Opinion dated May 3, 2018, Withdrawn, Motion for Rehearing Granted, 

Reversed and Remanded, and Majority and Dissenting Opinions on Rehearing 

filed September 11, 2018.

In The 

Fourteenth Court of Appeals 

NO. 14-17-00005-CR

LESLEY ESTHER DIAMOND, Appellant 

V.

THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee 

On Appeal from County Criminal Court at Law No. 8 

Harris County, Texas 

Trial Court Cause No. 2112570 

D I S S E N T I N G O P I N I O N O N R E H E A R I N G 

To demonstrate reversible error under Brady,

1

 appellant was required to show 

the State failed to disclose material evidence that was favorable to her. Ex Parte 

Miles, 359 S.W.3d 647, 665 (Tex. Crim. App. 2012). The evidence in question is 

 

1 Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 83 S. Ct. 1194, 10 L. Ed. 2d 215 (1963).
2

(1) Gooden’s certification of the Hurtado2 report when it contained a labeling error; 

and (2) Gooden’s removal or suspension from performing her regular job duties 

before she testified at appellant’s trial. The record reflects the trial court found the 

evidence was not favorable to appellant’s defense. The trial court then found that 

even if the evidence had been disclosed, it would not have been relevant or 

admissible, citing Rule 608(b). Further, the trial court concluded the evidence was 

not material. I respectfully dissent from the majority’s conclusion that the 

undisclosed evidence was material.3

We review the trial court’s denial of habeas corpus relief under an abuse of 

discretion standard and consider the facts in the light most favorable to the trial 

court’s ruling. Ex parte Wheeler, 203 S.W.3d 317, 324 (Tex. Crim. App. 2006). We 

afford almost complete deference to the trial court’s determination of historical facts 

supported by the record, especially when those factual findings rely upon an 

evaluation of credibility and demeanor. Ex parte Tarlton, 105 S.W.3d 295, 297 (Tex.

App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2003, no pet.). We apply the same deference to review 

the trial court’s application of law to fact questions, if the resolution of those 

determinations rests upon an evaluation of credibility and demeanor. Id. Only if the 

outcome of those ultimate questions turns upon an application of legal standards do 

we review the trial court’s determination de novo. Id.

 

2

 The Hurtado report is the “erroneous lab report in an unrelated case” discussed in Section 

II of the majority opinion. 

3

 I would note that the oral pronouncement controls over the written judgment, see Taylor 

v. State, 131 S.W.3d 497, 500 (Tex. Crim. App. 2004), and our record included the reporter’s 

record wherein the trial stated that appellant was convicted of a Class A misdemeanor.
3

The trial court made the following findings of fact: 

A. THE TRIAL

17. The State presented the following evidence of Applicant’s guilt for 

the charged offense: 

a. On March 23, 2013, Harris County Constable Precinct 5 

Deputy Justin Bounds was conducting a traffic stop in an 

unrelated case on the Westpark Tollway in Harris County, 

Texas, when he first observed Applicant, who was the sole 

operator and occupant of her vehicle, driving in excess of the

speed limit in the lane closest to the stopped patrol car and the 

other stopped vehicle.

b. Bounds observed Applicant make several unsafe lane changes 

without signaling that caused other drivers to slam on their 

brakes. 

c. Bounds illuminated his overhead lights, but Applicant took a 

long time to stop her vehicle. 

d. Bounds asked Applicant to step out of her car; when she did so, 

Applicant was staggering and could not keep her balance. 

e. During this traffic stop Applicant told Bounds that she was 

coming from a golf course at a country club, but was unable to 

identify the name or location of the club despite being asked 

multiple times. 

f. Applicant admitted she had been drinking, and told Bounds that 

she had consumed three Bud Light beers that day. 

g. Bounds recovered one open can of beer and two cold, unopened 

cans of beer from Applicant’s vehicle. 

h. Bounds testified that Applicant appeared intoxicated; that there 

was a very strong odor of alcohol coming from Applicant’s 

vehicle and breath; Applicant had red, glassy eyes, incoherent, 

slurred speech, and appeared confused; and Applicant indicated 

she was taking medication, but she was unable to identify the 

medication. 

i. Bounds testified that he requested another deputy to assist him 

with Applicant’s traffic stop, and Bounds, who was also 

certified to administer standardized field sobriety tests, 
4

observed Deputy J. Francis administer the walk-and-turn and 

one-leg-stand field sobriety tests to the applicant. 

j. Bounds testified that he observed Applicant exhibit five clues 

of intoxication on the walk-and-turn test and four clues of 

intoxication on the one-leg-stand test, and that he formed the 

opinion that Applicant had lost the normal use of her mental 

and physical faculties. 

k. Bounds testified that Applicant had poor balance and was 

staggering during the walk-and-turn test. 

l. Bounds testified that Applicant’s poor performance on the 

walk-and-turn test was not due to nervousness, and she stated 

that she suffered no handicaps or disabilities that would have 

affected her performance. 

m. Applicant was then placed under arrest for driving while 

intoxicated. 

n. Bounds arrested Applicant and requested a sample of her breath 

or blood for alcohol analysis, and Applicant refused to give a 

sample. 

o. Bounds secured a search warrant to obtain a sample of 

Applicant’s blood. 

p. Bounds testified that over the course of 3 or 4 hours he had an 

opportunity to observe Applicant and concluded that she was 

“highly intoxicated.” 

q. Finally, Bounds testified that: 

i. he observed Nurse Curran draw Applicant’s blood; 

ii. Applicant’s blood vials were labeled with his initials, 

Applicant’s name, and the case number;

iii. the case number in the primary case was 035791513M; 

and 

iv. Bounds delivered the blood vials to a secure lockbox at the 

Houston Police Department. 

r. This Court excluded Francis’s testimony following a violation 

of TEX. R. EVID. 614.

s. Regarding her analysis of Applicant’s blood, Gooden testified 

that: 
5

i. she retrieved Applicant’s blood samples in the primary 

case from a cooler;

ii. prior to testing Applicant’s blood sample, Gooden verified 

that the name on the blood vial labels matched the name 

on the sealed evidence envelope; 

iii. Applicant’s name was on the blood vial labels; 

iv. the instrument used to analyze Applicant’s blood sample 

was validated at the time of the analysis; 

v. Gooden followed all the lab’s standard operating 

procedures that were in place at the time of her analysis of 

Applicant’s blood in the primary case;

vi. Gooden used the PerkinElmer instrument in analyzing 

Applicant’s blood sample; 

vii. the Standard Operating Procedures specify the use of the 

Agilent instrument; 

viii. the use of the PerkinElmer instrument was authorized in a 

memo; 

ix. the PerkinElmer memo was an addendum to the Standard 

Operating Procedures; and, 

x. the PerkinElmer instrument was validated. 

t. Gooden further testified regarding her qualifications, namely 

that she had completed two to three thousand exercises and 

passed a competency test prior to engaging in blood alcohol 

analysis casework.

u. Finally, Gooden testified that alcohol did not affect everyone 

in the same way, and alcoholics may exhibit no symptoms of 

intoxication due to tolerance. 

v. Gooden then testified that her analysis of Applicant’s blood 

sample revealed a blood alcohol level of .193 grams per 100 

milliliters. 

w. Gooden testified over a period of two days, April 29 and 30, 

2014, and the defense conducted a thorough crossexamination of Gooden. 
6

Appellant’s brief does not argue, and the majority opinion does not conclude, 

that any of the above findings are not supported by the record. Instead, appellant 

hypothesizes that Bounds’ testimony was so “destroyed” by cross-examination that 

the jury could not have believed any part of his testimony. Discounting Bounds’ 

evidence entirely, making Gooden’s testimony “the most important evidence at 

trial,” appellant then theorizes that the undisclosed evidence would have enabled her 

to impeach Gooden and either exclude her testimony or discredit it, resulting in a 

mistrial or an acquittal. At its’ core, appellant’s argument is that if we ignore 

Bounds’ testimony the undisclosed evidence would have formed the basis for a 

successful attack on the blood evidence that she was intoxicated and her BAC level 

was over 0.15. 

Evidence is material if there is a reasonable probability that, had it been 

disclosed, the outcome of the trial would have been different. Ex Parte Miles, 359 

S.W.3d 647, 665 (Tex. Crim. App. 2012). The United States Supreme Court has 

defined “reasonable probability” to mean the likelihood of a different result is great 

enough to undermine confidence in the outcome of the trial. Smith v. Cain, 565 U.S. 

73, 75, 132 S. Ct. 630, 181 L. Ed. 2d 571 (2012) (citing Kyles v. Whitley, 514 U.S. 

419, 434, 115 S.Ct. 1555, 131 L.Ed.2d 490 (1995)). Thus the “outcome” is not a 

hypothetical result that a jury could have reached, such as a mistrial, but is the result 

of the trial in question. In this case, then, the question is whether there is a reasonable 

probability that, had the evidence been disclosed, the jury would have found 

appellant “not guilty” or answered “no” on the special issue.

Impeachment evidence “may not be material if the State’s other evidence is 

strong enough to sustain confidence in the verdict.” Cain, 565 U.S. at 76. According 

to the unchallenged findings of fact, the jury heard evidence that appellant was 

driving over the speed limit, made unsafe lane changes without signaling, staggered 
7

when she exited her vehicle, did not know the name or location of the country club 

she claimed to have left, admitted to having consumed three beers, and had an empty 

can of beer and two cold, unopened cans of beer in her vehicle. Further, appellant 

appeared intoxicated, smelled of alcohol, had red, glassy eyes, her speech was 

incoherent and slurred, and she appeared confused. In addition, appellant failed the 

field sobriety tests, had poor balance and was staggering during the walk-and-turn 

test. 

Appellant’s blood was drawn, the blood vials were labeled with appellant’s 

initials, name, and case number and delivered to a secure lockbox. Gooden retrieved 

appellant’s blood samples and prior to testing verified the name on the blood vials 

matched the name on the sealed evidence envelope; it was appellant’s name. Gooden 

followed all the lab’s standard operating procedures which included, by addendum, 

use of the PerkinElmer instrument. Gooden had completed two to three thousand 

exercises and passed a competency test. Appellant’s blood revealed a BAC of .193. 

Furthermore, from the evidence developed external to appellant’s trial and adduced 

at the hearing on her petition, the trial court found, and appellant does not challenge, 

that there was no evidence of any error in the labeling of appellant’s blood or 

Gooden’s analysis of it. 

The majority concludes the evidence set forth above is sufficient to sustain 

confidence in the jury’s finding of “guilty” but not its answer of “yes” to the special 

issue.4 The majority reaches this conclusion by disregarding the trial court’s findings 

of fact and reweighing the evidence presented.5

 It is not for this court to reweigh the 

 

4 Because I would find the evidence sufficient to sustain both the “guilty” finding and “yes” 

answer, I do not address whether the majority’s reversal of the conviction is the appropriate 

remedy.

5

 The majority goes so far as to quote the State’s disparaging remarks about Officer Bounds 

to no discernible purpose. 
8

evidence and invade the jury’s role as the sole judge of the credibility of the 

witnesses and the evidence presented. See Villani v. State, 116 S.W.3d 297, 301 

(Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2003, pet. ref’d.). 

There is no logical connection between the undisclosed evidence—that 

Gooden certified a report in another case that contained a labeling error by the officer 

or was removed or suspended from her regular job duties to provide documentation 

regarding that error—and the testimony describing appellant’s intoxicated state or 

the accuracy of the blood test results. In her reply brief, appellant attacks the trial 

court’s finding that Gooden’s removal or suspension was for the purpose of 

documenting the Hurtado error. But the trial court expressly found the claim of 

Gooden’s supervisor, William Arnold, that it was for another reason was not credible 

in light of the surrounding circumstances. In an article 11.072 post-conviction 

habeas corpus proceeding, the trial judge is the sole finder of fact. See Ex parte 

Garcia, 353 S.W.3d 785, 788 (Tex. Crim. App. 2011). We “afford almost total 

deference to a trial court’s determination of the historical facts that the record 

supports especially when the trial court’s fact findings are based on an evaluation of 

credibility and demeanor.” Guzman v. State, 955 S.W.2d 85, 89 (Tex. Crim. App. 

1997); see also Ex parte Peterson, 117 S.W.3d 804, 819 (Tex. Crim. App. 2003), 

overruled on other grounds by Ex parte Lewis, 219 S.W.3d 335 (Tex. Crim. App. 

2007). We are obligated to defer to the trial court’s assessment of Arnold’s 

credibility because the trial court heard his testimony while we must rely on the cold 

record. See Lancon v. State, 253 S.W.3d 699, 705 (Tex. Crim. App. 2008). 

Moreover, the trial court’s findings detail the events surrounding the Hurtado 

report, the reports of the City of Houston Officer of Inspector General and the Texas 

Forensic Science Commission, and correspondence between Arnold and Gooden. 

Those findings, but for the one noted above, are not challenged on appeal. It is the 
9

trial court that is charged with finding the facts and applying the law. Hester v. State, 

535 S.W.2d 354, 356 (Tex. Crim. App. 1976). “On appeal challenges to the trial 

court’s ruling generally should be directed to whether the trial court abused its 

discretion in one of its findings of fact or to whether the trial court properly applied 

the law to those facts found by it.” Id. We should restrict our review of the facts to 

any issues raised in challenge to the trial court’s findings. See id. 

 “[I]mpeachment evidence is that which disputes, disparages, denies, or 

contradicts other evidence.” Ex Parte Miles, 359 S.W.3d 647, 665 (Tex. Crim. App. 

2012) (citing Harm v. State, 183 S.W.3d 403, 408 (Tex. Crim. App. 2006)). Given 

the unchallenged findings of fact by the trial court that the blood samples were 

labeled as appellant’s and there was no evidence of any errors in Gooden’s analysis 

of appellant’s blood, the undisclosed evidence in this case would not impeach the 

evidence that appellant’s blood was analyzed and had a BAC level of .193. Thus, 

the likelihood of a different result is not great enough to undermine confidence in 

the outcome of the trial. I would therefore conclude the alleged Brady evidence is 

not material and affirm the trial court’s ruling. 

 

 /s/ John Donovan

 Justice 

Panel consists of Justices Jamison, Busby, and Donovan (Jamison, J. majority).

Publish — Tex. R. App. P. 47.2(b).