1 THIS VERSION INCLUDES T HE ERRATA DTD 13F EB02-e
UNITED STAT ES COURT OF AP P EALS FOR VETERANS CLAIMS

No. 98-2247
D EE W. K I LPAT RI CK , A PP EL L ANT ,

V
. ANTHONY J. P RI NCI PI , S EC RE T A RY O F V ET ER A N S A FF A I RS , A PPEL L EE
.

On Ap pe a l f ro m th e B oa

rd of Ve te ra ns ' Ap pe a ls (Argued De cembe r 13, 2001 De cided F ebrua ry 8, 2002 )

Michae l P. Horan , o f Wa sh ing ton , D .C. , f or the a pp e lla nt. Richard May erick, w ithwh om Leigh A. Bradley , G e ne ra l Co un se l; Ro n G arv in , Assistant Gene ral Counsel; and Ca ro lyn F . W ashington , De p u t y

As s i s t an tGe n er al C o u n s el , al l o f W as h i n gt o n, D.C., were on the pleading s, for the a ppellee.
Be fore HOL DAWAY, STEI NB ERG, and GREENE, Judges

. STEI NB ERG, Judge : The appellant, throug h counsel, seeks revie w of an Oc tober 24, 1998, Boa rd of Ve tera

ns' Appea ls (Boa

rd o r BV A) d ec ision that denied his claim for De partment of Veter ans Aff

airs (V A) spec ial adaptive housingor a spec ial home-a daptation g rant, unde r cha pter 21 of titl e 3 8 , U. S

. C o d e, as well as his reque st for financ ial assistance for the pur chase of an automobile and automobile adaptive equipment, or for adaptive equipment only , under c hapter 39 of t itle 38. Record ( R.) at 3. The a ppellant and the Sec reta

ry have both f

iled briefs, a

nd, afte r two rounds of supplementa l briefingorder ed by the Court, the Court hear d oral a rgu m en t fr o m the parties. This appe al is timely , and the Court ha s jurisdiction pur suant to 38 U.S.C. §§ 7252(a) and 72 6 6 ( a )

. F o r

t h e r e a s o n s t h a tf

o l l o w , t h e C o u rtw i l l r e v e r s e t h e B o ar d d e c i s i o ni np artan d

va c a te it in part and re mand the matter for r eadjudication.2 I. Bac kgr ound The ve tera

n serve d in the U.S. Army from September

1960 to September 1963. See R. at 2, 14. Around 1990, a

ppare ntly , he re ceive d a g unshot wound from an a ccide ntal shooting. R. at 109. I n that y ear , the bullet that cause d his gunshot wound was remove d by surg ery at a VAmedical cente r, af ter whic h the veter an wa s ambulatory and suff

ere d no bowel, b l adder, or sexual complications. Ibid. Ho we ve r, he wa s lat e r re a dmi tte d to a VA med ic a l ce nte r due to pa in f ro m a
r u p tu r e d d i s c a tL3

- 4

. R

. a t4 4

. S h o rt l y t h e r e a f t e r , h e " u n d e r w e n tl a m i n e c t o m y L1 , L2 , an d

L3 toge ther with fora

minotomy and dis kectomy " to repa ir his injuries (R. at 44); this surg ery resulted in substantial medical complications (R. at 44-45, 109-10). I n October 1995, a VA r eg ional office (RO) a war ded dis ability compensation to him under 38 U.S.C. § 1151 for bowel dy sfunction (30%) , bladder dy sfunction (40%) , para ly sis of le ft l eg(40%) , and par tial para ly sis of rig ht leg (20%) , as
we ll a s sp e c ia l mo nth ly

c omp e ns a tion du e to p ara ly sis of the le ft le g . R. a t 44 -4 5. Th e VA RO det erm in ed t hat th e vet eran 's con di ti on s w ere "no t t he natural con seq uen ce[ s] of th e la mi nect om y ". Ib id . I n J une 1996, the RO (1) incre ased his ratings for loss of use of both le g s to 100%, for bow el dy sf un c tio n to 1 00 %, and

fo r b la dd e r d

y sf un c tio n to 60 %; (2 ) g ra

nte d s e rv ic e c on ne c tio n f or los s of us e of a c re a tiv e or g an, wh ic h it

ra te d at 0% ; (3) g ra

nte d s pe c ia l mo nth ly

c omp e ns a tio n f

or the se
c on dit ion s; a

nd (4 ) g ra nte d s e rv ic e c on ne c tio n a

nd a 10 % d isa b i l i t y ratin g fo r c arp a l tunn e l sy nd ro me of the ri g ht w ri st. R. at 49 -51

. Th ereafter , th e ve te ra n ma de a thi rd c la im t o th e RO , th is t ime

re qu est in g grants fo r ( 1) sp e c ia lly a da pte d h ou sin g and

a sp e c ia l ho me a da

pti on un de r 3 8 U .S. C. § 2 10 1( a ), (2) a

uto mob ile a nd

a da pti ve e qu ipm e nt o r a da

pti ve e qu ipm e nt o nly

un de r 3 8 U .S. C. §§ 3901 and 3902, and ( 3) vocational reha bilitation under chapte r 3 1 o f t i tle 38, U.S. Code. See R. at 61 -6 3. I n N ov e mbe r 1 99 6, the RO de nie d a ll thr e e c la ims ( ibid. ), and the veter an then a ppeale d to the Boa

rd (R. at 86). I n the Aug ust 1998 BVA d ec i s ion here on appea l, the Boa rd re manded to the RO the vocational r ehabilitation claim (R. at 9-10) and denied the hous ing and automobi le benefits sought under c hapter s 21 and 39, re spectively (R

. at 9 ). T he B oard ba sed its decision on VA Ge nera l Counsel Prece dential Opinion 24-97 (July 3, 1 9 9 7 ) [ here inafter

G.C. Prec. 24- 97 or " the GC op ini on " ], w hic h it

re c og nize d a s b ind ingand c ha ra c te ri zed a s f oll ow s:3 [T] he [GC] opinion dete rm i n ed that a veter an with a disability that resulted f rom VA hospitalizat i o n
. . . who has be en dete rmined elig ible for c ompensati o n 'as if' such injury wer e ser vice- connec ted pursuant to [section] 1151 is not eligible for either a specia l housing adaption g rant or a g rant for acquir ing an automobile and a daptive equipment as a

result of the disability

cause d by

VA medica l car e. R. at 6- 7; se e als o R. at 99- 105 (text of the GC opinion). The B oard c oncluded: " Essentially , the benef its [t he veteran soug ht] , as provided unde r cha pters 21 and 39, a

re be y ond the scope of the g rant of be ne fi ts p ro vid e d und e r [s e c tio n] 11 51 ." R. at 7. Th e a pp e lla nt t he n a pp e a le d to thi s Co ur

t in Dec ember

1998. At o ra l ar gu m en tan d

i nt h ei r b ri ef

s , t h e ap p el l an tan d t h e S ec re t ar y b o t h re l y

o nt h e l an gu age of sec tion 1151 as disposit ive, ea ch claimi ng that the statute is plain on its face in allowing a nd limit ing, r espec tivel y , ancillar y benef its. Appellant' s Br ief (B r.) at 29; Secreta ry ' s Br . at 3. The appellant a lso spends a subs t an t i al porti on of his brief attacking the validity of the GC opinion. Br . at 5-28, 32-37. Spec ifically , the appe ll an t cl ai ms that the Boa rd er red in re ly ing on the GC opinion because it is procedura lly invalid under 5 U.S.C. §§ 552 and 553, p ro v i s i o ns of the Ad min istrativ e Pr oc e dure Ac t ( APA ). B r. a t 8- 12 . T he Se c re tary de c lin e s to a dd

re ss t he va lid ity of the GC opini on "[a]bsent Court order ", be cause the appe llant had ra ised these issues be fore the Court for the f

irst time, rather tha

n exhausting his administrative re medies. B r. at 4. Th e Court

in M arc h 2 00 0 o rd e re d th e Se c re tary to f ile a su pp le me nta l br ie f a dd

re ssi nga ll arguments raised by

the appe llant and not conce ded b y t h e S ec reta ry and also to discuss the applicability

of Ma gg itt v . W est , 202 F.3d 1370 (Fe d. Cir. 2000), and Stu c k e yv . W est , 13 Vet.App. 163 (1999), " to the Secre tary ' s argument that the Court should not a ddress the arguments raised by the appe llant to the Court but not t o the B oard in this case ". Kilp atr ic k v . W est , 13 Vet.App. 403, 40 3- 04 (2 00 0) (p e r curi a m ord e r)

. Th e Court ' s ord e r al so pe rm itt e d th e a pp e lla nt t o f ile a re sp on se to the Secre tary ' s supplemental brief

. Id. a t 40 4. I n h is su

pp le me nta l br ie f, the Se c re tary c on te nd s, inter alia, that the APA does not ap p l y t o t h e GC opinion, because it is i nterpre tive rathe r than substantiv e (S u p plemental (Suppl.) B r. at 2-5) and bec ause se ction 1151, under Mi ntz v . B ro wn , 6 Vet.App. 277 ( 1994), is "pla in on its fac e" in clea rly prec luding non-chapte rs 11 and 13 anc illary benef its (Suppl. Br. at 10). The appellant a rg ues in his supplemental reply brief that the GC opinion4

is unreasona

ble, and t h er ef

o re inva lid, because it does not give eff ect to the " service -conne cted" langua g e of se c tio n 115 1 as de fi ne d in 38 U.S. C. § 11 0( 16 ). Sup pl. Re ply B r. at 8- 12 . In r e sp on se to t he Court ' s o rd e r t o a dd

re ss Ma gg itt and Stucke

y , the Secre tary conce des that the Court, by virtue of its jur isdiction ove r the a ppeal, doe s, in fact, have jurisdiction under Ma gg itt , 202 F.3d at 1377, to h e ar a ll a

rgume nts ra ise d b y

the a pp e lla nt. Sup pl. B r. a t 11. Th e Se c re tary do e s n ot d isc us s Stucke y . See Suppl. B r. at 11-12. I n his supplemental reply brief, the appellant r eiterates many of his pri o r ar guments and, in addition, argues that, under SE C v . Ch e ne ry Cor p ., 318 U.S. 80, 88 (1943), Mi ntz m ay n o t b e invoked to jus tify the GC opinion, beca

use the VAGene ral Counsel (VAG C) did not rely

on Mi ntz in writing the opinion. Suppl . Reply Br . at 1. Fu rt h er m o re, the appellant a

rg ues that the GC opinion should be invalidated on the basis that it conflicts with law a nd policy . Suppl. R eply

Br . at 8-11. Subsequently , the Court d et er m ined that furthe r supplemental br iefing was ne cessa ry and issued a May

2001 order

requiringthe par

ties to discuss "(1) the leg islative history of [section 1151] or of a ny other statutory

provis i o n re l ati ng to the appellant' s claims for a ncillary benef its under chapte rs 21, 23, and 39 . . . i n terms of a ny connec tion between se ction 1151 and such pote ntial ancillar y benef its . . . , or (2) any pertinent reg ulatory history reg arding those statutory provisions and any su ch co nn ect io n. " Kilpat rick v . Principi , 15 Vet.App. 22, 22 ( 2001) (pe r curiam). I n response , n e i t h e r p art y h a s b e e na

b l e t o r e f e r t o an y s i g n i f

i c an tl e g i s l a t i v e h i s t o r

y t o a i d t h e C o u rt

. N o t a

b l y, the par ties do not discuss in their briefs and w ere not prepa red t o d i s cuss at ora l argument the specific provisions of chapte rs 21 and 39, the c hapter s under whic h the appe llant seeks bene fits.

II. Ana lys is A. Se c tio n 11 51 (a

) B e ne fi ts Se c tio n 1 15 1( a ) p ro vid e s, in p e rt ine nt p art :

Where a ny veter an shall have suff er ed an injury , or an ag g ravation of an injury , as t h e re s ult of hospitaliz ation, medical or surg ical tre atment . . . awa rded unde r any

of the law s administered by the Secr etar

y , or as a result of having submitted to an e x amin ati on under a ny such law, a

nd not the result of such veter an' s own willful misconduct, and such injury or ag g ravation results in additional dis abi li ty to o r d e a th o f s uc h v e te ra n, dis a bil ity or de a th5 compens ation un de r t

his c ha pte r a nd dep e nd e nc y

and ind e mni ty com p en sation under c hapter

13 of this titl e shall be a

war ded in the sa me manne r as if suc h dis ab ili ty , ag grav ation, or de ath we re service -connecte d

. 38 U.S.C. § 1151(a) (1994) (ame nded, ef fec tive Oct. 1, 1996) (empha sis a dded). Section 101(16) define s "se rvice -conne cted" as " with respec t to disability or death, that such disability was incur

red

or a g g ra vate d, or that th e de a th r e su lte d f

ro m a dis a bil ity inc ur

re d or a g g ra vate d, in l ine of

du ty in the ac tive milit ary , naval, or air ser vice." 38 U.S.C. § 101(16). Both pa rties ar g ue that sec tion 1151 is pl ain on its face . The a ppellant ar g ues t h at section 1151(a) "states clea

rly " that "a

ny disability a vete ran sustains while rece iving VA medical tre atment is to be treate d by

VA ' as if such disability ' is service -conne cted" . Br . at 29. The S ecr etar y argues that the use of the word "c ompensation" in se ction 1151 ref ers only to "monthly

pay ment[s] " unde r section 101 (1 3 ), an d

th er ef o re , "[ p ] o t en t i al aw ar d s u n d er s ec t i o n1 1 5 1 [ ar e] leg islatively self-limiting to potential awar ds of compensation unde r chapte rs 11 and 13 of title 38 ex clusively , to the exclusion of other be nefits under

other c hapter s." B r. at 3. B oth arguments are misplaced. Althoug h section 1151(a) provides f

o r t h e pay

ment of compe nsation (disability compensation under cha pter 11 or depende ncy

and indemnity compensation unde r chapte r 13) to the class of benef iciarie s to which the

a pp e lla nt b e lon g s, the pa

rt ie s se e m to have fo rg ott e n th a t th e a pp e ll ant is seek ingbe ne fi ts under chapters 21 and 39 and that it is the be ne fi ts pr ov isi on s o f t ho se c ha pte rs that mu st b e e xami ne d in order to decide the questions before the Court. For the re asons that follow, the provisions of sec tion 1151(a) and sec tion 101(16), in and of the mselves, neither al low for nor restric t eligibility

for pay ments under other

chapte rs of title 38 or under any n o n -c h ap t er 1 1 or 13 authorities. See Ha mi lto n v . B ro wn , 4 Vet.App. 528, 536 ( 1993) (e n banc) (holding t h at d ef initions , "w hether statutory or re g ulatory , are not themselves oper ative provisions of law" ). As to the Secre tary ' s re l i an ce on Mi ntz as authority

for the pr oposition t hat sec tion 1151 pr e c lud e s n on -cha

pte r 1 1 a nd 13 anc ill ary

be ne fi ts, the Cou

rt no te s th a t Mi ntz related to service

connec ted burial be nefits soug ht by a sec tion 1151 benefic iary under section 2307, not c hapter s 21 and 39. Mi ntz , 6 Ve t.A

pp . at 28 2- 83 ; se e als o 38 U.S.C. § 2307 (providing f or pay ment of burial and fune ral e x penses f

or dec ease d veter an who "die s as t he result of a service -conne cted disability ")

. I n Mi ntz , t h e C o u rt h el d that "a claimant would not be e ntitled to . . . burial benefits . . . under6

38 U.S.C. § 2307, unless service co n n ec t i o n is established under a statutory provision other than 38 U. S

. C

. § 1151". Ibid. That is, to determine e ligibility for a ncillary benef its, the statutory elig ibilit y criter ia – her e, those in cha pter 23 – unde r which the veter an is seekingbenef its must be examined beca

use, by its very terms, sec tion 1151 relates only to the awa

rd of compens ation under chapte rs 11 and 13, a

nd an awa rd of compensation is not at stake in the instant case. F urthermor e, the Court notes that section 2307, at issue in Mi ntz , awa rds bene fits for " a vete ran w ho dies as the

re su lt o f s e rv ic e -c on ne c te d d isa bil ity " , r a the r t

ha n u si ng th e e lig ibi lity

langua g e " e nti tle d to compensation under cha

pter 11" , as do sec t i o n s 3901 and 2101. Cf. 38 U.S.C. § 2302(a)(1) (providing for p aym ent of fune ral a nd burial expenses whe re ve tera n did not die from servic econnec ted d i s ab i l i t y

but "at the time of death was in rec eipt of compe nsation") . There fore , the Secre tary ' s arguments in reliance on Mi ntz are not persuasive

. Th e a pp e lla nt' s c on te nti on that se c tio n 11 51 " c le arl y " dic ta te s that a se c tio n 1 15 1 d isa

bil ity

" is to be treated by

V A 'as if su ch disabili ty' is service connected " (B r. a t 29 (e mph a sis a dd e d) ) i s equally unpersua sive. Section 1151 does not co n fer upon its beneficia

ries the sta tus of ser

vice

connec tion; rather, sec tion 1151 awards com pensation as if the claim ant w ere se rvice connected

. I n other wor ds, section 1151 nowher e provides that the dis ab ili ty is, as the appe llant sugg ests (B r. at 2 9 ), t o b e t re at edgen er al l y as i f i twe re s er v i ce co n n ec t ed

. S i m i l ar l y u n av ai l i n g i s t h e ap p el l an t 's

a tte mpt to i so la te the de fi nit io n of "serv ic e -c on ne c tio n" in s e c tio n 1 01 (1 6) a s th ou g h it c ou ld somehow assume inde pendent mea ning outside se ction 1151' s opera t i v e provisions . I nstead, the definition must take its meaning from the lang uag e of se ction 1151, see H amilton , su

pra , and that section' s operative lang uag e relates only to providing for compensation pay ments under c hapter

11 or 13 and not to the nature of disabiliti es in some g ener ic sense. Acc ording ly , in order to de termine the e li g ib il it

y o f a s e c ti o n 1 1 5 1 b e n e f ic ia r y f o r b e n e f it s u n d e r c h a

p te r s 2 1 an d 3 9 , th e Co u rt now turns to the chapte r 21 and 39 pr ovisions at issue. B. C hap te r 2 1 Anc ill

ar y Be ne fi ts Se c tio n 2 10 1( a ) o f t itl e 38 , U .S. Cod e , p ro vid e s:

(a ) T he Se c re tary

is auth orized , under suc h regulations as the S e c r e t ar y m ay p r e s c r i b e , t o a s s i s tan y v e te ra n wh o is e ntit le d to compens ation u nder chapter 11 of this ti tle for perm anent and total se rv ic e -c onne c te d d

isa bil ity

--7 (1) due to t he loss, or los s o

f u se , of both lower extremit ies , su c h a s to pr e c lud e loc omo tio n w it hout t he a id o f b ra c e s, crutc hes, ca

nes, or a whee lchair, or (2 ) wh ic h in c lud e s ( A) bli nd ne ss i n b oth

e y e s, havin g on ly light per ception, plus (B ) loss or loss of use of one lower extremity , or ( 3 ) d u e t o t h e l o s s o r

l o s s o f u s e o f o n e l o w e r

e xtr e mit y to gethe r wit h (A) resid ual s of organic di seas e or i nj ury , o r (B) the loss or loss of use of one upper extremity , which so af fec t the func tions of balance or propulsion as to pre clude locomotion w i t h o ut the aid of bra ces, c rutche s, cane s, or a whee lchair, in a cquiring a suitable housing uni t with special made nece ssary

fi b x y tu t r h e e s n o a rt m ur o e v o a f b t l h e e f a v c e i t l e i r ti a e n s ' s disability , and nec essar

y land there for. The re g ulations of the Secr etar y shall include, but n o t be limited to, provisions requiringfinding s that (1) it is medically fea sible for such ve t er an to reside in the pr op os e d h ou sin g un it a

nd in t he pr op os e d locality ; ( 2) the pr op os e d h ou sin g un it be ars a pr op e r re la tio n to the ve te ra n' s pr e se nt a

nd a nti c ipate d in c ome and

e xpe ns e s; and (3) the nature and condition of the pr opos ed h ousing unit ar e such a s to be suitable to the veter an' s needs f or dwe lling purpose s. 38 U.S.C. § 2101(a) (e mphasis added) . The c orre spondin g VA re g ulation, 38 C.F.R. § 3.809,

re qu ir e s, in o rd e r f

or a ve te ra n to be e lig ibl e fo r se c tio n 21 01 (a ) be ne fi ts, that " [t]he dis a bil ity mus t have be en incur

red or ag g ravated as the result

of [ac tive] se rvice

. . . and the veter an mus t be entitled to c omp e ns a tio n f

or pe rm ane nt a

nd tot a l di sa bil ity du e to" , in te r a lia , th e los s o f u se of bo th l e g s. 38 C.F.R. § 3.809(b) ( 2001) (e mphasis added)

. Be cause the veter an is rec eiving section 1151 compe nsation benef its at a 100% rating due to the loss o f u s e o f b o th of his lower e x tremities (R. at 51), unde r the plain mea ning of section 2101(a) (1) he is within the s tatutory elig ibilit y criter ia bec ause he is "e ntitled to compensation under chapte r 11" – specific ally , under se ction 1151 – "f or per manent and t o tal service -conne cted dis a bil ity " fo r a

lis te d disa

bil ity , the los s of use of bo th le g s. Mo re ov e r, e ve n if the Court we re to fi nd se c tio n 210 1( a ) am

biguo us , whi c h it do e s not, a s to th e e lig ibi lity of se c tio n 1 15 1 b e ne fi c iari e s, under Brown v. Gardner any interpre tive doubt in statutory interpre tation is to be "re solved in the veter an' s favor ". Gardner , 5 1 3 U. S

. 1 1 5 , 1 1 8 (1 9 9 4 ) ( ci t i n g King v. St. Vincent's Hospital , 5 02 U. S. 21 5, 22 0- 22 1 n .9 (1 99 1) ); se e als o J on es ( Et he l) v . W est , 136 F.3d 1296, 1299 n.2 ( Fe d. Cir. 1998) (s a me ); Al le n (

W ill iam ) v . B ro wn , 7 Vet.App. 439, 446 (1995) ( en banc ) (same). The Court notes that se c tio n 2 10 1( a )' s p e rm iss ive langua g e that " [t]he Se c re tary is auth orized , under su c h

r e g u lations8

a s t h e S e c r e t ar

y m ay presc ribe ," ( emphasis adde d) might be re ad as e stablishing only a discre tionary pro gra m an d not an entitlement for those in the define d elig ibilit y cate g ories. But see M

atter of W ick, 4 Vet.App. 487, 494 ( 1993) (holding as follows: " The provision of § 5904( d)(3) that the Secre tary ' may direc t' pa

y ment must be rea d in light of the ' is to be paid to th e at t o rn ey b y the Se c re tary ' langua g e of

[38 U .S. C.] § 59 04 (d )( 2) (A ). Th e re c an b e no qu e sti on that Co ngres s, in

enac ting § 5904( d), conte mplated an oblig atory rathe r than a

discreti o nary

direc t pay

ment by the Secre tary to a claimant' s attorney .") , rev'd on other grounds , 40 F.3d 367 ( Fe d. Cir. 1994). The Court nee d not resolve that que stion , h o wever. Even if it were to be assumed that

se c tio n 2 10 1( a ) e sta

bli sh e s a dis c re tio na

ry pr og ra m, t he Se c re tary ' s d isc re tio n w ou ld b e on ly a s to whether to implement or not the prog ram for the benef iciarie s presc ribed by

Congr ess. Ther e is no

rea son to believe that Cong ress g ave him leave to pick and c ho o s e from the classes to which Congr ess g rante d elig ibilit y – all those veter ans entitled to c ompensation under chapte r 11 who have

any of the re qu isi te disa

bil iti e s. F or

e xamp le , a ssumin g a g a in t hat th e Se c re tary

ha s d isc re tio n to implement the provisions of section 2101(a ), he c ould not crea te entitlement for those vetera ns listed in c la us e (1 ), wh o s uf

fe re d lo ss or los s of use of bo th le g s, 38 U. S.C. § 2 10 1( a )( 1) , a nd no t f or tho se l i s t edi ncl au s e ( 2 ) , w h o ar e b l i n d i nb o t h ey es an d

s u ff er fr o m l o s s o r l o s s o f u s e o f o n e l eg, 38 U.S.C. § 2101(a)(2) , or for those listed in c lause (3) , who suffe r fr om loss or loss of use of one le g a s w e ll a s e ith e r r e sid ua ls o f o rg anic dis e a se or los s o r l os s o f u se of an arm, 3 8 U .S. C. § 2101(a) (3). I n the same manner , the Secr etar y could not cre ate e ntitlement for those injured dur ing

a cti ve se rv ic e and

no t f or tho se inj ur e d d

ur ingho sp ita l tr e a tme nt; bo th a re e qu a lly

" e nti tle d to compensation under chapter 11 . . . for pe rm ane nt a nd tot a l se rv ic e -c on ne c te d d isa bil ity " . 3 8 U .S. C. § 2101(a)

. Al tho ug h c ouns e l f

or the Se c re tary

c on c e de d th e pr e c e din g po in t at ora l argume nt, thi s is , nonetheless, pr ecise ly

what the r eg ulation seems to do b y ad d i n g a condition on chapter 21 elig ibilit y , in addition to "entitle[ment] to compensation under chapter 11 of t his title for per manent and total servic e-c onnecte d disability ", 38 U .S.C. § 2101(a), so as t o re q uire that the disability be "inc urre d or ag g rava

ted as the r esult of [active] service ", 38 C.F .R. § 3.809(a), ( b). I t would be inconsistent w ith the overa ll statutory scheme to implement benefit entitlement only for s o me of the

me mb e r s o f

th e c la s s e s o f

v e te r an s li s te d

in the s tatute. Se e ge ne ra lly Bailey v . United States ,9

516 U.S. 137, 145 (1995) (c onsidering "not only the bar e mea

ning of [a] word but also its placement

and purp os e in the st a tut or

y sc he me " ); Reno v . Koray , 515 U.S. 50, 56-57 (1995) ( construing statut or y langua g e in c on te xt of

statut or y sc he me ); Talley v. De rwinski , 2 Vet.App. 282, 287 ( 1992) (h old ingthat " [j]ust

a s a statut e sh ou ld b e c on str

ue d s o a s to su sta in i ts consti tut ion a lity , . . . so sh ou ld re g ulatio ns be c on str ue d so a s to ha

rm on ize the m wi th the a

uth or izin g law" ); United States

v. C h o i ce , 2 0 1 F

. 3 d 8 3 7 , 8 4 0 ( 6 th Ci r
. 2 0 0 0 ) ( e xp la in in g th a t c o u rt s h o u ld lo o k a t la n g u a g e and de sig n o f statut e a s who le in i nte rp re tin g pla in m e anin g ); Robbins v. Bentsen , 41 F.3d 1195, 1198 (7th Cir. 1994) (noting that regulations " cannot trump the plain lang uag e of statutes" and re fusing to r e a d s ta tut e and

re g ulatio n a s in

c on fl ic t w he re su c h r e a din g no t ne c e ssa ry ); United Stat es v. Me y e rs , 952 F.2d 914, 918 ( 6th Cir. 1992), cert. de nied 50 3 U .S. 99 4 ( 19 92 ); Emery Mining Corp. v. Sec 'y of Labor , 7 44 F .2 d 14 11 , 14 14 (1 0th Cir

. 19 84 ) (r e a so nin g that re g ulatio n mus t be re a d in light of s t at u t e it implements so as to harmonize with and not to conflict with statute and citing Trustees of Indiana Univ. v. United States , 6 18 F .2 d 7 36 , 739 (C t. C l. 1 98 0) ); United Telecom m., Inc. v . Comm'n of Internal Revenue , 589 F.2d 1389, 1390 ( 10th Cir. 1978) (same). To the e x tent that thi s r e g ulatio n ma

y be re a d a s d e nyinge lig ibi lity to a se c tio n 115 1 re c ipi e nt, it is inva lid be c a us e it im p r o p e r ly e xc lu d e s an in c lu d e d c la s s o f b e n e f ic ia r ie s u n d e r th e s tatute

. S

ee Gallegos v. Gobe r , 1 4 Ve t

. Ap p
. 5 0 , 5 7 -5 8 (2 0 0 0 ) ( i n v al i d at i n g re gu l at i o no ngro u n d s t h ati tex ce ed edS ec re t ary 's authority ), argued , No. 01-7037 (F ed. Cir. Dec . 7, 2001). Fur thermore , an e xa

mi n a ti o n o f th e e nti r e s ta

tutory scheme reg ardingancillar y benef its under

c ha pte r 2 1 d e mon strate s th a t any int e rp re ta tio n th a t w ou ld g ive the Se c re tary dis c re tio n in implementing its provisions (by virtue of the la

ng uag e " is authorized" to provide assista n c e a n d "ma y presc ribe" regulations) could l ead to an absurd result. Under such a construction, section 2101(a),

un de r w hic h th e a

pp e lla nt i s e lig ibl eby vir tue of his los s o f u se of

bo th l e g s, the n w ould co ntr a st marke dly with section 2101(b), w hich dire c ts that "the Secre tary

. . . sha ll assist any

veter an (other than a vete ran wh o is eligible for assistan ce under subsection (a) of this se c tio n) who is entitled to com pen sat io n u nd er ch apt er 11 of t hi s t it le f or a p e rm a nen t an d t ot al s ervi ce-co nn ect ed d is abi li ty ", including f

or blindness in both eyes and loss or l oss of use of bot h hands. 38 U.S.C. § 2101(a), (b) (empha sis added). Such a rea ding w ould re qui

re that the S ecr etar

y assist veter ans who are e ntitled to compensation under

chapte r 11 for

blindness in both ey es or loss or loss of use of both hands, but10

permit him to ex clude be nefits entitlement for a ppare ntly -no-less- disabled vete rans with cha pter 11-

c omp e ns a ble dis a bil iti e s due to los s or los s of use of bo th le g s, bli nd ne ss in a dd iti on

to l os s o r l os s of use of one leg , loss or loss of use of one leg toge ther with either residuals of or g anic disea se or with injury

or loss or loss of use of an arm. There is no le g islative history available that clar ifies why any such discre pancy

would exis t and, if so, wh ether it was intentional. An interpre tation of the statute that would result in section 1151 bene ficiar ies being treated differ ently based on whether they los e the ir ha

nd s or the ir le g s wou ld se e m to be su c h an ano ma lou s re su lt that it wo uld pr e va il o nly if it were clea

r that Cong ress spec ifically intended to make s u ch a dis tinction. See Gree n v. Boc k Laundry Mach. Co. , 490 U.S. 504, 509 (1989) ( declining to apply plain lang uag e of r

ule of e vidence beca use " literal re ading would compel an odd result in a ca se like this") ; United States v. Am. T r ucking Ass'ns, Inc. , 3 1 0 U

. S. 5 3 4 , 5 4 3 ( 1 9 4 0 ) ( h o ld in g th a t w h e r e p la in me an in g p r o d u c es an

" un re a sonab le res ult " , c ourt wi ll f oll owpurp os e , n ot r

ule ); Allen (

W illiam) v . Principi , 237 F.3d 1368, 1375-76 (F ed. Cir. 2001); Thayer v. Princ ipi , 15 Vet.App. 204, 210 (2001) (en banc ) (holding that whe n i n t erp reting statute, Court must avoid "[a] conclusion that . . . is not supported when

co n s t ru i n g ev ery p ar t o r se ct i o n o f th e st at u t e an d wo u l d y i el d an ab s u rd re s u l t " an d ci t i n g Tril les v. W est , 1 3 V e t.A

pp . 3 14 , 3 24 (2 00 0) ); Holliday v. Principi , 14 Vet.App. 280, 285 ( 2001) (c iting prec edent reg arding need to avoid absurd re sult when interpre ting statute) ; Gardner v. D erwinski , 1 Vet.App. 584, 587 ( 1991) (e x plaining the "a bsurd result" exception to plain meaning rule) ( citing Public Citiz en v. U

.S. Dep't of Justice , 491 U.S. 440, 470-71 (1989) ( Kenne dy , J ., concur ring ), a ff 'd , 5 F.3d 1456 (Fe d. Cir. 1993) and 51 3 U .S. 11 5 ( 19 94 )) ; Dye r v. United States 832 F.2d 1062, 1066 (9 th Cir . 198 7) (s a me a s Am. Trucking Ass'ns, Inc. , su pra ) ( ci t i n g Betche l Const., Inc . v. United Bhd. of C ar pe nte rs , 812 F.2d 1220, 1225 ( 9th Cir. 1987); Chapman v. United States , 500 U.S. 453, 476 (1991) ( Stevens, J ., dissenting) (" There is nothing in our jurisprudenc e that compels us to interpret

an ambi g uo us statut e to r e a c h s uc h a n a bs ur d r e su lt. I n f

a c t, we have sp e c if

ic a lly de c lin e d to d o s o in the past, even when the statute was not ambig uous, on the g round that Cong ress c ould not have intended such an outcome." ); Gree n , 490 U.S. at 527 (S calia, J., concurr ing in judg ment) (" We are confr onted her e with a statute w hich, if interpr eted litera lly , produce s an absur d, and per haps

un c on sti tut ion a l, r e su lt. " ); Trustees of Indiana Univ. , su pra (s a me a s Am Trucking Ass'ns, Inc. ).11

I n view of the fore g o i n g an al y s i s , the Court holds that 38 C.F.R. § 3.809 is invalid t o the

e xten t th a t it i s in te rp re te d to e xclu de se c tio n- 11 51 be ne fi c iari e s b y re qu ir ingthat a

lis te d d isa

bil ity be " incurre d or ag g ravated as the r esult of [active] service"

. For the s ame reasons, the GC opinion is also invalid in purporting to bar a sec ti o n -1 1 51 benef

iciary from elig ibilit y . G.C. Prec. 24- 97 (" veter an with a disability

that resulted f

rom VA hospitalization o r me d ic al or surg ical tre atment who has bee n deter

mined elig ible for c ompensation 'as if' such injury wer e ser vice c onnecte d pursuant to 38 U. S.C. § 11 51 is no t e lig ibl e fo r a sp e c ia l ho us inga da

ptatio n g ra

nt a s a re su lt o f t he dis a bil ity

c a us e d b y VAme dic a l c are " ); cf. Snyde r v. Principi , 15 Vet.App. 285, 292-94 (2001) ( invalidating GC pr e c e de nti a l op ini on

in co nf lic t with Court ' s ana ly sis of statut or y pr ov isi on s) ; Cox v. Principi , 15 Vet.App. 280, 281, 283 (2001) (same). Moreover, be cause the Court holds that the GC opinion is invalid on these g rounds, we n eed not address the a ppellant' s contentions reg ardingany lack of APA-pre scribed pr ocedur al compliance

. C. Ch apter 39 Anc ill

ar y Be ne fi ts I n its decision, the BV A stated that the G C opinion "specif ically addre ssed elig ibilit y for

. . . chapte r 39 bene fits" ( R. at 8) and "de termined that a veter an [rece iving be nefits under section 1151] is n ot e lig ibl e fo r .
. . a c qu ir ingan a uto mob ile and

a da pti ve e qu ipm e nt a s a

re su lt o f t

he dis a bil ity

c a us e d b y VAme dic a l c are " (R . at 7)

. Ho we ve r, the GC op ini on sp e c if ic a lly pe rt a ine d to e lig ibi lity only "f or a specia l housingadaptation gr ant as a result of the disability

cause d by

VA medica l car e" and thus c onstitut ed a concr ete BV A-binding opinion, rather tha n casua l advice, that a sec tion 1151 benef iciary is ineligible only

under that chapter

. T h e C o u rt notes that in its dis cussion, the GC state d: The rationale of this op i n i on would equally apply to other non-cha pter 11 or 13 be nefits s uch as a utomobiles and adaptive equipmen t u n der c hapter 39 of title 38 whe re e lig ibi lit y is condition ed on the veteran having a service-connecte d condition , unle ss the sta tute or leg islative history c le ar ly and unambig uous ly pr ov ide d o the rwi

se
. G.C. Prec. Opinion 24-97, at para
. 23 (empha sis a dded). The discrepa ncy betwee n the asser

tion by the B VA that the GC spec ifically addre ssed and r eac hed a binding o p i nion reg ardingchapte r 39 benef its and the conditional lang uag e of the opi nion is substantial. The GC opinion did not examine12

the c ha pte r 3 9 s ta tut or

y pr ov isi on s p ote nti a lly awar din g be ne fi ts und e r t hat c ha pte r, no r d id i t pr ov ide any

ba sis fo r a

de te rm inatio n th a t e lig ibi lit y the re un de r i s " c on di ti on e d o n th e ve te ra n[' s] having a ser

vice- connec ted condition". Ibid. Moreo v er , the GC opinion cites no authority for

re q u ir in g that vet eran s' ben efi ts eli gibi li ty mu st be "cl earl y

andun amb iguo us ly

pro vi ded " in "a statute or leg islative history ". Ibid. I nd e e d, any su c h in te rp re tiv e re qu ir e me nt w ou ld c on fl ic t w ith the interpre tive rule set f

orth in Brown v. Gardner and the related ca ses cited in par t I I .B., a bove. The B oard is re quired to consider , and discuss in its deci s i o n , all "pote ntially applicable " provisions of law and r eg ulation and to include in its decision a wr itten statement of the r easons or bases f or its findings a

nd conclusions on all m ater ial issues of fa ct and law prese nted on the re cord; t h e s t at em en tm u s tb e a d eq u at e t o en ab l e a n ap p el l an t t o u n d er s t an d t h e pr ec i s e ba s i s fo r t h e B o ar d 's decision, as we ll as to facilitate r eview in this Court. See 38 U.S.C . § 71 04 (a ), (d )( 1) ; W eave r v. Principi , 1 4 V e t. A p p
. 3 0 1 , 3 0 2 ( 2 0 0 1 ) ( p e r c u riam orde r); Allda yv . B ro wn , 7 Vet.App. 517, 527 (1 99 5) ; Schafrath v. De rwinski , 1 Vet.App. 589, 593 ( 1991). He re, the Boa rd erred by

interpre ting the GC opinion to bar a s ection 1151 bene ficiar y from elig iblity

"f or either a spec ial housing adaption g rant or a

g rant for acquir ing a

n automobile and ada

ptive eq u i p m en t as a result of the dis a bil ity c a us e d b y VA me dic a l c are " . R. a t 6- 7 ( e mphasi s a dd e d) . B e c a us e the GC op ini on

did

no t r e a c h a

sp e c if ic ho ldi nga s to c ha

pte r 3 9 b e ne fi ts ba se d on an a ly sis of c ha pte r 3 9 p ro vis ion s in light of the Brown v. Gardner interpre tive rule, the B oard' s relianc e on it as binding prec edent prec luding those benef

its re nders the BV A decision defic ient in terms of an a dequate statement of

rea sons or base s. See W

eave r , Allday , and Sc ha

fra th , a ll su

pra . F ur the rm or e , th e B oa

rd ' s f a ilure to loo k to the langua g e of se c tio ns 39 01 and 39 02 in d e te rm ini ngthe a pp e lla nt' s e nti tle me nt t o b e ne fi ts there under r end er s i t s decision lac king a n adequa te statement of r easons or bases on that ba sis as wel l

. T he Court will thus vacate that part of the Boa rd dec ision and remand the matter for

rea djudication as to cha

pter 39 e ligibility

. As no te d in par

t I I .B ., a bo ve , re g ard ing c ha

pte r 21 be ne fi ts, the e nti re statut or y sc he me mus t be ex amined to deter

mine elig ibilit y under that prog ram. See R eno , Bailey , Talley , Choice , Robbins , Me y e rs , Em e ry , and United Telecom m. Inc

. , a ll su pra . The same is true reg ardingsection 3902 of tit le 38 , U. S. Cod e , " As sis tanc e fo r p ro vid inga uto mob ile and

a da pti ve e qu ipm e nt" , w hic h p ro vid e s, in p e rt ine nt p art :13 (a ) T he Se c re tary , und e r r e g ula tio ns whi ch the Se c re tary sh a ll presc ribe, shall provide or assist in providing an a utomobile or other conveyance to eac h e lig

ibl epe rso n by

paying . . . . (b )( 1) Th e Se c re tary , un de r re g ulatio ns wh ic h the Se c re tary sh a ll presc ribe, shall provide eac h eligible person the ada ptive equipment deem ed n eces sary

. . . . " 38 U.S.C. § 3902 (emphasis added) . Section 3901(a) define s "e ligible pe rson " as " any veter an entitled to compensation under chapte r 11 of this title for any of the disabilities described . . . be low, if the disabili ty is the result of an inj ury incurr ed or disease contracted in or aggravated by ac tive

m ilitar y, n aval, or

air service " , inc lud ing " pe rm ane nt los s of us e of on e or bo th f e e t . .

. . " 38 U. S.C. § 3 90 1( a ) ( e mph a sis a dd e d) . In c on tr a st, se c tio n 3 90 2( b) (2 ) p ro vid e s, in p e rt ine nt p art : " I n th e c a se of any veter an (othe r than a

person e ligible f

or assistance under para g raph (1) of this subsection) who is e ntit le d to c ompe nsa tio n f

or ank y los is

. . . , the S ecr etar

y , under r eg ulations which the Secr etar y shall presc ribe, s h a l

l provide s u c h a daptive equipment to over come the disa bility resulting from such

ank y los is .

. . ." 38 U. S.C. § 39 02 (b )( 2) (e mph a sis a dd e d) . L a stl y , 3 8 C. F .R. § 3 .8 08 (b )( 2) pr ov ide s: "V eter ans not servingon active duty must be entitled to compensation for the disability . As to any claimant the disability

must be se rv ic ec onne c te d in ac c orda nc ewith usua l c rit e ria

. (See §§ 3.1 (m) and (n), 3.301-3.310.)"

. 38 C.F.R. § 3.808(b)( 2) (2001) (empha sis added). The Court notes that § 3 .1 (m ) d e a ls w iththe " in t he lin e of du ty " se rv ic e -c on ne c tio n r e qu irement, § 3. 1( n) de a ls w ith "w illful mi sconduct" as an e x ception to s ervic e connection, and §§ 3.301-3.310 deal with these a nd other e lements of service connec tion. Noticea bly absent from the Secre tary ' s regulatory ref ere nce list of "usual c riteria" is § 3.358, which is the regulation implementing sec tion 1151. Under section 3902(b) (2), the be nefic iaries de scribed a re not de fined by

ref ere nce to the "e ligible pe rson" standard a s are those descr ibed in section 3901(a ). As a r esult of this disti nction, as long as a subse ction (b)( 2)-de scribed vetera n suffe rs from ankylosis, that veter an appe ars to have

a c l e ar e n t i t l e m e n t( " t h e S e c r e t ar y sha ll pr ov ide " (e mph a sis a dd e d) ) to the be ne fi ts o f a n a uto mob ile or of a daptive automobile equipment. I f section 3902(a) and section 3902(b)( 1) ar e re ad, by virtue of their e x press incorporation of "e ligible person" and it s section 3901 definition, t o exclude section 1151 benef

iciarie s from chapter 39 benef its, then the statutory

scheme , including the entitlement set forth in sec tion 3902(b)(2), w ould y ield the anomalous result of e ntit ling to b e ne fi ts a vete ran w ho,14

duri ngho sp ita l tr e a tmen t, i nc ur re d in jur ie s r e su lti ngin a

nk y los is, bu t e

xc lud ing from be ne

fi ts a veter an who suff

ere d a wrong ful amputation (or some other non-a nky losis section 1151-qualifying disability ). Such a discrepa ncy might be seen as odd, unrea sonable, or absurd, as discussed in part I I .B., a bove, re g ardingchapte r 21 bene fits. See G reen , 4 90 U. S. at 50 9; Public Citiz en , Am. Trucking Assn's, Inc. , Thayer , Holliday , Al len ( W illiam) , Tril les , Gardner , Dye r , Betche l Constr ., Inc. , Trustees of Indiana Univ. , and Chapman , a ll su pra ; Gree n , 4 9 0 U.S . at 527 (Sca lia, J ., concur ring in the judgme nt). The Court notes that ne ither the pa rties nor the Court ha s found leg islative h i story

indicating , one wa

y or the other , whether

Congr ess intended that se ction 1151 benef iciarie s be entitled to automobile or ada ptive automobile benef

its. There fore , in de termining on rema nd the extent to which section 1151 rec ipients are e ntitled to chapter 39 benef its, the Secre tary must ree x amine thi s matter in the conte x t of the entire statutory

sc he me , re g ard ing anc ill ary be ne fi ts, inc lud ing our hol din g tod ay re g ard ingc ha

pte r 2 1 e nti tle me nt, and the lac k of re fer ence t o § 3 .358 in the chapte r 39 re g ulation (38 C.F.R. § 3.308(b)( 2)). The Court stresses that this chapter 39 matter is o n e fo r deter mination in the first instance by the Secre tary , and the Court a t this time e x presse s no view on the questions involved except that they need to be addre ssed by

the Secr etar

y . Of c ourse, it may

ultimately

b e t h at they

can be resolved f a ir ly o n ly b y r e c o u r s e to th e Co n g ress. See Mor ton v . W est , 12 Vet.App. 477, 485- 86 (1999),
vacate d on other grounds by14 Vet.App. 174 ( 2000) (pe r cur iam order ) (withdra wing prior Court opinion vacatingunderlying B VA dec ision, and dismis sing a ppeal, a ll due to death of a ppellant while ca se wa s on appea l from this Court's opinion).

III. Conclusi on Upo n consideration of the parties' pleading s, oral ar g ument, and the f org oing a naly sis, the Court (1) re verse s the Octobe r 1998 BV A dec ision as to the chapter 21 claim and r emands that matter for

expeditious awa

rd of c hapter

21 benef its to t he appe llant, and (2) va cate s the BV A decision as to the chapter 39 c laim and re mands that matter f or expeditious further de velopment and issuance of

a re adjudicate d decision suppo rt ed by an ade quate state ment of re asons or ba ses, see 38 U. S.C. §§ 11 51 , 2 10 1( a ), 39 01 (a ), 51 07 , 7 10 4( a ), (d )( 1) ; Fletche r v. De rwinski , 1 Vet.App. 394, 39 7 ( 19 91 ) –

a ll c on sis te nt w iththi s o pin ion and in a c c or da

nc e wi th s e c tio n 3 02 of

the Ve te ra

ns '15

Be nefits I mprovements Ac t, Pub. L . No. 103-446, § 302, 108 Stat. 4645, 4658 (1994) ( found at 38 U. S.C. § 5 10 1 n ote ) ( re qu ir ingSe c re tary to p ro vid e fo r " e xpe dit iou s tr e a tm e nt" fo r c la ims

rema nded by BV A or the Court). See A llday , 7 Ve t

. Ap p
. at 533-34. F urthermor e, the Court inval id ate s G .C. Pr e c . 2 4- 97 and 38 C.F .R. § 3 .8 09 to t

he e xten t th a t th e y

are inc on sis te nt w ith 38 U.S.C. § 2101(a) a s here in interprete d. On re mand, the appellant will be fr ee to submit additional evidenc e and a

rg ument on the re manded c laim in accor dance with Kut sc he ro us k yv . W est , 12 Vet.A pp . 3 69 , 3 72 -7 3 ( 19 99 ) ( pe r c ur iam or de r) (c on c lud ingthat an a pp e lla nt i s e nti tle d, un til 90 day s after

Boa rd mails postremand notice to appellant, to submit additiona l evidence and argument or to reque st hearingon appea l at w hich appellant may submit new evidenc e). The Court notes th at a re m an d b y

this Court and by

the B oard c onfer s on an appe llant the rig ht to VA

c omp lia nc e wi th t he te rm s o f t

he re mand

or de r a nd imp os e s on the Se c re tary a c on c omi tant d uty to

ensure compl i an ce wi t h those terms. Se e Ste ga ll v . W est , 11 Vet.App. 268, 271 ( 1998). A fina l de c isi on by the B oa rd foll owi ng th e rem and

he re in o rd e re d w ill c on sti tut e a ne w d e c isi on

tha t, i f adver se, may

be appe aled to this Court only upon the filing of a new Notice of Appea l with the Court

no t late r t ha n 1 20 da y s a ft e r the date on wh ic h no tic e of the ne w f

ina l B oa rd de c isi on is m a ile d to the appe llant. Se e Ma rsh v . W est , 11 Vet.App. 468, 472 ( 1998). REVERSED I

N PART, VACATED I

N PART AND REMANDED

.