J

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NON

- PRECEDENTIAL DECISION

- SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA

v.

TERRANCE XAVIER PEREZ

Appellant :

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

: IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

PENNSYLVANIA

No. 1060 MDA 2020

Appeal from the PCRA Order Entered July 24, 2020 In the Court of Common Pleas of Lycoming County Criminal Division at

No(s): CP

- 41

- CR

- 0001046

- 2015

BEFORE: LAZARUS, J., McCAFFERY, J., and STEVENS, P.J.E. *

MEMORANDUM BY LAZARUS, J.: FILED MARCH 8 , 2021

Terrance Xavier Perez appeals from the order, entered in the Court of

Common Pleas of Lycoming County, denying his petition filed pursuant to the

Post Conviction Relief Act (PCRA ), 42 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 9541

- 9546

. After careful

review, we affirm.

We have previously set forth the underlyin g facts of this case as follows:

On May 11, 2015, a [n] altercation occurred between Rory Herbert and Jamil Bryant[,] the victim[,] due to Herbert’ s b eli ef that [Bryant] had “shorted” him on a marijuana purchase. Herbert recounted the event to his cousin, Brandon Love, who was a friend of [Perez] and [Bryant]

. Thereafter, Herbert, Love, and [Perez] went to the home of Cosme Berrones. Also present were Berrones’ s girlfriend, Brooke Dawson, and J ada Jenkins, the mother of Love’ s child. Love and [Perez] spent the next several hours on Love’ s cell phone, texting and orally arguing with [Bryant]

. Berrones testified that [Bryant] threaten ed to blow Love’ s head off and, in response, [Perez] stated to [Bryant], “ if you have a problem with Love then you have a problem with me,

_________________ __________ ______ ____ _______

* Former Justice specially assigned to the Superior Court.J

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he’s not the only one with a gun.” Thereafter, [Perez] and Love left Berrones’ s home and, when they returned, [Perez ] had a silver revolver. [Perez] asked Love and [] Jenkins to take him to get bullets for the firearm, but they declined.

[Perez] then started talking about shooting [Bryant]

. [Perez] asked Love for a ride home, but Love refused. Ultimately, Berrones us ed Love’ s vehicle to drive [Perez] home, where [Perez] , a state parolee, dropped off his electronic ankle monitor [,] in order to establish a false alibi regarding his whereabouts [, and] in anticipation of later shooting [Bryant]

. [Perez] an d Berrones retu rned to Berrones’ s home, where [Perez] debated [] getting ammunition for the silver revolver or a different gun for the purpose of killing [Bryant]

. [Perez] asked Love for a ride to get another gun, and Love refused. Berrones thereafter drove [Perez] to a storage facility for the purpose of retrieving another gun. [ Chris Hayman, driving a silver van,] met [Perez] at the entrance to the storage facility [. Perez] entered the silver van, after which [,] he and [Hayman] drove through the gates of the storage facility [and] reemerged [approximately five minutes later]

. When [Perez] re

entered Love’ s vehicle, he was carrying a long black assault rifle. Berrones and [Perez] returned to Berrones’ s home with the assault rifle, whereupon [Perez] resumed talking about shooting [Bryant].

[Perez] then aske d Love for a ride to [Bryant]’s house, and Love agreed. Love then drove [Perez] and Berrones to [Bryant]’s neighborhood, where they spent forty to forty

- five minutes driving around looking for [Bryant]

. Eventuall y, they saw [Bryant] on his front porch, and Love and Berrones dropped off [Perez] nearby [with] the assault rifle [.] Love and Berrones proceeded to a pre

arranged pick

- up location on Grant Street [,] where they waited for [Perez]

. Berrones heard what sou nded like firecrackers before [Perez] ran back to Love’s car, and said that he “shot that pussy in his muffin.” 1 [Perez] warned Love and Berrones, “you pussies better not say anything.”

1 Berrones testified that “muffin” means “head,” and that [Perez] was indicating that he shot [Bryant] in the head.

Upon return [ing] to Berrones’ s home, [Perez] , still in possession of the assault rifle, went to the basement, and re

- emerged without the weapon. [Perez then borrowed clothes and a backpack from Berrones to ch ange his appearance.] As [Perez] left Berrones’ sJ

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home, Berrones heard him say “ let me know when that pussy dies, I’ll feel better at night.”

Shortly thereafter, Berrones found the assault rifle in the rafters of his basement.

. . . Berrones later consen ted to a search of his home, [] led police to the weapon

. . . and confirmed that [Perez] used [it] to shoot [Bryant]

.
* * *

[Perez]’s mother, Sabina Kent, was shown a photograph of the assault rifle recovered from Berrones’ s basement, and identified it as belonging to [Perez]

. [Kent] had last seen the assault rifle one week before the murder in the home she shared with [Perez]

. [Kent also testified at trial regarding her knowledge of the contents of a duffel bag wherein Per ez kept the assault rifle .]

* * *

[Perez] was charged with criminal homicide, criminal conspiracy (homicide), persons not to possess firearms, and related offenses for [Bryant]’s murder. The persons not to possess firearms charge was severed befor e trial. On November 1, 2016, a jury found [Perez] guilty of first

- degr ee murder, criminal conspiracy [to commit] homicide[] , and related charges. Thereafter, the trial court found [Perez] guilty of persons not to possess firearms. On November 1, 2016, the trial court sentenced [Perez to a life sentence without the possibility of parole and consecutive sentences aggregating to an additional twenty

- five to fifty years’ incarceration

. Perez] filed post

- sentence motions which w ere denied by operation of la w.

Commonwealth v. Perez , 486 MDA 2017, at * *1

- 12 (Pa. Super. filed Nov

.

29
, 2018) (unpublished memorandum) (i nternal citations, brackets , and

footnote omitted ). On November 29, 2018, this Court affirmed Perez’s

judgment of sentence on direct appeal
, i d. at *49, and our Supreme Court

denied review. Commonwealth v. Perez
, 854 MAL 2018 (Pa. 2019).

Accordingly, Perez’s sentence became final on July 16, 2019. See 42

Pa.C.S.A. § 9545(b)(3) ; U.S. S up

. Ct. R. 13

.J

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On August 23, 2019, Perez filed a pro se petition under the PCRA. The

court appointed Jeana Longo, Esquire, who filed an amended petition on

November 14, 2019
, wherein she advanced a claim of ineffective assistance

of trial counsel for failure to preserve Perez’s claim of improperly admitted

ev idence

. On January 2, 2020, the court granted Perez’s request for an

e videntiary hearing, and held that hearing on July 6, 2020. The PCRA court

described what transpired at the evidentiary hearing as follows:

Chief Public Defender [Nicole] Spring [, Esqui re] testified at [] the evidentiary hearing.

. . . Both Spring [, then serving as First Assistant Public Defender,] and Joshua Bower, Esq [uire
, ] w ere assigned to handle [Perez]’s case.

. . . After trial, Spring was solely responsible for the post

- sen tence motion[] and [Perez]’s appeal. One of the issues Spring raised [] was [the fact that] the trial court allow[ed] the Commonwealth to introduce [that the “ugly gun” 1 was among] the contents of a duffel bag [ via Kent’s rehabilitative testimony

. Perez] ’ s [m] otion to [e]xclude [t] estimony regarding the “ugly gun” was initially granted [, the
court reasoning] that the prejudicial effect of an additional gun outweighed [its] probative value. At trial, Bower cross [

- ] examined [] Kent [] regarding the content s of the duffel bag [
, where Perez’s assault rifle was located] :
Q. Now, I w ant to talk about the gun. You said that you had seen that gun about a week ahead of time before the shooting?

A. Yes.

Q. Do you recall telling the police that in that bag, in addition to a towel and bullets, there would be a scope?

_________________ __________ ______ ____ _______

1 Kent used t he term “ ugly gun” at trial, and that term has been continuously used throughout the history of this case to refer to a specific revolver . The

“ ugly gun ” has no connection to this case except that it was located in the duffel bag with the assault rifle that Perez fired at Bryant

. For clarity and consistency , this Court will continue to use the term.J

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- A. Yes.

Q. And that w as kept in the bag?

A. Yes.

Q. There [was] also a tripod?

A. Yes.

Q. That the gun would sit on?

A. Yes, it was.

Q. That you thought would be in the bag?

A. Yes, I did.

* * *

Q. And you told them that the scope on the gun we saw in Commonwealth’s No. 7 was broken?

A. Yes.

Q. Did you see a scope on Commonwealth’ s Exhibit 7? If [] we could put 7 back up again. There is not a scope there?

A. That’ s how I i dentified the gun [,] because there was no scope there.

Q. And you didn’ t see a scope in the bag?

A. No.

[N.T. Jury Trial, 10/27/16, at 15

- 19.] Following this testimony [,] the Commonwealth requested a sidebar [] to dis cuss introduction of the “ ugly gun ,” claiming [Perez] had opened the door through his cross

- examination [of Kent]

. The [Commonwealth ] argued:

I believe that [Perez] has opened the door to other items that were, in fact , in the bag

. . . . In light of the fact that [Perez ] cross[

- examined K ent regarding whether] the [duffel] bag was missing a scope and tripod [, which ] suggest[ed] that [Kent] was mistaken about the items in the bag, [the Commonwealth] believe [s] it would be
appropr iate to rehabilitate [Kent] by her also being able to positive ly identify the [ “ ugly gun ” ] that [ was] found in theJ

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- bag , which the [c] ourt had previously precluded [the Commonwealth] from doing.

The [c] ourt agreed with the Commonwealth that the quest ions [Perez] asked on cross

- examination enabled [ it ] “ to get back int o the issue of whether or not [Kent] identified something properly in the bag, ” which included the “ ugly gun. ” Spring testified at t he evidentiary hearing that she included the “ugly gun” issue in both her post[

- ]sentence motion[] and [ Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b)] statement, but did not brief the issue on appeal. In the handling of her twenty to fifty homic ide appeals while at the Public Defender ’ s [O] ffice, Spring stated that she typically f ocuses on what she believes are the strongest issues [,] and often [] redu ce [s] the issues betw een [ the Rule 1925(b) statement] and [ the corresponding appellate] brief[,] to not dilute th[e] stronger issues. In [Perez’s direct appeal ,] S pring reduced the issues from tw elve to seven [, and did not include the “ugly gun” issue

. N evertheless,] Spring stated that she should have included [it]

.
PCRA Court Opinion, 7/24/20, at 2

- 4 (internal citations and footnotes

omitted)

. On July 24, 2020, the PCRA court dismissed Perez’s petition by order

with an accompanying opinion. See Opinion and Order, 7/24/20. Perez filed

a notice of appeal on August 20, 2020, and an appellate brief on September

29, 2020. 2

On appeal, Perez presents one issue for our review: “[w]hether the

[PCRA] court erred in failing to grant a claim of ineffective ness of counsel

when counsel was ineffective for waiving [Perez]’s right to appeal the

admission of inadmissible evidence.” Appellant’s B rief, at 6. Specifically,

_________________ __________ ______ ____ _______

2 After our grant of an extension of time to file the Commonwealth’s reply brief, see Order, 10/29/20, the Commonwealth, instead, filed a notice of its intent to rely on the opinion and order of the PCRA court, and declined to file its appellate brief. See Commonwealth’s Letter, 11/30/20.J

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Perez claims that trial counsel deprived him of his right to appeal the “ugly

gun” issue by failing to raise it in his appellate brief, and that he is entitled to

a restoration of his direct appeal. See Appellant’s Brief, at 16.

The standard of review in PCRA appeals is limited to a determination of

whether the PCRA court ’s findings are support ed by the record and free from

legal error. Commonwealth v. Johnson , 966 A.2d 523, 532 (Pa. 2009).

The PCRA court’ s factual determinations ar e entitled to deference, but legal

determinations are subject to plenary review. Id.

To obtain relief based on a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, a

PCR A petitioner must establish : (1) the underlying claim is of arguable merit;

(2) there was no reasonable basis for counsel’s action or failure to act; and

(3) a resultant prejudice to the petitioner

— i.e., but for counsel’s error, there

is a “reasonable probability the result of the proceeding would have been

different.” Commonwealth v. Treiber , 121 A.3d 435, 444 (Pa. 2015).

Failure to satisfy any of the three prongs is fatal to a claim of ineffective

assi stance of counsel. Commonwealth v. Spotz , 84 A.3d 294, 311 (Pa.

2014). We presume counsel was effective, and the petitioner has the burden

to prove otherwise. See Commonwealth v. Williams , 570 A.2d 75, 81 (Pa.

1990). After review, we agree with the PCR A court’s analysis and conclude

that Pere z’s claim is meritless.

In its opinion accompanying the order dismissing Perez’s petition, the

PCRA court reasoned that:J

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[Perez] was not prejudiced by [Attorney Spring’s] omission [of the “ugly gun” claim in Perez’s appellate brief on direct appeal]. As the Commonwealth pointed out at the evidentiary hearing, the Pennsylvania Superior Court has previously held that

the properly admitted and uncontrad icted independent evidence of [Perez]’s guilt was so overwhelming, and the prejudicial effect of the ostensibly erroneous admission of Agent Kontz’s limited testimony regarding the scope and results of the investigation so insignificant by comparison, that any error could not have contributed to the verdict. Multiple witnesses testified as to the day

- long feud involving [Perez], Love, and [Bryant]: [Perez]’s statements regarding his intent to shoot [Bryant] ; [Perez’s] unsuccessful efforts to obtain ammuni tion for the silver revolver; [Perez’s] retrieval of the assault rifle and ammunition from the storage facility; and [Perez’s] statements confirming [] he [] shot [Bryant]

. The jury was also presented with DNA and ballistics evidence that linked [Perez] t o the murder weapon and the ammunition used to shoot [Bryant].

[] Perez

, 486 MDA 2017, [at] * 8 ([] finding the introduction of other evidence was harmless error [ and did not contribute to the verdict beyond a reasonable doubt]).

The Superior Court reached this conclusion without taking into consideration the “ugly gun” introduced by Kent. Therefore, [Perez] would not have been prejudiced, even if its introduction was improper.

PCRA Court Opinion, 7/24/20, at 6 (emphasis added )

.
Here, we agree with the PCR A court that Perez has failed to establish

prejudice

— that but for Attorney Spring’s omission, a reasonable probability

exists that Perez’s conviction would not stand. See T rei ber
, supra . Indeed,

as the PCRA court correctly points out, this Court on direct appeal, without

taking into consideration Perez’s now complained

- of admitted evidence, found

that his conviction resulted from s uch overwhelming evidence of guilt that anyJ

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error in the conviction withstood constitutional attack. See C ommonwealth

v. Story , 383 A.2d 155, 162

- 63 n.12 (Pa. 1978) (standard for determining

whether error involving state law is harmless is same as federal constitutional

standard, which “reflects a fundamental belief that once error has been

established, it is far worse to conclude incorrectly that the error was harmless

than it is to conclude incorrectly that error was reversible”). Given that the

complained

- of evidence did not contribute to this Court’s harmless error

analysis on direct appeal, Perez has fail ed to prove how the result of the

proceeding could have been different. 3 Therefore, Perez’s ineffective

assistance of counsel claim fails. 4 See Spotz
, supra . Consequently, the

_________________ __________ ______ ____ _______

3 Perez argues the Commonwealth’s only reason to introduce the “ugly gun” was to “ improperly prejudice the jury and to show that Perez had a propensity for cr iminal behavior in violation of [Pa.R.E. 404(b)(1)]. . . . The trial court [acknowledged , when it ruled to exclude the “ugly gun” pre

- trial, ] tha t [“the jury should not think Perez] had one gun[, so] he must have had the other gun[.]” Appellant’s Brief, at 19

- 20. Here, we are not persuaded that admission of the “ugly gun” undermines confidence in Perez’s convictions, especially where Perez has fa iled to connect such an attenuated allegation regarding the jury’s improper consideration of propensity evidence with any explanation of how the proceeding would have come out differently. S ee Commonwealth v. Jones , 210 A.3d 1014, 1018

- 19 (Pa. 2019) ( “ In the context of a post

- conviction challenge to counsel’s stewardship, prejudice is established where the truth

- determining process was so undermined that no reliable adjudication of guilt or innocence could have taken place, i.e. there is a reasonable pr obability that, but for counsel’s errors, the outcome of the proceeding would have been different.

. . . [A] speculative or attenuated possibility of a different outcome is insufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome. ”) (citations omitted; emphas is added).

4 To the extent Perez claims that Attorney Spring had no reasonable basis for omitting the “ugly gun” argument from Perez’s direct appellate brief, see Appellant’s Brief, at 21

- 22, we find that argument meritless

. SeeJ

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PCRA court’s order is supported by the record and free of legal error. See

J ohnson
, supra

.

Order affirmed.

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq. Prothonotary

Date: 03/08/2021

_________________ __________ ______ ____ _______
Commonwealth v. Koehler
, 36 A.3d 121, 132 (Pa. 2012) ( “Courts should not deem counsel’s strategy or tactic unreasonable unless it can be concluded that an alternative not chosen offered a potential for success substantially greater than the course actually pursued.”) (citation and quotation marks omitted) ; see also Commonwealth v. Stanton , 120 A.3d 277, 294 (Pa. 2015 ) ( “[t]he process of winnowing out weaker arguments on appeal and focusing on those more likely to prevail, far from being evidence of incompetence, is the hallmark of effective appellate advocacy.”) Here, Perez has not shown that including the “ugly gun” claim in his appellate brief offered a potential for success substantially greater than the course Attorney Spring actually pursued, especially where we have already f ound that, when considering the evidence proffered at trial, minus the “ugly gun,” the Commonwealth proved Perez’s guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. See Perez
, 486 MDA 2017, at * 8.