*

Afterexaminingthebriefsandtherecord,wehaveconcludedthatoralargumentis

unnecessary.Thus,theappealissubmittedonthebriefsandtherecord.SeeFED. R. APP. P.

34(a)(2)(C).

United States Court of Appeals

FortheSeventhCircuit

Chicago,Illinois60604

SubmittedJune23,2010*

DecidedJuly27,2010

Before

JOHNL.COFFEY,CircuitJudge

JOELM.FLAUM,CircuitJudge

DANIELA.MANION,CircuitJudge

No.091035

CEDRICDUPREE,

PlaintiffAppellant,

v.

EARLYLASTER,etal.,

DefendantsAppellees.

AppealfromtheUnitedStatesDistrict

CourtfortheSouthernDistrictofIllinois.

02cv1059DRH

DavidR.Herndon,

ChiefJudge.

ORDER

CedricDupree,anIllinoisinmate,suedemployeesoftheIllinoisDepartmentof

Correctionsunder42U.S.C.§1983,claimingthattheyhadinterferedwithhisrightto

practicehisreligioninviolationoftheFirstAmendmentandtheReligiousLandUseand

InstitutionalizedPersonsAct(“RLUIPA”),42U.S.C.§§2000cc—cc5.Thedistrictcourt

initiallydismissedthecomplaintatscreening,andweremanded,concludingthatDupree’s

complaintsufficientlystatedclaimsundertheFirstAmendmentandRLUIPA.Dupreev.

NONPRECEDENTIALDISPOSITION

Tobecitedonlyinaccordancewith

Fed.R.App.P.32.1
No.091035 Page2

Laster,106F.App’x503(7thCir.2004).Onremandthedistrictcourtrecruitedcounselto

representDupreeand,afterathreedayjurytrial,enteredjudgmentinfavorofthe

defendants.Dupreeappeals,butbecausehehasfailedtoprovideuswithatrialtranscript,

weareunabletoconsidermanyofhisarguments.See FED. R. APP. P.10(b)(2).Ofthosethat

weareabletoreview,nonehasmerit,andweaffirmthejudgmentofthedistrictcourt.

DupreetriedhisFirstAmendmentandRLUIPAclaimsbeforeajuryandfocusedon

threeincidents.Heclaimedthatthedefendantsviolatedhisrighttoreligiousexercisewhen

theysuspendedhimfromattendinggroupchurchserviceswhileinsegregation,andwhen

theydisciplinedhimforhavingaBibleinthe“chowhall”andforgatheringinmatesfor

prayerinthedietaryunit.Afterthejuryreturnedaverdictforthedefendants,Dupreefiled

proseamotionforanewtrialortosetasidethejuryverdictandthreesupplemental

motionsforanewtrial.Thedistrictcourttreatedthefirstthreeofhisfilingsasmotionsfor

anewtrialunderRule59(a)andhislastfilingasaRule60(b)motionforrelieffrom

judgment;thecourtdeniedeach.SeeFED. R. CIV. P.59(a);FED. R. CIV. P.60(b).Dupree’s

attorneymovedtowithdraw,citingDupree’sclaimthathehadreceivedineffective

assistanceofcounselduringthetrial.Thedistrictcourtgrantedcounsel’srequestandlater

deniedDupree’smotionforreappointmentofcounsel.

OnappealDupreechallengesthedistrictcourt’sdenialofhisposttrialmotions.His

mostsubstantiveargumentsforanewtrialarethatthedistrictcourterredinallowingthe

defendantstointroduceevidenceofhispriorconvictionsandprisondiscipline,

misinstructingthejuryastotheburdensofproofforestablishingaviolationunder

RLUIPA,andnotoverturningthejury’sverdictdenyinghisclaimthatthedefendants

prohibitedhimfromattendinggroupworship.Dupreealsoassertsthatthecourtignored

hiscomplaintsthathewasnotallowedtobringhislegaldocumentstocourt,thatonone

occasionthejurysawhiminshacklesasheexitedthecourtroom,andthathewasnot

allowedtopresentevidencethatduringthetrialprisonemployeesbeathiminretaliation

forhislawsuit.Eachofthesepurportederrors,Dupreecontends,prejudicedhiscaseand

warrantsanewtrial.

Ordinarilyourreviewofadistrictcourt’sdenialofamotionforanewtrialisforan

abuseofdiscretion.Mooreexrel.EstateofGradyv.Tuleja,546F.3d423,427(7thCir.2008).A

newtrialmaybegrantedonlyifthejury’sverdictisagainstthemanifestweightofthe

evidence,meaning“norationaljury”couldhaverenderedtheverdict.Id.(quotingKingv.

Harrington,447F.3d531,534(7thCir.2006)).Attheoutset,wenotethatDupreehasnot

specifiedwhathispriorconvictionsorprisondisciplinewerefor,andthuswecannot

evaluatehisclaimthatthedistrictcourtshouldhaveexcludedthemattrial.Moreover,we

areunabletodeterminewhethertheverdictisagainstthemanifestweightoftheevidence

orwhetherthepurportederrorsprejudicedDupreebecausehehasnotincludedatrial
No.091035 Page3

transcriptintherecord.Withoutthetranscript,weareunabletoverifyhisclaimsor

conductanymeaningfulappellatereviewofhisargumentsforanewtrial.SeeLearning

CurveToys,Inc.v.PlayWoodToys,Inc.,342F.3d714,731n.10(7thCir.2003);LaFollettev.

Savage,63F.3d540,544(7thCir.1995).FederalRuleofAppellateProcedure10(b)(2)

providesthat“[i]ftheappellantintendstourgeonappealthatafindingorconclusionis

unsupportedbytheevidenceoriscontrarytotheevidence,theappellantmustincludein

therecordatranscriptofallevidencerelevanttothatfindingorconclusion.”FED. R. APP. P.

10(b)(2);seeLearningCurveToys,Inc.,342F.3dat731n.10.BecauseDupree’sarguments

requireustoevaluatethetrialevidenceaswellasstepstakenbythedistrictcourtto

minimizeanyprejudice,hisfailuretoprovidethetranscriptrendersthearguments

forfeited.SeeLearningCurveToys,Inc.,342F.3dat731n.10.Dupree’sprosestatusdoesnot

prohibitthisresult.SeeWoodsv.Thieret,5F.3d244,245(7thCir.1993)(dismissinginpart

theappealofproseplaintiffforfailuretoprovidetranscript).

WecouldorderDupreetosupplementtherecordasauthorizedunderFederalRule

ofAppellateProcedure10(e),see LaFollette,63F.3dat545,butwedeclinetodosohere.In

theirresponsebrief,theappelleesgaveDupreenoticeofhisobligationtohavethetranscript

preparedandtheconsequencesofhisfailuretodoso.Despitethisnotice,Dupreehasmade

noattempttosecureatranscript.SeeLearningCurveToys,Inc.,342F.3dat731n.10;

LaFollette,63F.3dat54546.

Wecan,however,addressafewofDupree’sargumentsontheirface.Dupree

complainsthathisrecruitedcounselwasineffectiveinfailingtoserveoneofthedefendants

who,Dupreecontends,couldhavetestifiedtosupporthisclaims.Butasthedistrictcourt

correctlyexplainedwhenitdeniedhisRule59(a)motion,thereisnoSixthAmendment

righttoeffectiveassistanceofcounselinacivilcase,sohisdissatisfactionwithcounsel’s

performancedoesnotwarrantanewtrial.SeeStancielv.Gramley,267F.3d575,581(7thCir.

2001).

Dupreealsocontendsthatafterthiscourt’sremand,thecaseshouldhavebeen

reassignedtoanewdistrictjudge.Inhisthirdsupplementalmotionforanewtrial,he

relieduponSupremeCourtRule36inarguingthathewasentitleduponremandtoa

changeofvenueandhenceanewjudge.SupremeCourtRule36,however,governsthe

custodyofprisonersinhabeascorpusproceedings,andthedistrictcourtcorrectlynoted

thattheruledoesnotapplytoDupree’scase.ThecourtthusdeniedDupree’smotion,

whichitconstruedasaRule60(b)motionforrelieffromjudgmentbecauseitwasfiledmore

thantendaysaftertheentryofjudgment.SeeFED. R. CIV. P. 59(b)(2008)(amendedDec.1,

2009);FED. R. CIV. P. 60(b);Talanov.Nw.Med.FacultyFound.,Inc.,273F.3d757,762(7thCir.

2001).PerhapsDupreeintendedtorelyonourCircuitRule36,whichprovidesthat

“[w]heneveracasetriedinadistrictcourtisremandedbythiscourtforanewtrial,itshall
No.091035 Page4

bereassignedbythedistrictcourtfortrialbeforeajudgeotherthanthejudgewhoheard

thepriortrial....”ButDupree’scasehadbeendismisseduponscreening,see28U.S.C.

§1915A(b)(1),andremandedforfurtherproceedings.“Ordersdirectingthedistrictcourtto

undertakefurtherproceedingsareroutinelyheardbythedistrictjudgewhoenteredthe

orderthatwasthesubjectoftheappeal,”andCircuitRule36doesnotrequirereassignment.

InreUnitedStates,572F.3d301,305n.3(7thCir.2009).Dupreefurtherassertsthat

reassignmentwasnecessarybecausethejudge’spriordismissalofthecomplaint

demonstratedhisprejudiceagainstthecase.Judicialrulings,however,rarelypresenta

validbasistoquestionajudge’simpartiality,Litekyv.UnitedStates,510U.S.540,555(1994),

andDupreehaspresentednoreasonwhythejudgecouldnotfairlyruleinhiscase

followingremand,seeCollinsv.Illinois,554F.3d693,697(7thCir.2009);seealsoLiteky,510

U.S.at551(“Ithaslongbeenregardedasnormalandproperforajudgetositinthesame

caseuponitsremand,andtositinsuccessivetrialsinvolvingthesamedefendant.”).

Finally,thedistrictcourtdidnotabuseitsdiscretionindenyingDupree’sposttrial

requestforreappointmentofcounsel.Thecourtappliedthecorrectlegalstandardand

baseditsdecisiononfactssupportedbytherecord.SeeSantiagov.Walls,599F.3d749,760

61(7thCir.2010);Pruittv.Mote,503F.3d647,658(7thCir.2007)(enbanc).Thecourt

consideredDupree’sargumentsregardingthecomplexityofhisclaimsandhisexperience

withmentalillness,butnotedthatDupreehadbeenabletoadequatelyfiletwoprosepost

trialmotions.ThecourtaddedthatDupreehadfoundfaultwitheachofthefourlawyers

recruitedtoassisthimandhadsimplybeenunabletomaintainanattorneyclient

relationship.Underthesecircumstances,weconcludethatthecourt’sdecisiontodenythe

reappointmentofcounselwasreasonable.SeePruitt,503F.3dat65859.

Accordingly,weAFFIRMthejudgmentofthedistrictcourt.