UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

ABAYOMI KALEJAIYE, : 

 : 

Plaintiff, : Civil Action No.: 19-02647 (RC)

 : 

 v. : Re Document No.: 86, 87, 88 

 : 

QUALITY INVESTIGATIONS, INC., : 

 : 

Defendant. : 

MEMORANDUM OPINION

GRANTING IN PART AND DENYING IN PART DEFENDANT’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY 

JUDGMENT; DENYING PLAINTIFF’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT; AND GRANTING IN 

PART AND DENYING IN PART PLAINTIFF’S MOTION FOR SANCTIONS

I. INTRODUCTION

Before the Court are Quality Investigation, Inc.’s (“QI”) Motion for Summary Judgment 

(“Def.’s Mot.”), ECF. 86-1, and Abayomi Kalejaiye’s Motion for Summary Judgment (“Pl.’s 

Mot.”), ECF No. 87-2. Both QI and Kalejaiye filed memoranda in opposition to the respective 

moving party’s motion for summary judgment, ECF Nos. 90 and 92-2 (“Def.’s Opp.” and “Pl.’s 

Opp.,” respectively). Both parties also filed replies, ECF Nos. 93 and 94 (“Pl.’s Reply” and 

“Def.’s Reply,” respectively). Additionally, Kalejaiye filed a Motion for Sanctions (“Sanctions 

Mot.”), ECF No. 88, to which QI filed an opposition (“Sanctions Opp.”), ECF No. 91, and in 

support of which Kalejaiye filed a reply, (“Sanctions Reply”), ECF No. 95. For the foregoing 

reasons, the Court grants in part and denies in part QI’s motion for summary judgment, denies

Kalejaiye’s motion for summary judgment, and grants in part and denies in part Kalejaiye’s 

motion for sanctions. 
2 

II. FACTUAL BACKGROUND

Prior to its dissolution, QI contracted with the federal government to provide security 

officers at government facilities. See Pl.’s Resp. to Def.’s Statement of Undisputed Material 

Facts at 1 (“Response to Undisputed Facts”), ECF No. 92-1. As relevant here, QI contracted 

with the government to provide security officers at a Department of Transportation (“DOT”) 

facility and a Department of Labor (“DOL”) facility. Id. at 1, 45. Kalejaiye—Plaintiff in this 

case—was one of the officers that QI employed to staff its DOT facility contract. Id. at 4. 

When QI hired Kalejaiye, he had a beard. Id. at 7. Under QI’s policies, QI employees 

were required to maintain certain grooming standards. Id. at 46. Specifically, QI employees 

were required to either (1) shave, (2) maintain a beard shorter than 1/4 of an inch with a medical 

waiver, or (3) receive an accommodation to grow their beard longer than 1/4 inch. Id. at 5–6, 46. 

Prior to beginning work at QI, Kalejaiye obtained a medical waiver permitting him to grow a 

beard of 1/4 inch in length, but after starting work with QI he requested a religious 

accommodation so that he could grow his beard longer. Id. at 6–7. QI’s grooming policies 

ostensibly regulated beard length to ensure that security guards at the DOT facility could use gas 

masks effectively if the need arose.1

 Id. at 4–6, 14. The parties disagree about what precisely 

happened next. 

QI points to evidence showing that its contract with DOT required it to obtain DOT’s 

approval before it could grant a religious accommodation allowing Kalejaiye to grow his beard 

beyond 1/4 inch. Id. at 11-12, 18, 26–27, 30–31. And QI points to evidence showing that it took 

Kalejaiye’s request to DOT and that DOT denied the request. Id. at 19, 25, 31. Kalejaiye rejects 

1

 The record reflects that maintaining a beard over a certain length—though the precise 

length is disputed—can cause an employee difficulty in creating an airtight seal with a gas mask, 

causing the gas mask to be ineffective. See Response to Undisputed Facts at 15–16, 20, 24. 
3 

these contentions. Specifically, Kalejaiye’s proffered evidence shows that QI was obligated to 

grant his accommodation request in the first instance and that DOT could review that decision 

subsequently. Id. at 25–27, 30–31. Additionally, Kalejaiye points to evidence calling into 

question whether QI ever presented his accommodation request to DOT. Id. at 25. 

The parties also dispute whether QI considered transferring Kalejaiye to its DOL facility 

contract—where Kalejaiye asserts gas masks were not required—as an accommodation for 

Kalejaiye’s religious practice of beard growth. Id. at 39–41. QI presents evidence that it 

considered the possibility of transferring Kalejaiye but determined that it had no vacant positions 

at the DOL site, that reassignment was impracticable, and that Kalejaiye would still be required 

to shave his beard to 1/4 inch even if reassigned to the DOL site. Id. at 39–44. Kalejaiye 

disagrees. Kalejaiye points to contradicting evidence suggesting that QI did not seriously 

consider moving him to its DOL contract. Id. at 39–44. 

The parties do not dispute that QI eventually informed Kalejaiye that DOT would not 

permit an accommodation and that if Kalejaiye did not shave his beard to 1/4 inch or shorter he 

would not be allowed to work on the DOT contract. Id. at 7, 28, 37. Kalejaiye did not shave his 

beard and, consequently, QI eventually removed him from the security guard rotation at the DOT 

facility. Id. at 27–28, 38. In June of 2018, Kalejaiye filed a charge of discrimination with the 

Equal Employment Opportunity Commission alleging religious discrimination under Title VII 

and in July of 2019 the EEOC issued Kalejaiye a notice of his right to sue. Id. at 38; Complaint

at 2 (“Compl.”), ECF No. 1. 

At some point before April of 2019, QI lost its security guard contract with the federal 

government. See Response to Undisputed Facts at 49. After QI lost its contract, the new 

contractor replacing QI held a job fair for security officers who worked at the DOT facility. Id.
4 

at 49–50. The new contractor received a list of employees under the current contract from the 

government, presumably based on a list of employees provided to DOT by QI. Id. When the 

new contractor held a job fair for current employees—approximately nine months after 

Kalejaiye’s last shift at the DOT facility—Kalejaiye’s name was not included on the list of 

employees DOT provided to the new contractor. Id. QI relies on testimony that Kalejaiye was 

removed from the list because he was terminated from QI and removed from the DOT facility 

guard rotation prior to the job fair. Id. at 49. Kalejaiye, by contrast, asserts that he was not 

informed of his termination until after the job fair. Id. at 49–50. 

In September of 2019, Kalejaiye sued QI for violations of Title VII of the Civil Rights 

Act of 1964, as well as common law tortious interference with prospective business advantage 

under District of Columbia common law. See Compl. at 7–8. After discovery, both QI and 

Kalejaiye moved for summary judgment and Kalejaiye moved for sanctions. See generally

Def.’s Mot.; Pl.’s Mot.; Sanctions Mot. The Court addresses all three motions below. 

III. LEGAL STANDARD

“The court shall grant summary judgment if the movant shows that there is no genuine 

dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. 

R. Civ. P. 56(a). A dispute is genuine if “the evidence presents a sufficient disagreement to 

require submission to a jury.” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 251–52 (1986). 

And a fact is material if it “might affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law.” Id. at 

248. On summary judgment, the Court views all evidence “in the light most favorable to the 

nonmoving party and the [C]ourt [ ] draw[s] all reasonable inferences in favor of the nonmoving 

party.” Talavera v. Shah, 638 F.3d 303, 308 (D.C. Cir. 2011). 
5 

With respect to Kalejaiye’s motion for discovery sanctions, the Federal Rules of Civil 

Procedure permit the Court to “order measures no greater than necessary to cure prejudice” 

arising from a party’s “fail[ure] to take reasonable steps to preserve” electronically stored 

information that should have been preserved in anticipation of litigation. Fed. R. Civ. P. 37(e). 

Rule 37(e)(1) “does not place a burden of proving or disproving prejudice on one party or the 

other” and the “rule leaves judges with discretion to determine how best to assess prejudice in 

particular cases.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 37 advisory committee’s note to 2015 amendment. 

IV. ANALYSIS

A. Sanctions

Because the Court’s resolution of Kalejaiye’s motion for sanctions could impact the 

evidence the Court considers when deciding the parties’ motions for summary judgment, the 

Court addresses Kalejaiye’s request for sanctions before proceeding to the merits. Kalejaiye’s 

motion for sanctions requests relief under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 37(e)(1) to cure the 

prejudice that Kalejaiye contends arises from QI’s failure to preserve certain electronically stored 

information. See Sanctions Mot. at 9. In particular—and for reasons that will become clearer 

below—Kalejaiye requests that the Court preclude QI from arguing that: (1) QI did not have 

over 500 employees, (2) QI did not have space to hire Kalejaiye pursuant to its DOL contract, 

and (3) QI punished other security officers for violations of its grooming standards. See

Sanctions Mot. at 14, 18–19. Kalejaiye “does not request sanctions pursuant to Rule 37(e)(2).” 

Id. at 9 n.8.2

2

 Rule 37(e)(2) sanctions are appropriate only where a “party acted with the intent to 

deprive another party of the information’s use in the litigation,” Fed. R. Civ. P. 37(e)(2), and 

“[t]he phrase ‘intent to deprive’ naturally requires that the spoliator has a ‘purpose of hiding 

adverse evidence’ from other parties.” Skanska USA Civ. Se. Inc. v. Bagelheads, Inc., 75 F.4th 

1290, 1312 (11th Cir. 2023) (citation omitted). Because Kalejaiye does not seek relief under 
6 

1. Number of Employees 

The Court begins with Kalejaiye’s request that the Court preclude QI from arguing that 

QI had fewer than 500 employees. Kalejaiye bases his motion on QI’s failure to preserve 

records reflecting the number of its employees. See Sanctions Mot. at 7, 11. The D.C. Circuit 

has explained that the “duty to preserve documents . . . exists where litigation is reasonably 

foreseeable.” Gerlich v. U.S. Dep’t of Just., 711 F.3d 161, 170 (D.C. Cir. 2013). “Once a court 

has determined that future litigation was reasonably foreseeable to the party who destroyed 

relevant records, the court must then assess . . . whether the destroyed records were likely 

relevant to the contested issue.” Id. at 171; see Borum v. Brentwood Vill., LLC, 332 F.R.D. 38, 

45 (D.D.C. 2019) (“Once a party anticipates litigation, it must preserve potentially relevant 

evidence that might be useful to an adversary.”). Thus, the Court must determine whether (1) 

“future litigation was reasonably foreseeable” to QI when it ceased preserving records reflecting 

its personnel count and (2) whether those records were “potentially relevant evidence that might 

be useful to” Kalejaiye. See Gerlich, 711 F.3d at 170; see also Borum, 332 F.R.D. at 45. 

The Court readily concludes that litigation was reasonably foreseeable when QI ceased 

preserving records reflecting the number of its employees. It appears that QI lost access to the 

records that Kalejaiye seeks sometime in 2020. See Sanctions Mot. at 3–4; Sanctions Opp. at 4 

(stating that QI went out of business in February 2020); Sanctions Reply at 4 (stating that QI 

went out of business in July 2020). A law firm retained to represent QI informed QI’s human 

Rule 37(e)(2) and there is no evidence that QI sought to hide records from Kalejaiye, the Court 

must ensure that any curative measures it may order “do not have the effect of measures that are 

permitted [only] under subdivision (e)(2).” Fed. R. Civ. P. 37 advisory committee’s note to 2015 

amendment. “An example of an inappropriate (e)(1) measure might be an order . . . precluding a 

party from offering any evidence in support of, the central or only claim or defense in the case.” 

Id. 
7 

resources contractor that it should institute a litigation hold on July 30, 2018. See Litigation 

Hold Letter, ECF No. 88-1. And Kalejaiye filed his complaint on September 4, 2019. See 

generally Compl. “At the very least, the duty [to preserve] begins no later than the date the 

lawsuit is filed.” Borum, 332 F.R.D. at 45. There is no question that QI could reasonably 

foresee litigation when it ceased preserving records reflecting the number of its employees 

because litigation had already begun. 

The Court also concludes that the number of QI’s employees was “relevant to [a] 

contested issue.” Gerlich, 711 F.3d at 171. This is so because the number of employees a 

company employs governs the compensatory damages cap in Title VII cases. See 42 U.S.C. 

§ 1981a(b)(3). It is unreasonable that QI did not maintain some record—whether that be a 

company roster, tax forms, personnel files, or payroll documents—that would permit Plaintiff to 

determine the number of employees employed by QI. The fact that QI closed its business does 

not completely absolve it of the responsibility to maintain relevant documents because parties 

have a continuing responsibility to take reasonable steps to preserve electronically stored 

information (“ESI”). See Fed. R. Civ. P. 37(e) (applicable when “a party failed to take 

reasonable steps to preserve” ESI); Fed. R. Civ. P. 37 advisory committee’s note to 2015 

amendment (“prospect of litigation may call for reasonable steps to preserve information by 

intervening in [] routine [business] operation[s]” (emphasis added)); see Schulman v. Saloon 

Beverage, Inc., No. 2:13-CV-193, 2014 WL 1516326, at *6 (D. Vt. Apr. 18, 2014) (explaining 

that the “general observation that [defendant] went out of business” did not completely absolve 

defendant of responsibility to preserve ESI); c.f., Peer Bearing Co.-Changshan v. United States, 

766 F.3d 1396, 1400 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (sale of company did not absolve defendant of obligation 

to preserve records under record preservation statute). Although a party’s resources may factor 
8 

into whether preservation efforts were reasonable, see Fed. R. Civ. P. 37 advisory committee’s 

note to 2015 amendment (explaining that “court should be sensitive to party resources”), a dearth 

of resources does not categorically exempt a party from its preservation obligations, id. (“A party 

may act reasonably by choosing a less costly form of information preservation, if it is 

substantially as effective as more costly forms. . . . A party urging that preservation requests are 

disproportionate may need to provide specifics about these matters in order to enable meaningful 

discussion of the appropriate preservation regime.”); C.f. hiQ Labs, Inc. v. LinkedIn Corp., 639 

F. Supp. 3d 944, 977, 979 (N.D. Cal. 2022) (awarding sanctions when company deleted ESI in 

an effort to reduce costs when company was “struggl[ing] financially” and “unable to pay the 

bills”). As Kalejaiye points out, QI had numerous low-cost options for storing information, see

Sanctions Reply at 2, and QI—or its insurance carrier and counsel—could have utilized these 

options even considering the fact that QI was going out of business. If companies could rid 

themselves of the obligation to preserve relevant ESI by dissolving, companies could dissolve 

and re-incorporate anytime they desired to deny a plaintiff access to ESI that would otherwise be 

discoverable.

For these reasons, the Court concludes that litigation was reasonably foreseeable when QI 

ceased preserving records reflecting the number of its employees, that the records were relevant 

to a contested issue, and that QI had an obligation to preserve the records. The Court also 

concludes that Kalejaiye suffered prejudice resulting from the loss of the records because, 

without information on the number of QI’s employees, Kalejaiye may be unable to demonstrate 

that a higher damages cap is applicable. 3

 Borum, 332 F.R.D. at 47 (“To show prejudice 

3 The compensatory damages cap issue becomes important only if a jury returns a verdict 

above the applicable cap (the parties appear to agree that the cap here is either $200,000 or 

$300,000, depending on the number of QI’s employees). See 42 U.S.C. § 1981a(b)(3); Sanctions 
9 

resulting from the spoliation, a party must only come forward with plausible, concrete 

suggestions as to what the destroyed evidence might have been" and why that evidence would 

have an impact on the “presentation of proof.” (cleaned up) (citation omitted)). 

2. Vacancy at DOL

The Court next considers Kalejaiye’s request that the Court preclude QI from arguing 

that it did not have a vacancy in which to employ Kalejaiye pursuant to its DOL contract. See

Sanctions Mot. at 18. In support of his motion, Kalejaiye contends that QI failed to retain 

records that would have indicated how many employees QI had working pursuant to its DOL 

contract so that Kalejaiye could determine whether there was capacity to hire him for that 

contract. Id.

For the reasons explained above, the Court concludes that QI could reasonably foresee 

litigation at the time it ceased preserving records reflecting the number of its personnel at the 

DOL facility—indeed litigation had already commenced. The closer question is “whether the 

destroyed records were likely relevant to the contested issue.” Gerlich, 711 F.3d at 171. 

Information is “relevant to the contested issue,” id., when it “bears on, [or could reasonably] lead 

to other matter that could bear on, an[] issue that is or may be in the case,” Oppenheimer Fund, 

Inc. v. Sanders, 437 U.S. 340, 351 (1978) (emphasis added). 

Mot. at 11; Sanctions Opp. at 10. The Court is open to reconsidering this issue if QI produces 

evidence that the $200,000 cap should apply. The Court will grant QI leave to make requests or 

issue third-party subpoenas to third-party entities (e.g., tax preparers; workers compensation 

providers or insurers; local, state, or federal taxing authorities; payroll banks; payroll facilities, 

etc.) at any point up to the deadline for motions in limine. Rule 37(e) is only applicable when lost 

ESI is irretrievable from another source, including other custodians. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 37 

advisory committee’s note to 2015 amendment. It is reasonable to believe that some record still 

exists regarding the number of QI’s employees given that the Internal Revenue Service 

recommends employers retain “records of employment taxes for at least 4 years,” see Department 

of the Treasury, (Circular E), Employer’s Tax Guide 8 (2024), which includes the “[d]ates of 

employment for each employee,” id.
10 

Neither Kalejaiye’s EEOC Charge of Discrimination nor his complaint filed in this Court 

asserted that he should have been accommodated by transfer to the DOL cite. See generally

Charge of Discrimination, ECF No. 86-26; Compl. And it appears that Kalejaiye only began 

seeking information about the possibility of transfer to the DOL site on May 25, 2021—after QI 

went out of business and ceased preserving some of its records. See Sanctions Reply at 4; 

Sanctions Opp. at 15; Pl.’s Mot. to Compel Continued 30(b)(6) Deposition, ECF No. 38. Thus, 

on one view, QI had no reason to believe that the DOL records “were likely relevant” to the 

issues presented by Kalejaiye when it failed to preserve those records. Gerlich, 711 F.3d at 171; 

c.f. Applebaum v. Target Corp., 831 F.3d 740, 745 (6th Cir. 2016) (“[F]ailure to document 

events that might prove relevant to unforeseen litigation and to retain those records indefinitely 

does not amount to spoliation.”). But that view does not capture the full picture. 

Kalejaiye’s EEOC charge generally asserted that QI failed to accommodate his religious 

practice. See Charge of Discrimination. And QI concedes that it considered transferring 

Kalejaiye to its DOL contract as a religious accommodation. See Def’s Mot. at 25–26; Def.’s 

Rely at 12; Lane Dep., Ex, 4 at 33-35, 36, ECF No. 86-5; Ricks Dep. at 29, ECF No. 87-9. 

Consequently, QI had reason to know that the possibility of reassignment could become a 

contested issue in the course of Kalejaiye’s accommodation litigation. In other words, 

information about the possibility of reassignment “bear[s] on . . . an[] issue that is or may be in 

the case.” Oppenheimer Fund, 437 U.S. at 351; c.f. Gile v. United Airlines, Inc., 95 F.3d 492, 

499 (7th Cir. 1996) (reversing decision of district court, in ADA accommodation case, where 

district court refused to compel discovery on possibility of reassignment as an accommodation 

because reassignment was possible accommodation and relevant to plaintiff’s claim); see also 29 

C.F.R. § 1602.14 (2024) (requiring employers to “preserve all personnel records relevant to [a]
11 

charge or action [for disability discrimination] until final disposition of the charge or the action” 

and specifying that relevant personnel records “include personnel or employment records 

relating to the aggrieved person and to all other employees holding positions similar to that held 

or sought by the aggrieved person” (emphasis added)); Sharma v. D.C., 65 F. Supp. 3d 108, 

113–114 (D.D.C. 2014) (treating violation of 29 C.F.R. § 1602.14 as a failure to comply with 

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 37); Byrnie v. Town of Cromwell, Bd. of Educ., 243 F.3d 93, 109 

(2d Cir. 2001) (superseded on other grounds) (“[W]here . . . a party has violated an EEOC 

record-retention regulation, a violation of that regulation can amount to a breach of duty 

necessary to justify a spoliation inference in an employment discrimination action.”). QI’s 

failure to preserve records reflecting the number of its personnel at the DOL facility prejudiced 

Kalejaiye because the lack of records prevents Kalejaiye from testing whether QI could have 

accommodated him by means of transfer to the DOL facility. See hiQ Labs, 639 F. Supp. 3d at 

979 (“Prejudice exists [in Rule 37(e)(1) context] where the spoiling party’s actions impaired the 

moving party’s ability to go to trial or threatened to interfere with the rightful decision of the 

case.” (cleaned up)).

3. Treatment of Other Officers

The same analysis is applicable to QI’s failure to retain documents relating to whether QI 

punished other security officers for violations of QI’s grooming standards. Like the records 

above, QI’s disciplinary records were lost after this litigation commenced. See Sanctions Mot. at 

18. The Court concludes that the disciplinary records are relevant. “It has been established that 

comparative information concerning an employer’s treatment of individuals is relevant evidence 

in an individual discrimination claim.” Glenn v. Williams, 209 F.R.D. 279, 281 (D.D.C. 2002); 

Minority Emps. at NASA (MEAN) v. Beggs, 723 F.2d 958, 962 (D.C. Cir. 1983) (“It is well 
12 

established that statistical data and comparative information” showing an employer’s treatment 

of other similarly situated employees is often relevant evidence because it “can be used by a 

plaintiff to make out a prima facie case of discrimination” or rebut a defense.). The records, 

therefore, bear on an issue that may be in the case. See Oppenheimer Fund, 437 U.S. at 351; see 

also 29 C.F.R. § 1602.14 (2024) (requiring employers to preserve “personnel or employment 

records relating to the aggrieved person and to all other employees holding positions similar to 

that held or sought by the aggrieved person” (emphasis added)). QI should have preserved any 

records it had evidencing its treatment of other employees who failed to comply with QI’s 

grooming standards. Accordingly, the Court holds that Kalejaiye was prejudiced by QI’s failure 

to preserve such records because the lack of records naturally makes it difficult for Kalejaiye to 

present comparator evidence. See hiQ Labs, 639 F. Supp. 3d at 979 (“Prejudice exists [in Rule 

37(e)(1) context] where the spoiling party’s actions impaired the moving party’s ability to go to 

trial or threatened to interfere with the rightful decision of the case.” (cleaned up)). 

* * * 

Because the Court holds that Kalejaiye suffered prejudice as a result of QI’s failure to 

preserve electronically stored information, the Court must determine what remedy would best 

rectify the prejudice. As explained by the advisory committee on civil rules when it amended 

Rule 37(e) in 2015 

Once a finding of prejudice is made, the court is authorized to employ measures 

“no greater than necessary to cure the prejudice.” The range of such measures is 

quite broad if they are necessary for this purpose. There is no all-purpose 

hierarchy of the severity of various measures; the severity of given measures must 

be calibrated in terms of their effect on the particular case. But authority to order 

measures no greater than necessary to cure prejudice does not require the court to 

adopt measures to cure every possible prejudicial effect. Much is entrusted to the 

court’s discretion. 

Fed. R. Civ. P. 37 advisory committee’s note to 2015 amendment. 
13 

 The Court holds that “permitting the parties to present evidence and argument to 

the jury regarding the loss of information,” and allowing the jury to make inferences 

therefrom, is the appropriate measure that is “no greater than necessary to cure the 

prejudice” from the loss of the records that Kalejaiye sought. Id.; see also hiQ Labs, 639 

F. Supp. 3d at 980 (holding that a permissive—rather than mandatory—adverse inference 

was appropriate sanction under Rule 37(e)(1) where financially struggling company 

deleted relevant ESI without intent to deprive); Hollis v. CEVA Logistics U.S., Inc., 603 

F. Supp. 3d 611, 625 (N.D. Ill. 2022) (concluding in employment discrimination case that 

permissive—rather than mandatory—adverse inference was appropriate Rule 37(e)(1) 

sanction against defendant who lost relevant ESI); Adamczyk v. Sch. Dist. of City of 

Hamtramck Pub. Sch., 667 F. Supp. 3d 534, 558 (E.D. Mich. 2023) (concluding that 

appropriate sanction under Rule 37(e)(1) was to permit plaintiff to “present evidence to 

the jury about the missing electronically stored information” and explaining that the 

Court would “instruct the jury that it may draw whatever inferences it considers 

appropriate from those facts against [d]efendant”). The Court will not preclude QI from 

offering evidence to counter an adverse inference as doing so would be closer to a 

measure authorized only under Rule 37(e)(2) and, thus, inappropriate here. See Fed. R. 

Civ. P. 37 advisory committee’s note to 2015 amendment (“An example of an 

inappropriate (e)(1) measure might be an order . . . precluding a party from offering any 

evidence in support of, the central . . . defense in the case.”); see also id. (“[E]ven grossly 

negligent behavior does not logically support [a mandatory adverse] inference.”); see also 

Borum, 332 F.R.D. at 49 (explaining that “sanctions available following a finding of 

intent under Rule 37(e)(2) are not available under Rule 37(e)(1)” and that sanctions under 
14 

Rule 37(e)(1) should be commensurate with prejudice to movant). Accordingly, the 

Court grants in part and denies in part Kalejaiye’s request for sanctions. 

B. Title VII Claims

QI and Kalejaiye’s competing motions for summary judgment revolve primarily around 

whether QI violated Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 by failing to provide Kalejaiye 

with a religious accommodation permitting Kalejaiye to grow his beard beyond the length 

otherwise permitted under QI’s grooming policies. QI’s motion for summary judgment also 

argues that the evidence Kalejaiye presents cannot support a retaliation claim.4

 

The first count of Kalejaiye’s complaint contends that QI’s conduct constituted religious 

discrimination because Kalejaiye held a bona fide religious belief requiring him to grow his 

beard, that belief conflicted with QI’s policies, Kalejaiye requested a religious accommodation, 

QI refused an accommodation, and QI stopped employing Kalejaiye because he refused to shave. 

See Compl. at 7. The second count of Kalejaiye’s complaint contends that QI retaliated against 

him for requesting a religious accommodation and for filing a charge of discrimination with the 

EEOC. See id. The Court assesses each claim in turn.

1. Accommodation Claim 

Under Title VII, it is unlawful for an employer to discharge or take negative employment 

action against an employee because of that employee’s religion. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1). In 

the context of Title VII, religion “includes all aspects of religious observance and practice, as 

well as belief, unless an employer demonstrates that he is unable to reasonably accommodate []

4

 Kalejaiye seeks summary judgment only on his accommodation claim and does not 

cross-move with respect to his retaliation claim. See Pl.’s Mot. at 2 (“Plaintiff brings this Motion 

for Summary Judgment regarding Count I of his Complaint, which alleges that Defendant failed 

to reasonably accommodate his request for accommodation in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 2000e2(a).”).
15 

an employee’s . . . religious observance or practice without undue hardship on the conduct of the 

employer’s business.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(j). “‘[U]ndue hardship’ is shown when a burden is 

substantial in the overall context of an employer’s business.” Groff v. DeJoy, 600 U.S. 447, 468 

(2023). Naturally, QI argues that it did not violate Kalejaiye’s rights under Title VII and 

Kalejaiye argues the opposite.

a. Analytical Framework 

The Court must first determine what framework applies to assessing Kalejaiye’s 

accommodation claim. Plaintiffs usually base their Title VII “claim[s] on circumstantial 

evidence under the familiar McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting framework.” Nurriddin v. 

Bolden, 818 F.3d 751, 758 (D.C. Cir. 2016). However, because Kalejaiye’s claim is based on 

QI’s failure to provide an accommodation, a modified version of McDonnell Douglas burden 

shifting is the appropriate analytical framework here. 

D.C. Circuit precedents in the Rehabilitation Act and Americans with Disabilities Act 

contexts hold that “accommodation claim[s] [are] not subject to analysis under McDonnell–

Douglas,” but instead have their “own specialized legal standards.” Aka v. Washington Hosp. 

Ctr., 156 F.3d 1284, 1288 (D.C. Cir. 1998). But the D.C. Circuit has not explained how or 

whether these “specialized legal standards” apply to Title VII accommodation claims. See 

Flemmings v. Howard Univ., 198 F.3d 857, 860 (D.C. Cir. 1999) (“[I]n [Aka] this court 

addressed the protocol for evaluating reasonable accommodation claims under the ADA.” 

(emphasis added)). 

The Court observes, however, that courts in this district, as well as in other circuits, have 

applied a modified McDonnell Douglas type framework to religious accommodation claims that 

is analogous to the D.C. Circuit’s analysis of disability accommodation cases. Compare Aka, 
16 

156 F.3d at 1288–1300 (explaining that accommodation analysis starts by asking whether 

plaintiff was qualified for accommodation and, if so, continues by inquiring into whether 

employer defendant would face undue burden if forced to provide that accommodation) with

Francis v. Perez, 970 F. Supp. 2d 48, 60 (D.D.C. 2013), aff’d, No. 13-5333, 2014 WL 3013727 

(D.C. Cir. May 16, 2014) (explaining that plaintiff must first satisfy criteria for prima facie case

and if a plaintiff satisfies that criteria the defendant employer must show that it was “unable 

reasonably to accommodate the plaintiff’s religious needs without undue hardship” (citation 

omitted)) and Thomas v. Nat’l Ass’n of Letter Carriers, 225 F.3d 1149, 1155 (10th Cir. 2000) 

(same). More specifically, “[t]o survive summary judgment on a religious discrimination claim 

of failure to accommodate, the employee initially bears the burden of production with respect to 

a prima facie case.” Thomas, 225 F.3d at 1155. 

To establish a prima facie case of discrimination based on a failure to provide a 

reasonable [religious] accommodation, plaintiff must show that []he (1) held a bona 

fide religious belief conflicting with an employment requirement; (2) informed 

h[is] employer of h[is] belief; and (3) faced an adverse employment action due to 

h[is] failure to comply with the conflicting employment requirement. 

Francis, 970 F. Supp. 2d at 60 (cleaned up); Thomas, 225 F.3d at 1155 (same). “Once a plaintiff 

successfully establishes a prima facie case, the burden shifts to the employer to show that it was 

unable reasonably to accommodate the plaintiff’s religious needs without undue hardship.” 

Francis, 970 F. Supp. 2d at 60 (citation omitted); Thomas, 225 F.3d at 1155 (same); see also, 

e.g., EEOC v. Firestone Fibers & Textiles Co., 515 F.3d 307, 312 (4th Cir. 2008) (applying same 

analysis); Davis v. Fort Bend Cnty., 765 F.3d 480, 485 (5th Cir. 2014) (applying same analysis). 

 At that point, the question becomes whether there is a genuine dispute of material fact 

with respect to the employer’s undue hardship. See, e.g., Davis, 765 F.3d at 489 (assessing 

whether a genuine dispute of material fact existed respecting “whether [the defendant] would 

have suffered undue hardship in accommodating [the plaintiff’s] religious observance”). The 
17 

Court begins by assessing whether Kalejaiye can establish a prima facie case of Title VII 

religious discrimination based on QI’s failure to accommodate and then proceeds to the undue 

hardship inquiry. 

b. Application to Kalejaiye’s DOT Beard Waiver Accommodation 

i. Prima facie case

Kalejaiye can make out a prima facie case of religious discrimination based on QI’s 

failure to accommodate his religious beard growth and refusal to permit him to grow his beard 

while working at the DOT facility. “To establish a prima facie case of discrimination based on a 

failure to provide a reasonable accommodation, [P]laintiff must show that [he] (1) held a bona 

fide religious belief conflicting with an employment requirement; (2) informed [his] employer of 

[his] belief; and (3) faced an adverse employment action due to [his] failure to comply with the 

conflicting employment requirement.”5

 Francis, 970 F. Supp. 2d at 60 (quotation marks and 

citation omitted); Thomas, 225 F.3d at 1155 (same); Davis, 765 F.3d at 485 (same); Firestone 

Fibers, 515 F.3d at 312 (same); see also Lowe v. Mills, 68 F.4th 706, 719 (1st Cir. 2023) (to state 

prima facie case of religious discrimination, plaintiff must demonstrate that his “bona fide 

religious practice conflicts with an employment requirement and was the reason for the adverse 

employment action” (quotation marks and citation omitted)); Bailey v. Metro Ambulance Servs., 

Inc., 992 F.3d 1265, 1275 (11th Cir. 2021) (Plaintiff can set forth a “prima facie case by showing 

5

 The Court is not convinced that an adverse employment action is always necessary to 

satisfy a prima facie case for employment discrimination. For instance, it may be that where an 

employee capitulates under pressure from an employer and compromises his religious beliefs in 

an effort to avoid losing his job, the plaintiff would still be able to make out a prima facie case. 

C.f. Hobbie v. Unemployment Appeals Comm’n of Fla., 480 U.S. 136, 146 (1987) (“State

[employer] may not force an employee to choose between following the precepts of her religion 

and forfeiting benefits and abandoning one of the precepts of her religion in order to accept 

work.” (cleaned up)). However, because Kalejaiye was subjected to an adverse employment 

action, the Court need not address that issue here. 
18 

that (1) his sincere and bona fide religious belief conflicted with an employment requirement, 

and (2) his employer took adverse employment action against him because of his inability to 

comply with the employment requirement or because of the employer’s perceived need for his 

reasonable accommodation.”). 

Here, Kalejaiye asserts that he had a bona fide religious belief that conflicted with QI’s 

beard length policy, he informed QI of that religious belief, requested an accommodation, the 

requested accommodation was denied, and he was removed from the security officer rotation at 

the DOT facility because of his refusal to comply with QI’s beard-length policy. See Compl. at 

7; Pl.’s Mot., Ex. 8 (“Letter from Abayomi Kalejaiye to Zebedee Middleton”), ECF No. 87-4; 

Pl.’s Mot. at 7–8; Pl.’s Mot., Ex. 31 at 1–2, ECF No. 87-9. QI counters that Kalejaiye has failed 

to state a prima facie case because (1) his religious belief that prohibits him from cutting his 

beard is not sincerely held, evidenced by the fact that he has cut his beard in the past, and (2) 

Kalejaiye’s blame is misplaced because DOT, not QI, refused his accommodation. See Def.’s 

Opp. at 9–10. 

QI’s arguments are unpersuasive. Plaintiff consistently asserted that his religious beliefs 

prohibited him from shaving his beard and refused to shave. See Response to Undisputed Facts 

at 28–29. The fact that Kalejaiye may have cut his beard in the past does not refute that his 

religious beliefs prohibited him from shaving while employed with QI. See Keene v. City & 

Cnty. of San Francisco, No. 22-16567, 2023 WL 3451687, at *2 (9th Cir. May 15, 2023) 

(“[R]eligious belief need not be consistent or rational to be protected under Title VII, and an 

assertion of a sincere religious belief is generally accepted.”); Singh v. Holder, 720 F.3d 635, 644 

(7th Cir. 2013) (“[A] sincere religious believer doesn’t forfeit his religious rights merely because 

he is not scrupulous in his observance; for where would religion be without its backsliders, 
19 

penitents, and prodigal sons?” (citation omitted)).6 So, at the very least, a dispute of fact exists 

and it will be up to a jury to determine whether Kalejaiye’s religious beliefs are sincerely held. 

Moreover, whether the government or QI denied Kalejaiye’s accommodation request is 

not pertinent at the prima facie stage because QI removed Kalejaiye from the guard rotation as a 

result of Kalejaiye’s failure to abide by QI’s grooming policies on account of his religious 

practice. If DOT bears responsibility for the decision not to afford Kalejaiye an accommodation, 

that may relate to whether QI would face an undue hardship if forced to accommodate Kalejaiye, 

not to whether Plaintiff has made out a prima facie case. Accordingly, Kalejaiye has stated a 

prima facie case. 

ii. Undue burden

The Court next assesses whether there exists a genuine dispute of material fact regarding 

whether QI “was unable reasonably to accommodate [Kalejaiye’s] religious needs without undue 

hardship.” Thomas, 225 F.3d at 1156. QI contends that its reason for failing to accommodate 

Kalejaiye was that the government contract pursuant to which QI was working prohibited QI 

from employing Kalejaiye at the DOT facility while his beard exceeded 1/4 inches in length 

unless the government approved a religious accommodation, and the government refused such 

approval. See Def.’s Mot. at 2–3; Def.’s Opp. at 7. Moreover, QI contends that maintaining 

Kalejaiye on its payroll while he was unable to perform his duties at the DOT facility would 

have constituted an undue hardship. See Def.’s Mot. at 24, 31; Def.’s Opp. at 11. 

6 The Court also observes that the judicial system is “singularly ill equipped” to determine 

what a party’s religious belief requires because “Courts are not arbiters of scriptural 

interpretation.” Thomas v. Rev. Bd. of Ind. Emp. Sec. Div., 450 U.S. 707, 715–16 (1981) (refusing, 

in the First Amendment context, to find that a petitioner’s practice was not sincere merely because 

other members of his religion did not share the same practice). 
20 

Kalejaiye disputes QI’s assertion than an accommodation would have caused an undue 

hardship. First, Kalejaiye says, under QI’s contract with the government—as well as under 

DOT’s then-existing policy—it was QI’s responsibility to grant religious accommodation 

requests in the first instance and QI did not do so. See Pl.’s Opp. at 27; Pl.’s Mot. at 24–25. 

From this fact, Kalejaiye infers that QI could have granted an accommodation without violating 

its contract with the government and that QI chose not to do so. 

QI presents evidence to the contrary—showing that employees’ accommodation requests 

needed to be approved by DOT and that it took Kalejaiye’s request to DOT. See Def.’s Mot. at 

19; Def.’s Opp. at 11. Specifically, QI points to the deposition testimony of one of its former 

employees, Jason Ricks, who stated that “I personally went to the Government myself and 

presented [Kalejaiye’s] case, only to be denied that [DOT] were going to accommodate 

anything . . . So I know I, personally, presented it to the Government.” Jason Ricks Depo. at 37, 

ECF No. 86-11. Ricks explained his understanding that there were “multiple conversations, 

multiple attempts over the course of months, trying to present [Kalejaiye’s accommodation 

request] to the Government, trying to present different things to get them to approve. But 

ultimately they would not honor that request, which would make [Kalejaiye] out of compliance if 

he continued to work on the contract.” Id. at 37–38. When asked by Plaintiff’s counsel whether 

he personally argued on Plaintiff’s behalf, Ricks stated “I actually personally took his request 

when it was brought to my attention in June upstairs to the Government, sat down in front of 

Michael Anderson, who was the supervisory COR, and presented the request to him.” Id. at 38. 

Ricks continued by explaining that Anderson, a DOT employee, denied Kalejaiye’s request on 

safety grounds and that Ricks related that information to Kalejaiye. Id. Ricks states that he 
21 

attempted to convince Anderson to authorize Kalejaiye’s religious accommodation request. Id.

at 40–41. 

QI’s contention that it was required to get approval of accommodations from DOT is 

bolstered by the deposition of Demetria McCoy who served as a project manager and director of 

operations for QI. McCoy testified that, per her understanding of QI’s contract with the 

government, religious beard waivers had to be approved by DOT. See Demetria McCoy Depo. 

at 21, ECF No. 86-13. She also testified that Jason Ricks brought a binder with a photo of 

Kalejaiye to DOT during a meeting—presumably so Ricks could request a beard exemption for 

Kalejaiye. See McCoy Depo. at 25–26. 

But Plaintiff has presented contrary evidence to show that QI did not, in fact, request that 

DOT authorize a religious accommodation permitting him to grow his beard beyond 1/4 inch in 

length and that its contract with the government did not require it to do so. See Pl.’s Mot. at 25; 

Pl.’s Opp. at 5–6; Szakal Declaration at 4–5, ECF No. 92-3, Ex. 2. Declarant Keith Szakal, a 

DOT supervisor, attested that “DOT does not review or decide reasonable accommodation 

requests that are made by employees of contractors.” Szakal Declaration at 3, Ex. 2. 

Additionally, Kalejaiye points out that the Statement of Work, a document articulating the scope 

of QI’s responsibilities and requirements pursuant to its contract to provide security officer

services for DOT, specifies that “[c]ontractors shall grant reasonable accommodations to 

the . . . religious practices” of security officers. Pl.’s Statement of Material Fact Not in Dispute 

at 12, ECF No. 87-1 (italics omitted); see Pl.’s Opp. at 27; Def.’s Mot., Ex. 7 (Statement of 

Work). The Statement of Work could reasonably be read to mean that contractors, like QI, 

rather than DOT, were responsible for granting accommodation requests in the first instance. 

Additionally, Kalejaiye alleges that other security officers were permitted to deviate from QI’s 
22 

grooming standards. See Pl.’s Opp. at 28. There are, thus, genuine disputes of material fact 

regarding whether QI or DOT was responsible for resolving Kalejaiye’s religious 

accommodation request. 

Kalejaiye also argues that Title VII does not permit QI to contract around its 

accommodation obligations and that QI’s contract with the government cannot form the basis for 

QI’s argument that it would suffer an undue hardship because such an argument would permit QI 

to circumvent Title VII. See Pl.’s Opp. at 11. It is true that QI has an obligation to comply with 

the religious accommodation strictures of Title VII regardless of whether DOT told QI that it 

could not post security officers with beards. 

Be that as it may—and as explained above—Title VII only requires an employer to 

provide a reasonable accommodation if doing so would not cause an undue hardship. See 42 

U.S.C. § 2000e(j); see also Thomas, 225, F.3d at 1156 (employer need not provide 

accommodation if doing so would cause undue hardship). Undue hardship implicates a 

condition imposed on an employer that “would result in substantial increased costs in relation to 

the conduct of its particular business.” Groff, 600 U.S. at 470. If QI’s evidence is credited, QI 

would have borne an undue hardship by retaining Kalejaiye because doing so would either 

require it to go against DOT’s direction or keep Kalejaiye on the payroll without being able to 

employ him on a contract. See id. at 470 (substantial increased cost in relation to business 

constitutes undue hardship); c.f., Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Hardison, 432 U.S. 63, 79 (1977) 

(holding that a contract may not be employed to violate Title VII, but that the duty to 

accommodate does not require an employer to take steps inconsistent with an otherwise valid 

agreement); Sutton v. Providence St. Joseph Med. Ctr., 192 F.3d 826, 830 (9th Cir. 1999) 

(“[C]ourts agree that an employer is not liable under Title VII when accommodating an 
23 

employee’s religious beliefs would require the employer to violate federal or state law.”).7 

Accordingly, a jury is necessary to determine which entity—DOT or QI—was responsible for 

approving Kalejaiye’s religious accommodation request. If DOT was responsible, QI can show 

that it would have suffered an undue hardship if it had been forced to accommodate Kalejaiye

and if QI was responsible, Kalejaiye can show that QI would not have faced an undue hardship 

by accommodating him. 

Because QI relies on DOT’s refusal as the basis for its inability to grant Kalejaiye’s 

request, this fact is material. Depending on what evidence a jury finds more credible, a jury 

could decide either way with respect to whether QI could grant Kalejaiye’s request consistent 

with its contract with DOT. Accordingly, because there is a genuine dispute of material fact with 

respect to whether accommodating Kalejaiye by permitting him to grow out his beard while 

working at the DOT site would have caused an undue hardship, summary judgment is 

inappropriate. 

7 Plaintiff cites to three out-of-district cases—including the Fifth Circuit’s opinion in 

Burton v. Freescale Semiconductor, Inc., 798 F.3d 222 (5th Cir. 2015)—where courts held that a 

defendant could not escape liability for employment discrimination by showing that a third party 

made the ultimate decision with respect to the negative employment decision. See Pl.’s Opp. at 

11–18. Defendant, by contrast, counters that courts have held that in joint employer cases, the 

“joint employer must bear some responsibility for the discriminatory act to be liable for an” 

employment discrimination violation. Def.’s Reply at 9 (quoting Burton, 798 F.3d at 228). 

Ultimately, however, the cases that both parties rely on are distinguishable because they 

do not involve an undue hardship inquiry. Because an employer’s failure to accommodate is 

unlawful only when accommodation would not cause an undue hardship, if QI can show that it 

faced an undue hardship its conduct would not be unlawful. QI may be able to prove that it 

would face an undue hardship if it employed Kalejaiye at the DOT facility in defiance of DOT 

direction. C.f. Hardison, 432 U.S. at 79 (1977); Thomas, 225 F.3d at 1156 (duty to 

accommodate does not require employer to violate collective bargaining contract). Accordingly, 

this case is different from cases that do not involve an undue hardship defense. 
24 

c. Application to the DOL Accommodation 

Separate from Kalejaiye’s request for a beard-length accommodation at the DOT facility, 

Kalejaiye asserts that QI could have provided an accommodation by transferring him to QI’s 

contract providing security officers to a DOL facility where, Kalejaiye says, gas masks were not 

utilized.8

 See Pl.’s Opp. at 29. Having concluded above that Kalejaiye established a prima facie 

case, the Court turns to whether a dispute of material fact exists respecting whether transferring 

Kalejaiye to the DOL facility would have caused QI an undue burden. 

QI denies the premise of Kalejaiye’s argument that it could simply move him to the DOL 

contract. QI asserts that although it considered transferring Kalejaiye to the DOL facility 

contract, doing so would have caused it an undue hardship because (1) QI had no vacancy in 

which to hire a new employee under its DOL facility contract, (2) hiring for the DOL contract 

8

 QI argues that Kalejaiye did not raise his DOL transfer argument in his EEOC charge or 

complaint and that the argument is unexhausted. See Def.’s Mot. at 26. The Court disagrees. 

Kalejaiye’s DOL transfer argument merely supports his overarching Title VII failure to 

accommodate claim. Kalejaiye’s EEOC charge alleged that QI discriminated against him by 

failing to accommodate his religious beliefs. See generally Charge of Discrimination. His 

argument that he should have been transferred to the DOL contract as an accommodation is 

simply another detail adding to that failure to accommodate claim. Kalejaiye need not have used 

any specific wording in his EEOC Charge to exhaust his failure to accommodate claim. See 

Marshall v. Fed. Express Corp., 130 F.3d 1095, 1098 (D.C. Cir. 1997) (“Naturally every detail 

of the eventual complaint need not be presaged in the EEO[] filing”); Maryland v. Sodexho, Inc., 

474 F. Supp. 2d 160, 162 (D.D.C. 2007) (explaining that “the law does not hold an employee to 

the use of magic words to make out a proper discrimination charge” so long as the employee 

“alert[s] the EEOC and the charged employer with the nature of the alleged wrongdoing”); 

President v. Vance, 627 F.2d 353, 362 (D.C. Cir. 1980) (“Title VII's exhaustion requirement 

should not be read to create useless procedural technicalities”). The important point is that 

Kalejaiye’s EEOC charge “contained sufficient information to put [QI] on notice of the claim 

and to enable [QI] to investigate it.” Crawford v. Duke, 867 F.3d 103, 109 (D.C. Cir. 2017)

(cleaned up). Here, Kalejaiye alleged to the EEOC that QI failed to accommodate his religious 

beliefs. See Charge of Discrimination at 1 (“I requested a religious accommodation to Mr. 

Middleton, Lieutenant in accordance with my chain of command.”). Certainly, QI understood 

and was on notice of this aspect of Kalejaiye’s claim because it was its own HR contractor that 

considered the potential accommodation through transfer to the DOL contract. Thus, Kalejaiye

need not have separately exhausted this aspect of his failure to accommodate claim.
25 

was separate from the DOT contract, (3) DOL facility security officers required different 

certifications—meaning that it could not simply reassign Kalejaiye to the DOL facility, and (4) 

the government’s grooming standards applied the same way at the DOL facility—meaning that 

transferring Kalejaiye would not have solved the beard-length issue. See Lane Depo. at 35; 

McCoy Depo. at 13, ECF No. 87-10; Def’s Mot. at 25–26. As part of its argument, QI further 

explains that moving Kalejaiye to the DOL facility would have resulted in taking away “shifts 

f[rom] the qualified DOL contract employees” because QI had no other openings at that facility. 

Def.’s Mot. at 26–27. Additionally, QI argues that transferring Kalejaiye to the DOL facility 

outside of the regular hiring procedures would have been difficult because “there was no process 

for a security guard to transfer from one site to another.” Id. at 27. Accordingly, QI argues, that 

moving Kalejaiye was either infeasible or, at a minimum, would have caused it an undue 

hardship. 

By contrast, Kalejaiye argues that moving him would not have caused QI an undue 

hardship and that QI’s explanation for its undue hardship lacks credibility. In support of this 

assertion, Kalejaiye argues that QI’s HR contractor raised the possibility of transferring him, but 

that QI never seriously considered or tried to move him to the DOL contract. See Response to 

Undisputed Facts at 39–40; Pl.’s Mot. at 29–34. Kalejaiye points out that one of QI’s HR 

contractors “asked the question” if it was possible that Kalejaiye could “be moved into the 

Department of Labor Building” but that QI said “they did not have any openings.” See Pl.’s 

Mot. at 30 (quoting Lane Depo, Pl.’s Mot., Ex. 33, ECF No. 87-9). And Kalejaiye points to 

evidence that an employee could, in fact, be moved as an accommodation. See Pl.’s Mot. at 32 

(quoting a deposition in which a QI employee stated “I’ve had situations unrelated to this where 
26 

a person had to be moved in order to be accommodated. The pay stays the same, the shift might 

change, maybe it gets better.” (quoting Peterson Depo, Pl.’s Mot, Ex. 32, ECF No. 87-9)). 

But, Kalejaiye argues, the evidence shows that QI “does not know whether anyone 

actually investigated whether it was possible to accommodate Plaintiff by transferring him to the 

DOL contract.” Pl.’s Mot. at 33 (italics omitted). Specifically, Plaintiff directs the Court’s 

attention to the deposition of Demetria McCoy, who served as a project manager and director of 

operations for QI. Id. at 32. When asked whether she had ever investigated moving Kalejaiye 

off the DOT contract and onto the DOL contract, McCoy responded “no,” that she “was never 

asked that question,” and never investigated moving Kalejaiye of her own initiative. McCoy 

Depo., Ex. 38 at 13, ECF No. 87-10. McCoy explained that moving Plaintiff to the DOL 

contract “wouldn’t have been an option” because the DOL contract “follow[ed] the same 

[grooming] standards” as the DOT contract. Id. If QI never bothered to inquire into whether it 

would be possible or difficult to transfer Kalejaiye to the DOL contract, Kalejaiye says, QI had 

no way of knowing whether transferring him would pose an undue hardship. And Kalejaiye 

points out that the hiring standards were functionally equivalent between the DOT and DOL 

sites, see Pl.’s Opp. at 33 (quoting McCoy Depo.), and that he had already satisfied those criteria, 

see id. at 34 (“DOL contract did not have any additional requirements that Plaintiff would have 

to meet that he had not already met before being deployed to the DOT contract”). 

Accordingly, there remains a genuine dispute over whether moving Kalejaiye to the DOL 

contract would have caused an undue hardship. Given that a reasonable jury could find for either 

party with respect to this factual dispute—which will determine whether QI refused to consider a 

reasonable accommodation—summary judgment is not appropriate on this point. 

* * * 
27 

In summary, genuine disputes of material fact exist with respect to both (1) whether 

allowing Kalejaiye an accommodation to grow his beard at the DOT facility would have caused 

QI an undue hardship and (2) whether QI assessed if it could accommodate Kalejaiye by moving 

him to a different contract and whether moving him to that contract would have caused an undue 

hardship. Accordingly, summary judgment is not appropriate with respect to either QI or 

Kalejaiye’s motions on Kalejaiye’s accommodation claim.

2. Retaliation Claim

QI asserts that the undisputed facts do not support Kalejaiye’s Title VII retaliation claim. 

See Def.’s Mot. at 21. Title VII’s anti-retaliation provision makes it unlawful for an employer 

“to discriminate against [an] employee[] . . . because he has opposed any practice” prohibited by 

Title VII (known as the “opposition clause”) or “has made a charge, testified, assisted, or 

participated in” a Title VII proceeding (known as the “participation clause”). 42 U.S.C. 

§ 2000e–3(a). The McDonnell Douglas “framework [] governs our analysis of [Kalejaiye’s] 

claims of unlawful retaliation in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 2000e–3(a).” Morgan v. Fed. Home 

Loan Mortg. Corp., 328 F.3d 647, 651 (D.C. Cir. 2003). “The only difference is the phrasing of 

the prima facie case: ‘In order to establish a prima facie case of retaliation, a plaintiff must show: 

1) that [he] engaged in a statutorily protected activity; 2) that the employer took an adverse 

personnel action; and 3) that a causal connection existed between the two.’” Id. (citation 

omitted). If a plaintiff can support a prima facie case, the defendant has an opportunity to 

provide a nonretaliatory reason for its employment decision. Id. Once a defendant proffers a 

nonretaliatory reason, the Court “proceed[s] to the ultimate issue of retaliation vel non.” Jones v. 

Bernanke, 557 F.3d 670, 678 (D.C. Cir. 2009). 
28 

a. Statutorily Protected Activity

The Court starts with whether Kalejaiye has provided evidence that he “engaged in a 

statutorily protected activity.” Morgan, 328 F.3d at 651. Kalejaiye argues that he was retaliated 

against because he requested an accommodation. See Compl. at 7. In other contexts, this Court 

and the D.C. Circuit have held that requesting an accommodation constitutes statutorily protected 

activity. See Floyd v. Lee, 968 F. Supp. 2d 308, 333 (D.D.C. 2013) (this Court holding that “the 

retaliation provision of the Congressional Accountability Act, like the nearly identical provision 

in the Americans with Disabilities Act, protects employees who request a reasonable 

accommodation from retaliation on that basis”); Solomon v. Vilsack, 763 F.3d 1, 15 (D.C. Cir. 

2014) (holding that “requesting in good faith a reasonable accommodation is a protected activity 

under 42 U.S.C. § 12203”); Menoken v. Dhillon, 975 F.3d 1, 11 (D.C. Cir. 2020) (“no dispute the 

complaint alleged that [plaintiff] engaged in statutorily protected activity by requesting a 

reasonable accommodation for a disability”); Minter v. D.C., 809 F.3d 66, 70 (D.C. Cir. 2015) 

(treating request for accommodation as protected activity).

The Court recognizes, however, that there is “a division of authority on the issue whether 

a request for religious accommodation constitutes protected activity for purposes of a retaliation 

suit,” Touvian v. D.C., 330 F. Supp. 3d 246, 251 n.3 (D.D.C. 2018) (collecting cases) (emphasis 

added); compare Payne v. Salazar, 899 F. Supp. 2d 42, 52 (D.D.C. 2012) (request for 

accommodation “does not constitute protected activity as defined by Title VII”), and Equal Emp. 

Opportunity Comm’n v. N. Mem’l Health Care, 908 F.3d 1098, 1103 (8th Cir. 2018) (“merely 

requesting a religious accommodation is not the same as opposing the allegedly unlawful denial 

of a religious accommodation” (citation omitted)), with Rashad v. Wash. Metro. Area Transit 
29 

Auth., 945 F. Supp. 2d 152, 167 (D.D.C. 2013) (treating request for religious accommodation as 

protected activity). 

Nevertheless, given D.C. Circuit precedents holding “that the act of requesting in good 

faith a reasonable accommodation is a protected activity under” the ADA, see, e.g., Solomon, 

763 F.3d at 15, and the fact that there is no persuasive reason to distinguish requesting an 

accommodation in the ADA context from requesting an accommodation in the Title VII context, 

the Court concludes that requesting a religious accommodation is a statutorily protected activity, 

see, e.g., Floyd, 968 F. Supp. 2d at 331 (concluding that “retaliation provisions of the 

Congressional Accountability Act and the Americans with Disabilities Act are, for present 

purposes, indistinguishable” and therefore holding that requesting an accommodation under the 

CAA was a protected activity). 

Kalejaiye’s complaint also asserts that he was retaliated against “for filing a charge of 

discrimination with the EEOC” against QI. See Compl. at 7. And “[t]he ‘filing of an EEO 

Complaint’ is protected EEO activity for which retaliation is unlawful.” Jones v. U.S. Dep't of 

Just., 111 F. Supp. 3d 25, 32 n.7 (D.D.C. 2015) (citing 42 U.S.C. § 2000e–3(a)). Because 

Kalejaiye was terminated, there is no dispute that QI took an adverse employment action against 

him. See Durant v. D.C. Gov’t, 875 F.3d 685 (D.C. Cir. 2017) (termination amounts to adverse 

employment action).9

 The Court therefore turns to whether that adverse employment action was 

causally related to either protected activity.

9 Kalejaiye also stated that QI retaliated by denying his accommodation request, see

Compl. at 7, but the denial of an accommodation request does not amount to an adverse 

employment action because “if the denial of a request for accommodation could itself support a 

claim of retaliation based on the request, then every failure-to-accommodate claim would be 

doubled.” Floyd, 968 F. Supp. 2d at 334. 
30 

b. Causation 

i. Retaliation for accommodation request 

 Kalejaiye has provided sufficient facts to show “a causal connection existed between” his 

accommodation request and his termination. For instance, Kalejaiye points to the facts that he 

was terminated shortly after requesting an accommodation and that he was treated differently 

from other employees who wore beards with lengths in excess of QI’s policy and who did not 

request an accommodation. See Pl.’s Opp., Ex. 13, ECF No. 92-5; Pl.’s Opp. at 28. And 

Kalejaiye continued to attempt to receive an accommodation throughout his tenure working for 

QI. The burden to satisfy a prima facie case is not onerous, see Oviedo v. WMATA, 299 F. Supp. 

3d 50, 60 (D.D.C. 2019); Gipson v. Wells Fargo, N.A., 460 F. Supp. 2d 15, 25 (D.D.C. 2015) 

(same), and here, at the very least, there is a dispute of material fact with respect to the causation 

element. Accordingly, the burden shifts to QI to show that it had a legitimate non-retaliatory 

reason for terminating Kalejaiye after he requested an accommodation. See Morgan, 328 F.3d at

651. 

ii. Retaliation for EEOC charge

Kalejaiye cannot, however, show that “a causal connection existed between” the filing of 

his EEOC charge and the adverse employment action QI took against him. Id. Kalejaiye 

presents no evidence that any action taken against him resulted from the filing of his EEOC 

Charge of discrimination. See Cutchin v. D.C., 369 F. Supp. 3d 108, 118 (D.D.C. 2019) 

(“Unsupported allegations or conclusory statements are not sufficient to defeat summary 

judgment.” (citing Ass’n of Flight Attendants-CWA v. U.S. Dep’t of Transp., 564 F.3d 462, 465-

66 (D.C. Cir. 2009))). Rather, all of Kalejaiye’s evidence relates to his request for an 

accommodation. See generally Pl.’s Opp. Moreover, the conduct that Kalejaiye complains of 

occurred before he filed his EEOC charge. See Charge of Discrimination (filed with EEOC on 
31 

June 26, 2018); Disciplinary and Termination Request, ECF No. 86-25 (sent by QI on June 22, 

2018); Quality Investigations, Inc. Removal from Schedule, Ex. 19, ECF No. 92-6 (sent by QI on 

June 21, 2018). “[A] plaintiff cannot base a retaliation claim on events that took place prior to 

the time she first engaged in EEO activity.” Payne, 899 F. Supp. 2d at 53; Lewis v. D.C., 653 F. 

Supp. 2d 64, 79 (D.D.C. 2009) (“The fact that the alleged retaliatory actions preceded the 

protected activity precludes a determination that the protected activity caused the defendant to 

retaliate against the plaintiff.”). Because no reasonable juror could find that Kalejaiye satisfied 

his burden with respect to his prima facie case for retaliation based on the filling of his EEOC 

charge, this claim fails, and the Court will grant QI summary judgment in this respect.

c. Non-Retaliatory Reason and Pretext 

Finally, the Court turns to whether a dispute of material fact exists with respect to QI’s 

proffered non-retaliatory reason for terminating Kalejaiye after Kalejaiye requested an 

accommodation. If a plaintiff can make out a prima facie case for retaliation, the burden shifts, 

meaning the employer must articulate a legitimate, non-retaliatory reason for its action. See 

Bernanke, 557 F.3d at 678. If the employer is successful in doing so, the plaintiff must show that 

the employer’s reason was pretextual. Id.

QI asserts that it had a legitimate non-retaliatory reason for terminating Kalejaiye—

namely, that he was out of compliance with QI’s grooming policy. See Def.’s Mot. at 23–25; 

Disciplinary and Termination Request, ECF No. 86-25. There is no dispute that Kalejaiye was, 

in fact, out of compliance. In support of its assertion that it did not terminate Kalejaiye because 

of his accommodation request, QI has also pointed to evidence showing that it attempted on 

several occasions to provide Kalejaiye with an accommodation but was stymied by the 
32 

government, which it contends shows that it bore no ill will towards Kalejaiye for seeking that 

accommodation. See Def.’s Mot. at 24; Jason Ricks Depo., Ex. 10 at 37, ECF No. 86-11. 

But Kalejaiye has presented sufficient evidence to create a genuine dispute of material 

fact regarding whether QI’s reasons for terminating Kalejaiye are pretextual. First, Kalejaiye 

points to photographs showing other security officers—including Kalejaiye’s supervisor—

wearing beards in excess of the length permitted by QI’s grooming policy. See Pl.’s Opp., Ex. 

13, ECF No. 92-5. And he contends that none of these individuals had ever requested a religious 

accommodation. See Pl.’s Opp. at 28 (citing Pl.’s Opp., Ex. 7, Coates Depo. at 46:1, ECF No. 

92-4). Moreover, Kalejaiye asserts, none of the individuals were terminated for having a beard 

that was out of compliance. Id. The only thing that makes him different, Kalejaiye argues, is 

that he requested an accommodation. See id. Taken together, Kalejaiye says, the fact that none 

of the other similarly situated out-of-compliance officers were terminated shows that it was 

Kalejaiye’s request for an accommodation that caused QI to terminate him. See Burley v. Nat’l 

Passenger Rail Corp., 801 F.3d 290, 301 (D.C. Cir. 2015) (“plaintiff can establish pretext . . . by 

presenting evidence suggesting that the employer treated other employees [who were similarly 

situated] . . . more favorably in the same factual circumstances (cleaned up)); Walker v. Johnson, 

798 F.3d 1085, 1092 (D.C. Cir. 2015) (same). Because a reasonable jury could conclude that QI 

terminated Kalejaiye because he requested an accommodation, there is a genuine dispute of 

material fact and QI’s motion is denied in this respect.
33 

C. Tortious Interference Claim

QI also seeks summary judgment with respect to Kalejaiye’s District of Columbia 

common law claim for tortious interference with prospective business advantage.10 See Def.’s 

Mot. at 28. Kalejaiye’s tort claim rests on the allegation that QI excluded his name from a 

personnel list that QI provided DOT, which in turn provided the list to the new contractor that 

took over QI’s contract with DOT. See id.; Compl. at 8. This personnel list was used by the new 

contractor for purposes of holding a job fair for the potential hiring of former QI security 

officers. See Def.’s Mot. at 28; Compl. at 8. 

Under DC law, “[t]he elements of tortious interference with prospective business 

advantage mirror those of interference with contract. . . . To prevail, however, a plaintiff 

obviously need not demonstrate the existence of a contract, but merely a prospective 

advantageous business transaction.” Casco Marina Dev., L.L.C. v. D.C. Redevelopment Land 

Agency, 834 A.2d 77, 84 (D.C. 2003) (citation omitted). Thus, to prevail on his tort claim, 

Kalejaiye must show that (1) he had a prospective advantageous business transaction, (2) that QI 

had knowledge of that prospective advantageous business transaction, (3) that QI intentionally 

interfered with the prospective advantageous business transaction, and (4) damages resulting 

from the interference. See Sorrells v. Garfinckel's, Brooks Bros., Miller & Rhoads, Inc., 565 

A.2d 285, 289 (D.C. 1989); Brown v. Carr, 503 A.2d 1241, 1247 (D.C. 1986) (“To establish a 

prima facie case of interference with business relations, ‘a plaintiff must show that the 

interference was intentional and that there was resulting damage.’” (citation omitted)). For the 

reasons set forth below, Kalejaiye’s tortious interference claim fails because he cannot show he 

10 Kalejaiye does not cross-move for summary judgment on his tortious interference 

claim. See generally Pl.’s Mot. 
34 

meets either the first or third elements required for such a claim. See Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 

477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986) (“Rule 56(c) mandates the entry of summary judgment . . . against a 

party who fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to 

that party’s case, and on which that party will bear the burden of proof at trial.”)

1. Prospective Advantageous Business Transaction 

The Court starts with whether Kalejaiye had a prospective advantageous business 

transaction. QI contends that “because Plaintiff had been off of the QI contract for nine months” 

Kalejaiye could not have had a prospective business advantage in employment with the new 

contractor because he “had long since been removed” from the DOT facility guard contract. See

Def.’s Mot. at 29; Kalejaiye Depo. at 137–138, ECF No. 86-6 (“Q. So if this job fair was in 

March of 2019, that was nine months after you last worked at QI at the FAA building? A. Yes.”). 

For his part, Kalejaiye argues that his relationship with QI ended fewer than nine months before 

the guard list was presented to the new contractor for its job fair because he was terminated on 

October 4, 2018—only roughly 5 months before the job fair, which occurred in March of 2019. 

See Pl.’s Opp. at 39; Kalejaiye Depo. at 137. Moreover, Kalejaiye says, QI never informed him 

that he was terminated and so he did not lose his expectancy in the prospective business 

transaction. Pl.’s Opp. at 39. 

The Court holds that, even viewed in the light most favorable to him, Kalejaiye did not 

have a prospective business advantage in employment with the new contractor. The D.C. Court 

of Appeals has explained that intentional interference with prospective economic advantage 

requires a plaintiff to show “business expectancies, not grounded on present contractual 

relationships but which are commercially reasonable to anticipate.” Havilah Real Prop. Servs., 

LLC v. VLK, LLC, 108 A.3d 334, 351 (D.C. 2015) (citation omitted); see also Robertson v. 
35 

Cartinhour, 867 F. Supp. 2d 37, 60 (D.D.C. 2012), aff’d, 553 F. App’x 1 (D.C. Cir. 2014) (“A 

valid business expectancy requires a probability of future contractual or economic relationship 

and not a mere possibility.” (citation omitted)). Because Kalejaiye had not worked at the DOT 

facility for nine months prior to the job fair, it is not “commercially reasonable to anticipate” that 

he would still be included on the guard rotation list that QI submitted to the government and 

which the government provided to the new contractor. See Havilah Real Prop. Servs., 108 A.3d 

at 351 (explaining that it is only “commercially reasonable to anticipate” a future economic 

relationship where one can gauge the “likelihood that the plaintiff would have received” the 

economic benefit and the likelihood is a “probability,” not a “mere possibility” (citations 

omitted)). While it is possible that QI could have kept Kalejaiye listed as an employee despite 

not employing him for nine months, a “mere possibility” is insufficient. Robertson, 867 F. Supp. 

2d at 60. No reasonable juror could conclude that it was commercially reasonable for Kalejaiye 

to anticipate a business expectancy after he had not been to work at the DOT facility in nine 

months. Thus, Kalejaiye “fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of” the 

prospective advantageous business transaction element “essential to [his] case”—“on which 

[Kalejaiye] w[ould] bear the burden of proof at trial.” Celotex, 477 U.S. at 322. 

2. Intent 

 Nor does the evidence presented bear out that QI intentionally interfered with any 

prospective business relationship.11 In support of his claim that QI intentionally interfered with a 

prospective advantageous business transaction, Kalejaiye points to the deposition of Jason Ricks 

11 Having determined that Kalejaiye could not satisfy his burden with respect to one 

element of his tortious interference claim, the Court need not address the other elements. 

Celotex, 477 U.S. at 322. Nevertheless, the Court explains why Kalejaiye cannot satisfy the 

intent element either.
36 

for the proposition that “QI removed Plaintiff’s name from the roster list, knowing that he would 

thereafter be denied the opportunity to transition to the new guard company.” Pl.’s Opp. at 40 

(citing the deposition of Jason Ricks at 92, Ex. 24, ECF No. 92-7). Ricks’s deposition, however, 

does not state that QI removed Plaintiff from the personnel list to interfere with his business 

relationship. Rather, Ricks explained that new contractors receive a list from the government of 

“all personnel on the contract” and that Kalejaiye’s name was not on that list “[b]ecause he was 

no longer a member of the contract as of – at the time that the transition began.” Ricks Depo. at 

92. Ricks’s statements do not support the inference that QI intentionally interfered with 

Kalejaiye’s prospective business relationship. Kalejaiye has not provided evidence countering 

QI’s evidence that it removed Kalejaiye from the DOT guard rotation list because he was no 

longer working for QI on the DOT contract. Accordingly, Kalejaiye has also failed to show that 

he could satisfy the third element of his tortious interference claim, i.e., that QI intentionally 

interfered with his prospective business relationship.12

* * * 

There is no genuine dispute of material fact with respect to whether Kalejaiye had a 

prospective advantageous business transaction and with respect to whether QI intentionally 

interfered with a prospective business transaction. Because no reasonable juror could conclude 

12 Although it is less certain based on the record presented by the parties, the Court 

observes that it is likely Kalejaiye also fails to satisfy his burden with respect to the knowledge 

element of his tortious interference claim. This is so because there is no evidence that QI 

realized it would be replaced by another contractor when it removed Kalejaiye’s name from the 

DOT facility guard rotation list. QI’s contract with the Federal Government ended in 2019 (after 

it terminated Kalejaiye), but it is not clear from the record when QI was informed that its 

contract would not be renewed. See Peterson Depo at 14, ECF No. 86-3. If QI was unaware that 

it would be replaced when it removed Kalejaiye from its personnel list, it would not have known 

about any prospective advantageous business transaction Kalejaiye could have had with QI’s 

replacement.
37 

that Kalejaiye could prove these elements of a claim for tortious interference with prospective 

business advantage, his claim fails, and the Court will grant QI summary judgment in this 

respect.

V. CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, Quality Investigation, Inc.’s motion for summary judgment is 

GRANTED in part and DENIED in part, Abayomi Kalejaiye’s motion for summary judgment is 

DENIED, and Abayomi Kalejaiye’s motion for sanctions is GRANTED in part and DENIED in 

part. An order consistent with this Memorandum Opinion is separately and contemporaneously 

issued. 

Dated: March 21, 2024 RUDOLPH CONTRERAS

United States District Judge