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Filed 8/23/22 Mejia v. San Francisco Assessor Recorder CA1/2

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for 

publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or 

ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115. 

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION TWO

JOSE MEJIA,

Plaintiff and Appellant,

v.

SAN FRANCISCO ASSESSOR

RECORDER,

Defendant and Respondent.

 A164132

 (San Francisco City & County

 Super. Ct. No. CPF-21-517388)

After petitioner Jose Mejia defaulted on a loan secured by a deed of 

trust on real property on Meda Avenue in San Francisco, the property was 

sold at a trustee’s sale. Mejia later submitted a form to the San Francisco 

Assessor Recorder purporting to transfer his lender’s interest in the property 

to himself. The trial court denied Mejia’s petition for a writ of administrative 

mandamus directing the recorder’s office to accept the form for filing, and 

Mejia appeals in propria persona. We affirm.

BACKGROUND

In 2013, petitioner Jose Mejia and his wife Cindy Mejia mortgaged real 

property on Meda Avenue in San Francisco, borrowing $326,700 from 

JPMorgan Chase Bank, NA (Chase). Two additional loans were later secured 

by the Meda Avenue property, including a $106,000 loan made by Bank of 

America, N.A., secured by a deed of trust recorded on May 19, 2016. 
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On January 22, 2019, a notice of default was recorded on the Meda 

Avenue property because the $106,000 loan was in default. 

On April 25, a notice of trustee sale was recorded, and on May 23, the 

property was sold at a trustee sale. On June 12, a trustee’s deed was 

recorded indicating that Paper Atlas had acquired the property and the 

unpaid debt on loans secured by the property. 

On September 12, Mejia submitted a “Change of Ownership Statement” 

on Form BOE-502 to the San Francisco Assessor Recorder’s Office requesting 

a transfer to “Jose Mejia sole owner, correction due to slander of title by 

Paper Atlas.” 

On April 17, 2020, a deed of reconveyance was recorded acknowledging 

the payment of the Chase mortgage and indicating Chase no longer held a 

security interest in the property. 

On January 19, 2021, Mejia attempted to record a grant deed with the 

San Francisco Assessor Recorder’s Office seeking to transfer JP Morgan 

Chase’s interest in the property to himself. That recording was rejected 

because the legal description of the property, the grantor’s signature, and 

notarization of the grantor’s signature were all missing. 

On March 4, Mejia filed a petition for writ of administrative mandamus 

in San Francisco Superior Court, and on August 28, an amended petition. 

The petition sought a writ of mandate, pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure 

1094.5, directing the recorder’s office to “accept and file” a “Change of 

Ownership Statement” on Form BOE-502, attached as an exhibit to the 

petition. The form, dated March 3, purported to transfer Chase’s interest in 

the property to Mejia. Under “Type of Transfer,” the box “Other” was 

checked, followed by the text “Trustee has been paid.” 
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On November 12, the trial court sustained the San Francisco Assessor

Recorder’s demurrer to the amended petition:

“Respondent San Francisco Assessor Recorder’s demurrer to petitioner 

Jose Mejia’s ‘ammended [sic] petition for writ of adminisdtrative [sic] 

mandamus’ is sustained on each of its three grounds. First, the petition is 

unverified and thus procedurally defective. Second, a writ of administrative 

mandamus addresses a ‘final administrative order or decision made as a 

result of a proceeding in which by law’ a hearing is held, evidence taken and 

facts determined. ([Code Civ. Proc., §] 1094.5[, subd.] (a).) The filing and 

recording of title documents is not such an order or decision, so the petition 

fails to state a cognizable claim. Third, petitioner fails to plead that he had 

an ownership interest in 48 Meda Avenue, San Francisco, when the Chase 

loan secured by that property was paid off. The petition thus again fails to 

state a claim. Respondent points out that petitioner has a pending federal 

suit against Chase in the Northern District of California that regards 

48 Meda: No. 21-CV-01351-HSG. I thus exercise my inherent power to stay 

petitioner’s writ proceeding in this court pending resolution of the federal 

suit.[1] (OTO, L.L.C. v. Kho (2019) 8 Cal.5th 111, 141.)” 

Mejia filed a notice of appeal. 

DISCUSSION

Mejia has chosen to represent himself on appeal, as is his right. In 

doing so, however, he is still held to the same standard as an attorney. (See 

1 Mejia filed a diversity action in federal court alleging breach of 

contract and negligence claims against Chase arising from the financing and 

sale of the property. The district court dismissed the action for failure to 

state a claim and the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed. (See Mejia v. 

JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A. (9th Cir. Apr. 19, 2022, No. 21-16550) 2022 WL 

1154762 [nonpub. opn.].) 
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Rappleyea v. Campbell (1994) 8 Cal.4th 975, 984–985; Nelson v. Gaunt (1981) 

125 Cal.App.3d 623, 638–639; Taylor v. Bell (1971) 21 Cal.App.3d 1002, 

1009.) Self-representation is not a ground for lenient treatment, and “as is 

the case with attorneys, pro. per. litigants must follow correct rules of 

procedure.” (Nwosu v. Uba (2004) 122 Cal.App.4th 1229, 1247.) In sum, 

Mejia “ ‘is entitled . . . [to] no greater consideration than other litigants and 

attorneys [citations], [but] is held to the same restrictive rules of procedure as 

an attorney [citation].’ ” (County of Orange v. Smith (2005) 132 Cal.App.4th 

1434, 1444.)

In addition, as an appellant it is Mejia’s “responsibility to affirmatively 

demonstrate error,” and he must show such error “by citation to the record 

and any supporting authority. In other words, review is limited to issues 

which have been adequately raised and briefed.” (Lewis v. County of 

Sacramento (2001) 93 Cal.App.4th 107, 116; see Eisenberg et al., Cal. 

Practice Guide: Civil Appeals and Writs (The Rutter Group 2021) ¶ 8:17.1 

[“When appellant asserts a point but fails to support it with reasoned 

argument and citations to authority, the court may treat it as waived and 

pass it without consideration”].) Specifically, “Each brief must: [¶] . . . State 

each point under a separate heading or subheading summarizing the point, 

and support each point by argument and, if possible, by citation of authority.” 

(Cal Rules of Court, rule 8.204(a)(1)(B).) And “[a]n appellant’s opening brief 

must: [¶] . . . (C) Provide a summary of the significant facts limited to 

matters in the record.” (Cal Rules of Court, rule 8.204(a)(2)(C).)

Mejia has filed a 9-page opening brief, including a cover page, a table of 

contents, and a two-page proof of service. The remaining five pages consist of

a very brief statement of the case, a three page “Table of Authorities,” setting 
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forth in full certain sections of the Code of Civil Procedure, as well as part of 

the instructions for form BOE-502, and the following: 

“STATEMENT OF FACTS

“Chase Bank issued the Petitioner an Instrument of Title (Gov Code 

27381)(Gov Code 27279) after having satisfied his mortgage loan.

“San Francisco Assessor Recorder accepted and recorded the Title 

Instrument. (IAA9) 

“As required by the State of California, Petitioner submitted form BOE502, Pertinent under Instructions for Part 1 letter I, to the San Francisco 

Assessor Recorder. (IAA30)

“CONCLUSION

“Petitioner submits to the Appellate Court the call for the San 

Francisco Assessor Recorder as recipient to a Writ of Mandate to accept for 

filing form BOE-502 which would complete the recordation of the transfer of 

beneficial interest from the Trustee(Chase) to the Trustor(Jose Mejia).” 

Under the principles set forth above, Mejia’s opening brief is 

inadequate. To begin with, it does not provide a summary of the significant

facts. For example, it does not even mention the Bank of America loan on the 

property, the default on that loan, the 2019 trustee’s sale, or the 2020 deed of 

reconveyance—creating the misleading impression that Mejia is requesting 

that the recorder’s office perform a ministerial duty rather than attempting 

to recover title to the property after losing it in foreclosure. Furthermore, as 

noted, the trial court sustained the demurrer on three separate grounds: that 

the petition was unverified and thus procedurally defective; that a writ of 

administrative mandamus cannot address filing and recording of title 

documents because no hearing was held, evidence taken, or facts determined 

under Code of Civil Procedure 1094.5; and that he failed to plead that he had 
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any ownership interest in the property at the time the Chase loan was paid 

off. Mejia’s brief does not even describe any of these grounds for the trial 

court’s decision, much less offer any argument or citation to authority 

showing why the trial court’s reliance on them was in error. In short, Mejia

has failed to adequately brief the issues, and he has not carried his burden to 

affirmatively demonstrate error. 

DISPOSITION

The judgment is affirmed. 
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_________________________

Richman, Acting P. J.

We concur:

_________________________

Miller, J.

_________________________

Mayfield, J. *

Mejia v. San Francisco Assessor Recorder (A164132) 

*Superior Court of Mendocino County, Judge Cindee Mayfield, sitting as 

assigned by the Chief Justice pursuant to article VI, section 6 of the California 

Constitution.