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******************************************************STEPHEN D. BENJAMIN ET AL.

v. CITY OF NORWALK ET AL.

(AC 37876)
Lavine, Mullins and Harper, Js. Argued September 20—officially released December 27, 2016 (Appeal from Superior Court, judicial district of

Stamford-Norwalk, Lee, J.)
Simon Sumberg, for the appellants (plaintiffs).
Urban S. Mulvehill, self-represented, the appellee (defendant).Opinion LAVINE, J. The plaintiffs, Stephen D. Benjamin and Helen Z. Benjamin, appeal from the judgment of the trial court denying their claim ofadverse possession of 708 square feet of land adjacent to their home in Norwalk (contested area). On appeal, the plaintiffs claim that the court erred by (1) finding that The Shorefront Park Company dedicated all of the roads shown on a subdivision map for the use of the defendant city of Norwalk (city), (2) determining that itwas theirburden to rebut municipal acceptance of dedicated roadways by clear and convincing evidence, and (3) finding that dominionoverthecontestedareawasshared. Weaffirm the judgment of the trial court.
The plaintiffs commenced the present action against thecity, The ShorefrontParkImprovementAssociation, Inc., and several individual defendants1 on December 17, 2009. The plaintiffs sought ajudgment vesting title to the contested area in them, claiming that they had established possession of the area to the exclusion of all others and had acquired title to the contested area by adverse possession. The case was tried to the court
over three days in October, 2014. The court made the following findings offact in its April 14, 2015 memorandum of decision.
The plaintiffs acquired title to their home at 40 Quintard Avenue (property) from the estate of Mary Ann Cocchia on June 18, 1992. The property is located in the Shorefront Park subdivision within the city. The Cocchia family had owned the property, which is locatedjust inside the subdivision’s western boundary, sinceJune 17, 1959. Betweenthepropertyand Quintard Avenue, a city street, runs a road called either ‘‘Shorefront Park’’2 or ‘‘Private Way.’’ The point where that road meets Quintard Avenue is marked by two stone pillars, which are approximately sixteen feet apart. A curb cut runs between the pillars, and a sign bearing the words ‘‘Shorefront Park’’ is posted on one of the pillars. A wider opening to the subdivision lies directly tothesouthofthepillars. Thecourtfoundthat, although there is no curb cut at the wider opening, the curb has been worn down by vehicular use. The contested area is approximately 708 square feet in size, and occupies the space between the pillars and the southwest edge ofthe property. The plaintiffs consider the pillars to be the entrance to their driveway and the contested area to be part oftheir driveway. The defendants, however, view the pillars to be a public entrance to the subdivision and the contested area to be a portion of ‘‘Shorefront Park’’ or ‘‘Private Way,’’ which they claim is a public roadway.
The court found that the contested area is not included in the title or deed to the plaintiffs’ property. The plaintiffs, however, claim that the Cocchia familyacquired ownership to the contested area by adverse possession because theytreatedthe area as their driveway for at least fifteen years after they acquired the property in 1959. The plaintiffs also claimed that they have treated the contested area as their driveway since they acquired title to the property in 1992. The defendantUrban S. Mulvehill (Mulvehill) counteredtheplaintiffs’ claim with two arguments: (1) the contested area
was dedicatedto andacceptedbythe cityin 1930, along with all of the other roadways in the subdivision, and property ownedby amunicipalitymaynotbe adversely possessed; and (2) even ifthe contested area were not included in the 1930 dedication, neither the plaintiffs’

nor the Cocchias’ use of the area was sufficient to establish title to the contested area in them via adverse possession. The plaintiffs responded to Mulvehill’s arguments by asserting that, even ifthe contested area had been dedicated to the city, the city had abandoned the area by failing to maintain it or otherwise treat it
as a public roadway.
In support of their claim, the plaintiffs placed into evidence the April, 1930 minutes of the city council, which include the following relevant language: ‘‘To the Honorable Mayor and Council of the City of Norwalk: ‘‘Gentlemen: ‘‘The Shorefront Park Company hereby petitions for theacceptance ofthehighwaysshownon [the] attached map of Shorefront Park. All highways asked to be accepted are fifty (50) feet in width and in good condition and in all of them have been laid water and gas mains at the Company’s expense. The City is collecting taxes on twenty-six houses erected in the development and up to date has not been obliged to expend any money for construction or repairs. ‘‘DatedatNorwalk, Conn. this 18thdayofMarch 1930. ‘‘The Shorefront Park Company ‘‘By (Signed) Mark Haut ‘‘Its Secretary ‘‘Councilman Charpentier stated that Mr. Jutten investigatedtheconditionofthehighwaysinShorefront Park and found them in good condition and recommends their acceptance.3
‘‘A motion that the highways in Shorefront Park as designated on map entitled ‘Map of Part of Shorefront Park Property of The Shorefront Park Co. Norwalk Conn. Aug. 1924’ be accepted was seconded and carried.’’ (Footnote added.)
The plaintiffs claim, on the basis of the April, 1930 minutes, that although the city may have purported to accept all of the highways depicted on the subdivision map, it could not have accepted any roads fewer thanfifty feet in width because those roads were never offered. The plaintiffs claim, therefore, that neither the contested area nor the private way leading to it could have been accepted bythe citybecause the road at that location is only sixteen feet wide.4
The court found that, according to the city’s land records, The Shorefront Park Company remains the recordownerofthe contestedarea, butthatitisunclear from the complaint or the record whether The Shorefront Park Company remains the record owner of all ofthe subdivision’s highways or only the small portion of road claimed by the plaintiffs. The subdivision map
on which the city council relied in 1930 was entered into evidence by the plaintiffs as exhibit 8. The subdivision map depicts one continuous highway that winds throughout the subdivision and is labeled at various locations either ‘‘Shorefront Drive’’ or ‘‘Private Way,’’ the latter being the designation given to the section of the highway where the contested area is located. Markings indicating afiftyfootwidthappearatsections of the highway labeled ‘‘Private Way,’’ as well as at sections labeled ‘‘Shorefront Drive.’’
The court first determined whetherthe actions taken at the April, 1930 meeting of the city council are evidence of a dedication and acceptance ofthe contested
area. In doing so, the court relied on Vernon v. Goff , 107 Conn. App. 552, 945 A.2d 1017, cert. denied, 289 Conn. 920, 958 A.2d 154 (2008), for guidance: ‘‘From early times, under the common law, highways have been established in this state by dedication and acceptance by the public.

. . . [T]wo elements are essential to a valid dedication: (1) a manifested intent by the
owner to dedicate the land involved for the use of the public; and (2) an acceptance by the proper authorities
or by the general public.

. . . No particular formality is required in order to dedicate a parcel of land to a public use; dedication may be express or implied.

. . . Whetherthere has been adedication and whetherthere has been an acceptance present questions of fact.

. . . Likewise, the determinationofthe extenttowhichthere has been an acceptance of a street involves a question offact.’’ (Internalquotationmarks omitted.) Id., 556–57.
The court also noted that ‘‘[w]hether there has been
adedication andwhetherthere has been an acceptance
are questions offact

. . . for which the burden ofproof rests upon the [party who claims that the property in question belongs to the public].’’ (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Drabik v. East Lyme, 234 Conn. 390, 397, 662 A.2d 118 (1995). A party claiming title by adverse possession, however, must prove, by clear and convincing evidence, that the contested areawas not dedicatedto the city. SeeAmerican Trading Real Estate Properties, Inc. v. Trumbull, 215 Conn. 68, 80, 574 A.2d 796 (1990); Shepard Group, LLC

v. Arnold, 124 Conn. App. 41, 44, 3 A.3d 975 (2010).Inthepresent case, thetrial courtfound, byapreponderance of the evidence, the existence of both an express dedication of the highways in the subdivision and an express acceptance ofthe contested areabythe city, and that the plaintiffs had failed to prove, by clear and convincing evidence, that the contested area was not dedicated with the rest of the subdivision’s highways. The court found that the minutes of the April, 1930 city council meeting record The Shorefront Park Companypetitioning the city ‘‘forthe acceptance ofthe highways shown on attached map of Shorefront Park.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) The minutes state that ‘‘[a]ll highways asked to be accepted are fifty (50) feet in width and in good condition and in all of them have been laid water and gas mains at the Company’s expense.’’ Theminutes also recorded Charpentier’srepresentation that Jutten had investigated ‘‘the condition of the highways in Shorefront Park and found them in goodconditionandrecommendstheiracceptance’’; and that a motion was made and seconded that ‘‘the highways in Shorefront Park as designated on map entitled ‘Map ofPart of Shorefront Park Property ofThe Shorefront Park Co. Norwalk Conn. Aug. 1924’ be accepted

. . . .’’ Moreover, the motion was carried.
The plaintiffs contended at trial that the contested
area could not have been dedicated because it is fewer than fifty feet wide. The court found, however, that the city council’s acceptance made no mention ofthe width of the highways as a condition of acceptance and The Shorefront Park Company did not object to the acceptance of all ofthe highways designated on the subdivision map. The court found that the map relied on by the city council, plaintiffs’ exhibit 8, reveals that the subdivision highways consist of a single winding road that, at manypoints, is fifty feet wide, but that narrows before reaching the contested area.5 The court concludedthatit didnotlogicallyfollowfrom adescription ofahighway as being fiftyfeetwide that, ifthe highway
narrows at some point, the narrower portion is not, nonetheless, a portion of the same highway.
The court rejected the plaintiffs’ argument that The ShorefrontPark Companyintendedto excludeportions ofhighwaynarrowerthanfiftyfeetfromthe dedication. The court found the argument unconvincing, particularlyinthe absence ofanyevidencethatThe Shorefront Park Company asserted any right with respect to the portionsofhighwayfewerthanfiftyfeetwideduringthe thirty years between the dedication and the company’s dissolution in 1959. Also, the court found no evidence that the shareholders ofThe Shorefront Park Company transferred any interest in those portions of roadway duringtheirlives or devised anyinterestinthe roadway
as part of their estates.
The court concluded that the plaintiffs had failed to prove, by clear and convincing proof, that the city’sacceptance was not express and did not include the contested area. The city council passed a motion to accept all ofShorefront Park’s highways, as designated
on the 1924 map, without reference to the width ofthe highways. Because it had determined that all of the highways, including the contested area, were expressly offered by The Shorefront Park Company, it found that the city’s express acceptance could and did include them.
The court furtherfoundthatthe city did not abandon the contested area and that the plaintiffs had not obtained title to the contested area by way of adverse possession. The court, therefore, renderedjudgment in favor of the defendants. Thereafter the plaintiffs appealed.
The plaintiffs subsequently filed a consolidated motion for articulation and motion for rectification, which the court granted in part and denied in part. In its ruling on the plaintiffs’ consolidated motion, the court statedthat ‘‘the evidence supports anunderstanding of The Shorefront Park Company’s intention and actions as an express dedication of all ofthe highways within Shorefront Park to the city of Norwalk, without any exclusion or retaining ofinterest in portions ofthe highways which were less than fifty feet wide.

. . . This finding supports the court’s ultimate conclusion that the contested area is part of a public highway belonging to the city of Norwalk.

. . . The court, however, was not presented with and did not consider evidence regarding a dispute as to the dedication and acceptance of any other particular segment of Shorefront Park highway. The court’s holding, therefore, is confined to its ultimate conclusion regarding the contested area.’’ (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.)
Additional facts will be set forth as necessary. I
The plaintiffs first claim that the court’s finding that TheShorefrontParkCompanydedicatedalloftheroads depicted on the subdivision map for the use ofthe city
was clearly erroneous. We disagree.
We first set forth the applicable standard of review. ‘‘Our review of the factual findings of the trial court is limited to a determination of whether they are clearly
erroneous.

. . . A finding of fact is clearly erroneous when there is no evidence in the record to support it

. . . or when although there is evidence to support it, the reviewing court on the entire evidence is left with the definite andfirm convictionthat amistake has been committed.

. . . Because it is the trial court’s function to weigh the evidence and determine credibility, we give great deference to its findings.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Ridgefield v. Eppoliti Realty Co., 71 Conn. App. 321, 328, 801 A.2d 902, cert. denied, 261Conn. 933, 806 A.2d 1070 (2002).
An understanding ofthe law and history ofestablishing highways inthis state provides auseful background for our resolution of the plaintiffs’ claim. Public highways may be established by one of four methods: ‘‘(1) through the direct action ofthe legislature; (2) through authorized proceedings involving an application to a court; (3) through authorized proceedings by agents appointed forthatpurpose, such as selectmen oftowns

. . . and specified authorities of cities and boroughs

. . . (4) through private dedication ofland for that purpose and its acceptance bythe public.’’ (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Montanaro v. AspetuckLand Trust, Inc., 137 Conn. App. 1, 9, 48 A.3d 107, cert. denied, 307 Conn. 932, 56 A.3d 715 (2012), quotingMakepeace v. Waterbury, 74 Conn. 360, 361, 50 A. 876 (1902). ‘‘Thelayoutofastreetorhighwaybyaprivateperson, company or corporation and the regulation ofits width unless determined otherwise by authority have been a part of our statute law since 1899. Public Acts 1899, c. 205 § 2; Windsor v. Whitney, 95 Conn. 357, 365, 111 A. 354 [1920]. Since that time our statutes have provided thatno street orhighwaylaid outbyanyprivateperson, company or corporation shall be opened to the public (1) until the grade, width and improvements of such street orhighway shall have the written approval ofthe selectmen ofthe town or, in case the location is within the limits of a city or borough, the approval of the
commoncouncilofthecityorthewardenandburgesses ofthe borough or (2) until such approval has been filed in the office of the clerk of the town, city or borough,
as the case may be.’’ Thompson v. Portland, 159 Conn. 107, 111–12, 266 A.2d 893 (1970).6
In Stratford v. Fidelity & Casualty Co., 106 Conn. 34, 39, 137 A. 13 (1927), our Supreme Court said that the dedication statute in effect at that time ‘‘has to do with the layout and improvement of roads or streets byindividuals orprivate corporations, andthe approval ofthe selectmen is an approval ofthe layout and opening ofprivate ways and not ofpublic highways; it looks to the possibility of their becoming public highways, but doesnot constitute anacceptance ofthemas such.’’ ‘‘Immediately following this decision, the legislature enacted chapter 248 ofthe Public Acts of 1927. Section 1 ofthat act (now General Statutes [Rev. to 1966] § 13a48) gave specific authority to a municipality at any annual or special meeting held for that purpose to accept as a public highway any street or highway situated in the municipality. Section 2 validated the action of any municipality theretofore taken in accepting any highway as a public highway. Where the legislature establishes the conditions necessary for a dedication of land for public purposes, the statutory provisions
are controlling.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.)Thompson v. Portland, supra, 159 Conn. 113. This historical review concerns the law in effect at the time the city accepted the highways in Shorefront Park in 1930. ‘‘Dedication is an appropriation ofland to some public use, made by the owner ofthe fee, and accepted for such use by and in behalf of the public.

. . . Both the owner’s intentionto dedicate the wayto public use and acceptance by the public must exist, but the intention to dedicate the way to public use may be implied from the acts and conduct of the owner, and public acceptance may be shown by proof of the actual use of the way by the public.

. . . Thus, the two elements are essential to a valid dedication: (1) a manifested intent by the owner to dedicate the land involved for the use of the public; and (2) an acceptance by the proper authorities or by the general public.

. . . No particular formality is required in order to dedicate a parcel of land to a public use; dedication may be express or implied.

. . . Whether there has been a dedication and whether there has been an acceptance present questions offact.’’ (Citations omitted.) Meshberg v. Bridgeport City Trust Co., 180 Conn. 274, 279, 429 A.2d 865 (1980). ‘‘The approval of a proposed subdivision and the acceptance of a public street are entirely separate and distinct proceedings.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id., 280.
Inthe present case, the trial court found, onthe basis of the evidence presented, specifically, the minutes of the April, 1930 city council meeting and the subdivision mapofAugust, 1924,thatTheShorefrontParkCompany dedicated the highways within Shorefront Park to the city andthatthe cityacceptedthe highways. On appeal, the plaintiffs do not contend that the council did not accept the dedication of highways on the subdivision map; they contend that the only highways the council accepted were those fifty feet wide. Specifically, they point to the second sentence of the minutes of the council meeting, which states: ‘‘All highways asked to be accepted are fifty (50) feet in width and in good condition and in all of them have been laid water and gasmains atthe Company’s expense.’’ We disagreewith the plaintiffs, as the construction ofthe language in the council minutes does not support such a conclusion.
To resolve the plaintiffs’ claim, we examine theApril, 1930 council minutes. The Shorefront Park Company petitioned the mayor and city council ‘‘for the acceptance ofthe highways shown on [the] attached map of Shorefront Park.’’ It is a simple declaratory sentence asking the city to accept the highways depicted on the subdivision map, without limitation or qualification as to the highways on the map.7 The following sentence is another simple declaratory sentence: ‘‘All highways asked to be accepted are fifty (50) feet in width and in good condition and in all ofthem have been laid water and gas mains at the Company’s expense.’’ Logically,‘‘[a]ll highways’’ must refer to the prior sentence and the highways on the attached map. The remainder of the sentence describes the width ofthe highways, their condition, and states that water and gas mains have been laid at the company’s expense. Although the language of the second sentence is descriptive, it is not conditional. In other words, the second sentence does not exclude any of the highways on the subdivision map, or any portion of them.
Councilman CharpentierstatedthatJuttenhadinvestigatedthe conditionofthehighwaysinShorefrontPark and found them to be in good condition and recommended their acceptance. A motion that ‘‘the highways in Shorefront Park as designated on map entitled ‘Map of Part of Shorefront Park Property of The Shorefront Park Co. Norwalk Conn. Aug. 1924’ be accepted seconded and carried.’’ The clear intent of the motion
wasforthecounciltoacceptthehighwaysinShorefront Parkas depictedonthe subdivisionmapwithoutqualification, clarification, or limitation.
As our Supreme Court stated in Thompson v. Portland, supra, 159 Conn. 111, ‘‘no street or highway laid outbyanyprivateperson, companyorcorporationshall be opened to the public (1) until the grade, width and improvements ofsuch street or highway shall have the written approval of the

. . . common council of the city

. . . .’’ The city council in the present case accepted the report of Jutten that the highways The Shorefront Park Company was offering for dedication
were in good condition. The minutes do not reflect any discussion or concern regarding the width of the highways as depicted on the subdivision map. As further evidence that the city accepted all of the highways depicted on the subdivision map, there is nothing otherwise in the record to suggest that The Shorefront Park Company objected to the public’s use of the highways in Shorefront Park at any time until the companywas dissolved in 1959. We, therefore, conclude that the court properly found that the highways depicted on the subdivision map are public roadways, including the contested area. As to the plaintiffs’ claim that the contested area is private property, there is no evidence inthe recordthat the plaintiffs hold title to the contested area. Richard McGannon, an attorney specializing in real property and title matters, testified that The Shorefront Park Company owned the land, including the roadbeds, for what became the subdivision. In McGannon’s opinion, the roads wereprivate in 1924 andthroughoutthe chain of title there was no record of a conveyance of title to theroads. The ShorefrontParkCompanydidnotconvey
an ownership interest in the road to the centerline. McGannon’s title search ofthe plaintiffs’ property demonstrated that the deed did not convey the roadbed to
a purchaser.For the foregoing reasons, the plaintiffs’ claim that the court’s determination that The Shorefront Park Company had dedicated all of the roads depicted on the subdivision map for the use of the city was clearly
erroneous fails.
II
The plaintiffs’ second claim is that the court improperly required them to rebut the city’s acceptance ofthe highways in the subdivision by clear and convincing proof. Although we disagree with the plaintiffs’ claim, the claim in and of itself is without consequence to theirappeal, asthetrialcourtfoundbyapreponderance ofthe evidence thatthe highways depicted inthe subdivision map, including the contested area, were dedicated by The Shorefront Park Company and accepted by the city. See part I of this opinion. Moreover, the court found that the highways in Shorefront Park, includingthe contestedarea, were sharedbythepublic. See part III of this opinion. The plaintiffs’ claim therefore fails. Despite our conclusion that the plaintiffs’ claim does not affect the outcome of their appeal, we take the opportunity to explain that it fails as a matter of law.
The plaintiffs take exception to the following language in the court’s memorandum of decision and iterated in its response to the plaintiffs’ motion for rectification. ‘‘The burden of proving a dedication and acceptance, by apreponderance ofthe evidence, generally falls upon the party who claims that the property in question belongs to the public.

. . . But, because a party claiming title by adverse possession must prove his or her claim by clear and positive proof

. . . it falls to the plaintiffs in this case to prove, by clear and positive proof, that the contested area was not dedicated to the city, or if it was, that the city abandoned it, since property owned by a municipality generally cannot be adversely possessed.’’ (Citations omitted.) ‘‘Where title is claimed by adverse possession, the burden of proof is on the claimant.

. . . The essential elements ofadversepossessionare thatthe ownershall be oustedfrompossessionandkeptoutuninterruptedly for fifteen years under a claim of right by an open, visibleandexclusivepossessionoftheclaimantwithout license or consent of the owner.

. . . The use is not exclusive if the adverse user merely shares dominion
over the property with other users.

. . . Such a possession is not to be made out by inference, but by clear and positive proof.

. . . In the final analysis, whether possession is adverse is a question offact for the trier.

. . . The doctrine of adverse possession is to be taken strictly.’’ (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.)Rochev. Fairfield, 186 Conn. 490, 498–99, 442 A.2d 911 (1982).
Our Supreme Court has held that ‘‘property that isheld in fee simple ownership by municipalities must be presumed to be held for public use. It follows that the party seeking title by adverse possession must bear the burden of rebutting that presumption. Municipal immunity from adverse possession is the rule and not the exception, and we have consistently held that the party seeking to acquire title by adverse possession bears the burden ofproving all the elements ofadverse possession.’’ American Trading Real Estate Properties, Inc. v. Trumbull, supra, 215 Conn. 80. Moreover, the plaintiffs’ claim overlooks the following findings and conclusions ofthe court. ‘‘Under either
a preponderance or clear and convincing proof standard, the court finds that the evidence supports an understandingofThe ShorefrontParkCompany’sintentions and actions as an express dedication of all ofthe highwayswithin ShorefrontParktothe cityofNorwalk, without any exclusion or retaining of interest in portions of the highways which were less than fifty feet wide. The court notes also that [the] identification of the contested area [in the subdivision map] as part of
a‘PrivateWay’ is ofno consequence, since severalother portions of highway on the map, many marked as fifty feet wide, are so labeled, and the plaintiffs do not contend that those sections ofthe road were exempt from The Shorefront Park Company’s dedication to the city. ‘‘The plaintiffs have also failed to prove, by clear and convincingproof, thatthe city ofNorwalk’s acceptance
was not express and didnotinclude the contested area. Again, a motion to accept all of Shorefront Park’s highways, as designated on the map, was passed without any reference to the width of the highways. Because the court has determined that all of the highways, including the contested area, were expressly offered, the court finds that the [city’s] express acceptance could and did include them.’’ (Footnote omitted.)
As we explained in part I of this opinion, the court properlyfoundbyapreponderance ofthe evidence that the highways on the subdivision map were expressly dedicated by The Shorefront Park Company and were expressly accepted by the city. Our Supreme Court has held that municipalities are immune from claims of adversepossession. SeeAmerican TradingRealEstate Properties, Inc. v. Trumbull, supra, 215 Conn. 80. Moreover, onthe basis ofourreview ofthe record, including the evidence, we conclude that the plaintiffs could not prevail on their claim of adverse possession because the evidence demonstrates that the contested area is shared by the public. See part III of this opinion.
Even ifthe plaintiffs had the legal right to claim title to the contested area, they could not prevail because the court foundthattheiruse ofthe contested areawas shared by the public. ‘‘[T]o establish title by adverse possession, the claimantmust oust an owner ofpossession and keep such owner out without interruption forfifteen years by an open, visible and exclusive possession under a claim of right with the intent to use the property as his [or her] own and without the consent of the owner.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Schlichting v. Cotter, 109 Conn. App. 361, 364–65, 952 A.2d 73, cert. denied, 289 Conn. 944, 959 A.2d 1009 (2008). ‘‘Because adverse possession is a question of fact for the trier

. . . the court’s findings as to this claimarebindinguponthis courtunlesstheyare clearly
erroneous in light ofthe evidence and the pleadings in the record as a whole.

. . . We cannot retry the facts
or pass on the credibility of the witnesses.

. . . A trial court’s findings in an adverse possession case, if supported by sufficient evidence, are binding on a reviewing court

. . . .’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Mulle v. McCauley, 102 Conn. App. 803, 809, 927 A.2d 921, cert. denied, 284 Conn. 907, 931 A.2d 265 (2007). The plaintiffs’ claim therefore fails.
III
The plaintiffs’ third claim is that the trial court’s finding that dominion over the contested area is shared by the public is clearly erroneous. We disagree.
At trial, the plaintiffs argued that, even if the contested areawas dedicated to the city in 1930, municipal immunity to adverse possession was lost when the city abandonedtheareabyfailingtomaintainitorotherwise treatitas apublic road. Inits memorandum ofdecision, the court noted that ‘‘[t]o establish title by adverse possession, the claimantmust oust an owner ofpossession and keep such owner out without interruption for fifteen years by an open, visible and exclusive possession under a claim of right with the intent to use the property for his [or her] own and without the consent of the owner.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Shepard Group, LLC v. Arnold, supra, 124 Conn. App. 44. ‘‘The use is not exclusive ifthe adverse user merely shares dominion over the property with other users.’’ Whitney v. Turmel, 180 Conn. 147, 148, 429 A.2d 826 (1980). ‘‘A finding of [a]dverse possession is not to be made out of inference, but by clear and positive proof.

. . . The burden of proof is on the party claiming adverse possession.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Shepard Group, LLC v. Arnold, supra, 44.
The court continued, ‘‘[t]itle to realty held in fee by
astate or any ofits subdivisions for apublic use cannot be acquiredbyadversepossession.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Campanelli v. Candlewood Hills Tax District, 126 Conn. App. 135, 140, 10 A.3d 1073 (2011). ‘‘In light of the myriad of public uses that may be advanced through public ownership of undeveloped lands

. . . property that is held in fee simple ownership by municipalities must be presumed to be held for public use. It follows that the party seeking title by adverse possession must bear the burden of rebutting that presumption. Municipal immunity from adversepossession is the rule and not the exception, and we have consistently held that the party seeking to acquire title by adverse possession bears the burden ofproving all the elements of adverse possession.’’ American Trading Real Estate Properties, Inc. v. Trumbull, supra, 215 Conn. 80. Furthermore, the two methods of terminating a town’s responsibility for a road differ. ‘‘A highway may be extinguished by direct action through governmental agencies, in which case it is said to be discontinued;
or by nonuser by the public for a long period of time with the intention to abandon, in which case it is said to be abandoned.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Doolittle v. Preston, 5 Conn. App. 448, 451, 499 A.2d 1164 (1985); see also R. Fuller, 9B Connecticut Practice Series: LandUse LawandPractice (4thEd. 2015) § 49:5, p. 112 (‘‘Once it is shown that the road was a public highway at some point inthe past, it remains one under Connecticut law no matter what its state of improvement or deterioration may be unless that status was terminated in one oftwo ways, (1) abandonment or (2) discontinuance as provided by General Statutes § 13a49.’’).8 The statutorymethod ofdiscontinuing the use of
ahighwaymustbepursuedstrictly.Doolittlev.Preston, supra, 451.
At trial, the plaintiffs made no claim that the city had discontinued use of the contested area by a majority vote of the selectmen pursuant to § 13a-49. The court foundthattheplaintiffshadtheburdenofprovingabandonment by clear and convincing evidence. Abandonment requires proof of both a long period of nonuse by the public and an intention to abandon. Montanaro

v. AspetuckLand Trust, Inc., supra, 137 Conn. App. 21. It is nonuse by the public, not the municipality, that must be proven. The parties presented conflicting evidence as to the first element of abandonment, i.e., a long period of nonuse by the public.
In its memorandum of decision, the court summarized the testimony ofseveral witnesses. Dominic Cocchia and Peter Cocchia, sons of Mary Ann Cocchia, testified that they moved into 40 Quintard Avenue in 1959. Theyunderstoodthatthe contested areawas part oftheir driveway where they played games and parked the family motor vehicles. Their father required them to clean up litter, weed, and shovel snow from the contested area. In 1970, their father had it paved. Neither Dominic Cocchia nor Peter Cocchia could recall anyactionthefamilytooktoexcludethepublicfromthe contestedareaortoprohibitthepublicfromentering or exiting the subdivision through the stone pillars.
Merritttestifiedthat she had resided at 78 Shorefront Park since 1944 and over atwenty year period, she had walked four dogs over the contested area and through the pillars approximately 200 times a year. She also testifiedthatsheregularlysawpedestrianspassthroughthe pillars, including women with baby carriages, children on bicycles, and other dog walkers. Merritt and other motorists drove their vehicles through the pillars to enter or exit the subdivision. She never witnessed any barrier or notice denying the public entry to the contested area. Mulvehill testified that he had been a resident of Shorefront Park since 1977. According to him, the city plows the subdivision every year and pushes snow into the contested area. He has never seen a chain, fence, sign, name on the pillars, or other circumstance that would suggest that the plaintiffs claimed possession of the contested area. Patricia Audet, a resident of 25 Shorefront Drive since 1977, testified that she frequently drove through the pillars to enter or exit the subdivision. Significantly, the court viewed the contested area and disclosed to the parties that, while he
was parked on QuintardAvenue, he observed awoman walk south on Quintard Avenue, through the stone pillars, and proceed down Shorefront Drive.
The court considered the conflicting evidence and, in its memorandum of decision, found that the testimony ofthe plaintiffs’ witnesses was not more likelyto be truethanthetestimony ofthe defendants’ witnesses. The court, therefore, concluded that the public’s use ofthe contested areaand ofthe stonepillars as apublic entrance to the subdivision fell somewhere between the levels suggested by the parties, but not so low as to satisfy the nonuser prong of abandonment. According to the court, the plaintiffs therefore failed to carrytheirburdenofproving, byclearandconvincing evidence, thatpublic use ofthe contested area or stone pillar entrance was so infrequent between 1959 and 1974, or between 1974 and the present, to satisfy the firstelementofabandonment. Rather,theevidenceindicated to the court that the use of the contested area
was shared by the owners of 40 Quintard Avenue and the generalpublic. The court explained: ‘‘Itis not essential

. . . that large numbers of the public participate in the user, or that the user be one which results in a large volume of travel. Each situation must be judged in relation to its own surroundings and conditions, and with a regard for the number of persons who would have occasion to use the way.

. . . It is only necessary that those who would be naturally expected to enjoy it have done so at their pleasure.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Granby v. Feins, 154 Conn. App. 395, 404, 105 A.3d 932 (2014).
The essence of the plaintiffs’ claim on appeal is that their witnesses, Dominic Cocchia and Peter Cocchia, lived atthe property duringthe period inwhich adverse possession is claimed and the only witness for the defendants who could testify as to the use of the contested area during the adverse period was Merritt. The plaintiffs acknowledge that it is in the discretion ofthetrial courtto accept hertestimony overthat ofDominic Cocchia and Peter Cocchia, but not ifits findings were not reasonable and the reviewing court is left with the impressionthatthefindingwasamistake. SeeStratford

v. Jacobelli, 317 Conn. 863, 870, 120 A.3d 500 (2015). The plaintiffs specifically argue that the court’s finding is clearly erroneous because Merritt testified that she
was ofthe opinionthatthe plaintiffs should not acquire the contested area by adverse possession. They claim, therefore, that such testimony makes her an interested witness, not one who is testifying on the basis of what she has seen. ‘‘[W]e must determine whether the facts set out in the memorandum of decision are supported by the evidence orwhether, inlightofthe evidence andthepleadings in the whole record, those facts are clearly
erroneous.

. . . We also must determine whether those facts correctly found are, as a matter of law, sufficient to support thejudgment.

. . . [W]e give great deference to the findings of the trial court because of its function to weigh and interpret the evidence before it and to pass upon the credibility of witnesses

. . . .’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Rana v. Terdjanian, 136 Conn. App. 99, 113, 46 A.3d 175, cert. denied, 305 Conn. 926, 47 A.3d 886 (2012). ‘‘[E]vidence is not insufficient

. . . because it is conflicting or inconsistent. [The trier of fact] is free to juxtapose conflicting versions of events and determine which is more credible.

. . . In this regard, [w]e are not in aposition to question the court’s credibility finding. The sifting and weighing of evidence is peculiarly the function of the trier. [N]othing in our law is more elementary than that the trier is the final judge of the credibilityofwitnessesandoftheweighttobeaccorded their testimony.

. . . The trier is free to accept or reject, in whole or in part, the testimony offered by either party.’’9 (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Masse v. Perez, 139 Conn. App. 794, 798, 58 A.3d 273 (2012), cert. denied, 308 Conn. 905, 61 A.3d 1098 (2013).
A court properly may take into account testimony from a witness with an interest in the outcome of the
case. See Beaucar v. Bristol Federal Savings & Loan Assn., 6 Conn. Cir. Ct. 148, 154, 268 A.2d 679 (1969). ‘‘[A] trial court is at liberty to discredit any witness or
a multitude of witnesses, if it deems that it has cause to do so.’’Antenucciv. HartfordRoman CatholicDiocesan Corp., 142 Conn. 349, 357, 114 A.2d 216 (1955). ‘‘[I]t is futile to assign error involving the weight of testimony or the credibility of witnesses.’’ HartfordConnecticut Trust Co. v. Putnam Phalanx, 138 Conn. 695, 699, 88 A.2d 393 (1952) (witness former trustee of defendant).
On the basis of our review of the record, the law, and the court’s memorandum ofdecision, we concludethat the court’s finding that the contested area was shared by the plaintiffs and the general public is not clearly erroneous. The judgment is affirmed.
In this opinion the other judges concurred.

1 The individual defendants were owners of property adjacent to Shorefront Park, aroadwayinthe city, andthe descendants ofthe original owners ofThe ShorefrontPark Company. The individual defendantpropertyowners
wereThursaJune Merritt, MaryMerritt, Urban S. Mulvehill, Diane K. Mulvehill,JamesA. Smith,JoanneC. Smith, WilliamFaulkenstein, andKaoriO’Brien. The individual defendant descendants were John Keogh III, M. Douglas Keogh, William Allen Keogh, Stephen B. Keogh, Tara Quinn-Siegel, and Jacqueline F. Quinn. The plaintiffs impleaded numerous other individuals who had apossible interest inproperty, but none appeared inthe trial court. The following defendants appeared at trial: the city, Thursa June Merritt, Urban S. Mulvehill, and The Shorefront Park Improvement Association, Inc. Those defendants filed appearances in this appeal, but only Urban S. Mulvehill, a self-represented party, filed a brief and argued on appeal. The defendants, as used in this opinion, refers to only those defendants who appeared at trial.

2 ‘‘Shorefront Park’’ is both a street address within the subdivision and the name of the subdivision itself.

3 The court found that the plaintiffs alleged that Jutten was employed by the city’s Department of Public Works. Another section of the minutes contains the words ‘‘A.F. Jutten Commissioner.’’

4 The court found that the road widens to fifty feet where it meets the border of the plaintiffs’ property.
5 Under either a preponderance of the evidence or clear and convincing proofstandard, the courtfoundthatthe evidence supports anunderstanding of The Shorefront Park Company’s intentions and actions as an express dedication ofall ofthe highways within Shorefront Park to the city, without any exclusion or retaining ofinterest in portions ofthe highways that were fewer than fifty feet wide. Although the plaintiffs’ exhibit 8 identifies the contested area as part of a ‘‘Private Way,’’ the court found that to be of no consequence, as several other portions of the highway on the map, many markedasfiftyfeetwide, are similarlylabeled. Theplaintiffs didnot contend that those sections of road were exempt from The Shorefront Park Company’s dedication to the city.

6 ‘‘Various minor changes were made in the statute, but no major change occurred until 1959, when the statute was amended to require the approval oftheplanning commissionwhere one existedin suchtown, city orborough andwherethe commissionhadadoptedsubdivisionregulations.’’ Thompson

v. Portland, supra, 159 Conn. 112.

7 IfShorefrontParkCompanyhadwishedtolimitorrestrictthe dedication, it might have included a restrictive phrase in the sentence, such as, ‘‘for the acceptance of the highways that are fifty feet wide shown on the attached map.’’

8 GeneralStatutes § 13a-49 (a) (1)providesinrelevantpart: ‘‘Theselectmen of any town may, subject to approval by a majority vote at any regular or special town meeting, by awriting signed bythem, discontinue any highway

or private way

. . . in its entirety

. . . .’’

9 We also note the jury instructions given with respect to possible bias

or motive of witnesses generally: ‘‘In weighing the testimony of a witness, you should consider his or her demeanor on the witness stand, whether his

or her testimony was reasonable or unreasonable, the basis ofthe witness’ knowledge or opportunity to observe the events that he or she testified about, whetherhis or hertestimonywas supported or contradicted by other testimony, his or her motive to tell the truth or not to tell the truth, the probability or improbability of his or her testimony.

. . . ‘‘You also have a right to consider whether any witness has shown bias

orprejudice orhasapersonalinterestorprofessionalinterestinthe outcome ofthe case which might cause him or her to testify to something other than the truth or to color or embellish his or her testimony. However, even if you find that the witness is an interested witness, has some stake in the matter, remember, there’s no legal presumption that he or she did not tell the truth nor is there any legal presumption that a disinterested witness did, in fact, tell the truth. The question of the interest of a witness and the effect upon his or her testimony is for you to decide from the evidence inthe case.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Patterson, 276 Conn. 452, 466 n.10, 886 A.2d 777 (2005); see also 2 D. Wright & W. Ankerman, Connecticut Jury Instructions (Civil) (4th Ed. 1993) § 641, pp. 1017–18.