# C_2010165EN.01000101.xml

| 24.6.2010 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | C 165/1 |
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24.6.2010

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 165/1

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COUNCIL RESOLUTION

of 3 June 2010

concerning an updated handbook with recommendations for international police cooperation and measures to prevent and control violence and disturbances in connection with football matches with an international dimension, in which at least one Member State is involved

2010/C 165/01

THE COUNCIL OF THE EUROPEAN UNION,

Whereas:

| (1) | The European Union's objective is, inter alia, to provide citizens with a high level of safety within an area of freedom, security and justice by developing common action among the Member States in the field of police mutatis mutandis in connection with other international cooperation as laid down under Title V of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union. |
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(1)

The European Union's objective is, inter alia, to provide citizens with a high level of safety within an area of freedom, security and justice by developing common action among the Member States in the field of police mutatis mutandis in connection with other international cooperation as laid down under Title V of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union.

| (2) | On 21 June 1999 the Council adopted a Resolution concerning a handbook for international police cooperation and measures to prevent and control violence disturbances in connection with international football matches (1). |
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(2)

On 21 June 1999 the Council adopted a Resolution concerning a handbook for international police cooperation and measures to prevent and control violence disturbances in connection with international football matches (1).

1

| (3) | This Resolution was first replaced by the Council Resolution of 6 December 2001 and later on by the Council Resolution of 4 December 2006 concerning a handbook with recommendations for international police cooperation and measures to prevent and control violence and disturbances in connection with football matches with an international dimension, in which at least one Member State is involved (2). |
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(3)

This Resolution was first replaced by the Council Resolution of 6 December 2001 and later on by the Council Resolution of 4 December 2006 concerning a handbook with recommendations for international police cooperation and measures to prevent and control violence and disturbances in connection with football matches with an international dimension, in which at least one Member State is involved (2).

2

| (4) | The current Resolution suggests that amendments to the handbook be proposed in the light of recent experience. |
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(4)

The current Resolution suggests that amendments to the handbook be proposed in the light of recent experience.

| (5) | Taking into account experience in recent years, such as the World Cup 2006 and the European Championships in 2008 and the experts' assessment of international police cooperation in the framework of those tournaments as well as extensive police cooperation in respect of international and club matches in Europe generally and comparable developments and experiences in respect of other sporting events with an international dimension, the handbook annexed to the aforementioned resolution of 4 December 2006 has been revised and updated. |
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(5)

Taking into account experience in recent years, such as the World Cup 2006 and the European Championships in 2008 and the experts' assessment of international police cooperation in the framework of those tournaments as well as extensive police cooperation in respect of international and club matches in Europe generally and comparable developments and experiences in respect of other sporting events with an international dimension, the handbook annexed to the aforementioned resolution of 4 December 2006 has been revised and updated.

| (6) | The changes included in the annexed updated handbook are without prejudice to existing national provisions, in particular the divisions and responsibilities among the different authorities and services in the Member States concerned, and to the exercise by the Commission of its powers under the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, |
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(6)

The changes included in the annexed updated handbook are without prejudice to existing national provisions, in particular the divisions and responsibilities among the different authorities and services in the Member States concerned, and to the exercise by the Commission of its powers under the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union,

HEREBY ADOPTS THIS RESOLUTION:

| (1) | The Council requests Member States to continue to further enhance police cooperation in respect of football matches (and, where appropriate, other sporting events) with an international dimension. |
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(1)

The Council requests Member States to continue to further enhance police cooperation in respect of football matches (and, where appropriate, other sporting events) with an international dimension.

| (2) | To that end, the updated handbook annexed hereto provides examples of strongly recommended working methods that should be made available to the police. |
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(2)

To that end, the updated handbook annexed hereto provides examples of strongly recommended working methods that should be made available to the police.

| (3) | This Resolution replaces the Council Resolution of 4 December 2006. |
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(3)

This Resolution replaces the Council Resolution of 4 December 2006.

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(1)  OJ C 196, 13.7.1999, p. 1.

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(2)  OJ C 322, 29.12.2006, p. 1-39.

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ANNEX

Handbook with recommendations for international police cooperation and measures to prevent and control violence and disturbances in connection with football matches with an international dimension, in which at least one Member State is involved

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Introduction - Basic Principles

| 1. | Information management by the police |
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1.

| 2. | Event related preparations by the police |
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2.

| 3. | Cooperation between police forces during the event |
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3.

| 4. | Cooperation between police and the organiser |
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4.

| 5. | Co-operation between police and criminal justice and prosecuting agencies |
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5.

| 6. | Co-operation between police and supporters |
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6.

| 7. | Communication and media strategy |
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7.

| 8. | EU Football Expert meeting |
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8.

| 9. | List of relevant documents on safety and security at football matches |
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9.

Appendices

| 1. | Dynamic Risk Assessment & Crowd Management |
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1.

| 2. | Timeframe for requesting Europol products and services |
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2.

| 3. | Specifications for and sample of Police Identification Vest |
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3.

| 4. | Categorisation of Football Supporters |
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4.

INTRODUCTION: BASIC PRINCIPLES

The purpose of this document is to enhance safety and security at football matches with an international dimension, and in particular to maximise the effectiveness of international police cooperation.

The content, where appropriate, can also apply to other sporting events with an international dimension.

The content is without prejudice to existing national provisions, in particular the competencies and responsibilities of the different agencies within each Member State.

Although this document is mainly focused on international police cooperation, in view of the multi-agency character of managing football (and other sporting events), there are references to police interaction with other key partners such as the event organiser.

International police cooperation and football policing operations must be guided by the principles of legality and proportionality. Examples of good practice are detailed at Appendix 1.

Whilst the competent authority in the organising Member State is responsible for providing a safe and secure event, authorities in participating, neighbouring and transit states have a responsibility to assist where appropriate.

This document should be widely disseminated and applied in each Member State and other European countries and beyond in order to minimise safety and security risks and ensure effective international police cooperation.

CHAPTER 1

Information management by the police

SECTION 1

Certain criteria that could be met with regard to the management of information

I.   INTRODUCTION

The timely exchange of accurate information is of the utmost importance in enhancing safety and security and preventing football-related violence and disorder.

In accordance with Council Decision 2002/348/JHA, each Member State must establish a National Football Information Point (NFIP) to act as the central and sole contact point for the exchange of relevant information for football matches with an international dimension, and for developing international police cooperation concerning football matches.

Where there is direct contact between organising and visiting police, any information exchanged shall be shared simultaneously with the relevant NFIPs. Such contact shall not jeopardise the key role of the NFIP in ensuring the quality of the information and wider dissemination to other relevant partners and authorities.

The relationship between the NFIP and the competent national authorities shall be subject to the applicable national laws.

In accordance with Council Decision 2002/348/JHA, each Member State shall ensure:

| — | The NFIP is able to perform its tasks efficiently and to a satisfactory standard; |
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The NFIP is able to perform its tasks efficiently and to a satisfactory standard;

| — | The NFIP shall be equipped with the necessary technical facilities to perform its tasks efficiently and swiftly; |
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The NFIP shall be equipped with the necessary technical facilities to perform its tasks efficiently and swiftly;

| — | NFIP personnel are trained and equipped to provide a national source of expertise regarding football policing and associated safety and security matters. |
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NFIP personnel are trained and equipped to provide a national source of expertise regarding football policing and associated safety and security matters.

NFIPs shall work on the basis of equivalence.

II.   TASKS WITH AN INTERNATIONAL DIMENSION

The NFIP shall support the competent national authorities. On the basis of information that has been analysed and assessed, the necessary proposals or recommendations will be sent to the competent national authorities to assist in developing a multi agency policy on football related issues.

The NFIP shall support local police with regard to national or international football matches.

For the benefit of NFIPs of other countries, each NFIP shall maintain an updated risk-analysis (1) related to its own clubs and its national team. The risk analysis is generally shared with other NFIPs using the forms available on the NFIP website (www.nfip.eu) (2).

Each NFIP shall have access to the relevant national police databases. The exchange of personal information is subject to the applicable national and international law, especially the Prum Council Decision (3) or bi-national or multi lateral agreements.

The NFIP shall ensure that all information is subject to quality control in respect of content.

The NFIP can, if appropriate, extend this exchange of information to other agencies which contribute to safety and security.

All information shall be exchanged using the appropriate forms provided on the NFIP website.

III.   EXCHANGE OF POLICE INFORMATION

1.   Kinds of information

A distinction can be made between general information and personal information. The term ‘event’ is used to mean a specific football match or tournament in all its aspects.

(a)   General information

General information can be divided into three categories:

| — | strategic information: information that defines the event in all its dimensions, with particular attention to safety and security risks associated with the event; |
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strategic information: information that defines the event in all its dimensions, with particular attention to safety and security risks associated with the event;

| — | operational information: information that assists in making an event related analysis of any potential risks; |
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operational information: information that assists in making an event related analysis of any potential risks;

| — | tactical information: information that assists the person in charge at the operational level to respond appropriately to safety and security issues during the event. |
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tactical information: information that assists the person in charge at the operational level to respond appropriately to safety and security issues during the event.

(b)   Personal information

In this context, personal information refers to information on individuals who are assessed as posing a potential risk to public safety in connection with the event. This may include individuals who have previously caused or contributed to violence or disorder in connection with football matches.

2.   Chronological sequence of information exchange

Three phases may be distinguished: before, during and after the event. These three phases need not always be strictly separated.

(a)   Task of the NFIP of the organising country

1.   Before the event

, information requirements are forwarded to the NFIP of the supporting country/countries. This requirement shall include:

| — | a risk analysis of supporters of the visiting team |
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a risk analysis of supporters of the visiting team

| — | other relevant information regarding the safety and security of the event e.g. supporter travel details and political or other threats |
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other relevant information regarding the safety and security of the event e.g. supporter travel details and political or other threats

The NFIP of the organising country shall provide information on the applicable legislation and policy of the authorities (e.g. alcohol policy) the organisation of the event and key safety and security personnel.

All relevant information shall be put at the disposal of the other NFIPs concerned and entered on the NFIP website via the appropriate forms.

, the NFIP of the supporting country / countries shall be requested to provide timely and accurate information regarding the movements of risk and non-risk supporters, the participating team (where there is a threat) and ticket sales, together with any other relevant information.

The NFIP of the organising country shall provide information to the NFIP of the supporting country (countries) in particular regarding the integration of the visiting police delegation into the organising country policing operation and information for visiting supporters, etc.

2.   During the event

, the NFIP of the organising country can request confirmation of the information previously provided and request an updated risk analysis. The request shall be forwarded and answered via a system of liaison officers if such a system has been set up.

, the NFIP of the organising country shall provide feedback on the accuracy of the information provided.

General information regarding the return of supporters including any that have been expelled and/or refused entry shall also be provided to the NFIPs of the country of origin and the relevant transit countries.

3.   After the event

The NFIP of the organising country shall (via the appropriate forms on the NFIP website) provide information to the supporting NFIPs:

| — | regarding the behaviour of supporters so that the risk analysis can be updated by the NFIPs of the country/club they support and/or where they reside; |
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regarding the behaviour of supporters so that the risk analysis can be updated by the NFIPs of the country/club they support and/or where they reside;

| — | concerning the description of any incident. Information regarding arrests or sanctions shall be exchanged in accordance with national and international law; |
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concerning the description of any incident. Information regarding arrests or sanctions shall be exchanged in accordance with national and international law;

| — | on the operational usefulness of the information they have provided and of the support of the visiting police delegation(s) (see Chapter 2). |
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on the operational usefulness of the information they have provided and of the support of the visiting police delegation(s) (see Chapter 2).

(b)   Tasks of the NFIP of the supporting country / countries

1.   Before the event

The NFIP of the supporting country / countries shall respond to the information requirement of the organising country NFIP and, on its own initiative, provide all relevant information to any other NFIPs concerned.

2.   During the event

The information supplied shall be updated and the movements and stay of the supporters shall be monitored. Useful information concerning event related incidents in their home country during the matches or tournaments shall also be provided to the organising country and any other relevant NFIP.

3.   After the event

Based on the information provided by the organising country NFIP and the visiting police delegation the risk analysis shall be updated (see Chapter 2).

An assessment shall be carried out concerning the information exchange and the work of the visiting police delegation.

SECTION 2

Additional guidance on the tasks of NFIPs

At the national level the NFIP shall coordinate the exchange of information regarding football matches and where appropriate, coordinate and organise the training and work of intelligence officers and / or spotters.

NFIPs shall be the channel for the exchange of information with non-EU countries. If these countries do not have an NFIP they should be asked to indicate a central, single contact point. Contact details should be forwarded to other NFIPs and entered on the NFIP website.

At the national level the NFIP shall act as a knowledge centre. In addition to the police, civil servants and academics could contribute to the role of the NFIP as a knowledge centre.

An NFIP can enter into a formal bilateral agreement with a third party regarding the exchange of certain information in accordance with their own national legislation. This information shall not be further shared without the agreement of the originator.

the NFIP of the organising country shall communicate with the NFIP of the supporting country / countries via the designated national liaison officer where appointed.

the NFIP of the organising country shall communicate with the NFIP of the supporting country through the designated liaison officer or Operations Coordinator of the country.

In respect of matters such as counter-terrorism and serious and organised crime the organising country NFIP or the competent police agency shall communicate through any existing network or specialist liaison officers appointed for that purpose.

Europol can, in accordance with its legal mandate, play an important role in supporting the competent authorities of countries organising major international football tournaments, by providing upon request, relevant information and analysis as well as general threat assessments on serious and organized crime and terrorism. In order to facilitate the information exchange, a Europol liaison officer (ELO) may also be stationed on site during the event. (4)

If a local football information centre exists, it shall cooperate with the NFIP. The local information centre and NFIP shall keep one another informed. This information flow should take into account information provided by the visiting police delegation.

CHAPTER 2

Event-related preparations by the police

Visiting Police Delegations

Efficient event preparations by the police in the organising country will be supported by a comprehensive exchange of information, in accordance with the principles which are to be found in chapter 1 of this handbook.

The organising NFIP, following close consultation with their police, should invite a visiting police delegation from countries that can contribute added value. This added value should be considered in the light of a number of factors such as professional experience in managing the behaviour of visiting supporters including risk supporters and the ability to provide the organising police with information designed to minimise risks to public order.

The organising NFIP can also invite police officers who are seeking to gain experience as a member of a visiting police delegation, enabling them to provide added value at football matches involving their supporters in the future.

In accordance with Council Decision 2002/348/JHA, for one-off football matches with an international dimension, the formal invitation for a visiting police delegation shall be transmitted via the NFIP in the organising country, who will receive advice from the police concerned. Taking into account the specific aims of cooperation, the invitation should indicate the composition of the delegation and clarify their roles and responsibilities. It should also specify the intended duration of the visiting police delegation’s time in the organising country.

For international tournaments and one-off matches (should either NFIP request) the formal invitation for a visiting police delegation shall come from the Ministry responsible in the organising country, on the advice of the organising country NFIP, and can be subject to an inter-governmental agreement.

If a visiting police delegation is not invited by the organising NFIP, the NFIP of the sending country can, if deemed appropriate, submit a proactive proposal to the organising NFIP to send a delegation. If the organising NFIP does not accept the proposal, any police delegation that still travels is acting in an unofficial capacity outside of the scope of this handbook.

The detail of the arrangements (e.g. police powers, equipment, uniforms etc.) concerning the visiting police delegation shall be agreed through negotiation between the respective NFIPs, following consultation with the local police for the one-off match. If a bi-national governmental agreement is not in place, these arrangements shall be in compliance with Article 17 of the Council Decision 2008/616/JHA (5) and the national laws applicable.

The visiting delegation must not exceed the number agreed by the organising NFIP and must respect the organising police command and control arrangements. If they act in a manner that is not within the terms of the agreement then they are acting outside of the scope of this handbook and the applicable EU Council Decisions and Treaties.

The detailed invitation for support shall be agreed between NFIPs concerned well in advance of a tournament and/or one-off match to allow the visiting police delegation sufficient preparation time. In that context, an invitation for support should be presented as soon as possible after the announcement of the date of the match.

For one-off matches with an international dimension the visiting police delegation will require at least 3 weeks’ preparation time. If there is less than 3 weeks prior notice of a match (for example in the later stages of a European club competition or due to an increased level of risk) the invitation shall be sent immediately. For international tournaments, the visiting police delegation requires at least 16 weeks’ preparation time.

Financial Arrangements

On each occasion the organising country shall pay for accommodation, meals (or subsistence) and other facilities made available locally whilst the visiting country shall pay for travel and salaries of the delegation members involved. Exceptionally, the respective NFIPs can agree on alternative arrangements. These arrangements need to be clarified in the Protocol for deployment of visiting police delegations, as available on the NFIP-website.

Organising Police Responsibilities

The police in the organising country shall provide an opportunity for key members of the visiting police delegation to acquaint themselves with the organisation of police operations in the organising country and/or the venue town(s) and with the stadium location, and to get to know the operational commander(s) at the venue town(s) on the match day(s).

| — | for international tournaments, this should take place at least one month prior to the tournament (e.g. by hosting workshops or seminars for key members of visiting police delegations). |
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for international tournaments, this should take place at least one month prior to the tournament (e.g. by hosting workshops or seminars for key members of visiting police delegations).

| — | for one off matches with an international dimension this will be on one of the days prior to the match. |
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for one off matches with an international dimension this will be on one of the days prior to the match.

Accompanying Visiting Police Delegations

Ensuring the safety of all members of a visiting police delegation is paramount and shall be reflected in all organising and visiting police risk assessments concerning police deployment.

Visiting members of a police delegation, in particular the Liaison Officer, Operations Co-ordinator and operational police officers (see below) should work alongside local police officers (commonly known as cicerones) who themselves should be serving police officers, preferably with experience of policing football in their own city or country, including familiarity with the venue area and potential risk areas.

Cicerones:

| — | must be integrated into the national / local policing operation and have the ability to relay information enabling operational police commanders to make key decisions; |
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must be integrated into the national / local policing operation and have the ability to relay information enabling operational police commanders to make key decisions;

| — | must have knowledge of their police organisation, processes and command structure; |
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must have knowledge of their police organisation, processes and command structure;

| — | shall not be tasked with monitoring their own risk supporters whilst they are deployed accompanying members of a visiting police delegation; |
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shall not be tasked with monitoring their own risk supporters whilst they are deployed accompanying members of a visiting police delegation;

| — | should be thoroughly briefed on the organising policing operation, their responsibilities, and on the tasks expected of the members of the visiting police delegation; |
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should be thoroughly briefed on the organising policing operation, their responsibilities, and on the tasks expected of the members of the visiting police delegation;

| — | will be responsible for the safety of visiting police delegation and provide a channel of communication with the organising police; |
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will be responsible for the safety of visiting police delegation and provide a channel of communication with the organising police;

| — | should be deployed with the visiting police delegation for the duration of the operation; this will assist in developing an effective working relationship; |
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should be deployed with the visiting police delegation for the duration of the operation; this will assist in developing an effective working relationship;

| — | shall work with the visiting police delegation in a common language agreed beforehand. |
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shall work with the visiting police delegation in a common language agreed beforehand.

Composition and Tasks of the Visiting Police Delegation

The composition of the visiting police delegation shall enable them to support the organising country policing operation for example by:

| 1. | Undertaking and communicating to the organising police an ongoing dynamic risk assessment (see Appendix 1); |
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1.

Undertaking and communicating to the organising police an ongoing dynamic risk assessment (see Appendix 1);

| 2. | Communicating and interacting with visiting supporters; |
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2.

Communicating and interacting with visiting supporters;

| 3. | If allowed in the national legislation of the organising country and subject to the agreement of the organising country intelligence and evidence gathering on behalf of the organising police or for their own purposes. |
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3.

If allowed in the national legislation of the organising country and subject to the agreement of the organising country intelligence and evidence gathering on behalf of the organising police or for their own purposes.

Depending on the exact nature of the support to be provided the composition of the delegation could be as follows:

| 1. | a Head of Delegation who is functionally and hierarchically in charge of the visiting police delegation; |
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1.

a Head of Delegation who is functionally and hierarchically in charge of the visiting police delegation;

| 2. | a Liaison Officer (or more if agreed by the respective NFIPs) who is responsible in particular for the exchange of information between his / her home country and the organising country; |
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2.

a Liaison Officer (or more if agreed by the respective NFIPs) who is responsible in particular for the exchange of information between his / her home country and the organising country;

| 3. | an Operations Coordinator who is responsible for coordinating the work of the visiting police officers; |
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3.

an Operations Coordinator who is responsible for coordinating the work of the visiting police officers;

| 4. | operational police officers (in plain clothes or uniform) with spotting, supporter liaison, escorting and other duties; |
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4.

operational police officers (in plain clothes or uniform) with spotting, supporter liaison, escorting and other duties;

| 5. | a spokesperson / press officer. The Head of the visiting police delegation can, if considered appropriate, act as a spokesperson and / or have his/her own press officer. |
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5.

a spokesperson / press officer. The Head of the visiting police delegation can, if considered appropriate, act as a spokesperson and / or have his/her own press officer.

Key Tasks:

Liaison Officer and /or Operations Co-ordinator

The assignment of a Liaison Officer and /or an Operations Co-ordinator should enable an effective exchange of information between the visiting and organising country authorities in connection with a one off football match or a tournament.

It is possible for both roles to be performed by the same officer. Whether this is appropriate is a decision for the organising and visiting police to agree on a case by case basis prior to deployment in the organising country.

The Liaison Officer/Operations Co-ordinator must, as a minimum requirement, have:

| — | a good working knowledge of this handbook; |
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a good working knowledge of this handbook;

| — | an understanding of the processes required to facilitate the international exchange of information; |
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an understanding of the processes required to facilitate the international exchange of information;

| — | the ability to represent their country and their role effectively when liaising with the organising police services (i.e. be diplomatic, self-confident, independent and able to communicate in a common language agreed beforehand); |
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the ability to represent their country and their role effectively when liaising with the organising police services (i.e. be diplomatic, self-confident, independent and able to communicate in a common language agreed beforehand);

| — | a background knowledge of the situation concerning football related violence / disorder in their country. |
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a background knowledge of the situation concerning football related violence / disorder in their country.

The main tasks of a Liaison Officer/Operations Co-ordinator can be summarised as:

| — | gathering and transferring information / intelligence between their delegation and the organising / local police; |
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gathering and transferring information / intelligence between their delegation and the organising / local police;

| — | ensuring effective deployment of their operational police officers (in uniform and / or plain clothes) in order to play an integral role in the organising police operation for the event; |
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ensuring effective deployment of their operational police officers (in uniform and / or plain clothes) in order to play an integral role in the organising police operation for the event;

| — | providing timely and accurate advice to the organising / local police commander. |
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providing timely and accurate advice to the organising / local police commander.

During international tournaments the Liaison Officer is likely to be based in a single or bi-national Police Information Co-ordination Centre (PICC) whilst the Operations Co-ordinator may be based in a local information centre in the area where the match will be played. For one off matches they may be based in the organising country NFIP or other appropriate environment.

For a one off match the Liaison Officer/Operations Co-ordinator shall work closely with the police of the organising city.

In order to perform their functions effectively the organising police shall provide the Liaison Officers/Operations Co-ordinators with access to the relevant technical equipment.

Operational Police Officers

A well balanced deployment of visiting operational police officers, whether in uniform or plain clothes (commonly referred to as spotters), can:

| — | be used by the organising police as a means of interacting with visiting supporters in order to assist crowd management; |
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be used by the organising police as a means of interacting with visiting supporters in order to assist crowd management;

| — | assist in reducing the anonymity of risk supporters in a crowd, and their ability to instigate and / or participate in acts of violence or disorder without further consequences; |
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assist in reducing the anonymity of risk supporters in a crowd, and their ability to instigate and / or participate in acts of violence or disorder without further consequences;

The officers should have experience in the policing of football matches in their own country.

They:

| — | will have the skills and experience to communicate effectively (where appropriate) in order to influence the behaviour of supporters; and / or |
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will have the skills and experience to communicate effectively (where appropriate) in order to influence the behaviour of supporters; and / or

| — | are specialists in the behaviour of, and the potential risks posed by their supporters; and |
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are specialists in the behaviour of, and the potential risks posed by their supporters; and

| — | are able to communicate effectively during the event to organising country police commanders, via their Liaison Officer /Operations Co-ordinator, information about the type of risk they might pose at any given time and place. |
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are able to communicate effectively during the event to organising country police commanders, via their Liaison Officer /Operations Co-ordinator, information about the type of risk they might pose at any given time and place.

Members of visiting police delegations should be able to communicate positive, as well as negative issues concerning their team / national supporters. This will allow the organising country police commanders to make balanced decisions around the need to intervene or facilitate legitimate supporter behaviour.

It is important to emphasise here that the primary role of visiting operational police officers is advisory and not operational or decision making.

Subject to the agreement of the organising country, visiting operational police officers can also be deployed to gather intelligence / evidence through the use of agreed equipment for use by the organising police or for prosecution purposes in their own country.

CHAPTER 3

Cooperation between police forces during the event

Maximum use should be made of the support and added value that a visiting police delegation can provide to organising police operations.

The visiting police delegation should be informed about the organising police organisation’s operational plan (including their crowd management philosophy and behavioural tolerance levels). They shall be fully integrated into the organising police operation (and given the possibility to attend and participate in pre-match briefing and post-match debriefing meetings).

As regards the use of languages, arrangements shall be made in advance by the countries concerned.

The organising police and the visiting police delegation shall keep their respective NFIPs informed of developments throughout the operation and submit to their NFIP a post-match report within 7 days.

The members of the visiting police delegation shall be shielded from the media unless specific arrangements have been agreed with the head of the delegation.

The visiting police delegation should always ensure that their actions do not unnecessarily jeopardise the safety of other persons (6).

In case of emergency (i.e. when there is an immediate threat for his/her physical safety) or when it is jointly agreed for tactical reasons, visiting police officer(s) who are not deployed in uniform shall use the standard luminous and distinctive visiting police identification vests, as described in Appendix 3. Each visiting police officer shall bring this vest when he/she travels abroad.

The police force of the organising country, in consultation with the football organisers, shall ensure that the visiting police delegation has, when appropriate, stadium access and accreditation (seating is not required) to enable the delegation to carry out their tasks effectively. Stewards and other safety and security personnel should be made aware of this at their briefing(s) prior to the game.

Countries which have the legal possibility to prevent risk supporters from travelling abroad should take all the necessary measures to achieve this objective effectively and should inform the organising country accordingly. Each country should take all possible measures to prevent its own citizens from participating in and/or organising public order disturbances in another country.

The police of the organising country should seek to have available interpreters for the languages spoken by supporters from visiting countries. This could save visiting police delegations from having to undertake this task, which would keep them from actual operational tasks. These interpreters could also facilitate communication between the organising country’s police and the visiting police delegation.

CHAPTER 4

Cooperation between police and the organiser

SECTION 1

Role of the organiser

The organisers of football matches with an international dimension should do everything in their powers to ensure safety and effective crowd management at the stadium, before, during and after the match, so that the police can be deployed as efficiently as possible.

A coordinated approach between all the parties involved is a prerequisite of an efficient strategy for the organisation of football matches with an international dimension. Close cooperation between the organiser, the private partners involved, the public authorities and the police is therefore strongly recommended.

In order to minimise safety and security risks the authorities and/or the police should impose on the organiser minimum requirements which they have to meet in order to organise football matches with an international dimension. To this end the Council of Europe checklist can be used (see Chapter 9).

SECTION 2

Cooperation between police and the organiser

The organiser should appoint an individual as being responsible for safety within the stadium (commonly referred to as the Safety Officer). It is important that the police liaise closely with this individual.

The police and the organisation responsible for safety within the stadium should work together on a complementary basis, without prejudice to each side’s own responsibilities, competencies and tasks, which are determined by national law and/or laid down or specified in a written agreement between the organiser and the police.

Unless determined by national law, this agreement should indicate what tasks shall be undertaken by the organiser and what tasks by the police, focusing on particular on the respective roles of the safety officer and police ground commander, and those of the safety personnel and of police officers.

Unless determined by national law, the agreement should also specifically identify:

| — | who should undertake pre entry cordons and searching; |
| --- | --- |

—

who should undertake pre entry cordons and searching;

| — | who should be in charge of measures to monitor and manage crowd movement and take decisions to open or close gates or turnstiles; |
| --- | --- |

—

who should be in charge of measures to monitor and manage crowd movement and take decisions to open or close gates or turnstiles;

| — | what assistance police officers will provide to safety personnel and/or vice versa in preventing trouble or dealing with troublemakers; |
| --- | --- |

—

what assistance police officers will provide to safety personnel and/or vice versa in preventing trouble or dealing with troublemakers;

| — | who shall decide that the start of the match shall be delayed and in what circumstances (normally the organiser on safety grounds, the police in case of actual or potential public disorder); |
| --- | --- |

—

who shall decide that the start of the match shall be delayed and in what circumstances (normally the organiser on safety grounds, the police in case of actual or potential public disorder);

| — | who shall decide and in what circumstances that a match shall be abandoned and who shall be responsible for liaison with the referee; |
| --- | --- |

—

who shall decide and in what circumstances that a match shall be abandoned and who shall be responsible for liaison with the referee;

| — | the circumstances in which the police shall take control of all or part of the stadium, the procedure for doing so and for the eventual return of control to the organiser; |
| --- | --- |

—

the circumstances in which the police shall take control of all or part of the stadium, the procedure for doing so and for the eventual return of control to the organiser;

| — | who shall direct and supervise evacuation of the stadium and in what circumstances; |
| --- | --- |

—

who shall direct and supervise evacuation of the stadium and in what circumstances;

| — | who shall inform the emergency services of any incident requiring or likely to require their presence; |
| --- | --- |

—

who shall inform the emergency services of any incident requiring or likely to require their presence;

| — | who shall activate the organiser’s emergency procedures. |
| --- | --- |

—

who shall activate the organiser’s emergency procedures.

CHAPTER 5

Co-operation between police and justice and prosecuting agencies

The contents of this chapter should be seen in the context of wide variations in the structure and competencies of justice and prosecuting agencies in Member States.

There can be significant benefits from close cooperation between police and justice and prosecuting agencies both in respect of one-off matches and tournaments.

Whilst the organising country has sovereignty and jurisdiction to deal with all alleged event related offences, the police and other authorities in Member States and EU competent bodies (e.g. Eurojust) also have a responsibility to assist and support the justice and prosecuting agencies in the organising country.

All Member States should ensure that it is possible to deal quickly and appropriately with event-related offences.

The organising police and other authorities should inform visiting police and supporters of relevant domestic legislation and / or criminal, civil or administrative procedures together with the maximum penalties for the most common football related offences.

Existing multi-lateral agreements on mutual legal assistance (MLA) should be fully utilised for all football matches with an international dimension where appropriate and additionally an organising country may agree bilateral arrangements with any other country for enhanced MLA before, during and after the event.

The NFIP of the supporting country / countries should inform the organising NFIP:

| — | of any legal possibilities (e.g. football banning orders / exit bans) they have to prevent risk supporters attending the event; |
| --- | --- |

—

of any legal possibilities (e.g. football banning orders / exit bans) they have to prevent risk supporters attending the event;

| — | what possibilities can be offered, in accordance with national or international law, to the visiting police delegation and / or other competent agency (e.g. visiting liaison prosecutors) within the framework of the bilateral agreement between the countries involved to gather evidence of any football-related offences committed by visiting supporters; |
| --- | --- |

—

what possibilities can be offered, in accordance with national or international law, to the visiting police delegation and / or other competent agency (e.g. visiting liaison prosecutors) within the framework of the bilateral agreement between the countries involved to gather evidence of any football-related offences committed by visiting supporters;

| — | what offences committed in the organising country could be prosecuted in the supporting country (upon the return of the offender). |
| --- | --- |

—

what offences committed in the organising country could be prosecuted in the supporting country (upon the return of the offender).

The organising country may invite any other countries to send a liaison prosecutor/judge or other body with prosecutor power to be present during the event.

It is recommended that the relevant organising authority, in accordance with the national law including data protection, provides the visiting police delegation and/ or competent agency (e.g. visiting liaison prosecutors) with information from judicial or court records and police or investigative reports, including arrest records, of their nationals.

Alternately, a supporting country may agree to have a liaison prosecutor/judge or other body with prosecutor power available on call to travel to the organising country at its request, or appoint a designated liaison prosecutor / judge or other body with prosecutor power for liaison with the organising authority.

Within the scope of national legislation the supporting NFIP(s) will attempt to answer promptly requests for further information on arrested individuals, such as details of previous convictions, including football-related offences.

All costs related to liaison prosecutors/judges or other body with prosecutor power being sent to the organising country should be subject to bi-lateral agreement.

The organising country will provide the necessary means of communication and other facilities for the visiting liaison prosecutors/judges or other body with prosecutor power.

CHAPTER 6

Co-operation between police and supporters

Police liaison with supporter groups at national and local level can have a significant impact in minimising safety and security risks at football matches with an international dimension. This co-operation can however be undermined if there is a perception that supporter representatives are working on behalf of the police and for example sharing personal data.

Organising police and other authorities should take account of the potential benefits associated with supporter led / supporter related initiatives such as Fan Embassies, Fan Projects and Fan Liaison Officers / Representatives.

Visiting police delegations and supporter representatives can help ensure that organising police are aware of the character and culture of the visiting supporters. This should be taken into account as part of the organising police dynamic risk assessment process.

Ongoing co-operation and communication between police and supporter groups can help provide a basis for a safe, secure and welcoming atmosphere for all supporters, and can provide a channel for relaying important information such as travel advice, access routes to the stadium, applicable legislation and behavioral tolerance levels. This could also include the provision of an easily accessible contact and information point where supporters could address their questions.

Pursuing this approach has been shown to contribute towards promoting self-policing amongst supporters and facilitating early and appropriate intervention in respect of emerging security problems or risks.

CHAPTER 7

Communication and Media Strategy

Communication Strategy

An effective and transparent communications strategy is integral to a successful safety and security concept for football matches, tournaments and other sporting events with an international dimension.

Organising country policing agencies should, therefore, work closely with governmental and local agencies, football authorities/organiser, the media and supporter groups in the preparation and delivery of a comprehensive multi-agency communications strategy.

An effective multi-agency media strategy is a crucial aspect of any communication strategy in terms of providing all parties, notably visiting supporters, with important information such as travel advice, access routes to the stadium, applicable legislation and behavioral tolerance levels.

The central aim should be to support a positive image of the event among home and visiting supporters, local communities, the general public and individuals participating in the safety and security operations. This can help generate a welcoming environment for all involved and play a major contributory role in minimising safety and security risks.

Media Strategy

The police (and wider multi-agency) media strategy should at least aim to:

| — | provide information in a proactive, open and transparent manner; |
| --- | --- |

—

provide information in a proactive, open and transparent manner;

| — | provide information on safety and security preparations in a reassuring and positive manner; |
| --- | --- |

—

provide information on safety and security preparations in a reassuring and positive manner;

| — | communicate the police intention to facilitate the legitimate intentions of supporters; |
| --- | --- |

—

communicate the police intention to facilitate the legitimate intentions of supporters;

| — | make clear what kinds of behaviour will not be tolerated by the police; |
| --- | --- |

—

make clear what kinds of behaviour will not be tolerated by the police;

The police should work closely with governmental and local agencies, football authorities /organisers and, where appropriate, supporter groups in establishing and delivering a multi-agency media strategy which:

| — | proactively promotes positive images of the event; |
| --- | --- |

—

proactively promotes positive images of the event;

| — | ensures clarity of responsibility among police and partner agencies in terms of who has the lead in communicating with the media on the various aspects of safety and security (and beyond); |
| --- | --- |

—

ensures clarity of responsibility among police and partner agencies in terms of who has the lead in communicating with the media on the various aspects of safety and security (and beyond);

| — | provides common background and briefing information for all police and partner agency spokespersons (briefing material should be regularly updated to take account of recurring themes or questions and emerging risks or events); |
| --- | --- |

—

provides common background and briefing information for all police and partner agency spokespersons (briefing material should be regularly updated to take account of recurring themes or questions and emerging risks or events);

| — | ensures that factual information is released to the media and / or on the internet on a regular basis in the build up, during and after the event; |
| --- | --- |

—

ensures that factual information is released to the media and / or on the internet on a regular basis in the build up, during and after the event;

| — | provides opportunity for press/media briefings on a regular basis; |
| --- | --- |

—

provides opportunity for press/media briefings on a regular basis;

| — | takes account of the needs/interests of different categories of journalists/media. |
| --- | --- |

—

takes account of the needs/interests of different categories of journalists/media.

CHAPTER 8

EU Football Expert meeting

It is highly recommended that each Presidency holds an expert meeting concerning:

| — | the recommendations mentioned in Chapters 1 to 7; |
| --- | --- |

—

the recommendations mentioned in Chapters 1 to 7;

| — | new trends/developments in supporter behaviour; |
| --- | --- |

—

new trends/developments in supporter behaviour;

| — | international links between supporter groups; |
| --- | --- |

—

international links between supporter groups;

| — | sharing of good policing practice; |
| --- | --- |

—

sharing of good policing practice;

| — | any other issues of interest. |
| --- | --- |

—

any other issues of interest.

The EU Football Expert meeting can commission subgroups of experts to consider emerging issues in the field of security in connection with football matches and make recommendations.

The Presidency shall report to the Council on the result of the meeting. This report replaces the annual questionnaire on football hooliganism required by document 8356/01 ENFOPOL 40.

CHAPTER 9

List of relevant documents on safety and security at football matches

SECTION 1

List of documents previously adopted by the EU Council

| 1. | Council Recommendation of 30 November 1993 concerning the responsibility of organisers of sporting events. |
| --- | --- |

1.

Council Recommendation of 30 November 1993 concerning the responsibility of organisers of sporting events.

| 2. | Council Recommendation of 1 December 1994 concerning direct, informal exchanges of information with the CCEEs in the area of international sporting events (network of contact persons). |
| --- | --- |

2.

Council Recommendation of 1 December 1994 concerning direct, informal exchanges of information with the CCEEs in the area of international sporting events (network of contact persons).

| 3. | Council Recommendation of 1 December 1994 concerning exchange of information on the occasion of major events and meetings (network of contact persons). |
| --- | --- |

3.

Council Recommendation of 1 December 1994 concerning exchange of information on the occasion of major events and meetings (network of contact persons).

| 4. | Council Recommendation of 22 April 1996 on guidelines for preventing and restraining disorder connected with football matches, with an annexed standard format for the exchange of police intelligence on football hooligans (OJ C 131, 3.5.1996, p. 1). |
| --- | --- |

4.

Council Recommendation of 22 April 1996 on guidelines for preventing and restraining disorder connected with football matches, with an annexed standard format for the exchange of police intelligence on football hooligans (OJ C 131, 3.5.1996, p. 1).

| 5. | Joint action of 26 May 1997 with regard to cooperation on law and order and security (OJ L 147, 5.6.1997, p. 1). |
| --- | --- |

5.

Joint action of 26 May 1997 with regard to cooperation on law and order and security (OJ L 147, 5.6.1997, p. 1).

| 6. | Council Resolution of 9 June 1997 on preventing and restraining football hooliganism through the exchange of experience, exclusion from stadiums and media policy (OJ C 193, 24.6.1997, p. 1). |
| --- | --- |

6.

Council Resolution of 9 June 1997 on preventing and restraining football hooliganism through the exchange of experience, exclusion from stadiums and media policy (OJ C 193, 24.6.1997, p. 1).

| 7. | Council Resolution of 21 June 1999 concerning a handbook for international police cooperation and measures to prevent and control violence and disturbances in connection with international football matches (OJ C 196, 13.7.1999, p. 1). |
| --- | --- |

7.

Council Resolution of 21 June 1999 concerning a handbook for international police cooperation and measures to prevent and control violence and disturbances in connection with international football matches (OJ C 196, 13.7.1999, p. 1).

| 8. | Council Resolution of 6 December 2001 concerning a handbook with recommendations for international police cooperation and measures to prevent and control violence and disturbances in connection with football matches with an international dimension, in which at least one Member State is involved (OJ C 22, 24.1.2002, p. 1). |
| --- | --- |

8.

Council Resolution of 6 December 2001 concerning a handbook with recommendations for international police cooperation and measures to prevent and control violence and disturbances in connection with football matches with an international dimension, in which at least one Member State is involved (OJ C 22, 24.1.2002, p. 1).

| 9. | Council Decision of 25 April 2002 concerning security in connection with football matches with an international dimension (OJ L 121, 8.5.2002, p. 1). |
| --- | --- |

9.

Council Decision of 25 April 2002 concerning security in connection with football matches with an international dimension (OJ L 121, 8.5.2002, p. 1).

| 10. | Council Resolution of 17 November 2003 on the use by Member States of bans on access to venues of football matches with an international dimension (OJ C 281, 22.11.2003, p. 1). |
| --- | --- |

10.

Council Resolution of 17 November 2003 on the use by Member States of bans on access to venues of football matches with an international dimension (OJ C 281, 22.11.2003, p. 1).

| 11. | Council Resolution of 4 December 2006 concerning a handbook with recommendations for international police cooperation and measures to prevent and control violence and disturbances in connection with football matches with an international dimension, in which at least one Member State is involved (OJ C 322, 29.12.2006, p. 1-39). |
| --- | --- |

11.

Council Resolution of 4 December 2006 concerning a handbook with recommendations for international police cooperation and measures to prevent and control violence and disturbances in connection with football matches with an international dimension, in which at least one Member State is involved (OJ C 322, 29.12.2006, p. 1-39).

| 12. | Council Decision of 12 June 2007 amending Decision 2002/348/JHA concerning security in connection with football matches with an international dimension (OJ L 155, 15.6.2007, p. 76 - 77). |
| --- | --- |

12.

Council Decision of 12 June 2007 amending Decision 2002/348/JHA concerning security in connection with football matches with an international dimension (OJ L 155, 15.6.2007, p. 76 - 77).

SECTION 2

List of documents previously adopted by the Standing Committee of the European Convention on Spectator Violence and Misbehaviour at Sports Events and in particular at Football Matches (Council of Europe)

| 1. | European Convention on spectator violence and misbehaviour at sport events and in particular at football matches. |
| --- | --- |

1.

European Convention on spectator violence and misbehaviour at sport events and in particular at football matches.

| 2. | Recommendation Rec (1999) 1 on Stewarding. |
| --- | --- |

2.

Recommendation Rec (1999) 1 on Stewarding.

| 3. | Recommendation Rec (1999) 2 on the removal of fences in stadiums. |
| --- | --- |

3.

Recommendation Rec (1999) 2 on the removal of fences in stadiums.

| 4. | Recommendation Rec (2001) 6 of the Committee of Ministers to member states on the prevention of racism, xenophobia and racial intolerance in sport. |
| --- | --- |

4.

Recommendation Rec (2001) 6 of the Committee of Ministers to member states on the prevention of racism, xenophobia and racial intolerance in sport.

| 5. | Recommendation Rec (1989) 1 on guidelines for ticket sales and |
| --- | --- |

5.

Recommendation Rec (1989) 1 on guidelines for ticket sales and

| 6. | Recommendation Rec (2002) 1 on guidelines for ticket sales at international football matches. |
| --- | --- |

6.

Recommendation Rec (2002) 1 on guidelines for ticket sales at international football matches.

| 7. | Recommendation Rec (2003) 1 on the role of social and educational measures in the prevention of violence in sport and handbook on the prevention of violence in sport. |
| --- | --- |

7.

Recommendation Rec (2003) 1 on the role of social and educational measures in the prevention of violence in sport and handbook on the prevention of violence in sport.

| 8. | Recommendation Rec (2008) 1 on the checklist of measures to be taken by the organisers of professional sporting events and by the public authorities. |
| --- | --- |

8.

Recommendation Rec (2008) 1 on the checklist of measures to be taken by the organisers of professional sporting events and by the public authorities.

| 9. | Recommendation Rec (2008) 2 on the use of visiting stewards. |
| --- | --- |

9.

Recommendation Rec (2008) 2 on the use of visiting stewards.

| 10. | Recommendation Rec (2008) 3 on the use of pyrotechnical devices at sport events. |
| --- | --- |

10.

Recommendation Rec (2008) 3 on the use of pyrotechnical devices at sport events.

| 11. | Recommendation Rec (2009) 1 on the use of public viewing areas at large scale sport events. |
| --- | --- |

11.

Recommendation Rec (2009) 1 on the use of public viewing areas at large scale sport events.

| 12. | Recommendation on hospitality principles when organising sports events (not finished yet). |
| --- | --- |

12.

Recommendation on hospitality principles when organising sports events (not finished yet).

---

(1)  Risk analysis means developing a profile on national and club supporters, including risk-groups and how they relate to other supporters at home and abroad including local population groups and the circumstances which can increase potential risk (including interaction with police and stewards).

(2)  The NFIP website is a highly secure website available for the exclusive use of NFIPs which contains information relating to football matches with an international dimension (e.g. club overview, pre and post match reports).

(3)  Council Decision 2008/615/JHA of 23 June 2008on the stepping up of cross-border cooperation, particularly in combating terrorism and cross-border crime (OJ L 210, 6.8.2008, p. 1).

(4)  See Appendix 2 for details on the timeframe to request Europol products and services.

(5)  Council Decision 2008/616/JHA of 23 June 2008 on the implementation of Decision 2008/615/JHA on the stepping up of cross-border cooperation, particularly in combating terrorism and cross-border crime (OJ L 210, 6.8.2008, p. 12).

(6)  See Articles 21 & 22 of the Prum Council Decision on civil and criminal liability.

Appendix 1

Dynamic Risk Assessment & Crowd Management

Taking into account:

| — | document 8241/05 ENFOPOL 40 concerning dynamic risk assessment in the context of international football matches; |
| --- | --- |

—

document 8241/05 ENFOPOL 40 concerning dynamic risk assessment in the context of international football matches;

| — | document 8243/05 ENFOPOL 41 concerning police tactical performance for public order management in connection with international football matches; |
| --- | --- |

—

document 8243/05 ENFOPOL 41 concerning police tactical performance for public order management in connection with international football matches;

| — | the experience and lessons of Euro 2004 and subsequent tournaments; |
| --- | --- |

—

the experience and lessons of Euro 2004 and subsequent tournaments;

| — | evaluation of the policing philosophy, commonly known as the 3D approach (dialogue, de-escalation and determination) during Euro 2008; |
| --- | --- |

—

evaluation of the policing philosophy, commonly known as the 3D approach (dialogue, de-escalation and determination) during Euro 2008;

the following considerations should be applied to the assessment of risk to safety and security before, during and after the event.

Key Principles

Current understanding of effective crowd management highlights the importance of:

| — | maintaining perceptions of appropriate policing among crowd participants; |
| --- | --- |

—

maintaining perceptions of appropriate policing among crowd participants;

| — | avoiding the use of force against crowds as a whole when only a minority are posing a risk to public order; |
| --- | --- |

—

avoiding the use of force against crowds as a whole when only a minority are posing a risk to public order;

| — | a ‘low profile’ or ‘graded’ tactical approach to policing that enhances police capability for communication, dialogue and dynamic risk assessment. |
| --- | --- |

—

a ‘low profile’ or ‘graded’ tactical approach to policing that enhances police capability for communication, dialogue and dynamic risk assessment.

Facilitation

| — | the strategic approach should be preventative through low-impact intervention rather than repressive; |
| --- | --- |

—

the strategic approach should be preventative through low-impact intervention rather than repressive;

| — | it is important that at every stage of an operation police strategy and tactics should take account of and facilitate the legitimate intentions of supporters, as far as these are peaceful (e.g. to celebrate their identity and culture, travel to and from the fixture in safety); |
| --- | --- |

—

it is important that at every stage of an operation police strategy and tactics should take account of and facilitate the legitimate intentions of supporters, as far as these are peaceful (e.g. to celebrate their identity and culture, travel to and from the fixture in safety);

| — | if it is necessary to impose limits on supporter behaviour, it is important to communicate with those supporters why police action has been taken and what alternative means the police are putting in place through which legitimate aims can be achieved. |
| --- | --- |

—

if it is necessary to impose limits on supporter behaviour, it is important to communicate with those supporters why police action has been taken and what alternative means the police are putting in place through which legitimate aims can be achieved.

Balance

| — | during any crowd event the levels of risk to public order can change rapidly; |
| --- | --- |

—

during any crowd event the levels of risk to public order can change rapidly;

| — | it is important that there is a proportionate balance between the style of police deployment and the level, sources and nature of risk at the point of police crowd interaction; |
| --- | --- |

—

it is important that there is a proportionate balance between the style of police deployment and the level, sources and nature of risk at the point of police crowd interaction;

| — | it is important that the policing is graded and capable of changing directly in response to the nature and levels of emerging and decreasing risk; |
| --- | --- |

—

it is important that the policing is graded and capable of changing directly in response to the nature and levels of emerging and decreasing risk;

| — | where balance is achieved the majority in the crowd are more likely to perceive the actions of the police as appropriate and less likely to support and associate with those seeking confrontation; |
| --- | --- |

—

where balance is achieved the majority in the crowd are more likely to perceive the actions of the police as appropriate and less likely to support and associate with those seeking confrontation;

| — | therefore, to help decrease the likelihood and scale of incidents, it is critical that risk assessments are accurate and inform police tactics at all times. |
| --- | --- |

—

therefore, to help decrease the likelihood and scale of incidents, it is critical that risk assessments are accurate and inform police tactics at all times.

Differentiation

| — | the indiscriminate use of force can contribute to a widespread escalation in the levels of public disorder through its interaction with crowd dynamics; |
| --- | --- |

—

the indiscriminate use of force can contribute to a widespread escalation in the levels of public disorder through its interaction with crowd dynamics;

| — | differentiation between individual supporters actually posing a danger and those that do not is therefore a consideration that must be built into every strategic and tactical decision relating to the management of crowds (i.e. training, planning, briefing and operational practice); |
| --- | --- |

—

differentiation between individual supporters actually posing a danger and those that do not is therefore a consideration that must be built into every strategic and tactical decision relating to the management of crowds (i.e. training, planning, briefing and operational practice);

| — | it is inappropriate to act against a whole crowd who happen to be present in a given location, unless there is evidence that they are uniformly seeking to provoke disorder. |
| --- | --- |

—

it is inappropriate to act against a whole crowd who happen to be present in a given location, unless there is evidence that they are uniformly seeking to provoke disorder.

Dialogue

| — | it is important to communicate proactively with supporters. This is best achieved by police officers with good communication skills; |
| --- | --- |

—

it is important to communicate proactively with supporters. This is best achieved by police officers with good communication skills;

| — | the focus is to create a welcoming atmosphere and avoid the potential for conflict; |
| --- | --- |

—

the focus is to create a welcoming atmosphere and avoid the potential for conflict;

| — | this approach can assist in the gathering of high quality information regarding supporter intentions, perspectives, concerns and sensitivities and any other information regarding potential risk; |
| --- | --- |

—

this approach can assist in the gathering of high quality information regarding supporter intentions, perspectives, concerns and sensitivities and any other information regarding potential risk;

| — | it also allows the police to communicate concerns regarding supporter behaviour, risks they may face and solutions to any emerging difficulties. |
| --- | --- |

—

it also allows the police to communicate concerns regarding supporter behaviour, risks they may face and solutions to any emerging difficulties.

Models of good practice

Before the event

Risk assessment should take into account:

| — | the underlying culture of the supporter group to be policed (e.g. characteristic behaviour, motivations and intentions); |
| --- | --- |

—

the underlying culture of the supporter group to be policed (e.g. characteristic behaviour, motivations and intentions);

| — | any factors likely to impact on risk e.g. the activities of other groups (such as opposition supporters and / or local communities), sensitivities, history, and anything else that has particular significance (dates, places, forms of action, symbols); |
| --- | --- |

—

any factors likely to impact on risk e.g. the activities of other groups (such as opposition supporters and / or local communities), sensitivities, history, and anything else that has particular significance (dates, places, forms of action, symbols);

| — | any circumstances likely to impact on the behaviour of, or risk posed by, those supporters or groups perceived to pose a risk to public order. |
| --- | --- |

—

any circumstances likely to impact on the behaviour of, or risk posed by, those supporters or groups perceived to pose a risk to public order.

Behavioural tolerance levels should be defined and priority given to communicating these to supporter organisations. Consideration should be given to encouraging supporters to gather in a safe/controlled environment (e.g. a fan zone).

Based upon this information and intelligence relating to the specific fixture it should be possible to predict and distinguish fixtures with normal risk and increased risk to public order.

It is important to clearly distinguish between risks for specific types of incidents, such as public order, public safety, criminality in relation to mass events and terrorism.

Initial contact

Since the level of risk to public order is not fixed but highly dynamic it can increase and decrease rapidly in response to circumstances. The levels of risk must therefore be monitored and accurately assessed on an ongoing basis.

To achieve this:

| — | police should engage in high levels of positive interpersonal interaction with supporters (non-aggressive posture, smiling, deployed in pairs or in small groups in standard uniform, dispersed widely across and within crowds, accommodating requests for photographs, etc); |
| --- | --- |

—

police should engage in high levels of positive interpersonal interaction with supporters (non-aggressive posture, smiling, deployed in pairs or in small groups in standard uniform, dispersed widely across and within crowds, accommodating requests for photographs, etc);

| — | where language is not a barrier, officers should try to communicate with supporters to gather information about their demeanour, intentions, concerns, sensibilities and any other issues relevant to their behaviour; |
| --- | --- |

—

where language is not a barrier, officers should try to communicate with supporters to gather information about their demeanour, intentions, concerns, sensibilities and any other issues relevant to their behaviour;

| — | interventions units (i.e. ‘riot squads’ with protective equipment, vehicles, etc) should be kept in discreet locations unless the situation determines that a more forceful intervention is required. |
| --- | --- |

—

interventions units (i.e. ‘riot squads’ with protective equipment, vehicles, etc) should be kept in discreet locations unless the situation determines that a more forceful intervention is required.

This will assist the organising police gather information and inform command decisions regarding tactical deployment on the basis of continuous and ongoing risk assessment.

Increasing risk

Where circumstances posing risk are identified it is important to:

| — | communicate to those posing the risk that they are provoking the potential for police intervention; |
| --- | --- |

—

communicate to those posing the risk that they are provoking the potential for police intervention;

| — | where an incident involves visiting supporters organising police assessments should be validated by the visiting police delegation. |
| --- | --- |

—

where an incident involves visiting supporters organising police assessments should be validated by the visiting police delegation.

Should the above measures not resolve the situation, then further police use of force may be required. The objective of police deployment at this stage is to minimise further risk and it is therefore essential that any action does not escalate tensions (e.g. indiscriminate use of force). Where any potential for an increase in risk is identified:

| — | it is vital that information about the persons creating the risk and its nature is communicated clearly to the intervention squads being deployed so that any use of force can be appropriately targeted; |
| --- | --- |

—

it is vital that information about the persons creating the risk and its nature is communicated clearly to the intervention squads being deployed so that any use of force can be appropriately targeted;

| — | those not posing any risk should be allowed to leave the vicinity and / or some time to impose ‘self-policing’. |
| --- | --- |

—

those not posing any risk should be allowed to leave the vicinity and / or some time to impose ‘self-policing’.

De-escalation

| — | once the incident(s) has been resolved policing levels should return to an appropriate level. |
| --- | --- |

—

once the incident(s) has been resolved policing levels should return to an appropriate level.

After the event

| — | a through debrief should be conducted and any relevant information (e.g. the quality of information received before and during the event, the behaviour and management of supporters, police tactics and the enforcement of tolerance levels) must be recorded with the NFIP. |
| --- | --- |

—

a through debrief should be conducted and any relevant information (e.g. the quality of information received before and during the event, the behaviour and management of supporters, police tactics and the enforcement of tolerance levels) must be recorded with the NFIP.

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Appendix 2

Timeframe for requesting Europol products and services
   (1)

| | Official request to Europol |
| --- | --- |
| Initial General Threat Assessment on Organised Crime Related to the Event (GTA) | D (2)–12 months |
| Initial General Terrorism Threat Assessment Related to the Event (GTTA) | D–12 months |
| Updates to the GTA and or GTTA | D–6 months |
| Specific (crime area) Threat Assessment(s) | D–6 months |
| Operational Analytical Support within the framework of the existing Europol Analysis Work Files | D–4 months |
| Training Course in Strategic Analysis | D–8 months |
| Training Course in Operational Analysis | D–8 months |
| Specialist (specific crime area) Training Courses | D–6 months |
| Europol Liaison Officer on site | D–12 months |

Official request to Europol

Initial General Threat Assessment on Organised Crime Related to the Event (GTA)

D (2)–12 months

Initial General Terrorism Threat Assessment Related to the Event (GTTA)

D–12 months

Updates to the GTA and or GTTA

D–6 months

Specific (crime area) Threat Assessment(s)

D–6 months

Operational Analytical Support within the framework of the existing Europol Analysis Work Files

D–4 months

Training Course in Strategic Analysis

D–8 months

Training Course in Operational Analysis

D–8 months

Specialist (specific crime area) Training Courses

D–6 months

Europol Liaison Officer on site

D–12 months

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(1)  Europol Support to Member States – Major International Sporting Events (Europol file number 2570-50r1).

(2)  The starting date of the event.

Appendix 3

Specifications for and sample of police identification vests

This is a slip on (over the head) non sleeve vest

Colour: NATO BLUE:

Colour code: Pantone 279C

Identification Markers

Single word: POLICE (in English only) with a box border - to be positioned in the centre of the vest both front & back.

POLICE letters and border: Nato Blue background.

Both letters and the surrounding box to be luminous silver.

| Box measurements | = | 25 cm × 9 cm |
| --- | --- | --- |

Box measurements

=

25 cm × 9 cm

| POLICE letters | : | Width | = | 1,3 cm per letter |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| Height | = | 7,5 cm |

POLICE letters

:

Width

=

1,3 cm per letter

Height

=

7,5 cm

Vest Front:

Left Breast (above POLICE box): National Flag 10 cm × 7 cm - embroidered/sewn on or in a plastic sleeve.

Right Breast (above POLICE box): EU Symbol 8 cm × 8 cm

Below the POLICE box should be a luminous silver band across the front of the vest × 5 cm wide.

Vest Rear:

National Flag above POLICE box: 10 cm × 7 cm.

Below the POLICE box should be a luminous silver band across the rear of the vest × 5 cm wide.

Vests should be able to be secured by means of either Velcro or popper type fasteners on both sides

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Appendix 4

Categorisation of football supporters

| | | |
| --- | --- | --- |
| Category A | | Non - Risk |
| Category B | | Risk |
| Category C | |

Category A

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Non - Risk

Category B

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Risk

Category C

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Definition for a ‘Risk’ Supporter

A person, known or not, who can be regarded as posing a possible risk to public order or anti social behaviour, whether planned or spontaneous, at or in connection with a football event (see dynamic risk assessment below)

Definition for a ‘Non-Risk’ Supporter

A person, known or not, who can be regarded as posing no risk to the cause of or contribution to violence or disorder, whether planned or spontaneous, at or in connection with a football event

RISK SUPPORTER CHECKLIST

| Elements | Supporting Comments |
| --- | --- |
| PUBLIC ORDER

  Historical rivalry between club
  Expected violence
  Racist behaviour
  Away supporters likely in home sector
  Pitch invasion
  Alcohol related problems
  Use of weapons
  Knowledge of police tactics
  Other

  PUBLIC SAFETY

  Terrorist threat
  Political tension/use of banners
  Use of flares/fireworks likely
  Travelling supporters without tickets
  Black market tickets
  Other

  CRIMINAL ACTIVITY

  Counterfeit tickets
  Sale/use of illegal drugs
  Other | |

Elements

Supporting Comments

PUBLIC ORDER

Historical rivalry between club

Expected violence

Racist behaviour

Away supporters likely in home sector

Pitch invasion

Alcohol related problems

Use of weapons

Knowledge of police tactics

Other

PUBLIC SAFETY

Terrorist threat

Political tension/use of banners

Use of flares/fireworks likely

Travelling supporters without tickets

Black market tickets

Other

CRIMINAL ACTIVITY

Counterfeit tickets

Sale/use of illegal drugs

Other

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