DA 11 - 0404



### IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF MONTANA 2012 MT 143 BNSF RAILWAY COMPANY, Petitioner and Appellee, v. CHAD CRINGLE, Respondent and Appellant. APPEAL FROM: District Court o f the First Judicial District,

In and For the County of Lewis and Clark, Cause No. BDV 09 - 1016 Honorable Jeffrey M. Sherlock, Presiding Judge COUNSEL OF RECORD:

For Appellant: Peter M. Meloy ,Meloy Law Firm ,Helena, Montana Te rry N. Trieweiler ,Triewei ler Law Firm, Whitefish, Montana For Appellee: Jeff Hedger, Benjamin O. Rechtfertig; Hedger Friend, P.L.L.C.; Billings, Montana Submitted on Briefs: May 8 , 2012 Decided: July 5 , 2012

Filed:

__________________________________________ C lerk July 6 20122

Justice Beth Baker delivered the Opinion of the Court. ¶1 Chad Cringle appeals the order of the First Judicial District Court, Lewis and Clark County, remanding this case to the Montana Human Rights Commission for further proceedings in his discrimination complaint against BNSF Railway Company (BNSF). The dispositive issue on appeal is whether BNSF has demonstrated sufficient grounds to excu se its noncompliance with the fourteen -day filing deadline of § 49 -2 - 505(3)(c), MCA. ¶2 We rev

erse the District Court’s order and remand with instructions to deny BNSF’s petition for judicial review and to enter judgment in favor of Cringle.

**PROCEDURAL AND FACTUAL BACKGROUND** ¶3 This case is before the Court fo r a second time regarding the fourteen -day time limit for app eal t o the Human Rights Commission ( C ommission). BNSF Ry. Co. v. Cringle , 2010 MT 290, 359 Mont. 20, 247 P.3d 706. The background is su mmarized briefly before turning to the issue raised in the present appeal. ¶4 On July 7, 2008, Cringle filed a complaintwith the Montana Department of Labor and Industry charging that BNSF had illegally discriminated against him in employment. The comp laint was referred to a hearing o fficer for contested case proceedings. On May 1, 2009, the hearing o fficer granted summary judgment to Cringle on the issue of liability. The hearing

o fficer determined that BNSF had “engaged in and is liable for a discriminatory refusal to hire Cringle.” Following proceedings on the issues of damages and affirmativerelief, the hearing o fficer issued a final decision in Cringle’s favor on3

September 2, 20 09. That same day, the hearing officer issuednotice of his decision by ma ilto counsel for Cringle and to counsel for BNSF. ¶5 The hearing

officer’s decision and the notice of that decision were received at the office of BNSF’s counsel the next day, September 3. This was a “particularly busy day” at the law office , with staff working on a voluminous discovery project. The office was short - staffed and both documents were “set aside.” Nineteend ays elapsed. Then, on September 22, a leg

al s ecretary discovered the hearing officer’s decision and the notice “under papers” on her desk. B y that time, the decision had become final under § 49 -2 - 505(3)(c), MCA, w

hich states that if the hearing officer ’s decision is not appealed to the Commissionwithin fourteend ays after issuance of the notice, “the decision becomes final and is not appealable to district court.” ¶6 BNSF filed a notice of appeal to the Commissionu nder § 49 -2 - 505(4), MCA. BNSF also file d a requestto the Commissionf or an extension of time in which to file its notice of appeal. Citing Rule 24.9.113(3) of the Administrative Rules of Montana, BNSF arg ued that the time to file its appeal to the Commission could be enlarged for good cause. That rule provides: “Except as to dates fixed by statute and not subject to modification, the commission may enlarge the time to perform an act. I n accordance with Rule 6(b) of the Montana Rules of Civil Procedure, the time may be enlarged for good causeshown.” Cringle objected to BNSF’s request for an extension of time and arg ued that the filing

deadline is a “jurisdictional” bar that deprives the Commission of authority to entertain untimely appeals.4

¶7 The Commission entered an order on October 5, 2009,denying BNSF’s extension request and dismissing BNSF’s appeal. Based on the plain language of § 49 - 2 - 505(3)(c), MCA, the Commi ssion observed that the hearing o fficer’s decision became “f inal” on September 16, six days before BNSF filed its notice of appe al. ¶8 BNSF soughtj udicial review in the District Court of the Commission’s order dismissing its appeal. BNSF adv ised the District Courtthat the hearing officer’s decision and notice were “either misfiled or otherwise misplaced by counsel’s staff, and th e time in which to file a notice of appeal was accordingly not placed on counsel’s calendar.” BNSF arg

ued that theC ommissionh ad authority to extend the fourteen - day period for BNSF’s appeal from thehearing officer’s decision on the g round that filing p eriods are subject to “equitable modification.” BNSF asked the District Court to reverse the Commission’s decision d enying BNSF’s extension requesta nd to remand the matter to the Commission with instructions either to accept BNSF’s notice of appeal as timely or to consider in the first instance whether to grant BNSF’s extension request. ¶9 The Commission and Cringle filed separate motions to dismiss BNSF’s petition. The Commission argued that its decision was in accordance with § 49 - 2 - 505(3)(c), MCA, and th at it did not have discretion to extend the statutory deadline. Cringle arg ued, among other things, that the District Court could not review the hearing o fficer’s decision because the fourteen -day filing deadline of § 49 - 2 - 505(3)(c) and (4), MCA, is juris dictional. Alternatively, Cringle arg ued that even if the filing deadline is a “categorical time prescription,” rather than a jurisdictional limitation, the result is still the5

same. He observed that there is no language in § 49 - 2 - 505(3)(c), MCA, allowin g the deadline to be extended based on good cause. ¶10 The District Court concluded that § 49 - 2 - 505(3)(c), MCA, “limit[s] this Court’s jurisdiction” ov

er decisions of

the Department of Labor and Industry by requiring that they be appealed to the C ommission within fourteendays. Thus, because subject - matter jurisdiction cannot be forfeited or waived, the District Court decided that BNSF’s petition must be dismissed. The court also deniedBNSF’s alternative request for “ a writ of mandate, writ of review, or oth er appropriate writ” directing the Commission to entertain BNSF’s appeal. The court observed that the Commission “does not have authority to lengthen statutory deadlines.” Finally, the court granted Cringle’s and the Commission’s cross -petitions to enforce the hearing officer’s decision. ¶11 BNSF appealed to this Court and argued that the District Court had jurisdiction to rev iew the dismissal order under §§ 2 - 4 - 702 and 49 - 2 - 505(9), MCA, or alternative ly under § 2 -4 - 701, MCA. BNSF arg ued that the District Court had erred in interpreting the fourteen - day fil ing deadline as “jurisdictional,” anda sked th is Court to hold that the Commission “h as the authority to extend the deadline.” ¶12 This Court articulated one issue on appeal: “Does the 14 - day filing deadlin e in § 49 - 2 - 505(3)(c), MCA, deprive a district court of jurisdiction over matters arising between the parties after the deadline has expired?” Cringle , ¶¶ 3, 12. Weanswere d this question in the negative, concluding that the fourteen - day filing deadline is a procedural time bar, not a limitation on a district court’s jurisdiction. Cringle , ¶¶ 18, 20. Under § 2 -6

4 - 702, MCA, the District Court “possesses jurisdiction to hear the parties’ dispute and adjudicate their issues.” Cringle, ¶ 20. The Court remanded to the District Court to consider BNSF’s “alleged good cause that would justify its motion for an extension of time . ” Cringle, ¶ 28. If BNSF made a su fficient showing, then BNSF could p ursue its appeal of the hearing

o fficer’s decision to the Commis sion. Cringle , ¶ 28. Otherwise, the District Court was directed to deny BNSF’s request for an extension. Cringle , ¶ 28 . ¶13 The case now returns to this Court following the District Court’s determination on remand that BNSF has shown good cause for its untimely filing. The District Court cited three considerations in its ruling. F irst , the court observed that the fourteen - day filing period is “a very short procedural limitation which implicates due process rights for both claimants and respondents because valid claims can be lost because documents can easily be misplaced for that period of time.” Second, the court concluded that Cring le wou ld suffer no prejudice if the fourteen - day time bar were waived because, “[i]f successful, Cringle will be awarded hisattorney fees for being required to march through the administrative hoops, a likely appeal to this Court or federal court, and another appeal to the Montana Supreme Court or the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals.” Lastly, the court stated that “it does notappear BNSF has acted in bad faith in misplacing the documents for a short period of time and acted promptly once the documents were found.” ¶14 Alternatively, the District Court noted that under an equitable tolling or excusable neglect standard, BNSF had presented evidence which the court viewed “as justifying relief from the very short 14 - day administrative time bar.” The court reasoned that the7

interests of justice would be served by allowing BNSF’s appeal to the Commission. The court entered an order onJuly 11, 2011, remanding this case to the Commission. Cringle timely appealed. ¶15 We now clarify that, because § 49 - 2 - 505(3)(c), MCA, is a statutory time prescription that provides an inflexible rule of finality, “ good cause” for excusing non compliance withthe statute requires a showing of circumstances beyond the party’s reasonable control that prevented the party from timely filing its notice of appeal. Applying this principle, we conclude that BNSF has failed to justify relief from the time bar. **STAND ARD OF REVIEW**  ¶16 The parties dispute the applicable standard of review. Cringle argues that de novo rev iew applies, while BNSF arguesthat the standard is whether the District Courtabuse d itsdiscretion. We conclude that de nov o review applies to determinew hether the facts found by the District Court warrant a conclusion that BNSF presented circumstances sufficient to grant it an equitable exception from the statutory filing deadline. We apply de novo rev

iew to mixed questions of law and fact, including the district court’s application of controlling leg al principles to its factual findings. State v. W eaver , 2008 MT 86, ¶ 10, 342 M ont. 196, 179 P.3d 534. I n such cases, the district court’s factual findings will not be disturbed unless they are clearly erroneous. State v. Hass , 2011 MT 296, ¶ 13, 363 Mont. 8, 265 P.3d 1221. Thus, althoug h we review the District Court’s factual determinations for clear error, whether those facts satisfy the legal standard is8

rev iewed de nov

o. Citizens Right to Recall v. State , 2006 MT 192, ¶ 6, 333 Mont. 153, 142 P.3d 764; Davis v. State , 2008 MT 226, ¶ 10, 344 Mont. 300, 187 P.3d 654 ( “We rev iew de nov

o a trial court’s decision to deny a motion for equitable tolling where the underlying facts are undisputed.”) . We have recognized in other contexts that such a “bifurcated stand ardo f review affords appropriate deference to the trial court’s fact - finding role and responsibility, while providing this Court with the opportunity to rev iew leg al conclusions and the applicationo f legal standards de novo.” State v. Kaufman , 2002 MT 294, ¶ 12, 313 Mont. 1, 59 P.3d 1166. **DISCUSSION** ¶17 On appeal, as they did before the District Court, the parties dispute what standard BNSF had to satisfy

t o proceed with its appeal despite noncomplian ce with the appeal deadline . This Court did not elaborate on that question in Cringle . In our decision, we simply held that the deadline in § 49 - 2 - 505(3)(c), MCA, is a nonjurisdictional time bar that is subject to “constitutional review and equitable principles.” Cringle , ¶ 18. The Court cited the doctrine of equitable tolling as an example of equitable principles. Cringle , ¶ 18. I

n its remand instructions, the Court directed the District Court to “hear BNSF’s alleged good cause that would justify” anout -of - time appeal. Cringle , ¶ 28. ¶18 Cringle argues that the standard for extending a deadline which is categorical and contains no express exceptions

—like § 49 - 2 - 505(3)(c), MCA

—should be greaterthan the standard for extending a deadline which expressly is madesubject to exceptions such9

as “g ood cause” or “excusable neglect . ” He arg ues that the Court should interpret the “g ood cause” language of Cringle consistently with the standard for equitable tolling. ¶19 BNSF asserts that “traditional equitable tolling” is not the standard. Rather, focusing on the references in Cringle ’sremand instructionto g ood cause, BNSF argues the Court unequivocally adopted a good cause standard, which is “considerably more lenient” than equitable tolling. BNSF arg ues that th is Court should uphold the District Court’s ruling on the basis of the four- factor testwe articulated in N.W. Truck & Trailer Sales v. Dvorak, 265 Mont. 327, 334, 877 P.2d 31, 35 (1994), for considerationin assessing “excusable neglect or good cause” und er Mont. R. App. P. 5(c) (1993). ¶20 We disagree that Cringle ’s reference to “equitable principles” and “good cause” created a liberal standard for excusing non compliance with the categorical statutory time bar contained in § 49 - 2 - 505(3)(c), MCA. We reject BNSF’s analogy to Dvorak, which interpreted a rule of court that expressly allowed a good cause or excusable neglect exception. We leave for another day, however, Cringle’s argument that we shouldapply principles of equitable tolling to a party’s fa ilure to meet a categorical deadline imposed by statute. ¶21 Both in Cringle, where we remanded for a determination of “good cause,”andin Weidow v. Uninsured Employers’ Fund , 2010 MT 292, 359 Mont. 77, 246 P.3d 704, where we did apply equitable tolling, we empha sized “‘the importance of applying procedural bars regularly and consistently.’” Wei dow, ¶ 28; Cringle, ¶ 18 (citing cases). Firm deadlines for launching an appeal “advance the interests of the parties and the legal10

system in fair notice and finality.” Greenlaw v. U.S. , 554 U.S. 237, 252, 128 S. Ct. 2559, 2569 (2008). While weh averecog nized that equitable principles will in some cases excuse strict compliance with a categorical time bar, “good cause” for such relief necessarily requires a “leg ally suf ficient reason.” City of Helena v. Roan , 2010 MT 29, ¶ 13, 355 Mont. 172, 226 P.3d 601. Because categorical claim-processing rules are generally rigid, inflexible, and unalterable, Mi ller v. Eighteenth Jud. Dist. Ct. , 2007 MT 149, ¶ 44, 337 Mont. 488, 162 P.3d 121, it necessarily follows that a “legally sufficient reason” for excusing noncompliance with a categorical time prescription requires a greater and more demanding showing than a “legally sufficient reason” for excusing noncompliance with a statuteor r ule providing a good cause exception. While we have rejected a “one - size - fits - all approach”in the application of equitable principles, Wei dow, ¶ 28, a legally sufficient reason requires , at a minimum, reasonable effort to pursue one’s legal rights . Puhto v. Smith Funeral Chapels, Inc. , 2011 MT 279, ¶ 14, 362 Mont. 447, 264 P.3d 1142 (denying relief for a layperson’s “inattention to mail” ). As we noted in Puhto , “[l]itigants have a duty to monitor litigation.” Puhto , ¶ 10 (citing Caplis v. Caplis , 2004 MT 145, ¶ 24, 321 Mont. 450, 91 P.3d 1282 ). See also Irwin v. Dept. of Veterans Affairs , 498 U.S. 89, 96, 111 S. Ct. 453 , 458 ( 1990) (characterizing an attorney’s failure to timely discover EEOC notice as a lack of “diligence in preserving his legal rights.”). ¶22 In this reg

ard, we reject BNSF’s characterization of the fourteen -day filing deadline as merely “an internal agency claim-processing rule.” As the C ommission pointed out in the District Court , the Montana Human Rights Act ’s short deadlines are11

designed to bring about prompt resolution of discrimination claims. See generally Title 49, chapter 2, part 5, MCA. Section 49 - 2 - 505(3)(c), MCA, mandates that a hearing officer’s decision is “final” unless it is appe aled to the Commission within fourteen days after issuance of the notice of decision. This period

—“short”though it may be

— reflects th e l egislature’s general intent to expedite discrimination claims. I t is therefore appropriateto excuse non compliance with the Human Rights Act ’sappeal deadline only wherethe parties have acted with reasonabl e diligenceto preserve their leg al rig hts but have been prevented from doing so by circumstances reasonably beyond their control . ¶23 We therefore conclude, as we did in Arthur v. Pierre Ltd ., 2004 MT 303, ¶ 42, 323 Mont. 453, 100 P.3d 987, that it is unnecessary to determine in this case whether the e quitable tolling doctrine recognized in federal discrimination cases ( e.g., Irwin , 498 U.S. at 96 , 111 S. Ct. at 458 ) should apply to the deadlines imposed by the Montana Human Rights Act. E ven under a “g ood cause” standard, as discussed abov e, BNSF is no t entitled to relief. In this case, BNSF had participated in contested case proceedings with a full opportunity to present evidence and legal argument. I t was represented by experienced legal counsel, familiar with the Human Rights Act’s processes, who reasonably knew or should have known the importance of responding quickly to the h earing o fficer’s d ecisions but simply “made a mistake.” There is no evidence that BNSF was prevented by any factor outside its control from timely filing its appeal. Althoug h BNSF disputes whether Cringle would suffer prejudice if the appeal were allowed to proceed, we conclude that consideration of potential prejudice to Cringle is12

not controlling under the circumstances presented in this case. M isplacement of the h earing o fficer’s decisionin counsel’s office fails to establish reasonable steps to preserve BNSF’s leg

al rig hts . Counsel’s fa ilureto discov er the notice did not constitute sufficient causefor relief from its untimely notice of appeal. ¶24 The July 11, 2011 order o f the District Court is reversed. On remand, the court is directed to deny BNSF’s petition for judicial review and to enter judgment in favor of Cringle . /S/ BETH BAKER We concur: /S/ MIKE McGRATH /S/ JAMES C. NELSON /S/ MICHAEL E WHEAT /S/ PATRICIA COTTER /S/ BRIAN MORRIS Justice Brian Morris, specially concurring. ¶25 I join in the Court’s decision because the facts do not warrant our exercise of equitable powers. I

w rite separately to reiterate that we rejected in Wei dow “ any one size - fits - all approach” when addressing a limitation sp eriod. Wei dow, ¶ 28. Equity allows courts to evaluate the circumstances and reasons for why a party failed to comply with a limitations period. Wei dow, ¶ 28. This equitable power proves particularly critical when a limitations period would deprive a party of his rights and where, simultaneously,13

enforcing the limitations period would serve no policy purpose. Wei dow, ¶ 28. Equity ensures just results in exception alcircumstances. Cringle , ¶ 18. /S / BRIAN MORRIS Justice Michael E Wheat joins in the special concurring Opinion of Justice Morris. /S/ MICHAEL E WHEAT Justice James C. Nelson, concurring. ¶26 I join the Court’s Opinion, which I believe correctly resolves this case based on th e law of the case established in Cringlea nd on the factual circumstances presented by BNSF on remand. I write separately to clarify my views concerning the application of common - law equitable exceptions to categorical time prescriptions. ¶27 In resisting BNS F’s motion for an extension of time in which to file an appeal to the Human Rights Commission, Cringle invoked the notion that the 14 - day filing deadline is “jurisdictional.” We made clear in Cringlethat this deadline

—and procedural time bars generally

—are not jurisdictional ( in the sense that they do not deprive a court of subject - matter jurisdiction). Cringle , ¶¶ 16 -20. I n so doing, we observed that “[p] rocedural time bars, like the 14 -day filing deadline in § 49 -2 - 505(3)(c), MCA, remain subject to co nstitutional review and equitable principles. ” Cringle , ¶ 18. There is no question that procedural time bars are subject to constitutional challenge and review. On14

this point, we were unanimous. See Cringle , ¶ 18 (opinion of the Court); Cringle , ¶ 39 (Rice, J., dissenting). Upon further research and reflection, however, I have reconsidered our suggestion that all

p rocedural time bars are subject to judicially crafted equitable exceptions. Cringle , ¶ 18. I h ave now concluded that this proposition is incorrect. Rather, each categorical time prescription must be analyzed individually, within its statutory context and framework, s o as to effect legislativeintent . (The same principle would apply to categorical time bars contained within rules of court.) ¶28 The Supreme Court’s equitable tolling jurisprudence provides some useful insights in this regard. In Irwin v. Dept. of Veterans Affairs , 498 U.S. 89, 111 S. Ct. 453 (1990), the Supreme Court observedthat time requirements in lawsuits between private litigants, including the statutory time limits applicable to lawsuits against private employers under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 , “ are customarily subject to ‘equitable tolling.’ ” 498 U.S. at 95, 111 S. Ct. at 457. The Supreme Court noted, h owever, that this “presumption of equitable tolling” is “rebuttable.” Irwin , 498 U.S. at 95 -96, 111 S. Ct. at 457. In order to honor legislative intent, the Irw in presumption is rebutted where “there [is] good reason to believe that Congress did not wantthe equitable tolling doctrine to apply.” United States v. Brockamp , 519 U.S. 347, 350, 117 S. Ct. 849, 851 (1997) (emphasis in original). Thus, the Supreme Court has stated that“[e]quitable tolling is not permissiblewhere it is inconsistent with the text of the relevant statute.” United States v. Beggerly , 524 U.S. 38, 48, 118 S. Ct. 1862, 1868 (1998); accord Young v. United States , 535 U.S. 43, 49, 122 S. Ct. 1036, 1040 (2002) (“It is hornbook law that limitations15

periods are customarily subject to equitable tolling, unless tolling would be inconsistent with the text of the relevant statute .” (citation sand internal quotation marks omitted)). ¶29 The tax statute under consideration in Brockamp , for example, set forth its time limitations “in unusually em phatic form.” 519 U.S. at 350, 117 S. Ct. at 851. Moreover, it set forth “explicit exceptions to its basic time limits, and those very specific exception s d [id] not include ‘equitable tolling.’ ” Brockamp , 519 U.S. at 351, 117 S. Ct. at 85 2 . The Supreme Court concluded , therefore, that Congress did not intend courts to read “unmentioned, open - ended, ‘equitable’ exceptions into the statute that it wrote.” Brockamp , 519 U.S. at 35 2 , 117 S. Ct. at 85 2 . Conversely, the Supreme Court concluded in Holland v. Florida , ___ U.S. ___, 130 S. Ct. 2549 (2010), that the timeliness provision in the federal habeas corpus statute issubject to equitable tolling. Among other things, the Supreme Court observed that the statute did not contain“ unusually emphatic” langu ag e and that equitable tolling would not undermine the statute’s basic purposes. Holland, 130 S. Ct. at 2561 - 62 (internal quotation marks omitted). ¶30 Following this log ic, the application of common - law equitable doctrines to categorical statutory time bars is a two - step process: f irst, determine whether the Legislature intended to preclude the application of equitable exceptions to the time bar at issue; second, if the Legislature did intend to preclude equitable exceptions, then the time bar must be enforc ed (absent a successful constitutional challenge), but if the Legislature did not intend to preclude equitable exceptions, then determine whether the claimed equitable exception applies on the facts presented. Whether the Legislature intended the16

courts t o read “unmentioned, open - ended, ‘equitable’ exceptions into the statute that it wrote,” Brockamp , 519 U.S. at 35 2 , 117 S. Ct. at 85 2 , is a preliminary question because equitable exceptions are not permissible where they are “inconsistent with the text of the relevant statute,” Beggerly , 524 U.S. at 48, 118 S. Ct. at 1868. ¶31 In Lozeau v. GEICO Indem. Co. , 2009 MT 136, 350 Mont. 320, 207 P.3d 316, the go verning time prov

ision stated: “ Except as prov ided in 27 - 2 - 216 and 27 - 2 -217, the period prescribed for the commencement of an action upon a liability not founded upon an instrument in writing is within 3 years.” S ection 27 - 2 -204(1), MCA ; see also Lozeau , ¶ 13 . This is not the sort of “unusually emphatic” statutory language that would preclude the application of equitable exceptions. Indeed, we applied our equitable tolling doctrine to Lozeau’s late - filed claim. Lozeau , ¶¶ 14 - 21. I n the present case, in contrast, the timing prov

ision states that an appeal may be filed with the Commission within 14 days af

ter n otice of the hearing officer’s decisioni s issued , but if the appeal is not filed within 14 days, “the decision becomes final and is not appealable to district court.” Section 49 - 2 - 505(3)(c), (4), MCA (emphasis added) . It is one thing for the Legislature to provide a mechanism for obtaining rev iew and to include a filing deadline. I n that situation, equitable doctrines may be available to excuse noncompliance with the deadline. But it is quite another when the Legislature goes further and dictates that a decision “is not appealable” if it is not appealed within the specified timeframe. In that situation, it is not the prerogative of the courts to ignore the Legislature’s clear and unequivocal pronouncement and to graft equitable exceptions onto the st atute. I n my17

view, the language “is not appealable” is a clear directive not to apply equitable exceptions to the filing deadline. It is “ ‘ an inflexible rule requiring dismissal whenever ’ its ‘ clock has run. ’ ” Holland, 130 S. Ct. at 2560 ( quoting Day v. McDonough , 547 U.S. 198, 208, 126 S. Ct. 1675, 1683 (2006) ); see also Cringle , ¶ 35 (Rice, J., dissenting). ¶32 I stand by

our holding in Cringlewith regard to the District Court’s erroneous “jurisdiction” rationale. 1 But ,f or the reasons discussed above , I n ow conclude that we should not have crafted an equitable exception to the filing deadline of § 49 - 2 - 505(3)(c), MCA. For purposes of

futurecases, if the 14 - day deadline is timely raised

— by the party who would benefit from it, by the Commission , or by the district court , see Cringle , ¶¶ 18, 25

—I believe it must be enforced, subject to constitutional challenge and rev iew. F or purposes of thisc ase, however, the law established in Cringlerequires that we apply a “good cause” analysis to BNSF’s motion. Cringle , ¶ 28. I believe the Court does so correctly, and I accordingly join the Court’s Opinion. ¶33 I concur. /S/ JAMES C. NELSON Justices Patricia O. Cotter and Jim Rice join the Concurrence of Justice James C. Nelson. /S/ PATRICIA COTTER /S/ JIM RICE

1 Additionally, I continue to believe that Wei dow was correctly decided on the facts specific to that case. I would not, however, enlarge that decision beyond its facts.