Dismiss and Opinion Filed July 26, 2013 

# S

In The Court of A ppeals Fifth District of Texas at Dallas No. 05-12-01438-CV DOUGLAS J. PAHL, Appellant V. DON SWAIM, P.C., Appellee On Appeal from the 191st Judicial District Court Dallas County, Texas Trial Court Cause No. DC 10-16517 MEMORANDUM OPINION Before Justices O'Neill, FitzGerald, and Lang-Miers Opinion by Justice FitzGerald This appeal arises from the trial court’s deni al of appellant’s special appearance. Because we conclude the notice of appeal was not timel y filed, we dismiss for want of jurisdiction. BACKGROUND Appellees filed the underlying lawsuit on December 21, 2010. Appella nt filed a special appearance on April 4, 2011, but did not set it for hearing. Appellees set the special appearance for a hearing on three occasions. On the day before the first two settings, appellant requested and was granted a continuance. Although appellant also requested a continuance before the third and final setting, the trial court denied the motion. The trial court conducted a hearing on the speci al appearance, and on July 6, 2012 signed an order denying appellant’s sp ecial appearance. On August 9, 2012, appellant filed a document entitled “motion to reconsider defendants’ specia l appearance and amended and restated special–2 appearance.” At a hearing on September 24, 2012, th e trial court entered an order denying the “motion to reconsider defendant’s special a ppearance.” On October 15, 2012, appellant filed a notice of appeal. The notice states, “after denial of his motion to reconsider and amended and restated special appearance, [appellant] gives no tice of his accelerated appe al from that certain order denying [his] special appear ance signed on September 24, 2012.” Concerned that we lacked jurisdiction over this appeal, we requested jurisdictional briefing, and upon receipt, tentatively conclu ded the court had jurisdiction. Having fully considered the jurisdictional issue, we concl ude for the reasons that follow the Court lacks jurisdiction over this appeal. DISCUSSION An order granting or denying a special appearan ce is an interlocutory, appealable order.
T EX . C IV . P RAC . & R EM . C ODE A NN . § 51.014(a)(7) (West Supp. 2012). Interlocutory appeals are accelerated. T EX . R. A PP . P. 28.1. A notice of appeal in an accel erated appeal must be filed within twenty days after the interlocutory order is signed. T EX . R. A PP . P. 26.1(b). In the present case, the order denying the sp ecial appearance was signed on July 6, 2012. The notice of appeal was due on July 26, 2012. See T EX . R. A PP . P. 26.1(b). Appellant did not file his notice of appeal until October 15, 2012, a nd did not request an extension of time. Appellant maintains his “first” special appe arance was not presente d at the July 6 hearing, and “by conducting the September 18, 2012 hearing and receiving evidence and argument,” the trial court afforded him the opport unity to be heard on the special appearance. The record reflects, however, that the trial judge expressly declined to re-open the evidence. The judge permitted appellant to admit the affidavit at tached to his initial sp ecial appearance because she stated she had considered the affidavit in ruling on the special appearance. And the judge allowed the admission of appellant’s amended affidavit because she noted that it was not–3 significantly different from the first. But there is no indication the court reconsidered the special appearance on the merits. Indeed, the order makes clear the court denied the motion for reconsideration. Appellant argues the order designated in his noti ce of appeal must be “viewed in terms of substance,” rather than the label assigned to it. While this proposition is generally true, here, the title of the order is indicative of its substance. The title of the order states that it is a denial of appellant’s motion for reconsideration. The body of the order states the court heard and considered the motion to reconsider the special appearance, and that such motion is denied. Thus, the substance of the order reflects that th e court declined reconsideration of appellant’s special appearance. Interlocutory orders may be appealed only if permitted by statute and only to the extent jurisdiction is conferred by statute. See Ogletree v. Matthews , 262 S.W.3d 316, 319 n.1 (Tex. 2007). Statutes authorizing interlocutory appeals ar e strictly construed becau se they are a narrow exception to the general rule that interlocut ory orders are not im mediately appealable. CMH Homes v. Perez , 340 S.W.3d 444, 447 (Tex. 2011). An order denying a motion for reconsideration is not an im mediately appealable order. See T EX . C IV . P RAC . & R EM . C ODE A NN
. § 51.014(a)(7); Diggs v. Knowledge Alliance, Inc , 176 S.W.3d 463, 464 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2004, no pet.) (stating court lacked ju risdiction over interloc utory appeal because motion to reconsider order granting special ap pearance is not “independently appealable”); see also Denton Cnty v. Huther , 43 S.W.3d 665, 667 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2001, no pet.) (holding order denying motion to reconsider and renewed plea to the jurisdiction not an appealable interlocutory order). As the supreme court has observed, “allowing interlocutory appeals whenever a trial court re fuses to change its mind . . . w ould invite successive appeals and–4 undermine the statute’s purpose in promoting judicial economy.” Bally Total Fitness Corp. v. Jackson , 53 S.W.3d 355, 358 (Tex. 2001). Finally, appellant argues that the rules pe rmit an amendment to a special appearance. See
T EX . R. C IV . P. 120a. But the rule is more specific than appellant’s argument suggests. Read in its proper context, the rule provides for amendmen t to a special appearan ce to cure defects. 1 Here, the amendment did not cure a defect. Instead, th e amended affidavit simply added more facts, and as the trial judge observed, was not material ly different from the original. Ultimately, however, the issue is not whether appellant had the right to amend the special appearance, but rather the effect of such an amendment on the appellate timetable.
In City of Houston v. Estate of Jones , 388 S.W.3d 663, 667 (Tex. 2012) (per curium), the supreme court answered this question in connectio n with a plea to the ju risdiction. Specifically, the court considered the deadline to appeal an order denying a plea to the jurisdiction when an amended plea had been filed. The court conclude d the appellate deadline should be calculated from the date of the original order rather than a second order denyi ng the subsequent plea. Id. In reaching its conclusion, the court noted that the renewed plea was “substantially a motion to reconsider the denial of [the original] plea.” Id . Because the interlocutory appeal was based on the denial of the amended plea, the court concl uded it was not timely and the appellate court lacked jurisdiction over the appeal. Id . The court observed that “[p]ermitting appeals under circumstances such as these would effectively eliminate the requirement that appeals from interlocutory orders must be f iled within twenty days after the challenged order is signed.” Id. (citations omitted). The right to an interlocutory appeal in a plea to the jurisdiction arises under the same statutory authority as the right to app eal a special appearance; therefore, we see no

1 T EX . R. C IV . P. 120a provides, in pertinent part, that a special appearance “shall be made by sworn motion filed prior to motion to transf er venue or any other plea . . . and may be amended to cure defects . . . .”–5 reason why this rationale would not apply with equal force in the case at bar. See T EX . C IV
. P RAC . & R EM . C ODE A NN . §51.014(a) (7), (8). We are to construe the rules of appellate pr ocedure reasonably and liberally so that the right to appeal is not lost by imposing requirements not absolutely necessary to effectuate the purpose of a rule. See Verburgt v. Dorner , 959 S.W.2d 615, 616–17 (Te x. 1997). Nevertheless, we are prohibited from enlarg ing the scope of our jurisdiction by en larging the time for perfecting an appeal in a civil case in a manner not provided for by rule. See T EX . R. A PP . P. 2; In
re T.W ., 89 S.W.3d 641, 642 (Tex. App.—Amarillo 2002, no pet.). Because this Court is not authorized to extend the time for perfecting an appeal except as provided by Texas Rules of Appellate Procedure 26.1 and 26.3, and appellant’s notice of a ppeal was not timely filed, we dismiss the appeal for want of jurisdiction. See T EX . R. A PP . P. 42.3(a).

121438F.P05 /Kerry P. FitzGerald/ KERRY P. FITZGERALD JUSTICE–6 

# S

Court of Appeals Fifth District of Texas at Dallas JUDGMENT
DOUGLAS J. PAHL, Appellant No. 05-12-01438-CV V. DON SWAIM, P.C., Appellee On Appeal from the 191st Judicial District Court, Dallas County, Texas Trial Court Cause No. DC 10-16517. Opinion delivered by Justice FitzGerald. Justices O'Neill and Lang-Miers participating. In accordance with this Court’s opinion of this date, the judgment of the trial court is DISMISSED for want of jurisdiction. It is ORDERED that appellee DON SWAIM, P.C. recove r his costs of this appeal from appellant DOUGLAS J. PAHL.
Judgment entered July 26, 2013

/Kerry P. FitzGerald/ KERRY P. FITZGERALD JUSTICE