IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF NORTH CAROLINA

2021-NCCOA-314

No. COA19-250-2

Filed 6 July 2021

Alamance County, No. 13 CRS 3976

STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA

v.

WILLIAM LEE SCOTT

Appeal by defendant from judgment entered 23 July 2018 by Judge Paul C. 

Ridgeway in Alamance County Superior Court. Heard in the Court of Appeals 15 

October 2019. A divided panel of this Court found no prejudicial error in defendant’s 

conviction by opinion filed 21 January 2020. State v. Scott, 269 N.C. App. 457, 838

S.E.2d 676 (2020). By opinion filed 16 April 2021, the Supreme Court of North 

Carolina remanded to this Court “to apply the proper standard and review this 

matter[.]” State v. Scott, __ N.C. __, 2021-NCSC-41, ¶ 11 (2021). 

Attorney General Joshua H. Stein, by Assistant Attorney General Kathryne E. 

Hathcock, for the State.

M. Gordon Widenhouse, Jr., for defendant-appellant.

TYSON, Judge.

¶ 1 The Supreme Court of North Carolina remanded this case to this Court to 

determine whether the State has carried its burden to prove and to apply a harmless 
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Opinion of the Court

error beyond a reasonable doubt standard of review to Defendant’s claim of 

constitutional error. Defendant’s blood had been unlawfully seized from a hospital 

where Defendant was treated following an auto collision. This Court previously 

concluded the admission of blood alcohol concentration (“BAC”) search results of 

Defendant’s blood was error. On remand, we determine whether the State has proved 

the Fourth Amendment seizure violation was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.

See U.S. Const. amend. IV.

I. Fourth Amendment Search

¶ 2 The Fourth Amendment of the Constitution of the United States guarantees 

“[t]he right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, 

against unreasonable searches and seizures[.]” U.S. Const. amend. IV. The Supreme 

Court of the United States observed:

[t]he interests in human dignity and privacy which the 

Fourth Amendment protects forbid any such intrusions on 

the mere chance that desired evidence might be obtained. 

In the absence of a clear indication that in fact such 

evidence will be found, these fundamental human interests 

require law officers to suffer the risk that such evidence 

may disappear unless there is an immediate search.

Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 769-70, 16 L. Ed. 2d 908, 919 (1966). “The 

[Fourth] Amendment thus prohibits ‘unreasonable searches,’ . . . [and] the taking of 

a blood sample . . . is a search.” Birchfield v. North Dakota, 579 U.S. ___, ___, 195 L. 

Ed. 2d 560, 575 (2016); see also State v. Romano, 369 N.C. 678, 685, 800 S.E.2d 644, 
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649 (2017) (“drawing blood . . . constitutes a search under both the Federal and North 

Carolina Constitutions.”). 

¶ 3 The Supreme Court of the United States also concluded: “The reasonableness 

of a search depends on the totality of the circumstances, including the nature and 

purpose of the search and the extent to which the search intrudes upon reasonable 

privacy expectations.” Grady v. North Carolina, 575 U.S. 306, 310, 191 L. Ed. 2d 459 

(2015) (per curiam). Blood tests: (1) “require piercing the skin and extract[tion of] a 

part of the subject’s body”; (2) are “significantly more intrusive than blowing into a 

tube”; and (3) place in the hands of law enforcement “a sample that can be preserved 

and from which it is possible to extract information beyond a simple BAC reading.” 

Birchfield, 579 U.S. at ___, 195 L. Ed. 2d at 565-66 (citations and internal quotation 

marks omitted).

¶ 4 Without probable cause, exigent circumstances, or an exception to the warrant 

requirement, a warrantless search violates the Fourth Amendment to the

Constitution of the United States. This Court unanimously agreed Defendant’s

constitutional rights were violated. State v. Scott, 269 N.C. App. 457, 465, 838 S.E.2d 

676, 681 (2020), rev’d, __ N.C. __, 2021-NCSC-41 (2021). See U.S. Const. amend. IV; 

State v. Welch, 316 N.C. 578, 587, 342 S.E.2d 789, 794 (1986) (interpreting the 

balancing test set forth in Schmerber, 384 U.S. at 770–72, 16 L. Ed. 2d at 919-20, as 

“forbidding law enforcement authorities acting without a search warrant from 
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requiring a defendant to submit to the drawing of a blood sample unless probable 

cause and exigent circumstances exist to justify a warrantless seizure of the blood 

sample”).

¶ 5 This Court also unanimously agreed Defendant’s motion to suppress should 

have been allowed. Scott, 269 N.C. App. at 465, 838 S.E.2d at 681. The order 

resulting in the production of the blood to the State was not based on either probable 

cause or exigent circumstances. Id. at 464–65, 838 S.E.2d at 681.

¶ 6 We previously concluded Defendant’s Fourth Amendment rights were violated 

by law enforcement officers, compelling the production and seizure of his blood from 

the hospital without a warrant. We review whether the State has proved the 

subsequent introduction of evidence obtained from the State Bureau of Investigation

laboratory’s analysis of Defendant’s blood and its admission at trial, was harmless 

beyond a reasonable doubt.

II. Standard of Review

¶ 7 Upon remand, the State must show, and this Court applies a harmless error 

beyond a reasonable doubt standard of review. The standard of review for federal 

constitutional errors applies to this case. See State v. Ortiz-Zape, 367 N.C. 1, 13, 743 

S.E.2d 156, 164 (2013) (“When violations of a defendant’s rights under the United 

States Constitution are alleged, harmless error review functions the same way in 

both federal and state courts.” (quoting State v. Lawrence, 365 N.C. 506, 513, 723 
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S.E.2d 326, 331 (2012)); State v. Autry, 321 N.C. 392, 399, 364 S.E.2d 341, 346 (1988) 

(“[If] the search violated defendant’s constitutional rights and . . . the evidence . . . 

was improperly admitted at trial, we find any such error in its admission harmless 

beyond a reasonable doubt.”); State v. Peterson, 361 N.C. 587, 594, 652 S.E.2d 216, 

222 (2007).

¶ 8 N.C. Gen. Stat. § 15A-1443(b) “reflects the standard of prejudice with regard 

to violation of the defendant’s rights under the Constitution of the United States, as 

set out in the case of Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 17 L. Ed. 2d at 705 (1967).” 

N.C. Gen. Stat. § 15A-1443 official cmt. (2019). The burden falls “upon the State to 

demonstrate, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the error was harmless.” N.C. Gen.

Stat. § 15A-1443(b) (2019); see also Brecht v. Abrahamson, 507 U.S. 619, 630, 123 L. 

Ed. 2d 353, 367 (1993); Chapman, 386 U.S. at 24; 17 L. Ed. 2d at 710-11; Lawrence, 

365 N.C. at 513, 723 S.E.2d at 331. “[B]efore a federal constitutional error can be 

held harmless, the court must be able to declare a belief that [the error] was harmless 

beyond a reasonable doubt.” Chapman, 386 U.S. at 24, 17 L. Ed. 2d at 708; see also

Davis v. Ayala, 576 U.S. 257, 267, 192 L. Ed. 2d 323, 332-33 (2015); N.C. Gen. Stat. § 

15A-1443(b).

III. Harmless Error Beyond a Reasonable Doubt

¶ 9 This Court allowed and received supplemental briefing on this issue from both 

parties. The State argues any error in the introduction and admission of the blood 
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evidence and the results of BAC testing performed on the blood was harmless error

beyond a reasonable doubt. The State argues other overwhelming evidence was 

properly admitted into evidence to show both: (1) Defendant was passing another 

vehicle at a high rate of speed in a no passing zone; and, (2) his admission he was

driving recklessly and grossly speeding at and near the time of the collision with 

Veocia Warren’s vehicle. The State asserts this evidence independently supports the

jury’s conclusion to prove the malice required for a conviction of second-degree 

murder by a motor vehicle to support the verdict beyond a reasonable doubt. 

¶ 10 The State also argues Defendant’s multiple prior convictions for impaired 

driving and speeding show knowledge, intent, and absence of mistake independently 

support the verdict and prove the introduction of the blood evidence was harmless 

beyond a reasonable doubt. The trial court also instructed the jury disjunctively that 

to convict, it must find “the defendant drove while impaired, and or drove in excess 

of the posted speed limit, and or drove recklessly.” (emphasis supplied).

¶ 11 The trial court stated, “I’m not sure what the evidence of impairment is. You 

know, there will be a motion to dismiss at the end of the State’s case. And as I 

understand the case, it rises or falls on the blood evidence.” As the trial court 

predicted, this Court and the Supreme Court of North Carolina agreed, “[t]he first 

and only indication of Defendant’s intoxication were results of tests on Defendant’s 
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blood samples taken from the hospital and tested over a week later at the SBI 

laboratory.” Scott, 269 N.C. App. at 463, 838 S.E.2d at 680. 

¶ 12 No person involved in the accident or investigation suspected Defendant was 

impaired. No one noticed any odor of alcohol on his breath, slur in his speech, nor 

any other signs of impairment at the scene of the collision, while being transported 

to the hospital, while at the hospital, nor at the home interview with officers after his 

release. 

¶ 13 The State’s evidence overcomes a motion to dismiss based upon Defendant’s 

speeding and reckless driving and his prior record to show malice. This showing does 

not end the inquiry. The State has not carried its burden to prove the admission of 

the blood evidence to demonstrate the federal constitutional error is “harmless 

beyond a reasonable doubt.” Lawrence, 365 N.C. at 513, 723 S.E.2d at 331 (citation 

omitted). See N.C.P.I. -- Crim. 206.32A (2010). 

¶ 14 The jury returned a general verdict form that did not specify the specific 

ground or grounds upon which it found to support malice. The day prior to trial, the 

State dismissed the misdemeanor death by vehicle count. The State proceeded to 

trial with the second-degree murder and felony death by vehicle charges. After the 

jury’s guilty verdicts on both charges, the trial court arrested judgment on the felony 

death by vehicle charge. 

IV. Conclusion 
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¶ 15 The State presented sufficient evidence to survive Defendant’s motion to 

dismiss. The State failed to carry its burden to demonstrate the constitutional error 

in the admission of the blood evidence was “harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.” 

Lawrence, 365 N.C. at 513, 723 S.E.2d at 331. We vacate Defendant’s conviction for 

second-degree murder, the trial court’s judgment entered thereon, and remand for a 

new trial. It is so ordered. 

NEW TRIAL.

Judges GORE and GRIFFIN concur.