NOT PRECEDENTIAL

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT

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No. 17-2647

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UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

v.

EDWARD JACKSON, aka QUILL,

Appellant

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On Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania

(D.C. Civil Action No. 2-11-cr-00434-060)

District Judge: Hon. Berle M. Schiller

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Argued Tuesday, January 14, 2020

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Before: HARDIMAN, PORTER, and PHIPPS,

Circuit Judges

(Filed: February 4, 2020)

Rachel A.H. Horton [Argued]

Ilana H. Eisenstein

DLA Piper

1650 Market Street

One Liberty Place, Suite 5000

Philadelphia, PA 19103

Bruce P. Merenstein

Schnader Harrison Segal & Lewis LLP

1600 Market Street, Suite 3600

Philadelphia, PA 19103
2

Counsel for Appellant

William M. McSwain, United States Attorney

Robert A. Zauzmer, Chief of Appeals 

Emily McKillip [Argued]

Bernadette A. McKeon

Michelle Rotella

Nancy B. Winter

Office of the United States Attorney

615 Chestnut Street

Suite 1250

Philadelphia, PA 19106

Counsel for Appellee 

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OPINION∗

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PORTER, Circuit Judge.

Edward Jackson pleaded guilty to one count of conspiracy to distribute 

oxycodone. Jackson later petitioned the District Court to vacate, set aside, or correct his 

sentence under 28 U.S.C. § 2255. A Magistrate Judge issued a Report and 

Recommendation, recommending that the District Court deny Jackson’s motion. After 

the deadline for Jackson to submit his objections to the Report and Recommendation, the 

District Court entered a final order adopting the Report and Recommendation and 

denying Jackson’s motion. More than sixty days later, Jackson appealed.

 ∗ This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not 

constitute binding precedent.
3

As a threshold matter, we must decide whether Jackson’s notice of appeal was 

timely. It was not. And because filing a timely notice of appeal is a jurisdictional 

question, we will dismiss Jackson’s appeal for want of jurisdiction. 

I

Jackson participated in a drug conspiracy. He pleaded guilty and was sentenced to 

240 months’ imprisonment. He directly appealed, but we affirmed his conviction. United 

States v. Jackson, 579 F. App’x 134, 136 (3d Cir. 2014). In 2015, Jackson filed a motion 

to vacate, set aside, or correct his sentence under § 2255. On April 17, 2017, the 

Magistrate Judge issued a Report and Recommendation, recommending that the District 

Court deny Jackson’s § 2255 motion. An accompanying notice alerted the parties that 

they could file objections to the Report and Recommendation within fourteen days. 

From prison on May 1, 2017, Jackson timely submitted his pro se objections to be 

transmitted to the District Court, but they were not docketed until May 8, 2017. On May 

3, 2017, the District Court entered an order (the “First Order”) adopting the Report and 

Recommendation, denying the § 2255 motion, and declining to grant a certificate of 

appealability. On July 14, 2017, Jackson mailed his request for a certificate of 

appealability, which we construed as a notice of appeal.1 On October 20, 2017, the 

District Court responded to Jackson’s objections to the Report and Recommendation by 

 1 Jackson contends that he filed an earlier notice of appeal, but he concedes that there is 

no evidence that we ever received or docketed it. See Appellant’s Br. at 13. And while he 

claims that a search of the prison mail log would support his contention, see id., he does 

not explain why an evidentiary hearing is necessary for him to conduct this search.
4

entering a second order (the “Second Order”) that again adopted the Report and 

Recommendation and denied Jackson’s § 2255 motion. 

II2

We must first decide whether we have jurisdiction to consider Jackson’s appeal. 

Because a § 2255 motion is considered a civil remedy, see United States v. Fiorelli, 337 

F.3d 282, 286 (3d Cir. 2003), whether Jackson’s appeal was timely filed is a 

jurisdictional question, see Bowles v. Russell, 551 U.S. 205, 209–11 (2007). A notice of 

appeal in a civil action in which the United States is a party is timely when it is filed 

within 60 days of the entry of an appealable order or a final judgment. Fed. R. App. P. 

4(a)(1)(B).

In the First Order, the District Court adopted the Report and Recommendation and 

denied Jackson’s § 2255 motion. The First Order was final because it “end[ed] the 

litigation on the merits and [left] nothing for the court to do but execute the judgment.” 

Quackenbush v. Allstate Ins. Co., 517 U.S. 706, 712 (1996) (quoting Catlin v. United 

States, 324 U.S. 229, 233 (1945)); cf. Browder v. Dir., Dep’t of Corr., 434 U.S. 257, 266

(1978) (“Respondent’s failure to assert the need for an evidentiary hearing . . . did not . . . 

render the [d]istrict [c]ourt order nonfinal.” (emphasis added)). And Jackson conceded as 

much. See Appellant’s Br. at 24 (“Here, the District Court’s first order denied habeas 

relief on May 3, 2017, and, therefore, that order had the finality required under FirsTier 

 2 The District Court had jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331, 2255. “We have 

jurisdiction to review our own jurisdiction when it is in doubt[.]” LeBoon v. Lancaster 

Jewish Cmty. Ctr. Ass’n, 503 F.3d 217, 222 (3d Cir. 2007) (citing Constitution Bank v. 

Tubbs, 68 F.3d 685, 691 (3d Cir. 1995)).
5

Mortgage.” (emphasis added)). The record shows that Jackson delivered his request for a 

certificate of appealability—which we construed as his notice of appeal—to prison 

authorities for mailing more than sixty days later, on July 14, 2017. Because Jackson 

missed the sixty-day deadline to appeal, we lack jurisdiction over his appeal.

Jacksons raises two alternative theories under which we might exercise 

jurisdiction. First, he contends that his objections to the Report and Recommendation 

should be construed as a motion to amend the District Court’s judgment under Federal 

Rule of Civil Procedure 59(e). Second, he asserts that Jackson’s notice of appeal 

“ripened” when the District Court entered the Second Order. We are unpersuaded and 

still conclude that we lack jurisdiction.

A

Jackson first tries to save his untimely appeal by inviting us to construe his 

objections to the Report and Recommendation as a motion to amend the judgment under 

Rule 59(e). If we interpret Jackson’s objections as a Rule 59(e) motion, then the deadline 

to file his appeal would have been tolled until the District Court resolved the motion. See 

Fed. R. App. P. 4(a)(4)(A)(iv), (B)(i). According to Jackson, construing his objections as 

a Rule 59(e) motion would render his notice of appeal timely because the deadline for his 

notice would have been tolled until the District Court entered the Second Order in 

October 2017.

We decline Jackson’s invitation to construe his objections to the Report and 

Recommendation as a Rule 59(e) motion. At the outset, we observe that objections to a 

report and recommendation and a Rule 59(e) motion are fundamentally different. 
6

Objections respond to a magistrate judge’s recommendation to a district court on how to 

resolve a dispositive motion. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b)(2) (governing objections filed to 

recommendations made by magistrate judges on dispositive motions); cf. Equal Emp’t 

Opportunity Comm’n v. City of Long Branch, 866 F.3d 93, 99–100 (3d Cir. 2017). 

Relevant here, a magistrate judge reviewing “applications for posttrial relief made by 

individuals convicted of criminal offenses” is authorized by statute to provide only

recommendations to a district court. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B) (“a [district] judge may 

also designate a magistrate judge . . . to submit . . . proposed findings of fact and 

recommendations for the disposition, by a judge of the court[ ]”). The plain meaning of 

§ 636(b)(1)(B) permits a magistrate judge to make a recommendation on an application 

for post-conviction relief—not rule on an application outright.

By contrast, Rule 59(e) motions respond to judgments entered by district courts.

Cf. In re Vehicle Carrier Servs. Antitrust Litig., 846 F.3d 71, 87 (3d Cir. 2017) as 

amended (Jan. 25, 2017). This is confirmed by the plain text of Rule 59(e), which

explicitly contemplates “alter[ing] or amend[ing] a judgment.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 59(e)

(emphasis added). We have also said that “[a] motion under Rule 59(e) is a device to 

relitigate the original issue decided by the district court, and used to allege legal error.” 

Fiorelli, 337 F.3d at 288 (emphasis added) (internal quotation marks and citation 

omitted). 

In short, objections and Rule 59(e) motions differ because they respond to 

different statements by courts: objections respond to magistrate judges’ recommendations 
7

to district courts, while Rule 59(e) motions respond to final decisions by district courts. 

Compare City of Long Branch, 866 F.3d at 99–100, with Fiorelli, 337 F.3d at 288.

Here, Jackson filed objections to the Report and Recommendation. He titled his 

filing as “Petitioner’s Objections to the Report and Recommendation,” JA234, and, in 

that filing, he “respectfully object[ed] to the [Report and Recommendation] filed by [the] 

Magistrate Judge . . . and urge[d] the District Court to independently review the grounds 

raised by [him].” JA239 (emphasis added). In form and substance, Jackson’s filing raised 

objections to the Report and Recommendation but did not purport to challenge any 

judgment of the District Court. Because we construe a pro se motion based on its 

“function . . . and not the caption,” see Fiorelli, 337 F.3d at 288, we must read Jackson’s 

objections as just that: objections to the Report and Recommendation.

And perhaps more importantly, we will not read Jackson’s objections as a Rule 

59(e) motion because doing so would imply that the Magistrate Judge could have 

resolved an application for post-conviction relief. If Jackson’s objections were considered 

a Rule 59(e) motion, then we would be treating the Magistrate Judge’s Report and 

Recommendation as a final judgment. But by statute, magistrate judges are not authorized 

to enter final judgments on applications for post-conviction relief; they are permitted only 

to recommend outcomes to district courts. See § 636(b)(1)(B). We decline to defy the 

plain meaning of a validly enacted statute by construing Jackson’s objections as a Rule 

59(e) motion.

Lastly, as a matter of temporal logic, a Rule 59(e) motion may not be submitted 

before a district court has announced its decision. In other words, Jackson could not have 
8

filed a Rule 59(e) motion until after the District Court announced the First Order. But 

here, Jackson submitted his objections to the Report and Recommendation before the 

District Court announced or entered the First Order. We will not construe his objections 

to the Report and Recommendation as a motion to amend a then-yet-to-be-announced

order. Cf. United States v. Hashagen, 816 F.2d 899, 904 (3d Cir. 1987) (“[I]t hardly 

would do to permit a party to file a general notice of appeal at the start of the action as a 

precaution . . . .”).

In sum, we will not indulge Jackson’s request to construe his objections to the 

Report and Recommendation as a Rule 59(e) motion to amend a then-unannounced

order.3

B

Next, Jackson argues that his request for a certificate of appealability—which we 

construed as a notice of appeal—“ripened” after the District Court entered the Second 

Order. Under this theory, Jackson’s notice of appeal was premature because the Second 

Order was issued after he filed it. To support his argument, Jackson relies on two cases—

FirsTier Mortgage Co. v. Investors Mortgage Insurance Co., 498 U.S. 269 (1991), and 

Lazy Oil Co. v. Witco Corp., 166 F.3d 581 (3d Cir. 1999). 

 3 Jackson insists that Fiorelli requires us to construe his objections as a Rule 59(e) 

motion. Jackson is wrong. There, we construed a Rule 60(b) motion as a Rule 59(e) 

motion. See Fiorelli, 337 F.3d at 287–88. In doing so, we observed that “motions for 

reconsideration under Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 59(e) and 60(b) serve similar 

functions[.]” Id. at 288. Here, as we explained above, Rule 59(e) motions and objections 

to magistrate judges’ recommendations do not serve similar functions. Thus, Fiorelli 

does not control. 
9

We are unpersuaded that either FirsTier or Lazy Oil supports Jackson’s argument. 

In FirsTier, the appellant filed a notice of appeal after the district court issued a bench 

ruling but before it entered judgment. 498 U.S. at 272. Because the bench ruling 

constitued a “final decision” for purposes of the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure, 

the appellant acted reasonably by filing its notice of appeal after the bench ruling but 

before the judgment was entered. Id. at 277. Here, the First Order was a final appealable 

order. See Quackenbush, 517 U.S. at 712. Jackson filed his appeal from that final order 

beyond the deadlines in Rule 4(a)(1)(B). In short, Jackson’s appeal was not premature—it 

was late. FirsTier is therefore distinguishable from Jackson’s appeal.

Lazy Oil also provides little support to Jackson’s argument. Lazy Oil is one of 

several cases that stand for the proposition that under certain circumstances, “a premature 

notice of appeal, filed after disposition of some of the claims before a district court, but 

before entry of final judgment, will ripen upon the [district] court’s disposal of the 

remaining claims.” 166 F.3d at 585 (emphasis added) (citing Cape May Greene, Inc. v. 

Warren, 698 F.2d 179, 184–85 (3d Cir. 1983)). But here, the District Court’s First Order 

resolved all of Jackson’s claims. In the First Order, the District Court adopted the Report 

and Recommendation, denied Jackson’s § 2255 motion in its entirety, and declined to 

issue a certificate of appealability. And Jackson conceded that the First Order is a final

one. See Appellant’s Br. at 24. Thus, Lazy Oil is also distinguishable from Jackson’s 

case. 

Accordingly, we reject Jackson’s argument that his untimely notice of appeal 

“ripened” upon the District Court’s entry of the Second Order. 
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* * *

Jackson did not file a timely notice of appeal, so we will dismiss for lack of 

jurisdiction.