2014 D e c i sion s O p inion s of the U nit e d S t a t e s C our t of Appe al s for the Thir d C ir c uit
7-16-2014 

# B l y the T o w nshi p v . J a mes L a r i sh

P r e c e de n t i al or N on-P r e c e de n t i al : N on-P r e c e de n t i al D ock e t N o . 13-4694

F o l lo w thi s a nd a dd it ion al w ork s a t : h tt p://d i g it alc ommon s .l a w . v i l l a no v a . e du/thir dc ir c uit_2014

Thi s de c i sion i s br ou gh t t o y ou for f r e e a nd ope n a c c e s s b y the O p inion s of the U nit e d S t a t e s C our t of Appe al s for the Thir d C ir c uit a t V i l l a no v a U niv e r sit y S choo l of L a

w Di g it al R e posit or y

. I t h as be e n a c c e pt e d for inclusion in 2014 D e c i sion s b y a n a uthor i z e d a dmini s tr a t or of V i l l a no v a U niv e r sit y S choo l of L a

w Di g it al R e posit or y

. F or mor e infor m a t ion, p le as e c on t a ct Be n j a min
. C a rl s on@l a

w . v i l l a no v a . e du

. R e c omme nde d C it a t ion

" B ly the T o w n ship v . J a me s L a r i sh " (2014). 2014 D e cisio n s . P a pe r 722. h tt p://d i g it alc ommon s .l a

w . v i l l a no v a . e du/thir dc ir c uit_2014/722NOT PRECEDENTIAL UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT

_____________ No. 13

- 4694

_____________ BLYTHE TOWNSHIP; FKV, LLC,

Appellants

v. JAMES LARISH; MICHAEL PETROZINO; TOM BRENNAN; JOHN BURKE; VALERIA DAVIS; WILLIAM DEMPSEY; JOHN HOUSEKNECHT

_____________ APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA

(D.C. C iv . No

. 3

- 1 3

- c v - 00 237 ) District Judge: Honorable James M. Munley

______________ Submitted Under Third Circuit L

. A

. R

. 34.1(a)

June 23 , 201 4

______________ Before: FUENTES , G REENAWAY, JR., and NYGAARD , Circuit Judges

.

(Opinion Filed: July 16, 2014 )

______________ OPINION

______________ GREENAWAY, JR., Circuit Judge

.Appellants claim that their due process righ ts were violated by the process used to review

their land use application, and argue that the District Court erred in dismissing their claims sua sponte as unripe. For the following reasons, we will affirm the District Court’s order of dismissal. I

. Fa cts and Procedural History Because we write primarily for the benefit of the parties, we recount only the facts essential to our discussion. Blythe Township is the owner of a parcel of land in central Pennsylvania . FKV, LLC is a development company. Bl ythe Township and FKV (together, “Appellants”) intend ed to open a construction debris l and fill. FKV entered into a d eve lopment

a greement with Blythe Township which provided that FKV would develop, construct, and operate the land fill on behalf of Blythe Township. St. Clair, a neighboring Borough, and members o f the St. Clair Borough Council (“Appellees”) oppose the development of a land fill on this specific parcel of land. Appellants contend that representatives of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, D epartment of Environmental Protection (“DEP”) initially approved Appellants’ environmental assessment permit. DEP, however, did not inform Appellants of its approval. In the meantime, Appellees allegedly had “secret meeting s ” with DEP to

reverse its init ial approval of Appellants’ environmental assessment permit. DEP reversed its approval, forcing Appellants to appeal to the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania Environmental Hearing Board.Ultimately, the DEP granted a permit to Appellants to begin constructi on of the

land fill. Appellees immediately appealed this decision to the Environmental Hearing Board. The appeal is pending. Meanwhile, Appellants file d a thirty

- two count complaint , pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 , alleging that Appellees deprived Appel lants of d ue process in violation of the F ourteenth Amendment. S tate law tortious interference with contract and prospective contract claims are also asserted . The Appellees joined DEP in a third

- party complaint

a lleg ing that DEP conspired with Appellees to violate Appellants’ due process rights. T he District Court dismissed Appellants ’ federal claims on ripeness grounds sua sponte
. This appeal followed.

II. Jurisdiction and Standard of Review The Dis tric t Court had jurisdiction under 2 8 U.S.C. § § 1331 and 1343 . We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291. Our review of the District Court’s dismissal on the grounds of ripeness is plenary. Taylor Inv. v. Upper Darby Twp. , 983 F.2d 1285, 1289 (3d Cir. 1993). In reviewing the grant of a moti on to dismiss, we accept all allegations of the complaint as true, attribute all reasonable inferences in favor of the plaintiff, and affirm only if it appears that the plaintiff could prove no set of facts that would entitle it to relief. Alston v. Parke r , 363 F.3d 229, 233 (3d Cir. 2004) (citing Nami v. Fauver , 82 F.3d 63, 65 (3d Cir. 1996)). I II . Analysis On appeal, Appellants urge that the matter is ripe for review because Appelleeshave caused harms to Appellants through lost profits and costs asso ciated with the delay

of construction of the land fill . The District Court reasoned that because the Environmental Hearing Board was still deciding the issue of the permit, this case was not ripe. Specifically, the District Court reasoned that if the Env ironmental Hearing Board denied Appellees’ appeal and approved Appellants’ permit, Appellants’ due process claims would be rendered moot. “The ripeness doctrine serves ‘to determine whether a party has brought an action prematurely and counsel s abstenti on until such time as a dispute is sufficiently concrete to satisfy the constitutional and prudential requirements of the doctrine.’” Khodara Envtl. , Inc. v. Blakey , 376 F.3d 187, 196 (3d Cir. 2004) (quoting Peachlum v. City of York , 333 F.3d 429, 422 (3d Cir. 2003)). Part of our analysis requires us to assess whether there is a final ruling that is judicially reviewable. “The ripeness doctrine prevents judicial interference ‘ until an administrative decision has been formalized and its effects felt in a concrete way by the challenging parties.’” Lauderbaugh v. Hopewell Twp. , 319 F.3d 568, 575 (3d Cir. 2003) (quoting Abbott Labs., Inc. v. Gardner , 387 U.S. 136, 149 (1967)). Thus, the finality rule all ows a suit whenever a “decision maker has arrived at a definitive position on the issue that inflicts an actual, concrete injury [

. ] ” Williamson Planning Comm’n v. Hamilton Bank , 473 U.S. 172, 19 3 (1985). Appellants argue that Appellees, as a governmental actor, have come to the “definitive” position of “st opping, delaying and preventing the construction of [the land fill].” (Appellants’ Br. 14). This argument, however, is based on the mistaken belief thatthe definitive action that matters in this case is that of Appellees. As the District Court

noted , i t is the definitive action of the Environmental Hearing Board that is still pending

. This fact renders Appellants’ case unripe. Permitting the Environmental Hearing Board to reach a final determination on the permit issue may resolve the constitutional issues that Appellants allege. For example, it is not apparent that Blythe Township has suffered a constitutional injury through the delay of receiving their permit. We have stressed “the importance of the finality requirement and our reluctance to allo w the courts to become super land

- use boards of appeals. Land

- use decisions concern a variety of interests and person, and local authorities are in a better position than the courts to assess the burdens and benefits of those varying interests.” Sameric Corp. of Delaware, Inc. v. City of Phila. , 142 F.3d 582, 5 98 (3d Cir. 1998). Finally, it is not clear from the record that the actions of Appellees will fall outside the statute of limitations if Appellants are forced to wait until the Environmental Hea ring Board reaches a decision

. The motion was dismissed without prejudice

. Appellees will have another opportunity to bring any due process claims against Appel lants once the agency’s appellate process is final. IV. Conclusion Because Appellants’ clai ms are not yet ripe for review, we will affirm the November 25, 2013 order of the District Court dismissing Appellants’ complaint.