Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 19A-CR-2286 | February 14, 2020 Page 1 of 15

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D), 

this Memorandum Decision shall not be 

regarded as precedent or cited before any 

court except for the purpose of establishing 

the defense of res judicata, collateral 

estoppel, or the law of the case.

ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT

Yvette M. LaPlante

LaPlante LLP

Evansville, Indiana

ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE

Curtis T. Hill, Jr.

Attorney General of Indiana

J.T. Whitehead

Deputy Attorney General

Indianapolis, Indiana

IN THE

COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA

Willie Steverson,

Appellant-Defendant,

v.

State of Indiana,

Appellee-Plaintiff.

February 14, 2020

Court of Appeals Case No.

19A-CR-2286

Appeal from the Vanderburgh 

Circuit Court

The Honorable Gary Schutte, 

Magistrate

Trial Court Cause No.

82C01-1905-F5-3719

Brown, Judge.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 19A-CR-2286 | February 14, 2020 Page 2 of 15

[1] Willie Steverson appeals his conviction for battery as a level 5 felony. He raises 

two issues: 

I. Whether the trial court abused its discretion in excluding evidence of 

the victim’s pending CHINS case; and

II. Whether the court abused its discretion in instructing the jury.

We affirm.

Facts and Procedural History

[2] On May 17, 2019, B.C. was walking home and encountered Steverson, whom

she had been dating on and off for three years. Steverson was hostile at first

and called her a “b----,” and B.C. went with him inside an apartment located 

near the intersection where they had met. Inside, “[e]veryone was getting 

high,” Steverson immediately pulled out a pipe, and he and B.C. began 

smoking methamphetamine. Transcript Volume II at 41. At some point, 

Steverson requested that he and B.C. go for a walk, and as they left, she did not 

have her cellphone. The pair walked down an alley, Steverson “kept saying, 

baby you know I love you right, you know I love you,” and B.C. “just got a sick 

feeling” in her stomach. Id. at 43. Upon entering a side door of an abandoned 

residence, “[i]t just turned all bad,” Steverson became angry and told B.C. that 

he saw messages on her phone and thought she was cheating on him, and B.C. 

grew frantic. Id. at 44. Steverson dragged her to a hallway, hit her, called her a 

“wh---” and a maggot, and stated that he should kill her. Id. He pulled her 

hair, dragged her into a bedroom, and smacked her with an open fist. She saw 

someone in the neighbor’s yard, and when she fell into a closet, Steverson said, 
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“B----, if you do not, if you don’t be quite [sic],” and “I’m going to lock you in 

this closet and catch this house on fire.” Id. at 45-46. He entered the closet, 

closed the door, and hit her again with an open fist. She pled with him that she 

could not breathe, they exited the closet, and he hit her with a closed fist

because she told him she did not cheat on him. Steverson then accused B.C. of 

stealing a pipe, she explained she did not have anything of his on her, and for 

the subsequent thirty to forty-five minutes, he smoked while she searched for 

the pipe. At some point, he choked her with his hands and “kept hitting” her 

head with a metal flashlight. Id. at 49. Giving up on searching for the pipe, 

they exited the house from the back door, and Steverson said, “B----, don’t 

make a scene.” Id. at 47.

[3] After cutting through the backyard and alley, B.C. saw some people down the 

street, screamed, and “made a scene hollering about [her] cellphone and took 

off” to her house. Id. at 49. When she arrived, her roommate noticed her 

demeanor and stopped her, and B.C. broke down, explained what had 

happened, and called the police. Evansville Police Officer Jeff Worthington 

responded to the dispatch, found B.C. distraught, crying, and hyperventilating, 

and called an ambulance, which took her to the hospital. Evansville Police 

Detective Brian Turpin met with her at the hospital, and the police took 

photographs of her injuries. Detective Turpin later interviewed Steverson at the 

police department after advising him of his Miranda rights, and the interview 

was recorded.
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[4] On May 28, 2019, the State charged Steverson with battery as a level 5 felony,

and the information explained that the charge was enhanced to a level 5 felony 

because he was convicted and sentenced for domestic battery with moderate 

bodily injury on January 16, 2019, in cause number 82C01-1808-F6-5815. On 

June 15, 2019, the State added a count of attempted invasion of privacy as a 

level 6 felony, to which Steverson later pled guilty.

[5] On July 24, 2019, the State filed several motions in limine, including one that 

moved the court to prevent Steverson from offering into evidence, or making 

reference to any evidence of, B.C.’s “illicit drug use prior to [] May 17, 2019, 

and any evidence of pending or closed CHINS matters” involving her. 

Appellant’s Appendix Volume II at 39. Following a hearing and argument, the 

court took the motion under advisement and indicated concern and preference 

that, “before going into anything with the CHINS case” or “anything gets 

slippery or out of control,” a hearing outside the presence of the jury would be 

held to clarify the direction of the testimony. Transcript Volume II at 22-23. A 

chronological case summary administrative event entry for July 29, 2019, states: 

“State[’]s Motions in Limine are granted pending testimony given.” Appellant’s 

Appendix Volume II at 11.

[6] During the jury trial, the State called B.C. as a witness, and she recounted the 

incident of May 17, 2019. She answered affirmatively when asked if she smoked 

meth while in the apartment and stated that she smoked once while in the 

abandoned residence before being accused of stealing from Steverson. After the 

court admitted pictures of B.C. and her injuries as State’s Exhibits 1-28 and the 
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State ended its direct examination, Steverson’s counsel made an offer of proof 

and examined B.C. outside of the jury’s presence. B.C. answered affirmatively 

when asked whether, at the time of the incident, she had a pending CHINS 

matter related to one of her children, whether she was participating in CHINS 

drug court, and whether there were rules about testing positive or using illicit 

drugs. She indicated that she was in court sometime before May 17th and that 

the court held her in contempt but suspended the executed sentence. When 

asked if that was for a violation, she answered affirmatively, and when asked

further about the violation, she stated: “I wasn’t doing what I was supposed to be 

doing” and “wasn’t doing my drops,” or her drug tests. Transcript Volume II at 

53. She agreed with statements of Steverson’s counsel that “smoking 

methamphetamine would have triggered another violation report” and that, from 

her perspective, when “the CHINS court says, I’m going to hold you in contempt 

for not doing, not following the rules, was it kind of I’m going to give you one 

last chance.” Id. When Steverson’s counsel added, “Before I put you in jail,” 

B.C. stated, “Yeah, I’ve been on thin ice for awhile with them.” Id. She agreed 

further with his counsel’s statements that she had a “pretty big” interest to not 

test positive and that she believed that she was “probably going to go to jail.” Id.

at 54. When asked if she believed that she would lose custody of her children, 

she stated, “No.” Id.

[7] When the prosecutor was asked to respond to the offer of proof, the following 

exchange occurred:
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THE STATE[]: [B.C.], what the result, so that’s in April, May 

17th happens, you admittedly smoke meth, what happens at your 

next appearance in CHINS Drug Court?

A Their exact words were they put me in jail to get me off the 

street, to get me clean and for my safety.

THE STATE[]: And how long were you in jail for that sanction?

A One week, and then I went to Stepping Stone.

THE STATE[]: And, when you say you went to Stepping Stone, 

was that inpatient treatment or outpatient treatment?

A Inpatient.

THE STATE[]: Inpatient treatment. At the time of the staying 

the executed sentence for contempt to the time of this incident,

you did not believe that you were going to lose your kids if you 

dropped dirty, is that correct?

A No.

THE STATE[]: Okay. Did you make any of this story up to

avoid the CHINS Drug Court sanction?

A No.

THE STATE[]: Did they ask you, did they drug test you and you 

drop dirty, or did you just say, I smoked?

A I told them.

THE STATE[]: You told them?

A Yeah. I didn’t fail any drops.

Id. at 54-55. B.C. answered “90 days” when Steverson’s counsel asked if she 

remembered the amount of jail time she faced when they held her in contempt 
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but then suspended it. Id. at 56. When asked if, after she “disclosed all these 

events, the [c]ourt did not impose the full amount of the sentence,” she answered 

in the negative and stated: “I had a choice.” Id. She indicated that she did not 

ever deny to anyone that she had smoked meth. She answered affirmatively 

when Steverson’s counsel asked if she told Detective Turpin on May 17th she 

was forced to smoke meth and whether she told hospital staff she was forced to 

smoke meth, and she answered in the negative when asked if she told her case 

manager that she was forced to smoke meth. 

[8] Steverson’s counsel offered her testimony under Ind. Evidence Rule 616 and 

argued it was relevant and admissible, he believed a valid theory of defense to 

be that “she smokes meth, she knows that she’s on thin ice, she knows that 

she’s probably going to go to jail if she gets caught, and so as the [c]ourt is 

aware, when people have PTR’s, they’re going to try to come in with some 

reason, some excuse,” he was “sort of hamstrung to present a full theory of 

defense” if the jury was not informed that there was a penalty or a consequence 

to her smoking meth, and that she received “some benefit to the version she 

presented to the CHINS [c]ourt.” Id. at 60. In denying Steverson’s motion, the 

court stated that it did not know that “we’ve established that she has a particular 

bias” against Steverson, that “what drives the day” was that she was honest with 

the CHINS manager and still did receive executed time, and that “she didn’t get 

the full 90 days, but I don’t know that we can attribute that to anything.” Id. at 

61-62. After pointing to B.C.’s testimony that “she never thought she was going 

to lose her children,” it stated: “There’s a difference between irrelevant and 
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admissible evidence, it may be relevant, as [the State] touched on, there’s a lot of 

relevant information, it does open up a pandora’s box of issues.” Id. at 62. 

[9] During testimony from Detective Turpin, clips from his interview with 

Steverson were admitted as State’s Exhibits 86 and 87. When it was published 

to the jury, State’s Exhibit 86 consisted of the following: 

[Steverson]: I’m telling you the truth man, we got, okay we got 

(inaudible) each other though, it wasn’t nothing like that, she 

(inaudible) she’s going to do that (inaudible).

DETECTIVE TURPIN: So, what happened, what happened, 

what did she do to you that caused you to do that?

[Steverson]: Well, I don’t know man, got in this argument and 

got in a f---ing fight man, you know what I’m saying.

DETECTIVE TURPIN: So, where are your injuries?

[Steverson]: What do you mean?

DETECTIVE TURPIN: Where are your injuries?

[Steverson]: Injuries.

DETECTIVE TURPIN: Injuries, yeah, what did she do to you, 

so if you have a mutual, if you and I, if we take the cuffs off, I’m 

not going to do this, this is not a threat in any way, if we take the 

cuffs off, even though I’m seriously old, when we leave here, if 

we decide to go at it, even though I’m seriously old, you’re going 

to have injuries, I’m going to have injuries. You’re a lot younger 

than me and probably in a lot better shape, so I’m probably going 

to have more injuries, but you’re going to have some injuries, I 

guarantee you, because that’s what a mutual fight does, that’s 

what I’m trying to tell you. I keep telling you I know this story 

inside and out and I need you to understand I get it man, you 

found out she’s cheating on you, you get fired up about that, 
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people do all the time, it’s understandable. I’m not saying that 

that makes you an awful person. 

[Steverson]: She got (inaudible), so I told her, she’s got to run, 

(inaudible) and I’m like listen man, (inaudible), stop hitting me 

man, you know, get the f--- off of me and stop hitting me, but it 

wasn’t until she had, it wasn’t until she had (inaudible).

Id. at 103-104. State’s Exhibit 87 was published to the jury and contained 

Steverson’s statement that “(Inaudible) some little small domestic a-- b---s---.” 

Id. At the end of the trial, Steverson’s counsel proposed a final instruction on 

the use of force to protect person or property based on “IN Pattern Instruction 

No. 10.0300, I.C. 35-41-3-2,” Appellant’s Appendix Volume II at 64, stated 

that, in the interview shown in State’s Exhibit 86, Steverson “says you know, 

well she gets rowdy, she jumped on me and I just sort of, and did like a hand 

motion of pushing her off,” and argued that there was evidence, “if she jumps 

on him first, despite the lack of injuries,” that pushing B.C. off was acting in 

self-defense. Transcript Volume II at 114. The State objected and argued that 

allowing the self-defense instruction and permitting him to argue self-defense in 

closing “opens the door to [Ind. Evidence Rule] 404(b).” Id. The court 

declined to give the instruction, stating in part: 

I think that the measuring stick is the evidence that was heard in 

the case. The only evidence that is arguably or questionably

could be construed as in favor of self-defense was his own 

statement which he said he pushed her away from him. I don’t 

think that that indicates that she was an initial aggressor. There’s 

no evidence he had any injuries . . . .
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Id. at 115. 

[10] The jury found Steverson guilty of battery as a class B misdemeanor, he 

admitted to the enhancement to a level 5 felony, and the court sentenced him to 

five years for the level 5 felony to be served concurrently with a one-year 

sentence for the level 6 felony for attempted invasion of privacy.

Discussion

I.

[11] The first issue is whether the trial court abused its discretion in excluding 

evidence of B.C.’s pending CHINS case. The admission and exclusion of 

evidence falls within the sound discretion of the trial court, and we review the 

admission of evidence only for abuse of discretion. Wilson v. State, 765 N.E.2d

1265, 1272 (Ind. 2002). An abuse of discretion occurs “where the decision is 

clearly against the logic and effect of the facts and circumstances.” Smith v. 

State, 754 N.E.2d 502, 504 (Ind. 2001). 

[12] Steverson argues that the trial court erred in failing to admit evidence of the 

“potential consequences that smoking methamphetamine would have in [B.C.’s] 

pending CHINS case,” Appellant’s Brief at 11, under a theory that B.C. had a 

motive to lie to obtain a leaner consequence; that is, she “had reason to make 

herself look sympathetic to avoid jail time.” Appellant’s Reply Brief at 5. In 

support, he points to the fact that she did not receive the executed sentence she 

anticipated after admitting to smoking methamphetamine but was offered the 

option of completing an inpatient program instead. He argues the trial court 
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erred in making a factual determination about B.C.’s credibility rather than 

leaving that matter for the jury, and he contends that the State, in failing to argue 

that the testimony does not demonstrate an interest of B.C. to pin her “decision 

to smoke methamphetamine on pressure from Steve[r]son, rather than her own 

personal choice,” concedes the consideration of relevancy. Appellant’s Brief at 

12. 

[13] He relies upon Mitchell v. State, in which this Court stated in a footnote: 

“A witness’s bias, prejudice or ulterior motives are always 

relevant at trial in that they may discredit her or affect the weight 

of her testimony.” Dyson v. State, 692 N.E.2d 1374, 1376 (Ind.

Ct. App. 1998) (interpreting Ind. Evidence Rule 616). However, 

Mitchell concedes on appeal that he did not offer the CHINS 

evidence for the purposes identified in Evidence Rule 616.[1]

730 N.E.2d 197, 197 n.4 (Ind. Ct. App. 2000), trans. denied. He claims that, had 

Mitchell’s counsel offered the evidence in question under Ind. Evidence Rule 

616, the testimony would have been admissible and that Mitchell’s motives are 

no different than those presented here; i.e., B.C.’s motive to identify Steverson as 

the aggressor to receive more lenient treatment in the CHINS matter. 

[14] The State maintains that the facts do not support Steverson’s defense theory. It 

argues that she was completely honest and admitted to her methamphetamine 

1 Ind. Evidence Rule 616 specifies that “[e]vidence that a witness has a bias, prejudice, or interest for or against 

any party may be used to attack the credibility of the witness.”
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use and that it did not give rise to a motive for dishonesty “in the case of B.C.’s 

relationship with CHINS,” where “she admitted her drug use to CHINS and 

did not expect parent-time repercussions.” Appellee’s Brief at 12. It further 

argues that the drug use, which had nothing to do with the injuries Steverson 

inflicted on B.C., was irrelevant and inadmissible.

[15] We note that Ind. Evidence Rule 616 provides for the admission of evidence 

showing bias or prejudice of a witness without any qualifications. See Ingram v. 

State, 715 N.E.2d 405, 407 (Ind. 1999). However, it “should be read in 

conjunction with Rule 403’s required balancing of probative value against the 

danger of unfair prejudice.” Id. Ind. Evidence Rule 403 provides that 

“[a]lthough relevant, evidence may be excluded if its probative value is 

substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the 

issues, or misleading the jury, or by considerations of undue delay, or needless 

presentation of cumulative evidence.” 

[16] The record reveals that, during the offer of proof, B.C. indicated that, at the time 

of the incident, she had a pending CHINS matter relating to one child and was 

participating in CHINS drug court. She indicated a court held her in contempt 

for a violation sometime before May 17th but suspended the executed sentence. 

When asked about the violation, she stated that she was not doing what she was 

supposed to be doing and was not participating in drug tests. B.C. testified that 

she served seven days and then received inpatient treatment. 
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[17] While B.C. stated she had been on “thin ice for awhile” and agreed with various 

statements of Steverson’s counsel regarding an interest to not obtain a positive 

drug test because, as he suggested, it would trigger an additional violation report, 

she indicated she had not believed she would lose custody of her children, had 

not fabricated a story to avoid the sanction of the CHINS drug court, and had 

never denied smoking methamphetamine to anyone. When asked whether she 

tested positive or whether she “just sa[id], I smoked,” she answered: “I told 

them.” Transcript Volume II at 55. 

[18] To the extent Steverson argues that the testimony about the potential 

consequences in B.C.’s pending CHINS case is relevant to the charge facing him, 

we note the court found that he had not established a particular bias that B.C. 

held against him and that it could not attribute her receipt of less than the full 

ninety-day sanction to anything. We further observe that, while B.C. indicated

she told Detective Turpin and the hospital staff at an earlier time that she was 

forced to smoke meth, Steverson does not point to the record to indicate that 

B.C. told persons involved in the CHINS case that he forced her to smoke. We

conclude under these circumstances that the court did not err or abuse its 

discretion in excluding the evidence of B.C.’s CHINS case.

II.

[19] The next issue is whether the trial court abused its discretion by rejecting the 

proposed jury instruction on the use of force to protect person or property. 

Steverson maintains the evidence supported the tendering of the instruction. He
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asserts defense counsel based the request “from a video clip in which Steverson 

told the detective he was pushing B.C. off of him.” Appellant’s Brief at 18 (citing 

Transcript Volume II at 113). He argues that the court made an erroneous

factual determination in deciding his statement during the interview did not 

indicate B.C. was the initial aggressor. He further argues: the “court concedes” 

that the instruction was supported by the evidence; the court did not address 

whether the instruction was a correct statement of the law or whether it was 

repeated by another instruction; and the prosecutor did not object that the 

defense failed to meet the required elements for tendering a jury instruction. Id.

at 19. 

[20] The State responds the record lacks evidence that B.C. was an initial aggressor

or that Steverson feared for his life, safety, or health. It contends the evidence 

demonstrates that “the victim’s injuries were visible, and [Steverson] showed no 

signs of injury.” Appellee’s Brief at 15 (citing State’s Exhibits 1-28, 86-87). It 

further maintains that the decision to reject the instruction was harmless and 

did not affect Steverson’s rights “given the large bulk of evidence rebutting any 

false claim to self-defense.” Id. at 16. 

[21] The purpose of an instruction is “to inform the jury of the law applicable to the 

facts without misleading the jury and to enable it to comprehend the case 

clearly and arrive at a just, fair, and correct verdict.” Overstreet v. State, 783 

N.E.2d 1140, 1163 (Ind. 2003), cert. denied, 540 U.S. 1150, 124 S. Ct. 1145 

(2004). Instruction of the jury is generally within the discretion of the trial court 

and is reviewed only for an abuse of that discretion. Id. at 1163-1164. A trial 
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court erroneously refuses to give a tendered instruction, or part of one, if: (1) the 

instruction correctly sets out the law; (2) evidence supports the giving of the 

instruction; and (3) the substance of the tendered instruction is not covered by 

the other instructions given. See id. at 1164. Before a defendant is entitled to a 

reversal, he must affirmatively show that the erroneous instruction prejudiced 

his substantial rights. Lee v. State, 964 N.E.2d 859, 862 (Ind. Ct. App. 2012) 

(citing Gantt v. State, 825 N.E.2d 874, 877 (Ind. Ct. App. 2005)), trans. denied. 

[22] As set out above, it is Steverson’s burden to demonstrate that the evidence 

supported giving the instruction. Steverson points only to his response to 

Detective Turpin’s inquiry into his injuries. We agree with the trial court that 

his statement does not indicate that B.C. was the initial aggressor. Based on the 

record, we cannot say that Steverson has demonstrated he was protecting 

himself from what he reasonably believed to be the imminent use of unlawful 

force. See Dixson v. State, 22 N.E.3d 836, 839 (Ind. Ct. App. 2014) (“When a 

case does not involve deadly force, a defendant claiming self-defense must show 

that he was protecting himself from what he ‘reasonably believe[d] to be the 

imminent use of unlawful force.’”) (quoting Ind. Code § 35-41-3-2(c)), trans. 

denied. We find that the trial court did not err or abuse its discretion in 

declining to give the proposed instruction.

[23] For the foregoing reasons, we affirm Steverson’s conviction.

[24] Affirmed.

Baker, J., and Riley, J., concur.