[Cite as State v. Copeland , 2011-Ohio-6034.]



### IN THE COURT OF APPEALS FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT OF OHIO HAMILTON COUNTY, OHIO

STATE OF OHIO, Plaintiff-Appellee,

vs. DEMETRIUS COPELAND, Defendant-Appellant. :

:

:

:

: APPEAL NO. C-110120 TRIAL NO. B-0304897

O P I N I O N.

Criminal Appeal From: Hamilton County Court of Common Pleas Judgment Appealed From Is: Cause Remanded Date of Judgment Entry on Appe al: November 23, 2011

Joseph T. Deters , Hamilton County Pros ecuting Attorney, and Scott M. Heenan , Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, for Plaintiff-Appellee, Demetrius Copeland , pro se.

Please note: We have removed this case from the accelerated calendar.OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS

2 Per Curiam. 

### {¶1} Defendant-appellant Demetrius Copeland appeals from the Hamilton County Common Pleas Court’s judgment ov erruling his “Motion to Vacate a Void Sentence.” We remand this case for the pr oper imposition of postrelease control. 

### {¶2} In 2003, Copeland was convicted of carrying concealed weapons, having weapons under a disability, and six counts of aggravated robbery. He unsuccessfully challenged his convictions in appeals to this co urt and to the Ohio Supreme Court. See State v. Copeland (Oct. 27, 2004), 1st Dist. No. C-030907, appeals not accepted for review, 105 Ohio St.3d 1463, 2005-Ohio-1024, 824 N.E.2d 91; 106 Ohio St.3d 1487, 2005-Ohio-3978, 832 N.E.2d 739. 

### {¶3} In February 2010, he filed with the common pleas court a motion seeking a new sentencing hearing on the ground that his sentence was void because the trial court had failed to adequately noti fy him concerning postrelease control. On appeal, Copeland presents a single assignment of error challenging the overruling of this motion. The challenge is well taken. 

### {¶4} In State v. Bloomer , 122 Ohio St.3d 200, 2009-Ohio-2462, 909 N.E.2d 1254, the Ohio Supreme Court declared that “the most basic requirement” of the postrelease-control statutes and the court’s postrelease-control decisions is that a sentencing court must “notify the offender of the mandatory nature of the term of postrelease control and the length of that mandatory term and incorporate that notification in its entry.” Id. at ¶69. Thus, in sentencing Copeland for the aggravated robberies, all first-degree felonies, the tria l court was required to notify Copeland, both at sentencing and in his judgment of conviction, that upon his release from prison, he would be subject to a mandatory five-year period of postrelease-controlOHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS

3 supervision. See R.C. 2929.1 9(B)(3)(c); R.C. 2967.28(B)(1); State v. Jordan , 104 Ohio St.3d 21, 2004-Ohio-6085, 817 N.E.2d 864, paragraph one of the syllabus. And in sentencing him for the fourth-degree felony of carrying concealed weapons and for the fifth-degree felony of having weapons under a disability, the court was required to notify Copeland, both at sentencing and in his judgment of conviction, that uponhis release from prison, he could be subject to up to three years of postreleasecontrol supervision. See R.C. 2929.19(B)(3)(d); R.C. 2967.28(C); Jordan , 104 Ohio St.3d 21, paragraph one of the syllabus. 

### {¶5} At Copeland’s sentencing hearing and in his judgment of conviction, the trial court failed to specify the durati on of each period of postrelease control imposed and failed to notify Copeland concerning the mandatory nature of the postrelease-control periods imposed for the ag gravated robberies. To the extent that the court did not adequately notify Copela nd concerning postrelease control, his sentences are void, and he is “entitled * * * to the proper imposition of postrelease

control.” State v. Fischer , 128 Ohio St.3d 92, 2010-Ohio-6238, 942 N.E.2d 332, paragraphs one and two of the syllabus; see, e.g., State v. Truitt , 1st Dist. No. C050188, 2011-Ohio-1885, ¶19; State v. Thomas , 1st Dist. Nos. C-100411 and C100412, 2011-Ohio-1331; State v. Brown , 1st Dist. No. C-100050, 2010-Ohio-4599, ¶13. 

### {¶6} Copeland did not assign this matter as error in his direct appeal from his convictions. He instead presented the challenge in a postconviction motion for resentencing. But when a sentence is void to the extent that it was not imposed in conformity with the statutory mandates concerning postrelease control, and the

matter has come to the attention of a co urt, whether on direct appeal or in aOHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS

4 collateral challenge, the cour t “cannot ignore” the matter, State v. Boswell , 121 Ohio St.3d 575, 2009-Ohio-1577, 906 N.E.2d 422, ¶12; see, also, State v. Simpkins , 117 Ohio St.3d 420, 2008-Ohio-1197, 884 N.E.2d 568, ¶23, and “the offending portion of the sentence is subject to review and correction.” Fischer , 128 Ohio St.3d 92, paragraph one of the syllabus and ¶27; accord Truitt , supra, at ¶20. 

### {¶7} Copeland’s sentences are void to the extent that he was not adequately notified concerning postrelease control. Because his motion for resentencing brought this matter to the attention of th e common pleas court, the court erred in overruling the motion. We, therefore, sustain the assignment of error and remand

this case for correction of th e offending portions of his sentences in accordance with the law and this opinion.

Cause remanded.

D INKELACKER , P.J., H ILDEBRANDT and S UNDERMANN , JJ.

Please note: The court has recorded its own entry on the date of the release of this opinion.