Filed 2/2/21 Holmes v. Holmes CA4/1

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS

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COURT OF APPEAL, FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION ONE

STATE OF CALIFORNIA

LAURA V. HOLMES,

Plaintiff and Appellant,

v.

ALDEN V. HOLMES, JR., as Trustee, 

etc.,

Defendant and Respondent.

 D077348

 (Super. Ct. No. 37-2018-

00052294-PR-TR-CTL)

APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of San Diego County, 

Julia C. Kelety, Judge. Affirmed. 

Law Offices of Rosemary Meagher-Leonard and Rosemary MeagherLeonard for Plaintiff and Appellant. 

No appearance for Respondent. 

Alden V. Holmes, Jr. (Alden Jr.) was the trustee of his parents’ trust. 

In June 2019, his sister, Laura V. Holmes (Laura), filed a petition for an 

order instructing Alden Jr. to reimburse her for certain expenses she 
2

allegedly incurred on her parents’ behalf in or before February 2015.1 The 

trial court granted Alden Jr.’s demurrer to Laura’s petition, finding the 

petition failed to state a cause of action and was time barred. We affirm. 

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

This is not Laura’s first appeal in this court; we have the benefit of 

underlying background from a prior related case. (Estate of Holmes (Aug. 31, 

2017, D071208) [nonpub. opn.].) We draw the operative facts from Laura’s

initiating petition, matters that were judicially noticed by the trial court, and 

the prior related case. 

Prior Power of Attorney Case2 

In 2011, Alden Sr. executed a limited springing power of attorney 

appointing his daughter Laura as his agent.3 Acting as his agent, Laura 

managed aspects of Alden Sr.’s finances and paid expenses from his accounts. 

Friction developed among Alden Sr.’s eight children, including Laura, and 

several of her siblings petitioned to remove Laura as Alden Sr.’s agent. In 

2014, the probate court appointed a temporary conservator for Alden Sr. and 

suspended Laura’s powers as attorney-in-fact. Laura provided an accounting 

of income and expenditures during her time as Alden Sr.’s agent. 

In August 2015, Alden Sr. died. 

1 Because the parties and other relevant individuals share the same last 

name, we will refer to them by their first names. 

2 San Diego superior court case number 37-2014-00084859-PR-OP-CTL. 

3 Prior to 2011, Alden Sr. also executed an advance heath care directive 

appointing Laura as his agent to make medical decisions for him if he could 

not do so himself. 
3

After receiving Laura’s accounting of her activities as Alden Sr.’s 

attorney-in-fact, several of Alden Sr.’s children (the petitioning siblings) 

petitioned the probate court to surcharge Laura for improper personal 

expenditures made from Alden Sr.’s accounts (petition for surcharge). The 

petitioning siblings obtained a specified hearing date in 2016 and properly 

served Laura with notice. 

At the time, Laura was represented by counsel. Shortly before the 

hearing date, however, Laura began representing herself in propria persona. 

Her attorney asked opposing counsel to obtain a continuance of the hearing 

because Laura was unavailable on the hearing date. The petitioning siblings’

attorney obtained a continuance to February 23, 2016, and Laura was duly 

notified. 

Laura did not appear at the continued hearing or file objections to the 

petition for surcharge. The court granted the petition, surcharged Laura 

approximately $79,058 for improper expenditures, and imposed $5,000 in 

attorney fees under Probate Code section 4545. 

Laura filed a motion to vacate the order under Code of Civil Procedure 

section 473, subdivision (b).4 She primarily argued that her failure to appear 

was excused due to medical incapacity and that she could not travel to San 

Diego from the San Francisco Bay area. She also pointed to her status as a 

self-represented litigant and her confusion regarding various pending probate 

proceedings. 

Laura filed proposed objections to the petition for surcharge with her 

motion. In the objections, she recounted the history of her appointment 

4 Laura’s recitation of facts did not mention that she filed a motion for 

relief in the power of attorney case. We ascertained these facts from Estate of 

Holmes, supra, at pages 3-4. 
4

under Alden Sr.’s power of attorney and her activities as his agent. Laura 

also provided justifications for the challenged expenditures. She argued, 

among other things, that her legal expenditures were authorized under the 

power of attorney signed by Alden Sr. 

The petitioning siblings opposed Laura’s motion to vacate. They 

argued that Laura’s claim of incapacitation was “completely false” and 

submitted evidence of her participation in litigation-related activities during 

the time that she claimed to be incapacitated. The petitioning siblings 

concluded there was no basis to excuse Laura’s failure to appear under 

section 473, subdivision (b). 

Following oral argument, the probate court denied Laura’s motion to 

vacate. The court’s decision was affirmed on appeal. (Estate of Holmes,

supra, at p. 9.) 

In 2018, in the same power of attorney case, Laura filed a “petition for 

reimbursement for reasonable expenses incurred,” seeking to recover 

approximately $29,544 she spent “as a result of acting as attorney-in-fact” for 

Alden Sr. (2018 petition for reimbursement). Laura alleged that she incurred 

the expenses as Alden Sr.’s agent between 2011 and 2015. In response, Alden 

Jr. filed a demurrer, arguing that Laura’s claim for reimbursement was time 

barred under Code of Civil Procedure section 366.2 because it had not been 

made within one year of Alden Sr.’s death, as required. The court agreed and 

sustained the demurrer without leave to amend. (See Wagner v. Wagner

(2008) 162 Cal.App.4th 249, 254-256 [one-year statute of limitations applies 

to actions on all claims against the decedent that survive the decedent’s 

death].) 
5

Current Trust Administration Case5

In October 2018, Alden Jr., as trustee, initiated the current case to 

resolve a payment matter involving his parents’ trust, the Alden and Eleanor 

Holmes Trust (Trust). 

In November 2018, Eleanor Holmes died. 

In June 2019, Laura filed a “petition for order instructing trustee to 

reimburse petitioner for reasonable expenses incurred” (2019 petition for 

reimbursement). This petition sought to recover the same two sums of money 

that were previously disputed in the power of attorney case: (1) $29,544, 

representing the expenses that Laura sought to recover in her 2018 petition 

for reimbursement,6 and (2) $79,058, representing the expenditures for which 

she had been surcharged in 2016. As before, Laura alleged that she incurred 

these expenses while acting as Alden Sr.’s agent under a power of attorney 

and his advance health care directive. 

Unlike before, the 2019 petition for reimbursement added the 

allegation that Laura’s expenditures “benefited both Alden Sr. and Eleanor” 

and “also benefited Eleanor Holmes” (italics added), i.e., were of incidental 

benefit to Laura’s mother. For example, Laura alleged that she traveled to 

San Diego from San Francisco to help both her parents with daily living 

activities and that decisions she made on behalf of Alden Sr. benefited 

Eleanor as well. 

5 San Diego superior court case number 37-2018-00052294-PR-TR-CTL. 

6 Laura attached Exhibit D to her petition showing a detailed breakdown 

of the approximately $29,544 of personal expenses she incurred between 2011 

and 2015. The expenses appear to relate primarily to travel, food, and 

attorney fees. 
6

Alden Jr. filed a demurrer to the 2019 petition for reimbursement, 

arguing that it failed to state a cause of action and was barred by the statute 

of limitations. He requested judicial notice of the court’s order sustaining his 

demurrer in the power of attorney case. Alden Jr. asserted that Laura was 

seeking reimbursement for the exact same expenses as before and that the 

allegation of incidental benefit to Eleanor was conclusory and, in any event, 

failed to establish that Laura incurred any expenses as Eleanor’s agent. 

In her opposition brief, Laura admitted she had been acting “only as 

her father’s agent” when she incurred the expenses but maintained that her 

mother had benefited by continuing to enjoy her customary life style. Laura 

characterized her claim as a creditor’s claim against the Trust assets, and as 

such, timely filed within one year of Eleanor’s death. 

On reply, Alden Jr. disputed that Laura’s claim was a proper creditor’s 

claim. 

The trial court held a hearing on the 2019 petition for reimbursement. 

Counsel for both parties was present. After considering the arguments of 

counsel, the court granted Alden Jr.’s request for judicial notice and 

sustained his demurrer without leave to amend. The court found that the 

2019 petition for reimbursement was untimely and failed to state sufficient 

facts to constitute a cause of action. The petition was dismissed with 

prejudice. 

This appeal followed. 

DISCUSSION

Laura contends the trial court erred in granting Alden Jr.’s demurrer 

to her 2019 petition for reimbursement. She argues the petition was not time 

barred and was a proper means for seeking reimbursement of the specified 
7

expenses. We conclude the trial court did not err and properly dismissed the 

petition. 

1. Standard of Review

“On appeal from an order of dismissal after an order sustaining a 

demurrer, the standard of review is de novo: we exercise our independent 

judgment about whether the complaint states a cause of action as a matter of 

law.” (Stearn v. County of San Bernardino (2009) 170 Cal.App.4th 434, 439.) 

We evaluate whether a cause of action has been stated under any legal 

theory. (Curcini v. County of Alameda (2008) 164 Cal.App.4th 629, 637.) As 

we do so, we assume the truth of the petition’s properly pleaded facts and 

judicially noticed matters. (Schifando v. City of Los Angeles (2003) 31 Cal.4th

1074, 1081.) “We do not, however, assume the truth of contentions, 

deductions, or conclusions of law.” (Stearn, at p. 440.) We review the trial 

court’s refusal to grant leave to amend the pleading under the abuse of 

discretion standard. (Zelig v. County of Los Angeles (2002) 27 Cal.4th 1112,

1126.) When a demurrer is sustained without leave to amend, we decide 

whether there is a reasonable possibility that the defect can be cured by 

amendment. (Ibid.) If the pleading is insufficient on any ground specified in 

a demurrer, we will uphold the order sustaining the demurrer, even if it is 

not the ground relied upon by the trial court. (Irwin v. Manhattan Beach

(1966) 65 Cal.2d 13, 20; Debro v. Los Angeles Raiders (2001) 92 Cal.App.4th

940, 946.) 

2. Analysis

Based on our review of the record, Laura’s claim in the current case is 

premised on a theory of quantum meruit, that is, she alleges a debt owed by 

decedent Eleanor for the reasonable value of services Laura rendered to 
8

Eleanor.7 For example, in the 2019 petition for reimbursement, Laura 

alleges that, between 2011 and February 2015, she “frequently traveled from 

her home in the San Francisco Bay Area to San Diego, where [Alden Sr. and 

Eleanor] lived, to care for them and to assist them with their activities of 

daily living.” When Laura incurred her expenses, she was acting as her 

father’s agent under his power of attorney; Alden Sr. allegedly authorized 

Laura to incur travel, meal, attorney, and other expenses, which, 

incidentally, benefited Eleanor. “Laura continued to act as agent [for Alden 

Sr.] until February 6, 2015, at which time the court suspended her authority 

to act as Alden Sr.’s agent, as well as all agents under [sic] for either Alden 

Sr. or Eleanor Holmes.” 

Laura’s 2019 petition sought to recover her expenses incurred in or 

before February 2015, while acting as Alden Sr.’s agent and which had the 

effect of also benefiting Eleanor. Unlike Laura’s prior claim against Alden 

Sr., which was based on an express contractual right, her 2019 claim against 

Eleanor was premised on the value of services rendered to Eleanor. 

Recovery from an estate for “services rendered to a decedent has 

frequently been permitted in this state in an action upon quantum meruit.” 

7 To the extent Laura argues that the “debt” for which she sought 

reimbursement belonged to Alden Sr., then Laura’s claim was required to be

brought within one year of Alden Sr.’s death. (Code Civ. Proc., § 366.2; Prob. 

Code, § 13554; Collection Bureau of San Jose v. Rumsey (2000) 24 Cal.4th 

301, 313 [collection agency trying to collect the medical expenses of a 

deceased spouse from a surviving spouse was required to bring action within 

one year of the deceased spouse’s death]; Dawes v. Rich (1997) 60 Cal.App.4th 

24, 31 [“Claims against a surviving spouse under Probate Code section 13550 

must be brought within one year of the death of the deceased spouse.”].) 

Alden Sr. died in August 2015, and thus, Laura could not maintain a claim 

against Eleanor in 2019 on the ground that she was the surviving spouse. 
9

(Long v. Rumsey (1938) 12 Cal.2d 334, 342 (Long) [relative who worked for 

decedent under an unenforceable oral contract required to pursue claim 

within statute of limitations for an action on quantum meruit].) “[O]rdinarily 

a promise to pay the value of such services is implied by law at the 

termination [of the services] thereof, and . . . the statute of limitations then 

begins to run.” (Id. at p. 343; Sonnicksen v. Estate of Sonnicksen (1937) 23 

Cal.App.2d 480, 481 (Sonnicksen) [wife’s alleged cause of action on quantum 

meruit against husband’s estate was time barred; cause of action accrued 

when their marriage ended three years prior to his death]; see also Estate of 

Ziegler (2010) 187 Cal.App.4th 1357, 1366-1367 (Estate of Ziegler) [quantum 

meruit theory of recovery based on value of services provided throughout 

decedent’s life].) 

Long, supra, 12 Cal.2d 334, is instructive. In that case, a relative 

(Long) worked in the home and bakery of the decedent for years, under an 

alleged oral agreement that Long would be compensated for her services after 

the decedent’s death. Long’s work for the decedent terminated in 1919, but 

the decedent did not die until 1935. (Id. at p. 337.) Our Supreme Court held 

that the alleged “oral contract” was unenforceable, and “a recovery, if any, 

must be based upon the theory of quantum meruit.” (Id. at p. 341.) The 

court found that the statute of limitations for quantum meruit began to run 

at the termination of Long’s services (in 1919) and had long expired, and her 

complaint against the decedent could not proceed unless she was able to 

establish the terms of an express contract, with evidence of a “convincing and 

definite character,” that she was to be paid at a future time. (Id. at p. 343.) 

Because Long could not establish “when a contract was made, how much 

service was to be performed, or what the future compensation was to be,” her 

cause of action was time barred. (Id. at pp. 346-347.) 
10

The statute of limitations for quantum meruit claims is two years. 

(Code Civ. Proc., § 339; Leighton v. Forster (2017) 8 Cal.App.5th 467, 490.) 

In this case, any services Laura rendered to Eleanor undisputedly 

ceased by February 2015, when the probate court ordered Laura’s activities 

to terminate. Laura could not have reasonably expected payment for services 

rendered after the probate court suspended her powers. A claim for quantum 

meruit against Eleanor thus accrued by February 2015 and was required to

be brought within two years of that date, or by February 2017. (Shewry v.

Begil (2005) 128 Cal.App.4th 639, 645 [“As a general rule, the statute of 

limitations begins to run upon a present right to sue.”].) Laura’s petition for 

reimbursement in the trust administration case was filed in 2019, and 

therefore, untimely. 

On appeal, Laura asserts she can amend her 2019 petition for 

reimbursement to include additional facts regarding the care or assistance 

she provided to Eleanor. Such an amendment would be futile because it 

would not alter the fundamental facts that Laura’s services ended in 2015 

and she had no express agreement with Eleanor to be paid for the specified 

expenses. 

Similarly, the 2019 petition for reimbursement fails to state sufficient 

facts to constitute a cause of action based on a different theory of contractual 

liability. (See, e.g., Estate of Ziegler, supra, 187 Cal.App.4th at p. 1366.) 

Laura cannot avoid the allegations she has repeatedly made that she 

incurred the relevant expenses as an agent for Alden Sr. under his power of 

attorney and/or health care directive, which only incidentally benefited 

Eleanor. In her appellate brief, Laura does not claim that Eleanor 

authorized Laura’s expenses or made any promise of payment. 
11

Laura contends her 2019 petition for reimbursement was timely filed 

within one year of Eleanor’s death pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure 

section 366.2.8 However, the one-year-after-death period under section 366.2 

would not replace the “applicable limitations period” for Laura’s claim based 

on quantum meruit. Section 366.2 states that “[i]f a person against whom an 

action may be brought on a liability of the person, whether arising in 

contract, tort, or otherwise, and whether accrued or not accrued, dies before 

the expiration of the applicable limitations period, and the cause of action 

survives, an action may be commenced within one year after the date of 

death, and the limitations period that would have been applicable does not 

apply.” (§ 366.2, subd. (a), italics added.) Here, Eleanor did not die “before 

the expiration of the applicable limitations period.” (Ibid.) The applicable 

limitations period for a quantum meruit claim began to run in February 2015 

and expired in February 2017, while Eleanor was still alive. (Long, supra, 12 

Cal.2d at p. 342; Sonnicksen, supra, 23 Cal.App.2d at p. 481.) 

In summary, Laura cannot maintain her claim against Eleanor’s Trust 

assets. After February 2015, Eleanor lived for over three more years. Laura 

could not sit by and wait until after Eleanor died to assert a claim premised 

on an uncertain benefit that Eleanor derived from Laura’s care in or before 

2015. “The statute of limitations . . . ‘ “promote[s] justice by preventing 

surprises through the revival of claims that have been allowed to slumber 

until evidence has been lost, memories have faded, and witnesses have 

disappeared.” ’ ” (Estate of Ziegler, supra, 187 Cal.App.4th at p. 1359.) 

8 Further unspecified statutory references are to the Code of Civil 

Procedure. 
12

Based on the foregoing reasons, the trial court did not err in sustaining 

Alden Jr.’s demurrer to Laura’s 2019 petition for reimbursement without 

leave to amend. 

DISPOSITION

The order is affirmed. 

McCONNELL, P. J.

WE CONCUR:

BENKE, J.

IRION, J.