FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

ZHIRAYR LALAYAN, AGHUNIK 

YEGHIAZARYAN, SERZH LALAYAN,

SAMSON LALAYAN, and A.L.,

Petitioners,

v.

MERRICK B. GARLAND, Attorney 

General,

Respondent.

No. 18-73062

Agency Nos.

A208-601-349

A208-601-286

A208-601-287

A208-601-288

A208-601-289

OPINION

On Petition for Review of an Order of the

Board of Immigration Appeals

Argued and Submitted March 11, 2021

San Francisco, California

Filed July 13, 2021

Before: J. Clifford Wallace, Ronald M. Gould, and 

Michelle T. Friedland, Circuit Judges.

Opinion by Judge Wallace
2 LALAYAN V. GARLAND

SUMMARY*

Immigration

Denying Zhirayr Lalayan, his wife Aghunik 

Yeghiazaryan, and their children’s petition for review of the 

Board of Immigration Appeals’ decision affirming an 

immigration judge’s denial of asylum, withholding of 

removal, and protection under the Convention Against 

Torture, the panel held that substantial evidence supported 

the adverse credibility determination as to Lalayan, based on 

implausibilities in the record, and as to Yeghiazaruan, based 

on her evasive and non-responsive testimony, and that 

substantial evidence supported the denial of withholding and 

CAT relief. 

The panel first clarified the law concerning 

implausibility findings. The panel explained that inherent 

plausibility in the context of adverse credibility 

determinations refers to the inherent believability of 

testimony in light of background evidence. The panel wrote 

that an IJ must provide specific and cogent reasons, 

including citations to record evidence, in support of an 

implausibility finding, and may not base that finding on 

speculation or conjecture. In addition, the IJ must provide a 

witness an opportunity to explain a perceived implausibility 

during the merits hearing. The panel wrote that the cited 

evidence in the record, including a witness’s own testimony, 

need not conclusively establish that the witness’s testimony 

is false, and the IJ’s implausibility finding will ultimately 

* This summary constitutes no part of the opinion of the court. It 

has been prepared by court staff for the convenience of the reader.
LALAYAN V. GARLAND 3

hinge on the application of a reasonable evaluation of the 

testimony and evidence based on common sense. The panel 

explained that this mix of constraints and flexibility enables 

an IJ to challenge a witness on a perceived implausibility and 

discredit unbelievable testimony, while guarding against 

unwarranted assumptions that are untethered from evidence 

in the record or based not on common sense but rather on 

cultural differences. Applying that framework to the 

agency’s implausibility determination, the panel concluded 

that the IJ reasonably applied common sense, gave specific 

and cogent reasons for finding Lalayan’s testimony 

implausible, and provided Lalayan ample opportunity to 

address the perceived implausiblities. The panel held that 

evidence therefore did not compel reversal of the adverse 

credibility determination as to Lalayan.

The panel also held that substantial evidence supported 

the IJ’s adverse credibility determination as to Yeghiazaryan 

based on her evasive and non-responsive testimony. 

Observing that the Board characterized this finding as a 

demeanor finding, and that this circuit has similarly 

characterized evasiveness and non-responsiveness as 

demeanor findings, the panel recognized that the REAL ID 

Act differentiates between the demeanor and responsiveness 

of a witness. The panel wrote that regardless of how the 

agency characterized the finding, however, the special 

deference this circuit provides for demeanor findings was 

not relevant here, because such deference applies only to 

non-verbal, and therefore non-textual, factors, and the IJ’s 

determination was based on verbal factors which were clear 

from the text of the hearing transcript. The panel wrote that 

the IJ’s finding was based on numerous identified instances 

of Yeghiazaryan’s evasiveness and non-responsiveness. 

The panel also concluded that the IJ provided Yeghiazaryan 

fair notice of any perceived evasiveness and non-
4 LALAYAN V. GARLAND

responsiveness by asking repeated questions on the point of 

concern, and admonishing Yeghiazaryan for not answering 

the question.

The panel held that substantial evidence supported the 

agency’s denial of withholding of removal and CAT 

protection. First, the panel explained that the credibility 

determination was dispositive as to past persecution. As to 

future persecution, the panel concluded that it was not clear 

that Lalayan holds the political opinion for which he claimed 

he would be persecuted, and while the country reports and 

news articles indicated that political corruption and human 

rights abuses exist in Armenia, they failed to establish that 

Lalayan would more likely than not be persecuted upon 

removal to Armenia on account of his stated political 

opinion. Recognizing that an adverse credibility 

determination does not, by itself, necessarily defeat a CAT 

claim, the panel agreed with the agency that the country 

reports failed to establish that Lalayan faced a particularized 

risk of torture.

COUNSEL

Artem M. Sarian (argued), Sarian Law Group APLC,

Glendale, California, for Petitioners.

Colin J. Tucker (argued), Trial Attorney; Song Park, Acting 

Assistant Director; Office of Immigration Litigation, Civil 

Division, United States Department of Justice, Washington, 

D.C.; for Respondent.
LALAYAN V. GARLAND 5

OPINION

WALLACE, Circuit Judge:

Petitioners Zhirayr Lalayan (Lalayan), his wife Aghunik 

Yeghiazaryan (Yeghiazaryan), and their three children Serzh 

Lalayan, Samson Lalayan, and A.L., a minor, (collectively, 

the Petitioners) seek review of the final order of the Board 

of Immigration Appeals (Board or BIA), which affirmed the 

Immigration Judge’s (IJ) denial of Lalayan’s applications for 

asylum, withholding of removal, and protection under the 

Convention Against Torture (CAT).1 We have jurisdiction 

pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1252. “We review factual findings, 

including adverse credibility determinations, for substantial 

evidence.” Garcia v. Holder, 749 F.3d 785, 789 (9th Cir. 

2014). “Factual findings ‘are conclusive unless any 

reasonable adjudicator would be compelled to conclude to 

the contrary.’” Id., quoting 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(4)(B). 

“When the BIA conducts its own review of the evidence and 

law . . . , our review is limited to the BIA’s decision, except 

to the extent that the IJ’s opinion is expressly adopted.” 

Shrestha v. Holder, 590 F.3d 1034, 1039 (9th Cir. 2010) 

(citation and quotation marks omitted). We deny the 

petition.

I.

The Petitioners are natives and citizens of Armenia. On 

or about November 28, 2015, they entered the United States 

from Mexico and applied for admission at the port of entry 

at San Ysidro, California. The Department of Homeland 

Security served the Petitioners with Notices to Appear in 

1 The Board also denied the Petitioners’ motion to terminate 

proceedings. The Petitioners do not challenge that decision on appeal.
6 LALAYAN V. GARLAND

immigration court, which alleged that they did not possess

valid United States entry documents and charged them with 

removability pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(7)(A)(i)(I). On 

May 27, 2016, the Petitioners appeared before the IJ 

represented by counsel, admitted to the notices’ allegations, 

and conceded that they were removable. Lalayan submitted 

applications for asylum, withholding of removal, and CAT 

protection, and he identified the other Petitioners as 

derivative beneficiaries.

In the applications, Lalayan claimed that he was 

persecuted in Armenia because of his political opinion and 

that he fears that he will be persecuted and tortured if 

removed to Armenia. In his declaration in support of his 

applications, Lalayan described harm that he and his family 

suffered after he reported members of the Yerkrapah 

Volunteer Union (the Union) for embezzling aid provided by 

the United Methodist Committee on Relief (UMCOR) 

intended for Armenians in need.

On October 17, 2016, the IJ conducted the first of two 

merits hearings. Lalayan testified that in 2001, he began 

working as a driver for the Armenia mission of UMCOR, a 

global non-profit organization headquartered in New York. 

According to Lalayan, one of the mission’s objectives is to 

provide aid to lower income families, sometimes through 

intermediary Armenian organizations. In 2008, Lalayan was 

promoted to the position of warehouse officer. In addition 

to working for UMCOR, Lalayan had been a member of the 

Union since 1997. According to Lalayan, the Union was 

founded to help “families of those warriors who were killed 

during” the Nagorno-Karabakh War, as well as disabled 

persons and other lower-income families. Lalayan testified 

that the Union now wields “very strong . . . political power” 

in Armenia. The Union receives aid from UMCOR and 
LALAYAN V. GARLAND 7

distributes it among its members and their families. In 2014, 

Lalayan was appointed as the vice chairman of the Union’s 

Avan branch.

In the summer of 2015, Lalayan received a job offer for 

a one-year position in Mexico, and in October 2015, he 

traveled to Mexico for about two weeks to learn more about 

the position. Upon returning to Armenia, Lalayan prepared 

to move to Mexico to start the new position and notified 

UMCOR and the Union of his plans. Lalayan gathered 

records related to his positions at UMCOR and the Union to 

present to the persons who would take over his 

responsibilities at each organization. Lalayan testified that 

when he reviewed those records, he discovered the Union’s 

practice of embezzling a portion of the UMCOR aid 

intended for families in need. On November 4, 2015, 

Lalayan filed a complaint with the prosecutor general of 

Armenia regarding the Union’s alleged embezzlement. He 

reported that three Union members broke into his house that 

same day and forced him to the office of Union chairman 

Manvel Grigoryan, a retired general and former lawmaker in 

Armenia’s National Assembly. He testified that while at 

Grigoryan’s office, Petros Amiryan, the chairman of the 

Union’s Avan branch and Lalayan’s Union supervisor, beat 

Lalayan and threatened to kill him. Lalayan stated that 

Grigoryan threatened to “vanish [his] family” if Lalayan did 

not withdraw his complaint with the prosecutor general’s 

office. After returning home, Lalayan decided not to 

withdraw his complaint because he “wanted to go all the way 

. . . so that they would be punished.” On November 5, 2015, 

Lalayan received a telephone call during which the caller 

threatened to kill Lalayan if he did not withdraw the 

complaint. Lalayan stated that on November 6, 2015, men 

in police uniforms broke into his house and beat him, 

Yeghiazaryan, and their son Serzh Lalayan. The men 
8 LALAYAN V. GARLAND

demanded the original accounting records, copies of which 

Lalayan had attached to his complaint. The men eventually 

secured the documents, ordered Lalayan to withdraw the 

complaint, and threatened to kill his family.

On November 17, 2015, the Petitioners flew from 

Armenia to Russia. They then traveled to Cuba and to 

Mexico on November 26, 2015, and ultimately to the United 

States on November 28, 2015. Lalayan testified that the

police questioned his parents about his whereabouts after he 

left Armenia and beat his father.

During cross-examination, Lalayan was questioned 

about the plausibility of several portions of his account. 

First, the government questioned Lalayan about how he 

could have discovered the Union’s embezzlement scheme 

only just before his scheduled departure from Armenia, after 

working as an UMCOR warehouse officer for seven years. 

Lalayan responded that when he prepared to leave his job at 

UMCOR, he requested that the Union submit its distribution 

list so that he could share it with the person replacing him at 

UMCOR. According to Lalayan, the Union only submitted 

two “very informal papers” that raised his concerns. The 

government asked Lalayan when he last requested the Union 

to submit records of its aid distribution. Lalayan testified 

that he had never previously obtained such distribution 

records from the Union and explained that whenever the 

Union “submitted the list, they were submitting that and 

turning [that] in. But because I was leaving[,] at that time is 

the first time that I looked at this list, so that it wouldn’t be 

my responsibility to turn it in.” However, on redirect 

examination, Lalayan indicated that he regularly reviewed 

distribution records of the various organizations that 

received aid from UMCOR. When Lalayan’s counsel asked 

whether he was “responsible for the [warehouse’s] 
LALAYAN V. GARLAND 9

accounting or [if] there were other people who were also 

taking in . . . the distribution sheets,” Lalayan testified that 

organizations seeking UMCOR aid “would come to the 

office and submit the request. And if there were any kind of 

discrepancies, then I would ask them to submit new papers.” 

Lalayan explained that he was “in charge of [the] warehouse 

at UMCOR . . . , and a lot of people knew me . . . as a diligent 

person. So, I wanted to submit everything correct.” Finally,

Lalayan’s counsel asked him to confirm that the Union 

“basically received the benefits from UMCOR and 

[Lalayan] also had an obligation for UMCOR to give the 

complete details of the accounting,” and Lalayan answered, 

“Yes.”

Second, the government questioned Lalayan about why 

he had not reported his concerns about the Union’s 

embezzlement to anyone at UMCOR’s Armenia mission or 

its headquarters in the United States. When the government 

asked if Lalayan reported his suspicions about the Union’s 

embezzlement to the workers in the UMCOR warehouse in 

Armenia, Lalayan answered that he did not “[b]ecause I was 

not dealing with paperwork.” The government also 

questioned Lalayan about why he felt obligated to report the 

embezzlement when he was about to leave for another job in 

Mexico, and Lalayan stated, “That’s my nature, probably. I 

always help people. I was [a] deputy at [the Union] and a lot 

of people knew me, and I wanted to make clear that I wasn’t 

involved in all that.” When the government asked Lalayan 

why he did not report his concerns to the UMCOR’s 

headquarters in New York after he arrived in the United 

States, Lalayan responded, “I didn’t see the reason to do 

that.”

In addition to the government’s cross-examination, the 

IJ also questioned Lalayan extensively about his decision not 
10 LALAYAN V. GARLAND

to report his concerns to UMCOR. When the IJ asked 

Lalayan why he had not reported his concerns to UMCOR, 

Lalayan replied, “I didn’t want that organization to close 

down.” When the IJ asked why Lalayan thought that 

UMCOR would end the Armenia mission’s operations if he 

reported his concerns, Lalayan answered that the news of the 

Union’s “false activity” might cause UMCOR to reconsider 

whether it can help Armenian individuals in need. The IJ 

then asked whether Lalayan thought that UMCOR would 

eventually learn about Lalayan’s complaint and the Union’s 

embezzlement during any investigation by the prosecutor 

general. Lalayan responded, “First, I didn’t think. I just let 

prosecutor’s office know about that. . . .” Finally, the IJ 

asked whether Lalayan ever tried to contact anyone at 

UMCOR’s New York headquarters to alert the organization 

about the embezzlement. Lalayan replied, “No, because I 

didn’t know the language and I wasn’t very good at 

computers, so I couldn’t do it.” With respect to a potential 

language barrier, the government later asked why Lalayan 

thought an organization that does work in Armenia would 

not have at least one person who could speak Armenian, and 

Lalayan answered, “I have very little time. That’s probably 

why I didn’t follow up, didn’t do more.” The IJ pressed 

Lalayan on his decision not to notify the UMCOR after 

arriving in the United States. Specifically, the IJ asked why 

Lalayan had not notified UMCOR of the Union’s 

embezzlement if, according to his testimony, Lalayan filed 

his complaint because the embezzlement prevented aid from 

reaching Armenian families in need. Lalayan replied, “I 

took those actions as a deputy chief of [the Union’s Avan] 

chapter, not as a worker of UMCOR.” He explained that he 

was concerned not “that UMCOR’s help is not getting there, 

but about those people who stole those goods from [the 

Union].” The IJ also pointed to a letter of recommendation 

written in English that the head of UMCOR’s Armenia 
LALAYAN V. GARLAND 11

mission provided Lalayan before he left Armenia. In light 

of Lalayan’s long history of employment with UMCOR 

outlined in the letter, the IJ again asked Lalayan why he did 

not notify UMCOR’s headquarters of the Union’s conduct, 

especially as it resulted in Lalayan being attacked on two 

occasions. Lalayan answered, “[I]t was my personal matter. 

Why would I bother people there?”

In addition, the IJ and government posed several 

questions to Lalayan that went to the timing of his decision 

to travel to the United States. The government asked him 

about his repeated attempts to obtain United States entry 

documents before finally entering the United States in 

November 2015. Lalayan testified that he had previously 

applied for a United States visa in 1998, 2007, 2013 and on 

November 2, 2015, just two days before the first event that 

gave rise to Lalayan’s claims. He acknowledged that all four 

applications were denied. The IJ also questioned Lalayan 

about when he decided to turn down the job offer in Mexico 

and travel to the United States. Lalayan answered that he 

called the employer in Mexico from Russia a few days after 

departing Armenia to provide notice that he would not be 

taking the job. But when the government had asked Lalayan 

why he did not work in Mexico, he testified about his fear of 

persecution in Mexico and stated that members of Armenia’s 

Republican Party have “people and properties over there” 

and that “[t]hey could have reached [him] over there.” The 

IJ asked Lalayan why he obtained a letter of 

recommendation written in English just before leaving 

Armenia, if he intended at that point to work in Mexico. 

Lalayan answered, “It was kind of like an affidavit for the 

place I was working.”

On February 24, 2017, the IJ conducted the second 

merits hearing. During this hearing, Yeghiazaryan generally 
12 LALAYAN V. GARLAND

corroborated Lalayan’s description of the attack at their 

home on November 6, 2015, and Lalayan’s statement that 

men visited his parents’ home after the Petitioners left 

Armenia. On cross-examination, the government 

questioned Yeghiazaryan about when Lalayan decided to 

decline the job offer in Mexico and when he notified the 

employer of that decision. Yeghiazaryan testified that she 

thought Lalayan made the decision some time after returning 

from Mexico on October 21, 2015. The government 

repeatedly asked Yeghiazaryan when, after returning from 

Mexico, Lalayan notified the prospective employer, and 

Yeghiazaryan answered that it was “[p]robably in 

November.” When the IJ asked Yeghiazaryan how Lalayan 

notified the employer, Yeghiazaryan stated, “I don’t know 

because most of the time he was not informing me or sharing 

with me, you know, the way he did things.” On redirect 

examination, Yeghiazaryan’s counsel asked her to explain 

again when Lalayan notified the prospective employer of his 

decision, and she answered, “That decision probably was 

made during the stay in Moscow. Or on the way, I don’t 

know[,] . . . [b]ecause he was not telling me everything.” 

On recross-examination, the government repeatedly 

questioned Yeghiazaryan about why Lalayan would not 

involve her in the decisions to decline the job offer and 

change the Petitioners’ destination from Mexico to the 

United States, when both decisions would impact 

Yeghiazaryan’s and the family’s future. Yeghiazaryan 

stated, “Well, I cannot respond to this question because it’s 

- I was afraid and scared a lot about the situation. At that 

time[,] he was trying to protect us and, you know, keep us 

aside out of those problems and troubles[.]”

The IJ repeatedly questioned Yeghiazaryan about 

whether Lalayan and Yeghiazaryan had always planned to 

travel to the United States:
LALAYAN V. GARLAND 13

IJ: Was it the plan all along to come to the

United States?

Yeghiazaryan: Well, all we knew that we 

were staying in Moscow just waiting for visas 

or temporary - those permits to enter Mexico 

to go and work there down on the road so the 

decision was made to turn down that position 

and we also knew that wherever we go they 

would be able to find us. So.

IJ: You didn’t answer my question.

Yeghiazaryan: Probably, I don’t understand 

exactlyIJ: Was the plan all along to come to the 

United States?

Yeghiazaryan: No, probably at the end my 

husband decided to come this way because 

this is the most democratic state - meaning 

the country where we could go - be and safe.

IJ: When was that decision made?

Yeghiazaryan: Probably on the way to 

Mexico.

IJ: When were you told?

Yeghiazaryan: Well, he was nervous in 

Moscow, he felt that – constantly he was told 

– he would keep saying I don’t know, where 
14 LALAYAN V. GARLAND

should we go? You know so that finally we’d 

be safe.

IJ: Ma’am, were you part of the decision 

making to come to the United States?

Yeghiazaryan: No, mainly he was the one 

who decided but we came together.

IJ: All right, and when did – when were you 

told that you were coming to the United 

States?

Yeghiazaryan: Probably in Mexico.

The IJ highlighted that the Petitioners were in Mexico only 

for two days before entering the United States and asked 

Yeghiazaryan to confirm that she learned of Lalayan’s 

decision to bring the family to the United States during those 

two days. Yeghiazaryan testified, “It’s not that I found out 

but, you know, I was more – it was more clear that that 

decision was made.”

A.

In September 2017, the IJ denied Lalayan’s applications 

for asylum, withholding of removal, and CAT relief on the 

grounds of adverse credibility determinations and Lalayan’s 

failure to submit objective evidence that established a wellfounded fear of future persecution or sufficient likelihood 

that he would be tortured if removed to Armenia.

Although the IJ found that Lalayan’s account of the 

attacks were consistent, she determined that three elements 

of Lalayan’s testimony were implausible. First, the IJ found 

that it was implausible that Lalayan would file a complaint 
LALAYAN V. GARLAND 15

with the prosecutor general’s office about the Union’s 

embezzlement but not notify UMCOR itself. The IJ 

discussed at length the issues in Lalayan’s explanation and

cited his changing answers. The IJ addressed Lalayan’s 

stated concern that if UMCOR learned of the Union’s 

embezzlement, it might end aid operations in Armenia. The 

IJ determined that while Lalayan’s “concerns [were] 

reasonable, his course of action [was] not,” reasoning that 

filing a complaint with the prosecutor general’s office about 

the Union’s embezzlement would likely cause Armenian 

authorities to notify UMCOR, the victim of the 

embezzlement. The IJ also addressed Lalayan’s decision not 

to report his concerns about the Union’s embezzlement to 

UMCOR’s New York headquarters after arriving in the 

United States. The IJ found that Lalayan’s explanation that 

he lacked the technology skills and English proficiency to 

contact UMCOR’s headquarters was unpersuasive. She 

cited Lalayan’s ability to obtain a letter of recommendation 

written in English from UMCOR and his evasive response 

to the government’s question about whether UMCOR’s 

headquarters would have access to at least one person 

proficient in Armenian. Finally, the IJ cited the incongruity 

between, on one hand, Lalayan’s decision to file the 

complaint and refusal to withdraw it because of his 

commitment to making sure the aid was delivered to 

Armenians in need and, on the other, his various 

explanations that he did not notify UMCOR of the 

embezzlement because he “didn't see a reason to do that,” he 

took action as a representative of the Union not UMCOR, 

and he was not concerned with the distribution of UMCOR’s 

aid to Armenians in need but rather the punishment of the 

Union. The IJ concluded that Lalayan’s “lack of interest in 

alerting UMCOR regarding the Union’s embezzlement casts 

doubt on whether a complaint against the Union was ever 

filed with the prosecutor’s office.”
16 LALAYAN V. GARLAND

Second, the IJ found implausible that Lalayan, “a 

warehouse agent of seven years, never looked at the Union’s 

distribution lists until he prepared to leave his position at 

UMCOR.” The IJ cited Lalayan’s “evasive and confusing” 

answer to government’s questions about whether he had ever 

previously reviewed the Union’s distribution records. The 

IJ also highlighted the letter of recommendation written by 

the Armenia mission head, which identified keeping 

inventory of and delivering UMCOR’s aid as Lalayan’s job 

responsibilities, Lalayan’s testimony that he was responsible 

for keeping complete accounting records for the warehouse, 

and his testimony that he instructed organizations applying 

for UMCOR aid to correct their requests if he identified any 

discrepancies. The IJ reasoned it was implausible that 

Lalayan would not then “preserve that same diligence with 

the Union’s documents.” Lastly, the IJ stated that Lalayan’s 

position as a vice chairman of the Union’s Avan branch 

undermined his description of the events, because Lalayan 

“seem[ed] completely disconnected from the Union’s 

undertakings.”

Third, the IJ held Lalayan’s narrative that he only 

decided to come to the United States after spending two days 

in Mexico “implausible given that the decision to leave 

Armenia and travel through several countries with an entire 

family is one that is unlikely to be made without minimal 

forethought.” The IJ identified two bases for this finding. 

She found that Lalayan’s multiple attempts to obtain United 

States entry documents evidenced a “long-standing intent to 

come to the United States” independent of his asylum claim. 

The IJ also determined that Lalayan’s testimony describing 

his eventual decision to travel to the United States did “not 

present a cogent story.” She emphasized that Lalayan 

decided in Russia that the Union would be able to harm him 

and his family in Mexico but then, despite believing Mexico 
LALAYAN V. GARLAND 17

was not safe, traveled there anyway with his family without 

a plan to relocate safely.

The IJ also determined that Yeghiazaryan’s testimony 

was not credible on two grounds. First, the IJ cited 

Yeghiazaryan’s “vague, evasive, and non-responsive” 

answers in response to the IJ’s repeated questions about 

when Lalayan decided to decline the job offer in Mexico and 

whether it was their plan all along to travel to the United 

States. Second, the IJ found it implausible that Lalayan and 

Yeghiazaryan, “a marriage of nearly seventeen years, would 

decide to leave Armenia and travel through three different 

countries without discussing the family’s plans or future” 

and concluded that it is “unlikely that [Yeghiazaryan] would 

not have been made aware of such significant decisions.” 

The IJ reasoned in part that Yeghiazaryan had applied with 

Lalayan for a United States visa on November 2, 2015, and 

that she had family members living in the United States.

Considering the objective evidence submitted in addition 

to Lalayan’s and Yeghiazaryan’s testimony, the IJ held that 

Lalayan has not established harm rising to the level of past 

persecution or a well-founded fear of future persecution.

The IJ denied Lalayan’s claim for CAT relief on the 

grounds of the adverse credibility determinations and 

Lalayan’s failure to provide objective evidence that he 

would more likely than not be tortured if removed to 

Armenia. The IJ determined that Lalayan failed to establish 

past torture. The IJ concluded that while the country 

condition reports and news articles submitted by Lalayan 

described “Armenia’s ongoing challenges with government 

interference with freedom of assembly and political dissent,” 

they did not establish that Lalayan will more likely than not 

be tortured for holding a political opinion.
18 LALAYAN V. GARLAND

B.

Lalayan appealed from the IJ’s decision and challenged 

her adverse credibility determinations. On January 8, 2019, 

the Board dismissed Lalayan’s appeal and affirmed the IJ’s 

decision based on her adverse credibility determinations and 

Lalayan’s failure to produce objective evidence to establish 

a well-founded fear of future persecution or likelihood of 

torture in Armenia. The Board cited the IJ’s findings that 

Lalayan’s testimony was implausible with respect to his 

decision to file a criminal complaint with the prosecutor 

general’s office but not to notify UMCOR of the suspected 

embezzlement, Lalayan’s discovery of the Union’s 

embezzlement just before his scheduled departure to 

Mexico, and the timing of Lalayan’s decision to travel to the 

United States. The Board generally incorporated the IJ’s 

reasons for her implausibility findings regarding Lalayan’s 

testimony; however, it did not cite the IJ’s statement that 

Lalayan’s 2014 appointment as vice chairman of the Union’s 

Avan branch made it unlikely that he would have been 

unaware of any Union embezzlement scheme. The Board 

also upheld the IJ’s adverse credibility determination with 

respect to Yeghiazaryan’s testimony. It characterized the 

IJ’s description of Yeghiazaryan’s “vague, evasive, and nonresponsive” answers as a “demeanor observation.” The 

Board did not cite the IJ’s finding that it was implausible 

Yeghiazaryan would not be involved in Lalayan’s decisionmaking processes to decline the job offer in Mexico and to 

travel to the United States. The Board also affirmed the IJ’s 

alternative holdings with respect to past persecution and the 

well-founded fear of future persecution, and it affirmed the 

IJ’s denial of CAT relief because Lalayan’s testimony and 

submitted objective evidence “did not demonstrate that he 

faces a particularized risk of torture.”
LALAYAN V. GARLAND 19

II.

The decisions of the IJ and the Board (collectively, the 

Agency) relied in part upon the IJ’s adverse credibility 

determinations, which were based on several implausibility 

findings as well as a finding regarding the way Yeghiazaryan 

answered questions. We address first the Agency’s 

decisions with respect to the implausibility findings.

A.

Our case law addressing implausibility findings in the 

context of adverse credibility determinations can at times 

appear confusing or at odds with itself. In Jibril v. Gonzales, 

423 F.3d 1129 (9th Cir. 2005), we compared four of our 

decisions upholding or rejecting what might seem like 

similar implausibility findings and concluded, “If there is a 

logical way to reconcile the first two decisions with the latter 

two, it is not obvious to us.” Id. at 1136. Of course, one 

helpful response is that it is not the words said but whether 

they are believed. That is, the IJ not only hears words but 

must determine believability under the totality of the 

circumstances. That essential part of the process is not only 

about words that can be captured in a written record but also 

about a determination of believability based on aspects of 

testimony such as body language and tone that only the trier 

of the facts can fully evaluate.

Also, some of our decisions have blurred the distinction 

between inconsistency and implausibility. See, e.g., Lizhi 

Qiu v. Barr, 944 F.3d 837, 845–46 (9th Cir. 2019); see also

Singh v. Lynch, 802 F.3d 972, 976 (9th Cir. 2015) (holding 

that the petitioner’s account of being attacked by Sikh 

militants was both implausible in light of and inconsistent 

with record evidence that Sikh militants had ended armed 

operations). In Lizhi Qiu, we held that substantial evidence 
20 LALAYAN V. GARLAND

did not support any of the Agency’s reasons for its adverse 

credibility determination, including the IJ’s finding that a 

university student who had completed her studies in Indiana, 

was waiting to receive her diploma, and filed her asylum 

application in California could not plausibly reside in a state 

far from her university. 944 F.3d at 845. Although we held 

that the IJ’s finding was based on speculation and conjecture, 

see id., terms associated with impermissible implausibility 

determinations, see Jibril, 423 F.3d at 1135, we adopted the 

Agency’s characterization of the issue as an “inconsistency.” 

Lizhi Qiu, 944 F.3d at 845 (“Neither the IJ nor the 

government asked Petitioner about the inconsistency at the 

merits hearing, so it cannot justify the denial of asylum.” 

(emphasis added)). While the Lizhi Qiu petitioner’s decision 

might have been inconsistent with the IJ’s assumption about 

where a student would reside while waiting for her degree, 

the finding did not identify a conflict between two discrete 

points in the petitioner’s testimony or documentary evidence 

but rather hinged on an assumption regarding what is 

plausible.

B.

“[U]nder the REAL ID Act, IJs must provide specific 

and cogent reasons in support of an adverse credibility 

determination.” Shrestha, 590 F.3d at 1044 (citation and 

quotation marks omitted). “In assessing the ‘totality of the 

circumstances,’ an IJ should discuss which statutory factors, 

including but not limited to ‘demeanor,’ ‘candor,’ 

‘responsiveness,’ ‘plausibility,’ ‘inconsistency,’ 

‘inaccuracy,’ and ‘falsehood,’ form the basis of the adverse 

credibility determination.” Id., citing 8 U.S.C. 

§ 1158(b)(1)(B)(iii). Inherent plausibility in the context of 

adverse credibility determinations refers to the inherent 

believability of testimony in light of background evidence. 
LALAYAN V. GARLAND 21

Jibril, 423 F.3d at 1135. An implausibility finding based on 

“[s]peculation and conjecture cannot form the basis of an 

adverse credibility finding, which must instead be based on 

substantial evidence.” Ai Jun Zhi v. Holder, 751 F.3d 1088, 

1093 (9th Cir. 2014) (alteration in original) (citation 

omitted). An implausibility finding is based on speculation 

and conjecture when the witness’s testimony is 

“uncontroverted by any evidence that the IJ can point to in 

the record.” Jibril, 423 F.3d at 1135. In addition, an IJ 

engages in impermissible speculation and conjecture when 

he or she bases an implausibility finding on an issue that the 

petitioner was not asked to address during the merits hearing. 

Ai Jun Zhi, 751 F.3d at 1093 (holding that the IJ’s suspicions 

about the petitioner’s type of visa were speculation because 

the IJ “never questioned [the petitioner] on the matter” or 

sought “an explanation that might have clarified the 

matter”).

The requirement that an implausibility finding be 

anchored in some record evidence seems to create a tension 

with our usual approach to ascertaining a statement’s 

believability. Outside of the context of evaluating a 

witness’s testimony in immigration proceedings, we 

regularly rely just on common sense to determine that a 

fantastical story is unbelievable. See, e.g., White v. Ryan, 

895 F.3d 641, 669 (9th Cir. 2018) (dismissing as fantastical 

a party’s claim that he was “tortured by biotelemetry 

implants”). Even in the context of immigration proceedings, 

the Board may rely upon its common sense to hold an IJ’s 

factual finding implausible, without citation to the record. 

Rodriguez v. Holder, 683 F.3d 1164, 1170 (9th Cir. 2012) 

(“The BIA may find an IJ’s factual finding to be clearly 

erroneous if it is illogical or implausible, or without support 

in inferences that may be drawn from the facts in the record.” 

(emphasis added) (citation and quotation marks omitted)). 
22 LALAYAN V. GARLAND

In Jibril, we recognized the constraint that this record 

evidence requirement places on IJs in making implausibility 

findings and contemplated the following:

Although “speculation and conjecture” alone 

cannot sustain an adverse credibility finding, 

an IJ must be allowed to exercise common 

sense in rejecting a petitioner’s testimony 

even if the IJ cannot point to specific, 

contrary evidence in the record to refute it. 

Without such latitude, IJs would be bound to 

credit even the most outlandish testimony as 

long as it was internally consistent and not 

contradicted by independent evidence in the 

record.

423 F.3d at 1135. While we observed in Jibril that IJs should 

“be allowed to exercise common sense” without citation to 

“specific, contrary evidence in the record,” id., we 

nonetheless recognized that “under our current practice, we 

must evaluate the IJ’s implausibility findings to determine 

whether or not they are speculative or conjectural,” id.

at 1136. In that case, the IJ had found it implausible that the 

petitioner could have remained unresponsive while being 

kicked in the head, survived a gunshot wound to the stomach 

overnight, and found a western aid organization’s medical 

facility in Somalia’s capital Mogadishu during a civil war. 

We held in Jibril that the IJ’s implausibility findings could 

“only be characterized as speculative or conjectural” 

because the IJ failed to point to any evidence in the record 

that contradicted the petitioner, such as “medical testimony 

at the hearing to support the IJ’s disbelief of [the petitioner’s] 

stoicism and stamina” or any “basis for the conclusion that 

western aid workers were not active in the city[.] . . .” Id. 

Thus, while Jibril contemplated the benefits of allowing IJs 
LALAYAN V. GARLAND 23

to rely on common sense without citing evidence 

controverting the testimony to reach an implausibility 

finding, we ultimately applied the record evidence 

requirement.

Considering Jibril and our other decisions addressing 

implausibility in the context of credibility determinations, 

we identify two points with respect to the manner in which 

IJs may reach an implausibility finding. First, while an IJ 

must cite contrary evidence in the record, an implausibility 

finding still hinges on the application of common sense, and 

this understanding is consistent with the text of the REAL 

ID Act. In Jibril, we stated that “no consistent line . . . has 

been drawn between an IJ’s legitimate application of 

common sense, on the one hand, and an IJ’s reliance on 

‘speculation or conjecture’ in determining that a fact alleged 

by a petitioner is implausible on the other.” 423 F.3d 

at 1135. While Jibril confirmed that an IJ must cite evidence 

in the record contrary to a witness’s testimony to avoid 

engaging in speculation and conjecture, it recognized the 

record evidence requirement as a complement to, not a 

substitute for, an IJ’s common sense. Indeed, Jibril’s 

examples of contrary evidence that the IJ could have cited to 

form the basis of a proper implausibility finding—medical 

testimony regarding the petitioner’s stamina or evidence of 

a lack of western aid workers in Mogadishu during the 

relevant time—would not have conclusively proven the 

petitioner’s testimony false but would have required the 

application of a reasonable assumption based in common 

sense. See id. at 1136. The petitioner’s testimony in Jibril

that he received medical treatment from an aid 

organization’s workers would perhaps not be impossible but 

would be implausible in light of record evidence that the 

organization had already evacuated its workers from 

Mogadishu. Thus, Jibril acknowledged that an 
24 LALAYAN V. GARLAND

implausibility does not necessarily arise from an express 

conflict between two points in a petitioner’s testimonial or 

documentary evidence but rather hinges on a reasonable 

assumption based in common sense.

Jibril preceded the REAL ID Act, which now expressly 

authorizes IJs to apply such common sense to reach an 

implausibility finding. In listing the factors that an IJ can 

consider in reaching a credibility determination, the REAL 

ID Act states:

Considering the totality of the circumstances, 

and all relevant factors, a trier of fact may 

base a credibility determination on the 

demeanor, candor, or responsiveness of the 

applicant or witness, the inherent plausibility 

of the applicant’s or witness’s account, the 

consistency between the applicant’s or 

witness’s written and oral statements . . . , the 

internal consistency of each such statement, 

the consistency of such statements with other 

evidence of record (including the reports of 

the Department of State on country 

conditions), and any inaccuracies or

falsehoods in such statements, without regard 

to whether an inconsistency, inaccuracy, or 

falsehood goes to the heart of the applicant’s 

claim, or any other relevant factor.

8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(1)(B)(iii). The statute identifies 

“inherent plausibility” of a witness’s account as a factor 

distinct from various types of inconsistencies, including 

those between a “witness’s written and oral statements” and 

those between a witness’s oral and written statements, and 

“other evidence of record (including the reports of the 
LALAYAN V. GARLAND 25

Department of State on country conditions).” Construing 

our record evidence requirement for implausibility findings 

as demanding an express conflict between a witness’s 

testimony and some other evidence in the record, 

independent from an application of common sense, would 

render the REAL ID Act’s distinction between 

implausibility and inconsistencies meaningless. Although 

canons of statutory interpretation are not mandatory rules, 

we try to give effect to each word and clause in a statute if 

possible. See Chickasaw Nation v. United States, 534 U.S. 

84, 93–94 (2001); see also United States v. Barraza-Lopez, 

659 F.3d 1216, 1220 (9th Cir. 2011). To give meaning to 

the inherent plausibility factor and distinguish it from the 

inconsistency factors, we interpret the REAL ID Act to 

enable IJs to apply common sense to reach an implausibility 

finding.

Thus, a witness’s testimony can satisfy the record 

evidence requirement for an implausibility finding. Our 

decisions upholding implausibility findings often consider 

the plausibility of a witness’s statement in light of 

background evidence such as country condition reports or 

news articles. See, e.g., Singh, 802 F.3d at 976 (upholding 

the IJ’s finding that the petitioner’s account of being 

attacked by Sikh militants in India was implausible 

considering an Amnesty International country report 

indicating that armed Sikh militancy ended years prior). 

However, contrary evidence that can form the basis of an 

implausibility finding is not limited to such country reports. 

Jibril, 423 F.3d at 1135 (“[A] finding made by an IJ that a 

petitioner’s testimony is implausible given the evidence in a 

Country Report or other objective evidence in the record is 

accorded deference.” (emphasis added)); see also id. at 1136 

(suggesting that “medical testimony” could have served as 

record evidence to support the IJ’s implausibility finding). 
26 LALAYAN V. GARLAND

Oral statements, including a witness’s testimony, are clearly 

also evidence in the record, and the REAL ID Act’s 

definition of evidence in the record encompasses a witness’s 

testimony. See 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(1)(B)(iii) (“[A] trier of 

fact may base a credibility determination on . . . the 

consistency of such [written or oral] statements with other 

evidence of record. . . .”). This is consistent with our 

requirement that the IJ provide an opportunity for a witness 

to address a potential implausibility. See Ai Jun Zhi, 

751 F.3d at 1093. Just as a witness’s explanation might 

clarify an issue, see id., his or her failure to provide a 

persuasive explanation or challenge an assumption can serve 

as the basis of an implausibility finding. While Jibril

worried about IJs having to accept “outlandish testimony as 

long as it was internally consistent,” 423 F.3d at 1135, 

simple follow-up questioning regarding a potentially 

implausible account can eliminate the risk of such absurd 

outcomes. In addition, a witness’s testimony on direct, 

cross-examination, or solicited by the IJ’s questioning can 

satisfy any record evidence requirement to support an IJ’s 

implausibility finding.

Thus, when making a credibility determination under the 

REAL ID Act, an IJ may consider, among other factors, the 

inherent plausibility of a witness’s account. Shrestha, 

590 F.3d at 1039, citing 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(1)(B)(iii); see 

also 8 U.S.C. §§ 1231(b)(3)(C) (adopting the standard in 

8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(1)(B) for withholding of removal); 

1229a(c)(4)(C) (all other relief). An IJ must provide specific 

and cogent reasons in support of an implausibility finding 

that forms the basis of an adverse credibility determination. 

See Shrestha, 590 F.3d at 1042. In addition, an IJ must 

provide a witness an opportunity to explain a perceived 

implausibility during the merits hearing. Ai Jun Zhi, 

751 F.3d at 1093. As with “each factor forming the basis of 
LALAYAN V. GARLAND 27

an adverse credibility determination, the IJ should refer to 

specific instances in the record that support a conclusion that 

the factor undermines credibility,” Shrestha, 590 F.3d at 

1044, and an IJ should cite evidence in the record that 

undermines the plausibility of the witness’s testimony, 

Jibril, 423 F.3d at 1135. An IJ must not “cherry pick solely 

facts favoring an adverse credibility determination while 

ignoring facts that undermine that result.” Shrestha, 

590 F.3d at 1040; see also Yan Xia Zhu v. Mukasey, 537 F.3d 

1034, 1040 (9th Cir. 2008) (holding that an IJ’s adverse 

credibility determination was not supported by substantial 

evidence when the “petitioner offered an explanation” for 

the purported implausibility that “the IJ did not address”). 

The cited evidence in the record, including a witness’s own 

testimony, need not conclusively establish that the witness’s 

testimony is false, and the IJ’s implausibility finding will 

ultimately hinge on the application of a reasonable 

evaluation of the testimony and evidence based on common 

sense. See id. at 1136. Factual findings, including 

implausibility findings, “are conclusive unless any 

reasonable adjudicator would be compelled to conclude to 

the contrary.” Garcia, 749 F.3d at 789, quoting 8 U.S.C. 

§ 1252(b)(4)(B).

We recognize that an IJ’s application of common sense 

might rest on unreasonable assumptions or be untethered 

from the evidence in the record. See Lizhi Qiu, 944 F.3d 

at 845; see also Yan Xia Zhu, 537 F.3d at 1040 (holding that 

the IJ’s finding that the petitioner would not have been 

knocked unconscious from a “slap” misstated the 

characterization of the attack in the transcript). Moreover, 

what seems like common sense to an IJ might be rooted in

significant differences between the IJ’s and witness’s 

cultural backgrounds and systems. In Yan Xia Zhu, we held 

that the IJ’s implausibility finding was impermissibly based 
28 LALAYAN V. GARLAND

in speculation and conjecture that a rape victim would 

necessarily see a doctor, and we faulted the IJ for not 

addressing the witness’s explanation for the perceived 

implausibility, that she “dare[d] not” go to a doctor. 

537 F.3d at 1040 (alteration in original). Moreover, a 

concurrence highlighted the greater stigmatization of rape

victims in other countries. See id. at 1046 (Gould, J., 

concurring) (“[R]egrettably, in many parts of the world, a 

young woman’s report of a rape is likely to bring shame and 

discredit upon her and her family, as much as it is likely to 

result in any prosecution of the wrongdoer.”). This mix of 

constraints and flexibility that we have identified enables an 

IJ to challenge a witness on a perceived implausibility and 

discredit unbelievable testimony, while guarding against 

unwarranted assumptions that are untethered from evidence 

in the record or based not on common sense but rather on 

cultural differences.

C.

Having clarified our case law with respect to 

implausibility findings, we turn to the implausibility 

findings in this case. Here, the IJ discussed in detail her 

specific and cogent reasons for finding implausible 

Lalayan’s testimony. Substantial evidence supports the IJ’s 

findings that it is implausible that Lalayan would file a 

complaint with the prosecutor general’s office about the 

Union’s embezzlement against UMCOR but not notify 

UMCOR itself, that he never looked at the Union’s 

distribution lists until he prepared to leave UMCOR, and that 

he decided to come to the United States only during his last 

two days in Mexico. With respect to each of these findings, 

the government and the IJ questioned Lalayan extensively 

about his decisions and his various explanations, and he had 

ample opportunity to address the perceived implausibilities. 
LALAYAN V. GARLAND 29

The Agency cited numerous points of evidence in the record, 

including Lalayan’s testimony, and applied assumptions 

based in common sense to make the implausibility findings.

With respect to Lalayan’s decision not to notify 

UMCOR, the IJ was careful not to assume how UMCOR 

might respond to a report of embezzlement, and the Agency 

instead cited Lalayan’s unpersuasive response to the IJ’s 

question of whether he thought UMCOR would be made 

aware of the prosecution. Lalayan argues that this was 

“clearly speculation by the IJ, as there is no evidence to 

support a finding that a complaint filed with the Prosecutor 

General’s office regarding illicit activities undertaken by the 

Union would automatically place UMCOR on notice.” 

However, as the government correctly points out, the 

Agency never suggested that the mere act of filing the 

complaint would have automatically put UMCOR on notice. 

Lalayan’s understanding of the requisite contrary evidence 

is overly narrow and confuses an inconsistency with an 

implausibility. See supra Part II.B. Additionally, in light of 

his statements discussing his reason for filing the complaint 

and his commitment to ending embezzlement, the Agency 

found implausible Lalayan’s other explanations for his 

decision not to notify UMCOR—that he was primarily 

interested in the Union being punished, not about aid 

reaching Armenians in need, and viewed it as a “personal 

matter.”

With respect to Lalayan’s discovery of the Union’s 

embezzlement just before leaving his position at UMCOR, 

the Agency cited Lalayan’s seven years of experience as an 

UMCOR warehouse officer, his testimony and documentary 

evidence that his UMCOR responsibilities included 

inventorying and delivering aid, and, most importantly, 

Lalayan’s testimony on redirect examination that he was 
30 LALAYAN V. GARLAND

responsible for the warehouse’s accounting, reviewed 

organizations’ distribution sheets, and rejected 

organizations’ requests if they contained discrepancies. 

Lalayan argues that he “likely did not check the distribution 

lists periodically” and suggests that he reviewed the 

distribution sheets more thoroughly in October 2015 so he 

could “leave his post in good standing.” The evidence in the 

record does not support Lalayan’s argument, and moreover, 

we cannot supplant the IJ’s reasonable assumption with any 

alternative explanation offered on appeal.

With respect to Lalayan’s decision to travel to the United 

States, the Agency cited Lalayan’s decision-making process 

after the Petitioners left Armenia, specifically that he 

determined in Russia that Mexico was not safe for his 

family, nevertheless decided to travel to Mexico without 

having a follow-on destination in mind, and only decided to 

travel to the United States during the Petitioners’ two days 

in Mexico. The Agency reasonably applied common sense 

to determine that it was not plausible that Petitioners would

have decided their travel plans in this manner.

The Agency’s ultimate conclusion that Lalayan’s 

account is not plausible must be sustained. The Agency’s 

implausibility findings are supported by evidence in the 

record and are based on reasonable assumptions, even if 

other alternative explanations exist. Any reasonable 

adjudicator would not necessarily be compelled to conclude 

to the contrary.

D.

We need not reach the issue of whether the IJ’s 

implausibility finding regarding Yeghiazaryan’s 

involvement in the decision to come to the United States was 

based on speculation and conjecture. During the merits 
LALAYAN V. GARLAND 31

hearing, Yeghiazaryan testified that Lalayan did not involve 

her in the decision-making process to travel to the United 

States and indicated that Lalayan regularly did not share 

information with her, referring to “the way he did things.” 

The IJ determined that it was implausible that Yeghiazaryan 

would not be involved and cited evidence in the record that 

she has family in the United States and applied with Lalayan 

for United States visas on November 2, 2015. Lalayan 

argues that the IJ’s implausibility finding is based on a faulty 

assumption that does not recognize cultural differences 

between the United States and Armenia with respect to 

traditional gender and marital roles. Lalayan states that “as 

a male Armenian head of the household, it is customary for 

[Lalayan] to be the decision-maker as it would be seen solely 

as [Lalayan’s] responsibility to ensure the safety of his 

family. Accordingly, it is not incredible for [Yeghiazaryan] 

to be in the dark about some of the decisions made by 

[Lalayan].” But the Board did not adopt this implausibility 

finding in its decision. Because we only review the IJ’s 

decision to the extent that the Board adopts the IJ’s 

reasoning, Shrestha, 590 F.3d at 1039, we need not 

conclusively determine whether the IJ provided 

Yeghiazaryan an opportunity to address the perceived 

implausibility and relied upon a reasonable assumption, or 

engaged in impermissible speculation and conjecture.

III.

We turn next to the IJ’s determination that Yeghiazaryan 

was not credible because of her evasiveness and nonresponsiveness. Substantial evidence supports this 

determination, regardless of whether it was simply a 

demeanor finding, or a mixed finding of demeanor, relating 

to evasiveness, and non-responsiveness.
32 LALAYAN V. GARLAND

The IJ based her adverse credibility determination in part 

on Yeghiazaryan’s “vague, evasive, and non-responsive” 

answers in response to the IJ’s repeated questions about 

when Lalayan decided to decline the job offer in Mexico and 

whether it was their plan all along to travel to the United 

States. The Board characterized this finding as the IJ’s 

“demeanor observation” and deferred “given the 

Immigration Judge’s unique position of witnessing the 

testimony of [Yeghiazaryan] during the hearing.” Although 

the Petitioners do not challenge this finding on appeal, we 

consider it as an element in the totality of circumstances that 

supported the IJ’s credibility determination. “[T]o support 

an adverse credibility determination based on 

unresponsiveness, the BIA must identify particular instances 

in the record where the petitioner refused to answer 

questions asked of him.” Shrestha, 590 F.3d at 1042 

(citation omitted). “An IJ should give fair notice of 

inconsistencies in testimony or points on which the IJ thinks 

the witness is not being responsive.” Garcia, 749 F.3d 

at 790. We have characterized an IJ’s determination that a 

witness was non-responsive and evasive as a type of 

demeanor finding, see Bingxu Jin v. Holder, 748 F.3d 959, 

965 (9th Cir. 2014); however, the “special deference” we 

accord to an IJ’s demeanor findings only applies to “nonverbal, and therefore non-textual, factors.” Jibril, 423 F.3d 

at 1137; see also Manes v. Sessions, 875 F.3d 1261, 1263 

(9th Cir. 2017) (“These are specific, first-hand 

observations—precisely the kind of credibility cues that are 

the special province of the factfinder.”).

We recognize that the REAL ID Act differentiates 

between the demeanor and responsiveness of a witness. See 

8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(1)(B)(iii). (“[A] trier of fact may base a 

credibility determination on the demeanor, candor, or 

responsiveness of the applicant or witness[.] . . .”). 
LALAYAN V. GARLAND 33

However, it is immaterial whether the Board correctly 

characterized the IJ’s determination that Yeghiazaryan 

provided “vague, evasive, and non-responsive” answers as 

only a demeanor finding, or if it constituted a mixed finding 

of both demeanor and non-responsiveness. Our special 

deference to certain types of demeanor findings is not 

relevant here because the IJ’s determination was based on 

verbal factors, and Yeghiazaryan’s evasiveness and nonresponsiveness are clear from the text of the hearing 

transcript. The Agency provided numerous instances of 

Yeghiazaryan’s evasiveness and non-responsiveness when 

answering the IJ’s questions regarding the timing of the 

decision to travel to the United States. The IJ’s repeated, 

seriatim questions regarding the couple’s decision as well as 

the IJ’s statement to Yeghiazaryan, “You didn’t answer my 

question,” provided Yeghiazaryan fair notice of the IJ’s 

observation of evasiveness and non-responsiveness. 

Substantial evidence supports the Agency’s adverse 

credibility determination regarding Yeghiazaryan.

IV.

We review for substantial evidence the Board’s 

determination that Lalayan is not eligible for withholding of 

removal. Shrestha, 590 F.3d at 1039. “To qualify for 

withholding of removal, a petitioner must establish a clear 

probability that his life or freedom would be threatened if he 

returned to his homeland on account of race, religion, 

nationality, membership in a particular social group, or 

political opinion.” Id. (citation and quotation marks 

omitted). “Eligibility for withholding of removal can be 

established by demonstrating past persecution or by 

‘demonstrat[ing] . . . a subjective fear of persecution in the 

future . . . that . . . is objectively reasonable[.]’” Id. (first 

alteration and ellipses in original) (citation omitted), quoting 
34 LALAYAN V. GARLAND

Wakkary v. Holder, 558 F.3d 1049, 1060 (9th Cir. 2009). As 

substantial evidence supports the Agency’s adverse 

credibility determination, Lalayan has failed to establish past 

persecution. He has also failed to establish a well-founded 

fear of future persecution. First, it is not clear that Lalayan 

holds the political opinion regarding corruption that he 

claims he would be persecuted for if removed to Armenia. 

Moreover, while the country reports and news articles 

submitted by Lalayan indicate that political corruption and 

human rights abuses exist in Armenia, they in no way 

establish that Lalayan would “more likely than not” be 

persecuted upon removal to Armenia on account of his stated 

political opinion. See Tamang v. Holder, 598 F.3d 1083, 

1091 (9th Cir. 2010), quoting INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 

480 U.S. 421, 429 (1987). Substantial evidence supports the 

Board’s holding that the IJ properly denied Lalayan’s 

withholding of removal claim.

V.

“We review for substantial evidence the BIA’s 

determination that [Lalayan] is not eligible for protection 

under CAT.” Id. at 1048. “To receive CAT protection, a 

petitioner must prove that it is ‘more likely than not’ that he 

or she would be tortured if removed.” Id., quoting 8 C.F.R. 

§ 1208.16(c)(2). “In addition, the petitioner must 

demonstrate that he would be subject to a particularized 

threat of torture, and that such torture would be inflicted by 

or at the instigation of or with the consent or acquiescence 

of a public official or other person acting in an official 

capacity.” Dhital v. Mukasey, 532 F.3d 1044, 1051 (9th Cir. 

2008) (citation and quotation marks omitted). “An adverse 

credibility determination does not, by itself, necessarily 

defeat a CAT claim because CAT claims are analytically 

separate from claims for withholding of removal.” Garcia, 
LALAYAN V. GARLAND 35

749 F.3d at 791 (citation and quotation marks omitted). “But 

when the petitioner’s ‘testimony [is] found not credible, to 

reverse the BIA’s decision [denying CAT protection,] we 

would have to find that the reports alone compelled the 

conclusion that [the petitioner] is more likely than not to be 

tortured.’” Shrestha, 590 F.3d at 1048–49 (alterations in 

original), quoting Almaghzar v. Gonzales, 457 F.3d 915, 

922–23 (9th Cir. 2006). We agree with the Agency that the 

country reports submitted do not indicate any particularized 

risk of torture if Lalayan were removed to Armenia. 

Substantial evidence supports the Board’s holding that the IJ 

properly denied Lalayan CAT relief.

VI.

Substantial evidence supports the Agency’s 

implausibility findings with respect to Lalayan’s testimony 

and its finding that Yeghiazaryan was evasive and nonresponsive. We do not consider the Board’s alternative 

holding that assumed that Lalayan was credible. The record 

does not compel the conclusion that the adverse credibility 

determination was erroneous or that the Agency erred in 

denying Lalayan’s applications for asylum, withholding of 

removal, and CAT relief.

The petition for review is DENIED.