(Slip Opinion) OCTOBER TERM, 2014 1 

Syllabus 

NOTE: Where it is feasible, a syllabus (headnote) will be released, as is

being done in connection with this case, at the time the opinion is issued.

The syllabus constitutes no part of the opinion of the Court but has been

prepared by the Reporter of Decisions for the convenience of the reader. 

See United States v. Detroit Timber & Lumber Co., 200 U. S. 321, 337. 

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 

Syllabus 

T-MOBILE SOUTH, LLC v. CITY OF ROSWELL, 

GEORGIA
 

CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR 

THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT 

No. 13–975. Argued November 10, 2014—Decided January 14, 2015 

Respondent Roswell’s city council (Council) held a public hearing to 

consider an application by petitioner T-Mobile South, LLC, to build a

cell phone tower on residential property. During the hearing, several 

Council members expressed concerns about the tower’s impact on the 

area. The hearing ended with the Council unanimously passing a

motion to deny the application. Two days later, the City’s Planning

and Zoning Division informed petitioner by letter that the application

had been denied and that minutes from the hearing would be made

available. The detailed minutes were published 26 days later. 

 Petitioner filed suit, alleging that the Council’s denial was not supported by substantial evidence in the record. The District Court 

agreed, concluding that the City, by failing to issue a written decision

stating its reasons for denying the application, had violated the Telecommunications Act of 1996, which provides that a locality’s denial 

“shall be in writing and supported by substantial evidence contained

in a written record,” 47 U. S. C. §332(c)(7)(B)(iii). The Eleventh Circuit, following its precedent, found that the Act’s requirements were

satisfied here because petitioner had received a denial letter and possessed a transcript of the hearing that it arranged to have recorded. 

Held: 

1. Section 332(c)(7)(B)(iii) requires localities to provide reasons

when they deny applications to build cell phone towers. This conclusion follows from the Act’s provisions, which both preserve and specifically limit traditional state and local government authority. It 

would be considerably difficult for a reviewing court to determine 

whether a locality’s denial was “supported by substantial evidence

contained in a written record,” §332(c)(7)(B)(iii), or whether a locality 
 

 

 

 

 

2 T-MOBILE SOUTH, LLC v. CITY OF ROSWELL 

Syllabus 

had “unreasonably discriminate[d] among providers of functionally 

equivalent services,” §332(c)(7)(B)(i)(I), or regulated siting “on the basis of the environmental effects of radio frequency emissions,” 

§332(c)(7)(B)(iv), if localities were not obligated to state their reasons

for denial. And nothing in the Act suggests that Congress meant to

use the phrase “substantial evidence” as anything but an administrative law “term of art” that describes how “an administrative record is 

to be judged by a reviewing court.” United States v. Carlo Bianchi & 

Co., 373 U. S. 709, 715. Pp. 6–8.

2. Localities are not required to provide their reasons for denying

siting applications in the denial notice itself, but may state those reasons with sufficient clarity in some other written record issued essentially contemporaneously with the denial. Pp. 8–13.

(a) Nothing in the Act’s text imposes a requirement that the reasons be given in any particular form, and the Act’s saving clause, 

§332(c)(7)(A), makes clear that the only limitations imposed on local

governments are those enumerated in the statute. Localities comply 

with their obligation to give written reasons so long as those reasons 

are stated clearly enough to enable judicial review. Because an adversely affected entity must decide whether to seek judicial review 

within 30 days from the date of the denial, §332(c)(7)(B)(v), and because a court cannot review the denial without knowing the locality’s

reasons, the locality must provide or make available its written reasons at essentially the same time as it communicates its denial.

Pp. 8–11.

(b) Petitioner’s contrary arguments are unavailing. The statute’s 

word “decision” does not connote a written document that itself provides all the reasons for a given judgment. The absence of the word 

“notify” in the provision at issue also does not signal an intention to 

require communication of more than a judgment. Nor does an obligation to provide reasons in the writing conveying the denial arise from

the “substantial evidence” requirement itself or from the requirement 

of court review “on an expedited basis,” §332(c)(7)(B)(v). It is sufficient that a locality’s reasons be provided in a manner that is clear

enough and prompt enough to enable judicial review. Pp. 11–13. 

3. The City failed to comply with its statutory obligations under the 

Act. Although it issued its reasons in writing and did so in an acceptable form, it did not provide its written reasons essentially contemporaneously with its written denial when it issued detailed

minutes 26 days after the date of the written denial and 4 days before

expiration of petitioner’s time to seek judicial review. P. 14. 

731 F. 3d 1213, reversed and remanded. 

SOTOMAYOR, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which SCALIA, 
Cite as: 574 U. S. ____ (2015) 3 

Syllabus 

KENNEDY, BREYER, ALITO, and KAGAN, JJ., joined. ALITO, J., filed a concurring opinion. ROBERTS, C. J., filed a dissenting opinion in which 

GINSBURG, J., joined, and in which THOMAS, J., joined as to Part I. 

THOMAS, J., filed a dissenting opinion. 
 

 

_________________ 

_________________ 

Cite as: 574 U. S. ____ (2015) 1 

Opinion of the Court 

NOTICE: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the

preliminary print of the United States Reports. Readers are requested to

notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of the United States, Washington, D. C. 20543, of any typographical or other formal errors, in order

that corrections may be made before the preliminary print goes to press. 

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 

No. 13–975 

T-MOBILE SOUTH, LLC, PETITIONER v.
 

CITY OF ROSWELL, GEORGIA
 

ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF 

APPEALS FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
 

[January 14, 2015]

 JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR delivered the opinion of the Court. 

The Telecommunications Act of 1996 provides, in relevant part, that “[a]ny decision by a State or local government or instrumentality thereof to deny a request to place,

construct, or modify personal wireless service facilities 

shall be in writing and supported by substantial evidence 

contained in a written record.” 110 Stat. 151, 47 U. S. C. 

§332(c)(7)(B)(iii). The question presented is whether, and 

in what form, localities must provide reasons when they 

deny telecommunication companies’ applications to construct cell phone towers. We hold that localities must 

provide or make available their reasons, but that those

reasons need not appear in the written denial letter or

notice provided by the locality. Instead, the locality’s

reasons may appear in some other written record so long

as the reasons are sufficiently clear and are provided or

made accessible to the applicant essentially contemporaneously with the written denial letter or notice. 

I 

In February 2010, petitioner T-Mobile South, LLC,

applied to build a new, 108-foot-tall cell phone tower on 
 

 

2 T-MOBILE SOUTH, LLC v. CITY OF ROSWELL 

Opinion of the Court 

2.8 acres of vacant residential property in the city of Roswell, Georgia (City). Roswell’s city ordinances require 

that any cell phone tower proposed for a residential zoning 

district must take the form of an “alternative tower structure”—an artificial tree, clock tower, steeple, or light

pole—that, in the opinion of the city council (City Council

or Council), is “compatible with the natural setting and

surrounding structures” and that effectively camouflages

the tower. Code of Ordinances §§21.2.2, 21.2.5(a); see 

App. 68, 75. In accordance with these provisions, petitioner’s application proposed a structure in the shape of an

artificial tree or “monopine.” Id., at 42. 

The City’s Planning and Zoning Division reviewed petitioner’s application, along with a substantial number of 

letters and petitions opposing it, and ultimately issued a

memorandum to the City Council concluding that the 

application met all of the requirements set out in the 

City’s ordinances. It recommended that the City Council 

approve the application on three conditions to which petitioner was prepared to agree. 

The City Council then held a 2-hour-long public hearing 

on April 12, 2010, to consider petitioner’s application.

Petitioner arranged privately to have the hearing transcribed, and, as discussed below, the City subsequently 

issued detailed minutes summarizing the proceedings. At 

the hearing, after the Planning and Zoning Division presented its recommendation and after petitioner’s representatives made a presentation in support of the application, a number of residents raised concerns. Among these

were concerns that the tower would lack aesthetic compatibility, that the technology was outdated and unnecessary, 

and that the tower would be too tall. Petitioner’s representatives responded by reiterating that it had met all of

the ordinance’s requirements and by providing testimony 

from a property appraiser that placement of cell phone

towers does not reduce property values. 
Cite as: 574 U. S. ____ (2015) 3 

Opinion of the Court 

Members of the City Council then commented on the 

application. One member of the six-person Council was 

recused, see id., at 111 (hearing transcript); id., at 322 

(meeting minutes), leaving five voting members. Member 

Igleheart said that other carriers had sufficient coverage

in the area and that the City did not need to level the

playing field for petitioner. Id., at 173–174 (hearing transcript). He also stated that his “[b]ottom line” was that he

did not think it was “appropriate for residentially zoned 

properties to have the cell towers in their location.” Id., at 

174 (hearing transcript); id., at 338 (meeting minutes). 

Member Dippolito found it difficult to believe that the 

tower would not negatively impact the area and doubted 

that it would be compatible with the natural setting. Id., 

at 175–176 (hearing transcript); id., at 339 (meeting 

minutes). Member Wynn expressed concerns about the 

lack of a backup generator for emergency services, id., at 

172 (hearing transcript), and did not think the tower 

would be “compatible with this area,” id., at 176 (hearing

transcript); id., at 339 (meeting minutes). Member Orlans 

said only that he was impressed with the information put 

together by both sides. Id., at 173 (hearing transcript); id., 

at 337 (meeting minutes). Finally, Member Price, the

liaison to the Planning and Zoning Division, made a motion to deny the application. She said that the tower 

would be aesthetically incompatible with the natural 

setting, that it would be too tall, and that its proximity to 

other homes would adversely affect the neighbors and the

resale value of their properties. Id., at 176–177 (hearing

transcript); id., at 339–340 (meeting minutes). The motion was seconded, and then passed unanimously. Id., at 

177 (hearing transcript); id., at 340 (meeting minutes).

Two days later, on April 14, 2010, the Planning and 

Zoning Division sent a letter to petitioner that said in its

entirety: 
 

 

 

4 T-MOBILE SOUTH, LLC v. CITY OF ROSWELL 

Opinion of the Court 

“Please be advised the City of Roswell Mayor and 

City Council denied the request from T-Mobile for a 

108’ mono-pine alternative tower structure during

their April 12, 2010 hearing. The minutes from the 

aforementioned hearing may be obtained from the city 

clerk. Please contact Sue Creel or Betsy Branch at 

[phone number].

“If you have any additional questions, please contact me at [phone number].” Id., at 278. 

The detailed written minutes of the hearing, however,

were not approved and published by the City until 26 days

later, on May 10, 2010. See id., at 321–341 (meeting 

minutes).1 

On May 13, 2010, 3 days after the detailed minutes 

were published—and now 29 days after the City denied 

petitioner’s application—petitioner filed suit in Federal

District Court. It alleged that the denial of the application 

was not supported by substantial evidence in the record, 

and would effectively prohibit the provision of wireless

service in violation of the Telecommunications Act of 

1996 (Act). The parties filed cross-motions for summary 

judgment.

The District Court granted petitioner’s motion for summary judgment, concluding that the City had violated the 

—————— 

1Brief minutes had been adopted on April 19, but these only noted

that the motion to deny the application had passed with five members

in favor and one member recused. See Council Brief 041210, online at 

http:// roswell.legistar.com/LegislationDetail.aspx?ID=657578&GUID=0

8D5297C-0271-41F9-9DAA-E8E3DD6314BD&Options=&Search= (all Internet Materials as visited January 12, 2015, and available in Clerk of 

Court’s case file). According to the meeting calendar for the City

Council’s May 10, 2010, meeting, it was on that day that the City

Council approved detailed minutes of the April 12 meeting that included a recitation of each member’s statements during the hearing. See 

http:// roswell.legistar.com/MeetingDetail.aspx?ID=101786&GUID=63 

828B21-EB83-4485-B4EA-10EE65CF48CD&Options=info|&Search=. 
 

Cite as: 574 U. S. ____ (2015) 5 

Opinion of the Court 

Act when it failed to issue a written decision that stated 

the reasons for denying petitioner’s application. The 

District Court interpreted the Act to require that a written 

denial letter or notice describe the reasons for the denial 

and that those reasons be sufficiently explained to allow a

reviewing court to evaluate them against the written 

record. 

The Eleventh Circuit reversed. 731 F. 3d 1213 (2013). 

It explained that, in T-Mobile South, LLC v. Milton, 728 

F. 3d 1274 (2013), which was decided after the District

Court’s decision in this case, it had held that “to the extent 

that the decision must contain grounds or reasons or 

explanations, it is sufficient if those are contained in a 

different written document or documents that the applicant is given or has access to.” Id., at 1285. The Eleventh 

Circuit acknowledged that the Courts of Appeals had split

on that question, and that it had departed from the majority rule. Compare Southwestern Bell Mobile Systems, Inc. 

v. Todd, 244 F. 3d 51, 60 (CA1 2001) (requiring that a

locality issue a written denial that itself contains a “sufficient explanation of the reasons for the permit denial to

allow a reviewing court to evaluate the evidence in the

record supporting those reasons”); New Par v. Saginaw, 

301 F. 3d 390, 395–396 (CA6 2002); MetroPCS, Inc. v. City 

and County of San Francisco, 400 F. 3d 715, 723 (CA9

2005), with AT&T Wireless PCS, Inc. v. City Council of 

Virginia Beach, 155 F. 3d 423, 429 (CA4 1998) (holding

that written minutes of a meeting and the word “denied” 

stamped on a letter describing the application were

sufficient). Applying its rule to this case, the Eleventh 

Circuit found that the requirements of 47 U. S. C. 

§332(c)(7)(B)(iii) were satisfied because petitioner had its

own transcript as well as a written letter stating that the

application had been denied and informing petitioner that 

it could obtain access to the minutes of the hearing. 731 

F. 3d, at 1221. It did not consider when the City provided 
 

 

6 T-MOBILE SOUTH, LLC v. CITY OF ROSWELL 

Opinion of the Court 

its written reasons to petitioner. 

We granted certiorari, 572 U. S. ___ (2014), and now 

reverse the judgment of the Eleventh Circuit. 

II
 

A 

The first question we answer is whether the statute

requires localities to provide reasons when they deny

applications to build cell phone towers. We answer that 

question in the affirmative. 

Our conclusion follows from the provisions of the Telecommunications Act. The Act generally preserves “the 

traditional authority of state and local governments to

regulate the location, construction, and modification” of 

wireless communications facilities like cell phone towers, 

but imposes “specific limitations” on that authority. Rancho Palos Verdes v. Abrams, 544 U. S. 113, 115 (2005); see 

§332(c)(7)(B). One of those limitations is that any decision

to deny a request to build a tower “shall be in writing and 

supported by substantial evidence contained in a written

record.” §332(c)(7)(B)(iii). Another is that parties adversely 

affected by a locality’s decision may seek judicial review.

§332(c)(7)(B)(v). In order to determine whether a locality’s

denial was supported by substantial evidence, as Congress

directed, courts must be able to identify the reason or

reasons why the locality denied the application. See Rancho Palos Verdes, 544 U. S., at 128 (BREYER, J., joined by 

O’Connor, Souter, and GINSBURG, JJ., concurring) (observing that the Act “requires local zoning boards . . . [to] give 

reasons for [their] denials ‘in writing’”).

The requirement that localities must provide reasons 

when they deny applications is further underscored by two 

of the other limitations on local authority set out in the 

Act. The Act provides that localities “shall not unreasonably discriminate among providers of functionally equivalent services,” and may not regulate the construction of 
 

 

Cite as: 574 U. S. ____ (2015) 7 

Opinion of the Court 

personal wireless service facilities “on the basis of the 

environmental effects of radio frequency emissions to the

extent that such facilities comply with the [Federal Communications Commission’s] regulations concerning such

emissions.” §§332(c)(7)(B)(i)(I), (iv).2 Again, it would be

considerably more difficult for a reviewing court to determine whether a locality had violated these substantive

provisions if the locality were not obligated to state its 

reasons. 

This conclusion is not just commonsensical, but flows

directly from Congress’ use of the term “substantial evidence.” The statutory phrase “substantial evidence” is a 

“term of art” in administrative law that describes how “an 

administrative record is to be judged by a reviewing

court.” United States v. Carlo Bianchi & Co., 373 U. S. 

709, 715 (1963). There is no reason discernible from the 

text of the Act to think that Congress meant to use the 

phrase in a different way. See FAA v. Cooper, 566 U. S. 

___, ___ (2012) (slip op., at 6) (“[W]hen Congress employs a 

term of art, it presumably knows and adopts the cluster of

ideas that were attached to each borrowed word in the 

body of learning from which it was taken” (internal quotation marks omitted)). Indeed, for those who consider 

legislative history relevant, the Conference Report accompanying the Act confirmed as much when it noted that

“[t]he phrase ‘substantial evidence contained in a written 

record’ is the traditional standard used for review of agency

actions.” H. R. Conf. Rep. No. 104–458, p. 208 (1996).

By employing the term “substantial evidence,” Congress

thus invoked, among other things, our recognition that

“the orderly functioning of the process of [substantial­

—————— 

2The last “limitation” listed in the Act provides that localities shall

act on applications to construct personal wireless service facilities 

“within a reasonable period of time after the request is duly filed . . . 

taking into account the nature and scope of such request.” 

§332(c)(7)(B)(ii). 
 

 

8 T-MOBILE SOUTH, LLC v. CITY OF ROSWELL 

Opinion of the Court 

evidence] review requires that the grounds upon which the 

administrative agency acted be clearly disclosed,” and that 

“courts cannot exercise their duty of [substantial-evidence]

review unless they are advised of the considerations underlying the action under review.” SEC v. Chenery Corp., 

318 U. S. 80, 94 (1943); see also Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Assn. 

of United States, Inc. v. State Farm Mut. Automobile Ins. 

Co., 463 U. S. 29, 43 (1983) (explaining that an agency 

must “articulate a satisfactory explanation for its action” 

to enable substantial-evidence review); Beaumont, S. L. & 

W. R. Co. v. United States, 282 U. S. 74, 86 (1930) (“Complete statements by the [agency] showing the grounds 

upon which its determinations rest are quite as necessary

as are opinions of lower courts setting forth the reasons on

which they base their decisions . . .”). 

In response, the City primarily argues that a reasongiving obligation would deprive it of local zoning authority. But Congress intended to place “specific limitations on 

the traditional authority of state and local governments”

regarding cell phone tower siting applications. Rancho 

Palos Verdes, 544 U. S., at 115. One of those “limitations,” 

§332(c)(7)(B), necessarily implied by the Act’s “substantial

evidence” requirement, is that local zoning authorities

state their reasons when they deny applications.

In short, the statutory text and structure, and the concepts that Congress imported into the statutory framework, all point clearly toward the conclusion that localities 

must provide reasons when they deny cell phone tower 

siting applications. We stress, however, that these reasons need not be elaborate or even sophisticated, but 

rather, as discussed below, simply clear enough to enable

judicial review. 

B 

The second question we answer is whether these reasons must appear in the same writing that conveys the 
Cite as: 574 U. S. ____ (2015) 9 

Opinion of the Court 

locality’s denial of an application. We answer that question in the negative. 

Like our conclusion that localities must provide reasons, 

our conclusion that the reasons need not appear in a denial letter follows from the statutory text. Other than 

providing that a locality’s reasons must be given in writing, nothing in that text imposes any requirement that the

reasons be given in any particular form. 

The Act’s saving clause makes clear that, other than the

enumerated limitations imposed on local governments by 

the statute itself, “nothing in this chapter shall limit or 

affect the authority of a State or local government or

instrumentality thereof over decisions regarding the 

placement, construction, and modification of personal 

wireless service facilities.” §332(c)(7)(A). Given this language, and the system of “cooperative federalism” on 

which the Act is premised, Rancho Palos Verdes, 544 U. S., 

at 128 (BREYER, J., concurring), we understand the enumerated limitations to set out an exclusive list. So while 

the text and structure of the Act render it inescapable that

localities must provide reasons in writing when they deny 

applications, we can locate in the Act no command—either 

explicit or implicit—that localities must provide those

reasons in a specific document. 

We therefore conclude that Congress imposed no specific 

requirement on that front, but instead permitted localities

to comply with their obligation to give written reasons so

long as the locality’s reasons are stated clearly enough to

enable judicial review. Although the statute does not

require a locality to provide its written reasons in any

particular format, and although a locality may rely on

detailed meeting minutes as it did here, we agree with the

Solicitor General that “the local government may be better

served by including a separate statement containing its

reasons.” Brief for United States as Amicus Curiae 26; see 

also id., at 34. If the locality writes a short statement 
 

10 T-MOBILE SOUTH, LLC v. CITY OF ROSWELL 

Opinion of the Court 

providing its reasons, the locality can likely avoid prolonging the litigation—and adding expense to the taxpayers,

the companies, and the legal system—while the parties

argue about exactly what the sometimes voluminous 

record means. Moreover, in that circumstance, the locality

need not worry that, upon review of the record, a court will

either find that it could not ascertain the locality’s reasons

or mistakenly ascribe to the locality a rationale that was

not in fact the reason for the locality’s denial. 

We hasten to add that a locality cannot stymie or burden the judicial review contemplated by the statute by 

delaying the release of its reasons for a substantial time 

after it conveys its written denial. The statute provides

that an entity adversely affected by a locality’s decision

may seek judicial review within 30 days of the decision. 

§332(c)(7)(B)(v). Because an entity may not be able to

make a considered decision whether to seek judicial review without knowing the reasons for the denial of its 

application, and because a court cannot review the denial

without knowing the locality’s reasons, the locality must

provide or make available its written reasons at essentially 

the same time as it communicates its denial.3 

—————— 

3 THE CHIEF JUSTICE’s dissent rejects this particular requirement, and 

instead invents a process that turns judicial review on its head. Rather 

than give effect to a process that would permit an entity seeking to 

challenge a locality’s decision to see the locality’s written reasons before

it files its suit—and the dissent agrees that the statute requires that a

locality convey its reasons in writing, see post, at 5—the dissent would 

fashion a world in which a locality can wait until a lawsuit is commenced and a court orders it to state its reasons. The entity would thus

be left to guess at what the locality’s written reasons will be, write a 

complaint that contains those hypotheses, and risk being sandbagged

by the written reasons that the locality subsequently provides in 

litigation after the challenging entity has shown its cards. The reviewing court would then need to ensure that those reasons are not post hoc 

rationalizations, see Burlington Truck Lines, Inc. v. United States, 371 

U. S. 156, 168 (1962), but the dissent offers no guidance as to how a

reviewing court that has never seen near-contemporaneous reasons 
Cite as: 574 U. S. ____ (2015) 11 

Opinion of the Court 

This rule ought not to unduly burden localities given the 

range of ways in which localities can provide their reasons. Moreover, the denial itself needs only to be issued

(or the application otherwise acted upon) “within a reasonable period of time.” §332(c)(7)(B)(ii). In an interpretation we have recently upheld, see Arlington v. FCC, 569 

U. S. ___ (2013), the Federal Communications Commission 

(FCC) has generally interpreted this provision to allow 

localities 90 days to act on applications to place new antennas on existing towers and 150 days to act on other 

siting applications. In re Petition for Declaratory Ruling to 

Clarify Provisions of Section 332(c)(7)(b), 24 FCC Rcd. 

13994, 13995, ¶4 (2009). If a locality is not in a position to 

provide its reasons promptly, the locality can delay the 

issuance of its denial within this 90- or 150-day window,

and instead release it along with its reasons once those 

reasons are ready to be provided. Only once the denial is

issued would the 30-day commencement-of-suit clock 

begin.4 

III 

Petitioner offers four reasons why, in its view, our analysis in Part II–B is incorrect. Petitioner argues that the 

statute requires that a locality’s reasons appear in the 

writing conveying the denial itself, but none of petitioner’s 

—————— 

would conduct that inquiry. 4The City urges us to hold that the clock does not begin to run until 

after the reasons are given. We cannot so hold, however, without 

rewriting the statutory text. The Act provides that a lawsuit may be

filed by “[a]ny person adversely affected by any final action or failure to

act . . . within 30 days after such action or failure to act.” 47 U. S. C. 

§332(c)(7)(B)(v). The relevant “final action” is the issuance of the 

written notice of denial, not the subsequent issuance of reasons explaining the denial. See Bennett v. Spear, 520 U. S. 154, 177–178 

(1997) (agency action is “final” if it “mark[s] the consummation of the

agency’s decisionmaking process” and determines “rights or obligations”

or triggers “legal consequences” (internal quotation marks omitted)). 
 

 

 

12 T-MOBILE SOUTH, LLC v. CITY OF ROSWELL 

Opinion of the Court 

reasons are persuasive.

First, petitioner argues that the word “decision” in the 

statute—the thing that must be “in writing”—connotes a

written document that itself provides all the reasons for a 

given judgment. See Brief for Petitioner 24 (quoting 

Black’s Law Dictionary 407 (6th ed. 1990) (a “decision” is a 

written document providing “‘the reasons given for [a] 

judgment’”)). But even petitioner concedes, with its preferred dictionary in hand, that the word “decision” can also 

mean “something short of a statement of reasons explaining a determination.” Brief for Petitioner 24 (citing

Black’s Law Dictionary, at 407).5 

Second, petitioner claims that other provisions in the

Act use the word “notify” when the Act means to impose 

only a requirement that a judgment be communicated.6 

Because the provision at issue here does not use the word

“notify,” petitioner argues, it must contemplate something 

—————— 

5One of petitioner’s amici argues that Congress has used the word

“decision” in the context of other communications laws to mean something more than a judgment or verdict. See Brief for Chamber of 

Commerce of the United States of America (Chamber) et al. 9–13. But 

while it is true that a word used across “the same act” should be given 

the same meaning, see Taniguchi v. Kan Pacific Saipan, Ltd., 566 U. S. 

___, ___ (2012) (slip op., at 10), the Chamber’s evidence is less persuasive because it arises out of entirely different “acts” and does not 

involve any term of art. By relying on other parts of Title 47 of the 

U. S. Code—some enacted in the Communications Act of 1934 decades 

before the enactment of the Telecommunications Act of 1996 at issue 

here—the Chamber stretches to invoke this canon of construction 

beyond its most forceful application. See A. Scalia & B. Garner, Reading Law: The Interpretation of Legal Texts 172–173 (2012). 6For example, petitioner cites §11 (FCC must “notify the parties

concerned” when it makes a “determination and order” regarding a railroad or telegraph company’s failure to maintain and operate a telegraph line for public use) and §398(b)(5) (“Whenever the Secretary [of

Commerce] makes a final determination . . . that a recipient” of federal 

funds has engaged in impermissible discrimination, the Secretary shall 

“notify the recipient in writing of such determination . . .”). Brief for 

Petitioner 24–25. 
Cite as: 574 U. S. ____ (2015) 13 

Opinion of the Court 

more than a judgment. This does not logically follow. For 

one thing, the statute at issue here does not use any verb 

at all to describe the conveying of information from a 

locality to an applicant; it just says that a denial “shall be 

in writing and supported by substantial evidence contained in a written record.” §332(c)(7)(B)(iii). But more to 

the point, “notify” is a verb the use—or nonuse—of which 

does not reveal what the thing to be notified of or about is.

Third, petitioner contends that the “substantial evidence” requirement itself demands that localities identify 

their reasons in their written denials. See Brief for Petitioner 23. Certainly, as discussed above, the phrase “substantial evidence” requires localities to give reasons, but it 

says nothing on its own about the document in which

those reasons must be stated or presented to a reviewing 

court. 

Finally, petitioner invokes the statutory requirement 

that any adversely affected person shall have their challenge heard by a court “on an expedited basis.” 

§332(c)(7)(B)(v). See Brief for Petitioner 14–15, 28. As 

long as the reasons are provided in a written record, however, and as long as they are provided in such a manner 

that is clear enough and prompt enough to enable judicial 

review, there is no reason to require that those reasons be 

provided in the written denial itself. 

We acknowledge that petitioner, along with those 

Courts of Appeals that have required a locality’s reasons 

to appear in its written denial itself, have offered plausible

bases for a rule that would require as much. See, e.g., 

Todd, 244 F. 3d, at 60 (“A written record can create difficulties in determining the rationale behind a board’s

decision . . .”). Congress could adopt such a rule if it were

so inclined, but it did not do so in this statute. It is not 

our place to legislate another approach. 
 

 

14 T-MOBILE SOUTH, LLC v. CITY OF ROSWELL 

Opinion of the Court 

IV 

Thus, we hold that the Act requires localities to provide

reasons when they deny cell phone tower siting applications, but that the Act does not require localities to provide those reasons in written denial letters or notices 

themselves. A locality may satisfy its statutory obligations if it states its reasons with sufficient clarity in some

other written record issued essentially contemporaneously

with the denial. In this case, the City provided its reasons

in writing and did so in the acceptable form of detailed 

minutes of the City Council meeting. The City, however, 

did not provide its written reasons essentially contemporaneously with its written denial. Instead, the City issued 

those detailed minutes 26 days after the date of the written denial and just 4 days before petitioner’s time to seek 

judicial review would have expired.7 The City therefore

did not comply with its statutory obligations. We do not 

consider questions regarding the applicability of principles

of harmless error or questions of remedy, and leave those

for the Eleventh Circuit to address on remand. 

* * * 

For the foregoing reasons, we reverse the judgment

below and remand the case for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. 

It is so ordered. 

—————— 

7Though petitioner arranged for a transcript of the meeting to be

recorded on its own initiative and at its own expense, see App. 109–275,

the fact that petitioner took steps to reduce oral statements made at

the City Council meeting to writing cannot be said to satisfy the obligation that Congress placed on the City to state clearly its reasons, and to 

do so in a writing it provides or makes available. 
_________________ 

_________________ 

Cite as: 574 U. S. ____ (2015) 1 

ALITO, J., concurring 

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 

No. 13–975 

T-MOBILE SOUTH, LLC, PETITIONER v.
 

CITY OF ROSWELL, GEORGIA
 

ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF 

APPEALS FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
 

[January 14, 2015]

 JUSTICE ALITO, concurring. 

I concur in the Court’s opinion because I agree that

Congress, by using the term “substantial evidence,” intended to invoke administrative law principles. One such 

principle, as the Court explains, is the requirement that

agencies give reasons. I write separately, however, because three other traditional administrative law principles

may also apply.

First, a court must “uphold a decision of less than ideal 

clarity if the agency’s path may reasonably be discerned.” 

Bowman Transp., Inc. v. Arkansas-Best Freight System, 

Inc., 419 U. S. 281, 286 (1974). In the context of 47 

U. S. C. §332(c)(7), which leaves in place almost the entirety of a local government’s authority, a succinct statement that a permit has been denied because the tower 

would be esthetically incompatible with the surrounding

area should suffice. Nothing in this statute imposes an 

opinion-writing requirement.

Second, even if a locality has erred, a court must not

invalidate the locality’s decision if the error was harmless. 

“In administrative law, as in federal civil and criminal 

litigation, there is a harmless error rule.” National Assn. 

of Home Builders v. Defenders of Wildlife, 551 U. S. 644, 

659–660 (2007) (internal quotation marks omitted). Here, 

for instance, I have trouble believing that T-Mobile South, 
 

2 T-MOBILE SOUTH, LLC v. CITY OF ROSWELL 

ALITO, J., concurring 

LLC—which actively participated in the decisionmaking

process, including going so far as to transcribe the public

hearing—was prejudiced by the city of Roswell’s delay in 

providing a copy of the minutes. 

Third, the ordinary rule in administrative law is that a 

court must remand errors to the agency “except in rare

circumstances.” Florida Power & Light Co. v. Lorion, 470 

U. S. 729, 744 (1985). Nothing we say today should be

read to suggest that when a locality has erred, the inevitable remedy is that a tower must be built. The Court has 

not passed on what remedial powers a “court of competent 

jurisdiction” may exercise. §332(c)(7)(B)(v). This unanswered question is important given the federalism implications of this statute. 

I do not understand the Court’s opinion to disagree with

this analysis. On that understanding, I join the Court’s 

opinion. 
 

_________________ 

_________________ 

Cite as: 574 U. S. ____ (2015) 1 

ROBERTS, C. J., dissenting 

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 

No. 13–975 

T-MOBILE SOUTH, LLC, PETITIONER v.
 

CITY OF ROSWELL, GEORGIA
 

ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF 

APPEALS FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
 

[January 14, 2015]

 CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS, with whom JUSTICE GINSBURG 

joins, and with whom JUSTICE THOMAS joins as to Part I, 

dissenting. 

The statute at issue in this case provides that “[a]ny

decision . . . to deny a request . . . shall be in writing and 

supported by substantial evidence contained in a written

record.” 47 U. S. C. §332(c)(7)(B)(iii). The Court concludes 

that the City loses this case not because it failed to provide

its denial in writing. It did provide its denial in writing. 

Nor does the City lose because the denial was not supported 

by substantial evidence in a written record. The City

compiled a written record; whether that record contained 

substantial evidence supporting the denial is not at issue 

here and has not been decided. Nor does the City lose

because its denial was not accompanied by a statement of 

reasons apart from the written record. A sharp conflict

had developed in the lower courts over the necessity of

such a separate statement, and the Court today squarely 

holds that one is not required. Ante, at 5, 8–11. No, the 

City instead loses because of a question of timing: The 

written record was not made available roughly the same 

day as the denial—a requirement found nowhere in the

text of the statute. 

The Court says this timing requirement is necessary for

judicial review of whether the denial is supported by 
 

 

2 T-MOBILE SOUTH, LLC v. CITY OF ROSWELL 

ROBERTS, C. J., dissenting 

substantial evidence. A reviewing court, however, can

carry out its function just as easily whether the record is

submitted four weeks or four days before the lawsuit is

filed—or four days after, for that matter. The Court also 

supports its timing rule by saying that the company whose

application is denied needs the time to carefully consider

whether to seek review. But cell service providers are not 

Mom and Pop operations. As this case illustrates, they

participate extensively in the local government proceedings, and do not have to make last-second, uninformed 

decisions on whether to seek review. 

The City here fully complied with its obligations under

the statute: It issued its decision in writing, and it submitted a written record containing—so far as we know—

substantial evidence supporting that decision. I respectfully dissent from the Court’s contrary conclusion. 

I 

Section 332(c)(7), enacted as part of the Telecommunications Act of 1996, places several limits on local governments’ authority to regulate the siting of cell towers and

other telecommunications facilities. A locality’s regulations must not unreasonably discriminate among service

providers, effectively prohibit the provision of service, or 

rest on concerns about the environmental effects of radio 

emissions. See §§332(c)(7)(B)(i), (iv). In addition, the 

provision central to this case specifies that “[a]ny decision

by a State or local government . . . to deny a request to 

place, construct, or modify” a cell tower “shall be in writing and supported by substantial evidence contained in a 

written record.” §332(c)(7)(B)(iii). And another provision

authorizes expedited judicial review of a locality’s alleged 

failure to comply with these rules. See §332(c)(7)(B)(v).

After the city council of Roswell voted to deny T-Mobile’s

application to build a cell tower, the City sent T-Mobile a 

short letter that announced the denial but provided no 
 

Cite as: 574 U. S. ____ (2015) 3 

ROBERTS, C. J., dissenting 

further explanation. The question T-Mobile has presented 

to this Court is whether such a letter satisfies the “decision . . . in writing” requirement of Section 332(c)(7)(B)(iii). 

See Pet. for Cert. i. 

I would hold it does. The City’s letter was certainly in 

writing. And it certainly memorialized the denial of TMobile’s application. So T-Mobile’s only hope is that the

lack of explanation for the denial means the letter is

not truly a “decision.” But like the majority, I reject TMobile’s contention that the term “decision” inherently

demands a statement of reasons. Dictionary definitions

support that conclusion. See ante, at 12 (citing Black’s

Law Dictionary); see also B. Garner, A Dictionary of Modern Legal Usage 251 (2d ed. 1995) (grouping “decision” 

with “judgment,” as distinct from “opinion”). 

A comparison between Section 332(c)(7)(B)(iii) and other 

statutory provisions that were on the books in 1996 also 

suggests that when Congress wants decisionmakers to 

supply explanations, it says so. Consider first the Administrative Procedure Act. In the context of formal adjudication and rulemaking, it demands that “decisions . . . include a statement of . . . findings and conclusions, and the 

reasons or basis therefor, on all the material issues.” 5 

U. S. C. §557(c)(A) (1994 ed.) (emphasis added). Even in 

informal proceedings, an agency must give prompt notice 

of the denial of a written application, and, “[e]xcept in

affirming a prior denial or when the denial is selfexplanatory, the notice shall be accompanied by a brief 

statement of the grounds for denial.” §555(e) (emphasis 

added).

The Communications Act of 1934, which the Telecommunications Act overhauled, itself contains a similar 

express requirement. Section 309 allows an interested 

party to petition the Federal Communications Commission 

to deny a license application. 47 U. S. C. §309(d)(1) (1994 

ed.). If the FCC decides to grant an application despite 
 

 

4 T-MOBILE SOUTH, LLC v. CITY OF ROSWELL 

ROBERTS, C. J., dissenting 

such a petition, it must “issue a concise statement of the 

reasons for denying the petition.” §309(d)(2). And a provision added along with Section 332(c)(7) in the Telecommunications Act provides that when the FCC grants or 

denies a petition for regulatory forbearance, it “shall 

explain its decision in writing.” §160(c) (2000 ed.) (emphasis added). Many other statutes in effect in 1996 could be

added to the list. See, e.g., 19 U. S. C. §1515(a) (1994 ed.) 

(notice of customs protest denial “shall include a statement of the reasons for the denial”); 30 U. S. C. §944 (1994 

ed.) (individual whose claim for black lung benefits “is

denied shall receive . . . a written statement of the reasons 

for denial”); 38 U. S. C. §5104(b) (1994 ed.) (notice of denial

of veterans benefits must include “a statement of the 

reasons for the decision”). 

Given the commonplace nature of express requirements 

that reasons be given—and the inclusion of such provisions in the Administrative Procedure Act, the original 

Communications Act, and another provision of the Telecommunications Act—the absence of one in Section 

332(c)(7)(B)(iii) is telling, and supports reading “decision 

. . . in writing” to demand nothing more than what it says: 

a written document that communicates the town’s denial. 

In my view, resolving that interpretive question in the 

City’s favor also resolves the case as it stands in this 

Court. Although Section 332(c)(7)(B)(iii) goes on to require 

that a denial be “supported by substantial evidence contained in a written record,” the adequacy of the City’s

written record is not properly before us. As the Eleventh 

Circuit noted in its opinion below, the “sole issue” before it 

was the “in writing” requirement; it did not examine

whether the City’s denial was supported by substantial 

evidence. 731 F. 3d 1213, 1221, n. 7 (2013). The Court 

today also—correctly—does not decide whether substantial evidence supported the City’s denial. The Eleventh 

Circuit’s judgment therefore ought to be affirmed and the 
 

Cite as: 574 U. S. ____ (2015) 5 

ROBERTS, C. J., dissenting 

case remanded to the District Court for further proceedings on T-Mobile’s remaining challenges. 

II 

The Court agrees that the City was not required to 

explain its reasoning in its denial letter, but it nonetheless 

rules for T-Mobile. The improbable linchpin of this outcome is the City’s failure to finalize the minutes of the

April 12 city council meeting until May 10. Improbable

because, so far as I can tell, T-Mobile never even mentioned this timeline, let alone based an argument on it, in 

its filings in the lower courts or its petition for certiorari. 

Nor did the Eleventh Circuit address this timing question 

in any way. Cf. Zivotofsky v. Clinton, 566 U. S. ___, ___ 

(2012) (slip op., at 12) (“Ordinarily, we do not decide in the

first instance issues not decided below.” (internal quotation marks omitted)).

The Court nonetheless rules against Roswell on this 

ground, proceeding in two steps: First it concludes that a 

town must provide written reasons in some form (the 

minutes being the only candidate here); then it decides a 

town must make those reasons available “essentially

contemporaneously” with its decision (the final minutes 

were not). Ante, at 14. In my view, the first step is justified by the statutory text, but the second is not.

The need to provide reasons in some form follows from

the portion of Section 332(c)(7)(B)(iii) requiring that denials be “supported by substantial evidence contained in a 

written record.” Like the majority, I read this phrase as

specifying a familiar standard of review to be used if a 

denial is challenged in court. And like the majority, I

agree that substantial evidence review requires that a 

decisionmaker’s reasons be identifiable in the written 

record. If a reviewing court cannot identify any of a town’s

reasons for denying an application, it cannot determine 

whether substantial evidence supports those reasons, and 
 

 

6 T-MOBILE SOUTH, LLC v. CITY OF ROSWELL 

ROBERTS, C. J., dissenting 

the town loses. 

But then the Court goes a step further and creates a

timing rule: A town must provide “its written reasons at 

essentially the same time as it communicates its denial.” 

Ante, at 10. This timing rule is nowhere to be found in the

text of Section 332(c)(7)(B)—text that expressly establishes 

other time limits, both general and specific. See 

§332(c)(7)(B)(ii) (requiring localities to act on siting requests “within a reasonable period of time”); §332(c)

(7)(B)(v) (giving injured parties 30 days to seek judicial 

review). Despite its assertion that the statute’s “enumerated limitations” constitute “an exclusive list,” ante, at 9, 

the Court offers two justifications for its inference of this

additional, unenumerated limitation. 

The first is that “a court cannot review the denial without knowing the locality’s reasons,” so it would “stymie”

judicial review to allow delay between the issuance of the

decision and the statement of reasons. Ante, at 10. This 

makes little sense. The Court’s “essentially contemporaneous” requirement presumably means the town must

produce its reasons within a matter of days (though the 

majority never says how many). But a reviewing court

does not need to be able to discern the town’s reasons 

within mere days of the decision. At that point no one has 

even asked the court to review the denial. The fact that a 

court cannot conduct review without knowing the reasons

simply means that if the town has not already made the 

record available, it must do so by whatever deadline the 

court sets. The court should proceed “on an expedited 

basis,” §332(c)(7)(B)(v), but that hardly means it will need 

the record within days of the town’s decision. And in this 

case there is no indication that the City’s submission of

the written record was untimely or delayed the District

Court’s review. 

The Court’s second justification focuses on the denied 

applicant, which must choose within 30 days from the 
 

 

Cite as: 574 U. S. ____ (2015) 7 

ROBERTS, C. J., dissenting 

denial whether to take the town to court. §332(c)(7)(B)(v).

“[W]ithout knowing the locality’s reasons,” the majority

says, the applicant “may not be able to make a considered 

decision whether to seek judicial review.” Ante, at 10. 

This concern might have force if towns routinely made 

these decisions in secret, closed-door proceedings, or if 

applicants were unsophisticated actors. But the local 

zoning board or town council is not the Star Chamber, and 

a telecommunications company is no babe in the legal 

woods. Almost invariably in cases addressing Section 

332(c)(7), the relevant local authority has held an open 

meeting at which the applicant was present and the issues 

publicly aired. In this case and others, T-Mobile has 

brought its own court reporter, ensuring that it has a

verbatim transcript of the meeting well before the town is

likely to finalize its minutes. See Brief for Petitioner 12, 

n. 2; T-Mobile South, LLC v. City of Milton, Georgia, 728 

F. 3d 1274, 1277 (CA11 2013). I strongly doubt that a

sophisticated, well-lawyered company like T-Mobile—with 

extensive experience with these particular types of proceedings—would have any trouble consulting its interests

and deciding whether to seek review before it had received

a written explanation from the town. The Court worries 

about towns “sandbagg[ing]” companies with unexpected 

reasons, ante, at 10, n. 3, but if those reasons in fact come 

out of nowhere, they will not be supported by substantial 

evidence in the record. And if the company’s initial complaint mistakes the town’s reasoning, the company will 

have no difficulty amending its allegations. See Fed. Rule 

Civ. Proc. 15(a). 

In sum, there is nothing impractical about reading the

statutory text to require only that the reasons implied by 

the term “substantial evidence” be discernible to the court 

when it conducts substantial evidence review. Demanding 

“essentially contemporaneous” written reasons adds a 

requirement that Congress has included expressly in 
 

 

 

 

 

8 T-MOBILE SOUTH, LLC v. CITY OF ROSWELL 

ROBERTS, C. J., dissenting 

many other statutes, but not in this one. See supra, at 

3–4. 

* * * 

For the foregoing reasons, the Court’s opinion and

judgment are wrong. But this is not a “the sky is falling” 

dissent. At the end of the day, the impact on cities and 

towns across the Nation should be small, although the 

new unwritten requirement could be a trap for the unwary 

hamlet or two. All a local government need do is withhold 

its final decision until the minutes are typed up, and make

the final decision and the record of proceedings (with 

discernible reasons) available together. 

Today’s decision is nonetheless a bad break for Roswell.

Or maybe not. The Court leaves open the question of 

remedy, ante, at 14, and it may be that failure to comply 

with the “in writing” requirement as construed by the

Court can be excused as harmless error in appropriate 

cases. It is hard to see where the harm is here. T-Mobile 

somehow managed to make the tough call to seek review

of the denial of an application it had spent months and 

many thousands of dollars to obtain, based on a hearing it

had attended. And nothing about Roswell’s failure to meet 

the “contemporaneously” requirement delayed, much less

“stymied,” judicial review. 

The Court today resolves the conflict over whether a

town must provide a statement of reasons with its final

decision, apart from the written record. We now know it 

need not. As the Court explains, “nothing in [the] text [of 

the Act] imposes any requirement that the reasons be

given in any particular form,” and there is “in the Act no 

command—either explicit or implicit—that localities must 

provide those reasons in a specific document.” Ante, at 9. 

Good analysis—which also should have been followed to 

reject the timing requirement the Court creates today. 

I respectfully dissent. 
_________________ 

_________________ 

 

Cite as: 574 U. S. ____ (2015) 1 

THOMAS, J., dissenting 

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 

No. 13–975 

T-MOBILE SOUTH, LLC, PETITIONER v.
 

CITY OF ROSWELL, GEORGIA
 

ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF 

APPEALS FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
 

[January 14, 2015]

 JUSTICE THOMAS, dissenting. 

I join Part I of THE CHIEF JUSTICE’s dissent, which says

all the Court needed to say to resolve this case. I write 

separately to express my concern about the Court’s eagerness to reach beyond the bounds of the present dispute to 

create a timing requirement that finds no support in the

text or structure of the statute. We have been unwilling to

impose procedural requirements on federal agencies in the

absence of statutory command, even while recognizing 

that an agency’s failure to make its decisions known at the 

time it acts may burden regulated parties. See, e.g., Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation v. LTV Corp., 496 U. S. 

633, 653–655 (1990). When a State vests its municipalities with authority to exercise a core state power, those

municipalities deserve at least as much respect as a federal agency. But today, the majority treats them as less 

than conscripts in “the national bureaucratic army,” 

FERC v. Mississippi, 456 U. S. 742, 775 (1982) (O’Connor,

J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). I respectfully 

dissent.