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SJC-13286

JASON DACEY vs. SANDY BURGESS.

Essex. December 5, 2022. – February 16, 2023.

Present: Budd, C.J., Gaziano, Lowy, Cypher, Kafker, Wendlandt, 

& Georges, JJ.

Landlord and Tenant, Habitability, Control of premises, 

Attorney's fees. Practice, Civil, Stipulation, Judgment, 

Entry of judgment, Execution, Relief from judgment, 

Vacation of judgment, Stay of proceedings, Attorney's fees, 

Costs. Judgment, Enforcement, Implementing settlement 

agreement, Relief from judgment. Housing Court, 

Jurisdiction, Costs and fees. Jurisdiction, Housing Court. 

Statute, Construction. Contract, Settlement agreement, 

Incapacity.

Civil action commenced in the Northeast Division of the 

Housing Court Department on February 26, 2020.

Motions for entry of judgment and for stay of execution 

were heard by Gustavo A. del Puerto, J., and motions to vacate 

the judgment and to alter or amend the judgment were also heard 

by him.

The Supreme Judicial Court on its own initiative 

transferred the case from the Appeals Court.

Paul R. Collier, III (Michael A. Weinhold also present) for 

the plaintiff.

Patrick F. Bull for the defendant.
2

Andrew Hoffman, for MLPB, amicus curiae, submitted a brief.

Richard M.W. Bauer, Patricia Whiting, Louisa Gibbs, & 

Benjamin Golden, for City Life/Vida Urbana & another, amici 

curiae, submitted a brief.

CYPHER, J. In March of 2020, following mediation, the 

plaintiff tenant, Jason Dacey, entered into a stipulation to 

dismiss voluntarily all claims against the defendant landlord,

Sandy Burgess, and agreed to vacate his apartment. In exchange 

for the release of claims and to assist with relocation, Burgess

agreed to waive rent for the month of March. Because of the 

COVID-19 emergency eviction moratorium, however, Burgess was 

unable to seek judgment on the parties' voluntary stipulation, 

and execution on such judgment, until October of 2020. On 

motion of Burgess, a judge of the Housing Court entered judgment 

in her favor.1 Dacey then sought relief from the judgment, and 

filed a motion to revise, revoke, or vacate the judgment on 

jurisdictional and equitable grounds. This motion was denied.

Dacey now appeals from both the judge's entry of judgment 

in favor of Burgess and the denial of his motion to revise, 

revoke, or vacate the judgment. This appeal presents, among 

other issues, the question whether Burgess could seek to enforce 

the parties' voluntary stipulation following mediation, and 

attempt to recover possession of the leased premises absent the

1 The judge, however, granted Dacey's request to stay 

issuance of the judgment through April 30, 2021.
3

commencement of a summary process action pursuant to G. L. 

c. 239. Where we conclude that the judge did have the authority

to award possession of the premises to Burgess in the 

circumstances of this case, we affirm the entry of judgment in 

favor of Burgess and the denial of Dacey's motion to revise, 

revoke, or vacate such judgment.2

Background. The plaintiff, Dacey, leased a two-bedroom

apartment from the defendant, Burgess. The original lease 

required Dacey to pay the sum of $1,250 per month. In November 

2019, however, Burgess informed Dacey of a rental increase of 

sixty-five dollars, increasing the total rent to $1,315 per 

month. He refused to pay the rental increase, and as a result 

of his refusal, Burgess sent a formal notice to quit via 

certified mail, which remained unclaimed. Burgess subsequently

had a notice to quit hand-delivered to Dacey.

Following the notice to quit, Dacey filed a verified 

complaint on February 26, 2020, and a motion seeking a temporary 

restraining order for treatment of an alleged bedbug issue 

within the apartment, as well as monetary compensation for 

damages. On March 12, 2020, the parties agreed to mediation, 

during which they reached a voluntary stipulation, which the 

2 We acknowledge the amicus letter of MLPB, and the amicus 

brief of City Life/Vida Urbana and Lynn United for Change filed 

in support of Dacey.
4

judge also signed, dismissing all claims. According to the 

terms of the stipulation, Dacey agreed to vacate the apartment 

by no later than August 31, 2020. In exchange for his agreement 

to waive all remaining claims against Burgess, Dacey received

one month free from rent for March 2020, to assist him with 

relocation.3

Following the voluntary stipulation, Dacey did not vacate 

the premises according to its terms, and remained in the 

apartment until the expiration of the COVID-19 emergency 

eviction moratorium in October 2020, at which time Burgess 

sought judgment and execution in an attempt to regain possession 

of the premises. After judgment entered in favor of Burgess, as 

explained supra, Dacey unsuccessfully attempted to revise, 

revoke, or vacate the judgment on both jurisdictional and 

equitable grounds.

Discussion. 1. Housing Court's authority. Dacey argues 

that, where Burgess failed to bring a summary process action 

pursuant to G. L. c. 239, the Housing Court lacked the authority 

to enforce the voluntary stipulation and award possession of the 

premises to Burgess. We disagree.

3 Under the terms of the stipulation, Dacey was required to 

begin paying monthly use and occupancy to Burgess beginning in

April 2020, until he vacated the premises.
5

Before reaching the merits of Dacey's argument, we note 

that he argues that the Housing Court does not have "subject 

matter jurisdiction" to order him to forfeit possession of the 

premises without a summary process action brought pursuant to 

G. L. c. 239. "[A]s a jurisdictional matter, the Housing Court 

has broad authority to resolve civil claims and counterclaims 

that relate 'directly or indirectly' to 'the health, safety, or 

welfare, of any occupant of any place used . . . as a place of 

human habitation,' as well as the authority to resolve all 

'housing problems, including all contract and tort actions which 

affect the health, safety and welfare of the occupants or

owners' of such housing." Federal Nat'l Mtge. Ass'n v. Rego, 

474 Mass. 329, 338 (2016), quoting G. L. c. 185C, § 3. The 

entire dispute between Dacey and Burgess arose from a civil 

claim concerning an alleged bedbug issue within the apartment; 

thus, it was a claim that directly related to the health, 

safety, and welfare of Dacey as an occupant of the apartment 

leased to him by Burgess. Therefore, the Housing Court 

undoubtedly possessed the "subject matter jurisdiction" to enter 

a judgment in Burgess's favor in this case. Dacey's argument on 

appeal then more properly may be characterized as an argument 

that Burgess could not enforce the parties' agreement because 

she did not instate an action pursuant to G. L. c. 239 when
6

attempting to recover possession of the apartment. See G. L. 

c. 184, § 18.

Our analysis begins with examining the actual words of 

G. L. c. 184, § 18. See GGNSC Admin. Servs., LLC v. Schrader, 

484 Mass. 181, 187 (2020), quoting Plymouth Retirement Bd. v. 

Contributory Retirement Appeal Bd., 483 Mass. 600, 604 (2019) 

("When conducting statutory interpretation, this court strives 

to effectuate the Legislature's intent by looking first to the 

statute's plain language"). "A fundamental tenet of statutory 

interpretation is that statutory language should be given effect 

consistent with its plain meaning and in light of the aim of the 

Legislature unless to do so would achieve an illogical result." 

Marengi v. 6 Forest Rd. LLC, 491 Mass. 19, 24-25 (2022), quoting 

Sullivan v. Brookline, 435 Mass. 353, 360 (2001).

Section 18 states: "No person shall attempt to recover 

possession of land or tenements in any manner other than through 

an action brought pursuant to [G. L. c. 239] or such other 

proceedings authorized by law" (emphasis added). G. L. c. 184, 

§ 18. Contrary to Dacey's argument, the plain language of the 

statute clearly demonstrates that a summary process action under 

G. L. c. 239, while likely the most common avenue for a landlord 

to recover possession of a leased premises, is not the exclusive

avenue for Burgess to recover possession of the apartment. See 

id. See also Serra v. Quantum Servicing, Corp., 747 F.3d 37, 43 
7

(1st Cir. 2014), citing G. L. c. 184, § 18 ("it is clear that 

'summary process' is not the exclusive means by which a 

foreclosing entity [may] seek possession of real property in 

Massachusetts"). The explicit language of the statute allows

recovery of possession of a leased premises by any "other 

proceeding[] authorized by law," G. L. c. 184, § 18, 

demonstrating that the Legislature understood that there may be 

some limited circumstances in which a landlord's recovery of 

possession of a leased property may arise outside the context of 

summary process pursuant to G. L. c. 239.

With that in mind, we turn to the particular factual 

circumstances of this case. Here, following the filing of the

complaint, Dacey filed a motion for a temporary restraining 

order. A hearing was scheduled in the Housing Court, and the 

parties were referred to a housing specialist for alternative 

dispute resolution prior to trial. At this point, the parties 

were "faced with a decision: proceed [on the current course 

toward] trial, or attempt to reach a mutually satisfactory 

agreement through negotiation or mediation." Adjartey v. 

Central Div. of the Hous. Court Dep't, 481 Mass. 830, 856 (2019)

(Appendix).

"Mediation is an informal, confidential process during 

which the parties meet with a housing specialist to discuss a 

potential settlement." Adjartey, 481 Mass. at 856 (Appendix).
8

"Housing specialists are Housing Court employees who work as 

impartial mediators in cases commenced in the court." Id. at 

856 n.17. Where the parties reach a settlement by their own 

accord or by way of the mediator's help, and it is approved by a 

judge of the Housing Court, the settlement becomes a binding 

court order. Id. at 856. See Boston Hous. Auth. v. Cassio, 428 

Mass. 112, 113-114 (1998). A judge then lawfully may enter the 

approved settlement agreement as a judgment, also known as a 

consent judgment. See Thibbitts v. Crowley, 405 Mass. 222, 226 

(1989).

While the fair administration of justice does not require 

settlement, parties freely may choose to settle. See Wong v. 

Luu, 472 Mass. 208, 220 (2015). In settling, the parties make a 

"free, calculated and deliberate choice to submit to an agreed 

upon decree rather than seek a more favorable litigated 

judgment." Kelton Corp. v. County of Worcester, 426 Mass. 355, 

360 (1997), quoting Thibbitts, 405 Mass. at 227. Once judgment 

is entered based on the parties' voluntary settlement, the 

judgment "conclusively determines the rights of the parties as 

to all matters within its scope." Kelton Corp., supra at 359, 

citing Fishman v. Alberts, 321 Mass. 280, 281 (1947).

Here, through the aid of mediation, Dacey voluntarily 

entered into the stipulation with Burgess. He agreed to vacate 

the apartment by no later than August 31, 2020, in exchange for 
9

one month free from rent during March of 2020. This stipulation

then was approved by a judge of the Housing Court, and judgment 

ultimately was entered in accordance with the stipulation's 

terms once the COVID-19 emergency eviction moratorium had 

expired in October of 2020.

While summary process actions likely are the more common 

avenue in which a landlord may recover possession of leased 

premises, as evidenced by the express language of G. L. c. 184,

§ 18, both Dacey and Burgess instead used court-referred 

mediation in the Housing Court, which this court previously has 

recognized and approved of, see Adjartey, 481 Mass. at 856

(Appendix), to enter voluntarily into a valid, binding contract

to settle all of their outstanding claims, in lieu of a trial. 

See Kelton Corp., 426 Mass. at 359-360. In the circumstances of 

this case, any summary process action following the voluntary 

stipulation would have been superfluous, as Dacey voluntarily 

surrendered possession of the premises to which Burgess lawfully 

was entitled as of August 31, 2020. See Nautican Realty Co. v. 

Nantucket Shipyard, Inc., 28 Mass. App. Ct. 902, 904 (1989)

(where lessor was entitled to recover possession of property in 

equity proceeding, "summary process proceeding may be treated as 

superfluous"). Furthermore, were we to permit the parties 

subsequently to challenge their settlement agreement, which 

already has been approved by a judge, we would eviscerate the
10

efficacy of the mediation process, as any agreement from such 

process would be worthless. See Cassio, 428 Mass. at 113 

(allowing party to renege on agreement, to which parties 

voluntarily agreed and which judge had approved, would render 

agreement "nugatory").

Ultimately, "[w]e . . . endeavor to interpret a statute to 

give effect 'to all its provisions, so that no part will be 

inoperative or superfluous.'" Connors v. Annino, 460 Mass. 790, 

796 (2011), quoting Wheatley v. Massachusetts Insurers 

Insolvency Fund, 456 Mass. 594, 601 (2010). The statutory 

phrase "other proceedings authorized by law" found in § 18 must 

be afforded substance to effectuate the Legislature's intent

behind its inclusion. See Worcester v. College Hill Props., 

LLC, 465 Mass. 134, 139 (2013), citing Selectmen of Topsfield v. 

State Racing Comm'n, 324 Mass. 309, 312-313 (1949) ("All the 

words of a statute are to be given their ordinary and usual 

meaning, and each clause or phrase is to be construed with 

reference to every other clause or phrase without giving undue 

emphasis to any one group of words, so that, if reasonably 

possible, all parts shall be construed as consistent with each 

other so as to form a harmonious enactment effectual to 

accomplish its manifest purpose"). Dacey's reading of the 

statute fails to do just that, as his interpretation ignores the 

provision "other proceedings authorized by law." See Monell v. 
11

Boston Pads, LLC, 471 Mass. 566, 576 (2015) (additional express 

statutory language may not be overshadowed and deemed 

superfluous by other express language found within same 

statutory provision). Therefore, we hold that Burgess could 

seek to enforce the parties' voluntary stipulation following 

mediation, and the judge had the authority to award possession 

of the leased premises to Burgess, as the entry of judgment 

based on a voluntary stipulation in these circumstances 

constituted an "other proceeding[] authorized by law" within the 

context of § 18.

2. Dacey's disability claim. Dacey argues that where the 

Housing Court failed to provide him with a reasonable 

accommodation for his disability, the judge abused his 

discretion in denying Dacey's motion to revise, revoke, or 

vacate the judgment.4 Dacey filed the motion to revise, revoke, 

or vacate the judgment pursuant to Mass. R. Civ. P. 59, 365 

Mass. 827 (1974), as well as Mass. R. Civ. P. 60, 365 Mass. 828 

(1974). We review the denial of a motion filed under each of 

4 Dacey also argues that where equity does not favor 

forfeiture, and where the COVID-19 pandemic negatively affected

tenants across the Commonwealth, including Dacey, the balance of 

harms is "vastly disproportionate," such that equity precludes 

enforcement of the stipulated judgment. See Howard D. Johnson 

Co. v. Madigan, 361 Mass. 454, 456 (1972) ("In our decisions we 

have followed the rule that equity does not favor a 

forfeiture"). Burgess argues that this issue is waived because 

Dacey raised it for the first time on appeal. See Boss v. 

Leverett, 484 Mass. 553, 562 (2020).
12

these rules for an abuse of discretion. See Matter of M.C., 481 

Mass. 336, 344 (2019) (review of denial of motion under Mass. R. 

Civ. P. 60 is for abuse of discretion); Clifton v. Massachusetts

Bay Transp. Auth., 445 Mass. 611, 623 (2005) (review of denial 

of motion under Mass. R. Civ. P. 59 is for abuse of discretion). 

"[A] judge's discretionary decision constitutes an abuse of 

discretion where [the appellate court] conclude[s] the judge 

made a clear error of judgment in weighing the factors relevant 

to the decision . . . such that the decision falls outside the 

range of reasonable alternatives" (quotation omitted). Miller

v. Miller, 478 Mass. 642, 653 (2018), quoting L.L. v. 

Commonwealth, 470 Mass. 169, 185 n.27 (2014).

Here, Dacey argues that where he was not given a reasonable 

accommodation for his alleged mental disability, the Housing 

Court judge erred in entering judgment based on the parties' 

voluntary stipulation. We disagree.

In Adjartey, 481 Mass. at 848-849, we held that "where a 

party in a summary process eviction action alerts the court and 

the adverse party to a disability requiring accommodation, the 

court, if it determines that the party indeed has a disability, 

shall provide the disabled party with reasonable accommodation." 

"What accommodation is reasonable must be determined on an 

individualized basis depending on the particular circumstances 
13

presented." Id. at 849, citing Garcia v. Department of Hous. & 

Community Dev., 480 Mass. 736, 749 (2018).

Following the entry of judgment based on the parties' 

voluntary stipulation, Dacey claimed that he was affected by a 

"disabling mental illness," and that the Housing Court judge's

failure to provide a reasonable accommodation during mediation 

rendered the voluntary stipulation void, such that this court 

ought to vacate the judgment against him. On this record, Dacey 

has provided no evidence that he ever "alert[ed] the court and 

the adverse party" of any alleged mental disability prior to, or 

during, the mediation process.5 Adjartey, 481 Mass. at 848. His 

submission on this issue, in his motion to revise, revoke, or 

vacate the judgment, was quite limited. Although Dacey averred 

that he suffered from depression and bipolar disorder, the 

record does not support such a claim with any medical evidence, 

or any evidence suggesting a disability that would have 

interfered with his ability to negotiate a voluntary settlement 

with the assistance of a court mediator. The record only

5 When determining whether a party requires a reasonable 

accommodation, a judge must "accompany [his or her] decision[]

with 'findings adequate to permit [appellate] review.'" 

Adjartey, 481 Mass. at 849, quoting McDonough, petitioner, 457 

Mass. 512, 526 (2010). While the judge did not make explicit 

findings as to Dacey's disability, this requirement nonetheless 

was satisfied where such findings were implicit in the judge's 

memorandum and order of decision on Dacey's motion to revise, 

revoke, or vacate the judgment.
14

reflects that Dacey suffered from a disability that was physical

in nature, one which arose from back and neck issues. This

physical disability did not "interfere[] with his . . . ability 

to appear in court," though, id. at 849, as Dacey physically was 

present during mediation.

"A settlement agreement is a contract and its 

enforceability is determined by applying general contract law." 

Sparrow v. Demonico, 461 Mass. 322, 327 (2012), citing Warner 

Ins. Co. v. Commissioner of Ins., 406 Mass. 354, 360 n.7 (1990). 

Such an agreement "is voidable by a person who, due to mental 

illness or defect, lacked the capacity to contract at the time 

of entering into the agreement." Sparrow, supra, citing Bucklin

v. National Shawmut Bank, 355 Mass. 338, 341 (1969). However, 

"[t]he burden is on the party seeking to void the contract to 

establish that the person was incapacitated at the time of the 

transaction." Sparrow, supra, citing Meserve v. Jordan Marsh 

Co., 340 Mass. 660, 662 (1960). On this record, while we can 

appreciate Dacey's averment in his affidavit that he suffers 

from depression and bipolar disorder, Dacey has failed to meet 

his burden to demonstrate that he lacked the capacity to enter 

into the voluntary stipulation, so as to render the stipulation

void. There is no medical evidence -- indeed, no evidence at 

all -- to support a claim that Dacey lacked the capacity to 

enter into the stipulation during mediation with the housing 
15

specialist. See Sparrow, supra at 332 ("medical evidence is 

necessary to establish that a person lacked the capacity to 

contract due to the existence of a mental condition"). Where 

Dacey's limited showing of a mental disability failed to 

properly alert the Housing Court judge of his alleged need for a

reasonable accommodation, in accordance with this court's 

decision in Adjartey, and where Dacey has not met his burden to 

void the voluntary stipulation for lack of capacity to contract, 

we conclude that the judge did not abuse his discretion in 

denying Dacey's motion to revise, revoke, or vacate the 

judgment.

3. Request for attorney's fees and costs. Finally, 

Burgess, characterizing this appeal as frivolous, requests that

this court award appellate attorney's fees and costs, pursuant 

to Mass. R. A. P. 25, as appearing in 481 Mass. 1654 (2019). We 

decline to do so.

Pursuant to Mass. R. A. P. 25, an appellate court may

"award just damages and single or double costs to the appellee" 

in civil cases where the appeal is "frivolous." "An appeal is 

frivolous, so as to risk [the] potential imposition of a 

sanction, where there can be no reasonable expectation of a 

reversal under well-settled law." Abuzahra v. Cambridge, 486 

Mass. 818, 829 (2021), quoting Marabello v. Boston Bark Corp., 

463 Mass. 394, 400 (2012). "[D]etermining 'whether an appeal is 
16

frivolous is left to the sound discretion of the appellate 

court.'" Oxford Global Resources, LLC v. Hernandez, 480 Mass. 

462, 478 (2018), quoting Marabello, supra.

Here, although we affirm the judgment awarding possession 

of the leased premises to Burgess absent a summary process 

action under G. L. c. 239, in accordance with the explicit 

language of G. L. c. 184, § 18, Dacey's appeal was not

frivolous, because it involved a question of law that this court 

previously had not addressed directly. See Abuzahra, 486 Mass. 

at 829 (no frivolous appeal where city's appeal "involved a

novel question of law that this court previously did not have 

occasion to address"). No appellate case in the Commonwealth 

had yet determined whether a voluntary stipulation with

dismissal satisfies the requirement of any "other proceeding[]

authorized by law" under § 18. Where the law is not "well 

settled" (citation omitted), Avery v. Steele, 414 Mass. 450, 455 

(1993), mere "[u]npersuasive arguments do not necessarily render 

an appeal frivolous," Oxford Global Resources, LLC, 480 Mass. at 

478, quoting Marabello, 463 Mass. at 400. Furthermore, where 

the COVID-19 pandemic and Dacey's allegations of a mental 

disability became complicating circumstances in the parties' 

voluntary stipulation with dismissal, we cannot say that Dacey

possessed "no reasonable expectation of a reversal," and as 

such, we decline to levy on him the sanction of appellate 
17

attorney's fees and costs. Abuzahra, supra, quoting Marabello, 

supra. Therefore, we hold that this appeal was not frivolous 

and conclude that Burgess is not entitled to appellate 

attorney's fees and costs pursuant to Mass. R. A. P. 25.

Accordingly, for the foregoing reasons, we affirm the 

judgment in favor of Burgess, and we also affirm the order 

denying Dacey's motion to revise, revoke, or vacate the 

judgment.

So ordered.