COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA

Present: Chief Judge Decker, Judges Fulton and Ortiz

STEVEN PERRY

MEMORANDUM OPINION* BY

v. Record No. 1472-22-1 CHIEF JUDGE MARLA GRAFF DECKER

DECEMBER 19, 2023

COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA

FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE CITY OF VIRGINIA BEACH

Leslie L. Lilley, Judge

(Diane P. Toscano; Toscano Law Group, P.C., on brief), for 

appellant. Appellant submitting on brief. 

(Jason S. Miyares, Attorney General; Amanda L. Lavin, Assistant 

Attorney General, on brief), for appellee. Appellee submitting on 

brief.

Steven Perry appeals the circuit court’s judgment that he remains a sexually violent predator 

under Code § 37.2-910 and recommitting him to the custody of the Department of Behavioral 

Health and Developmental Services (the Department) for continued treatment. The appellant argues 

that the circuit court erred by finding that he remained a sexually violent predator and did not meet 

the criteria for conditional release. We hold the record supports the circuit court’s factual findings. 

Accordingly, we affirm the court’s judgment.1

* This opinion is not designated for publication. See Code § 17.1-413(A).

1 Portions of the record in this matter are sealed. Nonetheless, this appeal necessitates 

unsealing relevant material for purposes of resolving the issues raised by the appellant. 

Consequently, “[t]o the extent that this opinion mentions facts found in the sealed record, we 

unseal only those specific facts, finding them relevant to the decision in this case. The remainder 

of the previously sealed record remains sealed.” Levick v. MacDougall, 294 Va. 283, 288 n.1 

(2017).

UNPUBLISHED
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BACKGROUND2

In 1988, the appellant was convicted of rape, burglary, and grand larceny. He was

sentenced to a total of thirty years and twelve months of incarceration. While in prison, the 

appellant accumulated “a significant number” of indecent exposure charges. 

In 2018, as the end of the appellant’s term of active incarceration neared, the

Commonwealth filed a petition against the appellant, as the respondent, to civilly commit him under 

the Sexually Violent Predators Act, Code §§ 37.2-900 to -921. A jury found that the appellant was 

a sexually violent predator. After reviewing additional evidence, the circuit court found that he did 

not satisfy the criteria for conditional release and there was “no less restrictive alternative to 

involuntary secure inpatient treatment.” Accordingly, the court committed the appellant to the 

Department’s custody for inpatient treatment at the Virginia Center for Behavioral Rehabilitation 

(the Center).

3

 

In 2022, in compliance with the Code, the circuit court held an annual review of the

appellant’s status as a sexually violent predator and related civil commitment. At the hearing, 

Dr. Daniel Montaldi, an expert in the treatment and risk assessment of sex offenders, confirmed that 

the appellant had been diagnosed with a “specified personality disorder” with “antisocial traits” and 

exhibitionist disorder.

4

 His personality disorder manifested in fewer “emotional resources for 

resisting” criminal “urge[s]” and less “aversion to violating the rights of other people.” 

2 Under the applicable standard of review, this Court considers “the evidence in the light 

most favorable to the Commonwealth,” as the prevailing party below. Lotz v. Commonwealth, 277 

Va. 345, 349 (2009). In doing so, we “accord the Commonwealth the benefit of all inferences fairly 

deducible from the evidence.” Shivaee v. Commonwealth, 270 Va. 112, 127 (2005). 

3 The appellant petitioned the Supreme Court of Virginia for an appeal from the circuit

court’s judgment. The Supreme Court refused the petition. 

4 Dr. Montaldi considered the appellant’s exhibitionist disorder to be in “full remission” 

because for twelve years the appellant had no documented incidents of indecent exposures.
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Dr. Montaldi opined that the combination of the appellant’s conditions resulted in little “remorse” 

for his offenses. In addition, the appellant’s score on the Static-99R, an objective risk assessment 

tool, placed him at an above-average risk of reoffending when compared to other sexual offenders. 

Dr. Montaldi reported that since the last annual review hearing, the appellant had been 

verbally abusive to the Center staff, repeatedly failed to follow their instructions, and engaged in 

physical altercations with other residents. Although the appellant showed some progress in phase I 

of treatment, he could not advance to phases II or III because he refused to admit that he committed 

the underlying rape. Dr. Montaldi explained that because he continued to deny the rape, the 

appellant could not make significant progress with his sex-offender treatment. In addition, although 

the appellant admitted to the indecent exposures, he refused to fully participate in the treatment to 

address that behavior. 

Given the lack of treatment progress, Dr. Montaldi opined that the appellant remained a 

sexually violent predator and needed continued inpatient treatment “to avoid deterioration of his 

condition.” Further, Montaldi believed that the appellant’s refusal to admit guilt would preclude

him from being able to comply with an outpatient treatment program intended to address the rape. 

Although Dr. Montaldi thought that the public risk from his release could be “managed” with “close 

monitoring and supervision,” he concluded that the appellant did not satisfy all of the statutory 

criteria for conditional release. 

Dr. Stephen Ganderson, a second expert in sexually-violent-predator evaluations, also 

assessed the appellant in anticipation of the annual review hearing and similarly opined that he 

remained a sexually violent predator. Dr. Ganderson confirmed the appellant’s diagnoses of 

personality disorder with antisocial traits and exhibitionist disorder but also noted “paranoid traits” 

associated with “psychotic disorder” that caused him to distrust others and be less deterred by rules. 

After reviewing the appellant’s records, Ganderson noted that he demonstrated “problematic 
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behavior,” including threats, misogynistic and racist remarks, and other forms of “verbal 

aggression.” Ganderson indicated that the appellant’s “verbal aggression” resulted from poor 

self-control. The doctor expressed concern that if released to the community with less supervision, 

the appellant’s propensity to verbalize his anger would “spill over . . . into sexual matters.” 

Moreover, in a clinical interview, the appellant was unable to communicate “treatment concepts” 

necessary to justify progressing to phase II of treatment. As a result, Ganderson concluded that the 

appellant would likely “deteriorate” without secure inpatient treatment, that outpatient treatment 

was not reasonably available, that the appellant was unlikely to adhere to the conditions of his 

release, and that his release would “present an undue risk to public safety.” 

The appellant testified that he was willing to address his “exposure behavior” but was not 

given the opportunity to fully participate in the treatment modules. He explained that he stopped 

exposing himself while still incarcerated because it was “holding [him] back.” The appellant was 

frustrated that he could not advance to phase II of treatment because he maintained his innocence 

regarding the underlying rape. He asserted that he could comply with any conditions of his release, 

stating that his “big problem” was that the Center staff did not respect him. 

After argument by counsel, the circuit court found that the appellant remained a sexually 

violent predator and did not meet the criteria for conditional release. 

ANALYSIS

The appellant argues that the evidence did not support the circuit court’s findings. 

Specifically, he believes the evidence established that he was no longer a sexually violent predator 

and that he met the criteria necessary for a conditional release.
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I. Standard of Review

The language of the applicable statutes and existing case law provide the standard of review 

governing appeals involving the continued civil commitment of someone under the Sexually 

Violent Predators Act. 

A “[s]exually violent predator” is someone “convicted of a sexually violent offense” who, 

“because of a mental abnormality or personality disorder, finds it difficult to control his predatory 

behavior, which makes him likely to engage in sexually violent acts.” Code § 37.2-900. Review 

hearings for the civil commitment of sexually violent predators are held every year for the first five 

years and then every other year. Code § 37.2-910(A). 

The review process requires the circuit court to “find[],” based on an examination of the 

evidence provided at the hearing, whether the individual “remains a sexually violent predator.”

Code § 37.2-910(D). If the circuit court finds that a respondent remains a sexually violent 

predator, the court “shall order that he remain in the custody” of the Department “for secure 

inpatient hospitalization and treatment or that he be conditionally released.” Id. For a 

respondent to be eligible for conditional release, the circuit court must find that he meets certain 

conditions. Code § 37.2-912(A). 

“The standard of proof adopted by the [Sexually Violent Predators Act] is proof by clear and 

convincing evidence.” Ellison v. Commonwealth, 273 Va. 254, 260 (2007); see Code 

§ 37.2-910(C). “This evidentiary standard describes an intermediate level of proof that exceeds the 

‘preponderance’ standard[] but does not reach the level of certainty required in criminal cases of 

‘beyond a reasonable doubt.’” Commonwealth v. Miller, 273 Va. 540, 551 (2007) (quoting Grubb 

v. Grubb, 272 Va. 45, 54 (2006)). The burden of proof rests with the Commonwealth. See Code 

§ 37.2-910(C). On appeal of the review decision, a circuit court’s findings of fact will be reversed 
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only if they are plainly wrong or without evidentiary support. See Commonwealth v. Squire, 278 

Va. 746, 749-50 (2009). 

The appellant challenges both the finding that he remained a sexually violent predator and 

the conclusion that he did not meet the criteria necessary for a conditional release.

II. Sexually Violent Predator

The appellant argues that the evidence failed to show that he remained a sexually violent 

predator as it did not prove that “because of” a personality disorder, he was “likely” to engage in a 

sexually violent act. He also contends that his exhibitionist disorder was in remission and would, at 

most, predispose him to nonviolent sexual behavior. The appellant also emphasizes that his 

personality disorder had not resulted in any recent offenses or behavioral issues. As a result, he 

maintains that he can “regulate his conduct” and has a low propensity to “engage in impulsive acts, 

particularly sexually violent ones.” 

The circuit court’s determination regarding whether a respondent remains a sexually 

violent predator must “be based on the totality of the record, including but not limited to expert 

testimony.” See DeMille v. Commonwealth, 283 Va. 316, 318 (2012). On appeal, we defer to the 

weight a circuit court assigns to the expert testimony and will not reverse that court’s finding that a 

respondent is a sexually violent predator “unless it is plainly wrong or without evidence to support 

it.” Squire, 278 Va. at 749; see Shivaee v. Commonwealth, 270 Va. 112, 128 (2005). 

Applying these principles to this case, we hold the record supports the circuit court’s 

conclusion that the appellant remained a sexually violent predator. Drs. Montaldi and Ganderson 

confirmed that he had been diagnosed with a personality disorder with antisocial traits and 

exhibitionist disorder. In addition, Ganderson opined that the appellant displayed “paranoid traits.” 

According to Montaldi and Ganderson, the combination of these factors resulted in the appellant

being less deterred by rules and more susceptible to the urge to engage in criminal behavior. 
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The appellant denied responsibility for the underlying rape. See Shivaee, 270 Va. at 127-28 

(holding that the evidence supported a finding that a respondent remained a sexually violent 

predator when he “continued to deny or minimize his offenses”). He had made no significant 

progress in treating his underlying disorders since his original adjudication as a sexually violent 

predator and could not progress to phases II or III of his treatment. His score on the Static-99R risk 

assessment tool demonstrated that he was at an above-average risk of reoffending when compared 

to other sexual offenders. See Miller, 273 Va. at 552 (reversing a finding that the respondent was 

not a sexually violent predator because he demonstrated “a significant risk of committing future 

offenses” on risk assessment tools and unsuccessfully participated in a treatment program). 

Although the appellant had not engaged in any sexual offenses in twelve years, his “verbal 

aggression” while at the Center represented poor self-control, leading Dr. Ganderson to opine that 

his anger could “spill over . . . into sexual matters” if he was released and under “looser” 

supervision. This record entirely supports the circuit court’s finding that the appellant remained a 

sexually violent predator.

III. Conditional Release

The appellant argues that the circuit court erred by concluding that he did not meet the 

criteria for conditional release, emphasizing Dr. Montaldi’s testimony that the risk to public safety 

could be managed with “close monitoring and supervision.” 

For a respondent to be eligible for conditional release, the circuit court must find that he 

meets four conditions. Code § 37.2-912(A); see Lotz v. Commonwealth, 277 Va. 345, 350 

(2009). First, it must find that he “does not need secure inpatient treatment but needs outpatient 

treatment or monitoring to prevent his condition from deteriorating to a degree that he would 

need secure inpatient treatment.” Code § 37.2-912(A)(i). Second, the court must determine that 

“appropriate outpatient supervision and treatment are reasonably available.” Code 
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§ 37.2-912(A)(ii). Third, the evidence must provide “significant reason to believe that the 

respondent, if conditionally released, would comply with the conditions specified.” Code 

§ 37.2-912(A)(iii). Fourth, the court must conclude that “conditional release will not present an 

undue risk to public safety.” Code § 37.2-912(A)(iv). 

The evidence shows that the appellant had not made any significant progress in his 

treatment. Instead, because he refused to admit culpability for the underlying rape, he could not 

advance beyond the initial phase of the treatment program. Consequently, Dr. Montaldi opined 

that the appellant needed to be in an inpatient program to avoid deterioration of his condition. 

Dr. Ganderson agreed. In addition, Montaldi explained that any conditional release plan would 

require the appellant to admit his guilt of the underlying rape in an outpatient treatment program. 

Both he and Ganderson opined that the appellant would not likely comply with the conditions of 

his release. Although the appellant claimed that he would follow any conditions the circuit court 

imposed, the court was unpersuaded. See Poole v. Commonwealth, 73 Va. App. 357, 369 (2021) 

(noting that the circuit court “was at liberty to discount [the appellant’s] self-serving statements” 

(quoting Becker v. Commonwealth, 64 Va. App. 481, 495 (2015))). Therefore, even if the risk to

public safety from the appellant’s release could be managed as Dr. Montaldi speculated, the 

above circumstances support the court’s conclusion that he did not meet all four of the criteria in 

Code § 37.2-912(A). See Lotz, 277 Va. at 350 (“[C]onditional release is permitted only after a 

judicial determination that [the respondent] satisfies all four criteria.” (emphasis added)).

CONCLUSION

We hold that the record supports the conclusions that the appellant remained a sexually 

violent predator and did not meet the criteria for a conditional release. Accordingly, we affirm 

the judgment of the circuit court.

Affirmed.