J-S27016-15

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

IN RE: ADOPTION OF A.J.K., A MINOR IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

PENNSYLVANIA

APPEAL OF: R.J.W., III, FATHER No. 2679 EDA 2014

Appeal from the Decree entered August 15, 2014, 

in the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County, Family 

Court, at No: CP-51-AP-0000235-2013, 

FID: 51-FN-001519-2013

BEFORE: FORD ELLIOTT, P.J.E., STABILE, and FITZGERALD,* JJ.

MEMORANDUM BY STABILE, J.: FILED JUNE 23, 2015

R.J.W., III, (Father) appeals from the decree entered August 15, 2014, 

in the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County, which involuntarily 

terminated his parental rights to his minor son, A.J.K. (Child). We affirm.1

Father is the former boyfriend of H.K. (Mother). Mother and Father 

separated shortly after the birth of Child in March of 2006. Since that time, 

Father has had little involvement in Child’s life. On April 19, 2013, Mother 

filed a petition to involuntarily terminate Father’s parental rights to Child.2 A 

termination hearing was held on October 16, 2013. During the hearing, the 

trial court heard the testimony of Mother; Stepfather; Mother’s mother, E.K. 

 

* Former Justice specially assigned to the Superior Court.

1 We note that our review of this fast-track matter was delayed significantly, 

as the trial court did not forward the certified record to this Court until 

December 19, 2014, over two months after its original due date of October 

10, 2014. 

2 Mother and her husband, S.M. (Stepfather), filed a petition for adoption at 

the same time as the termination petition.
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(Maternal Grandmother); Father; and Father’s mother, M.W. (Paternal 

Grandmother). The hearing then was continued until October 25, 2013. On 

that date, the trial court interviewed Child in camera. On August 15, 2014, 

the court entered its decree terminating Father’s parental rights.3 Father 

timely filed a notice of appeal on September 10, 2014, along with a concise 

statement of errors complained of on appeal.

Father now raises the following issue for our review. “Did the [t]rial 

[c]ourt err in terminating the parental rights of [Father] in that clear and 

convincing evidence for terminating his parental rights did not exist?” 

Father’s Brief at 6. 

We consider Father’s claim mindful of the following. 

The standard of review in termination of parental rights cases 

requires appellate courts to accept the findings of fact and 

credibility determinations of the trial court if they are supported 

by the record. If the factual findings are supported, appellate 

courts review to determine if the trial court made an error of law 

or abused its discretion. A decision may be reversed for an 

abuse of discretion only upon demonstration of manifest 

unreasonableness, partiality, prejudice, bias, or ill-will. The trial 

court’s decision, however, should not be reversed merely

because the record would support a different result. We have 

previously emphasized our deference to trial courts that often 

have first-hand observations of the parties spanning multiple 

hearings.

 

3 On October 25, 2013, the court entered an order requiring each party to 

file proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law, as well as a proposed 

decree, within 30 days of the date that the termination proceedings were 

transcribed. It is not clear from the record when the notes of testimony 

were transcribed. However, the parties did not comply with the court’s 

order until June and July of 2014.
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In re T.S.M., 71 A.3d 251, 267 (Pa. 2013) (citations and quotation marks 

omitted). 

Our courts apply a two-part analysis in reviewing a decree terminating 

parental rights. As we explained in In re L.M., 923 A.2d 505 (Pa. Super. 

2007),

[i]nitially, the focus is on the conduct of the parent. The party 

seeking termination must prove by clear and convincing 

evidence that the parent’s conduct satisfies the statutory 

grounds for termination delineated in Section 2511(a). Only if 

the court determines that the parent’s conduct warrants 

termination of his or her parental rights does the court engage in 

the second part of the analysis pursuant to Section 2511(b): 

determination of the needs and welfare of the child under the 

standard of best interests of the child. One major aspect of the 

needs and welfare analysis concerns the nature and status of the 

emotional bond between parent and child, with close attention 

paid to the effect on the child of permanently severing any such 

bond.

Id. at 511 (citations omitted).

In this case, the trial court terminated Father’s parental rights 

pursuant to 23 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 2511(a)(1), (2), and (b). We need only agree 

with the trial court as to any one subsection of Section 2511(a), as well as 

Section 2511(b), to affirm. In re B.L.W., 843 A.2d 380, 384 (Pa. Super. 

2004) (en banc), appeal denied, 863 A.2d 1141 (Pa. 2004). Here, we 

analyze the court’s decision to terminate under Sections 2511(a)(1) and (b), 

which provide as follows.

(a) General Rule.—The rights of a parent in regard to a child 

may be terminated after a petition filed on any of the following 

grounds:
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(1) The parent by conduct continuing for a period of 

at least six months immediately preceding the filing 

of the petition either has evidenced a settled purpose 

of relinquishing parental claim to a child or has 

refused or failed to perform parental duties. 

* * *

(b) Other considerations.—The court in terminating the rights 

of a parent shall give primary consideration to the 

developmental, physical and emotional needs and welfare of the 

child. The rights of a parent shall not be terminated solely on 

the basis of environmental factors such as inadequate housing, 

furnishings, income, clothing and medical care if found to be 

beyond the control of the parent. With respect to any petition 

filed pursuant to subsection (a)(1), (6) or (8), the court shall not 

consider any efforts by the parent to remedy the conditions 

described therein which are first initiated subsequent to the 

giving of notice of the filing of the petition.

23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2511(a)(1), (b).

We first address whether the trial court abused its discretion by 

terminating Father’s parental rights pursuant to Section 2511(a)(1). To 

meet the requirements of this section, “the moving party must produce clear 

and convincing evidence of conduct, sustained for at least the six months 

prior to the filing of the termination petition, which reveals a settled intent to 

relinquish parental claim to a child or a refusal or failure to perform parental 

duties.” In re Z.S.W., 946 A.2d 726, 730 (Pa. Super. 2008) (citing In re 

Adoption of R.J.S., 901 A.2d 502, 510 (Pa. Super. 2006)). The court must 

then consider “the parent’s explanation for his or her conduct” and “the 

post-abandonment contact between parent and child” before moving on to 

analyze Section 2511(b). Id. (quoting In re Adoption of Charles E.D.M., 

708 A.2d 88, 92 (Pa. 1998)).
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This Court has emphasized that a parent does not perform his or her 

parental duties by displaying a “merely passive interest in the development 

of the child.” In re B.,N.M., 856 A.2d 847, 855 (Pa. Super. 2004), appeal 

denied, 872 A.2d 1200 (Pa. 2005) (quoting In re C.M.S., 832 A.2d 457, 462 

(Pa. Super. 2003), appeal denied, 859 A.2d 767 (Pa. 2004)). Rather, 

“[p]arental duty requires that the parent act affirmatively with good faith 

interest and effort, and not yield to every problem, in order to maintain the 

parent-child relationship to the best of his or her ability, even in difficult 

circumstances.” Id. (citation omitted). Critically, incarceration does not 

relieve a parent of the obligation to perform parental duties. An 

incarcerated parent must “utilize available resources to continue a 

relationship” with his or her child. In re Adoption of S.P., 47 A.3d 817, 

828 (Pa. 2012) (discussing In re Adoption of McCray, 331 A.2d 652 (Pa. 

1975)).

Instantly, the trial court concluded that Father “purposefully and 

decidedly abdicated his parental role” with respect to Child, and that Father 

“failed to vigorously work to insert and maintain himself in the life of the 

child in a meaningful way.” Trial Court Opinion, 12/16/14, at 5 

(unpaginated). Father argues that he made efforts to maintain contact with 

Child by sending letters to Mother, and trying to contact her. Father’s Brief 

at 9. Father also contends that both he and his parents were prevented 

from seeing Child by Mother, as they feared she would call the police. Id. 
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After a thorough review of the record in this matter, we conclude that 

the trial court did not abuse its discretion by terminating Father’s parental 

rights to Child. During the termination hearing, Mother testified that Father 

and Child have never resided together. N.T., 10/13/13, at 34-35, 43. 

Mother further explained that the last time she saw Father was in August of 

2012, when he came to her home intoxicated and asked to see Child. Id. at 

11, 36, 41, 46, 50. Mother stated that she did not permit Father to see 

Child, as Father no longer had visitation rights due to a November 2011 

custody order. Id. at 11-12, 29, 50. Mother called the police, who asked 

Father to leave. Id. at 36-37, 46, 50-51. 

Mother also was asked about Father’s involvement with Child during 

the six-month period preceding the filing of the termination petition on April 

19, 2013. Mother testified that she was not contacted by Father in any way 

from October of 2012 until January of 2013. Id. at 15. Mother explained 

that Father sent a letter asking for pictures of Child in January of 2013. Id.

at 15, 38, 43, 50, 52. Mother did not respond to the letter. Id. at 38. 

Father had no further contact with Mother from January of 2013 until April of 

2013. Id. at 12-15. Mother acknowledged that she changed residences in 

September of 2012, and that her current address is confidential. Id. at 16, 

40. However, she stated that she set up a forwarding address at the post 

office, such that mail sent to her prior address would be directed to her 

current home. Id. Mother also noted that Father has her cellphone number, 
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and that this number has not changed in “[s]ix years or so.” Id. at 16-17, 

41. 

Maternal Grandmother testified that she resides in the same home 

where she has lived for the past 34 years. Id. at 58-59. Maternal 

Grandmother stated that Father lived in her home with Mother from 

approximately November of 2005 until February of 2006. Id. at 58. Father 

also knows Maternal Grandmother’s phone number. Id. at 59. Despite this, 

Maternal Grandmother indicated that Father did not send any letters, call her 

on the phone, or make any contact with her at all between October of 2012 

and April of 2013. Id. at 59-60. 

Father testified that Mother informed him in April of 2006 that he “will 

never see [Child] again,” which prompted Father to file a custody petition. 

Id. at 66, 105. Father was awarded visitation with Child twice per week, 

which he attended consistently for a period four years. Id. at 67. Father 

claimed that these visits stopped because Mother “just started to call the 

cops if I went over there . . . .” Id. at 69. Father stated that he sometimes 

tried to see Child when he was not scheduled to do so, but stated that 

Mother would call the police during even his scheduled visitation periods. 

Id. at 69, 100. Father stated that he at one point filed a contempt petition, 

but that his petition was withdrawn because Mother relented and let him see 

Child. Id. at 100-01. Father admitted that he last saw Child in 2011, and 

that he lost his visitation rights because “I could not stay out of jail.” Id. at 

99, 108. Specifically, Father testified that he was incarcerated at an 
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unspecified time, and that he was released in approximately December of 

2010. Id. at 81. Father again was arrested in June or July of 2011, and 

was released on March 22, 2012. Id. at 74, 77, 80. Finally, Father was 

incarcerated starting on May 30, 2012. Id. at 77. Father explained that he 

was released on July 30, 2013, and that he now works detailing cars. Id. at 

64, 77. 

Father claimed that, while incarcerated, he would send letters to 

Mother and Child “[m]aybe once a week” at Mother’s former address, and 

that “I would show up and try to see my son” during the times when he was 

not incarcerated. Id. at 70-71, 86, 107. Father stated that he had been 

incarcerated for 16 or 18 months over the previous two years, and he sent 

letters during “the beginning of the 18 months that I was incarcerated.” Id.

at 70, 84-85, 107. Father specified that the letters were sent “[b]efore I left 

county, I was in the county for two months.” Id. at 85. Father also stated 

that he sent letters during “the last six months” prior to the termination 

hearing. Id. at 107. According to Father, he used to called Mother “all the 

time” while he was incarcerated, but this stopped in July of 2012 because 

Mother stopped answering her phone. Id. at 75-76, 93-94. Father reported 

that Maternal Grandmother told him that “she would call the cops if I 

contacted her” or Mother. Id. at 72, 94. 

Paternal Grandmother testified that she visited with Child twice per 

week for about five years. Id. at 112-13. She stated that Father “always 

wrote letters to his son,” and that she used to sit and read letters to Child 
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“all the time.” Id. at 117. However, a dispute arose concerning Father’s 

payment of child support about two years prior to the termination hearing, 

and Paternal Grandmother has not seen Child since that time. Id. at 113. 

Paternal Grandmother testified that the last time she tried to see Child, 

Mother told her to leave the property and called the police, and that “there’s 

been cops called, I don’t know how many times when we went to go pick up 

[Child].” Id. at 114, 118. Paternal Grandmother admitted that she has not 

taken any steps to see Child since then. Id. at 114. Reportedly, Mother 

also had informed Paternal Grandmother that Maternal Grandmother would 

throw away any pictures that Father sent to Child. Id. at 117.

The record supports the finding of the trial court that Father has failed 

to perform parental duties for a period of at least six months prior to the 

filing of the termination petition. The court was free to accept Mother’s 

testimony that Father sent only a single letter during the relevant six-month 

period, asking for pictures of Child. This displays a “merely passive interest” 

in the development of Child, and is not sufficient to prevent termination. 

B.,N.M., 856 A.2d at 855. Moreover, even if the court were to credit 

Father’s testimony, Father indicated that he did little, if anything, to 

maintain a relationship with Child during the relevant time. Father stated 

that he sent Child letters during the first two months of his most recent 

incarceration, which took place well outside of the relevant period. Father 

also stated that he sent Child letters within the six months preceding the 

termination hearing, which overlapped the relevant period only by a few 
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days. Moreover, while Father was incarcerated during this six-month period, 

and, while both Father and Paternal Grandmother testified concerning 

Mother’s efforts at preventing Father from seeing Child, these circumstances 

do not excuse Father from endeavoring to perform parental duties. Id.; 

S.P., 47 A.3d at 828. In order to maintain his parental rights, Father was 

required to make a good faith effort at maintaining a relationship with Child. 

B.,N.M., 856 A.2d at 855. He failed to do so.

We next consider whether the trial court abused its discretion by 

terminating Father’s parental rights under Section 2511(b). We have 

discussed our analysis under Section 2511(b) as follows.

Section 2511(b) focuses on whether termination of parental 

rights would best serve the developmental, physical, and 

emotional needs and welfare of the child. As this Court has 

explained, Section 2511(b) does not explicitly require a bonding 

analysis and the term ‘bond’ is not defined in the Adoption Act. 

Case law, however, provides that analysis of the emotional bond, 

if any, between parent and child is a factor to be considered as 

part of our analysis. While a parent’s emotional bond with his or 

her child is a major aspect of the subsection 2511(b) bestinterest analysis, it is nonetheless only one of many factors to be 

considered by the court when determining what is in the best 

interest of the child.

[I]n addition to a bond examination, the trial court 

can equally emphasize the safety needs of the child, 

and should also consider the intangibles, such as the 

love, comfort, security, and stability the child might 

have with the foster parent. Additionally, this Court 

stated that the trial court should consider the 

importance of continuity of relationships and whether 

any existing parent-child bond can be severed 

without detrimental effects on the child.
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In re Adoption of C.D.R., 111 A.3d 1212, 1219 (Pa. Super. 2015) (quoting 

In re N.A.M., 33 A.3d 95, 103 (Pa. Super. 2011)) (quotation marks and 

citations omitted).

In this case the trial court concluded that Child has no bond with 

Father, and that Father “has had no significant contact with the child for the 

majority of his life.” Trial Court Opinion, 12/16/14, at 5 (unpaginated). In 

contrast, the court found that Child has a “serious bond” with Stepfather, 

who is “the only father the child knows . . . .” Id. Father argues that 

termination is not in Child’s best interest because “there was nothing in the 

record, which would indicate any beneficial effect for” Child. Father’s Brief at 

9. 

We again conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion.

Mother testified that Child does not remember Father, and that Child instead 

calls Stepfather “dad.” Id. at 19-20, 38-39, 42. Maternal Grandmother 

testified that Child and Stepfather have a “[w]onderful” relationship. Id. at 

60. She described Stepfather as “a father in every since [sic] of the word 

other than biological.” Id. at 60-61. Stepfather agreed that he and Child 

have a “great” relationship. Id. at 53-54. Stepfather stated that Child calls 

Father by his first name, and that Child “knows his name, that’s pretty much 

all he ever really says.” Id. at 55.

In contrast, Paternal Grandmother testified that, the last time she saw 

Father and Child together, Child ran up to Father, and called him “dad.” Id.
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at 116, 119. According to Paternal Grandmother, Child has stated that “I 

really, really, miss my dad, but he’s never coming back.” Id. at 119. 

Paternal Grandmother indicated that Child “loves his father, it’s as simple as 

that.” Id. at 116. Similarly, Father testified that he has an “[a]wesome” 

relationship with Child, that he loves Child, and that Child “knows who I am. 

He knows I am his father.” Id. at 73, 76. However, Father conceded that 

Child “is in[]a better spot,” and that it would be best for Child to “stay with 

his mother and [Stepfather]. I believe he’s in the best place that he could 

be . . . .” Id. at 108, 110. Despite this admission Father indicated that “I 

don’t want to lose him,” and “as far as me not being in his life, I don’t see 

that as fair.” Id. 

During his interview with the trial court, Child was asked who his 

father is. N.T., 10/25/2013, at 7. Child responded with Stepfather’s first 

name. Id. Child stated that he does not remember Father, but that he did 

remember getting a present from Father’s parents when he was 4 or 5 years 

old. Id. at 7-8. Child further stated that he would not recognize Father if he 

were to see him now. Id. at 10.

Thus, the record supports the trial court’s conclusion that Father and 

Child do not have a bond, as Child does not remember who Father is. In 

contrast, Child considers Stepfather to be his father. Under the 

circumstances, it would serve Child’s needs and welfare for Father’s parental 

rights to be terminated, as termination would permit Child to be adopted by 
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Stepfather, and would provide Child with permanence and stability. We 

discern no abuse of discretion.

Accordingly, because we conclude that Father’s claim does not entitle 

him to relief, we affirm the decree of the trial court.

Decree affirmed.

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 6/23/2015