Filed 9/29/21 P. v. Castillo-Lopez CA4/1

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or 

ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for 

purposes of rule 8.1115. 

COURT OF APPEAL, FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION ONE

STATE OF CALIFORNIA

THE PEOPLE,

Plaintiff and Respondent,

v.

ALBERTO CASTILLO-LOPEZ,

Defendant and Appellant.

 D078829

 (Super. Ct. No. C1912849)

ORDER MODIFYING 

OPINION AND DENYING 

REHEARING

NO CHANGE IN JUDGMENT

THE COURT:

The opinion filed September 23, 2021, is hereby modified as follows:

1. On page 14, within the citation on the last two lines of the 

second paragraph, insert “(McCoy)” after the pincite page and before the 

bracketed quote, so that the citation now begins: “(People v. McCoy (1944) 25 

Cal.2d 177, 193 (McCoy) . . . .”

2. On page 15, footnote 6, the sentence beginning: “In light of our 

reversal based on prejudicial instructional error” is deleted, and the following 

sentences are inserted in its place: 
2

The parties have extensively briefed the issue. Castillo-Lopez’s 

argument lacks merit. As “ ‘[t]he drawing of a weapon is 

generally evidence of an intention to use it’ ” (McCoy, supra, 25 

Cal.2d at p. 193), one reasonable interpretation of the evidence is 

that by unsheathing and holding up the machete, Castillo-Lopez 

was in the process of putting the machete to use as a weapon 

against M.M., such as by swinging it, but he was too intoxicated 

to do so in an efficient and effective manner. Therefore, 

although such a finding is certainly not required by the evidence 

presented at trial, the record does contain substantial evidence 

to permit a reasonable juror to find that Castillo-Lopez used the 

machete “in such a way that it [was] capable of causing and 

likely to cause death or great bodily injury.” (CALCRIM No. 

3145.)

Appellant’s petition for rehearing is denied.

There is no change in judgment.

HUFFMAN, Acting P. J.

Copies to: All parties
Filed 9/23/21 P. v. Castillo-Lopez CA4/1 (unmodified opinion)

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or 

ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for 

purposes of rule 8.1115. 

COURT OF APPEAL, FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION ONE

STATE OF CALIFORNIA

THE PEOPLE,

Plaintiff and Respondent,

v.

ALBERTO CASTILLO-LOPEZ,

Defendant and Appellant.

 D078829

 (Super. Ct. No. C1912849)

APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Santa Clara County, 

Andrea E. Flint and Julianne Sylva, Judges. Affirmed in part, reversed in 

part, and remanded with directions.

Evan C. Greenberg, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for 

Defendant and Appellant. 

Xavier Becerra, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief Assistant 

Attorney General, Jeffrey M. Laurence, Assistant Attorney General, Eric D.

Share and Ashley Harlan, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and 

Respondent.
2

A jury found Alberto Castillo-Lopez guilty of one count of attempted

second degree robbery (Pen. Code, §§ 212.5, subd. (c), 664),1 with a further 

finding that he personally used a deadly or dangerous weapon (a machete)

(§ 12022, subd. (b)(1)); and one count of misdemeanor resisting, delaying or 

obstructing a peace officer (§ 148, subd. (a)(1)). The trial court suspended 

imposition of sentence and ordered that Castillo-Lopez be placed on probation 

for a term of three years. The trial court also imposed certain fines and fees. 

Castillo-Lopez makes several arguments on appeal. First, he seeks 

reversal of the true finding that he personally used a deadly or dangerous 

weapon in committing the attempted robbery. Specifically, he contends that 

(1) the jury was prejudicially misinstructed as to that enhancement, and 

(2) in any event, substantial evidence does not support a true finding on the 

enhancement. Second, according to Castillo-Lopez, the trial court abused its 

discretion in admitting evidence that (1) he possessed a piece of metal wire 

when he was arrested that was possibly a burglary tool, and (2) as he walked 

away from the attempted robbery, he was seen peering into cars. Third, 

Castillo-Lopez argues the jury should have been instructed that it could 

consider voluntary intoxication in connection with the charge that he 

resisted, delayed or obstructed a peace officer. Fourth, he contends the jury 

should have been instructed on brandishing (§ 417, subd. (a)(1)) as a lesser 

included offense to the attempted robbery charge. Fifth, due to a recent 

statutory amendment to section 1203.1, subdivision (a), Castillo-Lopez seeks 

a reduction of his term of probation to two years. Finally, Castillo-Lopez

argues that based on People v. Dueñas (2019) 30 Cal.App.5th 1157 (Dueñas), 

1 Unless otherwise indicated, all further statutory references are to the 

Penal Code.
3

the trial court did not adequately take into account his inability to pay when 

imposing certain fines and fees. 

We conclude (1) the trial court prejudicially erred in instructing on the 

enhancement for personally using a deadly or dangerous weapon for the 

attempted robbery count, and (2) Castillo-Lopez should be resentenced 

consistent with the two-year limitation on terms of felony probation set forth 

in the current version of section 1203.1, subdivision (a). Further, with 

respect to Castillo-Lopez’s inability to pay the fines and fees imposed at 

sentencing, the record is unclear as to whether the trial court considered the 

constitutional principles set forth in Dueñas and subsequent case law. We 

find no merit to Castillo-Lopez’s remaining contentions. Accordingly, we 

reverse the true finding on the one-year enhancement for personally using a 

deadly or dangerous weapon, and on remand we direct the trial court to 

(1) resentence Castillo-Lopez in a manner consistent with the current version 

of section 1203.1, subdivision (a); and (2) expressly consider whether, in light 

of Castillo-Lopez’s inability to pay, it should reduce or strike certain of the 

fines and fees imposed at sentencing.

I.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

On the afternoon of July 2, 2019, after finishing her shift at work in an 

industrial area of San Jose, M.M. walked with her sister to her sister’s car, 

which was parked near the entrance to their workplace. M.M. carried a 

purse and a lunch box, which she planned to place inside the car. As M.M. 

opened the passenger-side door in preparation for placing the items inside, 

Castillo-Lopez approached M.M. on the sidewalk, physically separated from 

her by a three-foot wide dirt strip. While noting that Castillo-Lopez appeared 

to be one of the homeless people populating the area around her workplace, 
4

M.M. nodded to Castillo-Lopez in a cordial manner. Castillo-Lopez held 

something in his hands, but, at that point, M.M. could not tell what it was. It 

was later revealed that the item was a two or three-foot long machete, which 

was wrapped in a dirty white cloth. 

Castillo-Lopez responded to M.M’s nodded greeting by raising his 

eyebrows and making head nudges while looking at her purse, which she held 

in her hand. Castillo-Lopez mumbled, “Give me. Give me it.” M.M. 

perceived that Castillo-Lopez wanted her purse, and she reacted by saying 

“No.” Castillo-Lopez responded by nodding his head, as if to indicate “Yes.” 

M.M. then threw her purse in the car and slammed the door shut. 

Castillo-Lopez took the machete, still wrapped in the white cloth, and 

slapped it against his left palm two times. He seemed angry, and the gesture 

was intimidating to M.M. As M.M. created distance from Castillo-Lopez by 

walking toward the rear of the car, Castillo-Lopez unsheathed the machete

from the white cloth. 

According to M.M., after Castillo-Lopez unsheathed the machete, “[h]e 

raised it up to show us—it was pointed towards the sky, blade down,” and “he 

was just shaking it, showing me.” M.M. was approximately 10 feet away 

from Castillo-Lopez at that point. The machete was old and rusty, but its 

edge appeared to be sharp. A police officer testified at trial that although the 

primary use of a machete is to chop down foliage, a machete can be used to 

cause bodily injury such as dismemberment or other life-threatening injuries. 

After Castillo-Lopez displayed the machete, M.M. took her cell phone

from her pocket, and Castillo-Lopez said, “Call the cops.” M.M. responded, 

“Yeah, I am calling the cops.” Castillo-Lopez then took several steps forward

through the dirt strip beside the sidewalk. M.M. confirmed during her 
5

testimony that Castillo-Lopez did not swing or point the machete at her, and 

he did not make any verbal threats to use the machete to hurt her. 

M.M. alerted her sister, who was standing near the driver’s door of the 

car but had not previously been paying attention. According to M.M.’s sister, 

she looked up and saw Castillo-Lopez with the machete, and “[h]e was just 

holding it and he waved it.” She explained that Castillo-Lopez was holding 

the machete “[d]ownward, but when I went to look . . . he went up with it, 

like that, with a smile.” When asked whether she meant to indicate by her 

gestures that Castillo-Lopez raised the machete to shoulder height, M.M.’s 

sister stated, “It wasn’t that high because he was intoxicated; so it seemed 

really heavy for him to hold, but he had it.” M.M.’s sister saw Castillo-Lopez 

start to approach as he “waved” the machete. M.M. and her sister ran into 

their workplace building, locking the door behind them. M.M.’s sister called 

911. 

Immediately afterwards, one of M.M’s co-workers armed himself with a 

bat and went outside to confront Castillo-Lopez, who eventually left the 

scene. Later, M.M.’s sister exited the building and saw Castillo-Lopez

walking in the distance while stopping to peer into the windows of parked 

cars. He was stumbling and not walking straight. 

Uniformed police officers in marked patrol cars, with lights flashing 

and sirens sounding, responded to the 911 call and located Castillo-Lopez in a 

nearby strip mall. Castillo-Lopez initially did not comply with police 

commands to stop walking away and to get down on the ground. Then, when 

officers forced Castillo-Lopez to the ground and attempted to handcuff him, 

Castillo-Lopez tensed his arms in a raised position to make it difficult to 

apply handcuffs. After Castillo-Lopez was handcuffed, officers discovered 

that he was holding a piece of metal wire, which an officer testified was of the 
6

type typically used as a burglary tool to pick locks or ignitions. CastilloLopez’s pockets held a pocket knife and a hacksaw blade. 

An information charged Castillo-Lopez with one count of attempted 

second degree robbery (§§ 212.5, subd. (c), 664) and one count of the 

misdemeanor offense of resisting, delaying or obstructing a peace officer. 

(§ 148, subd. (a)(1).) For the attempted robbery count it was alleged that 

Castillo-Lopez personally used a deadly or dangerous weapon (a machete). 

(§ 12022, subd. (b)(1).)

The jury found Castillo-Lopez guilty on both counts and made a true 

finding on the weapon enhancement. At sentencing on December 16, 2019, 

the trial court suspended imposition of sentence, placed Castillo-Lopez on 

probation for a term of three years, and imposed certain fines and fees. On 

January 23, 2020, a hearing was held at which the trial court found that 

Castillo-Lopez violated the conditions of probation, and ordered that CastilloLopez serve a six-month jail term. 

II.

DISCUSSION

A. The Trial Court Prejudicially Erred by Instructing That the Machete

Could Be an Inherently Deadly or Dangerous Weapon for the Purpose of 

the Weapon Enhancement

We first consider Castillo-Lopez’s contention that the trial court 

prejudicially erred in its instruction on the enhancement for personal use of a 

deadly or dangerous weapon in connection with the attempted robbery count. 

More specifically, the issue is whether prejudicial error occurred when the 

trial court instructed on the theory that the jury could find the machete used 

by Castillo-Lopez to be an inherently deadly or dangerous weapon. As we will 

explain, although the parties agree that the trial court erred, they disagree 

on whether the error was prejudicial.
7

We begin with the relevant statutory provision. Section 12022, 

subdivision (b)(1) provides, “A person who personally uses a deadly or 

dangerous weapon in the commission of a felony or attempted felony shall be 

punished by an additional and consecutive term of imprisonment in the state 

prison for one year, unless use of a deadly or dangerous weapon is an element 

of that offense.” The jury was instructed with CALCRIM No. 3145 as follows 

with respect to that enhancement:

“• If you find the defendant guilty of the crime charged in 

Count 1, you must then decide whether the People have 

proved the additional allegation that the defendant 

personally used a deadly or dangerous weapon during 

attempted commission of that crime.

“• A deadly or dangerous weapon is any object, instrument, or 

weapon that is inherently deadly or dangerous or one that 

is used in such a way that it is capable of causing and likely 

to cause death or great bodily injury. 

“• Great bodily injury means significant or substantial 

physical injury. It is an injury that is greater than minor 

or moderate harm.” 

Case law establishes a weapon may qualify as a deadly or dangerous 

weapon under this enhancement in two ways: (1) the weapon used by the 

defendant may be inherently deadly or dangerous; or (2) although not 

inherently dangerous, the weapon may be used by the defendant in a manner 

that qualifies it as a deadly or dangerous weapon. (People v. Aledamat (2019) 

8 Cal.5th 1, 6 (Aledamat).)2 The concept of an inherently deadly or 

dangerous weapon as used in section 12022, subdivision (b)(1) is a term of art

2 The same approach applies when the issue is whether the defendant 

has used a “deadly” weapon in committing an assault. (Aledamat, supra, 8 

Cal.5th at p. 6, fn. 2.) Thus, our analysis refers interchangeably to case law 

arising in both contexts.
8

that does not necessarily reflect the common meaning of the phrase. 

Specifically, “ ‘inherently deadly or dangerous’ ” weapons are objects that are 

deadly or dangerous in “ ‘the ordinary use for which they are designed,’ ” 

meaning they lack any practical, nondeadly/nondangerous purpose and are 

not commonly “used for innocent purposes.” (Aledamat, at p. 6.) Applying 

this definition, case law has determined that certain weapons, like dirks and 

blackjacks, are inherently deadly as a matter of law (People v. Aguilar (1997) 

16 Cal.4th 1023, 1029), while others, like knives and box cutters, are not. (In 

re B.M. (2018) 6 Cal.5th 528, 533 (B.M.) [knife]; Aledamat, at p. 6 [box 

cutter]; see also People v. McCoy (1944) 25 Cal.2d 177, 188 [noting the 

“distinction between instrumentalities which are ‘weapons’ in the strict sense 

of the word, such as guns, dirks, etc., and those instrumentalities which are 

not weapons in that sense, such as ordinary razors, pocket-knives or other 

sharp objects”].) “[M]ost objects are not inherently deadly even if they may 

be used in a way that makes them deadly.” (Aledamat, at pp. 15-16.) As a 

matter of law, a machete is indisputably not an inherently deadly or 

dangerous weapon, and the parties do not contend otherwise. This is because 

a machete is essentially a large specialized knife with the useful purpose of 

chopping foliage.

It is well-established that a trial court errs if it instructs jurors that 

they may find a weapon to be inherently deadly or dangerous, when, as a 

matter of law, the weapon is not inherently deadly or dangerous. (Aledamat, 

supra, 8 Cal.5th at pp. 6-7 [because “ ‘[a] box cutter’ ” “is not an inherently 

deadly weapon as a matter of law,” “the trial court erred in presenting the 

jury with two theories by which it could find the box cutter a deadly weapon: 

(1) inherently or (2) as used,” as “[t]he first theory (inherently) is incorrect.”].) 

Such an instruction is “flawed because [it] suggest[s] the jury might properly 
9

conclude that a [weapon] is inherently dangerous,” when it cannot be so as a 

matter of law. (People v. Stutelberg (2018) 29 Cal.App.5th 314, 317

(Stutelberg).) 

The People concede that the trial court erred by including the portion of 

CALCRIM No. 3145 stating that a deadly or dangerous weapon is any object, 

instrument, or weapon “that is inherently deadly or dangerous.” As the 

People explain, “ ‘[b]ecause the trial court here did not define what 

“inherently deadly” meant, the jury would not [have been] equipped to know 

that, contrary to what the instruction suggested, a [machete] is not an 

inherently deadly weapon.’ ” 

Although the parties agree that the trial court committed instructional 

error, they disagree as to whether the error was prejudicial. In Aledamat, 

our Supreme Court established that for the type of error at issue here, “the 

usual ‘beyond a reasonable doubt’ standard of review established 

in Chapman v. California (1967) 386 U.S. 18, 24 (Chapman) for federal 

constitutional error applies. The reviewing court must reverse the conviction 

unless, after examining the entire cause, including the evidence, and 

considering all relevant circumstances, it determines the error was harmless 

beyond a reasonable doubt.” (Aledamat, supra, 8 Cal.5th at p. 3.)3 As 

3 Aledamat concerned the exact type of instructional error that occurred 

here. The defendant pulled out a box cutter, thrust it at the victim and 

threatened to kill him. (Aledamat, supra, 8 Cal.5th at p. 4.) In instructing on 

the charge of assault with a deadly weapon and the weapon enhancement for 

personally using a deadly or dangerous weapon (§ 12022, subd. (b)(1)), the 

trial court erred by instructing the jury it could find the box cutter to be an 

inherently deadly or dangerous weapon. (Aledamat, at pp. 6-7.) As here, the 

issue in Aledamat was whether the error was prejudicial. All seven justices 

in Aledamat agreed that the general harmless error inquiry set forth in 

Chapman, supra, 386 U.S. at page 24, applied to the type of error that had 
10

Justice Cuéllar pointed out in his concurring and dissenting opinion in 

Aledamat, there are two helpful analytical approaches to determining 

whether such an instructional error was prejudicial: “we can conclude 

‘beyond a reasonable doubt’ either that the jury necessarily relied on a valid 

legal theory [citations] or that the element omitted or misdescribed ‘was 

uncontested and supported by overwhelming evidence, such that the jury 

verdict would have been the same absent the error.’ ” (Aledamat, supra, 8 

Cal.5th at p. 17 (conc. & dis. opn. of Cuéllar, J.), italics omitted.) We proceed 

by applying both of those inquiries.

1. We Cannot Conclude the Jury Relied on a Valid Legal Theory for 

Finding the Machete to Be Deadly or Dangerous

Turning to the first of these inquiries, we cannot conclude beyond a 

reasonable doubt that, although misinstructed, the jury relied on a valid legal 

theory in finding the machete to be a deadly or dangerous weapon, namely 

that the machete was “used in such a way that it [was] capable of causing 

and likely to cause death or great bodily injury.” (CALCRIM No. 3145.) As 

we will explain, our conclusion is based on two main considerations.

First, based on the argument of counsel, there is a reasonable 

possibility that the jury relied on the invalid legal theory that the machete 

was inherently deadly or dangerous. Specifically, during closing argument, 

the prosecutor addressed the issue of whether the machete was deadly or 

dangerous by referring only to the theory that it was inherently deadly or 

dangerous. Referring to the machete, she argued, “[t]hat item is inherently 

occurred. (Aledamat, at pp. 13, 16 (conc. & dis. opn. of Liu, J.), 17-18 (conc. & 

dis. opn. of Cuéllar, J.).) However, based on a combination of (1) the totality 

of the jury instructions, (2) the content of counsel’s argument to the jury, and 

(3) the findings the jury necessarily made in arriving at an assault conviction, 

a four-justice majority in Aledamat determined that the error was not 

prejudicial. (Id. at pp. 13-16.)
11

dangerous,” and she then reminded the jury of the police officer’s testimony 

describing how a machete could cause damage, including dismemberment. 

(See In re Martinez (2017) 3 Cal.5th 1216, 1226-1227 [concluding the jury 

could have convicted on an invalid legal theory where the prosecutor 

extensively argued that theory to the jury during closing argument].) 

Significantly, the prosecutor said nothing about whether the machete was 

deadly or dangerous based on how Castillo-Lopez actually used it. Defense 

counsel omitted any discussion during closing argument about whether the 

machete was a deadly or dangerous weapon. Therefore, the sole guidance the 

jury received during closing argument as to how they should approach the 

issue of whether the machete was deadly or dangerous was that they should 

find it to be inherently deadly and dangerous.

Next, having been urged by the prosecutor to conclude that the 

machete was inherently deadly or dangerous, there is a significant possibility 

that the jury accepted the approach proposed by the prosecutor and found 

that the machete was inherently deadly or dangerous. Significantly, the 

phrase “inherently deadly or dangerous” was not defined for the jury. 

Accordingly, the phrase would likely be understood by an average person as 

denoting an object that is “inherently” deadly or dangerous if it is the type of 

object that, by its very nature, is obviously capable of causing harm or death. 

Because a machete is a long and sharp cutting tool, most people would 

conclude that a machete satisfies that definition. (Aledamat, supra, 8 Cal.5th 

at p. 15 [describing the risk that “because the court did not define the term, 

the jury might have applied its common understanding to find the box cutter 

deadly because it is sharp and used for cutting”].) Even a passing glance at a 

machete reveals that it could do significant harm if swung at another human 

being. Any reasonable person would understand that it is necessary to avoid 
12

the path of a machete to prevent from being injured, even when a machete is 

being used for the innocent purpose of chopping foliage. Moreover, a person’s 

manner of using a machete does not change depending on whether it is used 

for its intended plant-cutting purposes as opposed to its non-intended 

purpose as a weapon. In both instances, a person raises the machete and 

swings it with a chopping motion, with the only difference being the target at 

which the machete is directed. Because of these characteristics, there is a 

significant possibility that, consistent with the prosecutor’s suggestion, the 

average juror would classify a machete as an inherently deadly or dangerous 

weapon based on the common meaning of that phrase.4

4 We note that our Supreme Court in Aledamat determined that 

although instructed on the theory that the box cutter could be inherently 

deadly or dangerous, the totality of the circumstances established that the 

jury would not have found the box cutter to be deadly or dangerous without 

also considering how the box cutter was used by the defendant. In so holding, 

Aledamat relied on an additional jury instruction given in that case. The jury 

was told, “ ‘In deciding whether an object is a deadly weapon, consider all of 

the surrounding circumstances including when and where the object was 

possessed and any other evidence that indicates whether the object would be 

used for a dangerous rather than a harmless purpose.’ ” (Aledamat, supra, 8

Cal.5th at p. 14.) As Aledamat explained, “This part of the instruction 

suggested the question was unitary, that is, that the jury had to consider all 

of the circumstances in deciding whether the object was a deadly weapon, 

either inherently or as used. The jury would likely view the ‘inherently 

deadly’ language in light of this additional instruction that it had to consider 

all of the circumstances. Given this additional instruction, it seems unlikely 

the jury would simply view the box cutter as inherently deadly without 

considering the circumstances, including how defendant used it.” (Id. at 

p. 14, first italics added.) No such instruction in the instant case served to 

focus the jury on how the machete was used. Thus, the jury here was 

unquestionably presented with the binary choice of deciding either that the 

machete was inherently deadly or dangerous or that it was deadly and 

dangerous based on how Castillo-Lopez used it. 
13

In sum, for these reasons we cannot conclude beyond a reasonable 

doubt that, although misinstructed, the jury relied on a valid legal theory in

finding the machete to be a deadly or dangerous weapon.

2. The Evidence that the Machete Was Deadly or Dangerous as Used 

Was Not So Overwhelming as to Render the Instructional Error 

Harmless Beyond a Reasonable Doubt

The second relevant inquiry in our harmless error analysis is whether 

the evidence that the machete was deadly or dangerous as used was so 

overwhelming that it made no difference that the jury was incorrectly 

instructed that the machete could be an inherently deadly or dangerous

weapon. (Aledamat, supra, 8 Cal.5th at p. 17 (conc. & dis. opn. of Cuéllar, 

J.).) To answer that question we must further explore what it means to use

an item as a deadly or dangerous weapon. 

As the jury was instructed, it could find the machete to be deadly or 

dangerous as used if it found that the machete was “used in such a way that 

it [was] capable of causing and likely to cause death or great bodily injury.” 

(CALCRIM No. 3145, italics added.) Consistent with this description, our 

Supreme Court has explained that “for an object to qualify as a deadly 

weapon based on how it was used, the defendant must have used the object in 

a manner not only capable of producing but also likely to produce death or 

great bodily injury. The extent of any damage done to the object and the 

extent of any bodily injuries caused by the object are appropriate 

considerations in the fact-specific inquiry . . . . But speculation without 

record support as to how the object could have been used or what injury 

might have been inflicted if the object had been used differently is not 
14

appropriate.” (B.M., supra, 6 Cal.5th at p. 530.)5 “[T]he determination of 

whether an object is a deadly weapon . . . must rest on evidence of how the 

defendant actually ‘used’ the object.” (Id. at p. 534.) Thus, for instance, in 

B.M. when the defendant stabbed a butter knife into the victim’s blanketed 

legs, the evidence was insufficient to show that the butter knife was used as a 

deadly weapon. Focusing on how the knife was actually used, our Supreme 

Court explained, “[i]t may be that [the defendant] could have caused serious 

injury if she had applied greater force, if she had applied the same force to 

[the victim’s] exposed legs, if she had used the knife on [the victim’s] head, 

face, or neck, or if [the defendant] had wielded the knife in an uncontrolled or 

unpredictable manner. But the inquiry must focus on the evidence of how 

[the defendant] actually used the knife, not on various conjectures as to how 

she could have used it.” (Id. at p. 538, italics added.)

Here, the evidence was that Castillo-Lopez held up the machete with 

the blade facing downward. M.M. perceived that Castillo-Lopez “raised [the 

machete] up to show” it to her. (Italics added.) Although Castillo-Lopez

eventually took several steps forward, M.M. confirmed that Castillo-Lopez 

did not swing the machete at her, point it at her or make any verbal threats 

to use the machete to hurt her. As she explained, “[H]e was just shaking it, 

showing me.” It is possible that a juror could infer that Castillo-Lopez was

preparing to employ the machete as a weapon. (People v. McCoy (1944) 25 

Cal.2d 177, 193 [“ ‘The drawing of a weapon is generally evidence of an 

5 B.M. examined the circumstances under which an object qualifies as a 

deadly weapon, based on its use, for the crime of assault with a deadly 

weapon. (B.M., supra, 6 Cal.5th at p. 533.) However, as we have noted, the 

same approach applies in the context of a weapon enhancement for 

personally using a deadly or dangerous weapon (§ 12022, subd. (b)(1)). 

(Aledamat, supra, 8 Cal.5th at p. 6, fn. 2.) 
15

intention to use it.’ ”]; B.M., supra, 6 Cal.5th at p. 533 [“ ‘In determining 

whether an object not inherently deadly or dangerous is used as such, the 

trier of fact may consider the nature of the object, the manner in which it is 

used, and all other facts relevant to the issue.’ ”].) But the evidence certainly 

does not require such a finding.6 Indeed, a reasonable finder of fact could 

conclude, based on the evidence, that by displaying the machete with the tip 

of the blade facing downward, Castillo-Lopez intended to instill fear in M.M.

based on his possession of a weapon, but that during his interaction with 

M.M., he was not wielding the machete as a weapon in a manner “likely to 

produce death or great bodily injury.” (B.M., at p. 530.)

Because the evidence is susceptible to an interpretation that CastilloLopez raised the machete with the tip of the blade facing downward merely to 

display it, and thus to scare or threaten M.M., we cannot conclude, beyond a 

reasonable doubt, that the jury, if correctly instructed, would have found the 

machete to be a deadly or dangerous weapon, as used. (See Stutelberg, supra,

29 Cal.App.5th at p. 322 [“The jury could reasonably conclude that 

[defendant’s] ‘flicking’ motion [with a box cutter] was more of a threat, as 

opposed to an act likely to cause death or great bodily injury. Under these 

circumstances, we cannot say that the court’s error in instructing the jury 

regarding an inherently dangerous weapon was harmless beyond a 

reasonable doubt” (italics added)].) Put another way, the evidence that 

Castillo-Lopez used the machete as a deadly or dangerous weapon was not so 

6 On appeal, Castillo-Lopez also argues that the true finding on the 

weapon enhancement should be reversed on the alternative ground that, even 

had the jury been correctly instructed, insufficient evidence supports a 

finding that, as used, the machete was a deadly and dangerous weapon. In 

light of our reversal based on prejudicial instructional error, we need not, and 

do not, conduct a detailed analysis of the substantial evidence challenge. 
16

overwhelming that we can conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that the 

outcome would have been the same regardless of the instructional error. 

In sum, “after examining the entire cause, including the evidence, and 

considering all relevant circumstances” (Aledamat, supra, 8 Cal.5th at p. 3),

we cannot conclude that it was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt for the 

trial court to instruct the jury that it could find the machete to be inherently 

deadly or dangerous. Accordingly, the instructional error was prejudicial, 

and we reverse the jury’s true finding on the one-year weapon-use

enhancement (§ 12022, subd. (b)(1)) attached to the attempted robbery count. 

B. The Trial Court Did Not Abuse Its Discretion in Admitting Evidence 

that Castillo-Lopez Held a Possible Burglary Tool When He Was 

Arrested and That He Peered Into Cars as He Walked Away from the 

Scene of the Attempted Robbery

Castillo-Lopez argues that the attempted robbery conviction should be 

reversed because the trial court abused its discretion in admitting testimony

about a possible burglary tool Castillo-Lopez possessed when he was arrested 

and about his actions as he walked away from the scene of the attempted 

robbery. 

1. The Challenged Evidence and Defense Counsel’s Objections

We begin by examining the evidence that Castillo-Lopez contends was 

improperly admitted, along with defense counsel’s objections. 

a. Evidence That Castillo-Lopez Held a Piece of Metal Wire

When He Was Arrested

When questioning one of the police officers who arrested Castillo-Lopez, 

the prosecutor elicited testimony that when Castillo-Lopez was handcuffed, 

he held a piece of metal wire in his hand. The wire was approximately four 

inches long and had the thickness of two or three paper clips. The prosecutor 

displayed photographs depicting the piece of metal wire to the jury. The 

prosecutor then asked the police officer, “[I]n what context do you usually see 
17

items like that?” Defense counsel objected to that question on the grounds of

relevance and undue prejudice under Evidence Code section 352. After a 

sidebar conference, the trial court overruled the objections. The police officer 

replied, “The first thing that comes to mind is burglary tools.” He then 

explained that a burglary tool is “a tool that someone might use to break into 

something, either a padlock, door lock, ignition, or something of that nature.” 

At the end of the day’s testimony, the trial court and counsel made a 

record of the sidebar conference during which defense counsel’s objections

regarding the piece of metal wire were discussed. Defense counsel explained, 

“I did lodge a relevance objection in regards to the introduction of People’s 

[Exh. No.] 3, which depicts a piece of—call it wire just for now—beige wire, 

perhaps. I did argue at sidebar that, frankly, this evidence and the opinion 

that it is a burglary tool is [under Evidence Code section] 352, more 

prejudicial than probative. I don’t think it can be used to go to my client’s 

mental state with regards to Penal Code [section] 211 [i.e., robbery]. I think 

to make that leap is speculative at best, and I think introduction of this 

evidence is more prejudicial than probative to Mr. Castillo-Lopez. I don’t 

anticipate we will receive any evidence that Mr. Castillo-Lopez was observed 

attempting to break into any residences or automobiles with this piece of 

wire.” 

The trial court explained why it overruled the objections: “So I did 

allow the officer to opine as to the purpose of the wire, at least in the officer’s 

mind, because I do believe that it is relevant as it does go partly to the state 

of the mind of Mr. Castillo-Lopez in terms of his intent to permanently 

deprive property from someone, whether it be through a robbery or through a 

burglary. The other thing is he could have just been holding the wire, but it’s 

also possible, seeing the police, he might have intended to use it as a lock 
18

pick. But in any event, I find the probative value does not substantially 

outweigh the prejudicial effect, risk of misleading the jury, or an undue waste 

of time; so I did allow the evidence into evidence.”7

b. Evidence That Castillo-Lopez Was Peering Into Parked Cars

During the testimony of M.M.’s sister, the prosecutor asked her what 

Castillo-Lopez was doing as he walked away in the distance. Defense counsel 

made an objection based on relevance, which the trial court overruled.8

M.M.’s sister replied that while Castillo-Lopez walked past a mechanic’s

shop, he was “[p]eeking in the cars through the windows as he was walking 

by. [At s]ome of them he did stop, and hovered his face over in the window.” 

2. Standard of Review

Castillo-Lopez contends that the trial court prejudicially erred in 

admitting this evidence. He argues the evidence was irrelevant, was unduly 

prejudicial under Evidence Code section 352, and was inadmissible character 

evidence under Evidence Code section 1101, subdivision (a). “ ‘We review 

claims regarding a trial court’s ruling on the admissibility of evidence for 

abuse of discretion.’ ” (People v. Henriquez (2017) 4 Cal.5th 1, 31.) “ ‘ “Under 

the abuse of discretion standard, ‘a trial court’s ruling will not be disturbed, 

and reversal . . . is not required, unless the trial court exercised its discretion 

in an arbitrary, capricious, or patently absurd manner that resulted in a 

7 Based on the context, in stating “I find the probative value does not 

substantially outweigh the prejudicial effect,” the trial court plainly misspoke 

and intended to state the opposite, namely, that the prejudicial effect does 

not substantially outweigh the probative value. 

8 In this instance, the off-the-record discussion was not later described 

for the record.
19

manifest miscarriage of justice.’ ” ’ ” (People v. Chhoun (2021) 11 Cal.5th 1, 

26 (Chhoun).)

3. Castillo-Lopez Failed to Preserve Certain of His Evidentiary 

Challenges

Before turning to a discussion of whether the trial court abused its 

discretion, we must first examine whether Castillo-Lopez sufficiently 

preserved each of his evidentiary challenges. To preserve an evidentiary

challenge for appeal, counsel must raise in the trial court an objection on the

specific ground asserted on appeal. (People v. Rundle (2008) 43 Cal.4th 76, 

116 [“ ‘Evidence Code section 353, subdivision (a) allows a judgment to be 

reversed because of erroneous admission of evidence only if an objection to 

the evidence or a motion to strike it was “timely made and so stated as to 

make clear the specific ground of the objection.” Pursuant to this statute, 

“ ‘we have consistently held that the “defendant’s failure to make a timely 

and specific objection” on the ground asserted on appeal makes that ground

not cognizable.’ ” ’ ”]; People v. Dykes (2009) 46 Cal.4th 731, 756 [“trial 

counsel’s failure to object to claimed evidentiary error on the same ground

asserted on appeal results in a forfeiture of the issue on appeal”].) 

“ ‘Although no “particular form of objection” is required, the objection must 

“fairly inform the trial court, as well as the party offering the evidence, of the 

specific reason or reasons the objecting party believes the evidence should be 

excluded, so the party offering the evidence can respond appropriately and 

the court can make a fully informed ruling.” ’ ” (People v. Valdez (2012) 55 

Cal.4th 82, 130.) An objection based on relevance and the unduly prejudicial 

nature of evidence is usually not sufficient to preserve an appellate challenge 

on the ground that the evidence is inadmissible under Evidence Code 

section 1101, subdivision (a). (Valdez, at p. 130, and cases cited therein.)
20

Here, with respect to evidence about the piece of metal wire, defense 

counsel’s only objections were based on relevance and undue prejudice. 

Therefore, defense counsel did not preserve an appellate argument that the 

evidence should have been excluded as inadmissible character evidence under 

Evidence Code section 1101, subdivision (a). With respect to evidence that 

Castillo-Lopez was peering into parked cars, defense counsel’s only objection 

was based on relevance. Thus, as to that evidence, he failed to preserve an 

appellate argument under either Evidence Code section 1101, subdivision (a) 

or Evidence Code section 352. 

Castillo-Lopez argues that despite defense counsel’s failure to preserve 

an objection premised on Evidence Code section 1101, subdivision (a), defense 

counsel was excused from doing so because any such objection would have 

been futile. Castillo-Lopez relies on People v. Gomez (2018) 6 Cal.5th 243, 

286-287, which held that although, at trial, defense counsel may have 

objected only on the basis of Evidence Code section 352 to the trial court’s 

admission of evidence that the defendant refused to come to court on one 

morning of trial, defense counsel previously raised extensive objections to 

that evidence during court hearings, which the trial court overruled in a 

manner indicating that it “would have rejected any objection to the 

testimony.” (Gomez, at p. 287.) Applying a futility analysis as in Gomez, 

Castillo-Lopez argues that because the trial court overruled his relevance

objections to the evidence, it would have also overruled his objections under 

Evidence Code section 1101, subdivision (a). As we will explain, the 

argument lacks merit.

Castillo-Lopez’s proposed challenge is based on Evidence Code section 

1101, subdivision (a), which states that unless an exception applies, “evidence 

of a person’s character or a trait of his or her character . . . is inadmissible 
21

when offered to prove his or her conduct on a specified occasion.” (§ 1101, 

subd. (a).) Specifically, Castillo-Lopez contends that evidence he possessed a 

burglary tool and was peering into cars constitutes evidence of uncharged 

“other crimes” amounting to impermissible character evidence, the admission 

of which is governed by Evidence Code section 1101, subdivision (a). (People 

v. Catlin (2001) 26 Cal.4th 81, 145 [“Section 1101 prohibits the admission of 

other-crimes evidence for the purpose of showing the defendant’s bad 

character or criminal propensity”].) As Castillo-Lopez points out, under 

subdivision (b) of section 1101, evidence of a person’s other crimes that would 

otherwise be inadmissible under subdivision (a) may be admitted if “relevant 

to prove some fact (such as motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, 

knowledge, identity, absence of mistake or accident . . .) other than [the 

person’s] disposition to commit such an act.” (§ 1101, subd. (b).) CastilloLopez observes that the trial court overruled his relevance objections to the 

challenged evidence by relying on the concept of intent, explaining that “it 

does go partly to the state of the mind of Mr. Castillo-Lopez in terms of his 

intent to permanently deprive property from someone, whether it be through 

a robbery or through a burglary.” (Italics added.) Based on the trial court’s 

reference to intent in overruling his relevance objection, Castillo-Lopez

argues that it would have been futile for defense counsel to raise an objection 

under Evidence Code section 1101, subdivision (a), because the trial court 

would have found the evidence to fall under the exception in Evidence Code 

section 1101, subdivision (b) for evidence of other crimes that are relevant to 

prove intent. 

This argument fails because two different standards apply for 

(1) determining that evidence meets the minimal standards of relevancy 

because it has a tendency to prove intent, and (2) finding that the exception 
22

in Evidence Code section 1101, subdivision (b) applies. The test for the 

relevancy of evidence is not very demanding. “ ‘Relevant evidence’ means 

evidence . . . having any tendency in reason to prove or disprove any disputed 

fact that is of consequence to the determination of the action.” (Evid. Code, 

§ 210.) In contrast, case law requires courts to apply a more demanding 

analysis in deciding whether an uncharged crime may be admitted for the 

purpose of showing intent under Evidence Code section 1101, subdivision (b). 

“ ‘In order to be admissible to prove intent, the uncharged conduct must be 

sufficiently similar to support the inference that the defendant “ ‘probably

harbor[ed] the same intent in each instance.’ ” ’ ” (People v. Foster (2010) 50 

Cal.4th 1301, 1328, italics added.) This approach is based on the recognition 

that “ ‘ “ ‘ “if a person acts similarly in similar situations, he probably harbors 

the same intent in each instance” . . . . The inference to be drawn is not that 

the actor is disposed to commit such acts; instead, the inference to be drawn 

is that, in light of the first event, the actor, at the time of the second event, 

must have had the intent attributed to him by the prosecution.’ ” ’ ” (Chhoun, 

supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 27.) 

Accordingly, here, the trial court’s determination that the challenged 

evidence was relevant to the issue of intent does not mean that it would have 

ruled the evidence met the more demanding requirements under Evidence 

Code section 1101, subdivision (b), had defense counsel asserted an objection 

under Evidence Code section 1101, subdivision (a). We therefore reject 

Castillo-Lopez’s argument that defense counsel was excused from raising an 

objection under Evidence Code section 1101, subdivision (a) because it would 

have been futile to do so.
23

4. With Respect to the Evidentiary Rulings Properly Before Us, the 

Trial Court Did Not Abuse Its Discretion

Turning to the evidentiary challenges that are properly before us, we 

first examine whether the trial court abused its discretion in overruling 

defense counsel’s objections to the evidence about the piece of metal wire—a 

possible burglary tool—that Castillo-Lopez held in his hand when he was 

arrested. Castillo-Lopez argues the evidence was irrelevant because “[t]he 

attempted robbery in this case had nothing to do with breaking into a lock or 

starting a car ignition,” and there was no evidence that he did anything to 

tamper with the car where M.M. placed her purse. The argument lacks 

merit. A central factual dispute at trial was whether Castillo-Lopez

approached M.M. with the intent to take her purse, or, in contrast, whether 

M.M. misunderstood his intentions. As the trial court reasonably concluded, 

evidence that Castillo-Lopez had a burglary tool in his possession during the 

incident is relevant because it has some “tendency in reason to prove” (Evid. 

Code, § 210) that Castillo-Lopez was walking around the neighborhood with 

the intention of stealing property, and that M.M. therefore correctly 

understood that he wanted to take her purse. 

Further, the trial court also reasonably overruled the objection made 

under Evidence Code section 352 that it would be unduly prejudicial to admit 

evidence about the piece of metal wire. Pursuant to Evidence Code 

section 352, “[t]he court in its discretion may exclude evidence if its probative 

value is substantially outweighed by the probability that its admission will 

(a) necessitate undue consumption of time or (b) create substantial danger of 

undue prejudice, of confusing the issues, or of misleading the jury.” (Id.)

“ ‘Evidence is substantially more prejudicial than probative . . . only if, 

broadly stated, it poses an intolerable “risk to the fairness of the proceedings 
24

or the reliability of the outcome.” ’ ” (People v. Tran (2011) 51 Cal.4th 1040, 

1047, brackets omitted.) “ ‘ “The ‘prejudice’ referred to in Evidence Code 

section 352 applies to evidence which uniquely tends to evoke an emotional 

bias against the defendant as an individual and which has very little effect on 

the issues. In applying section 352, ‘prejudicial’ is not synonymous with 

‘damaging.’ ” [Citation.]’. . . . [E]vidence should be excluded as unduly 

prejudicial when it is of such nature as to inflame the emotions of the jury, 

motivating them to use the information, not to logically evaluate the point 

upon which it is relevant, but to reward or punish one side because of the 

jurors’ emotional reaction.” (People v. Scott (2011) 52 Cal.4th 452, 491.) 

Applying these standards here, as we have explained, evidence that CastilloLopez had a piece of metal wire that could have been a burglary tool did have 

probative value to a disputed issue. Weighed against that probative value, 

the possession of a piece of metal wire is a relatively innocuous fact and is 

therefore not the type of evidence that is especially prejudicial in that it

“ ‘ “uniquely tends to evoke an emotional bias against the defendant” ’ ” or 

that “is of such nature as to inflame the emotions of the jury.” (Ibid.) 

Accordingly, we find no merit to the contention that the trial court abused its 

discretion in overruling the objection based on Evidence Code section 352. 

We also find no merit to Castillo-Lopez’s challenge to the trial court’s 

admission, over defense counsel’s relevance objection, of testimony that he

was peering into parked cars as he walked away from the scene of the 

attempted robbery. Like the evidence that Castillo-Lopez possessed a 

possible burglary tool, evidence that he was stopping to look into parked 

cars—presumably to determine their contents—is evidence that CastilloLopez was walking through the neighborhood with the intent to steal 

something, and that M.M. thus correctly understood that he wanted to take 
25

her purse. Further, the testimony from M.M.’s sister about Castillo-Lopez’s

actions as he walked away in the distance was relevant to Castillo-Lopez’s 

level of intoxication—an issue that the jury was instructed it could consider 

in connection with the attempted robbery count. Specifically, M.M.’s sister 

explained that at the same time she watched Castillo-Lopez stopping to peer 

into parked cars, she also saw him stumbling and not walking straight. The 

trial court could reasonably conclude that the jury should hear a complete 

description of what M.M.’s sister saw as she watched Castillo-Lopez in the 

distance if it was going to use that testimony to assess Castillo-Lopez’s level 

of intoxication. 

C. The Trial Court Properly Denied the Request to Instruct on Brandishing 

as a Lesser Included Offense to Attempted Robbery

We next consider Castillo-Lopez’s contention that the trial court erred 

by denying his request to instruct on misdemeanor brandishing (§ 417, subd. 

(a)(1)) as a lesser included offense to attempted robbery. The Penal Code 

describes the crime of brandishing as follows: “Every person who, except in 

self-defense, in the presence of any other person, draws or exhibits any 

deadly weapon whatsoever, other than a firearm, in a rude, angry, or 

threatening manner, or who in any manner, unlawfully uses a deadly weapon 

other than a firearm in any fight or quarrel is guilty of a misdemeanor . . . .” 

(§ 417, subd. (a)(1).)

“ ‘An instruction on a lesser included offense must be given . . . if there 

is substantial evidence from which a jury could reasonably conclude that the 

defendant committed the lesser, uncharged offense, but not the greater, 

charged offense.’ . . . ‘On appeal, we review independently the question 

whether the trial court improperly failed to instruct on a lesser included 

offense.’ ” (People v. Nelson (2016) 1 Cal.5th 513, 538.) The trial court denied 

defense counsel’s request to instruct on brandishing as a lesser included 
26

offense because it determined that the crime of brandishing did not qualify as 

a lesser included offense of attempted robbery. As we will explain, we agree 

with the trial court’s conclusion.

“To determine if an offense is lesser and necessarily included in another 

offense for this purpose, we apply either the elements test or the accusatory 

pleading test. ‘Under the elements test, if the statutory elements of the 

greater offense include all of the statutory elements of the lesser offense, the 

latter is necessarily included in the former. Under the accusatory pleading 

test, if the facts actually alleged in the accusatory pleading include all of the 

elements of the lesser offense, the latter is necessarily included in the 

former.’ ” (People v. Shockley (2013) 58 Cal.4th 400, 404 (Shockley).)

Castillo-Lopez does not dispute that, under the elements test, 

brandishing is not a lesser included offense of attempted robbery. This is 

because the force or fear necessary to commit attempted robbery can be 

supplied by an act other than brandishing a weapon.9 

Castillo-Lopez argues, however, that brandishing qualifies as a lesser 

included offense under the “expanded accusatory pleading test” employed by 

the Sixth District in People v. Ortega (2015) 240 Cal.App.4th 956, 967-970

(Ortega). Normally, the accusatory pleading test looks only at the accusatory 

pleading itself to determine whether the facts actually alleged include all of 

the elements of the lesser offense. (Shockley, supra, 58 Cal.4th at p. 404.) 

9 The jury was instructed with the following elements of robbery: “1. The 

defendant took property that was not his own; [¶] 2. The property was in the 

possession of another person; [¶] 3. The property was taken from the other 

person or her immediate presence; [¶] 4. The property was taken against that 

person’s will; [¶] 5. The defendant used force or fear to take the property or to 

prevent the person from resisting; [¶] AND [¶] 6. When the defendant used 

force or fear, he intended to deprive the owner of the property permanently.” 
27

However, Ortega set forth an “expanded accusatory pleading test” under 

which “[t]he evidence adduced at the preliminary hearing must be considered 

in applying the accusatory pleading test when the specific conduct supporting 

a holding order establishes that the charged offense necessarily encompasses 

a lesser offense.” (Ortega, at pp. 967-970.) 

It is undisputed that brandishing would not qualify as a lesser included 

offense of attempted robbery under the standard accusatory pleading test, as 

the charging document does not allege that Castillo-Lopez exhibited the 

machete in a rude, angry or threatening manner, and not in self-defense,

However, Castillo-Lopez contends that the opposite conclusion is required if 

Ortega’s expanded accusatory pleading test is applied. According to CastilloLopez, based on M.M.’s testimony at the preliminary hearing that CastilloLopez “exhibited the machete . . . in a way that scared her . . . , and her 

description of events [that] proved he didn’t act in self-defense,” he was “put 

. . . on notice that the attempted robbery’s force-or-fear element depended on 

conduct that established the lesser-included offense of misdemeanor 

brandishing.” 

We conclude that Castillo-Lopez’s argument is without merit because 

case law, including from this court, has uniformly rejected Ortega’s expanded 

accusatory pleading test. (People v. Alvarez (2019) 32 Cal.App.5th 781, 787

(Alvarez); People v. Macias (2018) 26 Cal.App.5th 957, 964; People v. Munoz

(2019) 31 Cal.App.5th 143, 158.) 

As we explained in Alvarez, supra, 32 Cal.App.5th 781, Ortega was 

wrongly decided because, among other things, it conflicts with our Supreme 

Court’s description of the accusatory pleading test. As our Supreme Court 

stated in People v. Montoya (2004) 33 Cal.4th 1031, 1036, “Consistent with 

the primary function of the accusatory pleading test—to determine whether a 
28

defendant is entitled to instruction on a lesser uncharged offense—we 

consider only the pleading for the greater offense.” Further, as we explained 

in Alvarez, “Montoya disapproved of People v. Rush (1993) 16 Cal.App.4th 20, 

which considered evidence from the preliminary hearing in applying the 

accusatory pleading test,” but “Ortega did not cite Montoya or attempt to 

reconcile its analysis.” (Alvarez, at p. 788.) As we concluded in Alvarez, “[a]s 

an intermediate appellate court, we are required to follow Supreme Court 

precedent” and thus “ ‘we are not to look beyond the language of the 

accusatory pleading itself in assessing lesser included offenses.’ ” (Ibid.)

We follow our opinion in Alvarez here, and we accordingly conclude 

that there is no merit to Castillo-Lopez’s contention that the jury should have 

been instructed with brandishing as a lesser included offense of attempted 

robbery based on the expanded accusatory pleading test. 

D. The Trial Court Did Not Err by Failing to Instruct That the Jury Could 

Consider Voluntary Intoxication in Deciding Whether Castillo-Lopez

Resisted, Delayed or Obstructed a Peace Officer

Castillo-Lopez next contends that the trial court should have instructed 

the jury that it could consider voluntary intoxication when determining 

whether he committed the crime of resisting, delaying or obstructing a peace 

officer. (§ 148, subd. (a)(1).)10

We begin with the factual and procedural background relevant to the 

issue. At trial, the jury heard evidence to support a finding that CastilloLopez was intoxicated while committing the crimes with which he was 

10 Section 148, subdivision (a)(1) states, “Every person who willfully 

resists, delays, or obstructs any public officer, peace officer, or an emergency 

medical technician, . . . in the discharge or attempt to discharge any duty of 

his or her office or employment, when no other punishment is prescribed” is 

guilty of a misdemeanor.
29

charged. Specifically, M.M. testified that Castillo-Lopez appeared “very 

much” intoxicated during her interaction with him. M.M.’s sister described 

Castillo-Lopez as “drunk” and stated that when she watched Castillo-Lopez

walk away in the distance, he was stumbling and not walking straight. One 

of the police officers who arrested Castillo-Lopez stated that he saw some 

possible signs of either drug or alcohol intoxication, including Castillo-Lopez’s

nonsensical statements, glassy watery eyes, erratic and agitated behavior, 

and rapid speech. A second police officer testified that, initially, CastilloLopez was acting “a little crazy, a little erratic” which could have been a sign 

of intoxication, but the officer did not note any signs of intoxication once 

Castillo-Lopez was handcuffed. He also noted that Castillo-Lopez was able to 

understand and respond to questions. 

During motions in limine, defense counsel requested an instruction on 

voluntary intoxication. At the close of the evidence, the trial court and 

counsel held a conference on jury instructions, at which the trial court 

indicated that it would instruct with CALCRIM No. 3426 regarding voluntary 

intoxication as requested by defense counsel. However, during the 

conference, defense counsel clarified that he believed voluntary intoxication 

was relevant only to attempted robbery as charged in count 1, and not to the 

charge in count 2 that Castillo-Lopez resisted, delayed or obstructed a peace 

officer in violation of section 148, subdivision (a)(1). The trial court indicated 

that it would modify CALCRIM No. 3426 by stating that voluntary 

intoxication was not a defense to count 2. Specifically, the court and defense 

counsel engaged in the following discussion:

“THE COURT: All right. Number 3426, voluntary intoxication.

“[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: I think it’s not a defense to the 148.
30

“THE COURT: Okay. I’m just going to say Count 2, period. Is 

that all right?

“[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: Yes.” 

The jury was therefore instructed as follows regarding voluntary 

intoxication:

“• You may consider evidence, if any, of the defendant’s voluntary

intoxication only in a limited way. You may consider that 

evidence only in deciding whether the defendant acted or failed to 

act with specific intent to permanently deprive a person of their 

property.

“• A person is voluntarily intoxicated if he becomes intoxicated by

willingly using any intoxicating drug, drink, or other substance

knowing that it could produce an intoxicating effect, or willingly

assuming the risk of that effect.

“• In connection with the charge of Count 1, and the lesser 

included charge of Larceny the People have the burden of proving 

beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant acted with specific 

intent. If the People have not met this burden, you must find the 

defendant not guilty of Count 1 and the lesser included charge of 

Larceny.

“• You may not consider evidence of voluntary intoxication for 

any other purpose.

“• Voluntary intoxication is not a defense to Count 2.” 

Castillo-Lopez contends that this instruction was legally incorrect 

because the jury should also have been permitted to consider voluntary 

intoxication in connection with count 2. Specifically, Castillo-Lopez contends 

that voluntary intoxication could be considered in determining whether he

had actual knowledge that the person he was resisting, delaying or 

obstructing was a peace officer. 
31

As an initial matter, we note that although defense counsel requested 

that count 2 be omitted from the voluntary intoxication instruction, CastilloLopez’s challenge to the instruction is nevertheless cognizable on appeal. “A 

trial court has no sua sponte duty to instruct on the relevance of intoxication, 

but if it does instruct, as the court here did, it has to do so correctly.” (People 

v. Mendoza (1998) 18 Cal.4th 1114, 1134.) “We may review the validity of an 

instruction initially requested by the defense where counsel’s actions in 

seeking or not objecting to the instruction constitutes simply neglect or 

mistake. [Citation.] The trial court does have a duty to correctly instruct the 

jury on principles of law relevant to issues raised by the evidence in a 

criminal case.” (People v. Hernandez (1988) 47 Cal.3d 315, 353, italics 

added.) The doctrine of invited error holds that a “defendant may not be 

entitled to challenge a requested instruction where the record clearly reflects 

that counsel had a deliberate tactical purpose in requesting it.” (Ibid., italics 

added.) However, “[t]he invited error doctrine will not preclude appellate 

review if the record fails to show counsel had a tactical reason for requesting 

or acquiescing in the instruction.” (People v. Moon (2005) 37 Cal.4th 1, 28.) 

Here, as the record does not suggest any deliberate tactical purpose for 

defense counsel’s request to omit count 2 from the voluntary intoxication 

instruction, we will review the instruction for legal error. 

There are two fundamental premises to Castillo-Lopez’s argument that 

the jury should have been instructed to consider voluntary intoxication in 

determining whether he resisted, delayed or obstructed an officer in violation 

of section 148, subdivision (a)(1). 

First, relying primarily on this court’s decision in People v. Reyes (1997) 

52 Cal.App.4th 975 (Reyes), Castillo-Lopez contends that a jury may consider 

voluntary intoxication if the offense at issue requires a finding that the 
32

defendant had actual knowledge when committing the crime. Specifically, 

Reyes held that for the crime of receiving stolen property, the jury could 

consider voluntary intoxication when deciding whether the defendant had 

actual knowledge that the property at issue was stolen. (Id. at pp. 985-986.)

While acknowledging that a recent opinion has cautioned against relying 

upon Reyes (People v. Berg (2018) 23 Cal.App.5th 959, 969), Castillo-Lopez

argues that Berg was wrongly decided and is not persuasive.11 As will 

become apparent, we need not further examine the validity of CastilloLopez’s first premise, or his reliance on Reyes, because his second premise is 

unsound.

As his second premise, Castillo-Lopez contends that, like the offense of 

receiving stolen property in Reyes, supra, 52 Cal.App.4th 975, the crime of 

resisting, delaying or obstructing an officer in violation of section 148, 

subdivision (a)(1) includes the element of actual knowledge. Specifically, he 

contends that the jury must find that the defendant had actual knowledge 

11 The purposes for which a jury may consider voluntary intoxication is 

governed by section 29.4, subdivision (b), which provides: “Evidence of 

voluntary intoxication is admissible solely on the issue of whether or not the 

defendant actually formed a required specific intent, or, when charged with 

murder, whether the defendant premeditated, deliberated, or harbored 

express malice aforethought.” As our Supreme Court explained in People v. 

Atkins (2001) 25 Cal.4th 76, “[e]vidence of voluntary intoxication is 

inadmissible to negate the existence of general criminal intent.” (Id. at 

p. 81.) “ ‘A crime is characterized as a “general intent” crime when the 

required mental state entails only an intent to do the act that causes the 

harm; a crime is characterized as a “specific intent” crime when the required 

mental state entails an intent to cause the resulting harm.’ ” (Id. at p. 86.) 

Reyes held that “with regard to the element of knowledge, receiving stolen 

property is a ‘specific intent crime,’ ” for the purpose of determining whether

evidence of voluntary intoxication is admissible. (Reyes, supra, 52 

Cal.App.4th at p. 985.)
33

that the person he or she was resisting, delaying or obstructing was a peace 

officer. 

However, that argument stands in opposition to the long-standing rule, 

first set forth in People v. Lopez (1986) 188 Cal.App.3d 592, 599 (Lopez), that 

instead of requiring actual knowledge, section 148, subdivision (a)(1) 

incorporates a knowledge requirement based on “that of actual knowledge or 

what a reasonable person should have known.” (Italics added.) As Lopez

explained, because the reasonable person standard is involved, “[t]his is an 

objective standard for measuring the knowledge of the actor,” not a subjective 

standard. (Ibid.) In the context of section 148, subdivision (a)(1), this 

standard has been cited in numerous subsequent cases (see, e.g., People v. 

Simons (1996) 42 Cal.App.4th 1100, 1108-1109; In re Muhammed C. (2002) 

95 Cal.App.4th 1325, 1329; In re Chase C. (2015) 243 Cal.App.4th 107, 113). 

It has also been endorsed by our Supreme Court. As stated in Yount v. City 

of Sacramento (2008) 43 Cal.4th 885, 894-895 (Yount), the “legal elements” of 

violating section 148, subdivision (a)(1), “are as follows: ‘ “(1) the defendant 

willfully resisted, delayed, or obstructed a peace officer, (2) when the officer 

was engaged in the performance of his or her duties, and (3) the defendant 

knew or reasonably should have known that the other person was a peace 

officer engaged in the performance of his or her duties.” ’ ” (Italics added.) 

The long-standing rule is reflected in CALCRIM No. 2656, which was given to 

the jury in this case. As that instruction states, the jury is required to find 

that “[w]hen the defendant acted, he knew or reasonably should have known, 

that [the officers] were police officers performing or attempting to perform 

their duties.” (Italics added.) 

Nevertheless, in advocating that we depart from the long-standing rule 

regarding the knowledge required for a violation of section 148, subdivision 
34

(a)(1), Castillo-Lopez relies on the Sixth District’s opinion in In re A.L. (2019) 

38 Cal.App.5th 15 (A.L.), which held that “[a] defendant’s actual knowledge 

that an officer is engaged in the performance of a duty is required by the 

plain language of . . . section[ ] . . . 148, subdivision (a)(1).” (A.L., at p. 25.) 

As A.L. observed, the language of the statute makes it a crime to “willfully

resist[ ], delay[ ], or obstruct[ ] any . . . peace officer . . . in the discharge or 

attempt to discharge any duty.” (§ 148, subd. (a)(1), italics added.) A.L.

reasoned as follows:

“Willfully is most naturally read as synonymous with knowingly, 

because ‘ “the term ‘willfully’ . . . imports a requirement that ‘the 

person knows what he is doing.’ ” ’ (People v. Garcia (2001) 25 

Cal.4th 744, 752 [(Garcia)], quoting People v. Honig (1996) 48 

Cal.App.4th 289, 334.) When ‘willfully’ is the mental state 

required for a crime, the perpetrator must have actual knowledge 

of the relevant facts. (In re Jerry R. (1994) 29 Cal.App.4th 1432, 

1437 [(Jerry R.)].) Therefore, . . . section 148, subdivision (a)(1) 

. . . requires that a defendant have actual knowledge he or she is 

resisting an officer in the performance of duty.” (A.L., at p. 22.)

The year after it was issued, A.L. was criticized and rejected by a

different panel of the Sixth District in People v. Mackreth (2020) 58 

Cal.App.5th 317. Mackreth explained that, for several reasons, “[a]pplication 

of the rules of statutory construction to section 148, subdivision (a)(1) 

inescapably leads to a conclusion that the Legislature did not intend for its 

use of the word ‘willfully’ here to create a requirement of ‘actual knowledge.’ ” 

First, the court explained, “the word ‘willfully’ is defined in the Penal Code, 

and its definition does not encompass a requirement of actual knowledge.” 

(Id. at p. 330.) Second, examining the legislative history of both section 148, 

subdivision (a)(1) and another similar statute that criminalizes resisting an 

officer (§ 69), the court noted that “simultaneously enacting these two related 

statutes in 1872 and using ‘willfully’ to describe the required mental state for 
35

a section 148 offense but ‘knowingly’ to describe the required mental state for 

a section 69 resisting offense, the Legislature clearly expressed its decision to 

require different mental states for the two offenses.” (Mackreth, at p. 331.) 

Third, the court found it significant that in 1997 the Legislature amended 

“section 148 to add subdivision (a)(2), which uses ‘knowingly and maliciously’ 

to describe the mental state required for the related offense of disrupting, 

impeding, or interfering with a police communication,” providing “further 

evidence of the Legislature’s recognition that ‘willfully’ in section 148, 

subdivision (a)(1) is not equivalent to actual knowledge.” (Mackreth, at 

p. 331.) Finally, looking again to the Legislature’s 1997 amendment, the 

court noted that because the amendment took place long after the court in 

Lopez, supra, 188 Cal.App.3d 592, held that section 148, subdivision (a)(1) did 

not require actual knowledge, the Legislature’s failure to alter the “willfully” 

language of section 148, subdivision (a)(1) in light of Lopez was “another 

strong indicator that the Legislature did not intend for a section 148, 

subdivision (a)(1) offense to require actual knowledge.” (Mackreth, at p. 332.) 

Mackreth then persuasively distinguished the cases upon which A.L.

relied for the rule that a statutory reference to “willfully” generally refers to 

actual knowledge. (Mackreth, supra, 58 Cal.App.5th at pp. 333-334 

[discussing Garcia, supra, 25 Cal.4th 744 & Jerry R., supra, 29 Cal.App.4th 

1432].) Mackreth concluded, “[b]ased on our application of the rules of 

statutory construction and our review of the statute’s legislative history, we 

hold that section 148, subdivision (a)(1) does not require actual knowledge. 

We therefore respectfully disagree with and decline to follow A.L.” 

(Mackreth, at p. 334.)

We find Mackreth’s analysis to be persuasive and we adopt it here. We 

will accordingly follow the long-standing approach under which section 148, 
36

subdivision (a)(1) does not require a finding that the defendant acted with 

actual knowledge that peace officers were involved. Instead, the proper 

inquiry is whether “ ‘ “the defendant knew or reasonably should have known 

that the other person was a peace officer engaged in the performance of his or 

her duties.” ’ ” (Yount, supra, 43 Cal.4th at p. 895.) 

As a result of this analysis, it is clear that the second premise of 

Castillo-Lopez’s argument fails because a defendant can violate section 148, 

subdivision (a)(1) without actual knowledge that a peace officer was the 

target of the resistance. Because one of the fundamental premises of 

Castillo-Lopez’s argument cannot stand, we reject his contention that the 

jury should have been instructed that it could consider voluntary intoxication 

when deciding whether Castillo-Lopez had the requisite state of mind for the 

charge of resisting, delaying or obstructing a peace officer in count 2.12

12 Castillo-Lopez relies upon the statement in People v. Moore (2018) 19 

Cal.App.5th 889, 894 that “the crime of resisting arrest requires the 

perpetrator to know the person they are resisting is an officer, and thus 

evidence of voluntary intoxication is admissible to show the defendant did not 

know.” Castillo-Lopez also cites People v. Quarles (2018) 25 Cal.App.5th 631, 

635, which quotes that language from Moore. However, the statements in

Moore and in Quarles were dicta, as neither case concerned the crime of 

resisting arrest. Moore was a prosecution for vandalism (Moore, at p. 893), 

and Quarles was a prosecution for damaging a telephone line or mechanical 

equipment connected to the line (Quarles, at p. 634). In support of its 

statement, Moore cited Lopez, supra, 188 Cal.App.3d at pages 599-600, and 

Reyes, supra, 52 Cal.App.4th at pages 985-986. Quarles, in turn, quoted 

Moore. (Quarles, at p. 635.) The cases cited by Moore plainly do not stand for 

the proposition that evidence of voluntary intoxication is admissible in a 

prosecution for resisting arrest in violation of section 148, subdivision (a)(1). 

We therefore assign no weight to the dicta in Moore and Quarles when 

analyzing whether the jury should have been instructed to consider voluntary 

intoxication in connection with count 2. 
37

E. Castillo-Lopez Is Entitled to Resentencing Due to Recent Legislation 

Generally Limiting Felony Probation to a Period of No More Than Two 

Years

The next issue is the impact of the Legislature’s recent enactment of 

Assembly Bill No. 1950 on the term of Castillo-Lopez’s probation.

At the time Castillo-Lopez was sentenced, section 1203.1, 

subdivision (a) provided that a court may impose felony probation “for a 

period of time not exceeding the maximum possible term of the sentence.” It 

further provided that “where the maximum possible term of the sentence is 

five years or less, then the period of suspension of imposition or execution of 

sentence may, in the discretion of the court, continue for not over five years.”

(Former § 1203.1, subd. (a).) Accordingly, the trial court ordered a three-year 

term of probation for Castillo-Lopez. 

During the pendency of this appeal, the Legislature enacted Assembly 

Bill No. 1950, which amended section 1203.1. (Stats. 2020, ch. 328, § 2.)

Subject to exceptions not applicable here, section 1203.1, subdivision (a), as 

amended, provides that a felony probation term cannot exceed two years. 

The provision now states, “The court, or judge thereof, in the order granting 

probation, may suspend the imposing or the execution of the sentence and 

may direct that the suspension may continue for a period of time not 

exceeding two years, and upon those terms and conditions as it shall 

determine.” (§ 1203.1, subd. (a).)

Castillo-Lopez argues that because his case is not yet final, under the 

principles of retroactivity applicable to ameliorative changes to the criminal 

law as set forth in In re Estrada (1965) 63 Cal.2d 740 (Estrada), he is entitled 

under Assembly Bill No. 1950 to have his term of probation reduced from 

three years to two years. The People explain that in light of several recent 

published decisions on the issue, they do not contest the application of the 
38

statutory amendment implemented by Assembly Bill No. 1950 to cases, like 

Castillo-Lopez’s, that are not yet final.

Based on this court’s opinion in People v. Sims (2021) 59 Cal.App.5th 

943 (Sims), we will retroactively apply Assembly Bill No. 1950 here. As we 

stated in Sims, “the two-year limitation on felony probation set forth in 

Assembly Bill No. 1950 is an ameliorative change to the criminal law that is 

subject to the Estrada presumption of retroactivity,” and “[t]herefore . . . the 

two-year limitation applies retroactively to all cases not reduced to final 

judgment as of the new law’s effective date.” (Sims, at p. 964.)

In Sims, instead of modifying the term of probation, we remanded for 

resentencing, stating that “defendant is entitled to seek a reduced probation 

term on remand under Assembly Bill No. 1950.” (Sims, supra, 59 

Cal.App.5th at p. 964.) We will follow the procedure employed in Sims, and 

we will therefore remand to the trial court with directions that Castillo-Lopez

be resentenced based on the current state of the law, as enacted by Assembly 

Bill No. 1950.

F. On Remand, the Trial Court May Expressly Consider Castillo-Lopez’s 

Inability to Pay the Fines and Fees Imposed on Him at Sentencing

The final issue is whether the trial court sufficiently considered 

Castillo-Lopez’s inability to pay when it imposed certain fines and fees at 

sentencing. As we will explain, because the record is unclear as to whether 

the trial court did so, we direct the trial court to expressly address the issue 

on remand.

We begin with the relevant proceedings in the trial court. At the 

sentencing hearing, defense counsel asked that the trial court take into 

account Castillo-Lopez’s inability to pay when imposing fines and fees: “Your 

Honor, prior to the incident, and prior to my client going into custody he was 

transient, living on the streets. He was not employed. Well, he did collect 
39

recyclables for spare change, Your Honor. However, at this time he does not 

have an ability to pay. I’d ask the court to take that into consideration when 

ordering fines and fees in this case.” 

The trial court did not conduct any further inquiry into Castillo-Lopez’s 

ability to pay, but it mentioned inability to pay when identifying one of the 

fees at issue. Specifically, the trial court first identified the fines it was 

imposing: “[a] restitution fine of $300, which is the minimum,” together with 

an administration fee of $30 and a suspended probation revocation 

restitution fine of $300. The trial court then went on to describe the fees it 

was imposing. “A court security fee of $40 is imposed pursuant to section 

1465.8 of the Penal Code. The additional security fee is waived by the court. 

A criminal conviction assessment of $30 is imposed pursuant to section 

7[0]373 of the Government Code. The additional $30 is waived by the court. 

You’re ordered to pay a $129.75 criminal justice administration fee. In fact, 

the court is going to strike that particular fee in light of your inability to pay. 

A presentence investigation fee, however, will be ordered in the amount of 

$100. That’s imposed pursuant to section 1203.1(b) of the Penal Code. And a 

probation supervision fee of $30 per month is also ordered, and that’s 

imposed pursuant to section 1203.1(b) of the Penal Code.” (Italics added.) 

In Dueñas, supra, 30 Cal.App.5th 1157, the court held that “due process 

of law requires the trial court to conduct an ability to pay hearing and 

ascertain a defendant’s present ability to pay before it imposes court facilities 

and court operations assessments under . . . section 1465.8 and Government 

Code section 70373” and that, “although . . . section 1202.4 bars consideration 

of a defendant’s ability to pay unless the judge is considering increasing the 

fee over the statutory minimum, the execution of any restitution fine imposed 

under this statute must be stayed unless and until the trial court holds an 
40

ability to pay hearing and concludes that the defendant has the present 

ability to pay the restitution fine.” (Dueñas, at p. 1164.) Numerous 

subsequent cases have addressed the issues presented in Dueñas, and the 

validity of Dueñas will be decided by our Supreme Court in currently pending 

cases. (E.g., People v. Kopp, 38 Cal.App.5th 47, review granted Nov. 13, 2019, 

S257844.) 

Castillo-Lopez contends that, based on the due process considerations 

discussed in Dueñas, supra, 30 Cal.App.5th 1157, the trial court should not

have imposed any of the fines and fees on him unless it concluded that he had

an ability to pay them.13 The People do not address whether they agree with 

Dueñas’s holding that principles of due process apply when determining 

whether fees should be reduced or stricken based on inability to pay. Instead, 

without addressing their position on Dueñas with respect to the imposition of 

fees, the People contend that the record shows that the trial court did

consider Castillo-Lopez’s ability to pay when imposing the fees. 

Turning to the issue of the restitution fine, the People agree that 

inability to pay is relevant when fines are imposed, but only as one 

component of an analysis conducted under the excessive fines clause of the 

Eighth Amendment. Indeed, “California courts have . . . held that ability to 

pay is relevant to excessiveness, and they have done so in applying both the 

Eighth Amendment and article I, section 17 of the California Constitution.” 

(People v. Cowan, 47 Cal.App.5th 32, 47, review granted June 17, 2020, 

13 Castillo-Lopez was sentenced on December 16, 2019. Dueñas was filed 

January 8, 2019. The Supreme Court granted review in Kopp on November 

13, 2019. (Kopp, supra, 38 Cal.App.5th 47, review granted Nov. 13, 2019, 

S257844.) Thus, the trial court would likely have been aware that when 

defense counsel cited Castillo-Lopez’s inability to pay, he was invoking the 

principles set forth in Dueñas and subsequent case law.
41

S261952 [citing People ex rel. Lockyer v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co. (2005) 37 

Cal.4th 707, 728].) 

Based on our review of the record, it is unclear whether the trial court 

applied the constitutional principles set forth in Dueñas, supra, 30 

Cal.App.5th 1157 and subsequent case law when considering whether 

Castillo-Lopez’s inability to pay should result in certain fines and fees being 

reduced or stricken. Indeed, we note that the only fee that the trial court 

struck based on inability to pay was the criminal justice administration fee 

referred to in former Government Code section 29550.2. However, that 

statute expressly permitted a court to decline to impose the fee based on the 

defendant’s inability to pay, stating that “[i]f the person has the ability to pay, 

a judgment of conviction shall contain an order for payment of the amount of 

the criminal justice administration fee by the convicted person.” (Former 

Gov. Code, § 29550.2, subd. (a).) Accordingly, it is possible that the trial 

court may have limited its consideration of inability to pay to those statutes 

that expressly authorize such an approach, rather than also considering the 

constitutional principles discussed in Dueñas and subsequent case law. 

As we are unable to determine whether the trial court took into account 

the constitutional principles discussed in Dueñas, supra, 30 Cal.App.5th 1157 

and subsequent case law, we will direct that, on remand, the trial court 

should expressly consider the current case law governing the issues raised by 

Dueñas, receive any relevant updated evidence regarding Castillo-Lopez’s 

financial condition, and based thereon, expressly decide whether any of the 

fines or fees should be reduced or stricken based on an inability to pay. 
42

DISPOSITION

The true finding on the one-year enhancement for personally using a 

deadly or dangerous weapon is reversed. This matter is remanded with 

directions that the trial court (1) resentence Castillo-Lopez consistent with 

the two-year limitation on terms of felony probation set forth in the current 

version of section 1203.1, subdivision (a); and (2) expressly decide, based on 

the constitutional principles discussed in Dueñas, supra, 30 Cal.App.5th 1157 

and subsequent case law, whether to reduce or strike certain of the fines and 

fees it imposed at sentencing in light of Castillo-Lopez’s inability to pay. In 

all other respects, the judgment is affirmed.

IRION, J.

WE CONCUR:

HUFFMAN, Acting P. J.

O'ROURKE, J.