P. I 

# l0tCMf?H-3L"3L

,y

Improvin g th e Efficienc

y an d Effectivenes s o f Complianc e Monitorin

g an d Enforcement o f Environmenta l Policie s
Unite d States : A

Nationa l Revie

w 

# Oct fff5~

Prepare d b y Chery l Wasserman U.S . Environmenta l Protectio n Agenc y

o n behal f of The Organizationfor Economi c Co-operatio nan d Development Environmen t Directorat e

****************************************************************** * Thi s pape r i s no t a nofficia l repor t o f th e U.S
. Environmenta l Protectio

nAgency . An

yopinion s expresse d herei n ar e solel y th e view s of th e author
.P. 2

_i INDE X

ACKNOWLEDGEMENT S

INTRODUCTIO

N

I . NATIONA

L CHARACTERISTIC S

II . ENVIRONMENTA

L POLICIE S AN

D PROGRA

M CHARACTERISTIC S

III . COMPLIANC E MONITORIN G

IV . COMPLIANC E INCENTIVE S AN D ENFORCEMEN

T PROCEDURE S

V . INSTITUTIONA

L CONTEXT

VI . EVALUATION : THE EFFICIENC YAN D EFFECTIVENES S O

F CURREN

T ENFORCEMEN

T AN D COMPLIANC E PROCEDURE S

VII . CONCLUDIN

GOVERVIEW : ENFORCEMEN T AN D COMPLIANC E SYSTEMS I N TH E UNITED STATE S APPENDICE S CHAPTERI I Appendix : Summar y o f th e Majo r Environmenta l Statute s an

dDefinitio

nof Ke y Progra m Terminolog

y CHAPTERII I Appendix : Summar y o f Complianc e Monitorin g Requirement s an

dPractice s



# IP. 3

ACKNOWLEDGEMENT S

Th e autho r gratefull yacknowledge s the contribution s t o thi s pape r o f numerou s individual s bot h withi n an d outsid e th e U.S
. Environmenta l Protectio n Agenc ywit h whomth e autho r ha s worke d closely
. First , th e autho r wishe s t o expres s he r appreciatio n t o th e member s o f th e Complianc e an d Enforcemen t Strategie s Tas k Forc e an

d thos e associate d wit h thi s recen t effor t wh o directl y an d indirectl ymad e significan t contribution s t o thi s paper . Th e Tas k Forc e wa s chaire d b yGlenn Unterberger , the n Directo r o f th e Offic e o f Lega l Enforcemen t Policy

. * Th e individua l medi a programstrategie s develope d b yth e Tas k Forc e provide d valuabl e informatio n o n complianc e monitorin g an d enforcemen t approache s an d evaluation s o f pas t an d futur e strategie s fo r achieving improve d level s o f compliance

. Th e Tas k Forc e als o develope d th e U.S
. EPA' s "Working Principles " fo r complianc e an d enforcemen t activities

. Bot h th e program strategie s an

d workin g principle s forme d th e basi s fo r a summarydocumen t "EPA' s Strateg yFramewor k fo r Complianc e an

d Enforcement " prepare d b yDonn a Fletche r o f th e Offic e o f Policy , Plannin g an d Evaluation

. Man ysection s o f Chapter s IV

an d V I o f thi s repor t borro wheavil yfro mthes e documents
. Second , th e autho r recognize s th e ground-breakin g wor k performe d b

yth e Steerin g Committe e o n th e State/Federa l Enforcemen t Relationshi p whos e product , th e "Polic yFramewor k fo r State/Federa l Enforcemen t Agreements " substantiall yaltere d ove r a thre e mont h perio d th e directio n o f th e U.S
. enforcemen t program . Third , th e autho r wishe s t o acknowledg e th e valuabl e insight s int o actua l programoperation s an d problem s gaine d fro mtw o majo r project s o f EPA' s Progra m Evaluatio n Division

. Th e Sourc e Monitorin g Study , manage d b yJea n Caufiel d evaluate d EPA' s requirement s fo r self-monitorin g an d reporting o f complianc e b yregulate d sources , i n th e air , wate r an d hazardou s wast e programs . Th e Ai r Continuou s Complianc e Stud ymanage d b

yJi m vickery , assesse d th e abilit yo f th e nationa l ai r progra mt o monito r an

d enforc e ai r emissio n standard s o n a continuin g basis

. Specia l appreciatio n als o goe s t o th e Nationa l Enforcemen t Investigation s Cente r i n Denve r fo r thei r contribution s t o th e Appendice s for Chapter s I I an d III , through th e concis e summarie s o f inspectio

npractice s an

d statutoryprogram s containe d i n thei r "Multi-Medi a Inspectio n Guide. "P. 4

INTRODUCTIO

N

Thi s pape r was ' prepare d a t th e reques t o f th e Organizatio n fo r Economi c Cooperatio n an d Developmen t (OECD)
. I t provide s a n overvie wo f ho wth e complianc e monitorin g an d enforcemen t aspect s o f th e Unite d States ' environmenta l program s actuall ywork in practice

. Chapte r I summarize s keynationa l characteristic s tha t shap e th e U.S
. procedure s fo r setting an d enforcing environ

menta l standards
. Chapte r I I summarize s th e specifi c mechanism s an d procedure s b

ywhic h environmenta l polic yan d program s ar e translate d int o enforceabl e requirements

. Chapte r II I review s ho wcomplianc e wit h environmenta l requirement s i s monitore d wit h particula r emphasi s o n howan d wh ydecision s hav e bee n mad e among variou s progra m design options

. Chapte r I V

describe s th e incentive s an d enforcemen t procedure s use d t o achiev e high rate s o f complianc e wit h environmenta l law s an d regulations

. Chapte r V describe s th e institutiona l settin g withi n whic h the desig n an d implementatio n o f U.S
. complianc e an d enforcemen t program s ar e carrie d but
. Chapter s V I an

d VI I provid e bot h an evaluatio n an d summar

y overvie wo f th e U.S
. program s an d howsuccessfu l the yhav e been
. Th e U.S. * environmenta l program s ar e divers e an d complex
. Eac h program

ha s adopte d somewha t differen t approache s t o monito r an d achiev e compliance

. I n thi s regar d the yprovid e a laborator y fo r evaluatin g differen t approaches
. Nevertheless , the yshar e man ysimilaritie s i n approache s whic h ar e fundamenta l t o th e value s an

d governmenta l system s foun d withi n th e Unite d States
. Thi s pape r wil l addres s bot h thes e similaritie s an d difference s amon g U.S
. program s wher e theyoccur . I n introducin g thi s paper , i t i s importan t t o distinguis h tw o concept s no wuse d i n th e Unite d State s environmenta l program : "compliance " and "enforcement. " "Compliance " i s almos t a stat e o f being

. Whena regulate d sourc e i s i n compliance , i t i s achievin g required environmenta l standard s o r regulations

. Th e term"enforcement " i s usuall yapplie d t o thos e agenc yaction s specificall yintende d t o conve ylega l sanctio n and/o r penalty
. Th e U.S
. Environmenta l Protectio n Agency' s "enforcemen t programs " traditionall yhav e encompasse d onl ycomplianc e monitorin g an d forma l o r informa l enforcemen t responses . Th e broa d rang e o f bot h coerciv e an

d noncoerciv e technique s use d t o effectivel y chang e o r dete r sourc e behavio r ar e no wbein g tied togethe r int o comprehensiv e complianc e strategie s fo r eac h o f th e majo r environ

menta l program s an d thei r components
. Hig h level s o f rea l an d continuin g complianc e ar e th e goa l o f ou r programs . Enforcemen t i s viewe d a s on e o f severa l tool s t o achiev e it

._H £

Ther e i s grea t importanc e attache d t o th

e distinctio

nbetwee

n th e tw o terms : complianc e an d enforcement . Man y differefl t kinds ' o f publi c an

d privat e incentive s an ddisincentive s ma y b e usedt o hel p attai nan

d maintai na health y an d beautifu l natura l environment ; th

e coerciv

e powe r of th

e U.S . an

d Stat e or loca l government s i s important , bu t i s onl y

one suc

hincentive . Changin g th e behavio r o f a pollutio nsourc e als o mean s changin g it s employees ' wil l an d ability

t o compl y

i nsom e respect. . Forc e o f la w ca ndo mucht o chang e one l s actions , bu t i t canno t necessaril y giv e one th e capacity

t o behav

e differently . T o focu s exclusivel y o nth e lega l an

d procedura l use s o f coerciv e powe r i s to mis s th e man y othe r incentive s an d practice s b

y whichgovernmen t help s buil d capacity

t o mee t popular , ne w socia l goals . Ove r th e pas t fiftee

n year s o f environmenta l activism , U.S . agenc y official s hav

e begu n t o thin k interm

s o f bothcomplianc e an d enforcemen t s o a s t o mak e th

e bes t us e o f th

e powerfu l an

dcostl y

apparatu s o f civi l o r crimina l prosecution . A t th e sam e time , improve

d management systems ar e bein

g developedt o ensur e mor e consisten t an d timely applicationan

d escalationo f forma l enforcemen t sanction s t o provide th

e necessar

y sens e o f will , purpos e an d incentiv

e t o gai nbroa

d complianc e wit henvironmenta l requirements .PJ5

_ 1- 1

I . NATIONA

L CHARACTERISTIC S Governmen t environmenta l programs—lik e mos t othe r regulator y programs—exis t t o reinforce , change o r dete r behavior . I nintroducin

g th e programs use

d t o establis han

denforc e Unite

dStates ' environmenta l policies , i t i s -importan t t o kee

p i nmin d th e socia l value s an

d nationa l characteristic s that shap e them . A

loo k a t som e o f thes e socia l value s that compet e fo r primac

y i nth e U.S. , alon

g withth

e institution s fo

r balancin

g an d implementin

g changin

g values , wil l se t th e stage fo

r th e mor e detaile

ddiscussio

nof ou

r complianc e an d enforcemen t programs . A . Socia l an

d Politica l Value s Governmen t program s i nth e U.S . succee

d s o lon

g a s the

y enjo y publi c confidence . Confidenc e i ngovernmen t agencie s i ntur n correlate s closel y

withth

e ability

o f official s t o operat e i n concer t withcurren t socia l an d politica l values . 1 . Environmenta l Value s Perhap s th

e mos t important influenc e o nU.S . environmenta l programs i s th

e significan t publi c suppor t of an dconcer

nfo r th e environmen t an

d publi c health . Publi c suppor t fo r environmenta l protectionha s indisputabl y rise nfro m obscurity

t o to pran k i n th e year s sinc e th

e publicationo f Rache l Carson' s boo k Silent Sprin g i nth e mi d 1950's . The dominanc e o f environmenta l value s shows u pi nman y ways . Fo r example , th

e enactmen t o f on

e piec e o f majo r environmenta l legislatio

nafte r anothe r a

t th e nationa l leve l durin g th e 1970's ; th e proliferatio

nan d growt hof environmenta l interes t groups ; a s wel l a s th

e creatio

nan d popularity

o f forma l technica l trainin g an d professiona l career s i nenvironmenta l specialties . Tabl e 1- 1 demonstrate s jus t ho w stron g an d persisten t value s hav e bee nfo r bothth e natura l environmen t a s wel l a s publi c health . As th e natura l resource s o f th e U.S . becom

e mor e limited , an da s ou r understandin

g o f th

e ecologica l link s betwee nenvironmenta l quality an d huma nhealt hgrow , s o hav e th e concern s o f th

e publi c ove r th

e introductio

no f pollutant s an dtoxi c wast e int o th e environment . 2 . Economi c Well-Bein g Value s im economi c vitality an defficienc

y continue t o b

e strongl y

fel t i nAmerica

nlife . Th

e cos t o f controllin g pollutio

n ca nb e sizeabl e i

nabsolut e terms , althoug hnot a s a percentage of Gros s Nationa l Product , especiall y i nth e earl y stage s o f contro l equipmen t installatio nor hazardou s sit e cleanup . Similarly , th e associated indirec t cost s o f uncertainty , litigatio nan d dela y attributed t o ne

w environmenta l regulation s als o hav e prove nto b e great . Althoug

hcompetin

g economi c value s recentl y hav e slowe d th e rat e o f ne

w regulatio

nan dhav e le dt o certai nprocedura l reforms , Tabl e 1- 1 indicate s tha t American s valu e environmenta lr_Z

_ 1- 2
qualit yeve n a t high economi c cost s a s measure d b ydollar s o r jjb s < lost
. On e migh t expec t economi c well-bein g t o b e value d asr . highl y a s environmenta l values , bu t thi s i s no t the case , a t leas t no t
. ye t th e cas e i n th e U.S
. Tabl e i- l VALUJS S I NENVIRONMENTAL OUALIT Y 197 8 "Cost s adde d b yregulation s ar e wort h i t t o protec t th e environment. " Ye s 42 %

N o 19 % (Opinio n Researc h Corporation ) 198 1 "Give n th e cost s involve d i n cleanin g up th e environment ,

d o yo u think Congres s shoul d mak e th e Clea n Wate r Ac t stricter? " Ye s 52 %

N O 44 % (Loui s Harri s an

d Associates/Busines s Week ) 198 2 "Environmenta l standard s can' t b e to o high. " Ye s 42 % N o 58 % (Resource s fo r th e Future ) 198 3 "Give n th e cost s involve d i n cleanin g u p th e environment , d o yo u think Congres s shoul d mak e th e Clea n Wate r Ac t stricter? " Ye s 62 %

N o 35 % (Loui s Harri s an

d Associates/Busines s Week )

3
. Distrus t o f Larg e Institution s American s ten

d t o distrus t larg e institutions

. Thi s usuall y result s i n th e us e o f check s an d balance s t o ensur e tha t thes e larg e institution s reflec t mor e o f th e confidenc e place d i n smal l ove r large , th * individua l ove r th e group , an d loca l ove r nationa l solutions

. Tabl e 1- 2 show s tha t thi s valu e ha s persiste d i n America n lif e fo r decades . Fo r thi s reason , th e standard-settin g an d complianc e activitie s o£

T regulator

y agencie s i n th e U.S
. ar e characterize d b y ope n procedures , freel yavailabl e information , an d seemingl yendles s opportunitie s fo r publi c commen t an d appea l t o othe r authorities

. The yals o attemp t t o effec t a balanc e through th e Federalis t structur e o f th e U.S
. governmenta l syste mwit h share d responsibilit ybetwee n th e Federa l an

d Stat e an

d loca l governments , an d through the cour t syste mt o monito r legislativ e an d executiv e functions

.P. 8
1- 3

TABL E 1- 2 REGULATIONAND MISTRUS T O F BI G BUSINES S 1936-37 : Percentag e Favoring Greate r Federa l Regulatio n o f Busines s

Unskille d worker s 55 % Skille d worker s 51 % Manageria l worker s 33 % Source : Combine d 1936-3 7 AIP O (Gallup ) surveys , quote d

i n Fortun e 1975 : "Th e wa ybusines s i s behaving , w e nee d th e governmen t t o

kee p a n ey e o n them. " Agre e 61 % Disagre e 28 % Source : Cambridg e SurveyResearc h in Publi c Opinion

.

Jun e 197 9 1978 : "Governmen t ha s t o pla yan increasingl yactiv e rol e i n regulatin g busines s an d industrybecaus e o f th e increasing siz e o f corporation s an d th e complexit yo f the U.S
. economi c system. " Agre e 59 % Disagre e 33 % N o Opinio n 8 % Source : Opinio n Researc h Corporatio n
4
. Privac yan

d Individua l Propert yRight s Stil l anothe r keyvalu e i n th e desig n an d implementatio n o f complianc e program s i s th e concer n fo r persona l privac yan d privat e propert yrights

. Thes e value s ar e fundamenta l an d ar e establishe d explicitl yi n bot h nationa l an d stat e constitutions

. Th e sanctit y o f privat e propert yan d th e righ t o f eac h perso n t o b e fre e fro m unwarrante d governmen t intrusion s int o hi s o r he r affair s ar e value s tha t colo r virtuall yeveryagenc ydecisio n t o monitor , inspect , o r enforc e fo r complianc e a t a give n site

. 5
. Confidenc e i

nScienc e an

d Technology Finally^ rulemakin g an d complianc e program s in th e U.S
. als o reflec t a stron

g bia s tha t publi c suppor t fo r protectin g th e publi c healt h an

d environmen t b e me t b ya n equall ystrong showing tha t w e "know " somethin g wel l enough t o ac t upo n it

. Tha t place s grea t emphasi s o n natura l an d socia l science

. Scienc e i s a respecte d an d necessarypar t o f overal l rulemaking , a s wel l a s a par t o f certai n individua l complianc e an d enforcemen t decisions

. On e canno t succee d fo r long i n th e worl d o f environmenta l regulatio n withou t a workin g knowledg e o f healt h effects , engineerin g technology , measuremen t technique s an d statistics , an

d economi c cos t an d benefi t calculations

. Th e America n publi c put s it s confidenc e in a n agencyP. 9 

### 1- 4

officia l wh o ca n justif yhi s o r he r action s o n ground s o f natural
. o r socia l science

. Effectiv e complianc e program s in th T e T n.s . ar e thos e wit h soli d scientifi c an d technica l support
. B
. Balancin g Competin g Value s I t i s withi n thi s contex t o f strongl yhel d an d sometime s competin g value s tha t American s mak e environmentall ysensitiv e decisions

. Abusinessma n allocatin g availabl e investmen t capita l amon g competin g project s i n th e fir mdecide s wha t typ e o f pollutio n contro l t o finance

. A n agenc yofficia l determine s th e appropriat e leve l o f pollutio n control
. Ajudg e determine s whethe r t o gran t privat e contractor s right s t o inspec t a pollutio n source . In each o f th e keydecision s affectin g th e environmen t competing value s ar e reconcile d on e wayo r another , implicitl yo r explicitly

. 1
. Advocac yan

d Adversaria l System s Th e mos t commo n America n approac h t o reconcilin g competing value s i s a n adversaria l one . American s ten d t o hav e an advocat e fo r eac h value.and le t th e advocate s argu e fo r primac yi n some controlle d institutiona l setting

. Th e environmenta l agencie s ofte n 3erv e a s th e appropriat e setting s fo r fai r an d ope n adversaria l process , t o ac t independentl yi n balancin g competin g value s i n a give n cas e t o th e exten t permitte d b ystatutoryauthorities

. Th e U.S
. judicia l syste m remain s a s a fina l arbite r i n mos t agenc y decisions , ensurin g tha t agenc ydecision s reflec t th e inten t o f the legislativ e bod

yi n settin g an

d enforcin g standard s an d effectivel y balancin g thes e variou s factor s i n reaching it s decisions

. U.S
. environmenta l statute s ar e amon g th e mos t detaile d an d specifi c o f America n laws
. Theycreat e complex , multi-tiere d program s an

d mandat e tha t a wid e variet yo f standard s b e se t an d enforce d withi n specifi c statutorydeadlines

. Theyals o se t fort h certai n requirement s an d constraint s fo r balancin g competin g values
. A s th e produc t o f year s o f politica l debat e an d compromise , thes e law s ough t t o b e a reasonabl yclea r se t o f marchin g instruction s fo r societ yt o approac h environmenta l goals
. Bu t fo r al l thei r detail , America n environmenta l law s leav e a grea t man yweight y decision s t o b e mad e ~ a s wel l a s implemente d —b yth e unelected , specialize d staff s o f national , state , an d loca l regulatoryagencies

. Thi s amounts , t o a gran t o f enormou s discretionar yauthorit yt o th e environmenta l regulator yagencie s t o balanc e values
. Ther e ar e verypractical , expedient , an d understandabl e reason s fo r legislator s t o a t onc e delegat e s o muc h authorit yt o th e regulator s an d hol d themt o th e mos t challengin g directives

. First , ther e i s jus t no t enoug h tim e i n a legislator' s da yt o specif yal l th e detail s neede d t o defin e an d protec t agains t environmenta l harm
. Second , fe wi f an

ylegislator s hav e th e technica l training t o se t standard s o r evaluat e contro l options

. Mor e importantly , politician s ofte n prefe r no t t o mak e clear-cu t decision s resolving fundamenta lP.1 0

conflict s amon

g values . Instead , thei r statute s giv e agenc y administrator s lon

g list s of "technica l considerations", , t o b e made i nan y agenc y decisio

nt o act , withou t a lo t o f instructio

na s to th e weight eac

hconsideratio

nshoul d carry . As a result , environment a agency official s i

nth e U.S . fin

d themselve s embroile di npowerfu l politica l controversie s i ncas e afte r case , bot hi nstandard-settin

g an d i nimplementatio

n— th e ver y controversie s that th e politician s shoul d perhap s hav

e resolve

d i nth e statutes . Withs o man

y progra m decision s subjec t t o activ e politica l controversy , man

y environmenta l regulation s an dpractice s hav

e bee nchallenged i

ncour t b

y one interes t or another , i nth e hop e tha t judicia l revie w woul d finall y

an d"correctly " resolv e th e matter . Moreover , specia l provision s i nenvironmenta l statute s give ordinar

y citizen s th

e right t o su

e eithe r t o forc e agenc y actio nwheneve r th

e agenc y ha s allegedl y

faile dt o ac t a s require d b y la w o r who fail s t o reconcil e th e concern s o f al l affecte d partie s befor e takin

g a nofficia l regulator y action . S o i

nman y respect s th e statute s declar e a kin d o f judicia l "ope nseason " o

na nagenc y chief . Provision s fo

r suc hjudicia l revie

w ca nb e a neffectiv

e mechanis

m t o ensur e that agenc y actio nneve r contravene s th e letter o

r th e intent o f environmenta l law . The y an dth e othe r characteristic s o f environmenta l la w exposin

g agency

decisionmakin

g t o controvers y an d judicia l revie

w hav e made th

e implementatio

no f environmenta l polic y i nth e U.S . a slower , mor e protracted proces s tha nenvisioned b y th e statutes . Yet the y als o ensur e that an y change s o

r development s i nenvironmenta l regulatio nwil l reflec t th

e mixo f America

nvalue s wel l enoug

ht o maintai npubli c confidenc e i ngovernmen t environmenta l programs . 2 . Consensua l Processe s Ther e i s a large socia l cos t associated withrelianc e o n confrontatio

nan d litigatio

nt o achiev

e balance

d environmenta l progress . Whil e th e predominan t postur e an d proces s fo

r makin g an d implementin

g environmenta l policy remain s a

nadversaria l one , governmen t agencie s activel y pursue mor e consensua l approache s t o rulemakin

g an d compliance . Durin g th e rulemakin

g process , withi n forma l rule s t o ensur e fairness , ther e i s a nextensiv

e exchange o

f informationan

d views wit hampl e provisio nfo r informa l an

d forma l publi c cooMsant . Experiment s i n"regulator

y negotiation, " involvin g al l interested partie s i na proces s seekin g compromis e an

d concensus , ar e i nprogres s t o furthe r reduc e th e incidenc e of litigatio narisin

g fro m standard setting . Negotiation s hav e alway s playe

dan d continue t o pla y a majo r par t i

ncomplianc e an

denforcemen t activities . 3 . Analyti c Technique s fo r Balancin

g Competin

g Value s Ther e i s progres s a s wel l i ndevelopin

g quieter , ne

w alternativ

e mechanisms fo

r strikin

g bette r environmental-economi c balance s durin g th e rulemakin

g process . B

y Presidentia l order , agencie s mus t no w perfor m economi c cost-benefi t o r cost-effectivenes s analyse sP.1 1

— 1^ 6

of proposed ne

w rule s befor e thos e rule s ca ntake effect . I

n orde r t o implement thi s order , agenc y analyst s hav

e been

r lookin g . muchmor e closel y

a t th e siz e an

d variety

o f economi c impact s tha t proposed rule s might have . Thi s requirement ma y eventuall y

hav e th e effec t o f eliminatin g man y later appeal s fo

r variance s or contested penalty

hearing s wher e th e alledgo

d root of th

e proble

m i s a disproportionatel y hig heconomi c cos t t o comply . Ther e ar e othe r longstandin g mechanism

s fo r strikin

g case-specifi c balance s betweeneconomic s an dcompliance . I

nsevera l program

s a regulated party

canpetitio

nfor a varianc e fro m a particula r requirement . Althoug hinfrequentl y

used , som

e o f thes e varianc e provision s permi t relaxatio nof a standar

d wher e economi c or othe r factor s mus t prevail , bu t mos t provision s merel y allo w alternativ

e technica l approache s o r tim e extensions . Finally , a t th e implemen tatio no r complianc e phas e o f a regulator y program , virtuall y ever y environmenta l statut e contain s som e provisio

nb y whic hth e Agency ca nus e a specially-tailored complianc e schedul e impose d i nconjunctionwit ha nenforcemen t action , eithe r administrativ e o r judicial . I

nthei r practica l application , complianc e schedule s preserve the prosecutabl e characteristi c o f th e origina l violatio n whil e grantin

g th e noncomplyin

g sourc e mor e tim

e t o manage th

e technolog

y an d financin

g require

d t o comply . 4 . Federalism Perhap s th

e mos t importan

t implementatio

nmechanis

m i nth e U.S . fo r balancin

g competin

g value s without sacrificin g environmenta l progres s i s th

e federa l intergovernmenta l system . I nenvironmenta l programs tha t syste m i s a somewha t cumbersom e an dredundant allocatio n o f authority

amon g th e national , state , an dloca l government s t o se t standards , monito r compliance , prosecut e violations , an d overse e eac hother' s activities . Sinc e th e "right " tradeof f betweenor amon g competin

g value s ca

ndiffe r fro

m localit

y t o locality , i

t i s helpfu l for eac

hleve l o f governmen t t o hav e a measur e of flexibilit y t o dea l comfortabl y withit s ow

ncircumstances . Sometime s a stat e o r loca l governmen t that i s denie dflexibility

b y federally-impose

d unifor m standard s recover s o r trie s t o recove r som e flexibilit

y throug hlocally-tailored monitoring , variance , o r enforcemen t policies . Continuing oversigh t o f Stat e an dloca l program

s i s therefor e essentia l t o maintai nconsistenc y an dfairnes s i

nth e . implementatio

no f nationa l environmenta l laws .P.1 2 II- l

II . ENVIRONMENTA

L POLIC YAN D PROGRA

M CHARACTERISTIC S

r r Nationa l characteristic s discussedi nth e precedin

g chapte r ar e a nimportant backdro pt o understanding : 1 ) th e specifi c grant s of statutor

y authority

b y Congres s t o th

e agencies , 2 ) th

e conduc t o f an d choice s made durin g th e rulemakin

g process , an

d 3 ) th e particula r regulator y o r policy

approachadopte

d b y a give nagenc y program . I nthi s chapte r thes e thre e predeterminant s of complianc e succes s ar e introduce d withspecifi c referenc e t o ch e major program

s an d subprograms . A . Genera l Federa l Regulator y Approach Th e U.S . federa l governmen t administer s or oversee s seve n majo r piece s o f environmenta l legislatio nthroug

hth e U.S . Environmenta l ProtectionAgency

(SPA) :

° CleanAi r Ac t (CAA ) 4 CleanWate r Ac t (CWA ) 4 Saf e Drinkin

g Wate r Ac t (SDWA ) ° Resourc e Conservationan d Recover

y Ac t (RCRA ) 4 Toxi c Substance s Contro l Ac t (TSCA ) 4 Federa l Insecticide , Fungicide an dRodenticide Ac t (FIFRA ) 4 Comprehensiv

e Emergency

Response , Compensatio nan d~'4- Liabilit y

Ac t (CERCLA) . the basi c approachi nmos t o f th

e U.S . programs i s to establis h bothnationa l standard s for acceptabl e ambient concentration s o f pollutants , and/o r for source s o f environmenta l pollutio nthroug

h specifi c requirement s fo r th e testing , registration , handling , emission , discharge , or disposa l o f harmfu l substances . Regulator y programs imposin

g nationa l standard s fo r source s o f pollutio nare supplemented b

y an y additiona l requirement s necessar y t o achiev

e an d maintai nambien t levels . Regulatedsource s are the nexpecte

d t o comply

wit hbothnationa l standard s pertainin g t o specifi c source s an

d requirement s neede dt o achiev

e ambient level s whethe r th e programs ar e implemente d directl y

b y th e EP A or delegated t o th e States . I nmos t cases , th e nationa l standard s are applie d t o source s throug

hpermit s whichar e tailore d t o individua l facilitie s an d thei r environmenta l circumstances . Meetin g th e federa l standard s usuall y i s a preconditionfor receivin g th e permi t wit hsom

e includin

g schedule s for meetin g federa l and/o r stat e standards . Th e EP S establishe s th e federa l standard s an d requirement s for permi t issuanc e for a napprovabl e Stat e program . Mos t permi t programs ar a thenadministered throug hthes e approvedStat e programs . Ther e are , however , exceptions . Fo r example , th e TSC A progra m i s ru nentirel y

b y th e federa l governmen t wherea s Subtitl e D of RCR A (governin

g th e disposa l of nonhazardou s soli dwaste ) an dth e FIFR A progra m ar e ru nalmos t entirel y

b y th e States . A

breakdow

n o f Federa l an

d Stat e responsibility i s describedi

nmore detai l i

n Chapte r V , o

ninstitutiona l aspect s o f th e program .P.1 3

II- 2 Th e State s mayse t mor e stringen t standard s than t^hos e require d b yfedera l law
. Stat e regulatio n o f ai r an d wate r pollutio n i s ofte n mor e inclusiv e than federa l regulation s require

. Fo r example , Californi a ha s mor e stringen t ai r pollutio n control s o n bot h stationar y an d mobil e sources , an d Texas ' condition s o n hazardou s wast e handlin g an d disposa l ar e mor e stringen t tha n federa l standards
. Californi a als o ha s chose n no t t o exemp t small-quantit ygenerator s o f hazardou s waste
. Adescriptio n o f eac h o f thes e statutoryprogram s mayb e foun d i n a n Appendi x t o thi s Chapter
. I t als o define s ke yacronym s fo r th e program s an

d subprogram s whic h ar e use d late r i n thi s report
. B
. Rulemakin g Characteristic s Choice s mad e durin g th e rulemakin g proces s ca n hav e a n enormou s effec t o n th e ultimat e leve l o f complianc e an d enforceabilit yo f a regulation

. Experienc e acros s th e variet yo f environmenta l program s a t th e nationa l an d stat e level s ha s le d Congres s an d U.S
. regulator s t o adop t severa l differen t practice s durin g rulemakin g i n orde r t o assur e tha t implementatio n an d enforcemen t ca n follo wsmoothl yfrom th e issuanc e o f a ne wregulation

. 1
. Impac t Analysis : Independen t Analysi s an d Publi c Commen t Perhap s th e mos t importan t rulemakin g characteristi c i s th e degre e t o whic h th e rulemaker s stud yth e capabilit yo f th e potentia l regulate d communit yt o compl ywit h a propose d rule
. I n th e U.S
. th e mos t commo n metho d fo r suc h stud yi s t o analyz e impact s befor e proposin g a rul e an d the n t o solici t an d revie wpubli c comment s a t th e tim e a rul e i s firs t proposed
. Advanc e notic e o f propose d new rule s i s no wcommonl ygive n i n well-indexed , low-cos t governmen t periodicals , s o tha t an yperso n o r organizatio n ca n quickl ysca n fo r proposal s affectin g it s interests

. Writte n comment s fromth e publi c ar e generall yaccepte d fo r 3 0 t o 9 0 day s afte r th e notic e i s given , an d agenc ystaf f prepar e detaile d summarie s o f an d response s t o suc h comments
. Ofte n th e comment s receive d bea r directl yo n th e difficult y o r unanticipate d effect s o f compliance , an d provid e th e agenc ywit h a n opportunit yt o rethink it s approach
. Wher e th e agenc ystaf f choos e t o disagre e wit h o r overrid e th e concern s expresse d i n publi c comments , the

y d o s o i n response s whic h ar e publishe d shortl yafte r th e initia l commen t period

. Whil e th e response s mayno t includ e a chang e in* regulator y approach , theyd o hel p th e regulate d communit y understan d aw l prepar e fo r th e futur e regulation

. Th e impac t analyse s commonl yinclud e a n economi c impac t analysis , i n whic h agenc yengineer s an d economist s loo k i n som e dept h a t th e cost s and , i n fewe r instances , benefit s o f complianc e wit h a propose d rule
. Thi s analysi s provide s a n independen t chec k o n th e publi c comment s received , an d mayserv e t o underscor e concern s tha t the rul e migh t prov e difficul t fo r industryo r loca l agencie s t o implement

.P.1 4

11- 3 Similarly , analyse s o f informatio n collectio n burden s tha t woul d b e impose d unde r th e proposa l can provid e clue s t o otherwis e hidde n implementatio n problems
. 2
. Ope nan

d Length

yProces s fo r Resolvin g Dispute s Ofte n i n U.S
. environmenta l rulemaking an agenc ypromulgate s a rul e onl yt o hav e th e regulate d community , environmenta l groups , o r bot h challeng e th e rulemaking i n court , an d litigat e the rul e al l th e wa yt o th e U.S
. Suprem e Court
. A s a result , staf f tr yt o draf t mor e comprehensiv e an d tightl ywritte n rules , an d attemp t t o solici t earl yan

d effectiv e comment
. Th e courtroo mlitigatio n ultimatel y establishe s th e accepte d fact s an d fina l determination s o f law
. Bu t suc h a n adversaria l approac h als o foster s —fro mth e ver

ybeginning o f a ne wprogram—a counterproductiv e attitud e among al l affecte d interes t groups . I t focuse s to o narrowl yo n preservin g th e lega l option s a t th e expens e o f buildin g incentive s fo r compliance , an d i t leave s confusio n i f a rul e i s stil l bein g challenge d a t th e time th e agenc ymove s t o enforc e t o ensur e compliance

. Ne wan d mor e consensua l approache s bein g trie d i n th e U.S
. wer e referre d t o i n Chapte r I
. Amon g thes e ar e th e us e o f regulatory negotiations , i n whic h al l majo r interest s i n a particula r rul e ar e identifie d i n advanc e an d invite d t o participat e i n informa l negoti

ation s ove r the shap e an d applicabilit yo f a ne wrule
. Suc h negoti

ations , ca n b e helpfu l i n sorting ou t futur e problem s early , an d i n eliminatin g resistanc e b yon e grou

p o r another
. However , existin g agenc yrulemakin g processe s alread yprovid e fo r commen t b youtsid e groups . Experienc e ha s show n tha t eve n consensua l approache s ca n leav e dissatisfactio n withi n th e regulate d communit ywhe n the agenc y postur e shift s fro mconsultin g an

d workin g wit h industr yi n devising a rule , t o actua l enforcemen t o f thos e rules
. Consensu s approache s ca n hel p improv e compliance , bu t theyar e n o guarante e o f success . 3
. Us e o f Accepte d IndustryPractice s Ther e ar e tw o helpfu l rulemakin g practice s i n th e U.S
. tha t clearl yimprov e th e climat e fo r compliance

. First , th e agenc ytrie s t o us e generall yrecognize d measuremen t an d analyti c method s t o demonstrat e tha t a give n rul e wil l i n fac t produc e measurabl e environmenta l improvement

. Suc h us e o f scienc e eliminate s a n eas y argumen t agains t a ne w rule , an

d help s wi n the respec t o f th e agency' s scientifi c an

d technica l counterpart s i n industry

. Second , th e agenc yproduce s preliminar ytechnica l dat a showing option s fo r feasibl e technologie s fo r meetin g propose d ne wstandards
. B ydoing so , the agenc

y no t onl yhelp s convinc e it s corporat e counterpart s tha t i t i s makin g a reasonabl e technologica l demand o n them , i t als o invite s firm s tha t suppl ycontro l (o r monitoring ) technolog yt o begi n t o commercializ e th e technolog yi n time fo r us e whe n th e propose d rul e take s effect
. Thes e scientifi c activitie s hel p buil d a willingnes s an d capacit yt o compl yi n th e technica l community

. Ther e are , however , instance s i n whic h protocol s mus t b e develope d simultaneousl ywit h th e standard , an

d i n whic h th e Congressiona l directiv e i s "technolog y forcing, " tha t is , i t require s level s o f pollutio n contro l o r mon i tonn eP.1 5 II- 4

whic h ar e beyond thos e establishe d b yth e "stat e o f th e art. " in

. thes e instances , complianc e ofte n take s longe r t o achieve * an d the programca n b e delaye d b ytechnica l controversy
. 4
. Coordinatio n Acros s Medi a an d Acros s Federa l Program s I t i s possibl e fo r ne wstandard s i n on e program are a t o interfer e wit h successfu l complianc e i n anothe r program . Recently , U.S
. electronic s firm s remedie d chemica l solven t leak s fromtank s int o ground wate r b

yreleasin g the mi n par t int o th e air , thereb yaggra vatin g a loca l ambien t ai r qualit yproblem
. Ther e ar e severa l rulemakin g practice s i n th e U.S
. tha t hel p avoi d suc h unintende d multi-medi a effects
. First , mos t nationa l statute s requir e th e progra madministrato r t o loo k affirmativel yfo r othe r environmenta l effects
. EPAi s currentl yexperimentin g wit h a n "Integrate d Environmenta l Managemen t Program " t o hel p it s policymakin g staf f d o thi s mor e effectively

. Second , th e agenc yissue s a "Star t Actio n Request " fo r eac h ne wrulemakin g effort , an d circulate s tha t reques t t o eac h differen t programoffic e fo r review

. Awor k grou p i s forme d fro mrepresentative s o f eac h o f th e program office s tha t ca n identif y a potentia l impac t i n it s jurisdiction

. Third , a key-industryimpac t analysi s i s performe d t o stud yth e industrie s mos t affecte d b ythe rul e t o se e i f jus t suc h intermedi a effect s migh t appear . Intermedi a coordinatio n i s als o accomplishe d acros s federa l agencies , includin g thos e wit h non-environmenta l missions

. I t i s th e responsibilit yo f th e Offic e o f Managemen t an d Budge t (OMB ) t o flag propose d environmenta l regulation s havin g potentia l conflict s i n othe r regulatoryareas . Fo r example , th e Offic e o f Surfac e Minin g recentl yforme d a wor k group wit h thre e differen t environmenta l progra moffice s t o develo p surfac e minin g regulations

. Th e overal l succes s o f suc h interagenc ycheck s i s fairl ygood
. Athir d an

d fina l tes t fo r intermedi a coordinatio n i s performe d b yth e federa l EP Aregiona l offices

. Regiona l offic e staf f si t o n eac h rulemakin g wor k group a t headquarters , an d tak e o n th e rol e o f representin g thei r own view s a s wel l a s bein g abl e t o bette r reflec t stat e agencies ' interest s an d practices

. 5
. Stringenc yVersu s Enforceabilit yo f Standard s Th e futur e succes s o f complianc e monitorin g an d enforcemen t depend s no t onl y

o n th e involvemen t b yregulator s o f th e regulate d community , an

d th e us e o f standar d technique s an d protocols , bu t als o upo nth e stringenc yo f th e requirement s theyset
. Mor e stringent : rule s i n theorymea n large r an d possibl yquicke r advance s i n environmenta l cleanup
. Th e stringenc yo f a standar d i s usuall yviewe d b ydecision-maker s a s a questio n o f time an d cost : th e toughe r th e standard , th e mor e expensive

- i t wil l b e fo r source s t o mee t i t —

especiall yi f i t ca n b e me t onl yb ywidesprea d us e o f technologystil l unde r development
. U.S
. environmenta l law s encourag e settin g tough standard s o n th e theorytha t stringenc ywoul d hel p forc e improvement s i n th e technologyavailabl e t o measur e an d contro l pollution

. Whereve r suc h technolog yi s alread

yfeasible , i t should , i n theory , onl yb e a questio n o f time befor e source s can budge t fo rP.1 6 II- 5 it , orde r equipment , tak e delivery , an d instal l controls
. Les s stringent standard s are see na s on e patht o gettin

g quic k complianc e an d publi c approval , bu t not necessaril y

a large quantum , "o f environ menta l improvement . Bu t stringenc

y ha s no t bee n clearl yexamine d b yU.S
. rulemaker s fo r it s effect s o n enforceabilit yan d ultimat e complianc e levels
. To o tight a standar d impose

dtoo earl y

i nth e lif e o f a progra

m can generat e both.disrespec t fo r th e rul e amon

g th e engineer s an

d plan t manager s wh

o mus t mak e complianc e decisions , an dreluctanc e t o enforc e amon

g th e regulators . Ther e are severa l example s o f thi s i nth e U.S
. programs wher e suc hprogram

s hav e bee nchallenge

d i n cour t an

d delayed . Onc e suc hdelay s occur , th e agenc y i s place

d i n th e positio

no f havin

g t o tak

e strong , forma l lega l enforcemen t measure s t o preserv e th e integrity

of it s program

s an d to breath

e lif e back int o the

m onc e th

e technolog

y i s perfected . The agenc y rarel y ca nsimpl y

backtrac k an

drela xth e standard , becaus e that to o woul d undermine it s credibility . Settin g ambitiou s ar.

dimpractica l standard s i

nth e firs t plac e make s th e task of enforcemen t mor e difficult , an

d th e remedie s fo

r violation s mor e limited . I nexaminin

g th e availability

o f technolog

y t o achiev

e specifi c level s o f pollutio

ncontrol , th

e agenc y ha s ver

y rarely examined th e tradeoff s betweenleve l o f contro l an dreliability

o f equipmen t ove r time . Thi s analysi s onc e wa s complete di nth e standard-settin

g proces s fo

r Clea nAi r Ac t ne

w sourc e performanc e standard s fo r electri c utilities , but i

t i s not commo

npractice . Ofte

nquestion s o f enforce ability ar e general , or tie dt o complianc e monitorin g requirements . A s th e agenc y focuse s mor e o n continuou s compliance , an dmonitorin g technique s improve , th e issu e o f equipmen t reliability wil l become mor e important . Indee d th e Agency

i s beginnin

g t o addres s issue s o f uncertainty

withi nth

e contex t o f ris k managemen t an d thi s mayals o hel p t o rais e issue s o f equipmen t or proces s reliability ove r time

. A recent developmen t i nU.S . standard-settin g i s th

e us e o f triggered stringency o r a phase

d approachbase

dupo n likel yrisk

. I nthi s approach , implemente di nth e hazardou s wast e permi t program , moderat e or minimu m federa l technica l standard s are se t fo r a sourc e alon g withself-monitorin g requirement s —in thi s instance , ground-wat e monitoring . Shoul d self-reporting , citizencomplaints , or inspection s indicat e a violatio no r relate

denvironmenta l hazard , th e sourc e mus t thereafte r compl y wit hstricte r standards . Th e triggere

d standard s usuall y requir e mor e intensiv e monitoring , bu

t the y ca nrequir e additiona l contro l measure s a s well . I nthi s wa

y a nagenc y can attemp t ova * tim

e t o plac e th

e cost s o f contro l o n thos e source s wher e problems ar e mos t seriou s or frequent , rathe r tha nacros s th

e board . 6 . D e Minimi s Level s an dSegmentin

g th e Regulate

dCommunit y Tiere d regulation s ar e widel yuse d in U.S
. environmenta l programs . Separat e outpu t rat e standard s hav e bee n promulgate d fo r eacho f dozen s o f categorie s o f ai r an d wate r pollution

. Man y rule s includ e exemption s fo r source s whos e siz e o r pollutio n output s fal l belo wso-calle d "cutoff " levels
. Sinc e federa l la wallow s state sP.1 7

II- 6
t o adop t standard s mor e stringen t tha nmos t nationa l requirements , ther e i s a smal l amoun t o f state-by-stat e tierin g o f stringenc

y a'bov e a unifor

m nationa l floor . C . Regulator

y Approache s an

d Policy

Tool s Employe

d The portfoli o o f regulator y approache s employe d i nenvironmenta l programs i s large , includin g regulator

y standard s o r permi t requiremen o f severa l type s discussedhere , alon g wit hmonitorin

g an d reportin

g requirement s tha t ar e discussed a t lengthi nChapte r III . Testing , registration , an

d certificatio

nar e als o tool s used , althoug hles s widely . Nonregulator y policy tool s suc

ha s grants , researchsubsidie s an d trainin

g programs , mak e u pa large portio

no f th e overal l EP

A activity . Thes e othe r policy tool s ca

nhav e important use s i nimprovi r complianc e inth

e regulator

y programs . Finally , politica l pressure s t o refor

m regulatio

nar e forcin

g agenc y staf f t o loo

k at a neve n wide r arra

y o f regulator

y approache s t o brin g abou t result s at lowe r cos t an d wit hles s intrusio nb y government . Th e selectiono f a regulator y o r hybri d policy

too l fro

m thi s portfoli o i s a

nimportan t determinan t o f th e eas e an

d succes s o f subsequen t complianc e monitorin g an d enforcement . Tabl e II- l show s th e type s o f standard s predominatin g i neac

hprogra

m area . Tabl e II- 2 highlight s th e mor e significan t o f approache s t o creat e ne w flexibility

inenvironmenta l programs , includin g th e way s variance s ad d a measur e o f flexibility t o U.S . environmenta l programs . ~ 1 . Permit s Versu s Rule s o f Genera l Application Requirement s ar e se t forthb y agencie s throug

hrule s o f genera l applicationrequirin g al l source s t o mee t th e sam e requirement , and/o r inth

e issuanc e o f individua l permits , eac hcontainin

g som e standardized a s wel l a s customizedcondition s t o b e me t b y th e regulatec source . Eachoptionha s advantage s an ddrawback s for complianc e monitorin

g an d enforcement . A genera l rul e canb e mor e amenabl e t o complianc e monitorin g dependin

g o nho w i t i s drafted . Al l thing s bein g equal , sinc e onl y one requiremen t applie s t o al l sources , self-monitorin g programs a s wel l a s inspection s ca nrequir e les s trainin g an d preparation ; onl y on e regim

e mus t be learned . I t i s easie r t o explai nth e rul e t o th e community

i nth e initia l stage s o f th e program , an

d i t i s easie r fo r supplier s o f monitorin g an dcontro l equipmen t to define an d mee t tha

i marke t need s createdb y th e rule . Eve nth

e lega l enforce men t staf f hav e aneasie r tim e i ntha t the

y hee d t o lear

ndefinitions , interpretations , an d evidentiar

y matter s for one kin do f violation . Bu t the advantage s for th e agenc y do no t necessaril y mea ntha t th e incidenc e o f complianc e i s boun d t o b e highe r under genera l rules . Th e burdeno f complyin g wit ha genera l rul e usuall y fall s mor e heavil y o nsom e source s tha

nother s and/o r requirement s ma y nee d t o b e interpreted a s to ho w the y appl y t o a nindividua l facility . Inequitabl e effect s o r unclea r requirement s ca nlea d t o greate r disregar d fo r th e "unfair " law , a correspondingl y lowe r willingnes s to comply , an d a greate r number o f petition s fo r a variance . Thi s i s largelyP.1 8

Pragra a Ai r - Gwtn l Stationar

y
Nobll t Wate r - genera l Dlacharg a PREDOMINAN T

Approach Standard s Rule s Par«it s Rule * Standard s Perait s TlM « n- i

REGULATOP

y exAitpi.e s 

# I

APPROAC H | i

•
r T

. Predominan t Standar d Ambien t Maa a o r Outpu t Rat e

Mas s o r Outpu t Rat a Ambien t Maa a o r Taehnolog y
Drinkin g wate r Undargroun d Injaetio n Ratardou a Wast e Rula a
Peralta/Rule a Rula a (interim ) Parait a (final ) Outpu t Rat a Practice s Ambien t Concentratio n Taehnolog y Taehnology , Ambien t Practice s Toxi c Substance * (PCBa ) Pesticide s

- Producer s

- Applicator a Rula a P a rait s

Registratio n (Permit )
Certificatio n

Tabl e II- 2 Informationa l

Practice s

Informational , Ambien t Reaidu e (ppm ) Practice s Practice s

PROVISION S TORPLBXIBILIT Y

Progra m EXAMPLE S Approache s Variance s Orante dFo r Ai r - Stationar y

Ai r - Mobil * Wate r Discharger s

Drinkin g wate r

Undergroun dInjectio n
Hazardou s Mast e

Toxi c Substance s Bubbl e Polic y Emission s Tradin g Noncomplianc e Pee s Plea t Averagin g Xntraplan t Bubbl e Wasteloa dTradin g Seasona l Permit s

Negotiate d Testin g Agreement s Outpu t Rat e Infeasibilit y Denonatrate dequivalenc e Innovativ e Technolog y

Fundamentall y

Differen t Paetor s Demonstrate dAbsenc e o f Therma l Effect s POT W Dlacharg a int o Dee p Ocea nCurrent s Intak e Wate r Condition s an dapplicatio no f treatmen t M o Undergroun dDrinkin g Wate r Sourc e i nVicinit y Demonstrate dLac ko f Statisticall y

Signi fican t Chang e i n Amoien t

Pesticide sP.1 9

II- 8 th e situatio

nfoun d inU.S . ai r quality programs fo

r stationarys,ourc

t unde r Stat e Implementatio n Plans
. S o man yvariance s fro

mgenerall y applicabl e Stat e emissio n standard s hav e bee n issue d fo r existing ai r pollutio

nsource s tha t man y argu e that i t woul d hav e bee n easie r t o star t wit hindividuall ynegotiate d permi t conditions

. Certainl y mos t of th

e stat e an

dloca l ai r quality agencie s themselve s employ operatin

g permit s a s th

e basi s fo

r thei r programs , eve n thoug h i t ma y no t b e require

d unde r th

e federa l statute . Pro m th e standpoin t o f a

nenforcemen t official , individua l permit s presen t a mor e difficul t challenge . Inspector s nee d to understan

d a wide r variety

of acceptabl e approache s an dpossibl e violations ; indeed , the y nee dto rea

d an d understand eac h source' s permi t befor e plannin g an d conductin

g a ninspection . Th e collectio n o f evidenc e differ s fro m cas e t o cas e a s doe s th e kind o f presentatio n t o b e made befor e a judge . Therefor e th e cos t of enforcin

g tend s t o b e higher , an

d th e probability

o f makin

g a nerror i

nth e prosecutio

n goe s u p wit heac

hdepartur e fro

m th e tried-and-true requirement i na genera l rule . Ye t whe nviewe

d fro m a complianc e perspective—especiall y the source' s perspective—th e customize dpermi t condition s ca nwel l compris e a goa l tha t th e sourc e i s eithe r mor e willin g o r bette r abl e t o meet . Agenc y

goal s an

d sourc e capacity

ar e accommodate

d i nsettin

g th e condition s i

nth e permit , ofteni

na kin do f consensual , local scal e negotiation . The agenc y ca ntherefor e expec t tha t th e probabil i o f complianc e b

y tha t permitte e i s higher—eve n thoug h the qualit y o f inspectio n an

d successfu l enforcemen t migh t b e lowe r i n th e even t o f a violation . Therei nlie s th e benefi t i

naskin g firs t wha t i t take s to achiev

e compliance , befor e designin g an dimplementin

g a progra m tha t maximize s onl y enforceability .
2 . Type s o f Standard s The kin d o f standar

dwrittenint o a rul e or permi t als o ha s important effect s o nth e succes s o f monitorin g an d enforcemen t activities . Th e followin g type s o f standard s are oftencalle d "comman d and-control " standard s sinc e the y ten dt o prescribe ver y specificall y wha t a regulated sourc e mus t do . Ambient , standard s ar e attractiv e i ntha t the

y mos t closel y represen t the socia l goa l o f environmenta l protection , namely , the reductioni nth

e concentrationo f harmfu l substance s i n th e ambien t environment * Indeed , ambien t standard s ar e usuall y writteni n unit s o f concentration(e.g . unit s o f mas s pe r uni t volume ) or unit s of relativ e concentration(part s pe r million) . Bu t ambient level s ar e seldo m use d a s enforceabl e standards . Instead , ambien t level s ar e use d for statin

g areawide goals , an dfo r plannin g wha t individual

sourc e contribution s ca n b e accommodate d individuall yan d in th e aggregat e i n a give n environmen t withou t exceedin g the standard
. Quit e frequentl yambien t standard s ar e se t no t a s requirement s bu t a s trigger s fo r specia l requirement s suc h a s mor e intensiv e monitoring o r contro l a t individua l sources .P.2 0 l II- 9

Mas s rat e (output ) standard s are th e mos t technicall y

informative characterization s o f a particula r facility' s pollutio ndischarges , an d ar e the standard s mos t widel y use di nwritin

g regulations , permits , an

d monitorin

g requirements . Outpu t rat e standard s ar e generall y

expresse

d a s unit s pe r uni t time passin g a give n physica l mark know

na s a complianc e surface . The y ar e unfortunatel y

onl y loosel y correlatabl e wit hambient environmenta l effect s b y mean s of comple xmathematica l "diffusio nmodels. " Negotiation s over a nappro priat e outpu t standar dfor a sourc e are oftencomplicate d b y differing opinion s ove r jus t ho w muc ha nadvers e ambient contributio n a give n source' s outpu t rat e wil l have . Moreover , output-rat e measurement s requir e samplin

g an d continuou s outpu t monitorin g instrument s tha t have , i nsom e medi a programs , bee nexpensiv

e an d difficul t t o kee p i n calibration . Mas s emissio

nor effluen t rat e standard s ar e oftenreferre d t o a s performance , a s opposed t o technology , standards . The y allo w source s t o adop t th e leas t costly

mean s o f achievin g a specifie

d environmenta l result . The y hav e als o beenth

e mos t amenabl e t o furthe r economi c reforms . The so-called"bubbl e policy " i nth e ai r progra m allows a sourc e wit hmultipl e stack s at one facilit y t o var y it s emission s fro

m th e outpu t standar

d for eac

hstack , s o lon

g a s th e aggregat e emission s fro m th e facility

d o no t increase . Th e bubbl e policy

appear s t o hav

e th e greates t applicatio namon g source s o f volatil e organi c compound s (VOC ) for whichth e relationshi p betwee n emissionrate s an

d ambient level s i s mos t direct . Sinc e 197 7 a stationar

y sourc e o f ai r pollutionha s bee nfre e unde r federa l la w t o overcontro l it s emissions , an d sel l or transfe r t o a nearb yplan t a "credit " fo

r th e unuse dallowabl e emissions . l a som e states , a simila r transfe r o f wate r pollutio nallowance s ha s bee nsuccessfull y implemented . Wate r permittin

g programs hav

e fro m thei r inceptio

ntreate

d a singl e plan t outfal l pip e i nmuc hth e sam e way , ignorin

g the characteristic s o f th e severa l wast e stream s unti l the

y ultimatel y flo w togethe r int o a singl e regulate d outfall . Similarly , th e mobile-sourc e progra m i nai r allows motor-vehicl e manufacturer s t o averag e th

e pollutionemission s o f differen t model s i nth e fleet , s o lon g a s th

e weightedaverag e o f models , sol dstays withi nthe singl e vehicl e outpu t rat e standar dfo r th e nation . Thes e reforms canoftenmak e enforcemen t mor e difficul t if the revised requirement s canno t b e easil y

trace dan dunderstoo

d b y a n inspector . Th e mor e creativ e th e regulator

y process , th

e mor e difficul t i t wil l be t o track compliance . I ntheory , however , th e mor e cost-effectiv e th e contro l requirements , th e mor e incentiv e ther e i s for "voluntar y compliance. " Technologystandard s are ofte n a nimplici t basi s fo r standard

settin g an

d enforcement
. Mos t statute s requir e EP At o se t performanc e standard s base d upo n th e bes t availabl e contro l technology
. Examining th e technology , therefore , ca n b e a n effectiv e substitut e fo r outpu t standards , especiall ywhe n the desig n o r bran d o f contro l equipmen t ha s bee n wel l known an d teste d fo r performanc e unde r the rang e o f inpu t an

d ambien t condition s generall yexperience d b ysource s in th

e community

. I n th e earl yday s o f a regulatoryprogram , whe nP.2 1 11-1 0 littl e i s know

n abou t outpu t rat e monitor s an d i t i s important-t o ge t initia l installatio no f contro l equipment , th e us e o f "technolog y standards " i s particularl y tempting . Moreover , inspect46. nfo r complianc e withtechnolog ystandard s i s quit e simpl e an d inexpensive ? one merel y

look s aroun

d t o se e i f a

napprove d typ

e o f equipmen t i s i n plac e an

d switche

d on . The drawback s o f technolog y standard s ar e that : 1 ) the y ten d t o freez e technologica l innovatio ni nth e contro l equipmen t industry , an d 2 ) th e mer e installatio no f equipmen t offer s littl e assuranc e ove r tim

e tha t it wil l continue t o operat e correctly . Th e importanc e o f gettin

g som e kin d o f contro l i

nplac e a

t majo r ai r an

dwate r pollutionsource s ha s bee ns o grea t ove r th e pas t decade i

nth e U.S . tha t permitting , standard-setting , an d complianc e monitorin g program s alike hav

e usuall y

begu na s technology-based efforts . A s a result , evenwhenrequirement s ar e performance-based , th e permi t specifie s ho w a nindividua l sourc e wil l compl y an d th e progra

m ofte n shift s it s focu s t o th

e promised technology . Practic e standard s ar e eithe r recommendation s o r prohibition s o f certai nordinaril y mino r activitie s an d method s practice

d b y sourc e employees . Standard s ar e writtenbecaus e suc hpractice s can hav e significan t environmenta l impacts , usuall y whe ntake ntogethe r ove r a perio

d o f time . Example s includ e prohibition s o

nslopp y gasoline hos e connection s an d carryin

g hazardou s liquid s i nuncovered buckets , or agricultura l practice s t o minimiz e non-poin t wate r runoff . Like technolog

y standards , practice s ar e easy t o inspec t an

d cit e fo r violations , bu t complianc e i s difficul t t o judg e o n a n ongoin g basis . U.S . court s hav e refused t o enforc e practic e standard s unles s th e legislatur e ha s specificall y authorizedth

e agenc y t o writ e suc h standards . Sinc e th e focu s o

nmanagemen t practice s appear s mor e intrusiv

e o f interna l busines s managemen t decision s tha nth e focu s o nenvironmenta l result , emissio no r effluen t rates , court s wan t t o b e sur e tha t th

e legislatur e intende d th e agenc y t o wiel d it s authorit y for suc hcause . Informationa l Rule s ar e distinc t fro m th e so-called "command

and-control " standard s abov e i nthat the

y requir e a sourc e of potentia l pollutiont o develop an dsubmi t informatio nevaluatin

g th e potentia l for environmenta l har m fro m it s releases . (Th e autho r i s excluding complianc e monitoring fro m thi s category. ) Thes e rule s ar e employed a a th

e majo r regulator

y too l whe

neither : 1 ) ta # release s ar e themselve s not wast e but valuabl e product s sucha s ne

w chemical s or pesticides , or 2 ) th a release s ar e a newly-identified par t o f a wast e strea m tha t i s alread

y subjec t t o costl y controls , an

d additiona l control s canno t b e justifie d withou t bette r information

. Th e firs t i s th e cas e unde r TSCAan d FIFRA , whil e th e secon d conditio n i s appearin g mor e frequentl ya s agencie s com e t o grip s wit h the relativel ysmal l amoun t o f toxi c substance s accompanyin g th e regulate d discharg e o f mor e conventiona l o r better-know n pollutants
.P.2 2 

### 11-1 1 I

Onc e reporte

d an d evaluated , ne

w chemical s an

d pesticide s ar e usuall y certifie

d fo r genera l us e or release . The objec t o f an y subsequen t agenc

y inspectio

no r monitorin

g progra

m i s th e quality

an d accurac y o f th e manufacturer' s testin g an danalysi s procedure s an d records . Som

e substance s ar e approve donly fo r limite

d uses , or wit

h certai nlabelin

g requirement s impose da s a conditio

no f certification . I nthes e cases , misus e or mislabelin g ca nb e cite da s a violatio

nmuc h a s i f th

e registratio

nor certificatio

ndocumen t wer e a permi t t o releas e th

e chemica l for us e i ncommerce , an

dth e us e o r labe l were a practic e standar

d a s discussed above . The valu e i nthi s approac

hi s j tha t th e potentia l fo

r disclosur e o f environmenta l hazard s ofte nj force s manufacturer s t o self-polic e an d kee p th e mos t hazardou s substance s fro

m eve r reachin

g th e marketplace . Variance s Mos t environmenta l statute s i nth e U.S . includ

e prevision s unde r whicha regulate

d sourc e ma

y petitio

nth e agenc y to grant it a

n exemptio

nfro m a rul e o f genera l application . Thi s forma l grant i s calle d a "variance " an

d it s term

s an d condition s hav

e muc hth e sam e effec t a s th

e condition s o f a permit . Variance s ca nb e obtained befor e sourc e operation s begin , althoug hman y ar e requeste

d afte r a violatio

nha s bee

nnote d or cite

db y a ninspector . Ther e ar e usuall y severa l precondition s fo r grantin

g a variance . Federa l rule s ^prohibi t stat e or loca l variance s fro m resultin

g i nviolatio

no f federa l law . Variance s ar e mos t frequentl y requeste

d fro m technolog

y standard s an d ai r pollutio

nemissio

nrat e standards . Lik e th e widesprea

d us e o f varie

d an d individua l permi t conditions , variance s increas e th e requirement s fo

r trainin

g an dpreparin

g inspectors , an

ddecreas e th

e probability

that th

e agency

ca nsuccessfull y

enforc e agains t violators . Circumstance s warrantin g a varianc e typicall y includ e th e availability

o f a ninnovativ

e or equivalen t contro l technology , a showin g tha t one' s facility i s fundamentall y

differen t fro

m th e facility

assumption s use

d i nsettin

g a standard , a showin g that peculia r physica l circumstance s (suc ha s naturall y

contaminated intak e water ) mak e complianc e technolog y inoperative , o

r a demonstratior tha t a nalternativ

e approachcreate s n o statisticall y

significant chang e i

nth e environment . 7 . Non-Regulator

y Tool s Environmenta l programs i nth e U.S . primaril y

are designe

d to se t regulator

y standards , an

d ensur e complianc e withthos e standards , throug hlega l sanction , penaltie s an dforc e o f law . However , statute s giv e EP A an d it s stat e governmen t counterpart s othe r tool s fo r improvin

c compliance . Technica l assistanc e programs als o ar e available , to a limite d extent , particularl y t o ai dsmal l businesse s that canno t affor d t o pa y environmenta l consultin g firm s t o advis e the

m o n thei r complianc e problems . Virtuall y

al l EP A scientifi c an

d technica l documents—includin g guidebook s o

ninspectio

ntechnique s an

d enforcemen t policies--ar e availabl e fo

r publi c purchase . Governmen t researc han ddevelopmentP.2 3
11-1 2 grant s programs ca ndirec t fund s towar d th e developmen t o f treatment facilitie s a s ha s bee nth e cas e fo

r municipa l sewage treatment plant s an d for subsidizin

g ongoin

g progra

m implementation , includin g inspection s an

d enforcement . Technica l assistanc e i s als o availabl e t o loca l government s o na routine basi s an d fo r one-tim

e surveys o

r mas s inspectio

nwhichthe

y canno t affor

dt o carryou t themselves . One o f th

e mos t effectiv

e mean s o f assistin g stat e o

r loca l governmen t i s fo r EP A t o assig

nstaf f o

nfedera l salar

y t o wor k i nth e Stat e or loca l office s fo

r a defined perio

do f time .P.2 4

III
. COMPLIANC E MONITORING
. Th e terr a "complianc e monitoring " —a s use d i n thi s chapter — encompasse s al l thos e activitie s undertake n b yth e regulate d communit y o r government , official s t o collec t an d asses s informatio n o n th e complianc e statu s o f regulate d source s o f environmenta l pollution

. I n th e U.S
. environmenta l programs , complianc e monitorin g provides :

0 informatio n fo r source s o f pollutio n themselve s t o tak e essentia l preventativ e an d correctiv e actio n t o maintai n compliance ?

• reliabl e an

d timel ydetectio n o f violation s a t an individua l pollutio n source ;

° evidenc e necessaryt o suppor t enforcemen t action s fo r identifie d violations ; an d
0 reliabl e complianc e statistic s fo r us e i n planning programs , settin g prioritie s an d evaluatin g progress . Ther e ar e fou r source s o f complianc e information : 1 ) sourc e self-monitorin g an

d reporting , 2 ) inspection s b ygovernmen t official s o r independen t third parties , 3 ) citize n complaints , an d 4 ) ambien t monitoring

. Th e mi x o f informatio n source s employe d varie s fro mon e environmenta l progra mt o another , bu t sourc e self-monitorin g an d inspection s ar e b

yfa r th e mos t importan t mean s o f complianc e monitori r A
. Sourc e Self-Monitorin g Afundamenta l principl e o f U.S
. environmenta l polic yi s tha t regulate d partie s shoul d kee p trac k o f thei r ow n complianc e statu s using require d methods , a s wel l a s an yothe r mean s the

ydeemreasonabl e t o provid e themselve s wit h reliabl e complianc e data
. Requirement s fo r sourc e self-monitorin g an d reporting ar e generall ybase d o n th e assumptio n tha t th e disciplin e o f collecting , recording , an d reporting complianc e dat a t o a responsibl e governmen t agenc ywil l resul t in a highe r leve l o f managemen t attentio n t o achieving an d maintainin g compliance

. Sourc e self-monitorin g an d reporting ar e als o use d t o supplemen t governmen t inspections , bot h i n uncovering relevan t dat a an d i n guidin g tha- allocatio n o f limite d inspectio n resources . Inspection s ar e costly r s o mor e frequen t sourc e self-monitorin g an d recordkeeping ca n provide a mor e complet e pictur e o f complianc e behavio r than a one tim e visi t coul d provide

. Self-monitorin g report s als o provid e governmen t official s wit h a basi s fo r screening source s an d selecting target s fo r inspection

. Sourc e self-monitorin g usuall ydoe s no t eliminat e the need fo r a n officia l inspectio n prio r t o forma l enforcemen t proceedings

. Ther e ar e some exception s in whic h forma l enforcemen t action s ar e takenP.2 5

solel yo n th e basi s o f self-reporte d data
. Ake yfacto r i n whethe r a programrelie s solel yo n sourc e reporte d dat a t o officiall ydefin e sourc e complianc e i s th e adequac yan d qualit yo f th e source'self

monitorin g date: , Bu t inspection s generall yar e performe d in additio n t o sourc e self-monitorin g t o corroborat e the accurac yo f the reporte d data
. Requirement s fo r methods , instrumentation , frequenc yo f dat a collection , th

e .recordkeepin

g an d reporting ar e al l subject.t o clos e publi c an

d privat e scrutiny

. Th e nee d fo r collectio n an d reportin g o f complianc e dat a i s alway s balance d b yconcern s ove r the cos t an d paperwor k burden
. Thi s balanc e i s reflecte d i n ne wnationa l policie s fo r mor e cost-effectiv e regulatio n an d reductio n i n paperwor k burde n o n stat e an

d loca l governmen t official s an d industryalike

. Recentl ytw o distinc t point s o f vie whav e clashe d ove r reportin g requirements

. On e scnoo l maintain s tha t th e requiremen t t o repor t al l complianc e dat a i s beneficia l i n an d o f itsel f i n promotin g highe r rate s o f complianc e —simpl ybecaus e i t i s backe d b ythe threa t o f governmen t revie wan d action , including crimina l prosecutio n fo r frau

d i n th e even t o f reportin g violations

. Th e othe r schoo l believe s tha t dat a report s shoul d no t b e require d wher e governmen t canno t possibl yrevie wan d ac t o n al l th e data
. Thi s schoo l argue s tha t i f governmen t canno t ac t o n al l self-reporte d violations , the n th e valu e o f self-reportin g i s diminished

. Ther e i s als o th e concer n tha t i f th e governmen t demand s al l th e informatio n tha t regulatee s generat e o n thei r complianc e status , i t create s a disincentiv e fo r th e regulatee s t o d o mor e monitorin g tha n i s minimall yrequired

. I n a n effor t t o accommodat e bot h schools , a numbe r o f reformer s hav e suggeste d th e us e o f "exception s reporting " - - tha t is , reporting onl yviolation s rathe r tha n al l complianc e data
. Th e debat e continue s a s t o whethe r th e integrit yo f a routin e reporting systemi s wort h th e cos t o f reportin g mor e dat a tha n official s ca n i n fac t use . Mos t o f th e environmenta l statute s ensur e tha t self-reporte d dat a i s availabl e t o th e public

. Th e U.S
. governmen t an d mos t State s hav e law s an

d regulation s grantin g an ycitize n th e righ t t o examin e o r copysuc h agenc yinformation

. Ther e ar e limite d exception s preventin g governmen t fromdisclosin g certai n kind s o f confidentia l busines s dat a tha t hav e bee n dul ylabele d an d submitte d in confidenc e b ya regulate d source , bu t thes e exception s ar e neve r availabl e fo r technica l informatio n describin g th e physica l natur e an d environmenta l impac t o f a violation . A s a practica l matter , confidentialit ypro vision s ar e rarel y a t issu e excep t i n th e pesticid e (FIFRA ) an d toxic s (TSCA ) prograpa * wher e companie s routinel ysubmi t produc t formulation , production , and distributio n dat a —an d wher e th e agenc yroutinel y protect s that ? compan y confidence

. Th e requirement s fo r self-monitoring , recordkeepin g an d reportin g i n th e variou s U.S
. environmenta l program s ar e summarize d i n the followin g table s an d text
. 1
. Wate r Pollutio n O f al l th e environmenta l program s in the Unite d States , the naticna l wate r program relie s mos t heavil yon sourc e self-monitorin gP.2 6

" lli- J "

an d reporting . Ther e are currentl y ove r 60,00 0 permittee s nationwide,

. an d abou t 6,00 0 ar e define d a s "major sources " base d upo ncriteri a relate d t o environmenta l impact

. Al l permit s fo r discharges T int o surfac e water s o f th e Unite d State s contai nrequirement s fo r self monitorin

g an d reporting . Th e programregulation s se t fort h a genera l requiremen t fo r monitoring , th e us e o f a standar d nationa l Discharg e Monitorin g Repor t for m fo r bot h federa l an d state-approve d programs , a minimu

mreportin

g frequenc

y o f onc e per year an d a three-yea r recordkeepin

g requirement . Mos t majo r source s mus t repor t e n a monthl y o r quarterl y

basis . Mino r source s generall y repor t annuall y

o r semi annually , stat e government s usuall y requir e mor e frequent reporting

. Tabl e III-a- 1 summarize s th e univers e o f minimu mfedera l requirement s that usuall y

appl y t o wate r pollutio nsources . However , the specifi c parameters , methods , an d frequenc

y o f monitorin

g an dreportin

g are usuall y tailore

d t o individua l source s a t th e time o f permi t issuanc e an d se t forthi

nth e permit . I

nrecent year s EP

A ha s develope

d statistica l profile s for specifi c industrie s whichhav e enable

d EP A t o reduc e th

e cos t an

d frequenc

y of monitorin

g requirements . Th e tabl e summarize s rule s fo r direc t dischargers ; indirec t discharger s (those , usin g publicl y

owne d treatment works , POTWs ) face simila r requirement s an d th e additiona l dut

y t o notifyin

g th e POT W wheneffluen t characteristic s ar e changin g o r comin g i na "slug " pattern . Ne

w requirement s t o pretrea t suc hindirec t wast e include mandator

y monitorin

g o f toxi c pollutants . Method s an

d Pollutant s - Federa l regulatio n(4 0 CF R 136 ) specifie s at leas t on

e analytica l technique (an dusuall y

more ) that mus t b e use d t o determine th

e leve l o f a give

npollutan t i

na give

nsample . Analytica l technique s fo r mor e tha

n10 0 differen t pollutant s hav e bee nspecified . Organi c toxi c pollutant s are t o b e monitore

d b y mean s o f a ga s chromatograp hmas s spectromete r (GC/MS) . A fe w ef fluent characteristic s ar e amenabl e t o continuou s monitoring ; mos t are measured i

nsample s take

nwithvariou s frequencies , wher e a source' s effluen t characteristic s ar e unchangin g and/or i

t i s a smalle r source , th e permi t wil l specify samplin

g frequencie s a s lo w a s onc e pe r quarter . Typica l testin g cost s fo

r an y on e paramete r pe r sampl e ru

nfro m $5 0 t o S2000 . Biomonitorin g ha s onl y

recentl y bee nrequired , an

d onl y wher e th

e sourc e i s a large , comple x facilit y dischargin

g toxi c substances . A s permit s begi nt o addres s toxi c limits , biomonitorin g technique s ar e likel y t o b e mor e frequentl y use d t o monito r suchoperation s o na continuin g basis . GC/M S i s generall y

viewed a s to o costl y t o us e o

na continuin

g basis . 2 . Drinkin

g Wate r Safety Approximatel y

60,00 0 community

wate r system

s supply

drinkin

g wate r t o mor e tha

n90 % o f th

e U.S
. population

. Eac h o f thes e system s i s require

d t o tes t it s wate r fo r th e presence , o f si x type s o f contaminant s fo r whic h nationa l primarystandards--maximu mcontaminan t level s (MCL)—hav e bee n set
. Th e result s o f suc h sampling mus t be reporte d t o th e governmen t a t frequencie s whic h var ywit h the siz e o f th e wate r systeman

d th e contaminan t o f interest

. Thes e sampling / reportin g frequencie s rang e fro mdail yt o everythre e years , four fo r radionuclides

. Onc e reported , th e result s become publi c information

.P.2 7 III- 4

Indeed , wher e a tes t show s tha t a n MC L ha s bee n exceeded , tha t violatio n an

d it s consequence s mus t b e reporte d b ythe systemt o ' it s customers
. I n th e even t tha t th e violatio n create s an imminen t healt h hazard , th e wate r syste m mus t repor t th e violatio n through th e loca l media

. Method s an

d Pollutant s - Federa l regulatio n (4 0 CF P 141 ) specifie s th e samplin g frequencie s an d analytica l method s t o b e use d i n monitorin g fo r contaminants

. Fo r qualit yassurance , al l system s mus t emplo ygovernment-certifie d laboratorie s t o perform thei r monitoring , although th e system s remai n responsibl e fo r reportin g th e result s t o the government
. Th e cos t fo r sampling an d analyzin g fo r an

yon e contaminan t range s fro m $ 2 t o abou t $500

. Althoug h 5 2 state s an d territorie s no wadministe r the drinkin g wate r programo n thei r own , th e monitorin g an d reporting requirement s ar e simila r fro

mon e localit yt o another
. Tabl e III-a- 2 summarize s th e self-monitorin g requirement s o f th e drinkin g wate r program . 3
. Underground Injectio n Contro l (UIC ) T o protec t underground drinkin g wate r supplie s fro mcontaminant s injecte d int o nearb ywell s primaril yb ywast e disposer s an d certai n oi l drillers , th e drinkin g wate r progra mregulate s suc h underground injectio n practices

. Th e UI C regulation s cove r 5 classe s o f wells
. Clas s I well s ar e thos e tha t ar e use d t o dispos e o f waste s belo wal l fres h wate r aquifer s an d ar e commonl yreferre d t o a s dee p disposa l wells
. Clas s I I well s ar e injectio n well s associate d wit h productio n o f oi l and ga s primaril yenhance d oi l recoverywel l an d brin e disposa l wells
. Clas s II I well s ar e thos e use d t o injec t fluid s fo r the in

sit e minin g o f minerals

. Clas s I V well s ar e well s use d fo r shallo w injectio n o f hazardou s o r radioactiv e waste s an d ar e banned
. Clas s V well s ar e al l othe r wells
. Th e regulation s fo r Clas s I , I I an d II I well s includ e som e genera l monitorin g an d reporting requirements

. Mor e specifi c requirement s ar e impose d o n a cas e b ycas e basi s i n permits

. Clas s V

well s ar e authorize d t o operat e a s long a s thi s operatio n doe s no t endange r underground source s o f drinkin g water
. Tabl e III-a- 3 summarize s th e self-monitorin g an d reportin g requirement a fo r underground source s o f drinkin g wate r protectio n program . 4
. Ai r Pollutio n Stationar ySource s - Ther e ar e approximatel y29,00 0 majo r stationar ysource s o f ai r pollutio n regulate d i n SIPs , an additiona l 2,10 0 ne wsource s regulate d b yne wsourc e standard s (NSPS) , an d anothe r 1,30 0 stationar ysource s emittin g hazardou s ai r pollutant s fo r whic h hazardou s ai r emission s standard s (NESHAPs ) hav e bee n promulgated
. Th e cos t o f contro l technolog yfo r thes e source s t o dat e exceed s th e complianc e cos t fo r an yothe r environmenta l program . Ye t th e requirement s fo r sourc e self-monitorin g an d reporting hav e bee n limite d i n compariso n t o suc h requirement s in wate r programs .P.2 8
III- 5

Stac k emission s test s ar e generall yrequire d onl ywhe n contro l equipmen t i s firs t installed , an d the n a governmen t inspecto r i s usual l presen t t o witnes s th e unusua l event
. Stac k test s als o hav e bee n littl e use d becaus e thei r cos t pe r tes t can ru n fro m$3,00 0 a t bes t t o $50,00 0 mor e commonly , an d eve n a s high a s $200,000

. Continuou s emissio n monitorin g (CEM ) equipmen t ha s unti l recentl ybee n expensiv e an d unreliable , du e t o th e ho t corrosiv e environmen t o f mos t stacks
. A s a result , onl yabou t 150 0 o f th e newe r source s hav e bee n require d t o instal l CEMs
. Othe r technique s hav e no t bee n require d o f sources . Visua l opacit yreading s usuall yrelie d upo n b yinspectors , thoug h cheap an

d well-accepted , giv e onl ya crud e indicatio n o f th e particula t emissio n rat e fro

ma stack
. Ther e i s a n interesting ne wopacit y monitorin g techniqu e employing laser-bea mrada r (lidar ) technolog y tha t nowoffer s mor e accurat e an d reliabl e dat a bu t i t i s expensiv e an d availabl e onl ythrough th e Nationa l Enforcemen t Investigation s Cente r i n Denver
. I n th e absenc e o f cost-effectiv e monitorin g technology , ai r progra mofficial s hav e impose d minima l routin e an d frequen t self

monitorin g requirements , an d limite d reporting requirement s a s well
. Although.th e technolog yan d regulatoryrequirement s ar e bot h changing wit h the times , th e U.S
. ai r progra m i s stil l characterize d b yrelativel ylittl e emission s testing , eithe r b yth e sourc e o r b

y governmen t officials

. Arenewe d commitmen t t o focu s o n continuou s complianc e ma ysoo n lead t o a substantia l increas e i n th e number s o f source s require d t o install , operat e an d repor t base d upo n continuou s emissio n monitors

. Mobil e Source s - Th e aggregat e emission s fro mth e engine s o f som e 15 0 millio n moto r vehicle s mak e u p a significan t portio n o f the ai r contaminatio n i n th e U.S
. Self-monitorin g an d reporting require

ment s ar e impose d toda yprimaril yo n thos e institution s tha t ca n easil yaffec t th e emission s o f man yvehicle s a t once : th e vehicl e manufacturers , th e vehicl e maintenanc e shops , an d th e fue l suppliers

. Pollutant s - Stationarysourc e rule s contro l th e emission s o f particulate s (TSP) , S02 , NO x , VOC , CO , an d lead
. Hazardou s pollutant s currentl yregulate d includ e asbestos , viny l chloride , beryllium , benzen e an d mercury . Viny l chlorid e source s mus t routinel yrepor t level s o f V C measure d b

ybatc h sample s an d G C monitors

. Stil l othe r pollutant s ar e regulate d unde r Sectio n 111(d ) t o th e exten t theyar e emitte d simultaneoual ywit h th e liste d pollutant s b ya give n sourc e (fo r example , B20rfro m

kraf t pape r mills)

. Th e sane pollutant s ar e emitte d b yvehicles , bu t mobile-sourc e program s ar a primaril yconcerne d wit h lead , VOC , NO x , an d CO
. Tabl e III-a- 4 summarize s th e self-monitorin g an d reporting requirement s i n th e two majo r ai r programs . 5
. Hazardou s Wast e Wast e analysis , ground-wate r monitoring , an d self-analysi s o f hazardou s wast e manifes t record s ar e a t the hear t o f the "cradle-to

grave " approac h t o hazardou s wast e handling in th e U.S
. Lik e th e wate rP.2 9


### rrr- 6

programs , th e hazardou s wast e program s fac e ten s o f thousand s o f , differen t wast e handler s man yo f whic h hav e comple x o r variabl e wast e constituents

. Th e shee r variatio n o f the regulate d communit ymake s self-monitoring , analysis , an d reporting al l th e mor e important , sinc e i t i s th e individua l wast e handle r tha t i s i n the bes t positio n t o questio n an d identif yth e man ywaste s characterizing it s facilit y o n a give n day
. I f th e waste-manifes t tracking system i s t o succee d a s th e nation' s primaryhazar d managemen t system , the n th e informatio n collecte d an

d entere d o n th e manifes t b ygenerators , transporters , an d TS D facilitie s mus t b e complet e an d accurate
. Method s an

d Pollutant s - Wast e constituent s tha t exhibi t igniti

bility , corrosivity , reactivity , an d toxicit ymak e th e wast e hazardou s fo r purpose s o f environmenta l regulation

. Alis t o f suc h waste s an d thei r identifying number s can b e foun d i n 4 0 CF R 261 , along wit h recommende d analyti c methods
. Ground-wate r monitorin g requirement s diffe r fro msit e t o site , bu t typicall yinclud e testin g fo r th e MCL s liste d unde r th e drinkin g wate r progra

mregulations , analyse s fo r th e presenc e o f certai n principa l hazardou s constituent s (PHC ) liste d i n the hazardou s wast e regulations , an

d annua l GC/M S scan s t o tes t fo r unexpecte d additiona l hazardou s constituents

. Tabl e III-a- 5 summarize s th e self-monitorin g an d reportin g requirement s fo r generators , transporters , an d TS D facilities

. 6
. Toxi c Substance s Mos t environmenta l release s o f toxi c substance s ar e regulate d b y agenc yprogram s i n th e foregoing areas . However , ther e i s a separat e progra ma t th e federa l leve l devote d t o identifying , listing , an d assessin g chemical s i n commercia l us e an d propose d ne wchemical s fo r thei r hazar d potential

. Unde r TSCA , thi s progra mca n contro l the productio n an

d us e o f know

n o r suspecte d hazardou s chemical s nationwid e I t ha s don e s o fo r onl ya fe wsuc h chemicals , although i t nowha s dat a o n thousand s o f substances
. Th e self-monitorin g an d reporting rule s unde r TSCAar e summarize d in Tabl e III-a-6
. 7
. Pesticide s Sinc e the pesticide s progra mi s primaril ya premarketin g testing an d registratio

nprogram , ther e ar e fe wself-monitorin g o r reporting requirement a beside s an annua l summaryo f productio n an d sal e o f genera l an

d restricted-us e pesticides

. However , ther e ar e importan t recordkeepin g requirement s t o giv e agenc yinspector s a n opportunit y t o chec k o n labeling an d advertisin g practice s tha t migh t no t compor t wit h restriction s o n use . Health-effect s tes t record s mus t als o b e maintaine d t o hel p trac e an yharmfu l effect s o f pesticide s in us e bac k t o th e manufacturer
. Ther e ar e abou t 11,00 0 registere d pesticid e producer s an

d dealer s an

d mor e than 2,000,00 0 certifie d apnlicators

. Tabl e III-a- 7 summarize s th e monitorin g an d reporting rule s unde r FIFRA
.P.3 0

B
. Inspection s T v Despit e widesprea d self-monitoring , inspection s remai n the backbon e o f agenc ycomplianc e monitorin g programs . A s the seve n table s i n th

e Appendi x attest , inspection s ar e th e government' s mai n too l fo r officiall yassessing compliance , an d fo r assuring qualit yan

d lending credibilit yt o self-monitoring programs . Th e independen t evaluatio n provide d b ya governmen t inspectio n i s th e key
. I f al l source s o f environmenta l risk s an d pollutio n wer e perfectl ywilling an d abl e t o compl ywit h environmenta l regulations , the n th e governmen t requirement s fo r self-monitorin g an d reporting woul d alon e b e sufficien t t o identif yproblem s an d ensur e speed

ycomplianc e b

ysourc e operators
. O f course , environmenta l value s ar e no t th e onl yone s a t wor k i n the operating decision s mad e b

ysourc e managers . I n reality , i t i s necessary fo r governmen t t o enforc e th e primac yo f environmenta l value s ove r economi c o r organizationa l value s whereve r th e sourc e manage r make s keydecision s affectin g th e environment

. I n orde r t o d o that , th e governmen t o r third-part ymus t a t som e poin t pa

yspecifi c attentio n t o th e informatio n availabl e o n th e particula r source . Tha t examinatio n int o th e environmenta l affair s o f a singl e regulate d sourc e i s calle d th e "inspection. "

1
. Characteristic s o f Inspection s Th e objective s o f an yinspectio n ar e t o discove r and , evaluat e sourc e performanc e an d complianc e thereb yimproving ' bot h the abilit yan

d th e wil l o f a sourc e t o compl ywit h a n applicabl e regulation

. Some inspection s ar e calle d inspection s "fo r cause " i n tha t the v ar e mad e i n respons e t o specifi c informatio n tha t something i s amis s a t a particula r facility

. Othe r inspection s ar e calle d "routine " an d ar e schedule d a s par t o f a n agency' s ongoin g complianc e program . I n bot h kinds , the inspecto r seek s to : 1 ) identif yspecifi c environmenta l problems , 2 ) infor mthe sourc e an

d th e agenc ya s t o th e existenc e o f th e problems , 3 ) collec t an

d preserv e evidenc e o f non-compliance , and/o r 4 ) "show th e flag " b

ycreatin g a credibl e presenc e o f the interes t an d powe r o f governmen t i n fron t o f particula r manager s a t a particula r site

. I t i a probabl ysaf e t o sa ytha t everyinspectio n wil l serv e al l four objectives , although th e desig n o f a n inspectio n shoul d reflac t th

e relativ e importanc e o f eac h objectiv e i n tha t instance

. Z n general , U.S
. environmenta l program s desig n thei r inspection a withspecifi c feature s i n mind : th e focu s an d leve l (o r complexity) , frequency , cost , an d likel ycomplianc e result
. Level s o f Inspection s - Th e focu s o f an yon e inspectio n i s commonl yon e o r mor e o f th e following : the existenc e o f an up-to

dat e permi t o r registratio n certificate , th e installatio n o f equipmen t necessaryt o monito r o r contro l pollution , specifi c managemen t plan s an d practices , th e preparatio n an d maintenanc e o f records , th e correc t operatio n o f suc h equipment , an d the conduc t o f sampling an d analysi s o f pollutio n streams
. Thes e ar eP.3 1
III- 8

liste d roughl yi n orde r o f increasing cos t t o inspect

. _U T . s. program s creat e differen t type s o f inspection s b ycombining on e o r mor e o f thes e objectives

. Regardles s o f th e level , mos t inspection s ar e conducte d wit h carefu l attentio n to : 1 ) th e manne r o f entryont o the sourc e premises , 2 ) a n opening conferenc e t o explai n th e inspectio n proces s t o th e source , 3 ) th e focu s o f th e inspectio n itself , 4 ) th e closing conference , an d 5 ) th e preparatio n o f an inspectio n repor t an

d file

. Right s o f Entry/Announcin g Inspection s - Entryfo r an inspectio n can b e eithe r announce d o r unannounce d t o th e source . Lega l an d practica l benefit s an d constraint s ente r int o th e choic e betwee n approaches.
. Al l U.S
. environmenta l progra mstatute s gran t right s o f entry , bu t FIFR

Aan d SDW Arequir e writte n notificatio n befor e entry
. Mos t U.S
. inspections , an d virtuall yal l comple x samplin g inspections , ar e announced
. Th e notificatio n usuall ycome s b y telephon e cal l followe d b ya notificatio n lette r detailin g th e kind s o f informatio n tha t shoul d b e availabl e t o th e inspecto r befor e o r durin g th e visit

. Announce d inspection s reduc e th e chanc e tha t th e time wil l b e waste d du e t o missin g record s o r absenc e o f knowledgeabl e personnel
. The yals o hel p reduc e tim e take n t o discus s whic h inspectio n dat a deserv e t o b e treate d a s confidentia l busines s information

. Some U.S
. inspector s tr yunannounce d inspection s routinel y an d other s onl ywhe n citize n complaint s o r employe e tip s giv e a n inspecto r goo d reasc n t o suspec t tha t a sourc e i s i n violation , an d i s likel yt o contes t an ysuc h determinatio n base d o n inspectio n data
. Similarly , wher e ther e i s reaso n t o believ e tha t dat a o r othe r evidenc e woul d b e destroye d prio r t o a n announce d inspection , th e surpris e visi t i s preferred , eve n though th e inspectio n i s bound t o b e stressfu l an d les s efficient

. Th e U.S
. ai r progra m i s conductin g a n evaluatio n o f th e cost s an d potentia l benefit s o f unannounce d inspection s give n th e difficult yo f obtainin g a goo d pictur e o f continuin g sourc e performanc e through existin g methods
. Afurthe r complicatio n i n th e us e o f unannounce d inspections , an d inspection s generall yi s that , unde r th e U.S
. constitution , person s hav

a a righ t t o b e fre e o f unwarrante d searche s an d seizure s —•literall yth e righ t t o tur n awaya n enforcemen t agen t a t tft

a door , unles s th e agen t alread yobtaine d a searc h warrant
. K

recen t U.S
. Suprem e Cour t decisio n limit s th e abilit y o f a n inspecto r t o demand entrywhethe r announce d o r unannounce d

—eve n whe n th e agency' s statutoryauthorit ygrant s a righ t o f entry
. Rathe r tha n ris k running afou l o f tha t constitutiona l provision , agenc yinspector s no wprepar e t o g o bac k quickl yt o a judg e t o obtai n a searc h warran t in th e even t tha t a sourc e refuse s requeste d entry
. A s lon g a s th e inspecto r doe s indee d hav e probabl e caus e t o searc h fo r violation s o r i s no t arbitraril y singlin g ou t th e source , a judg e i s likel yt o issu e th e warran t an d eliminat e th e constitutiona l barrie r t o th e visit

.P.3 2

Frequenc

y o f Inspectio

n- Th

e frequenc

y of inspectio

na t a givensit e i s determined b y cos t an

d th e expecte

dcomplianc e benefit . Fo

r example , wher e a sourc e i s recalcitrant , there are frequent inspections . Anothe r determinan t o f frequenc y i s th e expected tim

e befor e equipmen t failur e (o r managemen t vigilanc e failure ) next occurs . Giventh e rea l consideratio no f costs , i

t become s necessar

y t o trad

e of f frequenc

y an d th e typ e (o r compre hensiveness ) o f inspection . I nth e U.S. , routin

e inspection s ar e scheduled primaril y at interval s o f 1 , 2 , 3 o r 5 years - — th e annua l tim

e period s bein

g explainedperhap s b y th e annua l nee d t o demonstrat e progra m performanc e i

norde r t o justify

nex t year' s inspectio

nbudget . Tabl e III- I summarize s th e inspectio

n frequenc

y recommende

d fo r majo r source s i

neac ho f th e majo r U.S . environmenta l progra m areas . Acces s t o Inspectio nDat a - I

nth e U.S. , th

e dat a collecte

d i nth e inspectio

nrepor t an

dfile s becom

e publi c informatio njus t a s self-monitorin

g report s do . A s such , th e dat a ca

nb e requeste

d b y othe r citizens , an d th e agency

mus t releas e it excep t wher e confidentia l busines s informatio nha s bee

nidentifie

db y th e source . 2 . Ensurin

g QualifiedInspector s an d Laborator

y Practice s Environmenta l regulation s i nth e U.S . are bot

hsufficientl y technica l an

d nove l tha t goo

dinspectio

nrequire s well-trained professionals . Goo d inspectio

nrequire s goo

d technica l professiona l inspectors . It i s not alway s possibl e t o fin denoug hspecialist s t o serv e a s governmen t agenc y employees—particularl y i nth e earl y year s o f a ne

w progra m or regulation . Salar y limitation s als o mak e it difficul t fo r governmen t t o recrui t an d kee p goo d inspectors . Thi s ha s prove nt o b e particularl y

troublesom

e i n th e ne w requirement s for ground-wate r monitorin g expertis e unde r th e RCR A an d UI C programs . Therefor e mos t agencie s rely t o som e exten t o

ntechnica l contractor s t o supplemen t or substitut e fo r governmen t inspectio nteams . Althoug

hth e immediat e expens e t o th e agenc y i s higher , th

e lon g ter m cos t i s lower an

dth e professiona l leve l immediatel y

availabl e for wor k i s higher . However , som e recent cour t decision s hav e narrowl y

construe

dth e statute s that gran t right s o f entr y t o non-governmen t officials , an dma y thereb y limi t entr

y b y contrac t inspector s unles s specificall y authorize

d b y statute . RCRA , th e hazardou s wast e program , doe s provide suchexplici t authorization ; th e clea nai r an

d clea nwate r statute s do not . Increasin

g attentio

ni s bein

g pai d t o ensurin

g th e quality o f laborator

y analysi s supportin g th e inspectio

nan dmonitorin

g programs . Th

e pesticide progra m relie s upo

na forma l laborator y certificationan

d th e Superfun

dprogra

m als o ha s a

nextensiv

e progra m fo r auditin

g th e laboratorie s use d to analyz e hazardou s wast e samples .P.3 3
111-1 0

Tabl e II1- 1 EXPECTED INSPECTIO

N FREQUENCIE S

AI R Major Source s Mino r Source s WATE R Majo r Source s Drinkin g Wate r Undergroun

d Injectio

n RCR A Majo r TS D Other s TSC A Tes t Lab s FIFR A Genera l Us e Establishment s Restricted Us e Establishment s Tes t Laboratorie s Annua l Biennia l

Annua l Annual-Surfac e Wate r 3 Years-Groun

d Wate r N/ A

Annua l 4 year s

3 Year s

5 Year s 3 Year s 2 t o 5 Year sP.3 4
III-l l

3
. Targeting an

d Allocating Inspectio n Resource s " r Sinc e ever

yenvironmenta l progra mha s limite d staf f an d dolla r resources , agenc ymanager s mus t allocat e inspectio n resource s wisely . Awid e variet yo f routin e an d specia l inspections , frequencies , Inspectio n levels , an d objective s can be mixe d in endles s combination s withou t exceeding a give n budget
. Bu t onl y a fe wo f thos e combination s can bring maximu mimprovement s i n complianc e fo r th e give n budget
. Perhap s th e bigges t singl e developmen t i

nU.S
. program s ove r th e pas t five year s ha s bee n th e emergenc e o f th e concep t o f tiere d level s o r type s o f inspections — eac h wit h it s ow

n cost-benefi t an

d cost-effectivenes s characteristic

. Th e choic e o f inspectio n leve l i s primaril ya tradeof f betwee n cos t an

d complianc e benefits

. Absen t othe r goo d complianc e needs , th e mer e showing o f th e fla g doe s muc h t o kee p source s in line , an

d make s i t quit e reasonabl e t o employth e lower-leve l type s o f inspectio n i n mos t cases . Ofte n cursor yinspection s can b e justifie d fo r source s wit h goo d complianc e record s an d o f a typ e unlikel yt o encounte r violations

. Mor e expensiv e an d intensiv e inspection s ar e necessaryto : 1 ) demonstrat e tha t th e agenc ycan an d wil l g o all-ou t o n occasion , 2 ) ensur e tha t self-monitorin g report s ar e i n fac t correct
. 3 ) kee p inspecto r training level s high , an

d 4 ) develo p community-wid e complianc e profile s fo r bette r progra madministratio n ove r time

. Th e selectio n o f source s t o b e inspecte d i s important , too
. U.S
. program s hav e onl yrecentl ybegun t o mor e systematicall y evaluat e a source' s potentia l t o d o environmenta l harm , th e complexit yo f th e inspectio n necessaryt o evaluat e complianc e a t th e source , it s complianc e historyan d tha t o f it s industria l sister s an

d neighbors , an

d th e availabilit yo f goo d self-monitoring report s an

d record s fo r prescreening

. Amon qth e impediment s hav e bee n th e lac k o f effectiv e dat a managemen t system s t o assis t i n analysi s o f complianc e pattern s an d t o systematicall ycompar e sourc e performance
. Anothe r importan t targeting an d allocatio n techniqu e recentl y employe d i s th e us e o f triggere d level s o f inspection , perhap s alternate d wit htriggere d tier s o f self-monitoring

. Fo r example , i f a sourc e i s foun d i nviolatio n o f a minor , easil yviewe d practic e standard , th e agenc ymigh t requir e th e sourc e t o perfor m mor e intenalv

e self-monitorin g fo r a perio d o f time , wit h a mor e intensiv e follow-u

p inspectio n schedule d shoul d th e extensiv e monitorin g indicat e mor e extensiv e non-compliance

. Th e principl e behin d suc h triggerin g mechanism s i s twofold : First , eac h trigge r even t itsel f shoul d b e relativel ycheap t o detec t whil e indicating th e possibilit yo f othe r non-complianc e discoverabl e wit h mor e monitoring

. Second , eac h trigge r shoul d ten d t o shif t the nex t burde n o f dat a gatherin g t o th e sourc e rathe r than the inspector' s budget
. Unde r thi s principle , heavie r informatio n collectio n burden s ar e no t impose d unti l lower-leve l monitorin g o r inspection s hav e warrante d th e expense .P.3 5
111-1 2

A nimportant limitatio no ntargetin

g an d allocatio

ntechnique s i s th e requiremen t tha t routin e inspections—a s distinc t fro m inspection s wher e prio r reason s exis t t o believ e that violation s wil l b e found—b e fairly

distributed acros s tim e an d acros s th

e regulate

d community . Again , longstandin g cour t decision s o nth e constitutiona l protection s agains t unwarrante dsearche s do . permi t suc hroutine inspection s s o lon g a s the

y ar e par t o f a "neutra l administrativ

e inspectio

nschem e (NAIS). " A

nagenc y ha s broa

d discretio

nt o develo

p suc ha scheme ; i t jus t ha s t o make sur e tha t an y apparentl y

disproportionall y

hig hinspectio

nrate 3 o

r monitorin

g burden s at a givensourc e ar e justifie db y goo d technica l reasons . Otherwise , late r prosecutio nof tha t sourc e migh t fai l o nground s o f discriminator y inspectio

npractices . Anothe r inspectio

nallocatio

ntechnique that , like targeting , ha s onl y

recentl y

beenembrace

dan d teste di nU.S . program

s i s share d o r coordinated inspection s amon g environmenta l program s an d withsiste r agencies . Suc hcoordinatio

nha s bee

nsuccessfu l o na nintergovernmenta l basi s amon g siste r agencie s intereste d i nth e sam e manufacturin

g facility , a s withFoo d an d Dru g Administration , Occupationa l Healt han d Safety

Administratio

nan d Toxi c Substance s Contro l Ac t inspection s of a chemica l plant . Multi-medi a inspection s are sometime s bu t not routinel y

use d b y EP A or Stat e inspectors. . Ther e ar e differin g view s a s t o whethe r trainin g ca nb e adequat e an

d whethe r individua l seria l inspection s ar e mor e or les s disruptiv e t o plant operations . I noverview , U.S . environmenta l program s hav e made enormou s progres s i

ndevelopin

g an dusin g th e technica l rudiment s of complianc e monitorin g inspection s bu

t ar e onl y

no w turnin g t o innovativ

e an d cost-efficien t inspectio nstrateg

y an dmanagement .
4 . Inspectio

nPractice s The variety

o f inspectio

npractice s employe db y governmen t inspector s inenvironmenta l program s acros s th

e U.S . i s fa

r to o grea t t o describe i

ndetai l here , particularl y whenon

e take s int o account th e variou s technica l operatin g characteristic s peculia r t o eac h piec e o f contro l equipmen t i nplac e a t eac

ho f hundred s o f thousand s o£-facilities . Indeed , that variety i s par t o f th

e inspector-trainin

g allocatio

nproble

m face d b y agenc y administrators . Lookin g acroa a programs , however , it i s possibl e t o fin dcommo n approache s t o definin g differen t level s o f inspectio ni npractice , an d estimat e personne l tim e necessar

y t o complet e a typica l inspectio

nat eac

hleve l o f inspectio ndetail . Leve l 1 - The simples t o f th e on-sit e inspections , thi s visi t i s limite

d t o walkin

g throug

ha facility , checkin g onl y fo r th e mer e existenc e of contro l equipment , wor k practice s an

d house keeping , instrumentation , an da record s repository . It s primar y objectiv

e i s t o sho

w th e flag , an

dagenc y manager s typicall y budge t fro

m 0. 5 t o 2 person-day s fo r th e effort . Leve l 2 - A

t thi s leve l o

f complexity , th

e agenc y usuall y receive s th

e greates t amount of informatio nper dolla r invested .P.3 6

111-1 3

Sometime s calle

d a "non-samplin

g complianc e evaluation, " thi s inspectio

ninclude s detaile

drevie w an dcritique of sourc e monitorin

g method s an

d dat a i

nadditio

nt o visua l inspectio

nan d probin g o f proces s an

d contro l device s i nplace . I t usuall y include s detailed pre-inspectio nrevie w of sourc e dat a i

nagenc y files . The budge t allocate d a t thi s leve l runs fro m 2 t o 5 person-days , an

d ca ng o a s hig

ha s 1 0 o

r 1 5 days wher e severa l contro l point s or ground-wate r monitor s mus t b e visite

dan d analyze

d together . Leve l 3 - Oftencalle d a "samplin

g inspection, " thi s visi t include s th

e visua l an

drecor d review

s of th e simple r inspections , but add s th

e tim e an d troubl e necessar

y t o duplicat e th

e source' s ow nsamplin

g an d laborator

y analysi s procedure s t o double-chec k actua l pollutio

nemissio

nor discharge rates . Typica l budget s range fro

m 2 5 t o 3 5 person-day s fo r suc ha ninspection ; th

e figure s includ

e th e us e o f outside laborator y service s o

r consul tant s workin

g unde r contrac t t o th e agency . Samplin

g inspection s performed o

ninitia l installatio nof control s (suc has ai r pollutio

n stack emissio

ntests ) ca

nru ntw o o r thre e time s mor e expensive , bu t suc htest s are frequentl y performe

d a t th e expens e o f th

e sourc e withth

e agenc y inspector present a s a nobserver . Table s III-a- 8 throug hIII-a-1 1 illustrat e th e variet

y of indi vidua l inspectio

npractice s employe di nU.S . program

s t o contro l ai r pollution , wate r pollution , soli d o r hazardou s waste , an d toxi c substances . Th e item s include

di nth e tabl e are frequentl y include d i ninspections ; however , relativel y fe w inspection s b

y eithe r federa l or stat e agencie s includ e al l practice s i

nan y on e visit . The inspectio

npractice s note

d i nTabl e III-a-1 1 fo r toxi c substance s ar e include d becaus e the

y are typica l of th e step s take nb y inspector s wher e extremel y hazardou s chemical s suc ha s PCB s ar e concerned . The y ar e not representativ e of inspection s for complianc e withmos t o f th e regulation s under TSCA , a progra m tha t lik

e FIFR A i s primaril y

concerne

dwithcollectin

g informatio

n o nth e potentia l hazard s fro m hundred s or.thousand s of chemical s i nus e rathe r tha

nlimitin

g emission s o f specifi c substances . C . Area Monitorin

g Soure a self-monitorin g an dgovernmen t inspection s on-sit e are b y fa r th e mos t important an dmos t commo

ntechnique s employe d b y U.S . agencie s t o monito r fo r complianc e withenvironmenta l regulations . However , it i s possibl e to obtai ninformatio no n complianc e statu s b y monitorin

g environmenta l condition s i nth e vicinity

o f a facility , withou t necessaril y walkin g ont o it s property . Thre e kind s of are a monitorin

g hav e bee nuse d fo r complianc e evaluatio ni nth e U.S. , withsomewha t limite d succes s an d effectiveness : ambient monitoring , remot e sensing , an d overflights .P.3 7

111-1 4

1
. Ambien t Monitorin g Th e technolog

yfo r detectin g an d measurin g concentration s o f pollutant s i n ambien t ai r an d ground o r surfac e water s ha s bee n i n existenc e muc h longe r than technolog yfo r sourc e emissio n samplin g an

d analysis

. Ambien t monitorin g wa s a n importan t scientifi c an

d researc h too l befor e nationa l legislatio n transforme d environmenta l protectio n int o a majo r regulatoryprogramobjectiv e i n th e 1970s
. Indeed , manyo f th e scientifi c studie s o f ambien t condition s an

d ecologica l effect s provide d th e justificatio n fo r thes e regulatoryprograms . Eve n today , eac h federa l an d stat e agenc ymus t conduc t som e degre e o f ambien t monitorin g i n orde r t o demonstrat e it s progres s toward s cleanin g up th e environment , an d t o evaluat e th e aggregat e amoun t o f ne wpollutio n tha t can b e permitte d i n a give n ai r basin , watershed , o r aquife r i n a give n year . Ambien t monitorin g an d researc h ar e expensiv e bu t necessary undertaking s i n th e administratio n o f agenc yprogram s throughou t th e U.S
. today
. Fo r al l thei r investmen t i n ambien t monitoring , however , agencie s onl yseldo memplo ysuc h monitorin g fo r complianc e evaluations

. Th e singl e bigges t proble min using ambien t dat a fo r complianc e purpose s i s tha t i t i s usuall yverydifficul t t o demonstrat e a causa l lin k betwee n emission s o r discharge s fro ma ' regulate d facilit yan d measure d degradatio n i n th e qualit yo f ambien t ai r o r wate r i n th e are a surroundin g tha t facility

. Sometime s a sourc e i s th e onl ysignifican t pollute r i n an area , o r it s emission s hav e a characteristi c compositio n tha t serve s t o "fingerprint " it s contribution s t o th e ambien t degradation—eve n though th e ambien t monitorin g instrument s ma yb e locate d a few mile s away . I n thi s unusua l case , routin e ambien t measurement s ca n an d d o giv e complianc e officer s an indicatio n tha t somethin g i s probabl yamis s a t th e facility , an d an on-sit e inspectio n i s warranted
. I n thi s respect , ambien t monitorin g ca n hel p agencie s targe t thei r limite d inspectio n resources , o r establis h "probabl e cause " t o conduc t a n unannounce d inspection

. Bu t th e ambien t measurement s alon e ar e seldo msufficien t proo f tha t a source specifi c emissio n standar d o r practice s regulatio n ha s bee n violated

. I n an

yevent , mos t source s ar e locate d i n o r nea r populate d area s wher e contribution s fro m othe r source s mi x int o th e ambien t conditions ; thi s make s i t impractica l i f no t impossibl e t o trac e ambien t result s t o a specifi c source . Still , ambien t monitorin g doe s fin d it s wayint o certai n source-specifi c requirements , usuall yimpose d a s permi t conditions

. I n ai r programs , a sourc e seekin g t o locat e i n a clea n ai r (o r PSD ) are a mus t perform ambien t monitorin g bot h befor e an d afte r constructio n t o demonstrat e tha t it s limite d ne wemission s d o no t caus e ambien t concentration s t o increas e b ymor e tha n th e legall y allowabl e "PS D increment " i n tha t ai r basin

. Similarly , a sourc e tha t want s t o us e th e emissio n trading o r bubbl e polic ymus t demonstrat e tha t it s propose d change s i n emissio n requirement s wil l no t an

d d o no t degrad e ambien t condition s i n it s vicinity

. Ambien t monitorin g i s require d o f certai n wate r pollutio n discharger s wit h unregulate d toxi c substance s i n thei r effluent ,P.3 8

111-1 5

an d discharger s desirin g variance s fro

m categorica l effluefi- t standards . Finally , ambient groundwate r monitoring—usuall y a t a fe w wel l location s one-quarte r t o one-hal f a mil e away—i s uniforml y

require

d for hazardou s wast e TS D facilitie s an dfo r som e undergroun

d injectio

nwells . I

neac hof thes e cases , exceedanc e of a nambient standar

d ma y o r ma y no t itsel f b

e a violation , bu

t it i s always a -trigge r fo r furthe r actio

nb y th e facility . Suc

h trigge r requirement s typicall y includ e mor e intensiv

e monitorin

q an d analysis , specia l reporting , or eve nsupplementar

y controls . 2 . Remote-Sensin

g Althoug hambient monitor s generall y canno t provide positiv e proo f o f a source-specifi c output-rat e violation , othe r technioue s ca nprovide suc

hproo f fro

m location s outside th e plant' s boundaries . The singl e mos t well-developed remote-sensin g technique i s th

e laser-bea

m radar , o r "Lidar" , fo r "ligh t detectio

nan dranqing. " Lidar ha s beenunde r developmen t for nearl y twent y years , an d ha s recently,beenliste di nEP A regulation s a s a

nacceptabl e alternativ

e fo r measurin

g smoke-plum

e opacity—tha t is , th e density (no t mas s emissio

nrate ) o f a plume . A ninspector ca

n, . no w driv e a lidar va

nnear a smokestack , shin e a laser bea

m throug hth e plum e fro m a distance , an

dmeasur e th

e radar/light i ech o fro m th e plum e s o a s t o yiel d th e particulat e density o f v th e plume . Lidar ca

nb e use dda y or night , an

d i s muchmor e precis e an

d accurat e tha

nth e socalle

d "calibrate

d eyeball " o f a traine

d smoke reader . I t i s als o les s expensiv e pe r measuremen t tha nin-stack samplin

g or continuou s opacity monitoring . Engineer s hav e alread

y demonstratedrelate d lidar capability t o measur e remot e concentration s o f S0 2 an d N0 X , althoug

hsuc hremot e sensin g o f gasse s i s a fe w year s awa

y fro m approva l of a

nequivalen t method . 3 . Overflight s Satellite s an

d aircraf t hav

e bee nemploye

db y environmenta l agencie s t o measur e ambient condition s a s wel l a s source-specifi c conditions . Like lidar , thes e remot e sensin g technique s wer e firs t developed a s ambient monitorin g tool s fo

r research . Satellit e sensor s remai nusefu l fo r area-wid

e assessment s an

d plannin g purposes , but imag e resolutio

ni s generall y

to o coars e to identif y

output-rat e for management-practic e violation s a t a givenfacility * Satellite s hav e successfull y

detecte

dgros s wate r pollutio

ndischarge plumes , an dtriggere

d subsequent samplin g inspection s tha t le d eventuall y

to prosecutions . I nthi s sense , satellit e dat a helpe d allocat e sit e inspectio ntim e an dresources . But satellite s ar e unabl e t o provide th e kind s o f quantitativ e measurement s necessar y to prov

e outpu t rat e violations . Aircraf t overflight s ca nb e eve nmor e effectiv

e tha nsatellite s i ncomplianc e monitoring . Fro m a naltitude o f a fe

w thousan

d feet , airborne camera s ca ndetec t an

drecor dai r an

dwate r plum

e densities , temperatures , an d spatia l extent . Eve nsom e biologica l effect s i

nstream

s ca nb e detecte

d fro m th e air . Perhap s mos tP.3 9

111-1 6
significantly , physica l characteristic s an d wor k practices'ar e easil yobserve d fro mth e air

. Fo r example , dike s an d fence s a t hazardou s wast e site s ca n b e observe d an d checke d agains t permi t record s fo r correc t locatio n an d condition

. Practice s suc h a s truc k loading a t gasolin e bul k terminal s an d hazardou s material s unloadin g an

d handlin g ca n b e observed
. Th e leve l o f productio n ca n b e gauge d from

th e ai r an

d compare d t o operating assumption s i n a wate r discharg e permit

. Although overflight s nee d no t cros s ove r plan t boundarie s an d thereb

yviolat e th e airspac e right s o f th e sourc e operator , th e us e o f suc h flight s ha s bee n recentl yan d successfull y challenge d i n cour t b ya majo r chemica l company , a t leas t wher e suc h flight s ar e unannounced
. Bot h th e lowe r cour t an d th e appeal s cour t hel d tha t suc h flight s violate d th e company' s reasonabl e expectatio n o f privac yi n conductin g it s busines s insid e it s fence s (an d environmenta l authorizin g statute s hav e neve r directl yaddresse d th e issues)

. Suc h privac yright s ar e a n importan t limitatio n o n al l governmen t searche s an d inspection s i n th e U.S
. On e particula r concer n wa s tha t certai n plan t layout s an

d practice s observabl e fro m th e ai r migh t als o b e trad e secret s largel yunrelate d t o pollutio n control
. Unde r U.S
. laws , suc h commercia l secret s disclose d t o an agenc yinspecto r ar e entitle d t o continue d confidentia l treatmen t b yth e agenc y provide d tha t th e sourc e ha s tol d th e agenc ywhic h dat a ar e commercia l secrets
. Eve n i n a n unannounce d inspectio n o n th e ground , compan

ypersonne l can promptl yidentif yfo r the inspecto r thos e processe s o r circumstance s requiring confidentia l treatment
. Bu t an overfligh t afford s th e compan yn o opportunit ya t al l t o protec t confidentia l trad e practice s befor e theyar e recorde d b y th e airborn e inspectors

. I n ligh t o f th e cour t decisio n i n thi s case , agencie s hav e curtaile d thei r already-limite d us e o f overflight s fo r complianc e monitoring

. D
. Ne wDirection s i n Complianc e Monitorin g Amon g th e mos t importan t an d interesting development s i n complianc e monitorin g i n th e U.S
. ar e th e mor e widesprea d relianc e o n sourc e self-monitorin g an d reporting , an

d th e mor e sophisticate d us e o f inspectio n targetin g practice s t o allocat e limite d inspectio n resource s moa t effectively

. Bot h o f thes e development s hav e alread ybeandiscussed

. Bu t thre e othe r recen t development s i n monitorin g polic

y an d practic e ar e worth yo f not e her e befor e turnin g t o a discussio n o f enforcemen t procedures : th e us e o f paramete r monitorin g i n lie u o f emissio n o r discharg e monitoring , ne wrequirement s fo r third-part ycertificatio n o f compliance , an d wide r us e o f privat e environmenta l audit s a t regulate d facilities

. 1
. Paramete r Monitorin g Ai r pollutio n emission s and , t o a lesse r extent , wate r pollutio n discharge s hav e bee n costl yan d difficul t t o measur e continuously

. Mos t rule s requir e periodi c sampling an d laborator

y analysi s t o determin e th e rat e a t whic h pollutant s ar e emitted — bu t thos e sample s represen t condition s onl ya t th e tim e the sampl eP.4 0
111-1 7

i s taken
. I t require s a lea p o f fait h fo r the agenc yt o r;eoresen t t o th e publi c tha t th e result s o f on e dail ysampl e accuratel y portra yth e overal l pollutio n rat e fo r a facilit yoperating aroun d th e clock
. Th e sampl e i s eve n les s likel yt o be representativ e i f take n onl ywhe n contro l equipmen t i s firs t installed , o r onl y whe n an annua l announce d inspectio n i s conducted , sinc e the contro l equipmen t i s likel yt o be operating les s effectivel yove r tim e withou t regula r maintenance

. I n orde r t o ensur e continuou s compliance , i t i s necessary fo r sourc e personne l themselve s t o hav e continuou s reading s o f equipmen t performance
. Ye t eve n afte r a decad e an d a hal f o f environmenta l regulation , continuou s monitorin g technolog yi s stil l expensiv e an

d i n some instance s unreliable

. S o a fe waqencie s hav e begun t o requir e continuou s monitorin g o f certai n surrogate s fo r pollutio n emissions , rathe r tha n th e emission s themselves
. Tha t is , some o f th e operating parameter s o f pollutio n contro l equipmen t can indicat e howwel l th e control s ar e operating

. I f th e agenc yi s convince d tha t th e equipmen t i s designe d an d installe d correctly , the n i t can b e assure d tha t output-rat e standard s ar e being me t s o lon g a s othe r parameter s indicat e tha t th e control s ar e operating correctl yan d continuously

. Example s o f suc h operating parameter s fo r ai r pollutio n contro l equipmen t are : lin e voltag e an d electrica l curren t drawn , blowe r speed , chambe r temperatur e an d pressure , gros s ga s velocit y o r flu x acros s a calibrate d surface , an d fue l inpu t rate
. Thes e parameter s ar e generall yinexpensiv e t o monitor , an d th e instrument s require d ar e als o quit e reliabl e onc e eithe r th e paramete r level s ar e properl ycalibrate d t o emission s performanc e a t th e particula r facilit yo r range s ar e use d a s screening techniques

. Take n togethe r wit h periodi c emission s sampling an d analysis , an

d equipmen t inspection , continuou s paramete r monitorin g i s proving t o b e a cost-effectiv e wa yfo r source s an

d agencie s alik e t o assur e themselve s tha t control s ar e in fac t operating correctl y an d continuously

. 2
. Certificatio n On e wayfo r agenc yinspector s t o monito r fo r complianc e i s t o se e whethe r anothe r kin d o f inspecto r wit h a simila r objectiv e ha s alread

ydon e th e job

. Wher e th e third-part yinspecto r ha s technica l proficienc yan d reliabl e incentive s o f hi s ow n t o certif yi n trut h tha t a sourc e facilit ymeet s a give n technology , emission , o r practic e standard , th e environmenta l agenc ymayno t wan t t o duplicat e tha t effort
. TodayU.S
. agencie s d o no t accep t certificate s o f complianc e i n lie u o f on-sit e inspection s o r dat a review s bu t hav e considere d relying o n the m t o a greate r exten t i n some circumstances : contro l equipmen t installatio n (relyin g o n certificatio n b

yregistere d professiona l engineers) , equipmen t performanc e (relying o n manufacture r warrantie s enforceabl e b y eithe r sourc e o r agency) , analysi s o f sample d effluen t (relyin g o n certificatio n b

yindependen t tes t laboratories) , an d overal l managemen t practice s (relyin g o n inspection s b yagent s fo r insuranc e companie s writin g environmenta l liabilit ycoverage)
. I n thes eP.4 1

T T 1-1 8

circumstances , th e rol e o f th e agenc ycomplianc e monitoring , progra mwoul d shif t fro

m sourc e monitorin g t o auditing th e . . third-part yorganizations , thereb ymultiplyin g th e effectivenes s o f the agenc ystaff
. 3
. Environmenta l Auditin g No t onl y'third*-part yorganizations , bu t source s themselve s ar e finding incentive s t o double-chec k an d ensur e tha t environmentall y soun d practice s hav e bee n implemente d i n thei r ow n facilities

. I n additio n t o th e forc e o f environmenta l law s man yfirm s hav e discovere d tha t valuabl e material s an d energ yca n b e recovere d fro mwast e stream s an d reuse d o r resold
. Othe r firm s hav e foun d tha t growin g tor t liabilit yfo r damage s fro mtoxi c o r hazardou s chemica l exposure s justifie s greate r interna l testin g an d control
. An d large r firm s whos e stoc k i s hel d b yth e genera l publi c hav e recentl ybee n require d b ysecuritie s regulator s t o full yan d correctl yasses s an d disclos e th e dolla r valu e o f thei r potentia l environmenta l liability , including prospectiv e complianc e costs ; thi s securitie s rul e alon e ha s led hundred s o f U.S
. firm s t o look mor e carefull ythan eve r befor e a t th e qualit yo f thei r interna l complianc e staf f an d programs . A s U.S
. executive s hav e foun d othe r goo d busines s reason s t o examin e th e effectivenes s o f thei r environmenta l performance , - theyhav e begun t o performo r sponso r privat e environmenta l audits — tha t is , independen t examination s an d verification s tha t existin g compan ycomplianc e assuranc e program s ar e i n fac t working

. Eac h tim e a sourc e manage r undertake s suc h a n independen t review , h e o r sh e coul d potentiall yeliminat e th e nee d fo r frequen t governmen t inspection

. Toda yU.S
. agencie s ar e experimentin g wit h way s t o encourag e source s t o perform thes e audits

. I n a paralle l development , a s mentione d above , th e federa l TSCAprogra mha s require d audit s i n lie u o f penaltie s i n case s o f noncomplianc e wit h PC B regulations

. A s a n alternativ e t o penalties , a require d audi t i s a metho d fo r increasing th e knowledg e an d capacit yo f a give n compan yt o achiev e complianc e an d th e Agenc yt o monito r complianc e i n th e future
. Environmenta l audit s als o giv e th e agenc ygreate r assuranc e tha t futur e self-monitorin g report s ar e accurat e an d complete
. Auditing , certification , an d continuou s paramete r monitorin g initiative a eachpromise s t o bring greate r assuranc e t o th e U.S
. publi c that r it s growin g environmenta l concern s ar e being me t mor e effectivel yan

d a t lowe r cos t b

yregulatoryagencie s withou t havin g t o raaor t t o large r an d mor e intrusiv e governmen t inspectio n programs .P.4 2

IV- 1

IV . COMPLIANCE INCENTIVE S AN D ENFORCEMEN

T PROCEDURE S
Withi nth

e Unite d State s literally

hundred s of thousand s o f facilitie s ar e subjec t t o th e environmenta l law s an d regulation s administere db y bothth

e U.S . Environmenta l Protectio

nAgency

(EPA ) an

d"approved " states . Majo r faci litie s ar e likely

t o b e subjec t t o regulation s and/or permit s unde r severa l statutes , eac himposin

g a large number of individua l requirements . Whil e al l facilitie s ar e require d t o compl y

withal l applicabl e environmenta l regulations , it i s impossibl e t o enforc e complianc e of ever y facilit

y withever

y requirement . The U.S . progra

m i s generall y

base dupo nth e premis e that a credibl e enforcemen t progra m withtoug

hlega l sanction s deter s th

e regulate

dcommunit

y a t large fro

m fallin g int o non-compliance , i.e. , that enforcemen t action s at selecte d individua l violatin g facilitie s provide a nincentiv

e fo r "voluntary " complianc e effort s b y th e larger communit

y o f • ? regulate

d sources . A

consisten t enforcemen t respons e als o provide s a

nelement of fairnes s t o th e regulator

y proces s that woul d b e missin

g i f thos e wh

o faile dt o comply

benefi t a

t th e expens e o f thos e wh o do , o r i f regulatee s ar e treate dver y differently . Despit e th e underlyin

g relianc e upo

na neffectiv

e enforcemen t deterren t t o non-compliance , th e ful l range of complianc e incentive s an denforcemen t procedure s hav e bee n establishe

d t o change or influenc e th e behavior o f th

e regulate

d community . A t on e en d o f th

e spectru

m ar e action s aime

d a t promotin

g compliance , suc

ha s providin

g technica l assistance . A t th e othe r en

d of th

e spectru

m are enforcemen t responses , suc ha s economi c penaltie s an d civi l o

r crimina l judicia l actions . Usin

g thi s range of tools , EPA' s challenge ha s bee nt o devis e strategie s whichreflec t th e appropriat e balanc e i

nbothfosterin

g "voluntary " effort s b y th e regulate

d community

t o achiev

e complianc e an

d takin g enforcemen t action s agains t individua l source s whic hfai l to comply . Thi s chapte r i s divide dint o thre e parts :
o Complianc e Motivation : A brie f discussio

no f th e theoretica l basis , botheconomi c an dsocial , fo

r th e range o f officia l response s use dt o achiev

e an d maintai ncompliance ;
o Complianc e Promotion : The action s take nb y EP A an d th e State s to educat e th e regulate

dcommunit

y about regulator

y requirements , an

dt o encourage companie s t o develo pinterna l program s t o ensur e compliance ; an

dP.4 3

IV- 2

o Enforcemen t Response : Th e tool s an

d procedure s availabl e t o EP

A t o ensur e that violation s an d resultin

g problem

s ar e promptl y

correcte

d an d t o dete r simila r non-complianc e i nth e future . A . Complianc e Motivation : Theoretica l Consideration s The action s take

nb y EP A an dth e State s t o promot e an d enforc e complianc e withenvironmenta l law s are mos t effec tiv e whenthe

y ar e consisten t with , an d supportiv

e of , th

e interna l factor s whichmotivat e compliance . A nincreasingl y sophisticated understandin g o f wha t motivate s regulate d entitie s t o compl y could , therefore , potentiall y lea d t o bette r targeted , mor e effectiv e us e of resource s t o induc e compliance . Traditionally , EPA' s operatin g assumptio

nha s bee

nan d continue s t o b

e tha t companie s comply wit hregulation s primaril y becaus e o f th

e threa t of enforcemen t tha t impose s lega l and/or economi c sanction . Thi s assumptio nonly partl y explain s sourc e behavior , sinc e it' s clea r tha t not al l violation s ca n b e detected or resul t i ngovernment-imposed ' sanctions . Economist s hav

e theorize

dthat withou t sufficien t economi c sanction s to make complianc e les s costly tha nnon-compliance , firm s woul d not comply . Economi c theor y i s th e basi s fo

r th e recentl y

issue d "Unifor

m Penalty

Policy " whichestablishe s th e principl e tha t a fai r an deffectiv

e enforcemen t progra m mus t bothrecou

p th e economi c benefi t fro m non-complianc e an d impos e a

nadditiona l penalty base dupo nth e gravity

o f th e har m create d b y th e violation . Nevertheless , th e amount an d applicatio

no f penaltie s are not likely to hav e bee nsufficien t t o hav e significantl y

affecte

d busines s economic s or complianc e behavio r t o th

e extent evidence

db y current level s of compliance . I f one assume s a rationa l decision-makin g mode l fo

r th e individual s ina fir m (an d thereb

y for th e fir m a s a whole) , th e degre e o f complianc e achieve dwoul d depen

d o nth e benefit s perceived relativ

e t o th e benefit s o f partia l or tota l non compliance . I norde r t o evaluat e thes e incentive s fo r an d barrier s t o achievin g compliance , it i s important to recogniz e tha t companie s ar e not motivatedt o comply or not comply , peopl e ara

v Thus , a ful l examinatio nof complianc e motiva tio nwou£ & addres s not onl y wha t th

e motivatio

nfactor s are , bu t als o who thos e factor s ten dt o motivate . Withi nan

y corporat e structure , a range o f peopl e ma y b e involve

d i nmanagin

g compliance , fro

m th e chie f executiv

e office r t o th

e wast e treatmen t plant operator . Senio r managemen t theoreticall y

woul d b

e mos t concerne

d withlowe r profit s or lessene d competitiv

e positio

nbecaus e of increase dcost s o

r poor publi c image . Plant manager s primaril y woul db

e concerne

d withkeepin

g productio

nlevel s u

p whil e dealin

g withth

e adde d complexity

o f environmenta l pollutio ncontrols , monitoring , reporting , etc . Worker s would , perhaps , b e concerne

d about th e additiona l workloa d superimpose

d o na nalread

y bus yP.4 4

IV- 3

an d stressfu l schedul e o r ho wthei r performanc e i s assesse d i f environmenta l complianc e i s a factor
. Unde r thi s model , th e immediat e consequence s o f environmenta l regulation s ar e likel yt o be viewe d differentl yan d perhap s negativel y a t al l level s o f th e firm

. Thi s to o doe s no t adequatel y explai n th e hig

h level s o f complianc e wit h man yenvironmenta l requirements

. Th e onl yexplanatio n remaining fo r th e degre e t o whic h hig h level s o f complianc e ar e achieve d woul d depend , then , o n th e existenc e o f opposing natura l o r externally-impose d incentive s whic h counterbalanc e th e negativ e motivations

. Natura l motivatin g force s aris e ou t o f thre e bases : moral , short-run economic , an d long-run economic

. Mora l motivation , simply , i s base d o n a fundamenta l sens e o f socia l responsibilit y t o obe yth e laws
. Additiona l mora l motivatio n mayaris e ou t o f high environmenta l protectio n value s o r attentio n t o socia l regulatio n an

d norm s hel d b

yke yindividual s i n th e firm

. Thos e wh o respon

d t o mora l an

d socia l motivation s migh t b e influence d b

ya limite d numbe r o f visibl e enforcemen t action s agains t other s o r publi c sentimen t a s a signa l o f newsocieta l norm s o f behavio r supporte d b ya "fair " systemtha t punishe s thos e wh o fai l t o comply
. Short-run economi c factor s ar e thos e immediat e positiv e outcome s tha t reduc e advers e cos t o r productivit yimpacts

. On e exampl e woul d b e reduce d insuranc e premium s availabl e t o firm s wit h excellen t complianc e records , a facto r whic h doe s no t nowoccu r wit h an ysignificanc e i n practice

. Anothe r exampl e migh t b e reduce d rawmaterial s cost s becaus e o f wast e reductio n an d recycling whic h ar e realize d i n practice , bu t onl yt o a verylimite d extent
. Anumbe r o f firm s have , however , pursue d an d publicize d thei r program s t o "mak e pollutio n pay. " Long-run economi c benefit s woul d includ e th e avoidanc e o f futur e liabilitie s through tor t o r environmenta l damage / clean-u p actions

. Th e avoidanc e o f ba d publicit ytha t coul d adversel yimpac t a company' s sale s o r stoc k price s i s anothe r example . Thi s i s a growin g concer n t o firm s wit h potentiall ycostl yhazardou s wast e responsibilitie s unde r th e "Superfund " statutes
. I n th a vie wo f th e author , th e mos t logica l plac e t o star t i n explainin g wha t influence s complianc e i s wit h the natura l motivatin g forces
. I f th e combinatio n o f thes e natura l motivatin g force s i s insufficien t t o overcom e th e apparen t disincentive s o f compliance , additiona l measure s mus t b e imposed

. Suc h measure s can b e complianc e promoting o r punitive

—deterrent
. Complianc e promotio n can reduc e th e degre e o f disincentive s through , fo r example , researc h an d developmen t o r technica lP.4 5 IV- 4

assistanc e activitie s to discove r cheape r mean s of compliance , or technica l assistanc e an dtrainin

g t o reduc e impact s o n productivity . Finally , mor e deterren t or punitiv e approache s ma

y hav e t o b e applied . Economi c sanction s ca ndirectl y

offse t th e monetar

y saving s o f non-complianc e an d actuall y

impos e monetar y costs . Publicizin g companies ' non-complianc e record s increase s th e potentia l negativ e long-ru

nimpac t o nstock price s or consume r acceptance . O nth e othe r hand , publicizin

g dat a for companie s withexcellen t record s woul d b

e a nincentive . Therefore , ke

y t o a successfu l an d efficien t complianc e promotio

nan d enforcemen t progra m i s matchin

g enforcemen t approache s t o th

e ful l rang e o f motivatin g factor s tha t ma

y b e a t wor k for individual s an dal l level s withi nregulate d entities . Jus t a s society ha s not ye t developeda predictiv e mode l o f huma

nbehavior , i t i s to o simplisti c t o assume , for example , tha t penaltie s alone woul db e sufficien t t o achiev e complianc e giventha t the y ma y reac honl y senio r personne l wh o ar e primaril y

concernedwithth e overal l economi c dynamic s o f a company . Neithe r ar e crimina l sanction s an df ba d publicity

sufficien t eve

nthoug hthe y ca nprovide eve

n mor e o f a

nincentiv

e tha npenaltie s wher e the y ar e appropriate . Management' s bes t intention s g o for naught i f a maintenanc e worke r forget s t o clos e a critica l valv e o na wast e storag e tank . Similarly , w e cannot.assum

e that trainin

g program

s an d technica l assistanc e woul db e effectiv

e onl y a t th e workin g leve l a s thes e program s ca nrais e th

e consciousnes s o f an d invok e ne w managemen t system s fro m senio r management . Complianc e depend s o nth e involvemen t an

dcommitment of al l th e parties . Determinin

g ho w bes t t o brin

g about complianc e i s a comple xan d continuall y

evolvin

g process . Not onl y mus t th e mi xo f progra

m approache s addres s a range of motivations , bu t th e effectivenes s o f complianc e approache s shift s ove r tim e a s a progra

m matures . I

nth e earl y stages , complianc e promotion—informin g th e regulatedcommunity o f wha t i s expected—i s mor e important , particularl y durin g th e perio d leadin

g u p t o an d followin

g issuanc e o f a regulatio n o r standard an

d befor e th

e complianc e deadline i s reached . Depending ; upo

nth e degre e o f socia l suppor t fo r th e progra

m an d th e acceptanc e o f th e anticipatedtechnica l solution s t o pollutionproblems , enforcemen t or coerciv e approache s ca npla y a mor e o r les s centra l rol e i nth e proces s of gainin g widespread complianc e an d acceptanc e of ne w practice s an d behaviors . Enforcemen t alway s remain s centra l t o addressin g th e recalcitran t source s whichdo not respon d t o les s forcefu l approaches .P.4 6

IV- 5

B
. Complianc e Promotio n Despit e the responsibilit yo f regulate d source s t o know wha t i s require d o f the man d t o tak e step s necessaryt o ensur e compliance , EP

Aha s recognize d tha t step s mus t b e take n t o foste r an

d .promot e complianc e b ythe regulate d communit ya s a whole
. I n th e past , suc h effort s hav e neithe r bee n extensiv e no r hav e theyformall ybee n viewe d a s being an essentia l par t o f th e "complianc e an d enforcement " program . Instead , the y hav e bee n viewe d a s th e fina l stag e o f regulatio n development ; an d sometime s thes e action s hav e bee n neglected
. Increasingl y ther e i s greate r emphasi s place d o n th e importanc e o f earl y an d successfu l complianc e promotio n activities

. Th e specifi c action s use d t o promot e complianc e rang e fro minforming th e regulate d communit yo f it s responsibilities , t o providin g technica l informatio n t o th e regulate d communit y o n complianc e techniques , t o encouragin g voluntaryeffort s t o achieve , maintain , an d monito r compliance

. T o assur e tha t member s o f th e regulate d communit yunderstand whic h regulatoryrequirement s the ymus t compl ywit h an d what ^ thos e requirement s mean , require s in th e firs t instance , th e issuanc e o f easil yunderstoo d regulations , policies , standards , an d interpretations

. Moreover , ther e i s a continuing nee d fo r communicatio n eve n afte r a regulatio n ha s bee n in plac e sinc e polic ytend s t o evolv e an d ne wregulation s ar e ofte n added
. Educationa l effort s mayb e necessaryt o ensur e eve n a minimu m understandin g b

ythe regulate d communit ywher e comple x regulation s ar e involved

. Severa l mechanism s use d b yEP At o kee p th e regulate d communit y informe d ar e describe d below
. 1
. Cooperatio n wit h Trad e an d Industr

yAssociations : EP A ofte n use s informatio n exchang e accomplishe d b yworking coopera tivel ywit h industryan d trad e associations

. EP Apersonne l regularl ymaintai n contac t wit h trad e an d industr

yassociation s through conferences , seminars , an d othe r publi c meetings

. Suc h activitie s provid e an aren a fo r th e exchang e o f informatio n an d idea s betweenth e regulate d communit yan d th e regulators
. A s examples , EP

Aha s undertake n a cooperativ e surveywit h th e electri c industry' s associatio n t o determin e the degre e t o whic h it s member s us e continuou s emission s monitor s (CEM ) an d t o identif yth e associate d technica l an d administrativ e pro blems
. Thi s surve ywa s followe d b ya n EPA-sponsore d nationa l conferenc e wit h th e association , CE M manufacturers , an d ai r pollutio n contro l agencies

. A s a result , EP Aha s establishe d itsel f a s a clearinghous e fo r CE M informatio n an d a sourc e tha t industrycan us e extensively

.P.4 7

EP A als o ha s workedwithth e Ca nManufacturer s Institut e t o produc e a complianc e handboo k fo r th e ca ncoatin

g industry . Withthi s handbook , ca ncoater s an

dregulator

y official s ca

nbette r understan

dth e proces s o f ca

ncoating , th e variou s complianc e approaches , an dcomplianc e schedules . 2 . Trainin

g an d Technica l Assistance : Educationa l program s ar e use d t o promot e complianc e an di nsom e instance s ar e a

n integra l par t o f progra m operations . Perhap s th e mos t wide sprea

d complianc e promotiontoo l i nthi s are a i s th

e pesticide applicato r trainin g an dcertificatio

nprogra

m unde r th

e Federa l Insecticide , Fungicide , an d Rodenticide Ac t (FIFRA) . Thi s program , conductedb y EP A and/o r th

e State s themselves , ensure s tha t bothprivat e an dcommercia l applicator s not onl y ar e awar e o f pesticide us e requirement s an d ar e generall y

competen t t o appl y pesticides , bu

t als o ar e competen t t o appl y restricted-us e pesticides . I nsom e cases , provision s for educationa l programs ar e embodie d withi nth

e environmenta l statute s or regulations . Like th e educationa l programs conductedunde r FIFR A (de scribed above) , othe r act s provide simila r mechanisms fo r education . For example , th e Toxi c Substance s Contro l Ac t (TSCA ) contain s a provisionrequirin g EP A t o maintai na TSC A Assistanc e Office . Thi s offic e prepare s an ddisseminate s informatio

no nTSC A requirement s t o industr y an d th e genera l publi c an

d respond s t o specifi c question s b y individuals . The TSC A progra m als o ha s establisheda specia l contracto r servic e t o provide direc t assistanc e t o smal l businesse s attemptin

g t o compl y

withpremanufactur e notificatio n requirements . EP A als o ha s established a hotline t o provide informatio n o nth e hazardou s wast e progra m reguirement s t o th e regulate

d community . Thi s hotline answer s 50,00 0 call s annually . Apar t fro

m specifi c medi a progra m effort s an

d Agency

pro grams t o provid e technica l assistance , regional , state , an d count y agencie s hav

e developed programs t o assis t thos e industrie s withi nthei r specifi c area . One noteworth y exampl e i s th e Industria l Assistanc e Progra m initiate

db y Eri e County' s Departmen t o f Environmenta l Plannin g i nNe w Yor k State . A primar y functio

no f thi s progra

m i s t o hel p loca l firm s solv e environmenta l problems tha t impos e technica l or financia l burden s whichthreatenthei r continued operation . Additionally , companie s tha t ar e eithe r startin g a ne w facility

or expandin

g a nexistin

g operationwithi nth e county

ca nge t assistanc e i nlocatin

g th e necessar

y environmenta l resource s neede d t o accommodat e ne

w pollutionsource s i naccordanc e withfedera l an d stat e environmenta l regulations . Finally , EP

A i s sponsorin

g a one-yea r pilo t progra m i n coordinationwit hth e Georgi a Institut e o f Technolog y an d th e Stat e o f Georgia . Th e progra

m consist s o f free , on-sit eP.4 8
IV- 7

technica l assistanc e t o Georgi a industria l firm s t o assTs t i nimprove

d hazardous'wast e managemen t practices . I f it prove s t o b

e a s promisin

g a s it appears , it i s hope dthat thi s or simila r servic e ca nb e adopte

db y man y mor e States , usin g loca l land-grant universitie s o r othe r appropriat e institutions . 3 . Guidanc e Documents : EP A ha s prepare

dnumerou s guidanc e documents , an dtechnica l an

dothe r materia l which assis t th

e regulate

d communit

y i ncomplyin

g wit hth

e variou s environmenta l law

s an d regulations . Man y o f thes e wer e not specificall y

designed for thi s purpos e but deman dfo r the m i s a goo

d indicatio

ntha t th

e nee d i s there . Fo r example , th e ai r program' s industry-specifi c inspectio nguides , whichar e mad e availabl e t o industry , explai nho w t o evaluat e whethe r pollutio

ncontro l equipmen t i s operatin g properly . Othe r program

s hav e comparabl e materials . Th e compendi a o f complianc e policie s an dinterpretation s for eachprogra m ar e availabl e t o th e regulate

dcommunity

a s wel l a s t o Region s an

d States . 4 . Smal l Busines s Ombudsma nProgram : I

nadditio

nt o th e ongoin

g mechanisms describe d abov e t o promot e complianc e * throug hinformin

g th e regulate

dcommunity , tha t EP A ha s undertakenothe r a

d hoc , special-purpos e approaches . One suc h exampl e i s th

e Smal l Busines s Ombudsma nProgra

m whichEP

A launche d in1982 . Unde r thi s program , a nEP A regulator

v liaiso nt o th e smal l busines s communit y ha s bee

ndesignated t o coordinat e th

e Agency' s complianc e assistanc e an d polic y efforts . A

numbe r o f initiative s ar e bein g undertakent o identify

an d evaluat e problem s tha t smal l firm

s ma y b e facin g i ncomplyin

g wit henvironmenta l regulations . Thes e initiative s include surveyin g trad e association s an

d smal l busines s owner s an

d operator s t o understan dwha t smalle r firm s se e a s thei r mos t seriou s complianc e problems ; improvin

g the effectivenes s of EPA' s communicatio nan d coordinatio

nwithsmal l companies ; providin g day-to-da

y complianc e assistanc e t o specifi c firm s vi a a toll-fre e hotline ; an

d maintainin

g regiona l liaiso

nwithsmal l business . 5 . Encouragin

g voluntar

y Compliance : As EP A continue s t o expan

d it * effort s towar dincreasin

g th e effectivenes s o f it s complianc e programs , i t ha s attempte dt o creat e a climat e whlaft encourage s voluntar y effort s o

nth e par t o f regulated entitie s t o monito r themselve s an d ensur e compliance . A s described i

nth e previou s chapter , complianc e inspection s ar e primaril y a complianc e monitorin g tool . Durin g o r followin

g thes e inspections , discussion s of th e requirement s an

d alternativ

e mean s o f complyin g frequentl y occur . Thes e discussion s provide a nimportan

t opportunity for educatin

g th e regulate

d community

o na one-on-one basi s concernin

g specifi c requirement s an d th e nee dto comply .P.4 9
IV- 8

Thi s approac h i s a primaryvehicl e use d b yman yStates' " a-

s par t o f a genera l progra mo f persuasio n whic h thes e State s prefe r t o takin g forma l enforcemen t action

. Severa l environmenta l statute s an d regulation s requir e individua l operatin g facilitie s t o monito r an d repor t o n thei r ow

n compliance

. I n additio n t o providin g a complianc e monitorin g vehicle , suc h requirement s ar e ofte n impose d a s a mean s o f encouragin g voluntarycompliance , sinc e theyensur e ther e i s a mean s fo r facilit yoperator s t o identif yan d correc t problem s promptly
. A s anothe r mean s o f encouragin g voluntarycompliance , EP Aha s bee n promotin g interna l complianc e assurance/environmenta l auditin g program s withi n industryfo r th e pas t tw o years . Environmenta l auditin g i s a systematic , independen t evaluatio n o f activitie s undertake n b ya compan

yt o asses s an

d verif y th e environmenta l performanc e o f it s operatin g facilities

. EP Aconsidere d developin g a mandator yrequiremen t fo r Agency

approve d environmenta l auditin g program s an d als o explore d whethe r a voluntaryincentives-base d approac h mad e sens e through fo r example , reduce d penalties , fewe r inspections , o r reduce d reportin g requirement s fo r firm s voluntaril y developin g EPA-approve d auditin g program s whic h no t onl y identifie d bu t als o correcte d an d prevente d problem s i n a timel ymanner . Becaus e o f lega l an d industryconcern s t o an d anticipate d administrativ e problems , t o dat e EPAha s abandone d plan s t o requir e auditin qo r t o provid e affirmativ e incentive s an

d ha s adopte d a three-pronge d approac h t o promot e environmenta l auditing :

o Endorsement : Actin g a s a clearinghous e o n audit

ing practices , sponsorin g workshop s an d othe r mechanism s t o transfe r auditin g information , showcasin g private-secto r program s t o serv e a s models , an

d workin g wit h intereste d parties

.
o Analysis : Understandin g wha t auditin g i s an d wha t i t ca n do .
o Assistance : Supportin g State s o r industr ygroup s wantin g t o pursu e join t private/publi c environ

aanta l auditin g approaches
. EPAha s conducte d a aarie s o f analyse s designe d t o develo p a nationa l clearinghous e an

d mode l fo r stat e auditin g programs . I n a limite d context , th e Agenc yals o ha s accepte d th e adoptio n b

yindustryo f audi t program s i n exchang e fo r mitigate d penaltie s i n a fe wisolate d "experiments " involving response s t o violations , relatin g t o f-^B s unde r th e Toxi c Substance s Contro l Act
.P.5 0
IV- 9

EP A senior managemen t official s are continuin g to Tc r losely examine environmenta l auditin g fo r potentia l polic

y initiative s t o promot e improve

d compliance . Th

e applicatio

no f environmenta l auditin g t o federa l facilitie s seem s to holdth

e greates t promis e giventhei r specia l obligatio nto ensur e complianc e an d th e mandat e b

y Executiv

e Orde r of th

e President fo

r U.S . EP A t o work ' cooperativel y withthe

m an d prohibitin

g cour t suit s agains t federa l facilitie s (althoug hi t shoul db

e note d that State s ca

nbut are ofte

nreluctant t o pursue forma l enforcemen t action s agains t federa l installations) . 6 . Publi c Pressure : The U.S . EP A ha s use

d publi c pressur e primaril y

to promot e complianc e throug hpubli c disclosur e of asbesto s i

nschool s an

dunsaf e drinkin

g water . I t ha s bee n viewe d a s potentiall y

mos t effectiv

e whenuse

d agains t publi c official s i

na situatio

nwhichwoul d b

e o f concer

nt o th e citizenry . B . Enforcemen t Response s A s note d above , th

e genera l vie

w withi nth

e U.S . hel d b

y th e public , Congress , an d governmen t official s i s that th e mos t effectiv

e wa y to promot e complianc e i s throug ha credibl e enforcemen t program . A credibl e enforcemen t presenc e i s therefore , viewe

d a s th

e prerequisit e t o ensur e that regulated partie s hav

e a nincentiv

e t o pursu

e "voluntary " complianc e efforts . I

nthi s sense , on

e coul d argu

e that complianc e is neve r entirel y

"voluntary. " The man y statute s fo

r whichEP

A i s responsibl e provide a wid e range of enforcemen t response s t o violation s of environ menta l law

s an d regulations . Whil e eac hstatut e ha s somewha t differen t procedure s an dauthorities , the y share certai n characteristics . A t on e en d o f th e enforcemen t spectru m i s a variety

o f informa l response s suc ha s warnin

g letter s an

d phone calls . Beyon d thes e informa l responses , federa l an d stat e agencie s us e civi l an dadministrativ

e lega l remedie s an d sanctions . Recently , withth e growin

g publi c awarenes s of th e proble

m of illega l hazardou s an dtoxi c wast e disposa l activity , an

d th e maturationo f th e olde r environmenta l statutes—suc ha s th e CleanWate r Act— a professional , crimina l investigation s an

d cas e developmen t capability ha s emerge

d a t EP A t o supplemen t th

e civi l enforcemen t programs . Federa l an d stat e program

s diffe r somewha t a s discusse d i nChapte r V . Thi s discussio nwil l focu s o

nEP A authorities . Figur e IV- 1 outline s th e enforcemen t procedure s speci fie d withi nth

e majo r environmenta l statutes . The balanc e of thi s sectio ndescribe s th

e fundamenta l goal s of enforcemen t response , th e typ e of enforcemen t respons e tool s available , an d th e factor s influencin g ho w th e variou s response s ar e selecte dan d used .P.5 1 

### rv-i o
TABL E IV- 1
ENFORCEMEN

T PROVISION S O F MAJO RENVIRONMENTA

L STATUTES : Type s o f Relie f Explicitl y Authorized an

d Form s o f Actio

n

CA A Stationar

y Administrativ

e Enforcemen t Action s Administrativ

e Orde r Authorit y Type :

- Complianc e Schedul e X

- Emergenc

y Orde r X

- Testin

g X

- Monitorin

g X

- Prohibition(i.e. , X Constructiono r Manufacture )

- Labeling , Limi t tion s o nuse . Distribution , etc . Administrativ

e Penalt y

Authorit y

x_[ £ Othe r Sanction s

- Contracto r Listin g X

- Suspensio

no f Permi t

- Limitation s o nFinancia l Assistanc e X Civi l Judicia l Action Injunctiv

e relie f X Penalty/Punitiv

e damage s X Seizur e Emergency

power s X Crimina l Judicia l Action Penalty/Punitiv

e Damage s X Imprisonmen t X CW A TSC A KCR A CERCL

A SDW A F l Mobil e

X X X
X
X

X X

X X X X

X X X

X X

X X X
X
X



# h
X X

X X X X X X X

X X

X X

UAdministrativ

e Penalt y

Authorit y

i s jus t t o recou

p th e economi c benefi t o f nun-compliance . _| £ Althoug

hno t explicitl y

authorized . Sectio n106(a ) o f CERCL

A i s probabl y

sufficientl y

broad t o cove r thes e areas . J___Onl y

administrativel y

impose d penaltie s ca

nb e collected throug h a judicia l action . ! 2

X X X X

X X X

X 

### 1 3 X

X X^52^


### IV-1 1

Goal s o f Enforcemen t Respons e I nchoosin g th e appropriat e respons e t o a nidentified , non-complianc e situation , progra m official s see k t o balanc e severa l goals : o Correctio no f th e violatio na s quickl y a s possibl e i nligh t o f th e applicabl e law , th e technologica l feasibilit y

o f the correctiv e actio nneede dan dthe ongoin g environmenta l ris k presente db y the violation . o Deterrenc e o f futur e violation s b y th e same part y o r b y othe r parties . o Eguitabl e treatmen t o f th e regulate dcommunit y throug hus e o f a unifor m approac ht o selectin g enforcemen t response s (i.e. , simila r violation s ar e treate dsimilarly ; violator s d o no t realiz e economi c gai nb y non-compliance) . o Punishmen t o f serious , willfu l wrongdoin g b y f impositio no f crimina l sanctions . \ : * 

### o Effectiv e us e o f enforcemen t resource s b y usin g th e leas t resource-intensiv e respons e tha t permit s th e othe r nationa l environmenta l goal s t o b e achieve d an dcorrespond s t o th e healt handenvironmenta l risk s involved . Beyondthes e genera l goals , eac henvironmenta l progra m ha s othe r specifi c objectives . Type s o f Response s A broa darra y

o f possibl e enforcemen t response s i s availabl e unde r eac henvironmenta l law . I nmos t cases , environmenta l official s hav e roo m t o exercise judgmen t in determinin g whethe r o r no t t o pursu e a forma l enforcemen t actio ni f a regulate dsourc e i s determine dt o b e ou t o f compliance . Fo r example , EP A ma y decid e no t t o pursu e an enforcemen t actio na s a response t o non-complianc e problem s whic hfai l belo w

threshold s o f severit y tha t ar e establishe d i nAgenc y

guidance . I nalmos t al l case s wher e EP A o r stat e official s discove r a non-complianc e situatio no f any significance , th e responsibl e agenc y doe s pursu e some typ e o f enforcemen t response , traditiona l enforcemen t response s generall y ca nb e categorize dint o five basi c type s o f respons e whic har e describe dbelo w i norde r o f increasin g severity : 1 . "Informal " enforcemen t response ; I nman y instances , program official s us e informa l discussion s wit hsource sP.5 3 IV-1 2

foun d t o b e ou t o f complianc e a s a mean s o f gainin g expe ^ ditiou s compliance

. I n thes e instance s ther e i s a heav y relianc e o n persona l relation s an d goo d fait h i n convincin q source s t o tak e th e necessarystep s t o correc t problem s tha t hav e bee n discovered

. Informa l .notificatio n ca n tak e a numbe r o f forms , severa l o f whic h ar e describe d below : Telephon e Call
. On e o f th e simples t method s o f infor

ma l notificatio n i s a telephon e cal l remindin g th e part y tha t a violatio n ha s occurre d an d tha t actio n i s require d o n hi s part
. Suc h notificatio n ma yinclud e a follow-u p reques t t o repor t o n correctiv e actio n taken
. On-Sit e Visit

. Anothe r metho d i s t o schedul e a n on-sit e visi t i.e. , inspection

. Arepresentativ e o f th e Agenc y inform s th e operato r o f th e probleman d ascertain s whethe r th e situatio n require s mor e forma l action

. Th e advantag e o f thi s metho d i s tha t i t i s ofte n quic k an d veryeffective , thereb yeliminatin g th e resourc e commitmen t require d fo r a mor e forma l response . However , agenc y representative s hav e t o b e carefu l no t t o undermin e th e A principl e tha t th e violato r ha s ultimat e responsibilit y fo r decidin g howt o compl yan d fo r achievin g compliance. f Warnin g Letters
. Warnin g letter s ca n tak e a variet yo f form s an

d ma yb e use d fo r al l type s o f violations

. Generally , warnin g letter s advis e th e violatin g part yo f th e violatio n an

d th e nee d fo r compliance

. The yca n als o advis e th e violatin g part yo f th e potentia l penaltie s whic h coul d b e impose d unde r th e appropriat e environmenta l statute
. Complianc e ma yb e obtaine d mor e easil yi f attentio n i s draw

n t o th e potentia l cost s o f continue d non-compliance

. Finally , thes e letter s can requir e a respons e fro

mth e violating fir mdetailin g th e correctiv e actio n take n t o achiev e compliance

. Warnin g letter s ma yprovid e a n opportunit yfo r th e violatin g part yt o mee t wit h th e Agenc yan d discus s compliance . I f th e fir mfail s o r refuse s t o tak e advantag e o f thi s opportunit ywithi n a reasonabl e time , fo r example , 3 0 days , othe r step s ar e considered

. However" , eve

nafte r commencin g forma l enforcemen t actions , negotiation s ma ycontinue

. Notic e o f Violation

. Notice s ar e mor e forma l than warnin g letter s an

d ar e sometime s specificall ymentione d a s a prerequisit e t o mor e forma l enforcemen t actions

. The y pu t a sourc e o n notic e tha t a violatio n ha s bee n detecte d an d ofte n includ e a tim e withi n whic h a sourc e mus t respond and/o r tak e correctiv e action

. Th e particula r typ e o f informa l notificatio n use d b y th e governmen t enforcemen t branc h take s cos t an d effec

tivenes s int o consideration

. Fo r example , i n som e cases ,P.5 4
IV-1 3

th e quickes t an

d easies t metho

do f informa l notificationT i s th e warnin

g letter , a s on-sit e visit s couldtak e th e bette r part of a da

y an d ma y b e resourc e intensive . Generally , informa l action s are use d fo r lower priorit

y violation s an

d fo r first-tim

e violators . Sinc e th e violator i s not provide

d a forma l opportunity t o refut e th

e charge , failur e t o respon

d t o suc

henforcemen t action s canno t itsel f constitut e a

nindependent violatio nqualifyin

g fo r a mor e seriou s response . Henc e the y ar e not independentl y enforceable . Record s o f suc

hpreviou s informa l enforcemen t action s can , however , be use

d t o suppor t seekin g mor e seriou s penaltie s i nfuture enforcemen t proceedings . 2 . Forma l Administrativ e Enforcemen t Responses : For mor e seriou s or continuin g violations , Agenc y official s a

t th e nationa l leve l ar e usuall y empowere

d withauthority

t o brin g a nadministrativ

e action , thi s authority varie s at th e stat e level . Administrativ e response s ar e formal , lega l action s whic

hresul t i

na norde r fro

m th e Agenc y itsel f fo

r th e violatin

g fir m t o correc t th

e violatio

nand , i

nsom e instances , t o pa

y a civi l penalty

amount commensurat e with th e seriousnes s an

d circumstance s o f th e violation . Th

e lin e betweeninforma l an d forma l enforcemen t respons e i s ofte ndifficul t t o define , a s som e State s cal l a notic e of •'- violatio

nsomethin

g tha t i

neffec t operate s lik e a forma l administrativ

e order . EP

A ha s recentl y

define dth e followin

g characteristic s of a forma l administrativ e actio ni norde r t o introduc e som

e consistenc

y t o th e concept . I t should :
o explicitl y

requir e th

e recipient t o tak

e som e cor rective/remedia l action , or refrai nfro m certai n behavior , to achiev e o r maintai ncompliance ;
o explicitl y

b e base do nth e issuin

g Agency' s deter minatio ntha t a violatio

nha s occurred ;
o require s specifi c correctiv e action , or specify a desire d resul t that ma

y b e accomplishe

dhoweve r th

e recipien t chooses , an dspecify

a timetabl e fo

r completion ;
o perhap s impos e requirement s i nadditio

nt o one s ralatin g directl y

to correctio

n(e.g. , specifi c monitoring , plannin g or reportin

g requirements) ; an d

o contai nrequirement s that are independentl y enforceabl e withou t havin

g t o prov

e th e origina l violatio nan d subject s th

e perso nt o advers e lega l consequence s fo r non-compliance . Becaus e thes e order s impos e lega l sanctio nan d ca naffec t individua l property an dothe r constitutiona l rights , suc h action s at th

e federa l an

d stat e level s ofte nare subjec t t oP.5 5

IV-1 4

Federa l an

d Stat e Administrativ e Procedure s Acts , whic hprovide appeal s procedure s an d opportunitie s fo r hearing s befor e impartia l administrativ e judicia l officers . Ther e are excep tion s however; , fo

r example , AP

A procedure s ar e not applie d t o Administrativ

e Order s (AO ) unde r CA A $113 , CW

A S309 , CERCL

A $106 , an

d virtuall y

al l emergenc

y A O authorities . Man y administrativ

e action s b

y EP A operat e withi nEPA' s interna l administrativ e lega l system , whichi s analogou s t o an y cour t syste

m hearing s ar e presidedove r b y administrativ

e la w judge s (ALJs ) dedicated t o workin g o nEP A matters . Unde r th e Agency' s ConsolidatedRule s o f Practice , an da s require

d b y th e U.S . Administrativ e Procedure s Ac t (APA) , violatin g source s receiv

e a forma l complaint fro m EPA . The respons e t o a complaint mus t b e file d wit ha Regiona l Hearin g Cler k withi n2 0 day s of servic e o f th e complaint . A

t that point a nALJ i s assigne

d t o the cas e an

da hearin

g ma y be hel d eithe r at th

e reques t o f th

e responden t or th e ALJ . Preliminar

y negotiation s ca

nlea d t o settlemen t prio r t o a forma l hearing . I f tha t i s th

e case , th

e AL J mus t agre o withan y consen t agreements . The judicia l office r o f th e Agenc y mus t the

n revie w th e documen t an

dit become s a consent order . I f there i s n o settlement , th

e AL J make s a

nindependent rulin g o n th e "administrativ

e action. " Violatin g firm s ma y furthe r appea l a

nALJ rulin

g t o th e EP A Administrator , an d ultimatel y t o th e U.S . civi l cour t system . Administrativ

e action s are stron g enforcemen t tools ; if a compan y violate s th

e term s o f a nadministrativ

e order , EP

A ma y see k U.S . cour t actio nt o forc e complianc e withth e order . Administrativ e action s hav

e th e potentia l t o b

e challenged i

ncourt , s o conduc t o f suc haction s i s governed b y a nextensiv

e se t o f procedura l rule s designedt o provide due proces s to th

e allege

d violato r an

densur e th

e integrity o f th e system . I nsom e cases , th

e statut e specifie s whe na nadministrativ

e orde r i s t o b

e issue dan d ho w it relate s t o les s forma l administrativ

e responses . For example , Sectio n11 3 o f th

e CleanAi r Ac t state s tha t wheneve r th e Administrato r find s tha t an y perso ni s i nviolatio

no f an y requiremen t o f a

n applicable-implementatio nplan , he shal l notif y th e perso n i nviolationo f th e plan . I f th

e violatio

nextend s beyon

d th e 30t hday

afte r th

e dat e o f notification , th e Administrato r may issue an orde r requirin g suc hperso nt o comply

withth

e requirement s o f th e Act . Generall y

th e mos t expedien t forma l mean s o f achievin g compliance , administrativ e order s ar e use

d heavil y

b y program

s wit hthi s authority . Ther e ar e othe r administrativ e action s whichca

nhav e a substantia l impac t o nsourc e behavior . Thes e othe r mechanisms ar e not frequentl y use dbut are significan t whenthe

y ar e an d include authority t o revoke license s an d permits , t o formall y lis t contractor s a s ineligibl e fo r federa l governmen t contracts , grant s or loans , etc .P.5 6

IV-1 5

3
. Civi l Judicia l Responses ; Civi l response s ar e forma l action s take n i n th e U.S
. Cour t systemb ythe U.S
. Departmen t o f Justic e (DOJ ) a t th e reques t o f EP

Ao r b ythe Stat e Attorney s Genera l a t th e reques t o f a stat e aqency . Judicia l case s ar e typicall yuse d principall yagains t seriou s o r recalcitran t violator s o f environmenta l laws , o r t o seek promp t correctio n o f imminen t hazar d situation s posing an immediat e threa t t o huma n healt h o r th e environment

. Civi l judicia l enforcemen t response s ofte n ca n pursu e penaltie s an d injunctiv e relie f whic h ma ygover n correctiv e actio n o r futur e behavior

. Preparatio n o f thes e case s i s resource-intensive , bot h becaus e o f th e formalize d procedure s require d fo r cour t action s an

d th e involvemen t o f othe r organization s suc h a s th e Departmen t o f Justic e an d Stat e Attorney s Genera l i n preparin g fo r an

d conductin g litigation

. Th e Departmen t o f Justic e an

d Stat e Attorney s Genera l hav e th e discretio n t o bring a nactio n t o cour t o r t o tak e n o action

. The yma yals o hav e authorit yt o tak e actio n independentl ywithou t a referra l froma n environmenta l agency . Bu t a s a practica l matte r thi s doe s no t occur . Similarly , i f DO J decline s a case , EPAmay? • pursu e i t independently

. I n some instances , litigatio n may tak e severa l year s t o complete
. EPAan d stat e counterpart s mus t tak e thes e resourc e demand s int o accoun t i n determinin g whic h violation s ar e mos t appropriat e t o addres s through civi l litigation

. 4
. Crimina l Judicia l Responses : Crimina l enforcemen t i s pursue d whe n punishmen t i s a n appropriat e lega l goal , i.e. , whe n a perso n o r compan yha s knowingl yan d willfull ycommitte d a seriou s violatio n o f th e lawo r ha s fraudulentl yreporte d complianc e o r othe r dat a t o a n agency . Th e majo r environmenta l statute s hav e particula r provision s fo r wha t constitute s a crimina l violatio n a s d o broadl yapplicabl e law s o n crimina l fraud
. Example s includ e instance s wher e an individual : (a ) knowingl yan

d willfull yviolate s th e statute ; (b ) knowingl y make s an

yfals e statements , representation , o r certification ; o r (c ) knowingl yrender s inaccurat e a monitorin g device

. Whil e civi l response s ofte n addres s corporat e wrongdoing , t o correc t th

e environmenta l problem , crimina l response s ofte n see k t o prosecut e th e individua l taking th e illega l actio n throug h fine s o r incarceratio nwhic h secondaril yresult s i n correctiv e action

. Crimina l sanction s ar e sough t fo r suc h action s a s flagran t disregar d fo r environmenta l rule s (e.g. , "midnigh t dumping" ) an

d deliberat e falsificatio n o f document s o r records
. Crimina l case s ar e th e mos t difficul t t o pursue ; theyrequir e specia l investigativ e an d cas e developmen t procedure s a s wel l a s th e highes t standar d o f proof , including proo f o f th e inten t o f th e violato r t o commi t th e prohibite d act
. Proo f i n crimina l case s mus t establis h th e requisit e violatio n "beyon d a reasonabl e doubt " wherea s i n civi l case s i t needP.5 7

IV-1 6

onl y b y a "preponderanc e of th e evidence. " Thi s i s becaus e th e constitutiona l protection s are greates t wher e persona l libertie s ma

y b e significantl y

curtailed , i

nthi s instanc e throug ha jai l term . The proces s fo

r bringin

g crimina l complaint s agains t a facilit y that fail s t o compl y withenvironmenta l law s an d regulation s i s simila r t o civi l judicia l case s i ntha t a referra l i s made b

y EP A t o DO J or Stat e Attorne y Genera l i f a Stat e agenc

y i s involved . I t i s mor e likely her e tha t DO

J might ac t o

nit s ow

nan dexercis e mor e judgment independen t o f EPA' s about whichcase s t o bring . A tria l i s precede

d b y a gran d jur y proceedin

g i nwhicha determinatio ni s mad e a s t o whethe r a

nindictment shoul db e issue dan dth e cas e pursued . Timelines s an

d Choic e o f Appropriat e Enforcemen t Respons e Selectin

g th e appropriat e enforcemen t respons e doe s not necessaril y

requir e startin

g withth

e leas t forma l actio n e.g. , informal ' notification , an d the nproceedin

g throug

h th e othe r options . As discusse dabove , eac

henvironmenta l statut e provide s fo r a narra y o f possibl e enforcemen t responses . Whil e th

e specifi c enforcemen t procedure s var y fro m statut e . t o statute , the

y ca nb e portraye

d i na number o f genera l categories , a s show ninFigur e IV-3 . Thi s figur e shows example s o f som

e of th e generi c activitie s tha t typicall y ma y occur a s EP

A pursue s th

e variou s enforcemen t response s (informal , administrative , civil , criminal) , an di s not intende d t o portra

y a complet e vie

w o f th e enforcemen t process . A s Figur e IV- 3 shows , eac hof th

e forma l response s ca n b e pursue

d eithe r directl y

or a s a resul t of havin g pursue

d a "les s formal " response . For example , i nrespons e t o a specifi c non-complianc e situation , EP A ma y decide t o initi at e administrativ

e actio ninitiall y

(e.g. , forma l complaint) , or ma y do s o afte r havin g pursue

d a serie s o f informa l response s Likewise , whil e EP

A ma y refe r a cas e t o DO J fo r civi l o

r crimina l actio

nimmediatel y

upo ndiscoverin

g a non-complianc e situation , th

e Agency

i s muc hmor e likely

to d o s o onl y afte r a serie s o f administrativ e action s fai l t o achiev e th e appropriat e correctiono f th e situation . Intens * o f timing , informa l an dadministrativ

e action s ar e generall y

les s time-consumin g tha ncivi l or crimina l action . I nth

e past , informa l actio nha s ofte

ngone o

nfo r severa l month s befor e mor e forma l actio ni s taken . I t i s not uncommo

nfo r administrativ

e actio nt o continue fo

r severa l years . Frequently , a non-complyin g sourc e wil l negotiat e an d follo w a serie s o f complianc e schedules , an d fina l correctio

n of th e situatio

nma y tak e severa l years . Thus , eac ho f th e boxe s inFigur e IV- 2 ha s a perio d o f tim

e associate

d withi

t whichvarie s fro

m situatio

nt o situation .P.5 8

IV-1 7

FIGUR E IV- 2
GENERI C FLO

W OF ENFORCEMEN T RESPONS E

» 

### M » Xafotaa l



### • r Initia l Actio n • Telephon e Call s • Uamln g Lette r

- Negotiatio n 

## J , FellewO p Inspectio n

•

•

•

e Non-Coapllanc e * X V Administrativei i

i .,, \ 

# J

* K Civi l

* Forra l Coaplain t " Negotiatio n • A U Hearin g 

# a Consen tAgreeaen t

- ConsentOrder • Appeal s

- Penalty/Schedul e 

## A Pollow-U p Xnapectlo a

•

. ... . V t Settlemen to r Furthe rActio n \ 4 / Crimina l

•

1

f \ r*~

* Depart**

—o f

Justic e Rcft-fr,'.

- Negotiatio n * Cour tCrie r



### .,_,.,

_s f FollowU p Inspectio n



### U Appl : e s rr - -VSri. i •>.-•'

. '• ' • '.-::! ' T«.' i •-s--r - ^P.5 9
IV-I B

I norde r t o introduc e more discipline int o th e enforcement EP A ha s developed , definition s o f what constitute s timel y an d appropriat e actio

nmus t ultimatel y

b e assesse

do na case specifi c basi s EP

A ha s define

dmilestone s i

neac hprogra

n whichwil l serv

e as : (1 ) genera l target s to striv e fo r i n goo d progra

m performance ; (2 ) trigge r point s EP A an dState s shoul d us e t o revie w progres s i

nindividua l cases ; an d (3 ) presumption s that , i f exceeded , EP A ma y tak e direc t enforcemen t actio nafter consideratio nof al l pertinen t factor s an d consultatio

nwit hth

e State . W

e wil l be usin

g thes e milestone s wit hState s an

d Region s t o asses s whethe r case s ar e expeditiousl y progressin

g towar d resolution . The concept s behin

dou r definitio

nof timely

an dappropriat e respons e ar e straightforward . Th e milestone s includ e a poin

t at whichth

e cloc k start s —

whe na violatio

ni s detected . The administerin

g agenc y i s the nexpectedt o tak

e som e actio n i nrespons e t o th

e violatio

nwithi na specifiedperio do f time . Thi s respons e ca nb e a phone call , notic e o f violation , etc . I nth e ai r progra

m thi s i s 4 5 day s fo r majo r source s excep t fo

r hazardou s ai r emission s an dthi s perio

di s 3 0 day s for Wate r (NPDES ) an dhazardou s waste . Th e agenc y i s expecte

d to us e whateve r enforcemen t tool s it deem s appropriat e t

o achiev e compliance , but a t a specifiedpoint i ntime , eithe r th e sourc e wil l hav

e achieve

dcomplianc e o r th e agenc y i s expecte d t o initiat e a forma l enforcemen t action , i.e. , a judicia l referra l o r forma l administrativ e actio nmeetin

g certai ncriteria . For example , thi s tim e perio d i s 12 0 day s i nth e Ai r an

d Wate r (NPDES ) programs . Th e cas e i s the

ntracke

d unti l complianc e i s achieved . Firm , fina l complianc e date s mus t b e specified . Wher e penaltie s ar e require dthi s proces s i s slightl y altered . Dependin

g upo nwha t enforcemen t vehicl e i s require d t o impos e a penalty , a stat e or federa l officia l ma y hav e t o procee d directl y

t o a forma l administrativ e orde r or judicia l referral . Th e timeframe s ar e progra m specifi c an

dwil l b

e adjuste

d t o accommodat e differen t Stat e authoritie s an dprocedures . The timeframe s wil l generall y apply onl y t o significan t non compliance , a t leas t unti l bothEP A an dth e State s hav

e mor e experienc a inusin g the m for managin

g th e enforcemen t programs . Th e choic e o f appropriat e respons e i s to b e define

d b y eac hprogra

m an d applie

do na case-by-cas e basi s takin g uniqu e factor s int o account . Withthre e exceptions , th e for m o f th e enforcemen t respons e i s not viewe db y EP A a s important b

y itself , a s lon

g a s it achieve s th e desire

dcomplianc e results . The exception s generall y fal l int o th

e followin

g three categories : (1 ) I f complianc e ha s not bee nachieve

dwithi na certai n timeframe , th

e enforcemen t respons e shoul dmee t th eP.6 0

IV-1 9
minimu mreguirement s fo r a forma l enforcemen t response ; (2 ) I f EP

Aha s identifie d th e clas s o r cas e a s on e requiring a penalt yo r eguivalen t sanctio n becaus e o f th e nee d t o creat e a strong deterrenc e t o non compliance , onl ycertai n enforcemen t vehicle s can provid e penalties ; o r (3 ) I n limite d circumstance s a judicia l actio n o r sanctio n i s the onl yacceptabl e enforcemen t tool , fo r example , wher e a complianc e schedul e fo r federa l requirement s goe s beyond federa l statutorydeadlines

. Progra mofficial s choos e response s base d o n th e fact s o f th e cas e an

d th e factor s se t ou t above
. Factor s involve d i n choosin g th e appropriat e respons e ar e th e gravit yo f th e violation , th e circumstance s surroundin g it , an d informatio n abou t th e violator

. Gravit yo f th e violation

. Th e gravit yo f th e violation ^ i s determine d b

yassessin g th e actua l o r potentia l har m . t o huma n healt h an

d th e environmen t presente d b yth e violation

. I n th e cas e o f a recordkeeping , reporting , o r dat a submissio n violation , th e gravit yfacto r i s base d on th e exten t t o whic h failur e t o compl yaffect s o r coul d affec t th e Agency' s abilit yt o performit s regulatoryfunction s t o properl yasses s whethe r ther e i s a healt h o r environmenta l risk

. Th e gravit yo f th e violatio n i s linke d t o progra mpriorities ; th e mos t seriou s violation s ar e als o th e highes t priorit yfo r enforcemen t action

. Circumstance s o f th e Violation

. Th e circumstance s o f th e violatio n ca n als o influenc e th e enforcemen t respons e selected
. Fo r example , coul d th e violatio n hav e bee n prevente d o r di d i t occur-becaus e o f circum

stance s beyond th e contro l o f th e violator

. I f th e violato r mad e effort s t o identify , report , an d correc t the violationindependen t o f th e enforcemen t response , thi s ta b coul d influenc e th e typ e o f respons e selected
. Informatio

nRegardin g th e violator

. Certai n informatio n abou t th

e violato r can affec t th e choic e o f response . Thi s informatio n includes , bu t i s no t limite d to , th e violator' s pas t complianc e historyand.th e economi c benefit s th e violato r accrue d a s a result
. Othe r consideration s whic h affec t the choic e o f respons e includ e whethe r ther e i s sufficien t evidenc e t o documen t the violatio n an

d lin k i t t o th e violatin g party , whethe r taking th e actio n i s likel yt o establis h a preceden t tha t i s desirable ,P.6 1

IV-2 0

an d whethe r takin

g a give

nactio ni s importan

t to maintainin

g a credibl e enforcemen t presence . Thes e factors , a s wel l a s a violator' s ability t o pay , ar e als o considere di ndecidin

g whethe r t o pursue civi l penalties , an dfo r wha t amount . Penalties Th e penalty

polic y o f eachenvironmenta l statut e i s intende d t o provide a stron g economi c deterren t t o non-complianc e a s wel l a s provide equity an dincentive s t o thos e who want t o compl y

withenvironmenta l requirements . Th e explici t statutor

y base s for penaltie s ar e summarize di nTabl e IV- 3 an d diffe r fro

m progra m t o program . Penaltie s can b e impose

d i nconjunctio

nwithadministrativ e or civi l or crimina l judicia l enforcemen t actions . Som e majo r programs suc ha s th e Federa l Clea

nWate r Ac t d o no t no w hav e administrativ

e penalt y authority

an dan y penaltie s woul drequir e cour t action . Th

e U.S . EP

A ha s requestedtha t Congres s grant thi s additiona l authority . I ngeneral , th

e penalt y

ma y b e determined o nth e basi s o f a numbe r o f factor s but mus t b e withi na statutor

y maximum . Paymen t o f penaltie s doe s not grant an y right or privileg e t o continue t o operat e i nviolatio

no f th

e la w or t o slo

w dow ncompliance . T o b e effective , violator s mus t not perceiv e penaltie s a s pollutio nfees . Penaltie s bea r a paradoxica l relationshi p t o th e goa l o f swif t compliance . O nth e on e hand , no one like s t o pa y penalties . Consequently , askin g for substantia l penaltie s raise s th e ris k tha t violator s wil l choos e t o litigat e rathe r tha ncooperate . O

nth e othe r hand , failur e t o obtai nlarge enoug hpenaltie s wil l eventuall y lea d t o th

e perceptio

ntha t th

e Agency' s enforcemen t progra m eithe r i s unfai r or lack s resolve . Eithe r perceptionmight resul t i

na lowe r rat e o f compliance . The U.S . EP

A ha s recentl y

issue d a "Unifor

m Civi l Penalty Policy " whichset s fort hth e policy

basi s fo

r assessin

g penaltie s wher e discretioni s available , t o th e agenc y — affectin

g penalt y

amounts , no t whethe r an dunde r wha t circum stance s the

y wil l b e imposed . Unde r thi s policy , ther e are tw o component s o f a penalty . Th e firs t i s a

neconomi c benefi t component s fro

m delayed compliance . Th e EP A intend s t o recou

p th e amoua t save

d b y th e sourc e b

y delayin

g th e implementatio

n o f treafan t technique s o r installatio no f treatmen t equipment . Thes e saving s usuall y aris e fro

m th e opportunity

t o inves t capita l elsewher e an dth e avoidanc e o f operatio nan dmaintenanc e expenses . I f th

e amoun t save

di s les s tha

n$10,000 , the

n thi s par t o f th

e penalty

nee d not b

e calculate

d an dassessed . Th e secon d componen t o f th

e penalty

i s a gravity

component . The gravity

componen t i s designedt o reflec t a rankin g of differen t type s o f violation s accordin g t o th

e seriousnes s o f th e act . I

ncreatin

g that ranking , program s conside r th

eTABL E IV- 3

SUMMAR Y O F PENALTIE S AN D IMPRISONMEN

T PROVISION S (I n Orde ro f

Magnitude )

Civi l Citatio nPenalt y

(Ho t aor e than ) 1 . Saf e Driakla c Hate r Ac t

2 . Supe r funs '

3
. Cles n Hate r Ac t 1414(b ) 1423(b )
10 9
309(e )

3013(e ) $5,000/da y

$5.00D/da y $10,000/da y
$10,00 0 /da y

4
. Toxi c Subatence a Contro l Ac t 5
. Clea n Ai r Ac t

4
. Resourc e Conservatio n an d Recover y Ac t l»(a ) 14 7 20 5 303(b ) 3008(a)(3 ) $2S,000/da y

$25,0O0/da y $10,000/da y $S,000/da y $25,000/day / violatio n $S,000/da y Citatio n
1414(c ) 1423(b)(2 ) 103(c ) 103(d ) 309(c)(1 )
309(c)(2 ) 16(b ) 113(c)(1 )

113(c)(2 ) 3000(d ) 3000(d ) 3008(a ) 3008(g ) 3008(e ) Crimina l Penal * (No t than )
$5.000/<U y $10,000/da y $10,Q00/yea r $20,000/yea r $2,SOO-$2S,0O0/da

y Second violation s $50,000/da y $10,000/da y $2S,000/da y $25,000/4a y Second vlolatlon i $50,000/da y $10,000/da y $S0,000/oa y $2S,000/da y $250,00 0 $250,00 0 $ 1 alllio n aajriaonawi t M * toaaoeeB )

None •on e 1 yea r 1 yea r 1 yea r 2 year a 4 aonth a 1 yea r 1 yea r
2 year s 6 aonth e
1 vea r 2 .ear a 2 year a 5 ear s IIV- 2 2

actua l o r possibl e harm , an d th e importanc e t o the regulatory scheme o f th e violate d requirement

. Quantifiabl e factor s particula r t o th e cas e ar e the n take n int o accoun t including th e amoun t o f pollutant , it s toxicity , sensitivit yo f th e environment , lengt h o f time a violatio n continue s an d th e siz e o f th e violator

. Onc e applie d t o a specifi c cas e adjustmen t factor s can be introduce d i n settlemen t negotiation s o r i n request s t o th e cour t whic h tak e int o accoun t th e source' s culpability , degre e o f cooperation , historyo f non-complianc e an d abilit yt o pay . I n orde r t o promot e fairnes s an d consistency , fo r eac h o f th e above , EPAlawyer s hav e bee n grante d a rang e o f discretio n withi n whic h the yma yadjus t th e penalt yrequested
. EPAwil l generall yno t reques t penaltie s tha t ar e clearl y beyond th e mean s o f th e violator

. Th e reason s fo r inabilit y t o paymus t b e carefull yscrutinized

. Dependin g o n th e fact s an d circumstance s o f eac h case , th e following alternative s mayb e considered :
o See k th e ful l penalt y( a lie n o n th e supplier' s propert yma yals o b e sough t s o tha t a recorde d judgmen t wil l b e had an d recoveryassured) ; o r
o Recommend tha t a tim e paymen t arrangemen t b e mad e ( a lie n mayals o b e sough t here) ; o r
o Conside r non-monetaryalternative s suc h a s publi c servic e activities ; o r
o Recommend tha t th e penalt yb e postpone d o r for

give n i n par t o r ji n toto
. Thi s i s particularl yimportan t wit h respec t t o smal l organization s wher e th e calculate d penalt ymaybe dispropor

tionat e t o th e resource s o f th e violator

. Typically , th e su

mtha t i s actuall yassesse d an d the n collecte d i s substantiall ylowe r than tha t calculate d b yan y fixe d formula
. Thi s i s becaus e withi n settlemen t negotiations , agenc yattorney s balanc e th e cost s an d benefit s o f continuin g adversaria l proceeding s versu s conceding t o th e sourc e a reduce d panalty . Consideration s ofte n includ e th e strengt h o f th e caae , compellin g publi c interes t an d compellin g equities

. Th e UniformCivi l Penalt yPolic yexplicitl yprovide s incentive s t o settl e an

d disincentive s t o litigate

. Reduction s i n th e gravit ycomponen t o f th e penalt ywil l b e mad e fo r settlement s wit h expeditiou s remedie s t o environmenta l problem s and/o r acceptin g additiona l environmenta l cleanu p i n lie u o f penaltie s onl yi f agree d t o i n pre-litigatio n settlement
. B yincreasing th e penalt yamoun t whic h EPApursue s unti l th e violatio n i s corrected , EPAwil l b e discouragin g protracte d litigation

. Sometime s creativ e settlement s wil l appl yo r credi t penalt yP.6 4

IV- 2 3

amount s agains t environmentall y beneficia l action s undertake n b y th e violator . Thi s ca nbe importan t leverag e inexpandin g the environmenta l benefit s fro m anenforcemen t action . Fo r example , som

e consen t decree s hav e include d provision s fo r environmenta l audit s a t al l o f a firm' s facilitie s i nlieuo f penalties . Ultimately , however , i t i s the court s tha t lev y a civi l penalt y

an d thi s to o caninfluenc e the fina l assessment . Rol e o f Negotiations : Forma l enforcemen t proceedings , whethe r administrativ e o r judicial , ar e tim e consumin g an

d costl y t o bot hEPA

and th e violator . Wheneve r possible , EP A seek s t o negotiat e a nequitabl e cour t settlemen t wit hthe violator . Indeed , th e grea t majorit y o f forma l administrativ e and judicia l hearing s reac hnegotiate d settlement s rathe r tha nadjudication . Negotiation s ar e a cost-effectiv e wa y t o addres s violation s a s lon g a s the y resul t i

nanagreemen t whic hachieve s th e enforcemen t goal s describe d above . Becaus e negotiation s ca nb e effectiv e onl y i f the threa t o f litigatio ni s real , EPA strive s t o adher e t o a stric t schedul e fo r the conduc t o f th e negotiation s inparalle l wit hpreparatio nfo r litigation . I f a nacceptabl e agreemen t i s no t reache d withi nth e specifie d tim e period , EP

A wil l begi nlitigation . T o furthe r th e incentiv e fo r companie s t o reac hsettlement , penalt y amount s ma y

be increase d i f the Agenc y i s force d t o resor t t o litigation . - Th e Agenc y

i s currentl y

developin g a decisio nmode l fo r negotiation s unde r th e abandone d hazardou s wast e sit e clean-u p program—Superfund . Thi s mode l show s whe ni t i s cost-effectiv e fo r th e governmen t t o continu e wit ha cour t sui t o r settle . Thes e case s ar e quit e complex , involvin g multipl e parties . I t i s uncertai nwhethe r th e potentia l users , particularl y lawyer s wil l fee l comfortabl e i nusin g the mode l t o achiev e a mor e cost-effectiv e enforcemen t program . Unde r it s "Unifor m Penalt y

Policy, " FP

A wil l pursu e two basi c approache s t o promotin g quic k settlement s whic hinclud e swif t resolutio no f environmenta l problem s withou t underminin g deterrence :
o Provid e Incentive s t o Settle : EP A polic y

wil l be t o provid e specifi c incentive s t o settle , includin g th e following :

- Reducin g the gravit y componen t o f th e penalt y fo r settlement s tha t includ e expeditiou s remedie s t o environmenta l problems . Acceptin g additiona l environmenta l cleanu p i nlie u o f penaltie s onl y i f agree d t o i

n pra-litigatio nsettlement .P.6 5

IV-2 4

o Provid e Disincentive s t o Litigate : Th e penalt y amoun t whic h EP

Apursue s wil l continu e t o ris e unti l th e violatio n i s corrected
. Th e continue d ris e i n penalt yi s systematicall ylinke d t o th e benefit s accruin g t o th e violato r an d t o th e continuin g ris k t o huma n healt h an

d th e environment

. Fo r thi s reason , thi s polic yprovide s strong disincentive s t o litigatin g withou t complying

. 3
. Difference s Amon g Statutes : Eac h o f th e environ

menta l statute s make s provisio n fo r enforcemen t response s t o b e take n t o resolv e non-complianc e situations

. However , th e specifi c natur e o f th e enforcemen t respons e varie s fro m statut e t o statute
. Table s IV-1& 2 summariz e some o f th e enforcemen t procedure s tha t ar e specificall ydescribe d i n variou s environmenta l statutes
. I t i s importan t t o not e tha t wit h th e implementatio n o f eac h statute , some informa l response s ar e use d (e.g. , warnin g letter ) whic h ar e no t specifie d i n th e statutes
. Liste d belo war e som e o f th e ke y way s i n whic h th e statute s differ : Remedies

. Th e variatio n i n th e rang e an d availabilit y o f penaltie s unde r variou s statute s i s broad
. Th e statute s als o varywit h respec t t o whethe r sanction s ma yb e impose d onl yadministrativel yo r onl yjudiciall y o r bot h administrativel yan d judicially

. Also , ther e i s variatio n i n wha t EP Ao r court s can reguir e a'sourc e t o d o (e.g. , cleanup , preven t futur e problems , requir e specifi c controls , o r non e o f th e above)
. Procedura l Prerequisites

. Th e statute s ar e inconsis

ten t wit h respec t t o procedura l prerequisite s an d limit s t o enforcemen t action

. Fo r example , bot h th e proces s t o issu e a n administrativ e orde r an d th e duratio n o f administrativ e order s diffe r fro mstatut e t o statute
. Judicia l Peview

. Th e statute s diffe r wit h respec t t o th e appropriat e foru man d time limitation s fo r chal

leng e t o variou s action

. Federal/Stat e Relationship

. Th e respectiv e role s o f th e stat e an

d federa l government s i n respondin g t o instance s o f non-complianc e varyamong statutes
. Whil e th e specifi c natur e o f th e enforcemen t respons e varie s fro

mstatut e t o statute , th e procedure s fo r enforcin g environmenta l law s an d regulation s continu e t o evolve
. A s note d earlier , on e o f th e ke ygoal s o f th e enforcemen t program i s t o appl ya uniformapproac h t o choosing appro priat e enforcemen t responses . Simila r violation s unde r simila r circumstance s shoul d b e responde d t o i n a comparabl e manner . Thi s i s necessaryt o ensur e fai r an d equitabl eP.6 6

IV- 2 5

treatmen t o f al l member s o f the regulate d community , n o matte r wher e they ar e located , an

d t o provid e certaint y abou t th e consequsnce s o f violatin g th e law . Eac hprogram

ha s develope d it s enforcemen t respons e guidanc e independentl y and , a s a result , ther e ar e varia tion s bot hi napproac hand i nth e degre e t o whic hthey ar e adhere d t o b

y EPA regiona l offices . A s a firs t ste p i n developin g a mor e cohesiv e approach , EPA ha s develope dit s uniform

civi l penalt y

policy . Eac hprogra m wit hcivi l penalt y

authorit y

wil l b e require d to.evaluat e it s existin g polic y agains t the ne w

polic y

an d mak e an

y necessar y

adjust ments . Simila r policie s regardin g selectin g th e appropriat e leve l o f actio neithe r hav e bee no r ar e bein g developed . Oversigh t o f regiona l office s help s eliminat e disparit y amon g region s i ntreatmen t o f simila r violations . Sinc e State s hav e th e lea d i nenforcemen t action s fo r mos t programs , consisten t nationa l polic y fo r EPA

enforcemen t response s wil l brin g complianc e program s onl y par t o f the wa y towar d achievin g a uniform enforcemen t approach . Stat e law s ofte ndo no t contai nadministrativ e penalt y authority , bu t the y

ma y includ e authoritie s no t availabl e t o EPA , suc h a s authorit y

t o revok e o r suspen d license s and permits — whic hcoul d b e a neve nmor e sever e economi c penalty . Presen t attempts , t o develo p anoveral l framewor k tha t matche s th e typ e o f respons e EP A woul d mak e t o a give nviolatio nwit h possibl e stat e response s whic hwoul d b e comparabl e ineffec t ar e discusse d i nChapte r V . Mor e systemati c oversigh t o f stat e program s an d attempt s t o articulat e the circumstance s i nwhic hEP

A woul d interven e ina stat e enforcemen t actio n shoul d smoot hou t thes e relationship s considerably .P.6 7

V . INSTITUTIONA

L CONTEX T
Thi s chapte r examine s thos e institutiona l relationship s tha t mos t heavil y

influenc e th

e succes s o f complianc e monitorin g an d enforcemen t programs i nth e U.S . Th

e firs t sectio

n describe s th

e ver y important partnershi pbetweenth e federa l governmen t an

d it s stat e an

dloca l counterparts . Th e next focuse s o

nrelate

d governmenta l agencie s a t th e federa l an

d stat e leve l tha t affec t th e development , implementation , an d evaluatio

no f complianc e an denforcemen t programs . The thir d sectio nidentifie s severa l institution s withi nth e privat e secto r tha t ca

nhav e a significan t impac t o ncomplianc e an

d enforcemen t programs . Successfu l implementatio nultimatel y depend s o

neffectiv

e workin

g relationship s witheac ho f thes e groups , at al l level s o f governmen t an dwithsevera l privat e institutions , makin g th e tas k al l th

e mor e complex . A . Th e Federal/Stat e Partnershi p The decentralized federa l syste m i s fundamenta l t o virtuall y

al l o f EP

A programs . A s described i nChapter s I an d II , environmenta l statute s usuall y giv e th e federa l governmen t primar

y authority

t o prescrib

e minimu

m pollutio

n standard s fo

r nationa l application . Th e federa l EP

A als o define s wha t constitute s a napprovabl e stat e or loca l program , consisten t withcriteri a specifie d withi nth

e statute . I f a Stat e progra

m meet s thes e criteria , i t i s incumbant upo

nth e EP A t o approv

e tha t program . Thi s sectio ndiscusse s ho

w thi s ver y comple xpartnershi pworks , ho w difference s i

nstat e an

d federa l programs , authoritie s an d procedure s fo

r enforcemen t o f environmenta l statute s affec t ho w th e federa l governmen t ensure s tha t approved stat e programs ar e implemente di na fai r an d consisten t manne r nationwide , an d finally , wha t recours e th

e federa l governmen t ha s t o poo r performanc e b y a state . 1 . Extent o f Delegatio nt o State s Whil*-the exten t o f delegatio ntoda y varie s fro

m progra m t o program? * overal l approximatel y 7 0 percent o f EPA' s day-to da y responaibility

t o inspec t an

d enforc e complianc e ha s bee n delegated t o States . Tabl e V- l illustrate s th e variety

o f delegation s o f regulator y authority

foun dtoda y unde r eac

ho f th e majo r EP

A programs . Althoug hsom e programs , suc

ha s th e Toxi c Substance s Contro l Act , ar e non-delegabl e unde r th e law , evenher e th

e federa l governmen t employs contract-like "cooperativ

e agreements " withStates , recognizin g thei r comparativ

e advantag e o f bein g close r t o th

e problems tha

n th e federa l governmen t ca nbe . As a resul t nearl y 85 % o f th

e governmen t staf f engage di nenvironmenta l regulatio ni nth e U.S . ar e employe

d b y stat e an

dloca l government .TABL E V- l
DELEGATIO

N O F FEDERA

L PROGRAMS

i n o .

. H a ; w w

5 5 « w 01 

## s * w A
. w D O w 

## a M 

## s s « t A

U P O
. « ai M 

# I

1 9 Z
Q « z O



### 8 M 

### 8 §

O
M 

### 2
O O

« 

# 8

z o t o 

### 8 H l i MEST
tt. M H 

### £ H (A H O 

### 8 « W C ) o
u M .- ) P
. 

### ft « C 9 Z M •- I w f O 

### 5 • M

« 

### B O 

## a w H o s o 0
. X M * POTENTIA L FO

RPROGRA

M DELEGATlrJN/APPROVAL T O STATE S Ye s
N o

WHA T I S C

E LEGATED ? "Enforcemen t o f Nationa l Program/Standard s "Enforcemen t o f Acceptabl e Stat e Program/Standard s "only Complianc e Monitorin g

ACTUA L EXTEN T OF U E LEGATIO

N •Numbe r o f State s withFina l o r Interi mDelegatio n 5 0 4 9 4 9 4 5 1 6 3 5 5 2 2 4 2 3 4 8 4 7 aAlthough th e relevan t statut e doe s not provide fo r stat e assumptio

no f th e progra

m throug hdelegatio

n o r approval , EP

Adoe s utiliz e cooperativ e agreenr*"*- ^ »•<"

> inpunvif^ o "*"*"*--«•• • L - - .P.6 9



### V- 3

Unde r approve

d stat e programs , State s routinel y monito r environmenta l quality an dcompliance , set inspectio ntargets , develo p statewide strategies , enforc e agains t violator s an d verify th e quality

o f monitorin

g an dcomplianc e data . Ther e ar e a fe

w case s —

suc ha s th e ai r progra

m — i nwhichth

e federa l governmen t delegate s directl y t o loca l government s but i nmos t instance s th e federa l governmen t work s throug h th e States . Unti l a progra

m are a ha s bee

ndelegated t o a givenState , th e federa l governmen t i s responsibl e fo r al l th

e standard settin g an d enforcemen t function s outline di nChapter s II , III , an d IV . Thi s i s a

nenormou s task , an dEP A work s closel y withState s t

o buil d thei r capacity to ru nthei r ow

nprograms . EP A use s it s grant program s t o provide federa l fundin g fo r staf f an

d equipment . Figur e V- 2 illustrate s th e importanc e o f th e stat e rol e i

nenforcemen t an

d compliance . State s perfor m th e vas t majorit y

of inspection s an dhav e withi nthei r jurisdictio n a large percentag e o f th e majo r pollutio

nsources . SUr i MXI » SUMMNTM

L

m omatu o m m

MAI M omen (**« >

2 . Criteri a for Delegation ; Comparability o f Stat e an

d Federa l Programs " One ke y issu e tha t wil l strongl y affec t th

e succes s of nationa l complianc e an denforcemen t program s i s th e extent to whichState s mus t hav e comparabl e authority , an dprocedures , t o thos e o f th

e federa l government . Generally , EP A delegate s o r approve s stat e or loca l regulator y program

s onl y whe ni t ha s foun

d tha t th

e stat e progra

m meet s certai nminimu m standard s an

d criteria . The philosoph y o f delegatio

nvarie s fro m statut e t o statute , bu t i ngeneral , stat e program s mus t b e comparabl e at leas t i neffect .P.7 0

V- 4

Th e bigges t differenc e betwee nstat e an

dfedera l authoritie s i

nenforcemen t i s ofte ni nth e authorizatio

nfo r an d eas e o f establishin g economi c fine s an dpenalties . I

n th e air , wate r (NPDES ) an dhazardou s wast e programs , dele gation s an

d approval s hav

e not depende

dupo nstate s havin

g comparabl e civi l penalty authority . Thi s requirement ma y b e introduce

d a t a late r dat e becaus e th e economi c sanctio

nha s take no nsuc himportanc e i

ngainin

g highe r level s o

f complianc e i nth e hazardou s wast e program . 3 . Continuin

g Federa l Rol e Afte r delegation , EP A neve r abdicate s it s responsibility t o ensur e complianc e withan d enforcemen t o f federa l statutes . I t remain s responsibl e i nla w an d accountabl e t o th e Congres s for progres s towar

d meetin

g nationa l environmenta l standards , an d fo r ensurin

g that federa l statute s an dregulation s are bein g enforced . To carr y ou t thi s responsibility , EP A over see s stat e progra

m implementatio

nan d take s direc t enforcemen t actio ngenerall y

whe na Stat e fail s t o tak e timely

an d appro priat e enforcemen t action . The dua l rol e of oversight an d direc t federa l enforcemen t ca nb e highl y

sensitiv

e a s state s : . generall y

believ e the y are doin

g a goo d jo bo f enforcin

g th e la w an d wha t constitute s a nappropriat e enforcemen t respons e ha s bee na highly

subjectiv

e determination . Implementin

g th e federal/stat e partnershi pi na manne r tha t make s th

e mos t productiv

e us e of th

e limite

dresource s o f eac hleve l o f governmen t an dcontinue s t o achiev e improve ment s i

nth e effectivenes s o f eac hha s bee

na continuin

g challenge . Th

e federa l EP

A ha s interprete

d th e partnershi p differentl y

a t variou s time s i

nit s history , sometime s takin g a heav y direc t federa l role , sometime s indicatin g that delegatio

n shoul d impl

y generall y

oversight , withdirec t federa l enforcemen t onl y a s a las t resort . T o stabiliz e thi s partnership , th e U.S . EP A recentl y

establisheda Steerin g Committe e o

nth e State/Federa l Enforcemen t Relationshi pwhichwa s chaire db y th e author , t o establis ha polic y framewor

k fo r implementin

g state/federa l enforcemen t programs . Th e result s hav

e bee n haile d a s a majo r ste

pforwar

db y federa l an

d stat e agencies , althoug hi t mus t b

e evaluatedwhenfully implemented . Th

e policy addresse s bothth e oversigh t functio nan d direc t federa l enforcemen t actions . Arrangement s withstate s wil l b e commemorate

d i nstate-specifi c enforcemen t agreements , t o b e updated annually , developedjointl y b y EP A regiona l office s an d th e relevant stat e agencies .
a . Oversight EP A no w ha s clear oversight criteria , specifie di n advanc e for assessin g goo d progra

m performance , whic happly equall y t o State s o

r EP A regiona l offices , whicheve r i sP.7 1

V- 5 responsibl e fo r administerin g th e program . Seve n oversigh t criteri a appl yt o mos t o f EPA' s enforcemen t programs :
o Clear identificatio n o f an d prioritie s fo r th e regulate d community ; o Clear an

d enforceabl e requirements ; o Accurat e an

d reliabl e complianc e monitoring ; o Hig h o r improving rate s o f continuin g compliance ; o Timel yan

d appropriat e enforcemen t response ; o Accurat e recordkeepin g an d reporting ; an

d o Soun d overal l progra

mmanagement
. Ther e i s a separat e protoco l fo r evaluatin g eac h EP A programan

d fo r th e firs t time , EP Aha s define d wha t constitute s timel yan

d appropriat e enforcemen t response , through specifi c milestone s an

d timeframe s fo r stat e actio n an d definitio n o f circumstance s unde r whic h differen t enforcemen t mechanism s mus t b e use d —se e Chapter s I V an d VI
. Workin g through it s regiona l offices , th e EPAidentifie s specifi c areas ' o f substandar d performanc e a t th e stat e o r loca l level , an

d work s wit h th e State s t o improv e thei r program . Th e polic yframewor k set s fort h thos e remedia l and

follow-u

p action s EP

Aundertake s wit h th e State s t o achiev e - thes e improvements , suc h a s informatio n exchange , technica l ' assistance , additiona l gran t funds , two-waycommunications , etc
. Mos t important , EP Aha s mad e a commitmen t t o identif y strength s an

d successe s a s wel l a s weaknesse s s o tha t goo d goo d program s ca n b e transferre d fro m on e Stat e o r regio n t o th e next
. b
. Direc t Federa l Enforcemen t EP Aha s no westablishe d clea r criteri a fo r whe n an d ho w i t wil l exercis e it s residua l enforcemen t rol e i n a manne r whic h wil l no t undermin e Stat e programs . Tha t rol e i s circumscribe d i n tw o ways . First , EP Awil l onl yconside r takin g actio n i f on e o r mor e o f th e following criteri a ar e met :

o Ait^aarlie

r EPAorde r o r consen t decre e i s violated ; o A atat o request s federa l action ; o TfiaVcao

e ha s nationa l significance , e.g. , th e non complianc e i s considere d t o b e significant , an d th e caa a comport s wit h nationa l o r regiona l priorities ; o The cas e woul d se t lega l precedent ; o Th e cas e raise s interstat e issues ; o Ther e i s significan t environmenta l o r publi c healt h damag e o r ris k involved ; o Ther e i s significan t economi c benefi t gaine d b yth e violator ; o Th e cas e involve s a repea t violator ; o r o Stat e authorit yi s inadequate

.P.7 2



### V- 6

Next , EP

A wil l conside r whethe r th e Stat e i s takin

g timel y an d appropriat e actio no nit s own . Ther e i s a genera l presumptio

ntha t a delegatedStat e ha s primar y responsibility for ensurin

g compliance . However , violation s o f a prio r EP A order , lega l precedent , or repea t violator s ar e considere d t o warran t an independen t federa l action , regardles s o f whethe r th e Stat e i s takin

g action . S o a s not t o upse t th e delicat e balanc e betweenimmediat e enforcemen t heed s an d th e long-ter

m relationshi p withth e States , EP

A ha s adopteda policy o f no-surprise s an dwil l giv e advanc e notic e an dconsul t withth

e State s befor e it take s an

y actio ni na delegated Stat e fro m inspectio

nt o enforcemen t response . Consultatio nshoul d affor

dth e agencie s a nopportunity

t o explor e creativ e an dconstructiv

e option s b y whichth

e federa l actio

nca ncomplemen t o r improv e th e stat e program , rathe r tha nappea r a s a publi c rebuke fo r failur e t o protec t th e publi c interest . Th e technique s EP

A wil l us e includ

e joint enforcemen t actions , pres s release s an d a sharin

g o f penalties , ensurin g t o th e exten t possibl e tha t a shar e goe s t o buildin g th e stat e program . The bigges t area o f conflic t remain s th e differin

g stat e an d federa l views o

nth e rol e o f economi c penaltie s i ngainin

g complianc e an

d establishin

g nationa l deterrence . EP A ha s mad e a commitmen t t o stud y ho w penaltie s ar e impose di n practice . It i s one thin g t o espous e th

e philosoph

y o f EPA' s Unifor m Civi l Penalty

Polic y that penaltie s shoul d b e use d to eliminat e an

y economi c benefi t fro m non-compliance . However , i t i s widel y

know ntha t penalt y

assessment s ar e ofte nnegotiated t o lowe r level s tha na ninitia l calculationwoul dindicate . The Unifor

m penalt y

policy an d subsequen t guidanc e t o b e issue d next yea r b

y eac hnationa l progra

m attempt s t o introduc e a consisten t philosoph y an d approach . Ho

w muchdiscretio

n State s wil l hav

e i ndeterminin

g penalty

amount s i s a

nimportant question . A

t thi s time , i

nth e absenc e o f clea r guidance , th e federa l governmen t wil l "overflie " a stat e enforcemen t actioni f afte r considerin g al l th

e factor s i

na cas e i t determine s a stat e penalt y i s grossl y

deficient . B . Othe r Governmen t Institution s Affectin g Progra

m Development , Implementatio

nan dEvaluatio

n At tbej&tadera l leve l ther e ar e severa l governmenta l unit s whic hhaffa^ a significan t impac t o ncomplianc e an

denforcemen t progra m deaign , implementatio nan d evaluation . Simila r institution s exis t a t th

e stat e an

dloca l levels . Th e principa l organization s described belo

w ar e th

e legislativ

e functio

n(th e U.S . Congress) ; th e executive functio n(th e Offic e o f Managemen t an dBudget) ; an d th e judicia l functio n(th e Departmen t o f Justice , th e court s an d th e agency' s administrativ e la w system) .P.7 3 V- 7

1
. Legislativ e Function ; Th e U.S, Congres s T Th e U.S
. Congres s probabl yha s the broades t impac t on progra m development
. Congress , a s th e legislativ e branc h o f the federa l government , passe s int o la wth e environmenta l statute s whic h EPAmus t enforce
. Congres s decide s the environmenta l goal s t o b e met , th e typ e o f enforcemen t powe r an d discretio n grante d t o EP Aan d the.leve l o f flexibilit ywit h whic h EP Amayachiev e it s environmenta l goal s an d th e leve l o f fund s th e agenc yha s t o work with

. Congressiona l concern s fo r procedur e t o protec t state s right s an

d individua l propert yright s reflec t a balanc e betwee n efficienc yan

d thes e protections

. Th e balancing ha s bee n differen t fromac t t o ac t an

d progra

mt o progra

ma s note d i n Chapte r IV
. Fo r the mos t part , however , Congres s ha s give n EP Ath e necessary authoritie s t o carryou t an effectiv e enforcemen t effort , an d wher e theyar e inadequate , EPAha s aske d fo r ne wauthority

. Mos t recently , EP

Aaske d fo r an

d receive d deputizatio n o f la w enforcemen t authorit yfromth e U.S
. Marshal l Service , including th e righ t t o issu e subpoenas , serv e searc h warrants , mak e arests , an d carryfirearms

. EP Aha s als o sough t streamline d administrativ e penalt yauthorit yi n th e Clea n Wate r Ac t Amendments
. EP Ai s currentl yconductin g a revie wo f al l o f it s statutoryenforcemen t authoritie s t o determin e wher e theyma ybe ' inadequat e o r inefficien t I n additio n t o actua l legislativ e authority , th e Congres s expresse s it s intentio n fo r th e conduc t o f enforcemen t an d complianc e program s through committe e reports , floo r debates , persona l meeting s an d letters , an

d hearing s requesting information

. Fo r example , th e Hous e Subcommitte e o n Oversigh t an d Investigation s recentl yexpresse d concer n ove r th e lowleve l o f civi l litigatio n referrals
. Th e Subcommitte e requeste d " a detaile d across-the-boar d analysi s an

d explanatio n o f th e reason s fo r th e lowlevel s o f civi l litigatio n referral s ....[including ] an update d assessmen t o f wha t impac t th e curren t organizationa l structur e i s having in th e enforcemen t program. " EP Awa s aske d t o respon d withi n te n days
. Thes e request s hav e a n importan t influenc e o n managemen t o f th e program . Congres s employ s a numbe r o f budgetarycontrol s ove r agenc y operations

. Budgetarycontrol s o n enforcemen t an d complianc e ca n b e very

- specific , appearin g a s lin e item s i n th e agency' s budget
. Pd

r example , during th e transitio n betwee n th e For d an d Carte r Administrations , th e executiv e offic e o f th e Presiden t recommendat f remova l o f 10 0 fiel d inspector s fro mth e wate r enforcemen t program . Congres s responde d b ycreating a budgetary lin e ite mfo r maintainin g th e inspectors

. Th e Genera l Accountin g Offic e (GAO ) i s th e inspectio n ar m o f th e Congress
. AGA O repor t wil l probe.th e operatio n o f a n agency , evaluatin g whethe r th e agenc yha s successfull ydischarge d it s dut yunde r th e statute s an d regulations

. I f an agenc yi s foun d deficient , GA O wil l mak e recommendation s fo r improvement

. Whil e no t binding , GAO recommendation s ofte n ge t seriou s consid

- H

-P.7 4

V- 8
eratio ni nlegislativ

e change s an

d Congressiona l oversigh t hearings . Enforcemen t programs hav e receive

dparticula r scrutiny . GA O recentl y

evaluated th

e Nationa l Pollutant Discharge Eliminatio n Syste m (NPDES ) unde r th

e CleanWate r Ac t an dfoun dthat becaus e selfmonitorin

g informatio

nb y polluter s wa s sometime s incomplet e or absent , EP

A wa s not a s awar e a s it shoul d b e o f complianc e with permi t requirements . Recommendation s wer e made concernin g improve ment s i

nsuc hmonitorin

g data . 2 . Executiv

e Offic e Functiont Offic e o f Managemen t an d Budge t an d Othe r Federa l Agencie s The Offic e o f th

e Presiden t contain s a ver y powerfu l operatio n i nth e Offic e o f Managemen t an d Budge t (OMB ) whichnot only prepare s an d rule s o

nth e budge t an

d resource s o f th

e federa l government , bu t als o reviews regulator y an dlegislativ

e activitie s an

d clear s al l informatio

nrequest s emanatin g fro m federa l agencies . OM B ha s a significan t impac t o ncomplianc e an

d enforcemen t programs i nal l thre e area s o f involvement . As a budge t operation , OM B historicall y

ha s not favore

d federa l governmen t fundin g o f trainin

g programs fo

r state s an

d th e regulated community . As a result , thes e approache s t o achievin

g complianc e hav

e no t receiveda s muchsuppor t a s thi s traditiona l enforcemen t programs o f inspectio nan denforcemen t action . Similarly , OMB' s budge t decision s ca nhav e a grea t impac t wher e th

e programs hav

e com e t o rely

upo nconsultant s t o supplemen t personne l no w unde r stric t hirin g ceilings , an

d t o conduc t inspection s i norde r thes e area s hav e bee nsubjec t t o budge t squeezes . Effectiv

e complianc e an

denforcemen t depend s o nhavin g reliabl e informatio nabou t th

e partie s subjec t t o environmenta l laws an d regulations . Unde r th e Paperwork Reductio nAct , th

e U.S . Congres s established OM B a s th e centra l coordinato r o f federa l informatio

npolicy . The Ac t require s tha t an y agenc y reques t for informatio nfro m te nor mor e non-federa l individual s be submitted t o th e OM B for prio r approval . Request s mus t includ e a supportin

g statemen t an

danalysi s presentin g th e nee d fo r th e information , method s o f ensurin g th e quality

o f th e dat a collected , alternativa a t o th e proposed informatio ncollectio

nan d estimated burde nhour * an

d cos t t o th

e publi c an

dth e agenc y o f complyin

g wit hth

e rmmuest . The Ac t i s intende dt o limi t informatio n request s omt&

y t o essentia l informatio nneed s o f a

nagency . Thes e restriction s affec t EPA' s enforcemen t an dcomplianc e monitoring programs i ntw o ways . First , identificatio no f th e regulated community ha s becom

e mor e difficult . EP A progra m manager s nee

d t o kno

w enoug habou t a regulate d community

i nth e firs t instanc e t o targe t thei r surveys , eve nbefor e initia l dat a request s ar e made . Second , sel f reporte d complianc e dat a fo r us e i ntargetin

g inspection s i s mor e difficul t t o justify an d harde r t o collect . The tendency i s t o us e a

dho c rathe r tha

n standardized informatio nrequest s whichpos e managemen t problem s i ninterpretin

g an d managin

g th e data .P.7 5
V- 9

Finally , OM

B clear s regulator

y action s an

dlegislativ

e proposal s o f federa l agencie s t o ensur e efficiency i ngovernment an d adherenc e t o Administratio npolicy . 3 . Judicia l Function : Department o f Justice , th e Court s an

d th e Administrativ

e Lega l Syste

m The workin

g relationshi pbetweenth e agenc y an dth e governmen t attorney s wh

o ar e actuall y

empowere

dt o brin

g forma l action s i

n municipal , state , or federa l court s i s critica l t o th e effectivenes s o f a nagency

enforcemen t program . Eve nafte r fiftee

nyear s o f environmenta l regulation , sometime s stat e an d loca l regulator

y agencie s canno t ge t enoug hattorne

y tim e an dcooperatio

nfro m th e officia l city

o r stat e attorney' s offic e - or th e Department o f Justic e at th

e federa l leve l —

t o dispos e o f thei r backlog s o f otherwis e goo

d cases . Mos t o f th e time , suc

hbottleneck s are created b

y uncoordinated plannin g an dbudgetin

g betwee

nindependen t departmen t officials . Sometimes , th e attorneys ' offic e delay s ar e a nadditiona l check an dbalanc e o

nenvironmenta l agencie s i n settin g enforcemen t priorities . Recent effort s t o involv e DO J attorney s earlie r i nth e cas e developmen t proces s an dt o shar e agency strategie s hav

e provent o b

e ver y successfu l i

novercomin

g thes e difficulties . EP A als o ha s a syste

m o f administrativ

e la w judge s (ALJs ) who provide a

ninterna l mechanism fo r enforcin

g administrativ

e order s an

d appealin

g EP A regulator

y actions . An

y party believin

g itsel f t o b

e th e targe t o f a

nimprope r EP

A actio nca nusuall y appea l t o a

nAL J for redress . The party woul d firs t discus s it s concern s withth

e administerin

g progra

m office . I f not satisfied , i t ca nthe nfil e a petitio

nwitha

nALJ . The judges ' rulin g ca n i nmos t case s b

e appealed t o th

e Administrator . Ruling s o f ALJ s ca nhav e enormou s impac t o nth e enforcemen t strateg y o f a program . Fo r example , Sectio

n21 1 o f th

e Clea nAi r Ac t prohibit s introducin g leade d gasoline int o a vehicl e designe d t o operat e o

nunleaded fuel . Prio r t o 1982 , violation s wer e pursued throug

hadministrativ

e proceeding s a s established b y regulation . I

n1982 , anALJ rule dtha t th

e regulation s allowin g administrativ

e proceeding s wer e invalid . Subsequently , ne w enforcemen t procedure s wer e established . Notice s o f violatio nare issue d t o alleged violators , an d unresolvedcase s are the nreferre

d t o th e Departmen t o f Justic e (DOJ ) for Distric t Cour t action . A backlog o f ove r 80 0 suc hcase s currentl y

exists . Th

e DO J i s reviewing anexpeditedmetho do f handlin

g thes e case s a s there ar e insufficien t resource s availabl e t o handl e th e current an

d continuin

g cas e loa

dunde r existin

g procedures . C . Relationship s WithGroup s Outside Federa l an d Stat e Government Institution s participatin g bot hi nth e development of a complianc e progra

m an d i nit s implementatio ninclud

e privat e organizations . Sinc e the y pla y a continuin

g rol e i

nth e lif e o

fP.7 6 V-i O

a program , an

d hav e a continuin g stak e i n it s operation , these ' institution s ca n b e critica l t o overal l programsucces s an d efficiency

. The yals o offe r agenc ymanager s a separat e se t o f incentive s an

d resource s outsid e th e governmen t tha t dan b e calle d int o pla yt o obtai n bette r complianc e leverag e fro ma limite d agenc ybudget . I n some cases , inattentio n t o a keyinstitutio n ca n severel y

limi t a n agency' s effectiveness

. 1
. IndustryAssociation s Industryo r trad e association s generall ysee k t o infor m thei r member s abou t applicabl e environmenta l restriction s an d responsibilities

. Group s suc h a s th e America n Electronic s Associatio n and th e America n Petroleu mInstitut e trac k th e developmen t o f relevan t legislatio n an d regulation

. Thes e association s ar e importan t i n "spreading th e word " abou t ne w restriction s an

d method s o f complyin g wit h thos e restrictions

. Fo r example , th e America n Electronic s Associatio n i s developin g a compute r dat a bas e o n regulatoryrequirement s fo r us e b yit s members
. I n addition , th e Associatio n publishe s a monthl ynewslette r whic h highlight s environmenta l development s relevan t t o th e industry

. Th e newslette r focuse s o n method s o f complyin g wit h ne wo r existin g regulations

. Association s o f firm s makin g contro l equipmen t an d moni

torin g devices , suc h a s th e Environmenta l Industrie s Council, ; hav e stron g economi c incentive s t o "sprea d th e word. " Informing a discharge r abou t hi s contro l obligation s an d possibl e technologie s fo r meetin g thos e obligation s i s a n importan t firs t ste p i n makin g a sale
. 2
. Professiona l an d Technica l Societie s Implementatio n o f environmenta l regulation s t o achiev e complianc e require s th e advic e an d analysi s o f specialize d technica l professionals

. A s environmenta l program s hav e grown , s o hav e th e numbe r an d membershi p o f professiona l affinit y group s an

d associations , suc h a s th e Nationa l Associatio n o f Environmenta l Professionals , th e Associatio n o f Stat e an d Territoria l Ai r Pollutio n ProgramAdministrators , th e Natura l Resourc e Sectio n o f th e Pollutio n Progra mAdministrators , th e Natura l Resourc e Sectio n o f th e America n Ba r Association , an d s o on . Thaa a organization s ca n b e a n extremel yefficien t mechanis mlo r collectin g o r disseminatin g informatio n o n a changin g regulator y program ; th e group ha s th e additiona l incentives * o f self-advancemen t an d members ' caree r advancemen t t o mak e i t work independentl yt o kee p it s member s i n touc h wit h curren t events
. The yca n als o b e effectiv e lobbying organization s wher e agenc ypolic yo r practic e run s afou l o f members ' professiona l o r persona l interests

. Privat e testin g an d technica l standard s organization s als o abound i n th e U.S. , i n larg e par t becaus e ther e ar e independentl y goo d busines s reason s fo r privat e industryt o develo p certai n qualit ycontrol s an d industrystandards
. Th e America n Societ y fo r Testin g an

d Material s (ASTM ) i s a nonprofi t organizatio n: >7 7
V-l l

whic h establishe s standard s fo r testing

. Th e ASTM publishe s manual s outlinin g method s foun d effectiv e fo r analyzing pollutants
. Test s ma ydetermin e the statu s o f environmenta l parameter s suc h a s acidity , bacteria l levels , an d presenc e o f metals
. Whil e ASTM i s no t affiliate d wit h EPA , th e Agenc ytend s t o adop t th e ASTM standard s a s approve d procedure s fo r stat e agenc yan d discharger s complianc e testing

. ASTM procedures , fo r example , ar e include d o r th e Lis t o f Approve d Tes t Procedure s in th e Clea n Wate r NPDE S regulations

. 3
. Insuranc e Companie s Careles s us e o r eve n th e mer e sal e o f highl ytoxi c o r hazardou s substance s can mak e manufacturer s liabl e fo r injurie s an d propert ydamag e cause d b yth e substances , quit e apar t fro m EPAregulatoryenforcement
. Privat e plaintiff s ar e beginning t o fil e mor e lawsuit s claimin g suc h environmentall yrelate d damage
. Specifi c provision s i n RCR Aan d CERCLArequir e hazardou s wast e dump s t o obtai n postclosur e insuranc e t o avoi d th e problemo f "orpha n dumps. " Therefor e insuranc e companie s hav e a rea l marke t an d a potentia l opportunit yto : 1 ) helping client s identif yfo r th e regulate d communit yan d "spreading th e word " regarding hazardou s wast e regulations , an d 2 ) assis t i n complianc e b yscrutinizin g operation s fo r saf e practice s befor e issuing a policy

. Unfortunately , insuranc e compan ypotentia l ha s no t ye t bee n realized

. First , ris k spreading b yinsuranc e companie s decrease s thei r incentiv e t o see k cos t saving s throug h advic e t o client s on ris k reductio n an

d improve d complianc e practices

. Further , thre e year s ag o EP

Abega n t o conside r encouragin g th e insuranc e industr y t o d o privat e inspections

. Th e insuranc e industry' s reactio n a t th e time wa s tha t inspection s wer e a federa l responsibilit yan d shoul d remai n so . Th e potentia l fo r bette r governmen t cooperatio n wit h thi s existin g industryinstitutio n remain s larg e nonetheless
. 4
. Publi c Interes t Group s Environmenta l an

d othe r publi c interes t group s vigorousl y trac k th e implementatio n o f environmenta l program s b yEP Aan d othe r agencies

. Al l environmenta l monitorin g dat a collecte d b y agencie s i s availabl e fo r publi c inspection

. Some groups , suc h a s th e Sierr a Clu b an d Natura l Resource s Defens e Council , hav e systematicall yreviewe d monitorin g report s an d file d citizen s suit s agaiaa t a larg e numbe r o f source s i n violatio n o f thei r discharg e permits . Withi n th e las t twelv e month s 30-4 0 citize n suit s hav e bee n file d an d ove r 20 0 notice s issue d b ythe munde r th e Clea n Wate r Act
. Citize n suit s ar e mos t commonl ybrough t agains t individua l discharger s believe d t o b e i n violation

. Suit s brough t agains t EP Afo r generall yno t enforcin g a progra mar e les s commo n an d ten d t o b e resolve d i n favo r o f th e Agency
. Th e overal l structur e an d prioritie s in an agenc yenforcemen t progra mar e viewe d a s discretionary , an

d court s ar e reluctan t t o forc e FP At o tak e actio n t o restructur e entir e enforcemen t offices

.P.7 8

V-1 2

Sectio n30 4 o f th

e Clea nAi r Ac t o f 197 0 wa s th e firs t provisionexpressl y empowerin

g citizen s t o ac t a s privat e attorney s genera l t o enforc e a federa l statute . Eac hfedera l environmenta l enactmen t sinc e 1970 , excep t FIFRA , ha s include d a citizensui t provisio nan deac hprovisio

nha s bee

nmodele

d o n Sectio n304 . Citizensuit s do no t alway s supplemen t agenc y action , t o th e exten t tha t the

y redirec t federa l resource s awa y fro m priority cases , the

y ca nb e a resourc e drain . Thi s i s bein g carefull y monitored .P.7 9 VI- 1

VI . EVALUATIO

N O F EFFICIENC

YAN D EFFECTIVENES S

Ove r th e years , U.S . EP

A an d th e publi c hav

e use dvariou s criteri a t o evaluat e th e effectivenes s o f nationa l enforcemen t an d complianc e monitorin g programs . Thi s sectio ndescribe s trend s an

d conclusion s that ca nb e draw nregardin

g th e desig n an d implementatio

no f curren t programs . The sectio ni s divide d int o a discussio nof : (a ) current measure s o f success , thos e whichare activel y use d t o manag e an

d evaluat e th

e U.S . complianc e monitorin g an denforcemen t programs , an d (b ) Genera l Oversigh t Criteri a i ncurrent o

r planne

dfuture use . A . Current Measure s o f Succes s Use di nU.S . Program

s The U.S . EP

A ha s establishedfou r type s o f measure s t o ensur e nationa l program s ar e achievin

g thei r desire

dgoals :
o th e rat e o f complianc e withpermit , regulator y an d statutor

y requirements ; o progres s i

nreturnin

g significan t violator s int o compliance ; o th e exten t o f complianc e monitoring : number of inspection s made ; an d o th e numbe r of administrativ e an d judicia l enforcement action s taken . The firs t tw

o o f thes e measure s ar e use dt o asses s progra

m results . Bot

hcomplianc e rate s an dprogres s i

nreturnin

g significan t violator s t o complianc e reflec t ho w wel l ou

r program

s ar e achievin

g th e ultimat e progra

m objective s o f hig han d continuin

g rate s o f compliance . Th e nex t tw o activity

measure s provide assurance s tha t ther e ar e health y level s of enforcemen t activity

t o creat e th

e necessar

y deterrenc e t o non-complianc e an d t o justify

reporte

drate s o f compliance . The char t o

nth e next page (Figure VI-1 ) provide s a sampl e o f ho

w thes e measure s are displayed i npractice . A nationa l syste

m calledth

e Strategi c Plannin g an d Managemen t Syste m provide s th

e framework withi nwhichforma l commitment s for goo d performanc e ar e negotiated wit hEP A Region s an

d State s baaad upo

npas t performance , progra m statistic s an

d fundin g levels . Progres s i s reporte deac hguarter . Eac ho f th e fou r ke y measure s i s discusse d belo w i nmor e detail : 1 . Complianc e Pates : The rat e o f complianc e shoul d b e ore o f th

e bes t overal l measure s o f progra m success . Hig

hrate s of rea l an dcontinuin

g complianc e ar e th

e ultimat e goal s of U.S . complianc e an dP.8 0 Vl-< ! FIGUR E VI- 1



### A
. MANAGEMEN TACCOUNTABILIT YSYSTE M

•••MANAG E AN O TRACKING A MIXTURE .< * «« ULV S ^ ACTMT y^ FOU R AREAS :

e CCMPUANC I MOMfTORlN Q e COMfUANC f RATt t e SIGNIFICAN TVK>UTK>N S e INPOftCfMIN TRISPONt f SAMM I ONLT « -©AT A A M NO

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FOCUS :
INSPECTIONS :

• V MCiO N COMPUANCI : SIONIPICAN TVIOLATOR S



### 8 " M SCHI O

laU V VWl l Q F YM VIOL' S S CIVI L •CRIMINA LP.8 1 VI- 3

enforcemen t programs . Nevertheless , the rat e o f complianc e ha s severa l significan t shortcoming s a s a singl e measur e o f success . Becaus e o f thes e shortcomings , th e V.S, progra m doe s no t hav e th e ful l confidenc e w e woul d lik e in complianc e statistics , although th e U.S
. EP Adoe s us e complianc e rate s t o identify

- specifi c area s requiring managemen t attention

. Thes e shortcoming s are : First , complianc e rate s ar e onl ya s goo d a s the statistica l adequac yand reliabilit yo f th e complianc e monitorin g dat a use d i n th e calculation

. Thi s i s particularl y troublesom e i n th e ai r programwhic h relie s heavil yo n infrequen t inspection s t o provid e a singl e dat a poin t o n compliance

. Becaus e program s usuall yassume complianc e fo r thos e source s fo r whic h a violatio n ha s no t bee n detected , th e result s o f a n announce d annua l inspectio n mayb e use d t o assum e yea r roun d compliance

. A t issu e i s whethe r th e complianc e rat e shoul d reflec t violation s detecte d fo r th e tota l univers e o f regulate d source s o r jus t thos e source s fo r whic h soun d dat a ar e availabl e i.e. , whic h wer e inspecte d o r fo r whic h self-surveillanc e dat a i s received

. Second , eve n a hig

h rat e o f complianc e doe s no t necessaril y indicat e succes s fro man environmenta l standpoint , parti

cularl yi f th e smal l numbe r o f violator s contribut e th e mos t significan t advers e impac t t o the environment

. Similarly , lowrate s o f complianc e shoul d no t necessaril y b e interprete d a s a programfailur e i f th e lo wrate s ar e th e resul t o f improve d method s o f detecting violations , th e applicatio n o f mor e stringen t standard s fo r defining complianc e o r th e introductio n o f ne wrequirements

. Third , th e U.S
. progra mcontinue s t o confron t definitiona l problem s i n wha t constitute s compliance

. Senio r managemen t a t EPAha s se t fort h a polic ytha t complianc e shoul d b e define d a s th e ultimat e achievemen t o f environmenta l standards
. Som e o f ou r programs , th e NPDE S wate r discharg e permi t programi n particular , ha d bee n definin g a sourc e a s bein g i n complianc e i f i t eithe r wa s achieving environ

menta l standard s o r wa s meetin g a schedul e fo r complianc e se t forthi n a

nenforcemen t orde r o r agreement
. Thi s practic e ha s no wstoppe d an d th e tw o complianc e rate s ar e reported separately
. Complianc e wit h actua l standard s muat^ba use d a s th e trues t measur e o f ho wwel l th e benefit s anticipated b

yth e regulatio n o r standar d ar e being realized

. Complianc e wit h an enforcemen t agreemen t can , however , be use d t o asses s ho wseriousl ysuc h agreement s ar e followe d an d ho wwel l theyar e negotiated

. Furthe r definitiona l problem s can b e an d hav e bee n encountered
. Fo r example , i s th e progra mreporting rate s o f complianc e wit h an yan d al l violations , n o matte r ho wminor , o r i s th e progra

mreportin g rate s o f significan t violations ? How shoul d th e progra

m trea t continuin g pattern s o f violations ?P.8 2

VI - 4

Fo r example , how

shoul d source s b e reporte d whic ha^r e i n complianc e durin g th e reportin g perio d bu t whic h regularl y ar e found t o g o i nan d ou t o f compliance ? Summarize d below

ar e dat a an

d trend s incomplianc e rates . Actua l trend s ca nonl y b e presente d fo r th e ai r an d wate r environmenta l programs . Th e hazardou s wast e program i s to o new

t o reflec t trend s o f non-compliance . I nth e toxic s and pesticide s programs , complianc e rate s usuall y canno t b e reporte d a s dat a d o no t exis t onth e tota l univers e o f regulate d sources .
a . Ai r Complianc e Trend s A s ca nb e see ni nFigur e VI-2 , th e earlies t record s show tha t i n1974 , onl y 59 % o f a univers e o f 17,73 2 source s regulate d unde r th e Stat e Implementatio nPlan s (SIPs ) wer e i ncomplianc e o r meetin g schedules . Progress , a s reflecte d i ndecrease d violationrates , wa s mos t dramati c i nth e earl y year s c f th e program and les s marke d thereafter . Ove r th e las t fiv e years , fro m 197 9 to th e present , th e rate s hav e hovere d ove r 90 * fo r Clas s A- l SI P sources , tha t is , source s whos e actua l o r potentia l emission s excee d 10 0 ton s pe r year . Th e rate s ar e slightl ybette r fo r new source s ; and hazardou s ai r emissions : fro m 95.5-97.1 * fo r NSPS an d 97. 7 - 98.7 * fo r NESHAPS .
Ai r Complianc e Rate *

'»' 0 thoug h 198 4

•M • • -

7 0 7 1 I I I I

7 8 7 3 7 * 7 9 7 7

7 « Fisca l T«a r

I'l l l i i 7 8 7 » 8 0 8 1 8 3 8 3 8 *

"exclude s NESHAP S Thes e dat a see m

t o sugges t tha t enormou s progres s ha s bee n mad e i n achievin g complianc e wit h th e Clea n Ai r Ac t an d tha t a platea u ha s bee n reache d wit h som e percentag e o f source s bein g i n violatio n a t an ypoin t i n time

. However , thi s doe s no tP.8 3

VI

- 5 tel l th e whol e story
. Arecen t breakdow n o f complianc e rate s a s o f th e en

d o f FY 198 3 show s tha t th e percentag e o f source s o f unknow

n statu s i s almos t equa l t o o r exceed s thos e know

nt o b e i n violation

.

TABL E VI- 1

Tota l 198 3 Category Clas s ASI P Clas s A l SI P NSP S NESHA P 26,58 2

14,40 5 2,06 9 1,26 5 I n Complianc e 24,38 5 (91.7* ) 12,80 7 (88.9* ) 1,92 9 (93.2* ) 1,18 6 (93.8* ) Mtg
. Sch
.

50 2 (1.9* ) 40 0 (2.8% ) 1 7 (0.8* ) 1 0 (0.8% ) In Viol

.

79 6 (3.0% ) 60 9 (4.2% ) 7 9 (3.8* ) 1 7 (1.3% ) Unknow

n 69 9 (3.4% ) 58 9 (4.1% ) 4 4 (2.1% ) 5 2 (4.1% )

I n th e lat e 1970' s managemen t a t EP Abelieve d tha t th e number s wer e suspiciousl yhigh give n tha t th e economic s showe d tha t i t pai d polluter s t o instal l bu t no t operat e an d maintai n th e pollutio n contro l equipment

. Annua l operatio n an d maintenanc e (O&M ) cost s ofte n equa l o r excee d annualize d capita l costs
. Amajo r serie s o f studie s conducte d ove r a tw o yea r perio d reveale d tha t whil e th e vas t majorit yo f source s ha d installe d ai r pollutio n controls , continuin g operatin g upset s an d O& M problem s coul d b e contributin g exces s emission s o f u p t o 25 % abov e standards , 67 * o f whic h wer e preventable
. 71 % o f the source s studie d had documente d exces s emissions , on the averag e o f 1 3 incident s a year , lastin g 6 4 hour s each
. 30 % o f thes e problem s wer e attribute d t o desig n inadequacies , e.g. , missizin g o f flu e ga s desulphurizatio n equipment , 37 % t o failur e t o maintai n equipmen t suc h a s changin g bag s fo r a baghouse , etc
. A s a resul t o f thes e studie s a ne wstrateg yha s bee n adopte d t o specificall yaddres s continuin g complianc e problems , including improve d inspectio n techniques , enhance d us e o f dat a fro m continuou s emission s monitoring , an d analysi s o f malfunctio n reportin g t o identif ysource s wit h pattern s tha t see moutsid e th e norman

d preventable
. Thua , whil e w

e canno t expec t continuou s improvemen t in compliance ) levels , thes e high complianc e rate s hav e no t bee n viewe d byEP

A a s indicativ e o f success . Indee d th e likel y consequence s o f newly-subjec t Volatil e organi c Compoun d (VOC ) source s an

d bette r dat a on continuou s compliance , ar e a n increas e in violatio n rates
. b
. Wate r Complianc e Trends ; (1 ) NPDES : Wate r Discharg e Permi t Program : An yanalysi s o f complianc e rat e trend s fo r the NPDE S Progra mmus t conside r thre e caveats
. First , u p t o the present ,P.8 4 VI- 6

th e complianc e rate s hav e reflecte

donl y thos e source s whic har e not "significan t violators. " "Significant Violations " in'th e NPDE S Progra

m ar e define

das : Facilitie s violatin g requirement s of previou s enforcemen t action s an

d complianc e schedule s are generall y considere

d significant . Also , facilitie s i nviolatio

nof permi t effluen t limit s ar e considere dt o b e i nsignifican t non-complianc e for :

- singl e event s an d short-ter

m limit s that hav

e potentia l t o caus e advers e environmenta l or healt himpacts .

- violation s of monthl y average permi t limits , fo r an y tw o month s i

na six-monthperio dthat excee

d th e limi t fo

r nontoxi c pollutant s b y 40 % or excee d th e limi t fo

r toxi c pollutant s b y 20% .

- violation s of monthl y average limit s fo r an y fou r month s i

na six-monthperiod . Second , unti l quit e recently , th e progra

m reporte

d a s i ncomplianc e thos e facilitie s whichwer e o nconstructio

n schedules , thus , ful l complianc e wit heffluen t standard s wa s not reflected . Third , th

e rate s ar e reporte donly fo r th e majo r sources , tha t is , th

e wors t 15 % o f th

e nationa l inventor y o f wate r dischargers . Keepin g thi s i

nmind , wha t i s mos t noteworth y fro m Figure VI- 3 i s th

e differentia l rat e of complianc e betweenindustria l an d municipa l discharger s an dth e lengt hof tim

e it ha s take nfo r source s t o actuall y achiev e complianc e withth e requirement s of th e statute . Wot« r Complianc e Rat « (NPDES )

l£____0 • Majo r Industria l Dischargers - Complianc e wit hschedule s • Majo r Industria l Dischargers - Complianc e wit heffluen t limit * • Majo r Municipa l Dischargers - Complianc e wit hschedule s

__Majo r Municipa l Dischargers - Complianc e wit heffluen t limit sP.8 5 VI- 7
Municipa l non-complianc e ha s bee n identifie d a s a problem an d targete

d a s a high priorit yfo r th e progra mfo r som^ r time

. I n th e lat e 1970' s a t th e same time th e evaluatio n studie s wer e performe d o n continuou s complianc e wit h ai r standards , studie s als o wer e conducte d o f the wate r program . Full y77 % o f th e majo r secondarytreatmen t publicl yowne d treatmen t work s (POTW's ) —plant s o f ove r 1 millio n gallon s pe r da y — experience d non-complianc e t o some degree , 53 % ha d violation s whic h wer e considere d seriou s (define d a s 1 violatio n o f 150 % o r mor e ove r standards ; o r 6 violation s o f 80 % o r mor e ove r standards ) o r significan t (define d a s 3 violation s o f 50 % o r mor e ove r standards ; o r 1 2 violation s o f 20 % o r mor e ove r standards)
. Ther e wa s an unwillingnes s a t al l level s o f governmen t t o tak e enforcemen t actio n agains t municipa l governments
. Th e progra

msuffere d fro

mtw o inconsisten t federa l roles : a regulatory/enforcemen t rol e an d a grant s rol e unde r whic h th e federa l governmen t share d th e cos t o f building th e treatmen t plants
. Th e reason s foun

d fo r suc h hig

h level s o f non-complianc e wer e tha t (1 ) municipalitie s wer e no t a t ris k o f lega l o r economi c sanction , an d (2 ) POTW staf f lacke d th e necessary operationa l skill s eithe r t o mak e th e treatmen t plant s wor k t o th e level s theywer e designe d t o mee t o r t o ensur e they wer e designe d properl yt o mee t curren t needs
. Trainin g an

d technica l assistanc e provide d t o operator s had no t bee n targete d t o mee t th e need s o f plant s experiencing operationa l problems
. Studie s als o indicate d tha t technica l assistanc e o r trainin g withou t enforcemen t di d no t bring non-complyin g plant s int o continuin g compliance

. Severa l step s wer e take n ove r a fou r yea r perio d t o addres s thes e problems
. First , th e U.S
. EP Aissue d diagnosti c guidanc e o n commo n malfunctio n problems
. Nex t th e agenc ydevise d a composit e correctio n progra mfo r trouble-shootin g a t poorl y performin g plants
. Finally , th e agenc ydevise d a forcefu l enforcemen t strategytha t call s fo r federa l an d stat e enforcemen t agains t municipa l plant s whethe r o r no t theyar e schedule d fo r federa l funding

. Th e federa l government' s firs t priorit ywil l b e t o enforc e standard s agains t plant s alread yconstructe d wit h federa l dollars . Next th e agenc ywil l ti e complianc e schedule s t o plant s scheduled t o receiv e federa l grant s t o upgrad e municipa l treatmen t works
. Finally , eve n i f a municipalit y need s an

d i s no t schedule d t o receiv e federa l funds , i t wil l b e subjec t t o enforcemen t action

. Thi s remove s th e disincentive s fo r municipalitie s t o properl yoperat e an d maintai n facilitie s onc e th e federall ysubsidize d constructio n phas e i s completed , an d remove s inadequat e resolv e a t al l level s o f governmen t t o tak e forcefu l lega l actio n agains t municipalitie s fo rP.8 6 VI- 8

failur e t o operat e an dmaintai ntreatment work s a t acceptabl e level s of effluen t discharge . (2 ) Complianc e Wit hDrinkin g Wate r Standard s Curren t .compliance dat a fo r fisca l yea r 1980-198 3 indicat e that complianc e withth e microbiologica l an d turbidity

maximu m contaminan t leve l (MCL ) an dM/ Rrequirement s hav e generall y improve d eachyear . However , approximatel y 29 % an d 10.5 % o f th e Publi c Wate r System s (PWS's ) ar e not i ncomplianc e with th e microbiologica l an dturbidity

standards , respectivel y 8.8 % an d 6.1 % o f th

e PWS' s system

s ar e classifieda s persisten t microbiologica l an d turbidity

violators . Becaus e th

e Publi c Wate r Syste m Progra m i s a matur e program , man

y o f th e system

s whichremai nou

t o f complianc e ?r e eithe r recalcitran t or lac k th e knowledg e or ability t o comply . T o ensur e tha t thes e system s ar e targete

d fo r complianc e require s a systemati c approachcombinin g programmati c an

d enforcemen t actions . A s th e U.S- . EP

A ha s analyze

dth e complianc e rate s o f variou s segment s o f th

e publi c wate r system s ove r th

e years , it ha s foun d tha t rate s of complianc e var y dependin

g upo nsyste m size , an d typ e o f syste

m (communit

y vs . non-community) . T o address , thes e specifi c problems , in197 9 EP A issue da strateg

y which suggeste

d tha t region s an

dstate s establis hfollow-u o an d enforcemen t prioritie s usin g suc hfactor s a s th

e populatio

nat risk , th

e typ e o f contaminan t leve l exceeded , th e sourc e of th e wate r supply , th e degre e o f treatment , an d th e typ e o f facility

serve d (hospital , foo

destablishment , res t area , etc.) . Continuin

g analysi s o f community complianc e dat a reveale d that non-complianc e wa s disproportionatel y concentratedi

nth e smal l an d ver y smal l wate r system s (system

s servin

g les s tha

n3,30 0 persons) . I

nrespons e t o thi s data , th e Offic e o f Drinkin g Wate r proposed a smal l system s strateg

y i nJune 198 0 an

d ha s encouraged State s t o us e th e stat e complianc e strateg y techniqu

e t o ran k follow-u

p an denforcemen t action s whenaddressin g instance s o f non-compliance . I n1984 , thes e strategie s wer e combine d t o anoveral l complianc e polic y fo r addressin

g complianc e problem s i na regulated wate r system .P.8 7 VI- 9

VI- 2 tuaioa o rSYST M I N VTOUITC

N WIT H m e tf CXSIOUBICM

. AN D TURBIDIT

rSTMSMD

S

r rmi-iM 3

• National Tota l Persistan tviolator s U Intatsrftten tViolator s I* main— m rt s o rt n r r1 2 n a rt s o n s i rt

n rf» 3 rt

to rt n rt n rt I T Micmninloglra l MOl l 11. 0 I. S t. t10. 0 1. 0 . » 1. 1 1. 4 10. 0 7. 6 1. 6 1. 6 */*[ « 30. 1 14. C 24. 4 2X 4 U. 4 0. 1 7. « (. ( 17. 7 lt. J It. I lt. t

34V. 7 H. S 10. 1 29. ) 14. 2 10. 0 ». l I. I 22. 4 l». l 20. 3 ». i
TurMdlt y

TOW , 2. 1 (. 1 9. S 1. 1 S. 3 7. 0 1. 4 10. 2 11. 4 1. 1 S.O 4. 1 3. 1 S.O /. 3 j . l 4. 9 4. 9 2. 2 3 . ! 4, 7 1. 9 3. 1 4. 4 4. 6 4. 9 3. 4 3. 0 11. 1 10. 2 13. 7 1. 1 16. 1 11. 9 16. 3 10. 5
J l senistent i i n afisca l y«ar— > 3 montt

aat i. quarte ri rviolatio n J 2 Iittesalttent : I

n afisca l year—

£ 3 sontfts o t1 quarte ri n violatio n J 2 MO. i Maxima

l Gantasinam Level ] f ft/Hi Monitoring an

d assortin g

c . Hazardou s an

d Toxi c Substance s Fo r mos t o f th e program s controllin g hazardou s wast e disposa l an

d toxi c substances , th e program s ar e eithe r to o ne w o r dat a insufficien t t o provid e complianc e rate s o r trends
. I n th e hazardou s wast e program , complianc e rate s hav e bee n quote d a s lowa s 20 % b

yrecen t studie s undertake n b yth e Genera l Accountin g Office

. Al l tha t can b e sai d a t thi s time i s tha t th e complianc e rate s ar e unacceptabl ylowmainl ydu e t o th e newnes s an

d complexit yo f th e program , an d th e absenc e o f a concerte d enforcemen t effort
. Th e hazardou s wast e enforcemen t progra mgo t underwaydurin g a perio d i n th e Agency' s history whe n th e emphasi s o n partnershi p wit h th e state s wa s interprete d a s deferrin g t o th e states
. Moreover , federa l staf f concentrate d o n Superfund activitie s t o th e neglec t o f a strong effor t t o enforc e interim

statu s regulation s unde r th e hazardou s wast e program . Attempt s ar e (currently ) bein g mad e t o remed ythi s situatio n an

d t o achieve highe r rate s o f compliance

. Becaus a ther e i s n o fixe d univers e o f regulate d entitie s i n mos t o f th

e toxic s an

d pesticide s programs , complianc e rate s canno t b e calculated . Th e exceptio n i s th e asbesto s in school s programfo r whic h a lo wcomplianc e rat e o f 60 % ha s bee n reported
. Th e enforcemen t strategyt o dat e ha s bee n t o publiciz e th e presenc e o f asbestos
. I n respons e t o the lowrate s o f compliance , thi s strateg yha s bee n revisite d t o introduc e mor e stringen t enforcemen t response s an d t o conside r requirement s fo r publi c disclosur e o f plan s fo r correctiv e action

.P.8 8 VI-1 0

2
. Progres s i n Returning Significan t Violator s t o Compliance

. On e o f th e U.S
. EPA' s mos t successfu l managemen t tool s an d measure s o f programsucces s ha s bee n th e establishmen t o f a lis t o f significan t violator s fo r whic h EP Aan d stat e official s ar e charge d wit h taking effectiv e enforcemen t action , sufficien t t o achiev e compliance

. Thi s approac h wa s use d i n th e "Majo r Sourc e Enforcemen t Effort " initiate d i n th e fal l o f 197 7 an d extende d unti l th e sprin g o f 1981
. During tha t 3 1/ 2 yea r perio d i t wa s th e drivin g forc e t o bring larg e industria l source s int o complianc e wit h ai r an d wate r regulations , it s focu s wa s o n th e installatio n o f th e require d ai r an d wate r pollutio n contro l equipmen t fo r initia l compliance

. Tha t effor t resulte d i n action s agains t specifi c larg e industrie s o f concer n suc h a s stee l mills , powe r plants , refineries , pul p mills , chemica l plants , etc
. Th e mor e recentl yinstitute d significan t violator s list s d o no t singl e ou t particula r industries

. Rather , th e list s ar e derive d fro

mth e applicatio n o f clearl ydefine d nationa l criteria

. The yreflec t severa l othe r improvement s ove r pas t managemen t systems
. First , th e source s ar e tracke d unti l ful l complianc e i s achieved

. Previousl yi t wa s considere d a succes s i f a forma l enforcemen t actio n wa s taken
. Second , th e lis t i s continuall yupdated
. EPAtrack s bot h th e beginning-of

yea r backlo g o f significan t violator s no t ye t brough t int o compliance , a s wel l a s ne wsignifican t violator s a s theyar e found
. Thi s provide s bot h a stati c an d dynami c pictur e o f how w e ar e doing

. Earlier , whe n th e majo r sourc e lis t wa s exhausted , EP Aenforcemen t seeme d t o declin e rapidly

. Today , however , th e significan t non-complie r list s ar e a continuin g managemen t tool
. EP Akeep s a quarterl ytall yo f thos e violator s fo r whic h a forma l enforcemen t actio n wa s taken , thos e whic h wer e brough t int o compliance , o r thos e whic h remain , pending enforcemen t action

. Target s ar e ambitious , s o tha t b yth e en d o f th e yea r EP Aan d th e State s ar e committe d t o reducing th e backlo g o f significan t violation s t o nearl yzero . A s illustrate d i n Figur e VI-4 , a t mid-yea r EPAan d State s wer e o n trac k t o mee t thi s end-of-yea r commitment

. Equall ya s important , figur e VI- 5 show s ho wEP Awil l continu e t o addres s tha

t aos t significan t violation s a s theyarise

. The focu

a o n a give n list , update d eac h year , ha s severa l advantagaa r (a ) enforcemen t response s ar e associate d wit h results ; (b ) i t permit s eas yverificatio n o f progres s i n resolvin g instance s o f non-compliance ; (c ) the criteri a fo r wha t constitute s a significan t violatio n direct s enforcemen t t o thos e action s whic h woul d yiel d the greates t environmenta l benefit ; an

d (d ) th e list s enabl e nationa l progra m manager s t o examin e pattern s o f complianc e problem s acros s media ,P.8 9
VI-1 1 FIGUR E I V W E AR E ESTABLISHIN G AN D MEETIN G COMMITMENT S T O CORREC

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industrie s an

d companies

. Th e ver yexistenc e o f th e significan t violato r lists , whic h a t thi s writing ar e publicl yavailabl e upo n request , als o mayprovid e a n incentiv e t o th e liste d source s t o correc t thei r violations

. (Not e tha t th e "Majo r Sourc e Enforcemen t Effort " list s wer e no t release d t o th e public. ) Summarize d belo wi s pas t experienc e i n th e wate r an d ai r program s wit h th e us e o f targete d lists

. Water : NPDE S Wit h th e passag e o f th e origina l Jul y1 , 197 7 statutory deadlin e fo r constructio n o f require d treatmen t facilities , th e Agenc ybega n a concentrate d driv e t o identif yan d bring enforcemen t action s agains t al l majo r permittee s tha t ha d violate d th e statutorydeadline

. On e objectiv e o f thi s effor t wa s t o see k penaltie s tha t remove d th e economi c advantag e o f delaye d complianc e an d woul d dete r futur e violations

. Durin g th e 3 1/ 2 yea r perio d i t wa s i n effect , th e Majo r Sourc e Enforcemen t Effor t (NSEE ) wa s th e drivin g forc e o f th e wate r enforcemen t program . Th e identifie d univers e o f non-complying permittee s wa s A relativel yhigh i n 1977 : 21 % o f th e majo r industria l sources , an d 47 % o f th e majo r POTWs
. Also , th e source s i n violatio n i n lat e 197 7 represente d larg e industrie s —stee l mills , powe r plants , refineries , pul p mills , chemica l plants , etc. ,

—tha t accounte d fo r a fa r large r portio n o f th e wate r pollutio n problemtha n thei r number s indicated

. Th e credibilit yo f EPA' s an

d th e States ' enforcemen t program s depende d o n demonstratin g tha t eve n thes e larg e an d recalcitran t source s mus t obe yth e law
. Th e MSE E resulte d i n a significan t enforcemen t succes s b yMay1979
. O f th e 60 9 source s targete d fo r civi l action s an d 5 designate d fo r crimina l actions , EPAtoo k 51 5 o f the action s an

d State s too k 9 9 actions

. Eve n mor e significan t tha n th e numbe r o f action s take n wer e th e settlement s and/o r tria l judgment s tha t resolve d importan t technologica l issue s wit h th e steel , electri c power , an d pul p an

d pape r industries , leadin g t o significan t environmenta l improvements

. Th e recentl y

institute d tracking o f significan t violato r list s i s beginnin

g t o yiel d similarl yimpressiv e results
. Se e Figure s VI-4 . Air : Th e Majo r Sourc e Enforcemen t Effor t (MSEE ) addresse d aoproximatel y1,67 0 ai r sources . A s par t o f thi s program , EPA' s Regiona l Office s initiate d judicia l referral s fo r approximatel y40 0 ai r case s (no t al l o f whic h wer e filed)

.P.9 2 VI-1 4

Man y othe r source s cam e int o complianc e a s a resul t o f EP A administrativ

e action , stat e judicia l o r administrativ e r action , o r withou t an y suc haction . Majo r characteristic s o f th e Majo r Sourc e Enforcemen t Effor t wer e th e predominan t Federa l rol e an

d th e heav y relianc e o

nlitigation . A

t th e conclusio

nof-thi s effort , it wa s considered tha t th e "initia l compliance " proble

m fo r particulate s an

dsulfur dioxide source s wa s generall y unde r control . Afte r th

e conclusio

nof th

e majo r sourc e enforcemen t effort , the focu s o f th e progra

m broadene

dt o includ

e a re-emphasi s o

nothe r element s of th e progra

m whic hwer e relativel y

ignore d durin g th e majo r sourc e enforcemen t perio d (fo r example , ne

w sourc e permi t requirements) . I n addition , complianc e date s for source s o f volatil e organi c compounds , oftenfirs t regulate di nSIP s i

n1977 , bega

nt o pass , creatin

g a nadditiona l grou

p o f violator s whichneede d t o be addressed . T o hel p set prioritie s for federa l action s agains t violatin

g sources , the concep t o f a "significan t violator " wa s developeda s par t of the Agency' s Managemen t Accountabilit y

Syste m inth e fal l o f 1981 . A significan t violato r wa s defined i nDecembe r 198 1 a s a _. sourc e meetin

g an y o f th e followin

g criteria : (1 ) a violato r o f a hazardou s ai r emissio n(MFSHA»s ) standar d unles s th

e magnitude an

dduratio

no f th e violatio

nar e minima l an

dth e violatio

nnonrecurring ; (2 ) a violato r o f ne w sourc e permi t requirement s an d standards , unles s the magnitude an d duratio

no f th e violationar e minimal ; (3 ) a violato r o f a Stat e Implementatio nPla ni f th e sourc e i s o f sufficien t siz e (presumptivel y 25 0 tons/yea r potentia l emission s o r 10 0 tons/yea r actua l emission s o f an y pollutant ) an

di s s o locate

d a s t o impac t a nonattainmen t area fo r a pollutant fo r whic hthe sourc e i s i nviolation . A combined federal-stat e effor t t o addres s significan t violator s *»• * inititatedi nearl y 1982 . Thi s ha s bee n differen t fcsjatth

e Majo r sourc e enforcemen t effor t i ntw o importan t wags} . Pirst , a s previousl y noted , whil e th

e majo r sourc e effov e wa s als o a join t federal/stat e effort , i t wa s heavil y dominate d b

y EPA . I

ncontrast , i

nimplementin

g the significan t violato r program , EP A ha s placed considerabl y greate r relianc e o nth e State s fo

r enforcemen t agains t source s withi nthei r jurisdictions . T o make assumptio nb y State s o f thi s increase

d responsibility

mor e feasible , EP A ha s greatl y expanded it s suppor t t o th e State s throug

hdirec t technica l assistanc e an

d stat e progra

m capacity

buildin

g initiative s (e.g. , workshop s an d technica l manuals) . Th e secon d fundamenta lP.9 3 VI-1 5
chang e wa s t o reduc e confrontatio n betwee n EP Aan d industr

y through pursuing negotiatio n an d informa l o r administrativ e resolutions , wit h litigatio n perceive d onl ya s a las t resort
. (The combinatio n o f thes e factors , combine d wit h other s such a s Agenc yreorganization s an d resourc e cuts , resulte d in a temporaryreductio n i n th e Agency' s enforcemen t profil e a s describe d i n sectio n 4 below. ) I n th e firs t 2 7 month s o f th e significan t violato r program , considerabl e progres s ha s bee n made
. A n initia l lis t o f 48 2 source s wa s establishe d and , sinc e then , a n additiona l 52 0 source s hav e bee n identified

. I n thi s same period , 60 2 source s (representing th e vas t majorit yo f th e origina l list ) hav e bee n brough t int o complianc e o r place d o n a n acceptabl e complianc e schedule
. 3
. Complianc e Monitoring : Inspectio n Level s Athir d measur e o f succes s fo r ou r complianc e an d enforcemen t program s i s ho wwel l theymonito r complianc e an d creat e an •enforcemen t presence " withi n th e regulate d community

. Th e U.S
. EP Amanagemen t syste mset s commitment s fo r an d report s progres s o n th e numbe r o f stat e an d federa l inspections

. Ther e i s significan t congressiona l an d environmenta l grou p interes t in thi s number
. Ho wwel l w e d o an d whethe r th e choice s w e mak e fo r complianc e monitorin g ar e cost-effectiv e ha s alread

ybee n discusse d i n Chapte r III
. Ther e are , however , tw o point s t o not e here
. First , thi s measur e credit s th e progra m onl yfo r inspections , leaving ou t sourc e self-surveillanc e o r third part ycertification

. I t therefor e fail s t o portra yth e ful l arrayo f monitorin g dat a availabl e t o progra mofficials

. Thi s ma yno t b e a seriou s problem , however , sinc e inspection s ar e stil l relie d upo n an d value d b

yth e publi c fo r thei r independen t verificatio n o f complianc e status
. Th e second itemt o not e i s tha t th e numbe r o f inspection s give s n o informatio n a s t o th e qualit yo f th e inspection s no r th e appropriatenes s o f th e target s o f inspection

. Th e U.S
. program s a t bot h th e Headquarter s an d Regiona l leve l attemp t t o mak e supplementa l evaluation s t o addres s thes e two concerns . On e approachi s t o evaluat e th e inspectio n strateg ytha t i s use d t o targe t inspection s t o determin e th e exten t t o whic h i t i s consisten t wit h nationa l criteri a an d norm s fo r inspectio n frequenc ydescribe d i n Chapte r III
. Anothe r i s th e us e o f oversigh t inspection s t o asses s th e qualit yo f the inspections

. Oversigh t inspection s ar e conducte d eithe r b yEP Aofficial s o r consultant s an

d ar e conducte d eithe r s-eparatel yo r simul

taneously , wit h stat e an d regiona l personnel
. Sampl e inspectio n repor t file s ar e als o reviewed

. I n th e past , inspection s an d inspectio n strategie s hav ? no t bee n give n th e ful l emphasi s theydeserv e in the U.S
. programs . Trainin g ha s bee n availabl e an d oversigh t inspecto rP.9 4 VI-1 6

ar e use d t o identify

problems . However , strategie s fo r targetin

g inspection s wil l b e give ngreate r emphasi s 'i nth e futur e an

d wil l b

e one of th

e concern s of th

e ne w offic e ofEnforcemen t an

d Complianc e Monitorin g a t th e U.S . EPA . Certainly , it i s on e o f th e ironie s o f assessin g progra

m performance,.tha t improve d targetin

g of inspection s to bette r detec t violation s wil l undoubtedl y yiel dlower rate s of compliance, , a

t leas t i

nth e shor t term . It i s therefor e essentia l that al l o f thes e measure s o f progra m effectivenes s b e reviewe

d i nthei r entirety . 4 . Enforcemen t Responses : The Numbe r o f Administrativ e an d Judicia l Enforcemen t Action s Based uponth

e leve l o f medi a attentio nan dpubli c inquiry , th e mos t important singl e indicator o f enforcemen t progra m effectivenes s t o bothCongres s an d th e publi c i s th

e leve l o f civi l o r crimina l cas e referral s a t th e federa l leve l (fro m U.S . EP

A t o th e Department o f Justice) . Manager s withi nEP

A an d th e publi c kee

p a clos e watc

ho nth e level s o f cas e referral s an d file dcour t cases . Thi s i s becaus e litigatio

ni s th

e ultimat e weapo

ni nth e arsena l o f enforcemen t tools . It s us e i s viewed a s a nindicatio

no f th e willingnes s of nationa l environmenta l progra m manager s t o take an y an d - al l actio

nt o gai ncompliance . Thi s i s no

t t o sa y that litigatio

ni s th

e bes t o

r mos t appropriat e indicator o f succes s i

nth e program . Indeed , relianc e o

nth e numbe r of cas e referral s a s a measur e o f performanc e ha s th e followin

g limitations : (a ) enforcemen t response s ca

nfai l t o achiev

e timel y

an d effectiv

e complianc e a t futur e dates , (th e mer e initiatio

no f an enforcemen t actio ni s n o guarante e of succes s an di t ca nlea dt o dela y an d length

y complianc e schedules) ; (b ) litigatio ni s th

e mos t costl y enforcemen t response , it i s resourc e intensiv e an d ti'.i e consuming , resultin g i nlon g delay s befor e complianc e i s achieved ? an d (c ) th

e program' s succes s depend s o nth e us e o f th e ful l rang e o f enforcemen t responses , not jus t litigatio npoint s whic har e oftenlos t i nth e focu s o

nnumber s of cour t actions . A t one brie f point i nth e Agency' s history , i nth e earl y 1980s , Agstnc

y managemen t decide dt o ignor e level s of enforcement activit y

and t o focu s o

ncomplianc e rate s a s th e onl y appropriat e indicato r o f success , regardless , whethe r achieve dthroug

h jaw-boning , technica l assistance , a forma l administrativ e order , litigation , o r penalty . Thi s di dno t las t ver

y lon g followin

g publi c inquir

y an d outcr y ove r lower level s of enforcemen t actions . Whil e it i s true that th e U.S . EP

A ha s bee ntryin g t o shif t publi c attentio nfro m it s preoccupatio

n wit hcour t case s t o results-based performanc e measures , i.e. , o nmeasurin

g overal l complianc e rate s an dprogres s agains t a set of significan t violators , ther e i s stil l a genera l recognitionof th e importanc e of usin g number s o

f bothcas e referral s an d administrativ

e action s t

o manage an iP.9 5 VI-1 7

evaluat e th e program . Ther e i s fa r to o muc h imprecisio n in ou r measuremen t o f complianc e rates , an d fa r to o muc h Impor t t o th e continued , predictabl e presenc e o f a visibl e enforcemen t effor t t o ignor e th e importanc e o f level s o f enforcemen t activity

. Nevertheless , i t wil l alway s prov e difficul t t o sa yho wmuc h enforcemen t activit yi s enough , i n th e absenc e o f othe r measure s t o plac e thes e number s i n a fulle r context
. Th e number s o f enforcemen t action s ar e availabl e fo r th e federa l EP

Aonly
. Startin g i n Octobe r o f 1984 , theywi n b e availabl e o n a consisten t basi s fo r stat e action s a s well
. Compariso n fro

mon e yea r t o th e nex t i s difficul t du e t o changin g definition s o f wha t i s counte d an d include d i n th e total
. A s ca n b e see n i n Figure s VI- 6 an d vr-7 , th e number s o f enforcemen t action s hav e prove n t o b e fa r mor e sensitiv e t o agenc ypolic yan d managemen t system s change s than ar e rate s o f compliance

. On e ca n se e dramati c increase s in th e perio d from197 7 t o 197 9 i n th e level s o f enforcemen t actio n i n respons e t o th e Majo r Sourc e Enforcemen t Effort s i n ai r an

d water , followe d b ya dramati c declin e whe n th e list s wer e whittle d down
. On e ca n als o se e a dramati c declin e i n th e level s o f federa l enforcemen t actio n wit h th e chang e i n organizatio n i n 1980
. Th e Enforcemen t division s wer e separate d int o technica l an d lega l staffs , wit h th e technica l staff s decentralize d an d integrate d int o progra moperation s staffs
. The n ther e i s a dramati c increas e agai n wit h th e institutio n o f newmanagemen t system s unde r th e Ruckelshau s administration , an

d th e pus h t o assur e a credibl e enforcemen t effort
. Th e agenc yresponde d t o lowlavel s o f enforcemen t activit yfromOctobe r t o Decembe r 198 3 b yinstituting monthl y reporting , an

d increase d managemen t tracking o f enforcemen t projection s whic h resulte d i n a tripling o f cas e referral s an d a doublin g o f administrativ e action s during th e secon d thre e mont h period , ove r th e firs t thre e mont h period

. Thes e changin g level s o f enforcemen t actio n relat e no t onl yt o managemen t initiative s bu t als o t o changing realitie s i n th e maturin g o f ol d program s an d th e initiatio n o f newe r programs . Th e ai r and wate r (NPDES ) program s hav e had t o shif t fro

m a mor e straightforwar d focu s o n initia l complianc e an d installatio n o f contro l equipment , t o th e mor e difficul t an d les s obviou s tas k o f ensurin g continuin g complianc e on a da yt o da y

basis . Th e number s o f enforcemen t action s hav e droppe d partl y

a s a resul t o f th e nee d t o shif t focu s an d th e increasin

g difficult yo f developin g cases . I n contrast , th e hazardou s wast e programi s experiencin g th e same lo w level s o f complianc e tha t seeme d i n evidenc e a t th e beginning o f th e othe r programs . However , publi c impatienc e an d concer n i s fa r greate r an

d finally , the regulate d source s o f pollutio n ar e gettin g smalle r an d mor e numerou s makin g th e tas k al l th e mor e difficult , an d th e investmen t in enforcemen t actio n mor e costly
.

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B . Genera l Oversigh t Criteria , T The previou s sectio ndescribedfou

r ke y indicator s used , t o evaluat e th

e U.S . complianc e an denforcemen t program : complianc e rates , progres s agains t significan t violators , th e extent of complianc e monitorin g an dth e number o f forma l enforcemen t actions . Ther e are , however , severa l othe r way s t o asses s th e efficiency

an d effectivenes s o f complianc e an denforcemen t programs . Discusse d belo w are: . (1 ) environmenta l results , (2 ) timel y an d appropriat e enforcemen t response , (3 ) penaltie s assessed , an d (4 ) resource s expended an

d cost-effectivenes s o f enforcemen t procedures . 1 . Environmenta l Result s BothState s an

d th e federa l EP

A woul dlik

e t o asses s th

e effectivenes s o f th e complianc e an

denforcemen t program s i n term s o f environmenta l results . A t thi s tim

e it I s generall y not possibl e t o attribut e a specifi c environmenta l benefi t t o th e takin g o f a specifi c enforcemen t action . Th e dat a systems d o not permi t thi s typ e o f comparison . Furthermore , i t i s difficul t t o asses s th e value o f a singl e enforcemen t actionwher e i t ha s a deterren t effec t o nother s who ar e contemplatin

g whethe r o r not t o comply . Environmenta l result s are , however , take nint o accoun t i

n plannin g for enforcemen t progra m activities , an

dmor e sophisticated technique s ar e bein g developed t o bette r ensur e tha t enforcemen t resource s lea

d t o maximu

m environmenta l benefits . Eac hprogra

m a t th e nationa l leve l mus t prepar e a complianc e an d enforcemen t strateg y whichbegin s withth e settin

g o f prioritie s whic hwil l yiel d th

e greates t environmenta l benefits . A t th e loca l level , th e agenc y i s experimentin

g wit hgeographicall y base d approache s t o pla nfor improve

d complianc e an

denforcemen t action s acros s medi a programs t o assis t i nresolvin

g a specified hig hpriorit y

environmenta l problem . Th e Agency' s wor

k o n ris k managemen t technique s include s plan s t o eventuall y us e thes e technique s t o assis t i nsettin

g enforcemen t priorities . However , thes e activitie s ar e not likel y t o yiel d result s i n th e immediat e future . Finally , th e definitio

nof significan t violato r an

d managemen t attentio nbein g paid - t o resolvin g significan t violation s i na timel y

manne r wil l b

e a majo r step toward ensuring tha t hig hpriorit y

violation s ge t resolve d first . Ho w wel l eachprogra

m i s doin

g i ntyin g complianc e prioritie s t o environaenta l result s ca nultimatel y

b e assessed b

y th e stat e o f the environmen t an d a nanalysi s o f th

e type o f enforcemen t actio n taken . Substantia l achievement s hav e bee nmade i

ncleanin

g u p ai r an d wate r resource s i nth e U.S . Al l acros s th e country , streams are increasingl y fishabl e an

dswimmable , al l attributabl e t o hig hlevel s of industria l complianc e withNPDE S permi t requirements , an

d th e upgradin

g o f man

y municipa l treatment facilities . Base

d o nth e bes t stat e an

dregiona l data , i t appear s that despit e significan t populatio nan d industria l growth ,P.9 9 VI-2 1

ove r th e las t decade , th e U.S
. ha s kep t pac e i n maintainin g wate r qualit yacros s th e countryan d ha s significantly'improve d manyarea s i n particular

. Complianc e wit h industria l discharg e permit s resulte d i n a decreas e i n biochemica l oxyge n deman d (BOD ) b y6 9 percent ; suspende d solid s b y8 0 percent ; oi l an d greas e b

y 7 1 percent; , dissolve d solid s b y5 2 percent ; phosphat e b y7 4 percent ; an d heav ymetal s b

y7 5 percent
. Sewag e treatmen t plant s ar e removing 6 5 percen t mor e BO D an d suspende d solid s tha n 197 3 levels , abou t 13,60 0 ton s pe r day
. B yJun e 1983 , 6 9 percen t o f th e secondarytreatmen t plant s require d b yth e Clea n Wate r Ac t had bee n constructe d a s compare d t o 3 7 percen t i n Jul y1977
. Ther e hav e bee n significan t reduction s ove r th e las t decad e i n ai r emission s o f sulfu r dioxid e b y27 % becaus e o f successfu l fue l substitutio n an d stac k controls ; carbo n monoxid e b y26 % becaus e o f aut o standards ; an d lead b

y57% , primaril ybecaus e o f unleade d gasoline

. Les s overal l improvemen t ha s bee n mad e i n particulate s wit h a 3 % decrease ; ozon e wit h a 13 % decrease ; an

d nitroge n oxides

. I n al l cases , exceedence s o f th e nationa l standard s wer e les s severe . A n examinatio n o f remainin g environmenta l problem s show s a substantia l correlatio n betwee n lo wrate s o f complianc e an d th e environmenta l problem s whic h remai n a significan t challenge
. Thos e stream s wit h continuin g wate r pollutio n problem s ar e thos e wit h non-complyin g municipa l discharger s o r a s ye t unregulate d non-poin t source s o f wate r pollutio n an d toxi c effluent
. Th e ai r programdefine s a s significan t violators , non-complyin g source s locate d i n area s exceedin g nationa l ai r qualit ystandards
. Th e ozon e standar d continue s t o pos e a substantia l proble man d complianc e rate s ar e presume d t o b e lowe r than tha t fo r th e traditiona l pollutants
. Ground-wate r qualit yi s onl yno wreceivin g nationa l progra mattention , an d i s an are a fo r whic h ther e ar e high rate s o f non-complianc e wit h hazardou s wast e regulations

. Although systemati c linkage s canno t b e drawn betwee n complianc e an d environmenta l results , thes e impact s sho wsignifican t result s an d ar e take n int o accoun t i n managin g thes e programs . 2
. Timel yan

d Appropriat e Enforcemen t Respons e On e oft th e bes t indicator s o f th e efficienc yo f procedure s an d administrativ

e approache s i s th e time i t take s t o achiev e th e desire d result
. Enforcemen t response s ar e suppose d t o retur n th e sourc e expeditiousl yt o compliance , tha t is , a s quickl ya s ca n reasonabl yb e expected
. Thi s i s assesse d o n a case-by-cas e basis

. N o studie s hav e bee n conducte d on th e averag e lengt h o f time i t take s t o retur n a sourc e t o compliance , althoug h th e ne wtrackin g system s fo r significan t violation s shoul d produc e a cleare r pictur e o f ho wlon g i t doe s take
.P.10 0 VI-2 2

Unti l quit e recently , U.S i program s als o lacke d norm s fo r definin g ho wquickl ymos t enforcemen t case s shoul d be develope d an

d brough t t o resolution , specifically , ho wwel l th e progra

mi s ensuring :

- timel yinitia l respons e t o violation s onc e the yar e detected ; respons e an

d penaltie s appropriat e t o th e violation ; follow-u

p t o determin e i f th e violatio n ha s bee n correcte d and/o r enforcemen t orde r complie d with ; appropriat e escalatio n o f penalties , wit h swif t enforcemen t respons e t o continuin g violations ; follow-up...
. Ther e ma yb e disput e a s t o whethe r a goo d enforcemen t syste mmus t respond i n some fashio n t o al l violation s o r jus t t o significan t violations

. Ther e als o ma yb e disput e a s t o wha t shoul d constitut e a significan t violation

. Nevertheless , ther e i s alway s agreemen t tha t onc e a programanswer s thos e questions , i t ha s faile d i f response s ar e tard yo r i f ther e i s n o respons e o r i f ther e i s n o follow-u p t o ensur e complianc e wit h th e forma l respons e o r i f ther e i s n o meaningfu l penalt y impose d fo r recalcitrance

. Th e U.S
. EPAha s jus t issue d guidanc e tha t wil l for mth e basi s fo r assessin g ho wwel l enforcemen t case s ar e movin g t o closure
. A s par t o f th e Polic yFramewor k definin g criteri a fo r goo d performance , eac h programoffic e define d timetable s fo r th e milestone s describe d i n Chapte r IV
. Tw o ke yaspect s o f thes e timeframe s are , first , tha t the ywil l appl yonl yt o significan t violation s s o a s no t t o us e limite d agenc yresource s i n respondin g inappropriatel yt o les s importan t violation s becaus e o f artificia l deadlines

. Second , the yar e no t intende d t o b e deadline s bu t rathe r ar e genera l expectation s fo r goo d performance , trigge r point s fo r revie wan d presumption s in favo r o f federa l interventio n dependin g o n th e circumstance s o f th e case . The ywil l als o b e adjuste d fo r alternativ e stat e lega l and procedura l requirements

. A n exampl e i s describe d i n Figur e VI- 8 fo r th e hazardou s wast e program . Initia l respons e t o violation s shoul d tak e plac e withi n 3 0 day s o f detection , escalatio n t o a n administrativ e orde r o r judicia l referra l withi n 15 0 day s thereafter
. Th e ai r program wil l us e 4f

t day s and 12 0 day s respectively

. Th e wate r (NPDES ) progra m usiss 3 0 day s an

d 12 0 day s respectivel yfo r thes e steps
. Th e program s wil l b e evaluate d ove r th e nex t yea r t o determin e ho wrealisti c thes e expectation s ar e an d whethe r performanc e measure s can b e designe d whic h ar e usefu l t o appris e managemen t o f ho wwel l th e programi s doing i n thi s regard
. Thi s shoul d resul t i n some significan t improvement s in correctin g problem s identifie d in th e past
. Self-reporte d non-complianc e sometime s wa s no t addresse d b ystat e an

d