### TEXA S COU RT O F AP PEAL S, THIR D DISTRIC T, AT AU STIN
NO. 03-99-00793-CR
The State of

Tex as, Appel

lant
v. James Dean Fudge, Appell ee

FROM THE COUN TY COUR T AT LAW N O. 5 OF

TRAVI S COUNTY NO. 517,426, HONORABLE DAVID F. CRAIN, JUDGE PRESIDING

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4444 DISSEN TING OPINION

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44444444444

4444 Because I do n

ot b el i eve the l aw prov i de s, as th

e m aj ori ty hol ds , th at a pe rs on un kn ow n to a poli ce of f i cer, w ho of f ers a n un soli ci ted, un corroborated

“ti p” i n a f ace -t o-fac e encounter is , without mo r e, inhe r en t ly re liable , t hu s p r o vid ing a s uffic ien t ba sis for a val id traf fi c stop, I re sp ec tf ul l y di ss en t. On a s pa r se r ec o r d, t he ex pe r ien ce d t r ial ju dg e e va lua t ed t he mea ge rfac t s be fo r e h im and concl uded that th e of

f i cer had n ei th er re as on ab l e s

us pi ci on n or p rob ab l e c au se

to stop appellee in his aut omo bile. This c ase t ur ns on what is not in the re cord al ong w i th t he we ight t o be given t he
sca nt testim

ony i n the record—an ass essm

ent the trial

court was i

n the b est posi

tion to eval uate. The2

maj or ity’s ho lding , t hat a p o lice o fficer may ac t t o mak e a t ra ffi c stop ba se d o n a co nc lus o ry t ip passed al ong to hi m f rom an unk nown i ndi vi dual, i s pre ci sel

y the v i ew re j ected i n Su prem e Court deci si ons establ

is hi ng the f ederal constitutional

parame ters in this area. It is undi sputed that t he sole

basis f ort he st op was t he t ip given t o t he o ffi cer by the unknown cab driv

er. Offi cer Pruet t, the only

witness at the hearing, testifi ed as foll ows: [Defense Atto rney ]: When you pul le d over [appell

ee ] or w he

n y ou s toppe d or detain ed him, the only re aso n you w er e de t aining him i s bec aus e o f what t he cabby h ad told y ou; i sn ’t t h at c orre ct? [O f f i cer Pr uett]: Cor

re ct. [Defense Attorne y]: You hadn’t seen

any kind o f ro ad vio latio ns o r vio latio ns o f the dri v i n g l aw s; i sn ’t t

h at c orre ct? [O f f i cer Pr uett]: That’ s c orre ct. [Defense A ttorn ey ]: A nd youhadn’t seen an

y e quipm ent vi olations or anythi ng l ike th at? [Of f i cer Pr ue tt]: N o. [Def en se A ttorney ]: Oka y . An d di d y ou know thi s ca b dr i ver? [Of f i cer Pr ue tt]: N o. [Defense Attorne y]: Okay . So y

ou had no r ea son orno in dic ate [sic] to belie

ve wh at h e w as tel l i n g y ou a t th at ti me w as re l i ab l e; i sn ’t t

h at c orre ct? [Off ic er Pruett ]: I was jus

t go in g on what he told m

e. Because t he Stat e fai

le d to carry i

ts burden that the off

ic er had ei the r th e “ qua nti ty” or “qua

l i ty” of i nf orma tion requi red f or a ve hi cle stop, I woul

d af f i rm the trial court ’s suppress ion of

the evi dence obtaine d in violation of the Fourt h Am endm ent to the United Stat es Co nst i tution and A rtic l e I,3

se cti on 9 of the Texa s Consti

tution
. U.S. Const. am

end. IV; Tex . Cons

t. art. I, § 9; Alaba ma v. White , 49 6 U. S. 325 , 33 0 (1 990 ); Hulit v. State , 982 S.W .2d 431 (Tex . Cri m . App. 1998 ). Standard of Review

In accordin g the trial

court its proper and necessa ry rol e, we giv e al most tot al deferen ce t o t he t rial co ur t ’s findings o f fact and conduct a de novo re view o f the cou rt’ s a ppl i ca ti on of la wto those f

acts. Carmo uche v. Sta te , 1 0 S .W. 3d 3 23, 327 (T ex. Crim. Ap p. 200 0) (c iting Guzmanv. State , 9 55 S .W. 2d 8 5, 88- 89 ( Te x. Cri m . App. 1999 )). In thi s case, the trial court was not asked to make ex

pli ci t fi ndi ngsof historical

facts. We, therefore, re view t he fact ual bas is for t he trial court ’s rul

in g in a ligh t most favorabl

e to t he r uli ng. Carmouche , 10 S. W.3d at 327 ; State v. Ballard , 987 S. W. 2d 88 9 ( T ex . Cr im. Ap p. 19 99 )
. We fur t he ras su me t he t r ial c o ur t mad e “ implic it fi ndi ngsof f act supported in the record that butt ress i ts conclus ion.” Carmouche , 10 S.W.3d at 328. In a supp ressi on hear ing, t he t rial co ur t is the so le tr ier o f fact and jud ge o f the
cred i b i l i ty of the witnesses and the w eight to be gi ven thei r testi mony . Ballard , 987 S.W.2d at 891. In parsi ng the degree of de feren

ce t o be given t he trial

court ’s determi

nations , the court of cri

mi nal ap pe als o bse rve d in Guzma n , “The amount of deference a r eviewi ng cou rt affords a t rial court ’s
ru ling on a ‘mixed qu est ion o f law and fact’ (such as the i ssue of probab le

cause) i s often determi

ned by whi ch j udicial actor i s i n a better posi

tion to decide th e i ssue.” 95 5 S.W .2d at 87
.
Thatt he t rial judg e de t er mine d the o ff ic er was “credi

ble” was n

ot the only

factual de term i na ti on to be m ade by the trial judge i n thi s ca se . Alt ho ug h t he fac t s he r e a r e la r ge ly und isputed, it would appear from the maj ority opini on that the inf

erences to be drawn from those4

f ac ts are any

thin g but cle ar. Certainl

y, the tria l judge was ent itled t o e valuat e t he o ffi cer ’s t est imony that t he t ipst er said he “believe d” t he dr iv er wa s d run k w he n d et er mining t he we igh t he wo uld attr i b ute t o t he t est imony, and co ncluding t hat t he fact s est ablished by t he o ffi cer ’s t est imony did not
con sti tute reasonable suspi

cion or pro babl

e cause f or the de tenti on. See Ornelas v. United States , 517 U.S . 69 0, 6 99 ( 199 6); see also State v. Ross , 32 S.W .3d 853 (Tex . Cri m . App. 2000 ). Wh en pr o pe r ly appl yi ng these standards to a review of the record, I co ncl

ude t hat t he trial court did n

ot abuse i ts discretion in

deci din g to suppress the ev

ide nce. Automobile Stop

St op ping an au t o mo bile an d deta i ni n g i ts o ccup an

ts co nst itu t es a “seizur e” w ithin t he meaning of

the F ourth A

mendm en t. Whren v. United States , 51 7 U. S. 806 , 80 9-1 0 (1 996 ); see also Delaware v. Prouse , 440 U.S . 64 8, 6 53- 54 ( 197 9); United Sta tes v. Mar tinez-F uerte , 428 U.S. 543, 556-58 (19 76) ; United States v. Brignoni-Ponce , 422 U.S. 873, 878 (19 75) ; cf. Terry v . Ohio , 392 U.S. 1, 16 (1968). We im pose a standard o f “r eas ona bleness” upo n t he exe rc ise o f discr et ion by go ver nment off

ic i al s, i ncluding law enfo rc ement officer s, in o rd er t o “‘ safeg uar d t he pr ivacy and
se cu ri ty of i ndi vi dual s agai nst arbi trary i nvasi ons . . . .’” Marshall v. Barlow ’s, Inc. , 436 U.S. 307, 312 (1978) (quot in

g Camara v. Mu nicipal Cou rt , 387 U .S. 523, 5 28 (19 67)). The de cisi

on to stop an auto mobi

le is general ly deem ed t o be re aso nable whe re t he police ha ve proba bl e ca use to bel i ev e tha t a traf f i c vi ola tion ha s occu rred. Whr

en, 517 U.S. at 813; Prouse , 440

U.S . at 6 59. W i

th th e p res en ceof an o bje ct ive ly

val id reas on for stopping a ca r such as
a tra f f i c v i ol ati on , the c on sti

tuti onal reasonabl

eness of traff ic stops do es not depend on the actual
mo t iva t io ns o f

the i ndi vi dual off i cer i nv olv ed. Whren , 51 7 U .S. at 8 13 . A mere h un ch th at a5

pa rticul ar c ar m

i gh t con tai n d rug s— thou gh f ar s hor t of the rea son ab l e suspici

on required to sto p a car t emp o ra rily t o inves t iga t e— ca n ne ver t hele ss be t he mo t ivat io n fo r a t ra ffi c st op so long as t he off ic er has observed a traf

f i c vi ola tion
. Id . at 810-13. Whi

le m uch critici zed because of the li

mi tless possibil ities of t r affic in fractions that giv

e poli ce expan si ve di scretion to sto p motorists, this s o-called

“pr etext” st o p— wh en ba se d o n p r o ba ble cause—i s now wel l e stablis hed i n the law. See, e.g., id. at 818-19; Garcia

v. State , 82 7 S. W.2d 937 , 94 4 (T ex. Cr im . App . 19 92) ; United States v. Castro , 166 F.3d 728, 732 (5th Cir. 1999) (lack ing re aso na ble suspi

ci on, but with i

nf ormation def

endan t was enga ging in dru g t ra ffi

cking, law enfo rc ement ag en ts fol lowed vehi

cl e driv en b y de fen dant 115 mi

le s un t il o fficer s o bse rv ed t ra ffi c v io latio n—dr iver no t wea ring se at belt) . While giving significant la titude to la

w enf orcemen t, even t he Whren cou

rt re cog n ize d th e i m por tan ce , a t th e v er y l ea st, of first hand observation or surveil lan ce by law en forcement offi

cers. In Whren , presented wi th the fact that the off

ic e r ha d o bser ved a t ra ffi c violat ion, t he Su pr eme Co ur t co nclude d t hat objec t ive ci rcumstances j ustif

ie d stopping the car. 517 U.S. at 817. In re ject ing t he pr et ext claim raised in Whren , the Supreme Court expressed a st ro ng preferen ce f ortyi ng the l egality of law enf

orcemen t measures to objective c ircum stances, rather

than to offi cers’ in tentions. T hus, the Cou rt r easo ned that a traf fic st o p ba se d o n an o bse rv at io n o f a t r affic off ense “forecl

ose[d] any

argumen t t hat the constitutional

reasonabl

eness of traff ic stops depends on the actual m

ot iv ations of the in div idua l of fi cers i nvol ved”or whet he r “the o ff icer’s conduct deviat ed mat er ially fro m usua l po lice pr act ices, so t hat a rea so na ble o ffice rin t he sa me ci rcu m sta nc eswoul d n

ot ha ve mad e the s top for the reasons gi ven .” Id. at 813 . The objective test thus al l ows th e p rote cti

on s of th e F our th A men dm en t to not turn on

pol i ce pra

cti ces that “ va ry f rom6

pla ce to pla ce and f rom tim e to t im e,” a prospect t he court found unacc ep tab l e. Id. at 815 . T he “r ea so na ble of

f i cer” te st g i

ve s ri se to the dif f i cul t prob l em s of appl i ca ti on we h ave h ere . Be ca us e of t he lac k o f matu

rati on of rea son ab l e suspici

on i n th e i ns tan t ca us e, th e m aj ori ty f orce s u s i nto a n in quiry largel y rej ected by the Supreme Court in these circumstances. The l egal i ty of i nv esti gati ve stops of autom obi l es wi thout pro b able cause was fi rst considered

by the S upr eme Co ur t in United States v. Brignoni-Ponce. 422 U.S. at 873. In thatcase, Border Pat ro l agent s co nduc t ing ro ving pat ro ls in area s near the i nternational

border asserted sta tutory au thor i ty to stopat ra

nd om any veh ic le in order t o determin

e whether i

t contained i

ll egal aliens or was in

volv ed i n sm uggli ng oper ati ons. The p ra cti ce wa s h el d to v i ol ate th e F our th A men dm en t, bu t t he Co ur t did no t inva lida t e a ll warrantless au t o mo bile s t o ps up o n le ss t ha n p r o ba ble
cause. Giv

en “ the im port ance of

the governm

ental in terest at stake, the mi

ni ma l i ntr us i on of a brief stop, and the ab sence of

practical al ternatives for poli ci ng the b orde r,” theCourt analo gized t he
ro ving-p at ro l sto p t o t he o n-t he- st re et enco unt er add re ssed in Terry v. Ohio , and hel

d: Exceptat the border and its f unctiona l equi val ents, off ic ers on rovin

g patro l m ay stop vehi cl es o nly

if they are aware of speci

fi c articul abl e fac ts, t ogether with rational in feren ces from those fact s, t hat re aso nably warr ant su sp icio n t ha t t he ve hic les co nt ain alie ns wh o may b e ill eg ally i n t he co un t ry. Id . at 884 (f

ootnote omi

tted). In United Sta tes v. Mar tinez-F uerte , the Supreme Court co ns i dere d t he
con sti tuti on al i ty o f ch ec kpoi

nt op erations a

t border s

tations. 428 U.S. at 556 -58. Th e court sustain ed th e ch eckp oi

n t sto psb ec au se

of th e “l es se

r i n tru si on up on th e m otorist’ s F our

th Amendment i

n terests: [w ]ev i ew

ch eckp oi n t st op s in a different light be cau se t he su bject ive1 “ Thi s dem an d f or s pe cif i ci ty i n th e i nf orm ati on upon whi

ch polic e act ion is pr edica t ed is t he cent ra l tea ching of t his Co ur t ’s Fo ur t h Amendment jurisprudence.” Terry v. Ohio , 392 U.S. 1, 21 n.18 (1968 ); Berkemer

v. McCar

ty , 468 U.S. 420, 439 (1984) (anal ogizi ng a traff ic stop t o a “ Terry stop”). 7 intr usio n—t he gene ra t ing o f co ncer n or even fr ight on t he pa rt of lawf ul travelers—i s appreciabl y l ess in the case of a c

heckpoi nt stop. ” Id . at 558 ; but see City of Indianapolis v. Edmond , 121 S. Ct. 447, 457 (2000) . Balanci

ng the publi

c in terest aga inst t he individual’s F ou rt h Amendment inter est s, t he Su pr eme Co ur t in Delaware v. Prouse h el d th at except in tho se sit uat ions i

n w hi ch the re i s a t l ea st a rticul ab l e a

nd reason ab l e suspici

on that a m ot orist is unl ic ensed or that an

au t o mo bile is not re gist er ed, or t hat eithe r t he ve hic le o ran o cc up an t is otherwi se s ubj ect to sei

zure for violat ion o f law, s t op ping an au t omo bile and de t aining t he dr iver in o rd er t o c heck his driver ’s license a nd t he re gi strati on of th e a utom ob i l e a reun re as on ab l e u

n der the F our

th A men dm en t. 440 U.S. at 662.

I n t he abs ence of p ro bable ca use , t hen, an au t omo bile sto p is su bj ec t to th e constitutional

im perat iv e that it no t be “unreasonabl e” under the circumstances. Whren , 517 U.S. at 810. “ Th us , the p er

m i ss i b i l i ty of a p ar ti cul ar l aw en f orc em en t prac ti ce i s j udged b y

b al an ci n g i ts i ntr us i on on the in

div idua l’ s Fourth Am

endm ent in ter ests ag ai

n st i ts prom oti on of l eg i ti mate governm ental in terests.” Prouse , 440 U .S. at 654. T he fac t s o n w hic h t his in tru sion is based m

ust be measu re d ag ainst “an o bject ivesta nd ard ,” w he the r th e te st is on

e of prob ab l e c au se

orr ea so na ble
sus pi cion. Id
. Short

of probable cause that a vi

olation h as occurred, then, traff

ic stops are anal ogous to Terry sto ps in t ha t an o ffic er ’s inve st iga t o ry st o p o f a v eh icle mus t be ba se d o n sp ec ific 1 and8

ar t icu lab le f

ac ts suf f i ci en t to su ppor t t he o ff ice r ’s r ea so na ble su sp icio n t ha t t he pe r so n d et ain ed is involved in crimina l activity
. See Terry , 392 U.S . at 21- 22; Harri s v. State , 913 S.W.2d 706, 708 (T ex. A pp. —Texa

rka na 199 5, n o p et.) . These f

acts must amount to somethi ng m ore t han an i n ch oate and un particularize d

sus pi cion or h

unc h. See United States v. Sokolow , 490 U.S. 1, 7 (1989) (c iting Terry , 392 U.S. at 27) ; Dickey v. State, 716 S.W .2d 499(Te x. Cri

m . A pp. 198 6) ( de ten

ti on based “ on a m ere h unc h” i s i l l egal ); William s v. State , 621 S.W.2d 609, 612 (Tex. Crim . App. 1981)
. Because t he fact s must be spe ci f i c an d articul ab l e i t is i ns uf f i cien t for an off i cer to provi de con

cl usory expl anations. Illinois v. Gates , 462 U .S. 213, 2 39 (19 83); Garcia v. State , 3 S.W.3d227 , 2 37 ( Te x. Cri m . App. 1999 ).

The reasonablenes s o f an in ves t igat ive det ent ion t ur ns o n t he “t ot ality o f the circumstances” i

n e ach cas e. Gates , 462 U.S. at 230-31; Shaff er v. State , 562 S. W.2 d 85 3, 855 (T ex. Crim. App. 197 8); State v. Sailo , 9 10 S .W. 2d 1 84, 188 (T ex. App.—F ort Worth 19 95, pet. ref ’d); Davis v. State , 79 4 S
. W. 2d 12 3, 12 5 ( T ex . Ap p. —A us t in 1990, pet. r ef’ d). The Supreme Court has pr ovid ed g uidanc e t o t he meaning o f t his elusive c onc ept “rea so nable su spicio n.” In United States
v. Cortez , the Court recogniz ed that, because of the m

yri ad fac tual si tuations that arise i

n a vehi cl estop context, an

y def i ni tion i s di f f i cul t. 449 U.S. 41 1, 41 7- 18 ( 19 81 )
. T he es se nc e o f an y ana lysis requires taki

ng i nto account t he “

to tali ty of ci rcumstances,” or “the whole pi cture”: Based upon the w hole p ictu re t he de t aining officer s must have a par t icular ized a nd objec t ivebasis f

orsus pecti ng th e parti cul ar person s

topped of cri m i na l acti vi ty. The ide a th at a n as se ss men t of th e w h ol e p i ctu rem us t y i el d a pa rt i cul ari ze d suspici

on co nt ains t wo element s, e ach of whichmus t be present bef

ore a sto p is

permissi ble. Fir st, the ass es sme nt mus t be ba se d u po n a ll o f t he cir cu mst an ce s. T he an alys is proceeds with v

arious o bje ct ive o bse rva t io ns, info rmat io n fr o m po lice r ep o r t s, if such areavai la ble, and consi

deration of the m

odes o rpa t t er ns o f o pe r at io n o f ce r t ain kin ds9

of la wbreakers. From

these data, a trained off ic er dr aws i

nf erences a nd m akes ded uct ions— inferenc es a nd de duc t ions t hat might w ell elude a n unt ra ined pe rso n. * * * T he second el

em ent contain

ed i n the i dea that an asses sm

ent of the whole pi ct ur e mustyi el d a particul

arize d suspici on is

the concept that t he process j ust descr ibe d must r ais e a su sp ic i o n t ha t t he pa r t icu lar ind ividua l be ing st o pp ed is e ng ag ed in wrongdoing. Id. (citations

omi tt ed). Based upon num

erous objecti

ve f ac ts ob taine d from

the agents’ prev

ious experiences

and knowle dge, survei

ll ances, an d ot her i nve stigatory techn

ique s, the Cortez court concl uded that t he agen

ts lawf ull y s to pped the subj ec t veh icle fo r ques tion i ng of i ts occup an

t. In
re viewing a d ec isio n, we do no t co nsid er t he va r io us fac t o r s inis olat io n, bu t r at he rin t he ir in terrelatedco nt ext , w her e ea ch may reinfo rc e t he ot her, so that t he “ la mi nated tot al ” m

ay be greater than the s um of i ts parts. United States v. Fooladi , 703 F .2d 180 , 184 (5 th Ci r. 1983 ). Rea so nable su spicio n t hen, like pr oba ble cau se, is dep ende nt upo n bot h t he co nt ent of the i nf orm ati on posse sse d by

the p oli ce a nd i ts degr ee of rel i ab i l i ty. See Alabama v. W

hite , 496 U.S. 325 , 33 0 (1 990 ). “

Both f ac tors— qua nti ty an d qu al i ty —a re c on si der ed in t he t ot ality o f the circu msta nces —t he whole pi cture. . . mus t be t ak en int o ac co un t wh en ev alu at ing wh et he rt he r e is
r ea so na ble suspici on.” Id. (c iting Cortez , 449 U.S . at 417 ); see also Carm ouche , 10 S.W.3dat 328- 29; Reynolds

v. State , 962 S.W .2d 307 , 311 (Tex. A pp.—H ouston [14th Dist.] 1998 , pet. ref ’d). Li kewi se, the Tex as Cou

rt o f Cri m i na l A ppe als h asrec ogn ize d that p eop l e a

re n ot shorn of their Fourt h Am

endm ent pro tect ion when

they step from their hom

es in to their auto mobi

les. Carmouche , 10 S .W. 3d a t 328 . Mo st re cent ly, in Schene kl v. State , the court addres se d th e con sti tuti on al i ty o f a sta te la w permi tt in g a l aw enf

orcemen t o ff ic er to stop and board a boat without2 In actuali ty, the tipster’s persona

l obs ervation conc erned

er ra t ic dr iving

behavio r. It was t he tipst er’s hy

pot hesis that this b ehav

ior could b e the resul

t o f dri vi ng wh il e i ntoxica ted as opp ose d to n on -c ri m i n al dri v i n g b eh av i or suc h as i n atte n ti v e d ri v i n g c on du ct. 10 pr o ba ble cau se o r r eas ona ble susp icion. 30 S .W. 3d 4 12, 413 (T ex. Crim . App. 2000). Citi

ng Prouse , t he co ur t obs er ved t hat aut omo bile tr avel is a “‘ba sic, pervasi ve , of ten ne ce ss ary

mea ns of tran sp ortati on in our society.’” Id. at 416 (quo ting Prouse , 4 40 U .S . a t 662 ). “As such, thereis a hei ghtened ex

pectation of pri

vacy whi le in a car as compa

red to a boat.” Id
. We note that t hi s case di ff ers from the Terryli

ne of cases in

im port ant res pec ts. Off ic er Pruett hi ms el f obs erved

no “u nusu al co nduc t ” lead inghi m “ reasonabl y to concl ude . . . t hat crim in al acti vi ty m ay be af oot.” The off

ic er’s sol e basi

s f or beli evi ng that the appelle e m

ay have been
co mmi t t inga c rim

e wa s the

al l eged tip f rom th e not-proved-to-b e-rel

i ab l e, un na med ti pster. 2 Moreov er, in Terry , what t he o ffi cer saw was “unus ual co nduc t ” giving t he o ffi cer a r eas on t o be lieve that an a rmed robbery was about t o be commi tt ed; swif t intervention on hi s part w as required to pr event a violent cr ime. He re , t her e is no sug ges t ion in t he re co rd t hat t he ap pellee w as d epa rt ing t he parking l

ot or o therwise en ga gin g in any beh avi or inv olvi ng i mm in ent danger that required Of fi cer Pruett to forego any

type of s urvei ll ance an d in stead act imm

ediat ely to pr event a c r ime. Su r ely, if there had be en su ch beha vior , t he pros ecutor would ha ve el i ci ted the testi mony . Instead, the rec ord i s s i l en t re ga rdi n g a n y n ee d f or O f f i cer Pr uett to act im

medi atel y . Fr om thi s rec ord, the

ab senc e of any ty peof i m m i ne nt d an ge r i s j us t the

sor t of i m pl i ed f i nd i ng tha t weac cord

to the sou nd di screti on of t he t rial co ur t . R eliance u po n t he co ncluso ry t ip o f the informant her e is inhere nt ly i nco nsist ent wi th the Supr eme Court’s t ot ali ty-of-the-circumstances anal ysi s. Base d o n t he r eco rd , I believe11

Off ic er Pruett actedon the tip wi th nothin g more than “an

i nc hoa te a nd un pa rticul ari ze d suspici

on or hunch” t hat called fo r so me type of c or ro bor at ion.

Because we r eq uir e a n o ffice r ’s o bse rva t io ns t o be sp ec ific a nd ar t icu lab le and no t
co nc lu so ry, it would b e an an omal ous result i f we a

ll owed a s to p base d on

a c onc l us ory hu nc h or i n ch oate suspici on or a conclusory statement f

rom an un

known tip ster. If the m

aj ority is correct about the st ate of the law—a t ipster’s conc l usory statem en t is suf f i cien t for a traf

f i c stop—w e are presented wit h t he an

omal y tha t a l aw en f orce men t of f i cer wou l d b e a bl e to a ct on

a ti p f rom another th at, if he him

self had o bser ved t he co nduc t first hand a nd t est ifi ed in su ch a c onc luso ry manner , t he stopwoul d n

ot be upheld. See, e.g., State v. A rriaga , 5 S.W.3d 804, 80 7 ( T ex . Ap p. —S an Ant o nio 1999, p et. ref

’d). Texas courts have n

ever al lowed a v ehi cl e stop based

on an unc or ro bor at ed t ip and
we shoul d not do so n

ow. See, e.g., State

v. Garcia , 25 S.W .3d

90 8 ( Te x . A

pp .—H ouston

[1 4th Di st.] 2000, no pet.) (crim in al activ ity detail ed wi th some parti cul arity

was corroborated

); Glenn v. State , 967 S. W.2 d 46 7 ( Te x. Ap p. —A mar illo 1998) , pet. d ism’ d , 988 S.W.2d 769 (Tex. Crim . App. 1999) ( an o nymo us t ip co rr o bo r at ed by p o li ce off ic er’s prior knowledge of s uspect’s cri

mi nal activ ities and sur

ve i l l ance of

predi cti ve beha vi or); State v. Adkins , 8 29 S .W. 2d 9 00, 902 (T ex. App.—F ort Wort h 1992, pet . ref’d) (po li ce offi cer observed t raff

ic off enseafter recei

vi ng an onym ous tip def endan t dri vi ng w hi l e i ntoxi cated)
. Because her e t he ar re st ing o ffi cer was t he only wit ness a t t he hea ring and h e testif ie d that t he ba sis of the stop rested entirel y on the in form ation provided

by the c ab dr iver, we t ur n t o t he12

we ig ht an o ffice rmay p lac e o n a t ip g ive n t o him in p er so n by a n u nid en t ified , an d p r ev io us ly
un kn own, i n f orm an t. Inform ants and T

ipsters A police off ic er “m ay rely upon in form ation recei ved through an i

nf ormant, rather than
on his di rect obs ervati ons, so long as the informant’s statement is reasonably cor

roborated by other matters within the off

icer’s know

ledge .” Gates , 462 U.S. at 242 (quot in g Jones v. United States , 362 U.S. 257 , 2 69 ( 196 0) ) ( emphas is add ed) . C or ro bor at ion by t he o ffi cer means, in li

ght of t he total

i ty of t he circumstances, t he o ffi cer co nfirms eno ugh fa ct s so t hat he may rea so nably conc lude t hat t he i nf orm ati on prov i de d i s rel i ab l e a nd a te m pora ry de ten ti on i s j ustif i ed. SeeWhite , 496 U.S. at 330-31. Corr obor ati on by the p olice o ffi

cer nece ssar ily

go es t o t he qu ality and r eliabili t y of t he infor matio n. Wh erethe in form ation has a f

ai rl y l ow d egree

of rel i ab i l i ty , m ore i nf orm ati on is requi red t o est abl

ish t he requi si te l ev el of s uspi cion nece ssa

ry to justif y an i nv esti gati ve deten tion
. Id. at 330 . Whe re t he rel i ab i l i ty of the i nf orma tion i s i ncreas ed, l

ess corroborati

on i s nece ssa

ry . Id. In cas es w here the Su

prem e Court ha s r ev iew ed inve st iga t o ry st o ps , pa r t o f it s a na lysis in evalua t ingt he t ot ality o f the circu msta nces has includ ed r eviewing t he r eliabili t y of t he informant
ortip ster. See Fl

orida v. J .L. , 529 U .S. 266, 2 71 (20 00); White , 496 U.S. at 331- 32; Gates , 462 U.S. at 225 ; Adams v. Williams , 407 U .S . 143, 144-47 ( 197 2). In de term i ni ng the rel i ab i l i ty of pe o ple p rovi

di ng i nf orma tion to poli ce of f i cers , the Su

prem e Court has c onsi

dered (1) k now n in formants, i

n di v i du als wi th whom the poli ce have previ ously work ed and whose reli

abi li ty has been establ is hed and (2) unkn

own in form ants or tipsters who call in to the police and l

eave tips
an o nymo us ly.3 In United Sta tes v. Villam onte-M arquez, the Su

prem e Court uph el d a stopof a ves sel in the openseas b ased on an a

nony mous ti p. 462 U.S. 579 (1983). The Court stated: “It seems cl ear that i f the c ustoms of f i cers in this case ha d stopped a

n a utomob i l e on a

pub l i c hi ghway

ne ar the borde r, r ather than a vesse l in a ship channel, t he st op wo uld have ru n afo ul o f the Fo ur t h Amendment bec au se of the abs ence of articulabl e suspi ci on.” Id . at 588. Acknowledgi ng the l im its on polic e powers to stop, wit hou t sea rc hing veh ic le s, Justice B rennan

in hi s di ssen

t not ed that the Court had “conti nued to in si st, as we have

al ways done, that there must be som e m eani ngf ul c hec k o n t he arb i trary dis cretion of the polic e.” Id . at 602 (c iting United Sta tes v. Mar tinez-F uerte , 428 U.S. 543, 558-59 (1976) and United States v. Brignoni-Ponce , 442 U .S. 873, 8 82-83 (1975 )). 13 In Williams , t he Su pr eme Co ur t de t er mined t ha t an un ve r ifie d t ip from a known i nf orm an t wa s n ot reliable enough to establi sh pr oba ble cau se t o a rr est , bu t uphe ld an invest igat ive stopbased on an

in form ant’s tip b earin

g suf fi ci ent “i ndici a of rel

ia b il ity .” Id. at 146 -47 ; see also Ca rmouche , 10 S.W .3d at 32 8. In Williams , su ch “indicia” w as sho wn by evidenc e t hat (1 ) t he in for mant was pers on al

l y kn own to th e of f i cer; (2 ) the i

n f orm an t h ad pr ov i de d th

e of f i cer w i th i nf orm ati on in the pas t; and

(3) t he i nf ormant was subject to arrest for making a false co mplainthad the off ic er’s i nve stigati on proved the tip f al se. 407 U.S. at 147. In Gates , t he Su pr eme Co ur t su gg es t ed t ha t , st an din g a lo ne , an an o nymo us t ip w o uld not be su f f i ci en t f orproba bl e ca use . A dopti

ng the total i ty-of -th e-c i rcu m sta nc estes t, th e C ourt took i n to acc ou nt t he fact s kno wn t o t he o ffi cer s fro m per so nal obs er vat ion, and gav e an an onym ous ti p weight in li ght of i ts in dic ia of relia bi li ty as establi

shed through i

ndepen dent police work. Gates , 462 U.S. at 242 -4 6. Rec og nizing that inf ormant’s ti

ps, li ke all e vi dence co ming to a po lice officer on t he scene, m ay vary greatly in their v al ue and rel ia bi li ty, the Gates co ur t det er mined t hat in li ght of t he anony mousin form ant’s tip as corrobor ated by in dependen t po li ce work, t he arrest was j ustif i ed. Id. These same f

acto rs are also re levant in the r eas ona ble susp icion co nt ext exce pt t hat a lesse r sho wing of s uspi cion i s req

ui red. White , 496 U.S. at 328-29. 314 In White , an an o nymo us ca ller left a t ele ph o ne t ip w it h t he po lice t ha t a p ar t icu lar ly descri bed woman was carry

in g coca ine and pr ed

i cte d sh e w oul

d l ea v e a n ap ar tmen t b ui l di n g a t a specifi ed t ime, ge t into a ca r mat ching a parti cul ar des cri pti on, an d dri ve to a nam ed h otel. T he t ip
was corro borated by i

ndepen dent police work that incl

uded survei

ll ances. The White

cou rt hel d th at, wh ile t he po lice did not verif y e very aspect of the anony

mous ti p, they di d verify facts that i

nvol ved f uture actions o r predi

cti ve i nf orma tion that wa s the

typ e not ordin

ari l y or easi l y predi cted. Id. at 332. Rec og nizing

that t he ca se w as a clos e o ne, t he Co ur t co nclude d t hat “unde r t he t ot ality o f the circumstances, the anony

mous ti p as corroborated

, exhi bi ted su fficient indic ia o f re liabilit y t o jus t ify the in vestigator y s

to p.” Id. (em

phasi s ad ded). Most re cent ly i

n Florid a v. J.L. , t he po lic e d is patcher recei

ved an anony mous t elepho ne ti

p t hat a pa rt icular ly descr ibed you t h at a pa rt icular loca t ion wa s ca rr ying a co ncea led gu n. 529 U.S. at 268 . Like the in stant case, the officers’ suspici ons that J.L. was carr yi

ng a weapon aro se not from any observati ons of thei

r own but insteadsolel

y f rom i nf ormation provi

ded by an unknown cal l er. The Suprem

e Court t hus address ed the i ssue wh ethe r an an o nymo us t ip t ha t a p er so n is
ca rry i n g a gu n i s, wi th out m ore , s uf f i ci en t to justify

a po li ce o ff icer’s st op and fr isk o f tha t per so n. The Co ur t held t hat t he t ip was not pr op er ly cor ro bor at ed a nd the in vestigative

stop was not justif

ie d. Id. at 272 . I n J.L. , t he o ffice rco rr o bo r at ed o nly ide nt ifying in form ation rel ating t o t he youth’s l oca ti on and a ppe ar ance . T he t ipst er did no t pr ovid e any pr edict ive informat ion and t he police off ic er stopped J. L. ba se d o nly

o n t he an o nymo us t ip. While t he infor matio n given by the t ipst er helped t he po lice o ffice rco rr ec t ly

ide nt ify t he pe r so n t he t ips t er mea nt t o ac cu se , t he t ip d id not sho w t hat t he tipster h ad kn owl ed ge of th e c on ce al

ed ac ti v i ty . Addi ti on al l y , the p oli ce

of f i cer di d n ot co rrobora

te15

any cri m i n al ac ti v i ty . Th e of f i cer di d n ot tes ti f y th at h e ob se rved ac ti on s i n di ca ti n g i l l eg al i ty o r t es t ify about matters wi

thi n h i s kn owl edge that woul

d reas onab l

y corroborate c

ri m i na l acti vi ty. Id. Th e Supreme C ourt stated:

Tha t t he allega t ion abo ut t he gu n t ur ned o ut t o be correc t doe s n ot sug ges t t hat t he off ic ers, prior to the frisks, had a r eas ona ble basis fo r su spe ct ing J. L. o f engag ingin unl awful con du ct: The reasonablenes s of off ic ia l s uspi ci on mus

t be me asured by

what t he o ffice r s k ne w b efo r e t he y co nd uc t ed t he ir se arc h. A l l the pol i ceha d to go on

in t his case was the bare report o f an unknown , unaccountabl

e i nf ormant who nei

ther expl ai ned how he kn ew about the gun nor supplie d any basis f or beli evi ng he had in si de i nf orm at io n ab o ut J. L. If White wa s a cl ose ca se on th e re l i ab i l i ty of anony mous ti ps, this one surel y f alls on the other side of the

li ne. Id. At 271 . I n rej ecting t he go ver nment’ s ar gument t hat a st op sho uld be p er mitt ed w hen a de scri ption by an an onym ous tip i s verif i ed an d “there are n o fa ctors th at c ast dou

b t on th e rel i ab i l i ty of t he t ip,” t he Co ur t co nclude d t hat t hese co nt ent ions “misapp re hend t he reli abi li ty ne eded fo ra t ip to jus tif y a Terry stop. ” Id. “The m ere fact t hat a tip, i f

true , wou

l d de scri be i l l eg al ac ti vi ty doe s n ot
me an that t he polic e m

ay ma ke a Terrystopwithout mee ting the rel

ia bi li ty requi remen t.” Id . at 273 n.1. The Co ur t furt her dec lined t o r eco gnize a n exigenc y excep t ion fo r firea rms t hat wo uld have reli eved the State from h

avi ng to meet

t he Gates rel

i ab i l i ty re qui rem en t. Id. at 273. If bare-boned tips ab out guns

could provi de th e b asis f or Terrystop s, th

e C ourt r easo ned t hat it w ou ld be
re aso nable t hen t o e xt end t he ex cepti ons to narcoti cs c ase s. Th i s the Courtrefuse d to do: “As we cl arif ie d wh en we made i n di ci a of re l i ab i l i ty cr itical in [ Williams ] and White , t he Fo ur t h Amendment4 The Supreme C ourt recogniz e d t hat t her e may be circums tances under whi ch the dan

ger alle g ed in an ano ny

mousti p m i gh t be so g rea t as to j us ti f y a s ea rch even wi thou t a s how i ng of r elia bilit y, such as

a bom b threat. And, of

cou rs e, a n of f i cer m ay stopan d qu es ti on a pers on if

there arereasonabl

e grounds to beli

eve that person i s wanted

f or past cri m i na l cond uct, see Cortez, or

in loca t ions where

the rea son abl e expect ation of F ourt h A me ndm ent priv acy is dim in is hed, such as airport s, sch

ools , or che ckpoi

nts. J.L. , 529 U .S. 266, 2 74 (20 00); but see City of Indiana polis v. Edmon d , 121 S . C t . 4 47, 454 (2 000 ) ( re affirming seizur e o t her t han at chec kpo int “must be acc omp an i ed b y som e m eas ure of i ndi vi dual ized s uspi cion”). 16 is not so easil

y s atisf ie d.” Id. at 1379. 4 In Stewart v. State , t his Co ur t re

ject ed a “DWI e xcep t ion” to the corrobora

tion requi rem en t. 22 S.W .3d 646

(Tex . App.—A

usti n 20 00, pet. ref

’d). In analyzing t he use

of i nf orma nts i n c onnection wi

th vehi cle stops, th

e Tex as C ourt of Criminal Ap peal s has t ra cke d t he ana lysis o f the Su pr eme Co ur t . I n Carmouche , the c ourt
exam in ed a ve hi cl e s top b as ed

on i nf orm ati on f rom a rel i ab l e i n f orm an t wh o h ad pr ov i de d accur ate i nf orm ati on on prior occasi ons. 10 S.W.3d at 323. The Carmouche court concl

uded that t he inf or mant’s history

of p ro viding re liable inf

or matio n est ablished a sufficient “ i n di ci a of re l i ab i l i ty ” to
cr ed it her i nf orma tion
. Id. at 328 (citin

g Williams, 407U.S . at 1 46- 47) . Even so, th e c ourt d i d n ot up ho ld t he st op base d o n t he infor mant’ s t ip alone . T he co ur t uphe ld t he st op ba s ed upon three factors: (1 ) t he inf

or mant’s tip; (2) the informant’s pre vi oushi story of prov i di ng rel i ab l e i nf orm ati on to au th ori ti es ; an d ( 3) su rvei l l an ce s b y th e of f i cersth at s er

v ed to corro borate her

i nf orma tion
. Id. While the in

form ant’s i nf ormation al

one was i nsuf fi ci ent, “al l of the surroundin

g ci rcumstances, taken together, justif

ied the st op.” Id . at 329. Addi tional ly , the court noted that t he stop was j ustif ie d because one of

the of f i cers obse rve d a traf

f i c vi ola tion
. Id . at 329 n.6 (citin g Whre n , 517 U .S. at 806).17

Isa Face-to

-Face E ncounter with an Unkno wn Pers

on an Encount

er Wit h a Known I

nformant or an Anonym ous Tipster?

The is sue be fo r e u s t he n is wh et he r , ba se d o n t he fac t t ha t t he fac e- t o - fac e t ip in t his
ca se ca me f rom a ca b dr i ver un know n to the p oli

ce of f i cer, the ca

b dr i ver sh oul d be treated a s (1) a kno wn, r elia ble in

form ant such that corrobor ation i s unn ecessary; (2) an an

onym ous tipster and, as in J.L. , s om

e c orro b ora

ti n g ev i den ce

or p re di cti ve info r ma t ion is r equ ired ; o r ( 3) an infor mant
som ewh erealong the spectru m of kn own-unknown inf

ormants and s uitable

corro boration i s requi

red. See J.L. , 529 U.S. at 270 . H er e, as in J.L. , the record est abl is hes that nothi

ng was kn own about t he informant . I n J.L. , t he Supreme Court squarely addressed facts li

ke tho se bef

ore u s: An a cc ur at e d es cr ipt io n o f a s ub jec t ’s r ea dily

observab le

locati on and appearan

ce is of co ur se r elia ble in t his limit ed se nse : I t will he lp t he po lic e c o r r ec t ly ident ify t he pe rs on who m the tipster me ans to accuse. Such a ti p, however, does not show that t he tipster has kn

owledge of c oncealed crim in al activ ity . The rea son ab l e suspici on here at iss ue re qui re s th at a t ip be re l i ab l e i

n i ts a ss er ti on of i l l eg al i ty , not j us t i

n i ts t ende ncy to ident ify

a de t er minate p er so n. Id
. at 272 . T he Su pr eme Co ur t in J.L. also st re ss ed t he imp o rt anc e o f predict iv e i nf orm ati on of cri m i na l i ty th at coul d be corroborated

by obse rva tion
. Id . at 271-72. Cou rtshave unifo rml

y h el d that an anony

mous ti p ma y justif y the initiation of an invest igat ion, b ut i

t alone will rare ly esta blish the level of su spicio n sufficient t o ju st ify a de t ent ion. E.g., White , 49 6 U. S. at 329 ; Davis v. State , 989 S.W .2d

85 9, 8 63 (Tex . A

pp .—A us ti n 19 99 , pe t. ref ’d); Adkins , 829 S.W.2dat 900. A poli ce off ic er must have addi

tional facts b efore the off

ic er may
r ea so na bly co nc lud e t ha t t he an o nymo us t ip is co nsid er ed r elia ble an d a n inv es t iga t o ry de t en t io n is jus tif ie d. Davis , 989 S.W.2d at 86 3. An o ffice r ’s pr io rkn o wle dg e a nd ex pe r ien ce , an d h is18

corr obor ati on o f t he de t ails of

the ti p, m ay be consi dered i n gi vi ng the an ony mousti p the a tten ti on orwei ght i t dese rve s. Id . at 864. But the corroborati

on of detai l s tha t are eas ily

obt ainable at t he t ime th e i n f orm ati on i s prov i de d, a n d w h i ch do n ot i n di ca te cri m i na l ac ti vi ty , wi l l not l end sup port to the ti p. Stewart, 22 S.W.3d at 649. In Davis , a police off

ic er was i nf ormed that a call

er had reported t hat

a p ar t icu lar ly descri bed vehi cle was be i ng d ri ve n n orthboun d on In ters tat e 35 at a speci fi

ed l ocation; that it was
oc cup ied by thr ee males; t hat t he vehi cle was be i ng d ri ven re ckl ess l y ; a nd th at the occ upan ts were po ss ibly smok ing marihua na. 989 S. W.2 d at 861 . T he o ffi cer po sitio ned himself to inter cep t t he suspect vehicle and stopped i

t. Id . T he o ffi

cer wit nesse d no offense and acknowl edged that he acted
so lely on the ba si s of the ti p. Id
. The call

er did not identif

y h im self , sto p at t he scene, or o therwise
co me f orward. Id
. T his C o ur t he ld t ha t “t he an o nymo us t ip, un co rr o bo r at ed as t o it s s ig nific ant
as pe cts by independ ent po lice wo rk , d id no t exhibit su ffi cient indicia of r eliabili

t y to just ify

t he in vestigative

stop. ” Id . at 865. In Adkins , t he court of appeal s uphel d a veh ic le stop based on a tip f

rom an uni dentif ie d ci tizen . In that case, t he o ffi cer initiat ed t he st op beca use t he cit izen had informed t he off ic er that t he dri

ver o f t he ca rap pe ar ed t o be “e xt r eme ly into xicat ed” and t he ca r w as a ppr oa ching
an in tersection controlle d by

a traff ic li ght. Consi stent with the ti p, the offi

cer obser v ed t hat t he
ve hic le had a f

la t t ire on the ri

ght rear wheel

that was badl

y da ma ged . The i ssue on appeal was whet her informat ion fro m a co ncer ned c itizen is leg ally suffi cient t o es t ab lish r ea so na ble sus picion. The Adkins court recogniz ed that unless an i nformant’s tip

carri es s uf f i cien t “i ndi cia of rel i ab i l i ty,” it req ui res f urth er i nv es ti ga ti on b ef ore a f orci bl e s top of a veh ic le would be authorized. 829 S.W.2d19

at 901 -0 2. Rec og nizing t hat an infor mant’ s ver acit y, re liabil ity, a nd ba sis o f kn o wle dg e “ ar e h igh ly relev an t,” t he co ur t agr eed wit h t he Su pr eme Co ur t in Gates tha t an “ ex pl i ci t an d de tai l ed de scri ption of alleged wr ong do ing, a long with a st atemen t t hat the even

t was observed f

irstha nd, enti tles an inf or mant’s tip t o greater weight than m igh t o therwis e be the cas e.” Id. at 901 (citin g Gates , 462 U.S. at 234 ). On

cri tic al f acts, Adkins ma

y be dist inguished fro m the c ase at hand. In Adkins , t he
re co rd makes clear t hat t he bas is for t he infor mant’ s infor matio n was his first hand observati on that Adkins wasdri

vi ng d angerous l y . In a ddit ion, the off

icer observe

d behavior

—Adk insdr iving on t he
r im o f his t ire —t hat su ffi ci en tly corr obo rat ed t he tip. T he maj or ity opini on not ed t hat Adkins’s conduct of dri

vi ng on hi s tire ri m was a vi

olat ion of state law. The re co rd also est ablished t he exi stence of ex

ige nt circum stances. The record establ is hed that A dk i n s was dri v i n g on ci ty streets and, furt her , t he o ffi

cer was “[c] onc er ned t hat t he po ssible DWI sus pec t mightget away.” Id . at 901. Indeed, the Supreme C ourt has n ever uph el d a n i nv es ti ga tory stopof an ind ividua l— much less a veh ic le stop—o n the quan

tum of ev ide nce rel ie d on in t he ca se be for e us . I n Adams v. Williams , a po lice officer act ed u po n an infor mant’ s t ip. T he fact t hat t he informant pe r so na lly ca me forward to give i

nf ormation that

was i mm edi ately verifi abl e at the scene l

ed that Court to concl

ude t ha t “[ t ] his is a s tronge r ca se tha n ob tai ns i n th e c as e of an an onym ous telephone ti

p.” 407 U.S. at 146. T he info rman t ’s un ve r ified t ip a lo ne, how ever , w as insufficient t o ju st ify t he de t ent ion. The Williams co ur t fo un d t he info rmat io n c ar r ied en o ug h “ind icia of reli abili ty” to justif

y the stop because t he info rman t wa s k no wn t o t he o ffice rpe r so na lly and ha d p r o vid ed him w it h r elia ble info rmat io n in the p ast. Id
.20 In this cause, Off

ic er Pruett confi

rmed only one fac t t hat the cab dri

ver told hi m, that appelle e was nea

rby in a whi te pickup. The re co rd is silent r ega rd ing any ot her fact s t hat co uld have po ss ibly be en corroborated

by Of f i cer Pru ett. The f act that t he wh

ite truck wa s n ea rby , a pp aren t to any obs er ver , g ave Off

ic er Pruett li tt le , if any , reason to credit the cab

driv er’s f urther “bel

ie f” that appelle e wa s i

ntox i ca ted . Ba se d on

t he sp ar se r eco rd , I wo uld ho ld t hat Officer P ru et t had o nly the quantum of i nf orm ati on to initiate

an inve st iga t io n. T he info rmat io n he ha d a t t he t ime he stopped app ellee did no t rise t o t he co nst itu t ionally necess ar y level of re aso nable su spicio n.

Off ic er Pr uet t ’s o pt ions a t t he t ime he was a ppr oa ched by the ca b d r ive rwe r e ma ny: he co uld have in

qu ired furt her of t he infor mant t o e st ablish his ident ity o r t he r eliabili t y of t he inf or mant’s obs er vat ions, or he co uld have simply obs er ved t he appe l l ee , looki ng f orsig ns o f er r at ic dr iving or a t raff ic violation. A

gai n, whi le the record is un

devel oped as to wh at occurre d, i

t appea rs that Offic er Pr ue t t o bse rve d t he ap pe llee dr ive his t ruc k in a normal ma nne r around the conveni

ence store, then f

orced appelle e to stopan

d ge t out of the truck. Th

e tri al cou rt cou l d have f oun d f rom t his record

that the def endan t was a bout to park

his truck and en ter the c onven

i ence store. Further, t he impli ed

f i nd i ng s w hi ch weac cord

to the sou nd di screti on of the tri al cou rt ce rtai nl y do n ot in dic ate that t he appel

le e was ab out to exi

t t he parki

ng l ot and re-enter traff

ic
. Wh ether t he i nf orma nt i s m ore ak i n to th e a n on y mous ti ps ter or a kn own i n f orm an t, however, the record is cl

ear that no reliabi

li ty has been

establ is hed. We need n ot fi nd that the cab dri ve r i s a ki n to a n a non y mouscal l er to c onc l

ude tha t hi s i nf orm ati on sho uld be ac co rd ed d iff

er ent t re at ment t han t hat o f a

co nfident ial inf

or mant w ho ha s pr ovid ed a ccu ra t e and rel i ab l e i nf orm ati on on prior occasi ons. So far as the record reveal s, nothin g is known ab out the in

form ant except that21

he was dri

vi ng a cab . The record is si le nt as to whether the in

form ant remai ned at the scene or departed imm

ediat ely. He re , t her e wa s no t est imony ab out wh ether th e c ab dri ve r wa s i de nti f i ed or ide ntif ia ble; there was no testim

ony a bout whether the off

ic er asked the cab

driv er about t he de t ails of what he had observ

ed or acq uire d any infor matio n t o e st ablish the t ipst er ’s r eliabili t y. In r eviewing t he totali ty of the c i rcum stan ces , I would hol

d tha t, on the m

eage r record in this case, the cab dri

ver is aki n to an anony

mous ti pster as in J.L. , and the corroborat ion a spect of the Gates re l i ab i l i ty an alys is
m us t b e m et. Suff ic e i t to sa y t hat informat ion t his far sho rt of t he line mu st be co rr o bo r at ed in so me ma nne r—either by addi tional qu estioni

ng o f the ti pster or b y f i rstha nd ob serv ati on of the of f i cer. Because the record is so sparse, an d there is no evi dence at all cor ro bor at ing t he ti

p, th e of f i cer’ s stop
was pr emat ur e and , t hus, not base d o n re aso nable su spicio n. Sailo and Sierra-Hernandez

In r ever sing t he t rial co ur t ’s su ppr essio n of t he evi dence, t he major ity aband ons t he
corr obor ati on re quir ement set ou t in the S upr eme Co ur t op inions of J.L. , Gates , and Whit e. I be lieve t he major ity’s r eliance o n Sailo and Sierra-Hernandez is si mpl y m is pla ced. Despi

te face-to-face tips in bot h Sailo and Sierra-Hernandez, nei ther court aban

doned the corro boration aspect of the Gates
re l i ab i l i ty anal ysi s. Sailo , 910 S. W.2d at 189 ; United States v. Sierra-Hernandez, 581 F.2d 760, 762 (9 th Ci r. 1 97 8) . M ore ov er , to the ex ten t tha t ei the r ca se i s read to a l l ow a

stopon an un

corro borated t ip, bo t h cas es p re ced e t he Su pr eme Co ur t ’s de cision in J.L.

In Sailo and Sierra-Hernandez, the court s determi ned that the re werear ti cul ab l e f ac ts wit hin the off ic ers’ personal

kn owl edgei nd ep en de nt of the i nf orm ati on the of f i cers rec ei ve d f ac e-to-5 Sailo and Sierra-Hernandez preceded J.L. wh ich r eje ct ed t his factor as “m is apprehen

d[in g] the reli abi li ty ne eded for a tip to justify a Terrystop. ” See J.L. , 529 U.S. at 272. 22 face from the uni dentif ie d in form ants that corro borated t he i nf ormants’ i nf ormation. 910 S.W.2d at 189; 581 F.2 d at 763 . I n Sailo , the c ourt of ap pe als de t er mined t ha t t he t ip w as r ea so na bly
corro borated beca use , a long wit h t he fact t hat t he suspect was descri

bed wi th particularity, the offi

cer knew that the area wasone of f reque nt DW I encoun ters. 91 0 S.W .2d at 18 9. Likew ise in SierraHe rnande

z , the in form ant pointed to a bl ack pi ckup truck and told the border agent, “The b la ck pic kup truck just loaded wi

th weed at the caneb

reak.” 581 F.2d at 762. The nearby caneb reak was know n a s a s i te of previ ous i

nc i den ts of d rug s m uggl i ng a nd i l l egal en try of al i en s. Id. In Sierra-Hernandez, th e c ourt h el d that i nf orm ati on fro m a citize n who confronts a police off ic er in person to advise the of

fi cer that an i

ndi vi dual present on the scen

e i s comm

ittin g a sp ec ific cr ime shou ld be given s erious a tt ention a nd great wei ght by

the off ic er. 581 F.2d at 763. The co ur t not ed t hat a pe rso n not co nnect ed w ith t he po lice or who is no t a p aid info rman t is inhe r en t ly tr u stworthy

wh en he adv i ses the p oli ce a cri me i s b ei ng c omm i tted. Id. “Nevertheless , whether the inf ormation is suf

fi cien t t o justify a sto p must

be eva luat ed w ith r efer ence t o t he f ac ts of each case, f or t here i s no per se rule.” Id. Each cas e i s revi ewed base d o n t he t ot ality o f the ci rcumstances orthe “wh

ole pi cture” wh en ev al ua ti n g th e rea son ab l en es s of th e of f i cer’ s c on du ct. The Sailo co ur t , fo llowing therea soning in Sierra-Hernandez, he ld t hat t her e wa s no t hing in the record th at sho uld have cau sed t he o ffi cer t o d ou bt t he r eliabili

t y or go od faith o f the inf orman t t ende ring t he informat ion. 5 Impo rt ant t o t his case is tha t in Sierra-Hernandez and Sailo , th e c our

ts found the ti

ps were corrobor ated.6 In Sailo , the offi cer asked t he cit ize n- info rman t t o st o p a nd pu ll over, p resumabl

y so the off

ic er co uld obtain i

nf ormation f

rom hi m. A lthough the i

nf ormant i ni tial ly pul led o ve r t o t he side of t he r o ad wa y, h e ev i den

tl y dr ov e of f af ter th e stop b

ut b ef oreei th er off ic er co uld g et any ident ify ing informat ion. State v. Sailo , 910 S.W.2d 184 , 1 86- 87 ( Te x. Ap p. —Fo rt Wor t h 199 2, pet . r ef’d) . T he reasonabl eness of suspi ci on is me asured by

what the of f i cer kn ew at the ti

me of the stop. J.L. , 529 U.S. at 271. 23

In th i s c as e, th e S tate

di d n ot el i ci t an y testi mon y f rom Of f i cer Pr uett t hat (1 ) t he
conven ie ncest o r e w as a p ar t icu lar ly fr eq ue nt ar ea fo rDW I s o rt he sit e o f p r ev io us cr imina l ac t ivit y; (2) the store was closed and dri vi ng i nto t he pa

rking ar ea and around the store was suspi ci ous ac t ivit y; (3 ) i

t wa s l ate at night at a t im

e when bars comm

only close an d d r ive r s ma y be d r iving wh ile in to xi cated; or (4) he him

self obs erve d ap pellee d riving er ra t ically . N or did t he St at e elicit a ny t est imony ab o ut t he id en t it y, av aila bilit y, or o ther facts i ndicatin g that t he cab

driv er was pr ovid ing
r elia ble informat ion. Nor was there testim ony tha t t he cab driv er was identif

ia ble becaus e some ty

pe of i den ti f i ca ti on wa s ob tai n ed f or p oss i b l e l ate r u se . Th e S tate si mply did not elicit any t est imony concerni ng the i dentity of the cab

driv er or even whe

ther he rem

ai ned on the sce

ne. Sailo and Sierra-Hernand ez ar e a lso r ea dily d ist ing uis ha ble fr o m t his c as e b ec au se in those casesthe court s recogni zed the existence of ex

ige nt circum stances. From

the facts presented in Sierra-Hernandez, t he co ur t co nclude d t hat t he infor mant “w ou ld have been avai la ble for f urther que st ioning if

the a gent had j udged the procedure appropr ia te.” Id. The court further found that there werear ti cul ate d r ea son

s to su pp ort th e a gen t’s f ai l ur e to c on

v er se f ur th er wi th th e i n f orm an t, to ask f or h i s n am e, or to note the li

cense of hi s car: The suspe ct wa s i n a ve hi cl e m ovi ng aw ay f rom t he age nt when t he t ip came a nd the cou rt f oun d that i t wa s rea son

ab l e u nd er th e c i rcu m sta nc esf or t he age nt to radi o for as si stan ce a nd to se t off i n pu rsui t, rather th

an to question the

i nf orma nt. Id. 624

In bot h Sailo and Sierra-Hernandez, the p oli ce of f i cers de scri b ed th e i n f orm an t wi th par t icular ity and f urthe r, ba se d o n t he “t o t alit y o f t he circ umst ance s,” just ifi ed t he st op s bec aus e o f exigent circumstances. I fi

nd i t sign if ic ant as wel

l that i n both cases

the ap pel la

te court s uphel

d the trial
cour ts’ decisions. Did Officer Pruett Corroborate the Tip?

Even the State doe s n ot argu e th

at th ey do n ot h av e to corro borate t he tip;rather, they argue that t he tip w

as corro borated. The St ate contends that Off ic er Pruett suf

fi ci ently corro borated the uni dentif ie d cab dri ver’s i nf ormation wh

en h e observed appe ll

ee pull i nto t he conv

eni ence store and d rive ar ou nd t he bac k o f the st or e. The Stat e argues that such acti vi ty wasout of the

ordi na ry and i nc rea se d the l

i ke l i hood that ap pel l ee was i ntoxi cated. Offic er Pr ue t t ’s t es t imo ny co nt r ad ict s t his
asse rt ion. Off

ic er Pr uet t did no t t est ify

t hat he t hou ght app ellee’s d riving ar ou nd t he conven

ie nce store wasstran

ge, suspi cious or out of the ordi

na ry . Nor did he testi fy

that appell

ee drov e f as t, sl ow orab no rmally

around the conven

ie nce store. Off

ic er Pruett testifi

ed: “I looked and I saw [the truck] go ingar ou nd t he bac k o f the store, and then the veh ic le cam e around [to ] the front of the store.” On
cross ex am i n ati on , O f f i cer Pr uett testifi

ed that, “I turned around and saw the p i ckuppul

l i n toward the back of t he st or e in the par king lo t , w ent around the store. ” The record is s il ent as to whether there was any

thin g unusual or suspici

ous about appellee driv

in g around the back of the

store. The record

is silent a s we ll on o t her cr itical de t ails. As the maj ority acknowledges, the record do es not contain an y e vi dence ab out the locati on of the stop exceptthat it t o o k p lac e in t he pa rki ng l ot of a c o nve nie nc e s t o r e a t t he co rne ro f Be n Whit e a nd So ut h C o ng r es s. T he St at e d id7 The St at e in its b rief attempts to charac terize the way Off ic er Pruett stopped appellee as co rr obo ra t ingt he ca b dr iver’s t ip and p ro viding Officer P ru et t wit h the necess ar y re as o na ble su sp i ci on for t he st o p. At t he he ar ing , Offic er Pr ue t t t es t ified t ha t he fr eq ue nt ly st o pp ed ca r s inthat sam e m an ner. 8 See529 U.S. at 272- 73. 25 not es tab l i sh the ti me of da y the i nc i de nt oc cu

rre d (or even whether i t was day or night ), whet her t he store was ope n or

cl osed, whether the appel le e was al one i n the vehi cl e, whether there was traff ic at t he store o r the parkin

g lot was f

ull and appel

le e simply dr ove ar ou nd t he bac k o f the st or e loo king for a place to park. Revi

ewi ng the f actual basis f ort he t rial co ur t ’s r uling, t her e wa s abso lut ely no
ev i dence est ablishing tha t Officer P ru et t co nsider ed a ppe llee’s dr iving aro und t he bac k o f the
conven ie ncest o r e u nu su al o ran o ut - o f- t he
- o r din ar y ac t ivit y t ha t mi gh t have corroborat ed the tip. Ad di t io na lly, Off

ic er Pruett testifi

ed that he stopped appel le e in his r o ut ine man ne rby sh ining his fl ashl igh t at appell ee and kn

ockin g on the driv

er’s wi ndow. 7 The Sta te f i n al l y argu es th at O f f i cer Pr uett h ad to act quick ly

to d etain

appelle e because appelle e was leavi ng the conveni

ence store an d w asdri vi ng ba ck i nto th e s trea m of t r affic
on So ut h Co ngr ess Ave nue. The re is no e vidence in the r eco rd sup po rt ing t his asse rt ion. S ig nific an t ly, unl

ike Sailo and Sierra-Hernandez, Pru ett di d n ot t est ify t o a ny exi gent ci rcumstances and hi s testim

ony i s si le nt about whether appelle e was attem pti ng to pa rk or t o continue dri

vi ng ba ck
on to South Con gre ss . F rom

these f acts, the tr ia

l co ur t co uld ea sily

co nclude t hat app ellee wa s in the pro cess of p arki

ng to en ter the s tore. Ev en if J.L. had

per mitt ed a n exigenc y excep t ion, 8 the re cord her e is i nadequate t o warr ant such a fi ndi ng. Cert ain

ly , t he i mm ediacy of the inv

estigation is a
re levant consi

de rati on und er the totali ty-of -the-c i rcum stan ces test. Bu t the State ha d the b urden of9 The m aj ori ty also m akes re f eren ce i n a f ootnote t o an affid av it f

or wa rra nt of arrest contained in the cl erk’s record. That do cum ent was not in

tro duced into evidenc e and was not bef ore t he trial cou rt. The m

aj ori ty appe ar s to as su

me th at t he indivi dua l named is t he t ipst er , bu t t her e is no ev i de nc e i n th e re cord f rom whi ch one could ma

ke that inferen

ce. It is cause f

or no smal

l wonde r th at, i n th e suppres si

on heari ng, t he pr os ecu t or never ask ed fo r a nd t he o ffi cer never mentio ned t he i den ti ty of t he t ipst er . I n any event , w hile the d oc ument re fers t o info rmat ion g iven co ncer ning t he of f ense of “weav in g in and out of

the l an e, cros si ng doubl e y el l ow l i ne ,” i t makesno r

ef ere nc e to a DWI alle gation an

d dif fers i n other respects from the

off ic er’s testim

ony a bout t he sub stanceof t he tip. 26 provin g that an exi

gency exi sted. See United States v. Blount , 123 F.3d831, 83 7 (5th C i r. 1997 ). Here, the Stat e di d not elici t t estim ony tha t exige nt circum stances ex

is ted. Unl ike the c ase s ci

ted by the m aj ority , there si m pl y were no specif ic f acts in the record f rom whi ch the off

ic er could, i

n l igh t o f h is experience an

d personal

kn owled ge , tog eth

er wi th in feren ces f rom th ose f ac ts, gi v e h i m ca us e to e f f ec tua te a t ra ffi c st op . T he infere nces dr awn by t he
maj ori ty are without a factualbasis. The m aj ority, f or exampl e, in fers that appel

le e was un

kn own to the ti pster a nd th at there f ore the driv

er was m erely a good citizen

as in Sierra-Hernandez ; t he r e is not hingin t he r eco rd fro m which one may draw suc h an infere nce. The re is not hingi n th e rec ord

to i n di ca te that the

i nf orma nt i s a m ere c i tiz en wi thout m otive or ani

muswhose tip sh

ould be giv en weight or ser ious att ention. The maj ority also infe r s t ha t t he t ips t er wa s s o meh o w “ ac co un t ab le f or his in tervention.” A

gai n, unl ike Sierra-Hernandez, there is n ot hi ng i n the r ec o r d t o su pp o r t t his
assu mpt ion. 9 The major ity also assu mes t he info rman t ’s st at eme nt t o t he o ffice ris based on pers onal knowle dge. There i s no testim ony tha t t he i nf orma nt sp oke wi

th personal

knowl edge

of the m atters t he off ic er cla im ed the i nf ormant observe d. The assum ptions m ad e b y th e m aj ority are pu re27

sp ec ula t io n

an d ig no r e t he ap pa r en t ly co nt r ar y infer en ce s t ha t we r e ma de by t he t r ial c o ur t in granting the motion to suppress. To law fully

st o p a pp elle e, it was not

necess ary that Of

fi cer Pruett observe appel

le e perf orm il le gal or crim in al activ ity . But, under the Gates anal ys is , the Stat e w

as required to establi sh that Offic er Pr ue t t ha d s pe cific and arti cul ab l e f acts th at i n s ome man ner corrobora

ted the cab dr iver’s re liabil

ity o r t ip o f criminal act ivity beyond just ident ifi cat ion o f the sus pec t . T he Su pr eme Co ur t r ec o gn ize d in Williams t ha t info rman t s’ t ip s ma y va ry gr ea t ly in t he irva lu e a nd r elia bilit y: So me t ips , co mple t ely la ck ing in ind icia o f r elia bilit y, w o uld eithe r w ar ra nt no police response or re quir e fur t her invest igat ion befo re a fo rc ible sto p o f a sus pec t wo uld be authorized. But in

some si tuations—for exam

ple , when t he vic t im o f a s t r ee t cr ime seeksimm

ediat e po lice aid and giv es a d es cr ipt io n o f his a ss aila nt , o rwh en a c r ed ible informant warns of a sp ec ific imp en din g c r ime— t he su bt let ies o f t he he ar sa y ru le should not t hwart an appropriate poli ce response. 407 U.S. at 147. Unl

ike Terry , where swift i

ntervention on the part o f the of fi cer was re qui

re d to pr event a s er io us cr ime of vi olen ce, here, there i s no evi

dence that appel

le e was prepari

ng to re-enter
a ci ty street and endan

ger another, and t herec or d sugg es ts th at the of f i cer had am ple m ea ns f or placing appe l l ee

un der sur v ei l l an ce . W h i l e m ost wou l d agr ee th at it wo uld h

ave b een poor police work f or O f f i cer Pr uett to simp ly wa lk a wa y fro m t he sc en e a nd do no t hing , it is e qu ally q ue st io na ble that he blind ly ac ce pt t he t ip a nd ac t o n it wi thout som e f urthe r i ndi cation of i ts rel i ab i l i ty;rathe r, t he tip cal le d for a cal

ib rated response. The tip here s

uff ered fr o m a t hr ee fo ld d efe ct , wit h e ac h fo ld compounding the others. The in form ant was unna

me d, he was n

ot shown to have b een

re liable as t o t he o ffense o bser ved, and he ga ve no i nf orm ati on th at d em ons trate d pe rs ona l obs erv ati on of an off ense. The uni dentif ie d cab28

dr iv er did n ot in dic ate to Off

ic er Pruett that he had an y pe rsonal knowle dge that appell

ee was into xi cated , th at h

e h ad ob se rved appe l l ee dri n ki n g a t an y ti me, or th at h e h ad an y con tact wi th appelle e t o kn o w if h e in fac t wa s int o xic at ed
. Fo rall t ha t ap pe ar s in t he r ec o r d, t he t ips t er mer ely concl uded that dr ink ing migh t be invo lve d b ec au se Offic er Pr ue t t t es t ified t ha t t he info rman t t o ld h im that he o bser ve d erratic dr iving. T he r eco rd co nt ains no indepe ndent fact s co rr obo ra t ing t he
re l i ab i l i ty of the ti p or suggestin g that either the i

nf ormant or the offi

cer observed a

crim in al off ense. Co ns eq ue nt ly, wh en Offic er Pr ue t t st o pp ed ap pe lle e he was act ing o n an incho at e and unparticul

arize d suspici on or hunch rather than spec if

ic and articul

abl e fac ts that appellee was in to xi cated. Thi s s ort of

ti p di f f ers mark edl y f rom the ac cu rate pre dicti on of be havior re co gnized by t he Su pr eme Co ur t in J.L. The t ip, u nco rr obo ra t ed a s t o it s significant respects by in dependen t po li ce work, di d n ot ex hi bi t su f f i ci en t i nd i ci a of rel i ab i l i ty to j ustif y the invest igat ive st op . S t riking t he bal ance he r e o n t his me ag er r ec o r d, I wo uld ho ld a s d id the trial court that t he State fai

le d to establi sh that Off ic er Pruett had the reasonable suspici on required to sto p appelle e. If we ar e to rel y upon th e di spens ati ons of

the l aw, we m

us t a l so d

ra w on i ts constr ain ts. In Terry

v. Ohio , the S up re me C our t ad moni sh ed th ose wh o m i gh t ca l l up on i ts teachings i

n close cases such as the one before us: The sche me of t he Fo ur t h Amendment be co mes mea ning ful o nly wh en it is assured that at so me po int t he co nduc t of t hos e cha rg ed w ith enfo rc ing t he laws can be subj ectedto the

more d eta ch ed , n eu tral scruti ny of a judg e who must evalua t e t he reasonablenes s o f a p ar t ic ular se arch or sei zure in li ght of the particul

ar circumstances. An

d in ma kin g that as se ss men t it is

im perative tha

t t he f acts be j udged agains t an o bje ct ive st an da r d: wo uld t he fac t s a va ilable t o t he o ffi cer at t he moment of the sei zure or t he search

“warrant a m

an o f re as o nab le c au t io n in t he b elief” that t he action taken was

appropr i ate ? A

ny thi ng l es s w oul

d i nv i te i ntr us i ons upon29

co nst it ut io na lly

gu aran tee d ri gh ts base d o n not hingmoresu b sta n ti al th an i n ar ti cul ate hunche s, a re sult t his Co ur t has c ons iste nt ly refused t o s anct ion.
392 U .S. at 21-22(ci

tations om

i tted). Nei ther t he ends of

la wenf orcemen t nor t he Fourth Am

endm ent are served b

y rel ia nce on t he un co rr o bo r at ed t ip. T he t r ial c o ur t ex pr es sly fo un d t ha t t he o ffice rwa s c r ed ible, bu t t ha t in t he ab se n ce of som eth i n g m ore —suc h as addi ti on al i n f orm ati on ab out o r f

rom the i nf orm an t or obs er vat ions by t he po lice officer —t he in form ation on wh

ic h the stop was based

did no t rise t o t he le vel r eq ui r ed by Terry andGates
. I n t he ab se nc e o f ev id ence demo ns trati ng i m m i ne nt d an ge r or ha rm —or even a need for swift a ct ion— Terry should be ex ten de d onl

y to those i

nstanc es w

here obs erv ati on by the off ic er hi ms el f or corro borated i

nf orm ati on sho ws “t hat cr imi

nal act ivity may be afoot.” Id. at 30.

Exe rc ising

the scrutin

y of the “detached”

and “ neutral” judge cal l ed

upon to ev al ua te the reasonabl

eness of thi s stop, I believe the tria l cou rt p rop erl y appl i ed th e l aw to t he fac t s o f t his
case an d p r o pe r ly gr an t ed t he mo t io n t o su pp r es s. T his is a c lo se ca se ; it req ui res a subtl e eva

l ua ti on of t he we ight t o be accorded the bri ef testi mony of a si ngle wi tness an d the trial cour t was in the best pos i ti on to ma ke th at e v al ua ti on . Th e tr i al cou rt di d n ot ab us e i ts di scre ti on

an d w e sh oul

d a f f i rm i ts
exer cise o f tha t discr et ion.

I would af

fi rm the tri al

court ’s order suppressi

ng the ev ide nce.30 Jan P. Patterson, Justice Bef ore Justices Yeake l, Patterson and Jones * File d: February

28, 2001 Publish

* Before J. Woodf

in Jones , Jus tice ( former ), Thir d Court of

Appeals, sitting by

assignment. SeeTex. G ov’t C ode A nn. § 75 .003(a)(1) (W est 199 8).