1996 Decisions

Opinions of the United

States Court of Appeals

for the Third Circuit

4-30-1996

United States v. Various Computers

Precedential or Non-Precedential:

Docket 95-3195,95-3378,95-3379

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Recommended Citation

"United States v. Various Computers" (1996). 1996 Decisions. Paper 205.

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1 

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 

FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 

____________________ 

NO. 95-3195/3378/3379 

_____________________ 

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 

 Appellee, 

v. 

VARIOUS COMPUTERS AND COMPUTER EQUIPMENT, 

PARIS FRANCIS LUNDIS, 

 Appellant. 

____________________ 

On Appeal from the United States District Court 

for the Western District of Pennsylvania 

D.C. No. 94-2090 

District Judge: Honorable William L. Standish 

____________________ 

Argued March 28, 1996 

Before: Greenberg, Roth, and Rosenn, Circuit Judges.

 (Filed April 30, l996) 

 _____________________ 

Frederick W. Thieman, U.S. Attorney 

Mary McKeen Houghton, Assistant U.S. Attorney (argued) 

633 U.S. Post Office and Courthouse 

Pittsburgh, PA 15219 

Counsel for Appellee 

Shelley Stark, Acting Federal Public Defender 

W. Penn Hackney, First Asst. Federal Public Defender 

Karen Sirianni Gerlach, Asst. Federal Public Defender (argued) 

415 Convention Tower 

960 Penn Avenue 

Pittsburgh, PA 15222 

Counsel for Appellant 
2 

______________________ 

OPINION OF THE COURT 

______________________ 

Rosenn, Circuit Judge.

 The primary, and in this circuit, novel, issue in this 

appeal is whether civil forfeiture, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. 

§981(a)(1)(C), constitutes punishment for double jeopardy 

purposes, when a court has already sentenced a defendant to 

imprisonment and the payment of restitution. Paris Francis 

Lundis pled guilty in the United States District Court for the 

Western District of Pennsylvania to one count of unauthorized use 

and possession of credit cards in violation of 18 U.S.C. 

§1029(a)(2) & (a)(3). In addition to a ten month prison sentence 

and three years of supervised release, the court ordered Lundis 

to pay $13,674.50 restitution, the value of several pieces of 

computer equipment fraudulently obtained by Lundis. Further, the 

court deemed the equipment to be proceeds of Lundis's crime, and 

thus forfeitable to the United States pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 981 

(a)(1)(C). The court issued a final order of forfeiture on March 

28, 1995. 

We conclude that we have jurisdiction and affirm.

I. 

 On September 21, 1994, Lundis pled guilty to Count I of a 

four count indictment charging him with unauthorized use and 
3 

possession of credit cards in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§1029(a)(2) 

and (a)(3). Lundis admitted that he stole the cards and used 

them to illegally purchase computers and computer equipment. The 

trial court sentenced him to ten months imprisonment, and ordered 

that he pay $13,674.50 in restitution to the store where he 

obtained the computers. 

 At the sentencing hearing, Lundis requested that the court 

allow him to keep the property in light of the court's 

requirement that he pay restitution.0 The Government argued that 

the computers were proceeds of Lundis's crime, and thus were 

subject to civil forfeiture pursuant to 18 U.S.C. §981(a)(1)(C).0 

The court denied Lundis's request for possession of the property, 

stating that the computers were forfeitable "as a matter of law." 

 On December 9, 1994, the Government instituted civil 

forfeiture proceedings in rem against the computers by filing a 

verified complaint for forfeiture. The Government contends that 

it personally served a warrant of arrest and complaint for 

forfeiture against the computers upon Lundis at the Allegheny 

County Jail on February 1, 1995. Lundis timely filed a claim to 

 

0

Lundis contends that the computers contain personal material 

such as music scores. The Government asserts that the computers 

contain information on various stolen credit cards, as well as 

instructions on how to "clone" a cellular phone. 

0

Section 981 provides, in pertinent part, for the civil 

forfeiture to the United States of: 

(a)(1)(C) Any property, real or personal, which 

constitutes or is derived from proceeds traceable to a 

violation of Section ... 1029 ... of this title .... 

18 U.S.C. § 981. 
4 

the computers and an answer to the Government's complaint, along 

with a motion to proceed in forma pauperis and for appointment of 

counsel. 

 The Government opposed Lundis's request to proceed in forma 

pauperis and his request for counsel. It also filed a motion to 

dismiss Lundis's claim. In the motion to dismiss, the Government 

asserted that Lundis's claim to the computers was defective 

because it was not verified as required by Supplemental Rule C(6) 

for Certain Admiralty and Maritime Claims ("Rule C(6)"). Lundis 

timely filed a response in opposition to the Government's motion 

to dismiss, admitting that his claim was neither verified nor 

properly served, but asserting that the procedural defects were 

due to his pro se and prison status. The district court 

dismissed Lundis's claim and entered a Judgment and Final Order 

of Forfeiture on March 28, 1995, in favor of the United States. 

 Throughout these proceedings, Lundis filed many documents 

pro se with the district court, including three "Notices of 

Appeal."0 Lundis filed motions for leave to appeal in forma 

pauperis and for appointment of counsel with this court, and this 

court granted the motions.0 

II. 

 

0

His first notice attempted to appeal from the district court's 

March 20, 1995 order: (1) denying Lundis's motion for 

appointment of counsel; (2) denying Lundis's motion to proceed in 

forma pauperis; and (3) dismissing Lundis's claim to the 

computers. 

0

This court first dismissed Lundis's appeal for failure to timely 

prosecute, then vacated the dismissal and reinstated the appeal. 
5 

 The Government raises jurisdictional issues contending that 

Lundis has not appealed from the final order of forfeiture. We 

have plenary review over questions of jurisdiction. See Anthuis 

v. Colt Indus. Operating Corp., 971 F.2d 999, 1002 (3rd Cir. 

1992). 

 The district court's dismissal of Lundis's claim to the 

property had the effect of denying him standing, and thus barred 

him from appealing the final forfeiture order. Without a 

colorable claim to the computers, Lundis lacked standing to 

challenge the forfeiture proceedings. Thus, as a threshold 

question, we must address whether the court properly denied 

Lundis's pro se motion to intervene in the forfeiture 

proceedings. 

A. 

 Rule C(6) requires a claimant to property in a civil 

forfeiture to file a verified claim with the district court. The 

rule provides, in relevant part: 

(6) Claim and Answer; Interrogatories. The claimant of 

property that is the subject of an action in rem shall 

file a claim within 10 days after process has been 

executed, or within such additional time as may be 

allowed by the court . . . . The claim shall be 

verified on oath or solemn affirmation, and shall state 

the interest in the property by virtue of which the 

claimant demands its restitution and the right to 

defend this action. 

Supplemental Rule C(6) for Certain Admiralty and Maritime Claims 

(emphasis added). 
6 

 After the Government initiated forfeiture proceedings, 

Lundis duly filed a "Claim and Cost Bond and Affidavit in forma 

pauperis" in which he asserted that the computer equipment the 

Government confiscated rightfully belonged to him. This claim 

conformed to the rules in every respect except it lacked a 

verification. 

 The purpose of Rule C(6) is to require claimants to come 

forward as quickly as possible after the initiation of forfeiture 

proceedings, so that the court may hear all interested parties 

and resolve the dispute without delay. See United States v. 1982 

Yukon Delta Houseboat, 774 F.2d 1432, 1436 (9th Cir. 1985). The 

Rule requires claims to be verified upon oath or solemn 

affirmation to minimize the danger of false claims. Id. We 

understand the importance of these goals. On the facts of this 

case, however, a verification by Lundis, as we note below, would 

have been superfluous. 

 The fundament of Lundis's claim to ownership of the 

computers is his obligation to make restitution to the owners of 

the computer equipment. This order of restitution came from the 

district court. Both the court and the Government were aware of 

the source of Lundis's interest in the property and the basis for 

his claim of ownership. Thus, the verification would not have 

added to the authenticity of Lundis's petition. We therefore 

believe that it was error under these circumstances to reject 

Lundis's claim merely because of the absence of verification, 

especially in light of Lundis's pro se status and his lack of any 

knowledge of Rule C(6). 
7 

 With his colorable claim to ownership of the computers, we 

believe that Lundis had standing at least to challenge the 

forfeiture proceedings. See United States v. Property at 4492 S. 

Livonia Rd., Livonia, 889 F.2d 1258, 1262 (2nd Cir. 1989); see 

also United States v. $38,000 in United States Currency, 816 F.2d 

1538, 1544 (11th Cir. 1987) ("A claimant need not own the 

property in order to have standing to contest its forfeiture; a 

lessor property interest, such as a possessory interest, is 

sufficient for standing."). We do not believe that we may 

equitably deny Lundis standing where his actions have not 

thwarted the goals of Rule C(6). See United States v. One Urban 

Lot Located at 1 Street A-1, 885 F.2d 994, 1001 (1st Cir. 1989); 

Property at 4492 S. Livonia, 889 F.2d at 1262; 1982 Yukon Delta 

Houseboat, 774 F.2d at 1436. 

 To dismiss Lundis's claim for failure to include a verified 

statement would "contradict[] both old-fashioned common sense and 

the time-honored admiralty principle that pleadings and 

procedural practices in maritime actions should be applied 

liberally." One Urban Lot, 885 F.2d at 1001. Under the 

extraordinary circumstances we have here, an inability to timely 

appeal from the forfeiture of the disputed property because of 

the erroneous denial of standing, we will allow the defendant to 

appeal. 

III. 

 Whether the forfeiture of the computers violated the Double 

Jeopardy Clause is an interesting question of law subject to 
8 

plenary review. See United States v. Baird, 63 F.3d 1213, 1215 

(3rd Cir. 1995), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 116 S.Ct. 909 

(1996). 

 Although the Double Jeopardy Clause provides that no person 

"subject for the same offence to be twice put in jeopardy of life 

or limb," U.S. Const. amdt. 5, the Supreme Court has explained 

that the Clause "protects against three distinct abuses: a 

second prosecution for the same offense after acquittal; a second 

prosecution for the same offense after conviction; and multiple 

punishments for the same offense." See United States v. Halper, 

490 U.S. 435, 440 (1989). Lundis contends that the district 

court violated the prohibition against multiple punishments by 

first ordering him to pay restitution for the value of the 

computers, and later, in a subsequent forfeiture proceeding, 

allowing forfeiture of the computers to the United States. 

 The relevant inquiry for this court is whether the 

forfeiture procedures under 18 U.S.C. § 981 constitute punishment 

for double jeopardy purposes. See Halper, 490 U.S. at 441. 

Recent Supreme Court cases note that civil sanctions may 

constitute punishment in certain circumstances. See Austin v. 

United States, ___U.S.___, 113 S.Ct. 2801, 2812 (1993) (civil 

forfeiture pursuant to 21 U.S.C. § 881(a)(4) and (a)(7) 

constitute punishment); Halper, 490 U.S. at 447 ("the labels 

'criminal' and 'civil' are not of paramount importance" in 

assessing the punitive character of a statute). 

 In Halper, the trial court sentenced the defendant, Irwin 

Halper, to two years imprisonment and fined him $5,000 for 
9 

violating the criminal false claims statute, 18 U.S.C. § 287. 

The Government later proceeded against Halper under the civil 

False Claims Act, 31 U.S.C. §§ 3729-3731. The provisions of the 

civil Act provided for a penalty of $2,000 for each violation of 

the Act. Halper had violated the Act 65 times, and thus the 

Government contended he was subject to a penalty of more than 

$130,000. Halper, 490 U.S. at 438-39. 

 The district court in Halper refused to impose the full 

$130,000 penalty, finding that the full penalty would violate the 

Double Jeopardy Clause in light of Halper's previous criminal 

punishment. The district court determined that the penalty would 

constitute punishment unless it served a remedial purpose. 

Sanctions serving a remedial purpose make the Government whole 

for such costs as detection, investigation and prosecution of a 

criminal. See id. at 445, 449. The court in Halper found that 

the amount of the penalty was "entirely unrelated" and bore no 

"rational relation" to the actual damages incurred by the 

Government. Thus, it held that the $130,000 penalty would 

"punish" Halper a second time in violation of the Double Jeopardy 

Clause. The Supreme Court agreed. It noted that punishment 

serves the "twin aims of retribution and deterrence," and 

explained: 

[I]t follows that a civil sanction that cannot fairly 

be said solely to serve a remedial purpose, but rather 

can only be explained as also serving either 

retributive or deterrent purposes, is punishment, as we 

have come to understand the term. . . . We therefore 

hold that under the Double Jeopardy Clause a defendant 

who already has been punished in a criminal prosecution 

may not be subjected to an additional civil sanction to 

the extent that the second sanction may not fairly be 
10 

characterized as remedial, but only as a deterrent or 

retribution. 

Id. at 448-49.0

 In Austin, 113 S.Ct. 2901, the Court applied the Halper

analysis to the forfeiture provisions of 21 U.S.C. §§ 881(a)(4) 

and (a)(7), and found that those provisions constituted 

punishment for purposes of the Eighth Amendment's Excessive Fines 

Clause.0 The Court noted that, historically, forfeiture was 

understood to be a punishment. Further, the Court found that the 

statute's emphasis on the culpability of the party indicated a 

congressional intent to punish. The Court concluded that 

forfeiture provisions deemed to be partially or entirely punitive 

in nature constitute punishment. Id. at 2811-12. 

 It is important to note that Austin involved forfeiture 

proceedings pursuant to 21 U.S.C. § 881(a)(4) and (a)(7). These 

 

0

The court remanded the case to the trial court to determine "the 

size of the civil sanction the Government may receive without 

crossing the line between remedy and punishment." Id. at 450. 

0

21 U.S.C. § 881(a)(4) and (a)(7) provide, in relevant part: 

(a) The following shall be subject to forfeiture to the 

United States and no property right shall exist in them: 

(4) All conveyances, including aircraft, vehicles, or 

vessels, which are used, or are intended for use, to 

transport, or in any manner to facilitate the 

transportation, sale, receipt, possession, or 

concealment or [controlled substances]. 

 . . . 

(7) All real property . . . which is used, or intended 

to be used, in any manner or part, to commit, or to 

facilitate the commission of, a violation of this 

subchapter . . . . 
11 

statutes involve property that facilitates illegal activity, and 

thus run the danger of commanding forfeiture of items that bear a 

disproportionate relationship to the government's costs.0 See

Austin, 113 S. Ct. at 2812 n.14 ("The value of the conveyances 

and real property forfeitable under §§ 881 (a)(4) and (a)(7) . . 

. can vary so dramatically that any relation between the 

Government's actual costs and the amount of the sanction is 

merely coincidental."). We believe these statutes may be 

distinguished from the statute implicated in the instant case, 18 

U.S.C. § 981(a)(1)(C). In Section 981(a)(1)(C), the forfeitable 

property is limited to proceeds of the crime. At least two 

courts of appeals have distinguished the Supreme Court's decision 

in Austin as inapplicable to cases where the only property the 

government seizes are direct proceeds of an illegal act. See

United States v. Salinas, 65 F.3d 551, 553 (6th Cir. 1995); 

United States v. Tilley, 18 F.3d 295, 300 (5th Cir. 1994), reh'g 

denied, 22 F.3d 1096 (5th Cir. 1994), cert. denied ___ U.S. ___, 

115 S. Ct. 574 (1994). 

 Tilley involved, inter alia, a challenge to the forfeiture 

provisions of 21 U.S.C. §§ 881(a)(6) and (a)(7).0 The defendants 

sought dismissal of their criminal indictment for selling drugs, 

 

0

For example, the Government invokes these statutes to confiscate 

automobiles or real estate that a party may have used as a base 

to make a drug sale. 

0

Section 881(a)(6) provides for the forfeiture of all moneys, 

securities, etc. furnished in exchange for a controlled 

substance, or used to facilitate a violation of the drug laws. 

Section 881(a)(7), as discussed in footnote 8, provides for the 

forfeiture of real property. The court in Tilley deemed all the 

property forfeited to be proceeds of the defendants' crime. See

Tilley, 18 F.3d at 297 n. 2. 
12 

arguing that the prior civil forfeiture of the proceeds of the 

drug sales constituted punishment for double jeopardy purposes. 

The Fifth Circuit court of appeals found that the forfeited 

property constituted unlawful proceeds to be a crucial factor in 

its analysis. Id. at 298. It noted that, unlike the fines 

imposed in Halper, the forfeiture of proceeds bore a rational 

relationship to the costs to the government and society of the 

illegal act. Id. at 299. The Tilley court found the Supreme 

Court's decision in Austin inapplicable. It noted that Austin

dealt with forfeitures under Sections 881(a)(4) (conveyances) and 

(a)(7) (real estate), and that, unlike proceeds of a crime, these 

provisions may have no proportional relationship to the costs to 

the government. The court explained: 

[A] forfeiture proceeding may constitute punishment 

because it involves the extraction of lawfully derived 

property from the forfeiting party. . . . When, 

however, the property taken by the government was not 

derived from lawful activities, the forfeiting party 

loses nothing to which the law ever entitled him. . . . 

[T]he forfeiture . . . does not punish the defendant 

because it exacts no price in liberty or lawfully 

derived property from him. The possessor of proceeds 

from illegal drug sales never invested honest labor or 

other lawfully derived property to obtain the 

subsequently forfeited proceeds. Consequently, he has 

no reasonable expectation that the law will protect, 

condone, or even allow, his continued possession of 

such proceeds because they have their very genesis in 

illegal activity. 

 . . . 

Consequently, instead of punishing the forfeiting 

party, the forfeiture of illegal proceeds, much like 

the confiscation of stolen money from a bank robber, 

merely places that party in the lawfully protected 

financial status quo that he enjoyed prior to launching 

his illegal scheme. This is not punishment "within the 

plain meaning of the word." 
13 

Id. at 300 (citations omitted). 

 

 We have already adopted Tilley's rationale as the 

controlling law of this circuit for civil forfeiture of proceeds 

under 21 U.S.C. § 881(a)(6). See United States v. $184,505.01 in 

United States Currency, 72 F.3d 1160, 1168-69 (3rd Cir. 1995) 

("We find the Fifth Circuit's reasoning [in Tilley] to be sound. 

We therefore hold that the forfeiture under 21 U.S.C. § 881(a)(6) 

of proceeds from illegal drug transactions, or proceeds traceable 

to such transactions, does not constitute "punishment" within the 

meaning of the Double Jeopardy Clause."). Following $184,505.01, 

we find Tilley equally persuasive for civil forfeitures under 18 

U.S.C. § 981(a)(1)(C). 

 We see no reason why our holding in $184,505.01 is not 

controlling.0 First, the statute at issue in this case and the 

statute at issue in $184,505.01 are parallel. Although the two 

forfeiture provisions use different language, we read them to 

mean the same thing. Both provide for forfeiture of proceeds. 

Compare 18 U.S.C. § 981(a)(1)(C) (providing for forfeiture of any 

 

0

At oral argument, counsel for appellant attempted to distinguish 

$184,505.01 by saying it dealt only with administrative 

forfeiture. This is plainly incorrect. Although the Government 

initially brought an administrative forfeiture proceeding against 

$14,000 and certain other property, it later converted that 

proceeding to a judicial forfeiture action. See 72 F.3d at 1162-

63 ("The DEA began separate administrative forfeiture proceedings 

. . . [then] referred the forfeitures to the United States 

Attorney, who filed complaints for civil forfeiture"). The 

forfeiture action against the $184,505.01 that formed the basis 

for our double jeopardy rulings was at all times a judicial 

forfeiture. See id. at 1162 n.5 ("The DEA referred the 

forfeiture of the $184K to the United States Attorney for 

judicial forfeiture, because its value exceeded $100,000, the 

maximum allowable amount for the . . . administrative forfeiture 

process."). 
14 

property "which constitutes or is derived from proceeds traceable 

to a violation of Section . . . 1029 . . . of this title . . . . 

") with 21 U.S.C. § 881(a)(6) (providing for forfeiture of all 

moneys "furnished in exchange for a controlled substance"). 

Because our decision in $184,505.01 dealt specifically with 

forfeiture of proceeds under § 881(a)(6), the additional language 

in that provision dealing with forfeiture of money "used to 

facilitate a violation of the drug laws" is of no moment. That 

this case involves a different statute is not enough to 

distinguish $184,505.01. 

 Second, when viewed in terms of the reasoning in Tilley, 

the relationship between the forfeited property and the 

underlying offense in this case is identical to that found in 

$184,505.01. Just like the proceeds of drug trafficking, the 

proceeds of credit card fraud vary directly with the severity of 

the crime: The more items purchased with stolen credit cards, 

the more property that will ultimately be forfeited to the 

government. See $184,505.01, 72 F.3d at 1168 ("[T]he forfeiture 

of drug proceeds will always be directly proportional to the 

amount of drugs sold. The more drugs sold, the more proceeds 

that will be forfeited." (quoting Tilley, 18 F.3d at 300)). The 

involvement in this case of a different underlying offense is 

therefore unimportant. 

 Finally, our reasoning in $184,505.01 applies even if 

Lundis has already paid an amount of restitution equal to the 

value of the stolen computers. We noted in $184,505.01 that two 

rationales were at work in Tilley, first that the forfeited 
15 

amounts were directly proportional to the severity of the crime, 

and second that forfeiture was not punishment because of the very 

nature of illegally derived property. Id. at 1168. Postrestitution forfeiture comports with both. Under the first, 

paying restitution plus forfeiture at worst forces the offender 

to disgorge a total amount equal to twice the value of the 

proceeds of the crime. Given the many tangible and intangible 

costs of criminal activity, this is in no way disproportionate to 

"the harm inflicted upon government and society by the 

[offense]." Tilley, 18 F.3d at 300. Under the second rationale, 

payment of restitution in no way alters the status of the 

property as ill-gotten gains. Restitution operates to make the 

victim of the crime whole, not to confer legal ownership on the 

offender of the stolen property. As a result, Lundis's payment 

of restitution prior to forfeiture makes no difference in our 

double jeopardy analysis. 

 Following $184,505.01, we hold that forfeiture of proceeds 

under § 981(a)(1)(C) is not punishment. In reaching this 

outcome, we remain aware of contrary authority. Lundis urges us 

to follow the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit's ruling in 

United States v. $405,089.23 United States Currency, 33 F.3d 1210 

(9th Cir. 1994), reh'g denied and modified on other grounds, 56 

F.3d 41 (9th Cir. 1995), cert. granted, ___ U.S. ___, 116 S.Ct. 

762 (1996), which held that civil forfeiture under 18 U.S.C. 

§981(a)(1)(A) and 21 U.S.C. § 881(a)(6) constitute punishment 

barred by the Double Jeopardy Clause. See also United States v. 

9844 S. Titan Court, 75 F.3d 1470 (10th Cir. 1996) (rejecting 
16 

reasoning of Tilley and $184,505.01, following $405,089.23). In 

$184,505.01, "we reject[ed] the contrary reasoning and 

conclusions of the Ninth Circuit regarding § 881(a)(6)." 72 F.3d 

at 1169. With nothing to distinguish this case from $184,505.01, 

we again reject the Ninth Circuit's reasoning in regards to 

§981(a)(1)(C).0

 Given this interpretation of 18 U.S.C. § 981(a)(1)(C), it 

follows that Lundis's forfeiture of his computer equipment did 

not constitute punishment for purposes of the Double Jeopardy 

Clause. The district court committed no error in rejecting 

Lundis's double jeopardy claim. 

B. 

 Lundis also asserts that the forfeiture of the computers 

violates the Excessive Fines Clause of the Eighth Amendment. 

Constitutional interpretations are questions of law subject to 

plenary review. See Epstein Family Partnership, 13 F.3d 762, 766 

(3rd Cir. 1994). 

 The Eighth Amendment prohibits excessive bail, excessive 

fines, and cruel and unusual punishment. Lundis may only succeed 

in challenging the forfeiture as a violation of the Excessive 

Fines Clause if the forfeiture provision constitutes a 

 

0

Indeed, our rejection of $405,089.23 seems even more warranted 

here: As discussed above, § 981(a)(1)(C) is a pure proceeds 

statute. By contrast, § 981(a)(1)(A) covers property "involved 

in" an offense, and § 881(a)(6) covers both proceeds and money 

"used to facilitate" an offense. To the extent that our holding 

rests on the unique status of proceeds, its logic applies most 

strongly to § 981(a)(1)(C). 
17 

"punishment." See Austin, 113 S. Ct. at 2804. The computers 

forfeited pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 981(a)(1)(C) were proceeds of 

Lundis's criminal activity. As discussed above, the forfeiture 

provision in the instant case does not constitute "punishment." 

Thus, Lundis's Excessive Fines claim has no merit. 

IV. 

 In sum, we hold that the district court improperly 

dismissed Lundis's claim to the property subject to forfeiture. 

Although his claim did not contain a verification of ownership, 

under the facts of this case, Lundis presented a colorable claim 

to the property to grant this court jurisdiction. 

 On the merits, we hold that the forfeiture of the 

computers, which were proceeds of Lundis's crime, and to which he 

had no legal rights of ownership, did not constitute punishment. 

Thus, the forfeiture did not violate the Double Jeopardy or 

Excessive Fines Clauses. 

 Accordingly, the order of forfeiture of the district court 

will be affirmed.