W hil e n o t sub je ct t o t he t rial co urt’ s t erm i na t i o n o rd er, i t i s i m p o rtant t o n o t e t ha t M o t he r h as a t hird , yo un ge st 1

c h ild , J. M o the r’s rig h ts to J . ar e no t t h e su b je c t o f t h e trial c o u rt’s o rd e r sin c e J . ha d no t b e e n tak e n into c u sto d y in T enn es s ee. Ap pare nt l y , J. ha s been wi t h h i s M ot her out

- of

- s t at e, but at t he t i me of t r i al was t he sub j ect of an i nv es t i gat i on i n Sout h Car ol i na.



### IN THE COURT OF APP EALS OF TENNESS EE

AT NAS HVILLE A ssi gne d on Br ie fs A ugus t 26 , 200 5

IN THE MATTER O F L.F.B. and D.M.D.
Appeal f romthe Juvenile court for Dickson County No. 06-04-077- CC A. Andrew Jackson, Ju dge

No. M2005- 00697-COA-R 3-P T - F iled Novem ber 7, 2005

This is a mo th e r ’ s ap p e a l o f th e te r mi n a ti o n o f h e r p ar e n ta l r ig h ts to h e r o ld e s t s o n a n d daug hter. Be cause we f

ind that there is clea

r and convincing evidenc e in the record to support the trial court’s termination on three (3) a lternative g rounds and that termination is in the children’ s best interest, we
a ff ir m. Tenn. R. App . P . 3 Appeal as of Right; Judgme nt of th e Juvenile Court Aff irm ed

P ATR I C I A J. C O T T RE LL , J ., delivere d the opinion of the court, in which W I L L I AM C. K O CH , J R ., P.J ., M.S., and F RAN K G. C L EME NT , J R ., J ., joined.

Mit c he ll B . D ug a n, Di c ks on , T e nn e sse e , f or the app e llant, V. M.
Paul G. Summers, Attorney Gene ral and Reporter , Amy T. Master, Assistant A ttorney Gene ral, for the app e lle e , St a te of

Te nn e sse e , D e pa

rt me nt o f C hil dr e n’ s Se rv ic e s.

OP IN ION

I. F A C TS

Th e c hil dr e n su bje c t to thi s app e a l are a bo y , L .F .B ., bo rn in Au g us t of 19 91 and a girl, D.M.D., born in April of 1998. The c hildren had diff ere nt father s. The trial court terminated the 1 pare ntal rig hts of their Mother and both father s. Only the Mother a

ppeale d the termination.T he C P S I nv es t i gat or l at er l ear ned M ot her ha d been i ndi ct ed i n O hi o y ear s ea r l i er for n egl ect of L. F. B

. H er 2

s on w as t ak en i n t o c u s t ody a n d l i v ed wi t h h i s g r ea t g r an dmot h er for a per i od of y ea r s

. T h e r ec or d i s n ot c l ea r on h ow lo n g M o the r lo st c u sto d y o f L .F .B ., f ro m 2 to 4 ye a rs . U lti m a te ly, M o the r re g a ine d c u sto d y.

-2- The two c hildren, L .F.B . and D.M.D., came into DCS custody on J anuary

22, 2003, when the Dickson police found the c hildren with D.M.D.’s f ather walking on the hig hway

afte r their c ar had broke n down. L .F.B . was a g e 11 and D .M.D. was a g e 4. The fathe r t old police he had taken the children away from their Mother in Missi ssippi because of her cra ck coc aine ha

bit. Si nce the re w as
a n o uts ta nd ing wa

rr a nt in a no the r state fo r the fathe r, he wa s take n int o po lic e c us tod y

. At the tim e t h e c h i l d r e n w e r e t ak e n i n t o c u s t o d y, M o t h e r , w h o l i v e d i n M i s s i s s i p p i , w a s ap p r o x i m a t e l y t w e n t ynine (29) y ear s old.
At that time, the Child P rotec tive Service s (“CPS”) I nvestig ator, Ms. Tiffany Evans, lea

rned from the c hildren that Mother ha d exposed them to her drug use and f reque ntly left them alone

. Tenne ssee CPS I nvestig ators conta cted their Mississ ippi counterpa

rts and lea

rned that the children
wer e the subjec ts of an inves tigation in Mi ssissippi arising from Mother a lleg edly exposi ng the children to drug s and arising fr om alleg ed sexual abuse by a baby sitter. There is no recor d that the children w ere subject to any court orde rs in Mississ ippi. The authorities in Missi ssippi indi cate d that it wa s d i fficult to re solve their investig ation since they had proble ms locating Mother and he r children. 2

DCS then filed a petition f or protec tive custody . Ms. Evans contac ted Mother by phone on the nig ht the children cam e into custody to expl ain why

the childre n wer e in custody and that the preliminary hearing was set f or January

28, 2003. When Mother expressed c oncern that she did not have tr ansportation to D ickson from her home in Oce an Spring s, Missis sippi, Ms. Evans sugg ested
se ve ra l r e so ur c e s in c lud ing the Mis sis sip pi De pa rt me nt of Hu ma n Se rv ic e s a ndtol d M oth e r w ho to contac t to arra ng e to have counsel appointed. A lthough Ms. Eva ns and Mother spoke sever al times befor e the preliminary hearing, Mother did not attend the hearing. At trial, Mother expl ai n ed she could not g et to Tenne ssee f or the pre liminary

hearing due to lack of transportation a nd since she had to car e for J ., her y oung est child. Mother also admitted, howeve r, t hat s he sent J . to his grandmother during this ti me and that she was able to trave l betwee n J ackson, Mississippi, where she worke d, and Oc e a n Sp ri ng s, Mis sis sip pi.

At thetim e thec hil dr e n w e re take n in to c us tod y , Ma ry Cun nin g ha m wa s a ssi g ne d a s th e ir
case worke r and r emained the ir case worke r throug hout these proc eeding s. On Fe bruary 18, 2003, Mother attende d the staff

ing f or the c hildren’s Perma nency Plans. Mother did not visit the childre n when she was in D ickson for the staffing , althoug h she wa s g iven that opportunity . The plans f or L .F .B . a ndD. M. D. we re ba sic a lly ide nti c a l a nd state d a s th e ir g oa l to e ith e r r e turn b othc hil dr e n to Mother, ad o p t i o n , or plac ement with a r elative within one ( 1) y ear . The plans identifie d the following tasks for Mother to acc omplish i n order

to be re united with her c hildren:

1. Coo pe rate wi th the Mis sis sip pi andTe nn e sse e inv e sti g a tio ns ; 2. Atte nda ndc omp le te pa re nti ng c la sse s;A t t ria l, M o the r sa id he r c o u n se lo r m isu n d e rs to o d he r a n d sa id tha t t h is w a s the c o st p e r w e e k , no t p e r d a y. 3

M o t her ackno wl ed ged at t he heari ng t hat D C S d i d not hi nd er her vi si t at i o n. 4

-3- 3. Arrang e and attend supervised visits with her childre n; 4. Atte ndc ou rt

pr oc e e din g s a ndsta ff

ing s; 5. Complete an alcohol and drug assessment and follow rec ommendations, i ncluding tr e a tme nt; 6. Sub mit

to r a nd om dru g sc re e ns ; 7. Atte ndAl c oh oli c s o r N arc oti c s A no nymou s; 8. Ma int a in andsh ow pr oo f o f e mpl oyme nt; 9. Submit to a home study ; and 1 0

. P ar t i c i p a t e i n t h e r ap y.

Ob vio us ly , s omeof

there qu ir e me nts of

the Pare nti ng Pla ns targ e te d M oth e r’ s u se of dr ug s. Admittedly , she starte d using c rac k when she was 18 y ear s old. Mother’s c ounselor later reported that Mother said the ha

bit cost betwee n Three Hundre d Dollars ($300) a nd One- Thousand Dollar s ( $ 1 , 0 0 0 ) p e r

d a y. 3

At the Fe bruary 2003 staffing , Mother re fused to sig n the Permane ncy Plan and at trial she
e xpla ine d th a t he r r e fu sa l w a s b a se d u po n a dv ic e of no n- pr e se nt c ou ns e l. Wh ile te sti fying a t tria l, Mo the r a c kn ow le dg e d h e r p art ic ipatio n in the sta ff ing , that sh e re c e ive d a

c op y of it, a ndthat D CS sta ff e xpla ine d it

to h e r, inc lud ing theCr ite ri a a nd P roce du res fo r T e rm inatio n o f P are nta l Rig hts included in the Pare nting Plan, which e x plained, among ot her g rounds, the def inition of
aba nd on me nt.

At the time the childre n wer e take n into custody , Mother lived in Oce an Spring s, Missis sippi
a ndwo rked in Jac ks on , M iss iss ipp i. Wh ile liv ing in O c e a n Sp ri ng s, Mo the r t oldthe CPS I nvestig ator that she and her boy friend w ere considering buy ing a house there . Whil e the c hildren
wer e allowe d to call their Mother every Saturday , this conta ct en ded af ter 3 or 4 months whe n Mo the r’ s te le ph on e wa s d isc on ne c te d. On Ap ri l 7, 20 03 , M oth e r v isi te d h e r c hil dr e n to c e le br a te her daug hter’s birthday . She would not see he r childre n ag ain for 14 months. Around J une of 2003, 4 Mother lef

t Ocean Springs, Mississippi, and moved to S outh Haven, Mississippi which is a suburb of Me mph is, Te nn e sse e . A t so me po int , Mo the r mov e d to Me mph is. He r D CS c a se wo rk e r, Ms. Cunningha m, testified that when Mother would reloc ate, she would not alway s appra ise DCS of her wher eabouts, sometimes for months, and even r efuse d to disclose her loc ation.
Approxim ately ten (10) months a fter the children wer e taken into c ustody , on October 22, 2 0 0 3 , t h e j u v e n i l e c o u r th e l d a n a d j u d i c a t i o n h e ar i n g o n D C S ’ s P e t i t i o n f o r T e m p o r ar y C u s t o d y. Al tho ug h Mo the r a c kn ow le dg e s that sh e re c e ive d no tic e of the he ari ng , s he didno t a tte nd . H e r c a se wo rk e r t e sti fi e d th a t sh e no tif ie d Mo the r abo ut the se pr oc e e din g s a nd e xpla ine d ho w M oth e r c ou ld g et an attorney . The trial c ourt found the c hildren we re de pendent a nd neg lected and place d them in the custody

of DCS. The Adjudication Hearing Order was entered on Dec ember 3, 2003. At theA t s om e poi nt t he r ecor d re f l ect s t hat M ot her s ent l et t er s t o t he chi l dren t hat M s

. Cunni ng ham i nt er cept ed s i nce 5
she bel i eved t he l et t ers wo ul d upset the chi l d ren. M o t her t est i f i ed s he sent 15 t o 20 l et t ers

. W hen t hese l et t ers were s ent i s no t i n t he reco rd. M s. C unni ngham t est i f i ed t hat s he l at er gave t he l et t ers t o t he chi l d ren.

O n O ct ob er 4, 20 04 , t he cour t ent er ed an order t er mi nat i ng t he pare nt al r i gh t s of t he chi l dren ’ s f at her s

. T hat 6

or der w as n ot a ppea l ed.
-4- time of this adjudicatory hearing, Mothe r had visited the c hildren one time, c alled the c ase w orker four ( 4) times, and re fused to disclose he r addr ess to the case worke r. Mother later testified that she
wa s l i v i n g i n M em p h i s att h e t i m e o f t h i s h ea ri n g.

I n November of 2003, the children wer e both place d in a foster home whe re the y rema ined at the time of trial. By al l ac co u nts, the children’ s place ment with their foster f amily has bee n
succe ssful, resulting in a loving and supportive environme nt for the c hildren. Their foster mother is a DC S c a se wo rk e r. Th e ir fo ste r f a the r t e sti fi e d th a t if

g ive n th e op po rtun ity , the y wo uld lik e to adopt the childre n.

I n Dec ember

of 2003, Mother moved to Slidell, L ouisiana wher e she enr olled in Remington College to train to become a Pharma cist Technic ian. She d ro p p ed o u t of school, and in Ma rch of 2004 Mother moved to Santee , South C arolina.

Th e re c or d r e fl e c ts that fr om the tim e the Mo the r vis ite d the c hil dr e n in Ap ri l of 20 03 , u nti l the State petitioned to terminate parenta l rig hts in J une of 2004, approximately 14 months, Mother had no conta ct with the childre n by phone or visitation. 5

The c hildren’s c ase w orker testified t hat during t he period betwee n J anuary of 2003, when the c hil dr e n c a me int o c us tod y , an d J un e of 20 04 , whe n DCS pe tit ion e d to te rm inate pa re nta l r ig hts , Mother did not n o t i fy DC S when she moved or her wher eabouts. Ms. Cunningham testified that Mo the r wo uld no t disc los e he r loc a tio n, g o months wi tho ut c a lli ng , a ndthe n w he n s he wo uldc a ll, Mother would re fuse to tell Ms. Cunning ham wher e she c ould be re ache d. Ms. Cunningham wa s
able to g e t a

g e ne ra l id e a

of he r w he re abo uts on ly

fr om c a lle r i de nti fi c ati on. F or e xamp le , M s. Cunningha m did not hear from Mother in May , J une or Julyof 2003. Mother c alled in Aug ust of 2003, ref used to tell Ms. Cunningham whe re she was, a nd then did not contact Ms. Cunningham
a g a in u nti l N ov e mbe r of 20 03

. Whe n Moth e r ca lle d in Nov e mbe r of 20 03 , M s. Cun nin g ha m a g a in explained to Mother the Parenting Plan and offe red to ma il he r another copy

. Ag ain, Mother re fused to disclose her location. After her N ovember , 2003 call, Ms. Cunningham then did not hear f rom Mother ag ain until March of 2004. I n April of 2004, Mot her c alled Ms. Cunningham a fe w times and sche duled a visit of the child re n in May of 2004. Mother did not appe ar or call to ca ncel the Ma y 20 04 vis it.

I n Jun e of 20 04 , D CS pe tit ion e d the c ou rt to te rm inate the pa re nta l r ig hts of

Mo the r andbo th fathe rs fo r a

ba nd on me nt u nd e r T e nn . Co de Ann

. § 36 -1 -1 13 (g )( 1) , s ub stanti a l f a ilu reto c omp ly 6 with the Permane ncy

Plan unde r Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-1-113( g )(2) , and per sistence of conditionsA p a re n t ha s a fun d a m e n ta l r igh t to th e c a re , c u sto d y a n d c o n tro l o f h is o r h e r c h ild

. S ta n le y v . Illi n o is , 405 7
U .S . 6 4 5 , 6 5 1 , 9 2 S . C t. 1 2 0 8 , 1 2 1 2 -1 3 (1 9 7 2 ); Nas h- Put nam v

. M cCl oud , 9 2 1 S .W .2 d 1 7 0 , 1 7 4 -7 5 (T e n n .1 9 9 6 ); In R e A d o p tio n o

f a F e m a le C h ild , 8 9 6 S .W .2 d 5 4 6 , 5 4 7 ( T e n n .1 9 9 5 ) ; Nal e v. Rober t s on , 871 S. W

. 2d 674, 678 (T enn. 1 9 9 4 ). T hi s ri ght i s a f und am ent al b ut no t ab sol ut e ri ght , and t he st at e m ay i nt erf ere wi t h pa rent al ri ght s i f t here is a c o m p e lli n g sta te inte re st in p ro te c ting the w e lfar e o f t h e c h ild

. Sa nt osky v

. Kram er , 4 5 5 U .S . 7 4 5 , 7 4 7 , 1 0 2 S . C t. 1 3 8 8 , 1 3 9 1 (1 9 8 2 ); Nas h- Put nam , 921 S. W

. 2d a t 174- 75.
-5- that preve nted the children’ s return to the home afte r six (6) months in foster car e under Te nn. Code Ann. §36-1-113( g )(3)

.
Be tween the time the State filed i ts petition in J une of 2004 and the hearing in Fe bruary of 20 05 , M oth e r v isi te d h e r c hil dr e n s ix (6 ) t ime s a ndc a nc e lle d a no the r s ix (6 ) s c he du le d v isi ts.

The he aring on the petition to terminate Mother’ s pare ntal rig hts was held on F ebrua ry 7, 20 05 . M oth e r w a s p re se nt andre pr e se nte d b y c ou ns e l. T he c ou rt

he ardte sti mon y

fr om 2 CPS investigators, the ca se worke r, Mother, the children’ s foster f ather , 13-y ear -old L .F.B . and L .F.B .’s counselor.

On Marc h 9, 2005, the trial court e ntere d an orde r terminating Mother’s pa renta l rig hts after finding clea

r a n d co n v i n ci n g ev i d en ce o f: (a ) a b an d o n m en tu n d erT en n

. C o d e A n n

. § 3 6 -1 -1 1 3 (g)( 1); (b ) pe rs ist e nc e of c on dit ion s un de r Te nn

. Cod e An n. § 36 -1 -1 13 (g )( 3) ; a nd (c ) su bs ta nti a l failu re to follow the par enting plan under Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-1-113( g )(2)

. Further, the c ourt found ther e was c lear and convincing evidence that termination of Mot her’ s pare ntal rig hts was in t he childre n’s best interest pursuant to Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-1- 113(i).

Mo the r a pp e a ls c la imi ng that T e nn e sse e wa s w ith ou t subj e c t matt e r j urisd ic tio n to e nte rt a in the termin at i o n of her

pare ntal rig hts petition si nce T ennesse e wa s not the children’ s home state. Al te rn a tiv e ly , if jurisd ic tio n exist s, Mo the r ar g ue s the re wa s not cl e ar andc on vin c ing e vid e nc e in the re cord to support the tria l court’s de cision to terminate.

II. S T ANDARD F OR T E RM I NAT I ON O F P A R ENTA L R I GH TS

A court may

term i n at e a person’s pa

renta l rig hts onlyif (1) the exis tenceof at lea st one statutory g round is pr oved by clea r and convincing evidenc e and (2) it is shown, also by clea r and convincing evidenc e, that termination of t he parent’s rights i s in the best interest of the child. Tenn. Cod e An n. § 3 6- 6- 11 3( c ); In re Vale ntine , 79 S.W .3d 539, 546 (Tenn. 2002) . The hig her e videntiary standard, a s we l l as p roce dural saf eg uards, e x ist to prevent unwar rante d g overnme nt interfer ence with a par ent’s fundame ntal and constitutionally protec ted rig ht to the car e and custody of his or her
c hil dren

. B e c aus e of

these ve ri ty

of the c on se qu e nc e s o f a

de c isi on to t e rm inate pa

re nta l r ig hts , 7

su c h p ro c e e din g s mu st i ns ur e pr ote c tio n o f that rig ht.

Our leg islature has identified those situations in which the state’s intere st in the welfar e of a child jus tifies interfe renc e with a parent’s c onstitut ional rig hts by setting f orth g rounds on which termination proce eding s can be broug ht. Tenn. Code Ann. § 36- 1 -1 1 3 (g ). The statutes on-6-

te rm inatio n o f p are nta l rig hts pr ov idetheon ly auth ority fo r a c ou rt to t e rm inate a parent ’s ri g hts

. Os bo rn v . M

ar r , 1 27 S.W. 3d 73 7, 73 9 (T e nn

. 20 04 ). Th us , pa re nta l ri g hts ma y

be te rm inate d o nly wh e re a statut orily

de fi ne d g ro un d e xists . T e nn . Co de An n. § 3 6- 1- 11 3( c )( 1) ; J on e s v . G ar re tt , 92 S.W .3d 835, 838 (Tenn. 2002) ; In r e M.W .A. , 980 S.W .2d 620, 622 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1998). T o support the termination of pare ntal rig hts, only one g round need be proved, so long as it is proved by clea r and c onvincing evidenc e. In the Matter of D.L.B. , 118 S.W .3d 360, 367 (Tenn. 2003)

.
The re quisite highe r standar d of proof applicable to both gr ounds and best intere st is one of the sa fe g ua

rd s nec e ssi ta te d b y

these ve ri ty

of the int e rf e re nc e wi th the pa

re nt’ s f un da me nta l r ig hts

. I n order to be clea

r and convinc ing, e vidence must elimi nate any serious or substantial doubt about the cor rec tness of t he conclusions to be drawn from the evidenc e. In re Vale ntine , 79 S.W .3d at 546; Hodges v . S.C. Toof

& Co. , 833 S.W .2d 896, 901 n.3 (Tenn. 1992). Such evide nce should produc e in the fac t-finder ’s mind a firm belief or convic tion as to the truth of the alleg ati o n s sought to be established. In re A.D .A. , 8 4 S. W.3 d 5 92 , 5 96 (T e nn . Ct . A pp . 2 00 2) ; In r e C

. W. W. , 3 7 S.W .3d 467, 474 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2000). I n contra st to the preponde ranc e of the evidenc e standard, clea r and convincing evidenc e shoul d demonstrate that the t ruth of t he facts asserted i s “hig hly probable ” as opposed to mere ly

“more probable ” than not. I n r e C

. W. W. , 37 S.W. 3da t 47 4; se e als o Estate of Acuff v. O’ Linger , 56 S.W .3d 527, 537 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2001).

Du e to the g ra ve c on se qu e nc e s th a t a c c omp a ny su c h d e c isi on s, c ou rt s mu st a pp ly individualiz ed decision-making to a termination dec ision. In re Swanson , 2 S.W .3d 180, 188 (Tenn. 1999). Due proce ss require s the application of stringe nt standards t o insure prote ction of the fu nd a me nta l r ig hts a t st ake . B e c aus e of the c on sti tut ion a l impli c a tio ns , g ra vity of c on se qu e nc e s, hig he r stand ard of pr oo f, a nd re qu ir e d ind ivi du a lize d de c isi on makin g , o ur le g isl a tur e ha s e xplic itl y
r e q u ir e d th a t c o u r ts ma

k in g te r mi n a ti o n o f

p ar e n ta l r

ig h ts d e c is io n s “ e n te r

a n o r d e r w h ic h ma

k es specific finding s of fa ct and c onclusions of law.” Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-1-113( k). I n this court’s revie w, we must dete rmine de novo whether DCS sust ained its burden to prove its case by clea r and convincing evidenc e. In re Vale ntine , 79 S.W .3d at 546.

III. J URI S DI CT I ON

Sin c e the jurisd ic tio na l e rr or a lle g e d b y

Mo the r m a y

be dis po sit iveof he r app e a l, w e a dd re ss it first. Mother cha lleng es whe ther Te nnessee is the children’ s h o m e state f or purpose s of establishing subje ct matter jurisdiction under the Uniform Child CustodyJ urisdiction and Enforc ement Act, Tenn. Code Ann. § 36- 6-201 et seq

. (“ UC CJEA ” ). A s ta te is a c hil d’ s h ome state if a child has “lived with a pare nt or a person acting as a pare nt f or at least s i x (6 ) c o n s ec u t i ve months im mediately

befor e commenc ement of a child custody

proce eding .” Tenn. Code Ann. § 36- 6-205(7) . “Child custody

proce eding ” is define d to inc lude “termination of a pare ntal rig hts.” Tenn. Cod e An n. § 36- 6- 20 5( 4)

. Sin c e thec hil dr e n h a d b e e n inthe c us tod y of DC S, andha d li ve d w ith f o s t e r p ar e n t s , m o r e t h a n s i x ( 6 ) m o n t h s b e f o r e D C S f

i l e d i t s p e t i t i o n t o t e r m i n a t e p ar e n t a l r i g hts , Tenne ssee wa s the children’ s home state in J une of 2004 w hen the pe tition was filed.M o t her t ri es t o argue t hat t he chi l d ren were i n T enness ee d ue t o ki d nap p i ng b y D

. D

. ’ s f at her. T he t ri al co urt 8
d i d not f i nd t hi s t o be t he case, and M o t her ad m i t t ed l y f i l ed no charges wi t h t he aut ho ri t i es abo ut any ki d nap p i ng. I n
a n y e v e n t, D C S , ra the r th a n the fath e r, o b ta ine d c u sto d y o f t h e c h il d r e n a n d c o n ta c te d M o the r a s w e ll a s o ff ic ia ls in M ississip p i.
-7- Although termination of parental rights proceeding “is a new and separate proce eding from a depe ndent neglec t proce eding ,” In re M .J.B. , 140 S.W .3d 643, 651 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2004), Mothe r appea rs t o challeng e the initial taking into custody by DCS, asserting that Tenne ssee wa s not then the home state and the childre n should have be en ret u rn ed t o M ississi ppi. Although the r ecor d befor e us does not include the order of J anuary 2003, the trial court’ s later de pendenc y and neg lect
o r d e r r e c o u n t s t h e s i t u a t i o n att h e t i m e t h e c h i l d r e n f i r s tc a m e i n t o D C S c u s t o d y.

The c hildren we re f

ound walking on the interstate w ith D.D.’s father who, it turned out, ha d
a n o uts ta nd ing wa

rr a nt a g a ins t hi m in I nd ia na a ndwa s t aken int o c us tod y . M oth e r w a s c a lle d in Mississ ippi, but did not come to T ennesse e until three we eks later , and then f or a visit. At the time, there was a n open investig ation o f t h e fa m i l yong oing in Mississippi. As the court found, the
c h i l d r e n w e r e d e p e n d e n t a n d n e g l e c t e d b e c au s e t h e y w e r e w i t h o u ta p r o p e r g u ar d i a n

. C o n s e q u e n t l y, the trial court had jurisdiction when the children first came into DCS custody under Te nn. Code Ann. § 36-6-219( a) and (b):
(a) A court of this state has tempora ry emer g ency

jurisdiction if the child is present in this state a ndthec hil d h a s b e e n a ba nd on e d o r i t is ne c e ssa ry in an e me rg e nc y

to pr ote c t the c hil d be c aus e the c hil d, or a sib lin g or pa re nt of the c hil d, is s ub

je c te d to or threatened with mistreatment or abuse.
(b) I f there is no previous child custody determination that is e ntitled to be e nforc ed under this part and a c hild custody proce eding has not be en commence d in a court of
a s t ate ha ving jurisdiction under §§ 36-6-216–36- 6-218, a c hild-custody determination made under this section remains i n ef fec t until an order is obtained fr om a c ou rt of a state ha vin g jurisd ic tio n u nd e r § § 3 6- 6- 21 6– 36 -6 -2 18 . I f a c hil d custody proce eding has not be en or is not commence d in a court of a s t at e h av ing jurisdiction unde r §§ 36-6-216–36- 6-218, a c hild custody determination made under th is s e c ti o n b e c o me s a f

in a l d e te r mi n a ti o n , if it s o p r o v id e s a n d th is s tate become s the home state of

the child.
When the juvenile court was pre sented with the c hildren in J anuary of 2003, base d on the proof introduc ed at the hearing, it clearly had eme rg ency

jurisdiction under Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-6- 21 9( a ) t o ta

ke the c hil dr e n in to c us tod y . T he c hil dr e n w e reaba nd on e d in Ten ne sse e

. Th e ir a du lt 8 g u ar d i a n w a s i n p o l i c e c u s t o d y a n d t h e i r M o t h e r d i dn o ta t t e m p tt o ap p e ar o r e x e r c i s e c u s t o d y. Under subsection (b), the re is no indication in the re cord that there exis ted a c urre nt child custody determination from any

other state. D CS contacted its Mis sissippi counter part. F urthermor e, no proce eding s were initiated in any other state with e ven purported jurisdiction. There fore , pursuant to Tenn. Code Ann. § 36- 6-219(b) , since Te nnessee assumed eme rg ency jurisdiction and no actionT her e i s no di s put e t hat t he j uv eni l e cour t has au t hor i t y t o t er mi nat e r i gh t s as s umi ng t hat T enn es s ee has s ubj ect 9

m at t er j uri sdi ct i o n.

T he t ri al co urt al so fo und ab and o nm ent ba sed o n f ai l ure t o s up p o rt

. T he evi d ence i s am b i guo us regardi ng 10

w h e the r M o the r u n d e rs to o d sh e ha d this d u ty sinc e the P a r e n ti n g P la n s w e re silen t o n this issu e a n d d o e s n o t cle a rly

e sta b lish M o the r’s a b ili ty t o p ro v id e su p p o rt. S inc e a b a n d o n m e n t i s c le a rly p re se n t b a se d o n failur e to visit, w e fi n d it

u n n e c e ssa ry to d isc u ss M o the r’s failu re to s u p p o rt. T h e tr ia l c o u rt a lso fo u n d a b a n d o n m e n t un d e r T e n n . C o d e A n n . § 36

- 1- 10 2( 1) ( A) ( i i ) bu t w e do n ot n e e d t o c on s i de r t h a t ba s i s s i n c e t h e g r ou n ds of a ba n do n me n t h a s ot h e r w i s e been p roven und er T enn. C o d e A nn. § 3 6

- 1

- 1 0 2 (1)(A )( i ).
-8- wa s ta ke n ina no ther s ta te wi th ev e n p os sib le jurisd ic tio n, the n T e nn e sse e wa s th e c hil dr e n’ s h ome state fo r p ur

po se s o f j urisd ic tio n to e nte rt a in the pe tit ionof DC S to te rm inate pa

re nta l r ig hts

. 9

IV. A B ANDON M E NT Among the g rounds alleg ed by DCS in i ts petition, and found by the t rial court to have bee n sh ow n, wa s a

ba nd on me nt, a s d e fi ne d b y a sp e c if ic su bs e c tio n o f the statut e de fi nin g that te rm : (i) F or a pe riod of four

(4) c onsecutive months i mmediately prec eding the fli ng of a proce eding or plea ding to terminate the par ental rig hts of the par ent(s) . . t h at the pare nt(s) . . . either

have w illfullyfailed to visit or have willfullyfai led to support or have willfullyfailed to make rea sonable payments toward the support of the child;
(ii) The c hild has been r emoved f rom the home of the pare nt(s) as a result of a petition filed in the juvenile court in which the child was found to be a depende nt and neg lec t ed ch i ld . . . and for a period of f

our (4) months following the r emoval, the department or ag ency

has made reas o n ab l e ef forts to assist the pare nt(s) or g uardia n(s) to establish a suitable ho m e fo r the child, but that the par ent(s) or g uardia n (s ) have made no r easona ble ef forts to provide a

suitable home and ha ve de mon str a te d a

la c k o f c on c e rnfo r the c hil d to su c h a de g re e that it app e ars un lik e ly that they will be able to provide a suitable home f or the c hild at an ea

rly date.
Tenn. Code Ann. § 36- 1-102(1) (A) ( i) and (ii).

The trial co urt found abandonment under Te nn. Code Ann. § 36-1- 102(1)( A)(i) , willful failu re to v isi t. Th e re c or d is c le ar that Mo the r d id n ot v isi t or oth e rw ise c on ta c t he r c hil dr e n in 10 the four ( 4) month period (F ebrua ry - May ) bef

ore DCS filed t o terminate in June of 2004. I n order to constitute abandonment unde r Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-1-102( 1)(A) (i), howeve r, Mother’ s failure to visit must be willful, i.e. , that sh e kn e w of the du ty , that sh e ha d the abil ity , andvo lun tari ly c ho se not to visi t. See I

n re M.J .B. and M. W

.S ., J r. , 140 S.W .3d 643, 654 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2004). There is c le ar a nd c on vin c ing e vid e nc e in the re c or d to su pp ort the tr ia l c ou rt ’s fi nd ing of w illfu lne ss. F ir st, the pa

re nti ng plan c le arl y

de sc ri be d b oththe du ty

a ndc on se qu e nc e s. I t is imp orta nt t o n ote that no t on ly

didMo the r n ot v isi t the c hil dr e n, sh e wo uld no t eve n d isc los e he r l oc a tio n to the ir c a se wo rk e r. Du ri ng thi s f

ou r ( 4) mon th perio d, in M arc h o f 2 00 4, Mo the r m ov e d f ro m L ou isi a na

to-9-

Santee, South Carolina so she wa s clea rly mobile. Most im portantly , when asked why she did not move to Tenne ssee to benear er he r childre n, she re plied that she wa nted a f resh start, “just wanted to g o somewher e else .” See I n re D.M.S., G .H.S. and T.M.S. , No. M2004-02584-COA- R3-PT, 2005 WL 1887526, at *9-10 (T enn. Ct. App. Aug ust 9, 2005) (No Te nn. R. App. P. 11 application filed) (finding decision by mother to live 500 miles away from childre n constituted willfulness for purposes of a

bandonment). U nder the se circ umstances, we ag ree wi th the trial court’ s finding of willfulness in her failure to visit under Tenn. Code A nn. § 36-1-102( 1)(A) (i).

V. F AI L URE T O C OM P L Y W I T H P E RM ANE NCY P L AN

Th e stand ard s f

or re vie wi ng te rm inatio n o f p aren tal rig hts ba se d o n s ub stanti a l f a ilu re to comply with a permanenc y plan under Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-1-113(g )(2) have be en discussed by the Tenne ssee Supre me Court in In re Valentine , 79 S.W .3d 539 (Tenn. 2002) . Prior to terminating a par ent’s rig hts on this ground, the tria l court must fi n d t h at t h e requirements of the pe rmane ncy pl an t h at t h e par ent alleg edly did not satisfy

are “re asonable and ar e re lated to re medy ing the conditions which necessitate foster care pla ceme nt.” Id . at 547 (quoting Tenn. Code Ann. § 37- 2- 403(a) (2)( C)). I f the trial court fails to ma ke this finding , this c ourt must re view the tri al court’s decision de novo without a presumption of cor rec tness. In re V

a l enti ne , 79 S.W .3d at 547. Determining whe ther substantial noncomplianc e exists i s a q u es tion of law that must also be revie wed without a pr esumption of corr ectne ss. Id. at 548.

The trial c ourt approve d both Parenting Plans on Febr uary 26, 2003, finding t hem to be
rea sonable. Mother has never dis puted t he reasonable ness of the pl ans at the s taffing , at trial or on appea l. Upon revie w of the pla ns, we likewise f ind they are rea sonable.

I n order for nonc ompliance to justify the term i n ati on of par ental rig hts, it m ust be “substan tial.” I n other wor ds, mere te chnica l noncompliance a lone is not sufficient to justify the termination of par ental rig hts. Id. at 548. Noncompliance with require ments in a permanency plan that a re ne ith e r re a so na

ble no r re la te d to re me dying the c on dit ion s th a t le d to the re mov a l of the c hil d from the pa

rent’s c ustody

is not relevant for purposes of Tenn. Code Ann. § 36- 1-113(g )(2)

. In re Valentine , 79 S.W .3d at 548-49.

Th e re i s c l e ar

a n d c o n v i n c i n g e v i d e n c e th a tM o t h e r f a i l e d t o s u b s t a n t i a l l y

c o m p l y wi th virtua lly a ll a sp e c ts o f the c hil dr e n’ s Pe rm a ne ncy P lan s. Mothe r f a ile d to c oo pe rate wi th D CS in may way s, most sig nificantly her unwillingness to disc lose her various residential locations. By her
ow n a dmi ssi on , s he didno t ta ke pa re nti ng c la sse s. As di sc us se d p re vio us ly , s he didno t st a y in contac t w ith he r children. She did not attend AA or NA meeting s. Whil e it a ppear s she is n ow seeing a counse lor in Santee, Sout h Carolina, other than self- reporting ty

pes of r eviews, she has not undertaken an A &D Assessment. Mother has not submitted to a home study

. Furthermore , she has
never submitt ed to r andom drug tests. The Parenting Plan r equire d proof of employment that Mother has not offe red. Whil e Mot her testified at t he hearing that she had rec ently rema rried, e stablished a h o me a n d h a d a jo b , th e tria l c o u r t d id n o t f in d h e r te s ti mo n y c r e d ib le

. T h e in c o n s is te n c ie s and inacc urac ies i n M o t her’ s testimonyare appar ent. Other than starting to see a

counselor in Julyof-10-

20 04 a ndapp e ari ng a t th e te rm inatio n h e ari ng , M oth e r d oe s n ot a pp e ar t o h a ve e ve n atte mpt e d to
c omp ly wi th the plans

. Th e re fo re , th e tria l c ou rt ha d a mpl e g ro un ds to f indMo the r f

a ile d to substantially

comply with the pare nting plan.

VI

. P ER SI STEN C E O F C ONDI T I ONS

I n the pre sent ca se, the trial c ourt terminated Mothe r’s pa renta l r i gh t s pursuant to the provisions of Tenn. Code Ann. § 36- 1-113 (g) (3 )( A) . This statute lists as one of the g rounds for te

rmination:
(3)( A) The child has been remove d from the home of the par ent or g uardia n by order of a c ourt for a

period of six (6) months and; (i ) T he c on dit ion s whi c h led to the c hil d’ s re mov a l or oth e r c on dit ion s w hic h ina ll
rea sonable proba

bilitywould cause the child to be s u b j ecte d to further

abuse or
ne g le c t a ndwh ic h, the re fo re , p re ve nt the c hil d’ s sa fere turn to the c areof the pa re nt, sti ll p e rs ist ; (i i) Th e re is l itt le lik e lih oo d th a t th e se c on dit ion s w ill be re me die d at a n e arl y date so that the child ca n be saf ely returned t o t h e p ar ent(s) or g uardia n(s) in the ne ar future; and (i ii) Th e co nti nu a tio n o f the pa re nt o r g ua

rd ia n a ndc hil d r e la tio ns hip g re a tly diminis hes the c hild’s chanc es of e arly integ ration into a safe , stable and pe rmane nt home.
These g rounds must be i n t er p re t ed and a pplied in acc ordanc e with the express leg islative intent of our statutory

sy stem of child re moval, foster c are , and adoption. One of the stated pur poses of these statutes is “ to pr otect [children] fr om needless pr olonge d place ment in foster c are and the
uncertainty

it provides, and to provide them a reasonable assura nce that, if an e arly return to the c are of their p ar en t s i s not possible, they will be place d in a permanent home at an ea rly date.” Tenn. Code Ann. § 37-2- 401(a) . Our c ourts have r ecog nized the significance of perma nency as the g oal of dec isions invol ving f

uture plac ement of c h i l d ren and termination of pa renta l rig hts. See, e .g., State Dep't of Human Servs.v . Smith, 785 S.W .2d 336, 338 (Tenn.1990)

. As requir ed for

the application of the s t at u te, the childre n have be en in custody more than six (6) months. The immediate c ause f or the c hil d ren c oming into DCS custody was their be ing without a g uardia n when D.D .’s fathe r was taken into c ustody

. The pe rmane ncy plans make it cle ar the under ly ing c ondition that made it unsafe f or the c hildren to be re turned to Mother’ s home was her dr ug use. As the statute ma kes cle ar, the “conditions” likely to le ad t o future ne g lect and that preve nt safe r eturn of the children may be the conditions le ading to r emoval or “other conditions.”

Review of the rec ord discloses that much of Mother’s ne g lect of the children stems fr om her use of c rac k cocaine. She beg an using cra ck at a g e 18 and told her counselor that she had spent $300 t o $ 1 , 0 0 0 p erd ay(o r p erwe ek ) t o s u p p o rt h er h ab i t

. W h i l e s h e t es t i fi ed t h ats h e h ad s t o p p ed u s i n g, there is no reason to find he r testimony cre dible. Whil e she testified at trial she stoppe d using c rac k in 2002, there ha ve bee n no reg ular random drug scre ens. The r eport she introduc ed fr o m her-11-

counselor disputes Mother ’s assertion that she quit in 2002 and states that Mother told the counselor she stopped using cocaine in early 2004. Howeve r, in September of 2004, when Mother

made a n appea ranc e in c ourt, she tested positive f or cocaine. At the hearing, her son testified in de tail about his Mother’s drug use and its eff ects. Sadly , it does not appe ar that these conditions will be reme died and continuation of the pare nt and child re lationship g reatly diminis hes t hese children’s c hance s of
a stable, safe and perma nent home. Ba sed on the fore g oing, this is clea r and c onvincing evidenc e to support the trial court’ s termination of her rig hts f or per sistent conditions under Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-1-113( g )(3)

.
VI I. R EASON A BLE E FF OR TS

Whil e no t e xplic itl y

raise d b y Mo the r o n a

pp e a l, s he arg ue s h e r failu re s we reno t he r f ault and implies that DCS did not make r easona ble ef forts to reunite Mothe r and he r childre n. Re a so na ble effo rt ha s b e e n d e fi ne d b y the Ge ne ra l A sse mbl y

to m e a n “ the e xer c ise of re a so na ble
car e and dilig enceby

DCS to provide service s related to me eting the nee ds of the child and f amily .” Tenn. Code Ann. § 37- 1-116 (g) (1 ). On e factor to conside r is the par ent’s ef forts to reme dy

the situation so th at re u n i fi ca t ion is possi ble. In re J .L.E. , 2 00 5 W. L . 1 54 18 62 a t *1 3; In re C.M.M

. , 2004 WL 438326 at *7.

Th e c hil dr e n’ s D CS c a se wo rk e r, Ma ry Cun nin g ha m, ke pt tho ro ug h r e c or ds of he r c on ta c ts with Mother. Ms. Cunningham rea dily acknow ledg ed that DCS had not provided c erta in types of service s to Mother. DCS’s failure to a ssist Mot h er did not arise fr om unwillingness or ne g lect of DCS. DCS was not able to help Mother bec ause she moved fre quently and would g o months wi tho ut l e tti ng DC S kn ow he r l oc a tio n. Som e tim e s Mo the r w ou ld c a ll M s. Cun nin g ha m a ndfl a tly ref use t o tell her where she wa s. I t was only by backtr acking throug h caller I D was Ms. Cunning ham able to determine what state and city Mother was located. Acc ording to Ms. Cunni ng ham, it is not possible to provide these ty pes of services to someone out-of -state who move s fre quently and re fuses to d isc los e the ir

loc a tio n. We a g re e. Th e tr ial cou rt no te d it s b e lie f that Mo the r w a s r e luc ta nt t o dis c los e he r l oc a tio n o ut o f c on c e rnthat if sh e did so , the n sh e mig ht los e c us tod y of he r y ou ng e st son, J . Her

counselor note d this was the re ason Mother w as re luctant to seek he lp. I n eff ect, f or whateve r re ason, Mother was avoiding DCS. The eff ort of DCS must be rea sonable a nd we a g ree wi th the tr ia l c ou rt

that th e re is c le ar andc on vin c ing e vid e nc e that D CS’ s e ff orts w e rere a so na

ble
un de r the se c ir c ums ta nc e s.

VI II. B EST I N TE R ESTS O F C HILDR EN

F ina lly , inorder to ter mi nate p are nta l rig hts , a tria l c ou rt

mus t f indit i s in the c hil d’ s b e st interest to do so. Tenn. Code A nn. § 36-1-113( c)( 2). I n determining whe ther termination of pare ntal ri g hts is i n a

c hil d' s b e st i nte re st, thelow e r c ou rt mus t c on sid e r the fo llo wi ng fa c tor s: (1) Whether t he par ent or g uardia n has made such an a djustment of circumstanc e, conduct, or

conditions as to make it safe and in the child’s be st interest to be in the ho me of thepa re nt o r g ua

rd ia n;-12-

(2) Whether

the par ent or g uardia n has failed to effe ct a lasting adjustment after
rea sonable e fforts by

available social ser vices a g encie s for such duration of time that la sti ng a dju stm e nt d oe s n ot r e a so na bly app e ar p os sib le ; (3) Whether the parent or g uardia n has maintained r eg ular visitation or other c ontact wi th the c hil d; (4) Whether

a mea ningf

ul re lationship has otherwise be en esta blished betwee n the pa re nt o r g ua

rd ia n a ndthec hil d; (5) The eff

ect a chang e of car etake rs and phy sical environment is likely to have on the c hil d’ s e mot ion a l, p sy c ho log ic a l a ndme dic a l c on dit ion ; (6) Whether

the par ent or g uardia n, or other pe rson re s i d i n g with the pare nt or g uardia n, has shown bruta lity , phy sical, sexual, e motional or psy cholog ical abuse , or
ne g le c t to wa

rdthec hil d, or

a no the r c hil d o r a du lt i n th e famil y or ho us e ho ld; (7) W hether the phy sical environment of t he parent’s or g uardia n’s hom e is hea lthy
a ndsa fe , w he the r the re is crimi na l ac tiv ity in the ho me , o r w he the r the reis s uc h u se of a lc oh ol o r c on tr oll e d s ub stanc e s a s may re nd e r the pa re nt o r g ua

rd ia n c on sis te ntl y un ableto c are fo r the c hil d ina sa fea ndsta

ble ma nn e r; (8) Whether

the par ent’s or g uardia n’s mental and/or em o t i o n al status would be detrimental to the child or preve nt the pare nt or g uardia n from ef

fec tively providing safe and stable c are and supervision for the child; or (9 ) Wh e the r the pa

re nt or g ua

rd ia n ha s pai d ch ild su pp ort c on sis te nt w iththe c hil d support g uidelines promulg ated by the depa rtment pursuant to § 36-5- 101.

Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-1-113( i). This list is not exhaustive, and the statute does not re quire the c ourt to f indthe e xiste nc e of

e ve ry fa c tor be fo re c on c lud ing that te rm inatio n is in a c hil d’ s b e st i nte re st.

He re , M oth e r h a s h a d n o c on ta c t w ithhe r c hil dr e n f or mon ths . O nly

aft er DCS fi le d it s pe tit ion to te rm inate in Jun e of 20 04 , d id m oth e r b e g in t o v isi t th e c hil dr e n a ndthe n s he ha d o nly six ( 6) vis its be fo re thehe ari ng date of F e br ua ry 20 05

. Du ri ng thi s pe ri odMo the r a lso c a nc e lle d s ix (6) visits. As late as Septembe r of 2004, Mother still tested positive for c ocaine

. I t is also clea r that Mo the r h a s n ot take n th e ne c e ssa ry ste ps to m akea n a dju stm e nt s o th a t th e c hil dr e n c ou ld s a fe ly return to he r custody . I nstead, she le t them rema in in foster care with litt le or no c ontact fr om her while she moved a

round. The c hildren have been with their foster pa rents since November

of 2003. B y a ll a c c o u n ts , th e c h il d r e n ar e d o in g w e ll w ith th e ir f o s te r p ar e n ts w h o w a n t t o a d o p t th e m. We believe that the rec ord contains clea r and convincing evidenc e that termination of Mother’ s pare ntal ri g hts is i n th e c hil dr e n’ s b e st i nte re st.

For the re asons set forth here in, we af firm the dec is i o n o f the trial court in terminating Mother’s pa

renta l rig hts. Cost s of this appea l are taxed to Mot her, f or which execution may

issue i f n e c e s s ar y.

____________________________________ PATRI CI A J . COTTRELL , J UDGE