alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
# New commander visits petroleum lab 

/ Published Aug. 22, 2019

Defense Logistics Agency Energy Europe and Africa Commander Army Lt. Col. Donna Welch visited the DLA Energy Petroleum Laboratory at the Rhine Ordnance Barracks in Germany July 12, as part of her command familiarization. 

The lab supports the quality surveillance mission providing full specification fuel testing services for DLA Energy customer operations across 57 Defense Fuel Support Points in 10 countries. As one of five DLA Energy labs worldwide, it receives approximately 2,000 fuel samples each year including routine quality surveillance, investigations of possible contamination as well as testing for secured fuels.

Laboratory Manager Mike Domen provided a tour of the facility and an overview of the capabilities of the million-dollar equipment housed in the lab.

The DLA Energy Europe and Africa Quality Division is responsible for administering the DLA Energy contract quality assurance and surveillance program on all energy products procured, shipped, stored and issued to U.S. Forces throughout U.S. European Command and U.S. Africa Command. Quality assurance representatives perform contract compliance audits of commercial Into-Plane and ship’s bunkering services as well as perform pre-award surveys and participate in post-award conferences in support of DLA Energy purchase programs, Domen explained.

Army Sgt. 1st Class Scott Tejada instructed Welch on how to perform several fuel tests

Welch highlighted the lab’s exceptional work and its efforts to engage with the local community. 

“DLA Energy Petroleum Lab supports the Warfighter, the President of the United States and goes the extra mile to host one to three high school science, technology, engineering and math students per semester who are in the Department of Defense Education Activity Career Practicum Program,” Welch said.

“I enjoyed having Lt. Col. Welch visit the lab,” said Petroleum Lab Specialist Army Sgt. Yhadira Meadows . “It is always great to have someone see the capabilities that the lab has to offer.”
II

103D CONGRESS

1ST SESSION S. 1688

To amend the Internal Revenue Code of 1986 to treat spaceports like airports

under the exempt facility bond rules.

IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES

NOVEMBER 19 (legislative day, NOVEMBER 2), 1993

Mr. GRAHAM (for himself, Mr. DOMENICI, and Mr. MACK) introduced the

following bill; which was read twice and referred to the Committee on Finance

A BILL

To amend the Internal Revenue Code of 1986 to treat

spaceports like airports under the exempt facility bond rules.

1 Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa2 tives of the United States of America in Congress assembled,

3 SECTION 1. SPACEPORTS TREATED LIKE AIRPORTS UNDER

4 EXEMPT FACILITY BOND RULES.

5 (a) IN GENERAL.—Paragraph (1) of section 142(a)

6 of the Internal Revenue Code of 1986 (relating to exempt

7 facility bond) is amended to read as follows:

8 ‘‘(1) airports and spaceports,’’.
2

S 1688 IS

1 (b) TREATMENT OF GROUND LEASES.—Paragraph

2 (1) of section 142(b) of such Code is amended by adding

3 at the end thereof the following new subparagraph:

4 ‘‘(C) SPECIAL RULE FOR SPACEPORT

5 GROUND LEASES.—For purposes of subpara6 graph (A), spaceport property which is located

7 on land owned by the United States and which

8 is leased to a governmental unit shall be treated

9 as owned by such unit if—

10 ‘‘(i) the lease term (as defined in sec11 tion 168(i)(3)) is at least 15 years, and

12 ‘‘(ii) such unit would be treated as

13 owning such property if such lease term

14 were equal to the useful life of such prop15 erty.’’.

16 (c) Paragraph (3) of section 149(b) of such Code is

17 amended by adding at the end thereof the following new

18 subparagraph:

19 ‘‘(E) EXEMPTION FOR SPACEPORTS.—

20 Paragraph (1) shall not apply to any exempt fa21 cility bond issued as part of an issue described

22 in paragraph (1) of section 142(a) to provide a

23 spaceport in situations where—

24 ‘‘(i) the guarantee of the United

25 States (or an agency or instrumentality
3

S 1688 IS

1 thereof) is the result of payment of rent,

2 user fees, or other charges by the United

3 States (or any agency or instrumentality

4 thereof), and

5 ‘‘(ii) the payment of the rent, user

6 fees, or other charges is for, and condi7 tioned upon the use of the spaceport by the

8 United States (or any agency or instru9 mentality thereof).’’.

10 (d) EFFECTIVE DATE.—The amendments made by

11 this section shall apply to obligations issued after the date

12 of the enactment of this Act.

Æ
II

103D CONGRESS

2D SESSION S. 1941

To terminate the Milstar II Communications Satellite program.

IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES

MARCH 16 (legislative day, FEBRUARY 22), 1994

Mr. BUMPERS (for himself, Mr. SIMON, Mr. CONRAD, Mr. LAUTENBERG, Mr.

FEINGOLD, and Mr. LEAHY) introduced the following bill; which was read

twice and referred to the Committee on Armed Services

A BILL

To terminate the Milstar II Communications Satellite

program.

1 Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa2 tives of the United States of America in Congress assembled,

3 SECTION 1. TERMINATION OF MILSTAR II COMMUNICA4 TIONS SATELLITE PROGRAM.

5 (a) TERMINATION OF PROGRAM.—The Secretary of

6 Defense shall terminate the Milstar II Communications

7 Satellite program.

8 (b) PAYMENT OF TERMINATION COSTS.—Funds

9 available on or after the date of the enactment of this Act

10 for obligation for the Milstar II Communications Satellite
2

•S 1941 IS

1 program may be obligated for that program only for pay2 ment of the costs associated with the termination of that

3 program.

Æ
No. 12-8506.

#### White *v.*United States.

C. A. 5th Cir. Cer-tiorari denied.
103D CONGRESS

1ST SESSION S. 1335

AN ACT

For the relief of the Menominee Indian Tribe of

Wisconsin.
103D CONGRESS

1ST SESSION S. 1335

AN ACT

For the relief of the Menominee Indian Tribe of Wisconsin.

1 Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa2 tives of the United States of America in Congress assembled,
2

S 1335 ES

1 SECTION 1. The Secretary of the Treasury is author2 ized and directed to pay to the Menominee Indian Tribe

3 of Wisconsin, out of any money in the Treasury of the

4 United States not otherwise appropriated, a sum equal to

5 the damages sustained by the Menominee Indian Tribe of

6 Wisconsin by reason of—

7 (a) the enactment and implementation of the

8 Act of June 17, 1954 (68 Stat. 250), as amended,

9 and

10 (b) the mismanagement by the United States of

11 Menominee assets held in trust by the United States

12 prior to April 30, 1961, the effective date of termi13 nation of Federal supervision of the Menominee In14 dian Tribe of Wisconsin.

15 SEC. 2. Payment of the sum referred to in section

16 1 shall be in full satisfaction of any claims that the Me17 nominee Indian Tribe of Wisconsin may have against the

18 United States with respect to the damages referred to in

19 such section.

Passed the Senate August 6 (legislative day, June

30), 1993.

Attest:

Secretary.
No. 12-7104.

#### Shahin *v.*Wilmington Trust.

C. A. 3d Cir. Motion of petitioner for leave to proceed *in forma pauperis*denied, and certiorari dismissed. See this' Court’s Rule 39.8.
No. 12-8314.

#### Chae Chang *v.*California.

Ct. App. Cal., 2d App. Dist. Certiorari denied.
#### Real v. Real 62

07/27/2016

200 MAL (2016)

62

. Justice MUNDY did not participate in the consideration or decision of this matter.

Denied

Pa.Super., 135 A.3d 657
COURT OF APPEALS

EIGHTH DISTRICT OF TEXAS

EL PASO, TEXAS

MR. YAMAHA, INC., TRACY 

MCINTYRE AND GENE MCINTYRE,

§

§ No. 08-11-00295-CV

Appellants,

§ Appeal from the

v. 

§ 34th Judicial District Court

MICHAEL MCINTYRE AND 

LAURA MCINTYRE,

§ of El Paso County, Texas

Appellees. (TC# 2006-316)

§

MEMORANDUM OPINION

On December 8, 2011, the Court granted an agreed motion to abate this appeal to allow 

the parties to finalize their settlement of this dispute. Appellants, Mr. Yamaha, Inc., Tracy 

McIntyre, and Gene McIntyre, and Appellees, Michael McIntyre and Laura McIntyre, have since 

filed an agreed motion to vacate the trial court’s judgment and dismiss the appeal because the 

parties have settled all matters in controversy. We therefore reinstate the appeal. Because we 

conclude that we are not authorized to grant all of the relief requested by the joint motion, we 

grant the motion in part and deny in part.

Rule 43.2 specifies the types of judgments a court of appeals is authorized to enter. 

TEX.R.APP.P. 43.2. It provides that a court of appeals may:

(a) affirm the trial court’s judgment in whole or in part;

(b) modify the trial court’s judgment and affirm it as modified;

(c) reverse the trial court’s judgment in whole or in part and render the judgment 

that the trial court should have rendered;
- 2 -

(d) reverse the trial court’s judgment and remand the case for further proceedings;

(e) vacate the trial court’s judgment and dismiss the case; or

(f) dismiss the appeal.

Rule 43.2(e) authorizes an appellate court to vacate the trial court’s judgment and dismiss the 

underlying suit. Under Rule 43.2(f), we are authorized to dismiss the appeal.

The agreed motion requests that we vacate the trial court’s judgment, but it does not 

request that we dismiss the underlying suit. Instead, the parties request that we dismiss the 

appeal. We do not have authority, however, to both dismiss the appeal and vacate the trial 

court’s judgment because the two actions are incompatible. See Smith and Marrs, Inc. v. D.K. 

Boyd Land and Cattle, Co., 224 S.W.3d 270 (Tex.App.--El Paso 2005, no pet.); Kisler v. 

Coldwell, 201 S.W.3d 187, 187-88 (Tex.App.--El Paso 2006, no pet.). Rather than denying the 

agreed motion outright, we will grant the request to vacate the trial court’s judgment and remand 

the cause for further proceedings as may be necessary to effectuate the parties’ agreement. We 

deny the request to dismiss the appeal. In accordance with the parties’ motion, we assess costs 

against the party incurring same. See TEX.R.APP.P. 42.1(d).

GUADALUPE RIVERA, Justice

January 25, 2012

Before McClure, C.J., Rivera, J., and Antcliff, J.
#### Mark A. Taylor, Respondent, v New York University Medical Center et al., Appellants.

[768 NYS2d 322]

Order of the Appellate Term of the Supreme Court, First Department, entered February 7, 2002, which, to the extent appealed from as limited by the brief, affirmed that part of an order of the Civil Court, New York County (Faviola Soto, J.), entered July 31, 2000, denying so much of defendants’ motion as sought summary judgment dismissing plaintiffs first cause of action, unanimously affirmed, without costs.

Plaintiff claims discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation *(see*Administrative Code of City of NY § 8-101 *et seq.),*and has made out a prima facie case *(see Brennan v Metropolitan Opera Assn.,*284 AD2d 66, 70 [2001]). While defendants have set forth evidence of a legitimate, independent, nondiscriminatory reason to support the decision to terminate plaintiff’s employment *(see Ferrante v American Lung Assn.,*90 NY2d 623, 629 [1997]), specifically, a reorganization *(see Brown v General Elec. Co.,*144 AD2d 746, 747 [1988]), plaintiff has responded with evidence sufficient to raise a triable question of fact as to whether the proffered reason is a mere pretext for discrimination *(Brennan, supra; and see Ferrante,*90 NY2d at 630).

Since defendants have not given plaintiff a chance to respond factually to their argument on behalf of the individual defendant in reliance on *Patrowich v Chemical Bank*(63 NY2d 541, 542 [1984]), made for the first time on appeal, and indeed, only in their reply brief, we do not reach it *(see 440 E. 62nd St. Owners Corp. v 440 E. 62nd St. Assoc.,*217 AD2d 426, 427 [1995]).

We have considered defendants’ remaining arguments and find them unavailing. Concur—Buckley, P.J., Tom, Sullivan and Williams, JJ. *[See*2002 NY Slip Op 50060CU).]
II

103D CONGRESS

1ST SESSION S. 198

To amend the Internal Revenue Code of 1986 to provide that the onetime exclusion of gain from sale of a principal residence shall not be

precluded because the taxpayer’s spouse, before becoming married to

the taxpayer, elected the exclusion.

IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES

JANUARY 26 (legislative day, JANUARY 5), 1993

Mr. HELMS introduced the following bill; which was read twice and referred

to the Committee on Finance

A BILL

To amend the Internal Revenue Code of 1986 to provide

that the one-time exclusion of gain from sale of a principal residence shall not be precluded because the taxpayer’s spouse, before becoming married to the taxpayer,

elected the exclusion.

1 Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa2 tives of the United States of America in Congress assembled,
2

•S 198 IS

1 SECTION 1. ELECTION BY TAXPAYER OF ONE-TIME EXCLU2 SION OF GAIN ON SALE OF PRINCIPAL RESI3 DENCE ALLOWED EVEN IF TAXPAYER’S

4 SPOUSE ELECTED THE EXCLUSION BEFORE

5 BECOMING MARRIED TO TAXPAYER.

6 (a) IN GENERAL.—Paragraph (2) of section 121(b)

7 of the Internal Revenue Code of 1986 (relating to one8 time exclusion of gain from sale of principal residence by

9 individual who has attained age 55) is amended to read

10 as follows:

11 ‘‘(2) APPLICATION TO ONLY ONE SALE OR EX12 CHANGE.—Subsection (a) shall not apply to any sale

13 or exchange if—

14 ‘‘(A) in the case of an unmarried individ15 ual, an election by such individual under sub16 section (a) with respect to any other sale or ex17 change is in effect, or

18 ‘‘(B) in the case of married individuals, an

19 election by each such individual under sub20 section (a) with respect to any other sale or ex21 change is in effect.’’.

22 (b) TECHNICAL AMENDMENT.—Paragraph (2) of

23 section 121(d) of such Code is amended to read as follows:

24 ‘‘(2) PROPERTY OF DECEASED SPOUSE.—For

25 purposes of this section, in the case of an unmarried

26 individual whose spouse is deceased on the date of
3

•S 198 IS

1 the sale or exchange of property, if the deceased

2 spouse (during the 5-year period ending on the date

3 of the sale or exchange) satisfied the holding and

4 use requirements of subsection (a)(2) with respect to

5 such property, then such individual shall be treated

6 as satisfying the holding and use requirements of

7 subsection (a)(2) with respect to such property.’’.

8 (c) EFFECTIVE DATE.—The amendments made by

9 this section shall apply to sales and exchanges after the

10 date of the enactment of this Act.

Æ
EXHIBIT 15.2





CONSENT OF INDEPENDENT REGISTERED PUBLIC ACCOUNTING FIRM





We consent to the incorporation by reference in Registration Statements No. 333-13320, No. 333-10312 and No. 333-132736 on Form S-8 and No. 333-168870 on Form F-3 of our report dated June 29, 2011 relating to the consolidated financial statements as of March 31, 2011 and for the year ended March 31, 2011 of Highway Holdings Limited and its subsidiaries (the “Group”), appearing in the annual report on Form 20-F of the Group for the year ended March 31, 2011.





/s/ Deloitte Touche Tohmatsu





Deloitte Touche Tohmatsu


Hong Kong


June 29, 2011
#### George Lopez et al., Respondents, v City of New York et al., Defendants, and Ulrik Holding, Ltd., et al., Appellants.

[768 NYS2d 621]

In an action, inter alia, to recover damages for personal injuries, the defendants Ulrik Holding, Ltd., Heilman Management, Marvin Heilman, and Rozman Realty Company appeal, as limited by their brief, from so much of an order of the Supreme Court, Kings County (Knipel, J.), dated November 12, 2002, as granted that branch of the plaintiffs’ motion which was, in effect, to vacate an order of the same court (M. Garson, J.), dated April 2, 2002, granting, without opposition, their motion to unconditionally preclude the plaintiffs from offering evidence of damages at trial, and dismissing the action, and thereupon, reinstated the action against them.

Ordered that the order dated November 12, 2002, is reversed insofar as appealed from, on the law, with costs, that branch of the plaintiffs’ motion which was, in effect, to vacate the order dated April 2, 2002, is denied, the complaint insofar as asserted against the appellants is dismissed, and the action against the remaining defendants is severed.

The plaintiffs failed to comply with a conditional order of preclusion dated October 10, 2001. As a result, the conditional order became absolute *(see Correa v Tscherne,*296 AD2d 476 [2002]; *Jenkinson v Naccarato,*286 AD2d 420 [2001]). The appellants’ subsequent motion for an unconditional order of preclusion, therefore, was unnecessary. Nevertheless, the Supreme Court granted the motion without opposition by the plaintiffs and dismissed the action. The plaintiffs subsequently moved, inter alia, in effect, to vacate their default in opposing the appellants’ motion.

*694To succeed on that branch of their motion which was, in effect, to vacate their default in opposing the appellants’ motion, the plaintiffs were required to demonstrate both a reasonable excuse for their default and the existence of a meritorious cause of action *(see Correa v Tscherne, supra; Jenkinson v Naccarato, supra).*They failed to demonstrate a reasonable excuse for their failure to comply with the conditional order *(see Correa v Tscherne, supra; Jenkinson v Naccarato, supra)*and their failure to oppose the appellants’ motion *(see Engel v Lichterman,*62 NY2d 943 [1984]). Consequently, their default should not have been vacated. Their contention that the appellants’ attorney agreed to reinstatement of the action rests on matter dehors the record and may not be considered on this appeal *(see Credit-Based Asset Servicing & Securitization v Chaudry,*304 AD2d 708 [2003]). Altman, J.P., S. Miller, McGinity, Adams and Mastro, JJ., concur.
DISMISS; and Opinion Filed February 4, 2015.

S

In The

Court of Appeals

Fifth District of Texas at Dallas

No. 05-14-00960-CV

ZABULON SMITH, Appellant

V.

CASA BLANCA APARTMENTS, Appellee

On Appeal from the County Court at Law No. 5

Dallas County, Texas

Trial Court Cause No. CC-14-03191-E

MEMORANDUM OPINION

Before Chief Justice Wright, Justice Lang-Miers, and Justice Stoddart

Opinion by Justice Lang-Miers

The filing fee, docketing statement, and clerk’s record in this case are past due. By 

postcard dated July 25, 2014 we notified appellant the $195 filing fee was due. We directed 

appellant to remit the filing fee within ten days and expressly cautioned appellant that failure to 

do so would result in dismissal of the appeal. Also by postcard dated July 25, 2014, we notified 

appellant the docketing statement had not been filed in this case. We directed appellant to file 

the docketing statement within ten days. We cautioned appellant that failure to do so might 

result in dismissal of this appeal. By letter dated September 18, 2014, we informed appellant the 

clerk’s record had not been filed because appellant had not paid for or made arrangements to pay 

for the clerk’s record. We directed appellant to provide verification of payment or arrangements 

to pay for the clerk’s record. We cautioned appellant that failure to do so would result in the 

dismissal of this appeal without further notice. To date, appellant has not paid the filing fee, 
–2–

filed the docketing statement, provided the required documentation, or otherwise corresponded 

with the Court regarding the status of this appeal. 

Accordingly, we dismiss this appeal. See TEX. R. APP. P. 37.3(b); 42.3(b), (c).

140960F.P05

/Elizabeth Lang-Miers/

ELIZABETH LANG-MIERS

JUSTICE
–3–

Court of Appeals

S

Fifth District of Texas at Dallas

JUDGMENT

ZABULON SMITH, Appellant

No. 05-14-00960-CV V.

CASA BLANCA APARTMENTS, Appellee

On Appeal from the County Court at Law 

No. 5, Dallas County, Texas

Trial Court Cause No. CC-14-03191-E.

Opinion delivered by Justice Lang-Miers. 

Chief Justice Wright and Justice Stoddart 

participating.

In accordance with this Court’s opinion of this date, this appeal is DISMISSED.

It is ORDERED that appellee CASA BLANCA APARTMENTS recover its costs of this 

appeal from appellant ZABULON SMITH.

Judgment entered this 4th day of February, 2015.
|                                                                                                  
|--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
|                                                                                                  
|View History:  Monthly  Annual Download Data (XLS File)                                          
|View History:  Monthly  Annual                                                                    
|View History:  Monthly  Annual                                                                    
|View History:                                                                                     
|                                                                                                  
|Price of Freeport, TX Liquefied Natural Gas Exports to Indonesia (Dollars per Thousand Cubic Feet)
|                                                                                                  
|                                                                                                  
|Price of Freeport, TX Liquefied Natural Gas Exports to Indonesia (Dollars per Thousand Cubic Feet)
|                                                                                                  

|Decade                                                                                                                            | Year-0 | Year-1 | Year-2 | Year-3 | Year-4 | Year-5 | Year-6 | Year-7 | Year-8 | Year-9
|--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- | ------ | ------ | ------ | ------ | ------ | ------ | ------ | ------ | ------ | ------
|2020's                                                                                                                            |        |        |        | 5.51   |        |        |        |        |        |       
|- = No Data Reported;  -- = Not Applicable;  NA = Not Available;  W = Withheld to avoid disclosure of individual company data.
|                                                                                                                                 
|Release Date: 7/31/2024                                                                                                          
|Next Release Date: 8/30/2024
No. 12-7979.

#### Pickens *v.*Chrones, Warden.

C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.
No. 12-8029.

#### Daniels *v.*Crews, Secretary, Florida Department of Corrections, et al.

C. A. 11th Cir. Certio-rari denied.
No. 12-8129.

#### Carter *v.*Washington.

Sup. Ct. Wash. Cer-tiorari denied.
#### Maria Del Carmen Hernandez, Respondent, v 34 Downing Owners Corp., Appellant.

[48 NYS3d 898]

Order, Supreme Court, New York County (Jennifer G. Schecter, J.), entered October 17, 2016, which denied the motion of defendant building owner for summary judgment dismissing the complaint, unanimously affirmed, without costs.

Summary judgment was properly denied in this action where plaintiff was injured when a door to the cellar of the restaurant at which she worked, which was located in the sidewalk abutting the building, swung shut and struck her on the head. Pursuant to its lease with nonparty Manhattan Mansions, which leased the commercial area of the building, defendant remained obligated to maintain and repair the cellar stairs and sidewalk. Although an out-of-possession landlord contractually obligated to make repairs may not be held liable unless it created or had notice of the dangerous condition *(see Gomez*
      *555
      *v 192 E. 151st St. Assoc., L.P.,*26 AD3d 276, 277 [1st Dept 2006]; *Torres v West St. Realty Co.,*21 AD3d 718, 721 [1st Dept 2005], *lv denied*7 NY3d 703 [2006]), here, defendant has failed to establish that it lacked constructive notice of the allegedly defective cellar door or that it did not create the condition.

Concur — Acosta, J.P., Renwick, Manzanet-Daniels, Webber and Gesmer, JJ.