14-4612 

Jiang v. Lynch 

BIA 

A200 601 917 

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 

FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT

SUMMARY ORDER

RULINGS BY SUMMARY ORDER DO NOT HAVE PRECEDENTIAL EFFECT. CITATION TO A SUMMARY ORDER FILED 

ON OR AFTER JANUARY 1, 2007, IS PERMITTED AND IS GOVERNED BY FEDERAL RULE OF APPELLATE 

PROCEDURE 32.1 AND THIS COURT=S LOCAL RULE 32.1.1. WHEN CITING A SUMMARY ORDER IN A DOCUMENT 

FILED WITH THIS COURT, A PARTY MUST CITE EITHER THE FEDERAL APPENDIX OR AN ELECTRONIC DATABASE 

(WITH THE NOTATION “SUMMARY ORDER”). A PARTY CITING TO A SUMMARY ORDER MUST SERVE A COPY 

OF IT ON ANY PARTY NOT REPRESENTED BY COUNSEL.

1 At a stated term of the United States Court of Appeals for 

2 the Second Circuit, held at the Thurgood Marshall United States 

3 Courthouse, 40 Foley Square, in the City of New York, on the 

22nd 4 day of August, two thousand sixteen. 

5 

6 PRESENT: 

7 JOHN M. WALKER, JR.,

8 DENNIS JACOBS, 

9 CHRISTOPHER F. DRONEY,

10 Circuit Judges. 

11 _____________________________________ 

12 

13 LING LING JIANG, 

14 Petitioner, 

15 

16 v. 14-4612 

17 NAC 

18 LORETTA E. LYNCH, UNITED STATES 

19 ATTORNEY GENERAL, 

20 Respondent. 

21 _____________________________________ 

22 

23 FOR PETITIONER: Mona Liza Fabular Lao, New York, New 

24 York. 

25 

26 FOR RESPONDENT: Benjamin C. Mizer, Principal Deputy 

27 Assistant Attorney General; 

28 Jennifer P. Levings, Senior 

29 Litigation Counsel; Jennifer R. 

30 Khouri, Trial Attorney, Office of 
2

1 Immigration Litigation, United 

2 States Department of Justice, 

3 Washington, D.C. 

4 

5 UPON DUE CONSIDERATION of this petition for review of a 

6 Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) decision, it is hereby 

7 ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED that the petition for review is 

8 DENIED. 

9 Petitioner Ling Ling Jiang, a native and citizen of the 

10 People’s Republic of China, seeks review of a November 20, 2014, 

11 decision of the BIA denying her motion to reopen. In re Ling 

12 Ling Jiang, No. A200 601 917 (B.I.A. Nov. 20, 2014). We assume 

13 the parties’ familiarity with the underlying facts and 

14 procedural history in this case. 

15 “We review the denial of motions to reopen immigration 

16 proceedings for abuse of discretion, mindful that motions to 

17 reopen ‘are disfavored.’” Ali v. Gonzales, 448 F.3d 515, 517 

18 (2d Cir. 2006) (quoting INS v. Doherty, 502 U.S. 314, 323 

19 (1992)). A movant’s failure to establish a prima facie case 

20 for the underlying substantive relief sought is a proper basis 

21 for declining to reopen. See INS v. Abudu, 485 U.S. 94, 104 

22 (1988). 
3

1 The BIA did not abuse its discretion. The BIA reasonably 

2 gave diminished weight to the unsworn letters from Jiang’s 

3 father and uncle and to the unsigned and unauthenticated village 

4 committee announcement. See Y.C. v. Holder, 741 F.3d 324, 334 

5 (2d Cir. 2013) (deferring to agency’s decision to afford little 

6 weight to letter stating that Chinese authorities were looking 

7 for petitioner because the letter was unsworn and from an 

8 interested witness); Xiao Ji Chen v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 471 

9 F.3d 315, 342 (2d Cir. 2006) (the weight accorded to documentary 

10 evidence is largely within agency’s discretion); In re H-L-H11 & Z-Y-Z-, 25 I. & N. Dec. 209, 215 (BIA 2010) (giving diminished 

12 weight to letters from relatives because they were from 

13 interested witnesses not subject to cross-examination), rev’d 

14 on other grounds by Hui Lin Huang v. Holder, 677 F.3d 130 (2d 

15 Cir. 2012). Further, the village committee notice is 

16 handwritten, it is not signed by any official, and it is unclear 

17 why or how a notary public (as opposed to the issuing office 

18 or officer) would be able to authenticate that document after 

19 the fact. Accordingly, Jiang failed to sustain her burden of 

20 demonstrating that she would be individually targeted because 
4

1 of her religion. See 8 C.F.R. § 1208.13(b)(2)(iii); Hongsheng 

2 Leng v. Mukasey, 528 F.3d 135, 142-43 (2d Cir. 2008). 

3 Absent reliable evidence that she would be singled out for 

4 persecution, Jiang had to demonstrate a pattern or practice of 

5 persecution of Christians in China. 8 C.F.R. 

6 § 1208.13(b)(2)(iii). The remaining country conditions 

7 evidence did not establish that Jiang’s alleged fear was 

8 objectively reasonable. Ramsameachire v. Ashcroft, 357 F.3d 

9 169, 178 (2d Cir. 2004) (setting forth requirement that fear 

10 be objectively reasonable). The country conditions reports 

11 reflected a large number of Christians practicing in China and 

12 that the treatment of those practitioners varies by region. 

13 Accordingly, the agency did not err in determining that Jiang 

14 failed to demonstrate systemic or pervasive persecution of 

15 similarly situated Christians sufficient to demonstrate a 

16 pattern or practice of persecution in China. See 8 C.F.R. 

17 § 1208.13(b)(2)(iii); Hongsheng Leng, 528 F.3d at 142-43; In 

18 re A-M-, 23 I. & N. Dec. 737, 741 (BIA 2005). 

19 Because Jiang failed to demonstrate her prima facie 

20 eligibility for relief, the BIA did not abuse its discretion 

21 in denying her motion to reopen. See Abudu, 485 U.S. at 104. 
5

1 For the foregoing reasons, the petition for review is 

2 DENIED. As we have completed our review, any stay of removal 

3 that the Court previously granted in this petition is VACATED, 

4 and any pending motion for a stay of removal in this petition 

5 is DISMISSED as moot. Any pending request for oral argument 

6 in this petition is DENIED in accordance with Federal Rule of 

7 Appellate Procedure 34(a)(2), and Second Circuit Local Rule 

8 34.1(b). 

9 FOR THE COURT: 

10 Catherine O’Hagan Wolfe, Clerk