T he H o no rable D avi d L. B unni ng, U ni t ed Stat es D i st ri ct Jud ge for t he E ast ern D i st ri ct of K ent ucky, s i t t i ng * b y de si gnat i o n. NO T R EC OM M EN DE D F OR F UL L- TEX T P UB LIC AT ION F ile Nam e: 08a0073n.06 F iled: Janu ary 24, 2008 Case Nos. 06- 2208, 06-2515 UN ITED STA TES C OU RT OF AP P EA LS F OR THE SI XT H C IR CU IT UNITED STAT ES O F AMERICA, P laintif f-App ellee,

v. DE SHA WN WEL LS, a. k.a . D e sha wn G e e m e s W e lls , Defendan t-Appellant.

_______________________________________ ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ON AP P EA L F RO M THE UNITED STAT ES DIS TRICT COURT F OR THE E ASTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIG AN

BEFORE: BATCHELDER and MOORE, Circuit Judges; BUNNING , District Judge. * ALI CE M. B ATCHELDER, Circuit Jud ge. De fe nd ant- Ap pe lla nt D e sh awn

Wel ls (“ Wel ls” ) a

pp e a ls the dis tr ic t c ourt ’s or de r d e nyinghis mot ion to dis mis s the c ri min a l in dic tme nt. Wells’s mot ion was pre mised o n h i s cl aim that the Plaintiff-Appe llee United States Gove rnment (“ Go ve rnme nt” ) h a d f

a ile d to pro vide pr ior

to h is p le a

he ari ngc e rt a in i mpe a c hme nt e vid e nc e in

acc ordanc e with Brady v. M aryland , 373 U.S. 83 (1963). This c l ai m is entirely fore closed by

the Supreme Court’s holding in Un ite d Sta te s v . R uiz , 536 U.S. 622 (2002), that the Gove rnment has no obligation to dis close such information prior to a de fenda nt’s entry of a guilty

plea, a nd we ther efor e AF F IRM the jud g me nt o f t he dis tr ic t c ourt
.

I. BACKG ROUND2

I n the ea rly morning hours of Aug ust 17, 2005, two office rs of the Jackson, Michig an, police depar tment on routine patrol hea rd a sing le g unshot followed by a series of rapid-f

ire g unshots. The

o ffice rs proc eede d immediately to the are a fr om which the sound of the gunshots had come, a nd observe d Wells m oving a way from the a

rea with a si l v er o bject in his hand. Wells ignore d the office rs’ orde rs to stop and fled on foot, pursued by the officers. Dur ing the pursuit, Wells discarde d what the of

fice rs later

d et er m i ned to be a

stolen .380 caliber

Walther semi-automatic pistol. The office rs eve ntually

found and a

rre sted Wells, who admitted possessing the firea rm in question. A ballistics ex pert c oncluded that one of the shell casing s rec overe d from the sc ene of the shooting ha d come f rom that g un. Wells had at least one pr ior felony conviction, and on Septembe r 28, 2005, a fe dera l gr and jur y ind ic te d h im on a c ha

rg e of be inga fe lon in p os se ssi on

of a fi re arm in v iol a tio n o f 4 2 U .S. C. § 922(g ). On Apr il 6, 2006, W ells pleade d g uilty to the char g e without the bene fit of a Rule 11 plea

a g re e me nt. Wel ls d id n ot t he n, no r d oe s h e no w, c on te st h is guil t. I nitially the Gover

nment soug ht a four-leve l incre ase in Wells’s offe nse leve l under United State s Se n te n c in g G u id e li n e s § 2 K 2

. 1 ( b ) ( 5 ) f o r th e u s e o f a f

ir e ar m in c o n n e c ti o n w it

h another felony offe nse. The Government intended to introduc e evide nce that Wells had fire d the wea pon at another person. But on Aug ust 14, 2006, the day befor e Wells’s scheduled se ntencinghear ing, the Gover nment withdrew its attempt to se ek this enhanc ement bec ause the re w as insufficie nt evidence to s ho w t hat We lls ha d f

ir e d th e g un

a t any on e , a

nd be c aus e th e Go ve rnme nt h a d ju st c ome int o possession of eviden ce that Wells would be able to use to impeach one of the police office rs the Gover nment intended to ca ll as a witness. The impeach m en t ev i dence arises f rom fac ts not

connec ted to this case.3

The Gove rnment immediately disclosed the impeac hment materia l, un d e r a Pr o te c ti v e O r der, to both the district court and Wells; the court continued the sentencinghear ing; a nd Wells filed a motion to di smiss t he indictment on the g rounds that he ha d not know ingly and voluntarily

pleade d g uilty beca use the Gove rnment had not disclosed the impeachme nt evidence prior to his g uilty plea. On September

18, 2006, prior to ru l i n g o n Wells’s mot ion to dism iss the indictment, the district court s en t enced Wells to 38 m onths’ incar cer ation, followed by two y ear s of supervise d rele ase. Then, on Nove mber 21, 2006, the district c ourt issued an opinion and order denying Wells’s motion to dismiss the indictment, holding t h at under Ru iz the Gover

nment was not oblig ated to provide Wells wit h the impeac hment evidenc e prior to his g uilty plea. Wells timely

appea led that dec ision. II. STA ND AR

D O F RE VI EW We r e vi ew for abu se of

dis c re tio n th e dis tr ic t c ourt ’s de c isi on de nyingWel ls’ s mo tio n to dismiss the i ndictment. United States v. Ov ermy er , 8 9 9 F. 2 d 4 5 7 , 4 6 5 (6 t h C i r. 1 9 9 0 ) ( ci t i n g United Sta te s v . P owe ll , 823 F.2d 996, 1001 ( 6th Cir. 1987)). III . A NA LY SIS Wel ls ra ise s two re la te d issu e s on app e a l. F ir st, he argue s th a t th e Go ve rnme nt v iol a te d h is constitutional rights by

not disclosing prior to the ple a hea ring the possible impeachme nt evidence reg ardingone of the arr esting office rs. Second, he argues that the Gove rnment’s fa ilure to turn over thi s e vid e nc e re nd e rs his guil ty ple a inv olu nta ry . B oth a lle g e d e rr or s, Wel ls a

rgue s, wa rr a nt a d i s m i s s al o f t h e i n d i ct m en t
. As we wi l l ex p l ai n , W el l s i s wr o n g. First, the Constitution does not require that the G overnme nt disclose impeachme nt i nformation prior to e ntering into a plea a g ree ment with a def endant or befor e a de fenda

nt pleads g uilty

. Ru iz , 536 U.S. at 629, 633. The Court wa s emphatic in Ru iz th a t t h e Brady rule re quiring4

such disclosures is li nked to the Constituti on’s g uara ntee of a fa ir trial, id . at 628, and whe n a defe ndant pleads guilty , he “f org oes not only a fair trial, but a lso other ac company ing c onstitut ional g uara ntees.” Id

. (c i t i n g Boyk

in v. Alabama , 395 U.S. 238, 243 (1969)) . The ne ed for impeachme nt in f o r mati o n , th e Co u rt e xp la in e d , is “ mo r e c lo s e ly r e late d to the fai rn ess of a tria l than to the

v olu nta rin ess of the plea .” Id . at 633 (e mphasis origi n al ). The a dded burde n imposed upon the Go ve rnme nt i n d isc los ingsu c h in fo rm a tio n be fo re ple a ne g oti a tio ns is hig h, wh ile the a dd e d b e ne fi t to the defe ndants is usually limit ed. Id

. Contrary to Wells ’s asser tions, Ru iz

is directly

on point and g ov e rn s th is c a se . A nd

he re , it is und isp ute d th a t th e Go ve rnme nt did not even hav e the information prior to Wells’s ple a hear ing and the entry of his guilty plea. There is no merit to Wells’s claim that the Gover nment was re quired to turn over impeachme nt information prior to Wells’s guilty plea. Second, the Gove rnment’s fa ilure to disclose the impea chment information — even if it had b e e n in p o s s e s s io n o f it p r io r to th e e n tr y o f th e g u il ty p le a

— d o e s n o t r e n d e r We ll s ’ s g uilty plea inv olu nta ry . B y ple a din g g uil ty , a

de fe nd ant v olu

nta ri ly re lin qu ish e s se ve ra l c on sti tut ion a l r ig hts

. See M cCarthy v. United States , 3 94 U. S. 4 59 , 4 66 (1 96 9) ; see also Brady v . United States , 39 7 U .S. 742, 748 (1 9 7 0 ) ( “ B u t t h e [g u il ty ] p le a

is mo r e th an

ana d mi s s io no f

p a s t c o n d

u c t; it is the de fe nd ant’ s c on se nt t

hat ju dg me nt o f c on vic tio n ma y be e nte re d w ith ou t a

tr ia l — a wa ive r o f h is rig ht to trial before a jury o r a j u d ge. ”)

. A g uilty plea pr ocure d from a de fenda nt who does not understand a

nd voluntarily

waive those rig hts is procured in violation of t he Due Process Clause a nd is void. Id .; Brady v. U

nited States , 394 U. S. at 748 . But “ imp e a c hme nt i nf or ma tio n is sp e c ia l in relation to the fairness of a tri al , n ot i n r e sp e c t of wh e the r a

ple a is voluntary.” Ru iz , 536 U.S. at 629 (empha sis origina l). Moreve r, “ i t is particular ly difficult to char acte rize impeachme nt5

information as c ritical information of which the def endant must alwa

y s be aw are prior to pleading g uilty .” Id . at 630. The C o n s t itution does not require that the de fenda nt have “ complete knowle dg e of the rele vant circumstances” in order to make a guilty plea voluntar

y . Id . I n Brady v. U

nited States , the Supreme Court stated: We f i n d n o r e qu i r e m e n t i n t h e C o n s t i tu t i o n t h a t a d e f e n d an t m u s t b e p e r

m i t te d to disown his solemn admissi ons in open court that he committed the ac t with which he is char g ed si mply beca

use i t later develops t hat t he S tate would have ha d a we aker c a se tha n th e de fe nd ant h a d th ou g ht. Id . at 757. Th e de fe nd ant n e e d o nly un de rs tand

the natur e of

his ri g ht a

nd ho w i t “ wo uld

lik e ly a pp ly in general

in the circ umstances.” Ru iz , 536 U.S. at 629 (empha sis origina l). The district cour t sufficie ntly informed Wells of his rights a nd the possible conseque nces of a g uilty plea at the plea hear ing. It is im materia l to the validity of Wells’s guilty

plea tha t b ec au s e W ells could have impeache d one of the Gover nment’s principal witnesses, t he Government m ay have had a we aker

case than he a

nticipated. F ina lly , w e re ite rate tha

t We lls has nev e r d e nie d h is guil t. H e ha s n e ve r p ro c la ime d h is innocenc e, and he h as n ever asked to withdra w his g uilty

plea. Rathe r, he nowclaims that the impeachme nt information “evisc erates 50% of the g overnme nt’s case,” a nd there fore require s the dismiss al of the indictment. Manif estly , information that evisce rate s only 50% of the G overnme nt’s

c a se le a ve s in ta c t th e re ma ini ng50%, bu t, th at a sid e , We lls po int s to no a uth or ity su pp or tin g his proposition that the Gover nment cannot be permitted to pr ocee d to tr ial in suc h a w ea k ened condition

. An d W el l s’s argument mere ly proves the Court’ s point in Ru iz : “a c onstitut ional obligation to p r o v ide impeachme nt information during plea ba rg aining , prior to entry

of a guilty

plea,6

could seriously

interfe re w ith the Governme nt’s i n t ere st in securing those g uilty pleas that a

re fac tually justified, desired by defe ndants, and help to secur e the efficie nt administration of justice.” Id. at 631. IV . C ON CL USI ON For the fore g oing r easons, we AF F IRM the jud g me nt o f t he dis tr ic t c ourt
.