[DO NOT PUBLISH]

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT

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No. 15-11643

Non-Argument Calendar

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D.C. Docket No. 2:13-cv-00495-CG-M

WILLIAM SMITH, 

 Plaintiff-Appellant,

versus

CITY OF GREENSBORO, 

CHIEF WILLIE HUDSON,

MAYOR JOHNNIE WASHINGTON, 

 Defendants-Appellees.

________________________

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Southern District of Alabama

________________________

(April 12, 2016)

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Before JORDAN, JULIE CARNES and JILL PRYOR, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM: 

William Smith, a black male, appeals from the district court’s grant of 

summary judgment in favor of defendants the City of Greensboro (the “City”), 

Chief of Police Willie Hudson, and Mayor Johnnie Washington on his employment 

discrimination claims under the First and Fourteenth Amendments of the United 

States Constitution, 42 U.S.C. § 1983, and Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 

1964. After consideration of the parties’ briefs and a thorough review of the 

record, we affirm.

I. BACKGROUND1

From 2006 through December 20, 2012, William Smith worked as a City

police officer. During this time, he worked only the night shift, which allowed him 

also to work as a school bus driver during the day. 

In September 2010, the City Council appointed Willie Hudson as Chief of 

Police. Virtually from the start, Hudson and Smith had a tense relationship. For 

example, in January 2011, Hudson met with Smith to address problems with 

Smith’s performance. Hudson memorialized the meeting in a “Letter of 

Counseling,” which he provided to Smith. In the letter, Hudson noted, among 

other issues, that Smith was difficult to reach when he was off duty.

 1 On review of the district court’s grant of summary judgment, we recount the facts in the 

light most favorable to Smith. See infra Part II.

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Shortly after this meeting, on February 12, 2011, Smith drafted a letter to 

“whom it may concern,” reflecting on the conflicts he had with Hudson. In the 

letter, Smith stated that Hudson was bullying him, threatening to “put [him] on all 

days so [he could not] drive [his] bus route.” Doc. 30-25 at 11.2

 Smith also 

complained specifically about the January meeting and Letter of Counseling, 

asserting that Hudson unfairly singled him out. Smith then requested a hearing 

before the City’s Grievance Committee to address Hudson’s alleged harassment. 

The Grievance Committee held a hearing on March 1, 2011. The record does not 

reflect the outcome of this hearing. 

Beginning in the spring of 2012, the City’s black incumbent mayor Johnnie 

Washington ran for reelection against a white man, Stephen Gentry, and a black 

man, Eldrin Long. Chief Hudson warned Smith and other officers that any black

officer who supported the white political leadership in the City would suffer 

negative consequences. At some unidentified point in time, Smith complained 

about this remark and generally about Hudson’s “racial politics” to Assistant Chief 

Mike Hamilton. 

Washington and Gentry garnered nearly an equal number of votes in the 

August 2012 general election, sending the contest to a run-off election scheduled 

for October 9, 2012. Smith then began supporting Gentry. During the 

 2 Citations to “Doc.” refer to docket entries in the district court record in this case.

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campaigning leading to the run-off election, Smith and Willie Lewis, his colleague 

on the police force, vocalized support for Gentry to other officers, including 

Assistant Chief Hamilton, and to members of the community including Hamilton’s 

brothers, Terry Hamilton and former Chief of Police Claude Hamilton. Smith and 

Lewis never made political statements at work, and Chief Hudson and Mayor 

Washington maintain that they were unaware of Smith’s political allegiance to 

Gentry.3

At some point between the August election and October run-off, Smith 

received a letter from Chief Hudson telling him that he could no longer work 

exclusively night shifts. At least by this point, Smith was the only officer not 

serving on rotating day and night shifts. Smith immediately contacted Mayor 

Washington and Chief Hudson and urged them to reverse this decision, explaining 

that he needed both jobs to support his family. He then met with Hudson and 

Assistant Chief Hamilton to reiterate his request. Hudson refused, citing “miss[ed] 

court dates, neglect[ed] papework,” and Smith’s unavailability by telephone. Doc. 

38-1 at 6, ¶ 17. According to Smith, he never missed court dates and Chief 

 3 Smith asserts that the City targeted him and Lewis for their support of Gentry. To 

support this assertion, Smith relies on statements he says he heard Terry Hamilton and Assistant 

Chief Hamilton make. Before the district court, the defendants challenged these statements as 

inadmissible hearsay, but they make no such challenge on appeal. In any event, because Smith 

failed to show that the City could be liable for any adverse employment action he allegedly 

suffered, see infra note 8, we need not address whether the City harbored a retaliatory intent and 

thus do not consider these remarks. 

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Hudson “always knew how to reach [him] because he knew where [he] lived and 

had all of [his] contact numbers.” Id. 

Mayor Washington won the run-off election on October 9, 2012. In 

November, Chief Hudson informed Smith that he was being placed in the shift 

rotation to work days as well as nights. 

In late November 2012, Smith took paid leave, returning to work the first 

week of December with a physician’s excuse. The excuse stated that Smith had 

visited the doctor on December 4 and should be excused from work for six weeks. 

The City Attorney4 responded on December 13, noting that the City understood he 

was continuing to work as a bus driver during his leave of absence from the police 

department. Thus, the City Attorney requested additional information from the 

doctor explaining why Smith could work as a bus driver but not as a police officer. 

Smith responded with a nearly identical physician’s note, providing no additional 

information. Smith subsequently stopped reporting to work. On December 20, the 

City Attorney informed Smith that his medical excuse was insufficient and that the 

City considered him “as having abandon[ed] and/or resigned [his] position.” Doc. 

30-7 at 2. Chief Hudson followed with a letter echoing this decision. 

 4 Smith averred that he received this letter from Chief Hudson, but the record reflects that 

the letter came from the City’s attorney, Dennis Steverson.

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Smith requested and received a grievance hearing. At the grievance hearing, 

the City explained that Smith had not been fired and that he could return to work if 

he desired. The City Attorney followed up with a letter stating, “You were not 

fired nor did you receive any disciplinary action from your request for six weeks of 

sick leave.” Doc. 30-11 at 2. The letter continued: 

You may return to work immediately or provide sufficient medical 

proof that you were medically unable to work during the six-week 

period that you requested for sick leave. Your medical proof must 

explain why you can work at another job outside of the police 

department during your sick leave, but can’t perform your duties at 

the police department.

Id. Smith failed to submit the requested medical proof and did not report to work. 

Smith continued working as a bus driver, however. Smith is no longer employed 

with the Greensboro Police Department. 

Smith filed a charge of discrimination with the Equal Employment 

Opportunity Commission (“EEOC”), which issued a right to sue letter. He then 

filed this action, alleging several claims against the City, Mayor Washington, and 

Chief Hudson including: (1) a First Amendment freedom of association retaliation 

claim;5 (2) a race discrimination claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and Title VII of the 

Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-2, 3; and (3) a Title VII retaliation 

 5 It was unclear from Smith’s operative amended complaint whether his First Amendment 

retaliation claim was based on freedom of speech or freedom of association. On appeal, Smith 

argues only that the defendants violated his right to freely associate, so we address only that 

claim.

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claim.

6

 Following a period of discovery, all three defendants moved for summary 

judgment. The district court granted the motion for summary judgment, dismissing 

this action with prejudice. This appeal followed.

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

We review a district court’s grant of summary judgment de novo. Galvez v. 

Bruce, 552 F.3d 1238, 1241 (11th Cir. 2008). “Summary judgment is appropriate 

when the evidence, viewed in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party, 

presents no genuine issue of fact and compels judgment as a matter of law.” 

Swisher Int’l, Inc. v. Schafer, 550 F.3d 1046, 1050 (11th Cir. 2008); accord Fed. R. 

Civ. P. 56(a). If the nonmoving party bears the ultimate burden of proof regarding 

the claim at issue in the summary judgment motion, that party, in response to the 

motion, must go beyond the pleadings and establish through competent evidence 

that there truly is a genuine, material issue to be tried. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 

477 U.S. 317, 324 (1986). 

III. ANALYSIS

Smith argues that the district court erred in granting the defendants’ motion 

for summary judgment on his First Amendment freedom of association retaliation 

 6 Smith raised several other claims including, among others, equal protection and due 

process claims under the Fourteenth Amendment and a state law claim of intentional infliction of 

emotional distress. The district court dismissed these claims, and Smith does not challenge their

dismissal on appeal. These claims, therefore, are abandoned. See Davis v. Coca-Cola Bottling 

Co. Consol., 516 F.3d 955, 972 (11th Cir. 2008). 

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claim, Title VII and § 1983 race discrimination claims, and Title VII retaliation 

claim. We first consider whether Smith can prove an adverse employment action, 

a necessary element of each of his claims. Because Smith can do so only for his 

two retaliation claims against Chief Hudson, we next consider whether the district 

court erred in dismissing those two claims on summary judgment. 

A. Adverse Employment Action

To prevail on his claims, Smith must prove he suffered an adverse 

employment action. See McCabe v. Sharrett, 12 F.3d 1558, 1563-64 & 1565 n.8 

(11th Cir. 1994) (First Amendment retaliation claim); Kidd v. Mando Am. Corp., 

731 F.3d 1196, 1202 (11th Cir. 2013) (Title VII discrimination claim); Crawford v. 

Carroll, 529 F.3d 961, 970 (11th Cir. 2008) (Title VII retaliation claim and race 

discrimination claim under Title VII and § 1983). Smith argues that he suffered 

two adverse employment actions: a coerced resignation and a shift change.

We first reject Smith’s coerced resignation argument with respect to all three 

of his claims. “Under the coercion or duress theory, we consider whether, under 

the totality of the circumstances, the employer’s conduct in obtaining the 

employee’s resignation deprived the employee of free will in choosing to resign.” 

Hargray v. City of Hallandale, 57 F.3d 1560, 1568 (11th Cir. 1995). Several 

factors guide our analysis including: “(1) whether the employee was given some 

alternative to resignation; (2) whether the employee understood the nature of the 

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choice he was given; [and] (3) whether the employee was given a reasonable time 

in which to choose.” Id.7

 The record shows that the City offered Smith an 

alternative to resignation: providing a medical reason for his inability to work as a

police officer. Smith indisputably understood the choice he was given and had 

ample time to make it. Under these circumstances, Smith’s resignation was not 

obtained through coercion and cannot support any of the claims here.

We next conclude that the shift change cannot support a Title VII or § 1983 

discrimination claim but can constitute an adverse employment action for purposes 

of Smith’s retaliation claims against Chief Hudson. For his race discrimination 

claims under Title VII or § 1983, Smith must prove that his employer took actions 

that materially changed the terms, conditions, or privileges of employment. Kidd, 

731 F.3d at 1202. Smith argues that being placed on the day-shift prevented him 

from working his day job, but he does not argue, nor does he support with 

evidence, that the shift change materially altered the terms, conditions, or 

privileges of his employment as a police officer with the City. Thus, Smith failed 

to show he suffered an adverse employment action to support his race 

discrimination claim under Title VII or § 1983. We affirm the district court’s grant 

of summary judgment on those claims. See Thomas v. Cooper Lighting, Inc., 506 

 7 We recognized in Hargray that other factors may be relevant, including “whether the 

employee was permitted to select the effective date of the resignation; and . . . whether the 

employee had the advice of counsel.” Hargray, 57 F.3d at 1568. Neither of these factors 

suggests that Smith was coerced into resigning. 

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F.3d 1361, 1364 (11th Cir. 2007) (“We may affirm the district court’s judgment on 

any ground that appears in the record, whether or not that ground was relied upon 

or even considered by the court below.”).

In contrast, the shift change could support Smith’s retaliation claims against 

Chief Hudson.

8

 “[T]he type of employer conduct considered actionable [in the 

retaliation context] has been broadened from that which adversely affects the 

plaintiff’s conditions of employment or employment status to that which has a 

materially adverse effect on the plaintiff, irrespective of whether it is employment 

or workplace-related.” Crawford, 529 F.3d at 973 (citing Burlington N. & Santa 

Fe Ry. Co. v. White, 548 U.S. 53, 67-68 (2006)); accord Lore v. City of Syracuse, 

670 F.3d 127, 163-64 (2d Cir. 2012) (“If the adverse-action element of a Title VII 

retaliation action can be satisfied by an action causing the employee harm outside 

the workplace, a fortiori an act in retaliation for the employee’s exercise of a 

constitutional right need not be tied to harm in the workplace.”). To determine 

whether the shift change had a materially adverse effect, we consider the totality of

 8 Smith offered no evidence or argument that the Mayor was involved in the shift change 

decision. Nor did Smith offer any basis to hold the City liable for the shift change under Monell

v. New York City Department of Social Services, 436 U.S. 658, 694 (1978). See Carter v. City of 

Melbourne, 731 F.3d 1161, 1167-68 (11th Cir. 2013) (affirming dismissal of a First Amendment 

retaliation claim against a city where the plaintiff failed to offer evidence that the employment 

decisions about which he complained were rendered by a final policymaker for the city). Thus, 

the district court did not err in dismissing Smith’s retaliation claims against the Mayor and the 

City.

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circumstances “judged from the perspective of a reasonable person in the plaintiff's 

position.” Burlington, 548 U.S. at 71 (internal quotation marks omitted).

Smith produced evidence that the shift change—after his six years of 

working only nights—made it impossible for him to keep his day job as a bus 

driver, a job he needed to support his family. Based on the evidence in the record, 

a reasonable jury could conclude that this shift change had a “materially adverse”

effect on Smith and thus constituted an adverse employment action for purposes of 

his two retaliation claims against Hudson. See Crawford, 529 F.3d at 973 n.13 

(“Burlington also strongly suggests that it is for a jury to decide whether anything 

more than the most petty and trivial actions against an employee should be

considered ‘materially adverse’ to him and thus constitute adverse employment 

actions.” (quoting Burlington, 548 U.S. at 71)). We thus must consider whether, 

on this record, Smith can satisfy the remaining elements of his First Amendment 

and Title VII retaliation claims against Hudson. We consider each claim 

separately.

B. First Amendment Retaliation Claim

The First Amendment prohibits the state from denying its citizens the right 

to associate with whomever they choose. See Rutan v. Republican Party of Ill., 

497 U.S. 62, 71-74 (1990). Accordingly, the state may not take a materially 

adverse action against its employee in retaliation for exercising First Amendment 

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associational rights. McCabe, 12 F.3d at 1568.9 “[I]n cases where the employer 

denies taking the adverse employment action solely because the employee 

exercised the expressive association right of political affiliation, we . . . employ 

the Mt. Healthy causation analysis.” Id. at 1565 n.8 (citing Mt. Healthy City Sch. 

Dist. Bd. of Educ. v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 274 (1977)). Under the Mt. Healthy analysis, 

the plaintiff must first show that “political affiliation was a substantial or 

motivating factor for the challenged action.” Id. Once the plaintiff satisfies this 

burden, “the burden of production shifts to the defendant . . . [to] show that he 

would have taken the same action in the absence of the protected activity.” 

Brannon v. Finkelstein, 754 F.3d 1269, 1275 (11th Cir. 2014) (internal quotation 

marks omitted). 

Smith has failed to produce sufficient evidence to satisfy his initial burden. 

“It is neither possible nor desirable to fashion a single standard for determining 

when an employee has met her initial burden of demonstrating that a retaliatory 

intent was a ‘substantial’ or ‘motivating factor’ behind a government employment 

decision.” Beckwith v. City of Daytona Beach Shores, 58 F.3d 1554, 1564 (11th 

 9 To prevail on a First Amendment retaliation claim based on freedom of association, 

“the plaintiff must make threshold showings (1) that the behavior at issue consists of 

constitutionally protected political affiliation or belief and (2) that he or she actually suffered 

adverse employment action before a court will consider the issue of justification.” McCabe, 12 

F.3d at 1565 n.8. The defendants do not contest that Smith’s support for Mayor Washington’s 

opponent was constitutionally protected, and we have already determined that Smith raised a 

genuine issue of material fact whether he suffered an adverse employment action for retaliation 

purposes.

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Cir. 1995) (applying Mt. Healthy to a First Amendment retaliation claim based on 

freedom of expression). Nonetheless, if “there is unrebutted evidence that the 

decision maker did not have knowledge that the employee engaged in protected 

conduct,” the plaintiff will be unable to show causation even where there is close 

temporal proximity between the protected conduct and adverse action. See 

Brungart v. BellSouth Telecomms., Inc., 231 F.3d 791, 799 (11th Cir. 2000)

(considering causation in a case under the Family Medical Leave Act).

Chief Hudson averred that he was unaware of Smith’s political association 

with Mayor Washington’s white opponent, Gentry. Smith failed to rebut this 

evidence. Although Smith maintained that he vocalized support for Gentry to 

other officers, including Assistant Chief Mike Hamilton and former Chief of Police 

Claude Hamilton, Smith offered no evidence that the Hamiltons or anyone else told 

Hudson about this support, or that Hudson learned of it in any other way. Smith 

himself maintained that he never discussed his political affiliation at work. Other 

than speculation, a reasonable jury would have no basis to find that Hudson knew 

about Smith’s support of Gentry. Speculation is insufficient to avoid summary 

judgment. Cordoba v. Dillard’s, Inc., 419 F.3d 1169, 1181 (11th Cir. 2005) 

(“Speculation does not create a genuine issue of fact; instead, it creates a false 

issue, the demolition of which is a primary goal of summary judgment.” (internal 

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quotation marks omitted)). Accordingly, the district court did not err in dismissing 

Smith’s First Amendment retaliation claim against Hudson.

C. Title VII Retaliation Claim

Last we consider Smith’s Title VII retaliation claim. In order to establish a 

prima facie case for retaliation under Title VII, a claimant may show that: (1) he 

engaged in a statutorily protected activity; (2) he suffered a materially adverse 

action; and (3) there was a causal link between the protected activity and the 

adverse action. Goldsmith v. Bagby Elevator Co., 513 F.3d 1261, 1277 (11th Cir. 

2008). Statutorily protected activity includes (1) “oppos[ing] any practice made an 

unlawful employment practice by” Title VII and (2) “mak[ing] a charge, 

testif[ying], assist[ing], or participat[ing] in any manner in an investigation, 

proceeding, or hearing under” Title VII. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a); see EEOC v. 

Total Sys. Servs., Inc., 221 F.3d 1171, 1174-75 (11th Cir. 2000). Smith argues that 

Chief Hudson retaliated against him because he “opposed the racist rantings of 

Chief Hudson,” Appellant’s Br. at 23, presumably referring to a complaint he 

voiced to Assistant Chief Mike Hamilton sometime in the spring of 2012.10 See 

 10 Smith also suggests without explanation or citation to authority that his political 

affiliation with a white candidate for mayor was statutorily protected conduct under Title VII. 

Even assuming his political support for Gentry constituted statutorily protected conduct under 

Title VII, any claim based on this political association would fail for the reasons explained above 

in Part III.B.

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Doc. 38-1 ¶ 11. We assume without deciding that this complaint constituted

statutorily protected conduct. 

Smith’s Title VII retaliation claim fails nonetheless because he provided

insufficient evidence to draw a causal link between the complaint about Hudson’s 

alleged racist remarks and the adverse action, his November 2012 shift change. 

“We construe the causal link element broadly so that a plaintiff merely has to 

prove that the protected activity and the negative employment action are not 

completely unrelated.” Goldsmith, 513 F.3d at 1278 (internal quotation marks 

omitted). Despite this low bar, Smith neither cites record evidence nor provides 

any explanation to show that his complaint was related in any way to the shift 

change. Just as with his First Amendment retaliation claim, to prove causation, 

Smith must “‘show that the decision maker was aware of the protected conduct at 

the time of the adverse employment action.’” Goldsmith, 513 F.3d at 1278

(quoting Brungart, 231 F.3d at 799); see, e.g., Quigg v. Thomas Cty. Sch. Dist., 

814 F.3d 1227, 1244-45 (11th Cir. 2016) (holding that without defendant’s 

knowledge that plaintiff engaged in protected activity, plaintiff cannot show that 

the activity caused the adverse employment action). Smith offers no evidence that 

Hudson was aware of Smith’s complaint to Mike Hamilton. In sum, because 

Smith failed to proffer sufficient evidence to support causation, the district court 

did not err in dismissing his Title VII retaliation claim on summary judgment.

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IV. CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the district court’s entry of summary 

judgment on all claims.

AFFIRMED.

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