[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advanc e sheets, it may be cited as State v. Fazenbaker , Slip Opinion No. 2020-Ohio-6731.]

NOTICE This slip opinion is subject to f ormal revision before it is pu blished in an advance sheet of the Ohio Official Reports. Readers are reques ted to promptly notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of Ohi o, 65 South Front Street, Columbus, Ohio 43215, of any typographical or other formal errors in the opinion, in order that corrections may be made before the opinion is published.

S LIP O PINION N O
. 2020-O HIO -6731
T HE S TATE OF O HIO , A PPELLANT , v . F AZENBAKER , A PPELLEE . [Until this opinion appears in t he Ohio Official Reports advanc e sheets, it

may be cited as State v. Fazenbaker , Slip Opinion No. 2020-Ohio-6731.] Breaking and entering

— Definition of “unoccupied structure”

— A vacant trailer that is designed for overnight accomm odation but is winterized and stored is an unoccupied structure pursuant to R.C. 2911.13(A)

— Judgment
reversed. (No. 2019-1567—Submitted July 22, 2020—Decided December 18, 202 0.)
A PPEAL from the Court of Appeals for Summit County, No. 29108,
2019-Ohio-3972.

________________ D ONNELLY , J. {¶ 1} In this discretionary appeal, we a re asked to determine the mea ning of “unoccupied structure” in the breaking-and-entering statute, R.C. 2911.13(A). The Ninth District Court of Appeal s held that entering a recrea tional travel trailer to commit theft does not constitute breaking and entering if th e trailer is winterized,S UPREME C OURT OF O HIO

2 covered, and stored, because a t railer in that condition is not an unoccupied structure. We conclude that a structure that is specifically d esigned for overnight accommodation and physically capable of being occupied, but is winterized, covered, stored, and uninhabited at the time of a break-in, is an unoccupied structure for purposes of R.C. 2911.13(A). Because such a stru cture was involved here, we reverse the judgmen t of the court of appeals. I. Background {¶ 2} At some point between the spring of 2016 and May 2017, appellee , Andrew Fazenbaker, broke into a recreational travel trailer and stole a television and stereo system that had been built into the trailer. The wi nterized trailer had been sitting covered outdoors at a storage facility ever since the owners had towed
it there in 2015. The trailer wa s built for occupation and ove rnight accommodation; it included a bedroom, bathroom, kitchen, and living room, whic h contained the
entertainment center that Fa zenbaker dismantled and stole. {¶ 3} Appellant, the state of Ohio, charged Fazenbaker with breaking and entering under R.C. 2911.13(A), wh ich prohibits “by force, stea lth, or deception” trespassing in an “unoccupied structure” to commit theft or a f elony offense. At trial, Fazenbaker unsuccessfully moved for acquittal pursuant t o Crim.R. 29, arguing that the trailer was not an unoccupied structure. The trial court overruled the motion, determining that the trailer was an “occupied struc ture” when used as a temporary dwelling and therefo re was an unoccupied structure when not used for that purpose. A jury found Fazenbaker guilty, and he received a 12-month prison

sentence. {¶ 4} A majority of the Ninth District panel concluded that the trail er did not constitute an unoccupied structure for the purposes of R.C. 2911.13(A) and reversed Fazenbaker’s conviction. 2019-Ohio-3972, ¶ 18. The m ajority held that a structure’s status as an “occupied structure” pursuant to R.C . 2909.01(C) depends on whether it is being “maintained” for residential use when th e crime occurs. Id

.January Term, 2020

3 at ¶ 17. Because the trailer here was not being maintained for residential use, the majority held that the trailer was not capable of being an occu pied structure, and since the trailer was winterized and not “adapted for overnight accommodation,”
the trailer was not an unocc upied structure either. Id. at ¶ 18. The majority vacated
Fazenbaker’s conviction and senten ce on this ground and determi ned that Fazenbaker’s additional assign ments of error were moot. Id . at ¶ 21. {¶ 5} The dissenting judge found fault in the majority’s reasoning th at because the trailer could not be an occupied structure, it ther efore could not be an unoccupied structure. The disse nter opined that “no structure would ever qualify as an ‘unoccupied structure’ for purposes of R.C. 2911.13(A)” u nder the majority’s logic. Id . at ¶ 26 (Teodosio, P.J., dissenting). {¶ 6} We accepted one proposition of law for review:

Any house, building, outbuilding, watercraft, aircraft, railroad car, truck, trailer, tent, or other structure, vehicle , or shelter, or any portion thereof, is a structure under R.C. 2909.01(C). A structure will be an “occupied structure” if any of the factors enumerated in R.C. 2909.01(C)(1-4) apply; if none of the factor s apply, the structure will be an “unoccupied structure.”

See 158 Ohio St.3d 1406, 2020-Ohio371, 139 N.E.3d 910. II. Analysis {¶ 7} Fazenbaker’s conviction for breaking and entering was pursuant to R.C. 2911.13(A), which prohibits t respassing into an “unoccupie d structure” to commit certain offenses. “Unoccupied structure” is not defined in R.C. 2911.13 or anywhere else in the Revised Code . This court has previously s uggested that the definition of “occupied struc ture” in R.C. 2909.01(C), which is used to define property offenses like aggravated arson, R.C. 2909.02(A)(2) and (B)(1), andS UPREME C OURT OF O HIO

4 burglary, R.C. 2911.12(A), (C), and (D), has traditionally info rmed the inverse concept of “unoccupied structure.” See State v. Carroll , 62 Ohio St.2d 313, 314, 405 N.E.2d 305 (1980). {¶ 8} The interpretation of a statute is a question of law, and accor dingly,
we review the matter de novo. State v. Pariag , 137 Ohio St.3d 81, 2013-Ohio4010, 998 N.E.2d 401, ¶ 9. When dealing with an issue of statu tory construction, our main concern is to ascertain and give effect to the intenti on of the General Assembly. Henry v. Cent. Natl. Bank , 16 Ohio St.2d 16, 242 N.E.2d 342 (1968), paragraph two of the syllabus. W e determine legislative intent largely from the plain language of a statute. Summerville v. Forest Park , 128 Ohio St.3d 221, 2010- Ohio-6280, 943 N.E.2d 522, ¶ 18. {¶ 9} Ohio’s breaking-and-entering statute states:

No person by force, stealth, or deception, shall trespass in an unoccupied structure, with purpose to commit therein any theft offense, as defined in section 2913.01 of the Revised Code, or any felony.

R.C. 2911.13(A). {¶ 10} R.C. 2909.01(C) defines “occupied structure” as

any house, building, outbuilding, watercraft, aircraft, railroa d car, truck, trailer, tent, or other st ructure, vehicle, or shelter, or any portion thereof, to which any o f the following applies: (1) It is maintained as a permanent or temporary dwelling, even though it is temporarily unoccupied and whether or not any person is actually present.January Term, 2020

5 (2) At the time, it is occupied as the permanent or temporary habitation of any person, whether or not any person is actually present. (3) At the time, it is specially adapted for the overnight accommodation of any person, whether or not any person is actually present. (4) At the time, any person is present or likely to be present in it.

{¶ 11} Although R.C. 2909.01(C) refers to objects that are widely thou ght of as structures, such as houses and buildings, it also refers to temporary dwellings like tents, as well as objects that can be physically occupied but that are not normally thought of as structures or dwelling places, such as v ehicles and watercraft. The sheer breadth of the list of objects in R.C. 2 909.01(C) suggests that some objects, such as motor vehic les, are considered structures only if occupied, which in turn implies that those objects cease to be structures if they are neither occupied nor presently cap able of being occupied. {¶ 12} This court addressed the potential gray areas between unoccupie d structures and nonstructures in R.C. 2909.01(C) and 2911.13 in Carroll , 62 Ohio St.2d at 315, 405 N.E.2d 305, in which this court determined th at a Volkswagen bus was not an “unoccupied struc ture” within the meaning of R.C . 2911.13. Fazenbaker urges that the facts of this case present a similar gray area and that
Carrollis controlling. We disagree. While details about the Volkswa gen bus in
Carroll are sparse, the opinion seems to imply that the bus was not a s tructure because it was a motor vehicle and because it was not set up fo r overnight
accommodations. See Carroll at 315, quoting the 1973 Legislative Service
Commission Comment to Am.Sub.H.B. N o. 511 (“ ‘The tent camper r igged for an overnight stay is an occupied structure, but would not come und er the definition [ofS UPREME C OURT OF O HIO

6 an occupied structure] when collapsed for travel’ ”). Unlike t he bus in Carroll , a recreational travel trailer that is pulled like the one here is not a motor vehicle. Moreover, it is not capable of being collapsed like a tent and thereby impossible to physically enter. {¶ 13} Although when Fazenbaker broke into the trailer it was not inte nded for immediate occupation, given that it was winterized and cove red with a tarp, the same argument could be made regarding an empty, winterized buil ding. That it has been closed, abandoned, or shut down does not make it a nonstru cture. Because the trailer was designed for the specific purpose of providing a temporary dwelling, including overnight accommodation, and because winterizing the trailer did not change its purpose or render it physically incapable of being o ccupied, it remained a structure capable of being o ccupied despite conditions that i ndicated that the owners did not want it to be occupied at the time. {¶ 14} When a statute’s meaning is clear and unambiguous, the statute is applied as written. Boley v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co. , 125 Ohio St.3d 510, 2010-Ohio-2550, 929 N.E.2d 448, ¶ 20. The recreational travel trailer—when in use—fits squarely within the def inition of an “occupied structu re” under R.C. 2909.01(C). Nothing about its natur e or physical attributes wo uld cause it to
become a nonstructure when unocc upied, and it therefore fits sq uarely within the meaning of an “unoccupied structure” as the term is used in R.C . 2911.13(A). Accordingly, the court of appeals erred in reversing Fazenbaker ’s conviction and
sentence based on insufficient evi dence of the “unoccupied stru cture” element in R.C. 2911.13(A).
III. Conclusion {¶ 15} The recreational travel trailer at issue here was manufactured for overnight accommodation. The fact that it was not occupied at the time of Fazenbaker’s theft rendered it an unoccupied structure rather t han a nonstructure. We therefore reverse the judgment of the Ninth District Court o f Appeals andJanuary Term, 2020

7 remand the cause for that court to consider Fazenbaker’s assign ments of error that it previously deemed moot. Judgment reversed
and cause remanded.
O’C ONNOR , C.J., and K ENNEDY , F RENCH , F ISCHER , and S TEWART , JJ.,

concur. D E W INE , J., concurs in judgment only.

_________________ Sherri Bevan Walsh, Summit County Prosecuting Attorney, and Jacquenette S. Corgan, Assistan t Prosecuting Attorney, for appe llant. James W. Armstrong, for appellee.

_________________