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United States Court of Appeals

Fifth Circuit

FILED

April 24, 2006

Charles R. Fulbruge III

Clerk

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

No. 05-10195

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

Plaintiff - Appellee

v.

ERIC RICHARD WISE

Defendant - Appellant

Appeal from the United States District Court 

for the Northern District of Texas

Before KING, SMITH, and BENAVIDES, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:

Defendant-appellant Eric Richard Wise appeals his judgment

of conviction and sentence, arguing that the district court erred

by refusing to group his counts of conviction pursuant to U.S.

SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 3D1.2 (2002) [hereinafter U.S.S.G.].

For the following reasons, we AFFIRM the judgment of conviction

and sentence as imposed by the district court.

I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

Beginning in 2002, defendant-appellant Eric Richard Wise

(“Wise”), a thirty-seven-year-old man living in Cedar Rapids,
1 In one of their chat room conversations, Doe complained

to Wise that she was upset that another man who was thirty-three

years old had shown interest in her.

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Iowa, began communicating over the Internet with Jane Doe

(“Doe”), a thirteen-year-old female living in Lubbock, Texas. 

Wise communicated with Doe in chat rooms and through instant

messaging, and eventually he also communicated with Doe by e-mail

and telephone. Based on their conversations, Wise knew that Doe

was not interested in forming a relationship with a man of his

age,1 so he initially represented to Doe that he was sixteen

years old. In subsequent communications, he gradually raised his

age to thirty-one. 

During these conversations, Wise and Doe often talked about

sex. Wise encouraged Doe to “be nastier,” to say “dirtier”

things, and to “be kinky with [him]” and expressed his approval

when she complied with his requests. Wise encouraged Doe to

elaborate on the sex acts they might perform on each other. 

On December 27, 2002, in response to Wise’s request, Doe emailed Wise a digital photograph that depicted her nude from the

waist up and exposed her breasts. That same day, Wise responded

by e-mailing Doe a nude photograph of himself. The next day, he

sent her an e-mail, commenting on her picture: “Youre so

beautiful [Doe]. I keep looking at your pic . . . wow, what a

perfect chest. Yum . . . when can I see the rest? hehe Love u

sooooooo much. Ya know we are engaged, since I asked u to marry
2 1 R. at 180 (quoted exactly as written by Wise, but

omitting the victim’s name). 

3 Id. at 181 (quoted exactly as written by Wise, with

“rents” referring to parents). 

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me and u said yes. :) Your Fiancee, E.”2 On December 30, 2002,

again in response to Wise’s prompting, Doe photographed herself

in a sexually explicit pose, exhibiting her genitals and pubic

area. This photograph is referenced in count one of the second

superseding indictment as an image bearing a

creation/modification date of December 30, 2002, at 7:38 p.m. 

On January 1, 2003, Wise e-mailed Doe a color photograph of

six rings. In this e-mail, Wise stated: “Which of these 6 u

like? Im thinking even though I want to get one thats a promise

ring, maybe we should get one that has colored stones, so ya

rents don’t get suspicious.”3

On January 2, 2003, Wise and Doe exchanged several

photographs. Doe photographed herself nude in five different

poses, two of which displayed her genitals and pubic area. After

each photograph was taken, she downloaded it on to her computer

and e-mailed it to Wise. Wise e-mailed Doe a full-length nude

photograph of himself in which he displayed his erect penis. He

also e-mailed a photograph of himself sitting on a couch holding

a cat. The two photographs showing Doe’s genitals and pubic area

are referenced in counts two and three of the second superseding

indictment and bear a creation/modification date of January 2,
4 As part of his factual resume, Wise admitted that: 

Doe would not have produced any of the sexually explicit

images that she took of herself, nor would she have sent

them by way of the Internet from Lubbock, Texas, to Cedar

Rapids, Iowa, but for the request of Wise for such images

to be produced and sent to him.

Id. at 182.

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2003, at 11:50 a.m. and 12:28 p.m., respectively.

On January 11, 2003, again in response to Wise’s request,

Doe photographed herself in two sexually explicit poses, exposing

her genitals and pubic area. These two photographs are

referenced in counts four and five of the second superseding

indictment and bear a creation/modification date of January 11,

2003, at 10:14 p.m. and 10:21 p.m., respectively.4 Wise stored

the photographs referenced in counts one through five of the

second superseding indictment on compact discs at his Iowa

residence.

Shortly after Doe sent the last of the photographs, Wise

made arrangements to travel to Lubbock to meet Doe. Wise

reserved a motel room in Lubbock for the nights of January 17-19,

2003, rented a car, and drove from Cedar Rapids to Lubbock. On

January 16, 2003, Wise e-mailed Doe informing her that he was on

his way to meet her. Wise traveled to Lubbock for the purpose of

engaging in sexual acts with Doe, and this conduct is referenced

in count fifteen of the second superseding indictment. His

enticement of Doe, which occurred from their initial Internet

communications through January 17, 2003, is referenced in count
5 Wise did not use any force or threats of force against

Doe during these sexual encounters. He also did not attempt to

conceal the fact from Doe that he intended to record and did in

fact record the encounters.

6 The videotapes, along with the compact discs containing

the sexually explicit photographs of Doe, were found in Wise’s

residence in Cedar Rapids when a search warrant was executed

there in August of 2003 by Kenosha, Wisconsin police on unrelated

child enticement charges.

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fourteen of the second superseding indictment.

Upon arriving in Lubbock on January 17, 2003, Wise met Doe

and drove her to a location in southwest Lubbock. While in the

vehicle, Wise fondled Doe’s genitals and digitally penetrated her

genital opening. On January 18, 2003, Wise met Doe at a Wal-Mart

and drove her to his motel room where he took non-sexual

photographs of himself with Doe. Wise then returned Doe to the

Wal-Mart where he had picked her up.

On January 19, 2003, Wise picked up Doe and drove her to his

motel. Wise set up his eight-millimeter camcorder on a tripod

next to the bed, with the intent of recording his sexual

encounter with Doe. They engaged in various sexual acts,

including oral-genital and vaginal intercourse, and Wise recorded

these acts. Wise engaged in this same sexually explicit conduct

and recorded the encounter on January 20, 2003.5 That same day,

Wise returned to Cedar Rapids from Lubbock, transporting the

videotapes. The videotapes from the two sexual encounters are

referenced in counts six and seven of the second superseding

indictment.6
7 Wise originally was charged by a seven-count indictment

dated November 6, 2003. On December 10, 2003, a fifteen-count

superseding indictment was filed. The second (and final)

superseding indictment was filed on August 18, 2004. 

8 In his plea agreement, Wise reserved the right to appeal

an incorrect application of the Sentencing Guidelines.

9 Section 3D1.2 in relevant part provides:

All counts involving substantially the same harm shall be

grouped together into a single Group. Counts involve

substantially the same harm within the meaning of this

rule:

(a) When counts involve the same victim and the

same act or transaction.

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Wise was charged by a second superseding indictment with

fifteen counts of various sexual exploitation offenses.7 On

October 21, 2004, Wise pleaded guilty to nine of the fifteen

counts.8 Specifically, Wise pleaded guilty to: seven counts of

production of child pornography (collectively, the “production

counts” or “production of child pornography counts”), in

violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2251(a); one count of enticement of a

child (“enticement count”), in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2422(b);

and one count of travel with intent to engage in a sexual act

with a juvenile (“travel count”), in violation of 18 U.S.C.

§ 2423(b). As part of Wise’s plea agreement, the government

agreed to dismiss the remaining six counts at sentencing.

In the Presentence Report (“PSR”), the probation officer

divided the nine counts into seven groups using the grouping

rules in U.S.S.G. § 3D1.2.9 The probation officer separately
(b) When counts involve the same victim and two or

more acts or transactions connected by a

common criminal objective or constituting part

of a common scheme or plan.

10 Section 3D1.1 in relevant part provides:

(a) When a defendant has been convicted of more than

one count, the court shall:

(1) Group the counts resulting in conviction into

distinct Groups of Closely Related Counts

(“Groups”) by applying the rules specified in

§ 3D1.2.

(2) Determine the offense level applicable to each

Group by applying the rules specified in

§ 3D1.3.

(3) Determine the combined offense level

applicable to all Groups taken together by

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grouped production counts two and three and production counts

four and five after concluding that these production counts

“occurred on the same occasion.” The groups were as follows:

Group One: Count 1 (December 30, 2002 photograph of

Doe, exposing her genitals and pubic

area);

Group Two: Counts 2 and 3 (January 2, 2003

photographs of Doe, exposing her genitals

and pubic area); 

Group Three: Counts 4 and 5 (January 11, 2003

photographs of Doe, exposing her genitals

and pubic area); 

Group Four: Count 6 (January 19, 2003 videotape

depicting Doe engaging in sexually

explicit conduct);

Group Five: Count 7 (January 20, 2003 videotape

depicting Doe engaging in sexually

explicit conduct); 

Group Six: Count 14 (enticement of a juvenile); and

Group Seven: Count 15 (travel with intent to engage in

sexual acts with a juvenile).

Using the procedures in U.S.S.G. § 3D1.1,10 the probation officer
applying the rules specified in § 3D1.4.

11 Section 3D1.4 in relevant part provides:

The combined offense level is determined by taking the

offense level applicable to the Group with the highest

offense level and increasing that offense level by the

amount indicated in the following table:

Number of Units Increase in Offense Level

1 none

1 1/2 add 1 level

2 add 2 levels

2 1/2 - 3 add 3 levels

3 1/2 - 5 add 4 levels

More than 5 add 5 levels.

In determining the number of Units for purposes of this

section:

(a) Count as one Unit the Group with the highest

offense level. Count one additional Unit for each

Group that is equally serious or from 1 to 4 levels

less serious.

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determined the offense level applicable to each group. In

calculating the combined offense level for Wise’s offenses

pursuant to U.S.S.G. § 3D1.4,11 the probation officer assigned

each group as a unit, for a total of seven units. Based on these

units, the probation officer recommended a five-level increase to

Wise’s offense level. After subtracting three levels for Wise’s

acceptance of responsibility, the probation officer recommended a

sentencing range of 135 to 168 months. The government filed a

statement adopting the PSR.

Prior to sentencing, Wise filed written objections to the

PSR, arguing, inter alia, that the probation officer should group

all nine of his counts. According to Wise, “all nine counts to
12 Wise’s proposed calculus would have resulted in a

sentence of 78-97 months, which fell below the applicable

statutory minimum of 120 months. See 18 U.S.C. § 2251(d).

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which [he] pleaded guilty involve substantially the same harm

because they involve the same victim . . . and consist of two or

more acts or transactions connected by a common criminal

objective or constituting part of a common scheme or plan.” In

an addendum to the PSR, the probation officer maintained that he

had applied the correct grouping analysis and that his analysis

was supported by examples in the commentary to U.S.S.G. § 3D1.2. 

He acknowledged that “[c]ase law is limited in this area” and

provided an alternative sentence of 120 months “should the Court

decide an improper grouping analysis occurred.”12 The government

filed an objection to the PSR addendum, urging the district court

to adopt the grouping calculations in the original PSR.

At sentencing, the district court adopted the grouping

calculations as set forth in the original PSR, and in so doing,

it grouped only those production of child pornography counts

occurring on the same day. The district court’s grouping

calculus resulted in seven groups and under U.S.S.G. § 3D1.4, the

district court added a five-level increase to Wise’s offense

level, resulting in a sentencing range of 135 to 168 months. The

district court sentenced Wise to 168 months in prison and three

years of supervised release. Wise filed this timely appeal. 

II. DISCUSSION
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Wise challenges only the district court’s refusal to group

his offenses pursuant to U.S.S.G. § 3D1.2(a) or (b). According

to Wise, regardless of whether we decide there should be one

group (all nine counts together), two groups (production counts

together and enticement and travel counts together), or three

groups (production counts together and enticement and travel

counts in separate groups), his maximum advisory sentence would

be the statutory minimum of 120 months. Because the production

of child pornography counts comprise five of the seven groups,

Wise correctly recognizes that in order for this court to agree

with his grouping theory, we must first determine that the

district court erred in refusing to group the production counts

that occurred on different days. We review the district court’s

interpretation and application of the grouping rules under the

Guidelines de novo. See United States v. Lopez-Urbina, 434 F.3d

750, 762 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 126 S. Ct. 672 (2005); United

States v. Tolbert, 306 F.3d 244, 246 (5th Cir. 2002) (“The

decision whether to group offenses is a question of law we review

de novo.”). 

Section 3D1.2 of the Guidelines instructs that “[a]ll counts

involving substantially the same harm shall be grouped together

into a single Group.” U.S.S.G. § 3D1.2. Separate counts involve

“substantially the same harm” when, inter alia, the “counts

involve the same victim and the same act or transaction” or the

“counts involve the same victim and two or more acts or
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transactions connected by a common criminal objective or

constituting part of a common scheme or plan.” Id. § 3D1.2(a)-

(b). The commentary reveals that counts are to be grouped

together under the guideline when: (1) “they represent

essentially a single injury or are part of a single criminal

episode or transaction involving the same victim”; or (2) they

“are part of a single course of conduct with a single criminal

objective and represent essentially one composite harm to the

same victim . . . even if they constitute legally distinct

offenses occurring at different times.” Id. § 3D1.2 cmt. n.3 &

n.4. 

The production of child pornography counts at issue here

involve the same victim, but there is a question as to whether

they involve the same transaction or scheme. The examples to the

commentary offer some guidance when, as here, the same victim is

involved and the conduct takes place on different days. See

id. § 3D1.2 cmt. n.3 ex.6 (stating that “counts are not to be

grouped together” when “[t]he defendant is convicted of two

counts of assault on a federal officer for shooting at the

officer on two separate days”) (emphasis added); id. § 3D1.2 cmt.

n.4 (stating that “[t]his provision does not authorize the

grouping of offenses that cannot be considered to represent

essentially one composite harm (e.g., robbery of the same victim

on different occasions involves multiple, separate instances of

fear and risk of harm, not one composite harm)”); id. § 3D1.2
13 Wise takes issue with the use of the example concerning

rape. In United States v. Von Loh, 417 F.3d 710 (7th Cir. 2005),

the Seventh Circuit recently rejected arguments similar to those

Wise makes here. The defendant in Von Loh argued that the court

should not rely on example five in the commentary because the

term “rape” covers only forcible assaults and not statutory rape

and because the Guidelines intended to treat statutory rape

different than example five for grouping decisions. Id. at 713. 

The Seventh Circuit was unpersuaded by this argument, stating

that:

Section 3D1.2 of the Guidelines includes cross-references

to provisions for both aggravated sexual abuse (§ 2A3.1)

and statutory rape (§ 2A3.2). This indicates that the

Sentencing Commission knew when it drafted Example 5

[dealing with rape of the same victim on different days]

that the Guidelines recognized multiple forms of rape.

It is reasonable to infer from these cross-references

that the Sentencing Commission used the more expansive

term “rape” to cover various forms of the crime. That

the Guidelines distinguish between forcible and statutory

rape in other provisions further supports the inference

that the Sentencing Commission’s use of more inclusive

terminology in Example 5 was intentional.

Id. (internal citation omitted); see also U.S.S.G. § 2L1.2 cmt.

n.1(B) (defining “crime of violence” to include both forcible sex

offenses and statutory rape); id. § 4B1.2 cmt. n.1 (defining

“crime of violence” to include forcible sex offenses only). 

Because our decision is not wholly reliant on example five and

for the same reasons proffered by the Seventh Circuit, we decline

to consider Wise’s argument other than to note it here.

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cmt. n.4 ex.5 (noting that “counts are not to be grouped

together” when “[t]he defendant is convicted of two counts of

rape for raping the same person on different days”) (emphasis

added).13

Courts interpreting the Guidelines must begin with the text

of the provision at issue and the plain meaning of the words in

the text. See United States v. Mendez-Villa, 346 F.3d 568, 570

(5th Cir. 2003). In addition, we must consider the commentary to

the Guidelines as authoritative. See U.S.S.G. § 1B1.7; see also
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Stinson v. United States, 508 U.S. 36, 38 (1993). The district

court’s decision to treat Wise’s production counts occurring on

different days as separate harms was consonant with both the

plain language of § 3D1.2 and the examples in the commentary. 

Although this is an issue of first impression in this circuit,

the district court’s decision was consistent with the circuit

courts that have addressed this and closely related issues. See

United States v. Searle, 65 F. App’x 343, 346 (2d Cir. 2003)

(unpublished) (considering multiple counts of production of child

pornography involving one victim and concluding that the district

court properly declined to group the counts because the child

victim “was harmed separately by the conduct embodied in each

count of conviction”); see also Von Loh, 417 F.3d at 714

(rejecting the defendant’s arguments that his counts of engaging

in sexual acts with a minor should be grouped because they

involved the same harm); United States v. Big Medicine, 73 F.3d

994, 997 (10th Cir. 1995) (holding that the defendant’s seventyfive instances of sexual contact with the same minor should not

be grouped).

Although these cases do not necessarily address the exact

factual situation before us, we find them very persuasive in the

resolution of this case. The district court here grouped the

production counts that took place on the same day but refused to

group those occurring on different days on the theory that each

time was a separate harm to Doe. Wise made numerous requests for
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sexually explicit photographs of Doe, and each of the photographs

that the district court refused to group was taken on a different

day in response to Wise’s request. Each photograph caused Doe to

engage in a separate act of sexually explicit conduct, and the

district court did not err in concluding that Doe suffered a

separate harm with each occasion of production. See New York v.

Ferber, 458 U.S. 747, 757 (1982) (recognizing that the

psychological effect of visually recording the sexual

exploitation of a child is devastating, and its elimination is of

“surpassing importance”); United States v. Grimes, 244 F.3d 375,

382 (5th Cir. 2001) (noting that the harms involved with the

production and dissemination of child pornography “occur during

the first step--the photographing of the lasciviously exposed

minor”).

Wise cannot point to any case supporting his theory that the

production of child pornography counts occurring on different

days should be grouped. The cases he cites are inapposite

because they did not have grouping issues before the court or

they involved multiple victims. See, e.g., United States v.

Newsom, 402 F.3d 780 (7th Cir. 2005), cert. denied, 126 S. Ct.

1455 (2006); United States v. Altman, 901 F.2d 1161 (2d Cir.

1990). As illustrated by the district court’s decision to group

the production of child pornography counts occurring on the same

days (counts two and three and counts four and five), these cases

will be fact intensive. Although we do not deal with every
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eventuality today, we are convinced that the district court did

not err by refusing to group the production of child pornography

counts occurring on different days because each time involved a

separate harm. See U.S.S.G. § 3D1.2 cmt. n.4 (noting that the

grouping provisions do not authorize the grouping of offenses

that cannot be considered to represent one composite harm); see

also United States v. Bonner, 85 F.3d 522, 526 (11th Cir. 1996)

(holding that the district court properly refused to group twenty

counts of mailing threatening communications where the victim

suffered separate and distinct instances of psychological harm

with each separate communication). In light of our conclusion

that the district court did not err in refusing to group Wise’s

production of child pornography counts occurring on different

days, we need not address Wise’s challenge to the district

court’s decision not to group his enticement and travel counts. 

Even assuming arguendo that these two counts should have been

grouped, Wise’s total units would be above the requisite number

of five pursuant to U.S.S.G. § 3D1.4. Thus, we need not reach

this issue.

III. CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, we AFFIRM Wise’s judgment of

conviction and sentence.