Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 49A02-1612-CR-2679 | September 7, 2017 Page 1 of 18

ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT

Deborah Markisohn

Marion County Public Defender Agency

Appellate Division

Indianapolis, Indiana

ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE

Curtis T. Hill, Jr.

Attorney General of Indiana

Eric P. Babbs

Deputy Attorney General

Indianapolis, Indiana

I N T H E

COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA

Kevin Dowdy,

Appellant-Defendant,

v.

State of Indiana,

Appellee-Plaintiff.

September 7, 2017

Court of Appeals Case No.

49A02-1612-CR-2679

Appeal from the Marion Superior 

Court

The Honorable John Christ, 

Commissioner

Trial Court Cause No.

49G14-1510-F6-37975

Brown, Judge.
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[1] In this interlocutory appeal, Kevin Dowdy appeals the trial court’s order 

denying his motion to suppress evidence. He raises two issues which we

consolidate and restate as whether the court erred in denying his motion to 

suppress. We affirm. 

Facts and Procedural History

[2] On October 21, 2015, Indianapolis Metropolitan Police Officer Cameron 

Taylor was conducting traffic patrol and “just running license plates” while he 

was driving. Transcript Volume II at 8. He ran a license plate on a vehicle and 

the status for the registration plate “came up expired” on his mobile data 

terminal. Id. at 12. The return for information from the BMV included three or

four pages, and Officer Taylor’s computer terminal screen showed that the issue 

date was October 21, 2014, and the expiration date was October 21, 2015. He 

activated his lights and initiated a traffic stop because of the expired 

registration. 

[3] Officer Taylor approached the vehicle and spoke to the occupants including 

Dowdy who was in the front passenger seat. Officer Taylor explained the 

reason for the stop, asked the driver for her driver’s license and the vehicle 

registration, and also asked Dowdy if he “wouldn’t mind giving [him] his 

identification.” Id. at 14. Officer Taylor received their identifications or wrote 

down their names and dates of birth, ran the occupants’ information, and 

discovered that there were warrants for Dowdy’s arrest. He conducted a search 

of Dowdy and discovered a “receipt with pills in it” in his pocket. Id. at 16. 
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[4] On October 26, 2015, the State charged Dowdy with possession of a narcotic 

drug as a level 6 felony. On May 2, 2016, Dowdy filed a motion to suppress 

evidence and argued that the stop, detention, arrest, and seizure of the 

contraband was illegal. 

[5] On July 26, 2016, the court held a suppression hearing. Officer Taylor testified

that the return for information from the BMV is four pages and that: 

[T]here’s a status that – it says status and then it will say active, 

inactive, suspended, or expired. I just look for that spot because 

I’m just – you know, I’m not trying to read every little detail 

about – I don’t care when the plate was issued. I don’t 

necessarily care when it was expired. I just look to see that it’s 

expired according to the BMV because that’s where I get my 

returns from.

Id. at 10-11. When asked if at any point it came to his attention that the license 

plate’s expiration date was the same as the date of the actual traffic stop, he

answered: “Somebody – I thought of it. I think it stood out to me obviously 

when I went to write the report.” Id. at 15. He also indicated that someone 

who has a warrant takes priority over an expired registration. On crossexamination, Officer Taylor testified that his computer terminal screen showed 

that the issue date was October 21, 2014, and the expiration date was October 

21, 2015. On redirect examination, he testified that the status for the vehicle

registration was expired. 

[6] On September 15, 2016, the court held a hearing and denied Dowdy’s motion 

to suppress. The court stated:
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After reviewing the case law and the facts, I do find that the 

officer’s behavior was reasonable; that he did rely upon the 

computer transmission from the Bureau of Motor Vehicles that 

indicated that the license plate and registration . . . were expired.

What I’m seeing – what my recollection that the officer relied on 

was not just the dates but the submission from the Bureau of 

Motor Vehicles that the license was, in fact – that the registration 

was, in fact, expired.

I don’t know if was [sic] a mistake of law on his part, but I think 

that there’s a difficulty interpretation – of interpreting that law.

I tried to find what the code would state as to the expiration date 

and when that would – when that would happen and when 

registrations would expire, and the only statute is the statute 

submitted by Defense that, you know, speaks to when the 

expiration date is on a Saturday, Sunday or holiday time when 

the license branches would be closed.

I think it would require the officer to make some sort of legal 

interpretation. I don’t know that it’s automatically clear of what 

the expiration date would be based on that statute when it 

happened in this case on a Wednesday.

I think the officer’s behavior was reasonable. I don’t think that it 

is inherently unreasonable. I don’t think it was a mistake of law 

or ignorance of the law. I think he relied reasonably upon the 

Bureau of Motor Vehicle’s communication that the license plates 

and registration were expired on that vehicle.

Mr. Dowdy had a warrant for his arrest. And I think everything 

found thereafter flows from the warrant and the search once he’s 
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taken into custody on that warrant. So I find the officer’s 

behavior reasonable.

Id. at 32-33. Dowdy now brings this interlocutory appeal.

Discussion

[7] The issue is whether the trial court erred in denying Dowdy’s motion to 

suppress. The admission of evidence is entrusted to the trial court’s sound 

discretion. Robinson v. State, 5 N.E.3d 362, 365 (Ind. 2014). See also Kelly v. 

State, 997 N.E.2d 1045, 1050 (Ind. 2013) (addressing a denial of a motion to 

suppress and holding that the admission of evidence is a matter entrusted to the 

trial court’s sound discretion). “We review a trial court’s denial of a 

defendant’s motion to suppress deferentially, construing conflicting evidence in 

the light most favorable to the ruling, but we will also consider any substantial 

and uncontested evidence favorable to the defendant.” Robinson, 5 N.E.3d at 

365. “We defer to the trial court’s findings of fact unless they are clearly 

erroneous, and we will not reweigh the evidence.” Id. “When the trial court’s 

denial of a defendant’s motion to suppress concerns the constitutionality of a 

search or seizure, however, it presents a question of law, and we address that 

question de novo.” Id.

[8] Dowdy argues that the registration was valid until midnight on October 21, 

2015, and that his rights under the Fourth Amendment of the United States 

Constitution and Article 1, Section 11 of the Indiana Constitution were 

violated. 
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A. Fourth Amendment

[9] The Fourth Amendment provides:

The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, 

papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, 

shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon 

probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and 

particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons 

or things to be seized.

U.S. CONST. amend. IV.

[10] A law enforcement officer must have reasonable suspicion of criminal conduct 

in order to justify a traffic stop, which is a “seizure” for purposes of the Fourth 

Amendment. Clarke v. State, 868 N.E.2d 1114, 1118 (Ind. 2007) (citing Terry v. 

Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 88 S. Ct. 1868 (1968)). See also Sanders v. State, 989 N.E.2d 

332, 335 (Ind. 2013) (“[A] traffic stop . . . is permissible where an officer has at 

least reasonable suspicion that a traffic law, or other law, has been violated.”), 

reh’g denied. We make reasonable-suspicion determinations by looking at the 

totality of the circumstances of each case to see whether the detaining officer 

has a particularized and objective basis for suspecting legal wrongdoing. 

Armfield v. State, 918 N.E.2d 316, 319 (Ind. 2009). In assessing the whole 

picture, we must examine the facts as known to the officer at the moment of the 

stop. Clark v. State, 994 N.E.2d 252, 264 (Ind. 2013). We review findings of 

reasonable suspicion de novo. Id. This is necessarily a fact-sensitive inquiry. 

Id.
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[11] Dowdy argues that the traffic stop violated the Fourth Amendment because 

Officer Taylor’s justification for the stop was a mistake of law. He contends 

that, where there is no vehicular violation, a stop is not constitutionally 

permissible, that Officer Taylor simply relied on the designation of expired that 

appeared as part of the BMV records check, and that he failed to fully examine 

the BMV record to learn the date the registration was issued and the date it 

expired. 

[12] The State asserts that it does not and that it need not take a position regarding 

whether a vehicle registration issued by the BMV remains valid until midnight 

following the expiration date. It argues that Officer Taylor’s on-the-spot 

evaluation was reasonable and that he could not have found the BMV return to

be in error by a cursory review. It asserts that, before finding the BMV return to 

be incorrect, Officer Taylor would have had to notice a discrepancy between the 

status of expired and the math revealed by the issue and expiration dates and 

adopt the most-driver friendly resolution of a legal issue that, as Dowdy admits 

on appeal, has no clear answer in Indiana statutes. The State also contends that 

in any event the evidence found on Dowdy’s person is admissible because the 

pre-existing arrest warrants sufficiently attenuated any taint, citing Utah v. 

Strieff, 136 S. Ct. 2056, 2059 (2016).1 

 

1 Because we decide that the stop was reasonable, we need not address the attenuation doctrine which can be 

applied under certain circumstances when an officer makes an unconstitutional investigative stop, learns 

during the stop that the suspect is subject to a valid arrest warrant, and proceeds to arrest the suspect and 

seize incriminating evidence during a search incident to that arrest. See Strieff, 136 S. Ct. at 2059-2064.
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[13] The State cites to Heien v. North Carolina, in which the United States Supreme

Court addressed whether a police officer’s mistake of law can give rise to the 

reasonable suspicion necessary to uphold a seizure under the Fourth 

Amendment. 135 S. Ct. 530, 534 (2014). In that case, a police officer initiated 

a traffic stop after observing only the left brake light illuminate when a vehicle 

braked. Id. Heien, a passenger of the stopped vehicle, consented to a search, 

and police discovered cocaine. Id. The State charged Heien with attempted 

trafficking of cocaine. Id. at 535. Heien moved to suppress the evidence seized 

from the car, contending that the stop and search violated the Fourth 

Amendment, and the trial court denied the motion. Id. Heien pled guilty but 

reserved the right to appeal the suppression decision. Id.

[14] The relevant provision of the vehicle code in Heien provided that a car must be:

equipped with a stop lamp on the rear of the vehicle. The stop 

lamp shall display a red or amber light visible from a distance of 

not less than 100 feet to the rear in normal sunlight, and shall be 

actuated upon application of the service (foot) brake. The stop 

lamp may be incorporated into a unit with one or more other rear 

lamps.

Id. (quoting N.C. Gen. Stat. Ann. § 20-129(g) (2007)). The North Carolina 

Court of Appeals reversed and held that the initial stop was not valid because 

driving with only one working brake light was not actually a violation of North 

Carolina law. Id. (citing 214 N.C. App. 515, 714 S.E.2d 827 (2011)). 

[15] The State of North Carolina appealed, and the North Carolina Supreme Court 

reversed. Id. (citing 366 N.C. 271, 737 S.E.2d 351). Noting that the State had 
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chosen not to seek review of the Court of Appeals’ interpretation of the vehicle 

code, the Court assumed for purposes of its decision that the faulty brake light 

was not a violation. Id. It concluded that, for several reasons, the police officer 

could have reasonably, even if mistakenly, read the vehicle code to require that 

both brake lights be in good working order, and noted that a nearby code 

provision required that all originally equipped rear lamps be functional. Id.

(citing 366 N.C. at 282-283, 737 S.E.2d at 358-359).

[16] The United States Supreme Court observed that the ultimate touchstone of the 

Fourth Amendment is reasonableness. Id. at 536. “To be reasonable is not to 

be perfect, and so the Fourth Amendment allows for some mistakes on the part 

of government officials, giving them ‘fair leeway for enforcing the law in the 

community’s protection.’” Id. (quoting Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160, 

176, 69 S. Ct. 1302 (1949)). The Court observed that searches and seizures 

based on mistakes of fact can be reasonable and held:

But reasonable men make mistakes of law, too, and such 

mistakes are no less compatible with the concept of reasonable 

suspicion. Reasonable suspicion arises from the combination of 

an officer’s understanding of the facts and his understanding of 

the relevant law. The officer may be reasonably mistaken on 

either ground. Whether the facts turn out to be not what was 

thought, or the law turns out to be not what was thought, the 

result is the same: the facts are outside the scope of the law. 

There is no reason, under the text of the Fourth Amendment or 

our precedents, why this same result should be acceptable when 

reached by way of a reasonable mistake of fact, but not when 

reached by way of a similarly reasonable mistake of law.
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Id. The Court also stated:

Heien also contends that the reasons the Fourth Amendment 

allows some errors of fact do not extend to errors of law. Officers 

in the field must make factual assessments on the fly, Heien 

notes, and so deserve a margin of error. In Heien’s view, no such 

margin is appropriate for questions of law: The statute here either 

requires one working brake light or two, and the answer does not 

turn on anything “an officer might suddenly confront in the 

field.” Brief for Petitioner 21. But Heien’s point does not 

consider the reality that an officer may “suddenly confront” a 

situation in the field as to which the application of a statute is 

unclear—however clear it may later become. A law prohibiting 

“vehicles” in the park either covers Segways or not, see A. Scalia 

& B. Garner, Reading Law: The Interpretation of Legal Texts 36-

38 (2012), but an officer will nevertheless have to make a quick 

decision on the law the first time one whizzes by. 

Contrary to the suggestion of Heien and amici, our decision does 

not discourage officers from learning the law. The Fourth 

Amendment tolerates only reasonable mistakes, and those 

mistakes—whether of fact or of law—must be objectively

reasonable. We do not examine the subjective understanding of 

the particular officer involved. Cf. Whren v. United States, 517 

U.S. 806, 813, 116 S. Ct. 1769, 135 L.Ed.2d 89 (1996). And the 

inquiry is not as forgiving as the one employed in the distinct 

context of deciding whether an officer is entitled to qualified 

immunity for a constitutional or statutory violation. Thus, an 

officer can gain no Fourth Amendment advantage through a 

sloppy study of the laws he is duty-bound to enforce.

Id. at 539-540. In applying the test of whether the mistake of law was 

reasonable to the facts, the Court stated:
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Here we have little difficulty concluding that the officer’s error of 

law was reasonable. Although the North Carolina statute at 

issue refers to “a stop lamp,” suggesting the need for only a single 

working brake light, it also provides that “[t]he stop lamp may be 

incorporated into a unit with one or more other rear lamps.” 

N.C. Gen. Stat. Ann. § 20-129(g) (emphasis added). The use of 

“other” suggests to the everyday reader of English that a “stop 

lamp” is a type of “rear lamp.” And another subsection of the 

same provision requires that vehicles “have all originally 

equipped rear lamps or the equivalent in good working order,” § 

20-129(d), arguably indicating that if a vehicle has multiple “stop 

lamp[s],” all must be functional.

The North Carolina Court of Appeals concluded that the “rear 

lamps” discussed in subsection (d) do not include brake lights, 

but, given the “other,” it would at least have been reasonable to 

think they did. Both the majority and the dissent in the North 

Carolina Supreme Court so concluded, and we agree. See 366 

N.C., at 282-283, 737 S.E.2d, at 358-359; id., at 283, 737 S.E.2d, 

at 359 (Hudson, J., dissenting) (calling the Court of Appeals’ 

decision “surprising”). This “stop lamp” provision, moreover, 

had never been previously construed by North Carolina’s 

appellate courts. See id., at 283, 737 S.E.2d, at 359 (majority

opinion). It was thus objectively reasonable for an officer in 

Sergeant Darisse’s position to think that Heien’s faulty right 

brake light was a violation of North Carolina law. And because 

the mistake of law was reasonable, there was reasonable 

suspicion justifying the stop.

Id. at 540.

[17] Dowdy states that there does not appear to be a single statute in the motor 

vehicle code which definitively controls the interpretation of when a vehicle’s 

registration expires and does not point to a case addressing when a registration 
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expires. He points to Ind. Code § 9-18-2-50 and asserts that this statute 

indicates a vehicle’s registration remains valid until midnight on the last day of 

the term of registration. Ind. Code § 9-18-2-50 is titled “Expiration date of 

registration; closure of license branch” and provides: 

If the date on which the registration of a vehicle expires is a day 

on which all license branches located in the county in which the 

vehicle is registered are closed, including:

(1) a Sunday; or

(2) a legal holiday listed in IC 1-1-9-1;

the registration expires at midnight on the date following the next 

day on which a license branch located in the county in which the 

vehicle is registered is open for business.[2]

[18] Even assuming that Officer Taylor was ultimately mistaken in his belief that a 

violation occurred, the traffic stop was based upon a good faith, reasonable 

belief that a statutory infraction had occurred. No case has cited Ind. Code § 9-

18-2-50. Officer Taylor testified that he was driving and running license plates, 

ran the plate, received three or four pages of information, and that the status for 

the registration came back as expired. He also testified that he looks to see if 

the registration is “expired according to the BMV because that’s where I get my 

returns from.” Transcript Volume II at 11. Under these circumstances, we 

 

2 The day Officer Taylor stopped Dowdy, October 21, 2015, was a Wednesday.
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conclude that the totality of the circumstances presented a particularized and 

objective basis for a stop and that the stop was reasonable and did not violate 

Dowdy’s rights under the Fourth Amendment.3 See Sanders, 989 N.E.2d at 336 

(holding that the apparent infraction for which the defendant’s vehicle was 

initially stopped did in fact exist at law, and although the officer was ultimately 

mistaken in his belief that a violation occurred, the traffic stop was based upon 

a good faith, reasonable belief that a statutory infraction had occurred and thus 

the Court was unable to say that the traffic stop was not lawful); Croom v. State, 

996 N.E.2d 436, 442 (Ind. Ct. App. 2013) (citing Sanders and concluding that an 

officer was concerned that the defendant was breaking the law, reasonably 

stopped the defendant in order to obtain more information, and that the 

officer’s good-faith reasonable belief that a violation occurred was sufficient to 

establish reasonable suspicion under the Fourth Amendment), reh’g denied, 

trans. denied.

4

 

3 Dowdy cites Gunn v. State, 956 N.E.2d 136 (Ind. Ct. App. 2011), and asserts that Officer Taylor lacked 

reasonable suspicion for the traffic stop because his belief that the registration was expired was a mistake of 

law. In Gunn, an officer believed that turning left into a lane other than the lane in the right half of the 

roadway closest to the center line was a traffic infraction, observed a vehicle make such a turn, and initiated a 

traffic stop. 956 N.E.2d at 138. We examined Ind. Code § 9-21-8-21, which governs the manner in which to 

make a turn at an intersection, and held that the statute does not specify which lane the driver must enter if 

there is more than one lane for traffic in that direction and that the only requirement was that the driver must 

enter a lane to the right of the center lane. Id. at 140. We held that “although an officer’s good faith belief 

that a person has committed a violation will justify a traffic stop, an officer’s mistaken belief about what 

constitutes a violation does not amount to good faith.” Id. Here, unlike in Gunn, the infraction for which 

Officer Taylor initially stopped the vehicle does in fact exist in law.

4 Upon discovering that Dowdy had warrants for his arrest, Officer Taylor conducted a search of his person. 

Dowdy does not argue that the search that revealed the pills did not constitute a valid search incident to 

arrest. 
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[19] To the extent Dowdy argues that, even if the registration had expired, Officer 

Taylor exceeded his authority in detaining the individuals and running their 

identifications, we disagree. Ind. Code § 9-18-2-7 governs the registration of 

vehicles and provides that a person that operates a vehicle with an expired 

license plate commits a class C infraction.5 Ind. Code § 34-28-5-3 provides:

(a) Whenever a law enforcement officer believes in good faith 

that a person has committed an infraction or ordinance violation,

the law enforcement officer may detain that person for a time 

sufficient to:

(1) inform the person of the allegation;

(2) obtain the person’s:

(A) name, address, and date of birth; or

(B) driver’s license, if in the person’s possession; and

(3) allow the person to execute a notice to appear.

 

5

Specifically, Ind. Code § 9-18-2-7 provides in part: 

(b) Except as provided in IC 9-18-12-2.5, a person that owns or operates a vehicle may 

not operate or permit the operation of a vehicle that:

(1) is required to be registered under this chapter; and

(2) has expired license plates.

* * * * *

(h) A person that operates or permits the operation of a motor vehicle in violation of subsection (b) 

commits a Class C infraction.
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[20] In Starr v. State, we addressed an officer’s interactions with a passenger of a 

vehicle following a traffic stop. 928 N.E.2d 876, 878 (Ind. Ct. App. 2010), 

trans. denied. Specifically, we addressed whether a vehicular passenger is subject 

to the same criminal penalties by refusing to identify himself when, unlike the 

driver of the vehicle, there was no reasonable suspicion that he had committed 

an infraction or violated an ordinance. We discussed Ind. Code § 34-28-5-3.5 

which provides:

A person who knowingly or intentionally refuses to provide 

either the person’s:

(1) name, address, and date of birth; or

(2) driver’s license, if in the person’s possession;

to a law enforcement officer who has stopped the person for an

infraction or ordinance violation commits a Class C 

misdemeanor.

[21] We held that “[t]here was no reasonable suspicion that he had committed an 

infraction or ordinance violation, giving rise to an obligation to identify himself 

upon threat of criminal prosecution,” and we reversed the conviction. Starr, 

928 N.E.2d 876 at 880. However, we also stated: 

Certainly, a police officer is free to request identification without 

implicating the Fourth Amendment. Hiibel v. Sixth Judicial Dist. 

Ct. of Nev., 542 U.S. 177, 185, 124 S. Ct. 2451, 159 L.Ed.2d 292 

(2004). As such, we do not suggest that an officer is constrained 

to request only the driver’s identification during a traffic stop. In 

the vast majority of cases, a person will choose to comply when 
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identification is requested. Nonetheless, as a general proposition, 

“[c]itizens are not required to interact with police officers.” 

Greeno v. State, 861 N.E.2d 1232, 1237 (Ind. Ct. App. 2007) 

(citing Illinois v. Wardlow, 528 U.S. 119, 120 S. Ct. 673, 145 

L.Ed.2d 570 (2000)).

Id. at 879-880. 

[22] We conclude that Officer Taylor’s asking Dowdy if he “wouldn’t mind giving 

[him] his identification,” Transcript Volume II at 14, did not violate Dowdy’s 

rights under the Fourth Amendment. See Starr, 928 N.E.2d at 879-880; United 

States v. Muriel, 418 F.3d 720, 726 (7th Cir. 2005) (holding that passengers may 

be questioned without reasonable suspicion). 

B. Article 1, Section 11

[23] Article 1, Section 11 of the Indiana Constitution provides:

The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, 

papers, and effects, against unreasonable search or seizure, shall 

not be violated; and no warrant shall issue, but upon probable 

cause, supported by oath or affirmation, and particularly 

describing the place to be searched, and the person or thing to be 

seized.

[24] Although its text mirrors the federal Fourth Amendment, we interpret Article 1, 

§ 11 of our Indiana Constitution separately and independently. Robinson, 5 

N.E.3d at 368. “When a defendant raises a Section 11 claim, the State must 

show the police conduct ‘was reasonable under the totality of the 

circumstances.’” Id. (quoting State v. Washington, 898 N.E.2d 1200, 1205-1206 
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(Ind. 2008), reh’g denied). “The focus of the exclusionary rule under the Indiana 

Constitution is the reasonableness of police conduct.” Hardister v. State, 849 

N.E.2d 563, 573 (Ind. 2006). “We consider three factors when evaluating 

reasonableness: ‘1) the degree of concern, suspicion, or knowledge that a 

violation has occurred, 2) the degree of intrusion the method of the search or 

seizure imposes on the citizen’s ordinary activities, and 3) the extent of law 

enforcement needs.’” Robinson, 5 N.E.3d at 368 (quoting Litchfield v. State, 824 

N.E.2d 356, 361 (Ind. 2005)).

[25] With respect to the degree of concern, suspicion, or knowledge that a violation 

has occurred, the BMV report listed the vehicle registration as expired and 

operating a vehicle with an expired registration is an infraction that exists. As 

for the degree of intrusion, we cannot say that Starr, which is relied upon by 

Dowdy and discussed above, warrants a finding that the degree of intrusion was 

high. The record reveals that Officer Taylor asked Dowdy if he “wouldn’t 

mind giving [him] his identification” and that Officer Taylor either received his 

identification or wrote down his name and date of birth. Transcript Volume II 

at 14. With respect to the extent of law enforcement needs, we observe that a 

police officer’s ability to search for outstanding warrants is important for 

officers to ensure the safety of the public. Further, upon discovering that 

Dowdy had warrants for his arrest, Officer Taylor conducted a search of 

Dowdy’s person. As noted, Dowdy does not argue that the search that revealed 

the pills did not constitute a valid search incident to arrest. Under the totality of 

the circumstances, we conclude that the stop and search was reasonable and did 
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not violate Dowdy’s rights under Article 1, Section 11 of the Indiana 

Constitution.6 See Croom, 996 N.E.2d at 442-443 (observing that the lack of 

registration information made an officer suspicious that the defendant’s car was 

not validly registered, balancing the high degree of concern, suspicion, or 

knowledge that a violation occurred and the needs of law enforcement against 

the low degree of intrusion, and concluding that the officer had reasonable 

suspicion under Article 1, Section 11). 

Conclusion

[26] For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the denial of Dowdy’s motion to suppress. 

[27] Affirmed.

May, J., and Pyle, J., concur.

 

6 Dowdy argues that, once Officer Taylor verified the registration was still valid, nothing in the record 

justified any further inquiry as the reason for the traffic stop no longer existed. The record reveals, that when 

asked if at any point it came to his attention that the license plate’s expiration date was the same as the date 

of the actual traffic stop, Officer Taylor answered: “Somebody – I thought of it. I think it stood out to me 

obviously when I went to write the report.” Transcript Volume II at 15. However, Dowdy does not point to 

the record to suggest that Officer Taylor determined that the registration was valid prior to requesting his

identification or discovering that there were warrants for his arrest.