Filed 11/25/20 In re X.T. CA2/6

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions 

not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion 

has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115. 

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION SIX

In re X.T., a Person Coming 

Under the Juvenile Court Law.

2d Juv. No. B299264

(Super. Ct. No. MJ23409)

(Los Angeles County)

THE PEOPLE,

 Plaintiff and Respondent,

v.

X.T.,

 Defendant and Appellant.

A Juvenile Petition (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 602) alleged two 

counts of robbery (Pen. Code, § 211),

1 one count of possessing a 

firearm by a minor (§ 29610), and one count of possessing live 

ammunition by a minor (§ 29650) against appellant X.T. Both 

robbery counts included three enhancements: (1) use of a deadly 

1 All statutory references are to the Penal Code unless 

otherwise noted.
2

or dangerous weapon (§ 12022, subd. (a)(1)); (2) use of a firearm 

(§ 12022.5, subd. (a)); and (3) commission of a violent felony 

(§ 12022.53, subd. (b)). The petition included a determination of 

appellant’s ineligibility for deferred entry of judgment. Appellant 

denied the allegations. The juvenile court sustained the petition

and committed appellant to the Department of Juvenile Facilities

(“DJF”) in a disposition order dated June 26, 2019. It calculated 

his maximum period of confinement as 14 years and his 

maximum theoretical period of imprisonment as 32 years and 300 

days. 

Appellant contends the juvenile court abused its discretion 

when it ordered him to DJF instead of a less restrictive 

alternative such as long-term camp commitment. He also 

contends it incorrectly calculated his predisposition custody 

credits and maximum terms of confinement and imprisonment. 

We affirm appellant’s commitment to DJF but remand the case 

for the limited purpose of recalculating appellant’s custody 

credits and term of confinement. 

BACKGROUND

Appellant and another man entered Lonnell Grimes’s

barber shop in Lancaster on the afternoon of May 1, 2018 and 

asked for haircuts. Grimes told them he did not accept walk-ins 

and planned to leave for the day once he finished the current 

customer’s haircut. One of the men asked for a business card.

When Grimes turned around to retrieve a card, appellant held a 

gun to his neck and took his cash, wallet, and cell phones. The 

other man took $400 and a chain from customer Rodrick Reese.

Reese’s two sons, ages 8 and 11, witnessed the robbery.
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Grimes saw the two as they fled out the building. He 

described appellant as having red pants, a gray sweater, and a 

red tattoo on his neck. 

A sheriff’s deputy stopped a silver Mercedes-Benz with no 

license plates shortly after the robbery. Two men jumped out and 

ran away in different directions. A detective recovered Grimes’s

wallet from the back seat of the car along with a sweater 

matching the one worn by appellant. He found a loaded Glock 

handgun 50-75 feet away from where the traffic stop occurred.

Security footage the detective obtained from a nearby business 

captured a suspect holding a handgun running from the car.

The detective asked appellant’s mother to visit the local 

sheriff’s station about a week after the robbery. During her visit, 

she said her son resembled the suspect in security footage.

Appellant confessed to the robbery in an interview with the same 

detective several months later. He later challenged the 

admissibility of his confession and the case proceeded to 

adjudication.

DISCUSSION

Order Committing Appellant to DJF

We review the juvenile court’s order of commitment for 

abuse of discretion. (In re Robert H. (2002) 96 Cal.App.4th 1317, 

1329-1330, citing In re Todd W. (1979) 96 Cal.App.3d 408, 416.) 

“‘“We must indulge all reasonable inferences to support the 

decision of the juvenile court and will not disturb its findings 

when there is substantial evidence to support them.”’” (Id. at 

p. 1330, quoting In re Lorenza M. (1989) 212 Cal.App.3d 49, 53.)

Appellant contends the court abused its discretion when it 

committed him to DJF. He explains how a litany of childhood 

traumas – his father’s death in a motorcycle accident and his 
4

mother’s brain injury during military service, as just two 

examples – left him with mental health conditions best treated in 

a less restrictive environment. He suggests a long-term camp 

placement would provide him with better therapeutic services 

without compromising public safety. In addition, the greater 

number of camps available in relation to DFJ facilities would 

keep him closer to his two children.

We have no reason to doubt the tragedies appellant

experienced in his formative years created or compounded mental 

health conditions that continue to plague him. Indeed, many if 

not most entering the juvenile justice system bear trauma’s 

profound psychological imprint.2 The record shows the juvenile 

court likewise recognized the psychological roots of appellant’s 

troubles and the need to provide him with mental health services 

during commitment. It balanced these rehabilitative 

considerations with public safety concerns presented by the 

violent nature of his present and past offenses. Significantly, 

appellant served six months in camp in 2016 after the court 

sustained a petition alleging assault likely to produce great 

bodily injury (§ 245, subd. (a)(4).) This prior case closed less than 

nine months before appellant and his accomplice robbed Mr. 

Grimes and Mr. Reese at gunpoint in front of two children.

2 See, e.g., Arredondo, Child Development, Children’s 

Mental Health and the Juvenile Justice System: Principles for 

Effective Decision-Making (2003) 14 Stan. L. & Pol’y Rev 13, 16 

(“A typical youth who repeatedly appears before the juvenile 

court . . . has learned that the world can be unpredictable, 

capricious, threatening, and grossly unfair. Additionally, he has 

not had the necessary developmental opportunity of internalizing 

consistently benevolent, reliable, and fair adult authority 

figures.”).
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Appellant’s prompt recidivism following a long-term camp 

program, combined with his poor behavior in predisposition 

detention, evidence “the inappropriateness or ineffectiveness of 

less restrictive alternatives” to DJF. (In re Angela M. (2003) 111 

Cal.App.4th 1392, 1396.) We affirm the juvenile court exercised 

its discretion properly when it committed appellant to DJF.

Appellant’s Predisposition Credits

Appellant spent 168 days in custody (i.e., January 10 to 

June 26, 2019) rather the 160 days reflected in the June 26 

disposition order. The People agree appellant is entitled to eight 

additional days of predisposition credit. We conclude the same.

Appellant’s Maximum Periods of 

Confinement and Imprisonment

The disposition order specifies appellant’s maximum period 

of confinement as 14 years and his theoretical maximum period 

of imprisonment as 32 years and 300 days. Much of this time is 

attributable to the three enhancements alleged in connection 

with both robbery counts. Appellant contends the juvenile court 

erred when it aggregated the terms associated with these 

enhancements. The People again agree. 

Penal Code section 12022.53, subdivision (f) states “[a]n 

enhancement involving a firearm specified in Section 12021.5, 

12022, 12022.3, 12022.4, 12022.5, or 12022.55 shall not be 

imposed on a person in addition to an enhancement imposed 

pursuant to this section.” Appellant’s enhancements under 

section 12022, subdivision (a)(1), section 12022.5, subdivision (a), 

and section 12022.53 fall within the ambit of subdivision (f). This 

means the juvenile court should have applied only the longest 

term of the three enhancements instead of adding the three 
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together. This error significantly lengthened the maximum 

periods of confinement and imprisonment for Counts 1 and 2. 

CONCLUSION

We conclude the court erred when it calculated appellant’s 

predisposition custody credits and maximum terms of 

confinement and imprisonment. We remand this matter with 

instructions to recalculate these parts of the June 26, 2019 

disposition order in a manner consistent with this opinion. We 

otherwise affirm.

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED.

PERREN, J.

We concur:

GILBERT, P. J. 

TANGEMAN, J.
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William A. Crowfoot, Judge

Superior Court County of Los Angeles

______________________________

Steven A. Torres, under appointment by the Court of 

Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant. 

Xavier Becerra, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief 

Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Senior 

Assistant Attorney General, Steven D. Matthews, Supervising 

Deputy Attorney General, and Rama R. Maline, Deputy Attorney 

General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.