### IN THE S UP REME COURT OF TENNESS EE AT NAS HVILLE June 4, 200 8 S es sio n TERRA NC E N . C AR TER v. RICKEYBELL App e al b y P e r m iss ion fro m th e Co ur t o f Cr im ina l A ppe als

Crim inal Cou rt for Davidson Coun ty No. 3766 Monte Watkins, Ju dge

No. M2006- 01363-SC-R11- HC - F iled Fe bruary 27, 2009

This a ppeal involves the application of the tra nsfer provisions in Tenn. Code Ann. § 16-1- 116 (Supp. 20 0 8 ) t o h abea s corpus pe titions challeng ing a criminal convic tion. The petitioner, who wa s incar cer ated in Da

vidson County , filed a pe tition for a writ of habea s corpus in the Criminal Court for Da vidson County . The trial c ourt promptly denied the petition on its merits. Rather than f iling a petition seekingpost-conviction re lief, the pe titioner appea led the dismissal of his habea s corpus petition to the Court of Crimi nal Appea ls. For the first time on appea l, the petitioner, invokingTenn. Code A nn
. § 1 6

- 1

- 1 1 6 , r e qu e s te d th e Co urt o f Cr im in a l Ap p e a ls to tr an s f e r h is h a b eas c orpus petition to Maury

Count y , wh er e he had bee n convicted, f or consider ation as a post-c onviction petition. The Court of Criminal Appeals de clined to transf er the h ab eas c orpus petition to Maury County and af firmed the de nial of the pe tition. Car te r v . B e ll , N o. M2 00 6- 01 36 3- CCA -R 3- HC , 2007 WL2744998 (Tenn. Crim. App. Sept. 21, 2007). We aff i rm the judgment of the Court of Criminal Appeals.

Te nn. R . A pp. P . 1 1 A ppe al b y P e r m iss ion ; J udgm e ntof t he Co ur t o f Cr im ina l A ppe als Affir m e d.

W I L L I AM C. K O CH , J R ., J ., delivere d the opinion of the co u rt , in which J ANI CE M. H OL DER , C.J ., W I L L I AM M. B ARKE R , and C OR NE L I A A. C LARK , J J ., joined. G AR Y R. W ADE , J ., filed a dissenting opinion.
Peter D. H eil, Nashville, Tenne ssee, f or the a ppellant, Ter

ranc e N. Car

ter. Robert E. Cooper, Jr., Attorney Gene ral a nd Reporter ; Michael E. Moore, Solicitor Ge nera l; Rachel E. Wil lis, Assist ant Attorney Gene ral; Victor S. J ohnson I I I , District Attorney Gene ral; and Rog er Moore, Assistant District Attorney Gene ral, for

the appe llee, State of Te nnessee
.P o ss ess i o n of co cai ne wi t h int ent to sel l les s t han p o i nt f i ve (. 5 ) gr am s, a C l ass C f el o ny , has a sent ence range 1

o f t h re e to six ye a rs fo r a R a n g e I o ff e n d e r. T e n n . C o d e A n n . § 4 0 -3 5 -1 1 2 (a )( 3 ) (2 0 0 6 ).
It was not unt i l t he o ral argument bef o re t he C o urt of C ri m i nal A p p eal s t hat M r. C art er’ s l awyer ci t ed T enn. 2 C o d e A n n . § 1 6 -1 -1 1 6 a s a u tho rity f o r h is re q u e st to tra n sfe r M r. C a rte r’s h a b e a s c o rp u s p e tit io n to M a u ry C o u n ty.

-2- OP IN ION
I.
In 2 00 5, Te rr anc e N. Cart er pl eaded guil ty in t he Cir c uit

Cou rt fo r M a ur y Cou nty to possession of less than one- half (.5) g rams of c ocaine with the intent to sell. On August 29, 2005, in acc ordanc e with Mr. C arte r’s plea agree ment, the cour t in Maury

County sentenc ed Mr. Car

ter a s a Rang e I offe nder to seve n y ears to be serve d consec utively to a prior se ntence . The judg ment stated in the spac e for

“Specia l Condit ions” that Mr. C ar t er h ad agree d to both consecutive sentenc ing a

nd to a sentenc e outside of the r ang e. Mr. Carter

was inca rce rate d in a prison in D avidson County . On May 23, 2006, he filed a pro se “ Petition for a Writ of Habea s Corpu s ” i n t h e C ri m inal Court for Davidson County . He a sse rt e d in

his pe tit ion

that th e tr ia l c ourt

in M a ur y County la c ke d ju

ri sd ict io n to imp os e his co n s ec u t i v e s ev en -y ear s en t en ce b ec au s e it ex ce ed ed th e m ax i mums en t en ce av ai l ab l e t o a R an ge Ioffe nder c onvicted of the crime to which he had pleade d guilty

. Mr. Carter further contende d that 1

“ [g ]ive n th e ill e g a lity

of the a g re e d se nte nc e s, ” his guil ty ple a “ wa s no t kn ow ing ly and vo luntari ly enter ed” a

nd may be withdra

wn. On J une 8, 2006, the tria l court denie d Mr. Carter ’s h ab ea s co rpus petition without appointing c ounsel or holdinga hea ring

. Noting that Mr. Carter had agree d to be sentenc ed outside of his rang e, the tria l court conc luded that Mr. Carte r’s judg ment was ne ither illeg al nor void.
Mr. Carter

then appe aled pro se to the Court of Criminal Appe als. Counsel was appointed to repre sent him. In his pro se brief filed in the C ourt of C riminal Appea ls, Mr. C arte r argued (1) that the trial cour

t erre d by denying the habea s corpus pe tition wi t h o ut appointing c ounsel and holding a hear ing a nd (2) that the judgment was void beca use he rec eived a

n out-of-r ang e sente nce. Mr. Carter

also asser

ted that the Court of Criminal Appea ls should treat the ha beas c orpus petition a s a pet iti on fo r pos t- c onvic tio n re lie f an d sho uld or de r t he Cr imi na l Co ur

t f or Da vid so n Co unty

to tr an s f e r th e c a s e t o M a

ur y C o un ty. 2 The Court of Criminal Appea ls filed its opini on on September 21, 2007. The court, in a holding e ntirely

consistent with Ho ov e r v . S tate , 215 S.W .3d 776, 780 (Tenn. 2007) , held that the sentenc e that Mr. Car

ter a g ree d to serve w as leg al bec ause it wa s within t h e m ax imum sentenceT h e max i mu m s en t en ce a l l owe d f or a C l as s C f

el on y i s f

i f t ee n y ea r s
. T en n
. Code An n
. § 40- 35- 111( b) ( 3) 3 (20 0 6 ).
C o m p a re A n d e rso n v . S ta te , N o. M 2004- 02116- CC A- R3- H C, 2006 W L 73 9 8 8 5 , a t * 1 ( T en n
. Cr i m. App.

4 M a r. 2 3 , 2 0 0 6 ) (N o T e n n . R . A p p . P . 1 1 a p p li c a tio n fi le d ) (d ire c ting the ha b e a s c o u rt to tra n sfe r th e p e tit io n to co nvi ct i ng co urt f

o r do cket i ng as p o st

- co nvi ct i o n m at t er) w ith St at e v
. D arden , N o. W 2001- 01833- CC A- R3- CD , 2002 W L 14 82 79 8, at * 2 (T enn
. Cri m. Ap p. Feb. 12, 200 2) ( N o T enn
. R. Ap p. P

. 11 appl i cat i on f i l ed) ( hol di ng t hat t he habea s co urt did no t have aut ho ri t y t o t rans f er case t o pro p er po st

- co nvi ct i o n co urt ).
A s a pr el i mi nar y mat t er , t he St at e a r gu es t hat t he C our t of Cri mi nal Ap peal s err ed i n add r es s i ng t he t r ans f er 5 i s s ue becau s e i t was not r ai s ed i n t he t r i al cour t

. W het her a t r ans f er woul d be i n t he i nt er es t of j us t i ce may be addre s s ed fo r t h e f ir st ti m e o n a p p e a l. See H awki ns v
. Te nn. D ep’ tof Cor r ec t i on , 1 2 7 S

. W

. 3 d 7 4 9 , 7 6 6 ( Te n n
. Ct

. Ap p
. 2002) (tra n sfe r o f p e tit io n fo r w rit o f ce rtio ra ri c h a llen g ing re su lt o f p riso n d isc ip lina ry p ro c e e d ing ). -3- allowable f

or the off ense. Car te r v . B e ll , No. M2006-01363-CCA-R3-HC, 2007 WL2744998, at 3 *1 (T en n
. C ri m
. App. S ept. 21, 2007). Af ter notingthat other pa

nels of the Court of Criminal Appea ls d is a g r e e d

o nth e tr an s f

e r qu e s ti o n , th e Co urt o f

Cr im in a l A

p p e a ls r e je c te d M r
. Ca rter’ s 4 argument that Tenn. Code Ann. § 16- 1-116 empowered the trial court in Davidson C ounty to transfe r Mr. Carter ’s habe as cor

pus petition to Maury

County

. Car te r v . B e ll , 2007 WL27449998, at *3. The c ourt, there fore , aff

irmed the de nial o f M r. C ar t er ’s habe as cor pus petition. W e grante d Mr. Carter ’s application for permission to a ppeal to se cure uniformity of decisions re g ardingthe transf er issue. SeeTenn. R. App. P. 11(a)

. 5
II.
An a pp lic atio n f

or a wr it o f h a

be a s c or pu s “s ho ul d be ma de to t he c ourt or jud g e mos t convenie nt in point of dist ance to the applicant, unless a suffic ient rea son be g iven in the petition for no t a pp lyingto su c h c ourt or jud g e .” Te nn . Co de Ann. § 2 9- 21 -1 05 (2 00 0) . F ili ngwi th t he ne are st court or judg e g ener ally

means the c o u n t y wh ere the petitioner is beingheld, unless a suff icient rea son is g iven for not doing so. Sta tee xre l. L e ac h v . A v e ry , 215 Tenn. 425, 427, 387 S.W.2d 346, 347 (1964). A post-c onviction petition, on the ot her ha nd, must be filed “with the c lerk of the court in which the convic tion occurr ed.” T enn. Code Ann. § 40- 30-104(a ) (2006)

. Mr. Carter

proper ly filed his habea s corpus pe tition i n the county in which he wa s inc arc e rate d. Hi s c la im – tha t he a g re e d to an il le g a l se nte nc e a nd sh ou ld t he re fo re be a ll owe d to withdraw his guilty

plea – wa s proper ly

prese nted in a habe as cor pus petition. See Sm ith v . Le wis , 20 2 S. W.3 d 1 24 , 1 29 (T e nn . 2 00 6) (reco g nizi ngthat whe re se nte nc e ba rg a ine d f or is o the rw ise illega l, gu i l t y p l ea ma

y be withdra

wn upon habe as cor

pus proce eding s). The c ourt in Davidson County prope rl y d ec l i ned to g rant Mr. Car ter ha beas c orpus re lief on the mer its of his claim. See Ho ov e r v . S

tate , 215 S.W .3d at 780 (holdingthat an agree d sentenc e outside of of fende r ra ng e but within statutory

maxi mum is l eg al).
Mr. Carter

asser ted for the first time befor e the C ourt of Criminal Appea ls that the habea s c or pu s p e tit ion

sh ou ld b e tr e ate d a s o ne fo r p os t- c onvic tio n r e lie f b a se d o n the c la im that hi s guil ty plea wa s not knowingly and volunt arily enter ed. The P ost-Conviction Procedur e Act provides thatAct of M ay 15, 2000, c h

. 794, 2000 T en n
. Pub. Act s 2271. 6
-4- a “pe tition for habea s corpus may be tre ated a s a petition under this part when the relief a nd proce dure a

uthorized by

this part appea

r ade quate a

nd appropr iate, notwithstanding a ny thing to the contra ry in title 29, chapte r 21, or any other statute.” Tenn. Code Ann. § 40- 30-105(c ) (2006) . No simil ar statutory

provision exi sts, however , specific ally authorizing a

habea s cou rt t o t ransf

er a pe tit ion fo r a wr it o f h a

be a s c or pu s to a c ourt wi th jur isd ic tio n to tre at the pe tit ion a s one fo r p os tconviction re lief. Even in the a

bsence of such a st atutory provision, a court has t he discre tion to treat a plea ding acc ordingto the relief

soug ht. Nor ton v . E

v e rh ar t , 895 S.W .2d 317, 319 (Tenn. 1995). In Norton , the petitioner filed a

pro se pe tition for a writ of habea s corpus in Morg an C ounty , alleg ing that the Boa rd of Par oles had illeg ally revoke d his parole. The trial court dism issed the petit ion, concluding that it failed to state a c laim for habe as cor pus relief and that a cla im for re view of the actions of the Boa rd of Par oles must be filed in Davidson County . The Court of Criminal Ap p ea l s reve rsed, concludingthat the trial cour t should have conve rted the habea s petition into a pe tition for commonlaw wr it of cer

tiorari and tr ansfe rre d it to a proper court in D avidson County . Although this Court ag ree d with th e Co urt o f

Cr im in a l A

p p e a ls th at a

tr ia l c o urt h a s th e d is c r e ti o nto tr e at a p le ading acc ordingto the relief

soug ht, we dete rmined that a tria l court lac king subje ct mat t er jurisdiction over a case may not transfe r it in the absenc e of statutory authority

. Nor ton v . E

v e rh ar t , 895 S.W .2d a t 319- 20

. T hu s , e v e ni f M r
. C art e r ’ s h a

b e a s c o r p u s p e t i t i o nc o u l d

b e tr e at e d

a s o n e f o r p o s tconviction re lief, the habeas court, lacking subject m atter jurisdiction over a post-convic tion case, may not transfe r the a ction in the absenc e of statutory authority

. Whil e bound by

this ge nera l rule, the Court in Norton observe d in dicta that “both judicial e c on omy and our s tate ’s po lic y

of dis po sin gof

c a se s on the me ri ts, ra

the r tha n fo r t e c hn ic a l r e a so ns , would be better serve d by the adoption of a r ule allowingcourts without subject matter jur isdiction to transfe r the case to any proper court.” Nor ton v . E

v e rh ar t , 8 95 S.W. 2d

at 32 0. Th e Court , there fore , invited the Gene ral Asse mbly to enac t a broa d transfe r statute. Nor ton v . E v e rh ar t , 895 S.W .2d at 320. Appar ently

in response to this Court’s invitation, the Gener al Assembly enac ted Tenn. Code An n
. § 16-1-116 in 2000. See Hawkins v. Tenn. De p’t of Correction , 1 2 7 S

. W

. 3 d at7 6 6

. T h is 6 tr ans fe r s tatut e pr ov ide s:

Notwithstanding a

ny other provision of law o r rule of court to the contra ry , when a

n orig inal civil action, an appea l from the judg ment of a court of g ener al sessions, or a petition f or revie w of a fi nal decision in a c ontested ca se under the Unifo rm Administrative Procedur es Ac t, compiled in tit l e 4 , ch ap ter 5, is filed in a state or county cou rt o f record or a

g ener al sessions court a nd such cour

t deter mines that it lacks jurisdictio n, the cour t shall, if it is in the interest of justice, tr ansfe r such a ction or appe al to any o t h er such-5- court in which the action or a ppeal c ould have b een br oug ht at the time it was originally filed. Upon s uch a transfe r, t he ac tion or appea l sh a ll p ro c e e d a s if it ha d be e n or ig ina lly fi le d in the c ourt to whic h it is transfer red on the date upon which it was actually filed i n the cour t from which it wa s transfe rre d. Tenn. Code Ann. § 16- 1-116. Mr. Car ter a rgues t h at T en n. Code Ann. § 16-1- 116 authorizes transfe r of a

habea s corpus pe tition t o the prope r post-convic t i o n fo ru m . The State re sponds that Tenn. Co d e Ann. § 16-1-116 does not provide author ity for a transfe r bec ause ne ither a ha beas corpus nor

a post-convic tion procee ding ma y be fa irly char acte rized as an “ orig inal civil action.” The issue pre sented for revie w requires statutory construction. We re view issues of statutory construction de novo w ith no presumption of corr ectne ss attachingto the ruling s of the cour t below. State v. Edmondson , 231 S.W .3d 925, 927 (Tenn. 2007) . The most basic principle of statutory construction is to asce rtain and g ive ef fec t to leg islative intent without broadeningthe statute beyond its int ended sc ope. State v. Sherm an , 2 6 6 S

. W

. 3 d 3 9 5 , 4 0 1 (T en n
. 2 0 0 8 ). W h ens t atut o ry l an gu age is clear and unambiguous, we must apply its plain meaningin its normal and acc epted use , without a for ced inter

pretation that would ex tend the mea ning of the languag e an d , i n t hat instance , we enfor ce the languag e without ref ere nce to the br oader

statutory intent, leg islative hi s t o ry , or other source s. Ove rstreet v . TR W Com me rc ial

Ste e ring D iv ., 256 S.W .3d 626, 630 (Tenn. 2008). Statutes relating to the same subject or having a common purpose should be c onstrued tog ether

. Lawrence County Educ. Ass’n v . Lawrence County Bd. of Educ. , 2 44 S.W. 3d 30 2, 30 9 ( Te nn . 2 00 7) . We mu st presume that the Gene ral Assembly is a war e of pr ior ena ctments and of de cisions of the cour ts when enac ting leg islation. Ki v . S tate , 78 S.W .3d 876, 879 (Tenn. 2002)

. Although the petitioner in Nor ton v . E v e rh ar t filed a ha beas c orp u s p e ti ti o n, this Court agr eed with the Court of Criminal Appeals that the petition should be treate d as a c ivil action. The issue in Norton , there fo re , concerne d transfe rringa civil ac tion. As such, the Gene ral Asse mbly ’s presumed a

war eness of Norton provides no support for Mr. Ca rter’ s argument that Tenn. Code Ann. § 1 6- 1- 11 6 s ho uld

be c on str ue d to a pp ly to t ra ns fe r o f h a

be a s c or pu s or p os t- c onvic tio n p ro c e e din g s. Tenn. Code Ann. § 16- 1-116 p ermits transfe rringan “or igina l civil action” only when the court in which it wa s filed “determines that it lacks jurisdi ction.” In this case, the Criminal Court for Da vidson County

had jurisdiction over the habea s corpus action. The ref ore, Te nn. Code Ann. § 16-1-116, on its fa ce, does not a uthorize tra

nsfer of the ha

beas c orpus petition to the Circuit Court for Ma ury County for that c ourt to treat the pe tition as a post-conviction petition under Te nn. Code Ann. § 40-30-105( c). Cf. Be ns on v . H e rb st , 240 S.W .3d 235, 238 n.4 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2007) (noting that the g ener al sessions court having jurisdiction to awa rd damag es reque sted would not ha ve bee n able to tra

nsfer th e ca s e to circuit cour

t under Te nn. Code Ann. § 16-1- 116). In this case, the Criminal Court for Davidson County lacke d jurisdiction over a post-c onviction action. Ther efor e, a ssumin gMr . Ca

rt e r’ s h a be a s c or pu s p e tit ion

may be pr op e rl y

tr e ate d a s a

pe tit ion se e kin gpo st-M r
. Cart er does not al l ege i n hi s p et i t i on t hat he was un awar e t hat hi s ag r eed s ent enc e wa s out s i de of t he r ang e. 7 T he f ace o f t he judgm ent m akes cl ear t hat he agreed to b e sent enced outs i d e o f t he range. T he al l eged i l l egal i t y o f t he s e n t e n c e i s t h e on l y f

a c t u a l ba s i s s t a t e d f

or h i s c l a i m t h a t h i s gu i l t y pl e a w a s n ot k n ow i n g l y a n d v ol u n t a r i l y e n t e r e d. As we s t at ed above, t he t r i al cour t corr ect l y det er mi ned t hat t he agr eed s ent enc e i s l ega l

. T her ef ore, t hi s f

act ual bas i s may n o l on g er be c on s i der ed. U n der t h e Pos t

- Conv i ct i on P roce du r e Act , “ [ f ] ai l u r e t o s t at e a f

ac t u al ba s i s f

or t h e g r ou n ds a lleg e d sh a ll re su lt in im m e d ia te d ism issa l o f t h e p e tit io n .” T e n n . C o d e A n n
. § 4 0 -3 0 -1 0 6 (d ) (2 0 0 6 ). S inc e M r. C a rte r’s pet i t i on woul d now be s ubj ect t o i mm edi at e di s mi s s al , t r eat i ng i t as a po s t

- convi ct i on pet i t i on woul d app ear t o be f ut i l e. W h e n a p e tit io n is fil e d p ro se , the tria l c o u rt h a s the d isc re tio n to a llo w the p e tit io n e r to fi le a n a m e n d e d p e tit io n to a v o id d ism issa l. See T enn
. C od e A nn
. § 40- 30

- 10 6(d) ( provi di ng t hat “ t he j udge may en t er an order s t at i ng t hat t he pet i t i oner m ust f i l e an am end ed pe t i t i o n t hat co m p l i es wi t h t hi s sect i o n wi t hi n f i f t een (15 ) days or t he p et i t i o n wi l l be dis m i ss ed ”). T he i s s ue i n t hi s ca s e, howev er , i s wh et her T enn
. Co de Ann. § 16

- 1- 11 6 aut ho rizes a t ran sf er. I n mak i ng t hat d et erm i nat i o n, we m u st tr e a t M r. C a rt er’ s p et i t i o n as i t was f i l ed , not as i t co ul d be am end ed

. N o t wi t hst and i ng our co ncerns ab o ut t he f

ut i l i t y of any p o t ent i al t rans f er i n t hi s case, we wi l l ad d res s t he i ss ue i n t he i nt erest of res o l vi ng t he c o n fli c t am o n g p a n e ls o f t h e inte rm e d ia te c o u rt. -6- conviction re lief, we must deter mine whether a post -convic tion action is an “orig inal civil action” 7 for the pur

pose of Te nn. Code Ann. § 16-1- 116.
Th is C ourt

ha s h e ld t

hat a po st- c onvic tio n p ro c e e din gis c ri min a l in natur e fo r t

he purp os e of Tenn. R. App. P. 4(a ). State v. Scale s , 767 S.W .2d 15 7 , 1 5 8 (Tenn. 1989) (wa iving notice of a pp e a l in int e re st o f j us tic e ). On the oth e r hand , we have he ld that a po st- c onvic tio n p e tit ion sh ou ld be conside red a s civil in nature for the purpose of tolling the statute of limitations. W atk ins v . S tate , 903 S.W .2d 302, 305 (Tenn. 1995) (apply ing g ener al savingstatute, Tenn. Code Ann. § 28-1-106) (application of Tenn. Code Ann. § 28-1-106 supe rsede d by statute in Tenn. Code Ann. § 40- 30- 102(a) (2006)) . As we r ece ntly observe d, howeve r, a p ro ce ed i n g t h at i s “civil in nature” is not nece ssarily

a “c ivil action.” State v. Harrison , 2 7 0 S

. W.3d 21, 35 n.11 (Tenn. 2008) (c oncluding that competenc y

hear ing is not civil ac tion for purpose of Tenn. R. Civ. P. 1). Post-conviction proce eding s are best descr ibed as proce eding s arising out of a c riminal case

. SeeTe nn . Co de An

n. § 16- 5- 10 8( a )( 2) (1 99 4) (d e fi nin g jur isd ic tio n o f C ourt of Cr imi na l App e a ls as i n c l u d i n g h ab ea s co rp u s an d p o s t -c o n v i ct i o np ro ce ed i n gs an d “o th er ca s es o r p ro ce ed i n gs instituted with ref

ere nce to or arisingout of a c riminal case ”). Post-convic tion procee dings a re not considere d civil actions for the purpose of

the jurisdiction of the Court of Appe als. SeeTenn. Code Ann. § 1 6- 4- 10 8( a )( 1) (1 99 4) . We mus t pr e sume that t he Gen eral Asse mbl y wa s awa re of the se statutes when e nactingTenn. Code Ann. § 16- 1-116. The Gene ral Assembly could have included post-conviction ac tions withi n the scope of Tenn. Code Ann. § 16-1-116 by ref err ing to these actions b y n ame
. In ste a d , th e G e n e r a l A s s e mb ly u s e d th e un amb igu o u s te r

m “ o r ig in a l c iv il a c ti o n
. ” We derive leg islative intent from the plain and ordinary meaning of t his statutory languag e. Applying the af oreme ntioned principles of statutory construction, we conclude that “orig inal civil action” doe s n o t i n c lu d e a

p o s t- c o n v ic ti o na c ti o n
. T h ere fore , Tenn
. Co d e A nn
. § 1 6

- 1

- 1 1 6 d o e s n o t a uth o r iz e transfe r of Mr. Ca

rter’ s petition, even if it wer e tre ated a s a post-convic tion action.
Ha vin gde te rm ine d th at T e nn . Co de Ann. § 1 6-1-1 16 doe s n ot a uth or ize a tr ans fe r i n th is situation, we lastly decide whether to fashion a reme dy

. See Nor ton v . E v e rh ar t , 895 S.W .2d at 322 (applying Tenn. R

. App. P

. 36(a) to suspend statute of limitations for filing a petition for a c ommon--7-

law wr it of cer

tiorari). After the t rial court promptly denied his habea s corpus petition, M r. Carte r had almost three months in which to file a p o st-conviction petition before the one- y ear statute of limit ations expi red. SeeTenn. Code Ann. § 4 0 -3 0 -102(a). To ensur e re view of a ny additional g round for

relief that might rende r his c onviction me rely voidable, as opposed to void, Mr. Ca rter could have prese nted his illeg al sentenc e claim in a post-conviction petition. Se eSu mm e rs v . S tate , 212 S.W .3d 251, 256 n.3 (Tenn. 2007) (noting t h at v o id or illeg al sentenc e may be cha lleng ed collater ally

in post-conviction proce edingwhen the statutory re quirements ar e met, includingthe one-year limit ations period). B eca use Mr. Car

ter is not without fault in failing to avoid the situation, we de cline to invoke our a uthority under Rule 36( a).

III . We have c oncluded that the Court of Criminal Appeals cor

rec tly deter mined that the trial c ourt did no t e rr by de nyingMr . Ca

rt e r’s pe tit ion

fo r a wr it o f h a

be a s c or pu s. We h ave a lso conclude d that the Court of Criminal Appea ls c orre ctly deter mined that Tenn. Code Ann. § 16- 1-116 does not authorize transf

er of Mr. C arte r’s habeas corpus petit ion to another county for c onsideration as a post-conviction proce eding

. Acc ording ly , we aff irm the judgme nt of the Cour t o f C ri minal Appea ls. I t appea

ringthat Mr. Car t er i s i n dige nt, we tax the costs of this appeal to the State of Tenne ssee.

___________________________________ WI L L IAM C. K OC H, JR., JUST I CE