In the United States Court of Federal Claims

No. 21-1548

Filed: July 30, 2021

)

DANA WILLIAM WILEY, )

)

 Plaintiff, )

)

 v. )

)

THE UNITED STATES, )

)

 Defendant. )

)

ORDER

On July 2, 2021, Dana William Wiley (“Plaintiff”), proceeding pro se, filed the pending 

Complaint, ECF No. 1, and Motion for Leave to Proceed in forma pauperis, ECF No. 2. Partly 

unintelligible, the Complaint seems to assert that this Court has jurisdiction pursuant to 28 

U.S.C. §§ 1331 and 1343, 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(6)(C)(i), 18 U.S.C. § 3500, and Rule 16(a)(1)(A) of 

the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, ECF No. 1 at 1-2, 8, and that venue is proper under 28 

U.S.C. § 1391, id. at 1.1 Further, the Complaint appears to allege various wrongs committed 

against Plaintiff, primarily that the United States failed to produce information in response to 

Plaintiff’s prior Freedom of Information Act (“FOIA”) request or requests. See generally id. 

The Complaint also seems to make allegations against the Government, although several of these 

claims appear to be directed at the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania rather than the United States,

of harassment, id. ¶ 4, wrongful issuance of a warrant, id. ¶ 5, denial of Plaintiff’s rights to a 

habeas hearing, id. ¶¶ 6-7, and a conspiracy between certain Government agents and the 

Pennsylvania Department of Corrections to destroy a video interview of Plaintiff, id. at ¶ 8. The 

Complaint further appears to allege that state law enforcement authorities wrongly held Plaintiff 

in custody and assaulted him. Id. ¶¶ 6-8. Lastly, the Complaint seems to allege that the 

“Western District Federal Court” mistakenly dismissed with prejudice Plaintiff’s two “Brand 

Trademark Copyright Infragment” [sic] lawsuits, one for $75 million against the World

Wrestling Entertainment company and another for $37 billion against the Sony Music 

Entertainment company and other unnamed music companies. Id. at ¶ 9. In sum, Plaintiff

asserts that the Government violated his Fourth, Fifth, Sixth, Seventh, Eight, Fourteenth, 

Fifteenth, and Sixteenth Amendment rights under the United States Constitution and his rights 

under 18 U.S.C. § 3500 and Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 16(a)(1)(A). Id. at 6.

1 Some of the Complaint’s assertions appear in numbered paragraphs and others do not. Where 

an assertion does not appear in a numbered paragraph, the Court cites the page numbering from 

the Court’s ECF Header.
2

For relief, the Complaint appears to request a “Criminal / Civil Rights 2254 / 2555 

Hearing,” judgment in Plaintiff’s favor for $37 billion and $75 million in punitive damages, and 

that the Court: order the Government to “pardon disqualify and vacate” Plaintiff’s criminal 

convictions; order the dismissal of Plaintiff’s state criminal charges; order the Government to 

hold a hearing concerning Plaintiff’s rights under a “Stand Your Ground” law and firearmrelated rights; grant punitive damages for denial of “unfair process,” failure to conduct a “proper 

criminal / civil rights violation,” and for harassment, sexual harassment, and sexual 

discrimination; and order the Government to take some unintelligible action related to 

information requested in a FOIA request concerning several foreign countries. Id. at 6-7.

I. Standard of Review for Subject Matter Jurisdiction.

“Subject matter jurisdiction is a threshold requirement for a court’s power to exercise 

jurisdiction over a case[.]” Dow Jones & Co. v. Ablaise Ltd., 606 F.3d 1338, 1348 (Fed. Cir. 

2010). Under the Tucker Act, this Court has subject matter jurisdiction to hear “any claim 

against the United States founded either upon the Constitution, or any Act of Congress or any 

regulation of an executive department, or upon any express or implied contract with the United 

States, or for liquidated or unliquidated damages in cases not sounding in tort.” 28 U.S.C. 

§ 1491(a)(1). The Tucker Act, however, “does not create a substantive cause of action.” Fisher 

v. United States, 402 F.3d 1167, 1172 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (en banc). Rather, the Tucker Act 

requires: (1) a separate money-mandating statute that supports any claims of monetary damages 

against the United States and (2) a plaintiff that alleges it falls “within the class of plaintiffs 

entitled to relief.” Antonellis v. United States, 106 Fed. Cl. 112, 114-15 (2012), aff’d, 723 F.3d 

1328, 1331 (Fed. Cir. 2013) (noting that Tucker Act jurisdiction is a waiver of sovereign 

immunity). To establish Tucker Act jurisdiction in this Court, in other words, a plaintiff “must 

demonstrate that the source of substantive law he [or she] relies upon ‘can fairly be interpreted as 

mandating compensation by the Federal Government’” for any sustained damage. United States 

v. Mitchell, 463 U.S. 206, 216-17 (1983) (quoting United States v. Testan, 424 U.S. 392, 400 

(1976)). Such “money-mandating provisions are uncommon . . . .” Maine Cmty. Health Options 

v. United States, 140 S. Ct. 1308, 1329 (2019) (citing M. Solomson, COURT OF FEDERAL CLAIMS:

JURISDICTION, PRACTICE, AND PROCEDURE 4-18 (2016)). “Subject-matter jurisdiction may be 

challenged at any time by the parties or by the court sua sponte.” Folden v. United States, 379 

F.3d 1344, 1354 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (citing Fanning, Phillips & Molnar v. West, 160 F.3d 717, 720 

(Fed. Cir.1998)). And “[i]f the court determines at any time that it lacks subject-matter 

jurisdiction, the court must dismiss the action.” RCFC 12(h)(3).

Generally, a pro se plaintiff’s complaint is held to “less stringent standards . . . .” Estelle 

v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 106 (1976) (quoting Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520-21 (1972)). 

But even a pro se plaintiff must strictly meet its jurisdictional burden. See Kelley v. Sec’y, U.S. 

Dep’t of Labor, 812 F.2d 1378, 1380 (Fed. Cir. 1987) (“We agree that leniency with respect to 

mere formalities should be extended to a pro se party, . . . [h]owever, . . . a court may not 

similarly take a liberal view of that jurisdictional requirement and set a different rule for pro se

litigants only.”). “Pro se or not, the plaintiff still has the burden of establishing by a 

preponderance of the evidence that this Court has jurisdiction over its claims.” Rothing v. United 

States, 132 Fed. Cl. 387, 390 (2017) (citing Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of Am., 511 U.S. 

375, 377 (1994)). “Although a litigant has the right to act as his or her own attorney, it is well 
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established that the right of self representation is not a license to fail to comply with the 

applicable rules of procedural and substantive law.” Walsh v. United States, 3 Cl. Ct. 539, 541 

(1983) (citing Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 834 n.46 (1975)).

II. Discussion

Even considering the lenient standards applied to pro se litigants, the Court finds that 

Plaintiff has failed to satisfy his burden of establishing this Court’s subject matter jurisdiction

over his Complaint for the following reasons. While the Complaint is not entirely clear, the 

claimed bases for jurisdiction and the relief sought are unquestionably outside this Court’s 

jurisdiction. Therefore, under Rule 12(h)(3), the Court must dismiss this action.

A. The statutes Plaintiff relies upon for jurisdiction or relief fail to provide this 

Court with jurisdiction to hear Plaintiff’s claims.

Because this Court is not a district court of the United States, the authorities Plaintiff 

relies upon to establish jurisdiction all fail. 2 See ECF No. 1 at 1-2, 8. First, Plaintiff asserts that 

the Court has jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1331, which states that “[t]he district courts shall 

have original jurisdiction of all civil actions arising under the Constitution, laws, or treaties of 

the United States.” (emphasis added). Similarly, Plaintiff relies upon 28 U.S.C. § 1343 to 

establish our jurisdiction, which also states that “[t]he district courts shall have original 

jurisdiction of any civil action authorized by law to be commenced by any person . . . .” 

(emphasis added). But when Congress vests jurisdiction in the district courts, this Court “lacks 

subject matter jurisdiction over” such claims because “[t]he Court of Federal Claims is not a 

district court of the United States . . . .” Ledford v. United States, 297 F.3d 1378, 1382 (Fed. Cir. 

2002); see also Embrey v. United States, No. 19-740C, 2020 WL 7312184, at *5 (Fed. Cl. Dec. 

11, 2020) (holding Section 1331 “does not apply to our court, however, and so does not provide 

the necessary jurisdiction to proceed.”) (citations omitted).

Second, the same is true with Plaintiff’s assertion of jurisdiction under FOIA, which 

provides that “the district court of the United States in the district in which the complainant 

resides, or has his principal place of business, or in which the agency records are situated, or in 

the District of Columbia, has jurisdiction to enjoin the agency from withholding agency records 

and to order the production of any agency records improperly withheld from the complainant.” 5 

U.S.C. § 552(a)(4)(B) (emphasis added). Indeed, “Congress has conferred on the district courts, 

and not this court, the responsibility for enforcing the FOIA statute.” Frazier v. United States, 

No. 16-1287C, 2016 WL 6583715, at *2 (Fed. Cl. Nov. 1, 2016), aff'd, 683 F. App’x 938 (Fed. 

Cir. 2017) (quoting Dobyns v. United States, 91 Fed. Cl. 412, 430 (2010)). This Court also “does 

not have jurisdiction over claimed violations of the Privacy Act or FOIA because those statutes 

2 Because this is a Court of national jurisdiction, venue is not at issue. If it were, however, the 

Plaintiff’s assertion that venue is proper under 28 U.S.C. § 1391 similarly misconstrues what this 

Court is. Section 1391 applies to “the venue of all civil actions brought in district courts of the 

United States.” (emphasis added).
4

do not contain money-mandating provisions.” Frazier, 683 F. App’x at 940 (citing Snowton v. 

United States, 216 F. App’x 981, 983 (Fed. Cir. 2007)).

Third, neither of the criminal provisions Plaintiff asserts for jurisdiction provide this 

Court with jurisdiction because “the jurisdiction of the United States Court of Federal Claims 

does not include jurisdiction over criminal causes of action.” Harvey v. United States, 149 Fed. 

Cl. 751, 766-67 (2020) (collecting cases). Therefore, the Court lacks jurisdiction under 18 

U.S.C. § 3500, which addresses the production of information in criminal proceedings. 

Similarly, the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure have no application in this Court because 

they apply to “all criminal proceedings in the United States district courts, the United States 

courts of appeals, and the Supreme Court of the United States.” Fed. R. Crim. P. 1(a)(1)

(emphasis added).

Fourth, Plaintiff appears to demand a habeas corpus hearing in this Court under 28 

U.S.C. §§ 2254-55. See ECF No. 1 ¶¶ 6-7 (appearing to assert a right to a “2254 ‘ 2255 

hearing”). Plaintiff also seeks an order to “require the U.S. Federal Claims Court to schedule a 

criminal / civil rights 2254 / 2255 hearing to determine if Plaintiff is entitled to the following 

relief damages.” Id. at 6.3 But this Court “does not have the power to entertain a petition for a 

writ of habeas corpus.” Ledford, 297 F.3d at 1381 (“[T]he habeas statute does not list the Court 

of Federal Claims among those courts empowered to grant a writ of habeas corpus, and the 

[Court] therefore is without power to entertain [plaintiff’s] petition.”).

Fifth, to the extent Plaintiff alleges any violations of his civil rights, this Court lacks 

jurisdiction to hear such claims. E.g., Kelly-Leppert v. United States, No. 21-955C, 2021 WL 

2853171, at *4 (Fed. Cl. July 8, 2021) (“In addition, the Court may not consider civil rights 

claims, because Congress has committed jurisdiction over claims brought pursuant to the Civil 

Rights Act to the United States district courts.”) (citing 28 U.S.C. § 1343(a)(4)).

B. This Court lacks jurisdiction over claims against any defendant other than 

the United States.

While it appears that the gravamen of the Complaint is that the Federal Government has 

not provided information Plaintiff sought through FOIA, there are what might be allegations that 

state actors wronged Plaintiff. ECF No. 1 ¶¶ 6-9. To the extent Plaintiff seeks to bring a cause 

of action against the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania or any of its employees, this Court has no 

jurisdiction over such claims. It is well-settled that “if the relief sought is against others than the 

United States the suit as to them must be ignored as beyond the jurisdiction of the court.” United 

States v. Sherwood, 312 U.S. 584, 588, (1941) (citations omitted).

C. This Court lacks jurisdiction to review the decisions of other courts.

Several of Plaintiff’s claims would require this Court to review the decisions of other 

courts, which we cannot do. For example, the Plaintiff seeks to have the Court: “Require the 

3 Much of the Complaint is typed in all capital letters. The Court’s quotations of the Complaint 

remove the extraneous capitalization of text.
5

Defendants to pardon4 disqualify and vacate Plaintiff , [sic] Dana Wiley felony convictions / 

illegal 8 to 26 year sentence for aggravated assault / robbery criminal case # 1144 and 1139 / 

1994,” ECF No. 1 at Prayer ¶ 1(A); and “Require the Defendants to amend pardon court order to 

the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania to drop and dismissed [sic] criminal charge # 827 / 2020,” 

id. at Prayer ¶ 1(B). But this Court has no authority to review Federal district courts’ decisions 

or judgments. E.g., Joshua v. United States, 17 F.3d 378, 380 (Fed. Cir. 1994) (“[T]he Court of 

Federal Claims does not have jurisdiction to review the decisions of district courts . . . relating to 

proceedings before those courts.”). The same is true concerning state court rulings. E.g.,

Robinson v. United States, 135 Fed. Cl. 556, 560 (2017) (“[T]o the extent that the complaint . . .

could be read to include a request that this court invalidate or otherwise reverse [a] state court 

decision . . . the court is powerless to review the decisions of state courts.”) (citation omitted).

While not as explicit, it also appears that Plaintiff’s claim for $37,075,000,000 is based 

on the United States District Court for the Western District of Pennsylvania’s dismissal of 

Plaintiff’s copyright infringement claims against World Wrestling Entertainment and Sony 

Music Entertainment. See ECF No. 1 ¶ 9 (alleging that “the Western District Federal Court 

prejudice dismissed the brand trade mark copyright infringement lawsuit against World 

Wrestling Entertainment for the sum[] $75 million[,] followby [sic] one against Sony Music[] 

Entertainment et al independent record labels for $37 billion dollars.”). This allegation appears 

to be attacking the Western District of Pennsylvania’s opinion in Wiley v. McMahon, No. 2:18-

cv-1207, 2019 WL 5395172 (W.D. Pa. Oct. 22, 2019) (adopting magistrate judge’s report and 

recommendation and dismissing the complaint with prejudice). Therefore, this Court may not 

disturb the district court’s decision.

And to the extent Plaintiff wants this Court to hold a hearing to determine whether he 

should have his “right to possess, control, manufacture[,] and purchase firearm[s]” reinstated, 

this Court lacks jurisdiction over such a claim. ECF No. 1 Prayer ¶ 1(C). While the Complaint 

does not explain why these rights were lost, it appears clear from the record that Plaintiff lost 

these rights due to his felony conviction(s). But this Court cannot undo the conviction(s) that 

appear to have cost Plaintiff his rights. And because such relief is clearly not monetary damages 

against the United States, this Court lacks jurisdiction in any event. See 28 U.S.C. § 1491(a)(1) 

(granting this Court jurisdiction over cases against the United States “for liquidated or 

unliquidated damages in cases not sounding in tort.”).

D. None of the cited Constitutional provisions provides this Court with 

jurisdiction to hear Plaintiff’s claims.

To the extent Plaintiff bases his allegations and requested relief on violations of his 

Fourth, Fifth, Sixth, Seventh, Eighth, Fourteenth, Fifteenth, and Sixteenth Amendment rights, 

ECF No. 1 at 6, it is well established that the Court lacks jurisdiction over such causes of action

4 In addition to this Court’s inability to review the Plaintiff’s criminal convictions, the Court 

notes that the pardon power is vested exclusively in the Executive branch, not the Judiciary. 

U.S. Const. Art II, sec. 2 cl. 1 (providing that the President “shall have Power to grant Reprieves 

and Pardons for Offences against the United States.”). And that federal power does not extend to 

state convictions. Id.
6

because, “except for the taking clause of the [F]ifth [A]mendment, the other [A]mendments do 

not require the United States to pay money for their alleged violation” and thus are not moneymandating sources of law. Elkins v. United States, 229 Ct. Cl. 607, 608 (1981) (per curiam); see 

also, e.g., Taylor v. United States, 844 F. App’x 369, 371 (Fed. Cir. 2021) (“Because ‘the Fourth 

Amendment does not mandate the payment of money for its violation,’ the [Court of Federal 

Claims] does not have jurisdiction over Fourth Amendment claims.”) (quoting Brown v. United 

States, 105 F.3d 621, 623 (Fed. Cir. 1997)); Smith v. United States, 709 F.3d 1114, 1116 (Fed. 

Cir. 2013) (“The law is well settled that the Due Process clauses of both the Fifth and Fourteenth 

Amendments do not mandate the payment of money and thus do not provide a cause of action 

under the Tucker Act.”) (citing LeBlanc v. United States, 50 F.3d 1025, 1028 (Fed. Cir. 1995));

Drake v. United States, 792 F. App’x 916, 920 (Fed. Cir. 2019) (“The Court of Federal Claims, 

however, does not have jurisdiction to render judgment on claims against the United States based 

on the Sixth Amendment because it is not money mandating.”) (citing Maxberry v. United 

States, 722 F. App'x 997, 1001 (Fed. Cir. 2018)); Drake, 792 F. App’x at 920 n. 6 (“[T]he 

Seventh Amendment is not money-mandating and[] . . . does not confer jurisdiction on the Court 

of Federal Claims.”) (citing Sherwood, 312 U.S. at 587); Trafny v. United States, 503 F.3d 1339, 

1340 (Fed. Cir. 2007) (per curiam) (“The Court of Federal Claims does not have jurisdiction 

over claims arising under the Eighth Amendment, as the Eighth Amendment ‘is not a moneymandating provision.’”) (quoting Edelmann v. United States, 76 Fed. Cl. 376, 383 (2007));

LeBlanc, 50 F.3d at 1028 (holding that the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process and Equal 

Protection clauses do not confer jurisdiction to this Court “because they do not mandate payment 

of money by the government.”) (citing Carruth v. United States, 627 F.2d 1068, 1081 (1980)); 

Maxberry v. United States, 722 F. App'x 997, 1000 (Fed. Cir. 2018) (“The [Court of Federal 

Claims] lacks jurisdiction over claims based on the Fourth, Sixth, Eighth, . . . and Fifteenth 

Amendments, . . . because they are not money-mandating.”) (citing Hernandez v. United States, 

93 Fed. Cl. 193, 198 (2010)); Russell v. United States, 78 Fed. Cl. 281, 288 (2007) (“Plaintiff's 

invocation of the Sixteenth Amendment is similarly unavailing. The court does not perceive 

how the amendment authorizing the government to collect taxes could possibly constitute a 

source mandating the payment of money to plaintiff.”). Thus, these Constitutional Amendments 

do not provide the Court with jurisdiction over Plaintiff ’s Complaint.

E. This Court lacks jurisdiction to hear Plaintiff’s tort claims.

The Complaint also appears to demand damages for “harassment,” “sexual harassment,” 

and “sexual discrimination.” See ECF No. 1 Prayer ¶ 1(F). But this Court lacks jurisdiction over 

such claims. Whatever evidence of harassment Plaintiff may have (none of which appears in the 

Complaint), these claims sound in tort and must be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction. 28 U.S.C. 

§1491(a)(1); Harvey v. United States, 845 F. App’x 923, 926 (Fed. Cir. 2021) (“The Tucker Act 

specifically excludes claims “sounding in tort” from the jurisdiction of the [Court of Federal 

Claims].”). 

Finally, much of Plaintiff’s Complaint seeks punitive damages. But it is well-settled that 

this Court “has no jurisdiction to award punitive damages.” Hawkins v. United States, No. 15-

360C, 2015 WL 6689860, at *1 (Fed. Cl. Oct. 30, 2015) (citing Environmental Safety 

Consultants, Inc. v. United States, 95 Fed. Cl. 77, 98 (2010)); see also Trevino v. United States, 

557 F. App’x 995, 998 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (holding that this Court “does not have jurisdiction over . 
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. . claims for . . . punitive damages.”); Francis v. United States, No. 19-770, 2019 WL 4784824, 

at *3 (Fed. Cl. Oct. 1, 2019) (“It is well established that punitive damages are not recoverable 

under the Tucker Act . . . . As a result, plaintiffs’ claim for punitive damages must be 

dismissed.”) (internal citations omitted).

III. Conclusion

For these reasons, Plaintiff’s Motion for Leave to Proceed in forma pauperis, ECF No. 2, 

is GRANTED. Because this Court unequivocally lacks subject matter jurisdiction over any of 

Plaintiff’s claims, the Complaint, ECF No. 1, is hereby DISMISSED. The Clerk is directed to 

enter judgment accordingly.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

s/ Edward H. Meyers

Edward H. Meyers

Judge