[Cite as State v. Rose, 2021-Ohio-2859.]

 

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO 

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT 

 CHAMPAIGN COUNTY 

STATE OF OHIO 

 

Plaintiff-Appellee 

v. 

DENVIL E. ROSE 

Defendant-Appellant 

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Appellate Case No. 2020-CA-28 

Trial Court Case No. 2020-CR-55 

(Criminal Appeal from 

Common Pleas Court) 

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O P I N I O N 

Rendered on the 20th day of August, 2021. 

. . . . . . . . . . . 

JANE A. NAPIER Atty. Reg. No. 0061426, Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, Champaign 

County Prosecutor’s Office, Appellate Division, 200 North Main Street, Urbana, Ohio 

43078 

 Attorney for Plaintiff-Appellee 

 

TRAVIS T. DUNNINGTON, Atty. Reg. No. 0096519, 117 North Main Street, Suite 400, 

Dayton, Ohio 45422 

 Attorney for Defendant-Appellant 

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HALL, J. 
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{¶ 1} Denvil E. Rose appeals from his conviction following a negotiated guilty plea 

to one count of aggravated drug possession, a second-degree felony. 

{¶ 2} In his sole assignment of error, Rose challenges the trial court’s 

determination that his sentence was required to be served consecutively to a prior 

sentence he was serving. 

{¶ 3} In exchange for Rose’s guilty plea, the State dismissed several other charges 

but made no agreement regarding sentencing. The trial court subsequently sentenced 

Rose to six to nine years in prison. It also found that the sentence was required to be 

served consecutively to a prior sentence Rose was serving for failure to comply with an 

order or signal of a police officer. Rose’s only argument on appeal is that the trial court 

erred in finding a consecutive sentence mandatory. 

{¶ 4} Upon review, we see no error in the trial court’s imposition of a mandatory 

consecutive sentence. Under R.C. 2921.331(D), if an offender is sentenced to prison for 

third- or fourth-degree felony failure to comply in violation of R.C. 2921.331(B), “the 

offender shall serve the prison term consecutively to any other prison term or mandatory 

prison term imposed upon the offender.” Rose argues that this mandate applies only 

when a trial court is sentencing an offender for failure to comply. He maintains that it does 

not apply to a sentence subsequently imposed in a separate case for a different offense. 

Therefore, he asserts that the trial court erred in finding itself obligated to make his 

sentence for aggravated drug possession consecutive to his earlier sentence for failure 

to comply. 

{¶ 5} Rose’s argument lacks merit. The language of R.C. 2921.331(D) requires a 
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sentence for failure to comply to be served consecutively to any other sentence. The 

statute does not limit itself to sentences imposed at the time of the failure-to-comply 

conviction. Any potential ambiguity in R.C. 2921.331(D) is clarified by R.C. 2929.14(C)(3), 

which provides: “If a prison term is imposed for * * * a felony violation of division (B) of 

section 2921.331 of the Revised Code, the offender shall serve that prison term 

consecutively to any other prison term or mandatory prison term previously or 

subsequently imposed upon the offender.” 

{¶ 6} Here, Rose admits that he previously was sentenced to prison for thirddegree-felony failure to comply in violation of R.C. 2921.331(B). (Appellant’s brief at 5.) 

That being so, he was required to serve his prison term for failure to comply “consecutively 

to any other prison term * * * previously or subsequently imposed[.]” (Emphasis added) 

R.C. 2929.14(C)(3). The sentence in the present case was a prison term imposed 

subsequent to the prison term for failure to comply. Therefore, the two prison terms were 

required to be served consecutively. This court has reached the same conclusion when 

addressing the same issue at least twice before. See State v. White, 2d Dist. Montgomery 

No. 28338, 2020-Ohio-5544, ¶ 67 (“Because White was convicted of failure to comply 

with an order or signal of a police officer, a third-degree felony, in [a prior case], the trial 

court also properly imposed consecutive sentences as required by statute. See R.C. 

2929.14(C)(3); R.C. 2921.331(D).”); State v. McComb, 2d Dist. Champaign No. 2015-CA17, 2016-Ohio-606, ¶ 5, 13-14 (recognizing that a prison sentence for heroin possession 

was required to be served consecutively to a prior felony sentence for failure to comply). 

{¶ 7} Arguing against mandatory consecutive sentences, Rose relies on State v. 

Irwin-Debraux, 2d Dist. Montgomery No. 28309, 2019-Ohio-5013. In that case, the trial 
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court imposed consecutive sentences for involuntary manslaughter, grand theft of a motor 

vehicle, and failure to comply. Consistent with the present case, we held that R.C. 

2921.331(D) obligated the trial court to order the sentences for involuntary manslaughter 

and grand theft of a motor vehicle to be served consecutively to the sentence for failure 

to comply. Id. at ¶ 11. We then held, however, that R.C. 2921.331(D) did not compel the 

trial court to impose consecutive sentences for involuntary manslaughter and grand theft 

of a motor vehicle. Although those sentences were required to be served consecutively 

to the sentence for failure to comply, R.C. 2929.331(D) did not require them to be served 

consecutively to one another. Absent consecutive-sentence findings under R.C. 

2929.14(C)(4), we held that the trial court was required to order the sentences for 

involuntary manslaughter and grand theft of a motor vehicle to be served concurrently to 

one another but consecutively to the failure-to-comply sentence. Id. at ¶ 12. Nothing in 

Irwin-Debraux is inconsistent with our analysis or conclusion in Rose’s case. 

{¶ 8} Finally, we note that the trial court was not required to make consecutivesentence findings under R.C. 2929.14(C)(4) because a consecutive sentence in this case 

was mandated by statute. State v. Thompson, 2d Dist. Montgomery No. 28308, 2020-

Ohio-211, ¶ 16 (recognizing that consecutive-sentence findings are not required when a 

consecutive sentence is mandated by law). 

{¶ 9} Rose’s assignment of error is overruled, and the judgment of the Champaign 

County Common Pleas Court is affirmed. 

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DONOVAN, J. and WELBAUM, J., concur. 
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Copies sent to: 

Jane A. Napier 

Travis T. Dunnington 

Hon. Nick A. Selvaggio