NOT FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

TIMOTHY LEE HENRICUS,

Plaintiff

- Appellant,

v.
NANCY A. BERRYHILL, Acting Commissioner Social Security,

Defendant

- Appellee. No. 16

- 15347

D.C. No. 2:14

- cv

- 02699

- KJN

MEMORANDUM *

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of California Kendall J. Newman, Magistrate Judge, Presiding

Submitted September 13, 2017 ** San Francisco, California

Before: KOZINSKI and FRIEDLAND, Circuit Judges, and ARTERTON, *** District Judge.

Timothy Henricus seeks social security disability benefits for a period

* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36

- 3.

** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).

*** The Honorable Janet Bond Arterton, United States D istrict Judge for the District of Connecticut, sitting by designation. 

# FILED

SEP 18 2017

MOLLY C. DWYER, CLER K U.S. COURT OF APPEAL S2

beyond what the administrative law judge ( “ ALJ ” ) awarded. We reverse and

remand for further proceedings.

When faced with contradictory opinions, the ALJ must give specific and

legitimate reasons supported by substantial evidence in the record to reject a

treating physician’s opinion. See Batson v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec. Admin. , 359 F.3d

1190, 1195 (9th Cir. 2004). An ALJ must give a germane reason for rejecting the

opinion of a physician’s assistant, who is considered an “other source” under the

Social Security regulations. See Molina v. Astrue , 674 F.3d 1104, 1111 (9th Cir.

2012). Here, the ALJ rejected the functional capac ity opinion of Henricus’s

treating physician Dr. Hembd and his assistant, Ms. Zichella, without giving any

reasons for doing so or even mentioning it. This was error. See Garrison v.

Colvin , 759 F.3d 995, 1012

- 13 (9th Cir. 2014) (“[A]n ALJ errs when [s]h e rejects a

medical opinion . . . while doing nothing more than ignoring it.”) ; Molina , 674

F.3d at 1111 . The error was not harmless, because the vocational expert testified

that
, if their opinion was credited fully , Henricus would be precluded from all

work. See Molina , 674 F.3d at 1115

. Henricus argues that the ALJ also erred by rejecting parts of Dr. Monks’s

functional capacity opinion. We disagree. The ALJ limited Henricus to simple,

repetitive tasks based on Dr. Monks’s opinion. This limitation shows that the ALJ

intended to adopt Dr. Monks’s opinion. See Orteza v. Shalala , 50 F.3d 748, 7503

(9th Cir. 1995) (distinguishing between discrediting and interpreting a medical

opinion ) ; see also Stubbs

- Danielson v. Astrue , 539 F.3d 1169, 1173

- 74 (9th Cir.

2008) (reasoning that the ALJ is responsible for translating functional limitations

into a residual functional capacity)

. As a result, we must uphold the ALJ’s

interpretation of Dr. Monks’s opinion so long as it w as rational. See Burch v.

Barnhart , 400 F.3d 676, 679 (9th Cir. 2005).

The ALJ’s limitation to simple, routine work reflects a rational interpretation

of Dr. Monks’s opinion , and rationally reconciles portions of that opinion that

might otherwise appear to be in conflict

. As a result, the ALJ did not err in her

treatment of Dr. Monks’s opinion.

Finally, we remand for further proceedings rather than for an award of

benefits to allow the Commissioner to properly evaluate Dr. Hembd and Ms.

Zichella’s opini on in the first instance. See Dominguez v. Colvin , 808 F.3d 403,

407 (9th Cir. 2015).

REVERSED and REMANDED.