1 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

MEMORANDUM OPINION
This matter comes before the C ourt on review of pro se P laintiff Heidi Peterson ’s application to proceed in forma pauperis

. The Court will grant the application, but dismiss the
C omplaint for lack of subject

- matter jurisdiction because Plaintiff has not established standing to

sue. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(h)(3) (requiring court to dismiss an action “at any time” if it determines that subject

- matter jurisdiction is lacking); Haase v. Sessions , 835 F.2d 902, 906 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (“[T]he d efect of standing is a defect in subject matter jurisdiction.”).
I. Background
Plaintiff Heidi Peterson alleges that the “Federal Reserves [ sic ] is accused of artificially holding up housing prices through their quantitative easing policies.” Compl. at 2

. According to
Plaintiff , this leads to “homelessness ” and “ contribut[es] to the change in birth rate and racial demographic of the country[.]” Id. at 4. Plaintiff has explained how the policies had an effect on her and her family:
I was not able to live in what America offered me as affordable housing for my safety and safety of my child and I was not able to afford a home in a white community where I would probably not HEIDI PETERSON , Plaintiff,

v. Civil Action No. 14
- 1053 (UNA) BOARD OF GOVERNORS OF THE FEDERAL RESERVE SYSTEM , Defendant.2 of been a target of attack and discrimination because me like many others can’t enter the higher end housing market [ sic ]

. Id. at 2.
Plaintiff refers to a specific attack that she was subjected to when “[t]he police refused to take police reports or investigate or send . . . prosecutors ” when a gang took over Plaintiff’s
house. Id. She claims that she needed to live in Detroit, “due to the fact it was one of the only places [she] had access to affordable housing, as [she] most likely could not get a loan. ” Id. The
gang purportedly took over her home because she could not live ther e while pregnant or with a
child because there was lead

- paint toxin. See i d. Plaintiff requests that this Court stop the “Federal Reserve [’] s Quantitative Easing
program ,” order the sale of mortgage

- backed securities in the open market, and direct the Fed eral Reserve to “[r]epay the disenfranchised people . . . treble damages . . . by possibly placing them in homes they have been unable to buy or rent due t o the artificial price fixing ” among other
relief. Id. at 7

- 8.
II. Analysis Article III of the Constitution limits the power of the federal judiciary to the resolution of
“Cases” and “Controversies.” Because “standing is an essential and unchanging part of the case

or - controversy requirement of Article III,” Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife , 504 U.S. 555, 560 (1992), finding that a plaintiff has standing is a necessary “predicate to any exercise of [the Court’s] jurisdiction.” Fla. Audubon Soc’y v. Bentsen , 94 F.3d 658, 663 (D.C. Cir. 1996); see also Allen v. Wright , 468 U.S. 737, 750 (1984) (discussing case

- or - controversy requirement). “This limitation is no mere formality: it ‘defines with respect to the Judicial Branch the idea of separation of powers on which the Federal Government is founded.’” Dominguez v. UAL Corp. , 666 F.3 d 1359, 1361 (D.C. Cir. 2012) (quoting Allen , 468 U.S. at 750).3 The doctrine of standing “requires federal courts to satisfy themselves that ‘the plaintiff has alleged such a personal stake in the outcome of the controversy as to warrant [ her ] invocation
of federal

- court jurisdiction.” Summers v. Earth Island Inst. , 555 U.S. 488, 493 (2009) (citing
Warth v. Seldin , 422 U.S. 490, 498

- 99 (1975)). “ To establish Article III standing, an injury must be ‘concrete, particularized, and actual or imminent; fairl y traceable to the challenged action; and
redr essable by a favorable ruling.’ ” Clapper v. Amnesty Intern. USA , 133 S. Ct. 1138, 1147 (2013) (quoting Monsanto Co. v. Geertson Seed Farms , 130 S. Ct. 2743, 27 47 (2010)).
While Plaintiff’s situation may be unfortunate, her claim fails to satisfy the last two elements of standing

. It is unclear how the Federal Reser ve’s policies caused Plaintiff the harm she alleges , and it is even more speculative to assume that a favorable decision by this C ourt will
prov ide her the relief she desires

. Assuming Plaintiff’s loss of her home is a “concrete and particularized” injury , “the line of causation between [the Federal Reserve’s] conduct” and her injuries “is attenuated at best.”
See Allen , 468 U.S. at 757; see also Vardon v. Fed. Reserve Sys. , No. 11

- 1565, 2011 WL 3847168, at *1 (D.D.C. Aug. 31, 2011) (dismissing plaintiff’s claim against Federal Reserve because Plaintiff’s financial losses were not fairly traceable to Federal Reserve ’ s allegedly failed policies ) , aff’d , 448 Fed. App’x 77 (D.C. Cir. 2012) ( per curiam ). Plaintiff claims that she had
to live in Detroit because “she most likely could not get a loan.” See Compl. at 2. Then she alleges that beca use she had to live in Detroit , there was lead paint ; when she became pregnant , she needed to move out. See i d. After this , a gang took over and the police did not investigate.
See i d. The injury to Plaintiff is “highly indirect and ‘results from the independent action of [ multiple] third part [ies] not before the court.’” See Allen , 468 U.S. at 758 (quoting Simon v. Eastern Kentucky Welfare Rights Org. , 426 U.S. 26, 42 ( 1976)). Therefore , even if the Federal4 Reserve’s policy adversely affect ed the housing market , it is entirely speculative to assume that Plaintiff’s harms were “fairly traceable” to Defendant’s conduct because there are too many li nks
in the chain of causation. See Allen , 468 U.S. at 759 (“The links in the chain of causation between the challenged Gover nment conduct and the asserted injury are far too weak for the chain as a whole to sustain responde nts’ standing.”). Similarly, any inquiry in to whether Plaintiff’s injuries are redressab le by this Court would involve substantial guesswork. See ASARCO Inc. v. Kadish , 490 U.S. 605, 614 (1989) (opinion of K ennedy , J.) (“[I]t is pure speculation whether the lawsuit would result in any actual tax relief for respondents .”)

. If this Court were to order the Federal Reserve to stop its Quantitative Easing Prog ram or order the sale of mortgaged

- backed securities, the possible effect
on the housing market w ould be entirely unclear

. But even if the Court assumes that Plaintiff’s proposed policies would be beneficial to the United States economy , it is “pure specu lation” to assume that this would fix Plaintiff ’s problem of not being able to live in her desired house in her
desired neighborhood. The Court, accor dingly, will an issue an Order dismissing the case without prejudice

. /s/ James E. Boasberg JAMES E. BOASBERG United States District Judge Date: June 20 , 2014