* After examining the briefs and appellate record, th is panel has determined

unanimously to honor the parties’ request for a dec ision on the briefs without oral argument. See F ED
. R. A PP
. P. The case is therefore ordered submitted without oral argument. 

## F I L E D United States Court of Appeals Tenth Circuit 

### APR 15 2003 

### PATRICK FISHER Clerk PUBLISH UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

TENTH CIRCUIT CARLA L. ROBEY-HARCOURT, Individually, Plaintiff-Appellant,

v. BENCORP FINANCIAL COMPANY, INC., an Oklahoma Corporation, CASZEY BENNET, P.K. SMITH, and KARLOS LESURE, Individually, Defendants-Appellees. No. 02-6259

APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF OKLAHOMA

(D.C. No. 01-CV-1028-F)

Submitted on the Briefs: Carla L. Robey-Harcourt, Oklahoma City, Oklahoma, f or Plaintiff-Appellant. Melvin C. Hall and Gisele K. Perryman, Oklahoma City, Oklahoma, for Defendants-Appellees.

Before EBEL, LUCERO and O’BRIEN , Circuit Judges. *-2-

O’BRIEN , Circuit Judge.

Ms. Carla L. Robey-Harcourt entered a mortgage brok erage business contract with BenCorp Financial Company Inc. (“Ben Corp”). In the contract, BenCorp agreed to “exert its best efforts to obtain a bona fide mortgage loan commitment” and “assembl[e] information, compil[e] file, and complet[e] credit application for borrower(s).” The contract specifi cally stated BenCorp could not make loans or guarantee the acceptance of a loan. After failing to receive the loan she desired, Ms. Robey-Harcourt filed a compla int in the Western District of Oklahoma against BenCorp alleging, among other clai ms, a violation of the federal Truth in Lending Act (“the Act” or “TILA”), 15 U.S.C. § 1601 et seq. On November 9, 2001, the court dismissed all claims ex cept her TILA claim and state law claims of fraud and conspiracy to commit fraud. On July 12, 2002, the district court granted BenCorp’s Motion for SummaryJudgment because it was not a creditor and thus could not be held accountab le under the Act. The court declined to exercise jurisdiction over the remainin g state-law claims and dismissed them without prejudice. She appeals, asserting the district court erred in (1) granting BenCorp1 Regulation Z was issued by the Board of Governors o f the Federal Reserve

Board and is the implementation tool for TILA. -3- summary judgment, and (2) ignoring Oklahoma’s exemp tion under Regulation Z, 1 12 C.F.R. § 226.29 (2002). We have jurisdiction pu rsuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291 and affirm based on the district court’s well-reaso ned order. See Robey-Harcourt v. BenCorp Fin. Co., Inc. , 212 F. Supp. 2d 1332 (W.D.Okla. 2002).
DISCUSSION We review the district court’s grant of summary judgment de novo, applying the same legal standard used by t he district court. Summary judgment is appropriate “if the ple adings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admiss ions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that the re is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is e ntitled to a judgment as a matter of law.” Simms v. Okla. ex rel. Dep’t of Mental Health & Sub stance Abuse Servs. , 165 F.3d 1321, 1326 (10th Cir. 1999), cert. denied, 528 U.S. 815 (1999) (quoting F ED
. R. C IV
. P. 56(c)). Ms. Robey-Harcourt asserts summary judgment was inappropriate because issues of material fact exist. She points to depos ition testimony of Ms. Cindy Barrett, a deputy administrator for Oklahoma’s Department of Consumer Credit, who stated her belief that BenCorp was not in compl iance with Regulation Z. But compliance with Regulation Z begs the question, whi ch is whether TILA applies to BenCorp. BenCorp is licensed as a mortgage brok er and TILA applies to2 TILA defines a creditor as “a person who both (1) r egularly extends,

whether in connection with loans, sales of propertyor services, or otherwise, consumer credit which is payable by agreement in mo re than four installments or for which the payment of a finance charge is or may be required, and (2) is the person to whom the debt arising from the consumer c redit transaction is initially payable on the face of the evidence of indebtedness or, if there is no such evidence of indebtedness, by agreement.” 15 U.S.C. § 1602(f)(2002). Regulation Z defines a creditor as “[a] person who regularly extends consumer credit that is subject to a finance charge or is payable by written agreement in more than 4 installments (not includin g a down payment), and (B) to whom the obligation is initially payable, either on the face of the note or contract, or by agreement when there is no note or contract.” 12 C.F.R. § 226.2(a)(17)(i)(2002). -4- “creditors.” Thus, TILA applies to BenCorp only if it is a “creditor” as defined under the TILA and Regulation Z definitions. 2 BenCorp is not a creditor under these definitions, and thus TILA is inapplicable. Ms. Robey-Harcourt next argues the district court i mproperly weighed evidence in granting summary judgment. BenCorp pro vided affidavits and other evidence that it does not regularly extend credit, and has not done so in the past two years. Ms. Robey-Harcourt did not refute BenCorp’s asserti ons, and the opinions expressed in Ms. Barrett’s deposition test imony are irrelevant. Since none of Ms. Robey-Harcourt’s evidence was relevant to the determination of whether BenCorp was a creditor, it could not be a m aterial fact affecting the district court’s decision. Ms. Robey-Harcourt also claims the district court e rred by relying on an3 A state may be accorded exemption status from a cla ss of transactions

from certain TILA requirements if “[t]he State law is substantially similar to the Federal law or . . . affords the consumer greater p rotection than the Federal law . . .” 12 C.F.R. § 226.29(a)(1)(2002). Because Oklaho ma law mirrors TILA, Oklahoma was granted an exemption. -5- unpublished opinion in granting summary judgment. The district court properly applied the statutes and regulations. The fact it mentioned, after announcing its holding, an unpublished case with a similar holding is immaterial. Finally, Ms. Robey-Harcourt argues Oklahoma’s exemp tion under Regulation Z was applicable and the district court erred in failing to apply Oklahoma law. 3 This argument is unavailing for three reasons. F irst, she did not raise this argument below, and we will not considera new theory on appeal, even one “that falls under the same general category as an argument presented at trial or . . . a theory that was discussed in a vague and ambiguous way . . .” Bancamerica Commercial Corp. v. Mosher Steel of Kan sas, Inc. , 100 F.3d 792, 798-99 (10th Cir. 1996) (quotations and citation om itted). Second, she fails to provide legal authority for her assertion that Okla homa law, rather than federal law, should apply in this case. Parties must suppo rt their arguments with legal authority. Phillips v. Calhoun , 956 F.2d 949, 953-54 (10th Cir. 1992); United States v. Almaraz , 306 F.3d 1031, 1041 (10th Cir. 2002), cert. denied _____ U.S. _____, 123 S.Ct. 1372 (2003). Her perfunctory argu ment that failed to develop the issue is insufficient to invoke appellate revie w. Murrell v. Shalala , 43 F.3d-6-

1388, 1389 n.2 (10th Cir. 1994). Finally, she does not explain how the Oklahoma exemption differs in any significant way from feder al law. Accordingly, the summary judgment in favor of BenCo rp is AFFIRMED

.