THE STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA 

In The Court of Appeals 

Stewart Buchanan, #69848, Appellant, 

v. 

South Carolina Department of Probation, Parole, and 

Pardon Services, Respondent. 

Appellate Case No. 2019-001554 

Appeal From The Administrative Law Court 

Ralph King Anderson, III, Administrative Law Judge 

Opinion No. 6021 

Heard May 3, 2023 – Filed August 30, 2023 

AFFIRMED 

Hannah Lyon Freedman, of Justice 360, and John H. 

Blume, III, of Law Office of John Blume, both of 

Columbia, for Appellant. 

Matthew C. Buchanan, of South Carolina Department of 

Probation, Parole and Pardon Services, of Columbia, for 

Respondent. 

THOMAS, J.: Stewart Buchanan appeals the order of the Administrative Law 

Court (ALC), which affirmed the denial of parole by the Parole Board of the South 

Carolina Department of Probation, Parole and Pardon Services (the Board), 

arguing (1) the Board's procedures violated his right to due process and (2) his 

forty-seven years of incarceration for a crime he committed as a juvenile 

constitutes cruel and unusual punishment. We are constrained to affirm. 
FACTS 

On May 18, 1973, Buchanan broke into the victim's home in the early morning 

hours. The victim, Buchanan's neighbor, awoke and fled the house. Buchanan 

stabbed her to death in the front yard. Buchanan, who was seventeen years old at 

the time, was under the influence of a mix of drugs and alcohol and a lack of sleep. 

In September of 1973, Buchanan pled guilty to murder and was sentenced to life 

imprisonment. At the time, an individual sentenced to life in South Carolina was 

eligible for parole upon the service of ten years. The trial court made a 

confidential report from Buchanan's psychiatrist available to the jury, which 

returned a verdict of guilty with a recommendation of mercy.1  

Buchanan first appeared before the Board on January 12, 1983, and was denied 

parole. He has now appeared before the Board at least eighteen times and been 

denied parole each time. Regarding the most recent denial in November 2018, 

parole was denied due to: (1) the nature and seriousness of the offense; (2) an 

indication of violence in this or a previous offense; and (3) the use of a deadly 

weapon in this or a previous offense. 

Prior to the most recent parole hearing, Buchanan submitted a Memorandum in 

Support of Favorable Parole Recommendation. The memo reported Buchanan had 

"more than demonstrated his rehabilitation and reformation through his positive 

institutional record and participation in numerous counseling, rehabilitative[,] and 

religious programs." The memo argued the Board should consider the factors 

enumerated in Aiken v. Byars.

2 

 

 

1 At the time of the hearing, the death penalty had been abolished, yet a jury still 

determined whether to recommend mercy. 

2 410 S.C. 534, 765 S.E.2d 572 (2014). The Aiken court held that a sentencing 

court considering a sentence of life without parole (LWOP) for a juvenile offender 

must consider: 

(1) the chronological age of the offender and the 

hallmark features of youth, including "immaturity, 

impetuosity, and failure to appreciate the risks and 

consequence"; 

(2) the "family and home environment" that surrounded 

the offender; 
As to the first factor, the hallmark features of youth, the memo explained 

Buchanan was a juvenile at the time of the crime, with a juvenile's lack of maturity, 

underdeveloped sense of responsibility, and incomplete neurological development. 

The memo notes Buchanan's childhood was tumultuous with an unstable family 

life, difficulties at school, and a peer group that was involved with drugs and 

alcohol. His parents were absent most of the time, his older sister had just run 

away from home, he spent time in a boys' home, and he "began engaging in 

attention seeking behavior at home and at school . . . ." 

Regarding the second factor, family and home environment, the memo reported 

that Buchanan's father was "an alcoholic who drifted from job to job" and when he 

was home, enforced corporal punishments, including backhanding, punching in the 

face, and hitting with a belt. Buchanan's mother was "cold and aloof" and highly 

critical of her children. In addition, she once allegedly attempted to run over one 

of Buchanan's father's mistresses and threatened to leave her husband many times 

"and did a few times for short periods of time." The family moved to Fort Mill, a 

town of less than 3,000 at the time, when Buchanan was seven years old. 

Buchanan did not fit in well in the small community. He was overweight, 

weighing over 200 pounds by the time he was sixteen years old. He was teased at 

school and became the class clown, often getting in trouble. After his older sister, 

who acted somewhat as a surrogate mother to him, ran away, and Buchanan 

returned from a short stay at a boys' home, he "turned to drinking and drugs." 

 

(3) the circumstances of the homicide offense, including 

the extent of the offender's participation in the conduct 

and how familial and peer pressures may have affected 

him; 

(4) the "incompetencies associated with youth—for 

example, [the offender's] inability to deal with police 

officers or prosecutors (including on a plea agreement) or 

[the offender's] incapacity to assist his own attorneys"; 

and 

(5) the "possibility of rehabilitation." 

Id. at 544, 765 S.E.2d at 577 (alterations in original) (quoting Miller v. Alabama, 

567 U.S. 460, 477–78 (2012)). These factors are generally referred to as the Miller 

factors. The parties here also refer to them as the Aiken factors. 
 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

The memo describes Buchanan's situation at the time of the offense when 

considering the third factor from Miller, the circumstances of the offense. During 

the summer of 1973, Buchanan began using methamphetamines and LSD, had 

stopped attending his auto mechanics classes at York Technical College, was 

working night shifts, and was not sleeping. The night of the offense, he took 

several hits of LSD and drank excessively. His recollection of the night in 

question was "a blur." Buchanan admitted to the police that he committed the 

offense and told them "he did not have complete control of his actions that night." 

However, "[t]hen and now[, he] takes full responsibility for his actions and the 

consequences thereof." 

In its discussion of the fourth factor, the incompetency of youth when dealing with 

the criminal justice system, the memo notes that at the time he pled guilty, 

Buchanan accepted the advice of his attorney, who "virtually guaranteed him that 

he would be paroled in less than twenty years" because many persons convicted of 

murder were granted parole after ten years of service, and it was rare not to be 

granted parole after twenty years. 

Finally, as to the fifth factor, the possibility of rehabilitation, the memo notes 

Buchanan has spent the last forty-five years incarcerated and has taken advantage 

of the opportunities available to him. While he was still seventeen years old, he 

became part of Manning's Comprehensive Drug Abuse Program by visiting 

schools and churches to dissuade other teenagers from using drugs. Within the 

prison, he has been certified as a literacy tutor for more than forty years. He tutors, 

teaches English at night school, and started his own course to teach inmates basic 

legal research and writing. He has also worked as a volunteer Inmate Grievance 

Clerk and a hospice volunteer, and is a member of the Character Based Unit (a 

society of inmates focused on rehabilitation), which is demanding and requires a 

good disciplinary history, ability to contribute, demonstrated interest in 

rehabilitation, mental stability, and credibility. Buchanan volunteers as a chaplain 

in the prison and, when on work release, he is actively involved with Trinity 

Baptist Church and Kairos, a Christian ministry program. 

In addition, Buchanan has been enrolled in the release plan, Jump Start. He was to 

graduate on November 14, 2018, "at the Blue Level — the highest possible level of 

completion." Jump Start is a Christian-based organization that focuses on 

transitioning men back into the workforce and society after prison. As a parolee 

and graduate of Jump Start, Buchanan would be provided transitional housing for 

two years, be mentored, and receive assistance getting a job and eventually buying 
 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

a home. He completed extensive business and vocational courses, completed more 

than 500 hours of carpentry training, and worked as a manager for Astro Glass 

during a work release program. Buchanan submitted numerous certificates of 

training, volunteerism, and education, and letters in support of his parole from 

educators, potential and past employers, and prison employees. 

Dr. Susan Knight, a forensic psychologist, examined Buchanan in preparation for 

the parole hearing. She noted Buchanan had some disciplinary charges during his 

incarceration; however, she concluded he did not represent a significant risk for 

future violent acts. Dr. Knight interviewed numerous employers, prison 

employees, a chaplain, and others, who positively described Buchanan as follows: 

a model inmate; a hard worker; a "really good, really respectful guy"; of "good 

character"; respected and well-liked by other inmates; helpful to other inmates; 

smart; deeply involved in religion; "If he got out tomorrow, I would be happy to 

know he bought a home on my street"; sincere, articulate, and honest; and 

remorseful. Dr. Knight concluded Buchanan suffered from no psychological 

disorders and found, "[H]is prison record indicates an exceptionally-responsible 

worker, with very few physical altercations, and a positive demeanor and attitude. 

Collateral and interview data indicate [he] expressed remorsefulness[] and [the] 

ability for empathy." 

Dr. Knight reviewed the criteria used by the Board and concluded that, as to the 

nature and seriousness of the offense, Buchanan took full responsibility, 

demonstrated remorse, and recognized with good insight the factors that facilitated 

his substance abuse. As to his adjustment while in confinement, Dr. Knight 

reiterated Buchanan's many accomplishments and honors. Regarding her 

assessment of Buchanan's risk to the community, Dr. Knight found he was at low 

risk for future violent recidivism, and she identified substance abuse treatment as 

his primary risk management strategy. Finally, as to the Board's criterion of the 

adequacy of an offender's parole plan, Buchanan has been approved for two years 

of housing at Jump Start and has the opportunity of employment in a ministry and 

involvement through Jump Start in woodworking, a furniture company, and other 

construction. 

Buchanan's attorney also submitted a letter to the Board, arguing that after Aiken, it 

needed to consider Buchanan's "youth and its attendant circumstances and provide 

a meaningful opportunity for release." The letter requested the Board (1) hire an 

expert in adolescent brain development and consider the expert's written 

evaluation; (2) schedule the parole hearing at a different time from hearings for 

adult offenders and allow testimony from mental health professionals and other 
witnesses; and (3) consider the factors of youth, including the incompetency of 

youth regarding the legal system, immaturity, home and community environment 

at the time of the offense, evidence of remorse, and efforts made toward 

rehabilitation. 

The Board responded to the letter, arguing Buchanan was not being denied any 

constitutional rights. The Board noted, "Though [its] reasons for denial . . . will 

never change, these reasons for denial are legal . . . ." The Board also stated, "As 

long as it is revealed that the Board applied the mandatory criteria, the use of the 

events of the offense as a reason for denial is lawful." 

At the hearing before the Board, Buchanan was represented by his attorney and 

accompanied by three pastors and Dave Johnson from Jump Start. Buchanan 

explained the events of the offense and his subsequent involvement in a 

comprehensive drug abuse therapy program, Narcotics Anonymous, and 

Alcoholics Anonymous. Buchanan's attorney spoke on his behalf. Pastor Tammy 

Blom also spoke on his behalf, concluding she envisioned Buchanan "moving into 

Jump [S]tart after leaving prison." Pastor Frank Ledvinka also spoke, indicating he 

believed in Buchanan, saw Buchanan's great love of God and others, and asked the 

Board to give him a chance. The hearing indicates the Board had "71 signatures in 

opposition." According to Buchanan, the Board deliberated for less than a minute 

before verbally denying his request for parole. In a subsequent letter, the Board 

stated it considered the following in denying parole: 

(1) the characteristics of your current offense(s), prior 

offense(s), prior supervision history, prison disciplinary 

record, and/or prior criminal record . . . ; 

(2) the factors published in Department Form 1212 

(Criteria for Parole Consideration); 

(3) the factors outlined in Section 24-21-640 of the 

South Carolina Code of Laws[;] and 

(4) actuarial risk and needs assessment factors 

pursuant to Section 24-21-10(F)(1) of the South Carolina 

Code of Laws. 

Buchanan appealed to the ALC. 

In its order affirming the Board, the ALC noted its review was confined to a 

determination of whether the Board's denial of parole afforded Buchanan due 

process and was consistent with Cooper v. South Carolina Department of 
 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Probation, Parole & Pardon Services.

3 The ALC rejected Buchanan's argument 

that recent case law had created a new substantive constitutional right to a 

"meaningful" parole review for inmates who were sentenced as juveniles, which 

required the Board to expressly consider an inmate's youth in determining parole. 

In addition, the ALC found it did not have the authority to "establish a new 

substantive constitutional right." The ALC denied Buchanan's request that it order 

the Board to grant parole. This appeal followed. 

STANDARD OF REVIEW 

Section 1-23-610(B) of the South Carolina Code (Supp. 2022) sets forth the 

standard of review when the court of appeals is sitting in review of a decision by 

the ALC on an appeal from an administrative agency. The court of appeals may 

reverse or modify the decision only if substantive rights of the appellant have been 

prejudiced because the decision is clearly erroneous in light of the reliable and 

substantial evidence on the whole record, arbitrary or otherwise characterized by 

an abuse of discretion, or affected by other error of law. Id. 

LAW/ANALYSIS 

A. Due Process 

Buchanan argues the "legal sea change" applicable to juvenile sentencing during 

the past decade or so requires the Board to adopt procedures that will allow 

juvenile offenders to have their youth and immaturity considered in parole 

decisions. See Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 578 (2005) ("The Eighth and 

Fourteenth Amendments forbid imposition of the death penalty on offenders who 

were under the age of 18 when their crimes were committed."); Miller, 567 U.S. at 

489 (finding juveniles convicted of homicide could not be subjected to mandatory 

LWOP sentences, "regardless of their age and age-related characteristics and the 

nature of their crimes" because to do so would "violate [the] principle of 

proportionality, and so the Eighth Amendment's ban on cruel and unusual 

punishment"); Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48, 74 (2010) (holding "that for a 

juvenile offender who did not commit homicide[,] the Eighth Amendment forbids 

the sentence of life without parole"); Montgomery v. Louisiana, 577 U.S. 190, 

212–13 (2016) (giving Miller retroactive effect and stating, "In light of what this 

Court has said in Roper, Graham, and Miller about how children are 

3 377 S.C. 489, 500, 661 S.E.2d 106, 112 (2008), abrogated on other grounds by 

Allen v. S.C. Dep't of Corr., 439 S.C. 164, 886 S.E.2d 671 (2023). 
constitutionally different from adults in their level of culpability, however, 

prisoners like Montgomery must be given the opportunity to show their crime did 

not reflect irreparable corruption; and, if it did not, their hope for some years of life 

outside prison walls must be restored."). 

South Carolina recognized these principles in Aiken as to sentencing, holding the 

sentences of "fifteen inmates who were sentenced to life without parole as 

juveniles" violated the Eighth Amendment under Miller. 410 S.C. at 536–37, 765 

S.E.2d at 573. Our supreme court acknowledged the "affirmative requirement that 

courts fully explore the impact of the defendant's juvenility on the sentence 

rendered." Id. at 543, 765 S.E.2d at 577. Aiken held that a sentencing court 

considering an LWOP sentence for a juvenile offender must consider the Miller 

factors. Id. at 544, 765 S.E.2d at 577. 

Buchanan argues the Board's current parole review process violates his due process 

rights by not also requiring the Board to consider these factors in reviewing his 

parole applications. Buchanan notes that fifteen of his eighteen parole denials cite, 

virtually verbatim, the same three reasons for denial: 

(1) the nature and seriousness of the current offense; 

(2) an indication of violence in this or a previous offense; 

and 

(3) the use of a deadly weapon in this or a previous offense. 

According to Buchanan, the Board's process is insufficient because it does not 

require the Board to consider his youth and rehabilitation. Buchanan argues many 

jurisdictions have judicially or legislatively required parole boards to specifically 

consider the "hallmark features of youth" in considering parole of juvenile 

offenders. 

The Board argues the change in the law as it relates to juvenile sentencing has not 

been extended beyond sentencing in South Carolina, maintaining Miller and Aiken 

require the factors of youth be considered only by the sentencing court, not the 

Board. Id. at 544, 765 S.E.2d at 577 (explaining that Miller mandates 

consideration of the factors of youth by "the sentencing authority"). In addition, 

the Board maintains that because Buchanan's sentence provides for parole 

eligibility, Miller and Aiken do not apply. See Montgomery, 577 U.S. at 212 ("A 

State may remedy a Miller violation by permitting juvenile homicide offenders to 

be considered for parole, rather than by resentencing them."). 
The statutory factors that must be considered by the Board are as follows: 

The board must carefully consider the record of the 

prisoner before, during, and after imprisonment, and no 

such prisoner may be paroled until it appears to the 

satisfaction of the board: that the prisoner has shown a 

disposition to reform; that in the future he will probably 

obey the law and lead a correct life; that by his conduct 

he has merited a lessening of the rigors of his 

imprisonment; that the interest of society will not be 

impaired thereby; and that suitable employment has been 

secured for him. 

S.C. Code Ann. § 24-21-640 (Supp. 2022). In addition, the Board must consider 

the factors enumerated in its parole form.

4 

 

 

4 The current list of the factors on Form 1212 are as follows: 

1. The risk the inmate poses to the community; 

2. The nature and seriousness of the inmate's offense, the circumstances 

surrounding the offense, and the inmate's attitude toward it; 

3. The inmate's prior criminal records and his/her adjustment under any 

previous programs or supervision; 

4. The inmate's attitude toward his/her family, the victim, and authority in 

general; 

5. The inmate's adjustment while in confinement, including his/her progress in 

counseling, therapy, and other similar programs designed to encourage the 

inmate to improve himself/herself; 

6. The inmate's employment history, including his/her job training and skills 

and his/her stability in the work place; 

7. The inmate's physical, mental and emotional health; 

8. The inmate's understanding of the cause of his/her past criminal conduct; 

9. The inmate's efforts to solve his/her problems such as seeking treatment for 

substance abuse, enrolling in academic and vocational education courses, and in 

general using whatever resources the Department of [C]orrections has made 

available to inmates to help with their problems; 

10. The adequacy of the inmate's overall parole plan. This includes [an] 

inmate[']s living arrangements, where he/she will live and who he[/she] will live 

with; the character of those with whom the inmate plans to associate in both 
In Cooper, our supreme court explained the Board's procedure is proper "if [the 

Board] clearly states in its order denying parole that it considered the factors 

outlined in section 24-21-640 and the . . . factors published in its parole form." 377 

S.C. at 500, 661 S.E.2d at 112; see also Compton v. S.C. Dep't of Prob., Parole & 

Pardon Servs., 385 S.C. 476, 479, 685 S.E.2d 175, 177 (2009) (relying on the 

holding in Cooper to affirm a denial of parole because the parole board "clearly 

stated in its [order] that it considered the [section 24-21-60] criteria and the criteria 

set forth in Form 1212"). 

As found by the ALC, the Board's denial of parole met the requirements of Cooper 

and the ALC had authority to review the decision.

5 

 Based on what Cooper says 

 

his/her working hours and his/her off-work hours; the inmate's plans for gainful 

employment; 

11. The willingness of the Community into which the inmate will be released to 

receive the inmate; 

12. The willingness of the inmate's family to allow his/her to return to the family 

circle; 

13. The attitudes of the sentencing judge, the solicitor, and local law 

enforcement officers respecting the inmate's parole; 

14. The feelings of the victim's family, and any witnesses to the crime about the 

release of the inmate[;] 

15. The actuarial risk and needs assessment outlined in section 24-21-10 (F)(1) 

of the S.C. Code of [L]aws; which evaluates based on Criminal Involvement, 

Relationships/Lifestyle, Personality/Attitudes, Family, Social Exclusion and 

Mental Health[; and] 

16. Other factors considered relevant in a particular case by the Board. 

South Carolina Department of Probation, Parole and Pardon Services, Criteria for 

Parole Consideration, https://www.dppps.sc.gov/content/download/200476/ 

4681336/file/Criteria+for+Parole+Consideration.pdf 

5 Following the South Carolina Supreme Court's decision in Cooper, the General 

Assembly amended section 1-23-600(D) of the South Carolina Code to provide 

that "[a]n administrative law judge shall not hear an appeal from an inmate in the 

custody of the Department of Corrections involving the loss of the opportunity to 

earn sentence-related credits . . . or an appeal involving the denial of parole to a 

potentially eligible inmate by the Department of Probation, Parole and Pardon 

Services." 2008 S.C. Acts No. 334, § 7 (effective June 16, 2008). The ALC and 

our supreme court have continued to review these appeals where they implicate an 

alleged deprivation of due process. See Rose v. S.C. Dep't of Prob., Parole & 

Pardon Servs., 429 S.C. 136, 144, 838 S.E.2d 505, 510 (2020) (reviewing a claim 
 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

about a routine denial of parole, this is a routine denial and the ALC correctly 

affirmed the Board. We recognize there is tension between the principle that 

inmates are entitled to a meaningful parole review and what appears to be serial 

denials of parole based solely on factors that do not change and that have no 

relation to an inmate's rehabilitation. Even so, we read the authorities to instruct 

that the court system's role does not include looking behind the Board's statement 

that it has considered all of the factors and made its decision. As noted by the 

Board, despite Buchanan's claim that "the Board has denied his request for parole 

based on the facts and circumstances of the offense[,] which [are] fixed in the past 

and cannot be changed[,]" Buchanan has not been permanently denied parole and 

"[j]ust because [he] hasn't received parole yet doesn't mean he never will." See 

Furtick, 352 S.C. at 598, 576 S.E.2d at 149 (stating "the permanent denial of 

parole eligibility implicates a liberty interest sufficient to require at least minimal 

due process") (emphasis in original); S.C. Code Ann. § 24-21-645(D) (Supp. 2022) 

("[U]pon a negative determination of parole, prisoners in confinement for a violent 

crime . . . must have their cases reviewed every two years for the purpose of a 

determination of parole . . . ."); S.C. Code Ann. § 16-1-60 (Supp. 2022) ("For 

purposes of definition under South Carolina law, a violent crime includes the 

offense[] of[] murder . . . ."). 

The Board asserts as long as its notice of rejection states it followed the statutory 

and Form 1212 criteria, its order of denial is valid. Based on the law currently 

that Rose had been granted parole in 2001 but remained incarcerated in 2020); 

Barton v. S.C. Dep't of Prob., Parole & Pardon Servs., 404 S.C. 395, 419, 745 

S.E.2d 110, 123 (2013) (reviewing a parole denial for an alleged ex post facto 

violation); see generally Furtick v. S.C. Dep't of Prob., Parole & Pardon Servs., 

352 S.C. 594, 598, 576 S.E.2d 146, 149 (2003) (reviewing an appeal from the 

Board's decision finding Furtick ineligible for parole because an inmate has a 

liberty interest in gaining access to the Board and a permanent denial of eligibility 

implicates a liberty interest requiring due process); Al-Shabazz v. State, 338 S.C. 

354, 376–77, 527 S.E.2d 742, 754 (2000) (finding the ALC has the authority to 

review non-collateral and administrative agency decisions); cf. Allen v. S.C. Dep't 

of Corr., 439 S.C. 164, 171, 886 S.E.2d 671, 674 (2023) (explaining "[an inmate's 

grievance] claim that implicates a state-created liberty or property interest is not 

required for the ALC to have subject matter jurisdiction over the appeal. However, 

the ALC is not required to hold a hearing in every matter and may summarily 

dismiss an inmate's grievance if it does not implicate a state-created liberty or 

property interest sufficient to trigger procedural due process guarantees"). 
 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

existing in South Carolina, we must agree. However, we are concerned regarding 

the perfunctory manner in which Buchanan's request for parole was denied. 

Although Buchanan and other juveniles similarly situated are technically eligible 

for parole, the continuing denial of parole based on the same factors, all 

unchangeable and related to their offenses, gives no guidance to these inmates 

about what can be done to improve their chances of parole and is, in essence, 

equivalent to being ineligible for parole. Under the current system, it appears no 

passage of time served (here, forty-seven years) or showing of rehabilitation (here, 

eighteen parole reviews now indicating Buchanan "has more than demonstrated his 

rehabilitation") can change his fate before this Board. The public policy behind 

Roper, Graham, and Miller, to restore hope to juvenile offenders for some life 

outside of prison, is thwarted by the Board's continued reliance on factors existing 

at the time of the conviction with little or no apparent consideration of subsequent 

rehabilitation efforts. The prospect of parole, including meaningful parole 

hearings, incentivizes good conduct while imprisoned and encourages participation 

in rehabilitative programs, which reduces recidivism rates. See Amanda Dick, The 

Immature State of Our Union: Lack of Legal Entitlement to Prison Programming 

in the United States as Compared to European Countries, 35 Ariz. J. Int'l & 

Compar. L. 287, 291 (2018). Additionally, parole reduces prison populations by 

releasing rehabilitated inmates, lessening the fiscal burden of incarceration by 

eliminating spending on the detention of individuals who no longer pose a threat to 

society. 

In this case, Buchanan argues he confessed, he accepted the advice of his attorney 

to plead guilty, "his attorney virtually guaranteed him that he would be paroled in 

less than twenty years[,]" and the jury recommended mercy. He has been 

imprisoned for fifty years for a crime he committed at age seventeen. And there 

appears to be no dispute—none—that he has been an exemplary inmate and 

demonstrated remorse, rehabilitation, and a low risk for recidivism. 

We reluctantly affirm the ALC's finding that the Board followed the proper 

procedure when it denied Buchanan parole because the Board's order of denial 

stated the Board had considered "the factors outlined in [s]ection 24-21-640" and 

"the factors published in Department Form 1212." See Risher v. S.C. Dep't of 

Health & Env't Control, 393 S.C. 198, 204, 712 S.E.2d 428, 431 (2011) ("A 

decision of the ALC should be upheld . . . if it is supported by substantial evidence 

in the record."); Cooper, 377 S.C. at 500, 661 S.E.2d at 112 (providing the 

procedure for denying parole is proper "if [the parole board] clearly states in its 

order denying parole that it considered the factors outlined in section 24-21-640 

and the fifteen factors published in [Form 1212]"); Compton, 385 S.C. at 479, 685 
 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

S.E.2d at 177 (affirming a denial of parole because the parole board's order 

complied with the Cooper requirements). Although the Board has complied with 

the minimal requirements necessary for this to satisfy the standard our supreme 

court articulated in Cooper, we are sympathetic to Buchanan's argument that it 

appears inmates who offended while juveniles are not given meaningful review 

regarding parole. Our role is one that is limited to operating within the framework 

set by statutory law and by our supreme court's precedents. It may well be good 

policy for the Legislature to review and/or revise the parole system to assure the 

factors of youth are a part of considering parole in these cases rather than 

permitting the seemingly perfunctory review now standardly given, but that is the 

Legislature's decision, not ours. 

B. Cruel and Unusual Punishment 

Buchanan argues the Board's multiple denials of parole over so many years 

violates the cruel and unusual punishment prohibitions in the United States and 

South Carolina Constitutions. We disagree. 

The United States Constitution provides, "Excessive bail shall not be required, nor 

excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted." U.S. 

Const. amend. XIII. The South Carolina Constitution provides, "Excessive bail 

shall not be required, nor shall excessive fines be imposed, nor shall cruel, nor 

corporal, nor unusual punishment be inflicted, nor shall witnesses be unreasonably 

detained." S.C. Const. art. I, § 15. Under either Constitution, we find no violation. 

"[P]arole is a privilege, not a matter of right . . . . Parole is a creature of statute and 

is exclusively in the province of the legislative branch of government. The 

General Assembly empowers the Department to administer the parole program." 

Major v. S.C. Dep't of Prob., Parole & Pardon Servs., 384 S.C. 457, 465, 682 

S.E.2d 795, 799 (2009). "[T]he permanent denial of parole eligibility implicates a 

liberty interest sufficient to require at least minimal due process." Furtick, 352 

S.C. at 598, 576 S.E.2d at 149. 

A State is not required to guarantee eventual freedom to a 

juvenile offender . . . . What the State must do, however, 

is give defendants . . . some meaningful opportunity to 

obtain release based on demonstrated maturity and 

rehabilitation. It is for the State, in the first instance, to 

explore the means and mechanisms for compliance. It 

bears emphasis, however, that while the Eighth 
 

 

 

Amendment prohibits a State from imposing a life 

without parole sentence on a juvenile non[-]homicide 

offender, it does not require the State to release that 

offender during his natural life. 

Graham, 560 U.S. at 75. We agree with the ALC that neither the United States 

Supreme Court nor our supreme court requires specific parole criteria to be 

considered in determining whether to grant parole, and the Board's denial of parole 

did not constitute cruel and/or unusual punishment under either Constitution. 

CONCLUSION 

Based on the foregoing, the order of the ALC is 

AFFIRMED. 

MCDONALD and HEWITT, JJ., concur.