[Cite as Clifton v. Blanchester, 131 Ohio St.3d 287, 2012-Ohio-780.] 

CLIFTON, APPELLANT, v. VILLAGE OF BLANCHESTER, APPELLEE. 

[Cite as Clifton v. Blanchester, 131 Ohio St.3d 287, 2012-Ohio-780.] 

Appropriation—Zoning—Regulatory taking—Standing of owner of property 

outside territory of zoning authority—Inverse condemnation. 

(No. 2010-1196—Submitted September 6, 2011—Decided March 1, 2012.) 

APPEAL from the Court of Appeals for Clinton County, 

No. CA2009-07-009, 2010-Ohio-2309. 

__________________ 

SYLLABUS OF THE COURT

A property owner lacks standing to bring a regulatory-taking claim against a 

municipality when the affected property is outside the municipality’s 

corporate limits. 

__________________ 

LUNDBERG STRATTON, J. 

I. Introduction 

{¶ 1} The issue before the court is whether a property owner has 

standing to compel a government entity to initiate appropriation proceedings for 

an alleged regulatory taking when the affected property lies outside the limits of 

the government entity. Because we hold that a property owner does not have 

standing to bring such a claim, we affirm the judgment of the court of appeals. 

II. Facts and Procedural History 

{¶ 2} J&M Precision Machining, Inc. (“J&M”) owns 23 acres of 

property in Clinton and Warren Counties. Robert Clifton, appellant, testified that 

prior to 1989, approximately two acres of J&M’s property was zoned “roadside 

business” and contained a house and barn. Clifton also testified that J&M had 

operated a machine shop on its property since the 1970s. 
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{¶ 3} In 1993, Clifton purchased approximately 99 acres of property that 

is contiguous to J&M’s property. Clifton testified that his property is zoned for 

agricultural and residential use. Clifton has farmed this property since he 

purchased it in 1993 and has usually made a profit in doing so. 

{¶ 4} In 1997, Clifton sold approximately two acres to J&M pursuant to 

a contract, which indicated that J&M would use the property for drainage for its 

factory operation. 

{¶ 5} Clifton testified that in 1998, Clinton County rezoned eight acres 

of J&M’s 23 acres to “business industrial,” which included the two acres that had 

previously been zoned “roadside business.” Clifton testified that the operation of 

the machine shop made no noticeable noise. 

{¶ 6} In 2002, appellee, the village of Blanchester, annexed J&M’s 

entire 23-acre parcel and rezoned all 23 acres for “general industrial” use. 

Because Clifton’s property is not within the village’s corporate limits, the 

rezoning did not apply to his 97-acre parcel. 

{¶ 7} On March 29, 2002, Clifton filed a complaint and notice of an 

administrative appeal regarding the rezoning of J&M’s property. Clifton alleged 

that the rezoning of J&M’s property was unconstitutional and that the rezoning 

resulted in a taking of his property. The court dismissed Clifton’s administrative 

appeal. 

{¶ 8} The village filed a motion for summary judgment as to Clifton’s 

remaining claims, which the court granted in part and denied in part. The trial 

court found that Clifton had not presented evidence that the rezoning of J&M’s 

property was unconstitutional and granted summary judgment to the village on 

this issue. However, the court also concluded that Clifton had raised a genuine 

issue of fact as to whether the rezoning resulted in a taking of his property and 

denied the village summary judgment on that issue. Subsequently, Clifton 

voluntarily dismissed his complaint. 
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{¶ 9} On April 3, 2006, Clifton refiled a complaint alleging that the 

rezoning of J&M’s property had resulted in a regulatory taking of his property 

without just compensation. Specifically, the complaint alleged that the rezoning 

of J&M’s property interfered with the enjoyment of his property and resulted in a 

diminution in its value. The trial court granted summary judgment to the village, 

finding that the village’s rezoning of J&M’s property did not result in a taking of 

Clifton’s property, because his property retained economic value. 

{¶ 10} The court of appeals affirmed the decision that the rezoning did not 

result in a total taking of Clifton’s property. Clinton App. No. CA2007-09-040, 

2008-Ohio-4434, ¶ 12, 14. However, the court found that the trial court had failed 

to inquire as to whether the rezoning resulted in a partial taking under Penn Cent. 

Transp. Co. v. New York (1978), 438 U.S. 104, 98 S.Ct. 2646, 57 L.Ed.2d 631. 

Id. at ¶ 13. Thus, the court of appeals affirmed in part and reversed in part and 

remanded to the trial court to undertake a partial-taking analysis under Penn 

Central. 

{¶ 11} While the case was pending on remand, the village filed a motion 

for reconsideration, alleging that the court of appeals had erred in remanding the 

case for a Penn Central analysis and that Clifton lacked standing to bring a taking 

claim in the first place. The court of appeals granted the village’s motion in part 

and ordered the trial court to also consider the issue of standing on remand. (Nov. 

3, 2008), Clinton App. No. CA2007-09-040. 

{¶ 12} On remand, the trial court granted summary judgment to the 

village, finding that Clifton had no standing to bring a takings claim and that even 

if he had, the rezoning of J&M’s property did not result in a partial taking of 

Clifton’s property. The court of appeals affirmed the trial court’s judgment. 

Clinton App. No. CA2009-07-009, 2010-Ohio-2309, ¶ 7–8. 

{¶ 13} Clifton’s appeal is before this court pursuant to the acceptance of 

his discretionary appeal. 126 Ohio St.3d 1597, 2010-Ohio-4928, 935 N.E.2d 44. 
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III. Analysis 

{¶ 14} Clifton’s first proposition asserts that a nonresident contiguous 

property owner has standing to litigate a claim for a partial regulatory taking 

against an adjacent political subdivision. Clifton’s second proposition asserts that 

a partial-taking claim based upon significant negative economic impact does not 

fail as a matter of law even though the regulatory action does not deprive the 

claimant of all economically viable use of his property. Because our resolution of 

the standing issue is dispositive, there is no need for us to address Clifton’s 

second proposition regarding a takings claim. 

A. Standing Generally 

{¶ 15} “It is well established that before an Ohio court can consider the 

merits of a legal claim, the person seeking relief must establish standing to sue.” 

State ex rel. Ohio Academy of Trial Lawyers v. Sheward (1999), 86 Ohio St.3d 

451, 469, 715 N.E.2d 1062. “ ‘Standing’ is defined at its most basic as ‘[a] 

party’s right to make a legal claim or seek judicial enforcement of a duty or 

right.’ ” Ohio Pyro Inc. v. Ohio Dept. of Commerce, 115 Ohio St.3d 375, 2007-

Ohio-5024, 875 N.E.2d 550, ¶ 27, quoting Black’s Law Dictionary (8th Ed.2004) 

1442. “ ‘ “[T]he question of standing depends upon whether the party has alleged 

such a ‘personal stake in the outcome of the controversy * * *’ as to ensure that 

‘the dispute sought to be adjudicated will be presented in an adversary context 

and in a form historically viewed as capable of judicial resolution.’ ” ’ ” Id., 

quoting State ex rel. Dallman v. Franklin Cty. Court of Common Pleas (1973), 35 

Ohio St.2d 176, 178-179, 64 O.O.2d 103, 298 N.E.2d 515, quoting Sierra Club v. 

Morton (1972), 405 U.S. 727, 732, 92 S.Ct. 1361, 31 L.Ed.2d 636, quoting Baker 

v. Carr (1962), 369 U.S. 186, 204, 82 S.Ct. 691, 7 L.Ed.2d 663, and Flast v. 

Cohen (1968), 392 U.S. 83, 101, 88 S.Ct. 1942, 20 L.Ed.2d 947. 

 
January Term, 2012 

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B. Standing to Challenge Government Action 

{¶ 16} “When the suit is one challenging the legality of government 

action or inaction, the nature and extent of facts that must be averred (at the 

summary judgment stage) or proved (at the trial stage) in order to establish 

standing depends considerably upon whether the plaintiff is himself an object of 

the action (or forgone action) at issue. If he is, there is ordinarily little question 

that the action or inaction has caused him injury, and that a judgment preventing 

or requiring the action will redress it. When, however, * * * a plaintiff's asserted 

injury arises from the government's allegedly unlawful regulation (or lack of 

regulation) of someone else, much more is needed. In that circumstance, 

causation and redressability ordinarily hinge on the response of the regulated (or 

regulable) third party to the government action or inaction—and perhaps on the 

response of others as well. The existence of one or more of the essential elements 

of standing ‘depends on the unfettered choices made by independent actors not 

before the courts and whose exercise of broad and legitimate discretion the courts 

cannot presume either to control or to predict,’ and it becomes the burden of the 

plaintiff to adduce facts showing that those choices have been or will be made in 

such manner as to produce causation and permit redressability of injury.” 

(Emphasis sic; citations omitted.) Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife (1992), 504 U.S. 

555, 561-562, 112 S.Ct. 2130, 119 L.Ed.2d 351. 

{¶ 17} In this case, the regulation (i.e., the zoning) was not directed at 

Clifton’s property. Therefore, the analysis in Lujan regarding causation and 

redressability is instructive in determining whether Clifton has standing to bring a 

regulatory-taking claim against the village. 

1. Causation 

{¶ 18} “[I]n ruling on standing, it is both appropriate and necessary to 

look to the substantive issues * * * to determine whether there is logical nexus 

between the status asserted and the claim sought to be adjudicated * * * to assure 
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that [the litigant] is a proper and appropriate party to invoke” legal proceedings. 

Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 102, 88 S.Ct. 1942, 20 L.Ed.2d 947. 

{¶ 19} “For a takings claim to prevail against a motion to dismiss in this 

court, the action complained of must be attributable to [a government entity].” 

May v. United States (2008), 80 Fed.Cl. 442, 445, citing Erosion Victims of Lake 

Superior Regulation v. United States (Fed.Cir.1987), 833 F.2d 297, 301. In the 

context of the regulatory-taking jurisprudence, whether a regulation constitutes a 

taking depends in large part upon the degree to which the regulation burdens 

private property. Generally speaking, the more severe the burden that the 

regulation imposes upon private property, the more likely it is that the regulation 

constitutes a compensable taking. Lingle v. Chevron U.S.A., Inc. (2005), 544 U.S. 

528, 539, 125 S.Ct. 2074, 161 L.Ed.2d 876. More specifically, if zoning becomes 

too burdensome, it can result in a partial or total taking of the regulated property. 

See, e.g., State ex rel. Gilmour Realty, Inc. v. Mayfield Hts., 119 Ohio St.3d 11, 

2008-Ohio-3181, 891 N.E.2d 320 (recognizing that it is possible that zoning could 

result in a partial or total taking of the property to which the zoning applies). 

{¶ 20} However, we can find no authority for the proposition that the 

zoning of a property is so burdensome on an adjacent property that is not subject 

to the zoning that it results in a taking of the adjacent property. Instead, we have 

found some precedent that indicates that a government’s regulation of property 

does not constitute a taking of an adjacent property. 

{¶ 21} In Fahoome v. St. Clair Shores (Mar. 17, 1998), Mich.App. No. 

194020, 1998 WL 2016580, the city of St. Clair Shores rezoned property adjacent 

to the plaintiff’s property. The plaintiff alleged that the rezoning of his neighbor’s 

property resulted in a taking of his property. The court held that there was no 

taking because the zoning was not specifically directed toward plaintiff’s 

property. 
January Term, 2012 

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{¶ 22} Further, in Murphy v. Detroit (1993), 201 Mich.App. 54, 506 

N.W.2d 5, the city of Detroit used its eminent-domain powers to purchase and 

raze 1,400 residential properties, pursuant to an urban-renewal plan. Business 

owners located adjacent to these properties filed inverse-condemnation claims 

against the city, alleging that the city’s actions caused a 75 percent decrease in 

their businesses and resulted in a de facto taking of their property. 

{¶ 23} The court in Murphy recognized that the value of the plaintiffs’ 

properties had greatly diminished because of the city’s actions and that the 

plaintiffs had purchased their property with the expectation that their customer 

base would remain constant. Id. at 57. However, the court pointed out that 

expectations are not rights. Ultimately, the court held that there was no taking 

because “[d]espite the diminution in value of plaintiffs’ land and buildings, 

resulting from defendants’ change in the way they used their land, defendants 

took no deliberate action directed toward plaintiffs’ property rights that deprived 

plaintiffs of possession or use of their land or buildings.” Id. 

{¶ 24} Together, Fahoome and Murphy can be interpreted to stand for the 

proposition that when a government’s taking or regulation of property causes 

incidental damage to an adjacent but unregulated property, the damage is not 

attributable to the government actor for the purpose of supporting a takings claim. 

2. Redressability 

{¶ 25} Next, we examine whether a property owner has a redressable 

regulatory-taking claim against a municipality when the affected property is 

beyond the municipality’s corporate limits. In order to answer this question, we 

again look to the substantive takings law. 

{¶ 26} The remedy for an alleged regulatory taking is for the property 

owner to file a complaint seeking a writ of mandamus to compel the regulating 

government entity to initiate appropriation proceedings against the property 
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allegedly burdened by the regulation. State ex rel. Gilbert v. Cincinnati, 125 Ohio 

St.3d 385, 2010-Ohio-1473, 928 N.E.2d 706. 

{¶ 27} The government entity responsible for the zoning in the instant 

case is a village. Villages are municipalities. Section 1, Article XVIII of the 

Ohio Constitution (“Municipal corporations are hereby classified into cities and 

villages”). Municipalities have inherent and statutory authority to appropriate 

property, but the scope of this authority is limited. “Section 3, Article XVIII of 

the Ohio Constitution, commonly known as the Home Rule Amendment, gives 

municipalities the ‘authority to exercise all powers of local self-government and 

to adopt and enforce within their limits such local police, sanitary and other 

similar regulations, as are not in conflict with general laws.’ ” Cleveland v. 

State, 128 Ohio St.3d 135, 2010-Ohio-6318, 942 N.E.2d 370, ¶ 7. A 

municipality’s home-rule authority includes the power of eminent domain. State 

ex rel. Bruestle v. Rich (1953), 159 Ohio St. 13, 14, 50 O.O. 6, 110 N.E.2d 778. 

However, aside from acquiring property to operate a public utility that serves its 

own residents, a municipality has no authority to exercise its inherent eminentdomain powers beyond its corporate limits. Britt v. Columbus (1974), 38 Ohio 

St.2d 1, 67 O.O.2d 1, 309 N.E.2d 412, at paragraph one of the syllabus. 

{¶ 28} The General Assembly has also provided municipalities with 

statutory authority to use eminent-domain powers to acquire property that lies 

outside the municipality’s corporate limits “when reasonably necessary,” but only 

for certain enumerated public purposes. R.C. 719.02 and 719.01. However, none 

of the enumerated purposes listed in R.C. 719.01 include appropriating property 

for an alleged regulatory taking. 

{¶ 29} Thus, a municipality has no authority to initiate appropriation 

proceedings in response to a property owner’s complaint in mandamus alleging a 

regulatory-taking claim if the affected property lies outside the municipality’s 

limits. A municipality’s liability for a regulatory taking is limited to the property 
January Term, 2012 

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that it is authorized to regulate, i.e., the property within its limits. Accordingly, a 

property owner has no redressable regulatory-taking claim against a municipality 

when the affected property lies outside the municipality’s corporate limits. 

IV. Conclusion 

{¶ 30} Applying our holding to the facts of this case, we conclude that 

Clifton lacks standing to bring a takings claim against the village. However, we 

emphasize that we do not hold that an adjoining property owner may never have 

standing. Instead, we hold that a property owner lacks standing under the facts 

and circumstances presented here. 

{¶ 31} The zoning at issue applies to J&M’s property, not Clifton’s. 

Therefore, the zoning imposes no limitation on Clifton’s use of his property 

whatsoever. Further, the alleged diminution in value of Clifton’s property is not a 

direct result of the village’s zoning, but instead is caused by J&M’s use of its 

property, as allowed by the rezoning. Finally, the rezoning that changed part of 

J&M’s property from “business industrial” to “general industrial” merely 

expanded a similar, existing, permitted use. Under these particular facts, we hold 

that there is an insufficient nexus between the rezoning of J&M’s property and the 

alleged diminution in value of Clifton’s adjacent property to indicate that Clifton 

is a proper party to bring a regulatory-taking claim. 

{¶ 32} Furthermore, because Clifton’s property is outside the village 

limits, the village has no authority to appropriate his property for an alleged 

regulatory taking. Accordingly, Clifton also has no redressable claim against the 

village for a regulatory taking. 

{¶ 33} Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the court of appeals. 

Judgment affirmed. 

O’CONNOR, C.J., and O’DONNELL, LANZINGER, CUPP, and MCGEE 

BROWN, JJ., concur. 

PFEIFER, J., dissents. 
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__________________ 

PFEIFER, J., dissenting. 

{¶ 34} This is a difficult case. The majority opinion has some logic on its 

side, and the end result is hardly unconscionable, but I am concerned that the 

resolution of this case will make it harder for future plaintiffs with legitimate 

complaints to force the government to initiate appropriation actions in similar 

circumstances. 

{¶ 35} The majority reaches three conclusions: (1) the city of 

Blanchester’s zoning change “imposes no limitation on Clifton’s use of his 

property whatsoever” and, therefore, Clifton cannot show a nexus between the 

zoning change and a diminution in the value of his property, (2) Blanchester 

cannot appropriate Clifton’s property, because it is not in Blanchester, and, 

therefore, (3) Clifton does not have standing to initiate an inverse-condemnation 

proceeding against Blanchester. I will address each of these conclusions in turn. 

No Limitation 

{¶ 36} It is clear that Blanchester’s zoning change does not directly limit 

Clifton’s use of his property. It cannot, because it is outside the Blanchester 

village limits. But it can indirectly limit Clifton’s use, and it can cause a 

diminution of value in his property. It is obvious that it is possible for a zoning 

change to diminish the value of adjacent property within a municipality, even if 

indirectly. So naturally it is possible for a zoning change to diminish the value of 

adjacent property that is in a different political subdivision. I dispute the 

majority’s claim that there is “no limitation,” because it is possible that certain 

uses of the property are less feasible and that certain uses have less economic 

value than before the zoning change was made. 

{¶ 37} The Supreme Court of the United States has stated that “regulatory 

takings challenges are governed by the standards set forth in Penn Cent. Transp.

Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104 [98 S.Ct. 2646, 57 L.Ed.2d 631] (1978).” 
January Term, 2012 

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Lingle v. Chevron U.S.A., Inc. (2005), 544 U.S. 528, 538, 125 S.Ct. 2074, 161 

L.Ed.2d 876. The court in Lingle stated that the primary factors to consider when 

evaluating regulatory-takings claims are “ ‘[t]he economic impact of the 

regulation on the claimant and, particularly, the extent to which the regulation has 

interfered with distinct investment-backed expectations.’ ” Id. at 538–539, 

quoting Penn Cent. at 124. These inquiries are aimed at identifying “regulatory 

actions that are functionally equivalent to the classic taking in which government 

directly appropriates private property or ousts the owner from his domain. 

Accordingly, each of these tests focuses directly upon the severity of the burden 

that government imposes upon private property rights.” Lingle at 539. A “Penn 

Central inquiry turns in large part, albeit not exclusively, upon the magnitude of a 

regulation's economic impact and the degree to which it interferes with legitimate 

property interests.” Id. at 540. 

{¶ 38} It is quite clear that the majority in this case has engaged in no 

such analysis. It may be difficult for Clifton to show that the zoning change has 

interfered with his legitimate property interests, but he should have the 

opportunity to establish that his rights under the federal or Ohio constitution have 

been infringed. 

Blanchester Can’t Appropriate 

{¶ 39} This is a troubling aspect of the case but one that ought not prevent 

this court from doing justice to the parties. It is obvious, as the majority opinion 

discusses, that Blanchester does not have the authority to appropriate property that 

is not within its jurisdiction. A plausible solution in this situation, if Blanchester 

is shown to have effected a taking, is to require Blanchester to buy the affected 

property or pay the amount of diminution. That remedy would fall within the 

concept of a virtual taking. Relying on United States Supreme Court precedent, 

the Court of Appeals of Utah has written that “if a regulation falls short of 

eliminating all economically beneficial use of land, an analysis of a complex of 
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factors indicates whether the interference is so great that a virtual taking has 

nonetheless occurred.” Arnell v. Salt Lake Cty. Bd. of Adjustment (2005), 2005 

Utah App. 165, 112 P.3d 1214, ¶ 17, citing Palazzolo v. Rhode Island (2001), 533 

U.S. 606, 617, 121 S.Ct. 2448, 150 L.Ed.2d 592. The factors to be considered 

include “ ‘[t]he economic impact of the regulation on the claimant and, 

particularly, the extent to which the regulation has interfered with distinct 

investment-backed expectations * * * [and] the character of the governmental 

action.’ ” Id., quoting Penn Cent., 438 U.S. at 124, 98 S.Ct. 2646, 57 L.Ed.2d 

631. “These inquiries are informed by the purpose of the Takings Clause, which 

is to prevent the government from ‘forcing some people alone to bear public 

burdens which, in all fairness and justice, should be borne by the public as a 

whole.’ ” Palazzolo, 533 U.S. at 617–618, quoting Armstrong v. United States

(1960), 364 U.S. 40, 49, 80 S.Ct. 1563, 4 L.Ed.2d 1554. 

{¶ 40} In this case, Clifton is seeking to avoid bearing alone the burden of 

a zoning change and the effect that it has on his property. Whether he will be able 

to prove a taking or diminution in value is beside the point at this time. We 

should analyze the various factors that the United States Supreme Court has 

determined bear on the issue and decide whether Blanchester has effected a 

virtual taking. If it has, we should order an equitable remedy and require 

Blanchester to make Clifton whole, either by buying his property or by paying 

him the amount of diminution. The end result would be the same as in an 

appropriation action—the government entity (Blanchester) would own the 

property, and the affected property owner (Clifton) would be compensated for 

harm suffered, whether directly or indirectly inflicted, at the hand of a 

governmental entity (Blanchester). 

Standing 

{¶ 41} The majority ultimately concludes that Clifton lacks standing 

because his problem is not redressable by an appropriation action because 
January Term, 2012 

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Blanchester cannot appropriate property outside its jurisdiction. Given the current 

state of the law, that is a sound conclusion. But ought not the law seek to do 

equity in such a circumstance? If a zoning change really does diminish the value 

of an adjacent property, then it diminishes the value whether the adjacent property 

is in the same or a different political subdivision. Why would the law 

countenance a remedy in one instance but not the other? All of the involved 

parties are in Ohio. Ought not the law of Ohio provide a remedy for an aggrieved 

landowner even if he lives in a different political subdivision from the one whose 

zoning change diminishes the value of his property? 

{¶ 42} Courts have considered similar issues and concluded that residents 

of adjacent political subdivisions can have standing for some purposes. For 

instance, in Scott v. Indian Wells (1972), 6 Cal.3d 541, 549, 99 Cal.Rptr. 745, 492 

P.2d 1137, the Supreme Court of California stated that a political subdivision 

considering a zoning change “owes adjoining landowners who are not city 

residents a duty of notice to the extent given similarly situated city residents, a 

duty to hear their views, and a duty to consider the proposed development with 

respect to its effect on all neighboring property owners. We are also satisfied that 

adjoining landowners who are not city residents may enforce these duties by 

appropriate legal proceedings and have standing to challenge zoning decisions of 

the city which affect their property.” (Emphasis sic.) In Cresskill v. Dumont

(1954), 15 N.J. 238, 247, 104 A.2d 441, the Supreme Court of New Jersey stated 

that a political subdivision “owes a duty to hear any residents and taxpayers of 

adjoining municipalities who may be adversely affected by proposed zoning 

changes and to give as much consideration to their rights as they would to those 

of residents and taxpayers of [itself]. To do less would be to make a fetish out of 

invisible municipal boundary lines and a mockery of the principles of zoning.” 

See also Koppel v. Fairway (1962), 189 Kan. 710, 371 P.2d 113, paragraph one of 
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the syllabus; Constr. Industry Assn. of Sonoma Cty. v. Petaluma (C.A.9, 1975), 

522 F.2d 897, 905. 

{¶ 43} I am persuaded that Clifton’s problem is redressable. The concept 

of a regulatory taking or a virtual taking and our authority when sitting in equity 

are broad enough to fashion a remedy for Clifton. By concluding that Clifton has 

no standing and consequently that property owners can never have standing when 

a political subdivision other than the one where their property is located makes a 

zoning change, this court is giving a green light to political subdivisions to make 

zoning changes that unduly affect property owners in adjacent cities and towns. 

Surely this court does not want that to happen. 

{¶ 44} I conclude that it is possible for Clifton to show that the 

Blanchester zoning change limits his use of his property, that even though 

Blanchester cannot appropriate Clifton’s property, it can compensate him as if it 

had appropriated his property, and therefore that Clifton raises an issue that is 

redressable. I conclude that Clifton has standing. I would allow the case to move 

forward on its merits. 

{¶ 45} I dissent. 

__________________ 

Fowler, Demos, & Stueve, William G. Fowler, and Gregory J. Demos, for 

appellant. 

 Schroeder, Maundrell, Barbiere & Powers, Lawrence E. Barbiere, and 

Robert S. Hiller, for appellee. 

Michael DeWine, Attorney General, Alexandra T. Schimmer, Solicitor 

General, and Laura Eddleman Heim, Deputy Solicitor, urging affirmance for 

amicus curiae, state of Ohio. 

______________________