[Cite as State v. Reeves, 2015-Ohio-3251.]

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO 

TENTH APPELLATE DISTRICT 

State of Ohio, : 

 Plaintiff-Appellee, : 

 No. 14AP-856 

v. : (C.P.C. No. 14CR-2911)

Arron A. Reeves, : (REGULAR CALENDAR) 

 Defendant-Appellant. : 

 

D E C I S I O N 

Rendered on August 13, 2015 

 

Ron O'Brien, Prosecuting Attorney, and Valerie Swanson, for 

appellee. 

Yeura R. Venters, Public Defender, and Timothy E. Pierce, for 

appellant. 

 

APPEAL from the Franklin County Court of Common Pleas 

KLATT, J. 

{¶ 1} Defendant-appellant, Arron A. Reeves, appeals from a judgment of 

conviction entered by the Franklin County Court of Common Pleas. For the following 

reasons, we affirm. 

I. Factual and Procedural Background 

{¶ 2} On June 2, 2014, a Franklin County Grand Jury indicted appellant with one 

count of domestic violence in violation of R.C. 2919.25 and one count of abduction in 

violation of R.C. 2905.02. The counts arose out of a physical altercation that occurred 

between appellant and his girlfriend. Appellant initially entered a not guilty plea to both 

counts. As part of an agreement with the state, however, appellant withdrew his not guilty 

plea to the count of domestic violence and entered a guilty plea to that count. The 

abduction charge was dismissed. The trial court accepted appellant's guilty plea, found 
No. 14AP-856 2 

him guilty, and sentenced him to 18 months in prison, the maximum prison term for his 

conviction. 

II. Appellant's Appeal 

{¶ 3} Appellant appeals and assigns the following errors: 

[1.] The lower court abused its discretion and imposed a 

sentence contrary to law when it ordered Appellant to serve a 

term of incarceration in the Ohio Department of 

Rehabilitation and Corrections in violation of the Fifth and 

Fourteenth Amendments of the United States Constitution 

and Article I, Sections 1 and 16 of the Ohio Constitution and 

R.C. 2953.08(A)(4) and (G). 

[2.] The lower court abused its discretion and imposed a 

sentence contrary to law when it ordered Appellant to serve 

eighteen (18) months' incarceration, the maximum prison 

term for felonies of the fourth degree, in violation of the Fifth 

and Fourteenth Amendments of the United States 

Constitution and Article I, Sections 1 and 16 of the Ohio 

Constitution and R.C. 2953.08(A)(1)(a). 

 A. First Assignment of Error–Was Appellant's Sentence 

 Contrary to Law? 

{¶ 4} We initially set forth our standard of review. We do not review a trial 

court's sentence for an abuse of discretion. Instead, we must determine whether clear and 

convincing evidence establishes that the sentence is contrary to law. State v. Mercier, 

10th Dist. No. 13AP-906, 2014-Ohio-2910, ¶ 4. Applying that standard, we look to the 

record to determine whether the sentencing court considered and properly applied the 

statutory guidelines and whether the sentence is otherwise contrary to law. State v. 

Burton, 10th Dist. No. 06AP-690, 2007-Ohio-1941, ¶ 19; State v. Stubbs, 10th Dist. No. 

13AP-810, 2014-Ohio-3696, ¶ 15; State v. White, 1st Dist. No. C-130114, 2013-Ohio-4225, 

¶ 9-10. 

{¶ 5} Appellant first argues that his sentence was not consistent with or 

proportional to sentences in other cases involving domestic violence in violation of R.C. 

2929.11(B). We disagree. 

{¶ 6} The consistency and proportionality requirements of R.C. 2929.11(B) 

require that sentencing courts impose punishment and sentence "consistent with 

sentences imposed for similar crimes committed by similar offenders." This court has 
No. 14AP-856 3 

stated that consistency does not necessarily mean uniformity. Instead, consistency aims 

at similar sentences. Accordingly, consistency accepts divergence within a range of 

sentences and takes into consideration a trial court's discretion to weigh relevant 

statutory factors. Although offenses may be similar, distinguishing factors may justify 

dissimilar sentences. State v. Worth, 10th Dist. No. 10AP-1125, 2012-Ohio-666, ¶ 98, 

quoting State v. Battle, 10th Dist. No. 06AP-863, 2007-Ohio-1845, ¶ 24. Thus, 

consistency in sentencing does not derive from a case-by-case comparison, but by the trial 

court's proper application of the statutory sentencing guidelines. State v. Hall, 179 Ohio 

App.3d 727, 2008-Ohio-6228, ¶ 10 (10th Dist.). In order to demonstrate that a sentence 

is inconsistent, an offender must demonstrate that the trial court did not properly 

consider applicable sentencing criteria found in R.C. 2929.11 and 2929.12. Worth at ¶ 99, 

citing State v. Holloman, 10th Dist. No. 07AP-875, 2008-Ohio-2650, ¶ 19. 

{¶ 7} Here, the trial court wrote in its judgment entry imposing sentence that it 

"considered the purposes and principles of sentencing set forth in R.C. 2929.11 and the 

factors set forth in R.C. 2929.12." That language in a judgment entry belies a defendant's 

claim that the trial court failed to consider the purposes and principles in sentencing, 

pursuant to R.C. 2929.11(A), and the R.C. 2929.12 factors regarding recidivism and the 

seriousness of the offense. State v. Foster, 10th Dist. No. 12AP-69, 2012-Ohio-4129, ¶ 15; 

State v. Small, 10th Dist. No. 09AP-1175, 2010-Ohio-5324, ¶ 16. 

{¶ 8} Appellant also argues that his prison sentence violates the sentencing 

principles found in R.C. 2929.11(A) because it constitutes an "unnecessary burden" on 

government resources. In relevant part, R.C. 2929.11(A) provides that: 

A court that sentences an offender for a felony shall be guided 

by the overriding purposes of felony sentencing. The 

overriding purposes of felony sentencing are to protect the 

public from future crime by the offender and others and to 

punish the offender using the minimum sanctions that the 

court determines accomplish those purposes without 

imposing an unnecessary burden on state or local government 

resources. 

{¶ 9} Although resource burdens are a relevant sentencing criterion under R.C. 

2929.11(A), a sentencing court is not required to elevate resource conservation above the 

R.C. 2929.12 seriousness and recidivism factors. State v. Luyando, 8th Dist. No. 97203, 

2012-Ohio-1947, ¶ 14, citing Burton at ¶ 19; State v. Wilson, 2d Dist. No. 24978, 2012-
No. 14AP-856 4 

Ohio-4756, ¶ 6. " 'Where the interests of public protection and punishment are well 

served by a prison sentence, the claim is difficult to make that the prison sentence 

imposes an unnecessary burden on government resources.' " Id., quoting State v. 

Bowshier, 2d Dist. No. 08-CA-58, 2009-Ohio-3429, ¶ 14; State v. Henry, 12th Dist. No. 

CA2013-03-050, 2014-Ohio-1318, ¶ 14. We have already determined that the trial court 

considered the relevant factors under R.C. 2929.11 and 2929.12. Thus, the trial court 

necessarily considered the burden on state and local government resources a prison term 

would entail. Additionally, appellant has not demonstrated that his sentence is an 

unnecessary burden on government resources. State v. Huckleby, 2d Dist. No. 25597, 

2013-Ohio-4613, ¶ 14. 

{¶ 10} Appellant also argues that trial court improperly weighed the R.C. 2929.12 

sentencing factors and should have given more weight to his grounds in mitigation. We 

disagree because "the trial court, in exercising its sentencing discretion, determines the 

weight afforded to any particular statutory factors, mitigating grounds, or other relevant 

circumstances." State v. Todd, 10th Dist. No. 06AP-1208, 2007-Ohio-4307, ¶ 23. While 

appellant disagrees with the trial court's balancing of the sentencing factors and 

mitigation evidence, such a disagreement does not make a sentence that falls within the 

applicable statutory range contrary to law. Stubbs at ¶ 16, citing State v. Saur, 10th Dist. 

No. 10AP-1195, 2011-Ohio-6662, ¶ 48. 

{¶ 11} Appellant has not demonstrated that his sentence is contrary to law. 

Accordingly, we overrule appellant's first assignment of error. 

 B. Second Assignment of Error–Did the Trial Court Impose a 

 Maximum Sentence for Improper Reasons? 

{¶ 12} Appellant next argues that the trial court sentenced him to a maximum 

prison term for his domestic violence conviction because the trial court felt that he had 

evaded responsibility for the abduction charge by entering into a plea agreement with the 

state. We disagree. 

{¶ 13} Appellant premises his argument on his interpretation of comments the 

trial court made at sentencing. Specifically, the trial court told appellant that "you did a 

wonder getting rid of that F3 [the abduction count] because I would have double stacked 

those bad boys in a heartbeat. He made sure that I didn’t get a real chance at you." (Tr. 

10.) While appellant interprets those comments as indicating retribution, we interpret 
No. 14AP-856 5 

them as the trial court telling appellant that his attorney got him a good deal because he 

would have sentenced him to consecutive prison terms if he had pled guilty to two 

offenses. We do not interpret them as providing a reason why the trial court imposed the 

maximum sentence. 

{¶ 14} In fact, the trial court was clear why it imposed maximum sentences, and it 

did not involve appellant's plea agreement: it was his own conduct. At sentencing, the 

trial court noted that it twice listened to the victim's 911 call while the offenses were 

occurring and that: 

It was a rant and rave over jealousy. * * * It was just a rant, 

and it was almost psychotic. No one deserves to be hit, 

period. And the rage that was on there, I have some real 

problems with it. I think I really need to protect society here. 

I must say it's not the worst DV I've ever seen; it's not even in 

the top ten. But his ranting and raving, I think a maximum 

sentence is appropriate to protect the public and not to 

demean the seriousness of the offense. That much rage and 

anger, it didn’t last for seconds. It went on and on and on. 

And I can justify everything. 

 (Tr. 10.) 

{¶ 15} The trial court further commented that it had "to justify what I did. It's to 

protect society. With these rantings and ravings, I'm sorry about your daughter. I'm 

sorry you're facing that, but I can't justify anything but this sentence." (Tr. 10.) These 

comments make it clear why the trial court chose to impose a maximum prison term. 

{¶ 16} For these reasons, we reject appellant's argument that the trial court 

improperly imposed a maximum prison term based on his plea agreement. Accordingly, 

we overrule his second assignment of error. 

III. Conclusion 

{¶ 17} Having overruled appellant's two assignments of error, we affirm the 

judgment of the Franklin County Court of Common Pleas. 

Judgment affirmed.

TYACK and HORTON, JJ., concur.