IN THE COMMONWEALTH COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA

Municipality of Norristown :

:

v. : No. 917 C.D. 2019

: SUBMITTED: March 26, 2020

JAR Investments, Inc., :

Appellant :

BEFORE: HONORABLE RENÉE COHN JUBELIRER, Judge

HONORABLE ELLEN CEISLER, Judge (P)

HONORABLE BONNIE BRIGANCE LEADBETTER, Senior Judge

OPINION NOT REPORTED

MEMORANDUM OPINION 

BY JUDGE CEISLER FILED: May 4, 2020

JAR Investments, Inc. (JAR) appeals from an order of the Court of Common 

Pleas of Montgomery County (trial court)1 granting judgment in favor of the 

Municipality of Norristown (Norristown) for delinquent trash fees relating to JAR’s 

two-unit rental property at 271 East Main Street in Norristown (Property).2 After 

thorough review, we affirm the trial court’s order.

 

1 The Honorable Bernard A. Moore, Senior Judge, presided.

2 A separate but similar appeal by JAR Investments, Inc. (JAR) is pending before this Court 

regarding another JAR rental property at 249 East Main Street in Norristown. That appeal is 

Municipality of Norristown v. JAR Investments, Inc. (Pa. Cmwlth. No. 919 C.D. 2019). By order 

dated October 9, 2019, this Court denied JAR’s application to consolidate the two appeals, because 

the trial court held separate hearings (although much of the evidence in the first hearing was also 

considered as evidence in the second hearing, see Reproduced Record at 207a, 254a), and issued 

separate opinions. The two appeals were argued seriately and are being decided 

contemporaneously and consistently with each other.
2

I. Background

Norristown has enacted an ordinance to provide for removal of trash from real 

properties in the municipality (the Ordinance),3through a contract with a designated 

trash removal service, currently J.P. Mascaro & Sons. See Reproduced Record 

(R.R.) at 28a-34a. Norristown sets the amounts of the trash fees periodically. R.R. 

at 93a; see, e.g., R.R. at 35a, 50a-51a, 67a, 88a-91a.

The Ordinance generally applies to all residential properties. However, 

certain properties are exempt from the Ordinance. Relevant here, an exemption 

applies to any rental property that has more than four rental units and for which 

Norristown’s trash removal service is not used. R.R. 32a-33a.

JAR has owned the Property since 1990. The Property has two rental units 

and is listed as a duplex on tax records. JAR has never used Norristown’s trash 

removal service. Instead, JAR contracts with a private trash removal service, Waste 

Management, Inc., for trash removal from all of its rental properties in Norristown, 

including the Property. However, JAR never formally sought an exemption from 

the Ordinance regarding the Property. 

The trash fees appear on property owners’ annual real property tax bills, along 

with county and borough taxes. R.R. at 158a, 252a. The Montgomery County Tax 

Claim Bureau (Tax Claim Bureau), through Northeast Revenue Service, LLC, 

collects delinquent real property taxes. Id. at 151a. However, the Tax Claim Bureau 

does not collect delinquent trash fees; those charges are currently collected for 

Norristown by Portnoff Law Associates, Ltd. (Portnoff) and were previously 

collected by Norristown itself. Id.

 

3 NORRISTOWN, PA., Admin. Code, ch. 274, art. I (2008).
3

JAR admittedly received bills from Norristown for trash fees relating to the 

Property as part of its annual tax bills. R.R. at 252a. From at least 2010 on, however, 

JAR did not pay the trash fees.4

As authorized by the statute popularly known as the Municipal Claims and 

Tax Liens Act (Lien Act),5 Norristown filed liens against the Property for unpaid 

trash fees for the years 2010 through 2016. JAR denies having received notice of 

the liens when they were originally filed. Although Norristown offered testimony 

concerning its normal practice of sending notices of all liens, it did not produce 

copies of any notices sent to JAR contemporaneously with the filings of the liens.

In 2017, the various liens were consolidated at Portnoff’s request by order of 

the trial court. In August 2017, Portnoff sent a certified letter notifying JAR of all 

of the trash fee delinquencies and the related liens regarding the Property. R.R. at 

173a, 177a-79a. Although JAR denies receiving the notice letter, the certified letter 

was sent to JAR’s business address in Norristown, and Portnoff received a signed 

return receipt evidencing delivery of the letter. Id. at 179a.

 

4

JAR has been struggling for the past decade with real property tax delinquencies relating 

to its rental properties and has been making payments to the Montgomery County Tax Claim 

Bureau (Tax Claim Bureau). JAR claims it did not pay delinquent trash fees during that time 

because it assumed the delinquent trash fees were included in the delinquent taxes. JAR blames 

the Tax Claim Bureau for not affirmatively pointing out that the trash fees were not part of the tax 

delinquencies being collected by the Tax Claim Bureau. However, the issues JAR raises on appeal 

do not relate to its alleged belief that it was paying the delinquent trash fees along with its 

delinquent taxes; rather, JAR’s arguments before this Court focus on the reasons why JAR believes 

it is not required to pay Norristown’s trash fees at all.

5 Act of May 16, 1923, P.L. 207, as amended, 53 P.S. §§ 7101-7455, popularly known as 

the Municipal Claims and Tax Liens Law (Lien Act), provides that “all municipal claims which 

may be lawfully imposed or assessed on any property in this Commonwealth . . . shall be and they 

are hereby declared to be a lien on said property.” Section 3 of the Lien Act, 53 P.S. § 7106(a). 

Section 4 provides that the lien “shall exist in favor of, and the claim therefore may be filed against 

the property thereby benefited by, the municipality extending the benefit.” 53 P.S. § 7107. 
4

In July 2018, the delinquent trash fees remained unpaid, and Portnoff filed a 

writ of scire facias (writ)6in the trial court seeking to reduce them to a judgment. 

Id. at 177a, 180a-81a. JAR’s attorney accepted service of the writ. Id. at 181a.

JAR asserted various defenses to the writ. JAR argued the trash fees were 

unlawful and excessive because it hired its own trash removal service for its rental 

properties and did not use Norristown’s contracted service. JAR also contended it 

was entitled to an exemption from the Ordinance because its various rental 

properties, although separate, were close to each other and collectively contained 

more than four rental units. JAR further claimed that although it received notice of 

delinquent taxes on the Property, it did not receive notice of any delinquent trash

fees until the writ was filed in 2018. Finally, JAR argued the liens were defective 

and invalid because the lien documents did not contain all of the information 

required by the Lien Act.

The trial court held a hearing on the writ in May 2019. Following the hearing, 

the trial court entered judgment in favor of Norristown and against JAR, together 

with a 10% penalty and interest at the rate of 10% as provided in the Ordinance. See

R.R. at 28a, 68a-69a (authorizing 10% interest); 33a (authorizing 10% penalty).

 

6 A writ of scire facias (writ) is used to enforce payment of a municipal claim against real 

property on which the claim is a lien. Newberry Twp. v. Stambaugh, 848 A.2d 173 (Pa. Cmwlth. 

2004) (citing Fox Chapel Sanitary Auth. v. Abbott, 384 A.2d 1012 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1978)). The writ 

directs the sheriff to notify the defendant to appear before the court and show cause why the 

municipality should not be permitted to enforce its claim. Stambaugh (citing Shapiro v. Ctr. Twp., 

632 A.2d 994 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1993)). The purpose of the writ is to ascertain the sum due on a lien 

and give the defendant an opportunity to show why the municipality should not have execution. 

Stambaugh (citing Shapiro).
5

In its opinion pursuant to Rule 1925(a) of the Pennsylvania Rules of Appellate 

Procedure, Pa.R.A.P. 1925(a) (Tr. Ct. Op.),

7

the trial court explained its rejection of 

each of JAR’s arguments. Regarding JAR’s private contract for trash removal, the 

trial court found no evidence of an agreement by Norristown not to collect trash fees 

from JAR. Accordingly, the trial court concluded Norristown was legally entitled 

to collect trash fees for the Property regardless of whether JAR used Norristown’s

trash collection service. The trial court also rejected JAR’s claim of an exemption

based on the total number of units in all of its properties, observing “there is no 

support for ruling that because triplexes, duplexes or single units are in close 

proximity, or ‘clustered’ these properties are exempt.” Tr. Ct. Op. at 4. As to JAR’s 

assertion that it received no notice of the delinquent trash fees, the trial court stated 

that at the hearing, the evidence included “[e]xhibits showing that delinquency 

letters for trash fee[s] for the [Property] were sent,” and further, “a certified mail 

 

7 At the time the trial court issued its opinion, Rule 1925(a) provided, in pertinent part:

(a) Opinion in support of order. 

(1) General rule. --Except as otherwise prescribed by this rule, upon receipt 

of the notice of appeal, the judge who entered the order giving rise to the notice of 

appeal, if the reasons for the order do not already appear of record, shall forthwith 

file of record at least a brief opinion of the reasons for the order, or for the rulings 

or other errors complained of, or shall specify in writing the place in the record 

where such reasons may be found. 

Pa. R.A.P. 1925 (former). The current rule, which became effective October 19, 2019, similarly 

provides, in pertinent part:

(a) Opinion in support of order. 

(1) General rule. Except as otherwise prescribed by this rule, upon receipt 

of the notice of appeal, the judge who entered the order giving rise to the notice of 

appeal, if the reasons for the order do not already appear of record, shall within the 

period set forth in Pa.R.A.P. 1931(a)(1) file of record at least a brief opinion of the 

reasons for the order, or for the rulings or other errors complained of, or shall 

specify in writing the place in the record where such reasons may be found.

Pa. R.A.P. 1925.
6

receipt for these letters was introduced.” Tr. Ct. Op. at 2. The trial court found 

“Norristown has presented credible evidence that these fees have not been paid, and 

that proper notices of the delinquencies were sent to JAR.” Id. at 4.

This appeal by JAR followed.

II. Issues

JAR raises five issues on appeal,

8 which we paraphrase as follows. 

1. Norristown is not entitled to collect trash fees for properties from which 

it does not actually remove trash. 

2. The Property should be exempt from Norristown’s trash fees because 

all of JAR’s rental properties are in close proximity to each other and contain a total 

of more than four rental units when aggregated.

3. Norristown implicitly agreed to JAR’s use of a privately contracted 

trash removal service instead of Norristown’s service. 

4. Even if Norristown did not affirmatively consent, it waived past due 

fees or is estopped from collecting them. 

5. Norristown’s lien claims were defective under applicable law.

III. Discussion

A. Trash Fees for Properties Not Served

JAR insists Norristown cannot impose trash fees against it because JAR pays 

for private trash removal service at the Property and does not use the service of 

Norristown’s contractor. This argument is without merit.

 

8 Our review is limited to a determination of whether the trial court abused its discretion or 

committed an error of law, whether its findings of fact were supported by competent evidence, and 

whether constitutional rights were violated. Allegheny Cty. v. Monzo, 500 A.2d 1096 (Pa. 1985);

Dreibelbis v. State Coll. Borough Water Auth., 654 A.2d 52 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1994); Shapiro.
7

This Court has repeatedly held that a municipality may impose trash fees on 

the owners of all properties in the municipality, including those that do not use the 

municipality’s service and instead contract for private trash removal. See City of 

Reading v. Heckman (Pa. Cmwlth., No. 428 C.D. 2012, filed November 8, 2012), 

2012 Pa. Commw. Unpub. LEXIS 845 (unreported)9(property owners must pay 

municipal trash fee, even if they dispose of their trash by other means); Newberry 

Twp. v. Stambaugh, 848 A.2d 173 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2004) (property owner required to 

pay municipal trash fee regardless of whether he used the service); Twp. of W. 

Manchester v. Mayo, 746 A.2d 666 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2000) (requirement to pay 

municipal trash fee applies no matter how property owner chooses to dispose of 

trash).

Further, to the extent JAR complains that it is being charged for a benefit or 

service it does not receive, we reject that assertion. As this Court explained in Mayo, 

“residents of a municipality are users of the municipality’s collection and disposal 

service regardless of how they choose to dispose of refuse because they receive the 

benefit from the general disposal system by the collection of refuse from other 

premises in the community.” Id. at 671. Accord R.R. at 156a (testimony that 

property contracting privately for trash removal still benefits from Norristown’s 

trash collection service to the municipality because trash is being picked up and the 

streets are clean).

We agree with the trial court that JAR cannot avoid payment of Norristown’s 

trash fees for the Property merely because JAR contracts for private trash removal 

instead.

 

9 Although this opinion is not binding authority, we cite it as persuasive pursuant to this 

Court’s Internal Operating Procedures, 210 Pa. Code § 69.414(a).
8

B. Aggregation of Rental Properties for Exemption Purposes

JAR also argues it should be exempt from paying Norristown’s trash fees 

because its properties in Norristown collectively include more than four residential 

units. Although its various rental properties are separate, and each contains less than 

four rental units, JAR asserts that the properties are in close proximity to each other 

and have a combined total of more than four rental units. JAR reasons that all of its 

rental properties, including the Property, should be considered in the aggregate for 

purposes of qualifying for an exemption from Norristown’s waste removal fee. We 

disagree.

JAR cites no provision of the Ordinance or other legal authority, and we are 

aware of none, to support the proposition that a municipality must consider all 

properties owned by a single entity as one property for purposes of assessing 

municipal fees or granting exemptions from such fees. Moreover, Norristown 

observes that JAR never formally requested an exemption from the Ordinance on 

that or any other basis. JAR does not dispute that observation; nor does JAR cite 

any authority or assert any argument that Norristown was required on its own 

initiative to aggregate JAR’s various separate rental properties, without a request 

from JAR, in order to exempt JAR’s properties from the municipal trash fee.

Accordingly, we conclude the trial court did not err in determining that JAR 

could not aggregate its various properties in order to meet the minimum number of 

units required to qualify for exemption from Norristown’s trash fees.

C. Implied-in-Fact Contract

JAR further asserts that Norristown, by its conduct, consented to JAR’s use 

of a private trash removal contractor. JAR points out that Norristown’s trash 

collector does not provide bins to JAR’s properties, all of which have dumpsters 
9

provided by Waste Management, Inc. Thus, JAR contends an implied-in-fact 

contract exists between itself and Norristown that JAR will not be subject to trash 

fees from Norristown. We find this argument to be without merit.

In support of its contention, JAR cites authorities for the general proposition 

that an implied-in-fact contract may arise from the parties’ conduct. However, JAR 

cites no legal authority, and we know of none, for the proposition that a municipality 

enters into an implied contract to exempt a property owner from a municipal service 

whenever an owner obtains the same service privately and the municipality does not 

force the property owner to use the municipality’s service. To the contrary, as 

discussed in section A above, the law is clear that a municipality is entitled to collect 

fees for municipal services, specifically including trash removal services, even from 

property owners contracting separately for private trash removal. See Heckman; 

Stambaugh; Mayo.

As JAR itself admits, Norristown has consistently billed JAR for trash 

removal services to its rental properties, including the Property, on its annual tax 

bills, and JAR has received those bills. R.R. at 252a. Norristown’s billings to JAR 

for trash removal support the trial court’s finding that Norristown’s conduct did not 

create an implied agreement to forgo charging JAR for trash removal from its rental 

properties. We agree with the trial court’s rejection of JAR’s assertion that 

Norristown’s conduct established an agreement not to impose trash fees. Accord

Elias v. Elias, 237 A.2d 215 (Pa. 1968) (lower court’s finding concerning existence 

of implied-in-fact contract is binding unless arbitrary or capricious); Walters v. Buck 

Hill Falls Co. (Pa. Cmwlth., No. 52 C.D. 2019, filed January 10, 2020), 2020 Pa. 

Commw. Unpub. LEXIS 37 (unreported) (affirming trial court’s rejection of 
10

implied-in-fact contract where evidence in record undermined any intention of the 

parties to be bound to the alleged implied agreement).

D. Waiver or Estoppel

In addition, JAR argues Norristown waived its ability to enforce its liens, or 

is estopped from doing so, by its delay in asserting, amending, and seeking to enforce 

the liens. We discern no merit in this argument.

Waiver and estoppel are equitable doctrines. See Harrington v. Stivanson, 59 

A. 268, 268 (Pa. 1904) (“[e]stoppel is governed by equitable principles”); Harbor 

Creek Sch. Dist. v. City of Erie, 579 A.2d 452, 454 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1990) (referring to 

“the equitable principles of estoppel, waiver and laches”). The Lien Act, under 

which Norristown filed its liens against the Property, does not contemplate the 

application of equitable procedures or principles to municipal liens. City of 

Philadelphia v. Perfetti, 119 A.3d 396 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2015) (en banc). The Lien Act

creates statutory municipal claims, together with statutory rights to enforce 

collection of such claims. Id. (citing City of Scranton v. Genet, 81 A. 335 (Pa. 1911); 

Trigona v. Lender, 926 A.2d 1226 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2007)). Because the lien process is 

statutory, it is not subject to equitable defenses. Perfetti (citing S. Union Twp. 

Sewage Auth. v. Kozares, 320 A.2d 381 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1974)). Therefore, consistent 

with our analysis in Perfetti, equitable principles offer JAR no defense to 

Norristown’s liens.

Indeed, JAR concedes “that equitable defenses are not avaible [sic] in 

statutory proceedings.” Br. of Appellant at 26. JAR suggests, however, that in the 

event the Lien Act is not applicable, equitable principles may apply. We reject this 

argument. The Lien Act is plainly applicable to this case, and JAR has not set forth 

any argument or cited any authority to support its suggestion to the contrary. 
11

The trial court correctly rejected JAR’s waiver and estoppel defenses.

E. Purported Defects in Lien Claims

Finally, JAR contends the filed liens contained several defects: (1) the 

original liens were unsigned; (2) the 2018 liens were still not signed by Norristown’s 

solicitor, but only by Portnoff; (3) the 2018 consolidated and restated liens were not 

filed until some six years after the first of the original liens; and (4) the liens did not 

contain a sufficient description of the service provided or the various fees imposed. 

In addition, JAR suggests that even if the 2018 liens are valid, the defects in the 

original liens preclude the addition of penalties or interest on those liens prior to 

2018. We find these various arguments to be without merit.

1. Alleged Defects in Original Liens

JAR alleges various defects in the original liens, including lack of a signature, 

absence of the Property address on the 2012 lien document, inconsistent mailing 

addresses for JAR, and failure to state the authority for the liens, the time periods for 

which they were filed, and the “work” to which the charges applied. Br. of Appellant 

at 29. These alleged defects are not relevant. 

Where a municipal lien has been filed but no writ has been issued seeking to 

reduce the lien to judgment, the claim may be amended or revived at any time, and 

the lien will reattach to the property at issue, except as to intervening interests of 

third party purchasers who had no notice of the lien because of its defects.10 Section 

1 of the 1959 amendment to the Lien Act,11 53 P.S. § 7432; see Perfetti; Sanft v. 

Borough of W. Grove, 437 A.2d 1332 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1981). Here, there is no dispute 

that Portnoff filed amended and consolidated liens before filing a writ to reduce them 

 

10 No intervening interests are averred here.

11 Act of September 23, 1959, P.L. 955, as amended, 53 P.S. § 7432.
12

to judgment. Therefore, only the defects, if any, in the amended lien filings can

affect the enforcement of the liens.

2. Alleged Defects in Amended and Consolidated Liens

JAR also contends that despite the filing of amended liens by Portnoff, some 

defects remain. The alleged remaining defects, however, do not preclude

Norristown’s enforcement of the liens.

a. Portnoff’s Signature

Section 10 of the Lien Act requires the signature of the municipality’s chief 

executive officer or its solicitor on a filed lien. 53 P.S. § 7144. JAR concedes that 

Portnoff is Norristown’s agent for collection of the liens, but insists the signature of 

a Portnoff attorney is insufficient to comply with the Lien Act because Portnoff is 

not Norristown’s solicitor. Norristown argues, and JAR concedes, that it did not 

raise this issue before the trial court. Therefore, it is waived. See Pa.R.A.P. 302(a).

Moreover, as Norristown correctly points out, the Ordinance expressly 

provides that Norristown’s contracted agent for collection of delinquent accounts 

constitutes its solicitor for collection purposes. R.R. at 30a. Therefore, Portnoff’s 

signature on the lien documents constitutes the signature of Norristown’s solicitor

for purposes of the liens, and it complies with the Lien Act.

b. Delay in Filing

A municipal lien arises by operation of law as soon as a municipal charge is 

assessed, whether or not a lien claim is filed. See 53 P.S. § 7106(a)(1); N. Coventry 

Twp. v. Tripodi, 64 A.3d 1128 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2013); Borough of Ambler v. 

Regenbogen, 713 A.2d 145 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1998). Moreover, under Section 1 of the

1959 amendment to the Lien Act, there is no time limit on amending a defective

municipal lien; an amended municipal lien claim may be filed at any time after the 
13

charges at issue are first payable. 53 P.S. § 7432. Thus, once an amended notice of 

the lien is filed, the lien is valid and enforceable except as against intervening rights 

and interests such as those of purchasers of the property without notice of the lien. 

See 53 P.S. § 7432; Heckman (citing Keller v. Scranton City Treasurer, 29 A.3d 436 

(Pa. Cmwlth. 2011)); Sanft. 

JAR has owned the Property since 1990. It is not an intervening owner that 

purchased the Property after filing of the original liens and without notice of them. 

Therefore, despite JAR’s arguments that the original filed liens were defective and 

that it did not receive notices of the liens until after they were amended and

consolidated in 2017, JAR is obligated to pay the fees reflected in the amended liens. 

Heckman.

c. Descriptions of Services Provided and Fees Imposed

JAR avers, without detail or support, that the amended lien filings do not 

describe with accuracy the “work” performed for which the claims were filed. Br. 

of Appellant at 30. A review of the amended liens, however, reveals that each 

expressly states the charges are for “trash fees” and states the service year of the 

delinquency. See R.R. at 103a, 105a, 107a, 109a, 111a, 113a. JAR neither cites any 

authority nor provides any explanation of why this description is inadequate. We 

find the amended liens sufficiently identify the services provided. See Forest Cty. 

Solid Waste Auth. v. Certain Parcels of Land (No. 2), 72 Pa. D. & C.2d 345 (1975) 

(description stating lien claim was for collection of refuse between two dates was 

sufficient); cf. City of Philadelphia v. Steward, 31 Pa. Super. 72 (1906) (lien claim 

was insufficient where it was so vague that it left doubt whether work done was to 

repair a sidewalk or install a sewer connection).
14

JAR further suggests the lien claims failed to delineate sufficiently the fees 

charged. Notably, the Lien Act does not require an itemization of the components 

of a fee to be set forth in a lien claim. See 53 P.S. § 7144. Perhaps recognizing this, 

JAR couches its argument concerning the fee components in terms of the description 

of the services performed. JAR cites no authority, and we are aware of none, 

requiring a lien claim to set forth and describe separately each individual component 

of the fee subject to a lien claim.

JAR suggests, however, that the 10% penalty added to the principal amount 

of each lien was not authorized by the Lien Act. JAR reasons that the Lien Act

authorizes collection of “charges” but not “penalties.” Br. of Appellant at 30 (citing 

53 P.S. § 7106(a)(1)).

Section 3 of the Lien Act provides that municipal claims are a lien on the 

property served, “together with all charges, expenses, and fees incurred in the 

collection of any delinquent account, including reasonable attorney fees. . . .” 53 

P.S. § 7106(a)(1). Norristown’s ordinance provides for a 10% penalty on trash fees 

more than 120 days delinquent. R.R. at 33a. JAR fails to support its argument 

against imposition of the penalty with an explanation or citation of authority 

sufficient to allow meaningful review on appeal. Therefore, it is waived. 

Commonwealth v. Bishop, 217 A.3d 833 (Pa. 2019).

3. Penalties and Interest on Original Liens

In its reply brief, JAR asserts, without elaboration, that because there were 

alleged defects in the original claims, it was unreasonable for Norristown to assess 

penalties and interest on the original as well as the amended claims. This claim is 

waived because it was first presented in a reply brief. Commonwealth v. Fahy, 737 

A.2d 214 (Pa. 1999) (appellant may not raise new issue in reply brief (citing 
15

Pa.R.A.P. 2113)); Chambersburg Area Sch. Dist. v. Dorsey, 97 A.3d 1281 (Pa. 

Cmwlth. 2014) (same). Further, it is waived because JAR has failed to provide 

sufficient explanation or citation to authority to allow meaningful review by this 

Court. Bishop.

IV. Conclusion

Based on the foregoing discussion, we conclude the trial court correctly 

granted judgment in favor of Norristown and against JAR. We therefore affirm the 

trial court’s order.

__________________________________

ELLEN CEISLER, Judge
IN THE COMMONWEALTH COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA

Municipality of Norristown :

:

v. : No. 917 C.D. 2019

:

JAR Investments, Inc., :

Appellant :

O R D E R

AND NOW, this 4

th day of May, 2020, the order of the Court of Common 

Pleas of Montgomery County is AFFIRMED.

__________________________________

ELLEN CEISLER, Judge