NONPRECEDENTIAL DISPOSITION

To be cited only in accordance with Fed. R. App. P. 32.1

United States Court of Appeals

For the Seventh Circuit

Chicago, Illinois 60604

Argued September 10, 2014

Decided September 24, 2014

Before

DIANE P. WOOD, Chief Judge

FRANK H. EASTERBROOK, Circuit Judge

JOHN DANIEL TINDER, Circuit Judge

No. 13-3627

LUCIAN R. DEAN,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

v.

CAROLYN W. COLVIN, Acting Commissioner

of Social Security,

Defendant-Appellee.

Appeal from the United 

States District Court for the 

Southern District of Indiana, 

Indianapolis Division.

No. 1:12-cv-00509-TWP-MJD

Tanya Walton Pratt, Judge.

Order

Lucian Dean’s application for Social Security disability benefits was denied, and a 

district judge concluded that the agency’s decision is supported by substantial evidence 

and free from procedural error. The district court’s thorough opinion covers the important issues, and we add only a few words about the main appellate argument.

Dean contends that the ALJ violated the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment by doing research on the Internet about the sort of jobs he had held, and in particular about his experiences in rappelling and as a guide of rafting tours. To the extent 

that the ALJ wanted to find out what rappelling is, and similar matters of “legislative 
No. 13-3627 Page 2

fact,” there is no greater problem in doing research on the Internet than in more traditional ways, such as reading books or magazines. Judges do not violate the Constitution 

by consulting their own funds of knowledge about the world, or by augmenting that 

knowledge. This court does so regularly. No judge is required to approach a case in 

complete ignorance. An open mind is required; an empty mind is not. See Liteky v. United States, 510 U.S. 540 (1994).

Nor do judges (under either Article I or Article III) violate the Constitution by learning “adjudicative facts” about the litigants in pending cases—though judges must put 

in the record what they believe they have learned and permit the litigants to reply. The 

ALJ did just that. Dean says that his mental condition prevents him from dealing adequately with surprises, such as the statements the ALJ made about what she had found. 

But Dean was represented by counsel, who neither objected nor asked for a continuance 

to allow the presentation of additional evidence. Dean’s current lawyer does not contend that the lawyer who represented him at the hearing was unable to cope with surprises; no one with such a limitation should represent a client at a trial or a hearing.

The Social Security Administration discourages but does not prohibit ALJs from 

making factual inquiries before or after a hearing. See Social Security Administration, 

Hearings, Appeals and Litigation Law Manual (HALLEX) I-2-5-1 (“If the claimant does not 

provide medical or other evidence ... the ALJ will generally make a decision based on 

the evidence in the record, including evidence the ALJ has obtained directly.”). Dean 

does not contend that any regulation, or even a statement in the HALLEX manual, unconditionally forbids gathering information on the Internet, so we need not decide 

whether the manual, which is designated as a guide rather than a regulation, establishes 

rights enforceable by claimants. Dean cites HALLEX I-2-5-69, which was amended after 

his hearing to limit ALJs’ use of the Internet, but does not contend that it is retroactive. 

That’s another reason why we need not decide whether it creates rights that litigants 

can enforce in court.

In this case, as in most other administrative proceedings, statutes and regulations offer the claimant a better chance of success than does a generic appeal to due process. 

See, e.g., Portillo-Rendon v. Holder, 662 F.3d 815 (7th Cir. 2011). The statutory question 

here is whether the record, including the additions made by the ALJ, supplies substantial evidence for the decision. The district court’s evaluation shows that the answer is 

yes. The regulation most helpful to Dean is 20 C.F.R. §404.940, which requires ALJs to 

recuse themselves when prejudiced. As Liteky shows, however, knowing facts about a 

litigant differs from prejudice.

AFFIRMED