Reliance National I nsuranc e Company is a n impaired car

rier as define d i n t h e i n s uranc e 1 code. SeeTe x. I ns . Co de Ann. art . 21. 28 -C , § 5( 9) (We st Supp . 200 5) . Be c a us e of the imp a ir

me nt, Texas P r o p e r

ty & Ca s u a lt y I nsuranc e Gua

ranty Association is responsible for discharg ing Re liance’ s policy obligations. See id. § 8(b). We cite the curr ent subsections of a rticle 21.28-C be cause the “impaire d car

rier” d e f in it io n a n d TPCI GA’s duty

to “dischar g e the policy

obligations of the impaired insurer” are unchang ed fr om the subsections in eff ect whe n suit was filed. 

### TEXA S C OU R T OF A PPEAL S, THIR D DIST R ICT , AT AU STIN

NO. 03-05-00309- CV

TPC IGA , f

or Re lia nc e Na ti ona l Inde mn it y Co mp any , App e lla nt

v. Magdalena F ord Morr ison a/ n/f of E ric F ord, Appellee

F ROM THE COUNTY COURT A T LAW NO. 2 OF TRAVIS COUNTY NO. 28049 1, HO NORAB LE DAVID PH ILLIP S, JUDGE PRESI DING

O P I N I O N
Th e iss ue pr e se nte d is ho w lon g wo rk e rs ’ c omp e ns a tio n de a th b e ne fi ts a re pa y a ble to a dec ease d employ ee ’s m i n or, depe ndent stepchild. Texas Property & Ca sualty

I nsuranc e Guar anty As s o c ia ti o n ( T PC I G A ) , r e p r e s e nti n g

a n im p a ir e d w o r kers’ compensation carr ier, contends 1 that beca use Eric For d is a depe ndent, bene fits are limit ed t o 3 6 4 weeks pursuant to the Texas Workers’ Compensation Ac t (the Ac t). SeeTex. L ab. Code Ann. § 408.183( e)( 2)(B ) (West 2006). Ma g da le na

F or d M or

ri so n, a s next fr ie nd of Er ic F or d, c on te nd s that as a mino r E ri c is e nti tle d toWe cite the cur rent sec tion of the statute and a dminist rative r ule bec ause the re ha

ve not 2 been substantive chang es t o them since suit was filed. See Act of May 12, 1993, 73d L eg ., R.S., ch. 269, § 1, sec. 408.183( c)- (d), 1993 Te x . Gen. L aws 987, 1189-90 ( amende d 2005) (curre nt version a t T e x. L a b. Cod e Ann. § 4 08 .1 83 (c )- (d ) ( Wes t 20 06 )) ; c om pa re28 Tex. Admin. C ode § 132.8(b) (2004) with 28 Tex. Admin. C ode § 132.8(b) (2006). The Te x as Workers’ Compensation Comm ission was abolished as of September 1, 2005, 3 and its functions wer e assumed by the division of worker s com p en s at i o n within the Texas Depa rtment of Insuranc e. SeeTex. L ab. Code Ann. § 402.001 ( West 2006). S ince the unde rlying dis pute be g an p ri or

to t he re or g anizatio n, a ll r e fe re nc e s in thi s o pin ion

are to t he Te xas Wo rk e rs ’ Compensation Comm ission. 2 rec ei v e b e n e f

it s u n ti l h e is 1 8 y e ar s o f a g e , o r if h e e n r o ll s a s a f u ll

- ti me s tu d e n t a t an acc redited educational institution, until he is 25 year s of ag e. Se e id
. § 408.183(c) , (d); 28 Te x . Admin. Code § 132.8(b). 2 Af

t e r t h e T e xa s W o r

k e r s ’ C o mp e n s a t i o n C o m m i s s i o n r u l e d th a t E r i c w a s o nly 3 entitled to death bene fits for 364 we eks, Morrison a ppeale d to the Travis Count y court at law. On stipulated fac ts, the parties f i l ed cross-motions for summary judgme nt. The cour

t reve rsed the Commi ssion’s de cision and g rante d summary judgme nt in favor of

Morrison, deny

ing T PCI GA’s summary -judg ment motion. We hold that beca use Eric is a child who was a minor at the time of the insured employ ee’ s death, he was e ntitled to rece ive benefits until age 18, or until ag e 25 so longas he met the r equire ments of sec tion 408.183(d).
BACK GR OUND The pa rties submitted the following ag ree d statement of facts to the trial c ourt under Texas Rule of Civil Procedur e 263:
A. Al l te rm s us e d he re in are me ant to ha ve the ir c omm on us a g e un le ss d e fi ne d in the Texas L abor Code (the Act), i n which case the definition in the Act is to be3 un de rs too d to re fl e c t th e int e nt o f t he pa rt ie s. Th e pa

rt ie s ag re e and

sti pu late to the fo llo wi ngfa c ts: B. Dec ease d, Way

ne Dar lington, died in the course and scope of his employ ment on April 2, 1996, and is the “c laimant” in this case. C
. W ayn e D ar l i n g t o nd i e d a s a r e s u l to f a c o mp e n s a

b l e i n j ur y. D. At the time of his death, Way ne Dar lington was marrie d, throug h a common-la w marria g e to Mag dalena

For d. E. Eric F ord is the son of Ms. Mag dalena For d from a pr ior marr iag e. F. Eric F ord wa s not adopted by Way ne Da rling ton. G. Eric F ord wa s born on . . ., and is there fore a minor. H. Eric F ord wa s Way

ne Da rling to n’s depe ndent stepson at the time of Way ne Dar lington’s de ath. I
. Death b en ef

i t s were paid to Eric For d as a pr oper le g al bene ficiar y of the c la ima nt. J
. Eric F ord’s de ath bene fits were discontinued after 364 we eks, rather than continuing until his eig hteenth birthday or until his twenty -fifth birthday if he we re a fu ll- tim e stu de nt.
SeeTe x. R. C iv. P. 2 63 . Way ne Da rl ing ton wa s an e mpl oy e e of

Al lst a te , Inc ., a t th e tim e of his de a th. Re lia

nc e Natio na l I nd e mni ty

Com pa ny wa s th e c arr ie r t

hat in sure d A lls tate . B e c a us e of its impairment, TPCI GA is responsible f or dischar g ing Re liance’ s p o l icy obligations. SeeTe x. Ins . Code Ann. ar

t. 21.28-C, § 8(b) (West Supp. 2005). T P C I GA an d

M o rr i s o nfi l edcr o s s -m o t i o n s fo r s u m m ary j u d gm en t
. Fo l l o wi n g a hear ing, the trial court de nied TPCI GA’s s u mm a ry judgme nt motion and gr anted summary judgme nt in f avo r o f M or

ri so n w ith out st a tin g the g ro un ds fo r i ts r uli ng . T he c ourt ’s fi na l ju dg me nt s tate s:W e ci t e th e cu rr en t s ec t i o n o f th e st at u t e b ec au s e t h er e h as n o tb ee nan y s u b s t an t i v e c h an ge 4 to it si nce suit wa s filed. SeeAct of Ma y 12, 1993, 73d L eg. , R.S., ch. 275, § 1, sec. 401.011(7) , 4 After consideringthe motions and argument of counsel, and upon considera tion of same , th e Court

ru le d th a t Pla int if

f’ s Cr os s Mo tio n f

or Summary

Judg me nt s ho uld be GR ANTED and De fenda

nt’s Motion fo r S ummary J udg ment should be DE NI ED . I t is therefor e, ORDE RED , A DJUD GE D AN D DE CRE ED that Er ic F or d sh a ll be awa rd e d d e a th be ne fi ts unti l he attain s th e a g e of 18 , o r i f at th a t ti me is e nr oll e d a s a fu ll- tim e student in an ac cre dited educa tion inst itution, unt il the ear liest of: (1 ) the date he c e a se s, fo r a se c on d c on se c uti ve se me ste r, to b e enro ll ed a s a fu lltime student in an acc redited e ducational institution; (2) the date he attains the ag e of 25; or (3 ) the date he die s. This appea l followed.
AN AL YSI S On a pp e a l, TPCI GA argue s that the “ so le re a so n” fo r E ri c ’s de a th b e ne fi ts e lig ibi lity was his s ta

tu s a s D a r li n g to n ’s depe ndent and that the c ourt’s judg ment improperly interpre ted sec tion 408.183 of the Ac t and C o m mission rule 132.8. SeeTex. L ab. Code Ann. § 408.183( e)( 2)(b) ; 28 Tex. Admin. C ode § 132.8(f )(2)
. Morrison contends that the Act’s specific definition of “child” includes a de pendent stepchild such as Eric and applies whene ver the term “c hild” appea rs in any subsequent provision. She then notes that TPCI GA stipulated that Eric was a minor at the time o f Dar lington’s de ath. Th e re fo re , s he ins ist s th a t th e c ourt c orrectly de te rm ine d E ri c ’s c on tin ue d e lig ibi lity

fo r d e a th benef its as a m i n o r ch i l d. SeeTex. L ab. Code Ann. §§ 401.011( 7) (West 2006); 408.182(f) (1) 42003 Tex. Gen. L aws 987, 1131 (a mended 2005 ) (c u rre nt version at Te x . L ab. Code Ann. § 401.011(7) ( West 2006)). W e c i t e t h e cu rr en t s ec t i o n o f th e st at u t e be cau s e th er e h as n o tb ee nan y s u b s t an t i v e c h an ge 5 to it si nce suit wa s filed. SeeAct of Ma y 12, 1993, 73rd L eg ., R.S., c h
. 269, § 1, sec. 408.182(f) (1)( C), 1993 Tex. Ge n. L aws 987, 1189 (ame nded 2005) (cur rent version at T ex . L ab. Code Ann. § 408.182(f

)(1) (C) (West 2006)). 5 (We st 2 00 6) ; 40 8. 18 3( c ), (d ); City of Austi n v . Southwestern Bell Tel. Co. , 92 S.W .3d 434, 442

5 (Tex. 2002) (spec ific statutory definition controls over or dinary meaningof def

ined word)
. St a nd a r d o f R e v ie w

Th e re c or d s ho ws that th e pa rt ie s f ile d a n a g re e d s tate me nt o f f

a c ts a nd su bmi tte d th is
case to the county

court at law “in acc ordanc e with Texas Rule of Civil Procedur e 263.” SeeT e x. R. Civ. P . 263. Be cause the par ties filed an a g ree d statement conta ining “all the rele vant fac ts of the
c a se ,” the iss ue on

a pp e a l invo lve s a

qu e sti on of law, and we re vie w t

he tr ia l c ourt ’s jud g me nt de

novo . C& G

, I n c . v . J o nes , 1 65 S.W. 3d

45 0, 45 3 ( Te x. Ap p. —D a lla s 2 00 5, pe t. d e nie d) ; se e als o Te x. R. C iv. P. 2 63 . A n a g re e d s tate me nt o f f a c ts und e r r

ule 26 3 is “ sim ila

r t o a sp e c ia l ve rd ic t; i t is the parties’ r equest for ju d gm en t u n d er the applicable law.” C& G, Inc

. , 165 S.W .3d at 453 (q u o t i n g State Farm Lloyds v. Kessler , 9 32 S.W. 2d 73 2, 73 5 ( Te x. Ap p. —Fort W or th 1 99 6, wr it denied) ); Abbott v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield of Tex., Inc ., 11 3 S. W.3 d 7 53 , 7 57 (T e x. Ap p. —Aus tin 2003, pet. denied) . I n these c ases, the only issue on appea l is whether the tr ial court prope rly applied the law to the a g ree d fac ts. C& G, Inc

. , 1 6 5 S
. W
. 3 d at 4 5 3 (q u o t i n g Kessler , 932 S.W .2d at 7 35); Ab bo tt , 113 S.W. 3d a t 757. Stip ulatio ns in an a g re e d ca se are bin din gon the pa rt ie s, the tr ia l c ourt , and the revie wing court. Travelers Inde m. Co. v. Starkey , 157 S.W .3d 899, 904 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2005, pet. denied)
.The ter m “depe ndent” is def

ined as “ an individual who re ceiv es a reg ular or r ecur ring 6 economi c b e n e f

it th a t c o n tr ib u te s s u

b s ta n ti a ll y to th e in d iv id

u a l’ s w e lf

ar e an d li v e li h o o d if

the individual is eligible” f

or the distribution of death benefits. Tex. L ab. Code Ann. § 401.011( 14)

6 Our re view re quires ana ly sis of the provisions of t he Act and the a dminist rative c ode. Th e g oa l of

statut or y c on str uc tio n is to g ive e ff

e ct to le g isl a tiv e int e nt. Continental C as. Co. v. Downs , 81 S.W .3d 803, 805 (Tex. 2002). Unless a statute is ambig uous, we discern that intent from the languag e of the statute itself. Id .; see also Tex. Gov’t Code Ann. § 311.011(a) (W est 2005). Reg ardle ss of whethe r the statute is ambig uous, we may consider the object soug ht to be attained, the circ umstances unde r which the statute was enac ted, the leg islative history , the common law or former stat u t o ry p rovisions, the conseque nces of a par ticular c onstruction, the administrative construction of the statute, and the title (c aption), pre amble, and e merg ency provision. Tex. Gov’t Code Ann. § 311.023 (West 2005). Fur ther, we consider

the statute as a

whole, not its provisions in isolation. Downs , 81 S.W .3d at 805.

We c on str

ue a dmi nis tr a tiv e ru le s, wh ic h have the same fo rc e a s st a tut e s, in t he same
manner as statutes. R o d

r i g u ez v. Serv ice Lloyds Ins. Co. , 9 9 7 S. W. 2 d 2 4 8 , 2 5 4 ( T e x. 1 9 9 9 )
. We must ensure that the ag ency has i nterpre ted its rule in harmony with its enabling statute. Continental Cas . Co . v . R iv e ra , 124 S.W .3d 705, 710 (Tex. App.—Austin 2003, pet. denied).
Child ’s Deat h Benef

its Under Act

and Comm ission Rules “Child” and “E ligible Ch ild”

One’ s status as a child is a function of one’ s relationship to the pare nt, not one’s ag e;
un de r t he Ac t, t he te rm “ c hil d” inc lud e s a

bio log ic a l so n or da

ug hte r, an ad op te d ch ild , or a ste pc hil d who was f

in ancia lly depende nt on the dec ease d employ ee. T ex. L ab. Code Ann. § 401.011( 7).

6(West 2006). 7

Howeve r, an a dult child is not elig ible for de ath bene fits unless she is a full-time student (up to the ag e of 25) , or is disabled, or is still f inancially depende nt on the pare nt f or some other re ason. Id
. § 408.182(f) (1).

An “ e lig ibl e c hil d” is a lso de fi ne d in the Ac t: (f) I n this section: (1 ) “ El ig ibl e c hil d” me ans a c hil d o f a

de c e a se d e mpl oy e e if

the c hil d is : (A) a minor; (B ) enrolled a s a full-time student in an a ccr edited educ ational institut ion and is less than 25 y ear s of ag e; or (C) a depe ndent o f t he dec ease d employ ee a t the time of the employ ee’ s death.
Id. § 408.182(f) (1).

B e c a u s e t h e d e f

i n i t i o no f “ c h i l d ” i ns e c t i o n4 0 1
. 0 1 1 ( 7 ) o f th e A c t i n c l u d e s o n l y a stepchild “who is a de pendent of the employ ee,” TPCI GA ig nores the al t er n ati ve def inition of

“ e lig ibl e c hil d” a s a

min or and argue s th a t E ri c is a

n “ e lig ibl e chi ld ” so le ly

be c a us e he wa s a depende nt of Dar lington. Id. §§ 401.011(7), 408.182( f)( 1)(C). We disag ree . As a “ child” of Dar lington, Eric was e ligible f or bene fits beca

use he w as a minor. Eric’ s classification as a “child,” for purposes of t he Act, was based on his status as Da rl i n gt o n ’s d ep en d en ts t ep ch i l d ; h i s e l i g i b i l i ty fo r d ea thb en ef

i t s wa s n o tb as edo nh i s b ei n g a depende nt but on his being a minor. Eric is a “ child” under section 401.011(7) beca

use, ac cording8

to the stipulation, he was Dar lington’s depende nt stepson. See id. § 401.011(7). The re is nothing in section 408.182’s plain languag e to sug g est that a de pendent stepc hild, such as E ri c, s h o uld be tr e a te d d if

fe re ntl y tha n a ny oth e r “ c hil d” wh o is e lig ibl e fo r d e a th b e ne fi ts. I n fa c t, the op po sit e is tr ue . Se c tio n 4 08 .1 82 (f

)( 1) state s th a t an “ e lig ibl e c hil d” is a ny “ c hil d” wh o is e ith e r a

min or , a fu lltim e stu de nt who is le ss tha n 25 y e ars of a g e , or a de pe nd e nt of the de c e a se d e mpl oy e e a t th e tim e
o f th e e mp lo y e e ’ s death. Id. § 408.182(f) (1)( A)-( C). Section 408.182(f) (1) simply uses the statutorily defined t er m “child,” a

nd does not distinguish betwe en an a dopted child, a biolog ical
c h il d , o r a d e p e n d e n t s te p c h il d
. A n y mi n o r c h il d ’ s e li g ib il it

y f o r b e n e f it s is g o v e r

n e d b y s e c tion 408.182(f) (1)( A). Id
. On the oth e r h and , th e Ac t do es n ot discriminate betwe en the e ligibility of a minor child and an a dult child. A child who was no long er a minor on the date of

an employ ee’ s death is not elig ible for death benefits unless that child (1) is under 25 year s of ag e and is e nrolled
a s a fu l l

- t i m e s tu d e n ta tana c c r e d i t e d e d u c a t i o n a l i n s t i tu t i o no r

( 2 ) c o n t i nu e d

t o b e f i n a nc ia lly depende nt as an a dult based on a disability or for some other r eason. Id
. I t is su g g e ste d th a t a

c hil d ma y be c on sid e re d a

n e lig ib le chi ld by

simult ane ou sly
me e tin g mor e tha

n on e c on dit ion of e lig ibi lity un de r se c tio n 40 8. 18 2( f) (1 ). Ho we ve r, it i s unli ke ly that th e le g isl a tur e int e nd e d to re nd e r i ne ff e c tiv e se c tio n 4 08 .1 83 pe rt a ini ngto t he dura tio n a c hil d is to r ec ei v e death benef

its. SeeT ex . Go v ’t C o d e A n n . § 3 1 1
. 0 2 1 (4 ) ( W es t2 0 0 5 ) ( “In e n ac t i n g a statute, it is presumed that a result fea sible of execution is intended.”)
. The pe ri o do f d u ration
s p e c i f i e d i ns e c t i o n4 0 8
. 1 8 3 v ar i e s b a s e d u p o nth e r e a s o nf

o r e l i g i b i l i ty: (c ) A chi ld who is el ig ibl e fo r d e a th b e ne fi ts be c au sethec hil d is a m ino r o nthe date of the employ ee’ s death is e ntitled to rec eive benef its until the child attains the ag e of 18.9

(d) A child eligible for death benefits under Subsection (c) who at ag e 18 is enrolled a s a fu ll- tim e stu de nt i n an a c c re dit e d ed uc a tio na l insti tut ion or a c hil d who is e lig ibl e fo r d e a th be ne fi ts be c a us e on the date of

the e mpl oy e e ’s de a th t

he c hil d is e nr o l l e d a s a f

u l l

- t i m e s tu d e n t i n an a c c r e d i t e d e d u c a t i o n a l i n s t i tu tio n is entitled to rec eive or

to co n t i n u e to re ceive , as appr opriate, be nefits until the ear liest of: (1) the date the child cea ses, for a s econd consec utive semester , to be enr olled as a f ull-time student in an acc redited e ducational institution; (2) the date the child attains the ag e of 25; or (3 ) the date the c hil d d ie s. (e ) A ch ild wh o is elig ibl e fo r de a th b e ne fi ts be c au se the c hil d is a de pe nd e nt of the dece ased e mploy ee on the d at e o f t he employ ee’ s death is entitled to rec eive benef its unti l the ear lier of: (1) the date the child dies; or (2 ) if the c hil d is de pe nd e nt: ( A ) b e c a u s e t h e c h i l d

i s ani n d i v i d

u a l w i tha p h ys i c a l o r

m e n t a l d i s a

b i l i ty, the date the child no longe r has the disa bility ; or (B ) be c a us e of a re a so n othe r tha

n a phy sic a l or m e nta l di sa bil ity , th e date of the e xpir a tio n o f 3 64 we e ks of de a th b e ne fi t pa

y me nts
. Id. § 408.183 (c) -(e ) (e mphasis added)
. I f t h e thre e elig ibilit y cate g ories we re ove rlappingrathe r than exclu s iv e , it w o u ld b e im p o s s ib le to d e te r

mi n e h o w lo n g a c h il d w h o is b o th a mi n o r and a depende nt would rec eive death benefits. Com pa reid
. § 408.182(f) (1)( A) with § 408.182(f) (1)( C). No su c h c on fu sio n re su lts if we int e rp re t se c tio n 4 08 .1 82 (f )( 1) a s se tti ngfo rt

h thre e e xclu siv e se ts of e lig ibi lity

fo r d e a th b e ne fi ts. Th e fi rs t se t in c lud e s all minor children. Se e id
. § 408.182(f) (1)( A). The sec ond set includes all non-minor c hildren who a re le ss than t we n t y -five year s of ag e and enrolled as full-time students at acc redited e ducational institutions. Se e id . § 408.182(f) (1)( B) . The10

third set consists of all children who wer e not mi n o rs but remaine d depende nt on a dec ease d employ ee at the time of the employ ee’ s death. Se eid . § 408.182(f) (1)( C).

Th e Com mis sio n’ s r

ule pe rt a ini ngto a

c hil d’ s e lig ibi lity

to r e c e ive de a th b e ne fi ts i s consistent with this re ad i n g t h at t h e thre e sets of e ligibility for a child are exclusive and do not overla p. See 28 Tex. Admin. Code § 132.4 (2006). The Texas Reg ister re flec ts the Commi ssion’s int en t b eca

use it contains notice of

the rule when propose d, the Commiss ion’s explanation of the rule, a nd any response to public comment about the rule
. See R odriguez , 997 S.W .2d at 254. The prea mble to Commi ssion rule 132.4 in the Texas Reg ister clar ifies the intended me aningof the rule : “The new se ction [132.4] sets out how a person must prove that he or she w as a c hild of the dec ease d
wo rk e r, and that a

c hil d who is not a minor, but a depende nt , f ull -t ime stu de nt, or

ha nd ic a pp e d c hil d must also submi t proof to re ceive death be nefits.” 15 Te x . Reg . 5005 (1990), adopted 1 5 T ex . R eg. 7023 (1 990) (c odified at 28 Te x . Admin. Code § 132.4) (e mphasis added) . The Commission’s
a pp e a ls p ane l a lso c on c lud e d, “ An e lig ibl e c hil d, purs ua

nt t o A c t [se c tio n] 40 8. 18 2( f) , c an f it i nto
one of three cate g ories: a minor, a n under- 25 student, or a de pendent at the time of death.” Texas Workers’ Comp. Comm’n, No. 033232-s, 2004 TX W rk
. C o m p. L EXI S 142, at *6 (J anuar y 29, 2004) (e mphasis added)
.

We h old that th e tr ia l c ou rt di d no t err in c on c lud ingthat E ri c is a c hil d w ho is elig ible to rec eive de ath bene fits beca use he w as a minor.
Duration o

f D e ath Be ne

fi ts TPCI GA insists that even as a minor Eric is only

elig ible for be nefits beca

use he wa s D ar l i n g t o n ’ s d e p e n d e n t , an d b e c a u s e h e d o e s n o t s u f

f e r f r o man y p h ys i c a l o r

m e n t a l d i s a

b i l i ty,11

section 408.183(e )(2) (B ) limits hi s death be nefits to 3 6 4 we eks. Tex . L ab. Code Ann. § 408.183(e) (2)( B) . TPCI GA re lies on the dec ision of the Commi ssion’s appea ls pa nel af firming the hearing office r’s decision to support its rea ding of the s tatute. Tex as Workers’ Comp. Com m’n, No. 033232-s, 2004 TX Wrk. Com p . L E XIS 1 4 2 , at *7-8. That panel cited its 1994 rulingthat ste pc hil dr e n w ho fa ile d to pr ov e the ir de pe nd e nc y

status are no t e nti tle d to de a th ben efi ts a nd its 2000 ruling that “a nonbiologica l or non-adoptive child of an injured worke r may onl y re cover benef its if that person is a depe ndent stepchild of the de cea sed.” Id
. at *4-6. The panel’s 1994 and 2000 ruling s simply

held that a stepc hild who did not carry his burden of e stablishing that he w as
a de pe nd e nt w a s no t a “ c hil d” and a pa rt y wh o is no t a

“ c hil d” is n ot e lig ibl e to r e c e ive de a th b e ne fi ts under the Act. Tex. L ab. Code Ann. § 408.182(f) (1). In this case, howe ver, it wa s stipulated that Eric wa s a depe ndent and the Commission does not disput e that he is a ch i l d u n d er the Act. The issue here is not whether Er ic is elig ible to rec eive be nefits but how l o n g h e i s entitled to rec eive be ne fi ts. Th e 19 94 and

20 00 ru lin g s d o n ot s up po rt the pa ne l’ s r uli ngthat E ri c wa s e lig ibl e fo r d e a th benef its as a depe ndent, rather than a s a minor child. Under our construc tion of sections 408.182 a n d 4 0 8
. 1 8 3 , E r ic ’ s s tatus as Dar lington’s depende nt is only

rele vant in deter

mining his status as a c hild. As a child, he is “ elig ible” to re ceive b en ef i t s b ec au s e h e w as a m i n o r a t t h e ti m e of Da rl i n gt o n ’s d ea th
. T h er e i s n o th i n g i nth e l an gu age of sections 4 0 8
. 1 8 2 an d 4 0 8
. 1 8 3 to s u g g e s t t

h a t c e rta in

ty p e s o f c h il dr e n , s u c ha s d e p e n d e nt stepchildren, a

re to be treated diffe rently than other children. Acc ording ly , once it is established that Eric is a minor and a child, then he must be treated li ke any other mi nor child. The statute a ssumes that a ll mi n o r

c h il dr e nar e d e p e n d e n t; e v e r y mi n o r c h il d ’ s e li g ib il it

y is g o v e r n e d b y s e c tion 408.182(f) (1)( A), a

nd the duration of his benefits is g overne d by section 408.183(c ) and ( d). Our12

construction does not re nder se ction 408.183(e) meaning less, it merely limit s its application to nonminor, depende nt children.

Eric is elig ible to r ece ive death benef its be cause he is a c hild who was a minor on the date of Da rl ingto n’s death. Ac c or din g ly , th e tr ia l c ourt c or re c tly a pp lie d s e c tio n 4 08 .1 83 wh e n it de te rm ine d th a t:
Eric F ord shall be a

war ded death benef

its unti l he attains the ag e of 18, or if at that tim e [he ] is e nr oll e d a s a

fu ll- tim e stu de nt in an a c c re dit e d e du c a tio n ins tit uti on , unti l the ea rliest of: (1 ) the date he c e ases , for a se c on d c on se c uti ve se me ste r, to b e e nr oll e d a s a fu lltime student in an acc redited e ducational institution; (2) the date he attains the ag e of 25; or (3 ) the date he die s.
Se e id . § 408.183(c) -(d)
. CO NC LU SION

Havingfound that the c ounty court at law cor

rec tly applied the law to t he stipulated fac ts in thi s case , we a ffirm the judg ment in Morrison’s favor.

J an P. Patterson, J ustice Be fore J ustices B . A. Smith, P atterson a nd Pury ear Affir med Filed: May

12, 2006