* Pursuant to Local Rule 47.5, the Court has determined that

this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except

under the limited circumstances set forth in Local Rule 47.5.4.

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FIFTH CIRCUIT

_________________

No. 98-30549

Summary Calendar

_________________

FAITH HOME HEALTH SERVICES INC,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

versus

DONNA E SHALALA; HEALTH CARE FINANCING

ADMINISTRATION,

Defendants-Appellees.

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Middle District of Louisiana

(98-CV-329)

December 15, 1998

Before EMILIO M. GARZA, DeMOSS, and BENAVIDES, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:*

Faith Home Health Services, Inc. (“Faith Home”) appeals the

district court's order dismissing for lack of subject matter

jurisdiction Faith Home's claims against Defendants. We affirm.

I

Faith Home is a private health care provider, which provides

home health care services under the Medicare program. Faith Home
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alleges that Defendants, administrators of the Medicare program,

wrongfully assessed it overpayments, withheld reimbursement

payments, and refused to allow for an extended repayment plan. The

district court dismissed Faith Home's claims for lack of subject

matter jurisdiction, on the grounds that Faith Home failed to

exhaust its administrative remedies. We review a district court's

jurisdictional determinations de novo. Hidden Oaks Ltd. v. City of

Austin, 138 F.3d 1036, 1041 (5th Cir. 1998).

II

Because Faith Home's suit “arises under” the Medicare Act, 42

U.S.C. § 1395 et seq., federal courts may not exercise general

federal question jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1331. See Heckler

v. Ringer, 466 U.S. 602, 614-615, 104 S. Ct. 2013, 2021, 80 L. Ed.

2d 622 (1984). Instead, Faith Home may obtain judicial review

under 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). See id. Section 405(g), however,

requires that a plaintiff fully exhaust any administrative remedies

before resorting to the federal courts. See id. at 617, 2023. 

Faith Home has conceded that its administrative appeals are

still pending. It argues, however, that alternative bases of

jurisdiction exist. First, Faith Home contends that the district

court has mandamus jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1361. Mandamus

jurisdiction is available only if a plaintiff “has exhausted all

other avenues of relief.” Ringer, 466 U.S. at 616, 104 S. Ct. at

2022. Thus Faith Home's failure to exhaust its administrative

remedies precludes mandamus jurisdiction. Second, Faith Home

argues that the Administrative Procedure Act (“APA”), 5 U.S.C.
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§§ 501 et seq., provides jurisdiction. The APA, however, does not

create an independent grant of jurisdiction to bring suit. See

Stockman v. Fed. Election Comm'n, 138 F.3d 144, 151 n.13 (5th Cir.

1998).

Finally, Faith Home argues that jurisdiction lies under the

All Writs Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1651(a). It is well established that

the All Writs Act does not itself create jurisdiction. See

Brittingham v. United States Comm'r of Internal Revenue, 451 F.2d

315, 317 (5th Cir. 1971). Nevertheless, courts have recognized

that the All Writs Act provides courts “limited . . . power to

preserve the court's jurisdiction or maintain the status quo by

injunction pending review of an agency's action through the

prescribed statutory channels.” V.N.A. of Greater Tift County,

Inc. v. Heckler, 711 F.2d 1020, 1027 (11th Cir. 1983). This “power

to enter a status quo injunction 'extends to the potential

jurisdiction of the appellate court where an appeal . . . may be

later perfected.'” Id. at 1027-28, quoting Federal Trade Comm'n v.

Dean Foods, 384 U.S. 597, 603, 86 S. Ct. 1738, 1743 (1966). 

When a plaintiff asks a court to exercise this power, however,

the usual requirements for a preliminary injunction are subject to

heightened standards. See V.N.A. of Greater Tift County, 711 F.2d

at 1030. Specifically, a plaintiff must show (1) a virtual

certainty of irreparable injury, (2) a virtual certainty of success

on the merits, (3) minimal harm to the agency, in the sense of

disruption of process, and (4) the public interest clearly favoring

the assumption of jurisdiction. See id. at 1034.
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Faith Home argues that it is entitled to an injunction under

this doctrine because (1) the Defendants' actions have rendered it

unable to pay its bills, to pay and retain its employees, and to

provide health care services to patients, (2) there is “a

substantial likelihood that [Faith Home] will ultimately succeed on

the merit[s] because of [Defendants'] wrongful conduct,” and (3)

“the issuance of an injunction would not disserve the public

interest.”

The district court correctly found that Faith Home failed to

meet the heightened standards required to issue a prejurisdictional injunction under the All Writs Act. It has not

shown a virtual certainty of success on the merits. Furthermore,

the harm Faith Home alleges is not sufficient to warrant a prejurisdictional injunction. See V.N.A. of Greater Tift County, 711

F.2d at 1031-32. Consequently, we affirm the district court's

ruling.

III

Because we affirm the district court's dismissal for lack of

subject matter jurisdiction, Faith Home's Motion for Judicial

Notice and Motion for Supplemental Judicial Notice are DENIED as

moot.