Affirmed and Memorandum Opinion filed June 11, 2013.

In The

Fourteenth Court of Appeals

NO. 14-12-00858-CV

MUHAMMAD AMIR QURASHI, Appellant,

V.

ISMAT JABEEN, Appellee.

On Appeal from the 310th District Court

Harris County

Trial Court Cause No. 2011-52035

M E M O R A N D U M O P I N I O N

In this appeal from a final decree of divorce, appellant Muhammad Amir 

Qurashi contends that the trial court abused its discretion in denying his motion for 

continuance and motion for new trial after his lawyer was allowed to withdraw just 

before the start of trial. We affirm.
2

I

Qurashi and appellee Ismat Jabeen were both born in Karachi, Pakistan. 

They married in New York in 2007, and the following year they had a child. In 

2011, Jabeen filed for divorce in Harris County, citing irreconcilable differences, 

cruelty, and adultery. Jabeen also requested that she be appointed sole managing 

conservator of the child and that Qurashi be prohibited from having unsupervised 

access to the child. 

The trial court signed temporary orders appointing Jabeen sole managing 

conservator of the child and Qurashi possessory conservator. The trial court also 

found credible evidence of a potential risk of international abduction, and restricted 

Qurashi’s access to the child to limited periods of supervised visitation through the 

Harris County SAFE program. The trial court later modified the temporary orders

to allow Qurashi overnight visits with the child consistent with the parties’

agreement. Qurashi then answered and filed a counter-petition for divorce, 

requesting that he and Jabeen be appointed joint managing conservators of their 

child. 

On May 18, 2012, seventeen days before trial, Qurashi’s counsel filed an 

“Opposed Motion to Withdraw.” In the motion, Qurashi’s counsel asserted that 

good cause existed for her withdrawal because Qurashi was “insisting on a course 

of action that requires counsel to withdraw” and that Qurashi had failed to pay 

reasonable and necessary attorney’s fees for her services. The motion, which 

reflected that it was served on Qurashi by certified and first-class mail the same 

day, informed Qurashi that the trial was set for 9:00 a.m. on June 4, 2012. 

On June 4, the case was called to trial, but Qurashi was not present. Before 
3

the start of trial, Qurashi’s counsel presented her motion to withdraw.1She 

explained that Qurashi initially objected to the motion, but on May 22, she 

received an email from Qurashi in which he informed her that he no longer 

considered them to have an attorney-client relationship and he instructed her to not 

to take any further action on his case. Qurashi’s counsel also stated that she had 

received a text from her office about ten minutes earlier informing her that Qurashi 

was in the courthouse. Counsel noted, however, that Qurashi had not yet arrived in 

the courtroom. The trial court, after stating for the record that the parties were 

notified to appear at 9:00 a.m., and it was now 9:30, granted counsel’s motion to 

withdraw and excused her. Qurashi’s counsel did not request a continuance on 

Qurashi’s behalf.

The trial commenced after a short break and Jabeen began presenting her

case. Jabeen testified that she had to flee Pakistan because Qurashi held her 

hostage there, and that he has threatened to take her daughter to Pakistan to give 

her to his second wife. She testified that he filed a fraudulent custody suit in New 

York claiming residency in New York. Jabeen also testified that Qurashi had failed 

to properly answer discovery, including failing to list his current employment, and 

that he had troubles with the IRS. Additionally, Jabeen testified that Qurashi had 

failed to follow the trial court’s order to turn over her daughter’s passport to her.

During Jabeen’s direct testimony, Qurashi entered the courtroom. The trial 

judge informed Qurashi that he had been ordered to be in the courtroom at 9:00 

that day, and she had already allowed his counsel to withdraw. Jabeen’s counsel 

 

1 Although the motion to withdraw does not indicate when it was set to be heard, it does 

reflect the trial date of June 4. Qurashi does not contend he had no notice of the hearing; he 

complains only that he thought the trial date was two days later. The trial court’s order granting 

the motion to withdraw reflects that both the hearing on the motion and the trial were scheduled 

for June 4, 2012, at 9:00 a.m. On appeal, Qurashi does not contend that the trial court abused its 

discretion in granting his attorney’s motion to withdraw.
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proceeded with her direct examination. After Jabeen’s counsel passed the witness, 

the trial court asked Qurashi if he had any questions for Jabeen. Qurashi initially 

replied that he did, but he then changed his mind and declined to cross-examine 

Jabeen. Jabeen’s lawyer then testified concerning her attorney’s fees; Qurashi also 

declined to cross-examine this witness. No other witnesses testified in Jabeen’s 

case.

At the start of his case, Qurashi stated that he was not prepared and it was 

his understanding that the hearing was set for June 6. He also stated that his 

counsel had charged him “a lot of money,” but she did not represent him as he 

desired.2 Qurashi then disputed Jabeen’s testimony and provided contradictory 

testimony concerning his relationship with Jabeen and the child. Among other 

things, Qurashi accused Jabeen of having a long-time affair, and he also claimed 

that Jabeen had engaged in international abduction by taking their child from 

Pakistan to Houston. Nevertheless, Qurashi maintained that he wanted the parties 

to reach a mutually agreeable resolution of their dispute. Qurashi also testified 

concerning his employment and finances.

During his testimony, Qurashi commented that he could present witnesses 

and evidence to support his version of events, and he stated that he would hire an 

attorney. Qurashi also reiterated later in his testimony that he was not prepared and 

did not bring documents because he thought the hearing was set for another day.

Qurashi then stated that he needed time to retain an attorney. The trial court 

responded, “And we’re in trial today, so I’m not going to give you any additional 

time.” The trial continued with additional testimony from both Jabeen and Qurashi. 

 

2

Later in the trial, Qurashi stated, “I should not say I fired my attorney. My attorney was 

not attorney and then acted as my attorney and provided even my previous -- a lot of e-mails, 

you know, to her that she has no right to send any document” and “I believe my client privilege 

rights has been compromised.”
5

At the conclusion of the trial, the trial court rendered a judgment for divorce and 

granted all relief requested by Jabeen. 

On July 3, 2012, Qurashi filed his motion for new trial complaining of the 

trial court's failure to “grant a continuance so that he could hire another attorney.”

Qurashi supported his motion for new trial with his affidavit stating inter alia that 

he asked his former lawyer to request a continuance; that his former lawyer told 

him that the trial setting was June 6, 2012; and that he had not been able to obtain a 

new lawyer in such a short time. 

II

On appeal, Qurashi contends that the trial court abused its discretion in 

denying his motion for continuance when his lawyer had been allowed to withdraw 

a few minutes before the trial began. For the same reason, Qurashi also argues that 

the trial court should have granted his motion for new trial. Because Qurashi briefs 

these issues together, we will likewise analyze them together. 

A

We apply an abuse-of-discretion standard to the trial court’s rulings on 

Qurashi’s motion for continuance and motion for new trial. See In re R.R., 209 

S.W.3d 112, 114 (Tex. 2006) (per curiam); Villegas v. Carter, 711 S.W.2d 624, 

626 (Tex. 1986); Aduli v. Aduli, 368 S.W.3d 805, 818 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th 

Dist.] 2012, no pet.). The test for determining whether a trial court abuses its 

discretion is whether it acts unreasonably or in an arbitrary manner without 

reference to any guiding rules or principles. Butnaru v. Ford Motor Co., 84 S.W.3d 

198, 211 (Tex. 2002). Unless the record shows a clear abuse of discretion, we will 

not reverse a trial court’s decision. Villegas, 711 S.W.2d at 626. 

When the ground for continuance is the withdrawal of counsel, the movant 
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must show that the failure to be represented at trial was not due to his own fault or 

negligence. Id.; see also Tex. R. Civ. P. 253 (“[A]bsence of counsel will not be 

good cause for a continuance . . . when called for trial, except it be allowed in the 

discretion of the court, upon cause shown or upon matters within the knowledge or 

information of the judge to be stated on the record.”). Because the right to counsel 

is a valuable right, its unwarranted denial is reversible. Villegas, 711 S.W.2d at 

626; Crank, 666 S.W.2d at 94. When considering a motion for continuance, the 

trial court may take into account the entire procedural history of the case. See 

Aduli, 368 S.W.3d at 818 (citing Waste Water, Inc. v. Alpha Finishing & 

Developing Corp., 874 S.W.2d 940, 942 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 1994, 

no pet.)).

B

Qurashi primarily relies on Villegas v. Carter to support his contention that 

the trial court abused its discretion in failing to grant his oral request for 

continuance.

3

In that case, Villegas appeared at trial without an attorney and 

requested time to obtain an attorney after the trial court allowed his attorney to 

withdraw two days before trial. Villegas, 711 S.W.2d at 625. The Villegas court 

held that the trial court abused its discretion in denying Villegas’s request for a 

continuance, because the evidence showed that (1) Villegas was not negligent or at 

fault for causing his attorney’s withdrawal, (2) two days was too short a time to 

 

3 Rule 251 provides that a motion for continuance shall not be granted except for 

“sufficient cause supported by affidavit, or by consent of the parties, or by operation of law.” 

Tex. R. Civ. P. 251. Generally, when a movant fails to comply with Rule 251’s requirement that 

a motion for continuance be “supported by affidavit,” a reviewing court presumes the trial court 

did not abuse its discretion in denying the motion. Villegas, 711 S.W.2d at 626. In Villegas, the 

supreme court reasoned, “It would be unrealistic, however, to apply this presumption to lay 

movants who without fault have their attorney withdrawn.” Id. On appeal, Jabeen does not 

dispute Qurashi’s contention that this exception to Rule 251’s requirement of a motion supported 

by affidavit applies in this case.
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find a new attorney and for the new attorney to investigate the case, and (3) 

Villegas was prevented from obtaining a new attorney because his former attorney 

refused to turn over Villegas’s file. Id. at 626–27. Accordingly, the court held that 

the trial court “should either have denied the attorney’s motion to withdraw or 

granted the party’s motion for continuance; it did neither.” Id. at 627. 

Qurashi contends that his counsel sought to withdraw based only on the 

“vague statements” that Qurashi was “insisting on a course of action that requires 

counsel to withdraw” and the assertion that Qurashi had failed to pay his legal fees, 

even though counsel failed to mention how much Qurashi had already paid. 

Qurashi also points out that the withdrawal motion was presented on the same day 

the case was set for trial, and his counsel did not request a continuance or take 

steps to protect Qurashi’s interests consistent with the rules of professional 

conduct. Further, Qurashi argues that his motion for new trial shows that he would 

have obtained relevant evidence that would have been probative of the issues 

before the trial court if he had been given more time. Consequently, he maintains, 

the trial court’s failure to give him more time to secure new counsel and to inquire 

into the withdrawing counsel’s compliance with her duties to her client conflicts 

with Villegas. See id. at 626 (“[W]hen a trial court allows an attorney to voluntarily 

withdraw, it must give the party time to secure new counsel and time for the new 

counsel to investigate the case and prepare for trial.”). 

The case law instructs that when the ground for the continuance is the 

withdrawal of counsel, the controlling issue is whether the movant was left without 

counsel through no fault of his own. See id.; Crank, 666 S.W.2d at 94. Thus, in 

Villegas, the court concluded that it was error to deny the request for a continuance 

when the evidence showed that Villegas: (1) did not learn of his lawyer’s 

withdrawal until six days before the trial; (2) his former lawyer refused to turn over 
8

his file and important evidence even though the lawyer had not presented Villegas 

with a bill; and (3) the attorney Villegas wanted to hire refused to take the case 

until he could see the file, look over the facts, and determine his fee. See Villegas,

711 S.W.2d at 625–26.

In contrast, in State v. Crank, Dr. Crank had previously received two 

continuances when, on the morning of his administrative hearing before the board 

of dental examiners, he announced that he and his counsel had reached 

“philosophical differences” in their approach to his case, and he requested a 

continuance to substitute other attorneys. See Crank, 666 S.W.2d at 93. Despite 

having notice of the scheduled hearing for over a month, it was not until the 

morning of the hearing that Dr. Crank informed the board that he would no longer 

be represented by his attorney of record and wanted more time to find other 

attorneys. Id. at 93–94. Based on those facts, the supreme court found no abuse of

discretion in denying Dr. Crank’s motion for continuance. Id. at 94.

We conclude that the facts of this case are more akin to Crank than Villegas. 

Here, Qurashi’s attorney filed her motion to withdraw on May 18 and notified 

Qurashi of the motion by regular and certified mail. Qurashi’s attorney stated that 

Qurashi was aware of the hearing date, and also pointed out that her motion to 

withdraw informed him of the June 4 trial date. We also note that Qurashi’s motion 

for new trial and accompanying affidavit are conspicuously silent concerning 

Qurashi’s receipt of his attorney’s motion to withdraw—though the motion states 

that a copy had been delivered to Qurashi and recites that the “final trial on the 

merits is scheduled for June 4, 2012, at 9:00 a.m.” According to Qurashi’s 

attorney, Qurashi informed her by email on May 22 that he no longer considered 

them to have an attorney-client relationship and he instructed her to take no 

additional action on his behalf. Thus, assuming the trial court credited the 
9

attorney’s representations, Qurashi had at least two weeks to obtain other counsel 

and to file a motion for continuance before the start of trial. Moreover, the trial 

court could have concluded that Qurashi’s instructions to his counsel precluded her 

from filing a motion for continuance on his behalf.

On the trial date, Qurashi arrived late. He explained that he thought the trial 

date was June 6, even though the motion to withdraw informed him of the correct 

date. When considering the credibility of Qurashi’s representations, the trial court 

could have taken into account Qurashi’s previous attempt to obtain an advantage in 

the New York custody proceedings by misrepresenting the child’s residency. The 

trial court also could have considered Jabeen’s testimony that the child was at risk 

of international abduction by Qurashi, as well as Jabeen’s trial testimony that 

Qurashi provided false information in discovery and failed to comply with the trial 

court’s temporary orders. See Aduli, 368 S.W.3d at 818 (trial court did not abuse 

its discretion in denying husband’s request for continuance when movant’s 

attorney was permitted to withdraw on day of trial given movant’s nonspecific 

representations and history of proceedings).

At trial, Qurashi did not maintain an opposition to his attorney’s withdrawal; 

instead, Qurashi’s comments indicated that he considered his former attorney’s 

representation to have been unsatisfactory. And although Qurashi stated that he 

wanted time to get another attorney, he did not indicate how much time he would 

need or what steps, if any, he had taken to obtain new representation. Nor did 

Qurashi complain that his attorney’s actions somehow impeded his ability to obtain 

other counsel. Qurashi simply appeared at trial late and informed the court that he 

disapproved of his attorney and wanted time to find another. Based on this 

evidence, the trial court was entitled to believe that Qurashi was aware that the 

motion and the trial would occur on June 4, 2012, at 9:00 a.m., that Quarshi had 
10

directed his lawyer to take no further steps on his behalf, and that Qurashi himself 

had taken no steps to protect himself.

Qurashi cites as support this court’s recent opinion in Harrison v. Harrison,

367 S.W.3d 822 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2012, pet. denied). In Harrison, 

the court held that the trial court abused its discretion in failing to grant a 

continuance when the wife’s counsel withdrew forty days before the trial date due 

to the wife’s failure to pay an unspecified amount of attorney’s fees. Id. at 835. In 

that case, however, the wife had strenuously objected to her counsel’s motion to 

withdraw, she requested that the trial court award interim fees to pay her attorney 

so that he could remain her counsel and the trial could go forward on the scheduled 

date, and she detailed her unsuccessful efforts to find a new attorney. See id. at 

831–32. Here, Qurashi did not object to his former counsel’s withdrawal and he 

offered no explanation for his failure to obtain representation by the trial date. 

Instead, Qurashi merely asserted that would retain an attorney if given more time. 

Harrison does not support Qurashi’s appellate argument.4

Based on this record, we conclude that Qurashi has failed to show that his 

lack of representation was not due to his own fault or negligence. See Crank, 666 

S.W.2d at 94; Aduli, 368 S.W.3d at 818. We therefore hold that the trial court did 

not abuse its discretion in denying Qurashi’s request for a continuance. We further 

hold that the trial court did not abuse its discretion by refusing to grant Qurashi’s 

motion for new trial, which was based on the trial court’s denial of his motion for 

continuance.

 

4 Qurashi cites other authorities as well, but they are all factually or procedurally 

distinguishable. Harrison and Villegas are his strongest cases, and as set forth above, they are 

inapposite.
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* * *

We overrule Qurashi’s issues and affirm the trial court’s final decree of 

divorce.

/s/ Jeffrey V. Brown

Justice

Panel consists of Justices Brown, Christopher, and McCally.