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S T A T E O F M I C H I G A N

C O U R T O F A P P E A L S

PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

UNPUBLISHED

April 24, 2018

V No. 334614

Saginaw Circuit Court

DOMINIQUE ARNETT RAMSEY, JR., LC No. 15-041847-FC

Defendant-Appellee.

Before: RONAYNE KRAUSE, P.J., and FORT HOOD and O’BRIEN, JJ.

PER CURIAM.

This case is before this Court on remand from the Michigan Supreme Court for 

consideration as on leave granted. People v Ramsey, 500 Mich 980; 893 NW2d 342 (2017). 

Following a jury trial, defendant was convicted of conspiracy to commit first-degree murder, 

MCL 750.157a; MCL 750.316. After defendant moved for a directed verdict of acquittal and a 

new trial, the trial court granted defendant’s motion. The prosecution filed a delayed application 

for leave to appeal the trial court’s order, and we reverse and remand for sentencing proceedings 

and for entry of a judgment of sentence consistent with the jury’s verdict.

I. FACTS

This case arises out of the homicide of Humberto Casas, who was gunned down in the 

early afternoon hours of Father’s Day, June 21, 2015, at the intersection of Cumberland and 

Holland in Saginaw, Michigan. Defendant and Travis Sammons were jointly tried on charges of 

open murder, MCL 750.316, conspiracy to commit murder, MCL 750.157a, possession of a 

firearm by a felon, MCL 750.224f, and three counts of possession of a firearm during the 

commission of a felony, MCL 750.227b. The prosecution’s theory at trial was that defendant 

drove the vehicle carrying Sammons, who fired the shots at Casas. Following the prosecution’s 

case-in-chief, defendant moved the trial court for a directed verdict, arguing that no evidence 

placed him at the scene of the murder. The trial court denied the motion, acknowledging that the 

record evidence was sufficient to submit the case to the jury. Notably, the trial court stated, in 

pertinent part:

If I look at the testimony that’s been presented so far against Defendant 

Ramsey, I believe that, taken in – [sic] evidence in the light most favorable to the 

nonmoving party, which is the prosecution, there is a mixture for the jury to at 
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least consider as it relates to his guilt or innocence, and therefore, I’m going to 

deny the motion at this time. 

Subsequently, the jury returned a verdict finding defendant and Sammons guilty of the 

conspiracy to commit first-degree murder charge, but not guilty on all other charges.1 Defendant 

then renewed his motion for a directed verdict, also seeking a new trial, arguing that no evidence 

established that he was part of an agreement to participate in Casas’s murder. The trial court 

thereafter granted defendant’s motion. The thrust of the trial court’s ruling was that the record 

evidence was devoid of any reliable direct or circumstantial evidence establishing that defendant 

was the driver of the vehicle carrying Sammons. The trial court also “conditionally” granted 

defendant’s motion for a new trial, concluding that the jury’s verdict was against the great weight 

of the evidence, resulting in a miscarriage of justice. 

The prosecution filed a delayed application for leave to appeal and a motion for 

peremptory reversal in this Court, both of which were denied. People v Ramsey, unpublished 

order of the Court of Appeals, issued December 29, 2016 (Docket No. 334614). The prosecution 

then sought leave to appeal in the Michigan Supreme Court, which remanded the case to this 

Court for consideration as on leave granted. People v Ramsey, 500 Mich 980; 893 NW2d 342 

(2017). 

On appeal, the prosecution contends that the trial court erred in granting defendant’s 

motion for a directed verdict of acquittal and for a new trial. We agree. 

II. STANDARDS OF REVIEW

This Court reviews de novo a trial court’s decision on a motion for a directed verdict of 

acquittal. People v Hammons, 210 Mich App 554, 556; 534 NW2d 183 (1995). This Court also 

reviews de novo a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence. People v Meissner, 294 Mich 

App 438, 452; 812 NW2d 37 (2011). “Considering all the evidence presented by the prosecution 

in the light most favorable to the prosecution, a directed verdict is inappropriate where a rational 

trier of fact could find that the essential elements of the crime charged were proven beyond a 

reasonable doubt.” Hammons, 210 Mich App at 556. To determine on appeal whether the 

evidence was sufficient to support a criminal conviction, this Court must discern, viewing the 

evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, whether “a rational trier of fact could 

find that the prosecution had proved the crime’s elements beyond a reasonable doubt.” People v 

Lane, 308 Mich App 38, 57; 862 NW2d 446 (2014). Any conflicts in the record evidence are 

resolved in favor of the prosecution. People v Kanaan, 278 Mich App 594, 619; 751 NW2d 57 

(2008). “Circumstantial evidence and reasonable inferences arising therefrom may be sufficient 

to prove the elements of a crime.” People v Avant, 235 Mich App 499, 505; 597 NW2d 864 

(1999). “This Court will not interfere with the jury’s role of determining the weight of the 

evidence or deciding the credibility of the witnesses.” People v Fletcher, 260 Mich App 531, 

561; 679 NW2d 127 (2004). When deciding a defendant’s motion for a directed verdict, “it is 

 1 This Court affirmed Sammons’ conviction. People v Sammons, unpublished opinion per 

curiam of the Court of Appeals, issues July 6, 2017 (Docket No. 332190).
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not permissible for a trial court to determine the credibility of witnesses[,] . . . no matter how 

inconsistent or vague that testimony might be.” People v Mehall, 454 Mich 1, 6; 557 NW2d 110 

(1997). 

Defendant also moved for a new trial pursuant to MCR 6.431(B), challenging the weight 

of the record evidence. “This Court reviews for an abuse of discretion a trial court’s decision to 

grant or deny a motion for a new trial. An abuse of discretion occurs when the trial court renders 

a decision falling outside the range of principled decisions.” People v Powell, 303 Mich App 

271, 276-277; 842 NW2d 538 (2013) (quotation marks and citation omitted). In People v 

Anderson, ___ Mich App ___, ___; ___ NW2d ___ (2018) (Docket No. 334219); slip op at 5, 

this Court recently recited the applicable principles of law in determining whether a jury’s 

verdict is against the great weight of the evidence:

The test to determine whether a verdict is against the great weight of the evidence 

is whether the evidence preponderates so heavily against the verdict that it would 

be a miscarriage of justice to allow the verdict to stand. When a defendant claims 

on appeal that his convictions were against the great weight of the evidence,

[c]onflicting testimony, even when impeached to some extent, is an insufficient 

ground for granting a new trial. [U]nless it can be said that directly contradictory 

testimony was so far impeached that it was deprived of all probative value or that 

the jury could not believe it, or contradicted indisputable physical facts or defied 

physical realities, the trial court must defer to the jury’s determination. 

Additionally, [i]t is the province of the jury to determine questions of fact and 

assess the credibility of witnesses. [Footnotes, citations and quotation marks 

omitted.] 

III. ANALYSIS

As noted above, the jury convicted defendant of conspiracy to commit first-degree 

murder. MCL 750.157a provides that “[a]ny person who conspires together with 1 or more 

persons to commit an offense prohibited by law, or to commit a legal act in an illegal manner is 

guilty of the crime of conspiracy. . . .” “The gist of conspiracy lies in the illegal agreement; once 

the agreement is formed, the crime is complete.” People v Seewald, 499 Mich 111, 117; 879 

NW2d 237 (2016) (citation, footnote and quotation marks omitted). As this Court recognized in 

People v Jackson, 292 Mich App 583, 588; 808 NW2d 541 (2011): 

A criminal conspiracy is a partnership in criminal purposes, under which 

two or more individuals voluntarily agree to effectuate the commission of a 

criminal offense. The individuals must specifically intend to combine to pursue 

the criminal objective, and the offense is complete upon the formation of the 

agreement. The intent, including knowledge of the intent, must be shared by the 

individuals. Thus, there must be proof showing that the parties specifically 

intended to further, promote, advance, or pursue an unlawful objective. Direct 

proof of a conspiracy is not required; rather, proof may be derived from the 
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circumstances, acts, and conduct of the parties. [Citations and quotation marks 

omitted.] 

“The elements of first-degree murder are (1) the intentional killing of a human (2) with

premeditation and deliberation.” People v Bennett, 290 Mich App 465, 472; 802 NW2d 627 

(2010). 

At trial, the prosecution called DyJuan Jones, who was an eyewitness to the shooting. 

Jones was travelling home from church with his mother, Felicia Little, sitting in the backseat of 

her vehicle, when he heard what he initially thought were firecrackers. As relevant to this 

appeal, Jones testified that the driver of the vehicle carrying the individual that shot and killed 

Casas was between 280 and 320 pounds. Jones observed the individual sitting in the vehicle

from 25 to 30 feet away. According to Jones, the driver of the Jeep was wearing a “big, white Tshirt[,]” and had a long beard which extended to his collar. Jones identified the vehicle carrying 

the shooter that killed Casas as a silver Jeep. When he visited the Saginaw Police Department in 

the early evening hours following the shooting, Jones, after observing defendant and Sammons 

held individually in separate interview rooms, was able to identify Sammons as the individual 

that shot and killed Casas, but he did not identify defendant as the driver of the Jeep. Sergeant 

David Rivard with the Michigan State Police also testified that Sammons and defendant were 

placed in separate interview rooms at the Saginaw Police Department, and that Jones positively 

identified Sammons as the shooter, but that Jones did not identify defendant. 

Little testified that between 1:15 and 1:30 p.m. on June 21, 2015, she was driving 

northbound on Cumberland Street, approaching the intersection of Cumberland and Holland, 

when she saw a “body” come from behind a grey truck and a “guy” walking up the street. 

According to Little, the grey truck and a burgundy truck were parked in a nearby parking lot. 

Specifically, Little testified that she saw someone “come on the sidewalk and start shooting.” 

However, according to Little, all she saw was “a body . . . and a hand and fire.” Afraid for her 

safety and that of her son, Little sped away, so she did not see the shooter or the driver of the 

truck that the shooter came from behind, and therefore could not identify the shooter or the 

driver. 

Rosei Watkins came upon the shooting as she and her eight-year-old grandson were 

driving home from visiting a local cemetery. Watkins observed three men on the side of the 

road, and she saw one of the men shoot one of the other men, while the third man got back in the 

driver’s seat of a silver or grey Jeep. Specifically, Watkins described the Jeep as “box[y].” 

Given the circumstances of the shooting, Watkins was afraid for her grandson’s safety, and 

quickly tried to manoeuver her vehicle away from the shooting, therefore she did not see the 

driver’s face. According to Watkins, the driver of the Jeep “wasn’t a real tall person[,]” and he 

was “in between” being of stocky and/or heavy and thin build. According to Watkins, the driver 

was of a “normal” build, and was not heavyset or in the range of 300 pounds. When questioned 

if the driver of the Jeep had a long beard, Watkins stated, “I don’t remember seeing it.” Watkins 

was not able to identify the driver of the Jeep or the shooter in a photographic lineup provided by 

the police on June 23, 2015. 

Officer Bradley Holp with the City of Saginaw Police Department attended the scene of 

the shooting at approximately 1:15 p.m. after receiving a dispatch call about a shooting. When 
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he arrived at the scene of the shooting, Officer Holp observed Casas lying in the street with 

multiple gunshot wounds, one to the head, and noted that he was in possession of two cellular 

telephones and crack cocaine. Officer Tyler Poirer of the Bridgeport Police Department was 

working the day shift on June 21, 2015, and sometime between 1:15 and 1:35 p.m., as he was 

travelling northbound on Dixie Highway, he observed a silver Jeep Commander, and he noted 

that “based off some incident earlier that day, [he] had obtained some information regarding this 

car.” Noticing that the silver Jeep had a defective brake light, Officer Poirer pulled the vehicle 

over, and defendant was driving the Jeep, and Sammons was his passenger. Officer Poirer 

recalled that defendant was wearing a white T-shirt. Officer Poirer also noticed during a patdown search that Sammons’s hands were “sweating heavily.” When Officer Poirer searched 

defendant, Sammons and the silver Jeep, his search did not yield any firearms or drugs. Officer 

Poirer also described defendant’s demeanor as normal. Officer Poirer also testified on recrossexamination that defendant was not 320 pounds, and that he did not have a long beard that 

extended to his chin. 

The prosecution also introduced as evidence a surveillance video mosaic, comprised of 

11 different surveillance videos from varying locations, detailing the movements of the Jeep 

Commander in the time period contemporaneous with Casa’s murder to the time that it was 

stopped by Officer Poirer. This evidence was admitted during the testimony of Detective Robert 

Scott with the Michigan State Police during the prosecution’s case-in-chief. Specifically, the 

video commenced at the scene of Casas’s murder, 1501 Cumberland Street, and shows the Jeep 

Commander entering the driveway at 1:21 p.m. where the homicide occurred. At one point 

during the surveillance video, at 1:26 p.m., the Jeep Commander stopped at 2573 Baldwin, a 

residential home, where it remained for 3 minutes and 12 seconds. The surveillance video shows 

2573 Baldwin from about 400 yards away. Detective Scott attended 2573 Baldwin on June 26, 

2015, and that is where Sammons was apprehended for his involvement in Casas’s murder. 

Detective Scott was questioned extensively regarding the portion of the surveillance video 

mosaic at 2573 Baldwin. While the Jeep Commander was parked at 2573 Baldwin, Detective 

Scott noted that the passenger exited the vehicle and went into the house and then can no longer 

be seen in front of the house, and that no other vehicles pull into the driveway of the home at that 

time. The following colloquy took place between defendant’s counsel and Detective Scott:

Q. And let’s pause it right there. Okay. Now, Detective Trooper, once 

again, no other cars pulled up, correct? 

A. Correct. 

Q. And at this time, we do not have a clear shot of the driver’s side of the 

vehicle, correct? 

A. Correct. 

Q. And you don’t see anyone walking down the street over here towards 

the end of Baldwin; do you?

A. Doesn’t appear so, no, sir. 
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Referring to another individual that was standing on the doorstep to the home at 2573 Baldwin, 

defendant’s counsel further questioned Detective Scott as follows:

Q. What is that that you see standing in front of the doorway?

A. I’m not sure if someone exited the residence or – it appears someone’s 

–

Q. But it appears that there’s someone standing outside of the door; 

correct?

A. Yes. 

Q. But we don’t see any other cars pull up, correct? 

A. Correct. 

Defendant’s counsel also confirmed with Detective Scott that after the passenger left the Jeep 

Commander and went inside 2573 Baldwin, another individual can be seen entering the home, 

and then later, multiple people are seen leaving the home. 

Q. So, Detective Scott, it appears from this video that we had two people 

enter this house; correct? 

A. Yes, sir. 

Q. And we had multiple people exiting the house; correct? 

A. Yes, sir.

Q. And upon those multiple people exiting the house, the vehicle pulls 

off; correct? 

A. That’s correct, sir. 

Q. And we can’t tell with absolute certainty based on this vehicle 

evidence –based on the video evidence of who that is exiting the vehicle; can 

you? 

A. The only difference I can see between the people is one had a white 

shirt – or a white top on, and [the] other had a darker top on. That was the only 

difference that I could see from playing it over several times and getting as close 

to my computer screen as possible. 

During cross-examination by Sammons’s counsel, Detective Scott conceded that he could not 

describe the individuals getting in and out of the Jeep Commander at 2573 Baldwin. 

Q. Okay. On the Baldwin [address], as we’re seeing, you really can’t –

doesn’t give a description of who the person was, just that a person, you know, 
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went into the house, another person came back out, or something of that nature; is 

that correct? 

A. That’s correct. 

Q. You can’t give a description of who, if anybody sitting in this 

courtroom or anybody else, was – was that person in the vehicle; correct? 

A. That would be correct. 

Q. And you cannot tell whether or not the people that left that Jeep there 

were the same people that left the house and got back into the vehicle; can you? 

A. Correct. 

Q. Okay. Could’ve been completely different people; you cannot testify 

any different, correct? 

A. That’s correct, sir. 

Subsequently, during redirect examination by the prosecution, Detective Scott answered the 

following inquiry regarding his observations of the individual that got out of the Jeep 

Commander at 2573 Baldwin:

Q. Okay. And [a] lot of discussion about people—people leaving the 

residence. As I understood it, correct me if I’m wrong, the video, does it show 

more than one person exiting the vehicle or just the passenger? 

A. All I can observe is the passenger exiting the vehicle. It doesn’t appear 

that the driver gets out of the vehicle. 

Detective Scott was then questioned extensively by defendant’s counsel during recross 

examination. 

Q. Now, Mr. Scott, you testified on cross-examination about the vehicle 

being parked at Baldwin Street; correct? 

A. Yes, sir.

Q. And you couldn’t ascertain from this vehicle whether or not it was 

parked or still running – or still running, I should say; correct? 

A. That’s correct, sir. 

Q. So we don’t know if it was stopped or if it was still running; right? 

A. Correct. 
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Q. And we clearly see the passenger side door open on that vehicle; 

correct? 

A. Yes, sir. 

Q. And because of the way the video is stationed, you can’t see the 

driver’s side of the vehicle; correct? 

A. Correct.

Q. And we clearly see on this video the passenger go inside the house; 

correct? 

A. Yes, sir. 

Q. And after he goes inside the house, roughly 35 seconds later, we see 

another person appear on the doorstep, correct? 

A. Yes, sir. 

Q. And we didn’t see any cars pull up at that time; did we? 

A. Correct. 

Q. So its’s safe to – we could reasonably assume that the driver is 

standing outside of the vehicle when the passenger goes inside; correct? 

A. You said we can assume the driver is standing outside the vehicle? Is 

that your question, sir? 

Q. We can assume that there’s another person outside the vehicle; 

correct?

A. I’m sorry sir. I don’t –

Q. Did you personally see on this video where that second person came 

from?

A. From inside the house. 

Q. So it’s your testimony now that the second person came from inside 

the house and not from outside? 

A. I don’t believe I testified to that before, but yes. 

Q. Let’s go back to the video. If we can cue this up? 

A. I’m sorry, sir, but I’m confused. 
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Q. You can just go back roughly 10 seconds. We can just stop it right 

here. Okay. Now if we look at the scene—if we can go back roughly five more 

seconds, all the way to two minutes. You can go back a little further. All right. 

Right here. Okay. Now, we don’t see anyone standing outside of the vehicle; 

correct? 

A. That’s correct, sir. 

Q. And we don’t see anyone at the door; do we? 

A. I believe there’s someone in a white shirt and someone in a dark shirt 

standing there. 

Q. Okay. So there’s two people standing outside of the door at this time. 

If we can press “play.” 

A. I think the “play,” it skips a little bit, but I believe they entered the 

house at that point in time. 

Q. So press “pause.” And right now, at this time, someone has entered 

the house. There’s no one standing on the doorstep; correct? 

A. Correct, sir.

Q. All right. Let’s press “play” again. No cars pull up during this time;

correct? 

A. Correct. 

Q. All right. Press “pause.” So now, what is this standing in front of the 

door? 

A. Appears the same two people, one in the white shirt and one in a dark 

shirt. 

Q. So the two people went inside and then came right back out? 

A. Yes, sir. 

Q. So they went in and came right back out. That’s your testimony. 

A. Yes, sir. 

Q. And that’s consistent with what you said on direct examination?

A. I believe so. I –

Q. Okay. Press “play.” Pause. Is there anybody out on the doorstep at 

this time? 
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A. No, sir. 

Q. Okay. And you’re able to tell me with absolute certainty that those 

people are the same people, or that’s the same passenger that you saw exit the 

vehicle standing on the doorstep? 

A. I can’t say that, sir. 

Q. You can’t say that, but you can say that those are two people; correct? 

A. Yes. 

Q. And you don’t know what two people those are; correct? 

A. Correct. 

Q. And if we’ve – you’ve testified that you saw multiple different shirts 

out there; correct? 

A. Yes, sir.

Q. All right. Let’s fast forward it to 3 minutes and 50 seconds. All right. 

And we can press “play” from here. Pause. Okay. Did it appear that the door 

just opened recently? 

A. Yes, sir. 

Q. Okay. You can play it again. And pause. And we saw the door open 

on the passenger side; correct? 

A. Yes, sir.

Q. Now, you put in your report that you saw multiple people walk outside 

the house at this time; correct? 

A. Correct. 

Q. And it’s true that multiple people do walk outside of the house at this 

time; correct? 

A. Correct. 

Q. And we can’t see what’s happening on the driver’s side of the car; can 

we? 

A. No, sir. 

Q. We can’t even tell who that was who got into the passenger side of the 

vehicle; can we?
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A. Correct. 

Q. But we did, once again, see multiple people exit the residence at 

roughly 3:50 on this video; correct? 

A. Yes, sir. 

In its written opinion and order granting defendant’s motion seeking a directed verdict of 

acquittal, the trial court noted Jones’s description of the driver of the Jeep Commander, as well 

as the fact that Little and Watkins could not identify the driver. According to the trial court, 

Jones’s description “did not even come close to describing defendant who weighed 

approximately 140 pounds and had minimal facial hair when he was arrested following the 

shooting.” Thus, it is clear that the trial court was troubled by the lack of direct evidence 

identifying defendant as the driver of the Jeep Commander. With regard to the circumstantial 

evidence against defendant, the trial court focused on the surveillance video, stating that “the 

occupants of the vehicle are not visible on the video. Further, unknown individuals appeared to 

exit and enter the vehicle while it was stopped on Baldwin before the traffic stop.” Specifically, 

the trial court went on to state, in pertinent part, as follow:

From the video, it is impossible to determine whether the individuals that were in 

the vehicle at the time of the traffic stop, Defendant and Sammons, were the same 

individuals that were in the vehicle before it arrived at the location on Baldwin. 

The uncertainties created by the video, coupled with the lack of any direct 

evidence implicating Defendant in a conspiracy, leads this Court to the conclusion 

that the evidence presented at trial was deficient as a matter of law to permit a 

rational trier of fact to find beyond a reasonable doubt that Defendant was a 

member of a conspiracy to commit first-degree premeditated murder. Therefore, 

in accordance with Defendant’s right to due process of law, the Court will enter a 

directed verdict of acquittal on the charge of conspiracy to commit first-degree 

premeditated murder. 

Contrary to the trial court’s determination, we determine that the record evidence, viewed 

in the light most favorable to the prosecution, amply supported the prosecution’s circumstantial 

case against defendant, as well as the jury’s ultimate verdict finding defendant guilty of 

conspiring with Sammons to commit first-degree premeditated murder. While Jones may not 

have identified defendant, and his description of the driver of the Jeep Commander did not 

comport with defendant’s physical appearance on the day of the murder, notably, Jones 

identified the vehicle carrying Casas’s assailants to be a silver Jeep. Additionally, Watkins 

joined in the identification of the silver Jeep as transporting the individuals who carried out 

Casas’s murder, while Little also recalled seeing a silver truck at the scene of the murder. 

Significantly, Jones clearly identified Sammons as the shooter who fired multiple shots at Casas, 

and in a very short time period following the murder, defendant and Sammons were 

apprehended, driving together with Sammons as the passenger, in the same Jeep Commander 

that the witnesses described as being at the scene of the shooting. Moreover, Watkins’s 

description of the driver of the Jeep was consistent with defendant’s physical appearance. Again, 

as the trial court recognized, Jones’s description of defendant did not align with defendant’s 
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physical appearance, and Jones, together with Watkins and Little, could not identify defendant as 

the driver of the silver Jeep carrying Sammons. However, the jury was presented with this 

evidence, and it was within the province of the jury to gauge the credibility of the witnesses, as 

well as the weight to be given to their testimony concerning the identification, or lack thereof, of 

defendant. Fletcher, 260 Mich App at 561. 

Further, while defendant’s counsel vigorously questioned Detective Scott about the 

surveillance video mosaic, in an effort to cast doubt on the prosecution theory that defendant was 

driving the Jeep Commander continuously from when Casas was shot to the time that defendant 

and Sammons were apprehended by Officer Poirer, we also note that the surveillance video 

mosaic was played for the jury’s consideration. Therefore, any alleged inconsistencies and 

deficiencies regarding that evidence, including issues concerning what individuals could be seen 

exiting and entering the Jeep Commander, as well as the house located at 2573 Baldwin, were 

thoroughly canvassed before the jury, which carried the ultimate responsibility of determining 

what credence and weight to give to that evidence. Id. While we recognize the prosecution’s 

case against defendant was indeed circumstantial, we conclude that the record evidence and all 

reasonable inferences drawn from that evidence, viewed in the prosecution’s favor, with all 

inconsistencies resolved in favor of the prosecution, certainly gave the jury a reasonable basis to 

find that defendant was driving the Jeep Commander at the time that Sammons gunned down 

Casas. The record evidence was also such that the jury, by defendant’s participation in the 

shooting, could find that defendant had the requisite intent to conspire with Sammons to commit

first-degree murder. Therefore, the trial court erred in granting defendant’s motion for a directed 

verdict of acquittal. For the same reasons, we hold that the trial court also abused its discretion

in conditionally granting defendant’s motion for a new trial where the record evidence did not 

preponderate against the jury’s verdict to the extent that a miscarriage of justice has occurred. 

Anderson, ___ Mich App at ___; slip op at 5. 

IV. CONCLUSION 

Accordingly, we reverse the trial court’s order granting defendant’s motion for a directed 

verdict of acquittal and conditionally granting defendant a new trial, and remand for sentencing 

proceedings and for entry of a judgment of sentence consistent with the jury’s verdict. We do 

not retain jurisdiction.

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/s/ Karen M. Fort Hood 

/s/ Colleen A. O'Brien 

 2 Given our disposition of this appeal, we need not address the prosecution’s claim that its 

motion for peremptory reversal was improperly denied in this Court.