alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
**MEMORANDUM**

DATE: September 25, 2014 TO: Clean Power Plan for Existing Power Plants; Do cket Id: OAR–2013-0602 FROM: Chris Sherry, EPA SUBJECT: September 18, 2014 Meeting Regarding Propo sed Clean Power Plan for Existing

Power Plants

**SUMMARY** A meeting was held by telephone between EPA and sta ff of the National Association of Regulatory Utility Commissioners (NARUC). The call focused on answering clarifying questions about the discussion in the proposal of different b asic types of state plan pathways.
**ATTENDEES**
**NARUC** Holly Rachel Smith, Assistant General Counsel **US EPA** Chris Sherry OAR, OAP, Climate Change Division
#### Kieffer, Matter of, v DeFrain

4th Dept: 147 AD3d 1539

denied
#### Com. v. Reese

11/16/2015

497 EAL (2015)

Denied

Pa.Super., 122 A.3d 1124
#### Com. v. Ritter

03/30/2016

710 MAL (2015)

Denied

Pa.Super., 131 A.3d 99
#### James Johnson et al., Appellants, v City of New York et al., Respondents.

[58 NYS3d 513]—

In an action to recover damages for personal injuries, the plaintiffs appeal from a judgment of the Supreme Court, Queens County (Velasquez, J.), entered May 8, 2015, which, upon a jury verdict, is in favor of the defendants and against them dismissing the complaint.

Ordered that the judgment is affirmed, with costs.

The plaintiffs allegedly were injured when a vehicle they occupied was involved in an accident with another vehicle. The other vehicle was being followed by a police vehicle operated by a police captain in his capacity as an officer with the New York City Police Department (hereinafter the NYPD). The plaintiffs commenced this action against the City of New York and the NYPD. After a jury trial, the jury returned a verdict in favor of the defendants.

“A jury verdict should not be set aside as contrary to the *504weight of the evidence unless the jury could not have reached the verdict by any fair interpretation of the evidence” *(Coma v City of New York,*97 AD3d 715, 715 [2012]; see *Lolik v Big V Supermarkets,*86 NY2d 744, 746 [1995]; *Nicastro v Park,*113 AD2d 129, 136 [1985]). Contrary to the plaintiffs’ contentions, there was sufficient evidence adduced at trial from which the jury could conclude that the captain did not act with reckless disregard for the safety of others when he was operating the police vehicle on the date of the subject accident *(see*Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1104 [e]; *Frezzell v City of New York,*24 NY3d 213, 217-219 [2014]). Accordingly, the verdict was supported by a fair interpretation of the evidence.

Moreover, the trial court providently exercised its discretion by not admitting the NYPD Patrol Guide into evidence, as the patrol guide imposed a higher standard of conduct on the defendants than that imposed by law *(see Rivera v New York City Tr. Auth.,*77 NY2d 322, 329 [1991]; *Crosland v New York City Tr. Auth.,*68 NY2d 165, 168 [1986]).

Rivera, J.P., Sgroi, Miller and Brathwaite Nelson, JJ., concur.
#### In the Matter of Committee to Stop Airport Expansion et al., Appellants, v Town Board of Town of East Hampton et al., Respondents, et al., Respondents.

[769 NYS2d 400]

In a hybrid proceeding pursuant to CPLR article 78 to review a determination of the Town Board of the Town of East Hampton dated April 6, 2001, which approved the repaving of an East Hampton Airport aircraft parking apron with funding from the Federal Aviation Administration and agreed to an extension of Federal Aviation Administration grant assurances, and an action, inter alia, for a judgment, in effect, declaring that Resolution No. 483 of 2001 was not validly enacted, the petitioners appeal, as limited by their brief, from so much of a judgment of the Supreme Court, Suffolk County (Kitson, J.), entered September 3, 2002, as dismissed the CPLR article 78 proceeding and the cause of action for declaratory relief.

Ordered that the judgment is modified by adding a provision thereto declaring that Resolution No. 483 of 2001 was validly enacted; as so modified, the judgment is affirmed insofar as appealed from, with one bill of costs to the respondents-respondents appearing separately and filing separate briefs.

The determination of the Town Board of the Town of East Hampton (hereinafter the Town Board) that the repaving of an aircraft parking apron at the East Hampton Airport was a Type II action under the State Environmental Quality Review Act (see ECL art 8; hereinafter SEQRA) was not arbitrary and capricious and had a rational and substantial basis in the record (see *Matter of Lahey v Kelly,*71 NY2d 135, 140 [1987]; *Matter of Fuhst v Foley,*45 NY2d 441, 444 [1978]). Such an action, by definition, does not have “a significant impact on the environment” and does not require environmental impact review under SEQRA (see 6 NYCRR 617.5; see *also Matter of Crews v Village of Dobbs Ferry,*272 AD2d 540 [2000]). The Town Board also properly determined that its determination to extend Federal Aviation Administration grant assurances in exchange for Federal funding for the repaving project was not an “action” as defined by 6 NYCRR 617.2 (b) (2).

The petitioners’ remaining contentions are without merit.

We note that since this is, in part, a declaratory judgment ac*851tion, the Supreme Court should have made a declaration in favor of the Town of East Hampton rather than dismissing the cause of action for declaratory relief *(see Lanza v Wagner,*11 NY2d 317, 334 [1962], *appeal dismissed*371 US 74 [1962], *cert denied*371 US 901 [1962]). McGinity, J.P., Luciano, Schmidt and Rivera, JJ., concur.
No. 12-7693.

#### Lamb *v.*Crews, Secretary, Florida Department of Corrections, et al.

C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied.
#### Binns *v.*First National Bank of California, Pennsylvania, Appellant.

*360Argued March 21, 1951.

Before Drew, C. J., Stern, Stearns, Jones, Bell, Ladner und Chidsey, JJ.

*373
      *Thomas L. Anderson,*with him *J. Oían Yarnall,*for appellant.

*D. M. Anderson, Jr.,*with him *J. K. Spurgeon*and *Anderson,é.Anderson,*for appellee.

May 21, 1951:

Opinion

Per Curiam,

The court below has correctly disposed of all the questions raised on this appeal. We therefore affirm the judgment on the opinion of Judge Carson refusing defendant’s motions for judgment n.o.v. and for a new trial.

Judgment affirmed.
#### In the Matter of David Elgart et al., Appellants, v New York State Division of Housing and Community Renewal, Respondent, and Sixty-Second II, LLC, Intervenor-Respondent.

[769 NYS2d 32]

Order, Supreme Court, New York County (Debra James, J.), entered on or about January 15, 2003, which denied the petition to annul the agency determination that had granted the intervenor owner’s request to modify petitioners’ use of certain storage space not contiguous with their apartments by substituting equivalent space elsewhere in the building, unanimously affirmed, without costs.

There was evidence to support the finding that the use of three rooms on the tenth floor for storage, by these sixth-floor tenants, was clearly service-related, as opposed to residential in nature. The landlord’s relocation of petitioners’ storage area to a space with similar characteristics in the basement was an appropriate substitution of services (Rent Stabilization Code [9 NYCRR] § 2522.4 [e]). The agency’s approval of that substitution was not an irrational application of the Code *(see Matter of Salvati v Eimicke,*72 NY2d 784, 791 [1988]). Concur—Nardelli, J.P., Tom, Mazzarelli and Ellerin, JJ.
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|Price of Corpus Christi, TX  Liquefied Natural Gas Exports to Portugal (Dollars per Thousand Cubic Feet)
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|Price of Corpus Christi, TX  Liquefied Natural Gas Exports to Portugal (Dollars per Thousand Cubic Feet)
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|Decade                                                                                                                            | Year-0 | Year-1 | Year-2 | Year-3 | Year-4 | Year-5 | Year-6 | Year-7 | Year-8 | Year-9
|--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- | ------ | ------ | ------ | ------ | ------ | ------ | ------ | ------ | ------ | ------
|2010's                                                                                                                            |        |        |        |        |        |        |        | --     | --     | 5.09  
|2020's                                                                                                                            | 5.38   | 8.88   | 10.13  | 5.69   |        |        |        |        |        |       
|- = No Data Reported;  -- = Not Applicable;  NA = Not Available;  W = Withheld to avoid disclosure of individual company data.
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|Release Date: 7/31/2024                                                                                                          
|Next Release Date: 8/30/2024
11 TH COURT OF APPEALS

EASTLAND

, TEXAS

JUDGMENT

In re Elmo Fortenberry

, * Original Proceeding

No. 11

- 2 1

- 00 00 9

- CR * January 22 , 20 2 1

* Per Curiam Memorand um Opinion

(P anel consists of: Bailey

, C. J.,

Trotter , J., and Williams, J.)

This court has inspected the record in this cause and concludes that the

proceeding should be dismissed for want of jurisdiction . Therefore, in accordance

with this court ’ s opi nion, the proceeding is dismissed.
```

[Congressional Bills 103th Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
[S. 195 Introduced in Senate (IS)]

103d CONGRESS
  1st Session
                                 S. 195

 To repeal the mandatory 20 percent income tax withholding on eligible 
           rollover distributions which are not rolled over.

_______________________________________________________________________

                   IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES

             January 26 (legislative day, January 5), 1993

   Mr. Helms introduced the following bill; which was read twice and 
                  referred to the Committee on Finance

_______________________________________________________________________

                                 A BILL

 
 To repeal the mandatory 20 percent income tax withholding on eligible 
           rollover distributions which are not rolled over.

    Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the 
United States of America in Congress assembled,

SECTION 1. REPEAL OF MANDATORY 20 PERCENT INCOME TAX WITHHOLDING ON 
              ELIGIBLE IRA ROLLOVER DISTRIBUTIONS WHICH ARE NOT ROLLED 
              OVER.

    (a) Repeal of Withholding Requirement.--Subsection (b) of section 
522 of the Unemployment Compensation Amendments of 1992 (relating to 
withholding on eligible rollover distributions which are not rolled 
over), and the amendments made by such subsection, are hereby repealed, 
and the Internal Revenue Code of 1986 shall be applied and administered 
as if such subsection, and amendments, had never been enacted.
    (b) Offset.--The President is authorized to reduce obligations and 
expenditures for programs, projects, and activities authorized under 
the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, except for allocation of funds for 
countries specified in law, by such sums as are necessary to offset the 
loss of revenues under subsection (a).

                                 <all>
```
Mississippi Chemical Corporation

            Re:  Form 10-Q Report for the quarter ended September 30,
                 1998

            Ladies and Gentlemen:

            This letter is written to meet the requirements of
            Regulation S-K calling for a letter from a registrant's
            independent accountants whenever there has been a change in
            accounting principle or practice.

            We have been informed that, beginning July 1, 1998,
            Mississippi Chemical Corporation (the "Company") changed its
            presentation of delivery costs from a component of selling
            costs to a component of net sales on its statement of
            income.  Management is of the opinion that this change was
            necessary to conform to industry practice so that the
            Company can be more readily compared to its peer group.

            A complete coordinated set of financial and reporting
            standards for determining the preferability of accounting
            principles among acceptable alternative principles has not
            been established by the accounting profession.  Thus, we
            cannot make an objective determination of whether the change
            in accounting described in the preceding paragraph is to a
            preferable method.  However, we have reviewed the pertinent
            factors, including those related to financial reporting, in
            this particular case on a subjective basis, and our opinion
            stated below is based on our determination made in this
            manner.

            We are of the opinion that the Company's change in method of
            accounting is to an acceptable alternative method of
            accounting, which, based upon the reason stated for the
            change and our discussions with you, is also preferable
            under the circumstances in this particular case.  In
            arriving at this opinion, we have relied on the business
            judgment and business planning of the Company's management.

            We have not audited the application of this change to the
            financial statements of any period subsequent to June 30,
            1998.  Furthermore, we have not examined and do not express
            any opinion with respect to your financial statements for
            the three months ended September 30, 1998.

            Very truly yours,

            Arthur Andersen LLP
            Memphis, Tennessee,
              October 10, 1998.
#### The People of the State of New York, Respondent, v William Rivera, Appellant.

[767 NYS2d 880]

Appeal by the defendant from a judgment of the Supreme Court, Kings County (Gary, J.), rendered January 2, 2002, convicting him of unauthorized use of a vehicle in the second degree, upon a jury verdict, and imposing sentence.

Ordered that the judgment is affirmed.

Contrary to the defendant’s contention, the Supreme Court providently exercised its discretion in its *Sandoval*ruling *(see People v Sandoval,*34 NY2d 371 [1974]). A defendant is not shielded from cross-examination merely because he or she specializes in one particular form of criminal conduct *(see People v Hayes,*97 NY2d 203, 208 [2002]; *People v Pavao,*59 NY2d 282, 292 [1983]; *People v Carrion,*265 AD2d 564, 565 [1999]). In addition, the age of some of the defendant’s prior convictions did not, by itself, mandate preclusion *(see People v Walker,*83 NY2d 455, 459 [1994]; *People v Patterson,*88 AD2d 694 [1982], *affd*59 NY2d 794 [1983]; *People v Simmons,*213 AD2d 433, 434 [1995]; *People v Scott,*118 AD2d 881 [1986]).

The defendant’s contention that his sentencing as a persistent felony offender violated his constitutional rights to notice and a jury trial pursuant to *Apprendi v New Jersey*(530 US 466 [2000] ) is without merit *(see People v Rosen,*96 NY2d 329 [2001] , *cert denied*534 US 899 [2001]). Santucci, J.P., Krausman, Cozier and Mastro, JJ., concur.
EXHIBIT 31.2 

I, Stephen M. Shea, Chief FinancialOfficer of Mestek, Inc., certify that: 

    1.                 I have reviewed this Quarterly Report on Form 10-Q for the fiscal quarter ended          June 30, 2005, of Mestek, Inc. (the “registrant”); 

    2.                 Based on my knowledge, this report does not contain any untrue statement of a          material fact or omit to state a material fact necessary to make the statements          made, in light of the circumstances under which such statements were made, not          misleading with respect to the period covered by this report; 

    3.                 Based on my knowledge, the financial statements, and other financial information          included in this report, fairly present in all material respects the financial          condition, results of operations and cash flows of the registrant as of, and          for, the periods presented in this report; 

    4.                 The registrant’s other certifying officer(s) and I are responsible for          establishing and maintaining disclosure controls and procedures (as defined in          Exchange Act Rules 13a-15(e) and 15d-15(e)) for the registrant and have:
#### Leggiadro, Ltd., Respondent-Appellant, et al., Plaintiffs, v Winston & Strawn, LLP, Appellant-Respondent.

[56 NYS3d 72]

Order, Supreme Court, New York County (Shirley Werner Kornreich, J.), entered April 15, 2016, which granted in part and denied in part the motion of defendant Winston & Strawn, LLP (W&S) for summary judgment dismissing the remaining legal malpractice claim in the complaint, unanimously modified, on the law, to deny W&S’s motion for summary judgment in its entirety, and otherwise affirmed, without costs.

The court properly declined to dismiss the corporate plaintiff’s claim that it would not have accepted the landlord’s buyout offer of the remaining six years on its commercial lease if it had been properly advised by W&S of a $400,000 New York City corporate tax obligation it would have to pay on the buyout figure. Deposition testimony and affidavits offered from the corporate plaintiff’s principal assert that it was W&S’s responsibility to ensure that the negotiated buyout covered all of plaintiff’s anticipated relocation expenses and attendant tax *414obligations such that plaintiff would not be out of pocket financially when relocating to allow the nonparty landlord to undertake a major renovation of its building. Under the circumstances presented, triable issues exist as to whether, but for W&S’s failure to inform plaintiff of the corporate tax obligation, plaintiff would have declined the buyout offer, remained in its existing leasehold and avoided any damages associated with having to pay, out of pocket, a corporate tax on the buyout sum *(see Rudolf v Shayne, Dachs, Stanisci, Corker & Sauer,*8 NY3d 438 [2007]; *Miuccio v Straci,*129 AD3d 515 [1st Dept 2015]).

Another branch of the malpractice claim alleged that but for counsel’s negligence in failing to raise the tax issue, the landlord would have offered a higher buyout figure to cover the New York City corporate tax obligation. This branch of the claim is also viable. Although the claim is founded upon a discretionary decision residing in another over whom the corporate plaintiff had no control, the circumstances support plaintiff’s contention that the landlord would have agreed to satisfy the tax liability. As we opined in sustaining the malpractice cause of action in the complaint on defendant’s motion to dismiss, plaintiff had a strong bargaining position because the amount of time left on the lease, as well as the importance of the leased space to the landlord’s conversion plans, would have pressured the landlord to acquiesce to plaintiff’s relatively minor request *(see Leggiadro, Ltd. v Winston & Strawn, LLP,*119 AD3d 442, 442-443 [1st Dept 2014]; *see also Campbell v Rogers & Wells,*218 AD2d 576, 580 [1st Dept 1995]; *Khadem v Fischer & Kagan,*215 AD2d 441, 443 [2d Dept 1995]). W&S has not proffered any new probative evidence to counter this aspect of plaintiff’s legal malpractice claim.

Concur—Richter, J.R, Andrias, Moskowitz, Feinman and Kapnick, JJ.
#### In the Matter of Elisha W-B., Respondent, v Aidan W., Appellant, et al., Respondent.

[54 NYS3d 852]—

Order, Family Court, New York County (Carol Goldstein, J.), entered on or about August 9, 2016, which, inter alia, after a hearing, awarded custody of the subject child to petitioner maternal cousin, unanimously affirmed, without costs.

The court properly found that respondent father’s presumptive entitlement to the custody of his son was overcome by petitioner’s showing of extraordinary circumstances based upon the facts that the father had never assumed a primary parental role in the child’s life, had not obtained adequate housing even though the matter was pending for about one year and had failed to contribute support for his son, and the child was afraid of him (see *Matter of Jessica Marie C. [Anthony H.],*118 AD3d 601, 602 [1st Dept 2014]; *Matter of Cockrell v Burke,*50 AD3d 895 [2d Dept 2008]).

The court’s determination that awarding custody to petitioner was in the child’s best interest was supported by the requisite fair preponderance of the evidence. The record shows that she supported the child, gave structure to his life, took care of his medical and educational needs and provided him with a stable and loving home where he was thriving *(see Matter of Joseph S. v Michelle R.F.,*3 AD3d 446, 447 [1st Dept 2004]).

Concur— Tom, J.P., Richter, Manzanet-Daniels, Mazzarelli and Gische, JJ.
# DLA assistant fire chief retires

/ Published March 6, 2019
Richmond, Va, 
Robert Cross, assistant fire chief, Security and Emergency Services, Defense Logistics Agency Installation Operations Richmond, retired after 32 years of federal government service and was honored in a ceremony on Feb. 28 at the fire station on Defense Supply Center Richmond, Virginia.With his wife, Leslie, at his side, he was commended for his hard work, determination and knowledge.

“Assistant Chief Cross has had a significant impact on our department and the DLA Richmond community. He has earned the respect of so many people he has come in contact with. He is a well-respected leader within the DLA fire service community,” said Donald Rogers, fire chief of the base.

Cross’ colleagues presented him with a plaque, framed memorabilia, a gift and a U.S. flag that was flown over DSCR.

Cross was previously recognized as Fire Officer of the Quarter and in May of 2016, he received a Certificate of Achievement for Excellence from then Secretary of Defense, Ash Carter.

He began his fire service career as an airman in the Air Force in 1987 before moving into civil service in 1992 at Mather Air Force Base, Sacramento, California. He spent the next several years at Fort Benjamin Harrison, Terra Haute, Indiana and Fort Knox, Kentucky.Cross would go on to Pope Air Force Base and to Fort Bragg, both in North Carolina where he was promoted to battalion chief. He served at DSCR from 2011 until 2019.