[Cite as Disciplinary Counsel v. Brickley, 131 Ohio St.3d 228, 2012-Ohio-872.]

D ISCIPLINARY C OUNSEL v . B RICKLEY

. [Cite as Disciplinary Counsel v. Brickley, 131 Ohio St.3d 228, 2012-Ohio-872.] Attorneys—Misconduct—Convic tions of felony theft involving client funds— Illegal acts reflecting adversely on lawyer’s ho nesty—Conduct involving deceit or dishonesty—Conduct adversely reflecting on fitn ess to practice
law—Permanent disbarment. (No. 2011-1728—Submitted December 7, 2011—Decided March 6, 2012.)
O N C ERTIFIED R EPORT by the Board of Commissioners on Grievances and Discipline of the Supreme Court, No. 10-080.

__________________ Per Curiam

. {¶ 1} Respondent, Barry Frederick Brickl ey, Attorney Registration No. 0011435, whose address of record is in Mansfield, Ohio, was admitted to the practice of law in Ohio in 1984. We i ndefinitely suspended his license in December 2002, and it has not been reinstated. Richland Cty. Bar Assn. v. Brickley , 97 Ohio St.3d 285, 2002-Ohio-6416, 779 N.E.2d 750. {¶ 2} On August 16, 2010, relator, disciplinary counsel, filed a complaint alleging that between Februa ry and September 2006, while working as a paralegal for a Mansfield attorney, Bric kley wrote seven checks to himself from the attorney’s client trust account without authorization and deposited them into his personal bank account. {¶ 3} His actions were not detected until December 2008. Brickley pleaded no contest to felony counts of thef t, forgery, and receiving stolen property and was accepted into the Richland County prosecuting attorney’s diversion program. Based upon this c onduct, relator alleged that Brickley had violated Prof.Cond.R. 8.4(b) (prohibiting a lawy er from committing an illegal act thatS UPREME C OURT OF O HIO

2 reflects adversely on the lawyer’s honesty or trustworthiness), (c) (prohibiting a lawyer from engaging in conduct involvi ng dishonesty, fraud, deceit, or misrepresentation), and (h) (prohibiting a lawyer from engaging in conduct that adversely reflects on the lawyer's fitness to practice law). {¶ 4} Before filing the complaint, relato r sent two letters of inquiry to Brickley, one at the address listed in his attorney registration and another at an
alternate Mansfield address. Both letters were returned, but one bore a forwarding address in Savannah, Georgia. A third letter was sent to the Georgia address and was signed for by a Jo A nn Wohlert. A fourth letter was handdelivered to Brickley at the Richland Count y Jail, but he did not respond to either inquiry. A letter informing Brickley that the investigation had terminated with a finding of probable cause was not returned to relator, nor was the notice of intent to file a complaint, although the latter wa s signed for by someone whose signature is illegible. Brickley did not respond to e ither letter. The complaint was served by certified mail at the Savannah, Georgia address provided by the postal service, but Brickley has not filed an answer. Th erefore, on December 23, 2010, relator filed
a motion for default. {¶ 5} A master commissioner appointed by the Board of Commissioners on Grievances and Discipline consider ed relator’s motion and supporting evidence in compliance with Gov.Bar R. V(6)(F)(1)(b) (requiring default motions in attorney disciplinary proceedings to be supported by sw orn or certified documentary prima facie evidence). Th e master commissioner found by clear and convincing evidence that Brickley had vi olated Prof.Cond.R. 8.4(b), (c), and (h), as alleged in relator’s complaint. Th e board adopted the master commissioner’s findings of fact and misconduct. {¶ 6} In recommending a sanction, the master commissioner and board considered the aggravating and mitigating factors listed in BCGD Proc.Reg. 10. See Disciplinary Counsel v. Broeren, 115 Ohio St.3d 473, 2007-Ohio-5251, 875January Term, 2012

3 N.E.2d 935, ¶ 21. As aggravating factors, the master commissioner found that Brickley had a prior disciplinary reco rd, engaged in a pattern of misconduct involving multiple offenses, and failed to cooperate in the disciplinary process.
See BCGD Proc.Reg. 10(B)(1)(a), (c), (d), and (e). The sole mitigating factor was that as of December 13, 2010, Brickley had been making restitution payments as part of his diversion program. {¶ 7} The master commissioner acknowledg ed that Brickley had been indefinitely suspended from the practice of law and was working as a paralegal when he committed his misconduct, and ther efore could not have had clients of his own. Nonetheless, he equated Brickley’s theft with the misappropriation of
client funds because the funds came from th e client trust account of the attorney who employed him. Observing that disb arment is the presumptive sanction for the misappropriation of client funds, Cleveland Bar Assn. v. Dixon , 95 Ohio St.3d 490, 2002-Ohio-2490, 769 N.E.2d 816, ¶ 15, and is an appropriate sanction when an attorney is convicted of theft offenses, Disciplinary Counsel v. Muhlbach , 104 Ohio St.3d 340, 2004-Ohio-6563, 819 N.E.2d 698, ¶ 11, the master commissioner recommended that Brickley be permanen tly disbarred. The board adopted the master commissioner’s findings of fact and misconduct, as well as his
recommended sanction. {¶ 8} Accordingly, we permanently disbar Barry Frederick Brickley from the practice of law in Ohio. Costs are taxed to Brickley. Judgment accordingly.
O’C ONNOR , C.J., and P FEIFER , L UNDBERG S TRATTON , O’D ONNELL , L ANZINGER , C UPP , and M C G EE B ROWN , JJ., concur.

__________________ Jonathan E. Coughlan, Disciplinar y Counsel, and Heather Coglianese, Assistant Disciplinary Counsel, for relator.

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