J-A25014-16

2017 PA Super 101

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA, IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

PENNSYLVANIA

Appellant

v.

JOSEPH BERNARD FITZPATRICK, III,

Appellee No. 1498 MDA 2015

Appeal from the Order Entered September 1, 2015

In the Court of Common Pleas of York County

Criminal Division at No(s): CP-67-CR-0002534-2014

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA, IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

PENNSYLVANIA

Appellee

v.

JOSEPH BERNARD FITZPATRICK, III,

Appellant No. 1679 MDA 2015

Appeal from the Order Entered September 1, 2015

In the Court of Common Pleas of York County

Criminal Division at No(s): CP-67-CR-0002534-2014

BEFORE: FORD ELLIOTT, P.J.E., SHOGAN, J., and STEVENS, P.J.E.*

OPINION BY SHOGAN, J.: FILED APRIL 12, 2017

The Commonwealth of Pennsylvania appeals from the order granting 

the post-sentence motion for judgment of acquittal filed by Appellee, Joseph 

____________________________________________

*

 Former Justice specially assigned to the Superior Court.
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Bernard Fitzpatrick, III.1 In addition, Appellee has filed a cross-appeal. For 

the following reasons, we reverse and remand for reinstatement of the jury 

verdict and judgment of sentence, and we quash Appellee’s cross-appeal.

The trial court summarized the factual and procedural history of this 

case as follows:

On June 6, 2012, emergency personnel were dispatched to 

2288 Old Forge Road in Chanceford Township, which is located in 

York County, Pennsylvania. EMTs found [Appellee] and his wife, 

Annemarie Fitzpatrick [“Victim”], down near the shore line of 

Muddy Creek. [Victim] was unresponsive, but EMTs were 

eventually able to get a pulse and she was transported to the 

hospital. A short time later, [Victim] was pronounced dead. 

Foul play was not suspected and the family began making 

arrangements; [Victim’s] body was sent to the mortician for 

embalming.

Two days later, on June 8, 2012, the Pennsylvania State 

Police received a call from Rebekah Berry, who was employed by 

the same company as [Victim]. Employees at Collectibles 

Insurance had found a note in [Victim’s] day planner that they 

felt was “suspicious.” The note said, “If something happens to 

me - JOE.” It was dated June 6, 2012, and signed “A. 

Fitzpatrick.” Upon request, Ms. Berry was given access to 

[Victim’s] work email where she found an email from [Victim] to 

‘feltonfitz@gmail.com,’ which was [Victim’s] personal [email] 

account. The subject line of the email stated, “if something 

happens to me,” and the body of the email read ‘Joe and I are 

having marital problems. Last night we almost had an accident 

where a huge log fell on me. Joe was on the pile with the log 

and had me untying a tarp directly below.” This email was sent 

____________________________________________

1 We observe that appeals in criminal matters are ordinarily taken from the 

judgment of sentence. However, our case law has permitted the 

Commonwealth to appeal from orders that grant post-sentence motions 

seeking judgment of acquittal in favor of a defendant. Commonwealth v. 

Feathers, 660 A.2d 90, 94 (Pa. Super. 1995) (en banc).
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June 6, 2012 at 10:30 A.M. Ms. Berry showed police the note 

and gave them access to [Victim’s] email account.

After viewing the note and email, troopers contacted 

[Appellee] and asked if he would be willing to come in for an 

interview; [Appellee] agreed. [Appellee] was asked to again 

explain what occurred the night [Victim] died; he was never 

asked about the note or email.

On June 9, 2012, approximately two days after [Victim’s] 

death and after the body had been embalmed, an autopsy was 

conducted. Dr. Barbara Bollinger, the forensic pathologist, 

determined that the cause of death was drowning. Although she 

was not asked to opine on the manner of death, she did state 

that she thought the circumstances were “suspicious.”

From the point the handwritten note and email were found, 

the investigation turned from an accident investigation into a 

homicide investigation with the prime suspect being [Appellee]. 

Eventually, troopers discovered that [Appellee] was having a 

non-sexual affair with a woman named Jessica Georg, and was 

thinking of leaving his wife for her. When confronted, [Appellee] 

admitted to hiding [Victim’s] phone from the police in an effort 

to hide this affair. Troopers also discovered that [Appellee] 

would gain approximately $1.7 million in life insurance if [Victim] 

were to die. After searching [Appellee’s] work computer, 

troopers recovered two Google searches from around the time of 

[Victim’s] death. The first search, done on June 1, 2012, 

searched for “life insurance review during contestability period.” 

The second search, done on June 5, 2012, searched for 

“polygraph legal in which states.” This all led to [Appellee’s] 

arrest on March 6, 2014 - approximately a year and a half after 

[Victim’s] death.

[Appellee] was formally arraigned on May 19, 2014, and 

Christopher A. Ferro, Esquire, entered his appearance on May 

22, 2014. The case was assigned to the Honorable Gregory M. 

Snyder, who scheduled a pre-trial conference for August 18, 

2014. After two extensions, [Appellee] filed an omnibus pre-trial 

motion on August 7, 2014. In that motion he raised several 

issues, however, because he only raises the issue of the hearsay 

note and email in his post-sentence motion we will not discuss 

the other issues. Specifically, [Appellee] argued that the 

handwritten note and email were inadmissible hearsay and the 
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Commonwealth should not be allowed to present either as 

evidence. The Commonwealth countered that the note and 

email were hearsay, but admissible under the state of mind 

exception. On October 20, 2014, Judge Snyder denied 

[Appellee’s] request, and permitted the Commonwealth to 

present both the handwritten note and email.

The case was reassigned to the undersigned Judge due to 

Judge Snyder’s reassignment into the Family Division.[2] We 

listed the case for trial during the May term of trials.

[Appellee’s] trial began on May 4, 2015. On May 13, 

2015, [Appellee] was found guilty of First Degree Murder, and 

was sentenced to life imprisonment on the same day. On May 

22, 2015, [Appellee] filed a timely post-sentence motion. We 

directed each side to submit briefs in support of their respective 

positions by the close of business July 1, 2015. [Appellee] filed 

his brief on June 30, 2015, and the Commonwealth filed its brief 

July 2, 2015.

After reviewing the briefs, we scheduled oral argument on 

the sole issue of whether the Commonwealth presented 

sufficient evidence to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that 

[Appellee] unlawfully killed his wife. That argument took place 

on August 6, 2015. We reserved decision on all three issues.[3]

____________________________________________

2 The case was transferred to Judge Richard K. Renn, who presided over the 

jury trial and post-verdict proceedings.

3 The three issues presented to the trial court were as follows:

I. Was the jury’s verdict of guilty against the weight of the 

evidence, which would entitle the Defendant to a new trial?

II. Did the Commonwealth present sufficient evidence to prove 

each element of First Degree Murder beyond a reasonable 

doubt?

III. Did the original trial judge commit reversible error in 

permitting the Commonwealth to present a handwritten note and 

email penned by the victim?

(Footnote Continued Next Page)
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Trial Court Opinion, 9/1/15, at 1-4.

On September 1, 2015, the trial court issued an order denying in part 

and granting in part Appellee’s post-sentence motion. Specifically, the trial 

court denied Appellee’s request for a new trial, but granted Appellee’s 

motion for judgment of acquittal based on the Commonwealth’s failure to 

present sufficient evidence to sustain a first-degree murder conviction. 

Order, 9/1/15, at 1. Also on September 1, 2015, the Commonwealth filed 

an appeal. On September 29, 2015, Appellee filed a cross-appeal from the 

September 1, 2015 order. The Commonwealth, Appellee, and the trial court 

have complied with Pa.R.A.P. 1925. On October 19, 2015, this Court sua 

sponte consolidated the appeals for disposition.

The Commonwealth presents the following issue for our review:

I. DID THE TRIAL COURT ERR IN GRANTING [APPELLEE’S] 

POST-SENTENCE MOTION FOR ACQUITTAL AS THE EVIDENCE 

WAS SUFFICIENT TO SUSTAIN A FIRST DEGREE MURDER 

CONVICTION?

Commonwealth’s Brief at 5.

In addition, Appellee presents the following issues in his cross-appeal:

I. WHETHER THE TRIAL COURT, AFTER DETERMINING THE 

COMMONWEALTH FAILED TO PRESENT SUFFICIENT EVIDENCE 

TO PROVE EACH ELEMENT OF FIRST DEGREE MURDER BEYOND 

A REASONABLE DOUBT, PROPERLY GRANTED A JUDGEMENT 

[sic] OF ACQUITTAL?

(Footnote Continued) _______________________

Trial Court Opinion, 9/1/15, at 4.
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II. WHETHER [APPELLEE] WAS DENIED RIGHTS GRANTED TO 

HIM BY THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION AND 

PENNSYLVANIA CONSTITUTION WHEN INADMISSIBLE HEARSAY, 

IN THE FORM OF A NOTE AND EMAIL FROM [APPELLEE’S] 

DECEASED WIFE, WAS ADMITTED INTO EVIDENCE AND USED 

BY THE COMMONWEALTH TO SECURE A CONVICTION ON THE 

CHARGE OF MURDER?

Appellee/Cross-Appellant’s Brief at 4.

In its sole issue on appeal, the Commonwealth argues that the trial 

court erred in granting Appellee’s post-sentence motion for judgment of 

acquittal. Commonwealth’s Brief at 30-81. In essence, the Commonwealth 

contends that it presented sufficient evidence at Appellee’s trial to establish 

the necessary elements of first-degree murder beyond a reasonable doubt. 

We are constrained to agree.

Our standard of review is as follows:

A motion for judgment of acquittal challenges the 

sufficiency of the evidence to sustain a conviction on a particular 

charge, and is granted only in cases in which the Commonwealth 

has failed to carry its burden regarding that charge.

The standard we apply in reviewing the sufficiency of the 

evidence is whether viewing all the evidence admitted at trial in 

the light most favorable to the verdict winner, there is sufficient 

evidence to enable the fact-finder to find every element of the 

crime beyond a reasonable doubt. In applying the above test, 

we may not weigh the evidence and substitute our judgment for 

the fact-finder. In addition, we note that the facts and 

circumstances established by the Commonwealth need not 

preclude every possibility of innocence. Any doubts regarding a 

defendant’s guilt may be resolved by the fact-finder unless the 

evidence is so weak and inconclusive that as a matter of law no 

probability of fact may be drawn from the combined 

circumstances. The Commonwealth may sustain its burden of 

proving every element of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt 

by means of wholly circumstantial evidence. Moreover, in 
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applying the above test, the entire record must be evaluated and 

all evidence actually received must be considered. Finally, the 

trier of fact while passing upon the credibility of witnesses and 

the weight of the evidence produced, is free to believe all, part 

or none of the evidence.

Commonwealth v. Hutchinson, 947 A.2d 800, 805-806 (Pa. Super. 2008) 

(citations and quotation marks omitted).

Murder is defined, in relevant part, as follows:

§ 2502. Murder

(a) Murder of the first degree.--A criminal homicide 

constitutes murder of the first degree when it is committed by an 

intentional killing.

18 Pa.C.S. § 2502(a). The Pennsylvania Supreme Court has discussed the 

elements of first-degree murder as follows:

To convict a defendant of first degree murder, the 

Commonwealth must prove: [(1)] a human being was unlawfully 

killed; [(2)] the defendant was responsible for the killing; and 

[(3)] the defendant acted with malice and a specific intent to kill.

Commonwealth v. Houser, 18 A.3d 1128, 1133 (Pa. 2011) (internal 

citations omitted.)

A killing is intentional if it is done in a “willful, deliberate and 

premeditated fashion.” 18 Pa.C.S. § 2502(d). The period of reflection 

needed to establish deliberation and premeditation may be as brief as a 

fraction of a second. Commonwealth v. Rivera, 983 A.2d 1211, 1220 (Pa. 

2009). Indeed, the deliberation and premeditation needed to establish 

intent exist whenever the assailant possesses the conscious purpose to bring 

about death. Id. The Commonwealth may use circumstantial evidence to 
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establish the elements of first-degree murder, including the element of 

intent. Id.

Regarding the element of intent, our Supreme Court has long 

explained that “murder may be committed without a motive, either actual or 

apparent, but an established motive may go to prove the related 

intent[,] just as an absence of motive may be used to deny the existence of 

intent.” Commonwealth v. Jones, 50 A.2d 317, 321 (Pa. 1947) (citations 

omitted) (emphasis added). In addition, we observe the following:

When there is no direct evidence of intent to kill, the fact-finder 

may glean the necessary intent from the act itself and from all 

surrounding circumstances. Specific intent to kill can be 

proven where the defendant knowingly applies deadly 

force to the person of another. Death caused by 

strangulation is sufficient to infer the specific intent required for 

a conviction of first degree murder.

Commonwealth v. Hawkins, 701 A.2d 492, 500 (Pa. 1997) (citations 

omitted) (emphasis added). Furthermore, our Supreme Court has stated 

that “[t]he fabrication of false and contradictory accounts by an accused 

criminal, for the sake of diverting inquiry or casting off suspicion, is a 

circumstance always indicatory of guilt.” Commonwealth v. Homeyer, 94 

A.2d 743, 747 (Pa. 1953) (quoting Commonwealth v. Spardute, 122 A. 

161, 163 (Pa. 1923)).

Our review of the record reflects that each of the three elements of 

first-degree murder was proven beyond a reasonable doubt. At trial, the 

Commonwealth presented the testimony of forensic pathologist, Dr. Barbara 
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K. Bollinger, who performed Victim’s autopsy three days after the murder. 

N.T., 5/6/15, at 494-568. Dr. Bollinger opined that the manner of death 

was drowning. Id. at 497. Further, Dr. Bollinger testified to the multiple 

injuries appearing on Victim’s body, which totaled at least twenty-five. Id. 

at 563. She stated that Victim had fourteen or more injuries about her 

torso, eight injuries to her upper extremities, and at least twelve injuries 

about her lower extremities. Id. at 562-563. Specifically, Dr. Bollinger 

documented the following injuries to Victim: bruises over the upper and 

lower lip; bruises over the right temporal region of the head and bruises to 

the upper right portion of the head; hemorrhages about the back of the head 

and about the mid aspects of the head;4 hemorrhages on the right side of 

the neck within the muscles of the neck; three bruises to the scapular 

regions; a patterened bruise on the infrascapular region; several bruises to 

the right kidney region; abrasions on the left buttock; a bruise on the right 

buttock; a bruise between the breasts; a small bruise in the right lower 

abdominal quadrant; a bruise near the shoulder where the Victim’s left arm 

and shoulder meet; a bruise along the left side of the torso that continued to 

the backside; bruises above the left hip area; a small scratch of the skin in 

the groin region; bruises on the back of the left thigh; a bruise on the outer 

aspect of the left foot; a bruise on the back of the right leg; scattered 

____________________________________________

4 Dr. Bollinger noted that “[t]here were no skull fractures and no collections 

of blood within the skull cavity.” N.T., 5/6/15, at 500.
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abrasions on the right leg and a severe laceration to the great toe; abrasions 

and contusions to the upper and lower parts of both of the arms; scratching 

and bruising about both of the elbows; scrapes and contusions on the back 

of both hands. Id. at 505-513.

In addition, Dr. Bollinger opined that, within a reasonable degree of 

medical certainty, the various bruises and injuries Victim suffered could have 

resulted from Victim being held under the water in a creek by another 

person and drowning. N.T., 5/6/15, at 558-564. Furthermore, repudiating 

Appellee’s claim that Victim drowned in an ATV mishap involving both 

Appellee and Victim, Dr. Bollinger opined that “the lack of injuries to 

[Appellee] did not correspond with [Appellee’s] rendition of the scene 

circumstances [regarding] what occurred at the time of [Victim’s] drowning.” 

Id. at 528.5 Accordingly, this evidence was sufficient for the jury to 

____________________________________________

5 We note that during initial questioning in his home immediately after the 

incident, Appellee told Trooper Thomas Grothey of the Pennsylvania State 

Police a detailed story of an ATV accident in which Victim was driving the 

ATV, and Appellee was seated behind her. N.T., 5/5/15, at 227. Appellee 

told Trooper Grothey that the ATV accelerated very quickly backwards and 

went over the embankment that was approximately six feet higher than the 

creek level. Id. Appellee said that the last thing he remembered was Victim 

going over the top of Appellee’s head when they hit the water. Id. at 228. 

Appellee claimed that he searched for Victim around the ATV, but could not 

find her. Id. at 228-229. Appellee told Trooper Grothey that when he 

eventually called 911 he saw Victim across the creek. Id. at 229. Appellee 

further indicated to Trooper Grothey that he jumped back into the water and 

retrieved Victim, but was not strong enough to carry Victim up the 

embankment. Id. Importantly, Appellee told Trooper Grothey that he was 

not hurt. Id. at 225. Trooper Grothey also testified that he “did not visibly 

(Footnote Continued Next Page)
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conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that Victim was unlawfully killed by 

being drowned in the creek. Thus, we conclude that the Commonwealth 

established the first element of the crime of first-degree murder.

With regard to the second element of first-degree murder, the 

evidence likewise established that the Commonwealth proved that Appellee 

was responsible for killing Victim. Indeed, it is undisputed that Appellee and 

Victim were alone on the property at the time that Victim drowned in the 

creek. Trooper Grothey testified that during the initial investigation, 

Appellee explained that he and Victim were celebrating their thirteenth 

wedding anniversary at the time of the incident and that their two children 

were staying with Appellee’s parents. N.T., 5/5/15, at 225. Appellee has 

not disupted this fact. Thus, Appellee was the only person who could have 

held Victim underwater in the creek, thereby making him responsible for the 

killing.

Concerning the issue of specific intent possessed by Appellee, the 

Commonwealth presented ample evidence of the couple’s estranged 

relationship, including the fact that Appellee was in the midst of an extra-

(Footnote Continued) _______________________

see any injuries on [Appellee].” Id. Additionally, Corporal George Cronin of 

the Pennsylvania State Police testified at Appellee’s trial regarding his 

interview with Appellee two days after the incident. N.T., 5/6/15, at 573-

585. Corporal Cronin stated his observation was that Appellee had no 

injuries to his body. Id. at 577. Corporal Cronin also testified that Appellee 

indicated that he had no injuries, did not go to the hospital, and did not go 

to the doctor. Id.
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marital relationship with another woman, Jessica Georg. N.T., 5/7/15-

5/8/15, at 724–846. Appellee indicated to Ms. Georg that he was nervous 

about losing his house and his children in a separation or divorce. N.T., 

5/8/15, at 772. In addition, Ms. Georg read into the record a Facebook post 

authored by Appellee to Ms. Georg two weeks prior to the murder, which 

provided, in relevant part, as follows:

My children love their home and I would not want to take that 

from them. I know you are [a] package deal and have frankly 

thought about how I could change the girls[’] rooms to 

accommodate your girls. But they are the easy things to get 

past. The hardest will be my separation.

Id. at 783. Also, on June 1, 2012, Appellee sent Ms. Georg an email which 

Ms. Georg described as follows, “[Appellee] wrote, I love you, in all caps 

with more exclamation points tha[n] I can count.” Id. at 793.

On the evening of June 2, 2012, Appellee sent the following Facebook 

message to Ms. Georg:

Can’t believe how I've fallen in love with you in such a short 

period of time. It’s crazy when you step back and think about it. 

I feel like I’m in a jail cell. Wanting something I can’t have. So 

it hurts real bad. I believe you feel the same. I understand your 

position. Single, want to be with someone, have a man pursuing 

you that you have been intimate with, so you are torn and want 

satisfaction. Understanding this, I tried to push the limits, take 

risks at getting caught prematurely to develop what I truly 

believe will be something that few people on this earth get to 

experience. My life is riddled with so many emotions, it’s hard to 

comprehend. I want to be yours. I want to help you pack, 

move, do whatever I can to help you, but I can’t. It feels like 

something is sticking in my chest with a knife. I hate feeling this 

way. So tears are filling my eyes because I guess I have to say 

good-bye [sic] until things are appropriate.
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N.T., 5/11/15, at 1085-1086.

Ms. Georg also testified that on the afternoon of the murder, Appellee 

sent Ms. Georg multiple text messages. N.T., 5/8/15, at 802-805. One of 

the text messages from Appellee stated, “[R]eally miss you.” Id. at 803. 

The next text message from Appellee to Ms. Georg exclaimed, “And really 

really really feel I was made for you.” Id. Another text message from 

Appellee stated, “Yes. But it is true I love you.” Id.

In addition, on that same afternoon Appellee sent Ms. Georg a text 

message with the lyrics of the song “You Are My Sunshine,” and the 

comment, “Well, maybe one day you won’t need to buy another property.” 

N.T., 5/8/15, at 805. Appellee ended that particular text message with the 

statement, “Love you. XOOOOO.” Id.

The Commonwealth also presented stipulated evidence of the 

existence of a total of $1,714,000 in life insurance policies upon Victim, with 

Appellee being the designated beneficiary of those policies. N.T., 5/11/15, 

at 920-921. In addition, it was stipulated that on the morning of June 1, 

2012, Appellee conducted a Google search on his work computer using the 

words “life insurance review during contestability period.” Id. at 918. This 

cumulative evidence, although circumstantial, viewed in the light most 

favorable to the Commonwealth, is sufficient to establish a motive for 
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Appellee’s murder of Victim, thereby satisfying the necessary element of 

intent.6

In conclusion, the record, viewed in the light most favorable to the 

Commonwealth, reflects that the Commonwealth established Victim was 

unlawfully killed and that Appellee committed the murder with the requisite 

motive and intent. Accordingly, we reverse the order granting Appellee’s 

motion for judgment of acquittal, and remand for reinstatement of the jury 

verdict on the charge of first-degree murder and judgment of sentence.

We next turn to the cross-appeal filed by Appellee, in which he 

challenges whether the Commonwealth met its burden of proof with regard 

to the crime of first-degree murder, and whether the trial court erred in 

denying his motion in limine to suppress two out-of-court statements of 

Victim. Appellee’s Brief at 18-32, 32-47.

As our Supreme Court has noted:

____________________________________________

6 We further observe that Appellee offered contradictory accounts of the 

details of the accident. Specifically, we note that Michael Simpson, the EMT 

who arrived on the scene, testified that Appellee told him that when Appellee 

did not see Victim after the accident “he got back in the water and dove 

down to the ATV.” N.T., 5/6/15, at 424. Appellee stated to Mr. Simpson 

that he found Victim under the ATV and that “[i]t took him several tries to 

get her loose.” Id. This account by Appellee contradicts the version of the 

incident he related to Trooper Grothey that, believing Victim might be 

trapped under the ATV, Appellee searched for Victim around the ATV and 

could not find her, and that it was not until he was later on the phone that 

Appellee saw Victim across the creek and then jumped back into the water 

and retrieved her from across the creek. N.T., 5/5/15, at 228-229. These 

contradictory accounts of the alleged accident given by Appellee immediately 

after the incident are additional indicators of guilt. Homeyer, 94 A.2d 747.
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only an aggrieved party can appeal from an order entered 

by the lower court. Pa.R.A.P. 501; In re Elliott’s Estate, 388 

Pa. 321, 131 A.2d 357, 358 (Pa. 1957); see also Green by 

Green v. SEPTA, 380 Pa. Super. 268, 551 A.2d 578, 579 (Pa. 

Super. 1988) (citations omitted) (“To be ‘aggrieved’ a party 

must have been adversely affected by the decision from which 

the appeal is to be taken. Generally, a prevailing party is not 

‘aggrieved,’ and, therefore, does not have standing to appeal an 

order which has been entered in his or her favor.”)

Commonwealth v. Polo, 759 A.2d 372, 373 n.1 (Pa. 2000) (emphasis 

added).

In Commonwealth v. Dellisanti, 831 A.2d 1159 (Pa. Super. 2003) 

(en banc), reversed on other grounds, 876 A.2d 366 (Pa. 2005), this Court 

quashed a cross-appeal from a judgment of sentence filed by the 

Commonwealth. In so doing, we stated the following:

We are constrained to quash the Commonwealth’s appeal as 

there appears to be no basis upon which the Commonwealth 

may cross-appeal from the judgment of sentence. The 

Commonwealth is not an aggrieved party as it prevailed in the 

proceedings below. Appellant was convicted as the 

Commonwealth charged, and the Commonwealth took no issue 

with the legality or the discretionary aspects of the sentence 

imposed. Our research has revealed no cases in which the 

Commonwealth was permitted to cross-appeal from a judgment 

of sentence under the same or similar circumstances. It is 

axiomatic that a party who is aggrieved by an appealable order 

can appeal from that order if the issues have been properly 

preserved below. The requirement that a prospective 

appellant be aggrieved by the order which he is 

attempting to appeal is not one which can be waived by 

the action or inaction of his opponents. An aggrieved party 

is one who has been adversely affected by the decision from 

which the appeal is taken. One is not an aggrieved party 

when one prevails and wins the case-in-chief even if one 

issue in the case was decided against that party. 

Moreover, a prevailing party’s disagreement with the legal 

reasoning or basis for a decision does not amount to such 
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a cognizable aggrievement as is necessary to establish 

standing.

Id. at 1163 n.7 (citations omitted) (emphases added). See also Taylor v. 

Department of Transportation, 948 A.2d 189, 193 (Pa. Cmmw. 2008) 

(quashing without prejudice cross-appeal of Licensee who was not aggrieved 

because he prevailed below and was “presumably not dissatisfied with the 

trial court’s ruling as said ruling was in his favor” and concluding that 

“Licensee apparently wants this Court to grant his appeal on the basis of 

every legal argument raised before the trial court”).7

Our review of the record reflects that on May 13, 2015, the jury 

returned a verdict of guilty on the sole charge of first-degree murder. That 

same day the trial court imposed a judgment of sentence of life 

imprisonment. Appellee then filed timely post-sentence motions. On 

September 1, 2015, the trial court entered an order that denied Appellee’s 

request for a new trial but granted “[Appellee’s] motion for acquittal based 

on the Commonwealth’s failure to present sufficient evidence to sustain a 

First Degree Murder conviction.” Order, 9/1/15, at 1. Immediately, the 

____________________________________________

7

“Although decisions of the Commonwealth Court are not binding on this 

Court, we may rely on them if we are persuaded by their reasoning.” 

NASDAQ OMX PHLX, Inc. v. PennMont Secs., 52 A.3d 296, 308 n.7 (Pa. 

Super. 2012); see also Commonwealth v. Rodriguez, 81 A.3d 103, 107 

n.7 (Pa. Super. 2013) (“Although the decisions of the Commonwealth Court 

are not binding upon this Court, they may serve as persuasive authority”).
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Commonwealth filed an appeal from the trial court’s order.8 Appellee then 

filed a cross-appeal from the trial court’s order of September 1, 2015. 

However, in light of the trial court’s ruling granting Appellee’s motion for 

judgment of acquittal, Appellee is presumably not dissatisfied with the trial 

court’s ruling on his post-sentence motion. Indeed, it cannot be said that 

Appellee was aggrieved by the order on appeal because said order granted 

his request for judgment of acquittal. Moreover, Appellee has presented his 

argument setting forth why he believes that the trial court was correct in 

granting his post-sentence motion. Appellee’s Brief at 18-32.

Accordingly, even though the trial court did not grant Appellee’s 

request for a new trial, we fail to see how Appellee was aggrieved by the 

order granting his request for judgment of acquittal so as to endow him with 

standing to file the instant cross-appeal. Hence, we quash Appellee’s crossappeal because he prevailed below. Dellisanti, 831 A.2d at 1163 n.7. 

However, we do so without prejudice to Appellee’s ability to file a direct 

appeal from the reinstated judgment of sentence, at which point Appellee 

may raise any and all appropriate and preserved issues that he deems to be 

necessary.

____________________________________________

8 As previously noted, our case law has permitted the Commonwealth to 

appeal from orders that grant post-sentence motions for judgment of 

acquittal in favor of a defendant. Feathers, 660 A.2d at 94. However, our 

research has discovered no cases wherein a successful defendant who has 

been granted a judgment of acquittal of the only crime charged against him 

has taken an appeal from that order.
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In conclusion, we reverse the trial court’s order granting Appellee’s 

post-sentence motion for judgment of acquittal. We quash Appellee’s crossappeal from the order disposing of Appellee’s post-sentence motions. 

Further, we remand this matter to the trial court with direction to reinstate 

the jury’s guilty verdict and original judgment of sentence. Feathers, 660 

A.2d at 94.

Order reversed. Case remanded for reinstatement of the jury verdict 

and judgment of sentence. Cross-appeal at 1679 MDA 2015 quashed. 

Jurisdiction relinquished.

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 4/12/2017