Filed 5/5/15 Marriage of Reade and Roizman CA2/4

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for 

publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication 

or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION FOUR

In re Marriage of VICTORIA READE and 

KEITH ROIZMAN.

 B253362

 (Los Angeles County

 Super. Ct. No. BD512241)

VICTORIA READE,

Appellant,

v.

KEITH ROIZMAN,

Respondent

WENDY L. SHEINKOPF,

 Respondent.

APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los Angeles County, Michelle 

Williams Court, Judge. Affirmed. 

Roberta L. Murawski for Appellant.

No appearance for Respondent. 

Wendy L. Sheinkopf, in pro. per. for Respondent Sheinkopf. 
2

Victoria Reade appeals an order requiring her to pay $73,000 in fees to respondent 

Wendy L. Sheinkopf, an attorney who represented Reade’s ex-husband, Keith Roizman, 

during the parties’ dissolution proceedings. Reade contends that the trial court abused its 

discretion by failing to consider whether Sheinkopf’s assessed fees were reasonable and 

issuing an order that exceeded the bounds of reason. We disagree and affirm.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL SUMMARY

A. Underlying Dissolution Proceedings

Reade and Roizman married on May 8, 2002. Reade initiated dissolution 

proceedings on September 11, 2009, a few weeks after she and Roizman were involved in 

a domestic violence incident that led her to obtain a restraining order against Roizman.

The dissolution proceedings—which should have been relatively straightforward given 

the absence of children and significant or complex assets – quickly became bogged down 

by disputes over the restraining order, the marital home,1and the operations (and later 

attempted joinder) of iontherapeutics, Inc., a struggling start-up medical device business 

in which Reade and Roizman each held a 35 percent stake and an executive position. 

Sheinkopf, who had been representing Roizman from the beginning of the litigation as an 

associate at the Law Offices of Robert M. Cohen, substituted into the case as his sole 

counsel on April 23, 2010. 

The court resolved the dispute over the restraining order in April 2010 when it 

denied Roizman’s request to modify or terminate the order. Iontherapeutics’ 

 

1 Ownership of the couple’s Hollywood Hills home was hotly contested even 

though the deed and mortgage were both in Reade’s name. Roizman claimed that a 

friend of his, Dr. R. James Klingenstein, purchased the home for Roizman’s benefit and 

owned the home until Reade tricked him into signing title over to her. Reade maintained 

that she legitimately purchased the home from Klingenstein using her separate property. 

Klingenstein intervened in the dissolution proceedings and filed a verified complaint 

alleging that Reade defrauded him (and seeking to quiet title as to Roizman). Reade 

subsequently filed a cross-complaint against Klingenstein and Roizman, and Roizman 

filed a cross-complaint against Reade. The home eventually fell into foreclosure. It is 

unclear from the record what became of the home and the claims regarding it. 
3

participation in and relevance to the dissolution proceedings likewise substantially 

diminished when the company declared bankruptcy on October 12, 2010. The marital 

home remained a source of controversy throughout the proceedings, however.

In late August 2010, Roizman served Reade with a demand to inspect the marital 

home (from which he had been banned by the restraining order since August 2009). Over 

the next several weeks, the parties exchanged a flurry of correspondence regarding the 

inspection and Roizman’s simultaneous demand for a continued deposition of Reade. 

Their exchanges became particularly contentious after Sheinkopf obtained first a 

temporary and later a permanent restraining order against Reade following an alleged 

battery incident.2 Ultimately, in October 2010, Roizman filed a voluminous motion to 

compel the inspection and deposition.

The court orally granted the motion to compel on November 29, 2010 and ordered 

the parties to conduct the inspection no later than February 28, 2011. Despite the court’s 

order, the inspection continued to generate controversy and heavy litigation during the 

next several months. The parties exchanged correspondence disputing the proper timing 

and duration of the inspection as well as other details. On February 24, 2011, Roizman 

filed an ex parte request seeking enforcement of the court’s November 29, 2010 orders. 

Roizman also sought monetary sanctions and fees. It is unclear from the record what 

happened at the hearing on Roizman’s ex parte motion. It appears, however, that Reade 

did not appear for the scheduled inspection, and that the parties were unable to reach an 

agreement regarding the deposition. The parties continued their litigation of discovery 

issues throughout the spring and summer. The court accurately observed in November 

2010 that the case was “being litigated as though it were a multimillion dollar estate.” 

Eventually, on August 4, 2011, the court issued a six-page ruling spelling out the 

precise manner in which the parties were to proceed with the deposition and inspection. 

 

2

Sheinkopf claimed that Reade hit her in the back at an arbitration involving Reade, 

iontherapeutics, and iontherapeutics’ former counsel. Reade “vociferously denie[d]” 

touching Sheinkopf and maintained that both the temporary and permanent restraining 

orders were entered without proper notice to her. 
4

The court declined to impose sanctions against either side, noting the “significant 

confusion” regarding the inspection. With regard to fees, the court stated that it “can and 

will make attorney fee awards when it is clear to the court what the assets in this 

dissolution are and what they are worth. . . . Both parties are convincing in their 

representation that they simply do not have any assets at this time to pay their own fees, 

let alone the fees for the other party.” 

Roizman discharged Sheinkopf shortly after the court’s August 4, 2011 discovery 

ruling. 

B. The Borson Motion and Related Proceedings 

1. The Borson Motion and Accompanying Documents 

On August 9, 2011, Sheinkopf filed a motion for attorney’s fees pursuant to In re 

Marriage of Borson (1974) 37 Cal.App.3d 632 (Borson), which permits a discharged 

attorney, with the express or implied consent of his or her former client, to seek fees from 

the opposing party in dissolution proceedings on the former client’s behalf. In the 

declaration attached to her motion, Sheinkopf averred that Roizman discharged her on 

August 7, 2011 after he incurred $135,450 in legal fees and $3,096.79 in costs, 

$90,157.383of which remained unpaid and all of which she characterized as “reasonable 

and necessary pursuant to the holding in In Re Marriage of Keech (1999) 75 Cal.App.4th 

860.” Sheinkopf averred that Roizman was unable to pay the fees himself, as he “is 

legally blind, and this severe disability prevents him from being gainfully employed.”4

Notwithstanding the court’s recent observation that neither party appeared able to pay 

fees, Sheinkopf contended that Reade, whom she described as “a healthy woman of 50,” 

was in a better position than Roizman to pay Sheinkopf’s outstanding fees. According to 

Sheinkopf’s declaration, Reade held degrees that rendered her employable (a B.S. in 

nursing and an M.B.A.), continued to earn at least $4,000 per month in rental income 

 

3

Sheinkopf later revised this number upward to $91,307.87. 

4 No party to this case appears to have questioned this assumption, despite

Roizman’s recent gainful employment as an executive at iontherapeutics. 
5

from the marital home, had been employed by iontherapeutics during the 14 months of 

the proceedings in which it remained a going concern, and “evidently has the financial 

resources to be able to have attorneys from two separate firms represent her at the same 

time in this action alone.” Sheinkopf further asserted that “the vast majority of the fees 

and costs incurred by [Roizman] during my representation were occasioned and required 

due to the conduct of [Reade],” particularly in connection with the protracted discovery 

disputes on which Roizman ultimately prevailed. 

Sheinkopf provided the court with 46 pages of redacted invoices. All of 

Sheinkopf’s time was billed at her “discounted” rate of $350 per hour, including the time 

she spent obtaining the restraining order against Reade. The invoices also reflected 

Sheinkopf’s litigation costs, including an $88 parking ticket and a $262.90 tow charge

incurred when she appeared in court.

Sheinkopf also provided income and expense declarations filed by Reade and 

Roizman. Both declarations painted relatively bleak pictures of the parties’ finances. 

Reade reported monthly expenses in excess of $12,000, monthly income of $4,000, and 

averred that she had been “deplet[ing] separate savings” and obtaining personal loans to 

pay her attorneys, to whom she still owed $49,000. Roizman reported monthly expenses 

of approximately $12,000 and claimed no income aside from his $1,174 monthly Social 

Security disability payment and $94 in other public assistance. He also reported using 

personal loans to pay his attorneys. 

Reade opposed Sheinkopf’s motion, claiming that Roizman had sufficient funds to 

pay his own fees and “caused this matter to be unnecessarily delayed and his attorney has 

caused unnecessary, protracted litigation.” The record does not reflect that she made any 

additional written argument about the reasonableness of Sheinkopf’s fees, invoices, or the 

charges contained therein. 

2. The Initial Hearing and Ruling 

The court, presided over by Judge Juhas, heard the Borson motion on September 

12, 2011. Roizman, who was “technically” represented by new counsel at that point, did 
6

not attend, and neither did his new counsel. (Roizman later claimed he did not receive 

notice of the hearing, and attempted to demonstrate that he did not consent to the motion. 

Reade’s counsel attended, and she and Sheinkopf each claimed that the other’s client bore 

responsibility for the heavily litigated nature of the proceedings. Sheinkopf requested an 

expeditious ruling, as she wanted to ensure “that somehow my law firm’s rights are 

preserved.” Counsel for Reade requested that the motion be reserved until the time of 

trial. Judge Juhas acknowledged both parties’ positions, stating, “If I don’t grant the 

Borson motion, it will be reserved until time of trial. Absolutely.” He took the motion 

under submission and stated that he would “look at the papers and get something out as 

quickly as I can.” 

One week later, on September 19, 2011, Judge Juhas issued a minute order stating 

in its entirety: “This is the court’s ruling in the submitted matter of Ms. Wendy 

Sheinkopf’s Borson motion. The court grants the motion, but reserves over any payment 

of fees to Ms. Sheinkopf until the matter is finally determined. The court reserves over 

both need and ability to pay fees as well as any Family Code section 271 fees. Ms. 

Sheinkopf is to be advised of any trial or settlement conference in this matter so that she 

can participate, to the appropriate extent, concerning her attorney fee bill. [¶] Ms. 

Sheinkopf is to give notice of this ruling.”

3. Reade’s Bankruptcy

On October 20, 2011, Reade filed for bankruptcy. Reade listed Sheinkopf as 

“Creditor #26” on her Schedule F – Creditors Holding Unsecured Nonpriority Claims, 

indicating that Sheinkopf held a contingent, unliquidated, and disputed claim of 

$143,909.37. (That figure, approximately $50,000 more than the $91,307.87 outstanding 

balance actually billed to Roizman, reflected the amount Sheinkopf claimed she could 

have charged Roizman if she had assessed her typical fee of $425 per hour and had billed 

him for every second she spent on the case.) In another filing, Reade averred that she had 

been self-employed as a healthcare consultant for the preceding six months and during 

that time had earned $10,000 per month. She also noted, however, that her consultancy 
7

agreement ended on October 31, 2011 and she had not secured a new position. Reade 

represented that her monthly disposable income was negative $728.67, and projected her 

60-month disposable income at negative $43,720.20. 

The bankruptcy court ordered Reade’s debts discharged on August 21, 2012. The 

bankruptcy court did not discharge “[d]ebts that are domestic support obligations.” 

4. Sheinkopf’s Attempts to Obtain Payment and Related Proceedings

In September 2012, after being advised by Reade’s counsel that the dissolution 

proceedings were nearing a resolution, Sheinkopf filed a request for order awarding 

payment pursuant to her Borson motion. Sheinkopf asserted that a Borson award was in 

the nature of a domestic support obligation, such that it was not discharged in Reade’s 

bankruptcy, and requested that the court order Reade and/or intervenor Klingenstein to 

pay her fees “forthwith.” 

Reade opposed Sheinkopf’s request. She argued for the first time that Sheinkopf’s 

bills were “so heavily redacted, it cannot be reasonably determined what work was 

performed by Ms. Sheinkopf, or what she actually accomplished, other than it is clear 

that none of it related to support for Mr. Roizman . . . .” Reade further argued that 

Sheinkopf failed to demonstrate that Roizman could not pay the fees, “or is not in better 

financial position to pay the fees than [Reade], who just emerged from bankruptcy.” 

Reade also contended that she lacked the ability to pay the fees. In support of her latter 

contention, Reade furnished a schedule of assets and debts dated September 12, 2012 in 

which she averred that she already had post-bankruptcy debts totaling $72,000. Reade 

also provided an updated income and expense declaration, in which she stated that she 

earned $6,000 per month for working 8-10 hours per week as a healthcare consultant. 

Her declaration, which also was dated September 12, 2012, indicated that she had $780 in 

the bank, incurred monthly expenses of approximately $10,250, and owed her attorneys 

$68,000. Roizman also opposed Sheinkopf’s request for order. 

The court, now presided over by Judge Court, denied Sheinkopf’s request for 

payment from Klingenstein without prejudice “because he wasn’t a named party in the 
8

original motion.” The court stayed Sheinkopf’s request for payment from Reade because 

Sheinkopf had a claim pending against Reade’s bankruptcy estate in bankruptcy court. 

The court also granted Reade’s outstanding motion to bifurcate status, terminated the 

marriage, and set any remaining issues for trial on February 11, 2013. Sheinkopf filed a 

second request for payment of her fees and set that motion for hearing at the scheduled 

trial. 

In December 2012, without notifying Sheinkopf as required by the court’s 

September 19, 2011 order, Reade and Roizman settled their remaining issues and 

prepared a judgment for the court’s signature. Under the terms of the proposed 

settlement judgment, Reade and Roizman each agreed to pay their own attorneys’ fees. 

After she was apprised of the parties’ settlement in January 2013, Sheinkopf filed 

an ex parte motion requesting that judgment be stayed or vacated until her Borson claims 

were fully resolved. The court granted the motion over Reade’s and Roizman’s 

objections, staying entry of the judgment. 

The court issued a ruling on Sheinkopf’s second request for payment on February 

22, 2013. In that ruling, the court again denied Sheinkopf’s request to recover fees from 

Klingenstein. The court also denied Sheinkopf’s request that Reade pay her fees, finding 

that Sheinkopf “failed to show that the bankruptcy court determined that her claim was a 

domestic support obligation” not discharged in Reade’s bankruptcy. The court predicated 

this finding on a January 15, 2013 ruling from the bankruptcy court disallowing 

Sheinkopf’s claim against the bankruptcy estate.

On February 27, 2013, Sheinkopf filed a motion for new trial pursuant to Code of 

Civil Procedure sections 656-662. As relevant here, Sheinkopf argued that the court’s 

ruling precluding her recovery against Reade rested on incorrect and incomplete facts 

because the bankruptcy court ruling on which it was based had been entered without 

proper notice to her. The bankruptcy trustee ultimately agreed with Sheinkopf on that 

point and agreed to refile its motion so she would be afforded an opportunity to respond.
9

Reade opposed Sheinkopf’s motion. Roizman joined Reade’s opposition in its entirety 

and further argued that he never consented to the Borson motion.

The court issued a tentative ruling on April 9, 2013. In that ruling, the court 

proposed denying Sheinkopf’s motion as it pertained to recovery against Klingenstein. 

The court proposed conditionally granting the motion for new trial as it pertained to 

Reade. The court proposed setting a new trial “for a date after . . . the bankruptcy court’s 

ruling. If the bankruptcy court determines that [Sheinkopf’s] claim is not a domestic 

support obligation and therefore, has been properly discharged, the new trial date will be 

taken off calendar. . . . If the bankruptcy court determines that [Sheinkopf’s] claim is a 

domestic support obligation and thus, improperly discharged, [Sheinkopf] will have 

shown newly discovered evidence for new trial under Code of Civil Procedure 657(4).” 

The court adopted its tentative ruling after hearing extensive oral argument on 

April 24, 2013. The court set the conditional date of new trial for June 26, 2013.

On June 12, 2013, the bankruptcy court “determined that (a) [Sheinkopf’s claim 

against the bankruptcy estate] is a contingent and unliquidated claim that arose prior to 

the petition date; (b) the amount of [Sheinkopf’s claim] will not be determined until the 

claimant’s “Borson” motion has been adjudicated by the Family Law Court; and (c) the 

evidentiary record does not otherwise support a disallowance of [Sheinkopf’s claim] 

under § 502(b)(1) at this time.” The bankruptcy court further ruled that the bankruptcy 

trustee could reassert its objection to Sheinkopf’s claim “after the state court rules on the 

Borson motion.” 

With that ruling in hand, the parties returned to family law court as scheduled on 

June 26. Reade did not personally appear but filed a declaration attesting to her “great 

financial hardship,” a significant portion of which she attributed to opposing Sheinkopf’s 

continuous pursuit of fees in both the bankruptcy and family law courts. Neither she nor

Roizman provided an updated income and expense declaration, however. The court 

concluded that without those declarations, it lacked “the information that it needs in order 

to make a proper inquiry” into the parties’ financial need and ability to pay fees. The 
10

court therefore continued the matter to October 16, 2013 and ordered both parties “to file 

and serve updated Income and Expense Declaration by September 16, 2013.”

Reade timely filed an updated declaration dated September 16, 2013. She 

indicated that she earned approximately $1,450 per month as a healthcare consultant and 

temporary contractor working 10-20 hours per week. She also stated that she had been 

receiving $200 per month in food stamps since May 2013 and had only $237.67 in the 

bank. Reade reported owing more than $100,000 to her attorneys, but also indicated that 

she voluntarily had paid her current attorney $2,000 that month. Reade also filed a 

schedule of assets and debts, recent bank statements, and her 2012 tax return. One of the 

bank statements indicated that her “combined balance in linked accounts, which may 

include [d]eposit accounts or qualifying credit accounts, including a credit card” was 

$13,299.65. 

Sheinkopf timely filed a supplemental brief. She argued that the court needed to 

decide “basically, two” issues: “(1) What is the amount of the Borson Award: (a) the 

sum of $143,909.37: the total sum of unpaid billed and unbilled fees and costs incurred 

by Roizman through his use of Sheinkopf’s legal services, as claimed by Reade in her 

bankruptcy filing papers; or (b) the sum of $91,307.87: the total sum of unpaid billed 

fees and costs incurred by Roizman through his use of Sheinkopf’s legal services; and (2) 

Between Reade and Roizman, which party has an ability to pay Sheinkopf’s unpaid legal 

fees and costs: if Roizman completely lacks the ability to pay, does Reade have such 

ability and to what extent?” Sheinkopf further asserted that the reasonableness of the fees 

she requested was not before the court because “that issue was not reserved and the 

determination of reasonableness was subsumed in the Order of this Court on September 

19, 2011.” She also argued that “Roizman is presumed . . . to lack the ability to pay fees 

and costs of the Borson Award, and to have the need for Reade to be ordered to pay those 

fees and costs,” because he “has consistently declared in this matter that he is legally 

blind . . . and he has no income other than his Social Security disability income of less 

than $2,000 per month.” 
11

Reade responded that she lacked the ability to pay Sheinkopf’s fees. She also 

challenged Sheinkopf’s “presumption” regarding Roizman’s financial situation, averring, 

“[i]t is hard to imagine that Mr. Roizman, who has not had to file for bankruptcy, and as 

far as we know is not on food stamps, can be any worse off financially than Petitioner.” 

In reply, Sheinkopf pointed to several discrepancies in Reade’s financial filings, 

including the $13,299.65 in “linked accounts,” the recent and voluntary $2,000 payment 

to her attorney, and an entry in her bank statement reflecting a $6,400 wire transfer from 

a Barclay’s bank account that never had been disclosed to the court. Roizman 

emphasized these and other discrepancies in his own untimely pro. per. filings, which for 

the first time supported Sheinkopf.

At the October 16, 2013 hearing, the court granted Reade’s motion to strike 

Roizman’s untimely income and expense declaration and ordered that the hearing “go 

forward today based on the evidence we have before us.” The court allowed each 

interested party – Reade, Sheinkopf, and Roizman, who appeared in pro. per. by 

telephone – to make arguments. During his argument, Roizman stated that he was blind, 

earned $1,339 per month in Social Security disability payments, and had no other 

income. 

The court issued its ruling on October 23, 2013. The court began by noting that it 

had not reserved jurisdiction over the reasonableness of the $91,307.87 Sheinkopf had 

billed during her tenure as Roizman’s counsel. Accordingly, it proceeded to a 

consideration of whether there was a disparity in access to funds to retain counsel and 

ability to pay. (See Fam. Code, § 2030, subd. (b)(2).)5The court found that the parties’ 

incomes were about equal if their income and expense declarations were taken as true: 

Reade claimed a monthly income of $1,450 and Roizman claimed $1,288.6The court 

 

5 All further statutory references are to the Family Code unless otherwise indicated. 

6

The court struck Roizman’s most recent income and expense declaration, so it is 

unclear to which declaration it was referring or how it ultimately arrived at its conclusion 
12

found, however, that Reade’s declaration “does not accurately reflect her true financial 

situation.” Concluding that it was “not credible” for Reade’s income to have declined 

from $6,000 per month in September 2012 to $1,450 in September 2013 “for working up 

to 10 hours more per week in her own business,” the court attributed to Reade a monthly 

income equal to “at least” her reported monthly expenses of $10,400. Based on this 

finding, the court determined that a disparity existed: Reade took home 80 percent of the 

former couple’s net disposable income after payment of taxes. The court also noted that 

Reade “has at least $27,000 in her bankruptcy estate.” “Taking into consideration 

[Reade’s] reasonable expenses including her reasonable litigation costs,” the court further 

determined that she possessed “sufficient resources to make a contribution to 

[Roizman’s] fees” even though she lacked the ability to pay the entire amount. The court 

found that Reade should pay 80 percent of the billed fees, or $73,000. 

The court next considered “whether its apportionment of the overall fees and costs 

is “just and reasonable:” [sic] whether its award is sufficient, to the extent practical, to 

enable each party to present their case adequately, and how to apportion the fees and 

costs based on the parties [sic] relative circumstances applying the relevant factors listed 

in Family Code § 4320.” (See §§ 2032, subds. (a) & (b), 4320.) The court concluded, 

“[b]ased on this analysis,” which incorporated a variety of the factors enumerated in 

section 4320, that Roizman “needs the fee award within the meaning of the Family Code” 

and that the award of $73,000 “is just and reasonable and is appropriate.” Finding that 

monthly installment payments would not place an unreasonable burden on Reade, the 

court ordered her to pay $1,500 per month to Sheinkopf, beginning as soon as the 

bankruptcy court adjudicated and disbursed Sheinkopf’s still-pending claim against 

Reade’s bankruptcy estate. 

 

that Roizman’s income was $1,288 per month. Reade has not challenged this finding on 

appeal. 
13

Reade timely appealed. The order is an appealable one over which we have 

jurisdiction. (See In re Marriage of Skelley (1976) 18 Cal.3d 365, 368; In re Marriage of 

Weiss (1996) 42 Cal.App.4th 106, 119.) 

DISCUSSION 

I. Legal Framework 

A Borson motion rests upon section 2030. (See In re Marriage of Turkanis & 

Price (2013) 213 Cal.App.4th 332, 356 & fn. 8; In re Marriage of Read (2002) 97 

Cal.App.4th 476, 480; Borson, supra, 37 Cal.App.3d at p. 634.) Section 2030 permits the 

court to order one party to a dissolution to pay the other’s attorney fees and costs and 

“reflects the public policy of providing, “‘“‘at the outset of litigation, consistent with the 

financial circumstances of the parties, a parity between spouses and their ability to obtain 

effective legal representation.’” [Citation.]’ [Citation.]” (In re Marriage of Sharples

(2014) 223 Cal.App.4th 160, 164 (Sharples).) “The purpose ‘is not the redistribution of 

money from the greater income party to the lesser income party,’ but rather ‘parity: a fair 

hearing with two sides equally represented.’ [Citation.]” (Ibid.) Accordingly, section 

2030 by its terms limits awards to “whatever amount is reasonably necessary for 

attorney’s fees and for the cost of maintaining or defending the proceeding during the 

pendency of the proceeding” (§ 2030, subd. (a)(1)) and expressly requires the court to 

“make findings on whether an award of attorney’s fees and costs under this section is 

appropriate, whether there is a disparity in access to funds to retain counsel and whether 

one party is able to pay for legal representation of both parties” (§ 2030, subd. (a)(2)).

The trial court may make an award under section 2030 only “where the making of 

the award, and the amount of the award, are just and reasonable under the relative 

circumstances of the respective parties.” (§ 2032, subd. (a).) In making its 

determination, the court “shall take into consideration the need for the award to enable 

each party, to the extent practical, to have sufficient financial resources to present the 

party’s case adequately, taking into consideration, to the extent relevant, the 

circumstances of the respective parties described in Section 4320.” (§ 2032, subd. (b).) 
14

Section 4320 sets forth a nonexhaustive list of circumstances for the court to consider 

when ordering spousal support, including the ability of the supporting party to pay, the 

needs of the recipient party, the obligations and assets of each party, the ability of the 

supported party to engage in gainful employment, the age and health of the parties, the 

balance of hardships to the parties, and any other factors the court deems just and 

equitable. (§ 4320, subds. (c), (d), (e), (g), (h), (k) and (n).) 

Decisional law outlines additional factors a court should consider when setting the 

amount of a need-based award, including “the nature of the litigation; its difficulty; the 

amount in controversy; the skill required and employed in handling the litigation; the 

attention given; the success of the attorney’s efforts; the attorney’s learning and 

experience in the particular type of work demanded; the intricacies and importance of the 

litigation; the labor and the necessity for skilled legal training and ability in trying the 

cause; and the time consumed.” (In re Marriage of Braud (1996) 45 Cal.App.4th 797, 

827, fn. 30; In re Marriage of Keech, supra, 75 Cal.App.4th at p. 870 (Keech); In re 

Marriage of Cueva (1978) 86 Cal.App.3d 290, 296.) Thus, the financial resources of the 

parties is but one factor the court must consider when determining whether an award is 

just and reasonable. (§ 2032, subd. (b).) 

II. Standard of Review

Family courts are vested with considerable discretion in crafting an award of 

attorney’s fees. (Sharples, supra, 223 Cal.App.4th at p. 165.) We review such awards 

only for an abuse of this discretion. (See id.; see also In re Marriage of Rosen (2002) 105 

Cal.App.4th 808, 829 (Rosen); Keech, supra, 75 Cal.App.4th at p. 866.) Under this 

deferential standard, we must affirm unless no judge reasonably could make the 

challenged order. (Rosen, supra, 105 Cal.App.4th at p. 829.) Put another way, “‘the trial 

court’s order will be overturned only if, considering all the evidence viewed most 

favorably in support of its order, no judge could reasonably make the order made.’” 

(Keech, supra, 75 Cal.App.4th at p. 866.) “However, the court’s ‘decision must reflect 

an exercise of discretion and a consideration of the appropriate factors as set forth in code 
15

sections 2030 and 2032.’ [Citations.]” (Sharples, supra, 223 Cal.App.4th at p. 165.) 

Additionally, “[t]he trial court’s failure to exercise discretion is itself an abuse of 

discretion.” (Ibid.) Reade, the party challenging the order, bears the burden of 

demonstrating an abuse of discretion (In re Marriage of Lopez (1974) 38 Cal.App.3d, 93, 

114, disapproved on other grounds by In re Marriage of Morrison (1978) 20 Cal.3d 437, 

452-453); error is never presumed on appeal (In re Marriage of Falcone & Fyke (2008) 

164 Cal.App.4th 814, 822). 

III. Analysis 

A. The trial court did not abuse its discretion by failing to make an express 

reasonableness finding

Reade first contends that the trial court abused its discretion because neither Judge 

Juhas, who made the initial ruling granting the Borson motion, nor Judge Court, who 

made all subsequent rulings regarding the award of fees, “reviewed the reasonableness of 

Sheinkopf’s fees.” She argues that without an explicit assessment of reasonableness “on 

the record, any decision is an abuse of discretion,” for “‘[t]he exercise of sound discretion 

by the trial court in the matter of attorney’s fees also includes judicial evaluation of 

whether counsel’s skill and effort were wisely devoted to the expeditious disposition of 

the case’ [Citation.]” (In re Marriage of Huntington (1992) 10 Cal.App.4th 1513, 1524; 

see also Keech, supra, 75 Cal.App.4th at p. 870 [“It was an abuse of discretion to order 

husband to pay wife’s attorney fees without making any inquiry into the reasonableness 

of those fees.”].) Although Reade is correct that neither Judge Juhas nor Judge Court 

expressly addressed the reasonableness of Sheinkopf’s fees, we disagree with her 

conclusion that the absence of express findings necessarily constitutes an abuse of 

discretion. 

Even where a court has statutory duties to state “in writing or on the record” its 

reasons for making or modifying an award, as it does in the context of child support (see 

§ 4056, subd. (a); § 4072, subd. (a)(1)), the court’s failure to expressly state its reasons 

does not lead to automatic reversal. To the contrary, “we are enjoined by our 
16

Constitution from imposing a reversible-per-se rule here.” (In re Marriage of Carlsen

(1996) 50 Cal.App.4th 212, 218 [child support hardship exemption].) “[T]he Legislature 

has not precluded us here from implying findings,” and we do not “have the 

constitutional due process concerns presented by the imposition of sanctions [citation] or 

the need to protect against ‘corrupt’ judicial interference with the criminal process 

[Citation.].” (Ibid.) The failure to make required findings may constitute reversible 

error, but only where “the missing information is not otherwise discernible from the 

record.” (In re Marriage of Hubner (2001) 94 Cal.App.4th 175, 183.) Put another way, 

“the failure to make a material finding on an issue supported by the pleadings and 

substantial evidence is harmless where the missing finding may reasonably be found to 

be implicit in other findings,” or “when, under the facts of the case, the finding would 

necessarily have been adverse to the appellant.” (Rojas v. Mitchell (1996) 50 

Cal.App.4th 1445, 1450.) 

Here, the missing finding – that Sheinkopf’s bills were reasonable – may 

reasonably be found to be implicit in Judge Juhas’s granting of the Borson motion and 

reservation only of “need and ability to pay fees.” When he made his ruling, Judge Juhas 

had before him copies of Sheinkopf’s bills, her declaration averring that much of her 

work was occasioned by Reade’s litigation conduct, and his own experience with the case 

(see In re Marriage of Cueva, supra, 86 Cal.App.3d at p. 300), which began at roughly 

the same time as Sheinkopf became Roizman’s sole counsel. He notably did not have 

before him the arguments Reade’s counsel now makes, that the bills contained improper 

or excessive charges, time expenditures, or redactions. Moreover, Judge Juhas told the 

parties he would “look at the papers and get something out as quickly as I can,” which 

strongly suggests that he was aware of and considered the substantial submissions 

proffered by counsel before issuing his ruling a full week after the hearing on the matter. 

These facts distinguish this case from Keech, in which the court “was not apprised of the 

nature and extent of the services rendered, so it could not determine their reasonable 

value based upon its own expertise.” (Keech, supra, 75 Cal.App.4th at p. 870), and In re 
17

Marriage of Tharp (2010) 188 Cal.App.4th 1295, 1314 (Tharp), in which the court 

“affirmatively refus[ed] and fail[ed] to exercise” its discretion by declining “‘to ferret out 

and determine, based on the billing statements of [wife’s] attorney, which fees were fair 

and unfair.’” 

Although the court allowed some potentially questionable “costs” contained in the 

46 pages of invoices, such as Sheinkopf’s parking ticket and towing charge, we note that 

Reade failed to call these or any other line items to the court’s attention at the time the 

motion was heard. (See In re Marriage of Feldman (2007) 153 Cal.App.4th 1470, 1496 

[refusing to consider challenge to reasonableness of attorney’s fees imposed as sanctions 

because husband failed to timely object].) We are not persuaded that the court’s failure 

to mention the three purportedly “questionable charges” Reade emphasizes in her brief 

constitutes an abdication of its duties akin to the trial court’s in Tharp. Unlike the court 

in Tharp, which refused to review the “‘reams of bills’” counsel filed (Tharp, supra, 188 

Cal.App.4th at p. 1314), Judge Juhas said he would “look at the papers” and took the 

matter under consideration for a full week before ruling. Additionally, nothing in Tharp 

or any of her other cited case law supports Reade’s position that she can establish that the 

trial court failed to review a piece of evidence simply by pointing to an error in that 

evidence or a belated assertion by Roizman that some unspecified portion of Sheinkopf’s 

bills pertained to issues outside the divorce case. Likewise, it does not follow from 

Sheinkopf’s attempts to seek payment from Klingenstein, or her comment that Reade 

may not be “obliged to make such a payment,” that Judge Juhas did not consider 

reasonableness or did not deem “all or substantially all” of Sheinkopf’s requested fees 

reasonable. Indeed, had Judge Juhas not implicitly ruled on reasonableness, his ruling 

granting the Borson motion while simultaneously reserving jurisdiction over other

requisite findings on need and ability to pay would have been virtually meaningless.

(Cf. Laabs v. City of Victorville (2008) 163 Cal.App.4th 1242, 1273 [“[T]he granting of 

the injunction itself necessarily implies that the trial court found that Mullvain knowingly 

and willfully engaged in a course of conduct that seriously alarmed, annoyed or harassed 
18

Ensworth, and that Ensworth actually suffered substantial emotional distress. No further 

express findings are required.”].) 

B. The trial court did not incorrectly decide it lacked jurisdiction to review 

the reasonableness of the bills

Reade next contends that Judge Court’s final order was “on its face, an abuse of 

discretion” because it evinces a “mistaken” belief that the court “had no ability to review 

the reasonableness of Sheinkopf’s bills.” She argues that the court misunderstood the 

scope of its discretion and therefore remand is required so that the court may “exercise 

informed discretion with awareness of the full scope of its discretion and applicable law.” 

(F.T. v. L.J. (2011) 194 Cal.App.4th 1, 16.) We are not persuaded. 

Judge Court’s order recognized that the reasonableness of Sheinkopf’s billed fees 

of $91,307.87 was a matter relevant to a fee award under section 2030 but did not 

comment further because Judge Juhas had granted the Borson motion more than two 

years ago and “did not reserve jurisdiction over the reasonableness of these fees.” While 

it is true that “[n]o single fees and costs order is an ‘all or nothing’ proposition[,]” and 

that “[n]eed-based awards may be augmented or modified as necessary during the entire 

pendency of the case, consistent with the parties’ ‘relative circumstances’” (Hogoboom & 

King, Cal. Practice Guide: Family Law (The Rutter Group 2014) ¶ 14:7, p. 14-3 

[emphases in original]), Reade has not pointed to any authority suggesting that a court 

must reconsider its previous rulings to avoid abusing its discretion when awarding fees 

under section 2030. Nor has she pointed to any authority that a party may withhold its 

objections to an order for more than a year and then expect the court to disturb what it 

clearly intended to be a partially dispositive determination. 

Moreover, Judge Court took care to make all three of the findings required by the 

plain language of section 2030. She expressly concluded that the “element” of “disparity 

in access to retain counsel and ability to pay . . . . [h]as been met,” and further found that 

Reade “has sufficient resources to make a contribution to [Roizman’s] fees,” and that 

“the award in this order is just and reasonable and is appropriate.” On the record before 
19

us, we are not convinced that Judge Court abused her discretion in declining to more fully 

explicate the reasonableness of Sheinkopf’s bills. 

C. The court’s award did not exceed the bounds of reason

Reade’s final argument is that no reasonable court could conclude that her 

changed income was not credible and that she could afford to pay $73,000 in attorney’s 

fees for her ex-spouse. She contends that the court ignored undisputed evidence of her 

financial hardship, such as her tax returns and bank statements, in favor of “the muddy 

allegations of Keith [Roizman] and Sheinkopf, unsupported by facts, that [she] was not 

credible, and of dubious character,” and improperly “assumed that the approximately 

$27,000 in her bankruptcy estate was Victoria’s money” and “factored” it in when 

assessing Reade’s ability to access funds and pay fees. We find no abuse of discretion.

Judge Court, whose familiarity with the record is apparent on the face of her 

ruling, found that Reade’s reported decline in monthly income during the pendency of the 

dissolution was not credible. Thus, instead of relying upon Reade’s reported income of 

$1,450 per month, the court considered her earning capacity and the expenses reported on 

her income and expense declaration when concluding that she had access to “at least 

$10,400 per month.” The court was entitled to consider Reade’s earning capacity instead 

of her reported income, particularly in light of its finding that Reade was not credible. (In 

re Marriage of Simpson (1992) 4 Cal.4th 225, 232; In re Marriage of Sullivan (1984) 37 

Cal.3d 762, 769.) To the extent Reade challenges the latter finding, “[w]e do not judge 

credibility on appeal.” (In re Marriage of Boswell (2014) 225 Cal.App.4th 1172, 1175). 

It is of no moment that the court rested its credibility assessment primarily on 

declarations. “‘[T]he applicable standards of appellate review of a judgment based on 

affidavits or declarations are the same as for a judgment following oral testimony.’” 

(Fininen v. Barlow (2006) 142 Cal.App.4th 185, 189.) 

Reade objects that the trial court “ignored” some of the evidence she proffered, 

including a notation on her income and expense declaration that she had received loans 

from family and friends, but the court as fact-finder was entitled to weigh the evidence as 
20

it saw fit, and Reade’s notation regarding the personal loans did not indicate that she was 

using those funds to pay her current monthly expenses. Reade also claims that the court 

uncritically accepted Roizman’s and Sheinkopf’s unsubstantiated attacks on her 

credibility, but the court appears to have independently arrived at the conclusion that 

Reade’s income statements were not credible; Sheinkopf argued only that Reade “does 

not tell the truth about what she has paid her attorney” or “how much she has in liquid 

assets,” and Roizman also focused on other alleged untruths and inconsistencies in 

Reade’s filings. We do not condone the ad hominem nature of either Sheinkopf’s or 

Roizman’s arguments, but it does not appear that the court was misled by them. 

Reade further challenges the court’s purported assumption that the $27,000 

comprising her bankruptcy estate “were sitting in a savings account in the bank next 

door.” We do not read the court’s order that way. Judge Court did mention the 

bankruptcy estate when discussing Reade’s access to funds, but also acknowledged in 

more nuanced fashion that some portion of that estate might be used to pay off the claim 

if the bankruptcy court so adjudicated, such that Reade would need only to pay “any 

remaining shortfall at the rate of $1,500 per month until paid in full.” We cannot 

conclude from this statement that Judge Court improperly “factored this money into 

Victoria’s ability to pay and access to funds.” Judge Court also stated that she considered 

“the respective obligations and assets of the parties, the balance of the hardships to the 

parties, the earning capacity of both parties, and the age and health of the parties.” Reade 

essentially invites us to reevaluate those factors, but “[t]he discretion belongs to the trial 

court, and not to us.” (In re Marriage of Stallworth (1987) 192 Cal.App.3d 742, 758 

(conc. & dis. opn. of Haning, J.).) We are not unsympathetic to Reade’s contentions 

regarding her financial situation, but we cannot conclude that the court abused its 

discretion or exceeded the bounds of reason in ordering the award it did.
21

DISPOSITION 

The judgment is affirmed. In the interests of justice, the parties are to bear their 

own costs on appeal. 

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

COLLINS, J.

We concur:

EPSTEIN, P. J.

MANELLA, J.