AFFIRMED and Opinion Filed August 26, 2024 

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In The 

### Court of Appeals Fifth District of Texas at Dallas No. 05-23-00938-CV LAMAR "YAKA" JEFFERSON AND JRMAR "JJ" JEFF ERSON, Appellants V. ADAM BAZALDUA AND ERIC JOHNSON, Appellees On Appeal from the 101st Judicial District Court Dallas County, Texas Trial Court Cause No. DC-23-07425 MEMORANDUM OPINION Before Justices Reichek, Goldstein, and Garcia Opinion by Justice Reichek In this appeal of two election cont ests brought by brothers Lamar Jefferson and Jrmar Jefferson, we consider whether the tria l court erred in granting the prevailing candidates’ pleas to the jurisdic tion. Because the Jeffersons were not on the ballot, we conclude they lacked standing to bring an election contest and affirm the trial court’s order. Background In a municipal election held in Da llas on May 6, 2023, Adam Bazaldua was elected to the Dallas City Council for Distri ct 7 (“District 7”) and Eric Johnson was–2– elected Dallas Mayor. On June 5, 2023, Lamar Jefferson (“ Lamar”) and Jrmar Jefferson (“Jrmar”) filed a pro se joint original petition, which they amended four days later, contesting these election results. 1 They alleged La mar was a candidate for District 7 and Jrmar wa s a candidate for mayor. Th e Jeffersons asserted the election results were inaccurate because election officials counted illegal votes, prevented eligible voters fro m voting, failed to count lega l votes, engaged in other fraud or illegal conduct, or made a mistake. As the Jeffersons acknowledged in their petition, neither Lamar nor Jrmar appeared on the ballot for the May 6 election. They were both disqualified, Jrmar for not submitting the required number of va lid signatures and La mar for failing to meet voter registration requirements. A City of Dallas webpage titled, “Candidates for the May 6, 2023 General Election,” in dicates they both filed for a place on the May 6, 2023 ballot, but were not qualified. See electCandidates_May2023 (dallascityhall.com) (last visited August 21, 2024) (“Candidates for the May 6, 2023 General Election”). The Jeffersons’ petition includes arguments about why they should have been on the ballot. Bazaldua filed a combined answer, pl ea to the jurisdiction, and motion to dismiss. By his plea, he asserted that Lamar lacked standing to bring an election contest because Lamar was not a candidate for District 7. Bazaldua argued that only

1 The petition named other plaintif fs who contested the results of various city council races and named other defendants, but those part ies are not part of this appeal.–3– candidates can bring an electio n contest. Similarly, Johnson filed a plea to the jurisdiction in which he asserted Jrmar lacked standing to contest the mayoral election because he wa s not a candidate. On September 12, 2023, Judge Charles Stokes, sitting by assignment, granted Bazaldua’s plea to the jurisdiction and dismi ssed Lamar’s claims with prejudice. On September 28, 2023, Judge St okes granted Johnson’s plea to the jurisdiction and dismissed “the case” with prejudice. The Jeffersons filed a joint notice of appeal from the trial court’s order granting Bazaldua’s plea to the jurisdiction. Jrmar also filed a notice of appeal from the order granting Johnson’s plea. We c onsolidated the two appeals because the interlocutory order granting Bazaldua’s pl ea merged into the final order granting Johnson’s plea and dism issing the case. The Jeffersons, who are also pro se on a ppeal, have each filed an appellate brief. Many of their issues and arguments ar e the same. As we in terpret their briefs, their issues can be divided into the follo wing main categories: (1) arguments that they have standing to contest the elec tions because they were candidates; (2) arguments challenging the fact that they we re left off the ballot for the May 6, 2023 election; (3) arguments about the merits of their election contest cases; and (4) arguments about the trial court’s failure to make findings of fact and conclusions of law.–4– Election Contest The Jeffersons first argue the trial court should not have granted the contestees’ pleas to the jurisdiction because the Jeffersons have standing to contest the election. We disagree. Standing is a component of subject-matter jurisdiction. Farmers Tex. Cty. Mut. Ins. Co. v. Beasley , 598 S.W.3d 237, 240 (Tex. 2020). We review the pleas to the jurisdiction de novo. Id. In applying a de novo standard of review to a standing determination, we construe the pleadings in the plaintiffs’ favor, but we also consider relevant evidence offe red by the parties. Id. Election contests are creatures of stat ute, and the power of a trial court to consider such contests exists only to the extent authorized by statute. Nichols v. Seei , 97 S.W.3d 882, 883 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2003, no pet.). Title 14 of the Texas Election Code governs election contests. A ny candidate in an election may contest the election. T EX
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. § 232.002. The purpose of an election contest is to determine whether the outcome of an election is correct. Rodriguez v. Rangel , 679 S.W.3d 890, 903 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2023, pet. denied). A trial court hearing the contest shall attempt to ascerta in whether the outcome of the contested election, as shown by the final canvass, is not the true outcome because illegal votes were counted, or the election officer or othe r official prevented eligible voters from voting, failed to count lega l votes, or engaged in ot her fraud or ille gal conduct or made a mistake. T EX
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. § 221.003(a). If a contestant meets his–5– burden of proof and the trial court can ascert ain the true outcome of the election, it shall declare the outcome; however if the c ourt cannot ascertain the true outcome, it must declare the election void. Id. § 221.012. With limited ex ceptions, the candidates in a new election ordered by a court in an election contest are the same candidates who were in the contested election. Id. § 232.042. Title 14, which authorizes “any candidate in an elec tion” to bring an election contest, does not define “candida te.” If a term in a statute is not defined, we interpret the term according to its ordinary meaning. Broadway Nat’l Bank v. Yates Energy Corp. , 631 S.W.3d 16, 24 (Tex. 2021). We furthe r consider statutes as a whole, rather than their isolated provisions. TGS-NOPEC Geophysica l Co. v. Combs , 340 S.W.3d 432, 439 (Tex. 2011). We presume the Legislature chooses a statute’s language with care, including each word chosen for a purpose, while purposefully omitting words not chosen. Id. We will not give an unde fined term a meaning that is out of harmony or inconsistent with the other terms in the statute. State v. $1,760.00 in U.S. Currency , 406 S.W.3d 177, 180 (Tex. 2013). If a different, more limited, or precise definition is apparent from the term’s use in the context of the statute, we apply that meaning. Id. Therefore, when an unde fined term has multiple common meanings, the definition most consiste nt within the context of the statute’s scheme applies. Id. at 180–81. The Jeffersons contend the definition of “candidate” found in Title 15 of the election code applies. Title 15 pert ains to “Regulating Political Funds and–6– Campaigns,” and requires candidates to report political contributions and expenditures. T EX
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. § 254.061. It broadly defines “candidate” as “a person who knowingly and w illingly takes affirmative ac tion for the purpose of gaining nomination or election to public office.” Id. § 251.001(1). The election code uses a similar definition of candidate in several places in Title 3, which governs election officers and observers. See id. §§ 31.035(c), 32.053(c), 32.054(c), 32.055(b), 33.032(b) (“ candidate” is “a person who has taken affirmative action, as described by the law regulating political funds and campaigns, for the purpose of gaining nomination or election.”). The Jeffersons would have us read into § 232.002 words that are not there. Title 14 and Title 15 serve diffe rent purposes. If the legisl ature had intended for the broad definition of ca ndidate found in Title 15 of th e election code to apply to election contests, it would have included th at definition in Title 14. Because it did not, we presume the Legislature intended a different, more limited, definition of candidate to apply in an election contest. Defining “candidate” to mean a person whose name appears on the ballot for an o ffice on Election Day is consistent with the purpose of an election contest, which contemplates a new election with the same candidates if it is shown that the outcome as shown by the final canvass was not the true outcome of the election. It would be illogical in this context to permit a person who was not on the ballot to overturn an el ection. Because they were disqualified and did not appear on the ballot, the Jeffe rsons were not candidates for purposes of–7– Title 14 of the election code. They therefore lacked standing to bring an election
contest. The Jeffersons also argue the merits of th eir election contest. They assert the election process suffered fro m fraud, irregularities, and administrative errors. Because they lacked standing to contest th e election results, these issues were not before the trial court or us on appeal. Disqualification The Jeffersons also argue that they shoul d not have been left off the ballot for the election. To the extent this issue wa s raised by their amended petition, it is moot, as we previously held when we dismissed an original proceeding they filed after the election, asking that their names be placed on the ballot. See In re Jefferson , No. 05-23-00473-CV, 2023 WL 388107 7, at *1 (Tex. App.—Da llas June 8, 2023, orig. proceeding) (mem. op.). It is well establis hed that issues regarding the validity of a person’s application to appear on the ballot become moot once an election

commences. In re Crenshaw , No. 05-17-00330-CV, 2017 WL 1292013, at *1 (Tex. App.—Dallas Apr. 7, 2017, no pet.) (mem. op.). A c ourt lacks subject matter jurisdiction to decide a moot controversy. In re Guardianship of Fairley , 650 S.W.3d 372, 379 (Tex. 2022). The trial court did not err in dismissing any claims related to the Jeffersons’ om ission from the ballot.–8– Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law In addition, the Jeffersons argue the tria l court erred in faili ng to make findings of fact and conclusions of law after they timely requested them and filed a notice of past due findings and conclusions. They contend they are entitled to an automatic reversal. Under rule of civil procedure 296, in a ny case tried in district or county court without a jury, a party may request the cour t to state in writing its findings of fact and conclusions of law. T EX
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. P. 296. A trial court has no duty to file findings of fact and conclusions of law when a case, like this one, has been dismissed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction and no evidentiary hearing has been held. Hall v. City of Bryan , No. 10-10-00403-CV, 2011 WL 4712243, at *1 (Tex. App.—Waco Oct. 5, 2011, pet. denied) (mem. op.); see IKB Indus. v. Pro-Line Corp. , 938 S.W.2d 440, 443 (Tex. 1997); Primestar Constr, Inc. v. City of Dallas , No. 05-17-01447-CV, 2019 WL 1033978, at *5 (Tex. App.—Dallas March 5, 2019, pet. denied) (mem. op.). Here, where it was undisputed the Jeff ersons were not on the ballot for the May 6 election and the issues before the trial c ourt were purely legal, the trial court did not err in failing to make findings of fact a nd conclusions of law. Even if it did, the Jeffersons do not explain how they have been harmed. They have not had to guess the reason the trial court ruled against them and have been able to present their argument that they had standing to contest the election results. See Larry F. Smith, Inc. v. The Weber Co. , 110 S.W.3d 611, 614 (Tex. App.—Dal las 2003, pet. denied).–9– Miscellaneous Issues The Jeffersons make additional arguments that are inadequately briefed. We construe liberally pro se pl eadings and briefs; however, we hold pro se litigants to the same standards as licensed attorneys and require them to comply with applicable laws and rules of procedure. In re N.E.B. , 251 S.W.3d 211, 211–12 (Tex. App.— Dallas 2008, no pet.). To do otherwis e would give a pro se litigant an unfair advantage over a litigant represented by counsel. Id. at 212. When a party fails to adequately brief a complaint, he waives the issue on appeal. Id. The Jeffersons suggest the trial judge’s stated familiarity with the Texas Election Code somehow called into ques tion his impartiality. Second, Jrmar contends that counsel for Mayor Johnson violated disciplinary rules in presenting arguments. They have not supported these contentions with appropriate citations to the record or legal authority. See T EX
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. P. 38.1(i). As a result, they have waived these issues. Pending Motions There are two motions pending in this a ppeal. Shortly before submission, the Jeffersons filed a motion asking us to take judicial notice of the election page on the City’s website, various provisions of the election code, case la w, and portions of the record in this case. The Jeffersons also filed a motion requesting a written opinion.–10– Because we have issued a written opinion and considered the relevant facts and law, by this opinion, and by separate orde r, we deny these motions as moot. We affirm the trial court’s order dismissing the case with prejudice.

230938F.P05 /Amanda L. Reichek / AMANDA L. REICHEK JUSTICE–11– 

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Court of Appeals Fifth District of Texas at Dallas JUDGMENT
LAMAR "YAKA" JEFFERSON AND JRMAR "JJ" JEFFERSON, Appellants
No. 05-23-00938-CV V.
ADAM BAZALDUA AND ERIC JOHNSON, Appellees On Appeal from the 101st Judicial District Court, Dallas County, Texas Trial Court Cause No. DC-23-07425. Opinion delivered by Justice Reichek. Justices Goldstein and Garcia participating.

In accordance with this Court’s opinion of this date, the judgment of the trial court is AFFIRMED

. It is ORDERED that appellees ADAM BA ZALDUA AND ER IC JOHNSON recover their costs of this appeal from appellants LAMAR "YAKA" JEFFERSON AND JRMAR "JJ" JEFFERSON.
Judgment entered this 26th day of August 2024.