1

RECOMMENDED FOR FULL-TEXT PUBLICATION

Pursuant to Sixth Circuit Rule 206

ELECTRONIC CITATION: 2004 FED App. 0158P (6th Cir.)

File Name: 04a0158p.06

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT

_________________

KENNETH FARHAT,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

v.

JANET JOPKE, in her

individual and official

capacity; MAUREEN KELLY,

in her individual capacity;

PAM HOOD, in her individual

capacity; TROY SCHOOL

DISTRICT,

Defendants-Appellees.

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No. 02-1896

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Eastern District of Michigan at Detroit.

No. 01-72333—John Corbett O’Meara, District Judge.

Argued: December 11, 2003

Decided and Filed: May 28, 2004 

2 Farhat v. Jopke, et al. No. 02-1896

*

The Honorable William O. Bertelsman, United States District

Judge for the Eastern District of Kentucky, sitting by designation.

Before: ROGERS and COOK, Circuit Judges;

BERTELSMAN, District Judge.*

_________________

COUNSEL

ARGUED: Timothy M. Holloway, Taylor, Michigan, for

Appellant. Ernest R. Bazzana, PLUNKETT & COONEY,

Detroit, Michigan, William F. Young, WHITE,

SCHNEIDER, BARID, YOUNG & CHIODINI, Okemos,

Michigan, for Appellees. ON BRIEF: Timothy M.

Holloway, Taylor, Michigan, for Appellant. Ernest R.

Bazzana, PLUNKETT & COONEY, Detroit, Michigan,

William F. Young, Jeffrey S. Donahue, WHITE,

SCHNEIDER, BARID, YOUNG & CHIODINI, Okemos,

Michigan, for Appellees.

_________________

OPINION

_________________

BERTELSMAN, District Judge. The Appellant, Kenneth

Farhat, appeals from the district court’s grant of summary

judgment to the defendants. This action arises from the

termination of Farhat from his position as a custodian for the

Troy School District.

Farhat raises four issues on appeal: (1) he was discharged

in retaliation for exercise of his First Amendment rights;

(2) he was denied due process when the school board refused

to grant a post-termination hearing in which he could deal

directly with the board; (3) an order not to speak to other

employees was an invalid prior restraint on his speech; and

(4) Appellee Hood is liable under a conspiracy theory for
No. 02-1896 Farhat v. Jopke, et al. 3

providing information to Appellee Kelly to aid in unlawfully

depriving Farhat of his rights. The district court found that no

constitutional violations had occurred and granted defendants’

motions for summary judgment. For the reasons set forth

below, we AFFIRM the judgment of the district court.

FACTUAL BACKGROUND

Appellant Kenneth Farhat was employed as a custodian by

the Troy School District for approximately 15 years. He was

discharged on September 18, 2000 and initiated this lawsuit

against the school district, its superintendent, an assistant

principal, and a fellow custodian who is also a union

representative. Appellant brought this action pursuant to 42

U.S.C. § 1983.

Appellant’s employment history is significant and factors

into the asserted justification for the actions of the school

district. Appellant had a checkered employment history with

the Troy School District. The record reflects that, from at

least 1997 forward, Appellant had a history of confrontational

behavior as well as hostile and accusatory communications

directed toward the school district, its officials, co-employees

and toward persons affiliated with the union. Appellant

received numerous warnings and other discipline in response

to specific behaviors that school officials found to be

disruptive to, and inappropriate for,the working environment.

Appellant typically responded to such corrective action

with a letter, usually directed to the author of the warning or

reprimand. All of Appellant’s responses contained primarily

personal opinions and conclusions that were directed against

specific individuals with whom he had had a disagreement.

For example, Appellant routinely referred to others as “sick

and demented,” “ignorant and abusive,” “mentally ill,”

“mindless criminals,” “liars,” “lazy and pampered,”

“alcoholic,” “insane,” “ignorant,” “dysfunctional,” “mentally

ill freak,” “jack ass,” and similar terms. The context of such

4 Farhat v. Jopke, et al. No. 02-1896

epithets will be addressed later in this opinion in greater

detail.

In January 1997, Appellant, then a union steward, attended

a grievance meeting. The record reflects that his behavior at

the meeting was inappropriate and threatening to others.

Appellant received a warning letter from the Superintendent

that explicitly explained to him that this type of conduct

would not be tolerated and, if it continued in the future, that

he could face more severe sanctions, up to and including

termination.

In April 1998, Appellant received another written

reprimand for his conduct toward the school district’s

executive director and a secretary. His conduct was described

as obnoxious, loud and threatening. In response, Appellant

claimed that the statements of the executive director were lies

and were intended as discrimination against him due to his

affiliation with the union. He claimed that he did not lose

control but that it was the school official who lost control at

the meeting.

In May - June of 1999, officials of the Michigan Education

Association (“MEA” or “the union”) corresponded and

discussed their concerns about an upcoming union meeting

with Appellant and his potential for workplace violence.

They expressed concern about their safety and stated that they

were seeking outside support and information about what

options they had to protect themselves if Appellant became

violent.

In January of 2000, Appellant wrote a letter to the

Superintendent claiming that he was going to sue the district

for libel and slander. He also claimed that he was forced into

a meeting where he was threatened with discipline for having

a weapon at a union meeting and at the workplace. Appellant

further asserted that these “liars” and “cowards” had

continued to attack his reputation and that he intended to sue.

Again in January of 2000, Appellant threatened to file
No. 02-1896 Farhat v. Jopke, et al. 5

grievances and to take additional action because he did not

get what he wanted.

Yet again, on February 24, 2000, Farhat wrote to the

“incompetent administration” claiming that he was

wrongfully denied a position because he threatened lawsuits

and grievances. He also stated that he had been wrongfully

disciplined for uncooperative behavior. He claimed it was

others who were uncooperative, not he, as he was “the best

custodian in Troy Schools . . .” and “the best union

representative in Troy Schools, bar none.”

On February 24, 2000, there was a significant incident

between Appellant and another employee/union

representative, Appellee Pam Hood. Appellant’s actions in

regard to this incident precipitated his termination. On this

occasion, Appellant was clearly unhappy about being denied

a position he wanted. Appellant phoned Hood, while she was

at work, and claimed that this was her fault. Within a short

period of time, Farhat called Hood a second time and

allegedly threatened her. Hood interpreted Farhat’s threats as

threats of violence. Appellant allegedly made statements such

as, “When I get through with you, you won’t be driving a bus

or doing custodial work.” Afraid to leave the room for fear

that Appellant was coming to the building to follow through

on his threats, Hood contacted a school official who

instructed her to contact the police. Hood then locked herself

in a room until the police arrived.

The following day, Appellant was suspended with pay to

allow for an investigation of the February 24, 2000 incident.

On March 21, 2000, a meeting was scheduled for Appellant

to have an opportunity to explain his behavior. Present at this

meeting were Appellant, Assistant Principal Maureen Kelly,

and Assistant Superintendent Mike Williams. Appellant was

represented at the meeting by union representatives Joe

Cusmano, Dominic Asaro and Mel Sledzinski. However, due

to Appellant’s uncontrolled, explosive and rude behavior, the

6 Farhat v. Jopke, et al. No. 02-1896

1

The full text of this letter is attached hereto as Appendix A.

meeting was recessed at the suggestion of his union

representative. Appellant was given several opportunities to

speak privately with his representatives before they decided

to end the meeting.

Another hearing was held on April 14, 2000. In a letter

from the Superintendent, Appellant was advised that after two

written reprimands for inappropriate behavior and two

disciplinary hearings, he would be given yet another chance.

However, because the school district found Appellant’s

behavior to be threatening, intimidating, and disruptive, it

gave him the option of attending an anger management

course, plus a 10-day suspension without pay, or 15 days

without pay if he did not attend the anger management course.

Appellant was instructed not to speak to other employees

during his suspension. In this letter, moreover, Appellant was

specifically advised that further conduct of this nature would

not be tolerated.

On May 11, 2000, Appellant responded by letter, stating

that he considered the letter from the Superintendent to be a

“joke,” and claiming that it was illegal. He claimed that all

the allegations against him were lies. He claimed that Hood,

other employees, and the school officials had been plotting

against him. He stated that he has the flawed character trait

of talking “fast and loud” and that this trait was being used

against him.1

This letter is filled with vituperative remarks about the

school district, specific employees, the union and specific

union representatives, and claims of collusion and corruption.

The same can be said of his previous letters and conduct. The

letter is not specific with regard to the charges of collusion or

corruption.
No. 02-1896 Farhat v. Jopke, et al. 7

2

The full text of this letter is attached hereto as Appendix B.

On May 18, 2000, Appellant sent a letter to Lu Battaglieri,

the union president. In this letter, Appellant complained that

his union representatives did not investigate his complaints as

he believed they should. He also claimed they were

purposefully not investigating because they were in collusion

with the school district. He referred to Hood as a “demented

and sick human being” and stated that he, Farhat, was the

“only honest union representative in the city.” He also

referred to the Assistant Principal, Appellee Maureen Kelly,

as “mentally ill.” 

Appellant further stated that he believed the union

representatives were creating obstacles for the express

purpose of covering up corrupt contract negotiations;

preferential treatment of the corrupt representatives resulting

in privatization, loss of bidding rights, loss of seniority rights,

unwarranted discipline, loss of medical benefits, and loss of

sick days; and a hostile environment of dissension and chaos.

He claimed that he was disciplined because he chose to

expose the union’s and the representatives’ collusion with the

employer. He did not offer any examples of his allegations of

corruption against the union except for what had happened to

him.2 Appellant copied this letter to three other union

officials, including Hood. Hood, concerned about the

statements in the letter, turned it over to the Superintendent.

On June 1, 2000, Appellee Maureen Kelly wrote to Joseph

Cusmano, a union representative, and stated, “We have

serious concerns about what Mr. Farhat has written and we

need to meet with him so that he has a due process hearing.”

As Appellant was on medical leave, these officials decided to

wait until he was released to return to work to continue the

investigation and hold a due process hearing. 

On September 18, 2000, Appellant was terminated from his

employment. The letter of termination from the

8 Farhat v. Jopke, et al. No. 02-1896

Superintendent, Appellee Janet Jopke, stated that Appellant

“crossed over the line” in his letter of May 18, 2000, and that

he is “simply incapable or refuse[s] to recognize the

inappropriateness of [his] conduct.” The Superintendent

specifically stated that she was not concerned with

Appellant’s statements about the union or union

representatives. However, his statements and comments

about school officials and employees were “abusive,”

“caustic,” and “grossly insubordinate” to her prior warnings

and directives, specifically her April 17, 2000 letter.

On November 1, 2000, following Appellant’s filing of a

grievance regarding his termination, a grievance hearing was

held. Present for the hearing were Appellee Kelly, Steven

Amburg for the union, the attorney for the school district,

Craig Lange, and the attorney for Appellant, Jerry Haymond.

Appellant failed to appear at this hearing. The hearing

proceeded in his absence, however, and the grievance was

denied.

On November 6, 2000, Appellant demanded arbitration.

Pursuant to his request and the collective bargaining

agreement, the case proceeded to arbitration before a neutral

arbitrator. The record before the court does not provide the

exact date of the arbitration. However, the record does show

that Appellant attended the arbitration, as did representatives

of the school district and the union. The parties reached a

tentative settlement on all claims, with Appellant present.

However, the settlement was subsequently rejected by

Appellant. Thereafter, the union withdrew its representation

of him.

Appellant’s next challenge to the school district was to file

this lawsuit. The United States District Court for the Eastern

District of Michigan, Southern Division, heard Appellant’s

motion for partial summary judgment, Hood’s motion to

dismiss or for summary judgment, and the remaining

defendants’ motions for summary judgment (the school

district and officials named therein). The district court held
No. 02-1896 Farhat v. Jopke, et al. 9

that Appellant’s speech was not protected, that there was no

constitutional violation upon which to base a § 1983 claim,

and that all defendants were entitled to summary judgment. 

This appeal followed.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

As this case is before us on appeal from the district court’s

grant of summary judgment, our review is de novo. Equitable

Life Assur. Soc’y v. Poe, 143 F.3d 1013, 1015 (6th Cir. 1998).

Summary judgment is appropriate where “the pleadings,

depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on

file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no

genuine issue as to any material fact” as to an essential

element of the non-moving party’s case. Fed. R. Civ. P.

56(c). An issue of fact is “genuine” if a reasonable person

could return a verdict for the non-moving party. Anderson v.

Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). After the

moving party has satisfied its burden, the burden shifts to the

non-moving party to set forth “specific facts showing that

there is a genuine issue for trial.” Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co.

v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587 (1986). Where

there are no disputed, material facts, we determine, de novo,

whether the district court properly applied the substantive

law. See Sutton v. Cleveland Bd. of Educ., 958 F.2d 1339,

1345 (6th Cir. 1991).

FIRST AMENDMENT RETALIATION

To establish a prima facie case of First Amendment

retaliation under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, Appellant must

demonstrate that: (1) he was engaged in a constitutionally

protected activity; (2) he was subjected to adverse action or

deprived of some benefit; and (3) the protected speech was a

“substantial” or “motivating factor” in the adverse action.

Leary v. Daeschner, 349 F.3d 888, 897 (6th Cir. 2000)

(citations omitted).

10 Farhat v. Jopke, et al. No. 02-1896

The framework for analyzingaFirst Amendment retaliation

case is well-established. In Rodgers v. Banks, 344 F.3d 587

(6th Cir. 2003), this court recently summarized this analysis:

While public employees may not be required to sacrifice

their First Amendment free speech rights in order to

obtain or continue their employment, Rankin v.

McPherson, 483 U.S. 378, 383, 107 S.Ct. 2891, 97

L.Ed.2d 315 (1987)(citingPerry v. Sindermann, 408 U.S.

593, 597, 92 S.Ct. 2694, 33 L.Ed 2d 570 (1972)), a state

is afforded greater leeway to control speech that threatens

to undermine the state’s ability to perform its legitimate

functions. See United States v. Nat’l Treasury

Employees Union, 513 U.S. 454, 475 n. 21, 115 S.Ct.

1003, 130 L.Ed.2d 964 (1995). Therefore, in

determining whether a public employer has violated the

First Amendment by firing a public employee for

engaging in speech, the Supreme Court has instructed

courts to engage in a three-step inquiry. First, a court

must ascertain whether the relevant speech addressed a

matter of public concern. See Connick v. Meyers, 461

U.S. 138, 143, 103 S.Ct. 1684, 75 L.Ed.2d 708 (1983).

If the answer is yes, then the court must balance the

interests of the public employee, “as a citizen, in

commenting upon matters of public concern and the

interest of the State, as an employer, in promoting the

efficiency of the public services it performs through its

employees.” Pickering v. Bd. of Educ., 391 U.S. 563,

568, 88 S.Ct. 1731, 20 L.Ed. 2d 881 (1968). Finally, the

court must determinewhetherthe employee’s speech was

a substantial or motivating factor in the employer’s

decision to take the adverse employment action against

the employee. Mt. Healthy City Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ.

v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 274, 287, 97 S.Ct. 568, 50 L.Ed.2d

471 (1977); Perry, 209 F.3d at 604.

Id. at 596.
No. 02-1896 Farhat v. Jopke, et al. 11

In the case now before the court, it is not contested that

Appellant’s letter of May 18, 2000, culminating the events

described above, was a substantial and motivating factor in

his termination. The letter of termination from the

Superintendent to Appellant specifically stated that he was

being terminated for the expression in that letter, as well as

for other specific instances of unacceptable conduct. This

meets the third step of the test as outlined above: that

Appellant’s expression in the May 18 letter was a motivating

factor in the adverse employment action. 

There remain for our consideration the other two steps of

the inquiry, the public concern step and the Pickering

balancing test.

PUBLIC CONCERN

Whether the speech at issue involves a matter of public

concern is a question of law for the court, Bonnell v. Lorenzo,

241 F.3d 800, 809-10 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 534 U.S. 951

(2001), although there may be some factual questions for a

jury if it is disputed whether the expression occurred or what

words were specifically stated. See generally Waters v.

Churchill, 511 U.S. 661 (1994). Our review of the lower

court’s decision on this issue is de novo. Dambrot v. Central

Mich. Univ., 55 F.3d 1177, 1182 (6th Cir. 1995).

The district court here did not expressly rule on the public

concern issue, but seemed to base its decision on the

Pickering balancing inquiry noted above. However, this issue

has been raised by all parties to this appeal.

In determining whether expression is a matter of public

concern, we are guided by Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138

(1983), which we have noted is “the Supreme Court’s most

instructive case on this issue.” See Cockrel v. Shelby County

Sch. Dist., 270 F.3d 1036, 1050 (6th Cir. 2001), cert. denied,

537 U.S. 813 (2002).

12 Farhat v. Jopke, et al. No. 02-1896

In Connick, an assistant prosecutor, upset over her pending

transfer within the New Orleans District Attorney’s office,

circulated a questionnaire to her fellow employees soliciting

their views on various issues. These issues included “office

transfer policy, office morale, the need for a grievance

committee, the level of confidence in supervisors, and

whether employees felt pressured to work in political

campaigns.” Id. at 141. The Court held that, of the several

topics raised by the questionnaire, only the matter of pressure

to work in political campaigns was a matter of public concern.

The Court observed:

When employee expression cannot be fairly considered

as relating to any matter of political, social, or other

concern to the community, government officials should

enjoy wide latitude in managing their offices, without

intrusive oversight by the judiciary in the name of the

First Amendment. Perhaps the government employer’s

dismissal of the worker may not be fair, but ordinary

dismissals from government service which violate no

fixed tenure or applicable statute or regulation are not

subject to judicial review even if the reasons for the

dismissal are alleged to be mistaken or unreasonable.

Id. at 146 (internal citations omitted) (emphasis added).

The Court further instructed that “[w]hether an employee’s

speech addresses a matter of public concern must be

determined by the content, form, and context of a given

statement, as revealed by the whole record.” Id. at 147-48.

Moreover, the entire speech does not have to address matters

of public concern, as long as some portion of the speech does

so. Id. at 149.

Applying this content-based test, the Court concluded that

the “focus” of the assistant prosecutor’s questionnaire, with

the exception of the question pertaining to pressure on

employees to work on political campaigns, was her personal
No. 02-1896 Farhat v. Jopke, et al. 13

3

The Court held that the one issue it found to be a matter of

public concern was not actionable because plaintiff’s case failed to pass

the Pickering balancing test. Id. at 154. See discussion, infra.

dispute with her superiors over the proposed transfer and thus

was not a matter of public concern:

While discipline and morale in the workplace are related

to an agency’s efficient performance of its duties, the

focus of [plaintiff’s] questions [in the questionnaire] is

not to evaluate the performance of the office but rather

to gather ammunition for another round of controversy

with her superiors. These questions reflect one

employee’s dissatisfaction with a transfer and an attempt

to turn that displeasure into a cause celèbre.

Id. at 148 (emphasis added). 

Summarizing this ruling, the Court stated:

We hold only that when a public employee speaks not as

a citizen upon matters of public concern, but instead as

an employee upon matters only of personal interest,

absent the most unusual circumstances, a federal court is

not the appropriate forum in which to review the wisdom

of a personnel decision taken by a public agency

allegedly in reaction to the employee’s behavior.

Id. at 147.3

In the twenty-one years since Connick, this court has had

numerous opportunities to apply that decision to determine

when a public employee’s speech is a matter of “public

concern.” In so doing, we have recognized that the most

difficult cases to adjudicate are “mixed speech” cases, i.e.,

those in which the speech for which the employee claims First

Amendment protection arises in the context of an

employment grievance or other personnel dispute, but where

14 Farhat v. Jopke, et al. No. 02-1896

4

See, e.g., Banks v. Wolfe County Bd. of Educ., 330 F.3d 888,

894 (6th Cir. 2003); Vaughn v. Lawrenceburg Power Sys., 269 F.3d 703,

716 (6th Cir. 2001); Bonnell v. Lorenzo, 241 F.3d 800, 812 (6th Cir.),

cert. denied, 534 U.S. 951 (2001). See also Leary v. Daeschner, 349 F.3d

888, 899 (6th Cir. 2003). Indeed, as we noted in Bonnell, Connick itself

was a “mixed speech” case because, although the Court did not use that

label, it looked at every act of expression on the employee’s questionnaire

and, after concluding that one of the questions touched upon a matter of

public concern, proceeded to the Pickering balancing test. See Bonnell,

241 F.3d at 811 n. 7.

5

Rodgers v. Banks, 344 F.3d 587, 596 (6th Cir. 2003) (citations

omitted); Banks v. Wolfe County Bd. of Educ., 330 F.3d 888, 893 (6th Cir.

2003). 

6

Rodgers, 344 F.3d at 598-99 (eschewing the “course of

employment gloss” on the Connick analysis); Cockrel v. Shelby County

Sch. Dist., 270 F.3d 1036, 1052 (6th Cir. 2001) (holding that although

teacher was speaking in her role as an employee when she presented

information on the environmental benefits of industrial hemp, the speech

nonetheless related to matters of political and social concern to the

community), cert. denied, 537 U.S. 813 (2002).

the employee claims that some part of the speech also touches

upon matters of public concern.4

The difficulty of determining whether speech is of “public

concern” is compounded by the fact that these cases tend, as

one might expect, to be highly fact-specific. However, our

close review of Connick and this circuit’s subsequent

decisions yields the following principles:

1. Speech is of “public concern” if it involves issues

about which information is needed or appropriate to enable

the members of society to make informed decisions about

the operation of their government.

5

2. The fact that the public employee engages in the

speech while in the course of his or her employment does

not preclude a finding that the speech touches upon a

matter of public concern.6
No. 02-1896 Farhat v. Jopke, et al. 15

7

Rodgers, 344 F.3d at 600 (“Although Plaintiff’s underlying

motive in writing the memo might have been to complain about

incompetent management, our duty is not to discern her underlying

motive, but rather to evaluate her point as it is presented in the speech.”);

Taylor v. Keith, 338 F.3d 639, 645 (6th Cir. 2003) (“The inquiry is

primarily concerned with what the speaker intended to communicate

through his statement, and not his reasons for speaking.”) (citation

omitted); Cockrel, 270 F.3d at 1052 (“Thus, even if a public employee

were acting out of a private motive with no intent to air her speech

publicly, as was the case with Myers, so long as the speech relates to

matters of ‘political, social, or other concern to the community,’ as

opposed to matters ‘only of personal interest,’ it shall be considered as

touching upon matters of public concern.”) (quoting Connick, 461 U.S.

at 146-49); Bonnell, 241 F.3d at 812; Chappel v. Montgomery Cty. Fire

Prot. Dist. No. 1, 131 F.3d 564, 575-76 (6th Cir. 1997).

8

Rodgers, 344 F.3d at 601 n. 5 (“We note that even if Plaintiff’s

opinion ultimately proved to be incorrect, this does not deprive her

statements of First Amendment protection.”); Chappel, 131 F.3d at 576-

77 (rejecting defendants’ argument that employee’s speech alleging

corruption and unethical conduct cannot address matters of public concern

absent proof of the truthfulness of his speech); Williams v. Kentucky., 24

F.3d 1526, 1535-36 (6th Cir.) (rejecting argument that plaintiff’s

admission that she “couldn’t prove” her allegations of unethical conduct

foreclosed conclusion that her speech was of public concern), cert. denied

sub nom Allen v. Williams, 513 U.S. 947 (1994). 

We emphasize here, as we did in Chappel, that this principle is

not in conflict with our opinion in Barnes v. McDowell, 848 F.2d 725,

734-35 (6th Cir. 1988). In Barnes, the employee alleged in his complaint

3. The employee’s motive for engaging in the speech in

question is a relevant, but not dispositive, factor when

considering whether an employee’s expression is of public

concern.

7

4. Although First Amendment protection might not be

available if the employer can show that the public

employee knowingly or recklessly made false statements,

a public employee is not required to prove the truth of his

or her speech in order to secure the protections of the First

Amendment.8

16 Farhat v. Jopke, et al. No. 02-1896

that he had made accusations of corruption against his public employer,

but discovery revealed that his actual speech included no such allegations,

only complaints of mismanagement. Id. Thus, because the employee had

failed to substantiate the allegations of his complaint, i.e., to produce

evidence that he actually accused his employer of corruption, we found

proper the district court’s conclusion that the speech in question was not

a matter of public concern. As we explained in Chappel, this does not

mean that an employee who does, in fact, engage in speech alleging

public corruption has to prove the truthfulness of that speech in order to

show it touches upon a public concern. Chappel, 131 F.3d at 576-77. 

In “mixed speech” cases, application of the second and

third principles is often difficult. That is, if the employee

speaks only in the course of his employment and does so

solely for personal reasons, when will the speech be of

concern to the community?

Taking the motive issue first, our opinions are clear that,

consistent with the “content” test of Connick, the pertinent

question is not why the employee spoke, but what he said: 

The defendants’ most sweeping argument is that none of

Chappel’s speech may be considered speech on a matter

of public concern because all of his speech was

fundamentally and predominately motivated by his selfinterest in obtaining a position as a paramedic with the

ambulance district. . . . They also suggest that Chappel

“lashed out against Chief Welch and the rest of his

family,” alleging misappropriations, nepotism, and a

conflict of interest, only because “he believed that they

were standing in his way.”

The defendants’ argument, that Chappel’s subjective

motivations are dispositive when determining whether

his speech addresses a matter of purely personal concern,

is in direct conflict with the Supreme Court’s holding in

Connick. In Connick, a public employee disseminated a

questionnaire “to gather ammunition for another round of

controversy with her superiors” because she was

“dissatisf[ied] with a transfer.” Connick, 461 U.S. at
No. 02-1896 Farhat v. Jopke, et al. 17

148, 103 S.Ct. at 1691. Notwithstanding the fact that this

personal grievance motivated the entire questionnaire,

the Court concluded that “[o]ne question in [the]

questionnaire . . . touch[ed] upon a matter of public

concern.” Id. at 149, 103 S.Ct. at 1691. We agree, as a

majority of the Third Circuit recently concluded, that

“[i]f motive were dispositive, the [Court’s] inquiry [in

Connick] could only have resulted in finding either that

all of [the employee’s] speech was public concern speech

or that none of it was.” Azzaro v. County of Allegheny,

110 F.3d 968, 978 (3d Cir. 1997) (en banc). . . .

[T]he inquiry into what a speaker intends to

communicate remains fundamentally different from an

inquiry into why the speakerintends that communication.

The former inquiry is of much greater significance in

determining whether speech addresses a matter of public

concern.

Chappel, 131 F.3d at 574-75 (italics in original; underlining

added). See also Bonnell, 241 F.3d at 817 (“However, even

assuming that Plaintiff was motivated by personal animus in

circulating the Apology, the fact remains that in doing so, he

addressed a matter occurring at the college which was of

public concern.”).

As for the “course of employment” issue, this circuit has

flatly rejected the argument that the fact that a public

employee’s speech occurs while he is carrying out his job

duties renders the speech of only private concern, noting that

such a rule would eviscerate First Amendment protection in

public employment. See Rodgers, 344 F.3d at 598-99;

Cockrel v. Shelby County Sch. Dist., 270 F.3d 1036, 1052 (6th

Cir. 2001), cert. denied, 537 U.S. 813 (2002). Cf. Banks v.

Wolfe County Bd. of Educ., 330 F.3d 888, 898-99 (6th Cir.

2003) (Gibbons, J., concurring).

Against the background of Connick and these principles,

our circuit has distilled the “public concern” test by stating

18 Farhat v. Jopke, et al. No. 02-1896

that the court must determine: the “focus” of the speech; “the

point of the speech in question”; “to what purpose the

employee spoke”; “the intent of the speech”; or “the

communicative purpose of the speaker.” See Rodgers, 344

F.3d at 600 (holding that pertinent inquiry is “the point or

focus of the speech in question”); Taylor v. Keith, 338 F.3d

639, 645 (6th Cir. 2003) (noting that proper inquiry is the

“point of the speech” and “what the speaker intended to

communicate”); Buckley v. City of Portage, No. 98-1783,

1999 WL 777542, at *4 (6th Cir. Sept. 16, 1999) (examining

“primary focus” of speech), cert. denied, 530 U.S. 1262

(2000); Dambrot v. Central Mich. Univ., 55 F.3d 1177, 1187-

88 (6th Cir. 1995) (court must look to the “point” of the

speech and the “communicative purpose” of the speaker);

Rahn v. Drake Ctr., Inc., 31 F.3d 407, 412-13 (6th Cir. 1994)

(court must examine “complete record” and determine

“focus” of statement for which employee claims protection),

cert. denied, 515 U.S. 1142 (1995).

As a corollary to this “focus” test, we have held that the

proper inquiry is not what might be “incidentally conveyed”

by the speech, and that “passing” or “fleeting” references to

an arguably public matter do not elevate the speech to a

matter of “public concern” where the “focus” or “point” of the

speech advances only a private interest. See Rodgers, 344

F.3d at 597-98; Taylor, 338 F.3d at 645-46; Buckley, 1999

WL 777542, at *4-5; Dambrot, 55 F.3d at 1187; Rahn, 31

F.3d at 412-13. 

Turning to the employee’s speech in the case at bar, viewed

in context of the complete record, we believe that the primary
No. 02-1896 Farhat v. Jopke, et al. 19

9

See Rodgers, 344 F.3d at 599-600; Buckley, 1999 WL 777542,

at *4; Rahn, 31 F.3d at 413.

10See Rodgers, 344 F.3d at 598-600 ; Taylor, 338 F.3d at 645;

Dambrot, 55 F.3d at 1187.

11See Dambrot, 55 F.3d at 1188.

12See Barnes v. McDowell, 848 F.2d 725, 735 (6th Cir. 1988)

(citation omitted), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 1007 (1989).

13See Rahn, 31 F.3d at 412-13.

14See Rodgers, 344 F.3d at 597; Dambrot, 55 F.3d at 1187.

“focus,”9 “point,”10or “communicative purpose”11 of

Appellant’s letters was his own personal “beef”12 with the

union and the school district concerning his deteriorating job

situation, and his references to collusion or corruption were

“passing”13 references that were “incidental to the message

conveyed.”14 Thus his letters were not matters of “public

concern.” 

Moreover, even if Appellant had satisfied this prong of the

First Amendment retaliation analysis, we conclude that

application of the Pickering balancing test still requires that

the summary judgments entered by the court below be

affirmed.

PICKERING BALANCING TEST

Application of the Pickering balancing test is a matter of

law for the court to decide. Leary v. Daeschner, 349 F.3d 888,

898 (6th Cir. 2000) (citation omitted).

 In Pickering v. Bd. of Educ., 391 U.S. 563 (1968), the

Court held that the firing of a teacher for writing a letter to a

newspaper, opposing a tax increase advocated by the

defendant Board of Education, was a violation of the First

20 Farhat v. Jopke, et al. No. 02-1896

15We read the district court’s succinct remarks at the summary

judgment hearing as a statement that the summary judgments were

granted on this ground.

Amendment because the issue was a matter of public concern.

Id. at 570-71. The letter was personally critical of the

members of the Board. The Supreme Court noted, however,

that there were no close working relationships between the

teacher and the members of the Board and, therefore, the

protected expression did not violate the Board’s “interests as

an employer in regulating the speech of its employees that

differ significantly from those it possesses in connection with

regulation of the speech of the citizenry in general.” Id. at

568-70.

The Court further enunciated what has come to be known

as the “Pickering balancing test”: “The problem in any case

is to arrive at a balance between the interests of the

[employee], as a citizen, in commenting upon matters of

public concern and the interest of the State, as an employer,

in promoting the efficiency of the public services it performs

through its employees.” Id. at 568.

Applying this test, we conclude that, even if portions of

Appellant’s expression did address matters of public concern,

the disruptiveness of his speech in the workplace outweighed

any value his expression might have had. Thus, summary

judgment was properly granted.15

Authority for this conclusion is found in Waters v.

Churchill, 511 U.S. 661 (1994). There, a nurse was reported

to her employer as having made critical remarks concerning

the operation of one of the departments of the hospital in

which she was employed. She also made highly derogatory

remarks concerning her supervisor, a physician. Id. at 665-

66. 
No. 02-1896 Farhat v. Jopke, et al. 21

Some of the remarks the nurse was alleged to have made

were disputed by her. The Court held that her firing was

justified, even though the employer had based its decision on

the reported remarks without having determinedwhatremarks

were actually made. Id. at 677 (plurality opinion by

O’Connor, J.), 686 (concurring opinion by Scalia, J.). 

The Court recognized the right of even a governmental

employer to deal with disruption in the workplace. It

emphasized that the government as employer has efficiency

concerns that give it greater discretion in dealing with a

disruptive employee, more discretion than it would have to

deter speech by a private citizen. Id. at 674-75. “[S]urely,”

the plurality observed, “a public employer may, consistently

with the First Amendment, prohibit its employees from being

rude to customers,” as well as to other employees, including

the supervising physician. Id. at 673 (internal quotations and

citations omitted). 

In language particularly applicable to the instant case, the

plurality stated:

[T]he extra power the government has in this area comes

from the nature of the government’s mission as an

employer. Government agencies are charged by law with

doing particular tasks. Agencies hire employees to help

do those tasks as effectively and efficiently as possible.

When someone who is paid a salary so that she will

contribute to an agency’s effective operation begins to do

or say things that detract from the agency’s effective

operation, the government employer must have some

power to restrain her. The reason the governor may . . .

fire [a robustly critical high-ranking] deputy is not that

this dismissal would somehow be narrowly tailored to a

compelling government interest. It is that the governor

and the governor’s staff have a job to do, and the

governor justifiably feels that a quieter subordinate

would allow them to do this job more effectively.

22 Farhat v. Jopke, et al. No. 02-1896

The key to First Amendment analysis of government

employment decisions, then, is this: The government’s

interest in achieving its goals as effectively and

efficiently as possible is elevated from a relatively

subordinate interest when it acts as sovereign to a

significant one when it acts as employer. The

government cannot restrict the speech of the public at

large just in the name of efficiency. But where the

government is employing someone for the very purpose

of effectively achieving its goals, such restrictions may

well be appropriate.

Id. at 674-675 (emphasis added).

The same principles have been recognized in our own

opinions. See, e.g., Leary v. Daeschner, 349 F. 3d 888, 897

(6th Cir. 2000); Rodgers, 344 F.3d at 596; Hoover v.

Radabaugh, 307 F.3d 460, 466 (6th Cir. 2002); Strouss v.

Mich. Dep’t of Corrections, 250 F.3d 336, 346 (6th Cir.

2001); Bonnell, 241 F.3d at 810-811; Charvat v. Eastern

Ohio Reg’l Wastewater Auth., 246 F.3d 607, 617 (6th Cir.

2000); Chappel, 131 F.2d at 573-574.

Thus, we find that Appellant’s speech, even if of public

concern, is not protected. Appellant’s “speech” was highly

disruptive to the point that it interfered with the effective

operation of the school district’s custodial staff. Indeed, at

times they feared for their physical safety in the workplace

due to Appellant’s behavior. As the plurality stated in

Waters: “As a matter of law, this potential disruptiveness was

enough to outweigh whatever First Amendment value the

speech might have had.” Waters, 511 U.S. at 681. Therefore,

on this ground also we find that the district court properly

held that there was no First Amendment violation. Thus, the
No. 02-1896 Farhat v. Jopke, et al. 23

16Appellant’s claims that his termination violated his First

Amendment rights to association and to petition the government are

without merit. Appellant’s association claim must fail because he did not

adduce any evidence that he was terminated because of his union

activities. His petition claim fails because the “petition” he relied on in

his complaint - - his contacts with the Troy City government - - was made

after he was terminated, and thus could not have been a factor in the

decision to terminate him.

lower court’s grant of summary judgment on the retaliation

claims must be affirmed.16

DUE PROCESS

The next issue presented is Appellant’s claim that he was

denied procedural due process because the school district did

not meet the Constitutional due process requirements for

pretermination and post-termination hearings. In support of

these claims, Appellant states that he never received a hearing

before a neutral decisionmaker. He further states that he was

not permitted to present his grievance directly to the school

board which, he asserts, is required by Michigan statute. 

Due process requires some sort of pretermination hearing,

the formality of which depends upon the importance of the

interest and the nature of the subsequent proceedings. See

Duchesne v. Williams, 849 F.2d 1004, 1006-07 (6th Cir.

1988), cert. denied, 489 U.S. 1081 (1989). For public

employees who can only be fired for cause, the Supreme

Court has held, specifically, that a pretermination proceeding

is required. Id. (discussing Cleveland Board of Education v.

Loudermill, 470 U.S. 532 (1985)).

In Loudermill, the Supreme Court held that a full

evidentiary hearing is not required prior to termination.

Rather, the pretermination hearing is to provide an initial

check against mistaken conclusions, “essentially, a

determination of whether there are reasonable grounds to

believe that the charges against the employee are true and

24 Farhat v. Jopke, et al. No. 02-1896

support the proposed action.” Loudermill, 470 U.S. at 545-

46. The essential elements required for due process are notice

and an opportunity to respond, either in writing or in person.

Id. at 546.

In the Sixth Circuit, we have held that prior to termination

of a public employee who has a property interest in his

employment, the due process clause requires that the

employee be given “oral or written notice of the charges

against him or her, an explanation of the employer’s evidence,

and an opportunity to present his or her side of the story to the

employer.” Buckner v. City of Highland Park, 901 F.2d 491,

494 (6th Cir.) (citing Loudermill v. Cleveland Bd. of Educ.,

844 F.2d 304 (6th Cir. 1988)), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 848

(1990). “To require more than this prior to termination would

intrude to an unwarranted extent on the government’s interest

in quickly removing an unsatisfactory employee.”

Loudermill, 470 U.S. at 546.

We also have held that in the pretermination stage, the

employee does not have a right to, and the Constitution does

not require, a neutral and impartial decisionmaker. The “right

of reply” before the official responsible for the discharge is

sufficient. Duchesne, 849 F.2d at 1006. It is at the postdeprivation stage where a neutral decisionmaker is needed to

adjudicate the evidence. Where there is a system of posttermination procedures available to the employee that

includes a neutral decisionmaker and/or arbitration, coupled

with a pretermination “right of reply” hearing, then the

employee has received all the process due under the

Constitution. See Duchesne, 819 F.2d at 1006; Buckner, 901

F.2d at 494; Loudermill, 470 U.S. at 545.

The law is well-established that it is the opportunity for a

post-deprivation hearing before a neutral decisionmaker that

is required for due process. As long as the procedural

requirements are reasonable and give the employee notice and

an opportunity to participate meaningfully, they are

constitutionally adequate. See Hennigh v. City of Shawnee,
No. 02-1896 Farhat v. Jopke, et al. 25

155 F.3d 1249, 1256 (10th Cir. 1998). As succinctly stated

by the Seventh Circuit, the “availability of recourse to a

constitutionally sufficient administrative procedure satisfies

due process requirements if the complainant merely declines

or fails to take advantage of the administrative procedure.”

Dusanek v. Hannon, 677 F. 2d 538, 542-43 (7th Cir.)

(citations omitted), cert. denied sub nom Dusanek v.

O’Donnell, 459 U.S. 1017 (1982). Consequently, where the

employee refuses to participate or chooses not to participate

in the post-termination proceedings, then the employee has

waived his procedural due process claim. See Krentz v.

Robertson Fire Prot. Dist., 228 F.3d 897, 904 (8th Cir. 2000)

(citations omitted).

“The law is also clear that grievance procedures provided

by a collective bargaining agreement can satisfy a plaintiff’s

entitlement to post-deprivation due process.” Hennigh, 155

F.3d at 1256; American Postal Workers Union Columbus

Area Local AFL-CIO v. U.S. Postal Service, 736 F. 2d 317,

319 (6th Cir. 1984). As we stated in Buckner, the opportunity

to challenge the termination in a more detailed posttermination proceeding, under the collective bargaining

agreement, satisfiesthe employee’sconstitutional due process

rights. Buckner, 901 F.2d at 497. 

In Duchesne, the employee claimed that he was denied

procedural due process because his pretermination proceeding

was biased. Duchesne, 849 F.2d at 1005. The proceeding

was presided over by the person who ultimately fired the

employee, who was also the person about whom the

employee had complained to the city council. Id. We held

that even if the decisionmaker at the pretermination hearing

was biased, due process is fulfilled by a post-termination,

trial-type proceeding where an opportunity to “ferret out bias,

pretext, deception and corruption by the employer in

discharging the employee” is provided. Id. at 1008.

Duchesne held that the employee was not entitled to a

pretermination hearing before a neutral decisionmaker, and

26 Farhat v. Jopke, et al. No. 02-1896

the injunction granted by the district court was vacated. Id. at

1007-1008.

In Buckner, a terminated police officer alleged that he had

been denied due process because no hearing was held prior to

his discharge. The officer further alleged that the termination

violated a state statute because he was an alcoholic in

treatment at the time of his discharge and believed he was

fired because of that condition. Buckner, 901 F.2d at 493.

We held that the facts of the case established that the officer

was given notice and an opportunity to respond, even though

he was in the hospital and there was not a formal

pretermination hearing in the standard format. Id. at 495-496.

Similarly, in Loudermill, the Court held that “all the

process that was due is provided by a pretermination

opportunity to respond, coupled with post-termination

administrative procedures . . . .” Loudermill, 470 U.S. at 547-

548. 

In the case before us, we find that Appellant was given all

the process due and that his constitutional rights were

protected. Appellant was provided with two pretermination

proceedings that were attended by himself as well as his

chosen union representatives. Post-termination, he was given

the opportunity for a full hearing before a neutral arbitrator,

as provided for in the collective bargaining agreement. At the

arbitration, the parties reached a tentative settlement.

However, after a few days, Appellant rejected the settlement.

Following this rejection, the union withdrewitsrepresentation

of him. The record reflects that Appellant made no further

attempts to pursue this issue directly with the school board.

Instead, Appellant filed this lawsuit.

Under the authority cited above, due process has not been

denied in this case. Appellant was given pretermination

notice and an opportunity to be heard. That is all that is

required prior to termination, even if the person against whom

he made the allegations was the same person who presided
No. 02-1896 Farhat v. Jopke, et al. 27

over the hearing. It is the post-termination proceeding where

bias and corruption are ferreted out. See Buckner, 901 F.2d

at 494; Duchesne, 849 F.2d at 1006.

We also find that post-deprivation due process was

adequate. Appellant was provided a post-termination

arbitration that he requested, attended, and at which he

reached a settlement, albeit one he later rejected. The fact

that Appellant was given the opportunity for a posttermination proceeding, before a neutral arbitrator, belies his

claim that due process was denied. See Buckner, 901 F.2d at

494-5; Hennigh, 155 F.3d at 1256; American Postal Workers,

736 F.2d at 319. Being dissatisfied with the result of the

arbitration does not give rise to a constitutional violation.

Moreover, we find that Appellant waived his post-deprivation

due process when, after rejecting the settlement, he failed to

pursue further arbitral proceedings. See Krentz, 228 F.3d at

904.

Appellant’s claim that Michigan law requires that he be

given a hearing directly before the board, lest he be denied

due process, also fails. The applicable Michigan statute,

M.C.L.A. 423.211, states that an employee may negotiate

directly with the employer and present grievances directly to

the employer. By its plain language, this action is

discretionary. Especially where other procedural measures

are available for the employee to present his case, due process

is not denied if the employer relies on the collective

bargaining agreement to provide that process. See Hennigh,

155 F.3d at 1256; American Postal Workers, 736 F.2d at 319.

Therefore, as a matter of law, we find that the district court

correctly held that Appellant was provided procedural due

process. The employer provided not one, but two,

pretermination hearings where Appellant was given notice

and an opportunity to be heard. Moreover, he was provided

the opportunity for a post-termination arbitration presided

over by a neutral arbitrator. The Constitution requires

nothing further.

28 Farhat v. Jopke, et al. No. 02-1896

Further, Appellant has failed to allege and prove the

inadequacy of state remedies, which failure is fatal to his

procedural due process claim. See Jefferson v. Jefferson

County Pub. Sch., 360 F.3d 583, 588 (6th Cir. 2004) (citing

various cases). Indeed, he concedes that state law permitted

him to arbitrate with the defendants even after the union

declined to represent him. Nonetheless, Appellant failed to

continue the arbitration after the union’s withdrawal and

elected to file this lawsuit instead.

PRIOR RESTRAINT

The third issue Appellant presents for review is his

allegation that the school district placed an unconstitutional

prior or overbroad restraint on his speech when, as part of

the15-day suspension and investigation, he was instructed to

refrain from speaking to other employees about the

investigation. Appellant dedicates approximately one page of

his argument to this issue, which is thin on analysis.

Appellant simply alleges that there was no legitimate reason

for this restriction, with no supporting evidence or argument.

The Sixth Circuit addressed the issue of a prior restraint on

speech of a government employee in Jackson v. City of

Columbus, 194 F.3d 737 (6th Cir. 1999) (abrogated on other

grounds by Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N.A., 534 U.S. 506

(2002)). Jackson involved the termination of a police chief

who alleged that his dismissal was racially motivated. He

further alleged that a “gag order” not to speak to the media

pending investigation of his alleged misconduct

unconstitutionally restrained his speech. Id. at 746. We

recognized that the Pickering balancing test applied to the

analysis of such allegedly improper prior restraints on the

speech of a public employee. Id. 

Thus, the same process applies here as it did with the first

issue we addressed in this appeal. That is, we first determine

if the issue is one of private or public concern. Second, we

balance the interests of the government employer in
No. 02-1896 Farhat v. Jopke, et al. 29

maintaining a functioning and cohesive working environment

against the employee’s interest in speaking. Id.

We find that the balance of interests on this issue weighs in

favor of the employer. As we stated previously, even if

Appellant’s speech had been of public concern, it is clear that

the interests of the employer outweigh the interests of the

employee, for this limited purpose. The school district only

restricted Appellant’s speech for 15 days, pending its

investigation of allegations about him and by him. Further,

he was restricted in his speech only as to co-employees. He

was not restricted from speaking to the public or his union.

As stated by Appellee Kelly in her deposition, the reason for

this restriction was to prevent further disruption of the

workplace and potential interruption of the investigation by

Appellant’s abusive and threatening behavior. The record is

replete with Appellant’s history of this very type of behavior.

Appellant has not presented any evidence of how he was

limited by this alleged restraint. Thus, we have nothing to

place on the Pickering scale to measure against the

employer’s interests. As such, we find that the alleged prior

restraint on Appellant’s speech was reasonable in light of the

employer’s interest in completing its investigation and in

protecting the workplace. The district court properly granted

summary judgment on this issue.

CONSPIRACY

Appellant’s final allegation is that Appellees are liable for

civil conspiracy for unlawfully causing his termination. He

bases this allegation on the theory that the “general objective

which Hood and Kelly shared was to cause some type of

adverse action concerning Farhat’s career.” Appellant claims

that because Hood went to her supervisor to advise the

supervisor of Appellant’s conduct, there was a conspiracy.

A civil conspiracy is “an agreement between two or more

persons to injure another by unlawful action.” Weberg v.

30 Farhat v. Jopke, et al. No. 02-1896

Franks, 229 F.3d 514, 526 (6th Cir. 2000). Claims of

conspiracy must be pled with some specificity: vague and

conclusory allegations that are unsupported by material facts

are not sufficient to state a §1983 claim. Gutierrez v. Lynch,

826 F.2d 1534, 1538 (6th Cir. 1987) (citation omitted).

Quite simply, Appellant has failed to establish that he was

injured by any unlawful action. As we have held here, there

were no constitutional deprivations by Appellees, thus there

is no unlawful action. Without an unlawful action causing

injury, Appellant cannot prove the elements required to

support a claim for conspiracy. Accordingly, the district court

correctly granted summary judgment to Appellees on this

issue.

CONCLUSION

For the reasons set forth herein, we AFFIRM the judgment

of the United States District Court for the Eastern District of

Michigan, Southern Division, as to all claims.
No. 02-1896 Farhat v. Jopke, et al. 31

Appendix A

Date: 5-11-00

To: J. Jopke, Superintendent Troy Schools

From: Ken Farhat, Custodial Steward, Troy Schools

Re: Rebuttal to Letter dated 4-17-00

I have been off work since 2-25-00, because of the ever

increasing violations of my civil rights, that has led to a

suspension based on a false police report by an incompetent

and corrupt union representative, Pam Hood. I was placed off

work because I was exposing Pam Hood for her collusion and

coercion, and failure to represent members of this bargaining

unit, in cooperation with your administration. This situation

is nothing more than a fabrication by administrators who are

unwilling to be accountable for their abuse, discrimination,

and incompetence.

Since you illegally removed me, I have been forced to attend

illegal meetings with the purpose to create fabricated charges

of inappropriate behavior, typical of the administrators in

Troy Schools. I am supposed to be docile while I am

harassed, lied about, in the most boring and redundant

manner. If I show opposition to these lies, more lies are

produced. The most telling ability of Kelly and her

persecution of me, is the statement she made to the fact that

I was filing charges against Pam Hood through proper

channels of MEA. Kelly referred to me as a threat. Since she

made mention to this in an angry and hostile manner, I

assume I was disciplined for my legal actions within the

union infrastructure. Kelly must believe I am a prisoner with

no civil rights.

During a hearing on 4-14-00, I was asked how I felt about

your letter dated 1-28-97, applied to me. It was a joke since

it was illegal to begin with. You stated that day, when you

gave me the letter, that it would not go in my file, it is not

designated “personnel file,” I was not offered a union

representative and it is not noted that I was. I did not file a

32 Farhat v. Jopke, et al. No. 02-1896

grievance because you said at the time it was not a discipline

action, but a concern. Furthermore, Maureen Kelly now says,

in regard to that meeting that your letter pertains to, that I was

pounding my fist on the table and leapt out of my chair, your

letter does not describe this at all. Your letter is a joke, in the

fact it isn’t worth the paper it’s written on. Also, Kelly is

lying in claiming Harry Sahourieh and Lloyd Stage support

her statements in regards to that day, and that they will

provide testimony, testimony that you at the time did not

pursue. Stage’s exact quote was “I was not paying attention,”

seems odd if I had pounded my fist and leapt out of a chair

that he didn’t notice that, being one seat over. Harry flat out

denies that he agrees with Kelly, or has provided any

testimony in agreement. Now that I am aware of this letter

being illegally put in my file, I will file the proper grievances.

The second so called discipline from Mike Williams, was

grieved, but the grievances were not processed because Mary

Watson refused to file them in the transition to the MEA,

since I now know she is in collusion with the employer I will

re-file these. Mike Williams’s letter is an outrageous and

cowardly tactic to camouflage his harassment, and abuse in

claiming that I was committing medical fraud and illegal

union organizing. When he could not prove this by

entrapment, he lied and said he was threatened, typical of

Williams. Also I wrote a rebuttal to all school board

members and never really got a reply, so his letter is not

worth the paper is [sic] written on. And again, Harry was

present and ready to testify that there was no threat. So much

for those.

In regards to Pam Hood, the Troy Police don’t believe her,

and closed the case. She concealed the fact that she was

coerced by Mike Williams prior to calling the police, that she

has been plotting this for some time, and has been slandering

me in the work place for years. As a matter of fact, I made a

complaint to Carol Miller, Asst. Principle [sic] at Troy High,

some weeks earlier in regards to Hood’s attacks on me. It

was the same day I asked that something be done with Becky
No. 02-1896 Farhat v. Jopke, et al. 33

Makowski, another employee that you have allowed to attack

me in the work place, along with Butler-Bull and Loretta

Witkowski. Hood’s actions were of retaliation and defense

because she realized I was going to expose her, and file

charges for collusion, and I would not submit to collusion

myself in regards to a member I was representing. A situation

that Pam Hood states, “I’m doing what Maureen Kelly wants

me to do, I’m doing what I’m told to do.”

My pattern of behavior is of honesty and integrity, traits that

are solely missing in Troy Schools. It is your administration

that is feared not me. My characterization of those such as

Jack Britton is completely warranted, he is an incompetent

supervisor that retaliated against me by abuse of his authority,

sanctioned by you. When I exposed his abuse and threatening

behavior towards members of this bargaining unit, I was

illegally demoted and further slandered and libeled. You also

claim my co-workers fear me, if they fear me it is because of

the conspiracy of this administration and corrupt union reps

that have been allowed to spread this slander and libel of

threats against people. Furthermore, as always in Kelly’s

warped investigations, she never names who these frightened

co-workers are, or of their testimony, and has refused to

provide this testimony.

I will only admit I talk fast and loud, everybody knows this as

a natural trait. Even if it is a flawed character trait, it is not a

threat. This is being exploited by this administration to avoid

the grievances I have filed, and will file upon returning to

work.

I expect this administration to produce more than rhetoric as

evidence.

I also request that a copy of the medical report be sent to my

residence, this is in regards to the appointment with

Dr. Sheiner. Contact Maureen Kelly.

34 Farhat v. Jopke, et al. No. 02-1896

Lastly, I have made an appointment to attend counseling at

the Evergreen Counseling Center, although this may change,

because of PPOM requirements. Not because of my behavior,

but because of this administration’s behavior.

Sincerely,

Kenneth Farhat

Cc. J. Cusmano

M. Kelly

M. Williams

L. Boehmns

J. Britton
No. 02-1896 Farhat v. Jopke, et al. 35

Appendix B

Date: 5-18-00

To: Lu Battaglieri, President MEA

From: Ken Farhat, Custodial Rep Troy Schools, TESPA

Re: Failure to represent

On 5-16-00, I met with Tom Fette, Joe Cusmano, and Jeff

Nyquist, you know who they are. Also present was Tim

Hagan, my attorney. During this meeting and by Mr.

Nyquist’s direction it was agreed that an investigation, into

the allegations and incidents leading up to my suspension,

would be conducted. Apparently Mr. Nyquist has no

influence over Cusmano, or Fette, to motivate them to follow

up on this. I believe Mr. Nyquist to be in good faith at this

time, Fette and Cusmano are not. Instead they continue to

avoid their responsibility, to cover up for Pam Hood, and

protect the employer, this corrupt local, and the incompetence

of the MEA reps up to date.

Today at approximately 9:30 a.m., I called Cusmano about a

concern more recent that the May 16 meeting. He refuses to

investigate. It only involves the President of my local, Pam

Hood, claiming that I stopped her bus with students aboard.

I believe that offence would get me life in prison, if true. It

is a demented accusation from a demented and sick human

being. Cusmano refused to contact Hood, and stated it was

not his concern.

Furthermore, in regards to the other matters of a needed

investigation, he now flatly refuses to do anything to uncover

evidence. Evidence and testimony that will prove beyond a

shadow of a doubt of the conspiracy behind Hood’s behavior,

and my being victimized for being the only honest union rep

in Troy with the ability and courage to stand up to this

ignorant and abusive administration in Troy Schools.

I can only conclude Cusmano, Fette, Mott, and Gay Shaw are

intentionally creating obstacles, innuendo and lies, to cover

36 Farhat v. Jopke, et al. No. 02-1896

up for the corrupt contract negotiation, the ongoing collusion

of the local representatives, and the preferential treatment

they receive. Of course at the expense of the bargaining unit.

An expense that has led to privatization, loss of seniority

rights, loss of bidding rights, unwarranted discipline, loss of

medical benefits, loss of sick days, the implementation of a

medical exam article that violates our civil rights, and a

hostile environment of dissension and chaos. Least I am

remiss, I should include the main component here, Maureen

Kelly’s good friend Mary Watson. A MEA staff rep who has

no problem lying in front of nearly 200 people about all the

above. This to enhance her mentally ill friend Kelly, and to

use this bargaining unit as a concession for the teachers

negotiation.

On 5-17-00, my attorney was contacted by Mr. Nyquist. He

stated a representative would be assigned to conduct an

investigation into my situation. On 5-18-00, I contacted

Fette, he claimed no knowledge of a rep other then an

advocate in a distant arbitration. I need action now. I don’t

know what Cusmano intends to present at this arbitration

other than begging like a dog. I will not do this.

The MEA has committed total failure in this matter and others

of this bargaining unit, yet Mark Middlewood is being

allowed to parade around the state claiming this contract is a

good contract. It is, if you’re a mindless animal, which

Maureen Kelly has done a good job in hiring mindless,

criminals as employees.

Well now you’ve been told, somewhat that is. I invite you to

a union meeting to hear our discussion. Oh excuse me that’s

right we don’t have meetings anymore. They are canceled

when our local reps are exposed for their incompetence and

collusion, and refuse to answer questions of their conduct.

Like our last meeting last February.

I have been disciplined because I choose to expose MEA and

local reps in complete collusion with the employer. To the
No. 02-1896 Farhat v. Jopke, et al. 37

point these liars are giving testimony, illegal testimony, to the

employer. Despicable.

It is your responsibility to assign staff that is honest and

unbiased. Where is the aggressive representation that was

promised during the organizing effort? Where is the legal

team that was supposed to protect our civil rights? You have

no answer because it was all a lie, and you were not President.

This was orchestrated by Mary Watson and carried on by

every MEA rep since. Fix it please. Believe me, I will

contact newspapers and politicians till something is done. I

will not be deterred, by any threat or conspiracy. I intend to

sue.

Sincerely,

Ken Farhat

CC. Fette

Shaw

Hood