J-S51009-19

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA

v.

JEFFREY LYNN STOUTER, JR. 

Appellant

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 IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

 PENNSYLVANIA

 No. 778 MDA 2018

Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence December 12, 2017

In the Court of Common Pleas of York County 

Criminal Division at No(s): CP-67-CR-0000225-2017

BEFORE: PANELLA, P.J., GANTMAN, P.J.E., and MUSMANNO, J.

MEMORANDUM BY PANELLA, P.J.: FILED NOVEMBER 14, 2019

Jeffrey Lynn Stouter, Jr. appeals pro se from the judgment of sentence 

imposed following his open guilty plea to one count of fleeing or attempting 

to elude a police officer, 75 Pa.C.S.A. § 3733(a.2)(2)(iii), and related 

offenses.

1 The charges were based primarily on an eighteen-minute car chase 

that occurred after Stouter refused to pull over. Police clocked Stouter driving 

at speeds substantially over a hundred miles an hour. The sentencing court 

imposed an aggregate sentence of not less than three-and-a-half nor more 

____________________________________________

1 The trial court permitted Stouter to represent himself, as requested, after a 

Grazier hearing. See Trial Court Opinion, 10/05/18, at 1 n.1; see also

Appellant’s Brief, at 8.
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than seven years of incarceration in a state correctional institution. On appeal,

Stouter chiefly challenges his sentence as excessive. We affirm. 

We derive the facts and the procedural history of this appeal from the 

opinions of the trial court and our independent review of the record.2 

On October 30, 2017, Stouter entered an open plea of guilty to one 

count of fleeing or attempting to elude police, as a felony of the third degree,

75 Pa.C.S.A. § 3733(a); one count of flight to avoid apprehension, 18 

Pa.C.S.A. § 5126(a); twenty-six summary driving offenses, including driving 

while operating privilege is suspended or revoked, 75 Pa.C.S.A. § 1543, and 

one count of receiving stolen property, 18 Pa. C. S.A. § 3925(a). Notably, 

this was Stouter’s twenty-second conviction for driving under suspension or 

revocation.

3

 The trial court recounted the facts of the case as follows: 

As described in the Affidavit of Probable Cause, [Stouter’s]

charges stemmed from a two-stage police pursuit begun in York 

County on December 12, 2016 [at approximately 8:37 in the 

evening], Lieutenant [Nicole] Palmer, [Pennsylvania State Police] 

York Station Commander, was operating an unmarked patrol 

vehicle on Route 30, York County, behind a white Nissan Maxima 

driven [eastbound] by [Stouter], when she observed the Maxima 

weave twice over the left fog line. At that point, the Maxima

accelerated, and Lt. Palmer clocked [Stouter’s] rate of speed at 

____________________________________________

2 The trial court authored two opinions. The first opinion was dated June 22, 

2018, and filed June 25, 2018. After this Court granted Stouter permission to 

file a supplemental statement of errors, the trial court filed a supplemental 

1925(a) opinion, on October 5, 2018. The trial court incorporated its original 

1925(a) opinion into its supplemental opinion. See Supplemental Opinion, 

10/05/18, at 2 n.2. 

3 The trial court noted that Stouter’s record of motor vehicle violations 

extended to thirty-six pages. See N.T. Sentence, 12/12/17, at 28.
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105 miles per hour for over three tenths of a mile. [Stouter]

crossed over into Lancaster County and then exited Route 30. Lt. 

Palmer, still following, activated the patrol car’s emergency lights

and siren to initiate a traffic stop. [Stouter] did not stop, but 

instead reentered Route 30 and began traveling westbound from 

Lancaster County towards York County, at a speed of 117 miles 

per hour. Continuing to pursue [Stouter], Lt. Palmer observed 

[Stouter’s] vehicle pass both a tractor trailer and a passenger car 

on the right shoulder of Route 30 and then continue on to pass 

multiple vehicles on the left shoulder. The Lieutenant ultimately 

discontinued the pursuit after approximately four minutes, 

because of [Stouter’s] rate of speed and the threat to safety of 

others.

Approximately three minutes later, Trooper Ryan 

Wildermuth, who had been alerted to the existence of the 

speeding Maxima and had set up a stationary patrol in a marked 

vehicle at the intersection of SR 462 and Kruetz Creek Road in 

York County, spotted the Maxima and immediately pulled behind 

it, activating the patrol car’s emergency lights and siren. [Stouter]

once again failed to stop, swerved around another trooper 

responding to assist, and then accelerated, with Trooper 

Wildermuth still in pursuit.

[Stouter] drove over spike strips set up to stop him at the 

intersection of SR 462 and SR 24. Despite damage to the front 

passenger tire, [Stouter] fled north on SR 24, running through two 

steady red lights and passing another vehicle over the double

yellow line. At the intersection of Whiteford Road and North Hills 

Road, [Stouter] ran a stop sign, causing a collision with the patrol 

car of a responding trooper. [Stouter’s] damaged front passenger 

tire became deflated and dislodged, yet [Stouter] continued to 

flee, driving on the right front tire rim, with sparks flying, against

traffic down several one way streets in the city of York. At some 

point, [Stouter] stopped the vehicle to let out a female passenger, 

who unsuccessfully attempted to flee on foot, but then he drove 

away. The vehicular chase ended only when [Stouter], boxed in 

by other marked patrol cars, crashed into two parked vehicles. At 

that point, [Stouter] abandoned the car, which remained in drive, 

and fled on foot, followed by four troopers. The troopers ultimately 

located and apprehended [Stouter], who was hiding behind a car. 

Troopers later discovered a factory-packaged Xbox and Beats

headphones in the backseat of the Maxima, which [Stouter], once 
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Mirandized, admitted he had bought from an unlicensed street 

dealer in the city of York for a discounted price.

Trial Court Opinion, 6/22/18, at 2-3. 

The trial court sentenced Stouter on the charge of fleeing and eluding 

to a term of incarceration of not less than three-and-a-half nor more than 

seven years in a state correctional institution. In imposing sentence, the court 

confirmed on the record that it had the benefit of a pre-sentence investigation

report. After a hearing, the court denied Stouter’s amended motion for 

reconsideration of sentence. This timely appeal followed.4

On appeal, Appellant presents five overlapping compound questions, 

framed as two major questions and four subordinate questions, for our review:

(1) Whether the sentencing court erred as a matter of law 

and/or abused its discretion in imposing the statutory maximum 

term of 31⁄2 to 7 years imprisonment on the charge of fleeing or

attempting to elude a police officer, 75 Pa.C.S. §3733(a), graded 

as a felony of the third degree pursuant to 75 Pa.C.S.

§3733(a.2)(2)(iii), where:

(A) As its justification for such a sentence, the 

sentencing court relied on Appellant’s 21 prior offenses of 

driving while operating privilege suspended or revoked, 75 

Pa.C.S. § 1543(e), thereby improperly enhancing 

Appellant’s sentence the basis of prior convictions for which 

appellant did not have counsel;

(B) as further justification for such a sentence, the 

sentencing court relied on Appellant’s prior conviction of an 

unrelated criminal offense in an unrelated case which led to 

Appellant’s service of a “sentence in a state correctional 

institution,” thereby improperly enhancing Appellant’s 

____________________________________________

4 As already noted, both Stouter and the trial court complied with Pa.R.A.P. 

1925. 
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sentence based on factors already taken into account in the

applicable sentencing guideline range, particularly

Appellant’s prior record score, and amounted to 

impermissible “double counting”;

(C) As additional justification for such a sentence, the 

sentencing court relied on materially-untrue assumptions 

and/or misinformation relating to the timing of Appellant’s 

sentencing in an unrelated Snyder County case, finding 

Appellant had committed the offenses in the instant case 

despite having been sentenced in the Snyder County case 

less than (2) months prior; and

(D) The sentencing court found aggravation in things

that “could have occurred” but did not, and which were risks 

inherently attending virtually all fleeing and eluding 

scenarios graded as a felony of the third degree pursuant to 

75 Pa.C.S. §3733(a.2)(2)(iii)?

(2) Whether the offense of fleeing or attempting to elude a

police officer, 75 Pa.C.S. §3733(e), graded as a felony of the third 

degree pursuant to 75 Pa.C.S. § 3733(8,2)(2)(iii), is 

unconstitutionally vague on its face and/or as applied to appellant, 

in, that the term “high speed chase” is insufficiently specific, 

undefined, and susceptible to arbitrary, capricious, and/or 

otherwise discriminatory application?

Appellant’s Brief, at 5-6 (unnecessary capitalization omitted). 

Appellant chiefly challenges the discretionary aspects of his sentence. 

He argues the sentencing court imposed an excessive sentence by 

impermissible reliance on improper factors. He maintains the sentencing court 

“double counted” certain prior convictions. He also claims the term “high 

speed chase” as used in the statute for the grading of the offense of fleeing 

and eluding is unconstitutionally vague. See Appellant’s Brief at 11. We 

disagree. 
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Generally, when a defendant enters a guilty plea, he or she waives all 

defects and defenses except those concerning the validity of the plea, the 

jurisdiction of the trial court, and the legality of the sentence imposed. See

Commonwealth v. Stradley, 50 A.3d 769, 771 (Pa. Super. 2012).

Nevertheless, the entry of a guilty plea does not preclude a petition for 

allowance of appeal of discretionary aspects of sentence subsequently 

imposed. See Commonwealth v. Becker, 557 A.2d 390, 392 (Pa. Super. 

1989).

However, a challenge to the discretionary aspects of sentencing is not 

automatically reviewable as a matter of right. See Commonwealth v. 

Phillips, 946 A.2d 103, 112 (Pa. Super. 2008). Prior to reviewing such a claim 

on its merits:

[W]e conduct a four part analysis to determine: (1) whether 

appellant has filed a timely notice of appeal; (2) whether the issue 

was properly preserved at sentencing or in a motion to reconsider 

and modify sentence; (3) whether appellant’s brief has a fatal 

defect; and (4) whether there is a substantial question that the 

sentence appealed from is not appropriate under the Sentencing 

Code.

When appealing the discretionary aspects of a sentence, an 

appellant must invoke the appellate court's jurisdiction by 

including in his brief a separate concise statement demonstrating 

that there is a substantial question as to the appropriateness of 

the sentence under the Sentencing Code . . . .

Id. (citations and quotations omitted); see also Pa.R.A.P. 2119(f).

Here, Stouter complied with the first two requirements. He preserved

his sentencing issue by filing a petition to reconsider sentence, and after it 
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was denied, he filed a timely notice of appeal. He included a separate Pa.R.A.P. 

2119(f) statement in his appellate brief. Therefore, we must determine 

whether he raises a substantial question. 

This Court has found that a claim that the sentencing court improperly 

“double-counted” an appellant’s prior criminal history when considering his 

sentence (because his past criminal convictions were already taken into 

account when his prior record score was calculated) raises a substantial 

question. Commonwealth v. Goggins, 748 A.2d 721, 732 (Pa. Super. 2000) 

(en banc). Therefore, Stouter has presented a substantial question, and we 

will proceed to review the merits of his claims. Nevertheless, on independent 

review, we conclude that his claims lack merit. 

Our standard of review for a challenge to the discretionary aspects of a 

sentence is well-settled. 

Sentencing is a matter vested in the sound discretion of the 

sentencing judge, and a sentence will not be disturbed on appeal 

absent a manifest abuse of discretion. In this context, an abuse 

of discretion is not shown merely by an error in judgment. Rather, 

the appellant must establish, by reference to the record, that the 

sentencing court ignored or misapplied the law, exercised its 

judgment for reasons of partiality, prejudice, bias or ill will, or 

arrived at a manifestly unreasonable decision.

When imposing a sentence, the sentencing court must 

consider the factors set out in 42 [Pa.C.S.A.] § 9721(b), that is, 

the protection of the public, gravity of offense in relation to impact 

on victim and community, and rehabilitative needs of the 

defendant. . . . Furthermore, [a] trial court judge has wide 

discretion in sentencing and can, on the appropriate record and 

for the appropriate reasons, consider any legal factor in 

imposing a sentence in the aggravated range. The sentencing 

court, however, must also consider the sentencing guidelines. 
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Commonwealth v. Shugars, 895 A.2d 1270, 1275 (Pa. Super. 2006)

(citations and internal quotation marks omitted) (emphasis added).

In reviewing a sentence on appeal, the appellate court shall 

vacate the sentence and remand the case to the sentencing court 

with instructions if it finds:

(1) the sentencing court purported to sentence within 

the sentencing guidelines but applied the guidelines 

erroneously;

(2) the sentencing court sentenced within the 

sentencing guidelines but the case involves circumstances 

where the application of the guidelines would be clearly 

unreasonable; or

(3) the sentencing court sentenced outside the 

sentencing guidelines and the sentence is unreasonable.

In all other cases[,] the appellate court shall affirm the 

sentence imposed by the sentencing court.

42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9781[(c)].

Commonwealth v. Lewis, 45 A.3d 405, 411 (Pa. Super. 2012).

The rationale behind such broad discretion and the 

concomitantly deferential standard of appellate review is that the 

sentencing court is in the best position to determine the proper 

penalty for a particular offense based upon an evaluation of the 

individual circumstances before it.

* * *

When imposing a sentence, a court is required to consider 

the particular circumstances of the offense and the character of 

the defendant. In particular, the court should refer to the 

defendant’s prior criminal record, his age, personal 

characteristics and his potential for rehabilitation. Where 

the sentencing court had the benefit of a presentence 

investigation report (“PSI”), we can assume the sentencing court 

was aware of relevant information regarding the defendant’s 
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character and weighed those considerations along with mitigating 

statutory factors.

Commonwealth v. Moury, 992 A.2d 162, 169-71 (Pa. Super. 2010)

(emphasis added) (citations and internal quotation marks omitted).

In this appeal, Stouter first argues that the sentencing court improperly 

enhanced his sentence for fleeing and eluding to the statutory maximum by 

relying on his twenty-one prior convictions for driving while his operating 

privilege was suspended or revoked. See Appellant’s Brief, at 12-15. We 

disagree. 

Preliminarily, as aptly noted by the Commonwealth, Stouter failed to 

raise this issue with the sentencing court. See Commonwealth’s Brief, at 13 

n.3.; see also N.T. Sentencing, 12/12/17; Motion for Reconsideration of 

Sentence, 12/22/17; N.T. Reconsideration of Sentence, 4/12/18. Accordingly, 

Stouter’s claim is waived. See Pa.R.A.P. 302(a) (“Issues not raised in the 

lower court are waived and cannot be raised for the first time on appeal.”). 

Additionally, Stouter failed to identify in his brief where this issue was 

raised with the sentencing court. See Pa.R.A.P. 2117(c)(1)-(4), Statement of 

Place of Raising or Preservation of Issues; see also Pa.R.A.P. 2119(e), 

Statement of Place of Raising or Preservation of Issues. It is not the role of 

this Court to scour the record to find evidence to support Appellant’s 

arguments. See J.J. DeLuca Co. v. Toll Naval Assocs., 56 A.3d 402, 411 

(Pa. Super. 2012). Accordingly, Stouter’s first issue is waived for these 

reasons as well. 
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Moreover, the claim would not merit relief. In both of its opinions, the 

sentencing court clearly explained that it did not consider Stouter’s 

twenty-one prior convictions for driving under suspension as grounds for the 

enhancement of his sentence, but as evidence of his flagrant disrespect for 

authority and his lack of amenability to rehabilitation. See Trial Court Opinion, 

6/25/18, at 11-12; see also Supplemental 1925(a) Opinion, 10/05/18, at 2-

3. Stouter’s first issue is waived and would fail on the merits. 

In his second issue, Stouter asserts the sentencing court’s supposed 

“double counting” of recent offenses by reference to his latest incarceration in 

a state correctional institution, even though Stouter’s conviction had been 

included in his prior record score. See Appellant’s Brief, at 15-18. The 

sentencing court noted that the commission of his current offenses had 

occurred only a few months after his release from a state correctional 

institution. See N.T. Sentence, 12/12/17, at 29-30, 33. 

The sentencing court cited this recent criminal history as evidence of 

Stouter’s continuing adult criminal record (which at age forty-one had 

stretched over twenty years), personal characteristics, and lack of amenability 

to rehabilitation. See id. This consideration was well within the discretion of 

the sentencing court. See Moury, 992 A.2d at 169-71 (requiring sentencing 

court to consider particular circumstances of offense and character of 

defendant, including defendant’s prior criminal record, age, personal 

characteristics and potential for rehabilitation). Stouter offers no controlling 
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authority to support his assertion that a sentencing court is prohibited from 

consideration of any offense merely because it has been factored into his prior 

record score. Stouter’s second issue does not merit relief. 

In his third issue, Stouter asserts that his sentence was based on 

“materially untrue assumptions.” Appellant’s Brief, at 19. Once again, Stouter 

fails to develop an argument based on reference to the record and pertinent 

authority that any such misguided reliance occurred. To the contrary, we 

agree with the sentencing court that Stouter’s claim of sentencing based on 

facts not admitted is “patently false.” Supplemental 1925(a) Opinion, 

10/05/18, at 6. Stouter’s third issue fails. 

In his fourth issue, Stouter asserts the sentencing court erred by 

focusing on things that could have occurred during the chase but in fact did 

not. See Appellant’s Brief, at 20-24. He maintains that the risk of injury was 

inherent in any occurrence of fleeing and eluding, which, he claims, should 

not have factored into a greater sentence. We disagree. 

It was the duty of the sentencing court to consider, inter alia, the 

protection of the public. See 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9721(b) (“In selecting from the 

[sentencing] alternatives set forth in subsection (a), the court shall follow the 

general principle that the sentence imposed should call for confinement that 

is consistent with the protection of the public, the gravity of the offense as 

it relates to the impact on the life of the victim and on the community, and 

the rehabilitative needs of the defendant.”) (emphasis added).
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Moreover, Stouter’s argument fails to consider that even if the statutory 

elements of a crime have been established, the sentencing court still has the 

duty to fashion a sentence which properly reflects the seriousness of the actual 

violation, the “gravity of the offense.” Id.

Here, Stouter not only fled to elude the police. He drove recklessly down 

the highway, colliding with one police car at Whiteford Road and North Hills 

Road, and placing all other fellow travelers at risk. He also drove at high 

speeds the wrong way down one-way city streets in York. He exceeded over 

one hundred miles an hour. See N.T., Guilty Plea Hearing, 10/30/17, at 7 

(Stouter agreeing to the factual basis set forth in the information); 

Information filed 2/6/17. He put the police who pursued him, as well as other 

drivers and their passengers who happened to be in his path of travel, at 

substantial risk of injury or death. 

Stouter’s fourth argument utterly fails to develop, or even suggest, a

valid legal basis for the claim that because his reckless rampage did not result 

in the actual loss of life or serious bodily injury, it was somehow improper to 

factor his criminal behavior and the risks it created into his sentence. 

Additionally, Stouter’s reckless behavior did cause substantial property 

damage to the cars that were in the barricade, and the police car he previously 

hit. Stouter’s issue lacks support in either the law or the facts. His fourth 

claim is frivolous. 
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Finally, in his fifth issue, Stouter claims that the term “high-speed 

chase” is unconstitutionally vague.5 See Appellant’s Brief, at 25-33. We 

disagree.

The constitutionality of a statute is a question of law. See 

Commonwealth v. Vargas, 947 A.2d 777, 780 (Pa. Super. 2008). As with 

all questions of law, our standard of review is de novo, and our scope of review 

is plenary. See Commonwealth v. Mauk, 185 A.3d 406, 409 (Pa. Super. 

2018).

[W]e begin our analysis by recognizing that there is a strong 

presumption in the law that legislative enactments do not violate 

the constitution. Moreover, there is a heavy burden of persuasion 

upon one who challenges the constitutionality of a statute. As a 

matter of statutory construction, we presume “the General 

Assembly does not intend to violate the Constitution of the United 

States or of this Commonwealth.” 1 Pa.C.S. § 1922(3). A statute 

will not be declared unconstitutional unless it clearly, palpably, 

and plainly violates the Constitution; all doubts are to be resolved 

in favor of a finding of constitutionality. 

* * *

[T]he void-for-vagueness doctrine requires that a penal 

statute define the criminal offense with sufficient definiteness that 

ordinary people can understand what conduct is prohibited and in 

a manner that does not encourage arbitrary and discriminatory 

enforcement. Due process is satisfied if the statute provides 

reasonable standards by which a person may gauge his future 

conduct. 

____________________________________________

5 Stouter argues that he did not waive his claim of unconstitutionality by his 

guilty plea, citing Class v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 798, 807 (2018).

However, we need not decide whether this argument would prevail, because, 

as discussed in the text, even if we assume that Stouter’s underlying claim 

survived his guilty plea, his constitutional challenge fails on the merits. 
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Commonwealth v. Mayfield, 832 A.2d 418, 421 (Pa. 2003) (case citations 

and internal quotation marks omitted). 

In this appeal, Stouter’s claim of vagueness relies chiefly on the dissent 

in In re R.C.Y., 27 A.3d 227, 231-32 (Pa. Super. 2011). See Appellant’s 

Brief, at 30-36. 

In In re R.C.Y., the Court addressed the scope of 75 Pa.C.S.A. 

§ 3733(a.2)(2)(iii), Fleeing or attempting to elude police officer. Subsection 

(a.2)(2)(iii) of the statute, in relevant part, made the offense a third degree 

felony, increasing the penalty for a violation when the actor engaged in a “high 

speed chase.” The R.C.Y. Court concluded that the Legislature (which had 

refrained from defining “high speed chase” in the statute) did not intend for 

the term to be construed literally; rather, it intended that “high-speed chase” 

be a term of art, having a practical, legal meaning “not closely bound by a 

literal definition.” In re R.C.Y., 27 A.3d at 230.

The dissent disagreed, reasoning that the term “high speed chase” has 

a common, usual meaning and thus should not be construed as a legal term 

of art. Id. at 231 (Fitzgerald, J., dissenting).

Here, Stouter argues, in effect, that if the R.C.Y. dissent disagreed with 

the Majority on what constitutes a high-speed chase, then he has proven 

vagueness that is constitutional in dimension. We disagree.

Preliminarily, Stouter’s reliance on the learned Justice Fitzgerald’s

dissent in In re R.C.Y. is misplaced, as it carries no precedential value. See, 
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e.g., Commonwealth v. Davis, 17 A.3d 390, 398 (Pa. Super. 2011) 

(applying the general rule that a decision lacks precedential value if it does 

not garner the support of a majority of the sitting judges). 

Moreover, as a practical matter, Stouter’s driving at speeds of over a 

hundred miles an hour in his unsuccessful effort to elude the police would 

plainly be prohibited under either the decision of the R.C.Y. majority, or 

Justice Fitzgerald’s dissent. 

The R.C.Y. Majority reasoned as follows:

From this history, we draw two conclusions. First, that the 

legislature intended the enhanced penalties to protect the safety 

of the public in general and police officers in particular. Indeed, 

the first clause of the subsection is “endangers a law enforcement 

officer or member of the general public....” Clearly, the “mischief 

to be remedied” is the danger presented by certain methods of 

fleeing or eluding police officers while driving a motor vehicle at 

high speeds.

Second, we conclude that the legislature did not intend for 

the term “high-speed chase” to be construed literally. Rather, it 

intended that “high-speed chase” be a term of art, having a 

practical, legal meaning that was not closely bound by a literal 

definition. The term “high-speed chase,” far from being the 

primary focus of the subsection, was intended to merely require a 

different level of danger from the run-of-the-mill dangers posed 

by merely failing to stop when signaled to do so by a police officer. 

In other words, the legislature included this term to indicate that 

the enhanced penalties applied only in cases where the 

defendant’s actions created an extraordinary danger to the public 

at large or to police officers.

In re R.C.Y., 27 A.3d at 230.

Justice Fitzgerald’s dissent reasoned in part as follows:

I agree with the majority that in enacting the grading 

enhancement, the [Legislature] intended to remedy a mischief of 
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the danger to police officers and the public posed by drivers who 

attempt to flee or elude police at high speeds. It is also clear that 

the legislature did not affix a minimum numerical rate of speed, 

but instead allowed for court interpretation of the individual 

circumstances of each case.

In re R.C.Y., 27 A.3d at 232 (Fitzgerald, J. dissenting).

[T]he void-for-vagueness doctrine requires that a penal statute 

define the criminal offense with sufficient definiteness that 

ordinary people can understand what conduct is prohibited and in 

a manner that does not encourage arbitrary and discriminatory 

enforcement. Due process is satisfied if the statute provides 

reasonable standards by which a person may gauge his future 

conduct.

Mayfield, 832 A.2d at 422 (citations and internal quotation marks omitted).

Here, on independent review, we conclude that Stouter’s argument, 

chiefly relying on citation to the R.C.Y. dissent, fails to meet the heavy burden 

to overcome the presumption of constitutionality. Nor does it establish that 

the statutory enhancement at issue is so indefinite that ordinary people cannot 

understand what “high speed chase” means, or what conduct is prohibited. 

None of his claims has merit. Stouter’s claim of unconstitutionality fails on 

the merits.

We conclude that the sentencing court correctly considered the nature 

and circumstances of Stouter’s offense, his criminal and driving history,

personal characteristics, as well as the Sentencing Guidelines. See 42 

Pa.C.S.A. § 9781(1). The court had the benefit of the PSI. Moreover, the court 

had ample opportunity to observe Stouter at his preliminary hearing, guilty 

plea hearing, and sentencing. See id.
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The court’s reasons for its sentence expressed an appropriate 

consideration of the protection of the public, the gravity of the offense as it 

related to the risks to the pursuing police and the community at large (in 

particular, other travelers), as well as Stouter’s amenability to rehabilitation, 

or the lack of it. See 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9721(b). We discern no proper basis on 

which to disturb the discretion of the sentencing court. 

Judgment of sentence affirmed.

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 11/14/2019