Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 20A03-1703-CR-641 | September 8, 2017 Page 1 of 11

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D), 

this Memorandum Decision shall not be 

regarded as precedent or cited before any 

court except for the purpose of establishing 

the defense of res judicata, collateral 

estoppel, or the law of the case.

ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT

Peter D. Todd

Elkhart, Indiana

ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE

Curtis T. Hill, Jr.

Attorney General of Indiana

Katherine M. Cooper

Deputy Attorney General

Indianapolis, Indiana

I N T H E

COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA

Daniel R. Rose,

Appellant-Defendant,

v.

State of Indiana,

Appellee-Plaintiff.

September 8, 2017

Court of Appeals Case No.

20A03-1703-CR-641

Appeal from the Elkhart Superior 

Court

The Honorable Teresa L. Cataldo, 

Judge

Trial Court Cause No.

20D03-1610-F4-48

Bailey, Judge.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 20A03-1703-CR-641 | September 8, 2017 Page 2 of 11

Case Summary

[1] Following a jury trial, Daniel R. Rose (“Rose”) was convicted of (1) Unlawful 

Possession of a Firearm by a Serious Violent Felon, as a Level 4 felony;1(2) 

Possession of Methamphetamine, as a Level 4 felony;2 and (3) Possession of 

Marijuana, as a Class B misdemeanor.3 Rose now appeals, raising a single 

issue which we restate as whether the trial court erred in restricting his crossexamination of a witness and thereby deprived him of a fair trial.

[2] We affirm.

Facts and Procedural History

[3] On September 29, 2016, the Elkhart County Interdiction and Covert 

Enforcement Unit (“ICE Unit”) was conducting surveillance related to a 

possible firearm transaction and began observing a truck driven by Douglas 

Flick (“Flick”) in which Rose was a passenger. At some point, Flick and Rose 

met with Courtney Fox (“Fox”) and got into a vehicle that she had been 

driving. In doing so, Rose brought a black backpack with him. Flick sat in the 

driver’s seat, Fox was in the front passenger seat, and Rose sat behind Fox.

[4] Flick began driving and the vehicle was followed by Sergeant Jack Oldroyd 

(“Sergeant Oldroyd”) of the Elkhart Police Department who was assigned to 

 

1

Ind. Code § 35-47-4-5(c).

2

I.C. §§ 35-48-4-6.1(a), -(c)(2).

3

I.C. § 35-48-4-11(a)(1).
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the ICE Unit. Sergeant Oldroyd observed Flick commit two traffic violations 

and subsequently initiated a traffic stop. As Sergeant Oldroyd approached the 

vehicle, Rose leaned to the left as though he was reaching for something. Rose 

then bent forward and reached toward the floor in front of him. Rose’s actions 

appeared furtive and Sergeant Oldroyd called for backup.

[5] An eventual search of the vehicle revealed several items of contraband. There 

was a 9mm handgun under the front passenger seat as well as a zippered case 

that contained methamphetamine and marijuana in red-striped Ziploc baggies. 

To the left of where Rose had been sitting, there was a black backpack that 

contained 9mm ammunition and empty baggies of the same red-striped style.

[6] In addition to these items, law enforcement located a red bag that Flick claimed 

as his. The bag contained another handgun and methamphetamine. Fox also 

relinquished fifty Oxycontin pills. Additionally, law enforcement located a 

woman’s jacket in the backseat, under the black backpack, that contained 

nearly thirty grams of methamphetamine.

[7] The State charged Rose with possessing the contraband located under Fox’s 

seat and a jury found Rose guilty. Rose now appeals.

Discussion and Decision

[8] Rose argues that the trial court erred in prohibiting him from eliciting certain 

testimony and that the error deprived him of the right to a fair trial under the 
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United States Constitution.4 “A trial court has broad discretion in ruling on the 

admissibility of evidence and we will disturb the court’s ruling only where it is 

shown the court abused that discretion. ‘But where, as here, a constitutional 

violation is alleged, the proper standard of appellate review is de novo.’” 

Leonard v. State, 73 N.E.3d 155, 168 (Ind. 2017) (citation omitted) (quoting 

Speers v. State, 999 N.E.2d 850, 852 (Ind. 2013), cert. denied).

[9] The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States 

Constitution guarantees criminal defendants the right to a fair trial, and the 

basic elements of a fair trial are defined largely through provisions of the Sixth 

Amendment. See Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 684-85 (1984). Among 

a defendant’s Sixth Amendment rights is the right of confrontation that serves 

the essential purpose of securing the opportunity to conduct cross-examination. 

Davis v. Alaska, 415 U.S. 308, 315 (1974). Moreover, the Fourteenth 

Amendment and the Sixth Amendment collectively “guarantee[] criminal 

defendants ‘a meaningful opportunity to present a complete defense.’” Crane v. 

Kentucky, 476 U.S. 683, 690 (1986) (quoting California v. Trombetta, 467 U.S. 

479, 485 (1984)). That is, a criminal defendant has “the basic right to have the 

prosecutor’s case encounter and ‘survive the crucible of meaningful adversarial 

testing.’” Id. at 690-91 (quoting United States v. Cronic, 466 U.S. 648, 656 

(1984)); see also Strickland, 466 U.S. at 685 (“[A] fair trial is one in which 

evidence subject to adversarial testing is presented to an impartial tribunal for 

 

4 Rose makes no argument under the Indiana Constitution.
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resolution of issues defined in advance of the proceeding.”). Nonetheless, “[a] 

criminal defendant does not enjoy an unlimited constitutional right to offer 

exculpatory evidence.” Hubbard v. State, 742 N.E.2d 919, 922 (Ind. 2001). 

Rather, when

the defendant’s Sixth Amendment right to present a defense 

collides with the State’s interest in promulgating rules of evidence 

to govern the conduct of its trials, the merits of the respective 

positions must be weighed, [and] the State’s interest must give 

way to the defendant’s rights if its rules are “mechanistically” 

applied to deprive the defendant of a fair trial.

Id. (quoting Huffman v. State, 543 N.E.2d 360, 375 (Ind. 1989), overruled in part 

on other grounds, Street v. State, 567 N.E.2d 102 (Ind. 1991)).

[10] At trial, the primary defense theory was that Fox put the contraband under her 

seat. While conducting cross-examination, Rose sought to elicit testimony 

concerning Fox’s relationship with law enforcement, including her work as a 

confidential informant. Rose also sought to elicit testimony that when Sergeant 

Oldroyd initiated the traffic stop, Fox called an officer from the ICE Unit on 

her cellphone—an officer who later responded to the scene and testified against 

Rose. When the State objected to these lines of cross-examination, Rose argued 

that the testimony would cast doubt on Fox’s credibility and be indicative of

bias, particularly because Fox was not immediately arrested for possessing the 

pills and was not questioned about the methamphetamine in the woman’s 

jacket for which no one was ever charged. The trial court sustained the State’s 

objection, concluding that the testimony was not relevant under the totality of 
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the circumstances. In doing so, the trial court also expressed concern that “the 

harm that could result to the . . . witness on the stand [was] substantially greater 

than any benefit that c[ould] be derived from the defense asking the witness to 

disclose, public[ly], who she spoke with during th[e] stop.” Tr. Vol. III at 77.

[11] “The partiality of a witness is subject to exploration at trial, and is always 

relevant as [to] discrediting the witness and affecting the weight of his 

testimony.” Davis, 415 U.S. at 316 (quotation marks omitted). Indeed, “the 

exposure of a witness’ motivation in testifying is a proper and important 

function of the constitutionally protected right of cross-examination.” Id. 

Moreover, “without knowing [a] witness’ status as an informant, ‘the jury 

d[oes] not have the necessary information from which to make a meaningful 

evaluation’” of the witness’ credibility. Standifer v. State, 718 N.E.2d 1107, 1110 

(Ind. 1999) (quoting Janner v. State, 521 N.E.2d 709, 716 (Ind. Ct. App. 1988)).

[12] Here, Rose was entitled to elicit testimony concerning Fox’s work as a 

confidential informant, a role that bore on her credibility as a State witness. 

Thus, the closure of these lines of questioning offended Rose’s right of crossexamination. Nevertheless, when a trial court limits cross-examination in 

violation of this right, a “conviction will be sustained only if the error is 

harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.” McCorker v. State, 797 N.E.2d 257, 266 

(Ind. 2003); see also McCarthy v. State, 749 N.E.2d 528, 534 (Ind. 2001).

Whether the trial court’s error is harmless depends on several 

factors including “the importance of the witness’ testimony in the 

prosecution’s case, whether the testimony was cumulative, the 
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presence or absence of evidence corroborating or contradicting 

the testimony of the witness on material points, the extent of 

cross-examination otherwise permitted, and, of course, the 

overall strength of the prosecution’s case.”

Standifer, 718 N.E.2d at 1111 (quoting Delaware v. Van Arsdall, 475 U.S. 673, 

684 (1986)).

[13] In arguing that the error rendered his trial fundamentally unfair, Rose likens 

this case to Chambers v. Mississippi, 410 U.S. 284 (1973), wherein a defendant 

had been prohibited from eliciting testimony that a third party had confessed, 

on several occasions, to committing the murder for which the defendant was on 

trial—potential evidence that the United States Supreme Court deemed critical 

enough to warrant a new trial. Here, however, the testimony Rose sought to 

elicit was not as critical nor did Fox play a vital role in the prosecution of the 

case. Disregarding all testimony from Fox, the evidence indicates that law 

enforcement saw Rose bring a black backpack into the vehicle. When Sergeant 

Oldroyd initiated the traffic stop, Rose made furtive movements to the left—

toward the area the backpack was found—and then toward the floor in front of 

him. Police found the handgun, methamphetamine, and marijuana in the area 

where Rose had reached, and the drugs were located in plastic baggies of the 

same style as those in the black backpack, which also contained ammunition. 

The drugs found elsewhere in the vehicle were in different kinds of baggies.

[14] Ultimately, this case turned on whether Rose concealed the contraband. At 

trial, Rose had ample opportunity to cross-examine a witness who testified that 
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because of the configuration of the area underneath the seat and the presence of 

trash wedged from the front, a front-seat passenger would be unable to slide the 

handgun and zippered case to the back of the under-seat area. Rose also 

elicited testimony regarding the potentially exculpatory position of the 

handgun, which was located with the grip closer to the front of the seat. There 

was also potentially exculpatory testimony that Fox had access to the vehicle 

and that Flick had recently loaned the vehicle to several others. Additionally,

Rose elicited testimony that he did not leave his residence with a backpack and 

he testified to leaning to the left only to retrieve his wallet. 

[15] In light of the strength of the State’s case independent of Fox’s testimony as 

well as the extent to which Rose was able to meaningfully cross-examine the 

testimony central to the prosecution, we conclude that the limitation of crossexamination amounted to error that was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.5

Conclusion

[16] Although Rose’s right of cross-examination was violated when the trial court 

limited inquiry into the potential bias of a State witness, the error was harmless 

beyond a reasonable doubt and therefore Rose was not deprived of a fair trial.

 

5

In addition to arguing that the trial court erred in limiting cross-examination concerning Rose’s status as an 

informant, Rose argues that he was improperly restrained from eliciting testimony concerning “the specifics 

of the plea agreement she secured related to her involvement in this case.” Appellant’s Br. at 10. However, 

the trial record indicates that Rose’s counsel knew that the agreement related to methamphetamine charges 

Fox faced prior to the instant traffic stop and there is no indication—through an offer of proof or otherwise—

that Fox received any benefit related to the instant case. Nonetheless, for the reasons discussed herein, we 

conclude that any error in the curtailment of cross-examination concerning Fox’s credibility was harmless 

beyond a reasonable doubt.
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[17] Affirmed.

Altice, J., concurs.

Baker, J., dissents with separate opinion.
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I N T H E

COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA

Daniel R. Rose,

Appellant-Defendant,

v.

State of Indiana,

Appellee-Plaintiff

Court of Appeals Case No.

20A03-1703-CR-641

Baker, Judge, dissenting.

[18] I respectfully dissent. I agree with the majority that Rose should have been 

permitted to elicit testimony regarding Fox’s work as a confidential informant 

and her relationship with law enforcement. I respectfully disagree that the 

ruling prohibiting this evidence from admission was harmless error.

[19] I acknowledge the evidence in the record regarding Rose’s backpack and his 

movements in the vehicle after the traffic stop was initiated. In my view, this 

evidence does not rise to the extremely high bar required to conclude that the 

erroneous limitation of Fox’s cross-examination was harmless beyond a 

reasonable doubt. 
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[20] Witness bias is always relevant and important, especially in a case such as this 

where the evidence of the defendant’s guilt is not overwhelming and where the 

key witness has an undisclosed relationship with law enforcement. The jury 

should have been permitted to assess Fox’s credibility in light of her status as a 

confidential informant. Likewise, it should have been permitted to consider the 

overall situation and Rose’s guilt or innocence given the relationship between 

Fox and the law enforcement community. It may well have been the case that 

the jury would have convicted Rose anyway, but I cannot reach that conclusion 

beyond a reasonable doubt. Therefore, I would reverse and remand for a new 

trial.