IN THE COMMONWEALTH COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA

John P. Sivick, :

Petitioner :

:

v. :

:

Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, :

State Ethics Commission, : No. 307 C.D. 2021

Respondent : Argued: October 18, 2021

BEFORE: HONORABLE P. KEVIN BROBSON, President Judge

HONORABLE ANNE E. COVEY, Judge

HONORABLE ELLEN CEISLER, Judge 

OPINION NOT REPORTED

MEMORANDUM OPINION BY 

JUDGE COVEY FILED: December 22, 2021

John P. Sivick (Sivick) petitions this Court for review of the 

Commonwealth of Pennsylvania (Commonwealth) State Ethics Commission’s 

(Commission) February 3, 2021 final adjudication and order (Adjudication After 

Remand),

1 wherein the Commission concluded that Sivick violated Section 1103(a) 

of the Public Official and Employee Ethics Act2(Ethics Act), Section 1104(d) of the 

Ethics Act,3and Section 1105(a) and 1105(b)(5) of the Ethics Act,4 ordered Sivick 

to file complete and accurate amended Statements of Financial Interests (SFI) for 

2011 and 2014, and directed that the matter be referred to the Pike County (County)

District Attorney and the Pennsylvania Attorney General with the Commission’s

recommendation that criminal prosecutions be initiated against Sivick. On appeal, 

1 The order is Commission order number 1731-2, mailed on February 25, 2021.

2

65 Pa.C.S. § 1103(a). 

3

65 Pa.C.S. § 1104(d).

4

65 Pa.C.S. § 1105(a), (b)(5).
2

Sivick presents one issue for this Court’s review: whether the Commission 

erroneously concluded that Sivick committed conflict of interest violations under 

Section 1103(a) of the Ethics Act relative to activities Sivick undertook before 

Lehman Township5(Township) hired his son, J. Justin Sivick (Son). After review, 

this Court affirms.

6

The Township is a second class township with a three-member Board 

of Supervisors (Board). Sivick served as a Supervisor on the Board (Supervisor) 

from January 1994 until December 2017, and as Board Chairman since 2004. 

Sivick has also held the Township’s full-time Roadmaster position since 1995. In 

2005, the Board assigned Sivick the additional responsibilities of Public Works 

Director. Other Supervisors during the subject time periods included Richard C. 

Vollmer (Vollmer), Paul D. Menditto (Menditto), and Robert H. Rohner (Rohner). 

Vollmer became a Supervisor on July 5, 2000, and, at the time of the Commission’s 

proceeding, was serving his third term.7 Vollmer has been Board Vice Chairman 

since January 2004. Menditto served as a Supervisor from January 2004 through 

January 2014, when he resigned his position following his election as a Magisterial 

District Judge. Rohner, who had been Township Secretary/Treasurer since 1995, 

became a Supervisor in January 2014, replacing Menditto on the Board.

In 2009, during his time as Supervisor, Menditto substantially upgraded 

the Township’s existing three-page employee pamphlet to an employee handbook 

(Handbook), which included detailed rules and regulations, and contained a policy 

that prohibited the hiring of an individual if that person would supervise or be 

5 Lehman Township is located in Pike County, Pennsylvania.

6 References herein to witness testimony are, in fact, references to deposition testimony 

that, pursuant to the parties’ stipulations, would have been presented to the Commission, under 

oath, had a hearing been held. 

7

See Section 403 of The Second Class Township Code, Act of May 1, 1933, P.L. 103, as 

amended, added by Section 1 of the Act of November 9, 1995, P.L. 350, 53 P.S. § 65403. 
3

supervised by a member of the person’s immediate family (Nepotism Policy).8 The 

Board approved the Handbook, which included the Nepotism Policy.

The Township did not have a formal hiring process, and Sivick 

conducted all of the Township’s hiring. In late 2012, Sivick verbally expressed to 

his fellow Supervisors in one-on-one, unadvertised meetings, that he wanted the 

Township to employ his Son. During these conversations, Sivick and the other 

Supervisors acknowledged that the Nepotism Policy would need to be removed from 

the Handbook before his Son could be hired.9 Shortly thereafter, Menditto, in 

consultation with the Supervisors, including Sivick, revised the Handbook to remove 

the Nepotism Policy. 

8 The Nepotism Policy defined “immediate family” as “one’s spouse, parent, son or 

daughter, sister or brother, grandparent or grandchild.” Reproduced Record (R.R.) at 94a-95a.

9 Rohner testified that, in the fall of 2012, Sivick told him: “I want to hire my [S]on, [so] 

we need to change the [Handbook].” R.R. at 127a. Rohner opined that Sivick did not present 

the Handbook change and hiring of his Son as a suggestion, but rather as a directive. See

R.R. at 128a. Rohner stated: “If you know [Sivick], that’s how it goes.” Id. “Rohner [explained] 

that . . . Sivick was the Township Supervisor who primarily ran things at the Township, and 

if he wanted things done[,] they got done.” Commission Adjudication (February 25, 2021 Order 

1731-2) at 11, ¶ 33(b)(1) (emphasis added). Vollmer testified:

In late 2012, [Sivick] came and he said[,] . . . “I’d like to somebody 

[sic] maybe have my [S]on work here” . . . also in our [H]andbook 

we have a thing about hiring employees you know like relatives and 

. . . I questioned him on it. I said look, I said “do you really think 

that’s a good idea?” I said “because a lot of time you know a father 

can’t work with his son.” Now I don’t [sic] know [Son] at this time. 

So [Sivick] proceeds to tell me that in the past there have been 

[S]upervisors who had their families working in there etc. And I 

know this is true . . . [.] But anyway that wasn’t the reason so I asked 

him. I said “are you absolutely sure?” I said you know. So he 

talked it up and I said [sic] and I had mixed emotions[,] I really did. 

I was one way or the other and I said alright look I said “but you 

know it’s in the [Handbook] and all” and he said [“]we[]ll we’re 

going to have to change the [Handbook] then.” So anyway I 

agreed[.] I said okay we’ll change the [Handbook]. 

R.R. at 156a-157a.
4

On January 7, 2013, at a Township reorganizational meeting, Menditto 

moved the Board to approve the “employee benefits and information[,]” that 

included the revised Handbook without the Nepotism Policy. Reproduced Record 

(R.R.) at 190a. Vollmer seconded Menditto’s motion, and it was approved. 

Although present at the meeting, Sivick abstained from voting on the revision, as 

instructed by the Township’s Solicitor. Despite the Board’s general practice of 

preparing an errata sheet reflecting Handbook changes, Sivick told Menditto not to 

prepare an errata sheet, and no errata sheet was created.

10 The meeting minutes 

do not reflect that the Nepotism Policy was removed. Rather, the minutes reference 

the Supervisors approving “the employee benefits and information[,]” and further 

document that Sivick abstained from that vote. R.R. at 190a.

As Roadmaster, Sivick coordinated and scheduled training classes for 

Township road crew employees. On March 20, 2013, Rohner submitted a 

registration form on the Township’s behalf enrolling six individuals in a traffic 

control flagger training course that the Pennsylvania Department of Transportation 

10 Menditto described the usual process used for implementing changes to the Handbook:

The Supervisors would discuss what change they wanted to make[,]

and then I would make the changes and[,] under most 

circumstances[,] I would then develop a[n] errata sheet that would

say here’s what’s changed[,] and I would give out the new 

[H]andbook or the revised [H]andbook along with the errata sheet 

to the employees . . . and I would have them sign for it so . . .

everybody knew, they didn’t have to look through the whole book 

to see what changed.

R.R. at 140a. Menditto recounted that, with respect to the Nepotism Policy’s removal: “[T]hat 

process was different. Again the Supervisors did discuss it, it was agreed that [the Nepotism 

Policy] would come out[,] along with other minor changes that might have taken place in the 

[Hand]book at that point. But I was told [by Sivick] not to make an errata sheet.” R.R. at 141a 

(emphasis added). When asked if Sivick explained his reason for directing that no errata sheet be 

made, Menditto stated: “I think it was obvious. I don’t remember him telling me why but I think 

it was obvious. . . . [H]e didn’t want people seeing that we were taking the [N]epotism [Policy]

out of the [Hand]book.” R.R. at 141a.
5

mandated for individuals with flagging duties. Although Sivick’s Son had not yet 

applied for Township employment, his name was among those included in the 

Township’s flagger course enrollment form. The Township submitted a $300.00 

payment, reflecting a $50.00 enrollment fee for each of the six registered enrollees. 

On the same date, Sivick issued a $50.00 check to the Township wherein the memo 

line read: “Flagging Class.” R.R. at 172a.

On June 3, 2013, Son applied for Township employment in public 

works maintenance.11 In early June 2013, Sivick again approached the Supervisors 

about hiring his Son. Although both Vollmer and Menditto admitted that they voted 

to approve Son’s employment at a June 2013 meeting,12 the June 2013 Township 

meeting minutes do not reflect an official Board vote approving Son’s hiring.

Sivick’s Son began employment on the Township’s road crew on June 

10, 2013. His initial pay rate was $15.00 per hour for regular work hours and $22.50 

per hour for overtime hours. His starting pay rate was consistent with pay rates for 

new Township employees. In 2014, Son’s regular pay rate was $16.20 per hour and 

his overtime rate was $24.30 per hour. In 2015, his regular pay rate was $17.45 per 

hour and his overtime rate was $26.18 per hour. In 2016, his regular pay rate was 

$18.20 per hour and his overtime rate was $27.30 per hour. 

11 Son checked a box on the employment application to indicate that he had a relative 

employed by the Township, but did not provide information requested therein to identify the 

relative, the relative’s relationship to him, or the relative’s position with the Township.

12 According to Menditto, during the time Menditto served as a Township Supervisor,

Sivick did all of the hiring and there was no formal hiring process at the Township. Menditto 

testified: “I don’t recall ever being asked an opinion on whether we should hire a certain person or 

not.” R.R. at 143a. He further stated that the Board did not ordinarily vote on hiring, and the vote 

to hire Son was not recorded in the meeting minutes. Adjudication After Remand at 11, Finding 

of Fact 34(d), (f). Record evidence reflects that Son was the only Township employee hired by a 

Board vote. Rohner testified that, although Vollmer and Menditto officially moved to hire Son, 

“[Sivick] was the one who wanted him hired.” R.R. at 125a.
6

The Township employed Son for 81 pay periods from June 2, 2013, to 

July 9, 2016, during which time his gross earnings totaled $126,552.24 (his net

earnings totaled $87,949.36). The Township terminated Son’s employment on June 

30, 2016.

On November 15, 2015, the Commission’s Investigative Division 

(Investigative Division) received a signed, sworn complaint, wherein it was alleged 

that Sivick had violated the Ethics Act. On January 19, 2016, the Investigative 

Division initiated a preliminary inquiry and, thereafter, a full investigation, and 

notified Sivick accordingly.13 On September 13, 2016, the Investigative Division 

13 In his brief, Sivick cites to and relies upon statements contained in a February 3, 2016 

Investigative Division Report of Interview prepared by Joseph Sherbaum (Sherbaum) regarding 

his interview of Rohner that day. Sherbaum’s February 3, 2016 report provides, in relevant part:

Rohner stated that [Sivick] had asked Vollmer and Menditto to hire 

[his Son]. Rohner stated that [Sivick], Vollmer, and Menditto had 

told Rohner that “they were going to change the employee

[Handbook] to take out the [N]epotism [P]olicy.” Rohner stated that 

those statements had occurred in Rohner’s office at the Township 

building. Rohner stated that those statements had occurred multiple 

times and that Rohner had replied to them: “[I]t would be nothing 

but trouble if they did that.”

Rohner stated that there was never an advertisement or job 

announcement for the full-time position that [Son] obtained at 

the Township. . . . Rohner stated that there were no other 

candidates for that road crew position.

Rohner stated that he did not personally witness [Sivick]

intimidating the other Supervisors into hiring [his Son]. Rohner 

stated that Menditto had struggled with the decision to hire [Son].

R.R. at 100a (emphasis added).

Notably, according to a February 8, 2016 Investigative Division Report of Interview, 

Rohner called Sherbaum after his February 3, 2016 interview. Sherbaum’s February 8, 2016 

report explains:

I had sensed that Rohner had not been as forthcoming with 

information . . . and that Rohner seemed to be uneasy due to the 

presence of [Township] Solicitor, Robert Bernathy, at said 

interview. After that interview, I had told Rohner that he may call 
7

mailed Sivick an Investigative Complaint/Findings Report, in response to which 

Sivick filed an answer on November 12, 2016. The parties filed a Stipulated Record 

in lieu of an evidentiary hearing and filed briefs. 

On February 1, 2018, the Commission issued its final adjudication

(First Final Adjudication), wherein it determined that Sivick violated the conflict of 

interest provisions of Section 1103(a) of the Ethics Act, that Sivick filed timely but 

deficient SFIs for calendar years 2011 and 2014 in violation of Section 1105(a) and 

1105(b)(5) of the Ethics Act, and that Sivick violated Section 1104(d) of the Ethics 

Act because he received compensation from the Township when he did not have 

accurate and complete SFIs on file with the Township. 

Specifically, the Commission ruled:

[Sivick] used the authority of his public positions for the 

private pecuniary benefit of his [Son], when he 

participated in discussions and actions of the Board to 

eliminate the Township’s Nepotism Policy with the intent 

and for the purpose of having his [S]on hired as a 

Township road crew employee; when he discussed, 

recommended, lobbied, influenced, or sought the support 

of the Board to effectuate the hiring of his [S]on as a 

Township employee; and when he verified Township 

records enabling and/or otherwise directing the payment 

of salary/wage to his [S]on from public monies.

. . . .

[Sivick] used the authority of his public office as a 

Supervisor by participating in the aforesaid discussions[,]

as well as later discussions with his fellow Supervisors[,]

or email me at any time with additional information. Rohner called 

on his own volition to provide additional information . . . .

. . . .

Rohner stated that the road crew position that [Son] had 

obtained with the Township in June 2013 was created by 

[Sivick] specifically for [his Son] . . . . 

R.R. at 112a (emphasis added).
8

regarding the changes to the [Handbook] to remove the 

Nepotism Policy. [Sivick]’s discussions/actions to 

effectuate the removal of the Nepotism Policy - a policy 

that [Sivick] had voted to approve only a few years earlier 

- were undertaken with the specific intent, motivation, and 

purpose of enabling the hiring of [his Son] by the 

Township. Although [Sivick] abstained from the January 

7, 2013[] vote of the Board that approved the revised 

[Handbook], he had already used the authority of his office 

to effectuate the removal of the Nepotism Policy from the 

[Handbook] prior to the vote.

. . . .

[Sivick] used the authority of his public office as a 

Supervisor when he discussed, recommended, lobbied, 

influenced, or sought the support of the Board to effectuate 

the hiring of his [S]on as a Township employee. [Sivick] 

“pled his case” to Vollmer about seeing his [S]on “get a 

chance.” After the Nepotism Policy had been removed 

from the [Handbook], [Sivick] again asked Vollmer if it 

would be alright if he brought his [S]on in to be a 

Township employee. When Vollmer asked [Sivick] if [his 

Son] had qualifications for the Township position, 

[Sivick] responded affirmatively and informed Vollmer of 

his [S]on’s qualifications.

First Final Adj. at 20-21 (citation omitted). 

Finally, the Commission held:

[Sivick] used the authority of his public office when he 

used the actual power he had by being a Township 

Supervisor to access and influence his fellow Township 

Supervisors to effectuate both the elimination of the 

Township’s Nepotism Policy and the hiring of [his S]on. 

Given that the Nepotism Policy would have precluded the 

hiring of [his S]on, and given that at least one of the 

Supervisors (Vollmer) raised concerns regarding hiring 

[his S]on, it is clear that [his Son] would not have been 

hired as a Township employee but for [Sivick]’s use of the 

authority of his public office as a Supervisor to engage in 

discussions with and make recommendations to his fellow 

Supervisors and to lobby/influence or seek the support of 

those Supervisors with regard to eliminating the Nepotism 
9

Policy and hiring his [S]on. But for being a Supervisor, 

[Sivick] would not have been in a position to engage in 

such communications and to exert such influence to 

effectuate the hiring of his [S]on]. [Sivick] was 

consciously aware of the private pecuniary benefit his 

[S]on would receive if hired by the Township, and 

[Sivick]’s actions in getting the Nepotism Policy 

eliminated and his [S]on hired were steps to secure that 

private pecuniary benefit.

Id. at 21-22. The Commission ordered Sivick to pay $30,000.00 in restitution to the 

Commonwealth, and to file complete and accurate SFIs for 2011 and 2014. Sivick 

appealed to this Court. 

On January 3, 2019, in Sivick v. State Ethics Commission, 202 A.3d 814 

(Pa. Cmwlth. 2019) (Sivick I), appeal granted in part, 217 A.3d 182 (Pa. 2019), and 

rev’d, 238 A.3d 1250 (Pa. 2020), this Court affirmed the Commission’s First Final 

Adjudication. The Sivick I Court concluded that the Commission properly 

determined that Sivick had violated Section 1103(a) of the Ethics Act when he used 

the authority of his office to solicit the elimination of the Township’s Nepotism 

Policy and his Son’s hiring, for his Son’s pecuniary gain. This Court also concluded 

that Sivick had violated Section 1103(a) of the Ethics Act by verifying and 

approving his Son’s payroll records. Finally, this Court determined that the 

Commission acted in accordance with Section 1107(a)(2) of the Ethics Act when it 

ordered Sivick to pay restitution. 
10

Sivick sought, and the Pennsylvania Supreme Court granted, an 

allowance of appeal;

14 however, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court limited its review 

to the following issues:

15

1) Whether, under Section 1107(13) of the [Ethics Act], 

the [] Commission, upon a finding that a public official or 

public employee violated the [Ethics] Act, has the 

authority to order restitution when the individual who 

obtained financial gain is not the public official or 

employee, but is an immediate family member of the 

public official or employee?

14 Sivick’s Petition for Allowance of Appeal (Pa. No. 118 MAL 2019) raised the following 

issues:

1. Whether the Panel abused its discretion and erred by ordering 

restitution from a public official on account of wages paid by the 

Township to his laborer-son notwithstanding the exemption of 

laborers as “public employees” under the Ethics Act and avoiding 

other restitutional arguments of the public official by sua sponte

dismissing his standing.

2. Whether the Panel erred by determining a public official commits 

a conflict of interest violation under the Ethics Act by inquiring and 

discussing, in the same way general members of the public could, 

the potential hiring of his [S]on under the First Amendment [, U.S. 

Const. amend. I,] with other elected supervisors and without 

evidence of threats, intimidation, any quid pro quo arrangements, or

voting of any kind.

3. To what extent, if any, does the Ethics Act require proof of efforts 

to furnish improper compensation in order to sustain a conflict of 

interest violation?

4. To what extent must the Commonwealth prove alleged ethical 

misconduct of supervisory public employees exceeds the 

class/subclass exemption for conflicts of interest relative to [eight]

subordinate employees, one of whom was recently added and a 

member of supervising public employee’s immediate family?

Id. at 1-2 (italics added).

15 The Pennsylvania Supreme Court’s per curiam Order declared: “AND NOW, this 6th 

day of August, 2019, the Petition for Allowance of Appeal is GRANTED, LIMITED TO the 

issues set forth below. Allocatur is DENIED as to all remaining issues.” Sivick v. State Ethics 

Comm’n (Pa., No. 118 MAL 2019, filed Aug. 6, 2019) (per curiam).
11

2) Whether the action of a public official or public 

employee reviewing and approving payroll records of a 

group of subordinate employees, one or more of whom is 

the public official’s or employee’s immediate family 

member, falls within the class/subclass exemption of the 

“conflict of interest” definition in the [Ethics Act]?

Sivick v. State Ethics Comm’n (Pa., No. 118 MAL 2019, filed Aug. 6, 2019) (per 

curiam). The Pennsylvania Supreme Court did not grant allowance of appeal on the 

issue of whether this Court correctly concluded that the Commission properly 

determined that Sivick violated Section 1103(a) of the Ethics Act by using the 

authority of his offices to solicit the elimination of the Township’s Nepotism Policy 

and his Son’s hiring.

On October 1, 2020, in Sivick v. State Ethics Commission, 238 A.3d 

1250 (Pa. 2020) (Sivick II), the Pennsylvania Supreme Court reversed this Court’s 

Sivick I decision, held that Sivick did not violate Section 1103(a) of the Ethics Act 

by reviewing and approving his Son’s timesheets, and declared that Section 

1107(13) of the Ethics Act did not authorize the Commission to order restitution 

where a public official or employee confers a financial benefit on an immediate 

family member. 

The Sivick II Court explained:

Having established that one of the three stated bases for 

the Commission’s finding that Sivick violated Subsection 

1103([a]) of the [Ethics] Act is infirm and that the 

Commission lacked statutory authority to impose 

restitution under the circumstances of this case, we now 

must address how to proceed on remand. Although 

conflict of interest is a felony, the Commission’s approach 

to this case was not like a conventional criminal matter, 

which typically proceeds by reference to individual counts 

as to each of which a defendant is convicted or acquitted, 

with certain potential penalties attaching to each 

conviction. By contrast, the Commission’s adjudication 

identified three distinct but interrelated actions as 

violating [S]ection 1103(a) [of the Ethics Act] without 
12

making clear whether each cited basis was sufficient by 

itself, or whether the violation was based upon 

aggregating the cited wrongdoing into one course of 

conduct. This creates a degree of uncertainty that is only 

exacerbated by the Commission’s imposition of a single 

sanction. It is exacerbated further still, now, by this 

Court’s determination that the lone sanction imposed 

lacked a statutory basis - and was, in a sense, an illegal 

sentence. The parties do not address this complication, 

which was immaterial to the court below because it 

affirmed the Commission’s [First Final] Adjudication.

When an appellate court invalidates any among a number 

of convictions in a given case, or otherwise deems invalid 

any component of a sentencing scheme in such a matter, 

we assume that the court, having imposed sentence with 

an overarching understanding of the aggregate sanction, 

should have the opportunity to fashion a new judgment of 

sentence. Here, it isn’t even entirely clear that the 

Commission would have found a conflict of interest 

violation at all without one of its three cited bases for the 

violation deemed invalid. But even if the Commission 

sustains its finding of a conflict of interest violation on the 

cited bases that remain undisturbed by our ruling, it may 

well wish to consider alternative sanctions available to it

under Section 1109 of the [Ethics] Act. That is the 

Commission’s decision to make on remand.

Sivick II, 238 A.3d at 1266-67 (emphasis added; footnotes omitted). Thus, the Sivick 

II Court vacated the Commission’s First Final Adjudication, and remanded the 

matter to the Commission for further proceedings, including, in the Commission’s 

discretion, the entry of a new adjudication and, if appropriate, the imposition of any 

sanction available under the Ethics Act.

On February 25, 2021, the Commission mailed its Adjudication After 

Remand addressing the remaining charges. The Commission again concluded that 

Sivick violated Section 1103(a) of the Ethics Act by using the authority of his office 

for his Son’s private pecuniary benefit by initiating discussions and taking action to 

eliminate the Township’s Nepotism Policy in order to effectuate his Son’s hiring. 
13

Further, the Commission’s findings of fact, discussion, and conclusions of law are

almost identical to those in its First Final Adjudication. 

The Commission ruled:

[Sivick] used the authority of his public office as a 

Township Supervisor by participating in the aforesaid 

discussions as well as later discussions with his fellow

Supervisors regarding the changes to the [Handbook] to 

remove the Nepotism Policy. [Sivick’s] 

discussions/actions to effectuate the removal of the 

Nepotism Policy - a policy that [Sivick] had voted to 

approve only a few years earlier - were undertaken with 

the specific intent, motivation, and purpose of enabling 

the hiring of [his Son], by the Township. Although 

[Sivick] abstained from the January 7, 2013[] vote of the 

Board that approved the revised [Handbook], he had 

already used the authority of his office to effectuate the 

removal of the Nepotism Policy from the [Handbook]

prior to the vote.

. . . . 

[Sivick] further used the authority of his public office as a 

Township Supervisor when he discussed, recommended, 

lobbied, influenced, or sought the support of the Board 

to effectuate the hiring of his [S]on as a Township 

employee. [Sivick] “pled his case” to Vollmer about 

seeing his [S]on “get a chance.” After the Nepotism 

Policy had been removed from the [Handbook], [Sivick]

again asked Vollmer if it would be alright if he brought his 

[S]on in to be a Township employee. When Vollmer 

asked [Sivick] if [his Son] had qualifications for the 

Township position, [Sivick] responded affirmatively and 

informed Vollmer of his [S]on’s qualifications.

Adj. After Remand at 21 (citation omitted). 

Finally, the Commission held:

[Sivick] used the authority of his public office when he 

used the actual power he had by being a Township 

Supervisor to access and influence his fellow Township

Supervisors to effectuate both the elimination of the 

Township’s Nepotism Policy and the hiring of [his Son]. 
14

Given that the Nepotism Policy would have precluded 

the hiring of [his S]on, and given that at least one of the 

Supervisors (Vollmer) raised concerns regarding hiring 

[his S]on, it is clear that [his Son] would not have been 

hired as a Township employee but for [Sivick’s] use of 

the authority of his public office as a Supervisor to 

engage in discussions with and make recommendations 

to his fellow Supervisors and to lobby/influence or seek 

the support of those Supervisors with regard to 

eliminating the Nepotism Policy and hiring his [S]on. 

But for being a Supervisor, [Sivick] would not have been 

in a position to engage in such communications and to

exert such influence to effectuate the hiring of his [S]on. 

[Sivick] was consciously aware of the private pecuniary 

benefit his [S]on would receive if hired by the Township, 

and [Sivick’s] actions in getting the Nepotism Policy 

eliminated and his [S]on hired were steps to secure that 

private pecuniary benefit.

Adj. After Remand at 22 (emphasis added).

Unlike the First Final Adjudication, the Commission did not order 

restitution, but rather, directed that the matter be referred to the Pike County District 

Attorney with the recommendation that criminal charges be initiated against Sivick. 

Sivick appealed to this Court.16 On March 26, 2021, the Commission filed an 

16 “This Court’s review is limited to determining whether the Commission’s necessary 

factual findings are supported by substantial evidence or whether the Commission committed an 

error of law.” Quaglia v. State Ethics Comm’n, 986 A.2d 974, 979 n.7 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2010). 

During appellate review, the “substantial evidence” test must first 

be applied to determine whether each of the necessary findings of 

fact relied upon for the determination of a violation are supported 

by substantial evidence. After the facts are found to be supported, 

this Court must then consider whether all the facts found by the 

Commission are “clear and convincing proof” that [the] [p]ublic 

[o]fficial violated the [Ethics] Act.

Pulice v. State Ethics Comm’n, 713 A.2d 161, 163 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1998) (citation omitted). 

Further,

[s]tatutory interpretation is a question of law, for which our standard 

of review is de novo, and our scope is plenary. [S]ee Malt Beverages 

Distrib[s.] Ass’n v. P[a.] Liquor Control B[d.], . . . 974 A.2d 1144, 

1154 ([Pa.] 2009) (citing Seeton v. P[a.] Game Comm[’n], . . . 937 
15

Application for Summary Relief (Application for Summary Relief) which this Court 

listed for disposition along with the merits of Sivick’s appeal.

Initially,

[t]he Ethics Act is remedial legislation with the salutary 

purpose of assuring the integrity and honesty of []

Commonwealth employees and, as such, must be 

“liberally construed.” Section 1101.1(a) of the Ethics 

Act[, 65 Pa.C.S. § 1101.1(a)]; Maunus v. State Ethics 

Comm’n, . . . 544 A.2d 1324, 1328 ([Pa.] 1988). 

Consequently, the coverage of the Ethics Act must be 

construed broadly, and its exclusions must be 

construed narrowly. 

Quaglia v. State Ethics Comm’n, 986 A.2d 974, 979 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2010) (emphasis 

added). 

The Commission bears the burden of proving a violation 

of the Ethics Act. In order to find a violation of the Ethics 

Act, at least four members of the Commission must find 

clear and convincing proof of a violation. Clear and 

convincing proof is evidence that is so clear, direct, 

weighty, and convincing that it enables the trier of fact to 

come to a clear conviction, without hesitance, of the truth 

of the precise facts at issue. 

G.L. v. State Ethics Comm’n, 17 A.3d 445, 453 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2011) (citations 

omitted).

Sivick argues that the Commission erred by concluding that he violated 

the conflict of interest prohibition in Section 1103(a) of the Ethics Act due to his 

discussions with the Supervisors for the purpose of eliminating the Nepotism Policy 

A.2d 1028, 1037 ([Pa.] 2007)[,] for the proposition that “while 

courts traditionally accord the interpretation of the agency charged 

with administration of the act some deference, the meaning of a 

statute is essentially a question of law for the court”).

Kistler v. State Ethics Comm’n, 22 A.3d 223, 227 (Pa. 2011) (citation omitted).
16

so the Township could hire his Son, and the actions he took to effectuate his Son’s 

hiring.

Section 1103(a) of the Ethics Act prohibits a “public official or public 

employee [from] engag[ing] in conduct that constitutes a conflict of interest.” 65 

Pa.C.S. § 1103(a). Section 1102 of the Ethics Act defines “[c]onflict” or “conflict 

of interest” as:

Use by a public official or public employee of the 

authority of his office or employment or any 

confidential information received through his holding 

public office or employment for the private pecuniary 

benefit of himself, a member of his immediate family[17]

or a business with which he or a member of his immediate 

family is associated. The term does not include an action 

having a de minimis economic impact or which affects to 

the same degree a class consisting of the general public or 

a subclass consisting of an industry, occupation or other 

group which includes the public official or public 

employee, a member of his immediate family or a business 

with which he or a member of his immediate family is 

associated.

65 Pa.C.S. § 1102 (italics and bold emphasis added). “Thus, in order to prove a 

violation, the Commission must establish by clear and convincing proof that: (1) a 

public official[18](2) used the authority of his office (3) for the private pecuniary gain 

17 The Ethics Act defines “[i]mmediate family” as “[a] parent, spouse, child, brother[,] or 

sister.” 65 Pa.C.S. § 1102.

18 The Ethics Act defines “[p]ublic official” as:

Any person elected by the public or elected or appointed by a 

governmental body or an appointed official . . . of this 

Commonwealth or any political subdivision thereof, provided that it 

shall not include members of advisory boards that have no authority 

to expend public funds other than reimbursement for personal 

expense or to otherwise exercise the power of the [s]tate or any 

political subdivision thereof.

65 Pa.C.S. § 1102. Sivick does not dispute that he was a public official during the relevant time 

periods. 
17

of himself[, a member of his immediate family] or a business with which he is 

associated.” G.L., 17 A.3d at 453. 

Section 1102 of the Ethics Act defines the term “[a]uthority of office or 

employment” as “[t]he actual power provided by law, the exercise of which is 

necessary to the performance of duties and responsibilities unique to a particular 

public office or position of public employment.” 65 Pa.C.S. § 1102. With respect 

to the use of the authority of office necessary to violate Section 1103(a) of the Ethics 

Act, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court has explained:

[T]o violate subsection 1103(a) [of the Ethics Act], a 

public official must “use” his or her office for private 

pecuniary benefit. Kraines v. P[a.] State Ethics 

Comm[’n], 805 A.2d 677, 681 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2002). The 

word “use” is not defined in the Ethics Act. The dictionary 

definition of the noun “use” is “[t]he act of using or putting 

to a purpose[, e.g.,] the use of a car;” analogously, the 

definition of the verb “use” is “1. [t]o bring or put into 

service or action: employ[, e.g.,] use a pen [or] use your 

imagination[, or] 2. to put to some purpose: avail oneself 

of[, e.g.,] use the bus to get to work.” Webster’s II New 

College Dictionary, Houghton Mifflin Co., 1995, at 1215. 

Thus, the common and approved usage of the word “use,”

which must guide our inquiry, indicates an action directed 

toward a purpose. Accordingly, to violate [Section]

1103(a) [of the Ethics Act], a public official must act in 

such a way as to put his office to the purpose of obtaining 

for himself a private pecuniary benefit. Such directed 

action implies awareness on the part of the public official 

of the potential pecuniary benefit as well as the motivation 

to obtain that benefit for himself.

That the General Assembly intended such an interpretation 

of [S]ection 1103(a) [of the Ethics Act] is strengthened by 

a declaration in the Ethics Act’s purpose provision: “The 

Legislature hereby declares that public office is a public 

trust and that any effort to realize personal financial gain 

through public office other than compensation provided by 

law is a violation of that trust.” 65 Pa.C.S. § 1101.1(a) 

Purpose (emphasis added).
18

Kistler v. State Ethics Comm’n, 22 A.3d 223, 227-28 (Pa. 2011) (underline emphasis 

added).

Further, 

to violate the conflict of interest provision in [S]ection 

1103(a) of the Ethics Act, a public official must be 

consciously aware of a private pecuniary benefit for 

himself, his family, or his business, and then must take 

action in the form of one or more specific steps to attain 

that benefit. . . . [T]his interpretation derives from the 

plain meaning of the statutory definition of conflict of 

interest, which requires that a public official use the 

authority of his office for private pecuniary benefit.

Id. at 231 (underline emphasis added). 

In Kistler, a member of an intermediate unit board of directors voted to 

authorize an architect to pursue construction of a school while simultaneously 

seeking a subcontract for his business from the same individual. The Pennsylvania 

Supreme Court held that the Commission erred by holding that Kistler had violated 

the Ethics Act because there was “no evidence that [Kistler] had acted with 

awareness that his . . . vote . . . could or would result in his receipt of a 

subcontract . . . .” Id.

In Pulice v. State Ethics Commission, 713 A.2d 161 (Pa. Cmwlth. 

1998), Pulice, a school district board of directors president, was charged with 

violating the Ethics Act’s conflict of interest provision by participating in meetings 

from which a new assistant principal position was created, and by voting two months 

later to hire his son-in-law for the newly-created position. In concluding that no 

violation had been proven, this Court reasoned:

[The] facts found by the Commission present strong, 

uncontradicted evidence that this newly[-]created position 

was not created specifically to promote or otherwise 

benefit [the] son-in-law, but was for the benefit of the 

[d]istrict. There is no evidence at all from which it can be 

inferred, rather than speculated, that [Pulice] “used his 
19

authority” for the private pecuniary benefit of [his] son-inlaw by voting for the creation of the new position.[19]

 At 

the time that [Pulice] voted on the creation of the new 

position there were no applicants. Consequently, there is 

not even substantial evidence, let alone clear and 

convincing evidence that supports the Commission[’s]

adjudication that [Pulice] violated [S]ection 3(a) of the 

[State Ethics Law20] . . . .

Pulice, 713 A.2d at 164. 

Unlike in Kistler and Pulice, the evidence in this case reflects Sivick’s 

intent to have the Township remove the Nepotism Policy from the Handbook for the 

purpose of hiring his Son, and Sivick’s intent that the Township hire his Son. In 

fact, Sivick, after referencing the Kistler standard, admits his “conscious awareness 

that his [S]on would be benefitted, i.e.[,] the mens rea element,” but he argues that 

there is “no evidence that [he] used ‘the actual power provided by law’ related to his 

position, i.e.[,] the actus reus element, for the private pecuniary benefit of his [S]on.” 

Sivick Br. at 18. In other words, Sivick concedes that he was “consciously aware of 

a private pecuniary benefit for himself, his family, or his business,” but strenuously 

disputes that he “t[ook] action [using the authority of his office] in the form of one 

or more specific steps to attain that benefit.” Kistler, 22 A.3d at 231.

The Commission has repeatedly and consistently explained that “[u]se 

of authority of office is more than the mere mechanics of voting[,] and encompasses 

all of the tasks needed to perform the functions of a given position. Use of authority 

includes . . . discussing, conferring with others, and lobbying for a particular 

19 Here, in contrast, Rohner told the Investigative Division that Sivick specifically created 

the Township position for his Son. See R.R. at 112a.

20 The original State Ethics Law, Act of October 4, 1978, P.L. 883, was reenacted and 

amended by the Act of June 26, 1989, P.L. 26, formerly 65 P.S. § 403(a). The original State Ethics 

Law was repealed by the Act of October 15, 1998, P.L. 729, and replaced by the Ethics Act.

The Pulice Court also concluded that the Ethics Act’s conflict of interest provision did not 

apply to in-laws.
20

result.”21 In re Gallen, Comm’n Order No. 1198, at 37 (2001) (citation omitted); 

see also Bloom, Comm’n Order No. 1722 (2017); Yusko, Comm’n Order No. 1705 

(2016); Esposito, Comm’n Order No. 1333 (2004); Yurek, Comm’n Order No. 1286 

(2003); Zwick, Comm’n Order No. 1062 (1997); Juliante, Comm’n Order No. 809 

(1991). 

Section 607 of The Second Class Township Code (Code)22 describes 

the Supervisors’ duties to include general Township governance and employ persons 

necessary for the conduct of Township business. Section 603 of the Code, 53 P.S. § 

65603, requires the Board to meet at least once per month to transact business. An 

affirmative majority vote at a public meeting is required for the transaction of any 

business. Id. Section 2302 of the Code23 mandates that, as Roadmaster, Sivick 

“shall:”

(1) Report to the [Board] any information that may be 

required by the [Board] and by the Department of 

Transportation.

(2) Inspect all roads and bridges as directed by the [Board].

(3) Do or direct to be done all work necessary to carry out 

the responsibilities imposed by the [Board] with respect to 

the maintenance, repair and construction of [T]ownship 

roads.

53 P.S. § 67302.

The Code governs and authorizes the Supervisors’ authority to engage 

in meetings for the purpose of conducting Township business.24 Clear and 

21 Although the issue before this Court is a question of law, the Court may consider the 

interpretation of the agency charged with administrating the statute at issue. Section 1921(a) of 

the Statutory Construction Act of 1972, 1 Pa.C.S. § 1921(a), provides that the object of statutory 

interpretation is to ascertain and effectuate the General Assembly’s intent.

22 Added by Section 1 of the Act of November 9, 1995, P.L. 350, 53 P.S. § 65607.

23 Added by Section 1 of the Act of November 9, 1995, P.L. 350, 53 P.S. § 67302.

24 Such discussions are deemed “deliberation[s]” under Section 703 of the Sunshine Act. 

65 Pa.C.S. § 703 (“The discussion of agency business held for the purpose of making a decision.”).
21

convincing record evidence reflects that Board Chairman, Supervisor, and 

Roadmaster Sivick met with Vollmer and Menditto to initiate and promote official 

Board action to eliminate the Township’s Nepotism Policy, directed Menditto not to 

prepare an errata sheet reflecting the change to the Handbook,

25 and met to discuss 

and encourage his Son’s hiring. Thus, Sivick’s access to and influence over the other 

Supervisors was rooted in his official authority, as “actual power provided by law, 

the exercise of which is necessary to the performance of duties and responsibilities 

unique to” his position as Board Chairman, Supervisor and Roadmaster. 65 Pa.C.S. 

§ 1102. Regardless of whether Sivick’s interactions with the other Supervisors about 

repealing the Nepotism Policy and hiring his Son were considered requests, 

recommendations or veiled heavy-handed mandates, they were nevertheless made 

in his capacity as Board Chairman, Supervisor and Roadmaster, and were made for 

the purpose of obtaining a Township job for his Son. Sivick’s use of his authority 

to promote his Son’s hiring was the use of “actual power provided by law[.]” 65 

Pa.C.S. § 1102. 

The fact that Sivick abstained from voting to remove the Nepotism 

Policy from the Handbook and to hire his Son is not dispositive when he initiated 

and encouraged the other Supervisors to eliminate the Nepotism Policy so the Board 

could vote on his Son’s hiring, directed that no errata sheet be created, and then 

lobbied the Township to hire his Son. Notably, in Sivick II, the Pennsylvania 

Supreme Court, in dicta, contrasted the facts in Kraines26 with Sivick’s actions,

observing:

25 Absent his role as a Supervisor, Sivick would not have had the authority or influence to 

demand that no errata sheet be created.

26 In Kraines, this Court reversed the Commission’s adjudication declaring that a county 

controller violated the Ethics Act’s conflict of interest provisions when she signed payroll checks 

to her husband, a forensic pathologist who provided services to her county. This Court found that 

Kraines did not improperly use her office to gain pecuniary benefits to which her husband was not 

entitled because he had been performing autopsies for the county years before Kraines was county 
22

To be sure, there are differences between this case and 

Kraines. In particular, the sum of Kraines’ behavior in 

that case was clearly less blameworthy than was Sivick’s 

in this case, where the Commission found other bases 

for violations in connection with Sivick’s role in 

soliciting the elimination of the [N]epotism [P]olicy and 

the hiring of [his] Son in the first instance. In those 

actions, Sivick plainly “used” his office to facilitate 

[his] Son’s private pecuniary benefit.

[27]

Sivick II, 238 A.3d at 1261 (bold and underline emphasis added).

The Commission found that Sivick “participated in discussions and 

actions of the Board to eliminate the Township’s Nepotism Policy with the intent 

and for the purpose of having his [S]on hired as a Township road crew employee.” 

Adj. After Remand at 21. The Commission also found that Sivick “discussed, 

recommended, lobbied, influenced, or sought the support of the Board to effectuate 

the hiring of his [S]on as a Township employee.” Id. Based on this Court’s record 

review, substantial record evidence supports the Commission’s findings that Sivick 

engaged in such conduct. 

Curiously, despite admitting to satisfying Kistler’s mens rea element -

Sivick’s conscious awareness of a pecuniary benefit - Sivick, citing Commonwealth 

controller. In addition, Kraines had no role in the county coroner’s decision to use her husband’s 

services and had no involvement in the amount her husband and other pathologists were paid. 

27 The Pennsylvania Supreme Court has described obiter dictum as “[a] judicial comment 

made during the course of delivering a judicial opinion, but one that is unnecessary to the decision 

in the case and therefore not precedential . . . .” Commonwealth v. Lee, 935 A.2d 865, 867 n.4 (Pa. 

2007) (quoting Black’s Law Dictionary 1100 (7th ed. 1999)); see also Commonwealth v. Romero, 

183 A.3d 364, 400 n.18 (Pa. 2018) (quoting Black’s Law Dictionary 1240 (10th ed. 2014), defining 

obiter dictum as “[a] judicial comment made while delivering a judicial opinion, but one that is 

unnecessary to the decision in the case and therefore not precedential (although it may be 

considered persuasive”)) (emphasis added).

Here, because the conflict of interest issues regarding the Nepotism Policy removal and 

Son’s hiring were not before the Sivick II Court, the Supreme Court’s statement that “in soliciting 

the elimination of the Nepotism Policy and the hiring of Son in the first instance[,]” “Sivick plainly 

‘used’ his office to facilitate [his] Son’s private pecuniary benefit[,]” Sivick II, 238 A.3d at 1261, 

is non-binding dicta, it is nonetheless persuasive.
23

v. Veon, 150 A.3d 435, 446-48 (Pa. 2016), argues that regarding the actus reus 

element, “the ‘actual power provided by law[,]’ [65 Pa.C.S. § 1102,] must yield a 

private pecuniary benefit, not merely a political impact[,]” and no such pecuniary 

benefit exists.

28 Sivick Br. at 28. 

The Ethics Act does not define the term “private pecuniary benefit[.]” 

65 Pa.C.S. § 1102. In Veon, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court held that “[a] 

pecuniary benefit or detriment must be financial. While it may not be possible to 

come up with a to-the-dollar value of a given pecuniary benefit, various statutes 

make clear that difficulties with precise quantification do not preclude grading of the 

offense by assessment of value.” Veon, 150 A.3d at 446 (footnote omitted). Thus, 

“to prove ‘pecuniary benefit’ as used in the conflict of interest statute, the 

prosecution must show some private financial gain.” Id. at 448 (emphasis added). 

The Veon Court held that pecuniary benefit does not include “intangible political 

gains.” Id. at 448. Relying on Veon, Sivick argues that, at most, his comments and 

discussions only had a political impact on the other Supervisors, and could not have 

furnished an economic benefit to his Son. 

Specifically, Sivick contends:

Here, the statements may have had a political impact upon 

the other supervisors, but the [Ethics] Act requires more to 

constitute a violation. There must be an economic impact 

for himself or his [S]on from the official actions of Sivick 

himself. Because Sivick’s non-official comments and 

discussions only had a political impact at most on the other 

members of the [Board], Sivick’s comments and 

discussions could not in any capacity furnish an economic 

benefit to his [S]on. The [S]on did not receive a single 

28 In Sivick II, the Court, citing to Veon, noted, “[f]or present purposes, we assume 

arguendo that Son’s receipt of fair compensation for services duly rendered qualifies as a ‘private 

pecuniary benefit’ bestowed upon a member of Sivick’s immediate family.” Sivick II, 238 A.3d 

at 1259 n.39.
24

dollar, nor could he, until the other members of the Board 

actually hired the [S]on.

Sivick Br. at 29. 

Sivick’s argument ignores the fact of his admitted intent to obtain 

Township employment for his Son - not some “intangible political gain.” Veon, 150 

A.3d at 447. The record evidence reflects that Sivick’s clear goal was to see the 

Township employ his Son, and he used the authority of his office to achieve that 

outcome. As a result, Son received gross earnings of $126,552.24 (net earnings of 

$87,949.36) from a job he would not have had, but for Sivick’s use of his authority 

of office in having the Nepotism Policy removed from the Handbook and having the 

Board hire his Son. Sivick’s actions resulted in a private pecuniary benefit to his 

Son.

Recently, in Commonwealth v. Como (Pa. Super., No. 1687 EDA 2018, 

filed November 23, 2020),29 the Pennsylvania Superior Court affirmed a school 

district superintendent’s conflict of interest conviction for, inter alia, “violating the 

Ethics Act by procuring a job for his son[, i.e., a pecuniary benefit] . . . as a [school 

district] night supervisor, a custodial position.” Id., slip op. at 34. The Como Court 

concluded:

The evidence demonstrates that [the superintendent] used 

the authority of his position for his son’s pecuniary 

benefit. He placed his son before the [s]chool [b]oard as 

the lone candidate for the job by overriding [the school 

district manager’s] selection for the night supervisor 

position, selecting his son instead, and failing to inform 

the [s]chool [b]oard about these behind-the-scene steps he 

took to position his son as the candidate.

Id., slip op. at 36 (emphasis added). Similarly, Sivick “used the authority of his 

position for [his Son’s] pecuniary benefit.” Id. In its Adjudication After Remand, 

29 Pursuant to Pennsylvania Superior Court Internal Operating Procedure 65.37, “[n]onprecedential decisions filed after May 1, 2019, may be cited for their persuasive value[.]” 210 Pa. 

Code § 65.37.
25

the Commission properly concluded that Sivick’s “use of the authority of his office 

. . . resulted in a private pecuniary benefit consisting of the compensation [his Son] 

received from the Township for a job he would not otherwise have held.” Adj. After 

Remand at 23. Accordingly, Sivick’s argument contending the absence of a 

pecuniary benefit fails.

The record evidence reflects that Sivick violated Section 1103(a) of the 

Ethics Act when he took the above-referenced actions.30 Accordingly, the 

Commission properly determined based on clear and convincing evidence that 

Sivick violated Section 1103(a) of the Ethics Act’s conflict of interest prohibition

when he lobbied for the removal of the Nepotism Policy and for his Son’s hiring.

30 Sivick also argues that “[t]he inquiries made by Sivick should be treated in a manner 

consistent with the First Amendment[ to the United States Constitution, U.S. Const. amend. I].” 

Sivick Br. at 29. However, the Commission, as trier of fact, found Sivick’s conduct far more 

intrusive than mere “inquiries[.]” Sivick Br. at 21. 

Sivick contends that Pennsylvania courts have “reminded the Commission to remain within 

the parameters of the statutory language itself,” citing to Sivick II, Kistler, and Commonwealth v. 

Orie, 88 A.3d 983 (Pa. Super. 2014). Sivick Br. at 30. Notably, in Sivick II, the Pennsylvania 

Supreme Court noted that in lobbying for the removal of the Nepotism Policy and Son’s hiring, 

“Sivick plainly ‘used’ his office to facilitate Son’s private pecuniary benefit.” Sivick II, 238 A.3d 

at 1261. In Kistler, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court merely disagreed with the Commission’s 

statutory interpretation, “declin[ing] to infer that when the General Assembly chose to use the 

phrase ‘an open and public process’ in the context of subsection 1103(f) [of the Ethics Act], its 

actual intent was to specify a competitive bidding process.” Kistler, 22 A.3d at 235. In Orie, the 

Superior Court rejected a claim that the Ethics Act impermissibly intruded on First Amendment 

rights, stating: “[T]he [Ethics Act] places no restrictions on a public official’s federal or state 

protected rights of expression and association, but only prohibits officials from using state-funded 

resources for non-de minimis private pecuniary gain.” Id. at 1026. Accordingly, Sivick’s 

argument is without merit.
26

For all of the above reasons, the Commission’s Adjudication After 

Remand and Order is affirmed.

31, 32

_________________________________

ANNE E. COVEY, Judge

31 In its brief, the Commission contends that this Court should dismiss Sivick’s appeal 

based on the law of the case doctrine. Because the Pennsylvania Supreme Court vacated the 

Commission’s First Final Adjudication, this Court reviewed the merits of the Commission’s 

Adjudication After Remand.

32 Given this Court’s disposition of the merits of Sivick’s appeal, the Commission’s 

Application for Summary Relief is dismissed as moot.
IN THE COMMONWEALTH COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA

John P. Sivick, :

Petitioner :

:

v. :

:

Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, :

State Ethics Commission, : No. 307 C.D. 2021

Respondent :

O R D E R

AND NOW, this 22nd day of December, 2021, the Commonwealth of 

Pennsylvania State Ethics Commission’s (Commission) February 3, 2021 final 

adjudication and order is affirmed.

The Commission’s Application for Summary Relief is dismissed as 

moot.

_________________________________

ANNE E. COVEY, Judge