COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA 

Present: Chief Judge Moon, Judges Willis and Fitzpatrick 

Argued at Alexandria, Virginia 

MARTIN JOSEPH REYNOLDS 

 OPINION BY 

v. Record No. 0378-96-4 CHIEF JUDGE NORMAN K. MOON 

 FEBRUARY 18, 1997 

COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA 

FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF ARLINGTON COUNTY 

Benjamin N. A. Kendrick, Judge 

 Brendan Feeley for appellant. 

 John H. McLees, Jr., Assistant Attorney 

General (James S. Gilmore, III, Attorney 

General, on brief), for appellee. 

 Martin J. Reynolds appeals his conviction for assault and 

battery. Reynolds argues that the trial court erred in 

permitting the Commonwealth to introduce evidence of Reynolds' 

alleged other bad acts unrelated to the charge for which he was 

tried. Finding the probative value of the other bad acts 

evidence outweighed its prejudicial effect, and because the 

evidence was probative of Reynolds' motive and intent and was 

sufficiently related in time and place to the act for which 

Reynolds was convicted, we affirm. 

 The victim, Hal Taylor, testified that on May 6, 1995, he 

went to the Bad Habits Grill at 10:00 p.m. in Arlington, 

Virginia. Taylor had two drinks and attempted to leave at 

approximately midnight. In order to leave, Taylor needed to pass 

through a narrow passageway between two bathrooms which was 

obstructed by Reynolds and his friend of fourteen years, Mark 
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Newell. Taylor testified that he asked, "[e]xcuse me, can I get 

by here," and Reynolds responded with a string of obscenities. 

Taylor stated that he shook his head and started to walk by but 

that Reynolds struck him in the back of the head, knocking him 

down. Taylor stated that as he attempted to get up Reynolds 

struck him in the face with a chair, knocking him unconscious. 

When Taylor regained consciousness, he discovered that he had a 

severe cut across his cheek, requiring internal and external 

stitches. 

 Reynolds testified that as Taylor passed by Reynolds and 

Newell, Taylor acted belligerent and drunken toward both men. 

Reynolds and Newell stated that after exchanging words with 

Taylor for a moment or two, Reynolds told Taylor to "get the f___ 

out of here." Reynolds said that Taylor got "right up in [his] 

face," and Reynolds pushed Taylor back. Reynolds and Newell both 

testified that Taylor, not Reynolds, then grabbed a chair and 

raised it to strike Reynolds at which point Reynolds struck 

Taylor in the face several times. Reynolds' witness, Robert 

Bainbridge, a self-employed contractor who worked with Reynolds' 

father in the construction business for ten years, also recalled 

seeing Taylor raise a chair to strike Reynolds. 

 David Johnson, another patron at the bar, testified that his 

attention was drawn to Taylor when he noticed Taylor backing into 

the barroom area, with his hands up in front of him, looking at 

Reynolds as he backed up. Johnson stated he saw Reynolds pick up 

a chair and that he, Johnson, then turned to tell the bartender 
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to call the police. Johnson recalled that when he turned back, 

he saw the chair fall, and he saw Reynolds repeatedly punch 

Taylor as Taylor moved backwards and fell and that Reynolds 

continued beating Taylor even after Taylor was obviously 

unconscious. 

 The bartender testified that he observed Taylor either 

standing still or backing away from Reynolds and that Taylor was 

holding a chair in front of him. The bartender stated that 

Taylor was definitely not raising the chair up and that Reynolds 

went after Taylor, striking him repeatedly, even after Taylor was 

on the floor. 

 The owner of the bar testified that he first became aware of 

Reynolds when he noticed Reynolds hurriedly paying his check as 

his friends clapped him on the back and urged him to hurry and 

leave. The owner stated that he then saw Taylor lying on the 

ground bleeding profusely and that he, the owner, then stepped 

between Reynolds and the door in order to prevent Reynolds and 

his friends from leaving. Reynolds then pushed the bar owner 

back and cursed him. Other bar employees and regulars jumped in 

and detained Reynolds until the police arrived. 

 Arlington County Police Officer Goldman arrived and detained 

and later arrested Reynolds. Goldman testified that Reynolds 

told him that Reynolds had assaulted the victim because the 

victim was a homosexual who had been making advances toward 

Reynolds and one of his friends. 

 During cross-examination Reynolds denied having "egged on" 
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other patrons in the bar and later volunteered that he "wasn't 

there looking for fights." In rebuttal, the Commonwealth 

recalled David Johnson who testified that twenty to twenty-five 

minutes prior to the altercation he had been sitting at the bar 

with his friend, Mark Sullivan, when Johnson noticed Reynolds 

staring at him. Johnson stated that he asked Reynolds if there 

was a problem and Reynolds responded, "[i]f you don't look away, 

there's going to be a problem." Johnson further testified that 

when he saw Reynolds attack Taylor, he commented to Sullivan, 

"[t]hat's the same guy that just stared me down earlier . . . 

trying to start something with me." Johnson testified that he 

had never seen Reynolds or Taylor before. 

 Finding Johnson's testimony relevant because Reynolds was 

charged with malicious wounding and because the evidence was 

"being offered to show that the defendant went a gunning," the 

court admitted the rebuttal testimony.1

 "Evidence of other independent acts of an accused is 

inadmissible if relevant only to show a probability that the 

accused committed the crime for which he is on trial because he 

is a person of bad or criminal character." Sutphin v. 

Commonwealth, 1 Va. App. 241, 245, 337 S.E.2d 897, 899 (1985). 

However, such evidence is admissible when it is "relevant to an 

issue or element in the present case." Id. "[I]f such evidence 

tends to prove any of the relevant facts of the offense charged 

 

 1 We assume, for purposes of this opinion, that Johnson's 

testimony is properly characterized as "other bad acts" evidence. 
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and is otherwise admissible, it will not be excluded merely 

because it also shows him to be guilty of another crime." 

Williams v. Commonwealth, 203 Va. 837, 841, 127 S.E.2d 423, 426 

(1962). 

 Accordingly, we have held that evidence of prior bad acts 

may be properly admitted 

 (1) to prove motive to commit the crime 

charged; (2) to establish guilty knowledge or 

to negate good faith; (3) to negate the 

possibility of mistake or accident; (4) to 

show the conduct and feeling of the accused 

toward his victim, or to establish their 

prior relations; (5) to prove opportunity; 

(6) to prove identity of the accused as the 

one who committed the crime where the prior 

criminal acts are so distinctive as to 

indicate a modus operandi; or (7) to 

demonstrate a common scheme or plan where the 

other crime or crimes constitute a part of a 

general scheme of which the crime charged is 

a part. 

Lockhart v. Commonwealth, 18 Va. App. 254, 258-59, 443 S.E.2d 

428, 429 (1994). "With respect to these exceptions, the test is 

whether `the legitimate probative value outweighs the incidental 

prejudice to the accused.'" Hawks v. Commonwealth, 228 Va. 244, 

247, 321 S.E.2d 650, 652 (1984) (quoting Lewis v. Commonwealth, 

225 Va. 497, 502, 303 S.E.2d 890, 897 (1983)). 

 In Satcher v. Commonwealth, the Supreme Court of Virginia 

affirmed a defendant's conviction for capital murder, rape, and 

related crimes, holding that evidence of another assault, 

robbery, and attempted rape committed by the defendant against 

another victim in the same area one hour earlier could have been 

admitted in order to prove the defendant's motive, intent, and to 
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show a "common plan, design or scheme." 244 Va. 220, 230-31, 421 

S.E.2d 821, 828 (1992). In Tomlinson v. Commonwealth, we held 

that in the defendant's trial for shooting into an occupied 

dwelling, evidence of his shooting into a second dwelling later 

the same evening was properly admitted as it was relevant to show 

the defendant's plan, intent, or scheme. 8 Va. App. 218, 224, 

380 S.E.2d 26, 30 (1989). 

Satcher and Tomlinson are distinguishable from the cases 

cited by Reynolds because in both cases the courts determined 

that the probative value of the other bad acts evidence, as it 

pertained to the accused's motive or intent, outweighed the 

incidental prejudice to the accused. Such was not the case in 

Foster v. Commonwealth, 5 Va. App. 316, 362 S.E.2d 745 (1987), 

cited by Reynolds, in which we considered the admissibility of 

evidence of two separate allegations of rape at the accused's two 

respective trials for the alleged rapes. In Foster, we concluded 

that "[t]he fact that [the second victim] had been attacked nine 

days after the offenses under indictment had no bearing as to 

whether [the first victim] consented to the intercourse." Id. at 

320, 362 S.E.2d at 747. Further, we did not consider the 

probative value of the other bad acts evidence as it related to 

the defendant's motive or intent because we found that although 

the evidence was purportedly offered to prove intent, the actual 

issue was the identity of the defendant. Id. at 323-24, 362 

S.E.2d at 748-49. Accordingly, citing our prior holdings that 

"[i]f evidence of another crime is offered ostensibly to prove 
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intent, it is still not admissible if the actual issue is 

identity or commission of the act itself." Id. at 323, 362 

S.E.2d 749 (citations omitted). 

 In Brown v. Commonwealth, the other case relied upon by 

Reynolds, a defendant was charged with distribution of cocaine. 

18 Va. App. 150, 442 S.E.2d 421 (1994). A police officer 

observed the defendant receive cash from an unidentified man in 

exchange for some unknown item or items. Twenty minutes later, 

the officer observed the defendant exchange money for drugs with 

another individual. We concluded that the evidence of the first 

exchange was inadmissible in the defendant's trial for the crime 

committed in the second exchange because it "did not tend to 

prove an element of the crime with which the defendant was 

charged. It tended to prove only his propensity to commit a 

crime, and was therefore inadmissible." Id. at 152, 442 S.E.2d 

at 423. 

 In both Satcher and Tomlinson the Court found that the 

evidence of other bad acts was admissible for purposes of showing 

the defendant's intent or motive. Similarly, here, the 

Commonwealth introduced evidence of other bad acts to prove 

motive or intent, not a general propensity to commit a crime. 

Like the evidence of other bad acts in Satcher and Tomlinson, 

here, the evidence was restricted to a narrow time frame, to 

events which occurred in the same location as the incident for 

which Reynolds was charged, and demonstrated conduct of a similar 

nature. We have acknowledged that "[a]llowing evidence of other 
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crimes to show motive, intent or knowledge recognizes that the 

more often a person commits a similar incident with similar 

results, the more likely it is that the result was intended." 

Henderson v. Commonwealth, 5 Va. App. 125, 128, 360 S.E.2d 876, 

878 (1987). 

 Reynolds' intent was directly at issue as it either 

buttressed or undermined his credibility. Evidence that 

Reynolds, unprovoked, tried to start an altercation with Johnson 

twenty minutes before assaulting Taylor permitted the jury to 

draw a reasonable inference that when Taylor attempted to pass by 

Reynolds, Reynolds, unprovoked, found a new opportunity to exert 

his hostilities. Reynolds' assertion that he was the victim of 

Taylor's hostility and that he acted strictly in self-defense is 

belied by evidence that only minutes earlier he attempted to pick 

a fight. 

 Thus, the exchange between Johnson and Reynolds was 

probative of Reynolds' intent at a specific time and place and 

thereby was not offered merely to demonstrate Reynolds' general 

propensity to commit crimes of violence. The probative value of 

such evidence as it reflected upon Reynolds' motive or intent 

clearly outweighed its incidental prejudicial effect. 

Accordingly, we hold the trial court did not abuse its discretion 

in admitting the evidence. 

 Affirmed.