1 Filed 12/12/13 P. v. Clark CA4/2 NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115. IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA FOURTH APPELL ATE DISTRICT DIVISION TWO

THE PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent,

v. QUINTERRIOUS RU SSELL CLARK, Defendant and Appellant. E057786 (Super.Ct.No. RIF1202006) OPINION

APPEAL from the Superior Court of Riverside County. Thomas D. Glasser, Judge. (Retired judge of the San Bernardino Super. Ct. assigned by the Chief Justice pursuant to art. VI, § 6 of the Cal. Const.) Affirmed. Richard L. Fitzer, under appointment by the Court of Appeal , for Defendant and Appellant. Kamala D. Harris, Attorney General, Da ne R. Gillette, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Julie L. Garland, Assistant Atto rney General, Natasha Cortina and Barry Carlton, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.2 Defendant Quinterrious Clark was convic ted after a jury trial on one count of annoying or molesting Jane Doe, a child un der the age of 18 years old (Pen. Code, § 647.6, subd. (a)(1)), 1 and on one count of receiving stol en property (§ 496, subd. (a)). The jury also found true an allegation th at defendant suffered a prior conviction for annoying or molesting a child under the age of 18 years ol d, such that the current conviction was punishable by im prisonment in state prison. (§ 647.6, subd. (c)(1).) The trial court sentenced defendant to a total of 10 years and 4 months in state prison. On appeal, defendant argues his convic tion for annoying and molesting a child under the age of 18 years old must be reve rsed because the pros ecution introduced no evidence that he was motivated by an unnatural or abnormal sexual interest in the victim when he touched her wrist. Because a reas onable jury could conclude that defendant’s conduct was motivated by an unnatural or abnormal sexual intere st in the underage victim, we affirm. F ACTUAL B ACKGROUND Jane Doe and her friend K. went to the Galle ria at Tyler to pick up applications for summer jobs. After getting two or three applic ations, Jane Doe called her father to come pick up her and K. from the mall. The girl s sat on a planter outside the mall as they waited for their ride. While seated there, Ja ne Doe saw defendant ride by on his bicycle about 12 to 15 feet away in the street. As he rode by, defendant said “hi” to the girls.

1 All additional undesignated statutory re ferences shall be to the Penal Code.3 Jane Doe had never before seen or met defendant, and she did not engage him in conversation or say hello back wh en defendant first rode by. A short while later, defendant walked b ack without his bicycl e to where the girls were seated and started talking to them. Defendant walked right up to Jane Doe and stood closely in front of her. Defendant aske d the girls if they had any telephones, asked if they had a charger he could use to charge his cellular phone, an d showed them three cellular phones he had with him. Jane Doe thought that defendan t was “hitting” on her because she “didn’t know him, so he shou ldn’t have asked me if I had a phone.” Defendant told Jane Doe that she “was pretty and that [her] hair was attractive,” which Jane Doe thought was “weird” and “creepy” b ecause he was a stranger and “much older” than her. Defendant then grabbed Jane Doe’s right wrist, looked at her gold bracelet, asked if it was handmade, and told he r he sold gold. Defendant also asked Jane Doe what kind of music she listens to. Jane Doe was scared and in shock as defe ndant held her wrist, and she thought defendant wa s “hitting on” her. Defendant held Jane Doe’s wrist for about a minute and rubbed it, which caused Jane Doe to feel disgusted and scared. Jane Doe did not tell defendant to leave her alone because she was scared and thought something might happen to her. Defendant then sat down next to Jane Do e on the planter. Jane Doe was scared that defendant might “do something that he shouldn’t be doing,” so she pretended to make a phone call to her cousin. Jane Doe and K. got up from th e planter and walked4 back inside the mall. Jane Doe looked back to make sure defendant did not follow them. Defendant also walked in to the mall, but he turn ed to walk in the opposite direction of the girls. Jane Doe did not no tice if defendant was looking for them or watching them. When Jane Doe’s father arrived at the mall he noticed that his daughter looked scared and upset. Jane Doe told him what happened and pointed out defendant to her father. Jane Doe’s father then confronted defendant, who told him he bought and sold gold and meant nothing by touching her hand. Jane Doe’s father told defendant not to leave and told Jane Doe to call the police. Jane Doe told th e 911 operator that defendant grabbed her hand. When asked, Jane Doe told the operator that defendant did not touch her “sexually” because she thought the opera tor “meant like touched me in my private parts, so I said, no, he didn’t.” D ISCUSSION “‘When considering a challenge to the su fficiency of the evid ence to support a conviction, we review the entir e record in the light most fa vorable to the judgment to determine whether it contains substantial evid ence—that is, evidence that is reasonable, credible, and of solid value—from which a reasonable trier of fact could find the defendant guilty beyond a reas onable doubt.’ [Citation.] We determine ‘whether, after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.’ [Citation.] In so doing, a reviewing court ‘presumes in support of the judgment the5 existence of every fact the trier could reason ably deduce from the evidence.’ [Citation.]” ( People v. Edwards (2013) 57 Cal.4th 658, 715.) “‘“‘Although it is the duty of the jury to acquit a defendant if it finds that circumstantial evidence is susceptible of two interpretations, one of which suggests guilt and the other innocence [citations ], it is the jury, not the appe llate court[,] which must be convinced of the defe ndant’s guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. “‘If the circumstances reasonably justify the trier of fact’s findings, the opinion of the re viewing court that the circumstances might also reasonably be re conciled with a cont rary finding does not warrant a reversal of the judgment.’” [Cita tions.]’” [Citation.]’ [Citation.]” ( People v. Harris (2013) 57 Cal.4th 804, 849-850.) “‘The primary purpose of [section 647. 6] is the “protection of children from interference by sexual offenders, and the appr ehension, segregation and punishment of the latter.” [Citations .]’ [Citations.]” ( In re Gladys R. (1970) 1 Cal.3d 855, 868.) Section 647.6 “does not require a touching [citation] but does require (1) conduct a ‘“normal person would unhesitatingly be irr itated by”’ [citations], and (2) conduct ‘“motivated by an unnatural or abnormal sexual intere st”’ in the victim [citations].” ( People v. Lopez (1998) 19 Cal.4th 282, 2 89.) “[T]here can be no normal sexual interest in any child and it is the sexual interest in the child that is the focus of the statute’s intent.” ( People v. Shaw (2009) 177 Cal.App.4th 92, 103.) Section 647.6 “contemplates a crime more serious than an indiscreet gesture, public nuisance, or sexual indiscretion.” ( People v. Tate (1985) 164 Cal.App.3d 133,6 138.) “For the most part, . . . section 647. 6 has been applied to incidents of explicit sexual conduct, where a defendant: fondled a minor’s genitals and had her touch his genitals [citation]; touched a minor’s genitals through her clothing [citation]; fondled and had sexual intercourse with a minor [citations]; solicited a sex act from a minor [citation]; grasped a minor by her buttocks and rubbed hi mself against her body [citation]; exhibited his genitals to a minor [citation].” ( People v. Kongs (1994) 30 Cal.A pp.4th 1741, 1750 ( Kongs ).) In those cases, the outward conduct its elf was strong evidence of an unnatural or abnormal sexual interest in the child. But section 647.6 is not limited to explicit lewd acts ( People v. Thompson (1988) 206 Cal.App. 3d 459, 464-466; see People v. Memro (1995) 11 Cal.4th 786, 871), and convictions under that st atute have been upheld even when the defendant’s conduct was outward ly “ambiguous” but still evidenced the requisite motive ( Kongs , supra , 30 Cal.App.4th at p. 1750). Defendant does not dispute that he grabbe d and rubbed the underage Jane Doe’s wrist and concedes that a normal person woul d unhesitatingly be di sturbed, irritated, offended, or injured by his conduct. He only disputes the sufficiency of the evidence that his conduct was motivated by an unnatural or abnormal sexual interest in Jane Doe. According to defendant, “not only was ther e insufficient evidence of an unnatural or abnormal motivation, the evidence adduced at trial clearly indicated there was no such motivation.” We disagree. Jane Doe testified that defendant, a co mplete stranger whom she had never met, rode past her and her friend K. and said “hi.” Shortly thereaf ter he walked back to where7 the girls were seated and started talking to them and asking whether they had cellular telephones with them. This left Jane Doe with the impression that he was “hitting” on her, communicating her perception of defendant’s sexual intent. Had that been the extent of defendant’s acts, we might agree with him because section 647.6 does not criminalize friendly conduct with children. (See People v. Carskaddon (1957) 49 Cal.2d 423, 426.) But defendant was more than ju st friendly with Jane Doe. Defendant told Jane Doe she was “pretty” and that she had “attractive” hair. Jane Doe felt this at tention from an older man whom she had never met was “weird” an d “creepy.” After approaching Jane Doe and grabbing her wrist, defendant held on to her wr ist long enough to imply a sexual interest. Defendant also rubbed Jane Doe’s wrist, which left her shocked, scared, and disgusted, and confirmed he r view that defendant was “hitting” on her. Finally, defendant sat down next to Jane Doe uninvited and continued to talk to her. From this evidence, a reasonable jury could conclude th at defendant was motivated by an unnatural or abnormal sexual interest in Jane Doe. Defendant contends the evidence shows, at most, that he “was trying to hustle these two girls, not sexually arouse himself or them.” True, Jane Doe testified that defendant said he sold gold and that he aske d her questions about her bracelet, which is consistent with his theory that he was trying to obtain the bracelet fr om her. But there is evidence from which the jury could reasonably infer that de fendant was interested in more than hustling Jane Doe of her bracelet. Defendant told Jane Doe she was “pretty” and then grabbed her wrist withou t first asking if he could look at her bracelet. He held8 Jane Doe’s wrist for a minute, and while he did so he rubbed it. Although defendant made no sexual comments to Jane Doe and did not touch her in an explicitly sexual way, the way he did touch her, when considered in light of the to tality of the circumstances, reasonably supported the jury’s inference that he was motivated by sexual interest in her. D ISPOSITION The judgment is affirmed. NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS RAMIREZ P. J.

We concur: HOLLENHORST J. CODRINGTON J.