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Filed 3/8/24 P. v. Hepokoski CA1/5

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on 

opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 

8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115. 

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION FIVE

THE PEOPLE,

Plaintiff and Respondent,

v.

STEVEN MARCUS HEPOKOSKI,

Defendant and Appellant.

 A167527

 (Solano County Super. Ct. No. 

VCR238361)

Steven Marcus Hepokoski appeals after he pled no contest 

to possessing a firearm as a felon (Pen. Code, § 29800, subd. 

(a)(1))1 and was granted probation. He argues that his pre-plea 

motion to suppress was erroneously denied (§ 1538.5, subd. (m)). 

We agree and reverse the judgment. 

BACKGROUND

A.

Officer Christopher Francis of the Benicia Police 

Department testified at the preliminary hearing that, at about 

10:00 p.m. on August 28, 2021, he was on patrol, with a police 

dog, in a marked patrol car. Officer Francis saw Hepokoski, in a 

gas station parking lot, riding a motorcycle without wearing a 

helmet. 

Officer Francis radioed dispatch that he was about to make 

a traffic stop at the gas station. However, Hepokoski parked his 

1 Undesignated statutory references are to the Penal Code.
2

motorcycle in one of the gas station’s parking spots in the 

interim. Thus, Officer Francis testified that “[t]here was no 

traffic stop,” and he merely “contact[ed]” Hepokoski to talk to him 

about the dangers of riding a motorcycle without a helmet. 

Officer Francis parked his patrol car about nine to 12 feet 

behind Hepokoski’s parked motorcycle, which faced a concrete 

curb and, beyond that, a landscaped area. The adjacent parking 

stalls (to the left and the right) were open. The left-hand stall 

was similarly bordered on two sides by a concrete curb and 

landscaping. The area, where Hepokoski and a female 

companion were eating fast food and listening to music, was 

illuminated by two streetlights and the headlights of Officer 

Francis’s patrol car. 

Two additional officers, Corporal Woodlief and Officer 

Stafford, arrived. All three officers were in uniform. Officer 

Francis initially approached Hepokoski together with Corporal 

Woodlief, while Officer Stafford stood a few feet behind and 

recorded the interaction on his body camera.2 Officer Francis 

stood no closer than two to three feet from Hepokoski. Corporal 

Woodlief and Officer Stafford both shined flashlights on 

Hepokoski and his motorcycle. 

Officer Francis testified, “I believe one of the first things I 

asked about . . . was where is his helmet at or why isn’t he 

wearing a helmet.” Officer Francis then asked Hepokoski if he 

had his identification. At this point, the three officers stood 

around Hepokoski and his motorcycle in a triangle shape. 

Corporal Woodlief and Officer Stafford continued shining their 

flashlights on Hepokoski and his motorcycle. Corporal Woodlief 

was positioned towards the left of the motorcycle, standing on the 

concrete curb facing the open, left parking stall. Officer Francis 

2 The recording captures neither the officers’ approach nor 

the audio for the first 30 seconds. 
3

was positioned at the other end of the left parking stall, and 

Officer Stafford was standing towards the right of the motorcycle, 

in the open, right parking stall. 

In response to Officer Francis’s question about his 

identification, Hepokoski checked his pockets, moved around the 

parking spaces, and then started to eat again. The officers spoke 

to Hepokoski and his companion in a friendly tone about fires in 

El Dorado County and their recent evacuation. Hepokoski moved 

past Officer Francis on at least one occasion, and Officer Francis 

did not stop him. Corporal Woodlief also walked back and forth 

between the two open stalls. 

Officer Francis testified that Hepokoski was not 

surrounded because “[there was] plenty of room for [him] to 

leave” on his motorcycle. Officer Francis eventually 

acknowledged that Hepokoski would not have been able to back 

straight out of the parking stall—because of where the patrol car 

was parked. Hepokoski’s only way to exit would have been to 

back up the motorcycle as much as he could, turn its wheel to the 

left or right, go around Officer Francis or Corporal Woodlief, and 

drive out through the adjacent parking stall. Officer Francis 

said, “I would move.” 

After about a minute, Officer Francis asked a second time if 

Hepokoski had identification. When Hepokoski began looking in 

belongings secured to the motorcycle, Corporal Woodlief and 

Officer Stafford focused their flashlights on those items. 

Hepokoski indicated that he would need to unload his 

belongings to locate his identification. Officer Francis said, 

“Yeah, absolutely. . . . I appreciate you offering.” Shortly 

thereafter, Officer Francis pulled out a pad of paper and asked 

Hepokoski if he knew the number by heart. He also asked for 

Hepokoski’s first and last name. Hepokoski told Officer Francis 

his name was “Steven Yancey.” 
4

After Officer Francis asked dispatch to run that name and 

the motorcycle’s license plate, he was informed that “[t]here was 

no match on Steven Yancey” but that the motorcycle was 

registered to a Steven Hepokoski, who was on probation and 

subject to a “full search” condition. Dispatch also sent a 

photograph of the motorcycle’s registered owner, which matched 

Hepokoski’s appearance. 

Officer Francis again asked Hepokoski what his last name 

was. Hepokoski repeated, “Yancey.” Shortly thereafter, Officer 

Francis reminded Hepokoski that their interaction was being 

videotaped. At that point, Hepokoski admitted his true last 

name. 

Officer Francis commanded Hepokoski and his companion 

to sit down on the curb. Asked to explain why he gave a false 

name, Hepokoski said, “I just wanted you guys to move along.” 

After Hepokoski was placed under arrest, the officers searched a 

backpack on the motorcycle and found an unloaded gun. 

B.

Hepokoski moved to suppress the gun, along with his 

statements and the officers’ observations, on the ground that the 

evidence was seized in violation of the Fourth Amendment to the 

United States Constitution. In its written opposition to the 

motion to suppress, the prosecution argued that Hepokoski’s 

detention was supported by Officer Francis’s reasonable 

suspicion that he violated Vehicle Code section 27803—by riding 

his motorcycle without a helmet—and that the subsequent search 

was lawful based on the officers’ knowledge of his probation 

search condition. 

At the preliminary hearing, the prosecution withdrew the 

former argument, acknowledging Vehicle Code section 27803 

does not apply in a parking lot. (Id., subd. (d).) Instead, the 
5

People argued Officer Francis’s interaction with Hepokoski began 

as a consensual encounter, not a detention. 

The magistrate denied Hepokoski’s motion to suppress. 

The magistrate expressly found that Officer Francis’s patrol car 

was parked directly behind Hepokoski’s motorcycle, but that 

Hepokoski was not blocked because there was “some room to back 

up and get around.” The magistrate also stated that, while a 

“reasonable person would feel impinged by the position of” the 

patrol car, “the manner in which the officers positioned 

themselves was not so overbearing [or] intrusive that it 

undermined a reasonable person’s ability to believe that they 

were free to go.” The magistrate also stated, “there’s nothing else 

whatsoever in the engagement between the officers and 

[Hepokoski] that appeared particularly coercive or investigatory.” 

The trial court later heard Hepokoski’s motion to set aside 

the information (§ 995) on the same grounds. The trial court 

denied the motion after reviewing the evidence from the 

preliminary hearing. Hepokoski entered a plea of no contest to 

possession of a firearm by a felon (§ 29800, subd. (a)(1)). The 

trial court suspended imposition of sentence and placed 

Hepokoski on probation for two years. 

DISCUSSION

A.

It is undisputed that Officer Francis had no reasonable 

suspicion Hepokoski was engaged in criminal activity before he 

gave a false name. Thus, the only question before us involves the 

timing of Hepokoski’s detention. Hepokoski argues that his 

motion to suppress should have been granted because he was 

unlawfully detained as soon as Officer Francis parked his patrol 

car behind Hepokoski’s motorcycle, the three officers approached

with flashlights shining on him, and Officer Francis began 

questioning him. The People, on the other hand, contend that 
6

Hepokoski was not detained until “after the police discovered he 

had lied about his identity and that he had a probation search 

condition.” Although it is a relatively close question, we agree 

with Hepokoski.

1.

In reviewing a suppression ruling, we defer to the 

magistrate’s factual findings, express or implied, if supported by 

substantial evidence. We then independently determine 

whether, on the facts so found, the search or seizure violates the 

Fourth Amendment, applying federal constitutional standards. 

(People v. Tacardon (2022) 14 Cal.5th 235, 242 (Tacardon).) 

“For purposes of Fourth Amendment analysis, there are 

. . . three different categories or levels of police ‘contacts’ or 

‘interactions’ with individuals, ranging from the least to the most 

intrusive. First, there are . . . ‘consensual encounters’ [citation], 

which are those police-individual interactions which result in no 

restraint of an individual’s liberty whatsoever . . . and which may 

properly be initiated by police officers even if they lack any 

‘objective justification.’ [Citation.] Second, there are what are 

commonly termed ‘detentions,’ seizures of an individual which 

are strictly limited in duration, scope and purpose, and which 

may be undertaken by the police ‘if there is an articulable 

suspicion that a person has committed or is about to commit a 

crime.’ [Citation.] Third, and finally, there are those seizures of 

an individual which exceed the permissible limits of a detention, 

seizures which include formal arrests . . . , and which are 

constitutionally permissible only if the police have probable cause 

to arrest the individual for a crime.” (Wilson v. Superior Court 

(1983) 34 Cal.3d 777, 784; accord, In re Manuel G. (1997) 16 

Cal.4th 805, 821.)

Police “officers may approach someone on the street or in 

another public place and converse if the person is willing to do so. 

There is no Fourth Amendment violation [if the] circumstances 
7

are such that a reasonable person would feel free to leave or end 

the encounter.” (People v. Rivera (2007) 41 Cal.4th 304, 309.) In 

contrast, a detention occurs when the police, by physical force or 

show of authority, communicate to a reasonable person, in view of 

all the circumstances, that they are not free to leave, or otherwise 

terminate the encounter, and if the person actually submits to 

the show of authority. (Tacardon, supra, 14 Cal.5th at pp. 241-

242; accord, Florida v. Bostick (1991) 501 U.S. 429, 439 (Bostick).)

“The test’s objective standard -- looking to the reasonable man’s 

interpretation of the conduct in question -- allows the police to 

determine in advance whether the conduct contemplated will 

implicate the Fourth Amendment.” (Michigan v. Chesternut

(1988) 486 U.S. 567, 574.)

“Relevant circumstances may include: the presence of 

multiple officers, an officer’s display of a weapon, the use of siren 

or overhead emergency lights, physically touching the person, the 

use of a patrol car to block movement, or the use of language or of 

a tone of voice indicating that compliance with the officer’s 

request is compelled.” (Tacardon, supra, 14 Cal.5th at pp. 241-

242.) We also consider “the time and place of the encounter, 

whether the police indicated the defendant was suspected of a 

crime, whether the police retained the defendant’s documents, 

and whether the police exhibited other threatening behavior.” 

(People v. Linn (2015) 241 Cal.App.4th 46, 58 (Linn).) If the 

police uncover evidence during an illegal detention, the 

unlawfully obtained evidence generally must be suppressed as 

“ ‘ “fruit of the poisonous tree.” ’ ” (People v. Kasrawi (2021) 65 

Cal.App.5th 751, 761.)

2.

Hepokoski’s argument—that he was detained before the 

false identification came to light—is based on several factual 

assertions: (1) that Officer Francis’s patrol patrol car blocked 

Hepokoski’s exit; (2) that three officers were present and 
8

surrounded him; (3) that Corporal Woodlief and Officer Stafford 

spotlighted Hepokoski with their flashlights throughout the 

encounter despite the area being well-lit; (4) that Officer Francis 

questioned him accusatorily about his failure to wear a helmet; 

and (5) that Officer Francis’s repeated requests for his 

identification suggested he was required to comply. Hepokoski’s 

first assertion is at odds with the superior court’s express 

findings, which we are required to accept if supported by 

substantial evidence. (Tacardon, supra, 14 Cal.5th at p. 242.) 

Nonetheless, after independently applying the law to the 

magistrate’s supported findings and other undisputed facts (id. at 

pp. 241-242, 255), we agree that a reasonable person in 

Hepokoski’s position would have believed he was not free to leave 

or to otherwise terminate the encounter. 

First, Hepokoski insists he was detained because Officer 

Francis’s patrol car was parked behind his motorcycle. A 

detention is not established by the mere fact that an officer parks 

behind or near the defendant’s vehicle, if the defendant has room 

to drive away. (See Tacardon, supra, 14 Cal.5th at p. 247; People 

v. Perez (1989) 211 Cal.App.3d 1492, 1494.) Here, the magistrate 

expressly found that Hepokoski was not blocked in and had 

“some room to back up and get around” Officer Francis’s patrol 

car. These findings are supported by Officer Francis’s testimony 

and the body camera recording. Hepokoski does not challenge 

the sufficiency of this evidence. 

This is where our agreement with the magistrate’s ruling 

ends. After finding that Hepokoski’s ability to exit was not 

physically blocked, the magistrate explicitly stated, “there’s 

nothing else whatsoever in the engagement between the officers 

and [Hepokoski] that appeared particularly coercive or 

investigatory.” To the extent that this is a finding that no other 

circumstances indicate a show of authority to which an 

objectively reasonable person would feel compelled to submit, it is 
9

contradicted by the undisputed facts. (See Tacardon, supra, 14 

Cal.5th at pp. 241-242, 251; People v. Paul (2024) 99 Cal.App.5th 

832, 840 (Paul); Linn, supra, 241 Cal.App.4th at p. 58.)

Most importantly, it is undisputed that Officer Francis 

approached Hepokoski and initially asked “where is [your] 

helmet at or why [aren’t you] wearing a helmet[?]” “[Q]uestions 

of a sufficiently accusatory nature may by themselves be cause to 

view an encounter as a nonconsensual detention[,] . . . and the 

degree of suspicion expressed by the police is an important factor 

in determining whether a consensual encounter has ripened into 

a detention.” (People v. Lopez (1989) 212 Cal.App.3d 289, 292-

293, italics added; accord, Wilson v. Superior Court, supra, 34 

Cal.3d at pp. 790-791.) Even without explicit mention of Vehicle 

Code section 27803, these questions would lead a reasonable 

person to believe that they were suspected of unlawful activity, 

and thus not free to merely leave or ignore Officer Francis’s 

questions. (See Linn, supra, 241 Cal.App.4th at pp. 58, 64-65.) 

“The same is true for commands or directions issued in the 

course of an encounter.” (Linn, supra, 241 Cal.App.4th at p. 58.) 

Here, Officer Francis testified that he merely asked if Hepokoski 

had his identification. The body camera recording corroborates 

Officer Francis’s account and shows that his tone was cordial. 

The Fourth Amendment is not necessarily implicated when a 

police officer asks a person for identification, “as long as the police 

do not convey a message that compliance with their requests is 

required.” (Bostick, supra, 501 U.S. at pp. 434-435, italics added; 

accord, People v. Leath (2013) 217 Cal.App.4th 344, 353.) Here, 

unlike in Bostick and Leath, Officer Francis’s repeated requests 

for identification came after he had communicated to Hepokoski 

that he was suspected of unlawful activity. The distinction is 

crucial. (See Linn, supra, at pp. 64-65 & fn. 7.)

Furthermore, Officer Francis repeated his request after 

Hepokoski gave an ambiguous response to the initial question 
10

about identification. The first time he was asked, Hepokoski 

checked his pockets, moved around the parking spaces, and then 

resumed his meal. At this point, Officer Francis did not verbally

inform Hepokoski, or otherwise indicate, that he was free to leave 

or to decline to answer his questions. (Cf. Bostick, supra, 501

U.S. at p. 432; People v. Franklin (1987) 192 Cal.App.3d 935, 941 

[“citizen participant in a consensual encounter may leave, refuse 

to answer questions or decline to act in the manner requested by 

the authorities”].) Instead, Officer Francis repeated his request 

for identification—indicating to an objective person in 

Hepokoski’s position that, although the officer’s tone was polite 

and his voice was not raised, Officer Francis was not going to let 

the matter drop until he completed further investigation. Officer

Francis’s tone of voice alone does not determine whether 

Hepokoski was detained. (Paul, supra, 99 Cal.App.5th at p. 841

[“[i]f the officer’s tone and words had been aggressive, it would be 

an additional reason for a reasonable person to believe that he or 

she was being detained” but “[t]he converse is not necessarily 

true”].)

Next, we consider the significance of Corporal Woodlief’s 

and Officer Stafford’s use of flashlights. At one point, there was a 

recognized split among the courts of appeal on whether an 

officer’s use of a spotlight communicates the same show of 

authority as an officer’s activation of emergency lights. 

(Tacardon, supra, 14 Cal.5th at pp. 243-245.) But our Supreme 

Court has since settled the question and decided that spotlights 

and emergency lights generally convey different meanings. 

(Tacardon, supra, at p. 246.) Tacardon explains: “[A] reasonable 

person would understand that spotlights can have a practical 

function that differs from the essentially communicative function 

of emergency lights. A spotlight can be used to illuminate the 

surrounding area for safety or other purposes unrelated to the 

projection of authority.” (Ibid.) 
11

Tacardon did not state a bright-line rule. We still “must 

consider the use of a spotlight together with all of the other 

circumstances. It is certainly possible that the facts of a 

particular case may show a spotlight was used in an 

authoritative manner. These may include flashing lights at the 

driver to pull the car over or attempting to blind the driver, 

which would be relevant considerations under the totality of the 

circumstances. [Citation.] But use of a spotlight, standing alone, 

does not necessarily effect a detention.” (Tacardon, supra, 14 

Cal.5th at p. 247.) 

Here, the body camera recording shows two of the three 

officers (Woodlief and Stafford) using their flashlights to 

illuminate Hepokoski and his motorcycle from multiple angles. 

They did so even though the parking lot where Hepokoski parked

was already illuminated by two streetlights and the headlights 

on Officer Francis’s patrol car. In the absence of any other 

explanation, the only inference to be drawn is that the officers 

used flashlights as a display of authority that would lead an 

objective person to believe they were not free to leave. (See 

Tacardon, supra, 14 Cal.5th at p. 247 [“facts of a particular case 

may show a spotlight was used in an authoritative manner”]; 

Paul, supra, 99 Cal.App.5th at p. 840 [objective person would 

believe they were suspected of wrongdoing when two officers 

approached parked car from both sides and shined flashlights 

into it from both sides].)

The presence of three uniformed officers further heightened 

this show of authority. (See In re Manuel G., supra, 16 Cal.4th at 

p. 821; In re J.G. (2014) 228 Cal.App.4th 402, 412; but see U.S. v. 

Drayton (2002) 536 U.S. 194, 205 [additional officer’s “position at 

the front of the bus . . . does not tip the scale in respondents’ 

favor” when officer left aisle clear, did nothing to intimidate 

passengers, and said nothing to indicate exit was forbidden].)
12

Here, the magistrate explicitly found that the position of 

the three officers—in a triangle around Hepokoski—did not

physically block his exit. In particular, the magistrate said that 

Corporal Woodlief’s presence in the right parking stall, which led 

to the rest of the parking lot, was not “enough to cause a 

reasonable person to feel that they have no means of departure” 

because “there was an area available where [Hepokoski] was free 

to go.” Nonetheless, we are required to independently consider 

the legal effect of the presence of multiple uniformed officers, 

positioned in a triangle around Hepokoski, for what was 

purportedly a casual conversation about helmet safety. (See 

Tacardon, supra, 14 Cal.5th at pp. 241-242; Paul, supra, 99

Cal.App.5th at p. 839 & fn. 2 [independently reviewing mixed 

question of whether trial court’s findings support its legal 

conclusions].) While we defer to the magistrate’s finding that 

Hepokoski’s egress was not physically blocked by the three 

officers, we conclude their presence and position in adjacent 

parking spaces constituted a show of authority that 

communicated Hepokoski was not free to go. (See Paul, supra, at 

pp. 839-840 [“[a]n objective person would not believe that [they 

were] free to simply start driving away with [a police officer] 

standing in the roadway”].)

True, backup officers, like spotlights, may serve an officer 

safety function, as opposed to a communicative function. (Cf. 

Tacardon, supra, 14 Cal.5th at p. 246.) But there is nothing in 

the record that suggests Hepokoski presented any danger to 

anyone but himself. And unlike in U.S. v. Drayton, supra, 536 

U.S. at pages 204-205 and I.N.S. v. Delgado (1984) 466 U.S. 210, 

216-218, which involved (respectively) passengers on a bus and 

workers in a factory, the presence of additional officers here is 

not explained by the sheer number of people that Officer Francis 

sought to question. (See Michigan v. Chesternut, supra, 486 U.S. 

at p. 573 [“what constitutes a restraint on liberty prompting a 

person to conclude that he is not free to ‘leave’ will vary, not only 
13

with the particular police conduct at issue, but also with the 

setting in which the conduct occurs”].)

Officer Francis did not activate his emergency lights to pull 

over Hepokoski’s motorcycle, touch him, or command him to stop. 

However, considering the totality of the undisputed 

circumstances—where Hepokoski was surrounded by three 

uniformed officers, immediately asked questions indicating 

suspicion he had engaged in unlawful activity, illuminated by 

multiple flashlights from multiple angles, and then repeatedly 

asked for his identification—a reasonable person would not 

believe this was an encounter that they were free to terminate. 

(See Paul, supra, 99 Cal.App.5th at pp. 839-841; Linn, supra, 241 

Cal.App.4th at p. 65.)

The trial court erred by failing to consider the totality of 

the circumstances. (See Tacardon, supra, 14 Cal.5th at p. 241.) 

The harmless error rule is inapplicable and the judgment must 

be reversed. Hepokoski must be given the opportunity to 

withdraw his no contest plea. (See Paul, supra, 99 Cal.App.5th 

at p. 841; People v. Wallace (2017) 15 Cal.App.5th 82, 95.)

3.

The People recognize that, in some circumstances, evidence 

seized as a result of an unlawful search or seizure is not subject 

to exclusion “when the causal connection ‘between the lawless 

conduct of the police and the discovery of the challenged evidence 

has “become so attenuated as to dissipate the taint.” ’ ” (People v. 

McWilliams (2023) 14 Cal.5th 429, 434.) However, they do not 

argue that the attenuation doctrine should apply here. (See id. at 

p. 438 [prosecution bears burden].) Accordingly, we need not

address the issue further.
14

DISPOSITION 

The judgment is reversed, and the matter is remanded with 

directions to the trial court (1) to vacate its order denying the 

suppression motion and enter a new order granting the motion; 

and (2) to permit Hepokoski an opportunity to withdraw his no 

contest plea.

BURNS, J. 

WE CONCUR:

SIMONS, ACTING P.J.

CHOU, J.

P. v. Hepokoski (A167527)