In the

United States Court of Appeals

For the Seventh Circuit ____________

No. 05-3676

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

v.

WILLIAM A. ELLIS,

Defendant-Appellant.

____________

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division.

No. 04 CR 449—Robert W. Gettleman, Judge.

____________

ARGUED JANUARY 19, 2006 —DECIDED MARCH 8, 2006

____________

Before EASTERBROOK,MANION, andKANNE, Circuit Judges.

MANION, Circuit Judge. William Ellis, former bishop of the

Apostolic Pentecostal Church in Morgan Park, Illinois,

pleaded guilty to one count of willfully making and subscribing a false income tax return, in violation of 26 U.S.C.

§ 7206(1). At sentencing, the district court found that Ellis

had abused his position of trust and had obtained over

$10,000 in illegal income without reporting it. Applying

enhancements for this conduct, the court imposed a sentence of eighteen months’ imprisonment. Ellis challenges the

enhancements as well as the reasonableness of the sentence.

We affirm.
2 No. 05-3676

I.

William Ellis became bishop of the Apostolic Pentecostal Church (“APC” or the “church”) in 1995. Soon

thereafter, Ellis proceeded to shake an ostensibly moribund church out of its doldrums, growing the church

coffers and drawing more people into the pews. The weekly

collections rose from $7,000 to $41,000, and church membership increased from 500 to 2,000 people. Ellis was the head

of the church; although APC had a board, Ellis “would

simply issue directives to be followed by the board.” APC

rewarded Ellis for his efforts with a healthy salary: in his tax

return for 1997, for instance, he claimed that he earned

$109,924.

Nonetheless, Ellis chose to supplement his salary by

taking money directly from the Sunday collection without reporting it on his tax returns. According to former APC

officials, shortly after Ellis began his work there,

he demanded $1,000 from the Sunday collection, a practice that he followed on most subsequent Sundays. Ellis

explained that he wanted the money as cash rather than

as part of his salary in order to avoid taxes.

Although his flock was not aware of Ellis’s actions,

some officials apparently knew and raised questions

about the practice. The chairman of the APC board, for

instance, questioned Ellis about it, telling him it amounted

to “stealing” and “deceiving God’s people.” Ellis rationalized his actions by saying “I bring it in, and I take it out.”

Ellis also warned the chairman of the board “[d]on’t muzzle

the ox.” When a deacon told him that his actions were

wrong, Ellis responded “[t]hat’s the way you take care of

your pastor?” and “[y]ou have a lot to learn about how to

take care of your pastor.” In order to cover themselves,

several APC officials who were aware of Ellis’s practice
No. 05-3676 3

made notes about the payments to him in the records of the

weekly offering sheets. Ellis instructed them to stop making

the records. Despite assurances that the church would raise

his salary if it was not enough, Ellis refused such an arrangement.

In addition to the money taken from the Sunday collections, Ellis also failed to include on his tax returns sundry

other benefits, such as a Mercedes that he used for both

personal and church business, making personal credit card

and life insurance payments with church funds, and using

the APC credit card for personal expenditures. From these

benefits and the plundering of the collection plate, the

government calculated that Ellis had additional gross

income in the amount of $520,602 in the years of 1996

through 2001, resulting in a large tax deficit.

The government indicted Ellis on five counts of willfully

making and subscribing a false income tax return, in

violation of 26 U.S.C. § 7206(1), one count of failure to

file an income tax return, in violation of 26 U.S.C. § 7203,

and one count of causing a domestic financial institution

to fail to file a report required by 31 U.S.C. § 5313(a).

Ellis pleaded guilty to one count of making a false tax return

for the year 1997. At the sentencing hearing, the district

court heard testimony and arguments regarding potential

enhancements for abuse of a position of trust and obtaining

over $10,000 in income from illegal sources without reporting it. The district court imposed both enhancements, which

produced a Guidelines range of 18 to 24 months. After

reflecting on Ellis’s many good works and the severity of his

crime, the district court sentenced him to 18 months’

imprisonment. Ellis appeals.
4 No. 05-3676

II.

A.

Ellis challenges each of the two enhancements that the

district court imposed. “Post-Booker we continue to review

the court’s application of the Sentencing Guidelines de novo

and its factual findings for clear error.” United States v.

Bothun, 424 F.3d 582, 586 (7th Cir. 2005); see also United States

v. Mabrook, 301 F.3d 503, 510 (7th Cir. 2002).

The abuse of a position of trust enhancement provides

“[i]f the defendant abused a position of public or private

trust, or used a special skill, in a manner that significantly facilitated the commission or concealment of the

offense, increase by 2 levels.” U.S.S.G. § 3B1.3; see United

States v. Baldwin, 414 F.3d 791, 798 (7th Cir. 2005). For the

enhancement to apply, Ellis must have: (1) occupied a

position of trust and (2) abused that position in a manner

that significantly facilitated the commission or concealment of his offense. See United States v. Cruz, 317 F.3d

763, 766 (7th Cir. 2003). In making our determination,

we analyze the circumstances from the perspective of

the victim, looking beyond formal labels to the actual

relationship that existed and the responsibilities that

the victim entrusted to Ellis. See Baldwin, 414 F.3d at 798.

The district court did not commit clear error when it

determined that Ellis had abused a position of trust. Ellis

argues that the enhancement is improper because APC,

whose trust he abused, was not a victim of his tax fraud

because it was financially prospering under his pastoral

care. This is less than convincing. To begin with, even if

we were to accept Ellis’s victimless theory, the enhancement

does not require a particular “victim” relationship between

the criminal and the person or group whose trust has been
No. 05-3676 5

abused. See Cruz, 317 F.3d at 766 (“[c]ourts may apply the

abuse of trust enhancement even if the defendant did not

occupy a position of trust in relation to the victim of the

offense of conviction”). Here, there can be no doubt that

Ellis held a position of trust in the church and used his

position to facilitate this crime. Specifically, Ellis, who was

in complete control of the church, demanded cash payments

directly from the Sunday offering. The church did not

authorize this; the few people who knew about the practice

challenged him, but were cowed by haughty rebukes about

the proper treatment of a pastor. Ellis also attempted to

thwart the members of the church who were keeping track

of these payments in order to better conceal his crime. Ellis’s

tax fraud was only possible because of his bishop’s chair.

In any event, it is clear that APC was a victim. Ellis claims

that the offers to improve his salary by the head of the APC

board (while trying to talk Ellis out of stealing from the

collection plate) and the healthiness of church finances

prove his point that he deserved (and thus took) more. They

do not. While APC might have been willing to increase his

salary, that was a decision for the church, not for him. What

Ellis committed was theft; he did not tell APC that he

wanted an increased salary and had not received permission

for the additional money. Nor can the overall healthiness of

church finances salvage his actions. Ellis’s argument,

essentially a slightly more sophisticated version of “I bring

it in, and I can take it out,” betrays a fundamental misapprehension. The funds were not his. While no doubt his skillful

ministry explains to a large extent the uptick in contributions, they were contributions to the church, not to him. The

church was not entitled to just a healthy cut of the increased

revenues; it was entitled to all of it. Clearly, APC was a

victim of Ellis’s scheme to extract tax-free income.
6 No. 05-3676

Ellis also challenges the imposition of an enhancement for

failure to report more than $10,000 in income from an illegal

source. U.S.S.G. § 2T1.1(b)(1). Ellis suggests that

the church’s revived financial state and some suggestions that he could be given a raise proved that this

money was not from an illegal source. Again, the district court did not commit clear error. As discussed above,

Ellis stole from the Sunday offerings, taking thousands of

dollars without permission from the church. Moreover, he

used APC funds to pay his personal credit cards and life

insurance, and racked up thousands more on APC credit

cards for personal expenditures. Ellis contends that the

government failed to show his intent to commit theft by

deception, but such intent can be shown from circumstantial

evidence, see, e.g., People v. Lambert, 552 N.E.2d 300, 306 (Ill.

App. Ct. 1990), and has been shown by the evidence here.

The more than $500,000 that Ellis took from APC during the

course of his episcopacy was derived from his illegal

activities, making the enhancement completely appropriate.

B.

Ellis also argues that his sentence was unreasonable. In

our post-Booker world, a district court has the obligation

to correctly compute the Guidelines range and then craft

a reasonable sentence, consulting the factors found in

18 U.S.C. § 3553(a). See United States v. Sharp, 436 F.3d

730, 738-39 (7th Cir. 2006). Any sentence that is properly

calculated under the Guidelines is entitled to a rebuttable

presumption of reasonableness. See United States v.

Mykytiuk, 415 F.3d 606, 608 (7th Cir. 2005). “This standard

is deferential; a defendant can only rebut the presumption by demonstrating that the sentence is unreasonable

when measured against the § 3553(a) factors.” Sharp, at *8.
No. 05-3676 7

In this case, the district court did not impose an unreasonable sentence. With the exception of contesting the enhancements, neither of the parties contends that the district court

erred in his calculation of the proper Guidelines range. At

the sentencing hearing, the district court heard from both

parties regarding what would constitute a proper sentence.

In its comments, the district court clearly demonstrated an

understanding of its post-Booker responsibilities and a

concern for weighing the different mitigating and aggravating factors. The district court expressly considered a number

of the § 3553(a) factors, including the nature of the offense,

the seriousness of the offense, and the deterrence effect of

any sentence. Going beyond these factors, the district court

recognized the many good deeds that Ellis has done

throughout his life, as well as his health and family circumstances. Still, the district court felt that a sentence at the low

end of the Guidelines range was most appropriate for Ellis’s

actions. While we would not necessarily impose the same

sentence as the district court, our inquiry is bound by

substantial deference to it. The district court went through

the proper steps, and we do not find that the sentence

imposed is unreasonable.

III.

Ellis committed a serious crime. He abused his position as

bishop while pursuing his scheme to cheat the IRS. The

district court thoughtfully weighed the various considerations bearing on Ellis’s sentence and selected a reasonable one. Therefore, we AFFIRM the decision of the district

court.
8 No. 05-3676

A true Copy:

Teste:

 _____________________________

Clerk of the United States Court of 

Appeals for the Seventh Circuit 

USCA-02-C-0072—3-8-06