SELENA E. MOLINA

 MASTER IN CHANCERY

COURT OF CHANCERY

OF THE

STATE OF DELAWARE

 LEONARD L. WILLIAMS JUSTICE CENTER

 500 NORTH KING STREET, SUITE 11400

 WILMINGTON, DE 19801-3734

Final Report: October 31, 2022

Date Submitted: July 12, 2022

Barbara Snapp Danberg, Esquire

Catherine M. Cramer, Esquire 

J. Garrett Miller, Esquire 

Baird Mandalas Brockstedt Federico & 

Cardea, LLC

2711 Centerville Road, Suite 401 

Wilmington, DE 19808

David J. Ferry, Jr., Esquire

Thomas R. Riggs, Esquire

Brian J. Ferry, Esquire

Ferry Joseph, P.A. 

1521 Concord Pike, Suite 202 

Wilmington, DE 19803

Re: In the Matter of the Estate of Lawrence M. Sullivan, Sr., Deceased,

C.A. No. 2020-0318-SEM 

Dear Counsel:

This case began with a petition for an elective share. After failed attempts at 

resolution, including mediation, the matter comes to me on summary judgment. The 

respondents argue that the petitioner’s request is barred by an antenuptial agreement

or the petitioner’s other inheritance from the estate; the petitioner contends there are 

disputes of fact material to both. I find the antenuptial agreement binds the petitioner

and she has failed to timely challenge it; therefore, I find summary judgment should 

be granted in the respondents’ favor and the petition dismissed.

This is my final report.
In the Matter of the Estate of Lawrence M. Sullivan, Sr., Deceased

C.A. No. 2020-0318-SEM

October 31, 2022

Page 2 of 15

I. BACKGROUND

This action stems from the estate of Lawrence M. Sullivan, Sr. (the 

“Decedent”). The Decedent married Catherine D. Sullivan (the “Petitioner”) on 

September 3, 1988.1 Before their marriage, on August 19, 1988, the Decedent and 

the Petitioner entered into an ante-nuptial agreement (the “Ante-Nuptial 

Agreement”).2 The Ante-Nuptial Agreement provides, in pertinent part, that the 

Petitioner: 

does hereby waive, release and relinquish all her right, title, estate and 

interest, statutory or otherwise, including, but not limited to, dower 

(inchoate or consummate) homestead, exempt property, family 

allowance, community property, statutory allowance, distribution in 

intestacy and right of election to take against the Will of [the Decedent]

which may be now or hereafter provided for under the law of Delaware, 

or any other state, county or jurisdiction[.]3

The Petitioner was represented by counsel at Morris, James, Hitchens & 

Williams in connection with the Ante-Nuptial Agreement.4 On August 19, 1988, 

the Petitioner’s attorney Barbara Crowell wrote to her explaining she had reviewed 

1 D.I. 1 ¶ 1. Undisputed facts from the petition are accepted as true for the purposes of this 

decision.

2 D.I. 31, Ex. D.

3

Id.

4 See D.I. 35, Ex. B.
In the Matter of the Estate of Lawrence M. Sullivan, Sr., Deceased

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the Ante-Nuptial Agreement and did not recommend the Petitioner sign it.

5

 She 

explained, “[i]f you sign the agreement . . . you will be doing so against my advice 

and without my approval.”6 The Petitioner confirmed her receipt and understanding

of the letter, signing where indicated to confirm that if the Petitioner signed the AnteNuptial Agreement it would be against counsel’s advice.7

 The Petitioner further 

explained in a handwritten note: “I acknowledge that I understand you don’t approve 

and will not represent me in any matter pertaining to the signed agreement.”8 

Despite these contemporaneous notes, the Petitioner submitted an affidavit in 

this action wherein she represents she “did not understand the effect the AnteNuptial Agreement had on [her] rights, and [she] did not receive adequate legal 

counsel.”9 Rather, the Petitioner now attests that she “was pressured to sign the 

Ante-Nuptial Agreement by [the Decedent], who told [her] that the Agreement 

would protect [her], and who [she] trusted because he was [her] fiancée and more 

importantly because he was a Delaware attorney and [she] therefore relied on his 

5

Id.

6

Id.

7

Id.

8

Id.

9 D.I. 35, Ex. J.
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C.A. No. 2020-0318-SEM

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knowledge of the law and his advice regarding the Ante-Nuptial Agreement.”10 

Nonetheless, the Decedent and the Petitioner remained married, with the AnteNuptial Agreement unchallenged, until the Decedent’s death on September 9, 

2019.11 

The Decedent’s estate (the “Estate”) is governed by his last will and testament, 

which was admitted to probate on December 2, 2019 (the “Will”).

12

 The Will named 

the Lawrence M. Sullivan, Sr. Revocable Trust U/A/D February 6, 2002 (the 

“Trust”) as the beneficiary of the residuary of the Estate.13 The Will named the 

Decedent’s children—Lawrence M. Sullivan, Jr., John L. Sullivan, and Catherine 

10 Id.

11 D.I. 1 ¶ 1.

12 Id. ¶ 4. See In re Sullivan, 173204 AF (“ROW”), D.I. 1; Arot v. Lardani, 2018 WL 

5430297, at *1 n.6 (Del. Ch. Oct. 29, 2018) (citing 12 Del. C. § 2501; D.R.E. 202(d)(1)(C)) 

(“Because the Register of Wills is a Clerk of the Court of Chancery, filings with the 

Register of Wills are subject to judicial notice.”).

13 ROW D.I. 1. The Trust was restated on September 20, 2018, amended on March 25, 

2019, and amended a final time on April 11, 2019. D.I. 31, Ex. A-C. The Decedent’s sons, 

Lawrence and John serve as trustees of the Trust. D.I. 31, Ex. A-C. The Trust provides 

that the Petitioner is entitled to 25% of the distributable income from the Trust during her 

lifetime, and 75% will go to the Decedent’s children per stirpes. D.I. 31, Ex. B. Upon the 

Petitioner’s death, 25% of the Trust’s remaining principal will go to the Petitioner’s 

surviving issue per stirpes with the remaining 75% going to the Decedent’s surviving issue 

per stirpes. D.I. 31, Ex. A. First names are used for clarity; no disrespect or familiarity is 

intended. 
In the Matter of the Estate of Lawrence M. Sullivan, Sr., Deceased

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S. Horner (collectively, the “Respondents”)—as executors.14 Ms. Horner declined 

the appointment and Lawrence and John were appointed as co-executors of the 

Estate.15 

The Petitioner filed a petition for an elective share of the Decedent’s estate on 

April 29, 2020 (the “Petition”).

16

 The Petitioner did not mention the Ante-Nuptial 

Agreement in the Petition. The first mention came in the Respondents’ responses 

filed on July 1, 2020.17 Therein, the Respondents listed several affirmative defenses 

including for failure to state a claim and that the Petitioner “is precluded from 

asserting her claim and from seeking the relief demanded in this action because she 

executed” the Ante-Nuptial Agreement “in which she waived her right to claim an 

elective share of the Decedent’s Estate.”18 The Respondents also asserted 

affirmative defenses of waiver, estoppel, laches, and acquiescence.19

14 ROW D.I. 1.

15 ROW D.I. 11, 13.

16 D.I. 1. On June 9, 2020, I granted an order allowing the Respondents additional time to 

respond to the petition. D.I. 6. 

17 The executors of the Estate filed a response, to which Ms. Horner joined by separate 

submission. D.I. 7, D.I. 8.

18 D.I. 7. See also D.I. 8.

19 D.I. 7. See also D.I. 8.
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On December 4, 2020, the parties filed a stipulation regarding the Decedent’s 

Federal Estate Tax Return Form 706, which I granted on December 11, 2020.

20

 After 

the form was provided to the Petitioner, the docket remained dormant for several 

months, until I requested a status letter from the parties on September 9, 2021.21 The 

Petitioner responded on September 14, 2021, by requesting a hearing date and an 

order for mediation in advance of the hearing.22 The Respondents replied the same 

day with an explanation that efforts at settlement failed and by filing a motion for 

summary judgment (the “Motion”).23 Soon after, on October 1, 2021, the 

Respondents filed a status report informing me that the parties agreed to mediate and 

wished to postpone the Motion until after mediation concluded.

24

 

The docket went dormant again, until I again requested a status letter from the 

parties on December 1, 2021.25 Both parties responded the same day, informing me 

that they had scheduled mediation for January 11, 2022, and that they would file a 

20 D.I. 13.

21 D.I. 14-15.

22 D.I. 16.

23 D.I. 17-18. 

24 D.I. 20.

25 D.I. 21.
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C.A. No. 2020-0318-SEM

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follow-up status letter following mediation.26 That letter arrived on March 24, 2022, 

informing me that mediation was not successful, and the litigation would be moving 

forward.27

On May 26, 2022, I granted a scheduling order for briefing the Motion.28 The 

Respondents filed their opening brief in support of the Motion on May 31, 2022.29 

The Petitioner filed her answering brief in opposition to the Motion on June 30, 

2022.30 By July 12, 2022, the Motion was fully briefed, and the matter was 

submitted for my consideration.31

II. ANALYSIS 

Under Court of Chancery Rule 56, summary judgment will be granted if 

“there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and . . . the moving party is entitled 

to a judgment as a matter of law.”32 “[T]he facts must be viewed in the light most 

26 D.I. 22, 23.

27 D.I. 25.

28 D.I. 30.

29 D.I. 31.

30 D.I. 35.

31 D.I. 37.

32 Ct. Ch. R. 56(c). 
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favorable to the nonmoving party and the moving party has the burden of 

demonstrating that there is no material question of fact.”33

The record for a motion for summary judgment consists of “the pleadings, 

depositions, answers to interrogatories and admissions on file, together with 

[supporting or opposing] affidavits, if any[.]”34 Under Court of Chancery Rule 56(e)

Supporting and opposing affidavits shall be made on personal 

knowledge, shall set forth such facts as would be admissible in 

evidence, and shall show affirmatively that the affiant is competent to 

testify to the matters stated therein. Sworn or certified copies of all 

papers or parts thereof referred to in an affidavit shall be attached 

thereto or served therewith.

“When a motion for summary judgment is made and supported . . ., an adverse party 

may not rest upon the mere allegations or denials of the adverse party’s pleading,” 

and, rather, must provide through affidavits “specific facts showing that there is a 

genuine issue for trial. If the adverse party does not so respond, summary judgment, 

if appropriate, shall be entered against the adverse party.”

35

33 Senior Tour Players 207 Mgmt. Co. v. Golftown 207 Hldgs. Co., 853 A.2d 124, 126 (Del.

Ch. 2004).

34 Ct. Ch. R. 56(c). 

35 Id.
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Under this lens, the Respondents argue that the Ante-Nuptial Agreement bars 

the Petitioner’s claim for an elective share, or the Petitioner is not entitled to an 

elective share because the value of the Petitioner’s inheritance is greater than her 

elective share, vitiating her claim.36 Regarding the first, the Respondents further 

argue the Petitioner is barred by laches from challenging the Ante-Nuptial 

Agreement. Because I agree and find the Ante-Nuptial Agreement is binding, I do 

not reach the Respondents’ second argument. When the Ante-Nuptial Agreement 

was executed, 13 Del. C. § 301 provided:

A man and a woman in contemplation of matrimony, by a marriage

contract executed in the presence of 2 witnesses at least 10 days before 

the solemnization of the marriage, may determine what rights each shall 

have in the other’s estate during marriage and after its dissolution by 

death and may bar each other of all rights in their respective estates not 

so secured to them and any such contract duly acknowledged before 

any officer authorized to take acknowledgments may be recorded in the 

deed records in the office of the recorder in any and all counties of the 

State.37

36 An elective share is equal to one-third of the deceased spouse’s elective estate, minus 

any other transfers made to the surviving spouse by the estate. 12 Del. C. § 901(a).

37 Coulbourn v. Lambert, 1996 WL 860586, at *5 (Del. Fam. Ct. Dec. 19, 1996).
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Further, “[b]ecause of the unique relationship between parties who are about to be 

married, courts generally review an antenuptial agreement for both procedural and 

substantive fairness.”38 An antenuptial agreement is not fair if:

it fails to satisfy any one of the following requirements: (1) each spouse 

has made a fair and reasonable disclosure to the other of his or her 

financial status; (2) each spouse has entered into the agreement 

voluntarily and freely; and (3) the substantive provisions of the 

agreement dividing the property upon divorce are fair to each spouse at 

the time of the execution of the agreement and, if circumstances 

significantly changed since the agreement, then also at the time of the 

divorce.39

Here, there is no dispute that the Ante-Nuptial Agreement met the 

requirements in Section 301. But the Petitioner argues that there are disputes of fact 

material to whether the Ante-Nuptial Agreement meets the procedural or substantive 

fairness tests. To do so, she introduced a letter reflecting counsel’s advice that the 

Petitioner not sign the Ante-Nuptial Agreement (and her acknowledgment thereof) 

and an affidavit attesting that she was pressured and deceived when signing the AnteNuptial Agreement. The Petitioner uses these documents to argue the Decedent was 

the dominant party in connection with the Ante-Nuptial Agreement and, as such, the 

38 Id. at *7. 

39 Id.
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Respondents, as proponents of the Ante-Nuptial Agreement, bear the burden of 

proving its fairness.40 Down these tracks, the Petitioner sees various disputes of fact.

But I find I need not tread either track because the Petitioner’s challenge to 

the Ante-Nuptial Agreement is barred by laches. Laches is an equitable doctrine

“rooted in the maxim that equity aids the vigilant, not those who slumber on their 

rights.”

41

 Although the statute of limitations for an action does not strictly dictate 

the time to bring equitable claims, the Court will apply the statute of limitations by 

analogy “absent tolling or extraordinary circumstances.”

42

 “There is a presumption 

of prejudice and unreasonableness when the analogous statute of limitations is 

exceeded.”

43

Thus, “[i]n order to grant summary judgment based on laches, I must 

determine which analogous statute of limitations applies.”

44

 The Uniform Premarital 

Agreement Act (the “UPAA”), which tolls the statute of limitations for challenging 

40 See J.A.B. v. N.H.B., 2003 WL 23312951, at *4 (Del. Fam. Ct. Nov. 18, 2003).

41 Kraft v. WisdomTree Invs., Inc., 145 A.3d 969, 974 (Del. Ch. 2016).

42 Id. at 983.

43 Olga J. Nowak Irrevocable Tr. v. Voya Fin., Inc., 2022 WL 2359628, at *9 (Del. Ch. 

June 30, 2022) (citations omitted). 

44 BioVeris Corp. v. Meso Scale Diagnostics, LLC, 2017 WL 5035530 at *5 (Del. Ch. Nov. 

2, 2017).
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a premarital agreement for the length of the marriage, does not apply.45 But the 

Petitioner argues that 12 Del. C. § 901 leads to the same conclusion—because the 

right of election does not arise until a spouse’s death, the Petitioner argues her claim 

did not begin to accrue until the Decedent’s death. I disagree.

At any time during their marriage, the Petitioner could have challenged the 

Ante-Nuptial Agreement. She could have brought an action to reform or challenge 

its various provisions, moving for declaratory relief. Such actions, as recognized in 

Olga J. Nowak Irrevocable Tr. v. Voya Fin., Inc., 2022 WL 2359628, at *6 (Del. Ch. 

June 30, 2022), invoke the three-year statute of limitations for contract actions.

46 In 

Olga J. Nowak Irrevocable Trust, this Court found contract reformation claims 

barred by laches where the movant waited more than three years after knowledge of 

the facts giving rise to a reformation claim.

47

 Therein, the Court recognized

“significant, material elements of the reformation claims involve[d] oral 

45 13 Del. C. § 328. The need for this provision was explained in comments to the UPAA, 

Section 8: “In order to avoid the potentially disruptive effect of compelling litigation 

between the spouses in order to escape the running of an applicable statute of limitations, 

Section 8 tolls any applicable statute during the marriage of the parties .... However, a 

party is not completely free to sit on his or her rights because the section does preserve 

certain equitable defenses.” Unif. Premarital Agreement Act, § 8, cmt.

46 See 10 Del. C. § 8106.

47 Nowak Irrevocable Tr., 2022 WL 2359628, at *9.
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communications occurring as far back as 1999 and no more recently than 2011.”

48

Thus, the Court found, “[i]t is unfair to any party to litigate the accuracy of such long 

ago conversations.”

49

The same is true here. The Petitioner was advised by her attorney in 1988 not 

to sign the Ante-Nuptial Agreement. She acknowledged that advice and the warning 

contained therein, yet never acted on it. Rather she and the Decedent “were happily 

married for over thirty-one years,” during which time the Ante-Nuptial Agreement 

remained in place.50 Only now does the Petitioner attest, through an affidavit dated 

June 27, 2022, that she did not understand the Ante-Nuptial Agreement or receive 

adequate legal counsel.51 Her affidavit, however, is conclusory, self-serving, and 

contradicts her and her attorney’s contemporaneous notes. 

And the Petitioner’s delay is not harmless, as she contends. Evidence 

surrounding execution of the Ante-Nuptial Agreement is stale and it is likely that the 

Decedent relied on the Ante-Nuptial Agreement’s enforceability in his estate 

planning. Further, although the UPAA now tolls the statute of limitations for 

48 Id.

49 Id.

50 D.I. 35, p.6.

51 D.I. 35, Ex. J.
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challenging a premarital agreement for the length of the marriage, it does not apply 

retroactively, and the Petitioner has not demonstrated any extraordinary 

circumstance that justifies tolling. 

The same was recognized by the Court of Appeals of North Carolina in 

Crosland v. Patrick.

52

 There, the appellate court was faced with a similar dilemma—

a spouse waited over thirty years to challenge an ante-nuptial agreement and North 

Carolina’s version of the UPAA did not apply. The court upheld the trial court’s 

ruling that the challenge was time-barred, finding the underlying claim accrued at 

the time the agreement was executed and the statute of limitations to bring such 

action expired during the marriage. The post-death, decades later request was too 

late.

I hold similarly and find the Petitioner is barred from challenging the AnteNuptial Agreement by laches.53

 Because her challenge is barred, the Petitioner 

cannot avoid summary judgment by injecting purported disputes of fact regarding 

the negotiation or execution of the Ante-Nuptial Agreement. The material facts—

that the Ante-Nuptial Agreement was executed and, by its unambiguous terms, bars 

52 Crosland v. Patrick, 2021 WL 980095, at *3 (N.C. Ct. App. 2021).

53 See also id.
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the right to claim an elective share—are undisputed. Thus, the Motion should be 

granted. 

III. CONCLUSION

For the above reasons, I find that the Motion should be granted. The Petitioner 

sat on her right to challenge the Ante-Nuptial Agreement for too long and is now 

barred by the doctrine of laches. With the Ante-Nuptial Agreement uncontestable, 

the Petitioner waived her claim to an elective share of the Estate and the Respondents 

are, thus, entitled to judgment as a matter of law. 

This is my final report and exceptions may be filed under Court of Chancery 

Rule 144.

Respectfully submitted,

/s/ Selena E. Molina

Master in Chancery