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32 Nebraska Appellate Reports

STATE V. HOEH

Cite as 32 Neb. App. 446

State of Nebraska, appellee, v. 

Michael C. Hoehn, appellant.

___ N.W.2d ___

Filed December 5, 2023. No. A-22-885.

1. Criminal Law: Courts: Judgments: Appeal and Error. In an appeal 

of a criminal case from the county court, the district court acts as an 

intermediate court of appeals, and its review is limited to an examination of the record for error or abuse of discretion. Both the district court 

and a higher appellate court generally review appeals from the county 

court for error appearing on the record. When reviewing a judgment for 

errors appearing on the record, an appellate court’s inquiry is whether 

the decision conforms to the law, is supported by competent evidence, 

and is neither arbitrary, capricious, nor unreasonable.

2. Constitutional Law: Search and Seizure: Motions to Suppress: 

Appeal and Error. In reviewing a trial court’s ruling on a motion to 

suppress based on a claimed violation of the Fourth Amendment, an 

appellate court applies a two-part standard of review. Regarding historical facts, an appellate court reviews the trial court’s findings for clear 

error, but whether those facts trigger or violate Fourth Amendment 

protections is a question of law that an appellate court reviews independently of the trial court’s determination.

3. Statutes: Appeal and Error. Statutory interpretation presents a question of law, which an appellate court reviews independently of the 

lower court.

4. ____: ____. Statutory language is to be given its plain and ordinary 

meaning, and an appellate court will not resort to interpretation to 

ascertain the meaning of statutory words which are plain, direct, and 

unambiguous.

5. Statutes: Legislature: Intent. Components of a series or collection of 

statutes pertaining to a certain subject matter are in pari materia and 

should be conjunctively considered and construed to determine the 

Nebraska Supreme Court Online Library

www.nebraska.gov/apps-courts-epub/

12/05/2023 09:06 AM CST
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intent of the Legislature, so that different provisions are consistent, harmonious, and sensible.

6. ____: ____: ____. In order for a court to inquire into a statute’s legislative history, that statute in question must be open to construction, and a 

statute is open to construction when its terms require interpretation or 

may reasonably be considered ambiguous.

7. Statutes. It is not within the province of a court to read a meaning into 

a statute that is not warranted by the language; neither is it within the 

province of a court to read anything plain, direct, or unambiguous out of 

a statute.

8. Statutes: Appeal and Error. To give effect to all parts of a statute, an 

appellate court will attempt to reconcile different provisions so they are 

consistent, harmonious, and sensible, and will avoid rejecting as superfluous or meaningless any word, clause, or sentence.

9. Words and Phrases. Under the ejusdem generis canon of construction, when a general word or phrase follows a list of specific persons 

or things, the general word or phrase will be interpreted to include only 

persons or things of the same type as those listed.

10. ____. Under the ejusdem generis canon of construction, specific terms 

modify and restrict the interpretation of general terms when they are 

used in a sequence.

11. Investigative Stops: Motor Vehicles: Police Officers and Sheriffs: 

Probable Cause. An officer’s stop of a vehicle is objectively reasonable 

when the officer has probable cause to believe that a traffic violation 

has occurred.

12. Investigative Stops: Motor Vehicles: Probable Cause. Traffic violations, no matter how minor, create probable cause to stop the driver of 

a vehicle.

13. Search and Seizure: Evidence. The exclusionary rule is not found 

in the federal or state Constitution, but is a prudential doctrine to 

be employed where the deterrence benefits of suppression outweigh 

its costs.

14. Police Officers and Sheriffs: Probable Cause. Police officers are not 

required to be legal scholars, but implicit in the probable cause standard 

is the requirement that a police officer’s mistakes be reasonable.

15. Constitutional Law: Search and Seizure. The Fourth Amendment to 

the U.S. Constitution and article I, § 7, of the Nebraska Constitution 

protect individuals against unreasonable searches and seizures by 

the government.

16. Constitutional Law: Search and Seizure: States. The Fourth 

Amendment’s protections are implicated whenever state action intrudes 

on a citizen’s reasonable expectation of privacy.
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17. Constitutional Law: Search and Seizure. Legitimation of expectations 

of privacy by law must have a source outside of the Fourth Amendment, 

either by reference to concepts of real or personal property law or to 

understandings that are recognized and permitted by society.

18. ____: ____. The analysis of whether the violation of a state law restricting searches is sufficient to show a Fourth Amendment violation turns 

on whether society recognizes an expectation of privacy deserving of the 

most scrupulous protection from government invasion.

19. Judgments: Appeal and Error. When the record demonstrates that the 

decision of the trial court is correct, although such correctness is based 

on different grounds from those assigned by the trial court, an appellate 

court will affirm.

Appeal from the District Court for Scotts Bluff County, 

Andrea D. Miller, Judge, on appeal thereto from the 

County Court for Scotts Bluff County, Kris D. Mickey, Judge. 

Judgment of District Court affirmed.

Bell Island, of Island Law Office, P.C., L.L.O., for appellant.

Michael T. Hilgers, Attorney General, Austin N. Relph, and 

Braden Dvorak, Senior Certified Law Student, for appellee.

Bishop, Arterburn, and Welch, Judges.

Welch, Judge.

INTRODUCTION

Michael C. Hoehn appeals the Scotts Bluff County District 

Court’s order affirming his conviction of driving under the 

influence. He contends that the district court erred in finding 

that the county court properly overruled his motion to suppress. For the reasons set forth herein, we affirm the decision 

of the district court, which affirmed the county court’s order 

overruling Hoehn’s motion to suppress.

STATEMENT OF FACTS

Facts Leading to Arrest

On May 24, 2021, following a citizen report of a white 

pickup that “was all over the roadway,” which roadway was 
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Cite as 32 Neb. App. 446

located outside of the city limits of Minatare, Nebraska, police 

officer Matt Rockwell left the city limits to investigate. After 

crossing the city line, Officer Rockwell observed a white 

pickup making a wide turn, straddling the centerline, and 

driving into the median, while the occupant threw cans out 

of the driver’s-side window. Officer Rockwell stopped the 

pickup, which was being driven by Hoehn. Following the stop, 

which occurred outside the city limits of Minatare but within 

Scotts Bluff County, Officer Rockwell arrested Hoehn. Hoehn 

was subsequently charged in Scotts Bluff County Court with 

first offense driving under the influence with a blood alcohol 

content of .15 or more, a Class W misdemeanor. The charge 

was subsequently amended to first offense driving under the 

influence with a blood alcohol content of .08 or more, also 

a Class W misdemeanor. See Neb. Rev. Stat. § 60-6,196 

(Reissue 2021).

Motion to Suppress

Hoehn filed a motion to suppress “all fruits of the illegal 

search and seizure, and his subsequent arrest.” Hoehn specifically argued during the suppression hearing that there was an 

insufficient showing that Officer Rockwell was authorized 

to make the stop in violation of his rights under the 4th and 

14th Amendments to the U.S. Constitution; article I, §§ 1, 3, 

and 7, of the Nebraska Constitution; and any and all relevant 

Nebraska Revised Statutes.

During the suppression hearing, the State’s sole witness was 

Officer Rockwell. Officer Rockwell described the events that 

occurred on May 24, 2021, that led to Hoehn’s arrest. Officer 

Rockwell testified that he received a radio dispatch that a 

citizen had reported following a white pickup heading “north 

on the 79E Link Highway that was all over the roadway.” 

Officer Rockwell responded to that dispatch, and upon arriving at the described location, he observed “a white pickup . . . 

making a wide turn.” As the pickup turned, Officer Rockwell 

observed “what appeared to be a beer can, a pop can, something 
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like that come out of the driver’s window.” According to 

Officer Rockwell, the pickup “was straddling . . . the center 

line closest to the grass median” heading east on the highway. 

Officer Rockwell turned on his vehicle’s patrol lights and followed the pickup. According to Officer Rockwell,

right before [the pickup] got . . . back to Minatare there’s 

a turnaround that you can make in the four-lane [highway]. And the pickup was turning. And there was some 

oncoming traffic. [The pickup] made a turn right in front 

of a car, and I thought there was going to be an accident, 

and then [the pickup made] a quick turn then right down 

into the grass median. . . .

During this turnaround, Officer Rockwell observed another 

can being thrown out of the window of the pickup. The driver, 

who was heading west, “accelerated really hard because [the 

pickup] was digging in with both back tires into the grass, 

throwing grass and dirt . . . up away from the pickup a long 

ways. [The pickup] had pulled back onto the highway and 

accelerated rapidly.” Officer Rockwell continued following 

the pickup, which “turned . . . went as far as the 79E Link 

again, turned south and went just a short little ways and then 

pulled right over to the right side of the road and stopped.” 

Officer Rockwell identified the driver as Hoehn and noted 

that Hoehn’s speech was slurred and that he had “bloodshot, 

watery eyes.” Officer Rockwell stated he “could smell a strong 

odor of an alcoholic beverage coming out of the vehicle.” 

Since Officer Rockwell did not have a working in-car video 

camera and did not have a body camera, he waited for another 

deputy to arrive, who had an in-car patrol video camera and 

body camera, to have Hoehn perform field sobriety tests. The 

events that transpired from that point on were captured by 

the other deputy’s in-car video camera and his body camera. 

Officer Rockwell testified that all of the events occurred in 

Scotts Bluff County.

Following the suppression hearing, the county court denied 

Hoehn’s motion to suppress from the bench stating that
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the [S]tate had proper authority to make a traffic stop 

upon observing the driving through the median, the taking the wide turn, the driving across the center line next 

to the median. The odor of alcoholic beverage, his speech 

being slurred, his eyes [were] bloodshot and watery, his 

inability to complete the field sobriety tests, observed 

dropping his phone and falling over behind the pickup, 

as well as the preliminary breath test that was administered, I find there was sufficient probable cause . . . for 

the arrest.

The court’s written journal entry stated that “[a] careful examination of the evidence concerning the stop and arrest of 

[Hoehn] shows the motion to suppress is without merit. There 

was sufficient evidence justifying the traffic stop, and the arrest 

is supported by ample evidence of probable cause.”

Stipulated Trial and Sentencing

A stipulated bench trial was held in October 2021 on 

the evidence presented during the suppression hearing, with 

Hoehn preserving the issues raised in his motion to suppress. 

The parties also stipulated that Hoehn’s blood draw was done 

in compliance with the applicable administrative code provisions and the test result was .245. The county court found 

Hoehn guilty of the charged offense and sentenced Hoehn to 

12 months’ probation, 40 hours of community service, a $500 

fine, and a 60-day license revocation, along with an order 

authorizing an ignition interlock permit.

Appeal to District Court

Following his sentencing, Hoehn timely appealed to the 

Scotts Bluff County District Court, contending that the 

county court erred, inter alia, in overruling his motion to suppress. Hoehn challenged Officer Rockwell’s authority to stop 

Hoehn outside of his primary jurisdiction, i.e., the city limits 

of Minatare.

The district court determined that the county court properly denied Hoehn’s motion to suppress and affirmed his 
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conviction. Although the district court noted that there was no 

dispute that Officer Rockwell was outside the Minatare city 

limits when the stop took place, the court found:

Officer Rockwell had probable cause to believe . . . 

Hoehn was operating a motor vehicle while under the 

influence of alcoholic liquor sufficient to initiate a stop 

of the vehicle. The citizen report from dispatch regarding the vehicle being all over the road, observation of 

throwing a can out [of] the window on two separate 

occasions, along with the erratic driving observed by the 

officer create[d] probable cause in this case to believe 

the crime of driving while under the influence was committed and thus stop the vehicle.

Relying on Neb. Rev. Stat § 29-215(3)(c) (Reissue 2016), the 

district court found:

Here Officer Rockwell made a stop outside the city of 

Minatare limits with a suspected driver under the influence of alcohol operating the motor vehicle. The stop 

was directly and solely related to enforcing the laws that 

concern a person operating or being in the actual physical 

control of any motor vehicle. The motion to suppress was 

thus properly overruled.

Hoehn has timely appealed to this court.

ASSIGNMENTS OF ERROR

Hoehn contends that the district court erred in finding that 

the county court properly overruled his motion to suppress. 

Specifically, Hoehn contends that (1) Officer Rockwell could 

not leave his jurisdiction without probable cause pursuant 

to § 29-215(3)(c); (2) probable cause did not exist to stop 

Hoehn’s pickup; (3) the radio dispatch was not from a citizen informant, but instead was an uncorroborated anonymous 

call; and (4) erratic driving and a can being thrown from the 

driver’s-side window was not probable cause to believe a person was driving under the influence.
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STATE V. HOEH

Cite as 32 Neb. App. 446

STANDARD OF REVIEW

[1] In an appeal of a criminal case from the county court, 

the district court acts as an intermediate court of appeals, and 

its review is limited to an examination of the record for error 

or abuse of discretion. State v. Johnson, 310 Neb. 527, 967 

N.W.2d 242 (2021). Both the district court and a higher appellate court generally review appeals from the county court for 

error appearing on the record. Id. When reviewing a judgment 

for errors appearing on the record, an appellate court’s inquiry 

is whether the decision conforms to the law, is supported by 

competent evidence, and is neither arbitrary, capricious, nor 

unreasonable. Id.

[2] In reviewing a trial court’s ruling on a motion to suppress based on a claimed violation of the Fourth Amendment, 

an appellate court applies a two-part standard of review. State 

v. Drake, 311 Neb. 219, 971 N.W.2d 759 (2022). Regarding 

historical facts, an appellate court reviews the trial court’s 

findings for clear error, but whether those facts trigger or violate Fourth Amendment protections is a question of law that 

an appellate court reviews independently of the trial court’s 

determination. State v. Drake, supra.

[3] Statutory interpretation presents a question of law, which 

an appellate court reviews independently of the lower court. 

State v. Williams, 313 Neb. 981, 987 N.W.2d 613 (2023).

ANALYSIS

Lawfulness of Stop

We first address Hoehn’s claim that the district court erred 

in affirming the county court’s denial of his motion to suppress on the basis that Officer Rockwell had no authority to 

leave his jurisdiction prior to developing probable cause to 

further investigate Hoehn. Hoehn argues that “[i]f an officer 

is allowed to leave his jurisdiction under . . . §29-215(3), the 

officer must have probable cause before leaving.” Brief for 

appellant at 10. He contends that because Officer Rockwell 

did not have probable cause that Hoehn was operating his 
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STATE V. HOEH

Cite as 32 Neb. App. 446

vehicle while under the influence prior to leaving the officer’s primary jurisdiction, the stop and arrest of Hoehn 

was unlawful.

The State disagrees. The State argues that “the plain language of § 29-215(3) does not require probable cause to exist 

before leaving the jurisdiction[;] it only requires that probable 

cause exist before taking action with respect to the individual 

involved.” Brief for appellee at 11 (emphasis in original). The 

State further argues that “if probable cause exists to believe an 

individual is operating a motor vehicle while under the influence, law enforcement has the authority to stop the individual 

and enforce the law, even outside of the officer’s primary 

jurisdiction.” Brief for appellee at 10. As applied to the instant 

case, the State contends that because Officer Rockwell had 

probable cause to believe that Hoehn was operating his vehicle 

in violation of driving under the influence laws prior to the 

stop of Hoehn, Officer Rockwell had the authority to stop 

Hoehn under § 29-215(3)(c).

[4-6] In considering the parties’ arguments concerning the 

interpretation of § 29-215(3)(c), we apply familiar principles 

of statutory interpretation that the Nebraska Supreme Court 

set forth in Heist v. Nebraska Dept. of Corr. Servs., 312 Neb. 

480, 492, 979 N.W.2d 772, 782-83 (2022):

First, statutory language is to be given its plain and ordinary meaning, and an appellate court will not resort to 

interpretation to ascertain the meaning of statutory words 

which are plain, direct, and unambiguous. Second, components of a series or collection of statutes pertaining to 

a certain subject matter are in pari materia and should be 

conjunctively considered and construed to determine the 

intent of the Legislature, so that different provisions are 

consistent, harmonious, and sensible.

Ordinarily, we look no further than the text. In order 

for a court to inquire into a statute’s legislative history, 

that statute in question must be open to construction, 

and a statute is open to construction when its terms 
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require interpretation or may reasonably be considered 

ambiguous.

[7,8] In performing that analysis, the Nebraska Supreme 

Court held in Angel v. Nebraska Dept. of Nat. Resources, 314 

Neb. 1, 12, 988 N.W.2d 507, 516 (2023):

It is not within the province of a court to read a meaning into a statute that is not warranted by the language; 

neither is it within the province of a court to read anything plain, direct, or unambiguous out of a statute. To 

give effect to all parts of a statute, an appellate court 

will attempt to reconcile different provisions so they 

are consistent, harmonious, and sensible, and will avoid 

rejecting as superfluous or meaningless any word, clause, 

or sentence.

The issue requires us to examine the full jurisdictional 

authority of law enforcement officers in this state. The authorizing statute is found at § 29-215 and provides, in pertinent part:

(1) A law enforcement officer has the power and authority to enforce the laws of this state and of the political 

subdivision which employs the law enforcement officer or 

otherwise perform the functions of that office anywhere 

within his or her primary jurisdiction.

(2) Any law enforcement officer who is within this 

state, but beyond his or her primary jurisdiction, has the 

power and authority to enforce the laws of this state or 

any legal ordinance of any city or incorporated village 

or otherwise perform the functions of his or her office, 

including the authority to arrest and detain suspects, as if 

enforcing the laws or performing the functions within his 

or her primary jurisdiction in the following cases:

(a) Any such law enforcement officer, if in a fresh 

attempt to apprehend a person suspected of committing 

a felony, may follow such person into any other jurisdiction in this state and there arrest and detain such person 
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and return such person to the law enforcement officer’s 

primary jurisdiction;

(b) Any such law enforcement officer, if in a fresh 

attempt to apprehend a person suspected of committing 

a misdemeanor or a traffic infraction, may follow such 

person anywhere in an area within twenty-five miles of 

the boundaries of the law enforcement officer’s primary 

jurisdiction and there arrest and detain such person and 

return such person to the law enforcement officer’s primary jurisdiction;

(c) Any such law enforcement officer shall have such 

enforcement and arrest and detention authority when 

responding to a call in which a local, state, or federal 

law enforcement officer is in need of assistance. A law 

enforcement officer in need of assistance shall mean 

(i) a law enforcement officer whose life is in danger 

or (ii) a law enforcement officer who needs assistance 

in making an arrest and the suspect (A) will not be 

apprehended unless immediately arrested, (B) may cause 

injury to himself or herself or others or damage to property unless immediately arrested, or (C) may destroy or 

conceal evidence of the commission of a crime; and

(d) Any municipality or county may, under the provisions of the Interlocal Cooperation Act or the Joint 

Public Agency Act, enter into a contract with any other 

municipality or county for law enforcement services or 

joint law enforcement services. Under such an agreement, 

law enforcement personnel may have such enforcement 

authority within the jurisdiction of each of the participating political subdivisions if provided for in the agreement. Unless otherwise provided in the agreement, each 

participating political subdivision shall provide liability 

insurance coverage for its own law enforcement personnel 

as provided in section 13-1802.

(3) When probable cause exists to believe that a 

person is operating or in the actual physical control of 
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any motor vehicle, motorboat, personal watercraft, or 

aircraft while under the influence of alcoholic liquor 

or of any drug or otherwise in violation of section 

28-1465, 28-1466, 28-1472, 37-1254.01, 37-1254.02, 

60-4,163, 60-4,164, 60-6,196, 60-6,197, 60-6,211.01, or 

60-6,211.02, the law enforcement officer has the power 

and authority to do any of the following or any combination thereof:

(a) Transport such person to a facility outside of the 

law enforcement officer’s primary jurisdiction for appropriate chemical testing of the person;

(b) Administer outside of the law enforcement officer’s 

primary jurisdiction any post-arrest test advisement to the 

person; or

(c) With respect to such person, perform other procedures or functions outside of the law enforcement officer’s 

primary jurisdiction which are directly and solely related 

to enforcing the laws that concern a person operating or 

being in the actual physical control of any motor vehicle, 

motorboat, personal watercraft, or aircraft while under the 

influence of alcoholic liquor or of any other drug or otherwise in violation of section 28-1465, 28-1466, 28-1472, 

37-1254.01, 37-1254.02, 60-4,163, 60-4,164, 60-6,196, 

60-6,197, 60-6,211.01, or 60-6,211.02.

Subsection (1) provides the general scope of an officer’s 

power and authority to enforce the laws of this state and the 

political subdivision that employs the officer. It provides 

that a law enforcement officer has the power and authority 

to enforce the laws of this state and the political subdivision 

that employs the officer, or otherwise perform the functions 

of that office, anywhere within his or her primary jurisdiction. 

Primary jurisdiction is defined in subsection § 29-215(4)(b) 

as “the geographic area within the territorial limits of the 

state or political subdivision which employs the law enforcement officer.” We will refer to the officer’s full power and 

authority as the officer’s plenary powers. Without more, an 
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officer’s plenary powers are limited to that officer’s primary jurisdiction.

But § 29-215(2) and (3) provide additions to the officer’s 

primary jurisdictional authority. Subsection (2) provides that an 

officer who is within the state, but beyond the officer’s primary 

jurisdiction, has plenary powers, including the authority to 

arrest and detain, as if performing the functions in the officer’s 

primary jurisdiction in certain limited circumstances. These 

are described in subsections (2)(a) through (d). These exceptions have been generally described by this court as follows: 

subsection (2)(a)—the fresh pursuit of a person suspected of 

committing a felony; subsection (2)(b)—the fresh pursuit of a 

person suspected of committing a misdemeanor or traffic violation; and subsection (2)(c)—response to a call for assistance 

by another officer. See State v. Connick, 5 Neb. App. 176, 557 

N.W.2d 713 (1996). Subsequently, § 29-215(2) was amended 

to add subsection (d), which provides for a municipality or 

county to enter into a contract with any other municipality or 

county under the Interlocal Cooperation Act or the Joint Public 

Agency Act for law enforcement services or joint law enforcement services for services provided in the agreement. Neither 

party suggests that any of the subsection (2) extraterritorial 

grants of authority apply in the case at bar.

Instead, both parties cite to the extraterritorial exception 

found in § 29-215(3), but then disagree about the subsection’s 

meaning. Unlike subsection (2), § 29-215(3) provides:

When probable cause exists to believe that a person is 

operating or in the actual physical control of any motor 

vehicle . . . while under the influence of alcoholic liquor 

or of any drug . . . the law enforcement officer has the 

power and authority to do any of the following or any 

combination thereof:

(a) Transport such person to a facility outside of the 

law enforcement officer’s primary jurisdiction for appropriate chemical testing of the person;
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(b) Administer outside of the law enforcement officer’s 

primary jurisdiction any post-arrest test advisement to the 

person; or

(c) With respect to such person, perform other procedures or functions outside of the law enforcement officer’s primary jurisdiction which are directly and solely 

related to enforcing the laws that concern a person operating or being in the actual physical control of any motor 

vehicle . . . while under the influence of alcoholic liquor 

or of any other drug . . . .

(Emphasis supplied.) As such, when an officer has probable 

cause to believe a person is operating a vehicle while under 

the influence, the powers of an officer outside of the officer’s 

jurisdiction are limited to transporting for chemical testing, 

administering post-arrest test advisements, and “perform[ing] 

other procedures or functions outside of the law enforcement officer’s primary jurisdiction which are directly and 

solely related to enforcing the laws that concern a person 

operating or being in the actual physical control of any motor 

vehicle” while under the influence of drugs or alcohol. See 

§ 29-215(3).

The State would have us read § 29-215(3)(c) as a general 

grant of plenary authority granting officers full power and 

authority to enforce the laws of the state regarding driving 

under the influence offenses, including detention and arrest, 

outside of the officer’s primary jurisdiction so long as the officer’s actions are supported by probable cause. Hoehn would 

have us read § 29-215(3)(c) as a general grant of plenary 

authority so long as probable cause is first developed within 

the officer’s primary jurisdiction before continuing the officer’s investigation. After reviewing the entirety of the language 

of § 29-215, we reject both interpretations.

As to the State’s suggestion that § 29-215(3)(c) grants 

primary jurisdictional authority, including the power to arrest 

and detain, any time probable cause exists to believe a person is driving under the influence anywhere, we find that the 
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State’s proposed interpretation would not give effect to the 

language of the statute as it was constructed.

[9,10] In Kuhn v. Wells Fargo Bank of Neb., 278 Neb. 428, 

445-46, 771 N.W.2d 103, 118-19 (2009), in analyzing a statutory canon of construction, the Nebraska Supreme Court held:

[U]nder the ejusdem generis canon of construction, when 

a general word or phrase follows a list of specific persons 

or things, the general word or phrase will be interpreted 

to include only persons or things of the same type as 

those listed. In other words, specific terms modify and 

restrict the interpretation of general terms when they are 

used in a sequence.

Here, unlike § 29-215(1) and (2), which provides officers 

with full plenary authority to “enforce the laws of this state” 

within its jurisdictional or extra-jurisdictional territories as 

defined, § 29-215(3) provides:

When probable cause exists to believe that a person is 

operating or in the actual physical control of any motor 

vehicle . . . while under the influence of alcoholic liquor 

or of any drug . . . the law enforcement officer has the 

power and authority to do any of the following or any 

combination thereof . . . .

(Emphasis supplied.) Section 29-215(3) then lists the following 

restrictive power and authority the following order:

(a) Transport such person to a facility outside of the 

law enforcement officer’s primary jurisdiction for appropriate chemical testing of the person;

(b) Administer outside of the law enforcement officer’s 

primary jurisdiction any post-arrest test advisement to the 

person; or

(c) With respect to such person, perform other procedures or functions outside of the law enforcement officer’s primary jurisdiction which are directly and solely 

related to enforcing the laws that concern a person 

operating or being in the actual physical control of any 
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motor vehicle . . . while under the influence of alcoholic 

liquor or of any other drug . . . .

The State would have us read § 29-215(3)(c) as a broad 

grant of authority that includes full officer enforcement powers, including the powers to arrest and detain, even though 

this grant of power follows the more specific and limiting 

powers set forth in § 29-215(3)(a) and (b). Applying the 

ejusdem generis canon of construction, we read the general 

language in subsection (3)(c) as a grant of power of the same 

limiting type set forth in both subsections (3)(a) and (3)(b). 

That is, we see the language in subsection (3)(c) as granting other procedural-type powers relating to enforcing laws 

outside the officer’s primary jurisdiction incident to an arrest 

or detention for which the officer had jurisdictional authority 

to arrest or detain under § 29-215(1) or (2). Accordingly, we 

find that § 29-215(3) does not provide an officer with plenary 

powers to arrest or detain an individual outside of the officer’s primary jurisdiction even where probable cause exists 

to believe a person is operating a motor vehicle while under 

the influence of alcohol or drugs in another jurisdiction. To 

the contrary, under its explicit terms, § 29-215(3) provides 

officers with limited powers to perform functions in another 

jurisdiction when probable cause exists in connection with a 

jurisdictional stop and arrest.

The concurrence urges: “If the majority’s interpretation of 

the statute stands, particularly now that § 29-215(3) has been 

construed, law enforcement would be constrained from intervening in potentially dangerous situations involving drivers 

under the influence of alcohol or drugs merely because the 

dangerous situation was taking place outside the officer’s primary jurisdiction.” Although that expression may serve as an 

aid for future legislative policy, we are confined to interpret 

the language of the statute as it is currently written.

Because the evidence demonstrates that Officer Rockwell’s 

investigation and stop occurred outside of his jurisdiction and 

there was no evidence of a § 29-215(2) extraterritorial right 

to extend full plenary powers to Officer Rockwell outside 
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his jurisdiction, his investigation, stop, and arrest of Hoehn 

was conducted without jurisdictional authority.

Probable Cause

Hoehn next argues that Officer Rockwell did not have probable cause to conduct a stop of his vehicle.

[11,12] An officer’s stop of a vehicle is objectively reasonable when the officer has probable cause to believe that a 

traffic violation has occurred. State v. Draganescu, 276 Neb. 

448, 755 N.W.2d 57 (2008). Traffic violations, no matter how 

minor, create probable cause to stop the driver of a vehicle. Id.

Here, prior to the stop of Hoehn’s pickup, Officer Rockwell 

had received information from dispatch of a report that a 

white pickup heading north on the 79E Link Highway “was 

all over the roadway.” Although Hoehn argues that the call 

should be considered to be an uncorroborated anonymous 

call, not a citizen informant, we find that the distinction is 

not determinative in this case. Even if the call was considered 

to be an uncorroborated anonymous call, after receiving that 

information, Officer Rockwell observed Hoehn’s white pickup 

being driven erratically, including making a wide turn, straddling the centerline, and driving into the median, and he saw 

the occupant throw one or two cans out of the driver’s-side 

window. Based upon these observed traffic violations, Officer 

Rockwell had probable cause to conduct a stop of Hoehn’s 

pickup. However, even though Officer Rockwell had probable cause to stop Hoehn’s pickup, because we determined 

that Officer Rockwell lacked jurisdiction to conduct the stop, 

we must determine whether the exclusionary rule requires the 

suppression of the evidence obtained as a result of the stop, 

detainment, and arrest of Hoehn.

Application of Exclusionary Rule

Having determined that Officer Rockwell’s actions were 

carried out without jurisdictional authority, we must now 

examine the applicability of the exclusionary rule that was 

addressed by both parties during oral argument.
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[13,14] In State v. Albarenga, 313 Neb. 72, 90-91, 982 

N.W.2d 799, 814 (2022), the Nebraska Supreme Court stated:

The Fourth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution guarantees “[t]he right of the people to be secure in their 

persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable 

searches and seizures . . . ,” as does article I, § 7, of the 

Nebraska Constitution. The exclusionary rule is not found 

in the federal or state Constitution, but is a prudential 

doctrine to be employed where the deterrence benefits of 

suppression outweigh its costs. When the police exhibit 

deliberate, reckless, or grossly negligent disregard for 

Fourth Amendment rights, the deterrent value of exclusion is strong and tends to outweigh the resulting costs. 

On the other hand, when the police act with an objectively reasonable good faith belief that their conduct is 

lawful or when their conduct involves only simple, isolated negligence, the deterrent value is weak and tends 

not to outweigh the resulting costs.

. . . . Police officers are not required to be legal scholars, but implicit in the probable cause standard is the 

requirement that a police officer’s mistakes be reasonable.

[15-17] Before examining the application of the exclusionary rule, we first pause to note that it is a prudential doctrine 

developed to deter police conduct when such police conduct 

“exhibit[s] deliberate, reckless, or grossly negligent disregard 

for Fourth Amendment rights.” State v. Albarenga, 313 Neb. 

at 91, 982 N.W.2d at 814. See Davis v. United States, 564 

U.S. 229, 131 S. Ct. 2419, 180 L. Ed. 2d 285 (2011). As the 

Nebraska Supreme Court held in State v. Knutson, 288 Neb. 

823, 835, 852 N.W.2d 307, 319 (2014):

The Fourth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution and 

article I, § 7, of the Nebraska Constitution protect individuals against unreasonable searches and seizures by the 

government. . . .

The Fourth Amendment’s protections are implicated 

whenever state action intrudes on a citizen’s reasonable 
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expectation of privacy. “‘Legitimation of expectations of 

privacy by law must have a source outside of the Fourth 

Amendment, either by reference to concepts of real or 

personal property law or to understandings that are recognized and permitted by society.’”

[18] In considering application of the exclusionary rule, 

the State urges us to consider the Nebraska Supreme Court’s 

holding in Knutson, wherein the court found that the particular 

violation of state law restricting searches involved in Knutson

was insufficient to show a Fourth Amendment violation. The 

State argues that because Officer Rockwell’s misunderstanding of § 29-215(c)(3) simply constitutes a violation of state 

law restricting jurisdiction, its violation alone is insufficient 

to constitute a Fourth Amendment violation thereby invoking the protections of the exclusionary rule. We disagree. As 

the Nebraska Supreme Court noted in Knutson, “The analysis 

turns on whether society recognizes an expectation of privacy 

deserving of “‘“the most scrupulous protection from government invasion.”’” 288 Neb. at 838, 852 N.W.2d at 320-21, 

quoting California v. Greenwood, 486 U.S. 35, 108 S. Ct. 

1625, 100 L. Ed. 2d 30 (1988). Thus, the question becomes 

whether a violation of this jurisdictional statute touches upon 

a societal expectation of privacy deserving of the most scrupulous protection from government invasion.

In assessing the application of a jurisdictional violation by 

an officer who conducted a stop in violation of the jurisdictional mandates of § 29-215, the Nebraska Supreme Court 

held, in State v. Cuny, 257 Neb. 168, 595 N.W.2d 899 (1999), 

that such a violation did warrant application of the exclusionary rule under certain circumstances. Without analysis 

regarding the interplay between a statutory jurisdictional violation under § 29-215 and the Fourth Amendment to the U.S. 

Constitution, the Nebraska Supreme Court held:

Having concluded that the actions of the . . . police 

officers were unlawful, we find the evidence obtained 

by [the sheriff] was the fruit of an illegal search or 
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seizure, in violation of the Fourth Amendment to the 

U.S. Constitution and article I, § 7, of the Nebraska 

Constitution, is inadmissible in a state prosecution, and 

must be excluded. See State v. Tingle, 239 Neb. 558, 477 

N.W.2d 544 (1991), citing State v. O’Kelly, 175 Neb. 798, 

124 N.W.2d 211 (1963), cert. denied 376 U.S. 956, 84 S. 

Ct. 978, 11 L. Ed. 2d 975 (1964). After concluding that 

the . . . police officers were without authority to make 

the stop and arrest, we hold that [the defendant’s] arrest 

was unlawful and that the trial court was clearly wrong 

in not suppressing all evidence obtained pursuant to the 

illegal actions.

State v. Cuny, 257 Neb. at 173-74, 595 N.W.2d at 903.

We reach a similar conclusion here that this statutory jurisdiction violation does implicate the Fourth Amendment. We 

recognize, as does the concurring opinion, that case law exists 

that holds that certain statutory violations do not also constitute violations of an individual’s Fourth Amendment rights. 

However, the facts of this case most closely reflect those found 

in State v. Cuny, supra. As such, we find no sufficient basis 

upon which we can reach an outcome inconsistent with the 

Nebraska Supreme Court’s decision in that case. This requires 

that we now examine whether the exclusionary rule should 

be applied.

Although we have found that Officer Rockwell’s actions 

were conducted without jurisdictional authority, we also 

acknowledge that prior to the stop herein, § 29-215(3) had 

not been construed by any Nebraska appellate court and that 

Officer Rockwell could have reasonably believed that he had 

jurisdictional authority to stop and arrest Hoehn. We further 

note that Officer Rockwell’s actions were not deliberate, reckless, or in grossly negligent disregard for Fourth Amendment 

rights. The culpability standard used in describing the requisite conduct necessary to apply the exclusionary rule is simply 

not present in this case. See State v. Bray, 297 Neb. 916, 902 

N.W.2d 98 (2017) (exclusionary rule is applicable only where 
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its deterrence benefits outweigh substantial social costs). To 

the contrary, the record reveals that Officer Rockwell detained 

Hoehn after observing Hoehn operating his vehicle in a dangerous manner, which observation provided the officer with 

probable cause to stop the vehicle subject to jurisdictional 

authority under a rule of law that had not previously been 

interpreted by a Nebraska appellate court. Under these limited 

circumstances, we decline to apply the exclusionary rule in 

this case.

[19] We have found that although the stop, detainment, and 

arrest of Hoehn violated his constitutional rights, the facts did 

not support application of the exclusionary rule in this case. 

Because we find that Officer Rockwell had probable cause 

before stopping Hoehn and that his conduct did not rise to the 

level of a deliberate, reckless, or grossly negligent disregard 

for Hoehn’s Fourth Amendment rights, the deterrence benefits 

of suppression do not outweigh the costs and therefore application of the exclusionary rule is not warranted. Despite the 

fact that our reasoning differs from that of the district court, 

when the record demonstrates that the decision of the trial 

court is correct, although such correctness is based on different grounds from those assigned by the trial court, an appellate court will affirm. See State v. Pauly, 311 Neb. 418, 972 

N.W.2d 907 (2022).

CONCLUSION

In sum, although Officer Rockwell lacked jurisdiction to 

conduct the stop and to detain and arrest Hoehn, we find 

that the facts in this case do not support application of the 

exclusionary rule. Accordingly, we affirm Hoehn’s conviction 

and sentence.

Affirmed.

Bishop, Judge, concurring.

I agree with the majority’s decision to affirm Michael C. 

Hoehn’s conviction and sentence. I write separately because I 

disagree with its interpretation of Neb. Rev. Stat. § 29-215(3)(c) 
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(Reissue 2016). Like the Scotts Bluff County District Court, I 

read the statute to provide law enforcement officers the power 

and authority to “perform other procedures or functions outside 

of the law enforcement officer’s primary jurisdiction” when 

they are “directly and solely related to enforcing the laws that 

concern a person operating . . . any motor vehicle, . . . while 

under the influence of alcoholic liquor or of any other drug” 

when “probable cause exists” to believe that is the situation. 

See id.

In affirming the county court’s order denying Hoehn’s 

motion to suppress, the district court’s November 6, 2022, 

order stated:

[Hoehn] claims Officer Rockwell did not have jurisdiction to perform the initial stop. This Court disagrees. 

Officer Rockwell had probable cause to believe . . . 

Hoehn was operating a motor vehicle while under the 

influence of alcoholic liquor sufficient to initiate a stop of 

the vehicle. The citizen report from dispatch regarding the 

vehicle being all over the road, observation of throwing 

a can out the window on two separate occasions, along 

with the erratic driving observed by the officer create 

probable cause in this case to believe the crime of driving 

while under the influence was committed and thus stop 

the vehicle.

Where probable cause exists, officers are allowed 

to perform other procedures or functions outside of 

the law enforcement officer’s primary jurisdiction which 

are directly and solely related to enforcing the laws 

that concern a person operating or being in the actual 

physical control of any motor vehicle. [§] 29-215(3)(c). 

Here Officer Rockwell made a stop outside the city of 

Minatare limits with a suspected driver under the influence of alcohol operating the motor vehicle. The stop 

was directly and solely related to enforcing the laws 

that concern a person operating or being in the actual 
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physical control of any motor vehicle. The motion to 

suppress was thus properly overruled.

I agree with the district court’s determination that when probable cause exists that a person is operating a motor vehicle 

while under the influence of alcohol, § 29-215(3)(c) authorizes 

law enforcement to stop the vehicle even when probable cause 

occurs outside the officer’s primary jurisdiction.

The majority determines, however, that § 29-215(3)(c) does 

not authorize law enforcement “to arrest or detain an individual outside of the officer’s primary jurisdiction even where 

probable cause exists to believe a person is operating a motor 

vehicle while under the influence of alcohol or drugs in another 

jurisdiction.” Therefore, the majority concludes that Officer 

Rockwell’s “investigation, stop, and arrest of Hoehn was conducted without jurisdictional authority,” and as a result, it was 

necessary to examine the applicability of the exclusionary 

rule. The majority declined to apply the exclusionary rule in 

this instance because “§ 29-215(3) had not been construed by 

any Nebraska appellate court” and Officer Rockwell’s “actions 

were not deliberate, reckless, or in grossly negligent disregard 

for Fourth Amendment rights.”

If the majority’s interpretation of the statute stands, particularly now that § 29-215(3) has been construed, law enforcement would be constrained from intervening in potentially 

dangerous situations involving drivers under the influence of 

alcohol or drugs merely because the dangerous situation was 

taking place outside the officer’s primary jurisdiction. Upon 

personally witnessing such situations, an officer outside the 

officer’s primary jurisdiction will be placed in the difficult 

position of having to decide whether to intervene, knowing 

that evidence of unlawful activity may be suppressed, or, 

alternatively, to not intervene and wait for a law enforcement 

officer with primary jurisdiction to arrive. Waiting increases 

the risk of injury to the driver and the general public; this 

seems contrary to any possible legislative intent. When construing a statute, a court must determine and give effect to the 
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purpose and intent of the Legislature as ascertained from the 

entire language of the statute considered in its plain, ordinary, 

and popular sense. Timothy L. Ashford, PC LLO v. Roses, 313 

Neb. 302, 984 N.W.2d 596 (2023).

As noted by the majority, “[t]o give effect to all parts of a 

statute, an appellate court will attempt to reconcile different 

provisions so they are consistent, harmonious, and sensible, 

and will avoid rejecting as superfluous or meaningless any 

word, clause, or sentence.” Angel v. Nebraska Dept. of Nat. 

Resources, 314 Neb. 1, 12, 988 N.W.2d 507, 516 (2023). 

When giving effect to all parts of § 29-215 in the present 

case, I cannot agree with the majority’s conclusion that Officer 

Rockwell’s arrest of Hoehn was in violation of that statute.

Section 29-215 contains four subsections. Subsection (4) 

provides meanings for certain words and is not relevant to the 

issue of the officer’s jurisdiction in this case; no one disputes 

that Officer Rockwell was outside his primary jurisdiction 

when the traffic stop occurred. Accordingly, it is the remaining three subsections of § 29-215 that are relevant to my 

analysis, with particular focus on the introductory language 

contained in each of those subsections.

When interpreting a statute, the starting point and focus of 

the inquiry is the meaning of the statutory language, understood in context. State v. Wines, 308 Neb. 468, 954 N.W.2d 893 

(2021). Section 29-215(1) consists of only one sentence, and it 

authorizes a law enforcement officer to “perform the functions 

of that office anywhere within his or her primary jurisdiction.” (Emphasis supplied.) Section 29-215(2) has an introductory sentence, which is followed by subparts (a) through (d). 

The introductory sentence for subsection (2) authorizes a law 

enforcement officer to “perform the functions of his or her 

office” when the officer is “beyond his or her primary jurisdiction” (emphasis supplied) in the circumstances described in 

subparts (a) through (d). The situations described in subparts 

(a) through (d) are set forth in the majority’s opinion and need 

not be repeated here.
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Notably, the introductory language of § 29-215(3) contains 

no reference to “within” or “beyond” an officer’s primary 

jurisdiction; rather, it only states that “[w]hen probable cause 

exists to believe that a person is operating . . . any motor vehicle . . . while under the influence of alcoholic liquor or of any 

drug,” the officer has the “power and authority to do any of 

the following or any combination thereof[.]” There are no limiting words related to jurisdiction in the introductory language 

of subsection (3) like there are in subsections (1) and (2). 

While subsection (1) refers to “within . . . primary jurisdiction” and subsection (2) refers to “beyond . . . primary jurisdiction,” the introductory language of subsection (3) refers to 

“probable cause” and “operating . . . any motor vehicle . . . 

while under the influence.” These differences in the introductory language of each subsection cannot be ignored.

Because the introductory language of § 29-215(3) does 

not make any reference to “within” or “beyond” an officer’s 

primary jurisdiction, the circumstances described under all 

subparts of § 29-215(3) should be construed without regard 

to whether probable cause arose within or beyond an officer’s 

primary jurisdiction. Instead, the focus is on whether probable 

cause exists to believe a person is driving under the influence of alcohol or drugs. If so, then § 29-215(3)(a) allows for 

the transport of that person to a facility outside the officer’s 

primary jurisdiction for chemical testing, and § 29-215(3)(b) 

allows for the administration of a post-arrest test advisement to 

that person outside the officer’s primary jurisdiction. Notably, 

subparts (a) and (b) involve specific acts by law enforcement 

that may require cooperation with facilities or services outside 

the officer’s primary jurisdiction.

Section 29-215(3)(c) provides authorization for law enforcement to

perform other procedures or functions outside of the 

law enforcement officer’s primary jurisdiction which are 

directly and solely related to enforcing the laws that concern a person operating or being in the actual physical 
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control of any motor vehicle . . . while under the influence of alcoholic liquor or of any other drug.

While the majority construes this language as “a grant of 

power of the same limiting type set forth” in subparts (a) and 

(b), I do not. Instead, I read subpart (c) as a broader catchall provision that follows two specific examples of the types 

of actions an officer may take beyond the officer’s primary 

jurisdiction, regardless of whether probable cause developed 

within or beyond the officer’s jurisdiction. In other words, 

under the introductory language of § 29-215(3), if there is 

probable cause to believe a person is operating a vehicle 

under the influence of alcohol or drugs, whether within or 

beyond an officer’s primary jurisdiction, a law enforcement 

officer has the power and authority to transport the person 

to a facility outside the officer’s primary jurisdiction for 

chemical testing, see § 29-215(3)(a); to administer, outside 

the officer’s primary jurisdiction, any post-arrest test advisement to the person, see § 29-215(3)(b); and then the catch-all 

provision, to “perform other procedures or functions outside 

of the law enforcement officer’s primary jurisdiction which 

are directly and solely related to enforcing the laws that 

concern a person operating or being in the actual physical 

control of any motor vehicle . . . while under the influence” 

of alcohol or drugs, § 29-215(3)(c). I find this reading of the 

law gives effect to every provision of the statute, including 

consideration of the differences in the introductory language 

of subsections (1) through (3). Those differences separate the 

authority granted “within” an officer’s primary jurisdiction, 

the authority granted “beyond” an officer’s primary jurisdiction, and the authority granted without regard for whether the 

officer is within or beyond the officer’s primary jurisdiction 

when probable cause exists that a person is driving under the 

influence of alcohol or drugs.

Accordingly, I agree with the district court’s interpretation of § 29-215(3) and would have affirmed on that basis. 

Further, to the extent the majority has properly construed the 
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statute and Officer Rockwell’s actions were in violation of 

§ 29-215, I disagree with the majority’s determination that 

this statutory violation implicated the Fourth Amendment. See, 

Virginia v. Moore, 553 U.S. 164, 176, 128 S. Ct. 1598, 170 L. 

Ed. 2d 559 (2008) (arrest prohibited by state law but based 

on probable cause did not violate Fourth Amendment; “warrantless arrests for crimes committed in the presence of an 

arresting officer are reasonable under the Constitution, and 

. . . while States are free to regulate such arrests however they 

desire, state restrictions do not alter the Fourth Amendment’s 

protections”); Marksmeier v. Davie, 622 F.3d 896 (8th Cir. 

2010) (court need not decide whether officer was acting outside primary jurisdiction under § 29-215 because even if arrest 

violated Nebraska law, it did not violate Fourth Amendment); 

Rose v. City of Mulberry, Arkansas, 533 F.3d 678 (8th Cir. 

2008) (no violation of Fourth Amendment when arrest outside 

of officer’s jurisdiction was based on probable cause). See, 

also, State v. Knutson, 288 Neb. 823, 852 N.W.2d 307 (2014) 

(absent constitutional violation, court will normally suppress 

evidence obtained in violation of rule or statute only if governing law provides that remedy). Section 29-215 provides no 

such remedy, nor has Hoehn informed this court of any other 

governing law providing such a remedy.

Regardless, although our reasoning differs, I concur with the 

majority’s ultimate conclusion to affirm Hoehn’s conviction 

and sentence.