RENDERED: SEPTEMBER 22, 2022

TO BE PUBLISHED

Supreme Court of Kentucky

2022-SC-0076-TG

(2021-CA-0280)

BRANDIS BRADLEY, INDIVIDUALLY,

AND IN HER OFFICIAL CAPACITY AS 

PRESIDENT OF THE FLOYD COUNTY BAR 

ASSOCIATION

APPELLANT

ON APPEAL FROM FRANKLIN CIRCUIT COURT

HONORABLE THOMAS D. WINGATE, JUDGE

NO. 2021-CI-00789

V. 

COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY EX REL. 

DANIEL CAMERON, ATTORNEY GENERAL;

AND MICHAEL ADAMS, SECRETARY OF 

STATE

APPELLEES

OPINION OF THE COURT BY CHIEF JUSTICE MINTON

VACATING AND REMANDING WITH INSTRUCTION

Brandis Bradley brings this appeal challenging a ruling of the Franklin 

Circuit Court concerning the constitutionality of House Bill (HB) 348,1 which 

partially adopted this Court’s 2016 Proposed Judicial Redistricting Plan, 

including this Court’s recommendation that one of the divisions of general 

jurisdiction in the 31st Judicial Circuit (Floyd Circuit) be eliminated based on 

insufficient workload. We accepted transfer from the Court of Appeals because 

this case raises important questions regarding the constitutionality of HB 348

1 Acts of Apr. 2, 2018, ch. 57, 2018 Ky. Acts 255.
2

and constitutional standing. After careful review, we conclude that Bradley’s 

claims must be dismissed for lack of standing. 

I. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

In 2016, this Court issued a “Proposed Kentucky Judicial Redistricting 

Plan for 2022.” The plan recommended an appropriate number of judges 

within each judicial circuit based on the results of the Judicial Workload 

Assessment Report.

Then, in February 2017, this Court issued a “Certification of Necessity: 

Realignment of Judicial Circuits and Districts and Reallocation of Existing 

Judgeships.” The 2017 Certification “certifie[d] to the General Assembly of the 

Commonwealth of Kentucky the need to realign circuit and district judicial 

boundaries and reallocate existing judgeships” in the manner prescribed within 

the Certification. Paragraph VI of the 2017 Certification provided that:

The Supreme Court finds and declares that each section of the 

judicial redistricting plan set forth in this Certification of Necessity 

is essentially and inseparably connected with and dependent upon 

each other. Accordingly, the provisions are nonseverable and if 

any part of the Judicial redistricting plan is rejected, then the 

entire Certification of Necessity is rendered void and 

unenforceable. 

During the 2018 Regular Session, the General Assembly passed HB 348, 

which partially adopted this Court’s Judicial Redistricting Plan. HB 348

eliminated one of the divisions of general jurisdiction in the 31st Judicial 

Circuit (Floyd Circuit) effective January 2, 2023. 

After passage of HB 348, this Court issued a second Certification of 

Necessity in July 2018. The 2018 Certification “certifie[d] to the General 
3

Assembly of the Commonwealth of Kentucky the need to eliminate one circuit 

court division in the 3lst Judicial Circuit Floyd Circuit Court.” The 2018 

Certification also stated: “Pursuant to HB 348 (2018), Section 9,

implementation herein shall have a delayed effective date of January 2, 2023;

no further Certification of Necessity shall be required of this Court.”

Bradley initiated this action in Franklin Circuit Court in October 2020. 

The original plaintiffs were Former Supreme Court Justice Janet L. Stumbo

and Brandis Bradley, individually, and as President of the Floyd County Bar 

Association. Stumbo and Bradley argued that HB 348’s elimination of one 

division of general jurisdiction in the Floyd Circuit Court violates Section 

112(3) of the Kentucky Constitution, which provides that “the General 

Assembly having power upon certification of the necessity therefor by the 

Supreme Court, to change the number of circuit judges in any judicial circuit.” 

Specifically, Stumbo and Bradley contend that passage of HB 348 before this 

Court’s 2018 Certification of Necessity was procedurally improper under 

Section 112(3) of the Kentucky Constitution. 

The Commonwealth intervened as a defendant in this action and moved 

to dismiss. Then, Stumbo and Bradley filed a motion for summary judgment.

The Franklin Circuit Court simultaneously granted the Commonwealth’s 

motion to dismiss and granted, in part, and denied, in part, the plaintiffs’

motion for summary judgment. In its mixed ruling, the circuit court first 

dismissed Stumbo for lack of standing. Then, the court concluded that HB 348 

was unconstitutional because it violated the purported procedure by which the 
4

branches must act under Section 112(3) of the Constitution. Even so, the 

circuit court found Sections 6 and 7 of HB 348 to be valid under the principles 

of judicial comity, reasoning that “the Kentucky Supreme Court essentially 

ratified the General Assembly’s actions by issuing the 2018 Certification of 

Necessity.”

Bradley, but not Stumbo, appealed to the Kentucky Court of Appeals. 

Stumbo entered a notice of appearance as co-counsel for Bradley before the 

Court of Appeals. After the case was fully briefed and oral argument was 

heard, the Court of Appeals recommended transfer to this Court under 

Kentucky Rule of Civil Procedure (CR) 74.02(5). We accepted transfer and 

ordered an expedited briefing schedule. We now address the parties’ 

arguments on appeal. 

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

“We review the trial court's issuance of summary judgment de novo and 

any factual findings will be upheld if supported by substantial evidence and 

not clearly erroneous.”2 Whether a party has standing is a jurisdictional 

question of law that is reviewed de novo.3

III. ANALYSIS

The Commonwealth raises two threshold—potentially dispositive—issues

for our consideration. First, the Commonwealth contends that Bradley’s direct

2 Adams v. Sietsema, 533 S.W.3d 172, 177 (Ky. 2017).

3 Commonwealth v. B.H., 548 S.W.3d 238, 242 (Ky. 2018) (“Jurisdiction is a 

question of law, and our review is de novo.”).
5

brief before this Court does not comply with the Kentucky Rules of Civil 

Procedure (“CR”). Second, the Commonwealth argues that Bradley lacks 

standing. We address each argument in turn. 

A. We decline to strike Bradley’s brief or dismiss for noncompliance

with the civil rules regarding the form and contents of briefs. 

CR 76.12(4) provides the appropriate form and content for briefs. Parties 

who cavalierly disregard the requirements of CR 76.12(4) do so at their own 

peril. “A brief may be stricken for failure to comply with any substantial 

requirement of [ ] Rule 76.12.”

4 Moreover, an appellate court has discretion to 

either disregard a particular argument5 or dismiss an appeal altogether for 

noncompliance with CR 76.12.6

In granting transfer from the Court of Appeals, we ordered an expedited 

briefing schedule and stated that each party was permitted to submit a direct 

brief to this Court. As a result, submission of a direct brief to this Court was 

left within the parties’ discretion. Even so, upon choosing to submit a brief to 

this Court, the parties were required to comply with CR 76.12, unless the 

Court directed alternative briefing instructions.

4 CR 76.12(8)(a); see also Commonwealth v. Roth, 567 S.W.3d 591, 595 (Ky. 

2019).

5 See Dixon v. Commonwealth, 263 S.W.3d 583, 587 n.11 (Ky. 2008); Smith v. 

Smith, 235 S.W.3d 1, 4–5 (Ky. App. 2006).

6 See Roth, 567 S.W.3d at 595; see also Craig v. Kulka, 380 S.W.3d 546, 547-49 

(Ky. App. 2012) (dismissing appeal for failing to comply with CR 76.12(4)(c)(iv) and (v)); 

Simmons v. Commonwealth, 232 S.W.3d 531, 533 (Ky. App. 2007) (“[D]ismissal for 

failure to comply with the provisions of CR 76.12 is discretionary[.]”); Baker v. 

Campbell Cnty. Bd. of Educ., 180 S.W.3d 479, 482 (Ky. App. 2005) (acknowledging 

dismissal as appropriate upon the failure to comply with CR 76.12).
6

The Commonwealth is correct that Bradley’s direct brief does not comply 

with CR 76.12 in several respects. For instance, the brief does not comply with 

CR 76.12(4)(c)(iv) and (v), which require “ample” citations “to the record” to 

support a party’s factual assertions. Indeed, Bradley’s statement of the case 

totals only three sentences and includes no citations to the record. 

Moreover, CR 76.12(4)(c)(v) requires parties to include an argument 

section “with ample supportive references to the record and citations of 

authority pertinent to each issue of law and which shall contain at the 

beginning of the argument a statement with reference to the record showing 

whether the issue was properly preserved for review.” But here, Bradley’s

argument section is less than four pages long, cites only one case, and includes 

no statement regarding preservation of issues for appellate review. 

Instead of complying with the requirements of CR 76.12, Bradley sought 

to rely on the pleadings filed in the Court of Appeals. The practice of 

incorporating briefing from other courts by reference is not permitted by our 

civil rules or caselaw. This Court is not obliged to scour the briefs filed in lower 

courts to find what arguments the parties advance on appeal, what legal 

authority supports those arguments, and the factual basis underlying those 

arguments. If parties choose to file a brief before this Court, they must comply 

with the substantive requirements outlined in CR 76.12.

Of course, as Bradley points out, this action comes to us in an unusual 

procedural posture. This case was fully briefed before the Court of Appeals and 

was transferred to this Court after oral argument before the Court of Appeals 
7

but before the Court of Appeals rendered any decision. And we acknowledge 

Bradley’s likely frustration with transfer of the matter after full briefing and 

oral argument before the Court of Appeals. But upon deciding to file a direct 

brief in this Court, Bradley was required to comply with CR 76.12, and she

failed to do so here. 

Even so, “[w]hen an appellate advocate fails to abide by [CR 76.12(4)(c)(v)] 

our options are: (1) to ignore the deficiency and proceed with the review; (2) to 

strike the brief or its offending portions; or (3) to review the issues raised in the 

brief for manifest injustice only.”7 Considering the unusual procedural posture 

of this case, we exercise our discretion to overlook the deficiencies in Bradley’s 

direct brief and proceed with review. 

B. Bradley has not established constitutional standing. 

“[T]he existence of a plaintiff's standing is a constitutional requirement to 

prosecute any action in the courts of this Commonwealth.”8 This Court has 

adopted the federal standard for constitutional standing espoused in Lujan v. 

Defenders of Wildlife.

9 “[A]ll Kentucky courts have the constitutional duty to 

ascertain the issue of constitutional standing, acting on their own motion, to 

ensure that only justiciable causes proceed in court, because the issue of 

7 Roth, 567 S.W.3d at 595 n.9 (citations omitted).

8 Commonwealth Cabinet for Health & Fam. Servs., Dep't for Medicaid Servs. v. 

Sexton ex rel. Appalachian Reg'l Healthcare, Inc., 566 S.W.3d 185, 188 (Ky. 2018); see 

also Beshear v. Ridgeway Properties, LLC, 647 S.W.3d 170, 175–76 (Ky. 2022); 

Overstreet v. Mayberry, 603 S.W.3d 244, 252 (Ky. 2020); Commonwealth v. Bredhold, 

599 S.W.3d 409, 414 (Ky. 2020).

9 Sexton, 566 S.W.3d at 188 (citing Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 

560–61 (1992)).
8

constitutional standing is not waivable.”

10 This practice “conforms to the 

general understanding of constitutional standing as a predicate for a court to 

hear a case and the ability of a court, acting on its own motion, to address that 

issue.”

11

To have constitutional standing, a “plaintiff must have suffered an injury 

in fact—an invasion of a legally protected interest which is (a) concrete and 

particularized, and (b) actual or imminent, not conjectural or hypothetical.”12

The party invoking jurisdiction bears the burden of establishing the elements of 

standing.13

1. Bradley has not established constitutional standing in her 

individual capacity.

Bradley has not established that the alleged injury—elimination of 

Division II from the Floyd Circuit Court—harmed her in a concrete and 

particularized way. Instead, Bradley’s alleged injuries constitute nonjusticiable 

generalized grievances. 

“To have standing, a litigant must seek relief for an injury that affects 

him [or her] in a ‘personal and individual way.’”14 The litigant “must possess a 

‘direct stake in the outcome’ of the case.”15 A litigant raising a generally 

10 Sexton, 566 S.W.3d at 192 (emphasis in original).

11 Id.

12 Lujan, 504 U.S. at 560 (internal citations and quotations omitted).

13 Id. at 561.

14 Hollingsworth v. Perry, 570 U.S. 693, 706 (2013) (quoting Lujan, 504 U.S. at 

560).

15 Id. (quoting Arizonans for Off. Eng. v. Arizona, 520 U.S. 43, 64 (1997)).
9

available grievance about government, no matter how sincere, and claiming 

only harm to her and every other citizen's interest in the proper application of 

the laws, does not state a justiciable case or controversy.16

The complaint in this action alleges that Bradley is a resident, registered 

voter, and taxpayer in Floyd County. But none of these classifications confer 

constitutional standing for Bradley to challenge the elimination of one division 

of the Floyd Circuit Court. Bradley does not argue that she is personally and 

uniquely impacted by HB 348 as a citizen or voter. Nor could she. Any citizen 

or voter in Floyd County could assert injuries identical to those advanced in 

Bradley’s complaint. As a result, Bradley’s claims constitute generalized 

grievances. 

Additionally, Bradley has failed to demonstrate that she is entitled to 

taxpayer standing. Kentucky courts recognize taxpayer standing in limited 

circumstances as a matter of equity.17 Typical cases invoking taxpayer 

standing involve litigants suing government entities or their agents to challenge 

the propriety of city, county, or state expenditure of public funds.18 Here, 

Bradley makes no allegation that this action involves a challenge to the

propriety of expenditure of government funds. 

Moreover, Bradley contends that she has standing as an “eligible” or 

“interested” candidate for judicial office in the circuit court division eliminated 

16 Id. (citing Lujan, 504 U.S. at 573–74).

17 See Sexton, 566 S.W.3d at 194 n.33; see also Overstreet, 603 S.W.3d at 263.

18 See Overstreet, 603 S.W.3d at 263.
10

by HB 348. But Bradley’s eligibility as a potential candidate for circuit judge in 

Floyd County does not demonstrate a concrete or particularized injury that is 

personal to Bradley. Instead, Bradley’s asserted harm is hypothetical and 

conjectural. Any attorney residing in Floyd County and meeting the minimum 

requirements for the office of circuit judge could assert identical injuries to 

those advanced by Bradley.

The United States Supreme Court has recently rejected standing 

arguments under similar facts. In Carney v. Adams, the United States 

Supreme Court held that a plaintiff did not have standing to challenge an 

eligibility requirement for Delaware state court judges because the plaintiff had 

not shown that he was “able and ready” to apply to become a judge.19 Without 

evidence that the plaintiff was likely to apply to become a judge, the Supreme 

Court held that his challenges to Delaware’s judicial eligibility requirements 

were nonjusticiable generalized grievances.20

Similarly, Bradley has failed to demonstrate that she has a personal and 

individual interest in running for the circuit judgeship eliminated by HB 348 

other than general eligibility or interest. Instead, the facts reflect a contrary

conclusion. The Court of Appeals took judicial notice of the fact that Bradley 

had filed to run for a position on the Floyd District Court, not Floyd Circuit 

Court, Division II. As a result, Bradley lacks constitutional standing in her 

19 141 S. Ct. 493, 499–500 (2020).

20 Id.
11

individual capacity to challenge HB 348 because she has failed to demonstrate 

a concrete and particularized injury-in-fact.

2. Bradley lacks representative standing as President of the Floyd 

County Bar Association.

Bradley also lacks associational standing as President of the Floyd 

County Bar Association. In her Complaint, Bradley asserts that she “also 

brings this action in her capacity as President of the Floyd County Bar 

Association, [which] voted unanimously to institute this litigation on October 2, 

2020.” 

There are two problems with Bradley’s assertion of associational 

standing. First, it does not appear that the association seeking standing, the

Floyd County Bar Association, was a plaintiff in the initial complaint. Second, 

even suing in her capacity as President of the Floyd County Bar Association, 

Bradley has not demonstrated that she satisfies the requirements for 

associational standing. 

Initially, the Floyd County Bar Association was not explicitly and clearly 

listed as a named plaintiff in the complaint. The caption of the complaint lists 

“JANET L. STUMBO and BRANDIS BRADLEY, Individually and as President of 

the FLOYD COUNTY BAR ASSOCIATION” as plaintiffs. And the first sentence 

of the Complaint says, “Come the Plaintiffs, Janet L. Stumbo, Brandis Bradley, 

and the Floyd County Bar Association, by counsel, and state as follows[.]” But 

the Floyd County Bar Association is not clearly listed as a plaintiff in the case 

caption. Instead, Bradley is listed as a plaintiff in her capacity as president of 

the Association. More importantly, the Floyd County Bar Association is not 
12

listed as a named plaintiff in the substantive text of the Complaint. Instead, 

the text of the complaint only lists “Brandis Bradley . . . in her capacity as 

President of the Floyd County Bar Association.”

The circuit court twice pointed out that the Association was not properly

named as a plaintiff in the complaint. Furthermore, the circuit court correctly 

stated that the “best practice would have been for Plaintiffs to directly name 

the Floyd County Bar Association.” Of course, when considering a motion to 

dismiss, pleadings are read in the light most favorable to the plaintiff.

21 But a 

plaintiff is also the master of his or her complaint.22 As a result, Bradley was

solely responsible for naming the proper parties in the complaint. 

Moreover, Bradley cannot add the Floyd County Bar Association as a 

plaintiff by simply adding the Association to the caption of her notice of 

appeal.23 Bradley was free to attempt to amend her complaint or move to add 

the Association as a party. Having done neither, the Association is not a 

proper party in this appeal. 

Regardless, even suing in her official capacity as President of the Floyd 

County Bar Association, Bradley has not demonstrated that the Association 

has standing to sue on behalf of its members in this action. The United States 

Supreme Court has espoused three requirements for an association to 

demonstrate standing in federal court: 

21 Fox v. Grayson, 317 S.W.3d 1, 7 (Ky. 2010).

22 See Segal v. Fifth Third Bank, N.A., 581 F.3d 305, 312 (6th Cir. 2009).

23 See CR 73.03(1) (“The notice of appeal shall specify by name all appellants 

and all appellees[.]”). 
13

(a) its members would otherwise have standing to sue in their own 

right; (b) the interests it seeks to protect are germane to the 

organization's purpose; and (c) neither the claim asserted nor the 

relief requested requires the participation of the individual 

members in the lawsuit.24

This Court has not held that all three elements of this federal 

associational standing test apply in Kentucky courts.25 But “at least the first 

requirement must apply.”26 An association can have standing only if its 

members could have sued in their own right.27 “Otherwise the primary 

requirement for standing, that the party has a real interest in the litigation, 

would be thwarted.”

28

Bradley’s complaint fails to satisfy the first prong of the three-part test

for associational standing. The circuit court concluded that “members of the 

Floyd County Bar association have a ‘real and substantial’ interest in 

maintaining their current judicial structure.” But a sincere interest in 

preserving the current judicial structure of the Floyd Circuit Court, standing 

alone, does not demonstrate that the members of the Floyd County Bar 

24 Commonwealth ex rel. Brown v. Interactive Media Ent. & Gaming Ass’n, Inc., 

306 S.W.3d 32, 38 (Ky. 2010) (quoting Hunt v. Wash. State Apple Advert. Comm'n, 432 

U.S. 333, 343 (1977)).

25 See id. Recently, the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit 

questioned the continued validity of the federal associational standing doctrine, noting 

that the United States Supreme Court’s recent cases demonstrate that a nonparty 

injury alone does not suffice to confer standing. See Association of Am. Physicians & 

Surgeons v. FDA, 13 F.4th 531, 537–43 (6th Cir. 2021). But we need not address the 

continued validity of associational standing in Kentucky courts here because such an 

analysis would constitute dictum because it is “unnecessary to the resolution of [this] 

case.” Id. at 547 (Siler, J., concurring).

26 Id.

27 Id.

28 Id.
14

Association have standing to sue in their own right. For instance, Bradley is 

the only remaining named plaintiff who is also a member of the Association. 

Yet we have already established that Bradley has failed to demonstrate 

constitutional standing in her individual capacity. 

Moreover, the Association’s members do not have individual standing to 

sue to remedy alleged injuries to their clients. The circuit court noted that the 

Association’s members “have expressed concern that reducing the number of 

judges will have a drastic impact on dockets.” And, in her motion for summary 

judgment, Bradley argued that the Association’s members were “affected by the 

loss of Division II because they represent clients in criminal and civil cases who 

will lose trial dates due to the loss of Division II.” 

But Bradley’s argument is unavailing. The Association does not

demonstrate that its members will suffer a concrete and particularized injury 

based on speculative harm to unspecified and unnamed clients.

29 Importantly, 

Bradley does not argue that the elimination of Division II of the Floyd Circuit 

Court will result in concrete and particularized injuries to the Association’s 

attorney members. Instead, under Bradley’s logic, unnamed, third-party

clients would be injured by the elimination of Division II, not the members of 

the Association themselves. This attenuated injury is neither direct nor 

personal to the Association’s members. Importantly, no client or litigant with a 

29 Associated Indus. of Ky. v. Commonwealth, 912 S.W.2d 947, 951 (Ky. 1995) 

(“The assertion of one’s own legal rights and interests must be demonstrated and the 

claim to relief will not rest upon the rights of third persons.”) (citing Warth v. Seldin, 

442 U.S. 490 (1975)).
15

court date pending in Floyd Circuit Court, Division II, has been named as a 

plaintiff on the face of Bradley’s complaint. And Bradley has made no 

argument concerning why those unspecified clients cannot sue to remedy the 

injuries alleged in the complaint. 

Ultimately, the Floyd County Bar Association has not demonstrated 

associational standing because the Association is not plaintiff in this action. 

Regardless of that defect, the Association has also failed to demonstrate that its 

members would otherwise have standing to sue in their own right. Here, the 

Association seeks third-party standing to represent unspecified, third-party

clients without any argument that these clients are unable to represent their 

own interests in the courts of this Commonwealth. As such, the Floyd County 

Bar Association does not have associational standing to bring the claims 

asserted in this action. 

3. We do not consider the standing of Stumbo in this action.

We do not consider whether Stumbo has standing to bring this action. 

The complaint lists “Janet L. Stumbo” as a plaintiff to this action. The circuit 

court ruled that Stumbo lacked standing, concluding that her alleged injury 

was not sufficiently “distinct and palpable” to confer constitutional standing.

In the notice of appeal to the Court of Appeals, Stumbo is listed in the 

case caption but is not listed as an appellant in the body of the notice. The 

relevant text of the notice of appeal says, “Comes the Plaintiff, Brandis Bradley, 

individually and in her official capacity as President of the Floyd County Bar 

Association and the Floyd County Bar Association, and hereby files their Notice 
16

of Appeal. . . . On Appeal, Brandis Bradley, individually, and In her official 

capacity as President of the Floyd County Bar Association, and the Floyd 

County Bar Association, will be the Appellants[.]” Stumbo did not appeal the 

ruling of the Franklin Circuit Court regarding her constitutional standing and 

is not an appellant in this appeal.30 As a result, we decline to render an 

advisory opinion on the Franklin Circuit Court’s ruling that Stumbo lacked 

constitutional standing in this matter.

IV. CONCLUSION

After review, we conclude that Bradley lacks standing on this record. 

Bradley has not alleged a concrete and particularized injury-in-fact to confer 

constitutional standing in her individual capacity. Additionally, the Floyd 

County Bar Association is not a proper party in this appeal and has not 

demonstrated associational standing. The judgment of the Franklin Circuit 

Court is vacated, and this matter is remanded with instruction to dismiss the 

action in its entirety without prejudice.

All sitting. All concur.

30 See CR 73.03(1) (“The notice of appeal shall specify by name all appellants 

and all appellees[.]”). 
17

COUNSEL FOR APPELLANT:

Janet Lynn Stumbo

Ned Barry Pillersdorf

Ryan Douglas Mosley

Pillersdorf Law Offices

COUNSEL FOR APPELLEES:

Courtney Elizabeth Albini

Office of the Solicitor General

Brett Robert Nolan

Matthew Franklin Kuhn

Office of the Attorney General