[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it may be cited as State 

ex rel. Wells v. Lakota Local Schools Bd. of Edn., Slip Opinion No. 2024-Ohio-3316.]

 

NOTICE

This slip opinion is subject to formal revision before it is published in an 

advance sheet of the Ohio Official Reports. Readers are requested to 

promptly notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of Ohio, 65 

South Front Street, Columbus, Ohio 43215, of any typographical or other 

formal errors in the opinion, in order that corrections may be made before 

the opinion is published.

SLIP OPINION NO. 2024-OHIO-3316

THE STATE EX REL. WELLS v. LAKOTA LOCAL SCHOOLS BOARD OF EDUCATION

ET AL.

[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it 

may be cited as State ex rel. Wells v. Lakota Local Schools Bd. of Edn., Slip 

Opinion No. 2024-Ohio-3316.]

Public records—Attorney-client privilege—Demand letter—Attorney invoices—

Writ granted in part and relator awarded statutory damages, some attorney 

fees, and costs.

(No. 2023-0190—Submitted July 9, 2024—Decided September 3, 2024.)

IN MANDAMUS.

_________________

The per curiam opinion below was joined by KENNEDY, C.J., and DEWINE,

DONNELLY, STEWART, BRUNNER, and DETERS, JJ. FISCHER, J., concurred in part 

and dissented in part and would not award statutory damages.
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2

Per Curiam.

{¶ 1} This is an original action in mandamus brought under Ohio’s Public 

Records Act, R.C. 149.43, by relator, Vanessa Wells, against respondents, the 

Lakota Local Schools Board of Education and its treasurer, Adam Zink, who 

maintains the board’s public records (collectively, “Lakota”). Wells seeks a writ 

of mandamus ordering Lakota to produce public records. She also seeks awards of 

statutory damages, attorney fees, and court costs. Wells has additionally filed a 

motion for oral argument or leave to file a supplemental brief. We grant the writ in 

part and deny it in part as moot, award $2,000 in statutory damages, award some 

attorney fees and deny others, award court costs, and deny the motion.

I. BACKGROUND

This case involves two separate public-records requests that Wells sent.

A. The first request

{¶ 2} On January 4, 2023, Wells sent her first request by email to Zink and 

Brodi Conover of Bricker Graydon, the law firm with which the board had 

contracted to represent it on public-records requests. Wells requested “any and all 

legal documentation (whether email or regular mail) sent from the law firm of 

Elizabeth Tuck/ matt Miller to all members of the lakota school board. Thank you 

in advance for a timely response.” At the time, Matt Miller was the superintendent 

of Lakota Local Schools, and Tuck was his private counsel. Wells had a child in 

the district and became concerned after allegations surfaced about Miller’s conduct.

{¶ 3} Conover responded to Wells via email on January 5, telling her that 

her request was overbroad, but stated that Lakota had searched its records beginning 

July 1, 2022, for email communications between Tuck and the board’s members. 

Conover attached to his email a copy of a November 2022 cease-and-desist letter 

that Tuck had sent to one of the board’s members, demanding that she immediately 

stop defaming Miller.
January Term, 2024

3

{¶ 4} Wells then sent a follow-up email to Conover on January 5, stating 

that, in an effort to clarify her original request, she now requested

all email or regular mail communication between the law firm of 

Elizabeth Tuck and all current lakota school board members, as well 

as legal counsel for the current board members; from the months of 

September 2022 until the current date of Jan 1, 2023 in regards to 

Matthew Miller & his employment at Lakota school district as the 

superintendent. Including, but not limited to the most recent 

investigation done by Jackson Lewis, notices, legal documents, 

letters to preserve, cease and desist & all other attachments and 

communication in regards to MatthewMiller.

{¶ 5} On January 11, Conover emailed Wells, reattaching the cease-anddesist letter and reiterating that the district had searched for and sent her the records 

she had asked for. Conover then told Wells that (1) if she was seeking 

communications between the board and its attorneys, then she could not obtain 

records of such communications because they were protected from disclosure under 

attorney-client privilege and (2) if she was seeking communications between “two 

non-public entities (that is, two separate law firms), those records are not a public 

record because they are not created, received, or otherwise under the jurisdiction of 

a public office.”

B. The second request

{¶ 6} On January 19, 2023, Wells sent her second request by email to 

Conover, the district’s public-records portal, and Zink, this time requesting “all 

legal invoices & documents from the date of January 1, 2022, until the current date 

of January 19, 2023 from all board/attorneys in Lakota Local school district.” 

Conover responded to Wells by email the same day, attaching redacted invoices 
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from 2022 and stating that he would look for invoices from 2023. Conover redacted 

the name of the attorney providing the service, the hours spent to provide the 

service, the attorney’s rate, and the narrative describing the service. Conover stated 

that the redactions were necessary to protect information covered by attorney-client 

privilege. He also redacted bank-account-related information based on R.C. 149.45

(authorizing redaction of personal information).

{¶ 7} In September 2023, about eight months after Wells sent her requests 

and seven months after Wells brought this case, Conover resent the invoices to 

Wells’s attorney, retaining the redactions for the narratives and bank-accountrelated information, but removing the redactions for the other information 

mentioned in the preceding paragraph.

C. This proceeding

{¶ 8} In February 2023, Wells filed a complaint in this court, which she 

later amended, seeking a writ of mandamus ordering the production of the public 

records that she had requested and awards of statutory damages, attorney fees, and

court costs. We granted an alternative writ scheduling the presentation of evidence 

and briefs and directing Lakota to file unredacted copies of the contested records 

under seal for an in camera inspection. See 2023-Ohio-4259. The case is ripe for 

decision.

II. ANALYSIS

A. Wells’s motion for oral argument or for leave to file a supplemental brief

{¶ 9} Wells has filed a motion asking us to either set the matter for oral 

argument or allow her an opportunity to file a supplemental brief. According to 

Wells, this relief is necessary because Lakota advanced an argument in its merit 

brief that she had not anticipated. Wells overlooks that under the terms of this 

court’s alternative-writ schedule, she had the opportunity to file a reply brief in 

response to Lakota’s merit brief. Id. We deny Wells’s motion.
January Term, 2024

5

B. Mandamus

{¶ 10} Mandamus is an appropriate remedy to compel compliance with 

R.C. 149.43. State ex rel. Physicians Commt. for Responsible Medicine v. Ohio 

State Univ. Bd. of Trustees, 2006-Ohio-903, ¶ 6. To obtain the writ, Wells must 

show that she has a clear legal right to the requested relief and that Lakota has a 

clear legal duty to provide it. State ex rel. Ellis v. Maple Hts. Police Dept., 2019-

Ohio-4137, ¶ 5. Wells bears the burden of production to plead and prove facts 

showing that she requested public records and that Lakota did not make the records 

available. Welsh-Huggins v. Jefferson Cty. Prosecutor’s Office, 2020-Ohio-5371, 

¶ 26.

1. The demand letter

{¶ 11} Wells argues that with respect to the records she requested in her 

first request, the court should grant a writ solely to compel the disclosure of what 

she calls a “demand letter.” Wells attests that she was told of the demand letter’s

existence by a district employee and that the letter threatened the board with 

litigation.1 The demand letter, which has been filed under seal, contains a 

settlement offer sent by Tuck on Miller’s behalf.

{¶ 12} Lakota insists that it properly withheld the demand letter because the 

letter constitutes a privileged settlement communication that is excepted from 

disclosure under the Public Records Act. The general rule articulated by this court 

is that a “settlement agreement of a lawsuit in which a public office is a party is a 

public record subject to disclosure under R.C. 149.43.” State ex rel. Findlay 

Publishing Co. v. Hanckock Cty. Bd. of Commrs., 1997-Ohio-353, ¶ 9; see also 

State ex rel. Cincinnati Enquirer v. Dupuis, 2002-Ohio-7041, ¶ 15 (same). 

1. To be clear, Conover did produce the cease-and desist letter that Miller’s attorney had sent to a 

board member threatening litigation in response to the accusations concerning Miller. If that letter 

alone were at issue, then Wells’s letter-related mandamus claim would be moot.
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6

Although there is no evidence in this case that Miller ever brought a lawsuit against 

the board, Lakota acknowledges in its brief that it would have been required to 

produce to Wells a copy of any agreement settling a lawsuit between itself and 

Miller (“Without question, if a final settlement agreement had been reached, 

approved by the Board, and entered into, the settlement agreement would be a 

public record”).

{¶ 13} But Lakota makes a different argument here, distinguishing between 

documents that memorialize settlement and those exchanged in furtherance of 

settlement. According to Lakota, the latter are not subject to disclosure. This court 

addressed aspects of this argument in Dupuis. In that case, a newspaper company 

sought a writ of mandamus to compel the City of Cincinnati to produce a copy of a 

proposed settlement agreement that it had received from the United States 

Department of Justice. The city argued that the document was exempt from 

disclosure on several grounds, among them that the federal Freedom of Information 

Act protected against disclosure. This court rejected the city’s FOIA arguments, 

id. at ¶ 32, observing that “FOIA does not apply to nonfederal agencies or officers,” 

and denied the writ.

{¶ 14} Lakota acknowledges Dupuis, but it says that the decision does not 

control. Rather, Lakota argues that the relevant precedent is Goodyear Tire & 

Rubber Co. v. Chiles Power Supply, Inc., 332 F.3d 976, 983 (6th Cir. 2003), which 

postdates Dupuis.

2

 According to Lakota, the rule announced in Goodyear, which 

we recount below, created federal law within the meaning of R.C. 149.43(A)(1)(v), 

which provides, “Records the release of which is prohibited by...federal law” are 

not public records. Lakota thus says that federal law—by way of Goodyear—

2. Amici curiae echo Lakota’s argument. But they make an additional argument that Lakota does 

not make. They say that the demand letter should be protected from disclosure based on the interplay 

between the Public Records Act and the Open Meetings Act, R.C. 121.22. We do not address the 

effect of the Open Meetings Act “given the general rule that an amicus curiae may not raise an issue 

not raised by the parties.” State ex rel. Grendell v. Walder, 2022-Ohio-204, ¶ 31, fn. 1.
January Term, 2024

7

protects the demand letter against disclosure. As the proponent of this exception, 

Lakota must show that the demand letter “falls squarely within [it].” State ex rel. 

Cincinnati Enquirer v. Jones-Kelley, 2008-Ohio-1770, paragraph two of the 

syllabus.

{¶ 15} In Goodyear, the court of appeals crafted a “settlement privilege,” 

holding that statements made in furtherance of settlement are privileged and 

protected from third-party discovery. Id. at 979. As authority to craft this privilege, 

the court quoted Fed.R.Evid. 501, which “authorizes federal courts to define new 

privileges by interpreting common law principles...‘in the light of reason and 

experience,’ ” Jaffee v. Redmond, 518 U.S. 1, 8 (1996). As support for the existence 

of this privilege, the court of appeals pointed to the strong public interest favoring 

the secrecy of information exchanged during settlement negotiations and this 

country’s tradition of protecting settlement communications. Goodyear at 980.

{¶ 16} Lakota’s reliance on Goodyear fails. First, Goodyear crafted the 

settlement privilege to resolve a discovery dispute. Because this case does not 

involve a discovery dispute, Goodyear does not apply. Accord Michigan Rising 

Action v. Secy. of State, 2022 WL 2902080, *3 (Mich.App. July 21, 2022) (drawing 

a similar distinction in rejecting a public office’s reliance on Goodyear within the 

context of Michigan’s FOIA). Second, even if this case presented a question 

concerning proper discovery procedure, Goodyear would still not help Lakota for 

all the reasons set forth in Consumers’ Counsel v. Pub. Util. Comm., 2006-Ohio5789, ¶ 90-91 (characterizing Goodyear as an outlier and observing that it should 

have turned on the state’s law of privilege). We reject Lakota’s argument that 

federal law authorizes it to withhold the demand letter.

{¶ 17} As an alternative to its argument that it could withhold the demand 

letter based on Goodyear, Lakota argues that Wells’s request for the demand letter 

fails because she alleged in her complaint that the demand letter was sent to 

Conover, but in fact it was not. Rather, the letter was sent to a different attorney. 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO

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The problem with this argument is that Wells did not limit her request to letters 

addressed to Conover; rather, in her January 5 follow-up email, she asked for, 

among other things, communications between Tuck and counsel for the board. The 

demand letter filed under seal fits this description.

{¶ 18} In sum, we grant a writ of mandamus ordering Lakota to produce the 

demand letter.

2. The legal invoices

{¶ 19} Wells argues that the court should grant a writ of mandamus ordering 

Lakota to produce copies of invoices that display nonprivileged information. She

claims that she is entitled to this relief because, she says, the invoices that Lakota 

produced to her “remain[] unlawfully redacted.” Lakota counters that Wells’s 

request for the writ is moot because the invoices that it produced in September 2023 

had only the narrative portions redacted, which Ohio law authorizes. Lakota is 

correct.

{¶ 20} “Under existing caselaw, an invoice for a legal service provided to a 

public-office client is a public record, with the caveat that the narrative portion of 

the invoice describing the service is protected from disclosure by the attorney-client 

privilege.” State ex rel. Ames v. Baker, Dublikar, Beck, Wiley & Mathews, 2022-

Ohio-3990, ¶ 15 (“Ames I”) (collecting cases). To determine whether a public 

office properly redacted portions of a legal invoice, the court reviews the 

unredacted invoice in camera. State ex rel Ames v. Baker, Dublikar, Beck, Wiley & 

Mathews, 2023-Ohio-2668, ¶ 6 (“We have reviewed the unredacted invoices and 

find. . . that the redactions extend no further than the narrative portions of each 

invoice. . . . .”).

{¶ 21} We have reviewed the unredacted legal invoices that Lakota 

submitted under seal and compared them with the invoices that Lakota produced in 

September 2023. Based upon our review, we conclude that Wells’s mandamus 

claim seeking the production of unredacted or lesser-redacted invoices is moot 
January Term, 2024

9

because the redactions appearing on the September 2023 production extend no 

further than the narrative portions of each invoice that describe the service rendered

and the bank-account-related information, the latter of which has not been placed 

at issue. See State ex rel. Martin v. Greene, 2019-Ohio-1827, ¶ 7 (“In general, a 

public-records mandamus case becomes moot when the public office provides the 

requested records.”).

C. Statutory damages

{¶ 22} Wells claims that she is entitled to statutory damages based on 

Lakota’s decision to withhold the demand letter and produce redacted legal 

invoices. She is correct.

{¶ 23} “R.C. 149.43(C)(2) provides that a requester who transmits a publicrecords request by electronic submission, as [Wells] did, in a manner that fairly 

describes the requested records, shall be entitled to statutory damages if a court 

determines that the public office failed to comply with an obligation of R.C. 

149.43(B). Statutory damages accrue at the rate of $100 for each business day the 

office failed to meet one of R.C. 149.43(B)’s obligations, beginning on the day the 

requester files a mandamus action, up to $1,000. R.C. 149.43(C)(2).” State ex rel. 

Horton v. Kilbane, 2022-Ohio-205, ¶ 15.

{¶ 24} Wells asserts that Lakota failed in its obligation to “make copies of 

the requested public record[s] available” either at all or “within a reasonable period 

of time.” R.C. 149.43(B)(1). Lakota asks the court to not award any damages,

citing R.C. 149.43(C)(2)(a) and (b).

{¶ 25} For the statute to apply, the court must determine that

(1) based on the law as it existed at the time of the request, a wellinformed person responsible for the records reasonably would have 

believed that R.C. 149.43(B) did not require their disclosure and (2) 

a well-informed person responsible for the records reasonably 
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would have believed that withholding the records would serve the 

public policy that underlies the authority asserted for withholding 

the records.

State ex rel. Harm Reduction Ohio v. OneOhio Recovery Found., 2023-Ohio-1547, 

¶ 38 (paraphrasing the statute). When both elements are met, a court may “reduce” 

or “not award statutory damages.” R.C. 149.43(C)(2).

1. The demand letter

{¶ 26} The sole decision that Lakota has pointed to as authority for 

withholding the demand letter is Goodyear, 332 F.3d 976. As explained, that 

decision does not speak to the question presented here, and this court has previously 

declined to adopt its reasoning in a different context. What is more, this court’s 

precedent holds that a settlement agreement involving a public office is a public 

record. See, e.g., Findlay, 80 Ohio St.3d at 136. With this precedent on the books 

at the time of Wells’s request, we fail to see how a well-informed custodian would 

reasonably believe that a communication made in furtherance of settlement could 

be withheld. We award $1,000 in statutory damages due to Lakota’s failure to 

produce the demand letter.

2. The legal invoices

{¶ 27} Although Well’s mandamus claim regarding the legal invoices is 

moot, her statutory-damages claim is not. See Martin, 2019-Ohio-1827, at ¶ 8. 

Here, over eight months elapsed between the time that Wells submitted her request 

and the time that Lakota sent her the properly redacted invoices. Given clear law 

on redacting attorney invoices at the time of Wells’s request, see, e.g., Ames I, 

2022-Ohio-3990, at ¶ 15, no well-informed custodian would have reasonably 

believed, as Lakota did when it first responded to Wells, that it could have redacted 

the names of the attorneys providing the services, the hours spent to provide the 
January Term, 2024

11

service, and the attorneys’ rates. We accordingly award $1,000 in statutory 

damages to Wells for Lakota’s delay in producing the legal invoices to her.

D. Attorney fees

{¶ 28} Wells asks for attorney fees under two provisions of the Public 

Records Act. The first permits a court to award attorney fees when it grants a writ 

of mandamus ordering a public office to comply with R.C. 149.43(B). R.C. 

149.43(C)(3)(b). The second permits a court to award attorney fees when it 

determines that the public office “responsible for the public records acted in bad 

faith when [it] voluntarily made the public records available to the relator for the 

first time after the relator commenced the mandamus action, but before the court 

issued any order concluding whether or not the public office . . . was required to 

comply with” R.C. 149.43(B). R.C. 149.43(C)(3)(b)(iii).

1. The demand letter

{¶ 29} Because Lakota has yet to voluntarily produce the demand letter, 

Wells cannot rely on R.C. 149.43(C)(3)(b)(iii)’s bad-faith language as the basis for 

her attorney-fee request. Instead, she must proceed under R.C. 149.43(C)(3)(b).

{¶ 30} Because we are granting a writ of mandamus ordering production of 

the demand letter, Wells is eligible for attorney fees subject to R.C. 

149.43(C)(3)(c)(i) and (ii), which, if met, empower a court to “not award” attorney 

fees. R.C. 149.43(C)(3)(c). Subdivisions (i) and (ii) set forth the “same” standard 

recited above with respect to the procedure a court must follow in determining 

whether to reduce or not award statutory damages. See Harm Reduction, 2023-

Ohio-1547, at ¶ 40.

{¶ 31} We have already rejected Lakota’s argument that it should not have 

to pay statutory damages, noting that Lakota cannot shield itself from damages 

based on Goodyear, 332 F.3d 976. We follow that approach here, concluding that 

Wells is entitled to attorney fees based on Lakota’s refusal to produce the demand 

letter. The amount of attorney fees will be determined at a later date, subject to the 
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filing of an itemized fee application by Wells that conforms to the proper standards. 

See, e.g., State ex rel. Rogers v. Dept. of Rehab. & Corr., 2018-Ohio-5111, ¶ 37-39 

(determining that the relator is entitled to attorney fees, authorizing the relator to 

file an itemized fee application, and specifying the standards the court must apply 

in determining a proper fee award).

2. The legal invoices

{¶ 32} Because Lakota has produced the legal invoices with proper 

redactions, no writ of mandamus will issue for this request. Wells thus cannot rely 

on R.C. 149.43(C)(3)(b) as the basis for her attorney-fee request. Instead, we

consider the R.C. 149.43(C)(3)(b)(iii) bad-faith provision.

{¶ 33} We have said:

“The term ‘bad faith’ generally implies something more than bad 

judgment or negligence.” State v. Powell, 132 Ohio St.3d 233, 

2012-Ohio-2577, 971 N.E.2d 865, ¶ 81, quoting State v. Tate, 5th 

Dist. Fairfield No. 07 CA 55, 2008-Ohio-3759, 2008 WL 2896658, 

¶ 13. Bad faith “imports a dishonest purpose, moral obliquity, 

conscious wrongdoing, breach of a known duty through some 

ulterior motive or ill will partaking of the nature of fraud. It also 

embraces actual intent to mislead or deceive another.” Id.

(Cleaned up.) State ex rel. McDougald v. Greene, 2020-Ohio-3686, ¶ 26.

{¶ 34} Wells claims that Lakota engaged in bad faith by redacting portions 

of the legal invoices that never should have been redacted. Wells posits that Lakota 

redacted unprotected portions of the invoices because she was “critical of [the 

board’s] investigation into allegations involving Miller.”

{¶ 35} It is true that the caselaw was clear at the time of Wells’s request that 

Lakota could redact the narrative portion of the invoice but not more. See, e.g., 
January Term, 2024

13

Ames I, 2022-Ohio-3990, at ¶ 15. And it is dismaying that Lakota took eight 

months to bring its production into compliance with the caselaw by removing the 

redactions that it had previously applied to the time, attorney name, and rate 

information.

{¶ 36} Even so, Wells cites no evidence for her assertion that Lakota’s 

conduct was prompted by her critique of its investigation, and this court “cannot 

assign bad faith based on [Wells’s] speculation.” State ex rel. Horton v. Kilbane, 

2022-Ohio-205, ¶ 36. Moreover, although Lakota plainly exercised bad judgment 

in its handling of the legal invoices, bad judgment is not equivalent to bad faith. Id.

at ¶ 34.

{¶ 37} We deny Wells’s request for attorney fees in connection with the 

legal invoices.

E. Costs

{¶ 38} Wells asks for court costs. Under the Public Records Act, if the court 

grants a writ of mandamus ordering the public office to comply with R.C. 

149.43(B), then it shall determine and award to the relator all court costs. R.C. 

149.43(C)(3)(a)(i). Because we are granting a writ of mandamus as to the demand 

letter, we award Wells her court costs. See Myers v. Meyers, 2022-Ohio-1915, ¶ 

77 (“Because we are granting a partial writ of mandamus, we award court costs to 

[relator]”).

III. CONCLUSION

{¶ 39} We deny Wells’s motion for either oral argument or leave to file a 

supplemental brief, grant a writ of mandamus as to the demand letter and deny it as 

moot as to the legal invoices, award $2,000 in statutory damages, award attorney 

fees as to the demand letter subject to the filing of an itemized fee application, deny 

attorney fees as to the legal invoices, and award court costs. Wells’s application 

for attorney fees shall be filed within 20 days of the date of today’s decision.
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Writ granted in part

and denied as moot in part.

__________________

Barron, Peck, Bennie & Schlemmer, Co., L.P.A., Matt Miller-Novak, and 

Steven C. Davis, for relator.

McCaslin, Imbus & McCaslin, Ian R. Smith, and R Gary Winters; Bricker 

Graydon, and Brodi Conover, for respondents.

Pepple & Waggoner, Ltd., Christian M. Williams, and Daniel L. Lautar, for 

amici curiae, Ohio School Boards Association, Ohio Association of School 

Business Officials, and Buckeye Association of School Administrators, in support 

of respondents.

__________________