J-A04016-22

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

IN RE: ESTATE OF CATHERINE 

PERKINS, DECEASED

APPEAL OF: FRANKLIN RUSSELL 

PERKINS

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 IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

 PENNSYLVANIA

 No. 1466 EDA 2021

Appeal from the Order Entered June 30, 2021

In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County Orphans' Court at 

No(s): 201900894DE

BEFORE: LAZARUS, J., NICHOLS, J., and McLAUGHLIN, J.

MEMORANDUM BY NICHOLS, J.: FILED MARCH 29, 2022

Appellant Franklin Russell Perkins appeals from the decree and order 

sustaining the preliminary objections of Appellee Angela Perkins to his 

amended petition to quiet title and strike deed. We affirm.

The trial court summarized the facts and procedural history of this 

matter as follows:

On January 7, 1981, Catherine E. Perkins (hereinafter “Decedent”) 

died intestate without a spouse. Decedent was survived by six 

(6) children: Gloria Perkins; Mary Perkins; Norman Perkins, Jr.; 

Norma Perkins; John Perkins; and [Appellant]. Decedent was 

predeceased by one child, Charles Perkins, who was survived by 

two issue: Tracy and Tony Perkins. At the time of her death, 

Decedent was the sole owner of 647 S. 55th Street, Philadelphia, 

PA 19143 (hereinafter “the Property”).

On March 9, 1981, Letters of Administration were granted to 

Norman Perkins Jr. by the Register of Wills of Philadelphia County. 

The Petition for Letters identified Norman Perkins Jr. and Norma 

Perkins as Decedent’s only heirs. On January 18, 1992, Norma 

Perkins passed away leaving her son Robert Perkins as her sole 

heir.
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By deed dated May 23, 2000, Norman Perkins Jr., as Administrator 

of Decedent’s Estate, and Robert Perkins, as sole heir of Norma 

Perkins, conveyed the Property to [Appellee] for the sum of 

$45,000.00. The Deed was recorded at the City of Philadelphia 

Department of records on August 24, 2000 [(the Deed)].

On July 23, 2019, Appellant filed a Petition for Citation directed to 

Appellee to show cause why the Deed should not be stricken, and 

why the court should not enter an order of ejectment removing 

Appellee from the Property. Preliminary objections to the Petition 

were sustained in part by decree dated October 1, 2020, and 

Appellant was ordered to refile the Petition in conformity with the 

rules of Orphans’ Court.[FN1]

[FN1] Preliminary objections to Appellant’s failure to list the 

names of all interested parties as required by Pa.O.C. Rule 

3.4(a)(5) and failure to include a proper verification were 

sustained, while the preliminary objection as to service of 

the Petition was overruled.

On November 7, 2020, Appellant filed an Amended Petition to 

Quiet Title and Strike Deed dated May 23, 2000. On December 1, 

2020, Appellee filed preliminary objections to the Amended 

Petition, claiming that:

1. The Amended Petition is untimely;

2. [Appellant] cannot allege an action to quiet title and 

ejectment simultaneously;

3. The Petition is legally insufficient to allege an action in 

ejectment;

4. Norman Perkins Jr. as Administrator of the Estate had the 

absolute right to convey the Premises; and

5. The Statute of limitations [had] expired.

On December 9, 2020, Appellant filed an answer to the 

preliminary objections arguing that the court should accept his 

petition as timely filed, that there is no claim for Ejectment, that 

Norman Perkins Jr. did not have the absolute right to convey the 

Property, and that fraudulent concealment tolled the time for an 

appeal from the Register of Wills to be taken.

On April 28, 2021, oral argument on the preliminary objections 

was conducted at which time Appellee withdrew the preliminary 
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objections concerning ejectment as Appellant had not alleged 

ejectment in his Amended Petition.

On June 30, 2021, the court entered an order sustaining 

Appellee’s first and fourth preliminary objections, that the 

Amended Petition was untimely, and that Norman Perkins Jr., as 

Administrator of the Estate, had the absolute right to convey the 

premises. Appellee’s fifth preliminary objection, that the statute 

of limitations had expired, was overruled.

Orphans’ Ct. Op., 9/13/21, at 1-3 (some formatting altered).

Appellant timely filed an appeal and Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b) statement of 

errors complained of on appeal.

Appellant raises the following issues for review:

1. Did the trial court abuse its discretion and commit an error of 

law in sustaining Appellee Angela Perkins’ preliminary objection 

that Appellant’s amended petition was untimely filed where 

Appellee’s substantive rights were not affected as a result of 

said filing?

2. Did the trial court abuse its discretion and commit an error of 

law in sustaining Appellee Angela Perkins’ preliminary objection 

in the nature of a demurrer that [the] administrator of the 

Estate of [Decedent], had the absolute right to convey the 

subject property, which could not be impeached where Mr. 

Perkins committed fraud upon the Register of Wills in becoming 

appointed as administrator, and failed to act in good faith when 

he sold the premises.

Appellant’s Brief at 8 (formatting altered).

In reviewing an order from the [o]rphans’ [c]ourt, our standard is 

narrow: we will not reverse unless there is a clear error of law or 

an abuse of discretion. Our scope of review is also limited: we 

determine only whether the court’s findings are based on 

competent and credible evidence of record.
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In re Estate of Karschner, 919 A.2d 252, 255-56 (Pa. Super. 2007) (citation 

omitted).

Timeliness

The Orphans’ Court Rules provide that the rules “shall be liberally 

construed to secure the just, timely and efficient determination of every action 

or proceeding to which they are applicable. The court at every stage of any 

action or proceeding may disregard any error or defect of procedure that does 

not affect the substantive rights of the parties in interest.” Pa.O.C.R. 1.2(a)

(emphasis added). Subsequent to the disposition of preliminary objections 

filed in orphans’ court, “[i]f the filing of an amended petition or a new petition 

is allowed or required, it shall be filed within 20 days after entry of the order

concerning such amended or new petition or within such other time as the 

court shall direct.” Pa.O.C.R. 3.9(e)(2) (emphasis added).

1

In Appellant’s first issue, he argues that the orphans’ court erred by 

dismissing his petition as untimely, where Appellee’s substantive rights were 

not affected. Appellant’s Brief at 16. In support of his argument Appellant 

cites In re Chiara’s Estate, 359 A.2d 756, 760 (Pa. 1979), and contends

that it is reversible error for a court “to not disregard a parties’ [sic] failure to 

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1

In Pennsylvania, the word “shall” is understood to be unambiguous. See, 

e.g., In re Canvass of Absentee Ballots of November 4, 2003 General 

Election, 843 A.2d 1223, 1231-32 (Pa. 2004) (stating that while “some 

contexts may leave the precise meaning of the word ‘shall’ in doubt, . . . . this 

Court has repeatedly recognized the unambiguous meaning of the word in 

most contexts” (citations omitted)). 
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comply with an Orphans[’] Court Rule where the substantive rights of a party 

has not been affected.” Appellant’s Brief at 16-17.

At the hearing on the preliminary objections, counsel for Appellant 

stated:

But the reason why there was a delay, and I would have my client 

testify to that, is, as Your Honor heard, there is only one remaining 

spouse—I’m sorry—one remaining heir of [Decedent]. The others, 

there [are] about 11 heirs that were children of my client’s 

siblings, and it took them a while to find this information.

. . . . There’s 11, and they are all across the various northeast 

area. And my client doesn’t live in this area, if he were to testify. 

He lives in Oklahoma, I believe. So he had to find all this 

information to be able to include them because that was one of 

the requirements here, is that all heirs be served with this . . . . 

petition.

So there was no prejudice whatsoever to [Appellee], and we think 

that when there’s no effect of substandard [sic] rights, then the 

case law is pretty clear that an individual may be able—the [c]ourt 

may be able to allow for an untimely petition to proceed.

N.T. H’rg, 4/28/21, at 11-12.

With regard to Appellant’s first issue, the court observed:

On October 1, 2020, the [c]ourt entered a [d]ecree directing 

Appellant to “refile his Petition to Quiet Title, Strike Deed dated 

May 23, 2000, and for Ejectment, originally filed July 23, 2019, so 

that it conforms to the rules of the Orphans’ Court.” Pursuant to 

Pa.O.C. Rule 3.9(e)(2), Appellant had twenty days from October 

1, 2020, to file an amended petition. Appellant filed his Amended 

Petition on November 7, 2020, more than twenty days[2] after the 

October 1, 2020, [o]rder without providing a sufficient explanation 

for the delay.

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2 Appellant’s amended petition was filed thirty-nine days after the date of the 

order.
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Orphans’ Ct. Op. at 4. 

Appellant’s reliance on Chiara’s Estate is unavailing, and the 

circumstances in that case are distinguishable from the instant matter. In 

Chiara’s Estate, the issues on appeal were “whether [assets were] of the 

decedent’s estate, or whether, on the contrary, the money had been given by 

decedent in her lifetime to her [son].” Id., 359 A.2d at 758. When 

determining the status of a particular savings certificate, the orphans’ court 

noted that no formal objection had been made, so the proceeds should be 

distributed in accordance with the schedule proposed by the administrator. 

Id. at 760. The Supreme Court observed that it could not tell 

whether the court did not pass on the question because no formal 

objection was made or whether the auditing judge overlooked the 

fact that the proceeds of the certificate were not in fact included 

in the proposed schedule of distribution, having been repaid by 

the administrator to [the son] at an earlier time . . . .

Id. 

Ultimately, our Supreme Court concluded that while the item in question 

should have been the subject of a formal objection:

failure to do so should not prove fatal in this case. The trial 

memorandum presented to the court on [the daughter’s] behalf 

before hearing on the objections and the brief submitted before 

decision was rendered were in effect, amendments to the formal 

objections, and should have been so treated by the court. 

Id. Conversely, in the instant case, the orphans’ court addressed the formal 

objection that was filed in the form of a preliminary objection in its decision. 

Cf. id.
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Pursuant to the rules and appropriate case law, the court may construe 

the rules liberally where it concludes such a construction is appropriate to 

protect the rights of litigants, but is not required to do so, particularly where 

other orphans’ court rules require the dismissal of untimely petitions. 

Pa.O.C.R. 1.2(a), 3.9(e); see also In re Canvass of Absentee Ballots of 

November 4, 2003 General Election, 843 A.2d at 1231-32; cf. In re 

Chiara’s Estate, 359 A.2d at 760. In the instant case, the orphans’ court 

refused to consider an untimely amended petition, where Appellant offered no 

reasonable explanation for the delay other than the fact that he lived in 

Oklahoma and had retained counsel in Pennsylvania since the filing of the first 

petition. We discern no abuse of discretion and conclude that Appellant and 

no relief is due. See Estate of Karschner, 919 A.2d at 255-56.

3

Order affirmed.

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3 We need not reach Appellant’s second issue as our conclusion concerning

Appellant’s first issue is dispositive of this appeal. However, were we to 

address the second issue, we would agree with the orphans’ court that 

Appellant did not plead and prove with specificity, his allegations of fraud, or 

lack of good faith; nor did he establish that the Administrator was unqualified 

to serve as a personal representative. See Orphans’ Ct. Op. at 5-6; see also 

Lange v. Burd, 800 A.2d 336, 339 (Pa. Super. 2002); Kern v. Kern, 892 

A.2d 1, 8 (Pa. Super. 2005); see also Estate of Karschner, 919 A.2d at 256 

(stating that “[a]llegations must be specific in order to compel the court to 

conduct a hearing” (citation omitted)); Pa.O.C.R. 3.3(c) (providing that 

“[a]verments of fraud or mistake shall be averred with particularity”). Thus, 

because it is “clear and free from doubt that [Appellant] will be unable to prove 

facts legally sufficient to establish the right to relief[,]” we see no error of law 

or abuse of discretion in the orphans’ court order sustaining Appellee’s 

preliminary objections and striking Appellant’s complaint. See Catanzaro v. 

Pennell, 238 A.3d 504, 507-08 (Pa. Super. 2020).
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Judge McLaughlin joins the memorandum.

Judge Lazarus concurs in the result.

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 3/29/2022