Filed 4/30/14 In re Tey. T. CA2/5 

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS 

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for 

publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication 

or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115. 

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA 

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT 

DIVISION FIVE 

In re TEY. T., et al., Persons Coming 

Under the Juvenile Court Law. 

 B250449 

 (Los Angeles County Super. Ct. 

 No. CK60784) 

LOS ANGELES COUNTY 

DEPARTMENT OF CHILDREN AND 

FAMILY SERVICES, 

 Plaintiff and Respondent, 

 v. 

E.C., et al., 

 Defendants and Appellants. 

 APPEAL from the orders of the Superior Court of Los Angeles County, Zeke 

Zeidler, Judge. Affirmed. 

 Valerie N. Lankford, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant 

and Appellant E.C. 

 Donna Balderston Kaiser, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for 

Defendant and Appellant K.M. 

 Tarkian & Associates, Arezoo Pichvai, for Plaintiff and Respondent. 

___________________________________ 
2

 K.M and E.C. (mother) appeal from the dependency court’s order declaring three 

of their children, Tey., Sav., and Sas., dependents of the court under Welfare and 

Institutions Code section 300,1

 subdivisions (b), (d), and (j), and removing them from 

parental custody under section 361, subdivision (c)(1) or (c)(4). K.M. contends the 

court’s jurisdictional findings based on his now-adult stepdaughter’s allegations of sexual 

abuse are not supported by substantial evidence. Mother contends the court denied her 

due process by amending the petition, that the allegations of the amended petition are 

facially insufficient, and that substantial evidence does not support the court’s 

jurisdictional findings. Mother further contends the court erred in removing Sav. and 

Sas. from her custody, and the court failed to consider reasonable alternatives to removal. 

We affirm. 

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 

 Mother has six children. Tra., mother’s eldest daughter, is now 20 years old. 

Mother’s two boys are Tre., 19, and Thi., 17. The youngest girls are Tey., 15, Sav., 7, 

and Sas., 3. K.M. has lived with all six children, but is only the biological father to Sav. 

and Sas. The other children’s biological father (T.T.) is not a party to this appeal. 

 The Los Angeles County Department of Children and Family Services 

(Department) filed the current petition in December 2012, alleging that the four children 

remaining in the home (Tre.,2 Tey., Sav., and Sas.) were at risk of physical harm or 

sexual abuse based on K.M.’s actions raping Tra. over a two-year period beginning when 

she was 16, mother’s awareness of the sexual abuse, mother’s failure to protect the 

 

1 All further statutory references are to the Welfare and Institutions Code, unless 

otherwise indicated. 

2 On May 15, 2013, the court dismissed Tre. from the petition because he had 

turned 18. 
3

children, and mother’s failure to provide the children with adequate amounts of food as a 

form of punishment. 

 The current case is the family’s third dependency proceeding. The Department 

filed the first petition in June 2006. Mother’s younger son, Thi., was nine at the time and 

had been hospitalized twice for severe emotional disturbance and diagnosed with a 

number of mental health disorders. Mother had initially entered into a voluntary family 

maintenance contract, but then refused to cooperate and would not allow mental health 

professionals to assist Thi. The Department filed a petition after Tra., Tre., and Tey. 

reported suffering both physical and mental abuse. The dependency court detained the 

children from mother and released them to T.T. The children had difficulties living with 

T.T and eventually transitioned to foster care. Thi. continued to suffer from mental 

health issues, and in December 2006, he was placed in a restrictive level 12 group home 

after a mental health hospitalization. The court sustained the petition on April 3, 2007, 

but in the interim, mother had given birth to Sav. in July 2006. Mother did not cooperate 

with the Department’s requests to see Sav., and when the social worker attempted to visit 

mother and K.M., the home was vacant and there was an eviction sign in the window. 

The Department filed a petition on behalf of Sav., obtained a protective custody warrant, 

located Sav., and placed the infant in foster care. On May 15, 2007, the court sustained a 

supplemental petition filed on behalf of Sav. By July 2007, four of the siblings were 

placed with the maternal aunt, and both mother and K.M. were participating in 

reunification services. After enrolling in various parenting classes, Mother and K.M. 

regained custody of all five children in January 2008, and the team providing mental 

health wraparound services to Thi. was confident that mother would ensure continued 

mental health services for him. The court terminated jurisdiction in July 2008. 

 The family again came to the Department’s attention in February 2011, when 

mother left Thi. with T.T., who was unable to care for the boy. Thi. reported that he and 

his siblings had not been to school in over four years, and mother and K.M. did not 

provide enough food to the family. The Department was unable to locate the other 

siblings, but filed a petition in May 2011 naming all six children. The court issued 
4

protective custody warrants for the missing children and arrest warrants for mother and 

K.M. 

 The Department was unable to locate the family until March 2012, when K.M.’s 

mother called the Department to report that the children had been dropped off at her 

home. The Department interviewed the children, who reported that they did not have 

contact information for their parents, but that Thi.’s allegations were untrue. They 

claimed to be properly homeschooled and denied any abuse. Mother and K.M. entered 

into a voluntary contract with the Department, and the petition was dismissed in June 

2012. Part of the contract was an agreement to enroll the children in school or in a 

certified homeschooling program. 

 In August 2012, Tra. filed a police report with the Palmdale Sheriff’s Department 

alleging K.M. had raped her on multiple occasions. In the police report, Tra. claimed that 

the rape occurrences began when she was 16 and continued until May 2012. They took 

place when mother was not home. In July 2012 and again in October 2012, the 

Department received reports that Tra. had disclosed she had been sexually abused by 

K.M. In both instances, social workers interviewed family members and concluded the 

reports were unfounded. 

 The Department received another report about the family on December 16, 2012, 

when Tre. and Tey. sought to leave the home to live with T.T. Four days later, T.T. 

dropped Tra., Tre., and Tey. off at a Los Angeles police station, stating he was unable to 

care for the children and that mother was still receiving financial assistance for them. 

Tre. and Tey. reported going to mother’s home earlier that day to obtain a letter from 

mother permitting T.T. to care for them, but she refused to let them into the house. 

 At the adjudication hearing, Tra. testified that K.M. first sexually abused her when 

Sas. was an infant. He sent the other siblings to the park, and when Tra. was putting Sas. 

down to sleep, “he was in there, and he came and got close to me. And, basically -- he 

did oral to me and, like, climbed on top of me.” Afterwards, she told Tey., but did not 

tell mother. On at least two occasions, K.M. penetrated her with his penis. The abuse 
5

ended when she was placed in foster care as part of the 2011 case. She did not tell 

anyone in the Department about the abuse because she was embarrassed. 

 Tey. testified that Tra. told her of the abuse, but she never witnessed K.M. 

sexually abusing Tra. She said she originally denied knowing of any abuse because she 

did not want to believe it. Mother testified she never left Tra. alone with K.M. and did 

not believe that K.M. had abused Tra. as Tra. alleged. 

 The court found no evidence that mother had been told of the abuse, but also noted 

that “the children didn’t really have a chance to express what was going on to the mother. 

She discouraged any of that sort of communication.” The court amended the sex abuse 

allegations under subdivisions (b), (d), and (j) to read as follows: “[K.M] sexually 

abused the children’s now adult sibling [Tra.], for two years since the sibling was sixteen 

years old by repeatedly forcibly raping the sibling by placing [K.M.’s] penis in the 

sibling’s vagina. [Mother] does not believe the allegations failed to protect [Tra.] when 

she knew of [K.M.’s] sexual abuse of the sibling. The mother allowed [K.M.] to reside in 

the children’s home and to have unlimited access to [Tra.]. Such sexual abuse of the 

sibling by [K.M.] and [mother’s] disbelief failure to protect the sibling endangers the 

children's physical health and safety and places the children at risk of physical harm, 

damage, danger, sexual abuse and failure to protect.” The court sustained the amended 

sex abuse allegations. 

 The court also struck language that mother denied food to the children, but added 

allegations that mother “failed to adequately provide for the children . . . .” Because the 

amendments arguably broadened the allegations regarding mother’s failure to provide, 

the court gave mother an opportunity to present additional evidence on the issue, which 

she did. The court sustained the allegations that mother failed to adequately provide for 

the children and ordered the children removed from parental custody. Both mother and 

K.M. appealed. 
6

DISCUSSION 

 The dependency court properly exercised jurisdiction over Tey., Sav., and Sas. 

based on the evidence supporting the petition allegations that K.M. repeatedly raped his 

now-adult stepdaughter, Tra., over a period of two years, and mother did not believe her 

daughter’s allegations of rape. We conclude that the petition allegations are sufficient to 

state a cause of action, and substantial evidence supported the court’s exercise of 

jurisdiction and the court’s removal order. 

 Because the court’s exercise of jurisdiction on the sex abuse allegations was 

proper, we decline to consider mother’s arguments relating to the allegations of failure to 

adequately provide for the children.3 “When a dependency petition alleges multiple 

grounds for its assertion that a minor comes within the dependency court’s jurisdiction, a 

reviewing court can affirm the [trial] court’s finding of jurisdiction over the minor if any 

one of the statutory bases for jurisdiction that are enumerated in the petition is supported 

by substantial evidence. In such a case, the reviewing court need not consider whether 

any or all of the other alleged statutory grounds for jurisdiction are supported by the 

evidence.” (In re Alexis E. (2009) 171 Cal.App.4th 438, 451.) 

A. The petition allegations are facially sufficient to state a cause of action. 

 Mother contends her disbelief that any sexual abuse had taken place is insufficient 

to support jurisdiction because the petition lacks any allegations about the causal 

connection between her disbelief and harm to the children. We disagree. 

 When reviewing the facial sufficiency of a dependency petition, the court 

construes the facts in favor of the petition. (In re Janet T. (2001) 93 Cal.App.4th 377, 

386; In re Nicholas B. (2001) 88 Cal.App.4th 1126, 1133.) A parent has a fundamental 

 

3 In her briefing, mother argued that the court erred by (1) amending the petition 

allegations, (2) denying mother’s motion to dismiss for failure to state a cause of action, 

and (3) sustaining the petition allegations without substantial evidence. 
7

due process right to notice of “‘the specific factual allegations against him or her with 

sufficient particularity to permit him or her to properly meet the charge.’ [Citation.]” (In 

re Fred J. (1979) 89 Cal.App.3d 168, 175, italics omitted.) “If the parent believes that 

the allegations, as drafted, do not support a finding that the child is ‘within’ one of the 

descriptions of section 300, the parent has a right to bring a motion ‘akin to a demurrer.’ 

[Citation.]” (In re Jessica C. (2001) 93 Cal.App.4th 1027, 1037.) A facially sufficient 

petition “does not require the pleader to regurgitate the contents of the social worker’s 

report into a petition, it merely requires the pleading of essential facts establishing at least 

one ground of juvenile court jurisdiction.” (In re Alysha S. (1996) 51 Cal.App.4th 393, 

399-400 (Alysha S.).) 

The petition initially alleged mother was aware K.M. sexually abused her oldest 

daughter, Tra., mother continued to permit K.M. to reside in the home with unlimited 

access to Tra., and mother’s awareness and failure to act placed the younger siblings at 

risk of physical harm or sexual abuse. The evidence presented during the adjudication 

hearing did not demonstrate mother’s awareness of any sex abuse, but it did show that 

when mother was informed of Tra.’s allegations, she disbelieved them. The court 

amended the petition to allege that mother’s disbelief placed the younger siblings at risk 

of physical harm or sexual abuse. 

 Mother’s disbelief of her daughter’s allegations against K.M. suffices as the causal 

connection between K.M.’s past abuse of Tra. and the risk of future harm to Tey., Sav., 

and Sas. A parent’s disbelief of a child’s report of sexual abuse is a valid basis for 

exercising jurisdiction over the siblings of an abused child. (In re D.G. (2012) 208 

Cal.App.4th 1562, 1570 (D.G.); In re Katrina W. (1994) 31 Cal.App.4th 441, 447 

(Katrina W.).) In D.G., the appellate court affirmed orders finding jurisdiction over the 

father’s older stepdaughter and younger biological daughter based on “substantial 

evidence that (1) Father sexually molested [the stepdaughter]; (2) Mother denies that the 

abuse occurred; and (3) Father’s abuse and Mother’s denial place both [stepdaughter] and 

[biological daughter] at risk of harm.” (D.G., supra, at p. 1570.) Where a father has 

molested one stepdaughter and the mother denies or disbelieves that such molestation 
8

took place, jurisdiction is supported under subdivisions (b), (d) and (j) “based on a 

substantial risk that [other minor girls in the household] will suffer serious physical harm 

as a result of the failure or inability of Mother to adequately protect them.” (Id. at p. 

1573.) The D.G. court relied on an earlier case, Katrina W., which upheld jurisdiction as 

to both parents where the father had molested his daughter and the mother was in denial 

of molestation. The Katrina W. court reasoned that the mother’s disbelief the father had 

done anything improper supported a finding of risk because other reports of future abuse 

might also be ignored by the mother. (Katrina W., supra, at p. 447.) 

 Mother relies on the holding in Alysha S., supra, 51 Cal.App.4th 393, to argue that 

an allegation of inappropriate touching, without allegations of additional facts 

demonstrating that the minor is likely to suffer serious physical harm, is insufficient to 

support jurisdiction under subdivision (b) of section 300. (Id. at pp. 398-399.) Contrary 

to the reasoning in Alysha S., more recent cases uphold jurisdiction on the grounds that 

sexual abuse of one sibling over a period of time places the siblings of the abuse victim at 

risk of substantial harm under subdivisions (b), (d), and (j). (See, e.g., In re I.J. (2013) 56 

Cal.4th 766 (I.J.) [affirming jurisdiction over male siblings of abuse victim under 

subdivision (j)]; Los Angeles County Dept. of Children & Family Services v. Superior 

Court (2013) 215 Cal.App.4th 962, 968, fn. omitted [directing lower court to sustain 

petition under subdivisions (b), (d), and (j) because “sexual abuse of one child may 

constitute substantial evidence of a risk to another child in the household—even to a 

sibling of a different sex or age or to a half sibling”]; In re P.A. (2006) 144 Cal.App.4th 

1339, 1345-1347 [affirming jurisdiction under subdivisions (b) and (d) because “aberrant 

sexual behavior by a parent places the victim’s siblings who remain in the home at risk of 

aberrant sexual behavior”].) Consistent with these cases, we conclude that the allegations 

of sexual abuse and mother’s disbelief are sufficient to state a cause of action under 

subdivisions (b), (d), and (j) of section 300.
9

B. Substantial evidence supports the dependency court’s jurisdictional finding that 

the children are at substantial risk of harm. 

 Viewed in the light most favorable to the court’s jurisdictional findings, there is 

substantial evidence that K.M. sexually abused Tra., that mother disbelieved such abuse 

had occurred, and that K.M.’s abuse and mother’s disbelief put Tey., Sav., and Sas. at 

substantial risk of physical harm or sex abuse. 

 Subdivision (b) of section 300 supports dependency court jurisdiction if a child 

has suffered, or there is a substantial risk the child will suffer, serious physical harm or 

illness as a result of the parent’s failure to adequately supervise or protect the child. 

Subdivision (d) of section 300 supports dependency court jurisdiction when a “child has 

been sexually abused, or there is a substantial risk that the child will be sexually abused, 

as defined in Section 11165.1 of the Penal Code, by his or her parent . . . .” Subdivision 

(j) of section 300 provides a basis for dependency court jurisdiction if “[t]he child’s 

sibling has been abused or neglected, as defined in subdivision (a), (b), (d), (e), or (i), and 

there is a substantial risk that the child will be abused or neglected, as defined in those 

subdivisions.” In determining jurisdiction under subdivision (j), the court must “consider 

the circumstances surrounding the abuse or neglect of the sibling, the age and gender of 

each child, the nature of the abuse or neglect of the sibling, the mental condition of the 

parent or guardian, and any other factors the court considers probative in determining 

whether there is a substantial risk to the child.” (§ 300, subd. (j); In re Maria R. (2010) 

185 Cal.App.4th 48, 64, disapproved of on another ground by I.J., supra, 56 Cal.4th at 

pp. 778-779.) Jurisdiction is warranted when a child is at risk of abuse, not only when 

the child has actually been abused. (See § 300, subds. (a), (b), (d), and (j).) We apply the 

substantial evidence standard of review when considering a challenge to the sufficiency 

of the evidence supporting the court’s jurisdictional findings. “In making this 

determination, we draw all reasonable inferences from the evidence to support the 

findings and orders of the dependency court; we review the record in the light most 
10

favorable to the court’s determinations; and we note that issues of fact and credibility are 

the province of the trial court.” (In re Heather A. (1996) 52 Cal.App.4th 183, 193.) 

 In this case, Tra. reported to social workers and testified that K.M. had repeatedly 

raped her over the course of two years beginning when she was 16 years old, and the 

court found her testimony to be credible. K.M. argues that Tra.’s testimony was 

inherently improbable because K.M. has a large scar on his pelvis and is missing one 

testicle, but Tra. answered “no” when asked whether there was anything distinct about 

father’s “private parts” that stood out to her. (See Evje v. City Title Ins. Co. (1953) 120 

Cal.App.2d 488, 492 [for doctrine of inherent improbability to warrant reversal of a 

judgment resting on witness statements, “there must exist either a physical impossibility 

that they are true, or their falsity must be apparent without resorting to inferences or 

deductions”].) Nothing in the record supports K.M.’s argument that Tra.’s testimony is 

“inherently improbable.” Her response to the question of whether there was anything 

distinct about K.M.’s anatomy does not demonstrate that her version of events was 

physically impossible, and a court would need to make certain inferences to find false her 

testimony about K.M.’s sexual abuse. She was never asked whether she had viewed 

K.M.’s “private parts” in circumstances or lighting that made it impossible for her to not 

notice the presence of a scar or the absence of a testicle. It would be reasonable for the 

court to still find Tra. credible given her detailed and consistent testimony, and we 

decline to usurp the court’s role as fact-finder “[u]nder the guise of inherent 

improbability . . . .” (In re S.A. (2010) 182 Cal.App.4th 1128, 1150.) 

 Mother does not challenge the trial court’s findings that K.M. sexually abused 

Tra., but rather contends that the jurisdictional findings are erroneous because there is no 

evidence any of the children have suffered any physical harm. She also contends that 

because she did not know or have any reason to know of the abuse, her disbelief is 

insufficient to support a jurisdictional finding against her. 

 We reject mother’s argument that the court lacks jurisdiction because the 

Department presented no evidence that the minors had suffered actual harm. “[S]ection 

300 does not require that a child actually be abused or neglected before the juvenile court 
11

can assume jurisdiction.” (I.J., supra, 56 Cal.4th at p.773.) “[A]berrant sexual behavior 

directed at one child in the household places other children in the household at risk, and 

this is especially so when both children are females.” (Los Angeles County Dept. of 

Children & Family Services v. Superior Court, supra, 215 Cal.App.4th at p. 970.) 

Numerous courts have held that sexual abuse of one child constitutes substantial evidence 

of risk to the child’s siblings who remain in the household, even if the other child is a 

different gender or age or is a half sibling. (See id. at pp. 968-970 [reviewing cases 

sustaining petition allegations as to male and female siblings and half-siblings based on 

abuse of one child in household].) In I.J., the California Supreme Court affirmed the 

trial court’s jurisdictional findings as to the younger male siblings of a 14-year-old girl 

who had been sexually abused by her father for three years, even though there was no 

evidence or claim that the father had “sexually abused or otherwise mistreated his three 

sons, and the evidence indicates that they had not witnessed any of the sexual abuse and 

were unaware of it” before the dependency proceeding began. (I.J., supra, 56 Cal.4th at 

p. 771.) Acknowledging disagreement among the Courts of Appeal, the California 

Supreme Court concluded that a finding of sexual abuse of a child of one gender may be 

sufficient to support a finding of risk as to children of a different gender. “‘When a 

parent abuses his or her child, . . . the parent also abandons and contravenes the parental 

role. Such misparenting is among the specific compelling circumstances which may 

justify state intervention, including an interruption of parental custody. [Citation]’ 

[Citation.]” (Id. at p. 778.) Here, the court sustained petition allegations supporting 

jurisdiction over three female children living in the same household, a decision that is 

supported by the facts of this case and the case law involving sex abuse allegations. 

 We also reject mother’s argument that the court erred in asserting jurisdiction 

based on evidence mother disbelieved Tra.’s allegations of sex abuse. Mother relies 

heavily on the argument that because two social workers disbelieved Tra.’s allegations of 

abuse, mother cannot be faulted for her disbelief. Tra. first reported in July 2012 that 

K.M. had sexually abused her for two years and the abuse ended when the children were 

detained in 2011. Three different social workers investigated the purported abuse. The 
12

social workers conducting investigations in July and October of 2012 concluded that 

Tra.’s allegations were unfounded. The third social worker found the allegations 

believable and initiated the proceedings that are the subject of the current appeal. While 

there are arguable inconsistencies in Tra.’s reports and testimony, the trial court resolved 

the ultimate credibility issue in favor of Tra.’s version and that determination is binding 

on appeal. 

 As discussed earlier in this opinion, a mother’s disbelief that her child has been 

sexually abused can support a jurisdictional finding based on the theory that there is 

substantial risk that she will fail to protect the child or her siblings from similar abuse in 

the future. Once the court found Tra.’s testimony regarding abuse credible, there was 

sufficient evidence to sustain its jurisdictional findings with respect to Tey., Sav., and 

Sas. (Los Angeles County Dept. of Children & Family Services v. Superior Court, supra,

215 Cal.App.4th at pp. 965, 966, 968.) 

C. Substantial evidence supports the dependency court’s order removing the 

minors from both parents.

 Mother contends the court erred when it removed Sav. and Sas.4 from her custody, 

because she was willing to abide by a court order prohibiting K.M. from residing in her 

home. Mother argues that there was no evidence that removal was necessary for the 

protection of the children, and that the court did not consider reasonable alternatives. 

 Before a child can be removed from parental custody, the Department must prove, 

by clear and convincing evidence, “[t]here is or would be a substantial danger to [her] 

physical health, safety, protection, or physical or emotional well-being if [she] were 

returned home” and removal is the only reasonable means of protecting her physical 

health. (§ 361, subd. (c)(1).) A court may also remove a child from parental custody 

after finding by clear and convincing evidence that “[she] is deemed to be at substantial 

 

4 Mother does not contend the court erred in ordering Tey. to remain removed 

from her custody. 
13

risk of being sexually abused . . . , and there are no reasonable means by which [she] can 

be protected from . . . a substantial risk of sexual abuse without removing [her] from . . . 

her parent . . . .” (§ 361, subd. (c)(4).) “‘The parent need not be dangerous and the minor 

need not have been actually harmed before removal is appropriate. The focus . . . is on 

averting harm to the child. [Citations.]’” (In re Miguel C. (2011) 198 Cal.App.4th 965, 

969.) We review a dispositional order removing a child from a custodial parent for 

substantial evidence. (In re John M. (2012) 212 Cal.App.4th 1117, 1126.) 

 There was sufficient evidence that Sav. and Sas. were at substantial risk of being 

harmed if they were returned to mother’s custody. Mother’s argument rests on her 

promise to discontinue living with K.M. if the court sustained the sex abuse allegations 

against him. However, mother has a less than stellar record of keeping her promises, and 

her earlier actions provide sufficient evidence to support the court’s findings that Sav. 

and Sas.’s removal was necessary for their protection. 

 The record includes evidence that mother previously promised to take corrective 

action, but then failed to follow through on such promises. In the 2006 dependency case, 

mother had initially entered into a voluntary family maintenance contract, but then 

refused to cooperate and would not allow mental health professionals to assist Thi., who 

had serious mental health problems. The record also contains no evidence that she 

continued with the mental health services that were being provided when the court 

terminated jurisdiction over the matter in 2008, although the Department clearly 

contemplated that such services would continue. In the case plan for the 2011 

dependency proceeding, mother had agreed to enroll the children in school or a certified 

homeschooling program, but then failed to do so. 

 Also, the family has a documented history of failing to cooperate with efforts to 

protect the younger children in the family. Sas. was born while the 2006 dependency 

case was pending, but mother refused to permit the Department to visit Sas. In the 2011 

dependency proceeding, the court had to issue protective warrants for all the children 

except for Thi., who was already in protective custody. The family managed to evade the 

Department for almost a full year, and the Department only detained the children after 
14

their paternal grandmother called to advise the Department that mother and K.M. had 

dropped the children off at her home. The parents left no contact information with their 

children. 

 Mother does not believe K.M. sexually abused her older daughter, she has been 

unwilling or unable to provide adequate mental health support for Thi., and she has a 

documented history of attempting to avoid or evade Department scrutiny. When all these 

circumstances are considered together, there is substantial evidence to support the court’s 

determination that it was necessary to remove Sav. and Sas. from mother’s custody and 

the Department had met the criteria of section 361(c)(1) or (4) by clear and convincing 

evidence. 

DISPOSITION 

 The dependency court’s jurisdictional findings and dispositional orders are 

affirmed. 

 KRIEGLER, J. 

We concur: 

 MOSK, Acting P. J. MINK. J. *

 

* Retired judge of the Los Angeles County Superior Court assigned by the Chief 

Justice pursuant to article VI, section 6 of the California Constitution.