T h e C o u rtn o t e s t h a ta s a t e c h n i c a l m a t t e r , t h e A t t o r n e y A p p e l l e e s ar e a c tu a l l y

c r o ss- 1 a pp e lle e s. 

### TEXA S C OU R T OF A PPEAL S, THIR D DIST R ICT , AT AU STIN

NO. 03-0 8 -00 287 -CV
Appellan t, Sheryl Michels// Cross-A ppellan t, Cliff

ord Ze if m an
v. App e lle e , C liffor d Z e ifm an/ / C r os s- App e lle e s, She r yl M ic he ls, Jo hn Ba r r e tt , K ar l E. Hay s, Law Of fi ces of John B arre tt, Bec ky Beaver, and the Law Of fi ce of Becky Beaver

F ROM THE DISTRICT CO URT OF TRAVIS COUNTY , 261S T JUDICIAL DISTRICT NO. D-1- GN-07- 0041 88 , HO NORAB LE STEP HEN Y ELENOSK Y , JUDGE PRESIDI NG

M E M O R

A N D U M O P I N I O N
Clifford Z eifman br oug ht suit aga inst his ex-wife, Sheryl Mic hels, and he r divorce counsel, Jo h n Ba rr et t , Kar l E. Hay s, the L aw Of fice s of J ohn Ba

rre tt, Bec ky

Be aver , and the L aw O f f ic e o f B e c ky B e a v e r ( c o ll e c ti v e ly , th e “ A tt o r n e y A p p e lle es”) , alleg ing c auses of action for 1 frivolous filing, fra

ud, neg lige nce, ma licious prosecution, abuse of proc ess, fra ud by nondisclosure, and conspira cy . T he trial c ourt g rante d summary judgme nt in favor of

Michels and the A ttorney Ap pe lle e s, dis mis sin g a ll of Zeif man’ s c la ims , b ut d ism iss ingthe ma lic iou s p ro se c uti on c la im without p r e

ju d ic e . M ic h e ls a

p p e a ls , ar g u in g th a t th e c la im o f ma li c io u s p r o s e c u ti o n s h o uld have be e n d ism iss e d with pr e

jud ic e , w hil e Z e if

man c ro ss- a

pp e a ls t o a sse rt

that th e tr ia l c ourt

e rr e d in g ranting summary

judgme nt in favor of Michels and the A ttorney Appellee s. We rever se the portion2

of the trial c ourt’s orde r dismissing the malicious prose cution claim wit h o u t p rejudice and re nder jud g me nt t

hat it be dis mis se d w ithpr e

jud ic e . We af

fi rm th e tria l c ourt ’s or de r w ithre sp e c t to
a ll o the r c la ims
. BACK GR OUND

Michels and Z eifman divorc ed in 1 998, signingan ag ree d divorce decr ee that included a pr ovision gove rning which ele mentary school their t wo children would attend. I n 2004, Michels fil ed a petition to modify the parent-child relationship, asking the court to modify the dec ree and aw ard he r the ex clusive rig ht to make educ ational dec isions reg ardingone of the children, ref err ed to her ein as A.A . The trial c ourt g rante d Michels’s re quest and modified the de cre e. Michels then withdre w A.A. f rom Br y ker Woods El ementar

y , a school in the Austin I ndepende nt Sc ho ol D istri c t ( AI SD) , a nd e nr oll e d h e r i n p ri vate sc ho ol at S t. An dr e w’ s E pis c op a l Sc ho ol. Zei fm an ap p ea led the trial c ourt’s orde r, and this Court reve rsed, holding that the trial cour t had
a bu se d it s d isc re tio n in

mod if y ingthe a g re e d d ivo rc e de c re e to g ive Mic he ls so le po we r t o make educational decisions on beha lf of A.A. Se e Ze ifm an v . M ic he ls , 212 S.W .3d 582, 596 (Tex. App.—Austin 2006, pet. denied).

After this Court’s opinion was rele ased but before the mandate issued, Michels sued AI SD seeking injunctive relief to preve nt the district from p er m itting Z eifman to e nroll A.A. at Br y ker Woods or any

other AISD school as the 2006 school y ear beg an. Miche ls asserted that Z eifman pla

nned to enroll A.A. in Bry ker Woods in violation of the trial court’s or der modify ing the div or c e de c re e and

a Tr a vis County

Di str ic t Co ur

t st and ingor de r g ov erni ng fam ily law c a se s. Michels did not name Z eifman a s a par ty to her suit seekinginjunctive relief
.3 Upon discover ing that Michels had obtaine d an ex parte te mporary restra ining or der ag ainst AI SD that would preve nt him from enrolling A.A. in public school, Z eifman f iled a petition in intervention, motion to di smiss, and moti on for sa nctions. The nex t business day , Michels filed a Rule 11 ag ree ment with AI SD, in which AI SD ag ree d not to permit A.A. to be enr olled at or attend Br y ker Woods without a final, non-a ppeala ble cour t order pe rmitting her enrollment, i n return f or Mic he ls’ s a g re e me nt to dis mis s he r su it fo r i nju nc tiv e re lie f. Mic he ls t

he n f ile d a no tic e of no n- su it and a motion t o strike Zeifma n’s i nterve ntion. The trial court gra nted t he motion to strike, dismi ssed Z e if man’ s mo tio n to dis mis s a s mo ot, and de nie d Z e if

man’ s mo tio n f

or sa nc tio ns . Z e if man a pp e ale d the tr ia l c ourt ’s de c isi on to s tr ike his int e rv e nti on and de ny his mot ion fo r s anc tio ns . T his Court re ve rs e d, ho ldi ngthat th e tr ia l c ourt a bu sed it s dis c re tio n in striking Z eifman’ s intervention, and rema nded for further proce eding s on the i ssue of sanc tions. See Ze ifm an v . M

ic he ls , 229 S.W .3d 460, 468 (Tex. App.—Austin 2007, pet. denied). T o date, Z eifman has not pursued sa

nctions on remand, a

nd no final judg ment has bee n enter ed in that ca se. I n D e c e mbe r 2 00 7, Z e if

man fil e d the pr e se nt sui t, br ing ing c la ims a g a ins t Mi c he ls
and the Attor

ne y Ap pe lle e s for fr ivo lou s fili ng , fr a ud , ne g lig e nc e , ma lic iou s p ro se c uti on , a nd a bu se of pr oc e ss, ba se d o n M ic he ls’ s su it fo r inj un c tiv e re lie f a g a ins t A I SD. Z e if man late r a

me nd e d h is petition to add claims for fr aud by n o n d isclosure a nd conspirac y . Michels and the A ttorney Appellee s moved for summar y judgme nt. The trial court gra nted t he motions for summary judgme nt
and dis mis se d a ll c la ims , but dis mis se d the ma lic iou s pro se c uti on c la im witho ut pr e jud ic e . M ic he ls
no w a pp e a ls, c on te nd ingthat th e ma lic iou s p ro se c uti on c la im s ho uld

have be e n d ism iss e d w ith prejudice . Z eifman cross-a ppeals, arguing that the trial court err ed in g ranting summary judgme nt in f a vo r o f M ic he ls a

nd the Attor ne y Ap pe lle e s.B ecaus e Mic he ls’ s so le iss ue on a pp e a l is that Z e if

man’ s ma lic iou s p ro se c uti on c la im 2 should have be en dismissed with prejudice, w e will addre ss her issue in our discussion of Z eifman’ s fifth issue on cr oss-appe al, in which he argues that the trial court err ed in dismissi ng his malicious prosec ution claim. Furthe rmore, w e will addre ss Z eifman’ s fi rs t issue on cross-a ppeal—that the trial court e rre d in g ranting summary judgme nt on later- pleade d claims not raised in the motions for summary judgme nt—after

our discussion of the five claims raise d in Z eifman’ s orig inal petition.

4 STA ND AR

D O F RE VI EW Summary judgme nts are r eviewe d de novo. Va le nc e Op e ra ti ng Co. v . D or se tt , 164 S.W .3d 656, 661 (Tex. 2005). To pre vail on a tra ditional moti on for summary judgme nt, the movant must show that there is no g enuine issue of materia l fac t and that it is entitl ed to judg ment
a s a matt e r of law. Pr ovide nt L ife& Ac c ide nt I ns . Co . v . Kn ott , 128 S.W .3d 211, 215-16 (Tex. 2003). Evidence favor able to the non- movant is taken as true and every rea sonable infe renc e must be indulge d in favor of the non-movant a

nd any doubts resolved in its favor. Id. at 215.
DI SCU SSIO N The Liti gation Privilege We m us t f ir st a dd re ss t he lit ig a tio n pr ivi le g e be c a us e it s e rv e s a s an a

bs olute ba

r t o all of Z eifman’ s claims ag ain s t the Attorney Appellee s. Z eifman r aises the issue of litigation pri vil e g e in h is s e c on d is su e on c ro ss- a pp e a l, a rguin g that th e tr ia l c ourt e rr e d in dis mis sin g his claims ag ainst the Attorney Appellee s on the basis of the litigation privilege
. 2 The litigation privilege protec ts an attorney from per sonal liabil i t y s t emming f rom
c on du c t th a t th e “ a tto rn e y e ng a g e s in

a s pa rt of the dis c ha

rg e of his du tie s in

re pr e se nti nga

pa rt y in a lawsuit.” Brad

t v . W est , 892 S.W .2d 56, 72 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1994, writ denied) (op. o n reh’ g ). “Stated diff ere ntly , an attorne y

cannot be held liable to a third pa rty for5

conduct that require s ‘the off ice, pr ofessional tra ining, skill, and authority of an attorney .’” Miller

v. Stonehenge

/FASA-Texas, J

DC, L.P. , 9 9 3 F. S u

p p . 4 6 1 , 4 6 4 (N
. D. T ex . 1 9 9 8 ) ( qu o t i n g Tac o B e ll Corp. v. Cracken , 939 F. Supp. 528, 532 (N.D. Te x . 1996)). The litigation privilege focuse s on the type of c on du c t e ng a g e d in

by the a tto rn e y , r a the r tha

n on w he the r t

he c on du c t w a s me ri tor iou s in the contex t of t he underly ing la wsuit. Bradt , 892 S.W .2d at 72 (stating that, for e x ample, attorne y could not be sued by opposing party for filing meritless or frivolous motions, “be cause m aking mot ion s is c on du c t an atto rn e y e ng a g e s in as part of the dis c ha rg e of his du tie s in re pr e se nti nga pa rt y in a l awsuit”). I f an attorney ’s conduc t violates his professional re sponsibili ty , the re medy is “public, not p ri vate.” Re nfr oe v . J on es &As so c s. , 947 S.W .2d 285, 287 (Tex. App.—For t Worth 1997,
wr it d e nie d) . T he pu rpo se behind the lit ig a tio n p ri vil e g e is t o p ro te c t an atto rn e y ’s “ ri g ht t o interpose a

ny defe nse or supposed de fense and make use of a ny rig ht in behalf of suc h client or
c lie nts a s [th e a tto rn e y ] d e e m[s] pr op e r and ne c e ssa ry , wi tho ut makin g him se lf su bje c t to lia

bil ity i n d am age s.” Morris v. Bailey , 398 S.W .2d 946, 947 (Tex. Civ. App.—Austin 1966, writ ref’d
n. r. e .) . A ny

oth e r p oli c y

“ wo uld dil ute the vig or wi th wh ic h Te xas attor ne y s r e pr e se nt t

he ir c lie nts , which would not be in the be st interests of justice.” Bradt , 892 S.W .2d at 72.

Z eifman a

rg ues that his claims ag ainst the Attorney Appellee s are not barre d by the litigation privileg e beca

use they arise from fr audulent conduc t, which is “for eig n to the duties of an attorney .” Poole v. H

ouston & T.C. Ry. Co. , 5 8 T e x. 13 4, 13 7 ( 18 82). T he lit ig a tio n p ri vil e g e is ina pp l i c a b l e i f an a t t o r

n e y kn o w i n g l y p art i c i p a t e s i n f r a u d u l e n t a c t i v i t i e s o u t s i d e t h e s c o p e of his leg al re prese ntation of the client. See Likov er v . S u n f l o w er Terrace I

I Ltd. , 696 S.W .2d 468, 472 (T e x. Ap p. —H ou sto n [1s t D ist .] 19 85 , n o w ri t) (h old ing attorn e y lia ble fo r a ssi sti ngc lie nt i n pe rp e tr a tin g fr a

ud ule nt b us ine ss s c he me inv olv ingsa le of a pa rtme nt c omp le x); Bo ur lan d v . S tat e ,6

528 S.W .2d 350, 357 (Tex. Civ. App.—Austin 1975, writ ref’d n.r .e.) ( holding a ttorney liable for misrepre sentations made to investors in client’s f raudule nt rea l estate sche me). In the pre sent ca se, ho we ve r, the c omp la ine d- of a c tio ns take n by the Attor ne y Ap pe lle e s ar e a ll ac tio ns that f a ll w ith in the context of their duty

to repre sent Michels in lit i gati on—filing a lawsuit for injunctive re lief,
se e kin g and

ob ta ini nga

te mpo ra ry re str a ini ngor de r, and ne g oti a tin g and fi lin g a Rul e 11 a g re e me nt. Such actions, which r equire the profe ssional training , skill, and authority of an attorney , have be en considere d insufficient to for m the basis of a f

raud c laim agai n s t an attorney by a non-c lient. See Al pe rt v . Crain , Ca ton & J

am es, P. C. , 178 S.W .3d 398, 408 (Tex. App.—Houston [1s t Dist.] 2005, pe t. d e nie d) (h old ing that lit ig a tio n pr ivi le g e ba rs fr a ud c la im ba se d o n a c tio ns su c h a s f ili nglaws uit s
and ple a din g s, pr ov idi ng le g a l adv ic e , a nd awa re ne ss o f s e ttl e me nt n e g oti a tio ns ); W hit e v . B ay le

ss , 32 S.W .3d 271, 276 (Tex. Ap p . — S an Antonio 2000, pet. dis m’d w.o.j.) (holding that claim of conspirac y

to commit fraud wa s barr ed by litigation privi leg e because attorney s’ ac tions of prepa ring and filing various plea dings w ere “ac tions take n as attorne y s repr esenting their client” ). Fur thermore , an attorne y

owes no duty to non- client parties in the adver sarial c ontext of litigation. Se e Mc Cam ish , M

ar tin , B ro wn &Loe

ffl e r v . F

.E. A pp lin g I nte re sts , 991 S.W
. 2 d 787, 795 (Tex. 1999) (“[A] third party ’s re liance on a n attorney ’s re prese ntation is not j usti fi ed wh en the
re pr e se ntatio n ta

ke s p la c e in a

n a dv e rs ari a l c on te xt.” ); see also Chu v. Hong , 249 S.W .3d 441, 446
n . 1 9 (T ex . 2 0 0 8 ) ( ci t i n g Mc Cam ish for pr oposition t hat “f raud a ctions cannot be broug ht ag ainst an opposing attorney in litigation as relianc e in those circ umstances is unre asonable ”). A s a re sult, we hold that the trial court did not er r in dismissi ng Z eifman’ s claims ag ainst the Attorney Appellee s beca use all such c laims are ba rre d by the litigation privileg e. Z eifman’ s second issue is overrule d.7

Frivolous Pleadings

Ha vin g dis po se d o f Z e if

man’ s c la ims a g a in s t

t h e A tt o r n e y A p p e l l e e s , w e n o w a dd

re ss tho se iss ue s o n a

pp e a l r e la tin g to Z e if

man’ s c la ims a g ain st Mic he ls. I n h is thir d is su e on c ro ssap p ea l , Zei fm an ar gu es t h at t h e t ri al co u rt erre d i nd i s m i s s i n g h i s cl ai m fo r f i l i n g fr i v o l o u s p l ea d i n gs under c hapter

9 of the c ivil practice an d reme dies code
. See Tex. Ci v. Prac. & Rem. Code Ann. §§ 9. 00 1- .0 14 (We st 2 00 2) . Ch a pte r 9 a uth or ize s san c tio ns fo r the fi lin g of g ro un dle ss ple a din g s in bad faith or for an improper purpose, such as hara ssment or to c ause unne cessa ry delay
. Id. § 9.011. Z eifman a rg ues that chapte r 9 allows a party to bring an indepe ndent ca use of a ction, separ ate f rom the suit in which the pleading s were filed. Z eifman ha s not cited, nor have we f ound, any authority supporting this proposition. I nstead, he points to sec tion 9.012( a), which states that “[a]t t he trial of the action or at any hear ing inquiring into the fac ts a nd law of the action,” the trial court may make a finding that sanctions ar e appr opriate. Id. § 9 .0 12 (a ). Z e if man arg ue s th a t th is lang uag e allows a

party to pursue cha

pter 9 sanc tions in a suit wholly separ ate f rom the one in whic h the objectionable pleading s were filed, provided that there is a “hear ing inquiring int o the fa cts and law of the action.”

Our sister c ourts have he ld that where the civil prac tice and r eme d i es code allows
a “m otion” for sa

nctions without ex plicitly cre ating an indepe ndent ca use of a ction for sanctions, no such c ause of ac tion ex ists. See M antri v. Bergman , 153 S.W .3d 715, 717-18 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2005, pe t. denied) ( holding that no i n d ependent cause of ac tion ex ists under chapte r 10, which g overns sa nctions for plea dings a

nd motions filed witho u t l ega l o r evide ntiary
su pp or t or fo r i mpr op e r p ur

po se ); Ma rti n v . Te

x as De p’ t of Fa mi ly & Pr ote c tiv e Se rv

s. , 176 S.W .3d8

390, 393 (Tex. A

pp.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2004, no pet.) (holding that chapte r 105 , g overning frivolous claims by state ag encie s, allows only “motion” for sa

nctions and there fore no aff irmative claim for r elief is ava ilable). W hile neither of these c ases a ddress c hapter 9 of the c ivil practice and
reme dies code , the under ly ing pr inciples are the same. Sec tion 9.012 allows sanctions to be imposed by the cour t “o n its own moti on” or “ on the motion of any party to the action,” T ex. C iv. Prac. & Re m. C od e Ann. § 9 .0 12 (a ), and the re is no pr ov isi on sp e c if ic a lly c re a tin g an inde pe nd e nt c a us e of ac tion for s anctions. As a result, we hold that the trial cour t did not err in dismissi ng Z eifman’ s
c la im f o r f r iv o lo u s p le a d in g s b e c a

u s e n o in d e p e n d e n t c a

u s e o f a c ti o n is a v a il a

b le u n d e r c hapter

9 of the c ivil practice and re medies code . Z eifman’ s third issue is overruled. Fraud and Negligence

I n h is f ourt h is su e on

c ro ss- a pp e a l, Zeifm an argue s th a t th e tr ia l c ourt e rr e d in dismiss ing his c laims for fr aud and neg lige nce on the basis that Michels owed no duty to Z eifman to disclose that the suit ag ainst AI SD had bee n filed. Z eifman takes the position that Michels owed him an informal duty

to disclose this information, based on their relationship as f ormer spouse s and joint m an agi n g conservators of A .A., as we ll as a for mal duty under se ction 153.076 of the family code. See Tex. Fam. C ode Ann. § 153.076(a) (West Supp. 2008) (requiring court to “or der that e a c h c on se rv a tor

of a c hil d h a s a du ty to inf

or m th e oth e r c on se rv a tor

of the c hil d in

a tim e ly
manner of sig nificant infor

mation conce rning the hea lth, education, and w elfa re of the child”)
. Gene rally , no duty

of disclosure a

rises in the abse nce of

a confide ntial or

fiduciar y relationship. I

n s u r a n c e C

o . o f N

. A m . v . M

or ris , 9 8 1 S.W .2d 667, 674 (Tex. 1998). Whil e a fi du c iary du ty e xists be tw een sp ou ses, th is d uty te rm inate s w he n th e pa rt ie s a re inv olv e d in9

contested divorc e proc eeding s and indepe ndently repr esente d by

cou n s el. Solares v. Solares , 23 2 S. W.3 d 8 73 , 8 81 (T e x. Ap p. —D a lla s 2 00 7, no pe t.) ; Toles v. Toles , 113 S.W .3d 899, 916-18 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2003, no pet.) (a ffirming summary judgme nt dismi ssing ne g lige nce a nd fra ud
c la ims be c a

us e no d ut y e xiste d b e tw e e n s po us e s in c on te ste d d ivo rc e pr oc e e din g s w he re e a c h s po us e
wa s r e pr e se nte d b y

c ouns e l) ; Ba ss v . B as s , 790 S. W
. 2 d 1 1 3 , 119 (Tex. App.—For t Worth 1990, no writ). As indicated by the proce dural history of this c ase and the related litigation, Z eifman a nd Mic he ls a re ind e pe nd e ntl y

re pr e se nte d b y c ouns e l as adve rs ari e s in litig a tio n af fe c tin g the pa

re ntchild relationship, which ar ose af ter c ontested divorce proce eding s. As a re sult, any confide ntial or fiduciar y relationship t hat exist ed duringthe par ties’ marr iag e has longsince ter minated. F ur the rm or e , Z e if

man h a s n ot p ro vid e d, and we hav e no t f

ound , a ny a uth or ity sug g esting that section 153.076 of the f ami l y co d e cr eate s a statutory duty that g ives rise to tort liability . Section 153.076 mere ly provides that the tria l court shall “or der that eac h conser vator of a child ha s a duty

to inform the other c onservator of the c hild in a timely manner of sig nificant information conc erningthe hea lth, education, and we l fa re o f the child.” Te x . Fam. Code Ann. § 153 .0 76 (a ). Sig nif

ic antl y , in a ca se inv olv ing the po te nti a l for tor t liab ili ty un de r a dif fe re nt f a mil y
c od e pr ov isi on , th e Te xas S up re me Court he ld that the statut e re qu ir ingwi tne sse s o f c hil d a bu se to repor t it to the appropriate authorities did not give rise to “a duty and standa

rd of c onduct in tort.” Pe rry v . S .N. , 973 S.W .2d 301, 309 (Tex. 1998). I n rea ching this conclusion, the court c onsidered such fa ctors as the lack of a duty in common law and the fact that the re quired c onduct—re porting child abuse—w as not clea rly define d by the statute. See id. Simi larl y , th e re is n o c omm on law c a us e of ac tion for fa ilure to di s cl o s e t h e information described in se ction 153.076(a) , and the r equire d10

conduct is not clea

rly define d, g iven the lac k of g uidance on what constitutes “s i gn i fi cant information” or

when a conser vator must disclose information in orde r for it be disclosed “in a timely manner .” See Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 153.076(a)
. I n the abse nce of any Texas prec edent f

or imp o s in g to rt li a

b il it y b a s e d o n s e c ti o n 1 5 3
. 0 7 6 o f th e f a mi ly c o d e , w e d e c li n e to d o so here , p articularly

in light of Pe rry . A c c o r d in g ly , w e h o ld th a t th e tr ia l c o u rt d id n o t e r r in dismissing Z eifman’ s claims for f

raud a nd neg lige nce. Z eifman’ s fourth issue is overr uled.
Malicious Prosecution

I n Z e if man’ s f if th i ssu e on

c ro ss- a pp e a l, h e argue s th a t th e tr ial c ourt e rr e d in dismiss ing his malicio u s prosec ution claim. Michels, in her sole issue on a ppeal, a rg ues that the malic io u s p r o s e c u ti o nc la im s h o u ld h a v e b e e nd is mi s s e d

w it h p r e ju d ic e , r a th e r

th anw it hout prejudice . To preva il on a claim for ma lic ious prosecution, a pla intiff must establish: (1) the instit ution or continuation of civil proce eding s ag ainst the plaintiff; (2) by or at the i nsistence of the defe ndant; (3) malice ; (4) lac k of probable cause; (5) termination of t he procee dings in the plaintiff’s favor ; and (6) spe cial dama g es. Texas Bee f Catt le Co. v. Gree n , 921 S.W .2d 203, 207 (Tex. 1996). Mic he ls c on te nd s th a t Z e if man f a ils to m e e t th re e of

the re qu ir e d e le me nts be c a us e he wa s n ot a pa rt y to t he su it f or inj un c tiv e re lie f, the su it h a s n ot y e t te rm ina te d in his fa vo r, and he fa ile d to show specia l damag es. The tr ial court dismissed the malicious prosec ution claim without prejudice on the g rounds that the under ly ing suit has not ter minated while t h e i s s u e o f sanctions remains pending on rema

nd. See Zeifman , 229 S.W .3d at 468 (re versingtrial court’ s order striking Z eifman’ s intervention and r emandingfor f urther pr ocee dings on issue of sanctions).The pa rties conc ede that only

the issue of sanc tions remains pending
. See Z ei fman 3 v . M ic he ls , 229 S.W .3d 460, 468 (Tex. App.—Austin 2007, pet. denied) (re versingtrial court’ s order str iki ngZ e if

man’ s in te rv e nti on

and re mand ingfo r fu rt her proc e e din g s o n is su e of sa nc tio ns ); see also Freightliner Corp. v. Motor Vehicle Bd. , 255 S.W .3d 356, 362 (Tex. App.—Austin 2008, pet. fi l ed) (observing that when a n appellate court re mands a c ase on a particula r issue, “the trial court is re stricted to a de termination of that par ticular issue” ). 11 An under ly ing c ivil cla im does not terminate in favor of the pla intiff in a malicious prosec ution case “ until the appeals proc ess h as b een e x hausted.” Gree n , 921 S.W .2d at 206. Fur thermore , the proc eeding s are not terminated “until the final dispositi on of t he appe al and of any fur the r p ro c e e din gs th at it may e nta il .” Id. at 208 (quoting Restatement (Sec ond) of Tor ts § 674 cmt. j (1977)) ( emphasis added)
. Whil e Z eifman argues that the underly ing proce eding s at issue here
wer e ter minated in his favor w hen all matter s of substantive re lief we re f inally decide d, see Zeifman , 229 S.W .3d at 468, the fa ct re mains that the appe als proce ss has not y et bee n exhausted beca use the issue of sanc tions remains pending on rema nd and may

still be appe aled whe n a fina l order on
sanc tio ns is i ssu e d by the tr ia l c ourt
. Un til the a pp e a ls p ro c e ss i s c omp le te wi th r e g ard to a ll i ssu e s, 3 inc lud ingsanc tio ns , th e un de rl y ingsu it h a s n ot y e t te rm inate d in Z e if man’ s fa vor. As a

re su lt, Z eifman’ s fifth issue is overrule d.

Z eifman ha s also failed to mee t the first elem ent of a claim for ma licious prosec uti o n
— “the institution or continuation of civil procee dings a g ainst the plaintiff.” Gree n , 9 2 1 S
. W
. 2 d at 2 0 7
. W h i l e Zei fm an ar gu es t h at a n o n -p ar t y t o t h e u n d er l y i n g ci v i l s u i tm ay b ri n g a claim for ma licious prosecution if he suf fer ed spec ial damag es as a direc t result of the unde rly ing suit, thi s argument is inconsistent with t he Te x as Supreme Court’ s express statement in Gree n that
a ma l i ci o u s p ro s ec u t i o n p l ai n t i ff m u s tes t ab l i s h “t h e i n s t i tu t i o no r c o n t i n u at i o no f c i v i l p ro ce ed i n gsI n light of our holdi n g, we ne ed not deter mine whether

Z eifman ha s alleg ed spec ial 4 damag es suffic ient to support a claim for malicious prosec ution. 12 ag ains t t h e p l aintiff.” Id. An ar g ument simil ar to the one made by Z eifman w as re

jected in RRR Farms, Ltd. v. American H orse Protection A s s o ciat ion, Inc. , 957 S.W .2d 121, 132-33 (Tex. A pp.—Houston [14t h Dist.] 1997, pet. denied) , in w hich our sister court, ci t i n g Gr een , “dec line[d] to expand the malicious prosecution t ort to include someone who was not a party to the underlying pr ocee ding.” RRR Farms , 957 S.W .2d at 133. The c ourt furthe r stated, “ This holding is c on sis te nt w iththe purp os e of the ma lic iou s p ro se c uti on tor t. F un dame nta lly , this tor t is a va ila ble
on ly to p art ie s who were wrongly sued and seek t o be made whole.” Id. (empha sis added). Following this reasoning , we too de cline to e x pand the malicious prosec ution tort to an individual wh o wa s not a na me d p art y in t he un de rl y ingpr oc e e din g . T he re fo re , Z e if man c ann ot m e e t th e fi rs t element of

a cla i m for malicious prosecution as a matter of law , and his claim must be dismissed with prejudice
. We s us ta in M ic he ls’ s is su e on a pp e a l. 4
Ab us e of Pro c ess

Z e if man, in h is s ixth is su e on cro ss- a pp e a l, a rgue s th a t th e tr ia l c ourt e rr e d in dismiss ing his c laim for abuse of proc ess. “Abuse of proc ess is the malicious use or misapplication
o f proc ess in order

to acc omplish an ulterior purpose.” Hu nt v . B ald win , 6 8 S. W. 3 d 117, 129 (T e x. Ap p. —H ou sto n [14 th D ist .] 20 01 , no pe t.)
. Ho we ve r, if the pr oc e ss is us e d fo r t he purp os e for whic h it is i ntended, no a buse of pr ocess has occur

red, “ even thoug h acc omplished by an ulterior motive.” Id. a t 13 0. A c la im b a se d o n th e fili ng and ma int a ini ngof

a laws uit c ann ot c on sti tut e abuse of proce ss, beca

use abuse of proc ess re fer s to “the improper use of the process afte r it has bee n13

issued.” Kle in & As so c s. Po lit ic al R e lat ion s v . P or t A rth ur In de p. Sc h. Di

st. , 92 S.W .3d 889, 898 (Tex. A pp.—Be aumont 2002, pet. denied)
. “To constitute abuse of proce ss, the proce ss must have be e n u se d to a c c omp lis h an e nd wh ic h is beyon d th e purv ie w o f t he pr oc e ss a

nd c omp e ls a

pa rt y to do a collateral thi ng which he could not be compelled to do.” Bossin v. Towber , 894 S.W .2d 25, 33 (T e x. Ap p. —H ou sto n [14 th D ist .] 19 94 , n o p e t.) . T his e le me nt i s n ot p re se nt i n th e c a se a t ba r, in wh ic h pr oc e ss wa s us e d to inf or m AI SD t hat Mi c he ls h a d f

ile d a laws uit se e kin g to p re ve nt A I SD fr om e nr oll ingA. A. in B ry ke r Wo od s and ha d obta ine d a tem po ra ry re str a ini ngor de r t o th a t e ff e c t. AI SD was not compelled to take any collater al ac tion, but rather to par ticipate in the litigation pr oc e e din g s, wh ic h it

did by ne g otiati ng th e Rul e 11 a g re e me nt. B e c a us e the pr oc e ss i n th is c a se
wa s u se d f

or the purp os e fo r w hic h it wa s in te nd e d, Z eif

man ’s abu se- of

-p ro c e ss c la im f

a ils a s a matter of la

w. We overr

ule Z eifman’ s six th issue.
Con sp ira c

yan d F ra ud by Non dis c los ur e I n Z eifman’ s first issue on cross-a ppeal, he argues t hat t he trial court erre d in gr anting summary judgme nt on his two later-plea ded cl ai m s of conspira cy and fr aud by

nondisclosure, be c a us e the se c la ims we re no t a dd re sse d in the mot ion s f

or su mma ry jud g me nt. As a g ener al rule, summar y judgme nt may

not be gr an t ed on cause s of ac tion that
were n o t ad d ressed in the summary judgme nt motions
. Chessher v. Southwestern Be ll Tel. Co. , 65 8 S. W.2 d 5 63 , 5 64 (T e x. 19 83 ); se e als o R ota tin g S e rv s. In du s. , I

nc . v . H arris , 245 S.W .3d 476, 487 (Tex. App.—Houston [1s t Dist.] 2007, pet. denied) (“Adefe ndant who does not amend or supplement its moti on for summar y j u d gm en t to addre ss claims asserte d in a plaintiff’s amended pleadingis g ener ally not entitled to a sum mary judgme nt on the pl aintiff’s entire ca se.”) . Howeve r,Th e state me nt o f f a c ts i n Z e if

man’ s ame nd e d p e tit ion

is i de nti c a l to the on e fo un d in his 5 orig inal petition. 14 an e x cepti on

to t his ru le a pp lie s to c a se s w he re the mot ion fo r s umm ary

jud g me nt i s su ff

ic ie ntl y broad to e ncompass the later-plea ded cla ims or where a def endant c onclusively

disproves an e lement common among pleade d cause s of ac tion. Owens v. M cLeroy, Litzler, Rutherford, Bauer & Friday, P. C. , 235 S.W .3d 388, 391 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 2007, no pet.). “ I n a nod to re ality , summary judgme nt may

be prope rly

g rante d on later- pleade d cause s of ac tion if the g rounds ac tually asser ted show that the plaintiff c ould not recove r on the late r-plea ded ca use of a ction.” Id. As previously

discussed, the litigation p ri v ileg e, which w as ra ised by the Attorney Appellee s in their motions for summary judgme nt, bars all cl ai m s against the Attorne y Appellee s
ari sin g fr om the a c tio ns take n in the c on te xt o f re pr e se nti ng Mic he ls in lit igatio n. Bec a us e Z eifman’ s claims of conspirac y and fra ud by nondisclosure a

re ba sed on the same conduct a s his five
or ig ina l c la ims , th e li ti gati on pr ivi le g e ne c e ssa

ri ly ba rs the se c la ims a s w e ll. The Attorne y 5 Ap pe lle e s’ mot ion s f

or su mma ry jud g me nt c le arl y

ra is e the lit ig a tio n p ri vil e g e , a nd a c c or din g ly establish that Z eifman c annot re cover on his later-ple aded c auses of action. Wit h reg ard to Z eifman’ s claims ag ainst Michels, Michels’s motion for summary judgme nt conclusively

establishes that Z eifm an ca nnot rec over on his cla ims for conspirac y or fra

ud by nondisclosure. Z eifman’ s fra ud by nondisclosure claim, like his g ener al fra ud
c la im, is ba se d on his argume nt t hat Mi c he ls o we d h im b oth an in fo rm a l duty

and a statut or y du ty
un de r t he fa mil y c od e to i nf

or m hi m of the su it a g a ins t A I SD f

or inj un cti ve rel ie f. As pr e vio us ly discussed, Michels ’s m otion for summary judgme nt neg ated a

n element of

Z eifman’ s fra

ud
c la im— the e xiste nc e of

a du ty to d isc los e . A s a

re su lt, Mic he ls’ s mo tio n simil arl y ne g a te s th is15

essential ele ment of Z eifman’ s fra ud by nondisclos u re cl aim
. Se e Pa tte rso n v . M c Mi c k le , 191 S.W .3d 819, 826 (Tex. App.—For t Worth 2006, no pet.) (“The failure to disclose information does not constitute fra

ud in the absenc e of a

duty to disclose.”). Civil conspirac y

is “a de rivative tort,” w hich depends on a def endant’ s participation

“ in s ome un de rl y ing tor

t fo r wh ic h th e pla int if

f s e e ks to h old

a t le a st o ne of

the name d d e fe nd a nts liable.” Tilton v . M

ar sh all , 925 S.W .2d 672, 681 (Tex. 1996)
. Where the plaintiff’s underly ing tor t claim fa ils, the conspirac y claims fails as we ll. See Chu , 249 S.W .3d at 4 4 7 (holding that wher e pla int if f’ s to rt c la im f a ils a s a ma tte r o f l aw, “ sh e ha s no c on sp ir a c y c la im a g a ins t [th e de fe nd a nt] fo r c on sp ir ingin s uc h a

tor t” ); W hit e , 32 S.W .3d at 276 (“ [P laintiff’s] inabilit y to arti cu l at e an actionable underlying tor

t claim is fatal to his conspirac y alleg ations.”). As discussed above, the trial
c ourt pr op e rl y g ra nte d M ic he ls’ s mo tio n f

or s u mm a r y j u d g m e nt o n Z e i f man’ s und e rl y ingtor

t c la ims
. I n lig ht of our ho ldi ng that Z e if man c ann ot re c ov e r on his un de rl y ing tor t c la ims , it ne c e ssa

ri ly follows that he cannot rec over on his conspirac y claim. Further, we hold that Michels’s motion for summary judgme nt, which established that Z eifman’ s underlying tor t claims fail as a matter of law,
wa s su ff icien t to e nc omp a ss h is l a te r- ple a de d c on sp ir a c y c la im a s w e ll. Z e if

man’ s f ir st issue is overrule d. Opportunity to Replead

I n h is s e ve nth

iss ue , Z e if

man a rgue s in the a lte rn a tiv e tha

t the tr ia l c ourt

e rr e d in dismiss ing his c laims without giving him an opportun i t y t o re p l ead. A trial court ne ed not g ive a plaintiff the opportunit y to amend if “the petition affirmatively demonstrates that no cause of ac tion
ex i s ts or that plaintiff’s re cover y is barre d.” Pee k v. E

quipment Serv . Co. , 779 S.W .2d 802, 80516

(T e x. 19 89 ). As pr e vio us ly dis c us se d, any

c a us e of a c tio n a g a ins t the Attor

ne y Ap pe lle e s in

thi s c a se is b arr e d a s a ma tte r of law b y the lit ig a tio n p ri vil e g e . F ur the rm or e , w e have c on c lud e d th a t no c a us e of ac tion ex ists for frivolous filing unde r cha pter 9 of the ci vil practice and re medies code , that Z eifman ma

y not rec over on claims for abuse of proce ss or malicious prosec ution a s a matter of law,
and that Mi c he ls d id n ot o we Z e if man a du ty to dis c los e , and the re fo re is n ot s ub je c t to tor t li a bil ity for a ny nondisclosure. Summary judgme nt in this c ase was g rante d, not beca use Z eifman’ s petition fa ile d to state a

c a us e of a c tio n, bu t be c a

us e it af fi rm a tiv e ly de mon str a te d tha t all of his c la ims fa il
as a matter of law
. See B radt , 892 S.W .2d at 66 (“ Summary judgme nt is proper

wher e the plaintiff’ s alleg ations cannot c onstitut e a c ause of action as a

matt er o f l aw.”). As a r esult, we hold that Z eifman is not entitled to an opportunity to replea d. Z eifman’ s seventh issue is overr uled.
CO NC LU SION We h o l d t hat the trial c ourt did not err in g ranting summary judgme nt dismi ssing Z eifman’ s claims, but the claim of malicious prose cution should h a v e b e e n d is missed with prejudice. Acc ording ly , we r ever se the dismissal of the malicious pr o s ec ution claim without prejudice and re nd er j u d gm ent that it be dismissed with prejudice. The rema inder of the trial court’ s order is affirme d.

__________________ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __________________ Diane M. H enson, Jus tice Be fore J ustices Patterson, Waldrop and H enson Affir med in Part; Reverse d and Rende red in Part Filed: F ebrua

ry 12, 2009