SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY

APPELLATE DIVISION

DOCKET NO. A-2277-16T4

IN THE MATTER OF EDMUND ANSARA,

CITY OF MILLVILLE, DEPARTMENT 

OF PUBLIC SAFETY.

________________________________

Argued April 25, 2018 – Decided

Before Judges Fuentes, Koblitz and Manahan.

On appeal from the New Jersey Civil Service 

Commission, Docket Nos. 2016-4183 and 2016-

4255.

Michael J. Confusione argued the cause for 

appellant Edmund Ansara (Hegge & Confusione, 

LLC, attorneys; Michael J. Confusione, of 

counsel and on the brief).

Stephen D. Barse argued the cause for 

respondent City of Millville (Gruccio, Pepper, 

De Santo & Ruth, PA, attorneys; Stephen D.

Barse, on the brief).

Gurbir S. Grewal, Attorney General, attorney 

for respondent Civil Service Commission 

(Pamela N. Ullman, Deputy Attorney General, 

on the statement in lieu of brief).

PER CURIAM

Appellant Edmund Ansara was a police officer in the City of 

Millville Police Department. He appeals from the Final 

NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE

APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION

This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court."

Although it is posted on the internet, this opinion is binding only on the 

parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R. 1:36-3.

August 31, 2018
2 A-2277-16T4

Administrative Action (FAA) of the Civil Service Commission

(Commission) issued December 21, 2016, that upheld the action 

taken by the appointing authority, City of Millville, terminating 

his employment based on two removals effective April 26, 2016 and 

May 26, 2016. The Commission based its decision on an independent 

evaluation of the record developed before an Administrative Law 

Judge (ALJ). The Commission thereafter accepted and adopted the 

Initial Decision of the ALJ which found sufficient evidence to 

sustain the disciplinary charges filed against appellant related 

to two separate incidents of misconduct on September 22, 2014, and 

October 11, 2014.

Appellant urges this court to reverse the Commission's 

decision. He argues the findings made by the ALJ were not 

supported by substantial credible evidence. He also claims the 

City of Millville did not demonstrate good cause to impose the 

ultimate disciplinary sanction of removal. After reviewing the 

appellate record, we conclude there is no legal basis to disturb 

the Commission's decision and affirm.

I

A

On September 22, 2014, the Millville Police Department 

received a call alleging domestic violence. For reasons not 

disclosed in the record, the dispatcher "held the call for eighteen 
3 A-2277-16T4

minutes" before directing appellant and Officer Catherine Shipley 

to respond to the call for assistance involving a possible domestic 

violence incident at a private residence. The incident arose from 

a verbal argument between C.G. and his girlfriend, M.M.1 The 

dispute had ended by the time appellant and Officer Shipley arrived 

at the residence. The occupants, a man and two women, all 

expressed their dissatisfaction about the length of time it took 

for the officers to respond.

In the hearing before the ALJ, Officer Shipley testified that 

M.M. "was sitting on the stairs" and appeared "[t]hat she had been 

crying." C.G. told the officers "that he could have killed [the 

two women] by the time it took [the officers] to get there." 

Officer Shipley testified that C.G. was uncooperative and refused 

the officers' request to produce identification. However, Officer 

Shipley also made clear that none of the occupants threatened her 

or appellant verbally or at any time intimated the use of physical 

force against the officers or each other. 

At the hearing before the ALJ, C.G. testified that when 

appellant asked him to produce identification, he told him that 

his identification card was in his truck. He then sat on the 

couch and began searching through his cellphone for a digital copy 

 

1 Because this incident involved domestic violence, we use initials 

to protect the privacy of the people involved. R. 1:38-3(c)(12).
4 A-2277-16T4

of his identification. C.G. conceded that he did not explain to 

the officers what he was doing with his cellphone. At this point, 

appellant crossed the living room and moved closer to C.G. At the 

time, C.G. did not have anything other than his cellphone in his 

hands; Officer Shipley testified she was not concerned that C.G. 

possessed a weapon.

When C.G. stood up, appellant moved toward him and placed him 

in handcuffs.2 According to Officer Shipley, it was unclear to 

her why appellant decided to handcuff C.G. However, she assisted 

appellant in detaining him because C.G. was not initially 

compliant. The two officers brought C.G. to the floor to subdue 

him while they handcuffed him. Appellant escorted C.G. in 

handcuffs to the front lawn of the residence near the police patrol 

car. Appellant kept C.G. handcuffed for approximately ten minutes. 

Appellant finally removed the handcuffs to permit C.G. to retrieve

his identification credentials from his car that was parked in 

front of the residence. 

Appellant asked Officer Shipley to charge C.G. with a 

disorderly persons offense. She refused. Appellant then charged 

C.G. with committing a disorderly persons offense. C.G. did not 

 

2 According to C.G., appellant "lunged from the front door . . . 

[s]lamming handcuffs onto my right wrist. Breaking my phone in 

the interim[, he s]lamm[ed] me to the floor."
5 A-2277-16T4

become aware that he had been charged with this offense until he 

received in the mail the summons to appear in municipal court. 

Officer Shipley believed something "wasn't right" with the way 

appellant acted that day, and reported the incident to Sergeant 

Duffield. Officer Shipley did not believe C.G.'s conduct presented 

a physical threat to herself or appellant and testified that 

appellant erred in placing him in handcuffs. 

Detective William Loteck was an investigator in the Internal 

Affairs Division. In his testimony before the ALJ, Detective 

Loteck characterized appellant's police report describing what 

occurred on September 22, 2014, as "not factual. Specifically 

that C.G. was . . . asked several times for his I.D. That it 

appeared C.G. pushed Officer Shipley's left arm. [Appellant] also 

stated that C.G. was taken to his knees to be handcuffed." 

(emphasis added).

On September 29, 2014, C.G. and M.M. filed an Internal Affairs 

complaint against appellant for excessive use of force and false 

arrest. Millville Chief of Police Jody Farabella and Internal 

Affairs Detective Brian Starcher also testified before the ALJ 

concerning this incident.

B

At approximately 3:22 p.m. on October 11, 2014, appellant 

responded to a private residence in the City of Millville. Upon 
6 A-2277-16T4

his arrival, appellant was met by C.W., a civilian dispatcher in 

the Millville Police Department, and his nephew R.W. C.W. was 

present during this entire incident. In the police report of the 

incident, appellant wrote:

[R.W.] said he has lived here for more than 

three years. [R.W.] said he has a key for the 

bottom lock, which is different than the 

deadbolt, which they never used, but [T.H.] 

is now using it. [R.W.] said the front door 

lock is different, as this residence used to 

be two apartments. 

Appellant was unable to unlock the back door with the key. 

Appellant did not take any action to confirm R.W. actually resided 

at the house, such as asking him to produce his driver's license 

or any other documentation showing proof of residence. Ironically, 

if he had asked R.W. to produce his driver's license, appellant 

would have discovered R.W. resided with his mother in a different 

municipality. 

Despite not having any competent evidence to corroborate 

R.W.'s allegations, appellant told R.W. that he "cannot stop [R.W.] 

from entering his residence." According to appellant's police 

report, R.W.

then text messaged [T.H.] that he was going 

to break out a window to enter the house. She 

immediately called [R.W.].

[T.H.] said she was not going to let [R.W.] 

get anything until he gives her the DJ 

equipment in his possession because it is 
7 A-2277-16T4

hers. [Appellant] requested she get his 

clothes for work but she continued to yell 

that she bought everything, nothing is his,

and he does not live there.

Despite the obvious civil character of this dispute, 

appellant stood by while R.W. "made entry by breaking a glass part 

of the back door and unlocked the dead bolt." (Emphasis added).

Against the expressed wishes of the person in possession of the 

residence, T.H., appellant followed R.W. into the residence and 

watched while R.W. entered the bathroom and "began to collect 

articles of clothing scattered on the room floor." T.H., described 

by appellant as a "female [T.H.], came downstairs yelling while 

holding an infant in her arms." 

According to appellant, T.H. "immediately got in my face 

. . . ." Appellant handcuffed T.H. in her kitchen and arrested 

her. At the hearing before the ALJ, appellant was asked: "And can 

you explain to me . . . what action [T.H.] was doing to make you 

arrest her?" Appellant responded: "She was -- had her fingers 

very close to my face." Appellant admitted that he pushed T.H.'s 

head against the counter while he arrested her for the disorderly 

persons offense of resisting arrest, N.J.S.A. 2C:29-2(a). 

Appellant placed T.H. in the rear of his patrol car, handcuffed.

While T.H. was inside appellant's patrol car, Sergeant 

Duffield arrived at the scene. According to appellant's police 
8 A-2277-16T4

report, Sergeant Duffield attempted to speak to T.H. but she did 

not respond. Internal Affairs Sergeant Starcher investigated the 

incident. He viewed the video recording of the incident taken by

the video camera in appellant's patrol car. Sergeant Starcher 

testified that the video recording shows that Sergeant Duffield 

never attempted to speak with T.H. While T.H. was detained in the 

patrol car, appellant reentered the residence several times to 

obtain some of R.W.'s clothing. T.H. told appellant that R.W. had 

her DJ equipment in his car. Appellant told her that he could not 

help her retrieve the equipment; she would have to pursue the 

matter through the Sheriff's Office. 

T.H. filed an internal affairs complaint against appellant. 

Internal Affairs Investigator Sergeant Starcher discussed the 

matter with appellant's supervisor, Lieutenant Ed Zadroga. 

Sergeant Starcher was concerned about "a possible pattern"

involving Fourth Amendment violations by appellant. Sergeant 

Starcher decided not to interview T.H., and referred the matter 

to the Cumberland County Prosecutor's Office based on 

inconsistencies he discovered in appellant's police report. T.H. 

pled guilty to resisting arrest before the Millville Municipal 

Court.
9 A-2277-16T4

II

Our review of a final decision of a State administrative 

agency is limited. Univ. Cottage Club of Princeton N.J. Corp. v. 

N.J. Dep't of Envtl. Prot., 191 N.J. 38, 48 (2007). "An 

administrative agency's final quasi-judicial decision will be 

sustained unless there is a clear showing that it is arbitrary, 

capricious, or unreasonable, or that it lacks fair support in the 

record." In re Herrmann, 192 N.J. 19, 27-28 (2007). This court 

accords the agency's decision substantial deference "even if [it] 

would have reached a different result in the first instance." Id.

at 28. "The burden of demonstrating that the agency's action was 

arbitrary, capricious, or unreasonable rests upon the person 

challenging the administrative action." In re Arenas, 385 N.J. 

Super. 440, 443-44 (App. Div. 2006).

To determine whether reversal of the agency determination is 

warranted, we must consider:

(1) whether the agency's action violates 

express or implied legislative policies, that 

is, did the agency follow the law; (2) whether 

the record contains substantial evidence to 

support the findings on which the agency based 

its action; and (3) whether in applying the 

legislative policies to the facts, the agency 

clearly erred in reaching a conclusion that 

could not reasonably have been made on a 

showing of the relevant factors. 
10 A-2277-16T4

[Mazza v. Bd. of Trs., 143 N.J. 22, 25 (1995) 

(citing Campbell v. Dep't of Civil Serv., 39 

N.J. 556, 562 (1963)).] 

This deferential standard also applies to decisions relating to 

employee discipline and punishment, including termination. 

Herrmann, 192 N.J. at 28; see also In re Carter, 191 N.J. 474, 486 

(2007).

The record developed before the ALJ is replete with competent 

evidence of appellant's unfitness to be a police officer. 

Appellant's conduct in both incidents reflects a disregard for the 

rule of law coupled with a disturbing pattern of abusive behavior 

in the exercise of his authority. The arguments attacking the 

validity of the Commission's decision lack sufficient merit to 

warrant discussion in a written opinion. R. 2:11-3(e)(1)(D). 

We affirm substantially for the reasons expressed by the 

Commission, as reflected in the ALJ's Initial Decision.

Affirmed.