IN THE SUPREME COURT

STATE OF NORTH DAKOTA

2023 ND 126

In the Interest of William James Gehlhoff

Tonya Duffy, State’s Attorney, Petitioner and Appellee

v.

William James Gehlhoff, Respondent and Appellant

No. 20230005

Appeal from the District Court of Barnes County, Southeast Judicial District, 

the Honorable Mark T. Blumer, Judge.

AFFIRMED.

Opinion of the Court by Tufte, Justice, in which Chief Justice Jensen and 

Justice McEvers joined. Justice Bahr filed a dissenting opinion, in which 

Justice Crothers joined.

Tonya Duffy, State’s Attorney, Valley City, N.D., for petitioner and appellee; 

submitted on brief.

Tyler J. Morrow, Grand Forks, N.D., for respondent and appellant.

FILED 

IN THE OFFICE OF THE 

CLERK OF SUPREME COURT 

JULY 7, 2023 

STATE OF NORTH DAKOTA
1

Interest of Gehlhoff

No. 20230005

Tufte, Justice.

[¶1] William Gehlhoff appeals from a district court order denying his 

application for discharge from civil commitment as a sexually dangerous 

individual. On appeal, Gehlhoff argues the district court erred in finding by 

clear and convincing evidence that he has “serious difficulty controlling 

behavior.” We affirm.

I

[¶2] This Court has explained its standard of review for civil commitments of 

sexually dangerous individuals:

This Court reviews civil commitments of sexually dangerous 

individuals under a modified clearly erroneous standard. We will 

affirm a district court’s decision unless it is induced by an 

erroneous view of the law or we are firmly convinced the decision 

is not supported by clear and convincing evidence. The court must 

specifically state the facts upon which its ultimate conclusion is 

based.

Interest of Sternberg, 2023 ND 40, ¶ 7, 987 N.W.2d 340 (cleaned up). In civil 

commitment proceedings, the State must prove by clear and convincing 

evidence that an individual has “serious difficulty in controlling behavior.” Id.

at ¶¶ 7-8 (citing Kansas v. Crane, 534 U.S. 407, 412 (2002)). The three 

statutory elements in N.D.C.C. § 25-03.3-01(8) are not at issue on this appeal.

II

[¶3] An individual has a “serious difficulty controlling behavior” if there is a 

“causal connection” or “nexus” between the individual’s sexual disorder and 

inability to control behavior that would likely cause sexually predatory conduct 

in the future. Matter of Muscha, 2021 ND 164, ¶ 5, 964 N.W.2d 507. “This 

required proof separates a dangerous sexual offender, whom the court may 

subject to civil commitment, from the dangerous but typical recidivist in the 

ordinary criminal case.” Sternberg, 2023 ND 40, ¶ 8 (quotations and citations 

omitted).
2

[¶4] “The district court’s findings must identify recent conduct or describe 

anything that shows an individual has a present serious difficulty controlling 

his behavior.” Sternberg, 2023 ND 40, ¶ 13 (cleaned up). “[C]ontemporary 

evidence or specific instances are necessary to demonstrate that a person has 

a serious difficulty controlling behavior.” Id. (quotations and citations omitted). 

In Sternberg, this Court concluded that Sternberg’s criminal history was “far 

too remote in time to the commitment hearing to have any impact on the 

consideration of whether Sternberg has substantial difficulty controlling 

behavior.” Sternberg, at ¶ 16 (quotations and citations omitted). Sternberg

committed these crimes twenty-one years before his civil commitment hearing. 

Id. In contrast, this Court upheld a district court’s finding of serious difficulty 

where an individual admitted that he had uncontrolled anger and rage and 

had to be moved to his own cell because he was “compulsively masturbating”

within approximately two years of the State’s petition to commit him civilly. In 

re Vantreece, 2009 ND 152, ¶¶ 2, 17, 19, 771 N.W.2d 585; see also In re 

Hanenberg, 2010 ND 8, ¶¶ 2, 13-14, 19, 777 N.W.2d 62.

[¶5] Here, the district court’s finding on serious difficulty in controlling 

behavior was limited to one sentence: “Gehlhoff is a person who will have a 

serious difficulty controlling his behavior—he demonstrated that several times 

during this review period with his trips to Fargo.” The court should have 

articulated a more detailed basis for its finding. Nevertheless, because the 

court also found Dr. D’Orazio’s testimony and report persuasive, it is clear that 

the court was referring to two incidents during Gehlhoff’s review period that 

are explained in further detail in the record.

[¶6] The first incident occurred in March 2022 when Gehlhoff visited Fargo 

and went to a restaurant that Dr. D’Orazio described as “specializ[ing] in 

having attractive young women serve meals in little clothing.” In Dr. D’Orazio’s 

opinion, the visit “involved a lot of planning” and Gehlhoff went because of 

“sexual interest.” He specifically dressed in nice clothing before going there and 

felt “overwhelmed and anxious.” Gehlhoff described that it was like going to a 

strip club.

[¶7] The second incident occurred after Gehlhoff became “emotionally 

dysregulated” after an argument with his father and went into a massage 
3

parlor, wore nothing but a towel, and had multiple erections during the 

massage but did not engage in sexual activity. Dr. D’Orazio explained: “On that 

occasion he disclosed he had been having the urge to masturbate more.... He 

was eventually able to identify feeling hurt, lonely, depressed and needing 

human contact.” Dr. D’Orazio characterized this as concerning because 

Gehlhoff was seeking physical touch as a coping mechanism for his feeling 

badly and he failed to thwart the inappropriate response.

[¶8] Dr. D’Orazio opined that these two events demonstrated that Gehlhoff 

had serious difficulty controlling behavior. She testified that he got the 

massage because of an emotional trigger and his coping mechanism was 

“physical touch.” In D’Orazio’s opinion, Gehlhoff’s visits to the restaurant and 

the massage parlor were examples of his acting out on his sexual urges without 

“sufficient forethought” and his decisions were “sexually risky for him.” The 

district court found Dr. D’Orazio’s testimony more persuasive than Dr. Mugge’s 

testimony and gave it more weight. In re Mangelsen, 2014 ND 31, ¶ 8, 843 

N.W.2d 8 (“[T]his Court will not reweigh expert testimony nor second-guess the 

credibility determinations made by the trial court in sexually dangerous 

individual proceedings.”). The two instances specifically relied on by the court 

and the further details of those events in D’Orazio’s testimony and report 

provided the district court with a sufficient evidentiary basis to conclude by 

clear and convincing evidence that Gehlhoff presently has serious difficulty 

controlling behavior, because they provide contemporary evidence of specific 

instances where Gehlhoff acted out of sexual compulsion within approximately 

one year of the district court’s hearing.

III

[¶9] We affirm.

[¶10] Jon J. Jensen, C.J.

Lisa Fair McEvers

Jerod E. Tufte
4

Bahr, Justice, dissenting.

[¶11] I respectfully dissent. I would reverse the district court’s order 

committing Gehlhoff as a sexually dangerous individual and remand for 

specific findings whether Gehlhoff has serious difficulty controlling his 

behavior.

[¶12] “[A] person alleged to be a sexually dangerous individual is entitled to a 

panoply of pre-commitment and post-commitment procedures that are 

sufficient to provide the individual with safeguards to protect the person’s 

liberty interest and satisfy due process.” In re R.A.S., 2008 ND 185, ¶ 13, 756 

N.W.2d 771. To civilly commit an individual as a sexually dangerous individual, 

this Court has held: 

[T]he district court must make detailed findings that (1) the

individual has engaged in sexually predatory conduct; (2) the

individual has a congenital or acquired condition that is

manifested by a sexual disorder, personality disorder, or other

mental disorder or dysfunction; (3) the condition makes the

individual likely to engage in further acts of sexually predatory

conduct which constitute a danger to the physical or mental health

or safety of others; and (4) there is proof the individual has serious

difficulty controlling his behavior.

In re Hanson, 2008 ND 198, ¶ 2, 758 N.W.2d 909 (discussing In re R.A.S., at 

¶ 9). As we recently stated, “The court must specifically state the facts upon 

which its ultimate conclusion is based.” Interest of Sternberg, 2023 ND 40, ¶ 7, 

987 N.W.2d 340 (quoting In re Rubey, 2012 ND 133, ¶ 9, 818 N.W.2d 731). 

“These detailed findings are necessary to enable us to fulfill our appellate 

function.” Hanson, at ¶ 2; see also In re Hehn, 2011 ND 214, ¶ 6, 806 N.W.2d 

189 (“We have continually recognized the need for detailed findings in 

commitment decisions.”).

[¶13] The district court did not make detailed findings on whether Gehlhoff 

has serious difficulty controlling his behavior. As noted by the majority, the 

court’s “finding on difficulty in controlling behavior was limited to one 

sentence: ‘Gehlhoff is a person who will have a serious difficulty controlling his 

behavior—he demonstrated that several times during this review period with 
5

his trips to Fargo.’” Majority, at ¶ 5. The court did not make specific findings 

regarding how the “trips to Fargo” evidenced Gehlhoff will have serious 

difficulty controlling his behavior.

[¶14] Acknowledging the district court “should have articulated a more 

detailed basis for its finding,” the majority finds the court’s single sentence 

sufficient because the court found Dr. Deirdre D’Orazio’s testimony and report 

persuasive. Majority, at ¶ 5. However, the court failed to explain, much less in 

detail, how Dr. D’Orazio’s testimony and report supported the court’s factual 

conclusion Gehlhoff will have serious difficulty controlling his behavior. “This 

Court cannot review a district court’s decision when the court does not provide 

any indication of the evidentiary and theoretical basis for its decision because 

we are left to speculate what evidence was considered and whether the law was 

properly applied.” In re Midgett, 2009 ND 106, ¶ 8, 766 N.W.2d 717 (quoting In 

re R.A.S., 2008 ND 185, ¶ 8). The district court’s single sentence finding 

Gehlhoff will have serious difficulty controlling his behavior, even in 

conjunction with its finding Dr. D’Orazio’s testimony and report is persuasive, 

leaves this Court to speculate as to what evidence the court actually considered 

and why it reached its factual conclusion. “It is not within our appellate 

function to make findings in the first instance or to infer from the district 

court’s conclusions and the record the factual findings it might have made in 

support of that conclusion.” In re Kulink, 2018 ND 260, ¶ 9, 920 N.W.2d 446.

[¶15] In re Thill, 2015 ND 295, 872 N.W.2d 617, supports reversal and 

remand to the district court. In Thill, the court “did not identify the facts on 

which it relied in determining Thill’s likelihood to engage in further sexual 

predatory conduct or the facts on which it relied in determining Thill has 

serious difficulty in controlling his behavior.” Id. at ¶ 7. Rather, the court 

referenced pages of a doctor’s report “without indicating which reported facts 

it relied on to conclude Thill continues to have a high risk of reoffending and 

difficulty controlling his behavior.” Id. We determined the court “did not make 

sufficient findings enabling us to fulfill our appellate function” and 

“remand[ed] the case for specific findings of fact on Thill’s likelihood to engage 

in further sexual predatory conduct and whether he has serious difficulty 

controlling his behavior.” Id. We wrote: “Rule 52(a), N.D.R.Civ.P., requires that 

we reverse and remand to the district court with instructions to demonstrate 
6

its factual basis for finding Thill remains a sexually dangerous individual.” Id. 

at ¶ 8; cf. In re L.D.M., 2011 ND 25, ¶ 7, 793 N.W.2d 778 (reversed and 

remanded because “the trial court did not specifically state the findings upon 

which it relied in formulating its conclusion” when it “merely stated both 

experts testified L.D.M. has serious difficulty controlling his behavior”). 

Similarly, although the court stated it found Dr. D’Orazio’s testimony and 

report persuasive, it did not indicate, other than a general reference to “trips 

to Fargo,” the specific facts it relied on to conclude Gehlhoff will have serious 

difficulty controlling his behavior.

[¶16] “The [district] court must specifically state the facts upon which its 

ultimate conclusion is based on.” In re R.A.S., 2008 ND 185, ¶ 8. “The court 

errs as a matter of law when it does not make the required findings.” Id. Based 

on the court’s limited findings, I am left to speculate as to the basis for the 

court’s decision, preventing me from meaningfully reviewing the court’s 

decision and determining whether its findings are clearly erroneous. Id. at ¶ 9. 

Accordingly, consistent with numerous cases where a court did not make 

sufficient findings about whether an individual had serious difficulty 

controlling his behavior, I would reverse and remand for specific findings

whether Gehlhoff has serious difficulty controlling his behavior. See, e.g., In re

Johnson, 2015 ND 71, ¶ 9, 861 N.W.2d 484 (reversed and remanded when the 

court “did not specifically state the facts upon which it relied, nor did it make 

specific findings on whether Johnson has serious difficulty in controlling his 

behavior”); In re Hoff, 2014 ND 63, ¶ 11, 844 N.W.2d 866 (reversed and 

remanded when the court did not make sufficient findings whether Hoff has 

difficulty controlling his behavior); In re Vondal, 2011 ND 59, ¶ 9, 795 N.W.2d 

343 (reversed and remanded because the “sparse finding . . . fails to explain 

the reasons why the court determined Vondal has difficulty controlling his 

behavior”); In re T.O., 2011 ND 9, ¶ 2, 793 N.W.2d 204 (reversed and remanded 

when the court simply found “by clear and convincing evidence” the respondent 

remained a sexually dangerous individual); In re Midgett, 2009 ND 106, ¶ 7 

(reversed and remanded when the court “did not make any findings on whether 

Midgett has serious difficulty controlling his behavior”); In re Vantreece, 2008 

ND 197, ¶ 3, 758 N.W.2d 909 (reversed and remanded when court made 

“conclusory and general findings of fact” and failed to make findings regarding 
7

whether the individual has difficulty controlling his behavior); In re R.A.S., at 

¶ 3 (reversed and remanded because the court did not make sufficient findings 

of fact when it found the State showed by clear and convincing evidence R.A.S. 

remained a sexually dangerous individual).

[¶17] Daniel J. Crothers

Douglas A. Bahr