The State c oncede s the double jeopar dy violation. Accor dingly , we r ever se the c onviction 1 fo r b ur g lary

and dis mis s th e pr os e c uti on

on that c ount. 

### TEXA S C OU R T OF A PPEAL S, THIR D DIST R ICT , AT AU STIN

NO. 03-0 7 -00 695 -CR

Je ffre y M ic hae l Wa hlig , A ppe lla nt

v. The State of Texas, App ellee

F ROM THE DISTRICT CO URT OF HAY S COUNTY , 22ND JUDICIAL DISTRICT NO. CR-06 -19 1 , HO NORAB LE DIB WALDRIP , JUDGE PRESIDI NG

M E M O R

A N D U M O P I N I O N A jury convicted a

ppell an t J eff

rey Michae l Wahlig of the of fense s of burg lary of a ha bitation, ag g ravated assault, and two counts of enda ng eringa child. See Tex. P enal Code Ann. §§ 22 .0 2( b) (1 ), .0 41 (c ) ( Wes t Su pp . 200 8) , § 30 .0 2( a )( 3) (We st 200 3)
. He wa s se nte nc e d to twelve y ear s in pr ison. Wahlig appea ls, asserting a double- jeopar dy violation and challeng ing the
su ff ic ie nc y of the e vid e nc e to sup po rt the c on vic tio ns fo r c hil d e nd ang e rm e nt. We a ff ir m th e c hil d 1
e nd ang e rm e nt c on vic tio ns .

J eff rey Michae l Wahlig and his wife, Rebecc a, had been ha ving ma rital difficulties be fo re the inc ide nt i n q

ue sti on . Re be c c a

a dmi tte d to Wah ligtha

t sh e ha d b een hav ing an a ff a ir with an old frie n d , E ri c S h arp . At the time of the incide nt, the status of the re lationship between2

Wah ligand

Re be c c a wa s unc le ar. Wah ligte sti fi e d t hat the y we re tr y ingto w or

k thro ug h th e ir p r o b l e m s . R e b e c c a t e s t i f i e d t h a t t h e y w e r e m a k i n g ar r an g e m e n t s t o s e p ar a t e an d d i vo rc e . B oth Wahlig and Re becc a ag ree , howeve r, that Rebec ca ha d promised not to see S harp. O n Fe bruar y 14, 20 06 , Re be c c a

“ br ok e do wn ” and

me t Sh arp a t th e ho me of he r s ist e r a

ro un d lu nc h ti me . Wahli g testified that he we nt to Rebecc a’s wor k place to take her out to lunch for V alentine’ s Day . He wa s informed that she had g one out f or a while, so acc ording to Wahlig , he heade d back to w ork. On the way back, he drove by Rebec ca’ s sister’s house, wher e he noticed her van and a nother ve hicle par

ked outside. Suspecting that Re b ec ca was with Sharp, he beg an knocking , kicking , and pounding on both the front and back doors. Eventually , while Wahlig wa s in the front of the house , Sharp fled t h ro u gh t h e b ac k

d o o r. W h en R eb ec cawe n tt o cl o s e t h e ga ra ge d o o r, s h e w as co n fr o n t edb y W ah l i g, wh o h it a nd kic ke d h e r r e pe a te dly . A ft e r t he a ssa ult , Wahli g g a ve Re be c c a a tow e l and

le ft
. Wahlig then dr ove to his daug hters’ sc hool and p ic k ed up the g irls beca

use, ac cording to Wahlig, he knew that “eve ntually the pol ice pr obably would come f

or me . . . a

nd Ijust wanted to be with them and say

g oodby e.” H e re turned with the g irls to his house , “[p] ut a movie in, took off their shoes and soc ks, g ave the m a little s n ac k an d p u t them in front of the TVand—just g ot them comforta

ble.” Shortly there afte r, police a rrived at the house and be g an knockingon the door. Ho we ve r, Wah lig re fu se d to le t the m in, e xpla ini ng that “ I wa nte d to g e t in

tou c h w ithmy

mom to le t he r k no w w hat’ s g oin g on

and my fr ie nd s so the y

c an ma ke arran gements t o p os sib ly ba il m e out.” He also testified that he was “trying to g ather up enoug h stuff for the g irls so that they can be pr e pa re d o n what e ve r t

he y ’r e g oin g to d o. Itr ie d to pr e pa re the m on

wh a t th e y ’r e g oin g to d o to
me and jus t so the y ’r e a lit tle awa re of wh a t’ s g oin g on .” Wah liga lso te sti fi e d th a t, i n th e pr oc e ss3

of g ather ing some things for the g irls, he “f

ound some left over

article s of ling erie that my wife
wore for [S harp].” Wahlig put Re becc a’s things in seve ral piles and w ent downstairs to g et lighte r fluid. On his way back upsta irs, he broug ht the g irls with him and had them sit down on the top of the stairs. He set the clothes on f ire, e scorted the g irls with their things downstairs, a nd surre ndere d to the police. I n f

our c ounts , Wahli g wa s in dic te d f or burg lary of a ha bit a tio n, a g g ra

vate d a ssa

ult , and two counts of e ndang ering a child. A jury convicted Wahlig on all four c ounts and sentenc ed him to ten y ear s for burg lary , twelve y ear s for a g g rava ted assault, and two y ear s for both counts of child endang erme nt. A ll se ntence s wer e to r un concur rently
. Wahlig appea ls, arg uing that he was subjecte d to mu lt ip le p u n is h me n t f o r th e s a me c r im in a l t

r an s a c ti o nin

v io lati o no f

h is d o ublejeopar dy rig hts and th at t h e ev i dence was insuffic ient to support conviction on the two counts of
c hil d e nd ang e rm e nt.

The State c oncede s that the judg ment sentenc ing Wahlig for both burg lary of a habit at i o n and agg ravated assault, a le sser-inc luded offe nse of bur g lary of a ha bitation, violated double jeopar dy

by subjecting him to two punis hments for the same c riminal transac tion. See, e .g. , Be rg e r v . S

tat e , 1 0 4 S
. W
. 3 d

1 9 9 , 2 0 4 -0 5 (T ex . Ap p . — Au s t i n2 0 0 3 , n o p et
. ) ( ci t i n g Blockburge r v. United States , 284 U.S. 299, 304 (1932)) ( two offe nses ar e same for double- jeopar dy purpo ses if one of offe n s es co n tains all elements of othe r). The rema ining dispute is limited to the proper
reme dy for the double -jeopa

rdy violation. The parties a g ree that this Court is require d to vacate the conviction for the lesser of fense , but disag ree as to the method by which we are to determine w hich offe nse is the lesser
. Se e Lan de rs v . S tat e , 9 5 7 S
. W
. 2 d

5 5 8 , 5 5 9 (T ex . C ri m . Ap p . 1 9 9 7 ) ( ci t i n g Ba llThe “ other fa ctors” me ntioned in Cavazos rem ai n important in determining the 2 most serious offense when the se ntence s ar e t h e s ame. Se e Bi go n v . S tat e , 252 S.W .3d 360, 373 (Tex. Crim. App. 2008). 4 v. United States , 470 U.S. 856, 864-65 (1985)) . Rely ing on E x p arte Cavazos , 203 S.W .3d 333 (Tex. Crim. App. 2006), the State contends that the most ser ious o ff en s e i s t o b e dete rmined by the sentenc e asses s ed by

the fa ct-finde r. While acknowle dg ing the court’s de cision in Cavazos , W a h l i gc o n t e n d s t h a tt h e m e t h o d e s p o u s e d b y Cavazos is c on sti tut ion a lly fl awe d a nd , to tha t e xten t, should not be followed.

I n 2 00 6, the Te xas C ourt

of Cr imi na l App e a ls c l a

r i f i e d th e “ mos t se ri ou s o ff

e ns e te st” orig inally set out in Lan de rs . [T]he “ mos t se ri ou s” off e ns e is the of

fe ns e of c on vic tio n f

or wh ic h th e g re a te st se nte nc e wa s ass e sse d. To the e xten t th a t Lan de rs holds that other fa ctors, such a s the de g re e of

the fe lony , r ang e of punis hme nt, and ru le s g ov e rn ingpa ro le e lig ibi lity and awa rd ingof g ood-con du c t ti me , s ha ll b e us e d in that de te rm inatio n, it i s overr uled.
Cavazos , 2 03 S.W. 3d

at 33 8; se e Lan de rs , 957 S.W .2d at 559. 2 Wahlig conte n ds that the test set out by the cour t in Cavazos is f

lawe d b e c a

us e it imperm i s s i b l y usurps the role of the leg islature in deter

mining which a

re the g reater off

enses a nd wh i ch ar e t h e l es s er

o ff en s es . Ac co rd i n g t o W ah l i g:
I n the abse nce of

L eg islative action, t he rule of law should def ine g reater a

nd lesser offe nses, not the ver dict o f an y gi v en j u ry in any g iven trial. . . . The pr imary problem with the Cavazos opinion is t hat it hands over to juries the L eg islative power to decide w hich of

fe n s e i s g reater than a

nother. Sec ondarily , the Cavazos opinion is unw or ka ble be c a us e it p re su

pp os es th at any

g ive n ju ry is a c tin g ra

tio na lly in5

deter mining sentence when t he only thing we know for sur e is that the jury has bee n g ive n e rr on e ou s le g a l in str uc tio ns fr om t

he tr ia l c ourt
. T h e S t ate a sserts that, in compliance with the rule set out in Cavazos , Wah lig ’s conviction for b u rgl ary

of a ha bitation should be rever sed, and the conviction for a g g ravated assault shoul d s tand. We ag ree with the State’s assessment of the state of the curr ent law a nd are
r e qu ir e d to f

o ll o w p r e c e d e n t e s ta

b li s h e d b y th e T e xa s Co u rt o f Cr im in a l A p p e als in Ca vazos . Acc ording ly , we sustain Wahlig’ s first point of err or and r ever se the judg ment o f conviction for burg lary of a ha bitation. I n h is s e c on d and th ir d po int s o f e rr or , Wahli g argue s th a t th e e vid e nc e is l e g a lly and fa ctually

insufficient to support his convictions for c hild endang erme nt. T h e jury found, as alleged i n t he indictment, that Wahlig e ndang ere d his children “by igniting multipl e ar eas of a second story

habitation” while his childre n wer e inside. Wahlig c halleng es the suff iciency of the
ev i d en ce t o s u

p p o rt t h i s fi n d i n g. I n a le g a l- su ff

ic ie nc y re vie w, we c on sid e r w he the r a rationa l tr ie r o f f

a c t c ou ld have f ound the essential elements of t he offense bey ond a re asonable doubt. Vo do c ho ds k yv . S tat e , 15 8 S .W .3 d 50 2, 50 9 ( Te x. Cr im. Ap p. 20 05 ). We r e vie w a ll the e vid e nc e in t he lig ht m os t favor able to the ve rdict and assume that the trie r of f act r esolved c onflicts in the testimony , weig hed the evidenc e, and dr ew r easona ble infer ence s in a manner that supports the verdic t. See R ollerson v. S tat e , 2 27 S.W. 3d

71 8, 72 4 ( Te x. Cr im. Ap p. 20 07 ); Sh am s v . S tat e , 1 9 5 S. W. 3 d 3 4 6 , 347 (T ex . Ap p . —

Au s t i n2 0 0 6 , p et
. re f’ d ) ( ci t i n g Gr iff in v . S tat e , 6 14 S.W. 2d

15 5, 15 9 ( Te x. Cr im. App. 1981)).6 I n a fac tual-suffic iency revie w, the evidenc e is revie wed in a ne utral lig ht. Ro be rts
v . S tat e , 220 S.W .3d 521, 524 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007). Evidenc e is fac tually insufficient (1) when the e vid e nc e su

pp or tin g the ve rd ic t is so we a k tha t the ve rd ic t see ms c le arl y wr on g and

manif e stl y unjust; or (2) when the supporting evidenc e is outwe ighe d by the g reat weig ht and pre pondera nce of the c ontrary

evidenc e so as to re n d er the verdic t clear ly wrongand manife stly

unjust. Id. An appellate court must be appr opriately defe rential to the jury ’s verdic t, in or der to avoid substit uting its own judgment for

that of the fa ct-finde r. Va sq ue z v . S tat e , 67 S.W .3d 229, 236 (Tex. Crim. App. 2 0 0 2 )
. We ma

y n o t r e - w e ig h th e e v id e n c e an d s u b s ti tute o u r

ju d g me n t f

o r th a t o f th e f a c t- finder. Kin g v . S tate , 29 S.W .3d 556, 562 (Tex. Crim. App. 2000). A per son commits an offense of child enda ng erme nt if he: intentionally , knowing ly , rec klessly , or with criminal neg lige nce, by act or omission, eng ag es in c onduct that place s a child y oung er than 15 y ear s in imm inent dang er of de a th, bo dil y

inj ur y , o r p hy sic a l or

me nta l im

pa ir me nt.
Tex. P enal Code A nn. § 22.041(c) . To be imminent, the conduc t must be:

rea dy to take plac e, nea

r at ha nd, impending, ha

ng ing thr eate ningly

over one ’s hea d, menac ingly

near . I t is not sufficient that the ac cused pla ced the child in a situation that is po te nti a lly

da ng e ro us . T he a c c us e d’ s c on du c t mu st thr e a te n th e child w ith imm e diate , im

pe nd ingde a th, bo dil y

inj ur y , o r i mpa ir

me nt.
Mi lls lag le v . S

tat e , 81 S.W .3d 895, 898 (Tex. App.—Austin 2002, pet. ref ’d). The re cord inc ludes evidenc e that, while the c hildr en we re w aiting at the top of the stairs, Wahlig se t fire to thr ee o r four diff ere nt locations inside the master be droom, which
was a lso locat ed u p s t ai rs . The re cord shows that Office r Patsy Oaks wa s the first to arr ive at7

Wahlig’s r esidenc e. Oaks testified that upon enteringthe house, she sme lled something bur ning and that “it wa s hazy ” and “ smoky looking.” The g irls were “upset a nd cry ing.” When Oaks took the g irls outside, she could see flames c oming f rom the roof

of the house. F ear ing f

or the safe ty

of the childre n, Oaks took them about 15 to 20 fe et from the house. When Oaks ag ain looked at the house, she sa

w “a lot more smoke and f

lames.” Th e jur y a lso he ard

the te sti mony

of Willi a m Mo nta g ue , th e a ssi sta nt f ir e mars ha l, wh o to ld t

he jur y that, b a se d o n h is o bs e rv a tio n o f b la c k s oo t aro un d th e a ir con di tio nin g ve nt, the ai r conditioning sy stem was on and “ sucking smoke into the air ducts a nd blowing it out the vents into e ach room.” Acc ording to Montag ue, this would cre ate “ very dang erous” conditions be c a us e smo ke and c arb on mon oxide wo uld be blo wn int o e ve ry ro om in the ho us e . Mo nta g ue a lso explained that car

bon monox ide i s particula rly dang erous to children be cause “[t] hey ’re a lot smaller than adults, so their sy stems rea ct a lot fa ster.”

Ac c or din g to Wa

hli g , “ [t]he c hil dr e n w e re ne ve r c los e e no ug h to the fi re to b e a ble to observe it while they wer e inside the house,” and expert testimony g iven by the assistant fire marshal as to i m m i n en t dang er f

rom ca rbon monox ide was insuff icient to establish whether the fire had
cre ated e noug h car

bon monox ide to pose an actua l da ng er to the children. Be cause “[a]ll evidenc e points to t heir [the children’ s] ex peditious removal from the hous e im mediately afte r t he blaze wa s set,” Wahlig contends, the e vidence is insufficient to support a finding that the childre n wer e eve r in immi nent dang er.

Th e re is s ome dis pu te in the re c or d as to how muc h time e la ps e d b e tw e e n th e tim e Wahlig set the fire and the time the children exi ted the house. Eve n if we a cce pt Wahlig’s stateme nt8

that h e s et t h e fi re only

two minutes before exit ing the house, howe ver, the conditions observed by both O aks and Montag ue are sufficie nt evidence for the f act- finder to c onclude that the c hildren
wer e in i mminent dang er. Fur ther, the jury could have deter mined that—even without the testim ony of Oa ks and Mo nta g ue —th e sim

ple fa c t th a t Wahli g sta

rt e d an un c on tr oll e d fi re in the ho us e wh ile the childre n wer e inside the house w as suffic ient to satisfy the test for imminent dang er. T h e re cord evidence is both lega lly and fa ctually

sufficie nt to support the jury ’s finding that Wahlig plac ed his children in i m m inent dang er, a s alleg ed in the indictment. See Vodochodsky , 158 S.W. 3d a t 50 9; Ro be rts , 220 S.W .3d at 524. Acc ording ly , Wahlig’s se cond and third points of error

are overr uled. We reve rse the judg ment of convic tion for burg lary of a ha bitation and dismiss that
c ount o f t he ind ic tme nt. We a ff

ir m th e jud g me nts of

c on vic tio n f

or a g g ra vate d a ssa

ult and c hil d
e nd ang e rm e nt.

__________________________________________ G. Alan Waldrop, Just ice Be fore J ustices Patterson, Waldrop and H enson Affir med in part; Rever sed and D ismiss ed in par t Filed: Mar ch 27, 2009 Do No t Pu

bli sh