United States Court of Appeals 

for the Federal Circuit ______________________ 

HOYT A. FLEMING, 

Plaintiff-Appellant,

v.

ESCORT INC. AND BELTRONICS USA, INC.,

Defendants-Cross-Appellants.

______________________ 

2014-1331, -1371

______________________ 

Appeal from the United States District Court for the 

District of Idaho in No. 1:09-CV-00105-BLW, Chief Judge 

B. Lynn Winmill.

______________________ 

Decided: December 24, 2014 

______________________ 

MICHAEL S. DOWLER, Park, Vaughan, Fleming & Dowler, LLP, of Houston, Texas, argued for plaintiffappellant. 

GREGORY F. AHRENS, Wood, Herron & Evans, L.L.P., 

of Cincinnati, Ohio, argued for defendants-crossappellants. With him on the brief was BRETT A. SCHATZ. 

______________________ 

Before TARANTO, BRYSON, and HUGHES, Circuit Judges.
2 FLEMING v. ESCORT INC. 

TARANTO, Circuit Judge. 

The district court in this case refused to disturb a jury 

verdict concerning two reissue patents. The jury found

for the patentee on infringement and validity as to most 

of the asserted claims, but it invalidated five claims. The 

patentee, Hoyt Fleming, appeals the five invalidity determinations, arguing that (1) the testimony offered to 

establish invalidity was insufficiently specific to support 

the verdict; (2) there was insufficient corroboration of the

prior invention relied on for the invalidity determinations; 

and (3) the prior invention, if it existed, was abandoned, 

suppressed, or concealed, disqualifying it from invalidating the claims. The adjudicated infringers, Escort, Inc., 

and Beltronics USA, Inc. (collectively, Escort), crossappeal on the ground that all of the asserted claims are 

invalid because Fleming’s reason for seeking reissue did 

not meet the “error” precondition for obtaining reissue. 

We affirm. 

BACKGROUND

Hoyt Fleming owns two reissue patents—U.S. Patent 

Nos. RE39,038 (issued Mar. 28, 2006) and RE40,653

(issued Mar. 10, 2009)—issued under 35 U.S.C. § 251. 

Both relate to radar detectors for detecting police signals. 

They claim methods for incorporating, as well as apparatuses that incorporate, a Global Positioning Satellite (GPS) 

unit into a radar detector. The incorporated GPS can 

reduce false alarms (i.e., the signaling of a police presence 

when none exists) by allowing the detector to disregard, or

“lock out,” certain signals from an identified location 

known to produce such false alarms (e.g., a storefront door 

opener transmitting a radar signal that can be mistaken 

for a police presence). 

Claim 1 of the ’038 patent is representative of the 

method claims. It reads:
FLEMING v. ESCORT INC. 3

1. A method, executed by a device having a position, of generating an alert to an incoming radar 

signal having a frequency and a signal strength, 

the method comprising the acts of:

(a) detecting the incoming radar signal;

(b) determining the position of the device that detected the incoming radar signal; and

(c) generating an alert if the position of the device 

is not within a predetermined distance of a predetermined position.

’038 patent, col. 6, lines 49–58. 

Claim 18 of the ’038 patent is representative of the 

apparatus claims. It reads:

18. A radar detector for alerting an operator of a 

motor vehicle to an incoming police radar signal 

comprising:

(a) a microprocessor;

(b) a circuit coupled to the microprocessor for detecting the incoming police radar signal; and

(c) a global positioning system receiver coupled to 

the microprocessor and operable to provide the 

microprocessor with data that indicates the position of the radar detector.

’038 patent, col. 7, lines 53–61. 

On March 10, 2009, Fleming sued Escort for infringement of his two patents. At the heart of Escort’s 

defenses was the contention that Steven Orr, who works 

for Escort as a consultant, had invented a GPSincorporating radar detector before Fleming did—a prior 

invention Escort invoked to support anticipation and 
4 FLEMING v. ESCORT INC. 

obviousness challenges under 35 U.S.C. §§ 102(g) and 103 

(2006).1 Fleming’s claimed priority date is April 14, 

1999—the filing date of his original patent application. 

Orr alleged that he conceived his invention in 1988 and 

made a working embodiment that reduced it to practice in 

April 1996. From 1988 to 1996, Orr was working at 

Cincinnati Microwave, which owned the potential patent 

rights to the alleged invention at issue. Cincinnati Microwave entered bankruptcy on February 14, 1997. With 

Orr assisting in the bankruptcy process, Escort acquired 

Cincinnati Microwave’s assets, including the potential 

patent rights to the alleged Orr invention, during the 

summer of 1997. Escort sought Orr’s assistance in the 

new enterprise, and Orr began working at Escort in July 

1998. He filed a patent application to claim his alleged 

invention, with Escort as assignee, on June 14, 1999, two 

months after Fleming filed his application. 

The jury in this case found most of Fleming’s asserted 

claims to be infringed by Escort and not to be invalid. It 

found invalidity, however, as to five claims of the ’038 

patent—claims 1, 18, 45, 47, and 48. The jury invalidated 

claim 45 as anticipated by Orr’s prior invention. It invalidated claim 18 as anticipated by the Orr invention and 

also for obviousness in light of Orr’s invention and two 

prior-art patents, Hoffberg (U.S. Patent No. 6,252,544) 

1 This case is governed by the statutory provisions 

in effect before the Leahy–Smith America Invents Act 

(AIA), Pub. L. No. 112-29, § 3, 125 Stat. 284, 285–93 

(2011), put into effect revisions of many provisions of Title 

35 of the U.S. Code, including sections 102, 103, and 251. 

See AIA § 3(n)(1), 125 Stat. at 293 (relevant AIA amendments apply only to applications and patents containing a 

claim with an effective filing date of March 16, 2013, or 

later). We hereafter omit a date in citing the statutory 

provisions.

 
FLEMING v. ESCORT INC. 5

and Ross (U.S. Patent No. 5,977,884). And it invalidated 

claims 1, 47, and 48 for obviousness in light of Orr’s prior 

invention and two prior-art patents, Hoffberg and Valentine (U.S. Patent No. 5,146,226). 

Fleming subsequently sought judgment as a matter of 

law to reverse the jury’s five invalidity determinations. 

He argued that the testimony regarding invalidity was 

conclusory, that Orr’s testimony regarding his prior 

invention was insufficiently corroborated, and that Orr’s 

prior invention—even if it existed—had been abandoned, 

suppressed, or concealed within the meaning of 35 U.S.C. 

§ 102(g)(2), disqualifying it as a basis for invalidity. 

Escort, in turn, sought judgment that Fleming’s patents 

were invalid, arguing that Fleming had not identified an 

“error” in his original patent (U.S. Patent No. 6,204,798), 

a prerequisite to securing a reissue patent under section 

251. The district court denied both sides’ motions. 

Both parties appeal the district court’s decision. We 

have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1295(a)(1).

DISCUSSION

We review the denial of a motion for judgment as a 

matter of law de novo, applying the same standards as did 

the district court in deciding whether the jury verdict 

must be reversed. See Enovsys LLC v. Nextel Commc’ns, 

Inc., 614 F.3d 1333, 1341 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (applying Ninth 

Circuit law). In doing so, we accept express or implied 

jury factual determinations, if supported by substantial 

evidence, and assess whether those facts support the 

judgment under the governing legal standards, whose 

interpretation we review de novo. See, e.g., Baxter 

Healthcare Corp. v. Spectramed, Inc., 49 F.3d 1575, 1582 

(Fed. Cir. 1995) (applying Ninth Circuit law); Pierce v. 

Underwood, 487 U.S. 552, 558 (1988). “Substantial 

evidence is such relevant evidence as reasonable minds 

might accept as adequate to support a conclusion even if 

it is possible to draw two inconsistent conclusions from 
6 FLEMING v. ESCORT INC. 

the evidence.” Landes Const. Co., Inc. v. Royal Bank of 

Can., 833 F.2d 1365, 1371 (9th Cir. 1987).

A 

1 

Fleming’s first contention on appeal from the five invalidity verdicts is that Escort’s evidence in support of 

invalidity was insufficiently specific to support the verdict. Fleming’s argument invokes our rulings that

“[g]eneral and conclusory testimony . . . does not suffice as 

substantial evidence of invalidity.” Koito Mfg. Co. v. 

Turn-Key-Tech, LLC, 381 F.3d 1142, 1152 (Fed. Cir. 

2004); see CytoLogix Corp. v. Ventana Med. Sys., Inc., 424 

F.3d 1168, 1176 (Fed. Cir. 2005); Motorola, Inc. v. Interdigital Tech. Corp., 121 F.3d 1461, 1473 (Fed. Cir. 1997). 

It is not enough simply to introduce a prior-art reference 

into the record, with no testimony showing where the 

limitations of the claims are to be found. Koito, 381 F.3d 

at 1151–52; see also Fresenius USA, Inc. v. Baxter Int’l, 

Inc., 582 F.3d 1288, 1300 (Fed. Cir. 2009). In this case, 

the principal prior art was not a patent or publication but 

the prior invention of Orr, who testified extensively about 

it. 

We conclude that there was sufficiently specific factual support for the invalidity determinations. The jury’s 

verdict on invalidity rested on two overlapping classes of 

findings. The first concerned Orr’s prior invention, which 

the jury found to anticipate claims 18 and 45—a question 

of fact. TI Grp. Auto. Sys. (N. Am.), Inc. v. VDO N. Am., 

LLC, 375 F.3d 1126, 1133 (Fed. Cir. 2004). The second 

concerned the teachings of the asserted combinations of 

Orr’s prior invention and Hoffberg, Ross, and/or Valentine. The content of those teachings and the motivation to 

combine are fact questions, see Kinetic Concepts, Inc. v. 

Smith & Nephew, Inc., 688 F.3d 1342, 1360, 1367 (Fed. 

Cir. 2012), which we assume the jury answered in Escort’s 

favor in finding claims 1, 18, 47, and 48 invalid for obvi-
FLEMING v. ESCORT INC. 7

ousness. Sufficiently specific evidence supported the 

jury’s findings.

The invalidated claims do not contain a large number 

of limitations, so extensive testimony was not required. 

Nevertheless, Orr and Escort’s expert, Dr. Grindon, 

together provided testimony that explained how the prior 

art taught the limitations of each invalidated claim. 

For example, claim 45 recites two limitations: (1) “a 

circuit operable to detect an incoming radar signal” and 

(2) “a microprocessor operable to disable an alert to the 

incoming radar signal based at least in part upon the 

position of the radar detector.” ’038 patent, col. 10, lines 

24–30. As to the first limitation, Orr explained that part 

of his invention consisted of a radar detector that received 

frequency information, allowing the detection of radar 

signals. J.A. 6198. As to the second limitation, Orr 

explained that the radar detector was connected to a GPS 

navigational card and a laptop, allowing the muting of 

certain signals “when [he] hit the spacebar” based on 

position information expressed in cylindrical coordinates. 

J.A. 6198. As to both limitations, Dr. Grindon evaluated 

evidence of Orr’s prior invention, including files that 

showed “routes that [Orr] took driving around under 

different conditions to collect . . . position and velocity 

information from a GPS device in his car,” J.A. 6324, and 

explained that Orr’s invention “definitely shows and 

discloses . . . the combination for a radar detector with a 

GPS system . . . combined with a processor, in this case a 

laptop computer . . . [to] suppress[] . . . false alerts . . . 

based upon location . . . [and] the speed of the car . . . [by] 

press[ing] the space bar on the laptop,” J.A. 6325. 

With regard to the other invalidated claims, Dr. Grindon testified in some detail to the aspects of Hoffberg, 

Ross, and Valentine—as well as the motivation to combine—that would have made the claimed subject matter

obvious at the relevant time. E.g., J.A. 6328–29 (describ-
8 FLEMING v. ESCORT INC. 

ing how Hoffberg “teach[es] . . . radar detection . . . in . . . 

various frequency bands” and “stor[ing] information . . . to 

discriminate against false alarms”); J.A. 6330–31 (describing how Ross “integrat[es] a system with a radar detector 

and a GPS, and then a processor . . . [to] address[] the 

same problem of false alarms and false alerts” through a 

comparison of “[t]he speed of the vehicle, which is derived 

from the GPS unit, . . . with [a] preset maximum”); J.A. 

6332–33 (describing how Valentine “address[es] the 

problem of false alerts in a very similar, but slightly 

different, way [from Hoffberg],” by “discriminat[ing] the 

signals based on frequency . . . in the same way [as Orr’s 

prior invention]”).

In light of this and other testimony, we cannot say 

that the invalidity challenge was supported by only 

conclusory testimony and unexplained prior-art documents. There was specific evidence sufficient to support 

the verdict.

2 

Fleming also challenges the proof of Orr’s prior invention by invoking the principle that “oral testimony by an 

alleged inventor asserting priority over a patentee’s rights 

. . . must be supported by some type of corroborating 

evidence.” Woodland Trust v. Flowertree Nursery, Inc., 

148 F.3d 1368, 1371 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (citation and internal 

quotation marks omitted). Such evidence is evaluated 

under “the rule of reason,” whereby “all pertinent evidence is examined in order to determine whether the 

inventor’s story is credible.” Sandt Tech., Ltd. v. Resco 

Metal & Plastics Corp., 264 F.3d 1344, 1350 (Fed. Cir. 

2001) (citations and internal quotation marks omitted); 

see also Medichem, S.A. v. Rolabo, S.L., 437 F.3d 1157, 

1171 (Fed Cir. 2006) (“corroboration is fundamentally 

about ‘credibility’”). Importantly, “[t]he law does not 

impose an impossible standard of independence on corroborative evidence by requiring that every point of a 
FLEMING v. ESCORT INC. 9

reduction to practice be corroborated by evidence having a 

source totally independent of the inventor; indeed, such a 

standard is the antithesis of the rule of reason.” Cooper v. 

Goldfarb, 154 F.3d 1321, 1331 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (citation 

and internal quotation marks omitted). We have treated 

the sufficiency of corroboration as a question of fact, with 

the district court’s determination subject to review for 

clear error. Medichem, 437 F.3d at 1171–72.

Here, Orr’s testimony of prior invention was sufficiently corroborated by the documentary evidence. The

record contains 1992 data from GPS experiments that Orr 

ran at the time, e.g., J.A. 7757 (frequency plot entitled 

“Ka band in False Region Record”), and 1996 notes and 

correspondence from Orr pertaining to GPS and, more 

specifically, to “realizing product features identified in . . . 

[a] brainstorming meeting . . . [by] integrat[ing] a radar 

detector into . . . automotive navigation systems,” J.A. 

7352–53. Most tellingly, perhaps, the record contains a 

1996 letter from Greg Blair, Vice President of Cincinnati 

Microwave, addressed to Orr and other employees, which 

refers to “entering the ETAK [a type of automotive navigation system] business . . . to get speed and position to 

silence a detector” and to “patent[ing] the concept of . . . 

vehicle position muting and then working with the ETAK 

folks for a data link to our detectors,” J.A. 7354. 

This evidence makes credible Orr’s general account: in 

1988, when he had his specific conception, various industry participants were thinking generally about equipping 

radar detectors with GPS to reduce false alarms; Cincinnati Microwave, in particular, was interested in the idea; 

by 1992, Orr was collecting data and working toward 

reducing the conception to practice; and in 1996, spurred

by great interest in his project, Orr reduced his invention 

to practice. The evidence, in referring to frequencies and 

to using a GPS-given location to mute a detector alarm, 

also provides substantial corroboration of the more specif-
10 FLEMING v. ESCORT INC. 

ic claim limitations concerning lockout frequencies and 

distances that Fleming has highlighted in his argument.

Fleming is correct that none of the corroborating evidence constitutes definitive proof of Orr’s account or 

discloses each claim limitation as written. But the corroboration requirement has never been so demanding. 

See Cooper, 154 F.3d at 1331. It is a flexible, rule-ofreason demand for independent evidence that, as a whole, 

makes credible the testimony of the purported prior 

inventor with regard to conception and reduction to 

practice of the invention as claimed. Sandt, 264 F.3d at 

1350–51. The evidence presented here sufficiently does 

that.

3 

Fleming’s final challenge is that, even if Orr had priority of invention by virtue of his activities through 1996, 

he lost priority under 35 U.S.C. § 102(g)(2)’s disqualification of prior inventions that have been “abandoned, 

suppressed, or concealed.” Although we accept the facts 

as found by the jury where (as here) they are supported 

by substantial evidence, we have said that “[s]uppression 

or concealment is a question of law which we review de 

novo.” Fujikawa v. Wattanasin, 93 F.3d 1559, 1567 (Fed. 

Cir. 1996). We reject Fleming’s challenge.

Abandonment, suppression, or concealment may be 

shown by proof of the prior inventor’s active efforts to do 

so or “may be inferred based upon the prior inventor’s 

unreasonable delay in making the invention publicly 

known.” Dow Chem. Co. v. Astro–Valcour, Inc., 267 F.3d 

1334, 1342 (Fed. Cir. 2001); see also Fox Grp., Inc. v. Cree, 

Inc., 700 F.3d 1300, 1305–06 (Fed. Cir. 2012). Whether a 

delay is sufficiently reasonable to avoid the inference “has 

consistently been based on equitable principles and public 

policy as applied to the facts of each case.” Checkpoint 

Sys., Inc. v. U.S. Int’l Trade Comm’n, 54 F.3d 756, 761 

(Fed. Cir. 1995) (citation and internal quotation marks 
FLEMING v. ESCORT INC. 11

omitted). For example, “delay between the first reduction 

to practice and public disclosure” is excused “if the inventor continued to refine, perfect, or improve the invention.” 

Eolas Techs. Inc. v. Microsoft Corp., 399 F.3d 1325, 1333 

(Fed. Cir. 2005). Moreover, even “a long period of inactivity need not be a fatal forfeiture, if the first inventor 

resumes work on the invention before the second inventor 

enters the field.” Paulik v. Rizkalla, 760 F.2d 1270, 1272 

(Fed. Cir. 1985). 

In this case, there is no evidence of any active efforts 

to suppress or conceal. And we find the timing of Orr’s 

activities leading to his June 1999 patent application not 

to warrant an inference of abandonment, suppression, or 

concealment. The evidence is sufficient to establish the 

following facts, covering three periods starting from the 

April 1996 reduction to practice. 

In the first period, before the February 1997 date of 

Cincinnati Microwave’s bankruptcy, Cincinnati Microwave had great interest in the project, J.A. 6094, and Orr 

studied, refined, and improved his invention: he studied 

“selective availability,” i.e., signal interference by the 

military that impaired the use of his invention, J.A. 6095, 

and conducted field testing and wrote additional code to

perfect his invention, J.A. 6104–22. In the third period, 

after Orr started working at Escort in the summer of 

1998, he was immediately put to work on his invention, 

and he continued this work at least until he filed for his 

own patent in June 1999. E.g., J.A. 6293 (Escort’s Kuhn 

testifying that Escort was motivated to hire Orr because 

of Orr’s expertise in radar/GPS, and that Kuhn told Orr to 

work on his invention once he joined Escort), J.A. 7494–

546 (Orr’s timesheets at Escort from July 1998 to July 

1999, mentioning work on radar/GPS work, including “Ka 

falsing improvements”). 

What happened in the middle period—between February 1997 and summer 1998—is this: For a period of 
12 FLEMING v. ESCORT INC. 

“approximately 13 months after the bankruptcy,” Orr 

joined another firm to work with “a group of engineers 

that were designing a cordless telephone.” J.A. 6123. The 

patent rights to Orr’s radar/GPS prior invention, created 

at Cincinnati Microwave, were acquired by Escort in the 

bankruptcy, and Escort set priorities to get its new business going but, even so, was interested in developing this 

invention. Orr testified that, from the middle of 1997 to 

the middle of 1998, while working elsewhere, he was 

giving Escort information about his invention, J.A. 6182, 

and that Escort was pursuing Orr’s invention and conferring with Orr about it during that period, J.A. 6184. 

Escort’s Kuhn testified that, from the start, Escort was 

motivated to hire Orr because of Orr’s expertise in radar/GPS, was seeking to hire him during its startup 

period, and finally did hire Orr, in July 1998, to adapt his 

invention to “a new detection scheme” to resolve performance issues. J.A. 6287–93. 

In these circumstances, we do not infer suppression, 

concealment, or abandonment for two reasons. First: In 

making his argument in this court and in the district 

court, Fleming’s position has been that his priority date is 

April 14, 1999, when he filed his patent application. That 

date is later than the dates of Orr’s conception (1988) and 

reduction to practice (1996)—not in dispute for purposes 

of the present issue. It also is later than the latest possible date—summer 1998—that the evidence establishes 

Orr resumed work on his prior invention when joining 

Escort. Even if the focus were solely on Orr (thus disregarding Escort, the patent-rights owner), and even if Orr 

had abandoned his invention before summer 1998, the 

defense of abandonment is properly rejected on the 

ground that Orr resumed his active work before Fleming’s 

April 1999 priority date. See Paulik, 760 F.2d at 1272.

Second: Although Fleming has not made an argument 

based on a pre-1999 priority date, the conclusion would 

not change even if we assumed a May 1998 conception 
FLEMING v. ESCORT INC. 13

date for Fleming (for which there is evidence). On that 

assumption, the crucial period for the abandonment 

analysis would be the time between Cincinnati Microwave’s February 1997 bankruptcy and Orr’s July 1998 

employment at Escort. But what occurred during that 

period does not warrant an inference of suppression, 

concealment, or abandonment. At most, there was a 

reasonable pause in active work: the rights to the invention were transferred from one owner to a new owner

during a period of bankruptcy; the new owner concentrated its initial efforts on products ready for immediate sale; 

and even during that period, the new owner maintained 

communication with Orr and made efforts to bring him to 

the firm precisely to resume the work needed to perfect 

the prior invention. The delay of active work in these 

circumstances was not unreasonable and was consistent 

with a continuing commitment to pursuing the project to 

the full extent conditions allowed. In brief, the concepts 

of abandonment, suppression, and concealment do not fit 

the facts as reasonably found by the jury.

B 

Escort, in its cross-appeal, argues that Fleming’s reissue patents are invalid because there was no “error” in 

the original patent, a prerequisite to obtaining a reissue 

patent. “Determining whether an applicant has met the 

statutory requirements of 35 U.S.C. § 251 is a question of 

law, which we review de novo.” In re Clement, 131 F.3d 

1464, 1468 (Fed. Cir. 1997). We reject Escort’s contention. 

The version of section 251 applicable here reads:

Whenever any patent is, through error without 

any deceptive intention, deemed wholly or partly 

inoperative or invalid, by reason of a defective 

specification or drawing, or by reason of the patentee claiming more or less than he had a right 

to claim in the patent, the Director shall, on the 
14 FLEMING v. ESCORT INC. 

surrender of such patent and the payment of the 

fee required by law, reissue the patent for the invention disclosed in the original patent, and in accordance with a new and amended application, for 

the unexpired part of the term of the original patent.

35 U.S.C. § 251 (2006). 

Escort invokes the requirement that there have been 

an “error” in the original patent. Errors are not limited to 

slips of the pen but encompass—and most often are—

deliberate drafting choices. See In re Dinsmore, 757 F.3d 

1343, 1347–48 (Fed. Cir. 2014). Not all choices qualify, 

though: “it is important whether deficient understandings, by the applicants or their agents, gave rise to the 

patenting choice that reissue is being invoked to correct.” 

Id. at 1348. A drafting choice that rested on “no cognizable false or deficient understanding of fact or law,” but 

that was, say, an eyes-open choice made to secure the 

patent, “is not ‘error’ as required by section 251.” Id. at 

1347. That kind of choice is nothing but a “now-regretted 

choice,” which is not error. Id. But this case does not fall 

into that category.

The asserted error here is that, when drafting his 

original patent, Fleming failed to appreciate the full scope 

of his invention and the inadequacy of the original claims 

for properly capturing the full scope. This is a classic 

reason that qualifies as error. Id. at 1348. It identifies a 

deficient understanding of some combination of fact and 

law bearing on the meaning of claim language, the inventions disclosed in the written description, and how particular language does or does not map onto products or 

processes that could be claimed under section 251 consistent with the written description. 

Escort suggests otherwise by noting Fleming’s explanation that he wrote his original patent from the perspective of a “programmer.” J.A. 5947, 5980. That fact, 
FLEMING v. ESCORT INC. 15

however, in no way undermines the premise of a mistaken 

understanding of the scope of the written description 

and/or claims—it actually helps explain the origin of the 

error. Likewise, the fact that it was marketplace developments that prompted Fleming to reassess his issued 

claims and to see their deficiencies, J.A. 5926–27, 5945, 

does not alter the qualifying character of the reason for 

reissue. Erroneous understandings of the written description or claims are just that, regardless of what triggered the recognition of error in those understandings.

Any reissue patent, of course, must meet all of section 

251’s requirements. But the only challenge presented by 

Escort is the lack of “error.” That challenge is meritless.

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the district 

court’s judgment upholding the jury’s verdict. 

AFFIRMED