This opinion is subject to revision before final 

publication in the Pacific Reporter

2017 UT 5

IN THE

SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH

NATALIE HESLOP and BRANDON HESLOP,

Appellants,

v.

BEAR RIVER MUTUAL INSURANCE COMPANY,

Appellee.

No. 20150697

Filed January 24, 2017

On Direct Appeal

Third District, Salt Lake

The Honorable William W. Barrett

No. 150900930

Attorneys:

Ronald E. Dalby, John P. Lowrance, Timothy E. Pettitt, South Jordan, 

for appellants

Kristin A. Van Orman, Jeremy G. Knight, Salt Lake City, for appellee

JUSTICE PEARCE authored the opinion of the Court in which

CHIEF JUSTICE DURRANT, ASSOCIATE CHIEF JUSTICE LEE,

JUSTICE DURHAM, and JUSTICE HIMONAS joined.

JUSTICE PEARCE, opinion of the Court:

INTRODUCTION

¶1 Natalie Heslop (Heslop) rolled her truck down an 

embankment. She told the responding police officer, her family, and 

medical personnel that the accident had been a suicide attempt. Ten 

days after the crash, she told an insurance adjuster that her “mind 

wasn’t right,” she had taken “too many pills” the day before the 

crash, and that the crash was “pretty much a suicide attempt.” Her 

insurance policy provided that it would exclude coverage “to any 

injured person, if the person’s conduct contributed to his injury . . . 

by intentionally causing injury to himself.” The district court granted 
HESLOP v. BEAR RIVER

Opinion of the Court

2

summary judgment to Bear River Mutual Insurance Company (Bear 

River) as to both Natalie Heslop’s personal injury claim and her 

husband Brandon Heslop’s property damage claim. It also denied 

the Heslops’ request for a continuance to permit additional 

discovery. We affirm.

BACKGROUND

¶2 On Sunday, October 5, 2014, Heslop overdosed on 

prescription Ambien and Lexapro. The next day, she decided to 

drive through Ogden Canyon to “look at the leaves.” While in the 

canyon, Heslop, unseatbelted, rolled her truck down an 

embankment. She suffered a hairline fracture to her C7 vertebrae. 

She received a skin graft and stitches over her right eye. She was also 

admitted to a hospital behavioral unit for several days.

¶3 On October 16, a Bear River insurance adjuster called Heslop 

to question her about the accident. Heslop told the adjuster that her

crash in the canyon “was pretty much a suicide attempt.” The 

adjuster asked, “you mean driving off the cliff was a, a suicide 

attempt?” She responded, “Yeah.” The adjuster asked Heslop, 

“Okay, and then what, you just saw an edge there and decided, you 

know, this is it?” Again she responded, “Yeah.” When the agent

asked Heslop if she had admitted to anybody else that her crash was 

a suicide attempt, she told him, “my whole family knows . . . , I told 

the police and all the doctors knew.” 

¶4 When the adjuster asked Heslop why she had attempted

suicide, she responded, “I had a bad reaction to a medication”; “I 

was going to the doctors all the time, everyone was just treating me 

for anxiety and the medications weren’t fixing it”; and “without the 

medication being right my mind wasn’t right and, and I, I don’t 

know, I know it wasn’t the right choice.” She also told the insurance 

adjuster “I think it’s due to my medications not being where they 

should have been.” 

¶5 Heslop expressed concern that admitting the crash was a 

suicide attempt would impact her coverage. Her insurance policy’s 

property damage provision covers only “accidental loss of or 

damage to [a] covered car.” And the policy’s intentional injury 

exclusion provision “does not apply . . . to any injured person, if the 
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Opinion of the Court

3

person’s conduct contributed to his injury . . . by intentionally 

causing injury to himself.”1

¶6 The Heslops attempted to collect from Bear River under both 

a personal injury protection (PIP) claim for Heslop’s personal

injuries and a property damage claim for damage to the truck. But 

ten days after Heslop’s interview with the insurance adjuster, the 

Heslops received a letter from Bear River denying their claims. Bear 

River based its denial on Heslop’s admission that she intended to 

drive down the embankment. It explained that because Heslop

“admitted to us that she was trying to use the vehicle to intentionally 

take her life by driving off the cliff, we cannot see how this can be 

considered ‘accidental’ loss.”

¶7 The Heslops asked Bear River to reconsider its decision. In 

support of their request, the Heslops forwarded a letter from 

Heslop’s psychiatrist, Dr. Ben Holt. Dr. Holt had begun treating 

Heslop after the incident. Dr. Holt explained that the day before the 

crash, Heslop had “overdosed on a large amount of Ambien and 

Lexapro in a suicide attempt.” Dr. Holt stated that as a result of 

ingesting the drugs, Heslop had developed “serotonin syndrome,” 

which can induce “agitated delirium” and “disorientation,” among 

other things. Dr. Holt explained that “[s]ome of the irrational 

behavior [Heslop] experienced, including driving her car off the 

road[,] could be contributed [sic] to the serotonin syndrome and 

possible agitated delirium and disorientation she experienced after 

the overdose the day prior to the incident.” 

¶8 In February 2015, the Heslops filed a complaint against Bear 

River alleging breach of contract, breach of the covenant of good 

faith and fair dealing, statutory relief, and intentional infliction of 

emotional distress. In April, Bear River moved for summary 

judgment. It argued that both Utah Code section 31A-22-309 and the 

terms of the insurance policy barred the Heslops’ claim. Bear River 

contended that the Heslops could not be compensated for property 

damage because the “crash was not accidental in nature, but the 

_____________________________________________________________

1 This intentional injury exclusion provision mirrors the language 

of Utah Code section 31A-22-309(2)(a)(iii), which allows for 

exclusion of personal injury protection coverage benefits “to any 

injured person, if the person’s conduct contributed to his injury . . .

by intentionally causing injury to himself.”
HESLOP v. BEAR RIVER

Opinion of the Court

4

result of Ms. Heslop’s intentional effort to crash her vehicle.” It

reasoned that Dr. Holt’s letter averring that Heslop’s serotonin 

syndrome “could contribute to ‘irrational acts,’ . . . did not opine that 

it did contribute to her act, or more importantly, that [it] negated her 

intent.” Bear River argued, “there is no dispute that Ms. Heslop 

contributed to her injuries when she intentionally drove her vehicle 

off the Ogden Canyon roadway in a suicide attempt.”

¶9 The Heslops opposed Bear River’s motion for summary 

judgment. They contended that “[t]here is a genuine issue of 

material fact as to whether [Heslop] had the mental capacity to 

perform an intentional act.” The Heslops cited Hoffman v. Life 

Insurance Company of North America for the proposition that “mental 

disease or defect of the insured is a relevant consideration in 

determining whether an insured’s [injury] is accidental.” 669 P.2d 

410, 419 (Utah 1983). They further cited Hoffman for the proposition 

that

where the insured suffers from a mental disease or 

defect so that he is not likely to be able to appreciate 

the consequences of his conduct, or cannot control his 

conduct in light of the probable consequences, then the 

test is subjective, and [injury] may be accidental even 

though a rational person in the same circumstances 

would have expected [injury] to be the probable result 

of his conduct.

Id.

¶10 The Heslops also offered a letter from Dr. Michael 

Crookston. Dr. Crookston’s letter spoke to the likely effects of 

Ambien on Heslop the day of the crash. He did not interview 

Heslop, but he reviewed Dr. Holt’s letter. Dr. Crookston averred that 

[s]ince Ms. Heslop took an overdose of Ambien, any 

and all statements she may have made concerning 

subsequent events, including the next day, are 

immediately suspect and unreliable. Under the 

influence of an Ambien overdose it is highly likely that 

Ms. Heslop was impaired cognitively and therefore 

could not fully appreciate the consequences of her 

actions or have the ability to fully control her actions.

¶11 At the end of their memorandum, the Heslops asked the 

court for a continuance. The Heslops requested—citing Utah Rule of 
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Opinion of the Court

5

Civil Procedure 56(f)2—additional time to permit “further 

discovery” into Heslop’s “mental state, capacity, the effects of 

serotonin syndrome, or the effects of large amounts of Ambien and 

Lexapro to the human system.” In support of this request, the 

Heslops included a sworn affidavit of their attorney. The attorney

stated that he believed “additional discovery is required prior to this 

matter being able to be fully adjudicated on the merits.” He opined 

that he also believed both Dr. Holt and Dr. Crookston “would testify 

under oath as to the veracity of the information and opinions 

currently contained in their letters.”

¶12 The district court granted Bear River’s motion for summary 

judgment. It stated that Heslop’s PIP coverage was governed by the

Utah statute and the insurance policy’s intentional injury exclusion 

provision. The court noted a Michigan case in which the insured had 

intentionally crashed his car in a suicide attempt and had introduced 

an affidavit from a medical professional stating that he was severely

depressed, coming off prescription drugs, and lacked the mental 

capacity to form the intent to commit suicide. Miller v. Farm Bureau 

Mut. Ins. Co., 553 N.W.2d 371, 377 (Mich. Ct. App. 1996). The Miller 

court held that the “intentional acts” clause in the policy prevented 

the insured from collecting under the policy. Id. The district court

adopted the Michigan case’s reasoning that “when the evidence 

unequivocally shows that the insured intended his or her actions, the 

existence of mental illness does not alter that conclusion.” Id.

¶13 The district court further reasoned that “Dr. Holt’s [letter] 

did not opine that the Serotonin Syndrome contribute[d] to Mrs. 

Heslop’s act, or that Serotonin Syndrome negated her intent.” It 

further noted that Dr. Crookston’s letter did not opine “that [Heslop]

was ‘sleep driving’ at the time she drove off the road, or that she 

cannot remember what she did.” In the end, the court found that the 

doctors’ equivocal statements regarding Heslop’s mental status did 

not sufficiently rebut “the undisputed facts [that] unequivocally 

show that [Heslop] intended to drive off the road in a suicide 

attempt.” 

_____________________________________________________________

2 In 2015, rule 56(f) became rule 56(d). See UTAH R. CIV. P. 56

(2015). We, thus, refer to the 2014 Utah Rules of Civil Procedure—

which govern this case—and keep the reference to rule 56(f).
HESLOP v. BEAR RIVER

Opinion of the Court

6

¶14 The district court concluded, “There is no dispute that Mrs. 

Heslop expected to be injured when she drove off the Ogden 

Canyon road or that she intended to kill herself. Accordingly, the 

intentional acts exclusion of the Policy and Utah Code . . . apply in 

this case.” It further concluded that “Brandon Heslop’s first-party 

cause of action against [Bear River] also fails as a matter of law due 

to the intentional acts exclusion,” because “he is part owner and a 

named insured of the vehicle, not a third-party victim in this 

accident” and because Utah law “does not require that Defendant 

insure itself against loss imposed by the law for damages caused by 

its named insured.” “Rather,” the court stated, “liability falls upon 

[Heslop], who is also a named insured and the one who caused the 

damage.”

ISSUES AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW

¶15 The Heslops contend that the district court erred when it 

granted summary judgment both “on the issue of Personal Injury 

Protection (PIP) coverage” and “on the issue of property damage.” 

We review a grant of summary judgment for correctness. Helf v. 

Chevron U.S.A. Inc., 2015 UT 81, ¶ 46, 361 P.3d 63. We give no 

deference to the district court’s legal conclusions and consider 

whether the court correctly decided “that no genuine issue of 

material fact existed.” Id. We “review the facts in a light most 

favorable to the party against whom summary judgment was 

granted.” Larson v. Wycoff Co., 624 P.2d 1151, 1153 (Utah 1981).

¶16 The Heslops also contend that the district court abused its 

discretion when it denied their rule 56(f) motion for a continuance.

See UTAH R. CIV. P. 56(f) (2014). We review a district court’s grant or 

denial of a rule 56(f) motion for abuse of discretion. Crossland Sav. v. 

Hatch, 877 P.2d 1241, 1243 (Utah 1994). “[W]e will not reverse unless 

the [court’s] decision exceeds the limits of reasonability.” Id.

ANALYSIS

I. The District Court Appropriately Granted Summary Judgment

to Bear River on the Personal Injury Protection Claim

¶17 The Heslops contend that “the district court erred in 

granting Bear River’s motion for summary judgment on the issue of 

PIP coverage” because there is a genuine issue of material fact

concerning Heslop’s ability “to form intent at the time of her 

injuries.” The Heslops argue that both Heslop’s interview and the 

doctors’ letters raise a factual question as to Heslop’s ability to form 
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Opinion of the Court

7

intent. They also contend that the district court erred by adopting the 

Michigan court’s reasoning that the existence of mental illness does 

not prevent a court from concluding that an insured’s actions are 

intentional.

¶18 The district court found that the intentional injury exclusion 

provision in Heslop’s policy defeated her PIP claim because Heslop 

admitted she intentionally drove her car off the road. The court 

noted that, “in determining whether an injury was accidental or 

intentional, the Utah Supreme Court has focused on whether the 

result was intended or expected.” (Citing N.M. ex rel Caleb v. Daniel 

E., 2008 UT 1, ¶ 11, 175 P.3d 566 (citing Hoffman v. Life Ins. Co. of N. 

Am., 669 P.2d 410, 416 (Utah 1983))). But the district court also 

applied the Miller test from Michigan, explaining that “when the 

evidence unequivocally shows that the insured intended his or her 

actions, the existence of mental illness does not alter that 

conclusion.” Miller v. Farm Bureau Mut. Ins. Co., 553 N.W.2d 371, 377

(Mich. Ct. App. 1996). 

¶19 In finding that there was no genuine issue of material fact as 

to Heslop’s intent, the court reasoned that Dr. Holt “did not opine 

that the Serotonin Syndrome contribute[d] to [Heslop’s] act, or that 

[it] negated her intent.” It further reasoned that Dr. Crookston’s 

letter on the effects of Ambien did not opine that Heslop was “‘sleep 

driving’ at the time she drove off the road, or that she [could not]

remember what she did.” The district court thus concluded that 

[t]he undisputed facts in this case demonstrate that 

[Heslop’s] intent was to commit suicide, regardless of 

Serotonin Syndrome, prior medication usage, or 

knowing such was a “wrong choice.” There is no 

dispute that [Heslop] expected to be injured when she 

drove off the Ogden Canyon Road or that she intended 

to kill herself.

¶20 “We review [a] district court’s summary judgment ruling for 

correctness, granting no deference to its legal conclusions, and 

consider whether it correctly concluded that no genuine issue of 

material fact existed.” Helf v. Chevron U.S.A. Inc., 2015 UT 81, ¶ 46, 

361 P.3d 63 (alteration in original). In determining whether a factual 

dispute exists, we apply “an objective standard.” Clegg v. Wasatch 

Cty., 2010 UT 5, ¶ 15, 227 P.3d 1243. The objective standard asks

“whether reasonable jurors, properly instructed, would be able to 

come to only one conclusion, or if they might come to different 
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Opinion of the Court

8

conclusions, thereby making summary judgment inappropriate.” Id.

But “where there could be no reasonable difference of opinion on [a 

question of fact] in light of the available evidence, ‘the decision is 

one of law for the trial judge or for an appellate court.’” AMS Salt 

Indus., Inc. v. Magnesium Corp. of Am., 942 P.2d 315, 320 (Utah 1997)

(citation omitted).

¶21 In the summary judgment context, “[t]he word ‘genuine’

indicates that a district court is not required to draw every possible 

inference of fact, no matter how remote or improbable, in favor of 

the nonmoving party.” IHC Health Servs., Inc. v. D & K Mgmt., Inc., 

2008 UT 73, ¶ 19, 196 P.3d 588. “Instead, it is required to draw all 

reasonable inferences in favor of the nonmoving party.” Id. (emphasis 

in original). And although circumstantial evidence may sometimes 

raise an inference strong enough to create a genuine issue of material 

fact on summary judgment, to be reasonable, the inference must 

present something more than pure speculation. See USA Power, LLC 

v. PacifiCorp, 2016 UT 20, ¶ 137, 372 P.3d 629; State v. Hester, 2000 UT 

App 159, ¶ 16, 3 P.3d 725 (noting the difference between drawing a 

reasonable inference and “merely speculating about possibilities”).

¶22 In distinguishing between a reasonable inference and 

speculation, an “inference is a deduction as to the existence of a fact 

which human experience teaches us can reasonably and logically be 

drawn from proof of other facts.” Manchester v. Dugan, 247 A.2d 827, 

829 (Me. 1968). Speculation, on the other hand, is the “act or practice 

of theorizing about matters over which there is no certain 

knowledge.” Speculation, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014).

Of course, “there is no black line between inference and 

speculation.” Hester, 2000 UT App 159, ¶ 17. But a reasonable 

inference exists when “there is at least a foundation in the evidence 

upon which the ultimate conclusion is based,” while “in the case of 

speculation, there is no underlying evidence to support the 

conclusion.” Harding v. Atlas Title Ins. Agency, Inc., 2012 UT App 236, 

¶ 7, 285 P.3d 1260.

¶23 “A single sworn statement is sufficient to create an issue of 

fact.” Webster v. Sill, 675 P.2d 1170, 1172 (Utah 1983). But

an affidavit must do more than reflect the affiant’s 

opinions and conclusions. The affidavit must ‘set forth 

specific facts’ showing there is a genuine issue for trial. 

The mere assertion that an issue of fact exists without a 

proper evidentiary foundation to support that assertion 
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Opinion of the Court

9

is insufficient to preclude the granting of a summary 

judgment motion.

Id. (citations omitted).

¶24 In sum, we will “affirm a grant of summary judgment only 

if there are no disputed issues of material fact and, with the facts and 

all reasonable inferences viewed in the light most favorable to the 

nonmoving party, the moving party is entitled to judgment as a 

matter of law.” Jensen ex rel. Jensen v. Cunningham, 2011 UT 17, ¶ 36, 

250 P.3d 465.

A. A district court may consider an insured’s mental disease or

defect when determining whether injuries are accidental or intentional

¶25 The district court correctly noted that “in determining 

whether an injury was accidental or intentional, the Utah Supreme 

Court has focused on whether the result was intended or expected.” 

Relying on Miller, the district court also concluded that, “when the 

evidence unequivocally shows that the insured intended his or her 

actions, the existence of mental illness does not alter that 

conclusion.” Miller v. Farm Bureau Mut. Ins. Co., 553 N.W.2d 371, 377 

(Mich. Ct. App. 1996). The Heslops contend that the Miller test

stands “in direct opposition to Utah Law.”

¶26 Although “direct opposition” overstates the point, we 

generally agree with the Heslops that Miller’s standard does not 

accurately reflect the way Utah courts have approached the question. 

Instead, we recognize that the effects of mental illness can impact the 

ability of an insured to intend her actions. In Hoffman v. Life Insurance 

Company of North America, we stated that in Utah, “[t]he law is firmly 

established that the mental disease or defect of the insured is a 

relevant consideration in determining whether an insured’s death is 

accidental.” 669 P.2d 410, 419 (Utah 1983).

¶27 In the insurance context, we have defined “accident” as 

descriptive of means [that] produce effects [that] are 

not their natural and probable consequences. . . . The 

[natural and] probable consequence of the use of given 

means is the consequence [that] is more likely to follow 

from their use than it is to fail to follow.

N.M. ex rel. Caleb v. Daniel E., 2008 UT 1, ¶ 6, 175 P.3d 566 (citing 

Richards v. Standard Accident Ins. Co., 200 P. 1017, 1023 (Utah 1921)

(omission in original). If a result is “the natural and probable 
HESLOP v. BEAR RIVER

Opinion of the Court

10

consequence of an act or course of action,” it is not accidental. N.M.,

2008 UT 1, ¶ 6.

¶28 We determine “what is natural and probable from the 

insured’s perspective.” Id. ¶ 9. But we assume, unless the evidence 

demonstrates otherwise, that the insured is an average person who 

will understand the natural and probable consequences of her 

actions. See id. (“[W]e apply ‘an objective test unless the evidence 

shows that the insured is not an “average individual.”’” (citation 

omitted)). In other words, “[e]ach individual may be considered the 

average individual unless the facts disclose that in reality he is not.” 

Hoffman, 669 P.2d at 419 (citation omitted). “[W]hen the facts do so 

show, then the question of the accidental nature of the result must be 

measured by this knowledge.” Id.

¶29 For example, in N.M., we acknowledged that an eight-yearold child was not the average insured because “eight–year-old 

children lack the experience, maturity and reasoning skills of 

adults.” 2008 UT 1, ¶ 9. Similarly, in Hoffman, we suggested that the 

insured’s mental delusions likely prevented him from understanding 

the consequences of his actions in the same way the average person 

would. 669 P.2d at 420. Thus, “when the actual state of mind of the 

insured can be established, the probability of [injury] resulting from 

certain conduct should be judged in light of that state of mind.” Id. at 

419.

¶30 This is not to say, however, that the existence of mental 

illness leads inexorably to the conclusion that the insured did not 

understand the natural and probable consequences of her actions. 

On the contrary, “if the insured actually knows that his or her 

[injury] is more likely than not to occur, the [injury] is not 

accidental.” Id. Hoffman instructs the court to consider whether the 

insured “subjectively expect[ed]” her conduct to cause the likely 

consequences of her actions. Id. Thus, “if the insured cannot 

subjectively expect [her] conduct will produce [her injury] because of 

a mental disease or defect, the [injury] is accidental.” Id. Where 

mental illness is concerned, Hoffman instructs that it is only where 

(1) the insured “is not likely to be able to appreciate the 

consequences of [her] conduct” or (2) “cannot control [her] conduct

in light of the probable consequences” that the court should consider 

an occurrence to be accidental, “even though a rational person in the 

same circumstances would have expected [injury] to be the probable 

result of [her] conduct.” Id.
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Opinion of the Court

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¶30 The Heslops’ appeal thus turns upon whether the evidence 

they forward to defeat summary judgment creates a genuine issue of 

material fact on the questions of whether Heslop (1) could appreciate 

the consequences of driving down the embankment or (2) could 

control herself from driving off the road even in light of likely injury 

or death.3

B. Heslop did not provide evidence sufficient to create a genuine issue

of material fact on the questions of whether she could appreciate the 

consequences of her actions and whether she could control her actions

in light of their probable consequences

¶31 The Heslops relied on two doctors’ letters to show that 

“there is a genuine issue of material fact” as to whether Heslop had 

“the mental capacity to ‘intentionally cause [. . .] injury to [her]self.’”

¶32 Dr. Holt’s letter opined on a condition known as “serotonin 

syndrome”:

Some of the irrational behavior [Heslop] experienced, 

including driving her car off the road[,] could be

contributed [sic] to the serotonin syndrome and possible

agitated delirium and disorientation she experienced 

after the overdose the day prior to the incident. 

(Emphases added.) Dr. Crookston’s letter opined on the effects of 

Ambien in the system: 

[I]t is highly likely that Ms. Heslop was impaired 

cognitively and therefore could not fully appreciate the 

consequences of her actions or have the ability to fully

control her actions. 

(Emphases added.)

¶33 But neither letter supports the conclusion that Heslop failed

“to appreciate the consequences of [her] conduct.” Hoffman, 669 P.2d 

at 419. To be clear, under Hoffman, evidence supporting a reasonable 

inference that Heslop failed to appreciate the consequences of her 

_____________________________________________________________

3 For purposes of this analysis, we assume without concluding 

that Heslop forwarded sufficient evidence to create a genuine issue 

of material fact on the existence of a mental illness that would permit 

the court to analyze whether she subjectively understood the 

consequences of her actions.
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Opinion of the Court

12

conduct did not require Drs. Holt and Crookston to repeat verbatim 

the Hoffman test. But for Heslop to defeat summary judgment, the 

doctors needed to provide testimony that would allow a jury to 

draw a reasonable inference about Heslop’s inability to appreciate 

the consequences of her actions. A party does not create a genuine 

issue of material fact when she submits evidence that simply invites 

the jury to speculate as to what happened. See USA Power, 2016 UT 

20, ¶ 137. But that is what Heslop did here.

¶31 Dr. Crookston’s letter provides the only evidence the jury 

could rely upon to conclude that Heslop could not appreciate the 

consequences of her actions. That letter stated that “it is highly likely

that Ms. Heslop was impaired cognitively and therefore could not 

fully appreciate the consequences of her actions.” Dr. Crookston’s 

letter uses language similar to Hoffman’s, but Dr. Crookston tempers 

his conclusion with the qualification “fully.” Thus, instead of an

opinion that Heslop could not appreciate her actions, Dr. 

Crookston’s letter describes a high likelihood that she could not 

“fully appreciate” the consequences of those actions.

¶32 This qualified opinion did not provide the jury a basis to do 

anything other than speculate as to whether one of the consequences 

Dr. Crookston suggests Heslop may not have fully understood is the 

consequence at the heart of this matter—that driving a car off the 

road can result in injury or death. A car accident may have many 

consequences. The more obvious consequences involve damage to 

the car and injury to the driver. The less obvious consequences might 

include distress to those who observe the crash and the need to 

deploy emergency services to respond. To create a genuine issue of 

material fact, Dr. Crookston’s letter needed to provide a reasonable 

basis for a jury to infer that Heslop did not comprehend that death 

or injury would be the consequence she would suffer if she drove off 

the road. Instead, Dr. Crookston’s letter invites the jury to speculate 

as to what behavior was included and excluded by the phrase “fully 

appreciate.” Without more specificity from Dr. Crookston, a trier of 

fact would be left to speculate about whether Dr. Crookston’s 

opinion spoke to an inability to understand the seemingly obvious 

consequences of Heslop’s actions. In other words, Dr. Crookston’s 

opinion by itself is insufficient to support a reasonable inference that, 

because of Heslop’s mental state, she did not understand that she 

would likely be hurt if she drove her car off the road. To create a 

genuine issue of material fact, Heslop needed to provide either a 

more specific opinion from Dr. Crookston or place other evidence in 
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Opinion of the Court

13

the record that would allow a jury to infer that one of the 

consequences Dr. Crookston’s statement referenced was injury or 

death.4

¶34 Moreover, the jury’s ability to reasonably infer that Dr. 

Crookston’s opinion referred to Heslop’s ability to understand the 

consequences of leaving the road is undone by the overwhelming 

evidence before the district court—including Heslop’s own 

statements—that supports a finding that Heslop did in fact 

appreciate that harm would result from driving off the road. Heslop 

told Bear River’s insurance adjuster that “driving off the cliff” “was 

pretty much a suicide attempt.” When the adjuster then asked, “and 

then what, you just saw an edge there and decided, you know, this is 

it?” Heslop replied, “Yeah.” And when the adjuster asked Heslop if 

she had admitted to anybody else that her crash was a suicide 

attempt, Heslop told him, “my whole family knows . . . , I told the 

police[,] and all the doctors knew.” Unfortunately, the evidence 

firmly establishes that Heslop understood that the natural and 

probable consequences of driving off the road would be death or 

_____________________________________________________________

4 The Heslops also contend that the district court unfairly 

dismissed Dr. Crookston’s letter because the court noted that the 

source of his opinion came from reading Dr. Holt’s letter rather than 

examining Heslop himself. See, e.g., Willey v. Bugden, 2013 UT App 

297, ¶ 28, 318 P.3d 757 (“‘[W]eighing credibility and assigning

weight to conflicting evidence’ is not appropriate at the summary 

judgment stage.” (Citation omitted)). The district court noted that 

Dr. Crookston “reviewed Dr. Holt’s letter” and opined on the effects 

of Ambien. But the district court did not weigh evidence or dismiss 

Dr. Crookston’s letter. Rather, it commented on the source of the 

doctor’s knowledge—Dr. Holt’s letter—just as it commented on the 

source of Dr. Holt’s knowledge—Heslop’s psychiatric interviews. 

But noting the foundational basis of a witness’s knowledge is not 

weighing evidence or assessing credibility. And ultimately, the 

district court did not rule against the Heslops because it found that 

the doctor’s testimony lacked credibility; it ruled that the doctors 

had not provided the evidence needed to create a genuine issue of 

material fact on the relevant questions. 
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Opinion of the Court

14

injury, and Dr. Crookston’s vague opinion was insufficient to permit 

a jury to infer otherwise.5

¶35 The Heslops next contend that “the possibility alone” that 

serotonin syndrome did, in fact, contribute to or cause irrational 

behavior “is enough to defeat a motion for summary judgment 

because a reasonable jury could find that serotonin syndrome did

contribute to her behavior.” Thus, they seem to argue that Heslop 

could not control her actions, even if she could appreciate them. But 

this claim fails for similar reasons.

¶36 In support of this contention, the Heslops again offer Dr. 

Crookston’s letter. But in discussing Heslop’s ability to control her 

actions on the day of the crash, Dr. Crookston’s letter again 

equivocates. Thus, instead of a statement claiming that Heslop could 

not control her actions, Dr. Crookston’s letter suggests a high 

likelihood that she could not “fully control” them. And again, this 

equivocal statement, standing alone, does not provide the jury with a 

reasonable basis to infer that Heslop could not in fact stop herself 

from driving off the road even though she knew she would be 

injured or killed.

¶37 The Heslops also contend that Dr. Holt’s letter, “in and of 

itself, creates a genuine issue of material fact.” They believe his letter 

“makes clear that [Heslop’s] behavior was not only irrational, but 

that the serotonin syndrome could have contributed to her behavior.” 

_____________________________________________________________

5 The Heslops suggest that Heslop’s admission to Bear River’s 

insurance adjuster is suspect because Heslop was under the 

influence of medication at the time of the incident and because “her 

prescription medications played a role in her behavior.” But 

Heslop’s statement to Bear River was made ten days after the crash, 

when Heslop had the benefits of sobriety and hindsight. What’s 

more, none of Heslop’s experts opined that her statement to Bear 

River was unreliable. The Heslops further argue that Heslop’s 

statement that she “just wanted to take a drive up the canyon . . . to 

look at the leaves” also calls her admission into question. But 

Heslop’s statement that she took a drive up the canyon to look at the 

leaves is not necessarily inconsistent with her later decision to drive 

her truck off the road, nor was it suspect for any reason Heslop 

forwards.
Cite as: 2017 UT 5

Opinion of the Court

15

(Emphasis added.) But while Dr. Holt’s letter unequivocally states 

that Heslop developed serotonin syndrome and that she was 

experiencing its effects the day after her accident, it suffers from the 

same defect as Dr. Crookston’s letter: it does not opine or otherwise 

support a reasonable inference that Heslop could not control her 

actions despite their consequences when she drove off the 

embankment. Rather, Dr. Holt writes that “[s]ome” of Heslop’s 

irrational behavior “could be” attributed to “possible” effects of 

serotonin syndrome. (Emphases added.) An expert opinion that a 

medication could have contributed to an unspecified “some of” a 

person’s behavior does not, by itself, allow a reasonable jury to infer 

that that person could not in fact control herself from engaging in a 

specific behavior. Dr. Holt’s opinion standing alone did not provide 

evidence that would allow a jury to do anything more than speculate 

as to the effect of the medication and whether one of those effects 

was Heslop’s inability to stop herself from driving off the road.

¶38 By contrast, in Hoffman, Hoffman’s doctor “testified that on 

the day of his death, Hoffman ‘was psychotic and at that time not 

able to make sound rational judgments.’” Hoffman, 669 P.2d at 415

(emphasis added). He also testified that “because of the highly 

unstable nature of [Hoffman’s] whole emotional state at that time, 

any unexpected, intense, or threatening incident would have caused 

a reaction of unreasonable magnitude, an unpredictable reaction.” Id. 

He opined that such a reaction “was a product of Hoffman’s mental 

illness.” Id. This court concluded that 

on the basis of the evidence [before it,] the trial court 

could have found that Hoffman was suffering from a 

mental disease or defect that prevented him from 

appreciating the consequences of his conduct or 

controlling his conduct in light of the circumstances. 

[Hoffman’s doctor] testified that, at the time of his 

death, Hoffman was unable to appreciate the 

consequences of his actions, i.e., he was unable to make 

sound rational judgments; could not control his 

conduct in light of the consequences; and any 

unreasonable and unpredictable action by Hoffman 

under the circumstances was a product of his mental 

illness.

Id. at 420. While Hoffman’s doctor spoke in unequivocal terms 

regarding Hoffman’s mental state, Heslop’s doctors do not. Indeed, 

this seemed to be the district court’s concern when it noted that the 
HESLOP v. BEAR RIVER

Opinion of the Court

16

doctors’ letters failed to state “that [Heslop] was ‘sleep driving’ at 

the time she drove off the road, or that she [could not] remember 

what she did.”

¶39 In the end, neither letter does the work it needed to do: 

provide the jury with a basis to conclude that Heslop did not 

understand that driving off the road would result in injury or that,

even in light of that expectation, Heslop could not control herself 

from driving off the embankment. See Hoffman, 669 P.2d at 419.

¶40 The Heslops correctly argue that the test the district court 

needed to apply is the one Hoffman articulates. But the Heslops bore 

the burden of forwarding evidence that Heslop did not understand 

the consequences of her actions or that she could not control her 

actions. The evidence they offer, in the form of letters from Drs. 

Crookston and Holt, fails to create a genuine issue of material fact on 

either of those issues.

II. The District Court Appropriately Granted Summary 

Judgment to Bear River on the Property Damage Claim

¶41 The Heslops also contend that “the district court erred in 

granting Bear River’s motion for summary judgment on the issue of 

property damage coverage.”

¶42 The property damage provision in the Heslops’ policy 

provides compensation for “each direct and accidental loss of or 

damage to your covered car.” The Heslops advance two arguments 

that the district court improperly granted summary judgment on this 

claim. First, they argue that the exclusion did not apply “for the 

same reasons [stated] above”—i.e., that the district court should 

have acknowledged a genuine issue of fact on the question of 

whether the crash was accidental. And we dispose of this argument 

on the grounds articulated above. 

¶43 Second, the Heslops argue that Brandon Helsop should 

recover for damages to his truck because he “should be considered 

an accident victim.” Unfortunately, this argument is inadequately 

briefed. “It is well established that a reviewing court will not address 

arguments that are not adequately briefed.” State v. Thomas, 961 P.2d 

299, 304 (Utah 1998); State v. Wareham, 772 P.2d 960, 966 (Utah 1989) 

(declining to rule on issue where defendant’s brief “wholly lack[ed] 

legal analysis and authority to support his argument”); State v. 

Amicone, 689 P.2d 1341, 1344 (Utah 1984) (declining to rule on 
Cite as: 2017 UT 5

Opinion of the Court

17

separation of powers argument where argument was not supported 

“by any legal analysis or authority”).

¶44 “In deciding whether an argument has been adequately 

briefed, we look to the standard set forth in rule 24(a)(9) of the Utah 

Rules of Appellate Procedure.” Thomas, 961 P.2d at 305. “This rule 

states that the argument in the appellant’s brief ‘shall contain the 

contentions and reasons of the appellant with respect to the issues 

presented . . . with citations to the authorities, statutes and parts of 

the record relied on.’” Id. (citation omitted) (omission in original). 

“Implicitly, rule 24(a)(9) requires not just bald citation to authority 

but development of that authority and reasoned analysis based on 

that authority.” Id. We have stated—and repeated—that appellate 

courts “[are] not . . . depositor[ies] in which the appealing party may 

dump the burden of argument and research.” Id.

¶45 In State v. Thomas, we upheld the court of appeals’ decision 

not to consider an inadequately briefed argument. Id. In Thomas, the 

appellant’s argument cited legal authority, including two 

amendments to the United States Constitution and one Utah case,

but contained no reasoned analysis or reference to controlling cases. 

Id. “Analysis of what this authority requires and of how the facts of 

Thomas’s case satisfy these requirements was wholly lacking.” Id. 

There, we stated that, “[w]hile failure to cite to pertinent authority 

may not always render an issue inadequately briefed, it does so 

when the overall analysis of the issue is so lacking as to shift the 

burden of research and argument to the reviewing court.” Id.

¶46 In similar fashion, the Heslops’ argument refers this court to 

one case, Speros v. Fricke, 2004 UT 69, 98 P.3d 28, and abruptly ends. 

The Heslops do not explain why Speros applies here or how Brandon 

Heslop qualifies as a victim under Speros. The argument also fails to 

identify certain material facts, for example whether Natalie Heslop 

was a co-owner of the truck or a co-insured on the policy. It entirely 

“dump[s] the burden of argument and research” upon this court to 

make its argument for it. See Thomas, 961 P.2d at 305.

¶47 While this court will not lightly toss aside partially briefed 

but still discernable arguments, we are limited by the practical 

considerations that an unbriefed argument presents. Here, we cannot 

determine the merits of the Heslops’ claim that Brandon Heslop was 

a victim of his wife’s car crash and is entitled to recover under the 

damages provision of the insurance policy. While there is no bright 

line between adequate and inadequate briefing, the Heslops have 
HESLOP v. BEAR RIVER

Opinion of the Court

18

not developed an argument sufficient to carry their burden of 

persuasion. See Bank of America v. Adamson, 2017 UT 2, ¶ 12, ___ P.3d 

___ (“an appellant who fails to adequately brief an issue ‘will almost 

certainly fail to carry its burden of persuasion on appeal’”) (citation 

omitted). As such, we cannot say that the district court erred by 

granting summary judgment on that claim.

III. The District Court Did Not Abuse Its Discretion when 

It Denied Heslop’s Rule 56(f) Motion for a Continuance

¶48 The Heslops also contend that the district court abused its 

discretion when it denied their rule 56(f) motion for a continuance to 

permit additional discovery. See UTAH R. CIV. P. 56(f) (2014). We 

review a district court’s grant or denial of a rule 56(f) motion for 

abuse of discretion. Crossland Sav. v. Hatch, 877 P.2d 1241, 1243 (Utah 

1994). “[W]e will not reverse unless the [court’s] decision exceeds the 

limits of reasonability.” Id.

¶49 “Rule 56(f) allows the opposing party to submit an affidavit 

stating the reasons ‘[she] is presently unable to present evidentiary 

affidavits essential to support [her] opposition to summary 

judgment.’” Aspenwood, L.L.C. v. C.A.T., L.L.C., 2003 UT App 28, ¶ 19, 

73 P.3d 947 (citation omitted). That explanation “must present facts 

in proper form. . . . And the opposing party’s facts must be material 

and of a substantial nature.’” Callioux v. Progressive Ins. Co., 745 P.2d 

838, 841 (Utah Ct. App. 1987) (omission in original) (citation 

omitted). “If the court finds the reasons to be adequate [it may] . . .

order that further discovery be conducted and continue the 

summary judgment motion.” Aspenwood, 2003 UT App 28, ¶ 19 

(omission in original) (emphasis added).

¶50 A district court does not abuse its discretion in denying 

such a motion where “the reasons . . . articulated in its affidavit 

would produce only cumulative evidence.” Sandy City v. Salt Lake 

Cty., 794 P.2d 482, 490 (Utah Ct. App. 1990), rev’d in part on other 

grounds by Sandy City v. Salt Lake Cty., 827 P.2d 212 (Utah 1992). A 

district court may deny a rule 56(f) motion for a continuance when 

that motion is “dilatory or lacking merit.” Price Dev. Co., L.P. v. Orem 

City, 2000 UT 26, ¶ 30, 995 P.2d 1237.

¶51 Moreover, conclusory claims do not sufficiently support a

motion to continue. Thus, the party opposing summary judgment

must “explain how the continuance will aid [her] opposition to 

summary judgment.” Callioux, 745 P.2d at 841 (Utah Ct. App. 1987); 

Robinson v. Jones Waldo Holbrook & McDonough, PC, 2016 UT App 34, 
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Opinion of the Court

19

¶ 19, 369 P.3d 119 (“A district court may refuse further discovery 

where the plaintiff ‘fail[s] to explain in [her] affidavit how additional 

discovery would aid [her] opposition to summary judgment.’”

(alteration in original) (citation omitted)). Otherwise, overly broad 

areas of inquiry may suggest to a court that a party is involved in a 

“fishing expedition” rather than a sincere opportunity to provide the 

court with information that will defeat summary judgment. See 

Nelson v. Target Corp., 2014 UT App 205, ¶ 29, 334 P.3d 1010 (stating 

that relevant factors in determining whether a rule 56(f) motion is 

warranted include “if the party requesting discovery is simply on a 

‘fishing expedition’” (citation omitted)).

¶52 The Heslops did not file a separate rule 56(f) motion. 

Instead, the “motion” consists of a five-sentence paragraph tacked 

onto the end of their memorandum in opposition to Bear River’s 

motion for summary judgment. The motion fails to explain in any 

detail what information the Heslops wished to discover, whom they 

wished to depose, or what their doctors would say in addition to 

what they had already said. Instead, it petitions the district court 

broadly to grant a rule 56(f) motion for further discovery into 

Heslop’s “mental state, capacity, the effects of serotonin syndrome, 

or the effects of large amounts of Ambien and Lexapro to the human 

system.” From this request, it is unclear what specific information 

the Heslops believed additional time would allow them to discover.

¶53 Nothing in the Heslops’ rule 56(f) motion mandated the 

conclusion that upon further discovery a genuine issue of material 

fact would arise. The breadth of the Heslops’ request without an 

accompanying statement explaining how the continuance would aid 

them in opposing summary judgment suggests that the Heslops 

would not be able to present the district court with further evidence 

that would defeat summary judgment. At the very least, given the 

paucity of information the Heslops provided the district court about 

its need for additional discovery, we cannot say that the district 

court’s denial of the rule 56(f) motion was an abuse of discretion or 

that its decision exceeded the “limits of reasonability.” See Crossland 

Sav., 877 P.2d at 1243 (citation omitted).

CONCLUSION

¶54 The district court appropriately granted Bear River’s motion 

for summary judgment on the personal injury claims. The district 

court correctly noted that Heslop admitted that she intentionally 

drove her truck off the road. The Heslops failed to provide the 
HESLOP v. BEAR RIVER

Opinion of the Court

20

district court with sufficient evidence to permit a reasonable jury to 

conclude that Heslop either did not understand the natural and 

probable consequences of driving off the road or that she was unable 

to control her actions. For the same reason, the district court did not 

err in granting summary judgment on Heslops’ property damages 

claim that was premised on the same argument. The Heslops’ claim 

that Brandon Heslop should be considered a victim and permitted to 

recover property damages is insufficiently briefed. Furthermore, the 

rule 56(f) motion before the district court made only conclusory

claims and suggested only cumulative evidence for further 

discovery. We thus cannot say the district court abused its discretion 

in refusing to grant a continuance. We affirm the district court’s 

grant of summary judgment.