20064 Federal Register / Vol. 63, No. 78 /Thursday, April 23, 1998 /Rules and Regulations

trips while on the ground, do not reset

without first identifying the source of the

electrical fault.

ELECTRICAL SYSTEM

Fuel Pumps

If the circuit breaker for any wing tank fuel

boost pump (circuit breakers U3, U4, U7, U8,

U9, U10, U13, U14) trips, do not reset. If the

pump trips while in flight, continue flight in

accordance with the procedures in the ‘‘Tank

Pumps LOW Lights On’’ portion of the

Procedures section of the AFM. If the breaker

trips while on the ground, do not reset

without first identifying the source of the

electrical fault.

’’

(b) Within 50 flight hours or 10 days after

the effective date of this AD, whichever

occurs first, install a placard on the

engineer’s fuel panel that states:

‘‘If FQIS is operative, do not operate the

fuel boost pumps when less than 1,200

pounds of fuel are in the corresponding wing

tanks.’’

(c) An alternative method of compliance or

adjustment of the compliance time that

provides an acceptable level of safety may be

used if approved by the Manager, Atlanta

Aircraft Certification Office (ACO), FAA,

Small Airplane Directorate. Operators shall

submit their requests through an appropriate

FAA Principal Maintenance Inspector, who

may add comments and then send it to the

Manager, Atlanta ACO.

Note 2: Information concerning the

existence of approved alternative methods of

compliance with this AD, if any, may be

obtained from the Atlanta ACO.

(d) Special flight permits may be issued in

accordance with sections 21.197 and 21.199

of the Federal Aviation Regulations (14 CFR

21.197 and 21.199) to operate the airplane to

a location where the requirements of this AD

can be accomplished.

(e) This amendment becomes effective on

April 28, 1998, to all persons except those

persons to whom it was made immediately

effective by emergency AD 98–08–09, issued

on April 3, 1998, which contained the

requirements of this amendment.

Issued in Renton, Washington, on April 16,

1998.

Darrell M. Pederson,

Acting Manager, Transport Airplane

Directorate, Aircraft Certification Service.

[FR Doc. 98–10756 Filed 4–22–98; 8:45 am]

BILLING CODE 4910–13–U

DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION

Federal Aviation Administration

14 CFR Part 39

[Docket No. 98–NM–124–AD; Amendment

39–10497; AD 98–09–16]

RIN 2120–AA64

Airworthiness Directives; Aerospatiale

Model ATR–42 and ATR–72 Series

Airplanes

AGENCY: Federal Aviation

Administration, DOT.

ACTION: Final rule; request for

comments.

SUMMARY: This amendment adopts a

new airworthiness directive (AD) that is

applicable to all Aerospatiale Model

ATR–42 and ATR–72 series airplanes.

This action requires revising the

Airplane Flight Manual (AFM) to add

specific flightcrew instructions to be

followed in the event of failure of one

or both of the direct current (DC)

generators. This amendment is

prompted by issuance of mandatory

continuing airworthiness information by

a foreign civil airworthiness authority.

The actions specified in this AD are

intended to prevent failure of the

second of two DC generators after the

failure of the first generator, which

could lead to the loss of main battery

power and result in the loss of all

electrical power, except the emergency

battery supply, during flight.

DATES: Effective May 8, 1998.

Comments for inclusion in the Rules

Docket must be received on or before

May 26, 1998.

ADDRESSES: Submit comments in

triplicate to the Federal Aviation

Administration (FAA), Transport

Airplane Directorate, ANM–114,

Attention: Rules Docket No. 98–NM–

124–AD, 1601 Lind Avenue, SW.,

Renton, Washington 98055–4056.

Information pertaining to this

amendment may be obtained from or

examined at the FAA, Transport

Airplane Directorate, 1601 Lind

Avenue, SW., Renton, Washington.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT:

Norman B. Martenson, Manager,

International Branch, ANM–116, FAA,

Transport Airplane Directorate, 1601

Lind Avenue, SW., Renton, Washington

98055–4056; telephone (425) 227–2110;

fax (425) 227–1149.

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: The

Direction Ge ́ne ́rale de l’Aviation Civile

(DGAC), which is the airworthiness

authority for France, recently notified

the FAA that an unsafe condition may

exist on all Aerospatiale Model ATR–42

and ATR–72 series airplanes. The DGAC

advises that an ATR airplane

experienced the loss of the number one

direct current (DC) generator, followed

by the loss of the number two DC

generator, during flight. The loss of the

second generator occurred following an

attempt by the flightcrew to reset the

number one generator, in accordance

with approved procedures. After a few

minutes, the airplane experienced the

loss of main battery power. The cause of

the failure of the second generator is

currently under investigation. Such

failures, if not corrected, could result in

the loss of all electrical power, except

the emergency battery supply, during

flight.

French Airworthiness Directives

The DGAC issued French telegraphic

airworthiness directives T98–148–

076(B) and T98–149–038(B), both dated

March 20, 1998, in order to assure the

continued airworthiness of these

airplanes in France. These French

airworthiness directives require

adherence to instructions specified in

ATR AFM Chapter 5–04 in the event of

one DC generator failure, and specify

that no attempt should be made to reset

the affected DC generator. Additionally,

the French airworthiness directives note

that, in the event of failure of both DC

generators, resetting the generators

should be attempted.

Explanation of FAA’s Findings

The current version of the FAAapproved ATR Airplane Flight Manual

(AFM) specifies that a single failed

generator is to be left in the ‘‘OFF’’

position; however, the AFM does not

explicitly prohibit an attempted reset of

a failed generator. Moreover, for some

operators, Flight Crew Operating

Manuals may contain instructions for

one attempt to reset a failed generator.

Therefore, the FAA has determined that

explicit instructions must be provided

in the Limitations section of the AFM to

specify that flight crews should not

attempt to reset a single failed generator.

However, in the event of dual DC

generator failure, reset of the generators

should be attempted.

FAA’s Conclusions

These airplane models are

manufactured in France and are type

certificated for operation in the United

States under the provisions of section

21.29 of the Federal Aviation

Regulations (14 CFR 21.29) and the

applicable bilateral airworthiness

agreement. Pursuant to this bilateral

airworthiness agreement, the DGAC has

kept the FAA informed of the situation

described above. The FAA has
Federal Register / Vol. 63, No. 78 /Thursday, April 23, 1998 /Rules and Regulations 20065

examined the findings of the DGAC,

reviewed all available information, and

determined that AD action is necessary

for products of this type design that are

certificated for operation in the United

States.

Explanation of Requirements of Rule

Since an unsafe condition has been

identified that is likely to exist or

develop on other airplanes of the same

type design registered in the United

States, this AD is being issued to

prevent failure of the second of two DC

generators after the failure of the first

generator, which could lead to the loss

of main battery power and result in the

loss of all electrical power, except the

emergency battery supply, during flight.

This AD requires revising the

Limitations Section of the AFM to add

specific flightcrew instructions to be

followed in the event of failure of one

or both of DC generators.

Interim Action

This is considered to be interim

action. The manufacturer has advised

the FAA that it is currently investigating

the cause of the dual generator failure

and may develop a modification that

will positively address the unsafe

condition in this AD. Once the

investigation is concluded, the FAA

may consider further rulemaking.

Determination of Rule’s Effective Date

Since a situation exists that requires

the immediate adoption of this

regulation, it is found that notice and

opportunity for prior public comment

hereon are impracticable, and that good

cause exists for making this amendment

effective in less than 30 days.

Comments Invited

Although this action is in the form of

a final rule that involves requirements

affecting flight safety and, thus, was not

preceded by notice and an opportunity

for public comment, comments are

invited on this rule. Interested persons

are invited to comment on this rule by

submitting such written data, views, or

arguments as they may desire.

Communications shall identify the

Rules Docket number and be submitted

in triplicate to the address specified

under the caption ADDRESSES. All

communications received on or before

the closing date for comments will be

considered, and this rule may be

amended in light of the comments

received. Factual information that

supports the commenter’s ideas and

suggestions is extremely helpful in

evaluating the effectiveness of the AD

action and determining whether

additional rulemaking action would be

needed.

Comments are specifically invited on

the overall regulatory, economic,

environmental, and energy aspects of

the rule that might suggest a need to

modify the rule. All comments

submitted will be available, both before

and after the closing date for comments,

in the Rules Docket for examination by

interested persons. A report that

summarizes each FAA-public contact

concerned with the substance of this AD

will be filed in the Rules Docket.

Commenters wishing the FAA to

acknowledge receipt of their comments

submitted in response to this rule must

submit a self-addressed, stamped

postcard on which the following

statement is made: ‘‘Comments to

Docket Number 98–NM–124–AD.’’ The

postcard will be date stamped and

returned to the commenter.

Regulatory Impact

The regulations adopted herein will

not have substantial direct effects on the

States, on the relationship between the

national government and the States, or

on the distribution of power and

responsibilities among the various

levels of government. Therefore, in

accordance with Executive Order 12612,

it is determined that this final rule does

not have sufficient federalism

implications to warrant the preparation

of a Federalism Assessment.

The FAA has determined that this

regulation is an emergency regulation

that must be issued immediately to

correct an unsafe condition in aircraft,

and that it is not a ‘‘significant

regulatory action’’ under Executive

Order 12866. It has been determined

further that this action involves an

emergency regulation under DOT

Regulatory Policies and Procedures (44

FR 11034, February 26, 1979). If it is

determined that this emergency

regulation otherwise would be

significant under DOT Regulatory

Policies and Procedures, a final

regulatory evaluation will be prepared

and placed in the Rules Docket. A copy

of it, if filed, may be obtained from the

Rules Docket at the location provided

under the caption ADDRESSES.

List of Subjects in 14 CFR Part 39

Air transportation, Aircraft, Aviation

safety, Safety.

Adoption of the Amendment

Accordingly, pursuant to the

authority delegated to me by the

Administrator, the Federal Aviation

Administration amends part 39 of the

Federal Aviation Regulations (14 CFR

part 39) as follows:

PART 39—AIRWORTHINESS

DIRECTIVES

1. The authority citation for part 39

continues to read as follows:

Authority: 49 U.S.C. 106(g), 40113, 44701.

§ 39.13 [Amended]

2. Section 39.13 is amended by

adding the following new airworthiness

directive:

98–09–16 Aerospatiale: Amendment 39–

10497. Docket 98–NM–124–AD.

Applicability: All Model ATR–42 and

ATR–72 series airplanes, certificated in any

category.

Note 1: This AD applies to each airplane

identified in the preceding applicability

provision, regardless of whether it has been

modified, altered, or repaired in the area

subject to the requirements of this AD. For

airplanes that have been modified, altered, or

repaired so that the performance of the

requirements of this AD is affected, the

owner/operator must request approval for an

alternative method of compliance in

accordance with paragraph (b) of this AD.

The request should include an assessment of

the effect of the modification, alteration, or

repair on the unsafe condition addressed by

this AD; and, if the unsafe condition has not

been eliminated, the request should include

specific proposed actions to address it.

Compliance: Required as indicated, unless

accomplished previously.

To prevent failure of the second of two

direct current (DC) generators after the failure

of the first generator, which could lead to the

loss of main battery power and result in the

loss of all electrical power, except the

emergency battery supply, during flight,

accomplish the following:

(a) Within 10 flight hours after the effective

date of this AD, revise the Limitations

Section of the FAA-approved Airplane Flight

Manual (AFM) to include the following

statements. This action may be accomplished

by inserting a copy of this AD into the AFM.

‘‘• In the event of failure of either DC

generator during flight, do not attempt to

reset the affected DC generator.

• In the event of failure of both DC

generators during flight, one attempt to reset

each of the generators may be made, as

follows:

—If the first attempt to reset a generator is

successful, do not attempt to reset the other

generator.

—If the first attempt to reset a generator is

not successful, one attempt to reset the

other generator may be made.

—If neither attempt to reset the generators is

successful, land at the nearest suitable

airport.’’

(b) An alternative method of compliance or

adjustment of the compliance time that

provides an acceptable level of safety may be

used if approved by the Manager,

International Branch, ANM–116, FAA,

Transport Airplane Directorate. Operators

shall submit their requests through an

appropriate FAA Principal Maintenance

Inspector, who may add comments and then
20066 Federal Register / Vol. 63, No. 78 /Thursday, April 23, 1998 /Rules and Regulations

send it to the Manager, International Branch,

ANM–116.

Note 2: Information concerning the

existence of approved alternative methods of

compliance with this AD, if any, may be

obtained from the International Branch,

ANM–116.

(c) Special flight permits may be issued in

accordance with sections 21.197 and 21.199

of the Federal Aviation Regulations (14 CFR

21.197 and 21.199) to operate the airplane to

a location where the requirements of this AD

can be accomplished.

Note 3: The subject of this AD is addressed

French telegraphic airworthiness directives

T98–148–076(B) and T98–149–038(B), both

dated March 20, 1998.

(d) This amendment becomes effective on

May 8, 1998.

Issued in Renton, Washington, on April 20,

1998.

Darrell M. Pederson,

Acting Manager, Transport Airplane

Directorate, Aircraft Certification Service.

[FR Doc. 98–10918 Filed 4–22–98; 8:45 am]

BILLING CODE 4910–13–U

DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION

Federal Aviation Administration

14 CFR Part 39

[Docket No. 98–NM–126–AD; Amendment

39–10491; AD 98–08–11]

RIN 2120–AA64

Airworthiness Directives; McDonnell

Douglas Model MD–11 and MD–11F

Series Airplanes

AGENCY: Federal Aviation

Administration, DOT.

ACTION: Final rule; request for

comments.

SUMMARY: This document publishes in

the Federal Register an amendment

adopting Airworthiness Directive (AD)

98–08–11 that was sent previously to all

known U.S. owners and operators of

certain McDonnell Douglas Model MD–

11 and MD–11F series airplanes by

individual notices. This AD requires

opening the circuit breaker of the

pneumatic sense line heater tape,

installing an inoperative ring, and

coiling and stowing the electrical wire

to the circuit breaker of the pneumatic

sense line heater tape. This AD also

provides for an optional inspection,

which, if accomplished, constitutes

terminating action for deactivation of

the pneumatic sense line heater tape.

This action is prompted by a report

indicating that, while an airplane was

on the ground, fuel was found leaking

from the fuel feed pipe of the number

2 engine due to inadequate clearance

between the fuel feed pipe and the

pneumatic sense line heater tape. The

actions specified by this AD are

intended to detect and correct such

inadequate clearance, which could

result in a hole in the fuel feed pipe

caused by electrical arcing, and

consequent fuel leakage and possible

ignition of the fuel vapors.

DATES: Effective April 28, 1998, to all

persons except those persons to whom

it was made immediately effective by

emergency AD 98–08–11, issued on

April 6, 1998, which contained the

requirements of this amendment.

The incorporation by reference of

certain publications listed in the

regulations is approved by the Director

of the Federal Register as of April 28,

1998.

Comments for inclusion in the Rules

Docket must be received on or before

June 22, 1998.

ADDRESSES: Submit comments in

triplicate to the Federal Aviation

Administration (FAA), Transport

Airplane Directorate, ANM–114,

Attention: Rules Docket No. 98–NM–

126–AD, 1601 Lind Avenue, SW.,

Renton, Washington 98055–4056.

The applicable service information

may be obtained from The Boeing

Company, Douglas Products Division,

3855 Lakewood Boulevard, Long Beach,

California 90846, Attention: Technical

Publications Business Administration,

Dept. C1–L51 (2–60). This information

may be examined at the FAA, Transport

Airplane Directorate, 1601 Lind

Avenue, SW., Renton, Washington; or at

the FAA, Transport Airplane

Directorate, Los Angeles Aircraft

Certification Office, 3960 Paramount

Boulevard, Lakewood, California; or at

the Office of the Federal Register, 800

North Capitol Street, NW., suite 700,

Washington, DC.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT:

Roscoe Van Dyke, Aerospace Engineer,

Propulsion Branch, ANM–140L, FAA,

Los Angeles Aircraft Certification

Office, 3960 Paramount Boulevard,

Lakewood, California 90712; telephone

(562) 627–5254; fax (562) 627–5210.

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: On April

6, 1998, the FAA issued emergency AD

98–08–11, which is applicable to certain

McDonnell Douglas Model MD–11 and

MD–11F series airplanes. That action

was prompted by a report indicating

that, while a McDonnell Douglas Model

MD–11 series airplane was on the

ground, fuel was found leaking from the

fuel feed pipe of the number 2 engine.

Investigation revealed that electrical

arcing between a pneumatic sense line

heater tape and the fuel feed pipe of the

number 2 engine caused a hole in the

pipe. As a result of this finding, the

operator inspected five additional

airplanes, of which one airplane was

found to have inadequate clearance

between the fuel feed pipe and the

pneumatic sense line heater tape. No

evidence of arcing or chafing was

detected. Such inadequate clearance, if

not corrected, could result in a hole in

the fuel feed pipe caused by electrical

arcing, and consequent fuel leakage and

possible ignition of the fuel vapors.

Explanation of Relevant Service

Information

The FAA has reviewed and approved

McDonnell Douglas Alert Service

Bulletin MD11–36A030, dated April 2,

1998. The alert service bulletin

describes procedures for opening the

circuit breaker of the pneumatic sense

line heater tape, installing an

inoperative ring, and coiling and

stowing the electrical wire to the circuit

breaker of the pneumatic sense line

heater tape. (Accomplishment of the

above actions deactivates the pneumatic

sense line heater tape.) The alert service

bulletin also describes procedures for

performing an inspection to determine if

adequate clearance exists between the

fuel feed pipe and pneumatic sense

lines, and repositioning of the

pneumatic sense lines, if necessary.

Accomplishment of this inspection

eliminates the need for deactivation of

the pneumatic sense line heater tape.

Accomplishment of the actions

specified in the alert service bulletin is

intended to adequately address the

identified unsafe condition.

Explanation of Requirements of the

Rule

Since the unsafe condition described

is likely to exist or develop on other

airplanes of the same type design, the

FAA issued emergency AD 98–08–11 to

detect and correct inadequate clearance

between the fuel feed pipe and the

pneumatic sense line heater tape, which

could result in a hole in the fuel feed

pipe caused by electrical arcing, and

consequent fuel leakage and possible

ignition of the fuel vapors. The AD

requires opening the circuit breaker of

the pneumatic sense line heater tape,

installing an inoperative ring, and

coiling and stowing the electrical wire

to the circuit breaker of the pneumatic

sense line heater tape. This AD also

provides for an optional inspection to

determine if adequate clearance exists

between the fuel feed pipe and

pneumatic sense lines, and

repositioning of the pneumatic sense

lines, if necessary; which, if

accomplished, constitutes terminating

action for deactivation of the pneumatic

sense line heater tape. The actions are