[Federal Register Volume 63, Number 96 (Tuesday, May 19, 1998)]
[Notices]
[Pages 27601-27604]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 98-13187]


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NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

[Docket No. 50-220]


Niagara Mohawk Power Corporation; Notice of Consideration of 
Issuance of Amendment to Facility Operating License, Proposed No 
Significant Hazards Consideration Determination, and Opportunity for a 
Hearing

    The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (the Commission) is 
considering issuance of an amendment to Facility Operating License No. 
DPR-63, issued to Niagara Mohawk Power Corporation (the licensee), for 
operation of the Nine Mile Point Nuclear Station, Unit 1 (NMP1) located 
in the town of Scriba, Oswego County, New York.
    The proposed amendment would change Technical Specifications (TSs) 
3/4.6.2, ``Protective Instrumentation,'' to reflect modifications to 
the initiation instrumentation for the Control Room Air Treatment 
System. Specifically, TS

[[Page 27602]]

Tables 3.6.2l and 4.6.2l, ``Control Room Air Treatment System 
Initiation,'' would be changed to delete the high radiation signal and 
substitute the following initiating signals from the Reactor Protection 
System: (1) low-low reactor water level in the reactor vessel, (2) high 
steam flow in the main steam line, (3) high temperature in the main 
steam line tunnel, and (4) high pressure in the reactor drywell. TS 
Table 3.6.2l would specify setpoints for each of these four initiating 
parameters ([greater than or equal to] 5 inches-indicator scale, [less 
than or equal to] 105 psid, [less than or equal to] 200 degrees F, and 
[less than or equal to] 3.5 psig, respectively). TS Table 3.6.2l would 
indicate for each of the four parameters that the minimum number of 
tripped or operable trip systems and the minimum number of operable 
instrument channels per operable trip system are two, and that the four 
parameters are required to be operable when the reactor mode switch is 
in the ``startup'' or ``run'' positions (but not if in the ``shutdown'' 
or ``refuel'' positions), except that the high drywell pressure signal 
may be bypassed when necessary for containment inerting. For three of 
the parameters (low-low reactor water level, high steam flow in the 
main steam line, and high drywell pressure), TS Table 4.6.2l would 
require daily sensor checks, quarterly instrument channel tests, and 
quarterly instrument channel calibrations (except that only the trip 
circuit need be calibrated and tested at these quarterly frequencies; 
the primary sensor would be calibrated and tested each operating 
cycle). For the parameter high temperature in the main steam line 
tunnel, TS Table 4.6.2l would require an instrument channel test and an 
instrument channel calibration each operating cycle, not to exceed 24 
months. Associated TS ``Bases for 3.4.5 and 4.4.5 Control Room Air 
Treatment System'' would also be changed to update the system 
descriptions consistent with these proposed changes to the automatic 
initiation circuitry, and to reflect the system's manual start 
capability. These changes to the TS Bases would include deletion of the 
statements that (1) the Control Room Air Treatment System is designed 
``to automatically start upon a receipt of a high radiation signal from 
one of the two radiation monitors located on the ventilation intake'' 
and that (2) ``* * * air intake radiation monitors will be calibrated 
and functionally tested each operating cycle, not to exceed 24 months, 
to verify system performance.''
    During a system design review, the licensee determined that (1) 
contrary to a commitment in letters to the NRC dated January 31 and 
March 19, 1984, the NMP1 Control Room Air Treatment System would not 
automatically initiate during an MSLB [main steam line break] or an 
LOCA [loss-of-coolant accident], and (2) initiation of the NMP1 Control 
Room Air Treatment System at the current radiation monitor setpoint of 
[less than or equal to] 1000 CPM, as required by TS Table 3.6.2l, is 
not sufficient for compliance with GDC 19 limits for radiological 
protection of the control room operators. Consequently, on April 21, 
1998, the licensee declared the Control Room Air Treatment System 
inoperable and notified the NRC that a 7 day limiting condition for 
operation had been entered as specified by TS 3.4.5. On April 27, 1998, 
the licensee informed the NRC Project Manager that resolution of the 
inoperability condition would involve modifications more extensive than 
mere setpoint adjustments, that these modifications should not be 
implemented while NMP1 is operating, and that the licensee was 
considering filing an application for an emergency license amendment to 
allow the modifications to be implemented and the plant restarted after 
a 7-day outage. NMP1 was shut down on April 28, 1998, in accordance 
with TS 3.4.5. On May 2, 1998, the licensee filed an application 
requesting that the NRC amend the NMP1 license by May 8, 1998, on an 
Emergency basis because ``resumption of operation cannot occur until 
NRC approval of the proposed change.'' However, on May 11, 1998, the 
licensee informed the NRC that as a result of the finding by a team of 
licensee engineers who reviewed the control room ventilation systems, 
modifications to the NMP1 Control Room Air Treatment System would not 
be completed and NMP1 determined ready for restart for 2 weeks. 
Accordingly, the NRC finds that exigent circumstances exist in that the 
full 30 days normally provided for public comment with respect to the 
proposed action is not available before NMP1 will be ready to resume 
power operation.
    Before issuance of the proposed license amendment, the Commission 
will have made findings required by the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as 
amended (the Act) and the Commission's regulations.
    Pursuant to 10 CFR 50.91(a)(6) for amendments to be granted under 
exigent circumstances, the NRC staff must determine that the amendment 
request involves no significant hazards consideration. Under the 
Commission's regulations in 10 CFR 50.92, this means that operation of 
the facility in accordance with the proposed amendment would not (1) 
involve a significant increase in the probability or consequences of an 
accident previously evaluated; or (2) create the possibility of a new 
or different kind of accident from any accident previously evaluated; 
or (3) involve a significant reduction in a margin of safety. As 
required by 10 CFR 50.91(a), the licensee has provided its analysis of 
the issue of no significant hazards consideration, which is presented 
below:
    1. The operation of Nine Mile Point Unit 1, in accordance with the 
proposed amendment, will not involve a significant increase in the 
probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated.
    * * * The proposed modification and associated TS changes involve a 
system that is intended to detect the symptoms of certain events or 
accidents and initiate mitigative actions (i.e., the Control Room Air 
Treatment System). Accordingly, the proposed changes do not affect the 
probability of any accident initiators previously evaluated. Therefore, 
the proposed changes will not result in a significant increase in the 
probability of any accidents previously evaluated.
    Currently, TS Table 3.6.2l, ``Control Room Air Treatment System 
Initiation,'' specifies a setpoint of ``<ls-thn-eq>1000 CPM'' for 
Parameter (1), ``High Radiation Ventilation Intake.'' This requires the 
continuous radiation monitors located in the outside air intake duct of 
the Control Room Ventilation System to initiate the Control Room Air 
Treatment System at a detector count rate of ``[less than or equal to] 
1000 CPM.'' The setpoint was established to comply with the radiation 
dose limits specified in 10 CFR 50, Appendix A, General Design 
Criterion (GDC) 19 and NUREG-0800, ``Standard Review Plan [SRP],'' 
Section 6.4 for control room habitability during an accident, including 
a Loss of Coolant Accident (LOCA). In the event of an accident, timely 
initiation and proper operation of the Control Room Air Treatment 
System minimizes the amount of airborne radioactivity entering the 
control room. However, based on the results of a current study, 
initiation of the Control Room Air Treatment System at this setpoint 
does not provide assurance that personnel occupying the control room 
under the most limiting Main Steam Line Break (MSLB) accident 
assumptions would not receive radiation exposures in excess of the GDC 
19 and SRP 6.4 limits. It was further determined that, contrary to a 
1984 commitment, the Control Room Air Treatment System would not 
automatically initiate during a LOCA.

[[Page 27603]]

    To correct this condition, a modification is proposed that will 
automatically initiate the Control Room Air Treatment System on either 
a MSLB or LOCA signal. Spare contacts from the RPS logic circuits will 
be used to provide the initiation signals. Specifically, MSLB automatic 
initiation of the system will be on main steam line high flow or main 
steam line tunnel high temperature, and LOCA automatic initiation of 
the system will be on high drywell pressure or low-low reactor vessel 
water level. Implementation of this modification will provide automatic 
initiation of the Control Room Air Treatment System at the onset of 
both a MSLB and a LOCA, as previously committed.
    The MSLB accident has been evaluated for full power operating 
conditions where radioactive gases released from the turbine building 
could be drawn into the Control Room Ventilation System and accumulate 
in the control room. Engineering calculations show that the Control 
Room Air Treatment System would maintain the dose to the control room 
operators below the GDC 19 and SRP 6.4 limits during these releases, 
and the addition of an anticipatory automatic initiation on a MSLB 
signal (main steam line high flow or main steam line tunnel high 
temperature) provides assurance that the consequences of the MSLB 
accident are bounded by the analysis.
    The LOCA analysis assumes that radioactive gases are released from 
the elevated stack and are then drawn back down into the Control Room 
Ventilation System intake duct. Analysis shows that for the bounding 
condition, the accumulated dose in the control room for a minimum of 30 
days would not be detected by the Control Room Air Treatment System 
radiation monitors, even at a significantly reduced setpoint. 
Consequently, the radiation monitors cannot be relied upon to initiate 
the Control Room Air Treatment System in the event of a LOCA. As a 
result, an anticipatory automatic initiation of the Control Room Air 
Treatment System on a LOCA signal (high drywell pressure or low-low 
reactor vessel water level) is proposed to be added to provide 
assurance that personnel occupying the control room under the most 
limiting LOCA assumptions will not receive radiation exposures in 
excess of the GDC 19 and SRP 6.4 limits.
    NMPC has also proposed to delete the requirement to have the 
Control Room Air Treatment System automatically initiate on a high 
radiation signal when the reactor mode switch is in the ``Refuel'' 
position. This change is acceptable based on 1) neither a LOCA or MSLB 
is assumed to occur in refuel; 2) for accidents assumed to occur during 
refueling (fuel handling accident), GDC 19 and SRP 6.4 limits are met 
without the Control Room Air Treatment System; and 3) the Control Room 
Air Treatment System can be manually initiated.
    In summary, the proposed changes for the Control Room Air Treatment 
System initiation channels will assure that the NMP1 control room 
operators will not receive radiation exposures in excess of the limits 
delineated in GDC 19 and SRP 6.4. Accordingly, the operators will be 
able to respond to and mitigate the consequences of anticipated 
accident scenarios. Therefore, the proposed changes will not involve a 
significant increase in the consequences of an accident previously 
evaluated.
    2. The operation of Nine Mile Point Unit 1, in accordance with the 
proposed amendment, will not create the possibility of a new or 
different kind of accident from any accident previously evaluated.
    * * * The proposed changes do not introduce any new accident 
initiators and do not involve any alterations to plant configurations 
which could initiate a new or different kind of accident. The actuation 
circuit of the Control Room Air Treatment System actuation logic does 
not control or interface with any primary reactor processes. Addition 
of the MSLB logic and the LOCA logic will ensure that the Control Room 
Air Treatment System initiates such that habitability of the control 
room is not compromised. No new failure modes to existing systems or 
equipment important to safety are created by this change. Post-
installation testing will confirm that the new logic will have no 
effect on other safety-related circuits and TS required surveillance 
testing will routinely confirm operability of the Control Room Air 
Treatment System. Therefore, the changes do not create the possibility 
of a new or different kind of accident from any accident previously 
evaluated.
    3. The operation of Nine Mile Point Unit 1, in accordance with the 
proposed amendment, will not involve a significant reduction in a 
margin of safety.
    The proposed changes to Sections 3.6.2 and 4.6.2 incorporate 
modifications to the initiation instrumentation for the Control Room 
Air Treatment System. * * * As a result of these changes, the 
requirement to have the Control Room Air Treatment System automatically 
initiate on a high radiation signal when the reactor mode switch is in 
the ``Refuel'' position has been deleted. * * *
    The addition of the trip circuit logic from the MSLB accident as 
well as from the LOCA circuits assures that the control room operator 
will not be exposed to radiation limits in excess of GDC 19 or SRP 6.4 
limits. Additionally, the initiation signal will be automatic at the 
onset of both accidents, which improves the response time of the 
Control Room Air Treatment System to the MSLB accident and the LOCA. 
NMPC has proposed to delete the requirement to have the Control Room 
Air Treatment System automatically initiate on a high radiation signal 
when the reactor mode switch is in the ``Refuel'' position. This change 
is acceptable based on (1) neither a LOCA nor MSLB is assumed to occur 
in refuel; (2) for accidents assumed to occur during refueling (fuel 
handling accident) GDC 19 and SRP 6.4 limits are met without the 
Control Room Air Treatment System; and (3) the Control Room Air 
Treatment System can be manually initiated.
    In summary, the proposed changes will assure that the Control Room 
dose established in GDC 19 and SRP 6.4 will not be exceeded. Therefore, 
the proposed activity does not involve a significant reduction in a 
margin of safety.
    The NRC staff has reviewed the licensee's analysis and, based on 
this review, it appears that the three standards of 10 CFR 50.92(c) are 
satisfied. Therefore, the NRC staff proposes to determine that the 
amendment request involves no significant hazards consideration.
    The Commission is seeking public comments on this proposed 
determination. Any comments received within 14 days after the date of 
publication of this notice will be considered in making any final 
determination.
    Normally, the Commission will not issue the amendment until the 
expiration of the 14-day notice period. However, should circumstances 
change during the notice period, such that failure to act in a timely 
way would result, for example, in derating or shutdown of the facility, 
the Commission may issue the license amendment before the expiration of 
the 14-day notice period, provided that its final determination is that 
the amendment involves no significant hazards consideration. The final 
determination will consider all public and State comments received. 
Should the Commission take this action, it will publish in the Federal 
Register a notice of issuance. The Commission expects that the need to 
take this action will occur very infrequently.

[[Page 27604]]

    Written comments may be submitted by mail to the Chief, Rules and 
Directives Branch, Division of Administrative Services, Office of 
Administration, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, DC 
20555-0001, and should cite the publication date and page number of 
this Federal Register notice. Written comments may also be delivered to 
Room 6D59, Two White Flint North, 11545 Rockville Pike, Rockville, 
Maryland, from 7:30 a.m. to 4:15 p.m. Federal workdays. Copies of 
written comments received may be examined at the NRC Public Document 
Room, the Gelman Building, 2120 L Street, NW., Washington, DC.
    The filing of requests for hearing and petitions for leave to 
intervene is discussed below.
    By June 1, 1998, the licensee may file a request for a hearing with 
respect to issuance of the amendment to the subject facility operating 
license and any person whose interest may be affected by this 
proceeding and who wishes to participate as a party in the proceeding 
must file a written request for a hearing and a petition for leave to 
intervene. Requests for a hearing and a petition for leave to intervene 
shall be filed in accordance with the Commission's ``Rules of Practice 
for Domestic Licensing Proceedings'' in 10 CFR Part 2. Interested 
persons should consult a current copy of 10 CFR 2.714 which is 
available at the Commission's Public Document Room, the Gelman 
Building, 2120 L Street, NW., Washington, DC, and at the local public 
document room located at the Reference and Documents Department, 
Penfield Library, State University of New York, Oswego, New York 13126. 
If a request for a hearing or petition for leave to intervene is filed 
by the above date, the Commission or an Atomic Safety and Licensing 
Board, designated by the Commission or by the Chairman of the Atomic 
Safety and Licensing Board Panel, will rule on the request and/or 
petition; and the Secretary or the designated Atomic Safety and 
Licensing Board will issue a notice of hearing or an appropriate order.
    As required by 10 CFR 2.714, a petition for leave to intervene 
shall set forth with particularity the interest of the petitioner in 
the proceeding, and how that interest may be affected by the results of 
the proceeding. The petition should specifically explain the reasons 
why intervention should be permitted with particular reference to the 
following factors: (1) the nature of the petitioner's right under the 
Act to be made a party to the proceeding; (2) the nature and extent of 
the petitioner's property, financial, or other interest in the 
proceeding; and (3) the possible effect of any order which may be 
entered in the proceeding on the petitioner's interest. The petition 
should also identify the specific aspect(s) of the subject matter of 
the proceeding as to which petitioner wishes to intervene. Any person 
who has filed a petition for leave to intervene or who has been 
admitted as a party may amend the petition without requesting leave of 
the Board up to 15 days prior to the first prehearing conference 
scheduled in the proceeding, but such an amended petition must satisfy 
the specificity requirements described above.
    Not later than 15 days prior to the first prehearing conference 
scheduled in the proceeding, a petitioner shall file a supplement to 
the petition to intervene which must include a list of the contentions 
which are sought to be litigated in the matter. Each contention must 
consist of a specific statement of the issue of law or fact to be 
raised or controverted. In addition, the petitioner shall provide a 
brief explanation of the bases of the contention and a concise 
statement of the alleged facts or expert opinion which support the 
contention and on which the petitioner intends to rely in proving the 
contention at the hearing. The petitioner must also provide references 
to those specific sources and documents of which the petitioner is 
aware and on which the petitioner intends to rely to establish those 
facts or expert opinion. Petitioner must provide sufficient information 
to show that a genuine dispute exists with the applicant on a material 
issue of law or fact. Contentions shall be limited to matters within 
the scope of the amendment under consideration. The contention must be 
one which, if proven, would entitle the petitioner to relief. A 
petitioner who fails to file such a supplement which satisfies these 
requirements with respect to at least one contention will not be 
permitted to participate as a party.
    Those permitted to intervene become parties to the proceeding, 
subject to any limitations in the order granting leave to intervene, 
and have the opportunity to participate fully in the conduct of the 
hearing, including the opportunity to present evidence and cross-
examine witnesses.
    If the amendment is issued before the expiration of the 30-day 
hearing period, the Commission will make a final determination on the 
issue of no significant hazards consideration. If a hearing is 
requested, the final determination will serve to decide when the 
hearing is held.
    If the final determination is that the amendment request involves 
no significant hazards consideration, the Commission may issue the 
amendment and make it immediately effective, notwithstanding the 
request for a hearing. Any hearing held would take place after issuance 
of the amendment.
    If the final determination is that the amendment request involves a 
significant hazards consideration, any hearing held would take place 
before the issuance of any amendment.
    A request for a hearing or a petition for leave to intervene must 
be filed with the Secretary of the Commission, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory 
Commission, Washington, DC 20555-0001, Attention: Rulemakings and 
Adjudications Staff, or may be delivered to the Commission's Public 
Document Room, the Gelman Building, 2120 L Street, NW., Washington, DC, 
by the above date.
    A copy of the petition should also be sent to the Office of the 
General Counsel, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, DC 
20555-0001, and to Mark J. Wetterhahn, Esquire, Winston & Strawn, 1400 
L Street, NW, Washington, DC 20005-3502, attorney for the licensee.
    Nontimely filings of petitions for leave to intervene, amended 
petitions, supplemental petitions and/or requests for hearing will not 
be entertained absent a determination by the Commission, the presiding 
officer or the presiding Atomic Safety and Licensing Board that the 
petition and/or request should be granted based upon a balancing of the 
factors specified in 10 CFR 2.714(a)(1)(i)-(v) and 2.714(d).
    For further details with respect to this action, see the 
application for amendment dated May 2, 1998, which is available for 
public inspection at the Commission's Public Document Room, the Gelman 
Building, 2120 L Street, NW., Washington, DC, and at the local public 
document room, located at the Reference and Documents Department, 
Penfield Library, State University of New York, Oswego, New York 13126.

    Dated at Rockville, Maryland, this 12th day of May, 1998.

    For the Nuclear Regulatory Commission.
Darl S. Hood,
Senior Project Manager, Project Directorate I-1, Division of Reactor 
Projects--I/II, Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation.
[FR Doc. 98-13187 Filed 5-18-98; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 7590-01-P