96-014

 IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF MONTANA

 No. 97-014

 ______________________________

JARED PRESTON, )

 ) 

 Plaintiff and Petitioner, ) O P I N I O N

 ) 

 ) And

 v. )

 ) O R D E R

THE MONTANA EIGHTEENTH JUDICIAL )

DISTRICT COURT, GALLATIN COUNTY, )

and THE HONORABLE THOMAS A. OLSON, ) 

PRESIDING JUDGE, )

 )

 Respondents. )

 ______________________________

 Petitioner Jared Preston, petitions this Court pursuant to Rule 17, M.R.App.

P.,

to issue a writ of supervisory control and vacate the order of the Eighteenth 

Judicial

District Court, Gallatin County, limiting the scope of discovery. We vacate the 

District

Court's order to the extent that it limits the scope of Preston's discovery.

 We consider the following issue and subissues in this Opinion and Order:

 1. Is a writ of supervisory control appropriate in this case?

 a. Did the District Court err in denying discovery of evidence of

substantially similar injuries caused by the same design defect in other product 

models

manufactured by the Defendant?

 b. Did the District Court err in limiting discovery to the time period

beginning with the manufacture of the N12 model roofing nailer and ending with the

Plaintiff's injury?

 Factual and Procedural History

 This request for a writ arises out of a products liability action in which 

Jared

Preston alleges defective design of the N12 model pneumatic roofing nailer 

manufactured

by Respondent Stanley-Bostich. Jared was working as a roofer with his brother and 

coworker Jeremy Preston when the injury occurred. Jared was laying out shingles on a

roof while Jeremy nailed the shingles in place using the N12 model nailer. Jared 

was on

his knees and had bent over to retrieve a shingle blown out of place by the wind. 

Jeremy

was standing behind Jared with the nailer in his hand. As Jared straightened up, he

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bumped the tip of the nailer causing it to discharge a nail into his head, causing 

him

injury. 

 The complaint against Stanley-Bostich alleges design defect and alternative 

design,

and requests punitive damages. Preston's claims are based upon the fact that, prior 

to

the development of the N12 model nailer, Stanley-Bostich had designed, patented,

manufactured, and marketed a safer "sequential-trip" trigger mechanism on most of its

pneumatic nailers. The trigger mechanism on the N12 model nailer is known as a

"contact-trip" mechanism, which is a spring loaded device on the tip of the nailer 

that

engages when it is pressed against any surface. Once the trigger is depressed, the 

nailer

will fire and continue to fire each time the tip comes into contact with an object.

 Preston served Stanley-Bostich with discovery requests asking for information

about the alternative design and information concerning injuries caused by the 

models not

equipped with the alternative sequential-trip safety mechanism. Stanley-Bostich 

refused

to provide any information pre-dating the manufacture of the N12, or any information

concerning injuries caused by any model other than the N12.

 Preston moved the District Court to compel discovery. The District Court 

granted

the motion, but limited discovery to the N12 model nailer, and to the time period 

from

the manufacture of the N12 to the date of Preston's injury. Preston requested

reconsideration of the restrictions imposed on the discovery. The District Court 

declined

to reconsider. Preston asks this Court to issue a writ of supervisory control 

vacating the

restrictions ordered by the District Court and compelling Stanley-Bostich to answer 

the

discovery requests. Stanley-Bostich filed a response in which it argued the 

substantive

merits of the District Court's order but did not contest the procedural 

appropriateness of

supervisory control in this case. In a March 18, 1997 order, we accepted original

jurisdiction of the issue raised in Preston's application for writ.

 Discussion

 1. Is a writ of supervisory control appropriate in this case?

 

 This Court has recently clarified the standard for determining whether to 

exercise

supervisory control. Plumb v. Fourth Jud. Dist. Court (Mont. 1996), 927 P.2d 1011,

53 St.Rep. 1187. Prior to Plumb, there existed two lines of authority which set 

forth the

standard for our exercise of supervisory control. The more commonly used standard 

was

that " 'supervisory control is appropriate where the district court is proceeding 

under a

mistake of law, and in so doing is causing a gross injustice.' " Plumb, 927 P.2d at 

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1014

(citations omitted). This line of authority evolved from the decision in State ex 

rel.

Whiteside v. District Court (1900), 24 Mont. 539, 63 P. 395, in which the Court held

that one of the functions of supervisory control is to "enable this court to control 

the

course of litigation in the inferior courts where these courts are proceeding within 

the

jurisdiction, but by a mistake of law, or willful disregard of it, are doing a gross

injustice, and there is no appeal, or the remedy by appeal is inadequate." 

Whiteside, 63

P. at 400.

 A second line of authority followed our decision in State ex rel. Racicot v. 

District

Court (1990), 244 Mont. 521, 798 P.2d 1004, where we held that the exercise of

supervisory control was appropriate upon the satisfaction of three circumstances. 

Plumb,

927 P.2d at 1015. The Racicot decision was subsequently interpreted to mean that all

three circumstances must be present before supervisory control will be accepted. 

Plumb,

927 P.2d at 1015. In Plumb, we decided that there may be cases in which supervisory

control is appropriate but which do not meet all three circumstances. Therefore, we 

held

that "to the extent that the Racicot decision suggests that all three elements must 

be

established before supervisory control is exercised, and to the extent that 

subsequent

decisions have applied the test in that fashion, they are reversed." Plumb, 927 

P.2d at

1015. We therefore followed the Whiteside line of authority for determining when

supervisory control is appropriate and noted that "this Court has followed the 

practice of

proceeding on a case-by-case basis though we are careful not to substitute the power 

of

supervisory control for an appeal." Plumb, 927 P.2d at 1015 (citing State ex rel. 

Reid

v. District Court (1953), 126 Mont. 489, 255 P.2d 693). 

 In Plumb, we held that the constitutionality of the statute in question was an

appropriate issue to decide by supervisory control because the petitioner's remedy of

appeal was inadequate and the denial of a speedy remedy by supervisory control would

be a denial of justice. We held that without the exercise of supervisory control 

"the

course of discovery will be affected, the cost of preparation and trial will be 

affected,

settlement by the parties will be rendered more difficult, and the value of any 

verdict will

be questionable, meaning additional time and expense for a resolution of this issue 

by

appeal and the inevitable subsequent litigation." Plumb, 927 P.2d at 1016.

 The present case involves a restriction on the discovery of information 

pertaining

to a products liability case. This Court has, in prior decisions, addressed the 

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propriety

of supervisory control in the discovery context. 

 Where the exercise of supervisory control over discovery proceedings will 

thwart

the purposes of the discovery rules contained in the Montana Rules of Civil Procedure

and where the relator has an adequate remedy of appeal, this Court will not issue a 

writ. 

State ex rel. Guarantee Insurance Co. v. District Court (1981), 194 Mont. 64, 634 

P.2d

648. In Guarantee Insurance we denied Guarantee's request for a writ of supervisory

control to avoid defeating the policy of speedy, inexpensive and just methods of

discovery, because its application for writ was untimely, because it failed to 

exhaust

available remedies in the district court, and because it had an adequate remedy by 

way

of appeal in that it could ask for expenses of producing the documents as part of the

judgment or on appeal. In Guarantee Insurance the district court had entered an 

order

denying the defendant's objections to interrogatories and directing it to comply 

with the

discovery requests. Guarantee Insurance, 634 P.2d at 649. In discussing the policy

considerations of accepting jurisdiction to review the discovery order, we held that

allowing the defendant to contest the court's order directing it to answer the

interrogatories would "open a Pandora's Box of abuses" of the discovery process. 

Guarantee Insurance, 634 P.2d at 651. We noted that accepting the writ in that case

would defeat the purpose and goal of the Montana Rules of Civil Procedure to provide

a speedy, inexpensive, and just method of discovering facts upon which each party's 

right

of action depends. Guarantee Insurance, 634 P.2d at 651.

 In State ex rel. Burlington Northern R.R. Co. v. District Court (1989), 239 

Mont.

207, 211, 779 P.2d 885, 888, we recognized this Court's reluctance to grant writs in 

the

context of discovery issues because of the interlocutory nature of a discovery 

order. 

Nonetheless, we noted the following two instances in which we had made an exception

and had exercised supervisory control in discovery matters. B.N., 779 P.2d at 888. 

 In Kuiper v. District Court (1981), 193 Mont. 452, 632 P.2d 694 (Kuiper I), we

issued a writ to determine whether the district court had properly granted a 

protective

order in a products liability suit. The plaintiff had sought admissions from the 

defendant

Goodyear Tire Company that certain documents in the plaintiff's possession were

genuine. The court denied the plaintiff's request to compel the defendant to admit 

the

genuineness of the documents and issued a protective order preventing the use of the

documents on the basis that the documents fell within the protections of the 

attorney-client

privilege and the work product rule. Kuiper I, 632 P.2d at 698. Because the 

protective

order implicated the plaintiff's free speech rights we accepted jurisdiction of the 

writ and

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ultimately reversed those parts of the protective order that prevented the use of 

documents

not protected by the attorney-client privilege or the work product rule. 

 In a second case, Jaap v. District Court (1981), 191 Mont. 319, 623 P.2d 1389,

this Court granted a writ because the district court had exceeded its authority by 

allowing

defendant's attorney to privately interview plaintiff's physicians. In Jaap the 

district

court's order was vacated because the method of discovery was not authorized by the

Montana Rules of Civil Procedure. 

 Having reviewed the precedents of Kuiper I and Japp, the Court in B.N. 

addressed

the district court's order compelling discovery of potentially privileged material. 

The

district court had ordered the defendant to produce certain work product and had 

enjoined

the defendant from engaging in further discovery until it complied with the discovery

order. B.N., 779 P.2d at 887. 

 The defendant contended that if it were to disclose privileged material then 

" 'the

harm is complete and cannot be rectified on appeal.' " B.N., 779 P.2d at 888. This

Court agreed that the potential harm which would be caused by the district court's 

order

could not be remedied by appeal and we held that the sanctions imposed on the 

defendant

placed it at a significant disadvantage in litigating the merits of the case. We 

therefore

exercised supervisory control and ultimately vacated that part of the district 

court's order

enjoining the defendant from engaging in further discovery. B.N., 779 P.2d at 894.

 Our recent decision in Plumb sanctions the exercise of supervisory control in 

order

to prevent a litigant from being placed at a significant disadvantage and to prevent

unwarranted expenses and delays in the ultimate resolution of the litigation. 

Plumb, 927

P.2d at 1016. 

 We hold that a writ of supervisory control is appropriate in the instant case

because, as explained below, the District Court is proceeding under a mistake of law

which does a gross injustice to Preston by placing him at a significant disadvantage 

in

litigating his case. Under the circumstances presented, remedy by appeal would be

inadequate.

 The District Court's order restricts the scope of Preston's discovery to 

information

about the N12 model nailer only, and to information on the N12 model nailer from the

time of manufacture to the date of Preston's injury. Preston argues that the 

District Court

is proceeding under a mistake of law in that information outside of the scope of the

District Court's order is discoverable pursuant to Rule 26(b)(1), M.R.Civ.P., which

provides:

 Parties may obtain discovery regarding any matter, not privileged, which

 is relevant to the subject matter involved in the pending action . . . . It 

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is

 not ground for objection that the information sought will be inadmissible at

 the trial if the information sought appears reasonably calculated to lead to

 the discovery of admissible evidence.

 Preston's claims of personal injury are based on Stanley-Bostich's alleged 

liability

for defective design of its N12 model nailer. In particular, Preston is claiming 

that

Stanley-Bostich is liable for its failure to implement a safer design for the nailer 

when

Stanley-Bostich knew of the dangerous nature of the N12 model nailer and where an

alternative design existed. 

 This Court has recognized a strong public policy in permitting broad discovery

concerning defective and dangerous products to promote the public safety. See Kuiper

I, 632 P.2d at 702. Other jurisdictions have also recognized a broad scope of 

discovery

in products liability actions. See, e.g., Schaap v. Executive Industries, Inc. (N.

D. Ill.

1990), 130 F.R.D. 384, 386; Kramer v. Boeing Co. (D. Minn. 1989), 126 F.R.D. 690,

692. 

 In determining whether the District Court has made a mistake of law in 

restricting

discovery, we will examine the court's discovery restrictions separately.

 

 a. Did the District Court err in denying discovery of evidence of

 substantially similar injuries caused by the same design defect in other

 product models manufactured by the Defendant? 

 

 As previously stated, the District Court in this case limited discovery to 

injuries

caused only by the N12 model nailer thereby excluding injuries caused by similar 

nailers

with the same trigger mechanism. Rule 26(b)(1), M.R.Civ.P., provides that any

information "reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence" 

is

discoverable. Additionally, this Court has recognized that evidence of other 

injuries

caused by similar products is relevant and admissible. See Kuiper v. Goodyear Tire &

Rubber Co. (1984), 207 Mont. 37, 56, 673 P.2d 1208, 1219 (Kuiper II); Krueger v.

General Motors Corp. (1989), 240 Mont. 266, 274, 783 P.2d 1340, 1346. If evidence

of other injuries is admissible then it must be discoverable as well, since any 

information

tending to lead to admissible evidence is subject to discovery under Rule 26(b)(1),

M.R.Civ.P.

 In Kuiper II, the plaintiff was injured by an exploding multi-piece wheel rim

manufactured by the defendant. The plaintiff introduced evidence of eighty-six 

injuries

caused by the same type wheels and by other multi-piece wheels. Kuiper II, 673 P.2d

at 1212. No evidence was introduced showing exactly how the other accidents 

occurred,

nor the age or condition of the exploding wheels. On appeal, we held that the 

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evidence

of other injuries was admissible so long as the plaintiff showed substantial 

similarity. In

offering guidance to the district court on retrial concerning the question of 

whether the

evidence of other injuries and products was substantially similar so as to be 

admissible

we stated:

 A concerted effort should be made by that court to allow the admission of

 evidence of only those accidents where both the product and the

 circumstances surrounding the accident were similar to the case at bar. 

Kuiper II, 673 P.2d at 1219. We noted for the court's consideration that although 

we had

determined in a previous opinion that information on similar injuries was 

discoverable,

the rules of admissibility are different from the rules of discovery and, thus, 

district

courts must make an independent inquiry regarding the admissibility of similar 

injuries. 

Kuiper II, 673 P.2d at 1218.

 We stated further, in another decision, that the circumstances of other 

injuries need

not be identical to be admissible. Krueger, 783 P.2d at 1346. In Krueger, the 

plaintiff

removed the front drive line of a 1976 Chevrolet pickup equipped with a New Process

Model 203 four-wheel drive transfer case. The vehicle rolled over the plaintiff 

leaving

him a quadriplegic. Krueger, 783 P.2d at 1342. On appeal, this Court approved the

admission of evidence of other accidents including one involving a Chrysler model and

one in which the rear drive line was removed. The Court concluded that both 

incidents

demonstrated the same roll-away characteristic that distinguished the defective 

product

(the Chevrolet with the New Process Model 203 transfer case) from alternative 

designs. 

Krueger, 783 P.2d at 1346. 

 Stanley-Bostich contends that these cases illustrate that the other models of 

nailers

about which Preston seeks information are not similar enough to the N12 model nailer

to withstand the "similar injury" standard. Without necessarily agreeing with this

contention we note that the standards referred to in the above-mentioned cases govern

admissibility of evidence, not discovery of evidence. As we stated above, discovery

requests are to be construed broadly in favor of disclosing any information tending 

to lead

to admissible evidence. Whether that evidence is admissible is for the court to 

decide at

trial, not for Stanley-Bostich to determine at the discovery stage of proceedings. 

 In another case in which Stanley-Bostich was the defendant in a products 

liability

action concerning a model N16CT pneumatic nailer, and where Stanley-Bostich attempted

to limit discovery of other accidents, a United States district court stated:

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 In the context of discovery of information relating to similar products, the

 defendant should not be the final arbiter of substantial similarity. Rule 26

 provides that requests for information need only be calculated to lead to the

 discovery of admissible evidence. The standard for relevance under Rule

 26 is less demanding than the standard for admissibility at trial [citation

 omitted].

 

Drabik v. Stanley-Bostich, Inc., No. 90-0322-CV-W-6 (W.D. Mo. June 18, 1992) (order

compelling discovery). 

 A plaintiff in a products liability action must prove that the product was 

sold in a

"defective condition unreasonably dangerous to a user. . . ." Section 27-1-719(2), 

MCA. 

Evidence of injuries caused by similar models is relevant to both the "defect" and 

the

"danger." In the instant case, Preston is also suing for punitive damages. In 

order to

prevail on his claim for punitive damages, he will have to prove that the defendant 

acted

with indifference to the "high probability of injury to the plaintiff." See 27-1-

221(2),

MCA. Evidence of injuries caused by similar models is also relevant to this issue 

in that

the existence of similar injuries tends to demonstrate the manufacturer's knowledge 

of the

"high probability of injury." 

 Preston seeks discovery about various product models which utilize the same

allegedly defectively designed contact-trip mechanism that caused Preston's injury 

in this

case. Evidence concerning similar models is commonly held to be discoverable when 

the

different models contain the same alleged design defect. See Krueger, 783 P.2d at 

1346;

Jackson v. Firestone Tire and Rubber Co. (5th Cir. 1986), 788 F.2d 1070, 1083; Schaap

v. Executive Industries, Inc. (N.D. Ill. 1990), 130 F.R.D. 384, 387; Kramer v. Boeing

Co. (D. Minn. 1989), 126 F.R.D. 690, 695. Because information of similar injuries

caused by other models of nailers manufactured by Stanley-Bostich would be relevant 

to

the issues of whether the design was unreasonably dangerous, whether Stanley-Bostich

was aware of the danger, and whether Stanley-Bostich was aware of a viable, 

alternative

design, we hold that it is reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of 

admissible

evidence under Rule 26(b)(1), M.R.Civ.P. Without information about models other than

the N12 model, Preston is deprived of relevant evidence regarding models employing 

the

alternative trigger design. The existence of an alternative design goes to the very 

heart

of this products liability action. To preclude discovery of the alternative design 

in this

manner would significantly disadvantage Preston's ability to litigate his claim.

 We hold that the District Court made a mistake of law in restricting 

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discovery to

the N12 model nailer only and that this mistake of law will significantly 

disadvantage

Preston in litigating his claim as he is without the means to discover evidence that 

is not

only relevant, but crucial, to his theory of the case.

 b. Did the District Court err in limiting discovery to the time period

 beginning with the manufacture of the N12 model roofing nailer and ending

 with the Plaintiff's injury? 

 

 The District Court's time frame limitation prevents Preston from discovering

evidence regarding the alternative design and evidence of similar injuries prior to 

StanleyBostich's manufacture of the N12 model nailer in 1983, or dated after Preston's 

injury

on August 5, 1991.

 Preston argues that information as to similar injuries is reasonably 

calculated to

lead to discovery of admissible evidence relating to unreasonably dangerous design,

alternative design, and punitive damages. We agree. Preston argues that StanleyBostich

designed the safer sequential-trip mechanism in the 1970s and made the decision to

discontinue this alternative design in most of its main line nailers in 1973. The

engineering and marketing decisions made in the 1970s are relevant to whether the

contact-trip mechanism in the N12 model nailer was "unreasonably" dangerous. 

Furthermore, evidence of alternative designs is only admissible where the alternative

design existed prior to, or concurrent with, the manufacture of the product in 

question. 

Krueger, 783 P.2d at 1345. Therefore, evidence of alternative designs available 

prior to

the manufacture of the N12 model is not only relevant, but necessary, to Preston's

products liability claim and, therefore, the District Court is clearly proceeding 

under a

mistake of law in precluding discovery of alternative design evidence predating the

manufacture of the N12 model.

 Evidence of prior injuries is also relevant to a punitive damage claim in 

that the

plaintiff must show that the manufacturer had notice that its product was dangerous 

and

caused injuries before it sold the product in question. In restricting discovery to 

injuries

occurring after the manufacture date of the N12 model nailer, the court arbitrarily

restricted information to injuries caused by only that nailer. The court's order, 

in effect,

requires that the product be the "same" rather than merely "similar." We have 

already

held that "similar injuries" includes injuries caused by similar products with the 

same

design defect. In precluding discovery of facts occurring before the manufacture 

date of

the N12 model nailer, the court impermissibly denied Preston access to information

reasonably calculated to lead to discovery of admissible evidence on the issue of 

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punitive

damages.

 Although evidence subsequent to the date of injury is not relevant to the 

alternative

design issue, it is relevant to the unreasonably dangerous design element of 

Preston's

case. The fact that the same design defect continues to cause injuries is relevant 

to

establishing the dangerousness of the product. See Jackson, 788 F.2d at 1084 

(holding

that under a strict liability theory, the dangerousness of a product may be proved 

as of

any time prior to trial). 

 We hold that the District Court made a mistake of law in restricting 

discovery to

the time period from the date of manufacture of the N12 model nailer to the date of

Preston's injury. If Preston is forced to proceed to trial without information 

which could

reasonably lead to the discovery of admissible evidence which is crucial to the 

proof of

his claim, he will be greatly disadvantaged in the litigation of his case.

 Allowing the District Court's discovery restrictions to stand in this case 

would not

only unfairly disadvantage Preston but would defeat the purpose of the Rules of Civil

Procedure in that it would require Preston to endure the time and expense of trial 

and an

appeal before obtaining discoverable material essential to his case. We therefore 

vacate

that portion of the District Court's order that restricts discovery to injuries 

caused by the

N12 model nailer only and to injuries occurring between the date of manufacture of 

the

N12 model nailer and the date of Preston's injury. We remand for further proceedings

consistent with this Opinion and Order.

 DATED this 10th of April, 1997.

 /S/ W. WILLIAM LEAPHART

We concur:

/S/ J. A. TURNAGE

/S/ WILLIAM E. HUNT, SR.

/S/ JAMES C. NELSON

/S/ JIM REGNIER 

/S/ KARLA M. GRAY

/S/ TERRY N. TRIEWEILER

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