[Cite as State v. Long, 2024-Ohio-3303.]

COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO

EIGHTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

COUNTY OF CUYAHOGA

STATE OF OHIO, :

Plaintiff-Appellee, :

No. 113406

v. :

LARENZANEY LONG, :

Defendant-Appellant. :

JOURNAL ENTRY AND OPINION

JUDGMENT: AFFIRMED

RELEASED AND JOURNALIZED: August 29, 2024

Criminal Appeal from the Cuyahoga County Common Pleas Court

Case No. CR-22-670511-A

Appearances:

Michael C. O’Malley, Cuyahoga County Prosecuting 

Attorney, and Margaret Graham, Assistant Prosecuting 

Attorney, for appellee. 

Cullen Sweeney, Cuyahoga County Public Defender, and

Thomas T. Lampman, Assistant Public Defender, for 

appellant. 

ANITA LASTER MAYS, J.:
{¶1} Defendant-appellant Larenzaney Long (“Long”) appeals her sentence 

and asks this court to vacate the sentence and remand this case for a new 

sentencing hearing. We affirm Long’s sentence.

{¶2} On October 11, 2022, Long pleaded guilty to an amended count of 

attempted felonious assault, a third-degree felony, in violation of R.C. 2923.02 and 

2903.11(A)(1). At the plea hearing, Long was referred to the court psychiatric clinic 

and a sentencing hearing was scheduled for November 11, 2022. Journal Entry 

No. 131005588 (Oct. 12, 2022). On November 7, 2022, the sentencing hearing was 

rescheduled to November 22, 2022, at Long’s request because she missed her 

court-ordered psychiatric appointment. The court ordered Long to reschedule the 

appointment. On November 22, 2022, the trial court again, rescheduled the 

sentencing hearing to December 22, 2022, at Long’s request because she wanted 

to get her personal affairs in order and test negative for all illegal substances. On 

December 22, 2022, Long arrived late to court, and the trial court issued a capias. 

Long objected and the trial court ordered Long to turn herself in on 

December 27, 2022, at 10:00 am. The trial court indicated that Long would be held 

in custody until the new sentencing hearing on January 19, 2023. The trial court’s 

December 22, 2022, journal entry states:

Defendant present in court. Prosecutor(s) [M. A.] present. Court 

reporter [J. S.] present. Defendant to turn herself in on 12/27/22 at 

10:00. State of Ohio ordered to notify victim of date/time of 

sentencing. Sentencing set for 01/19/2023 at 08:30 AM.
Journal Entry No. 135708603 (Dec. 22, 2022).

{¶3} On December 27, 2022, Long filed a motion to reconsider and notice 

of her attempt to comply. In Long’s motion, she stated that she arrived at the court 

as instructed and tried to turn herself in to the jail. However, the clerk of courts, 

the main sheriff’s desk, and then a police sergeant advised her that the trial court’s 

December 22, 2022 journal entry was not sufficient enough for her remand and 

that no warrant or capias existed that would allow the jail to hold Long. 

{¶4} Long’s motion also requested the trial court to take notice of her 

attempts to comply with its December 22, 2022 order and to reconsider the order. 

Long moved the court to simply hold the sentencing hearing on January 19 without 

ordering her remanded. The record does not reflect whether the trial court granted 

or dismissed Long’s motion, but it did issue a journal entry on January 5, 2023, 

stating that the sentencing date is still January 19, 2023. The trial court also 

ordered Long to be screened for eligibility to be placed in the community-based 

correctional facility (“CBCF”). Journal Entry No. 136598117 (Jan. 5, 2023).

{¶5} On January 19, 2023, the trial court continued the sentencing hearing 

to February 2, 2023, because the court was engaged in trial on another case. On 

February 2, 2023, Long failed to appear in court for the sentencing hearing and a 

capias was issued. On September 16, 2023, Long was taken into custody and a new 

felony case was added. Journal Entry No. 159704248 (Sept. 26, 2023). 
[Cite as State v. Long, 2024-Ohio-3303.]

{¶6} On October 6, 2023, Long filed a motion to reinstate bond. In Long’s 

motion, she states that she is pregnant with her third child and failed to appear at 

the February 2, 2023 sentencing hearing because she was pregnant and learned 

about another indictment against her. Long stated that she was scared she would 

be sent to prison while pregnant and unable to make arrangements for the care of 

her other two children.

{¶7} The trial court set a hearing on the motion for October 18, 2023. At the 

motion hearing, Long waived her presence, and the trial court denied the motion. 

The trial court also scheduled the sentencing hearing for October 23, 2023. On 

October 31, 2023, the sentencing hearing took place. The record does not reflect 

why the hearing was rescheduled for a later date.

{¶8} At the sentencing hearing, the trial court imposed a prison sentence of 

30 months. The journal entry reflects that the trial court considered all required 

factors of the law and found that prison is consistent with the purpose of 

R.C. 2929.11. Journal Entry No. 163375075 (Oct. 31, 2023).

{¶9} The trial court allowed the victim to speak at the sentencing hearing. 

She stated: “All I really wanted to say is that since that day, everything has 

happened, it’s never, ever been the same in my life.” Tr. 64. The trial court asked, 

“[w]hat do you mean by that?” To which the victim responded:

I’m supposed to be in school. I don’t go to school anymore because I 

can’t focus right since I had got hit by the vehicle. My head has been 

blurring, banging bad. So I’ve been trying to get myself still right since 

it happened. And I have a heart murmur, liver condition and kidneys 
and I’ve been bleeding out real bad to the point I went to the hospital 

every other week or so. It’s just — it’s not the same anymore. My life is 

not the same. It’s been downhill since everything happened.

Tr. 65.

{¶10} The trial court asked the victim to speak about her injuries. To which 

she replied: “Yes, I had a head injury. I was on blood clot — I had a blood clot in 

my eye real bad, I couldn’t see. My lip was busted open.” Id. The victim continued 

stating that she still is having problems with her eye and is in the process of trying 

to obtain therapy for it. Tr. 66. Long apologized to the victim. Tr. 67. 

{¶11} The trial court proceeded with sentencing, and the following 

exchanged occurred:

THE COURT: Well, Ms. Long, a couple of things I note. Again, 

originally we took your plea on October 11th of 2022, and sentencing 

was set for November 10th of 2022. And I believe — I don’t recall 

whether or not you were out on bond or not prior to that point in time. 

But obviously you were out after the plea. We referred you to the Court 

Psychiatric Clinic for an appointment for a report to be prepared. We 

had to continue the original sentencing at [defense counsel’s] request. 

And the reason that is stated in the Court’s journal entry is that you 

missed the psychiatric appointment, and so you were re-ordered to 

schedule a new appointment, State was to notify victim of the date and 

of the new sentencing date, which at that point in time would have been 

November 22nd. So November 22nd we gave you the opportunity to 

get your personal affairs in order and test negative for all substances.

You continued it to be rescheduled for December 22nd. On December 

22nd we were in court and you were ordered to turn yourself in on 

December 27th at 10:00 a.m. On December 27th, we came in, [defense 

counsel] asked for a motion for reconsideration for your — not sure —

just filed a motion for reconsideration. In any event —
[Cite as State v. Long, 2024-Ohio-3303.]

DEFENSE COUNSEL: I can explain that, your Honor. I would be 

happy to, if you want.

THE COURT: That’s okay, thank you. So there’s an entry — the next 

entry is dated January 5th. Sentencing remains set for 1/19 and 

ordered to be screened for CBCF eligibility. Maybe that’s why we 

continued the original sentencing date. There’s a nunc pro tunc entry, 

not sure what it’s for. There’s another entry on January 20th that says 

sentencing previously set on 1/19/23 is continued to 1/26 at the Court’s 

request. We must have been engaged in a trial.

DEFENSE COUNSEL: I believe so, Judge.

THE COURT: There’s another sentencing that was previously set —

JE that indicates that we are still in trial. That was from 1/26, continued 

sentencing for February 2nd. On February 2nd she failed appear. So 

there’s that. So I will also just say for the record, I agree, [defense 

counsel], I hope you know that I have a very high opinion of you, 

particularly your advocacy, and I believe it to be a genuine advocacy on 

behalf of your client. I do genuinely appreciate that. I appreciate the 

time that your office put in here with respect to reintegration plan. 

Regrettably, I so wholeheartedly agree with your assessment that we 

are putting her in a much worse situation, and her children are just 

screwed. But by the way, I’m also a little offended that knowing by the 

way that the JE reads, that the writing was on the wall that you were 

going to spend a little timeout. You were responsible enough sometime 

during that period of time to get pregnant. I’m not that good in math, 

if you just had a child in October, sometime around January, February, 

whatever, you chose to be irresponsible and have another child. I can’t 

begin to express how frustrated and aggravated I am that now you have 

put all of us here, all the rest of us taxpayers in a situation that we are 

hoping and praying to God that your children survive foster care and 

are not standing in front — next to [defense counsel] in 18 years facing 

the same situation that you are, because you had a terrible upbringing. 

Without specific recollection, by reading the JE, it clearly was my 

thought process — and probably again [defense counsel], I mean this 

truly in a [complimentary] sense, because of your advocacy, my guess 

is that probably originally I was intending to send her to the 

penitentiary, however, I’ll again give you the credit of talking me into 

the consideration of CBCF, which I’m likely to have done back at that 

point in time. However, after considering the purposes and principles 

set forth in felony sentencing, one of the factors I’m to consider is 
genuine remorse. I can’t imagine how that can be construed for having 

been capias after all this time. So I find that you’re not amenable to 

community control sanctions. I’m going to impose a 30-month prison 

sentence on this case. Because you will be receiving a prison sentence, 

you will be subject to PRC for a mandatory period of one year up to a 

maximum of three. If you violate any PRC rules or conditions, you 

could go back up for half the time. For rule violations on this felony, 

that time can be run consecutive. You’re getting credit for time served, 

which I do not have that calculation immediately in front of me. I’m not 

imposing any further fines, fees or costs.

Tr. 68-72.

{¶12} Long filed this appeal assigning one error for our review:

Long’s sentence is contrary to law because the trial court based

the sentence on unlawful considerations.

I. Sentence Contrary to Law

A. Standard of Review

{¶13} We review felony sentences under the standard set forth in 

R.C. 2953.08(G)(2). State v. Marcum, 2016-Ohio-1002, ¶ 1, 21. Under 

R.C. 2953.08(G)(2), an appellate court may increase, reduce, modify, or vacate and 

remand a challenged felony sentence if the court clearly and convincingly finds 

either that the record does not support the sentencing court’s findings as required 

by relevant sentencing statutes or the sentence is otherwise contrary to law. A 

sentence is contrary to law if it falls outside the statutory range for the offense or if 

the sentencing court failed to consider the purposes and principles of sentencing 

set forth in R.C. 2929.11 and the sentencing factors in R.C. 2929.12. State v. 

Pawlak, 2016-Ohio-5926, ¶ 58 (8th Dist.). Conversely, if the sentence is within 
the statutory range for the offense and the trial court considered both the purposes 

and principles of felony sentencing in R.C. 2929.11 and the seriousness and 

recidivism factors in R.C. 2929.12, the court’s imposition of any prison term for a 

felony conviction is not contrary to law. State v. Woodard, 2018-Ohio-2402, ¶ 35 

(8th Dist.); see also State v. Clay, 2020-Ohio-1499, ¶ 26 (8th Dist.), citing Pawlak 

at ¶ 58.

B. Law and Analysis

{¶14} In Long’s sole assignment of error, she argues that her sentence is 

contrary to law because the trial court expressed that it was offended, frustrated, 

and aggravated by Long choosing to have another child. A sentence is contrary to 

law if it falls outside the statutory range for the offense or if the sentencing court 

failed to consider the purposes and principles of sentencing set forth in 

R.C. 2929.11 and the sentencing factors in R.C. 2929.12. Pawlak at ¶ 58. 

{¶15} ‘‘This court also recognized that ‘otherwise contrary to law’ means ‘in 

violation of statute or legal regulations at a given time.’” State v. Bryant, 2022-

Ohio-1878, ¶ 22, quoting State v. Jones, 2020-Ohio-6729, ¶ 34, quoting Black’s 

Law Dictionary 328 (6th Ed.1990). “Accordingly, when a trial court imposes a 

sentence based on factors or considerations that are extraneous to those that are 

permitted by R.C. 2929.11 and 2929.12, that sentence is contrary to law.” Id.
{¶16} Long pleaded guilty to attempted felonious assault, a third-degree 

felony, in violation of R.C. 2923.02 and 2903.11(A)(1). According to R.C. 

2929.14(A)(3)(b), “[f]or a felony of the third degree that is not an offense for which 

division (A)(3)(a) of this section applies, the prison term shall be a definite term of 

nine, twelve, eighteen, twenty-four, thirty, or thirty-six months.” 

{¶17} The trial court sentenced Long to 30 months in prison, which is within 

the statutory range for the offense. Next, we determine if the trial court failed to 

consider the purposes and principles of sentencing set forth in R.C. 2929.11 and 

2929.12. “R.C. 2929.11 and 2929.12 list several factors that the trial court must 

consider.” State v. Roby, 2023-Ohio-1889, ¶ 10 (8th Dist.). 

However, “R.C. 2929.11 and 2929.12 are not fact-finding statutes and 

although the trial court must consider the factors, it is not required to 

make specific findings on the record regarding its consideration of 

those factors, even when imposing a more-than-minimum sentence.”

Id., quoting State v. Artis, 2022-Ohio-3819, ¶ 13 (8th Dist.), citing State v. Pate, 

2021-Ohio-1089, ¶ 6 (8th Dist.). 

{¶18} “‘Indeed, consideration of the factors is presumed unless the 

defendant affirmatively shows otherwise.’” Id., quoting Artis at ¶ 13, citing State 

v. Wright, 2018-Ohio-965, ¶ 16 (8th Dist.). “‘Furthermore, a trial court’s statement 

in its sentencing journal entry that it considered the required statutory factors is 

sufficient to fulfill its obligations under R.C. 2929.11 and 2929.12.’” Id., quoting 
Artis at ¶ 13, citing State v. Sutton, 2015-Ohio-4074, ¶ 72 (8th Dist.); State v. 

Clayton, 2014-Ohio-112, ¶ 9 (8th Dist.).

{¶19} As stated above, before the trial court sentenced Long, it stated, in 

part:

But by the way, I’m also a little offended that knowing by the way that 

the JE reads, that the writing was on the wall that you were going to 

spend a little timeout. You were responsible enough sometime during 

that period of time to get pregnant. I’m not that good in math, if you 

just had a child in October, sometime around January, February, 

whatever, you chose to be irresponsible and have another child. I can’t 

begin to express how frustrated and aggravated I am that now you have 

put all of us here, all the rest of us taxpayers in a situation that we are 

hoping and praying to God that your children survive foster care and 

are not standing in front — next to [defense counsel] in 18 years facing 

the same situation that you are, because you had a terrible upbringing. 

Without specific recollection, by reading the JE, it clearly was my 

thought process — and probably again [defense counsel], I mean this 

truly in a [complimentary] sense, because of your advocacy, my guess 

is that probably originally I was intending to send her to the 

penitentiary, however, I’ll again give you the credit of talking me into 

the consideration of CBCF, which I’m likely to have done back at that 

point in time.

Tr. 70-71.

{¶20} Although the trial court referenced her pregnancy, those statements

were not used as nonstatutory factors to determine Long’s sentence. Additionally, 

Long’s sentence was not imposed based on impermissible considerations — i.e., 

considerations that fall outside those that are contained in R.C. 

2929.11 and 2929.12. See Bryant, 2022-Ohio-1878, ¶ 22. The trial court stated at

the sentencing hearing that it considered the purposes and principles set forth in 
felony sentencing guidelines. Tr. 71. Additionally, the journal entry states the 

court considered all required factors of law and finds that prison is consistent with 

the purpose of R.C. 2929.11. 

{¶21} The record does not demonstrate that the trial court used the fact that 

Long was pregnant as consideration for sentencing. Nor does the record reflect 

that Long’s sentence was retaliatory. The trial court stated that it originally was 

considering CBCF. However, because Long failed to appear and a capias was 

issued, the trial court found that Long was not amenable to community control 

sanctions. Tr. 71-72. The trial court also stated that it considered Long’s genuine 

remorse, but because Long was capias for more than six months, it “couldn’t 

imagine how that can be construed.” Tr. 71. As such, the trial court did not err in 

sentencing Long to 30 months’ imprisonment because the sentence is not contrary 

to law because it is well within the statutory range for the offense and the record 

demonstrates that the trial court considered the purposes and principles of 

sentencing set forth in R.C. 2929.11 and 2929.12. 

{¶22} Therefore, Long’s sole assignment of error is overruled.

{¶23} Judgment affirmed.

It is ordered that appellee recover from appellant costs herein taxed.

The court finds there were reasonable grounds for this appeal.

It is ordered that a special mandate issue out of this court directing the 

common pleas court to carry this judgment into execution. The defendant’s 
conviction having been affirmed, any bail pending appeal is terminated. Case 

remanded to the trial court for execution of sentence.

A certified copy of this entry shall constitute the mandate pursuant to Rule 

27 of the Rules of Appellate Procedure.

________________________________

ANITA LASTER MAYS, JUDGE

KATHLEEN ANN KEOUGH, A.J., and 

EILEEN T. GALLAGHER, J., CONCUR