### IN THE COURT OF APP EALS OF TENNESS EE AT NAS HVILLE A SS IG N E D O N BR IE FS MA Y 29, 200 7
IRIN A N
. P A R R IS v. JE R R A L D
. P A R R IS

Direc t Appeal from the Chancer y Court for G rundy Cou nty No. 5242 Bud dy D. P err y, Judge, By Designation

No. M2006–02068- COA-R3- CV - F iled Septem ber 18, 2007

This is a post-divorce case involving several issues stemming from a modific ation of child support and custody

hear ing a nd order resulting from that hear ing. T he par ties were divorce d in 2003, and the pe rm ane nt p are nti ngpla n wa s file d on Nov e mbe r 10, 20 03

. Wif e re ta ine d cu sto dy of

the pa rt ie s’ two minor ch i l d re n . Husband wa s to pay Wife $1,250 a month child support. I n 2005, Husband filed motions to review a nd revise both the c ustody and visitation arra

ng eme n t s co ntained in the perma nent par enting plan and his child support oblig ation. The court treated Husband’s motions as
a pe tit ion fo r mod if

ic atio n of cu sto dy and

c hil d s up po rt . H us ba

nd re pr e se nte d h ims e lf

pro se on July 17, 2006, at the petiti on hear ing. The court enter ed an order on August 21, 2006, finding no materia l
c ha ng e of c i r c u m s t an c e an d thu s , W i f

e r e t a i n e d

c u s t o dy o f th e tw o c h i l dr e n
. T h e o r d e r a l so incre ased H usband’s c hild support obligation. Fina lly , the cour t found Husband in conte mpt of court and sentenced him to five day s in jail with $1,000 bond. Husband appe als, arguing that 1) the cour t err ed in findingno materia l chang e of c ircums t an ce ; 2 ) the cour t erre d in the finding s conce rning both Husband and Wife’ s income per taining to the c hild support; and 3) the c ourt err ed in finding Husband in conte mpt. W e af firm.

Te nn. R . A pp. P . 3 ; A ppe al a s o f Rig ht ; J udgm e ntof t he Cha nc e r y C our t A ffirm e d & Rem anded
A L AN E. H I G H ERS , J ., delivere d the opinion of the cour t, in which D AVI D R. F ARMER , J ., and H O LLY M. K I RBY , J ., joined.

J anelle A . Simm ons, Cherie L . Cash-Rutledg e, Na shville, TN, for Appe llant
Eric J. Burc h, Manche ster, TN, f or Appe lleeT he p art i es’ b ri ef s cl ai m the d at e o f

d i vo rce is M ay 5 , but i n a pe t i t i o n f o r cont em p t f

o und i n t he reco rd, t he 1 d a te is sa id to b e M a y 6 . In a n y e v e n t, the e x a c t d a te o f t h e d ivo rc e is no t a c o n te ste d issu e in this a p p e a l.
-2- OP IN ION

I. F A C TS & P R OC EDU R A L H I S T ORY
On May 5, 20 03 , the Cha

nc e ry Court fo r G ru nd y County , T e nn e sse e , g ra

nte d Iri na N. Parr is 1 (“Wife” or “A

ppellee” ) and Jerra l D. Parris (“Husband” or “A ppellant”) an absolute divorc e. The Permane nt ParentingPlan was filed on November 10, 2003, and the c ourt approve d it on Febr uary 6, 20 04 . T he c ourt

awa rd e d Wif e c us tod y of the pa rt ie s’ tw o min or c hil dr e n, and Hu sb and ’s c hil d support obligation was $1,250.
Husband filed a

motion pr o s e on Janu ary 20 , 2 00 5, re qu e sti ngthat th e c ourt re du c e his c hil d support obligation. Husband then filed a motion to alter or amend the judg ment on Marc h 28, 2005,
re qu e sti ngthat th e c ourt re vie w a nd re vis e the c us tod

y and vis itatio n a

rr ang e me nt, and

a g a in
re qu e sti ngtha

t th e c ourt

re du c e his c hil d sup po rt ob lig a tio n. Wif e mov e d to di smi ss f

or fa ilure to state a c laim for which relief ma y be g rante d, pointing out that Husband should have filed a pe tition to modify

in s te a d o f a mo ti o nto a lt e r

o r ame n d th e ju d g me n t. O nAp r il 1 5 , 2 0 0 5 , Ju d g e Buddy Perry denied Husba

nd’s motion to reduce his child support obligation. After numerous motions filed by Husband, th e co u rt enter ed an or der on Ma rch 15, 2006, in whic h the cour t treate d Husband’s prior motions as a petition for modification of custody and child support. At the petition hear ing on J uly 17, 2006, Husband re prese nted himself pr o s e
. The trial c ourt hear d testimony

from the following six wit nesses: Husband; Wife; Judge L arr y Ross; Tami P oston Ross; Debra L inder; and Jimm y L ewis. Husband first called Wife a s a witness, and a s to the custody issue, Husband introduce d three photogr aphs depictingWife’s house. The two photogr aphs, take n in 2006, depicted Wife’s f ront porch piled wi t h box es and othe r debr is. The third photog raph of Wife’s front porc h was take n in 2002, when Wife moved into the house. Husband c ontended that it looked like there w as excreme nt on the porch, but Wife said that “I cannot tell y ou what’s ther e on the front por ch.” Wife te stified that she holds yard sales from time to time, a nd that she stores the y ard sa le items in box es on her front porc h. Husband a sked Wife if she wa s embarr assed a bout th e w ay h e r

f r o n t p o r c h l o o k e d , an d W i f e s a i d n o , “ [ i ] t ’ s n e a t l y s t a c k e d i n b o x e s
. . . o u to f th e w ay. Do e s n o t p r e s e n t a

n y f ir e h a zar d a s y o u [‘ r e ] im p ly in g
. . . . D o o r a c c e s s is c o mp le tely fre e and windows [are] completely fre e.” Husband a lso questioned Wife conce rningher boy friend, to whic h Wife admitted that she and the c hildren spent one night at the boyfriend’ s house due to bad w eathe r.
As to Wi fe ’s fi na

nc ia l con dit ion , she te sti fi e d that she make s a livin g a s a te a c he r’ s a ssi sta nt, with gr oss wag es of around $715 a month. Wife also supplements her income by maintaining a

nd rentingsix homes. Wife additionally ear ned ar ound $1,200 helping prepa re tax returns. A s to her expenses, Wife testified that she purc hased a new c ar w ith a $10,000 down pay ment and make s monthly p ay

me n ts

. InD e c e mb e r

2 0 0 5 , w h e n

Wi f e p ur c h a s e d

th e c ar , s h e h a d

in h e r c h e c k ing
acc ount around $20,000. Wife’s testimony also reve aled that Wife took a vacation with her two-3-

children on a

cruise. Wife is or igina lly from the f ormer c ountry

of Ukra ine, and Husba

nd questioned Wif e c on c e rn inghe r k

no wl e dg e of

the Uk ra ine ’s ho us ingan d

e c o n o m i c s itu a tio n, a sk ingWif e , “ Di d I send i nformation to y ou that y ou could be paid $85,000 a y ear to return to the Ukr aine a

nd help the people f ind housing? ” Wife’s counsel objected to the r eleva nce of the question, and the judg e tried to c lari fy wh at po int

Hu sb and wa s tr yingto c onve y

wi th t he fo llo wi nge xch ang e :
The Court: Your [ s i c] proposing that she [ Wife] should take the

tw o g i r l s an d

g o b a c k t o th e U k r a i n e ?
Mr. Parris: Well, why not? Not fore ver. Th e Court : I ’m

a sk ing , is that wh a t you ’r e pr op os ingsh e sh ou ld do?
Mr. Parris: Right, to enroll them in a Montessori school there and

sh e he lp h e r c ountr

y me n, 25 ,0 00 pe op le in the str e e ts without homes, and she’s g ot the s k i l l s and $85,000 salary , USA I D. She speaks the languag e.
Whe n a sk e d wh at he do e s f or a liv ing , H us ba

nd te sti fi e d th a t he is a

po e t, b ut t

hat he is a lso sole proprie tor of Ha

rmony Industries, a c o n s t ru ct i on company . Husband c laimed he c ould not
reme mber submitting to the court his H armony Industries chec k rec ord, and the court interjec ted that

“ y ou e ith e r g ive me c or

re c t inf or matio n or I ’m g oin g to d

ra w s ome a ssumpt ion s a

bo ut your a

bil ity to e arn . N owy ou

c an p lay g ame s o r n ot, so I ’m

putti ngy ou

on no tic e abo ut what’ s g oin g to ha pp e n. ” Hu sb and

c la ime d th at hi s in c ome fo r bot h 200 4 an d 200 5 wa s zer o, and that hi s in c ome for 2006 wa s “minus zero.” Wife’s counsel asked Husband if he knew that betwee n April 2005 and April 2006, total deposits in his Harmony Industries che ckingacc ount were $237,692.76; Husband responde d that it could have, but that “I could s ay that I took in 210,000 and spent 230,000, so there y ou have it.” T he bala

nce of Har mony Industries’ ac count on April 1 7 , 2 0 0 6, was $42,000; on De c e mbe r 6 , 2 00 5, Ha

rm ony Ind us tr ie s d e po sited $ 33 ,9 90 . H us ba nd a lso ow ns re nta l pr op e rt ie s, including one renta l that g ener ates $350 a mont h, and si x renta l cabins. Husband also admitted that his girlf riend re g ularly

spends the nig ht at his home when the c hildren ar e pre sent. Concerning his two children, H usband re iterate d that he believe d it in the best interest of the
c h i l dr e nth atW i f

e m o v e t o th e U kr a i n e an d th e y g o w i t h h e r : “ I d i d n ’ ts ay th e y w o u l d g o t o s t ay, they wo u l d g o to learn, to a school, and if the e nvironment is a little bit dange rous, then so be it.” Hu s b an d al s o t es t i fi ed th ath e h adb ee ns en t en ce d t o s erv e 2 1 0 d ay s fo r a t t em p t edex t o rt i o no f J u d ge L arr y Ros s.
Duri ngthe c ours e of the he ari ng , Hus ba nd e ng a g e d in nume ro us arg ume nts wi th t

he c ourt

. Judg e Pe rr

y wa rn e d H us ba

nd at le a st f ive tim e s th a t if his be havio r pe rs ist e d, he wo uld be he ld i n contempt of c ourt. The f irst warningcame afte r the judg e excluded, upon Wif e’s c ounsel’s ob je c tio n, a ps y c ho log ic a l e va luatio n p e rf or me d p ri or to t he date of the div or c e :-4- The Court: I f it happene d prior to the divorce decr ee I sustain the

ob je c tio n. We’ re tr

ying wh a t ha

pp e ne d f ro m th e date of t he divorce forward, and y our burde n is to show a chang e of circ umstances from the date of the divorce forwa rd . . . .

Mr. Parris: As to custo d y ? I n o t h er wo rd s , an y t h ing in that pe rs on’s histo ry

that th e y ’v e do ne be fo re a c e rt a in d at e h a s n o r e f

l e c t i o no nc u s t o dy.
The Court: T h e issue here is from the date of the di vorce decr ee

fo rw ard , a

nd that’ s w hat w e ’r e loo kin g a t.
Mr. Parris: Even thoug h that a - - The Court: Sir, I ’m not here to be your leg al adviser , and I can’ t do that. I ’m not here to eng ag e in arguments with y ou about the law. I

think I ’m corr ect ab o ut it. I f I ’m incorre ct, you g et it review ed at the ne x t step.
Mr . Pa rr is: So c an Ic lari fy

wh a t th e Court

sa id? The Court

sa id that I ’m not - -
The Court: I ’m saying my obliga t i o n i s t o not retry the divorce
c a se . I do n’ t do that.
Mr. Parris: Even thoug h Ielec ted not to have a defa ult trial - -

. . . Th e Court : I ’m tel li ng y ou, the ru lin g I ’m g ivi ng y ou is e xac tly

the ruli ng I would g ive a lawy er that’s standing there

. Th at’ s th e ru lin g s you ’r e e nti tle d to . I ’ve r ule d, a sk y our next question.

Mr

. Parr is: Yo ur Ho no r, I have a ps y c ho log ic a l e va luatio n of thi s woman [W ife] that was made b ef o re the divorce decr ee.
The Court: Sir - -
Mr. Parris: And I ’m asking- --5- The Court: You’re about to approa ch the point of contempt, and

y ou know what I ’ll do if Id o t h at

. . . . Don’t stand there and continue to argue with me, beca use I ’m not eng ag ing in a

n argument with you. Idon’t do lawy ers that way and I ’m surely

not goingto let y ou do it that
w ay.
Mr. Parris: Well, is a psy chol o gi cal evaluation that’s been done

on thi s w oma

n p e rm iss ibl e in t

he c us tod y tr ia l?
The Court: I f it was prior to the divor ce de cre e it’s not . . . . Mr. Parris: Okay . And the fac t that I ’m entitled to a def ault jury trial and I elec ted not - -
The Court: We’ve had that discussion and I ’m not g oing ba ck and

havingit [ with] y ou ag ain.

Hu sb and c on tin

uo us ly atte mpt e d to t e sti fy duri nghis dir e c t e xami natio n o f o the r w itn e sse s. DuringHusband’s dire ct examination of Wife, the judg e notified Husba nd that “I ’m rea chingthe point that y ou either start asking questions or I ’m g oing to sta rt holding y ou in contempt,” and that Husband must “either

do it properly

[question the witness instead of trying to testify] or y ou’re g oing to f a c e the c on se qu e nc e s f

or it. No w, if

y ou wa nt t o tr y me , g o a head.” Th e next w arn ingc ame wh e n H us ba

nd c on du c ted h is d ir e c t e xami natio n o f Jud g e L arr y Ros s, wh o w a s invo lve d in Husband’s pr evious extortion t rial. Husband questioned J udg e R oss conce rningmatters involved with the previous trial held in Warren County , Tenne ssee, to which Wife’ s counsel objec ted. The court sustained the objection, and a fter se vera l more sustained o b je ctions involving questions related to J udg e Ross’s own per sonal divorce , the identity of his ex-wife, and the name of his child from that pr e vio us marr ia g e , th e c ourt wa rn e d H us ba

nd a g a in that “th e ne xt time y ou do it I ’m g oin g to h old y ou in contempt of cour

t and y ou’re g oing to end up in jail. Now play howeve r y ou want to play .” Husband a g ain tried to bring up the s ame issue conce rning J udg e R oss’s divorce , and ag ain the cour t told Husband that “if you g o there ag ain I ’m g oing to f ind y ou in contempt and put you in jail, and I ’m rea dy to do that at t his point, and I don’t think y ou believe me, so it’s g oing to ha ppen I suspect very quickly .” Husba

nd called T ami Poston R oss, wife of Judge Ross and former counsel for Wife duringthe divorce proce eding s, as a witness. Husba nd likewise asked her que stions concer ning the
atte mpt e d e xtor

tio n tr ia l and qu est ions r e latin g to H us ba nd and Wif e ’s div or c e pr oc e e din g s. Husband a lso questioned her c oncer ning a n incident, appa

rently prior to the divorc e, in which she
c a lle d the po lic e be c a

us e Hu sb and

wo uld no t le ave he r o ff

ic e . H us ba

nd the n s tate d th a t “ Idid

n’ t ju st barg e in [to t he off

i ce ] , ” and a sked her , “How quic kly should a person le ave?” The court then
su sta ine d a

n o bje c tio n to the re le va

nc e of thi s li ne of qu est io ni ng. Hus ba nd c a lle d a s a

wi tne ss Debr a L inder, for

the sole purpose of serving her a cer tified letter pertaining to what appe ars to be the pr ior div or c e pr oc e e din g s. Hu sb and ’s qu e sti on ing of Jimmy L e wi s, a re tir e d poli c e of fi c e r, de a lt with whether

he eve r saw Wife a fra id, and that “on a ny occa sion did the Court, outside the court, at-6-

my residenc e, at the jail, a ny wher e, have y ou ever

hear d me ra ise my

voice? ” The witness a

nswere d in the neg ative, and Husband had no other que stions. The breaking point ca me when Wife’ s counsel
wa s c on du c tin g dir e c t e xami natio n o f Wi fe c on c e rn inginc ome fr om h e r r e nta l un its :

Q: What about the other two [uni ts] that are curr ently not rente d?
A: Okay , unit E was re nted 10 months out of 12.
The Court: Unit E?
A: Yes, unit E.

Mr . Pa rr is: Jesu s Chri st.

. . . The Court: Do what? Do y o u wa n t to end up g oing to jail rig ht

no w? Ihe ard

wh a t you sa id. You sa id Je su s Chri st. I ’m g oin g to f

ind y ou in con te mpt

and I ’m g oin g to sentence you to five day s in jail. You want to play those silly g ames, we ’re g oing to play them. That wa s totally uncalled f

or, Mr. Parr is. I ’ve be nt over backw ards to ac commodate you today

. . . . At the conc lusion of the hear ing, the court re quested that both par ties submit a final decr ee, a par entingplan, and a child support workshee t to which the court would sign one, or i f neither wer e a pp ro pr iate , th e jud g e wo uld dr aw o ne himself. Th e c ourt re ite ra te d th a t H us ba

nd wa s f ound in contempt, and se ntence d him to five day s jail with $1,000 bond. The order dated August 22, 2006, found that Husband f

ailed to ca rry his burden conc erning a cha ng e in circ umstance a

nd held that the
c ur re nt pe rm ane nt pa

re nti ng pla

n wo uld re ma in in pla c e
. Th e c ourt a lso inc re a se d H us ba

nd ’s c hil d supp o rt o b li g ati o nf

r o m $ 1 , 2 5 0 to $ 1 , 6 4 6 a

mo n th , f in d in g “ a s ign if ic an t v ar ia

n c e [i nHusband’s income] of more than f

iftee n perc ent.” The court a lso found Husband in conte mpt of court and sentenc ed him to five day s jail with bond set at $1,000.O n D ec em b er 1 4 , 2 0 0 6 , w e o rd ere d H usb an d t o eit he r p ay t he l i t i ga t i o n tax w i t hin t en d ays o r sho w ca use 2
as t o why t hi s ap p eal s ho ul d not b e d i smi ss ed

. H usband d i d no t co m p l y , and t he co urt d i smi ss ed t hi s ap p eal o n January 4 , 2 0 0 7 . H u sb a n d the n fi le d a m o tio n to re ins ta te , an d w e va c a te d the o rd e r o f d ism issa l.
-7- II. I SSU ES P R ESENTED Appellant filed a

timely appea l and pre sents the followingissues for re view:

2

1

. W h e th e r

th e tr i a l c o urte r

r e d i nf i n d i n g H u s b an d

i nc o n t e mp to f

c o urt ? 2. Whether the trial c ourt err ed in findingno materia l chang e of c ircumstance ? 3

. Whe th e r

th e tr ia l c o urt e r

r e d in th e c a lc u lati o nan d

in c r e a s e o f

H usband’s child support obligation?

F or the fo llo wi ngre a so ns , w e a ff ir m.
III
. S TA N D A R D O F REVIEW On appe al, we pr esume that the tria l court’s fa ctual finding s are corr ect, a nd we will not
ov e rt ur n th os e fa c tua l f

ind ing s un le ss the e vid e nc e pr e po nd e rate s a g a ins t th e m. T e nn . R. Ap p. P. 13 (d ) ( 20 06 ); Bogan v. Bogan , 6 0 S.W.3 d 721 , 727 (T e nn . 2 00 1) . F or the e vid e nc e to p re po nd e rate ag ainst a trial cour

t’s finding of fa ct, it must support another finding of fact wit h g reater c onvincing eff ect. Watson v. Watson , 1 9 6 S

. W

. 3 d 6 9 5 , 7 0 1 ( T e n n
. C t

. Ap p
. 2 0 0 5 ) ( ci t i n g W alker v . Sidney Gi lre ath &As so cs. , 4 0 S. W.3 d 6 6, 71 (Tenn . Ct . App . 2 00 0) ; The Realty Shop, Inc . v. R.R. W est mi n s ter Holding, Inc. , 7 S.W .3d 581, 596 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1999)) . As to the trial cour t’s conclusions of law , we r eview de novo upon the rec ord with no presumption of cor rec tness. Union Carbide Corp. v. Huddl

eston , 8 5 4 S

. W

. 2 d

8 7 , 9 1 (T en n
. 1 9 9 3 ) ( ci t i n g Es tate of A dk ins v . W hite Consol. Indus., Inc. , 78 8 S.W. 2d 81 5, 81 7 (T e nn
. Ct. Ap p. 19 89 )) . I f t he tr ia l c ourt

ma de no sp e c if

ic finding s of fa ct, then we must look t o the re cord to “ deter mi n e wh er e t h e pre pondera nce of the evidenc e lies.” Kend

rick v . Sh o e make , 9 0 S

. W

. 3 d

5 6 6 , 5 7 0 (T en n
. 2 0 0 2 ) ( ci t i n g Ganzenv oort v. Ru sse ll , 9 46 S.W. 2d

29 3, 29 6 ( Te nn . 1 99 7) ). We w ill se t a sid e a c ourt ’s fi nd ingof c on te mpt on ly if the court abused its discretion. Sta te e x. re l. Flow e rs v

. T e nn. T ruckin g As so c . Se lf Ins. G ro up Tr ust , 2 0 9 S

. W

. 3 d

6 0 2 , 6 1 0 (T en n
. C t

. Ap p
. 2 0 0 6 ) ( ci t i n g Ha wk v . H awk , 8 5 5 S.W .2d 573, 583 ( T e n n
. 1 9 9 3 ) )

. Ab u s e o f d is c r e ti o n o c c ur s o n ly w h e n th e c o urt a p p li e s a w r o n g le g a l s tandar d or
rea ches a n illogica l decision or a de cision that “ca uses an injustice to t he par ty complaining .” Id. (c i t i n g Eldridge v. Eldridge , 42 S.W .3d 82, 85 (Tenn. 2001)). We must not, howeve r, substitute our jud g me nt f

or that of the tr ia l c ourt

. Id. (citation omitted).-8- IV. D I S CUS S I ON
A. Con tem

pt On appe al, Husband c ontends that the trial cour t erre d in finding him guilty of conte mpt b ecause his b e h av io r

d id n o t r is e to th e le v e l o f

o b s tr u c ti o no f th e a dmi n is tr a ti o no f

ju s ti c e
. We disag ree
. We must first surmis e whe ther the judgme nt in this case was civil or cr iminal contempt. See State of Tenn essee

v. Turner , 914 S.W .2d 951, 955 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1996) . “The char acte r and purpose of

the punishment imp o s ed g ener ally serve s to disti ng uish criminal from civil contempt proce eding s.” Walker v. Walker , N o. 02 A0 1- 92 09 -C H- 00 26 3, 19 93 WL32 78 26 , at *2 ( Te nn . Ct

. App. Aug

. 20, 1993). The punishm ent i mposed for c riminal contempt is “punitive in char acte r, and the proc eedingis to vindi cate the authority of the law , and the court as an org an of soc iety .” Turner , 91 4 S. W.2 d at 95 5. Civ il c on te mpt , b y c on tr a st, is impo se d f

or the be ne fi t of

the oth e r p art

y lit ig ant. Id. Fur thermore , contempt is classified a s either dire ct or indirec t: direct conte mpt i s an ac t committed in t he cour

t’s prese nce, a

nd indirect c ontempt is an act c ommitt ed outside the c ourt’s prese nce. Id. (citations omitted). The c o u rt m ay s u m m arily punish an individual for direc t contempt, but as for

indirect c on t em p t , t h e offender must be g iven notice a

nd a hea ringbefor e punishment is im posed. Id.
The court’s power to punish parties for courtroom misconduct is “absolutely essential to the
smo oth fu nc tio nin g of

the jud ic ia l sy ste m. ” D ar gil v . T e rminix Int’ l Co
. , L.P. , 23 S.W .3d 342, 344 (Tenn. Ct. Ap p
. 2 0 0 0). The c ourt’s powe r to inflict such punishment for c ontempt is li mited, ho we ve r, to t

he fo llo wi ngsit

uatio ns : (1 ) T he wi llf

ul m isb e havio r o f a

ny pe rs on in t he pr e se nc e of the c ourt , or so nea r there to as to obstruct the administration of justice; (2 ) T he wi llf

ul m isb e havior of any

of the of fi c e rs of su c h c ourt s, in the ir of fi c ia l tr ans a c tio ns ; (3) The willful disobedience or resistanc e of a

ny office r of the suc h
c ourt s, pa rt y , ju ro r, wi tne ss, or any oth e r pe rs on , to any lawf ul wri t, pr oc e ss, or de r, ru le , d e c re e , o r c omm and of su c h c ourt s; (4) Abu s e o f, or unlawful interfe renc e with, the proc ess or pr oc e e din g s o f t

he c ourt ; (5) Willfully

conver sing w ith jurors i n relation to the merits of the
cause in the trial of which the y are eng ag ed, or othe rwise tampe ring with them; or-9- (6) Any other a ct or omission declar ed a c ontempt by law.

Te nn . Co de Ann. § 29- 9- 10 2 (20 00 ). “ An a c t of c on te mpt is a wi llf ul o r i nte nti on a l a c t th a t hi nd e rs , delay s, or obstructs the c ourt’s administration of justice.” Sta te e x. re l. F low e rs v . T e nn. T ruckin g Ass oc . Self Ins. G

ro up T rus t , 2 0 9 S

. W

. 3 d

6 0 2 , 6 1 2 (T en n
. C t

. Ap p
. 2 0 0 6 (c i t i n g Ah e rn v . A he rn , 15 S.W. 3d

73 , 7 8 ( Te nn . 2 00 00 ); W inf re e v . S tate , 175 Tenn. 427, 13 5 S .W.2d 454, 455 (1940)). “Willful” actions or conduc t are voluntary or intentional rathe r than inadve rtent or a ccide ntal. Id. (citations omitted). “An obstruc tion to the administration of justice is a

ny willful misconduct which
em b ar rasse s, hinders, obstructs, or de rog ates the a uthority or dig nity

of the c ourt.” State of Tenne sse e v . P e as e , No. E2000-02469-CCA-R3-CD, 2001 WL 1284223, at *2 (Tenn. Crim. App. Oc t

. 2 4 , 2 0 0 1 ) ( ci t i n g Black v . Blount , 938 S.W .2d 394, 401 (Tenn. 1996) ).

I n th e p r e s e n t c a s e , it is c le ar th a t th e c o n te mp t a t is s u e is c r im in a l b e c ause the court sentenc ed Husband to jail as puni shment for his courtroom behavior. Fur thermore , we a

re de aling with direct c ontempt, a s all Husband’s statements and conduct occur red in Judge Perry ’s pre sence , an d th e j u d ge s u m m ar i l y

i mp o s ed p un i s h m en t

. Inth e c o urt ’s o rd er d at edAu gu s t2 2 , 2 0 0 6 , th e j u d ge m ad e t h e f

o l l o wi n g fi n d i n gs o f f

ac tco n ce rn i n g th e c o n t em p tfi n d i n g: De sp ite re pe ate d a dmo nit ion s f ro m th e Court , M r. Parr is p e rs ist e d in arguments with the Court and offe ringextraneous comments during opposing c o u n s el’s questioni ng . DuringMr. B urch’ s direct
e xami natio n o f M s. P arri s, Mr . Pa rr is e xcla ime d “ Jesu s Chri st” fo llo wi nga

qu e sti on and ans we r that app are ntl y fr

us tr a te d him. Th is
outbu rs t, i n a dd iti on to t

he pr ior state me nts and

a c tio ns of

Mr . Pa rr is, place him in contempt of court.

We cannot say

that the trial cour

t abused its discretion by holding Husband in conte mpt of court a nd sentenc ing him to five day s in jail. Fr om the record it is clea r that the c ourt was more than patient with Husband, g iving him g reat leewa y beca use he w as re prese nting himself. The court g ave Husband numer ous war

nings that if he did not behave proper ly , he would be found in contempt and sentenc ed to jail. Husband ne verthe less continued to a rgue with the judge , and his outburst of “Jesus Christ,” viewed w ith his entire be h a v io r duringthe hea

ringjustified the contempt cha rg e under Tenn. Code Ann. §29-9-102( 1). His behavior and exclamation of “Jesus Christ” was obviously intentional or “w illful,” and this unnece ssary outburst, along with his constant bickeringwit h the cour t and inappropriate questi oning of witnesses did “obstruc t the administration of justice” by hinderingthe proce edingand trying to e mbarra ss wit n es s es with completely irrele vant questions. “Court proce eding s are to be conduc ted in a ci v i l an d dignif ied manner , and whe n one stray s from that
course , their conduc t risks obstructing the administration o f j u s tice.” State of Tennessee v
. Prov e nc io , No. E2005-01253-CCA-R3-CD, 2005 WL 3088078, at *2 (Te nn. Crim. App. Nov. 18, 2005). In Prov e nc io , the Court of C riminal Appea ls aff irmed t he lower court’s f

inding of contempt based on the defe ndant’s statement to the court: “I ’m the victim he re, and I ’m beingscre wed a round, and this lady

f-kingpulled my

chain f or I don’t know how l o n g .” Id. L ikewise, this court finds-10-

Husband’s la

ng uag e choic e off

ensive a nd completely

unnece ssary , and we wi l l n ot substit ute our jud g me nt f

or that of the c ourt

.

Hu sb and argue s that he sh ou ld no t be he ld i n c on te mpt be c a us e a s a pro se lit ig ant, he sh ou ld have be en able to “testify

either in na

rrative or question and a

nswer form.” Husband relies on Sta te of Tenne sse ev . P e as e , No. E2000-02469- CCA-R3-CD, 2001 WL 1284223, at *3 (Te nn. Ct. App. Oct. 24, 2001), but this relianc e is misguided. T he cour t in this case d i d n ot bar Husba nd from testifying in narr ative format like the cour t in Pe as e ; r ather , Husband was admonished sever al times fo r t ry ingto t e sti fy

duri nghis dir e c t e xami natio n o f o the r w itn e sse s a nd a sk ingir

re le va nt q ue sti on s. We also pointed out in Pe as ethat “c ouns e l sh ou ld b e pe rm itt e d to e lic it n arr a tiv e qu e sti on s th a t do not unduly waste time . . . .” Id. (e mph a sis a dd e d) . Wh ile it i s tr ue tha t th e c ourt

sh ou ld t ake int o a c c ount t he fa c t th at pro se litigants have no leg al training , the cour t mus t n evertheless apply the
same substantive and proce dural rule s that repr esente d parties must follow. Hessm er v. He ssm er , 1 3 8 S

. W

. 3 d

9 0 1 , 9 0 3 (T en n
. C t

. Ap p
. 2 0 0 3 ) ( ci t i n g E d m u n d s o n v

. Pr att , 9 45 S.W .2d 754, 755 (T e nn . Ct . App . 1 99 6) ; Kayloir v. Bradley , 912 S.W .2d 728, 733 n.4 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1995)). In any event, a s evident fr om the aboveme ntioned port i o n s of the he aring , Husband’s be havior we nt far beyond simply

testifying in a

narr ative for

mat.

Husband also argues t hat t he court err ed by not setting forth the s pecif ic elements of Tenn. Cod e Ann. § 2 9- 9- 10 2 in

the or de r. We r e

je c t th is a rgume nt. Al tho ug h th e c ourt ’s or de r did no t us e the spec ific languag e fr om the Tenne ssee Code, the court did spec ifically find Husband in contempt and listed the re asons. The c ourt could have found Husband in contempt under se ction (1) of 29-9- 102, as we have previously discussed, for his w illful misbehavior that obstructed the a dminist ration of j u s t i ce. A lternatively , the cour t could have f

ound Husband in conte mpt under sec tion (4), for abuse of the proc eeding s. The judg e pointed out in the final orde r that Husband ha d ulterior motives fo r t his he ari ng , as is ev ide nt fr om the re c or d. Hu sb a nd ’s qu e sti on ingof

Judg e Ros s r e late d in

mos t pa rt to the atte mpt e d e xtor

tio n tr ia l. T he qu e sti on ing of Tami Po sto n Ro ss, Judg e Ros s’ s w if e , a lso de a lt w it h th e e xto rti o n tr ia l. T h e o n ly qu e s ti o n s a s k e d to D e b r a L in d e r c o n c e r n e d th e certified le tte r, wh ic h w a s com

ple te ly unre late d to the iss ue a t han d. F ina lly , H us ba nd qu e sti on e d Jim L e wi s, a r e ti r e d p o li c e o f

f ic e r , a s to w h e th e r h e h a d e v e r w it n e s s e d H u s b an d in an y k in d of threa tening
manner or had ever hear d Husband raise his voic e. I t is unclear why this testim ony

was introduce d. Husband’s be havior showe d a g reat disrespec t to the court, using a custody hear ing a s a vehicle f

or what appe ars to be ha

rassment of the se witnesses, a nd thus we af

firm.

B. Modification of Ch ild Cu stody

Husband a

rgues that the lowe r co urt err ed by finding no materia l chang e in circ umstance war rantingthe cha

ng e in custody

from Wife to Husband. We disag ree
.-11-

Once a dec ision reg ardingcustody is made, it is considered re s ju dic ata on fac ts that ex isted at that time or fac ts that should have bee n rea sonably fore seea ble. Curt is v . Hi ll , 215 S.W .3d 836, 840 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2006). T his is not t o say that courts cannot alter a custody arr ang ement whe n there are interveningcirc umstances: “Such de cre es shall re main within the control of the court a nd be subjec t to such chang es or modification as t he ex ige ncies of the case m ay require .” Tenn. Code Ann. § 3 6- 6- 10 1( a )( 1) (S up p. 20 06 ); See Cla rk v . Ar thur , No. M2005-01719-COA- R3-CV, 2007 T e n n
. Ap p
. L E XIS 2 9 3 , at* 1 1 (T en n
. C t

. Ap p
. M ay 3 0 , 2 0 0 7 ) ( ci t i n g Krupp v. CunninghamGrogan , No

. M 2 0 0 5 -0 1 0 9 8 -C OA -R 3 -C V, 2 0 0 6 T en n
. Ap p
. L E XIS 5 6 8 , at * 7 (T en n
. C t

. Ap p
. Au g. 29, 2006)). The party

seekingthe modification of a court’s prior custody decr ee ha s the burden of proof:
I f the iss u e before the court is a modification of the court’ s prior

decr ee pe rtainingto custody , the pet i t i o ner must proveby a preponderanc e of the evide nce a material change in circumstance . A materia l chang e of c ircumstance does not require a showingof a substantial risk of harm to the ch i l d. A mater ial chang e of
c ir c ums tanc e may

inc lud e , b ut i s not limi te d to, f a ilure s to a dh e re to the par enting plan or a n order o f custody

and visitation or
c ir c ums tanc e s th at make the p are nti ngpla n n o lo ng e r i n th e be st interest of the child.

Tenn. Code. Ann. § 36- 6-101(a )(2) (B ) (Supp. 2006) (e mphasis a dded). The “thre shold issue” for the lower court is “whe ther a materia l chang e in circumstances ha s occur red a fter the initial custody deter mination.” Kendrick v. Shoem ake , 9 0 S

. W

. 3 d 5 6 6 , 5 7 0 ( T e n n
. 2 0 0 2 ) ( ci t i n g Blair v. Badenhope , 77 S.W .3d 137, 150 (Tenn. 2002) ). Althoug h there are no brig ht-line rule s a court should apply

in determiningwhether

a par ty has prove n a cha

ng e i n ci rcumstance, the Te nnessee Sup re me Court

ha s la id o ut t

he fo llo wi ngg uid e lin e s: (1) whe ther a

chang e has occur

red after the entry of the orde r soug ht to b e mod if

ie d; (2) whether a chang e was not known or reasona bly anticipated when the orde r wa s entere d; and (3) whe ther a ch an ge i s one that af fec ts the child’s well-be ing in a
m e an i n g f u l w ay.

Crans ton v. Com bs , 1 0 6 S

. W

. 3 d 6 4 1 , 6 4 4 (T en n
. 2 0 0 3 ) ( ci t i n g Kendrick, 90 S.W. 3d a t 57 0; se e als o Blair , 77 S.W .3d at 150)). Apare nt’s ch an ge i n circ umstances c ould be consider ed a “ materia l chang e in circumstance” war ranting a modi fication in custody , if the chang e affec ts the well-be ing of the c hild. Kendrick v. Shoem ake , 90 S.W . 3d 566, 570 (Tenn. 2002). Only if a c ourt finds that the re ha s b e e n a

mate ri a l c ha

ng e in c ir c ums tanc e do e s it pro ceed to th e ne xt ste p in the ana ly sis , which is to determine whether a modification would be in the child’s best intere st. Id.A s t o W i f e’ s p arent i ng s ki l l s, “ Jud ge R o ss and T am i R o ss bo t h t est i f i ed t hat M s. P arri s was an exem p l ary 3

m o the r a n d the c h ild re n w e re w e ll m a n n e re d , h a p p y a n d h e a lthy c h ild re n .” T h e c o u rt fur the r p o inte d o u t t h a t W ife “is i n t i m a t e l y i n v o l v e d i n t h e w e l l

- b e i n g of h e r c h i l d r e n
. S h e i s i n v o l v e d i n t h e c h i l d r e n ’ s s c h o o l i n g a n d a c t i v i t i e s
. . . . By al l wi t nes s ac count s , i ncl udi ng M r
. P ar r i s , t he chi l dren ar e do i ng ver y wel l i n s chool

. ” T her e h ave been ca s es wh er e a m o d ifi c a tio n o f t h e c u sto d y d e c re e w a s ju stif ie d d u e to the c h ild ’s p o o r p e rfo rm a n c e in sc h o o l, s ee D one gan v . D one

gan , N o . 0 1 A 0 1 -9 8 0 5 -C H -0 0 2 5 8 , 1 9 9 9 W L 1 0 0 8 6 , at *6 (T e n n . C t. A p p . Ja n . 1 2 , 1 9 9 9 ), b u t a s ju st sta te d , t h e c h ild re n in this c a se a re p e rfo rm ing w e ll in sc h o o l.
-12- Inth e p re s en tca s e, t h e co urt fo un d th atHu s b an d

h adn o tm eth i s b urd en co n ce rn i n g a mate ri a l c ha

ng e in c ir c ums tanc e , a

nd thu s d id n ot g e t in to a

n a na ly sis of wh e the r the chan ge in
c us tod y wo uld be in t he be st i nte re st o f t

he c hil dr e n. Hu sb and

c on te nd s th a t th e c ourt

fa ile d to
s u p p o rt i ts c o n c lu s io nth at H u s b an d h a d n o t m e t h is bu

r d e nc o n c e r

n in g a c h an g e in

c u s to dy
. We dis a g re e . T he c ourt

state d in the or de r t

hat “ Mr . Pa

rr is’ te sti mony

re le va nt t o th e c us tod

y wa s ‘ a ll over the board.’ ” Husba

nd “initially

took the position t hat the childre n should live with him for four y e ars be c a

us e the y ha d li ve d wi th th e mothe r f or fo ur y e ars . L a te r i n th e he ari ng , M r. Parr is advocated that the childre n sho u l d re l o cate to the Ukra ine . . . .” The court pointed out that Hu sb and ’s q ues ti on in g of wi tn ess es y iel dedirrel evan t i nfo rm ati on th at w ou ldno t h e lp Hus ba nd wi th provingthat a materia l c hang e of c ircumstance occur red; if a ny thing, it showed H usband “a s a man who was de lusional and out of control duringthe orig inal divorce litigation.” The court did take 3 into c onsideration the f

act that Wife stayed the nig ht at her boyfriend’ s home with the two children
on on e oc c a sio n du e to ba d we athe r, but th e c ourt a lso no te d th a t H us ba

nd a lso “ a dmi tte d th a t hi s g irlfriend spe nt almost every night in his ho m e when the children we re pr esent.” Fr om reviewof the re c or d, we c ann ot s ay that th e e vid e nc e pr e po nd e ra te s a g a ins t th e tr ia l c ourt ’s fi nd ing s o f f a c t.

More spe cifica lly , though, H usband arg ues t hat t he court err ed by its failure to addr ess the safe ty and cle anliness of Wife’s home. Although it is true that the court did not mention these issues in t he or der, we fi nd

that th is e vid e nc e do e s n ot r e qu ir e a fi nd ingin H us ba

nd ’s fa vo r. Th e on ly evidenc e int roduce d at t he hearing perta ining to saf ety and cle anliness wer e the photog raphs take n of Wife’s home, a

photogr aph date d 2002 and the other s dat ed 2 0 0 6. Eac h photogr aph depic ted Wife’s front porc h. The 2002 picture showed boxes, trash bag s, a piec e of furniture, and var ious other items; the 2006 pi cture s wer e similar, except the fr ont porch a ppear ed more piled up than the 2002 picture. Wife testified that these items do not pose a s af et y problem, and H usband did not testify as to Wife’s home’s a lleg ed saf ety and cle anliness problem. J udg e L arr y Ross did testify

that he had known Wife approximately five y ear s, and that ever y time he eve r saw the children, the y had a cle an appe ara

nce. B ased on t h e witnesses’ c redibility , the cour t could have simply

found that Wif e ’s ho me ha d n ot b e c ome un sa fe or un c le an a

nd thus, he di d no t fi nd

the pic tur e s h e lpf

ul i n de te rm ini ngwh e the r a

mate ri a l c ha

ng e in c ir c ums tanc e ha d o c c ur re d. As we hav e po in ted out in previous ca ses, “[c]ustody decisions often hing e on subtle fa ctors, such a s the pare nts’ demea nor and
cre dibilit y

duringthe proc eeding s.” Morm an v. Morm an , No. M2005-00931-COA- R3-CV, 2006 W L 2 0 6 8 7 5 7 , at* 2 (T en n
. C t

. Ap p
. J u l y 2 5 , 2 0 0 6 ) ( ci t i n g Adelsperge r v. Adelspe rger , 970 S.W .2d 482, 485 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1997)). L ooking at the rec ord, the 2006 picture s do not show much of a
c ha ng e in t he a pp e ara nc e of the c on dit ion of the fr on t por c h as co mpa re d to the 20 02 pic tur e . T hisC o ncerni ng t he chi l d ren’ s d i spo si t i o ns, W i f e’ s at t o rney asked H usband , “ I t ho ught y o u s ai d t h ey [ t h e chi l d ren] 4 weren’ t wel l m annered al l t he t i m e, ” t o whi ch H usband respo nd ed that the chil d ren are “t erri f i ed o f thei r m o t her, t hey’ re t erri f i ed of t hei r mo t her, and I can q uo t e what t he chi l d ren s ay, do n’ t get on t he wrong si d e o f m o t her, y o u do n’ t want her as an enem y
. ” W i f

e’ s co unsel t hen m o ved t o s t ri ke, and the co urt grant ed the m o t i o n. W e al so p o i nt out t hat H usband faile d to a rg u e o n a p p e a l t h a t t h e e x c lus io n o f t h is e v id e n c e w a s e rr o r, a n d thu s w e w ill no t ge t i n to tha t an a lysis.

H u sb a n d ’s b rie f p o ints to H u sb a n d ’s f o llo w ing a n sw e r to the ju d g e ’s q u e stio n o f wh e the r h e w a n te d to c a ll 5 his chil d ren as w i t ne sses as the e vid en ce o f t he ch i l d ren ’ s p refere nc es:

“ Y our H onor, i t woul d be a t el l i ng s t at ement t hat t he chi l dren woul d m ake if we were t o a sk them i n f

ront o f y o u, wo ul d y o u l i ke t o s p end hal f t he t i m e wi t h y o ur d a d d y a n d ha lf the ti m e w ith yo u r m o the r a n d the n the y re sp o n d e d to tha t, w o u ld t hat be of

an y [ C our t i nt er

j ect s ]

. ”

-13- alone is not enoug h to cause the evidenc e to pre ponderate in Husband’s f av o r. T h us, we re

ject Husband’s a

rgument.

Husband a lso argues that the trial c ourt err ed by placingno weight on the fa ct that the
c hil dr e n a re “ te rr if ie d” of Wif

e
. Th is argume nt ha s no me ri t. T he c ourt pr op e rl y dis re g ard e d th is evidenc e bec ause Wife’ s counsel moved to strike Husba nd’s statements as to what the children alleg edly said, and it was so stricke n from the r ecor d. As to the same c ontention that the court 4 pla c e d n o w e ig ht o n ev ide nc e that the c hil dr e n sai d that the y wi sh e d to sp e nd

mor e tim e wi th t

he ir f ath e r , w e a l s o r e

j e c t i t

. W e d o n o t f

i n d s u c h e v i d e n c e i nth e r e c o r d , a s th e c h i l dr e nd i d n o tt e s t i f y. 5

Finally , Husband a

rgues that the c ourt err ed by failingto consider a

modification of visitation. Husband re lies on Wagner v. Gaston , No. 01A01-9804-CV- 00215, 1999 WL767825,
at* 1 ( T e n n
. C t

. Ap p
. S e p t

. 2 9 , 1 9 9 9 ) , b u t th a tc a s e i s d i s t i n g u i s h a b l e f r o mth e c a s e atb ar
. In Wagner , th e fathe r in clu de d in his pe tit ion

to m od if y an a lte rn a tiv e re qu e st f

or an in c re a se in visitation. Alt houg h it is t rue that Husband made a mot ion “to revie w and r evise the vis itatio n/c us tod

y arr ang e me nts ,” thi s mo tio n w a s n ot p ro pe r p e r t he Ten nesse e Rul e s o f C ivi l Procedur e. The judge g ave H usband g re at l ee way in his pleading s beca

use he w as re prese nting h i m s e l f , an d tr e at e d a l l o f H u s b an d ’ s p r i o r m o t i o n s a s a

p e t i t i o nf o r m o d i f i c a t i o no f c u s t o dy o n l y: “The defe ndant has been advised by the C ourt to be succ essful re g ardinga cha ng e of c ustody

that it is i ncumbent upon the defe ndant t o show a material chang e of circ umstances. The Court is going to treat the pr ior motion as a petition for modification of cu s t o d y an d ch ild support . . . .” Fur thermore , Husband did not reque st at t he hearing that the cour t modify the visitation schedule. Nor can we say that the i ssue was trie d by implied consent. See ge nerally Zumste in v . Smith , No. 0 3 A 0 1

- 9 4 0 9

- C H

- 0 0 3 4 6 , 1 9 9 5 W L1 1 3 4 7 2 , a t * 3 ( T e n n
. C t

. Ap p
. M ar
. 1 6 , 1 9 9 5 )

. Ap p ar e n t l y, Husband is arguing that the court should have acte d su a s po nte and modified the visitation schedule. In Fenley v. Fenley , No. 03A01-9604- CH-00121, 1996 WL469683, at *3 (Te nn Ct. App. Aug . 19, 1 9 9 6 ), we h el d

th a t t h e t ri al co urt erre d i nm o d i fy i n g su a s

po ntethe vis itatio n s c he du le a t a modification of child custody hear ing. I

n Fenley , th e fa th er ’s p et i t i o n al l ege d th ata m at er i al ch an ge in circ umstance justi fied chang e of custody

. Id. at *1. I t did not, however, a lleg e alter natively thatT he cour t wen t on t o s ay t hat H us band’ s s uppo r t obl i gat i on woul d be m od i f i ed “ as r ef

l ect ed i n t he at t ach ed 6

c h ild su p p o rt w o rk sh e e t.” T h e c h ild su p p o rt w o rk sh e e t wa s n o t i n c lud e d in the re c o rd

.

H u sb a n d a rg u e s tha t “[h ]a d the T ria l C o u rt c o rr e c tly a p p lied the C h ild S u p p o rt G u id e line s a s it re la te s to 7 self-em p lo y ed pa rent s t he A p p el l ant ’ s gross i nco m e wo ul d have si gni f i cant l y vari ed f

rom what t he C o urt f

o und t he i nco m e t o be

. ” H usband f urt her argues t hat had t he co urt “prop erl y co nsi d ered t he evi d ence present ed b y t he A p p el l ant as i t rel at ed t o thi s i nco m e t he rul i ng w o ul d ha ve b een d ram at i cal l y d i f f erent

. ” H usband fai l s t o tel l us ho w o r why “ t he (c o n tinu e d ...)
-14- the court should modify the visitation arrang ement. Id. As we pointed out in that case , a judg ment b ey o n d t h e pleadings is invalid. Id. at * 3 ( c it a ti o n s o mi tt e d )

. T hu s , th e c o urt w a s c o r r e c t i nn ot ad dre s s i n g i s s u es p ert ai n i n g t o m o d i fi ca t i o n o f vi s i t at i o n
. In s u m , we fi n d th atth e c o urt ’s fi n d i n gs are more than suppor

ted by the evidenc e in the re cord.

C. Mo dif ic ation o f C hild Supp ort

Husband c ontends that the cour t erre d in its calculation and incr ease of his child support obligation. W e disag ree
.

The c ourt made the following finding s of fact i n the order dated August 22, 2006, conce rning Hu sb an d ’ s i n c o m e : “ M r
. P ar r i s e xh i b i t e d a p r o p o s e d c h i l d s u p p o rt w o r

k s h e e t s h o w i n g tha t hi s income wa s z ero. H oweve r, the de posits in hi s business chec king a ccount f or the last y ear

of the
re co rd s s h o w that he made deposits of $237,692.76 . . . . [I ]t appea rs to the Court that of the total deposits, $191,109.87 came f rom business income.” T he cour t had more difficulty

with Husband’s business expenses, howeve r:

[I ]t is difficult for the Court to dete rmine what is business-related . . . beca use it appea

rs t hat Mr. Parr is pay s all his livi ng expenses out of his business a ccount . . . . F rom a re view of Exhibit 24, t he Court fi nd s th at hi s b us ine ss e xpe ns e s f or m [sic ] A pr il 17 , 2 00 5 unti l Apr il 17 , 2 00 6 to ta l $4 1, 88 0. 91 . T his le ave s Mr . Par ri s w itha ne t in c ome of $149,228.96.”

Ba sed on this information, the cour t found a sig nificant va

rianc e g reater than f

ift ee n p erc ent, and thus increa sed Husband’ s child support obligation from $1,250 to $1,646. 6

Husband a

rgues that the c ourt err ed in applying the Child Support Guidelines (“ Guidelines”) as they relate to his self-employ

ment income. Husba

nd does not specify

as to how the c ourt err ed in i ts a pp lic a tio n, oth e r tha

n by po int ingto t

he Gu ide lin e s d e a lin g wi th a dju stm e nts to gro ss i nc ome for se lf-employ ed par ents. We affir m. 7(

. . . con t i n u ed) 7

ru ling w o u ld ha v e b e e n d ra m a tica lly d iff e re n t.”
-15- Trial courts have the authority to incre ase or decr ease child support obligations when there is a “sig nificant va

rianc e betwe en the amount of support provided in the child support guidelines and the amount of support c urre ntly order ed . . . .” Wil

lis v . W ill is , 62 S.W .3d 735, 738 (Tenn. Ct. App. 20 01 ) ( c iti ngTe nn . Co de Ann. § 3 6- 5- 10 1( a )( 1) (S up p. 20 00 )) . T he Gu ide lin e s sp e c if y that a “sig nificant va

rianc e” must be “at least a fiftee n perc ent (15%) chang e betwee n the amount of the
curr ent support o rder

(not including any

deviation amount) a

nd the amount of the pr oposed presumptive support orde r . . . .” Tenn. C omp. R. & Reg s. 1240-2-4- .05(2)( c) ( 2006). Child support obligations are ba sed upon net income as define d in T enn. Comp. R & Reg s. 1240-2-4.03(4) (2006). In order to determine ne t income, the cour t must first determine g ross income, which is defined a s fo llo ws : (3) Gr oss income.

(a) Deter mination of Gross Income.
1. Gross income of

eac h pare nt . . . shall include all income fr om any source (bef

ore de ductions for taxes and other deductions such as pre -existi ng child support order s and cr edits for other qualified children) , whether

ear ned or une arne d, and includes, but is not l i m i t ed t o , th e f o l l o wi n g: (i ) Wa g e s; (i i) Sa lari e s; (i ii) Commis sio ns , f

e e s, and tip s; (i v) Inc ome fr om s e lf

-e mpl oy me nt;

. . . 3. Self-Employ

ment Income. (i) Income f

rom self e mploy

ment includes income f

rom, but not limit ed to, business opera tions, work as an inde pendent c ontrac tor or consultant, sale s of g oods or servic es, and r ental prope rties, etc., less ordinary

and re asonable expenses nece ssary to produce such income. (ii) Ordina

ry and Rea sonable Expenses of Self Employ ment Nec essar y to Produce Income.-16- (I ) Excessive promotional, excessive trave l, excessive car expenses or excessive pe rsonal expenses, or de prec iation on equipment, the cost of oper ation of home off ices, e tc., shall not be consider ed
re a so na ble e xpe ns e s. (I I ) Amounts allowed by

the Interna l Revenue Ser vice f or acc eler ated de prec iation or investment tax credits shall not be
c on sid e re d r e a so na

ble e xpe ns e s. Tenn. Comp. R. & Reg s. 1240-2-4-.04( 3) (2006)

.T he G uid eli ne s p ro vid e a s f o l l o w s: 8
(4 ) A d

justm en t s t o G ro ss Inco m e fo r S elf

- E m p l o yed P are nts. 1. ( a ) T h e Ch i l d S u pp or t S c h e du l e i n c l u de s de du c t i on s f r om a pa r e n t ' s g r os s i n c om e f o r t he em p l o y ee' s shar e o f the co nt ri b ut i o ns f

o r t he f i rs t s i x and t wo - t ent hs p ercent (6.2% ) i n Fed eral Ins urance C o nt ri b ut i o ns A ct (FIC A ) and o ne and f o rt y - f i ve hund re dt h s ( 1. 45% ) i n M edi ca r e t ax es
. T h e f u l l t ax r at e, f

i f t ee n a n d t h r ee - t ent hs perc ent ( 15

. 3% ) , i s a t ot al of t wel ve and f

our - t ent hs perce nt (1 2. 4% ) f or s oci al securi t y (ol d

- age, s urvi vo rs , and dis ab i l ity i nsur ance) and t wo and ni ne- t ent hs p ercent (2.9% ) f

o r M ed i care (hospit al i nsur ance). A l l net earni ngs o f at l east f

o ur h u n dr ed dol l ar s ( $400) ar e s u bj ec t t o t h e M edi ca r e par t

. Empl oy er s pa y on e- h al f of
an em p l o yee ' s F IC A an d M ed i ca re taxe s. ( b) For a s el f

- empl oy ed par en t w h o i s pay i n g s el f

- empl oy men t t ax , an a mou n t f or FIC A - - si x and t wo - t ent hs p ercent (6.2% ) So ci al Se curi t y p l us o ne and f o rt y - f i ve hu ndr edt hs per cen t ( 1. 45 % ) M edi car e a s of 19 91 , or any amo un t s ubs equen t l y s et by f e de r a l l a w a s F I CA t a x - - s h a l l be de du c t e d f r om t h a t pa r e n t ' s g r os s i n c om e earned f rom s el f

- em p l o y m ent , up t o t h e a m o u nt s al l o wed unde r f ed eral l aw, and
a c tua lly p a id b y the p a re n t. (c) So ci al Sec uri t y t ax wi t hho l d i ng (FIC A ) f o r hi gh- i nco m e p erso n s m a y vary d uri ng t he y ear. Six and t wo - t ent hs p ercent (6. 2 % ) i s wi t hhel d on t he f i rs t nine ty t ho usand d o l l ars ($9 0 , 0 0 0 ) of gross earni ngs (f

o r wage earners i n 2 0 0 5 ). A f t er t he
m axi m u m fiv e t ho usand f i ve hund red eight y do l l ars ($5 , 5 8 0 ) i s wi t hhel d , no addi t i on al FI CA t ax es a r e wi t h h el d. (d) Self

- em p l o y ed p ers o ns are req ui red b y law to p ay t he f ul l F IC A tax o f

t welve
an d f o ur tenths p erc en t (1 2 .4% ) up t o the n i ne t y tho usa nd d o l l ars ($ 9 0 ,00 0 ) gro ss e a r n i n g s l i m i t a n d t h e f u l l Me d i c a r e t a x r a t e o f t w o a n d n i n e t e n t h s p e r c e n t ( 2

. 9 %)
o n al l earned i nco m e. O n e h a lf o f each am o unt i s al read y acco unt ed f o r i n t he B C SO amount s on t he Schedul e. (e ) A n y s e lf- e m p lo ym e n t ta x p a id u p to o n e -ha lf o f t h e m a x im u m a m o u n ts d u e in
a y e a r s h a l l b e d e d u c t e d f r o m g r o s s i n c o m e a s p a r t o f t h e c a l c u l a t i o n o f

a p a r e n t 's A d ju ste d G ro ss I n c o m e , as ind ic a te d in P a rt II o f t h e C S W o rk sh e e t. ( f ) W hen cal cul at i ng credi t s f or ot her qual i f

i ed ch i l dren un der para gr aph ( 5) bel ow, an y s el f

- empl oy men t t ax pai d s h al l al s o be dedu ct ed on t h e Cr edi t W or k s h ee t f r om a p arent ' s gross i nco m e f o r t he p urpo ses of cal cul at i ng a t heo ret i cal chi l d s up p o rt
o rder. ( g ) T h e per ce n t ag es an d dol l ar amou n t s es t abl i s h ed or r ef er en ce d i n t h i s pa r ag r aph (4) w i t h respe ct to t he p ayment o f sel f

- em p l o y m ent t axes s hal l be ad jus t ed by t he D epar t ment or by t he t r i bunal , as ne ces s ar y , as r el eva nt ch ang es occu r i n t he f eder al t ax l aw s.
-17- Husband c ites to Tenn. Comp. R. & Reg s. 1240-2-4.04( 4) in support of t he arg ument that the trial 8 court incor

rec tly applied the Guide lines. Ag ain, as we have mentioned, Husband does not specify in his argument how the cour t erre d in its application of the Guide lines. From the r ecor d, it does not appea r that the trial c ourt made a ny adjustments to Husband’s income a s provided in Tenn. Comp. R. & Reg s. 1240-2-4.04(4) . It does appe ar, how ever , that the cour t impli citly

found Husband’ s income information unreliable

. The c ourt disreg arde d Husband’s tax returns a nd statements that he ha d a zer o n e t in c ome , a

nd fo un d h is n e t in c ome to be $1 49,2 28 .9 6 b a se d o n H us ba nd ’s bu sin e ssF ro m a re v ie w o f W ife’s W 2 sta te m e n t, the ju d g e us e d the M e d ic a r e w a g e s a n d ti p s a m o u n t t o c a lc u la te 9 W ife’s’s inc o m e , he ju st d id no t l a b e l i t as su c h in the o rd e r.
-18- acc ount d ep o s i t s and business expenses. The T ennesse e Supreme Court has noted the following
c on c e rn ingse lf

-e mpl oy me nt i nc ome :

Th e se se lf

- e mpl oy me nt guid e lin e s are fa sh ion e d in su c h a wa y a s to authorize the trial cour

t to address the p o t en tial of a self- employ ed obligor to manipulate income for the purpose of avoidingpay ment of child support. Cou rts have r ecognized that a self- employ ed oblig or has the opportuni t y ‘t o manipulate his repor ted income by

either fa ili ngto a g g re ssi ve ly

so lic it b us ine ss o r b y

inf latinghis e xpe ns e s, the re by min imi zinghis inc ome .’ B a se d on this re a so nin g , in c e rt a in sit uatio ns , a c ourt may imp ute inc ome to a so le ow ne r of a bu sin e ss.

Ta y lor v . Fe ze ll , 158 S.W .3d 352, 358 (Tenn. 2005) (citations omitted). We f ind that the court, a fter fi nd ingHu sb and ’s inf

or matio n unr e lia

ble , c or re c tly de te rm ined Husb and ’s inc ome fr om r e lia ble information re lating to his deposits and business expenses. Se e ge ne ra lly Radebaugh v. R a debaugh , No. M2005-02727-COA- R3-CV, 2006 WL3044155, slip op. at *12 (Tenn. Ct. App. Oc t. 26, 2006) (re m an d i n g a similar ca se to the trial cour t for re -ca lculation of the husband’ s child support obligation based on re liable information per taining to his g ross rec eipts and business expenses).

As to Wife’ s income, the court found that Wife rec eived $8,266.56 from h ert ea ching assistant position. She also ear ned $1,200 in 2005, by assisting in preparingtax returns, and $1,258 fr om h e r w or

k at Se thr a
. Fin all y , the c ourt fo un d th a t Wif

e ’s re nta l ho me s yie lde d $ 16 ,3 54 .0 0 in 2005, less maintenanc e expenses of $10,004.52, leavingWife with a net re ntal income of $6,349.48. Husband a

rgues that the c ourt err ed by not taking into conside ration Wife’s Social Secur ity Medica re Income of

$8,266.56. This a

rgument has no merit. In the final orde r, the judg e spec ifically found th at W if e “ ma d e $ 8 , 2 6 6

. 5 6 f

r o m h e r te a c h in g p o s it io nin G r

un dy Co un ty in 2 0 0 5

. ” H u s b an d n e xt 9 argues that the cour

t erre d by not imputi ng income to Wife bec ause she is willfully undere mploy ed; she fai l ed t o provide a

reliable income information at the hear ing; a nd she lea ds an extravag ant lifestyle. We disag ree
.

Husband a

rgues that Wife is undere mploy ed bec ause she has the e quivalent o f a Master’s De g ree and has tax prepa ration and bookke epingexperience . Husband ne x t argues that the c ourt failed to c onsider Wife’s e x trava g ant lifestyle, including $20,000 in he r saving s acc ount in 2005; the purcha se of a

vehicle w ith a $10,000 down pay ment; and the takingof a c ruise vac ation. Husband also argues that “it is pr oper pursuant to the cur rent Te nnessee Child S upport Guidelines to find that
a p ar e n t i s w il lf

u ll y v o lu n ta r il y un d e r e mp lo y e d

w h e n th e r e is n o r e li a

b le s o ur c e o f

in c o me
. . . . ” WeF a i l u r e t o p r ov i de r e l i a bl e e v i de n c e of i n c om e i s a s e pa r a t e s i t u a t i on wh e r e t h e co u r t ma y i mp u t e i n c om e 10
t o t he pare nt

. T he G ui del i nes provi de t he f ol l owi ng conc er ni ng a l ack of r el i abl e e vi dence : ( I I ) W hen M od i f

y i ng an E xi s t i ng O r der 1. I

. I f a par en t f

ai l s t o pr odu ce r el i abl e ev i den ce of i n come ( s u ch a s t ax r et u r n s f or p rio r ye a rs , ch e c k stub s, o r o the r in fo rm a tio n fo r d e te rm inin g c u rr e n t ab ili ty t o supp o rt ); and II . T h e trib u n a l ha s n o re liab le e v id e n c e o f t h a t p a re n t' s inc o m e o r in c o m e p o te n tial; I I I

. T h en , i n s u ch c as es , g r os s i n come f or t h e cu r r en t a n d pr i or y ea r s s h al l be det er mi ned by i mp ut i ng an nu al gr oss i ncome of t hi r t y - s i x t hous and t hr ee hund red si xt y - ni ne d o l l ars ($3 6 , 3 6 9 ) f o r male parent s and t wenty

- si x t ho usand
n ine h u n d re d e igh ty-nine d o llar s ($ 2 6 ,9 8 9 ) fo r fe m a le p a re n ts . .

. .

T e n n . C o m p . R

. & R e g s. 1 2 4 0 -2 -4 -.0 4 (3 )( II ) (e m p h a sis a d d e d ). H u sb a n d ’s c o u n se l d o e s p o int o u t, tho u g h , t h a t W ife d id no t ha v e he r 2 0 0 5 tax re tur n a v a ilab le a t the he a rin g , b u t we fi n d tha t t h is is no t en o u g h to im p u te inc o m e to W ife
u n d e r th is p ro v isio n o f th e G u id e line s. W ife d id no t ha v e he r 2 0 0 5 tax re tur n a v a ilab le a t t h e he a rin g , an d the ju d g e to ld h u s ban d n u mer ou s t i mes t h at h e wou l d be mor e t h an h appy t o r es ch edu l e t h e h ea r i n g s o t h at t h i s i n f or mat i on w ou l d be
ava i l abl e; H us band decl i ned. W i f e di d hav e a vai l abl e h er W 2 and 109 9 s t at ement s f or 2005

. She al s o t es t i f i ed as t o her
re n ta l i n c o m e fro m e a c h p ro p e rty. T h u s, W ife d id p ro d u c e “ o the r info rm a tio n fo r d e te rm inin g c u rr e n t a b ili ty to su p p o rt,”
a n d the c o u rt b a se d it s d e c isio n o n re liab le e v id e n c e o f W ife’s inc o m e
.

T he G ui del i nes f

ur t her s t at e: 11

1 . T h e G u id e line s d o n o t p re su m e tha t an y p a re n t i s w ill fully an d /o r v o lun ta rily und er or unem p l o y ed

. T he p urpo se of t he d et erm i nat i o n i s t o ascert ai n t he reasons f o r th e p a r e n t ' s o cc up ati o na l ch o i ce s, an d t o assess the re aso na b l en ess o f t he se c h o ic e s in ligh t o f t h e p a re n t' s o b liga tio n to su p p o rt h is o r h e r c h ild (r e n ) a n d to d et erm i ne whet her s uch cho i ces bene f i t t he chi l d ren. ( I ) A de t er mi n at i on of w i l l f u l a n d/ or v ol u n t ar y unde r or u n empl oy men t i s n ot l i m i t ed t o oc cup at i o nal cho i ces mo t i vat ed only by an i nt ent t o avo i d or reduc e t he pay ment of

ch i l d s uppo r t

. T he det er mi nat i on may be bas ed on an y i nten t i onal choi ce or a ct t hat af

f ect s a par ent ' s i ncome. ( I I ) O n ce a pa r en t t hat h as be en f ou n d t o be w i l l f

u l l y a n d/ or v ol u n t ar i l y u n der or unem p l o yed , ad d i t i o nal i nco m e can b e al l o cat ed t o t hat pa rent t o i ncrease t he par en t ' s g r os s i n come t o an amou n t wh i ch r ef l ec t s t h e par en t ' s i n come pot en t i al or earni ng cap aci t y , and t he i ncreased am o unt s hal l be us ed f o r chi l d s up p o rt
ca l cu l at i on pu r pos es
. T h e addi t i on al i n come a l l oca t ed t o t h e par en t s h al l be (c o n tinu e d ...)
-19- a dd re ss t he latte r a

rg ume nt f ir st a nd fi nd that H us ba

nd ’s c ouns e l ha s mi sr e a d th e Gu idel ine s. Whether the court lacks re liable evidenc e of inc ome is not part of the a naly sis of whether

a par ent is w ill fu lly

un de rem plo y e d. Ne xt, w e a dd re ss H us ba

nd ’s argume nt t

hat Wif e is w ill fu lly 10 undere mploy ed, and thus the c ourt err ed in ca lculating her inc ome. The Guidelines allow for a cour t to i mpute inc ome if

tha t pa re nt “ ha s be e n d e te rm ine d b y a tr ibu na l to be wi llf

ull y and /or vo luntari ly undere mploy ed or unemploy ed.” Tenn. Comp. R. & Reg s. 1240-2-4-.04( 3)(a )2(I ) (2006) . “The 11(

. . . con t i n u ed) 11 det er mi ned u s i ng t he f ol l owi ng cr i t er i a: I. T he p arent ' s p ast and present em p l o y m ent ; and II

. T he p arent ' s ed ucat i o n and t rai ni ng.

. . .
T h e f ol l owi n g f

ac t or s ma y be c on s i der ed by a t r i bu n al w h en ma k i n g a de t er mi n at i on o f willf u l an d vo lun ta ry u n d e re m p lo ym e n t o r u n e m p lo ym e n t: (I ) T h e p a re n t' s p a st a n d p re se n t em p lo ym e n t; (I I) T he p arent ' s ed ucat i o n, t rai ni ng, and ab i l i t y t o wo rk;

. . . (I V ) A p arent ' s ext ravagant l i f est y l e, i n c l ud i ng ow ners hi p of val uab l e ass et s and
re so u rc e s (s u c h a s a n e x p e n siv e ho m e o r a u to m o b ile) , t h a t ap p e a rs ina p p ro p ria te
o r u n re a so n a b le fo r th e inc o m e c la im e d b y the p a re n t;

. . . (V I) W het her unemp l o y m ent or und erem p l o y m e n t fo r t he p urpo se of pursui ng a d d iti o n a l t ra inin g o r e d u c a tio n is re a so n a b le in ligh t o f t h e p a re n t' s o b liga tio n to
su p p o rt h is/h e r c h il d re n a n d , t o this e n d , w h e the r th e tra inin g o r e d u c a tio n w ill
u l t i mat el y be n ef

i t t h e ch i l d i n t h e ca s e i mmedi at el y u n der co n s i der at i on by i ncr eas i ng t he pare nt ' s l eve l of s uppo r t f

or t hat ch i l d i n t he f

ut ur e; ( V I I ) Any addi t i onal f

act ors deemed re l eva nt t o t he part i cul ar ci r cums t anc es of t he cas e.

-20- d e te r mi n ati o n o f w h e th e r a p arti c u la r p ar e n t is w il lf

u ll y an d v o lu

n ta r il y un employ ed or undere mploy ed is fac t-depe ndent, and can only be made afte r consider ation of all the c ircumstance s surroundingthat pare nt's pa st and prese nt employ ment or busi ness activiti es.” Ralston v. Ralston , No. 01A01-9804- CV-00222, 1999 WL562719, at *3 (Te nn. Ct. App. Aug . 3, 1999).

Under the Guidelines, ther e is no presumption that a pare nt is willfully undere mploy ed, and the iss ue wa s n ot r a ise d at the he ari ng
. Thus , Hu sb and c ann ot br ing it up fo r the fi rs t tim e on a pp e a l. B ut e ve n a ft e r r e viewing the r e c or d, inc lud ingte sti mony c on c e rn ingWif

e ’s pr e se nt a

nd pa st employ ment, and her

edu ca t i o n and lifestyle, we c annot say that the trial cour

t erre d by

not de te rm ini ngthat Wif

e is w ill fu lly

un de re mpl oy e d. Ab se nt a wr itt en fi nd in g th a t Wif e is undere mploy ed, the trial court was corr ect in ba sing the child support obligation on her a ctual income at the time of the hea ring

. See ge nerally V

ia v . V ia , No. M2006-02002-COA- R3-CV, 2007 WL2198187, at *5 (Tenn. Ct. App. J uly 23, 2007). Wife is or igina lly from the f ormer U kraine and
we nt t o s c ho ol i n th at c ountr y
. Al th ou ghWif

e te sti fi e d th a t pe r h e r e du c a tio n th e re , s he ha s a master’ s deg ree , she als o t est ified that she wa s taking some United States colleg e cour ses online beca use she is not ce rtified to t eac h in this country

. Wife also testified t hat s he has he lped pre pare tax returns, but lacks formal acc ounting training and testified t hat s he wa s not proficient in pre paring tax returns. There is no proof as to what other amounts Wife has eve r made duringher l ife other-21-

than the amount as a teac her’ s assistant, nor is the re any proof in the rec ord that Wife left a highe r paying job to take the job of tea cher ’s assistant. As to the extravag ancy of Wife’s lifestyle, we f ind that the fa cts in this case do not support such a conclusion. Wife’s purc hase of a vehic le and taking of a f amily vaca tion do not rise t o t h e l evel of indicating that she has se cre t wealth that should be imputed for purpose s of child support, nor does this a lone indicate that she is leadingan extravag ant lifestyle. For

the af oreme ntioned rea sons, we af firm.

D. Attorn ey’ s fee s on Appeal

Ap pe lle e ha s r e qu e ste d atto rn e y ’s fe e s on app e a l. An a wa rd of a tto rn e y ’s fe e s is ava ila

ble only if provided f

or by statute, contra ct, or a recog nized equitable gr ound. Parchm an v. Parchm an , No. W2003-01204-COA-R3-CV , 2004 Tenn. App. L EXI S 768, at *15 (Tenn. Ct. App. Nov. 17, 2 0 0 4 ) ( qu o t i n g Austin P o w d er Co. v. Thompson , No. 03A01-9607- CV-00229, 1996 Tenn. A pp. L EXI S 805, at *5 (Tenn. Ct. App. Dec. 16, 1996)). “In divorce case s the recover y of attorney ’s fe es is permitted by

statute, which provide s that a spouse see king enforc ement of an alimony or custody
awa rd may be g rante d attorney ’s fe es.” Id. (citingTenn. C o d e Ann. § 36-5-103(c) ( 2003)). Fur thermore , it is i n the sole discre tion of this court whether to awar d attorney ’s fees on appeal. See Id. at *15- 16 (c iti ng Te nn . Code Ann. § 3 6- 5- 10 3( c ) ( 20 03 ); Archer v. Archer , 907 S.W .2d 412, 419 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1995)) . As such, when t h i s C o u rt considers whether to awar d attorney ’s fe es on appea l, we must be mindful of “the ability of the re questing party

to pay the ac crue d fee s, the reque sting pa

rty ’s succ ess in the appea l, whether the reque sting pa rty soug ht the appea l in good f aith, and any other equitable fac tor that nee d be conside red.” Dul in v . D ulin , No. W2001-02969-COA-R3-CV, 2003 Tenn. App. L EXI S 628, at *26-27 (Te nn. Ct. App. Sept. 3, 2003) (c i t i n g Fo lk

v . F olk , 2 10 Te nn . 3 67 , 3 57 S.W. 2d 82 8, 82 9 (T e nn . 1 96 2) ); see also Parchm an , 2004 Te nn . App . L EX I S 76 8 at *1 5- 16 . Co ns ide ri ngAp pe lle e ’s inc ome and he r su c c e ss i n th is a pp e a l,
we fi nd it e qu ita ble to a wa rd Ap pe lle e ’s a tto rn e y ’s fe e s.

V. C ONCL US I ON

For the afor ementioned rea sons, we af firm the dec ision of the trial court. F urther, w e aw ard attorney ’s fe es to Appellee . The matter is remande d to the trial court to deter mine the amount of fe es that are rea sonable a

nd nece ssary

in this case
. Costs of this appe al ar e taxed to Appellant, J err al D. P ar r i s , f o r w h i c he x e c u t i o nm ay i s s u e i f n e c e s s ar y.

___________________________________ ALAN E. HI GHERS, J UDGE