Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 49A02-1608-CR-1798 | February 24, 2017 Page 1 of 12

ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT

Suzy St. John

Marion County Public Defender Agency

Indianapolis, Indiana

ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE

Curtis T. Hill, Jr.

Attorney General of Indiana

Michael Gene Worden

Deputy Attorney General

Indianapolis, Indiana

I N T H E

COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA

Jefferson Jean-Baptiste,

Appellant-Defendant,

v.

State of Indiana,

Appellee-Plaintiff.

February 24, 2017

Court of Appeals Case No.

49A02-1608-CR-1798

Appeal from the Marion Superior 

Court

The Honorable Rebekah F. 

Pierson-Treacy, Judge

Trial Court Cause No.

49G19-1604-CM-12899

Najam, Judge.

Statement of the Case

[1] Jefferson Jean-Baptiste appeals his conviction, following a bench trial, for 

resisting law enforcement, as a Class A misdemeanor. Jean-Baptiste raises a 

single issue for our review, but we address two issues on appeal:
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1. Whether the State presented sufficient evidence to support 

Jean-Baptiste’s conviction. 

2. Whether the trial court committed fundamental error 

when it denied Jean-Baptiste his right to a jury trial 

without first securing his personal waiver of that right on 

the record.

[2] The undisputed evidence demonstrates that a law enforcement officer, while 

attempting to serve a “civil arrest warrant”

1 on Jean-Baptiste at his home, 

unlawfully entered Jean-Baptiste’s home. In light of that unlawful entry, JeanBaptiste had the right, pursuant to Indiana Code Section 35-41-3-2(i), to 

reasonably resist the law enforcement officer. As that lawful resistance was the 

only basis for Jean-Baptiste’s conviction, the State failed to present sufficient 

evidence to support his conviction and, thus, we reverse. We also hold, sua 

sponte, that the record unmistakably shows that the trial court failed to secure 

Jean-Baptiste’s personal waiver of his right to a jury trial on the record. 

Accordingly, the trial court committed fundamental error under the Sixth 

Amendment to the United States Constitution when it denied Jean-Baptiste’s

jury’s trial request. As such, for that additional reason we also reverse.

 

1

 The officer who served the warrant repeatedly identified it as a “civil arrest warrant,” and the parties on 

appeal also use that terminology. We surmise that a “civil arrest warrant” is either a bench warrant or a writ 

of body attachment issued in a civil proceeding.
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Facts and Procedural History

[3] On April 5, 2016, Marion County Sheriff’s Deputy James Russo went to JeanBaptiste’s residence to serve an arrest warrant stemming from a civil action 

against Jean-Baptiste. Deputy Russo drove his official vehicle to JeanBaptiste’s residence and wore his law enforcement uniform and badge. He 

approached Jean-Baptiste’s front door and knocked loudly on it. Upon JeanBaptiste opening the door, Deputy Russo identified himself as a law 

enforcement officer. Deputy Russo then explained that he had a civil arrest 

warrant for Jean-Baptiste, which Deputy Russo showed to Jean-Baptiste, and 

that he needed Jean-Baptiste to “turn around and place his hands behind his 

back.” Tr. Vol. II at 11. Jean-Baptiste impolitely refused. Deputy Russo 

repeated his request “[n]umerous times,” to no avail. Id.

[4] During their exchange, Deputy Russo stood “outside of the threshold to the 

doorway.” Id. at 19. Jean-Baptiste, however, “was in the threshold of his 

doorway.” Id. That is, as Deputy Russo later explained, during their exchange 

Deputy Russo was “outside of the residence” while Jean-Baptiste “was inside 

the residence.” Id.

[5] In light of Jean-Baptiste’s noncompliance, Deputy Russo told Jean-Baptiste that 

if Jean-Baptiste did not comply “he would . . . be tased.” Id. at 12. Rather than 

comply, Jean-Baptiste “stood there.” Id. Deputy Russo then reached across the 

threshold of the doorway “to grab [Jean-Baptiste’s] right arm to place him into 

custody,” but Jean-Baptiste “yanked” his arm away “forcefully.” Id. Jean-
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Baptiste then backed away from the door and into his residence. Asserting 

probable cause that Jean-Baptiste had just resisted arrest, Deputy Russo then 

fully entered Jean-Baptiste’s residence and, thereafter, placed Jean-Baptiste into 

custody.

[6] The State charged Jean-Baptiste with resisting law enforcement, as a Class A 

misdemeanor, and disorderly conduct, as a Class B misdemeanor.2 After a 

bench trial, the court found Jean-Baptiste guilty of resisting law enforcement 

and not guilty of disorderly conduct. The court then sentenced Jean-Baptiste 

accordingly. This appeal ensued.

Discussion and Decision

Issue One: Sufficiency of the Evidence

[7] Jean-Baptiste contends on appeal that the State failed to present sufficient 

evidence to support his conviction for resisting law enforcement. In our review 

of such claims, “we consider only the evidence and reasonable inferences most 

favorable to the conviction[,] neither reweighing evidence nor reassessing 

witness credibility.” Griffith v. State, 59 N.E.3d 947, 958 (Ind. 2016). “We 

affirm the judgment unless no reasonable factfinder could find the defendant 

guilty.” Id.

 

2

 The facts underlying the disorderly conduct charge arose after Deputy Russo had placed Jean-Baptiste into 

custody.
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[8] To prove that Jean-Baptiste committed Class A misdemeanor resisting law 

enforcement, the State was required to show that he knowingly or intentionally 

forcibly resisted, obstructed, or interfered with a law enforcement officer “while 

the officer [wa]s lawfully engaged in the execution of the officer’s duties.” Ind. 

Code § 35-44.1-3-1 (2015) (emphasis added). The only question in this appeal is 

whether a law enforcement officer who attempts to effect a civil arrest warrant 

is lawfully engaged in that duty when he crosses the threshold of the 

defendant’s residence without permission or other legal justification and grabs 

the defendant. We hold he is not.

[9] The instant appeal is on all fours with this court’s opinion in Casselman v. State, 

472 N.E.2d 1310 (Ind. Ct. App. 1985). In Casselman, a sheriff’s deputy 

appeared at the front door of Casselman’s residence with a civil body 

attachment order for Casselman to appear before the court. The deputy 

knocked on the door, Casselman answered, and the deputy explained who he 

was and why he was there. Casselman impolitely refused to cooperate, and he 

then “tried to close the door” on the deputy. Id. at 1312. The deputy attempted 

to physically prevent the door from closing, and Casselman “pushed” the 

deputy away. Id. The two then engaged in “a shoving and grabbing match” 

before Casselman retreated into his home. Id. The deputy followed him inside 

and placed him into custody. The trial court convicted Casselman of resisting 

law enforcement, as a Class A misdemeanor.

[10] We reversed on appeal. We initially noted that a writ of body attachment or 

civil arrest warrant “is not a criminal arrest warrant.” Id. We noted that “[t]his 
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distinction is important as we view the confrontation on the doorstep of 

Casselman’s house.” Id. at 1313. Acknowledging the vitality of the Castle 

Doctrine in Indiana,3see I.C. § 35-41-3-2, we stated that, “in matters concerning 

merely civil process, the courts of this land have been zealous in protecting 

against the authority of the government to force entry into a private dwelling.” 

Casselman, 472 N.E.2d at 1314.

[11] Accordingly, we held that the deputy in Casselman

was not lawfully engaged in the execution of civil process when, 

while attempting to effect service of the writ, he prevented 

Casselman from closing the door to his home. Casselman had 

the right to close the door; he engaged in no resistance, 

obstruction[,] or interference other than to attempt to assert that 

right. The scuffle between Casselman and [the deputy] arose 

only after [the deputy] unlawfully entered Casselman’s doorway 

to prevent Casselman from closing the door. 

Id. (citations omitted). Further, we expressly rejected the State’s argument that, 

the lawfulness of the deputy’s actions aside, Casselman had no right to resist. 

Id. at 1316. Specifically, we stated that, “assuming Casselman knew that civil 

arrest was intended, . . . where the arrest is attempted by means of a forceful 

and unlawful entry into a citizen’s home . . . such an entry represents the use of 

excessive force.” Id.

 

3

 “The Castle Doctrine arises out of ‘the common law rule that a man’s home is his castle, which gives him

the right to reasonably resist unlawful entry.’” Cupello v. State, 27 N.E.3d 1122, 1124 n.1 (Ind. Ct. App. 2015) 

(quoting Barnes v. State, 953 N.E.2d 473, 474 (Ind. 2011), superseded by statute, I.C. § 35-41-3-2(a)).
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[12] We also recognize that the Indiana General Assembly recently reaffirmed its 

commitment to Castle Doctrine as the policy in Indiana. See I.C. § 35-41-3-

2(a); see also Cupello v. State, 27 N.E.3d 1122, 1132 (Ind. Ct. App. 2015) (noting 

that recent amendments to Indiana Code Section 35-41-3-2 “reaffirmed . . . the 

Castle Doctrine”). In particular, Indiana Code Section 35-41-3-2(i) provides 

that “[a] person is justified in using reasonable force against a public servant if 

the person reasonably believes the force is necessary to . . . prevent or terminate 

the public servant’s unlawful entry of . . . the person’s dwelling . . . .”

[13] In light of Casselman and Section 35-41-3-2, we hold that the State failed to 

present sufficient evidence to support Jean-Baptiste’s conviction for resisting 

law enforcement. The undisputed evidence shows that Deputy Russo was 

“outside of the residence” while Jean-Baptiste was “inside the residence” when 

Deputy Russo, without permission or other legal justification, reached across 

the threshold and grabbed Jean-Baptiste. Tr. Vol. II at 19. As a matter of law, 

Deputy Russo unlawfully entered into Jean-Baptiste’s residence. Casselman, 472 

N.E.2d at 1316. Thus, Deputy Russo was not lawfully engaged in the exercise 

of his duties, which permitted Russo, under Section 35-41-3-2(i), to use 

reasonable force to prevent or terminate Deputy Russo’s entry. And that is 

what Jean-Baptiste did when he “yanked” his arm away “forcefully” from 

Deputy Russo’s grasp. Tr. Vol. II at 12. 

[14] Nonetheless, the State argues that Casselman is inapposite because “Deputy 

Russo did not focibl[y] enter [Jean-Baptiste’s] residence . . . .” Appellee’s Br. at 

12. We cannot agree that Deputy Russo acted without force when he reached 
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across the threshold and, by his own admission, “grab[bed]” Jean-Baptiste’s 

right arm. Tr. Vol. II at 12. And insofar as the State’s argument is that an 

officer may not stick his foot in the doorway to prevent the resident from 

closing the door, see Cupello, 27 N.E.3d at 1130, but the officer may nonetheless 

grab a resident in the threshold of his doorway, we reject that distinction.

[15] The State also argues that the threshold “is essentially . . . a public place.” 

Appellee’s Br. at 12. The Indiana Supreme Court thinks not:

For purposes of the Fourth Amendment, . . . the threshold of a 

home is the line that law enforcement officers cannot transgress 

without judicial authorization. . . . [T]he Fourth Amendment 

has drawn a firm line at the entrance to the house. Absent 

exigent circumstances, that threshold may not be reasonably 

crossed without a warrant.

Middleton v. State, 714 N.E.2d 1099, 1101 (Ind. 1999) (quotation marks 

omitted); see also Cupello, 27 N.E.3d at 1130 (“Constable Webb unlawfully 

entered Cupello’s dwelling by placing his foot within the threshold of the 

apartment door without lawful justification.”). The State’s argument on this 

issue is without merit.

[16] Finally, the State argues that the most factually analogous case to JeanBaptiste’s is not Casselman but, rather, Johnson v. State, 747 N.E.2d 623 (Ind. Ct. 

App. 2001). We cannot agree. In Johnson, an officer went to Johnson’s 

residence “to issue . . . a dog restraint violation.” Id. at 626. While engaging 

with Johnson’s wife on the porch of the residence, Johnson engaged in 

disorderly conduct directed at the officer from “the doorway” of the residence. 
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Id. The officer then “grabbed [Johnson’s] arm in order to arrest him,” but 

Johnson pulled his arm back and retreated into his residence. Id. The officer 

followed and arrested Johnson. 

[17] We affirmed his convictions for resisting law enforcement and disorderly 

conduct. In analyzing whether the officer had acted lawfully for the resisting 

law enforcement charge, we stated that “Johnson was in the doorway, 

not . . . in the house . . . .” Id. at 632. We also relied on the fact that “Johnson 

was engaged in a public confrontation” with the officer prior to his resisting 

arrest. Id. And we noted that Johnson’s wife had “invited [the officer] onto the 

porch . . . .” Id. 

[18] None of those facts are present here. Unlike in Johnson, the undisputed 

evidence here unequivocally shows that Jean-Baptiste was “inside the 

residence.” Tr. Vol. II at 19. Further, there is no evidence that Jean-Baptiste 

had engaged in disorderly conduct prior to or contemporaneous with the facts 

underlying his resisting law enforcement conviction. And neither did JeanBaptiste or any other resident affirmatively invite Deputy Russo onto the 

property. As such, we reject the State’s argument that Johnson rather than 

Casselman is the more analogous authority here.

[19] In sum, we hold that the State failed to present sufficient evidence to support 

Jean-Baptiste’s conviction for resisting law enforcement, as a Class A 

misdemeanor. The undisputed evidence inescapably demonstrates that Deputy 

Russo was not lawfully engaged in the exercise of his duties when he reached 
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across the threshold of Jean-Baptiste’s residence without permission or other 

legal justification and grabbed him. As Deputy Russo was not lawfully engaged 

in the exercise of his duties, as a matter of law Jean-Baptiste had the right to 

reasonably resist Deputy Russo, which Jean-Baptiste did.4 Thus, we reverse

Jean-Baptiste’s conviction.

Issue Two: Jury Trial Waiver

[20] Even if we were to agree that the State presented sufficient evidence to support 

Jean-Baptiste’s conviction, we would still be obliged to reverse, sua sponte, 

because the trial court committed fundamental error when it denied JeanBaptiste’s right to a jury trial without first eliciting a personal waiver from him 

on the record. As we explained in Casselman:

Criminal Rule 22 provides:

A defendant charged with a misdemeanor may demand a 

trial by jury by filing a written demand therefor not later 

than ten (10) days before his scheduled trial date. The 

failure of a defendant to demand a trial by jury as required 

by this rule shall constitute a waiver by him of trial by jury 

unless the defendant has not had at least fifteen (15) days 

advance notice of his scheduled trial date and of the 

consequences of his failure to demand a trial by jury.

The state urges that since Casselman failed to demand a jury as 

provided by the rule, no error was committed. The argument is 

 

4

 In light of our holding, we need not reach the State’s further argument that Deputy Russo was permitted to 

enter Jean-Baptiste’s residence under a theory of hot pursuit.
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specious. If the rule is, itself, to pass constitutional muster it 

must meet the requirements of Boykin v. Alabama (1969), 395 U.S. 

238, 89 S. Ct. 1709, 23 L. Ed. 2d 274 that waiver of such a 

fundamental right cannot be presumed from a silent record. . . .

472 N.E.2d 1310, 1311 n.1 (Ind. Ct. App. 1985) (emphasis added); see also

Fiandt v. State, 996 N.E.2d 421, 425-28 (Najam, J., dissenting), trans. not sought. 

Further, it is beyond dispute that the Sixth Amendment requires the waiver of 

the right to a jury trial to be made personally by the defendant. Doughty v. State, 

470 N.E.2d 69, 70 (Ind. 1984). 

[21] Here, the record shows that Jean-Baptiste had been advised of Criminal Rule 22 

and had not complied with it. Rather than complying with Rule 22, on the day 

of his bench trial Jean-Baptiste requested a trial by jury. The trial court denied 

his request solely on the basis of Jean-Baptiste’s noncompliance with Rule 22. 

Tr. Vol. II at 7. That was fundamental error. Absent his personal waiver of his 

right to a jury trial on the record, the court was required under the Sixth 

Amendment to presume that a defendant charged with a Class A misdemeanor 

desired a jury trial, not a bench trial. See Fiandt, 996 N.E.2d at 425-28 (Najam, 

J., dissenting); see also Holly v. State, 681 N.E.2d 1176, 1177-78 (Ind. Ct. App. 

1997) (Rucker, J.) (“Sentences exceeding six months may not be imposed 

absent a jury trial or [a constitutionally sufficient] waiver thereof.”). Only after 

that personal waiver on the record is secured may the trial court then operate 

under Rule 22. As that did not happen here, the trial court committed 

fundamental error when it denied Jean-Baptiste his right to a jury trial, and for 

that additional reason we reverse his conviction.
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[22] Reversed.

Bailey, J., and May, J., concur.