RENDERED: APRIL 28, 2023; 10:00 A.M.

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED

Commonwealth of Kentucky

Court of Appeals

NO. 2022-CA-0236-MR

BRITTANY ADAIR APPELLANT 

v. 

APPEAL FROM BULLITT FAMILY COURT

HONORABLE MONICA K. MEREDITH, JUDGE

ACTION NO. 20-CI-00592

BRANDON LEE ADAIR APPELLEE 

OPINION

AFFIRMING

**   **  **

BEFORE: ACREE, KAREM, AND TAYLOR, JUDGES.

KAREM, JUDGE: Brittany Adair (“Brittany”) appeals from the Bullitt Family

Court’s findings of fact, conclusions of law, and decree of dissolution of her 

marriage to Brandon Lee Adair (“Brandon”). She also appeals from the Bullitt 

Family Court’s order denying her motion to alter, amend, or vacate. Specifically, 

Brittany takes issue with the family court’s distribution of marital property and 

how the family court calculated her monthly income in determining her award of 
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monthly spousal maintenance. Moreover, Brittany argues that the family court 

abused its discretion by punishing Brittany for having physical and mental 

disabilities and through alleged personal biases and unprofessional conduct. 

Finding no error, we affirm the family court.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

Brittany and Brandon married in July 2010 and separated in July 

2020. Brandon filed a petition for dissolution of marriage action on August 10,

2020. While the couple had two minor children, Brittany is not appealing the 

family court’s order regarding its decisions on custody or timesharing. 

Brittany was a former schoolteacher but was unemployed and 

receiving disability benefits. Her preliminary verified financial disclosure 

indicated that her only source of income was $1,300.00 from disability. Brandon

was employed as an engineer for the Army Corps of Engineers, with a monthly 

income of $7,343.00. 

The family court held a trial on August 30, 2021, and entered its 

findings of fact, conclusions of law, and decree on October 14, 2021. In its 

decision, the family court awarded Brittany $700.00 per month in maintenance 

payment from Brandon. However, it stated that it would review the maintenance 

award if or when Brittany began to receive additional disability payments, returned 

to either part-time or full-time employment, or met other conditions enabling her to 
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meet her financial needs without Brandon’s contribution. Additionally, the family 

court divided the parties’ marital and non-marital property and assigned the marital 

debts. On October 22, 2021, Brittany filed a motion to alter, amend, or vacate, 

which the family court denied. This appeal followed.

We will address further facts as they become relevant to the Opinion. 

ANALYSIS

1. Division of Marital Property

Because the division of marital and non-marital property affects a 

court’s analysis regarding maintenance, we will first examine Brittany’s claims 

regarding the family court’s division of marital property. See Owens v. Owens, 

672 S.W.2d 67, 69 (Ky. App. 1984). When the division of property is at issue, the 

family court’s classification of that property as marital or non-marital is a required 

threshold task. Sexton v. Sexton, 125 S.W.3d 258, 264-65 (Ky. 2004). Indeed, 

Kentucky Revised Statute (“KRS”) 403.190(1) instructs the family court to first 

classify each item of property as marital or non-marital and then assign each 

spouse the non-marital property belonging to such spouse. Snodgrass v. 

Snodgrass, 297 S.W.3d 878, 887 (Ky. App. 2009). 

All property acquired during the marriage is presumed to be marital 

property unless shown to fall under one of the exceptions in KRS 403.190(2). 

Sexton, 125 S.W.3d at 266. In dividing marital property, the family court must 
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consider several factors, including the “[v]alue of the property set apart to each 

spouse” and the “[e]conomic circumstances of each spouse when the division of 

property is to become effective, including the desirability of awarding the family 

home or the right to live therein for reasonable periods to the spouse having 

custody of any children.” KRS 403.190(1)(b) and (d). Further, KRS 403.190(1) 

requires a family court to divide the marital property in “‘just proportions;’ it does 

not require that the division be equal.” McGowan v. McGowan, 663 S.W.2d 219, 

223 (Ky. App. 1983) (emphasis added) (citing Quiggins v. Quiggins, 637 S.W.2d 

666, 669 (Ky. App. 1982)). 

An appellate court reviews the family court’s distribution of marital 

property under an abuse of discretion standard. Herron v. Herron, 573 S.W.2d 

342, 344 (Ky. 1978). An abuse of discretion concerns “whether the trial judge’s 

decision was arbitrary, unreasonable, unfair, or unsupported by sound legal 

principles.” Commonwealth v. English, 993 S.W.2d 941, 945 (Ky. 1999) (citations 

omitted). 

In this case, the family court found that the parties owned a primary 

residence in Mount Washington, Kentucky, with an estimated value of 

$367,866.00. The mortgage balance as of October 2020 was $316,668.00. 

Further, the parties agreed that Brandon had a non-marital interest in the residence 

of $19,316.00. Thus, the equity balance less the non-marital claim equaled
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$31,882.00. The family court awarded Brandon the sole ownership and possession 

of the marital residence.

In this case, we do not discern any clear error or abuse of discretion 

by the family court. The family court correctly restored Brandon’s non-marital 

contribution of $19,316.00. However, the family court noted that while it was 

awarding the primary marital asset to Brandon, he was also required to take on all 

the marital debt, or approximately $67,789.00. Thus, in awarding the marital home 

to Brandon, the court was looking at the total picture, including that Brandon had 

sole custody of the children and would be taking on all the marital debt, including 

all mortgage payments and other liabilities for the primary residence. 

Indeed, the court was properly considering the “[e]conomic 

circumstances of each spouse” as required under KRS 403.190(1)(d) and 

addressing the fact that Brandon had carried the financial obligation of maintaining 

the marital residence and providing for the parties’ children. We again note that a

family court has “wide discretion” in dividing marital property. Johnson v. 

Johnson, 564 S.W.2d 221, 222 (Ky. App. 1978). Brittany has failed to show an 

abuse of discretion in the court’s division of marital property.

Brittany further argues that the family court erred in failing to divide 

the parties’ retirement accounts. The family court found that Brandon had 

retirement accounts valued at $77,720.00 at the time of separation. Brittany had a 
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retirement account valued at $51,668.00 at the time of the separation. 

Additionally, a significant portion of the marital debt – $31,498.00 – represented 

loans from Brandon’s retirement account. The family court declined to divide the 

retirement accounts and awarded each party their account.

However, we can again discern no error. The family court stated that 

it considered all the information each party provided in their respective verified 

financial disclosure statements and took an overall view of the parties’ marital 

assets and marital debt. Because Brittany was not equally sharing the 

responsibilities of raising the children, Brandon had a less flexible schedule and 

fewer options for additional earnings. Additionally, much of the accumulated 

marital debt was assigned to him by the court. Thus, we see no clear error or abuse 

of discretion.

Additionally, Brittany argues that the family court’s findings failed to 

address her allegation that Brandon had taken her engagement ring and sold it for 

$2,350.00 in January 2021. However, the family court did address the ring issue in 

its order regarding Brittany’s motion to alter, amend, or vacate. In that order, the 

family court stated that Brittany’s trial memorandum did not include this issue, and 

Brittany had presented no evidence at trial concerning the issue. 

Here, the family court stated that Brittany first raised the ring issue at 

a hearing in April 2021. On May 7, 2021, the family court ordered Brittany to 
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produce a copy of the sales receipt to Brandon’s counsel within fourteen (14) days. 

There is no evidence that she did so. While Brittany cites this Court to the record 

of a January 29, 2021, receipt from Genesis Diamonds for $2,350.00, she did not 

provide the receipt to the family court and Brandon until February 11, 2022. 

Thus, Brittany presented no evidence at the August 2021 trial concerning the 

engagement ring. Accordingly, we affirm the family court as to this issue. 

In conclusion, Brittany has failed to show an abuse of discretion in the 

court’s division of marital property.

2. Maintenance

Brittany next argues that the family court should have calculated the 

amount she was owed in maintenance using a $0 income for Brittany and

contended that she did not receive $1,300.00 per month in disability payments. 

The Kentucky Supreme Court has stated that “the award of 

maintenance comes within the sound discretion of the trial court . . . [.]” Powell v. 

Powell, 107 S.W.3d 222, 224 (Ky. 2003) (citations omitted). Such discretion 

extends to the amount and duration of maintenance as well. Weldon v. Weldon, 

957 S.W.2d 283, 285 (Ky. App. 1997) (citation omitted). 

To reverse the family court, “a reviewing court must find either that 

the findings of fact are clearly erroneous or that the trial court has abused its 

discretion.” Perrine v. Christine, 833 S.W.2d 825, 826 (Ky. 1992). A family
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court’s finding of fact “is not clearly erroneous if it is supported by substantial 

evidence.” Hunter v. Hunter, 127 S.W.3d 656, 659 (Ky. App. 2003) (citations 

omitted). Substantial evidence “is evidence, when taken alone or in light of all the 

evidence, which has sufficient probative value to induce conviction in the mind of 

a reasonable person.” Id. (citations omitted). 

In this case, the family court based its maintenance decision on the 

information of record before the court. Indeed, in the only verified disclosure 

statement she submitted to the court; Brittany listed her gross monthly income as 

$1,300.00. Brittany argues that her final verified financial disclosure never stated 

an income of $1,300.00. However, Brittany provides no citations to the substantial 

record to indicate where her final verified disclosure statement is located. Nor 

does Brittany point to any other evidence that her income was $0 other than her 

counsel’s statements that Brittany had informed the family court on numerous 

occasions that she had no income. Thus, the court correctly calculated the

maintenance obligation based on the record it had at hand. We affirm.

3. Other Matters

Brittany next argues that the family court “openly punished [Brittany] 

for having physical and mental disabilities.” However, she points to no specific 

family court ruling that inflicted “punishment” on Brittany other than that the 

family court held a pre-trial hearing in her absence in October 2020. Nor does 
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Brittany cite any legal authority upon which this Court can make an informed 

decision on her argument. Thus, we affirm.

Finally, Brittany argues that the family court abused its discretion “by 

allowing personal biases and wholly unprofessional conduct to interfere with the 

execution and outcome of this action.” However, Brittany again fails to point to a 

specific action or ruling by the family court upon which to base her argument. 

Brittany did not file any motions to disqualify the family court or opposing 

counsel. Further, she again fails to cite to any legal authority to support her 

position. We affirm.

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the Bullitt Family Court’s 

decision.

ACREE, JUDGE, CONCURS. 

TAYLOR, JUDGE, DISSENTS AND DOES NOT FILE SEPARATE 

OPINION.

BRIEFS FOR APPELLANT:

Phyllis K. Lonneman

Elizabethtown, Kentucky

BRIEF FOR APPELLEE:

J. Scott Wantland

Shepherdsville, Kentucky