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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF IDAHO

Docket No. 37555

STATE OF IDAHO,

Plaintiff-Respondent,

v.

SIERRA DAWN GRACE,

Defendant-Appellant.

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2010 Unpublished Opinion No. 750

Filed: December 21, 2010

Stephen W. Kenyon, Clerk

THIS IS AN UNPUBLISHED

OPINION AND SHALL NOT

BE CITED AS AUTHORITY

Appeal from the District Court of the Fifth Judicial District, State of Idaho, Twin 

Falls County. Hon. Randy J. Stoker, District Judge. 

Judgment of conviction and sentence for possession of methamphetamine, 

affirmed.

Molly J. Huskey, State Appellate Public Defender; Eric D. Fredericksen, Deputy 

Appellate Public Defender, Boise, for appellant. 

Hon. Lawrence G. Wasden, Attorney General; Lori A. Fleming, Deputy Attorney 

General, Boise, for respondent. 

________________________________________________

Before GUTIERREZ, Judge, GRATTON, Judge

and MELANSON, Judge

PER CURIAM

Sierra Dawn Grace appeals from the judgment entered upon her conditional guilty plea to 

possession of methamphetamine. On appeal, Grace challenges the denial of her motion to 

suppress. Specifically, she argues that the district court made a clearly erroneous factual finding 

that Grace voluntarily consented to a search of her purse. The incident in question occurred after 

Officer Ken Rivers approached Grace and sought to determine if she had any connection to a 

fight that had been called in. In addition to questioning Grace about any involvement in the 

fight, Officer Rivers requested verification of identification and requested permission to search 

Grace’s purse. Grace responded “Sure” to the request for search of her purse, handed her purse 
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to the officer adding, “I don’t see why you have to do this though . . . .” Officer Rivers 

discovered a pipe containing methamphetamine residue in the purse.

Whether a consent to a search was voluntary is a question of fact, the determination of 

which is reviewed on appeal for clear error. State v. Reynolds, 146 Idaho 466, 472, 197 P.3d 

327, 333 (Ct. App. 2008); State v. Stewart, 145 Idaho 641, 648, 181 P.3d 1249, 1256 (Ct. App. 

2008). “Findings will not be deemed clearly erroneous if they are supported by substantial 

evidence in the record.” Stewart, 145 Idaho at 648, 181 P.3d at 1256 (quoting State v. Jaborra, 

143 Idaho 94, 98, 137 P.3d 481, 485 (Ct. App. 2006)).

The voluntariness of an individual’s consent is a question of fact to be determined based 

upon the totality of the circumstances. Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 248-49 (1973); 

State v. Varie, 135 Idaho 848, 852, 26 P.3d 31, 35 (2001). In order to be valid, consent cannot be 

the result of duress or coercion, either direct or implied. Schneckloth, 412 U.S. at 248. The mere 

presence of officers asking for consent to search is not sufficient, as a matter of law, to constitute

improper police duress or coercion. See United States v. Watson, 423 U.S. 411, 424-25 (1976). 

Instead, the court must consider all of the surrounding circumstances and find consent 

involuntary only if “coerced by threats or force, or granted only in submission to a claim of 

lawful authority . . . .” State v. Hoisington, 104 Idaho 153, 158, 657 P.2d 17, 22 (1983) (quoting 

Schneckloth, 412 U.S. at 233).

The district court found that the state met its burden of proving that Grace voluntarily 

consented to the search of her purse.

Here, it is clear that consent to search was freely given by Grace. Rivers asked 

Grace if he could search her purse. Grace replied “Sure” and handed her purse to 

Rivers. At no time did Grace tell Rivers he could not search her purse or 

withdraw consent in any other way. The Court finds as a fact that Grace’s 

questioning of why Rivers had to search her purse as she handed it to him did not 

act as withdrawal of her consent. The act of handing Rivers the purse and her 

response were an unequivocal consent to search. Grace’s consent is further 

evidenced by her holding items from her purse as it was being searched when 

asked and her later statement that she wouldn’t have let Rivers go through her 

purse if she knew there was anything in it.

No threats were made by Rivers towards Grace if she did not consent to 

the search of her purse. Though Rivers was initially accompanied by another 

officer, [Rivers] was the only officer conducting the search. Further the questions 

asked by Rivers regarding Grace’s permission to search her purse allowed Grace 

adequate opportunity to reject his requests. The tone of voice used by Rivers 

during the encounter was [calm] and unthreatening. As such, the act of handing 
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her purse to Rivers and her response of “Sure” constituted adequate consent to 

search by Grace. See State v. Knapp, 120 Idaho 343, 348, 815 P.2d 1083, 1088 

(Ct. App. 1991) (consent to search may be in the form of words, gestures, or 

conduct).

On appeal, Grace argues that “the district court made a clearly erroneous factual finding 

that Ms. Grace voluntarily consented to a search of her pur[se].” She focuses exclusively on the 

fact that, while the officer was searching her purse, Grace stated, “I don’t see why you have to do 

this, though . . . .” Grace’s reliance on this single statement, to the exclusion of all of the other 

facts in the record, does not show clear error in the district court’s determination that Grace’s 

consent was voluntary. Substantial evidence supports the district court’s finding, based on the 

totality of the circumstances, that Grace voluntarily consented to the search of her purse. Grace 

has failed to show error in the denial of her motion to suppress. Accordingly, Grace’s judgment 

of conviction for possession of methamphetamine is affirmed.