NOT FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 

Plaintiff-Appellee, 

 v. 

ANGEL REYES-TORRES, 

Defendant-Appellant.

No. 19-50045 

D.C. No. 3:18-cr-04986-LAB-1 

MEMORANDUM*

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Southern District of California

Larry A. Burns, District Judge, Presiding

Submitted October 15, 2019**

Before: FARRIS, LEAVY, and RAWLINSON, Circuit Judges. 

Angel Reyes-Torres appeals from the district court’s judgment and 

challenges the 18-month sentence, three-year term of supervised release, and three 

conditions of supervised release imposed following his guilty-plea conviction for

being a removed alien found in the United States, in violation of 8 U.S.C. § 1326. 

* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent 

except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.

** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision 

without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).

FILED

OCT 23 2019

MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK

U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
2 19-50045 

We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, and we affirm in part and remand

with instructions.

Reyes-Torres contends that the district court erred by denying the parties’ 

joint recommendation for a fast-track departure under U.S.S.G. § 5K3.1. We 

review the denial of a fast-track departure only as part of our review of the overall 

substantive reasonableness of the sentence. See United States v. Rosales-Gonzales, 

801 F.3d 1177, 1180 (9th Cir. 2015).1 The district court did not abuse its 

discretion by imposing the 18-month sentence, which is substantively reasonable in 

light of the 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) sentencing factors and the totality of the 

circumstances, including Reyes-Torres’s significant immigration and criminal 

history. See Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 51 (2007). 

Reyes-Torres next contends that the district court erred by failing to 

calculate the Guidelines range for the supervised release term and by insufficiently

explaining its decision to impose a three-year term. We review for plain error, see 

United States v. Valencia-Barragan, 608 F.3d 1103, 1108 (9th Cir. 2010), and 

1 Contrary to Reyes-Torres’s argument, Rosales-Gonzales is not “clearly 

irreconcilable” with Molina-Martinez v. United States, 136 S. Ct. 1338 (2016). See 

Miller v. Gammie, 335 F.3d 889, 900 (9th Cir. 2003) (en banc). Thus, we remain 

bound by Rosales-Gonzales. The record belies Reyes-Torres’s contention that the 

district court denied the fast-track departure based on a blanket policy. Rather, the 

record reflects that the court properly declined to grant the departure based on the 

particular circumstances of Reyes-Torres’s case. See Rosales-Gonzales, 801 F.3d 

at 1183-84.
3 19-50045 

conclude that there is none. On this record, Reyes-Torres has not shown a 

reasonable probability that he would have received a different sentence had the 

district court expressly calculated the applicable Guidelines range or more fully 

explained its decision to impose the three-year term of supervised release. See 

United States v. Dallman, 533 F.3d 755, 762 (9th Cir. 2008).

Finally, the government concedes, and we agree, that conditions 4, 7, and 8 

in the written judgment conflict with the oral pronouncement of sentence, which 

did not include these nonstandard conditions. See United States v. Napier, 463 

F.3d 1040, 1042 (9th Cir. 2006). We thus remand and instruct the district court to 

strike conditions 4, 7, and 8 from the written judgment. See United States v. Hicks, 

997 F.2d 594, 597 (9th Cir. 1993).

AFFIRMED in part; REMANDED with instructions.