2023 IL App (1st) 221383-U

No. 1-22-1383 

Order filed December 6, 2023 

Third Division

NOTICE: This order was filed under Supreme Court Rule 23 and is not precedent except in the 

limited circumstances allowed under Rule 23(e)(1).

______________________________________________________________________________ 

IN THE

APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS

FIRST DISTRICT

______________________________________________________________________________ 

THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS,

Plaintiff-Appellee, 

 v. 

MICAH JEFFERSON, 

Defendant-Appellant. 

)

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

Appeal from the

Circuit Court of

Cook County. 

No. 14 CR 12511 

Honorable 

Michael B. McHale, 

Judge, presiding. 

JUSTICE LAMPKIN delivered the judgment of the court.

Justices D.B. Walker and R. Van Tine concurred in the judgment. 

ORDER

¶ 1 Held: The judgment of the trial court summarily dismissing defendant’s first-stage 

petition for postconviction relief is affirmed. 

¶ 2 This appeal arises from the August 17, 2022, first-stage summary dismissal of defendant 

Micah Jefferson’s May 25, 2022, petition for postconviction relief. In his petition, defendant 

claimed that posttrial counsel rendered ineffective assistance by failing to investigate and present 
No. 1-22-1383 

- 2 - 

evidence of defendant’s psychiatric medication use, the side effects of such medication on his 

ability to represent himself at trial, and the effects of a head injury he suffered shortly before trial.

¶ 3 The trial court dismissed defendant’s petition as frivolous and patently without merit.

¶ 4 For the reasons that follow, we affirm the judgment of the circuit court.1

¶ 5 I. BACKGROUND

¶ 6 Because we already summarized the evidence from defendant’s trial in his direct appeal

(People v. Jefferson, 2022 IL App (1st) 172484-U), we will reference only that which is pertinent 

to this appeal. Defendant was charged with multiple counts of aggravated kidnapping and 

aggravated criminal sexual assault against the victim, who was his girlfriend and the mother of his 

infant child. 

¶ 7 During pretrial proceedings, defendant initially was represented by counsel, then elected 

to represent himself pro se for some time, later agreed to be represented by counsel again for a 

while, and ultimately elected to go pro se. When the jury trial commenced, defendant continued 

to represent himself pro se. 

¶ 8 The evidence presented at trial showed that defendant, the victim and their infant child had 

been living together. One day in June 2014, defendant returned home in the early morning hours 

and eventually argued with the victim about spending her money. Thereafter, defendant struck the 

victim numerous times on her buttocks, lower back and thighs with his hand, a belt and an electrical 

cord. He also forced her to perform numerous sex acts where he penetrated her vaginally, orally 

1 In adherence with the requirements of Illinois Supreme Court Rule 352(a) (eff. July 1, 2018), 

this appeal has been resolved without oral argument upon the entry of a separate written order.
No. 1-22-1383 

- 3 - 

and anally. The victim also alleged that defendant choked her. When defendant fell asleep, the 

victim took the baby and went to her father’s house. Thereafter, she went to the police, who 

arrested defendant.

¶ 9 Defendant took the stand on his own behalf and testified that the sex was consensual and 

the victim enjoyed role playing and rough sex. During the trial, he participated in jury selection, 

gave an opening statement, cross-examined witnesses, raised objections to the State’s evidence, 

introduced evidence, made a closing argument, and requested a jury instruction for a lesserincluded offense. 

¶ 10 After the jury found him guilty of multiple counts of aggravated criminal sexual assault, 

defendant resumed representation by counsel and filed a motion for a new trial. This motion 

included an argument that prior to trial, defendant was not fit and the court erred in not having him 

evaluated for fitness. Counsel never mentioned, in the motion for a new trial or at the hearing on 

the motion, anything regarding defendant’s psychiatric medication or head injury and any side 

effects from those issues that impaired his ability to represent himself. The trial court denied the 

motion for a new trial, stating that there was no evidence of defendant lacking in fitness and the 

evidence established that defendant understood the proceedings, represented himself quite well 

and was very articulate. The assistant state’s attorney (ASA) commented that she had many 

conversations with defendant during the trial and at no time did he appear to be unfit. Rather, she 

stated that defendant was knowledgeable about many areas of the law and attempted to engage in 

negotiations. 
No. 1-22-1383 

- 4 - 

¶ 11 Defendant refused to participate in the presentencing investigation report. At his sentencing 

hearing, his mother, Elaine Jefferson, testified that defendant was a bright, bubbly, and inquisitive 

child. His adolescent years were no different than those of her other children. He was a wonderful 

son, and although “he’s had his problems,” he was quiet, reliable and loved. Defendant was 

convicted of four counts of aggravated criminal sexual assault. The trial court sentenced him to 13 

years’ imprisonment for each count, to be served consecutively for a total of 52 years, which 

defendant was required to serve at 85%. 

¶ 12 On direct appeal, he argued that he was deprived of a fair trial by the prosecutor’s opening 

statement, examination of the witnesses, and closing and rebuttal arguments. He also argued that 

the trial court erred by refusing his requested instruction for domestic battery as a lesser-included 

offense and by denying his request to admit into evidence certain letters the victim wrote to him 

while he was in jail. This court affirmed defendant’s convictions. Jefferson, 2022 IL App (1st) 

172484-U.

¶ 13 In May 2022, defendant filed the pro se postconviction petition at issue in this appeal. His 

petition raised a number of issues, including that he was unfit for trial, that if he had been thinking 

clearly he would have accepted the State’s pretrial offer, and that his posttrial counsel was 

ineffective. According to the petition, posttrial counsel was ineffective, inter alia, for failing to 

investigate defendant’s mental health history and psychotropic medication use, and failing to 

present evidence of defendant’s physical and mental health issues to the court during the 

proceedings on the motion for a new trial. Defendant claimed that the evidence regarding his 
No. 1-22-1383 

- 5 - 

physical and mental health issues demonstrated that he was not competent to waive his right to 

counsel, stand trial, and represent himself.

¶ 14 Defendant claimed that he was over-medicated during his trial, suffered from side effects 

that impaired his ability to represent himself, and would not have chosen to represent himself pro 

se if he had known of the side effects and how he was affected during trial. According to his 

petition, he was prescribed and took 60 milligrams of Remeron before, during, and after trial, and 

the side effects of the drug caused him to be confused, disoriented, dizzy, and sleepy. As a result,

he left in his jail cell questions for witnesses, diagrams of the victim’s injuries, and his opening 

and closing arguments. According to defendant, he did not experience the side effects of the 

medication until trial began, at which point he was “stuck” going pro se and had no choice but to 

proceed pro se. If he had known the medication caused his irrational thinking, he never would 

have decided to represent himself pro se. 

¶ 15 Defendant’s petition states that he told posttrial counsel that the medication was given to 

him every night and disrupted his short-term memory, caused him to be disoriented, unable to 

focus, and to take quick naps at trial. He explained that the medication altered his way of thinking 

and the dosage was too high, causing irrational thoughts and actions. The petition also averred that 

posttrial counsel told him during a visit in jail that if counsel found any proof defendant was taking 

the medication, then counsel would bring it to the attention of the court. The petition faulted 

posttrial counsel for not investigating defendant’s medication use and never informing the court 

about defendant’s medication, how he was given a dosage that allegedly exceeded the 
No. 1-22-1383 

- 6 - 

recommended dose set by the Federal Drug Administration (FDA), and the alleged side effects 

that defendant claimed negatively impacted his ability to function at trial. 

¶ 16 The petition further claimed that, one week before trial, defendant suffered a serious head 

injury as the result of an attack by other inmates in jail. That injury resulted in a gash to his right 

eyebrow, which had to be glued together. According to defendant, this caused him to suffer from 

random moments of blindness and spells of confusion before, during, and after trial. The injury 

sustained as a result of the attack and the medication allegedly impaired his ability to observe, 

recollect, and relate occurrences, and his performance and motor processes were impaired during 

trial. According to the petition, defendant told posttrial counsel about these issues, but counsel 

never investigated and did not expound upon these issues at the proceeding on the motion for a 

new trial. Defendant maintains that if counsel had told the trial court about the side effects 

defendant suffered from the Remeron and head injury, the trial court would have ordered a fitness 

hearing, which would have shown that defendant was incompetent to stand trial.

¶ 17 In support of his claims, defendant attached a number of exhibits to his petition. The 

exhibits included (1) a prison psychotropic medication information sheet that listed sedation, 

weight gain and increased appetite as the possible side effects of Remeron, (2) jail medication lists 

for defendant indicating Remeron/mirtazapine, (3) documents from Cermak Health Services and

medication orders for defendant, including prescriptions for two tablets of 30 milligrams of 

mirtazapine, and (4) copies of e-mails between defendant and his sister that listed the possible side 

effects of Remeron and other antidepressant medicines, such as manic episodes, visual problems, 

sleepiness, and effects on one’s ability to make decisions, think clearly, or react quickly. 
No. 1-22-1383 

- 7 - 

¶ 18 Also, the exhibits included documents relating to defendant’s civil rights lawsuit under 

section 1983 of the United States Code (42 U.S.C. § 1983), which he filed after the jail attack, and 

a copy of the settlement agreement indicating that he accepted a monetary settlement of $3250. In 

addition, defendant stated that his current psychiatrist at the prison, Dr. Adams, could testify that 

60 milligrams of Remeron was beyond FDA recommendations and more than inmates could 

receive in the prison. Defendant explained that because he was incarcerated and Dr. Adams was a 

State employee, defendant needed counsel to obtain an affidavit from Dr. Adams. Finally, 

defendant explained that his mother, Elaine Jefferson, had records and could testify about his 

mental health issues, but he needed counsel to explain to her the necessary steps to legally make a 

statement. 

¶ 19 On August 17, 2022, the trial court summarily dismissed defendant’s pro se petition as 

frivolous and patently without merit. The trial court stated that defendant’s ineffective counsel 

claim was forfeited because it could have been raised on direct appeal. Forfeiture aside, the court 

found that all of defendant’s self-serving claims of unfitness were clearly rebutted by the record, 

noting that defendant represented himself well at trial, including his questions, statements, 

conduct, and exchanges with opposing counsel and the trial court, which did not disclose a single 

instance of defendant’s confusion about the nature or purpose of the proceedings. The trial court 

then provided specific examples of defendant’s competency, including his written and verbal 

adversarial skills in his pretrial pleadings, jury selection, opening statement, examination of the 

witnesses, and closing argument. The court stated that defendant represented himself during a fourday jury trial and at all times demonstrated that he was “knowledgeable, intelligent, articulate, and 
No. 1-22-1383 

- 8 - 

fully coherent.” Further, the court observed that there were no supporting affidavits and the 

information attached to his petition was insufficient. The court concluded that none of defendant’s 

claims had merit, and none of the allegations would have made any difference in the outcome of

his motion for new trial. Defendant timely appealed. 

¶ 20 II. ANALYSIS

¶ 21 In his appeal, defendant contends his postconviction petition established the gist of a claim 

that his posttrial counsel was ineffective for failing to investigate and present evidence at the 

motion for a new trial regarding the mental and physical side effects defendant suffered from the 

Remeron and head injury that impaired his ability to effectively and competently waive his right 

to counsel, stand trial, and represent himself. Defendant claims that he was over-medicated during 

his trial, suffered from side effects that impaired his ability to represent himself, and would not 

have chosen to represent himself pro se if he had known of the side effects and how he was affected 

during trial. Defendant also argues that if he had been thinking clearly he would have accepted the 

State’s pretrial offer.

¶ 22 The State responds that the allegations in the petition are not sufficient to raise a bona fide

doubt of defendant’s fitness, which consequently negates any ineffective assistance of counsel 

claim. The State also claims the record positively rebuts any suggestion that defendant was unfit. 

Further, the State claims defendant failed to attach the appropriate supporting documentation to 

his petition. The State, therefore, maintains the petition was properly dismissed as frivolous and 

patently without merit. 
No. 1-22-1383 

- 9 - 

¶ 23 The Post-Conviction Hearing Act (Act) provides a mechanism by which a defendant may 

raise a collateral attack against his conviction based on a claim of actual innocence or where there 

was a substantial denial of his rights under the Constitution of the United States, the State of 

Illinois, or both. 725 ILCS 5/122-1 et seq. (West 2020). The purpose of postconviction proceedings 

is to allow inquiry into constitutional issues involved in the original conviction and sentence that 

have not been, and could not have been, adjudicated previously on appeal. People v. Buffer, 2019 

IL 122327, ¶ 12. Review of the trial court’s dismissal of a postconviction petition is de novo, 

meaning we afford no deference to the trial court’s decision. Id.; People v. Randall, 2016 IL App 

(1st) 143371, ¶ 44.

¶ 24 The Act sets out a three-stage process for the adjudication of postconviction petitions. 

Randall, 2016 IL App (1st) 143371, ¶ 45. At the first stage, the stage pertinent to this case, the trial 

court is required to determine only whether a petition is “frivolous or patently without merit.” 725 

ILCS 5/122-2.1(a)(2) (West 2020); Buffer, 2019 IL 122327, ¶ 45. In People v. Brown, 236 Ill. 2d 

175 (2010), the Illinois Supreme Court explained that, at the first stage,

“the trial court examines the petition independently, without input from the parties. 

[Citation.] A petitioner need present only a limited amount of detail and is not required to 

include legal argument or citation to legal authority. [Citation.] A pro se petitioner is not 

excused, however, from providing any factual detail whatsoever on the alleged 

constitutional deprivation. [Citation.] The allegations of the petition, taken as true and 

liberally construed, need only present the gist of a constitutional claim. [Citation.] This 
No. 1-22-1383 

- 10 - 

standard presents a “low threshold” [citation], requiring only that the petitioner plead 

sufficient facts to assert an arguably constitutional claim [citation]. 

In considering the petition, the trial court may examine the court file of the criminal 

proceeding, any transcripts of the proceeding, and any action by the appellate court. 

[Citation.] The trial court must summarily dismiss the petition if it is frivolous or patently 

without merit. [Citation.] We recently explained that a pro se postconviction petition is 

frivolous or patently without merit only if it “has no arguable basis either in law or in fact.” 

[Citation.] A petition lacking an arguable basis in law or fact is one “based on an 

indisputably meritless legal theory or a fanciful factual allegation.” [Citation.] A claim 

completely contradicted by the record is an example of an indisputably meritless legal 

theory. [Citation.] Fanciful factual allegations include those that are fantastic or delusional. 

[Citation.]

Petitioner’s claim of ineffective assistance of counsel is reviewed under the test 

established in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984). The petitioner must show 

counsel’s performance was deficient and that prejudice resulted from the deficient 

performance. [Citation.] A postconviction petition alleging ineffective assistance of 

counsel may not be dismissed at the first stage of the proceedings if: (1) counsel’s 

performance arguably fell below an objective standard of reasonableness; and (2) the 

petitioner was arguably prejudiced as a result. [Citation.]” Id. at 184-85. 
No. 1-22-1383 

- 11 - 

¶ 25 A. Arguable Basis in Fact

¶ 26 We first consider whether the allegations in defendant’s postconviction petition set forth 

an arguable basis in fact for his constitutional claim. He alleged his constitutional right to effective 

assistance of counsel was violated because his posttrial attorney failed to investigate and present 

evidence of defendant’s psychiatric medication use, the side effects of such medication on his 

ability to represent himself at trial, and the effect of a head injury he suffered shortly before trial. 

In support of his claim, defendant averred that he informed posttrial counsel that he was taking 60 

milligrams of Remeron every night and the medication disrupted his short-term memory, caused 

him to be disoriented, unable to focus, take quick naps at trial, and have irrational thoughts and 

actions. In response, counsel said that if he found any proof defendant was taking the medication, 

then counsel would bring it to the attention of the court. 

¶ 27 Furthermore, defendant averred that he told counsel he suffered from random moments of 

blindness and spells of confusion before, during and after the trial as a result of a serious head 

injury he suffered from an attack by other inmates in jail. Defendant averred that the head injury 

and medication use impaired his ability to observe, recollect and relate occurrences, and impaired 

his performance and motor processes during trial. Counsel, however, never investigated these 

issues or presented this information to the trial court to contest defendant’s fitness to represent 

himself and stand trial. To corroborate these allegations, defendant attached medical records that 

showed he was prescribed and taking 60 milligrams of Remeron. He explained that he was unable 

to obtain affidavits from his psychiatrist and mother to support his claims concerning his mental 

health issues without the assistance of counsel.
No. 1-22-1383 

- 12 - 

¶ 28 We have consistently held that to survive summary dismissal, a postconviction petition 

need present only a limited amount of detail and is not required to set forth a constitutional claim 

in its entirety. People v. Edwards, 197 Ill. 2d 239, 244 (2001). Thus, a pro se petitioner is not 

required to allege facts supporting all elements of a constitutional claim to survive summary 

dismissal. Id. at 244-45. In reviewing pro se postconviction petitions, courts are encouraged to use 

a “lenient eye, allowing borderline cases to proceed.” People v. Hodges, 234 Ill. 2d 1, 16 n.7 

(2009). Even if a single claim in the pro se petition is deemed sufficient, the entire petition 

advances to the second stage. People v. Tate, 2012 IL 112214, ¶ 10.

¶ 29 Due process bars the prosecution of an unfit defendant. People v. Hanson, 212 Ill. 2d 212, 

216 (2004). A defendant is unfit to stand trial if, due to a mental or physical condition, he is unable 

to understand the nature and purpose of the proceedings or to assist in the defense. 725 ILCS 

5/104–10 (West 2020). The trial court must order a fitness hearing if a bona fide doubt is raised of 

the defendant’s fitness. 725 ILCS 5/104–11(a) (West 2020). A number of factors may be 

considered in assessing whether a bona fide doubt of fitness is raised, including a defendant’s 

irrational behavior, demeanor at trial, any prior medical opinion on the defendant’s competence, 

and any representations by defense counsel on the defendant’s competence. People v. Eddmonds, 

143 Ill. 2d 501, 518 (1991). No fixed or immutable sign, however, invariably indicates the need 

for further inquiry on a defendant’s fitness. Id. at 518. Rather, the question is often a difficult one 

implicating a wide range of manifestations and subtle nuances. Id. 

¶ 30 We conclude that defendant’s postconviction allegations cannot be characterized as 

fantastic or delusional. The petition sets forth sufficient facts to assert a claim that is arguably 
No. 1-22-1383 

- 13 - 

constitutional. Accordingly, we conclude the petition cannot be deemed frivolous or patently 

without merit for lack of an arguable factual basis.

¶ 31 B. Arguable Basis in Law

¶ 32 Next, we must determine whether the petition is based on an indisputably meritless legal 

theory. A legal theory is indisputably meritless if it is completely contradicted by the record. 

Hodges, 234 Ill. 2d at 16. All well-pleaded facts must be taken as true unless “positively rebutted” 

by the trial record. People v. Coleman, 183 Ill. 2d 366, 385 (1998). As noted, defendant claims his 

posttrial attorney was ineffective for failing to support the request for a fitness hearing by 

investigating defendant’s mental and physical condition, discovering his health records, and 

presenting evidence during the motion for a new trial of his unfitness to stand trial and represent 

himself. 

¶ 33 According to the medication list attached to his postconviction petition, defendant began 

taking 60 milligrams of Remeron on March 1, 2016, which was over one year before his trial, 

which occurred on April 25-28, 2017. He also alleged that he received a “serious head injury” 

during an “attack” while he was in jail on April 18, 2017, which was one week before the start of 

his jury trial.

¶ 34 The mere fact that the defendant suffers from mental disturbances or requires psychiatric 

treatment does not necessarily raise a bona fide doubt of his fitness. People v. Owens, 139 Ill. 2d 

351, 362 (1990). A defendant may be competent to participate at trial even though his mind is 

otherwise unsound. See id. “Fitness speaks only to a person’s ability to function within the context 

of a trial or sentencing hearing; it does not refer to competence in other areas.” People v. Balfour, 
No. 1-22-1383 

- 14 - 

148 Ill. App. 3d 215, 226 (1986). In People v. Mitchell, 189 Ill. 2d 312, 331 (2000), this court held 

administration of psychotropic medication is not equivalent to a bona fide doubt of a defendant’s 

fitness. In this case, however, defendant alleged more than ingestion of psychotropic medication. 

He alleged additional facts about sustaining a severe head injury. Defendant alleged that both his 

medication use and head injury adversely affected his ability to act rationally and effectively during 

the trial proceedings.

¶ 35 The allegations of defendant’s sworn petition establish that he told posttrial counsel that he 

was taking psychotropic medication and had suffered a severe head injury in jail. Defendant further 

alleged that his medication use and head injury disrupted his short-term memory; caused him to 

be disoriented, unable to focus, and take quick naps at trial, caused him to have irrational thoughts 

and actions; caused random moments of blindness and spells of confusion before, during and after 

the trial; impaired his ability to observe, recollect and relate occurrences; and impaired his 

performance and motor processes during trial.

¶ 36 The State contends the record positively contradicts any suggestion that defendant was 

unfit to stand trial. The State notes that the ASA informed the trial court at the motion for a new 

trial proceeding that she had multiple conversations with defendant during the trial and at no time 

did he appear to be unfit. Moreover, the trial court stated there was no evidence of defendant 

lacking in fitness and the evidence established that he understood the proceedings, represented 

himself quite well, and was very articulate. 

¶ 37 Defendant responds that many of his claims involved events that happened to him off the 

record. His allegations detailed how the medication negatively affected his thoughts and feelings 
No. 1-22-1383 

- 15 - 

at the time—information that only could have been known to him and not evident to the judge or 

others at trial. 

¶ 38 We agree with the State that defendant’s legal theory is completely contradicted by the 

record of his own conduct in this case. Defendant appeared in court more than 40 times, conversed 

with the court on multiple occasions, drafted and argued pretrial motions on his own behalf, 

represented himself during a four-day trial that involved jury selection, giving an opening 

statement, cross-examination of the State’s witnesses, testifying on his own behalf, giving a 

closing argument, and a jury instructions conference. Our review of the record supports the trial 

court’s conclusion that at all times, defendant demonstrated that he was knowledgeable, intelligent, 

articulate and fully coherent. His questions, statements, conduct and exchanges with opposing 

counsel and the trial court cover 600 pages of the report of proceedings and do not disclose a single 

instance of confusion about the nature or purpose of the proceedings.

¶ 39 Defendant claims that during the relevant time period, he was manic, confused, disoriented, 

dizzy, sleepy, and agitated. He asserted that during the trial he experienced uncontrollable naps, 

blindness, impaired motor functions, inability to focus, and disruption to his short-term memory. 

However, he does not provide evidence of any of those alleged impairments during trial, and the 

record does not show any moments of confusion during his trial, any inappropriate demeanor, or 

irrational act. The record establishes that defendant fully understood the proceedings and 

competently conducted himself as his own counsel. He delivered a compelling opening statement 

and closing argument and successfully impeached some of the State’s witnesses. He also took the 

stand to clearly testify in his own defense. 
No. 1-22-1383 

- 16 - 

¶ 40 The record shows that defendant drafted his own pretrial pleadings, including an April 24, 

2017, 10-page handwritten response to the State’s proof of other crimes motion. Defendant’s

response was extremely legible, which contradicts his claim of a loss of motor control. That 

response also displayed excellent grammar, punctuation and vocabulary. He argued his response 

in a very convincing and articulate manner and even succeeded in having a key piece of evidence—

a letter in which the victim wrote that he did not rape her—admitted for his defense at trial. 

¶ 41 During jury selection the next day, defendant clearly understood the process, took notes, 

knew the names of each potential juror, successfully argued to remove a juror for cause, and 

exercised five of his seven peremptory challenges. Additionally, he demonstrated his focus and 

ability to keep track of important details. For example, when the trial court read the list of witnesses 

to the venire, defendant correctly noticed that his copy of the State’s witness list was missing two 

specific names.

¶ 42 Defendant’s opening statement was well-reasoned, articulate, and showed that he had a full 

grasp of the facts against him and how he intended to defend against those facts. Specifically, he 

laid out a detailed chronological series of events and told the jury that the sex was consensual and 

the victim enjoyed role playing and rough sex. He also told the jury what the State’s evidence 

would not show—i.e., he never used any knife or gun, there were no eyewitnesses, and the victim 

had no neck bruises despite her allegation that he violently choked her. He asked the jury to listen 

closely to the State’s evidence of recorded telephone conversations between him and the victim 

while he was in jail and note how nonthreatening and loving the recordings portrayed him. He told 

the jurors that the victim visited him in jail after the incident and sent him money. Significantly, 
No. 1-22-1383 

- 17 - 

he revealed that he would produce a letter from the victim in which she stated that defendant had 

not raped her. He also conceded that he asked the victim to change her statement to the police but 

did so only because the statement she gave was false. 

¶ 43 The record establishes that defendant understood trial strategy and techniques. His crossexaminations were direct, concise and effective. He successfully impeached some of the State’s 

witnesses on certain points, showing his clarity of mind to keep track of small details between the 

testimony of the various witnesses and documentary evidence. For example, he refuted witness 

testimony that he previously had injured the victim’s lip and showed that the detective’s report 

misidentified the victim’s race. Defendant had the treating physician concede that the victim’s 

vaginal wall abrasion was consistent with rough consensual sex. The physician also conceded that 

her report recorded no bruising on the victim’s arms or strangulation marks, which contradicted 

the victim’s version of the events. Under cross-examination, the victim conceded that she did not 

try to escape when she retrieved the electrical cord from another room and suffered no injuries 

when defendant allegedly dragged her back into the apartment. Moreover, defendant’s choice not 

to cross-examine the State’s expert witnesses was consistent with his defense theory of consent. 

¶ 44 At the jury instructions conference, defendant showed his legal knowledge and strategic 

awareness when he requested the lesser-included offense of misdemeanor domestic battery, even 

though his request was ultimately denied. His closing argument, which filled 27 pages of the 

record, was well-organized, articulate, and persuasive. He effectively highlighted inconsistencies 

between the testimony of the detective, the victim, and her friend. In response to the State’s 

argument that he tried to manipulate the victim and convince her to change her original statement 
No. 1-22-1383 

- 18 - 

to the police, he argued that his manipulation skills must have been poor because the victim never 

changed that statement. He also argued the great significance of the victim putting in writing the 

statement that she was not raped. 

¶ 45 Defendant’s skilled representation and eloquent arguments were not made by someone 

suffering from “crippling” side effects from medication or a serious head injury. His claims of 

blindness, loss of motor control, and sleeping during the trial would not have gone unnoticed by 

the trial court during four days of trial. It also defies logic that defendant would not have taken the 

many opportunities to alert the trial court before and during trial to his alleged extreme disabilities. 

¶ 46 We conclude that defendant’s petition is frivolous or patently without merit because it has 

no arguable basis in law since it is based on an indisputably meritless legal theory that is 

completely contradicted by the record. See Hodges, 234 Ill. 2d at 16. Although pro se petitions 

must be given a liberal construction and are to be viewed with a lenient eye, a “[l]iberal 

construction does not mean that we distort reality.” People v. Thomas, 2014 IL App (2d) 121001, 

¶ 48. Accordingly, we affirm the decision of the trial court that dismissed defendant’s petition at 

the first stage of the postconviction proceedings. 

¶ 47 III. CONCLUSION

¶ 48 For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the judgment of the trial court. 

¶ 49 Affirmed.