IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA

No. 16-2111

Filed January 24, 2018

IN RE THE MARRIAGE OF CATHY L. TIESKOETTER

AND MARK F. TIESKOETTER

Upon the Petition of

CATHY L. TIESKOETTER,

Petitioner-Appellee,

And Concerning

MARK F. TIESKOETTER,

Respondent-Appellant.

________________________________________________________________

Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Dubuque County, Monica L. Ackley, 

Judge.

Mark Tieskoetter appeals the economic provisions of his decree dissolving 

his marriage to Cathy Tieskoetter. AFFIRMED AS MODIFIED.

Stuart G. Hoover of Blair & Fitzsimmons, P.C., Dubuque, for appellant.

Jennifer A. Clemons-Conlon of Clemons, Walters, Conlon, Runde & Hiatt, 

L.L.P., Dubuque, for appellee.

Heard by Danilson, C.J., and Doyle and Mullins, JJ.
2

DOYLE, Judge.

Mark Tieskoetter appeals the economic provisions of his decree dissolving 

his marriage to Cathy Tieskoetter. Upon our de novo review, we affirm the district 

court’s ruling as modified.

I. Standard of Review.

Because the district court hears dissolution-of-marriage proceedings in 

equity, our review is de novo. See In re Marriage of Mauer, 874 N.W.2d 103, 106 

(Iowa 2016); see also Iowa Code § 598.3 (2016); Iowa R. App. P. 6.907. This 

requires examining the entire record and adjudicating the issue of the property 

distribution anew. See In re Marriage of McDermott, 827 N.W.2d 671, 676 (Iowa 

2013). Nevertheless, we give weight to the district court’s factual findings, 

especially with respect to the credibility of the witnesses. See id.; see also Iowa 

R. App. P. 6.904(3)(g). Ultimately, the ruling will not be disturbed unless there has 

been a failure to do equity. See Mauer, 874 N.W.2d at 106.

II. Background Facts and Proceedings.

Mark and Cathy were both born in 1954, and they married in 1975. They 

have one adult son. Both parties inherited sums of money during the marriage; 

Cathy inherited approximately $86,000 in the late 1990s and early 2000s, and 

Mark inherited approximately $282,000 in 2015. Some of Cathy’s inheritance was 

spent over the years on improvements to the marital home, refinancing, and gifts 

to Mark and her son.

In November 2015, Cathy filed a petition for dissolution of marriage. At that 

time, Cathy was working thirty-two hours a week as a nurse, with an income of 

approximately $51,000 per year. Mark was self-employed as a direct importer and 
3

contract manufacturer, which included purchasing and sales. Before selfemployment, Mark worked for a company as an importer and contract 

manufacturer, and he made approximately $65,000 in 2010. In 2011, he began 

building his own business while working full-time, earning a total income of $77,000 

in 2011 and $109,000 in 2012. Mark left his employment mid-2013, and he has 

continued to operate his own business since. Mark’s income was approximately 

$139,000 in 2013, $75,000 in 2014, and $100,000 in 2015.

Trial in the case commenced in August 2016. Cathy testified things sort of 

fell apart in April 2015. Mark told Cathy he was flying to Las Vegas for his sixtyfirst birthday for some rest and relaxation, alone. At that time, most of their money 

was commingled. Cathy learned the trip involved two airline tickets, and there 

were numerous expenses that looked like they were for more than one individual, 

including show tickets, two-person meals, and $2700 at a spa-type place. Cathy 

began looking into their finances and found numerous cash withdrawals from bank 

accounts, charges to credit cards, and other transfers of money that substantially 

changed over the years. For instance, the marital savings account showed 

numerous cash withdrawals over the years, and from December 2012 to 

December 2015 alone, there had been at least $25,797 withdrawn from that 

account of which she was unaware. When Cathy asked Mark about the 

withdrawals, he told her it “was none of [her] business, . . . [she] worried about it 

too much, and that [Mark] would let [her] know if [they] were ever in financial 

trouble.” Cathy testified there were also unusual charges on their credit-card 

statements, testifying that at least $36,000 of marital money was missing or spent 

without explanation from December 2012 to December 2015.
4

Cathy believed Mark had dissipated these assets, and she requested to be 

compensated for the dissipation. During discovery in the case, Cathy asked him 

about certain 2015 withdrawals. Cathy testified she learned from Mark’s answers 

that he had spent over $14,000 from their marital savings account to help someone 

she did not know “get out of [an] abusive situation.” Cathy testified that since she 

filed the dissolution petition, Mark had reimbursed the marital account $14,000 

from his inheritance account, but she and her attorney did not believe that $14,000 

figure accounted for everything that had been taken, including “the cash 

withdrawals that ke[pt] disappearing, or the trips and all that other stuff that’s on

the credit card.” Cathy believed Mark may have been hiding money.

Cathy also testified she believed Mark was minimizing his income to avoid 

spousal support. Mark’s financial affidavit, signed at the end of December 2015, 

reported his gross income was $140,000 per year. In his answers to 

interrogatories, signed and dated January 2016, Mark stated he expected “to have 

gross income [t]his year of approximately $139,000.” Nevertheless, at the time of 

trial, Mark projected his 2016 income would only be $80,000. Cathy requested 

Mark pay her $2800 per month in spousal support. She also requested Mark be 

required to maintain “the $550,000 death benefit policy that he currently has in 

place” and to contribute to her attorney fees.

Mark admitted he had been “helping out” his friend’s thirty-one-year-old 

daughter that lived in Wisconsin, and he denied they had a romantic relationship. 

He knew from a conversation with her mother that the young woman needed 

money, and he wanted to help her out. He testified he initially hired the young 

woman to do some work around his house and yard. He could not recall how much 
5

he paid her for the work, but he did not “think it was quite $5000.” Mark testified 

he paid the young woman “out of our household money, because [the work was] 

for the house.” This amount was in addition to the $14,000 he had spent and 

repaid to the marital savings account. Mark testified the $14,000 he spent was 

given to the young woman in cash and in gifts, and the gifts included payment of 

her rent and a deposit, furniture, clothes for her children, and a purchase from 

Coach. Mark testified he did not live with the young woman in Wisconsin, but he 

admitted he had signed her apartment’s lease and was “consistently paying the 

rent out of [his] inheritance.” Mark further testified he hired the young woman to 

work for his business and had paid her $6400 as a contract employee, and then 

brought her on as a full-time employee with a salary of $50,000 per year. He had 

paid her an additional $16,898.51 through 2016. He testified he believed “you’ve 

got to spend money to make money, and that’s what [he’s] doing with [the young 

woman] right now.” He still had approximately $172,000 left from his inheritance.

Regarding the cash withdrawals from the marital savings account, Mark 

testified that part of his job as a salesman required him to travel. Mark explained

that when he was on the road, he withdrew cash to have on hand in case of an 

emergency, which accounted for most of his withdrawals. Mark also testified some 

of the larger cash withdrawals went to pay the young woman’s mother for work she 

had done for him, of which Cathy was aware. Yet, Mark testified that he charged 

the majority of his business expenses to their credit card so he had documentation 

of the expenses.

Mark testified he was not minimizing his income in an effort to prevent an 

award of alimony to Cathy, but circumstances, such as a dock-workers strike and 
6

excess inventories had resulted in a decline in income, and he provided a letter 

from one of his clients generally supporting his explanation.1 He testified he 

believed his 2016 gross income would be under $100,000. His client stated in the 

letter that “2017 may be better but there are way too many variables to project with 

any certainty.” Mark also testified his business expenses had “gone up 

dramatically,” in part because he was “trying to broaden [his] customer base” and 

had hired the young woman to assist in that endeavor.

Mark admitted some of the items he listed on his personal monthly budget 

were, at least in part, written off as business expenses. He also admitted that in 

2015 he purchased a 2014 Kia Sorento with his inheritance money, titled in his 

and the young woman’s name, for the young woman to drive to use for business. 

He did not list the vehicle on his financial affidavit because he purchased it with his 

inheritance money and “didn’t think that was important.” He also did not claim the 

purchase as a business expense. 

Mark testified he had two term-life-insurance policies with zero cash value—

one with a benefit of $300,000 that expired in a year, and the other a benefit of 

$100,000 that expired in 2024. Mark testified that he paid $104 per month on the 

latter policy and $300 per month for the $300,000 policy, though his financial 

affidavit stated he paid $350 per month for life insurance. Mark testified that if he 

renewed the $300,000 policy when it expired, when he was age sixty-three, the 

 

1 Many of the issues stated in the letter occurred in 2015 and caused decreased sales in 

2016. That does not explain why Mark, at the end of 2015 and in early 2016, when he 

presumably knew of these issues, still projected his income would be $140,000.
7

premium would cost $23,000 per year. Mark testified he could not afford to pay 

for another policy.

Following the trial, the district court entered its decree dissolving the parties’ 

marriage and finding Cathy established Mark dissipated marital assets without her 

authorization. The court found:

The testimony is not believable that [Mark] returned all that he spent 

from the marital accounts by a deposit from his inheritance. He 

justifies all his conduct with the ability to use his inheritance to cure 

the infractions. Yet, he has no explanation for some of the things he 

has done . . . . The testimony also indicates money is in Wisconsin, 

but how much and where, the court cannot say. The Kia is just one 

example of this in light of the fact that he did not report it on his 

financial affidavit. Instead, the information was brought forth by 

[Cathy’s] investigation into his bank accounts and other financial 

records. The money used was not spent for any benefit of the 

marriage. The money was not spent for necessities. The money 

was not spent for legitimate household or business expenses. 

Instead, the money was spent [on] a variety of personal living 

expenses for a third party. The spending on [Mark’s] new employee 

seems reckless and extravagant given her history and the short time 

within which [Mark] has known this woman. But, as he indicated, he 

can throw his inheritance into the wind if he so choses.

The court ordered Mark to pay Cathy spousal support of $2000 per month until her 

death and to maintain a life insurance policy “in the amount of not less than the 

current aggregate of the policies insuring his life at the present,” so long as Mark’s 

alimony obligation existed. The court also ordered that the parties’ “rental property 

located on Jackson Street . . . be subject to a mortgage in [Cathy’s name] in the 

amount of $25,000 as her equitable share of the value of the property.” Based 

upon the court’s asset and debt distribution, the court ordered Mark to pay Cathy 

a lump-sum equalization payment of $26,786. Finally, the court ordered Mark to 

pay $7000 of Cathy’s trial attorney fees.
8

Each party subsequently filed an Iowa Rule of Civil Procedure 1.904(2) 

motion and resisted the other’s party’s motion. Before the district court ruled on 

the motions, Mark filed a notice of appeal. Cathy filed a motion for limited remand 

with the supreme court. In response, the supreme court stated in its order:

Ordinarily, the filing of an appeal by a party who has a pending 

motion to enlarge would result in the abandonment of that motion. 

See IBP, Inc. v. Al-Gharib, 604 N.W.2d 621, 628 (Iowa 2000); Recker 

v. Gustafson, 271 N.W.2d 738, 739 (Iowa 1978). However, the 

pendency of the appellee’s motion rendered the appellant’s appeal 

from the district court’s September 28, 2016, order interlocutory. See 

IBP, Inc., 604 N.W.2d at 628; Wolf v. Ely, 493 N.W.2d 846, 848 (Iowa 

1992).

Where a party has improperly sought review of a district 

court’s ruling by filing a notice of appeal rather than an application 

for interlocutory review, the case shall not be dismissed but shall 

proceed as though the proper form of review had been sought. Iowa

R. App. P. 6.108. This court treats the appellant’s notice of appeal 

as an application for interlocutory appeal, and denies the application.

The district court may rule on the parties’ motions to enlarge. 

This court does not retain jurisdiction and if either party wishes to 

appeal after the district court rules on its pending motion, the party 

must file a notice of appeal (or cross-appeal) as provided in appellate 

rules 6.101 and 6.102.

Thereafter, the district court entered its ruling granting in part and denying 

in part each party’s motion. Among other things, the court reduced the equalization 

payment to $21,596.50 to account for Mark’s personal tax obligation that the court

did not include in its initial accounting. The court ordered the parties to file 

amended state and federal income 2015 tax returns and awarded Cathy any funds 

received from those returns “as her share of the dissipation of marital assets that 

was found by the court,” and it ordered that Mark pay the attorney-fee award to 

Cathy with funds other than the tax-refund monies. The court affirmed its order in 

all other respects.
9

Mark filed a second notice of appeal. He argues the court erred in awarding 

Cathy alimony for life because the court incorrectly calculated his income, failed to 

consider Cathy’s income, ignored the parties’ expenses, ages, health, and a prior 

agreement between the parties. He also contends the court erred in requiring him 

to maintain a life insurance policy for Cathy’s benefit because his current policies 

are set to expire and the cost of replacing them at his age is prohibitive. He 

maintains the court erred in its distribution-of-marital-assets calculation, in finding 

he dissipated assets, and in awarding Cathy trial attorney fees. Cathy requests 

appellate attorney fees. We address Mark’s arguments, out of turn.

III. Discussion.

A. Dissipation of Marital Assets.

We begin with Mark’s challenge of the district court’s determination that he 

dissipated marital assets. “A court may generally consider a spouse’s dissipation 

or waste of marital assets prior to dissolution when making a property distribution.” 

In re Marriage of Kimbro, 826 N.W.2d 696, 700 (Iowa 2013). A spouse dissipates 

assets when they lose or dispose of assets that should have been in the marital 

property division at the time of the dissolution. See id. at 700-01. However, marital 

assets may be spent on “legitimate household and business expenses.” Id. at 701 

(citation omitted).

We apply a two-pronged test to claims of dissipation of assets. See id. 

First, “a court must decide ‘whether the alleged purpose of the expenditure is 

supported by the evidence.’” Id. (quoting In re Marriage of Fennelly, 737 N.W.2d 

97, 104 (Iowa 2007) (citations omitted)). To establish this prong, a spouse “must 

show a nexus between the payment of the expenses and the use of the marital 
10

assets at issue.” Id. The second prong asks “whether that purpose amounts to 

dissipation under the circumstances.” Fennelly, 737 N.W.2d at 104 (citation 

omitted). In addressing the second prong, courts look to the following factors:

(1) the proximity of the expenditure to the parties’ separation, (2) 

whether the expenditure was typical of expenditures made by the 

parties prior to the breakdown of the marriage, (3) whether the 

expenditure benefited the “joint” marital enterprise or was for the 

benefit of one spouse to the exclusion of the other, and (4) the need 

for, and the amount of, the expenditure.

Id. at 104-05 (citation omitted).

Ultimately, the issue comes down to the court’s credibility findings. The 

court expressly stated it did not believe Mark had actually “returned all that he 

spent from the marital accounts by a deposit from his inheritance,” as Mark 

claimed. The court did not believe Mark’s claims that the money he withdrew from 

the marital accounts were spent for legitimate business or household expenses. 

The court also believed Mark was hiding assets. Upon our de novo review, we 

find no reason in the record to disturb the court’s credibility findings.

Here, in this long marriage, Mark essentially controlled the parties’ money 

but for a few accounts Cathy held. Cathy was able to show there were substantial 

amounts of money withdrawn from their marital savings account from December 

2012 to December 2015—and potentially more over the years. She believed, 

based upon the parties’ bank and credit-card statements that at least $36,000 was 

missing from those years alone. Mark claimed that the withdrawn money was 

either used for home or business expenses or that he reimbursed their account for 

the withdrawals, but the only evidence he provided to support the claim was his 

own testimony. He did provide a list that he created of business expenses for 2014 
11

and 2015, but he did not show how he paid for the claimed expenses. In fact, he 

testified he actually charged the majority of his business expenses to the credit 

card, which would not account for the cash withdrawals. Mark also provided bank 

records showing he moved money around, including depositing a $14,500 check 

from his inheritance account into the parties’ marital account to reimburse the 

money he spent on the young woman in October and November 2015, but he did

not provide receipts or documentation showing any reimbursements to the account 

before that time. Ultimately, given the amounts of cash Mark has withdrawn over 

the years, along with his failure to disclose assets and his defensiveness in 

explaining how he spent money, we agree with the district court’s conclusion that 

he dissipated marital assets.

The court, in its rule 1.904(2) ruling expressly awarded Cathy any proceeds 

from the parties’ 2015 tax returns, which Mark estimated would be approximately 

$7400,2 as her share of the assets Mark had dissipated. Because this argument 

corresponds to Mark’s argument concerning the district court’s equitabledistribution calculation, we address it in that section below. We affirm in all other 

respects on the issue of dissipation.

B. Spousal Support.

“Whether spousal support is justified is dependent on the facts of each 

case.” In re Marriage of Shanks, 805 N.W.2d 175, 178 (Iowa Ct. App. 2011). 

Though not mandated, the district court may order spousal support be paid if it 

 

2

In her post-trial rule 1.904(2) motion, Cathy stated the amended 2015 returns had been 

filed but the expected refunds, which she estimated to be $7000, had not yet been 

received. Mark, in his rule 1.904(2) motion, anticipated the refunds to be $7596.
12

determines support payments are warranted after considering all of the following 

factors together:

a. The length of the marriage.

b. The age and physical and emotional health of the parties.

c. The distribution of property made pursuant to section 

598.21.

d. The educational level of each party at the time of marriage 

and at the time the action is commenced.

e. The earning capacity of the party seeking maintenance, 

including educational background, training, employment skills, work 

experience, length of absence from the job market, responsibilities 

for children under either an award of custody or physical care, and 

the time and expense necessary to acquire sufficient education or 

training to enable the party to find appropriate employment.

f. The feasibility of the party seeking maintenance becoming 

self-supporting at a standard of living reasonably comparable to that 

enjoyed during the marriage, and the length of time necessary to 

achieve this goal.

g. The tax consequences to each party.

. . . .

j. Other factors the court may determine to be relevant in an 

individual case.

Iowa Code § 598.21A(1); see also In re Marriage of Gust, 858 N.W.2d 402, 407-

08, (Iowa 2015); Shanks, 805 N.W.2d at 178. The trial court is “in the best position 

to balance the parties’ needs, and [appellate courts] should intervene . . . only 

where there is a failure to do equity.” Gust, 858 N.W.2d at 416. The Iowa Supreme 

Court has “also recognized that the court can consider an intentional dissipation of 

assets to avoid future support payments when it makes an award of alimony.” In 

re Marriage of Olson, 705 N.W.2d 312, 317 (Iowa 2005).

Here, the parties were married for forty years. The district court found 

Mark’s income was approximately $145,000 per year. Mark asserts the record 

does not support that finding, but by Mark’s own account, he initially believed his 

income would be around that amount. Moreover, Mark made almost $140,000 in 
13

gross receipts in 2015 and was able to pay the young woman almost $8000 in 

wages. He was so sure of his business’s income he employed the young woman 

at a salary of $50,000 per year. Given Mark’s self-employed status and lack of 

credibility, we believe the evidence supports a finding that Mark’s income was 

approximately $145,000 per year.

But even if we disagreed with the income figure, we would still find the 

district court’s support award to be equitable. Cathy’s income was $51,000 per 

year. Based upon Cathy’s age, educational background, training, employment 

skills, and work experience, there is no reason to believe her earnings will ever 

increase such that she will become capable of earning enough to maintain a 

comparable standard of living to that she enjoyed during her marriage to Mark—

even considering her present income along with additional education or working 

more hours. See Mauer, 874 N.W.2d at 111. We agree Cathy is entitled to lifetime 

spousal support. See id. The court ordered Mark to pay Cathy $2000 per month, 

which equals $24,000 per year. This amount plus Cathy’s $51,000 annual income 

puts her at an income of approximately $75,000 per year. Mark’s projected income 

on his answer to interrogatories was $139,000. That amount less $24,000 still puts 

his total income above $100,000 per year. And, if we use Mark’s 2015 income of 

$100,000, his income still surpasses Cathy’s by $1000. Considering all of the 

relevant factors stated above, along with the considerable latitude we accord the 

trial court in its spousal support award and credibility and other fact-findings, see 

Gust, 858 N.W.2d at 406-07, we conclude the spousal support award of $2000 per 

month was equitable and should not be disturbed. See In re Marriage of Anliker, 

694 N.W.2d 535, 541 (Iowa 2005). But we expressly modify the first sentence of 
14

the alimony provision in the decree to state: “Respondent shall pay the sum of 

$2,000.00 per month commencing October 1, 2016, and continuing until 

Petitioner’s or Respondent’s death.” See Gust, 858 N.W.2d at 415 (noting 

“traditional spousal support is ordinarily unlimited in duration except” for certain 

circumstances, like the “death of either party”).

C. Life Insurance.

Mark argues the district court should not have required him to secure his 

spousal support obligations with life insurance, arguing that the cost of a $400,000 

policy at his age is unduly burdensome. As noted above, the permanent spousal 

support award generally terminates upon the death of either party. See id. at 412; 

In re Marriage of Lytle, 475 N.W.2d 11, 12 (Iowa Ct. App. 1991); In re Marriage of 

Hayne, 334 N.W.2d 347, 352 (Iowa Ct. App. 1983). However, a requirement to 

maintain life insurance to secure spousal support is permissible. See Olson, 705 

N.W.2d at 318; In re Marriage of Weinberger, 507 N.W.2d 733, 736 (Iowa Ct. App. 

1993); see also Stackhouse v. Russell, 447 N.W.2d 124, 125 (Iowa 1989) (“A 

provision in a dissolution of marriage decree to maintain life insurance is 

enforceable.”). If the party requesting the security has demonstrated a need and 

the cost of such a policy would not be unduly burdensome, the court may order the 

security of a life insurance policy. See Olson, 705 N.W.2d at 318; see also In re 

Marriage of Debler, 459 N.W.2d 267, 270 (Iowa 1990); In re Marriage of Muow, 

561 N.W.2d 100, 102 (Iowa Ct. App. 1997).

Upon our de novo review, we find Cathy demonstrated a need for continued 

support. However, Cathy did not demonstrate the cost of such a policy in the 

amount ordered by the district court would not be unduly burdensome. Yet, we 
15

are skeptical of Mark’s claim that a $300,000 policy would cost him $23,000 per 

year, even given his age. Neither party provided an independent estimate of the 

cost of a new policy. Based upon Mark’s testimony that he pays $104 a month for 

a $100,000 policy that does not expire until 2024, we believe a policy of this amount 

would be adequate to secure the support award without being unduly burdensome. 

Accordingly, we further modify the district court’s alimony provision in the parties’ 

decree—specifically, the second sentence—to state: “While this obligation 

continues to be paid, the Respondent shall maintain a $100,000 life insurance 

policy with Petitioner as the named beneficiary so as long as the Respondent has 

an obligation to pay alimony under the decree.”

D. Distribution of Assets and Trial Attorney’s Fees.

“The partners in the marriage are entitled to a just and equitable share of 

the property accumulated through their joint efforts,” In re Marriage of Hazen, 778 

N.W.2d 55, 59 (Iowa Ct. App. 2009), and Iowa Code section 598.21(5) requires 

marital property be divided equitably in dissolution-of-marriage cases. See also In 

re Marriage of Hansen, 733 N.W.2d 683, 702 (Iowa 2007). This first requires a 

determination of which property is subject to division, and then, considering the 

factors set forth in section 598.21(5), that property must be divided equitably. See 

Fennelly, 737 N.W.2d at 102.

Nevertheless, it “is important to remember marriage does not come with a 

ledger.” Id. at 103-04. In determining how to equitably divide the property, an 

“equitable division is not necessarily an equal division.” Hansen, 733 N.W.2d at 

703. Though “it is generally recognized that equality is often most equitable,” 

Fennelly, 737 N.W.2d at 102, “[e]quitable distribution depends upon the 
16

circumstances of each case,” Hansen, 733 N.W.2d at 703. Consequently, 

precedent is of little value. See McDermott, 827 N.W.2d at 682. “[K]eeping in mind 

there are no hard and fast rules governing economic issues in dissolution actions,” 

we must apply the factors contained in section 598.21(5) in reaching an equitable 

division. Id. Notably, we will not disturb a court’s valuation if it is within the range 

of permissible evidence. See Hansen, 733 N.W.2d at 703. Similarly, “we give the 

district court considerable discretion in determining whether it should award fees 

at the district court level.” In re Marriage of Michael, 839 N.W.2d 630, 639 (Iowa 

2013). An abuse of discretion occurs when the district court exercises its discretion 

“on grounds or for reasons that are clearly untenable or to an extent clearly 

unreasonable.” State v. Nelson, 791 N.W.2d 414, 419 (Iowa 2010); Graber v. City 

of Ankeny, 616 N.W.2d 633, 638 (Iowa 2000).

Mark argues on appeal that the additional $25,000 mortgage on the rental 

property was in error, given that the property was already accounted for in the 

assets part of the court’s distribution table, a point Mark raised in his posttrial rule 

1.904(2) motion. The district court stated in its ruling that the parties’ pretrial 

stipulation had listed the Jackson Street “house as a separate asset of the MFT 

Property Investments with a value of $81,466,” and the court noted the money for 

the house’s purchase came from Mark’s 401K that was accumulated throughout 

the parties’ marriage. The court further explained it valued Mark’s company, MFT 

Property Investments, “at the cash value in the bank according to the parties’ 

representation. The marital aspect was [then] separated out and the value was 

divided according to the financial history of the purchase.” Based on this 

reasoning, the court concluded “the value of the equity is properly divided.”
17

Our own review of the evidence leads us to a different conclusion than the 

district court, even considering the weight afforded to the court’s credibility findings 

and the permissible-range-of-evidence standard for valuations. See In re Marriage 

of Hoak, 364 N.W.2d 185, 192-93 (Iowa 1985). The only evidence presented was 

that the Jackson Street house’s value was included in the $81,466.80 value of MFT 

Property Investments and related accounts described on the pretrial stipulation, 

the Provident Trust and Self-directed IRA. The court’s reasons for the additional 

valuation of $50,000 was not within the range of permissible evidence. Therefore, 

we must strike the award of the additional $25,000 mortgage to Cathy.

Mark also argues the court erred in awarding Cathy a separate award of 

$7000 for trial attorney fees and in awarding Cathy the proceeds of the parties’ 

2015 tax refund. Mark argues Cathy’s personal loan, which the court properly 

allocated between the parties as a liability, was a loan to pay for her trial attorney

fees. He asserts the $7000 award to Cathy in addition to the loan’s inclusion in 

the liability calculation “has caused [him] to pay the same debt to Cathy twice.” He 

further argues the court’s rule 1.904(2) ruling awarding Cathy all of the parties’ tax 

refund essentially required him to pay a third time for Cathy’s trial attorney fees. 

We do not find the court abused its discretion.

Concerning the tax refund, Mark listed it as an asset on his proposed 

resolution, but the district court did not address it in its decree. Mark then asked 

the court to address it in its rule 1.904(2) ruling, and he requested the refund be 

given to Cathy to cover the court’s $7000 trial-attorney-fee award. Mark did not 

argue that the $7000 award was not proper because the court had included the 

loan in the liability calculation. Consequently, Mark failed to preserve the issue for 
18

our review. See In re Marriage of Okland, 699 N.W.2d 260, 270 (Iowa 2005) (“To 

preserve error on the issue, Timothy was obligated to seek a ruling on the issue.”).

But even if Mark had preserved the issue, we would not find an abuse of 

discretion. The court in its rule 1.904(2) ruling expressly awarded the tax refund 

to Cathy as a separate award to compensate her for Mark’s dissipation of assets, 

and that amount was well within the permissible range of evidence. Additionally, 

the attorney-fee affidavit submitted by Cathy’s trial counsel showed a total bill at 

that time of $15,469.06. Clearly inclusion of the loan in the liabilities calculation 

and awarding a separate amount of $7000 in trial attorney fees was within the 

permissible range of evidence, considering the court’s findings that Mark 

dissipated assets, failed to disclose assets to Cathy, was likely hiding more assets,

and caused Cathy’s trial attorney to spend time investigating the parties’ finances. 

Here, the court’s separate attorney-fee and 2015 tax-refund awards were within 

the permissible range of evidence, and we find no abuse of discretion.

E. Appellate Attorney Fees.

Finally, Cathy requests appellate attorney fees. Whether to award appellate 

attorney fees is within our discretion. See Spiker v. Spiker, 708 N.W.2d 347, 360 

(Iowa 2006). An award of appellate attorney fees depends on three factors: (1) 

the needs of the party making the request, (2) the ability of the other party to pay, 

and (3) whether the party making the request was obligated to defend the trial 

court’s decision on appeal. Id. After considering the appropriate factors, along 

with Mark’s success on at least one issue, we determine no appellate attorney fees

should be awarded.
19

IV. Conclusion.

Based upon the foregoing, we modify the district court’s decree as follows. 

On page 10 of 10 of the district court’s decree, in the paragraph titled “ALIMONY,” 

the first two sentences are modified to state:

Respondent shall pay the sum of $2,000.00 per month commencing 

October 1, 2016, and continuing until Petitioner’s or Respondent’s 

death. While this obligation continues to be paid, the Respondent 

shall maintain a $100,000 life insurance policy with Petitioner as the 

named beneficiary as long as the Respondent has an obligation to 

pay alimony under the decree.

On the same page, we strike from the decree the paragraph titled “RENTAL 

PROPERTY” in its entirety. We affirm in all other respects.

AFFIRMED AS MODIFIED.