J-S19022-22

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA

v.

PATRICK HORAN 

Appellant

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 IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

 PENNSYLVANIA

 No. 2363 EDA 2021

Appeal from the PCRA Order Entered October 15, 2021

In the Court of Common Pleas of Northampton County Criminal Division 

at No(s): CP-48-CR-0002868-2006

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA

v.

PATRICK HORAN 

Appellant

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 IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

 PENNSYLVANIA

 No. 2364 EDA 2021

Appeal from the PCRA Order Entered October 15, 2021

In the Court of Common Pleas of Northampton County Criminal Division 

at No(s): CP-48-CR-0002881-2006

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA

v.

PATRICK HORAN 

Appellant

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 IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

 PENNSYLVANIA

 No. 2426 EDA 2021

Appeal from the PCRA Order Entered October 15, 2021

In the Court of Common Pleas of Northampton County Criminal Division 

at No(s): CP-48-CR-0002572-2006
J-S19022-22

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BEFORE: PANELLA, P.J., OLSON, J., and STEVENS, P.J.E.*

MEMORANDUM BY OLSON, J.: FILED AUGUST 8, 2022

Appellant, Patrick Horan, appeals from the order entered on October 15, 

2021, dismissing as untimely his petition to enforce a plea agreement 

pursuant to Post Conviction Relief Act (PCRA), 42 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 9541-9546.

1

 

Upon careful consideration, we affirm.

We summarize the facts and procedural history pertinent to this appeal 

as follows. On May 16, 2007, as the result of two separate criminal incidents, 

Appellant pled guilty but mentally ill to aggravated indecent assault, criminal 

attempt to commit rape, aggravated assault, stalking, burglary, criminal 

attempt to commit burglary, criminal trespass, and loitering and prowling at 

night.2 On August 31, 2007, the trial court sentenced Appellant to 

consecutive, standard range sentences totaling an aggregate term of 

incarceration of 39 years and ten months to 78 years and eight months. 

Moreover, based upon an assessment by the Sexual Offender Assessment 

Board, the trial court deemed Appellant a sexually violent predator (SVP). 

This Court affirmed Appellant’s judgment of sentence in an unpublished 

memorandum on March 15, 2012. See Commonwealth v. Horan, 947 A.3d 

____________________________________________

* Former Justice specially assigned to the Superior Court.

1

 As will be discussed at length below, however, Appellant’s petition did not, 

in fact, arise under the PCRA because it did not raise collateral claims.

2 18 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 3125 (aggravated indecent assault), 901 (criminal 

attempt), 3121 (rape), 2702 (aggravated assault), 2709 (stalking), 3502 

(burglary), 3503 (trespass), and 5506 (loitering and prowling at night).
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1245 (Pa. Super. 2012) (unpublished memorandum). Our Supreme Court 

denied further review. See Commonwealth v. Horan, 76 A.3d 539 (Pa. 

2013).

On August 19, 2014, Appellant filed a pro se PCRA petition alleging 

ineffective assistance of trial counsel. The PCRA court appointed counsel to 

represent Appellant. On October 2, 2014, the PCRA court vacated the original 

plea and sentence and accepted “a negotiated, universal resolution that 

included a new guilty plea with a sentence bargain.” Trial Court Opinion, 

10/15/2021, at 5, see also N.T., 10/2/2014, at 4-6. More specifically, the 

PCRA court “accepted the negotiated resolution for the entry of a nolo 

contendere” plea and modified Appellant’s aggregate sentence to 26 to 52 

years of imprisonment pursuant to an agreement between Appellant and the 

Commonwealth.

On August 15, 2018, Appellant filed a subsequent PCRA petition. The 

PCRA court dismissed the petition as untimely and without exception to the 

PCRA time bar. We quashed the appeal by judgment order and Appellant did 

not seek further review with our Supreme Court. See Commonwealth v. 

Horan, 2019 WL 2323813 (Pa. Super. 2019).

On April 16, 2020, Appellant filed a civil petition for injunctive relief. 

More specifically, after being transferred to the State Correctional Institution 

(SCI) at Camp Hill, Appellant requested “he be transferred or housed in a 

different ‘therapeutic environment’ within” the Department of Corrections

(DOC), asserting that Camp Hill could not address his mental health treatment 
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needs. Trial Court Opinion, 10/15/2021, at 7. On April 23, 2020, the trial 

court dismissed Appellant’s petition for lack of jurisdiction, because the trial 

court concluded that “original jurisdiction was with the Pennsylvania 

Commonwealth Court.” Id. at 8. Appellant thereafter filed an appeal with the 

Commonwealth Court.

On July 30, 2021, the Commonwealth Court issued an unpublished, per 

curiam memorandum opinion, remanding the case to the trial court, with the 

following analysis and instructions:

The trial court in this matter did not dismiss the [p]etition based 

on a determination that the Commonwealth Court, as the 

appropriate court of review, would under no circumstances be able 

to grant [Appellant’s] requested relief. Instead, the trial court 

dismissed the action based solely on a determination that 

jurisdiction properly lay with the Commonwealth Court. Dismissal 

of the matter by the trial court for this reason alone was error. In 

the absence of a determination by the trial court that the proper 

court could not have granted the relief sought by [Appellant]

based on an evaluation of the underlying claims, the proper action 

was not to dismiss the matter, but rather to transfer the matter 

to the appropriate court for determination, which was, regarding 

the claims concerning the DOC's administrative decision to 

transfer [Appellant], the Commonwealth Court. See 42 Pa.C.S.A. 

§ 5103 [(addressing transfers of erroneously filed matters and 

stating, “If an appeal or other matter is taken to or brought in a 

court or magisterial district of this Commonwealth which does not 

have jurisdiction of the appeal or other matter, the court or 

magisterial district judge shall not quash such appeal or dismiss 

the matter, but shall transfer the record thereof to the proper 

tribunal of this Commonwealth, where the appeal or other matter 

shall be treated as if originally filed in the transferee tribunal on 

the date when the appeal or other matter was first filed in a court 

or magisterial district of this Commonwealth.”)]. Because the trial 

court erred, therefore, [the Commonwealth Court] vacate[d] the 

trial court's April 23, 2020 order dismissing the [p]etition and 

remand[ed] the matter to the trial court for further action.
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[The Commonwealth Court] note[d], however, that [it could not] 

discern from the [p]etition whether [Appellant] simply 

complain[ed] of the DOC's decision to transfer him, or whether 

instead he also raise[d] a separate claim that he ha[d] been 

denied the benefit of the sentence imposed as a result of his guilty 

plea, which would require a determination of whether the alleged 

plea agreement/sentence term actually formed a part of the plea 

agreement and sentence imposed. See Commonwealth v. 

Martinez, 147 A.3d 517, 533 (Pa. 2016) (noting that, a convicted 

criminal is entitled to specific performance of the terms of a guilty 

plea where a court determines that the alleged term is part of the 

parties’ plea agreement). The trial court's criminal division, not 

civil division, [was] the appropriate court in which to determine 

such a claim. See id.

* * *

Because [the Commonwealth Court found] the trial court 

improperly dismissed the [p]etition for the sole reason that 

jurisdiction over the claims therein properly lay with 

[Commonwealth] Court, [it] vacate[d] the trial court's April 23, 

2020 order dismissing the [p]etition for lack of jurisdiction. 

Further, [the Commonwealth Court] remand[ed the matter] to the 

trial court with direction[s] that it make a determination as to 

whether [Commonwealth] Court, in [its] original jurisdiction, 

c[ould] grant the relief [Appellant sought] in the [p]etition. In so 

doing, [the Commonwealth Court noted that] the trial court may 

direct [Appellant] to file an amended pleading, setting forth with 

greater clarity the nature of his complaint against the named 

defendants and the relief that he seeks. If the trial court 

determines that [Commonwealth] Court has original jurisdiction 

over the complaint and c[ould] grant the relief [Appellant seeks]

in [the Commonwealth Court’s] original jurisdiction, [the trial 

court should] transfer the matter to [Commonwealth] Court 

pursuant to Section 5103(a) of the Judicial Code, 42 Pa.C.S.A

§ 5103(a). If the trial court determines that [the Commonwealth]

Court has original jurisdiction over the complaint but [could not]

grant the relief [Appellant seeks], it [could] transfer the matter to 

[Commonwealth] Court's original jurisdiction or, in the interest of 

judicial economy, dismiss the action. [See] Smock [v. 

Commonwealth, 436 A.2d 615, 617 (Pa. 1981).]

Additionally, as noted above, to the extent [Appellant] seeks 

specific performance of the terms of his criminal plea agreement, 

he should pursue such a claim via an appropriate filing under his 
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criminal case docket number, not through a new civil action in the 

common pleas court or [Commonwealth] Court.

Horan v. Harry, 260 A.3d 1107, at *3-4 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 2021)

(unpublished).

On August 13, 2021, Appellant filed a petition to enforce a plea 

agreement at his criminal docket. Trial Court Opinion, 10/15/2021, at 9-10. 

The DOC filed preliminary objections, asking that Appellant’s petition “be 

dismissed rather than transferred because (1) the [p]etition failed to state a 

claim upon which relief should be granted; and, (2) [t]he civil petition to 

enforce a plea agreement must be brought under a criminal docket number.” 

Id. The trial court scheduled a hearing on the matter for September 2, 2021. 

Following the scheduled hearing, the trial court “entered an [o]rder 

transferring the [p]etition for [injunctive relief] back to the Commonwealth 

Court.” Id. at 10. Additionally, the trial court determined that the remainder 

of Appellant’s August 13, 2021 filing, the “petition to enforce a purported plea 

agreement,” remained pending. As such, the trial court “treated the petition 

as a claim encompassed by the PCRA.” Id. 

On September 27, 2021, the trial court issued notice of its intent to 

dismiss the petition without a hearing pursuant to Pa.R.Crim.P. 907. Id. 

Appellant filed a response on October 14, 2021. On October 15, 2021, the 

trial court issued an opinion and order concluding that it lacked jurisdiction

under the PCRA because the petition was untimely and not subject to 

exception. In the alternative, the trial court opined that Appellant’s claim 
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lacked merit because the trial court had “no authority to interfere with the 

DOC’s administrative decisions in regard to where they house their inmates[,]” 

so that even if it had made a recommendation regarding treatment, “it would 

have been unenforceable.” Id. at 19. Moreover, the trial court concluded 

that “even if the claim of a failure of the DOC to keep [Appellant] placed in a 

mental health facility consistent with a sentencing directive [was] reviewable 

under the PCRA, no such directive exist[ed] in this record.” Id. The trial court 

reviewed the sentencing transcripts “from [Appellant’s] original sentence 

imposed on August 31, 2007 [following his guilty but mentally ill plea], and 

his resentenc[ing following his nolo contendere plea] entered on October 2, 

2014.” Id. at 20. Ultimately, the trial court determined that “there was never 

a request from Appellant regarding mental health treatment” and the trial 

court did not “sua sponte make any recommendations.” Id. at 22. This timely 

pro se appeal resulted.3

On appeal pro se, Appellant presents the following issues for our review:

I. Whether [the lower court] erred [by] dismiss[ing] 

Appellant’s petition to enforce [a] plea agreement by 

treating it as an untimely PCRA [petition]?

____________________________________________

3

 On November 10, 2021, Appellant filed three timely, separate notices of 

appeal, one at each of the above-captioned criminal dockets, in compliance 

with our Supreme Court’s decision in Commonwealth v. Walker, 185 A.3d 

969 (Pa. 2018). Appellant also filed corresponding statements of errors 

complained of on appeal pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b). On November 29, 

2021, the trial court issued an opinion pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 1925(a) that 

largely relied upon its earlier decision issued on October 15, 2021. On January 

24, 2022, this Court sua sponte consolidated the appeals. 
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II. Whether [the lower court] erred by claiming that Appellant’s 

October 2, 2014 resentencing nullified all aspects of 

Appellant’s original guilty but mentally ill (GBMI) plea and 

sentence?

Appellant’s Pro Se Brief at 4 (unnecessary capitalization omitted).

In his first issue presented, Appellant argues that the trial court erred 

by dismissing his petition to enforce a plea agreement as an untimely PCRA 

petition. For the reasons that follow, we agree. In this case, the trial court,

relying upon this Court’s decision in Commonwealth v. Hromek, 232 A.3d 

881 (Pa. Super. 2020), determined:

The Pennsylvania Superior Court has consistently held so long as 

a pleading falls under the ambit of the PCRA, the court should 

treat any pleading filed after the judgment of sentence is final as 

a PCRA petition. [In Commonwealth v. Hromek, supra,] Mr. 

Hromek filed the same styled pleading as [Appellant] – “Petition 

for the Enforcement of a Plea Agreement” – which the Hromek

Court recognized as an untimely petition under the PostConviction Relief Act (PCRA), and thus held that the Court of 

Common Pleas lacked jurisdiction to review the merits of the 

petition and/or grant relief.

Here, precedent guides us to construe [Appellant’s] “Petition for 

Enforcement of Plea Agreement” as a PCRA petition – albeit a 

clumsily filed one. See Hromek, 232 A.3d at 884.

Trial Court Opinion, 10/15/2021, at 15-16. 

We reject the trial court’s reliance on Hromek. In that case, Hromek 

filed a petition which he characterized as a petition for the enforcement of plea 

agreement. This Court, however, recognized that Hromek’s claim actually 

challenged the constitutionality of his SVP lifetime registration requirements. 

See Hromek, 232 A.3d at 884. Our Court thus determined that, although

Hromek titled his filing as a petition for enforcement of a plea agreement, he 
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actually challenged “the legality of his sentence [and his petition] should have 

been treated as a PCRA petition.” Id.; see also Commonwealth v. Porter, 

35 A.3d 4, 12 (Pa. 2012) (citation omitted) (The designation of a petition 

“does not preclude a court from deducing the proper nature of a pleading.”). 

We find our decision in Hromek to be distinguishable from the 

circumstances presently before us. In this matter, Appellant does not 

challenge the legality of his sentence but insists he is entitled to mental health 

treatment, as contemplated under the terms of his original plea agreement. 

Appellant’s claim rests on his contention that, as part of his plea agreement, 

“[t]here can be no doubt that Appellant needed, asked for, and was led to 

believe that his term of incarceration would be served at a facility equip[p]ed

to provide adequate and effective psychological treatment.” Appellant’s Pro 

Se Brief, at 8 (citation omitted). Because Appellant’s claim plainly seeks 

enforcement of terms allegedly incorporated into a plea agreement, and does 

not challenge the constitutionality of a sentence, we reject the trial court’s 

reliance on Hromek in concluding that Appellant’s petition fell within the 

scope of the PCRA and was therefore subject to the PCRA’s timing 

requirements.

Instead, we have previously recognized that

[a] petition for collateral relief will generally be considered a PCRA 

petition if it raises issues cognizable under the PCRA. See 

Commonwealth v. Peterkin, 722 A.2d 638, 640 (Pa. 1998); 42 

Pa.C.S.A. § 9542 (stating PCRA shall be sole means of obtaining 

collateral relief and encompasses all other common law and 

statutory remedies for same purpose). The plain language of the 
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PCRA mandates that claims which could be brought under the 

PCRA, must be brought under the PCRA. Commonwealth v. Hall,

771 A.2d 1232, 1235 (Pa. 2001).

* * *

On the other hand, a collateral petition to enforce a plea 

agreement is regularly treated as outside the ambit of the 

PCRA and under the contractual enforcement theory of 

specific performance. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. 

Martinez, 147 A.3d 517 (Pa. 2016); Commonwealth v. 

Fernandez, 195 A.3d 299 (Pa. Super. 2018) (en banc); 

Commonwealth v. Hainesworth, 82 A.3d 444 (Pa. Super. 

2013) (en banc), appeal denied, 95 A.3d 276 (Pa. 2014); 

Commonwealth v. Farabaugh, 136 A.3d 995 (Pa. Super. 

2016), appeal denied, 172 A.3d 1115 (Pa. 2017); 

Commonwealth v. Nase, 104 A.3d 528 (Pa. Super. 2014), 

appeal denied, 163 A.3d 405 (Pa. 2016). Compare

Commonwealth v. James Johnson, 200 A.3d 964 (Pa. Super. 

2018) (stating generally that plea enforcement theory is 

unavailable as ground for collateral relief if there is no plea bargain 

to enforce). The designation of the petition “does not preclude a 

court from deducing the proper nature of a pleading.” See 

Commonwealth v. Porter, 35 A.3d 4, 12 (Pa. 2012) (citing

Commonwealth v. Abdul–Salaam, 996 A.2d 482 (Pa. 2010) 

(involving deceptive labeling of PCRA pleading)).

Contract interpretation is a question of law, so “[o]ur standard of 

review over questions of law is de novo and to the extent 

necessary, the scope of our review is plenary.” Gillard v. Martin, 

13 A.3d 482, 487 (Pa. Super. 2010). Plea bargains play a critical 

role in the criminal justice system of this Commonwealth:

With respect to plea bargains, [t]he reality of the criminal 

justice system is that nearly all criminal cases are disposed 

of by plea bargains: [n]inety-seven percent of federal 

convictions and ninety-four percent of state convictions are 

the result of guilty pleas. Plea bargaining is not some 

adjunct to the criminal justice system; it is the criminal 

justice system. Accordingly, it is critical that plea 

agreements are enforced, to avoid any possible perversion 

of the plea-bargaining system. The disposition of criminal 

charges by agreement between the prosecutor and the 

accused, ...is an essential component of the administration 

of justice. Properly administered, it is to be encouraged. In 
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this Commonwealth, the practice of plea bargaining is 

generally regarded favorably, and is legitimized and 

governed by court rule.... A “mutuality of advantage” to 

defendants and prosecutors flows from the ratification of the 

bargain.

Assuming the plea agreement is legally possible to fulfill, 

when the parties enter the plea agreement and the court 

accepts and approves the plea, then the parties and the 

court must abide by the terms of the agreement. Specific 

enforcement of valid plea bargains is a matter of 

fundamental fairness. The terms of plea agreements are 

not limited to the withdrawal of charges, or the length of a 

sentence. Parties may agree to—and seek enforcement of—

terms that fall outside these areas.

Although a plea agreement occurs in a criminal context, it 

remains contractual in nature and is to be analyzed under 

contract-law standards. Furthermore, disputes over any 

particular term of a plea agreement must be resolved by 

objective standards. A determination of exactly what 

promises constitute the plea bargain must be based upon 

the totality of the surrounding circumstances and involves a 

case-by-case adjudication.

Any ambiguities in the terms of the plea agreement will be 

construed against the [Commonwealth]. Nevertheless, the 

agreement itself controls where its language sets out the 

terms of the bargain with specificity. Regarding the 

Commonwealth's duty to honor plea agreements, 

well-settled Pennsylvania law states:

Our courts have demanded strict compliance with that 

duty in order to avoid any possible perversion of the 

plea-bargaining system, evidencing the concern that 

a defendant might be coerced into a bargain or 

fraudulently induced to give up the very valued 

constitutional guarantees attendant the right to trial 

by jury.

Whether a particular plea agreement has been 

breached depends on what the parties to the 

agreement reasonably understood to be the terms of 

the agreement.
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Farabaugh, supra at 1001-1002 (internal citations and 

quotation marks omitted).

We acknowledge that the analogy of a plea agreement 

as a contract is not a perfect one. For instance, unlike 

a typical contract, a plea agreement does not become 

binding on the parties upon their consent to terms; 

rather, a plea agreement is not valid and binding until 

it is evaluated and accepted by a third party, i.e., a 

trial court....

Nonetheless, as the Hainesworth court recognized, 

plea agreements clearly are contractual in nature. 

See Puckett v. United States, 556 U.S. 129 (2009) 

(stating[:] “Although the analogy may not hold in all 

respects, plea bargains are essentially contracts”).

Martinez, 147 A.3d at 531 (one internal citation omitted). 

“[T]he convicted criminal is entitled to the benefit of his 

bargain through specific performance of the terms of the 

plea agreement. Thus, a court must determine whether an 

alleged term is part of the parties' plea agreement. If the 

answer to that inquiry is affirmative, then the convicted 

criminal is entitled to specific performance of the term.” Id.

at 532-533.

Commonwealth v. Kerns, 220 A.3d 607, 611–613 (Pa. Super. 2019)

(emphasis added).

In this case, despite finding that it lacked jurisdiction under the PCRA to 

entertain Appellant’s claim seeking appropriate mental health treatment and 

placement pursuant to the terms of his plea agreement, the trial court 

examined the merits of the claim:

[The trial court] made no recommendation to the DOC about 

[Appellant’s] treatment or an expected mental health placement 

at either sentencing proceeding. Further, the record also reflects 

that [Appellant] made no such request or demand. 

In fact, [the trial court’s opinion carefully reviewed] the 

sentencing transcripts from [Appellant’s] original sentence 
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imposed on August 31, 2007, and his [] sentence entered on 

October 2, 2014 [following resentencing]. During [Appellant’s]

2007 sentencing, [defense] counsel [made several]

representations about [Appellant’s] mental health[,] noting that 

[Appellant] had “pretty substantial mental illnesses; counsel 

asked that the court fashion a sentence that [Appellant] can get 

the treatment he needs; ... and the record is clear that he needs 

treatment, he understands that, and he asks for it.” [N.T.,] 

8/31/2007, at 18. However, the sentencing transcript also noted 

that [Appellant] did not wish to make any statement during 

sentencing. Id. at 19. [The trial court] then entered a standard 

range sentence with regard to each charge and did not make a 

recommendation to the DOC with regard to [Appellant’s] 

treatment needs.

At his PCRA hearing in 2014, the Commonwealth and [Appellant] 

agreed to vacate his original guilty plea, and entered a new, 

second nolo contendere plea with a sentence bargain. The 

negotiated resolution vacated his first conviction based upon the 

Commonwealth’s acknowledgment that [Appellant’s] guilty plea 

counsel was ineffective for providing deficient advice to 

[Appellant] regarding his sentencing exposure. Then, instead of 

a guilty but mentally ill plea, [Appellant] plead nolo contendere. 

N.T., 10/2/2014, at 12-13. Further, when [the trial court] 

questioned [Appellant] about taking psychotropic medication and 

his state of mind, [Appellant] indicated that he was not taking any 

medication and admitted that he was very clear minded. Id. at 

16. Further, [the trial court] allowed [Appellant] to make a 

statement about his mental health.

Trial Court Opinion, 10/15/2021, at 20 (original brackets omitted). 

At the October 2, 2014 plea hearing, Appellant described the mental 

health treatment he received while incarcerated. Appellant stated that he 

received minimal, monthly psychological and psychiatric counseling sessions 

“for maybe 10 [to] 15 minutes” while imprisoned but did not “consider that 

really being under treatment.” Id., citing N.T., 10/2/2014, at 17-18. Despite 

being diagnosed with “severe depression,” Appellant confirmed that he did not 
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have any significant mental health symptoms, was not in active treatment, 

and was not prescribed medication. Id. at 22, citing N.T., 10/2/2014, at 18. 

Appellant stated that he managed his mental health by talking with prison 

staff and other inmates and could “handle it that way, so it works.” Id. 

Finally, the trial court noted that it did not make any sua sponte sentencing 

recommendations regarding mental health treatment. Id.

On appeal, Appellant does not challenge the trial court’s determination 

that there was no agreement that Appellant receive mental health treatment 

pursuant to the October 2, 2014 plea bargain under which Appellant agreed 

to withdraw his prior plea of guilty but mentally ill and further agreed to enter 

a nolo contendere plea in its place. See Appellant’s Pro Se Brief at 10-13. 

Rather, Appellant argues that the guilty but mentally ill portion from his 

original sentence still applied to his October 2, 2014 resentencing because 

“the purpose of this proceeding was to reduce Appellant’s sentence.” Id. at 

10. Finally, Appellant argues that if it is determined that the judgment of 

sentence imposed on October 2, 2014 supplanted all aspects of Appellant’s 

original 2007 sentence, then Appellant’s SVP designation, as well as other 

registration requirements, must also be vacated. Id. at 12.

Upon review of the certified record and applicable law, we conclude that 

Appellant is not entitled to relief. Initially, we address Appellant’s assertion

that the trial court erred by determining that Appellant’s new nolo contendere

plea nullified all aspects of his original guilty but mentally ill plea. As set forth 

at length above, we are required to analyze Appellant’s claim under 
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contract-law standards. “The doctrine of novation, or substituted contract, 

applies where: (i) a prior contract has been displaced, (ii) a new valid contract 

has been substituted in its place, (iii) there exists sufficient legal consideration 

for the new contract, and (iv) the parties consented to the extinction of the 

old and replacement of the new.” First Lehigh Bank v. Haviland Grille, 

Inc., 704 A.2d 135, 138 (Pa. Super. 1997). Here, Appellant consented to the 

extinction of his original plea and its replacement with the terms of the new 

plea. Thus, we discern no error by the trial court in finding that Appellant’s 

original plea was replaced completely by his subsequent plea. Moreover, there 

is no evidence in the record that the Commonwealth, Appellant, or the trial 

court incorporated mental health treatment concerns into the terms of the 

new October 2, 2014 plea agreement. In fact, at the time of his October 2, 

2014 plea, Appellant specifically stated that he did not require mental health 

treatment, including either counseling or medication. “A defendant is bound 

by the statements he makes during his plea colloquy, and may not assert 

grounds [] that contradict statements made when he pled.” Commonwealth 

v. Stork, 737 A.2d 789, 790–791 (Pa. Super. 1999).

Finally, we conclude that Appellant waived the portion of his claim 

pertaining to his SVP designation. Appellant did not raise the issue in his 

petition to enforce the plea agreement, Appellant did not identify the issue in 

his subsequent Rule 1925(b) statement, and the trial court never addressed 

it. See Interest of D.C., 263 A.3d 326, 335 (Pa. Super. 2021), citing

Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b)(4)(vii) (“This Court will not consider a claim of error when 
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an appellant fails to raise the claim in the trial court at a time when the error 

could have been corrected” and “issues not included in an appellant's Rule 

1925(b) [s]tatement are waived.”). Instead, Appellant raises the SVP issue 

for the first time on appeal, which he cannot do. See Pa.R.A.P. 302(a) 

(“Issues not raised in the lower court are waived and cannot be raised for the 

first time on appeal.”). As such, Appellant did not properly present or preserve 

issues pertaining to his SVP designation and we decline to address this aspect 

of Appellant’s claim for the first time on appeal. 

For all of the foregoing reasons, we conclude that the trial court did not 

err or abuse its discretion in denying Appellant relief.4 

Order affirmed.

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 8/8/2022

____________________________________________

4

 Although the trial court erroneously determined that Appellant’s filing fell 

under the auspices of the PCRA, we affirm the trial court’s opinion regarding 

the merits of Appellant’s claim. Commonwealth v. Singletary, 803 A.2d 

769, 772–773 (Pa. Super. 2002) (“It is well settled that where the result is 

correct, an appellate court may affirm a lower court's decision on any ground 

without regard to the ground relied upon by the lower court itself.”).