FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL

STATE OF FLORIDA

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No. 1D18-50

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K.D., Mother of C.D., Minor 

Child,

Appellant,

v.

DEPARTMENT OF CHILDREN AND 

FAMILIES,

Appellee.

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On appeal from the Circuit Court for Bay County.

Brantley S. Clark, Judge.

April 13, 2018

ROBERTS, J.

K.D., the mother, appeals an order terminating her parental 

rights.* K.D. does not contest the grounds for termination, but 

argues that the Department of Children and Families (the 

Department) failed to prove by clear and convincing evidence that 

termination was the least restrictive means of protecting the child, 

C.D. We disagree and affirm the order terminating the mother’s 

parental rights to C.D.

 * The father voluntarily surrendered his parental rights to 

C.D.
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The mother has suffered from chronic substance abuse for 

over a decade. Since 2008, the Department has removed seven 

older children from her care, primarily due to her substance abuse 

problems. The instant appeal concerns her child, C.D., born on 

October 27, 2016. C.D. tested positive for cocaine and marijuana 

at birth and was sheltered three days later based on the drug 

exposure. The mother was found in violation of her drug offender 

probation and was criminally committed to an inpatient substance 

abuse treatment facility, A Woman’s Addiction Recovery Effort

(AWARE). At the time of the adjudicatory hearing on termination, 

the mother had been living at AWARE for almost three months 

and was, by all accounts, doing very well. The mother does not 

dispute that AWARE was providing for all of her needs and she 

was not living independently.

Based on her chronic substance abuse and her history with 

the Department, the Department did not offer the mother a case 

plan, but instead filed an expedited petition to terminate her 

parental rights under sections 39.806(1)(c), (i), (j), and (l), Florida 

Statutes (2016). The Department alleged termination was the 

least restrictive means to protect C.D. because the mother’s 

chronic substance abuse, which had not been remedied despite 

services offered to her in the past, posed a significant risk of harm 

to the child. After an adjudicatory hearing in which the trial court

received testimony from the mother, C.D.’s caregiver, the child 

protection investigator, the assigned case manager, the guardian 

ad litem, and the AWARE program director as well as 

documentary evidence related to the removals of the mother’s 

seven older children, the trial court found the Department had 

established by clear and convincing evidence the four grounds for 

termination alleged in the petition. The court also found by clear 

and convincing evidence that termination of the mother’s parental 

rights was the least restrictive means to protect C.D. from harm.

On appeal, the mother only challenges the trial court’s finding 

of least restrictive means because termination was effectuated 

without the Department offering her a case plan. Our review, 

confined to the least restrictive means prong of the termination 

order, is “highly deferential” and limited to whether competent, 

substantial evidence supports the trial court’s judgment and 
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whether we “‘cannot say that no one could reasonably find such 

evidence to be clear and convincing.’” J.P. v. Fla. Dep’t of Children 

& Families, 183 So. 3d 1198, 1203 (Fla. 1st DCA 2016) (quoting 

N.L. v. Dep’t of Children & Families, 843 So. 2d 996, 1000 (Fla. 1st 

DCA 2003)). Our role is not to reweigh the evidence heard by the 

trial court. J.P., 183 So. 3d at 1204.

Because parental rights are a fundamental liberty interest, 

termination must be the “least restrictive means of protecting the 

child from serious harm.” Padgett v. Dep’t of Health & Rehab. 

Servs., 577 So. 2d 565, 571 (Fla. 1991). This means that the 

Department ordinarily must show that it has made a good faith 

effort to rehabilitate the parent and to reunify the family, often 

through a case plan and related services. Id. However, a case plan 

is not a mandatory prerequisite to termination. Under section 

39.806(2), Florida Statutes (2016), reasonable efforts to preserve 

and reunify families are not required when termination is proven 

under sections 39.806(1)(b) through (d) or (1)(f) through (m). 

Termination, here, was premised on sections 39.806(1)(c), (i), (j), 

and (l); therefore, the Department was not obligated to offer the 

mother a case plan before seeking to terminate her parental rights. 

The Florida Supreme Court has recognized in “extraordinary 

circumstances,” termination without a case plan is the least 

restrictive means. In re T.M., 641 So. 2d 410, 413 (Fla. 1994). The 

“extraordinary circumstances” here, namely the mother’s decadelong substance abuse and involvement with the Department,

allowed the Department to swiftly remove C.D. and seek 

termination due to the child’s substantial risk of potential harm 

from the mother’s continued involvement. See R.W. v. Dep’t of 

Children & Families, 228 So. 3d 730, 733 (Fla. 5th DCA 2017) 

(recognizing “extraordinary circumstances” for termination 

without a case plan include termination based on continuing abuse 

through continued involvement under section 39.806(1)(c)). We 

find no merit to the mother’s argument that termination was 

improper without her first being offered a case plan.

The mother seems to suggest that termination was improperly 

based solely on events occurring in and around 2008 when she 

failed to engage in services offered to her and had some of her 

children removed. She suggests that she is doing well in AWARE 

now and should have another chance to engage in a case plan and 
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services. The mother’s narrow view of the past decade ignores her 

chronic substance abuse that led to the removal of seven of her 

children. Most importantly, she glosses over her own admitted 

drug use while pregnant with C.D., who was born suffering the 

consequences. The trial court received evidence that the mother 

was presently doing well, and acknowledged her progress, but 

appropriately recognized that the case was not all about the 

mother as the ultimate welfare of the child remains paramount. 

We agree with the trial court and decline the mother’s invitation 

to reweigh the evidence. The least restrictive means prong is not 

“intended to preserve parental bonds at the cost of a child’s future. 

Instead, this test requires that ‘those measures short of 

termination should be utilized if such measures can permit the 

safe re-establishment of the parent-child bond.’” A.H. v. Dep’t of 

Children & Families, 144 So. 3d 662, 665-66 (Fla. 1st DCA 2014) 

(quoting L.W. v. Dep’t of Children & Families, 71 So. 3d 221, 224 

(Fla. 4th DCA 2011)). Under the “extraordinary circumstances” of 

this case, termination was the least restrictive means of protecting 

C.D. from serious harm. 

Based on the foregoing, the order terminating the mother’s 

parental rights as to C.D. is AFFIRMED. 

LEWIS and JAY, JJ., concur.

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Not final until disposition of any timely and 

authorized motion under Fla. R. App. P. 9.330 or 

9.331.

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Susan Barber, Assistant Regional Conflict Counsel, Tallahassee; 

Crystal M. Frusciante of Frusciante Law Firm, P.A., Sunrise; and 

Megan O. Peak, Assistant Regional Conflict Counsel, Panama 

City, for Appellant.

Sarah J. Rumph of Children's Legal Services, Tallahassee, for 

Appellee Florida Department of Children and Families.
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Jesse Ryan Butler of Dickinson & Gibbons, P.A., Sarasota; 

Thomasina F. Moore and Sara Goldfarb, Sanford, for Guardian Ad 

Litem Program.