J-S20003-22

2022 PA Super 200

ANGELA MARIE BARRETT 

Appellant

v.

M&B MEDICAL BILLING, INC. AND 

SANDRA CASEY

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 IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

 PENNSYLVANIA

 No. 1442 WDA 2021

Appeal from the Judgment Entered January 18, 2022

In the Court of Common Pleas of Allegheny County Civil Division at 

No(s): No. GD-17-005863

BEFORE: NICHOLS, J., MURRAY, J., and KING, J.

OPINION BY NICHOLS, J.: FILED: NOVEMBER 22, 2022

Appellant Angela Marie Barrett appeals from the judgment awarding her 

$1,000 in damages. Appellant argues that the trial court erred by allowing 

co-Appellee Sandra Casey (Casey), who is not an attorney, to represent coAppellee M&B Medical Billing, Inc. (M&B) at trial and to present evidence that 

was not relevant to damages. Appellant also claims that the trial court’s 

damages award is against the weight of the evidence. We affirm in part, 

vacate in part, and remand for a new trial as to damages. 

The trial court summarized the factual and procedural history as follows:

Appellant . . . filed a complaint against her former employers, 

[M&B and Casey]. The complaint alleges that Appellees 

committed defamation [per se], intentional infliction of emotional 

distress, [tortious] interference with contractual relationships and 

demanded both compensatory and punitive damages. [Appellant] 

claimed that she had been employed as a medical coder for 
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Appellees until December of 2015. After several of her paychecks 

were late, she tendered her resignation on December 26, 2015.

[Appellant’s] claim is that . . . [a] prospective employer, UPMC, 

sent a request for information to Appellees concerning 

[Appellant’s] former employment with them, in order to determine 

whether [Appellant] would be a suitable and prospective employee 

of UPMC.

Appellees returned UPMC’s requested response, which included a 

statement that [Appellant] took proprietary client information with 

her, and disclosed that [information. Also, Appellee stated that] 

contrary to [Appellant’s] representations to UPMC, [Appellant’s] 

position with [Appellees] was merely as a data analyst clerk and 

not a medical coder.

Thus, [Appellees] filed an answer and new matter and 

counterclaim, denying [Appellant’s] allegations and noting that 

[Appellant] violated her employment contract by her use of 

proprietary information, when she contacted Appellee[s’] clients, 

to solicit them for letters of recommendation for her job search. 

Appellees informed UPMC and answered that [Appellant] was not 

employed as a medical coder by the [Appellees], as her complaint 

represented.

. . . Counsel for Appellee[s later] withdrew from representing 

[Appellees] and [after that withdrawal, Appellees] failed to 

respond to [Appellant’s] discovery [requests]. The Honorable 

Robert J. Colville awarded [Appellant] $1,000.00, for sanctions 

and granted a default verdict in favor of [Appellant on April 29, 

2019]. Thus, Appellees were prevented from putting on a defense 

at the time of this damages only trial.

Trial Ct. Op., 2/24/22, at 1-2 (unpaginated) (formatting altered).

The trial court held a non-jury trial limited to damages only on 

November 3, 2021. Casey appeared for trial and stated that she was 

representing both herself and M&B. N.T. Trial at 3. Appellant’s counsel 

objected to Casey’s representation of M&B because a corporation must be 

represented by counsel. Id. at 3-4. The trial court replied: “We’ll just start 
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the [trial] and see where we go.”1 Id. at 4. At no point during the trial did 

the trial court instruct Casey that she could only represent herself and not the 

corporation. During the trial, Casey cross-examined Appellant and testified 

on her own behalf as part of Appellees’ case. Id. at 25-63, 65-68. 

That same day, the trial court entered a verdict in favor of Appellant in 

the amount of $1,000. Appellant filed a timely post-trial motion2 on November 

10, 2021, requesting that the trial court reassess the damages or, in the 

alternative, award Appellant a new trial. In her post-trial motion, Appellant 

argued, among other things, that the trial court erred in allowing Casey to 

represent M&B because a corporation may appear in court only through 

counsel. On November 18, 2021, the trial court denied Appellant’s post-trial 

motion. 

Appellant filed a notice of appeal on December 2, 2021.3 Appellant 

subsequently filed a court-ordered Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b) statement and the trial 

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1 We note that the trial court asked the parties to attempt to negotiate a 

settlement, and the trial commenced after the parties represented to the trial 

court that they were unable to settle this matter. N.T. Trial at 4, 12-15. 

2 Appellant captioned her motion as a “motion for reconsideration.” However, 

a motion captioned as a motion for reconsideration that is filed within the tenday period set forth in Pa.R.C.P. 227.1(c) and seeks to modify the trial court’s 

decision may be treated as a timely-filed post-trial motion. See Gemini 

Equip. Company v. Pennsy Supply, Inc., 595 A.2d 1211, 1214 (Pa. Super. 

1991). 

3 According to the notice of appeal, Appellant purports to appeal from the trial 

court’s November 3, 2021 verdict. Additionally, Appellant filed her notice of 

appeal prior to the entry of judgment on that verdict. Generally, an appeal to 

(Footnote Continued Next Page)
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court issued an opinion addressing Appellant’s claims that it erred by 

considering evidence related to liability at a trial limited to damages, reducing 

Appellant’s damages against M&B, and that its damages award was against 

the weight of the evidence. See Trial Ct. Op. at 3-5 (unpaginated). 

Appellant raises the following issues for our review, which we restate as 

follows: 

1. Whether the trial court erred by allowing co-Appellee Sandra 

Casey, acting pro se, to represent the interests of co-Appellee 

M&B, at trial?

2. Whether the trial court erred by allowing co-Appellee Sandra 

Casey to introduce liability evidence at the trial limited to 

damages?

3. Whether the trial court erred by reducing damages against coAppellee M&B when it was not represented by counsel at trial?

4. Whether the trial court’s damages award was against the 

weight of properly admitted evidence?

Appellant’s Brief at 5 (formatting altered). 

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this Court properly lies from the entry of judgment. See, e.g., Mackall v. 

Fleegle, 801 A.2d 577, 580 (Pa. Super. 2002). Nevertheless, a final 

judgment entered during the pendency of an appeal is sufficient to perfect 

appellate jurisdiction. See Drum v. Shaull Equip. and Supply Co., 787 

A.2d 1050, 1052 n.1 (Pa. Super. 2001). 

On January 18, 2018, this Court issued a rule to show cause directing 

Appellant’s counsel to enter judgment on the trial court docket and provide a 

copy to this Court. Appellant filed a response on February 1, 2022, indicating 

that she had complied. Because the trial court entered final judgment on 

January 18, 2022, Appellant’s notice of appeal relates forward to January 18, 

2022. See Pa.R.A.P. 905(a)(5) (stating that a notice of appeal filed after a 

court’s determination but before the entry of an appealable order shall be 

treated as filed after such entry and on the day thereof). Therefore, we have 

jurisdiction to consider the instant appeal. 
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In her first issue, Appellant argues that the trial court erred in allowing 

co-Appellee Casey, who is not a licensed attorney, to represent co-Appellee 

M&B at trial. Id. at 11-12. Appellant contends that Pennsylvania law prohibits 

an officer of a corporation, who is not licensed to practice law, from 

representing that corporation in legal proceedings. Id. at 11-12 (citing, inter 

alia, Walacavage v. Excell 2000, Inc., 480 A.2d 281, 284-85 (Pa. Super. 

1984)). 

In reviewing Appellant’s claim, we are guided by the following principles:

Our appellate role in cases arising from non-jury trial verdicts is 

to determine whether the findings of the trial court are supported 

by competent evidence and whether the trial court committed 

error in any application of the law. The findings of fact of the trial 

judge must be given the same weight and effect on appeal as the 

verdict of a jury. We consider the evidence in a light most 

favorable to the verdict winner. We will reverse the trial court 

only if its findings of fact are not supported by competent evidence 

in the record or if its findings are premised on an error of law. 

However, where the issue concerns a question of law, our scope 

of review is plenary.

The trial court’s conclusions of law on appeal originating from a 

non-jury trial are not binding on an appellate court because it is 

the appellate court’s duty to determine if the trial court correctly 

applied the law to the facts of the case.

Bank of N.Y. Mellon v. Bach, 159 A.3d 16, 19 (Pa. Super. 2017) (Bach) 

(citation omitted). 

The following standard of review applies to our review of the trial court’s 

denial of a motion for a new trial:

We will reverse a trial court’s decision to deny a motion for a new 

trial only if the trial court abused its discretion. We must review 

the court’s alleged mistake and determine whether the court erred 
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and, if so, whether the error resulted in prejudice necessitating a 

new trial. If the alleged mistake concerned an error of law, we 

will scrutinize for legal error. Once we determine whether an error 

occurred, we must then determine whether the trial court abused 

its discretion in ruling on the request for a new trial.

Carlini v. Glenn O. Hawbaker, Inc., 219 A.3d 629, 643 (Pa. Super. 2019) 

(citation omitted). 

Section 2501 of the Judicial Code guarantees an individual’s right to selfrepresentation in civil matters. See 42 Pa.C.S. § 2501(a) (stating that “[i]n 

all civil matters before any tribunal every litigant shall have a right to be heard, 

by himself and his counsel, or by either of them”); see also In re Lawrence 

Cty. Tax Claim Bureau, 998 A.2d 675, 680 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2010) (discussing 

the right to self-representation).4 However, it well settled that, with certain 

exceptions, non-attorneys may not represent other parties before 

Pennsylvania courts. See, e.g., Dauphin Cty. Bar Ass’n v. Mazzacaro, 351 

A.2d 229, 233-35 (Pa. 1976) (holding that a public adjuster may not represent 

accident victims in settlement negotiations against alleged tort-feasors or 

their insurers). Further, the unauthorized practice of law is prohibited and 

criminalized in Pennsylvania. See 42 Pa.C.S. § 2524(a). 

Additionally, the Courts of this Commonwealth have held that artificial 

entities, such as corporations, may only appear in court through counsel. See, 

e.g., Skotnicki v. Ins. Dep’t, 146 A.3d 271, 284 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2016) 

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4 Although decisions of the Commonwealth Court are not binding on this Court, 

they may provide persuasive authority. See Maryland Cas. Co. v. Odyssey

Contracting Corp., 894 A.2d 750, 756 n.2 (Pa. Super. 2006). 
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(explaining that “corporations may not act pro se in court, and that nonattorneys may not represent them, regardless of the individual’s status as the 

corporation’s officer, director, shareholder[] or employee” (citations and 

footnote omitted)); Walacavage, 480 A.2d at 283-85 (holding that a 

corporation may not appear in court and be represented by a corporate officer 

and shareholder who is not an attorney); accord Norman for Est. of 

Shearlds v. Temple Univ. Health Sys., 208 A.3d 1115, 1121 (Pa. Super. 

2019) (concluding that a non-attorney administrator of an estate could not 

represent the estate pro se), appeal denied, 223 A.3d 668 (Pa. 2020), cert. 

denied, 141 S.Ct. 301 (2020). 

Our Supreme Court recently held that a plaintiff who is not an attorney 

may litigate a wrongful death action pro se in their individual capacity, but 

that same pro se plaintiff may not represent the estate of the decedent as its 

administrator. Bisher v. Lehigh Valley Health Network, 265 A.3d 383 (Pa. 

2021). Additionally, in other jurisdictions, courts have held that while a 

corporate officer who has been sued in his or her personal capacity may 

proceed pro se, that officer cannot represent the interests of the co-defendant 

corporation if he or she is not an attorney.5 See, e.g., Alexander & Baldwin, 

LLC v. Armitage, 508 P.3d 832, 843-49 (Haw. 2022) (Armitage) (holding 

that an unincorporated entity, like a corporation, may not appear in court 

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5 This Court may rely on the decisions of other states for persuasive authority. 

See Hill v. Slippery Rock Univ., 138 A.3d 673, 679 n.3 (Pa. Super. 2016) 

(noting that “the decisions of other states are not binding authority for this 

Court, although they may be persuasive” (citation omitted)). 
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through non-attorney agents); Flathead Bank of Bigfork v. Masonry by 

Muller, Inc., 383 P.3d 215, 219 (Mont. 2016) (Flathead Bank) (affirming 

the trial court’s conclusion that corporation’s president “could only represent 

himself personally and could not appear on behalf of [the corporation]”); 

Office of Attorney Gen., Dep’t of Legal Affairs v. Nationwide Pools, 

Inc., 270 So.3d 406, 408 n.1 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2019) (Nationwide Pools) 

(noting that “[u]nlike the corporate defendants, an individual may defend 

himself or herself without an attorney”). 

Our courts have the authority to sua sponte intervene to prevent the 

unauthorized practice of law. Bisher, 265 A.3d at 406; accord Armitage, 

508 P.3d at 844. In Bisher, our Supreme Court held that the unauthorized 

practice of law is a curable defect. See Bisher, 265 A.3d at 403-07. 

Further, the Bisher Court explained: 

Significantly, we stress that we decide only that the court has the 

discretion to permit a remedy in . . . situations [involving the 

unauthorized practice of law], not that it must do so. The default 

position in such cases should be that the offending party should 

be given a “reasonable opportunity” to cure. But we are not 

convinced that the rule is absolute. . . . [T]here may be cases in 

which the unauthorized practice of law is an attempt to game the 

system. 

Bisher, 265 A.3d at 409; see also id. at 406 (affirming this Court’s decision 

to order the pro se administrator to retain counsel on behalf of the appellant 

estate in order to proceed with the appeal). 

Likewise, in Armitage, the Supreme Court of Hawaii reversed a 

judgment against an unincorporated entity known as the “Reinstated Hawaiian 
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Nation” because the trial court allowed two non-attorney agents of that entity, 

one of whom was a co-defendant sued in his personal capacity, to represent 

the entity before the trial court. Armitage, 508 P.3d at 838-40. The 

Armitage Court explained that

[a]s an unincorporated entity, the Reinstated Hawaiian Nation 

may only appear in court through an attorney representative. 

[The agents], as non-attorneys, should not have been allowed to 

represent its interests before the [trial] court. The [trial] court 

should have sua sponte exercised its power to prevent the 

unauthorized practice of law by preventing [the agents] from 

representing the Reinstated Hawaiian Nation.

* * *

[W]hen confronted with an attempt by a layperson to represent 

an entity, the court should continue the proceedings to allow the 

entity to obtain counsel; if the entity fails to do so within a 

reasonable period, the court should enter a default or take other 

remedial action.

Armitage, 508 P.3d at 843-44 (citation omitted). 

The Supreme Court of Hawaii also concluded that the unauthorized 

practice of law on behalf of an entity is a curable defect in the proceedings. 

Id. at 845-48 (citing, inter alia, Bisher, 265 A.3d at 408-10). With respect 

to the Reinstated Hawaiian Nation, the Armitage Court concluded that while 

the unauthorized practice of law “was apparently unwitting, the pervasiveness 

of the representation, and the policy goals behind [the prohibition against the 

unauthorized practice of law] require vacatur here.” Id. at 848. 

Here, the trial court did not address Casey’s unauthorized practice of 

law on behalf of M&B in its Rule 1925(a) opinion. 
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Based on our review of the record, we conclude that the trial court erred 

in allowing Casey to represent M&B. See Bach, 159 A.3d at 19. Although 

Casey has the right to proceed pro se with respect to the claims against her 

in her individual capacity, she could not represent M&B at trial because she is 

not an attorney. See Skotnicki, 146 A.3d at 284; Walacavage, 480 A.2d 

at 283-85; accord Armitage, 508 P.3d at 843-49; Flathead Bank, 383 P.3d 

at 219; Nationwide Pools, 270 So.3d at 408 n.1. 

Further, we conclude the trial court abused its discretion by denying 

Appellant’s motion for a new trial. See Carlini, 219 A.3d at 643. Casey 

represented M&B throughout the trial, and repeatedly raised liability issues 

during a trial limited to damages over objections from Appellant’s counsel. 

See N.T. Trial at 11, 12, 28, 29, 31, 54, 65-67. Further, the trial court 

awarded only nominal damages against M&B. See Trial Ct. Op. at 4-5 

(unpaginated). For this reason, we conclude that Casey’s unauthorized 

practice of law resulted in prejudice necessitating a new trial. See Carlini, 

219 A.3d at 643; accord Armitage, 508 P.3d at 848 (reversing judgement 

against unincorporated entity where unauthorized practice of law by its agents 

was pervasive and reversal served the policy goals of prohibiting the 

unauthorized practice of law). 
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Therefore, we vacate the judgment entered on the verdict with respect 

to damages and remand this matter for a new trial limited to damages.6 The 

trial court shall provide M&B a reasonable time period to obtain counsel. See

Bisher, 265 A.3d at 409; accord Armitage, 508 P.3d at 843-44. However, 

if M&B fails to obtain counsel in a reasonable time, the trial court may proceed 

to trial in the absence of M&B. See, e.g., Dublin Sportswear v. Charlett, 

403 A.2d 568, 571 (Pa. 1979) (holding that pursuant to Pa.R.C.P. 218, a trial 

may be held in the absence of the defendant if the defendant is absent without 

satisfactory excuse); accord Armitage, 508 P.3d at 844 (noting that default 

could be entered against a corporation that failed to retain counsel within a 

reasonable period). In light of our disposition, we need not address 

Appellant’s remaining issues. 

Judgment affirmed in part and vacated in part. Case remanded for 

further proceedings consistent with this opinion. Jurisdiction relinquished. 

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 11/22/2022 

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6 We stress that our ruling is limited to Casey’s representation of the 

corporation and nothing in our decision prevents Casey from proceeding pro 

se at the new trial if she so chooses. See 42 Pa.C.S. § 2501(a); Lawrence 

Cty. Tax Claim Bureau, 998 A.2d at 680.