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STATE OF MICHIGAN 

COURT OF APPEALS 

 

UNPUBLISHED 

In re ROBINSON, Minors. February 16, 2017 

No. 332844 

Muskegon Circuit Court 

 Family Division 

LC No. 15-044043-NA 

 

Before: MURPHY, P.J., and SAWYER and SWARTZLE, JJ. 

PER CURIAM. 

 Respondent mother appeals as of right the trial court order terminating her parental rights 

to the minor children CR, ZR, and BR, under MCL 712A.19b(c)(i), (g), and (j). We affirm. 

 The trial court placed the children in the care of the Muskegon Department of Health and 

Human Services (DHHS) in February 2015 after respondent’s boyfriend sent CR and ZR 

unsupervised to their school bus stop without appropriate winter clothing on a day when school 

was cancelled due to low temperatures. The children returned home after more than an hour. 

When they arrived home, they were locked out of the house and were unable to wake any adult 

inside. Eventually a neighbor heard the children crying and knocking on the door of the home, 

and the neighbor called law enforcement. After 15 minutes of knocking, officers were finally 

able to wake respondent. 

 When respondent met with law enforcement, she initially lied and said her boyfriend was 

not in the home. Officers eventually discovered the boyfriend in the home and arrested him on 

the basis of two outstanding warrants. Respondent also admitted to smoking marijuana and to 

consuming Xanax, Norco, and methadone. 

 Following their removal, the DHHS placed the children in foster homes. At the time of 

their placement, CR and ZR both had lice and their teeth were gray and black. While in their 

foster placements, CR and ZR disclosed to the DHHS caseworker that respondent’s boyfriend 

frequently struck them in their faces with his belt and made their noses bleed. Additionally, BR 

displayed significant developmental issues, including a droopy eye, muffled and incoherent 

speech, and frequent behavioral issues. 

 The DHHS referred respondent to weekly counseling sessions and drug screens and, on 

her own initiative, respondent began attending parenting classes and Alcoholics Anonymous 

meetings. Respondent initially showed some progress with these services. Respondent provided 
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mostly clean drug screens during the early months following the removal and achieved her onemonth sober designation from Alcoholics Anonymous. Respondent also completed her parenting 

classes and worked with a DHHS parent mentor who reported that respondent was showing some 

progress in her parenting skills. 

 Respondent regularly attended her supervised parenting time, which was initially 

supervised by her mother. After respondent, however, lost ZR at a shopping mall during one of 

these visits and allegedly instructed the child to not tell the DHHS about the incident, the trial 

court ordered that respondent’s mother could no longer supervise respondent’s parenting time. 

Respondent achieved unsupervised parenting time in June 2015 after providing the court with 

three consecutive clean drug screens but, thereafter, her progress declined. Her unsupervised 

parenting time was revoked after just three weeks when respondent brought the children into 

contact with her boyfriend on two occasions despite being instructed by the DHHS not to do so. 

 Shortly thereafter, respondent’s interaction with the DHHS began to deteriorate. 

Respondent walked out of a July 13, 2015 family-time meeting after just 15 minutes and sent her 

caseworker numerous belligerent text messages over the next several weeks. Respondent called 

her caseworker names, implied that the caseworker was on drugs, and accused the caseworker of 

purposefully keeping her from her children. About this time, respondent also disengaged from 

her services. Respondent stopped attending AA meetings in June 2015, did not attend counseling 

from September 2015 to January 2016, and failed to appear for most drug screens from October 

2015 to January 2016. When she did appear for drug screens in January 2016, respondent twice 

tested positive for marijuana. 

 Between October 2015 and December 2015 respondent attended only four of nine 

scheduled parenting time visits. During the visits she did attend, respondent was often more 

engaged with her phone than her children. When she did interact with the children, respondent 

made inappropriate comments, including telling the children that she did not like her caseworker 

and telling CV and ZV that BV should not attend the visits because she did not care about him. 

Following these visits, the children’s behavior declined. 

 The trial court held termination hearings in February and March 2016, and, in April 

2016, the trial court terminated respondent’s parental rights under MCL 712A.19b(3)(c)(i), (g), 

and (j). 

I. REUNIFICATION SERVICES 

 On appeal, respondent first argues that the DHHS did not make reasonable efforts to 

promote reunification with the children. We disagree. 

This Court reviews a preserved issue regarding reasonable efforts for clear error. In re 

Fried, 266 Mich App 535, 541; 702 NW2d 192 (2005). “When a child is removed from a 

parent’s custody, the agency charged with the care of the child is [usually] required to report to 

the trial court the efforts made to rectify the conditions that led to the removal of the child.” In 

re Plump, 294 Mich App 270, 272; 817 NW2d 119 (2011). “The adequacy of the [DHHS]’s 

efforts to provide services may bear on whether there is sufficient evidence to terminate a 

parent’s rights.” In re Rood, 483 Mich 73, 89; 763 NW2d 587 (2009). “[A trial] court is not 
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required to terminate parental rights if the State has not provided to the family of the child . . . 

such services as the State deems necessary for the safe return of the child to the child’s home.” 

Id. at 105 (quotation marks and citation removed). 

 Respondent argues that the DHHS failed to provide her with proper reunification services 

because it did not provide her with the services of a psychiatrist. The DHHS “must make 

reasonable efforts to rectify conditions, to reunify families, and to avoid termination of parental 

rights.” In re LE, 278 Mich App 1, 18; 747 NW2d 883 (2008). It has no duty, however, to 

provide every conceivable service. See In re Terry, 240 Mich App 14, 27-28; 610 NW2d 563 

(2000). Moreover, “[w]hile the [DHHS] has a responsibility to expend reasonable efforts to 

provide services to secure reunification, there exists a commensurate responsibility on the part of 

respondents to participate in the services that are offered.” In re Frey, 297 Mich App 242, 248; 

824 NW2d 569 (2012). 

After respondent’s mental health was brought to the attention of the trial court in October 

2015, the DHHS arranged for mother to have a psychological evaluation completed to assess her 

mental health needs. Psychologists evaluated respondent twice. Respondent first arranged an 

evaluation by a psychologist outside the DHHS’s referral. Then, a few months later, respondent 

finally completed an evaluation with the DHHS-recommended psychologist. Neither 

psychological evaluation recommended the services of a psychiatrist and, by the time mother 

completed the DHHS-recommended psychological evaluation, the DHHS was proceeding with 

termination and was not required to provide any further reunification services. In re HRC, 286 

Mich App 444, 463; 781 NW2d 105 (2009). The psychologists’ reports make clear that the 

DHHS was not required to provide respondent with psychiatric services. Moreover, any failure 

to provide these services cannot form the basis for respondent’s appeal because respondent’s 

own delay would have precluded her from receiving these services before the DHHS filed its 

termination petition. 

At the termination hearing, the DHHS caseworker testified that the DHHS offered 

respondent drug screening, supervised parenting time, transportation assistance, a psychological 

evaluation, participation in a parent-mentor program, housing assistance, and counseling. From 

at least October 2015 until January 2016, respondent repeatedly demonstrated her unwillingness 

to cooperate with the DHHS and its services.1

 Considering the extent of services offered by the 

DHHS and respondent’s consistent failure to participate in these services, we conclude that the 

trial court did not clearly err by finding that the DHHS made reasonable efforts to reunite 

respondent with her children. 

 

 

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 Insofar as mother argues that she was forced to obtain services without assistance from the 

DHHS, “[t]he fact that respondent sought treatment independently in no way compels the 

conclusion that [the DHHS’s] efforts toward reunification were not reasonable, and, more to the 

point, does not suggest that respondent would have fared better if the worker had offered those 

additional services to [her].” In re Fried, 266 Mich App at 543. 
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II. STATUTORY GROUNDS FOR TERMINATION 

 Next, respondent argues that the trial court erred when it found that clear and convincing 

evidence supported terminating her parental rights. We disagree. 

 To terminate parental rights, the trial court must find that at least one of the statutory 

grounds for termination in MCL 712A.19b(3) has been met by clear and convincing evidence. 

In re McIntyre, 192 Mich App 47, 50; 480 NW2d 293 (1991). “We review for clear error . . . the 

court's decision that a ground for termination has been proven by clear and convincing 

evidence.” In re Trejo, 462 Mich 341, 356-357; 612 NW2d 407 (2000). A finding is “clearly 

erroneous where the reviewing court is left with a definite and firm conviction that a mistake has 

been made.” In re Terry, 240 Mich App at 22. 

 Respondent’s parental rights were terminated under MCL 712A.19b(3)(c)(i), (g), and (j), 

which provide: 

(3) The court may terminate a parent’s parental rights to a child if the court finds, 

by clear and convincing evidence, 1 or more of the following: 

* * * 

(c) The parent was a respondent in a proceeding brought under this chapter, 182 

or more days have elapsed since the issuance of an initial dispositional order, and 

the court, by clear and convincing evidence, finds either of the following: 

(i) The conditions that led to the adjudication continue to exist and there is no 

reasonable likelihood that the conditions will be rectified within a reasonable time 

considering the child’s age. 

* * * 

(g) The parent, without regard to intent, fails to provide proper care or custody 

for the child and there is no reasonable expectation that the parent will be able to 

provide proper care and custody within a reasonable time considering the child’s 

age. 

* * * 

(j) There is a reasonable likelihood, based on the conduct or capacity of the 

child’s parent, that the child will be harmed if he or she is returned to the home of 

the parent. 

 The trial court removed the children from respondent’s care because respondent abused 

substances, exposed the children to her abusive boyfriend, and failed to provide for the children’s 

proper care and guidance. Although respondent initially showed some progress on the services 
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offered her, from at least October 2015 until the time of the termination hearing, respondent 

refused to engage meaningfully in the services offered her. Respondent failed to attend most of 

her drug screenings and tested positive for marijuana on other occasions. Respondent did not 

attend counseling and repeatedly berated her caseworkers. Twelve months after the children’s 

removal, respondent had yet to maintain unsupervised visitation with the children. During the 

brief period that respondent exercised unsupervised parenting time, respondent twice exposed the 

children to her abusive boyfriend despite clear direction not to do so. Between October 2015 and 

December 2015, respondent failed to attend half of her scheduled parenting time visits and, 

during the visits she did attend, demonstrated poor parenting skills that appear to have caused her 

children to suffer behavioral setbacks with their foster placement. 

 Accordingly, respondent did not accomplish “any meaningful change in the conditions” 

that led to adjudication. In re Williams, 286 Mich App 253, 272; 779 NW2d 286 (2009). 

Because respondent refused to engage in the majority of services offered by the DHHS during 

the twelve months following her children’s removal from her care, the trial court properly 

concluded that grounds existed to terminate respondent’s parental rights under MCL 

712A.19b(3)(c)(i). 

 “Having concluded that at least one ground for termination existed, we need not consider 

the additional grounds upon which the trial court based its decision.” In re HRC, 286 Mich App 

at 461. Nonetheless, because this Court has held “that a parent’s failure to comply with the 

parent-agency agreement is evidence of a parent’s failure to provide proper care and custody for 

the child,” In re JK, 468 Mich 202, 214; 661 NW2d 216, 223 (2003), we conclude that that the 

trial court properly determined that grounds also existed under MCL 712A.19b(3)(g) to 

terminate respondent’s parental rights. Additionally, respondent’s failure to address adequately 

her issues with substance abuse, mental health, and parenting skills, renders harm to the children 

reasonably likely if they were to return to her care. Indeed, the psychologist that completed her 

second evaluation stated that respondent presented a risk to the children based on her personality 

deficits, ongoing mood problems, and unresolved substance abuse issues. Accordingly, we 

conclude that the trial court also properly determined that MCL 712A.19b(3)(j) supported 

termination of respondent’s parental rights. 

III. BEST INTERESTS OF THE CHILDREN 

Finally, respondent argues that the trial court erred when it found that termination was in 

the children’s best interests. We disagree. 

 “Once a statutory ground for termination has been proven, the trial court must find that 

termination is in the child’s best interests before it can terminate parental rights.” In re 

Olive/Metts Minors, 297 Mich App 35, 40; 823 NW2d 144 (2012). Because proof of a statutory 

ground for termination establishes the state’s substantial “interest in protecting the welfare of the 

child,” In re Moss, 301 Mich App 76, 90; 836 NW2d 182 (2013), the trial court need not find 

clear and convincing evidence that termination is in the child’s best interests. Rather, “whether 

termination of parental rights is in the best interests of the child must be proved by a 

preponderance of the evidence” Id. at 90. 
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 The trial court may consider the record as a whole in determining whether termination is 

in the child’s best interests. In re Trejo, 462 Mich at 354. The trial court must “state on the 

record or in writing its findings of fact and conclusions of law with respect to whether or not 

parental rights should be terminated.” MCL 712A.19b(1). When deciding whether termination 

is in the child’s best interests, the trial court may consider “the child’s bond to the parent, the 

parent’s parenting ability, the child’s need for permanency, stability, and finality, and the 

advantages of a foster home over the parent’s home.” In re Olive/Metts Minors, 297 Mich App 

at 41-42 (citations omitted). The trial court may also properly consider evidence concerning the 

length of time the child has been in foster care and whether the child could be returned to the 

parent “within the foreseeable future, if at all.” In re Frey, 297 Mich App at 248-249. “We 

review for clear error . . . the court's decision regarding the child's best interest.” In re Trejo, 462 

Mich at 356–57. 

 In this case, although the children appear to have been initially bonded with respondent, 

respondent has failed to maintain unsupervised parenting time and more recently failed to attend 

many of the supervised visits. When present, respondent frequently acted inappropriately 

causing the children behavioral issues in their foster placement. Accordingly, respondent’s 

parenting time was suspended in December 2015. 

 From at least October 2015 until the DHHS filed the termination petition, respondent 

refused to engage meaningfully in the services provided to her. As a result, respondent failed to 

address adequately her issues with substance abuse, mental health, and parenting skills by the 

time of the termination hearing. Although respondent claims to have taken steps towards 

addressing these issues since the time of the termination petition, respondent had previously 

shown limited progress on her services only to disengage from those services shortly thereafter. 

Given that the children have shown progress in their foster placement and appear to be bonded to 

their foster family, we cannot conclude that the trial court erred by determining that termination 

was in the children’s best interests despite respondent’s recent efforts. 

 Respondent also argues that the trial court erred by not considering the best interests of 

each child separately. The child is the “primary” intended beneficiary of the best-interests 

determination, In re Trejo, 462 Mich at 356, and therefore, the trial court must consider the best 

interests of each child individually. In re Olive/Metts Minors, 297 Mich App at 42. The trial 

court is only required, however, to make explicit “factual findings concerning each child’s best 

interests” when “the best interests of the individual children significantly differ.” In re White, 

303 Mich App 701, 715-716; 846 NW2d 61 (2014). 

 Respondent argues that the trial court was required to address each child’s best interests 

separately because the children “have different developmental needs.” In her brief on appeal, 

however, respondent has provided this Court with no support for that argument. “It is not 

sufficient for a party simply to announce a position . . . and then leave it up to this Court to 

discover and rationalize the basis of his claims, or unravel and elaborate for him his arguments, 

and then search for authority either to sustain or reject his position.” Wilson v Taylor, 457 Mich 

232, 243; 577 NW2d 100 (1998). Accordingly, we cannot conclude that the trial court erred by 

not considering the best interests of the children separately. 
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Affirmed. 

/s/ William B. Murphy 

/s/ David H. Sawyer 

/s/ Brock A. Swartzle