IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE 

HANNA LAYTON and LINDA 

COSTAS,1

 

Respondents Below, 

Appellants, 

v. 

JACKSON P. LAYTON, 

Petitioner Below, 

Appellee. 

§ 

§ Nos. 87, 2018; 100, 2018; 

§ and 125, 2018 

§ Consolidated 

§ 

§ Court Below—Family Court 

§ of the State of Delaware 

§ 

§ C.A. No. CN15-04403 

§ Petition Nos. 17-22998 and 

§ 17-24587 

§ 

 Submitted: August 17, 2018 

 Decided: October 23, 2018 

Before VAUGHN, SEITZ, and TRAYNOR, Justices. 

ORDER 

 Upon consideration of the parties’ briefs and the record on appeal, it 

appears to the Court that: 

(1) The appellants, Hanna Layton (“Mother”) and Linda Costas 

(“Grandmother”), filed these consolidated appeals from three Family Court 

orders. The underlying case involves Jackson Layton (“Father”) and Mother’s 

two daughters (“the Children”) and Father’s efforts to visit and reunify with 

the Children. At the time these appeals were filed, the Children were under 

 

1

 The Court previously assigned pseudonyms to the parties under Supreme Court Rule 7(d). 
2

the guardianship of Grandmother.2 In the orders on appeal, the Family Court 

found Mother and Grandmother in contempt of its prior orders regarding 

Father’s visitation and reunification therapy with the Children. The Family 

Court also ordered Mother to pay attorneys’ fees to Father’s counsel3

 and 

ordered Grandmother to pay $2000 to secure the services of a new 

reunification therapist. After careful consideration, we find no merit to these 

consolidated appeals. Accordingly, we affirm the Family Court’s judgments. 

(2) The Children were born on April 28, 2004 and March 25, 2007. 

The family’s history is long and complicated. It appears that Mother and 

Father became estranged from one another in 2011, and Mother was awarded 

sole custody of the Children in November 2013. In August 2015, 

Grandmother, through counsel, filed a petition for guardianship of the 

Children. Mother’s whereabouts were unknown at the time. Although she 

failed to file an answer to the guardianship petition, she later appeared in 

person to support the petition. Father, through counsel, objected to the 

 

2

 Although the Family Court initially stayed its consideration of Father’s petition to rescind 

Grandmother’s guardianship pending reunification therapy, the Family Court later lifted 

the stay and granted Father’s petition for rescission after these appeals were filed. Mother 

and Grandmother filed several different appeals from the rescission proceedings, which are 

pending before the Court. 

3

 Father’s counsel is representing Father on a pro bono basis by assignment from a group 

providing services to military veterans. In turn, Father’s counsel was directed to forward 

Mother’s installment payments of $200 per month to the Veteran’s Clinic associated with 

the Delaware Law School. 
3

petition. In March 2016, the parties reached an agreement for a temporary 

guardianship order pending a hearing in July 2016. The temporary order 

included the parties’ stipulation that Father and the Children would engage in 

reunification therapy with Dr. Samuel Romirowsky in consultation with the 

Children’s therapist, Jennifer Cutrona. 

(3) After a two-day trial, the Family Court granted Grandmother’s 

petition for guardianship on August 10, 2016 (“the Guardianship Order”).4

 As 

part of the Guardianship Order, the Family Court cautioned Mother and 

Grandmother to cooperate with the previously agreed-to reunification therapy 

between Father and the Children. The Family Court stated that it would “not 

tolerate interference with Father’s attempts to improve” his relationship with 

the Children.5

 The Family Court further warned Mother and Grandmother 

that, while it did not want to uproot the Children and remove them from 

Grandmother’s home at present, “the Court will seriously consider moving 

the children to Ohio [where Father lives] on a permanent basis if the maternal 

family acts as an impediment to Father’s efforts.”6

 The Guardianship Order 

awarded Father visitation with the Children “as determined appropriate by Dr. 

Romirowsky,” and stated that, if Dr. Romirowsky believed that the maternal 

 

4 Costas v. Layton, File No. CN15-04403, Pet. No. 15-24413 (Del. Fam. Ct. Aug. 10, 2016). 

5

Id. at 22. 

6 Id. 
4

family was interfering with Father’s visitation, then the Court would consider 

imposing sanctions that might include granting “additional visitation to 

Father, fines, incarceration, or a change in custody....”7

(4) In December 2016, Father filed a petition for a rule to show 

cause, alleging that Grandmother and Mother were in contempt of the 

Guardianship Order by thwarting the progress of his reunification with the 

Children. After two days of hearings, the Family Court issued an order dated 

June 5, 2017, finding both Mother and Grandmother in contempt (“the First 

Contempt Order”).8

 The Family Court warned them against “continuing to 

display a negative and hateful attitude towards Father to the girls” and stated 

that the Court would “tolerate no contempt of this Order.”9

 The Court ordered 

that “Dr. Romirowsky shall schedule reunification therapy/visits between 

Father and the girls at his discretion and shall solely be responsible for setting 

the frequency, date, time and length of the contact.”10 

(5) Thereafter, Mother and Grandmother filed a petition for a rule to 

show cause in July 2017, alleging that Father was in contempt of the First 

Contempt Order and requesting, among other things, that the reunification 

 

7 Id. at 23-24. 

8 Layton v. Costas, File No. CN11-03412, Pet. No. 16-38190 (Del. Fam. Ct. June 5, 2017). 

9 Id. at 13. 

10 Id. 
5

therapy with Dr. Romirowsky be discontinued. Father, in turn, filed a petition 

for a rule to show cause, alleging that Mother and Grandmother were in 

contempt of the First Contempt Order. Among other things, Father asked the 

Family Court to rescind Grandmother’s guardianship as a sanction for her 

ongoing contempt and interference with Father’s attempts to reunify with the 

Children. 

(6) The Family Court held three days of hearings in January and 

February 2018 on the parties’ cross-petitions. Dr. Romirowsky testified that, 

before Mother and Grandmother cut off his contact with the Children, he had 

had more than twenty sessions with the Children and Father. When they 

started therapy, the Children indicated they had no memories of Father, either 

good or bad, but they were interested in developing their relationship with 

him. Dr. Romirowsky testified that, on multiple occasions, the therapy 

sessions would be interrupted by members of the maternal family. On one 

occasion, when Father was participating in the session via Skype, Mother 

walked into the session unannounced and ended it prematurely, stating that 

the Children needed to have their dinner. Dr. Romirowsky finally told the 

maternal family members that they were not allowed in his office but had to 

wait outside during his sessions with the Children and Father. 
6

(7) Dr. Romirowsky testified that, while sometimes the sessions 

started with the Children protesting, the sessions quickly dissipated into 

warm, playful and affectionate interaction between Father and the Children. 

Based on his experience with the parties and in light of the Family Court’s 

order giving him the discretion to do so, Dr. Romirowsky testified that he 

approved Father taking the Children for visits in the community on two dates 

in July 2017. Those visits were to be followed by debriefing with the parties 

in his office, and if Dr. Romirowsky determined those visits had gone well, 

then Father would be permitted to have two overnight visits with the Children 

in August 2017. Dr. Romirowsky testified that Grandmother refused to 

cooperate with his approved visitation plans, telling him that the Children 

would not attend any of those visits. 

(8) In September 2017, Grandmother and Mother appeared at Dr. 

Romirowsky’s office without an appointment while he was in session with 

another patient, demanding that he turn over the Children’s files. Dr. 

Romirowsky explained that he could not release the files unless a proper 

release was signed by both Grandmother and Father. One of the women then 

called the police on her cell phone and began yelling into the phone that the 

doctor was a liar. Dr. Romirowsky testified that one of his patients in the 

waiting room was so disturbed by the ruckus that he left the office. Dr. 
7

Romirowsky also testified that he received a letter from Mother in November 

2017 stating that he was not permitted to have any further contact with the 

Children. 

(9) Dr. Romirowsky expressed the opinion that Mother and 

Grandmother had created a toxic environment for the Children’s reunification 

efforts and had placed enormous pressure on the Children not to have a 

relationship with Father. He believed that the maternal family was planting 

false memories in the Children and, in short, that the Children were being 

“brainwashed.” Dr. Romirowksy testified that, because Grandmother was 

blocking the reunification process, he would not continue undertaking 

reunification therapy while the Children remained under Grandmother’s 

guardianship. 

(10) In addition to Dr. Romirowsky, the Family Court also heard 

testimony from Father, Mother, Grandmother, Father’s stepfather, Mother’s 

father, the Children’s therapist, and Dr. Romirowsky’s office assistant. The 

Family Court also spoke briefly with the Children and listened to numerous 

recorded Skype conversations between Father and the Children, which had 

been made without Father’s knowledge and were offered into evidence by 

Mother and Grandmother. 
8

(11) On February 8, 2018, the Family Court issued a twenty-six page 

opinion, setting forth all of the testimony and evidence presented during the 

three-day hearing (“the Second Contempt Order”).11 The Court concluded 

that the First Contempt Order gave Dr. Romirowsky sole discretion for 

scheduling therapy and visits between Father and the Children. Dr. 

Romirowsky had determined that it was appropriate for Father to go straight 

to community visits with the girls rather than engaging in further therapy 

sessions in Dr. Romirowsky’s office. Thus, Father was not in contempt of the 

First Contempt Order for failing to engage in further counseling with the 

Children before attempting to schedule community visits. The Family Court 

denied Mother and Grandmother’s petition for a rule to show cause. 

(12) As to Father’s petition for a rule to show cause against Mother 

and Grandmother, the Family Court concluded that several of Father’s 

allegations were not supported by clear and convincing evidence. 

Nonetheless, as to Mother, the Family Court found that her letter to Dr. 

Romirowsky, stating that the doctor did not have her permission to engage in 

further therapy sessions with the Children, was a clear violation of the First 

Contempt Order, which provided that Mother and Grandmother were to 

 

11 Costas v. Layton, File No. CN15-04403, Pet. Nos. 17-22998, et al. (Del. Fam. Ct. Feb. 

8, 2018). 
9

follow the schedule set by Dr. Romirowsky and to follow his 

recommendations for treatment. The Family Court ordered Mother to 

reimburse Father’s counsel’s fees and costs incurred in filing and prosecuting 

his contempt petition. 

(13) As to Grandmother, the Family Court concluded that there was 

clear and convincing evidence that she had violated the First Contempt Order 

in multiple ways, including refusing to follow Dr. Romirowsky’s schedule for 

visitation by declaring that further visits “were not going to happen,” by 

disrupting what was left of Dr. Romirowsky’s therapeutic relationship with 

the Children when she appeared unannounced in his office and demanded the 

Children’s files in a belligerent and harassing manner, and by making or 

permitting other family members to make disparaging remarks about Father 

within the Children’s hearing. 

(14) The Family Court further found that Grandmother had failed in 

her statutory responsibilities as guardian of the Children to provide for their 

emotional well-being and to comply with all Court orders because she failed 

to support the Children’s reunification efforts and she allowed Mother daily 

access to the Children and participated with Mother in the continued 

poisoning of the Children against Father. Despite this conclusion, the Family 

Court stayed further consideration of Father’s petition to rescind 
10

Grandmother’s guardianship, pending further reunification efforts with a new 

therapist. To retain a new therapist, Grandmother was ordered to pay $10,000 

to Father’s counsel, who would hold the money in escrow until further order 

of the Court. The Family Court stated that it would schedule a review hearing 

for each Monday following every appointment with the new therapist. 

(15) On February 20, 2018, the Family Court entered its final order 

on attorney’s fees, requiring Mother to pay Father’s attorney $8900 in fees 

and costs, payable at a rate of $200 per month until paid in full (“the 

Attorney’s Fees Order”). Thereafter, on February 23, 2018, the Family Court, 

following a review hearing with the parties on the progress of the reunification 

therapy, issued a modification to the Second Contempt Order, reducing 

Grandmother’s obligation from $10,000 to $2,000 to pay for the reunification 

therapy (“the Revised Contempt Order”). The Family Court gave 

Grandmother until March 14, 2018 to make the payment and noted that the 

first therapy appointment was to be scheduled for March 16, 2018. 

Grandmother never made the payment, and reunification therapy with a new 

therapist never occurred. 

(16) Mother and Grandmother filed these appeals, challenging the 

Second Contempt Order, the Attorney’s Fees Order, and the Revised 

Contempt Order. Although they raise six issues, only four were properly 
11

raised in this appeal.12 First, they contend that the Family Court abused its 

discretion by completely disregarding the testimony of Jennifer Cutrona, the 

Children’s therapist, in favor of Dr. Romirowsky’s testimony. Second, they 

contend that the Family Court erred in finding them in contempt because the 

First Contempt Order required three additional therapy sessions before Dr. 

Romirowsky could approve community visits between Father and the 

Children. Third, they contend that the Family Court’s conclusion that the 

three therapy session anticipated by the First Contempt Order were not 

mandatory reflects judicial bias. And fourth, they contend that the Family 

Court did not conduct a proper interview of the Children. 

(17) In his answering brief, Father raises several points. First, he 

contends that the appeals should be dismissed for Mother and Grandmother’s 

ongoing contempt of the Guardianship Order, the First Contempt Order, the 

Second Contempt Order, and the Revised Contempt Order. Second, Father 

 

12 There are six claims raised in the body of the Argument section of the appellants’ opening 

brief on appeal. These six arguments do not correspond to the six arguments contained in 

the opening brief’s Summary of Argument section. See Murphy v. State, 632 A.2d 1150, 

1152 (Del. 1993) (noting that, under Supreme Court Rule 14(b)(vi)(A)(3), any argument 

that is not raised in the body of the argument section of the opening brief will not be 

considered by the Court on appeal). The following arguments were not properly raised in 

this appeal - the Family Court abused its discretion in accepting Father’s completion of an 

out-of-state domestic violence course as an adequate substitute for a Domestic Violence 

Coordinating Council course, which was previously addressed but was not part of the 

Second Contempt Order, and the Family Court erred in discharging the guardian ad litem

who was appointed to represent the Children during the guardianship proceedings in 2016, 

which was not raised in and was irrelevant to the Second Contempt Order. Supr. Ct. R. 8. 
12

contends that any issue about Grandmother’s payment for reunification 

therapy is moot because, after these appeals were filed, the Family Court 

rescinded Grandmother’s guardianship of the Children and awarded Father 

custody. Finally, Father asserts that, if this Court reaches the merits of the 

appeals, the judgments of the Family Court should be affirmed because: (i) 

the Family Court did not err in denying the petition for contempt against 

Father; (ii) the Family Court did not err in finding both Mother and 

Grandmother in contempt of the First Contempt Order; and (iii) the Family 

Court did not err in ordering Mother to pay $8900 in legal fees as a sanction 

for her contempt. 

(18) Our review of a Family Court order extends to the facts and the 

law as well as to the inferences and deductions made by the trial judge.13 If 

the Family Court has correctly applied the law, our standard of review is 

abuse of discretion.14 Although we have a duty to review the sufficiency of 

the evidence and to the test the propriety of the trial court’s factual findings, 

we will not overturn those findings unless they are unsupported by the record 

or are clearly wrong.15 When the determination of facts turns on a question 

of the credibility and the acceptance or rejection of the testimony of witnesses 

 

13 Wife (J.F.V.) v. Husband (O.W.V., Jr.), 402 A.2d 1202, 1204 (Del. 1979). 

14 Jones v. Lang, 591 A.2d 185, 186 (Del. 1991). 

15 Wife (J.F.V.), 402 A.2d at 1204. 
13

appearing before the trial court, we will not substitute our opinion for that of 

the trier of fact.16

(19) Father argues that we should dismiss these consolidated appeals 

without reaching the merits because of Mother’s and Grandmother’s ongoing 

contempt of the Family Court’s orders. Father relies upon this Court’s ruling 

in Schmidt v. Schmidt,

17 where we held that a party who displays defiance of 

a trial court’s order by refusing to comply with the order should not be 

permitted to appeal the substance of that ruling while persisting in his 

defiance.18 In Schmidt, the appellant sought review of a property division 

order without also seeking review of the Family Court’s order finding him in 

contempt of the property division order. Under those circumstances, we 

concluded that the appellant could not use the judicial process to appeal the 

merits of the underlying property division order. We further noted, however, 

that our dismissal of the appeal was not to be construed as a ruling that one 

held in contempt could not seek review of the contempt determination itself.19

(20) The circumstances in this case are distinguishable from Schmidt. 

In the present case, the parties are only appealing the Family Court’s orders 

 

16 Id. 17 610 A.2d 1374 (Del. 1992). 

18 Id. at 1377. 

19 Id. 
14

finding them in contempt of the court-ordered reunification therapy and 

awarding attorney’s fees and imposing sanctions. The validity of the 

reunification therapy, which was part of a consent order entered in 2016, was 

never appealed and is not at issue here. The parties have a right to seek review 

of the Family Court’s orders related to the contempt proceedings. 

(21) Thus, we have considered the substance of Mother’s and 

Grandmother’s fairly-raised issues on appeal, but we find no merit to their 

arguments. The record reflects, contrary to their assertions, that the Family 

Court carefully considered all of the witnesses’ testimony presented during 

the three-day hearing on the parties’ cross-petitions resulting in the Second 

Contempt Order. The Family Court’s findings that Mother and Grandmother 

were each in contempt of its prior orders regarding the reunification therapy, 

but that Father was not, are supported by clear and convincing evidence in the 

record and are not clearly wrong. 

(22) The First Contempt Order gave Dr. Romirowsky the sole 

discretion to direct the reunification process and warned Mother and 

Grandmother about the potential consequences of their continued interference 

and contempt of the court-ordered reunification. Dr. Romirowsky’s testimony 

at the hearing reflected that Mother wrote to him, saying that he was not 

permitted to have further contact with the Children. Dr. Romirowsky also 
15

testified that Grandmother, among other things, refused to make the Children 

available for visits with Father that were approved by Dr. Romirowsky. 

(23) Under these circumstances, we find no error in the Family 

Court’s findings of contempt. Contrary to the appellants’ argument, the 

Family Court did not abuse its discretion in finding Dr. Romirowsky’s 

testimony to be credible and in giving that testimony more weight than the 

testimony of the witnesses presented by Mother and Grandmother. Such 

credibility determinations are entirely within the judge’s discretion.20 We also 

find no merit to the appellants’ conclusory argument that the weight afforded 

Dr. Romirowsky’s testimony is evidence of judicial bias or their contention 

that the judge conducted an “improper” interview of the Children. Instead, 

we find that the record supports the Family Court’s conclusion that Dr. 

Romirowsky testified credibly about Mother’s and Grandmother’s continuing 

interference with Father’s reunification efforts. The Family Court also 

properly interviewed the Children. We also find no error in the Family 

Court’s rejection for lack of credibility Mother’s and Grandmother’s 

purported justifications for their contemptuous conduct. 

(24) Moreover, we find no abuse of the Family Court’s discretion in 

ordering Mother to pay Father’s attorney’s fees. The Family Court has broad 

 

20 Wife (J.F.V.), 402 A.2d at 1204. 
16

discretion in deciding whether to award attorney’s fees and costs.21 The award 

in this case was to compensate Father’s counsel for the time and effort that 

counsel expended in prosecuting a second contempt petition. Because 

Father’s counsel is representing Father on a pro bono basis, the Family Court 

ordered that Mother would pay a reduced fee, to be forwarded by Father’s 

counsel to a veterans’ legal clinic. There is nothing in the record to support 

Mother’s contention that the Family Court abused its discretion in awarding 

reasonable attorney’s fees, payable in $200 monthly installments until paid in 

full. The award was not arbitrary or unreasonable.22

(25) We also find no abuse of the Family Court’s discretion in 

sanctioning Grandmother for her contemptuous conduct.23 The Family Court 

found that Grandmother’s ongoing defiance and disruption of the courtordered reunification process led Dr. Romirowsky to refuse to provide further 

reunification therapy. As a result of her contempt, the Family Court required 

Grandmother to pay $10,000 (later reduced by the Revised Contempt Order 

to $2000) in order to retain the services of a new reunification therapist. 

 

21 Thomas v. Thomas, 102 A.3d 1138,1150 (Del. 2014). 

22 Id. at 1150-51. 

23 Father argues that this issue was rendered moot by the Family Court’s subsequent 

rescission of Grandmother’s guardianship, which nullified the need for further 

reunification services. Because the rescission of Grandmother’s guardianship is still 

pending appeal in this Court, the Family Court’s contempt sanction against Grandmother 

arguably remains a “continuing justiciable controversy,” which we will address on the 

merits. See Family Court v. Alexander, 522 A.2d 1265, 1268 (Del. 1987). 
17

Under the circumstances, the compensatory sanction was justified and 

reasonable. There is no basis in the record to overturn the Family Court’s 

finding that Grandmother could afford to pay $2000. 

NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS ORDERED that the judgments of the 

Family Court are AFFIRMED. 

 BY THE COURT: 

 /s/ Collins J. Seitz, Jr. 

 Justice