NOTICE: NOT FOR OFFICIAL PUBLICATION.

UNDER ARIZONA RULE OF THE SUPREME COURT 111(c), THIS DECISION IS NOT PRECEDENTIAL

AND MAY BE CITED ONLY AS AUTHORIZED BY RULE.

IN THE

ARIZONA COURT OF APPEALS

DIVISION ONE

LAW OFFICE OF WILLIAM R. HOBSON PC, Plaintiff/Appellee,

v.

ANGELLEE CHEN, Defendant/Appellant.

No. 1 CA-CV 22-0196 

Appeal from the Superior Court in Maricopa County

No. CV2016-091045

The Honorable Rodrick J. Coffey, Judge

AFFIRMED IN PART, VACATED IN PART

COUNSEL

Angellee Chen, Clovis, California

Defendant/Appellant

Stanley R. Lerner, P.C., Phoenix

Counsel for Plaintiff/Appellee

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Presiding Judge Samuel A. Thumma delivered the decision of the Court, in 

which Judge Cynthia J. Bailey and Vice Chief Judge David B. Gass joined.

FILED 2-7-2023
HOBSON PC v. CHEN

Decision of the Court

2

T H U M M A, Judge:

¶1 The Law Office of William R. Hobson PC filed this case 

against former client Angellee Chen for unpaid attorneys’ fees and costs. In 

a prior appeal, this court reversed a dismissal for failure to state a claim,

noting “some interpretations of the complaint entitle Hobson to relief.” Law 

Office of William R. Hobson, P.C. v. Chen (Hobson I), 1 CA-CV 20-0223, 2020 

WL 7587113, at *1 ¶ 1 (Ariz. App. Dec. 22, 2020) (mem. dec.). On remand, 

the superior court found Hobson provided Chen a benefit of $40,000, also 

awarding Hobson $1,618.76 in costs and $6,000 in sanctions. For the reasons 

stated below, the award of $40,000 plus $1,618.76 in costs is affirmed, and

the sanctions award is vacated.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

¶2 In April 2012, Chen filed a wrongful termination lawsuit 

against her former employer. A few months later, Chen hired Hobson to 

replace her first attorney. Chen and Hobson discussed a fee agreement 

where Chen would pay half of Hobson’s normal hourly rate and a 

percentage contingent on the outcome. But no such written fee agreement 

was ever signed by the parties. Nor was any other fee agreement reached 

by the parties.

¶3 Twice -- in July 2012 and April 2013 -- Hobson invoiced Chen 

for his work at his normal hourly rate and Chen paid the invoices. Hobson

later claimed that he did not provide Chen any more invoices because he 

believed she could not pay. Hobson took various actions on Chen’s behalf, 

including filing an amended complaint, participating in discovery, taking

depositions and defeating a motion for summary judgment. In January 

2015, Chen fired Hobson. In June 2015, Chen settled her claims, receiving 

$250,000 from her former employer. Hobson then filed this case, seeking 

compensation for his time spent on Chen’s case on a quantum meruit

theory. Hobson’s complaint attached a third invoice that detailed time

spent on the case but that had not been sent to Chen.

¶4 After failing in numerous attempts to serve Chen at her home, 

the court allowed Hobson to serve her by publication. After doing so, Chen 

appeared and moved to dismiss, claiming insufficient process, insufficient 

service of process and a failure to state a claim. See Ariz. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(4–

6). The court denied Chen’s motion. 
HOBSON PC v. CHEN

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¶5 When Hobson failed to prosecute the case, it was placed on

the dismissal calendar and then dismissed in April 2017. Hobson moved to 

reinstate and to vacate the dismissal, and when Chen filed no timely 

opposition, the court granted the motion and reinstated the case. Chen later 

unsuccessfully argued the case was improperly reinstated. 

¶6 Chen then moved to dismiss, arguing Hobson’s claim was 

barred by Levine v. Haralson, Miller, Pitt, Feldman & McAnally, P.L.C., 244 

Ariz. 234 (App. 2018). The court first denied the motion, but reconsidering, 

later found Levine barred Hobson’s quantum meruit claim. Meanwhile, 

Chen filed other motions, again challenging personal jurisdiction and 

claiming the case was improperly reinstated, which the court denied. 

¶7 After entry of a final judgment dismissing the case, Hobson 

timely appealed. Tacitly rejecting personal jurisdiction and improper 

reinstatement arguments, Hobson I reversed and remanded, finding issues 

of fact, stating “if there was no operative agreement between Hobson and 

Chen, Hobson would be allowed to recover the reasonable value of the legal 

services it provided.” 2020 WL 7587113, at *2 ¶ 9. 

¶8 On remand, after a bench trial where Hobson and Chen 

testified, the court found there was no binding agreement between the 

parties and that Chen was liable for the reasonable value of Hobson’s 

services. The court set that value at $40,000 and entered final judgment. In 

February 2022, Hobson timely moved to amend the judgment, seeking 

sanctions for an unaccepted offer of judgment it provided to Chen in 2018. 

As Chen’s response noted, however, that motion relied on Ariz. R. Civ. P. 

(Rule) 68(g) as amended effective January 1, 2022. Hobson then filed a 

second motion, seeking sanctions for an unaccepted offer of judgment 

provided to Chen in 2017. That second motion, however, was filed about 35 

days after the entry of judgment.

¶9 Ultimately, the court issued an amended order, awarding 

Hobson $40,000, $1,618.76 in costs and $6,000 as a sanction under Rule 68(g) 

as amended effective January 1, 2022. This court has jurisdiction over 

Chen’s timely appeal under Article 6, Section 9, of the Arizona Constitution 

and Arizona Revised Statutes (A.R.S.) sections 12-120.21(A)(1) and -2101.
HOBSON PC v. CHEN

Decision of the Court

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DISCUSSION

¶10 Chen argues the superior court: (1) lacked jurisdiction to 

reinstate the case; (2) lacked personal jurisdiction because process and 

service of process were inadequate; (3) wrongly awarded Hobson quantum 

meruit fees; (4) improperly determined that the quantum meruit value of 

Hobson’s services was $40,000 and (5) erred in awarding Hobson sanctions 

under current version of Rule 68(g). The court addresses these arguments 

in turn, recognizing Hobson I resolves the first three.

I. Chen’s First Three Arguments Fail Under the Law of This Case.

¶11 Hobson I reversed the grant of Chen’s motion to dismiss and 

remanded to the superior court for further proceedings. 2020 WL 7587113, 

at *2 ¶ 13. Hobson I did so even though Chen had argued in that appeal that 

“dismissal is appropriate because the court lacked personal jurisdiction 

over Chen due to insufficient process and insufficient service of process.” 

See id. Accordingly, Hobson I tacitly determined that the superior court did 

not err in reinstating the case and that process and service of process were

sufficient to invoke jurisdiction over Chen. See id. Thus, under the law of 

this case and the mandate in Hobson I, the superior court lacked authority 

to reverse its decision reinstating the case or dismissing for lack of personal 

jurisdiction. See, e.g., Tovrea v. Superior Court, 101 Ariz. 295, 297 (1966); 

Ziegler v. Superior Court, 134 Ariz. 390, 393 (App. 1982).

¶12 In reversing the dismissal and remanding for further 

proceedings, Hobson I directed that, “if there was no operative agreement 

between Hobson and Chen, Hobson would be allowed to recover the 

reasonable value of the legal services it provided.” 2020 WL 7587113, at *2 

¶ 9. On remand, the superior court lacked authority to deviate from that 

mandate. See Tovrea, 101 Ariz. at 297. Nor has Chen shown any exception 

to the law of the case or the mandate that applies. See Dancing Sunshines

Lounge v. Indus. Comm’n, 149 Ariz. 480, 482–83 (1986). Thus, Chen’s first 

three issues fail.

II. The Court Did Not Err in Reinstating the Case.

¶13 The superior court’s jurisdiction is an issue of law reviewed 

de novo. R.A.J. v. L.B.V., 169 Ariz. 92, 94 (App. 1991). By rule, the court is to 

place a case on the Dismissal Calendar if the parties have not filed a joint 

report and proposed scheduling order within 210 days from the filing of the 

complaint. Ariz. R. Civ. P. 38.1(d). “If an action remains on the Dismissal 

Calendar for 60 days, the court must dismiss it without prejudice . . . .” Ariz. 

R. Civ. P. 38.1(d)(2). Arizona courts, however, have the discretion to 
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Decision of the Court

5

reinstate a case after it is dismissed without prejudice from the dismissal 

calendar. See Jepson v. New, 164 Ariz. 265, 277 (1990) (construing prior rule);

Black v. Greer, 17 Ariz. App. 383, 385 (1972) (same); Campbell v. Deddens, 93 

Ariz. 247, 250–51 (1963) (even after the case has been dismissed, the court 

has discretion to grant relief from the order dismissing the case).

¶14 Chen does not argue any deficiency with Hobson’s motion to 

reinstate nor does she challenge the court’s reasoning in reinstating the 

case. Instead, Chen cites pre-Rules cases to argue that “nothing in the Rules

authorizes the court to reinstate the case after it has been properly 

dismissed without prejudice for lack of prosecution.” At least since the 

promulgation of Rule 38.1 and its predecessors, Arizona law is to the 

contrary. See Jepson, 164 Ariz. at 277. Chen has shown no error in the 

superior court reinstating the case.

III. Chen Has Shown No Reversible Jurisdictional Error.

¶15 Apart from the law of this case regarding jurisdiction, Chen 

has shown no resulting prejudice for any alleged defect in process or service 

of process. She had actual notice of the case, participated in the litigation 

and is challenging a judgment on the merits. See State v. 1810 E. Second Ave., 

193 Ariz. 1, 6 (App. 1997) (where party had actual knowledge of the 

proceeding and “took full advantage of it by contesting the matter all the 

way through judgment,” any failure to provide the notice prescribed by the 

statute caused no prejudice. “If an error is not prejudicial, it is not grounds 

for reversal.”).

IV. Chen Has Shown No Error in the Court Determining Hobson Was 

Entitled to Recovery Under Quantum Meruit. 

¶16 Absent a written fee agreement, an attorney may not recover 

the quantum meruit value of services provided “because unwritten 

contingent fee agreements are void as against public policy.” Levine, 244 

Ariz. at 236 ¶ 1. Hobson I, however, distinguished Levine, concluding the 

proposed agreement would have been a hybrid agreement with a regular 

fee component. 2020 WL 7587113, at *2 ¶ 9. Hobson I concluded that “[s]ome

interpretations of the complaint’s allegations would allow Hobson to 

recover its fees,” adding that “if there was no operative agreement between 

Hobson and Chen, Hobson would be allowed to recover the reasonable 

value of the legal services . . . provided.” Id. at *2 ¶¶ 9 & 12.
HOBSON PC v. CHEN

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6

¶17 At trial, neither party presented evidence that they had 

entered into an operative agreement. The superior court noted the 

requirement that a contingency fee be signed by the client and found no 

operative agreement between the parties. “[A] trial court must ‘strictly 

follow’ the mandate of an appellate decision.” Bogard v. Cannon & Wendt 

Elec. Co., Inc., 221 Ariz. 325, 334 (App. 2009) (quoting cases). Given this 

finding that the parties had “no operative agreement,” which is not 

challenged on appeal, the superior court properly looked to quantum 

meruit and determined “the reasonable value of the services provided.” 

Chen has shown no error.

V. The Court Did Not Err in Awarding $40,000 as the Reasonable 

Value of the Services Provided.

¶18 The calculation of damages is reviewed for an abuse of 

discretion. Solar-West, Inc. v. Falk, 141 Ariz. 414, 419 (App. 1984). Chen 

argues the court’s award is not supported by reliable evidence. When 

determining the reasonable value of the services provided, the court should 

consider the following four factors:

(1) the qualities of the advocate: his ability, his 

training, education, experience, professional 

standing and skill; (2) the character of the work 

to be done: its difficulty, its intricacy, its 

importance, time and skill required, the 

responsibility imposed and the prominence and 

character of the parties where they affect the 

importance of the litigation; [3] the work 

actually performed by the lawyer: the skill, time 

and attention given to the work; (4) the result: 

whether the attorney was successful and what 

benefits were derived.

Schwartz v. Schwerin, 85 Ariz. 242, 246–47 (1959). The trial evidence 

addresses these factors. William Hobson testified about his legal 

experience, including with cases like Chen’s. He testified about the details 

of the case which included amending the complaint and defeating Chen’s 

former employer’s motion for summary judgment. Evidence also showed 

that, after defeating that motion and a few months after Hobson’s 

representation was terminated, Chen obtained a settlement for $250,000. See 

Hobson I, 2020 WL 7587113, at *1 ¶ 4. The dispute over Hobson’s work was 

detailed in the court’s decision and led to the court reducing the amount 

requested by nearly 25 percent from $53,544.55 to $40,000.
HOBSON PC v. CHEN

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7

¶19 Chen argues the court erred in finding Hobson’s hourly rate 

reasonable because she did not object to it when she paid the first two 

invoices. Chen’s support for that argument is an ethics opinion stating it 

would be unreasonable to charge a full hourly rate and collect a contingent

fee. See Ariz. Ethics. Op. 03-06. The award for Hobson, however, was not 

for legal contract damages but an equitable quantum meruit award for the 

court’s determination of the reasonable value of the benefit he provided to 

Chen. See Schwartz, at 85 Ariz. at 246. Chen has not shown that the rate the 

court used in making that equitable award was unreasonable. 

¶20 Chen similarly argues that the court erroneously admitted in 

evidence Hobson’s third invoice for services. Chen has shown no valid 

objection to that admission under the Arizona Rules of Evidence, 

particularly for a bench trial. Indeed, Chen cites no authority to support her 

contention and therefore waives her argument on appeal. See Polanco v. 

Indus. Comm’n, 214 Ariz. 489, 491 ¶ 6 n.2 (App. 2007) (where party mentions 

an “argument in passing” in an opening brief, but “cites no relevant 

supporting authority and does not develop it further,” the issue is waived).

For these reasons, Chen has failed to show that the court erred in making 

the $40,000 equitable quantum meruit award authorized by Hobson I.

VI. The Court Erred in Awarding Hobson Sanctions Under the 

Version of Rule 68(g) Effective January 1, 2022.

¶21 Chen correctly notes the superior court applied the wrong 

version of Rule 68(g) in awarding sanctions. Hobson concedes, claiming an 

entitlement to $10,320.67 in sanctions under the previous rule. Because 

Hobson did not timely file a proper motion for sanctions under the prior 

version of the rule, the award is vacated. 

¶22 “A motion to alter or amend a judgment must be filed no later 

than 15 days after the entry of judgment.” Ariz. R. Civ. P. 59(d). Hobson 

timely filed a motion to amend the final judgment, but sought sanctions 

under the version of Rule 68(g) effective January 1, 2022. Hobson sought to 

correct that error in filing a new motion for sanctions citing the correct 

version of Rule 68(g), but did so more than a month after the final judgment 

was filed. Thus, the timely request for sanctions erroneously cited the 

incorrect version of the rule, and the later motion for sanctions citing the 

correct version of the rule was untimely. The superior court could not issue 

the award of sanctions that it did because it applied a version of Rule 68(g) 

that did not apply. And the superior court lacked jurisdiction to award 

sanctions under the correct version of Rule 68(g) because the motion 
HOBSON PC v. CHEN

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8

seeking those sanctions was untimely. Thus, the award of Rule 68(g) 

sanctions is vacated.

VII. Attorneys’ Fees and Costs.

¶23 Each party seeks attorneys’ fees and costs on appeal under

A.R.S. §§ 12-341 and 12-341.01. Because Hobson is not the successful party, 

its request is denied. And because Chen is self-represented, her request for 

fees is denied. Chen is awarded her taxable costs contingent upon her 

compliance with ARCAP 21. 

CONCLUSION

¶24 The final judgment is affirmed in part and vacated in part.