[DO NOT PUBLISH]

In the

United States Court of Appeals

For the Eleventh Circuit

____________________

No. 21-12931

Non-Argument Calendar

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UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 

Plaintiff-Appellee,

versus

DENNIS BRIAN DEVLIN, 

Defendant-Appellant.

____________________

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Middle District of Florida

D.C. Docket No. 6:11-cr-00056-JA-DCI-1

____________________

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2 Opinion of the Court 21-12931

Before BRANCH, BRASHER, and EDMONDSON, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:

Dennis Devlin, a federal prisoner proceeding pro se,1 appeals the district court’s order denying Devlin’s pro se motion challenging the forfeiture orders entered in Devlin’s 2011 criminal proceedings. No reversible error has been shown; we affirm.2

I. 

In 2011, Devlin pleaded guilty to sexual exploitation of a 

child: a violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2251(a), (e). Pursuant to a written 

plea agreement, Devlin agreed to forfeit to the government any interest Devlin had in the hotel property where the criminal conduct 

took place (“Property”). 

In May 2011, the district court entered a preliminary order 

of forfeiture. The order provided that Devlin’s interest in the Property was subject to forfeiture by the government. 

At Devlin’s sentencing hearing, the district court ordered 

Devlin to forfeit his interest in the Property. The district court 

1 We read liberally briefs filed by pro se litigants. See Timson v. Sampson, 

518 F.3d 870, 874 (11th Cir. 2008). We also construe liberally pro se pleadings. 

See Tannenbaum v. United States, 148 F.3d 1262, 1263 (11th Cir. 1998).

2 Devlin’s motions for leave to file a reply brief out of time and for appointment of counsel are DENIED. Devlin’s motions to provide supplementary 

appellate arguments are GRANTED. 

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21-12931 Opinion of the Court 3

imposed a sentence of 180 months’ imprisonment. The final criminal judgment was entered on 1 August 2011. Devlin did not appeal 

his conviction or his sentence.

On 19 September 2013, the district court -- in the light of the 

pending sale of the Property -- entered an amended preliminary order of forfeiture. The district court ordered that Devlin’s interest 

in the net proceeds of the sale of the Property (an amount equal to 

$1,552,588.62) was forfeited to the government in lieu of forfeiting 

Devlin’s interest in the Property. Devlin never appealed the 

amended preliminary order of forfeiture. The district court entered the final order of forfeiture on 26 September 2013.

Beginning in 2018, Devlin filed pro se several motions seeking to challenge the forfeiture proceedings. Briefly stated, Devlin 

alleged that he never had an interest in the Property. Devlin asserted that the government had obtained the final forfeiture order 

through extortion, by fabricating evidence, and by perpetuating a 

fraud on the district court. The district court denied Devlin’s various motions, concluding that Devlin had no standing to contest the 

final forfeiture order. Devlin pursued three separate appeals of the 

district court’s orders denying relief. We dismissed each appeal for 

lack of jurisdiction, concluding that Devlin lacked standing to challenge the final order of forfeiture. 

In 2021, Devlin filed pro se the motion at issue in this appeal: 

a motion titled “Motion to Vacate an Unconstitutional-Illegal Preliminary Forfeiture Order. Motion to Dismiss the Government 

Motion ‘Court Lacks Jurisdiction’ Used to Perpetrate Fraud on 

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Court” (“Motion to Vacate”). In his Motion to Vacate, Devlin went 

over again the same arguments raised in his earlier unsuccessful 

motions challenging the forfeiture proceedings. Among other 

things, Devlin continued to assert that he never had an interest in 

the Property and that the government obtained the forfeiture order 

through fraud, extortion, and by fabricating evidence. 

The magistrate judge issued a report and recommendation 

(“R&R”), recommending that the district court deny Devlin’s Motion to Vacate. The magistrate judge explained that the district 

court had already addressed the arguments raised in Devlin’s motion and had concluded that Devlin lacked standing to challenge 

the final order of forfeiture. The magistrate judge also recommended that the district court enjoin Devlin from filing additional 

forfeiture-related motions. 

Devlin filed timely objections to the R&R. In his objections, 

Devlin never challenged the magistrate judge’s recommendation 

that Devlin be enjoined from future forfeiture-related filings. 

The district court overruled Devlin’s objections. The district court adopted the R&R and denied Devlin’s Motion to Vacate. 

The district court also enjoined Devlin from “making any filings 

related to the forfeiture orders or the property subject to forfeiture 

in this case” and ordered that such filings be stricken without further notice. The district court then struck Devlin’s most recently 

filed forfeiture-related motion. This appeal followed.

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II. 

A.

We review de novo jurisdictional issues, including threshold 

questions about standing. See United States v. Weiss, 467 F.3d 

1300, 1307-08 (11th Cir. 2006). 

To establish standing, a litigant must show (1) “that he has 

suffered a concrete injury” (2) “that is fairly traceable to the challenged conduct,” and (3) that “is likely to be redressed by a favorable judicial decision.” United States v. Amodeo, 916 F.3d 967, 971 

(11th Cir. 2019). For purposes of appellate standing, the litigant 

“must possess a direct stake in the outcome of the case.” Id. “Only 

a litigant who is aggrieved by the judgment or order may appeal.” 

Id. In deciding whether a litigant has standing in a forfeiture proceeding, we consider whether the litigant has shown an interest in 

the property subject to forfeiture. Id. 

When a criminal defendant -- like Devlin -- pleads guilty and 

agrees to forfeiture, the district court enters a preliminary forfeiture order. See id. at 972. At sentencing, the preliminary forfeiture 

order becomes final for the defendant and extinguishes the defendant’s interest in the property. Id. The district court may then conduct ancillary proceedings to assess the interests of third parties in 

the forfeited property. Id. At the conclusion of the ancillary proceedings, the district court enters a final order of forfeiture. Id. 

“A defendant has standing to challenge a preliminary order 

of forfeiture because that order causes his injury -- the loss of his 

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property.” United States v. Bane, 948 F.3d 1290, 1294 (11th Cir. 

2020). A defendant, however, has no standing to challenge the final 

order of forfeiture: an order that is “entered after the defendant has 

already lost ownership of the property” and that concerns only the 

rights of third parties in the property. Id. 

To the extent Devlin’s Motion to Vacate sought to challenge 

the final forfeiture order3 or the settlement agreement reached 

during the ancillary forfeiture proceedings, the district court determined properly that Devlin lacked standing to do so. See id. 

Devlin’s Motion to Vacate can also be construed as challenging 

both the district court’s initial and amended preliminary forfeiture 

orders. Devlin has standing to challenge those preliminary orders. 

See Bane, 948 F.3d at 1293-94 (concluding that defendants had 

standing -- years after the final forfeiture order was entered -- to 

raise a claim that the district court erred in holding them jointly 

and severally liable for the forfeiture judgment because the defendants’ argument constituted a challenge to the preliminary forfeiture order). 

The government argues that Devlin disclaimed standing to 

challenge the preliminary forfeiture orders by asserting that he 

never had an interest in the Property. We disagree. The preliminary forfeiture orders constituted a part of Devlin’s final criminal 

3 On appeal, Devlin says he is not challenging directly the final forfeiture order. Devlin says he cites to the final forfeiture order only as evidence of the 

government’s alleged misconduct.

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sentence. See 21 U.S.C. § 853 (governing criminal forfeitures); Libretti v. United States, 516 U.S. 29, 38-39 (1995) (“Forfeiture is an 

element of the sentence imposed following conviction . . . .”). That 

Devlin seeks to challenge the sentencing court’s determination that 

the Property was subject to criminal forfeiture does not deprive 

Devlin of standing to challenge his own criminal sentence. But 

standing to litigate an issue is different from success in that litigation.

B.

We next address the district court’s lack of authority to modify the preliminary forfeiture orders. Because a preliminary forfeiture order is a part of a defendant’s criminal sentence, it is challenged properly in a direct criminal appeal. See United States v. 

Mosavi, 138 F.3d 1365, 1366 (11th Cir. 1998). A district court has 

no authority to modify a criminal forfeiture order under 28 U.S.C. 

§ 2255, Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b), or under a writ of error coram nobis. 

See Mamone v. United States, 559 F.3d 1209, 1210-11 (11th Cir. 

2009) (concluding that 28 U.S.C. § 2255 cannot be used to raise a 

collateral challenge to noncustodial punishments); Mosavi, 138 

F.3d at 1366, n.1 (concluding that a defendant cannot challenge a 

criminal forfeiture under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure or 

by a writ of error coram nobis).

Devlin never appealed his conviction or sentence and never 

appealed the district court’s entry of the amended preliminary forfeiture order. Devlin first sought to challenge the forfeiture orders 

five years after the final forfeiture order was entered -- long after 

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the time for filing a direct appeal had expired. See Fed. R. App. P. 

4(b) (requiring a criminal defendant to file a notice of appeal within 

14 days after entry of the judgment being appealed); Fed. R. Crim. 

P. 32.2(b)(4)(C) (providing that the time to appeal a criminal forfeiture order begins to run from the date the judgment is entered or, 

if the court later amends the order to substitute property, from the 

date the amended order becomes final). 

Devlin has identified (and we have found) no source of authority under which the district court could modify Devlin’s preliminary forfeiture orders. The district court lacked authority to 

modify the challenged preliminary forfeiture orders; we affirm the 

district court’s denial of Devlin’s Motion to Vacate.

C.

On appeal, Devlin argues that the district court’s order enjoining him from further forfeiture-related filings was unlawful and 

constituted a violation of his due process rights and his constitutional right to defend himself. 

In his objections to the R&R, Devlin failed to object to the 

magistrate judge’s recommendation that Devlin be enjoined from 

filing additional motions related to the criminal forfeiture proceedings. As a result, Devlin has waived the right to challenge that portion of the district court’s order on appeal. See 11th Cir. R. 3-1. 

Nor can we conclude that a review for plain error is necessary in the interests of justice. See id. (“In the absence of a proper 

objection, however, the court may review on appeal for plain error 

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if necessary in the interests of justice.”). The district court’s injunction has not foreclosed completely Devlin’s access to the courts. 

Cf. Martin-Trigona v. Shaw, 986 F.2d 1384, 1386-87 (11th Cir. 1993) 

(“The only restriction this Circuit has placed upon injunctions designed to protect against abusive and vexatious litigation is that a 

litigant cannot be ‘completely foreclosed from any access to the 

court.’” (emphasis in original)). Instead, the district court’s injunction restricts Devlin only from filing additional forfeiture-related 

motions. Devlin has had ample opportunity to litigate his arguments challenging the forfeiture proceedings in this case. 

AFFIRMED.

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