[Cite as State v. Agee, 2021-Ohio-489.]

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO 

TENTH APPELLATE DISTRICT 

State of Ohio, : 

 Plaintiff-Appellee, : 

 No. 19AP-12 

v. : (C.P.C. No. 16CR-1176)

Roshawn L. Agee, : (REGULAR CALENDAR) 

 Defendant-Appellant. : 

 

D E C I S I O N 

Rendered on February 23, 2021 

 

On brief: [G. Gary Tyack], Prosecuting Attorney, and 

Michael P. Walton, for appellee. Argued: Michael P. 

Walton. 

On brief: Soroka and Associates, LLC, Roger Soroka, and 

Joshua Bedtelyon, for appellant. Argued: Joshua 

Bedtelyon. 

 

APPEAL from the Franklin County Court of Common Pleas 

KLATT, J. 

{¶ 1} Defendant-appellant, Roshawn L. Agee, appeals from a judgment of the 

Franklin County Court of Common Pleas finding him guilty, pursuant to jury verdict, of two 

counts of felony murder with associated firearm specifications; guilty, pursuant to bench 

verdict, of one count of having weapons while under disability; and determining him to be 

a repeat violent offender. Finding no merit to the appeal, we affirm. 

{¶ 2} By indictment filed March 3, 2016, plaintiff-appellee, State of Ohio, charged 

appellant with two counts of aggravated murder in violation of R.C. 2903.01(A), 

unspecified felonies, two counts of felony murder in violation of R.C. 2903.02(B), 
No. 19AP-12 2 

unspecified felonies, and one count of having weapons while under disability in violation of 

R.C. 2923.13, a third-degree felony. The aggravated murder and felony murder charges 

carried three-year firearm specifications in violation of R.C. 2941.145(A), repeat violent 

offender specifications in violation of R.C. 2941.149(A), and criminal gang activity 

specifications in violation of R.C. 2941.142(A). The charges arose from the shooting deaths 

of Robert Bass and Cherod Houchins on July 28, 2014.1 

{¶ 3} Appellant waived his right to a jury trial and elected to be tried by the court 

on the having weapons while under disability count. The aggravated murder and felony 

murder counts, along with the firearm and gang specifications, were tried to a jury. 

Appellant was tried jointly with co-defendant Sophia Childs.2 The evidence presented at 

trial relevant to this appeal establishes the following. 

{¶ 4} In July 2014, four drug "trap" houses operated in the Stevens Avenue/Schultz 

Avenue area on the near west side Columbus. Because the drug trade in the area was quite 

profitable, there was significant competition among the trap houses. In addition, due to 

the illegal and lucrative nature of the drug business, those operating the trap houses had 

armed security at the doors; only persons known to security were permitted to enter and 

purchase drugs. 

{¶ 5} The two trap houses central to the present case were located within two 

blocks of each other on Stevens Avenue. The trap house located at 189-R Stevens Avenue 

("189-R Stevens") was operated by appellant and Childs, also known as "Fee." In addition 

to their drug trafficking operation, Childs and appellant were in a personal relationship. It 

is undisputed that at the time of the events at issue, appellant was imprisoned at Noble 

Correctional Institution. Childs' associate, Clarence Pierce, also known as "Chicago," 

sometimes acted as security for the trap house. (Tr. at 459-60.) The second trap house, 

located at 85 Stevens Avenue ("85 Stevens"), was rented by Calvin Clark and operated by 

Dwayne Lewis, also known as "D," and Robert Earl Wilson, also known as "Boo Face." 

Clark, D, and Boo Face are all bald, African American men. 

 

1 Appellant's first trial, conducted in January 2018, resulted in a hung jury on the aggravated murder and 

felony murder charges. 

 

2 Childs was indicted for two counts of aggravated murder, two counts of felony murder, and one count of 

having weapons while under disability. The aggravated murder and felony murder counts included firearm 

specifications. 
No. 19AP-12 3 

{¶ 6} On July 26, 2014, Catherine Dudley ("Dudley"), an admitted long-time drug 

user, was at 85 Stevens purchasing drugs from D. Childs entered the house and began 

arguing with D about drug sales. At one point, Childs said she "didn't give a fuck" and would 

"shut this motherfucker down and shoot up * * * this house." Id. at 473. Dudley returned 

to 85 Stevens the next day and saw that the front window was broken and a brick was sitting 

on the living room floor. 

{¶ 7} On July 28, 2014, Dudley spent the entire day using drugs at both 189-R 

Stevens and 85 Stevens. At approximately 9:00 p.m., she walked from 189-R Stevens to 85 

Stevens. A person inside the house opened the back door for her; she had "no idea" who 

did so. Id. at 607. Bass and Houchins were in the kitchen. Dudley requested drugs from 

Bass, but before he could provide them, two men, both carrying guns, entered the kitchen 

through the back door. Dudley did not know the men, did not open the door for them, did 

not see anyone else open the door for them, and did not think the men forced their way 

inside. One of the men wore a red shirt and immediately shot Bass in the head; the other 

attempted to fire his gun but it jammed. Dudley exited through the back door and ran 

toward 189-R Stevens. She heard multiple gunshots as she ran away. 

{¶ 8} Dudley knocked on the door at 189-R Stevens; no one answered. She then 

walked down the alley behind 189-R Stevens to a nearby garage and told the two men sitting 

inside that she had just witnessed Bass get shot. Approximately 20 minutes after the 

shooting, she saw Childs driving an SUV toward 189-R Stevens. Childs parked behind 189-

R Stevens and exited the vehicle along with the man in the red shirt Dudley had seen shoot 

Bass. Shortly thereafter, Childs and the man carried several items from 189-R Stevens and 

loaded them into the SUV. 

{¶ 9} Dudley was arrested the next day on an outstanding misdemeanor warrant. 

She agreed to tell the police what she had seen at the two Stevens Avenue trap houses on 

July 28, 2014 in exchange for lifting the warrant. She did not tell the police that she had 

witnessed an argument between Childs and D on July 26, 2014 because she did not think it 

was related to the shooting. She did, however, tell the police that she thought "Chicago and 

them * * * robbed the guys." Id. at 604. At trial, she explained that by "Chicago and them" 

she meant Chicago and Childs; however, she conceded that she did not identify Childs by 

name when questioned by the police. She further admitted that she did not see either 
No. 19AP-12 4 

Chicago or Childs at 85 Stevens at the time of the murders. On August 1, 2014, the police 

showed Dudley photo arrays of possible suspects. She identified the man who had shot Bass 

and the man whose gun had jammed. She told the police she did not know their names. 

{¶ 10} On July 28, 2014, LaToya Galloway ("Galloway"), an admitted long-time drug 

user with a lengthy criminal record, was using drugs at 189-R Stevens and overheard Childs 

speaking on the phone to a person Galloway assumed was appellant. During the call, Childs 

said "Okay. Okay. I'm going to shut the damn spot down." Id. at 843. Childs then left in 

an SUV. Approximately 30 minutes later, Galloway heard gunshots outside. Childs 

returned to 189-R Stevens five to six minutes after the shots were fired. Galloway observed 

a "young dude" wearing a "red hoodie" with Childs. Id. at 847. Galloway described the man 

as "paranoid. He was sweating a lot, walking around, peeking out the window." Id. at 848. 

Childs and Galloway left 189-R Stevens for a brief time. When they returned, the man in 

the red hoodie was still inside. Shortly thereafter, the three of them left in Childs' SUV. 

During the drive, Childs and the man engaged in a heated conversation during which Childs 

said, "You're stupid. I told you the bald-headed mother - - you just shot the wrong 

motherfuckers. I told you to shoot the bald-headed dude. * * * You didn't kill the right 

person." Id. at 855-56. After Childs dropped the man off, she and Galloway returned to 

189-R Stevens. 

{¶ 11} The next day, Galloway confronted Childs about the shooting at 85 Stevens. 

Galloway was angry at Childs because two "innocent kids" had been killed. Childs 

responded, "I don't give a fuck. They shot the wrong person." Id. at 858. 

{¶ 12} Galloway did not contact the police after the murders because she did not feel 

it was her business to do so. She first spoke to the police in July 2017 as a favor to Boo Face 

(with whom she had a sexual relationship) regarding his involvement in a completely 

separate criminal incident. She was unaware that she would be asked about the July 28, 

2014 incident until the police began questioning her about it. She agreed to provide 

information only if she would not be required to testify in court, as she did not want to be 

labeled "a snitch" and was concerned about "retaliation" for testifying. Id. at 821, 823. She 

was subpoenaed to testify, however, and did so, albeit unwillingly. 

{¶ 13} On cross-examination, Galloway was impeached by testimony she provided 

in appellant's first trial, i.e., that Childs did not return to 189-R Stevens for 30 to 45 minutes 
No. 19AP-12 5 

after the shots were fired. She also acknowledged her testimony in the first trial that she 

told the police that she was at 85 Stevens during the shooting, that two "young dudes" 

opened the door because they were "thirsty for money," and that the shooters began 

shooting before they entered the house. She explained that she told police that "story" 

because it was what she had heard "on the street." Id. at 892-93. 

{¶ 14} Teresa Bass ("Ms. Bass"), an admitted long-time drug user, frequently 

purchased and used drugs at 85 Stevens and was aware that Childs sold drugs on Stevens 

Avenue. Late in the afternoon on July 28, 2014, she was with Calvin and others at 85 

Stevens. She heard and observed Childs arguing with Calvin by the back door. An African 

American man was with Childs. Childs told Calvin that "if she wanted to, she could shut 

this house down, * * * and that she could shoot it up." Id. at 915. 

{¶ 15} A few hours later, Ms. Bass saw Bass and Houchins in the kitchen of 85 

Stevens acting as security and controlling drug sales. She and Calvin went into the 

bedroom. Dudley entered the bedroom to retrieve a scale Bass needed to measure drugs. 

After Dudley left, Ms. Bass heard gunshots coming from the kitchen. She and Calvin 

entered the kitchen and saw Bass and Houchins on the floor; both had sustained gunshot 

wounds. Dudley was not in the kitchen. Ms. Bass later provided a statement to the police 

reporting what she had heard Childs say to Calvin. She acknowledged she was not 

completely honest with the police because she was afraid of repercussions for her family. 

She further acknowledged that a warrant issued for her arrest in a prior, unrelated 

misdemeanor drug case had been lifted in exchange for her trial testimony; however, this 

circumstance did not influence her testimony. 

{¶ 16} Tina Legg ("Legg"), an admitted long-time drug user with a lengthy criminal 

record, regularly purchased drugs from the trap houses on Stevens Avenue. On July 26, 

2014, Legg witnessed a confrontation between Childs, Calvin, and D pertaining to the men's 

refusal to allow Childs to sell drugs out of 85 Stevens. Childs was "pissed off, mad, [and] 

angry" about the situation. Id. at 1123. Late in the evening on July 28, 2014, Legg and 

Chicago were standing at an intersection near a lighted parking lot on West Broad Street 

not far from Stevens Avenue. Childs, driving a dark SUV, stopped and asked Chicago if he 

was "ready to go shoot the house up and take over the block," which Legg interpreted to 

mean taking over the drug trade at 85 Stevens by force. Id. at 1129. Legg did not know if 
No. 19AP-12 6 

anyone else was in the SUV. Thereafter, Childs drove away; Chicago remained with Legg. 

Five to ten minutes later, Legg saw several emergency vehicles drive toward Stevens 

Avenue. She then observed Childs' SUV drive past where she was standing; she could not 

see who was inside the vehicle. 

{¶ 17} Columbus Police Officer Thomas Pierson was dispatched to 85 Stevens at 

9:21 p.m. on July 28, 2014. According to Pierson, the radio dispatch indicated that two men 

had been shot and that two potential suspects, both African American males, one wearing 

tan pants, had been seen running northbound from the scene. Upon arrival, a man named 

Calvin let Pierson inside the house. Pierson observed two men with gunshot wounds on the 

kitchen floor. One of the men was positioned very near the closed back door; the other was 

slumped against a wall. Pierson saw no signs of forced entry through the back door. 

{¶ 18} Columbus Police Detective Suzanne Nissley of the Crime Scene Search Unit 

("CSSU") responded to 85 Stevens after the murders. There were no signs of forced entry 

into the house and there was no evidence of a burglary or robbery. No DNA or fingerprint 

evidence was collected. 

{¶ 19} Columbus Police Detective Timothy Huston works in the Central Intelligence 

Unit ("CIU"), also known as the "gang unit." Id. at 1051. Pursuant to his investigation 

following the murders on July 28, 2014, Huston developed two suspects–Antonio Rogers, 

also known as "Mook," and Dionte Agee, also known as "D Money." Id. at 1059. D Money 

was appellant's brother; Mook was a known associate of appellant and was part of the drug 

operation appellant ran on the west side of Columbus. On July 31, 2014, three days after 

the 85 Stevens murders, D Money and his girlfriend were fatally shot. Huston, aware that 

appellant was in prison and based on a belief that appellant had been apprised of his 

brother's murder, obtained a subpoena for prison call records made by appellant between 

July 18 and August 1, 2014. Pursuant to that subpoena, the prison provided Huston a digital 

recording of the calls. At that time, Huston did not consider either appellant or Childs as 

suspects in the murders. 

{¶ 20} Huston assigned a patrol officer, Wesley Williams, to review and create a 

summary of the calls. Williams had little training or experience in gang matters and/or 

trap house operations and was unfamiliar with street and/or gang language. The summary 

Williams provided Huston indicated that he overheard a conversation between Childs and 
No. 19AP-12 7 

appellant planning the double murder at 85 Stevens. Thereafter, Huston listened to the 

recorded prison calls and determined that "[i]t sounded like somebody was planning a 

murder, planning ahead basically, or actually planning to go in there and kill D." Id. at 

1065. Huston put the calls relevant to the July 28, 2014 murders on a disk and submitted 

it to the lead detective in the case. 

{¶ 21} At the time of the murders, Columbus Police Officer Robert Vass worked in 

the CIU division.3 Vass was familiar with the drug trade on Stevens Avenue, including the 

trap houses at 85 Stevens and 189-R Stevens. Pursuant to his CIU investigations, Vass had 

numerous encounters with appellant. 

{¶ 22} Following the July 28, 2014 murders, Vass reviewed Williams' summary of 

appellant's prison phone calls. Vass acknowledged that because Williams was not familiar 

with gang and/or street terminology, the summary he prepared was not completely 

accurate. In contrast, through his work with CIU, Vass was extremely knowledgeable about 

gang and drug trafficking matters, including gang and street lexicon. Accordingly, Vass 

listened to the recordings of the prison calls and corrected Williams' summary in 

accordance with his more accurate interpretations.4 Because the recordings were difficult 

to understand, Vass utilized headphones and listened to the recordings multiple times to 

determine, to the best of his ability, what was being said. From his previous interactions 

with appellant, Vass was able to recognize appellant's voice on the recordings. Vass noted 

that during the calls, appellant sometimes referred to himself as "Skeeno," a nickname he 

utilized both on the street and on his social media accounts. 

{¶ 23} Vass's translation and interpretation of the prison calls establishes the 

following.5 At 7:38 p.m. on July 28, 2014, appellant called Childs on her cell phone. Childs 

reported the argument she had with D at 85 Stevens, which resulted in her later "bust[ing] 

 

3 At the time of trial, Vass was working as a SWAT officer. 

4 Vass identified State's Ex. W12, the summary of the recorded prison calls, and referred to it during his 

testimony. However, State's Ex. W12 was not offered for admission by the state. Id. at 1292 (identified); Id.

at 1550 (not offered). Vass also identified State's Ex. W13, the transcripts of the recorded prison calls, and 

referenced them during his testimony. However, the trial court sustained appellant's objection to the 

admission of State's Ex. W13. Id. at 1296 (identified); Id. at 1556 (objection sustained). Accordingly, neither 

State's Ex. W12 nor State's Ex. W13 are part of the appellate record. 

 

5 State's Ex. B2, the audio recording of appellant's prison calls, was played for the jury during Vass's 

testimony. State's Ex. B2 was admitted into evidence and is part of the appellate record. 
No. 19AP-12 8 

out" a window. Id. at 1302. Childs told appellant that D nearly assaulted her during the 

argument. Appellant responded that he "needs to call his dudes6 real quick." Id. at 1303. 

Appellant further averred that his "little brother" was waiting for him to call so that Childs 

could "go get him and he can blow over there with you." Id. at 1305. Appellant stated that 

his "little brother" was "Team AB," and he's - - if he's in it for me, he's in it for you." Id. at 

1308. Vass explained that "AB" was a "gang term" for appellant. Id.

{¶ 24} Childs responded, "[Y]eah, I was mad as fuck. He really wanted to hit me and 

everything * * * though I ain't going to let him * * * get all up in my face." Id. at 1306. Childs 

also reported that Chicago had been afraid to accompany her to Calvin's house because D 

had stated he was going to "fuck Chicago up." Id. at 1310. Childs later said, "Yeah, that was 

all silent, like that's D's house for real," to which appellant responded, "I would have turned 

all the way up over there, man." Id. at 1311. According to Vass, the phrase "turned up" 

meant "to get violent, go crazy, tear the place up." Id. Childs stated that Calvin was mad at 

her for breaking the window and that she might have to move if she did not pay for it. 

Appellant averred that "Chicago should have went over there with you and went on 20." Id.

at 1313. Vass interpreted this to mean that Chicago should have "go[ne] off big time." Id.

{¶ 25} Later in the call, appellant told Childs to call 614-813-1911, ask for "Rob," and 

tell him "Skeeno [is] on the phone for him." Id. at 1314. There were some difficulties with 

Childs getting Rob on the phone, so appellant had her initiate a three-way call with him. 

During the three-way call, appellant initially conversed with an unidentified man, who told 

appellant that he was playing basketball and that "[w]hen I'm done shooting basketball, 

you know what I'm gonna do? I'm gonna shoot dudes, that's what I do." Id. at 1317. 

Appellant then asked for Rob and was told he was on the east side of the city. Appellant 

told the man to call Childs and that she would come and get him. 

{¶ 26} At 7:56 p.m. on July 28, 2014, appellant called 614-813-1911 and averred to 

the unidentified man who answered, "I need you and my B to fly out west with my bitch 

real quick, man." Id. at 1319. He continued, "And this is going - - and this is after you do 

that dude, like, you go right to the next street * * * and get your bag off." According to Vass, 

"bag off" meant "[g]et a bag of dope." Id. at 1320. Appellant then said, "Out west on 

Stevens, it's a geek, bro." Id. at 1321. Vass translated "geek" to mean a drug addict. 

 

6 Vass substituted the term "dude" for racial slurs utilized by appellant. 
No. 19AP-12 9 

Appellant continued, "Do shit on Stevens. * * * [W]hen somebody do open the door * * *, 

it's this bald-headed geek motherfucker. But she gonna let him know * * * that she ain't no 

tuck her tail in and she ain't about to run to the car or none of that. She's going to be there 

right with you." Id. at 1321-22. 

{¶ 27} Appellant then told the man, "if you're in good graces with the queen, then 

she's going to get you even more dope to sell so you can make more money." Id. at 1322. 

He instructed the man to take his "bang" with him. Id. at 1323. Vass testified that "bang" 

is a street term for a gun. Id. Appellant then stated he was going to hang up so he could 

call Childs and "hook up with you." Id. at 1324. 

{¶ 28} At 8:06 p.m. on July 28, 2014, appellant called Childs and reported, "My 

young dude man, he in the car with my other young dude. * * * Rob will be more or less like 

the muscle * * * after he do what he do." Id. at 1325. Childs responded, "Yeah, I don't think 

D is there, but his son is there." Id. at 1326. The two also discussed the fact that Boo Face 

was not at 85 Stevens. Appellant stated, "I just got off the phone with the young dude * * *. 

He ridin' around with absolutely nothin' to do * * * and he's out on bond. So I'm like, listen, 

bro, I need you to * * * do something for me. And he like, oh, shit, bro, I got the strap on 

me." Id. at 1327. According to Vass, "strap" is a street name for a gun. Later in the call, 

Childs said, "And Calvin, he had to get that done because it's his house," to which appellant 

responded, "Well, after tonight, it won't be nobody's house." Id. at 1328. Childs responded, 

"[w]ell bro, we need all the money anyway, so fuck them." Id. 

{¶ 29} Appellant told Childs he wanted Rob to stay with her. "Rob is my 

motherfucking left hand. * * * You can trust him though, babe, for sure. He ain't nothing 

like no other dude from around my way * * *. But we about to use these two young dudes. 

I need you to go get Rob for sure. I need you to call." Id. at 1329. Childs responded, "I am, 

babe. I'm going to get him as soon as I get * * * on the street * * *." Id. at 1330. Appellant 

told Childs to park on Schultz Avenue (one street over from Stevens) and "then walk 

through the cut," which, according to Vass, meant "between the houses." Id. Appellant 

averred, "[W]e're gonna make all this happen real fast, man, 'cause the motherfucker has 

got to know that, for every action, there is a reaction * * *." He also told Childs that the man 

would "have his bang on him." Id. at 1331. Appellant told Childs "I'm trying to be in the 

car with you." Id. at 1333. Appellant directed Childs where to pick up the men and then 
No. 19AP-12 10 

said, "I ain't about to hang up yet, I want to make sure you all get in the car together." Id. 

Appellant told Childs he would call her later and that she should "[b]e careful." Id. at 1334. 

{¶ 30} At 10:14 p.m. on July 28, 2014, appellant called Childs and asked her 

"[w]hat'd you get accomplished?" Id. at 1335. She responded that she would see appellant 

on her next visit. Appellant then asked, "Did they go over there?" Id. After some hesitation, 

Childs responded, "I'll talk to you." Id. Appellant then said, "Just say yes or no. That's all 

you gotta say." Id. Childs responded, "No, they did not, no." Id. Later during the call, 

appellant said, "I'm gonna kick D's ass when I get out. Don't worry about it * * *. " Id. at 

1337. Childs responded, "I don't even want to talk about them." Id. Later in the call, Childs 

said, "I wish you could see the news though." Id. at 1340. Appellant stated, "I know. What's 

on the news? What happened? * * * Somebody get killed?" Id. at 1341. Childs replied, "I'll 

tell you when I visit." Id. Appellant then asked "Did somebody get robbed?" Id. at 1342. 

Childs responded, "Babe, no." Id.

{¶ 31} Columbus Police Detective James Howe, a digital forensics expert, analyzed 

phone records associated with Childs' cell phone number, appellant's prison personal 

identification number, and the 614-813-1911 cell phone number. The 614-813-1911 number 

was linked to a TracFone wireless company; accordingly, Howe could not determine the 

identity of the person associated with that number. 

{¶ 32} Howe also performed a historical cell-site analysis of Childs' cell phone and 

the cell phone associated with the 614-813-1911 number. That analysis revealed that both 

cell phones "pinged" on cell phone towers in the "general location" of 85 Stevens in the hour 

preceding and following the murders on July 28, 2014. Id. at 1453-54. 

{¶ 33} On the evidence before it, the jury returned verdicts finding appellant guilty 

of the felony murder charges with the firearm specifications, but not guilty of the 

aggravated murder charges and all the gang specifications.7 The trial court later found 

appellant guilty of having weapons while under disability8 and determined appellant to be 

 

7 The jury acquitted Childs of the two aggravated murder counts but was unable to reach a unanimous 

verdict as to the two felony murder counts. Accordingly, the trial court declared a mistrial as to those 

counts. 

8 The trial court also found Childs guilty of having weapons under disability. 
No. 19AP-12 11 

a repeat violent offender. The trial court sentenced appellant to an aggregate prison term 

of 27 years to life. 

{¶ 34} In a timely appeal, appellant asserts the following two assignments of error 

for our review: 

[I.] Appellant's conviction was based on insufficient evidence. 

[II.] Appellant's conviction was against the manifest weight 

of the evidence. 

{¶ 35} Appellant's first and second assignments of error are interrelated and will be 

considered together. Appellant contends that his convictions for felony murder and having 

weapons while under disability were not supported by sufficient evidence and were against 

the manifest weight of the evidence. We disagree. 

{¶ 36} The legal concepts of sufficiency of the evidence and weight of the evidence 

are both quantitatively and qualitatively different. State v. Thompkins, 78 Ohio St.3d 380 

(1997), paragraph two of the syllabus. "An appellate court's function when reviewing the 

sufficiency of the evidence to support a criminal conviction is to examine the evidence 

admitted at trial to determine whether such evidence, if believed, would convince the 

average mind of the defendant's guilt beyond a reasonable doubt." State v. Jenks, 61 Ohio 

St.3d 259 (1991), paragraph two of the syllabus. "The relevant inquiry is whether, after 

viewing the evidence in a light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact 

could have found the essential elements of the crime proven beyond a reasonable doubt." 

Id., following Jackson v. Virgina, 443 U.S. 307 (1979). 

{¶ 37} Whether the evidence is legally sufficient to support a criminal conviction is 

a question of law, not fact. Thompkins at 386. "Indeed, in determining the sufficiency of 

the evidence, an appellate court must give 'full play to the responsibility of the trier of fact 

fairly to resolve conflicts in the testimony, to weigh the evidence, and to draw reasonable 

inferences from basic facts to ultimate facts.' " State v. Parks, 10th Dist. No. 09AP-810,

2010-Ohio-2105, ¶ 7, quoting Jackson at 319. "Consequently, the weight of the evidence 

and the credibility of the witnesses are issues primarily determined by the trier of fact." Id., 

citing State v. Yarbrough, 95 Ohio St.3d 227, 2002-Ohio-2126, ¶ 79. "A verdict will not be 

disturbed unless, after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, 
No. 19AP-12 12 

it is apparent that reasonable minds could not reach the conclusion reached by the trier 

of fact." Id., citing State v. Treesh, 90 Ohio St.3d 460, 484 (2001). 

{¶ 38} In contrast, a manifest weight of the evidence claim requires a different 

analysis. "The weight of the evidence concerns the inclination of the greater amount of 

credible evidence offered in a trial to support one side of the issue rather than the other." 

State v. Brindley, 10th Dist. No. 01AP-926, 2002-Ohio-2425, ¶ 35, citing State v. Gray,

10th Dist. No. 99AP-666 (Mar. 28, 2000); State v. Chandler, 10th Dist. No. 05AP-415, 

2006-Ohio-2070, ¶ 8. When presented with a challenge to the manifest weight of the 

evidence, an appellate court " 'review[s] the entire record, weighs the evidence and all 

reasonable inferences, considers the credibility of witnesses and determines whether in 

resolving conflicts in the evidence, the jury clearly lost its way and created such a manifest 

miscarriage of justice that the conviction must be reversed and a new trial ordered.' " 

Thompkins at 387, quoting State v. Martin, 20 Ohio App.3d 172, 175 (1stDist.1983). An 

appellate court should reserve reversal of a conviction as being against the manifest 

weight of the evidence for only the most " 'exceptional case in which the evidence weighs 

heavily against the conviction.' " Id. 

{¶ 39} Although sufficiency and manifest weight are different legal concepts, 

manifest weight may subsume sufficiency in conducting the analysis, i.e., a finding that a 

conviction is supported by the manifest weight of the evidence necessarily includes a 

finding of sufficiency. State v. Braxton, 10th Dist. No. 04AP-725, 2005-Ohio-2198, ¶ 15, 

citing State v. Roberts, 9th Dist. No. 96CA006462 (Sept. 17, 1997). "[T]hus, a 

determination that a conviction is supported by the weight of the evidence will also be 

dispositive of the issue of sufficiency." Id. Accordingly, we must first examine whether 

appellant's convictions are supported by the manifest weight of the evidence. State v. 

Sowell, 10th Dist. No. 06AP-443, 2008-Ohio-3285, ¶ 89. 

{¶ 40} In this case, appellant was prosecuted for felony murder under a theory of 

complicity. The elements of felony murder are set forth in R.C. 2903.02(B), which states 

in relevant part that "[n]o person shall cause the death of another as a proximate result 

of the offender's committing or attempting to commit an offense of violence that is a 

felony of the first or second degree." The predicate offense of violence charged in the 

indictment is felonious assault pursuant to R.C. 2903.11. R.C. 2903.11(A)(2) provides in 
No. 19AP-12 13 

pertinent part that "[n]o person shall knowingly * * * [c]ause or attempt to cause physical 

harm to another * * * by means of a deadly weapon." A person acts knowingly, regardless 

of purpose, when he is aware that his conduct will probably cause a certain result or will 

probably be of a certain nature. A person has knowledge of circumstances when he is 

aware that such circumstances probably exist. R.C. 2901.22(B). It is undisputed that Bass 

and Houchins suffered fatal gunshot wounds. 

{¶ 41} Ohio's complicity statute, R.C. 2923.03, provides in pertinent part that 

"[n]o person, acting with the kind of culpability required for the commission of the 

offense, shall * * * [a]id or abet another in committing the offense." R.C. 2923.03(A)(2). 

When an individual acts to aid or abet a principal in the commission of an offense, the 

individual and principal are equally guilty and the individual is prosecuted and punished 

as if he were a principal offender. R.C. 2923.03(F). The statute further states that "[i]t is 

no defense to a charge under this section that no person with whom the accused was in 

complicity has been convicted as a principal offender." R.C. 2923.03(B). 

{¶ 42} To prove complicity by aiding and abetting under R.C. 2923.02(A)(2), the 

evidence must demonstrate that the defendant "supported, assisted, encouraged, 

cooperated with, advised, or incited the principal in the commission of the crime, and that 

the defendant shared the criminal intent of the principal." State v. Johnson, 93 Ohio 

St.3d 240 (2001), syllabus. Such intent may be inferred from the circumstances 

surrounding the crime. Id. " '[P]articipation in criminal intent may be inferred from 

presence, companionship and conduct before and after the offense is committed.' " Id. at 

245, quoting State v. Pruett, 28 Ohio App.2d 29, 34 (4th Dist.1971). A common purpose 

among persons to commit a crime need not be shown by positive evidence but may be 

inferred from circumstances surrounding the act and from the defendant's subsequent 

conduct. State v. Gonzalez, 10th Dist. No. 10AP-628, 2011-Ohio-1193, ¶ 25, citing Pruett. 

Further, "[t]the identity of the principal is not an element that the state must prove to 

establish the offense of complicity by aiding and abetting pursuant to R.C. 

2923.03(A)(2)." In re T.K., 109 Ohio St.3d 512, 2006-Ohio-3056, paragraph one of the 

syllabus. 

{¶ 43} Moreover, "when a person sets in motion a 'sequence of events, the 

foreseeable consequences of which were known or should have been known to him at the 
No. 19AP-12 14 

time, he is criminally liable for the direct, proximate and inevitable consequences of death 

resulting from his original act.' " State v. Hubbard, 8th Dist. No. 83389, 2004-Ohio5204, ¶ 40, quoting State v. Williams, 67 Ohio App.3d 677, 683 (8th Dist.1990). "It is not 

necessary that the accused be in a position to foresee the precise consequence of [his] 

conduct; only that the consequences be foreseeable in the sense that what actually 

transpired was natural and logical in that it was within the scope of the risk created by 

[his] conduct." Id., citing State v. Losey, 23 Ohio App.3d 93, 95-96 (10th Dist.1985). 

{¶ 44} Here, competent, credible evidence presented at trial permitted a 

reasonable jury to conclude that appellant was complicit in the murders of Bass and 

Houchins. Appellant and Childs operated a trap house at 189-R Stevens that was in 

competition for drug sales with the trap house operated by Calvin, D, and Boo Face at 85 

Stevens. Two days before the murders, Childs argued with D about drug sales and 

threatened to "shoot up" 85 Stevens. During a 7:38 p.m. phone call on the night of the 

murders, Childs told appellant about the argument with D and averred that he had nearly 

assaulted her. Appellant indicated that he would have gotten violent with D had he been 

present. Appellant told Childs that he was going to call an associate and inform him that 

Childs was going to pick him up and take him to 85 Stevens. Appellant also directed 

Childs to initiate a three-way call with 614-813-1911; during that call, appellant told the 

man who answered to call Childs. 

{¶ 45} A few minutes later, at 7:56 p.m., appellant called the 614-813-1911 number 

and told the man who answered that he needed him to accompany Childs and "do shit" 

on Stevens Avenue. Appellant told the man that at least one of the occupants of 85 

Stevens was "bald-headed." As noted above, those involved in operating the trap house 

at 85 Stevens, i.e., Calvin, D, and Boo Face, were all bald. Appellant directed the 

individual to bring a firearm with him. Appellant told the man that if he accomplished 

the task, he would be in Childs' "good graces," who would then provide him more drugs 

to sell so he could make more money. Appellant then told the man that Childs would get 

in touch with him. 

{¶ 46} Soon after that call ended, appellant called Childs and reported what he had 

directed the man to do. When Childs mentioned Calvin's house, appellant responded that 

"after tonight, it won't be nobody's house." Appellant further averred that D had to know 
No. 19AP-12 15 

that "for every action, there is a reaction." Appellant also told Childs that the men she 

was to pick up would have guns on them. He directed Childs where to pick up the men, 

to park on Schultz Avenue, and to walk to 85 Stevens between the houses. Appellant 

referred to the men as "Team AB" and averred that they were "in it" for both him and 

Childs. He told Childs that he "wanted to be in the car" with her and that he did not want 

to hang up until he was sure she and the men were all in the car together. It is undisputed 

that the shootings at 85 Stevens occurred within an hour and a half of this phone call, at 

approximately 9:20 p.m. 

{¶ 47} The jury reasonably could conclude that this evidence established that 

appellant "supported, assisted, encouraged, cooperated with, advised, or incited the 

principal in the commission of the crime, and that the defendant shared the criminal 

intent of the principal." Johnson, 93 Ohio St.3d 240 (2001), syllabus. As observed by the 

state, appellant's statements in the three phone calls preceding the murders indicate that 

he was angry at those operating the trap house at 85 Stevens and sent his associates there 

to ensure that those individuals would no longer be selling drugs from that location. 

{¶ 48} Indeed, appellant set in motion the sequence of events that led to the deaths 

of Bass and Houchins. Even if appellant did not specifically direct the men to murder 

Bass and Houchins, or could not foresee the murders as the precise consequences of his 

actions, the murders were foreseeable in the sense that what actually transpired was the 

natural and logical result of appellant's actions in enlisting the men to accompany Childs 

to the location she had expressed a desire to "shoot up" and directing them to take 

firearms with them. 

{¶ 49} Appellant sets forth several arguments challenging the manifest weight of 

the evidence underlying his convictions. Appellant first contends that the jury was not 

required to accept as true the incredible, that is, that he was "somehow able to convince 

other individuals to murder on his behalf despite being confined to prison with no ability 

to exert such influence." (Appellant's Brief at 35.) Appellant asserts that the evidence of 

his communications with the shooters "is devoid of any rationale of why someone may 

accept this risk on his behalf." There is no offer of profit, physical threats, or any other 

potential consequences for noncompliance." Id. at 36. Appellant's contention is belied 

by his 7:56 p.m. phone call on July 28, 2014, wherein appellant told his associate that if 
No. 19AP-12 16 

he did what he was being asked to do, he would be in Childs' "good graces," resulting in 

him receiving more drugs to sell. Appellant's statement demonstrates that he was offering 

his associate something of value in exchange for solving the problem appellant had with 

those operating the competing trap house at 85 Stevens. 

{¶ 50} Appellant also contends that appellant's acquittal on the aggravated murder 

charges and the gang specifications confirms that appellant was not involved in the 

murders. We disagree. The jury reasonably could conclude that even if the evidence did 

not establish beyond a reasonable doubt that appellant "purposely and with prior 

calculation and design" caused the deaths of the victims pursuant to R.C. 2903.01(A) via 

criminal gang activity, the evidence established that appellant aided and abetted the 

principals, whether gang members or simply associates of appellant, in committing 

felonious assault with a deadly weapon which resulted in the victims' deaths. 

{¶ 51} Appellant further argues that his convictions were against the manifest 

weight of the evidence because the prison phone calls establish that both appellant and 

Childs knew that neither D nor Boo Face would be present at 85 Stevens. Again, we 

disagree. The jury reasonably could conclude that appellant aided and abetted the 

principals in committing felonious assault at 85 Stevens in order to shut down the 

competition, regardless of whether D and/or Boo Face were present. 

{¶ 52} Appellant also challenges as incredible and unreliable the testimony offered 

by Dudley, Galloway, Ms. Bass, and Legg. Appellant argues that these witnesses lacked 

credibility and that their testimony was unreliable based upon their history of drug usage 

and their admitted drug use during the timeframe encompassing the murders. Appellant 

also contends that their testimony was impeached, internally and externally 

contradictory, internally inconsistent, or self-serving. 

{¶ 53} The jury was well-aware of these witnesses' drug usage, lifestyles, criminal 

past, and reasons for testifying. Further, the jury heard the testimony appellant now 

challenges, which, we note, was subject to cross-examination. A decision on the 

credibility of the witnesses made by a factfinder, such as a jury, is given great deference 

by a reviewing court. State v. Covington, 10th Dist. No. 02AP-245, 2002-Ohio-7037, 

¶ 28. The weight to be given the evidence, as well as the credibility of the witnesses, are 

issues which are primarily to be determined by the trier of fact. State v. Hairston, 10th 
No. 19AP-12 17 

Dist. No. 05AP-366, 2006-Ohio-1644, ¶ 20, citing State v. DeHass, 10 Ohio St.2d 230 

(1967). The jury is in the best position to take into account inconsistences in witness 

testimony, along with the witnesses' manner and demeanor, and determine whether the 

witnesses' testimony is credible. State v. Chandler, 10th Dist. No. 05AP-415, 2006-Ohio2070, ¶ 9, citing State v. Williams, 10th Dist. No. 02AP-35, 2002-Ohio-4503, ¶ 58. A 

jury, as the finder of fact and the sole judge of the weight of the evidence and the credibility 

of the witnesses, may believe or disbelieve all, part, or none of a witness's testimony. State 

v. Antill, 176 Ohio St. 61, 67 (1964); State v. Jackson, 10th Dist. No. 01AP-973, 2002-

Ohio-1257. "While the jury may take note of the inconsistencies and resolve or discount 

them accordingly, * * * such inconsistencies do not render [a] defendant's conviction 

against the manifest weight of the evidence." State v. Nivens, 10th Dist. No. 95APA09-

1236 (May 28, 1996). 

{¶ 54} Appellant also contends that his convictions were against the manifest weight 

of the evidence because the prosecution failed to prove who committed the murders. 

Appellant acknowledges that the prosecution was not required to prove the identities of the 

principals to establish his guilt under a theory of complicity. However, appellant contends 

that the prosecution relied upon the impermissible stacking of inferences to tie him to the 

principals. 

{¶ 55} "The rule prohibiting the stacking of one inference upon another prohibits 

the drawing of one inference solely and entirely from another inference, where that 

inference is unsupported by any additional facts or inferences drawn from other facts." 

(Citations omitted.) State v. Ingram, 10th Dist. No. 11AP-1124, 2012-Ohio-4075, ¶ 23. 

"Although inferences cannot be built upon inferences, several conclusions may be drawn 

from the same set of facts." (Citations omitted.) Id. "Because reasonable inferences 

drawn from the evidence are an essential element of the deductive reasoning process by 

which most successful claims are proven, the rule against stacking inferences must be 

strictly limited to inferences drawn exclusively from other inferences." (Citations 

omitted.) Id. 

{¶ 56} Appellant claims that the jury was required to stack the following three 

inferences to find him guilty of complicity: (1) that he "ordered, or gave instruction to his 

co-defendant and unknown assailants to commit the crime of felonious assault or murder," 
No. 19AP-12 18 

(2) that the "unknown shooters acted in complicity with Appellant or under the Appellant's 

direction, and (3) that he "either aided and abetted the princip[al] offenders." (Appellant's 

Brief at 19-20.) These are not three separate inferences stacked upon one another; rather, 

there is one single inference, phrased by appellant in three different ways. The single 

inference, that appellant aided and abetted the principals in committing felony murder, is 

a conclusion that can be drawn from the evidence presented, particularly the prison calls 

wherein appellant communicated to the principals that he wanted them to arm themselves 

and travel to 85 Stevens. 

{¶ 57} Appellant also contends that his liability for murder via a theory of complicity 

"flowed through Childs['] involvement in the alleged offen[s]e and was directly tied to a 

theory of complicity with Childs." Id. at 39. According to appellant, the jury's inability to 

reach a verdict as to Childs' guilt rendered his conviction against the manifest weight of the 

evidence. Indeed, appellant asserts that "Ms. Childs also being found guilty of murder is 

the only possible way the State's presented theory holds up for certainty that Mr. Agee was 

guilty of these offenses." Id. at 39-40. We disagree. Although the evidence demonstrates 

that Childs was involved in the events leading to the murders, appellant's liability via 

complicity was independent from that of Childs. The evidence demonstrates that appellant 

spoke directly to at least one of the principals during the 7:38 p.m. call with Childs and then 

called that person directly at 8:06 p.m., without Childs' involvement. In both calls, 

appellant urged the principals to act. Accordingly, the failure to convict Childs did not, ipso 

facto, render appellant's conviction against the manifest weight of the evidence. 

{¶ 58} Further, even assuming that the verdicts finding appellant guilty and 

acquitting Childs were inconsistent, inconsistent verdicts between co-defendants does not 

constitute a sufficient reason for reversing a conviction. State v. Hill, 8th Dist. No. 99819, 

2014-Ohio-387, ¶ 33, citing State v. Eppard, 6th Dist. No. CL 05-1279, 2007-Ohio-2257, 

¶ 16. 

{¶ 59} In light of the evidence presented at trial, we cannot say that the jury clearly 

lost its way in finding appellant guilty of two counts of felony murder. We re-emphasize 

that the weight of the evidence and the credibility of the witnesses are matters primarily for 

the jury. DeHass, 10 Ohio St.2d 230 (1967), paragraph one of the syllabus. The jury heard 

the testimony provided by the witnesses familiar with what transpired both in the days 
No. 19AP-12 19 

preceding the murders and at the actual time of the murders. The jury also heard the audio 

recordings of the prison calls, along with Vass's translations and interpretations of those 

calls. Following evaluation of this evidence, the jury reasonably could conclude that 

appellant aided or abetted the actions of the individuals who fired deadly weapons inside 

the 85 Stevens trap house, and that such actions caused the deaths of Bass and Houchins. 

Accordingly, we conclude that appellant's felony murder convictions are not against the 

manifest weight of the evidence. 

{¶ 60} We now consider appellant's manifest weight/sufficiency arguments 

regarding his conviction for having weapons under disability. R.C. 2923.13(A)(2) 

provides, in relevant part, that "[u]nless relieved from disability under operation of law 

or legal process, no person shall knowingly acquire, have, carry, or use any firearm * * * 

if * * * [t]he person * * * has been convicted of any felony offense of violence." The parties 

stipulated that appellant had a previous disqualifying conviction. A stipulation that a 

defendant has a prior felony offense of violence conviction "relieve[s] the state of its 

burden of proving the prior conviction element of the weapons-under-disability charge." 

State v. McLaughlin, 12th Dist. No. CA2019-02-002, 2020-Ohio-969, ¶ 56. 

{¶ 61} In finding appellant guilty of having weapons under disability, the trial 

court stated: 

I find * * * each defendant guilty of * * * having weapons under 

disability. I believe the evidence indicated beyond a 

reasonable doubt that they both were involved in the 

conspiracy to commit murder and that the co-conspirators 

who carried out the homicides were armed with firearms. 

And based on the case law that the State provided the Court 

about three or four weeks ago, the defendants can be guilty of 

weapons under disability based on their own disabilities, plus 

the possession of the firearm by other principal offenders. 

Even though we don't know who they are, we know a firearm 

was used. And, as I said, I believe beyond a reasonable doubt 

that they conspired with the people who used the firearms. So 

the finding is guilty on the weapons under disability for both 

of them. 

(Tr. at 1874-75.) 
No. 19AP-12 20 

{¶ 62} Appellant first contends that R.C. 2923.01, the conspiracy statute, "does not 

allow the prosecution of a Weapons Under Disability charge or a Felonious Assault charge 

through a theory of conspiracy." (Appellant's Brief at 29.) Appellant's conspiracy 

argument is misplaced. As with the felony murder prosecution, appellant was prosecuted 

for having weapons under disability under a theory of complicity, not conspiracy. 

Although the trial court, after finding appellant guilty, referenced a "conspiracy," the 

sentencing entry clearly states that appellant was found guilty of having weapons while 

under disability in violation of R.C. 2923.13, not conspiracy in violation of R.C. 2923.01. 

A court speaks through its journal and not mere oral pronouncements. State v. Hampton,

134 Ohio St.3d 447, 2012-Ohio-5688, ¶ 15. 

{¶ 63} Appellant further contends that the evidence fails to support the trial court's 

finding of guilt because "[t]here was no testimony offered that Appellant ever possessed 

a gun on the date in question, or even that he had constructive possession of any firearm 

on the date in question." (Appellant's Brief at 29.) It is undisputed that appellant was in 

prison at the time of the murders; thus, he did not acquire, carry, or use a firearm. 

Accordingly, the issue resolves to whether appellant knowingly "had" a firearm. 

{¶ 64} This court discussed this issue in State v. Ridley, 10th Dist. No. 03AP-1204, 

2005-Ohio-333: 

In order to "have" a firearm, one must either actually or 

constructively possess it. State v. Hardy (1978), 60 Ohio App. 

2d 325, 327, 397 N.E.2d 773; State v. Messer (1995), 107 Ohio 

App. 3d 51, 56, 667 N.E.2d 1022. "Constructive possession 

exists when an individual exercises dominion and control over 

an object, even though that object may not be within his 

immediate physical possession." State v. Wolery (1976), 46 

Ohio St. 2d 316, 329, 348 N.E.2d 351 * * *. Constructive 

possession may also be achieved by means of an agent. Hardy, 

at 327; U.S. v. Clemis (C.A.6, 1993), 11 F.3d 597 * * * 

(constructive possession of a firearm exists when a defendant 

knowingly has the power and intention at any given time to 

exercise dominion and control over a firearm, either directly or 

through others). Moreover, we recognize that constructive 

possession of a weapon, even absent actual physical 

possession, may be established by a totality of evidence 

establishing an accomplice relationship between the physical 

possessor and his or her accomplice. State v. McConnell 

(Oct. 13, 1983), Cuyahoga App. No. 45294, 1983 Ohio App. 

LEXIS 13756. 
No. 19AP-12 21 

Id. at ¶ 18. 

{¶ 65} In State v. Dalmida, 1st Dist. No. C-140517, 2015-Ohio-4995, the court held 

that an accomplice can be convicted of having weapons under disability without holding 

the firearm if that accomplice aided and abetted the person who actually possessed and 

brandished the firearm. Id. at ¶ 16. "The accomplice can have constructive possession of 

the firearm by exercising dominion and control through another." Id. The court further 

held that a nonshooting accomplice can be convicted for having weapons under disability 

based on that accomplice's disability, not the disability of the shooter. Id. In other words, 

an accomplice can constructively possess a firearm by exercising dominion and control over 

another who does possess the firearm. Id. 

{¶ 66} Recently, the Sixth District Court of Appeals affirmed a defendant's 

conviction for having weapons under disability in violation of R.C. 2923.13(A)(2), finding 

that while he was in prison, he constructively possessed a weapon found in his girlfriend's 

home. State v. Brooks, 6th Dist. No. WD-19-077, 2020-Ohio-6648. During prison calls 

with his girlfriend, Brooks directed her to put his firearm in the safe he kept in her house. 

A few days later, the police executed a search warrant at the girlfriend's residence and found 

the firearm. At trial, Brooks stipulated that he was under a qualifying disability and was 

prohibited from possessing a firearm. 

{¶ 67} Due to the stipulation, the court found the only relevant question was 

whether Brooks "had" the firearm while he was in prison and the firearm was with his 

girlfriend. Id. at ¶ 11. The court concluded that "[a]lthough the gun was not within [Brooks] 

immediate physical possession as of April 13, 2018 [when it was discovered pursuant to the 

search warrant], a reasonable fact finder could conclude that [Brooks] exercised dominion 

and control over the gun as of that date so as to regain actual possession of the gun upon 

his release from jail, and therefore possessed the gun beyond a reasonable doubt." Id. at 

¶ 14. 

{¶ 68} As we explained above, appellant's convictions for felony murder were not 

against the manifest weight of the evidence because the evidence established that 

appellant aided and abetted those who actually possessed and fired the weapon. 

Although appellant was in prison and it was his associates who actually used a firearm to 

commit the murders, the phone calls initiated by appellant establish that appellant 
No. 19AP-12 22 

directed those associates to take firearms with them to 85 Stevens. Even absent 

appellant's physical possession of the firearm and physical presence at the crime scene, 

appellant constructively possessed the firearm through those that physically possessed it. 

In other words, appellant constructively possessed a firearm by exercising dominion and 

control over those who did possess the firearm. Ridley; Dalmida; Brooks. 

{¶ 69} Moreover, we note that the jury, in rendering its guilty verdicts on the felony 

murder counts, approved the accompanying firearm specifications, finding that appellant 

"act[ed] with another who had a firearm on or about his person or under his control while 

committing the offense and did display and/or brandish and/or indicate that he did 

possess the firearm and/or used the firearm to facilitate the offense." (Tr. at 1828.) "[T]he 

Ohio Supreme Court has held that [an accused] is subject to a sentencing enhancement 

on a firearm specification regardless of whether he was the principal or an unarmed 

accomplice." State v. Humphries, 8th Dist. No. 99924, 2014-Ohio-1230, ¶ 18, citing State 

v. Chapman, 21 Ohio St.3d 41, 42 (1986). "In such a case, the actions of the principal are 

imputed to the accomplice, and the accomplice may be found to have committed every 

element of the offense committed by the principal, including possession of the weapon." 

Id., citing State v. Frost, 164 Ohio App.3d 61, 67, 2005-Ohio-5510 (2d Dist). Thus, the 

jury's finding that the principals "had" a firearm on or about their persons or under their 

control while committing the offenses may be imputed to appellant for purposes of the 

sentencing enhancement on the firearm specification and is consistent with the trial 

court's finding of guilt on having weapons under disability based upon "the possession of 

a firearm by other principal offenders." (Tr. at 1874.) 

{¶ 70} For the foregoing reasons, we conclude that there was competent, credible 

evidence supporting the trial court's finding of guilt for having weapons while under 

disability, and his conviction for that offense was not against the manifest weight of the 

evidence. 

{¶ 71} Our determination that appellant's convictions were not against the manifest 

weight of the evidence is dispositive of appellant's claim that his convictions were not 

supported by sufficient evidence. Braxton, 10th Dist. No. 04AP-725, 2005-Ohio-2198, ¶ 15. 

Accordingly, appellant's first and second assignments of error are overruled. 
No. 19AP-12 23 

{¶ 72} Having overruled appellant's first and second assignments of error, we 

hereby affirm the judgment of the Franklin County Court of Common Pleas. 

Judgment affirmed.

BROWN and BEATTY BLUNT, JJ., concur.