Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 20A-JT-443 | August 7, 2020 Page 1 of 13

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D), 

this Memorandum Decision shall not be 

regarded as precedent or cited before any 

court except for the purpose of establishing 

the defense of res judicata, collateral 

estoppel, or the law of the case.

ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT

Cara Schaefer Wieneke

Wieneke Law Office, LLC

Brooklyn, Indiana

ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE

Curtis T. Hill, Jr.

Attorney General of Indiana

Frances Barrow

Robert J. Henke

Deputy Attorneys General

Anthony J. Smith

Certified Legal Intern

Indianapolis, Indiana

I N T H E

COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA

In re the Termination of the 

Parent-Child Relationship of 

B.B.K, J-E.K., J-M.K., and 

A-M.K. (Minor Children) and

M.K. (Mother)1,

Appellant-Respondent,

August 7, 2020

Court of Appeals Case No.

20A-JT-443

Appeal from the Vigo Circuit 

Court

The Honorable Sarah K. Mullican, 

Judge

1 The father of B.B.K. did not appear for the termination hearing, and his parental rights were terminated by 

default. The father of J-E.K., J-M.K., and A-M.K. offered in open court to voluntarily relinquish his parental 

rights to all three children, which the court took under advisement. Neither father participates on appeal. 
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 20A-JT-443 | August 7, 2020 Page 2 of 13

v.

Indiana Department of Child 

Services,

Appellee-Petitioner.

The Honorable Daniel Kelly, 

Magistrate

Trial Court Cause Nos.

84C01-1909-JT-1109

84C01-1909-JT-1135

84C01-1909-JT-1136

84C01-1909-JT-1138

Mathias, Judge.

[1] M.K. (“Mother”) appeals the Vigo Circuit Court’s order terminating her

parental rights to her four children. Mother challenges four of the trial court’s

factual findings and argues that the trial court’s termination of her parental

rights is not supported by clear and convincing evidence.

[2] We affirm.

Facts and Procedural History

[3] M.K. has four children: B.B.K. born in 2016, A.M.K. born in 2014, J.M.K.

born in 2012, and J.E.K. born in 2011. Mother and the children were living in a

homeless shelter in Terre Haute in January 2018. Mother had no income. The

Department of Child Services (“DCS”) filed a petition alleging that the children

were in need of services (“CHINS”), but the children initially remained in

Mother’s care. However, Mother was “continually [] asked to leave homeless

shelters and other residences due to lack of supervision of the children and

aggressive behaviors towards the staff.” Ex. Vol. 1, p. 88.
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[4] After the family was evicted from a homeless shelter at the end of January 

2018, DCS removed the children from Mother’s care because they had no other 

place to live. Id. at 75, 121. Mother moved to Indianapolis in February 2018 

after the children were placed in foster care.

[5] The children were adjudicated CHINS on June 25, 2018. While Mother was 

living in Indianapolis, she was unable to participate in visitation with the 

children because she lacked transportation to Terre Haute. Mother refused to 

participate in parenting counseling or work with home-based counselors. 

Mother believed the offered services were useless. She also failed to maintain 

consistent communication with DCS and her service providers. Mother missed 

appointments with service providers and was hostile toward her family case 

manager.

[6] In February 2019, Mother moved back to Terre Haute. She began participating 

in supervised visitation with the children. Mother participated in four of six 

scheduled supervised visitations while she was living in Terre Haute. Visitation 

supervisors observed that Mother lacked the skills needed to effectively parent 

her children, who exhibited negative behaviors during the visitations. The 

children acted out physically and refused to listen to Mother. Mother was on 

telephone calls or social media during most of the visitation time. The visitation 

supervisor confiscated Mother’s phone during one visit. Mother refused to 

listen to or follow suggestions from the supervising therapists. She also “roughhoused” with one child, causing the child to cry. Tr. p. 81. The supervising 

therapist had to intervene to get Mother to stop “rough-housing.” Id. Mother 
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was eventually escorted from the visit by security. Mother told the supervisor 

that she could do whatever she wanted to do with the children. Tr. p. 84.

[7] Mother was unable to secure stable housing in Terre Haute. She decided to 

move to Michigan where she believed she would be eligible for Section 8 

housing. Mother lacked transportation to return to Terre Haute and has not had 

any visitation with the children since April 2019. 

[8] DCS filed petitions to terminate Mother’s parental rights to her four children in 

September 2019. Mother participated telephonically in the fact-finding hearings 

held on October 2 and December 30, 2019. Mother has not been able to obtain 

stable housing or a source of income since January 2018, when the children 

were removed from her care. Mother moved to Michigan despite advice from 

DCS that leaving Indiana would make it difficult to reunify with her children. 

And Mother informed the court during the fact-finding hearing that she had no 

intention of returning to Indiana. Tr. p. 131.

[9] On January 10, 2020, the trial court issued orders terminating Mother’s 

parental rights to her four children. In pertinent part, the trial court found:

f. There is a reasonable probability that the conditions which 

resulted in the removal of the child from his parents will not be 

remedied or the reasons for placement outside of the home of the 

parents will not be remedied or the reasons for placement outside 

of the home of the parents will not be remedied or that 

continuation of the parent-child relationship poses a threat to the 

well-being of the child as follows:

* * *
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5. Mother was given a referral for home-based case 

management with Ireland Home-Based Services, which was 

to assist her with coping skills, employment and housing. At 

the sole conference with [Mother], Mother was focused on 

getting to North Carolina or Michigan, where she had family 

residing. The service provider tried to get Mother to 

understand that her efforts should be concentrated on getting 

situated here, since all of her children were in the care of 

Indiana and were wards of the state.

6. The visitation supervisor who supervised Mother’s visits in 

the spring of 2018 testified, and the court finds, that Mother 

attended four visits in the month of March 2018. She was late 

to all of her visits and no-showed two of the visits that were 

scheduled that month. During those supervised visits, the 

children were unruly and Mother did almost nothing to 

attempt to gain control over them. In addition, [Mother] 

refused to listen to suggestions on dealing with the children 

and was largely distracted. The kids would climb on tables 

and hit and bite one another, while Mother did nothing but 

ineffectually yell at them. When it was suggested that she put 

the children in time out, she would threaten to do so but 

failed to follow through.

7. When Robyn Morton became the DCS Family Case 

Manager for the family in September of 2018, [Mother] had 

been living in various places in Indianapolis and reported that 

she could not come to Terre Haute. She had been 

noncompliant with all court-ordered services, including 

submitting to a psychological evaluation, home-based 

casework, parenting counseling, random drug screens and 

visitation with her children. DCS tried to engage Mother in 

services while she was living in Indianapolis, but before any 

progress was made, she moved away from there. She was 

living in Jackson, MI, at the time of the termination factfinding hearing and participated in the hearing by telephone. 
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8. In February 2019, Mother came back to Terre Haute for a 

short time and had some visits with the children. These visits 

went no better than the earlier ones. One of the children 

appeared to be ignored during the visits and then engaged in 

self-harming behaviors. She engaged in rough-housing with 

one of the children who began to cry. [Mother] continued the 

rough play while the child cried and the supervisors tried to 

get her to stop. Eventually they had to have a security guard 

come and remove [Mother] from the building.

9. Mother engaged in two sessions with the home-based case 

worker, after initially refusing to engage with her. But after 

those two sessions, Mother moved away again and has not 

seen any of the children since then. The [family case manager 

(“FCM”)] is usually unable to reach [Mother] for telephone 

calls, but can often receive a reply to text messages. [Mother] 

calls the FCM approximately once a month. She is 

consistently hostile and belligerent in her interactions with 

DCS. She has refused to work reunification services with the 

FCM or anyone she has put in place to help her. To date, 

Mother has not secured safe and appropriate housing, gainful 

employment or transportation and has largely abandoned the 

children to their foster parents for the past two years. No one 

has been able to persuade Mother to return to Indiana where 

the children live.

Appellant’s App. pp. 187–88.2 The court concluded that termination of 

Mother’s parental rights was in the children’s best interests and found that the 

2 The trial court’s findings numbers 6 and 8 discuss Mother’s visitation with the children. Finding number 6 

accurately describes the testimony of the visitation supervisors concerning Mother’s behavior and lack of 

parenting skills during the visitations. But our review of the records does not support the trial court’s finding 

that Mother had visitation with the children in 2018 and 2019. During these proceedings, Mother 

participated in only four visits with the children in the early months of 2019, with the last visit occurring in 

April 2019. In her brief, Mother agrees that she did not have any visitation with the children in 2018 when 

she lived in Indianapolis. See Appellant’s Br. at 6.
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children are thriving in their pre-adoptive placements. Id. at 188. Mother 

appeals the termination of her parental rights.

Standard of Review

[10] Indiana appellate courts have long had a highly deferential standard of review 

in cases involving the termination of parental rights. In re D.B., 942 N.E.2d 867, 

871 (Ind. Ct. App. 2011). We neither reweigh the evidence nor assess witness 

credibility. Id. We consider only the evidence and reasonable inferences 

favorable to the trial court’s judgment. Id. In deference to the trial court’s 

unique position to assess the evidence, we will set aside a judgment terminating 

a parent-child relationship only if it is clearly erroneous. Id. Clear error is that 

which leaves us with a definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been 

made. J.M. v. Marion Cty. Off. of Family & Children, 802 N.E.2d 40, 44 (Ind. Ct. 

App. 2004), trans. denied.

I. Factual Findings

[11] Mother challenges four factual findings in the trial court’s termination order. 

When a trial court’s judgment contains special findings and conclusions, we 

apply a two-tiered standard of review. Bester v. Lake Cty. Off. of Fam. & Child., 

839 N.E.2d 143, 147 (Ind. 2005). First, we determine whether the evidence 

supports the findings, and second, we determine whether the findings support 

the judgment. Id. “Findings are clearly erroneous only when the record contains 

no facts to support them either directly or by inference.” Quillen v. Quillen, 671 

N.E.2d 98, 102 (Ind. 1996). If the evidence and inferences support the trial 
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court’s decision, we must affirm. In re L.S., 717 N.E.2d 204, 208 (Ind. Ct. App. 

1999), trans. denied.

[12] DCS agrees that the following challenged findings are not supported by clear 

and convincing evidence.

1. DCS initially received a report on October 31, 2017, alleging 

that Mother’s oldest child, who is not a subject of these 

proceedings, was not attending school and by November 8, 2017, 

had 35 unexcused absences which were significantly impacting 

his performance in school. A 2nd report was received in 

December 2017, alleging that Mother and her four youngest 

children had been evicted from a homeless shelter while the 

oldest boy was living in Indianapolis with his father.

2. When DCS investigated the second report, Mother was 

located in Vermillion County, Indiana, living with a friend. She 

had no permanent residence and no transportation. The two 

youngest school-aged children were not going to school. The 

oldest boy was living with his father in Indianapolis but was not 

enrolled in school there because Mother was still planning to pick 

him up and enroll him in school.

3. Mother was evicted from the Conner Center homeless shelter 

and had to be out by December 15, 2017, due to her failure to 

supervise her children and her failure to follow the house rules. 

DCS persuaded the Conner Center to allow Mother to stay 

awhile longer while alternative housing was explored, but due to 

subsequent failures to supervise the children and Mother’s 

rudeness to staff, she was not allowed to stay longer.

4. A friend of Mother’s put her up in a hotel for one week. She 

was initially staying in Red Carpet Inn, but was told she had too 

many people in one room. She then moved to Motel 6.

Appellant’s App. pp. 186–87.
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[13] Because DCS concedes that these findings are not supported by sufficient 

evidence, we will not consider these findings in our consideration of the 

remaining issue presented in this appeal. We accept the remaining unchallenged 

findings as true and determine only whether these unchallenged findings are 

sufficient to support the judgment. In re A.M., 121 N.E.3d 556, 562 (Ind. Ct. 

App. 2019), trans. denied; see also T.B. v. Ind. Dep’t of Child Servs., 971 N.E.2d 

104, 110 (Ind. Ct. App. 2012) (holding that when the trial court’s unchallenged 

findings support termination, there is no error), trans. denied.

II. Clear and Convincing Evidence

[14] Mother claims that the trial court’s order involuntarily terminating her parental 

rights is not supported by clear and convincing evidence. Indiana Code section 

31-35-2-4(b)(2) provides that a petition to terminate parental rights must allege:

(B) that one (1) of the following is true:

(i) There is a reasonable probability that the conditions that 

resulted in the child’s removal or the reasons for placement 

outside the home of the parents will not be remedied.

(ii) There is a reasonable probability that the continuation of 

the parent-child relationship poses a threat to the well-being 

of the child.

(iii) The child has, on two (2) separate occasions, been 

adjudicated a child in need of services;

(C) that termination is in the best interests of the child; and

(D) that there is a satisfactory plan for the care and treatment of 

the child.
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[15] DCS must prove each element by clear and convincing evidence. Ind. Code § 

31-37-14-2; In re G.Y., 904 N.E.2d 1257, 1260 (Ind. 2009). Because Indiana 

Code subsection 31-35-2-4(b)(2)(B) is written in the disjunctive, the trial court is 

required to find that only one prong of subsection 4(b)(2)(B) has been 

established by clear and convincing evidence. In re A.K., 924 N.E.2d 212, 220 

(Ind. Ct. App. 2010).

[16] Clear and convincing evidence need not establish that the continued custody of 

the parent is wholly inadequate for the child’s very survival. Bester, 839 N.E.2d 

at 148. It is instead sufficient to show by clear and convincing evidence that the 

child’s emotional and physical development are put at risk by the parent’s 

custody. Id. If the court finds the allegations in a petition are true, the court 

shall terminate the parent-child relationship. Ind. Code § 31-35-2-8(a).

[17] The purpose of terminating parental rights is not to punish parents but instead 

to protect children. In re S.P.H., 806 N.E.2d 874, 880 (Ind. Ct. App. 2004). 

Although parental rights have a constitutional dimension, the law allows for 

their termination when the parties are unable or unwilling to meet their 

responsibilities as parents. Id. Indeed, parental interests must be subordinated to 

the child’s interests in determining the proper disposition of a petition to 

terminate parental rights. G.Y., 904 N.E.2d at 1259.

[18] Mother claims that DCS failed to present sufficient evidence to prove either that 

there is a reasonable probability that the conditions that resulted in the 

children’s removal will not be remedied or that continuation of the parent-child 
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relationship poses a threat to the children’s well-being. In her brief, Mother 

focuses on the reasons for the children’s removal, i.e., her inadequate housing 

and lack of income, and cites to her own uncorroborated testimony in support 

of her claim that she has remedied those conditions.3

[19] Mother does not raise an independent argument concerning the trial court’s 

finding that continuation of the parent-child relationship poses a threat to the 

children’s well-being. She has therefore waived the issue on appeal. See Ind. 

Appellate Rule 46(A)(8). Moreover, Indiana Code section 31-35-2-4(2)(B) is 

written in the disjunctive, and therefore, only one of the three requirements of 

the subsection must be established by clear and convincing evidence. See In re 

L.S., 717 N.E.2d at 209.

[20] Waiver notwithstanding, we consider whether DCS proved by clear and 

convincing evidence that continuation of the parent-child relationship poses a 

threat to the children. Mother has not had a stable home or income for the two 

years preceding the fact-finding hearing. Mother declined to remain in Indiana 

despite DCS’s advisement that leaving the state would hinder her ability to 

reunify with the children. She left the Terre Haute area to move to Indianapolis, 

3 Mother testified that she has been approved for Section 8 housing in Michigan and is applying for Social 

Security benefits, but she presented no other evidence to support her testimony. She also admitted that she is 

not currently living in Section 8 housing. Even if the trial court had credited Mother’s testimony, Mother still 

did not have stable housing or income on the date of the fact-finding hearing, nearly two years after the 

children were removed from her care.
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and then later to Michigan, knowing that she lacked transportation to return to 

Terre Haute to participate in visitation with her children. 

[21] During Mother’s brief return to Terre Haute, she did not attend all of the 

scheduled therapeutic visitations. Those that she did attend went poorly, 

according to the supervisors and therapists in attendance. Mother was 

preoccupied with making telephone calls or with social media, at the expense of 

focusing on her children during their limited time together. She could not 

maintain discipline of the children and refused to heed parenting suggestions 

made by the therapeutic visitation supervisor. She rough-housed with one child, 

and when the child started crying, Mother refused to stop until the visitation 

supervisor intervened. Mother also refused to participate in some services 

offered to her and described them as useless. Since Mother’s move to Michigan 

in the spring of 2019, Mother has not seen the children. 

[22] Mother effectively abandoned her children after they were removed from her 

care in January 2018. Mother’s limited attempts to reunify with her children 

demonstrated that she lacked skills needed to parent the children. For all of 

these reasons, we conclude that the trial court’s finding that continuation of the 

parent-child relationship poses a threat to the well-being of the children is 

supported by clear and convincing evidence.

Conclusion

[23] We agree with Mother’s argument that four of the trial court’s findings were not 

supported by clear and convincing evidence. We did not consider those findings 
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in reaching our conclusion that the trial court’s termination order is supported 

by clear and convincing evidence.

[24] Affirmed.

Bradford, C.J., and Najam, J., concur.