alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
#### Richard J. Wallenhorst, II, Appellant, v James R. Wallenhorst et al., Respondents, et al., Defendant.

[51 NYS3d 914]

Appeal from an order of the Supreme Court, Jefferson County (James P. McClusky, J.), entered May 4, 2016. The order denied plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment.

It is hereby ordered that the order so appealed from is unanimously modified on the law by granting the motion in part and dismissing the third counterclaim of defendants James R. Wallenhorst, Michael R. Wallenhorst, Shelia Wal-lenhorst, Richard J. Wallenhorst, Rita Wallenhorst, and Rick Maier, and as modified the order is affirmed without costs.

*1641Memorandum: This action arises out of the use of beach property, also referred to as lot 28, that is owned by plaintiff and defendants as tenants in common. Plaintiff constructed a concrete retaining wall and deck pavers on a portion of the property, and thereafter commenced this action seeking a declaration confirming his right to construct the wall, thereby preventing defendants from damaging or interfering with his use of the wall. Plaintiff moved for summary judgment seeking, inter alia, the above declaration and dismissal of the second and third counterclaims of James R. Wallenhorst, Michael R. Wallenhorst, Shelia Wallenhorst, Richard J. Wal-lenhorst, Rita Wallenhorst, and Rick Maier (defendants). Supreme Court denied the motion.

We agree with plaintiff that the court erred in denying that part of his motion seeking dismissal of defendants’ third counterclaim, which alleges breach of contract, and we therefore modify the order accordingly. Plaintiff met his initial burden on the motion by establishing, inter alia, that there is no homeowners’ association relating to the joint ownership of the beach property and that there is no written or oral agreement regarding any expenses associated with the property, and defendants failed to raise a triable issue of fact *(see generally Zuckerman v City of New York,*49 NY2d 557, 562 [1980]). We otherwise affirm the order for reasons stated in the decision at Supreme Court.

Present—Whalen, P.J., Lindley, DeJoseph, NeMoyer and Curran, JJ.
# 05-16938, Jones v. Gowen

Farris, Beezer, Thomas, CJJ

474.70953
MEMORANDUM 

DATE: July 29, 2015

TO: Clean Power Plan for Existing Power Plants; Docket Id: OAR–2013-0602

FROM: Lora Strine, EPA

SUBJECT: July 28, 2015 Phone Call Regarding Proposed Clean Power Plan for Existing 

Power Plants

SUMMARY

A phone call was held between EPA and Gabe Pacyniak, GCC on July 28, 2015 to discuss the 

proposed Clean Power Plan for Existing Power Plants. The Clean Power Plan for Existing Power 

Plants was proposed on June 2, 2014.

ATTENDEES

Georgetown Climate Center

Gabe Pacyniak

US EPA

Lora Strine

Jeremy Tarr
---

---

Exhibit 15.7

# LETTER OF CONSENT

We hereby consent to the reference
to each of our studies listed below, which we prepared for Plaza Centers N.V. (the Company),
in the Annual Report on Form 20-F/A of Elbit Imaging Ltd. for the year ended December 31,
2007 and to the incorporation by reference of such Annual Report in the Registration
Statements on Form S-8 (Registration No. 333-117509, No. 333-130852, No. 333-136684 and
No. 333-152820) filed by Elbit Imaging Ltd.:

| | Valuation
of options granted in October 2006 under the Companys 2006 Employee Stock Option
Plan (ESOP 2006), dated February 2007;
|- | ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

| | Valuation
 of options  granted in March 21,  2007 under the  framework  of ESOP 2006,  dated June
         2007;
|- | ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

| | Valuation
 report in respect of options  granted in May 29, 2007 under the framework of ESOP 2006
dated June 2007;
|- | ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

| | Valuation
report in respect of options granted in August 30, 2007 under the framework of ESOP 2006,
dated October 2007;
|- | -----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

| | Valuation
report in respect of options granted in November 25, 2007 under the framework of ESOP
2006 , dated February 2008;
|- | ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

| | Valuation
report in respect of options repriced in November 1, 2007 under the framework of ESOP
2006 , dated November 2007;
|- | ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

This consent is not to be construed
as an admission that we are an expert or that we are a person whose consent is required
to be filed with the Annual Report under the provisions of the Securities Act of 1933, as
amended.

| |                                              
| | ---------------------------------------------
|
|
|
|
| | Very truly yours,                            
| | /s/ BDO Ziv Haft Consulting & Management Ltd.

November 17, 2008
Tel Aviv, Israel



---

---
#### Jose L. Rebay, Respondent, v Melanie D. Tormey, Appellant.

[769 NYS2d 386]

In a negligence action to recover damages for personal injuries, the defendant appeals from an order of the Supreme Court, Suffolk County (Lifson, J.), dated June 20, 2003, which granted the plaintiffs motion pursuant to CPLR 4404 (a) to set aside a jury verdict in her favor on the issue of liability and ordered a new trial.

Ordered that the order is affirmed, with costs.

This action arose out of a motor vehicle accident on a four-lane roadway when the defendant made a left turn into a gas station, crossing two lanes of oncoming traffic. The defendant stopped in the left eastbound lane prior to starting her turn and noticed a van which was stopped in front of her and to the left in the westbound lane. The defendant testified that the van obscured her view of oncoming traffic and it wasn’t until after she began to turn that she saw the plaintiffs car one second before the collision. The plaintiffs car had been hidden from her view behind the van, and she first observed it approaching from the opposite direction as it came up from behind the van. The front of the plaintiffs vehicle collided with the passenger side and rear of the defendant’s automobile. The jury returned a verdict finding the defendant was not negligent and the trial court set aside the verdict as against the weight of the evidence.

We agree. On these facts the jury could not have rendered a verdict finding the defendant was not at fault in the happening of this accident on any fair interpretation of the evidence (see *Nicastro v Park,*113 AD2d 129, 134 [1985]; CPLR 4404 [a]). The proof established that the defendant violated Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1163 when she turned into the gas station driveway at a time when such turning movement could not be made with reasonable safety (see *e.g. Mathewson v Bender,*259 AD2d 673 [1999]; *Smalley v McCarthy,*254 AD2d 478 [1998]). Such a violation constitutes negligence as a matter of law which *827could not be disregarded by the jury (see *Bous v Fahey,*250 AD2d *638 [1998]; Batal v Associated Univs.,*293 AD2d 558 [2002]). Moreover, the left-turning defendant was obligated by the proper use of her senses to see the plaintiffs vehicle, which was so close as to constitute an immediate hazard, and yield the right of way (see *Smalley v McCarthy, supra; Batal v Associated Univs., supra*at 559; *see also*Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1141). Accordingly, the Supreme Court properly granted the plaintiffs motion to set aside the verdict and ordered a new trial. Santucci, J.P., Krausman, Schmidt and Rivera, JJ., concur.
COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA

Present: Judges Humphreys, Po well and Senior Judge Clements

RONALD ARTIS MEMORANDUM OPINION * v. Record No. 1188-10-1 PER CURIAM NOVEMBER 9, 2010 CITY OF PORTSMOUTH DEPARTMENT OF SOCIAL SERVICES

FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE CITY OF PORTSMOUTH John E. Clarkson, Judge (Michael Rosenberg; Richardson and Rosenberg, LLC, on brief), for appellant. (G. Timothy Oksman, City At torney; Shelia C. Riddick, Assistant City Attorney, on brief), for appellee. (Nathan A. Chapman; Chapman Law Firm, on brief), Guardian ad litem for the minor children.

On May 15, 2010, the trial court entered an order terminating the residual parental rights of Ronald Artis (“father”) to his three minor childre n, C.T., S.A., and A. A., pursuant to Code § 16.1-283(B) and (C)(1). Father does not appeal the termination of his residual parental rights under subsection (B), but contends the evidence was insufficient to supp ort the trial court’s decision under subsection (C). U pon reviewing the record and briefs of the parties, we conclude this appeal is without merit. Accordingly, we summarily affirm th e decision of the trial court.

See Rule 5A:27.

While the best interests of th e child is “the paramount consid eration of a trial court” in a termination proceeding, Logan v. Fairfax County Dep’t of Human Dev. , 13 Va. App. 123, 128,

* Pursuant to Code § 17.1-413, this opin ion is not designated for publication.- 2 - 409 S.E.2d 460, 463 (1991), terminations under Code § 16.1-283(B) and the subsections of Code § 16.1-283(C) provide distinct, “i ndividual bases upon which a petiti oner may seek to terminate residual parental rights.” City of Newport News Dep’t of Soc. Servs. v. Winslow , 40 Va. App. 556, 563, 580 S.E.2d 463, 466 (2003). Because father does not challenge the trial court’s decision to terminate his residual parental rights under subsection (B ), the issue of whether termin ation was warranted pursuant to subsection (C) is rendered moot. Acco rdingly, we need not consider it. See Fields v. Dinwiddie County Dep’t of Soc. Servs. , 46 Va. App. 1, 8, 614 S.E.2d 656, 659 (2005) (termination of parental rights upheld under one subsection of Code § 16.1-283 fo recloses need to consider termination under alternative subsections). The trial court’s decision is summarily affirmed. See Rule 5A:27.

Affirmed.
2017-1626.

#### State v. Henry.

Jefferson App. No. 16 JE 0010, 2017-0hio-7505. On motion for leave to file delayed appeal. Motion granted. Appellant shall file a memorandum in support of jurisdiction within 30 days.

O’Connor, C.J., dissents.

O’Neill, J., not participating.
<PAGE>



                                  Exhibit 32.2


     CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002

         I, Kenneth L. Hignett, Senior Vice President, Chief Financial Officer
and Secretary of Morgan's Foods, Inc. (the "Company"), hereby certify, pursuant
to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that:

         (1)      The Quarterly Report on Form 10-Q of the Company for the
                  period ended November 9, 2003 (the "Report"), which this
                  certification accompanies, fully complies with the
                  requirements of Section 13(a) of the Securities Exchange Act
                  of 1934; and

         (2)      The information contained in the Report fairly presents, in
                  all material respects, the financial condition and results of
                  operations of the Company.




                                           /s/ Kenneth L. Hignett
                                           ------------------------------------
                                           Kenneth L. Hignett,
                                           Senior Vice President,
                                           Chief Financial Officer and Secretary
December 23, 2003




                                       18
No. 12-996.

#### Ancient Coin Collectors Guild *v.*United States Customs and Border Protection Agency, Department of Homeland Security, et al.

C. A. 4th Cir. Certio-rari denied.
#### In the Matter of the Arbitration between Military Contractors, Inc., Respondent, and Marrano/Marc Equity Corporation, Appellant.

[768 NYS2d 891]

Appeal from an order of Supreme Court, Erie County (Makowski, J.), entered January 29, 2003, which granted plaintiffs motion seeking to confirm an arbitration award and denied the cross motion of defendant seeking to vacate that award.

It is hereby ordered that the order so appealed from be and the same hereby is unanimously affirmed without costs.

Memorandum: Respondent (denominated defendant) appeals from an order granting the motion of petitioner (denominated plaintiff) seeking to confirm the award of the arbitrator and denying the cross motion of respondent seeking to vacate that award. Respondent contends on appeal that its rights were prejudiced on the ground that the arbitrator failed to consider the evidence presented by respondent in support of its counterclaim, thereby exceeding his power or so imperfectly executing his power that a final and definite award was not made *(see*CPLR 7511 [b] [1] [iii]). The arbitrator set forth in his decision that “a considerable amount of testimony and numerous exhibits were presented” and that respondent failed to prove its counterclaim. Respondent failed, however, to include the record of the hearing before the arbitrator in the record on appeal. Thus, the record on appeal is incomplete, and we are therefore unable to review respondent’s contention. “Respondent, as the appellant, submitted this appeal on an incomplete record and must suffer the consequences” *(Matter of Santoshia L.,*202 AD2d 1027, 1028 [1994]; *see Le Roi & Assoc. v Bryant,*309 AD2d 1144 [2003]). Present—Pigott, Jr., P.J., Hurlbutt, Scudder and Kehoe, JJ.
2016-1649.

#### State ex rel. Kindred Healthcare Operating, Inc. v. Indus. Comm.

Franklin App. No. 15AP-1106, 2016-Ohio-7128. On appellant’s application for dismissal. Motion granted. Cause dismissed.
#### People v Kunz

4th Dept: 150 AD3d 1696

denied
<TABLE> <S> <C>

<ARTICLE>         5
<LEGEND>
THIS SCHEDULE CONTAINS SUMMARY FINANCIAL INFORMATION FROM THE FORM
10-QSB FOR THE QUARTER ENDED MARCH 31, 1997 AND IS QUALIFIED
IN ITS ENTIRETY BY REFERENCE TO SUCH FINANCIAL STATEMENTS.
</LEGEND>
<MULTIPLIER>      1,000
       
<S>                                        <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                               3-MOS
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                          DEC-31-1997
<PERIOD-END>                               MAR-31-1997
<CASH>                                             178
<SECURITIES>                                         0
<RECEIVABLES>                                     1010
<ALLOWANCES>                                         0
<INVENTORY>                                       1110
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                                  2364
<PP&E>                                            1969                                       
<DEPRECIATION>                                       0
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                                    5803
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>                             1460
<BONDS>                                              0
<COMMON>                                           341
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                                0
<PREFERRED>                                          0
<OTHER-SE>                                        3907
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>                      5803
<SALES>                                           4202
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                                  4202
<CGS>                                             3016
<TOTAL-COSTS>                                        0
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                                    37
<LOSS-PROVISION>                                     0
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                                   0
<INCOME-PRETAX>                                     50
<INCOME-TAX>                                        70
<INCOME-CONTINUING>                                  0
<DISCONTINUED>                                       0
<EXTRAORDINARY>                                      0
<CHANGES>                                            0
<NET-INCOME>                                       (20)
<EPS-PRIMARY>                                     (.01)                                     
<EPS-DILUTED>                                     (.01)
        

</TABLE>
Flag Precedence: Why the Marine Corps is senior to the Navy
 
  By U.S. Marine Corps Lt. Col. Joshua Sperling
  Anyone who has attended a military event or sat in a briefing where the Service flags are displayed should know that the order of precedence goes from left to right. The National Ensign followed by the Army, Marine Corps, Navy...wait. What? The Marine Corps is senior to the Navy in order of precedence even though it is an underling to the Department of the Navy? Is it because we can do more pull-ups? Run farther? Carry more weight? Have better looking uniforms? No. It’s a little debatable but seems to stem from a litany of historical events. When I was a young lieutenant, I was told that it was because the Navy had broken time and the Marine Corps did not. Meaning after the Revolutionary War, the Navy was disbanded due to lack of appropriations. That didn’t change until the Barbary pirate threat (a tale for another day). But the Marine Corps was disbanded too! So that’s not it. Lineage. The Marine Corps has claimed its colors since 1881 and our current flag has been in existence since 1939. The Navy didn’t have an official flag until twenty years later. The order of precedence was set before that. It seems kind of harsh and squishy as a reason to put the Navy behind the Marines. So let’s keep going. Some scholars argue that the Marine Corps has been more staunch in claiming Nov. 10, 1775, as its birthday since 1921. All the while the Navy kind of waffled between March 27, 1794 – the date of the Naval Act – and April 30, 1798 – the date the Department of the Navy was established. Both of which were younger dates than the Marine Corps until Adm. Elmo Zumwalt one-upped us in 1972 with an Oct. 10, 1775 birthday claim – the date of Continental Congress approval. The one I like the most comes from the Navy landing force manuals of the 1890s which also stipulated parade protocols for some reason. I suppose we defeated the enemy during an amphibious assault and then conducted a parade? Sounds very American old school. These manuals instructed that a Marine formation, when marching with a Navy formation, would always take its place to the right (more senior position) in order to keep the Sailors marching in a straight line. Ok, I made up the “straight line” bit. But the rest is true. The Marine Corps is a very special organization with a storied history full of legend and lore. Small wars, expeditions and ensuring American freedom of movement on the seas has been our mission for 245 years. It is fitting that we sit between the Army and the Navy when the flags are displayed because we have elements of both. We cannot bring the firepower of the Army. We cannot conduct raids without the sea legs of the Navy. We cannot sustain aviation combat operations without the Air Force flying in the “stack.” But we insert ourselves into harm’s way faster than anyone on earth. And we can deliver a devastating right hook that enables our sister services to follow through with a finishing blow. Semper Fidelis. Happy Birthday Marines.
162 A.3d 289

#### IN THE MATTER OF EDWARD G. WERNER, AN ATTORNEY AT LAW (ATTORNEY NO. 035191989)

June 15, 2017

ORDER

The Disciplinary Review Board having filed with the Court its decision in DRB 16-092, concluding on the record certified to the Board pursuant to *Rule*1:20-4(f)(default by respondent), that EDWARD G. WERNER, formerly of ALLENTOWN, who was admitted to the bar of this State in 1989, and who has been *333temporarily suspended from the practice of law since March 12, 2014, should be censured for violating *RPC*8.1(b)(failure to reply to a lawful demand for information from a disciplinary authority, and *RPC*8.4(d)(conduct prejudicial to the administration of justice), and good cause appearing;

It is ORDERED that EDWARD G. WERNER is hereby censured; and it is further

ORDERED that respondent remain suspended from the practice of law pursuant to the Order of the Court filed March 12, 2014, and pending his compliance with the Order; and it is further

ORDERED that respondent continue to comply with *Rule*1:20-20 dealing with suspended attorneys; and it is further

ORDERED that the entire record of this matter be made a permanent part of respondent’s file as an attorney at law of this State; and it is further

ORDERED that respondent reimburse the Disciplinary Oversight Committee for appropriate administrative costs and actual expenses incurred in the prosecution of this matter, as provided in *Rule*1:20-17.
#### Wilson v Poughkeepsie City Sch. Dist.

2d Dept: 147 AD3d 1112

denied
##### 



EXHIBIT 3

CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO 18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350,

AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO

SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002

In Connection with the Annual Report of Tramford International Limited
(the Company) on Form 20-F for the year ended December 31, 2002, as filed
with the Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the Report),
we, Jiang Xin Hao and Michael Siu, respectively, Principal Executive Officer
and Principal Financial Officer of the Company, certify, pursuant to 18 U.S.C.
Section 1350, as adopted pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of
2002 that, to the best of our knowledge:



| | (1) |  | The Report fully complies with the requirements of Section
13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and                               
| | --- |  | ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
|
| | (2) |  | The information contained in the report fairly presents, in
all material respects, the financial condition and results of
operations of the Company.

July 14, 2003



|                      |  | 
|--------------------- |  | 
|By: /s/ Jiang Xin Hao |  | 

Jiang Xin Hao

Chief Executive Officer



|                    |  | 
|------------------- |  | 
|By: /s/ Michael Siu |  | 

Michael Siu

Chief Financial Officer

A signed original of this written statement required by Section 906 has been
provided to the Company and will be retained by the Company and furnished to
the Securities and Exchange Commission or its staff upon request.