### IN THE COURT OF APP EALS OF TENNESS EE AT NAS HVILLE A ugus t 8, 200 8 S es sio n
ERVIN D. SMI TH, ET AL 

### . v. PAUL EVANS, ET AL 

### . Appeal f rom the Chancer y Court for Montgom ery C ounty No. MC- CH-CV- MG -07-1 Laurence M. Mc Millan, Jr., Jud ge

No. M2007- 02855-COA-R 3-CV - F iled Augu st 27, 2008

Owner s of p r o p e rty

b r o u g h t s u it

to te r mi n a te anin g r e s s /e g r e s s e a s e me n t a c r o s s th e ir la n d, contendingthat the nec essity for the e ase m ent no l ong er e x isted. Following a trial, the Chanc ery Court ru le d a g a ins t th e ow ners, fi nd ingthat si nc e the e a se me nt w a s r e se rv e d in a re c or de d p lat, i t was not an e aseme nt by

nece ssity ; conseque ntly , the ea sement wa s not destroy ed upon the s al e of the dominant estate. O n appea l, the owner s maintain that the easement wa s destroy ed at the e nd of the ne c e ssi ty . F ind ingthe e a se me nt t o b e e xpre ss, we a ff irm th e de c isi on

of the Cha nc e ry Court

. Finding the appe al not to be frivolous, no attorne y ’s fe es ar e aw arde d. Tenn. R. App . P . 3 Appeal as of Right; Judgme nt of th e Chancer y Court Affi rm ed

R I C HAR D H. D I NK I NS , J ., delivere d the opinion of the court, in which F RAN K G. C L EME NT , J R ., and ANDY D. B E NN E TT , J J ., joined.
Gre g ory D. Smith, C larksville, Tenne ssee, f or the Appe llants, Ervin D. Smit h and Donna Smit h.

Joe We y ant, Cla

rk sv ill e , T e nn e sse e , f

or the Ap pe lle e s, Pa

ul E va ns and Da nie lle Ev ans
. OP IN ION Prior to 1992, the Donald C. Cook Construction Co., I nc. owne d a lar g e plot of land located in Montgome ry County

. I n Dec ember 1992, Donald Cook, as pre sident of the compa ny , rec eived
a pp ro va l of

a pla t wh ic h div ide d up pa

rt of the pr op e rt

y int o tr a c ts v ary

ingfr om 1 .5 to 2 .1 9 a c re s, all fronting on the ea st and west sides of Sawmill Road; the lots were made available f or sale. Mr

. Cook retained ownership of a 14.2 acr e tract of l and im mediately behind t he lots which fr onted on t h e west side of Sawmill Road (the “Cook Property”). To e nsure a cce ss to the Cook P roper ty , heW i t h ou t re s er v i n g t h e e as eme n t , t h e 14. 2 ac r e pa r ce l wou l d ha v e be en l an dl ock ed f r om pu bl i c a cc es s r oads 1 by t h e t r ac t s c r ea t ed i n t h e pl at t o t h e ea s t a n d by pr e- ex i s t i n g t r ac t s of l an d t o t h e we s t (n on e of wh i ch wer e own ed by M r
. Co ok)

. T he part i es ag r ee t hat , at t he t i me t he pl at was cr eat ed, t he eas ement was nec es s ar y t o ens ur e a cce s s bet ween the C o o k P ro p e rty a n d S a w m ill R o a d

. -2- rese rved a 20 foot ingr ess/eg ress e aseme nt over lot 5 of the subdivision; this ease ment was include d in the rec orded plat and allows ac cess to Sawmill Road. 1

I n May 1994, Erv i n and Donna

Smit h (“the Smit hs”) pur chase d lot 5. At the time of the p u r c h a s e , t h e y

w e r e aw ar e o f

t h e e a s e m e n te v e nt h o u g h i tw a s n o tm e n t i o n e d i nt h e i r d e e d

. In addition, their dee d expressly provided that the convey ance was subjec t to the “terms, matter s and conditio n s ” as shown on the rec orded subdivision plat. Paul and Danie lle Evans (“ the Evanse s”) owned pr operty which adjoined the western side of the Cook Proper ty and which f

ronted on Chester Har ris R o ad ; t h ei r homeplace was located on this property . The Cook Property lay betwee n the Smith s ’ p r o p e rty a

n d th e E v an s e s ’ p r o p e rty

. I n O c to b e r 2 0 0 0 th e E v an s e s p u r c h a s e d the Cook Property ; as a re sult of their purcha se, acc ess from the Cook Property to Chester Ha

rris Road wa s now ava ilable ac ross the Evanse s’ homeplac e lot.

I n Fe bruar

y 2007, the Smiths filed suit in Chanc ery Court f or Montgome ry County

seeking to terminate the e aseme nt over their pr operty , asser ting it was an e aseme nt by nece ssity which wa s exti n gu i s h ed when the E vanses pur chase d the Cook Property . The Eva nses contende d that the
ease ment was ex press in the pl at and thus was not terminated by the end of the ne cessity . Following a trial, the Chanc ery

Court found that the ea sement continued to e x ist. This appeal followed.

STA ND AR

D O F RE VI EW Both pa rties ag ree as to the fa cts of this case ; conseque ntly , the appe al conc erns a question of law. Th e sta

nd ard of re vie w o n a

pp e a l of a qu e st io n of l aw i s “ de novo without a presumption of cor rec tness aff

orded to the lowe r cour

t’s conclusions of law .” B la ir v. Brownson , 197 S.W .3d 68 1, 68 3 ( Te nn . 2 00 6) ; Perrin v. Gay lord Entm’t Co. , 120 S.W .3d 823, 826 (Tenn. 2003)

. AN AL YSI S

I. The Na tu r e of t he Eas e m e nt
An ea sement is “an inter est in pr operty that confe rs on its holder a leg ally enfor cea ble rig ht to use another ’s proper

ty for a spec ific purpose .” Ha ll v. Pi pp in , 9 84 S.W. 2d

61 7, 62 0 ( Te nn . Ct

. A p p
. 1 9 9 8 ) ; se e als o F

o wler v. W

ilbanks , 4 8 S. W.3 d 7 38 , 7 40 (T e nn . Ct . App . 2 00 0) ; Pev ear v. Hunt , 924 S.W .2d 11 4 , 1 1 5 (T en n. Ct. App. 1996). Such an intere st in land can be cre ated in a number of w ay s; the methods ap p l icable to the pr esent c ase a re ( 1) by express g rant, (2) by implication, and (3) by

rese rvation. Pev ear , 924 S.W .2d, at 115.-3-

An express ea sement is a g rant of a n interest in land which must comply with the require ments of th e s t at u t e o f frauds at Te nn. Code Ann. § 29-2- 101. Cellco P’ship v. She lby Cou nty , 1 72 S.W. 3d

57 4, 59 3 ( Te nn . Ct . App . 2 00 5) ; Mitchell v. Chance , 149 S.W .3d 40, 47 (Tenn. Ct. Ap p. 20 04 ); Nunnelly v. Southern I ron Co. , 29 S.W

. 361, 365-66 (Tenn. 1895). “To cre ate a n ease ment by

express g rant, ther e must be a w riting c ontaining pla in and direc t la ng uag e evinc ing the g rantor’ s intent to crea

te a rig ht in the nature of an ease ment rathe r than a license.” 25 Am. J ur. 2d E a s em en t s a n d Licenses § 1 5 ( 20 08 ); Adcoc k v. W itcher , 1995 WL 675852 at *2 (Te nn. Ct. App. Nov. 15, 1995). “The scope of such an ease ment is set forth in express terms, either in the g ranting documents or a s matter of incorpora tion and lega l construction of terms of re levant docume nts...” 25 Am. J ur. 2d Easeme nts and Li cense s § 15

. An easement reserve d in a recorde d plat is sufficient to constitute an express ease ment. Moore v. Que ener , 464 S.W .2d 296, 302 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1970);
se e als o Jacoway v. Palme r , 753 S.W. 2d 67 5 (T e nn . Ct . App . 1 98 7) ; Smith v. Black, 547 S.W .2d 947 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1976).
An ea sement by

implication is an easement that will “a rise upon seve ranc e of a

single piece of land into separ ately owned pa rts as an infe renc e of a

n intention of the parties to the c onvey ance .” Ce llc o P ’s hip , 1 7 2 S

. W

. 3 d at 5 8 8 -8 9 (c i t i n g Ba rre tt v . H ill , 1999 WL 802642 *2 (Tenn. Ct. App. Oc t 7, 19 99 )) ; se e als o LaRue v. Gre ene County Bank , 166 S.W .2d 1044, 1048 (Tenn. 1942). “A common law way

of nec essity

is a ty pe of e aseme nt by

implication and ‘re sts on the impli cation that th e p arti e s in te n d e d

an d a g r e e d to p r o v id e f

o r s u c h a w ay
. ’” Cellc o P ’s hip , 172 S.W .3d at 591 (citin g Gow an v. Cra wfo rd , 599 So.2d 619, 621 (Ala. 1992)) (empha sis added). The implied
ease ment arises “ wher e it is of such nece ssity that we may presume it was within the contemplation of t he parties to the conveyance .” Fowler , 48 S.W. 3d a t 74 0; The Pointe, LLC v. Lake M

gmt Ass’n, Inc. , 5 0 S. W.3 d 4 71 , 4 78 (T e nn . Ct . App . 200 0)

. To c re a te an e a se me nt b y ne c e ssi ty , a

pa rt y mus t sh owthat: (1) the titles to the two trac ts in question must have bee n held by one per son; (2) the unity of title must have bee n sever ed by a conve y an ce o f o n e o f the tra cts; (3) the
e a se me nt m

us t be ne c e ssa

ry in o rd e r f or the ow ne r o f t

he do min ant t e ne me nt to u se his land wi th t he ne c e ssi ty exis ting both at the time of the sever ance of title and the tim e of e xer c ise of

the e a se me nt.
Ce llc o P ’S

hip , 1 7 2 S

. W

. 3 d

at 5 9 2 (c i t i n g Powell v. Miller , 785 S.W .2d 37, 39 (Ark. 1990) ).
An ea sement by

rese rvation is “i n b eh al f of the g rantor [of] a new r ight issuing out of the thing g r an te d , an d an e a s e me n t a p p u rte n an t to th e g r an to r ’ s r e ma in in g la n d ma y b e c r e a te d by
rese rvation.” 25 A m. J ur. 2d. Easeme nts and Li cense s § 16 (2008). Eve n though a n ease ment by
rese rvation is a sepa

rate ty pe of e aseme nt, it can s till be sub-categ orized as beingeither e x press or implied. Id. ; LaRue , 1 66 S.W. 2d a t 10 48 -4 9; Johnson v. H eadrick, 237 S.W .2d 567, 569-70 (Te nn. Ct. App. 1949). An i mplied ease ment by rese rvation is cre ated ove r one pa rce l of subdivided land “whe re, during the unity of t itle, an appare ntly perma nent and obvious servitude is imposed on one part of a n estate in fa

vor of a nother pa rt, which ser

vitude, at the time of the se vera nce, is in use a

nd is rea sonably nece ssary for the fair enjoy ment of t he other part of the estate...” Johnson , 237 S.W .2d-4-

at 569-70 (c iting 17 Am. Jur. Ea se me nts pp. 945, 946). Thus, an im plied ease ment by rese rvation require s no writing; just a servitude which is a ppare nt in light of the exis ting c ircumstance s. LaRue , 1 6 6 S

. W

. 2 d a t 1 0 4 9

. A ne x p r e s s e a s e m e n tb y r e s e r v a t i o n“ ar i s e s w h e na

p r o p e rt y o w n e r

c o n v e ys pa rt of his or he r p ro pe rt

y to a no the r, bu t includes language in t h e convey ance rese rving the rig ht to use some part of the transfe rre d land as a rig ht-of-w ay .” 25 Am. J ur. 2d. Easeme nts and Li cense s § 16 (2008) ( emphasis adde d). Any rese rvation of a

n ease ment “is equivale nt, for the pur pose of
cre ation of the e aseme nt, to an express g rant of the ease ment by the g rante e of the lands.” Id.
When an easement can be either express or i mplied, a court should find the easement to be express. “Ease ments by

implications...are e x ceptions to the g ener al rule that ease ments must be
cre ated by

either a n express g rant or by

presc ription.” Ce llc o P ’s hip , su pra at 5 8 9 (c i t i n g Ba rre tt , 19 99 WL80 26 42 a t *2 ); se e als o Cole v. Dy ch , 5 35 S.W. 2d 31 5, 31 8 ( Te nn . 1 97 6) . T he c ourt in Cellco P’ship he ld that, wh e re a de e d did n ot e xpre ssl y g ra nt a n e a se me nt, the Court

mus t r e so rt

to alternative theories to deter mine “whe ther an ease ment was neverthele ss cre ated.” Id. at 588. The alternative theories refe rre d to were ease ments by implication. Id. Thus, a court should consider an e a s e m e n tb y i mp l i c a t i o no n l y if it h a s d e te rm ine d th a t th e re is n o e xpre ss e a se me nt.
Th e Smiths argue tha

t th e su bs tanc e of

the e a se me nt s ho uld

wi n o ut o ve r i ts f

or m and , a s it
wa s b or n o f n e c e ssi ty , th e fa c t th a t it wa s r e se rv e d i n a reco rded p lat do e s n ot m a ke it a n e xpre ss ease ment. Whil e they are corr ect that the intent of the parties is r eleva nt in deter mining whe ther a

n ease ment by

implication arose, se e Ce llc o P ’s hip , 172 S.W .3d at 588-89 , a n e xpre ss e a se me nt w ill be found if i ts creation is i n the prope r for m; the intent behind the cre ation is not a determining fac tor. See M

oore v. Q ueene r, supra.
The Chanc ellor found that Mr. Cook’s in t en t i n cr eatingthe ea sement wa s to connec t the landlocked 14.2 a cre trac t to Sawmill Road and that the e ase m en t over lot 5 was r eser ved by
rec ording it in the origina l plat. B eca use Mr. Cook, a s g rantor, reta ined an interest over the land that he g rante d (lot 5), an e aseme nt arose by rese rvation. F urthermor e, Mr. Cook expressly rese rved the
e a se me nt when he included it in the subdivision drawing and lang uag e of the rec orded plat. All the require ments of an e x press e aseme nt were met.
II. The Te r m ina ti on o f the Eas e m e nt
We must next de termine whether the ease ment was destroy ed when the Evanses boug ht the Coo k Pr op e rt

y or in a ny oth e r f a sh ion . T here are a numbe r o f w ay s to e nd an e xpre ss e a se me nt; howeve r, there is no evidence that any action wa s taken to terminate the ea sement in this case.
The Smiths contend that an express ease ment cre ated out of a nece ssity should terminate at the elimination of such nec essity , i.e., when the Evanses boug ht the Cook Property , there by ending the nec essity

for a cce ss to Sawmill Road. This is contrary to the law of Te n n es s ee
. I n Smith v. Adkinson , 622 S.W. 2d 54 5 (T e nn . Ct. App . 198 1) , the pla int if fs so ug ht to en fo rc e the ir ri g hts to u se a ro a d b e tw e e n th e ir

pr op e rt y and pr op e rt

y of the de fe nd ants . T he de fe nd ants c la ime d th a t, at mo st, pla int if fs ha d a n e a se me nt o f n e c e ssi ty ; th e y so ught to h a ve the e a se me nt e xtinguis he d b e c a us e-5-

pla int if fs ha d a c qu ir e d oth e r p ro pe rt y g ivi ngthe m a c c e ss t o th e same ro a d at is su e . O n a pp e a l, t his court c ited with approva l “the rule that t h e ea s em ent ceases with the ne cessity has no application to...an express ea sement.” Id . at 54 7 ( c iti ng28 C.J.S. Ea semen ts § 54 ( 19 41 )) . T his is t he same situation as in the present c ase.
An ea sement by

express g rant c an be e x tinguished: by an ac t of the domi n an t o wner , either by rele ase or

abandonme nt, by

act of the servient owne r by

presc ription or conveyance to a bona f ide purc haser

witho ut notice, by the conduc t of both parties, such a s by merg er or

estoppel, or by

eminent domain, mortg ag e, for eclosure , or tax sale.
25 Am. J ur. 2d Easeme nts and Li cense s § 95. An ea sement “c reated by ref ere nce to a

filed map c an be e xtinguis he d o nly

by the un ite d a c tio n of all lo t own e rs fo r who se be ne fi t th e e a se me nt i s cre ated...” 28A C.J .S. Ea se me nts § 140 (2008). No such measure s were taken in this case ; indeed, the de e d c on ve yingthe Coo k Pr op e rt y to the Ev ans e s inc lud e s the fo llo wi ng langua g e : “ I nc lud e d in the he re in co nv e y anc e is a 20 fo ot e a se me nt f

or purp os e of

ing re ss a nd e g re ss o ve r t

he so uth e rn

mos t portion of L ot 5...from the easterly boundary of the he rein de scribed tr act to the we sterly marg in of the right-of- way of Sawmill Road
, so-ca lled.” The e aseme nt was not terminated when the Eva nses b o u g h tt h e C o o k

P r o p e rt y.
III . A tt or ne ys F e e s F or The App e al
The Eva nses ask this Court to a

war d attorney ’s fee s based upon what they contend to be a fr ivo lou s a

pp e a l. We do no t f

ind the a pp e a l to be fr ivo lou s a

nd , c on se qu e ntl y , d e ny

the re qu e st.
Th e re me dy

fo r a fr ivo lou s app e a l is pr ov ide d in Tenn. Cod e Ann. § 2 7- 1- 12 2, wh ic h s tate s: [w] hen it appea

rs to any revie wing court that the a ppeal f rom any court of r ecor d was frivolous or take n solely

for de lay , the court may , either upon motion of a pa rty or of i t s o wn m otion, awar d just damag es ag ainst the appe llant, which may include but need not be limit ed to, costs, intere st on judge ment and expenses incu rr ed by the
a pp e lle e a s a

re su lt o f t

he a pp e a l.
This statute “must be int erpr eted and applied st rictly so as not to discourag e leg itimate appea ls...” Davis v. Gulf I

ns. Group , 546 S.W .2d 583 at 586 (Tenn. 1997). The Smiths are not askingfor a ny fundame ntal chang es to exist ing la w; rathe r, they

seek a differ ent interpre tation or application of the law of e aseme nts. Simpl y beca use t his Court ag ree s with the l ower court’s de cision does not make the appe al frivolous.
CO NC LU SION-6-

F or the re a so ns se t f

or th a bo ve , th e de c isi on

of th e Chan c e ry

Cou rt fi nd ingof

an e xpre ss e a se me nt i s A F F I RME D. Cos ts are a sse sse d a g a ins t the Smit hs , fo r wh ic h e xec uti on

may iss ue if
n e c e s s ar y.

___________________________________ RI CHARD H. DI

NKI NS, J UDGE