J-S35035-21

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

R.C. BOWMAN, INC.

v.

RICHARD C. BOWMAN, III 

Appellant

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 IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

 PENNSYLVANIA

 No. 417 MDA 2021

Appeal from the Order Entered March 2, 2021

In the Court of Common Pleas of Clinton County Civil Division at No(s): 

1690-2019

BEFORE: OLSON, J., KUNSELMAN, J., and PELLEGRINI, J.*

MEMORANDUM BY PELLEGRINI, J.: FILED: JANUARY 14, 2022

Richard C. Bowman, III (Bowman III) appeals from the order entered in 

the Court of Common Pleas of Clinton County (trial court) granting R.C. 

Bowman, Inc.’s (R.C. Bowman) post-trial motion for contempt for his failure

to comply with the verdict issued in replevin to return certain property within 

30 days of the order. We affirm in part and vacate in part.

The background facts of this matter are contentious and we recite only 

those necessary for this appeal from our independent review of the record and 

the trial court’s December 4, 2020 and March 2, 2021 opinions.

____________________________________________

* Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court.
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I.

R.C. Bowman, Inc. was incorporated on April 19, 1999, with Richard C. 

Bowman, Jr., Robert K. Bowman (Rob Bowman), and Bowman III each having 

a one-third interest in said corporation. Rob Bowman and Bowman III are 

twin brothers and Richard C. Bowman, Jr. is their father. Bowman III was

president, shareholder and employee of the corporation since its founding until

a February 8, 2019 shareholders’ meeting he failed to attend despite notice. 

At the meeting, because he received no nominations as a director or officer, 

he was removed as president. He remained an employee until his March 25, 

2019 termination and continues to be a one-third shareholder.

It is undisputed that shortly after his removal as president, Bowman III 

took several items from his R.C. Bowman office without permission (Property). 

The Property included:

a. Corporate checks 15001 through 15024;

b. 2011 Chevrolet Crew Cub pickup truck;

c. Desk and couch;

d. Two chairs;

e. iPad;

f. Corporate safe;

g. Corporate vehicle titles, spare keys, and key box for vehicles;

h. Computer with two screens; and

i. Military medals.
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(Joint Statement of Undisputed Facts, at Paragraph 19).1

On April 8, 2019, Bowman III established a new corporation, Richard C. 

Bowman, III, Inc. Since May 13, 2019, Richard C. Bowman, III, Inc., trading 

as Bowman Excavating, Paving and Concrete, has conducted a business in 

direct competition with R.C. Bowman, Inc.

On November 18, 2019, Bowman III filed a complaint against R.C. 

Bowman seeking to compel R.C. Bowman to produce the books and records 

for his inspection as shareholder at docket number 1576-2019. On December 

12, 2019, R.C. Bowman filed a complaint setting forth five counts against 

Bowman III in this case at docket number 1690-2019: Count I: 

misappropriation of trade secrets pursuant to Pennsylvania’s Uniform Trade 

Secrets Act (PUTSA);

2 Count II: Breach of fiduciary duty; Count III: Equitable 

relief; Count IV: Conversion; and Count V: Replevin. In the replevin count, 

R.C. Bowman sought the return of the Property. (See Complaint, 12/12/19, 

at 5) (pagination provided). In the replevin count, the one that is involved in 

this appeal, R.C. Bowman sought an order directing return of the Property. It 

did not seek damages.

____________________________________________

1

It is undisputed that the military medals were not owned by R.C. Bowman 

or part of the action. (See Statement of Undisputed Facts, at Paragraph 28).

2 12 Pa.C.S. §§ 5301-5308.
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The trial court consolidated the two actions and a two-day non-jury trial 

commenced on October 15, 2020. The limited material facts underlying the 

replevin action were undisputed. Specifically, Bowman III agreed that he 

removed the Property without authorization and that it belonged to R.C. 

Bowman. (See Joint Statement of Undisputed Facts, at Paragraph 19); (RR 

41a-44a). “[N]o evidence of damages was presented to [the] [c]ourt. Th[e]

[c]ourt received no testimony as to cost of any of the [Property] nor the 

damages due R.C. Bowman, Inc.” (Trial Court Opinion, 12/04/20, at 24); 

(see id. at 25) (“[A]bsolutely no evidence of money damages was offered by 

R.C. Bowman, Inc., at trial.”).

On December 4, 2020, after thorough briefing by the parties, the trial 

court entered a verdict granting R.C. Bowman’s action in replevin.

3 (See

Opinion, 12/04/19, at 24). The court ordered that Bowman III was to return 

the Property and directed that “said return of property shall be arranged 

through counsel and shall be completed within thirty (30) days of the date of 

this Order.” (Verdict, 12/14/20, at 3) (pagination provided). It did not set 

forth any other conditions or grant any damages.

____________________________________________

3 The court’s verdict also granted R.C. Bowman’s claims for misappropriation 

of trade secrets as to a customer list and conversion. It denied the remainder 

of R.C. Bowman’s claims and Bowman III’s action to inspect the corporation’s 

records. Bowman III appealed those decisions at docket numbers 415 MDA 

2021 and 416 MDA 2021. They are not the subject of this appeal.
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On the evening of December 24, 2020, Bowman III returned some of 

the Property. On December 28, 2020, R.C. Bowman filed a post-trial motion 

alleging Bowman III returned the Property “during torrential rains” and that 

the items were “substantially damaged or destroyed.” (Post-Trial Motion by 

R.C. Bowman, Inc., 12/28/20, at Paragraph 6). The corporation conceded

that “[s]ince the destruction of the personal property of R.C. Bowman Inc. 

occurred at a time when that property has been unlawfully taken and retained 

by Richard C. Bowman, III[,] ... the proper claim for relief would be a new 

action for damages to personal property.” (Id. at Paragraph 7). The court 

scheduled argument and a hearing for February 23, 2021.

On January 28, 2021, Bowman III filed a response in which he requested 

discovery and argued that a motion for contempt was an improper subject of 

a post-trial motion because the alleged damage was not discovered until after 

trial and, as conceded by R.C. Bowman, the damage to the Property created 

a new cause of action; thus, it was required to file a complaint providing 

Bowman III with notice of the allegations against him. (Response to PostTrial Motions of R.C. Bowman, 1/28/21, at Paragraphs 3, 7, 10-12). On

February 17, 2021, Bowman III inspected the Property.

After a hearing, the trial court explained the circumstances regarding 

the return of the Property and costs incurred by R.C. Bowman as follows:

The return [of the Property] occurred on December 24, 2020, 

Christmas Eve, in the pouring rain with the items exposed to the 

weather. The two (2) chairs, the Corporate checks, and some of 

the vehicle titles were not returned. Although the computer was 
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returned, the hard drive was removed from the computer. R.C. 

Bowman, Inc. has complained through testimony from Robert K. 

Bowman that the following items were damaged: 2011 Chevrolet

Crew Cab Pickup Truck, the couch, and the desk. R.C. Bowman, 

Inc. also alleged that Richard C. Bowman, III returned the 

Corporate safe, but the combination was not forwarded and R.C. 

Bowman, Inc. had to engage a locksmith to assist with the 

opening of the safe and the installation of a new combination for 

the safe.

... [R.C. Bowman] claimed the following damages:

A. Locksmith cost - $85.00;

B. Cost for duplicate titles concerning the titles that were not 

returned - $300.00;

C. Cost to replace couch which was damaged - $5,000.00;

D. Cost to replace chair[s] not returned - $3,000.00;

E. Truck repair - $5,079.76; and

F. Cost to refinish desk top - $235.07.

Total - $13,699.83.

This [c]ourt would note that Richard C. Bowman, III 

objected to the Exhibits that established the damages listed above 

[based on hearsay.] ...

These objections were sustained by this [c]ourt. However, 

this [c]ourt must note that no objection was raised to the 

testimony of Robert K. Bowman, who testified to said amounts. ...

(Trial Court Opinion and Order, 3/02/21, at 3-4); (See N.T. Hearing, 2/23/21, 

at 21-30).

Counsel for Bowman III cross-examined Rob Bowman about the 

foregoing. On cross-examination, Rob Bowman stated that the damage to the 

nine-year-old pickup truck was not caused by the rain, but at some time while 
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in Bowman III’s possession. He conceded that he was not certain when the 

scratches and other body damage occurred; whether prior to Bowman III’s 

termination and removal of the Property or thereafter. He admitted that the 

couch and desk had been in R.C. Bowman’s possession for approximately 18 

years, that the desk could have been damaged before Bowman III removed it 

and he had no actual knowledge of what happened to the couch or if 

something was sprayed on it. (See N.T. Hearing, at 31-42).

At the conclusion of the hearing, the court entered an order finding 

Bowman III in contempt of its December 4, 2020 order. (See Trial Ct. Op., 

3/02/21, at 3-4). It directed that he could purge himself of the contempt by:

(a) Returning the hard drive of the computer;

(b) Returning the two (2) chairs; and

(c) Paying R.C. Bowman, Inc.:

(1) $85.00 - locksmith cost[;]

(2) $235.07 – refinish desktop;

(3) $300.00 – duplicate title cost; and

(4) $5,079.76 – truck repair cost.

$5,669.83 Total.

The court further ordered that Bowman III’s failure to purge himself of 

contempt would result in the scheduling of a proceeding to impose sanctions. 
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(See id. at 4, 7-8). Bowman III timely appealed and filed a court-ordered 

statement of errors complained of on appeal.

4

 See Pa.R.A.P. 1925.

On appeal, Bowman III argues that the trial court erred or abused its 

discretion in: (1) holding the evidentiary hearing; (2) finding him in 

contempt; and (3) awarding damages that were punitive, unreasonable, 

arbitrary and excessive.5

II.

A.

Bowman III first argues that “the relief sought by R.C. Bowman was not 

the proper subject of a post-trial motion” because it “did not seek relief from 

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4 On May 11, 2021, this Court issued a rule to show cause order directing 

Bowman III to show cause why the appeal should not be quashed as taken 

from an interlocutory order where it directed him to purge himself within 30

days or the court would schedule a proceeding to impose sanctions. See 

Lachat v. Hinchcliffe, 769 A.2d 481, 488 (Pa. Super. 2001) (“Until sanctions 

are actually imposed by the trial court, an order declaring a party to be in 

contempt is interlocutory and not appealable.”) (citation omitted). In his 

response, Bowman III argued that despite the order’s language stating that 

sanctions would be imposed for further non-compliance, they already had 

been since it directed him to pay $5,699.83 for damages suffered because of

his failure to comply with the December 4, 2020 order. (See Response to 

Rule to Show Cause Order, 5/17/21, at 2-3). We agree. See Hinchcliffe, 

supra at 488 (finding contempt order directing appellant “to make remedial 

payment” for costs incurred due to contemnor’s actions imposed sanctions 

and was final and appealable). Thus, we will consider the merits of this appeal.

5 “[A]ppellate review of a finding of contempt is limited to deciding whether 

the trial court abused its discretion.” Hinchcliffe, supra at 487 (citation 

omitted).
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the trial court concerning the conduct of the trial or the trial decision.” (Id.

at 20).

Pursuant to Rule 227.1 of the Pennsylvania Rules of Civil Procedure, 

after a trial, a party may file a motion seeking post-trial relief. See Pa.R.C.P. 

227.1(a). The purpose for Rule 227.1 is “to provide the trial court with the 

opportunity to correct errors in its ruling and avert the need for appellate 

review.” Warfield v. Shermer, 910 A.2d 734, 737 (Pa. Super. 2006), appeal 

denied, 921 A.2d 497 (Pa. 2007) (citation omitted). Toward that end, the 

court may order a new trial, direct the entry of judgment in favor of a party, 

remove a nonsuit, “affirm, modify or change the decision” or enter any other 

appropriate order. Pa.R.C.P. 227.1(a).6

In this case, R.C. Bowman’s post-trial motions asserted, in pertinent 

part, that the “court included, in its Opinion and Order, a decision in favor of 

R.C. Bowman, Inc., in replevin [and] R.C. Bowman, Inc. seeks Post Trial Relief 

with regard to that decision, limited to subsequent damage to that 

personal property.” (Post Trial Motions by R.C. Bowman, at Paragraph 3) 

(emphasis added). As can be seen, those motions are not asserting trial court 

error that would justify any of the remedies identified in Rule 227.1(b). While

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6 Although not raised by Bowman III, we note that “[a] motion for post-trial 

relief may not be filed to matters governed exclusively by the rules of petition 

practice.” Rule 227.1, Note. Pursuant to the Crawford County Local Rules of 

Civil Procedure, an action for civil contempt is brought pursuant to petition 

practice. See CRAWFORD CTY CT RCP Rule 206.1(a).
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the subsection allows a court to enter “any other appropriate order,” such 

order would be filed to correct errors in the court’s ruling or decisions made 

at trial. See Shermer, supra at 737. Because the post-trial motions on their

face, alleged grounds and sought damages not contemplated by Rule 227.1, 

we agree with Bowman III that they were not the proper subject of a posttrial motion.7

Nonetheless, we note that, “[w]ith respect to civil contempt,[

8] it is 

axiomatic that courts have always possessed the inherent power to enforce 

their orders and decrees by imposing sanctions for failure to comply with said 

orders.” Wood v. Geisenhemer-Shaulis, 827 A.2d 1204, 1207 (citation, 

bracket and internal quotation marks omitted). Although the motion to 

compel was filed improperly, if we vacate and remand, the practical effect

would be the filing of the same petition for contempt. In the interest of judicial 

economy, where the December 4, 2020 order was entered after a full trial, 

Bowman III responded to the motion, he conducted an inspection of the 

alleged damages and his counsel appeared at the hearing and thoroughly 

____________________________________________

7 R.C. Bowman fails to address how its motion was properly filed as part of a 

post-trial motion and as stated previously, it admitted that it should have been 

brought as a separate action since R.C. Bowman is making claims for damages 

that allegedly occurred after trial. (See R.C. Bowman’s Brief, at 10-13); 

(Complaint, at Paragraph 5).

8

It is undisputed that the contempt proceeding in this case was civil in nature. 

(See Trial Ct. Op., 3/02/21, at 4-5).
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cross-examined Rob Bowman, we will consider this appeal’s merits. See 

Diamond v. Diamond, 792 A.2d 597, 601 (Pa. Super. 2002) (“Ordinarily, 

due process requires a five-step procedure prior to a finding of civil contempt. 

However, when the contempt proceedings are predicated on a violation of a 

court order that followed a full hearing, due process requires no more than 

notice of the violations alleged and an opportunity for explanation and 

defense.”) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).

B.

“The order that forms the basis for the contempt process in civil 

proceedings must be definitely and strictly construed.” GeisenhemerShaulis, supra at 1207 (citations omitted).

In proceedings for civil contempt of court, the general rule 

is that the burden of proof rests with the complaining party to 

demonstrate, by preponderance of the evidence, that the 

defendant is in noncompliance with a court order. However, a 

mere showing of noncompliance with a court order, or even 

misconduct, is never sufficient alone to prove civil contempt.

To be punished for contempt, a party must not only have 

violated a court order, but that order must have been definite,

clear, and specific-leaving no doubt or uncertainty in the mind of 

the contemnor of the prohibited conduct.

Because the order forming the basis for civil contempt must 

be strictly construed, any ambiguities or omissions in the order 

must be construed in favor of the defendant. In such cases, a 

contradictory order or an order whose specific terms have not 

been violated will not serve as the basis for a finding of contempt.

To sustain a finding of civil contempt, the complainant must 

prove certain distinct elements: (1) that the contemnor had 

notice of the specific order or decree which he is alleged to have 

disobeyed; (2) that the act constituting the contemnor’s violation 
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was volitional; and (3) that the contemnor acted with wrongful 

intent. A person may not be held in contempt of court for failing 

to obey an order that is too vague or that cannot be enforced.

Lachat v. Hinchcliffe, 769 A.2d 481, 488 (Pa. Super. 2001) (citations, 

quotation marks and some emphasis omitted).

In this case, the trial court found Bowman III in contempt because he:

[O]bviously was aware of the December 4, 2020 Order because 

Richard C. Bowman, III returned some of the items required by 

this [c]ourt to R.C. Bowman, Inc. Richard C. Bowman, III had 

previously stipulated that those were owned by R.C. Bowman, 

Inc., and that Richard C. Bowman, III had taken these items from 

the property of R.C. Bowman, Inc. Richard C. Bowman, III did 

not return other items and returned some items damaged. 

Richard C. Bowman, III at the proceeding on February 22, 2021 

offered no defense to the allegations of R.C. Bowman, Inc. It is 

clear that Richard C. Bowman, III has violated this [c]ourt [o]rder.

....

(Trial Ct. Op., 3/02/21, at 5-6).

C.

We first consider Bowman III’s argument that the court abused its 

discretion in holding him in contempt because the December 4, 2020 order 

“was silent on the condition the property was to be returned” and “R.C. 

Bowman did not offer any evidence to demonstrate when the [P]roperty was 

damaged.” (Bowman III’s Brief, at 25, 26).

The December 4, 2020 court order directed that Bowman III “must 

return” the Property. (Order, at 3) (pagination provided). It stated further 
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that “[s]aid return of property shall be arranged through counsel[

9] and shall 

be completed within thirty (30) days of the date of this [o]rder.” (Id.).

We agree with Bowman III that there is no language in the court’s order 

as to the condition of the Property to be returned, whether it was to be as it 

was prior to Bowman III’s termination, as it existed at the time of trial or any 

other qualifying language. While it is logical to infer that the court’s intent 

was that the Property be returned in the same condition that it was when 

Bowman III removed it, the court omitted any such qualifier from its order. 

Hence, strictly construing any omissions in the order in favor Bowman III, we 

cannot find that he was in contempt of the court’s order for returning the 

Property in the condition he did. See Hinchcliffe, supra at 488.

We also note that Rob Bowman admitted that R.C. Bowman was moving 

for contempt due to the damage that occurred to the Property not only at the 

time it was returned in the rain. For example, he testified that the truck was 

damaged as if something sharp struck the doors and someone had sat on the 

roof. Its hood was scratched as if something had been thrown across it. The

couch was stained by something being sprayed on it. (See N.T. Hearing, at 

____________________________________________

9 Rob Bowman testified that the Property was returned without any notice. 

(See N.T. Hearing, at 25-27). However, the court does not mention this fact 

as a basis for its decision, and R.C. Bowman did not assert this as a ground 

for seeking a contempt finding or make any argument about it either at the 

hearing or in its brief to this Court. We do not make factual findings and will 

not develop an argument on behalf of a party. See In re R.D., 44 A.3d 657, 

674 (Pa. Super. 2012).
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19, 21-30). However, to the extent that the damages could have been raised 

at trial, they are waived. “The failure of a party to present sufficient evidence 

before or during trial to support a decision in that party’s favor cannot be 

cured by a motion filed pursuant to Rule 227.1. ... where the new evidence 

cannot be characterized as after-discovered evidence[.]” Claudio v. Dean 

Mach. Co., 831 A.2d 140, 145 (Pa. 2003) (citations omitted).

Here, as noted by Bowman III, R.C. Bowman had the right to inspect 

the Property during discovery for the underlying litigation pursuant to Rule 

4009.31 and failed to do so. (See Bowman III’s Brief, at 23-24); Pa.R.C.P. 

4009.31. At the conclusion of trial, the court expressly found that R.C. 

Bowman provided no evidence of damages or costs and, therefore, it denied 

any monetary award. (See Trial Ct. Op., 12/04/20, at 24-25; Order, at 3). 

Because any damages that might have occurred prior to trial were required to 

be presented at the trial and R.C. Bowman failed to do so, they are waived,

and the only damages R.C. Bowman could seek were those incurred posttrial. We agree that since any pre-trial damages were waived, the court should 

not have considered such evidence at the hearing.

In fact, even if such evidence were properly considered, Rob Bowman

was unable to definitively say if the damage happened during Bowman III’s 

unlawful possession, whether pre- or post-trial. He testified that R.C. Bowman 

possessed the couch and desk for 18 years and the truck for nine before 

Bowman III removed them when he left the company. Although he saw the 
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pertinent Property when he walked by it while it was in R.C. Bowman’s 

possession, he was unable to say whether the damage occurred before or after 

it was in Bowman III’s unlawful possession. (See N.T. Hearing, at 31-38).

Based on all the foregoing, R.C. Bowman failed to prove that Bowman 

III was in contempt of the court’s December 4, 2020 order because that order 

did not speak to the condition of the Property to be returned. Additionally, 

even assuming arguendo that the order did so, and the trial court properly 

considered waived evidence, Rob Bowman was unable to testify that the 

damage actually occurred while it was in Bowman III’s possession. See 

Hinchcliffe, supra at 488.

D.

Bowman III next claims that “there was no evidence presented ... and 

the trial court failed to make a finding[] that [his] act in not returning the hard 

drive and two office chairs was volitional and done with wrongful intent.” (Id.

at 26).10

Although we are cognizant that a violation of an order alone is 

insufficient to prove contempt, “[t]his Court has previously acknowledged that

intent can be difficult to prove directly because it is a subjective frame of 

mind.” Commonwealth v. Faulk, 928 A.2d 1061, 1070 (Pa. Super. 2007), 

____________________________________________

10 R.C. Bowman’s post-trial motion did not seek relief on the basis that R.C. 

Bowman failed to return some of the Property, only that when it was returned,

it was damaged. (See Post Trial Motions of R.C. Bowman, at Paragraph 6).
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appeal denied, 944 A.2d 756 (Pa. 2008) (citation and internal quotation marks 

omitted). “Civil contempt may be proved by circumstantial evidence and 

logical inference from other facts. Wrongful intent can be inferred from 

circumstantial evidence.” Waggle v. Woodland Hills Assoc., Inc., 213 A.3d 

397, 404 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2019) (citations, internal quotation marks and footnote 

omitted).11

It is undisputed that Bowman III was aware of the court’s order. 

Further, at the February 22, 2021 hearing, Rob Bowman testified that the 

corporate checks, some titles, two chairs, the computer hard drive and the 

key box were not returned. (See N.T. Hearing, 2/22/21, at 19). This violated 

the plain language of the order directing Bowman III to return the Property

and Bowman III did not provide any evidence or testimony to dispute Rob 

Bowman’s representations.

12

While we agree that Rob Bowman provided no express evidence that 

Bowman III acted volitionally and with the wrongful intent necessary to 

____________________________________________

11 “This Court is not bound by decisions of the Commonwealth Court. 

However, such decisions provide persuasive authority, and we may turn to 

our colleagues on the Commonwealth Court for guidance when appropriate.” 

Petow v. Warehime, 996 A.2d 1083, 1089 n.1 (Pa. Super. 2010), appeal 

denied, 12 A.3d 371 (Pa. 2010).

12 We are aware that the order directed return of the computer without 

expressly stating that it be returned with the hard drive and the corporate 

safe with its combination. However, returning a computer without a hard 

drive and a safe without a known combination is akin to not returning them

at all because they are unusable.
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support civil contempt when he failed to return items of R.C. Bowman’s

Property, such could be proven based on circumstantial evidence available to 

the court. See Woodland Hills Assoc., Inc., supra at 404. The trial court 

was fully aware of the contentious nature of this litigation and the 

circumstances surrounding Bowman III’s termination, having sat as the 

arbiter at the non-jury trial. The court’s December 4, 2020 order expressly 

directed Bowman III to return the Property and he chose to return only some 

of it, in violation of that order. In consideration of the circumstances within 

the court’s knowledge, we find that it properly exercised its discretion when it 

concluded that Bowman III acted volitionally and with wrongful intent when 

he failed to return all the Property. Bowman III’s argument to the contrary 

lacks merit.

E.

In his final argument, Bowman III claims that the trial court abused its 

discretion in awarding punitive, unreasonable, arbitrary and excessive

damages. (See Bowman III’s Brief, at 27-28). Because of the damages we 

have already disallowed, the only remaining damages at issue are for $385.00 

representing $85.00 for the cost incurred in obtaining a locksmith and $300.00 

in duplicate title costs. Bowman III contends that the locksmith and 

replacement titles were unreasonable because R.C. Bowman did not ask him 

for the combination or the location of the titles after he failed to provide them. 

(See id. at 28). While those costs were incurred, there was no evidence 
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offered that a demand was made on Bowman III for the combination of the 

safe or the titles to the vehicle. Absent such evidence, Bowman III could not 

be held liable in contempt for those costs.

Accordingly, for the reasons set forth above, we affirm that portion of 

the trial court’s March 2, 2021 order finding that Bowman III was in contempt 

for not returning two chairs and the computer hard drive to R.C. Bowman 

within 30 days of its December 4, 2020 order. However, we vacate that 

portion of that order directing Bowman III to pay $235.07 to refinish the 

desktop and $5,079.76 in truck repair costs, as well its directing Bowman III 

to pay $85.00 in locksmith costs and $300.00 in duplicate title costs.

Order affirmed in part and vacated in part. Case remanded. Jurisdiction 

relinquished.

Judge Olson joins the memorandum.

Judge Kunselman files a concurring/dissenting statement.

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 1/14/2022