NOTICE: NOT FOR OFFICIAL PUBLICATION. 

UNDER ARIZONA RULE OF THE SUPREME COURT 111(c), THIS DECISION IS NOT PRECEDENTIAL 

AND MAY BE CITED ONLY AS AUTHORIZED BY RULE. 

IN THE 

ARIZONA COURT OF APPEALS

DIVISION ONE

In re the Marriage of: 

JOHN ALAN GRIFFITHS, Petitioner/Appellant, 

v.

MICHELLE HEYWOOD, Respondent/Appellee. 

No. 1 CA-CV 14-0556 FC 

 1 CA-CV 14-0655 FC 

(Consolidated) 

 

Appeal from the Superior Court in Maricopa County 

No. FC2010-090193 

The Honorable Emmet J. Ronan, Judge (Retired) 

DISMISSED IN PART; AFFIRMED IN PART 

COUNSEL 

The Law Office of Kyle T. Green, PLLC, Mesa 

By Kyle Green 

Counsel for Petitioner/Appellant 

Udall Shumway, PLC, Mesa 

By Barry C. Dickerson, David R. Schwartz 

Counsel for Respondent/Appellee
GRIFFITHS v. HEYWOOD 

Decision of the Court 

2 

MEMORANDUM DECISION 

Judge Peter B. Swann delivered the decision of the court, in which 

Presiding Judge Kenton D. Jones and Judge Samuel A. Thumma joined. 

S W A N N, Judge: 

¶1 These consolidated appeals arise from several post-decree 

orders in a dissolution proceeding. John Alan Griffiths (“Father”) appeals 

in 1 CA-CV 14-0556 FC from the family court’s appointment of a real 

estate special commissioner (“special commissioner”) and its grant of 

attorney’s fees. In 1 CA-CV 14-0655 FC, Father appeals two family court 

orders awarding attorney’s fees. For the following reasons, we affirm the 

award of attorney’s fees in 1 CA-CV 14-0655 FC and the appointment of 

the special commissioner in 1 CA-CV 14-0556 FC. We dismiss the 

remainder of the issues in 1 CA-CV 14-0556 FC for lack of jurisdiction. 

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY 

¶2 In January 2010, Father petitioned the family court for 

dissolution of marriage from Michelle Heywood (“Mother”). In April 

2010, the family court entered a consent decree in which it awarded the 

marital residence to Father. 

¶3 In August 2012, the family court modified the decree, 

ordering Father to “continue his best efforts” to remove Mother’s name 

from the two mortgages on the marital residence within six months. 

Nearly a year later, Father had failed to have Mother’s name removed 

from the mortgages. She then filed a post-decree petition, requesting the 

appointment of a special commissioner to sell the marital residence and 

requesting attorney’s fees. She also filed petitions for civil contempt to 

enforce Father’s obligation to pay child support. Thereafter, the court 

issued several rulings relevant to this consolidated appeal. 

The May 1, 2014 Ruling 

¶4 In a signed order on May 1, the family court ordered Father 

to relinquish the marital residence to the lender by a deed in lieu of 

foreclosure, and awarded attorney’s fees to Mother. The ruling did not 

specify the amount of attorney’s fees and did not include Ariz. R. Fam. 
GRIFFITHS v. HEYWOOD 

Decision of the Court 

3 

Law P. 78(B) language. Father filed his first notice of appeal challenging 

the May 1 ruling, but later voluntarily dismissed it. 

The June 25, 2014 Rulings 

¶5 As Father’s noncompliance with the order to have Mother 

removed from the mortgages continued, Mother filed an emergency 

motion for appointment of a special commissioner and again requested 

attorney’s fees. In an unsigned minute entry, the family court ordered the 

appointment of the special commissioner and awarded Mother attorney’s 

fees. The court also entered a signed order appointing a special 

commissioner the same day. Father filed his second notice of appeal 

challenging the family court’s appointment of the special commissioner 

and the award of attorney’s fees, giving rise to 1 CA-CV 14-0556 FC. In 

his opening brief to this court, Father added that he was appealing the 

order for the deed in lieu of foreclosure. 

The August 1, 2014 Ruling 

¶6 Pursuant to its June 25 unsigned minute entry awarding 

attorney’s fees and costs for Mother’s emergency motion for appointment 

of the special commissioner, the family court awarded her $3,046.87 in a 

signed order entered on August 1. Father did not appeal from the August 

1 ruling. 

The August 4, 2014 Rulings 

¶7 On August 4, the family court entered a signed order 

awarding Mother $15,607.38 in attorney’s fees and costs as authorized by 

the May 1 ruling related to Mother’s efforts to remove her name from the 

mortgages. That same day, the family court also awarded Mother 

$2,928.60 in attorney’s fees relating to Mother’s petition for contempt for 

non-payment of child support. Father filed his third notice of appeal 

challenging the attorney’s fees entered in both orders, giving rise to 1 CACV 14-0655 FC. 

DISCUSSION 

I. PARTIAL DISMISSAL AND PARTIAL AFFIRMATION OF 1 CA-CV 

14-0556 FC 

¶8 In his opening brief, Father challenges the family court’s 

order of “a Deed in Lieu of Foreclosure and appointment of the [special 

commissioner],” as well as the award of attorney’s fees. Mother argues 
GRIFFITHS v. HEYWOOD 

Decision of the Court 

4 

that we lack jurisdiction to consider these issues. She contends that 

Father’s second notice of appeal challenged only the family court’s 

unsigned June 25, 2014 ruling appointing the special commissioner and 

awarding an unspecified amount of attorney’s fees and that the appeal 

therefore was premature and a nullity. Further, she asserts that because 

the deed in lieu of foreclosure was not mentioned in the notice of appeal, 

we lack jurisdiction to review it. 

¶9 We agree that Father’s second notice of appeal was 

ineffective to challenge the award of fees from the unsigned June 25 

minute entry. The minute entry did not resolve the amount of attorney’s 

fees stemming from Mother’s motion for appointment of a special 

commissioner, and it did not contain Rule 78(B) finality language. Father 

did not appeal the family court’s August 1 ruling, which resolved the 

amount of attorney’s fees related to the June 25 ruling, and the time to do 

so has long since passed. We therefore lack jurisdiction to review the 

award of fees from Father’s second notice of appeal, and dismiss that 

portion of his appeal. We also agree that we lack jurisdiction to review 

the deed in lieu of foreclosure. The court ordered the deed in an order 

entered May 1, which Father appealed and voluntarily dismissed. He did 

not include the May 1 order in his notice of appeal from the June 25 order, 

but even had he included the May 1 order, the appeal would have been 

untimely. 

¶10 But the court also entered a signed order appointing a special 

commissioner on June 25. That order was final and appealable, and 

Father’s appeal from it was timely. We review measures to enforce prior 

orders for an abuse of discretion. See Ariz. R. Fam. Law P. 91(A), (H); cf. 

In re Marriage of Priessman, 228 Ariz. 336, 338, ¶ 7 (App. 2011). Abuse of 

discretion exists when the record, viewed in a light most favorable to 

upholding the court’s decision, demonstrates no evidence to support the 

decision. Little v. Little, 193 Ariz. 518, 520, ¶ 5 (1999). Mother first 

requested a court-appointed special commissioner in 2011 to assist in the 

sale of the house, and the court ordered Father to have Mother’s name 

removed from the mortgages through refinance, foreclosure, deed in lieu 

of foreclosure, sale or short sale within six months after June 15, 2012. As 

of June 25, 2014 when the court appointed the special commissioner, 

Father still had not complied with the court’s order to remove Mother’s 

name from mortgages. Based on the evidence in this record, the trial court 

did not abuse its discretion in appointing the special commissioner to 

enforce its orders, and we affirm the order. 
GRIFFITHS v. HEYWOOD 

Decision of the Court 

5 

II. ATTORNEY’S FEES AWARD IN 1 CA-CV 14-0655 FC 

¶11 We next turn to Father’s timely appeal from the two August 

4, 2014 rulings awarding attorney’s fees. We review an award of 

attorney’s fees under A.R.S. § 25–324 for an abuse of discretion. Rinegar v. 

Rinegar, 231 Ariz. 85, 90, ¶ 22 (App. 2012). 

¶12 The court may award reasonable attorney’s fees “after 

considering the financial resources of both parties and the reasonableness 

of the positions each party has taken throughout the proceedings.” A.R.S. 

§ 25-324(A). Either prong of the statute may justify an award. Magee v. 

Magee, 206 Ariz. 589, 591 n.1, ¶ 8 (App. 2004). Income disparity may 

support an award of attorney’s fees even when the opposing party’s 

positions have been reasonable. In re Marriage of Pownall, 197 Ariz. 577, 

583, ¶ 29 (App. 2000). When considering the parties’ financial resources 

under § 25-324, “the court is obligated to consider factors such as the 

degree of the resource disparity between the parties, the ratio of the fees 

owed to the assets and/or income of each party, and other similar 

matters.” Magee, 206 Ariz. at 592, ¶ 17. The family court need not make 

express findings of fact in support of an award unless such findings are 

specifically requested. A.R.S. § 25-324(A). 

¶13 Here, though the parties did not request and the family 

court did not make any findings establishing Mother’s entitlement to fees 

under A.R.S. § 25-324(A), the record contains Mother and Father’s 

affidavits of financial information, filed within the same year as Mother’s 

petitions concerning child support and the marital residence. The 

affidavits show significant financial disparity: Father’s income was more 

than double Mother’s income. Father listed no outstanding debt in his 

affidavit, and Mother listed many thousands of dollars of debt. This 

disparity was sufficient to justify an award of fees. See Pownall, 197 Ariz. 

at 583, ¶ 29. 

¶14 We discern no abuse of discretion in the amount of fees the 

court awarded. Father argues that the family court’s August 4 ruling that 

awarded Mother $2,928.60 for Mother’s contempt petition for nonpayment of child support permitted recovery of fees only for “pleadings 

generated after the child support issue was raised.” He therefore argues 

that Mother could only recover fees for the contempt petition itself, but 

not time spent on ancillary tasks such as phone calls, emails, or hearing 

preparation. The family court considered Father’s objection to Mother’s 

request for attorney’s fees and correctly rejected it. The family court’s 
GRIFFITHS v. HEYWOOD 

Decision of the Court 

6 

order awarded fees for Mother’s petition and all related legal efforts, and 

those fees were reasonable. We discern no abuse of discretion.1 

¶15 Father further challenges the reasonableness of the family 

court’s August 4 ruling awarding Mother $15,607.38 in attorney’s fees 

arising out of Mother’s efforts to remove her name from the mortgages. 

He argues that the fees were “excessive” and “exorbitant” because the 

court found Mother acted in bad faith. But the court did not find Mother 

acted in bad faith, only that Mother had been “somewhat uncooperative,” 

and that both parties had “at times, been unreasonable in their positions.” 

Father further argues the family court should have reduced the fee award 

due to Father’s financial situation. Father also contends Mother’s 

counsel’s fee affidavit contained inconsistencies, duplicative entries, and 

billed excessive time for drafting the petition and a related motion to 

consolidate. Ultimately, the family court exercised its discretion by 

awarding Mother $7,662 less than she requested. In view of the fact that 

Father created the need for Mother’s attorney’s fees by his long 

noncompliance with court orders, we find his arguments unavailing and 

perceive no abuse of discretion. 

III. REQUEST FOR ATTORNEY’S FEES ON APPEAL 

¶16 Mother requests attorney’s fees on appeal pursuant to § 25-

324. In the exercise of our discretion, we deny her request for fees. 

 

1 Father also alerts us to an alleged billing error for a single time 

entry, wherein Mother’s counsel’s paralegal’s rate is incorrectly listed as 

$90 an hour instead of her usual $80 per hour rate. Examination of the 

affidavit, however, shows that although the paralegal’s hourly rate is 

listed incorrectly for the one time entry, the mathematical computation of 

her fee is correct. 
GRIFFITHS v. HEYWOOD 

Decision of the Court 

7 

CONCLUSION 

¶17 For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the appointment of the 

special commissioner (1 CA-CV 14-0556 FC) and the awards of attorney’s 

fees (1 CA-CV 14-0655 FC). We award Mother her costs on appeal upon 

compliance with ARCAP 21.