In the

United States Court of Appeals

For the Seventh Circuit

No. 12-2635

EN GAO,

Petitioner,

v.

ERIC H. HOLDER, JR., Attorney General

of the United States,

Respondent.

Petition for Review of an Order of the 

Board of Immigration Appeals.

No. A094-824-782

ARGUED MARCH 6, 2013—DECIDED JULY 12, 2013

Before MANION, WOOD, and SYKES, Circuit Judges.

WOOD, Circuit Judge. En Gao, a native and citizen of

China, petitions for review of an order of the Board of

Immigration Appeals denying his motion to reopen. Gao

originally applied for asylum and withholding of

removal, alleging that he feared persecution because his

wife had been sterilized under China’s “family-planning”

policy. After an immigration judge (IJ) denied his ap-
2 No. 12-2635

plication and the Board denied his appeal, Gao moved

to reopen on the ground that he had in the intervening

time converted to Christianity and would be persecuted

if he was sent back to China. The Board denied this

motion, concluding that Gao had not established the

changed country conditions necessary to excuse his

untimely filing. We conclude that the Board’s decision

is supported by substantial evidence and thus deny

the petition for review.

I

Gao, like many others we have seen, hails from Fujian

Province, which is in southeastern China. He entered

the United States without inspection in 2005 with the

goal of earning money to send home to his family, who

remained in China. Shortly after he arrived in the

United States, Gao’s wife (back in China) gave birth

to the couple’s second child—a daughter—and was

sterilized. Gao then sought asylum on the ground that

his wife’s sterilization amounted to persecution of him.

Holding that Gao had not personally suffered any harm

in China, the IJ denied his petition for asylum and

ordered him removed to China. The Board dismissed

his appeal, citing its rule that spouses of persons subjected to forced sterilization no longer qualify automatically for asylum.

One day after the applicable 90-day deadline, Gao

moved to reopen the proceedings to amend his asylum

application to add a claim that he feared that he would

be subjected to religious persecution if he was re-
No. 12-2635 3

turned to China. He recounted that his anxiety over

his impending removal had led him to seek solace in

the Christian Bible; as a result, he now expected to

face arrest, detention, and beating upon his return. The

authorities in Fujian Province would know that he

was Christian because he planned to attend church

services there. Gao acknowledged that his motion was

untimely, but he maintained that his religious conversion, coupled with evidence that persecution of Christians in China is on the rise, established changed conditions sufficient to excuse his late filing. In support of

this motion, Gao submitted numerous articles and

reports relating to the persecution of Christians in

China; he also furnished an affidavit from a Mr. Chen

(supposedly a relative), who stated that he had been

detained and beaten for attending an underground Christian church in Fujian Province.

The Board denied Gao’s motion to reopen for failure

to demonstrate the changed country conditions

required to excuse his one-day-late filing. See 8 U.S.C.

§ 1229a(c)(7)(C)(i), (ii). It concluded that Gao’s decision

to convert to Christianity reflected a change in his

personal circumstances and thus in itself did not show

changed circumstances in China. In addition, the

Board noted that the articles and reports that Gao had

submitted in support of his motion showed that repression of Christians in China has been going on for

years. Finally, it found that Gao had failed to show that

any governmental authorities even knew of his recent

conversion.
4 No. 12-2635

II

Before this court, Gao urges that Chen’s account and

a 2010 report on religious freedom from the Department

of State suffice, taken together, to demonstrate that

country conditions in China have changed sufficiently to

excuse his untimely motion to reopen. Evidence at the

time of his hearing showed that there was some persecution of Christians even then, but, he argues, his new

evidence shows that conditions have worsened.

The Board reasonably decided, however, that the exception to the time limit for a motion to reopen is available

only if the proffered evidence of changed conditions

is material and “was not available and would not have

been discovered or presented at the previous proceeding.”

8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(C)(ii); see Zheng v. Holder, 701 F.3d

237, 240 (7th Cir. 2012). Even though some of the reports

and articles Gao presented in his motion to reopen

support his claim that persecution of Chinese Christians

has worsened in recent years, most of these materials

were published well before Gao’s 2010 hearing. Indeed,

the information relating to persecution of Christians

presented in the Department of State’s report does not

differ significantly from many of the other articles Gao

submitted.

Gao also suggests generally that the Board failed to

consider all of his evidence when it denied his motion to

reopen. But he makes this assertion without elaboration,

argument, or citation to the record; that is not enough

to preserve the point for review. See Wang v. Gonzales,

445 F.3d 993, 999 (7th Cir. 2006). As far as we can tell, the
No. 12-2635 5

argument is meritless in any event: the Board appears

to have addressed all of Gao’s evidence. It explained

that the evidence predated his hearing, undercut his

claim that conditions have changed, and related to provinces other than Fujian.

The Board also thought that Gao’s religious conversion represented only a change in his personal circumstances, based on his actions in the United States, and

that it therefore does not qualify him for relief from

the filing deadline for motions to reopen. See 8 U.S.C.

§ 1229a(c)(7)(C)(i); Liang v. Holder, 626 F.3d 983, 988

(7th Cir. 2010). But we think that in this respect the

Board misunderstood Gao’s argument. Although his

conversion to Christianity (the genuineness of which

no one has challenged) occurred in the United States, Gao

is arguing that circumstances for Christians in China

have appreciably deteriorated over the years since he

has been here. The right to choose one’s religion is part

of the religious freedom that is recognized in the United

States. See Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 303 (1940)

(“Freedom of conscience and freedom to adhere to

such religious organization or form of worship as the

individual may choose cannot be restricted by law.”). The

same is true at the global level. See, e.g., International

Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Art. 18 (providing

that the right to freedom of “thought, conscience

and religion” . . . “shall include freedom to have or to

adopt a religion or belief of [the person’s] choice”),

http://www.ohchr.org/EN/ProfessionalInterest/Pages/

CCPR.aspx (last visited July 9, 2013). The fact that Gao

did not become a Christian until he reached the United
6 No. 12-2635

States means that on the merits, he could not show past

persecution on that ground, but it would not prevent

him from showing changed conditions in China since

the time he left with respect to the treatment of

Christians, nor would it prevent him from showing a wellfounded fear of future persecution. This does not help

Gao, of course, because the Board rejected his effort to

satisfy his threshold burden to prove changed country

conditions.

The petition for review is DENIED.

7-12-13