[Cite as State v. Copeland, 2011-Ohio-6034.]

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS 

FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT OF OHIO 

HAMILTON COUNTY, OHIO 

STATE OF OHIO, 

 Plaintiff-Appellee, 

 vs. 

DEMETRIUS COPELAND, 

 Defendant-Appellant. 

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APPEAL NO. C-110120 

TRIAL NO. B-0304897 

O P I N I O N.

 

Criminal Appeal From: Hamilton County Court of Common Pleas 

 

Judgment Appealed From Is: Cause Remanded 

Date of Judgment Entry on Appeal: November 23, 2011 

Joseph T. Deters, Hamilton County Prosecuting Attorney, and Scott M. Heenan, 

Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, for Plaintiff-Appellee, 

Demetrius Copeland, pro se. 

Please note: We have removed this case from the accelerated calendar.
OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS 

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Per Curiam. 

{¶1} Defendant-appellant Demetrius Copeland appeals from the Hamilton 

County Common Pleas Court’s judgment overruling his “Motion to Vacate a Void 

Sentence.” We remand this case for the proper imposition of postrelease control. 

{¶2} In 2003, Copeland was convicted of carrying concealed weapons, 

having weapons under a disability, and six counts of aggravated robbery. He 

unsuccessfully challenged his convictions in appeals to this court and to the Ohio 

Supreme Court. See State v. Copeland (Oct. 27, 2004), 1st Dist. No. C-030907, 

appeals not accepted for review, 105 Ohio St.3d 1463, 2005-Ohio-1024, 824 N.E.2d 

91; 106 Ohio St.3d 1487, 2005-Ohio-3978, 832 N.E.2d 739. 

{¶3} In February 2010, he filed with the common pleas court a motion 

seeking a new sentencing hearing on the ground that his sentence was void because 

the trial court had failed to adequately notify him concerning postrelease control. On 

appeal, Copeland presents a single assignment of error challenging the overruling of 

this motion. The challenge is well taken. 

{¶4} In State v. Bloomer, 122 Ohio St.3d 200, 2009-Ohio-2462, 909 N.E.2d 

1254, the Ohio Supreme Court declared that “the most basic requirement” of the 

postrelease-control statutes and the court’s postrelease-control decisions is that a 

sentencing court must “notify the offender of the mandatory nature of the term of 

postrelease control and the length of that mandatory term and incorporate that 

notification in its entry.” Id. at ¶69. Thus, in sentencing Copeland for the aggravated 

robberies, all first-degree felonies, the trial court was required to notify Copeland, 

both at sentencing and in his judgment of conviction, that upon his release from 

prison, he would be subject to a mandatory five-year period of postrelease-control 
OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS 

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supervision. See R.C. 2929.19(B)(3)(c); R.C. 2967.28(B)(1); State v. Jordan, 104 

Ohio St.3d 21, 2004-Ohio-6085, 817 N.E.2d 864, paragraph one of the syllabus. And 

in sentencing him for the fourth-degree felony of carrying concealed weapons and for 

the fifth-degree felony of having weapons under a disability, the court was required 

to notify Copeland, both at sentencing and in his judgment of conviction, that upon 

his release from prison, he could be subject to up to three years of postreleasecontrol supervision. See R.C. 2929.19(B)(3)(d); R.C. 2967.28(C); Jordan, 104 Ohio 

St.3d 21, paragraph one of the syllabus. 

{¶5} At Copeland’s sentencing hearing and in his judgment of conviction, 

the trial court failed to specify the duration of each period of postrelease control 

imposed and failed to notify Copeland concerning the mandatory nature of the 

postrelease-control periods imposed for the aggravated robberies. To the extent that 

the court did not adequately notify Copeland concerning postrelease control, his 

sentences are void, and he is “entitled * * * to the proper imposition of postrelease 

control.” State v. Fischer, 128 Ohio St.3d 92, 2010-Ohio-6238, 942 N.E.2d 332, 

paragraphs one and two of the syllabus; see, e.g., State v. Truitt, 1st Dist. No. C050188, 2011-Ohio-1885, ¶19; State v. Thomas, 1st Dist. Nos. C-100411 and C100412, 2011-Ohio-1331; State v. Brown, 1st Dist. No. C-100050, 2010-Ohio-4599, 

¶13. 

{¶6} Copeland did not assign this matter as error in his direct appeal from 

his convictions. He instead presented the challenge in a postconviction motion for 

resentencing. But when a sentence is void to the extent that it was not imposed in 

conformity with the statutory mandates concerning postrelease control, and the 

matter has come to the attention of a court, whether on direct appeal or in a 
OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS 

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collateral challenge, the court “cannot ignore” the matter, State v. Boswell, 121 Ohio 

St.3d 575, 2009-Ohio-1577, 906 N.E.2d 422, ¶12; see, also, State v. Simpkins, 117 

Ohio St.3d 420, 2008-Ohio-1197, 884 N.E.2d 568, ¶23, and “the offending portion of 

the sentence is subject to review and correction.” Fischer, 128 Ohio St.3d 92, 

paragraph one of the syllabus and ¶27; accord Truitt, supra, at ¶20. 

{¶7} Copeland’s sentences are void to the extent that he was not adequately 

notified concerning postrelease control. Because his motion for resentencing 

brought this matter to the attention of the common pleas court, the court erred in 

overruling the motion. We, therefore, sustain the assignment of error and remand 

this case for correction of the offending portions of his sentences in accordance with 

the law and this opinion. 

Cause remanded. 

DINKELACKER, P.J., HILDEBRANDT and SUNDERMANN, JJ.

Please note: 

 The court has recorded its own entry on the date of the release of this opinion.