J-S72040-18

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

IN RE: M.A.O.R., A/K/A M.O., A 

MINOR

APPEAL OF: V.R.L., MOTHER

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 IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

 PENNSYLVANIA

 No. 657 MDA 2018

Appeal from the Decree Entered March 14, 2018

In the Court of Common Pleas of Berks County Orphans’ Court at No(s): 

85415

IN RE: A.Y.O.R., A MINOR

APPEAL OF: V.R.L., MOTHER

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 IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

 PENNSYLVANIA

 No. 658 MDA 2018

Appeal from the Decree Entered March 14, 2018

In the Court of Common Pleas of Berks County Orphans’ Court at No(s): 

85416

IN RE: V.O.R., A MINOR

APPEAL OF: V.R.L., MOTHER

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 IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

 PENNSYLVANIA

 No. 659 MDA 2018

Appeal from the Decree March 14, 2018

In the Court of Common Pleas of Berks County Orphans’ Court at No(s): 

85417

BEFORE: BOWES, J., SHOGAN, J., and KUNSELMAN, J.
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MEMORANDUM BY BOWES, J.: FILED: MAY 20, 2019

V.R.L. (“Mother”) appeals from the orphans’ court decrees entered on 

March 14, 2018, that granted the petitions filed by the Berks County Office of 

Children and Youth Services (“CYS”) to involuntarily terminate her parental 

rights to three minor children: M.A.O.R., born January 2009; A.Y.O.R., born 

July 2010; and V.O.R., born June 2013. We affirm.

The family became involved with CYS during May of 2015 due to 

Mother’s inadequate parental supervision, deficient parental skills, and neglect 

of the children’s basic needs. The agency was also concerned about Mother’s 

mental health, substance abuse, and susceptibility to domestic violence. 

Within a month, the juvenile court adjudicated the three children dependent 

and placed them together in their current foster home, a pre-adoptive 

resource. 

The juvenile court ordered Mother to participate in parenting education, 

complete a mental health evaluation and follow recommendations, obtain 

stable and appropriate housing, and continue employment. She was also 

required to maintain contact with CYS, complete casework services through 

third-party referrals, and follow recommendations. In addition, Mother was 

ordered to comply with random urinalysis, complete a drug and alcohol 

evaluation, and follow recommendations. Mother’s compliance with the courtsanctioned reunification plan was inconsistent during the course of the 

dependency proceedings. 
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On March 30, 2017, CYS filed petitions to involuntarily terminate 

Mother’s parental rights to M.A.O.R., A.Y.O.R., and V.O.R. pursuant to 23 

Pa.C.S. § 2511(a)(2), (5), (8), and (b). The orphans’ court conducted a 

hearing on February 26, 2018.1 CYS called one witness, Melissa Evans, the

CYS caseworker who maintained the family’s case file. The witness’s 

testimony was guided by a twenty–page case summary that she prepared in 

anticipation of the hearing. CYS marked the summary as Exhibit 79, and 

sought to admit it into evidence as part of a packet of eighty-one exhibits. 

Mother leveled hearsay objections to the admissibility of nearly all of the 

exhibits, and following argument, the orphans’ court granted CYS’s request to 

take judicial notice of all but three exhibits. Specifically, the court took judicial 

notice of “all the documents that were submitted and incorporated in [the] 

prior [dependency] hearings.” N.T., 2/26/18, at 101. Of the three exhibits 

that remained subject to Appellant’s hearsay objections, the orphans’ court 

admitted Exhibit 71 and Exhibit 80, two sets of documents that outlined 

Mother’s record of attendance at random drug tests and reported the 

attendant results, under the medical records exception to the rule against 

hearsay. Id. Thereafter, approximately two weeks after the hearing, the 

____________________________________________

1 The children’s legal interests were represented during the contested 

involuntary termination of parental rights proceedings by Melissa Krishock, 

Esquire, the guardian ad litem appointed to represent the best interests of the 

children during the dependency action. Attorney Krishock confirmed that no 

conflict existed in her simultaneous representation of the children’s best 

interests and legal interests, having talked to the children and discerned the 

children’s preference to be adopted by their foster parents. N.T., 2/26/18, at 

98, 116-17.
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orphans’ court admitted without explanation Exhibit 79, the twenty–page case 

summary that guided Ms. Evans’s in-court testimony. See Orphans’ Court 

Order, 3/14/18, Document # 17. 

On March 14, 2018, the orphans’ court terminated Mother’s parental 

rights to M.A.O.R., A.Y.O.R., and V.O.R. Mother filed timely notices of appeal 

and complied with Pa.R.A.P. 1925(a)(2)(i) by simultaneously filing concise 

statements of errors complained of on appeal. 

Mother presents five issues for our review. 

A. Whether the trial court erred as a matter of law and abused 

its discretion by permitting [CYS] to submit inadmissible hearsay 

evidence, to wit: a voluminous packet of exhibits—including 

various reports from service providers, evaluations, case notes 

from third parties not present at the hearing—all of which were 

submitted for the truth of the matters asserted therein, and not 

covered by any hearsay exceptions under the Pennsylvania 

[R]ules of [E]vidence? 

B. Whether the lower court erred as a matter of law and abused 

its discretion in its evidentiary rulings at hearing and in the order 

entered March 14, 2018, by admitting Exhibit no. 79 inadmissible 

hearsay evidence, to wit: the summary of court proceedings 

outline which of the caseworker’s rendition of the court 

proceedings and casework session, counseling and of the services 

or events, all of which were submitted for the truth of the matters 

asserted therein and not covered by any hearsay exception under 

the Pennsylvania Rules of Evidence?

C. Whether the trial court erred in its evidentiary ruling at trial 

by permitting [CYS] to present hearsay testimony by the [CYS]

caseworker?

D. Whether the trial court erred in determining that [CYS] met 

its burden of proving by clear and convincing evidence that the 

statutory grounds for termination in 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2511 had been 

met?
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E. Whether the trial court erred in determining that [CYS] met 

its burden of proving by clear and convincing evidence that 

termination best meets the needs and welfare of the child[ren] as 

required by 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2511(b)?

Mother’s brief at 4. 

We review these claims mindful of our well-settled standard of review:

The standard of review in termination of parental rights cases 

requires appellate courts to accept the findings of fact and 

credibility determinations of the trial court if they are supported 

by the record. If the factual findings are supported, appellate 

courts review to determine if the trial court made an error of law 

or abused its discretion. A decision may be reversed for an abuse 

of discretion only upon demonstration of manifest 

unreasonableness, partiality, prejudice, bias, or ill-will. The trial 

court’s decision, however, should not be reversed merely because 

the record would support a different result. We have previously 

emphasized our deference to trial courts that often have first-hand 

observations of the parties spanning multiple hearings.

In re T.S.M., 71 A.3d 251, 267 (Pa. 2013) (citations and quotation marks 

omitted).

As Mother presents a single argument supporting her first three issues, 

we address those claims collectively. Mother contends that the orphans’

court’s admission of the CYS exhibits over her hearsay objection, particularly 

the case summary marked Exhibit 79, was contrary to our Supreme Court’s 

recent holding in In re A.J.R.-H., 188 A.3d 1157 (Pa. 2018). In that case,

the Court overruled the orphans’ court’s wholesale admission of 167 exhibits 

under the business records exception to the prohibition against hearsay, and 

concluded that the court’s evidentiary error could not be excused as harmless. 
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Significantly, Mother does not invoke the Supreme Court’s holding in In 

re A.J.R.-H., for the specific proposition that en masse admission of exhibits 

is reversible error per se, as that was not our Supreme Court’s holding. In 

actuality, Mother relies upon our High Court’s discussion to highlight that the 

orphans’ court’s admission of the “documents without proper foundation, 

specifically . . . the admission of [E]xhibit 79, the [case summary], is 

reversible error.” Mother’s brief at 9. (emphasis added). Mother continues, 

“it cannot be asserted that the admission of said documents was harmless 

error in that the caseworker testified ongoingly [sic] to hearsay based on the 

documents offered as exhibits[.]” Id.

The only aspects of the orphans’ court’s evidentiary determination that 

is subject to Mother’s hearsay challenge relate to the court’s admission of 

Exhibits 71, 79, and 80 because the court took judicial notice of the 

information in the other seventy-eight exhibits without objection. Thus, we 

limit our review to whether Mother’s hearsay argument has merit pursuant to 

the Supreme Court’s discussion in In re A.J.R.-H. 

In In re A.J.R.-H., the Supreme Court rejected the orphans’ court’s 

rote admission of a collection of exhibits under the business records exception, 

without proper foundation. The High Court reasoned,

Without question, the manner in which these exhibits were 

admitted into evidence in the first instance failed to satisfy the 

requirements of the business records exception. CYS did not 

present any witness in support of the exhibits’ admission, let alone 

“the custodian or other qualified witness.” See 42 Pa.C.S. 

§ 6108(b); Pa.R.E. 803(6)(D). Instead, all of the exhibits were 
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presented to the court for admission, in bulk, by the county 

solicitor prior to calling any witnesses to testify. N.T., 8/12/2016, 

at 16. There was also no testimony of record that someone with 

knowledge created any of the 167 exhibits at or near the time of 

the event or that they were created in the regular practice of the 

various agencies from which the documents came. See 42 

Pa.C.S. § 6108(b); Pa.R.E. 803(6)(A), (C). Additionally, none of 

the documents were certified copies. See Pa.R.E. 803(6)(D), 

902(11). The only information provided at the time of the 

exhibits’ admission was the county solicitor’s assurance, in 

response to the leading question posed by the orphans’ court, that 

the exhibits were contained in CYS’s files and “were collected in 

the ordinary course of business with regard to this case.” N.T., 

8/12/2016, at 18-19; see 42 Pa.C.S. § 6108(b); Pa.R.E. 

803(6)(B).

Id. at 1167-68 (footnote omitted). Thus, the High Court held that it was error 

for the orphans’ court to admit the exhibits without first establishing the 

proper foundation to support the business records exception. As the exhibits 

were not prepared by the testifying witnesses, and CYS neglected to lay a 

foundation with regard to their preparation, the exhibits were held to be 

inadmissible. 

Furthermore, as it relates to whether the evidentiary error was harmless 

in light of the concurrent testimony that CYS adduced at the evidentiary 

hearing, the High Court stressed, “the standard for finding harmlessness in a 

termination case requires us to conclude that the evidentiary error could not 

have had any impact upon the orphans’ court’s decision.” In re A.J.R.-H., 

supra at 1175. Notably, it continued, “[t]hat there may have been properly 

admitted evidence sufficient to support termination does not render the 

orphans’ court’s substantial evidentiary error harmless.” Id. 
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Thereafter, the In re A.J.R.-H. Court clarified that, while couched as 

harmless error, this Court’s practice of affirming a trial court decision on any 

basis supported by the certified record is, in reality, an application of the “right 

for any reason” doctrine. Id. at 1176. Importantly, the Court observed that 

this doctrine is inappropriate where an unresolved dispute of fact exists. It 

explained, “appellate courts should refrain from assuming the role of a factfinder in an attempt to sustain the action of the court below.” Id. (quoting 

Bearoff v. Bearoff Bros., Inc., 327 A.2d 72, 76 (Pa. 1974)). Hence, 

according to the High Court, the right for any reason doctrine “may not be 

used to affirm a decision when the appellate court must weigh evidence and 

engage in fact finding or make credibility determinations to reach a legal 

conclusion.” In re A.J.R.-H., supra at 1176. 

Instantly, the orphans’ court neglected to identify which exception to 

the rule against hearsay it invoked to admit Exhibit 79, Ms. Evans’s case 

summary. Notably, that exhibit is comparable to the “termination testimony,” 

marked as Exhibit 161, which was a point of contention in In re A.J.R.-H. 

Id. at 1162-63. In the same manner that Ms. Evans relied upon Exhibit 79 

throughout her testimony, the Supreme Court noted that “[a]t various points 

throughout her testimony, [the CYS witness] referred to her written summary 

of the case (Exhibit 161) to answer questions posed to her about the family.” 

Id. at 1164. 
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The In re A.J.R.-H. Court held that the written summary was 

inadmissible because, although it was created by the testifying caseworker, it 

was an aggregate of information from various unknown sources and prior 

caseworkers who did not provide corresponding documentation. As the 

Supreme Court noted, Exhibit 161 “is comprised almost exclusively of 

additional hearsay statements (some with multiple levels of hearsay), for 

which no exception to the prohibition against hearsay was offered before the 

orphans’ court.” Id. at 1170. Indeed, citing In re Involuntary Termination 

of Parental Rights (Jones), 297 A.2d 117, 121 (Pa. 1972), the Court 

reiterated that “we have long recognized that summaries of this nature are 

not admissible at termination proceedings” and observed that, while the 

summary may qualify as a business record insofar as it was compiled by the 

testifying caseworker, application of the exception was inappropriate because 

the summary lacked any foundation regarding the “sources of information and 

the time and manner of preparation.” In re A.J.R.-H. supra at 1170 (quoting 

Jones, supra at 121). Hence, the Supreme Court held that the orphans’

court committed an abuse of discretion in admitting the myriad exhibits, 

including Exhibit 161, under the business record exception without requiring 

CYS to satisfy the foundational prerequisites. 

For the same reasons that the Supreme Court found Exhibit 161 

inadmissible in In re A.J.R.-H., we conclude that the orphans’ court erred in 

admitting Exhibit 79 in the case at bar. In anticipation of her testimony, Ms. 
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Evans created an aggregate summation of relevant information that she

compiled from various undocumented sources. While it is possible that 

Exhibit 79 could qualify as a Pa.R.E. 803(6) business records hearsay 

exception, CYS neglected to proffer any foundational basis for the admission 

of the exhibit, or the numerous separate documents contained therein, and 

the orphans’ court failed to identify which exception applied to warrant 

admission of the evidence over Mother’s hearsay objection. 

For similar reasons, the urine screens, marked as Exhibits 71 and 80,

are not admissible under the medical records exception found at 

Pa.R.E. 803(4) because CYS failed to proffer a foundation for their admission. 

The orphans’ court’s declaration that the exhibits fall within that exception is 

woefully inadequate as it is beyond peradventure that merely stating that a 

document is a medical record is insufficient to permit its admission into 

evidence. Commonwealth v. Fink, 791 A.2d 1235, 1246 (Pa.Super. 2002).

The Fink Court expounded on this reality as follows, 

 The medical treatment exception provides that testimony 

repeating out-of-court statements made for the purposes of 

receiving medical treatment are admissible as substantive 

evidence. . . . [A] statement comes within this exception when 

two requirements are met: (1) the declarant must make the 

statement for the purpose of receiving medical treatment, e.g., 

statements relating to the cause of the injury, including testimony 

repeating statements made to nurses for the purposes of medical 

treatment and diagnosis; and (2) the statement must be 

necessary and proper for diagnosis and treatment, e.g., 

statements to medical personnel as to how the person sustained 

the injuries, but not the identity of the perpetrator.
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Id. at 1246 (citing Commonwealth v. Smith, 681 A.2d 1288, 1291 (Pa. 

1996)). 

Instantly, CYS neglected to demonstrate that the two exhibits, which 

track Mother’s attendance record and the results of the random urine screens, 

were made for the purposes of receiving medical treatment or that they were 

necessary for medical diagnosis and treatment. As these foundational 

prerequisites are absent herein, the orphans’ court erred in admitting the 

exhibits under the medical records exception outlined in Pa.R.E. 803(4). 

Next, having explained that the orphans’ court erred in admitting all 

three exhibits over Mother’s hearsay objections, a developed analysis of the 

error is warranted pursuant to In re A.J.R.-H. Preliminarily, we observe that, 

since Ms. Evans’s in-court testimony was founded on the same out-of-court 

statements she compiled in Exhibit 79, her admittedly duplicative testimony 

is insufficient to cure the orphans’ court’s error in admitting the inadmissible 

hearsay.2 See In re A.J.R.-H., at 1172-73; citing Jones, supra (caseworker 

could not testify to substance of inadmissible documentary evidence); and In 

re Sanders Children, 312 A.2d 414, 416 (Pa. 1973) (“The witness’[s] firsthand knowledge of some of the facts contained in the report cannot justify the 

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2

 The certified record is replete with examples of Ms. Evans’s reference to the 

exhibit prior to answering questions posed during both direct examination and 

cross examination. See e.g., N.T., 2/26/18, at 46, 61, 96. 
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admission of otherwise incompetent hearsay testimony drawn from the same 

report.”). 

The In re A.J.R.-H. Court confronted this precise scenario and, relying 

upon the foregoing precedent, it reasoned, 

As in Jones and In re Sanders Children, [the case 

worker] in the case at bar admitted that the majority of her 

testimony was not based on her firsthand knowledge about the 

family, and instead that she relied on reports from prior CYS 

caseworkers and third-party service providers. It could not have 

been otherwise, as [the case worker] only assumed responsibility 

for the case in February 2016, around the time that CYS filed the 

petitions to terminate Mother’s parental rights to the Children. 

Throughout her testimony, [the caseworker] regularly had to refer 

to the exhibits (in particular, Exhibit 161) to provide answers to 

questions posed to her regarding the history of CYS’s involvement 

with the family and the parties’ compliance with the court ordered 

services. No other witness provided any testimony in support of 

the above-findings made by the orphans’ court in support of 

termination.

In re A.J.R.-H., at 1173 (internal citation to record omitted). 

Since Ms. Evans’s in-court testimony was drawn from Exhibit 79, we 

cannot simply rely upon that testimony to remedy the orphans’ court’s error 

in failing to sustain Mother’s hearsay objection to that exhibit.3 However, 

unlike the Supreme Court’s ultimate disposition in In re A.J.R.-H., our review 

of the seventy-eight exhibits of which the orphans’ court took judicial notice 

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3 As Ms. Evans was the adoption caseworker, she had ample first-hand 

knowledge of the children’s interactions with Mother and their foster parents, 

respectively. Hence, Ms. Evan’s testimony concerning the children’s needs 

and welfare pursuant to 23 Pa.C.S. § 2511(b) is not tainted by her references 

to Exhibit 79. 
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confirms that the certified record supports the orphans’ court’s decision to 

terminate Mother’s parental rights notwithstanding its admission of Exhibit 79. 

Importantly, the state of the certified record, which is flush with 

judicially-noticed facts, is a significant departure from the circumstance that 

the High Court confronted in In re A.J.R.-H. Indeed, the packet of judiciallynoticed exhibits includes six sets of permanency review hearings and their 

accompanying findings of fact that provide the narrative of Mother’s progress 

between the first permanency review hearing during November 2015 and the 

permanency review hearing that preceded the orphans’ court proceeding on 

February 2018. See CYS Exhibits 19-21, 22-24, 28-30, 34-36, and 46-51. In 

sum, that evidence reveals Mother’s noteworthy progress during the first 

several months of the dependency proceedings. During this period, Mother 

demonstrated substantial compliance with the reunification plan and moderate 

to substantial progress toward alleviating the circumstances that led to the 

children’s placement. Mother’s attendance at the drug screens remained 

inconsistent, however, and she was discharged from a mental health program 

due to non-attendance. Nevertheless, Mother maintained full-time 

employment and independently obtained appropriate housing. 

However, these gains were ephemeral. After CYS granted Mother 

unsupervised overnight visitation with the three children, a precursor to 

reunification, Mother initiated a campaign of self-sabotage that culminated in 

CYS filing the petitions to terminate her parental rights. Between February 
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2017 and January 2018, Mother made little progress toward reunification. She 

began by disappearing for two months without contacting CYS or the children. 

When Mother reappeared, she did little more than maintain employment and 

attend supervised visitations, which CYS reduced in frequency and duration. 

Mother’s housing was sporadic, and she was uncooperative with CYS, her 

service providers, and mental health counselors. Mother was twice discharged 

from outpatient therapy for non-attendance, and after the program 

readmitted her, it deemed her highly apathetic and lacking a genuine 

commitment to treatment. Similarly, Mother attended random drug screens 

infrequently, submitted diluted urine samples, and tested positive for K2 (a 

synthetic cannabinoid) on several occasions.4 

In addition, Mother’s unhealthy behavior remained a prevailing concern, 

as is highlighted by her irresponsible conduct and unwillingness to address her 

issues with domestic violence. For example, due to Mother’s noncompliance 

with the terms of her participation in the accelerated rehabilitative disposition

(“ARD”) program in relation to a 2015 offense, the criminal court revoked ARD 

and issued a bench warrant for her arrest during April 2017. Likewise, Mother 

continued to minimize the significance of her extensive history with domestic 

violence, and she justified her victimization. In this vein, Mother filed a 

petition for protection from abuse (“PFA”) against her quarrelsome paramour, 

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4 Nearly all of the evidence contained in the drug screen exhibits, Nos. 71 and 

80, could be gleaned from the judicially-noticed orders.
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but she elected to withdraw the petition before the entry of a final PFA order. 

As of December 2017, Mother maintains a relationship with her alleged 

abuser. 

Having reviewed all of the judicially-noticed facts, it is obvious that no 

unresolved dispute of fact exists which would require this Court to engage in 

fact finding, weigh evidence, or make credibility determinations. Hence, the 

underlying evidentiary errors “could not have had any impact upon the 

orphan’s court’s decision,” In re A.J.R.-H., supra at 1175. Accordingly, the 

orphans’ court’s evidentiary errors were harmless.

Next, we address Mother’s remaining argument that the orphans’ court 

erred in finding that CYS demonstrated by clear and convincing evidence the 

statutory grounds to terminate her parental rights to M.A.O.R., A.Y.O.R., and 

V.O.R. From what we can glean from Mother’s scant argument, she contends 

that, after omitting the improperly admitted evidence from consideration, the 

remaining evidence was insufficient to support the termination of her parental 

rights. Mother’s assertion fails.

Termination of parental rights is governed by § 2511 of the Adoption 

Act, 23 Pa.C.S. §§ 2101-2938, which requires a bifurcated analysis: 

Initially, the focus is on the conduct of the parent. The party 

seeking termination must prove by clear and convincing evidence 

that the parent’s conduct satisfies the statutory grounds for 

termination delineated in Section 2511(a). Only if the court 

determines that the parent’s conduct warrants termination of his 

or her parental rights does the court engage in the second part of 

the analysis pursuant to Section 2511(b): determination of the 

needs and welfare of the child under the standard of best interests 
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of the child. One major aspect of the needs and welfare analysis 

concerns the nature and status of the emotional bond between 

parent and child, with close attention paid to the effect on the child 

of permanently severing any such bond.

In re L.M., 923 A.2d 505, 511 (Pa.Super. 2007) (citations omitted).

Instantly, the orphans’ court terminated Mother’s parental rights 

pursuant to § 2511(a)(1), (2), (5) (8), and (b), which provide as follows: 

§ 2511. Grounds for involuntary termination

(a) General rule.--The rights of a parent in regard to a child may 

be terminated after a petition filed on any of the following 

grounds:

(1) The parent by conduct continuing for a period of at least 

six months immediately preceding the filing of the petition 

either has evidenced a settled purpose of relinquishing parental 

claim to a child or has refused or failed to perform parental 

duties.

(2) The repeated and continued incapacity, abuse, neglect 

or refusal of the parent has caused the child to be without 

essential parental care, control or subsistence necessary for his 

physical or mental well-being and the conditions and causes of 

the incapacity, abuse, neglect or refusal cannot or will not be 

remedied by the parent.

. . . .

(5) The child has been removed from the care of the parent 

by the court or under a voluntary agreement with an agency for 

a period of at least six months, the conditions which led to the 

removal or placement of the child continue to exist, the parent

cannot or will not remedy those conditions within a reasonable 

period of time, the services or assistance reasonably available 

to the parent are not likely to remedy the conditions which led 

to the removal or placement of the child within a reasonable 

period of time and termination of the parental rights would best 

serve the needs and welfare of the child.

. . . .
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(8) The child has been removed from the care of the parent 

by the court or under a voluntary agreement with an agency, 

12 months or more have elapsed from the date of removal or 

placement, the conditions which led to the removal or 

placement of the child continue to exist and termination of 

parental rights would best serve the needs and welfare of the 

child.

. . . .

(b) Other considerations.--The court in terminating the rights 

of a parent shall give primary consideration to the developmental, 

physical and emotional needs and welfare of the child. The rights 

of a parent shall not be terminated solely on the basis of 

environmental factors such as inadequate housing, furnishings, 

income, clothing and medical care if found to be beyond the 

control of the parent. With respect to any petition filed pursuant 

to subsection (a)(1), (6) or (8), the court shall not consider any 

efforts by the parent to remedy the conditions described therein 

which are first initiated subsequent to the giving of notice of the 

filing of the petition.

23 Pa.C.S. § 2511(a)(1), (2), (5), (8), and (b).

First, it is a well ensconced legal principle that appellate courts do not 

review sufficiency claims on a diminished record. See e.g., D’Alessandro v. 

Pennsylvania State Police, 937 A.2d 404, 410 (Pa. 2007) (plurality) 

(quoting Commonwealth v. Lovette, 450 A.2d 975, 977 (Pa. 1982)) (“A 

sufficiency claim will not be reviewed on a diminished record, ‘but rather on 

the evidence actually presented to the finder of fact rendering the questioned 

verdict.’”); Commonwealth v. Weaver, 76 A.3d 562, 569 (Pa.Super. 2013)

(law is clear that we are required to consider all evidence that was actually 

received without consideration as to admissibility of evidence or whether 
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court’s evidentiary rulings were correct). Thus, Mother’s predicate contention 

that we must disregard the improperly admitted evidence is baseless. 

Moreover, as outlined supra, and for the reasons cogently articulated in 

the orphan’s court opinion, CYS adduced ample evidence to sustain its burden 

of proof. Thus, after a thorough review of the certified record, the parties’

briefs and the pertinent law, we affirm the March 14, 2018 decrees on the 

basis of the well-reasoned trial court opinion entered on May 14, 2018, by the 

distinguished Judge Benjamin Nevius.

Decrees affirmed.

Judge Shogan joins the memorandum.

Judge Kunselman files a concurring statement.

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date:5/20/2019
Received 6/18/2018 12:49:59 PCirculated 04/09/2019 10:10 AM M Superior Court Middle District 

INRE: 

M.A.0.-R. 

A.Y.0.-R. 

V.0.-R. 

Filed 6/18/2018 12:49:00 PM Superior Court Middle District 

657 MDA 2018 

OF BERKS COUNTY, PENNSYLVANIA 

ORPHANS' COURT DIVISION 

No. 85415 

No. 85416 

No. 85417 

Jennifer L. Grimes, Attorney for BCCYS, Petjti ner'/Appellee 

Melissa Krishock, Guardian Ad Litem 

Kathleen Dautrich, Attorney for N.R., Mother 

Q;plNION, J, Benjamin Nevius, J. Dated: May 11, 2018 

This matter arises from separate petitions (the "Petitions") filed by Berks County 

Children and Youth Services ("BCCYS'') to terminate the parental rights of V.R.-L. ("Mother"), 

M.0.-M. ("Father"), and/or anyone else claiming paternity of three minor children, M.A.0.-R. 

(born 2009), A.Y.0.-R. (born 2010), and V.0.-R. (born 2013) (collectively, the "Children"), 

pursuant to Section 2511 of the Adoption Act, 23 Pa. C.S.A. §§ 2101, et seq. (the "Act"). 

On March 31, 2017, BCCYS filed a Petitions for Involuntarily Termination of Parental 

Rights relative to Mother, Father, and/or anyone else claiming paternity of the Children (the 

"Petitions") pursuant to Section 2511 of the Act. On February 26, 2018, the Court presided over 

a hearing on BCCYS's Petitions. Mother was present in the courtroom with her court-appointed 

attorney. Father did not attend and, in fact, has not participated in any proceedings in 

dependency or before the Orphans' Court relative to the Children. 

On February 26, 2018, the Court entered separate Orders terminating the parental rights 

of Father and/or anyone else claiming paternity of the Children. On March 14, 2018, and much 

careful consideration, the Court entered a separate Final Decree terminating the parental rights of 

Mother, finding that BCCYS had established its burden by clear and convincing evidence. 

1 On 

I Father has not appealed the Court's Final Decree terminating his parental rights. Accordingly, this Opinion 

addresses Mother's appeal and the termination of her parental rights, only. 
April 13, 2018, Mother filed a Notice of Appeal (the "Notice") and a Statement of Matters 

Complained of on Appeal (the "Statement"), raising five issues for consideration on appeal: 

(1) The trial court erred as a matter of law and abused its 

discretion by permitting the Appellee BCCYS to submit 

inadmissible hearsay evidence, to wit: a voluminous packet 

of exhibits-including various reports from service 

providers, evaluations, case notes from third parties not 

present at the hearing-all which were submitted for the 

truth of the matters asserted therein, and not covered by any 

hearsay exception under the Pennsylvania Rules of 

Evidence. 

(2) The lower court erred as a matter of law and abused its 

discretion in its evidentiary rulings at hearing and in the 

Order entered March 14, 2018, by admitting Exhibit No 79, 

inadmissible hearsay, to wit: the summary of court 

proceedings outline which of the caseworker's rendition of 

the court proceedings and casework session, counseling and 

of the services or events, all of which were submitted for 

the truth of the matters asserted therein and not covered by 

any hearsay exception und the Pennsylvania Rules of 

Evidence. 

(3) The trial court erred in its evidentiary ruling at trial by 

permitting BCCYS to present hearsay testimony by the 

BCCYS caseworker. 

( 4) The Trial court erred in determining that the Berks County 

Office of Children and Youth Services (BCCYS) met its 

burden of proving by clear and convincing evidence that 

the statutory grounds for termination in 23 Pa.C.S.A §2511 

has been met. 

(5) The trial court erred in determining that BCCYS met its 

burden of proving by clear and convincing evidence that 

termination best meets the needs and welfare of the child as 

required by 23 Pa C.S.A §251 l(b). 

[See Statement, p. I]. 

In sum, Mother argues that the Court made a number of mistaken evidentiary rulings 

pertaining to hearsay, and that the Court erred in finding that (a) parental rights should be 

2 
terminated, and (b) that termination best meets the needs and welfare of the Children. [Id., pp. 1- 

2). Mother failed to request a transcript of the proceedings. This Opinion follows.

2 

WAIVER 

As an initial matter, it is well settled that an appellate court may only consider facts 

which have been duly certified in the record on appeal. See Murphy v. Murphy, 599 A.2d 647, 

652 (Pa. Super. Ct. l 99 l ). Furthermore, the appellant is responsible for providing the Superior 

Court with the complete record for review. See Com. v. Feflie, 581 A.2d 636, 640 (Pa. Super. 

Ct. l 993). «where a claim is dependent upon materials not provided in the certified record, the 

claim is considered waived." Com. v. Proetto, 771 A.2d 823, 834 (Pa .. Super. Ct. 2001).)) 

Here, a review of the issues raised by the Mother is dependent upon a transcript of the 

proceedings that documents both proper preservation of issues and the bases for the Court's 

decision to terminate parental rights. Mother's failure to have the hearing transcribed for official 

use should result in a waiver of all issues on appeal. 

BASES FOR TERMINATION 

Substantively, the Court terminated Mother's parental rights based upon her failure to 

comply with Court-ordered services, treatment, and testing. BCCYS established by clear and 

convincing evidence that, despite numerous chances> Mother failed to recognize or remedy 

unsafe conditions presenting a danger to herself and to her Children. 

2 "The standard of review in termination of parental rights cases requires appellate courts to accept the findings of 

fact and credibility determinations of the trial court if they are supported by the record. If the factual findings are 

supported, appellate courts review to determine if the trial court made an error of law or abused .its discretion. A 

decision may be reversed for an abuse of discretion only upon demonstration of manifest unreasonableness, 

partiality, prejudice, bias, or ill-will. The trial court's decision, however, should not be reversed merely because the 

record would support a different result. We have previously emphasized our deference to trial courts that often have 

first-hand observations of the parties spanning multiple hearings." In re Adoption of A.C., 162 A.3d 1123, 1128 

(2017) (citing In re T.S.M, 71 A.3d 251, 267 (Pa. 2013)); see also In re Adoption o/S.P., 47 A.3d 817, 826-27 (Pa. 

2012) ("[E]ven where the facts could support an opposite result, as is often the case in . . termination cases, an 

appellate court must resist the urge to second guess the trial court and impose.Its own credibility determinations and 

judgment"). 

3 
On May 26, 2015, the Hon. Maryann Ullman of the Court of the Berks County Court of 

Common Pleas entered an Order adjudicating the Children dependent, requiring that Mother 

comply with certain services, treatment, and testing. The Court expanded that list of obligations 

through subsequent Orders entered in connection with the dependency proceedings as a result of 

Mother's continued failure to make suitable progress. Among other things, the Court ordered 

Mother to: 

(a) Undergo a mental health evaluation and comply with any 

treatment recommendations; 

(b) Establish and maintain suitable and appropriate housing and 

mcome; 

(c) Notify BCCYS of changes in income or residence; 

(d) Participate in casework sessions through BCCYS and 

comply with any recommendations; 

(e) Undergo a drug and alcohol evaluation and comply with any 

treatment recommendations; and 

(f) Undergo random urinalysis. 

Since May 2015, Mother has failed to satisfactorily participate in these Court-ordered 

services, among others. For example, Mother inconsistently attended monthly casework 

meetings with BCCYS and failed to comply with recommendations. BCCYS caseworker, Sara 

Evans ("Ms. Evans"), indicated that Mother initially appeared motivated to participate in 

programs and casework sessions, but that Mother failed to follow through. Ms. Evans testified 

that Mother would pretend as though she was hearing about Court-ordered services for the first 

time each time that she met with BCCYS. 

Recently, third-party service provider, Justice Works Youth Care ("Justice Works"), 

reported to BCCYS that Mother failed to appear for four sessions in December 2017, at which 

time BCCYS had arranged for weekly meetings. Further, Mother promised to provide 

information to BCCYS regarding her mental health treatment and providers, but failed to do so. 

Ultimately, Justice Works discharged Mother for non-compliance and minimal progress. 

4 
With regard to stable housing, Mother moved nine times over the course of three years, 

mostly residing with family and friends. She frequently failed to advise BCCYS of her changes 

in residence. In fact, BCCYS was unaware where Mother was residing immediately prior to the 

hearing on the Petitions. As recently as July 2017 (months after BCCYS filed the Petitions to 

terminate her parental rights), Mother averred to a service provider in an application for housing 

assistance that she was homeless, living out of a car, and without food. Further, Ms. Evans 

reported that Mother changed her telephone numbers numerous times without informing 

BCCYS, making it nigh impossible for BCCYS to contact and remind Mother about 

appointments and other obligations. 

Although Mother, for the most part, consistently participated in visitation with the 

Children, she engaged in conduct for a period of time that Ms. Evans described as "selfsabotage." Specifically, in January 2017, BCCYS was working toward overnight visitation with 

Mother, with the goal of reunification. Mother, however, disappeared and ceased attending 

visitation completely. One month later, in February 2017, Mother contacted BCCYS and 

advised that she was "hiding out" to avoid contact with an ex-paramour who had assaulted 

Mother. Mother revealed that she was in an abusive relationship during this period and did not 

want the Children to see her. Ms. Evans also reported that Mother admitted to frequent 

substance abuse - K2 - during this period. 

With regard to substance abuse, Mother failed to acknowledge, much less properly 

address, these issues or comply with Court-ordered treatment and testing. Ms. Evans indicated 

that, since 2015, Mother engaged and disengaged in drug and alcohol treatment/counseling 

numerous times. Throughout her treatment, counselors reported that Mother appeared 

"ambivalent>' and unmotivated to participate in treatment. Mother appeared to be "in denial" and 

5 
"minimized" her issues. As a result, Mother's counselors discharged her for non-compliance 

multiple times. In January of this year- 10 months after BCCYS filed its Petitions to terminate 

Mother's parental rights - she sought to reengage in drug and alcohol counseling. 

With regard to testing, Mother missed 66 of her 118 scheduled screenings, had a number 

of diluted screenings, and tested positive seven times for K2. The most recent positive test came 

in July 2017, more than three months after BCCYS filed the Petitions. As Ms. Evans observed 

during the hearing on the Petitions, this was the same period during which Mother produced a 

number of diluted urine samples. To this date, concerns remain about Mother's sobriety, as she 

provided four diluted samples and failed to attend four screenings immediately prior to the 

termination hearing from December 19, 2017 through February 20, 2018. 

Additionally, Mother had been required to participate in mental health and domestic 

violence evaluations, as well as participate in any counseling recommended as a result of those 

evaluations. Although Mother purported to participate in some individual mental health therapy, 

Ms. Evans and others were unable to confirm what services Mother participated in because 

Mother did not provide the necessary information to BCCYS. 

With regard to domestic violence concerns, as indicated above, in early 2017, Mother 

advised BCCYS that she was "hiding out'tto escape an abusive relationship. The alleged abuser 

resided with Mother at the time. BCCYS identified this concern, among others, during the 

dependency proceedings, and the Court required Mother to participate in domestic violence 

counseling. Although Mother attended her domestic violence evaluation and began treatment, 

she shortly thereafter started failing to appear for sessions. 'As a result, in January '2018, 

Mother's domestic violence counselor discharged her from treatment. In conversations with Ms. 

6 
Evans about the situation, Mother minimized the risk and failed to recognize the dangers of an 

abuser living in the home with her Children. 

While all of this was going on with Mother, the Children had been bonding and attaching 

with their foster parents, most notably looking at them as being their parents. Although Mother 

has a bond with the Children, and although she clearly loves them very much, all evidence points 

toward the best interests of the Children being served by remaining with their resource family. 

Ms. Evans testified the Children are doing well in their placement and that they have bonded 

with their foster parents. Further, Ms. Evans testified that the Children expressed their desire to 

remain in the care of their foster parents. Ms. Evans observed the Children interacting with the 

foster parents, and her observations were consistent with the desires expressed to her by the 

Children. Ms. Evans observed the Children telling the foster mother that they loved her, and she 

noted that the Children are clearly bonded with the foster parents - they look to their foster 

parents for love, safety, and support. 

Section 2511 of the Act provides, among other things, that parental rights in regard to a 

child may be terminated if/when: 

(I) The parent by conduct continuing for a period of at least six 

months immediately preceding the filing of the petition 

either bas evidenced a settled purpose of relinquishing 

parental claim to a child or has refused or failed to perform 

parental duties; 

(2) The repeated and continued incapacity, abuse, neglect or 

refusal of the parent has caused the Children to be without 

essential parental care, control or subsistence necessary for 

his physical or mental well-being and the conditions and 

causes of the incapacity, abuse, neglect or refusal cannot or · 

will not be remedied by the parent; 

(5) The Children has been removed from the care of the parent 

by the court or under a voluntary agreement with an agency 

for a period of at least six months, the conditions which led 

7 
to the removal or placement of the Children continue to 

exist, the parent cannot or will not remedy those conditions 

within a reasonable period of time, the services or 

assistance reasonably available to the parent are not likely 

to remedy the conditions which led to the removal or 

placement of the Children within a reasonable period of 

time and termination of the parental rights would best serve 

the needs and welfare of the Children; and 

(8) The Children has been removed from the care of the parent 

by the court or under a voluntary agreement with an 

agency, twelve months or more have elapsed from the date 

of removal or placement, the conditions which led to the 

removal or placement of the Children continue to exist and 

termination of parental rights would best serve the needs 

and welfare of the Children." 

�ee 23 Pa. C.S.A. § 211 l(a)(l), (2), (5), and (8). 

Section 2511 further provides that, "[w]ith respect to any petition filed pursuant to (a)(l), 

(6), or (8), the court shall not consider any efforts by the parent to remedy the conditions 

described therein which are first initiated subsequent to the giving of notice of the filing of the 

petition." 23 Pa. C.S.A. § 251 l(b). · "Parental rights may not be preserved by waiting for some 

more suitable financial circumstance or convenient time for the performance of parental duties 

and responsibilities." In re: D.J.S., 737 A.2d 283, 287 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1999). The long-standing 

law of the Commonwealth is that the inability of a parent to perform parental duties makes him 

or her just as parentally unfit as a parent who refuses to perform these duties. In re: B.L. W., 843 

A.2d 380, 388 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2004). 

Regardless of inability or refusal, once a parent demonstrates a failure to fulfill his or her 

parental duties,' the child's right to fulfillment of his or her potential in a permanent, healthy, 

3 There is no simple or easy definition of parental duties. Parental duty is best understood in relation to the needs of 

a child. A child needs love, protection, guidance, and support. These needs, physical and emotional, cannot be met 

by a merely passive interest in the development of the child. Thus, this court has held that the parental obligation is a 

positive duty which requires affirmative performance. In re Adoption of A. C., 162 A.3d at 1129. 

8 
safe environment with proper parenting supersedes the parent's basic constitutional right to 

custody and rearing of the child. Id. In terminating the rights of a parent, the court must give 

"primary consideration to the developmental, physical, and emotional needs and welfare of the 

[c [hildren." 23 Pa. C.S.A. §2511 (b ). 

The Court can appreciate that Mother cares for the Children. That said, given numerous 

opportunities, Mother has shown a propensity for beginning services but failing to follow 

through. Mother began but failed to complete domestic violence counseling. Mother began but 

foiled to complete drug and alcohol treatment. Mother began but failed to complete individual 

mental health counseling. Mother began, but failed to participate in casework services. 

Based upon Ms. Evans's testimony, the Children are bonded with the foster parents. 

Terminating Mother's parental rights will not detrimentally affect the Children. In fact, the 

foster parents are resources who can continue to meet the Children's developmental, physical, 

and emotional needs. It is, therefore, in the Children's best interest to continue in the care of 

their foster parents. 

Mother was unable or unwilling to comply with Court-ordered services, and to make the 

changes necessary to provide for a safe, healthy, and permanent living environment for the 

Children. After much reflection on the matter, and after careful consideration, the Court 

terminated Mother's parental rights to offer the Children the permanency they need. The 

Children deserve stability, permanency, and an opportunity to grow up in an environment free of 

the disruption and turmoil surrounding the dependency process. 

Here, Mother's "right to the custody and rearing of [C]hildren is converted, upon the 

failure to fulfill her parental duties.jo the [C)hildren's right to have proper parenting and 

fulfillment of his or her potential in a permanent, healthy safe environment, H In re: B.L. w:, 843 

9 
A.2d at 388. As the Superior Court has observed, "it is time to give [the Children] a chance to 

have [their] fundamental needs met without the constant insecurity that comes with knowing that 

someday, perhaps in the unreasonably distant future, [they] might again be wrenched away from 

[their] committed and capable caregivers." Id. (quoting In re N.C., 763 A.2d 913, 919 (Pa. 

Super. Ct. 2000)). 

For the foregoing reasons, the Court found that BCCYS carried its burden of establishing 

by clear and convincing evidence that Mother's parental rights should be terminated, and that, in 

fact, it is in the best interest of the Children that this occur. As such, the Court entered its Decree 

terminating the parental rights of Mother to the Children.

4 

BY THE COURT: 

Distribution: 

Clerk of the Orphans' Court 

BCCYS Solicitor 

Guardian Ad Litem 

Attorney for Mother 

Attorney for Father 

4 With regard to Mother's objections based upon evidentiary rulings, which are not preserved on appeal, "[a] trial 

court has broad discretion to determine whether evidence is admissible and a trial court's ruling on an evldentiary 

issue will be reversed only if the court abused its discretion." Com. v. Cook, 676 A.2d 639, 647 (Pa. 1996). 

Accordingly, a ruling admitting evidence "will not be disturbed on appeal unless that ruling reflects manifest 

unreasonableness, or partiality, prejudice, bias, or ill-will, or such lack of support to be clearly erroneous." Co111. v. 

Minich, 4 A.3d I 063, 1068 (Pa. Super. Ct. 20 I 0) (citations omitted); see a{so Com. v. Huggins, 68 A.3d 962, 966 

(Pa. Super. Ct.2013). Here, the Court entertained, carefully considered, and ruled on evidentlary objections. All 

documents admitted are documents of BCCYS kept in the ordinary course of the dependency and orphans' court 

proceedings, and/or prepared by its caseworkers. 

10