NOT RECOMMENDED FOR PUBLICATION

File Name: 22a0176n.06

No. 21-1366

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT

NICOLE THOMPSON,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

v.

SCOTT ANDREW RENNER, et al,

Defendant-Appellants.

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ON APPEAL FROM THE 

UNITED STATES DISTRICT 

COURT FOR THE WESTERN 

DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN

Before: BATCHELDER, ROGERS, and WHITE, Circuit Judges.

WHITE, J., delivered the opinion of the court in which ROGERS, J., joined. 

BATCHELDER, J. (pp. 26–32), delivered a separate dissenting opinion.

HELENE N. WHITE, Circuit Judge. Defendant-Appellants Scott A. Renner and Velo 

Associates, PLC (“Velo/Renner”) appeal the district court’s grant of summary judgment against 

them in this action filed under the Federal Debt Collection Practices Act (“FDCPA”), 15 U.S.C. 

§ 1692 et seq. On appeal, Velo/Renner argue that the district court erred in concluding that their 

filing a request for garnishment on an out-of-state garnishee, with no reason to believe that there 

was personal jurisdiction over the garnishee or that the garnishee would consent to jurisdiction,

violated the FDCPA. They also argue that the district court abused its discretion in awarding actual 

and statutory damages. We disagree and affirm.
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I.

A.

On April 11, 2013, St. Mary’s Hospital (“St. Mary’s”) obtained a default judgment against 

Plaintiff-Appellee Nicole Thompson for an alleged medical debt. Sometime later, St. Mary’s 

retained lawyers Velo/Renner to represent it in collecting its debt from Thompson.1 On January 

15, 2019, Velo/Renner filed a request for periodic garnishment (“Request for Garnishment” or 

“Request”) on St. Mary’s behalf in Michigan’s 61st District Court directed to Thompson’s 

employer, Ingalls Memorial Hospital (“Ingalls”). Ingalls is located in Illinois. The Request stated 

that Thompson owed St. Mary’s an unsatisfied judgment of $1,149.70. A Velo/Renner agent 

signed the Request. In a section entitled “TO THE GARNISHEE,” the Request instructed 

garnishee Ingalls that it should “not pay any obligations to [St. Mary’s] unless allowed by statute 

or court rule.” R. 36-1, PID 110.

On March 14, 2019, the 61st District Court issued the requested writ of garnishment (the 

“Writ of Garnishment” or “Writ”) ordering that Ingalls garnish Thompson’s wages to satisfy her 

debt. St. Mary’s, through Velo/Renner, served Ingalls with a copy of the Writ and accompanying 

garnishee disclosures, interrogatories, and fee. Ingalls, through its agent MedCentrix, Inc., 

provided Velo/Renner with the completed forms and responses to St. Mary’s interrogatories. 

However, Ingalls did not withhold any funds from Thompson’s wages or release any funds to St. 

Mary’s. 

Thompson filed a timely objection to the Writ of Garnishment in the 61st District Court, 

arguing that “the [W]rit was not properly issued or is otherwise invalid” because, under MCL

1 The parties agree that, within the meaning of the FDCPA, Thompson is a “consumer” and 

“person,” Velo/Renner are “debt collectors,” and the alleged debt to St. Mary’s is a “debt.”
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§ 600.4011, “[t]his [Michigan] Court does not have jurisdiction over the Illinois garnishee.” See 

R. 36, PID 107; R. 36-4, PID 118. 

The 61st District Court held a hearing on Thompson’s objection. Concluding that St. 

Mary’s had not demonstrated that the court could exercise personal jurisdiction over Ingalls, the 

61st District Court sustained Thompson’s objection and released the Writ of Garnishment. 

St. Mary’s appealed the 61st District Court’s order to the Kent County Circuit Court 

(“Circuit Court”), which affirmed. The Circuit Court explained that Michigan courts may exercise 

garnishment jurisdiction only “in accordance with the Michigan Court Rules” and only over third 

parties and obligors if those entities are “subject to the judicial jurisdiction of the state.” R. 36-6, 

PID 125 (first quoting Nationsbanc Mtg. Corp. of Ga. v. Luptak, 625 N.W.2d 385, 387 (Mich. Ct. 

App. 2000); and then citing MCL § 600.4011). The court explained that there are three methods 

by which a plaintiff may demonstrate a Michigan court’s proper exercise of personal jurisdiction 

over a corporation: 

(1) Incorporation under the laws of [Michigan];

(2) Consent, to the extent authorized by the consent and subject to the limitations 

provided in [MCL § 600.]745; and

(3) The carrying on of a continuous and systematic part of its general business 

within the state.

Id. at 124–25 (first citing Oberlies v. Searchmont Resort, Inc., 633 N.W.2d 408, 411 (Mich. Ct. 

App. 2001); and then citing MCL § 600.711). The court noted that it was “undisputed that Ingalls 

is not incorporated in the state of Michigan, nor does it carry on a continuous and systematic part 

of its general business within the state.” Id. The court then explained why, contrary to St. Mary’s 

argument, it would not find that Ingalls’s disclosures and responses to the Writ constituted 

“consent” to personal jurisdiction pursuant to MCL § 600.711(2):
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St. Mary’s has not specifically pled, nor has it introduced evidence, in support of 

its proposition that Ingalls consented to personal jurisdiction.

MCR [Michigan Court Rule] 3.101(L)(4) is persuasive. MCR 3.101(L)(4) states:

The filing of a disclosure, the filing of answers to interrogatories, or 

the personal appearance by or on behalf of the garnishee at a 

deposition does not waive the garnishee’s right to question the 

court’s jurisdiction, the validity of the proceeding, or the plaintiff’s 

right to judgment.

(emphasis added). Per court rule, Ingalls’ actions—compliance with the writ, filing 

of a disclosure, the filing of answers to interrogatories, or even personal 

appearances if such occurred—do not waive a judicial jurisdictional issue.

While waiver and consent hold different meanings, in this matter they are 

practically the same. St. Mary’s has failed to meet its burden to show the court has 

personal jurisdiction over Ingalls. All it has done is identify that Ingalls did not 

waive a potential jurisdictional issue. Without more—such as a formal written 

consent or some other affirmative actions by Ingalls—the court cannot find that 

Ingalls consented to the district court’s jurisdiction. Therefore, the district court 

lacked judicial jurisdiction over Ingalls, as provided in MCL 600.4011.

Id. at 126. The court then concluded that lack of jurisdiction was a valid basis for Thompson’s 

objection to the garnishment and affirmed the 61st District’s release of the Writ. 

B.

After the state court released the Writ, Thompson sued Velo/Renner in federal court 

alleging that they had violated the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act by “fil[ing] a post judgment 

garnishment against [Thompson]’s Illinois employer in a Michigan collection lawsuit when the 

Michigan court did not have jurisdiction over the Illinois employer.”2 R. 1. Thompson argued 

that Velo/Renner’s allegedly jurisdictionless Garnishment Request violated the FDCPA’s 

prohibition on “the use of any false, misleading, or deceptive representation or means in 

connection with the collection of a debt, including the threat to take any action that cannot legally 

2 Thompson also alleged that Velo/Renner’s conduct violated the Michigan Collection Practices 

Act, MCL § 445.251 et seq, but the district court declined to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over this 

claim. It is not before us.
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be taken.” Id. at 3 (citing 15 U.S.C. § 1692(e)). In Thompson’s view, Velo/Renner’s Garnishment 

Request constituted a “threat to take any action that cannot legally be taken” because, at the time 

Velo/Renner filed the Request in the 61st District, they could not demonstrate that the Michigan 

court had personal jurisdiction over Thompson’s Illinois employer. 

The district court agreed that Velo/Renner’s Garnishment Request violated the FDCPA’s 

prohibition on threats to “take action that cannot legally be taken” and awarded Thompson $2,720 

in actual damages, $500 in statutory damages, and $18,875 in costs and attorney fees, for a total 

award of $22,095. 

Velo/Renner appeal on two grounds: first, they argue that the district court erred in 

concluding that their Garnishment Request violated the FDCPA because it did not contain any 

affirmative representations regarding jurisdiction; because a jurisdictional error is not “actionable” 

under the FDCPA; and because the FDCPA is an improper mechanism to vindicate violations of 

state procedural law; and second, that the district court abused its discretion in awarding Thompson 

damages “absent credible evidence” that she had sustained those damages and absent proper 

“analysis of the relevant factors” under 15 U.S.C. § 1692(k). Appellants’ Br. at viii. 

II.

A.

We review the grant of summary judgment de novo and “make all reasonable inferences 

in [the non-movant’s] favor.” Brent v. Wayne Cnty. Dept. of Human Servs., 901 F.3d 656, 681 

(6th Cir. 2018). Summary judgment is appropriate if a movant shows “that there is no genuine 

dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to summary judgment as a matter of law.” 

Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). 
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The FDCPA’s self-stated purpose is to “eliminate abusive debt collection practices by debt 

collectors, to insure that those debt collectors who refrain from using abusive debt collection 

practices are not completely disadvantaged, and to promote consistent State action to protect 

consumers against debt collection abuses.” 15 U.S.C. § 1692(e). To that end, the FDCPA prohibits 

debt collectors from “us[ing] any false, deceptive, or misleading representation or means in 

connection with the collection of any debt,” including “[t]he threat to take any action that cannot 

legally be taken or that is not intended to be taken.” Id. § 1692e(5). The Act is “extraordinarily 

broad.” Currier v. First Resol. Inv. Corp., 762 F.3d 529, 533 (6th Cir. 2014) (quoting BaranySnyder v. Weiner, 539 F.3d 327, 333 (6th Cir. 2008)). It is a “strict-liability statute: A plaintiff 

does not need to prove knowledge or intent and does not have to have suffered actual damages” to 

prove a violation. Stratton v. Portfolio Recovery Assocs., LLC, 770 F.3d 443, 448–49 (6th Cir. 

2014) (internal citation omitted). “To determine whether conduct fits within the broad scope of 

the FDCPA, the conduct is viewed through the eyes of the least sophisticated consumer.” Currier, 

762 F.3d at 533 (internal quotation omitted). “This standard ensures that the FDCPA protects all 

consumers, the gullible as well as the shrewd.” Barany-Snyder, 539 F.3d at 333 (internal citations 

omitted). 

B.

Velo/Renner make two arguments why their Garnishment Request did not violate the 

FDCPA. First, they argue that the Request did not contain “any affirmative representations” as to 

jurisdiction, and that simply filing the Request cannot be a violation of the FDCPA’s prohibition 

on misleading representations. Appellants’ Br. at 14–15. Second, Velo/Renner argue that even if 

a court later determined that they were mistaken regarding jurisdiction at the time of filing, this 

mistake is not “actionable” under the FDCPA because the allegation regarding jurisdiction was 
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not necessarily false at the time it was made given the possibility that grounds for jurisdiction 

could be found after discovery or that Ingalls would later consent to jurisdiction. Id. at 17–20. 

These arguments lack merit. 

1.

As an initial matter, Velo/Renner are incorrect that their signature on the Garnishment 

Request was not an “affirmative representation” as to jurisdiction. Michigan courts have 

jurisdiction over garnishees “only in accordance with the Michigan Court Rules.” MCL 

§ 600.4011(2). And MCR 1.109(E)(5)—a provision analogous to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure

11—provides that a signature on a filed document constitutes a “certification by the signer that . . . 

to the best of his or her knowledge, information, and belief formed after reasonable inquiry, the 

document is well grounded in fact and is warranted by existing law or a good-faith argument for 

the extension, modification, or reversal of existing law.” Thus, as the district court aptly observed,

“by filing . . . the garnishment, the Plaintiff in the underlying action impliedly makes the factual 

contention that jurisdiction over the garnishee is a reasonable opportunity available to them.” 

R. 51, PID 233. 

But even without state-specific rules regarding affirmative representations, filing a 

garnishment request without reasonable belief that the court has jurisdiction to grant it may be 

sufficient to violate the FDCPA. “Court filings can be a threat under the FDCPA. . . . The fact that 

the threat appears in a lawsuit or other court filing does not diminish the threatening nature of the 

communication for purposes of the FDCPA.” Currier, 762 F.3d at 535; see also Stratton, 770 F.3d 

at 450 (noting that a garnishment request is litigation in pursuit of a debt and is therefore regulated 

by the FDCPA). It is well-established that taking, or threatening to take, an action impermissible 

under state law may be sufficient to violate the FDCPA. Stratton, 770 F.3d at 445 (“Under 
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Kentucky law a party has no right to statutory interest if it has waived the right to collect 

contractual interest. And any attempt to collect statutory interest when it is ‘not permitted by law’

violates the FDCPA.”); Currier, 762 F.3d at 535–36 (concluding that filing a judgment lien against 

a debtor’s home that was invalid under Kentucky law is “a threat to take an action that cannot 

legally be taken” because of “the intimidating effect on the least sophisticated consumer: that she 

would be confused, and reasonably might feel pressured to immediately pay the debt, even if she 

disputed its validity in order to avoid the implied consequences of the lien”) (internal quotation 

marks omitted). Thus, filing a garnishment request without reasonable grounds for jurisdiction

may be sufficient to violate the FDCPA’s prohibition on “us[ing] any false, deceptive, or 

misleading representation or means in connection with the collection of any debt” because it 

constitutes “[t]he threat to take any action that cannot legally be taken or that is not intended to be 

taken.” 15 U.S.C. § 1692e(5). 

Velo/Renner point to this court’s statement in Currier that Congress did not intend to “turn 

every violation of state law into a violation of the FDCPA.” Appellants’ Br. at 13 (quoting Currier, 

762 F.3d at 537). True. But in concluding that debt collectors violated the FDCPA by filing a 

judgment lien on a debtor’s home that was invalid under state law, Currier went on to explain:

[While] Congress did not turn every violation of state law into a violation of the 

FDCPA[,] . . . that does not mean that a violation of state law can never also be a 

violation of the FDCPA. The proper question in the context of an FDCPA claim is 

whether the plaintiff alleged an action that falls within the broad range of conduct 

prohibited by the Act. The legality of the action taken under state law may be 

relevant, as it is in this case. If the judgment lien [filed against the debtor’s home] 

had been valid under state law for the month that [the debt collector] held it, we 

could not say that it was an unfair debt collection practice even though it was 

coercive in nature. But the same action becomes unfair [within the meaning of the 

FDCPA] when accomplished by using a state mechanism that does not authorize 

it.

762 F.3d at 537 (internal citation omitted) (emphasis added). 
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Thus, even without regard to whether Velo/Renner made “affirmative misrepresentations” 

in their Garnishment Request, the Garnishment Request could itself be “an action . . . accomplished 

by using a state mechanism that does not authorize it.” Id. Or put in the FDCPA’s own terms, 

filing the Garnishment Request could constitute a “threat to take any action that cannot legally be 

taken.” 15 U.S.C. § 1692e(5). 

2.

a.

Having concluded that it is possible to violate the FDCPA’s prohibition on toothless threats 

by filing a jurisdictionless garnishment request, the next question is whether Velo/Renner’s 

garnishment request was, in fact, a “threat to take any action that cannot legally be taken.” 

§ 1692e(5). Velo/Renner argue that the issue of jurisdiction was, at worst, an open question at the 

time of filing, which did not render their Request a “false,” “misleading,” “deceptive,” or otherwise 

impermissible filing under Michigan law. 

As the 61st District Court explained in the underlying state case, MCL § 600.4011 limits 

the state courts’ garnishment authority as follows:

[A Michigan] court has power by garnishment to apply the following property or 

obligation, or both, to the satisfaction of a claim evidenced by contract, judgment 

of this state, or foreign judgment, whether or not the state has jurisdiction over the 

person against whom the claim is asserted:

(a) personal property belonging to the person against whom the claim is 

asserted but which is in the possession or control of a third person if the 

third person is subject to the judicial jurisdiction of the state and the 

personal property to be applied is within the boundaries of this state.

(b) an obligation owed to the person against whom the claim is asserted if 

the obligor is subject to the judicial jurisdiction of the state.

Id. § 600.4011(1) (emphasis added). As plaintiffs in the garnishment action, Velo/Renner bore the 

burden of establishing jurisdiction over the obligor/garnishee. See Oberlies, 633 N.W.2d at 411.
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A Michigan court has personal jurisdiction over a corporation that stands in any one of the 

following three relationships with the state:

(1) Incorporation under the laws of [Michigan].

(2) Consent, to the extent authorized by the consent and subject to the limitations 

provided in section 745.

(3) The carrying on of a continuous and systematic part of its general business 

within [Michigan].

MCL § 600.711. The state court noted in the underlying proceedings that “[i]t is undisputed that 

Ingalls is not incorporated in the state of Michigan.”3 R. 36-6, PID 125. Velo/Renner have not 

challenged this fact in these proceedings. Thus, the only possible avenues for jurisdiction when 

Velo/Renner filed the Garnishment Request were either that 1) Ingalls would consent—or had 

already consented—to Michigan’s jurisdiction; or that 2) Ingalls carried on a “continuous and 

systematic part of its general business within” Michigan under MCL § 600.711. 

A foreign corporation may consent to personal jurisdiction in Michigan by “agree[ing] in 

writing that an action on a controversy may be brought in [Michigan],” provided certain conditions 

are met. Id. § 600.745(2)(a)–(d). Velo/Renner do not claim that Ingalls agreed in writing to litigate 

in Michigan. 

Or, a corporation may waive jurisdiction by failing to raise a jurisdictional objection in its 

first responsive pleading or motion. MCR 2.116(D)(1). Although Ingalls served the completed 

garnishee disclosures and interrogatories on St. Mary’s in the garnishment proceedings, the

Michigan Court Rules explicitly state that such filings do not waive a garnishee’s right to object 

to jurisdiction. MCR 3.101(L)(4) (“The filing of a disclosure, the filing of answers to 

3

It is also undisputed that MCL § 600.711 is the applicable law governing personal jurisdiction 

over Ingalls and that Ingalls is a “corporation” within the meaning of this section. 
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interrogatories, or the personal appearance by or on behalf of the garnishee at a deposition does 

not waive the garnishee’s right to question the court’s jurisdiction, the validity of the proceeding, 

or the plaintiff’s right to judgment.”). 

As to continuous-and-systematic business within the state, Michigan courts look for indicia 

that a corporation’s “affiliations with the State . . . render them essentially at home in the forum 

State,” such as when “the particular corporate entity has a physical location, officers, employees, 

or bank accounts in Michigan.” Glenn v. TPI Petroleum, Inc., 854 N.W.2d 509, 515 (Mich. Ct. 

App. 2014) (internal citations omitted) (collecting cases). 

Velo/Renner do not challenge the district court’s factual finding that, at the time of filing 

the Garnishment Request, they had “no reason to believe that any further investigation or discovery 

might support” that Ingalls had either consented to Michigan’s jurisdiction or that it had a 

continuous-and-systematic business relationship with the state. R. 51, PID 234. Instead, 

Velo/Renner argue that the FDCPA does not require debt collectors to know with absolute 

certainty at the time of filing that there are jurisdictional grounds for a garnishment request. But 

the district court never required absolute certainty. Rather, it required a reasonable belief that 

jurisdiction was supported, or some actions calculated to make that determination. Velo/Renner 

cite three cases in support of their position that the district court required too much: Van Hoven v. 

Buckles & Buckles, P.L.C., 947 F.3d 889 (6th Cir. 2020); Harvey v. Great Seneca Fin. Corp., 453 

F.3d 324 (6th Cir. 2006); and Lee v. Javitch, Block & Rathbone LLP, 601 F.3d 654, 658 (6th Cir. 

2010). 

Van Hoven involved a debt-collection company that, when filing garnishment requests with 

a Michigan-state court clerk, made two allegedly “false, deceptive, or misleading representations” 

under Michigan law: “(1) they sought the costs of each garnishment request under Michigan law, 
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and (2) they sought the costs of prior failed garnishments under Michigan law.” 947 F.3d at 893. 

In concluding that the second statement was an actionable misrepresentation but the first was not, 

we clarified that there are two requirements for a claimed violation or false representation of state 

law to constitute a violation of the FDCPA: first, the “claim must turn on a material misstatement,” 

and second, the representation must be false “at the time the creditor makes it.” Id. at 894. After 

clarifying that the Act’s definition of “‘false’ material statements . . . does not [] extend[] to every 

representation about the meaning of state law later disproved,” we gave several examples of what 

may and may not constitute false representations. “[M]isquoting a case, relying on a statute no 

longer in existence, [] invoking an overruled decision,” “claim[ing] that a one-year statute of 

limitations runs for two years,” and “say[ing] today that the Act does not apply to attorneys 

collecting debts” would all be “false when made, and it does not matter whether the lawyer knows 

they are false” because “[i]gnorance of the law is not a defense.” Id. at 895. In contrast, it would 

not be a false representation for a lawyer to “acknowledge[, whether in a debt collection action or 

a legal brief,] that state law was unclear about whether the creditor could obtain a certain cost” and 

then to seek the cost after “explain[ing] that its best reading of the law allowed the cost.” Id. 

Analogizing to Rule 11 of the Federal Rule of Civil Procedure’s authorization of sanctions when 

attorneys advance “‘legal contentions’ that are not ‘warranted by existing law,’” we ultimately 

held that a material misrepresentation of state law is only actionable under the FDCPA when it is 

“objectively baseless” at the time it was made, making the misrepresentation “legally 

indefensible.” Id. at 895–96 (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 11(b)). Applying this analysis to the Van 

Hoven facts, we held that the debt collectors had not made “objectively baseless” requests for the 

costs of each new garnishment because the requests were “reasonable [] under,” and “reflected the 

better reading of,” Michigan law at the time. Id. at 897. However, the requests for the costs of 
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prior garnishments were false representations because “[a]t the time of this lawsuit, the [Michigan 

Court] Rules made clear that creditors were not entitled to recover” those costs. Id. at 899 (internal 

citation omitted). 

Harvey involved a debtor who alleged that a debt collector violated the FDCPA by filing 

“a lawsuit to collect a purported debt without the means of proving the existence of the debt, the 

amount of the debt, or that [the debt collector] owned the debt.” 453 F.3d at 326. In concluding 

that Harvey’s complaint had failed to sufficiently allege that the debt collector’s filing was a 

deceptive practice under the FDCPA, we reasoned that the debt collectors

did not implicitly represent by filing the Complaint for Money that they had in hand 

the means to prove [their] claims. Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 

does not require attorneys to ensure that their client can prove its case before filing. 

Instead, the Rule mandates only that “the allegations and other factual contentions 

have evidentiary support or, if specifically so identified, are likely to have 

evidentiary support after a reasonable opportunity for further investigation or 

discovery.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 11(B)(3). [The plaintiff] did not allege in her complaint 

that Seneca and Javitch failed to undertake a reasonable investigation into whether 

or not Harvey’s debt existed; rather, she essentially focused on the contention that 

[the debt collectors] did not presently possess the means of proving that debt.

Id. at 333 (emphasis added). 

Finally, Javitch involved a debtor who alleged that an attorney violated the FDCPA by 

filing an affidavit for non-wage garnishment of the debtor’s bank account when, after garnishment, 

“the court later returned the money after [the debtor] proved that the account contained only” funds 

exempt from garnishment. 601 F.3d at 655. We concluded that the attorney had not violated the 

FDCPA because the signed affidavit stated only that the attorney had a “reasonable basis to 

believe” that the bank account contained garnishable wages, and that the attorney’s belief was 

indeed reasonable under the relevant standard imposed by Ohio law. Id. at 658. 

The parties disagree on the significance of these cases, as they did before the district court. 

The district court concluded that Van Hoven governs this case and that Velo/Renner’s 
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representation of jurisdiction was “objectively baseless”—and therefore violated the FDCPA—

because Velo/Renner “filed the garnishment without ever being able to show that the Court had 

jurisdiction over the Illinois corporation.” R. 51, PID 233–34 (noting that Velo/Renner had, at the 

time of the court’s ruling, still failed to proffer a “reason to believe that any further investigation 

or discovery might support” jurisdiction for their Garnishment Request). 

On appeal, Velo/Renner respond only partially to the district court’s analysis. In 

Velo/Renner’s view, Van Hoven/Harvey/Javitch support their position because the issue of 

jurisdiction—specifically, the issue of consent to jurisdiction—was an “open question” at the time 

of filing, and their later-rejected assertion of jurisdiction was, at most, a reasonable and debatable 

mistake of law. Specifically, Velo/Renner argue that the question whether Ingalls might have had 

ongoing business with Michigan or might consent to jurisdiction in the future was 

necessarily [a] fact-specific [inquiry that would] require discovery, which is 

ordinarily not available to a party until after a complaint, or, in this instance, a 

garnishment, has been filed. . . . At the end of the day, judgment creditors and their 

counsel should not be required to meet additional filing requirements not found in 

Michigan law to avoid running afoul of the FDCPA.

Appellants’ Br. at 20–21 (internal citations omitted). 

Thompson responds by reiterating the district court’s conclusion that Velo/Renner’s 

representation as to jurisdiction violated the FDCPA under Van Hoven because it “was baseless 

when it was made and [Velo/Renner] had no reason to believe that jurisdiction would later arise.” 

Appellee’s Br. at 14–15. Thompson similarly argues that Harvey and Javitch are distinguishable. 

Unlike in Harvey—where the court found no FDCPA violation because the plaintiff did not “allege 

in her complaint that [the debt collectors] failed to undertake a reasonable investigation into 

whether or not [the debtor]’s debt existed”—Velo/Renner “filed the garnishment without ever 

being able to show that the court had jurisdiction and without any basis to believe that any further 
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investigation would support jurisdiction in the Michigan court.”4 Id. at 15; Harvey, 453 F.3d at 

333. And unlike in Javitch—where we found that the attorney had a “reasonable basis” to believe 

that there were garnishable funds in the debtor’s account—Velo/Renner “had no reasonable basis 

to believe that the Michigan court had jurisdiction.” Appellee’s Br. at 16 (citing 601 F.3d at 657). 

Finally, Thompson argues that Velo/Renner’s actions are analogous to those in Currier, 

Stratton, and a line of cases holding that debt collectors violate the FDCPA when they file a timebarred lawsuit. Id. at 9–11. As previously discussed, Currier held that filing a judgment lien 

against a debtor’s home that was invalid under Kentucky law can “fairly be characterized as a 

threat to take an action that cannot legally be taken.” 762 F.3d at 535–36. Stratton held that a 

debt collector violated the FDCPA by misrepresenting, in a complaint filed to recover the debt,

the amount owed as interest under Kentucky law. 770 F.3d at 451 (noting that the misstatement 

was a “threat . . . to take an action that cannot legally be taken” because it “falsely represent[ed] 

both the ‘character’ and ‘amount’ of [the] debt” such that “[a]n unsophisticated consumer would 

most certainly have been misled”). As to the time-barred cases, the Sixth Circuit has not explicitly 

held that suing on a time-barred debt violates the FDCPA. However, the Van Hoven court noted 

in its discussion that doing so would be “objectively baseless, and is unsurprisingly subject to 

liability in many circuits.” 947 F.3d at 896; see also Harvey, 453 F.3d at 332–33 (approvingly 

quoting a district court’s explanation that time-barred-debt collection is impermissible under the 

FDCPA because it “play[s] upon and benefit[s] from the probability of creating a deception. 

Honest disclosure of the legal unenforceability of the collection action due to the time lapse since 

the debt was incurred would [] foil[] . . . efforts to collect on the debt. So instead, the [debt 

4 Conversely, we suggested in Harvey that there could have been an FDCPA violation if the debt 

collectors had “filed the complaint without the means of ever being able to obtain sufficient proof of the 

debt-collection action.” See 453 F.3d at 328. 
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collector] implicitly misrepresent[s] the status of the debt, and thereby misle[ads a debtor] as to 

the viability of legal action to collect.”) (internal citation omitted).

Thompson argues that Velo/Renner’s Garnishment Request is analogous to Currier, 

Stratton, and these time-barred-lawsuit cases because it relied on a deception that the Request was 

valid when filed, and “in hopes that the garnishee and the consumer [Thompson] would 

unwittingly acquiesce and honor the garnishment without objection.” Appellee’s Br. at 11. 

Thompson also correctly points out that this unwitting acquiescence was precisely Velo/Renner’s 

position in state court, when they failed to argue that they plausibly alleged jurisdiction at the time 

of filing and instead argued that “Ingalls’ [responses to the Garnishment Request] could constitute 

consent” to jurisdiction under Michigan law. R. 36-6, PID 124. 

b.

We agree with the district court that Van Hoven establishes when violations of state law 

rise to “actionable” false representations under the FDCPA. Under Van Hoven, Thompson must 

first demonstrate that the alleged misrepresentation was a “material” misstatement. 947 F.3d at 

894. Second, she must demonstrate that the representation was false “at the time the creditor 

ma[de] it.” Id.

Neither party disputes that a misrepresentation regarding jurisdiction is “material” to this 

action. See id. Thus, the key question is whether Velo/Renner’s representation regarding

jurisdiction was false “at the time the creditor ma[de] it,” rendering the representation “objectively 

baseless” and “legally indefensible.” Id. at 895–96. 

The district court determined that at the time Velo/Renner filed the Garnishment Request, 

they had no basis for believing that Michigan had jurisdiction under either the consent prong of 

the statute or the continuous-and-systematic-part-of-its-general-business prong. See MCL 
No. 21-1366, Thompson v. Renner, et al

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§ 600.711. Nothing in the record suggests a willingness on the part of Ingalls to consent to 

jurisdiction. Both the state court and the district court concluded that Velo/Renner had introduced 

no evidence to support jurisdiction under either prong, and the district court observed that, as of 

the date of the summary-judgment hearing, Velo/Renner “still” had offered “no reason to believe 

that any further investigation or discovery might support a Michigan court’s jurisdiction over the 

Illinois hospital.” R. 36-6, PID 125–26; R. 51, PID 233–34. On appeal, Velo/Renner argue that 

consent and continuous-and-systematic-business jurisdiction both involve fact-specific inquiries 

and information inaccessible to them until discovery, which would necessitate waiting until after 

the Garnishment Request has been filed in order to substantiate the suit. But as highlighted by the 

cases discussed above, debt collectors still need to have some reasonable basis for believing that 

their suit is viable at the time of filing; a Garnishment Request cannot be an unsupportable shot in 

the dark. Van Hoven, 942 F.3d at 896 (noting that while “a lawyer does not ‘misrepresent’ the law 

by advancing a reasonable legal position later proved wrong,” contentions that are “objectively 

baseless” will violate the Act); Harvey, 453 F.3d at 333 (suggesting that a debt collector would 

violate the FDCPA by “fail[ing] to undertake a reasonable investigation into whether or not [the] 

debt existed” prior to filing).

Velo/Renner offered no evidence in the state and federal actions that they conducted any 

“reasonable investigation” or otherwise had any reasonable basis to believe that the Michigan court

had jurisdiction when they filed the Garnishment Request. In addition to conducting their own 

internal inquiry into Ingalls’s business activities before filing, Velo/Renner could have reached out 

to Ingalls itself to make a reasonable inquiry into its business contacts with Michigan or its 
No. 21-1366, Thompson v. Renner, et al

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willingness to consent to Michigan’s jurisdiction for garnishment purposes.

5

 Because 

Velo/Renner provided no evidence to support a reasonable belief that there was jurisdiction when

they filed their Garnishment Request, we conclude that Velo/Renner made a representation about 

Michigan state law that was false “at the time the creditor ma[de] it.” 947 F.3d at 895–96. 

Nor may Velo/Renner rely on the bare hope that, after filing a garnishment request without 

reasonable basis for jurisdiction, Ingalls might subsequently consent to jurisdiction or waive its 

right to contest it. To be sure, Michigan’s corporate personal jurisdiction statute theoretically 

allows a corporation to consent to jurisdiction after a lawsuit against it has been filed. MCL 

§ 600.711 (allowing corporations to consent to jurisdiction “to the extent authorized by the 

consent”). But Velo/Renner produced nothing to support that there was a reasonable possibility 

that Ingalls would do so, or that they reasonably believed that it would. For example, Velo/Renner 

5 Velo/Renner argue that mandating these additional inquiries would be tantamount to a 

“require[ment] to meet additional filing requirements not found in Michigan law to avoid running afoul of 

the FDCPA.” Appellant’s Br. at 21. But as discussed, Michigan’s signature requirements already impose 

a duty of “reasonable inquiry” before filing a lawsuit. MCR 1.109(E)(5). And, in any event, the FDCPA 

may impose requirements not found in state law.

Velo/Renner also suggest that bringing this FDCPA lawsuit was improper given the existence of 

“[v]arious mechanisms already exist[ing] under the Michigan Court Rules to sanction allegations of 

improper court practice as alleged in this case.” Appellant’s Br. at 15–16 (citing MCR 1.109(E)(6) (which 

imposes sanctions for violating Michigan filing standards) and MCR 2.625(A)(2) (which awards costs 

against filers of frivolous actions)). Velo/Renner argue that “asking the District Court to mete out sanctions 

for litigation conduct undertaken in a state court is improper, especially because the state court is in the best 

position to determine whether an attorney’s conduct runs afoul of the court’s rules.” Id. at 17. 

We disagree. The state court rules identified by Velo/Renner remedy improper procedural practices 

generally, and Thompson would have been within her rights to seek these remedies from the 61st District. 

The federal FDCPA lawsuit serves a different purpose: it does not remedy “allegations of improper court 

practice,” as Velo/Renner suggest, but allegations of predatory debt collection. See Stratton, 770 F.3d at 

449 (“Strict liability [in FDCPA actions] places the risk of penalties on the debt collector that engages in 

activities which are not entirely lawful, rather than exposing consumers to unlawful debt-collector behavior 

without a possibility for relief. By allowing a prevailing plaintiff to recover [damages], Congress further 

placed the cost of enforcing the FDCPA squarely on the group that could most easily ensure that the Act is 

not violated—the debt collectors themselves.”). 
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submitted no affidavits supporting any expectations grounded in past experiences with out-of-state 

garnishments. 

The FDCPA is “extraordinarily broad,” Currier, 762 F.3d at 533 (quoting Frey, 970 at 

1521), and we must view potential violations “through the eyes of the least sophisticated 

consumer.” Id. at 533; 15 U.S.C. § 1692(e) (declaring that the Act’s purpose is to “eliminate 

abusive debt collection practices by debt collectors”) (emphasis added). We are persuaded by 

Thompson’s analogy of Velo/Renner’s conduct in this case to a debt collector’s deceptive practice 

of filing a time-barred lawsuit—which could theoretically be valid if the debtor consents to suit or 

fails to assert the statute-of-limitations defense—operating under the assumption or hope that the 

debtor will unwittingly consent. Indeed, this appears to be exactly what Velo/Renner were hoping 

for—or at least the advantage they attempted to take—in the underlying state case when they 

argued that Ingalls’s responses to the Writ constituted consent to jurisdiction. Further, it is 

important to recognize that Thompson could have been prompted to pay the debt after receiving 

notice of the jurisdictionless Writ (instead of objecting as she did). 

In short, because Velo/Renner provided the district court with no support for a reasonable 

belief that there was jurisdiction over Ingalls, or that Ingalls would consent to jurisdiction, there 

was no error in the district court’s conclusion that Velo/Renner’s Garnishment Request violated 

the FDCPA.6

6 This is not to say that to avoid FDCPA liability a debt collector in Michigan must necessarily 

establish personal jurisdiction over a debtor’s out-of-state employer before seeking garnishment through 

that employer. We take no position on a case, for instance, unlike this one, in which there is some minimal 

basis identified by the creditor for assuming Michigan contacts or for anticipating consent. 
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C.

Velo/Renner next argue that the district court abused its discretion in awarding Thompson 

damages under the FDCPA.

The FDCPA authorizes district courts to award three different types of damages: actual 

damages, statutory damages, and attorney fees and costs. The statute provides in relevant part:

(a) Amount of Damages—Except as otherwise provided by this section, any debt 

collector who fails to comply with any provision of this subchapter with respect 

to any person is liable to such person in an amount equal to the sum of—

(1) any actual damage sustained by such person as a result of such failure;

(2)

(A) in the case of any action by an individual, such additional damages 

as the court may allow, but not exceeding $1,000; or

(B) [language addressing class actions] and

(3) in the case of any successful action to enforce the foregoing liability, the 

costs of the action, together with a reasonable attorney’s fee as determined 

by the court. . . . 

(b) Factors Considered by Court—In determining the amount of liability in any 

action under subsection (a), the court shall consider, among other relevant 

factors—

(1) in any individual action under subsection (a)(2)(A), the frequency and 

persistence of noncompliance by the debt collector, the nature of such 

noncompliance, and the extent to which such noncompliance was 

intentional.

15 U.S.C. § 1692k.

Velo/Renner challenge the award of actual and statutory damages, arguing that Thompson 

failed to substantiate her request for actual damages; that the district court abused its discretion in 

awarding her damages anyway; and that the district court failed to appropriately consider certain 

damages factors under § 1692k(b)(1). 
No. 21-1366, Thompson v. Renner, et al

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1.

If a district court finds a violation of the FDCPA, the court may award “any actual damage 

sustained by [a prevailing party] as a result of [the FDCPA violation].” § 1692k(a). We review

the district court’s award of these damages for abuse of discretion. See Dowling v. Litton Loan 

Servicing LP, 320 F. App’x 442, 446 (6th Cir. 2009). A district court abuses its discretion when 

it “relies on clearly erroneous findings of fact, or when it improperly applies the law or uses an 

erroneous legal standard. Conversely, the district court’s [damages] calculations receive 

substantial deference where the court provides a clear and concise explanation of its reasons.” Id.

(internal citations omitted). 

In awarding Thompson actual damages based on her costs and attorney fees “incurred in 

defending [the] underlying [state-court] collection action,” the district court considered the 

following documents: an “invoice” dated January 14, 2021, which listed a total of 9 hours 

expended, plus a $20.00 court filing fee; Thompson’s counsel’s time records for the underlying 

garnishment proceeding, which she indicated were made from “data entered contemporaneously 

and [that] were previously invoiced on May 29, 2019 and October 2, 2019”; and the retainer 

agreement pertaining to the state-court proceeding which set forth a $300 hourly rate. R. 47, PID 

198–99. Based on these documents, the district court concluded that Thompson had “proven these 

damages to a reasonable certainty and [the court] will therefore award her actual damages of 

$2,720.00.” Id. at 199. 

On appeal, Velo/Renner argue that “Thompson did not adequately plead or present credible 

evidence to support her request for actual damages in the amount of $2,720.” Appellants’ Br. at 

23. Specifically, Velo/Renner argue that Thompson’s January 14, 2021 invoice was 

unauthenticated and that Thompson’s other evidence does not demonstrate “that Thompson 
No. 21-1366, Thompson v. Renner, et al

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actually paid any out of pocket attorney’s fees or costs to challenge the garnishment, or remains 

obligated to do so.” Appellants’ Br. at 24. 

Velo/Renner made these same arguments to the district court, which acknowledged and 

rejected them, holding that although Thompson’s “proofs in this regard are thin,” R. 47, PID 198–

99, she had proved them to a reasonable certainty. 

A district court’s determination regarding the amount of damages is a question of fact that

may be reversed only if the court’s findings are clearly erroneous. Fed. R. Civ. P. 52(a)(6); Neyer 

v. United States, 845 F.2d 641, 644 (6th Cir. 1988) (a factual determination is “clearly erroneous” 

where “the reviewing court on the entire evidence is left with a definite and firm conviction that a 

mistake has been committed”). The district court’s calculation of actual damages in this case was 

not clearly erroneous, as the proofs showed that the amount of loss was $2,720.00: $2,700 for state 

counsel’s nine hours of work at $300 per hour, plus $20 for the court filing fee. And, contrary to 

Velo/Renner’s suggestion that Thompson did not provide “any evidence that [she] actually paid 

any out of pocket attorney’s fees or costs to challenge the garnishment, or remains obligated to do 

so,” Appellants’ Br. at 24, Thompson provided a copy of her April 12, 2019 retainer agreement 

with her signature dated April 14, 2019. The retainer agreement stated that Thompson “agrees to 

reimburse and hold attorney harmless for all costs, disbursements, and expenses incurred in 

handling client’s case,” that Thompson would “pay for services rendered,” and that upon receipt 

of “monthly . . . statements of attorney fees and costs” the payment would be “due within 15 days.” 

R. 46-1, PID 185. 
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In light of this evidence that Thompson incurred actual expenses in her garnishment action

that she is obligated to pay, the district court did not abuse its discretion in awarding them to her.7

2.

Velo/Renner next argue that the district court erred in awarding Thompson statutory 

damages because she failed to offer “admissible” evidence in support of them. Appellants’ Br. at 

24–25. Specifically, Velo/Renner argue that Thompson failed to offer evidence of “the frequency 

and persistence of noncompliance by the debt collector, the nature of such noncompliance[,] and 

the extent to which such noncompliance was intentional,” and that this failure rendered the district 

court unable to substantiate its award of statutory damages. Id. (citing 15 U.S.C. § 1692k(b)(1)). 

The FDCPA authorizes district courts to award “such additional damages as the court may 

allow, but not exceeding $1,000.” § 1692k(a)(2)(A). The district court provided the following 

analysis in awarding Thompson $500 in statutory damages under this section:

[Velo/Renner] argue that “[a]s with [Thompson]’s actual damages claim, 

[Thompson] has offered no admissible evidence to inform the Court’s 

determination of statutory damages, if any.” (ECF No. 45 at PageID.173).

The statute instructs that “in determining the amount of liability in any action under 

subsection (a), the court shall consider, among other relevant factors—(1) in any 

individual action under subsection (a)(2)(A), the frequency and persistence of 

noncompliance by the debt collector, the nature of such noncompliance, and the 

extent to which such noncompliance was intentional. . . .” 15 U.S.C. § 1692k(b). 

The Court determines that [Thompson] has not substantiated a claim for statutory 

damages in the maximum amount allowed under the FDCPA. However, the Court 

will award [Thompson] $500 in statutory damages for the FDCPA violation proved 

in this case.

R. 47, PID 200. 

7 Thompson makes an additional argument on appeal that she suffered reputational, in addition to 

monetary, loss as a result of the garnishment action. But she did not make this argument in district court 

and, therefore, it is forfeited. Frazier v. Jenkins, 770 F.3d 485, 497 (6th Cir. 2014). 
No. 21-1366, Thompson v. Renner, et al

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The district court did not abuse its discretion in awarding $500 in statutory damages. First, 

Thompson need not provide proof of actual damages in order to receive an award of statutory 

damages. Stratton, 770 F.3d at 448–49 (“The FDCPA is a strict-liability statute: A plaintiff does 

not need to prove knowledge or intent, and does not have to have suffered actual damages [to bring 

a successful case].”) (internal citations omitted); Beaudry v. TeleCheck Servs., Inc., 579 F.3d 702, 

706 (6th Cir. 2009) (“Any actual damages sustained by a consumer as a result of a failure to comply 

with the Fair Debt Collection Protection Act are available as an alternative to the recovery of 

statutory damages, suggesting that such damages are not a necessary precondition to suit.”) 

(internal citations omitted). 

Additionally, the district court’s opinion demonstrates that it considered the statutory 

requirements—the frequency, persistence, nature, and intentionality of Velo/Renner’s 

noncompliance with the FDCPA—even though it did not offer in-depth reasoning as to its 

decision, and its decision to award $500, rather than $1,000, for the single “violation proved in 

this case” comports with the Sixth Circuit’s guidance about how such factors should be considered. 

See, e.g., Wright v. Finance Serv. of Norwalk, Inc., 22 F.3d 647, 651 (6th Cir. 1994) (“The 

provision requiring courts to consider ‘frequency and persistence of noncompliance’ in ‘any 

action’ suggests that Congress envisioned situations . . . where repeated violations are the subject 

of a single proceeding. . . . Where multiple [FDCPA] violations occur, Congress intended the 

courts to award close to the full $1,000. Conversely, in less egregious situations, the court can 

award less.”). We find no error here.8

8 Though Velo/Renner mention attorney fees as an issue presented upon appeal, they do not actually 

contest the award of attorney fees in their brief and instead focus only on the award of actual and statutory 

damages. Because Velo/Renner do not develop an attorney-fee argument, it is waived. Spirko v. Mitchell, 

368 F.3d 603, 612 (6th Cir. 2004) (“It is a settled appellate rule that issues adverted to in a perfunctory 
No. 21-1366, Thompson v. Renner, et al

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III.

We AFFIRM the district court for the reasons set forth above.

manner, unaccompanied by some effort at developed argumentation, are deemed waived.”) (internal 

citation omitted). 
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ALICE M. BATCHELDER, Circuit Judge, dissenting. Under today’s holding, a debt 

collector in Michigan must establish personal jurisdiction over a debtor’s out-of-state employer 

before seeking garnishment through that employer—failure to do so violates the FDCPA. I cannot 

join this view of personal jurisdiction, garnishment, or the FDCPA. 

I.

Nicole Thompson had a $745.76 bill for medical services that was long past due to St. 

Mary’s Hospital in Grand Rapids, Michigan. Eventually, St. Mary’s obtained a default judgment 

from a Michigan State Court, but Thompson still would not pay her bill. By the time St. Mary’s 

sought to garnish her wages, the amount due was $1,149.70, including interest and costs. 

Thompson lives in Illinois and works for Ingalls Memorial Hospital in Chicago, Illinois. 

St. Mary’s hired attorney Scott Renner, who requested a writ of garnishment from the 

Michigan District Court that had entered the default judgment. See Mich. Ct. Rule 3.101(D) (“The 

clerk of the court that entered the judgment shall review the [garnishment] request.”). Renner 

named Ingalls Hospital as the garnishee. The Michigan Clerk of Court granted the writ and Renner 

served garnishment forms to Ingalls Hospital, see Rule 3.101(F)(1), including a “Garnishee 

Disclosure” form created by the Michigan State Court Administrative Office, see Rule 3.101(C). 

On whole, Renner complied with Michigan’s garnishment rules, using the prescribed State-created 

forms, which he completed fully, accurately, and honestly. This is not in dispute.

Upon receipt of the forms, and in accordance with the instructions, Ingalls Hospital mailed 

a disclosure to Thompson, alerting her to the pending garnishment. Before Ingalls Hospital 

(garnishee) withheld any money from Thompson or transmitted any money to St. Mary’s Hospital, 

Thompson filed an objection, claiming the Michigan Court did not have jurisdiction over Ingalls 

Hospital because Ingalls Hospital had no presence or contacts in the State of Michigan.
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The Michigan District Court found that it did not have personal jurisdiction over Ingalls 

Hospital and released the garnishment. Renner appealed to the Michigan Circuit Court, arguing 

that Ingalls Hospital consented to personal jurisdiction by complying with the writ. The Michigan 

Circuit Court recognized that consent is a valid means of establishing personal jurisdiction, M.C.L. 

§ 600.711(2), but that a garnishee does not consent to personal jurisdiction merely by filing the 

required forms, Mich. Ct. Rule 3.101(L)(4). The court explained: “Without more—such as a 

formal written consent or some other affirmative actions by Ingalls [Hospital]—the court cannot 

find that Ingalls [Hospital] consented to the district court’s jurisdiction.” The court did not opine 

as to what “other affirmative actions” would establish consent. The circuit court concluded that 

the district court did not abuse its discretion by releasing the garnishment. 

Up to this point, everything was correct: Renner requested the garnishment; the Michigan 

Clerk of Court issued the writ; Renner served the garnishee, Ingalls Hospital; Ingalls Hospital 

notified Thompson; Thompson objected in the Michigan Court, contesting personal jurisdiction; 

the Michigan Court analyzed the claim, agreed, and released the garnishment; Renner appealed; 

and the reviewing Michigan Court affirmed, ending the proceeding. 

II.

Thompson sued Renner in federal court, claiming that Renner violated the FDCPA by 

seeking the garnishment without first conclusively establishing personal jurisdiction over the 

garnishee, Ingalls Hospital. Specifically, Thompson claimed that Renner was “not legally entitled 

to file a garnishment against Ingalls Memorial Hospital in the Michigan court because the 

Michigan court did not have [personal] jurisdiction over Ingalls Memorial Hospital,” so that 

garnishment action constituted a “threat to take an[] action that cannot legally be taken” under 15 

U.S.C. § 1692e, and “was unconscionable and unfair” under § 1692f. Thompson moved for 
No. 21-1366, Thompson v. Renner, et al

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summary judgment, claiming that, at the time he filed for the writ in the Michigan Court, the 

possibility existed that he could establish personal jurisdiction. He argued that he did not have to 

be correct, he merely needed a reasonable belief that he could establish personal jurisdiction, so it 

should not be determinative that, in the end, he had not established personal jurisdiction. 

The district court disagreed with Renner and held that his claim that Ingalls Hospital could 

“consent or waive jurisdiction is a deceptive practice” and “a[n] ‘objectively baseless’ legal 

contention.” I find this ruling preposterous. It is not unreasonable for a plaintiff’s attorney to 

suspect or even anticipate that an out-of-state corporation might consent to personal jurisdiction. 

On the contrary, it is so reasonable that the Michigan legislature specifically included such consent 

in its statute as one means of establishing personal jurisdiction over an out-of-state corporation. 

See M.C.L. § 600.711(2); see also Witbeck v. Bill Cody’s Ranch Inn, 411 N.W.2d 439, 442 (Mich. 

1987) (holding that “general personal jurisdiction over a corporate defendant is authorized by 

statute if the corporation consents thereto”). Nor is it unreasonable for a plaintiff’s attorney to 

proceed with a legal action without obtaining such consent beforehand, given that “a party may 

stipulate to, waive, or implicitly consent to personal jurisdiction.” See Michigan v. Lown, 794 

N.W.2d 9, 23 (Mich. 2011) (citing Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 473 n.14 (1985) 

(“[B]ecause the personal jurisdiction requirement is a waivable right, there are a variety of legal 

arrangements by which a litigant may give express or implied consent to the personal jurisdiction 

of the court.” (quotation marks and citations omitted))). In fact, Michigan’s garnishment rules 

include an express provision that a garnishee does not waive personal jurisdiction merely by filing 

the prescribed forms, answering interrogatories, or appearing at a deposition. See Mich. Ct. Rule 

3.101(L)(4). The clear implication of this provision is that a garnishee can waive a challenge to 

personal jurisdiction through actions other than those three expressly articulated actions—as the 
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Michigan Circuit Court indicated in its jurisdictional ruling. More importantly, the very inclusion 

of this provision in the garnishment rules demonstrates that it is not unreasonable for a plaintiff’s 

attorney to expect a garnishee might waive such a challenge to jurisdiction. 

Corporate defendants routinely consent to out-of-state jurisdiction, either intentionally or 

unintentionally, thus creating an entire doctrine of law about waiver and implied consent to 

personal jurisdiction. See, e.g., Burger King, 471 U.S. at 473; Lown, 794 N.W.2d at 23. And 

certain case-specific facts also tilt in Renner’s favor. It is undisputed that Ingalls Hospital received 

the forms (Writ of Garnishment and Garnishee Disclosure) that identified “St. Mary’s Hospital” 

as the plaintiff seeking payment. It is perhaps too much to assume that Ingalls Hospital has its 

own troubles with deadbeats and past due bills, which might motivate it to cooperate with St. 

Mary’s Hospital’s attempts to recoup payment, but neither would it be wholly unreasonable if that 

were Ingalls Hospital’s view. More to the point, by all appearances, Ingalls Hospital initially acted 

to comply with the garnishment and only stopped when Thompson objected. And Ingalls Hospital 

did not actively challenge jurisdiction: it did not file any motion to dispute jurisdiction, it did not 

endorse or support Thompson’s jurisdictional challenge, and it did not appear at the hearing before 

the Michigan district judge concerning that challenge. Those facts, considered in the light most 

favorable to Renner, could suggest a willingness to consent to jurisdiction. 

III.

Looking at this another way, the district court created a construct in which a debtor’s 

successful challenge to the court’s personal jurisdiction over the third-party garnishee transforms 

an otherwise valid collection action into an FDCPA violation. This is absurd.

“The goal of the FDCPA is to eliminate abusive debt collection practices,” Lyshe v. Levy, 

854 F.3d 855, 859 (6th Cir. 2017), including “false, deceptive, or misleading representation or 
No. 21-1366, Thompson v. Renner, et al

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means,” 15 U.S.C. § 1692e, or “unfair or unconscionable means,” § 1692f, in collecting or 

attempting to collect any debt. “[A] debt collector’s actions are false, deceptive, or misleading 

under § 1692e” when, “in addition to being technically false,” the action (or statement) is 

“material,” meaning that it “would tend to mislead or confuse the reasonable unsophisticated 

consumer.” Wallace v. Washington Mut. Bank, F.A., 683 F.3d 323, 326 (6th Cir. 2012). “[W]e 

are not concerned with mere technical falsehoods that mislead no one, but instead with genuinely 

misleading statements that may frustrate a consumer’s ability to intelligently choose his or her 

response.” White v. Universal Fid., LP, 793 F. App’x 389, 397 (6th Cir. 2019) (White, J., 

concurring) (quoting Donohue v. Quick Collect, Inc., 592 F.3d 1027, 1034 (9th Cir. 2010)).

“The FDCPA does not define an ‘unfair or unconscionable’ practice under § 1692f,” but 

we have held it to “include[] the collection of any amount not expressly authorized . . . by law.” 

Currier v. First Resol. Inv. Corp., 762 F.3d 529, 534 (6th Cir. 2014) (citations omitted). “Unfair 

practices and deceptive practices are prohibited under separate” provisions, so “a collection 

practice could be unfair without necessarily being deceptive.” Id. (citations omitted). In applying 

§ 1692f, we have asked whether “the least sophisticated consumer” would regard the action “as an 

unfair or unconscionable means to collect or attempt to collect the debt.” Id. at 535.

In light of this legal standard, a few basic, indisputable facts warrant recognition. 

Garnishment is a legitimate means of collecting a debt. Michigan has rules for garnishment and 

Renner followed them to the letter. Michigan has prescribed forms for garnishment and Renner 

used them. Neither the garnishment rules nor the forms require (or even provide for) the requester 

to make any affirmative representation about the court’s personal jurisdiction over the garnishee. 

Renner did not make any false or misleading statements; he did not make any threats or anything 

that could be construed as a threat; he did not communicate with Thompson at all.
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Renner merely filed a request for garnishment, naming Ingalls Hospital as the garnishee. 

There was nothing false, deceptive, misleading, unfair, or unconscionable about that. If Ingalls 

Hospital had consented to personal jurisdiction, the Michigan Court would have enforced the 

garnishment. Renner’s garnishment actions were proper. The Michigan Court released the 

garnishment because the garnishee, Ingalls Hospital, did not consent to personal jurisdiction in an 

out-of-state court. It makes no sense to characterize a debt collector’s actions as fair or foul based 

solely on the third-party garnishee’s response to it. A garnishee’s failure to consent to jurisdiction 

cannot delegitimize a debt collector’s otherwise proper conduct (nor could a third party’s 

cooperation or consent necessarily legitimize a debt collector’s otherwise improper conduct). 

In Van Hoven v. Buckles & Buckles, P.L.C., 947 F.3d 889, 895 (6th Cir. 2020), in which a 

debtor claimed that a mistake of law was a false statement, we held that: “A representation of law 

is not actionably false every time it turns out wrong.” “[W]e do not see how the fact that a lawsuit 

turns out ultimately to be unsuccessful could, by itself, make the bringing of [that lawsuit] an action 

that cannot legally be taken.” Id. (quotation marks omitted) (quoting Heintz v. Jenkins, 514 U.S. 

291, 295-96 (1995)). Rather, “[t]he question . . . is whether the legal contention was objectively 

baseless at the time it was made, making it legally indefensible or groundless in law.” Id. at 896 

(quotation marks and citations omitted). Thus, it is “not a violation of the Act to file a collection 

lawsuit without presently possessing means to prove a debt exists, . . . because Rule 11 requires 

only that factual contentions are likely to have evidentiary support after a reasonable opportunity 

for further investigation or discovery.” Id. (quotation marks and citations omitted).

That case is not exactly on point, but it is conceptually overwhelming. Here, Renner did 

everything according to the rules and procedures; he did nothing that was false, deceptive, 

misleading, unfair, or unconscionable; nothing that would mislead or frustrate Thompson’s ability 
No. 21-1366, Thompson v. Renner, et al

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to choose her response; nothing that would (before today) justify Rule 11 sanctions. Renner filed 

an action that was permissible and even appropriate. But because Thompson challenged personal 

jurisdiction, Renner could not establish personal jurisdiction by waiver or implied consent, and the 

Michigan Court dismissed the action. That is the nature of our legal system. The fact that Renner’s 

garnishment request turned out ultimately to be unsuccessful does not, by itself, make his 

legitimate filing of that garnishment request an action that cannot legally be taken.

IV.

For all of the foregoing reasons, I dissent.