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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF HAWAI‘I

---o0o---

STATE OF HAWAI‘I, Respondent/Plaintiff-Appellee,

vs.

ADRIAN-JOHN C. BRINGAS, also known as ADRIANJOHN BRINGAS, 

Petitioner/Defendant-Appellant.

SCWC-17-0000543

CERTIORARI TO THE INTERMEDIATE COURT OF APPEALS

(CAAP-17-0000543; CR NO. 1PC161000617)

[DATE]

RECKTENWALD, C.J., NAKAYAMA, J., AND CIRCUIT JUDGE CHANG, 

ASSIGNED BY REASON OF VACANCY, WITH McKENNA AND WILSON, JJ., 

EACH DISSENTING SEPARATELY

OPINION OF THE COURT BY RECKTENWALD, C.J.

I. INTRODUCTION

Petitioner Adrian-John C. Bringas was convicted of 

second-degree murder for the death of W, a minor. In its jury 

instructions, the circuit court1 properly instructed the jury on 

 1 The Honorable Paul B.K. Wong presided. 

Electronically Filed

Supreme Court

SCWC-17-0000543

31-AUG-2021

09:07 AM

Dkt. 41 OPA
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the lesser included offenses of second-degree murder, including

third-degree assault. Hawaiʻi Revised Statutes (HRS) § 707-712 

(2014), the statute defining third-degree assault, provides that 

the offense may be reduced to a petty misdemeanor if the fight 

or scuffle is the result of “mutual affray.”2 Consistent with 

the statute and Hawai‘i Jury Instructions Criminal (HAWJIC) 

9.21A, the circuit court submitted a special interrogatory to 

the jury on mutual affray. The interrogatory stated: “Did the 

prosecution prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the fight or 

scuffle was not entered into by mutual consent?” The court

instructed the jury that it must answer the special 

interrogatory only if it found Bringas guilty of the included 

offense of third-degree assault. The jury found Bringas guilty 

as charged of second-degree murder, yet answered the special 

interrogatory by placing an X on the line next to “no.” 

Bringas argues that the circuit court abused its 

discretion when it denied his motion for a new trial because the 

jury’s inconsistent verdict mandated vacatur. We disagree. 

There is a reasonable way to reconcile the jury verdict. The 

evidence in this case could have reasonably caused the jury to 

conclude that the altercation leading to the decedent’s death 

 2 HRS § 707-712(2) specifically provides: “Assault in the third 

degree is a misdemeanor unless committed in a fight or scuffle entered into 

by mutual consent, in which case it is a petty misdemeanor.”
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began as mutual affray but ended in second-degree murder. Thus, 

the jury’s answer to the mutual affray special interrogatory is

reconcilable with its verdict that Bringas was guilty of seconddegree murder. We thus affirm Bringas’s conviction. 

II. BACKGROUND 

Bringas was charged by indictment with one count of 

murder in the second degree (Count I), in violation of HRS 

§ 707-701.5,3 and one count of assault in the second degree 

(Count II), in violation of HRS § 707-711(1)(a), (b), and/or 

(d).4 As to the first count, the State alleged that Bringas 

 3 HRS § 707-701.5 (2014) provided:

(1) Except as provided in section 707-701, a person 

commits the offense of murder in the second degree if the 

person intentionally or knowingly causes the death of 

another person.

(2) Murder in the second degree is a felony for 

which the defendant shall be sentenced to imprisonment as 

provided in section 706-656.

4 HRS § 707-711 (2014) provided in relevant part:

(1) A person commits the offense of assault in the 

second degree if: 

(a) The person intentionally or knowingly 

causes substantial bodily injury to another;

(b) The person recklessly causes serious or 

substantial bodily injury to another;

. . . .

(d) The person intentionally or knowingly 

causes bodily injury to another with a dangerous 

instrument;

. . . .
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intentionally or knowingly caused the death of W, a minor. As 

to the second count, the State alleged that Bringas 

intentionally or knowingly caused substantial injury to, 

recklessly caused substantial bodily injury to, and/or 

intentionally or knowingly caused bodily injury with a dangerous 

instrument to C.U., the older brother of W. 

The following evidence was adduced at Bringas’s jury 

trial in February 2017. It was undisputed that after an 

altercation on the night of April 12, 2016, Bringas stabbed W in 

the chest, resulting in W’s death, and stabbed C.U. in the leg. 

The State alleged that Bringas was the aggressor, while the 

defense argued Bringas acted in self-defense. 

Bringas testified that while riding his bike in 

Kalihi, the chain of his bike fell off near Ahonui Street, so he 

stopped to fix it using a fixed blade knife he was carrying in 

his backpack. After fixing his bike, W approached Bringas and 

offered him marijuana. The two had not previously met, and 

Bringas testified that the mood was “dark,” and Bringas felt W 

was “check[ing] him” by asking him questions. Then, Eileen 

Prescott, a family friend of W, approached Bringas and W and 

began smoking with W, which Bringas testified “lightened the 

situation[.]” 

 (2) Assault in the second degree is a class C 

felony.
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Competing accounts of what happened next were adduced 

at trial. Bringas testified that he began to gather up the 

trash from his bag, and while doing so W and Prescott walked 

away. After walking over to a dumpster to deposit the trash, 

Bringas testified that he was hit hard from behind and fell to 

the ground. Bringas was unsure what had hit him and caused him 

to fall to the ground, but he was able to get back on his feet 

and ran away. However, he slipped and rolled his right ankle, 

causing him to fall again. While on the ground, an unidentified 

individual began punching and kicking Bringas. Bringas 

testified that he was able to get the person off of him and 

begin running again, but he was met on the street by two male 

individuals who attacked him. At this point, Bringas grabbed 

the knife out of his waistband.5 He shouted at the two men to 

“stop, get back,” and noticed that Prescott had his backpack in 

her hand and his belongings were on the ground. Bringas 

recalled yelling at the two men and Prescott that they could 

have his belongings, “just let me go.” He was then hit by an

object one of the men was holding and fell to the ground again.

While lying face down on the floor, Bringas “fe[lt] a presence 

on top” of him, again hitting and kicking him. Bringas recalled 

flailing his right hand - which held the knife - around his head 

 5 Bringas testified that he placed the knife in his waistband, 

rather than returning it to his backpack, because he felt uneasy and 

threatened by the way W was speaking to him before Prescott approached them. 
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in an effort to protect himself. After, “the attack just 

stop[ped],” and he ran away again. He ran as fast as he could 

down three more streets, jumping into the bed of a truck that

pulled into a gas station. 

Prescott testified that she saw Bringas and W talking 

behind the trash can, and when she turned away to talk to her 

boyfriend, R.K., she overhead Bringas ask W if he wanted to “buy 

a dime,” but W stated he didn’t have any money. Soon after, she 

noticed Bringas and W shoving one another. According to 

Prescott, she saw Bringas grab a shiny object from his backpack 

before chasing W and stabbing him. Bringas began to walk back 

toward the dumpster when Prescott pointed Bringas out to R.K., 

who tackled Bringas and the two began to fight. R.K. testified 

the two stopped fighting when R.K. realized Bringas had a 

“shining object in his hand[.]” While R.K. retreated, Bringas 

ran in the opposite direction. R.K. saw C.U. and pointed 

Bringas out to C.U., and the two began to fight. R.K. testified 

that C.U. hit Bringas with an unidentified object, causing 

Bringas to fall to the ground, but C.U. testified that he could 

not remember whether he had used an object to strike Bringas. 

Shortly after C.U. and Bringas began fighting, C.U. felt blood 

rushing from a slit in his shorts; he realized he had been 

stabbed and ran away from Bringas. C.U. was unsure whether 

Bringas was following him. R.K. testified that he and another 
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friend followed Bringas, but could not catch him. They 

retreated after Bringas exited the Kuhio Park Terrace area. 

Following the close of evidence, the court instructed 

the jury as to the elements of murder in the second degree, 

stating that “if and only if you find the defendant not guilty 

of Murder in the Second Degree, or you are unable to reach a 

unanimous verdict . . . then you must consider whether the 

defendant is guilty or not guilty” of the lesser included 

offenses: manslaughter, followed by assault in the first degree, 

assault in the second degree, and assault in the third degree.

The jury was further instructed that, if assault in the third 

degree was proven, it was to “consider whether the fight or 

scuffle was entered in to by mutual consent[.]”

The court then read the mutual consent interrogatory 

to the jury as follows:

In Count [I] of the indictment, if you find that the 

prosecution has proven the offense of Assault in the Third 

Degree beyond a reasonable doubt, then you must also 

consider whether the fight or scuffle was entered into by 

mutual consent, whether expressly or by conduct.

You must determine whether the prosecution has proven 

beyond a reasonable doubt that the fight or scuffle was not 

entered into by mutual consent. This determination must be 

unanimous and is to be indicated by answering “yes” or “no” 

on a special interrogatory that will be provided to you. 

The verdict form for the first count consisted of six 

options: not guilty, guilty of murder in the second degree, 

guilty of manslaughter, guilty of assault in the first degree, 

guilty of assault in the second degree, and guilty of assault in 
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the third degree. It also included the special interrogatory 

about mutual affray. The jury returned the verdict form marked 

as follows:

As to Count I:

___ WE THE JURY in this case, find the Defendant not 

guilty.

_X_ WE THE JURY in this case, find the Defendant guilty as 

charged of the offense of Murder in the Second Degree.

___ WE THE JURY in this case, find the Defendant guilty of 

the included offense of Manslaughter.

___ WE THE JURY in this case, find the Defendant guilty of 

the included offense of Assault in the First Degree.

___ WE THE JURY in this case, find the Defendant guilty of 

the included offense of Assault in the Second Degree.

___ WE THE JURY in this case, find the Defendant guilty of 

the included offense of Assault in the Third Degree.

SPECIAL INTEROGATORY

Question:

Did the prosecution prove beyond a reasonable doubt that 

the fight or scuffle was not entered into by mutual 

consent? (Your answer to this question must be unanimous.)

Answer:

Yes ___ No _X_

As to Count II, which is not at issue here, the jury 

also answered the special interrogatory, marking “X” on the line 

next to “yes” even though it had not found Bringas guilty of 

assault in the third degree. The verdict form was returned as 

follows: 

As to Count II:

_X_ WE THE JURY in this case, find the Defendant not 

guilty.
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___ WE THE JURY in this case, find the Defendant 

guilty as charged of the offense of Assault in the 

Second Degree.

___ WE THE JURY in this case, find the Defendant 

guilty of the included offense of Assault in the 

Third Degree.

SPECIAL INTEROGATORY

Question:

Did the prosecution prove beyond a reasonable doubt 

that the fight or scuffle was not entered into by 

mutual consent? (Your answer to this question must 

be unanimous.)

Answer:

Yes _X_ No ___

The clerk read the jury verdict forms for each count 

without any reference to the jury’s answers to the special 

interrogatory questions on each verdict form.6 Bringas was found 

guilty of murder in the second degree in Count I, and acquitted 

of all offenses in Count II.

After reading the verdict forms, the court asked 

defense counsel if there was a request for a poll of the jury; 

defense counsel replied that there was not.7 The jury was 

excused to return to the jury deliberation room thereafter.8 

 6 We note that the better course would have been to inform counsel 

immediately of the jury’s answers to the special interrogatory.

7 It appears defense counsel was not aware of the discrepancy 

between the finding of guilt and the answer to the mutual consent special 

interrogatory at that time. 

8 Shortly after, the court noted to both parties that on the 

verdict form for Count I, the jury “convict[ed] the defendant of Murder in 

the Second Degree but also answered special interrogatory that is normally 

reserved for the Assault 3, Mutual Affray instruction[.]” The circuit court 

proposed that the jury return the following Tuesday to “give Court and 
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Bringas filed a motion for a new trial contending that

“the jury was . . . confused and did not fully understand the 

jury instructions,” as demonstrated by their answer to the 

special interrogatory. He argued that a new trial was “required 

in the interest of justice under [Hawaiʻi Rules of Penal 

Procedure (HRPP)] Rule 33[9] given the overwhelmingly apparent 

confusion and misunderstanding regarding the instructions and 

verdict forms” and that “the verdict appear[ed] to be so 

manifestly against the weight of the evidence as to indicate 

bias, prejudice, passion, or misunderstanding of the charge of 

the court on the part of the jury, under HRS § 635-56.”10 

 

counsel some time to research what, if anything, can be done at this point in 

time.” The State indicated it was “fine” with that proposal, and Bringas’s 

counsel likewise said he would “defer to the Court on how the Court wants to 

handle it,” albeit noting that interviewing the jury could be “very messy[.]” 

However, after an off-the-record discussion, the circuit court decided to 

“reverse [its] previous order” for the jury to return the following Tuesday, 

and excused the jury. The circuit court asked the parties if there was 

“anything [they] want[ed] to place on the record” before adjourning, and 

counsel for Bringas stated there was “nothing.”

9 HRPP Rule 33 (2012) provides:

The court on motion of a defendant may grant a new 

trial to the defendant if required in the interests of 

justice. If trial was by the court without a jury, the 

court on motion of a defendant for a new trial may vacate 

the judgment if entered, take additional testimony and 

direct the entry of a new judgment. A motion for a new 

trial shall be made within 10 days after verdict or finding 

of guilty or within such further time as the court may fix 

during the 10-day period. The finding of guilty may be 

entered in writing or orally on the record.

10 HRS § 635-56 (2016) provides:

In any civil case or in any criminal case wherein a 

verdict of guilty has been rendered, the court may set 

aside the verdict when it appears to be so manifestly 
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After a hearing on the motion, the circuit court 

concluded that “a new trial [was] not required in the interest 

of justice and . . . accordingly and respectfully [denied 

Bringas’s] motion for new trial.” The circuit court entered 

judgment against Bringas for murder in the second degree and 

sentenced him to imprisonment for a term of life with the 

possibility of parole. 

Bringas appealed his conviction to the ICA arguing, as 

relevant here, that “[t]he trial court erred in failing to 

resolve the jury’s inconsistent verdicts prior to having them 

read in open court, erred in choosing which part of the verdict 

forms to read and which to omit, and abused its discretion in 

denying the Motion for a New Trial.” 

The ICA affirmed Bringas’s conviction, holding that 

the circuit court did not err or abuse its discretion in denying 

Bringas’s motion for a new trial. Although the ICA recognized 

that “the jury did not follow the Circuit Court’s instruction to 

answer the special interrogatory question only if it did not 

reach a verdict on a greater offense,” it nonetheless concluded 

that “the superfluous answering of the special interrogatory did 

not undermine or cast any doubt upon the jury’s verdict, much 

 against the weight of the evidence as to indicate bias, 

prejudice, passion, or misunderstanding of the charge of 

the court on the part of the jury; or the court may in any 

civil or criminal case grant a new trial for any legal 

cause.
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less create an irreconcilable inconsistency with the jury’s 

verdict that Bringas was guilty of Murder Second.” 

Bringas filed an application for writ of certiorari 

with this court, presenting the following three-part question 

for our review:

Whether the ICA gravely erred in (1) affirming the 

circuit court’s failure to resolve the jury’s inconsistent 

verdicts prior to having them read in open court; (2) 

concluding the circuit court did not err in choosing which 

part of the verdict forms to read and which to omit; and 

(3) holding that the circuit court did not abuse its 

discretion in denying Bringas’s motion for a new trial.

III. STANDARD OF REVIEW

As a general matter, the granting or denial of a 

motion for new trial is within the sound discretion of the 

trial court and will not be disturbed absent a clear abuse 

of discretion. . . . The trial court abuses its discretion 

when it clearly exceeds the bounds of reason or disregards 

rules or principles of law or practice to the substantial 

detriment of a party litigant. 

State v. Stone, 147 Hawai‘i 255, 270, 465 P.3d 702, 717 (2020) 

(citations omitted). 

IV. DISCUSSION

Bringas challenges the circuit court’s reading of the

verdicts without first addressing the jury’s mistake in 

answering the special interrogatory. Bringas argues that once 

the court became aware of the “obvious inconsistencies” in the 

verdicts, “it should have halted the reading, made counsel aware 

of the problem and/or sought supplemental briefing on 

resolutions to the problem. The court should then have 

reinstructed or otherwise clarified with the jury the meaning of 
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their verdict choices.” This error, Bringas contends, warranted

a new trial because the jury’s verdict in Count I was 

irreconcilable and the judge had dismissed the jury. For the 

following reasons, Bringas’s arguments lack merit. 

A. The Circuit Court Was Not Required to Reconvene the Jury to 

Address or Resolve Its Inconsistent Verdict

Bringas contends that the circuit court failed to 

follow “procedure[ ]” by discharging the jury without first 

having them resolve or address the obvious inconsistencies with 

their verdict. Bringas does not argue that the verdict was 

against the weight of the evidence, but instead asserts that the 

circuit court erred in “completely failing to address” the

jury’s answer to the special interrogatory despite concluding 

that Bringas was guilty of murder in the second degree. In 

support of this contention, Bringas cites Dias v. Vanek, 67 Haw. 

114, 679 P.2d 133 (1984). 

Dias involved the purchase of real property. Shortly 

after moving in, the buyers discovered extensive termite damage 

in the master bedroom that was not immediately visible because 

the damaged wall had been covered with wallpaper. Dias, 67 Haw. 

at 115-16, 679 P.2d at 134. The buyers sued the sellers for 

recission of the purchase contract and the refund of all sums 

paid, including a $20,000 down payment, and the sellers

counterclaimed for breach of contract. Id. at 116, 679 P.2d at 
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135. After trial, a jury concluded that the inspector’s 

negligent inspection and the sellers’ concealment of the damaged 

wall resulted in $16,850.56 in damages to the buyers for a postpurchase inspection and fumigation costs. Id. However, the 

jury also awarded the sellers $6,263 in damages for breach of 

the sale agreement; the verdict was ambiguous as to whether this 

award was in addition to or in lieu of the $20,000 down payment. 

Id. The circuit court, upon motion by the buyers for the return 

of their down payment, and after the jury had already been 

discharged, concluded that the sellers were entitled to retain 

the down payment, in addition to the $6,263 damages awarded by 

the jury. Id. This court reversed, recognizing that the 

“[d]etermination of the proper amount of damages . . . is within 

the exclusive province of the jury,” and “when the pertinent 

instruction is read in conjunction with the verdict form, it 

appears that the jury may have intended that the damages of 

$6,263 were inclusive rather than exclusive of the $20,000 down 

payment.” Id. at 117-18, 679 P.2d at 135-36 (citation omitted). 

Dias is distinguishable from this case for two 

reasons. First, the jury instructions in Dias were themselves

ambiguous. Regardless of the amount awarded by the jury to the 

sellers, it would have remained unclear, partly due to the 

court’s instructions to the jury, whether the jury intended for 

the award to include the $20,000 down payment. Additionally, 
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the jury’s verdict was consistent with the court’s instructions

despite failing to clearly resolve a crucial factual issue that 

remained “within the exclusive province of the jury[.]” Id. 

Thus, whether the jury intended for the sellers’ damages award 

to be inclusive of the $20,000 award was unclear, and the court

invaded the province of the jury by amending the damages award 

to reflect a verdict that was not clearly what the jury 

intended. By contrast, here, the jury’s verdict clearly evinces 

the jury’s intent to find Bringas guilty of second-degree 

murder. And the jury’s answer to the special interrogatory -

although contrary to the circuit court’s instructions - does not 

make the intent to find Bringas guilty of second-degree murder 

for the stabbing of W ambiguous or unclear. 

Additionally, Bringas cites to this court’s language 

in Dias that the “remedy of an ambiguous verdict is to have the 

jurors return to clarify the verdict,” and when “the jury ha[s] 

been discharged . . . the only available remedy is a remand for 

a new trial[.]” Dias, 67 Haw. at 118, 679 P.2d at 136. As 

such, Bringas argues that Dias provides a specific 

“procedure[ ]” that a circuit court should follow when presented 

with an ambiguous jury verdict. However, the verdict here is 

not ambiguous - the jury clearly found Bringas guilty of seconddegree murder for the stabbing of W. Moreover, while Bringas is 

correct that we explained in Dias that the “preferred remedy” is 
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to have the jury reconvene to clarify its verdict, we also 

concluded that the court “may . . . amend a jury verdict when 

the intention of the jury is clear.” Id. at 117, 679 P.2d at 

135 (citations omitted) (emphasis added). Thus, it was not an 

abuse of discretion for the circuit court not to reconvene the 

jury to address its verdict finding Bringas guilty of seconddegree murder and subsequently answering the special 

interrogatory on mutual affray. 

In addition to Dias, Bringas also cites Kanahele v. 

Han, 125 Hawai‘i 446, 263 P.3d 726 (2011), in support of his 

argument that the circuit court is required to reconvene the 

jury when confronted with an allegedly-inconsistent verdict. 

However, in relying on Kanahele, Bringas conflates a verdict

that is improper as a matter of law with one that is contrary to 

the circuit court’s instructions, but nonetheless remains

reconcilable. In Kanahele, a personal injury case, this court 

concluded that the jury’s verdict awarding damages in the amount 

of $1 in general damages but special damages of $12,280.41 was 

improper and remanded for a new trial on damages. 125 Hawai‘i at 

457, 263 P.3d at 737. This court explained that “it is well 

established” that a jury verdict that awards special damages but 

not general damages is “improper,” and thus we “invalidated” the 

jury’s verdict, concluding that a general damages award of $1 

was the legal equivalent of awarding no general damages. Id. at 
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456-457, 263 P.3d at 736-37 (citations and quotation marks 

omitted). The circuit court in Kanahele thus erred in entering 

the jury’s verdict because the awarded remedy was improper as a 

matter of law. In contrast, Bringas’s verdict reflected that 

the jury did not follow the circuit court’s instructions

regarding when to answer the special interrogatory on mutual 

affray, but the jury’s failure to follow the instructions did 

not render its verdict improper as a matter of law. The answer 

to the special interrogatory does not conflict with or disprove 

any element of murder in the second degree as mutual affray is 

not a defense to murder in the second degree. 

Thus, the circuit court’s decision not to address the 

jury’s mistake in answering the special interrogatory despite 

finding Bringas guilty of second-degree murder was not an abuse 

of discretion, nor was it a departure from prescribed or 

mandatory procedure. 

B. The Circuit Court Did Not Abuse Its Discretion When It

Denied Bringas’s Motion for A New Trial 

Bringas contends that “a new trial should have been 

granted ‘in the interest of justice’” and points to HRS § 635-56 

and HRPP Rule 33 in support of this argument. HRS § 635-56 

states: 

In any civil case or in any criminal case wherein a verdict 

of guilty has been rendered, the court may set aside the 

verdict when it appears to be so manifestly against the 

weight of the evidence as to indicate bias, prejudice, 

passion, or misunderstanding of the charge of the court on 
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the part of the jury; or the court may in any civil or 

criminal case grant a new trial for any legal cause. 

(Emphasis added.)

Since the verdict “reflected a misunderstanding of the 

charge of the court on the part of the jury,” Bringas argues the 

circuit court abused its discretion by denying his motion for a 

new trial. However, that the jury misunderstood the court’s 

instructions does not mean that the verdict must be set aside. 

The jury returned a reconcilable verdict reflecting a theory of 

the case that the evidence at trial supported, and we therefore 

affirm the denial of the motion for a new trial.

1. Before Vacating a Criminal Conviction, the Court Must 

First Search for a Reasonable Way to Reconcile Any 

Inconsistencies in the Verdict

As a preliminary matter, we address Bringas’s 

contention that the jury verdict was “irreconcilably 

inconsistent.” This standard comes from Carr v. Strode, in 

which this court held, “A conflict in the jury’s answers to 

questions in a special verdict will warrant a new trial only if 

those answers are irreconcilably inconsistent, and the verdict 

will not be disturbed if the answers can be reconciled under any 

theory.” 79 Hawai‘i 475, 489, 904 P.2d 489, 503 (1995) (emphasis 

added) (citation omitted).11 Thus, the court must first “search 

 11 A “special verdict,” which was at issue in Carr, is distinct from 

a “special interrogatory,” at issue here. A “special verdict” is “[a] 

verdict in which the jury makes findings only on factual issues submitted to 
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for a reasonable way to read the verdicts as expressing a 

coherent view of the case, and must exhaust this effort” before 

it vacates the jury’s verdict and remands the case for a new 

trial. Id. (citing Toner v. Lederle Laboratories, 828 F.2d 510, 

512 (9th Cir. 1987) (citations omitted)). 

Bringas argues - for the first time during oral 

argument - that Miyamoto v. Lum, 104 Hawai‘i 1, 7, 84 P.3d 509, 

515 (2004), not Carr,12 sets the appropriate standard for courts 

to review jury verdicts. However, this misconstrues the holding 

of Miyamoto. In Miyamoto, this court concluded that the trial

court erred in denying the petitioner’s motion for a new trial

because “our review of the record indicate[d] that the jury 

 

them by the judge, who then decides the legal effect of the verdict.” 

Black’s Law Dictionary (11th ed. 2019). A “special interrogatory” is “[a] 

written jury question whose answer is required to supplement a general 

verdict.” Id. The mutual affray defense question to the jury was required 

to supplement the jury’s general verdict of guilty on third-degree assault, 

were it to reach that verdict. Nonetheless, the test set forth in Carr

applies to allegedly inconsistent special interrogatories, as well as special 

verdicts; the two are treated similarly in the law. See 75B Am. Jur. 2d 

Trial § 1526 (2020) (“The findings in special verdicts and special 

interrogatories submitted with a general verdict cannot be internally 

inconsistent. However, a verdict will not be considered irreconcilably

inconsistent if supported by any reasonable hypothesis. A jury’s special 

findings are inconsistent with a general verdict only where they are clearly 

and absolutely irreconcilable with the general verdict when, as a matter of 

law, the special finding when taken by itself would authorize a judgment 

different from that which the general verdict will permit.” (footnotes 

omitted) (emphasis added)).

12 Although Bringas cited to Carr as supporting authority in his 

opening brief filed in the ICA, he concedes in his certiorari application 

that Carr does not support the conclusion Bringas asks us to reach today. 

Instead, in his application Bringas argues that this court should rely on, 

inter alia, Dias v. Vanek, 67 Haw. 114, 679 P.2d 133 (1984), and Kanahele v. 

Han, 125 Hawai‘i 446, 263 P.3d 726 (2011). However, as discussed in the 

previous section, those cases are distinguishable.
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instructions conflicted with the instructions on the special 

verdict form and misled the jury.” Id. at 9, 84 P.3d at 517.

The jury in Miyamoto concluded that defendant Kenneth Lum’s 

negligence was not the legal cause of plaintiff Nobuo Miyamoto’s 

injury. Id. at 6, 84 P.3d at 514. However, the jury

nonetheless awarded Miyamoto general and special damages 

totaling $18,446. Id. This court held:

[I]f the answers to Question 6 and 8 are ignored, we are 

left with a verdict finding that Lum’s actions were not the 

legal cause of Nobuo’s injuries; thus, Lum would prevail. 

However, if the answer to Question 1 is ignored, we are 

left with a verdict finding that Lum’s actions contributed 

twenty-five percent to Nobuo’s “present condition,” 

amounting to $18,446 in damages; thus, Nobuo would prevail. 

Inasmuch as ignoring the answer to Question 1 “requires the 

entry of a judgment different from that which the court has 

entered” . . . the verdict is irreconcilably inconsistent. 

Id. at 9, 84 P.3d at 517. 

The Miyamoto court carefully scrutinized the verdicts 

and concluded that there was no reasonable way to reconcile 

them. Miyamoto’s holding is thus consistent with the mandate in 

Carr that the court is bound to search for a reasonable way to 

reconcile the verdicts before vacating a conviction on that

ground. 

Although Miyamoto and Carr are civil cases, the 

principle that appellate courts should attempt to first 

reconcile seemingly-inconsistent verdicts before vacatur finds 

broad support in the criminal context. E.g., State v. Holmes, 

24 P.3d 1118, 1121-22 (Wash. Ct. App. 2001) (concluding that a 
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general verdict finding defendant guilty of first degree robbery 

under the statutory alternative of being armed with a deadly 

weapon was not irreconcilably inconsistent with a special 

verdict rejecting a sentencing enhancement for being armed with 

a deadly weapon); State v. Connolly, 518 A.2d 458, 459 (Me. 

1986) (disagreeing with the defendant’s contention that “the 

verdicts are irreconcilably inconsistent” because she was 

charged with two counts of drug trafficking, but only found 

guilty of one count); State v. McClary, 679 N.W.2d 455, 461 

(N.D. 2004) (asking whether allegedly-inconsistent verdicts can 

be “rationally reconciled”); State v. Lopez, 892 P.2d 898, 902 

(Idaho Ct. App. 1995) (“[T]he threshold question in this case is 

whether the verdicts are reconcilable on a rational basis[.]” 

(citation omitted)); United States v. Pierce, 940 F.3d 817, 821 

(2d Cir. 2019) (noting that courts of appeal should first 

“attempt to harmonize” a jury’s verdict of guilt that directly 

conflicts with answers to special interrogatories, so as to find 

a “fair reading” that renders the verdicts “consistent” 

(citations omitted)); United States v. McBride, 962 F.3d 25, 34 

(1st Cir. 2020) (holding that a verdict and special 

interrogatory were not “irreconcilably inconsistent” because 

“[i]t is possible to give effect to both the ‘guilty’ verdict 

and the answer to the special interrogatory”). 
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We agree that requiring appellate courts to first

attempt to reconcile an inconsistent jury verdict is 

appropriate. Moreover, a reviewing court advances important 

public policy considerations when it attempts to preserve a

jury’s seemingly inconsistent verdict before vacatur. “Public 

policy demands that the sanctity of jury deliberations be 

vigorously guarded to ensure frankness and open discussion. The 

purpose for providing secret deliberations is to ensure the 

impartiality of the jury.” Oahu Publ’ns, Inc. v. Ahn, 133 

Hawai‘i 482, 498-99, 331 P.3d 460, 476-77 (2014) (brackets, 

quotation marks, and citations omitted)). Accordingly, the jury 

trial process is structured so as to preserve the integrity of 

jury deliberations. Cf. Pierce, 940 F.3d at 823 (“Courts have 

always resisted inquiry into a jury’s thought processes.” 

(citing United States v. Powell, 469 U.S. 57, 67 (1984)). The 

requirement that an appellate court search for any reasonable 

way to reconcile a jury’s verdicts serves to avoid speculation 

into the jury’s confidential deliberations and to safeguard the 

result of those deliberations, if at all possible. Indeed, in 

protecting the sanctity of a jury’s verdict, other courts –

including the United States Supreme Court - take a more 

restrictive approach and will not consider an appeal of a jury’s 

verdict solely because of alleged inconsistencies. Dunn v. 

United States, 284 U.S. 390, 393 (1932) (“Consistency in the 
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verdict is not necessary.”); see also Harris v. Rivera, 454 U.S. 

339, 345 (1981) (recognizing that “[i]nconsistency in a verdict 

is not a sufficient reason for setting it aside.” (citations 

omitted)); Beattie v. State, 924 N.E.2d 643, 649 (Ind. 2010) 

(“Jury verdicts in criminal cases are not subject to appellate 

review on grounds that they are inconsistent, contradictory, or 

irreconcilable.”). We do not endorse the view that inconsistent 

verdicts are per se unreviewable. Rather, a court tasked with 

determining the effect of an inconsistent verdict should 

“attempt to harmonize” the inconsistencies in the verdict so 

that they are reconcilable. Pierce, 940 F.3d at 821. However,

we point to Dunn and similar cases to highlight the sanctity 

with which a jury verdict is treated in American law, and 

appellate courts’ general unwillingness to speculate as to the 

jurors’ thought processes. Consistent with these principles, 

our rule respects the jury’s verdict when possible, which can be 

done when the record supports a reasonable way to harmonize 

seemingly-inconsistent verdicts.

The dissents instead would conclude that “[a] verdict 

in a criminal case should be certain and devoid of ambiguity.” 

Wilson, J., Dissent at 26 (citing Yeager v. People, 462 P.2d 

487, 489 (Colo. 1969)); see also McKenna, J., Dissent at 3. 

Respectfully, the dissents misconstrue the language in Yeager, 

which is not in conflict with this opinion. In Yeager, the 
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defendant was charged with, relevant here, the unlawful sale of 

narcotics “with the intent to induce and aid another to 

unlawfully use and possess narcotic drugs[.]” Id. at 487. 

However, the jury “declined to sign either of the [verdict] 

forms provided by the court, and proceed[ed] to” prepare and 

sign their own verdict form which stated: “We, the jury, duly 

empaneled and sworn in the above entitled cause, do upon our 

oaths, find the defendant guilty of unlawfully and feloniously 

selling a narcotic drug as charged in the first count[.]” Id.

at 488. The Colorado Supreme Court vacated Yeager’s conviction, 

concluding that “the verdict prepared . . . by the jury relating 

to count one is at best, . . . unclear as to whether the jury 

was finding that the defendant not only sold a narcotic drug but 

also possessed” intent to induce and aid another to unlawfully 

use and possess narcotics. Id. at 489. Thus, the jury’s 

verdict was ambiguous, in that it “did not include all the

essential elements of the offense charged.” Id. at 488. But 

Colorado law is also clear that “consistency of verdicts is not

required.” People v. Frye, 898 P.2d 559, 560 (Colo. 1995).13 In

 13 In fact, in Frye, the Supreme Court of Colorado concluded that 

the verdicts were irreconcilable but, adopting the federal rule, nonetheless 

allowed them to stand. 898 P.2d at 566 (“We reject such an implausible 

explanation and conclude that the verdicts are indeed inconsistent.”); id. at 

570 (upholding the inconsistent verdict). The court reasoned that “an 

individualized assessment of the reason for the inconsistency would be based 

either on pure speculation, or would require inquiries into the jury’s 

deliberations that courts generally will not undertake.” Id. at 569 (quoting 

Powell, 469 U.S. at 66) (quotation marks omitted). 
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other words, verdicts may be devoid of ambiguity and

nevertheless be inconsistent.14

Here, Bringas’s verdict in Count I was free and devoid 

of ambiguity – the verdict clearly conveys the jury’s intention

to convict Bringas of second-degree murder. That Bringas and W 

entered a scuffle by mutual affray does not negate any element 

of that offense. 

We therefore conclude that Carr provides the correct 

standard, and the court is bound to “search for a reasonable way 

to read the verdicts as expressing a coherent view of the case, 

and must exhaust this effort” before granting a new trial. 79 

Hawai‘i at 489, 904 P.2d at 503 (citation omitted). 

 

14 In her dissent, Justice McKenna additionally cites Barnhill v. 

State, 41 So.2d 329 (Fla. 1949) and Hyslop v. State, 68 N.W.2d 698 (Neb. 

1955). McKenna, J. Dissent at 3. Respectfully, these cases are factually 

distinguishable and do not support as sweeping a rule as the dissent 

suggests. Barnhill involved the distinct question of whether, to convict a 

defendant of a repeat violation of a liquor law, the jury must explicitly 

find “the historical fact of the former conviction.” 41 So.2d at 331. While 

the Florida Supreme Court held that an explicit finding was required, it 

further explained that “with respect to jury verdicts in criminal cases 

generally the rule appears to be that while a verdict must be certain and 

impart a definite meaning free from ambiguity, all fair intendments should be 

made to sustain it.” Id. (emphasis added). Thus, the Florida Supreme Court 

recognized, as do we, that verdicts should be sustained when reasonably 

possible. Likewise, Hyslop involved a situation in which the jury returned a 

guilty verdict in open court, but the record contained a not-guilty verdict 

form that had been partially erased in an apparent attempt to “cancel”

it. 68 N.W.2d at 702. The Nebraska Supreme Court affirmed the guilty 

verdict, noting that “[a]ll presumptions exist in favor of the regularity and 

correctness of the orders and judgments of courts of general jurisdiction,”

and “[i]f, upon the whole record, so construed, it is clear beyond any 

reasonable doubt that the jury found the defendant . . . guilty of the charge 

contained in the indictment, the verdict is sufficiently definite.” Id. at 

701-02 (citations and quotation marks omitted) (emphasis added). Thus, 

although Hyslop is factually distinguishable from the instant case, it 

recognizes that verdicts should be evaluated in light of the entire record

before vacating them. 
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2. The Jury’s Inconsistent Verdict is Reconcilable

Bringas argues that the ICA erred in concluding that 

the jury’s inconsistent verdict in Count I was reconcilable. 

This argument is unpersuasive. Second-degree murder requires 

that the defendant “intentionally or knowingly causes the death 

of another person.” HRS § 707-701.5. Third-degree assault is a 

lesser included offense of second-degree murder, and the statute 

criminalizing third-degree assault includes the mitigating

defense of “mutual affray,” which reduces the offense to a petty 

misdemeanor: “Assault in the third degree is a misdemeanor 

unless committed in a fight or scuffle entered into by mutual 

consent, in which case it is a petty misdemeanor.” HRS § 707-

712(2). Mutual affray is not a defense to second-degree murder. 

Prescott testified that she saw Bringas and W fist 

fighting, then watched Bringas grab a shiny object from his 

backpack as W was running away, chase after W, and stab him. 

Similarly, R.K. testified that he saw W and Bringas punching 

each other, then saw W run away from Bringas; he further 

testified that he noticed a shiny object in Bringas’s hand. 

Given this testimony, the jury’s finding of guilty on the 

second-degree murder count is consistent with its finding that 

the State did not disprove the mutual affray defense to thirddegree assault. Prescott and R.K.’s testimonies support the 

conclusion that W and Bringas entered into the initial fight by 
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mutual consent and that Bringas then chased after W and stabbed 

him, rendering Bringas guilty of second-degree murder. The 

jury’s findings that there was a mutual affray and that Bringas 

subsequently committed second-degree murder were consistent, and 

the jury’s verdicts are thus reconcilable.15 

The jury could reasonably conclude both that there was 

a mutual affray and that the circumstances of the mutual affray 

were not such that Bringas could reasonably believe that deadly 

force was necessary to protect himself. Indeed, the text of the 

jury’s verdicts indicates they concluded exactly that. 

Regardless of how the altercation between Bringas and W began, 

the jury’s guilty verdict on second-degree murder supports the 

conclusion that the defendant used unjustifiable force to finish 

that altercation.16 

 15 Although the jury’s verdict as to Count II are not challenged on 

appeal since Bringas was acquitted, those, too, reflect a similarly coherent 

view of the evidence. Prescott testified that just after the altercation 

between Bringas and W, she pointed out Bringas to C.U., W’s brother, and C.U. 

grabbed Bringas. Prescott further testified that Bringas stabbed C.U. during 

the fight that ensued. Similarly, R.K. testified that he pointed out Bringas 

to C.U., saw C.U. hit Bringas with an object, and then saw the two of them 

fight before C.U. walked away; he later learned that C.U. had been stabbed. 

Thus, the evidence supported the jury’s finding that the prosecution had 

disproved mutual affray with regard to C.U. Bringas did not mutually enter 

into the fight with C.U.; rather, C.U. grabbed him. However, the jury could 

have chosen to credit Bringas’s contention that he stabbed C.U. in selfdefense after C.U. grabbed him, and thus acquitted Bringas of second-degree 

assault with respect to C.U. 

16 In his dissent, Justice Wilson suggests that answering the 

special interrogatory supports the idea “that the jury similarly 

misunderstood the self-defense instruction in Count 1 and mistakenly assumed 

self-defense would apply only if . . . the State proved beyond a reasonable 

doubt that W, not Bringas initiated the altercation.” Wilson, J., Dissent at 

25-26. However, recognizing the “sanctity of jury deliberations,” Oahu 
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The Colorado Court of Appeals came to a similar 

conclusion in People v. Brooks. There, the jury found the 

defendant guilty of “menacing” – an element of which is the use 

of a deadly weapon – but returned a special interrogatory 

finding that the defendant “did not use, or threaten the use of, 

a deadly weapon” during the burglary for which he was also 

charged. 471 P.3d at 1173. These verdicts were reconcilable 

because, “[b]ased on the evidence at trial, the jury could well 

have determined that, though [the defendant] did not have a 

weapon when he entered the home, once inside he obtained the 

weapon from somewhere inside the home and then threatened the 

victim with it.” Id. at 1176. Nothing about the jury’s 

response to the special interrogatory “negate[d] any element of 

the offense of menacing.” Id. at 1177. 

United States v. Pierce is also instructive. There, 

the district court had set aside a guilty verdict for conspiracy 

to possess with intent to distribute four types of narcotics and 

concluded that the conviction was inconsistent with the jury’s 

findings on a special interrogatory form concerning the weight 

of the narcotics; the jury had marked that the government had 

“not proven” that the defendant “conspired to possess with 

 

Publ’ns, Inc., 133 Hawai‘i at 498, 331 P.3d at 477, we resist “inquiry into 

[the] jury’s thought processes” in reaching its verdict, Pierce, 940 F.3d at 

823, and there is nothing in the record here to suggest the jury was confused 

about self-defense. 
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intent to distribute” the four narcotics. Pierce, 940 F.3d at 

819. The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit 

affirmed, concluding that the verdicts were “metaphysically 

impossible to reconcile.” Id. at 824 (citation and quotation 

marks omitted). In so holding, the court recognized, “To enter 

a guilty verdict, the court would have needed to overlook the 

special verdict findings that [the defendant] did not conspire 

to distribute any of the drugs at issue in the case.” Id. at 

823 (quoting United States v. Shippley, 690 F.3d 1192, 1195 

(10th Cir. 2012)). In other words, the special interrogatory 

was irreconcilable with the general verdict because it was 

impossible to “give[] full effect” to both. Shippley, 690 F.3d 

at 1195. 

The general verdict and special interrogatory in this 

case do not present a “metaphysical impossib[ility],” Pierce, 

940 F.3d at 824, but instead resemble the verdict at issue in 

Brooks. While the jury’s finding that Bringas and W entered 

into a mutual affray would have reduced the third-degree assault 

charge to a petty misdemeanor, “the response to the special 

interrogatory regarding [mutual affray] did not negate any 

element of the offense of [second-degree murder].” Brooks, 471 

P.3d at 1177. And because the evidence supports that the jury 

“could well have determined” that the confrontation began as 

mutual affray but ended in second-degree murder, it is possible 
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to “give[] full effect” to both the special interrogatory and

the general verdict based on the evidence in this case. 

Shippley, 690 F.3d at 1195. The verdict is not irreconcilably 

inconsistent.

V. CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, we hold that the circuit 

court did not abuse its discretion in dismissing the jury 

without first having them rectify the inconsistent jury verdict, 

or by denying Bringas’s motion for a new trial. Accordingly, 

the ICA’s November 13, 2018 judgment on appeal is affirmed. 

Phyllis J. Hironaka /s/ Mark E. Recktenwald

for petitioner

/s/ Paula A. Nakayama

Sonja P. McCullen

for respondent /s/ Gary W.B. Chang