This section of the FEDERAL REGISTER

contains regulatory documents having general

applicability and legal effect, most of which

are keyed to and codified in the Code of

Federal Regulations, which is published under

50 titles pursuant to 44 U.S.C. 1510.

The Code of Federal Regulations is sold by

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REGISTER issue of each week.

Rules and Regulations Federal Register

26955

Vol. 63, No. 94

Friday, May 15, 1998

NUCLEAR REGULATORY

COMMISSION

10 CFR Parts 60, 72, 73, 74, and 75

RIN 3150–AF32

Physical Protection for Spent Nuclear

Fuel and High-Level Radioactive Waste

AGENCY: Nuclear Regulatory

Commission.

ACTION: Final rule.

SUMMARY: The Nuclear Regulatory

Commission is amending its regulations

to clarify physical protection

requirements for spent nuclear fuel and

high-level radioactive waste stored at

independent spent fuel storage

installations (ISFSIs), monitoredretrievable storage (MRS) installations,

and geologic repository operations areas

(GROAs). These amendments codify

standards for protecting spent fuel at the

various storage sites licensed under the

Commission’s regulations.

EFFECTIVE DATE: November 12, 1998.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT:

Priscilla A. Dwyer, Office of Nuclear

Material Safety and Safeguards, U.S.

Nuclear Regulatory Commission,

Washington, DC 20555–0001, telephone

(301) 415–8110, e-mail PAD@NRC.GOV.

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:

I. Background

On August 15, 1995 (60 FR 42079),

the Commission published for public

comment a proposed rule that would

clarify its regulations on the physical

protection of spent nuclear fuel and

high-level radioactive waste. The

proposed regulation would have applied

to spent fuel and high-level radioactive

waste stored at ISFSIs, power reactors

that have permanently ceased reactor

operations, MRS installations, and the

GROA. The proposed rule stated that

the requirements for physically

protecting this type of material lacked

clarity in defining which regulations

were to be applied at these sites. This

resulted in a non-cohesive regulatory

base. The proposed rule would provide

a set of performance-based

requirements, consistent with current

programs that are currently licensed and

implemented at sites under a unified

policy for physical protection.

The proposed rule also indicated that

the Commission was studying the need

for specific protection against the

malevolent use of a vehicle at sites

affected by the rule (this is discussed

further under the ‘‘Protection Goal’’

heading). The rule also proposed a

conforming amendment to 10 CFR Part

60—to require material control and

accounting (MC&A) measures at the

GROA that would be identical to that

required of ISFSIs under Part 72 . The

proposed rule added a provision under

10 CFR Part 75 to clarify that if GROAs

are subject to International Atomic

Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards, then

NRC’s nuclear material accounting and

control regulations for implementing the

‘‘Agreement between the United States

and the IAEA for the Application of

Safeguards in the United States’’ apply.

Finally, the Commission requested

specific comment on five questions

regarding impacts of the proposed

regulation on licensees.

II. Summary and Analysis of Public

Comments

The proposed rule was subject to a 90-

day public comment period which

ended on November 13, 1995. Twenty

letters of comment were received.

Sources for these comments included a

nuclear industry group [the Nuclear

Energy Institute (NEI)]; one national

laboratory; fifteen utilities involved in

nuclear activities; two Federal agencies

[the Environmental Protection Agency

(EPA) and the Department of Energy

(DOE)]; and one citizen’s group. Twelve

letters of comment explicitly endorsed,

either in total or in part, the views

expressed by the NEI. Four letters of

comment, in part, supported the general

objectives of the proposed rulemaking.

Correspondence received from EPA

indicated no comment. The comments

have been grouped under the following

general topics:

1. Protection Goal.

2. Basis for Requirements.

3. Required Level of Physical Protection.

4. Backfit and Regulatory Analysis.

5. Rule Language Specifics.

6. GROAs.

7. Staff-Generated Amendments.

8. Summary of Responses to

Commission’s Specific Questions.

1. Protection Goal

Comment. Commenters noted that,

although it was appropriate that a

protection goal for spent fuel and highlevel radioactive waste be defined, the

protection goal needed to be less

stringent than the codified design basis

threat for radiological sabotage. It was

further stated that a 10 CFR Part 100

release, the unofficial criterion for

determining radiological sabotage of

power reactors, would be extremely

difficult to realize with respect to spent

fuel and high-level radioactive waste.

The citizen’s group commented that any

protection goal developed for spent fuel

should also counter the malevolent use

of an airborne vehicle.

Response. The NRC agrees that the

establishment of a protection goal

should be the first step in the

development of any physical protection

standards. One issue that may have

caused confusion in the proposed rule

is that the assumptions for determining

‘‘radiological sabotage’’ differ between

Part 72, ‘‘Licensing Requirements for the

Independent Storage of Spent Fuel and

High-Level Radioactive Waste,’’ and

Part 73, ‘‘Physical Protection of Plants

and Material.’’ The differing

assumptions are appropriate because

‘‘radiological sabotage,’’ as used under

Part 73, applies to a power reactor and

implies the unofficial criterion of a Part

100 release for power reactors.

‘‘Radiological sabotage’’ as used under

Part 72 applies to the storage of spent

fuel and high-level radioactive waste

and is based on the consequences of a

design basis accident as defined under

Part 72. Although the same term is used

under both 10 CFR Parts; it is based on

different assumptions and results in

different levels of required protection.

The Commission agrees that this is

confusing and that ‘‘radiological

sabotage,’’ as used for operating

reactors, is not an appropriate

protection level for spent fuel and highlevel radioactive waste. The

Commission concludes that the

protection goal is best characterized by

the phrase: ‘‘protection against the loss

of control of the facility that could be

sufficient to cause radiation exposure

exceeding the dose as described in 10
26956 Federal Register / Vol. 63, No. 94 / Friday, May 15, 1998 /Rules and Regulations

CFR 72.106.’’ The final rule has been

modified accordingly.

With regard to protection against the

malevolent use of a land-based vehicle,

NRC has determined, based on the

opinions of expert study and a peer

review of findings, that there is no

compelling justification for requiring a

vehicle barrier as perimeter protection

for spent fuel and high-level radioactive

waste stored under a Part 60 or Part 72

license. Inclusion of an airborne vehicle

was assessed for possible inclusion into

the protection goal for this rule.

However, protection against this type of

threat has not yet been determined

appropriate at sites with greater

potential consequences than spent fuel

storage installations. Therefore, this

type of requirement is not included

within the protection goal for this final

rule.

2. Basis for Requirements

Comment. Commenters frequently

questioned the need for tying Part 72

requirements to Part 73. The

commenters assumed that by involving

Part 73 in the rulemaking, it was

implied that the level of physical

protection normally attributed to power

reactors was being required.

Phraseology used in the proposed

requirements, such as using the term

‘‘protected area,’’ (PA) tended to further

foster this impression.

Response. The Commission disagrees

that placing requirements under Part 73

implies any association with the

physical protection requirements for

power reactors. It is noted that Part 73

provides, in one consolidated Part, all of

the requirements for those facilities

needing physical protection. This is one

reason why an explicit requirement for

the protection of spent fuel and highlevel radioactive waste is being added to

Part 73. Part 73 includes more stringent

requirements for power reactor and

Category I fuel cycle facilities and much

less stringent requirements for the

protection of Category III facilities. With

regard to use of the term ‘‘protected

area,’’ the Commission has determined

that the term is correctly used in review

of its definition under 10 CFR 73.2.

Nonetheless, the Commission has

reviewed the physical protection

terminology found in the final rule to

ensure that it does not imply a different

level of physical protection than

intended.

3. Level of Physical Protection Needed

Comment. Some commenters

expressed the opinion that the level of

physical protection described by the

proposed amendments was unnecessary

and overly burdensome. The industry

group noted that what was truly needed

was a level of physical protection

comparable to ‘‘enhanced industrial

security.’’ Cited examples of this type of

protection were: use of suitable fencing,

locked access points, sufficient

illumination, and periodic security

patrols. Other commenters questioned

the need for some of the redundancy

that was included in the proposed rule.

One citizen’s group believed that

physical protection measures should be

more stringent than those described in

the proposed rule.

Response. The Commission believes

that the appropriate level of physical

protection for spent fuel and high-level

radioactive waste lies somewhere

between industrial-grade security and

the level that is required at operating

power reactors. The Commission also

notes that the nature of spent fuel and

of its storage mechanisms offers unique

advantages in protecting the material.

This factor, along with revised

consequence considerations, leads the

Commission to conclude that physical

protection at sites where spent fuel and

high-level radioactive waste are stored

under a 10 CFR Part 60 or 72 license can

be more flexibly applied than

previously proposed. Accordingly, the

final rule has been revised to minimize

redundancy and add flexibility. Specific

changes are outlined in Section III,

‘‘Summary of Specific Changes Made to

the Proposed Rule as a Result of Public

Comment.’’

4. Backfit and Regulatory Analysis

Comment. NEI and a few licensees

commented that the proposed regulation

imposes a generic backfit as defined

under 10 CFR 50.109 and 72.62. The

NRC asserted in the proposed rule that

the amendments merely codified and

standardized physical protection

measures that, through license

amendment, were already in place at

existing sites. Hence, it was concluded

that no backfit was involved.

Commenters further stated that, in terms

of backfit requirements, the cost to

implement the proposed rule was not

justified based on the potential increase

in protection that the rule would afford

public health and safety.

Other commenters specifically

responded to the Regulatory Analysis

that accompanied the rule. These

commenters expressed concern that

certain provisions of the regulatory

analysis could turn into de facto

requirements.

Additionally, it was recommended

that affected sites should be

‘‘grandfathered’’ under any final

rulemaking. Accordingly, these sites

would not be required to meet the

provisions of the new physical

protection rule because an adequate

level of physical protection was already

in place at the site, based on an NRCapproved physical protection plan.

Response. Under the proposed rule,

the Commission stated that the backfit

rule in 10 CFR 50.109 did not apply

because the amendments did not

impose any additional requirements on

Part 50 licensees. Furthermore, the

Commission notes that all references to

Part 50 licensees are deleted in the final

rule.

The Commission further stated that

the backfitting requirements in 10 CFR

72.62 did not apply because the

proposed amendments neither imposed

nor modified procedures or

organizations of ISFSIs licensed under

Part 72. The Commission considers

these statements true based on their

assessment of the proposed regulation

and its intended implementation.

However, on further review, the backfit

rule in 10 CFR 72.62 may be applicable

to one facility which has only one

isolation zone exterior to the perimeter

barrier. The NRC staff has identified

alternative measures currently in place

that provide an equivalent level of

physical protection. The staff does not

intend to require this facility to

establish an interior isolation zone.

Thus, no backfit occurs due to the new

rule. Because 10 CFR 72.62 does not

cover reporting and recordkeeping

requirements, the inclusion of 10 CFR

73.51 in 73.71 event reporting is not a

backfit.

With respect to grandfathering

existing sites, the Commission believes

that implementation of this final rule at

these sites presents no undue burden to

affected licensees and provides a

minimum level of physical protection to

adequately protect the public health and

safety. Accordingly, there is no need for

a grandfathering provision and no

change has been made in the final rule

in response to this comment. The

Commission notes that the Regulatory

Analysis for the final rule has been

revised to reflect changes made in

response to public comment and to

eliminate ambiguities.

5. Rule Language Specifics

Comment. A variety of comments

were received regarding specific rule

terminology. The suggestion was made

that the term ‘‘protected area’’ be

revised to ‘‘ISFSI controlled access

area.’’

Response. As indicated previously in

this notice, the use of the term

‘‘protected area,’’ is consistent with its

definition in 10 CFR 73.2. Furthermore,

because it is the Commission’s position
Federal Register / Vol. 63, No. 94 / Friday, May 15, 1998 /Rules and Regulations 26957

that a site where spent fuel and highlevel radioactive waste is stored be

surrounded by a fence, it is not

considered adequate to call the

enclosure a controlled access area

(CAA). Under 10 CFR 73.2, the

definition of a CAA requires only a

demarcation of the area, not a fence.

Comment. Another commenter

supported the Commission position that

operating power reactor licensees that

store spent fuel under a general license

should have the option of using the

physical protection measures of either

10 CFR 72.212(b)(5) or the proposed 10

CFR 73.51. The commenter also

questioned whether the requirements of

10 CFR 72.182, 72.184, and 72.186

apply to a general license, in addition to

Subpart K. A related question requested

clarification on how general license

holders were to notify NRC regarding

which option they would exercise.

Response. The Commission notes that

a licensee having a Part 50 license does

not fall within the scope of the final

rule. The Commission believes it is

premature to bring these licensees under

the provisions of the final rule because

continued protection for spent fuel in

storage pools at Part 50 sites is currently

under study by the NRC.

Comment. One commenter requested

clarification on the specific exclusion of

an exemption for ISFSIs from the

malevolent use of a vehicle threat

within the design basis threat. The

commenter indicated that it was not

readily apparent and also a cumbersome

process to determine the current exempt

status of an ISFSI under present

regulations.

Response. The Commission agrees

and has revised the text of the rule to

exclude reference to the design basis

threat described under 10 CFR 73.1.

Comment. One commenter questioned

whether the proposed rule would apply

to a permanently shutdown power plant

where spent fuel is stored and the plant

is operating with a Part 50 possessiononly license.

Response. A facility with a Part 50

license is not subject to the provisions

of the final rule. This revision to the

final rule has been made because the

Commission believes it is premature to

include these licensees within the scope

of the rule because continued protection

for spent fuel in storage pools at Part 50

sites is currently under study by the

NRC.

Comment. A commenter requested

clarification on the need for back-up

power for physical protection-related

equipment.

Response. The Commission believes

that affected licensees should not be

vulnerable to loss of offsite power.

Thus, it is necessary for licensees to

assure either continuous operation of

required physical protection equipment

during power failure or to demonstrate

the ability to provide immediate

compensation for such failures.

Comment. Required illumination

levels, assessment techniques, required

frequency of physical protection patrols,

and searches before entry to the PA

were all subjects of comment. A

commenter suggested that illumination

be provided only during periods of

assessment and that the entire PA need

not be illuminated to a level of 0.2

footcandle.

Response. The Commission agrees

that illumination to a 0.2 footcandle

level represents a large operating cost

and may be difficult to achieve, given

cask structure. This provision has been

amended to more clearly indicate that,

while illumination should be

maintained during all periods of

darkness, only an adequate level of

illumination is required within the PA

for the detection assessment means

used. In addition, required performance

capabilities regarding detection are

clarified in the final rule by specifying

the use of active intrusion detection

equipment, as opposed to passive

systems.

Comment. Some commenters noted

that the frequency of patrols should

coincide with watchmens’ duty shift

lengths, as opposed to once every eight

hours as recommended in the proposed

rule.

Response. The Commission does not

agree that the frequency of patrols

should coincide with duty shift lengths.

However, the Commission agrees that

some flexibility can be provided.

Accordingly, this provision of the final

rule is revised to require daily random

patrols, only.

Comment. Licensees cited the burden

of maintaining expensive and delicate

explosives detection equipment to meet

the proposed requirement for explosives

searches conducted before entry to the

PA.

Response. The Commission agrees. To

clarify this issue, the Commission has

revised the proposed rule to require

only a visual search for explosives.

Because pedestrian and vehicular traffic

is not expected to be high volume at

facilities affected by the rule, this type

of search is not considered an undue

burden to affected licensees.

Furthermore, the amount of explosives

that may cause a radiological release is

not easily concealed.

Comment. Other commenters noted

redundant records retention

requirements in 10 CFR 72.180 and 10

CFR 73.51(c).

Response. This concern has been

corrected in the final rule.

Comment. One commenter noted an

apparent contradiction in the proposed

regulation regarding use of deadly force

in the protection of an ISFSI. The

commenter had been advised by NRC

staff that use of deadly force was not

expected of members of the security

organization at ISFSIs. The commenter

reasoned that this was not consistent

with the requirement to protect against

radiological sabotage under the

proposed rule.

Response. The issue involving the use

of the term radiological sabotage has

been resolved as discussed previously.

Further, the Commission never intended

that onsite physical protection

personnel at an ISFSI would provide a

response to a safeguards event other

than calling for assistance from local

law enforcement or other designated

response force unless their timely

response could not be ensured. The

Commission also notes that 10 CFR

73.51 only calls for unarmed watchmen,

not armed guards.

Comment. Commenters believe that

the requirements for redundant alarm

monitoring stations and specified

staffing levels for the primary alarm

station are overly burdensome and

unnecessary.

Response. The Commission agrees

that the requirement for redundant

alarm stations is excessive. Regarding

alarm monitoring, this provision is

revised in the final rule to require, in

the redundant location, only a summary

indication that an alarm has been

generated. This location need not

necessarily be located onsite and could,

for example, be a simple readout in a

continually-staffed local law

enforcement agency office. This is

contingent on the assurance that

communications with the local law

enforcement agency or the designated

response force can be maintained.

Regarding required staffing levels of the

primary alarm station, the Commission

has deleted the specific requirement

that the physical protection organization

be comprised of at least two watchmen

from the final rule. This deletion is

contingent on the Commission’s

expectation that a human presence be

maintained in the primary alarm station

at all times. To achieve this, the

Commission clarifies its position that

the primary alarm station must be

located within the PA, be bulletresisting, and be configured such that

activities within the station are not

visible from outside the PA. The intent

of these measures is to ensure that a

single act cannot destroy the capability

of an onsite watchman to call for
26958 Federal Register / Vol. 63, No. 94 / Friday, May 15, 1998 /Rules and Regulations

assistance. The final rule has been

modified accordingly.

Comment. Finally, concerning the

actual terminology and format of the

proposed rule, commenters expressed

support for its performance-based

nature but rejected the set of provisions

under 10 CFR 73.51(d) as being overly

prescriptive.

Response. The Commission responds

that the proposed regulation found in 10

CFR 73.51(d) is needed to provide

additional clarity in meeting the

performance capabilities in 10 CFR

73.51(b) and notes that many of the

physical protection measures described

under 10 CFR 73.51(d) are relaxed in the

final rule and are less prescriptive in a

number of cases.

6. GROA

Comment. Two comments were

received from DOE on the amendments

to Part 60 dealing with the geologic

repository. The first commenter

requested that it be emphasized in the

‘‘Statement of Considerations’’ for the

final rule that the requirement for

physical protection of GROAs be

applicable only during their operational

phases and not after closure.

Response. The Commission agrees

with this observation and has clarified

the exemption in the final rule to

specifically exempt GROAs from the

requirements of 10 CFR 73.51 after

permanent closures.

Comment. The second commenter

requested clarification on apparent

conflicts in Part 60, ‘‘Disposal of HighLevel Radioactive Waste in Geologic

Repositories,’’ regarding the level of

detail required of physical protection

plans during the different phases of the

certification process.

Response. The Commission notes that

NUREG 1619, ‘‘Standard Review Plan

for Physical Protection Plans for the

Independent Storage of Spent Fuel and

High-Level Radioactive Waste,’’ to be

issued concurrently with the effective

date of the final rule, will contain

guidance in this area.

7. NRC Staff-Generated Amendments

Subsequent to publication of the

proposed rule, a technical issue arose

involving the cooling time of spent fuel

as it relates to the degree of physical

protection needed. Because a response

to this issue continues to evolve within

the NRC, the Commission believes it

would be inappropriate to apply the

provisions of the final rule at this time

to a licensee holding a 10 CFR Part 50

license. Hence, licensees holding a 10

CFR Part 50 license are not within the

scope of the final rule. Further, review

indicated that there was some confusion

pertaining to MC&A requirements for

ISFSIs. Specifically, the NRC staff asked

if ISFSIs were exempt from the

requirements of 10 CFR 74.51 and, if

not, why not. Specific MC&A

requirements for ISFSIs are found under

Part 72. After consideration of the issue,

for clarification, the NRC staff has

included an amendment to 10 CFR Part

74 that specifically exempts ISFSIs from

10 CFR 74.51 in the final rule.

8. Summary of Responses to

Commission’s Specific Questions

Question 1. Would the proposed

amendments impose any significant

additional costs for safeguards of

currently stored spent nuclear fuel

beyond what is now incurred for that

purpose?

Summary of Responses. Five

responses from nuclear utilities

specifically addressed this issue. All

indicated that the amendments, as

proposed, would significantly increase

costs. Manpower-intensive measures,

such as the requirement to maintain a

minimum of two watchmen per shift,

were most often cited as creating an

undue burden. One licensee estimated

costs of $1 to $2 million to implement,

and a continuing cost increase of 30–50

percent, annually, to physical protection

operations.

NRC Response. Licensees holding a

10 CFR Part 50 license are no longer

within the scope of this rule. The final

rule has been revised to minimize

redundancy and add flexibility to its

implementation. There should be no

significant increase in cost to current

licensees.

Question 2. Is there reason to expect

the costs to future licensees to differ

substantially from those of current

licensees?

Summary of Responses. Four

responses from nuclear utilities

specifically addressed this issue. Three

utilities cited both higher current and

annual operating costs. One utility

noted that, to the extent that current

licensees have been required to commit

to the practices recommended in the

proposed rule in initial licensing, there

is no anticipated difference in cost.

NRC Response. Licensees holding a

10 CFR Part 50 license are no longer

within the scope of this rule. The final

rule has been amended to be more

consistent with physical protection

implemented at sites with currently

approved physical protection plans.

Hence, there should be no significant

increase in costs to future licensees.

Question 3. Are the cost estimates in

Table III of the Draft Regulatory

Analysis representative of current

industry experience? Are there

significant costs that have not been

included in the table?

Summary of Responses. Three

responses from nuclear utilities

specifically addressed this issue. One

respondent indicated that the cost

estimates in Table III of the ‘‘Draft

Regulatory Analysis’’ are sufficiently

broad to address industry experience.

However, the inclusion of a continual

surveillance system is not covered and

the respondent suggested that it should

be a separate line item. Another

respondent indicated that the cost

estimates appear to be comprehensive

except they do not include construction

and maintenance of physical protection

office space, a records retention area,

and alarm station(s).

NRC Response. The ‘‘Regulatory

Analysis’’ has been revised to reflect

public comment to include any

omissions or changes made to the final

rule.

Question 4. Are the costs justified by

the benefits that would be afforded by

the proposed amendments? Are there

alternatives that would afford

essentially the same benefits but be

more cost effective?

Summary of Responses. Three

responses from nuclear utilities

specifically addressed this issue. All

three indicated that the costs were not

justified by the benefits derived from

the proposed rule. One respondent

stated that the individual measures of

10 CFR 73.51(d) have merit, but, when

taken in aggregate, they are not

necessary to protect public health and

safety. This respondent further stated

that redundancy in the proposed rule

was not needed and the rulemaking

should give affected licensees latitude

in selecting and justifying the means of

physical protection. Alternatives that

were suggested involved the deletion of

specific provisions of the proposed rule

and also the restructuring of the rule so

as to not group all ISFSIs under one set

of physical protection criteria.

NRC Response. The Commission has

revised the requirements of the

proposed rule to eliminate unnecessary

redundancies, add flexibility in

implementation, and reduce manpowerintensive measures while maintaining

an adequate level of physical protection.

Question 5. Are the proposed

amendments to 10 CFR 73.51

appropriate for an MRS or geologic

repository operated by DOE?

Summary of Response. NEI was the

only respondent to this issue. NEI noted

that NRC should be mindful of the

evolving nature of MRS installations

and the geologic repository in the

development of physical protection

regulations for these sites.
Federal Register / Vol. 63, No. 94 / Friday, May 15, 1998 /Rules and Regulations 26959

NRC Response. NRC staff continues to

work closely with DOE staff in the

development of the certification process

for MRS installations and the GROA.

III. Summary of Specific Changes Made

to the Proposed Rule as a Result of

Public Comment

Major changes made to the proposed

rule include:

(1) The incorporation of a protection

goal, and

(2) Regarding required levels of

physical protection, redundancies have

been reduced, flexibility added, and

manpower-for example—

• Regarding alarm monitoring, the

redundant alarm station need only

provide a summary indication at a

continually staffed location;

• Redundant records retention has

been eliminated;

• The required staffing level for the

security organization has been

eliminated and required siting and

configuration of the primary alarm

station clarified;

• Hand-held equipment searches for

explosives are replaced with visual

searches; and

• Illumination levels need only

permit adequate assessment of the PA

according to the assessment means

used. Detection equipment must be

active in nature.

As discussed previously, the final rule

does not apply to a licensee holding a

10 CFR Part 50 license.

A section-by-section comparison of

the proposed and final rules follows.

Part 60—Disposal of High-Level

Radioactive Wastes in Geologic

Repositories

1. Section 60.21, Content of

application. This section is unchanged

from the proposed rule.

2. Section 60.31, Construction

authorization. This section is

unchanged from the proposed rule.

3. Section 60.41, Standards for

issuance of a license. This section is

unchanged from the proposed rule.

4. Section 60.78, Material control and

accounting records and reports. This

section is unchanged from the proposed

rule.

Part 72—Licensing Requirements for the

Independent Storage of Spent Nuclear

Fuel and High-Level Radioactive Waste

5. Section 72.24, Contents of

application: Technical information. This

section is unchanged from the proposed

rule. The term ‘‘radiological sabotage’’ is

based on Part 72 assumptions and not

a Part 100 radiological release.

6. Section 72.180, Physical security

plan. This section is unchanged from

the proposed rule except for changing

the title to Physical Protection Plan to

be consistent with 10 CFR Part 73.

7. Section 72.212, Conditions of

general license issued under § 72.210.

Revisions to this section have been

deleted in their entirety.

Part 73—Physical Protection of Plants

and Materials

8. Section 73.1, Purpose and Scope.

Paragraph (b)(6) is unchanged from the

proposed rule.

9. Section 73.50, Requirements for

physical protection of licensed

activities. This section remains

unchanged from the proposed rule.

10. Section 73.51, Requirements for

the physical protection of stored spent

nuclear fuel and high-level radioactive

waste. Paragraph (a), Applicability, has

been revised to more precisely define

the type of material affected by the rule

and to eliminate 10 CFR Part 50

licensees from the provisions of the

rule.

Paragraph (b)(3), General Performance

Objectives, has been revised to read:

‘‘The physical protection system must

be designed to protect against loss of

control of the facility that could be

sufficient to cause radiation exposure

exceeding the dose as described in 10

CFR 72.106.’’ This revised statement

describes a more appropriate protection

goal that is consistent with Part 72. It

also allows for a physical protection

system less stringent than required to

protect against radiological sabotage at

operating power reactors.

The introductory text of paragraph (d)

has been revised to more clearly

indicate the Commission’s intent that

alternative measures may also be

available for meeting the provisions of

(d). For example, several questions arose

during final rule development as to

whether the use of a hardened and

protected alarm station sited at an

adjacent operating power reactor would

meet the intent of paragraph (d)(3) to

have a hardened alarm station within

the PA of the ISFSI. Staff considers this

to be an acceptable alternative measure

for meeting this provision of the final

rule.

In paragraph (d)(1), the last sentence

has been deleted because it is no longer

necessary due to the revision cited in

the previous paragraph above.

Paragraph (d)(2) has been revised to

read: ‘‘Illumination must be sufficient to

permit adequate assessment of

unauthorized penetrations of or

activities within the protected area.’’

This revision has been made to permit

flexibility in illumination levels.

Paragraph (d)(3) has been revised to

read: ‘‘The perimeter of the protected

area must be subject to continual

surveillance and be protected by an

active intrusion alarm system that is

capable of detecting penetration through

the isolation zone and that is monitored

in a continually staffed primary alarm

station located within the protected

area, and in one additional continually

staffed location to ensure that a single

act cannot destroy the capability of the

onsite watchman to call for assistance.

The primary alarm station must be

located within the protected area; have

bullet-resisting walls, doors, ceiling, and

floor; and the interior of the station

must not be visible from outside the

protected area. A timely means for

assessment must also be provided.

Regarding alarm monitoring, the

redundant location need only provide a

summary indication that an alarm has

been generated.’’ This clarifies the

Commission’s position that the

necessary level of protection should

ensure that a single act cannot destroy

the capability of the onsite watchman to

call for assistance.

Paragraph (d)(4) has been revised to

reduce the frequency of patrol from ‘‘not

less than once every 8 hours’’ to ‘‘daily

random patrols’’ with additional

discussion provided in guidance issued

to support the rule.

Paragraph (d)(5) has been revised to

read: ‘‘A security organization with

written procedures must be established.

The security organization must include

sufficient personnel per shift to provide

for monitoring of detection systems and

the conduct of surveillance, assessment,

access control, and communications to

assure adequate response. Members of

the security organization must be

trained, equipped, qualified and

requalified to perform assigned job

duties in accordance with Appendix B

to Part 73, I.A, (1) (a) and (b); B(1)(a);

and the applicable portions of II.’’ This

change eliminates a required staffing

level and describes qualification and

training levels for watchmen, only, as

the primary members of the security

organization.

Paragraph (d)(6) has been changed to

require ‘‘timely’’ response from the

designated response forces. If timely

response cannot be provided, additional

protective measures may be required, to

include use of armed guards.

Paragraph (d)(7) has been deleted.

Paragraph (d)(8) has been

redesignated as paragraph (d)(7) and

revised to read as follows: ‘‘A personnel

identification system and a controlled

lock system must be established and

maintained to limit access to authorized

individuals.’’ This eliminates the

unnecessary coupling of the

identification system with the system
26960 Federal Register / Vol. 63, No. 94 / Friday, May 15, 1998 /Rules and Regulations

used for key and lock control as

requested by commenters.

Paragraph (d)(9) has been deleted. If a

person is authorized access to the PA,

properly identified, and subject to

search, there is no need for the

individual to be escorted.

Paragraph (d)(10) has been

redesignated as paragraph (d)(8).

Regarding communications, the term

‘‘security organization’’ has been revised

to ‘‘onsite security force members’’ to

more precisely define communication

channels.

Paragraph (d)(11) has been

redesignated as paragraph (d)(9) and

revised to read as follows: ‘‘All

individuals, vehicles and hand-carried

packages entering the protected area

must be checked for proper

authorization and visually searched for

explosives before entry.’’ This is

permissible because the amount of

explosives needed to cause a

radiological release is not easily

concealable.

Paragraph (d)(12) has been

redesignated as paragraph (d)(10). The

text of this paragraph is unchanged from

the proposed rule.

Paragraph (d)(13) has been

redesignated as paragraph (d)(11) and

revised to read as follows: ‘‘All

detection systems, surveillance/

assessment systems, and supporting

subsystems including illumination

systems must be tamper-indicating with

line supervision and be maintained in

operable condition. Timely

compensatory measures must be taken

after discovery of inoperability to assure

that the effectiveness of the physical

protection system is not reduced.’’

Paragraph (d)(14) has been

redesignated as paragraph (d)(12) and

remains unchanged from the proposed

rule.

Paragraph (d)(15) has been

redesignated as paragraph (d)(13). This

provision has been added to assure that

duplication of records under § 72.180 is

not required. Paragraph (d)(13)(ii) has

been revised to read as follows:

‘‘Screening records of members of the

security organization.’’ Finally, the log

of patrols must contain all patrols, not

just routine patrols.

Paragraph (e) has been revised for

clarity.

11. Section 73.71, Reporting of

safeguards events, remains unchanged

from the proposed rule.

Part 74—Material Control and

Accounting of Special Nuclear Material

12. In Section 74.51, Nuclear material

control and accounting for special

nuclear material, paragraph (a) has been

revised to read as follows: ‘‘General

performance objectives. Each licensee

who is authorized to possess five or

more formula kilograms of strategic

special nuclear material (SSNM) and to

use such material at any site, other than

a nuclear reactor licensed pursuant to

Part 50 of this chapter, an irradiated fuel

reprocessing plant, an operation

involved with waste disposal, or an

independent spent fuel storage facility

licensed pursuant to Part 72 of this

chapter, shall establish, implement, and

maintain a Commission approved

material control and accounting (MC&A)

system that will achieve the following

objectives: * * * ’’ This paragraph

specifically exempts Part 72 ISFSIs from

the requirements of 10 CFR 74.51.

Part 75—Safeguards on Nuclear

Material—Implementation of US/IAEA

Agreement

13. Section 75.4, Definitions, remains

unchanged from the proposed rule.

Criminal Penalties

NRC notes that these final

amendments are issued under Sections

161b and i of the Atomic Energy Act of

1954, as amended. Therefore, violation

of these regulations may subject a

person to criminal sanctions under

section 223 of the Atomic Energy Act.

Environmental Impact: Categorical

Exclusion

The Commission has determined that

this final rule is the type of action

described as a categorical exclusion in

10 CFR 51.22(c)(3)(i) and (iii).

Therefore, neither an environmental

impact statement nor an environmental

assessment has been prepared for this

final rule.

Paperwork Reduction Act Statement

This final rule amends information

collection requirements that are subject

to the Paperwork Reduction Act of 1995

(44 U.S.C. 3501 et seq.). These

requirements were approved by the

Office of Management and Budget

(OMB), approval numbers 3150–0002,

3150–0055, 3150–0123, and 3150–0132.

Public Protection Notification

If an information collection does not

display a currently valid OMB control

number, the NRC may not conduct and

a person is not required to respond to,

the information collection.

Regulatory Analysis

The Commission has prepared a

‘‘Final Regulatory Analysis’’ for this

final rule. The final analysis examines

the benefits and alternatives considered

by the Commission. The ‘‘Final

Regulatory Analysis’’ is available for

inspection in the NRC Public Document

room, 2120 L Street NW (Lower Level),

Washington DC. Single copies of the

analysis may be obtained from Priscilla

A. Dwyer, Division of Fuel Cycle Safety

and Safeguards, Office of Nuclear

Material Safety and Safeguards, U.S.

Nuclear Regulatory Commission,

Washington, DC 20555–0001. The

‘‘Final Regulatory Analysis’’ is available

for viewing and downloading from the

NRC’s rulemaking bulletin board.

Regulatory Flexibility Certification

As required by the Regulatory

Flexibility Act, 5 U.S.C. 605(b), the

Commission certifies that this rule does

not have a significant economic impact

on a substantial number of small

entities. The final rule affects operators

of ISFSIs and DOE as the operator of the

MRS and GROA. The affected licensees

do not fall within the scope of the

definition of ‘‘small entities’’ set forth in

Section 601(3) of the Regulatory

Flexibility Act, or the NRC’s size

standards (10 CFR 2.810).

Small Business Regulatory Enforcement

Fairness Act

In accordance with the Small

Business Regulatory Enforcement

Fairness Act of 1996, NRC has

determined that this action is not a

‘‘major rule’’ and has verified this

determination with the Office of

Information and Regulatory Affairs of

OMB.

Backfit Analysis

The Commission has determined that

the backfit rule in 10 CFR 50.109 does

not apply because this final rule does

not impose new requirements on

existing 10 CFR part 50 licensees. The

backfit rule in 10 CFR 72.62 may be

applicable to one facility which has

only one isolation zone exterior to the

perimeter barrier. However, the NRC

staff has identified alternative measures

currently in place that provide an

equivalent level of physical protection.

The staff does not intend to require this

facility to establish an interior isolation

zone. Thus, no backfit occurs due to the

new rule. Because 10 CFR 72.62 does

not cover reporting and recordkeeping

requirements, the inclusion of 10 CFR

73.51 in 10 CFR 73.71 event reporting

is not a backfit. Finally, the transfer of

spent fuel from a reactor, licensed under

10 CFR part 50 and subject to 10 CFR

73.55 physical protection requirements,

to an ISFSI licensed under 10 CFR part

72, and its associated physical

protection provisions (e.g., 10 CFR

73.51) is not a backfit. A new license

under 10 CFR art 72 is a matter of

compliance with regulations. In all
Federal Register / Vol. 63, No. 94 / Friday, May 15, 1998 /Rules and Regulations 26961

cases, transition from 10 CFR 73.55 to

73.51 is a relaxation of requirements

and not a backfit.

List of Subjects

10 CFR Part 60

Criminal penalties, High-level waste,

Nuclear power plants and reactors,

Nuclear materials, Reporting and

recordkeeping requirements, Waste

treatment and disposal.

10 CFR Part 72

Manpower training programs, Nuclear

materials, Occupational safety and

health, Reporting and recordkeeping

requirements, Security measures, Spent

fuel.

10 CFR Part 73

Criminal penalties, Hazardous

materials transportation, Export, Import,

Nuclear materials, Nuclear power plants

and reactors, Reporting and

recordkeeping requirements, Security

measures.

10 CFR Part 74

Accounting, Criminal penalties,

Hazardous materials transportation,

Material control and accounting,

Nuclear materials, Packaging and

containers, Radiation protection,

Reporting and recordkeeping

requirements, Scientific equipment,

Special nuclear material.

10 CFR Part 75

Criminal penalties, Intergovernmental

relations, Nuclear materials, Nuclear

power plants and reactors, Reporting

and recordkeeping requirements,

Security measures.

For the reasons set out in the

preamble and under the authority of the

Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended,

the Energy Reorganization Act of 1974,

as amended, and 5 U.S.C. 552 and 553

the NRC is adopting the following

amendments to 10 CFR parts 60, 72, 73,

74, and 75.

PART 60—DISPOSAL OF HIGH-LEVEL

RADIOACTIVE WASTES IN GEOLOGIC

REPOSITORIES

1. The authority citation for part 60

continues to read as follows:

Authority: Secs. 51, 53, 62, 63, 65, 81, 161,

182, 183, 68 Stat. 929, 930, 932, 933, 935,

948, 953, 954, as amended (42 U.S.C. 2071,

2073, 2092, 2093, 2095, 2111, 2201, 2232,

2233); secs. 202, 206, 88 Stat. 1244, 1246 (42

U.S.C. 5842, 5846); secs. 10 and 14, Pub. L.

95–601, 92 Stat. 2951 (42 U.S.C. 2021a and

5851); sec. 102, Pub. L. 91–190, 83 Stat. 853

(42 U.S.C. 4332); secs. 114, 121, Pub. L. 97–

425, 96 Stat. 2213g, 2228, as amended (42

U.S.C. 10134, 10141) and Pub. L. 102–486,

sec 2902, 106 Stat. 3123 (42 U.S.C. 5851).

2. In § 60.21, paragraphs (b)(3), (b)(4),

and (c)(10) are revised to read as

follows:

§ 60.21 Content of application.

* * * * *

(b) * * *

(3) A detailed plan to provide

physical protection of high-level

radioactive waste in accordance with

§ 73.51 of this chapter. This plan must

include the design for physical

protection, the licensee’s safeguards

contingency plan, and security

organization personnel training and

qualification plan. The plan must list

tests, inspections, audits, and other

means to be used to demonstrate

compliance with such requirements.

(4) A description of the program to

meet the requirements of § 60.78.

* * * * *

(c) * * *

(10) A description of the program to

be used to maintain the records

described in §§ 60.71 and 60.72.

* * * * *

3. In § 60.31, paragraph (b) is revised

to read as follows:

§ 60.31 Construction authorization.

* * * * *

(b) Common defense and security.

That there is reasonable assurance that

the activities proposed in the

application will not be inimical to the

common defense and security.

* * * * *

4. In § 60.41, paragraph (c) is revised

to read as follows:

§ 60.41 Standards for issuance of license.

* * * * *

(c) The issuance of the license will

not be inimical to the common defense

and security and will not constitute an

unreasonable risk to the health and

safety of the public.

* * * * *

5. A new § 60.78 is added to read as

follows:

§ 60.78 Material control and accounting

records and reports.

DOE shall implement a program of

material control and accounting (and

accidental criticality reporting) that is

the same as that specified in §§ 72.72,

72.74, 72.76, and 72.78 of this chapter.

PART 72—LICENSING

REQUIREMENTS FOR THE

INDEPENDENT STORAGE OF SPENT

NUCLEAR FUEL AND HIGH-LEVEL

RADIOACTIVE WASTE

6. The authority citation for part 72

continues to read as follows:

Authority: Secs. 51, 53, 57, 62, 63, 65, 69,

81, 161, 182, 183, 184, 186, 187, 189, 68 Stat.

929, 930, 932, 933, 934, 935, 948, 953, 954,

955, as amended, sec. 234, 83 Stat. 444, as

amended (42 U.S.C. 2071, 2073, 2077, 2092,

2093, 2095, 2099, 2111, 2201, 2232, 2233,

2234, 2236, 2237, 2238, 2282); sec. 274, Pub.

L. 86–373, 73 Stat. 688, as amended (42

U.S.C. 2021); sec. 201, as amended, 202, 206,

88 Stat. 1242, as amended, 1244, 1246 (42

U.S.C. 5841, 5842, 5846); Pub. L. 95–601, sec.

10, 92 Stat. 2951 as amended by Pub. L. 102–

486, sec. 7902, 106 Stat. 3123 (42 U.S.C.

5851); sec. 102, Pub. L. 91–190, 83 Stat. 853

(42 U.S.C. 4332); secs. 131, 132, 133, 135,

137, 141, Pub. L. 97–425, 96 Stat. 2229, 2230,

2232, 2241, sec. 148, Pub. L. 100–203, 101

Stat. 1330–235 (42 U.S.C. 10151, 10152,

10153, 10155, 10157, 10161, 10168).

Section 72.44(g) also issued under

secs. 142(b) and 148(c), (d), Pub. L. 100–

203, 101 Stat. 1330–232, 1330–236 (42

U.S.C. 10162(b), 10168 (c), (d)). Section

72.46 also issued under sec. 189, 68

Stat. 955 (42 U.S.C. 2239); sec. 134, Pub.

L. 97–425, 96 Stat. 2230 (42 U.S.C.

10154). Section 72.96(d) also issued

under sec. 145(g), Pub. L. 100–203, 101

Stat. 1330–235 (42 U.S.C. 10165(g)).

Subpart J also issued under secs. 2(2),

2(15), 2(19), 117(a), 141(h), Pub. L. 97–

425, 96 Stat. 2202, 2203, 2204, 2222,

2224 (42 U.S.C. 10101, 10137(a),

10161(h)). Subparts K and L are also

issued under sec. 133, 98 Stat. 2230 (42

U.S.C. 10153) and sec. 218(a), 96 Stat.

2252 (42 U.S.C. 10198).

7. In § 72.24, paragraph (o) is revised

to read as follows:

§ 72.24 Contents of application; Technical

information.

* * * * *

(o) A description of the detailed

security measures for physical

protection, including design features

and the plans required by subpart H. For

an application from DOE for an ISFSI or

MRS, DOE will provide a description of

the physical protection plan for

protection against radiological sabotage

as required by subpart H.

* * * * *

8. Section 72.180 is revised to read as

follows:

§ 72.180 Physical protection plan.

The licensee shall establish, maintain,

and follow a detailed plan for physical

protection as described in § 73.51 of this

chapter. The licensee shall retain a copy

of the current plan as a record until the

Commission terminates the license for

which the procedures were developed

and, if any portion of the plan is

superseded, retain the superseded

material for 3 years after each change or

until termination of the license. The

plan must describe how the applicant

will meet the requirements of § 73.51 of

this chapter and provide physical

protection during on-site transportation
26962 Federal Register / Vol. 63, No. 94 / Friday, May 15, 1998 /Rules and Regulations

to and from the proposed ISFSI or MRS

and include within the plan the design

for physical protection, the licensee’s

safeguards contingency plan, and the

security organization personnel training

and qualification plan. The plan must

list tests, inspections, audits, and other

means to be used to demonstrate

compliance with such requirements.

PART 73—PHYSICAL PROTECTION OF

PLANTS AND MATERIALS

9. The authority citation for part 73

continues to read as follows:

Authority: Secs. 53, 161, 68 Stat. 930, 948,

as amended, sec. 147, 94 Stat. 780 (42 U.S.C.

2073, 2167, 2201); sec. 201, as amended, 204,

88 Stat. 1242, as amended, 1245, sec. 1701,

106 Stat. 2951, 2952, 2953 (42 U.S.C. 5841,

5844, 2297f).

Section 73.1 also issued under secs.

135, 141, Pub. L. 97–425, 96 Stat. 2232,

2241 (42 U.S.C, 10155, 10161). Section

73.37(f) also issued under sec. 301, Pub.

L. 96–295, 94 Stat. 789 (42 U.S.C. 5841

note). Section 73.57 is issued under sec.

606, Pub. L. 99–399, 100 Stat. 876 (42

U.S.C. 2169).

10. In § 73.1, paragraph (b)(6) is

revised to read as follows:

§ 73.1 Purpose and scope.

* * * * *

(b) * * *

(6) This part prescribes requirements

for the physical protection of spent

nuclear fuel and high-level radioactive

waste stored in either an independent

spent fuel storage installation (ISFSI) or

a monitored retrievable storage (MRS)

installation licensed under part 72 of

this chapter, or stored at the geologic

repository operations area licensed

under part 60 of this chapter.

* * * * *

11. The introductory text of § 73.50 is

revised to read as follows:

§ 73.50 Requirements for physical

protection for licensed activities.

Each licensee who is not subject to

§ 73.51, but who possesses, uses, or

stores formula quantities of strategic

special nuclear material that are not

readily separable from other radioactive

material and which have total external

radiation dose rates in excess of 100

rems per hour at a distance of 3 feet

from any accessible surfaces without

intervening shielding other than at a

nuclear reactor facility licensed

pursuant to part 50 of this chapter, shall

comply with the following:

* * * * *

12. A new § 73.51 is added to read as

follows:

§ 73.51 Requirements for the physical

protection of stored spent nuclear fuel and

high-level radioactive waste.

(a) Applicability. Notwithstanding the

provisions of §§ 73.20, 73.50, or 73.67,

the physical protection requirements of

this section apply to each licensee that

stores spent nuclear fuel and high-level

radioactive waste pursuant to

paragraphs (a)(1)(i), (ii), and (2) of this

section. This includes—

(1) Spent nuclear fuel and high-level

radioactive waste stored under a

specific license issued pursuant to part

72 of this chapter:

(i) At an independent spent fuel

storage installation (ISFSI) or

(ii) At a monitored retrievable storage

(MRS) installation; or

(2) Spent nuclear fuel and high-level

radioactive waste at a geologic

repository operations area (GROA)

licensed pursuant to part 60 of this

chapter;

(b) General performance objectives.

(1) Each licensee subject to this section

shall establish and maintain a physical

protection system with the objective of

providing high assurance that activities

involving spent nuclear fuel and highlevel radioactive waste do not constitute

an unreasonable risk to public health

and safety.

(2) To meet the general objective of

paragraph (b)(1) of this section, each

licensee subject to this section shall

meet the following performance

capabilities.

(i) Store spent nuclear fuel and highlevel radioactive waste only within a

protected area;

(ii) Grant access to the protected area

only to individuals who are authorized

to enter the protected area;

(iii) Detect and assess unauthorized

penetration of, or activities within, the

protected area;

(iv) Provide timely communication to

a designated response force whenever

necessary; and

(v) Manage the physical protection

organization in a manner that maintains

its effectiveness.

(3) The physical protection system

must be designed to protect against loss

of control of the facility that could be

sufficient to cause a radiation exposure

exceeding the dose as described in

§ 72.106 of this chapter.

(c) Plan retention. Each licensee

subject to this section shall retain a copy

of the effective physical protection plan

as a record for 3 years or until

termination of the license for which

procedures were developed.

(d) Physical protection systems,

components, and procedures. A licensee

shall comply with the following

provisions as methods acceptable to

NRC for meeting the performance

capabilities of § 73.51(b)(2). The

Commission may, on a specific basis

and upon request or on its own

initiative, authorize other alternative

measures for the protection of spent fuel

and high-level radioactive waste subject

to the requirements of this section, if

after evaluation of the specific

alternative measures, it finds reasonable

assurance of compliance with the

performance capabilities of paragraph

(b)(2) of this section.

(1) Spent nuclear fuel and high-level

radioactive waste must be stored only

within a protected area so that access to

this material requires passage through or

penetration of two physical barriers, one

barrier at the perimeter of the protected

area and one barrier offering substantial

penetration resistance. The physical

barrier at the perimeter of the protected

area must be as defined in § 73.2.

Isolation zones, typically 20 feet wide

each, on both sides of this barrier, must

be provided to facilitate assessment. The

barrier offering substantial resistance to

penetration may be provided by an

approved storage cask or building walls

such as those of a reactor or fuel storage

building.

(2) Illumination must be sufficient to

permit adequate assessment of

unauthorized penetrations of or

activities within the protected area.

(3) The perimeter of the protected area

must be subject to continual

surveillance and be protected by an

active intrusion alarm system which is

capable of detecting penetrations

through the isolation zone and that is

monitored in a continually staffed

primary alarm station and in one

additional continually staffed location.

The primary alarm station must be

located within the protected area; have

bullet-resisting walls, doors, ceiling, and

floor; and the interior of the station

must not be visible from outside the

protected area. A timely means for

assessment of alarms must also be

provided. Regarding alarm monitoring,

the redundant location need only

provide a summary indication that an

alarm has been generated.

(4) The protected area must be

monitored by daily random patrols.

(5) A security organization with

written procedures must be established.

The security organization must include

sufficient personnel per shift to provide

for monitoring of detection systems and

the conduct of surveillance, assessment,

access control, and communications to

assure adequate response. Members of

the security organization must be

trained, equipped, qualified, and

requalified to perform assigned job

duties in accordance with appendix B to
Federal Register / Vol. 63, No. 94 / Friday, May 15, 1998 /Rules and Regulations 26963

part 73, sections I.A, (1) (a) and (b),

B(1)(a), and the applicable portions of II.

(6) Documented liaison with a

designated response force or local law

enforcement agency (LLEA) must be

established to permit timely response to

unauthorized penetration or activities.

(7) A personnel identification system

and a controlled lock system must be

established and maintained to limit

access to authorized individuals.

(8) Redundant communications

capability must be provided between

onsite security force members and

designated response force or LLEA.

(9) All individuals, vehicles, and

hand-carried packages entering the

protected area must be checked for

proper authorization and visually

searched for explosives before entry.

(10) Written response procedures

must be established and maintained for

addressing unauthorized penetration of,

or activities within, the protected area

including Category 5, ‘‘Procedures,’’ of

appendix C to part 73. The licensee

shall retain a copy of response

procedures as a record for 3 years or

until termination of the license for

which the procedures were developed.

Copies of superseded material must be

retained for 3 years after each change or

until termination of the license.

(11) All detection systems,

surveillance/assessment systems, and

supporting subsystems, including

illumination systems, must be tamperindicating with line supervision and be

maintained in operable condition.

Timely compensatory measures must be

taken after discovery of inoperability, to

assure that the effectiveness of the

security system is not reduced.

(12) The physical protection program

must be reviewed once every 24 months

by individuals independent of both

physical protection program

management and personnel who have

direct responsibility for implementation

of the physical protection program. The

physical protection program review

must include an evaluation of the

effectiveness of the physical protection

system and a verification of the liaison

established with the designated

response force or LLEA.

(13) The following documentation

must be retained as a record for 3 years

after the record is made or until

termination of the license. Duplicate

records to those required under § 72.180

of part 72 and § 73.71 of this part need

not be retained under the requirements

of this section:

(i) A log of individuals granted access

to the protected area;

(ii) Screening records of members of

the security organization;

(iii) A log of all patrols;

(iv) A record of each alarm received,

identifying the type of alarm, location,

date and time when received, and

disposition of the alarm; and

(v) The physical protection program

review reports.

(e) A licensee that operates a GROA

is exempt from the requirements of this

section for that GROA after permanent

closure of the GROA.

13. In § 73.71, paragraphs (b)(1) and

(c) are revised to read as follows:

§ 73.71 Reporting of safeguards events.

* * * * *

(b)(1) Each licensee subject to the

provisions of §§ 73.20, 73.37, 73.50,

73.51, 73.55, 73.60, or 73.67 shall notify

the NRC Operations Center within 1

hour of discovery of the safeguards

events described in paragraph I(a)(1) of

appendix G to this part. Licensees

subject to the provisions of §§ 73.20,

73.37, 73.50, 73.51, 73.55, 73.60, or each

licensee possessing strategic special

nuclear material and subject to

§ 73.67(d) shall notify the NRC

Operations Center within 1 hour after

discovery of the safeguards events

described in paragraphs I(a)(2), (a)(3),

(b), and (c) of appendix G to this part.

Licensees subject to the provisions of

§§ 73.20, 73.37, 73.50, 73.51, 73.55, or

73.60 shall notify the NRC Operations

Center within 1 hour after discovery of

the safeguards events described in

paragraph I(d) of appendix G to this

part.

* * * * *

(c) Each licensee subject to the

provisions of §§ 73.20, 73.37, 73.50,

73.51, 73.55, 73.60, or each licensee

possessing SSNM and subject to the

provisions of § 73.67(d) shall maintain a

current log and record the safeguards

events described in paragraphs II (a) and

(b) of appendix G to this part within 24

hours of discovery by a licensee

employee or member of the licensee’s

contract security organization. The

licensee shall retain the log of events

recorded under this section as a record

for 3 years after the last entry is made

in each log or until termination of the

license.

* * * * *

PART 74—MATERIAL CONTROL AND

ACCOUNTING OF SPECIAL NUCLEAR

MATERIAL

14. The authority citation for part 74

continues to read as follows:

Authority: Secs. 53, 57, 161, 182, 183, 68

Stat. 930, 932, 948, 953, 954, as amended,

sec. 234, 83 Stat. 444, as amended (42 U.S.C.

2073, 2077, 2201, 2232, 2233, 2282, 2297f);

secs. 201, as amended 202, 206, 88 Stat.

1242, as amended, 1244, 1246 (42 U.S.C.

5841, 5842, 5846).

15. In § 74.51, the introductory text of

paragraph (a) is revised to read as

follows:

§ 74.51 Nuclear material control and

accounting for special nuclear material.

(a) General performance objectives.

Each licensee who is authorized to

possess five or more formula kilograms

of strategic special nuclear material

(SSNM) and to use such material at any

site, other than a nuclear reactor

licensed pursuant to part 50 of this

chapter, an irradiated fuel reprocessing

plant, an operation involved with waste

disposal, or an independent spent fuel

storage facility licensed pursuant to part

72 of this chapter shall establish,

implement, and maintain a

Commission-approved material control

and accounting (MC&A) system that will

achieve the following objectives:

* * * * *

PART 75—SAFEGUARDS ON

NUCLEAR MATERIAL—

IMPLEMENTATION OF US/IAEA

AGREEMENT

16. The authority citation for part 75

continues to read as follows:

Authority: Secs. 53, 63, 103, 104, 122, 161,

68 Stat. 930, 932, 936, 937, 939, 948, as

amended (42 U.S.C. 2073, 2093, 2133, 2134,

2152, 2201); sec. 201, 88 Stat. 1242, as

amended (42 U.S.C. 5841).

Section 75.4 also issued under secs.

135, 141, Pub. L. 97–425, 96 Stat. 2232,

2241 (42 U.S.C. 10155, 10161).

17. In § 75.4, paragraph (k)(5) is

revised to read as follows:

§ 75.4 Definitions.

* * * * *

(k) * * *

(5) Any location where the possession

of more than 1 effective kilogram of

nuclear material is licensed pursuant to

parts 40, 60, or 70 of this chapter, or

pursuant to an agreement state license.

* * * * *

Dated at Rockville, Maryland, this 11th day

of May, 1998.

For the Nuclear Regulatory Commission.

John C. Hoyle,

Secretary of the Commission.

[FR Doc. 98–12978 Filed 5–14–98; 8:45 am]

BILLING CODE 7590–01–P