substantial evidence supports the arbitrator's award, which is not 

arbitrary or capricious. The Town opposes that argument and also argues 

that the arbitrator manifestly disregarded the law of employment 

arbitration. 

The common law grounds under which a court may review 

private binding arbitration awards are "(1) whether the award is 

arbitrary, capricious, or unsupported by the agreement; and (2) whether 

the arbitrator manifestly disregarded the law." 1 Clark Cnty. Educ. Ass'n 

v. Clark Cnty. Sch. Dist. (CCEA), 122 Nev. 337, 341, 131 P.3d 5, 8 (2006). 

Under the first ground, a court's "review is limited to whether the 

arbitrator's findings are supported by substantial evidence in the record." 

Id. at 344, 131 P.3d at 9-10. "Substantial evidence is evidence that a 

reasonable person would deem adequate to support a decision." City of 

Reno u. Reno Police Protective Ass'n, 118 Nev. 889, 899, 59 P.3d 1212, 1219 

(2002). 

Here, the issue is whether Van Leuven was dishonest when he 

stated that he applied the brakes but that the brakes failed. Evidence was 

presented that the ambulance's brakes were in good working condition 

and that there were skid marks on the road consistent with the 

ambulance's path of travel. A person in the back of the ambulance 

testified that he felt some braking deceleration. 2Testimony was also 

'Neither party advocates any statutory grounds under NRS 

38.241(1). 

2The arbitration hearing was not recorded and, thus, transcripts are 

not available. In the absence of transcripts, we have no option but to rely 

upon the arbitrator's detailed factual findings concerning the testimony 

elicited at the arbitration• hearing. Wichinsky v. Mosa, 109 Nev. 84, 87, 

847 P.2d 727, 729 (1993); see Gittings v. Hartz, 116 Nev. 386, 393 n.6, 996 

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presented that the skid marks were old and could not be attributed to the 

ambulance. Van Leuven steadfastly testified that he attempted to apply 

the brakes before reaching a stop sign, but that nothing happened. The 

arbitrator found that, while the brakes did not fail and Van Leuven was 

negligent for not stopping, Van Leuven was also not dishonest because he 

honestly believed that he applied the brakes and they failed. 

While the district court found irreconcilable differences 

between the findings that the brakes were in operable condition and that 

Van Leuven believed that he applied the brakes, making factual 

conclusions from this conflicting evidence is reserved for the arbitrator. 

See CCEA, 122 Nev. at 344, 131 P.3d at 9-10. In this regard, a finding 

that the brakes were in operable condition does not exclude the possibility 

that Van Leuven honestly believed that he applied the brakes; the brakes 

may not have been applied due to operator error or some other problem. 

Conflicting evidence was presented and the arbitrator's determination 

that Van Leuven was not dishonest was supported by substantial 

evidence. Accordingly, the district court erred by vacating the arbitration 

award. 

As to the Town's manifest disregard of the law argument, the 

arbitrator did not ignore the Town's argument, based on Southwest Gas 

Corp. v. Vargas, 111 Nev. 1064, 901 P.2d 693 (1995), that termination was 

warranted based upon its reasonable, good faith belief that Van Leuven 

...continued 

P.2d 898, 902 n.6 (2000) (suggesting that an arbitrator's detailed factual 

findings might be sufficient to support a finding even without a transcript 

of the arbitration hearing or an NRAP 9(c) (previously NRAP 9(d)) type of 

statement). 

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was dishonest. Instead, the arbitrator considered and rejected the 

argument. Under the manifest disregard of the law standard, "the issue is 

not whether the arbitrator correctly interpreted the law, but whether the 

arbitrator, knowing the law and recognizing that the law required a 

particular result, simply disregarded the law." CCEA, 122 Nev. at 342, 

131 P.3d at 8 (quotation marks omitted). Thus, "we may not concern 

ourselves with the correctness of the arbitrator's" application of the law 

and must allow the arbitrator's conclusions on this issue to stand. Id. at 

345, 131 P.3d at 10. Nevertheless, we also agree with the district court 

and the arbitrator that while an employer's reasonable, good faith belief 

that an employee was dishonest may shield the employer from claims for 

wrongful termination, see Sw. Gas Corp., 111 Nev. at 1073-74, 901 P.2d at 

698-99, this is not the standard applied in arbitration matters pursuant to 

a collective bargaining agreement, IBEW Local 396 v. Cent. Tel, Co., 94 

Nev. 491, 493, 581 P.2d 865,867 (1978) ("[A]n arbitrator's award must be 

based on the collective bargaining agreement . . . ."). 

Accordingly, the arbitration award must stand, and we 

ORDER the judgment of the district court REVERSED. 

Saitta 

Pickering 

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cc: Hon. Robert W. Lane, District Judge 

Kathleen M. Paustian, Settlement Judge 

McGannon Law Office, P.C. 

Rourke Law Firm 

Armstrong Teasdale, LLP/Reno 

Nye County Clerk 

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