FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

SANA KAPPOUTA, 

Plaintiff-Appellant,

 v. 

VALIANT INTEGRATED 

SERVICES, LLC, a Virginia limited 

liability company; THE 

ELECTRONIC ON-RAMP, INC., a 

Maryland corporation; DOES, 1-20, 

inclusive, 

Defendants-Appellees.

No. 21-56310 

D.C. No. 3:20-cv01501-TWR-BGS 

OPINION

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Southern District of California

Todd W. Robinson, District Judge, Presiding

Argued and Submitted December 5, 2022

Pasadena, California

Filed February 21, 2023
2 KAPPOUTA V. VALIANT INTEGRATED SERVICES

Before: Paul J. Kelly, Jr.,* Sandra S. Ikuta, and Morgan 

Christen, Circuit Judges. 

Opinion by Judge Kelly 

SUMMARY**

Labor Law 

The panel affirmed the district court’s dismissal of Sana 

Kappouta’s action under the Defense Contractor 

Whistleblower Protection Act against Valiant Integrated 

Services, LLC, and The Electronic On-Ramp, Inc.

Kappouta alleged that while at a bar at the U.S. embassy 

compound in Baghdad, Iraq, she was shoved by an 

intoxicated co-worker. After she reported the incident, her 

employer attempted to transfer her to a different 

position. After initially refusing the transfer, she was fired.

The panel held that to survive a motion to dismiss under 

the Defense Contractor Whistleblower Protection Act, 10 

U.S.C. § 4701(a)(1)(A), a plaintiff must plausibly allege 

that: (1) she made a disclosure that she reasonably believed 

was evidence of a violation related to a Department of 

Defense contract; and (2) her employer discharged, 

* The Honorable Paul J. Kelly, Jr., United States Circuit Judge for the 

U.S. Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit, sitting by designation.

** This summary constitutes no part of the opinion of the court. It has 

been prepared by court staff for the convenience of the reader.
 KAPPOUTA V. VALIANT INTEGRATED SERVICES 3 

demoted, or otherwise discriminated against her because of 

that disclosure. 

As to the first element, the panel held that Kappouta did 

not plausibly allege a reasonable belief that her complaint 

about the shoving incident encompassed one of the acts 

described in § 4701(a)(1)(A)-(C), which include a violation 

of law related to a Department of Defense contract. The 

panel held that, in the context of a defense contract, a 

violation of law is related to the contract if it is related to the 

purpose of the contract or affects the services provided by 

the defense contractor to the Department of Defense. A 

disclosure is protected if a disinterested observer with 

knowledge of the operative facts would reasonably conclude 

that the disclosure evidences a violation of law related to a 

defense contract in this manner. The panel concluded that, 

under this standard, Kappouta’s complaint failed to allege a 

sufficient nexus between the shove and the Department of 

Defense-Valiant contract.

COUNSEL

Derek J. Angell (argued), Roper PA, Orlando, Florida; John 

L. Holcomb, Jr., Obagi Law Group PC, Los Angeles, 

California; Zein E. Obagi, Jr., Obagi Law Group PC, 

Redondo Beach, California; for Plaintiff-Appellant. 

Matthew S. Hellman (argued), Jenner & Block LLP, 

Washington, D.C.; Kirsten Spira and Sati Harutyunyan, 

Jenner & Block LLP, Los Angeles, California; Gary L. 

Eastman and Sara Gold, Eastman IP, San Diego, California; 

for Defendants-Appellees.
4 KAPPOUTA V. VALIANT INTEGRATED SERVICES

OPINION

KELLY, Circuit Judge:

While at a bar at the U.S. Embassy compound in 

Baghdad, Iraq, Plaintiff-Appellant Sana Kappouta was 

shoved by an intoxicated co-worker but was not injured. She 

was reluctant to report the incident, but she eventually 

acquiesced to requests of the State Department and her 

employer. Concededly because of her report, Ms. 

Kappouta’s employer attempted to transfer her to a different 

position. After initially refusing the transfer, she was fired. 

Ms. Kappouta filed suit under the Defense Contractor 

Whistleblower Protection Act (DCWPA), 10 U.S.C. 

§ 4701.

1 The district court dismissed her complaint without 

prejudice, allowing leave to amend. Ms. Kappouta then 

waived the right to amend, contending that additional facts 

were either unnecessary or could not be pled in good faith

and requested the district court enter final judgment. This 

appeal followed. Our jurisdiction arises under 28 U.S.C. 

§ 1291, and we affirm.

I. Background

We describe the well-pled facts alleged in Ms. 

Kappouta’s complaint, which we assume to be true at the 

motion to dismiss stage. See Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 

U.S. 544, 555 (2007). We also notice the factual findings in 

the Office of Inspector General report (OIG Report) attached 

to, and referenced in, Ms. Kappouta’s complaint. See United 

1

 Ms. Kappouta filed suit under 10 U.S.C. § 2409, which has since been 

renumbered as 10 U.S.C. § 4701. The current section of the Code is cited

in this opinion. 
KAPPOUTA V. VALIANT INTEGRATED SERVICES 5

States v. Ritchie, 342 F.3d 903, 908 (9th Cir. 2003). But we 

are not bound to accept as true the legal conclusions included 

therein. See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 679, 681

(2009). 

Ms. Kappouta worked as a linguist for Valiant Integrated 

Services, LLC (Valiant),2 pursuant to a United States 

Department of Defense (DoD) contract. While at Valiant, 

she worked and resided at a U.S. Embassy compound in 

Baghdad, Iraq. On December 7, 2017, after work hours, at

the Embassy bar, Ms. Kappouta’s co-worker, Sarah Maher,

shoved her and nearly knocked her down.

Later that evening, Ms. Kappouta recounted the incident 

to her supervisor/Valiant employee Parween Babani, who 

was a friend of Ms. Maher. Ms. Babani urged Ms. Kappouta 

not to “make any problems,” positing that Ms. Maher was 

intoxicated. 

The next morning, embassy Regional Security Officers 

(RSOs) from the State Department contacted Ms. Kappouta

and pressured her to make a formal complaint about the 

incident. Ms. Kappouta initially declined, expressing fear of 

retaliation and losing her job. RSOs then reported the 

incident to Valiant management, including Oscar Ortiz, who 

again pressured Ms. Kappouta to report, assuring her she 

would not be retaliated against. On December 12, 2017, Ms. 

Kappouta provided a written statement to RSOs including 

2 Ms. Kappouta’s complaint names both Valiant and The Electronic OnRamp, Inc. (EOR) as her employers. But the OIG Report indicates she 

is a subcontractor of Valiant. Neither defendant contested Ms. 

Kappouta’s employment status at the district court, nor is such a 

challenge raised on appeal. In any event, Ms. Kappouta’s technical 

employment status is relevant only for background and not to the issue

before us. 
6 KAPPOUTA V. VALIANT INTEGRATED SERVICES

the fact that she had been asked to do so and that it was

intended “just for the records and not as a report.” On 

December 13, 2017, Ms. Kappouta emailed EOR 

management to inform them of the assault and express her 

concern about retaliation for the RSO report. 

Ms. Babani also submitted her account of the events,

confirming that Ms. Kappouta had told her about the shove 

the night of December 7, but stating that “she did not see Ms. 

Maher touch Ms. Kappouta or do anything wrong” and 

“insinuat[ing] that Ms. Kappouta was drunk at the time.” 

Between January 10 and January 12, 2018, Mr. Ortiz and 

Ms. Babani decided that Ms. Kappouta should be transferred 

to a position in Basra, Iraq. According to the complaint, Mr. 

Ortiz admitted that the decision to transfer Ms. Kappouta 

was based on her cooperation in the investigation. 

On January 28, 2018, Mr. Ortiz, Ms. Babani, and Chief 

Shanklin met with Ms. Kappouta to tell her for the first time 

about the transfer, which they informed her was at the behest 

of Ms. Kappouta’s Army unit. Ms. Babani threatened that if

Ms. Kappouta did not accept the transfer, she would lose her

job. 

Ms. Kappouta next went to Army officials, with whom 

she worked on the DoD-Valiant contract. They confirmed 

that the Army had not requested her transfer and that it was 

at Valiant’s direction. Ms. Kappouta responded with her 

belief that it was retaliatory. On January 29, 2018, Ms. 

Kappouta met with Mr. Ortiz to accept the transfer, but was 

told instead she was being terminated. The stated basis for 

her discharge: Ms. Kappouta’s refusal to accept the transfer 

and her “jump[ing] the line of command” to complain to 

Army personnel. 
KAPPOUTA V. VALIANT INTEGRATED SERVICES 7

Ms. Kappouta first submitted a complaint to the DoD

Office of the Inspector General (OIG), initiating an 

investigation. The OIG prepared a report (OIG Report), 

finding Ms. Kappouta’s claim meritorious and 

recommending she be reinstated. Ms. Kappouta then filed 

suit under the Defense Contractor Whistleblower Protection 

Act (DCWPA), 10 U.S.C. § 4701, alleging she was 

terminated in retaliation for making protected disclosures 

under the Act. Valiant filed a motion to dismiss for failure 

to state a claim pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure

12(b)(6). The district court held that Ms. Kappouta had not 

alleged a protected disclosure, given the lack of (a) a legal 

violation contemplated by the whistleblower statute and (b)

nexus between the shove and the DoD-Valiant contract.

II. Discussion

We review the grant of a motion to dismiss de novo and 

may affirm on any basis supported by the record. ASARCO, 

LLC v. Union Pac. R.R. Co., 765 F.3d 999, 1004 (9th Cir. 

2014). Under § 4701(a)(1)(A), “[a]n employee of a 

contractor . . . may not be discharged, demoted, or otherwise 

discriminated against as a reprisal for disclosing to a person 

or body . . . information that the employee reasonably 

believes is evidence of . . . a violation of law, rule, or 

regulation related to a Department contract (including the 

competition for or negotiation of a contract) or grant.” 10 

U.S.C. § 4701(a)(1)(A). Therefore, to survive a motion to 

dismiss under the DCWPA, a plaintiff must plausibly allege 

that: (1) she made a disclosure that the plaintiff “reasonably 

believe[d]” is evidence of a violation related to a DoD

contract; and (2) her employer discharged, demoted, or 

otherwise discriminated against her because of that 

disclosure.
8 KAPPOUTA V. VALIANT INTEGRATED SERVICES

No one contests that Ms. Kappouta’s complaint has 

adequately alleged that she suffered an adverse employment 

action based on her compliance with an internal 

investigation. At the pleading stage, Ms. Kappouta has 

plausibly alleged she was transferred (and ultimately 

discharged) because of one or more reports she made about 

the shove. Therefore, the question remains whether she has 

plausibly alleged a reasonable belief that her complaint 

about the shoving incident encompassed one of the acts 

described in § 4701(a)(1)(A)–(C). 

To give rise to whistleblower protection in this context,

the disclosure must be one that the plaintiff reasonably 

believes is related to an act described in § 4701(a)(1)(A)–

(C):

• “Gross mismanagement of a Department 

of Defense contract or grant,

• a gross waste of Department funds,

• an abuse of authority relating to a 

Department contract or grant, 

• [] a violation of law, rule, or regulation 

related to a Department contract . . . .

• [or] [a] substantial and specific danger to 

public health or safety.”

10 U.S.C. § 4701(a)(1)(A)–(C). 

Our task is to interpret the meaning of “a violation of law 

. . . related to a Department contract,” an issue few courts 

have had occasion to address. Although the caselaw is 

limited in this regard, we have interpreted “related to” in 

other contexts as bearing a significant relation to. California 
KAPPOUTA V. VALIANT INTEGRATED SERVICES 9

Trucking Ass’n v. Bonta, 996 F.3d 644, 656 (9th Cir. 2021) 

(quoting Morales v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 504 U.S. 

374, 390 (1992)) (interpreting the FAAAA; distinguishing 

“significant[] relat[ion]” from “tenuous, remote, or 

peripheral connection”); Dilts v. Penske Logistics, LLC, 769 

F.3d 637, 643 (9th Cir. 2014) (quoting Rowe v. N.H. Motor 

Transp. Ass’n, 552 U.S. 364, 371 (2008)) (same). Likewise, 

in interpreting the Contract Disputes Act, the Federal Circuit 

has recognized that the phrase “relating to the contract” 

necessarily implies “some relationship to the terms or 

performance of [that] contract.” Todd Const., L.P. v. United 

States, 656 F.3d 1306, 1312 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (quoting 

Applied Cos. v. United States, 144 F.3d 1470, 1478 (Fed. 

Cir. 1998)). In the context of a defense contract, we 

conclude a violation of law is related to the contract if it is 

related to the purpose of the contract or affects the services 

provided by the defense contractor to the DoD. And a 

disclosure is protected if a disinterested observer with 

knowledge of the operative facts would reasonably conclude 

that the disclosure evidences a violation of law related to a 

defense contract in this manner. See Coons v. Sec’y of U.S. 

Dep’t of Treasury, 383 F.3d 879, 890 (9th Cir. 2004). 

Ms. Kappouta theorizes that the shove constituted an 

assault in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 113(a)(5), which makes 

simple assault a crime in certain federal jurisdictions. In her

view, violation of this statute is tantamount to a “violation of 

law” contemplated by the Act. 10 U.S.C. § 4701(a)(1)(A). 

Defendants contend Ms. Babani’s conduct does not rise to 

the level of unlawful behavior contemplated by the DCWPA

and, further, bears no relation to the DoD-Valiant contract. 

At this stage, we need not decide whether the underlying

facts could constitute a simple assault. Nor is it necessary to 

determine whether a violation of 18 U.S.C. § 113(a)(5) could 
10 KAPPOUTA V. VALIANT INTEGRATED SERVICES

ever give rise to whistleblower protection. Rather, we are 

obligated to affirm dismissal of the complaint because it fails 

to allege a sufficient nexus between the shove and the DoDValiant contract. Stated another way, the allegations in the 

complaint do not encompass a disclosure sufficiently related 

to the DoD-Valiant contract to give rise to DCWPA 

protection. In this way, the statute necessarily limits the 

scope of claims giving rise to protection under the Act. 

Thus, we decline to address defendants’ broader argument

that the conduct and resulting disclosure could never come 

within the protection of the Act. 

Ms. Kappouta argues that the assault was related to the 

contract and that she plausibly alleged her reasonable belief 

that it was job-related and also related to the DoD-Valiant 

contract. Defendants contend Ms. Kappouta argues 

reasonable belief for the first time on appeal and therefore 

has forfeited this argument. Indeed, Ms. Kappouta’s 

opposition to the motion to dismiss does not elucidate her 

belief that her disclosure was related to the contract. Instead, 

the opposition relies on conclusions to this effect arrived at 

by the OIG, which we do not accept as fact. In any event, 

our review is of the well-pleaded facts in the complaint, and, 

as addressed below, the facts alleged do not plausibly 

demonstrate an objectively reasonable belief that the 

disclosure shared a nexus with the contract. 

The statutory text makes clear that this standard is a 

relatively forgiving one. That is, Ms. Kappouta need only 

plead a “reasonable belief” that her disclosures were 

protected, and that belief need not be correct. See Van 

Asdale v. Int’l Game Tech., 577 F.3d 989, 1001 (9th Cir. 

2009) (considering a different whistleblower statute that 

protects disclosures the plaintiff “reasonably believes” 

encompass a violation of law). However, the belief must be 
KAPPOUTA V. VALIANT INTEGRATED SERVICES 11

objectively reasonable. See id. (interpreting the reasonable 

belief requirement as including both a subjective and 

objective component). And, on the facts alleged, the 

disclosures concerning the shoving incident were, at best, 

only tenuously related to the defense contract.

In support of the nexus requirement, the complaint cites 

to several provisions required by regulation to be included in 

the DoD-Valiant contract: (1) a clause establishing an ethical 

code of conduct, requiring “due diligence to ‘prevent and 

detect criminal conduct’” and “commitment to compliance 

with the law”; (2) a further requirement of disclosure to an 

agency OIG “whenever a principal, employee, agent, or 

subcontractor . . . has committed a violation of Federal 

criminal law involving fraud, conflict of interest, bribery, or 

gratuity violations found in Title 18 U.S.C. or a violation of 

the civil False Claims Act”; (3) a reporting system for 

“instances of ‘improper conduct,’” “instructions that 

encourage employees to make such reports,” and “provide 

for disciplinary action” for such conduct “or for failing to 

take reasonable steps to prevent such conduct”; and, (4) an 

“internal control system . . . to ensure timely reporting . . . 

of specific criminal violations under Title 18 U.S.C., or 

violation of the False Claims Act.” 

Taking each provision in turn, no reasonable observer 

would think that the incident described in the complaint

would implicate the clause requiring Valiant to exercise due 

diligence to “prevent and detect criminal conduct.” Nor 

would a reasonable observer conclude that the incident 

qualifies as a “violation of Federal criminal law involving 

fraud, conflict of interest, bribery or gratuity” or a “violation 

of the civil False Claims Act.” Although the shove may have 

been an instance of “unethical” or “improper conduct,” or 

even arguably a criminal violation under Title 18, possibly 
12 KAPPOUTA V. VALIANT INTEGRATED SERVICES

implicating the internal control system (Ms. Kappouta could 

and did report the incident to Embassy security), the 

complaint does not contain any plausible allegation that it is 

of the sort triggering the mandatory reporting of specific 

criminal violations under Title 18 of the U.S. Code or the 

False Claims Act. Moreover, the theoretically applicable 

provisions are either so tenuously related or vague that to 

accede to their application in this instance would render any 

complaint of interpersonal disagreement protected under

§ 4701, a result plainly not intended by the statute. In 

essence, Ms. Kappouta asks us to find that because the 

dispute was between employees of a contractor, it is thereby 

related to the contract. We decline to adopt such a broad 

interpretation. 

Our conclusion that the disclosure must demonstrate a 

tangible connection to the purpose of the contract is reflected 

in the statutory text and comports with the analysis this and 

other courts have applied in analogous situations. 

Section 4701 describes “mismanagement of a Department of 

Defense contract,” waste of Department funds,” “abuse of 

authority relating to a Department contract,” and

“violation[s] of law . . . related to a Department contract.”

10 U.S.C. § 4701(a)(1)(A) (emphasis added). Congress 

reminds us of the limits of the statutory scope at each step. 

To this end, one district court recognized that descriptions of

“persistent sexual harassment,” while conceivably 

pertaining to a violation of law, failed on the grounds that 

the disclosures were not related to a government contract to 

provide security services. Sargent v. Pompeo, No. 19-cv00620, 2020 WL 5505361, at *15 (D.D.C. Sept. 11, 2020). 

By contrast, the Fourth Circuit found the DCWPA to be an 

appropriate avenue for relief when employees raised 

concerns that a contractor was intentionally submitting bids 
KAPPOUTA V. VALIANT INTEGRATED SERVICES 13

with deflated estimated labor costs (that would ultimately 

result in cost overruns) to win contracts. United States ex 

rel. Cody v. Mantech Int’l, Corp., 746 F. App’x 166, 181 

(4th Cir. 2018). And in Coons, this court determined 

disclosures regarding a possible fraudulent tax refund were 

protected under the Whistleblower Protection Act given that 

they concerned the “mission” of the IRS — to collect taxes. 

383 F.3d at 890. Though the Whistleblower Protection Act 

does not contain the same nexus requirement as that of the 

DCWPA, see 5 U.S.C. § 2302(b)(8)(A)(i)–(ii), it contains 

the same reasonable belief requirement, see Coons, 383 F.3d 

at 890, and in Coons, we considered it significant that the 

disclosure related to the agency’s function. 

Along these same lines, as Ms. Kappouta candidly 

admits, the incident at the bar bears no relation to her 

everyday job duties, that is, to perform linguist services 

pursuant to Valiant’s contract with the Department. Todd 

Const., L.P., 656 F.3d at 1312 (“[R]elating to the contract” 

necessarily implies “some relationship to the terms or 

performance of [that] contract.”). Without some relation to 

the services Ms. Kappouta, and thereby Valiant, was

contracted to provide, it is difficult to imagine a relation to

the contract itself. Here, the facts as pled concern a personal 

dispute (outside of working hours, for that matter), and do 

not sufficiently allege — nor would any reasonable observer 

believe — that they implicated the DoD-Valiant contract.

Although Valiant’s actions may be unwise or unjust, the 

DCWPA is simply not the appropriate avenue for recourse

based on what was pled here. Were we to so hold, any 

dispute that might constitute a violation of the law, 

regardless of a reasonable belief about the nexus to a

contract, would be actionable, a result plainly not 

contemplated by the Act. See Sargent, 2020 WL 5505361, 
14 KAPPOUTA V. VALIANT INTEGRATED SERVICES

at *15 (“To expand the reach of [the National Defense 

Authorization Act] to encompass any” violation of law

“occurring within the context of a federal contract would 

stretch the statute’s text beyond its plain meaning.”). 

Congress has told us that “violation of law” precipitates 

statutory protection only if the plaintiff reasonably believes 

the violation is related to a defense contract. 10 U.S.C. 

§ 4701(a)(1)(A). After having declined the opportunity to 

amend her complaint, Ms. Kappouta fails to allege such a 

reasonable belief. 

AFFIRMED.