J-A23026-17 & J-A23027-17

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

JOHN J. BIELEC

v.

AMERICAN INTERNATIONAL GROUP, 

INC., NATIONAL UNION FIRE 

INSURANCE COMPANY OF 

PITTSBURGH, P.A., VERIZON 

COMMUNICATIONS INC. AND 

VERIZON PENNSYLVANIA

APPEAL OF: VERIZON 

PENNSYLVANIA LLC AND VERIZON 

COMMUNICATIONS INC.

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 IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

 PENNSYLVANIA

 No. 336 EDA 2017

Appeal from the Order Entered December 5, 2016

In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County Civil Division at 

No(s): 1440 September Term, 2014

JOHN J. BIELEC

v.

AMERICAN INTERNATIONAL GROUP, 

INC. NATIONAL UNION FIRE 

INSURANCE COMPANY OF 

PITTSBURGH, PA, VERIZON 

COMMUNICATIONS, INC. AND 

VERIZON PENNSYLVANIA, INC.

APPEAL OF: NATIONAL UNION FIRE 

INSURANCE COMPANY 

OF PITTSBURGH, PA

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 IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

 PENNSYLVANIA

 No. 418 EDA 2017

Appeal from the Order Entered December 5, 2016
J-A23026-17 & J-A23027-17

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In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County Civil Division at 

No(s): 1440 September Term, 2014

BEFORE: PANELLA, J., DUBOW, J., and FITZGERALD, J.*

MEMORANDUM BY DUBOW, J.: FILED DECEMBER 26, 2017

In these consolidated appeals, Appellants, Verizon Pennsylvania LLC 

and Verizon Communications, Inc., (“Verizon”) and American International 

Group, Inc. and National Union Fire Insurance Company of Pittsburgh, PA

(“National”) (collectively, “Appellants”) appeal from the December 5, 2016 

Orders entering summary judgment in favor of Appellee, John J. Bielec, in 

this Declaratory Judgment action. After careful review, we affirm.

The facts and procedural history are as follows. Appellee was an 

employee of Verizon. On November 21, 2013, during the course of his 

employment, Appellee was driving a vehicle owned by Verizon. At a traffic 

light, an automobile struck Appellee’s vehicle. The automobile was insured 

only for the minimum bodily damage limits allowed under the law. Appellee 

alleged that he sustained serious injuries and damages in excess of these 

minimum amounts, and consequently made an underinsured motorist 

(“UIM”) claim to Verizon’s insurer, National. National denied the claim on 

the grounds that, in 2013, Verizon had rejected UIM coverage, pursuant to 

____________________________________________

* Former Justice specially assigned to the Superior Court.
J-A23026-17 & J-A23027-17

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Section 1731(c) of the Motor Vehicle Financial Responsibility Law (“MVFRL”), 

75 Pa.C.S. § 1731.

On September 9, 2014, Appellee commenced the instant Declaratory 

Judgment action against Verizon and National. On November 5, 2014, 

Verizon filed an Answer With New Matter to Appellee’s Complaint. On 

November 11, 2014, National filed an Answer With New Matter and a 

counterclaim for a Declaratory Judgment. In its counterclaim, National 

sought a declaration that Verizon had validly rejected UIM coverage. On 

November 26, 2014, Appellee filed a Reply to New Matter and Counterclaim. 

On January 15, 2016, Verizon, National, and Appellee filed Motions for 

Summary Judgment. The trial court scheduled a hearing on the Motions and 

ordered the parties to file supplemental Briefs addressing the public policy 

implications of the issues raised in the Motions.

Following the hearing, on December 5, 2016, the trial court denied 

Appellants’ Motions for Summary Judgment, granted Appellee’s Motion for 

Summary Judgment, and dismissed National’s counterclaim. The court 

concluded that Verizon’s UIM rejection was defective as a matter of law and

that Appellee is entitled to UIM benefits under Verizon’s policy with National. 

On December 29, 2016, and December 30, 2016, Verizon and National, 

respectively, filed Motions for Reconsideration and Motions to Stay 

Proceedings. The trial court denied the Motions on January 3, 2017.
J-A23026-17 & J-A23027-17

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On January 3, 2017, and January 4, 2017, National and Verizon each

filed Notices of Appeal. The trial court did not order Appellants to file 

Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b) Statements.

National raises the following three issues on appeal, which we have 

reordered for ease of disposition:

1. Does [Appellee] have standing to challenge the validity of the 

rejection of [UIM] coverage made by his employer, the 

Named Insured on the insurance policy issued by [National]?

2. Is the rejection of UIM coverage in this case by [Verizon] void 

or invalid for failure to comply with 75 Pa.C.S. § 1731?

3. Does any Pennsylvania public policy relating to the [MVFRL] 

require that notice [ ] be given to an employee of an 

employer’s decision to reject UIM coverage in order for such a 

rejection of UIM coverage be valid?

4. Does failure by a corporate insured to provide notice to its 

employee that UIM coverage is being rejected obligate the 

insurer to provide such coverage notwithstanding the 

rejection of UIM coverage.

National’s Brief at 6.

Verizon raises the following two issues on appeal:

1. Is [Appellee] entitled to UIM benefits as a third-party 

beneficiary of Verizon’s insurance policy because, even 

though Verizon signed a form that reproduced the MVFRL’s 

required rejection language verbatim with a clear intention to 

waive coverage, Verizon signed only on the form’s second 

page?

2. Is [Appellee] entitled to UIM benefits through Verizon’s 

insurance policy because, on balance, the MVFRL’s public 

policy goals require an employer to notify affected employees 

when it wishes to waive UIM coverage, regardless [of] 

whether they would have taken action in response to such 

notice?
J-A23026-17 & J-A23027-17

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Verizon’s Brief at 5.

Standing

In its first issue, National claims that Appellee, as a third-party 

beneficiary of Verizon’s insurance policy, lacks standing to challenge the 

validity of Verizon’s waiver of UIM coverage. National’s Brief at 19-22.1 

It is well-settled that a defendant waives a challenge to the issue of a 

plaintiff’s standing to sue if he does not raise the challenge at the “earliest 

possible opportunity.” Kuwait & Gulf Link Transport Co. v. Doe, 92 A.3d 

41, 45 (Pa. Super. 2014). Where an objection to standing is concerned, the 

“earliest possible opportunity” is defined as “in preliminary objections or in 

[a defendant’s] answer to the complaint.” Drake Mfg. Co., Inc. v. 

Polyflow, Inc., 109 A.3d 250, 257 (Pa. Super. 2015). 

Our review of the pleadings indicates that National failed to challenge 

Appellee’s capacity to bring this action for benefits under Verizon’s policy 

before the trial court. In addition, in its Brief, National has not referred to 

the place in the record where it preserved this issue. See Pa.R.A.P. 

2119(c), (e). Thus, we conclude that National has waived this issue.2, 3 

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1 Verizon also makes this argument in its Brief, but presents it as an 

alternative argument in support of its overarching claim that the trial court 

erred in finding its UIM waiver invalid, and not as a separate Question 

Involved. See Verizon’s Brief at 31-36. 

2 Verizon has likewise waived this issue for the reasons set forth, supra.
J-A23026-17 & J-A23027-17

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The UIM Waiver

National’s second issue and Verizon’s first issue are interrelated; thus, 

we address them together. In these issues, Appellants essentially challenge 

the trial court’s conclusion that Verizon’s UIM coverage waiver was invalid 

under the MVFRL. National’s Brief at 22-34; Verizon’s Brief at 20-31.

We review orders granting summary judgment under a familiar 

standard. 

Summary judgment is proper only when the pleadings, 

depositions, answers to interrogatories, admissions and 

affidavits and other materials demonstrate that there is no 

genuine issue of material fact and that the moving party is 

entitled to judgment as a matter of law. The reviewing 

court must view the record in the light most favorable to 

the nonmoving party and resolve all doubts as to the 

existence of a genuine issue of material fact against the 

moving party. Only when the facts are so clear that 

reasonable minds could not differ can a trial court properly 

enter summary judgment. 

Wall Rose Mut. Ins. Co. v. Manross, 939 A.2d 958, 962 (Pa. Super. 2007) 

(citations omitted).

(Footnote Continued) _______________________

3 Even if National had not waived this issue, it would not merit relief as 

Appellee has standing to challenge the validity of Verizon’s UIM coverage 

waiver in an effort to identify the benefits, if any, he is entitled to under 

Verizon’s policy. Appellee would not have standing to bring a claim for UIM 

benefits where no such benefits existed. Here, the question is whether UIM 

coverage exists. See Petty v. Federated Mut. Ins. Co., 152 A.3d 1020, 

1026 n.3 (Pa. Super. 2016) (holding that a third party beneficiary does not 

have a claim for UIM benefits where an insured has properly rejected UIM 

coverage); General Acc. Ins. Co. of America v. Parker, 665 A.2d 502, 

504 (Pa. Super. 1995) (explaining that the rights of a third party beneficiary 

are subject to the same limitations as those of a party to the contract). 
J-A23026-17 & J-A23027-17

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When considering an order granting summary judgment in the context of a 

declaratory judgment action, our scope of review is plenary. Kvaerner 

Metals Division of Kvaerner U.S., Inc. v. Commercial Union Ins. Co., 

908 A.2d 888, 895 (Pa. 2006). We will reverse the Order of the trial court 

only if we find that an error of law or an abuse of discretion has occurred. 

Id. “The test is not whether we would have reached the same result on the 

evidence presented, but whether the trial court's conclusion can reasonably 

be drawn from the evidence.” Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co. v. Cummings, 

652 A.2d 1338, 1341 (Pa. Super. 1994).

The issues raised by Appellants challenge the trial court’s conclusion 

that Verizon’s UIM coverage waiver was invalid, which is a pure question of 

law. Orsag v. Farmers New Century Ins., 15 A.3d 896, 899 (Pa. 2011). 

Thus, “our standard of review is de novo, and our scope of review is 

plenary.” Id.

Our analysis begins with consideration of the relevant provision of the 

MVFRL. When construing a statute, we must, whenever possible, give each 

word meaning. Winslow–Quattlebaum v. Maryland Ins. Group, 752 

A.2d 878, 881 (Pa. 2000), quoting 1 Pa.C.S. § 1921(a).

Pursuant to the MVFRL, an insured who desires to waive UIM coverage 

must sign a rejection form. The form must state as follows:
J-A23026-17 & J-A23027-17

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REJECTION OF UNDERINSURED MOTORIST PROTECTION

By signing this waiver I am rejecting underinsured motorist 

coverage under this policy, for myself and all relatives residing in 

my household. Underinsured coverage protects me and relatives 

living in my household for losses and damages suffered if injury 

is caused by the negligence of a driver who does not have 

enough insurance to pay for all losses and damages. I 

knowingly and voluntarily reject this coverage.

___________________________

Signature of First Named Insured

___________________________

Date

57 Pa.C.S. § 1731(c). The MVFRL further provides explicit instructions with 

respect to the execution of the waivers.

(c.1) Form of waiver.--Insurers shall print the rejection forms 

required by subsections (b) and (c) on separate sheets in 

prominent type and location. The forms must be signed by the 

first named insured and dated to be valid. The signatures on the 

forms may be witnessed by an insurance agent or broker. Any 

rejection form that does not specifically comply with this 

section is void. If the insurer fails to produce a valid rejection 

form, uninsured or underinsured coverage, or both, as the case 

may be, under that policy shall be equal to the bodily injury 

liability limits. On policies in which either uninsured or 

underinsured coverage has been rejected, the policy renewals 

must contain notice in prominent type that the policy does not 

provide protection against damages caused by uninsured or 

underinsured motorists. Any person who executes a waiver 

under subsection (b) or (c) shall be precluded from claiming 

liability of any person based upon inadequate information.

75 Pa.C.S. § 1731(c.1) (emphasis added).
J-A23026-17 & J-A23027-17

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As noted above, the waiver of UIM coverage is effectuated by specific 

compliance with the mandates of Section 1731(c.1). Pennsylvania courts 

interpreting this statute have concluded that de minimis or hyper-technical 

defects in a UIM coverage waiver will not serve to defeat an otherwise valid 

rejection of UIM benefits. See, e.g., Ford v. Am. States Ins. Co., 154 

A.3d 237, 245 (Pa. 2017) (holding that “when a UIM rejection form differs 

from the statutory form in an inconsequential manner, the form will be 

construed to specifically comply with Section 1731[.]”); Petty v. Federated 

Mut. Ins. Co., 152 A.3d 1020 (Pa. Super. 2016) (affirming the trial court’s 

finding that “the differences cited by [a]ppellants are hyper-technical and do 

not cause confusion or result in an uninformed waiver.”).

However, as noted by this Court in Jones v. Unitrin Auto & Home 

Ins. Co., 40 A.3d 125 (Pa. Super. 2012), Section 1731(c) “prescribes the 

proximal relationship between the required language and the required 

signature and date lines following the language.” Id. at 131 (emphasis 

omitted). The proximity of the signature line to the text of the waiver is, 

thus, significant. In Jones, this Court concluded that the rejection of UIM 

benefits was invalid because the insurer’s UIM rejection form “interpose[d] a 

sentence, not directly related to [the] rejection of UIM coverage, between 

the required language and the signature line.” Id. Thus, the location of the 

execution line is not “de minimis” and the requirement of a signature 

thereon is not “hypertechnical.”
J-A23026-17 & J-A23027-17

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Here, the form tracked verbatim the language of the statute. The UIM 

rejection paragraph at issue in Verizon’s policy on page 1, entitled “Rejection 

of Underinsured Motorist Protection,” included the required signature and 

date lines. Verizon UIM Waiver Form, dated 4/26/13. In addition, National 

had inserted a “tick-box” next to the rejection paragraph on page 1, a 

feature not required by statute. On the same page, the form had two 

additional sets of paragraphs, signature and date lines, and “tick-boxes,”

entitled “Selection of Limits” and “Underinsured Coverage Limits.” 

Although Verizon’s authorized representative placed a mark in the 

“tick-box” next to the paragraph entitled “Rejection of Underinsured Motorist 

Protection,” she did not sign or date on the lines immediately following the 

rejection paragraph as required by statute. Instead, on page 2 of the 

coverage form, she signed after the following untitled paragraph:

I understand the protection afforded by Underinsured Motorist 

Coverage and the selection(s) I have made on this Notice 

regarding Underinsured Motorist Coverage. I further understand 

and agree that my selection(s) will apply to this policy and all 

future transfers, substitutions, amendments, alterations, 

modifications, reinstatements or replacements of this policy, and 

all future renewals of this policy, unless I make a written request 

to change my selection(s) and such request is received and 

approved by the Company.

All other terms, conditions, and exclusions of the policy remain 

unchanged.

_____________ ______________________________

Effective Date Authorized Signature of Named Insured
J-A23026-17 & J-A23027-17

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_____________ _______________________________

Date Signed Name and Title

Although Verizon’s authorized representative signed and dated on each 

line immediately following the untitled paragraph indicating she had made 

“selection(s),” she failed to sign on the line immediately following as 

required by case law and statute to indicate explicit waiver of coverage. 

Such omission created an ambiguity. As a result, Verizon did not validly 

waive UIM coverage. 

National argues that the UIM rejection form signed by Verizon

specifically complied with the MVFRL because: (1) it contained the required 

statutory language; (2) Verizon, the named insured, signed the form; (3) 

any deviations from the prescribed statutory language were de minimis; (4) 

the text of the form did not modify coverage or inject ambiguity into the 

statutory form; and (5) the subjective intent of the contracting parties was 

clear. National’s Brief at 22-34.

Verizon set forth variations on the same arguments: (1) that the 

language of the UIM form signed by Verizon matches verbatim the language 

of Section 1731(c); (2) that the court erred in concluding that the location of 

Verizon’s representative’s signature has legal significance; (3) that, in 

keeping with its longstanding practice, Verizon intended to waive UIM 

coverage; and (4) that there is no reason to invalidate the UIM rejection and 

impose strict liability on National where Verizon, and not National, failed to 

observe a statutory technicality. Verizon’s Brief at 20-31.
J-A23026-17 & J-A23027-17

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We are not convinced by Appellants’ bald assertion that Verizon’s 

placement of an “X” in the “tick-box” next to the UIM coverage waiver 

paragraph on National’s form, together with the signature on page 2 of the 

form, were sufficient to effectuate Verizon’s waiver. Appellants have not

supported this argument by citing to any authority. The mandatory form 

described in Section 1731(c.1) does not include a “tick-box” or any similar 

method for indicating an intent to waive coverage. Rather, the express 

terms of Section 1731(c) and (c.1) emphasize the importance of the 

proximal relationship between the waiver language and the insured’s 

signature, indicating an explicit requirement that the insured must sign on 

the line directly below the waiver paragraph in order to effectuate a valid 

rejection of UIM coverage. 

Accordingly, we agree with the trial court that by failing to sign on the 

line below the UIM waiver option paragraph, Verizon failed to select the 

waiver of UIM coverage as it purportedly intended. 

Thus, the trial court did not err in granting summary judgment in favor 

of Appellee.4 

Order affirmed. Jurisdiction relinquished.

Judge Panella joins the memorandum.

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4

In light of our disposition, we decline to address the public policy issues 

raised by the trial court’s summary conclusion that “an employer who fails to 

notify its employee driver that UIM coverage has been rejected is acting 

against public policy.” Trial Ct. Op. at 13.
J-A23026-17 & J-A23027-17

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Judge Fitzgerald files a dissenting statement.

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 12/26/2017