United States Court of Appeals 

for the Federal Circuit ______________________ 

ROBERT L. DOYON,

Plaintiff-Appellant

v.

UNITED STATES,

Defendant-Appellee

______________________ 

2021-2095

______________________ 

Appeal from the United States Court of Federal Claims 

in No. 1:19-cv-01964-LKG, Judge Lydia Kay Griggsby.

______________________ 

Decided: January 25, 2023 

______________________ 

MICHAEL CLEMENTE, Latham & Watkins LLP, Washington, DC, argued for plaintiff-appellant. Also represented by EUGENE R. ELROD, ADAM MICHAEL GREENFIELD; 

REMINGTON LAMONS, Costa Mesa, CA; ROCHELLE BOBROFF, 

National Veterans Legal Services Program, Arlington, VA. 

 ELIZABETH ANNE SPECK, Commercial Litigation 

Branch, Civil Division, United States Department of Justice, Washington, DC, argued for defendant-appellee. Also 

represented by BRIAN M. BOYNTON, STEVEN JOHN 

GILLINGHAM, PATRICIA M. MCCARTHY. 

 ALEXANDER O. CANIZARES, Perkins Coie, LLP,

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2 DOYON v. US

Washington, DC, for amicus curiae Connecticut Veterans 

Legal Center. Also represented by JOHN MICHAEL GEISE, 

Elias Law Group LLP, Washington, DC. 

 MAYA M. ECKSTEIN, Hunton Andrews Kurth LLP, Richmond, VA, for amicus curiae Protect Our Defenders. Also 

represented by JEFFREY PIERCE LAMBERSON; KEVIN 

EDWARD GAUNT, Washington, DC.

 ALEC UMBERTO GHEZZI, Veterans’ Voice of America, Silver Spring, MD, for amicus curiae Vietnam Veterans of 

America.

______________________ 

Before NEWMAN, LINN, and CHEN, Circuit Judges.

CHEN, Circuit Judge. 

Plaintiff-Appellant Robert Doyon petitioned the Board 

for the Correction of Naval Records (BCNR) to correct his 

military service records to state that he was discharged

from the Navy for service-connected post-traumatic stress 

disorder (PTSD) rather than a “personality disorder.” After the BCNR denied his petition, Doyon brought suit in 

the Court of Federal Claims (Claims Court), seeking disability retirement payment for service-connected PTSD pursuant to 10 U.S.C. § 1201 and alleging that the BCNR 

failed to review his application with “liberal consideration.” 

The government moved for judgment on the administrative 

record, which the Claims Court granted. The court reasoned that the “liberal consideration” standard does not apply to the type of correction Mr. Doyon requested. 

Because Mr. Doyon challenges the correctness of the 

narrative reason for his discharge, as stated in his military 

records, and because both 10 U.S.C. § 1552(h) and a Department of Defense memorandum (Kurta Memo) require 

liberal consideration for such correction requests, the 

Claims Court erred in holding that the liberal 

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DOYON v. US 3

consideration standard does not apply to Mr. Doyon’s petition. Accordingly, we vacate the Claims Court’s decision 

granting judgment on the administrative record in favor of 

the government and remand with instructions to afford Mr. 

Doyon’s application liberal consideration.

BACKGROUND

I. Statutory and Regulatory Background

Congress created a statutory framework of administrative boards to adjudicate petitions by current or former military service members to correct their military records. 

10 U.S.C. § 1552. Congress authorized the Secretaries of 

military departments, acting through such administrative 

boards for each department, to “correct any military record” when “necessary to correct an error or remove an injustice.” Id. § 1552(a)(1); see also 32 C.F.R. § 723.2 

(establishing the BCNR). A service member who believes 

he was erroneously denied disability retirement due to errors in his military records may petition the BCNR for correction of his military record. See Chambers v. United 

States, 417 F.3d 1218, 1225 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (explaining 

that “where the service member was released from service 

without a [retirement] board hearing and subsequently 

files a claim for disability retirement before a military correction board, the Correction Board becomes the first 

proper board to act (or to be asked to act) on the matter

. . . . [and a] Correction Board proceeding becomes a mandatory remedy” (internal quotation marks and citation 

omitted)). There is no dispute that the BCNR has the 

power to make corrections granting or amending military 

disability retirement. Appellant’s Br. 34; Appellee’s Br. 20. 

In 2014, Secretary of Defense Chuck Hagel issued guidance to correction boards regarding claims seeking to upgrade a service member’s discharge characterization based 

on previously unrecognized PTSD. J.A. 1232–35 (Hagel 

Memo). The Hagel Memo noted that, because “PTSD was 

not recognized as a diagnosis at the time of service” for 

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4 DOYON v. US

Vietnam veterans and because PTSD diagnoses often 

“were not made until decades after service was completed,” 

many veterans’ records lack sufficient “substantive information” concerning PTSD. J.A. 1232. The Hagel Memo 

therefore instructed correction boards to give liberal consideration to “petitions for changes in characterization of 

service” when the former service member’s records “document one or more symptoms” of PTSD. Id. “Characterization of service” is a term of art that appears on military 

discharge paperwork and that reflects the circumstances of 

a veteran’s separation from military service—i.e., “Honorable,” “General (Under Honorable Conditions),” and “Under Other Than Honorable Conditions.” See Dep’t of 

Defense (DoD) Instruction 1332.14 at Encl. 4, ¶ 3(b)(2).

Then, on August 25, 2017, Undersecretary of Defense 

Anthony Kurta issued another memorandum, titled “Clarifying Guidance to Military Discharge Review Boards and 

Boards for Correction Military/Naval Records Considering 

Requests by Veterans for Modification of their Discharge 

Due to Mental Health Conditions; Traumatic Brain Injury; 

Sexual Assault; or Sexual Harassment” (Kurta Memo), to 

expand on the Hagel Memo and to promote “greater uniformity amongst the review boards.” J.A. 1940; see also

J.A. 1943 ¶ 22. Unlike the Hagel Memo, which was focused 

on “petitions for changes in characterization of service”—

e.g., changing a service member’s discharge from dishonorable or less-than-honorable to honorable, J.A. 1234, the 

Kurta Memo’s guidance is not limited to discharge characterization upgrades and applies to “any petition seeking 

discharge relief including requests to change the narrative 

reason, re-enlistment codes, and upgrades from General to 

Honorable characterizations,” J.A. 1943 ¶ 24. 

Like the Hagel Memo, the Kurta Memo explains that

the more lenient liberal consideration evidentiary standard 

is appropriate for PTSD-related correction claims because 

“[i]t is unreasonable to expect the same level of proof for 

injustices committed years ago when . . . PTSD . . . w[as] 

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DOYON v. US 5

far less understood than [it is] today.” J.A. 1943–44

¶ 26(a), (b), (k). Evidence relevant to a PTSD-related petition may include “changes in behavior, . . . deterioration in 

work performance; inability of the individual to conform 

their behavior to the expectations of the military environment; substance abuse; episodes of depression, panic attacks, or anxiety” and more. J.A. 1941 ¶ 5. Additionally,

the “veteran’s testimony alone” may establish the existence 

of PTSD, and a service-connection determination by the VA 

is “persuasive evidence” that PTSD existed during military 

service. J.A. 1942 ¶¶ 13–14. There is no dispute that the 

Hagel and Kurta Memos’ guidance is binding on the BCNR. 

See Fisher v. United States, 402 F.3d 1167, 1177 (Fed. Cir. 

2005) (“[T]he military is bound to follow its own procedural 

regulations should it choose to promulgate them.”).

Congress subsequently codified the liberal consideration standard into the BCNR’s authorizing statute on December 12, 2017, when it amended 10 U.S.C. § 1552 to add

sub-section (h). See National Defense Authorization Act 

for Fiscal Year 2018, Pub. L. No. 115-91 § 520, 131 Stat. 

1283, 1379, 1380 (2017). Section 1552(h) imposed a requirement on correction boards to review claims involving 

PTSD with liberal consideration. See 10 U.S.C. § 1552(h). 

Under controlling naval regulations at the time of Mr. 

Doyon’s discharge, service members could be “separated

[from military service], by reason of unsuitability, with an 

honorable or general discharge” for, among other reasons, 

character and behavioral disorders “[a]s determined by 

medical authority.” J.A. 1834 (Bureau of Naval Personnel 

Manual—Part C) § 10310(1), (2)(e). To discharge a service 

member as “unsuitable” due to a personality disorder, “the 

disorder [must be] of such severity as to render the member 

incapable of serving adequately.” Id. § 10310(4). Moreover, controlling DoD regulations at the time of Mr. Doyon’s 

discharge distinguished personality disorders, such as 

character and behavioral disorders, from physical disabilities, such as psychoses and psychoneuroses (thenCase: 21-2095 Document: 63 Page: 5 Filed: 01/25/2023
6 DOYON v. US

analogues to PTSD). See DoD Directive 1332.18, Encl. 2, 

§ XIV ¶ 3(a) (Sept. 9, 1968) (J.A. 1190) (specifying that 

“[c]haracter and behavior disorders may render an individual unsuitable rather than unfit because of physical disability” (emphasis added)); see also id., Encl. 1 ¶ E 

(J.A. 1164) (defining “physical disability” as including 

“mental disease [except] behavior disorders, personality 

disorders, and primary mental deficiency”).

Military disability retirement, on the other hand, is 

governed by 10 U.S.C. § 1201, which provides: “[U]pon the 

Secretary’s determination that a service member is ‘unfit

to perform the duties of the member’s office, grade, rank, 

or rating because of physical disability incurred while entitled to basic pay,’ the service member may retire for disability.” See Chambers, 417 F.3d at 1223, 1224 (quoting 

10 U.S.C. § 1201(a)); see also DoD Directive 1332.18

§ V(A)(1) (Sept. 9, 1968) (J.A. 1153) (setting forth “Standards of Unfitness by Reason of Physical Disability”). A separate Physical Examination Board “determines a service 

member’s fitness for duty and entitlement to disability retirement once a Medical Examination Board . . . finds the 

soldier does not meet the [military department’s] standards for retention under its regulations.” See Chambers, 

417 F.3d at 1225 n.2. So while some service members 

might be discharged from military service on “unsuitability” grounds, other service members may instead retire 

from service due to disability if the Secretary of their respective military department determines that they are “unfit” for duty. 

II. Mr. Doyon’s Military Service

Mr. Doyon served in the Navy from March 17, 1966, to 

November 21, 1968. J.A. 1102; J.A. 1136. During the Vietnam War, Mr. Doyon was assigned to the U.S.S. Intrepid, 

where he attained the rank of Airman and received several 

medals and commendations, including the Vietnam Service 

Medal (One Bronze Star), the Vietnam Campaign Medal, 

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DOYON v. US 7

and the National Defense Service Medal. J.A. 1240–46; 

J.A. 1969. 

On July 29, 1967, a rocket misfired on the deck of the 

U.S.S. Forrestal, causing an explosion and fire that resulted in more than 130 deaths and 160 injuries. 

J.A. 1001–02 ¶ 2; J.A. 1251–55. From the deck of the Intrepid, Mr. Doyon witnessed the immediate aftermath of 

the explosion and fire. Id. On October 23, 1967, four members of the Intrepid went Absent Without Leave (AWOL). 

J.A. 1007–08 ¶ 24; J.A. 1255. Mr. Doyon alleges that because he was friendly with two of the deserters, he was verbally and physically harassed and threatened by his 

shipmates. J.A. 1007–08 ¶ 24; J.A. 1577 ¶ 12. In April 

1968, Mr. Doyon’s parents wrote to Senator Edward Kennedy about his mental health, and Senator Kennedy, in 

turn, wrote to the commanding officer of the Intrepid. 

J.A. 1008 ¶ 25. The commanding officer subsequently reprimanded Mr. Doyon for going outside of the chain of command. J.A. 1254. 

In May 1968, Mr. Doyon went AWOL for two days. 

J.A. 1246; J.A. 1256; J.A. 1268–69. Upon his return to the 

Intrepid, Mr. Doyon was referred to the ship’s sick bay because of his “inability to get along with his peers, his recent 

mental agitation and deteriorating work habits, and his expression of admiration for several of 1967’s famous four deserters.” J.A. 1009 ¶ 28. Once admitted to sick bay, he was 

sedated with Thorazine, which Mr. Doyon contends is an 

antipsychotic. J.A. 1009 ¶ 28; J.A. 1115; see also J.A. 1258. 

On August 16, 1968, Mr. Doyon was transferred to Naval 

Base Subic Bay for further evaluation. J.A. 1009 ¶ 29. 

While at Subic Bay, a medical evaluation diagnosed Mr. 

Doyon with “passive aggressive personality disorder.” J.A. 

1009 ¶ 30. 

On August 31, 1968, Mr. Doyon returned to the Intrepid. J.A. 1010 ¶ 32. Less than a month later, Mr. Doyon

witnessed a fatal plane crash, including dismemberment of 

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8 DOYON v. US

a fellow Airman, while he was standing duty at a video recording console. J.A. 1010–11 ¶ 36; J.A. 1256–57. 

Mr. Doyon was then spent several hours replaying video 

recordings of the crash for Air Department and Incident 

Report Personnel. J.A. 1011 ¶ 37; J.A. 1257. 

On September 26, 1968, the commanding officer of the 

Intrepid recommended the Navy separate Mr. Doyon from 

military service for unsuitability, citing his diagnosis of 

passive-aggressive personality disorder. J.A. 1279. A subsequent psychiatric evaluation conducted on October 28, 

1968, changed Mr. Doyon’s diagnosis to “Emotionally Unstable Personality #3210, with noted paranoid trait in his 

personality.” J.A. 1002 ¶ 4; J.A. 1115; J.A. 1052. 

On November 21, 1968, Mr. Doyon was discharged

from the Navy. J.A. 1134. The “Characterization of Service” field on Mr. Doyon’s DD-214 form1 characterized his 

discharge as “Honorable,” and the “Reason and Authority” 

field on his DD-214 form contained a separation code indicating that he was discharged for unsuitability due to a 

personality disorder.2 See J.A. 1102. Accordingly, Mr. 

1 Mr. Doyon’s DD-214 form is entitled “Armed Forces 

of the United States Report of Transfer or Discharge.” J.A. 1102. A DD-214 form provides “a clear, concise summary of each discrete period of active 

service . . . . [and] includes relevant data regarding the 

[service] member’s service and the circumstances of termination” and serves as “an authoritative source of personnel 

information for administrative purposes, and for making 

enlistment or reenlistment eligibility determinations.” DoD Instruction 1336.01 § 1.2(d)(1), (2) (Feb. 17, 

2022).

2 The “BUPERS MANUAL ART. C-10310” separation code in the “Reason and Authority” field of Mr. Doyon’s 

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DOYON v. US 9

Doyon was not eligible to receive a military disability retirement. 

III. Administrative Proceedings 

In December 2013, Mr. Doyon filed an application for 

disability compensation with the Department of Veterans 

Affairs (VA) for PTSD. J.A. 1404. In June 2014, a VA psychiatrist diagnosed Mr. Doyon with PTSD and opined that 

he had experienced in-service stressors, including witnessing the fatal plane crash and the Forestall fire. 

J.A. 1112–20. The VA subsequently granted Mr. Doyon’s 

application for disability compensation due to PTSD and 

assigned a 50-percent disability rating, effective December 

9, 2013. J.A. 1136–39. On November 18, 2015, based on a 

PTSD diagnosis by a second VA psychiatrist, the VA 

granted Mr. Doyon’s claim for an increased disability rating and assigned a 70-percent disability rating, effective 

August 27, 2015. J.A. 1406–12; J.A. 1141–44. 

In September 2017, Mr. Doyon sought correction of his 

military records with the BCNR. J.A. 1068–70. Specifically, Mr. Doyon requested that the BCNR correct the separation code indicating the narrative reason for his 

discharge on his DD-214 form to: (1) reflect that he was 

medically retired due to physical disability; (2) reflect that 

he was unfit and medically retired for psychoses or psychoneuroses (then-analogues to PTSD); and (3) remove any 

reference to unsuitability due to personality disorder.3 

J.A. 1068; see also J.A. 1094 (supporting brief requesting 

DD-214 corresponds to “Discharge of Enlisted Personnel by 

Reason of Unsuitability.” See J.A. 1102; J.A. 1834. 

3 The narrative reason for Mr. Doyon’s discharge is 

a separation code, and he seeks to correct the narrative reason by changing to a different separation code, one necessary for military disability retirement. See J.A. 1102; 

J.A. 1068.

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10 DOYON v. US

same). Mr. Doyon also argued that his request was entitled 

to liberal consideration pursuant to 10 U.S.C. § 1552. 

J.A. 1074. 

To support his application, Mr. Doyon submitted a psychiatric evaluation report from Dr. Ted R. Greenzang, who 

opined that (i) Mr. Doyon experienced manifestations of 

PTSD at the time of his military discharge from the military, (ii) his medical history was inconsistent with a personality disorder diagnosis, and (iii) his separation from 

the Navy for unsuitability was “not an appropriate disposition.” J.A. 1423–39. The BCNR then sought an advisory 

opinion from Secretary of the Navy Council of Review 

Boards (CORB), J.A. 1067, and a CORB medical advisor 

responded that the evidence did not support a determination that Mr. Doyon had a PTSD-based physical disability, 

J.A. 1052–57. The medical advisor therefore concluded 

that there was insufficient evidence to support an unfitness 

determination but noted that reconsideration would be appropriate “[s]hould further evidence surface supporting unfitness or a disability retirement.” J.A. 1056. Mr. Doyon 

responded to that advisory opinion and submitted a responsive report from Dr. Greenzang. J.A. 1803–12; 

J.A. 1815–20.

On November 20, 2018, the BCNR denied Mr. Doyon’s

petition. J.A. 1049–51. The BCNR “substantially concurred” with the advisory opinion, concluding that the evidentiary record did not warrant a change to Mr. Doyon’s 

military record. J.A. 1050. As to Dr. Greenzang’s opinion 

and Mr. Doyon’s recent VA ratings for his PTSD condition, 

the BCNR found that “these findings were made too distant 

in time from 1968 to be probative of [Mr. Doyon’s] fitness 

for continued naval service in 1968” and there was “more 

than enough evidence [in Mr. Doyon’s military record] of 

behavior consistent with a personality disorder to support 

the diagnosis made in 1968.” Id. 

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DOYON v. US 11

IV. Claims Court Proceeding

On December 27, 2019, Mr. Doyon initiated a military 

pay action before the Claims Court, challenging the 

BCNR’s denial of his request to correct his military records 

to reflect that he was unfit for duty and medically retired 

for psychosis or psychoneuroses associated with PTSD. 

Doyon v. United States, No. 19-1964C, 2021 WL 120923, 

at *1 (Fed. Cl. Jan. 13, 2021). As relief, Mr. Doyon sought 

(i) an order that his military records be corrected, (ii) military disability retirement pay, and (iii) other pay. Id. The 

government moved to dismiss Mr. Doyon’s complaint for 

lack of subject-matter jurisdiction and for failure to state a 

claim upon which relief can be granted. Id. The parties 

also filed cross-motions for judgment upon the administrative record. Id. Mr. Doyon argued that the BCNR erred by 

failing to review his application with liberal consideration 

pursuant to 10 U.S.C. § 1552(h) and the Kurta Memo. 

J.A. 2134–35; J.A. 2304–05; J.A. 2326. The government 

argued that the Kurta Memo does not mandate liberal consideration under the circumstances because the memo is 

limited to misconduct-based upgrades or modifications to a 

service member’s characterization of service (characterization upgrades)—e.g., changing a service member’s discharge from dishonorable or less-than-honorable to 

honorable. J.A. 2212. The government did not substantively respond to Mr. Doyon’s § 1552(h) arguments. See

J.A. 2214. 

In its decision, the Claims Court concluded that the 

Kurta Memo is not limited to misconduct-based discharge 

upgrades or modifications but instead requires the BCNR 

to also afford liberal consideration to requests seeking to 

correct the narrative reason for a service member’s discharge. See Doyon, 2021 WL 120923, at *10. The court

found, however, that the BCNR did not err by not applying

liberal consideration to Mr. Doyon’s case because he sought 

“a determination regarding his fitness for duty in 1968,” 

which is a necessary finding for military disability 

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12 DOYON v. US

retirement, rather than “challeng[ing] the narrative reason 

for his discharge” from the Navy for unsuitability based on 

a personality disorder. Id.; see also 10 U.S.C. § 1201(a). 

Mr. Doyon timely appealed to this court. We have jurisdiction over an appeal from a final decision of the Claims 

Court pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1295(a)(3).

DISCUSSION

I. Standard of Review

Service members who are dissatisfied with the decision 

of the BCNR may seek judicial review, Mitchell v. United 

States, 930 F.2d 893, 896 (Fed. Cir. 1991), but a court may 

only set aside the BCNR’s decision if it was “arbitrary or 

capricious, unsupported by substantial evidence, or otherwise not in accordance with law”—i.e., “essentially the 

standard under which administrative agency decisions are 

reviewed,” Fisher, 402 F.3d at 1180. “We review a decision 

of the Court of Federal Claims granting or denying a motion for judgment on the administrative record without deference.” Barnick v. United States, 591 F.3d 1372, 1377 

(Fed. Cir. 2010) (citing Chambers, 417 F.3d at 1227). We

therefore apply “the same standard of review as the trial 

court” and will not disturb the BCNR’s decision unless it is 

“arbitrary, capricious, contrary to law, or unsupported by 

substantial evidence.” Id. 

II. Liberal Consideration

Mr. Doyon’s application asked the BCNR to change the 

narrative reason for his discharge indicated on his DD-214 

form from unsuitability due to personality disorder to a 

PTSD-related physical disability so that he would be eligible for disability retirement payments. Appellant’s Br. 40–

41; J.A. 1068; J.A. 1073, 1094. The only dispute is whether 

the BCNR was required to apply a “liberal consideration” 

standard to Mr. Doyon’s application pursuant to either the 

Kurta Memo or 10 U.S.C. § 1552(h). We consider each theory separately.

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DOYON v. US 13

A. Kurta Memo

Mr. Doyon argues that the BCNR should have given 

liberal consideration, in view of the Kurta Memo, to his application to correct the narrative reason on his DD-214

form. Appellant’s Br. 39–49. The government again argues that the Kurta Memo is limited to characterization 

upgrades and does not encompass changing a narrative 

reason for discharge to medical disability retirement. Appellee’s Br. 32–35. We agree with the Claims Court that 

the Kurta Memo is not limited to characterization upgrades but “requires that the BCNR give ‘liberal consideration’ to applications seeking discharge relief that 

challenge the narrative reason for a military discharge.” 

Doyon, 2021 WL 120923, at *10. However, we disagree 

with the Claims Court’s finding that Mr. Doyon is not challenging the reason for his discharge. Mr. Doyon requested 

the BCNR change the narrative reason on his DD-214 form

to reflect that he was discharged due to physical disability 

(i.e., PTSD) rather than personality disorder. Mr. Doyon 

thus challenged his narrative reason for discharge, and 

such challenge is entitled to liberal consideration under the 

Kurta Memo. 

To ensure “greater uniformity amongst the review 

boards,” the Kurta Memo instructs that liberal consideration (1) “will be given” to a veteran’s application for discharge relief “based in whole or in part on matters relating 

to mental health conditions, including PTSD”; and (2) is 

not limited to characterization upgrades (e.g., from Under 

Other Than Honorable Condition to Honorable Discharge) 

but “appl[ies] to any petition seeking discharge relief including requests to change the narrative reason, re-enlistment 

codes, and upgrades from General to Honorable characterizations.” J.A. 1940; J.A. 1941 ¶ 3; J.A. 1943 ¶ 24 (emphasis added); see also J.A. 1943 ¶ 20 (defining “discharge” as

including “the characterization, narrative reason, separation code, and re-enlistment code” (emphasis added)). In 

other words, the narrative reason for discharge is a 

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14 DOYON v. US

distinct, recognized basis for correction, separate and apart 

from upgrading or modifying a service member’s characterization of service, and is entitled to liberal consideration. 

See also LaBonte v. United States, 43 F.4th 1357, 1374

(Fed. Cir. 2022) (noting that “[t]he Kurta Memo . . . 

make[s] clear that this liberal consideration applies not 

only to upgrades to the character of a discharge, but also to 

requests for changes to the narrative reason for separation 

on a veteran’s DD-214”). 

Moreover, the Kurta Memo expressly authorizes the 

BCNR to analyze evidence related to the correctness of the 

narrative reason for discharge: “Evidence that may reasonably support more than one diagnosis or a change in diagnosis, particularly where the diagnosis is listed as the 

narrative reason for discharge, will be liberally construed 

as warranting a change in narrative reason to ‘Secretarial 

Authority,’ ‘Condition not a disability,’ or another appropriate basis.” J.A. 1942–43 ¶ 17 (emphasis added); see also

J.A. 1942 ¶¶ 13–14 (explaining that “[a] diagnosis made by 

a licensed psychiatrist or psychologist that the condition 

existed during military service will receive liberal consideration” and that a determination made by the VA should 

be considered “persuasive evidence” that PTSD existed 

during military service). The memo further explains that 

“liberal consideration” is the appropriate evidentiary burden under these circumstances because “[i]t is unreasonable to expect the same level of proof for injustices 

committed years ago when” PTSD was “far less understood 

than [it is] today.” J.A. 1943 ¶ 26. In sum, a veteran’s challenge to the recorded narrative reason for discharge necessarily encompasses the factual determinations necessary 

to correct or maintain the narrative reason.

Here, Mr. Doyon contends that the narrative reason for 

his discharge, as represented in his DD-214 form, should 

be corrected from the “BUPERSMAN Art. C-10310, 265” 

separation code (i.e., unsuitability due to personality disorder) to the “BUPERSMAN C-10305” separation code (i.e., 

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DOYON v. US 15

separation due to physical disability). Appellant’s 

Br. 40–41; J.A. 1001 (Appellant’s complaint to the Claims 

Court); see also J.A. 1068 (Appellant’s application to the 

BCNR); J.A. 1073, 1094 (Appellant’s briefing to the 

BCNR); J.A. 1969 (Appellant’s DD-214 form); J.A. 1830 

(description for BUPERSMAN C-10305). Regardless of 

whether an unfitness determination is necessary for an ultimate determination of whether Mr. Doyon was entitled to 

military disability retirement, see Doyon, 2021 WL 120923, 

at *10, Mr. Doyon’s application to the BCNR is nonetheless 

a challenge to the accuracy of the narrative reason listed 

on his DD-214 form. As such, the Kurta Memo requires 

that the BCNR review Mr. Doyon’s application with liberal 

consideration. 

Because the Claims Court mischaracterized Mr. 

Doyon’s claim as not challenging the narrative reason for 

his discharge and, thus, determined that liberal consideration was not required, vacatur is warranted. We offer no 

opinion as to whether liberal consideration would entitle 

Mr. Doyon to a correction of his DD-214 form or to disability retirement. See discussion infra § III. The BCNR legally erred by reviewing the merits of Mr. Doyon’s 

application without giving it liberal consideration. 

B. 10 U.S.C. § 1552(H) 

Mr. Doyon separately argues that 10 U.S.C. § 1552(h) 

requires that the BCNR give liberal consideration to his 

correction request because his application is a “claim under 

[§ 1552] for review of a discharge,” “based in whole or in 

part on matters related to [PTSD],” and his service-connected PTSD “contributed to the circumstances resulting 

in [his] discharge.” Appellant’s Br. 32–33 (quoting 

§ 1552(h)(1), (2)(B)). The government disagrees, arguing 

that § 1552(h) cannot be retroactively applied to his application and that it is substantively inapplicable to the same. 

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16 DOYON v. US

We disagree with the government and address each objection separately.4

1 

The government argues that Mr. Doyon failed to 

demonstrate that § 1552(h), which was enacted after Mr. 

Doyon filed his application to the BCNR, retroactively applied to his application. Appellee’s Br. 20. Although the 

government’s argument was not presented to the Claims 

4 The government also asserts that Mr. Doyon did 

not preserve his § 1552(h)-based arguments by failing to 

present it to the BCNR. Appellant’s Br. 18–20. Even if 

that were the case, the government did not object below 

when Mr. Doyon repeatedly argued to the Claims Court 

that § 1552(h)(2)(B) required the BCNR to review his application with liberal consideration. J.A. 2134–35; 

J.A. 2304–05; J.A. 2326 & n.1. Accordingly, the government forfeited its preservation argument. See In re Google

Tech. Holdings LLC, 980 F.3d 858, 862 (Fed. Cir. 2020). 

Moreover, we exercise our discretion to consider the interpretation of § 1552(h) because Mr. Doyon pressed his 

§ 1552(h)-based argument to the Claims Court and the parties’ cross-motions for judgment based on the administrative record suggest that the factual record needs no further 

development. See Singleton v. Wulff, 428 U.S. 106, 121 

(1976) (“The matter of what questions may be taken up and 

resolved for the first time on appeal is one left primarily to 

the discretion of the courts of appeals, to be exercised on 

the facts of individual cases.”); see also White v. U.S. Dep’t 

of the Army, 720 F.2d 209, 211 (D.C. Cir. 1983) (“Exercise 

of that discretion is particularly appropriate where . . . the 

question is a purely legal one, the resolution of which would 

not be aided by any further factual development. . . . [and 

the agency] has fully stated its position and reasoning on 

this issue.”).

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DOYON v. US 17

Court—despite argument by Mr. Doyon regarding 

§ 1552(h)—we nonetheless conclude that § 1552(h) applies 

to the BCNR’s decision on Mr. Doyon’s application. 

“A statute does not operate ‘retrospectively’ merely because it is applied in a case arising from conduct antedating the statute’s enactment.” Landgraf v. USI Film Prods., 

511 U.S. 244, 265, 269 (1994). To determine whether a 

“statute should be applied to a case that originated before 

the statute was passed”—i.e., whether applying the statute 

would have improper “retroactive effect”—the question is 

“whether the new provision attaches new legal consequences to events completed before its enactment.” Rodriguez v. Peake, 511 F.3d 1147, 1152–53 (Fed. Cir. 2008) 

(citing Landgraf, 511 U.S. at 269–70). 

We typically examine three factors to determine 

whether a statute would have retroactive effect: 

“(1) whether it would impair rights possessed by a party 

when he acted, (2) whether it would increase a party’s liability for past conduct, or (3) whether it would impose new 

duties with respect to already completed transactions.” Id.

at 1153. Here, 10 U.S.C. § 1552(h) prescribes the circumstances in which the BCNR must apply liberal consideration. It does not impair Mr. Doyon’s rights, increase his 

liability for past conduct, or impose any new duties on him. 

Likewise, § 1552(h) does not impair the rights of, increase 

the liability of, or impose new legal consequences on the 

government because the Kurta Memo already required the 

BCNR to review “any petition seeking discharge relief” 

with liberal consideration. See Rodriguez v. Peake, 511 

F.3d at 1152–53; see also J.A. 1943. As such, the BCNR 

was obligated to “apply the law in effect at the time it renders its decision, unless doing so would result in manifest 

injustice or there is statutory direction or legislative history to the contrary.” See Bradley v. Sch. Bd. of Richmond, 

416 U.S. 696, 711 (1974); see also Landgraf, 511 U.S. at 278 

(explaining that Bradley is “consistent with a presumption 

against statutory retroactivity”). And although the Claims 

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18 DOYON v. US

Court recognized that Congress codified the liberal consideration standard with respect to reviewing “the circumstances resulting in the discharge,” Doyon, 2021 WL 

120923, at *3 (quoting 10 U.S.C. § 1552(h)(2)(B)), the court 

did not apply § 1552(h), which was “in effect at the time it 

render[ed] its decision,” nor explain its decision not to apply § 1552(h), cf. Bradley, 416 U.S. at 711. We therefore

hold that the BCNR and Claims Court erred by failing to 

consider the effect of § 1552(h) on Mr. Doyon’s application.

2 

The government also argues that the plain meaning of 

“review of a discharge or dismissal” in 10 U.S.C. § 1552(h) 

does not include review of an honorable discharge for reasons other than misconduct. Appellee’s Br. 21. We disagree. 

Section 1552(h) codified the liberal consideration 

standard prescribed by the Kurta Memo. Section 1552(h) 

states in full:

(h)(1) This subsection applies to a former member 

of the armed forces whose claim under this section 

for review of a discharge or dismissal is based in 

whole or in part on matters relating to post-traumatic stress disorder or traumatic brain injury as 

supporting rationale, or as justification for priority 

consideration, and whose post-traumatic stress disorder or traumatic brain injury is related to combat

or military sexual trauma, as determined by the 

Secretary concerned.

(2) In the case of a claimant described in paragraph (1), a board established under subsection (a)(1) shall— 

(A) review medical evidence of the Secretary of Veterans Affairs or a civilian health 

care provider that is presented by the 

claimant; and

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DOYON v. US 19

(B) review the claim with liberal consideration to the claimant that post-traumatic 

stress disorder or traumatic brain injury 

potentially contributed to the circumstances resulting in the discharge or dismissal or to the original characterization of the 

claimant’s discharge or dismissal.

10 U.S.C. § 1552(h) (emphases added). In short, § 1552(h) 

applies to all “former member[s] of the armed forces whose 

claim under this section for review of a discharge or dismissal is based in whole or in part on matters relating to posttraumatic stress disorder.” Id. § 1552(h)(1). And the 

BCNR must review such claims “with liberal consideration 

to the claimant that post-traumatic stress disorder” (1) “potentially contributed to the circumstances resulting in the 

discharge or dismissal” or (2) potentially contributed to the 

“original characterization of the claimant’s discharge or 

dismissal.” Id. § 1552(h)(2)(B).

There appears to be no dispute that Mr. Doyon is a “former member of the armed forces.” See id. § 1552(h)(1). Nor 

that his claim is “based in whole or in part on matters relating to post-traumatic stress disorder” that is “related to 

combat.” Id. § 1552(h)(1); see also Doyon, 2021 WL 120923, 

at *13 (Claims Court noting that Mr. Doyon’s “PTSD diagnosis is not in dispute”). Instead, the parties dispute 

whether Mr. Doyon’s application seeks a “review of a discharge or dismissal” that is entitled to liberal consideration. See Appellant’s Br. 33–38; Appellee’s Br. 21–23.

The government argues that liberal consideration under § 1552(h) is limited only to upgrading or modifying a 

service member’s characterization of service. See Appellee’s Br. 23. However, nothing in the text of § 1552(h) limits liberal consideration for PTSD-related claims to 

characterization upgrades or any other subset of misconduct-related discharge relief regularly provided by the 

BCNR. Although not defined within the statute, the word 

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20 DOYON v. US

“discharge” in § 1552(h)(1)’s “review of a discharge or dismissal” language plainly refers to “severance from military 

service.” See Gumpenberger v. Wilkie, 973 F.3d 1379, 1382 

(Fed. Cir. 2020) (“A court interpreting the statute ‘presume[s] that Congress intended to give those words their 

plain and ordinary meanings.’” (alteration in original) (citation omitted)); see also Discharge, Black’s Law Dictionary

(11th ed. 2019) (“8. The dismissal of a member of the armed 

services from military service.”); DoD Instruction 1332.14, 

Encl. 6, at 54 (defining “discharge as “[c]omplete severance 

from all military status gained through enlistment or induction”). Even if “discharge” may refer to characterization 

of service when the term is accompanied by a preceding 

characterization modifier,5 such as “honorable discharge,” 

for example, the unmodified “discharge” recited in 

§ 1552(h)(1) is not limited to any particular characterization, honorable or otherwise. Moreover, the government’s 

blanket, unsupported assertion that “discharge” has a settled meaning that is limited to a service member’s characterization of service, see Appellant’s Br. 32–33, is 

undermined by the Kurta Memo’s definition of “discharge” 

as encompassing “narrative reason, separation code, and 

re-enlistment code” in addition to “characterization,” see 

J.A. 1943 ¶ 20. 

Furthermore, the express language of the statute 

makes clear that “review of discharge or dismissal” is not 

limited to just upgrading or modifying characterization of 

service. The statute does state, as one basis for providing 

liberal consideration, a claim that PTSD potentially contributed to “the original characterization of the claimant’s 

5 See Discharge, Black’s Law Dictionary (11th ed. 

2019) (providing characterization-specific definitions for 

“administrative discharge,” “bad-conduct discharge,” “dishonorable discharge,” “general discharge,” “honorable discharge,” and “undesirable discharge”).

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DOYON v. US 21

discharge or dismissal.” 10 U.S.C. § 1552(h)(2)(B). But the 

statute also states a second, broader basis for liberal consideration: whether PTSD “potentially contributed to the 

circumstances resulting in the discharge or dismissal.” Id. 

Had Congress intended to limit liberal consideration only 

to upgrading or modifying a service member’s characterization of service, the statute would not include the alterative “circumstances resulting in the discharge” clause as an 

additional, separate ground for liberal consideration. See 

id. The government’s overly narrow reading would render 

the “circumstances resulting in the discharge or dismissal” 

clause superfluous and violate the “‘cardinal principle of 

statutory construction’ that ‘a statute ought, upon the 

whole, to be so construed that, if it can be prevented, no 

clause, sentence, or word shall be superfluous, void, or insignificant.’” See Gumpenberger, 973 F.3d at 1382 (citation 

omitted); see also, e.g., Lowe v. SEC, 472 U.S. 181, 207 n.53 

(1985); Antonin Scalia & Bryan A. Garner, Reading Law: 

The Interpretation of Legal Texts 174–79 (2012). Moreover, whether the reason for Mr. Doyon’s discharge from the 

Navy was based on a misdiagnosis of personality disorder 

instead of PSTD is a question that falls within the plain 

meaning of the “circumstances resulting in the discharge,” 

to which § 1552(h)(2)(B) affords “liberal consideration.” 

Contrary to the government’s arguments, that similar 

“liberal consideration” language is found in 10 U.S.C. 

§ 1553(d) does not control or limit 10 U.S.C. § 1552(h). See

Appellee’s Br. 23. Section 1553 establishes discharge review boards (DRBs), which have the limited authority to 

“change a discharge or dismissal, or issue a new discharge.” 

10 U.S.C. § 1553(b)(1); see also 32 C.F.R. § 724.205(a)(9) 

(“The [DRB] shall have no authority to . . . [c]hange the 

reason for discharge from or to a physical disability.” (emphasis added)). The BCNR’s authority is broader; it may 

“correct any military record” when “necessary to correct an 

error or remove an injustice.” 10 U.S.C. § 1552(a)(1) (emphasis added). So unlike the BCNR, the scope of liberal 

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22 DOYON v. US

consideration at the DRB is circumscribed by the jurisdiction of the DRB, not by the language in § 1553(d). 

Accordingly, 10 U.S.C. § 1552(h)(1)’s “review of a discharge” refers to the BCNR’s power to review and correct 

records related to a former service member’s “severance 

from military service.”6 Mr. Doyon’s DD-214 form, titled 

“Report of Transfer or Discharge,” includes a field indicating the narrative reason for his discharge—i.e., the “Reason and Authority.” J.A. 1102. Mr. Doyon seeks to correct 

this field. J.A. 1068; see also J.A. 1094. Whether Mr. 

Doyon’s discharge was misattributed to unsuitability based 

on a personality disorder instead of unfitness based on 

PTSD-related disability plainly falls within 10 U.S.C. 

§ 1552(h)’s requirement that the BCNR shall apply liberal 

consideration when reviewing whether PTSD “potentially 

contributed to the circumstances resulting in the discharge.” Thus, the BCNR erred by not reviewing Mr. 

6 After oral arguments, the government filed a letter 

pursuant to Rule 28(j) of the Federal Rules of Appellate 

Procedure, arguing that “disability retirement is not a ‘discharge’ because it is not a complete severance from all military status.” See Appellee’s Letter, No. 21-2095 (July 6, 

2022), ECF No. 61. Although the government purports to 

offer this argument “in response to Mr. Doyon’s argument 

that his request for a disability retirement is encompassed 

by a ‘review of a discharge or dismissal’” under 10 U.S.C. 

§ 1552(h) or the Kurta Memo, id., the government never 

raised this argument to the Claims Court. See discussion 

supra note 4 (discussing the government’s forfeiture). Notwithstanding forfeiture, Mr. Doyon was in fact discharged 

from the Navy, and it is the recorded reason for that discharge for which he seeks review and correction, regardless 

of whether disability retirement is a complete separation 

from the military.

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DOYON v. US 23

Doyon’s application to correct his DD-214 form with liberal 

consideration.7

III. Military Disability Retirement

Although this case is narrowly about correcting Mr. 

Doyon’s military records to reflect a discharge due to PTSD 

instead of a personality disorder, there is a larger underlying dispute about whether Mr. Doyon was unfit, rather 

than unsuitable, for service at the time of his discharge 

from the Navy. Mr. Doyon argues that once the BCNR determines that PTSD, rather than a personality disorder, 

was the basis of his discharge from the Navy, he is automatically entitled to a new separation code reflecting unfitness due to physical disability, and that entitles him to 

medical retirement. See Appellant’s Br. 57–60; Appellant’s 

Reply Br. 28–29; J.A. 1068. The government disagrees, arguing that a determination that Mr. Doyon was discharged 

due to PTSD does not automatically mean that he was also 

unfit for service, which is a separate determination necessary for him to receive medical retirement. See Appellee’s 

Br. 51–53. This unfitness dispute between the parties is 

not properly before us at this stage and can be addressed, 

if necessary, on remand. 

Accordingly, this case is remanded to the Claims Court 

to instruct the BCNR to consider whether the record evidence indicates, under the “liberal consideration” 

7 Mr. Doyon also argues that the BCNR’s decision, 

even without liberal consideration, is not supported by substantial evidence. Appellant’s Br. 48–57. Because we decide today that the BCNR applied the wrong legal standard 

in assessing Mr. Doyon’s petition, we think the better 

course is to have the BCNR apply the liberal consideration 

standard in the first instance rather than our court review 

fact findings that had been made using an incorrect legal 

standard.

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24 DOYON v. US

standard, that PTSD-related psychoses or psychoneuroses 

“contributed to the circumstances resulting in [Mr. 

Doyon’s] discharge,” see 10 U.S.C. § 1552(h)(2), and “warrant[s] a change in [the] narrative reason” for Mr. Doyon’s 

discharge from the Navy, see, e.g., J.A. 1942–43. 

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the Claims Court’s decision 

is vacated. The case is remanded to the court for further 

proceedings consistent with this opinion.

VACATED AND REMANDED

COSTS

Costs to Appellant.

Case: 21-2095 Document: 63 Page: 24 Filed: 01/25/2023