Federal Register / Vol. 63, No. 96 /Tuesday, May 19, 1998 / Notices 27605

NUCLEAR REGULATORY

COMMISSION

[Docket Nos. 50–266 and 50–301]

In the Matter of Wisconsin Electric

Power Company (Point Beach Nuclear

Plant, Unit Nos. 1 and 2); Exemption

I

Wisconsin Electric Power Company

(the licensee) is the holder of Facility

Operating License Nos. DPR–24 and

DPR–27, which authorize operation of

the Point Beach Nuclear Plant, Units 1

and 2, respectively. The licenses

provide, among other things, that the

licensee is subject to all rules,

regulations, and orders of the

Commission now or hereafter in effect.

The facility consists of two

pressurized-water reactors located at the

licensee’s site in Manitowoc County,

Wisconsin.

II

The Code of Federal Regulations at 10

CFR 50.48, ‘‘Fire Protection,’’ requires

that nuclear power plants licensed to

operate prior to January 1, 1979, meet

Appendix R, ‘‘Fire Protection Program

for Nuclear Power Facilities Operating

Prior to January 1, 1979,’’ Sections III.G,

III.J, and III.O. Appendix R, Section III.J,

‘‘Emergency Lighting,’’ requires that

‘‘Emergency lighting units with at least

an 8-hour battery power supply shall be

provided in all areas needed for

operation of safe shutdown equipment

and in access and egress routes thereto.’’

Equipment needed for safe shutdown

after a fire at Point Beach Nuclear Plant

is maintained inside the main power

block and several buildings onsite.

Emergency lighting is provided inside

these buildings for areas needed for

operation of safe shutdown equipment

and for access and egress routes in

accordance with 10 CFR part 50,

Appendix R, Section III.J. However, no

emergency lighting meeting Section III.J

requirements has been installed for

outdoor routes between these buildings.

Because of cost and maintenance

considerations, and after determining

that application of Section III.J was not

necessary to achieve the underlying

purpose of the rule, the licensee

submitted an exemption request with

respect to these outdoor routes.

The requested exemption from the

requirements of Appendix R, Section

III.J, would allow the use of hand-held

portable lights, in the event that

sufficient daylight, normal lighting, or

security lighting is not available, when

transiting (access and egress routes)

between the main power block and

buildings separated from the main

power block, namely, the diesel

generator building (G–03 and G–04),

13.8 kV switchgear building, service

water and fire pump house, fuel oil

pump house, gas turbine building, and

warehouse 3. These buildings contain

equipment relied upon in the detailed

fire plans to mitigate the consequences

of a fire that could affect the capability

to place the reactor in cold shutdown.

As stated above, emergency lighting is

maintained within these structures as

required by Appendix R, Section III.J.

However, access and egress between

these buildings and the main power

block require walking outdoors. The

areas outside of and between these

buildings are paved, commonly used for

vehicular traffic, and are maintained

clear of snow and other obstructions.

In the worst-case scenarios that

postulate a fire concurrent with a loss of

offsite power, the hand-held, batterypowered, portable lighting units

currently maintained on site in four

‘‘abnormal operating procedure’’ (AOP)

packs located in the control room and

additional hand-held, battery-powered,

portable lighting units maintained by

operations personnel would be used,

under the proposed exemption, by the

operations staff to allow transit between

buildings to safely perform the

functions required by the fire plans and

operations procedures. Each of the four

AOP packs contain a hand-held, batterypowered, portable lighting unit in

addition to tools. Each hand-held,

battery-powered, portable lighting unit

is verified to be operable in a monthly

surveillance and the batteries are

replaced every 6 months.

III

Pursuant to 10 CFR 50.12, the

Commission may, upon application by

any interested person or upon its own

initiative, grant exemptions from the

requirements of 10 CFR Part 50 when (1)

the exemptions are authorized by law,

will not present an undue risk to the

public health or safety, and are

consistent with the common defense

and security, and (2) when special

circumstances are present. Special

circumstances are present whenever,

according to 10 CFR 50.12(a)(2)(ii),

‘‘Application of the regulation in the

particular circumstances would not

serve the underlying purpose of the rule

or is not necessary to achieve the

underlying purpose of the rule.’’

The underlying purpose of 10 CFR

part 50, Appendix R, Section III.J, is to

provide adequate illumination to assure

the capability of performing all

necessary safe shutdown functions, as

well as to assure personnel movement to

and from the equipment and

components that must be manually

operated by plant personnel to effect

safe shutdown during emergencies. In

addition, the illumination must have a

capability to allow sufficient time for

normal lighting to be restored.

To achieve safe shutdown during a

plant emergency, personnel may be

required to go to and from buildings

outside the main power block to control

equipment locally, monitor equipment

status, or obtain equipment, such as fans

or repair materials. Any equipment that

would need to be obtained could be

carried with one hand or, if necessary,

transported on wheeled carts. In the

latter case, a minimum of two

individuals would be available, one of

whom could provide the necessary

lighting if needed.

The availability of hand-held, batterypowered portable lights would serve the

underlying purpose of the rule with

respect to transit between the main

power block and the separate buildings

identified above, in that the use of such

hand-held lights would provide

adequate illumination to permit access

to and egress from buildings containing

safe shutdown equipment and

components, yet would not significantly

hinder the transportation of equipment

if such is necessary during a plant

emergency. In addition, such hand-held

lights would be available for use during

an 8-hour period contemplated by the

regulation.

On the basis of its evaluation, the staff

concludes that with the availability of

hand-held battery-powered portable

lights for use during transit between site

structures described above, the

installation of emergency lighting units

with at least an 8-hour battery power

supply for these transit routes is not

necessary to achieve the underlying

purpose of Section III.J of Appendix R

to 10 CFR part 50. The licensee’s request

for an exemption from the requirements

of Section III.J to 10 CFR part 50 to

allow the use of alternative means of

lighting for access and egress routes

between the main power block and the

diesel generator building, 13.8 kV

switchgear building, service water and

fire pump house, fuel oil pump house,

gas turbine building, and warehouse 3 is

acceptable to the staff.

IV

Accordingly, the Commission has

determined, pursuant to 10 CFR 50.12,

that this exemption is authorized by

law, will not present an undue risk to

the public health and safety, and is

consistent with the common defense

and security. The Commission further

determines that special circumstances

as provided in 10 CFR 50.12(a)(2)(ii) are
27606 Federal Register / Vol. 63, No. 96 /Tuesday, May 19, 1998 / Notices

present in that application of the

regulation in these particular

circumstances is not necessary to

achieve the underlying purpose of the

rule.

Therefore, the Commission hereby

grants the Wisconsin Electric Power

Company an exemption from the

requirements of 10 CFR part 50,

Appendix R, Section III.J, with respect

to access and egress routes between the

main power block and the diesel

generator building, 13.8 kV switchgear

building, service water and fire pump

house, fuel oil pump house, gas turbine

building, and warehouse 3 at Point

Beach Nuclear Plant, Units 1 and 2, to

the extent alternative means of lighting

as described herein are available.

Pursuant to 10 CFR 51.32, the

Commission has determined that the

granting of this exemption will not have

a significant effect on the quality of the

human environment (62 FR 46381).

This exemption is effective upon

issuance.

Dated at Rockville, Maryland, this 7th day

of April 1998.

For The Nuclear Regulatory Commission.

Samuel J. Collins,

Director, Office of Nuclear Reactor

Regulation.

[FR Doc. 98–13189 Filed 5–18–98; 8:45 am]

BILLING CODE 7590–01–P

NUCLEAR REGULATORY

COMMISSION

[Docket Nos. 50–317 and 50–318]

Baltimore Gas and Electric Company;

Calvert Cliffs Nuclear Power Plant, Unit

Nos. 1 and 2 Environmental

Assessment and Finding of No

Significant Impact

The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory

Commission (the Commission) is

considering issuance of an amendment

to Facility Operating Licenses Nos.

DPR–53 and DPR–69, issued to

Baltimore Gas and Electric Company

(the licensee), for operation of the

Calvert Cliffs Nuclear Power Plant, Unit

Nos. 1 and 2, located in Calvert County,

Maryland.

Environmental Assessment

Identification of the Proposed Action

The proposed action would revise the

Technical Specifications (TSs) to reduce

the minimum Reactor Coolant System

(RCS) total flow rate from 370,000 gpm

to 340,000 gpm; reduce the Reactor

Protective Instrumentation trip setpoint

for Reactor Coolant Flow—Low from

greater than or equal to 95% to greater

than or equal to 92% of design reactor

coolant flow; adjust the reactor core

thermal margin safety limit lines to

reflect the reduced RCS flow rate; and

reduce the lift setting range for the eight

Main Steam Safety Valves (MSSVs) with

the highest allowable lift setting from

the current range of 935 to 1065 psig to

a more restrictive range of 935 to 1050

psig. In addition to the changes to the

TSs necessary to support an increased

number of plugged steam generator

tubes, reanalysis of the accident

analyses affected by this change

identified an Unreviewed Safety

Question (USQ) associated with these

changes. The USQ results from the

determination that the Seized Rotor

Event analysis involves an increased

percentage of failed fuel cladding.

Finally, four reanalyzed events Main

Steamline Break (MSLB), Steam

Generator Tube Rupture (SGTR) Loss of

Coolant Flow, and Boron Dilution)

require Nuclear Regulatory Commission

approval due to changes to the

methodology or assumptions used to

analyze these events.

The proposed action is in accordance

with the licensee’s application for

amendment dated January 31, 1997, as

supplemented by letters dated February

13, February 28, March 25, April 16,

August 16, and September 29, 1997, and

January 22, March 17, April 8, and April

21, 1998.

The Need for the Proposed Action

During the 1998 Unit 1 refueling

outage, Baltimore Gas and Electric

Company (BGE) will perform extensive

steam generator tube inspections. Tubes

that experience excessive degradation

reduce the integrity of the primary-tosecondary pressure boundary. Eddy

current examination is used to measure

the extent of tube degradation. When

the reduction in the tube wall thickness

reaches the plugging or repair limit, as

specified in the Technical

Specifications, the tube is considered

defective and a corrective action is

taken.

Currently, the Calvert Cliffs TSs allow

defective tubes to be plugged and

removed from service, or to be repaired

using welded sleeving techniques

developed by Westinghouse Electric

Corporation or Combustion Engineering,

Inc. The most widely used tube

maintenance technique at many

pressurized water reactors, including

Calvert Cliffs, is removal of the

degraded tube from service by installing

plugs at both ends of the tube. The

installation of steam generator tube

plugs removes the heat transfer surface

of the plugged tube from service, and

the increased flow resistance leads to a

reduction in the primary coolant flow

available for core cooling. The

minimum primary coolant flow

requirements in the TSs are based upon

operation with no more than 800

plugged tubes in each steam generator.

There is a possibility that the results of

steam generator tube inspections in the

upcoming refueling outage will

necessitate exceeding the 800 plugged

tube criteria in at least one of the Unit

1 steam generators. If this is the case,

BGE will require implementation of the

proposed TSs changes and approval of

the USQ prior to Mode 2 entry following

the 1998 Unit 1 refueling outage.

Environmental Impacts of the Proposed

Action

The Commission has completed its

evaluation of the proposed action and

concludes that the proposed action will

not have a significant effect on the

quality of the human environment. To

the extent there is any environmental

impact from increasing the number of

plugged steam generator tubes, such

impact results from the increased RCS

temperature and the reduced RCS flow

rate expected to result from this activity.

Reanalysis of the Seized Rotor Event

analyses has indicated a greater

percentage of fuel pin failures would be

expected during these postulated

accidents due to the revised coolant

temperature and flow rates; the

increased number of plugged tubes

results in an increase in offsite releases,

relative to past analyses.

The licensee’s results of the MSLB

event reanalysis with reduced RCS flow

indicate a reduction in the 0–2 hour

thyroid dose at the Exclusion Area

Boundary (EAB) from 81 rem to 5 rem,

and a decrease in the 0–2 hour whole

body dose at the EAB from 0.3 rem to

0.2 rem. The licensee’s results of the

Seized Rotor Event reanalysis indicate

the resultant 0–2 hour EAB thyroid dose

increases from 3.6 rem to 12 rem,

whereas the whole body dose at the

EAB is reduced from 0.4 rem to 0.2 rem.

The licensee presented, for the first

time, doses at the low population zone

(LPZ) for the MSLB and the Seized

Rotor Events. These doses were 1.2 rem

thyroid and 0.04 rem whole body for the

MSLB and 1.0 rem thyroid and 0.04 rem

whole body for the Seized Rotor Event.

The guideline dose limits for accidents

involving fuel failure are the 10 CFR

Part 100 limits of 300 rem to the thyroid

and 25 rem to the whole body.

The licensee presented the results of

an SGTR analysis. Two cases were

presented. The first case was based

upon primary coolant being at the 100

hour technical specification value for

dose equivalent 131 I of 1 μCI/g and

iodine spiking factor of 500. The