2014 Decisions

Opinions of the United

States Court of Appeals

for the Third Circuit

7-16-2014

Blythe Township v. James Larish

Precedential or Non-Precedential: Non-Precedential

Docket No. 13-4694

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"Blythe Township v. James Larish" (2014). 2014 Decisions. Paper 722.

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NOT PRECEDENTIAL

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT

_____________

No. 13-4694

_____________

BLYTHE TOWNSHIP; FKV, LLC,

Appellants

v.

JAMES LARISH; MICHAEL PETROZINO; TOM BRENNAN; JOHN BURKE; 

VALERIA DAVIS; WILLIAM DEMPSEY; JOHN HOUSEKNECHT

_____________

APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA

(D.C. Civ. No. 3-13-cv-00237)

District Judge: Honorable James M. Munley

______________

Submitted Under Third Circuit L.A.R. 34.1(a)

June 23, 2014

______________

Before: FUENTES, GREENAWAY, JR., and NYGAARD, Circuit Judges.

(Opinion Filed: July 16, 2014)

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OPINION

______________

GREENAWAY, JR., Circuit Judge.
Appellants claim that their due process rights were violated by the process used to review 

their land use application, and argue that the District Court erred in dismissing their 

claims sua sponte as unripe. For the following reasons, we will affirm the District 

Court’s order of dismissal. 

I. Facts and Procedural History

Because we write primarily for the benefit of the parties, we recount only the facts 

essential to our discussion.

Blythe Township is the owner of a parcel of land in central Pennsylvania. FKV, 

LLC is a development company. Blythe Township and FKV (together, “Appellants”) 

intended to open a construction debris land fill. FKV entered into a development 

agreement with Blythe Township which provided that FKV would develop, construct, 

and operate the land fill on behalf of Blythe Township. St. Clair, a neighboring Borough, 

and members of the St. Clair Borough Council (“Appellees”) oppose the development of 

a land fill on this specific parcel of land. 

Appellants contend that representatives of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, 

Department of Environmental Protection (“DEP”) initially approved Appellants’ 

environmental assessment permit. DEP, however, did not inform Appellants of its

approval. In the meantime, Appellees allegedly had “secret meetings” with DEP to 

reverse its initial approval of Appellants’ environmental assessment permit. DEP 

reversed its approval, forcing Appellants to appeal to the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania 

Environmental Hearing Board. 
Ultimately, the DEP granted a permit to Appellants to begin construction of the 

land fill. Appellees immediately appealed this decision to the Environmental Hearing 

Board. The appeal is pending. 

Meanwhile, Appellants filed a thirty-two count complaint, pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 

1983, alleging that Appellees deprived Appellants of due process in violation of the 

Fourteenth Amendment. State law tortious interference with contract and prospective 

contract claims are also asserted. The Appellees joined DEP in a third-party complaint 

alleging that DEP conspired with Appellees to violate Appellants’ due process rights. 

The District Court dismissed Appellants’ federal claims on ripeness grounds sua 

sponte. This appeal followed. 

II. Jurisdiction and Standard of Review

The District Court had jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331 and 1343. We have 

jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291. Our review of the District Court’s dismissal 

on the grounds of ripeness is plenary. Taylor Inv. v. Upper Darby Twp., 983 F.2d 1285, 

1289 (3d Cir. 1993). In reviewing the grant of a motion to dismiss, we accept all 

allegations of the complaint as true, attribute all reasonable inferences in favor of the 

plaintiff, and affirm only if it appears that the plaintiff could prove no set of facts that 

would entitle it to relief. Alston v. Parker, 363 F.3d 229, 233 (3d Cir. 2004) (citing Nami 

v. Fauver, 82 F.3d 63, 65 (3d Cir. 1996)). 

III. Analysis

On appeal, Appellants urge that the matter is ripe for review because Appellees 
have caused harms to Appellants through lost profits and costs associated with the delay 

of construction of the land fill. The District Court reasoned that because the 

Environmental Hearing Board was still deciding the issue of the permit, this case was not 

ripe. Specifically, the District Court reasoned that if the Environmental Hearing Board 

denied Appellees’ appeal and approved Appellants’ permit, Appellants’ due process 

claims would be rendered moot. 

“The ripeness doctrine serves ‘to determine whether a party has brought an action 

prematurely and counsels abstention until such time as a dispute is sufficiently concrete 

to satisfy the constitutional and prudential requirements of the doctrine.’” Khodara 

Envtl., Inc. v. Blakey, 376 F.3d 187, 196 (3d Cir. 2004) (quoting Peachlum v. City of 

York, 333 F.3d 429, 422 (3d Cir. 2003)). Part of our analysis requires us to assess 

whether there is a final ruling that is judicially reviewable. “The ripeness doctrine 

prevents judicial interference ‘until an administrative decision has been formalized and 

its effects felt in a concrete way by the challenging parties.’” Lauderbaugh v. Hopewell 

Twp., 319 F.3d 568, 575 (3d Cir. 2003) (quoting Abbott Labs., Inc. v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 

136, 149 (1967)). Thus, the finality rule allows a suit whenever a “decisionmaker has 

arrived at a definitive position on the issue that inflicts an actual, concrete injury[.]” 

Williamson Planning Comm’n v. Hamilton Bank, 473 U.S. 172, 193 (1985). 

Appellants argue that Appellees, as a governmental actor, have come to the 

“definitive” position of “stopping, delaying and preventing the construction of [the land 

fill].” (Appellants’ Br. 14). This argument, however, is based on the mistaken belief that 
the definitive action that matters in this case is that of Appellees. As the District Court 

noted, it is the definitive action of the Environmental Hearing Board that is still pending. 

This fact renders Appellants’ case unripe. 

Permitting the Environmental Hearing Board to reach a final determination on the 

permit issue may resolve the constitutional issues that Appellants allege. For example, it 

is not apparent that Blythe Township has suffered a constitutional injury through the 

delay of receiving their permit. We have stressed “the importance of the finality 

requirement and our reluctance to allow the courts to become super land-use boards of 

appeals. Land-use decisions concern a variety of interests and person, and local 

authorities are in a better position than the courts to assess the burdens and benefits of 

those varying interests.” Sameric Corp. of Delaware, Inc. v. City of Phila., 142 F.3d 582, 

598 (3d Cir. 1998). 

Finally, it is not clear from the record that the actions of Appellees will fall outside 

the statute of limitations if Appellants are forced to wait until the Environmental Hearing 

Board reaches a decision. The motion was dismissed without prejudice. Appellees will 

have another opportunity to bring any due process claims against Appellants once the 

agency’s appellate process is final. 

IV. Conclusion

Because Appellants’ claims are not yet ripe for review, we will affirm the 

November 25, 2013 order of the District Court dismissing Appellants’ complaint.