Not for Publication in West's Federal Reporter Citation Limited Pursuant to 1st Cir. Loc. R. 32.3 

# United Stat es Court of Appeals

For the First C ircuit

No. 03-2605 PAUL ELIE DELVA, Petitioner,

v. JOHN ASHCROFT, ATTORNEY GENERAL,

Respondent.

ON PETITION FOR REVIEW OF AN ORDER OF THE BOARD OF IMMIGRATION APPEALS

Before Boudin, Chief Judge , Torruella and Selya, Circuit Judges .

Michael D. Greenberg on brief for petitioner. Peter D. Keisler , Assistant Attorney General, Civil Division, Linda S. Wendtland , Assistant Director, Of fi ce of Immigration Lit igat ion, and Luis E. Perez , Attorney, Office of Immigration Litigation, on brief for respondent.

September 21, 20041 Before the Boar d, D elva also sought withholding of removal

andrelief under the UnitedNations Convention Against Torture, but he does not contest the denial of that relief on appeal. -2- PerCuriam . Paul Elie Delva, a citizen of Haiti and

a former member of the Haitian National Police, seeks judicial reviewof a B oar d of Immigration Appeals' order finding him ineligible for asylum. 1 Delva argues that the Board erred in concluding that his alleged persecution was motivated solely by his activities as a police officer rather than, at least in part, by his political opinion.

This court's review of the Board's decision is narrowly circumscribed. To the extent that Delva challenges the Board's factual findings, those findings "can be reverse d o nly if the evidence [he] presented . . . was such that a reasonable factfinder would have to conclude [to the contrary]." INS v. Elias-Zacarias , 502 U.S. 478, 481 (1992). In other words, to reverse, we "must find that the evidence not only supports that conclusion, but compels it." Id. at 481 n.1; see also 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(4)(B). To the extent that Delva challenges the Board's application of the r elev ant legal standards to his factual circumstances, that application is entitled to substantial deference as well. INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca , 480 U.S. 421, 448 (1987); Alverez-Flores v. INS , 909 F.2d 1, 3-4, 5 (1 st Cir. 1990).

Under those sta ndards, the Board's decision in thi s

case easily survives review. To be eligible for asylum, Delva2 In his application for asylum, Delva claimed persecution on

account of both his political opinion and his membership in a particular social group (presumably, the Haitian National Police). Before the Board, however, he claimed persecution only on the basis of his political opinion. To the extent that he now claims to fear -3- had to prove that he "is unable or unwilling to return to . . . [his] countr y because of persecution or a well-founded fear of persecution on account of race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group, or political opinion." 8 U.S.C. §§ 1101(a)(42), 1158(b)(1); see also 8 C.F.R. § 1208.13(b); Ravindran v. INS , 976 F.2d 754, 758 (1 st Cir. 1992). The evidence in the record does not compel the conclusion that Delva either

was persecuted in the past or has a genuine and well-founded fear of being persecuted in the future on account of any of the enumerated grounds. Past Persecution

In support of his claim of past pe rsec ution, Delva claims that politically connected gangsters, whom he was investigating a nd trying to arrest, threatened him; twice attackedhis sister's home, destroying her personal property and scaring her and his cousin; and once shot at his car. Even assuming that those events occurred and that they rose to the level of "persecution," the Board concluded that any persecution sufferedby Delva was solely on account of his a ctivi ties as a police officer, not on account of his actual or imputed political opinion, the only protected ground relied upon by Delva. 2persecution on account of his membership in the social group of

former police officers, that claim is forfeited, both because he didnot raise it before the Board, Ravindran , 976 F.2d at 761, and because he did not adequately brief it on appeal, United States v. Bongiorno , 106 F.3d 1027, 1034 (1 st Cir. 1997). -4- In reaching that conclusion, the Board did not find Delva to be per se ineligible for asylum based solely on h is status as a policeman. Cf. Velarde v. INS , 140 F.3d 1305, 1312 (9 th Cir. 1998) (faulting Board for finding applicant ineligible for asylumbasedsolely on her status as a security guard without considering strong evidence that she was persecutedon political grounds). Rather, the Board took into account Delva's membership in the KID Party and his investigation of politically connected ind ivi duals but found no evidence of a connection between his actual or imputedpolitical opinions and the threats andattacks that he reported. That analysis is legally correct. Just as it is wrong to infer the absence of a political motive based solely

on the v icti m's status as a police officer, id. , it would be equally wrong to infer the presence of a political motive based solelyon that status. See Samoya Cabrera v. Ashcroft , 367 F.3d 10, 14 (1 st Cir. 2004) (holding that "[p]articipation in a civil defense patrol does not by itself compel a conclusion that an individual is subject to politically-inspired persecution").

The absence of a political motive is borne out by the record. There is no evidence that Delva was a political activist. Cf. Fergiste v. INS , 138 F.3d 14, 16-17 (1 st Cir. 1998)-5-

(finding political motive established whe re applicant was a political ac tiv ist who attended party meetings, helped to campaign and raise money, an d wo rked with a neighborhood committee). Nor is there any evidence that the Lavalas Family P a rty, whose members allegedly threatened Delva, was directly opposedto the KID Party, to which Delva belonged . Cf. id . (a ppl icant, who was active in pro-Aristide party, was shot by member of anti-Aristide party). To the contrary, even though the two parties may "not have the same political visions," as Delva testified, they were both pro-Aris tid e. Finally, there is no evidence that those who threatened Delva and invaded his sister's home knew or cared about Delva's membership in the KID.

On the other hand, the recordis replete with evidence that Delva was targeted because of his police activities. Delva himself acknowledged that "there was a direct connection between [his] jo b an d [his] persecution." That connection was corroboratedby Delva's sole witness (a Boston police officer who hadserved as a United Nations monitor and trainer of Delva's unit of the Haitian National Police), who testified that police officers were targeted by their former detainees. The State Department also reported attacks on members of the Hai tian National Police. Fu rthermore, those who threatened Delva repeatedly referred to him as a "policeman." Well-Founded Fear of Future Persecution-6- Absent a finding of past persecution on a protected ground, the burden is on the petitioner to show that he has a well-foundedfear of future persecution on that ground. 8 C.F.R. § 1208.13(b)(1). The Board's conclusion that Delva had not met that burden is amply supported by the evidence.

"The standard for proving a well-founded fear of future persecution has both objective and subjective components." Laurent v. Ashcroft , 359 F.3d 59, 65 (1 st Cir. 200 4); see a lso Cardoza-Fonseca , 480 U.S. at 430-31. "[T]o establis h as ylum eligibility, an applicant must not only harbor a genuine fear of futur e persecution, but also must establish an objective l y reasonable basis for that fear." Laurent , 359 F.3d at 65.

As t o the subjective component, both the immigration judge and the Board doubted the sincerity of Delva's fear of future persecution, based on his repeated returns to Haiti after trips to Canada and the Dominican Republic. That inference, which is supported by undisputed facts and not challenged on appeal, is entitled to judicial deference. See Aguilar-Solis v. INS , 168 F.3d 565, 571 (1 st Cir. 1999).

To establish the objective component of a well-founded fear of persecution, Delva had to show "by credible, direct, and specific evidence," Ravindran , 976 F.3d at 758 (internal citations and quotation marks omitted), that "a reasonable person in [his] circumstances would fear persecution," Aguilar-Solis ,-7-

168 F.3d at 572. Delva pr esented no such evidence at the administrative level. And in his appellate brief, he relies solelyon the presumption of future persecution that would arise if he had established past persecution, which, as discussed

a bov e, he did not do. Indeed, at the end of his brief, Delva

con cedes that "it is impossible to determine what effe c t [Delva's] past actions [as a police officer] will have on the future of [Delva] if ordered removed." Delva therefore failed to

mee t h is burden of showing "by credible, direct, and specific evidence," Ravindran , 976 F.3d at 758 (internal citations and quot ation marks omitted), that "a reasonable person in [his] circumstances would fear persecution." Aguilar-Solis , 168 F.3d at 572. To clinch matters, other record evidence supports the opposite conclusion–-that Delva's fear of future persecution was not objectively reasonable . T he State Department's Profile of AsylumClaims and Countr y Co nditions, introduced by the INS, states that "the likelihood of an erstwhile Aristide activist encountering political harassment upon returning to Haiti appears to be extremely slight." While the Sta te Department reported

some political ly motivated killings, they were of political candidates and party leaders, no t rank -and-file members of opposing parties.-8- Accordingly, the petition for review is denied , and the order of the Board of Immigration Appeals is summarily affirmed . See Local Rule 27(c).