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******************************************************SHARON DENUNZIO v

. PETER DENUNZIO ET AL. (SC 19388)
Palmer, Zarella, Eveleigh, McDonald, Espinosa and Robinson, Js. Argued September 11, 2015—officially released January 12, 2016 Michael P. Kaelin, with whom was William N. Wright, for the appellant (plaintiff).
Samuel V. SchoonmakerIV , with whom, onthe brief,

was Wendy Dunne DiChristina, for the appellee (named defendant).
Louise T. Truax, with whom, onthe brief, wasLeslie I. Jennings-Lax, for the appellee (defendant Douglas DeNunzio).Opinion McDONALD, J. In 2007, the legislature adopted a paradigmatic shift in its approach to conservatorship appointments, includingsignificantmodificationstothe circumstances and mannerin whichtheymaybe made. This certified appeal requires us to consider how the substantive and procedural amendments to the conservatorship scheme set forth in No. 07-116 of the 2007 Public Acts (P.A. 07-116) affected the Probate Court’s selection of a conservator in this case. The plaintiff, Sharon DeNunzio, appeals from the judgment of the Appellate Court affirming the trial court’s judgment which, in turn, affirmed the Probate Court’s decisionto appointthe defendant, theplaintiff’s former husband, Peter DeNunzio, conservator of their adult son, Douglas DeNunzio.1 On appeal, the plaintiff claims that the Appellate Court improperly concluded thathersubstantialrightswere notprejudicedbecause: (1) the Probate Courtproperlycoulduse Douglas’ ‘‘best interests’’ as a consideration in the appointment of a conservator, inadditiontothestatutoryfactorsadopted in P.A. 07-116; see General Statutes § 45a-650 (h);2 or
as a guiding principle in applying those factors; and (2)

a guardian ad litem’s report supporting the defendant’s appointment was properly considered by the Probate Court for its opinion as to the ultimate issue offact and

was not considered insofar as it contained inadmissible hearsay. We agreewiththeplaintiffthat, afterthe enactment ofP.A. 07-116, probate courts may no longer consider the amorphous ‘‘best interests’’ of a respondent in conservatorship proceedings. We further agree that probate courts may only consider evidence that has been properly admitted pursuant to the rules of evidence. Weneverthelessconcludethat, tothe extentthat the Probate Court may have engaged in such improper considerations, the plaintiff’s substantial rights were notprejudicedinlightofthe clearweightoftheadmissible evidence supporting the defendant’s appointment undertheproperstandard. Wethereforeaffirmthejudgment of the Appellate Court.
The record reveals the following undisputed facts and procedural history. For many years, Douglas has manifested symptoms of mental distress, including paranoia, extreme anxiety, and a tendency to perseverate, meaning to obsess over a particular topic, most notably, his health. The plaintiff and the defendant, whose marriage was dissolved in 2003 when Douglas

was still a minor, have been involved in a protracted dispute over whether Douglas’ symptoms were caused by chronic Lyme disease and/or psychological and/or developmental disorders. Duringthe earlystages ofthis dispute, thetrialcourtinthedissolutionactionmodified its custody orders to confer on the defendant sole decision-making authority over medical decisions concerning Douglas. The trial court in the dissolution actionsubsequentlyheldtheplaintiffincontemptofthatorder after she took Douglas to a pediatrician without the defendant’s consent, finding that the plaintiff’s ‘‘preoccupation with Douglas’ health’’ was unhealthy for Douglas. Douglas’ numerous treating physicians have determinedthathis symptomswere causedbyschizophrenia and an Asperger spectrum disorder. The defendant accepted these physicians’ opinions and agreed with their advice to place Douglas on a regimen of antipsychoticmedications, whichappearedtothemto stabilize Douglas’ condition. With the plaintiff’s consent, the defendant placed Douglas in a residential education and treatment facility (school) that holds itself out as specializinginthe treatment ofyoung maleswith developmental, psychological and learning disorders. The school’s staff has concluded that Douglas was making good progress under this course of treatment. Although the plaintiff agrees that Douglas is on the autismspectrum, she disagreeswiththe defendantwith respect to the cause of that condition and Douglas’ symptoms of mental distress. Specifically, the plaintiff is convinced that these conditions have resulted from chronic Lyme disease that had persisted despite repeated courses of antibiotic treatment, negative test results, and Douglas’ ability to engage in vigorous athletic activities such as skiing. She therefore advocated substantially reducing Douglas’ antipsychotic medication and treating him with antibiotics.
In 2011, shortly after Douglas’ twenty-first birthday, the defendant filed an application in the Probate Court seeking to be appointed as Douglas’ conservator. The plaintifffiled an objection to that application, and filed

an application seeking her own appointment. The Probate Court thereafter appointed an attorney and a guardian ad litem for Douglas, Louise T. Truax and Richard J. Margenot, respectively.
BecauseDouglas’representativesandparentsallstipulated that Douglas’ condition was such that he needed

a conservator, the evidentiary hearing on the applications focused principally on the question of who the conservator should be. Truax informed the court that Douglas had refused to express a preference regarding which one ofhis parents should be appointed. Both the plaintiffand the defendant testified at length regarding Douglas’ medical and educational history, and voiced their respective views about the underlying cause of his symptoms. The defendant also testified that he had taken Douglas to hundreds of medical appointments

over the years, that he had discussed Douglas’ wishes regarding his medical treatment with Douglas as recently as the previous week, and that he was willing to commit his time and financial resources to ensure that Douglas received appropriate medical care. The plaintiff testified that Douglas wanted to be taken offofhis current medication and treated for Lyme disease, that she would replace Douglas’ medical team if appointed, and that she believed that the defendant

was not committed to following Douglas’ interests or promoting his independence.
In support of his application, the defendant offered testimony from Douglas’ current treatment providers. These providers contrasted their observations of the defendant’s commitment to a course of treatment that hadhelpedDouglasandDouglas’ calmstatewhenunder the defendant’s care with their contrary observations ofthe plaintiff. Nancy O’Hara, aphysician who specializes in autism andneurological development issues and who had treated Douglas for many years, testified that, although Douglas previously had Lyme disease, it had been effectively treated. O’Haratestified that the plaintiff repeatedly had violated instructions not to discuss medical treatment with Douglas because it caused him

severe anxiety. O’Hara also testified that she did not believe the plaintiff would adhere to her advice that Douglasshouldcontinuehisantipsychoticmedications. O’Hara further testified, over the plaintiff’s objection, that it was her opinion that the defendant, who had adhered to O’Hara’s instructions, should be appointed Douglas’ conservator. O’Hara’s concerns about the plaintiff’sconductasitadverselyeffectedDouglas’state ofmindwasechoedintestimonyfromShahrzadYamini,

a psychiatrist at Douglas’ school, and Joanne Boelke,

a clinical therapist and social worker at the school.
In support of the plaintiff’s application, the court heard testimony from two psychiatrists who had examined Douglas eighteen months and three years prior to the hearing, respectively. In addition to their observations based on those examinations, these experts offered opinions based on information that had been provided to them by the plaintiff. Carl Mueller testified that Douglas had an abnormality on the surface of his brain that could have been caused by chronic Lyme disease, and suggestedthe possibilitythat Douglas may be on too high a dosage of antipsychotic medication, butconcededthatDouglas should continue the medicationasprescribedifthe defendantaccuratelyhadrepresented Douglas’ condition. Robert Bransfield opined thatLyme diseasemaybeacontributoryfactorto Douglas’ symptoms andtherefore recommendedthataLyme disease specialist be added to Douglas’ treatment team and that the team consider adding antibiotics to Douglas’ current medications.
On the last day ofthe evidentiary hearings, Margenot filedaguardianadlitemreportovertheplaintiff’sobjection. The report indicated that Margenot had interviewed various medical and educational professionals, Douglas’ family members, and Douglas himself, and had reviewed various documents, including deposition testimony. Thereportstatedthat, basedonthisinforma-tion and the evidence adduced during the preceding evidentiary hearings, Margenot’s opinion was that it

was ‘‘in [Douglas’] best interests to appoint [the defendant] as [Douglas’] [c]onservator of the [p]erson and [e]state

. . . .’’ The plaintiff claimed that the report
was inadmissible because it contained hearsay and an opinion on the ultimate issue in the case. The Probate Court indicated that it believed that it was proper for

a guardian ad litem to offer such an opinion, but withheld adefinitive ruling onthe admissibilityofthe report pending a review of the rules of evidence. Although Margenot did take the stand so that the plaintiff could questionhimregardingthereport, itwasneveradmitted into evidence.
The Probate Court subsequently issued a decision finding by clear and convincing evidence that Douglas needed a conservator ofboththe person and estate and appointed the defendant as conservator. The Probate Court’s decision cited testimony related to Douglas’ psychological and developmental conditions and symptoms, the harmful effect that his parents’ conflict had

on him, and concerns about the plaintiff’s interference with Douglas’ current course ofmedical treatment. The decision noted the filing of Margenot’s report and the conclusion therein that the defendant should be appointed conservator. The Probate Court concluded its decision by stating: ‘‘This court further finds that there is no doubt that both parents care and love their

son deeply; that they cannot agree on the proper treatment for [Douglas] as they disagree with each other

on [Douglas’] current diagnosis; that the [plaintiff’s] constantsecond-guessing oftheprofessionalsincharge of [Douglas’] care, causes inconsistent care, duress, anxiety and perseveration to [Douglas]; and that medicalprofessionals involvedwith [Douglas’] currentcare and supervision have testified that it is in the best interest of[Douglas] to have the [defendant] appointed

as conservator

. This court therefore appoints [the defendant] as the conservator ofthe person and estate of [Douglas] to servewithoutbond.’’ (Emphasis added.) The decision then set forth the conservator’s powers, followedbytwostatementssimplynoting, withoutelaboration, that the court had considered the factors set forth in § 45a-650 (h) in deciding whom to appoint as conservator.
The plaintiffappealed from the Probate Court’s decision to the trial court pursuant to General Statutes § 45a-186. The plaintiffclaimed, inter alia, that the Probate Court had failed to apply the statutory factors for selecting a conservator set forth in § 45a-650 (h) and had improperly considered Margenot’s report. The trial court rejected these claims and affirmed the Probate Court’s decision. The trial court ultimately concluded thatthere was competent and compelling evidence that the appointment ofthe defendant ratherthan the plaintiffwas in Douglas’ best interests and that the plaintiffhad not proved that her substantial rights were prejudiced.
TheplaintiffappealedtotheAppellate Court, reiterating her claim that consideration of Margenot’s report
was improper. In connection with that claim, the plaintiff also asserted that the Probate Court’s decision improperlyhadbeenbased onastandardthatno longer existed following the enactment ofP.A. 07-116. Specifically, she contendedthatinstead ofapplyingthe factors prescribed in § 45a-650 (h), the court improperly had applied the pre-2007 best interests of the conserved person standard.
The Appellate Court affirmed the trial court’s judgment, concluding that the Probate Court’s decision had been rendered in conformity with the conservatorship scheme as modified by P.A. 07-116. DeNunzio v. DeNunzio, 151 Conn. App. 403, 95 A.3d 557 (2014). With respect to Margenot’s report, the Appellate Court determined that, although the rules ofevidence applied and Margenot’s report had not been admitted into evidence, the Probate Court had considered the report. Id., 412. Nonetheless, it concluded that Margenot could give his opinion on the ultimate issue of fact—who should be appointed as conservator—because having been appointed specifically to investigate the circumstances of the parties, the specialized knowledge he had gained pursuant to his investigation qualified him to make recommendations to the court as to what appointment would be in Douglas’ best interests.3 Id. The Appellate Court further concluded that Margenot properly could rely on hearsay statements in reaching his opinion, and that there was no indication in the recordthatthe Probate Courthadrelied on anyhearsay in the report for substantive purposes in deciding to appoint the defendant. Id., 414.
In connection with its conclusion that the Probate Court could use the specialized knowledge acquired by Margenot to assist it with its determination as to what appointment would be in Douglas’ best interests, the Appellate Court stated: ‘‘To the extent that the plaintiff suggests that the court is confined to the factors set forth in § 45a-650 (h) in determining whom to appoint

asconservator, andthebestinterestsoftheconservatee
are not a consideration, we disagree. The statutory factors cannotbe considered in avacuum. Consistentwith the overall policy and purpose of a conservatorship, the best interests of a conservatee must always be a consideration and a guide in examining the statutory factors. In other words, because a conservator is appointedto servethebestinterests ofthe conservatee, the statutory factors enumerated in § 45a-650 (h) must be considered with the overarching purpose of serving those interests.’’ Id., 409 n.3.
We subsequently granted the plaintiff’s petition for certification to appeal, limited to the following issues:(1) ‘‘Didthe Appellate Courtproperly conclude thatthe [Probate Court properly could use] the ‘best interest[s] of the conservatee’ standard as [a consideration and a guideinexaminingthe statutoryfactors]?’’; and (2) ‘‘Did the Appellate Court properly determine that

. . . the plaintiff’s substanti[al] rights were not prejudiced by the Probate Court’s consideration of

. . . Margenot’s report, which was not admitted into evidence?’’4 DeNunzio v. DeNunzio, 314 Conn. 926, 101 A.3d 271 (2014). We conclude that the statutory factors adopted by the legislature in § 16 of P.A. 07-116 and codified

as § 45a-650 (h) wholly supplant any ‘‘best interests’’ consideration, but, to the extent that the Probate Court considered that matter, the record demonstrates that the statutory factors were considered and supported the Probate Court’s selection of the defendant as conservator. We further conclude that, although there appears to be clear tension between a guardian ad litem’s report being considered for substantive purposes without being admitted into evidence and the strict procedural changes mandated under P.A. 07-116,

we are not persuaded that any improper reliance on Margenot’s report would have affected the outcome. Accordingly, the plaintiff’s substantial rights were not prejudiced.
Before turning to the merits of the plaintiff’s claim, it is useful to set forth a brief overview ofthe relevant 2007 amendments to the conservatorship process, and the legal contextin whichthose changes were adopted. See P.A. 07-116. Prior to 2007, this court generally adhered to the principle that ‘‘the legal disability of an incompetent is analogous to that of a minor.’’ Cottrell

v. Connecticut Bank & Trust Co., 175 Conn. 257, 264, 398 A.2d 307 (1978); accord Lesnewski v. Redvers, 276 Conn. 526, 537, 886A.2d 1207 (2005), overruledbyGross

v. Rell, 304 Conn. 234, 270–71, 40 A.3d 240 (2012).5 This court thus reasoned that ‘‘there is no difference in the court’s duty to safeguard the interests of a minor and the interests of a conserved person.

. . . This is reflected in the statutory scheme governing conservatorships, whichrequires the Probate Courtto be guided by the conserved person’s best interests in establishing the conservatorship andselectingthe conservator; General Statutes [Rev. to 2005] § 45a-650 (e); limiting the conservator’spowersandduties; General Statutes [Rev. to 2005] § 45a-650 (h); resolving conflicts between conservators; General Statutes [Rev. to 2005] § 45a-657; approving a conservator’s petition to sell or mortgage the conserved person’s real property; General Statutes [Rev. to 2005] § 45a-164 (a); and determining whether toremoveaconservator. GeneralStatutes [Rev. to2005] §§ 45a-242 (a) and 45a-199

. . . .’’6 (Citations omitted.) Lesnewski v. Redvers, supra, 540–41.
Public Act 07-116 evidenced a fundamental shift in policy regarding the capacity ofconservedpersons and their concomitant rights. As our courts previously haverecognized, the legislature made comprehensive substantive andprocedural changesto the conservatorship scheme designed to require probate courts to respect individuals’ preferences, impose the least restrictive

means of intervention, and provide more transparency and accountability in the conservatorship process. See Kortner v. Martise, 312 Conn. 1, 53–56, 91 A.3d 412 (2014) (discussing legislative history of P.A. 07-116); Falvey v. Zurolo, 130 Conn. App. 243, 250–53, 22 A.3d 682 (2011) (same). These changes included enumerating factors that must be considered in determining whether aconservatoris necessaryand, ifone is necessary, who should be appointed as conservator. P.A. 07- 116, § 16 (codified as § 45a-650 [g] and [h]).
Public Act 07-116, § 16, also required the Probate Court to follow more formal procedures, under which the rules of evidence for civil proceedings apply and testimony is taken under oath. Proceedings relating to the selection of a conservator are required to be conducted on the record; General Statutes § 45a-650 (b); eliminating the usual practice prior to 2007, under which appeals from decisions rendered by the Probate Court were trials de novo. General Statutes (Rev. to 2007) § 45a-186 (a); seeP.A. 07-116, § 2 (amending § 45a186 [a]); Lesnewski v. Redvers, supra, 276 Conn. 543. Becauseoftheformalitiesrequiredinsuchproceedings, they are subject to a new standard of review, under which ‘‘[t]he Superior Court shall affirm the decision ofthe Court ofProbate unless the Superior Court finds that substantial rights of the person appealing have been prejudiced because the findings, inferences, conclusions or decisions are: (1) In violation ofthe federal

or state constitution or the general statutes, (2) in

excess of the statutory authority of the Court of Probate, (3) made on unlawful procedure, (4) affected by other error of law, (5) clearly erroneous in view of the reliable, probative and substantial evidence on the whole record, or (6) arbitrary or capricious or characterized by abuse of discretion or clearly unwarranted exercise ofdiscretion.’’ GeneralStatutes § 45a-186b; see also Falvey v. Zurolo, supra, 130 Conn. App. 256–57 (explaining that this standard also applies to appellate courts).
I
With that background in mind, we turn to the plaintiff’s claim that the Appellate Court improperly concluded that the Probate Court could consider the ‘‘best interests’’ ofthe respondent in selecting a conservator, either as an independent consideration or an overarching guiding principle. The plaintiff contends that, because the ‘‘bestinterests’’ standardwas excisedfrom the relevant statute and replaced with five mandatory factors to be considered, it would be inconsistent with the statutory text and the purpose of P.A. 07-116 in limiting the probate courts’ discretion to allow the Pro-bate Court to use the respondent’s ‘‘best interests’’ in selecting a conservator. The plaintiff further contends thatthe decisionevidencesthattheProbate Courtmade its decision on the basis of which appointment would be in Douglas’ best interests by reciting opinion testimony to that effect and by failing to make any findings relating to the statutory factors. In response, the defendant contends that the decision indicates that the Probate Court’s decision was predicated on the statutory factors, but even ifthe court did consider Douglas’ best interests, P.A. 07-116 did not intend to preclude such

a consideration.7 The defendant notes that other sections of the conservatorship statutes expressly retain the ‘‘bestinterests’’ standard. See, e.g., General Statutes §§ 45a-132 (d) and 45a-657. We conclude that the respondent’s ‘‘best interests’’ are neither a factor nor
an overarching guide in selecting a conservator. We further conclude, however, that to the extent that the Probate Court considered Douglas’ best interests, that consideration was not harmful given the Probate Court’s consideration of the statutory factors and the clear weight of the admissible evidence supporting its decision under those factors.8
A
The questionofwhetherthe ‘‘bestinterests’’ standard is aproper consideration orguide to selecting aconservator is a matter of law, subject to plenary review and

our well established principles of statutory construction. See General Statutes § 1-2z (setting forth plain meaning rule); Teresa T. v. Ragaglia, 272 Conn. 734, 742, 865 A.2d 428 (2005) (‘‘[w]hen a statute is not plain and unambiguous, we also seek interpretive guidance from the legislative history of the statute and the circumstances surrounding its enactment, the legislative policy it was designed to implement, the statute’s relationship to existing legislation and common-law principles governing the same general subject matter’’).
As previously noted, § 16 of P.A. 07-116 amended § 45a-650, which prescribes the procedures a Probate Court must follow in determining whether to appoint

a conservator on an application for involuntary representation and, if so, who should be appointed to serve that role. Priorto the passage ofP.A. 07-116, the statute provided that ‘‘the court shall be guided by the best interests ofthe respondent’’ in making both determinations. General Statutes (Rev. to 2007) § 45a-650 (e). Indeed, even when the respondent had requested that

a particular person serve as conservator, the Probate Court could disregard that choice if it found that the respondent lacked ‘‘sufficient capacityto form an intelligent preference’’ or if that appointment was ‘‘not in the best interests of the respondent.’’ General Statutes (Rev. to 2007) § 45a-650 (e). Public Act 07-116, § 16, deleted the intelligent preference requirement and everyreference to ‘‘bestinterests’’ in § 45a-650. Instead,itdirectedthe Probate Courtto complywiththerespondent’s choiceunlessthenomineewasunwilling, unable,

ordisqualifiedbysubstantialevidence. P.A. 07-116, § 16. In the absence ofan expressed choice, P.A. 07-116 prescribed as follows: ‘‘In considering who to appoint

. . . the court shall consider (1) the extent to which a proposed conservator has knowledge of the respondent’s

or conserved person’s preferences regarding the care of his or her person or the management of his or her affairs, (2) the ability of the proposed conservator to carry out the duties, responsibilities and powers of a conservator, (3) the cost of the proposed conservatorship to the estate of the respondent or conserved person, (4) the proposed conservator’s commitment to promoting the respondent’s or conserved person’s welfare andindependence, and (5) anyexistingorpotential conflicts ofinterest ofthe proposed conservator.’’ P.A. 07-116, § 16, codified as § 45a-650 (h).
In light of this background, we can readily dispense with the Appellate Court’s determination that the respondent’s best interests may be considered as afactor in conjunction with the statutory factors. Underthe doctrine of expressio unius est exclusio alterius—the expression of one thing is the exclusion of another—

we presume that when the legislature expresses items

as part of a group or series, an item that was not included was deliberately excluded. State v. Bell, 303 Conn. 246, 265, 33 A.3d 167 (2011). Indeed, because the legislature affirmatively deleted everyreference to best interests in § 45a-650, we presume that the legislature intended to remove that matter from consideration. Thispresumptionisreinforcedbythe factthatthe legislature undoubtedly knows how to enumerate a nonexclusivelistoffactorswhenitwantsto. See, e.g., General Statutes § 19a-528 (‘‘the commissionermay consider all factors that the commissioner deems relevant, including, butnotlimitedto, the following’’); General Statutes § 51-219b (a) (‘‘the following factors, as well as any other factors which may be relevant, shall be considered’’). Using best interests as a factor could thwart thelegislature’sclearintentbecausenothingwouldpreclude the Probate Court from giving that factor dispositive weight after considering the statutory factors.
We similarly are not persuaded that the respondent’s ‘‘best interests’’ remain an overarching guide through which the statutory factors should be analyzed. That contention is at odds withthe text andpurposes ofP.A. 07-116. The legislature readily could have retained the language directing that the Probate Court ‘‘shall be guidedbythe bestinterests ofthe respondent’’; General Statutes (Rev. to 2007) § 45a-650 (e); in selecting a conservator and simply elaborated that the statutory factors were relevant to that assessment. Instead, the legislature unambiguously chose to excise the phrase ‘‘shallbe guidedbythebestinterests ofthe respondent’’ from § 45a-650. Indeed, the fact that the legislatureretained the ‘‘best interests’’ standard in a few other sections of the conservatorship scheme demonstrates that it retained that standard where it intended for that standard to apply. It is noteworthy that the provisions in which the ‘‘best interests’’ standard was retained all involve issues that arise after a conservator has been appointedandbeenprovidedwiththoselimitedpowers that cannot be retained by the conservatee. See, e.g., General Statutes § 45a-164 (a) (sale or mortgage ofreal property); General Statutes § 45a-655 (e) (distribution of gifts from estate); General Statutes § 45a-657 (conflicts between conservators); General Statutes § 45a679 (conflicts between guardians and conservators). ThetextofP.A. 07-116therefore indicatesthatthe legislature retained the ‘‘best interests’’ standard in the specific circumstances in which it was appropriate and abandoned it in those for which it was not. Although we acknowledge that faithful application ofthe enumeratedfactors shouldyield aresultthatis in

arespondent’s best interests, as that term is commonly understood, the legislature evidently recognized that the ‘‘best interests’’ standard has historically been imbued with a particular meaning in Probate Court proceedings—one that effectively equates adults who

are respondents in conservation proceedings with minors. PublicAct07-116unambiguouslymanifeststhat such a paternalistic view no longer is consistent with

a contemporary understanding of the broad range of capacities ofpersons who are in need ofa conservator and the necessity of preserving the rights of such persons to the greatest extent possible. See, e.g., P.A. 07- 116, § 1 (allowing respondent or conserved person to refuse court-ordered examination byphysician, psychiatrist or psychologist); P.A. 07-116, § 16 (requiring conservators, in carrying out their duties, to employ least restrictive meansnecessarytomeetneeds ofconserved person and reserving to conserved person all rights and authority not expressly assigned to conservator). Indeed, becausethereisnostatuteorrulethatexpressly directstheProbate Courttomakefindingsontherecord in support ofthe enumerated factors; cf. Practice Book § 6-1 (requiring trial court to state basis for conclusion

as to each claim of law and factual basis therefor in rulings that constitute final judgment for purposes of appeal); sanctioning the Probate Court’s use of the respondent’s best interests as a ‘‘guide’’ in considering those factors runs the risk of the Probate Court effectively continuing to followpastpractice. Doing so obviously would be at odds with the goal of P.A. 07-116 to
ensure greater accountability in the conservatorship process. Wetherefore concludethatthe ‘‘bestinterests’’ of the respondent are neither a factor nor a guide in the selection of a conservator.
B Having concluded that the ‘‘best interests’’ of therespondent are no longer a proper consideration in making such an appointment, we must determine whetherthe Probate Court improperly engaged in such

a consideration, and, if so, whether the plaintiff’s substantialrightswereprejudicedbyanysuchimpropriety. Although it appears that the Probate Court considered Douglas’ best interests, we conclude thatthis improprietywas notharmfulbecause the recordreflectsthatthe ProbateCourtultimately, butimperfectly,predicatedits decision on the statutory factors.
We note at the outset that the Probate Court’s decision is not a model ofclarity. The Probate Court unambiguously stated twice in its decision that it had considered the factors set forth in § 45a-650 (h) in selecting the defendant.9 The decision does not, however, reference any of the specific statutory factors or state factual findings that are directly connected to any
one of those factors. In what appears to be a brief summary of the evidence preceding the decision to appoint the defendant, much ofthe evidence recited is

more directlyrelatedtowhytheplaintiffis notqualified

or the better qualified person to be the conservator rather than why the defendant is qualified or the better qualified person. In the court’s statements immediately preceding its statement appointing the defendant, the court noted ‘‘that medical professionals involved with [Douglas’] current care and supervision have testified that it is the best interest[s] of [Douglas] to have the [defendant] appointed as [c]onservator.’’
When examining an ambiguous decision, however, ‘‘we presume that the trial court applied the correct standard

. . . .’’ Singhaviroj v. Board ofEducation, 301 Conn. 1, 17 n.12, 17A.3d 1013 (2011). We also ‘‘read the record to support, rather than to undermine, the judgment.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Blumenthal v. Kimber Mfg., Inc., 265 Conn. 1, 9, 826 A.2d 1088 (2003).
The record lends strong support to the statements in the decision that the Probate Court considered, and in fact relied on, the statutory factors. It is clear that the parties litigated the case underthe expectation that the statutoryfactors would governthe court’s decision. The defendant’s attorneyaskedvarious witnesses questions relating to those factors. The attorney asked Yamini, forexample, whether, inheropinion, the defendant had ‘‘any personal conflicts’’ with any of Douglas’ physicians, whether he had ‘‘the ability to carry out the duties and responsibilities’’ of a conservator, and whether he had knowledge of Douglas’ preferences. Although O’Hara used the term ‘‘best interest’’ on a few occasions during her testimony, including when expressing her belief that both parents had Douglas’ ‘‘best interest’’ at heart, none ofthe questions posed to her sought to elicit an opinion in terms of Douglas’ best interests. Indeed, the plaintiffdid not object to therelevancy of those questions posed or the responses given thereto. The plaintiff and the defendant also focused on the statutory factors in their closing arguments. The defendant’s attorney, for example, stated ‘‘[l]et’s discuss the statutory factors Your Honor needs to consider,’’ and then went through the factors one by

one. The plaintiff’s attorney responded, arguing why the factors weighed in favor ofappointing the plaintiff. Given this posture, we are not persuaded that the Probate Court either ignored this evidence and argument while stating in its decision that these factors were considered, or decided, without notice to the parties, that a factor other than the statutory factors would be given conclusive weight.
We acknowledge, however, that on the last day of the evidentiary hearings, the Probate Court stated that it had ‘‘to determine

. . . what [was] in the best interest of’’ Douglas. In light ofthe Probate Court’s decision and the litigation posture of the parties, however, it appears most likely that the Probate Court unwisely used the phrase ‘‘best interest’’ as shorthand for the collective effect of the statutory factors. Indeed, in its decision, the court stated that Douglas’ current treatmentprovidershadtestifiedthatitwouldbeinDouglas’ bestinterestto havethe defendantappointedas conservator. Only O’Hara, however, had made a statement to that effect; the otherproviders directedtheirtestimony to the statutory factors. Therefore, we conclude that,

even assuming Douglas’ ‘‘best interests’’ were considered, the plaintiff has failed to demonstrate that her substantial rights were prejudiced.
We underscore, however, that, had the record not been so clear that this case was litigated under the statutory factors, we would have been compelled to request an articulation or reverse the judgment. See, e.g., Falvey v. Zurolo, supra, 130 Conn. App. 255 (concluding that appointment of defendant as conservator
was arbitrary and constituted abuse ofdiscretion when Probate Court indicated that it had considered § 45a650 [h] factors in appointing defendant but ‘‘the record [was] bereft of any evidence regarding the defendant

or his qualifications to be conservator’’)

. Moreover, although we recognize that there is no rule ofpractice

orstatuteexpresslyrequiringtheProbateCourttomake specific findings relating to the court’s consideration of each ofthe statutory factors, it clearly would be the better practice to do so. II
We now turn to the plaintiff’s claim that her substantial rights were prejudiced by the Probate Court’s consideration of Margenot’s report. Although Margenot’s report was never offered or admitted as evidence, the plaintiffclaimsthattheProbate Courtimproperlyrelied

on it as though it had been, when the report could not have been properly received into evidence because: (1)it contained a conclusion on the ultimate issue insofar

as it recommended that the defendant be appointed; and (2) it was replete with hearsay. With respect to the first reason, the plaintiff argues that no one can be an expert qualified to testify on the ultimate issue of who shouldbeappointedasaconservatorbecausethe § 45a650 (h) factors ‘‘present questions of fact [that] do not require any special scientific or technical knowledge to decide.’’10 Thus, according to the plaintiff, a recommendation on who should be appointed as conservator is not necessary to assist the court, and is therefore inadmissible underthe rules ofevidence. Inthe alternative, the plaintiffargues that, even ifan expert’s recommendation could help the court, a guardian ad litem may be an expert on the law, if also an attorney, but is not an expert on disabled adults. With respect to her second reason, the plaintiffclaims that the hearsay throughoutthereportwasharmful,pointingspecifically to a statement attributed to O’Hara that the plaintiff’s appointment as conservator would ‘‘ ‘kill’ ’’ Douglas. The defendant responds that there is no evidence that the Probate Court relied on the report, and, even ifthe court did rely on it, the report was cumulative of other admissible evidence and therefore harmless. We conclude that consideration ofthe report would have been improperunderthe circumstances. Nonetheless, weare not persuaded that the report, to the extent that it may have been considered, had a substantial impact on the Probate Court’s decision.
One of the fundamental reasons that, prior to 2007, appealsfromconservatorshipproceedingsweresubject to trials de novo in the trial court was because Probate Court proceedings were relatively informal. See Thomas v. Arafeh, 174 Conn. 464, 470, 391 A.2d 133 (1978) (noting, inter alia, that strict rules of evidence

were rarely followed). The trial court in the present case, however, was bound to follow the rules of evidence. See Conn. Code Evid. § 1-1 (b). Following the enactment of P.A. 07-116, in conservatorship proceedings under § 45a-650, the Probate Court is required to adhere to the more formalizedprocedures to which the trial court previously was bound. See General Statutes § 45a-650 (b). Thus, statementsinareportbyaguardian ad litem cannot be relied on as substantive evidence unless the report has been properly admitted into evidence.
A guardian ad litem’s report is, by its nature, hearsay ifoffered for its truth, and it typically contains hearsay within hearsay insofar as it contains the out-of-court statements ofothers. See Conn. Code Evid. § 8-1 (defining hearsay). Use of such statements for substantive purposes (i.e., their truth) is barred unless they satisfy

an exception provided by a statute or rule. See Conn. Code Evid. §§ 8-2 and8-7. Suchstatementsmaybeused, however, for nonsubstantive purposes under certain conditions. See, e.g., Conn. Code Evid. § 7-4 (b) (‘‘Thefacts in the particular case upon which an expert bases

an opinion

. . . need not be admissible in evidence if ofatype customarilyrelied onbyexpertsintheparticular field in forming opinions on the subject. The facts reliedonpursuanttothissubsectionarenotsubstantive evidence, unless otherwise admissible as such evidence.’’). An opinion on an ultimate issue of fact may likewise be inadmissible unless certain predicates are satisfied. See Conn. Code Evid. §§ 7-2, 7-3 and 7-4. In addition to these evidentiary constraints, relying on such a report for substantive purposes without requiring its author to be subject to cross-examination may raise due process concerns. See Toms v. Toms, 98 S.W.3d 140, 144–45 (Tenn. 2003). Duringthe proceedings inthe present case, however,

a Probate Court rule was in effectrequiring a guardian adlitemto submit awritten reportto the court. Probate Court Rules (2012) § 4.3. Although that rule since has beenrepealed; see Probate CourtRules § 13.6 (effective July 1, 2013); a recent amendment to the conservatorship scheme appears to sanction or at least acknowledge the practice of guardians ad litem submitting reports to the court. See Public Acts 2012, No. 12-25, § 1, codifiedasGeneralStatutes § 45a-132 (a) (3) (‘‘[a]ny appointment of a guardian ad litem under this subdivision shall terminate uponthe guardian ad litem’s report to the judge or magistrate

. . . or earlier upon the order of the judge or magistrate’’).11 Nonetheless, the legislature has not set forth an exception to the evidentiary requirements for guardian ad litem reports. Cf. General Statutes § 54-46a (b) (in probable cause hearings, ‘‘[t]he court shall be confined to the rules of evidence, except that written reports of expert witnesses shall be admissible in evidence and matters involving chain of custody shall be exempt from such rules’’). It may be, however, that these reporting practices can be reconciled with the mandate that the rules of evidence apply to conservatorship proceedings.
Some courts have also drawn a distinction between reliance on such reports for substantive purposes and review for nonsubstantive purposes. See, e.g., Toms v. Toms, supra, 98 S.W.3d 144 (‘‘[a]lthough a guardian ad litem’s report is not admissible evidence, we hold that such a report may be reviewed by a trial court’’); Joyce S. v. FrankS., 6 Neb. App. 23, 33, 571 N.W.2d 801 (1997) (distinguishing between reviewing report to determine whether guardian ad litem has performed adequate investigation and relying on it for truth of statements therein). Indeed, the Tennessee Supreme Court noted that holding otherwise and precluding the submission of reports ‘‘would effectively undermine the important role played by a guardian ad litem’’ and that a guardian ad litem’s report ‘‘may assist the parties by: [1] alerting the parties to the identity of potential witnesses who maybeinterviewed; [2] highlightingthetestimony, both favorable and unfavorable, that may be presented attrial; and [3] providing a third party’s view of the facts of the case.’’ Toms v. Toms, supra, 144.
In the present case, it is not clear to this court that the Probate Court relied on the report for substantive purposes rather than simply acknowledged that it had reviewedthe reportbecause it was required underthen existing court rules to accept it. We first observe that everyparagraphinthe Probate Court’s decision, except the one relating to the report, commenced with the phrase ‘‘This court finds’’ or ‘‘This court further finds

. . . .’’ In contrast, the decision states: ‘‘Margenot, guardian ad litem, has filed his report

. . . .’’ This appears to be a purposeful distinction. We further observe that the court never resolved on the record the plaintiff’s specific evidentiary objections to the report
or otherwise suggested why it had concluded that it could rely onthe report in light ofthe statutoryrequirement ofcompliance with the rules ofevidence that had been brought to the court’s attention. With respect to any hearsay on which Margenot relied in reaching his recommendations, we agree with the trial court and the Appellate Court that there is no indication in the record that the Probate Court relied on any such hearsay for substantive purposes. With respect to Margenot’s opinion as to the ultimate issue of fact,

even if we assume that this opinion was substantively considered, we are not persuaded that any such impropriety prejudiced the plaintiff’s substantial rights.
‘‘When a court commits an evidentiary impropriety,

we will reverse the trial court’s judgment only if we conclude that the trial court’s improper ruling harmed [a party].

. . . In a civil case, a party proves harm by showing that the improper evidentiary ruling likely affectedtheoutcomeoftheproceeding.’’ (Citationomitted.) Weaver v. McKnight, 313 Conn. 393, 417, 97 A.3d 920 (2014). ‘‘It is well established that if erroneously admitted evidence is merely cumulative of other evidence presented in the case, its admission does not constitute reversible error.’’ Swenson v. Sawoska, 215 Conn. 148, 155, 575 A.2d 206 (1990). ‘‘In determining whether evidence is merely cumulative, we consider the nature of the evidence and whether any other evidence was admitted that was probative of the same issue as the evidence in controversy.’’ Duncan v. Mill Management Co. of Greenwich, Inc., 308 Conn. 1, 23, 60 A.3d 222 (2013).
The critical dispute before the Probate Court was which parent was committed to a course of treatment that would promote Douglas’ welfare and independence. The defendant marshaled testimony from all of Douglas’ current treatment providers in support of his application. Mostsignificantly, O’Hara, who hadtreated Douglas formanyyears, hadundertaken extensive testing and examinations of him, and who specialized in the very conditions at issue, opined that the defendantwas pursuing the proper and effective course of treatment. The plaintiff’s own experts offered some support forthecourseoftreatmentundertakenbythedefendant and only supported the possibility that Douglas could still have Lyme disease and that such a condition could be a contributing factor in his condition. Therefore, we cannot conclude that Margenot’s opinion, which was consistent with the view of Douglas’ longtime treating physician and the clear weight of the remaining evidence, likely affected the outcome.
The judgment of the Appellate Court is affirmed.
In this opinion the other justices concurred.

1 InhercomplaintappealingfromtheProbateCourt’sdecision, theplaintiff named Peter DeNunzio and Douglas DeNunzio as defendants. For convenience, we referto Peter DeNunzio as the defendant andto Douglas DeNunzio by his first name.
2 Although § 45a-650 has been amended bythe legislature since the events underlyingthe present case; see, e.g., PublicActs 2014, No. 14-103, § 6; those amendments have no bearing on the merits of this appeal. In the interest of simplicity, we refer to the current revision of the statute.
3 The Appellate Court’s opinion principally focused on a statement made in the Probate Court by Margenot at oral argument on the admissibility of his report regarding his opinion as to who should serve as conservator; DeNunzio v. DeNunzio, supra, 151 Conn. App. 410–11; but the Appellate Court noted that the same reasoning applies to his opinion in the report. Id., 412 n.6.

4 The first question, as certified, stated: ‘‘Did the Appellate Court properly conclude that the trial court correctly used the ‘best interest of the conservatee’ standard as the basis for its decision?’’ DeNunzio v. DeNunzio, 314 Conn. 926, 101 A.3d 271 (2014). In accordance with established practice,

wehavereframedthequestiontomore accuratelyreflecttheissuepresented to the Appellate Court. See State v. Ouellette, 295 Conn. 173, 184, 989 A.2d 1048 (2010).

5 In Gross v. Rell, supra, 304 Conn. 269, this court recognized that, even under the pre-2007 scheme, the legal status of incapable adults was not equivalent to minors for all purposes. In that case, this court concluded that ‘‘the governing standard for the representation of impaired adult clients is not the protection of their best interests, but, to the extent possible, the zealous advocacy of their expressed preferences. This is true even if the Probate Court has appointed a conservator for the client.’’ Id.; see id., 264, 270–71 (citing 2005 revision to General Statutes as applicable to case before court and overruling Lesnewski v. Redvers, supra, 276 Conn. 526, insofar

as it held that conserved person may appeal in his or her own name from Probate Court decision only if conserved person’s attorney demonstrates to trial court that appeal is in conserved person’s best interests).

6 Recently, in Kortnerv. Martise, 312 Conn. 1, 52–53, 91 A.3d 412 (2014), this court quoted this best interests framework fromLesnewski v. Redvers, supra, 276 Conn. 540–41, under circumstances that did not require us to consider whether the ‘‘best interests’’ standard continued to apply to the selection ofthe conservatorfollowingthe enactmentofP.A. 07-116. Because Kortner was decided well after the Probate Court’s decision in the present case, it could not have influenced that court’s view of the proper legal standard. Nonetheless, it may have influenced the Appellate Court’s view of the law, which we now clarify.

7 Truax filed a brief in this court on behalf of Douglas arguing against the position advanced by the plaintiff in this certified appeal. The plaintiff contends that we should not consider Truax’ brief because the fact that Douglas did not want to take a position before the Probate Court on which

one of his parents should serve as his conservator makes it unethical for Truax to advocate for one parent over the other on appeal. Because Truax’ brief does not raise any arguments that substantively differ from the defendant’s, however, we need not consider the plaintiff’s contention.

8 We do not rely on Margenot’s report in reaching that conclusion. See part II of this opinion.

9 The fact that one statement in the decision refers to the ‘‘conservator(s) named above,’’ ratherthanthe ‘‘conservator’’ raises aquestion asto whetherthis statement was preprinted on the Probate Court form. Nonetheless, the plaintiff has neither advanced such a contention, nor provided this court with a copy of the Probate Court form then in effect.

10 It is unclear from the plaintiff’s argument whether she recognizes that

an expert may not only have scientific or technical knowledge, but also may have ‘‘other specialized knowledge’’ for which he or she is qualified as
an expert by skill, experience, training, or education. See Conn. Code Evid. § 7-2.

11 We recognize that there is an inherent tension between the guardian adlitem’straditionalrole asanadvocatefortherespondent’s ‘‘bestinterests’’ and his or her role in proceedings determining whether a conservator is necessary and who should be appointed in light of the fact that the ‘‘best interests’’ standard no longer is applicable to such proceedings. The 2012 amendment to the conservatorship statutes, however, limited the circumstances under which a guardian ad litem may be appointed in conservatorship proceedings and required the order making such an appointment to specifically delineate the scope of the guardian ad litem’s mandate. See General Statutes § 45a-132 (a) (3) (‘‘No judge or magistrate may appoint a guardian ad litem for a conserved person in a proceeding under section 17a-543 or 17a-543a or sections 45a-644 to 45a-663, inclusive, unless [A] the judge or magistrate makes a specific finding ofa need to appoint a guardian ad litem for a specific purpose or to answer specific questions to assist the judge ormagistrate inmakingadetermination, or [B] the conservedperson’s attorney is unable to ascertain the preferences of the person, including preferencespreviouslyexpressedbytheperson. Priorto appointing aguardian ad litem for a person under subparagraph [B] of this subdivision, the judge or magistrate may question the person to determine the person’s preferences or inability to express such preferences. If the judge or magistrate appoints a guardian ad litem under this subdivision, the judge’s or magistrate’s order shall [i] limit the appointment in scope and duration, and [ii] direct the guardian ad litem to take only the specific action required or to answer specific questions posed bythejudge or magistrate

. . . .’’). Thus, the guardian ad litem’s role may be limited, particularly when the issue to be decided is one in which the ‘‘best interests’’ standard no longer applies.