14-3139-cv Wright v. Belafonte et al.

1 UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT SUMMARY ORDER
RULINGS BY SUMMARY ORDER DO NOT HAVE PRECEDENTIAL EFFECT. CITATION TO A SUMMARY ORDER FILED ON OR AFTER JA NUARY 1, 2007, IS PE RMITTED AND IS GOVERNE D BY FEDERAL RULE OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE 32.1 AND THIS COURT = S LOCAL RULE 32.1.1. WHEN CITING A SUMMARY ORDER IN A DOCUMENT FILED WITH THIS COURT, A PARTY MUST CITE EITHER THE FEDERAL APPENDIX OR AN ELECTRONIC DATABASE (W ITH THE NOTATION A SUMMARY ORDER @ ). A PARTY CITING TO A SUMMARY ORDER MUST SERVE A COPY OF IT ON ANY PARTY NOT REPRESENTED BY COUNSEL. At a stated term of the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, held at the Thurgood Marshall United States Courthouse, 40 Fo ley Square, in the City of New York, on the 12 th day of April, two thousand seventeen.
PRESENT: AMALYA L. KEARSE, PETER W. HALL, DENNY CHIN, Circuit Judges.

_____________________________________ Raymond Wright, Plaintiff-Appellant , v. 14-3139-cv Harry Belafonte, Michael Shnayerson, Penguin Random House LLC, Alfred A. Knopf, a division of Random House LLC, New York Times Co., New York Times, International Herald Tribune, Boston Globe, Defendants-Appellees , Federal Bureau of Investigation, Defendant

.

_____________________________________14-3139-cv Wright v. Belafonte et al.

2 FOR PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT: Raymond Wright, pro se, New York, New York. FOR DEFENDANTS-APPELLEES: David E. McCraw, Jeremy A. Kutner, The New York Times Company, New York, New York. Linda J. Steinman, Eric J. Feder, Davis Wright Tremaine LLP, New York, New York. Appeal from a judgment and order of the Unite d States District C ourt for the Southern District of New York (Daniels, J .; Ellis, M.J. ).
UPON DUE CONSIDERATION, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED that the judgment and orde r of the district court are AFFIRMED

. Appellant Raymond Wright, proceeding pr o se, appeals the district court = s judgment dismissing his defamation complaint and the dist rict court’s order de nying reconsideration. Wright, Harry Belafonte’s half-brother, allege d that he had been defamed in Belafonte’s autobiography, and sued Belafont e, the book’s co-author and publishe rs, and newspapers that had reviewed the book. He raised de famation, trade libel, false light, intellectual prope rty theft, and RICO claims. We assume the parties = familiarity with the underlying facts, the procedural history of the case, and the issues on appeal. We review the grant of a motion to dismi ss de novo, “construing the complaint liberally, accepting all factual allegations in the complaint as true, and drawing all reasonable inferences in the plaintiff’s favor.” Chambers v. Time Warner, Inc ., 282 F.3d 147, 152 (2d Cir. 2002). A complaint must plead “enough facts to state a claim to relief th at is plausible on its face,” Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly , 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007), and “all ow[] the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged,” Ashcroft v. Iqbal , 55614-3139-cv Wright v. Belafonte et al.

3 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). Although all alle gations contained in the compla int are assumed to be true, this tenet is “inapplicable to legal conclusions.” Iqbal , 556 U.S. at 678. The court’s denial of reconsideration is reviewed for abuse of discretion. RJE Corp. v. Northville Indus. Corp ., 329 F.3d 310, 316 (2d Cir. 2003). Here, our review of the record and relevant case law reveals that the district court properly dismissed the complaint and denied reconsideration of that decision. We affirm for substantially the reasons stated by the magistrate judge in his thorough report and recommendation, adopted by the district court judge. One issue warrants brief discu ssion. Wright’s negligent inf liction of emotional distress (“NIED”) and intentional infliction of emotional di stress (“IIED”) claims were dismissed because they were duplicative of the libel claim and because Wright had not stated an NIED or IIED claim. In general, NIED and IIED claims are “not allowed if essentially duplicative” of another cause of action. Wolkstein v. Morgenstern , 275 A.D.2d 635, 637 (1st Dep’t 2000). However, because the libel claims were dismissed, the court may have erred by dismissing the NIED and IIED claims as duplicative. See 164 Mulberry St. Corp. v. Columbia Univ ., 4 A.D.3d 49, 58 (1st Dep’t 2004) (reasoning that “insofar as both li bel and libel per se claims were dismissed . . . it follows that dismissal of the intentional infliction of emo tional distress claims is not required”). Nonetheless, these claims were properly dism issed because Wright did not plead “extreme and outrageous conduct.” Howell v. N.Y. Post Co ., 81 N.Y.2d 115, 121 (1993). Liability on such a claim is imposed only for conduct “so outrageous in character, and so extreme in degree, as to go beyond all possible bounds of decency, and to be regarded as atrocious, and utterly14-3139-cv Wright v. Belafonte et al.

4 intolerable in a civilized community.” Chanko v. Am. Broad. Cos. , 27 N.Y.3d 46, 56 (2016) (quoting Howell , 81 N.Y.2d at 122). The brief, unflattering portrayal of Wri ght in Belafonte’s autobiography does not rise to this level. Id. at 57 (ruling that the defe ndant’s “broadcasting of a recording of a patient’s last mo ments of life without consent . . . would likely be considered reprehensible by most people,” but was “not so extreme and outrageous as to satisfy our exceedingly high legal standard”); Freihofer v. Hearst Corp ., 65 N.Y.2d 135, 143–44 (1985) (publishing the contents of confidential divorce records was not extreme and outrageous conduct). On appeal, Wright argues that the district court judge should have recused himself. Wright has waived this claim because he neve r moved for recusal in the district court. See United States v. Yu-Leung , 51 F.3d 1116, 1119 (2d Cir. 1995). Moreove r, he has articulated no basis on which “a reasonable person, knowing all the facts , would conclude that the court’s impartiality might reasonably be questioned.” United States v. Pitera , 5 F.3d 624, 626 (2d Cir. 1993) (quoting Apple v. Jewish Hosp. & Med. Ctr. , 829 F.2d 326, 333 (2d Cir. 1987)); see also Liteky v. United
States , 510 U.S. 540, 555–56 (1994) (setting fo rth guidelines for recusal); Diamondstone v. Macaluso , 148 F.3d 113, 121 (2d Cir. 1998) (recusal is not required for “remote, contingent, indirect or speculative interests” (quoting United States v. Thompson , 76 F.3d 442, 451 (2d Cir. 1996))). We have considered all of Wright’s argumen ts and find them to be without merit. Accordingly, we AFFIRM the judgment and order of the district court.

FOR THE COURT: Catherine O = Hagan Wolfe, Clerk