United States Court of Appeals

For the Seventh Circuit

Chicago, Illinois 60604

Submitted May 3, 2018

Decided May 4, 2018

Before

JOEL M. FLAUM, Circuit Judge

FRANK H. EASTERBROOK, Circuit Judge

AMY C. BARRETT, Circuit Judge

No. 16-3892

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

v.

VICTOR MATA MADRIGAL,

Defendant-Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District 

Court for the Northern District of Illinois, 

Eastern Division.

No. 14 CR 543-1

Amy J. St. Eve,

Judge.

O R D E R

Victor Mata Madrigal pleaded guilty to possessing cocaine with intent to 

distribute it, 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1), (b)(1)(A), and conspiring to distribute cocaine,

id. § 846, and was sentenced to 276 months’ imprisonment and a five-year term of 

supervised release. Madrigal filed a notice of appeal, but his appointed lawyer asserts 

that the appeal is frivolous and moves to withdraw under Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 

738 (1967). Madrigal did not respond to counsel’s motion. Because counsel’s analysis 

appears to be thorough, we limit our review to the subjects he discusses. 

See United States v. Bey, 748 F.3d 774, 776 (7th Cir. 2014); United States v. Wagner, 103 F.3d 

551, 553 (7th Cir. 1996).

NONPRECEDENTIAL DISPOSITION

To be cited only in accordance with Fed. R. App. P. 32.1
No. 16-3892 Page 2

Madrigal is a Mexican national with no legal status in the United States. He and 

several codefendants, including his girlfriend Stephanie Arredondo, operated a drug 

trafficking organization in the Chicago area. The organization distributed wholesale 

quantities of illegal drugs, including an estimated 110 kilograms of cocaine. Madrigal 

was in charge of coordinating and supervising cocaine shipments to Michigan.

In April 2013 Madrigal was arrested and detained on immigration charges, but 

he continued to provide instructions to his codefendants through Arrendondo.

Arredondo, who discovered she was pregnant with Madrigal’s child the day of his 

arrest, collected debts and arranged drug trades at Madrigal’s direction. Madrigal later 

pleaded guilty, and was sentenced to 276 months’ imprisonment—below the 

recommended range of 360 months to life (based on an offense level of 39 and a 

criminal history category of VI). 

In his Anders brief, counsel informs us that Madrigal does not wish to withdraw 

his guilty plea, and thus counsel appropriately refrains from discussing the adequacy of 

the plea colloquy or the voluntariness of the plea. United States v. Konczak, 683 F.3d 348, 

349 (7th Cir. 2012); United States v. Knox, 287 F.3d 667, 670–71 (7th Cir. 2002).

Counsel first considers whether Madrigal could argue that the district court 

erred in imposing an upward adjustment for knowingly involving a pregnant 

individual (his girlfriend) in the distribution of a controlled substance, see U.S.S.G. 

§ 2D1.1(b)(15)(B)(iii). At sentencing Madrigal disputed the application of the adjustment 

because Arredondo “voluntarily and willingly” chose to participate in the drug

trafficking organization. But counsel recognizes that raising this argument on appeal 

would be frivolous because it does not adhere to the text of § 2D1.1(b)(15)(B)(iii); there 

is no exception for women who want to engage in drug trafficking. Because Madrigal 

knew that his girlfriend was pregnant and still assigned her responsibilities in a 

narcotics trafficking organization, any challenge to the adjustment would be frivolous.

Counsel also addresses whether Madrigal could challenge the upward 

adjustment for his role as an organizer or leader of the drug conspiracy, see U.S.S.G. 

§ 3B1.1(a), but correctly concludes that the challenge would be frivolous. In his plea 

agreement Madrigal stipulated to facts that identified his “leadership position” in the 

organization. Based on this admission, any challenge to the adjustment would be 

frivolous. See United States v. Warneke, 310 F.3d 542, 550 (7th Cir. 2002) (remarking that 

stipulation in plea agreement “removes all contest from the case”).
No. 16-3892 Page 3

Counsel next evaluates whether Madrigal could challenge the reasonableness of 

his sentence, but appropriately concludes that such a challenge would be frivolous. 

Madrigal’s sentence is presumed reasonable because it is below the guidelines range, 

and we agree with counsel that the record presents no basis to disturb the presumption. 

See Rita v. United States, 551 U.S. 338, 347 (2007); United States v. Poetz, 582 F.3d 835, 837 

(7th Cir. 2009). The court adequately considered the factors set forth in 18 U.S.C. 

§ 3553(a), including the nature of his crime (which resulted in “a lot of cocaine on the 

streets of Chicago”), his criminal history (additional drug convictions and illegal reentry 

into the United States), and possible sentencing disparities with his codefendants

(reflecting his greater role in the drug organization and his extensive criminal history). 

Accordingly, we GRANT the motion to withdraw and DISMISS the appeal.