No. 2--01--1180

________________________________________________________________

	IN THE

	APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS

	SECOND DISTRICT

________________________________________________________________

THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE	)	Appeal from the Circuit Court

OF ILLINOIS,	)	of McHenry County.

		)

	Plaintiff-Appellant,	)

	)	No. 01--TR--33505

v.	)

	)

BENJAMIN J. JORDAN,	)	Honorable

	)	Gerald M. Martin G. Zopp, Jr.,G. Martin Zopp,

	Defendant-Appellee.	)	Judge, Presiding.

________________________________________________________________

	JUSTICE KAPALA delivered the opinion of the court:

	The State appeals from an order of the circuit court of

McHenry County dismissing the statutory summary suspension pursuant

to section 11--501.1 of the Illinois Vehicle Code (Code) (625 ILCS

5/11--501.1 (West 2000)) of the driving privileges of defendant,

Benjamin J. Jordan.  The State contends that the trial court erred

in concluding that defendant was entitled to relief because the

arresting officer failed to give immediate notice of the

suspension.  We reverse and remand.

	Defendant was arrested for driving under the influence of alcohol, drugs, or intoxicating compounds (DUI) (625 ILCS 5/11--501

(West 2000)) on May 26, 2001, at which time he consented to have

blood drawn and tested.  On July 23, 2001, the arresting officer

submitted a sworn report indicating that testing of defendant's

blood disclosed the presence of cannabis, a controlled substance,

or an intoxicating compound.  The sworn report further indicated that on July 23, 2001, the officer had given notice, by mail, of

the statutory summary suspension of defendant's driving privileges. 

The Secretary of State mailed a notice of confirmation of the

statutory summary suspension indicating that it would take effect

on September 7, 2001.  Defendant filed a petition to rescind the

suspension.  In addition, he filed a separate motion to "dismiss"

the summary suspension due to the arresting officer's failure to

give him immediate notice of the summary suspension and the right

to a hearing.  At the hearing on the motion to dismiss, the

arresting officer testified that after defendant's blood was drawn,

the sample was sent to the Illinois State Police Crime Laboratory. 

The officer identified a letter to him from the laboratory dated 

June 20, 2001, containing the test results.  The officer had no

knowledge of when the letter was sent and he did not recall when he

received it.  Finding that there was an unreasonable delay from the

time that the blood test results were known until the notice of the

statutory summary suspension was mailed to defendant, the trial

court granted defendant's motion to dismiss.  At that point

defendant withdrew his petition to rescind and this appeal

followed.

	Section 11--501.1 of the Vehicle Code (Code) provides in

pertinent part:

		"(a)  Any person who drives or is in actual physical

control of a motor vehicle *** shall be deemed to have given

consent * * * to a chemical test or tests of blood, breath, or

urine for the purpose of determining the content of alcohol,

other drug or drugs, or intoxicating compound or compounds or any combination thereof in the person's blood if arrested, as

evidenced by the issuance of a Uniform Traffic Ticket, for

[DUI]. ***

	* * *

		(d) If the person refuses testing or submits to a test

that discloses an alcohol concentration of 0.08 or more, or

any amount of a drug, substance, or intoxicating compound in

the person's breath, blood, or urine resulting from the

unlawful use or consumption of cannabis listed in the Cannabis

Control Act, a controlled substance listed in the Illinois

Controlled Substances Act, or an intoxicating compound listed

in the Use of Intoxicating Compounds Act, the law enforcement

officer shall immediately submit a sworn report to the circuit

court of venue and the Secretary of State, certifying that the

test or tests was or were requested under paragraph (a) and

the person refused to submit to a test or tests, or submitted

to testing that disclosed an alcohol concentration of 0.08 or

more.

						***	* * *

		(f) The law enforcement officer submitting the sworn

report under paragraph (d) shall serve immediate notice of the

statutory summary suspension on the person and the suspension

shall be effective as provided in paragraph (g).  In cases

where the blood alcohol concentration of 0.08 or greater or

any amount of a drug, substance, or compound resulting from

the unlawful use or consumption of cannabis ***, a controlled

substance ***, or an intoxicating compound *** is established by a subsequent analysis of blood or urine collected at the

time of the arrest, the arresting officer or arresting agency

shall give notice as provided in this Section or by deposit in

the United States mail of the notice in an envelope with

postage prepaid and addressed to the person at his address as

shown on the Uniform Traffic Ticket and the statutory summary

suspension shall begin as provided in paragraph (g). ***

		(g) The statutory summary suspension referred to in this 

Section shall take effect on the 46th day following the date

the notice of the statutory summary suspension was given to

the person."  625 ILCS 5/11--501.1 (West 2000).

	The State argues, inter alia, that this provision does not require immediate notice of a statutory summary suspension based on

a blood- alcohol concentration established by laboratory testing of

blood or urine (as opposed to a breathalyser test that displays

results at the time the test is administered).  Based on the plain

language of the statute we agree.

	When interpreting a statute, the court's primary objective is

to ascertain and give effect to the intent of the legislature. 

Ramos v. City of Peru, 333 Ill. App. 3d 75, 77 (2002).  When determining legislative intent, a court will construe the language

of the statute according to its plain and ordinary meaning and if

the statutory language is clear and unambiguous, the statute's

plain meaning will be given effect.  Ramos, 333 Ill. App. 3d at 77- 78.

	The first sentence of section 11--501.1(f) of the Code

explicitly requires a law enforcement officer to give "immediate notice" of a statutory summary suspension.  However, the next

sentence creates an exception where the blood- alcohol concentration

"is established by a subsequent analysis of blood or urine

collected at the time of the arrest."  625 ILCS 5/11--501.1(f) (West

2000).  In that situation, the statute authorizes alternative methods of notification: "the arresting officer or arresting agency

shall give notice as provided in this Section or by deposit in the United States mail ***."  (Emphasis added.)  625 ILCS 5/11--501.1(f)

(West 2000).  "As used in its ordinary sense, the word 'or' marks

an alternative indicating the various members of the sentence which

it connects are to be taken separately."  People v. Frieberg, 147 Ill. 2d 326, 349 (1992).

	Here the disjunctive word "or" separates notice "by deposit in

the United States mail" from notice "as provided in this Section";

thus the two methods of notice plainly stand in contradistinction

to one another.  Notice by United States mail is distinct from

notice as otherwise provided in section 11--501.1(f).  Therefore, when a law enforcement officer is authorized to give notice by

mail, the general requirements of section 11--501.1(f), including

the requirement of "immediate notice," do not apply.  It is

significant that a statutory summary suspension only takes effect

on the 46th day after notice is given.  625 ILCS 5/11--501.1(g)

(West 2000).  Delay in giving notice of a statutory summary suspension defers the effective date of the suspension by an equal

interval.  We fail to see how such delay visits any hardship on

affected motorists: they are simply allowed to stay on the roads

longer before the suspension takes effect.

	For the foregoing reasons, we reverse the judgment of the circuit court of McHenry County.  Because of the disposition below,

the trial court never considered defendant's petition to rescind. 

Accordingly we remand the cause to the circuit court for further

proceedings on that petition.

	Reversed and remanded.

	HUTCHINSON, P.J., and BYRNE, J., concur.