If this opinion indicates that it is “FOR PUBLICATION,” it is subject to 

revision until final publication in the Michigan Appeals Reports.

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S T A T E O F M I C H I G A N

C O U R T O F A P P E A L S

LEORA BAR-LEVAV, also known as LEORA 

BAR, also known as LEORA LEVAV,

Plaintiff/Counterdefendant-Appellee,

UNPUBLISHED

March 2, 2023

v No. 360077

Oakland Circuit Court

RAN BACHAR, LC No. 2020-178818-CH

Defendant/Counterplaintiff-Appellant.

Before: RICK, P.J., and M. J. KELLY and RIORDAN, JJ.

PER CURIAM.

Defendant, Ran Bachar, appeals as of right the trial court’s judgment, entered after a bench 

trial, in favor of plaintiff, Leora Bar-Levav. The court imposed a constructive trust on defendant’s 

one-half interest in real property and ordered defendant to execute a quitclaim deed conveying his 

undivided one-half interest in the property to plaintiff. The court also dismissed defendant’s 

counterclaim for partition. We affirm.

I. BACKGROUND

This case arises out of a dispute over real property located on Farmbrook Road in 

Southfield, Michigan. The parties, who were involved in a serious romantic relationship, 

purchased the property with the intent to build a home. Plaintiff provided the funds to purchase 

the property and intended to have the property titled solely in her name. After some discussion 

about defendant acting as a general contractor and doing some of the construction work for the 

home himself, plaintiff agreed to add defendant’s name to the deed. A little more than a year later, 

the parties ended their relationship, without the house being built. When defendant refused to sign 

a quitclaim deed conveying his interest in the property to plaintiff, plaintiff filed this action, 

asserting claims for breach of contract, constructive trust, unjust enrichment, and quiet title. 

Defendant filed a counterclaim for partition. At trial, plaintiff withdrew her claims for breach of 

contract and quiet title.

The trial court found that plaintiff sustained her burden of establishing that a constructive 

trust was necessary to prevent defendant from being unjustly enriched. Accordingly, the court 
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imposed a constructive trust on defendant’s one-half interest in the property in favor of plaintiff 

and ordered defendant to convey his interest in the property to plaintiff. On appeal, defendant 

challenges the trial court’s imposition of a constructive trust and the court’s denial of his claim for 

partition. He also argues that the trial court made numerous erroneous factual findings and that 

the number of erroneous findings demonstrates judicial bias against defendant.

II. STANDARDS OF REVIEW

The trial court’s findings of fact following a bench trial are reviewed for clear error, while 

its conclusions of law are reviewed de novo, Ladd v Motor City Plastics Co, 303 Mich App 83, 

93; 842 NW2d 388 (2013), including “whether the trial court properly applied equitable 

principles,” 21st Century Premier Ins Co v Zufelt, 315 Mich App 437, 443; 889 NW2d 759 (2016). 

“A finding is clearly erroneous where, after reviewing the entire record, this Court is left with a 

definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been made.” Smith v Straughn, 331 Mich App 209, 

215; 952 NW2d 521 (2020) (citation and quotation omitted).

Generally, to preserve a claim of judicial bias, a party must make a motion in the trial court 

to disqualify the judge under MCR 2.003. See In re Contempt of Henry, 282 Mich App 656, 679; 

765 NW2d 44 (2009). In this case, defendant’s claim of judicial bias is related to the trial court’s 

factual findings after a bench trial, a claim that would not have been apparent until the court issued 

its written opinion and order. Nevertheless, defendant did not preserve the claim by moving for a 

new trial or otherwise raising it in the trial court. We review this unpreserved claim of error for 

plain error affecting substantial rights. See Duray Dev, LLC v Perrin, 288 Mich App 143, 150; 

792 NW2d 749 (2010). Plain error affects a party’s substantial rights if the party is prejudiced by 

the error, meaning that the error affected the outcome of the lower court proceedings. Id.

III. CONSTRUCTIVE TRUST

“A constructive trust is an equitable remedy created not by intent or by agreement, but by 

the operation of law.” In re Filibeck Estate, 305 Mich App 550, 552; 853 NW2d 448 (2014) 

(citation omitted). A court imposes a constructive trust when equity is necessary or to prevent 

unjust enrichment. Id. at 553. In Kammer Asphalt Paving Co v E China Twp Sch, 443 Mich 176; 

504 NW2d 635 (1993), our Supreme Court explained:

A constructive trust may be imposed “where such trust is necessary to do 

equity or to prevent unjust enrichment. . . .” Hence, such a trust may be imposed 

when property “ ‘has been obtained through fraud, misrepresentation, concealment, 

undue influence, duress, taking advantage of one’s weakness, or necessities, or any 

other similar circumstances which render it unconscionable for the holder of the 

legal title to retain and enjoy the property . . . .’ ” Accordingly, it may not be 

imposed upon parties “who have in no way contributed to the reasons for imposing 

a constructive trust.” The burden of proof is upon the person seeking the imposition 

of such a trust. [Id. at 188 (citations omitted).]

Defendant argues that allowing him to retain his interest in the property would not be 

unconscionable because there was no evidence of fraud, misrepresentation, concealment, undue 
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influence, duress, or any other similar circumstances. However, in Kent v Klein, 352 Mich 652; 

91 NW2d 11 (1958), our Michigan Supreme Court stated:

Fraud in the inception we do not require, nor deceit, nor chicanery in any of its 

valied guises, for it is not necessary that property be wrongfully acquired. It is 

enough that it be unconscionably withheld. Nor is it necessary, to move the 

chancellor’s conscience, that plaintiffs have suffered a loss, although in most cases 

there is both a loss to the plaintiffs and a like gain to the defendant. [Id. at 657

(citations omitted.)]

Thus, plaintiff was not required to prove fraud, misrepresentation, concealment, undue 

influence, duress, or a loss in order to carry her burden of proof for a constructive trust. Rather, 

plaintiff had to prove that it was unjust or unconscionable for defendant to retain legal title to the 

property. Kent, 352 Mich at 657-658.

Although defendant recognizes that a constructive trust may be a remedy for unjust 

enrichment, defendant argues that he was not unjustly enriched by plaintiff’s adding of his name 

to the deed. “Unjust enrichment is a cause of action to correct a defendant’s retention of a benefit 

owed to another.” Genesee Co Drain Comm’r v Genesee Co, 504 Mich 410, 417; 934 NW2d 805 

(2019). In order to establish a claim of unjust enrichment, a plaintiff must establish the receipt of 

a benefit by the other party from the plaintiff and an inequity resulting to the plaintiff because of 

the retention of the benefit by the other party. Karaus v Bank of New York Mellon, 300 Mich App 

9, 22-23; 831 NW2d 897 (2012). Unjust enrichment claims based in equity can be remedied by 

the establishment of a constructive trust. See Genesee Co Drain Comm’r, 504 Mich at 421.

Plaintiff clearly demonstrated that defendant received a benefit from plaintiff when she 

added his name to the deed without his contributing any funds toward the purchase price. Karaus, 

300 Mich App at 23-24. The question is whether an inequity would result if defendant were 

allowed to retain his interest in the property. The evidence demonstrated that plaintiff allowed

defendant’s name to be placed on the deed because he agreed to contribute his time and labor 

toward building a house on the property. It is undisputed that defendant failed to build a house on 

the property as contemplated by the parties. The trial court properly could find from this evidence 

that it would be inequitable to allow defendant to retain an interest in the property where he did 

not perform the task that was the basis for granting him a shared interest in the property in the first 

instance.

Defendant argues that even though the home that the parties contemplated was never built 

on the property, it would not be unjust to allow him to retain his interest in the property because 

he made considerable contributions in the amount of $37,113.49 toward satisfying the parties’ 

agreement. He argues that the trial court erred by finding that these contributions held no current 

value for the property. Defendant presented an itemized list of expenditures he made toward the 

property. Two of the expenditures, totaling $22,429.32, were items that remained in defendant’s 

possession, namely: (1) a tractor and related parts, and (2) flooring. Defendant installed 2,000 

square feet of the 6,000 square feet of flooring in his White Lake home. Because $22,429.32 of 

defendant’s claimed expenses were for items still in his possession, which he testified he could 

sell, the trial court did not clearly err by determining that these expenditures did not hold any 

current value for the property or provide a benefit to plaintiff.
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Defendant said that he paid Kieft Engineering $4,882 for a property and tree survey and 

for the final site plan to be submitted to the city to obtain the building permit. Kieft’s owner and 

land surveyor, Timothy Hart, testified that, in general, the property survey was valid for about 90 

days. After 90 days, Hart would have to visit the site again. If he did not have to make any 

changes, he would charge another $500 to $600. Hart thought that the tree survey would remain 

valid for a year, but after a year he would have to survey the site again. A field visit to update a

tree survey could cost as much as $1,500 to $2,000. Because Kieft’s surveys and site plan were 

issued in April 2018, the trial court did not err by concluding that they held no present value 

because they would have to be redone according to Hart’s testimony.

Defendant also claimed to have paid $4,250 to Revive Development for clearing the lot. 

However, plaintiff testified that $2,000 of the Revive Development bill was charged for regrading 

defendant’s White Lake property, and she paid him $2,300. Although defendant denied that 

plaintiff paid him $2,300 for the Revive Development costs, the trial court credited plaintiff’s 

testimony. This Court defers to the trial court’s superior ability to judge the credibility of the 

witnesses. Smith, 331 Mich App at 215. There were also miscellaneous expenses for lot clearing 

in the amount of $1,038.27. The trial court did not clearly err by determining that defendant’s 

remaining expenditures had no current value to the property because the clearing that was done in 

2018 would have to be redone.

Defendant’s remaining expenditures of $2,970 were for permits that had since expired. 

Neither party presented any evidence whether the permits could be renewed or if the parties had 

to reapply for permits. Accordingly, the trial court did not err by concluding that these 

expenditures failed to add value to the property.

In his arguments regarding unjust enrichment and his contribution to the building of the 

house, defendant fails to address any of the expenditures that plaintiff made on top of the purchase 

price of the property, such as the property insurance and taxes, the installation of the utility 

driveway, or the architectural plans. In addition, defendant ignores that plaintiff also paid for 

permits and a bond that no longer held any value. Plaintiff also testified that while she lived with 

defendant she bought the groceries, paid for the parties’ social engagements and trips to Israel and 

Mexico, paid the utilities, and paid defendant’s 2019 winter taxes. Plaintiff also gave defendant 

$5,400 on December 10, 2018, and $7,200 on January 18, 2019. Considering this evidence, the 

trial court did not err by concluding that defendant would be unjustly enriched if he were allowed 

to retain half of the value of the property.

Defendant also argues that the trial court erred by failing to apply Takacs v Takacs, 317 

Mich 72, 82; 26 NW2d 712 (1947), in which the Court stated that “a deed or conveyance will be 

supported by a consideration of natural love and affection, or of a close relationship.” In that case, 

the Court held that a father was not entitled to the cancellation of a deed to his son, reasoning that 

there was no question that the father had executed the conveyance out of affection for his son and 

desired to assist him and save him any inconvenience. Id. In addition, the Court observed that the 

father had instigated the transaction and acted solely out of love and affection for his son. Id. at 83.

In this case, while there is no dispute that the parties were in a serious, romantic relationship 

and were motivated by a desire to share a life together, the evidence demonstrated that plaintiff 

did not add defendant’s name to the deed out of affection and a desire to assist defendant. Rather, 
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the parties agreed that plaintiff initially intended to be the sole owner of the property because she 

would be funding the entire purchase price. Although the parties’ testimonies differed in some 

respects, they agreed that defendant refused to build a house on the property unless plaintiff put 

his name on the deed. It is also undisputed that a house was never built on the property. Plaintiff 

had the same affection for defendant and desire to share a life with him when she expressed her 

intention to solely own the property as she did when she added his name to the deed. Defendant’s 

name was also placed on the deed with the understanding that defendant would be building a house 

on the property. Considering the evidence presented at trial, the trial court could properly find that 

this case was factually distinguishable from Takacs, 317 Mich at 82, because, although love and 

affection can constitute adequate consideration for a conveyance, that was not the consideration 

for plaintiff’s agreement to place defendant’s name on the deed in this case.

Considering the evidence, the trial court did not err by imposing a constructive trust on 

defendant’s interest in the property and ordering defendant to convey his 50% interest in the 

property to plaintiff where plaintiff contributed 100% of the funds to purchase the property and 

defendant’s name was added to the title only because he agreed to build a home on the property, 

which never happened. Although defendant contributed toward some of the costs in preparing to 

build a home, so did plaintiff, in addition to the purchase price of the property, and those 

contributions did not add any current value to the property. The trial court did not clearly err by 

concluding that plaintiff met her burden for establishing a constructive trust.

We reject defendant’s efforts to frame this case as one involving a claim for breach of 

contract. Defendant argues that plaintiff breached the parties’ contract first because she failed to 

provide the financial support to enable him to build the house after the breakup. Defendant 

contends that he provided adequate consideration toward their agreement by agreeing to build the 

house, but plaintiff breached the agreement, and therefore, plaintiff could not maintain a breachof-contract claim against him and she is not entitled to equitable relief.

At the conclusion of the bench trial, however, plaintiff withdrew her breach-of-contract 

claim because there was no meeting of the minds on the material elements. Plaintiff also withdrew 

her claim to quiet title and asked the trial court to proceed only on the unjust-enrichment and 

constructive-trust claims. A review of the trial court’s opinion reveals that the court did not base 

its decision on contract principles. Rather, the trial court answered defendant’s arguments that 

plaintiff breached the agreement, and therefore, could not maintain this action against defendant 

for failure to perform. The trial court did not clearly err by finding that there was no evidence that 

plaintiff breached the agreement first. Defendant argues that plaintiff first breached the agreement 

when, in the summer of 2018, she declared that she would no longer support defendant while he 

built the house. However, plaintiff gave defendant $5,400 on December 10, 2018, $7,200 on 

January 8, 2019, and paid his winter taxes on his White Lake home. Plaintiff moved in with 

defendant in August 2018, and paid for the utilities, groceries, their social engagements, and two 

vacations. On the basis of this evidence, the trial court found that “[d]efendant breached the 

parties’ agreement by failing to construct the home to which he agreed to do” and that “[s]uch a 

breach predates [d]efendant’s claim that the [p]laintiff ceased offering to pay for the construction 

of the home.” The evidence supports the trial court’s finding. Moreover, the evidence established 

that a continuation of the agreement after the breakup of the relationship was impossible. The trial 

court did not clearly err by determining that defendant failed to build a house on the Farmbrook 

property and that plaintiff did not first breach the parties’ agreement.
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IV. PARTITION

Defendant argues that if this Court finds that the trial court erred by imposing a constructive 

trust in favor of plaintiff, it should grant his claim for partition. “Actions . . . for the partition of 

lands . . . are equitable in nature.” MCL 600.3301. The trial court stated: “[S]ince this Court finds 

that the Defendant did not build the home in exchange for his 50% interest, this Court finds that a 

partition in favor of Defendant would be unjust.” Defendant’s claim for partition is dependent

upon a finding that he has an enforceable 50% interest in the Farmbrook property. Because the 

trial court did not err by ruling that it was inequitable for defendant to retain a 50% interest in the 

property and by imposing a constructive trust on defendant’s 50% interest in favor of plaintiff, 

defendant’s partition claim cannot succeed. Accordingly, the trial court did not err by dismissing 

this claim.

V. FINDINGS OF FACT AND JUDICIAL BIAS

A party claiming judicial bias must overcome a heavy presumption of judicial impartiality. 

Armstrong v Ypsilanti Charter Twp, 248 Mich App 573, 597; 640 NW2d 321 (2001). This Court 

will not find bias simply because the judge ruled against a party. See In re Contempt of Henry, 

282 Mich App 656, 680; 765 NW2d 44 (2009). A judicial ruling will only constitute actual bias 

if the judicial opinion “display[s] a deep-seated favoritism or antagonism that would make fair 

judgment impossible.” Cain v Dep’t of Corrections, 451 Mich 470, 496; 548 NW2d 210 (1996) 

(quotations marks and citation omitted).

Defendant has not made, or established, any claims of actual personal and extrajudicial 

bias. Rather, defendant claims that the trial court made several factual errors in its opinion and 

order that demonstrate its bias against him. Defendant contends that the factual errors adversely 

affected his substantial rights and, as such, this Court should reverse the trial court’s decision.

We agree that the trial court made some factual misstatements in its opinion regarding the 

date that plaintiff moved into defendant’s residence, defendant’s agreement to provide material for 

the construction of the house, and defendant’s incurring of costs for architectural drawings and a 

tree bond. None of these findings were material to the trial court’s decision, nor did they 

demonstrate any bias or deep-seated favoritism or antagonism that could not support a fair 

judgment. Accordingly, defendant has not established that these misstatements warrant appellate 

relief. Duray Dev, LLC, 288 Mich App at 150.

Contrary to defendant’s argument, the trial court never stated that defendant refused to 

build the home after the parties’ breakup. Rather, the court stated that “after the parties 

separated[,] . . . and while [defendant] testified that he never refused to build the home, there was 

no further progress.” Further, the trial court’s statement that “[d]efendant claims he provided 

consideration in the form of love and affection” is supported by defendant’s trial brief, in which 

defendant claimed that his consideration for his interest in the Farmbrook property included 

“preparing the Property, love and affection, or alternatively, his refusal to accept new business.”

Defendant’s remaining claims of error involve matters for which there was conflicting 

testimony. Defendant asserts that the trial court erroneously stated that “[t]here was also testimony 

that the parties agreed that Defendant would sell his existing home in White Lake Township when 
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the couple completed their home [and] [t]he proceeds from the sale of Defendant’s home were to 

help equalize the parties’ financial contribution toward the construction and improvement of the 

parties’ home and purchase of the vacant land.” Plaintiff testified that once the construction was

finished and the construction loan was converted into a mortgage, they planned to put a value on 

defendant’s work, defendant would sell his home, and the parties would contribute equally to the 

house and the property. Although defendant testified that he had no plans to sell his White Lake 

home, and that plaintiff had expressed to him that he should retain his White Lake home to secure 

his retirement income, it is clear from the trial court’s opinion that it credited plaintiff’s testimony 

with respect to this matter. This Court will not disturb a trial court’s determination of credibility. 

Berger v Berger, 277 Mich App 700, 707; 747 NW2d 336 (2008). Thus, the trial court’s finding 

was not clearly erroneous.

Next, defendant argues that the trial court’s finding regarding the payments to Revive 

Development was erroneous. We disagree. The trial court properly recited the amounts of the 

payments to Revive Development for lot clearing. The court included the $2,300 payment that 

plaintiff testified that she made to defendant to reimburse him for the payments he made to Revive 

Development. The trial court further found, however, that regardless of any expenditures by 

defendant, “because the [d]efendant failed to build on the property, the money expended for the 

lot clearing has not value to either party.” In this instance, the trial court weighed the evidence 

and the parties’ testimony and concluded that defendant’s expenditures did not add any value to 

the property. The trial court properly recited the evidence and came to a conclusion regarding the 

weight of that evidence. Because the evidence supports the trial court’s finding, we will not disturb 

it. Berger, 277 Mich App at 707. Further, defendant has not demonstrated that this finding shows 

that the court was biased against him.

Defendant also challenges the trial court’s finding that “[t]he evidence, however, 

established that [defendant] took jobs that he wanted, and in fact, had improved the value of his 

own home while being supported by [plaintiff].” Defendant argues that this finding is not 

supported by any testimony. However, the evidence presented and defendant’s testimony 

indicated that defendant’s income increased from 2017 to 2018, and remained the same from 2018 

to 2019. Defendant also testified that, in 2018, he worked part time at his business and part time 

on his own home to prepare for plaintiff to move in. Defendant testified regarding the

improvements he made to his White Lake house, which included the installation of 2,000 square 

feet of flooring. After reviewing the record, we are not left with a definite and firm conviction that 

the trial court’s finding is erroneous. Smith, 331 Mich App at 215.

Defendant further argues that the trial court erred by finding that defendant was offered a 

substantial job in 2019 and turned it down. The trial court addressed this matter in the context of 

discussing, and rejecting, defendant’s claims of lost opportunities for cabinetry jobs. It is apparent 

that a witness was confused about the year that defendant turned down the Maple Road job. The 

witness clearly testified that defendant turned down a substantial work opportunity on Maple Road, 

but gave both 2018 and 2019 dates for when this happened. Even if the trial court’s finding that 

this occurred in 2019 was erroneous, considering the conflicting testimony, any error does not 

establish any bias by the court or deep-seated favoritism that could not support a fair judgment. In 

re Contempt of Henry, 282 Mich App at 680. Further, any error did not affect defendant’s 

substantial rights, especially in light of the evidence that defendant’s income remained relatively 

the same in 2017, 2018, and 2019.
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Finally, defendant argues that the trial court erred by finding that plaintiff loaned him 

money to support himself. This statement was made in the context of the trial court reciting 

plaintiff’s testimony regarding this subject. While plaintiff testified that she had given defendant 

money in December 2018 and January 2019, and that she paid his winter tax bill, she also testified 

that she assumed that defendant would pay her back. Contrary to what defendant argues, however, 

the trial court did not find that plaintiff loaned defendant money, it only recited plaintiff’s 

testimony to that effect. More significantly, the court rejected plaintiff’s request for an additional 

money judgment on the basis of its conclusion that it would be inequitable “to require [defendant] 

to repay those funds when [p]laintiff indicated the monies were not considered a loan.” Thus, the 

trial court’s discussion of this matter does not support a claim of judicial bias.

Affirmed. Plaintiff, being the prevailing party, may tax costs pursuant to MCR 7.219.

/s/ Michelle M. Rick 

/s/ Michael J. Kelly 

/s/ Michael J. Riordan