* Pursuant to 5 TH C IR . R. 47.5, the court has determ ined that this opinion should not be published and is not prec e dent except under the limit ed circumstances set fo rth in 5 TH C IR . R. 47.5.4. United States Court of Appeals Fifth Circuit 

## FILED June 20, 2006 Charles R. Fulbruge III Clerk UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FIFTH CIRCUIT

_________________ No. 05-41572 (Sum mary Calendar)

_________________ PAULA HIRTH,
Plaint iff - Appellant,
versus
METROPOLITAN LIFE INSURANCE CO; SYNCHRONY INTERGRATED DISABILITY SERVICES; ELECTRONIC DATA SYSTEMS CORPORATION, also known as EDS, Defendants - Appellees.
Appeal from the United States District Court For the Eastern District of Texas

5:04-CV-53
Before SMITH, GARZA, and PRADO, Circuit Judges. PER CURIAM: * Paula Hirth (“Hirth”) appeals the district court’s grant of summary judgment to defendants Electronic Data Systems (“EDS”) and Metropolit an Insurance Com pany (“Met Life”), on her claims-2-

of breach of contract and breach of the duty of good f ait h and fair dealing arising from the defendants’ cessation of her disability benefits. In 2002, Hirth requested short term disabilit y benefit s from her employer, EDS, as she recovered from a series of back surgeries . The EDS short term disabilit y policy is managed by a subsidiary of Met Life. The Policy is designed to provide up to 26 weeks of continued pay for employees who must be absent from the workplace due to injuries that prevent them from worki ng. Details about the Policy are included in the Benefits Handbook, a section of the Em ployee Handbook. The Benefits Hand

book states that EDS has the right to modi fy t he policy at any time, and a disclaimer makes it clear that the handbook is merely a guideline and “should not be interpreted as alt ering an individual’s employment relationship and do[es] not constitute an employment contract.” Met Life stopped providing short-term disability benefits after 25 weeks, one week before the lo ng term disabilit y coverage was due to begin, asserting that the benefit s were discontinued because Hirth failed to provide the requ ested medical documentation to support her continued inability to work. The district court granted summary judgment t o both EDS and Met Li fe, agreeing with their argument that the short term disabilit y policy did not constitute a valid contract between Hirth and EDS and Met Life. Hirth now appeals. We review a grant of summary judgment de novo , applying the same standards as the district court. Willis v. Coca Cola Enter. Inc. , 445 F.3d 413, 416 (5th Cir. 2006). Summary judgement is properl y granted when there is no genuine dispute as to mat erial fact and the mo vant is entitled to judgment as a mat ter of law. F ederal Ins. Co. v. Ace Prop. & Cas. Co. , 429 F.3d 120, 122 (5th Cir. 2005). Hirth argues that the short term disability policy is a valid contract and that because EDS-3-

int ended to be bound by the policy, it should be enfo rced by thi s court. Thi s argument fails. The disclaimers contai

ned in the Benefits Handboo k “negate[ ] any implicat io n t hat a personnel procedures manual places a restriction on the employment at will relationship.” F ederal Exp. Corp.
v. Dutschmann , 846 S.W.2d 282, 283 (Tex. 1993). S ee also Gamble v. Gregg Co. , 932 S.W.2d 253, 255 (Tex. App.

)) Texarkana, 1996, no wri t) (“In an employment -at-will situation, an employee policy handbook or manual does not, of it self, constitute a binding contract fo r the benefit s or policies stated unless the manual uses language clearly indicating an intent to do so.”). Hirth also asserts that EDS and Met Life owed her a duty of good fait h and fair dealing. She appears to argue that because the granting of lo ng-term disabilit y bene fit s is dependent on the exhaustion of the short-term disabilit y benefit s, EDS and Met Li fe had a financial int erest i n any decision as to whether to conti nue to provide short-term disabilit y benefit s. She contends that the decision to deny lo ng-term disabilit y benefit s was, in effect, due to the denial of th e short term disabilit y benefit s and therefore asserts that the decision to deny the lo ng-term benefit s is subject to the duty of good f

ait h and fair dealing. The general rule provides that a duty of good fait h and fair dealing cannot arise from an at-will employ ment relationship. C

ity of Midland v. O’Bryant , 18 S.W.3d 209, 216 (Tex. 2000). Hirth inst ead relies on Arnold v. Nat’l County Mut. Fire Ins. Co. , 725 S.W.2d 165 (Tex. 1987), and analogizes her situation to that of an insurer and the insured, who can have, in certain situations, a special relationship. I

d. at 167. Thus, wh en an insurer breaches the duty of good faith and fair dealing, Texas allo ws a cause of action by the insured. S ee Robinson v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co. , 13 F.3d 160, 162 (5th Cir. 1994). Irrespecti ve of the merit s of her argument, Hirth’s state law claim is preempted by t he1 Hirth concedes that the long-term disability benefit plan is governed by ERISA. -4- Em ployee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (“ERISA”). S ee 29 U.S.C. § 1144(a) (“[T]he provisions of this
. . . chapter shall supersede any and all State laws inso far as they may now or hereafter relate to any employ ee benefit plan.”); U num Life Ins. Co. v. Ward, 526 U.S. 358, 363 (1999). The long-term benefits plan is an employee welfare benefit plan cognizable under ERISA. See Mem’l Hosp. Sys. v. Northbrook Life Ins. Co. , 904 F.2d 236, 240 (5th Cir. 1990). Hirth’s claims
as to the denial of the long-term disability plan are therefore preempted. S ee Ellis v. Liberty Life Assur. Co. of Boston , 394 F.3d 262, 276 (5th Cir. 2004) (holding that ERISA preempted plaint iff’s
com mo n law claim fo r breach of the duties of good faith and fair dealing arising from the denial of lo ng-term disability benefit s). 1 As she raises no claims under ERISA, her claims as to the lo ng-term disabilit y benefit s must fail. Hirth then argues that she is due damages from the defendants’ breach of contract as to the short-term disabilit y benefit s and that this claim fo r damages is not preempted by ERISA. However,
as discussed above, Hirth’s claim as to breach of contract fails, and th us, she cannot recover damages flo wing from the alleged breach. S ee Ham Marine, Inc. v. Dresser Indus. Inc. , 72 F.3d 454, 462 (5th Cir. 1995) (disallowing damages where the underlying claim fails as a matter of law). Therefore, we AFFIRM the grant of summary judgment.