COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA 

Present: Judges Humphreys, Clements and Agee 

Argued at Richmond, Virginia 

CHRISTINE SOLEM AND 

 JOHN COLES 

 MEMORANDUM OPINION* BY 

v. Record No. 1618-01-2 JUDGE G. STEVEN AGEE 

 OCTOBER 15, 2002 

COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA 

FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF ALBEMARLE COUNTY 

Rayner V. Snead, Judge Designate 

 Christine Solem (John Coles, pro se, on 

briefs). 

 Richard B. Smith, Senior Assistant Attorney 

General (Jerry W. Kilgore, Attorney General, 

on brief), for appellee. 

 Christine Solem (Solem) and John Coles (Coles) were 

convicted in the Circuit Court of Albemarle County of 

"[f]ail[ing] to securely protect food in the process of 

manufacture or storage from contamination by flies, dust, dirt 

or other injurious contamination," in violation of Code 

§ 3.1-368, and the "[m]anufacture, sale, delivery, holding or 

offering for sale food that is adulterated," in violation of 

Code § 3.1-388(a). Both Solem and Coles were each ordered to 

pay fines totaling $200. On appeal, Solem and Coles contend the 

trial court erred by denying their motions to suppress certain 

 

 * Pursuant to Code § 17.1-413, this opinion is not 

designated for publication.
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evidence. Specifically, they contend the search warrant (1) did 

not recite a valid offense; (2) was issued without probable 

cause; and (3) was issued based on observations illegally 

obtained. For the following reasons, we find the trial court 

did not err and affirm the convictions. 

I. STANDARD OF REVIEW 

In reviewing a trial court's denial of a motion to 

suppress, "[t]he burden is upon [appellants] to show that this 

ruling, when the evidence is considered most favorably to the 

Commonwealth, constituted reversible error." Fore v. 

Commonwealth, 220 Va. 1007, 1010, 265 S.E.2d 729, 731 (1980). 

"Ultimate questions of reasonable suspicion and probable cause 

to make a warrantless search" involve issues of both law and 

fact and are reviewed de novo on appeal. See Ornelas v. United 

States, 517 U.S. 690, 691 (1996). "In performing such analysis, 

we are bound by the trial court's findings of historical fact 

unless 'plainly wrong' or without evidence to support them[,] 

and we give due weight to the inferences drawn from those facts 

by resident judges and local law enforcement officers." McGee 

v. Commonwealth, 25 Va. App. 193, 198, 487 S.E.2d 259, 261 

(1997) (en banc) (citation omitted). 
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II. THE WARRANT STATED A VALID OFFENSE 

 Code § 3.1-399 grants agents of the Commissioner of the 

Department of Agriculture and Consumer Services (the 

Commissioner) free access 

to any factory, warehouse, or establishment 

in which foods are manufactured, processed, 

packed, or held for introduction into 

commerce . . . or any store, restaurant or 

other place in which food is being offered 

for sale, for the purpose . . . [o]f 

inspecting such [place] . . . to determine 

if any of the provisions of [Title 3.1, 

article 3] are being violated . . . . 

"The refusal to permit entry or inspection . . ., as authorized 

by [Code] § 3.1-399" is prohibited. Code § 3.1-388(e). 

 The Department's agents found on June 19, 1999 that goat 

cheese ostensibly produced at Satyrfield Farm was offered for 

sale to the public and sought to inspect the production and 

storage area at the farm pursuant to Code § 3.1-399. Solem 

refused the agents entry to conduct an inspection. The agents 

then sought a search warrant that would authorize the search in 

light of the refusal, which they believed was in violation of 

Code § 3.1-388(e). 

 Solem and Coles contend the warrant issued does not cite a 

valid offense applicable to them because their goat cheese 

production took place within their home and on its accompanying 

property. Because it was their private home, Solem contends she 

was constitutionally permitted to refuse entry for a warrantless 

search, regardless of the commercial application for which the 
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residence was used. Solem cites the United States Supreme Court 

decision in Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523 (1967), to 

support her position. 

 While warrantless searches of a private home are 

prohibited, warrantless inspections may be allowed when there is 

a "pervasively regulated industry" involved. The "pervasively 

regulated industry" exception to the warrant requirement permits 

reasonable warrantless inspections of commercial enterprises 

engaged in closely regulated businesses. See Donovan v. Dewey, 

452 U.S. 594, 600 (1981); Colonnade Catering Corp. v. United 

States, 397 U.S. 72, 77 (1970). Where governmental interests 

are furthered by regulatory inspections, a warrantless 

inspection does not violate the Fourth Amendment, so long as the 

search is reasonable. See Donovan, 452 U.S. at 600. 

Enterprises that supply dairy products for human 

consumption in the Commonwealth constitute a "pervasively 

regulated industry."1 This is not an unknown concept to the 

appellants, based on prior litigation experience involving the 

 1 In Commonwealth v. Stratford Packing Co., 200 Va. 11, 104 

S.E.2d 32 (1958), the Supreme Court of Virginia held that it is 

"'inherent in the plenary power in the state which enables it to 

prohibit all things hurtful to the comfort, safety, and welfare 

of society.'" Id. at 16, 104 S.E.2d at 36 (citation omitted). 

Regulations governing the Commonwealth's food supply are 

justified by the state's interest in the "protection of its food 

supply." Id. The General Assembly has charged the Commissioner 

and the Department with the duty to "inquire carefully into the 

dairy and food and drink products . . . which are manufactured 

or sold, or exposed or offered for sale in this Commonwealth." 

Code § 3.1-402. 
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Commonwealth's regulation of goat products as part of its 

regulation of the dairy industry. See generally Kenley v. 

Solem, 237 Va. 202, 375 S.E.2d 532 (1989); Carbaugh v. Solem, 

225 Va. 310, 302 S.E.2d 33 (1983). Solem and Coles were 

notified by the Commissioner that they were subject to the laws 

and regulations applicable to food production enterprises if 

they chose to produce goat cheese for sale. They were notified 

that inspections would be performed. Therefore, provided the 

parameters for a warrantless inspection are reasonable, a 

warrantless inspection upon the premises of a dairy product 

enterprise is permissible. By entering into their commercial 

goat cheese enterprise, Solem and Coles have subjected 

themselves to the laws and regulations of the Commonwealth 

governing the production and sale of food products and cannot 

shield themselves from compliance by simply producing their 

product in the kitchen of their home. 

We find the warrantless search authorized by Code § 3.1-399 

to be reasonable. The reasonableness of a warrantless search 

depends upon the specific enforcement needs and privacy 

guarantees of each statute. Marshall v. Barlow's, Inc., 436 

U.S. 307, 321 (1978). The authority to conduct a warrantless 

inspection pursuant to Code § 3.1-399 is restrictive. A 

warrantless inspection is permitted only in those places where 

"foods are manufactured, processed, packed, or held for 
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introduction into commerce . . . or [the] place in which food is 

being offered for sale." Code § 3.1-399. In this case, a 

warrantless inspection would have been permitted only in those 

areas of the home and farm where the goat cheese was produced 

and stored and no other places. Further, regulations prohibit 

night and holiday inspections. See id. (access by Commissioner 

and his agents limited to "reasonable hours"). 

In sum, the goat cheese production and storage areas at 

Satyrfield Farm were subject to a warrantless inspection. Solem 

refused entry to the inspectors in violation of Code 

§ 3.1-388(e). Therefore, the search warrant stated a valid 

offense.2

III. THE WARRANT WAS ISSUED UPON PROBABLE CAUSE 

 Next, Solem and Coles contend the search warrant was issued 

without probable cause. We disagree. 

 Whether probable cause exists to support the issuance of a 

warrant is to be determined from the "totality of the 

circumstances" that are presented to the magistrate. Illinois 

v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 238 (1983). 

 2

 Moreover, the procedure followed by the Department in this 

case was exactly that prescribed by the United States Supreme 

Court in Camara. "Warrants should normally be sought only after 

entry is refused . . . ." Camara, 387 U.S. at 539. When Solem 

refused a warrantless inspection under Code § 3.1-399, the 

Department's agents properly applied for a search warrant, which 

was granted. The evidence, to which the motion to suppress was 

directed, came not from a warrantless inspection, but from a 

validly issued search warrant. 
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The task of the issuing magistrate is simply 

to make a "practical, common-sense decision 

whether, given all the circumstances set 

forth in the affidavit before him, including 

the veracity and the basis of knowledge of 

persons supplying hearsay information, there 

is a fair probability that contraband or 

evidence of a crime will be found in a 

particular place." And the duty of a 

reviewing court is simply to ensure that the 

magistrate had a "substantial basis for 

. . . concluding" that probable cause 

existed. 

* * * * * * * 

[A]n after-the-fact review of a magistrate's 

decision should not be made de novo[,] . . . 

great deference should be given to the 

magistrate's finding of probable cause. 

Derr v. Commonwealth, 242 Va. 413, 421, 410 S.E.2d 662, 666 

(1991) (quoting Gates, 462 U.S. at 238). 

 In this case, the magistrate was informed that agents of 

the Department observed Coles sell goat cheese in a public 

market on June 19, 1999; that the goat cheese was being sold 

without prior inspection by the Department, in violation of Code 

§ 3.1-398.1; that Coles resided at Satyrfield Farm and that 

agents of the Department had been refused entry to inspect at 

Satyrfield Farm. These facts provided the magistrate with 

probable cause to believe Satyrfield Farm was subject to 

inspection and entry had been denied in violation of Code 

§ 3.1-388(e). The things to be searched would provide evidence 

that Satyrfield Farm was producing goat cheese for sale to the 
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public and was, therefore, subject to inspection which should 

not have been refused. 

 We, therefore, find the search warrant was based on 

probable cause. 

IV. THE WARRANT WAS NOT BASED ON ILLEGALLY 

OBTAINED OBSERVATIONS 

 Lastly, Solem and Coles contend the evidence should have 

been suppressed because the search warrant was based, in part, 

on observations illegally made by Agent Williams. The 

observations they challenge are those describing their home as 

"[a] faded masonite board two story residence and surrounding 

barns." It is their contention that Williams was illegally upon 

their property when he made these observations and these 

observations tainted the search warrant. We disagree with the 

contention that Williams' observation of the structures required 

the suppression of evidence. 

 As we have stated, Satyrfield Farm was subject to 

inspection as a food production and storage site. Williams, an 

agent of the Commissioner, drove to the farm and walked from his 

car to the front door to perform the requisite inspection 

pursuant to Code § 3.1-399. He was therefore lawfully on the 

property. Solem and Coles "had no reasonable expectation of 

privacy in those areas of their property observable by members 

of the public who might approach their residence . . . or 

lawfully be upon their property." Shaver v. Commonwealth, 30 
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Va. App. 789, 796, 520 S.E.2d 393, 396 (1999). Williams' 

observation of the design of the house and the presence of a 

barn were made while walking the distance from his car to the 

front door and back again when Solem refused entry. Williams 

therefore did not perform an illegal search that tainted the 

search warrant when his description of the house and barn were 

used in the affidavit. 

 Further, neither the observations regarding the style of 

house at Satyrfield Farm nor the fact that Williams actually 

observed a barn on the farm provided a basis upon which the 

warrant was issued. The observations simply added a more 

definitive description to the places sought to searched, and 

without that information the warrant would still have been 

issued as the observations had nothing to do with an alleged 

offense and added nothing to the Department's allegations. 

 Accordingly, we find the trial court did not err when it 

denied Solem's and Coles' motions to suppress. The convictions 

are affirmed. 

Affirmed.