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******************************************************STATE FARM FIRE AND CASUALTY COMPANY

v. MARK TULLY ET AL. (SC 19600)
Rogers, C. J., and Palmer, Zarella, Eveleigh, McDonald, Espinosa and Robinson, Js. Argued March 28—officially released August 23, 2016 Kirk D. Tavtigian, Jr., for the appellant-appellee (defendant Child Doe).
Ron Murphy, for the appellee-appellant (named defendant).
Jack G. Steigelfest, for the appellee in both appeals (plaintiff).Opinion ROBINSON, J. The principal issue in these appeals is whether evidence of an insured person’s voluntary intoxication may be used, when an insurance policy excludes coverage for intentional acts, to negate intent and thereby establish the insurer’s duty to defend the insured person against civil claims arising from sexual misconduct with aminor. The plaintiff, State Farm Fire and Casualty Company, brought this action seeking a declaratory judgment that it owed no duty to defend the named defendant, Mark Tully, under ahomeowners insurance policy (policy), in a separate civil action filed
on behalf of the defendant Child Doe.1 The defendants appeal2 from the judgment of the trial court granting the plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment on the ground that, because the policy excluded coverage for acts ‘‘intended’’ by the insured, Tully’s actions fell outside the scope of the policy and, thus, the plaintiff had
no duty to defend him under the presumption ofintent established in United Services Automobile Assn. v. Marburg, 46 Conn. App. 99, 104–105, 698 A.2d 914 (1997). On appeal, the defendants claim that the trial court improperly rendered summaryjudgment in favor of the plaintiff because evidence that Tully was intoxicated at the time of the incident created a genuine issue of material fact as to whether his actions were intentional. Specifically, the defendants assert that evidence of voluntary intoxication may negate the intent presumed under Marburg and thereby establish an insurer’s duty to defend. We disagree and, accordingly, affirm the judgment of the trial court.
The record reveals the following undisputed facts and procedural history. On July 2, 2012, Doe and two other girls were in the shower area of Winding Trails Park in Farmington. At that time, Doe was fourteen years old and the two other girls were, respectively, thirteen and eight years old. Tully, who was fifty-six years old and ‘‘under the influence of intoxicating liquor,’’ approached the three girls and offered to buy them ice cream. After the girls refused, Tully grabbed Doe’sbreast, nearlyremovingherbathingsuittop. Tully then fondled the buttocks of the eight year old girl in Doe’s view. Doe, by and through herparent as next friend, subsequently filed a civil action against Tully alleging, inter alia, that he ‘‘negligen[tly]’’ sexually assaulted herwhile he was intoxicated.3 The plaintiffhad previously issued the policy, which provided that the plaintiff would defend Tully against claims resulting from an ‘‘occurrence,’’ which is defined in the policy as an ‘‘accident,’’ but not from claims resulting from his intentional actions. Tully claimed coverage underthe policy, based
on his intoxicated state, and requested that the plaintiff defendhiminthe action.4Theplaintiffdenied coverage, however, on the ground that Doe’s claim fell within theintentional act exclusion of the policy.
In response to this complaint, the plaintiff initiated the present action seeking a declaratoryjudgment with regard to its duty to defend Tully.5 The plaintiff moved forsummaryjudgmentonthe groundthatthe complaint in the underlying action alleged an intentional act, which fell within the policy’s intentional act exclusion ofcoverage. Inresponse, Tullysubmittedtwoaffidavits,
one from a physician and one from a psychologist, which opined that he was an alcoholic and so intoxicated on the day ofthe incident that he could not have formed the requisite intent to harm Doe, as well as his
own affidavit attesting that he did—and still does— struggle with alcoholism. The defendants argued that this evidence raised a genuine issue of material fact as to whether Tully’s actions were intentional.6 The trial courtrendered summaryjudgment infavor ofthe plaintiff, concluding that the plaintiffwas entitled to rely on Marburg, which established a presumption ofintent in
casesinvolvingthesexualassaultofaminor. See United ServicesAutomobileAssn. v. Marburg, supra, 46 Conn. App. 104. The trial court then stated, more generally, that ‘‘voluntary intoxication does not establish a question of intent when defending against an exclusionary clause ofan insurance policy.’’ These appeals followed. See footnote 2 of this opinion.7
On appeal, the defendants reiterate their claim that evidence ofTully’svoluntaryintoxicationraises agenuine issue of material fact as to whether his actions
were intentional and, thus, fall within the intentional act exclusion of the policy.8 The defendants first claim that the trial court improperly applied the presumption established in Marburg because this court overruled that presumption in Allstate Ins. Co. v. Barron, 269 Conn. 394, 409, 848 A.2d 1165 (2004), which held that the standard for determining whether an insured’s intentmaybe negatedforthepurposes ofanintentional act exclusion is whetherthe insured was able to understand the wrongfulness ofhis conduct. Thus, the defendants claim that there was a genuine issue of material fact as to whether Tully was able to understand the wrongfulness ofhis conduct as a result ofhis intoxication. Alternatively, should this court applytheMarburg presumption, the defendants argue that this court should, as a policy matter, allow evidence ofvoluntary intoxication to be used to negate that intent. Lastly, the defendants claimthatthetrialcourtimproperlydecided ‘‘that an insured’s intoxication can never, as amatterof law, negate the intentrequiredto invoke the intentional acts exclusion.’’ (Emphasis in original.)
In response, the plaintiffcontends thatthe trial court properly applied the Marburg presumption and, thus, there is no genuine issue of material fact that Tully’s acts fellwithinthe intentional acts exclusion. Theplaintiff also argues that Barron clarified the Marburg pre-sumption, rather than overruled it, given that the two
cases are factually distinguishable. Finally, the plaintiff argues that this court should not allow evidence of Tully’svoluntaryintoxicationto rebuttheMarburgpresumption, as it would be against public policy to allow evidence of voluntary intoxication to negate intent for the purposes ofan intentional exclusion act in an insurance policy.
We agree with the plaintiffand conclude that: (1) the Marburg presumption of intentional conduct based on
an insured’s sexual misconduct with a minor remains good law after Barron; (2) the trial court properly applied the Marburg presumption in the present case; and (3) evidence of voluntary intoxication may not be used to negate intent in duty to defend cases in which the insured’sintentisinferredfromthe underlying complaint that alleges that the insured committed sexual misconduct with a minor. We, therefore, conclude that the plaintiff satisfied its burden of demonstrating that
no genuine issue of material fact exists insofar as the complaint in the underlying civil action alleges intentional acts and, thus, the plaintiff has no duty to defend Tully. ‘‘In seeking summaryjudgment, it is the movant who has the burden of showing the nonexistence of any issue of fact. The courts are in entire agreement that the movingpartyforsummaryjudgmenthas the burden of showing the absence of any genuine issue as to all the material facts, which, under applicable principles ofsubstantive law, entitle himto ajudgmentas amatter oflaw. The courts hold the movant to a strict standard. To satisfy his burden the movant must make a showing that it is quite clear what the truth is, and that excludes any real doubt as to the existence of any genuine issue of material fact.

. . . As the burden of proof is on the movant, the evidence must be viewed in the light most favorable to the opponent.

. . . When documents submitted in support of a motion for summary judgment failto establishthatthereisno genuineissue ofmaterial fact, the nonmoving party has no obligation to submit documents establishing the existence of such an issue.

. . . Once the moving party has met its burden, however, the opposing party must present evidence that demonstrates the existence of some disputed factual issue.

. . . It is not enough, however, for the opposing party merely to assert the existence of such a disputed issue. Mere assertions of fact

. . . are insufficient to establishthe existence ofamaterial fact and, therefore, cannot refute evidence properly presented to the court under Practice Book [§ 17-45]

. . . . Our review of the trial court’s decision to grant [a] motion for summary judgmentisplenary.’’ (Citations omitted; footnote omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.)AllstateIns. Co.

v. Barron, supra, 269 Conn. 405–406. ‘‘The principles governing our determination of[whether an insurer has a duty to defend] are well settled. [A]n insurer’s duty to defend

. . . is determined by reference to the allegations contained in the [underlying] complaint.

. . . The obligation of the insurer to defend does not depend on whether the injured party will successfully maintain a cause of action against the insured but on whether he has, in his complaint, statedfactswhichbringthe injurywithin the coverage. If the latter situation prevails, the policy requires the insurer to defend, irrespective of the insured’s ultimate liability.

. . . It necessarily follows that the insurer’s duty to defend is measured by the allegations of the complaint.

. . . Hence, if the complaint sets forth a cause of action within the coverage ofthe policy, the insurer must defend.

. . . Indeed, [i]f
an allegation ofthe complaintfalls evenpossiblywithin the coverage, then the insurance company must defend the insured.

. . . On the other hand, if the complaint alleges a liability which the policy does not cover, the insurer is not required to defend.’’ (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) CommunityAction for Greater Middlesex County, Inc. v. American Alliance Ins. Co., 254 Conn. 387, 398–99, 757 A.2d 1074 (2000). Specifically, ‘‘[w]here

. . . the policy excludes coverage for damages resulting from intentional acts, the court examines the factual allegations to decide whether both intentional acts and intended results are present.’’ Middlesex Ins. Co. v. Mara, 699 F. Supp. 2d 439, 449 (D. Conn. 2010). ‘‘Moreover

. . . Connecticut courts have long eschewed the notion that pleadings should be read in a hypertechnical manner.

. . . They thus read the complaint in a manner that advances substantial justice, construing it reasonably to contain all that it may fairly mean.’’ (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Id., 450. ‘‘The result is that
even when an action is [pleaded] as an unintentional tort [suchasnegligence], the courtexaminesthealleged activities in the complaint to determine whether the insured intended to commit both the acts and the injuries that resulted. If so, regardless of the title of the action, the court holds the action to be outside the coverage of the policy.’’ Id. ‘‘Furthermore, harmful intent may be inferred at law in circumstances where the alleged behavior in the underlying action is so inherently harmful that the resulting damage is unarguably foreseeable.’’ Id. ‘‘Case law is clear that where the provisions in the insurance policy expressly exempt intentional acts of an insured from coverage, the court will grant summaryjudgment infavoroftheinsurerwhoreliesuponsuchexemption.’’ Id., 450–51; see also United ServicesAutomobileAssn.

v. Marburg, supra, 46 Conn. App. 104. When an insurer relies on an exclusionary clause to deny coverage, the initial burden is on the insurer to demonstrate that all the allegations within the complaint fall completelywithin the exclusion. Community Actionfor Greater Middlesex County, Inc. v. AmericanAlliance Ins. Co., supra, 254 Conn. 398–99. Ifthe complaint alleges liabilitythatfallscompletelywithinthe exclusion,theinsurer is not required to defend. Id., 399.
The plaintiff argues that Tully’s intent may be presumed in this case as a matter of law under Marburg because the complaint in the underlying civil action alleged sexual misconduct with a minor. This requires
usto considerthe defendants’ argumentthatintentmay not be presumed because Allstate Ins. Co. v. Barron, supra, 269 Conn. 394, overruled the Marburg presumption.
In United Services Automobile Assn. v. Marburg, supra, 46 Conn. App. 100–101, ourAppellate Court considered whether an insurer had a duty to defend the defendant, Bonita Marburg, a woman accused of sexually abusing a minor during tutoring sessions. In its motion for summaryjudgment, the insurer argued that
no genuine issue ofmaterial fact existed as to whether the allegations fell within the homeowners insurance policy’s ‘‘ ‘expected-or-intended injury’ ’’ exclusion. Id., 102. The minor and his mother alleged, however, that Marburg’s sexual misconduct was a result of a mental disease or defect that negated her intent to harm the minor. Id., 103. TheAppellate Court, followinganAmericanLawReportsannotation, recognizedapresumption of intent for acts of sexual molestation of minors becausethatactitselfis ‘‘so heinousthatintentto cause harm is presumed as a matter of law.’’ Id., 104, citing annot., 31A.L.R.4th957, § 5 (b) (1984); see, e.g., Gearing

v. NationwideIns. Co., 76 Ohio St. 3d 34, 37, 665 N.E.2d 1115 (1996) (observingthat, by‘‘1993, theinferredintent standard in cases ofsexual molestation ofa minor was characterizedasthe unanimous rule,’’ andthatminority approach of considering subjective intent has ‘‘largely been abandoned, having been criticized as logically untenable’’ [internalquotationmarksomitted]); seealso Twin City Fire Ins. Co. v. Doe, 163 Ariz. 388, 390, 788 P.2d 121 (App. 1989) (concluding that public policy supports presuming intent to injure with respect to sexual abuse of minors because such acts are not performed under any claim ofright or privilege under law, and are infact crimes); HoraceMannIns. Co. v. Leeber, 180 W. Va. 375, 380–81, 376 S.E.2d 581 (1988) (observing that presumption of intent was supported by doctrine ofreasonable expectationswithrespecttopolicyholder and homeowners insurance carrier). Applying this presumption and relying on the standard set out inHomeIns. Co. v. AetnaLife & Casualty Co., 35 Conn. App. 94, 644 A.2d 933 (1994), rev’d on other grounds, 235 Conn. 185, 663 A.2d 1001 (1995), the Appellate Court then reasoned that, ‘‘[a]n insured’s conduct can be considered unintentional in situations such as those here only if the insured can produceevidence to show that she did not intend to cause the damage.

. . . If the insured cannot show that her behavior was unintentional, the presumption of intent remains intact, and the exclusion of the homeowners policy precludes coverage.’’ (Citation omitted.) United ServicesAutomobileAssn. v. Marburg, supra, 46 Conn. App. 104–105. The Appellate Court then analyzed the evidence that Marburg provided to rebut the presumption—namely, an affidavit and letter from two physicians describing her mental condition—to determine whetheramaterialissue offactwasindisputeregarding Marburg’s ability to form intent. Id., 106–107. Ultimately, theAppellate Courtheldthatthe affidavits demonstrated that no genuine issue ofmaterial fact existed and, thus, summary judgment was appropriate. Id., 110–11.
Several years later, we decided Allstate Ins. Co. v. Barron, supra, 269 Conn. 407, acaseinwhichtheunderlying complaint leading to the insurance coverage dispute alleged, inter alia, that a mother stabbed her husband and one of her children, poured gasoline on herself and the child, and then set fire to the house. The underlying complaint also alleged that, ‘‘atthe time ofthese events, [the mother] was suffering from amental illness or impairment that rendered her incapable either of appreciating the nature, consequences and wrongfulness ofher conduct or controlling her actions
or both.’’ Id. Specifically, the mother had been diagnosed with postpartum depression, recurrent major depression, and bipolar disorder. Id., 411.
InBarron, this court adoptedthe holding fromHome Ins. Co. v. Aetna Life & Casualty Co., supra, 35 Conn. App. 94, which was also applied in United Services Automobile Assn. v. Marburg, supra, 46 Conn. App. 104–107, namely, that ‘‘an insured’s intent to commit
an act may be negated for purposes of an intentional conduct exclusion clause when the insured did not understand the nature or wrongfulness of his conduct,
or was deprived of the capacity to control his actions regardless ofhis understanding ofthe nature or wrongfulness of his action.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Allstate Ins. Co. v. Barron, supra, 269 Conn. 407. We, therefore, determinedthatthe dispositiveissuewas ‘‘not whether [the mother’s] actions were intentional in thenarrowsensethattheywere deliberate, butwhether her intent was negated by her inability to understand the wrongfulness ofher conduct or to control her conduct.’’ Id., 409. Ultimately, this court concluded that, ‘‘[t]he documents submitted by the plaintiff in support of its motion for summary judgment simply did not address that issue.’’ Id.
We conclude thatBarron is inapposite to the present
case and does not affect the continuing vitality of the Marburg presumption. First, the allegations in the underlying complaint inBarron did not concern sexualmisconductwithaminorchild. Second, the legalpropriety of the Marburg presumption was not at question inBarron

. Rather, Marburg andBarron are both cases in which our courts have adopted and applied the standardsetforthinHomeIns. Co. v.AetnaLife & Casualty Co., supra, 35 Conn. App. 94, to determine whether an insured adduced evidence sufficientto defeat summary judgment as to whether mental incapacity rendered the relevantactionsunintentionalundertheintentionalacts exclusion clause of an insurance policy. Barron cited toMarburg as a situation in which an insurer had satisfied its burden of demonstrating that no genuine issue of material fact existed with regard to whether the underlying allegations fell completely within the insurance policy’s intentional acts exclusion clause, and the insured subsequently failed to proffer sufficient evidence to allow for an inference that the insured was incapable of forming the intent necessary to result in her acts being intentional. Allstate Ins. Co. v. Barron, supra, 269 Conn. 412. InBarron, because there was no claim that the allegations gave rise to a presumption of intent as a matter of law, the insurer had an initially greater burden to demonstrate that there was no genuine issue of material fact on summary judgment than in cases, such as the present one, in which an insurer mayrelyon apresumption ofintentto satisfyitsburden
onsummaryjudgment. TheinsurerinBarronultimately had to demonstrate that, despite the allegations within the complaint that the mother suffered from mental disease at the time of the incident, she nevertheless formed the requisite intent to commit the acts, that her acts were intentional, and that the allegations fell completely within the intentional acts exclusion ofthe policy. Thus, Barron did not overrule theMarburg presumption; rather, Barron clarified the standard for determining whether an insured sufficiently has negated intent in order to defeat summaryjudgment in favor of the insurer. Tully also argues in his brief that the Marburg presumption should not apply in the present case because the underlying facts in that case are too dissimilar, insofar as Marburg concerned allegations of sexual assault, including penetrative intercourse, on at least seventy-three occasions. See United Services Automobile Assn. v. Marburg, supra, 46 Conn. App. 101. We disagree. InMarburg, ourAppellate Court, inpresuming intent to harm as a matter of law when an insured has engaged in sexual misconduct with a minor, did not consider any restrictions on the type or manner ofsexual assault of a minor by an adult. Id., 104–106. This
was for good reason. As the Maryland Court ofAppeals observedinrejecting an argumentthatthe presumption is inapplicable in a case without a ‘‘ ‘violent’ ’’ sexual assault, minor victims of sexual abuse are unable to consent as matter of law, and ‘‘[c]hild sexual abuse is
an affront to the dignity of the child—an invasion ofthe child’s autonomy—because a child cannot appreciate or comprehend the full nature of the sexual acts.

. . . While it is undoubtedly worse to couple sexual molestation of a child with physical injury, such a distinction differs in degree, not in kind. The essence of child sexual abuse is the violation ofthe dignitaryinterest, whether there is physical injury or not.’’ (Citation omitted.) Pettit v. Erie Ins. Exchange, 349 Md. 777, 783–84, 709 A.2d 1287 (1998). Put differently, the very nature of the act of sexual abuse of minors, ‘‘inevitabl[y]’’ causes injury extending to ‘‘emotional harm to minors from sexual abuse in all forms’’; Maryland Casualty Co. v. Havey, 887 F. Supp. 195, 198 (C.D. Ill. 1995); regardless of whether the abuser subjectively meant no harm from his actions, and the abuse was not violent in nature. See, e.g., Allstate Ins. Co. v. Troelstrup, 789 P.2d 415, 419–20 (Colo. 1990) (rejecting claim that inference should not apply because abuse
was not ‘‘ ‘extreme’ enough to warrant such a result’’); Scudder v. Hanover Ins. Co., 201 Ill. App. 3d 921, 929, 559 N.E.2d 559 (1990) (presumption of intent applies to fondling of minor’s genitals because of emotional harm, despite lack of force); Pettit v. Erie Ins. Exchange, supra, 783–87 (presumption applies in case offondling ofminors’ genitalia by diagnosed pedophile who subjectively meant no harm and believed his acts
were expression of love); Gearing v. Nationwide Ins. Co., supra, 76 Ohio St. 3d 40 (concluding that presumption applied in cases of ‘‘criminal sexual touching’’ of children and holding that ‘‘[b]ecause harm is inherent in the act ofsexual molestation, [insured’s] representations that he was subjectively ignorant of the fact that his actions would harm his victims were insufficient to raise a genuine issue of material fact’’); Horace Mann Ins. Co. v. Leeber, supra, 180 W. Va. 379–81 (rejecting insured’s reliance on ‘‘ ‘negligent’ seduction’’ in holding presumption applicable to nonviolent fondling of minor’s genitalia). Accordingly, we conclude that the Marburg presumption is applicable in the present case, despite the fact that the sexual abuse in Marburg was farmore severe thanthatallegedinthe underlying complaint.9
Because we conclude that the Marburg presumption remains good law and is applicable in the present case,
we now consider the terms of the policy, which excluded coverage for ‘‘bodily injury

. . . which is either expected or intended by the insured,’’ in light of the allegations contained within the complaint in the underlying civil action. Specifically, we seek to determine whether the allegations of Tully’s sexual misconductwithaminortriggertheMarburgpresumptionand,
asaresult, fallcompletelywithinthepolicy’sintentional acts exclusion. The complaint in the underlying civil actionallegesthatTully, inanintoxicatedstate, grabbed Doe’s breast and fondled the buttocks of an eight year oldchild. Thecomplaintthencharacterizestheseallega-tions as negligence. The complaint alleges that Doe’s injuries ‘‘were caused by [Tully’s] negligence

. . . in that [he] was under the influence ofintoxicating liquor when he committed these actions.’’ The complaint furtherallegesthat ‘‘[a]s aresultof[Tully’s] negligence and carelessness, [Doe] has suffered bodily and emotional injuries, and has been severely and permanently injured.’’ Construingtherelevantpleadings‘‘broadly,’’ ‘‘realistically’’ and ‘‘reasonably, to contain all that it fairly means,’’ butnot ‘‘contortedin such awayso as to strain the bounds of rational comprehension’’; Deming v. Nationwide Mutual Ins. Co., 279 Conn. 745, 778, 905 A.2d 623 (2006); we conclude that the complaint in the underlying civil action alleged that Tully engaged in sexual misconduct with aminor. That complaint, therefore, alleges presumptively intentional conduct on the part of Tully. First, the complaint alleges that Tully attempted to lure the minor girls by offering to buy them ice cream. The complaint then alleges that Tully grabbed Doe’s breast, almost removing herbathing suit top, and fondled the buttocks of an eight year girl. Marburg aside, to read these allegations as anything other than sexual misconduct with a minor would be to ‘‘strain the bounds of rational comprehension.’’ Id. Although the defendants contend that the allegations arisefromnegligence, ratherthandeliberatesexualmisconduct with a minor, we are not persuaded. ‘‘[E]ven when an action is [pleaded] as an unintentional tort [such as negligence], the court examines the alleged activities in the complaint to determine whether the insured intended to commit both the acts and the injuries that resulted. If so, regardless of the title of the action, the court holds the action to be outside the coverage of the policy.’’ (Internal quotations marks omitted.) Middlesex Ins. Co. v. Mara, supra, 699 F. Supp. 2d450. Nothingabouttheallegationsintheunderlying civil action involve anegligent act. That complaint does not, for example, allege that Tully was so intoxicated that he drunkenly fell down and accidentally touchedDoe’sbreast. Rather, the complaintallegesthat Tully ‘‘proceeded to grab [Doe’s] breast, almost completely removing her bathing suit in the process’’ and ‘‘then proceeded to fondle the buttocks of the [eight] year old girl

. . . .’’ Because the complaint in the underlying civil action alleges deliberate sexual misconduct withaminor, we, therefore, concludethatthetrialcourt properly allowed the plaintiff to rely on the Marburg presumption of intent in satisfying its initial burden on summary judgment.10
Because theMarburg presumption ofintent is rebuttable, nextweturntothe question ofwhetherthe defendants have adduced evidence sufficient to raise a genuine issue of material fact as to Tully’s intent. See United Services Automobile Assn. v. Marburg, supra,46 Conn. App. 104–106. To rebuttheMarburgpresumption, the defendants claim that this court should consider evidence of voluntary intoxication, such as affidavits from physicians or Tully himself, to negate intent. See footnote 6 of this opinion. The plaintiff argues in response that evidence ofvoluntary intoxication should not be considered to negate Tully’s intent. We agree with the plaintiff, and conclude that evidence of voluntary intoxication may not be used to negate intent in situations, as here, in which the defendants seek insurance coverage for a claim arising out of Tully’s sexual misconduct with a minor.
This court has not considered previously whether evidence of voluntary intoxication may negate intent in the context of insurance claims arising from sexual misconduct with a minor. This also is a relatively novel issue forthe country as awhole. In Wileyv. StateFarm Fire& CasualtyCo., 995 F.2d457, 465–66 (3dCir. 1993), the United States Court ofAppeals forthe Third Circuit described, generally, the three approaches courts
across the country have taken to resolve this policy issue.
Under the first approach, intent is inferred based on the nature and character of the act, and the insured’s subjective intentto harmis ‘‘whollyirrelevant.’’ Id., 465. Under this approach, ‘‘any question of the inability to form the intent to harm, whetherit arises out ofalleged mental disease or defect or voluntary intoxication, is immaterial in resolving the insurer’s obligation to provide coverage.’’ (Emphasis added.) Id. Put anotherway, in cases in which intent is inferred, the inference is conclusive, and aninsuredmaynotrebutthatpresumption with evidence oflack ofcapacityto form the requisite intent for the acts to be considered ‘‘intentional.’’ See, e.g., State Farm Fire & Casualty Co. v. Estate of Jenner, 874 F.2d 604, 606–607 (9th Cir. 1989); Mutual FireIns. Co. v.Hancock, 634A.2d 1312, 1313 (Me. 1993); American Family Mutual Ins. Co. v. Peterson, 405 N.W.2d418, 422 (Minn. 1987);PublicEmployeesMutual Ins. Co. v. Rash, 48 Wn. App. 701, 705, 740 P.2d 370 (1987); N.N. v. Moraine Mutual Ins. Co., 153 Wis. 2d 84, 96, 450 N.W.2d 445 (1990).
Underthe secondapproach, regardless ofthe character of the act, an insured is precluded entirely from assertingvoluntaryintoxicationasadefensetoanintentional acts exclusion in an insurance policy in any duty to defend case. Wiley v. State Farm Fire & Casualty Co., supra, 995 F.2d 465–66. The reasoning is that ‘‘evidence establishing thatthe insured was underthe influence of intoxicants is of no consequence, for the law must not permit the use of such stimuli to become a defense for one’s actions.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id., 465 Essentially, voluntarily becoming intoxicated should not excuse poor behavior or judgment exercisedwhile intoxicatedunderanysetoffacts.See, e.g., Capitol Indemnity Corp. v. Evolution, Inc., 293 F. Supp. 2d 1067, 1074 (D.N.D. 2003); Allstate Ins. Co. v. Sherrill, 566 F. Supp. 1286, 1288 (E.D. Mich. 1983), aff’d, 735 F.2d 1363 (6th Cir. 1984); Prasad v. Allstate Ins. Co., 644 So. 2d 992, 994–95 (Fla. 1994); Dolan v. State Farm Fire & Casualty Co., 573 N.W.2d 254, 257 (Iowa 1998); Group Ins. Co. ofMichigan v. Czopek, 440 Mich. 590, 600–601, 489 N.W.2d 444 (1992); Hanover Ins. Co. v. Newcomer, 585 S.W.2d 285, 289 (Mo. App. 1979); Beckwith v. State Farm Fire & Casualty Co., 120 Nev. 23, 27, 83 P.3d 275 (2007).
The third approach deems it appropriate for only a fact finder to consider and determine the insured’s intent when an insured claims incapacity to form the requisite intent. Wiley v. State Farm Fire & Casualty Co., supra, 995 F.2d 466. Importantly, under this approach, eveninsituationsinwhichintentisotherwise presumed, ‘‘this factual inquiry in effect supersedes scrutiny ofthe nature and character ofthe act committed and renders application of the inferred intent rule inappropriate.’’ Id.; see, e.g., GlobeAmerican Casualty Co. v. Lyons, 131 Ariz. 337, 339–40, 641 P.2d 251 (App. 1981); State Farm Fire & Casualty Co. v. Morgan, 258 Ga. 276, 276–77, 368 S.E.2d 509 (1988); Hanover Ins. Co. v. Talhouni, 413 Mass. 781, 785–86, 604 N.E.2d 689 (1992); Burd v. Sussex, 56 N.J. 383, 398–99, 267 A.2d 7 (1970).
We adopt the second approach, and conclude that,
as a matter of law, evidence ofvoluntary intoxication11 may not be used to negate intent for the purposes of determining whether an insurer owes a duty to defend
an insured in cases in which the insured’s intent is presumed because the conduct in question involved sexual misconduct with a minor. Under the second approach, evidence of voluntary intoxication may never, in any case, serve to negate intent for insurance purposes. Wiley v. State Farm Fire & Casualty Co., supra, 995 F.2d 465. For a variety ofpublic policy considerations, we conclude the second approach is persuasive in the context of sexual misconduct with a minor, even without considering whether it extends to other acts.
The first policy consideration for holding that voluntary intoxication should not operate to negate intent is not to relieve the insured of responsibility, financial and otherwise, for his otherwise intentional actions. One federal court, applying Michigan state law, stated that, ‘‘public policy demands that avoluntary departure of one’s good judgment and rational decision-making abilities should not permit the insured to abrogate his financial responsibility to those he brutally injures.’’ Allstate Ins. Co. v. Sherrill, supra, 566 F. Supp. 1288. Further, permitting voluntary intoxication to negate intent ‘‘would allow commission ofa crime without the requisite responsibility’’ and would ‘‘create the abilityto act unwiselywithoutthe requisite financial responsibility.’’ Group Ins. Co. ofMichigan v. Czopek, supra, 440 Mich. 601.
Another policy consideration in support of our conclusion that evidence ofvoluntary intoxication may not negateintentisthat, eventhoughapersonisintoxicated at the time, the conduct is such that a reasonable insured would not expect it to fall within his policy coverage. See American Family Mutual Ins. Co. v. Peterson, supra, 405 N.W.2d422 (voluntaryintoxication did not negate intent when man struck woman on head with hammer because reasonable insured would not expect that type of assault to be covered); see also Dolan v. State Farm Fire & Casualty Co., supra, 573 N.W.2d 257 (insured cannot claim that intentional assault was unexpected or unintended for purpose of insurance coverage). Finally, indeterminingwhetherevidence ofvoluntary intoxication should negate intent, some state courts have looked to their state’s criminal statutes to determine, as an expression of public policy, whether the legislature would have intended for evidence ofvoluntary intoxication to negate intent in duty to defend
cases. For example, in Michigan, the state’s legislators had ‘‘distinguishe[d] between a lack ofmental capacity due to mental illness and that which results from acute voluntaryalcohol ordrugintoxication. Inthe lattersituation, even though a criminal defendant’s freedom and liberty [were] at stake, a defense ofvoluntary intoxication [could] not be tendered. To allow such a defense would create an intolerable precedent of self-immunity.’’ Allstate Ins. Co. v. Sherrill, supra, 566 F. Supp. 1288. The court then applied that distinction to the insurance context, holding that, ‘‘where an insured voluntarily ingests alcohol or drugs he may not assert a defense to an exclusionary clause

. . . based on his lack ofcapacityto formthe intentto act orharm, where that defense is based solely onthe effects ofthe alcohol and/or drugs.’’12 Id.
We find these policy rationales that hold the insured responsible for his intentional actions to be consistent with existing Connecticut statutes and case law. Turning first to our own criminal statutes, we find support in General Statutes § 53a-7.13Thatstatute expresslyprovides that, ‘‘[i]ntoxication shall not be a defense to a criminal charge

. . . if the actor, due to self-induced intoxication, is unaware

. . . such unawareness, disregard or failure to perceive shall be immaterial.’’ (Emphasis added.) General Statutes § 53a-7. Further, the official comment following § 53a-7 states that, ‘‘where the [criminal] offense is based on recklessness
or criminal negligence, unawareness of the actor due to self-induced intoxication does not excuse him. For example, a defendant chargedwith criminallynegligent homicide cannotarguethathewastoo intoxicatedtobeaware ofthe risks involvedinhis conduct andtherefore shouldnotbeheldliableforhisunawareness.’’ Commission to Revise the Criminal Statutes, Penal Code Comments, Conn. Gen. Stat. Ann. § 53a-7 (West 2012), commission comment. Thus, the statutory language expresslyprovides thatvoluntary intoxication does not
excuse a defendant from liability for criminal negligence.
We find furtherlegislative support forprecluding evidence ofvoluntary intoxication from negating intent in the insurance context in situations involving the insured’s sexual misconduct with a minor within General Statutes § 53a-13,14 the mental capacity affirmative defense statute. Section 53a-13 expresslyprecludesvoluntaryintoxicationasalackofmentalcapacitydefense. Because our legislature specifically precluded voluntary intoxication as a lack of mental capacity defense in the criminal context, we extend that statement of public policy to the insurance context, in which the insured’s money, rather than his freedom, is at stake. See Allstate Ins. Co. v. Sherrill, supra, 566 F. Supp. 1288 (extending legislature’s distinction between lack of mental capacity and acute voluntary intoxication in criminal context to civil insurance context). Finally, the second approach set forth in Wiley is consistent with our holding and analysis in Barron

. Unlike the first approach, which serves as a total bar precluding an insured from presenting any evidence of any lack of capacity defenses, including evidence of mental disease or defect, in cases in which intent is inferred based on the nature of the act, the second approach allows aninsuredtopresent evidence ofmental disease or defect, aside from evidence ofvoluntary intoxication, to negate intent in the insurance context. Thus, we conclude that the second approach is consistent with our case law that allows evidence of mental disease or defect to negate intent.15 See, e.g., Allstate Ins. Co. v.Barron, supra, 269 Conn. 408–13 (considering extrinsic evidenceto determinewhetherinsuredlacked mentalcapacitytonegateintent); UnitedServicesAutomobileAssn. v. Marburg, supra, 46 Conn. App. 107–10 (allowing insured to provide affidavits to demonstrate lack of capacity to negate intent, but ultimately finding that evidence was insufficient).
The defendants, however, claim that precluding voluntary intoxication from negating intent would undermine the ability of victims to receive compensation from an insurance company in an automobile accident involving driving under the influence. We disagree. Comparing the situation at hand to an accident involving an intoxicated driver is akin to comparing apples and oranges. In such an accident, a driver voluntarily
consumes alcohol, gets behind the wheel of a vehicle, and then accidentally injures another driver or pedestrian on the road. In that situation, an insurance com-panywouldhave adutyto defendthe intoxicated driver because the injury of the other person was unintentional, however foreseeable. Here, however, Tully voluntarily consumed alcohol, wenttoalocalpark, attemptedtolure children, grabbed
one child’s breast, and fondled the buttocks ofanother. The act of sexual molestation of minors was not unintentional or accidental. The situation at hand is more similar to a scenario in which a driver voluntarily consumes alcohol, gets behind the wheel of a car, sees a pedestrian in the road and then intentionally hits the person with his vehicle. In that situation, the driver’s act of injuring the pedestrian was intentional, despite the driver’s voluntary intoxication, which lowered his inhibition. Accordingly, we conclude that evidence ofvoluntary intoxication may not negate intent in duty to defend
cases in which the insured’s intent is inferred from an underlying complaint that alleges the insured committed sexualmisconductwithaminor.16Applyingthis rule to the present case, the trial court properly granted the plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment because the defendants failed, as a matter of law, to rebut the presumption of intent based on Tully’s sexual misconduct with a minor.17
The judgment is affirmed.
In this opinion the other justices concurred.

1 In accordance with our policy of protecting the privacy interests of the victims ofsexual assault and the crime ofrisk ofinjuryto a child, we decline to identify the victims or others through whom the victims’ identities may be ascertained. See General Statutes § 54-86e.

2 Doe appealed, and Tully cross appealed, from the judgment of the trial court to the Appellate Court, and we transferred the appeal and the cross appeal to this court pursuant to General Statutes § 51-199 (c) and Practice Book § 65-2.

3 Tully also was arrested and charged with various criminal offenses. He entered a plea of nolo contendere to sexual assault in the fourth degree in violation of General Statutes § 53a-73a (a) (2), unlawful restraint in the second degree in violation of General Statutes § 53a-96, and risk of injury to a child in violation of General Statutes § 53-21 (a) (1). He was sentenced to ten years imprisonment, execution suspended after thirty months, and five years of probation.

4 The complaint in the underlying civil action was later amended to allege

a single negligence claim against Tully.

5 The plaintiff also sought a determination as to whether it owed a duty to indemnify Tully. The trial court did not decide that issue, however, as it determinedthatthe plaintiffdidnothave adutyto defend Tully. SeeDaCruz

v. State Farm Fire & Casualty Co., 268 Conn. 675, 688, 846 A.2d 849 (2004) (‘‘[b]ecause the duty to defend is significantly broader than the duty to indemnify, where there is no duty to defend, there is no duty to indemnify’’ [internal quotation marks omitted]).

6 To rebut the presumption of intent, Tully offered affidavits from a licensed physician and a licensed psychologist describing his intoxication at the time of the incident and his alcoholism. First, Tully attached an affidavit from a licensed physician, who averred that ‘‘Tully’s level ofintoxication at the time ofthe incident was such that it is unlikely he would have maintained the capacity to form intent or to act with an expectation to

cause harm or bodily injury.’’ Second, Tully attached the affidavit of a licensed psychologist who conducted a psychological evaluation and sex offender risk assessment on Tully and stated that his ‘‘conduct on [July 2, 2012] was the result of excessive alcohol consumption due to his alcohol dependence and

. . . that it is unlikely he would have had the intent orexpectation to cause harm orbodily injury

. . . before or during the incident at issue.’’ Finally, Tully provided his own affidavit in which he stated that he is an alcoholic and was one at the time of the incident. He also attested thathe did not ‘‘recallthe events of [July2, 2012] otherthan drinking alcohol before going to Winding Trails [Park], drinking alcohol while at Winding Trails [Park], and then being arrested.’’ Tully also stated that he did not intend to cause harm to anyone.
7 We note that, six days before we transferred the appeal to this court, the trial court, Peck, J., renderedjudgment by stipulation in the underlying civil action in favor of Doe in the amount of $90,000. This stipulation was enteredpursuantto an agreementbetween the parties inthat case. Although the underlying civil action has settled, the defendants are not precluded from pursuing the present appeals. ‘‘If the insurer declines to provide its insured with a defense and is subsequently found to have breached its duty to do so, it bears the consequences of its decision, including the payment of any reasonable settlement agreed to by the plaintiff and the insured, and the costs incurred effectuating the settlement up to the limits ofthe policy.’’ Capstone Building Corp. v. American Motorists Ins. Co., 308 Conn. 760, 806, 67 A.3d 961 (2013).

8 The plaintiff also denied coverage on the ground that Doe’s complaint failed to allege an ‘‘ ‘occurrence’ ’’ under the policy, defined as an ‘‘ ‘accident,’ ’’ claiming that it had no duty to defend Tully because his actions did not fall within the scope of the policy. ‘‘A typical definition of the term ‘accident’ is ‘a lack of intention or necessity, often opposed to design; an unforeseen unplanned event; [a] sudden event or change occurring without intent or volition

. . . and producing an unfortunate result.’

. . . In short, the relevant inquiry in determining whether an accident has occurred is whether the injuries at issue were caused by the intentional design of the insured, or rather, by a sudden, unforeseen event.’’ (Citations omitted.) Vermont Mutual Ins. Co. v. Walukiewicz, 290 Conn. 582, 594, 966 A.2d 672 (2009). Although this court has sometimes treated the analyses of whether

an act constitutes an ‘‘occurrence,’’ defined as an ‘‘accident,’’ and whether the act falls within the intentional act exclusion separately; see, e.g., id., 597; the ultimate inquiry—whether the act was intentional—is the same. We therefore need not conduct a separate analysis as to whether Tully’s actions constitute an ‘‘occurrence.’’ See also Allstate Ins. Co. v. Suchecki, UnitedStatesDistrictCourt, DocketNo. 3:12CV01566 (VLB) (D. Conn. February 20, 2014) (concluding that act did not meet definition of ‘‘ ‘occurrence’ ’’ underinsurance policy, and also that actfellwithin intentional act exclusion of policy ‘‘for the same reasons’’).

9 We note that neither ofthe defendants has asked us to overruleMarburg

on the ground that the presumption of intent established in that case is doctrinally unsound as a general proposition. Although there was, at one point, a split of authority as to whether a presumption of intent to harm could be inferred as a matter of law in cases concerning the sexual abuse of minors by adults, with the vast majority of state courts adopting the inference, we note that ‘‘the supreme courts of the other four states that previouslyfollowedtheminorityapproachhaveallnowadoptedthemajority approach.’’ State Farm Fire & Casualty Co. v. Davis, 612 So. 2d 458, 464 (Ala. 1993); see Gearing v. Nationwide Ins. Co., supra, 76 Ohio St. 3d 37 (describing inferred intent in cases concerning sexual abuse of minors as ‘‘unanimous rule’’ by 1993); see also Pettit v. Erie Ins. Exchange, supra, 349 Md. 788 and n.5 (discussing resolution of split). Similarly, neither of the defendants claim that the inferred intent rule is inapplicable on the ground that the girls were not minors, or even that Tully

was subjectively unaware of their ages, when he acted in this case. See Allstate Ins. Co. v. Patterson, 904 F. Supp. 1270, 1282 n.11 (D. Utah 1995) (discussing split of authority with respect to whether inferred intent rule applies whenvictim is adult); see alsoNorthernSecurity Ins. Co. v. Perron, 172 Vt. 204, 214–15, 777 A.2d 151 (2001) (discussing split of authority with respect to whether inferred intent rule should apply when perpetrator is minor, rather than adult).

10 The defendants also argue that the initial burden was on the plaintiff,

as the party seeking summary judgment, to establish the absence of any genuine issue as to Tully’s mental condition. We disagree. The initial burden is on the plaintiff to establish that there are no genuine issues of material fact as to whether the allegations fall entirely within the policy exclusion. See, e.g., CommunityActionfor GreaterMiddlesex County, Inc. v. American Alliance Ins. Co., supra, 254 Conn. 398–99. Because the complaint in the underlying civil action alleges sexual misconduct with a minor, thustriggering the Marburg presumption, the plaintiff satisfied its burden, and the burden then shifted to the defendants to establish that his actions were notintentional, based onthe standard setforthinAllstateIns. Co. v. Barron, supra, 269 Conn. 407–406. See UnitedServicesAutomobileAssn. v.Marburg, supra, 46 Conn. App. 106.

11 The defendants claim that the plaintiff failed to establish that Tully’s intoxication was voluntary rather than involuntary and, thus, there was a genuineissue ofmaterialfactthatshouldhave defeatedtheplaintiff’smotion for summaryjudgment as to whether the plaintiffhad a duty to defend him. Theyfurther claimthatthe affidavits they submitted supportthe proposition thathisintoxicationwasinvoluntarybecause ofhis alcoholism. We disagree. First, the insurer’s burden of proof on a motion for summary judgment is to establish that no genuine issue of material fact exists as to its duty to defend. CommunityActionforGreaterMiddlesexCounty, Inc. v.American Alliance Ins. Co., supra, 254 Conn. 397–98. To do so, the insurer must compare the policyterms withthe four corners ofthe complaint. Id., 398–99. Involuntary intoxication is ‘‘a very rare thing, and can never exist where the person intoxicated knows what he or she is drinking, and drinks the intoxicantvoluntarily, andwithoutbeingmadetodosobyforceorcoercion.’’ 2 Criminal Practice Manual § 40:2 (West 2016). The complaintinthe underlying civil action did not allege that Tully’s intoxication was involuntary. Rather, it alleged that Tully ‘‘approached [Doe] and her friends while he

was in an intoxicated state,’’ and that Tully ‘‘was under the influence of intoxicating liquor when he committed these actions.’’ On the basis of a reasonable reading of the allegations in a manner not to distort rational comprehension; see, e.g., Deming v. Nationwide Mutual Ins. Co., supra, 279 Conn. 778; we do not read the complaint in the underlying civil action to give rise to a genuine issue ofmaterial fact as to whether Tully’s intoxication was voluntary or involuntary.

12 On the other hand, the most common policy rationale for allowing evidence ofvoluntary intoxication to negate intent—and leaving that question for the fact finder to decide—is the public interest in compensating victims. See, e.g., HanoverIns. Co. v. Talhouni, supra, 413 Mass. 786 (citing ‘‘public interestthatthevictim be compensated, and theviewthatthe victim is aided by the narrowest view of the policy exclusion’’ [internal quotation marks omitted]);Burdv. Sussex, supra, 56 N.J. 398–99 (citingpublic interest ‘‘that the victim be compensated, and the victim’s rights being derivative from the insured’s, the victim is aided by the narrowest view of the policy exclusion consistent with the purpose of not encouraging an intentional attack’’). Although a policy interest in compensating victims exists, that interest must be balanced by the fact that insurance policyholders share a risk, as reflected by the cost of premiums. As the Ohio Supreme Court has aptly observed, ‘‘requiring an insurer to indemnify an insured who has engaged in sexual abuse of a child subsidizes the episodes of child sexual abuseofwhichitsvictimscomplain, attheultimateexpenseofotherinsureds to whom the added costs of indemnifying child molesters will be passed,’’ and ‘‘the average person purchasing homeowners insurance would cringe at the very suggestion that he was paying for such coverage

. . . [a]nd certainly

. . . would not want to share that type of risk with other homeowners [policyholders].’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Gearing v. Nationwide Ins. Co., supra, 76 Ohio St. 3d 39.

13 General Statutes § 53a-7 provides: ‘‘Intoxication shall not be a defense to a criminal charge, but in any prosecution for an offense evidence of intoxication of the defendant may be offered by the defendant whenever it is relevant to negate an element of the crime charged, provided when recklessness or criminal negligence is an element of the crime charged, if the actor, due to self-induced intoxication, is unaware of or disregards or fails toperceive a risk which he would have been aware ofhad he not been intoxicated, such unawareness, disregard or failure to perceive shall be immaterial

. Asusedinthis section, ‘intoxication’ means asubstantial disturbance of mental or physical capacities resulting from the introduction of substances into the body.’’ (Emphasis added.)

14 General Statutes § 53a-13 provides in relevant part: ‘‘(a) In any prosecution for an offense, it shall be an affirmative defense that the defendant, at thetimehe committedtheproscribedactoracts, lackedsubstantialcapacity,

as aresult ofmental disease or defect, eitherto appreciate the wrongfulness ofhis conduct or to control his conduct within the requirements ofthe law. ‘‘(b) It shall not be a defense under this section if such mental disease

or defect was proximately caused by the voluntary ingestion, inhalation or injection ofintoxicating liquor orany drug or substance, or any combinationthereof, unless such drug was prescribed for the defendant by aprescribing practitioner, as defined in subdivision (22) of section 20-571, and was used in accordance with the directions of such prescription.

. . .’’

15 We acknowledge the defendants’ reliance on evidence establishing that Tullyis alcohol-dependent, andthatthe actions atissue resultedfrom excessive intoxication stemming from his alcoholism. To this end, Tully himself claims that his alcoholism was ‘‘ ‘out of control,’ ’’ precluding him from forming the intent to harm anyone when he committed the acts at issue in this case. See footnote 6 of this opinion. Consistent with our legislature’s pronouncement on this issue, we acknowledge that alcohol dependency, or alcoholism, is itself a recognized mental disease or disorder. See General Statutes § 17a-680 (1) (‘‘‘[a]lcohol-dependent person’ means a person who meets the criteria for moderate or severe alcohol use disorder, as described in the most recent edition of the American Psychiatric Association’s ‘Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders’ ’’); see also Skakel v. Benedict, 54 Conn. App. 663, 677, 738 A.2d 170 (1999) (statutory privilege for psychiatric records under General Statutes § 52-146d [2] applicable to alcoholism treatment). The defendants do not, however, cite any authorities suggesting that intoxication is any less voluntary as a matter of law when it is spurred by an alcoholic’s substance dependency, and, as observed by the plaintiff, the case law on this point holds expressly to the contrary. See American Family Mutual Ins. Co. v. Peterson, supra, 405 N.W.2d 422 (holding, in hammer attack committed by diagnosed alcoholic, that ‘‘voluntary intoxication may not be used to deny an intent to injure one’s victim where the circumstances of the assault otherwise compel an inference of intent to injure’’ and observing that ‘‘[n]or do we think that other kinds of assaults, such as rape, if committed in an alcoholic blackout, are within an insured’s reasonable expectations of insurance coverage’’); see also State

v. Johnson, 327 N.W.2d 580, 582–83 (Minn. 1982) (describing as ‘‘weak,’’ and ‘‘not

. . . accepted in any jurisdiction,’’ defendant’s claim ‘‘that a chronic alcoholic’s intoxication is really involuntary intoxication and that thereforethe defense ofinvoluntaryintoxication, whichappliestoall crimes,

even general intent crimes, can be raised whenever a chronic alcoholic commits a crime while intoxicated’’); Commonwealth v. Kuhn, 327 Pa. Super. 72, 82, 475 A.2d 103 (1984) (‘‘involuntary intoxication cannot, as a matter of law, be established through evidence showing that the criminal defendant was a chronic alcoholic incapable of voluntarily refraining from ingestion of alcohol’’); State v. Allert, 117 Wn. 2d 156, 167–68, 815 P.2d 752 (1991) (holdingthat, in absence ofstatutorydirectionto consideralcoholism

or other addictive diseases in sentencing, ‘‘voluntary use of alcohol is an improper factor to consider in deciding whether to impose an exceptionally low sentence’’); State ex rel. Jacobus v. State, 208 Wis. 2d 39, 51–54, 559 N.W.2d 900 (1997) (statute prohibiting prosecution of alcoholic for public drunkenness or consumption of alcohol did not preclude prosecution for violation of bail condition precluding consumption of alcohol); cf. In the Matter ofMoulton, 198 App. Div. 2d 595, 603 N.Y.S.2d 240 (1993) (rejecting unemployment insurance claim because ‘‘[i]t was not claimant’s alcoholism but his voluntary disregard of a legitimate condition of employment, the maintenance of an operator’s license, which mandated his termination’’).

16 We need not, however, consider whether voluntary intoxication may negate intent in cases in which intent is not inferred, as a matter of law, or in cases in which intent is inferred for acts other than sexual misconduct with minors.

17 Because we hold that evidence of voluntary intoxication may not, as a matter of law, negate intent for purposes of insurance coverage arising out of a claim against the insured for sexual misconduct with a minor, we need not reach the question ofwhetherthe evidence presented by the defendants

was sufficient to create a genuine issue of material fact.