The Clerk of the Court is directed to amend the ca ption to read a s shown above. See8 * U.S.C. § 1252(b)(3)( A). 09-3805 B ro ok s v . B oa

rd of I mmi g ratio n App e a ls U N IT E D S T A T E S C O U R T O F A P P E A LS F OR THE S EC OND C IR C U IT

_______________ August Term, 2010 (On Submission: August 25, 2010 Dec ided: September 17, 2010)

________________________________________________________

S A M U EL D AVI D B ROO KS ,

Petitioner , —v.— E RI C H. H OL DER , J R ., A TTORN EY G EN ER AL , * Respondent
. Docke t No. 09-3805-a g

________________________________________________________
B e f o r e : K

ATZ MANN , H A LL , C H IN , Circuit Judges
.

_______________ Th e pe tit ion e r s e e ks re vie w o f a n o rd e r o f t

he B oa rd of I mmi g ra tio n App e a ls d ism iss inghis appea l from the immigr ation judge ’s orde r of r emoval. F or the re asons stated be low, the petition fo r r e vie w i s DE NI ED
.

_______________-2-

Counsel for Petitioner: T h o m as H. No o t er , Fr ee m an , No o ter & Gi n s b er g, New Y ork, NY C o un s e l f o r R e s p o n d e n t : Da nie l I . Sm ulo w, Tr ial A tto rn e y (T on y Wes t, As s is ta n t A tt o r n e y G e n e r a l, Lyle D
. Je n tz e r , Se nior L i t i gat i o nC ounsel, o

f c ounsel), Off

ice of I mmigration L itigation, U.S. Depa

rtment of Just ice, Washing ton, DC

_______________ P ER C UR I AM : In the ca se at ha

nd, we de cide whe ther a

New Y ork State convic tion of one count of criminal possession of a w eapon in violation of N.Y . Penal L aw § 265.03( 1)(b) satisfies the definition of a “ crime of

violence” under 18 U .S.C. § 16 such that petitioner in deportation proce eding s was re movable and a lso ineligible for canc ellation of re moval. We find that it does and thus deny

the petition for re view. Petitioner Samuel David B rooks is a native a nd citizen of J amaica

who came to the United States as a la

wful per manent re sident in Febr

uary 1996. On September

3, 2008, he pleade d g uilty

in a New York State c ourt to one count of c riminal possession of a we apon in the second de g ree in violation of N.Y. Penal L aw § 265.03( 1)(b) . The immigr ation authorities subsequently

char g ed him with removability under 8 U .S.C. § 1227(a)(2) (A)( iii), as an alien convicted of

an ag g ravated fe lony , and under 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2) (C), as a n alien convic ted of a firea rms offe nse. B rooks’s immigr ation proce eding s were conducte d at the Ulster Corr ectional Fa cility in Napanoc h, New Y ork. At the c onclusion of a he aringon April 28, 2009, the immigration judge ( “I J ”) f ound that Br ooks’s NewYork State c onviction qualified as a n ag g ravated fe lony

beca use it met the definition of a “ crime of violence” under 18 U .S.C. § 16; that he wa s theref

ore r emovable; a

nd that he wa s also there fore ineligible f or ca ncellation ofIn the first instance , we de cline to find that B rooks’s due pr ocess r ights we re violate d. 1 -3- remova l. See8 U.S.C. § 1229b(b)(1)( C). Br ooks appea led the I J ’s dec ision to t he B oard of I mmi g ratio n App e a ls ( “ B I A” ), arguin gthat he ha d b e e n d e nie d d ue pr oc e ss o f l aw b e c a

us e his rig ht to counsel had be en violated a nd that his state conviction did not constitute a “c rime of violence.” The B I A conc luded that B rooks had not bee n denied due proce ss and af firmed the I J ’s deter mination that he had bee n convicted of a cr ime of violence , and it there fore dismiss ed Br ooks’s appe al in a dec ision dated August 11, 2009. Brooks now se eks re view of the BIA’s decision. We focus our attention here on the question whether a convic tion for possession of a
we a po n in the se c on d d e g re e in v iol atio n o f N .Y . Pe na l L aw § 26 5. 03 (1 )( b) c on sti tut e s a “ c ri me of vio le nc e ” un de r 1 8 U .S. C. § 16 and the re fo re is a

n a g g ra vate d f e lony tr ig g e ri ngre mov a l. 1 Under 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2) (A)( iii), “[a] ny alien who is convic ted of a n ag g ravated fe lony

at any time after admission is deportable.” An “ag g ravated fe lony ,” as de fined in § 101(a )(43) of the I mmigration and Nationality Act (“ I NA”) , includes “a

crime of violence ( as def

ined in section 16 of Title 18 . . . ) for

which the ter

m of imprisonment [ is] at least one y ear .” 8 U.S.C. § 11 01 (a )( 43 )( F ). Se c tio n 1 6 o f T itl e 18 of the Un ite d St ate s Co de , in tur n, pr ov ide s th at a

“ c ri me of violence ” mea

ns (a) an off ense that has as an e lement the use, attempted use, or thre atene d use of phy sical forc e ag ainst the person or proper ty of anothe r, or (b) a ny other off ense that is a felony

and that, by

its nature, involves a substantial risk that phy sical for ce a g ainst the person or proper ty of anothe r may

be used in the c ourse of committing the off

ense. To deter mine whether

a g iven offe nse fits this definition, we “look to the ele ments and the natureIn United States v. Gam ez , 577 F.3d 394 ( 2d Cir. 2009), we he ld that criminal 2 possession of a fir ear

m under N.Y . Penal L aw § 265.03 is not a “ crime of violence” within the meaningof § 2L 1.2(b)( 1) of the Sente ncingGuidelines. 577 F .3d at 400. Howe ver, the definition of “c rime of violenc e” se t forth in the commentar y to § 2L 1.2(b)( 1) trac ks only the languag e of 18 U .S.C. § 16(a) re g ardingthe “use , attempted use, or threatened use of phy sical forc e”; it does not conta in lang uag e compa rable to that found in § 16(b) re g ardingthe “substantial risk” that f

orce will be used. Gamez the re fo re did

no t a dd re ss t he iss ue be fo re us . -4- of the off ense of conviction, rather than to the pa rticular f acts re lating to pe titioner’s crime.” Le oc al v . A sh c ro

ft , 543 U.S. 1, 7 (2004). In other wor ds, we take a “c ateg orica l” appr oach. See Blake v . Gonzales , 481 F.3d 152, 156 ( 2d Cir. 2007). Under this approac h, “only

the minimum criminal conduc t nece ssary to sustain a conviction under a g iven statute is rele vant.” Id. (quoting Da lto n v . A sh c ro

ft , 257 F.3d 200, 204 ( 2d Cir. 2001)). New Y ork Penal L aw § 265.03( 1)(b) provides that “[a] person is guilty of cr iminal po sse ssi on

of a we a po n in the se c on d d e g re e wh e n . . . wi th i nte nt t o u se the same un lawf ull y ag ainst another, suc h person . . . possesse s a loade d firea rm . . . .” We have previously held that “to establish cr iminal possession of a wea pon in the second de g ree [under N.Y. Penal L aw § 265.03], t he prose cution must demonstrate, beyond a re asonable doubt, that a per son: (1) po sse sse d o ne of

the de sc ri be d w e a

po ns ; and (2 ) h a d inte nt t o u se su c h w e a po n unla wf ull y ag ainst another.” United States v. Gam ez , 577 F.3d 394, 398 ( 2d Cir. 2009) (per curiam). The question prese nted her e is whethe r this offense “involves a substantial risk that phy sical for ce ag ainst the person or

proper ty of anothe r may

be used in the c ourse of

committing the off

ense.” 18 U.S.C. § 16(b). This is a question of first impression in this C ircuit. The Third Circ uit, however , has 2 addre ssed it and answe red in the a ffirmative. See H enry v . Bureau of Imm igration & Customs Enforceme nt , 493 F.3d 303 ( 3d Cir. 2007). Be low, the B I A similarly conclude d that Br ooks’s-5-

state cr ime conviction constitutes an ag g ravated fe lony
. In re Samue l David Brooks , No. A044 859 042 (B .I .A. Aug . 11, 2009). We revie w the B I A’s dete rmination de novo
. Blake , 481 F.3d
at 15 6; see also Sutherland v. Re no , 228 F.3d 171, 174 ( 2d Cir. 2000) (“I n contra st to sit uations wher e a f eder al ag ency

is interpretinga statute it is char g ed with administering , courts owe no de fe re nc e to a

n a g e nc y ’s int e rp re tatio ns of state or fe de ra l c ri min a l la

ws , b e c a us e the a g e nc y

is not char g ed with the administration of such la ws.” (inter

nal quotation marks omitted)). We find the rea soning of

the Third Circuit in He nr yto b e pe rs ua siv e , a

nd we a do pt i t here
. See 49 3 F .3 d at 30 8- 10 . T he po sse ssi on of a loa de d f ir e arm wi th t he int e nt t o u se it
un lawf ull y a g a ins t ano the r p e rs on

pla inl y “ inv olv e s a

su bs tanti a l r isk

tha t phy sic a l f

or c e a g a ins t the per son or prope rty

of anothe r may

be used.” Acc ording ly , we hold that a c onviction for possession of a we apon in the sec ond deg ree in violation of N.Y. Penal L aw § 265.03( 1)(b) constitutes a “c rime of violenc e” unde r 18 U.S.C. § 16 and there fore is an ag g ravated fe lony trig g eringremova l under 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a) (2)( A)(iii). Br ooks’s ce ntral ar g ument as to why the def inition of a “cr ime of violence ” is not
satis fi e d is that, i n h is v ie w, on e c an v iol ate the statut e by po sse ssi nga

we a po n w iththe re qu isi te intent without there beingany risk that forc e will be used a g ainst another pe rson. In support of this posit ion, however , he cites va rious case s in which individuals have bee n convicted unde r New Y ork Penal L aw § 265.03 without attemptingor threateningto use the we apon in question ag ainst another pe rson. See, e .g. , Fo ur nie r v . Le Fe v re , 734 F.2d 125, 128 ( 2d Cir. 1984) (e x p l ai n i n g th ata p er s o n

ca nb e c o n v i ct edun d er

N. Y. P en al L aw § 2 6 5
. 0 3 fo r d i s ch ar gi n g a
wea pon with the intent only

to frig hten, rather than to ha rm, another

while flee ing the scene of a
c ri me ); People v . Jame

s M. , 92 A.D.2d 594 (N .Y. App. Div. 2d De p’t 1983) (a ffirming-6-

defe ndant’s convic tion where the evidenc e showe d that he possessed a loaded silver r evolver and, base d upon considera tion of all of the evide nce in the c ase, a rea sonable jury

could infer

the requisite intent). The se ca ses ar e beside the point in that none shows that an individual may be
c onvic te d und e r § 26 5. 03 wi tho ut t he re havin ge xiste d a

su bs tanti a l ris k

that forc e would be use d ag ainst another pe rson. Such a r isk can e x ist before any actua l attempt or threat is made, and when it does, § 16(b) is satisfied, even if § 16(a) , which addr esses the “ attempted use[] or threatened use of phy sical for ce,” is not. As the Supreme Court noted in Leocal , “[s] ection 16(b)
swee ps more broa dly

than § 16(a ).” 543 U .S. at 10. I t would be per verse to conclude that when an individual possesses a loa ded fire arm with the intent to use it unlawfully ag ainst another person, ther e is not a substantial risk that forc e will be used a g ainst another pe rson. We s e e no me ri t in

B ro ok s’ s a dd iti on a l argume nt t hat th e ri sk

that f or c e wi ll b e us e d is not nece ssarily

prese nt in a conviction under § 265.03 beca

use, under

New Y ork law, the requisite intent may

be pre sumed from possession of a loaded f irea rm. SeeN.Y. Penal L aw § 265.15(4) ( “The possession by any person of any . . . wea pon . . . is presumptive evidenc e of int e nt t o u se the same un lawf ull y a g a ins t ano the r. ” ). An

int e nt i s n ot s ome ho w f

ic tit iou s si mpl y beca use, as a n evidentiar

y matter, it is established throug h a statutory presumption. Once the presumption is invoked, it may be re butted. I f it is not rebutted, the intent is an established element of

the cr ime. The subseque nt question of whether in all case s the exist ence of such a n intent presents a

substantial risk that force will be used re mains unchang ed. Br ooks does not contest that he w as convic ted of c riminal possession under § 26 5. 03 (1 )( b) . T he B I A the re fo re c or re c tly c on c lud e d th at he wa s r e mov a ble and statut or ily ine lig ibl e fo r c anc e llatio n o f r e mov a l.-7-

We have c onsidered B rooks’s other arguments and find them to be without merit. F or the fo re g oin gre a so ns , th e pe tit ion fo r r e vie w i s DE NI ED
.