J-S27009-21

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA

v.

ANTONIO JUAN GONZALEZ 

Appellant

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 IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

 PENNSYLVANIA

 No. 493 WDA 2021

Appeal from the PCRA Order Entered April 8, 2021

In the Court of Common Pleas of Mercer County Criminal Division at 

No(s): CP-43-CR-0002188-2019

BEFORE: OLSON, J., NICHOLS, J., and COLINS, J.*

MEMORANDUM BY OLSON, J.: FILED: DECEMBER 30, 2021

Appellant, Antonio Juan Gonzalez, appeals from the order entered on 

April 8, 2021, which denied his first petition filed under the Post-Conviction 

Relief Act (“PCRA”), 42 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 9541-9546. We affirm.

Appellant’s underlying charges stemmed from the October 24, 2019 

death of his 14-year-old son (hereinafter, “victim”). PCRA Court Opinion, 

6/10/21, at 2. After receiving a 911 call, emergency medical technicians and 

Pennsylvania State Police officers arrived at Appellant’s residence and 

pronounced the victim dead at the scene. Id. at 2. Evidence collected at the 

scene demonstrated that the victim “had been severely beaten and starved 

by Appellant” prior to his death. Id. 

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* Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court.
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On April 24, 2020, Appellant pleaded guilty to one count of first-degree 

murder.

1

In exchange for his plea, the Commonwealth agreed to (1) forgo

the death penalty and nolle prosse the balance of Appellant’s charges; (2) 

refrain from charging Richard Jackson (a friend of Appellant) for any homicide 

or drug-related offenses; and (3) allow Appellant to possess his daughter’s 

photograph and communicate with her. See N.T. Guilty Plea Hearing, 

4/24/21, at 2-3 and 8-10. Appellant agreed to cooperate with the 

Commonwealth in its prosecution against co-defendant and roommate Paul 

Bacorn. Id. at 3 and 10. 

As part of the guilty plea process, the Commonwealth and Appellant’s 

trial counsel, Autumn L. Johnson, Esquire and Robert H. Hartley, Esquire 

(hereinafter, collectively, “trial counsel”) of the Public Defender’s Office,

drafted a factual colloquy consisting of 47 factual statements to establish the 

basis for the guilty plea. Id. at 11-13. At the plea hearing, Appellant 

confirmed that he initialed each factual statement to signify that he reviewed, 

understood, and agreed with each declaration; Appellant also signed the last 

page of the factual colloquy. Id. at 13. The trial court conducted an extensive 

on-the-record colloquy which included, inter alia, Appellant’s confirmation that 

he discussed all matters with trial counsel, was satisfied with trial counsel’s 

services, initialed and signed the factual colloquy of his own free will, 

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1 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 2502(a).
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understood the nature of the charges and the plea proceeding, wished to enter 

his plea of guilty, and was not promised anything for, or coerced into, entering

his plea. Id. at 14-15. After verifying trial counsel’s belief that Appellant

understood the oral and written colloquies and the consequences of his guilty 

plea, the trial court accepted Appellant’s plea as voluntary, knowing, and 

intelligent and imposed the mandatory sentence of life imprisonment without 

the possibility of parole. Id. at 15-16, and 39. Appellant did not file a 

post-sentence motion or notice of appeal. 

Rather, Appellant filed a pro se PCRA petition on July 3, 2020. In it, 

Appellant averred that his guilty plea was unlawfully induced, that the 

Commonwealth violated his constitutional rights, and that he received 

ineffective assistance of counsel. Pro Se PCRA Petition, 7/3/20, at 3. More 

specifically, Appellant’s petition for collateral relief rested on the following 

factual allegations:

Ineffective [a]ssistance of [counsel]: My public defenders refused 

to obtain critical medical evidence to my defense. I was informed 

by my public defenders that the [District Attorney] was going to 

start arresting people from my cell phone as “accessory after the 

fact” unless I signed a [colloquy] admitting guilt. I am illiterate of 

legal jargon and new to the process of [the Pennsylvania] legal 

system. Also, I only saw [a] portion of my discovery packet.

Id. at 5. Appellant appended no exhibits to his petition. The PCRA court 

appointed PCRA counsel, who elected not to file an amended petition.

The PCRA court held an evidentiary hearing on April 8, 2021, where 

Appellant, Attorney Johnson, and Attorney Hartley testified. At the conclusion 
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of testimony and argument, the PCRA court found that Appellant failed to meet 

his burden and denied Appellant’s PCRA petition. PCRA Court Opinion, 

6/10/21, at 2. This timely appeal followed.2

Appellant raises two issues on appeal:

1. Whether [Appellant’s] trial counsel [were] ineffective where 

trial counsel failed to allow [Appellant] the opportunity to 

personally review the discovery in this case in full?

2. Whether [Appellant’s] guilty plea was unlawfully induced where 

[Appellant] testified that, due to the actions and/or inactions of 

his trial counsel, he felt that he had no choice other than to enter 

a guilty plea as proposed by trial counsel?

Appellant’s Brief at 4.

Our standard of review for challenges to the denial and dismissal of 

petitions filed pursuant to the PCRA is well-settled.

We must determine whether the findings of the PCRA court are 

supported by the record and whether the court's legal conclusions 

are free from error. The findings of the PCRA court and the 

evidence of record are viewed in a light most favorable to the 

prevailing party. The PCRA court's credibility determinations, 

when supported by the record, are binding; however, this [C]ourt 

applies a de novo standard of review to the PCRA court's legal 

conclusions. We must keep in mind that the petitioner has the 

burden of persuading this Court that the PCRA court erred and 

that such error requires relief. Finally, this Court may affirm a 

valid judgment or order for any reason appearing of record.

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2 Appellant filed a timely notice of appeal on April 16, 2021. Pursuant to 

Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b), on April 16, 2021, the PCRA court ordered Appellant to file 

a concise statement of errors complained of on appeal, which Appellant timely 

filed on April 23, 2021. The PCRA court issued its 1925(a) opinion on June 

10, 2021.
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Commonwealth v. Montalvo, 205 A.3d 274, 286 (Pa. 2019) (citations 

omitted). “This Court grants great deference to the findings of the PCRA court, 

and we will not disturb those findings merely because the record could support 

a contrary holding.” Commonwealth v. Hickman, 799 A.2d 136, 240 

(Pa. Super. 2002) (citation omitted). Rather, we reverse only where the PCRA 

court’s legal conclusions are erroneous or where there is no support for the 

findings in the certified record. Commonwealth v. Lawson, 90 A.3d 1, 4 

(Pa. Super. 2014). 

Appellant argues in his first issue on appeal that trial counsel was 

ineffective. Counsel is presumed to be effective and “the burden of 

demonstrating ineffectiveness rests on [the] appellant.” Commonwealth v. 

Rivera, 10 A.3d 1276, 1279 (Pa. Super. 2010).

To satisfy this burden, an appellant must plead and prove by a 

preponderance of the evidence that[ ] (1) his underlying claim is 

of arguable merit; (2) the particular course of conduct pursued by 

counsel did not have some reasonable basis designed to effectuate 

[the appellant’s] interests; and, (3) but for counsel's 

ineffectiveness, there is a reasonable probability that the outcome 

of the challenged proceeding would have been different. Failure 

to satisfy any prong of the test will result in rejection of the 

appellant's ineffective assistance of counsel claim.

Commonwealth v. Holt, 175 A.3d 1014, 1018 (Pa. Super. 2017) (internal 

citations and quotation marks omitted). As this Court explained:

A claim has arguable merit where the factual averments, if 

accurate, could establish cause for relief. See Commonwealth 

v. Jones, 876 A.2d 380, 385 (Pa. 2005) (“if a petitioner raises 

allegations, which, even if accepted as true, do not establish the 

underlying claim . . . , he or she will have failed to establish the 
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arguable merit prong related to the claim”). Whether the facts 

rise to the level of arguable merit is a legal determination.

The test for deciding whether counsel had a reasonable basis for 

his action or inaction is whether no competent counsel would have 

chosen that action or inaction, or, the alternative, not chosen, 

offered a significantly greater potential chance of success. 

Counsel’s decisions will be considered reasonable if they 

effectuated his client's interests. We do not employ a hindsight 

analysis in comparing trial counsel's actions with other efforts he 

may have taken. 

Prejudice is established if there is a reasonable probability that, 

but for counsel’s errors, the result of the proceeding would have 

been different. A reasonable probability is a probability sufficient 

to undermine confidence in the outcome.

Commonwealth v. Stewart, 84 A.3d 701, 707 (Pa. Super. 2013) (some 

quotations and citations omitted). 

Here, Appellant argues that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to 

allow him “the opportunity to personally review the discovery in [his] case in 

full[.]” Appellant’s Brief at 4. He alleges that he suffered prejudice because 

he was unable to assist in the preparation of his defense and consequently felt 

he had no choice but to “concede to trial counsel’s demands that he enter a 

guilty plea.” Id. at 15.

Appellant’s underlying claim lacks arguable merit. First, Appellant failed

to cite authority, nor can we find any, to support his contention that a 

defendant must personally review all discovery in his case. In contrast, the 

Pennsylvania Rules of Criminal Procedure only require disclosure to defense 

counsel, subject to limitations. See Pa.R.Crim.P. 573(B)(1) (“on request by 

the defendant, and subject to any protective order ... the Commonwealth 
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shall disclose to the defendant’s attorney all of the following requested 

items or information, provided they are material to the instant case. The 

Commonwealth shall, when applicable, permit the defendant’s attorney to 

inspect and copy or photograph such items.”) (emphasis added). Second, the 

PCRA court credited the testimony of trial counsel that they fully reviewed the 

contents of discovery with Appellant at great length and detail and left 

discovery with counselors at Mercer County Jail for Appellant’s review. PCRA 

Court Opinion, 6/10/21, at 5. Third, to the extent Appellant argues that trial 

counsel denied Appellant an opportunity to review certain discovery materials 

(i.e., the victim’s medical records and records obtained from Children and 

Youth Services), the testimony credited by the PCRA court showed that all of 

the requested items were included within the discovery reviewed with 

Appellant and contained information unfavorable to him. See N.T. PCRA 

Hearing, 4/8/21, at 40 and 50. Therefore, Appellant’s claim that trial counsel 

“failed to allow him the opportunity to review” discovery lacks arguable merit. 

Furthermore, Appellant failed to establish prejudice. Appellant baldly 

asserts that he was prejudiced because he was unable to assist in the 

preparation of his defense. Appellant’s Brief at 13. Appellant’s own testimony 

belies his contention, however, as he explained that he utilized the jail’s law 

library to research his charges and presented a written summary of his 

findings to trial counsel. N.T. PCRA Hearing, 4/8/21, at 12. Moreover, 

“Appellant failed to point to any materials in discovery, the knowledge of which 
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would have caused him to refrain from entering his plea” within his petition or 

testimony. PCRA Court Opinion, 6/10/21, at 7. Consequently, Appellant failed 

to demonstrate a reasonable probability that he would have pleaded not guilty 

if he personally reviewed the discovery materials in full. Stewart, supra. 

Appellant is not entitled to relief on this issue. 

In his second issue, Appellant argues that trial counsel’s actions or 

inactions unlawfully induced his guilty plea. Appellant’s Brief at 4. To sustain 

his burden of proof, Appellant must plead and prove his assertions before the 

PCRA court. See Commonwealth v. Rivers, 786 A.2d 923, 927 (Pa. 2001); 

42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9543(a) (a PCRA petitioner “must plead and prove by a 

preponderance of the evidence” his or her eligibility for collateral relief). 

Appellant raises arguments on appeal that differ from those set forth within 

his pro se petition. Thus, Appellant fails to demonstrate where he pleaded the 

claims he now raises with this Court. See Pa.R.A.P. 2119(e) (requiring 

appellants to cite where issues were raised or preserved). Within his petition, 

Appellant alleged he was entitled to collateral relief because trial counsel 

refused to obtain or disclose medical records, threatened to use evidence 

retrieved from Appellant’s cellular telephone to prosecute others if Appellant

did not plead guilty, and offered Appellant only limited review of discovery. 

See Pro Se PCRA Petition, 7/3/20, at 5. On appeal, Appellant argues that,

“[t]rial counsel essentially advised [Appellant] that they didn’t believe him, 

refused to provide [Appellant] with requested discovery, and solely focused 
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on [Appellant’s entry of] a guilty plea after March 26, 2020.” Appellant’s Brief 

at 19. The only issue Appellant properly preserved before the PCRA court is 

whether his guilty plea was unlawfully induced by trial counsel’s failure to 

ensure his opportunity to review discovery materials in full. We have 

previously rejected the merits of this claim. Because Appellant did not raise 

and preserve his alternate claims before the PCRA court, we find his other 

arguments to be waived.3 See Pa.R.A.P. 302(a) (“[i]ssues not raised in the 

trial court are waived and cannot be raised for the first time on appeal.”). 

As explained above, Appellant’s arguments involving discovery are 

unavailing. Consequently, his claim that trial counsel’s failure review such 

discovery unlawfully induced Appellant’s guilty plea is similarly meritless. 

Therefore, Appellant is not entitled to relief. 

Order affirmed. Jurisdiction relinquished. 

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3 Moreover, the PCRA court credited testimony establishing that Appellant was 

“heavily involved in the finalization of the factual colloquy,” including 

suggesting changes to be incorporated before he agreed to initial and sign the 

draft. See PCRA Court Opinion, 6/10/21, at 8. Trial counsel continually 

explained to Appellant that he had an absolute right to trial and “ultimately, 

the decision to proceed to trial was Appellant’s to make.” Id.
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Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 12/30/2021