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# THEA NERAL

February 17, 1947

HonorableMaureen Moore OpinionNo. V-30 Commissioner,Bureau of Labor Stntistios Re: Inasmuch as the President Austin, Texas has by proclamationdeclared an end of hostillties, does that alsomean that the state of national emergencyhas ceased to exist?
DearMrs. Moore:

Your request for our opinion on the above oaptionedmatter has been receivedby this department. We quote fromyour letter as follows:

wSbction 6 of the Nine, Fifty-four Hour Law, enactedby the 40th Legislature, authorizes the Labor Commissioner to grant certain exemptions from the Nine, Fifty-four Hour Law ‘in time of war and/ orwhen the President of the United States proclaims a state of national emergencyto exist.’ “Inasmuchas the President has by proolamation declared an end of hostilities,d~oes that alsomean that the state of national emergencyhas ceased to exist?” Section 6 of the Nine, Fifty-four Hour Law, referred to in your letter, sets forth certain exceptions duringwar or national emergencies. Section 9 0P this law dealswith the authority of the Commissioner of Labor Statistics to make an order granting an exemption in time of war under certain oonditions.

We are confining our opinion to the meaning of “in time of war” and to your question of whether or not the state oP national emergencyhas ceased to exist, inasmuchas the President has by proclamationdeclared an end of hostilities.

Title 38, Chapter 12, Sec. 704,U. S. C. A., provides in part as r’ollows:Hon. Maureen Moore, page 2 (V-30)

"The president shall prescribe by re ulation (subjectto the provisions of section 701 e) 7 of this title) the date of the beginningand of the termination of the period in each war subsequent to the CivilWar, includiq the B,oxer Rebellion and the Philippine Insurrection,

. . en As stated to you in opinion MO. O-7360, approved October 25, 1946, this department has held in several opinions that awar is not concluded in the legal sense until some formalaction by a competent authority terminating the war and re-establishing peace is had. The 77th Congress of the United States, by joint resolution, formally declared a state of war between the United,States and certain foreign governments. On May 27, 1941,by proclamation2487, 1 CFR, cum. supp., 2.1, the President prdclaimed a state of unlimitednational emergency to exist. To date this proclamationhas notbeen revoked.

In Vol. 41, Words and Phrases, the following definition of "Time ofWar" appears:

"*Time of War' continues Prom the date of the declaration of war by Congress until some formal proclamation of peace by an authority competentto proclaim it." Ex parte Givins, D. C. N. D., Ga., 262 F. 702, 705. Our researchdiscloses that neither Congress nor the President has formally declared a terLmination of theWar referred to above. On December 31, 1946, the President of the United States issued Proclamation 2714,.entitled "Cessation of Hostilities of Wo~rld War 11," The proclamation is published inVol. 12, No. 1, of the Federal Register dated January 1, 1947, a portion of which is quoted:

"Althougha state of war still exists, it is at this time possible to declare, and I find it to be in the public interest to declare, that hostilities have terminated." (Emphasissupplied) "Now, therefore, I, Harry S. Truman, President of the United States of America, do hereby proclaim the cessation of hostilities of World War II, effective 12 o!clock noon, December 31, 1946."**. .** 

**. ’** 
Hon. MaureenMoore, page 3 (V-30)

In the case of Ribas y Hijo v. United States, decidedMay 16, 1904, 194U. S. 315, 24 S. Ct. 727, 48 L. Ed. 994,Mr. JusticeHarlan, in duscussingthe case at bar, said:
“It is none the less a case sounding in tort because the claim is in form for the use of the vessel after actual hostilitieswere suspendedby the protocol of August 12th, 1898. A state of war did not, in law, oease until the ratification in April 1899, of the treaty of peace. ‘A truce or suspension of arms,’says Kent,*doesnot terminate thewar, but ,itis one of the commerciabell1which suspends its op erations.

. . .At the expiration of a truce, hostilitiesmay recommencewithout any fresh declaration of war.’ 1 Kent, Corn.159, 161.”
In the case of Citizens Protecti,ve League et al. v. Clark,AttorneyGeneral of U. S., and Reimann v. Same, decidedMay 2, 1946, by the United States Court ofAppeals, District of Columbia, 155 F. R. (2d) 290, Associate Justice Prettyman said:

11

. . .No peace treaty has yet been signed with Germany, and a state cf war has not been terminated by anAct of Congress or by executive proclamation. Cases involving the terminationof otherwars dispose ofAppellants’ point. It is not for the Court to determine the end of a war declaredby the Congress.” It is our opinion, therefore, onthe basis of the authorities and laws,hereinabovecited, that a “Time ’ of War” and national emergency still exist, even though the President has proclaimeda cessationof hostilities.

There is a Pundamental differencebetween the “end of hostilities”and the “end of a war.” The President’sProclamation of December 31, 1946, declares only cessation of hostilities ofWorld War II and recognizesthat “a state OP war” still exists. Such state of war can be terminatedonly by Congress or Presidential Proclamation pursuant to authority of congress,which has not been don? in relation toWorld War II or the national emergenoy proclaimedby President Roosevelt on May 27, 1941. Therefore,Section 6 of Senate Bill 129,Hon. Maureen Moore, page 4 (V-30)

48th Legislature, setting forth certain exceptions duringwar or national emergencies,and Section 9 of such Senate Bill authorizing the Commissioner of Labor Statistics to make an order granting an exemption in time of war under certain conditions, are still in effect.
Yours very truly ATTORNEY GENERAL OFTEXAS

Assistant

APPROVED FEB. 17, 1947
5ck-L-Jd ATTORNEY GERERAL

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