alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
(November 9, 2017)

#### Sherma Castillo, Appellant, v Montefiore Medical Center, Respondent.

[63 NYS3d 232]—

Order, Supreme Court, Bronx County (Elizabeth A. Taylor, J.), entered on or about July 22, 2016, which granted defendant’s motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint, unanimously affirmed, without costs.

On August 6, 2012, defendant hired plaintiff as a patient care technician, subject to a 90-day probationary period. After plaintiff started her employment, the administrator of the clinic observed plaintiff at work and noticed that she “did not show that she wanted to work.” Two physicians also provided negative feedback to the administrator about plaintiff’s employment, including that the physicians were unhappy with plaintiff, that “she’s not working,” and that she did not meet the standards expected in the department. On September 12, 2012, the administrator met with plaintiff to inform her of their concerns regarding her job performance, and advised her that she needed to improve and show initiative.

On September 19, 2012, plaintiff learned that she was pregnant. On September 21, 2012, the administrator scheduled a call with plaintiff and her unit supervisor, and the administrator terminated plaintiff’s employment.

Defendant established that plaintiff received negative feedback about her performance during her probationary employment, and was told to improve and show initiative. In response, plaintiff fails to raise a triable issue to support her claims of pregnancy-based employment discrimination under the New York State and City Human Rights Laws. Plaintiff admitted that she was not aware of any facts that would support her claim that she was terminated because of her *427pregnancy, and she conceded that she did not inform the administrator of her pregnancy. In addition, the administrator stated at her deposition that she did not have any knowledge of plaintiff’s pregnancy prior to plaintiff’s termination *(see Melman v Montefiore Med. Ctr.,*98 AD3d 107, 116-121 [1st Dept 2012]). On September 20, 2012, plaintiff told her unit supervisor that she was pregnant, but did not tell the administrator. Moreover, the unit supervisor did not tell anybody that plaintiff was pregnant. Plaintiff has failed to show that the reason proffered by defendant is merely a pretext for discrimination against her *(see Bennett v Health Mgt. Sys., Inc.,*92 AD3d 29, 44-46 [1st Dept 2011], *lv denied*18 NY3d 811 [2012]).

Plaintiff’s challenge to the dismissal of her retaliation claims is deemed abandoned, as she failed to address those claims in her brief *(see Hardwick v Auriemma,*116 AD3d 465, 468 [1st Dept 2014], *lv denied*23 NY3d 908 [2014]). In any event, there is no evidence to support the retaliation claims.

Concur—Tom, J.P., Richter, Andrias, Gesmer and Singh, JJ.
*October 9,*2017

2017-Ohio-8117.]

2017-0087.

#### State v. Carnes.

Hamilton App. No. C-150752, 2016-Ohio-8019. On motion for appointment of the Office of the Ohio Public Defender as counsel. Motion granted.
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA EASTERN DISTRICT

EDWARD H. ARNOLD AND JEANNE D. ARNOLD

v.

CHERNERY MANAGEMENT, INC.; ROY E. HAHN; LARRY J. AUSTIN; HARRIS MYCFO, INC.; PHIL GROVES; ART SHAW; FRANK TIRELLI; STARS HOLDING COMPANY, INC. F/K/A MYCFO, INC.; HOULIHAN CAPITAL, LLC; HOULIHAN CAPITAL HOLDINGS, INC. F/K/A HOULIHAN VALUATION ADVISORS, INC.; COGENT CAPITAL F/K/A HOULIHAN VALUATION ADVISORS, INC.; LEBOEUF LAMB GREENE & MACRAE LLP N/K/A DEWEY & LEBOEUF, LLP; GRAHAM R. TAYLOR; SIDLEY AUSTIN BROWN & WOOD LLP N/K/A SIDLEY AUSTIN LLP; R.J. RUBLE; GRANT THORNTON LLP; HILLWOOD INVESTMENT FUND LLC; THOMSON INVESTMENT FUND LLC; AND EPPING INVESTMENT FUND LLC

PETITION OF: HARRIS MYCFO, INC. : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : No. 422 EAL 2014

Petition for Allowance of Appeal from the Order of the Superior Court

ORDER

PER CURIAM AND NOW , this 18th day of March, 2015, the Petition for Allowance of Appeal is
DENIED

.
<TABLE> <S> <C>

<ARTICLE> UT
<LEGEND>
THIS SCHEDULE CONTAINS SUMMARY FINANCIAL INFORMATION EXTRACTED FROM THE BALANCE
SHEET AND INCOME STATEMENT FOR THE COMPANY FOR THE THREE MONTHS ENDED MARCH 31,
1997 AND IS QUALIFIED IN ITS ENTIRETY BY REFERENCE TO THE COMPANY'S FORM 10-Q
FOR THE THREE MONTHS ENDED MARCH 31, 1997.
</LEGEND>
<MULTIPLIER> 1,000
       
<S>                             <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                   6-MOS
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                          SEP-30-1997
<PERIOD-START>                             OCT-01-1996
<PERIOD-END>                               MAR-31-1997
<BOOK-VALUE>                                  PER-BOOK
<TOTAL-NET-UTILITY-PLANT>                      116,941
<OTHER-PROPERTY-AND-INVEST>                      5,476
<TOTAL-CURRENT-ASSETS>                          21,596
<TOTAL-DEFERRED-CHARGES>                         1,455
<OTHER-ASSETS>                                   7,197
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                                 152,665
<COMMON>                                            32
<CAPITAL-SURPLUS-PAID-IN>                       17,540
<RETAINED-EARNINGS>                             38,097
<TOTAL-COMMON-STOCKHOLDERS-EQ>                  55,669
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                                0
<PREFERRED>                                          0
<LONG-TERM-DEBT-NET>                            65,122
<SHORT-TERM-NOTES>                                   0
<LONG-TERM-NOTES-PAYABLE>                            0
<COMMERCIAL-PAPER-OBLIGATIONS>                       0
<LONG-TERM-DEBT-CURRENT-PORT>                    2,177
<PREFERRED-STOCK-CURRENT>                            0
<CAPITAL-LEASE-OBLIGATIONS>                          0
<LEASES-CURRENT>                                     0
<OTHER-ITEMS-CAPITAL-AND-LIAB>                  29,757
<TOT-CAPITALIZATION-AND-LIAB>                  152,665
<GROSS-OPERATING-REVENUE>                       47,297
<INCOME-TAX-EXPENSE>                             4,132
<OTHER-OPERATING-EXPENSES>                      33,665
<TOTAL-OPERATING-EXPENSES>                      37,797
<OPERATING-INCOME-LOSS>                          9,500
<OTHER-INCOME-NET>                                 162
<INCOME-BEFORE-INTEREST-EXPEN>                   9,662
<TOTAL-INTEREST-EXPENSE>                         2,762
<NET-INCOME>                                     6,900
<PREFERRED-STOCK-DIVIDENDS>                          0
<EARNINGS-AVAILABLE-FOR-COMM>                    6,900
<COMMON-STOCK-DIVIDENDS>                         1,807
<TOTAL-INTEREST-ON-BONDS>                        5,039<F1>
<CASH-FLOW-OPERATIONS>                           8,431
<EPS-PRIMARY>                                     2.12
<EPS-DILUTED>                                     2.12
<FN>
<F1>TOTAL INTEREST ON BONDS REPRESENTS INTEREST EXPENSE RELATED TO LONG-TERM DEBT
OUTSTANDING UNDER FIRST MORTGAGE BONDS AND LONG-TERM SECURED NOTES.
</FN>
        

</TABLE>
Board of Directors Annual Compensation







	


Board of Directors Annual Compensation 

	
	
	
	

	


 Fiscal Year 06 Existing 
	
	


 Fiscal Year 07 Proposed 

	
	
	
	

	


 $                           18,000.00 
	


Board Member Annual Director Fee
	


 $              30,000.00 
	


*

	
	
	
	

	


 $                           10,000.00 
	


Audit Committee Chairman
	


 $              10,000.00 
	

	
	
	
	

	


 $                           10,000.00 
	


Compensation Committee Chairman
	


 $              10,000.00 
	

	
	
	
	

	


 $                             5,000.00 
	


Nominating and Corporate Governance Chairman
	


 $                5,000.00 
	

	
	
	
	

	


 $                             1,000.00 
	


Per Board Meeting Attended
	


 $                2,500.00 
	

	
	
	
	

	


 $                             1,000.00 
	


Per Committee Meeting Attended
	


 $                1,000.00 
	

	
	
	
	

	
	
	
	

	
	
	
	

	


 * Portion i.e. 1/3 could be restricted stock 
	
	

	
	
	
	

	


 Board Members would also be eligible to participate in the company's deferred compensation plan 
	

	


 20,000 share annual stock option grant 
	
	

	


 One time 20,000 share stock option grant for new board member
AAM-13-292-E 

April 17, 2013 

 Exemption No. 10284A 

 Regulatory Docket No. FAA-2011-0574 

Mr. Monte R. Myers 

Double M Helicopters, Inc. 

2429 Pirates Loop, S.E. 

Mandan, ND 58554 

Dear Mr. Myers: 

This letter is to inform you that we have granted your petition to extend Exemption No. 

10284. It explains the basis for our decision, describes its effect, and lists the conditions and 

limitations. 

The Basis for Our Decision 

By letter dated March 14, 2013, you petitioned the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) on 

behalf of Double M Helicopters, Inc. (Double M) for an extension of Exemption No. 10284. 

That exemption from § 120.117(a)(2) of Title 14, Code of Federal Regulations (14 CFR) 

allows Double M, which is operating under separate parts of 14 CFR, to cover its safetysensitive employees under one drug testing program. 

In your petition, you indicate that there has been no change in the conditions and reasons 

relative to public interest and safety that were the basis for granting the original exemption. 

The FAA has determined that good cause exists for not publishing a summary of the petition 

in the Federal Register because the requested exemption would not set a precedent, and any 

delay in acting on this petition would be detrimental to Double M. 

Our Decision 

The FAA has determined that the justification for the issuance of Exemption No. 10284 

remains valid with respect to this exemption and is in the public interest. Therefore, under the 
2 

authority provided by 49 U.S.C. 40113 and 44701, which the FAA Administrator has 

delegated to me, I grant your petition, subject to the following conditions and limitations. 

Conditions and Limitations 

1. Employees of Double M are subject to the drug and alcohol regulations at all times 

while conducting operations under part 135 or part 91. 

2. The drug and alcohol testing program must be implemented under the auspices of 

the Double M part 135 operation, not under part 91. 

This exemption terminates on June 30, 2015 unless sooner superseded or rescinded. 

Sincerely, 

/s/ 

James R. Fraser, M.D. 

Deputy Federal Air Surgeon
# DLA Distribution San Diego’s Martinez retires after 42 years of service

/ Published April 3, 2020
SAN DIEGO, 
Defense Logistics Agency Distribution San Diego, California, hosted a retirement ceremony for Jose Martinez, quality assurance evaluator, Feb. 28.

Martinez, who also served nearly six years in the U.S. Army before transitioning to civil service, is retiring after 42 years of government service.

During the ceremony Navy Capt. Jerome White, commander, DDDC, presented Martinez with the Superior Civilian Service Award, a Gold Letter signed by the DLA Director, and a Letter of Appreciation signed by him.

“Even though Jose’s background was with DLA Energy, he hit the ground running and proved to be an invaluable asset to our team.  He helped us get to the point we are at today. Jose, keep that in mind while you are on your way home. We truly appreciate your contributions,” said Steven Essex, quality assurance examiner, DDDC.

Martinez remarked that he is humbled by just being there with the people that have supported him throughout his time with DDDC. “You helped train me and introduce me to the Distribution enterprise. Now here I am —I appreciate the support all of you gave me, and I’m out of here! Thank you very much.”
EN EL TRIBUNAL SUPREMO DE PUERTO RICO

In re:

Elaine M. Vélez Torres

(TS

- 12,858) 202 4 TSPR 10 3

21 4 DPR ___

Número del Caso: AB

- 2020

- 0048

Fecha: 2 0 de septiembre de 202 4

Oficina de Inspección de Notarías:

Lcdo. Manuel E. Ávila De Jesús

Director

Representante Legal de la peticionaria:

Lcdo. Luis E. Miñana Rodríguez

- Feo

Materia: Re instalaci ón al ejercicio de la notaría

.

Este documento está sujeto a los cambios y correcciones del proceso

de compilación y publicación oficial de las decisiones del Tribunal

Supremo. Su distribución electrónica se hace como un servicio

público a la comunidad.EN EL TRIBUNAL SUPREMO DE PUERTO RICO

In re:

Elaine M. Vélez Torres

( TS

- 12

, 858 ) AB

- 20 2 0

- 0 048

RESOLUCIÓN

En San Juan, Puerto Rico, a 20 de septiembre de 20 2 4

.

E xaminada la Moción en c umplimiento de o rden

presentad a por la Lcda. Elaine M. Vélez Torres

, así

como la Moción en cumplimiento de orden presentada

por la Oficina de Inspección de Notarías (ODIN ), se

ordena el archivo de la queja. Se apercibe a la

letrada que en el futuro deberá cumplir estricta y

fielmente con la Ley Notarial y su Reglamento.

Del mismo modo, se reinstala a la licenciada Vélez

Torres al ejercicio de la notaría, condicionado a que

nos acredite la adquisición de una fianza nota rial

buena y válida. Una vez cumpla con lo anterior y se

emita la resolución correspondiente aprobando la

fianza notarial y reinstalándol a al ejercicio de la

notaría , la licenciada Vélez Torres tendrá la

obligación de recoger la obra protocolar depositada y

custodiada en el Archivo general de Protocolos del

Distrito Notarial de Caguas , así como su sello

notarial en custodia de la ODIN.

Lo acordó el Tribunal y certifica el Secretario

del Tribunal Supremo. El Juez Asociado señor Estrella

Martínez no intervino.

Javier O. Sepúlveda Rodríguez

Secretari o del Tribunal Supremo
#### Com. v. Collazo 9

02/08/2016

891 MAL (2015)

9

. Justice EAKIN did not participate in the decision of this matter. Madame Justice DONOHUE did not participate in the consideration or decision of this matter. Reconsideration Denied April 4, 2016.

Denied

Pa.Super., 134 A.3d 93
#### Masso Kebe, Respondent, v Greenpoint-Goldman Corp. et al., Appellants, et al., Defendants.

[54 NYS3d 387]

Order, Supreme Court, Bronx County (Sharon A.M. Aarons, J.), entered August 18, 2016, which, to the extent appealed from as limited by the briefs, granted plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment as to liability on his Labor Law § 240 (1) claim as against defendants Greenpoint-Goldman Corp., Greenpoint Goldman SM LLC, GFI Development Company, LLC, Atara Vanderbilt, LLC and Triton Construction Company, LLC, unanimously affirmed, without costs.

As the Court of Appeals recently reiterated in *O’Brien v Port Auth. of N.Y. & N.J.*(29 NY3d 27, 33 [Mar. 30, 2017]), “[T]he fact that a worker falls at a construction site, in itself, does not establish a violation of Labor Law § 240 (1).” “Rather, liability is contingent upon the existence of a hazard contemplated in *454section 240 (1) and the failure to use, or the inadequacy of, a safety device of the kind enumerated therein” *(Narducci v Manhasset Bay Assoc.,*96 NY2d 259, 267 [2001]). However, “[i]n cases involving ladders or scaffolds that collapse or malfunction for no apparent reason,” the Court of Appeals has applied “a presumption that the ladder or scaffolding device was not good enough to afford proper protection” *(Blake v Neighborhood Hous. Servs. of N.Y. City,*1 NY3d 280, 289 n 8 [2003])—a presumption that the *O’Brien*Court recognized but found inapplicable to the facts before it, which involved a fall from an exterior stairway.

Here, plaintiff established prima facie that Labor Law § 240 (1) was violated through his testimony that the ladder from which he fell wobbled during its use (see *e.g. Hill v City of New York,*140 AD3d 568 [1st Dept 2016]; *Montalvo v J. Petrocelli Constr., Inc.,*8 AD3d 173 [1st Dept 2004]; *Soriano v St. Mary’s Indian Orthodox Church of Rockland, Inc.,*118 AD3d 524 [1st Dept 2014]), that two of the ladder’s rubber feet were missing (see *Orphanoudakis v Dormitory Auth. of State of N.Y.,*40 AD3d 502 [1st Dept 2007]), and that the ladder spun and fell over (see *Blake,*1 NY3d at 289 n 8).

In opposition, defendants failed to raise triable issues of fact as to whether the ladder provided proper protection. The testimony of a superintendent that he saw the ladder standing when he arrived at the scene one-half to one hour after plaintiff’s fall is insufficient to raise an issue of fact. In the absence of any evidence that the ladder was not moved or repositioned after plaintiff fell, it would be speculative to infer from the superintendent’s testimony that the ladder did not fall over. Furthermore, the superintendent’s testimony does not negate plaintiff’s testimony that the ladder began to spin, causing him to fall. While a coworker submitted an affidavit disputing whether the ladder lacked its rubber feet, he did not address the happening of the accident in any way and did not deny that the ladder began to spin. Furthermore, unlike *O’Brien,*this case does not present a battle of the experts.

Concur—Sweeny, J.P., Richter, Andrias, Feinman and Kahn, JJ.
#### The People of the State of New York, Respondent, v Tyshawn Riley, Appellant.

[52 NYS3d 224]

Appeals having been taken to this Court by the above-named appellant from the judgments of the Supreme Court, New York County, rendered September 3, 2015 (Patricia Nuñez, J.), and September 17, 2015 (Richard Weinberg, J.), said appeals having been argued by counsel for the respective parties, due deliberation having been had thereon, and finding the sentence not excessive, it is unanimously ordered that the judgments so appealed from be and the same are hereby affirmed.

Concur—Friedman, J.P., Richter, Moskowitz, Gische and Kapnick, JJ.
10-3536-pr Bennett v. James UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT SUMMARY ORDER RULINGS BY SUMMARY ORDER DO NOT HAVE PRECEDENTIAL EFFECT. CITATION TO A SUMMARY ORDER FILED ON OR AFTER JANUARY 1, 2007, IS PERMITTED AND IS GOVERNED BY FEDERAL RULE OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE 32.1 AND THIS COURT’S LOCAL RULE 32.1.1. WHEN CITING A SUMMARY ORDER IN A DOCUMENT FILED WITH THIS COURT, A PARTY MUST CITE EITHER THE FEDERAL APPENDIX OR AN ELECTRONIC DATABASE (WITH THE NOTATION “SUMMARY ORDER”). A PARTY CITING A SUMMARY ORDER MUST SERVE A COPY OF IT ON ANY PARTY NOT REPRESENTED BY COUNSEL. At a stated term of the United States Cour t of Appeals for the Second Circuit, held at the Daniel Patrick Moynihan United States Courthouse, 500 Pearl Street, in the City of New York, on the 20 th day of December, two thousand eleven. PRESENT: JOSEPH M. MCLAUGHLIN, GUIDO CALABRESI, REENA RAGGI, Circuit Judges

.

---------------------------------------------------------------------- DONALD BENNETT, Plaintiff-Appellant , v. No. 10-3536-pr TRACEY JAMES, DR. GOLDBERG, Dr. of Chronic Care at Westchester County Jail Health Services, Defendants-Appellees

.

---------------------------------------------------------------------- FOR APPELLANT: Donald Bennett, pro se , Valhalla, New York. FOR APPELLEES: Thomas G. Gardiner, Senior Assistant County Attorney, James Castro-Blanco, Chief Deputy County Attorney, on behalf of Robert F. Meehan, Westchester County Attorney, White Plains, New York. Appeal from the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York (Gabriel G. Gorenstein, Magistrate Judge ).UPON DUE CONSIDERATION, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED that the judgment entered on September 16, 2010, is AFFIRMED. Appellant Donald Bennett, proceeding pro se , appeals the district court’s grant of summary judgment dismissing his 42 U.S.C. § 1983 complaint for failure to exhaust administrative remedies pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a). We assume the parties’ familiarity with the underlying facts, the proce dural history of the case, and the issues on appeal. We review de novo a district court’s grant of summary judgment, with the view that “[s]ummary judgment is appropriate only if the moving party shows that there are no genuine issues of material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Miller v. Wolpoff & Abramson, L.L.P. , 321 F.3d 292, 300 (2d Cir. 2003). Further, we review de novo a district court’s ruling on whether a plaintiff has exhausted his administrative remedies. See Ortiz v. McBride , 380 F.3d 649, 653 (2d Cir. 2004). Upon such review, we conclude that Bennett’s appeal is without merit substantially for the reasons articulated by the magistrate judge in his well-reasoned decision. See Bennett
v. James , 737 F. Supp. 2d 219 (S.D.N.Y. 2010). We have considered all of Bennett’s arguments on appeal and find them to be without merit. For the foregoing reasons, the judgment is AFFIRMED.
FOR THE COURT: Catherine O’Hagan Wolfe, Clerk of Court
No. 12-8552.

#### Schwartz v. United States.

C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied.
#### The People of the State of New York, Respondent, v Qualon Cooks, Appellant.

[51 NYS3d 433]

*1324McCarthy, J.

Appeal from a judgment of the County Court of Albany County (Herrick, J.), rendered June 13, 2014, convicting defendant upon his plea of guilty of the crime of robbery in the second degree.

Defendant pleaded guilty to robbery in the second degree in satisfaction of two indictments and another uncharged crime. As part of his guilty plea, he waived his right to appeal both orally and in writing. In accordance with the terms of the plea agreement, he was sentenced to 10 years in prison, to be followed by five years of postrelease supervision. Defendant now appeals.

Initially, we find no merit to defendant’s challenge to the validity of his waiver of the right to appeal. Our review of the record discloses that County Court explained the consequences of the waiver and advised defendant that it was separate and distinct from the other rights that he was forfeiting by pleading guilty. Defendant communicated his understanding and, after conferring with counsel, signed a written waiver in open court. Accordingly, we find that the waiver was knowing, voluntary and intelligent *(see People v Dolberry,*147 AD3d 1149, 1150 [2017]; *People v Simpson,*146 AD3d 1175, 1176 [2017]).

Although defendant’s valid appeal waiver does not preclude him from contesting the voluntariness of his guilty plea, this claim has not been preserved for our review as the record does not reveal that he made an appropriate postallocution motion *(see People v Dolberry,*147 AD3d at 1150; *People v Darrell,*145 AD3d 1316, 1317 [2016]). Moreover, inasmuch as defendant did not make any statements during the plea colloquy that cast doubt upon his guilt, the exception to the preservation rule is inapplicable *(see People v Lopez,*71 NY2d 662, 665-666 [1988]; *People v Darrell,*145 AD3d at 1317). Likewise, to the extent that defendant’s claim of ineffective assistance of counsel raised in his supplemental pro se brief impacts the voluntariness of his plea, it has also not been preserved due to the absence of a postallocution motion *(see People v Fairweather,*147 AD3d 1153, 1154 [2017]; *People v Golgoski,*145 AD3d 1195, 1195 [2016]). Defendant’s other pro se assertions regarding counsel’s alleged deficiencies are precluded by his valid appeal waiver *(see People v White,*145 AD3d 1324, 1325 [2016]), as is his challenge to the severity of the sentence *(see People v McCall,*146 AD3d 1156, 1157 [2017]; *People v Taylor,*144 AD3d 1317, 1318 [2016], *Iv denied*28 NY3d 1151 [2017]).

*1325Peters, P.J., Egan Jr., Mulvey and Aarons, JJ., concur.

Ordered that the judgment is affirmed.
*October 13, 2017*

2017-Ohio-8183.]

2017-0986.

#### State ex rel. Cincinnati Enquirer v. Denney.

In Mandamus. On relator’s application for dismissal. Application granted. Cause dismissed.