Cite as: 594 U. S. ____ (2021) 1 

Per Curiam 

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 

JODY LOMBARDO, ET AL. v. CITY OF ST. LOUIS, 

MISSOURI, ET AL. 

ON PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED 

STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT 

No. 20–391. Decided June 28, 2021

 PER CURIAM. 

On the afternoon of December 8, 2015, St. Louis police 

officers arrested Nicholas Gilbert for trespassing in a condemned building and failing to appear in court for a traffic

ticket.1 Officers brought him to the St. Louis Metropolitan 

Police Department’s central station and placed him in a

holding cell. At some point, an officer saw Gilbert tie a piece

of clothing around the bars of his cell and put it around his

neck, in an apparent attempt to hang himself. Three officers responded and entered Gilbert’s cell. One grabbed Gilbert’s wrist to handcuff him, but Gilbert evaded the officer 

and began to struggle. The three officers brought Gilbert,

who was 5’3” and 160 pounds, down to a kneeling position

over a concrete bench in the cell and handcuffed his arms 

behind his back. Gilbert reared back, kicking the officers 

and hitting his head on the bench. After Gilbert kicked one 

of the officers in the groin, they called for more help and leg

shackles. While Gilbert continued to struggle, two officers

shackled his legs together. Emergency medical services 

personnel were phoned for assistance. 

Several more officers responded. They relieved two of the

original three officers, leaving six officers in the cell with 

—————— 1Because this case was decided by summary judgment, the evidence 

here recounted is viewed “ ‘in the light most favorable’ ” to the nonmoving

party (here, Gilbert’s parents, the petitioners). Tolan v. Cotton, 572 

U. S. 650, 655–656 (2014) (per curiam). 
 

2 LOMBARDO v. ST. LOUIS 

Per Curiam 

Gilbert, who was now handcuffed and in leg irons. The officers moved Gilbert to a prone position, face down on the 

floor. Three officers held Gilbert’s limbs down at the shoulders, biceps, and legs. At least one other placed pressure

on Gilbert’s back and torso. Gilbert tried to raise his chest, 

saying, “‘It hurts. Stop.’” Lombardo v. Saint Louis City, 

361 F. Supp. 3d 882, 898 (ED Mo. 2019).

After 15 minutes of struggling in this position, Gilbert’s

breathing became abnormal and he stopped moving. The 

officers rolled Gilbert onto his side and then his back to 

check for a pulse. Finding none, they performed chest compressions and rescue breathing. An ambulance eventually

transported Gilbert to the hospital, where he was pronounced dead. 

Gilbert’s parents sued, alleging that the officers had used

excessive force against him. The District Court granted 

summary judgment in favor of the officers, concluding that

they were entitled to qualified immunity because they did

not violate a constitutional right that was clearly established at the time of the incident. Id., at 895. The U. S. 

Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit affirmed on different grounds, holding that the officers did not apply unconstitutionally excessive force against Gilbert. 956 F. 3d 

1009, 1014 (2020). 

In assessing a claim of excessive force, courts ask 

“whether the officers’ actions are ‘objectively reasonable’ in 

light of the facts and circumstances confronting them.” 

Graham v. Connor, 490 U. S. 386, 397 (1989).2 “A court 

—————— 2Petitioners brought their excessive force claims under both the 

Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments. See, e.g., First Amended Complaint in No. 4:16–cv–01637, ECF Doc. 28 (ED Mo.), p. 46. We need not 

address whether the Fourth or Fourteenth Amendment provides the

proper basis for a claim of excessive force against a pretrial detainee in 

Gilbert’s position. Whatever the source of law, in analyzing an excessive 

force claim, a court must determine whether the force was objectively

unreasonable in light of the “ ‘facts and circumstances of each particular 
 

Cite as: 594 U. S. ____ (2021) 3 

Per Curiam 

(judge or jury) cannot apply this standard mechanically.” 

Kingsley v. Hendrickson, 576 U. S. 389, 397 (2015). Rather, 

the inquiry “requires careful attention to the facts and circumstances of each particular case.” Graham, 490 U. S., at 

396. Those circumstances include “the relationship between the need for the use of force and the amount of force 

used; the extent of the plaintiff ’s injury; any effort made by

the officer to temper or to limit the amount of force; the severity of the security problem at issue; the threat reasonably perceived by the officer; and whether the plaintiff was

actively resisting.” Kingsley, 576 U. S., at 397. 

Although the Eighth Circuit cited the Kingsley factors, it 

is unclear whether the court thought the use of a prone restraint—no matter the kind, intensity, duration, or surrounding circumstances—is per se constitutional so long as

an individual appears to resist officers’ efforts to subdue

him. The court cited Circuit precedent for the proposition 

that “the use of prone restraint is not objectively unreasonable when a detainee actively resists officer directives and 

efforts to subdue the detainee.” 956 F. 3d, at 1013. The 

court went on to describe as “insignificant” facts that may

distinguish that precedent and appear potentially important under Kingsley, including that Gilbert was already 

handcuffed and leg shackled when officers moved him to the 

prone position and that officers kept him in that position for 

15 minutes. See 956 F. 3d, at 1013–1015. 

Such details could matter when deciding whether to

grant summary judgment on an excessive force claim. 

Here, for example, record evidence (viewed in the light most

favorable to Gilbert’s parents) shows that officers placed 

pressure on Gilbert’s back even though St. Louis instructs 

its officers that pressing down on the back of a prone subject 

can cause suffocation. The evidentiary record also includes 

—————— 

case.’ ” Kingsley v. Hendrickson, 576 U. S. 389, 397 (2015) (quoting Graham, 490 U. S., at 396). 
 

 

4 LOMBARDO v. ST. LOUIS 

Per Curiam 

well-known police guidance recommending that officers get 

a subject off his stomach as soon as he is handcuffed because of that risk. The guidance further indicates that the

struggles of a prone suspect may be due to oxygen deficiency, rather than a desire to disobey officers’ commands. 

Such evidence, when considered alongside the duration of 

the restraint and the fact that Gilbert was handcuffed and 

leg shackled at the time, may be pertinent to the relationship between the need for the use of force and the amount

of force used, the security problem at issue, and the

threat—to both Gilbert and others—reasonably perceived 

by the officers. Having either failed to analyze such evidence or characterized it as insignificant, the court’s opinion could be read to treat Gilbert’s “ongoing resistance” as 

controlling as a matter of law.3 Id., at 1014. Such a per se

rule would contravene the careful, context-specific analysis 

required by this Court’s excessive force precedent. 

We express no view as to whether the officers used unconstitutionally excessive force or, if they did, whether Gilbert’s right to be free of such force in these circumstances

was clearly established at the time of his death. We instead 

grant the petition for certiorari, vacate the judgment of the 

Eighth Circuit, and remand the case to give the court the 

opportunity to employ an inquiry that clearly attends to the 

facts and circumstances in answering those questions in the 

first instance. 

It is so ordered. 

—————— 3 While the dissent suggests we should give the Eighth Circuit the benefit of the doubt, in assessing the appropriateness of review in this factbound context, it is more prudent to afford the Eighth Circuit an opportunity to clarify its opinion rather than to speculate as to its basis. 
 

Cite as: 594 U. S. ____ (2021) 1 

ALITO, J., dissenting 

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 

JODY LOMBARDO, ET AL. v. CITY OF ST. LOUIS, 

MISSOURI, ET AL. 

ON PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED 

STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT 

No. 20–391. Decided June 28, 2021

 JUSTICE ALITO, with whom JUSTICE THOMAS and 

JUSTICE GORSUCH join, dissenting. 

I cannot approve the Court’s summary disposition because it unfairly interprets the Court of Appeals’ decision

and evades the real issue that this case presents: whether 

the record supports summary judgment in favor of the defendant police officers and the city of St. Louis. The Court 

of Appeals held that the defendants were entitled to summary judgment because a reasonable jury would necessarily find that the police officers used reasonable force in 

attempting to subdue petitioner Lombardo’s son, Nicholas

Gilbert, when he was attempting to hang himself in his cell. 

In reaching this conclusion, the Court of Appeals applied 

the correct legal standard and made a judgment call on a 

sensitive question. This case, therefore, involves the application of “a properly stated rule of law” to a particular factual record, and our rules say that we “rarely” review such

questions. See this Court’s Rule 10. But “rarely” does not

mean “never,” and if this Court is unwilling to allow the decision below to stand, the proper course is to grant the petition, receive briefing and argument, and decide the real 

question that this case presents.

That is the course I would take. I do not think that this 

Court is above occasionally digging into the type of factbound questions that make up much of the work of the 

lower courts, and a decision by this Court on the question 

presented here could be instructive.

The Court, unfortunately, is unwilling to face up to the 
 

 

2 LOMBARDO v. ST. LOUIS 

ALITO, J., dissenting 

choice between denying the petition (and bearing the criticism that would inevitably elicit) and granting plenary review (and doing the work that would entail). Instead, it 

claims to be uncertain whether the Court of Appeals actually applied the correct legal standard, and for that reason

it vacates the judgment below and remands the case.

This course of action may be convenient for this Court,

but it is unfair to the Court of Appeals. If we expect the 

lower courts to respect our decisions, we should not twist

their opinions to make our job easier. 

When the Court of Appeals’ opinion is read in the way we

hope our opinions will be interpreted, it is clear that the

Court of Appeals understood and applied the correct standard for excessive-force claims. The per curiam acknowledges that the Court of Appeals correctly cited the factors

that must be taken into account in determining whether the 

officers’ actions were objectively reasonable. Ante, at 3; see 

956 F. 3d 1009, 1013 (CA8 2020). But the per curiam finds 

it “unclear whether the [Court of Appeals] thought the use 

of a prone restraint—no matter the kind, intensity, duration, or surrounding circumstances—is per se constitutional 

so long as an individual appears to resist officers’ efforts to 

subdue him.” Ante, at 3. 

Can the Court seriously think that the Eighth Circuit

adopted such a strange and extreme position—that the use

of prone restraint on a resisting detainee is always reasonable no matter how much force is used, no matter how long

that force is employed, no matter the physical condition of

the detainee, and no matter whether the detainee is obviously suffering serious or even life-threatening harm? Suppose officers with a combined weight of 1,000 pounds knelt 

on the back of a frail and infirm detainee, used all their 

might to press his chest and face into a concrete floor for 

over an hour, did not desist when the detainee cried, “You’re 

killing me,” and ended up inflicting fatal injuries. Does the 

Court really believe that the Court of Appeals might have 
Cite as: 594 U. S. ____ (2021) 3 

ALITO, J., dissenting 

thought that this extreme use of force would be reasonable? 

Is there any support for that interpretation in the Court of

Appeals’ opinion?

The per curiam latches onto this sentence in the opinion 

below: “This Court has previously held that the use of prone 

restraint is not objectively unreasonable when a detainee 

actively resists officer directives and efforts to subdue the 

detainee.” 956 F. 3d, at 1013; see ante, at 3. Read in context, its meaning is apparent.

The sentence recounts and cites to what the Eighth Circuit had held in an earlier case, Ryan v. Armstrong, 850 

F. 3d 419 (2017), in which a resisting detainee had been

held in a prone position for a period of time. In order to 

understand the sentence in the opinion below, it is necessary to look at that prior decision. And when the language 

in the decision below is read in that way, what it obviously 

means is that the use of prone restraint is not objectively

unreasonable per se when a detainee is actively resisting. 

That is exactly what the appellees, citing Ryan, had argued: 

“No court has held that placing a resisting prisoner in a 

prone position while restrained is per se unreasonable.” 

Brief for Appellees in No. 19–1469 (CA8), p. 24. That is a 

correct reading of Ryan, and that is how the opinion below 

interpreted it. 

Ryan held only that the use of force in that case was reasonable based on “the totality of th[e] circumstances,” including the detainee’s resistance. 850 F. 3d, at 428. The 

Ryan court explained: 

“Several factors support the foregoing conclusion. 

Among the most important is the observation that [the

detainee] was actively resisting the extraction procedure by ignoring directives to lie down on his bunk and 

resisting the defendants’ efforts to subdue him once 

they entered his cell.” Ibid. (emphasis added). 

Thus, Ryan clearly did not adopt any sort of blanket rule, 
 

4 LOMBARDO v. ST. LOUIS 

ALITO, J., dissenting 

and the sentence in this case that the per curiam seizes 

upon did not purport to go beyond Ryan. 

 This Court’s per curiam refers to one other statement in 

the opinion below. The per curiam states: 

“The [Eighth Circuit] went on to describe as ‘insignificant’ facts that may distinguish [Ryan] and appear potentially important under Kingsley, including that Gilbert was already handcuffed and leg shackled when

officers moved him to the prone position and that officers kept him in that position for 15 minutes.” Ante, at 

3 (quoting 956 F. 3d, at 1014). 

Here, again, the per curiam strains to give the Eighth

Circuit’s opinion a possible interpretation that can justify a

remand. But when this sentence is read in context, what it 

plainly means is not that the duration of the officers’ use of

force or the fact that Gilbert had been handcuffed and 

shackled were irrelevant but that certain factual differences between this case and Ryan were not significant in

the sense that they did not call for a different result. 

The court used the term “insignificant” in responding to

Lombardo’s efforts to distinguish Ryan. Lombardo argued 

that this case is different because Gilbert was restrained for 

a longer period and, unlike the detainee in Ryan, had already been handcuffed and shackled. See 956 F. 3d, at 

1014; Brief for Plaintiffs-Appellants in No. 19–1469 (CA8),

pp. 14–15. What the Eighth Circuit characterized as “insignificant” were these factual differences between the two 

cases.* 

—————— 

*The Eighth Circuit wrote: 

“Lombardo argues that Ryan is not on point. Specifically, Lombardo

argues that, unlike Ryan, in which the detainee was held in prone restraint for approximately three minutes until he was handcuffed, . . . Gilbert was held in prone restraint for fifteen minutes and was placed in

this position only after he had been handcuffed and leg-shackled. Lombardo also argues that she presented expert testimony that Gilbert’s 
 

Cite as: 594 U. S. ____ (2021) 5 

ALITO, J., dissenting 

Without carefully studying the record, I cannot be certain

whether I would have agreed with the Eighth Circuit panel

that summary judgment for the defendants was correct.

The officers plainly had a reasonable basis for using some

degree of force to restrain Gilbert so that he would not harm

himself, and it appears that Gilbert, despite his slight stature, put up a fierce and prolonged resistance. See 956 F. 3d, 

at 1011–1014. On the other hand, the officers’ use of force 

inflicted serious injuries, and the medical evidence on the

cause of death was conflicting. See id., at 1012. 

We have two respectable options: deny review of the factbound question that the case presents or grant the petition,

have the case briefed and argued, roll up our sleeves, and 

decide the real issue. I favor the latter course, but what we 

should not do is take the easy out that the Court has chosen. 

—————— 

cause of death was forcible restraint inducing asphyxia whereas the undisputed cause of death in Ryan was sudden unexpected death during 

restraint. . . . We find these differences to be insignificant. This Court 

has previously noted that ‘[h]andcuffs limit but do not eliminate a person’s ability to perform harmful acts.’ United States v. Pope, 910 F. 3d 

413, 417 (8th Cir. 2018), cert. denied, [589 U. S. ___ (2019)]. As discussed 

above, the undisputed facts show that Gilbert continued to violently 

struggle even after being handcuffed and leg-shackled. Specifically, after

being handcuffed, he thrashed his head on the concrete bench, causing 

him to suffer a gash on his forehead, and he continued to violently thrash

and kick after being leg-shackled. Because of this ongoing resistance, 

the Officers moved Gilbert to the prone position so as to minimize the

harm he could inflict on himself and others.” 956 F. 3d, at 1014.