Pursuant to Fede ral Rule of A ppellate Proc edure 43(c) (2), Attorne y Gene ral Er ic H. 1 Ho lde r Jr . is a

uto matic a lly

su bs tit ute d f or fo rm e r A tto rn e y

Ge ne ra l A lbe rt o G on zal e s a s a responde nt in this case . -1- 06

- 00 32

- ag M endez v. H ol der UN ITED STA TES C OU RT OF AP P EA LS F OR THE SE CO ND CI RC UI T

August Term, 2006 (Argued: J une 12, 2007 De cided: May 8, 2009 ) Docke t No. 06-0032-a g

J UAN M AN UE LM E ND E Z, Petitioner ,

– v. – ERI C H. HOL DER J R., ATTORNEY G ENERAL , 1 UNI TED STATES DEPARTMENT OF J USTI CE,

Re sp on de nts

.

Be fore : McLAUGHL I

N, CALAB RESI , and SOTOMAYO R, Circuit Judges

. 1 Petition for reviewof the B oard of I mmigration Appeals’ de cision summarily aff irming 2 an Immigration J udg e’s de nial of ca ncellation of r emoval on the grounds that Petitioner had not 3 de mon str ate d th at hi s r e mov a l w ou ld c a us e “ e xce pti on a l and

e xtre me ly

unus ua l ha

rd sh ip” to h is-2- 1 United States citizen children. 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(b)(1) (D). Under our decision in Xiao Ji Chen 2 v. U.S. De

p’t of Justice , 471 F.3d 315, 329 ( 2d Cir. 2006), that the REAL I D Act r estores our 3 jurisdiction to review “ constitutional claims or questions of law,” 8 U .S.C. § 1252(a)(2) (D), a nd 4 our d e c isi on

inBarco-Sandov al v. Gonzales , 516 F.3d 35 ( 2d Cir. 2008), that we c an re view the 5 deter

mination of whether

“exceptional and e x tremely unusual hardship” is present in those ra re 6 case s where a B I A dec ision rests on fac t-finding“which is fla wed by an er ror of law,” id . at 40, 7 we hold that the B I A’s dec ision in t his case must be r emande d beca use sig nificant e vidence was 8 overlooke d and the r ecor d was mischar acte rized to an extent amounting to err ors of law

. 9 There fore , the petition is GRANTED, and the c ase is REMANDED to the BIA for a 10 re c on sid e ratio n o f P e tit ion e r’ s c la ims a bs e nt t he se e rr or s. 11 12 MARTI N L . ROTHSTEI

N, B arst & Mukamal, L L P (Dan 13 Lundy , on the brief ), Ne w York, N .Y., for

Pe tit ion e r. 14 15 J ENNI FER PAI SNER, Office of Immigration L itigation, 16 United States Depa rtment of Just ice, Civil Division, 17 Washington, D.C., for Re sp on de nts

. 18 19 20 21 22 PER

CU RIAM : 23 Petitioner J uan Manue l Mendez, a native a nd citizen of Mexi co, see ks review of a 24 decision of the B oard of I mmigration Appeals (“ BIA”) summarily aff irming a decision of a

n 25 I mmigration J udg e (“ I J ”), which denied Me ndez’s application for canc ellation of re moval. In re 26 Juan Manue l Mende z , No. A78 428 394 (B .I .A. Dec . 9, 2005), aff’g No

. A7 8 4 2 8 3 9 4 (Imm i g. 27 Ct. N.Y. City

Sept. 28, 2004). The I J denied Me ndez’s petition on the gr ounds that he had not 28 de mon str ate d th at hi s r e mov a l w ou ld r e su lt i n “ e xce pti on a l and e xtre me ly

unus ua l ha

rd sh ip” to-3- 1 his United States citiz en childre n. 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(b)(1)( D). 2 Petitioner argues that the I J err ed as a matter of la

w by applying the wrongstandard f or 3 de te rm ini ngwh e the r t he ha rd sh ip c a us e d b y his re mov a l w ou ld b e “ e xce pti on a l and e xtre me ly 4 unusual.” Our

Circuit’s prec edent is that “e x ceptional a nd extremely

unusual hardship” 5 deter

minations are g ener ally

discretionar

y judgme nts that we lac k jurisdiction to review, DeLa 6 Vega v . Gonzales , 4 36 F .3 d 1 41 , 1 45 -4 6 ( 2d Cir . 2 00 6) , unle ss t

he y ra ise “ c on sti tut ion a l c la ims 7 or qu e sti on s o f l aw, ” 8 U .S. C. § 12 52 (a )( 2) (D ); accord Barc o-Sandoval v . Gonzales , 516 F.3d 8 35, 38-39 (2d Cir. 2008). N otwithstanding these prec edents, Petitioner asse rts that we have 9 jur isd ic tio n to re vie w h is c la im r e g ard ingthe c on str uc tio n a nd a pp lic atio n o f t

he ha rd sh ip 10 sta

nd ard , a rguin gthat “ so fa

r a s De La Vega h o l d s th ath ar d s h i p d e t e r m i n at i o n s ar e d i s c r e t i o n ar y, 11 that holding is base d on inapplicable r easoningand ca se law r eg ardinga previous ve rsion of the 12 Cance llation statute, which diffe rs in critica l way s from the c urre nt one.” 13 We disag ree with Petiti oner that we ca n disreg ard the limit ations set forth in De La Vega 14 and Barco-Sandov al , and we adher e to our holding s in these ca ses that we c annot re view the 15 acc urac y

of an I J ’s fa ct-findingor the wisdom of his discre tion. Never theless, we c onclude that 16 Petitioner has ra ised questions of law that we have jur isdiction to consider, see Barco-Sandov al , 17 516 F.3d at 39, and, upon doingso, we hold that the B I A, which summarily aff irmed the I J ’s 18 decision, committed err ors of lawin denying Petitioner’ s elig ibilit y for c ance llation of removal. 19 Consequently , we r emand the pe tition t o the B I A for c onsideration of whether , absent such 20 err ors, a ha

rdship deter

mination is appropriate in this case

. 21 BACK GR OUND 22 Be cause the ag ency has not questioned Petitioner’s c redibility , we take the fa cts asser ted-4- 1 by him to be true. See Yan C hen v. G onzales , 4 17 F .3 d 2 68 , 2 71 -7 2 ( 2d Cir . 2 00 5) (h old ingthat, 2 wh e re the re is n o a dv e rs e c re dib ili ty de te rm inatio n in

the de c isi on

be ingre vie we d b y

thi s Co ur t, 3 we as s u m e t h atth e p et i t i o n er i s cr ed i b l e)

. P et i t i o n er

en t er edth e U n i t edS t at es i n1 9 8 9 , atage 4 fi ft e e n, and

ha s li ve d in

thi s c ountr

y e ve r s inc e . In 1 99 8, he marr ie d; h is w if e is a lso pr e se nt i n 5 the United States without documentation. Petitioner and his wife have two c hildren: their son, 6 J esus Manue l, was born in 1992, and the ir daug hter, Da isy , was born in 1999. B oth children a re 7 Un ite d St ate s c iti zen s. 8 Petitioner’s daug hter suff ers f rom sever e asthma. Petitioner testified that she has about 9 twenty -five a sthma attacks a y ear and that her

condition require s the use of a home nebulizer as 10 well as a

n inhaler. She a lso require s regular visits to the emerg ency room for se rious attacks. 11 Shortly

afte r he w as born, Petitioner’s son wa s diag nosed with Gra de I IVesicour eter al 12 Reflux. Thi s disease c auses ur ine to ref lux from the bladde r bac k to the kidney s and liver, 13 c a

us ingsta phinf e c tio ns , s c arr ing , a

nd tis su e dama g e . U lti mate ly , th e c on dit ion c an le a d to 14 kidney

or liver f ailure. Jesus rec eived tre atment for this condition until ag e seve n, at which point 15 te sts sh ow e d th at hi s k idn e y s w e re no rm a l. H e mus t se e a sp e c ia lis t e ve ry

y e ar, ho we ve r, to 16 e ns ur e that th e re a re no re c ur

re nc e s o r l a sti nge ff

e c ts. 17 Pe tit ion e r t e sti fi e d th at th e re are “ no t ma ny job s ava ila

ble ” in t he pa rt of Me xico that he is 18 fr om, and

that hi s r e lativ e s w ou ld b e un a ble to s up po rt

him and his fa mil y if he re tur ne d. As a 19 result, he would be unable to pay for his childre n’s medica l car e or e ducation ther e. More over, 20 the re is n o d oc tor in h is v ill a g e in M e xico , a nd he wo uld have to p ay

to t ra ve l to ano the r c ity 21 whene ver one of his children ne eded me dical ca re. A ccor ding to Petitioner, the r eg ion of Mexico 22 in whic h h is v ill a g e is l oc ate d h a s f e w d oc tor s a

nd e ve n f e we r s pe c ia lis ts. He wa s unc e rt a inThe Immigration and Natura liz ation Service cea sed to exist in 2003. The func tions at 2 issue here are now per formed by the B urea

u of Citiz enship and Immigration Services, within the Depa rtment of Homela

nd Security

. See6 U.S.C. § 271(b).

-5- 1 wh e the r t

he me dic atio ns fo r h is d a ug hte r’ s a sthma

wo uld be ava ila ble the re , b ut h e wa s c e rt a in 2 that, if they

wer e, they

would be “ve ry

expensive.” 3 Ad dit ion a lly , Pe tit ion e r’ s c hil dr e n a re un fa mil iar w ithMe xica

n c ult ur e and no t f ull y 4 c omf

or ta ble sp e akin gSpa

nis h. Pe tit ion e r t e sti fi e d th at hi s so n is in a n h on or s p ro g ra

m and wa nts 5 to b e a

lawye r, a do c tor , o r a

po lic e of fi c e r. In M e xico , Pe tit ion e r d id n ot t hink h e wo uld

be a ble 6 to pay

for the e ducation nec essar y for his son to pursue these fields. In short, Petitioner 7 conclude d that reloc atingto Mex ico would be a “disaster ” for

his children. 8 The Immigration and Natura liz ation Service serve d Petitioner with a Notice to Appe ar on 2 9 J un e 1 0 , 2 0 0 2

. P e t i t i o n e r c o n c e d e d

r e m o v a b i l i ty an d a p p l i e d f o r c an c e l l at i o no f

r e m o v a l

. T h e IJ 10 denied the a

pplication, finding Petitioner ineligible f or re lief, and the BIA summarily aff irmed. 11 DI SCU SSIO N 12 In order

to demonstrate e ligibility for c ance llation from remova l, Petiti oner must show 13 that he: 14 (A) ha s been phy sically prese nt in the United States for a continuous period 15 of not less than 10 y ear s immediately prec edingthe date of

such application; 16 (B ) has be en a pe rson of g ood moral cha rac ter duringsuch per iod; 17 (C) has not bee n convicted f or an of fense under se ction 1182(a) (2), 18 1227(a) (2), or 1227(a) (3) of

this ti tle . . . ; and 19 (D ) e sta bli sh e s th at r e mov a l w ou ld r e su lt i n e xce pti on a l and e xtre me ly 20 unusual hardship to the a lien’s spouse, par ent, or c hild, who is a citiz en of the 21 United States or an a lien lawfully admitted for pe rmane nt residenc e. 22 23 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(b)(1). The Gover nment stipulated that Petiti oner me ets the first thre e 24 require ments. Acc ording ly , the only contested issue be fore the ag ency was whe ther Petitioner-6- 1 de mon str ate d th at hi s r e mov a l w ou ld r e su lt i n e xce pti on a l and e xtre me ly

unus ua l ha

rd sh ip t o h is 2 children. 3 The I J found that it would not. She wrote that, “[w]hile it i s clea r fr om the evidenc e of 4 rec ord that the re spondent’s childre n will, in fact, suffe r a ha rdship, one which mig ht even be 5 char acte rized or classifie d as an e x treme ha rdship, the Court finds that there is insufficient 6 evidenc e on which the Court can c onclude that this hardship to his children w ould be exceptional 7 and extremely

unusual.” The BIA summarily aff irmed. 8 Under

8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2) (B )(i), this Court lacks jurisdiction to review “any judgme nt 9 reg ardingthe g rantingof re lief under . . . [8 U.S .C. § 1229b] .” Notwithstandingthis provision, 10 Petitioner contends that “8 U .S.C. § 1252(a)(2) (B ) does not strip cour ts of jurisdiction to review 11 no nd isc re tio na

ry de c isi on s r e g ard ingan a lie n’ s eligibilit y fo r t he re lie f s pe c if

ie d in 8 U .S. C. 12 § 1252(a) (2)( B) (i).” Sepulve da v. Gonzales , 4 07 F .3 d 5 9, 62 -6 3 ( 2d Cir . 2 00 5) (e mph a sis 13 added) . That is, “[o] btaining . . . c ance llation of removal is a two- step proce ss. First, an a lien 14 must prove elig ibilit y by showing that he mee ts the statutory elig ibilit y

require ments. Second, 15 assuming a

n alien satisfies the statutory require ments, the Attorney Gene ral in his discretion 16 decide s whether

to gr ant or de ny

relief .” Rodriguez v. Gonzales , 451 F.3d 60, 62 ( 2d Cir. 2006) 17 (per

curiam) (citations omitted). He a rgues that “[b]ecause the se two stag es ar e distinct, we 18 have jur isd ic tio n to re vie w whe the r t he B I A c or

re c tly de te rm ine d th at th e a lie n w a s eligible for” 19 canc ellation of re moval, id. , but we lac k jurisdiction at the second stag e to re view the Attorne y 20 Gene ral’s de cision to gr ant or de ny relief , made e ntirely

in his discretion. Se e als o INS v. St. Cyr , 21 533 U.S. 289, 307 (2001) (r ecognizi ngthe traditional distinction “betwee n elig ibilit y for 22 discretionar

y relief , on the one ha

nd, and the f

avora ble exercise of

discretion, on the otherThis Court has not y et dec ided whethe r it has jurisdiction to review the ag ency ’s moral 3 char acte r dete rminations made under the “c atch- all” provision of 8 U.S.C. § 1101(f)

. See Zai m- Sa ssi

v . I NS , 2 01 F . App ’x 16 , 1 8 ( 2d Cir . 2 00 6) (“ We a

re no t ba rr e d b y 8 U .S. C. § 1252(a) (2)( B) (i) fr om review ing nondisc retionar y g ood moral cha

rac ter de terminations under any of the per se cate g ories desc ribed in 8 U.S.C. § 1101(f). We have not deter mined whether we have jur isd ic tio n to re vie w g oo d mo ra l c ha ra c te r d e te rm inatio ns ma de un de r t he “ c atc h- a ll” provision of 8 U.S.C. § 1101(f) . . . .” ) (c itation omit ted). -7- 1 hand”)

. 2 Pe tit ion e r p oints o ut t hat, b a se d o n th is a

na ly sis , w e have pr e vio us ly he ld t hat w e re ta in 3 jur isd ic tio n to re vie w c e rt a in a g e nc y de te rm inatio ns re g ard ingtw o o f t he fo ur e lig ibi lity 4 re qu ir e me nts fo r c anc e llatio n o f r e mov a l: ( a ) t hat an a lie n h a s n ot b e e n c onvic te d o f c e rt a in 5 crimes, see Rodrigue z , 451 F.3d at 62-63; and (b) that an alien “ has bee n a per son of g ood moral 6 char acte r,” see Se

pulveda , 407 F.3d at 62-64. We have a lso inti mated, but not y et held, that we 3 7 have jur isdiction to review the third re quirement – that a n alien mee ts certa in phy sical pre sence 8 conditions. See id. at 63. Petitioner contends that we broke f rom these holding s in De La Vega 9 wh e n w e ru le d th at w e la c k ju ri sd ic tio n to re vie w the la st r e ma ini nge lig ibi lity re qu ir e me nt, 10 “exceptional and e x tremely unusual hardship,” and wr ong ly conclude d that such dete rminations 11 are inhere ntly

discretionar

y judgme nts. See 43 6 F .3 d at 14 5- 46 ; see also Barco- Sandoval , 516 1 2 F. 3 d

at3 8 -3 9 (r ea ff

i rm i n g De La Vega as binding law). 13 Petitioner asserts that ther e is no compellingrea son to differe ntiate the “e x ceptional a nd 14 e xtre me ly

un us ua l ha rd sh ip” de te rm inatio n f

ro m th e oth e r e lig ibi lity

re qu ir e me nts . H e c la ims 15 that the plain languag e of the canc ellation of re moval statute sug g ests no differ ence betwee n the 16 four r equire ments, and that there is no compelling a rgument why , for e x ample, the de finition of 17 “phy sical pre sence ” or “ g ood moral cha rac ter” is more a que stion of statutory construction thanWhil e Petitioner conc edes that an “e x ceptional a nd extremely

unusual hardship” 4 deter mination is necessar ily

less deter minate than other

elig ibilit y

require ments for c ance llation of re moval — for e x ample, whe ther a n alien has be en phy sically prese nt in the United States for ten y ear s — he conte nds that this differe nce doe s not counsel for no r eview, but f or more de fe re nti a l r e vie w. He no te s th at th e g e ne ra l st a nd ard fo r whe n a

n a c tio n is “ c omm itt e d to a g e nc y dis c re tio n b y

law” un de r t

he Ad min istra tiv e Pr oc e dure Ac t, 5 U. S.C. § 7 01 (a )( 2) , is whether there is “no law to apply ,” Hec kler v . Chaney , 470 U.S. 821, 830 (1985) (inter nal qu otatio n ma

rk s o mitte d) , a

nd that th e Sup re me Court

ha s d e fi ne d a

dis c re tio na

ry a c t a s o ne in which the individual authorized to ac t “must ex erc ise his authority acc ordingto his own understandingand consc ience ,” Un ite d S tates e xre l. A c c ar

di v . S ha ug hn essy , 347 U.S. 260, 267 (1954). Cer

tainly , Petitioner argues, there is law to apply in review ing a

hardship dete rmination, as evide nced by

the B I A’s own tre atment of ha rdship as a le g al standar d. See, e .g. , In re A- S-B- , 24 I . & N . Dec . 493, 497 (B I A 2008) (e x plaining that the BIA re views an I J ’s fa ctual finding s for c le ar e rr or , b ut r e vie ws de novo the question of whe ther those f acts support a

conclusion that the ha rd sh ip r ise s to the re qu ir e d le ve l) ; see also Bd. of Imm igration Appeals: Procedural Reforms To Improve Case M

anageme nt , 67 Fe d. Reg . 54878, 54890 (Aug . 26, 2002) (a nnouncingthat the B I A m ay re vie w h ard sh ip d e te rm inatio ns fo r c anc e llatio n o f r e mov a l de novo as a que stion of law) . In s ho rt , Pe tit ion e r c on te nd s th at w hil e a ha rd sh ip d e te rm inatio n ma

y e nta il s ome dis c re tio n o n th e pa

rt of the a g e nc y , th e de c isi on

is n ot d isc re tio na

ry in t he se ns e that it

is committed to the discretion of the A ttorney Gene ral. See, e .g. , Zhao Quan Chen v. Gonzales , 492 F.3d 153, 154 ( 2d Cir. 2007) (per curiam) (denia l of motion to reopen or r econside r re viewed fo r a bu se of dis c re tio n) ; see also Pe dreros v. Keisler , 503 F.3d 162, 164 ( 2d Cir. 2007) (per curiam) (denia l of continuanc e re viewed f or abuse of discre tion). -8- 1 the de fi nit ion

of “ e xce pti on a l and

e xtre me ly

unus ua l ha

rd sh ip. ” L ike wi se , Pe tit ion e r a rgue s th at 4 2 if the B I A wer e to deny an alien’ s petition, not because it dee med the har dship to, say , the alien’ s 3 adoptive mother insuff iciently serious, but bec ause it dete rmined that an a doptive mother wa s not 4 a “ pa re nt” wi thi n th e me anin gof 8 U .S. C. § 12 29 b( b) (1 )( D) , w e wo uld have jur isd ic tio n to 5 question the ag ency ’s statutory interpre tation. See J

un Min Zhang v. Gonzales , 457 F.3d 172, 6 18 0 ( 2d

Cir . 2 00 6) (C a la

br e si, J., c on c ur

ri ng ). Th is, Pe tit ion e r c la ims , d e mon str ate s th at a s to 7 so me pa

rt s o f t he la st e lig ibi lity

re qu ir e me nt f

or c anc e llatio n o f r e mov a l, w e have the same 8 a uth or ity to r e vie w that w e have e xer c ise d w ithre sp e c t to the oth e r t hr e e re qu ir e me nts

. 9 Petitioner asserts that, in compa rison with hardship re quirements found in other sections 10 of the I

NA, the languag e for

canc ellation of re moval sug g ests that we have jurisdiction here . The-9- 1 hardship dete rmination for c ance llation of removal r equire s that an alien “ establish[] that 2 re mov a l w ou ld r e su lt i n e xce pti on a l and e xtre me ly

unus ua l ha

rd sh ip t o th e a lie n’ s sp ou se , p are nt, 3 or child, who is a c itiz en of the United States or an a lien lawfully admitted for pe rmane nt 4 residenc e.” 8 U .S.C. § 1229b(b)(1)(D ). In contra st, other sec tions of the I NA re quire that a

n 5 alien esta

blish ex treme ha

rdship “in the opinion of the Attorne y Gene ral” or “to the satisfaction 6 of the Attorne y

Gene ral.” This lang uag e wa s used for suspe nsion of deportation, the prede cessor 7 of the c urre nt canc ellation of re moval law. B ut it was not included with respe ct to canc ellation. 8 See 8 U.S.C. § 1254(a)(1) (suspension of de portation) (r epea led 1996); 8 U.S.C. § 1182(i)(1) 9 (§ 212(i) r elief)

. 10 Petitioner points to our decision in Kal k ou li v . A sh c ro

ft , 282 F.3d 202 ( 2d Cir. 2002) (per 11 curiam), wher e we held that we la ck jurisdiction to reviewthe har dship determination for 12 suspension of depor tation because the plain languag e of the provision — “in the opinion of the 13 Attorney

Gene ral” — “cle arly

entrusts the dec ision to t he Attorne y Gene ral’s discr etion.” Id. at 14 204. Petitioner argues that this additional clause, which is now lackingas to ca ncellation of 15 re mov a l, s ug g e sts a signif ic ant d if fe re nc e in t

he statut e s a

nd that w e sh ou ld n ot t

re at th e c la

us e in 16 the other I

NA har dship provisions as surplusag e. See, e .g. , Russello v. United States , 4 64 U. S. 17 16, 23 (1983) ( “[W ]here Cong ress include s particular languag e in one se ction of a statute but 18 omi ts i t in

ano the r s e c tio n o f t

he same Ac t, i t is g e ne ra lly pr e sume d th at Co ng re ss a c ts 19 intentionally

and purpose ly

in the disparate inclusion or exclusion.” (internal quotation marks 20 omitted)); Conn. ex rel. Blume nthal v. U.S. Dep’ t of Interior , 228 F.3d 82, 88 ( 2d Cir. 2000) 21 (“[W] e ar e re quired to ‘disfa vor interpr etations of statutes that re nder la ng uag e super fluous.’” 2 2 (qu o t i n g Con n. Nat ’l Ba nk v . G e rm ain , 5 03 U. S. 2 49 , 2 53 (1 99 2) )) ; see also Nethagani v.-10- 1 Mukase

y , 532 F.3d 150, 154- 55 (2d Cir. 2008) (holdingthat “whe n a statute a uthorizes the 2 Attorney

Gene ral to make a dete rmination, but lacks additional languag e spec ifically rende ring 3 that de te rm inatio n to be wi thi n h is d isc re tio n, ” the statut e is n ot o ne that “ a bate [s] our p ow e r t o 4 revie w the dec ision”). 5 Finally , Petitioner contends that any doubt should strongly

favor a construc tion permitting 6 revie w bec ause of the “strongpresumption in favor of judicial revie w of a dminist rative a ction,” 7 St. Cyr , 533 U.S. at 298, and the “ ‘long standing principle of c onstruing a ny linge ringambig uities 8 in deportation statutes in favor of the a lien,’” id. at3 2 0 (qu o t i n g INS v. Cardoza-Fonsec a , 480 9 U.S. 421, 449 (1987)). 10 Petitioner has pre sented substantial ar g uments. Were we operating on a clea n slate, we 11 would be inclined to hold that the question of whe ther a n alien has e stablished “exceptional and 12 extremely

unusual hardship” is a deter mination that we have jurisdiction to review, just as we 13 can r eview de cisions dealingwith the other e ligibility require ments for c ance llation of removal. 14 We are , howeve r, bound by prior dec isions of our Court. See U nited States v. Snow , 462 F.3d 55, 15 65 n. 11 (2 d Ci r. 20 06 ) ( “ [A] pr ior de c isi on of a pa ne l of thi s c ourt bin ds a ll s ub se qu e nt p ane ls 16 ‘abse nt a cha

ng e in law by

highe r authority

or by way of an in ba

nc proc eeding ’ . . . .” ( quoting 17 United States v. King , 276 F.3d 109, 112 ( 2d Cir. 2002))). I n Barco-Sandov al , th is C ourt he ld 18 that the deter

mination of whether

“exceptional and e x tremely unusual hardship” is present for the 19 purposes of c ance llation of removal is beyond our jurisdiction to review, e x cept in those ra re 20 case s where the B I A dec ision on whether this kind of har dship ex ists is made “ ‘without rational 21 justification or based on a n err oneous leg al standar d,’” Barco-Sandov al , 516 F.3d at 39 (quoting 22 Xiao Ji Chen v. U.S. D ep’t of Justice , 471 F.3d 315, 329 ( 2d Cir. 2006) (“ Xiao Ji Chen II

”)) , or-11- 1 rests on fa ct-finding“which is fla wed by an er ror of law,” id . 516 F.3d at 40. We therefor e find 2 ourselves una

ble to acc ept Petitioner’s ar g uments set out above. 3 We need not dec ide in this case whe ther the c ircumstance s conce rningthe hea lth issues 4 fac ed by

Petitioner’s children, c onsidered in lig ht of the questionable a vailability

of medica l car e 5 for their

health nee ds in the event they return to Me x ico with their par ents, are so ext reme that an 6 ag ency

decision findingno “exceptional and e x tremely unusual hardship” would be “w ithout 7 rational justification or ba sed on an e rrone ous leg al standar d,” Barco-Sandov al , 516 F.3d at 39 8 (interna l quotation marks omitted), under the sta ndards the B I A has e stablished for de termining 9 wh e the r a

n a pp lic atio n f

or c anc e llatio n o f r e mov a l de mon str ate d a n “ e xce pti on a l and

e xtre me ly 10 unusual hardship.” See I n re Gonzalez Re cinas , 2 3 I . & N. De c . 4 67 (B IA 2 00 2) ; In re Andazola11 Rivas , 2 3 I . & N. De c . 3 19 (B I A 2 00 2) ; In re M onreal-Aguinaga , 2 3 I. & N

. D e c . 5 6 ( B IA 12 2001). 13 Ins te a d, we dis po se of thi s p e tit ion

by no tin gthat th e a g e nc y ’s de c isi on re sts on fa c t14 finding “which is fla wed by an er ror of law.” Ba rc o- Sa nd

ov al, 516 F.3d at 40. For e x ample, 15 a lth ou g h Pe tit ion e r t e sti fi e d th at hi s n ine -ye ar- old da ughte r h a s a

ro un d tw e nty -f

ive a sthma 16 attacks e ach year , sever al of whic h require emer g ency visits t o the hospital; that she must use a 17 home nebulizer, a spe cialized piece of equipment, in addition to an ordinar y inhaler; a nd that 18 doctors do not expect her to outgr ow her

asthma, the I J did not address a ny of these f actor s. 19 Fur

thermore , the I J stated incorr ectly that “[t] he only

evidenc e re spondent has off ere d reg arding 20 thi s [a sthma ] is a le tte r f ro m D r. He c tor

F lor man o f t he Natio na l Pe diatr ic Ce nte r whic h o nly 21 ind ic ate s th at th e c hil dr e n h ave be e n tr e ate d o n mu lti ple oc c a sio ns wi th r e sp ir ator y inf e c tio ns ” 22 and

c on c lud ingthat “ [t]he re ’s no thi ngin t he re c or d to su g g e st that th e a sthma su ff e re d .

. . isI t is po ssi ble that th e I J’s r e fe re nc e to “ the on ly e vid e nc e ” is i nte nd e d a s a re fe re nc e to 5 th e o n l y medical

e vid e nc e , a

nd that th e I J disc ounte d th e Pe tit ion e r’ s o wn c ha ra c te ri zat ion s o f h is children’ s medical state a s inex pert a nd marke d by

an expected pa

renta l solicitude and anxiety

. Indeed, in the r ecitation of f acts, the I J expli citly

sets forth that Petitioner testified a s to the approximately

twenty -five a sthma attacks pe r y ear and the use of a home nebulizer. But the ba re text of the holdingleave s open an infe renc e of e rror . But seefootnote 5, su

pra . 6 -12- 1 sever e in any

way .” 5 2 Ina d d i t i o n , a l th o u g hth e IJ c o n c l u d e d th atP e t i t i o n e r ’ s s o n , w h o s u f f e r s f r o mG r a d e II 3 Vesicour eter al Reflux — a condition that may lead to kidney

or liver f ailure — w as “c ured or

. . . 4 cer

tainly in remission,” the I J did not address the f act that the son’ s y ear ly

examinations are 5 highly

specia liz ed and that Petiti oner’ s are a of Me x ico, if he a nd his family

are remove d, has fe w 6 do c tor s —

le t a lon e kid

ne y sp e c ia lis ts —

and that Pe tit ion e r t e sti fi e d th at he wi ll n ot b e a ble to 7 tr ave l to se e sp e c ia lize d d oc tor s o r t o p ay fo r t re atme nt. 8 We rea dily acknow ledg e that the a g ency does not commit an “e rror of law” ever

y time an 9 item of evidenc e is not expl icitly considere d or is descr ibed with imperfe ct ac cura cy , but where , 10 as her e, some fa cts important to the subtle determination of “ exceptional and extremely unusual 11 hardship” ha

ve bee n totally

overlooke d and other s have be en ser iously mischara cter ized, we 12 c on c lud e that an e rr or of law h a s o c c ur

re d. Th e I J did n ot m ake an a dv e rs e c re dib ili ty 6 13 deter

mination, and we a

re not c onfident that, af

ter takingthe over looked evidenc e into acc ount 14 and desc ribing it accur ately , the ag ency would come to the c onclusion that Petiti oner ha s not met 15 the standar d of “e x ceptional a nd extremely

unusual hardship.” See, e .g. , In re Gonzale z Recinas , 16 23 I . & N . Dec . at 470 (“ [T] he har dship standard is not so restrictive that only a handf ul of 17 applicants, such as those who have a qualifying relativewith a serious medical condition , w illOn re mand, should the BIA dee m it useful to develop furthe r standar ds clarif ying the 7 “exceptional and e x tremely unusual hardship” require ment, such fur ther de velopment should be up to it. Cf. Bd. of Immigration Appeals: Affirmance W ithout Opinion, Referral for Panel Rev iew, and Publication of Decisions as Prece dent , 73 Fe d. Reg . 34654, 34,660 (propose d J une 18, 2008) (to be c odified at 8 C.F.R. pt. 1103) ( commendingthe Court’s dec ision to remand case s to the BIA for f

urther sta ndards “ rathe r than unde rtakingto establish . . . leg al standar ds as a matter of first impression”)

. -13- 1 qualify

for r elief.” (empha sis added))

. 2 CO NC LU SION 3 Acc ording ly , we grant this petition and rema nd the ca se to the B I A to evaluate — 4 clea

nsed of these err ors — whethe r Petitioner established that his citizen children will suffe r 5 “exceptional and e x tremely unusual hardship” in light of the standa rds the B I A itself established 6 in In re M

onreal-Aguinaga and

su bs e qu e nt c a se s. 7 7 8 The pe tition for reviewis GRANTED, and the case is REMANDED to the B I A for consideration consistent with thi s opinion. 9