alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
1

The Honorable Richard E. Dorr, United States District Judge for the Western

District of Missouri.

United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT

___________

No. 07-3227

___________

United States of America, *

*

Appellee, *

* Appeal from the United States

v. * District Court for the

* Western District of Missouri.

David Teague, *

* [UNPUBLISHED]

Appellant. *

___________

Submitted: February 5, 2009

Filed: February 17, 2009

___________

Before BYE, COLLOTON, and GRUENDER, Circuit Judges.

___________

PER CURIAM.

David Teague pleaded guilty to being a felon in possession of a firearm. The

district court1

 sentenced him as an armed career criminal (ACC) under 18 U.S.C.

§ 924(e) and U.S.S.G. § 4B1.4 based on several prior violent-felony convictions,

including two burglary convictions and one robbery conviction. According to the

unobjected-to facts contained in the presentence report (PSR), both of Teague’s

burglary convictions involved the unlawful entry into a commercial building with

intent to commit larceny. On appeal, his counsel has moved to withdraw and filed a
-2-

brief under Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967), arguing the district court erred

in holding that some of Teague’s prior felony convictions were violent felonies for

ACC purposes.

After careful de novo review, see United States v. Livingston, 442 F.3d 1082,

1083 (8th Cir. 2006), we conclude the district court did not err in sentencing Teague

as an ACC based on his two prior burglary convictions and his prior robbery

conviction. See Taylor v. United States, 495 U.S. 575, 599 (1990) (person has been

convicted of burglary for purposes of § 924(e) enhancement if convicted of any crime

having basic elements of unlawful entry into a building with intent to commit crime);

United States v. Bell, 445 F.3d 1086, 1090-91 (8th Cir. 2006) (based on unobjected-to

facts in PSR, district court correctly held that appellant’s prior commercial-burglary

conviction was for crime of violence under Guidelines); United States v. Johnson, 411

F.3d 928, 931-32 (8th Cir. 2005) (robbery is crime of violence under Guidelines); see

also United States v. Williams, 537 F.3d 969, 971 (8th Cir. 2008) (this court has never

recognized difference between “crime of violence” and “violent felony”). Therefore,

we need not address the treatment of Teague’s other convictions.

Having reviewed the record independently under Penson v. Ohio, 488 U.S. 75,

80 (1988), we find no nonfrivolous issues. Accordingly, we affirm. We also grant

defense counsel’s motion to withdraw.

______________________________
# L_2010114EN.01001101.xml

| 7.5.2010 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | L 114/11 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

7.5.2010

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

L 114/11

---

COMMISSION REGULATION (EU) No 392/2010

of 6 May 2010

granting no export refund for butter in the framework of the standing invitation to tender provided for in Regulation (EC) No 619/2008

THE EUROPEAN COMMISSION,

Having regard to the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union,

Having regard to Council Regulation (EC) No 1234/2007 of 22 October 2007 establishing a common organisation of agricultural markets and on specific provisions for certain agricultural products (Single CMO Regulation) (1), and in particular Article 164(2), in conjunction with Article 4, thereof,

Whereas:

| (1) | Commission Regulation (EC) No 619/2008 of 27 June 2008 opening a standing invitation to tender for export refunds concerning certain milk products (2) provides for a permanent tender. |
| --- | --- |

(1)

Commission Regulation (EC) No 619/2008 of 27 June 2008 opening a standing invitation to tender for export refunds concerning certain milk products (2) provides for a permanent tender.

| (2) | Pursuant to Article 6 of Commission Regulation (EC) No 1454/2007 of 10 December 2007 laying down common rules for establishing a tender procedure for fixing export refunds for certain agricultural products (3) and following an examination of the tenders submitted in response to the invitation to tender, it is appropriate not to grant any refund for the tendering period ending on 4 May 2010. |
| --- | --- |

(2)

Pursuant to Article 6 of Commission Regulation (EC) No 1454/2007 of 10 December 2007 laying down common rules for establishing a tender procedure for fixing export refunds for certain agricultural products (3) and following an examination of the tenders submitted in response to the invitation to tender, it is appropriate not to grant any refund for the tendering period ending on 4 May 2010.

| (3) | The Management Committee for the Common Organisation of Agricultural Markets has not delivered an opinion within the time limit set by its Chair, |
| --- | --- |

(3)

The Management Committee for the Common Organisation of Agricultural Markets has not delivered an opinion within the time limit set by its Chair,

HAS ADOPTED THIS REGULATION:

Article 1

For the standing invitation to tender opened by Regulation (EC) No 619/2008, for the tendering period ending on 4 May 2010, no export refund shall be granted for the products and destinations referred to in points (a) and (b) of Article 1 and in Article 2 of that Regulation.

Article 2

This Regulation shall enter into force on 7 May 2010.

This Regulation shall be binding in its entirety and directly applicable in all Member States.

Done at Brussels, 6 May 2010.

For the Commission, On behalf of the President,

Jean-Luc DEMARTY

Director-General for Agriculture and Rural Development

---

(1)  
  OJ L 299, 16.11.2007, p. 1.

1

(2)  
  OJ L 168, 28.6.2008, p. 20.

2

(3)  
  OJ L 325, 11.12.2007, p. 69.

3

---
[Federal Register Volume 63, Number 99 (Friday, May 22, 1998)]
[Notices]
[Page 28412]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 98-13707]


=======================================================================
-----------------------------------------------------------------------

DEPARTMENT OF LABOR

Employment and Training Administration
[TA-W-34,188 and NAFTA-02140]


Badger Paper Mills, Incorporated Peshtigo, WI; Notice of 
Affirmative Determination Regarding Application for Reconsideration

    By letter of March 27, 1998, the petitioners requested 
administrative reconsideration of the Department of Labor's Notices of 
Negative Determination Regarding Eligibility to Apply for Worker 
Adjustment Assistance (TA-W-34,188) and NAFTA-Transitional Adjustment 
Assistance (NAFTA-02140) for workers of the subject firm. The TAA and 
NAFTA-TAA notices were signed on March 2, 1998 and published in the 
Federal Register on March 23, 1998 (63 FR 13878) and (63 FR 13879), 
respectively.
    The petitioners present evidence that the Department's survey of 
the subject firm's domestic customers was incomplete.

Conclusion

    After careful review of the application, I conclude that the claim 
is of sufficient weight to justify reconsideration of the Department of 
Labor's prior decision. The application is, therefore, granted.

    Signed at Washington, DC, this 8th day of May 1998.
Grant D. Beale,
Acting Director, Office of Trade Adjustment Assistance.
[FR Doc. 98-13707 Filed 5-22-98; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 4510-30-M
No. 12-953.

#### In re Del Rio.

Petition for writ of mandamus denied.
[Federal Register Volume 63, Number 99 (Friday, May 22, 1998)]
[Notices]
[Page 28408]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 98-13677]


-----------------------------------------------------------------------

DEPARTMENT OF THE INTERIOR

Bureau of Land Management
[AK-040-96-003; AA-76879, AA-77643, AA-77776, AA-76936, AA-76935, AA-
77839]


Management Framework Plans, Etc: Alaska

AGENCY: Bureau of Land Management, Interior.

ACTION: Notice of availability; proposed amendment to the Southwest and 
Southcentral Management Framework Plans (MFP) in Southwest and 
Southcentral Alaska.

-----------------------------------------------------------------------

SUMMARY: The BLM has amended the Southwest and Southcentral MFPs to 
allow for the sale of public lands needed for church-group related 
development and to resolve several land occupancy problems. The 
following described public lands have been examined through the land 
use planning process and have been found suitable for disposal pursuant 
to Section 203 of the Federal Land Policy and Management Act of 1976, 
43 U.S.C. 1713. Parcel Two of the following described lands is also 
classified as suitable for lease and sale under the Recreation and 
Public Purposes Act, as amended, 43 U.S.C. 969.

Parcel One (AA-76879): Seward Meridian, Alaska, T. 20 N., R. 8 E., 
Sections 23 and 26, containing approximately 80 acres.
Parcel Two (AA-77643): Seward Meridian, Alaska, T. 15 N., R. 1 W., 
Lot 53, Section 19, containing approximately 1.42 acres.
Parcel Three (AA-77776): Seward Meridian, Alaska, T. 17 N., R. 2 E., 
Section 26, Lot 22, containing approximately 0.94 acre.
Parcel Four (AA-76396): Kateel River Meridian, Alaska, T. 27 S., R. 
22 E., Section 32, containing approximately 45 acres
Parcel Five (AA-76935): Kateel River Meridian, Alaska, T. 27 S., R. 
22 E., Section 32, containing approximately 1 acre.
Parcel Six (AA-77839): Seward Meridian, Alaska, T. 2 N., R. 12 W., 
Sections 21 and 22, containing approximately .72 acre

    The above lands contain approximately 129 acres.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Robert P. Rinehart, Anchorage Field 
Office, Bureau of Land Management, 6881 Abbott Loop Rd., Anchorage, 
Alaska, 99507-2599, (907) 267-1272.

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: For a period of 30 days from the date this 
notice is published in the Federal Register, any party that 
participated in the plan amendment and is adversely affected by the 
amendment, may protest this action in accordance with 43 CFR 1610.5-5 
only as it effects issues submitted for the record during the planning 
process.
Nick Douglas,
Field Manager.
[FR Doc. 98-13677 Filed 5-21-98; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 4310-22-P
#### The People of the State of New York, Respondent, v Clarence Prude, Appellant.

(Appeal No. 2.)

[768 NYS2d 912]

Appeal from an order of Monroe County Court (Marks, J.), dated August 28, 2001, which denied defendant’s CPL 440.10 motion seeking to vacate the judgment of conviction.

*1321It is hereby ordered that the order so appealed from be and the same hereby is unanimously affirmed.

Memorandum: Defendant appeals from an order denying his CPL 440.10 motion seeking to vacate the judgment of conviction based on his contention that the prosecutor failed to disclose that a witness at his murder trial was granted partial immunity for his grand jury testimony and that the prosecutor affirmatively misrepresented that fact to the jury. County Court properly denied defendant’s motion on the ground that sufficient facts appear on the record to permit review of defendant’s contention on direct appeal *(see*CPL 440.10 [2] [b]). Defendant contends that he did not become aware of the alleged immunity agreement until years after his trial, when he obtained a copy of the witness’s testimony at the separate trial of a codefendant. Defendant and the codefendant, however, were jointly indicted following a single grand jury presentation at which the witness testified. Those minutes would confirm the nature of the immunity that the witness received, allowing for review of defendant’s present contention on direct appeal. Present— Pigott, Jr., P.J., Pine, Wisner, Hurlbutt and Gorski, JJ.
#### The People of the State of New York, Respondent, v Samuel Dehoney, Appellant.

[768 NYS2d 656]

— Appeal by the defendant from a judgment of the Supreme Court, Kings County (Kreindler, J.), rendered June 20, 2001, convicting him of robbery in the first degree (six counts), upon his plea of guilty, and imposing sentence.

Ordered that the judgment is affirmed.

We have reviewed the record and agree with the defendant’s assigned counsel that there are no nonfrivolous issues which could be raised on appeal. Counsel’s application for leave to withdraw as counsel is granted *(see Anders v California,*386 US *744738 [1967]; *People v Paige,*54 AD2d 631 [1976]; *cf. People v Gonzalez,*47 NY2d 606 [1979]). Ritter, J.P., Smith, Friedmann, H. Miller and Crane, JJ., concur.
|                                                                      
|----------------------------------------------------------------------
|                                                                      
|View History: Annual Download Data (XLS File)                        
|View History: Annual                                                  
|View History: Annual                                                  
|View History:                                                         
|                                                                      
|Colorado Natural Gas Percentage Total Industrial Deliveries  (Percent)
|                                                                      
|                                                                      
|Colorado Natural Gas Percentage Total Industrial Deliveries  (Percent)
|                                                                      

|Decade                                                                                                                            | Year-0 | Year-1 | Year-2 | Year-3 | Year-4 | Year-5 | Year-6 | Year-7 | Year-8 | Year-9
|--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- | ------ | ------ | ------ | ------ | ------ | ------ | ------ | ------ | ------ | ------
|1990's                                                                                                                            |        |        |        | 0.87   | 0.87   | 0.84   | 0.94   | 0.71   | 1.00   | 0.94  
|2000's                                                                                                                            | 0.99   | 1.88   | 1.74   | 1.57   | 1.55   | 1.92   | 1.71   | 1.76   | 1.79   | 1.84  
|2010's                                                                                                                            | 1.67   | 1.06   | 1.01   | 1.05   | 1.02   | 1.04   | 1.04   | 1.07   | 1.05   | 1.09  
|2020's                                                                                                                            | 1.02   | 1.04   | 1.07   |        |        |        |        |        |        |       
|- = No Data Reported;  -- = Not Applicable;  NA = Not Available;  W = Withheld to avoid disclosure of individual company data.
|                                                                                                                                 
|Release Date: 7/31/2024                                                                                                          
|Next Release Date: 8/30/2024
<PAGE>

                                                                   EXHIBIT 23.1

               CONSENT OF ERNST & YOUNG LLP, INDEPENDENT AUDITORS

We consent to the incorporation by reference in the Registration Statement (Form
S-8 No. 333-87787) pertaining to the Amended and Restated 1996 Stock Plan, the
1997 Employee Stock Purchase Plan and the 1997 Director Option Plan of Somnus
Medical Technologies, Inc., of our report dated February 4, 2000, with respect
to the consolidated financial statements and schedule of Somnus Medical
Technologies, Inc., included in the Annual Report (Form 10-K) for the year ended
December 31, 1999.


                              /s/ Ernst & Young LLP

Palo Alto, California
March 29, 2000
# L_2010047EN.01000401.xml

| 24.2.2010 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | L 47/4 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

24.2.2010

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

L 47/4

---

COMMISSION REGULATION (EU) No 147/2010

of 23 February 2010

entering a name in the register of protected designations of origin and protected geographical indications (Pemento do Couto (PGI))

THE EUROPEAN COMMISSION,

Having regard to the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union,

Having regard to Council Regulation (EC) No 510/2006 of 20 March 2006 on the protection of geographical indications and designations of origin for agricultural products and foodstuffs (1), and in particular the first subparagraph of Article 7(4) thereof,

Whereas:

| (1) | Pursuant to the first subparagraph of Article 6(2) and in accordance with Article 17(2) of Regulation (EC) No 510/2006, Spain’s application to register the name ‘Pemento do Couto’ was published in the Official Journal of the European Union (2). |
| --- | --- |

(1)

Pursuant to the first subparagraph of Article 6(2) and in accordance with Article 17(2) of Regulation (EC) No 510/2006, Spain’s application to register the name ‘Pemento do Couto’ was published in the Official Journal of the European Union (2).

| (2) | As no statement of objection under Article 7 of Regulation (EC) No 510/2006 has been received by the Commission, that name should therefore be entered in the register, |
| --- | --- |

(2)

As no statement of objection under Article 7 of Regulation (EC) No 510/2006 has been received by the Commission, that name should therefore be entered in the register,

HAS ADOPTED THIS REGULATION:

Article 1

The name contained in the Annex to this Regulation is hereby entered in the Register.

Article 2

This Regulation shall enter into force on the 20th day following its publication in the Official Journal of the European Union.

This Regulation shall be binding in its entirety and directly applicable in all Member States.

Done at Brussels, 23 February 2010.

For the Commission

The President

José Manuel BARROSO

---

(1)  
  OJ L 93, 31.3.2006, p. 12.

1

(2)  
  OJ C 140, 20.6.2009, p. 9.

2

---

ANNEX

Agricultural products intended for human consumption listed in Annex I to the Treaty:

Class 1.6.   Fruit, vegetables and cereals, fresh or processed

SPAIN

Pemento do Couto (PGI)

---
COURT OF APPEALS

	SECOND DISTRICT OF TEXAS

	FORT WORTH

	NO. 2-05-198-CR

TRAVIS MARK SMITH	APPELLANT

	V.

THE STATE OF TEXAS	STATE

	------------

	FROM CRIMINAL DISTRICT COURT NO. 4 OF TARRANT COUNTY

	------------

	MEMORANDUM OPINION1

	------------

	Appellant Travis Mark Smith, a pro se incarcerated inmate, seeks to appeal from a purported ruling on a petition for declaratory judgment he filed in Criminal District Court No. Four of Tarrant County, Texas, the court that sentenced him in 1994 to twenty years’ confinement for credit card abuse.2  We dismiss the appeal for want of jurisdiction.

	On February 18, 2005, Appellant filed his petition for declaratory judgment requesting the trial court to declare that the Texas Department of Criminal Justice and the Texas Board of Pardons and Paroles have unlawfully  applied certain rules regarding parole and credit for time served.  The face of the motion bears the notation, “Presented to Judge Thomas & no action taken. MC.”  On March 8, 2005, Appellant filed a notice of appeal complaining of the trial court’s notation of “no action taken.”

	On June 9, 2005, we notified Appellant of our concern that this court lacks jurisdiction over this appeal because the trial court has not ruled upon his petition for declaratory judgment.3  Appellant has responded that “no action taken” is the same as a denial order and is therefore appealable. 

	A criminal defendant may appeal when “the trial court enters an appealable order.”  Tex. R. App. P. 26.2(a)(1).  It is the written order that memorializes the judge's intent to authenticate the action taken.  State v. Shaw, 4 S.W.3d 875, 877-78 (Tex. App.—Dallas 1999, no pet.); see State v. Rosenbaum, 818 S.W.2d 398, 402 (Tex. Crim. App. 1991) (holding the term "entered by the court" encompasses the signing of an order by the trial judge).  We disagree that the notation by the trial court clerk of “no action taken” is the equivalent of an order by the trial court that might be appealable.

	Accordingly, because there is no written order that might properly be appealed,4 we dismiss this appeal for want of jurisdiction.  See Tex. R. App. P.  43.2(f).

								PER CURIAM

PANEL D: HOLMAN, GARDNER, and WALKER, JJ.

DO NOT PUBLISH

Tex. R. App. P. 47.2(b)

DELIVERED:  July 21, 2005
* Pursuant to 5 TH C IR
. R. 47.5, the court has determined that this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5 TH C IR
. R. 47.5.4. 

### IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

No. 05-30955 Conference Calendar

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA Plaintiff-Appellee

v. CORY D RIGMAIDEN Defendant-Appellant

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Western District of Louisiana USDC No. 2:04-CR-20128
Before JOLLY, BENAVIDES, and STEWART, Circuit Judges. PER CURIAM: * Cory D. Rigmaiden appeals the sentence imposed following hisguilty-plea conviction of possessing with the intent to distribute coc aine base. He argues that his sentence is unreasonable because it was imposed under what amounts toa de facto mandatory sentencing guidelinessystem resulting from this court’s precedents bestowing a presumption of reasonableness on sentences which fall withi n a defendant’s advisory sentencing guidelines range. Rigmaiden also argues that the district court failed to consider his arguments for a United States Court of Appeals

Fifth Circuit 

### F I L E D October 24, 2007 Charles R. Fulbruge III ClerkNo. 05-30955

2 below-guidelinessentence, failed toanalyze on the record the sentencing factors in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a), and gave too much weight to the advisory Sentencing Guidelines. The 300-month term of imprisonment imposed in Rigmaiden’s case fell within his properly calculated guidelines range and is entitled toa presumption of reasonableness. See United States v. Alonzo, 435 F.3d 551, 554 (5th Cir. 2006). Rigmaiden’s argument that the presumption of reasonableness used by this court returns the Sentencing Guidelines to their formerly unconstitutional, mandatory status is foreclosed. See Rita v. United States, 127 S. Ct. 2456, 2462 (2007). The district court’s statements at sentencing reflect sufficient consideration of Rigmaiden’s mitigation argument and of the § 3553(a) factors. Rigmaiden has not demonstrated that the district court clearly erred in exercising its broad sentencing discretion by imposing a sentence that failed to “account for a factor that should have received significant weight,” gave “significant weight to an irrelevant or improper factor,” or represented “a clear
error of judgment in balancing the sentenci ng factors.” See United States v. Nikonova, 480 F.3d 371, 376 (5th Cir. 2007), cert. denied,

___S.Ct

. ___, 2007 WL 1708063 (Oct. 1, 2007) (No. 06-11834). Accordingly, Rigmaiden has not rebutted the presumption of reasonableness

. AFFIRMED.