J-A11030-20

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA

v.

JOSHUA NATHANIAL DUDLEY 

Appellant

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 IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

 PENNSYLVANIA

 No. 1850 MDA 2019

Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Entered September 19, 2019

In the Court of Common Pleas of Dauphin County Criminal Division at 

No(s): CP-22-CR-0002007-2019

BEFORE: PANELLA, P.J., McLAUGHLIN, J., and STEVENS, P.J.E.*

MEMORANDUM BY McLAUGHLIN, J.: FILED AUGUST 27, 2020

Joshua Dudley appeals from the judgment of sentence entered on 

September 19, 2019. Dudley contends that the trial court imposed an 

excessive sentence. We affirm. 

The trial court summarized the facts as follows:

On February 25, 2019, Capitol Police were dispatched to 322 

Market Street, the Market on Market. Dispatch advised that 

Harristown Security was watching on camera three males, 

including [Dudley], break a side window and enter into the 

store using a brick. They then stole a number of items and 

fled the store. Capitol Police were able to catch up to them

and detain them. A search incident to arrest revealed a large 

amount of cash and packs of cigarettes in their pockets. 

The store owner and victim, Navtaj Grewal, confirmed that 

the money, cash registers, and cigarettes were taken from 

the store during this incident.

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* Former Justice specially assigned to the Superior Court.
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Trial Court Opinion, filed January 9, 2020, at 2 (internal citations omitted).

On July 10, 2019, Dudley pled guilty to burglary, criminal trespass, 

conspiracy to commit burglary, corruption of minors, and criminal mischief.1

The court sentenced him to one and a half to three years’ incarceration, with 

eligibility for boot camp, and two years of state probation. Dudley filed a postsentence motion, which the trial court denied. This timely appeal followed.2

Dudley has raised one issue for our review:

Whether the imposition of an aggregate sentence of [one 

and one-half to three years’] incarceration was excessive 

given the circumstances of [Dudley] when the sentence 

imposed at count one (1) exceeded the standard sentencing 

guideline range by two (2) months, was an abuse of 

discretion and manifestly unreasonable as the gravity of the 

offense was already taken into consideration by the grading 

of the offense and the attendant [offense gravity score]

applied to the offense was contrary to the fundamental 

norms underlying the sentencing process, where more 

emphasis was placed on the incident than on the 

rehabilitative needs of [Dudley], and failed to account for 

mitigating factors including [Dudley’s] age and mental 

health issues?

Dudley’s Br. at 4 (unpaginated) (unnecessary capitalization omitted).

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1 18 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 3502(a)(4), 3503(a)(1)(i), 903, 6301(a)(1)(i), and 

3304(a)(5), respectively. 

2 Dudley stated in his notices of appeal that he was appealing from the order 

denying his post-sentence motion. However, the appeal properly lies from the 

judgment of sentence imposed on September 19, 2019, and we have 

amended the caption accordingly. See Commonwealth v. Shamberger, 788 

A.2d 408, 410, n.2 (Pa.Super. 2001) (en banc) (correcting the caption when 

appellant misstates where the appeal lies).
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Dudley challenges the discretionary aspects of his sentence. “The right 

to appellate review of the discretionary aspects of a sentence is not absolute, 

and must be considered a petition for permission to appeal.” Commonwealth 

v. Conte, 198 A.3d 1169, 1173 (Pa.Super. 2018), appeal denied, 206 A.3d 

1029 (Pa. 2019). Before reviewing the merits of Dudley’s claim, we must 

determine whether: “(1) the appeal is timely; (2) the appellant has preserved 

his issue; (3) his brief includes a concise statement of the reasons relied upon

for allowance of an appeal with respect to the discretionary aspects of his 

sentence; and (4) the concise statement raises a substantial question whether 

the sentence is inappropriate under the Sentencing Code.” Commonwealth 

v. Green, 204 A.3d 469, 488 (Pa.Super. 2019); see also Pa.R.A.P. 2119(f)

(stating that an appellant who challenges the discretionary aspects of a 

sentence “shall set forth in a separate section of the brief a concise statement 

of the reasons relied upon for allowance of appeal with respect to the 

discretionary aspects of a sentence”).

Instantly, Dudley has complied with the first three requirements: his 

appeal is timely, he preserved the issue in a post-sentence motion, and his 

brief includes a statement of the reasons for allowance of appeal. We now turn 

to whether Dudley has raised a substantial question. 

A substantial question exists when the appellant makes a colorable 

argument that the sentencing judge’s actions were either inconsistent with a 

specific provision of the Sentencing Code or contrary to the fundamental 

norms underlying the sentencing process. Commonwealth v. Moury, 992 
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A.2d 162, 170 (Pa.Super. 2010). Dudley’s Pa.R.A.P. 2119(f) statement asserts 

that the sentencing court imposed an unreasonable sentence by sentencing

him outside of the sentencing guidelines and placing more emphasis on the 

nature of the offenses than on his rehabilitative needs. Dudley’s Br. at 7 

(unpaginated). Such a claim raises a substantial question. See

Commonwealth v. Felmlee, 828 A.2d 1105, 1107 (Pa.Super. 2003) (en 

banc) (stating that a substantial question is raised where appellant claims the 

sentencing court imposed an aggravated range sentence without considering 

mitigating circumstances); Commonwealth v. Riggs, 63 A.3d 780, 786 

(Pa.Super. 2012) (finding that appellant raised a substantial question when 

he argued that “the trial court failed to consider relevant sentencing criteria, 

including . . . the rehabilitative needs of [a]ppellant, as 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9721(b) 

requires”). Thus, we proceed to the merits of Dudley’s claim. 

Dudley contends that his sentence was excessive and constituted an 

abuse of discretion because the court gave little consideration to his character, 

background, and history, or to the minimum sentence necessary for the

protection of the public. He further maintains that the court based his sentence 

“solely on the negative aspects of the offense without giving proper weight to 

his background and character,” and the sentence does not reflect the requisite 

consideration for beginning Dudley’s rehabilitation. Dudley’s Br. at 9 

(unpaginated). He also argues “the trial court failed to state sufficient reasons 

for the aggravated range sentence especially when [Dudley] had 

approximately seven (7) months’ time credit from February 25, 2019 to 
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September 19, 2019 towards his sentence and would ultimately lose his 

mental health services.” Id. at 9-10 (unpaginated). 

“Sentencing is a matter vested in the sound discretion of the sentencing 

judge, and a sentence will not be disturbed on appeal absent a manifest abuse 

of discretion.” Commonwealth v. Edwards, 194 A.3d 625, 637 (Pa.Super. 

2018), appeal denied, 202 A.3d 41 (Pa. 2019) (citation omitted). An abuse of 

discretion occurs where “the sentencing court ignored or misapplied the law, 

exercised its judgment for reasons of partiality, prejudice, bias or ill will, or 

arrived at a manifestly unreasonable decision.” Id. (citation omitted). In 

imposing a sentence, the sentencing court must consider “the protection of

the public, the gravity of the offense as it relates to the impact on the life of 

the victim and on the community, and the rehabilitative needs of the 

defendant.” 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9721(b). 

The sentencing court must state its reasons for the sentence on the 

record. Id. “A sentencing court’s indication that it has reviewed a presentence 

report can satisfy the requirement of placing reasons for imposing the 

sentence on the record.” Commonwealth v. Bullock, 170 A.3d 1109, 1126 

(Pa.Super. 2017) (citing Commonwealth v. Burns, 765 A.2d 1144, 1151 

(Pa.Super. 2000)). Indeed, “where the trial court is informed by a 

[presentence] report, it is presumed that the court is aware of all appropriate 

sentencing factors and considerations, and that where the court has been so 

informed, its discretion should not be disturbed.” Id. (quoting 

Commonwealth v. Ventura, 975 A.2d 1128, 1135 (Pa.Super. 2009)); see 
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also Moury, 992 A.2d at 171 (stating “[w]here the sentencing court had the 

benefit of a presentence investigation report (“PSI”), we can assume the 

sentencing court was aware of relevant information regarding the defendant’s 

character and weighed those considerations along with mitigating statutory 

factors”) (quotation marks and citation omitted). Additionally, “this Court 

should not reweigh the proper sentencing factors considered by the trial court 

and impose our own judgment in the place of the trial court.” 

Commonwealth v. Peck, 202 A.3d 739, 747 (Pa.Super. 2019).

In the instant case, the trial court was informed of a presentence report 

and it was made a part of the record during sentencing. N.T., 9/19/19, at 6. 

Therefore, we presume that the trial court was aware of all appropriate 

sentencing factors and considerations, including Dudley’s character, 

rehabilitative needs, and mitigating factors such as Dudley’s age and mental 

health issues, at the time of sentencing. See Bullock, 170 A.3d at 1126-

1127. Further, the court specifically noted on the record Dudley’s young age 

and his history of recidivism in that he had two felony convictions for burglary. 

N.T., 9/19/19, at 6. The court also considered Dudley’s mental health issues 

of anxiety and bipolar disorder and ordered Dudley to continue his mental 

health treatment within the state prison system. Id. at 5, 9.

Based on the foregoing, it is evident that the trial court considered all of

the relevant sentencing factors, including the information contained within the 

presentence report, the seriousness of the crime, the need to protect the 
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public, and Dudley’s need for rehabilitation. Accordingly, we discern no abuse 

of discretion by the trial court and Dudley’s claim is without merit. 

Judgment of sentence affirmed.

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 08/27/2020