[DO NOT PUBLISH]

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT

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No. 14-12315

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D.C. Docket No. 0:13-cv-61225-RSR

STIG SOLNES, 

 Plaintiff - Appellant,

versus

WALLIS & WALLIS, P.A.,

 Defendant - Appellee.

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Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Southern District of Florida

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(June 8, 2015)

Before MARCUS and WILSON, Circuit Judges, and SCHLESINGER,∗ District 

Judge.

 ∗ Honorable Harvey E. Schlesinger, United States District Judge for the Middle District of 

Florida, sitting by designation.

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PER CURIAM: 

This is the case of a yacht sale that never was. Stig Solnes (“Solnes”) paid 

$300,000.00 for a yacht that the seller never delivered. Wallis & Wallis, P.A. 

(“WWPA”), accepted the money, on the seller’s behalf as an escrow agent, and 

forwarded it to the seller, even though, Solnes contended, WWPA knew that the 

yacht in question had been sold to another buyer and would never be delivered.

Solnes initiated this action, and WWPA moved to dismiss the Complaint. 

The district court granted in part and denied in part WWPA’s motion. In its ruling, 

the district court held that the language of the Vessel Purchase and Sale Agreement 

(“Agreement”) between the seller and Solnes limited WWPA’s implied-in-fact 

contractual liability to the deposit of $30,000.00, and barred any liability for 

misdelivery of the purchase price of $270,000.00.

Solnes responded with a three-count Amended Complaint alleging claims 

for breach of implied contract against Peter Wallis and WWPA, Counts I and II, 

for both the deposit and the balance paid on the yacht and a claim, Count III, for 

money had and received against WWPA. Once again, WWPA sought to dismiss

the Amended Complaint. This time, however, the district court converted the

pleading to a Motion for Summary Judgment, directed WWPA to file a statement 

of material facts and granted Solnes leave to respond.

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In April 2014, the district court granted in part and denied in part the

construed Motion for Summary Judgment. Solnes’ claims against Wallis 

individually were dismissed, and the amount of damages Solnes could recover 

under the implied contractual theory was limited to the deposit—$30,000.00. 

However, the district court determined that a trial was necessary on the issue of 

whether there had been an early disbursement of the deposit monies by WWPA. 

Following a bench trial, the district court entered Judgment in favor of Solnes in 

the amount of $30,000.00 for breach of implied contract, Count II, and in favor of 

WWPA for money had and received, Count III.

This appeal presents four issues. First, whether the district court properly

determined that the Agreement limited WWPA’s “implied-in-fact” contractual 

liability to the deposit of $30,000.00, and barred any liability for misdelivery of the 

purchase price of $270,000.00. Second, whether the district court correctly 

concluded that no “new agreement” for the return of the entire $300,000.00 was 

created by a conversation between Solnes and Joan Wallis. Third, whether the 

district court’s grant of summary judgment on Count II of the Amended 

Complaint, by finding that Wallis was not individually liable, was correct. Fourth, 

and finally, whether the district court correctly determined that WWPA was not 

liable for the entire purchase price of $300,000.00 based on a theory of money had 

and received.

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We review a grant or denial of summary judgment de novo. Carithers v. 

Mid-Continent Cas. Co., 782 F.3d 1240, 1245 (11th Cir. 2015). Summary 

judgment is appropriate only if there is “no genuine dispute as to any material fact 

and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c). 

“Following a bench trial, we review legal conclusions de novo and findings 

of fact for clear error.” Carithers, 782 F.3d at 1245. “Under the clear error 

standard, we may reverse the district court’s findings of fact if, after viewing all 

the evidence, we are left with the definite and firm conviction that a mistake has 

been committed.” Crystal Entm’t & Filmworks, Inc. v. Jurado, 643 F.3d 1313, 

1319-20 (11th Cir. 2011) (internal quotations and citations removed). “‘The 

credibility of a witness is in the province of the factfinder and this court will not 

ordinarily review the factfinder’s determination of credibility.’” Id. at 1320

(quoting United States v. Copeland, 20 F.3d 412, 413 (11th Cir. 1994)).

After reviewing the record, we find the district court committed no error in 

determining that the language of the Agreement specifically limited WWPA’s 

liability to $30,000.00 and barred any further liability for either WWPA or Wallis 

for the remaining $270,000.00.

Accordingly, we affirm the district court’s opinion.

AFFIRMED.

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