Pursuant to Ind.Appellate Rule 65(D),

this Memorandum Decision shall not be 

regarded as precedent or cited before 

any court except for the purpose of 

establishing the defense of res judicata, 

collateral estoppel, or the law of the 

case.

ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE:

MOTHER:

ALISA L. RUDE

T. DEAN SWIHART Indiana Dept of Child Services

Fort Wayne, Indiana Fort Wayne, Indiana

ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT ROBERT J. HENKE

FATHER: DCS Central Administration

Indianapolis, Indiana

ROBERT H. BELLINGER

Fort Wayne, Indiana

IN THE

COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA

IN THE MATTER OF THE TERMINATION OF )

THE PARENT-CHILD RELATIONSHIP OF: )

A.C., Minor Child, )

)

K.W., Mother, and J.C., Father, )

)

Appellants-Respondents, )

)

vs. ) No. 02A04-1206-JT-300

)

INDIANA DEPARTMENT OF CHILD )

SERVICES, )

)

Appellee-Petitioner. )

APPEAL FROM THE ALLEN SUPERIOR COURT

The Honorable William L. Briggs, Senior Judge

Cause No. 02D08-1109-JT-156

February 13, 2013

MEMORANDUM DECISION - NOT FOR PUBLICATION
2

BROWN, Judge

K.W. (“Mother”) and J.C. (“Father”) appeal the involuntary termination of their

respective parental rights to their child, A.C. Concluding that there is sufficient evidence 

to support the trial court’s judgment, we affirm.

Facts and Procedural History

Mother is the biological mother of four children, including A.C., born in July 

2008. Father is the alleged biological father of A.C. only.1The evidence most favorable 

to the trial court’s judgment reveals that in May 2010, the local Allen County office of 

the Indiana Department of Child Services (“ACDCS”) received a report that Mother had 

taken A.C. from Father’s home in Michigan for visitation purposes and was refusing to 

return the child to Father’s care. The referral further indicated that two of Mother’s three 

older children (A.C.’s half-siblings) were deceased and that Mother was facing pending

Murder charges in the State of California related to the death of one of these children. 

ACDCS initiated an assessment of the matter, located A.C. and Mother at the 

maternal grandmother’s home in Fort Wayne, Indiana, and took A.C. into emergency 

protective custody based on Mother’s admissions regarding the existence of a pending

Murder charge in California2and concerns regarding Mother’s ability to provide A.C.

with a safe and stable home environment. During its assessment, ACDCS also learned 

 

1 Although Father does not dispute his parentage of A.C., it is unclear from the record whether

paternity of A.C. had been legally established at the time of the termination hearing.

2 The record discloses that prior to A.C.’s removal from Mother’s care, Mother was arrested in 

California on Murder charges relating to the death of one of her children. She was later released from 

incarceration on her own recognizance. The California court did not impose any travel restrictions on 

Mother, and she later relocated to Michigan in April or May of 2010 with Father and A.C. 
3

that in addition to Mother’s two deceased children, Mother’s third child had suffered 

severe physical injuries while in Mother’s legal custody. Mother’s third child was

adopted by relatives. 

Following A.C.’s removal from Mother’s care, ACDCS filed a petition alleging 

A.C. was a child in need of services (“CHINS”). The trial court thereafter adjudicated 

A.C. a CHINS after Mother and Father admitted to a majority of the allegations contained 

in ACDCS’s amended CHINS petition. Specifically, Mother admitted she: (1) had lived 

a “transient lifestyle in multiple states” with the alleged biological father of her older 

children and currently did not have independent housing; (2) had a prior criminal history 

including convictions for theft and fraud in the State of Florida for which she served oneand-one half years incarceration; and (3) was the victim of domestic violence having 

been “physically abused by [Father]” sometimes in the presence of A.C. State’s Exhibit 

11, p. 1-2.

Father’s CHINS admissions included that he: (1) was unemployed and resided in 

Michigan in the home of his own mother; (2) used illegal substances in his past; (3) had 

witnessed Mother “become physically violent, having struck [Father] in the past;” (4) 

observed Mother “frequently yell at [A.C.] and become overly impatient with otherwise 

typical toddler behavior;” and (5) was involved in episodes of domestic violence that

sometimes occurred in the presence of A.C. Id. at 2-3. The Amended CHINS order also

alleged A.C. was a twenty-three-month-old toddler who “does not speak, suffers from 

significant anxiety, and is otherwise developmentally delayed.” Id. at 2.
4

In June 2010, the trial court issued a dispositional order formally removing A.C. 

from Mother’s and Father’s custody and ordering that the child be made a ward of 

ACDCS. The court’s dispositional order also incorporated a Parent Participation Plan 

(“PPP”) which directed both parents to successfully complete a variety of tasks and 

services designed to address their respective parenting deficiencies and to facilitate 

reunification with A.C. Although the PPP was not included in the record on appeal by 

either Mother or Father, the language of the trial court’s dispositional order specifically 

directed both parents to, among other things: refrain from all criminal activity; maintain 

clean, safe, and appropriate housing at all times; enroll in parenting classes; submit to 

psychological evaluations and follow all resulting recommendations; and participate in 

regular supervised visits with A.C.

Mother’s and Father’s participation in court-ordered services was varied, but 

ultimately unsuccessful in both cases. Mother, for example, achieved stable housing and 

employment. Mother also submitted to a psychological evaluation, but the results of her 

assessment were, in large part, not interpretable due to Mother’s attempt to portray 

herself in an overly positive light through her test responses. In addition, although 

Mother regularly participated in individual counseling as recommended by ACDCS, she 

was unwilling to discuss her role in the circumstances surrounding the deaths and/or

injuries to her three older children, as well as how these past events may serve to impact 

her future functioning and ability to safely parent A.C. Thus, notwithstanding Mother’s

participation in services, many caseworkers and service providers remained unconvinced 

that Mother could provide A.C. with a safe and stable home environment. 
5

Father, on the other hand, failed to maintain stable housing throughout the 

underlying proceedings and bounced between living with friends and family. Father also 

never obtained stable employment and suffered with depression and other emotional 

difficulties throughout the underlying proceedings. In addition, Father continued to use

alcohol and illegal substances.

After several unsuccessful attempts at placing A.C. with Father and relatives 

residing in Michigan through an Interstate Compact on the Placement of Children 

(“ICPC”) agreement, ACDCS eventually filed a petition seeking the involuntary 

termination of Mother’s and Father’s parental rights in October 2011. A four-day 

evidentiary hearing on the termination petition was later held in February 2012. 

During the termination hearing, ACDCS presented substantial evidence

establishing that Mother and Father had failed to resolve their respective parenting issues 

and consequently remained incapable of providing A.C. with a safe and stable home 

environment. Moreover, many caseworkers and service providers testified that they 

believed continuation of the parent-child relationship between Mother and A.C. posed a 

threat to the child’s well-being. As for the child, ACDCS presented evidence showing 

A.C. was improving and thriving in foster care.

At the conclusion of the termination hearing, the trial court took the matter under 

advisement. In May 2012, the court entered its judgment terminating Mother’s and 

Father’s parental rights to A.C. Both parents now appeal.
6

Discussion and Decision

When reviewing the termination of parental rights, we will not reweigh the 

evidence or judge the credibility of the witnesses. Bester v. Lake Cnty. Office of Family 

& Children, 839 N.E.2d 143, 147 (Ind. 2005). Instead, we consider only the evidence 

and reasonable inferences that are most favorable to the judgment. Id. When, as here, 

the trial court makes specific findings of fact and conclusions thereon, we apply a twotiered standard of review. First, we determine whether the evidence supports the 

findings, and second, we determine whether the findings support the judgment. Id. In 

deference to the trial court’s unique position to assess the evidence, we will set aside the 

court’s judgment terminating a parent-child relationship only if it is clearly erroneous. In 

re L.S., 717 N.E.2d 204, 208 (Ind. Ct. App. 1999), trans. denied; see also Bester, 839 

N.E.2d at 147. Thus, if the evidence and inferences support the trial court’s decision, we 

must affirm. Id.

“The traditional right of parents to establish a home and raise their children is 

protected by the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution.” In re M.B., 

666 N.E.2d 73, 76 (Ind. Ct. App. 1996), trans. denied. Although parental rights are of a 

constitutional dimension, the law provides for the termination of these rights when 

parents are unable or unwilling to meet their parental responsibilities. In re R.H., 892 

N.E.2d 144, 149 (Ind. Ct. App. 2008). Moreover, a trial court need not wait until a child 

is irreversibly harmed before terminating the parent-child relationship. McBride v. 

Monroe Cnty. Office of Family & Children, 798 N.E.2d 185, 203 (Ind. Ct. App. 2003). 
7

Before parental rights may be involuntarily terminated in Indiana, the State is 

required to allege and prove, among other things:

(B) that one (1) of the following is true:

(i) There is a reasonable probability that the conditions that 

resulted in the child’s removal or the reasons for placement 

outside the home of the parents will not be remedied.

(ii) There is a reasonable probability that the continuation of the 

parent-child relationship poses a threat to the well-being of 

the child.

(iii) The child has, on two (2) separate occasions, been 

adjudicated a child in need of services;

(C) that termination is in the best interests of the child . . . .

Ind. Code § 31-35-2-4(b)(2).3 The State’s burden of proof for establishing these 

allegations in termination cases “is one of ‘clear and convincing evidence.’” In re G.Y., 

904 N.E.2d 1257, 1260-1261 (Ind. 2009) (quoting Ind. Code § 31-37-14-2 (2008)). “[I]f 

the court finds that the allegations in a petition described in section 4 of this chapter are 

true, the court shall terminate the parent-child relationship.” Ind. Code § 31-35-2-8(a) 

(emphasis added). Mother challenges the sufficiency of the evidence supporting the trial

court’s findings as to subsection (b)(2)(B) and (C) of the termination statute cited above. 

Father’s sole allegation on appeal challenges the sufficiency of the evidence supporting

the trial court’s determination that termination of his parental rights is in A.C.’s best 

interests. We shall address each parent’s arguments in turn.

 

3

 We observe that Indiana Code section 31-35-2-4 was amended by Pub. L. No. 48-2012 (eff. 

July 1, 2012). The changes to the statute became effective after the filing of the termination petition 

involved herein and are not applicable to this case. 
8

I. Threat to Well-Being

Indiana Code § 31-35-2-4(b)(2)(B) requires the State to establish, by clear and 

convincing evidence, only one of the three requirements of subsection (b)(2)(B). 

Because we find it to be dispositive, we limit our review to Mother’s allegations of error 

pertaining to subsection (b)(2)(B)(ii) of Indiana’s termination statute, namely, whether 

ACDCS presented clear and convincing evidence establishing that continuation of the 

parent-child relationship poses a threat to A.C.’s well-being.

When making such a determination, a trial court must judge a parent’s fitness to 

care for his or her child at the time of the termination hearing, taking into consideration 

evidence of changed conditions. In re J.T., 742 N.E.2d 509, 512 (Ind. Ct. App. 2001), 

trans. denied. The court must also “evaluate the parent’s habitual patterns of conduct to 

determine the probability of future neglect or deprivation of the child.” Id. Pursuant to 

this rule, courts have properly considered evidence of a parent’s prior criminal history, 

drug and alcohol abuse, history of neglect, failure to provide support, and lack of 

adequate housing and employment. A.F. v. Marion Cnty. Office of Family & Children, 

762 N.E.2d 1244, 1251 (Ind. Ct. App. 2002), trans. denied. The trial court may also 

consider any services offered to the parent by the county department of child services and 

the parent’s response to those services, as evidence of whether conditions will be 

remedied. Id. 

Here, the trial court made meticulous findings concerning Mother’s history of 

criminal activities, deficient parenting, and participation in domestic violence in its 

fourteen-page termination order. In so doing, the trial court detailed Mother’s prior 
9

relationship with the alleged father of A.C.’s older siblings, acknowledging that two of 

A.C.’s siblings are now deceased and that their alleged father has been charged with their

murder. The trial court went on to find that Mother was likewise facing pending murder 

charges in the State of California for the death of one of her children. In addition, the 

court specifically found:

[I]t was revealed that after the death of one of the children, [Mother] and 

[the alleged father] kept the child’s body in a container and she and [alleged 

father] traveled for quite some time with the child’s body in the container. 

Neither [Mother] nor [the alleged father] reported the death of the second 

child to the authorities at the time of the child’s death.

Joint Appendix of Appellants at 10. The court further noted that the couple’s third child 

had also received “significant injuries” while in the home of Mother and the alleged 

father and that this child was later adopted by relatives at or near the same time Mother 

was incarcerated on theft and fraud convictions in Florida. Id. at 9.

As for Mother’s past relationships and home environment for A.C., the trial court 

specifically found that both parents have “acknowledged that they would engage in 

verbal arguments and physical altercations and that on one occasion, [Mother’s] nose got 

broken during a physical altercation.” Id. The court went on to note that Mother and 

Father “acknowledge that [A.C.] was sometimes present during the fights,” and that on 

another occasion Father was in the car with A.C. when Mother “threw a cinder block that 

broke the car window” and left glass “all over [Father] and [A.C.].” Id.

Regarding Mother’s psychological evaluation, participation in individual 

counseling, and current ability to safely care for A.C., the trial court recognized in its 

findings that Mother had participated in a psychological evaluation performed by Dr. 
10

James Cates in order to assess Mother’s “needs.” Id. at 11. The court pointed out, 

however, that Dr. Cates’s felt “the validity of the results” of the Millon Clinical 

Multiaxial Inventory-III, which evaluates personality functioning and dysfunction, “was 

in question because [Mother] tried to portray herself in an overly positive light.” Id. Dr. 

Cates further reported that during the evaluation, Mother’s responses were “defensive” 

and that the Child Abuse Potential Inventory-Form VI test results indicated that Mother’s 

responses “tried to create an unrealistically favorable impression, suggesting that the test 

results were invalid and largely uninterpretable [sic].” Id.

Although Dr. Cates reported that he had advised Mother not to share any 

information with him that may incriminate Mother in her pending murder proceedings, 

the court’s findings reflect Dr. Cates’ testimony that he remained concerned that “without 

some of the information that could be shared if the criminal charges were not pending, he 

could not confirm what [Mother’s] role was in the deaths of her children or the injuries to 

her third child.” Id. at 12. The court further found:

[Dr. Cates] specifically noted that based upon his evaluation of the mother, 

she appeared to be re-writing history. He noted that there were major 

discrepancies in what she was describing to him and specifically noted that 

he was concerned about her ability to protect herself and others. . . . [Dr. 

Cates] also noted that he did not believe that therapy would be helpful until 

the criminal charges were disposed of. He felt that it would be important to 

truly understand the mother’s role in the deaths of two (2) of her children 

and the injury of a third child. He also felt that it would be important to 

know how the mother has coped with what has happened. When advised 

that the mother’s current therapist, who is not a psychologist and not a 

member of the American Psychological Association, only addressed 

incidents that occurred in the mother’s past approximately thirty (30%) of 

the time over the course of her eight (8) months of therapy, he noted that 

the [ACDCS] would be unable to assess whether the mother could ensure 

her own safety or ensure the safety of those around her.
11

Id. Based on these and other findings, the trial court concluded:

The Court finds and concludes that although the mother has participated in 

many of the services provided by the [ACDCS], she has not benefitted from 

services to the point where the court can conclude that she no longer poses 

a danger to the well[-]being and safety of her child. Unfortunately, during 

her counseling sessions, there was little emphasis in uncovering the 

mother’s role in the deaths of two of her children and the significant 

injuries to a third child while in her home and little discussion regarding 

how she has coped with the deaths and injuries or about incidents that 

occurred in the mother’s past which could have an impact on her 

psychological functioning. In fact, it is highly likely that the events 

occurring in her past have had a significant impact on her functioning and 

on the events surrounding the deaths of two of her children and the injuries 

sustained by the third child. In his evaluation, Dr. Cates indicated that the 

mother appeared to be re-writing her history to completely deny or ignore 

that certain tragic events have occurred. This is borne out by the fact that 

although the mother acknowledged that her stepfather molested her when 

she was a child, at the hearing on the Petition for Termination of the ParentChild Relationship, she testified that if the child were returned to her care, 

her stepfather would be the person who would care for the child while she 

is at work. This theory is also supported by the fact that although the 

mother initially informed the [ACDCS] case managers that she had been 

physically abused by her mother when she was a child, she later denied that 

the events occurred and further denied even making the statements when 

she was evaluated by Dr. Cates. [Mother] is presently living in the home of 

her mother and stepfather and would be relying on them to assist her in the 

care of [A.C.] if [the child] were returned to her home. This propensity to 

deny and/or minimize events occurring in her past and her inability to fully 

address these issues in counseling prevents her from truly addressing her 

psychological issues and causes great concern for the safety and well[-

]being of any child who would be in her care.

Id. at 7. A thorough review of the record reveals that clear and convincing evidence 

supports the trial court’s findings and conclusions detailed above. 

During the termination hearing, Dr. Cates confirmed that Mother “tried to present 

herself in an excessively favorable light” during portions of the psychological evaluation

and at other times “responded in a defensive manner.” Transcript at 260, 262. Dr. Cates 

also testified that testing revealed Mother’s Post Traumatic Stress Profile was “elevated” 
12

and that post-traumatic stress is a “crippling anxiety” which impacts an individual’s 

“coping skills” and ability to “remain adaptive.” Id. at 262. Dr. Cates went on to 

acknowledge that post-traumatic stress could potentially “impact a parent’s ability to 

provide protection for a child.” Id.

When asked if he had “any concern[s]” regarding Mother in light of her presence 

in the lives of her older children when they died, Dr. Cates answered in the affirmative 

and explained that although it was his “ethical responsibility” to advise Mother not to 

share information that could be incriminating in her pending criminal case, he 

nevertheless was “concerned about what her role was.” Id. at 270-271. Dr. Cates further 

testified that there were “glaring discrepancies” in the way Mother had described her 

history to other people in the past and the way she had described her history to him, 

stating that he believed Mother was “rewriting her history, consciously or 

unconsciously,” which left him “concerned about [Mother’s] ability to effectively protect 

herself, much less anyone else, under those circumstances.” Id. at 271. Finally, Dr.

Cates informed the trial court that until Mother was able to “have true confidentiality” 

with a therapist so she could “genuinely open up” about what had happened in her past, 

he did not believe that Mother’s “therapy was truly going to be helpful.” Id. at 272.

In recommending termination of Mother’s parental rights, ACDCS case manager 

Mary Lane likewise testified that she remained concerned about A.C.’s well-being should 

the child be allowed to return to Mother’s care. Although Lane acknowledged that 

Mother completed most of the reunification services initially ordered by the trial court, 

Lane pointed out that Mother had refused to submit to ACDCS’s request for a second 
13

psychological evaluation. Lane informed the trial court that the second referral had been 

made due to conflicting reports by Mother’s therapist, Helen Ferguson, who did not share 

Dr. Cates’ concerns regarding Mother’s ability to progress in therapy and to safely care 

for A.C. In addition, Lane confirmed that Mother had failed to complete individual 

counseling by the time of the termination hearing and that ACDCS remained concerned 

about Mother’s pending murder charges as follows:

At this point, the pending murder charge is a concern. . . . [Mother] has 

indicated that she was not present during the deaths of her children. 

However, we are not sure. [Mother] [h]asn’t really indicated what 

responsibility or what level of responsibility she had in that . . . [and] . . . 

[a]t this point, she hasn’t completed her treatment. She hasn’t completed 

therapy. 

Id. at 337. 

When asked whether she agreed with therapist Ferguson about Mother’s abilities 

to provide care for A.C., Lane answered in the negative stating:

I believe until . . . we know exactly what [Mother’s] role was with the other 

children, whether she was personally involved, or if she didn’t physically 

harm the children, how she continued to allow this man to be a caregiver[,] 

I don’t know how we can ensure that she wouldn’t allow the same with 

A.C.

Id. at 353. When pressed during cross-examination as to why she believed knowing the 

extent of Mother’s involvement in the deaths and injuries to her three older children was 

so important in light of the fact that their alleged father had reportedly “taken full 

responsibility for the deaths of the two children,” Lane explained that it was troubling

that Mother had reported being “shocked” each time after all three children had been 

killed or seriously injured by their alleged father. Id. at 354, 357. Lane further testified 

that in light of this response by Mother, ACDCS remained concerned regarding Mother’s 
14

ability to protect A.C. in the future. Lane also emphasized that there continued to be

unanswered questions as to why Mother had allowed the alleged father “to continue to be 

a caregiver after a first death, and a second death[,] and he was again a caregiver a third 

time.” Id. at 357.

 As noted above, a trial court must judge a parent’s fitness to care for his or her 

child at the time of the termination hearing, taking into consideration the parent’s 

habitual patterns of conduct to determine the probability of future neglect or deprivation 

of the child. In re D.D., 804 N.E.2d 258, 266 (Ind. Ct. App. 2004), trans. denied. A trial 

court need not wait until a child is irreversibly influenced by a deficient lifestyle such that 

his or her physical, emotional, and social growth is permanently impaired before 

terminating the parent-child relationship. In re E.S., 762 N.E.2d 1287, 1290 (Ind. Ct. 

App. 2002). After reviewing the record in its entirety, we conclude that clear and 

convincing evidence supports the trial court’s specific findings set forth above. These 

findings, in turn, provide ample support for the court’s ultimate decision to terminate 

Mother’s parental rights to A.C. Mother’s arguments to the contrary, emphasizing her 

self-serving testimony, rather than the evidence relied upon by the trial court, amount to 

an impermissible invitation to reweigh the evidence. See D.D., 804 N.E.2d at 265. 

Finally, Mother’s complaint that the trial court improperly relied upon her refusal to 

participate in a second psychological evaluation because the evaluation was merely 

requested by ACDCS and not specifically ordered by the trial court is unavailing. Even 

assuming, arguendo, that the trial court made an improper finding in this regard, in light 

of the numerous other specific findings supporting the trial court’s determination that 
15

continuation of the parent-child relationship poses a threat to A.C.’s well-being, any 

erroneous finding regarding the request for a second psychological evaluation in this 

regard is harmless error. See In re M.M., 733 N.E.2d 6, 14 (Ind. Ct. App. 2000) (stating 

that in light of factually accurate findings supporting the termination, any erroneous 

findings are harmless).

II. Best Interests

We next consider both Mother’s and Father’s assertions that ACDCS failed to 

prove termination of their respective parental rights is in A.C.’s best interests. In 

determining what is in the best interests of a child, the trial court is required to look 

beyond the factors identified by the Indiana Department of Child Services and look to the 

totality of the evidence. McBride, 798 N.E.2d at 203. In so doing, the court must 

subordinate the interests of the parent to those of the child. Id. Moreover, we have 

previously held that the recommendations by both the case manager and child advocate to 

terminate parental rights, in addition to evidence that the conditions resulting in removal 

will not be remedied, is sufficient to show by clear and convincing evidence that 

termination is in the child’s best interests. M.M., 733 N.E.2d at 13.

In addition to the findings previously cited, the trial court made several additional 

pertinent findings relating to A.C.’s best interests. Specifically, the court found that both 

parents had shown over the course of the CHINS case, and in “numerous specific 

services made available and/or provided, that said parent(s) continue(s) to be unable, 

refuse, or neglect to provide for the basic necessities of a suitable home for the raising of 

[A.C.].” Joint Appellant’s Appendix at 16. The court went on to find that the 
16

relationship between Mother and Father had been a “dangerous and destructive 

relationship” that was “verbally and physically abusive” to such a degree that A.C. 

“apparently became so accustomed to the chaos and violence in his home environment 

that on the day of his removal, he fell asleep in the case manager’s arms even though 

there was a lot of chaos, yelling, screaming[,] and crying going on because of the 

removal.” Id. In addition, at the time of A.C.’s removal from the family home, the 

nearly two-year-old child “was not very verbal,” did not “interact well with other 

children” in the foster home, would “engage in temper tantrums where he would bite or 

kick others, scratch himself, throw himself against a wall[,] or slam himself into the back 

of his high chair.” Id. 

The court also took note of Mother’s history of involvement in “dangerous and 

destructive” relationships, finding that Mother chose to stay in a relationship with the 

alleged father of her older children, even after “each tragic” death or injury occurred and

that she later entered into a relationship with Father, which was also “a volatile 

relationship.” Id. at 19. The court went on to find that “[t]his pattern of domestic 

violence appeared to have an impact on [A.C.’s] emotional functioning and 

development.” Id. In addition, the court acknowledged Dr. Cates testimony concerning 

what appears to be Mother’s “re-writing” of her history and further finding that her 

“propensity to deny and/or minimize” the events occurring in her past, her “dependent 

personality traits,” and the “inability to fully address these issues in counseling prevents 

her from truly addressing her psychological issues and causes great concern for the safety 

and well[-]being of any child who would be in her care.” Id.
17

As for Father, the trial court found that although ACDCS’s referrals for Father 

were “designed to assist him in caring for [A.C.] and in providing for the necessities of a 

suitable home for the raising of the child,” Father had “failed to participate.” Id. The 

court further noted that during the underlying proceedings, Father never achieved stable 

housing and had lived “in at least 6 different locations,” including living in a tent in the

woods on a friend’s property. Id. The court also found that Father had participated in the 

use of alcohol and marijuana “from time to time” during the underlying proceedings, but 

had declined to participate in counseling or any other service designed to assist him in 

refraining from consumption of these substances. Id. at 20. Finally, the trial court noted 

Father’s own testimony during the termination hearing that he was currently 

“experiencing emotional difficulties,” “cried all the time,” had contemplated suicide, did 

not currently have stable housing, was unemployed, and could not “provide a home or 

financially care for [A.C.] at that time.” Id. Based on these and other findings, the trial 

court concluded that termination of both Mother’s and Father’s parental rights was in 

A.C.’s best interests. These findings and conclusions, too, are supported by the evidence.

In recommending termination of Mother’s and Father’s respective parental rights, 

the Guardian Ad Litem (“GAL”) Susan Rutz informed the trial court that in light of 

significant testimony concerning Father’s past and current housing and employment 

stability, in addition to newly alleged “inappropriate behavior” with his sister, she 

believed that Father was “not in a position to take care of himself right now, let alone 

take care of [A.C.].” Id. at 399. As for Mother, GAL Rutz testified that she remains 

“disturbed” by Mother’s “lack of truly . . . understanding her role in the deaths of the two 
18

children, the injuries to the third[,] and the reasons for the removal of A.C.” Id. at 399-

400. Rutz further testified that she questions the “effectiveness” of Mother’s counseling 

to date and does not believe that Mother is “in a position at this point in time to protect

A.C.” Id. at 401-402. Similarly, in recommending termination of Mother’s and Father’s 

parental rights as in A.C.’s best interests, case manager Lane informed the trial court that 

A.C. was “doing really well” in his current foster home. Id. at 338. Lane also informed 

the trial court that A.C. needs “stability” in a “home free from abuse and neglect.” Id. 

Finally, Lane testified, “A.C.’s been in foster care for approximately two years at this 

point. [ACDCS] doesn’t feel that either parent is in a position to parent him at this 

time[,] and A.C. needs permanency.” Id. at 361.

Based on the totality of the evidence, including Mother’s and Father’s unresolved

parenting issues and failure to complete and/or benefit from court-ordered reunification 

services throughout the underlying proceedings, coupled with the testimony from case 

manager Lane and GAL Rutz recommending termination of the parent-child 

relationships, we conclude that there is clear and convincing evidence to support the trial

court’s determination that termination of both Mother’s and Father’s parental rights is in 

A.C.’s best interests. 

This court will reverse a termination of parental rights ‘“only upon a showing of 

“clear error” – that which leaves us with a definite and firm conviction that a mistake has 

been made.’” Matter of A.N.J., 690 N.E.2d 716, 722 (Ind. Ct. App. 1997) (quoting Egly 

v. Blackford Cnty. Dep’t of Pub. Welfare, 592 N.E.2d 1232, 1235 (Ind. 1992)). We find 

no such error here.
19

Affirmed.

BAILEY, J., and VAIDIK, J., concur.