[Cite as Reed v. Sims , 2020-Ohio-2777.]
STATE OF OHIO ) IN THE COURT OF APPEALS )ss: NINTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COUNTY OF LORAIN )
DEREK REED Appellant

v. VALERIE SIMS, et al. Appellee C.A. No. 19CA011494

APPEAL FROM JUDGMENT ENTERED IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS COUNTY OF LORAIN, OHIO CASE No. 12DU075654
DECISION AND JOURNAL ENTRY Dated: May 4, 2020

HENSAL, Judge. {¶1} Derek Reed appeals a judgment of the Lorain County Court of Com mon Pleas, Domestic Relations Division, that denied his motion to transfer jurisdiction. For the following reasons, this Court affirms.
I. {¶2} Mr. Reed and Valerie Sims divorced in Lorain County in 2013. T hey have one child, who was born in 2010. In 2015, Father was granted sole custody. Mother’s parents were granted visitation rights and Mother was granted supervised vis itation rights. Shortly thereafter, Father announced his intention to relocate to Tennessee. The p arties ended up reaching an agreement that would allow Father to move out of state. {¶3} In 2018, Father filed a motion to m odify the parties’ parenting plan in a Tennessee court. Mother subsequently file d a motion to modify the parent ing plan in the Ohio action. Father then filed a motion to stay the proceedings in Ohio and transfe r jurisdiction to Tennessee.2 Following an evidentiary hearing, the trial court denied Father ’s motion. Father has appealed, assigning as error that the trial court abused its discretion w hen it found that Ohio was a not an inconvenient forum under Revised Code Section 3127.21.
II. ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR
THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION WHEN IT DID NOT FIND TENNESSEE AS A MORE APPROPRIATE STATE TO EXERCISE JURISDICTION AND REFUSED TO FIND OHIO AN INCONVENIENT FORUM UNDER THE CIRCUMSTANC ES PURSUANT TO ORC §3127.21[.] {¶4} Father argues that the trial court abused its discretion when i t found that it was not an inconvenient forum under Section 3127.21. Section 3127.21(A ) provides that “[a] court of this state that has jurisdiction * * * to make a child custody deter mination may decline to exercise its jurisdiction at any time if it de termines that it is an inconve nient forum under the circumstances and that a court of another stat e is a more convenient forum.” In making that de termination, the court is required to “consider a ll relevant factors,” including : (1) Whether domestic violence has occurred and is likely to con tinue in the future and which state could best protect the parties and the child; (2) The length of time the chil d has resided outside this state ; (3) The distance between the court in this state and the court in the state that would assume jurisdiction; (4) The relative financial ci rcumstances of the parties; (5) Any agreement of the partie s as to which state should assum e jurisdiction; (6) The nature and location of t he evidence required to resolve the pending litigation, including the t estimony of the child; (7) The ability of the court of each state to decide the issue expeditiously and the procedures necessary to present the evidence;3 (8) The familiarity of the court of each state with the facts a nd issues in the pending litigation. R.C. 3127.21(B). As Father has acknowledged, we review a trial court’s determination under Section 3127.21(B) for an abuse of discretion. Baker v. Baker , 2d Dist. Montgomery No. 27850, 2018-Ohio-3065, ¶ 34; see In re Guardianship of Wonderly , 67 Ohio St.2d 178, 187 (1981) (applying predecessor to R.C. 3127.21). {¶5} Father argues that the trial court erred with respect to the fi rst factor, which pertains to domestic violence. The court wrote that it was giving “some weight to this factor, as it has been acknowledged by both plaintiff a nd defendant that domestic viol ence appears to have occurred in the past amongst them, here in the state of Ohio.” Father argu es that there was no evidence presented that established that domestic violence has occurred. He notes that the trial court specifically excluded testimony about domestic violence that wa s alleged to have occurred before Mother’s and Father’s divorce. {¶6} Father does acknowledge that there was evidence that Mother has been convicted of child endangering regarding t heir child. Under Section 3113 .31(A)(1)(a)(iii), domestic violence includes committing an act that would result in a child being a n abused child, which, in turn, includes a child who is enda ngered under Section 2919.22. J.M. v. M.M. , 9th Dist. Medina No. 15CA0057-M, 2016-Ohio-5368, ¶ 21. The trial court did not iden tify the “domestic violence [that] appears to have occurred in the past[,]” but it could have been referencing Mother’s treatment of the child. {¶7} Even if the trial court’s finding was inaccurate, Father has no t established that he experienced any prejudice from the finding. Although the court initially wrote that it was giving the factor “some weight[,]” as it was working through each fact or individually, the court did not4 mention the domestic violence factor when it was explaining its overall determination of why it did not believe that Ohio was an i nconvenient forum. The court wrote: In sum, this Court has put much weight on the credible testimon y presented, including this Court’s long history and familiarity with the ca se, the minor child’s significant ties to Lorain County, Ohio, this Court’s willingne ss to work with [Father’s] and the minor child’s schedules, and this Court perm itting court attendance and/or testimony in t echnological manners * * *. Fu rther, this Court has put additional weight * * * t hat [Father] has demonstrated resistance to cooperate with [Mother], and/or p romote a relationship between the minor child and [Mother]. As a result, [Mother] has filed contempt motions against [Father], which are currently pending * * *. As previously emphasized, t his Court would be the most appropriate court to hear evidence whether or not [Fat her] has violated this Court’s own orders * * *. This Court further cannot ignor e the evidence presented that three of the par ties’ understanding was that thi s Court would continue to retain jurisdiction, even if they agreed that [Fath er] would relocate * * * to hear and modify issues regarding the minor child. Upon review of the entirety of t he trial court’s decision, we c onclude that any error with respect to the domestic violence fact or was harmless. Civ.R. 61. {¶8} Regarding the second factor, Father argues that the trial court implied that the factor weighed in favor of keeping the forum in Ohio even though, acco rding to Father, it should have weighed in favor of transferring the case to Tennessee. Father notes that the court identified that the child had been born in Ohio a nd had resided in Ohio for 5 y ears and had resided in Tennessee for three-and-a-half years. Acco rding to Father, this Court ha s previously held that just two years in a new state was sufficient to make the new state the superio r place for the case to be heard.
Daerr v. Daerr , 41 Ohio App.3d 206, 207 (9th Dist.1987). {¶9} This Court’s decision in Daerr preceded Ohio’s adoption of the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction and Enforcement Act (UCCJEA). At the time of Daerr , Ohio applied the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction Act (UCCJA), which listed di fferent criteria for determining whether a court was an inconvenient forum. R.C. 3109.25(C) (19 87). The UCCJA instructed courts to consider:5 (1) If another state is or recently was the child’s home state; (2) If another state has a closer connection with the child and his family or with the child and one or more of the contestants; (3) If substantial evidence conc erning the child's present or f uture care, protection, training, and personal relati onships is more readily available in another state; [and] (4) If the parties have agreed on another forum that is no less appropriate.
Id . We also note that, in Daerr , the trial court determined that the other state was the more convenient forum. On appeal, this Court concluded that, under the facts of that particular case, the trial court had not abus ed its discretion. Daerr at 207. In light of the different statute involved and different factual circum stances, we conclude that Daerr is of limited persuasive value in this

case. {¶10} Regarding the third and fourth factors, Father does not take is sue with the trial court’s determination that the distance between the two states and the financial circumstances of the parties does not weigh for or against transfer of the case. He argues, however, that the trial court should have considered the feasibility of involving a gua rdian ad litem for the child if the case remains in Ohio. According to Father, it would be cost pr ohibitive and illogical for a guardian ad litem in Ohio to investigate the best interests of a child w ho lives in Tennessee. Upon review of the record, however, we note that this issue was not raised before the trial court. Accordingly, we conclude that Father has forfeited his argument. See Ilg v. Ilg , 9th Dist. Summit No. 23987, 2008-Ohio-6792, ¶ 6; Goldfuss v. Davidson , 79 Ohio St.3d 116, 121 (1997). {¶11} Regarding the fifth factor, Father argues that the trial court did not weigh the credibility of the witnesses as to whether the parties had an o ral agreement as to jurisdiction. Instead, the court limited its analysis to the written document s that the parties signed, which do not reflect such an agreement. According to Father, the writte n agreements establish, at best, an6 understanding that the trial cour t would retain jurisdiction to hear the case. He argues that they do not establish an agreement about w hether Ohio is a convenient f orum. {¶12} Initially, we note that the fifth factor concerns whether there is an agreement about “jurisdiction” not about the m ost convenient forum. R.C. 3127. 21(B)(5). In addition, Father’s argument focuses on only part of the trial court’s journal entr y. In explaining it decision for retaining jurisdiction, the cour t wrote that “[t]his Court * * * cannot ignore the evidence presented that three of the parties’ unders tanding was that this Court wo uld continue to re tain jurisdiction, even if they agreed that [Father] would relocate * * *, to hear and modify issues regarding the minor child.” Thus, contrary to F ather’s argument, the trial c ourt did not exclusively consider the parties’ written agreements when it determined whether there wa s an agreement about jurisdiction. Instead, the court appears to have found credible the testimony of Mother and the grandparents that there was an agreement between the parties that jurisdicti on of the case would remain in Ohio even though Father was re locating to Tennessee. See R.C. 3127.21(B)(5). {¶13} As to the sixth factor, Father argues that the trial court impr operly discounted the fact that most of the evidence a nd witnesses, including the chi ld, are in Tennessee. Father argues that the trial court would have limited ability to enforce a su bpoena outside of its jurisdiction and that it would be burdensome to try to arrange the video testimo ny of witnesses who could not travel to Ohio. He notes that any in camera interviews with the child would have to be done in person and with the guardian ad litem present. Father also argues tha t, like in Daerr , the fact that most of the evidence regarding the child is and will be in Tennessee we ighs heavily in favor of transferring jurisdiction. {¶14} Mother and her parents argue that Father’s witness concerns are unfounded because the UCCJEA contains provisions for managing out-of-state witnes ses. Section 3127.10 provides7 that the testimony of such witnesses may be offered by depositi on or otherwise. R.C. 3127.10(A). Depositions may be done by telephone or other electronic means. R.C. 3127.10(B). Documentary evidence may also be transmitted electronically and may not be excluded on that basis. R.C. 3127.10(C). Regarding the tes timony of the child, Mother and her parents note that the child comes to Ohio regularly. {¶15} In addition to the points that Mother’s side makes, we note tha t the UCCJEA allows a court of one state to request a court of another state to hol d evidentiary hearings, order individuals to produce or give evidence, and order evaluations concerning c ustody determinations. R.C. 3127.11(A)(1-3). Tennessee has also adopted the UCCJEA and has a statutory provision that, “[u]pon request of a court of another state, a court of this st ate may hold a hearing or enter an order” as to those matters . Tenn. Stat. 36-6-215(b). Upon rev iew of the record, we conclude that the trial court gave adequate consideration to the sixth factor

. See Urteaga v. Urteaga , 12th Dist. Warren No. CA2014-Ohio-08- 109, 2015-Ohio-2465, ¶ 25-28. {¶16} Regarding the seventh factor, Fa ther contests the trial court’s assertion that it can decide the issues expeditiously. He notes that he filed his mo tion in May 2018, but that it took three separate trips to Ohio to have his motion fully heard and another two months for the trial court to enter its decision, a total of ten months. We conclud e that, although the term “expeditiously” is subjective, there is no evidence in the reco rd regarding how quickly a Tennessee court could consider the custo dy and visitation matters raised by the parties’ other motions. R.C. 3127.21(B)(7). Father can only spec ulate about which court wou ld act faster. {¶17} As to the eighth factor, the trial court found that the factor weighs in favor of keeping the case in Ohio because the court had a significant hi story with the parties and the facts and circumstances surrounding the matter. Father argues that, even though the case may have been8 in Ohio for a significant period of time, the particular judge and magistrate who were involved with the motion to transfer juri sdiction had never met or heard from the parties before. Father argues that the court’s only actual familiarity with the partie s is from the three days of hearing on the motion, which does not weigh very heavily in favor of keepi ng the case in Ohio. Although we acknowledge Father’s arguments, the trial court’s history with the parties is more than a particular judge’s face-to-face interaction with them at a hearing. The c urrent judge and magistrate have ready access to the record, which contains the history of all o f the parties’ filings and the court’s rulings since the action was initiated. Even just focusing on in-court appearances, it cannot be disputed that the trial court has more familiarity with the par ties than any Tennessee court and, thus, the eighth factor necessari ly weighs in favor of Ohio. {¶18} Regarding additional factors, t he trial court found that the ch ild has connections with many family members in Ohio. It also found that the child participates in many activities with her family members while she is in Ohio. The Court furthe r found that Father is resistant to allowing Mother to have a relati onship with the child. It dete rmined that it was in the best position to resolve Mother’s pending show cause and other motions. {¶19} Father argues that the child has stronger connections to Tennes see, where she spends 42-44 weeks a year, than Ohio, where she spends only 8-1 0 weeks a year. Father also argues that he has legitimate rea sons to be concerned about the child being around Mother, in light of Mother’s convictions for multip le crimes including child end angering. Father further argues that whether he has been comp liant with the vi sitation order is immaterial as to which court is the more convenient forum. He furthe r argues that the trial court did not claim to be the better forum for hearing his motion to modify the parenting time schedule. Mother and her parents argue that9 the trial court’s findings about the child’s connections and ac tivities in Ohio are supported by substantial evidence and note that all of Mother’s visitation w ith the child occurs in Ohio. {¶20} The trial court gave individual consideration of each of the fa ctors identified in Section 3127.21 as well as additiona l factors that it considere d relevant as to whether Ohio was an inconvenient forum. The factors that it determined were most s ignificant were the court’s long history with the parties, the child’s significant family ties t o Lorain County, the court’s willingness and ability to accommodate the parties’ schedules, and its abil ity to employ technology to overcome the challenges inherent i n resolving disputes between parties with limited means who reside hundreds of miles apart. T he court also found significa nt that there were current allegations that Father had violated the cou rt’s orders and the parties’ un derstanding that the case would remain in Ohio despite F ather’s relocation. {¶21} Father has not established that the factors identified by the t rial court as more significant are, instead, less significant than other factors. See Urteaga , 2015-Ohio- 2465, at ¶ 19 (recognizing that R.C. 3127.21 “does not set forth what weight to assign the statutory factors” and that the trial court, therefore , has discretion to determine wh at weight to assign each factor in relation to the others). Upon rev iew of the record, we concl ude that Father has not establish that the trial court exercised improper discretion when it determine d that Ohio was “a more convenient forum to dispose of the pending m atters” and that it would cont inue to retain jur isdiction over the proceedings. Father’s assignment of error is overruled.
III. {¶22} Father’s assignment of error is overruled. The judgment of the Lorain County Court of Common Pleas, Domestic R elations Division, is affirmed

. Judgment affirmed.10

There were reasonable grounds for this appeal. We order that a special mandate issue out of this Court, direc ting the Court of Common Pleas, County of Lorain, State of Ohio, to carry this judgment into execution. A certified copy of this journal entry shall constitu te the mandate, pursuant to Ap p.R. 27. Immediately upon the filing hereof , this document shall consti tute the journal entry of judgment, and it shall be file s tamped by the Clerk of the Cour t of Appeals at which time the period for review shall begin to run. App.R. 22(C). The Clerk of the Court of Appeals is instructed to mail a notice of entry of this judgment to the parties and to m ake a notation of the mailing in the docket, pursuant to App.R. 30. Costs taxed to Appellant.

JENNIFER HENSAL FOR THE COURT

TEODOSIO, J. CONCURS. CARR, P. J. CONCURS IN JUDGMENT ONLY.

APPEARANCES: JAMES V. BARILLA, Attorney at Law, for Appellant. GOWRI V. HAMPOLE, Attorney at Law, for Appellee. MICHAEL and KAREN ASBURY, pro se, Appellees.