-1- 

### STATE OF MICHIGAN

COURT OF APPEALS

UNPUBLISHED In re ROBINSON, Minors. February 16, 2017

No. 332844 Muskegon Circuit Court Family Division LC No. 15-044043-NA

Before: M URPHY , P.J., and S AWYER and S WARTZLE , JJ.

P ER C URIAM

. Respondent mother appeals as of right the trial court order te rminating her parental rights to the minor children CR, Z R, and BR, under MCL 712A.19b(c)( i ), (g), and (j). We affirm.

The trial court placed the children in the care of the Muskego n Department of Health and Human Services (DHHS) in Febru ary 2015 after respondent’s boyfr iend sent CR and ZR unsupervised to their school bus stop without appropriate winte r clothing on a day when school was cancelled due to low temperatures. The children returned h ome after more than an hour. When they arrived home, they were locked out of the house and w ere unable to wake any adult inside. Eventually a neighbor heard the children crying and kno cking on the door of the home, and the neighbor called law enforcement. After 15 minutes of k nocking, officers were finally able to wake respondent.

When respondent met with law enforcement, she initially lied a nd said her boyfriend was not in the home. Officers even tually discovered the boyfriend in the home and arrested him on the basis of two outstanding warrants. Respondent also admitte d to smoking marijuana and to consuming Xanax, Norco, and methadone.

Following their removal, the DHHS placed the children in foste r homes. At the time of their placement, CR and ZR both had lice and their teeth were g ray and black. While in their foster placements, CR and ZR disclosed to the DHHS caseworker t hat respondent’s boyfriend frequently struck them in their faces with his belt and made th eir noses bleed. Additionally, BR displayed significant developmental issues, including a droopy eye, muffled and incoherent speech, and frequent be havioral issues.

The DHHS referred respondent t o weekly counseling sessions and drug screens and, on her own initiative, r espondent began attending parenting classe s and Alcoholics Anonymous meetings. Respondent initially s howed some progress with these services. Respondent provided-2- mostly clean drug screens during the early months following the removal and achieved her onemonth sober designation from Al coholics Anonymous. Respondent a lso completed her parenting classes and worked with a DHHS parent mentor who reported that respondent was showing some progress in her parenting skills.

Respondent regularly attended her supervised parenting time, w hich was initially supervised by her mother. Aft er respondent, however, lost ZR a t a shopping mall during one of these visits and allegedly instructed the child to not tell the DHHS about the incident, the trial court ordered that respondent’s mother could no longer supervis e respondent’s parenting time. Respondent achieved unsupervised parenting time in June 2015 af ter providing the court with three consecutive clean drug screens but, thereafter, her progr ess declined. Her unsupervised parenting time was revoked after just three weeks when responde nt brought the children into contact with her boyfriend on tw o occasions despite being instr ucted by the DHHS not to do so.

Shortly thereafter, respondent’s interaction with the DHHS beg an to deteriorate. Respondent walked out of a July 13, 2015 family-time meeting af ter just 15 minutes and sent her caseworker numerous belligerent text messages over the next sev eral weeks. Respondent called her caseworker names, implied that the caseworker was on drugs, and accused the caseworker of purposefully keeping her from her children. About this time, r espondent also disengaged from her services. Respondent stopped attending AA meetings in June 2015, did not attend counseling from September 2015 to January 2016, and failed to appear for m ost drug screens from October 2015 to January 2016. When she did appear for drug screens in January 2016, respondent twice tested positive for marijuana.

Between October 2015 and December 2015 respondent attended onl y four of nine scheduled parenting time visits. During the visits she did att end, respondent was often more engaged with her phone than her children. When she did interac t with the children, respondent made inappropriate comments, including telling the children tha t she did not like her caseworker and telling CV and ZV that BV should not attend the visits beca use she did not care about him. Following these visits, the child ren’s behavior declined.

The trial court held termination hearings in February and Mar ch 2016, and, in April 2016, the trial court terminated respondent’s parental rights u nder MCL 712A.19b(3)(c)( i ), (g), and (j).

I. REUNIFICATION SERVICES

On appeal, respondent first argues that the DHHS did not make reasonable efforts to promote reunification with the children. We disagree.

This Court reviews a preserved issue regarding reasonable effor ts for clear error. In re Fried , 266 Mich App 535, 541; 702 NW2d 192 (2005). “When a child is removed from a parent’s custody, the agency charged with the care of the child is [usually] required to report to the trial court the efforts made to rectify the conditions that led to the removal of the child.” In re Plump , 294 Mich App 270, 272; 817 NW2d 119 (2011). “The adequacy of the [DHHS]’s efforts to provide services may bear on whether there is suffic ient evidence to terminate a parent’s rights.” In re Rood , 483 Mich 73, 89; 763 NW2d 587 (2009). “[A trial] court is no t-3- required to terminate parental rights if the State has not prov ided to the family of the child . . . such services as the State deems necessary for the safe return of the child to the child’s home.” Id. at 105 (quotation marks and citation removed).

Respondent argues that the DHHS failed to provide her with pro per reunification services because it did not provide her with the services of a psychiatr ist. The DHHS “must make reasonable efforts to rectify conditions, to reunify families, and to avoid termination of parental rights.” In re LE , 278 Mich App 1, 18; 747 NW2d 883 (2008). It has no duty, how ever, to provide every conceivable service. See In re Terry , 240 Mich App 14, 27-28; 610 NW2d 563 (2000). Moreover, “[w]hile the [DHHS] has a responsibility to expend reasonable efforts to provide services to secure reunification, there exists a commen surate responsibility on the part of respondents to participate in the services that are offered.” In re Frey , 297 Mich App 242, 248; 824 NW2d 569 (2012).

After respondent’s mental health was brought to the attention o f the trial court in October 2015, the DHHS arranged for mother to have a psychological eval uation completed to assess her mental health needs. Psychologists evaluated respondent twice. Respondent first arranged an evaluation by a psychologist out side the DHHS’s referral. Then , a few months later, respondent finally completed an evaluation with the DHHS-recommended psych ologist. Neither psychological evaluation recommen ded the services of a psychiat rist and, by the time mother completed the DHHS-recommended psychological evaluation, the DH HS was proceeding with termination and was not required to provide any further reunifi cation services. In re HRC , 286 Mich App 444, 463; 781 NW2d 105 (2009). The psychologists’ rep orts make clear that the DHHS was not required to provide respondent with psychiatric se rvices. Moreover, any failure to provide these services cannot f orm the basis for respondent’ s appeal because respondent’s own delay would have precluded her from receiving these service s before the DHHS filed its termination petition.

At the termination hearing, the DHHS caseworker testified that the DHHS offered respondent drug screening, superv ised parenting time, transport ation assistance, a psychological evaluation, participation in a p arent-mentor program, housing a ssistance, and counseling. From at least October 2015 until January 2016, respondent repeatedlydemonstrated her unwillingness to cooperate with the DHHS and its services. 1 Considering the extent of services offered by the DHHS and respondent’s consistent f ailure to participate in thes e services, we conclude that the trial court did not clearly err by finding that the DHHS made r easonable efforts to reunite respondent with her children.

1 Insofar as mother argues that she was forced to obtain service s without assistance from the DHHS, “[t]he fact that responde nt sought treatment independentl y in no way compels the conclusion that [the DHHS’s] effo rts toward reunification were not reasonable, and, more to the point, does not suggest that respondent would have fared better if the worker had offered those additional services to [her].” In re Fried , 266 Mich App at 543.-4- II. STATUTORY GROUND S FOR TERMINATION

Next, respondent argues that the trial court erred when it fou nd that clear and convincing evidence supported terminating her parental rights. We disagre e.
To terminate parental rights, the trial court must find that a t least one of the statutory grounds for termination in MCL 712A.19b(3) has been met by clea r and convincing evidence. In re McIntyre , 192 Mich App 47, 50; 480 NW2d 293 (1991). “We review for cle ar error . . . the court's decision that a ground fo r termination has been proven by clear and convincing evidence.” In re Trejo , 462 Mich 341, 356-357; 612 NW2d 407 (2000). A finding is “cle arly erroneous where the reviewing court is left with a definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been made.” In re Terry , 240 Mich App at 22.

Respondent’s parental rights were terminated under MCL 712A.19 b(3)(c)( i ), (g), and (j), which provide:

(3) The court may terminate a parent’s parental rights to a ch ild if the court finds, by clear and convincing evidence , 1 or more of the following:

* * *

(c) The parent was a respondent in a proceeding brought under this chapter, 182 or more days have elapsed since the issuance of an initial disp ositional order, and the court, by clear and convinci ng evidence, finds either of th e following:

( i ) The conditions tha t led to the adjudication continue to exis t and there is no reasonable likelihood that the c onditions will be rectified wit hin a reasonable time considering the child’s age.

* * *

(g) The parent, without regard to intent, fails to provide pro per care or custody for the child and there is no reasonable expectation that the p arent will be able to provide proper care and custody within a reasonable time consid ering the child’s
age.

* * *

(j) There is a reasonable likelihood, based on the conduct or capacity of the child’s parent, that the child will be harmed if he or she is r eturned to the home of the parent.

The trial court removed the children from respondent’s care be cause respondent abused substances, exposed the childre n to her abusive boyfriend, and failed to provide for the children’s proper care and guidance. Although respondent initially showed some progress on the services-5- offered her, from at least October 2015 until the time of the t ermination hearing, respondent refused to engage meaningfully in the services offered her. Re spondent failed to attend most of her drug screenings and tested positive for marijuana on other occasions. Respondent did not attend counseling and repeatedly berated her caseworkers. Twel ve months after the children’s removal, respondent had yet to maintain unsupervised visitationwith the children. During the brief period that respondent ex ercised unsupervised parenting t ime, respondent twice exposed the children to her abusive boyfrie nd despite clear direction not t o do so. Between October 2015 and December 2015, respondent failed to attend half of her schedule d parenting time visits and, during the visits she did attend, demonstrated poor parenting s kills that appear to have caused her children to suffer behavioral setbacks with their foster placem ent.

Accordingly, respondent did not accomplish “any meaningful cha nge in the conditions” that led to adjudication. In re Williams , 286 Mich App 253, 272; 779 NW2d 286 (2009). Because respondent refused to engage in the majority of service s offered by the DHHS during the twelve months following her children’s removal from her car e, the trial court properly concluded that grounds existed to terminate respondent’s parent al rights under MCL 712A.19b(3)(c)( i ).

“Having concluded that at least one ground for termination exi sted, we need not consider the additional grounds upon which the trial court based its dec ision.” In re HRC , 286 Mich App at 461. Nonetheless, because this Court has held “that a parent ’s failure to comply with the parent-agency agreement is evidence of a parent’s failure to pr ovide proper care and custody for the child,” In re JK , 468 Mich 202, 214; 661 NW2d 216, 223 (2003), we conclude that that the trial court properly determined that grounds also existed under MCL 712A.19b(3)(g) to terminate respondent’s parenta l rights. Additionally, responde nt’s failure to address adequately her issues with substance abuse, mental health, and parenting s kills, renders harm to the children reasonably likely if they were to return to her care. Indeed, t he psychologist that completed her second evaluation stated that res pondent presented a risk to th e children based on her personality deficits, ongoing mood problems, and unresolved substance abuse issues. Accordingly, we conclude that the trial court al so properly determined that MCL 712A.19b(3)(j) supported termination of respondent ’s parental rights.

III. BEST INTERESTS OF THE CHILDREN

Finally, respondent argues that the trial court erred when it f ound that termination was in the children’s best int erests. We disagree.

“Once a statutory ground for termination has been proven, the trial court must find that termination is in the child’s best interests before it can term inate parental rights.” In re Olive/Metts Minors , 297 Mich App 35, 40; 823 NW2d 144 (2012). Because proof of astatutory ground for termination establishes the state’s substantial “int erest in protecting the welfare of the child,” In re Moss , 301 Mich App 76, 90; 836 NW2d 182 (2013), the trial court nee d not find clear and convincing evidence that termination is in the child’ s best interests. Rather, “whether termination of parental rights is in the best interests of the child must be proved by a preponderance of the evidence” Id. at 90.-6- The trial court may consider the record as a whole in determin ing whether termination is in the child’s best interests. In re Trejo , 462 Mich at 354. The trial court must “state on the record or in writing its findings of fact and conclusions of la w with respect to whether or not parental rights should be termi nated.” MCL 712A.19b(1). When deciding whether termination is in the child’s best interests, the trial court may consider “the child’s bond to the parent, the parent’s parenting ability, the child’s need for permanency, st ability, and finality, and the advantages of a foster home over the parent’s home.” In re Olive/Metts Minors , 297 Mich App at 41-42 (citations omitted). The trial court may also properl y consider evidence concerning the length of time the child has been in foster care and whether th e child could be returned to the parent “within the foreseeable future, if at all.” In re Frey , 297 Mich App at 248-249. “We review for clear error . . . the court's decision regarding th e child's best interest.” In re Trejo , 462 Mich at 356–57.

In this case, although the childr en appear to have been initia lly bonded with respondent, respondent has failed to maintai n unsupervised parenting time a nd more recently failed to attend many of the supervised visits. When present, respondent freque ntly acted inappropriately causing the children behavioral issues in their foster placemen t. Accordingly, respondent’s parenting time was suspended in December 2015.

From at least October 2015 until the DHHS filed the terminatio n petition, respondent refused to engage meaningfully in the services provided to her. As a result, respondent failed to address adequately her issues w ith substance abuse, mental heal th, and parenting skills by the time of the termination hearing. Although respondent claims to have taken steps towards addressing these issues since the time of the termination petit ion, respondent had previously shown limited progress on her services only to disengage from t hose services shortly thereafter. Given that the children have show n progress in their foster pla cement and appear to be bonded to their foster family, we cannot conclude that the trial court er red by determining that termination was in the children’s best inter ests despite respondent’s recen t efforts.

Respondent also argues that the trial court erred by not consi dering the best interests of each child separately. The child is the “primary” intended bene ficiary of the best-interests determination, In re Trejo , 462 Mich at 356, and therefore, the trial court must consider the best interests of each child individually. In re Olive/Metts Minors , 297 Mich App at 42. The trial court is only required, however, to make explicit “factual find ings concerning each child’s best interests” when “the best inte rests of the individual children significantly differ.” In re White

, 303 Mich App 701, 715-716; 846 NW2d 61 (2014).

Respondent argues that the trial court was required to address each child’s best interests separately because the children “have different developmental n eeds.” In her brief on appeal, however, respondent has provided this Court with no support for that argument. “It is not sufficient for a party simply to announce a position . . . and then leave it up to this Court to discover and rationalize the basi s of his claims, or unravel an d elaborate for him his arguments, and then search for authority either to sustain or reject his p osition.” Wilson v Taylor , 457 Mich 232, 243; 577 NW2d 100 (1998). Accordingly, we cannot conclude that the trial court erred by not considering the best interes ts of the children separately.-7- Affirmed.

/s/ William B. Murphy /s/ David H. Sawyer /s/ Brock A. Swartzle