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Filed 8/21/20

CERTIFIED FOR PUBLICATION

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION THREE 

In re I.M., a Person Coming 

Under the Juvenile Court Law.

______________________________

THE PEOPLE, 

Plaintiff and Respondent, 

v.

I.M.,

Defendant and Appellant.

 A156934

 

 (Contra Costa County

 Super. Ct. No. J1800600)

 

 

Appellant I.M., a ward of the juvenile court, challenges two 

probation requirements in a disposition order, that she (1) participate 

and successfully complete the “Girls in Motion” (GIM) program at 

juvenile hall, and (2) report “any police contacts” to the deputy 

probation officer within 24 hours.

We remand the matter for the juvenile court to either strike or 

modify the reporting requirement to meet constitutional standards. In 

all other respects, we affirm the order. 

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

On February 28, 2019,1 while then 17-year-old appellant was a

ward of the court and on probation, the Contra Costa County District 

 

1 Unless otherwise noted, all further events occurred in 2019.
2

Attorney filed a supplemental Welfare and Institutions Code section 

602, subdivision (a) petition, alleging appellant had committed acts 

constituting felony second-degree robbery (Pen. Code, §211).

The parties entered into an agreement to resolve the petition and 

a pending violation of probation allegation. On March 12, the People

amended the petition to include an allegation that appellant had 

committed acts constituting felony grand theft. Appellant admitted to 

the felony grand theft allegation, and the robbery and violation of 

probation allegations were dismissed. The People agreed not to object 

to the reduction of the felony grand theft allegation to a misdemeanor

upon appellant successfully completing probation. 

Prior to the March 26 disposition hearing, probation reported 

that appellant had continually failed to engage in community 

rehabilitative services and posed a risk to herself and the community. 

To assist with rehabilitation, probation recommended the court require 

her to participate and successfully complete the custodial GIM program 

conducted at juvenile hall. 

On March 26, the juvenile court continued appellant as a ward of 

the court. The court ordered appellant detained in juvenile hall for a 

period not to exceed her maximum custody time of 3 years 4 months, or 

until the age of 21, whichever occurred first, with credit for time served 

of 57 days. The court directed appellant to comply with certain 

probation conditions, including a requirement that she was “to report 

any police contacts” to the deputy probation officer within 24 hours.

The court also ordered appellant “to participate in the County 

Institution Program, GIM, [] successfully complete all motions of the 

program, follow all treatment requirements, and obey all rules and 
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regulations” while detained at juvenile hall. The court found the GIM 

program was “a good and appropriate program” for appellant, who 

needed a “significant intervention” to reset her life patterns. 

Appellant’s counsel objected on due process grounds as no date certain 

was set for termination of the custodial commitment in juvenile hall 

and probation would be allowed to determine whether and when 

appellant had successfully completed the GIM program. Rejecting 

counsel’s arguments, the court noted it was not relinquishing its 

authority to monitor appellant while she was in the GIM program. To 

that end, the court scheduled a September review hearing. The court 

also stated that appellant could file a petition for modification of the 

disposition order based on a change of circumstances. 

Appellant timely appealed.

DISCUSSION

I. Probation Requirement to Participate and Successfully 

Complete Custodial GIM Program 

Appellant challenges the requirement that she participate in the 

custodial GIM program conducted at juvenile hall as the dispositional 

order unconstitutionally delegated the juvenile court’s authority to 

determine the length of commitment to the probation department. 

While the issue is moot as the juvenile court terminated appellant’s 

detention on January 30, 2020 after she successfully completed the 

GIM program2, we exercise our discretion to address the issue on its 

 

2 On February 27, 2020, we granted the People’s motion to 

augment the record on appeal to include the juvenile court’s January 

30, 2020 minute order, which indicates appellant was released from 

juvenile hall following her successful termination “from GIM aftercare.”
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merits as it is likely to recur, might otherwise evade appellate review, 

and is of continuing public interest. (See People v. Morales (2016) 63 

Cal.4th 399, 409.) 

As described in “a ‘draft’ handbook,” revised November 29, 2016,3

the GIM Program is designed “to provide a safe and structured 

environment at the Contra Costa County Juvenile Hall [for minors 

detained there] using [a] behavioral management system . . . and 

individualized treatment plans . . . focused to strengthen pro-social 

values/attitudes and restructure anti-social behaviors and cognitive 

distortions.” “The time spent” in the program “is determined by 

successful completion of each of the four motions which can typically be 

accomplished within a period of 5-6 months. A resident’s individual 

program length will depend on their individual progress towards 

completing treatment goals, and their ability to reach personal 

objectives, complete assigned treatment classes and successfully work 

through the [four] motions (steps) of the program.”

The GIM program’s first three motions are completed in juvenile 

hall, followed by motion four which is completed while the minor is 

conditionally released into the custody of a parent or guardian and on 

electronic monitoring. The program designates a minimum aggregate 

period of approximately four and a half months (six weeks each) to 

complete motions one through three. “A court review of the resident’s 

progress will be set for 5 months from the date of program 

 

3 On December 3, 2019, we granted appellant’s unopposed request 

for judicial notice of “a ‘draft’ handbook of the Girls in Motion 

Program,” revised November 29, 2016.
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commitment. At the 5 month court review, the probation officer will 

notify the court of the resident’s progress in the program and the 

anticipated . . . remaining time until treatment goals are completed.” 

At the completion of motion four (90-day conditional release), the minor 

returns to the court “for a final GIM review”: probation provides the 

court with an update, and “once the [minor’s] commitment to GIM is set 

aside by the court,” probation transfers the minor to a “general 

supervision” deputy probation officer in the community. 

Appellant argues the GIM program requirement constitutes an 

unlawful delegation of authority that violates constitutional separation 

of powers and due process because (1) the length of the juvenile hall

commitment depends on the minor’s successful completion of the GIM 

program4; (2) the GIM program handbook provides that probation 

decides whether a minor advances through the various phases of the 

program; and (3) thus, it is probation that determines the length of a 

minor’s custodial commitment in juvenile hall. 

We disagree. The disposition order states that the minor is to be 

detained at juvenile hall for an identified period of time (maximum of 3 

years 4 months, or until 21, whichever occurs first), and that while

detained the minor must “successfully complete all motions of the 

program, follow all treatment requirements, and obey all rules and 

regulations.” Thus, by its own terms, the order makes it clear it is 

 

4 While not entirely clear from the transcript of the disposition 

hearing, the juvenile court appeared to contemplate that appellant 

would be released from juvenile hall if she successfully completed the 

GIM program. In fact, on January 30, 2020 the court terminated 

appellant’s detention at juvenile hall based upon successful completion 

of the GIM program.
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juvenile court which has determined the maximum length of 

appellant’s commitment in juvenile hall and terms of commitment. 

While the custodial GIM program is conducted in juvenile hall, which is 

managed and operated by probation as part of its responsibility for the 

“day-to-day supervision and control over [the minor], the juvenile court 

nonetheless retain[ed] the ultimate authority” to determine the length 

of commitment in juvenile hall, subject to an earlier release if and when 

appellant successfully completed the GIM program. (In re J.C. (2019) 

33 Cal.App.5th 741, 745 (J.C.).)

Appellant acknowledges that her improper delegation of 

authority argument has been rejected by our Division Five colleagues 

in J.C., supra, 33 Cal.App.4th 741, which reviewed a disposition order 

involving a minor committed to juvenile hall for a maximum term, but 

provided for an earlier release if and when he successfully completed 

the Contra Costa County Youthful Offender Treatment Program 

(YOTP) (id. at pp. 744-745). J.C. did not address the minor’s 

separation of powers argument because it found the juvenile court had 

not unlawfully delegated its authority to determine the length of the 

minor’s custodial commitment by allowing probation to decide whether 

and when the minor successfully completed YOTP. (Id. at pp. 745-746.)

In reaching its conclusion, J.C. found, in pertinent part, that (1)

under In re Robert M. (2013) 215 Cal.App.4th 1178 (Robert M.), “[w]hen 

a minor is committed to a county facility and ordered to complete a 

treatment program, juvenile courts can and do delegate the day-to-day 

supervision of the minor, while retaining the ultimate authority to 

determine whether the minor has successfully completed the program”; 

(2) probation’s day-to-day supervisory authority included making 
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decisions in the first instance regarding a minor’s progress through the 

various phases and successful completion of YOTP; (3) the juvenile

court exercised its retained authority to decide whether and when the 

minor successfully completed YOTP by scheduling YOTP review 

hearings to exercise its retained authority over whether and when the 

minor successfully completed YOTP; (4) probation’s decisions regarding 

the minor’s progress and successful completion of YOTP could be 

challenged at the review hearings by the minor, and, at any time, 

minor (or parents, attorney, or any interested person), could file a 

petition for modification of the disposition order under Welfare and 

Institutions Code section 778, subdivision (a)(1) and California Rules of 

Court, rule 5.60(e)(1); and (5) YOTP’s handbook provisions supported 

the court’s rejection of the minor’s assertion of an impermissible 

delegation of authority to probation to decide whether and when a 

minor had successfully completed YOTP. (J.C., supra, 33 Cal.App.5th 

at pp. 745-747.) 

Appellant argues J.C. was incorrectly decided because it 

improperly relied on Robert M., which merely holds the juvenile court 

has the ultimate responsibility and control over a minor in any 

placement, and did not address the issue here – whether probation’s 

day-to-day supervisory authority includes decisions regarding a minor’s 

progress and successful completion of the GIM program, which in turn 

impacts the length of the minor’s custodial commitment. According to 

appellant, the length of a minor’s custodial commitment is rendered 

indeterminate because probation alone makes the decisions in the first 

instance as to whether and when a minor advances through the various 

motions of the GIM program. However, “[t]he logical extension of 
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[appellant’s] argument is that any decision impacting a minor’s 

progress through [the GIM program] cannot be made by probation in 

the first instance, even if the court will hold review hearings and 

retains the authority to overrule the decision. We see no legal basis for 

such a conclusion. When a minor is committed to a county facility and 

ordered to complete a treatment program, juvenile courts can and do 

delegate the day-to-day supervision of the minor, while retaining the 

ultimate authority to determine whether the minor has successfully 

completed the program. (Robert M., supra, 215 Cal.App.4th at p. 

1185.)” (J.C., supra, 33 Cal.App.5th at p.747, italics in original.) J.C.

persuasively reasons that Robert M.’s “analysis —finding that despite 

the administrative entity’s day-to-day supervision of the minor, the 

juvenile court retains the ultimate authority to determine whether the 

minor successfully completed the program —applies equally” in the 

case before us. (J.C., supra, at p. 746.) 

Nor are we persuaded by appellant’s attempt to distinguish J.C. 

based on differences between the GIM program at issue here and YOTP 

at issue in J.C. Like the GIM Program, “YOTP is . . . located inside 

Juvenile Hall.” (J.C., supra, 33 Cal.App.5th at p. 745, fn. 5.) While the 

timed phases in the GIM program are shorter, YOTP is also “split into 

three phases. Each is 12 weeks long, including [a]n orientation phase” 

. . . followed by a fourth phase “which is completed outside juvenile 

hall.” (J.C., supra, at pp. 743, 747, fn. 7.) YOTP’s handbook provides 

that “ ‘[a] court review will be set by your Deputy Probation Officer 

prior to your completion of phase three, your [Deputy Probation Officer] 

will then inform the court of your progress, and whether you should be 

released to Phase Four, GPS Supervision/Community Aftercare.’ ” 
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(J.C., supra, at pp. 746-747; first italics added by this court; second 

italics added by J.C. court.) In contrast, the GIM program’s handbook 

specifically provides for a juvenile court review five months after 

disposition, a court and probation determination as to the length of 

time a minor shall be on electronic monitoring during the 90 days of 

conditional release, and a final court review of the minor’s behavior, 

progress, and compliance at the completion of the 90 days of conditional 

release. As is self-evident, these differences are insignificant.

Of importance, and similar to YOTP, the GIM program “plainly 

contemplates the probation officer will provide the juvenile court with 

opinions” about the minor’s participation in the program and when the 

minor may be expected to complete the program, as well as “an opinion 

about whether the minor has successfully completed the program and 

will make a recommendation to the court regarding the minor’s release. 

The court will then make the final determination on these issues.” 

(J.C, supra, 33 Cal.App.5th at p. 747.) 

Simply put, the juvenile court did not delegate to the probation 

officer the authority to determine the length of the minor’s custodial 

commitment. While the probation department supervises the minor’s 

progress through the GIM program on a day-to-day basis, “the juvenile

court retains the supervisory authority to determine whether and when 

[the minor] successfully completes” GIM, “and, therefore, whether and 

when [the minor] will be released early from juvenile hall.” (J.C., 

supra, 33 Cal.App.5th at p. 748.) In fact, the juvenile court scheduled a 

review hearing “in the exercise of that supervisory authority” (ibid.)

and made sure the minor and counsel were aware of the ability to file a 

petition to modify the disposition order under Welfare and Institutions 
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Code section 778, subdivision (a)(1) and California Rules of Court, rule 

5.60(e)(1). (J.C., supra, at p. 748.) 

Therefore, the disposition order did not improperly delegate to 

probation the authority to determine the length of appellant’s custodial 

commitment at juvenile hall without judicial review and approval. 

II. Probation Requirement to Report Police Contacts 

Appellant argues, the People concede, and we concur that the 

probation requirement “to report any police contacts” to the deputy 

probation officer within 24 hours is unconstitutionally vague and 

overbroad. This requirement “does indeed leave one to guess what 

sorts of events and interactions qualify as reportable,” and “casts an 

excessively broad net over what would otherwise be activity not worthy 

of reporting.” (People v. Relkin (2016) 6 Cal.App.5th 1188, 1197.) 

The parties propose alternate remedies. Appellant contends the 

reporting requirement should either be stricken or modified. The 

People propose we modify the reporting requirement to provide: “Minor 

to report any police contacts related to criminal activity, arrests, or an 

officer’s request for the minor’s identification, to the DPO within 24 

hours.” However, this proposed modification remains vague as it does 

not indicate whether appellant is required to report police contacts

concerning criminal activities and arrests based solely on her own 

conduct or whether it also includes criminal activities and arrests of 

other persons which appellant may witness. 

Rather than attempting to craft a modification, we remand the 

matter to the juvenile court to determine in the first instance whether 

to strike or modify the reporting requirement. If the court determines 

modification is appropriate, the new reporting requirement should be 
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“closely” tailored to its purpose (In re Sheena K. (2007) 40 Cal.4th 875, 

890), and use language that is sufficiently precise so that appellant will 

know what types of police contacts she is required to report.

DISPOSITION

This matter is remanded to the juvenile court with directions to 

either strike or modify the probation requirement that reads: “Minor to 

report any police contacts to the DPO within 24 hours,” consistent with

the views expressed in this opinion. In all other respects, the March 

26, 2019 disposition order is affirmed.
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_________________________

Petrou, J.

WE CONCUR:

_________________________

Fujisaki, Acting P.J.

_________________________

Jackson, J.

People v. I.M./A156934
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Trial Court: Contra Costa County Superior Court

Trial Judge: Hon. John C. Cope

Counsel: Office of Attorney General, Xavier Becerra, Attorney 

General, Lance E. Winters, Chief Assistant Attorney 

General, Jeffrey M. Laurence, Senior Assistant 

Attorney General, Catherine A. Rivlin, Supervising 

Deputy Attorney General, Karen Z. Bovarnick, 

Deputy Attorney General, for Plaintiff and 

Respondent.

First District Appellant Project, Karriem Baker, for 

Defendant and Appellant.