IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

No. 17-30374

Summary Calendar 

KATHERYN SWENSON, 

 Plaintiff - Appellant 

v. 

UNITED OF OMAHA LIFE INSURANCE COMPANY, 

 Defendant - Appellee 

Appeal from the United States District Court 

for the Western District of Louisiana 

Before DAVIS, CLEMENT, and COSTA, Circuit Judges. 

GREGG COSTA, Circuit Judge:

Katheryn Swenson filed suit in Louisiana state court seeking benefits 

from a life insurance policy after her husband passed away. The insurance 

company refused to pay based on its belief that Swenson’s husband was not a 

covered employee at the time of his death. In seeking to recover the death 

benefits, Swenson cited Louisiana statutes imposing certain requirements on 

group life policies concerning the rights of a discharged employee to convert 

the employer-provided policy into individual life insurance. La. R.S. 22:942(7), 

(10). Although Swenson alleged only state law claims, the insurer removed the 

matter to federal court arguing it was completely preempted by the Employee 

United States Court of Appeals

Fif h Circuit

FILED

December 4, 2017

Lyle W. Cayce

Clerk

 Case: 17-30374 Document: 00514259575 Page: 1 Date Filed: 12/04/2017
No. 17-30374

2

Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA). After the case was removed, 

Swenson added a claim for equitable relief under ERISA. 

The district court dismissed Swenson’s claims on various grounds. It 

held that ERISA preempted the state law claims, so it dismissed them with 

prejudice. Because of this finding of complete preemption, the district court 

construed the complaint as seeking recovery of benefits from an ERISA plan. 

But that claim was dismissed without prejudice for failure to exhaust 

administrative remedies (Swenson has since commenced the ERISA 

administrative process). As to the claim for equitable relief under ERISA, the 

court dismissed it with prejudice on the ground that equitable relief is not 

available when ERISA provides an adequate legal remedy such as the 

provision allowing judicial review of benefit denials (29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(1)). 

On appeal, Swenson challenges only the preemption ruling and denial of 

her claim for equitable relief. We review de novo these dismissals that occurred 

at the pleading stage. N. Cypress Med. Ctr. Operating Co. v. Cigna Healthcare, 

781 F.3d 182, 191 (5th Cir. 2015).

Swenson does not dispute that the life insurance policy under which she 

seeks to recover is an ERISA plan. For such plans, federal law provides the 

sole avenue for seeking to recover benefits. This congressional intent to have 

ERISA completely occupy the field converts Swenson’s state law claims seeking 

to recover policy benefits into a federal claim under section 502 of ERISA (29 

U.S.C. § 1132(a)(1)(B)). Arana v. Ochsner Health Plan, 338 F.3d 433, 440 (5th 

Cir. 2003) (en banc) (citing Metro. Life Ins. Co. v. Taylor, 481 U.S. 58, 66 

(1987)). 

Swenson attempts to avoid this complete preemption by invoking 

ERISA’s savings clause, which provides that “[e]xcept as provided in 

subparagraph (B), nothing in this subchapter shall be construed to exempt or 

relieve any person from any law of any State which regulates insurance, 

 Case: 17-30374 Document: 00514259575 Page: 2 Date Filed: 12/04/2017
No. 17-30374

3

banking, or securities.” 29 U.S.C. § 1144(b)(2)(A). Swenson emphasizes that 

the cited exception to the savings clause, id. § 1144(b)(2)(B), itself excludes 

from its carve out a “plan established primarily for the purpose of providing 

death benefits.” This means, according to Swenson, that the Louisiana 

statutes she cites in seeking to recover death benefits are within the scope of 

the savings clause and not preempted. 

The problem for Swenson is that the savings clause does not allow state 

law claims seeking recovery of ERISA benefits to escape preemption. Quality 

Infusion Care Inc. v. Humana Health Plan of Texas Inc., 290 F. App'x 671, 681–

82 (5th Cir. 2008) (citing Aetna Health Inc. v. Davila, 542 U.S. 200, 217–18

(2004)); see also Prudential Ins. Co. of Am. v. Nat'l Park Med. Ctr., Inc., 413 

F.3d 897, 913–14 (8th Cir. 2005) (explaining that even a state law saved from 

preemption by the savings clause is itself preempted “if it provides a separate 

vehicle to assert a claim for benefits outside” of section 502 of ERISA). It only 

saves certain state laws from conflict preemption, which is a federal defense 

that can be asserted when a federal law conflicts with a state law. Quality 

Infusion, 290 F. App’x. at 681–82. In other words, although the savings clause 

preserves a role for certain state laws that regulate insurance, 1 state claims 

that provide a separate vehicle for seeking benefits from an ERISA plan 

 

1 Kentucky Association of Health Plans, Inc. v. Miller, 538 U.S. 329 (2003), provides 

an example of how the savings clause protects certain state laws from conflict preemption. 

Health maintenance organizations sought a declaratory judgment that ERISA preempted a

state “Any Willing Provider” law that prohibited health insurers from excluding qualified 

doctors from their provider networks. The Supreme Court rejected the preemption defense

because the Kentucky law regulated insurance and thus was within the scope of the savings 

clause. Id. at 334–42. Miller did not involve complete preemption as it was not a case brought 

to recover ERISA plan benefits. The same is true of other Supreme Court cases applying the 

savings clause. See, e.g., Rush Prudential HMO, Inc. v. Moran, 536 U.S. 355 (2002) (holding 

that savings clause allowed Illinois to enforce law requiring independent medical review of 

certain denials of medical benefits); UNUM Life Insur. Co. v. Ward, 526 U.S. 358 (1999) 

(holding that savings clause allowed California to enforce a law limiting the defense that an 

insured provided untimely notice of a claim to situations when the insurer could show that 

the delay resulted in prejudice). 

 Case: 17-30374 Document: 00514259575 Page: 3 Date Filed: 12/04/2017
No. 17-30374

4

remain preempted as such claims must be brought under ERISA's civil 

enforcement provision (section 502). Otherwise the exclusivity and uniformity 

of that federal remedy would be undermined. Davila, 542 U.S. at 217–18

(“ERISA § 514(b)(2)(A) must be interpreted in light of the congressional intent 

to create an exclusive federal remedy in ERISA § 502(a).”). That is not to say 

that, when challenging the lawfulness of the denial of ERISA benefits, a 

beneficiary cannot argue that the administrator failed to comply with 

applicable laws including any state laws that retain force because of the 

savings clause. But that must be done in the context of ERISA’s civil 

enforcement provision, a claim that was not ripe when Swenson filed this suit 

because she had not engaged in the administrative review process. Because 

Swenson’s claim for benefits must be brought under federal law, the district 

court correctly dismissed her state law claims seeking the same relief.

The availability of that statutory remedy under section 502 of ERISA 

also defeats Swenson’s claim for equitable relief under federal law. Equitable 

relief under ERISA is normally unavailable “where Congress elsewhere 

provided adequate relief for a beneficiary's injury.” Varity Corp. v. Howe, 516 

U.S. 489, 515 (1996). Because ERISA’s civil enforcement provision provides a 

direct mechanism to address the injury for which Swenson seeks equitable 

relief, she cannot assert a separate ERISA claim for breach of fiduciary duty. 

Tolson v. Avondale Indus., Inc., 141 F.3d 604, 610 (5th Cir. 1998).

The judgment of the district court is AFFIRMED.

 Case: 17-30374 Document: 00514259575 Page: 4 Date Filed: 12/04/2017