that have tried to help [Mother and Father,] only to face Father’s anger

and hostility.” OCM I at 43; OCM II at 49. The court emphasized that

“although Father is at the center of the majority of the hostility, Mother is

either complacent to it or supportive of it.” Id.

Finally, as to the third element of section 2511(a)(8), concerning

whether termination of parental rights would best serve the needs and welfare

of Children, the orphans’ court found that CYS has met its burden. See OCM

I at 44; OCM II at 50. The court determined that sufficient evidence was

presented to demonstrate Mother is incapable of and/or refuses to provide

appropriate care for Children. Id. The court elaborated:

[Mother’s] mental health situation and history prevent [her] from

being able to understand proper parenting techniques and the

needs of any children in [her] care. As Dr. von Korf explained,

[Mother and Father] still don’t recognize the severity of their prior

actions, like locking [C.L.] and his half-brother in a feces filled

room. He pointed out that Mother brushed this aside by

explaining[,] “C.L.’s room was a little messy.” If they are unwilling

to accept that there was a problem, and they definitely are not

willing to accept that there was, there is[,] no potential for

change; and, if there is no potential for change[,] there is the

definite, in fact highly likely probability, that if [C]hildren are in
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their care in the future it will result in further locked rooms and

emotionally and physically damaged [C]hildren.

OCM at 50. We deem the orphans’ court’s determination under section

2511(a)(8) to be well-supported by the record, and we discern no abuse of

discretion.

Mother does not contest the trial court’s application of section 2511(b).

In light of the brief submitted by Children’s legal counsel, however, we review

the court’s analysis under this subsection.4 The orphans’ court opined the

following regarding D.S. and her bond with Mother:

[D.S.] has a very limited bond with [Mother and Father]. For the

two years and seven plus months of her life[,] she has been in the

care of [Foster Parents,] and she recognizes them as her parental

caretakers. The frequent missed visits and appointments by

[Mother and Father] ha[ve] limited the bond and connection that

[D.S.] could have had with [them]. Further, to the extent that

she has one[,] it is a negative bond. [Mother and Father] have an

inability to understand and learn how to lovingly interact with her

and provide for her needs.

[D.S.] has a strong and stable bond with [Foster Parents], their family members[,] and her brother[,] C.L. If ... [C.L.] was

removed from [Foster Parents’] home[,] D.S.] would suffer a loss

from losing her connection with C.L. However, there is also [a]

strong basis to terminate Mother’s and Father’s parental rights for

C.L. and to allow him to also be adopted by [Foster Parents]. OCM II at 51. ____________________________________________

4

In In re Adoption of L.B.M., 161 A.3d 172 (Pa. 2017), our Supreme Court

held that 23 Pa.C.S. § 2313(a) requires that counsel be appointed to represent

the legal interests of any child involved in a contested involuntary termination

proceeding. The Court defined a child’s legal interest as synonymous with his

or her preferred outcome. Id. at 174. Here, C.L. expressed a desire to reunite

with Mother and Father. Accordingly, the orphans’ court appointed separate

legal counsel to represent Children’s legal interest.
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In regards to C.L., the court concluded:

[C.L.] does have a bond with [Mother and Father], but [it]

is not a productive bond. The court accepts Dr. von Korf’s opinion

that C.L.’s bond with [Mother and Father] “is out to extreme on

insecure, ambivalent bond” [which negatively affects] C.L.’s

security and development. [5] The court also accepts Dr. von Korf’s

opinion that “if [Mother’s and Father’s] rights were terminated,

and [C.L.] recognizes permanency in [the] foster home, [he]

would want therapy [for him], but it would be his final opportunity

to get permanency.”

OCM I at 44-45.

Counsel for Children argues that the orphans’ court’s findings are not

supported by competent evidence and that severing the bond between C.L.

and Mother would cause irreparable harm. See Brief of Counsel for Children

at 2. Counsel for Children avers that the orphans’ court failed to give primary

consideration to C.L.’s developmental, physical, and emotional needs, in

accordance with section 2511(b). Id. Counsel asserts that C.L.’s wishes to

be returned to Mother and Father have been made known,6 and claims that ____________________________________________

5 Dr. von Korf described an insecure bond as where “a parent downplays [a]

child’s needs” and “routinely prefers [the] child to be self-occupied.” OCM I

at 20. He described an ambivalent bond as: “The child is resistant. On shaky

terms with parents. Aggressive, cry. Behaviors make no sense. Parents have

been inconsistently available. All too often[,] parents are not responding to

the child’s needs. The child has temper tantrums, [is] anxious.” Id. at 20- 21.

6 Counsel cites numerous examples in support of his claim. See Id. at 5

(C.L.’s Spanish teacher, Miss Splain, testifying that C.L. told her he wants to

live with Mother and Father) (citing N.T. Termination, 4/5/19, at 173); Id. at

6 (caseworker, Elizabeth Girard, testifying that C.L. misses Mother and Father

“and would like to go live with them”) (quoting N.T. Termination, 6/11/19, at

85); Id. (Foster Mother’s stating: “If you ask him, [C.L.] says he does want
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the orphans’ court abused its discretion in failing to properly consider the

damage that would result from terminating Mother’s parental rights to him.

Id. at 5, 7.

Contrary to Children’s counsel’s assertion, the orphans’ court gave

weight and consideration to C.L.’s indication that he wants to live with Mother

and Father. See OCM I at 45; OCM II at 51. However, the court agreed with

Dr. Korf’s opinion that:

“C.L.’s preference does not impact my opinions here today. He ...

feels attachment to [Mother and Father]. He is insecurely

attached to them. He has the capacity of a 5 year old. He does

not have the ability to step back on his experiences with them.”

C.L.’s preference is based on the appropriate limits that are placed

on him in the foster home. He “does not like the rules in the foster

home” and believes there will be less rules and hassle in [Mother

and Father’s] home. However, it is the existence of those “rules”

and stability in the [Foster Parents’] home that give him, an

already troubled child due to his past with [Mother and Father],

the greatest opportunity to have a productive childhood and [to]

grow into a stable adult. It was very revealing when C.L.’s teacher

indicated that C.L. [would] tell her that he “hates school” and “I

won’t have to go to school when I live with [Mother and Father].”

Where did this thought come from? C.L. either concluded,

because he is an observant young man, that [Mother and Father]

aren’t on the ball and probably won’t be able to get him to school

if he resides with them; or, [Mother and Father] told him that he

won’t have to go to school if he lives with them. Either way, the

“lack of school with [Mother and Father]” comment by C.L.

demonstrates that his preference is based on his consideration of

invalid factors. Therefore, the court concludes that termination of

parental rights for C.L. will also best fulfill his developmental,

physical and emotional needs and welfare.... [D.S.] will [also] be

able to maintain her relationship and connection with C.L.[,] if

parental rights are terminated regarding her.... ____________________________________________

to go live with his [Mother and Father]”) (quoting N.T. Termination, 6/11/19,

at 85).
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The court specifically finds that: 1) [Foster Parents] have been

providing exceptional care for [Children]; 2) [Foster Parents’]

ability to provide care for ... [C]hildren has been limited by the fact

that [Mother and Father] have refused to assist regarding

[Children’s] medical, educational[,] and mental health care[,] ...

and [Foster Parents] do not have authority to do so; and 3) [Foster

Parents] plan on adopting [Children] if that is an option.

OCM II at 51-53. We are convinced that the orphans’ court carefully and

thoroughly considered Children’s best interest, in light of C.L.’s stated

preference. We discern no abuse of discretion as to section 2511(b). Accordingly, we affirm the orders terminating Mother’s parental rights

to Children, pursuant to 23 Pa.C.S. § 2511(a)(8) and (b).

Orders affirmed.

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 5/27/2020