[DO NOT PUBLISH]

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT

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No. 14-10847

Non-Argument Calendar

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D.C. Docket No. 8:01-cr-00079-EAK-1

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 

 Plaintiff-Appellee,

 versus

DANYEL BURNETT, 

 Defendant-Appellant.

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Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Middle District of Florida

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(August 19, 2014)

Before MARCUS, MARTIN, and FAY, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:

Danyel Burnett is a federal prisoner serving a sentence of life imprisonment 

after being convicted of: (1) distributing 50 grams or more of cocaine base, in 

violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1) and (b)(1)(A)(iii), and (2) possessing with intent 

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to distribute 50 grams or more of cocaine base, in violation of 21 U.S.C. 

§ 841(a)(1) and (b)(1)(A)(iii). In 2012, Burnett filed a motion to reduce his 

sentence pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2) based on Amendments 748 and 750 of 

the United States Sentencing Guidelines (USSG). The district court denied this 

motion, finding that Burnett was not eligible for a reduction in his sentence 

because he was originally sentenced as a career offender pursuant to USSG 

§ 4B1.1. Burnett now appeals, and the government has moved to summarily 

affirm the district court ruling and to stay the briefing schedule in the meantime. 

After careful review, we grant the government’s motion to summarily affirm the 

district court’s ruling. As a result, the government’s motion to stay the briefing 

schedule is denied as moot.

Summary disposition is appropriate either where time is of the essence, such 

as “situations where important public policy issues are involved or those where 

rights delayed are rights denied,” or where “the position of one of the parties is 

clearly right as a matter of law so that there can be no substantial question as to the 

outcome of the case, or where, as is more frequently the case, the appeal is 

frivolous.” Groendyke Transp., Inc. v. Davis, 406 F.2d 1158, 1162 (5th Cir. 

1969).1

 1 In Bonner v. Pritchard, 661 F.2d 1206 (11th Cir. 1981), the Eleventh Circuit adopted as binding 

precedent the decisions of the former Fifth Circuit rendered before October 1, 1981. Id. at 1207.

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Summary disposition for the government is appropriate here because our 

binding precedent clearly prevents Burnett from receiving the sentencing relief he 

is seeking. In United States v. Moore, 541 F.3d 1323 (11th Cir. 2008), this Court 

held that prisoners who were sentenced as career offenders under § 4B1.1 are not 

authorized to be resentenced pursuant to § 3582(c)(2) when the “retroactively 

applicable guideline amendment reduces a defendant’s base offense level, but does 

not alter the sentencing range upon which his or her sentence was based.” Id. at 

1330. Burnett responds that the Supreme Court’s decision in Freeman v. United 

States, ___ U.S. ___, 131 S. Ct. 2685 (2011), calls into question this Court’s 

holding in Moore. He acknowledges, however, that this Court considered and 

rejected this argument in United States v. Lawson, 686 F.3d 1317, 1320–21 (11th 

Cir. 2012). See id. at 1321 (“Moore remains binding precedent because it has not 

been overruled.”). Thus, Burnett is not entitled to relief here because he was 

originally sentenced as a career offender, and his guidelines range was not changed 

by Amendments 748 and 750.

To the extent that Burnett argues that he is entitled to be resentenced because 

of the Fair Sentencing Act’s reduction of certain statutory mandatory minimums,

this argument is also foreclosed by this Court’s binding precedent. See United 

States v. Berry, 701 F.3d 374 (11th Cir. 2012). In Berry, this Court held that the 

Fair Sentencing Act “is not a guidelines amendment by the Sentencing 

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Commission, but rather a statutory change by Congress, and thus it does not serve 

as a basis for a § 3582(c)(2) sentence reduction.” Id. at 377. Additionally, this 

Court held that the Fair Sentencing Act does not apply retroactively to defendants 

sentenced prior to the Act’s enactment on August 3, 2010. Id. Burnett, who was 

sentenced in 2003, therefore cannot benefit from the Fair Sentencing Act’s 

reductions in statutory mandatory minimums.

Because this Court’s binding precedent forecloses the review Burnett seeks, 

the government’s motion for summary affirmance is GRANTED, the judgment of 

the district court is AFFIRMED, and the government’s motion to stay the briefing 

schedule is DENIED as moot.

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