United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT

________________

No. 07-1330

________________

Riley B. Housley III; Kathleen

Sullivan,

Appellants,

v.

City of Edina; Brandon Deshler,

Edina Police Officer; Erik Kleinberg,

Edina Police Officer; City of

Minneapolis; Officer Hofius,

Minneapolis Police Officer; Officer

Ketzner, Minneapolis Police Officer;

Police Officers Federation of

Minneapolis; John Doe; Mary Roe,

Edina and/or Minneapolis police

officers whose names are unknown at

this time,

Appellees.

*

*

*

*

*

*

*

*

*

*

*

*

*

*

*

*

*

*

*

*

Appeal from the United States

District Court for the

District of Minnesota.

[UNPUBLISHED]

________________

Submitted: November 16, 2007

 Filed: February 22, 2008

________________

Before MURPHY, HANSEN and GRUENDER, Circuit Judges.

________________

PER CURIAM.
*

The Honorable David S. Doty, United States District Judge for the District of

Minnesota.

-2-

Riley Housley and Kathleen Sullivan appeal from the district court’s*

 adverse

grant of summary judgment on their 42 U.S.C. § 1983 lawsuit against the cities of

Edina, Minnesota, and Minneapolis, Minnesota, and several of each city’s police

officers. On July 3, 2003, a police officer stopped a car on suspicion of drug-related

activity. Justin Harris, a passenger in the car, identified himself to the officer. Harris

acted suspiciously, and the officer requested that Harris exit the vehicle. The officer

held Harris by the arm, but Harris broke free and fled the scene. One of the car’s

passengers identified Harris and gave the officer a telephone number. On July 17,

2003, an officer called the number, listed to a business at 204 Lowry Avenue in

Minneapolis, and Housley answered. Housley told the officer that Harris had worked

for him, and the officer averred from his experience that information identifying

Harris could be found at a location where Harris had worked. Police officers obtained

a search warrant to search Sullivan’s building located at 204 Lowry Avenue, where

Housley worked and lived, for evidence that would be useful to identify and locate

Harris. The warrant was signed by a state district court judge. The copy of the

warrant that officers presented to Housley during the search did not contain the

judge’s signature. When Housley protested the validity of the warrant, an officer

handcuffed Housley and placed him in the back of a squad car. During the search,

police officers obtained information regarding Harris, while Housley remained

handcuffed in the air-conditioned squad car for three to four hours.

Based upon our de novo review of the record, we conclude that the district court

properly granted summary judgment. First, Housley argues that the warrant was

invalid under the Fourth Amendment because the copy presented to him lacked the

issuing judge’s signature. The original warrant, however, was signed and issued

“upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation” in compliance with the

Fourth Amendment. See United States v. Lipford, 203 F.3d 259, 270 (4th Cir. 2000).
-3-

Second, Housley argues that officers may detain occupants of a residence during a

search only where contraband is involved. We have permitted similar detentions

during a search for evidence not involving contraband executed pursuant to a valid

search warrant. See United States v. Wallace, 323 F.3d 1109, 1111 (8th Cir. 2003).

In any event, the legitimate law enforcement interests of preventing flight, officer

safety and orderly completion of the search outweighed the intrusiveness of Housley’s

detention. See United States v. Hogan, 25 F.3d 690, 693 (8th Cir. 1994). Finally,

Housley argues that the police officer used excessive force by leaving him in the

squad car handcuffed, which resulted in injuries to his wrists, and that the

municipalities should be liable for inadequate training. The undisputed facts show

that the officer followed standard handcuffing procedures, using reasonable force

from the perspective of a reasonable officer, and Housley does not contest the

constitutionality of the handcuffing procedure. See Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386,

396 (1989). Housley also does not assert that the municipalities’ method of training

officers reflected “deliberate indifference” to his rights. Larkin v. St. Louis Hous.

Auth. Dev. Corp., 355 F.3d 1114, 1117 (8th Cir. 2004).

Accordingly, we affirm for the reasons set forth in the district court’s wellreasoned opinion. See 8th Cir. R. 47B.

______________________________