30518 Federal Register / Vol. 63, No. 107 /Thursday, June 4, 1998 / Notices

MSPB, 725 17th Street, NW.,

Washington, DC 20503.

Dated: June 1, 1998.

Robert E. Taylor,

Clerk of the Board.

[FR Doc. 98–14823 Filed 6–3–98; 8:45 am]

BILLING CODE 7400–01–M

NUCLEAR REGULATORY

COMMISSION

[Docket No. 50–289]

GPU Nuclear Inc., et al. Three Mile

Island Nuclear Station, Unit No. 1;

Confirmatory Order Modifying License

Effective Immediately

I

GPU Nuclear Inc., (GPUN or the

Licensee) is the holder of Facility

Operating License No. DRP–50, which

authorizes operation of Three Mile

Island Nuclear Station, Unit No. 1

located in Dauphin County,

Pennsylvania.

II

The staff of the U.S. Nuclear

Regulatory Commission (NRC) has been

concerned that Thermo-Lag 330–1 fire

barrier systems installed by licensees

may not provide the level of fire

endurance intended and that licensees

that use Thermo-Lag 330–1 fire barriers

may not be meeting regulatory

requirements. During the 1992 to 1994

timeframe, the NRC staff issued Generic

Letter (GL) 92–08, ‘‘Thermo-Lag 330–1

Fire Barriers’’ and subsequent requests

for additional information that

requested licensees to submit plans and

schedules for resolving the Thermo-Lag

issue. The NRC staff has obtained and

reviewed all licensees’ corrective plans

and schedules. The staff is concerned

that some licensees may not be making

adequate progress toward resolving the

plant-specific issues, and that some

implementation schedules may be either

too tenuous or too protracted. For

example, several licensees informed the

NRC staff that their completion dates

had slipped by 6 months to as much as

3 years. For plants that have completion

action scheduled beyond 1997, the NRC

staff has met with these licensees to

discuss the progress of the licensees’

corrective actions and the extent of

licensee management attention

regarding completion of Thermo-Lag

corrective actions. In addition, the NRC

staff discussed with licensees the

possibility of accelerating their

completion schedules.

GPUN was one of the licensees with

which the NRC staff held a meeting. At

this meeting, the NRC staff reviewed

with GPUN the schedule of Thermo-Lag

corrective actions described in the

GPUN submittals to the NRC dated

February 10, 1994, December 5, 1994,

July 7, 1995, August 16, 1996,

November 5, 1996, December 31, 1996,

August 19, 1997, and November 23,

1997, to complete implementation of

Thermo-Lag 330–1 fire barriers

corrective actions by December 31,

1999, excluding those corrective actions

which are the subject of the pending

exemption request dated December 31,

1996, and supplemented by letters dated

July 31, 1997, September 8, 1997, and

December 30, 1997. Based on the

information submitted by GPUN and

provided during the meeting, the NRC

staff has concluded that the schedule

presented by GPUN is reasonable. This

conclusion is based on the: (1) Amount

of installed Thermo-Lag, (2) the

complexity of the plant-specific fire

barrier configurations and issues, (3) the

need to perform certain plant

modifications during outages as

opposed to those that can be performed

while the plant is at power, and (4)

integration with other significant, but

unrelated issues that GPUN is

addressing at its plant. In order to

remove compensatory measures such as

fire watches, it has been determined that

resolution of the Thermo-Lag corrective

actions by GPUN must be completed in

accordance with the current GPUN

schedule. By letter dated April 27, 1998,

the NRC staff notified GPUN of its plan

to incorporate GPUN’s schedule

commitment into a requirement by

issuance of an order and requested

consent from the Licensee. By letter

dated May 5, 1998, the Licensee

provided its consent to issuance of a

Confirmatory Order.

III

The Licensee’s commitment as set

forth in its letter of May 5, 1998, is

acceptable and is necessary for the NRC

to conclude that public health and

safety are reasonably assured. To

preclude any schedule slippage and to

assure public health and safety, the NRC

staff has determined that the Licensee’s

commitment in its May 5, 1998, letter be

confirmed by this Order. The Licensee

has agreed to this action. Based on the

above, and the Licensee’s consent, this

Order is immediately effective upon

issuance.

IV

Accordingly, pursuant to sections

103, 161b, 161i, 161o, 182, and 186 of

the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as

amended, and the Commission’s

regulations in 10 CFR 2.202 and 10 CFR

part 50, it is hereby ordered, effective

immediately, that:

GPUN shall complete final implementation

of Thermo-Lag 330–1 fire barrier corrective

actions at Three Mile Island Nuclear Station,

Unit No. 1 described in the GPUN submittals

to the NRC dated February 10, 1994,

December 5, 1994, July 7, 1995, August 16,

1996, November 5, 1996, December 31, 1996,

August 19, 1997, and November 23, 1997, by

December 31, 1999, excluding those

corrective actions which are the subject of

the pending exemption request dated

December 31, 1996, and supplemented by

letters dated July 31, 1997, September 8,

1997, and December 30, 1997. A schedule for

completion of any activity associated with

the items excluded will be developed

separately.

The Director, Office of Nuclear Reactor

Regulation, may relax or rescind, in

writing, any provisions of this

Confirmatory Order upon a showing by

the Licensee of good cause.

V

Any person adversely affected by this

Confirmatory Order, other than the

Licensee, may request a hearing within

20 days of its issuance. Where good

cause is shown, consideration will be

given to extending the time to request a

hearing. A request for extension of time

must be made in writing to the Director,

Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation,

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission,

Washington, DC 20555, and include a

statement of good cause for the

extension. Any request for a hearing

shall be submitted to the Secretary, U.S.

Nuclear Regulatory Commission,

Attention: Chief, Rulemaking and

Adjudications Staff, Washington, DC

20555. Copies of the hearing request

shall also be sent to the Director, Office

of Nuclear Reactor Regulation, U. S.

Nuclear Regulatory Commission,

Washington, DC 20555, to the Deputy

Assistant General Counsel for

Enforcement at the same address, to the

Regional Administrator, NRC Region I,

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission,

475 Allendale Rd., King of Prussia, PA

19406–1415, and to the Licensee. If such

a person requests a hearing, that person

shall set forth with particularity the

manner in which his/her interest is

adversely affected by this Order and

shall address criteria set forth in 10 CFR

2.714(d).

If a hearing is requested by a person

whose interest is adversely affected, the

Commission will issue an Order

designating the time and place of any

such hearing. If a hearing is held, the

issue to be considered at such hearing

shall be whether this Confirmatory

Order should be sustained.

In the absence of any request for

hearing, or written approval of an
Federal Register / Vol. 63, No. 107 /Thursday, June 4, 1998 / Notices 30519

extension of time in which to request a

hearing, the provisions specified in

Section IV above shall be final 20 days

from the date of this Order without

further order or proceedings. If an

extension of time for requesting a

hearing has been approved, the

provisions specified in Section IV shall

be final when the extension expires if a

hearing request has not been received.

An answer or a request for hearing shall

not stay the immediate effectiveness of

this Order.

Dated at Rockville, MD, this 22nd day of

May 1998.

For the Nuclear Regulatory Commission.

Samuel J. Collins,

Director, Office of Nuclear Reactor

Regulation.

[FR Doc. 98–14775 Filed 6–3–98; 8:45 am]

BILLING CODE 7590–01–P

NUCLEAR REGULATORY

COMMISSION

[Docket No. 50–461]

Illinois Power Co; Consideration of

Issuance of Amendment to Facility

Operating License, Proposed No

Significant Hazards Consideration

Determination, and Opportunity for a

Hearing

The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory

Commission (the Commission) is

considering issuance of an amendment

to Facility Operating License No. NPF–

62 issued to Illinois Power Company

(IP, or the licensee) for operation of the

Clinton Power Station (CPS) located in

DeWitt County, Illinois.

The proposed amendment concerns

operation of a new emergency reserve

auxiliary transformer (ERAT) to provide

power to the plant 4.16-kV busses from

the offsite 138-kV transmission network.

The new ERAT will have a larger

capacity and automatic load tapchanging (LTC) capability.

Before issuance of the proposed

license amendment, the Commission

will have made findings required by the

Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended

(the Act) and the Commission’s

regulations.

The Commission has made a

proposed determination that the

amendment request involves no

significant hazards consideration. Under

the Commission’s regulations in 10 CFR

50.92, this means that operation of the

facility in accordance with the proposed

amendment would not (1) involve a

significant increase in the probability or

consequences of an accident previously

evaluated; or (2) create the possibility of

a new or different kind of accident from

any accident previously evaluated; or

(3) involve a significant reduction in a

margin of safety. As required by 10 CFR

50.91(a), the licensee has provided its

analysis of the issue of no significant

hazards consideration, which is

presented below:

(1) Installation of the new ERAT with

automatic LTC capability (and increased

capacity) will support operability of the 138-

kV source for CPS, thus maintaining at least

one operable source of offsite electrical

power in accordance with Technical

Specification 3.8.2. The voltage support

provided by the new ERAT LTC will also

minimize the probability of a transfer to the

onsite emergency diesel generator(s) in the

event of high plant load (including a real or

inadvertent actuation of ESF [engineered

safety feature] systems). These positive

effects from the voltage regulation provided

by the ERAT LTC support operation of safety

systems required for decay heat removal and

maintaining the plant in a safe condition, as

well as may be required for mitigation of

accidents that could occur during plant

shutdown conditions.

At the same time, (and as further addressed

below) employment of the ERAT LTC

introduces the possibility of a new

malfunction that could cause plant

equipment important to safety to be subjected

to overvoltage. However, since the ERAT LTC

incorporates a primary and backup means of

preventing voltage extremes (high or low),

the potential for damage to plant equipment

(or an unnecessary trip of the undervoltage

relays) is low. The PRA [probabilistic risk

assessment] performed for this potential

overvoltage condition, under plant shutdown

conditions, showed that an event involving

overvoltage caused by LTC/LTC-controller

failure and which leads to equipment failure

and subsequent fuel damage, is not credible.

On the basis of the PRA evaluation, and in

consideration of the safety benefit associated

with the voltage support provided by the

ERAT LTC, IP believes that employment of

the ERAT LTC during plant shutdown

conditions has no significant adverse impact

to plant safety systems. Therefore, the

proposed does not involve a significant

increase in the probability or consequences

of any accident previously evaluated.

(2) In consideration of the potential

adverse impacts that the ERAT LTC may

have on plant systems, structures or

components, such impacts are primarily

confined to potential electrical faults or

abnormal conditions. With respect to

potential adverse electrical impacts, the

potential electrical failure modes or abnormal

conditions applicable to the ERAT LTC

mainly include the same failure modes or

conditions that applied to the ERAT as a

fixed-tap transformer, except for the potential

malfunction of the LTC controller that could

cause voltage to be run up or down to

excessively high or low values. As noted

previously, however, this potential is greatly

reduced by the backup controller provided

with the ERAT LTC. (For an undervoltage

condition, plant equipment would be

additionally protected by the plant safety bus

degraded voltage relays.) With respect to a

potential LTC malfunction that may cause an

overvoItage condition, further evaluation by

PRA (for plant shutdown conditions) has

shown that the probability of an event

involving an LTC malfunction that causes an

overvoltage condition leading to damage of

safety-related equipment and subsequent fuel

damage is 2 x 107 per year. This makes such

an event incredible. Further, the potential for

overvoltage from an LTC malfunction to lead

to a new or unanalyzed accident is reduced

by the plant being in a shutdown condition,

as previously described.

Thus, although the use of the ERAT LTC

introduces the possibility of a new

equipment malfunction not previously

evaluated, based on the above, it does not

introduce the possibility of a new or different

accident not previously evaluated.

(3) As noted previously, incorporation of

the ERAT LTC into the CPS auxiliary power

system will regulate plant bus voltage for the

138-kV offsite source. As such, the ERAT

LTC will compensate for reduced margin that

has occurred or may occur in the near term

(especially during peak summer load

demand), with respect to the difference

between the voltage required for plant safety

loads and the minimum expected offsite

voltage. The ERAT LTC also has a

significantly higher load capacity, than the

current ERAT, thus further enhancing the

capability and capacity of the 138-kV offsite

source. This increased margin also reduces

the probability of a transfer to the diesel

generator(s) (that are intended to be an

emergency electric power source) in the

event of high plant load with low offsite

source voltage.

Based on the above, and with respect to

voltage requirements for plant loads the

proposed ERAT replacement does not

involve a significant reduction in the margin

of safety.

The NRC staff has reviewed the

licensee’s analysis and, based on this

review, it appears that the three

standards of 10 CFR 50.92(c) are

satisfied. Therefore, the NRC staff

proposes to determine that the

amendment request involves no

significant hazards consideration.

The Commission is seeking public

comments on this proposed

determination. Any comments received

within 30 days of the date of publication

of this notice will be considered in

making any final determination.

Normally, the Commission will not

issue the amendment until the

expiration of the 30-day notice period.

However, should circumstances change

during the notice period such that

failure to act in a timely way would

result, for example, in derating or

shutdown of the facility, the

Commission may issue the license

amendment before the expiration of the

30-day notice period, provided that its

final determination is that the

amendment involves no significant

hazards consideration. The final

determination will consider all public