COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA 

Present: Judges Fitzpatrick, Annunziata and Senior Judge Duff 

Argued at Alexandria, Virginia 

JOYCE ELAINE CHAMBERS 

 MEMORANDUM OPINION* BY 

v. Record Nos. 1623-95-4 JUDGE JOHANNA L. FITZPATRICK 

 through 1629-95-4 MARCH 11, 1997 

COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA 

FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF ARLINGTON COUNTY 

Benjamin N. A. Kendrick, Judge 

 Bobby B. Stafford (Kathryn E. Coward; Raby & 

Stafford, on brief), for appellant. 

 Michael T. Judge, Assistant Attorney General 

(James S. Gilmore, III, Attorney General, on 

brief), for appellee. 

 Joyce Elaine Chambers (appellant) was tried jointly with 

Richard Lawrence Randolph (Randolph), and Alice Lavada Coffey 

(Coffey), and was convicted in a jury trial of grand larceny, 

credit card theft, and conspiracy to commit a felony. On appeal, 

she argues that the trial court erred in: (1) denying her motion 

to sever and (2) limiting her cross-examination of the 

Commonwealth's witness.1

 For the reasons that follow, we reverse 

 

 *Pursuant to Code § 17-116.010 this opinion is not 

designated for publication. 

 1Because we reverse on the cross-examination issue, we do 

not address the severance issue. However, we address the 

severance issue in the companion case Randolph v. Commonwealth, 

___ Va. App. ___, ___ S.E.2d ___ (1997) (holding joint trial not 
 2 

 

the convictions. 

 On the evening of July 24, 1994, Sergeant Kenneth Hutton 

(Hutton) of the Metropolitan Washington Airport Authority (MWAA) 

was on pickpocket detail at National Airport. He first observed 

Randolph, with a green garment bag draped over his shoulder, 

walking toward the United Airlines section of the airport. In 

the American Airlines baggage claim area, Hutton saw Randolph 

approach several people from behind who were waiting to claim 

their baggage. Randolph stood within inches of each person for a 

few minutes and then moved on to another person. He never 

claimed any baggage. Next, he went to the cab stand outside the 

Northwest Airlines baggage claim area and approached several 

people in the same manner. 

 When Randolph left the cab stand, he got into the front 

passenger seat of a green Mercury automobile driven by appellant 

and put the green garment bag in the backseat. A few minutes 

later, Sergeant Alan Pelleranan (Pelleranan), a MWAA officer, saw 

the car driven by appellant arrive at the U.S. Air terminal with 

Randolph, Coffey, and Linda Williams (Williams). Appellant, 

Randolph, and Williams went into the terminal. When Hutton 

arrived at the terminal, he saw appellant and Randolph exit the 

terminal and walk over to the shuttle bus stop. Randolph again 

error where codefendant's confession implicates both defendants 

and statement is otherwise admissible.) 
 3 

approached people from behind while appellant stood about fifteen 

feet away, looking around. Appellant and Randolph returned to 

the Mercury, which Coffey had parked nearby. Pelleranan 

apprehended Williams inside the terminal and brought her to the 

car. 

 Upon her arrest and after being advised of her Miranda

rights, Hutton asked appellant "why she had come to the airport." 

 She answered: "To steal . . . to pick pockets." Hutton wrote 

in his notes that: "Subject #3 [appellant] advised us in the 

interview that on the way over to National Airport from the D.C. 

Convention Center [S]ubject[] #1 [Williams] and Subject #2 

[Randolph] discussed stealing. She further advised us that she 

knew the reason they were coming to the airport was to steal 

(pick-pocket)." 

 Appellant, Randolph, and Coffey were indicted for grand 

larceny, credit card theft, and conspiracy to commit a felony, 

and were scheduled to be tried jointly. Prior to trial, Randolph 

and Coffey objected to the admission of appellant's statement, 

and all three codefendants requested to be tried separately. The 

court denied the motions. 

 On the morning of trial, when the codefendants renewed their 

motions to sever, the Commonwealth suggested redacting 

appellant's statement from "we came to steal" to "I came to 

steal." (Emphasis added). Appellant objected to the redaction 

and argued that it would negate the conspiracy theory, and that 
 4 

it was prejudicial to her because it gave the other defendants "a 

license to dump it on her to exonerate" themselves. The trial 

court ruled that "[t]he motion to sever is denied. The statement 

is admissible if it's redacted to, [']I came to steal,['] where 

it's clear there[] [are] no references to the other individuals 

that are on trial." 

 During the joint trial, codefendant Randolph requested a 

limiting instruction that would direct the jury to consider the 

statement only in reference to appellant. The Commonwealth 

argued that the statement required no such instruction, because 

it was admissible as a declaration against penal interest. In 

response, appellant asserted that redacting her statement would 

be "tantamount to instructing the jury that she is saying that, I 

came over her[e] to steal." Appellant also contended that the 

redaction would make cross-examination more difficult because she 

would not be able to "cross-examine on the 'we,' the context, who 

was there, who is included in the statement and so forth." The 

court held that the statement was "admissible if it's redacted to 

'I came to steal.'" 

 At trial, Hutton testified that appellant told him 

that she came to the airport "to steal . . . 

to pick pockets." During cross-examination, 

appellant questioned Hutton about his written 

notes, and Hutton admitted that his testimony 

regarding appellant's confession was not an 
 5 

exact quote. Appellant then asked Hutton: 

"[I]sn't it correct that your summary of that 

statement suggests that they came over here 

to steal?" (Emphasis added). The trial 

court sustained codefendant Coffey's 

objection, and required appellant to question 

Hutton further regarding his report out of 

the presence of the jury. Hutton testified 

that although he wrote "they," appellant 

actually used the word "we." The court ruled 

that appellant could not introduce the 

reference to "they" because of "the authority 

[appellant's counsel] relied on [Berger v. 

Commonwealth, 217 Va. 332, 228 S.E.2d 559 

(1976)]." Appellant argued that she was "not 

saying in that statement that she came over 

here to steal," but "that others came over 

here to steal." (Emphasis added). In 

response to Randolph's objection to "anybody 

asking any question about any of the details 

of that statement," the court told 

appellant's counsel that he would not be 

allowed to ask questions regarding the 

written statement as reflected in Hutton's 

report, and if he did, he would be held in 
 6 

contempt. The court directed: We spent 

hours talking about this and [appellant's 

counsel] asked the question anyway. . . . I 

am telling [appellant's counsel] in no 

uncertain terms that if [he] [tries] to 

deliberately cause a mistrial on areas that 

[he] know[s] [he] should not ask, [he] will 

be held in contempt to Court. [He] may get 

the mistrial but [he'll] get more than that. 

 

 On March 23, 1995, appellant was convicted of grand larceny, 

credit card theft, and conspiracy to commit a felony. On appeal, 

appellant argues that the trial court erred in (1) limiting her 

cross-examination of the Commonwealth's witness regarding her 

confession, and (2) overruling the motions to sever and 

subsequently admitting a redacted statement attributed only to 

appellant. 

 In a separate trial, appellant's unredacted statement would 

have been admissible against the codefendants under the 

declaration against penal interest exception to the hearsay rule 

and against appellant as a party admission. See Scaggs v. 

Commonwealth, 5 Va. App. 1, 4-5, 359 S.E.2d 830, 831-32 (1987) 

("[I]t is settled in Virginia that . . . a declaration against 

penal interest is recognized as an exception to the hearsay 

rule. . . ."), and Alatishe v. Commonwealth, 12 Va. App. 376, 
 7 

378, 404 S.E.2d 81, 82 (1991) ("Any statement by a party to the 

proceedings . . . is admissible as an exception to the hearsay 

rule when offered against that party."). Appellant argues that 

redaction was inappropriate in this case because it changed the 

meaning of her original statement and it failed to "solve a 

conflict that only severance could adequately alleviate." 

 In the instant case, appellant's response to Hutton's 

question about the codefendants' purpose in being at the airport 

was contested. The trial court redacted appellant's original 

response that Williams and Randolph discussed stealing and that 

she knew "they" were coming to the airport "to steal" to "I came 

to steal." This change "radically alter[ed] the meaning" of the 

statement. See Pugliese v. Commonwealth, 16 Va. App. 82, 90, 428 

S.E.2d 16, 23 (1993), and United States v. Washington, 952 F.2d 

1402, 1404 (D.C. 1991), cert. denied, Jones v. United States, 503 

U.S. 1009 (1992). Further, the limitation on cross-examination 

of the context of the statement compounded the detrimental effect 

of the redaction. Thus, appellant argues, the trial court 

improperly limited her cross-examination of Hutton regarding her 

confession, which was "the most crucial part of the evidence 

against her." We agree. 

 "Cross-examination of prosecution witnesses 'is "fundamental 

to the truth-finding process and is an absolute right guaranteed 

to an accused by the [C]onfrontation [C]lause of the [S]ixth 

[A]mendment."'" Maynard v. Commonwealth, 11 Va. App. 437, 444, 
 8 

399 S.E.2d 635, 639 (1990) (en banc) (quoting Williams v. 

Commonwealth, 4 Va. App. 53, 77-78, 354 S.E.2d 79, 93 (1987) 

(citations omitted)). "Subject to such reasonable limitations as 

the trial court may impose, a party has an absolute right to 

cross-examine his opponent's witness on a matter relevant to the 

case, which the opponent has put in issue by direct examination 

of the witness." Id. (citation omitted) (emphasis added). 

"Limitation of cross-examination is a matter within the sound 

discretion of the trial court and is subject to review only for 

abuse of discretion." Naulty v. Commonwealth, 2 Va. App. 523, 

529, 346 S.E.2d 540, 543 (1986) (citation omitted).2

 

 2See also United States v. Gravely, 840 F.2d 1156, 1163 (4th 

Cir. 1988) (citing United States v. Atwell, 766 F.2d 416, 419-20 

(10th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 921 (1985)) ("limiting 

the extent of cross-examination is within the discretion of the 

trial court and does not warrant reversal absent an abuse of 

discretion clearly prejudicial to the defendant"), and Delaware 

v. Van Arsdall, 475 U.S. 673, 678 (1986) ("[T]rial judges retain 

wide latitude insofar as the Confrontation Clause is concerned to 

impose reasonable limits on such cross-examination based on 

concerns about, among other things, harassment, prejudice, 

confusion of the issues, the witness' safety, or interrogation 

that is repetitive or only marginally relevant.") (emphasis 

added). 
 9 

 "In exercising that discretion, the trial judge may 

appropriately consider whether the proposed cross-examination 

would unfairly prejudice a co-defendant." United States v. 

Bodden, 736 F.2d 142, 145 (4th Cir. 1984) (citing United States 

v. Dansker, 537 F.2d 40 (3d Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 

1038 (1977)). A restriction on cross-examination to avoid unfair 

prejudice to a codefendant when the probative value of the 

excluded evidence is slight will be upheld. See, e.g., United 

States v. Tarantino, 846 F.2d 1384, 1400 (D.C. Cir.) (per 

curiam), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 840 (1988). 

 Regarding oral utterances "[t]he general rule . . . is . . . 

that the substance or the effect of the actual words spoken will 

suffice, [and] the witness . . . may give his 'understanding' or 

'impression' as to the net meaning of the words heard." Pierce 

v. Commonwealth, 2 Va. App. 383, 388, 345 S.E.2d 1, 4 (1986) 

(citations omitted). However, "[w]hen a confession is 

admissible, the whole of what the accused said upon the subject 

at the time of making the confession is admissible and should be 

taken together . . . the accused is entitled to put in evidence 

all that was said to and by him at the time . . . including any 

exculpatory or self-serving declarations connected therewith." 

Id. at 389, 345 S.E.2d at 4 (emphasis added). 

 In the instant case, the trial court restricted appellant's 

cross-examination of Hutton regarding the actual words and 

context of her confession. It prevented her from eliciting 
 10 

potentially exculpatory evidence or exploring any ambiguity in 

the original statement. Although the trial court attempted to 

redact appellant's statement to prevent possible prejudice to the 

codefendants, see Randolph v. Commonwealth, ___ Va. App. ___, 

___, ___ S.E.2d ___, ___ (1997), the court's restriction of 

appellant's cross-examination regarding the context of the 

statement and of the circumstances surrounding its making was 

prejudicial to her. 

 We cannot say, when looking at this record, that the error 

was harmless, as the statement was the primary evidence linking 

appellant to the crimes. Accordingly, we hold that the court 

abused its discretion, and we reverse and remand this case for 

further proceedings. 

 Reversed and remanded.