COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA 

Present: Judges Benton, Coleman and Elder 

Argued at Richmond, Virginia 

GREGORY ALAN RANSOM 

 MEMORANDUM OPINION* BY 

v. Record No. 1322-98-2 JUDGE SAM W. COLEMAN III 

 MAY 18, 1999 

TINA CHANG RANSOM 

FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF SPOTSYLVANIA COUNTY 

William H. Ledbetter, Jr., Judge 

R. Scott Pugh for appellant. 

Edward V. O’Connor, Jr. (Byrd, Mische, 

Bevis, Bowen, Joseph & O’Connor, P.C., on 

brief), for appellee. 

 In this appeal from a final divorce decree the husband 

contends that the decree is void because (1) he failed to receive 

notice of the evidentiary deposition hearing and (2) failed to 

receive notice of the entry of the final decree. We find that 

husband did not receive the required notice for the evidentiary 

hearing or of the presentation of the proposed final divorce 

decree. Therefore, we reverse and vacate the final divorce decree 

and remand the case for further proceedings.1

 

Continued . . . 

 *Pursuant to Code § 17.1-413, recodifying Code § 17-116.010, 

this opinion is not designated for publication. 

1

Husband also contends that the divorce decree should be 

reversed because the clerk of the circuit court failed to 

deliver his letter to the trial judge informing the judge of his 

lack of notice, thereby depriving him of his right to seek a 
BACKGROUND

 Husband, who was represented by counsel, filed a bill of 

complaint for divorce alleging adultery and requesting child 

custody and the equitable distribution of their property. The 

bill of complaint alleged that wife had left the marital 

residence. Wife filed a pro se answer and cross-bill, alleging 

adultery by the husband and requesting child custody, child and 

spousal support, and equitable distribution. After filing an 

answer to the wife’s cross-bill, husband’s attorney withdrew. 

Husband proceeded pro se, but did not file with the clerk of court 

a written statement of his place of residence or mailing address 

as provided by Code § 8.01-319. 

 During the ensuing proceedings, wife retained counsel. Also, 

during that time husband, acting pro se, endorsed two decrees. 

Proceeding with her cross-bill, wife mailed a copy of a notice to 

take depositions to husband at 3205 Waverly Drive, Fredericksburg, 

VA 22407. Waverly Drive was not the marital address where the 

parties had resided. “3205 Waverly Drive” was the address at 

which wife alleged husband was living with his paramour.2 In 

 

Continued . . . 

vacation or modification of the final decree within twenty-one 

days of entry of the decree as provided by Rule 1:1. Because we 

reverse on other grounds, we do not reach this issue. 

2

Wife’s answer asserted that “Mrs. Hernandez lives at 3205 

Waberly Drive, Fredersburg VA 22407.” (Emphasis added). 

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addition to wife’s mailing the notice, the sheriff went to the 

same Waverly Drive address and after finding no one there for 

substituted service, he posted the notice on the front door. 

Thereafter, depositions were taken in husband’s absence. 

 Following the depositions, wife filed a notice that she would 

present to the circuit court on a date certain a final divorce 

decree for entry. The certificate of mailing appended to the 

notice certified that wife timely mailed a copy of the notice to 

husband at 1200 Townsend Boulevard, #8, Fredericksburg, VA 22407. 

The trial judge entered the final decree without the husband’s 

endorsement.3 The final decree recited that husband failed to 

appear after opposing counsel had mailed notice to him of the 

proposed entry of the final decree. The decree, which granted the 

wife a divorce based upon a one year separation, awarded her 

custody of the children granting husband “reasonable” visitation, 

child and spousal support, equitable distribution, and attorney’s 

fees. The husband appeals from the divorce decree. 

 3

Twelve days after entry of the final decree, husband sent 

an ex parte letter addressed to the trial judge explaining that 

he had received no notice of the evidentiary hearing and 

requesting an opportunity to be heard on the matter. Husband’s 

letter indicated that his address was 1200 Townsend Boulevard, 

#8, Fredericksburg, VA 22407 –- the same address where 

twenty-four days earlier wife had mailed the notice of the 

proposed entry of a final divorce decree. The clerk responded 

by providing husband a copy of the wife’s certificate of mailing 

and informing him that neither the clerk’s office nor the judge 

could provide him legal advice. At that time, seven days 

remained before the divorce decree became final under Rule 1:1. 

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ANALYSIS

 An elementary requirement of due 

process in any proceeding is “notice 

reasonably calculated, under all the 

circumstances, to apprise interested parties 

of the pendency of the action and afford 

them an opportunity to present their 

objections.” . . . Due process does not 

require actual notice to a party of the date 

of a trial or hearing after he or she has 

been properly made a party to the 

proceeding. [However, a state’s] 

legislature may prescribe “the kind of 

notice and the manner in which it shall be 

given if it is reasonable under all the 

circumstances and affords the party affected 

a reasonable opportunity to be heard.” 

Eddine v. Eddine, 12 Va. App. 760, 763, 406 S.E.2d 914, 916 

(1991). 

 Here, husband had notice of the pendency of the suit. He 

had instituted it in filing the bill of complaint. He asserts, 

however, that having made a general appearance, he was 

thereafter entitled to interim notice of evidentiary proceedings 

and of the entry of the final divorce decree. 

 In a divorce suit, the bill of complaint shall not be taken 

for confessed. The case shall be heard independently of the 

admissions of either party, and the charges shall be proven by 

full and clear testimony. See Code § 20-99; Westfall v. 

Westfall, 196 Va. 97, 101, 82 S.E.2d 487, 490 (1954). A party 

desiring to take evidence by deposition testimony may do so by 

giving reasonable notice in writing to the other party stating 

the time, place, and name and address of persons to be examined. 

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See Rule 4:5(b)(1). Rule 1:12 provides that when no other 

provision exists for service of a pleading, motion, or other 

paper, service shall be given by mailing or delivering to 

counsel of record. Code § 20-99(4) provides that notice to take 

depositions may be served by mailing a copy of the “notice” to 

counsel for opposing party. Code § 20-99 provides that in the 

context of notice in divorce proceedings, “‘[c]ounsel for 

opposing party’ shall include a pro se party who (i) has entered 

a general appearance in person by filing a pleading or endorsing 

an order of withdrawal of that party’s counsel.” See also Rule 

1:5 (“‘counsel of record’ includes a . . . party who has signed 

a pleading in the case or who has notified the other parties and 

the clerk in writing that he appears in the case”). 

 Where a party who has appeared in a divorce proceeding has 

not received notice of the evidentiary hearing upon which the 

divorce decree is based, the decree shall be vacated. See

Soliman v. Soliman, 12 Va. App. 234, 241, 402 S.E.2d 922, 927 

(1991) (holding that failure to give notice of the 

commissioner’s evidentiary hearing as required by Rule 2:18(a) 

invalidates the final decree). Thus, the question before us is 

whether the wife’s mailing of the notice or sheriff’s posting of 

it on the door of the Waverly Road address satisfied the notice 

requirement. 

 When husband’s counsel withdrew, husband became “counsel of 

record” and was entitled to notice of any hearings and of 

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pleadings. See Rule 1:12. Both Rule 1:12 and Code § 20-99(4) 

provide that notice may be given to counsel of record or 

opposing counsel by mailing a copy to him or her. Thus, the 

wife could have given notice to husband for the taking of 

depositions by mailing or by serving notice upon him in 

accordance with the provisions of Code §§ 8.01-296 or 

8.01-319(A). 

 However, Code § 8.01-319(A) provides that a pro se party 

“shall file with the clerk of court in which the action is 

pending a written statement of his place of residence and 

mailing address during the pendency of the action” and that an 

opposing party may rely on the “last written statement filed” 

for purposes of noticing the pro se party. See Eddine, 12 Va. 

App. at 764, 406 S.E.2d at 917. The record contains no evidence 

that husband furnished the clerk with his residence or mailing 

address. 

 Further, husband, who filed the initial bill of complaint 

did not provide an address as required by Rule 1:4(C). Thus, 

no “last written statement” of an address existed upon which 

wife could rely for mailing notice. 

 Although husband failed to provide an address for mailing 

or for constructive service, Code § 8.01-319(A) authorizes the 

trial court to dispense with the notice requirement or to 

require some form of substitute notice. However, wife did not 

inform the court that husband had failed to furnish an address, 

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nor did she request that the court waive the notice requirements 

or authorize her to substitute a notice procedure. Moreover, 

the record does not indicate that the court dispensed with the 

notice requirement of Rule 1:12. 

 When a pro se party fails to provide an address as required 

by Code § 8.01-319, the omission does not empower the opposing 

party to dispense with the required notice except by leave or 

direction of the court. Here, wife failed to follow the 

statutory requirements for notice of the taking of depositions 

and the entry of the final divorce decree. See Soliman, 12 Va. 

App. at 241, 402 S.E.2d at 927 (vacating divorce for lack of 

notice of commissioner’s hearing). 

 In addition, the record contains no indication that the 

husband received notice of entry of the final decree. Husband 

did not endorse the final decree as required by Rule 1:13. 

Although Rule 1:13 gives the trial judge discretion to dispense 

with a party’s endorsement of the decree and the notice 

requirement, here, the trial judge apparently dispensed with the 

notice and endorsement requirement based on the husband’s 

failure to appear. Under these circumstances, we hold that 

wife’s failure to comply with Code § 8.01-319 or otherwise give 

husband notice of entry of the divorce decree violated his due 

process and statutory rights and resulted in the entry of an 

invalid decree of divorce. See Rosillo v. Winters, 235 Va. 268, 

271-73, 367 S.E.2d 717, 718-19 (1988) (declaring void a draft 

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order entered by the trial court without notice to, or 

endorsement by, opposing counsel); Norfolk Div. of Soc. Services 

v. Unknown Father, 2 Va. App. 420, 427-28, 345 S.E.2d 533, 

536-37 (1986) (finding an order entered without notice to, or 

endorsements by one party, was void); but see Smith v. Stenaway, 

242 Va. 286, 288-89, 410 S.E.2d 610, 612 (1991) (affirming entry 

of an order without notice or endorsement where both counsel 

were present when the judge issued the ruling orally and, 

therefore, were fully aware of the court’s decision). 

 Accordingly, the judgment of the trial court is reversed, 

the decree is vacated and the case remanded for such further 

proceedings as are necessary. 

Reversed and remanded. 

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