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E L E C TR O N I C C I TAT I O N : 2003 F E D App . 0231P ( 6th C ir .) F il e N a me : 03a 0231p.06



### UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE SIXT H CIR CUIT

_________________

ANGELA M. J ONES ,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

v.

C OMM ISSIONER OF S OCIA L S ECUR ITY , Defenda nt-Appel

lant. X - - - -

> , - - - - N No. 01-2315

Appeal from the United States District Court for the E astern D istrict of Michiga n at Detr oit. No. 00-74924—Anna Diggs Tay lor, District Judge.
Argued: March 27, 2003
Decided and Filed: July 15, 2003

Befor e: BOGG S, SUHRHEI

NRICH , and SI

LER, Ci rcuit Judges.

_________________ COUNSEL

ARGUE D: Sharon Swingle, UNITED STATE S DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, CIVIL D IVI SION
, Washington, D.C., for Appe llant. Kenneth F. Lar itz, Clinton 2 Jones v. Commissioner of Soc. Sec. No. 01-2315

Township, Michigan, for Appellee. ON BRI EF: Sharon Swingle, John C. Hoyle, UNI TED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, CIVI

L DI VISI ON, Washington, D.C., for Appellan t. Kenneth F. Lar

itz, Clinton Township, Michigan, for Appellee.

_________________

OPINION

_________________ BOGGS, Circuit Judge. In Decembe r 199 9 and February 2000, Angela

M. Jones app lie d fo r disability insurance benefit s and supple

mental se curity

income, claiming that she had been disabled since August 23, 1999 as a result of seve re panic attacks
, ananxiety disorder, and a de pressive disorder. After the denial of her a

ppli cation for benefits, Ms. Jones requested a he ari ng b efo re a n Ad mi ni st rat iv e La w Jud ge (ALJ ), who found that she was not disabled within th e meaningof the Social Se curity Act (the Act). The ALJ’s decisionbeca me the final decision of the Commissioner of Social Security (the Commissioner) and Ms. Jones subseque ntly sought ju

dicial re view of that decision by the districtcourt . The d istr ict co urt he ld th at the ALJ’s f indi ngs
were not suppor

ted by substantia

l evidenc e in

the record and ruled infavor of Ms. Jones. The Commissioner now appe als the distri ct court’s judgment, arguing tha t there was substant ial e vidence in the record to support the AL J’s decision. We agree with the Commissioner and reverse the district court’s decision.

I

Ms. Jones alleges that she has been unable to work since August 23, 1999, when she left her job as a machine operator ina plastics company. She

was 28 yea

rs old at the time and had previously wor

ke d as a re cycling c ollector , a waitr ess, and a babysitter. Ms. Jones contin ued to apply for jobs, but reported that she was unable to sustain them for more than aNo. 01-2315 Jones v. Commissioner of Soc. Sec. 3

few hours because of panic attacks and c rying spe lls, which would cause her to leave work.

Ms. Jones first sought medical treatment for her condition

onNovember 6, 1999, at

a local health center, where she was diagnosed

as having a panic disorder with ag oraphobia, and

a recurr ent major depress ive disor

der, pen din g an i nitial evaluat io n by a p syc

hiatrist. On Novemb er 23, 19 99, Ms. Jones was seen by

Dr. Burgoy

ne, a psychia

trist at the center, who noted that she complained of longstanding panic at tacks, depression, insomnia, low motiva tion and dizzy spells on most days, but that s he was “ very orga nized ,” and was peacefulin appea

rance. He pres c rib ed Imipramine and Xanax.

OnDecem

ber 1 1, Dr. Burgoy

ne again saw Ms. Jones, for

a formal evaluation

of her condition. After

listing the various sym ptoms reported by

Ms. Jones, including the fact that she had left at least seven j o bs since August 1999 as a result of her pani c attacks, Dr. B urgoy ne state d in his re

port that:

Ms. Jones pr es ents as oriented to time, place, person, and situation. She is cooperative and does not demonstrat e untoward anxiety. There are no signs of psychomotor

deficit, physical limitation, or tremors. Her weight is proportionate to her height. Her clot hi ng and self care areappropriate. Her thinking is organized, goal directed, spontaneous, and p rogressive. She denies suicidal and homicidal ideas. Th ere are no significant formor conte

nt defic its in

speech. Her mood

is euthy mic inappearance. Her

affec t is appro

priate to the situation, however it does not reflect the depress ion and an xiety that she complains of.

Dr. Burgoy

ne further noted that Ms. Jones had rep orte d an improvement

in her condition over t he la st three weeks, “since she [had] been

taking Imipramine

100mg, and Xanax .25 mg sublingual prn impending panic.” Dr. B urgoy ne
ass igned Ms. Jones a G

AF (Glob al Assessment o f 4 Jones v. Commissioner of Soc. Sec. No. 01-2315

Funct ioni ng) score of 55 and diagno sed h er as ha ving a “panic disorder with agoraphobia”and a mild first episode of major depress io n w ithout psychotic feature s. The doctor continued her treatment with medication and directed that she return in a month for further analy sis.

Ms. Jones also visited a counselor at the clinic: Kathleen Berrisford, MSW, CSW. On December 15, 1999, Berrisford reported that Ms. Jones was crying because she had “run out of gas,” but that

the me dicat ion wa s help ing. On January 12, 2000, Berris ford re

ported th at Ms. Jones was depressed most of the time, b

ut noted that Ms. Jones

was only taking one

third of her medications. On February 9, 2000, Berrisford reported that Ms. Jones was smiling and apparently felt better, concludingthat the medication was having an impact on Ms. Jones’s condition. In March 2000, however , Ms. Jones’s condition appeared to worsen aga in. A differ ent c ounselor, filling in for

Berris ford, not

ed that Ms . Jones came late to the appointme

nt, and that although X anax had reduced the number of panic attacks and eliminated the reoccurr ing pains inher chest, Ms. Jones report ed that s he was “cry ing more days than not.”

On M arch 28, 2000, Mar y G erwoll, a

psy cholog ist, examined Ms. Jones. She diagnos edMs. J ones a s havi ng a mild recurr ent major

depress ive orde

r and a pe

rsonality disorder with borderline featur

es. Dr. Ger

woll noted

that Ms. Jones’s panic attacks wer e “situationally predisposed,” a nd did not appear

to meet the full criteria for a panic disorder. Dr. Gerwoll assigned Ms. Jones a GAF score of 60 and noted that her prognosis was “guar ded - due to early

onset and chronicity.”

In her notes on Ms. Jones’s personal history, Dr. Gerwoll stated that “[s]ince being f ired [Ms. Jones] has gotten about 20 jobs and just walked out.”

InApril2000, a clinical assessment form reflected that Ms

. Jones’s status was improving and that she was to start taking 20mg of Paxil in addition to Imipramine and Xanax. On A pril 9, 2000, D r. Kriau ciunias, a licens ed psy

cholog ist,No. 01-2315 Jones v. Commissioner of Soc. Sec. 5

reviewed Ms. Jones’s file and filled out a Psychiatr ic Review Form for the Social Security Administration. D r. Kriauciunias co nclu ded that Ms. Jones suffered from an affective disorder and a personality disorder, and checked the box that stated “a severe impairment is present which d oe s notmeet or

equal a listed impairment.” Dr. Kriauciunias’s function al assessme

nt was tha

t Ms. Jones wa s modera tely limi te d in her ab ility

to rememb er deta

iled instr uctions, t o maintain regular attendance, attention, and concentration for extended periods, and also in her ability to intera ct with the general public. However

Dr. Kriauciunias concluded that she could perform simple, low-stress unskilled work.

InJune and July of 2 000, clini cal asse ssment for ms reflected that

Ms. Jones’s status was deteriorating. After an ap pointmenton June 28, 2000, Berrisford reported tha t Ms

. Jones was depressed, cry ing, un motivated, missing appointm ent s, and slee

ping nig ht and day . Accor

ding to Berrisford, Ms. Jones regarded the medications as no longer worki ng, since she was expe rienci ng a “loss of concentration, fatigue, loss of all pleasure, [and coul d no t] work or socialize,” but she was not suicidal. In July, Dr. Burgoy ne adjusted her medication by lowe

ring the amount of Paxil and increasing

her dosage of I

mipramine, in an effort to return to the dosage s being t

aken by Ms. Jones in May, when she ha d been feeling better.

OnAugust 1, 2000, a clinical assessment form filled out by Dr. Burgoy

ne reflect e d that Ms. Jones was once ag ain impro ving, but prescribed a new drug for Ms. Jon es, Depakote, in order

to deal wi

th her “mood inst a bility.” Nevertheless, on August 19, another as sessment form filled outby Dr. Burgoyne noted that the “gatekeeper” ha d not ordered Depakote and thus Ms. Jones had not yet been started

onthe dru g. In addition, the form noted that she exhibited “mild pressured speech” and reporte d that she was unab le to get out o f bed t hree da ys a week, w as irr itabl e, angr y, a nd depre ssed. On September 16, 2000, a clinical assessment formreflected tha

t Ms. Jones was improving, although she 6 Jones v. Commissioner of Soc. Sec. No. 01-2315

1 Depako te, Paxil, Imipramine, and Xanax. had not yet begu

n taking Depakot e. Ms. Jones denied having disabling panic an

d depres sion. At the he aring in October 2000, Ms. Jones testified that she was taking all four drugs. 1

II
The Administrative Law Judge’s Hearing

The Social Security Act def ines disability

as the ina bility to engage in any substantial ga inful ac tivity by

reason of a medicall y determinable physic al or mental impairment that

can be expect

ed to res ult in dea thor that has lasted or can be expected to last for a continuous period of not less than 12 months. 42 U.S.C. §§ 423(d)(1 )(A), ( d)(2)( A); 20 C.F .R. § 404.1505; se e als o 20 C.F.R. § 404.1509. To be found disabled, Ms. Jones’s

impairme

nts must not only

prevent her fromdoing her previous work, but, considering her age (29 at the time of the ALJ’s decision), education (e ighth grade edu cation), and w ork experience (machine operator, re cycling collector, waitress, and babysitter), must also rende r her unable to enga ge in an y ot her kind o f work tha

t exists in signif ica ntnumbers i

n the nati onal economy . 42 U.S.C. § 1382c(a )(3)(B ); Bogle v. Sullivan , 998 F.2d 342, 347 ( 6th Cir. 1993).

To determine if a

claimant is disable d within

the meaning of the Act, t he ALJ employ s a

five-step inquiry defined in 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520; Abbott v. Sullivan , 905 F.2d 918, 923 ( 6th Cir. 1990) (citing 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520). Through step four, the claimant bears the burden of proving the existence and severity of limitations caused by her impairments and the fact that she is precluded from performing her past relevant work, butat step five of the inquiry, whic h is the focus of

this case, the burden shifts to the Commissioner to identify a signific ant number of jobs in the economy that ac commodate the claimant’s residua

l function al capa city (dete rmi ned at stepNo. 01-2315 Jones v. Commissioner of Soc. Sec. 7

four) and vocational profile. See Bowen v. Yuckert , 482 U.S. 137, 146 n.5 (1987).

At the h eari ng, t he vo cati onal

exp ert (VE) testified to the fact that if Ms. Jones’s testimony regar ding her constant crying spells, daily panic attac

ks, inability to leave the

house, and inability to get along

with others wer e to be credited, there we re no jobs

that would

fit her ne eds. How ever, the ALJ did not find Ms. Jones’s tes timony to be entir

ely credibl e and instead constructed a h

ypot hetical question for the VE that incorpor

ated his own ass essment of Ms. Jones’s limitations
, asking t

he VE to a ssume tha

t Ms. Jones would be capable only of light work, which was not at an “unprotected height,” that did no t require Ms. Jones t o dr ive, climb, or work around d

anger ous o r h azardous machinery , was “relati vely simple an d rout ine in nature, not requiring more th an very fe

w steps,” and that the work be low in stress and include only very

limitedcontact with other people. The VE resp onded

that unde

r such ci rcumstan ces, Ms. Jones could perform light janitorial work, some stock pos it ions, and material handling

positions, all of

which were unskilled, light work that did no t “in

volve m uch contact with people.” The VE further testified that there were a sig nificant number of these jobs available in the Detroit metropolitan area.

The ALJ sub s equently perf ormed the required five-step evaluation

and found that Ms. Jones’s claim survived the require ments of the fir

st four ste

ps, b ut did not meet the require ments of step five, since there are jobs other than her pa st releva nt work tha

t exist in sig

nifican t numbers

i n th e national econo my, w

hich can accommodate her residual fun ctional capacity . Accordingly , the ALJ denied Ms. Jon es’ s applicationfor benefits, having determined that she was not disabled for purp oses of th e Act. 8 Jones v. Commissioner of Soc. Sec. No. 01-2315

Is there substantial evidence to support the Commissioner’s decision?

Inorder to

affirm t he Commissioner’s de

terminat i on , the decision must be supported by substantial evidence in the record as a whole. 42 U.S.C. § 4 05(g); Walters v. Commissioner
, 127 F.3d 5 25, 528 (6th Cir. 1997). “‘Substantial evidence’ is defined as ‘such relevant evidence

as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to su

pport a conclusion.’” Stanley v. Secretary of Health & Human Se

rvs. , 39 F.3d 115, 117 ( 6th C ir. 19 94) (q uoti ng Richardson v. Perales
, 402 U.S. 389, 401 (197 1)). F urthermore, we mu st defer to an ag ency ’s decis ion “eve n if there is substa nti al evidence in the re cord tha t would have supported an

opposite conclusion, so long as substantial evidence supports the conclusion reached

by the AL

J.” Key v. Callahan , 109 F.3d 270, 273 (6th Cir. 1997).

The ALJ stated in his written order that Ms. Jones w as moderat ely impaired in social functioning, g iven her cry ing spells and her problems with anger, and had a modera

te impairment

of concentration, persisten ce, and pace. Nevertheless, the ALJ con cluded that Ms. Jones’s sta tements regarding th e s ev er it y of

he r s ymptoms an d her att empts to find work were not fully c

redible, and that she was capable of showing up at a job every da y, despite Dr. Kr

iauciunias’s assessment

that she was moderat

ely impaired in her ab ility

to maintain attendance. Moreover, the ALJ found that she was limitedto a light

level of exertion on the basis of her lowered energy level resulting from her depression. Accordingly , the ALJ determ

ine d th at M s. Jo ne s should be capable of performing

light work, but work tha t did not include unprotected

heights, driving, climbing or operat ing hazardous

ma ch in er y, and perhaps most importantly, required

only very limited contact with “the public, co-workers and supervi sors. ”

M s. Jones conte

nds that th e AL J’s conclu sion that she is capable of performing light work, even whe re the cont act with others is limited, is not supported by substantialNo. 01-2315 Jones v. Commissioner of Soc. Sec. 9

evidence. More specifically, Ms. Jones contendsth at t he A LJ should not have disregarded her

testimony and

presented the VE with a hypothetical

based on his own assessment, since in her opinion, her testimony wasconsiste nt with the

analy sis of the various mental health professionals that saw her. Had the ALJ credited Ms. Jones’s testimony, she would have been, according to the VE’s te stim ony at the ALJ’s h earing, incapab le of holding a job and would, therefore, be considered

disabled pursuant to the Act. In addition
, Ms. Jones contends

that t he ALJ improperly disregarded Dr. Kriauciunias’s conclusionthat she c ould not ma intain regular attendance, which wou

ld als o prec lude

her f rom w orkin

g. We first deal with the issue of whethe r the ALJ’s determination of Ms. Jones’s credibility was supported by substantial evidence.

There is no qu est ion that subjective complaints of a claimant can supp ort a cla

im for disa

bility , if there

is al so objective medic al e vidence of an underly ing medical condition in the record. See Young v. Sec retary of Health & Human Servs. , 925 F.2d 146, 150-51 (6th Cir. 1 990); Duncan

v. Secreta ry of Hea lth &

Human Se

rvs. , 801 F.2d 847, 852 (6th Cir. 1986) . The doctors in this case diagnosed Ms. Jones with various disorders, medica ted her f or those d isorder s, and have therefore supplied the requisite objective medical condi t ion to su pp or t M s. Jo ne s’ s c la im fo r d is ab il it y. Neve rtheless
, an ALJ is not required to accept a c laiman t’ s subjec tive complaints and may prope rly consider the

cr edib ility

of a claimant when making a determination of di sa bi li ty. See Walters v. Commissioner of Social Sec.
, 127 F. 3 d 525, 5 31 (6t h Cir . 1997 ) (cit ing Kirk v. Secretary of Health & Human Se

rvs. , 667 F.2d 524, 538 (6th Cir. 1981)). In addition, the AL

J can present

a hypothetical to the

VE on the basis of hi s own assessment if he reasonably deems the claimant’s testimony

to b e inaccurate. See Townsend v. Secreta ry of Health &

Human Se

rvs. , 7 62 F.2d 40, 44 (6th Cir. 1985). See also Blacha v. Secretary of Health & Human Servs.
, 927 F.2d 228, 231 (6th Cir. 1990) (hol di ng that the ALJ had an adequat e basis to d iscount M r. Bl acha’ s 10 Jones v. Commissioner of Soc. Sec. No. 01-2315

cr ed ib il it y, where his behavior and themedical evidence was inconsistent with the claimant’s testimony).

Her e, the A LJ foun

d that Ms. Jones was no t credib le in light of the observations made by her own treating

physician, the psycholog ists that se

parate ly e valuated her, and various inconsistencies in her own statements. Upon review, we are to accord the ALJ’s determinations of credibility gr

eat weight and defere nce par ticularl y since the ALJ has the op po rt un it y, whichwe do not, of obser ving a w itness ’ s demean

or while testif yin g. Walte

rs , 127 F.3d at 528 (citations omitted). Therefore, we are limited to evaluating whether or not the AL J’s explanations for partially discre diting Ms. Jone s ar e
reasona ble and supported by substantial evide nce in the record.

The ALJ first

found that Ms. Jones’s symptoms were not as

s evere as she suggested in her testimony . Dr. Burgoy ne’s reports support this finding, since he did not find her sym ptoms or her

disorder to be severe and even noted in one of his reports that her complaints were “less than credi ble.” Ad di ti on al ly, in Dr. Burgoy ne ’ s original assessment on December

11, 1999, he reported

that Ms. Jones’s appearance did “no t reflect the depression and anxiety that she complain[ed] of.” Furthermore, Dr. Kriauc iunias found that Ms

. Jones was “[n]ot significantly limited for simple, lowstre ss unskilled work.” On several occasions, the men ta l health profess ionals who

spent time

with Ms. Jones noted that she was pleasant and had a normal appearance. Berrisford’s

n ot es from her therapy

sessions with Ms. Jones provide the best support f or Ms. Jones ’s testimo ny, inthat they verify that she would hav e cry

ing spel ls and was not alway s cooperative andpleasan

t. Howeve

r, the AL J did not dispu

te that Ms. Jones has the disor

ders she has been diagno sed with, only

the severity of her symptoms, which h e v iewed a s being i n
c on tradictionwith the observations made by the medical personnel who evaluated her.No. 01-2315 Jones v. Commissioner of Soc. Sec. 11

2 On No vem ber 6 , 199 9, the initial re por t filled out b y the clinic refle c ts M s. Jone s’s stateme nt that she had “a pplie d for 1 5 jo bs an d will not go d ue to her a nxi ety and depr essi on.” Dr. Burg oyne’ s re port of December 11
, 19 99
, s t at es t ha t Ms . Jones inform ed him that she h ad to leave “seven or m ore jo bs sinc e Au gust of 1 999 .” Dr . Go rwell ’s r eport from March 28, 2000, stat es tha t Ms. Jones reported having “gotten about 20 jobs” inwhich she “just wal ked out.” Dr. Gorwell’s report, whi ch the ALJ dete rmin ed to b e in co nfl ict withthese previous stat ements, was fi lledout over t

hree and a ha lf mont

hs af ter Dr. Burgoyne’s report, an d thus it is not imp ossib le that M s. Jone s’s stateme nts are c onsi ste nt, if , f or example, she sec ured a n umb er of jo bs du ring that tim e per iod. In fact, it may be that

Ms. Jones was c onsoli dating in her answer to D r. Go rwell those job s that she a pplie d for a nd d id not g o to, with t hose jobs that she had st art ed and l eft , an d tha t t his “di scre pancy ” is a mis unde rsta n ding. N evertheless, Ms. J ones does not arg ue onappea l t

hat th ese see mi ngl y inconsist ent st atemen ts are reconcilab le. Instead she argues that these inconsi stenci es are p art of her disab ility. We do n ot see h ow this is helpfu l to her p osition

. The ALJ ’s cre dibility

determination with

respect to Ms. Jones’s testimony reg ardingher unsuc cessful efforts to obtain work is also reasonable. T he ALJ explained in his written order that h e found i t likely that Ms. Jones, had she been telling the truth

about having left so many jobs as a result of crying spells and panic attacks, would h ave dis cussed such

eve nts with Berrisford, in whose reports such events we r e notably lacking. Furthermore, the ALJ relied on the fact that there were several discrepanci es in Ms. Jones’s testimony regar ding the number of job attempts made. Although t h e discrepancies are potentially r econcilable, 2 Ms . Jones does notargue this on appeal and the ALJ’s conclusions appear to be reasonable.

Fi na ll y, the AL

J disrega rded only one conclusion made by

a medical professiona l, and that is Dr. Kriauciunias’s assessment

that M s. J ones was moderately limited in her ability to maintain regular

attendance. A treating phy sician’s opinion is normall

y entitled to substantial deference, but the A LJ is not bound by that opinion. See Shelman v. H eckler
, 821 F.2d 316, 321 (6th Cir . 1987). T he trea ti ng physician’s opinion must be suppo rtedby sufficient medica l data. See 12 Jones v. Commissioner of Soc. Sec. No. 01-2315

Harrisv. Heckler , 756 F.2d 431, 435 (6th Cir. 1985). If the treatingphy sician’s

opinion is not suppor ted by objective medical evi den ce, th e ALJ is entitle d to discredit the opinion

as long as he sets forth a reasoned basis for her rejection. See Shelman
, 821 F.2d at 321. Here, we are de aling with a reviewing physician’sopinion, w

hich is due , if

any thing, le ss deferencethan the trea

t ing physician’ s opinion and thus the

same standard may be

applied. There w as no objective medical evidence support in g Dr. Kriauciunias’s assessment that M s. J ones w as lim ited i n her ab ilit y to main tain r egu la r attendance and the A

LJ discr edited hi s o pini on by

caref ully reasoningthat since

it was undi sputed tha

t Ms. Jones was able to take her

daughter to school each morning a nd pick her up each a fterno on, she was capable of maintaining a re gular schedule. The ALJ’s determination was, theref ore, re asonable and supported by the e

vidence.

The district court focused inits brief ruling from the bench

onMs. Jones’s testimony regarding her cry ing spells, a nd found that since the ALJ did not explain “ why [Ms. Jones]

was totally

disbeliev ed about t

he cry ing spel l s[,] . . . the evidence milita

tes toward

supporting

[M s . Jones’s] position.” This analy

sis is troub lesomein two res pects. F irst, as noted above, th e AL

J did not in fact “disbelieve” Ms. Jones’s testimony entirely as to her

crying spells; he only disputed

the severity of her symptoms. Furthe rmore, th e ALJ articulated his reasons

for reje cting Ms . Jones’s te stimony in some detail. Second, the substantial deference a ccorded the A LJ’s fi ndin gs of credibility, and the standa rd of review for the Commissioner’s f

indings o f fact p

ursuant t o 42 U.S.C. § 405(g), militate in favor of upholding the Commissioner’s deci sion even if t

he distric t court wo

uld have v

iewed th e evidence differently. A s noted above, the Commi ssioner’s decisioncannot be overturned if substantial evidence, or e ven
a prepond erance of the ev

idence, supports t

h e claimant’s position, so long as substantial evidence also supports the

c onclusion reached by

the ALJ. In this case

there was more than e nough e viden ce to s uppor t the A LJ’s fi ndin g.No. 01-2315 Jones v. Commissioner of Soc. Sec. 13

Insum, it was

entir el y proper for the ALJ to present the vocational expertwith

the hypothetical he c onstructed, which did notreflect Ms. Jones’s complaints, including the constant crying s pells , since the hypothetica l was supported by substantial evidence in the record. We therefore affirm the Commissioner’s final decision.

New Evidence

Inthis appeal, Ms. Jones proffers new evidence of her deteriorating

mental sta

te, inclu din g a l etter from her sister da ted September 24, 2001, and records from a counsel in g service dated October 17, 2001, in su pport of her claim

. However, this information comes over a ye ar after the ALJ’s denial of benefits and

several months after the district court’s reversal and award of benefits, a nd cannot, therefore, be considered

by this court on review. See Wyatt v. Secretary of H ea lth & Human Se

rvs. , 974 F.2d 680, 685 (6th Cir. 1992) (holding that this c ourt is “co nfined to review evidence that

was available to the [ALJ], and to determ ine whether the decisionof the [AL

J] is supported by substantial evidenc e.”). As we have no te d previously, “[e]vidence of a subsequent de terio rationor change in condition after the administrative hearing is deemed immaterial.” Ibid

. The records included in the Appellee’s brief fr om New Passag es, a psy

chiatric clinic, r eflect t hat Ms . Jones has “impaired insight a

nd judgme

nt,” and t

hat h er gen eral appearanceand behavior was “[a]lert, un-gro omed
, c ooperative, but an xio us and nervo us at t imes, crying, an d also occasionally

inattenti ve to dire ct questions.” The clinic assigned her a GAF score o f 40. These observations are inconsistentwith

the medical evidence that was present ed to the AL J i n this case and could suggest that Ms. Jones’s condition has deteriorated. Although this evidence ca nnot be considered

by us for t

he aforementioned reasons, Ms. Jones has availab le the opt

ion of fili

n g a new c laim based on a different period of disability than the one considered here. 14 Jones v. Commissioner of Soc. Sec. No. 01-2315

III

For the reasons given above, w e REVERSE the district court’s judgmen t.