FI L ED U.S. COURT OF A P P E A LS E LE V E N T H C IR C U IT Marc h 11, 2008 THOMAS K. KAH

N CL ERK [PUBLIS H] IN THE UN ITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FO R T HE EL EV EN TH CIRC UI T

____ ____ ____ ____ ____ ____ N o. 04- 1171 1

____ ____ ____ ____ ____ ____ D.C. Dock etNo. 0 1- 00 02 9- CV-C- E JAM ES CHARLES LAW HORN, Petitioner-Appellee, ve rs us RICH ARD F. AL LEN, Com m issio ner, A la ba m a D ep t. of

Co rr ec tio ns, ATTORNEY G ENERAL OF AL ABAMA, Re spon de nts -Appe llants .

____ ____ ____ ____ ____ ____ __ App ea l f ro m the U nit ed

S ta te s D istri ct

Co urt f or the N o rt h e rn D i s t r i c to f

A l ab a ma

____ ____ ____ ____ ____ ____ _ (M ar ch 11, 200 8) Be fo re : B IR CH , BA RKE T T a nd W IL SO N , Ci rc uit Jud ge s. BI RC H , Ci rc uit

Jud ge :A c e rt if ic ate of a pp e a la bil ity is n ot r e qu ir e d in

an a pp e a l by a st ate . Fed. R. A

pp . P. 1 22(b)( 3). Ex cept a s otherwise c ited, the fact s are taken f rom opinions of the Alabama Court of 2 Criminal Appeals. See E x p arte L awhor n, 581 So.2d 1179, 1180 (Ala. 1991) ( “L awhor n I I ”) (re fer encingthe “de tailed statement of the pert i n en t facts” found at L awhor n v. State, 581 So. 2d 11 59 ( ( Ala. Crim . App . 1 99 0) (“ L awh or n I ” )) and L awh or n v . St ate , 7 56 So. 2d

97 1 ( Al a . Cr im. App. 1999) (L awhor

n V) (r efe renc ing the “esse ntial fac ts of this case” rec ited in L awhor n I ). 2 An A labam a j ury

found petiti oner Jam es Charles L aw horn (“ Lawhorn”) gui lty of c ap ita l m ur de r an d r ec om

m en de d th at

he be se nte nc ed

to de ath. T he state ci rcu it co ur t ju dg e ad op te d t ha t re co m m en da ti on an d s en te nc edLawho rn to de at h. A ft er e xhaust ing his state c ourt r em ed ie s, L awhor n f ile d af ed er al ha be as c or pus pe tit ionpur suant t o 28 U . S. C. § 22 54. T he dis tr ic t c ourt gr an te d inpart a nd denied in part Law horn’ s habeas petition , and the state appealed. A fter a 1 tho ro ugh re vie wof

the r ec or d, a nd h av ing the be ne fi t of or al a rg um en t and the parties’ briefs, we RE VE RSE the district court’ s judgm ent granting Law horn h ab ea s re l i ef

b y s up p re s s i n g h i s co n fe s s i o n , a n dAF FI RM t h e d i s t ri ct co u rt ’s j udgm en t gr an tin g L awhor n ha be as r el ie f on the iss ue of ine ff ec tiv e as sis tanc e of co unse l. I. BACKG ROUND 2 During the late m orning o f 31 Marc h 198 8, Sy lacauga, Ala bam a Police O ff ic er K en ne th B ra she r obse rv ed som e pe opl e ar gui ng a cr oss the str ee t f ro m the ga s st at ionw he re he ha d st oppe d. H e sawaw om anin a tr uc k th at be lon ge d to3

A lti on M ax ine W al ke r, a nd a lso sawW ill ia m Cl ar en ce Be rr

y r un and g et

int o hi s au to m ob il e whi le be in g c ha se d b y James Ch arl es Lawho rn , W al ke r’s ne ph ew. L awhor n I , 581 S o. 2d 1 159, 116 1 ( A la . Cr im . App. 199 0) ; R 1- 17, T ab 9 a t 28 7- 294. About 3:30 -4:00 P.M. that sam e day , G rover C. W illiam s saw a truck turn tow ar d hi m

of f H igh w ay

148 a nd o nto adir

t r oa d. I d. a t 29 4- 96. W ill ia m s sa id that there w ere three “ fairly y oung people” sitting in the front seat of the truck ca b an d “ at le as t on e of

the m ” ha d a“ he av y

be ar d. ” I d. a t 29 5- 96. Mona Lisa Jones, who liv ed acr oss a road from Collier’ s Store, on Highway 148 ea st o f Sy la ca

ugane ar W ir eg ra ss R oa d, sa id tha t sh e an d he r husb an d fo ll owe d a redcar an d a tru ckon th e ro adou t fr om Sy la cau ga to wardth ei r ho us e. Id. at 282. The car wa s driven by a m an; the truck wa s driven by a w om an. Af

ter both dr ive rs got

out of the ir ve hic le s to buy

dr ink s f ro m am ac hin e in f

ro nt o f the sto re , the y

got int o th e tr

uc k and dro ve a w ay . I d. a t 28 3- 84. A ro und 3:3 0- 4:0 0 P. M. , W ill ia m

Co lli er , the ow ne r of

Co lli er ’ s S tor e, r et

ur ne d f ro m atr ip t o Sy lacauga to find a car

sitting in front of his closed sto re. Id. at 279-80. T he car re m ai ne d inf

ro nt o f Co lli er ’ s S tor e unt il it w as tow ed by pol ic e of fi ce rs on 2 Apr il.There wer e four entra nce w ounds from the pistol or rifle: one to the nec k, one to the chin, 3 and two to the che st. L awhor n I , 581 So. 2d at 1161. The wound to the chin, which traveled to the brain, a nd t h e o n e of the wounds to the che st, which sever ed the spine a nd spinal cord, “ caus[ed] de ath i ns tantl y .” I d. Th e re ma ini ng tw e lve e ntr anc e wo un ds we re fr om the sh otgun and we re to b oth arms, the uppe r abdome n, the che st, the rig ht leg , and upper back. I d. 4 On 2 April, Be rry ’ s bodywa s found in a w ooded area off W iregrass Road ne ar S y la ca uga , A la ba m a. A n auto psy

r ev ea le d f

or eh ea d a br as ion s and 2 7 guns hot w ound s f ro m apis tol or

ar if le a nd a sho tgun. L awhor

n v. S ta te , 575 S o. 2d 11 59, 1161 (Ala. Crim . App. 1990) (“ Lawhorn I”) . “ The c ause of death w as

‘ m ultip le gunsh ot and sho tgun wounds’ ” because “ [t] he wounds from either weap on wou ld ha ve be en fat al .” Id. Th atev en in g a nd in th e fo ll owi ng da y s, a 3 s h o t g u n , p i s t o l , a n ds h e l l s w e r e r e c o v e r e df r o m Wa l k e r ’s r e s i d e n c e . Af i r e a rms ex pe rt not ed that the spe nt s hot gun she lls f ound ne ar the vic tim ’ s bo dy

ha d th e

“ sa m e cl as s c hara ct er ist ic s” a s th e shot gun re co ve re d f ro m W al ke r’ s r es ide nc e, but w as una ble to say w ithabsol ute c er

ta inty w he the r the spe nt s he lls w er e fi re d f ro m the sho tgun. I d. H e w as , how ev er , able to de te rm ine that the spe nt . 25 a uto cal ib er p ro

jecti le s re co ve redfro m

th e v ic ti m ’s bo dy were fir edfro m th e p is to l. A fi nge rp ri nt e xpe rt

m at ch ed apr int li ft ed f ro m the e xte ri or

pa sse nge r door

of W al ke r’ s tr

uc k to L awhor

n.Ac c or din gto Wa lli s, he sp ok e to L awh or n s ometim e betw e e n 9 :00 P.M . a nd mid night. 4 R1-17, Ex h. Tab 9 at 333, 335; Tab 10a at 387. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S. C t. 1602 (1966). 5 The arr est form shows that L awhor n was arr ested on 2 April 1988 at 10:30. The time of 6 da y , h ow e ve r, is unc le ar: the fo rm ha s tw o bo xes to be c he c ke d to ind ic ate wh e the r t he tim e is A .M . or P.M.; the chec k mark on the f orm is located in betwe en the two box es. R1-17, Ex h. Tab 4 at 6.

5 T ha t e ve nin g, L awhor

n w as int er

vie w ed by F ranki e W al lis , a n in ve sti ga tor wit h t he Tall ad eg a Co un ty Sheri ff’s Dep art m en t. R1- 17 , Exh . Tab 9 at 3 32 . 4 W al lis a dvi se d L awhor

n of his c onst itu tio na l r igh ts u sin g astandard Mi randa fo rm . I d. a t 33 2- 33; T ab 10a a t 33 5- 337, 387 -8 8, 392 . A ft er he w as a dvi se d of 5 his r igh ts, L awhor

n in dic at ed

that he und er sto od h is r igh ts, a nd answ er ed “ [y ] es ” whe n a sk edwhet he r he wis he d t o t al k t o Wall is an d t he ot he r of fic ers at t ha t t im e. Id . , T ab 9 a t 33 6; T ab 10a a t 38 8. H e the n e xe cu te d aw ai ve r fo rm , w itn es se d by W al lis , a nd m ad e a sta te m en t. I d. , T ab 9 a t 33 6- 37; T ab 10a a t 38 8. I n th e statem ent, L aw horn said th at he had stay ed with W alker for several nights and th at he ha d m et

Be rr y , w ho h e unde rs too d w as W al ke r’ s bo y fr ie nd. I d. a t T ab 9 a t 33 7- 38. A ft er he w as a ske d a

bout be ing se enby

Br as he r dur ing the m or

nin g of 31 March, Lawhorn said that he wanted a lawy er and all questi onin g stop ped. I d. at 338. L awhor

n w as the n arr es te d f

or Be rr y ’ s m ur de r an d pl ac ed

in the T al la de ga CountyJail. Id. , T ab 4 at 6. Lawhorn, however, did no t talk to a lawy er a t that

6 tim e or be fo re he ne xt s awW al lis on 7 Apr il.6

On 7 April, W allis and Ann W allace, an em ploy ee of the T alladega D istrict A tto rn ey ’ s of

fi ce , w er e w al kin g pa st L awhor n’ s c el l w he n L awhor

n c al le d to W al lis a nd t old

him that he w an te d to ta lk. I d. , T ab 9 a t 34 0- 41; T ab 10a a t 37 1- 70. W al lis e xpl ai ne d to L awhor n th at he c oul d no t t al k to L awhor n be ca use he ha d a ske d f

or a n a tto rn ey

but L awhor n sa id tha t he w an te d to w ai ve his r igh ts, ta lk to W al lis , a nd t el l hi m

w ha t ha d ha

ppe ne d. I d. , T ab 9 a t 34 1. W al lis tol d Lawhorn that he w as busy but that he would get back with Lawhorn, and Lawhorn res po nd edby tell in g Wall is to co m e b ack . Id. at 34 1- 42 . T ha t a ft er noon , W al lis , W al la ce , and L ie ute nant B ill y Joe P ope m et

w ith Lawhorn. Id. at 343, 348; Tab 10a at 389, 394-95. W allis again advised Law horn of his Miranda rights and Law horn stated that he un derstood h is rights and wished to waive them . Id., Ta

b 9 at 342-45 , 348; Ta

b 10a at 350-51 , 389-91. L aw horn sig ne d aw ai ve r an d w ro te on i t tha t he did not w an t a law y er . I d. , T ab 9 a t 34 5- 46; Tab 10a at 352, 391. L aw horn’ s waiver wa s then sig ned by

Pope, W allace, and W allis as witnesses. Id., Ta b 9 at 345-46 ; Ta

b 10a at 391. Lawhorn then m ade two statem ents. T he first statem ent was m ade about 3:55 P. M. At that tim e, L awhor n st at ed that W al ke r tr ie d to hir e him to kil l B er

ry but that he w oul d no t do it. I d. , T ab 9 a t 34 7- 48; T ab 10a a t 35 2, 392 , 394 . A ft er

abr eak inc onve rs at ion an d a ft er L awhor n w as e nc our ag ed

to te ll the tr

uth , L awhor

n m ad e the se co nd7

statem ent about 5: 40 P.M. Id. , T ab 9 at 348; Tab 10a at 352-54, 392-93. Betw een the tw o st at em en ts tha t a ft er noon , the of

fi ce rs did not r ea dm ini ste r a Mi randa warning, but “ refe rred bac k” to the Miranda warning giv en to Lawhorn earlier that sa m e day . I d. , T ab 9 a t 34 8- 49. Inthe se co nd s ta te m en t, L awhor n de sc ri be d inde ta il his part ic ipa tio n in Berr y ’ s m urder. H e said that, during the wee k when he w as stay ing with W alker, W alker told him

that she was scared of Be rry and, alm ost daily , had off ered to pay L awhor n to “ ge t r id” of

Be rr y . L awhor

n I , 581 S o. 2d a t 11 62. H e sa id tha t, w hil e they we re out running err ands, they picked up Law horn’ s brother, Ma c L aw horn (“ Mac ”), an d Walk er as ke d M ac i f he was i nt eres te d i n e arn in g s om e m on ey . Af ter Mac answer ed “ [y ] es” and asked what the j ob inv olved, W alker explained that she wanted to “ [g] et rid of [B erry ] .” R1-17, E xh. T ab 10a at 410. W alker had Ma c lie dow n inthe tr

uc k w hil e the y

dr ove to re tr ie ve asho tgun and s he lls f ro m the auto m obi le of

W al ke r’ s so n, Ro be rt

K ilg or e. I d. a t 41 0- 12. W al ke r the n dr ove Lawhorn and Mac to a wooded area which she and Ber

ry had visited. Lawhorn and Mac got out of the truck and waited in the woods while W alker w ent to get Berr y . Lawhorn car

ried a pistol taken from

W alker’ s truck; Mac loaded and then carr ie d th e shot gun.8

W al ke r re tur

ne d w ithBe rr

y , a nd the n sh e le ft

the tr uc k to go a cr oss the ro ad . B er ry ini tia lly start ed a cr oss the r oa d w ithW al ke r an d th enbe gan r unni ng dow n th e ro ad . W al ke r fo und L awhor n and M ac a nd t old

the m that B er ry ha d r un aw ay . She then got int o the driver’ s seat of her tr uck and had Law horn and Mac lie dow n inthe tr

uc k be d. S he tol d L awhor n and M ac that, w he n sh e ca ught up w ithBe rr y , she w oul d sl am

on the br ak es . Whe n sh e slam

m ed on the br ak es , Ma c “ ra ise d up ” in the tr uc k and s hot Be rr y . L awhor

n I , 581 S o. 2d at 11 62. B er ry f el l bu t go t up a nd r antow ar ds the w oods . L awhor

n st at ed that M ac the n sh ot at B er ry a ga in. A ft er

Be rr y f el l, Lawhorn w alked over to Berr y and heard him

m aking “ gurglin g nois es.” Id. at 1163 . Lawhorn said that he shot Berry about three tim es to “ m ake sure he w as de ad . ” I d. L awhor

n and M ac the n go t ba ck

int o th e tr

uc k, W al ke r put

the pis tol an d t he sh el ls in to a sa ck , and th ey ret urne d t o t own . About 5:3 0 P . M. , L awhor

n and K ilg or e w en t t o th e m ur de r sc en e to l ook fo r any pistol or shotgu n shells b ecause L aw horn did not want to leave any evidence at the scene. T hey

did no t find any

and went to W alker’ s hous e. K ilgore instructed W alker to clean the shot gun and get the pistol but found out that W alker ha d gi ve n pi sto l t o M ac to dis card . L awhor n c al le d M ac , a nd the n w en t w ith W al ke r to L awhor

n’ s m oth er ’ s ho use to re tr ie ve the pis tol . W al ke r w ai te d intheWalker and Ma c we re a lso indicted for murder of Be rry pursuant to a c ontrac t for hire for 7 $40 consideration. Walker was convicted in 1988 and se ntence d to death. On a ppeal, he r convic tion was re verse d beca

use of a violation under B atson v. Kentuc ky , 476 U.S. 79, 106 S. Ct . 1712 (1986). Walker v. State, 586 So. 2d 49 (Ala. Crim. App. 1991) (re manding for evidentiar y proce eding s), 611 So.2d 1133 (Ala. Crim. App. 1992), ce rt. denied ( Ala. J an 22, 1993) (No. 1920188), ove rruled on other g rounds, Smith v. S tate, 838 So.3d 413 (Ala. Crim. App. 2002) (per curiam). She was r etried and convic ted in 2004, and sente nced to life. Her conviction was a ffirme d. Walker v. Alaba ma, 919 So. 2d 1235 (Ala. Crim. App. 2004). He r petitions for writ of certiorar i wer e denie d, In re Walker , 920 So. 2d 1141 (Ala. 2004); Walker v. A labama, 544 U .S. 925, 125 S. C t. 1645 (2005). Mac w as convic ted in 1989, and sente nced to life without the possibil ity of parole. L awhor

n v. State, 574 So.2d 970 (Ala. Crim. App. 1990), ce rt. denied, ( Ala. Jan. 25, 1991) (No. 1900484). Giddens had be en in pr actice less than five y ear s. R1-17, Ex h. Tab 43 at 19. His brother, 8 Rod Giddens, was an assistant district a ttorney assig ned to assist in L awhor n’s prosec ution. I d. at 23, 97-98. No objection was r aised a s to any potential conflict re sulting fr om the Giddens brother s servingas def

ense a nd prosec uting attorney s. I d. at 71, 98-99. 9 truck while L aw horn got the pistol . When they returned to W alker’ s hous e, K ilg or e too k th e pis tol a nd s ai d th at he w oul d take c ar e of

it . T he ne xt m or

nin g, L awhor n w en t t o th e bank w ithW al ke r. S he pa id L awhor n $5 0 “ fo r ‘ ge tti ng r id’ of Berry .” Id . at 1 16 4. A c om pla int c harg ing L awhor

n w ithint en tio na lly

c au sin g th e de ath of Be rr y pur suant t o ac ontra ct

w ithW al ke r fo r co nsi de ratio n of $10 0, in vio la tio n of A la . Co de 13A -5 -4 0( a) (7 ), a nd an arr es t w ar rant w er e iss ue d on8 Apr il 1988 . R 1- 17, E xh. T ab 4 a t 5, 9. L awhor n su bm itt ed a n a ff idavit of ind ige nc y , a nd o n 10 7 May 198 8, a tto rn ey

S te ve n D . G idd en s w as appoi nte d to r ep re se nt h im . R 1- 17, 8 E xh. T ab 4 a t 7- 8. L awhor n w as ind ic te d f

or Be rr y ’ s m ur de r on 2 Jun e 1988 . I d. at 9- 10.10

On 9 June 1988 , attorney Hank Fannin was appointed to represent L aw horn as lea d c ou ns el , and Fan ni n a nd Gid de ns ap pe ared wit h Lawh orn a t ar rai gn m en t. Id., Ta b 43 at 7-8, 10, 19, 88. Fannin and Giddens m et w ith Law horn on 9 June, 11 Augus t, a nd o n 10 N ove m be r 1988 . I d. a t 20 -2 2, 27- 28, 33, 94. I n June 198 8, Gid de ns pre pa redan d fi le d a m ot io n t o s up pr es s Lawh orn’s co nf es si on . Id. at 23 . Inthe m oti on, L awhor

n a lle ge d th at

his state m en ts “ w er e m ad e unde r dur es s in response to a prom ise of leniency or better tr eatm ent.” Id. The m otion wa s ap pa ren tl y

de ni ed , and th e cas e p ro ceed edto di sc ov ery. D ur ing “ ope n c ourt” in January 198 9, L awhor

n’ s a tto rn ey s m ove d f

or the ap poi ntm en t of

a n in ve sti ga tor

“ to d isc ove r an y

m iti ga tin g f

ac tor s . . . of

a ny si gn ifi can ce . . . in th e ev en t [Lawh orn wa]s co nv ic te d.” Id., Tab 4 at 22 . In ve sti ga tor

Ja ck Ma tso n w as appoi nte d to inv es tig at e L awhor n’ s ba ck gr ound , inc lud ing his f

am ily , e duc at ion , e m

plo ym en t, c ri m ina l hi sto ry , a nd dru g and al co hol use . I d. ; T ab 43 at 65 -6 6. I n F eb ru ar y , F an nina nd G idd en s m ove d f or

“ [f]un ds to [e]m

pl oy [p]sy ch ia tri st ” to “ co ns ul t wi th . . . co un se l an d m ak e . . . inv es tig at ion s and e xa m ina tio ns” f or pr ep ar at ionof

ade fe nse dur ing the gui ltThere is ne ither an order addre ssing the motion for funds to a n employ a psychiatrist nor 9 a psychiatric assessment in the re cord. R1-17, Exh. Tab 43 at 81-85, 102- 03. 11 ph as e an d fo r us e as a m it ig at in g fa ct ordu rin g t he pe na lt y ph as e. Id ., Tab 4 at 1 8. T his m oti on w as appare ntl y de nie d. 9 Although no psy chiatric assessm ent was pre pared, a m ental assessm ent was pr ep ar ed by T al la de gaMe nta l H ea lthCe nte r co or din at or G ar y L . G ar ne r at the request of the trial j udge. In the assessm ent, G arner reported that L aw horn

“ adm itted to alcoho l use since age 14.” Id. at 21. G arner opin ed that Lawhorn appeared “ capable of understanding th e nature of le gal proceedings” that he was faci ng , “ cap ab le of a ss is ti ng hi s at to rn ey in pre pa rin g fo r hi s d efen se an d t ria l,” an d no t “ in n ee d of

f urthe r psy ch ia tr ic e xa m ina tio n and tre atm en t. ” I d. InApr il 1989 , G idd en s m ove d to w ith dr awa s c ouns el a nd g av e his c as e fi le to Fannin. Id. , T ab 43 at 41, 88-89. O ne we ek before the tr ial began, attorney Mark N elson was appointed to repre sent Lawhorn, w ith Fannin rem aining as lead co unse l. I d. a t 41 -4 2, 106 -0 7. F an nina nd N el son dis cu sse d de fe nse str at eg ie s, inc lud ing sup pr es sio n of

the c onf es sio n and m iti ga tin g f

ac tor s f or the pe na lty phase in the event Law horn was found guil ty . Id. at 109-11 . Before the trial be gan, N el son pr ep ar ed

am oti on f

or c hange of

ve nue , m et

onc e w ithL awhor

n, rev ie wedth e fi le , di d s om e li br ary res earc h, an d c on ta ct edth e p ot en ti al wit ne ss es .12

Id. at 107-14 . The c hange of venue m otion wa s based on prejudicial pretria l publ ic ity ; i t w as de nie d on24 Apr il 1989 . I d. , T ab 4 a t 13 -1 7. L awhor n’ s tr ia l be gan on24 Apr il 1989 . R 1- 17, E xh. T ab 3. D ur ing the tr ia l, L awhor

n’ s a tto rn ey

obj ec te d to the intro duc tio n of L awhor n’ s se co nd sta te m en t on7 Apr il be ca use ane wMi randaw ar

nin g w as not

giv en ; the obj ec tio n w as ove rr ru le d. I d. , T ab 9 a t 34 9. L awhor n te sti fi ed

that, a ft er

the f ir st s ta te m en t on 7 Apr il 1988 , W al lis c hange d th e ta pe in the r ec or de r an d to ld h im that he

“ needed to tell [his] part in the story , e xactly what happened and tell the truth.” Id . , T ab 10a

a t 35 3- 54. L awhor

n st at ed that he tol d W al la ce “ tha t the f ir st t ap e tha t I gave w as the tr

uth , a nd [ W al lis ] sa id, ‘ N o, it w as not the tr uth . ’ [ W al lis ] sa id that I needed to tell the part that I play ed in this . . . m urder . . . and said I needed to t el l the tr

uth . ” I d. a t 35 4; s ee a lso 355 -5 6. L awhor n sa id tha t W al lis w as the one w ho t old

him to sto p ly ing a nd t o te ll the tr uth , but that W al la ce , P ope , a nd Tall ad eg a Co un ty Sheri ff J erry Stu dd ardwere al so in th e ro om . Id. at 35 4. Lawhorn declar ed that he wa s “ frightened” and “ scared to death” beca use they ke pt “ qu es ti on in g [h im ] ov er an d o ve r ab ou t t he same thi ng .” Id . at 3 56 -5 7. He sa id tha t, a lth oughW al lis sa id tha t “ it w oul d be be tte r on [ L awhor n] . . . if I w oul d te ll the tr uth , ” W al lis ne ve r pr ovi de d any spe ci fi c inf

orm at iona s to howit

w oul d be be tte r, ne ve r thr eate ne d hi m , a nd n ev er of fe re d or pr om ise d anythi ng i n13

exchange for a statem ent. I d. at 357, 359-61, 364. H e also conceded that he wa s aw ar e of his Mi randar igh ts whe n he m ad e the state m en ts o n 7 Apr il. I d. a t 36 2, 365- 66. Fo llo w ing one a nd o ne -h al f day s of tr ia l, the part ie s w er e pe rm itt ed c los ing ar gum en ts. D ur ing the c los ing a rg um en t, F an ninc onc ed ed that the re w as a m urder and that L aw horn had adm itted sho oting the victim but asked that th e j ury n o tc o n v i c tLa w h o rn o f

c ap i t a l mur d e r . I d . , Ex h . Ta b 1 2 a t4 5 8 - 6 2 . Th e ju ry, ho wev er, ret urne d a ve rd ic t o f gu il ty of cap it al m ur de r on 26 Apri l at 3: 15 P.M. Id . , T ab 15. The pe na lt y

he ari ng be ga n a t 4 :0 5 P .M. on th e sa m e d ay . Id., Tab 16 a. A ft er a n op en ing state m en t by the pr ose cu tor , F an ninpr es en te d se ve ra l w itn es se s, inc lud ing L awhor

n. F an nina ske d L awhor

n hi s nam e an d a ske d L awhor n to m ak e his r eque ste d st at em en t t o th e j ur y . L awhor

n th enstate d: Me m be rs of the j ur y , I kno wI w as w ro ng and I w an t a ll y ou t o kn ow I w as w ro ng, a nd I ’ d li ke to say ple as e ha ve m er cy

on m e. I w an t a ll y ou t o kn owI w as w ro ng. I w as le ad a nd I w as w ro ng. I sho uld not h a v e d i di t . I d i di t . I ’m s o rry. T h a t ’s a l l I h a v e t o s a y. Id., Exh. Ta

b 18 at 545 . Fannin asked Law horn no further questio ns, and turned him ove r to the pr ose cu tor

f or c ro ss- ex am ina tio n. F oll ow ing L awhor n’ s c ro ss-14

ex am ina tio n, the pr ose cu tor intro duc ed

the r ec or ds o f L awhor

n’ s pr ior c onvi ct ion s fo r bu rg la ry , th eft , and po ss es si on of b ur gl ary to ol s. Id ., Exh . Tab 1 9 a t 5 75 -7 8. Fanni n th en“ w ai ve [d ] ” cl osi ng arg um en t and o bj ec te d “ to the S ta te m ak ing an y f urthe r cl osi ng arg um en ts. ” I d. , T ab 21 at 58 4. T he state r es pond ed that i t had a “ split” argum ent and that, based on Alabam a Suprem e Court prec edent, had the r igh t “ ev enif

he doe s no t arg ue ” “ to o pe n and t o c los e. ” I d. A lth oughF an nin m ai nta ine d th at , if

he did not a rg ue , the state ha d a lr ea dy “ ope ne d and c los ed , ” the pr ose cu tor

r es pond ed

that “ Fanni n’ s po sit ionw as “ the lawin a ci vil c as e . . . but it is not [the law] in a crim inal case. ” Id. , T ab 22 at 585. The trial court then pe rm itt ed the state to pr es en t a

se co nd, r eb utt al c los ing a rg um en t. I d. ; T ab 43 at 5 2 . Du ri n g t h e r eb u t t al cl o s i n g ar g u m en t , t h e p ro s ec u t o r d i re ct ed t h e ju ry’s atte nti on t o L awhor

n and i de nti fi ed

him a s B er ry ’ s “ ex ec uti one r” dur ing “ a ly ing in- w ai t am

bush ” w hic h w as “ as c old a nd c al cu la te d and a s m er ci le ss . . . a s y ou can ge t. ” I d. , T ab 22 at 58 9, 591 . T he tr ia l c ourt i nstru ct ed

the j ur y on the e le m en ts n ec es sary to fi nd ag gr av at ing c ir cu m stanc es inv olv ed in the c ri m e. I t e xpl ai ne d th at one aggravating circum stance, that the offense w as com m itted for capital gain, w as es ta bli she d by

the j ur y ’ s ve rd ic t of

gui lty of m ur de r fo r hir e. I t the n st at ed :15

A nothe r [c ir cu m stanc e] y ou c oul d c onsi de r . . . not pr ove n by

y our v er d i ct i s t h at t h e c ap i t al o ff en s e w as es p ec i al l y h e[ i n o u s ], at [] ro ci ous, or

c ru el , c om

pare d w ithoth er

c ap ita l of

fe nse s a s se t ou t [i n th e sta tut e] de fi nin g a ggr av at ing c ir cu m stanc es . Id . , T ab 23 at 59 5. T he j ur y pr oc ee de d to de lib er at ion s. A t 7: 35 P . M. , the j ur y r et ur ne d a ve rd ic t r ec om

m en din g th at

L awhor n be se nte nc ed

to de ath. I d. , T ab 24 at 60 1- 02. A pr es en te nc e inv es tig at ionr ep ort w as pr ep ar ed a nd f ile d a t the 26 June 1989 se nte nc ing he ar ing . I d. , T ab 4 a t 44 . A t the he ar ing , ne ith er L awhor n no r hi s co un se l o bjec te d t o a ny sta te m en ts wit hi n t he pre se nt en ce i nv es ti ga ti on rep or t, of fere d a ny oth er ev id en ce, o r req ue st eda li fe s en te nc e. Id ., Tab 2 5 a t 6 07 -0 8. T he tr ia l c ourt i ndi cate d th at it ha d c onsi de re d th e pr es en te nc e inv es tig at ion report, and that “ [n] othin g in [it] would . . . constitu te a m itigatin g circum stance . ” Id . , T ab 1 a t 66 -6 7. I t f

ound that the L awhor

n ha d th re e pr ior

f el ony c onvi ct ion s, an d th at the of fe nse w as c om

m itt ed f or pe cuniary

ga in and w as “ es pe ci al ly he in ou s, at ro ci ou s, o r cru el co m pa redto ot he r cap it al off en se s.” Id . at 6 7- 68 . The tri al co ur t t he n s en te nc edLawho rn to de at h. Id ., Tab 2 5 a t 6 08 . L awhor n’ s c onvi ct iona nd s en te nc e w er e af fi rm ed by the A la ba m a Co urt of Cr im ina l Appe al s, L awhor n v. S ta te , 581 S o. 2d 1 159 (A la . Cr im . App. 199 0) (“ L awhor n I ”) , a nd the A la

ba m a Su pr em e Co urt, I n r e L awhor n, 581 S o. 2d 1 179On appe al, L awhor n raised the following issues: (1) whe ther the tria l court er red in: (a) 10 de nyinga c ha ng e of ve nu e based

on pr e tr ia l pu

bli c ity ; ( b) fa ili ngto i nq

uir e wh e the r t

he ve nir e so favor ed the de ath penalty that they would not vote for life imprisonment without the possibi lity of parole ; ( c) denying his motion to suppr ess his c onfession beca use it wa s involuntary ; (d) cha rg ing the jury that it could consider the a g g ravating c ircumstance that the m urder was atrocious, crue l or heinous as compa

red to other

capital of

fense s; and (e) fi nding no mitig atingcirc umstances; (2) whether his de ath sentenc e was unconstitutional be cause the state argued that the verdic t should not be base d on sy

mpathy ; (3) whe ther the pr esente nce r eport wa s highly prejudicia l beca

use it included a re commended se ntence of death; and (4) whether he was denied a fair tr ial and re liable sentenc ing as a r esult of prosec utorial misconduct. L awhor n I , 581 So. 2d at 1164-79. In 1990, L awhor

n filed a pe tition for writ of ce rtiorar i, addre ssing the issues r aised be fore the Court of Criminal Appea ls and “13 additional issues.” L awhor n I I , 581 So. 2d at 1180-81. One of the ra ised additional issues conce rned whether he was subjected to unre asonable delay in securing a judicial dete rmination of proba ble ca use for his warr antless ar

rest. R1-17, Exh. Tab 30 at iv, 53- 54. He a

rgued that his four da y s of d etention before a n arr est war

rant wa s obtained unconstitutionally deprive d him of his r ight to a fair and reliable deter mination of probable cause . I d. Th e Ala

bama Sup re me Court

fo un d n o r e ve rs ibl e e rr or and a dd re sse d o nly

on e of the ne wl y raised issues: whe ther the tria l court er red by allowingtwo of the prosec utor’s witnesses to sit at the prosec ution’s table throug hout the trial. L awhor n I I , 581 So. 2d at 1180-81. In his petition for writ of ce rtiorar i to the United States Supreme Court, L awhor n raised 11 only two issues: ( 1) whether a state jury was pe rmitted to find the “espe cially heinous, atroc ious or crue l” aggrav at i ngcirc umstance when it had re ceive d an instruction on that circ umstance a nd the circ umstance ha d been r ejec ted in two separ ate tria ls involvi ngthe same of fense , and (2) whether Powers v. Ohio, 499 U.S. 400, 111 S. Ct. 1364 (1991) s h o u l dbe applied r etroa ctively and thus pe rm it L awh orn, a whi te de fe nd ant, to c ha lle ng e the state ’s e xclu sio n o f b la c k v e nir e me mbe rs . R17 -1 , Exh. Ta

b 34 at i, 7- 12 . H e did

no t r a ise the iss ue of

unre a so na

ble de lay in o bta ini ngan a

rr e st war rant. 16 (A la . 199 1) ( “ L awhor

n I I” ). O n 9 S ep te m

be r 1991 , L awhor

n f ile d ape tit ionf

or 10 writ of c ert io rari wit h t he Uni te d S ta te s Su pr em e Co ur t. The p et it io n was de ni ed . 11 certiorar i, L aw horn v. Ala bam a, 502 U.S . 970, 112 S. Ct. 445 (199 1) (“ Lawhorn II I” ), a nd p et iti on f

or r eh eari ng, L awhor

n v. A la ba m a, 502 U . S. 105 0, 112 S . Ct . 919 (199 2) (“ Lawhorn IV ”).17

I n h i s ap p e a l s t o t h e A l ab a maC o u rt o f C r i mi n a l Ap p e a l s a n dA l ab a ma Su pr em e Co urt, L awhor

n w as r ep re se nte d by

F an ninw itha ssi stanc e fr om the Ca pit al Re sour ce Ce nte r in M ont gom er y , A la ba m a. R 1- 17, E xh. T ab 43 at 73 -7 4, 11 7- 18 . Lawhorn m oved for postcon viction relief under Alabam a Rule of C rim inal Pr oc ed ur e 32. I n th is m oti on, L awhor n r ai se d, int er

a lia , the de lay

in the procurem ent of an arr est warrant. Id. , T ab 36 at 3; Tab 38 at 3. The state court he ld an e vid en tiary

he ar ing on the m oti on. A t the he ar ing , L awhor n’ s c ourtap poi nte d tr ia l c ouns el te sti fi ed . F an ninstate d th at , a t the ti m e of his appoi ntm en t, he ha d be enin pr ac tic e fo r ove r 20 y ears , ha d tr ie d be tw ee n 15 0 and 2 00 f el ony j ur y tr ia ls, inc lud ing oth er

c ap ita l c as es , a nd w as f

am ili ar w ithA la ba m a de ath pe na lty law . I d. , T ab 43 at 12 , 62- 63. H e opi ne d th at a n a tto rn ey

pr ovi din g effe ctive assistance in a capital ca se would “ investig ate the ca se as m uch as poss ibl e, ” co nf

er a nd d isc uss the laww iththe de fe ndant and any c o- co unse l, a nd wor k o ut a st rat eg y

forbo th th e g ui lt an d p en al ty pha se s. Id . at 1 3- 14 . He co nf irm ed that he obt ai ne d in fo rm at ion , inc lud ing L awhor n’ s c onf es sio n, f ro m the pr ose cu tio n, a nd tha t he a nd G idd en s c onsi de re d w he the r L awhor n’ s c onf es sio n co uld be sup pr es se d and w he the r ve nue sho uld be c ha lle nge d ba se d onw he re the cr im e oc curr ed . I d. a t 14 -1 7, 24- 28, 69- 70, 90- 97. F an nin ’ s f ee de cl ar at ionTh e de fe ns e c ri me sc e ne inv e sti g atio n fo c us e d on the ir c on c e rn s a s to the sp e c if ic c ounty 12 in which the cr ime occur

red. This strateg y

was ultimately

not pur sued af

ter one trial witness testified t h at t h e s ce n e was clea

rly in Talladeg a County

and leg al re sear ch provide d that a cr ime could be prosec uted if it occur

red w ithin one mile of a county line. R1-17, Ex h. Tab 43 at 24-27. 18 reveale d that he spent 1 4.5 hours out of court prepar ing for trial. R1-17, E xh. T ab 43 a t E xh. 2, 4. F an ninspe nt e igh t ho ur s on10 O ct obe r 1988 inv es tig at ing the co unty in w hic h th e cr im e oc curr ed , a nd the r em ai nin g si x and o ne -h al f hour s in 12 three m eetings with Lawhorn and in preparing a m otion for a psy chiatrist. I d. at E xh. 2 a t 2. F an nina nd G idd en s’ s tr ia l strate gy w as to m ak e the state pr ove it s case “bey ond a reasonable doub t to the satisfaction of the jury .” R1-17, E xh. T ab 43 a t 18 , 69. F an nine xpl ai ne d th at , a ft er r es earc hin g th e m atte r an d di sc uss ing it w ithL awhor

n and G idd en s, he m ad e a str at eg ic de ci sio n to w ai ve c los ing ar gum en ts b ec au se he w an te d to pr ev en t the pr ose cu tor f ro m “ inf la m ing the m ind s of the j ur y ” by c al lin g L awhor

n “ a co ld b loo de d m

ur de re r an d ba ck

sho ote r. ” I d. at 50-51. Fannin believed that the prosecutio n’ s oppo rtunity to m ake the final cl osi ng arg um en t f

oll ow ing ade fe nse c los ing a rg um en t w as f or ec los ed und er the A la ba m a “ ru le s of

e vid en ce ” if

the de fe ndant w ai ve d c los ing a rg um en t. I d. a t 51 . G idd en s e xpl ai ne d th at

the y w an te d “ num

be r one , . . . to ke ep [ the confession] out,” and that, if they we re unable to do that, they needed for L aw horn to tes ti fy th atth e ad m it te d c on fes si on was n ot what he act ua ll y sai d. Id . at 9 6.19

G idd en s c om

m en te d th at , onc e a de fe ndant “ co nf es se s to the c ri m e, the de fe nse is ve ry dif fi cu lt fr om

that po int

f or w ar d. I t’ s di ff

ic ult to co nvi nc e the j ur

y that [ the de fe ndant] didn’ t do it

w he n he tol d th e pol ic e he did . [ T ] he str at eg y a t tha t po int is j ust up i n th e ai r. ” I d. a t 10 0. Fanni n, G idd en s, a nd M at son, the ir inv es tig at or , spo ke w ithanum be r of potenti al w itnesses before the trial including Shirley Hudson, L aw horn’ s m other; D eb ra L awhor n Jo ne s, L awhor

n’ s si ste r; Rh onda

P et er s, L awhor

n’ s j uve nil e pr oba tio n of

fi ce r an d c ouns el or ; and J er ry L awre nc e, L awhor

n’ s j uni or hig h sc hool pr inc ipa l. I d. a t 42 -4 4, 50, 70, 74. F an ninr em em be re d vi sit ing w ith H udso n and J one s, but

did not r em em be r the sub stanc e of

the ir c onve rs at ion . I d. at 42-43. A lthou gh Matson ’ s report m entioned th at L aw horn had sm oked m ar ij uanaa nd u se d a lc ohol , F an nina nd G idd en s di d no t l earnof a ny sig nif ic an t al co h o l o r d ru g u s e b y La wh o rn fr o m t h ei r i n t er v i ew s wi t h La wh o rn , M at s o n ’s rep or t, o r di sc us si on s wi th th e p os si bl e wit ne ss es . Id. at 63 -6 4, 7 6- 77 , 10 0. Hudson testified that, after Lawhorn and Mac w ere arre sted, she w as approached w hil e she w as a t w ork by Be rr y ’ s w ido w . I d. a t 18 5- 86. B er ry ’ s w ido wtol d H udso n th at

she w as “ sor

ry that [ L awhor

n and M ac ] got

inv olv ed ” be ca

use “ she d i d n ’t f ee l t h ey h ad an yth i n g t o d o wi t h i t ” a n dt h at “ i twa s al l Ma x i n e [ ] W al k er ’s doin gs.” I d. at 186-87; Tab 42 at 453. H udso n and Jon es testified that theyL awh or n al so c on sid e re d B ate s a bu siv e , a nd te sti fi e d th at B ate s h a d in jur e d H ud so n to 13 the extent that she neede d stitches. R1-17, Ex h. Tab 43 at 204-06.

J err y L awhor n related a few episodes of abuse by Howar d Maddox. Maddox once took 14 J er r y an d L aw h o r

n d u c k hun ti n g , an d in

ju r e d Je r r y b y h itti n g h im a c r o s s h is h e a d w ith a full 12- g aug e shell strap a s they

wer e g etting out of t h e t ru ck . R 1 -1 7 , Ex h. Tab 43 at 143-44. When the hunt proved unsucc essful, Maddox blamed J err y and L awhor

n for makingtoo much noise and be at the m. I d. at 14 4. Jer

ry sa id t hat, a lth ou g h M a dd ox ha d tr ie d to smo the r h im, ha d tw ist e d h is p e nis , sto m p ed o n h i m , and busted his chin, and oc casiona lly beat L awhor

n, Maddox denied all such conduct. I d. at 144-45, 150-51. J ones added that Maddox hit and shouted at her siblings if the y wer e around, a nd had sexually

abused he r. I d. at 164, 169-70.

20 vis ite d F an ninto re port this c onve rs at ionto Fanni n, but he did not c onsi de r it im portant. I d. a t 45 3; T ab 43 at 16 8- 69, 187 . Je rr y L awhor n ( “ Je rr y ”) , L awhor

n’ s br oth er , te sti fi ed

that, a ft er

H udso n div or ce d th ei r fathe r, D ona ld L awhor n ( “ D ona ld” ), she m ar

ri ed G eo rg e Ba te s. I d. at 138 . B at es w as a“ a re al m ean f el low ” w ho drank a

lot a nd w as phy sic al ly ab u s i v e t o t h e i r

“mo t h e r , th e k i d s [ i n c l u d i n g L a w h o rn ] a n da n yo n e w h o c a me across his path.” Id. at 137-41, 158. In 1972, Bates c ut Hilton Maddox “ real 13 ba d” dur ing af

igh t and w as the n sh ot and k ill ed by Ma ddox . I d. a t 14 1. Je rr y sa id th atHud so n m arri edMad do x’s b ro th er, Ho ward , ano th er “ ab us iv e al co ho li c,” 14 wit hi n a y ear o f Bat es ’s dea th bu t d iv or cedhi m ab ou t a year la te r. Id. at 14 2- 43 . A f ewy ears late r, Hudson began datin g Randall Hudson (“ Randall”) and m arrie d him in 1977 . I d. a t 14 6. R an da ll w as a lso abusi ve to the boy s, be at ing the m a nd ha nd cu ffi ng th em

to th e st ai rs when th ey

m is be ha ve d. Id . at 1 48 -4 9, 1 51 , 16 8. Whe n H udso n w as w orkin g or spe ndi ng w ee ke nds w ithRanda ll, L awhor n and h isJ ones sig ned Hudson’s na me to any

school notes and r eports, and th ei r gra ndmother 15 advised them not to tell anyone that they wer e alone to preve nt child welfa re intervention. I d. at 147- 48, 167. Do na ld w a s ma rr ied at th e tim e , b ut l ate r d ivo rc e d, and Ma c wa s so on

re tur ne d to 16 Alabama beca use Dona ld was unable to car e for him. I d. at 152, 194. 21 three y oung er siblings were c ared f or by their sister, Jones, w ho was tw o y ears old er than L awhor

n. I d. a t 14 6- 48, 162 , 165 -6 6. 15 Whe n L awhor

n w as in the e igh th g ra de , he a nd M ac w er e se nt t o li ve w ith the ir f athe r, D ona ld, in T ex as be ca use L awhor

n w as ti re d of

li vin g w ithRanda ll an d w an te d to ge t t o kn owD ona ld. I d. a t 15 1. L awhor n e nr oll ed

in sc hool but 16 did not f ini sh e igh th g ra de . I d. a t 19 2- 99. A ft er D ona ld w as a rr es te d f

or dr ivi ng u n d ert h e i n fl u en ce a f

ew m o n t h s l at er , La wh o rn l i v ed wi t h s o m e o f D o n al d ’s friends for a

bout six m onth s and occasionallyattended school . Id. at 194-96 . In 1981 , D ona ld a dm itt ed

that he w as ac hr oni c al co hol ic a nd w as una ble to hol d a job , and th ey

m ov edto Geor gi a to li ve wit h Do na ld ’s bro th er an d s is te r-i n- la w, Bi ll an d Dat he rle ne Lawho rn . Id. at 19 9. A ft er L awhor n m ove d to G eo rg ia , he li ve d f or sho rt pe ri ods of

ti m e w ithhis unc le a nd a

unt , his m oth er

a nd s te p- fathe r, oth er

r el at ive s, a nd h is f

athe r, a nd oc ca sio na lly

a tte nde d sc hool . I d. a t 15 7, 199 -2 04. I n 19 82, L awhor n dr oppe d ou t of school when he turned 16 y ears old and did no t com plete the ninth grade. Id. at 203. H e m ove d in to a

r en ta l tra ile r w ithhis br oth er Je rr y a nd anothe r fr ie nd, a ndAppell believed that Fa nnin w as ineffe ctive in f

ailing to a dvise the judge , the jury , and 17 the dis tr ic t atto rn e y

of B e rr y ’s wi do w’ s c on ta c t wi th Hu ds on . I d. at 33 2- 33 . App e ll a lso op ine d th at, to have e ffe ctively

repr esente d L awhor

n, Fa nnin should have pre ssed for f unds for a psy chiatric or psy cholog ical evaluation, offe red evidence of L awhor n’s druguse and B err

y ’s widow’s de sire that L awhor n not be sentenc ed to death, rebutted unfa vorable statements in the presentence investigation at sentenc ing, a

nd asked the jury

and the judg e not to sentenc e L awhor n to death. I d. 317-20, 325- 26, 329-31, 339-40, 348- 50. 22 attem pted to su pport him self. Id. at 152-53, 204. Jerr y testified that Lawhorn use d narc oti cs , but

w as ne ve r vio le nt t ow ar ds any one . I d. a t 15 1, 157 -5 9. L awhor n a dm itt ed

that he ha d us ed

dr ugs fo r y ears , inc lud ing m ar ij uanaa nd narc oti cs suc h a s D ila

udi d. I d. a t 20 6, 222 . H e sa id tha t he w as “ ex tr em el y hig h” on the a ft er

noonof the m ur de r. I d. a t 22 2- 23. In198 8, L awhor

n w as e m plo y ed a t R uss el l P ipe a nd F oundry , m ak ing $3. 90 pe r hour . I d. a t 20 6- 07. O n 31 Marc h 19 88, he c as he d hi s pay ch ec k and g av e m one y to his m oth er

pay f or the pr ep ar at ionof

his inc om e ta x r et

ur n. I d. a t 20 7- 08 . He exp ect edto rece iv e $ 58 6 a s an in co m e ta x re fu nd . Id. at 20 8. Ro ge r Appe ll, aBi rm ing ha m a tto rn ey w ho s pe ci al iz ed

in cr im ina l l awa nd ha d d efen de d t en cap it al cas es , tes ti fie d a s an ex pe rt wi tn es s. Id . at 3 09 -1 2. Appell believed that Fannin provi ded ineffective a ssistance of counsel, and that his “ m ost e gr eg iou s m ist ak e” w as his f ai lur e to m ak e a cl osi ng arg um en t a t the e nd of the pe na lty

pha se . I d. a t 31 5, 323 . H e co m m en te d th at

he ha d ne ve r w ai ve d a 17Addre ssing the ine ffe ctive as s istance of counsel c laim for fa ilure to make a closing 18 argument duringthe pena lty phase, the trial court f

ound that Fa

nnin’s decision to waive his closing a rgument did not rend er h is perfor mance defic ient beca use it was a strateg ic decision to keep the district attorney from makinga closing argument. This Court has watche d [t he] district attorney [] on many occa sions during closing argument. He is powe rful and eff ective duringclosing argument. Ba sed on this Court’s ex perie nce, it is not an unusual tactica l de cision in T alladeg a County for attorney s to waive closing argument to preve nt [t he] district attorney [] from making a c los ingargume nt. Tr ial cou rt’ s d e c isi on to w a ive c los ingargume nt i s v ir tua lly unchalleng eable . Trial counse l’s perf ormanc e wa s not deficient. R1-17, Ex h. Tab 41 at 420-22 (citations omitted).

On appe al from the de nial of his motion for postconviction relief , L awho rn raised the 19 following issues: (1) the trial c ourt err ed in adoptingthe state’s pr op o s ed fi n dings of fac t and concl u s io n s o f la

w ; an d ( 2 ) in e f

f e c ti v e a s s is ta

n c e o f c o un s e l f

o r ( a ) f a il in g to ma

k e a c la im under Batson v. Ken t u ck y , 4 7 6 U. S. 79, 106 S. C t. 1712 (1986) at tria l, (b) fa iling to asser t a claim for unconstitutional delay

in obtaining the i n d i ct m ent, and thus a claim under County of Riverside v. McL aug hlin, 500 U.S. 44, 111 S. Ct. 1661 (1991), at trial; (c) failingto lay a prope r foundation for th e tr ia l c ourt

to r ule that hi s se c on d c on fe ssi on wa s n ot v olu

nta ry ; ( d) fa ili ngto a de qu ate ly investigate L awhor

n’s hi story

of alc ohol and druguse thus preve nting a jury char g e on involuntary intox ication; (e) failingto object t o the t rial court’s jury instruction on rea sonable doubt; (f) failing to adequately

prepa re L awhor

n and ot h er wi t n es s es for the pena lty

phase; (g ) fa iling to make a c los ingstate me nt at th e pe na lty ph a se ; (h) fa ili ng to have him e xami ne d by a ps y c ho log ist ; and (i ) failingto object to the trial court’s jury instruction reg arding the aggravating circumstance s that the murder w as “e specia lly

heinous, atroc ious, or crue l” when c ompare d to other capital offe nses; and (j) failing to a dequate ly object and r espond to the pre sentenc e investig ation repor t. L awhor n V, 756 So. 2d at 977-992. The Ala bama Court of Criminal Appe als observe d that L awhor n had aba ndoned 23 cl os in g a rg um en t i n a cap it al cas e an d h adne ve r he ardof a nyon e el se do in g s o. Id . a t 32 3- 24. The state trial court denied the postcon viction m otion . R1-17, E xh. T ab 18 4 2 . T h e A l ab a maC o u rto f C r i mi n a l Ap p e a l s a f

f i rme dt h e d e n i a l , a n dt h e A l ab a ma Suprem e Court denied Lawhorn’ s petition for w rit of cer tiorari. L aw horn v. State, 756 So . 2d 9 71 ( A la . Cr im . App. 199 9) , c er t. de nie d ( A la . Jan. 7, 200 0) ( N o. 1982 018) (“ Lawhorn V ”). L aw horn’ s petition for w rit of cer tiorari to the United 19many

of the iss ue s that he ra ise d in the tr ia l c ourt . I d. at 99 2- 94 . It a lso no te d th at se ve ra l c la ims raised w ithin L awhor

n’s postconviction petition were proce durally ba r r e d b eca use they “we re r aised and addr essed at trial and/or on d i re ct appea l,” id. at 994, “c ould have be en ra ised at trial and on direc t appea l but were not,” id. at 995, “c ould have be en but wer e not ra ised at tri al , b ut were addre ssed on appe al,” id. at 996, a nd “althoug h . . . not raised on a ppeal, they

wer e ad d ressed on a pp e a l” by the Al a bama Court of Cr imi na l App e a ls o r t

he Al a bama S up rem e Co urt und e r a pla in err or re view. I d. The Ala bama Court of Criminal Appeal s i n cl u d ed L awhor n’s claim that he w as subjected to a

n unconstitutional delay in the j udicial deter mination of probable c ause in the group of cla ims that were pr ocedur ally barr ed bec ause the y

wer e not ra ised at trial but wer e addr essed on appea l, and cited L awhor n I I , 581 So. 2d at 1181. L awhor n V, 756 So. 2d at 996. 24 St at es S upr em e Co urt w as de nie d. L awhor n v. A la ba m a, 531 U . S. 835 , 121 S . Ct . 93 (2000 ) (“ Lawhorn V I”). Lawhorn filed a f

ederal petition for w rit of habeas corpus. The district court ad opt ed the m ag istrate j udge ’ s r ep ort and r ec om m en da tio n th at

the pe tit ionbe gr an te d inpart

a nd d en ie d inpart , a nd v ac at ed L awhor n’ s c onvi ct iona nd sentence. The district court held, inter alia, that Lawhorn w as subjecte d to an unc onst itu tio na l de lay

in the se curi ng o f a j udi ci al de te rm ina tio n of pr oba ble c au se for his arr est and was denied ef fective a ssistance of counsel when his trial couns el f a i l e dt o mak e ac l o s i n g a r g u men tdu r i n g t h e p e n a l t y p h a s e . La w h o rn v . Ha l e y, 3 2 3 F . S up p . 2 d

1 1 5 8 ( N . D . A l a . 2 0 0 4 ) ( “L a w h o rn V I I ” ) . T h e S t a t e o f A l ab a maL aw h orn d id n o t c r o s s - a p p e a l th e d is tr ic t c o urt’ s o r d e r , an d d id n o t, th e r e f o r e , seek a 20 cer tificate of appea lability . He c ontends that a noti ce of cross-a ppeal is notnece ssary , and proc eeds to addre ss claims denied by the district court a

rguing that he is not reque sting us to enlar g e the r elief g ra nte d b y the dis tr ic t c ourt . We dis a g re e and wi ll n ot r e vie w the se c la ims . In a h a b e a s p r o c e e d i n g , “ ana

p p e a l m ay n o tb e t ak e n ” a b s e n ta “ c e rt i f i c at e o f a p p e a l a b i l i ty” indicating“which spe cific issue or issues satisfy

the showing ” “of

the denial o f a constitutional rig ht.” 28 U.S.C. § 2253 (a) , (c) (1), ( 2), (3) . The only exception is for an a

ppeal by a state or the fe de ra l g ov e rnme nt, and

no c e rt if ic ate of pr ob a

ble c a us e is re qu ir e d. F e d. R. Ap p. 22 (b )( 3) ; State of T ex . v . Gr av es , 352 F.2d 514 ( 5th Cir. 1965) (per curiam) (adoptingthe re asoningof United States ex rel. Tillery

v. Cavell, 294 F.2d 12 ( 3rd Cir. 1960) that, despite 28 U . S . C . § 2 2 5 3, a c e rt i f i c at e o f p r o b a b l e c a u s e w a s n o t e s s e n t i a l t o an a p p e a l f i l e d b y a s t at e o r i t s r e p r e s e n t at i v e ) . In Tillery , the cour

t examined the leg islative history of § 2253 which “ ma[d] e cle ar that petitions t o the fe d er al co urt s fi l edb y

p er s o n s i n s t at e c u s t o dy

re s u l t i n g i nun n ec es s ary

d el ay i nth e s t at e p ro ce ed i n gs wa s the e vil so ug ht to be re me die d. ” 29 4 F. 2d at 15. I t no te d th at “ Con g re ss w a s n ot c on c e rn e d w ith a pp e a l in the se c a se s tak e n by a state or its re pr e se ntativ e s” and that the c e rt if ic ate of pr ob a

ble c a us e re qu ir e me nt “ wa s pla inl y a de vic e to re du c e a pp e a ls fr om de c isi on s in fa vo r of state s . . . n ot t

he ir appea ls from dec isions aga inst them.” I d. at 15. To that ex tent, revie w of additional claims would, i n d e e d , c a

u s e a d d i t i o n a l d e l ay. Fur ther, a lthough a

party may raise a ny arg ument in support of a judgment, a party who has not appea led m ay not bring an argument in opposition to a judgment or attack the judg ment in any respe ct, United States v. Am er i ca n R y . Ex press Co., 265 U.S. 425, 435-36, 44 S. Ct. 560, 564 (1924), or “hitch a ride on his adver sary ’s not ice of appea l” to “enla rg e his rig hts under the judg ment o r d i m i n i s h those of the opposingparty .” Campbell v. Wainwrig ht, 726 F.2d 702, 704 (11th Cir. 1984). By failing to f

ile a cross-a

ppeal, L awhor

n failed to pr eser

ve these issues for ap p ea l . See Sik e s v . T e le lin e , Inc ., 28 1 F .3 d 1 35 0, 13 67 n. 44 (1 1th Cir . 20 02 ); T. D. S., Inc . v. She lby Mut. I ns . Co., 760 F.2d 1520, 1528 n.5 (11th Cir. 1985). Compare J ackson v. Her ring , 42 F.3d 1350, 1353 (1 1 Cir . 1 99 5) (a dd

re ssi ngpe tit ion e r’ s c la ims ra ise d b y c ro ss- a pp eal fr om t

he de nia l of

c la ims th denied by the district court whe re A labama a ppeale d the g rant of ha

beas r elief on othe r cla ims). We will thus not addre ss any of L awhor

n’s ar g uments as t o any

issue outside the scope of Alabama ’s appe al. See Ha rbor Tug& B arg e, Inc. v. B elche r TowingCo., 733 F.2 d 8 2 3 , 825 n.1 (11th Cir. 1984). 25 appealed, and m oved for a stay of the j udgm ent pendin g appeal. T he district 20 co urt gr an te d th e m oti on f or astay . R 2- 38 a t 1. II. ISS UES 1. Whe the r the dis tr ic t c ourt e rr ed in re fu sin g to appl y

the r ule of S ton e v. Powe ll, 428 U. S. 465, 96 S. C t. 3037 (1976 ), to bar consideration on habeas26

co rp us o f L awhor

n’ s F ourth A m en dm en t c la im that he w as de nie d apr om pt p ost arre st de te rm in at io n o f pr ob ab le cau se . 2. I f L awhor

n’ s F ourth A m en dm en t c la im w as not barr ed , w he the r the dis tr ic t c ourt e rr ed

in co nc lud ing that the appr opr ia te r em edy f or a ny G er ste in v . Pu gh, 420 U . S. 103 , 95 S . Ct . 854 ( 1975 ) an d C ounty of Ri ve rs ide v. Mc L au ghl in, 5 0 0 U.S . 4 4 , 1 1 1 S. Ct . 1 1 6 1 (1 9 9 1 ) v i o l at i o n wa s t h e s up p re s s i o n o f L aw h o rn ’s co nf es sio n. 3 . Wh et h ert h e d i s t ri ct co u rt erre di n co n cl u d i n g t h at La wh o rn ’s co u n s el ’s strategic decision to waive his closing argum ent at sentencing was both (a) co nst itu tio na lly

de fi ci en t and ( b) pr ej udi ci al w ith in the m eanin g of S tr ic kland v . W ashingt on, 466 U. S. 66, 104 S. C t. 2052 (1984 ). III. D ISCU SSION Whe n w e ex am ine adis tr ic t c ourt’ s or de r in p ro ce ed ing s f ile d purs uant t o § 2254 , w e re vie wthe que sti ons of lawa nd m ixe d qu es tio ns o f lawa nd f ac t de novo , a nd the f

ind ing s of

f ac t f or c le ar e rr or . S te w ar

t v. S ec ’ y , D ep ’ t of

Co rr s, 476 F. 3d 1 193, 120 8 ( 11th C ir . 200 7) . U nde r 2254 , our r ev ie wis, how ev er , c le ar ly li m it edan d h ig hl y

de fere nt ia l t o t he de ci si on s o f th e st at e co ur ts . Id.; 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (e )( 1) . S ta te c ourt f ac tua l de te rm ina tio ns are “ ‘ pr es um ed to be c or re ct ’ ” an d the pe tit ion er

be ar s “ ‘ the bur de n of

r eb utt ing th[ at ] pr es um

pti on . . . by

c le ar a nd27

co nvi nc ing e vid en ce . ’ ” Marquard v. S ec ’ y f or the D ep ’ t of

Co rr s. , 429 F . 3d 1 278, 1303 ( 11th C ir . 200 5) ( quot ing § 22 54( e) (1 )) . H ab ea s r el ie f is ava ila ble onl y in ca se s w he re the c la im s w er e ad j udi cate d onthe m er its a nd the a dj udi catio n re sul te d inade ci sio n “ co ntr ar y to, or [ tha t] inv olv ed

a n un re as ona

ble appl ic at ion of c le ar ly e sta bli she d F ed er al law , a s de te rm ine d by the S upr em e Co urt of

the U nit ed S ta te s” or

w as “ ba se d ona n un re as ona ble de te rm ina tio n of

the f ac ts i n lig ht o f the e vid en ce pr es en te d inthe S ta te c ourt pr oc ee din g. ” Cr ow e v. H al l, 490 F.3 d 8 40 , 84 5 (1 1t h C ir. 2 00 7) (qu ot in g 2 8 U.S.C. § 22 54 (d )). A . R ef usa l t o B ar

L awhor n’ s F ourth A m en dm en t C la im A la ba m a ar gue s th at

L awhor n’ s R ive rs ide /G er ste in F ourth A m en dm en t cl ai m w as barr ed

f ro m c onsi de ratio n onha

be as r ev ie wby

S ton e. I t c ont en ds tha t St one bars r ev ie wof

a ll Fo urth A m en dm en t c la im s and i s no t l im ite d to tho se contesting the state courts’ fac tual finding s. I t also m aintains that th e claim wa s barr ed be ca use , de spi te the opp ortun ity to do s o, L awhor

n f ai le d to r ai se the iss ue of his e xte nde d po st- ar

re st d et en tio n a t tri al a nd b ec au se the c la im w as r ai se d and de ci de d b y

th e st at e ap pe ll at e co ur t. U nde r the F ourth A m en dm en t, astate “ m ust pr ovi de af

ai r an d r el ia

ble de te rm ina tio n of

pr oba ble c au se a s ac ondi tio n f or a ny sig nif ic an t pr etri al r es tr ai nt of liberty , . . . m ade by

a j udicial officer either before or prom ptly after arr est.”28

Ge rstein, 420 U. S. at 125, 495 S. C t. a t 868-69 . In Riverside, the Suprem e Court co nsi de re d “ the que sti on [ of ] w ha t i s ‘ pr om

pt’ und er G er ste in” a nd “ ar

tic ula te [d ] m ore clearly

the boun daries of w hat is perm issib le under the Fourth Am endm ent.” 500 U.S . at 55, 56, 111 S. Ct. at 1169, 1170 . To that intent, the Court declared tha t the G er ste in p ro m

ptn es s r equir em en t i s m et w he re ( 1) the pr oba

ble c au se d et er m i n at i o n i s h el dwi t h i n 4 8 h o u rs o f a rr es t , ab s en tt h e a rr es t ed i n d i v i du al ’s dem onstration of an unreasonable delay , or (2) the governm ent shows a bona fi de em ergency , or other extraordinary circum stances delay ed the determ ination . Id. at 56-57, 111 S. Ct. at 1670. Bec ause Riverside set forth a “ new r ule for the co nduc t of

c ri m ina l pr ose cu tio ns, ” it is “ ap pli ed r etro ac tiv el y

to al l c as es . . . not y et final. ” Pow ell v. N evada, 511 U.S . 79, 84-85, 114 S. Ct. 1280 , 1283 (1994); Grif fit h v . Kent uc ky, 479 U.S. 31 4, 3 28 , 10 7 S . Ct. 7 08 , 71 6 (1 98 7) . W e ar e ge ne ra lly

barr ed f ro m he ar ing F ourth A m en dm en t c la im s ina fe de ra l ha be as c or pus pr oc ee din g. I n S ton e, the S upr em e Co urt he ld tha t w he re the S ta te ha s pr ovi de d an op portun ity f or f ull a nd f ai r lit iga tio n of a Fourth A m endm ent claim , a state prisoner m ay

not be granted fe de ra l ha be as c or pus re lie f on the gr ound

that e vid en ce obt ai ne d in an un co ns ti tu ti on al sea rch or s ei zu re was in tro du cedat h is tri al . 428 U . S. a t 49 4, 96 S . Ct . a t 30 52. An “ oppo rtunity

for f ull and fair litigation ” m eans j ust that: an oppo rt uni ty . I f a sta te pr ovi de s th e pr oc es se s w he re by ade fe ndant can ob ta in f

ull a nd f ai r lit iga tio n of

af ourth am en dm en t c la im , S ton e29

v. P ow el l bars f

ed er al ha be as c or pus co nsi de ratio n of

that c la im whe th er o r no t t he de fen da nt em pl oys th os e p ro ces se s. Cave r v. S ta te of

A la . , 577 F . 2d 1 188, 119 2 ( 5thCi r. 197 8) . “ ‘ [F ] ull a nd f ai r co nsi de ratio n’ in the c ont ex t of the F ourth A m en dm en t i nc lud es ‘ at le as t on e ev ide nti ar

y he ar ing in a tr ia l c ourt and the a va ila bil ity of m eanin gf

ul a ppe llate reviewwhen there are fac ts in dis pute, and full consideration byan appellate court when the fa cts are not in dispu te.’ ” Br adley v. N agle, 212 F.3d 559 , 565 (11th Cir. 2000 ) (quot ing Cave r, 577 F . 2d a t 11 91) . A lth ough“ som et im es ‘ fu ll an d f ai r co nsi de ratio n’ m eans c onsi de ratio n by tw o ti er s of

state c ourts[ ;] som et im es it re qui re s c onsi de ratio n by onl y one . ” O ’ Be rr

y v. W ai nw ri ght , 546 F . 2d 1 204, 121 3 (5th Circuit 1977 ). Fo r a cl ai m

to be f ull y a nd f ai rl y c onsi de re d by

the state c ourts, “ wher e the fa cts are in disp ute, f ull and fair consideration requires co nsi de ratio n by

the f ac t- fi ndi ng c ourt, a nd a t l ea st the a va ila bil ity of m eaningful appellate reviewby a higher state court. Where, however, the f ac ts are und isp ute d, a nd the re is nothin g to be se rv ed by or de ri ng a ne we vid en tiary

he ar ing , the f

ull a nd f ai r co nsi de ratio n r equir em en t is satisfied where the state appellate court, presented with an u n d i s p u t ed fa ct u al re co rd , g i v es fu l l co n s i d er at i o n t o d ef en d an t ’s Fo ur th Am en dm en t cl ai m s.” T uke s v. D ugge r, 911 F . 2d 5 08, 513 -1 4 ( 11th C ir . 199 0) ( quot ing O ’ Be rr y , 546 F. 2d a t 12 13) . A lth oughade fe ndant c an not sho waF ourth A m en dm en t vi ola tio n if “ [t ] he state of

the lawa t the ti m e of

his tr ia l di d no t de pr ive [ the de fe ndant] of anopp ortun ity

f or f ull a nd f ai r lit iga tio n” of

his c la im , Cave r, 577 F . 2d a t 11 94,Whe re , h ow e ve r, the iss ue wa s p re se nte d to the state tr ia l, i nte rm e diate a pp e llate , a

nd state 21 supreme co u rt s , ea ch court rejec ted the issue, the inter mediate a ppellate c ourt stated that it had “ca ref ully examined the record and deter mined” the mer its of the issue, and a dissent f rom the denia l of re hear ing be fore the intermediate appellate court was written on that issue, the petitioner “ cannot succe s s fu l ly

argue that he did not re ceive full consideration of his claim.” Swiceg ood v. State of Ala., 577 F .2d 1322, 1324 (5th Cir. 1978). 30 the situatio n is different if the c laim did no t exist at the tim e of his trial. Where the “ part ic ular Fo urth A m en dm en t c la im did not e ve n e xis t un til y ears a ft er [ the de fe ndant’ s] a rr es t and tri al [] , . . . he did not be ne fi t f ro m the ‘ oppo rt

uni ty f or f ai r an d f ull li tig at ion ’ of

it in [the state ’ s] c ourt[ ] to w hic h he w as e nti tle d. ” A nde rs on v. Ca lde ro n, 232 F . 3d 1 053, 106 8 ( 9thCi r. 200 0) . Ac la im a rg ue d a t tri al a nd o n ap pe al but

“ ign or ed ” by

the state appe llate c ourt ha s no t r ec ei ve d f ull a nd f ai r co nsi de ratio n, a nd o ur

c onsi de ratio n of

it is thu s no t barr ed

by S ton e. A ge e v.

21 White, 809 F.2d 1487, 1490 (11th Cir. 1987). A f e d e r a l c o u rtc a n n o tg r a n tap e t i t i o n f o r w r i to f h ab e a s c o r

p u s o n c l a i ms adj udicated on th e m erits in the state court unless the decisio n was ( 1) “ contrary to ” o r an “ un reas on ab le ap pl ic at io n o f” “ cl earl y est ab li sh ed ” Supr em e Co ur t l aw. W ill ia m s v. T ay lor , 529 U . S. 362 , 412 , 120 S . Ct . 149 5, 152 3 ( 2000 ). Ade ci sio n is “ co ntr ar

y to” S upr em e Co urt pr ec ed en t “ if the state c ourt arr ive s a t a c onc lus ion op po si te to th atreac he d b y [th e Supr em e Co ur t] on a qu es ti on of l aw or. . . de ci de s ac as e dif

fe re ntl y than [ the S upr em e Co urt] ha s onase t of m at er ia lly ind ist ing uis hable f

ac ts. ” I d. a t 41 3, 120 S . Ct . a t 15 23.31

L awhor n r ai se d th e iss ue of

the inv oluntari ne ss o f his se co nd 7 Apr il sta te m en t i n am oti on t o su ppr es s f ile d inJun e 1988 , in anobj ec tio n duri ng the tr ia l, a nd o n di re ct

appe al . R 1- 17, E xh. T ab 4 a t 23 ; R 1- 17, E xh. T ab 9 a t 34 9; L awhor n I , 581 S o. 2d at 11 66- 68. H e ra ise d th e iss ue a ga in i n th e 1990 pe tit ion fo r w ri t of

c er tio rari f ro m the de nia l of

his dir ec t a

ppe al w he n he a rg ue d th at he w as sub j ec te d to a n un re as ona

ble de lay in the se curi ng o f a j udi ci al de te rm ina tio n of pro ba bl e cau se du rin g h is warran tl es s ar res t. R1 -1 7, Ex h. Tab 30 at i v, 5 3- 54 . Inthat pe tit ion , he c ite d G er ste in, Bake r v. Mc Co llan, 443 U . S. 137 , 99 S . Ct . 2689 ( 1979 ), a nd W al dr op v . S ta te , 523 S o. 2d 4 75 ( A la . Cr im . App. 198 7) . T he A la ba m a Su pr em e Co urt de nie d hi s pe tit ionf or w ri t of c er tio rari on 1 0 M ay

199 1, a n dL a w h o rn f

i l e dap e t i t i o n f

o r w r i to f c e rt i o r a r i t o t h e U n i t e dS t a t e s S up r e me Co urt on9 S ep te m

be r 1991 . I n th is p et iti on, L awhor n ne ith er r ai se d th e iss ue of u n r e a s o n ab l e d e l a y n o r

c i t e dR i v e r s i d e , w h i c h h a db e e n d e c i d e db y t h e S up r e me Co ur t o n 1 3 M ay

19 91 . In199 3, L awhor

n r ai se d th e iss ue of

unr ea sona

ble de lay in his state pe tit ion for postconv iction relief, citing Baker, W aldrop, Riverside, and Ala. R. Crim . P . 4 . 3 . R 1 - 1 7 , E x h . T ab 3 6 a t3 ; T ab 3 8 a t3 . T h e s t a t e t r i a l c o u rta n dA l ab a ma Court of Crim inal Appeals eac h found th at this claim wa s procedurally

barre dIn 1988, Alabama require d that a per son arr ested without a wa rra n t b e t aken be fore a 22 mag istrate for

a probable cause deter

mination “ without undue delay .” Nicholas L . Chiarkas, Jr., Ala. Crim. Trial Practice 12 (The H arr ison Co. 1988) (1981) (c iting Ala. Propose d R. C ri m . P. 4.3). Arre sts and the deter

minati o n o f p robable cause for a person de tained without a wa rra nt were g overne d by

statutes and ca selaw and wer e not a ddresse d in the 1980 Ala. R. Crim. P . Temp. See g ener ally Ala. R. Crim. P. Temp. (1980) (West Publ’g Co. 1989); Hugh Maddox, Ala. R. C rim. P . 197-98 (1999) . In 1991, the Alabama Supreme Court a dopted Rules of Criminal Procedure which re qu ir e d th at “ [a] p e rs on

arr e ste d w ith out a

wa rr ant . . . [be ] t aken befo re a jud g e or ma g istrate without undue delay , except in no event later than seve nty -two (72) hours af ter a rre st, unless the c ha rg e fo r whic h th e pe rs on wa s ar re ste d is no t a

ba ila ble of fe ns e .” Al a . R. Cr im. P. 4 .3 (a )( 1) (i ii) (1991); Maddox, supra, at 199. In 1992, following Riverside, Rule 4.3(a) (1)( iii) was amende d. I d.; Ala. R. Crim. P. 4.3(a)(iii)(2003), Comm. Cmt. 1997. That rule re quires that a de fenda nt detained on a wa rr antl e ss a

rr e st r e c e ive a

pr ob a ble c a us e he ari ngwi thi n 4 8 h ours . A la . R. Cr im. P. 4.3(a) (1)( iii) (1990) 32 be ca use it c oul d have be en , but

w as not , r ai se d a t tri al a nd w as a ddr es se d on ap pe al . I d. , T ab 42 at 5- 6; L awhor n V , 756 S o. 2d at 99 6. T he m ag istrate j udge r ec om m en de d th at

L awhor n’ s f ed er al ha be as pe tit ion be gr an te d onthi s is sue , not ing that L awhor n ha d be ena rr es te d and d et ai ne d f or six day s be fo re a n arr es t w ar rant w as obt ai ne d. R 2- 22 a t 15 . T he m ag istrate j udge re co gni ze d th at , a lth oughA la ba m a lawr equir ed

that he be a rr ai gne d w ith in 7 2 hour s, Ri ve rs ide he ld tha t a de lay in obt ai nin g apr oba

ble c au se de te rm ina tio n 22 which “ exceed[e d] 48 hou rs presum ptivelyviolate[d] the Fourth Am endm ent.” R2-22 at 15. T he m agistrate j udge no ted that Lawhorn’ s case w as not final whenAlthough the mag istrate judg e stated that the Supreme Court denie d L awhor n’s petition 23 for wr it of cer

tiorari in November 1990 or October 1991, the certiora ri petition was ac tually

denied on 18 November

1991. R2-22 at 15, 19 n.3; L awhor n I I I , 502 U.S. 970, 112 S. C t. 445. B e c a us e the Riv e rs ide c la im w a s r a ise d b oth at tr ia l and on dir e c t a

pp e a l, L awh or

n d id 24 no t have an argua

ble c la im fo r ine ff

e c tiv e a ssi sta

nc e of c ouns e l ba se d on his atto rney ’s f ail ure to argue thi s issue. The Alabama Court of C riminal Appea ls erre d by concludingthat the claim wa s proce durally

barr ed bec ause it wa s raised f or the fir st tim e on collate ral a ppeal. 33 Ri ve rs ide w as iss ue d on13 M ay 199 1, a nd tha t R ive rs ide w as r etro ac tiv el y

23 ap pli ca ble to al l no n- fi na l c as es . I d. L awhor n’ s c onvi ct iondid

not be co m e fi na l f

or r etro ac tiv ity

pur pose s un til his petiti on for wr it of certiorari to the Suprem e Court w as denied in Novem ber 1 9 9 1 . B e c au s e R i v e r s i d e w a s d e c i d e dt h r e e d a ys a f t e r t h e A l ab a maS up r e me Co urt de nie d hi s pe tit ionf or r eh eari ng, L awhor

n di d no t have a n op portun ity to raise the issue of a delay

in the obtain ing a probable cause determ ination which exceeded 48 hours or have it fully and fairly

considered. A lthou gh the iss ue wa s

24 not c le ar ly e sta bli she d a t the ti m e of

the A la ba m a Su pr em e Co urt’ s de nia l of

his dir ec t a ppe al , the de ci sio ns d en y ing the c la im w er e co ntr ar

y to Ri ve rs ide a nd, because his case w as not y et final, the lawwa s applicable to Law horn. Further , the issue was clearly

established when Lawhorn raised it in his Rule 32 m otion for post co nvi ct ionr el ie f. T he A la ba m a Co urt of

Cr im ina l Appe al s e rr ed

by not rev is it in g t he ch an ge in th e la w. B. S uppr es sio n a s an Appr opr ia te Re m edy34

A la ba m a co nte nds tha t the dis tr ic t c ourt e rr ed by a dopt ing the m ag istrate j udge’s r ecom

m endation to suppress Law horn’ s 7 April confession as an appropriate rem edy

for the River side/Gerstein violation. It m aintains that Lawhorn adm itted waiving his Miranda rights knowinglyand volu ntarily . It argues that the tem

poral proxim ity

fac tor m ust closelyfollow the unlawf ul pol ice act iv it y an d n ot be sep arat edfro m th atact iv it y

by a sig ni fic an t am ou nt of t im e. The state appellate court noted that Law horn adm itted that he init iated the 7 Apr il co nve rs at ion s w ithW al lis , that he r ec ei ve d and a cknow le dge d hi s unde rs tandi ng o f his Mi randaw ar nin gs, a nd tha t he kne whis r igh ts unde r Mi randa an d c ou ld st op th e q ue st io ni ng at a ny tim e. Lawho rn I, 58 1 S o. 2 d a t 1 16 7. He al so a dm itt ed

that he w as not

of fe re d any pr om ise or

r ew ar d or

thr eate ne d by W al lis , that on ly

one pe rs on i n th e ro om

w as vis ibl y

a rm ed , a nd tha t he w as not handc uf fe d. I d. T he state appe llate c ourt l ooke d to the “ tot al ity of the ci rc um stanc es ” an d f

ound that A la ba m a ha d m et

it s burd enof

sho w ing the volu ntariness of Lawhorn’ s confession with “ abundant , c redible” evidence. It co nc lud ed

that su bst an tia l e vid en ce sho w ed that L awhor

n c onf es se d a ft er

m ak ing aninf orm ed a nd i nde pe nde nt c hoi ce of his ow n f

re e w ill w iththe c ap ac ity to do so, a nd tha t hi s w ill w as not ove rb or ne by sur ro undi ng p re ssure s and ci rcu m st an ces . Id. at 11 67 -6 8.Th e e xclu sio na ry ru le is n ot c on ta ine d in

the F ourt h A me ndme nt a

nd , b e c a us e a F ourt h 25 Am e ndme nt v iol atio n o c c ur s w he n th e re is a n unla wf ul s e arc h o r s e izur e , th e re is n ot a se pa rate Four th Amendment violation for the use of the fr uits of that se arc h or seizure. Arizona v. Evans, 514 U.S. 1, 10, 115 S. C t. 1185, 1191 (1995). Other c ourts have he ld that wrong ful l y s ei z ed evidenc e may result in exclusion of the evidenc e. U n i ted States v. Davis, 174 F .3d 941, 942, 946 n.8 (8th Cir. 1999) (a ffirmingthe 35 The m agistrate j udge acknowledged that “ [t] he fac t that [L aw horn] wa s giv enhis Mi randaw ar

nin gs o n tw o oc ca sio ns w ei ghs som ewha t i n [ A la ba m a’ s] favor” but “ [t] he length of Law horn’ s detention and his iso lation do not” and that the “ ‘ te m por al pr oxi m ity ’ f

ac tor w ei ghs he av ily

in L awhor

n’ s f av or . ” R1 -2 2 a t 23 (quot ing Br ow n v. I lli noi s, 422 U . S. 590 , 603 , 95 S . Ct . 225 4, 226 1 ( 1975 )) . T he m agistrate j udge foun d that Law horn’ s confession “ occurred only after he had g i v e n t w o e x c u l p a t o ry s t a t e men t s a n da f t e r h e h a db e e n i n c u s t o d y fo r f i v e d a ys w ith out a cc es s to c ouns el ” an d thus “ vio la te d no t on ly Ri ve rs ide but

a lso the A la ba m a sta tut e w hic h r equir ed his a rr ai gnm en t w ith in 7 2 ho ur s. ” I d. T he m ag istrate j udge a lso f

ound that the gov er

nm en t ha d f

ai le d to de m onstrate a ny int er ve nin g c ir cu m stanc es , oth er than hi s e xte nde d in carc er at ion , a nd tha t this inc ar ce ratio n w as f

or “ anim pr ope r pur

pose . ” I d. a t 24 . The issue of w hether suppressio n is an appropriate rem edy for a Ri ve rs ide /G er ste in v iol at ionis unr es olv ed by the S upr em e Co urt a lth oughthe Suprem e Court has held that exclusion is appropriate for other c onsti tutio nal violatio ns. See Powe ll, 511 U. S. at 85 n.*, 114 S. Ct. at 1284 n.* (“ Whether a

25suppression of a statement bec ause it wa s o b tained in violation of the F ourth Amendment, but decliningto decide whether suppressi o n wa s “nec essar ily the appr opriate r emedy” for such a violation as it was not a ddresse d befor e the district c ourt). See also United States v. Fuller ton, 187 F.3d 587, 592 ( 6th Cir. 1999) (deny ing suppression wher e, despite an unreasonable delay , another reme dy was available) ; United S tates v. Sholola, 124 F.3d 803, 821 (7th Cir. 1997) (re servingthe issue of suppression as an appropr iate reme dy issue for another day wher e the def endant ha d failed to establish a Riverside violation). 36 supp ression rem edy

applies [in a Fourth Am endm ent violatio n] rem ains an unr es olv ed

que sti on. ”) . T he pr im ar

y be ne fi t f ro m use of the e xc lus ion ar

y r ule is

“ the de te rr en ce of

pol ic e co nduc t tha t vi ola te s F ourth A m en dm en t r igh ts, ” an d

“ the e duc at ive e ff

ec t of the r ule m ay dis sol ve ” “ as ti m e pa sse s be tw ee n th e m om ent of the [Fourth A m endm ent violatio n] and the m om ent of Petitioner’ s final co ll at eral fed eral ap pe al y ears lat er.” O’Berry, 54 6 F .2d at 1 21 4 n . 16 . T o de te rm ine w he the r or

not e xc lus ionis anappr opr ia te r em edy , the pr ose cu tio n m

ust f ir st p ro ve the thr es hol d r equir em en t of the vol unt ar ine ss o f an y sta te m en t. B ro w n, 422 U . S. a t 60 3- 04, 95 S . Ct . a t 22 61- 62. T he de te rm ina tio n of vol unt ar ine ss i s go ve rn ed by f our f ac tor s, non e of

w hic h is ind ep en de ntl y dis posi tiv e: ( 1) w he the r the pr oc ed ur al sa fe guard s w ar

nin g pr es cr ibe d by Miranda, 384 U.S . at 444-45 , 86 S. Ct. at 1612 was given; (2) “ [t] he tem poral pr oxi m ity of the a rr es t and the c onf

es sio n” ; ( 3) “ the pr es en ce of int er ve nin g circum stances,” and (4) “ the purpos e and flagrancy of the officia l m iscondu ct.” Br ow n, 422 U . S. a t 60 3- 04, 95 S . Ct . a t 22 61- 62. T he a m ount of ti m e fo und37

suf fi ci en t t o m ee t the te m

por al pr oxi m ity

f ac tor r an ge s f ro m im m ed ia te or

“ cl ose in tim e, ” U nited States v. Be rry , 670 F. 2d 58 3, 588-89, 605 (11th Cir. 1982 ) (e n banc), to three m inutes, United States v. Santa, 236 F.3d 662, 677 (11t h Cir. 2000 ), U nit ed

S ta te s v. Ch an tha soux at , 342 F . 3d 1 271, 128 0 ( 11th C ir . 200 3) , to tw o ho ur s, Br ow n, 422 U . S. a t 60 4, 95 S . Ct . a t 22 62, D av is, 174 F . 3d a t 94 3. B ut se e A nde rs on, 232 F . 3d a t 10 73 ( te m por al pr oxi m ity

is m et w he n th e de fe ndant

“ shou ld a lr ea dy

ha ve be enarr ai gne d. ”) . T he e ff ec t of the il le ga l a ct

m ay be

“ dissi pated” through “ a significant lapse of tim e” or intervening circum stance be tw ee n th e m isc ondu ct

a nd the c onf

es sio n. S an ta , 236 F . 3d a t 67 8. Asig nif ic an t intervening circum stance is indicated where the defendant “ volu nteered a desire” to t al k to the lawe nf

or ce m en t of

fi ci al s “ soona ft er

alaw fu l arr es t, a ft er

a dvi ce of rights, and while his detention was plainly legal.” A nderson, 232 F.3d at 1073. If l aw en fo rc emen to ff

i ce rs h ad s u ff

i ci en tev i d en ce at th e t i m e o f t h e d ef en d an t ’s ar re st t o su ppor t the c harg ed

of fe nse , the re is ne ith er

aRi ve rs ide vio la tio n no r the need for suppression of any subsequ ently

obtained evid ence, Sholola, 124 F.3d at 82 0- 82 1. “ [T]he fac t t ha t p ro ba bl e cau se su pp or te d t he in it ia l ar res t d oe s n ot ,” ho wev er, cu re a s ub se qu en t u nc on st it ut io na l d et en ti on . Davi s, 1 74 F.3d at 9 44 . The state appellate court rea sonablyconcluded that Alabam a presented su bs ta nt ia l cr ed ib le ev id en ce t ha t Lawh orn’s co nf es si on was v ol un ta ry . He38

adm itt ed that he ini tiate d th e co nve rs at ion s on7 Apr il, r ec ei ve d, a cknow le dge d, an d un de rs too d hi s M ir an dar igh ts and tha t he c oul d st op the que sti oni ng a t any tim e. L awhor

n ha s f ai le d to sho wc le ar

a nd c onvi nc ing e vid en ce that the state co urt’ s de te rm ina tio n w as inc or re ct . L awhor

n w as giv enMi randaw ar nin gs o n tw o oc ca sio ns: ( 1) be fo re he w as ini tia lly int er vie w ed on Apr il 2 and ( 2) a ga in w he n th e int er

vie w ing be gan onApr il 7. H e te sti fi ed that he und er sto od h is r igh ts as e xpl ai ne d onboth da te s. A lth oughthe re is no i ndi catio n inthe r ec or d th at , during th e five intervening day s, he spoke to either any one in his fam ily or to an attor ne y , the re is al so n o in dic at ionthat he r eque ste d pe rm iss ionto spe ak to an y one . D es pit e L awhor n’ s te sti m ony

that he w as sc ar ed

dur ing that pe ri od o f t i me a n dwa s t o l dh e wo u l db e t r e a t e db e t t e r i f h e c o n f e s s e d , o th e r

t e s t i mo n y described Lawhorn as “ in a good m ood and not nervou s” and four w itnesses te sti fi ed that no one ha d to ld L awhor n th at he w oul d be tr eate d be tte r if he confessed. Lawhorn I, 581 So. 2d at 1167 . Further, althoug h the judicial determ ination of probable cause w as not obt ained until 8 April, the day after L awhor n’ s c onf es sio n, a nd the pol ic e co nti nue d th ei r inv es tig at iondur ing hisIn his brief on direc t appea l to the Alabama S upreme Court, L awhor n acknow ledg ed that 26 “the f acts available to the police to support probable c ause w ere based solely on Walker’s statement.” R1-17, Exh. Tab 30 at 50. Wallis testified at trial reg arding probable cause that, on 2 April 1988, Walker made a stateme nt to W allis and Wallace that Be rry was shot by

L awhor n. I d., Tab 9 at 325-27. Duringthe time of L awhor n’s detention until his confession, 2 April unt i l 7 Ap ril, the investigation into t he B err y ’s murder

continued. The investigators g ather ed phy sical evide nce f rom the cr ime scene , obtained fing erpr ints from L awhor n and his code fenda

nts and from a motor vehicle, compar ed the f

inge rprints, and re cover ed the we apons. R1-17, Exh. Tab 9 at 1 5 2 , 157, 159, 166, 169, 179, 197, 199-204, 208-09, 233- 36, 252-53, 258-59, 330- 32. Alabama cites United States v. Daniels, 64 F .3d 311, 314 (7th Cir. 1995) for the proposition that it is “ludicrous” “to prec lude law e n f o r c e m e n tf

r o mb o l s t e r i n gi t s c a s e a g a i n s t a d e f e n d an t w h i l e h e aw a i t s h i s G e r s t e i nh e ar i n g . ” In Daniels, proba

ble ca use wa s established by

the ar restingoffice r’s a ffidavit that “two . . . [bank employ ee] witnesses identified [ t h e d ef endant bank robber ] from a photo arr ay that included [the defe ndant’s] picture” a

nd t hat “a

nother . . . [bank customer] witness ‘positively ’ identified [the defe ndant] from a photo ar ray .” I d. at 313. The inve stigation, which consisted of a photo line-up, continued afte r the pre paration of the arr esting office r’s a ffidavit in support of proba ble ca use. I d. at 313-14. 39 de te nti on, L awhor

n a cknow le dge d th at

the a rr es t w ar

rant w as ba se d so le ly

on W al ke r’ s st at em en t. 26 Although the m agistrate j udge correctly determ ined that Law horn was unlawfully

detained, w e do not conclu de that supp ression of his con fession is an ap p ro p ri at e r emed y i n l i g h to f t h e s t at e ap p el l at e c o u rt ’s fi n d i n g t h at La wh o rn ’s co nf es si on was g iv en as a n i nd ep en de nt an d i nf or m edch oi ce o f hi s o wn fr ee wi ll . C. Ineff ective A ssistance of Counsel A la ba m a ar gue s th at

the dis tr ic t c ourt e rr ed

in co nc lud ing that the state co urt’ s r ej ec tio n of

L awhor n’ s in ef fe ct ive a ssi stanc e of

c ouns el c la im

ba se d onhis attor ne y ’ s w ai ve r of

his c los ing a rg um en t duri ng the pe na lty pha se w as obj ec tiv el y40

unr ea sona

ble . I t m ai nta ins that, a lth oughF an nin ’ s c hoi ce m ay se em str an ge , it w as not str an ge a t a ll be ca

use he hop ed

to pr ev ai l up on the j udge to pr ec lud e the p ro s ec u t o r f

ro m m ak i n g a s ec o n dre b u t t al cl o s i n g an db ec au s e t h e p ro s ec u t o r’s in it ia l cl os in g a rg um en t was lo w-k ey . The state court found th at Fannin’ s representation wa s not in effe ctive. In re spon se to L awhor

n’ s arg um en t tha t F an ninha d f ai le d to r es earc h r el ev an t l aw , it noted th at the only

evidence presented during the Rule 32 hearing regarding legal resear ch concerned Fannin ’ s testim ony “ that he found a case before trial that supp orted his po sition that the [prosecutor] could no t argue if the def ense wa ived its closin g argum ent.” R1-17, E xh. T ab 42 at 462. The state court stated that Fannin had foun d a suppo rting case “ and presented it to the trial court.” Id. at 462- 63. I t f

ound F an nin ’ s de ci sio n to w ai ve c los ing a rg um en t no t de fi ci en t be ca use it w as “ a str at eg ic de ci sio n to ke ep the dis tr ic t a tto rn ey f ro m m ak ing a cl osi ng arg um en t. ” I d. a t 48 9. I t c om m en te d th at , ba se d onit s ob se rv at ion s of the pr ose cu tor ’ s “pow er fu l and e ff ec tiv e” c los ing a rg um en ts, w ai vin g c los ing ar gum en t w as not

“ anunu sua l t ac tic al de ci sio n inT al la de gaCo unty . ” I d. a t 48 9- 90. It a lso foun d that Law horn was not prej udiced by Fannin’ s decision b ecause a cl osi ng arg um en t w as not ne ce ssary

to pr es en t an e xpl an at ionof the m iti ga tio n ev i d en ce o r a p l ea fo r mer cy t o t h e ju ry. Id . a t4 9 0 . It co n cl u d ed t h at “ [t ]h i s [w a]s41

not ac as e w he re the j ur

y w oul d have a cc ep te d aple a fo r m er cy or . . . f ound a ny m iti ga tin g e vid en ce that ou tw ei ghe d th e ag gr av at ing c ir cu m stanc es ” of the of fen se . Id. at 49 1- 92 . T he state a

ppe llate c ourt a ff

irm ed , f ind ing that, “ in this sit

ua tio n w iththe se part ic ular fa ct s, ” a cl osi ng arg um en t by F an nin“ w oul d have ha d li ttl e im pa ct ” an d fi ndi ng “ unpe rs ua siv e” L awhor n’ s c la im that F an ninc oul d have sug ge ste d th e m iti ga tin g c ir cu m stanc e of sub stanti al dom ina tio n be ca use suc h asug ge sti on

“ w oul d have m er el y

r ed ir ec te d th e j ur

y ’ s a tte nti on t o th e eg re gio us n at ur e of thi s cri m e.” Lawh orn V, 7 56 So . 2dat 9 87 -8 8. Th e d i s t ri ct co u rt fo u n dAl ab ama’s o b je ct i o n s t o t h e mag i s t ra t e ju d g e’s re co m m en da tio n r eg ar din g th e ine ff ec tiv e as sis tanc e of

c ouns el c la im

“ unpersuasiv e, ” adopted that portio n of the recom m endation, and granted relief, va cat in g Lawh orn’s d eat h s en te nc e. Lawho rn VII, 32 3 F . Sup p. 2 d a t 1 17 6- 77 . T he m ag istrate j udge f

ound that the state c ourt e rr ed in as se rt ing that F an ninf ound an d pr es en te d ac as e to the tr ia l c ourt w hic h su ppor te d hi s po sit ionbe ca

use the record showed that F annin had n either presented nor m entioned a case to the trial co urt or to the j ur y . I d. a t 12 25- 26. H e not ed that, dur ing the Ru le 32 h eari ng, Fannin conceded that he did not present a case to the state c ourt, and adm itted that he ba se d hi s po sit ionon a r ef er en ce in his pe rs ona l f

ile to Sh ep pard

v. S ta te , 5542

So . 514 , 515 ( A la . 191 1) , w hic h he e rr one ousl y be lie ve d he ld tha t, if

he r es te d, the prosecution would be precluded from presenting further argum ent. L aw horn VII , 3 2 3 F. Su p p . 2 dat 1 2 2 6 . Th e mag i s t ra t e ju d g e c o n cl u d ed t h at Fa n n i n ’s re pr es en ta tio n w as obj ec tiv el y de fi ci en t, a nd tha t hi s f

ai lur e to p re se nt a

c los ing ar gum en t and f

ai lur e to p re se nt an op en ing a rg um en t a ski ng the j ur y f or m er cy or t o s p ar e L aw h o rn ’s l i fe , h u m an i zi n g La wh o rn , a n ds u m m ar i zi n g La wh o rn ’s po si ti on , pre

jud ic edLawho rn . Id. at 12 26 -2 7. A n in ef fe ct ive a ssi stanc e of

c ouns el c la im

c anbe e sta

bli she d up on a show ing that the ( 1) “ co unse l’ s pe rf orm an ce w as de fi ci en t, ” an d ( 1) “ tha t the de fi ci en t pe rf

orm an ce pr ej udi ce d th e de fe nse ” be ca use the “ er

ro rs w er e so s er iou s as to deprive the defendant of a fa ir trial, a trial whose result is reliable.” Stri ck land, 466 U . S. a t 68 7, 104 S . Ct . a t 20 64. I n aha be as c or pus ac tio n, the pe tit ion er ge ne ra lly c ar ri es the bur de n to e sta

bli sh b othc om

pone nts . A tki ns v . Si ngl et ar y , 965 F . 2d 9 52, 958 -5 9 ( 11th C ir . 199 2) . T he e xc ep tio n to the petition er’ s burden lies if the circum stances of counsel’ s ineffec tive assistance

“ ar e so l ike ly

to pr ej udi ce the a cc use d th at the c ost of li tig at ing the ir

e ff ec t . . . is unj ust if ie d. ” U nit ed

S ta te s v. Cr oni c, 466 U . S. 648 , 658 , 104 S . Ct . 203 9, 204 6 (1984). Such cir cum stances exist in a case w here “ the accused is denied counsel at ac ri tic al sta ge of

his tr ia l . . . [ or

w he re ] c ouns el e nti re ly

f ai ls t o su bj ec t the43

prosecution ’ s case to m eaningful adversarial testing.” I d. at 659, 104 S. Ct. at 2047 . A“ cl osi ng arg um en t i s a‘ cr iti ca l st ag e’ of atr ia l. ” H unt er

v. Mo or e, 304 F. 3d 1 066, 107 0- 71 ( 11th C ir . 200 2) ( quot ing Cr oni c an d ho ldi ng tha t, r eg ar dle ss of prej udice, a constitu tional error exists if defense c ouns el is denied an op po rtu ni ty for cl os in g a rg um en t). 1. P erfor m ance T o e sta bli sh a c onst itu tio na lly

de fi ci en t pe rf

orm an ce , the de fe ndant m ust

“ ide nti fy the a ct s or

om iss ion s . . . that are a lle ge d no t t o have be enthe r es ult of re as ona ble pr of es sio na l j udgm en t” to “ showthat c ouns el ’ s r ep re se nta tio n f el l be lowa n ob

j ec tiv e standard

of r ea sona ble ne ss” a nd “ out sid e the w ide r an ge of pr of es sio na lly c om pe te nt a ssi stanc e. ” S tr ic kland, 466 U . S. a t 68 7, 690 , 104 S . Ct . at 206 4, 206 6. T he “ hig hly de fe re nti al ” re vie w ing c ourt m ust “ ind ulg e a str ong pr es um pti on tha t c ouns el ’ s c ondu ct f al ls w ith in the w ide r an ge of r ea sona ble pr of es sio na l a ssi stanc e, ” id. a t 68 9, 104 S . Ct . a t 20 65, a nd r ec ogni ze that c as es warranting the grant of habeas relief based on an ineffective assistance cla im “ are fewand far betwee n.” Chandler v. U nited States, 218 F. 3d 13 05, 1313 (11t h Cir. 2000 ) (e n banc) (quotation and citation om itted). T he unreasonable perform ance m ust ha ve be ensuc h th at

“ no c om pe te nt c ouns el

wo uld hav e tak en the ac tio n th at [the petitio ner’s] counsel did take . ” G ray son v. T hom pson , 257 F . 3d 1 194, 121 644

(11th Cir. 2001). “ [T ] he defendant m ust ov ercom e the presum ption that, under the circum stances, the c hallenged action ‘m ight b e considered sound trial str at eg y . ’ ” Stri ck land, 466 U . S. a t 68 9, 104 S . Ct . a t 20 65. O ur int er es t l ie s in de te rm ini ng “ w he the r the a dve rs ar ia l pr oc es s . . . w orke d a de qua te ly ” an d no t i n

“ gr ad ing [ the ] law y er s’ pe rf orm an ce [. ] ” Ro ge rs v. Z an t, 13 F . 3d 3 84, 386 ( 11th Ci r. 199 4) . B ec au se “ it is a ll too e as y to co nc lud e tha t a

part ic ular ac t or

om iss ion of c ouns el w as unr ea sona

ble in the hars h li ght

of hin dsi ght , ” Be ll v. Co ne , 535 U . S. 685 , 702 , 122 S . Ct . 184 3, 185 4 ( 2002 ), w e m ust m ak e “ ev er

y e ff ort . . . to el im ina te the dis tortin g e ff ec ts o f hin dsi ght , to re co nstru ct the c ir cu m stanc es of co u n s el ’s ch al l en g ed co n du ct , a n dt o ev al u at e t h e c o n du ct fr o m co u n s el ’s pe rs pe ct ive a t the ti m e. ” S tr ic kland, 466 U . S. a t 68 9, 104 S . Ct . a t 20 65. In rev ie win g a n i ne ffec ti ve ass is ta nc e cl ai m bro ug ht un de r 28 U.S.C. § 2254 , the pe tit ion er

m ust not onl y e sta bli sh tha t the state c ourt a ppl ie d S tr ic kland inc or re ct ly , but

a lso that the state c ourt “ ap pli ed S tr ic kland t o th e fa ct s of his c as e in a ob jecti ve ly unr eas on ab le m an ne r.” Bel l, 5 35 U.S. at 6 99 , 12 2 S . Ct. at 18 52 . InA la ba m a, if ac ri m ina l de fe ndant’ s a tto rn ey de cl ine s to m ak e a cl osi ng ar gum en t, the tr ia l j udge ha s th e dis cr et ionto pe rm it or de ny the pr ose cu tio n a cl osi ng arg um en t. S he ppard , 55 S o. a t 51 5. S ee a lso F loy d v. S ta te , 571 S o. 2d 1221 , 122 7 ( A la . Cr im . App. 198 9) , r ev ’ d onoth er gr ound s, E x part e Fl oy d, 57145

So . 2d 1 234 (1 990) ( co unse l’ s strate gic de ci sio n to w ai ve c los ing a rg um en t succeeded in depriving the prosecution o f its second closin g argum ent). A de te rm ina tio n a s to w he the r the r eque st f or the use of

thi s di sc re tio n ina capital case constitu tes a constituti onally deficient perf

orm ance r equires a re view of the c ir cu m stanc es . I n B el l, the S upr em e Co urt he ld tha t i t w as not obj ec tiv el y unreasonable for a def

ense counsel to waive a f inal argum ent at sentencing which could have reprised his earlier sum m ation of the m itigatin g evidence and his pl ea for life to prevent the “ very persuasive” prosecutor from “ depict[ing] his client as a he ar tle ss k ill er

j ust be fo re the j ur or s be gan th ei r de lib er at ion . ” 535 U . S. a t 70 1, 702, 122 S. Ct. at 1854. In Be ll, howe ver, the defense attorney had m ade an ope nin g st at em en t a t se nte nc ing af ewhours e ar lie r dis cu ssi ng the m iti ga tin g ev ide nc e an d ur gin g aple a fo r lif e, the pr ose cu tio n di d no t pu t onany dr am at ic or im pr es siv e te sti m ony

dur ing the se nte nc ing he ar ing , the pr ose cu tio n de liv er ed a fa ct -b as ed

c los ing that di d no t dw el l ona ny of the br uta l a spe ct s of

the c ri m e, a nd the w ai ve r pr ev en te d th e pr ose cu tor ’ s c los ing a rg um en t. I d. a t 70 1- 02, 122 S . Ct . at 1854. Also see Me sser v. K em p, 760 F.2d 1080, 1090 (11th Cir. 1985) (trial co unse l’ s f

ai lur e to m ak e anope nin g st at em en t duri ng the gui lt pha se w as not ine ff ec tiv e w he n “ he a cc om

pli she d duri ng v oir

dir e w ha t m ost

a tto rn ey s se t ou t t o do in th ei r op en in g re m ark s,” wa s co ns is te nt wit h “ hi s s tra te gy . . . to us e a l ow-46

ke y appr oa ch , m ai nta in c re dib ili ty w iththe j ur

y , a nd t o pr es en t the hum ansid e of his c lie nt d

ur ing the se nte nc ing pha se , ” an d th er e w as “ no e vid en ce ” w hic h he co uld ha ve pr es en te d to f

urthe r the de fe nse ); L igh tbo ur ne v. D ugge r, 829 F . 2d 1012 , 102 5- 26 ( 11th C ir . 198 7) ( pe r curi am) (tri al c ouns el ’ s f ai lur e to p re se nt a ll av ai la ble m iti ga tin g e vid en ce a t se nte nc ing w as not ine ff ec tiv e “ [g ] ive n th e ci rc um stanc es of

th[ e] c as e” w he n c ouns el c ondu ct ed a n in ve sti ga tio n in to h is cl ie nt’ s ba ck gr ound , f

oc use d onhis c lie nt’ s la ck of asig nif ic an t c ri m ina l r ec or d, ar gue d a ga ins t the w isd om of the de ath pe na lty , a nd w he n m ost of the m iti ga tin g evidence wa s presented in the presentence investigatio n report which w as co nsi de re d by

the tr ia l j udge be fo re se nte nc ing ); F loy d, 571 S o. 2d a t 12 27 (counsel’ s strategic decision to waive closing argum ent was “unchallengeable” w he re the pr ose cu tio n’ s in iti al c los ing a rg um en t w as “ ve ry br ie f” a nd une m oti ona l, a nd d ef

en se c ouns el a nti ci pa te d th at “ the pr ose cu tio n w as sa vin g it s persuasive argum ent for last. ”) D ef ic ie nt p er fo rm an ce is de m onstrate d by a n a tto rn ey ’ s f

ai lur e to u se the cl osi ng arg um en t t o f

oc us the j ur

y ’ s a tte nti on o n hi s c lie nt’ s c hara ct er or a ny m iti ga tin g f

ac tor s of the of fe nde r’ s c ir cu m stanc es , a nd b y his f ai lur e to a sk the j ury to spare his client’ s life. D obbs v. T urpin, 142 F.3d 1383 , 1389 (11th Cir. 1998 ).47

T he iss ue of

w he the r co unse l’ s ta ct ic al de ci sio n w as r ea sona ble is a qu es ti on of l aw th atwe rev ie w de novo . H ar dw ic k v. Cr osby , 320 F . 3d 1 127, 1158 , 116 3 ( 11th C ir . 200 3) . “ [S ] tr at eg ic c hoi ce s m ad e af te r tho ro ugh inv es tig at ionof

lawa nd f

ac ts r el ev an t t o pl au sib le opt ion s are vir tua lly unc ha lle nge ab le ; and s tr at eg ic c hoi ce s m ad e af te r le ss than c om

ple te inv es tig at ion ar e re as ona

ble pr ec ise ly

to the e xte nt tha t r ea sona ble pr of es sio na l j udgm en ts supp ort the li m itatio ns o n in ve sti ga tio n. C raw fo rd v. H ea d, 311 F . 3d 1 288, 129 8 (1 1thCi r. 200 2) ( quot ing S tr ic kland, 466 U . S. a t 69 0- 91, 104 S . Ct . 206 6) . “ O ne of the prim ary

duties defense counsel owes to his client is the duty to prepare him se lf a de qua te ly

pr ior ” to a

le ga l pr oc ee din g. Ma gil l v. D ugge r, 824 F . 2d 8 79, 886 (11t h Cir. 1987 ). Such prepar ation inclu des an understandi ng of the legal pr oc ed ur es a nd the le ga l si gni fi canc e of ta ct ic al de ci sio ns w ith in those proceedings. Y oung v. Z ant, 677 F. 2d 79 2, 794, 799-800 (11t h Cir. 1982 ) (an attor ne y ’ s r el ianc e on f

orm er lawa nd unaw ar en es s of

pr oc ed ur e de pr ive d hi s cl ie nt o f ef

fe ct ive a ssi stanc e) . T ac tic al or str at eg ic de ci sio ns b as ed on a m isund erstanding of the law ar e unreasonable. Hardwick, 320 F.3d at 1163; see al s o Ho rt o n v . Za n t , 9 4 1 F. 2 d1 4 4 9 , 1 4 6 2 , 1 4 6 3 (1 1 t h Ci r. 1 9 9 1 ) ( co u n s el ’s

“ ta ct ic al de ci sio n” to pr es en t no m iti ga tin g e vid en ce dur ing the se nte nc ing pha se w as “ unr ea sona

ble ” w he n it

w as ba se d onam isi nte rp re ta tio n of the lawa nd theT h e st at e tr i al co urt ’s co m m en t th at i t wa s “n o tan unu s u al t ac t i ca l d ec i s i o ni nT al l ad ega 27 County for attorney s to waive c losing a rgument to preve nt [the] district attorney . . . from making a closingargument” is unsupported by the record. R1-17, Ex h. Tab 42 at 489-90. There is nothing in the statement that indicate s tha t t h e at t orney s waivingclosing arguments did so based on a mistaken understa

nding of the law. The se attorney s may have known the l aw and taken a calc ulated risk, based on the specific fac tual situation in t heir c ases, to waive their clients’ rig ht to close. The re c or d d oe s n ot r e fl e c t any of the fa c ts i n th os e re fe re nc e d c a se s o r e ve n whe the r t he y we re de ath pe na lty c a se s wh e re c los ing argume nt duri ng the pe na lty ph a se pla y s a dif fe re nt ro le tha

n it do e s in the adjudication of g uilt or innocence . 48 fa i l u re t o ev al u at e a l t er n at i v e p at h s ); J ac k s o n , 4 2 F. 3 dat 1 3 6 7 -6 8 (c o u n s el ’s str at eg ic de ci sio n w as not r ea sona ble a s it w as “ unsu

ppor te d by suf fi ci en t in ve st ig at io n” an d i nf

or m at io n “ of

th e av ai labl e o pt io ns ”). Fanni n’ s pe rf

orm an ce w as unr ea sona

bly de fi ci en t. H is d ec isi on w as not m ad e af te r a tho ro ugh inv es tig at ionof the lawbut

w as m ad e ba se d onagr oss m isunde rs tandi ng o f a cl ear ru le of A la ba m a cr im ina l pr oc ed

ur e. H is d ec isi on t o w ai ve c los ing a rg um en t w as unr ea sona ble be ca use it w as ba se d onac om

ple te m isunde rs tandi ng o f a cl ear ru le of law . T he de fi ci en t pe rf

orm an ce is not

onl y Fannin’ s decision to wa ive closing argum ent but also h is failure to conduct ad equa te le ga l r es earc h insup port of that de ci sio n. V ie w ing the f ac ts o f the c as e at the ti m e of

his de ci sio n, “ no c om

pe te nt c ouns el ” w oul d have m ad e suc h a m istake in his legal resea rch in deciding to wa ive closing argum ent. See 27 Gr ay son, 257 F.3d at 1216. He failed to adequately investig ate or r esearc h the law an d w as thu s un ab le to m ak e a str at eg ic de ci sio n a s to w he the r to w ai ve a rg um en t49

or to le sse n th e pr ose cu tio n’ s c los ing a rg um en t by a n a lte rn at ive m eans. I t i s th e co m bi na ti on of t ho se act s t ha t m ak e h is rep res en ta ti on co ns ti tu ti on al ly defi ci en t. 2. Pr ej udice Once a constituti onally

deficient perf

orm ance is established, the petitioner m ust a lso sho wpr ej udi ce . H e m ust , spe ci fi ca lly , “ showthat the re is a re as ona ble probabilit y

that . . . the result of the [sentencing] proceeding would have been differe nt,” S trickland, 466 U. S. at 694, 104 S. C t. at 2068 , “ if com petent couns el had presented and explained th e significance of all the available evidence.” W ill ia m s, 529 U . S. a t 39 9, 120 S . Ct . a t 15 16. O ur de te rm ina tio n is ba se d ona re vie wof “ the e nti re pos tc onvi ct ionr ec or d . . . a s aw hol e” a nd w ithc onsi de ratio n of a ll cu m ula tiv e ev ide nc e. I d. a t 39 9, 120 S . Ct . a t 15 16. W e ar e aw ar e tha t “ som e [d eath p en al ty ] c as es a lm ost c er ta inl y c an not be won by defendants” because “ som etim es the best law y er ing , not j ust r ea sona ble lawy ering, c annot conv ince the sentencer to overlook the facts of a brutal m ur de r– or , e ve n a

le ss b ru ta l m

ur de r[ –] fo r w hic h th er e is s tr ong ev ide nc e of gui lt in fact .” Cli sb y

v. St at e o f Alaba m a, 26 F.3d 10 54 , 10 57 (11 th Cir . 19 94 ). Be ca use one of

the m ost im portant f unc tio ns o f the c ap ita l se nte nc ing pr oc es s is the opp ortun ity

to hum an iz e the de fe ndant, the im portanc e of

the de fe nse ’ s c los ing ar gum en t c an not , the re fo re , be ove rs ta te d. Mars ha ll v. H en dr ic ks, 307 F . 3d 3 6,50

99, 103 ( 3r d C ir . 200 2) ( “ T he pe na lty pha se f oc use s “ on the pr oduc tio n of ev ide nc e to m ak e a ca se f or li fe ” hum an iz ing the de fe ndant b y sho w ing “ the m eanin g and v al ue of

the de fe ndant’ s li fe ” an d “ w orthi ne ss t o li ve . ”) ; se e al so Hardwick, 320 F.3d at 1163 (citing Marshall). T hrough closing argum ent, c ouns el ha s on e “ la st c le ar

c hanc e” or

f ina l op portun ity

to m ar sha l a ll of

the m iti ga tin g ev id en ce b efo re t he jury an d e xp la in or m in im iz e th e p ro se cu ti on ’s evi de nc e. H er ri ng v . N ewY ork, 422 U . S. 853 , 862 , 95 S . Ct . 255 0, 255 5 ( 1975 ). E ve n in ca se s w er e the f

ac tua l ba ck gr ound

is ea sil y und er sto od, c los ing a rg um en t by the de fe nse c anr em ind

the f ac tf ind er of f av or ab le f

ac ts tha t i t m ay

ha ve f or got te n or m ist ak en ly

dow npl ay ed

or pr em at ur el y m isj udge d, a nd h el p pr ev en t an e rr one ous ve rd ic t. Id . at 8 63 , 95 S. Ct. at 25 56 . During the trial and sentencing, the j ury heard the shocking evi dence of the cr im e: th at

L awhor n sh ot B er

ry a ft er Be rr y ha d f al le n and b ec om e en tangl ed in vin es a nd unde rb ru sh, a nd w iththe int en t of ins ur ing that B er

ry w as de ad . D ur ing his ope nin g arg um en t duri ng the pe na lty pha se , F an ninout lin ed

the f our m itigatin g factors that he though t the evidence would establish: (1) Lawhorn l a c k e da“s i g n i f

i c a n th i s t o ry o f

v i o l e n ta c t s ” ; ( 2 ) L a w h o rn a c t e du n d e r “e x t r e me duress or . . . the subs tantial dom ination of another person”; (3) L aw horn was rel at iv el y y ou ng at t he ti m e o f th e o ffen se ; an d (4 ) Lawho rn ha d a go od ch arac te r.“I f the jury is unable to rea ch an a dvisory verdic t rec ommending a

sentenc e, or f

or other 28 manifest nec essity , the t rial cour t may decla re a mistrial of the sentenc e hea ring .” Ala. Code § 13A05-46(g ). F ollowing suc h a mistrial, a sec ond sentenc ing he ari ng“shall be c onducted be fore another jur y ” fo r an a dv iso ry

ve rd ic t or

the pa rt ie s ma y c on se nt t o w a ive a

jur y a dv iso ry ve rd ic t and

su bmi t to a trial cour

t sentence . I d. 51 R1 -1 7, E xh. T ab 17 at 49 8- 500. H e advis ed the j ur y that the y c oul d c onsi de r “ an y ev ide nc e in m iti ga tio n” “ w hic h w oul d e nti tle [ L awhor n] to lif e w ith out paro le instead of the death penalty .” Id. at 499. H e re quested that th e j ury “ com e back on a r ec om m en da tio n of

li fe w ith out

paro le . ” I d. a t 50 1. If he ha d pr es en te d ac los ing a rg um en t, F an ninc oul d have r ef re she d th e j ur y ’ s m em or

y of the e vid en ce of

sub stanti al dom ina tio n pr es en te d duri ng the gui lt p h a s e . T h e e v i d e n c e o f

Wa l k e r ’s s ub s t a n t i a l d o mi n a t i o n o f L a w h o rn a tt h e t i me of the of fe nse w as sig nif

ic an t: L awhor

n’ s c onf es sio n in dic at ed

that, dur ing the day s preceding the m

urder, Lawhorn w as living with W alker, that she was fr igh te ne d of

Be rr y , a nd tha t sh e pe rs ist ed

in he r re que sts f

or L awhor n to kil l Be rr y . F an ninc oul d have a lso a rg ue d f or the m iti ga tio n of

L awhor n’ s a ge a t the ti m e o f th e o ffen se an d h is tro ub le d fa m il y ba ck gr ou nd . Even w ithou t a closing argum ent, one j uror voted to recom m end life instead of de ath. R 1- 17, E xh. T ab 4 a t 39 . I n A la ba m a, aj ur

y w as r equir ed

to ha ve avot e of at least 10-2 to recom

m end a death sentence; a vote of at le ast 7-5 was r equired for a r ecom

m endation o f life without parole. A la. Code § 13A-5-46(f). 28L awhor n’s co- defe ndant an d b ro t h er , Mac, w as also cha rg ed with murder ing B err y 29 pursuant to a c ontrac t f

or hire. L awhor

n, 574 So. 2d at 971. During the g uilt phase , the jury hear d Mac’ s confe ssion to, arguably , less shockingco n duct than L awhor n’s. I d. at 973-74. Dur ing the penalty phase, Ma c’s c ounsel prese nted closing argument and differ ent mitigatingevidenc e. I d. at 971. The jury

rec ommended life imprisonment without parole. I d. The Ala bama Court of Criminal Appe als noted that the “ unconflicting ” evide nce w as 30 “over whelming ” that L awhor

n dir e c tly pa rt ic ipate d in

a c on sc ie nc e le ss, pit ile ss, and tor tur ou s murd e r. B e rr

y ’s la st minutes w ere obviously filled with te rror , fea r, and knowledg e that his de at h was imm ine nt, and

he e xpe ri e nc e d a

high de g re e of pr olo ng e d pa in be fo re his de ath. Al l of thi s w a s a c c omp lis he d b y [ L awh or n] w ithc omp le te ind if

fe re nc e –c omp le te indiffer ence to Be rry ’s p ai n an d t err or and c omplete indiffer ence to the value of human life, whic h he found to be worth $50.” L awhor n I , 581 So. 2d at 1177. 52 T hus, F an ninne ed ed

onl y to co nvi nc e tw o othe r j ur or s to a lte r the out co m e of the pr oc ee din gs. F an nin , how ev er , sur re nde re d hi s “ la st c le ar

c hanc e” to se t f

orth 29 an y fa ct s du ri n g h i s o p en i n g ar g u m en twh i ch wo u l dh av e s u m m ar i ze dLa wh o rn ’s posit ion or hum anized L aw horn, and failed to ask the j ury for m ercy

or to spare L awhor n’ s li fe . S ee H er

ri ng, 422 U . S. a t 86 2, 95 S . Ct . a t 25 55; L awhor n I , 581 So. 2d at 1174, 1177. Fannin’ s failure to present a c losin g argum ent prej udiced 30 Lawhorn because there is a rea sonable prob ability that, but for his unprofession al erro r, th e res ul t o f th e se nt en ci ng pro ceed in g wo ul d h av e b een di ffer en t. IV. C ONC LUS ION W e do n ot f

ind that L awhor

n ha s r eb utt ed

the pr es um

pti on o f co rr ec tne ss t h at t h e ju d g m en to f t h e C o u rt o f C ri m i n al Ap p ea l s fi n d i n g t h at La wh o rn ’s confession was volun tarily given. W e do find that Law horn has dem onstrated that53

the state c ourt de ci sio n f

ind ing that hi s c ouns el ’ s w ai ve r of c los ing a rg um en t du ri n g t h e p en al t y p h as e w as “ co n t ra ry t o ” c l ea rl y es t ab l i s h ed fe d er al l aw . We re ve rs e the dis tr ic t c ourt’ s j udgm en t gr an tin g L awhor n r el ie f by

sup pr es sin g hi s co nf es sio n bu t a ff

irm the dis tr ic t c ourt’ s gr an tin g of r el ie f on the iss ue of

the wa iver of closing argum ent during th e penalty phase. REVERSE i n pa rt a nd AFFIRMED i n pa rt.54

BARKETT, Circ ui t J ud ge , CONCURRING: I concur in Judge Birch’ s opin ion and also believe there w ere other in st an ces of i ne ffec ti ve co un se l t ha t wo ul d war ran t a n ew se nt en ci ng he ari ng .