SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY

APPELLATE DIVISION

DOCKET NO. A-5129-15T1

STATE OF NEW JERSEY,

Plaintiff-Respondent,

v.

FRANCIS G. LANGLEY, a/k/a

FRANCIS G. LANGLEY, JR., and

FRAN LANGLEY,

Defendant-Appellant.

————————————————————————————————-

Submitted August 8, 2017 – Decided

Before Judges Hoffman and Currier.

On appeal from Superior Court of New Jersey, 

Law Division, Cape May County, Indictment 

Nos. 13-07-0720 and 15-01-0008.

Joseph E. Krakora, Public Defender, attorney 

for appellant (Jay L. Wilensky, Assistant 

Deputy Public Defender, of counsel and on 

the brief).

Christopher S. Porrino, Attorney General, 

attorney for respondent (Jane C. Schuster, 

Deputy Attorney General, of counsel and on 

the brief).

PER CURIAM

NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE

APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION

This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court."

Although it is posted on the internet this opinion is binding only on the 

parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R.1:36-3.

September 13, 2017
2 A-5129-15T1

Defendant Francis G. Langley appeals from two judgments of 

conviction entered by the trial court on February 27, 2015. 

Pursuant to a plea agreement covering two separate indictments, 

the judgments of conviction declared defendant guilty of seconddegree certain persons not to have weapons, N.J.S.A. 2C:39-7(b), 

and fourth-degree resisting arrest, N.J.S.A. 2C:29-2(a)(2). The 

judge sentenced defendant to a five-year term of imprisonment 

with no eligibility for parole on the weapons conviction and a 

concurrent eighteen-month term on the resisting arrest

conviction. Defendant then moved for bail pending appeal, which 

the sentencing judge denied. 

On appeal, defendant challenges the judge's pretrial ruling 

of April 9, 2014, following a hearing on April 1, 2014, denying 

his motion to suppress physical evidence seized by police. He 

also challenges the judge's pretrial ruling of January 5, 2015, 

following a hearing on that date, denying his motion to suppress

his statements to police. Defendant further appeals the denial 

of his post-sentence motion to withdraw his guilty plea. He 

presents the following points for our consideration:

POINT I 

USE OF THE WEAPON SEIZED HERE IN A CRIMINAL 

PROSECUTION IS PROHIBITED UNDER THE DOMESTIC 

VIOLENCE ACT, AND NOT JUSTIFIED UNDER THE 

COMMUNITY CARETAKING DOCTRINE. ACCORDINGLY, 

SUPPRESSION SHOULD HAVE BEEN GRANTED. U.S. 
3 A-5129-15T1

CONST., AMEND[S]. IV, XIV; N.J. CONST.

(1947), ART. 1, PAR 7.

POINT II

THE MOTION COURT'S RULING AS TO SUPPRESSION 

OF PHYSICAL EVIDENCE WAS BASED ON UNADMITTED 

"EVIDENCE," AND IS ACCORDINGLY INVALID AND 

MUST BE VACATED. U.S. CONST., AMENDS. VI, 

XIV; N.J. CONST. (1947), ART. 1, PAR 10.

(NOT RAISED BELOW)

POINT III

THE DEFENDANT'S STATEMENTS WERE TAKEN IN THE 

ABSENCE OF NECESSARY MIRANDA WARNINGS, AND 

ACCORDINGLY MUST BE SUPPRESSED. U.S. 

CONST., AMEND[S]. V, XIV.

POINT IV

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DENYING DEFENDANT'S 

MOTION TO WITHDRAW HIS PLEA. U.S. CONST., 

AMEND. XIV; N.J. CONST. (1947), ART. 1, PAR. 

9.

Finding no merit in these arguments, we affirm. We address the 

facts and law relating to each point in turn. 

I.

At the April 1, 2014 suppression hearing, the State 

presented testimony from Sergeant John Mazzuca of the Ocean City 

Police Department. Sergeant Mazzuca stated that on June 27, 

2013, at approximately 8:30 p.m., dispatch directed him to a 

"domestic dispute" at a residence on Coolidge Road, which a 

neighbor had reported to 9-1-1. Dispatch notified the sergeant 

that a prior disturbance had occurred at the residence and 
4 A-5129-15T1

defendant "had returned to the property and . . . forcibly 

entered the rear door." 

Sergeant Mazzuca arrived at the residence "almost 

simultaneously" with two other police officers. Defendant's 

mother-in-law met the officers as they approached and informed

them that defendant and his wife, N.L., were "arguing and 

fighting inside" and that defendant was "screaming" at her. The 

officers also learned that N.L.'s children fled the residence 

during the fight. 

Sergeant Mazzuca went inside the residence and heard a male 

voice yelling. He entered a bedroom to find defendant and N.L.;

he observed N.L. "visibly shaken," upset, crying, and 

"distraught because she felt her marriage was going away." The 

officers then separated defendant and N.L. to speak with them 

individually. Sergeant Mazzuca spoke with defendant in the 

bedroom, who told him that he and N.L. "just had a verbal

dispute and no physical altercation had taken place." 

Consistent with this explanation, the sergeant did not notice 

any signs of physical injury and saw defendant "was packing up 

his stuff to leave."

One of the other officers then entered the room and 

informed Sergeant Mazzuca about his conversation with N.L.; she 

stated defendant "told her to get a shotgun that was under the 
5 A-5129-15T1

bed and load it and blow her head off." Police moved defendant 

to a different bedroom where he admitted he made this statement, 

adding that he "just thought she was suicidal" and "it was a bad 

choice of words to make." The officers also asked defendant if 

he had a shotgun; defendant admitted he had an unloaded shotgun 

under his bed in the prior room and gave the officers permission 

to check. Defendant further admitted to having a crossbow in 

his closet. 

Sergeant Mazzuca next inquired whether defendant had any 

prior criminal convictions. Defendant replied that he had been 

convicted of "theft from a vehicle." At that point, the 

officers decided to seize the weapons, "partially for that 

reason and also for the safety of his wife, who he had claimed 

was suicidal." They retrieved the weapons from the locations 

defendant indicated. 

Sergeant Mazzuca testified that prior to this incident he 

had encountered defendant during a "motor vehicle stop." Based 

upon this previous involvement, he believed "there was a strong 

possibility that [defendant] was a certain person not to possess 

a weapon." However, the sergeant acknowledged he "was going to 

have [to] research" the statute to make certain. 

Sergeant Mazzuca also discussed with N.L. whether she

wanted to pursue a restraining order against defendant. When 
6 A-5129-15T1

she responded that she did, he drove her to the police 

headquarters. After N.L. "calmed down" at the station, Sergeant 

Mazzuca noted he "did not feel she was a threat to commit 

suicide at that point." He acknowledged the only indication

that N.L. was suicidal was defendant's statement at the 

residence. However, he clarified that during his time at the 

residence, "it was not [yet] determined whether she was or 

wasn't [suicidal]," and the officers were acting under the 

possibility that she "could be." 

The officers conducted a criminal history check of 

defendant at the station, which revealed "a number of felony 

convictions," including some for burglary. Sergeant Mazzuca 

noted that a burglary conviction qualifies an individual as a 

certain person not to possess a weapon. 

In a written opinion, the motion judge denied defendant's 

motion to suppress the shotgun under two separate legal 

theories. First applying the Prevention of Domestic Violence 

Act (PDVA), N.J.S.A. 2C:25-17 to -35, the judge found "the 

illegal nature of the weapons was immediately apparent when 

[d]efendant told the police officers that he had been convicted 

of 'car theft,' thus making him a certain person not to have 

weapons." She added that defendant had no reasonable 

expectation of privacy in his criminal records, and thus the
7 A-5129-15T1

records check "was not a search." Second, the judge determined 

the search and seizure were permissible under the "emergency aid

doctrine," which she termed "a subcategory of [the] community 

caretaking exception" to the warrant requirement. The judge 

concluded that the possibility N.L. might have harmed herself 

gave the officers "an objectively reasonable basis to believe 

that an emergency required immediate assistance to preserve life 

or prevent serious injury." 

Defendant now argues the motion judge erred because neither 

the PDVA nor the community-caretaking exception supported denial 

of suppression. However, having reviewed the applicable law, we 

are satisfied the judge appropriately denied suppression under

the emergency-aid doctrine. 

When reviewing a motion to suppress, we "must uphold the 

factual findings underlying the trial court's decision so long 

as those findings are supported by sufficient credible evidence 

on the record." State v. Rockford, 213 N.J. 424, 440 (2013) 

(quoting State v. Robinson, 200 N.J. 1, 15 (2009)). "Those 

findings warrant particular deference when they are 

'substantially influenced by [the trial judge's] opportunity to 

hear and see the witnesses and to have the "feel" of the case, 

which a reviewing court cannot enjoy.'" Ibid. (alteration in 

original) (quoting Robinson, supra, 200 N.J. at 15). "To the 
8 A-5129-15T1

extent that the trial court's determination rests upon a legal 

conclusion, we conduct a de novo, plenary review." Ibid.

"Both the United States Constitution and the New Jersey 

Constitution guarantee an individual's right to be secure 

against unreasonable searches or seizures." State v. Minitee, 

210 N.J. 307, 318 (2012) (citing U.S. Const. amend. IV; N.J. 

Const. art. I, ¶ 7). Searches and seizures conducted without a 

warrant, "particularly in a home, are presumptively 

unreasonable." State v. Edmonds, 211 N.J. 117, 129 (2012)

(quoting State v. Bolte, 115 N.J. 579, 585 (1989)). As such, 

the State has the burden of proving that such searches and 

seizures are "justified by one of the '"well-delineated 

exceptions" to the warrant requirement.'" State v. Shaw, 213 

N.J. 398, 409 (2012) (quoting State v. Frankel, 179 N.J. 586, 

598, cert. denied, 543 U.S. 876, 125 S. Ct. 108, 160 L. Ed. 2d 

128 (2004)). 

The exceptions to the warrant requirement include the 

emergency-aid and community-caretaking doctrines. State v. 

Hathaway, 222 N.J. 453, 468 (2015); State v. Keaton, 222 N.J.

438, 452 (2015). Under the community-caretaking doctrine, 

"[c]ourts have allowed warrantless searches . . . when police 

officers have acted not in their law enforcement or criminal 

investigatory role, but rather in a community caretaking 
9 A-5129-15T1

function." State v. Bogan, 200 N.J. 61, 73 (2009). Our Supreme 

Court has held that the community-caretaking doctrine prohibits 

"the warrantless entry into or search of a home in the absence 

of some form of exigent circumstances" or "objectively 

reasonable emergency." State v. Vargas, 213 N.J. 301, 305, 321 

(2013). 

However, the Court made clear that "[p]olice officers 

serving in a community-caretaking role are empowered to make a 

warrantless entry into a home under the emergency-aid exception 

to the warrant requirement." Id. at 323. "The emergency aid 

doctrine is derived from the commonsense understanding that 

exigent circumstances may require public safety officials, such 

as the police, . . . to enter a dwelling without a warrant for 

the purpose of protecting or preserving life, or preventing 

serious injury." Hathaway, supra, 222 N.J. at 469 (quoting 

Frankel, supra, 179 N.J. at 598).

Courts apply a "two-prong test" that considers "the 

totality of the circumstances" to determine whether the 

emergency-aid doctrine justifies a warrantless search of a home. 

Id. at 470, 474. The State must show that "(1) the officer had 

an objectively reasonable basis to believe that an emergency 

require[d] that he provide immediate assistance to protect or 

preserve life, or to prevent serious injury and (2) there was a 
10 A-5129-15T1

reasonable nexus between the emergency and the area or places to 

be searched." Ibid. (quoting Edmonds, supra, 211 N.J. at 132). 

The doctrine does not require "certitude" of danger but only 

reasonable belief that immediate action is required. Ibid.

(quoting Frankel, supra, 179 N.J. at 599). Reasonableness turns 

on the circumstances at the time and "does not depend on whether 

it is later determined that the danger actually existed." Ibid. 

If an emergency exists, "[t]he emergency-aid doctrine, 

particularly when applied to the entry of the home, must be 

'limited to the reasons and objectives that prompted' the need 

for immediate action." Edmonds, supra, 211 N.J. at 134 (quoting 

Frankel, supra, 179 N.J. at 599). "When the exigency that 

justifies immediate action dissipates, the rationale for 

searching without a warrant is no longer present." Ibid. 

Defendant does not dispute that police had the authority to 

enter the home due to a report of domestic violence, but he 

argues the emergency-aid doctrine does not apply to the gun 

search because the PDVA governs the events in question. 

However, we have noted that exceptions to the warrant 

requirement still apply to searches that implicate the PDVA. 

See State v. Perkins, 358 N.J. Super. 151, 161 (App. Div. 2003)

("[U]nless the factual circumstances justify a search under a 

recognized exception to the warrant requirement, a search and 
11 A-5129-15T1

resulting seizure under [the PDVA] is deemed reasonable . . . so 

long as the results are not used to facilitate a criminal 

prosecution."). Moreover, in Edmonds, supra, 211 N.J. at 139-

40, the Court considered the emergency-aid doctrine in the 

context of a domestic violence call. Because police discovered 

no evidence of a domestic disturbance upon entering a residence, 

the Edmonds Court concluded there was no objectively reasonable 

basis to search the home. Id. at 121-22. 

Here, we conclude that the officers had an objectively 

reasonable basis to believe that a danger to life required 

immediate assistance, and that there was a nexus between the 

emergency and the area searched. Officer Mazzuca observed N.L. 

was "distraught," and defendant stated she might be suicidal and 

that he told her to take his shotgun and "blow her head off."

Based on these circumstances, the officers reasonably searched

the locations indicated to secure the shotgun and crossbow.

They did not expand their search beyond these specific areas. 

Although the officers had separated defendant and N.L. at the 

time of the search, the officers' actions were reasonable to 

prevent the possibility that N.L. might harm herself. 

We are therefore satisfied that the motion judge correctly 

applied the emergency-aid doctrine to uphold this search and 

seizure. We further note that the criminal history check of 
12 A-5129-15T1

defendant was lawful, as our Court has held that criminal 

background checks are not searches under the state or federal 

constitutions. See State v. Sloane, 193 N.J. 423, 436 (2008). 

As such, we need not address defendant's arguments relating to 

the judge's application of the PDVA.

II.

In Point II, defendant urges this court to vacate the 

judge's ruling denying suppression of the physical evidence, 

contending the judge improperly based her written opinion on

"unadmitted" evidence outside of the April 1, 2014 motion 

record. Specifically, in her recitation of the background 

facts, the judge apparently referenced information from police 

reports and the neighbor's 9-1-1 calls, which were not testified 

to at the motion hearing. Defendant further challenges the 

judge's interpretation of certain facts relating to Sergeant 

Mazzuca's understanding of his prior convictions. 

We reject these arguments and need not consider them at 

length. As discussed above, the testimony elicited at the 

motion hearing was sufficient to support the judge's ruling. 

Moreover, the State provided the court with the police reports 

and audio of the 9-1-1 calls in the appendix to its motion 

brief. The judge stated on the record that she had both

parties' briefs, and defense counsel did not object. Because
13 A-5129-15T1

defendant has failed to show plain error, R. 2:10-2, we decline 

to disturb the judge's ruling on this basis.

III.

Defendant next challenges the judge's January 5, 2015 

ruling, denying suppression of his statements to police. At 

this second hearing, the State presented testimony from Ocean 

City Police Officer Joshua Clarke, who was with Sergeant Mazzuca 

at the subject residence. Officer Clarke spoke with N.L., who 

stated defendant told her to "take my shotgun and kill 

yourself"; she informed the officers that defendant kept a 

shotgun underneath the bed. Officer Clarke thus became 

concerned there were weapons on the premises and went to speak 

with defendant. Pursuant to department protocol, he planned to 

"secure the scene" and temporarily seize any firearms. 

Defendant complied with the officers' request to move from 

the master bedroom to the children's bedroom. While speaking 

with Officer Clarke, defendant "seemed frustrated and agitated 

with the situation" and said his comments "were a stupid thing 

to say." Defendant "said that he did keep a shotgun underneath 

the bed," "pointed to the bedroom [the officers] were standing 

across the hallway from," and gave them permission to check. 

According to Officer Clarke, defendant "volunteered" this 

information, and he was not under arrest at this time. Officer 
14 A-5129-15T1

Clarke acknowledged that the officers did not give defendant 

Miranda1 warnings during this exchange. 

After the officers seized the weapons, defendant asked if 

he was free to leave. The officers "allowed him to gather up 

some things and then he . . . was free to go." Defendant left 

the residence, approximately forty minutes after police first 

arrived. 

The officers later checked defendant's criminal history at 

the police station and then returned to the residence to arrest

him. According to the arrest report, defendant listed his home 

address as the Coolidge Road residence where these events 

transpired. 

The motion judge denied defendant's suppression motion in

an oral opinion, concluding police did not need to give him 

Miranda warnings because he was not subjected to a custodial 

interrogation. The judge noted defendant "voluntarily provided 

information to the police while in his own home and before any

indication that he would be questioned or taken into custody." 

She found the police moved defendant to the children's bedroom 

not to conduct a custodial interrogation but to "secure the 

scene and to secure the safety of the officers and to secure the 

persons in the home." The judge determined that the officers 

 

1 Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S. Ct. 1062, 16 L. Ed.

2d 694 (1966). 
15 A-5129-15T1

were conducting an investigation, and thus "[a]n objectively 

reasonable man would not [have] felt his freedom was compromised 

in any significant way given these circumstances." 

Defendant now argues the motion judge erred by finding the 

officers did not subject him to a custodial interrogation. As 

noted, we grant deference to the judge's factual findings and 

review her legal conclusions de novo. Rockford, supra, 213 N.J.

at 440. 

It is well established that police officers must provide

Miranda warnings when they conduct a custodial interrogation, 

which is "questioning initiated by law enforcement officers 

after a person has been taken into custody or otherwise deprived 

of his freedom of action in any significant way." Miranda, 

supra, 384 U.S. at 444, 86 S. Ct. at 1612, 16 L. Ed. 2d at 706. 

Custodial interrogations that trigger the obligation to provide 

Miranda warnings do not require physical restraint and may take 

place in the suspect's home. State v. Hubbard, 222 N.J. 249, 

266 (2015). When not in custody, an accused has no Miranda

protection because there is no police-dominated atmosphere, 

which forms the basis for the United States Supreme Court's 

Miranda jurisprudence. State v. Nyhammer, 197 N.J. 383, 406

(citing Beckwith v. United States, 425 U.S. 341, 346-47, 96 S. 
16 A-5129-15T1

Ct. 1612, 1616, 48 L. Ed. 2d 1, 7-8 (1976)), cert. denied, 558 

U.S. 831, 130 S. Ct. 65, 175 L. Ed. 2d 48 (2009). 

A court must consider the totality of the circumstances in 

determining whether an individual is in custody. State v. 

Milledge, 386 N.J. Super. 233, 244 (App. Div.), certif. denied,

188 N.J. 355 (2006). "Pertinent factors include the duration of 

the detention, the nature and degree of the pressure applied to 

detain the individual, the physical surroundings of the 

questioning and the language used by the officer in summoning 

the individual." Ibid. (quoting State v. Pierson, 223 N.J. 

Super. 62, 67 (App. Div. 1988)). "The critical determinant of 

custody is whether there has been a significant deprivation of 

the suspect's freedom of action based on the objective 

circumstances, including the time and place of the 

interrogation, the status of the interrogator, the status of the 

suspect, and other such factors." State v. P.Z., 152 N.J. 86, 

103 (1997).

We consider these standards when police questioning stems 

from a reported domestic dispute. See State v. Smith, 374 N.J. 

Super. 425, 431-32 (App. Div. 2005). "When considering the need 

for Miranda warnings before questioning in a private residence, 

our courts have not viewed the home as a location so isolated or 

dominated by the police as to lead the reasonable person to 
17 A-5129-15T1

conclude he or she is in custody or in danger of abuse." Id. at 

432. Though "police action subsequent to entering [a] residence 

is likely to involve some restraint on the occupants' freedom of 

action," we have analogized the detention involved "to field 

investigations of suspicious conduct authorized by Terry v. 

Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 88 S. Ct. 1868, 20 L. Ed. 2d 889 (1968), and 

traffic stops authorized by Berkemer v. McCarty, 468 U.S. 420, 

104 S. Ct. 3138, 82 L. Ed. 2d 317 (1984)." Smith, supra, 374 

N.J. Super. at 431. In doing so, we held that, absent 

circumstances equivalent to arrest, in-home questioning is 

insufficient to rise to the level of custody necessitating 

Miranda warnings. Id. at 431-33.

Additionally, where a defendant is merely "the subject of 

an officer's attempt to gather information, the required 

compulsion is not present to necessitate Miranda warnings." 

State v. Dispoto, 383 N.J. Super. 205, 214 (App. Div. 2006), 

aff'd in part and modified in part, 189 N.J. 108 (2007). 

Applying these principles, we find there are more than 

sufficient grounds to treat the events under review as a noncustodial situation. The officers properly entered defendant's 

home in order to investigate a reported domestic disturbance.

After hearing N.L.'s statement that a weapon was located under 

the bed, they moved defendant to a different room to secure the 
18 A-5129-15T1

scene and asked him limited questions to investigate N.L.'s 

account. Defendant voluntarily told the officers he kept a 

shotgun under his bed and gave them permission to check. The 

officers did not pressure defendant or place him under arrest, 

he was in his own home the entire time, and he was free to leave 

after police seized the weapon. 

Under these circumstances, we conclude an objectively

reasonable person would not have believed they were in police

custody during these events. See Smith, supra, 374 N.J. Super.

at 432. In the absence of custodial interrogation, Miranda

warnings were not required and the motion judge did not err by 

declining to suppress defendant's statements. We therefore 

discern no basis to disturb the judge's ruling. 

IV.

Last, defendant argues the judge should have granted his 

motion to withdraw his guilty plea. This issue is governed by 

the four-factor test expressed by our Supreme Court in State v. 

Slater, 198 N.J. 145, 157-58 (2009): "(1) whether the defendant 

has asserted a colorable claim of innocence; (2) the nature and 

strength of defendant's reasons for withdrawal; (3) the 

existence of a plea bargain; and (4) whether withdrawal would 

result in unfair prejudice to the State or unfair advantage to 

the accused." 
19 A-5129-15T1

Courts must balance all of the factors in deciding the 

motion for withdrawal of a guilty plea. Id. at 162. As no 

factor is mandatory, the fact that one may be missing "does not

automatically disqualify or dictate relief." Ibid.

With regard to the first Slater factor, "[a] bare assertion 

of innocence is insufficient to justify withdrawal of a plea." 

Id. at 158. The defendant must present specific and credible 

facts "and, where possible, point to facts in the record that 

buttress [his or her] claim." Ibid. Courts may look to 

evidence that was available to the parties when the defendant 

entered his plea. Id. at 158-59. Courts should not conduct a 

"mini-trial" but should "simply consider whether a defendant's 

assertion of innocence is more than a blanket, bald statement 

and rests on particular, plausible facts." Id. at 159. 

Regarding the second Slater factor, a defendant has 

adequate reason to withdraw his or her plea where the court or 

prosecutor misinforms the defendant about an element of the 

plea, or where "the defendant was not informed and thus did not 

understand" material terms and consequences of the plea. Ibid. 

The record shows that several months after sentencing, 

defendant moved to withdraw his plea, or in the alternative, for 

reconsideration of his motion for bail pending appeal. In 

support of this motion, defendant claimed he only pled guilty 
20 A-5129-15T1

because his attorney told him he would receive bail pending his 

appeal if he did so. Defendant further asserted his innocence, 

claiming the shotgun police recovered actually belonged to his 

son, and it arrived at N.L.'s residence after he moved out. 

Defendant submitted a letter and affidavit from his plea counsel

and affidavits from friends and family members to support these 

claims. 

Following a hearing on February 4, 2016, the judge2 denied 

defendant's motion to withdraw his plea. Applying the Slater

factors, the judge found defendant had not asserted he was 

innocent or demonstrated sufficient reasons for withdrawal; 

rather, he "simply no longer wants [to] deal with the 

consequences of the plea." The judge noted defendant entered

his plea pursuant to an agreement, and she found that withdrawal

would unfairly prejudice the State, which was prepared to go to 

trial. The judge also rejected defendant's claim that he was 

led to believe he would receive bail pending appeal, citing the 

plea transcript and other portions of the record that showed he 

was aware the State was opposing his motion. She noted that any 

claims regarding his attorney's advice were appropriate for 

post-conviction relief (PCR). 

 

2 A different judge conducted defendant's plea withdrawal 

hearing. 
21 A-5129-15T1

Defendant now argues the judge erred in her application of 

the Slater factors. We disagree. First, although defendant 

submitted affidavits stating the shotgun was not his, the 

suppression record shows defendant freely admitted to possessing 

the shotgun. The record further shows that at the time of his 

arrest, defendant told police he lived at the address where they 

seized the shotgun. For these reasons, we find defendant did 

not base his assertion of innocence upon credible facts. 

Second, the record shows defendant was informed he was not 

guaranteed bail upon pleading guilty. At his plea hearing, 

defendant affirmed he understood that the State was going to 

object to his application for bail pending appeal. His plea 

form further noted the State would oppose bail. As the judge 

appropriately noted, any claims defendant has against his 

attorney are appropriate for PCR. Similarly, we find the judge 

correctly balanced the remaining Slater factors to deny 

defendant's motion. We discern no basis to reverse. 

Affirmed.