17-2907 Rana v. Barr UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SECO ND CIRCUIT SUMMARY ORDER

RULINGS BY SUMMARY ORDER DO NOT HAVE PRECEDENTIAL EFFECT. CITATION TO A SUMMARY ORDER FILED ON OR AF TER JANUARY 1, 2007, IS PERM ITTED AND IS GOVERNED BY FEDERAL RULE OF APPELLATE PROC EDURE 32.1 AND THIS COURT’S LOCAL RULE 32.1.1. WHEN CITING A SUMMARY ORDER IN A DOCUMENT FILED WITH THIS COURT, A PARTY MUST CITE EITHER THE FEDERAL APPEND IX OR AN ELECTRONIC DATAB ASE (WITH THE NOTATION “SUMMARY ORDER”). A PARTY CITING A SUMM ARY ORDER MUST SERVE A COPY OF IT ON ANY PARTY NOT REPRESENTED BY COUNSEL. At a stated term of the United States Cour t of Appeals for the Second Circuit, held at the Thurgood Marshall United States Courth ouse, 40 Foley Square, in the City of New York, on the 25 th day of September, two thousand nineteen. PRESENT: ROSEMARY S. POOLER, BARRINGTON D. PARKER, REENA RAGGI, Circuit Judges

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**_____________________________________** RANJIT RANA, Petitioner , v. No. 17-2907-ag WILLIAM P. BARR, UNITED STATES ATTORNEY GENERAL, Respondent.

**_____________________________________** FOR PETITIONER: Stuart A ltman, New York, New York. FOR RESPONDENT: Chad A. Read ler, Acting Assistant Attorney General; Melissa Neiman-Kelting, Assistant Director; Anthony J. Me ssuri, Trial Attorney, Office of Immigration Litigation, United States Department of Justice, Washington, DC. Appeal from the Board of Immigration Appeals.2 UPON DUE CONSIDERATION, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED that the petition for review of a Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) decision is DENIED. Petitioner Ranjit Rana, a native and citizen of Nepal, seeks review of a BIA decision affirming an Immigration Judge’s (“IJ”) deni al of asylum, withholding of removal, and relief under the Convention Against Torture (“CAT”). See In re Ranjit Rana , No. A206 296 708 (B.I.A. Aug. 28, 2017), aff’g No. A206 296 708 (Immig. Ct. N.Y. City Oct. 31, 2016). Under the circumstances of this cas e, we review both th e IJ’s and the BIA’s decisions. See Wangchuck v. Dep’t of Homeland Sec. , 448 F.3d 524, 5 28 (2d Cir. 2006). In doing so, we assume the parties’ familiari ty with the underlying facts and procedural history in this case. The challenged agency denial was based on its finding that Rana had not credibly demonstrated past persecuti on. We review adverse cr edibility determinations for substantial evidence. See 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(4)(B); Gurung v. Barr , 929 F.3d 56, 60 (2d Cir. 2019) (stating that substantial evidence sta ndard “requires that . . . factual findings be based on reasonable, substantia l, and probative evid ence in the record” (internal quotation marks and brackets omitted)); Hong Fei Gao v. Sessions , 891 F.3d 67, 76 (2d Cir. 2018). Under the governing standard, a trier of fa ct, “[c]onsidering the totality of the circumstances, . . . may base a credibility dete rmination on . . . the consistency between the applicant’s or witness’s written and oral statemen ts . . . , the internal consistency of each such statement, [and] the consis tency of such statements with other evidence of record . . . without regard to whether an inconsistency, inaccuracy, or fa lsehood goes to the heart of3 the applicant’s claim.” 8 U. S.C. § 1158(b)(1)(B)(iii). We defer to an IJ’s credibility determination unless “it is plain that no reason able fact-finder could make such an adverse credibility ruling.” Xiu Xia Lin v. Mukasey , 534 F.3d 162, 167 (2d Cir. 2008); accord Gurung v. Barr , 929 F.3d at 60; see 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(4)(B). Here, the agency found Rana not cred ible based on several inconsistencies supported by the record. Firs t, the agency identified incons istencies in Rana’s and his wife’s accounts of a 2008 home encounter with Maoists. While Rana stated in a written declaration that he paid Maoists a few thousand rupees during that inci dent, he testified at his merits hearing that only his wife paid the Maoists. Rana claimed at the hearing that his written declaration, prepared by his br other, was mistaken, and that when Rana submitted his application to the asylum office in Jamaica, New York, he “assumed that the system will change and correct it.” Certif ied Administrative Record (“CAR”) at 80. Rana also testified that he told the asylum office during his second interview it was his wife who had given rup ees to the Maoists during the 20 08 incident, and that he had indicated to the officer that there was a mistak e in his application. But neither the asylum officer’s notations in Rana’s application, nor the officer’s summary of Rana ’s interview, make any reference to such a correction. Further, when confronted with an English translation of his wife’s letter, which stated that Rana had paid the Maoists, he claimed that his wife’s original letter, written in Nepali, did not in fact state th at he had paid them. An inte rpreter at the hearing confirmed that Rana’s wife’s letter implicated both Ra na and his wife as havi ng been involved in the4 payment and, on appeal before the BIA, Rana conceded that he had made a mistake when he testified that his wife’s lett er contained a translation error. See id. at 4. Second, the agency id entified an inconsistency betw een Rana’s hearing testimony that, following a Maoist attack in 2011, Rana was hospitaliz ed for six days at Antipul Hospital, and a hospital record indicating that Rana had been treated at Kathmandu Medical College Hospital. When confronted with this inconsistency, Rana claimed that he had made a mistake in his testimony. The agency was not compelled to credit Rana’s explanations for these inconsistencies and, therefore, to find him credible. See Majidi v. Gonzales , 430 F.3d 77, 80 (2d Cir. 2005). Moreover, even if individua lly, these inconsisten ces might be deemed minor so as not to support an adverse credibility determination, see generally Gurung v.
Barr , 929 F.3d at 61, their cumulative effect, under the totality of the circumstances, could lead a reasonable fact-finder to conclude that Rana was not credible in te stifying to the past persecution by Maoists that formed the basis for his asylum application, see Xiu Xia Lin v. Mukasey , 534 F.3d at 167 (observing that “IJ may rely on any inconsistency . . . in making an adverse credibility determinati on as long as the totality of the circumstances establishes that an asylum applicant is not credible” (e mphasis in original) (internal quotation marks omitted)); id. (reasoning that, even though inconsistenc es and omissions relied upon by IJ were “not directly material” to petitioner’s claims, their “cumu lative effect . . . reasonably could have affected the IJ’s [credibility] evaluation”). In sum, the record here would not have “compelled” a reasonable adjudicator to reach a credibility determina tion in favor of Rana. Majidi v. Gonzales , 430 F.3d at 79.5 Thus, we identify no error in the agency determination th at Rana had not credibly demonstrated the persecution su pporting his claims for asylum , withholding of removal, and CAT relief. 1 For the foregoing reasons, the pe tition for review is DENIED.
FOR THE COURT: CATHERINE O’HAGAN WOLF E, Clerk of Court

1 The agency did not address and, therefore, we need not consider, whether the abusive conduct by Maoists, if credited, constituted political persecution. See Rizal v. Gonzales , 442 F.3d 84, 92 (2d Cir. 2006) (“[P]ers ecution can certainly be found when the government, although not itself conducting the persecution, is unable or unwilling to control it.”).