2976 Federal Register / Vol. 63, No. 12 / Tuesday, January 20, 1998 / Notices

FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS

COMMISSION

[DA 98–48; Report No. AUC–97–18–A

(Auction No. 18)]

Comment Sought on Reserve Prices or

Minimum Opening Bids and Other

Auction Procedural Issues for the

Phase II 220 MHz Service

AGENCY: Federal Communications

Commission.

ACTION: Notice; seeking comment.

SUMMARY: The Commission is seeking

comment on a proposed formula for

calculating minimum opening bids as

well as other procedural issues in the

auction of licenses for the Phase II 220

MHz Service, Auction No. 18.

DATES: Comments are due on or before

January 29, 1998. Reply comments are

due on or before February 5, 1998.

ADDRESSES: To file formally, parties

must submit an original and four copies

to the Office of the Secretary, Federal

Communications Commission, Room

222, 1919 M Street N.W., Washington,

D.C. 20554. In addition, parties must

submit one copy to Kathleen O’Brien

Ham, Chief, Auctions and Industry

Analysis Division, Wireless

Telecommunications Bureau, Federal

Communications Commission, Room

5202, 2025 M Street N.W., Washington,

D.C. 20554.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Lisa

Hartigan, Bob Reagle or Frank Stilwell,

Auctions and Industry Analysis

Division, Wireless Telecommunications

Bureau, at (202) 418–0660.

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: This

public notice was released on January

13, 1998 and is available in its entirety,

including attachments; for inspection

and copying during normal business

hours in the FCC Reference Center

(Room 239), 1919 M Street, N.W.,

Washington, D.C., and also may be

purchased from the Commission’s copy

contractor, International Transcription

Services, (202) 857–3800, fax (202) 857–

3805, 1231 20th Street, N.W.,

Washington, D.C. 20036.

SYNOPSIS OF THE PUBLIC NOTICE

Background

I. Reserve Price or Minimum Opening

Bid

The Balanced Budget Act of 1997

calls upon the Commission to prescribe

methods by which a reasonable reserve

price will be required or a minimum

opening bid established when FCC

licenses are subject to auction (i.e.,

because they are mutually exclusive),

unless the Commission determines that

a reserve price or minimum bid is not

in the public interest. Section 3002(a),

Balanced Budget Act of 1997, Public

Law 105–33, 111 Stat. 251 (1997)

(‘‘Budget Act’’); 47 U.S.C. 309(j)(4)(F).

The Commission’s authority to establish

a reserve price or minimum opening bid

is set forth in 47 CFR 1.2104(c) and (d).

Consistent with this mandate, the

Commission has directed the Wireless

Telecommunications Bureau (‘‘Bureau’’)

to seek comment on the use of a

minimum opening bid and/or reserve

price prior to the start of each auction.

See In the Matter of Amendment of Part

1 of the Commission’s Rules—

Competitive Bidding Procedures,

Allocation of Spectrum Below 5 GHz

Transferred from Federal Government

Use, 4660–4685 MHz, WT Docket No.

97–82, ET Docket No. 94–32, FCC 97–

413, Third Report and Order and

Second Further Notice of Proposed Rule

Making (rel. December 31, 1997) at

¶ 141 (‘‘Part 1 Third Report and Order’’).

The Bureau was directed to seek

comment on the methodology to be

employed in establishing each of these

mechanisms. Among other factors the

Bureau should consider is the amount of

spectrum being auctioned, levels of

incumbency, the availability of

technology to provide service, the size

of the geographic service areas, the

extent of interference with other

spectrum bands, and any other relevant

factors that could reasonably have an

impact on valuation of the spectrum

being auctioned. The Commission

concluded that the Bureau should have

the discretion to employ either or both

of these mechanisms for future auctions.

Id.

Normally, a reserve price is an

absolute minimum price below which

an item will not be sold in a given

auction. Reserve prices can be either

published or unpublished. A minimum

opening bid, on the other hand, is the

minimum bid price set at the beginning

of the auction below which no bids are

accepted. It is generally used to

accelerate the competitive bidding

process. Also, in a minimum opening

bid scenario, the auctioneer generally

has the discretion to lower the amount

later in the auction.

The Bureau recently announced the

auction of 908 licenses for the Phase II

220 MHz Service which is scheduled to

begin May 19, 1998. See Public Notice,

‘‘FCC Announces Spectrum Auction

Schedule for 1998,’’ DA 97–2497 (rel.

November 25, 1997), 62 FR 64833,

64833–64834 (December 9, 1997). These

licenses encompass the United States,

the Northern Mariana Islands, Guam,

American Samoa, the United States

Virgin Islands and Puerto Rico.

Specifically, the licenses include: (1)

Five licenses in each of 175 geographic

areas known as Economic Areas (EAs);

(2) five licenses in each of six Regional

Economic Area Groupings (REAGs),

which we will refer to as ‘‘Economic

Area Groupings’’ (EAGs); and (3) three

nationwide licenses which encompass

the same territory as all of the EAGs,

combined. We note that the geographic

area encompassed within a 220 MHz

REAG differs from the geographic area

encompassed within REAGs in prior

auctions. In order to avoid confusion,

therefore, we will use EAGs in the 220

MHz auction. See 47 CFR 90.717(a)

(nationwide channel assignments); 47

CFR 90.721(b) and 90.761 (Phase II EA

and REAG channel assignments).

In anticipation of this auction and in

light of the Balanced Budget Act, the

Bureau proposes to establish minimum

opening bids for the 220 MHz auction,

and retain discretion to lower the

minimum opening bids.

The Bureau believes a minimum

opening bid, which has been utilized in

other auctions, is an effective bidding

tool, and we propose to use this

approach in the 220 MHz Service

auction. See In the Matter of Auction of

800 MHz SMR Upper 10 MHz Band,

Minimum Opening Bids or Reserve

Prices, DA 97–2147, Order (rel. October

6, 1997), 62 FR 55251 (October 23,

1997); In the Matter of Revision of Rules

and Policies for the Direct Broadcast

Satellite Service, IB Docket No. 95–168,

PP Docket No. 93–253, Report and

Order, 11 FCC Rcd 9712, 9787–9788,

¶ 186 (1995), 60 FR 65587, 65591

(December 20, 1995). A minimum

opening bid will help to regulate the

pace of the auction and provides

flexibility.

Specifically, the Commission

proposes the following formula for

calculating minimum opening bids in

Auction No. 18:

1. Nationwide Licenses: $0.02 MHz/POP

2. EAG Licenses: $0.015 MHz/POP

3. EA Licenses: $0.0175 MHz/POP

with a minimum of no less than

$2500.00 per license.

Comment is sought on this proposal.

We note that we have received a

proposal from SEA, Inc. to establish a

minimum opening bid for the 220 MHz

auction. This document has been made

a part of the record in this proceeding.

If commenters believe that the formula

proposed above for minimum opening

bids will result in substantial numbers

of unsold licenses, or is not a reasonable

amount, or should instead operate as a

reserve price, they should explain why

this is so, and comment on the

desirability of an alternative approach.
Federal Register / Vol. 63, No. 12 / Tuesday, January 20, 1998 / Notices 2977

Commenters are advised to support

their claims with valuation analyses and

suggested reserve prices or minimum

opening bid levels or formulas. In

establishing the formula for minimum

opening bids, we particularly seek

comment on such factors as, among

other things, the amount of spectrum

being auctioned, levels of incumbency,

the availability of technology to provide

service, the size of the geographic

service areas, issues of interference with

other spectrum bands and any other

relevant factors that could reasonably

have an impact on valuation of the

Phase II 220 MHz spectrum.

Alternatively, comment is sought on

whether, consistent with the Balanced

Budget Act, the public interest would be

served by having no minimum opening

bid or reserve price.

II. Other Auction Procedural Issues

The Balanced Budget Act of 1997

requires the Commission to ‘‘ensure

that, in the scheduling of any

competitive bidding under this

subsection, an adequate period is

allowed * * * before issuance of

bidding rules, to permit notice and

comment on proposed auction

procedures * * *.’’ Budget Act,

§ 3002(a)(E)(i). Consistent with the

provisions of the Balanced Budget Act

and to ensure that potential bidders

have adequate time to familiarize

themselves with the specific provisions

that will govern the day-to-day conduct

of an auction, the Commission directed

the Bureau, under its existing delegated

authority, to seek comment on a variety

of auction-specific issues prior to the

start of each auction. Part 1 Third

Report and Order at ¶ 124. The

Commission directed the Bureau to seek

comment on specific mechanisms

related to day-to-day auction conduct

including, for example, the structure of

bidding rounds and stages,

establishment of minimum opening bids

or reserve prices, minimum accepted

bids, initial maximum eligibility for

each bidder, activity requirements for

each stage of the auction, activity rule

waivers, criteria for determining

reductions in eligibility, information

regarding bid withdrawal and bid

removal, stopping rules, and

information relating to auction delay,

suspension or cancellation. Id. at 125.

We therefore seek comment on the

following issues.

a. License Groupings

In the 220 MHz Third Report and

Order the Commission concluded that it

would auction the 908 Phase II 220 MHz

licenses in a single, simultaneous

multiple-round auction. However, the

Commission reserved the discretion,

which it ultimately delegated to the

Bureau, to auction each of the license

types (i.e., nationwide, EAG, EA)

separately or in different combinations

(e.g., nationwide and EAG together). See

In the Matter of Amendment of Part 90

of the Commission’s Rules to Provide

for the Use of the 220–222 MHz Band

by the Private Land Mobile Radio

Service, Implementation of Sections

3(n) and 332 of the Communications

Act, Regulatory Treatment of Mobile

Services, Implementation of Section

309(j) of the Communications Act—

Competitive Bidding, PR Docket No. 89–

552, RM 8506, GN Docket No. 93–252,

PP Docket No. 93–253, Third Report

and Order and Fifth Notice of Proposed

Rulemaking, 12 FCC Rcd 10943, 11046,

¶ 221 (1997) (‘‘220 MHz Third Report

and Order’’), 62 FR 15978, 15979 (April

3, 1997). For reasons of administrative

efficiency, we propose to award the 908

licenses in the Phase II 220 MHz Service

in a single, simultaneous multipleround auction. We seek comment on

this proposal.

b. Structure of Bidding Rounds, Activity

Requirements, and Criteria for

Determining Reductions in Eligibility

We propose to divide the auction into

three stages: Stage One, Stage Two and

Stage Three. The auction will start in

Stage One. We propose that the auction

will advance to the next stage (i.e., from

Stage One to Stage Two, and from Stage

Two to Stage Three) when in each of

three consecutive rounds of bidding, the

high bid has increased on 10 percent or

less of the licenses being auctioned (as

measured in bidding units). However,

we further propose that the Bureau

retain the discretion to accelerate the

auction by announcement. This

determination will be based on a variety

of measures of bidder activity including,

but not limited to, the auction activity

level, the percentages of licenses (as

measured in bidding units) on which

there are new bids, the number of new

bids, and the percentage increase in

revenue. We seek comment on these

proposals.

In order to ensure that the auction

closes within a reasonable period of

time, an activity rule requires bidders to

bid actively on a percentage of their

maximum eligibility during each round

of the auction rather than waiting until

the end to participate. A bidder that

does not satisfy the activity rule will

either lose bidding eligibility in the next

round or use an activity rule waiver.

For the Phase II 220 MHz Service

auction, we propose that, in each round

of the first stage of the auction, a bidder

desiring to maintain its current

eligibility is required to be active on

licenses encompassing at least 80

percent of its current bidding eligibility.

Failure to maintain the requisite activity

level will result in a reduction in the

bidder’s bidding eligibility in the next

round of bidding (unless an activity rule

waiver is used). During Stage One,

reduced eligibility for the next round

will be calculated by multiplying the

current round activity by five-fourths

(5⁄4). In each round of the second stage

of the auction, a bidder desiring to

maintain its current eligibility is

required to be active on at least 90

percent of its current bidding eligibility.

During Stage Two, reduced eligibility

for the next round will be calculated by

multiplying the current round activity

by ten-ninths (10⁄9). In each round of the

third stage, a bidder desiring to

maintain its current eligibility is

required to be active on 98 percent of its

current bidding eligibility. In this final

stage, reduced eligibility for the next

round will be calculated by multiplying

the current round activity by fiftyfortyninths (50⁄49). We seek comment on

these proposals.

c. Minimum Accepted Bids

Once there is a standing high bid on

a license, a bid increment will be

applied to that license to establish a

minimum acceptable bid for the

following round. For the Phase II 220

MHz Service auction, we propose, as

described immediately below, to use an

exponential smoothing methodology to

calculate minimum bid increments. The

Bureau retains the discretion to change

the minimum bid increment if it

determines that circumstances so

dictate. The exponential smoothing

methodology has been used in previous

auctions, including the WCS auction

and the 800 MHz SMR auction. We seek

comment on this proposal.

Exponential Smoothing

The exponential smoothing formula

calculates the bid increment based on a

weighted average of the activity

received on each license in the current

and all previous rounds. This

methodology will tailor the bid

increment for each license based on

activity, rather than setting a global

increment for all licenses. For every

license that receives a bid, the bid

increment for the next round for that

license will be established as the greater

of $0.25 per bidding unit for each

license or a percentage increment that is

determined using the exponential

smoothing formula.

Using exponential smoothing, the

calculation of the percentage bid

increment for each license will be based
2978 Federal Register / Vol. 63, No. 12 / Tuesday, January 20, 1998 / Notices

on an activity index, which is calculated

as the weighted average of the current

activity and the activity index from the

previous round. The activity index at

the start of the auction (round 0) will be

set at 0. The current activity index is

equal to a weighting factor times the

number of new bids received on the

license in the current bidding period

plus one minus the weighting factor

times the activity index from the

previous round. The activity index is

then used to calculate a percentage

increment by multiplying a minimum

percentage increment by one plus the

activity index with that result being

subject to a maximum percentage

increment. The Commission will

initially set the weighting factor at 0.5,

the minimum percentage increment at

0.05, and the maximum percentage

increment at 0.15.

Equations

Ai = (C * Bi) + ( (1–C) * Ai-1)

Ii = smaller of ( (1 + Ai) * N) and M

Where,

Ai = activity index for the current round

(round i)

C = activity weight factor

Bi = number of bids in the current round

(round i)

Ai-1=activity index from previous round

(round i-1), A0 is 0

Ii=percentage bid increment for the

current round (round i)

N=minimum percentage increment

M=maximum percentage increment

Under the exponential smoothing

methodology, once a bid has been

received on a license, the minimum

acceptable bid for that license in the

following round will be the new high

bid plus the greater of either the dollar

amount associated with the percentage

increment (variable Ii from above times

the high bid) or the absolute increment

(a fixed dollar amount per bidding unit

for each license, e.g., $0.25 per bidding

unit).

Example

License 1 (800,000 bidding units)

C=0.5, N=0.05, M=0.15, Absolute bid

increment=$0.25 per bidding unit

Round 1 (2 new bids, high

bid=$1,000,000)

1. Calculation of percentage

increment using exponential smoothing:

A1=(0.5 * 2)+(0.5 * 0)=1

I1=(1+1) * 0.05=0.1

2. Dollar increment using the

percentage increment (I1 from above)

0.1 * $1,000,000=$100,000

3. Dollar increment using the absolute

increment

$0.25 * 800,000 bidding units=$200,000

4. Minimum bid increment: greater of

percentage and absolute=$200,000

Round 2 (3 new bids, high

bid=2,000,000)

1. Calculation of percentage

increment using exponential smoothing:

A2=(0.5 * 3)+(0.5 * 1)=2

I2=(1+2) * 0.05=0.15

2. Dollar increment using the

percentage increment (I2 from above)

0.15 * $2,000,000=$300,000

3. Dollar increment using the absolute

increment

$0.25×800,000 bidding units=$200,000

4. Minimum bid increment: greater of

percentage and absolute=$300,000

Round 3 (1 new bid, high bid =

2,300,000)

1. Calculation of percentage

increment using exponential smoothing:

A3 = (0.5 * 1) + (0.5 * 2) = 1.5

I3 = (1 + 1.5) * 0.05 = 0.125

2. Dollar increment using the

percentage increment (I3 from above)

0.125 * $2,300,000 = $287,500

3. Dollar increment using the absolute

increment

$0.25 • 800,000 bidding units =

$200,000

4. Minimum bid increment: greater of

percentage and absolute = $287,500

d. Initial Maximum Eligibility for Each

Bidder

In the 220 MHz Third Report and

Order, the Commission delegated to the

Bureau the authority and discretion to

determine an appropriate upfront

payment for each license being

auctioned, taking into account such

factors as the population in each

geographic license area, and the value of

similar spectrum. The Commission

noted that the Bureau should establish

an upfront payment amount that would

roughly equate with a five percent value

for the license. 220 MHz Third Report

and Order, 12 FCC Rcd at 11055–11056,

¶ 255, 62 FR at 15981.

With these guidelines in mind, we

propose, for the Phase II 220 MHz

Service auction, an upfront payment of

one cent per MHz-pop with no amount

less than $2,500. Our proposal will

utilize the data in Attachment A to this

Public Notice. We seek comment on this

proposal.

For the Phase II 220 MHz Service

auction, we further propose that the

amount of the upfront payment

submitted by a bidder will determine

the initial maximum eligibility (as

measured in bidding units) for each

bidder. Upfront payments are not

attributed to specific licenses, but

instead will be translated into bidding

units to define a bidder’s initial

maximum eligibility. The total upfront

payment defines the maximum amount

of bidding units on which the applicant

will initially be permitted to bid. We

seek comment on this proposal.

e. Activity Rule Waivers and Reducing

Eligibility

Use of an activity rule waiver

preserves the bidder’s current bidding

eligibility despite the bidder’s activity

in the current round being below the

required minimum level. An activity

rule waiver applies to an entire round

of bidding and not to a particular

license. Activity waivers are principally

a mechanism for auction participants to

avoid the loss of auction eligibility in

the event that exigent circumstances

prevent them from placing a bid in a

particular round.

The FCC auction system assumes that

bidders with insufficient activity would

prefer to use an activity rule waiver (if

available) rather than lose bidding

eligibility. Therefore, the system will

automatically apply a waiver (known as

an ‘‘automatic waiver’’) at the end of

any bidding period where a bidder’s

activity level is below the minimum

required unless: (1) There are no activity

rule waivers available; or (2) the bidder

overrides the automatic application of a

waiver by reducing eligibility thereby

meeting the minimum requirements.

A bidder with insufficient activity

that wants to reduce its bidding

eligibility rather than use an activity

rule waiver must affirmatively override

the automatic waiver mechanism during

the bidding period by using the reduce

eligibility function in the software. In

this case, the bidder’s eligibility is

permanently reduced to bring the bidder

into compliance with the activity rules

as described above. Once eligibility has

been reduced, a bidder will not be

permitted to regain its lost bidding

eligibility.

A bidder may proactively use an

activity rule waiver as a means to keep

the auction open without placing a bid.

If a bidder submits a proactive waiver

(using the proactive waiver function in

the bidding software) during a bidding

period in which no bids are submitted,

the auction will remain open and the

bidder’s eligibility will be preserved. An

automatic waiver invoked in a round in

which there are no new valid bids will

not keep the auction open.

We propose that each bidder in the

Phase II 220 MHz Service auction will

be provided five activity rule waivers

that may be used in any round during

the course of the auction. We seek

comment on this proposal.
Federal Register / Vol. 63, No. 12 / Tuesday, January 20, 1998 / Notices 2979

f. Information Regarding Bid

Withdrawal and Bid Removal

For the Phase II 220 MHz Service

auction, we propose the following bid

removal and bid withdrawal

procedures. Before the close of a

bidding period, a bidder has the option

of removing any bids placed in that

round. By using the remove bid function

in the software, a bidder may effectively

‘‘unsubmit’’ any bid placed within that

round. A bidder removing a bid placed

in the same round is not subject to

withdrawal payments.

Once a round closes, a bidder may no

longer remove a bid. However, in the

next round, a bidder may withdraw

standing high bids from previous

rounds using the withdraw bid function.

A high bidder that withdraws its

standing high bid from a previous round

is subject to the bid withdrawal

payment provisions. See 47 CFR

90.1007; 1.2104(g); 1.2109. We seek

comment on these bid removal and bid

withdrawal procedures.

In the 220 MHz Third Report and

Order, the Commission adopted the bid

withdrawal provisions found in Part 1

of the Commission’s Rules for the Phase

II 220 MHz auction. 220 MHz Third

Report and Order, 12 FCC Rcd at 11057,

¶ 263, 62 FR at 15981. In the Part 1

Third Report and Order, the

Commission recently explained that

allowing bid withdrawals facilitates

efficient aggregation of licenses and

pursuit of efficient backup strategies as

information becomes available during

the course of an auction. The

Commission noted, however, that in

some instances bidders may seek to

withdraw bids for improper reasons,

including to delay the close of the

auction for strategic purposes. The

Bureau, therefore, has discretion, in

managing the auction, to limit the

number of withdrawals to prevent

strategic delay of the close of the

auction or other abuses. The

Commission stated that the Bureau

should assertively exercise its

discretion, consider limiting the number

of rounds in which bidders may

withdraw bids, and prevent bidders

from bidding on a particular market if

the Bureau finds that a bidder is abusing

the Commission’s bid withdrawal

procedures. Part 1 Third Report and

Order at ¶ 150. We note that the Part 1

Third Report and Order for the most

part expressly does not apply to the

auction of licenses for the 220 MHz

Service. Id. at ¶ 7. However, as we

previously stated, the 220 MHz Third

Report and Order invokes the Part 1

provisions in establishing its

withdrawal rules. We therefore follow

the reasoning of the Commission in the

Part 1 Third Report and Order with

respect to withdrawals in our analysis of

this issue.

Applying this reasoning, we propose

to limit each bidder in the Phase II 220

MHz Service auction to withdrawals in

no more than two rounds during the

course of the auction. To permit a

bidder to withdraw bids in more than

two rounds would likely encourage

insincere bidding or the use of

withdrawals for anti-competitive

strategic purposes. The two rounds in

which withdrawals are utilized will be

at the bidder’s discretion; withdrawals

otherwise must be in accordance with

the Commission’s Rules. There is no

limit on the number of bids that may be

removed in either of the rounds in

which withdrawals are utilized.

Withdrawals will remain subject to the

bid withdrawal payment provisions

specified in the Commission’s Rules.

We seek comment on this proposal.

g. Stopping Rules

In the 220 MHz Third Report and

Order, the Commission adopted a

simultaneous stopping rule for the

Phase II 220 MHz Service auction. The

Commission noted that experience in

prior auctions demonstrated that the

simultaneous stopping rule balanced the

interests of administrative efficiency

and maximum bidder participation. The

Commission concluded that the

substitutability between and among

licenses in different geographic areas

and the importance of preserving

bidders’ ability to pursue backup

strategies support the use of a

simultaneous stopping rule. See 220

MHz Third Report and Order, 12 FCC

Rcd at 11048, ¶ 228, 62 FR at 15980.

The Bureau has discretion to ‘‘establish

stopping rules before or during an

auction in order to terminate the auction

within a reasonable time.’’ See 47 CFR

90.1005(d). We therefore have the

discretion to adopt an alternative

stopping rule to the simultaneous

stopping rule if we deem appropriate.

Thus, unless circumstances dictate

otherwise, bidding would remain open

on all licenses until bidding stops on

every license. The auction would close

for all licenses when one round passes

during which no bidder submits a new

acceptable bid on any license, applies a

proactive waiver, or withdraws a

previous high bid.

We propose that the Bureau retain the

discretion to keep an auction open even

if no new acceptable bids or proactive

waivers are submitted and no previous

high bids are withdrawn. In this event,

the effect will be the same as if a bidder

had submitted a proactive waiver. The

activity rule, therefore, will apply as

usual and a bidder with insufficient

activity will either lose bidding

eligibility or use a remaining activity

rule waiver.

Finally, we propose that the Bureau

reserve the right to declare that the

auction will end after a specified

number of additional rounds (‘‘special

stopping rule’’). If the Bureau invokes

this special stopping rule, it will accept

bids in the final round(s) only for

licenses on which the high bid

increased in at least one of the

preceding specified number of rounds.

The Bureau proposes to exercise this

option only in circumstances such as

where the auction is proceeding very

slowly, where there is minimal overall

bidding activity, or where it appears

likely that the auction will not close

within a reasonable period of time.

Before exercising this option, the

Bureau is likely to attempt to increase

the pace of the auction by, for example,

moving the auction into the next stage

(where bidders would be required to

maintain a higher level of bidding

activity), increasing the number of

bidding rounds per day, and/or

increasing the amount of the minimum

bid increments for the limited number

of licenses where there is still a high

level of bidding activity. We seek

comment on these proposals.

h. Information Relating to Auction

Delay, Suspension or Cancellation

For the Phase II 220 MHz Service

auction, we propose that, by public

notice or by announcement during the

auction, the Bureau may delay, suspend

or cancel the auction in the event of

natural disaster, technical obstacle,

evidence of an auction security breach,

unlawful bidding activity,

administrative or weather necessity, or

for any other reason that affects the fair

and competitive conduct of competitive

bidding. In such cases, the Bureau, in its

sole discretion, may elect to: resume the

auction starting from the beginning of

the current round; resume the auction

starting from some previous round; or

cancel the auction in its entirety.

Network interruption may cause the

Bureau to delay or suspend the auction.

We emphasize that exercise of this

authority is solely within the discretion

of the Bureau, and its use is not

intended to be a substitute for situations

in which bidders may wish to apply

their activity rule waivers. We seek

comment on this proposal.

III. Conclusion

Comments are due on or before

January 29, 1998, and reply comments

are due on or before February 5, 1998.
2980 Federal Register / Vol. 63, No. 12 / Tuesday, January 20, 1998 / Notices

To file formally, parties must submit an

original and four copies to the Office of

the Secretary, Federal Communications

Commission, Room 222, 1919 M Street

NW., Washington, DC 20554. In

addition, parties must submit one copy

to Kathleen O’Brien Ham, Chief,

Auctions and Industry Analysis

Division, Wireless Telecommunications

Bureau, Federal Communications

Commission, Room 5202, 2025 M Street

NW., Washington, DC 20554. Comments

and reply comments will be available

for public inspection during regular

business hours in the FCC Public

Reference Room, Room 239, 1919 M

Street NW., Washington, DC 20554.

Federal Communications Commission.

Magalie Roman Salas,

Secretary.

[FR Doc. 98–1282 Filed 1–16–98; 8:45 am]

BILLING CODE 6712–01–U

FEDERAL HOUSING FINANCE BOARD

Sunshine Act Notice; Announcing an

Open Meeting of the Board

TIME AND DATE: 10:00 a.m. Wednesday,

January 21, 1998.

PLACE: Board Room, Second Floor,

Federal Housing Finance Board, 1777 F

Street, N.W., Washington, D.C. 20006.

STATUS: The entire meeting will be open

to the public.

MATTERS TO BE CONSIDERED DURING

PORTIONS OPEN TO THE PUBLIC:

• Policy Statement on Financial and

Other Disclosures in the Combined

Financial Report of the Federal Home

Loan Bank System.

• Notice of Proposed Rulemaking on

Financial Disclosures by Federal Home

Loan Banks.

• Book-Entry Procedures for Federal

Home Loan Bank Securities—Final

Rule.

CONTACT PERSON FOR MORE INFORMATION:

Elaine L. Baker, Secretary to the Board,

(202) 408–2837.

William W. Ginsberg,

Managing Director.

[FR Doc. 98–1314 Filed 1–14–98; 4:55 pm]

BILLING CODE 6725–01–P

FEDERAL RESERVE SYSTEM

Change in Bank Control Notices;

Acquisitions of Shares of Banks or

Bank Holding Companies

The notificants listed below have

applied under the Change in Bank

Control Act (12 U.S.C. 1817(j)) and §

225.41 of the Board’s Regulation Y (12

CFR 225.41) to acquire a bank or bank

holding company. The factors that are

considered in acting on the notices are

set forth in paragraph 7 of the Act (12

U.S.C. 1817(j)(7)).

The notices are available for

immediate inspection at the Federal

Reserve Bank indicated. The notices

also will be available for inspection at

the offices of the Board of Governors.

Interested persons may express their

views in writing to the Reserve Bank

indicated for that notice or to the offices

of the Board of Governors. Comments

must be received not later than February

3, 1998.

A. Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas

City (D. Michael Manies, Assistant Vice

President) 925 Grand Avenue, Kansas

City, Missouri 64198-0001:

1. Bruce L. Trimble, Leroy, Kansas,

Individually and as Trustee of the Ival

L. Trimble December 9, 1997 Irrevocable

Trust; to acquire voting shares of Flint

Hills Bancshares, Inc., Gridley, Kansas,

and thereby indirectly acquire voting

shares of Citizens State Bank, Gridley,

Kansas.

Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve

System, January 13, 1998.

Jennifer J. Johnson,

Deputy Secretary of the Board.

[FR Doc. 98–1172 Filed 1–16–98; 8:45 am]

BILLING CODE 6210–01–F

FEDERAL RESERVE SYSTEM

Change in Bank Control Notices;

Acquisitions of Shares of Banks or

Bank Holding Companies

The notificants listed below have

applied under the Change in Bank

Control Act (12 U.S.C. 1817(j)) and §

225.41 of the Board’s Regulation Y (12

CFR 225.41) to acquire a bank or bank

holding company. The factors that are

considered in acting on the notices are

set forth in paragraph 7 of the Act (12

U.S.C. 1817(j)(7)).

The notices are available for

immediate inspection at the Federal

Reserve Bank indicated. The notices

also will be available for inspection at

the offices of the Board of Governors.

Interested persons may express their

views in writing to the Reserve Bank

indicated for that notice or to the offices

of the Board of Governors. Comments

must be received not later than February

3, 1998.

A. Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas

City (D. Michael Manies, Assistant Vice

President) 925 Grand Avenue, Kansas

City, Missouri 64198-0001:

1. Richard Owen Wikert, Fremont,

Nebraska, and Clarence Wilson

Persinger, as Trustee of the C. Wilson

Persinger Trust, Sioux City, Iowa; to

acquire voting shares of American Banc

Corporation, Fremont, Nebraska, and

thereby indirectly acquire voting shares

of American National Bank of Fremont,

Fremont, Nebraska.

Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve

System, January 14, 1998.

Jennifer J. Johnson,

Deputy Secretary of the Board.

[FR Doc. 98–1269 Filed 1–16–98; 8:45 am]

BILLING CODE 6210–01–F

FEDERAL RESERVE SYSTEM

Formations of, Acquisitions by, and

Mergers of Bank Holding Companies

The companies listed in this notice

have applied to the Board for approval,

pursuant to the Bank Holding Company

Act of 1956 (12 U.S.C. 1841 et seq.)

(BHC Act), Regulation Y (12 CFR Part

225), and all other applicable statutes

and regulations to become a bank

holding company and/or to acquire the

assets or the ownership of, control of, or

the power to vote shares of a bank or

bank holding company and all of the

banks and nonbanking companies

owned by the bank holding company,

including the companies listed below.

The applications listed below, as well

as other related filings required by the

Board, are available for immediate

inspection at the Federal Reserve Bank

indicated. The application also will be

available for inspection at the offices of

the Board of Governors. Interested

persons may express their views in

writing on the standards enumerated in

the BHC Act (12 U.S.C. 1842(c)). If the

proposal also involves the acquisition of

a nonbanking company, the review also

includes whether the acquisition of the

nonbanking company complies with the

standards in section 4 of the BHC Act.

Unless otherwise noted, nonbanking

activities will be conducted throughout

the United States.

Unless otherwise noted, comments

regarding each of these applications

must be received at the Reserve Bank

indicated or the offices of the Board of

Governors not later than February 13,

1998.

A. Federal Reserve Bank of Boston

(Richard Walker, Community Affairs

Officer) 600 Atlantic Avenue, Boston,

Massachusetts 02106-2204:

1. Peoples Heritage Financial Group,

Inc., Portland, Maine; to acquire and

thereby merge with CFX Corporation,

Keene, New Hampshire, and thereby

indirectly acquire Safety Fund National

Bank, Fitchburg, Massachusetts; Orange

Savings Bank, Orange, Massachusetts;

and CFX Bank, Keene, New Hampshire.