1 NOTI CE Decisi on fi led 06 /05/ 08. The textof this dec ision m ay be changed or corrected prior to the filing of a Petit ion for Re hea ri ng o r th e dispos it ion of

the s ame. NO. 5-06-0087 IN T HE AP PEL LA TE C OU RT OF ILLIN OIS

FIF TH DIST RICT

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_____________________________________________________________ NE W TO N T RA CT OR SA LE S, IN C., ) Appeal from the ) Circui t Court of Plaintiff-Appell ant and Cross -Appellee , ) F aye tte C ou nt y. ) v. ) No. 04-L-17 ) KUBOTA TRACTOR COR PORATI ON ) an d MI CHAEL JACOBSE N, ) Honorable ) William J. B ecker, Defendan ts-Appellees and Cross-Appellants. ) Judge, presi ding.

__________________________________________________________________________ JUS TIC E W EL CH delive red the opin ion o f the c ourt: The plaintiff , New ton T ractor S ales, Inc ., broug ht a n acti on t o recover damages againstthe de fend ants, K ubo ta Tractor Corp. and Michael J acobsen, ba sed, inter alia , on a theory of promissor

y es toppel. The circuit court of Fayet te County

entere d an order gr anting
a sum mary jud gm ent in favor of the defendants. The defendants t hen fil ed a motion se eking costs for the c ourt appearance fee, dep osit ion subpoena fe es, and depos iti on trans cription fees. The circuit court gr anted the motion for the court

appearance fe es and denie d the motion for the deposi tion s ubpoen a fees and deposition t ranscr ipti on fees. On appeal , the plaintiff asks th is cou rt to revers e the o rder g ranting the su mm ary judgm ent in favor of the defe ndan ts, and o n cro ss-app eal, the d efen dants ask th is cour t to revers e the orde r deny ing the motion reque sti ng deposit ion subpoe na fees and deposition tr anscription fe es. For the following reasons, w e affirm the judgm ents entered b y the circuit court of F ayette C ou nt y. We fir st d isc us s th e p lai nt iff's argument onappe al. Th e fac ts are as follow s. Ku bota Tractor Corp. (Kubota) is in the business of sell ing tractors and equipment through dealers. Va ndalia Tractor

& Equipment, Inc. (Vandalia ), was the loc al authorized deale r of K ubo ta2

products. How ever, Newton T ractor Sales, Inc. (Newton), and Vandali a began negoti ations forNewton to purchas e the Van dalia dealer ship. In April2003, Newton submitted a deale rship applic ation to become a localauthori zed dealer of Ku bota pr od uc ts t o K ub ot a's regionalsale s m ana ger , M icha el Ja cob sen (Jac obs en) . On Jun e 19 , 2 003, a revi sed applic ationw as su bm itte d. J ac ob se n f or w ar de d t he ap pl ica tio n t o K ub ot a's divis ion offi ce in C olu mb us, O hio , for rev iew

. On July 10, 2003, Ne wto n ente red into an as set pu rchas e agre eme nt w ith V anda lia to purchase the asset s of Vandalia 's de alers hip. The agr eement was continge nt upon Newton becoming a localauthori zed dealer of Kubota product s and provi ded that Newton was perm it ted to canc el the a greem ent in th e eve nt that K ubo ta rejecte d N ew ton's de alersh ip applic ation. At that time, Newton' s dealer ship appl icat ion had not be en approved. On July 28, 2003, J acobson reco mmended t he ap prov al of N ew ton's de alersh ip app lic ationto K ubo ta in w riting. A roun d A ugu st 12, 2 003 , Ku bota's d ivision offic e in Columbu s, Ohio, approved t he applic ation and recommended the fi nal ap pr ov al b y K ub ot a's corp orate office in Torranc e, Cali fornia. On August 29, 2003, repres entativ es of Va ndalia term inate d th e au tho rized dea lersh ip ag reem ent w ith K ubo ta. In Sep temb er 20 03, K ubo ta 's c or porate of fice i n Torrance, Califor nia, denied N ew to n's de al er sh ip ap pl ic at io n. Aft er le arni ng t

ha t Ne wt on's de a lers hip appli cati on had been rejec ted, Jacobsen cont acted Newton and reques ted addi tionalinform ation to forw ard to Ku bota. A fter rev iewin g th is ad di tio na l in fo rm ati on , K ub ot a a ga in de ni ed N ew to n's app licatio n. On July 27, 2004, t

he plai ntiff

file d a co mp laint aga inst th e de fen dan ts ba sed , inter alia , on a c laim o f pro misso ry estopp el. Th e com plaint a lleged that o n or a bou t July 25, 2003, Ja co bs en , a s an a ge ntfo r Kubota, re pr es en te d t o Ne wton that Newton would be t he localauthori zed deale r of K ubo ta products and that Vandalia had t o terminate it s author ized3

deale rship agree men t with K ubo ta before Newton could become a l ocal authori zed dealer of Kubota. In rel ian ce on the pr omise of Jacobs en, Newton dire cted the repres entat ives of Va ndalia to terminate Vandali a's right to sel l Kubota equipment and Va ndalia termin ated its authori zed dealer ship agr eement with Kubota. The complaint further alle ged that in breach of its July 25, 2003, promise, during the l ast weeks of Sept ember 2003, Kubota indic ated that Newton would not be a l ocal aut horized de aler

of K ubo ta prod ucts an d rem oved its prod ucts from th e p os se ss io n of

Newt on. As a resu lt, New ton su ffere d dam ages includ ing u npaid warranty work that had be en performed on behal f of Kubota. On Sep temb er 29 , 2005 , the de fend ants filed a m otio n fo r a su mm ary jud gm ent. The defe ndan ts argued that a su mmary judg ment should be aw arded in their favor because promisso ryes to pp el i s n ot a p ro pe r c au se of ac tio n a nd is a va ila bl e o nl y as an af firmat ive defense in Il linoi s. On Janua ry30, 20 06, the tri al court entere d a writt en order gr anting a
summ aryjudgment i n favor of the defendants . In i ts orde r, t he tri al court

notedthat this court has held in DeWitt v. Fleming , 357 Il l. App. 3d 571 (2005), and in ESM D evelopment Corp.
v. Dawson , 342 Ill . App. 3d688 (2003), that promissory estoppel is not

a theory under which
a cause of action seeking monetary reli ef can be asse rtedand th at "[ i]t i s th e tr ial co ur t's obligation to follo w e xisting appe llate auth ority from the same district in which the trial cou rt sits. " On February

14, 2006, t

he plai ntiff

file d a notice of

appeal arg uing that the trial court erredin granting the summary judgment i n favor of the defendants . A summary j udgment is approp riate where the pleadings, affidavit s, depositi ons, admissions, and exhibi ts on fi le, when viewed in the light most favorabl e to the nonmoving party , revea l that there is no genuine issue on an y materi a l fact and that t he moving party is enti tled to a judgment as a matter of la w. Busch v. Graphic Color Corp. , 169 Il l. 2d 325, 333 (199 6). Alt

hough a
summ aryjudgment i s an effic ient and useful aid in t he expedit ious di sposition of a la wsu it,4

a sum mary jud gm ent is a d rastic remedyan d s ho ul d o nl y be gr an ted w he n t he m ov in g p ar ty's right to a jud gm ent is cle ar and free f rom dou bt. Outboard Marine Corp. v. Liberty Mutual InsuranceCo ., 154 Ill. 2d 90, 102 (1 992). A summ ary judgmen t is proper where the nonmoving party

fail s to establis h an e leme nt o f the cau se o f ac tion

. Pyne v. Wit mer , 129 Ill. 2d 3 51, 358 (1 989 ). We r ev ie w de novo the trial co urt's aw ard o f a su mm ary judgm ent. Chatham Foot Speciali

sts, P.C. v. Health Care Service Corp. , 216 Ill . 2d 366, 376 (20 05). The plaintiff con tend s that dama ges can b e recovere d from the defen dants und er a theory of prom issory estoppel and m oreover tha t allowing reco very is supp orted b y public policy and is nece ssary to prevent improper bus iness practi ces. I n support of the pl ain tif

f's argu men t, the pla intiff u rges th is cou rt to dep art from its recent holding in DeWitt v. Fleming , 357 Ill. App. 3d 571 ( 200 5), and to instea d fo llow our d issentin g colle ague 's opinio n in De Witt that promissory estoppelcan be used as a viable cause of action in Illinois. In response, the defendant s argue t hat we should not

depart f rom our recent

ruli ng. In De Witt , the pla inti ffs fil ed a complaint to recove r the cos ts of a s urvey performed
on a parcelof land, which the defendant had orally pr omised to s ell to the plaint iffs but subs eque ntly refu sed to se ll. De Witt , 357 I ll. App. 3d 571. On appeal, the defendant argued that the trial court erred in apply ing the doc tri ne of promiss oryestoppelbecause the doctrine of promissor

y es toppel c annot be used to bar the a pplicationof

the s tatut e of

frau ds. De Witt , 357 Ill . App. 3d 571. In De Witt , w e co nclud ed tha t "in Illinois prom issory estop pel is availa ble only as a defense ( i.e

. , as a shiel d), not as a cause of a ction ( i.e ., as a sw ord )." De Witt , 357 Ill. A pp. 3 d at 5 73. We reinforced our posi tion by noting that w e had held th e sam e in our previ ous ruling in ESM D evelopment Corp. v. Dawson , 342 Il l. App. 3d 688 ( 2003), wher e we explic itly stat ed that promissory

estoppel" 'i s nota pro per v ehicle for d irect relief ,' " " 'canno t prop erly be pled as a

cause of action ,' " " 'is mean t to be utilized as a defensive mechanism


### Snot as a5

means of attack,' " and " 'does not form the basis for a damages claim.' " De Witt , 3 57 Il l. App. 3d at 573 (quoting ESM D evelopment Corp. , 342 Ill. A pp. 3 d at 6 95)

. Our analy sis in De Witt is worth repeati ng here: "Unlike o ur diss en ting c ol le agu e, we ar e no t c onv in ced th atth e I ll in oi s Supr eme C ou rt's opinions in Doyle v. Holy CrossHospital , 186 Ill. 2d 104 , 110 (199 9), and Quake Construction, I

nc. v. American Airl ines, Inc. , 141 Il l. 2d 281, 28 7 (1990 ), directly contradi ct our hol ding in ESM D evelopment Corp. In Do yle , *** the issue be fore the court was whether an employercould make unila teralchanges to provisi ons in an employee handbook, i n the absenc e of a previous reser

vation of the ri ght to do so, that w ould oper ate to the dis advantage of existing em plo yees. Doyle v. Holy Cross Hospital , 186 Ill. 2d 104 , 110 (19 99)

. The majo rity*** concluded t hat aft er an employe r is c ontract ually bound to the provisi ons of an em ployee h andb ook , an attem pted u nil atera l mod ific ation of its terms by

the employe r to an employ ee's disadvant age fail s for a l ack of c ons ider ation

. Do yle , 186 Ill. 2d at 112-13. In other words, the Do yle majorit y deci ded the i ssue befo re it on the basis of co ntr act l aw principl es. I ndeed, t he majori ty

decli ned to addre ss at a ll t he issue of p rom isso ry esto ppe l. Do yle , 186 Il l. 2d at 117
. Then-Chief Justice Free man, joined by Jus tice McM orrow, concur red in par

t with and di ssente d in p a rt fr om the
m ajo rity's disposi tion. Justi ce Freeman agree d with the maj orit y t hat a cont

ract exist ed, and he agreed t hatthe cas e should be decided on contract law principles. Do yle , 186 Ill . 2d at

118 ( Free man , C.J., con currin g in p art and dissen ting in p art, joined byMc Mo rrow, J.). However, Justi ce Freeman wrote that because the court ha d made a find in g th at a contract existed, he wou ld address the issu e of prom issory
es toppel and e xplicitly find that a re med y of pro misso ry estopp el wa s not a vailabl e to the pla inti ffs under t

he fac ts of

the c ase . Do yle , 186 Il l. 2d at 123 (Fre eman, C.J .,6

concurring in part a nd d issentin g in p art, joinedby McMorrow, J.) . Although our dissenting colle ague cit es Justice Fr ee m an 's po sit io n a s a co nt ra di cti on of th is c ou rt's recent holding in ESM D evelopment Cor p. v. Dawson , 342 Il l. App. 3d 688, 695 (2003), we believe t

hat Justice Free man's position, cons tituting a m inority posit ion, is too remote and equivocalto be equat ed with a di rect pronouncement from the Illinois Supreme Court that promis sory es top pel clearly and explicitl y exist s as a proper vehicle for direct relief in Il linois. In Quake Constructi on, Inc. v. American Airlines, Inc. , 141 Il l. 2d 281, 287 (1990), *** the is sue before t he court was whether

a letter of

intent sent by one of the parti es to the other was anenforceabl e contra ct giving rise to a cause of acti on by t he latterparty , who all egedly had been aggri eved by a b reac h of that c ont ract. The co urt concludedthat t

he letter of intent was ambiguous and that parol evi dence was requir ed to dete rmine whether the parties i ntended the letter t o serve as an enfo rceab le contra ct. Quake Constructi on, Inc. , 141 Il l. 2d a t 309 . Having spent most of the opiniondiscu s sing the contra ct law principl es that determi ned its decisi on ( Quake Construction, Inc. , 141 Ill. 2d at 287-309 ), the co urt then turned to the im pact th at its holding would have on each of the f our cou nts in the p laint iff's c om plain t. Quake Const ructi on , Inc. , 141 Il l. 2d at 309. The second count of t he complaint

alle ged detrimental relianc e, restated by the co urt as p rom issory estop pel. Qu ake Con struction, Inc. , 141 Ill. 2d at 309. In a scant two pages of its otherw is e voluminous opinion, the court set out the el ements of a cl aim for promi ssory estoppel and affirmed the appellate court' s reversa l of the dis missa l of the seco nd co unt, pending the det erminat ion, on r emand, of whether t he parti es int ended the l ette r of intent to se rve as a n en for cea ble c ont ract. Quake Constructi on, Inc. , 141 Il l. 2d at 309-11. The court did not explicitly address the via bili ty of a promiss oryestoppel7

claim brought by

a plai ntiff

as a distinct c ause of act ion. Becaus e the court was not asked to rul e on that

questi on, and i n fact di d not rule on it, we are not as per suaded
as our diss enting c ollea gue that Quake Constructi on, Inc. stands f or the pr oposit ion that promissory

estoppel is a proper vehicl e for direct rel ief in Ill inois courts. In the absenc e of dire ctly control ling aut

horit y t o the co nt ra ry, we declin e to abandon our [previous decisi on in ESM D evelopment Corp. ] that promissor

y es toppel 'is not a proper

vehicl e fordirect rel ief,' 'cannot properly be pled as a cau se o f ac tion ,' 'is meant to be utili zed as a defensive mechanism


### Snot as a means of atta ck,' and 'does not fo rm th e b as is for a d am ag es cla im .' ESM Development Corp. v. Dawson , 342 I ll. App. 3d 6 88, 69 5 (20 03). W e belie ve tha t an expli ci t rule of law th at promissory estoppelexists o nly for de fens ive pu rpose s in Illi nois promotes t he stabi lit

y and integrity of Illino is jurispru denc e and prov ides atto rneys pra cticing in Illinois, as w ell
as their clie nts, with a cl ear, s table guidepost to which they m ay co nfo rm th em selv es." De Witt , 357 Ill. A pp. 3 d at 5 73- 75. In the insta nt case , we a gain d ecline to depart f rom our clear and unequivocalruli ng that promisso ryes toppel i s only avail able as a

defense, not a cause of acti on. See De Witt , 357 Ill. A pp. 3 d at 5 73- 75. Therefore, we find that the trial c ourt di d not err i n granting the
summ aryjudgment i n fav or of the defendants . Accordingly, we hereby af firm the order entere d by t

he circ uit cour

t of Fay ette County gr anting t he summary j udgment in favor of the defendants. We turn n ow to the d efen dants ' argum ent on cross- appe al that the trial cou rt erred in denying their

motion to tax th e cos ts of deposition subpoena fe es and deposi tion t ranscr ipti on fee s ag ains t the p laint iff. Afterthe summary

judgment was ent eredin favor of t he defe ndan ts, the de fend ants file d a m otio n on M arch 2, 200 6, s eeking cost s for the court a ppearance fee , deposi tion8

subpoena fees, and deposition tr anscription fe es, in the amount of $2,701.81. A telephone hearing on t

he motion was conduct ed on March 22, 2006. The tri al court entere d an order granting the m otion for the c ourt appearance fe e but denying the moti on for the de posit ion subpoe na fees a nd dep osition transcription fees . The trial court stated in its written ord er: "Since t he Court grant ed Defendants' summary j udgment motions , the deposit ions
were not used at

tri al. Although Defendants have a pl ausible arg ument that the deposit ion costs s hould be taxed because the depo sitions were u sed in supp ort of the
summ aryjudgmentmotions, th is Cou rt is bound b yap pe ll at e c as el aw [ sic ] li miti ng awards for thi s ty

pe of costs to the s ituation where the depositions ar e necessarily used at tria l." On cross- appe al, the defendant s ask thi s court to rever se the t

rialcourt' s denialin part of the motion to tax c osts and to direct the tri al court t o enter an order awarding costs relat ing to t he dep ositio ns to the d efe nda nts. Atco mmonlaw, a s uc ce ss fu l l itig an t wa s not e ntitled to recover the costs of the litigati on fro m h is op pon ent. Galowich v. Beech Ai rcraft Corp. , 92 Il l. 2d

157, 162 (1982). A cc or di ng ly, before c osts can be all ocated t o the los ing part y i n a lawsuit , the re must be statutoryautho rity, and an y assesse d cos ts are limitedto thos e specif ical ly allowed by

stat ute. Galowich , 92 Ill . 2d at

162. While t

he power to impose c o sts mu st ulti mate ly be fou nd in
som e stat ute, the legis lature may grant the power in generalterms t o the court s, which may in turn make rules or orders u nder w hich cos ts m ay be taxe d an d im pos ed. Gebelein v. Blum field , 2 31 I ll. A pp. 3d 1 011 , 1013 (199 2). Th e aw arding of co sts and fees is discretionary with the t

rialcourt and wil l not be di sturbe d on re view abse nt a clear abuse of disc retio n. Gleason v. Carter , 212 Ill. A pp. 3 d 20 6, 20 9 (1 991 ). The defendan t s seek deposition s ubpoena fees and depos iti on trans cription fees a s taxab le costs u nder section 5-11 0 of the Illino is Cod e of C ivil Procedure (735 ILCS 5/5-1109

(West 2004)), which provides for the r ecovery of costs when a judgment is entere d as the resul t of a m otio n. The d efe ndant s a ls o r el yon Su pr eme C ourt Ru le 208 (d ) ( 134 Il l. 2d R. 208(d)), which provides that de posit ion tr anscriptionfees mayin the di scret ion of the trial
cou rt be taxe d as cos ts. The Ill inois Supreme Court has interpr eted Rule 208( d) as authori zing trial cou rts to tax as co sts the e xpen ses on ly of thos e dep osition s nec essarily used at a tr ial. Galowich , 92 Ill. 2d at 166. In Galowich , the plain tiffs vo luntarily dismis sed their suit prior to a trial, and the tri al court

taxed as c osts on lythe def endants'court fi ling fe es but r efused to tax the deposit ion costs. The Illinois Su preme C ourt upheld the tri al court 's de cisi on, reas oning that the deposit ions were not necessar y for use at t he tri al bec aus e the re w as n o tria l. Galowich , 92 I ll. 2d at 16 2. In the ins tant c ase, t

he defendants argue that the de cisi on in Gal owi ch is not control ling beca use it inv olved a volu ntary dism issal an d no t a summary j udgment as in t he inst antcase. The defendants fur ther contend that

the de positio ns w ere ne cessa ry to obtain the sum mary jud gm ent. H ow ever, w e note th at other court s have refus ed to dis tingui sh a voluntary dismis sal fr om a summary j udgment

. In Premier Elect rical Construction Co. v. Morse/D iesel, Inc. , 257 Il l. App. 3d 44 5, 462 (1993) , a sum mary jud gm ent w as en tered in favorof the defendants, and the co urt refused t o tax cost s agains t the pl ainti ffs because t he deposit ions were n ot used at a trial. The c ourt in Premier Elect rical Construction Co. noted that although t

he case i nvolved a summary judgment an d not a volu ntary dism issal as in Galowich , the Illino is Sup reme Co urt's ruling in Galowich was nonethele ss appli cable. PremierElectr ical Const ructi on Co. , 257 Il l. App. 3d at 462. The court t hen held that the deposit ions w ere no t nec essa ry for u se a t a tria l bec aus e the re w as n o tria l. Premier Electr ical

Construction Co. , 257 I ll. Ap p. 3d at 46 2. The cour t furthe r noted that Galowich does not p rovid e an e xcep ti on for the costs o f depo sitions used in sup port of a su mm ary10

judgmentmo tion and is eq ually a ppl icab le the reto
. Premier Elect rical Construction C o. , 2 57 Ill. A pp. 3 d at 4 62. In the instant case, althou gh the de positions w ere used in su pport of the defendants' motion for a sum mary judgm ent, the depo sitions were not necess ary for use at a tri al because there was no tri al. Accordingly , we find that the tri al court did not abus e its dis c retion in denying the defendant s' mot ion to t ax the cost s of deposi tion t ranscr ipti on fees and deposit ion subpoena fees. The orderentere d by the c ircuit co urt of F ayette County i s hereby affirmed.

Affirmed.

DO NO VA N an d GO LD EN HE RSH , JJ., concur.NO. 5-06-0087 IN T HE AP PEL LA TE C OU RT OF ILLIN OIS

FIF TH DIST RICT

___________________________________________________________________________________ NE W TO N T RA CT OR SA LE S, IN C., ) Appeal from the ) Circui t Court of Plaintiff-Appell ant and Cross -Appellee , ) F aye tte C ou nt y. ) v. ) No. 04-L-17 ) KUBOTA TRACTOR COR PORATI ON ) an d MI CHAEL JACOBSE N, ) Honorable ) William J. B ecker, Defendan ts-Appellees and Cross-Appellants. ) Judge, presi ding.

___________________________________________________________________________________ Opinion Filed : June 5, 2008

___________________________________________________________________________________ Justice s : Honorable Th omas M . Welch, J.

Honorable James K. Donovan, J., and Ho nor able Ric har d P . Go lden her sh, J ., Concur

___________________________________________________________________________________ Atto rneys James Richard Mye rs, Larry L. LeFevre, LeFevre, Oldfi eld, Myers, Apke & Payne for Law Group, Ltd., 303 Sout h Seventh, P.O. Box 399, Vandali a, IL 62471 Appell ant

___________________________________________________________________________________ Atto rneys Da vid G . Lub ben, N ancy L . Barn hart, D avis & Cam pbell, L .L.C ., 401 M ain S treet, for Suite 1600, Peoria, IL 61602-1241 Appellees

___________________________________________________________________________________