Filed 2/26/14 P. v. Allen CA6 

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS 

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for 

publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication 

or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115. 

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA 

SIXTH APPELLATE DISTRICT 

THE PEOPLE, 

Plaintiff and Respondent, 

v. 

CHRISTOPHER PAUL ALLEN, 

Defendant and Appellant. 

 H039525 

 (Santa Clara County 

 Super. Ct. Nos. C1084794 

 and CC944574) 

 In consolidated cases, defendant Christopher Paul Allen pleaded no contest to 

three felonies and a misdemeanor, and he admitted prior strike allegations. In exchange, 

the prosecution agreed to a specified prison term and dismissal of the remaining charges. 

On appeal, defendant challenges the trial court’s consolidation order. He also challenges 

venue in Santa Clara County for an offense that occurred in San Francisco. As we 

explain, these issues are not cognizable on appeal from defendant’s no contest plea 

because they do not concern the jurisdiction or the legality of the proceedings resulting in 

the plea. (Pen. Code, § 1237.51

; People v. Kaanehe (1977) 19 Cal.3d 1, 9 (Kaanehe).) 

Because the issues are barred by defendant’s plea, we will dismiss the appeal. 

I. TRIAL COURT PROCEEDINGS 

 In case No. CC944574, defendant was charged by information with two counts of 

forcible rape (§ 261, subd. (a)(2); counts one and three), forcible oral copulation (§ 288a, 

 1

 Further statutory references are to the Penal Code. 
subd. (c)(2); count two), and making criminal threats (§ 422; count four). The 

information alleged a prior strike conviction (§ 1170.12) and a prior serious felony 

conviction (§ 677, subd. (a)). The offenses involved defendant’s former girlfriend. 

Counts one and two occurred in August 2008 in San Jose, count four occurred between 

May and September 2008 in San Jose, and count three occurred in May 2008 in San 

Francisco. At the preliminary hearing, the trial court admitted into evidence a letter from 

a San Francisco County assistant district attorney authorizing prosecution of the San 

Francisco offense in Santa Clara County. 

 In case No. C1084794, defendant was charged with assault with a deadly weapon 

or with force likely to cause great bodily harm. (§ 245, subd. (a)(1).) That offense, 

involving a different girlfriend, occurred in August 2010. 

 The information in case No. CC944574 was filed in January 2010, and the 

information in case No. C1084794 was filed a year later, in January 2011. In September 

2011, the court granted the prosecution’s motion to consolidate the two cases, with the 

earlier case designated as the main case and the assault count renumbered as count five. 

 Nearly a year after consolidation, the parties entered into a plea agreement. In 

August 2012, in exchange for a stipulated prison sentence of 19 years 8 months, 

defendant pleaded no contest to counts one, three, and four, and admitted the prior 

convictions alleged. The prosecution amended the information to add misdemeanor 

battery (§ 243, subd. (a); count six), to which defendant also pleaded no contest, and it 

dismissed counts two and five. 

 In February 2013, the court sentenced defendant consistent with the terms of the 

plea agreement. The court issued a certificate of probable cause in February 2013 in case 

No. C1084794, and an amended certificate of probable cause on March 15, 2013, 

encompassing both cases. Defendant filed a timely notice of appeal. 
II. DISCUSSION 

A. APPEAL FROM JUDGMENTS ENTERED AFTER GUILTY OR NO CONTEST 

 PLEAS

 A plea of guilty “admits all matters essential to the conviction.” (People v. 

DeVaughn (1977) 18 Cal.3d 889, 895.) To be cognizable on an appeal from a guilty plea, 

an issue must be based on “reasonable constitutional, jurisdictional, or other grounds 

going to the legality of the proceedings” resulting in the plea. (§ 1237.5(a); see also 

People v. Ribero (1971) 4 Cal.3d 55, 60-64.) The limitation on appellate review from a 

criminal judgment applies equally to appeals from judgments entered pursuant to no 

contest pleas. (People v. Voit (2011) 200 Cal.App.4th 1353, 1364.) 

 Section 1237.5, requiring a defendant to obtain a certificate of probable cause 

before taking an appeal from a guilty or no contest plea, is a procedure to weed out 

frivolous claims. (Kaanehe, supra, 19 Cal.3d at p. 9.) Obtaining a certificate of probable 

cause does not expand the grounds upon which an appeal may be taken after entry of a 

plea, nor does it make cognizable issues which have been waived by a guilty or no 

contest plea. (Ibid; People v. Collins (2004) 115 Cal.App.4th 137, 149.) Review of 

noncognizable issues on appeal may be barred by a plea even where, as in this case, the 

trial court issued a certificate of probable cause. (See, e.g., People v. Krotter (1984) 162 

Cal.App.3d 643 (Krotter) [rejecting appeal notwithstanding issuance of certificate of 

probable cause].) 

B. THE CONSOLIDATION CLAIM

 Defendant argues that the trial court’s consolidation of the informations was error 

under section 9542

 because the cases were not connected in their commission, nor were 

 2

 Section 954 provides: “An accusatory pleading may charge two or more 

different offenses connected together in their commission, or different statements of the 

same offense or two or more different offenses of the same class of crimes or offenses, 

under separate counts, and if two or more accusatory pleadings are filed in such cases in 

the same court, the court may order them to be consolidated.” 
the offenses part of the same class of crimes. Defendant also contends consolidation was 

improper based on the potential prejudice to defendant from the aggregated evidence. 

These arguments are not cognizable on appeal. 

 Arguing that defendant’s consolidation challenge is barred by his no contest plea, 

the People rely on cases barring review of severance after entry of guilty or no contest 

pleas: People v. Haven (1980) 107 Cal.App.3d 983, 986 (challenge to denial of 

severance motion not cognizable on appeal); People v. Sanchez (1982) 131 Cal.App.3d 

323, 335; People v. Turner (1985) 171 Cal.App.3d 116, 127 (Turner); and Krotter, supra, 

162 Cal.App.3d at p. 648. Defendant correctly notes that none of the above-cited cases 

challenged consolidation. They nonetheless compel our conclusion that defendant’s 

consolidation claim is barred by his no contest plea. As explained in Krotter, a no contest 

plea bars a defendant from appealing the trial court’s denial of a motion to sever because 

“motions to sever are designed to protect the right to a fair trial, i.e., by not prejudicing 

the jury against the defendant charged with many unrelated crimes.” (Ibid.) Like the 

availability of severance, limitations on consolidation are designed to protect a 

defendant’s right to a fair trial. Both serve as safeguards in the inquiry into guilt, but 

neither protection implicates “the [trial court’s] jurisdiction or legality of the proceedings 

resulting in the plea.” (Kaanehe, supra, 19 Cal.3d at p. 9.) Thus, purported errors 

relating to either consolidation or a refusal to sever are waived by entry of a no contest 

plea. 

Turner also supports our conclusion. Holding that a defendant could raise a 

double jeopardy challenge on appeal from a guilty plea, the court explained that speedy 

trial and due process issues are not cognizable on appeal from a judgment after a guilty 

plea because those issues necessitate factual assessments to determine prejudice, and no 

facts are assessed when a defendant pleads guilty. (Turner, supra, 171 Cal.App.3d at pp. 

128-129.) In contrast, a double jeopardy challenge survives a guilty plea because guilt 

and prejudice are irrelevant to the double jeopardy inquiry. (Ibid.) Like speedy trial, due 
process and severance claims, challenges to a trial court’s consolidation order are barred 

by guilty and no contest pleas because they require a careful assessment of prejudice, 

which cannot be done when a defendant enters a plea instead of going to trial. (People v. 

Balderas (1985) 41 Cal.3d 144, 171 [evaluating motions for severance and objections to 

consolidation in light of facts known to trial court; requiring defendant to establish 

prejudice].) 

C. THE VENUE CLAIM

 Defendant argues that the Santa Clara County Superior Court lacked “territorial 

jurisdiction” over count three (the San Francisco rape) because the court failed to comply 

with section 784.7, subdivision (a), which provides for properly joinable rape offenses 

occurring in more than one county to be tried together.3

 According to defendant, no 

hearing was held under section 784.7, subdivision (a), no writing was provided by the 

Santa Clara County District Attorney accepting venue for the San Francisco offense, and 

the letter from the San Francisco District Attorney’s Office was insufficient because it 

was signed by an assistant district attorney and not the elected district attorney. 

 Although the Legislature has used the term “jurisdictional territory” to designate 

proper venue in criminal cases (§§ 777, 691, subd. (b)), the California Supreme Court has 

explained that “venue is not jurisdictional in the fundamental sense,” as it does not 

involve subject matter jurisdiction over a proceeding. (People v. Simon (2001) 25 Cal.4th 

1082, 1096 (Simon).) Unlike the trial court’s subject matter jurisdiction which can be 

 3

 Section 784.7, subdivision (a) states: “When more than one violation of Section 

. . . 261 . . . occurs in more than one jurisdictional territory, the jurisdiction of any of 

those offenses, and for any offenses properly joinable with that offense, is in any 

jurisdiction where at least one of the offenses occurred, subject to a hearing, pursuant to 

Section 954, within the jurisdiction of the proposed trial. At the Section 954 hearing, the 

prosecution shall present evidence in writing that all district attorneys in counties with 

jurisdiction of the offenses agree to the venue. Charged offenses from jurisdictions 

where there is no written agreement from the district attorney shall be returned to that 

jurisdiction.” 
raised at any time in a criminal proceeding (People v. Mower (2002) 28 Cal.4th 457, 474, 

fn. 6), an objection to a trial court’s venue must be raised before trial or it is forfeited. 

(Simon, supra, at p. 1104.) 

 By pleading no contest, defendant forfeited his challenge to the Santa Clara 

County Superior Court’s venue over the San Francisco rape change. Krotter is 

controlling. In Krotter, the court held that a change of venue motion is not reviewable 

after a no contest plea. (Krotter, supra, 162 Cal.App.3d at p. 648.) Krotter reasoned that 

a change of venue motion relates to a defendant’s guilt or innocence because the motion 

is designed to protect a defendant’s interest in receiving a fair trial. (Ibid.) Indeed, “the 

right to be tried in a statutorily designated venue is intended, from the perspective of an 

accused, as a safeguard against being required to stand trial in an unrelated and 

potentially burdensome distant location.” (Simon, supra, 25 Cal.4th at p. 1103.) 

 Defendant contends that his claim is not barred by Krotter because he is not 

challenging the denial of a motion to change venue. Rather, he challenges the validity of 

the trial court’s decision to include the San Francisco rape charge within the Santa Clara 

County information without following the statutory requirements. We disagree. The 

procedural posture of defendant’s claim does not render the claim reviewable. 

Defendant’s challenge is to the lawfulness of venue in Santa Clara County. Regardless of 

how it is packaged, it relates to defendant’s interest in receiving a fair trial. In 

accordance with Krotter, the claim is not reviewable in light of defendant’s no contest 

plea. 

D. REVIEW BY PETITION FOR WRIT OF MANDATE

 Defendant argues that his issues are cognizable on appeal because he otherwise 

would be forced to go to trial to preserve his right to appellate review. This argument is 

unfounded. A defendant is free to seek pretrial review of venue and consolidation rulings 

through a petition for writ of mandate. (Krotter, supra, 162 Cal.App.3d at p. 649 

[venue]; Verzi v. Superior Court (1986) 183 Cal.App.3d 382 [severance].) 
III. DISPOSITION 

 The appeal is dismissed. 

 ____________________________________ 

 Grover, J. 

WE CONCUR: 

____________________________ 

Elia, Acting P.J. 

____________________________ 

Mihara, J.