27606 Federal Register / Vol. 63, No. 96 /Tuesday, May 19, 1998 / Notices

present in that application of the

regulation in these particular

circumstances is not necessary to

achieve the underlying purpose of the

rule.

Therefore, the Commission hereby

grants the Wisconsin Electric Power

Company an exemption from the

requirements of 10 CFR part 50,

Appendix R, Section III.J, with respect

to access and egress routes between the

main power block and the diesel

generator building, 13.8 kV switchgear

building, service water and fire pump

house, fuel oil pump house, gas turbine

building, and warehouse 3 at Point

Beach Nuclear Plant, Units 1 and 2, to

the extent alternative means of lighting

as described herein are available.

Pursuant to 10 CFR 51.32, the

Commission has determined that the

granting of this exemption will not have

a significant effect on the quality of the

human environment (62 FR 46381).

This exemption is effective upon

issuance.

Dated at Rockville, Maryland, this 7th day

of April 1998.

For The Nuclear Regulatory Commission.

Samuel J. Collins,

Director, Office of Nuclear Reactor

Regulation.

[FR Doc. 98–13189 Filed 5–18–98; 8:45 am]

BILLING CODE 7590–01–P

NUCLEAR REGULATORY

COMMISSION

[Docket Nos. 50–317 and 50–318]

Baltimore Gas and Electric Company;

Calvert Cliffs Nuclear Power Plant, Unit

Nos. 1 and 2 Environmental

Assessment and Finding of No

Significant Impact

The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory

Commission (the Commission) is

considering issuance of an amendment

to Facility Operating Licenses Nos.

DPR–53 and DPR–69, issued to

Baltimore Gas and Electric Company

(the licensee), for operation of the

Calvert Cliffs Nuclear Power Plant, Unit

Nos. 1 and 2, located in Calvert County,

Maryland.

Environmental Assessment

Identification of the Proposed Action

The proposed action would revise the

Technical Specifications (TSs) to reduce

the minimum Reactor Coolant System

(RCS) total flow rate from 370,000 gpm

to 340,000 gpm; reduce the Reactor

Protective Instrumentation trip setpoint

for Reactor Coolant Flow—Low from

greater than or equal to 95% to greater

than or equal to 92% of design reactor

coolant flow; adjust the reactor core

thermal margin safety limit lines to

reflect the reduced RCS flow rate; and

reduce the lift setting range for the eight

Main Steam Safety Valves (MSSVs) with

the highest allowable lift setting from

the current range of 935 to 1065 psig to

a more restrictive range of 935 to 1050

psig. In addition to the changes to the

TSs necessary to support an increased

number of plugged steam generator

tubes, reanalysis of the accident

analyses affected by this change

identified an Unreviewed Safety

Question (USQ) associated with these

changes. The USQ results from the

determination that the Seized Rotor

Event analysis involves an increased

percentage of failed fuel cladding.

Finally, four reanalyzed events Main

Steamline Break (MSLB), Steam

Generator Tube Rupture (SGTR) Loss of

Coolant Flow, and Boron Dilution)

require Nuclear Regulatory Commission

approval due to changes to the

methodology or assumptions used to

analyze these events.

The proposed action is in accordance

with the licensee’s application for

amendment dated January 31, 1997, as

supplemented by letters dated February

13, February 28, March 25, April 16,

August 16, and September 29, 1997, and

January 22, March 17, April 8, and April

21, 1998.

The Need for the Proposed Action

During the 1998 Unit 1 refueling

outage, Baltimore Gas and Electric

Company (BGE) will perform extensive

steam generator tube inspections. Tubes

that experience excessive degradation

reduce the integrity of the primary-tosecondary pressure boundary. Eddy

current examination is used to measure

the extent of tube degradation. When

the reduction in the tube wall thickness

reaches the plugging or repair limit, as

specified in the Technical

Specifications, the tube is considered

defective and a corrective action is

taken.

Currently, the Calvert Cliffs TSs allow

defective tubes to be plugged and

removed from service, or to be repaired

using welded sleeving techniques

developed by Westinghouse Electric

Corporation or Combustion Engineering,

Inc. The most widely used tube

maintenance technique at many

pressurized water reactors, including

Calvert Cliffs, is removal of the

degraded tube from service by installing

plugs at both ends of the tube. The

installation of steam generator tube

plugs removes the heat transfer surface

of the plugged tube from service, and

the increased flow resistance leads to a

reduction in the primary coolant flow

available for core cooling. The

minimum primary coolant flow

requirements in the TSs are based upon

operation with no more than 800

plugged tubes in each steam generator.

There is a possibility that the results of

steam generator tube inspections in the

upcoming refueling outage will

necessitate exceeding the 800 plugged

tube criteria in at least one of the Unit

1 steam generators. If this is the case,

BGE will require implementation of the

proposed TSs changes and approval of

the USQ prior to Mode 2 entry following

the 1998 Unit 1 refueling outage.

Environmental Impacts of the Proposed

Action

The Commission has completed its

evaluation of the proposed action and

concludes that the proposed action will

not have a significant effect on the

quality of the human environment. To

the extent there is any environmental

impact from increasing the number of

plugged steam generator tubes, such

impact results from the increased RCS

temperature and the reduced RCS flow

rate expected to result from this activity.

Reanalysis of the Seized Rotor Event

analyses has indicated a greater

percentage of fuel pin failures would be

expected during these postulated

accidents due to the revised coolant

temperature and flow rates; the

increased number of plugged tubes

results in an increase in offsite releases,

relative to past analyses.

The licensee’s results of the MSLB

event reanalysis with reduced RCS flow

indicate a reduction in the 0–2 hour

thyroid dose at the Exclusion Area

Boundary (EAB) from 81 rem to 5 rem,

and a decrease in the 0–2 hour whole

body dose at the EAB from 0.3 rem to

0.2 rem. The licensee’s results of the

Seized Rotor Event reanalysis indicate

the resultant 0–2 hour EAB thyroid dose

increases from 3.6 rem to 12 rem,

whereas the whole body dose at the

EAB is reduced from 0.4 rem to 0.2 rem.

The licensee presented, for the first

time, doses at the low population zone

(LPZ) for the MSLB and the Seized

Rotor Events. These doses were 1.2 rem

thyroid and 0.04 rem whole body for the

MSLB and 1.0 rem thyroid and 0.04 rem

whole body for the Seized Rotor Event.

The guideline dose limits for accidents

involving fuel failure are the 10 CFR

Part 100 limits of 300 rem to the thyroid

and 25 rem to the whole body.

The licensee presented the results of

an SGTR analysis. Two cases were

presented. The first case was based

upon primary coolant being at the 100

hour technical specification value for

dose equivalent 131 I of 1 μCI/g and

iodine spiking factor of 500. The
Federal Register / Vol. 63, No. 96 /Tuesday, May 19, 1998 / Notices 27607

licensee calculated the thyroid and

whole body doses at the EAB as 13 rem

and 0.55 rem, respectively.

The LPZ doses, which were reported

for the first time by the licensee, were

calculated as 5 rem thyroid and 0.15

whole body. The second case, which

was evaluated, assumed primary coolant

was at the maximum instantaneous

technical specification value of dose

equivalent 131 I of 60μCi/g. The results

of this case were presented for the first

time. The licensee calculated the doses

at the EAB as 22 rem thyroid and 0.66

rem whole body. The LPZ doses were

calculated as 6 rem thyroid and 0.18

rem whole body.

Even though there is some increase in

dose for the Seized Rotor Event, the

actual total dose is a fraction of the

limits of 10 CFR part 100, as noted

above, and there is a low probability of

these accidents. This change does not

significantly affect the risk of any

dominant accident scenario, and the

effect on overall risk of an accident at

Calvert Cliffs Nuclear Power Plant is

insignificant. The change will not

increase the probability or consequences

of accidents, no changes are being made

in the types of any effluents that may be

released offsite, and there is no

significant increase in the allowable

individual or cumulative occupational

radiation exposure. Accordingly, the

Commission concludes that there are no

significant radiological environmental

impacts associated with the proposed

action.

The staff has performed confirmatory

calculations of the consequences of an

MSLB, SGTR and Seized Rotor Events.

The staff has confirmed that the

consequences of these accidents will

result in offsite doses which are a small

fraction of the 10 CFR part 100 dose

guidelines. In addition, the staff has

determined that the proposed action

will not result in an increase in normal

radiological effluents from the Calvert

Cliffs Nuclear Power Plant such that 10

CFR part 20 and Appendix I to 10 CFR

part 50 will continue to be met.

With regard to potential

nonradiological impacts, the proposed

action does involve features located

entirely within the restricted area as

defined in 10 CFR part 20. It does not

affect nonradiological plant effluents

and has no other environmental impact.

Accordingly, the Commission concludes

that there are no significant

nonradiological environmental impacts

associated with the proposed action.

Alternatives to the Proposed Action

The principal alternative to approving

the license amendment request needed

to allow plugging up to 2500 tubes per

steam generator would be to deny the

request and retain the current coolant

flow limitations. However, this

alternative could reduce operational

flexibility as it may prevent a Unit 1

start-up following the upcoming

refueling outage, if the steam generator

tube inspections necessitate plugging

greater than 800 tubes in either of the

unit’s two steam generators.

Furthermore, denial of the amendment

would not significantly enhance the

protection of the environment as the

impacts of this alternative and the

proposed action are similar.

Alternative Use of Resources

This action does not involve the use

of any resources not previously

considered in the Final Environmental

Statement for the Calvert Cliffs Nuclear

Power Plant, Unit Nos. 1 and 2 dated

April 1973.

Agencies and Persons Consulted

In accordance with its stated policy,

on May 5, 1998, the staff consulted with

the Maryland State official, Richard I.

McLean of the Maryland Department of

Natural Resources, regarding the

environmental impact of the proposed

action. The State official had no

comments.

Finding of No Significant Impact

Based upon the environmental

assessment, the Commission concludes

that the proposed action will not have

a significant effect on the quality of the

human environment. Accordingly, the

Commission has determined not to

prepare an environmental impact

statement for the proposed action.

For further details with respect to the

proposed action, see the licensee’s letter

dated January 31, 1997, as

supplemented by letters dated February

13, February 28, March 25, April 16,

August 16, and September 29, 1997, and

January 22, March 17, April 8, and April

21, 1998, which are available for public

inspection at the Commission’s Public

Document Room, The Gelman Building,

2120 L Street, NW., Washington, DC,

and at the local public document room

located at the Calvert County Library,

Prince Frederick, Maryland 20678.

Dated at Rockville, Maryland, this 12th day

of May 1998.

For The Nuclear Regulatory Commission.

S. Singh Bajwa,

Director, Project Directorate I–1, Division of

Reactor Projects—I/II, Office of Nuclear

Reactor Regulation.

[FR Doc. 98–13188 Filed 5–18–98; 8:45 am]

BILLING CODE 7590–01–P

NUCLEAR REGULATORY

COMMISSION

Year 2000 Readiness of Computer

Systems at Nuclear Power Plants;

Issue

AGENCY: Nuclear Regulatory

Commission.

ACTION: Notice of Issuance.

SUMMARY: The Nuclear Regulatory

Commission (NRC) has issued Generic

Letter (GL) 98–01 to all holders of

operating licenses for nuclear power

plants, except those who have

permanently ceased operations and

have certified that fuel has been

permanently removed from the reactor

vessel, to require the submittal of

written responses that will give the NRC

the necessary assurance that addressees

are effectively addressing the year 2000

(Y2K) problem in computer systems at

their respective facilities. Simply stated,

the Y2K problem pertains to the

potential for a system or an application

to experience date-related problems,

such as misreading ‘‘00’’ as the year

1900 rather than 2000. This generic

letter requires the following information

from addressees, under the provisions of

Section 182a of the Atomic Energy Act

of 1954, as amended, and 10 CFR

50.54(f): (1) Written confirmation that

each addressee is implementing an

effective plan to address the Y2K

problem and provide for safe operation

of their respective facilities prior to

January 1, 2000, and (2) written

certification that the facilities are Y2K

ready with regard to compliance with

the terms and conditions of the facility

licenses and NRC regulations.

The generic letter is a ‘‘rule’’ for

purposes of the Small Business

Regulatory Enforcement Fairness Act (5

U.S.C., Chapter 8). The staff has

received confirmation from the Office of

Management and Budget that the

generic letter is a non-major rule.

The generic letter is available in the

NRC Public Document Room under

accession number 9805050192.

DATES: The generic letter was issued on

May 11, 1998.

ADDRESSEES: Not applicable.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT:

Matthew Chiramal, at (301) 415–2845.

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: This

generic letter only requires information

from addressees under the provisions of

Section 182a of the Atomic Energy Act

of 1954, as amended, and 10 CFR

50.54(f). The generic letter does not

constitute a backfit as defined in 10 CFR

50.109(a)(1) since it does not impose

modifications of or additions to