COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA 

Present: Judges Fitzpatrick, Overton and Senior Judge Duff 

Argued at Alexandria, Virginia 

DOUGLAS M. HAYES 

 MEMORANDUM OPINION* BY 

v. Record No. 2038-96-4 JUDGE NELSON T. OVERTON 

 JUNE 3, 1997 

ANN M. HAYES 

FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF CULPEPER COUNTY 

Jay T. Swett, Judge 

 Jeffrey B. Rice for appellant. 

 No brief or argument for appellee. 

 Douglas M. Hayes (husband) appeals from a July 15, 1996 

order of the circuit court awarding Ann M. Hayes (wife) a 

judgment in the amount of $11,370.73 with interest running from 

June 13, 1994. Husband contends that the court had no authority 

to set interest from that date. We disagree and affirm. 

 The parties are fully conversant with the record in the 

cause, and because this memorandum opinion carries no 

precedential value, no recitation of the facts is necessary. 

 Husband and wife were divorced by final decree on October 

18, 1994. In that decree, the trial judge found that wife had 

made loans to husband totaling $11,620.73, but denied a money 

judgment for that amount on the basis that the debt was separate 

debt of the husband rather than marital debt. Wife appealed, and 

 

 *Pursuant to Code § 17-116.010 this opinion is not 

designated for publication. 
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on January 11, 1996, the Court of Appeals reversed, interpreting 

Code § 20-107.3(C) to authorize the circuit court to require 

payment of non-marital debt owed by one party to the other. The 

Court remanded the case for further proceedings without 

instructions regarding interest. Subsequently, on July 15, 1996, 

the trial court entered a judgment for $11,370.73, the amount 

wife requested in her Motion for Partial Summary Judgment, with 

interest at the statutory rate from June 13, 1994. 

 Code § 8.01-382 provides: 

 Except as otherwise provided in 

§ 8.3-122, in any action at law or suit in 

equity, the verdict of the jury, or if no 

jury the judgment or decree of the court, may 

provide for interest on any principal sum 

awarded, or any part thereof, and fix the 

period at which the interest shall commence. 

The judgment or decree entered shall provide 

for such interest until such principal sum be 

paid. If a judgment or decree be rendered 

which does not provide for interest, the 

judgment or decree awarded shall bear 

interest from its date of entry, at the rate 

as provided in § 6.1-330.54, and judgment or 

decree entered accordingly; provided, if the 

judgment entered in accordance with the 

verdict of a jury does not provide for 

interest, interest shall commence from the 

date that the verdict was rendered. 

Husband places emphasis on the language providing that interest 

shall commence from the date of the order’s entry. He further 

reasons that, because no order was originally entered before wife 

appealed, and because the Court of Appeals was silent as to 

interest, the trial court could only allow interest from July 15, 

1996. 
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 We disagree with husband's reading of the statute. Code 

§ 8.01-382 states that if a judgment be rendered which does not

provide for interest, then the interest shall commence from the 

date of entry. It also permits the court to provide for interest 

and fix the period at which the interest shall commence. The 

July 15, 1996 order explicitly sets a rate of interest and the 

period of commencement. As the trial court acted under authority 

granted by the Code, we will not disturb the judgment. 

 Accordingly, the decision of the circuit court is affirmed. 

 Affirmed.