[Cite as State v. McLoyd, 2023-Ohio-3971.]

COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO

EIGHTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

COUNTY OF CUYAHOGA

STATE OF OHIO, :

Plaintiff-Appellee, :

No. 112107

v. :

TAMARA MCLOYD, :

Defendant-Appellant. :

JOURNAL ENTRY AND OPINION

JUDGMENT: AFFIRMED

RELEASED AND JOURNALIZED: November 2, 2023

Criminal Appeal from the Cuyahoga County Court of Common Pleas

Case No. CR-22-669261-B

Appearances:

Michael C. O’Malley, Cuyahoga County Prosecuting 

Attorney, and Brad Meyer, Assistant Prosecuting 

Attorney, for appellee. 

Valore & Gordillo LLP and Michael Gordillo, for 

appellant. 

MARY J. BOYLE, J.:

In this companion appeal, defendant-appellant, Tamara McLoyd 

(“McLoyd”), appeals her convictions and sentence for aggravated robbery, 
kidnapping, improperly handling firearms in a motor vehicle, and having a weapon 

while under disability.

1

 For the reasons set forth below, we affirm.

I. Facts and Procedural History

In April 2022, McLoyd and codefendants Jermaine Hagwood 

(“Hagwood”) and Jada Hite (“Hite”) were charged in a 21-count indictment

stemming from a series of aggravated robberies, which occurred in the cities of 

Cleveland, Lakewood, and Cleveland Heights.2 Count 1 charged each of them with 

the aggravated robbery of Natalie Pape (“Pape”). Counts 2-4 charged each of them 

with the aggravated robbery, kidnapping, and felonious assault of Tanika Ghivens

(“Ghivens”).

3 Counts 5-7 charged each of them with the aggravated robbery, 

kidnapping, and felonious assault of Sherri Gurka (“Gurka”). Count 8 charged each 

of them with the aggravated robbery of Happy Pizza. Count 9 charged each of them 

with the aggravated robbery of Peggy Lyons (“Lyons”). Count 10 charged Hite with 

failure to comply and contained a furthermore specification stating that she 

operated “a motor vehicle so as willfully to elude or flee a police officer after receiving 

a visible or audible signal from a police officer to bring the person’s motor vehicle to 

a stop.” Counts 11 and 21 charged McLoyd with having a weapon while under 

1 This appeal is a companion case to State v. Hagwood, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 

112065 and State v. McLoyd, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 112092.

2 As of the date of this opinion, codefendant Hite has not filed a notice of appeal.

3 In the indictment and jury instructions, this victim was also referred to as “Tinika 

L. Givhan.” For consistency, the victim will be referred to as “Ghivens” throughout, based 

on how the victim spelled her name during trial. 
disability (“HWWUD”). Each of Counts 12, 15, 18, and 20 charged Hagwood with 

HWWUD. Count 13 charged Hite and McLoyd with improperly handling firearms 

in a motor vehicle. Count 14 charged Hite and Hagwood with the aggravated 

robbery of Christina Watters. Count 16 charged Hagwood with the aggravated 

robbery of Lindsay Sovchik. Count 17 charged Hagwood with the kidnapping of L.S. 

(d.o.b. 06/28/16). Count 19 charged McLoyd and Hagwood with the aggravated 

robbery of Madison MacArthur.4

The matter proceeded to a jury trial in August 2022.5 In midst of trial, 

Hite pled guilty to Counts 1, 2, and 10, as amended, and Counts 9 and 14, as charged, 

with Counts 3-8 and Count 13 nolled. The trial court sentenced Hite to a minimum 

of 17 years in prison. The trial then continued with McLoyd and Hagwood, the 

remaining codefendants. Relevant to this appeal, the following evidence was 

adduced at trial.

Natalie Pape Robbery

Pape testified that on November 2, 2021, she “was robbed at 

gunpoint” while walking home from her boyfriend’s house in Lakewood. (Tr. 558.) 

This happened somewhere between 9:00 p.m. – 9:30 p.m. on Bunts Road. Pape 

testified that as she was walking, a man and a woman ran up to her from behind, 

placed an “object” that felt like a gun firmly at her back and chest, demanded her 

4 Each of the counts, except Counts 11, 13, 21 contained various firearm 

specifications.

5 McLoyd elected to have Counts 11 and 21 tried before the bench.
belongings, and took off with her purse in a car parked at Merl Avenue, which 

intersects with Bunts. Pape testified that both assailants were average height, 

wearing dark clothing, medical masks, and hats. Pape testified that her phone, keys, 

debit card, ID, and jewelry, about $105 to $110 in cash, and other miscellaneous 

things were in her purse. There was no video of the robbery, but video from a nearby 

residence was played for the jury that depicted Pape crossing the street and the 

assailants’ vehicle pulling up to the corner of Merl. In two other videos played for 

the jury, the assailants can be observed walking at a rapid pace to catch up to Pape 

and running southbound after the incident. 

After the robbery, Pape walked to a nearby gas station and asked the 

cashier to call the police. Pape gave a statement to Lakewood Police Officer 

Jonathan Schmitz. When Pape returned home, she posted a warning about her 

incident on Facebook. Someone then sent her a video that same night of a robbery 

at Happy’s Pizza, which was approximately three miles away from where her robbery 

occurred. Pape testified that she thought the same people could have carried out 

both incidents “[b]ecause two incidents in one night in a close area ma[d]e [her] 

worried.” (Tr. 572.) Pape further testified that at 9:44 p.m. that night, she received 

an email alert that her debit card had been declined for a transfer to Cash App due 

to a lack of funds in the account. Pape testified Hite’s name was associated with the 

transfer, and she did not know Hite nor did she give Hite permission to use her card. 

Lakewood Police Detective Daniel Hilfiker (“Det. Hilfiker”) testified 

that he was assigned to investigate the Pape robbery. Pape contacted Det. Hilfiker 
the day after the robbery informing him of a robbery at Happy’s Pizza because “she 

felt that the people who had robbed her looked similar to the people who she saw in 

that video.” (Tr. 1455.) Det. Hilfiker then spoke with Cleveland Police, who advised 

that a small four-door, dark colored Nissan Sentra was involved in the Happy’s Pizza 

robbery. Det. Hilfiker then reviewed the video footage from a resident’s house on 

Bunts, which showed that Pape’s assailants arrived in “a blue small four-door 

Sedan” with silver and black rims. Det. Hilfiker testified he believed that the vehicle 

depicted in the Bunts Road surveillance video appeared to be the same vehicle seen 

in surveillance video from the Happy’s Pizza robbery. Det. Hilfiker further testified 

that he learned from Cleveland Police that the Cleveland Heights Police Department 

was investigating a third robbery that occurred the same night involving suspects 

fleeing in a small blue Nissan Sentra. 

Aliyah Nelson (“Nelson”) testified that she was in a relationship with 

Hite in November 2021. Nelson testified that Hite drove a blue Nissan at that time 

and she drove a silver Chevy Cruze. Nelson testified that she and Hite would often 

share their vehicles based on whichever keys were available. On November 4, 2021, 

Nelson was stopped by Cleveland police at the Rite Aid located at Clark and Fulton 

while she was driving the blue Nissan. At the time, Hite was driving Nelson’s Chevy 

Cruze. The police brought Nelson back to the station where her phone was 

confiscated. Nelson’s phone had a text conversation between her and Hite from 

around midnight on November 3, 2021 in which Hite texted Nelson, “I just got in a 

high-speed chase. I need to come to your house or sum.” Nelson replied, “Okay, 
Mya [Nelson’s sister], there. I gotta make a run.” (Tr. 623.) Later that evening, 

Nelson left her home at 5:00 p.m. and returned home the next day at 3:00 a.m. to 

find Hite at her house. They switched cars at some point later in the day on 

November 4, 2021. Nelson testified that Hite never returned her car and that she 

retrieved it from the police after Hite was arrested. Nelson told Det. Hilfiker that 

she took some items from the Chevy Cruze and threw them in the trash. Det. Hilfiker 

found a wine bottle and a pair of brown gloves in the trash. Nelson also told 

Detective Hilfiker the Instagram names “6.twin” and “_t.hefner,” which were 

identified to be McLoyd’s and Hite’s respective Instagram accounts. (Tr. 1499, 1135-

36.) 

Jeffrey Oblock (“Oblock”), a forensic scientist in the DNA department 

at the Cuyahoga County Regional Forensic Science Laboratory, testified that he 

tested the DNA swabs that were submitted from the mouth of the wine bottle and 

the brown gloves. Oblock testified that the DNA swab of the wine bottle matched 

Hagwood and Hite and the swab of the brown gloves matched both McLoyd and 

Hagwood.

Matthew Seabold (“Seabold”), a crime analyst with the Crime 

Strategies Unit of the Cuyahoga County Prosecutor’s Office testified that he reviewed

cell phone records provided by cell phone providers and detectives and “drop[ped]

the records into a mapping program that puts the records on a map.” (Tr. 1368.) 

With regard to McLoyd’s cell phone, her records failed to place her at any of the 

robbery locations from November 2, 2021. Rather, her cell phone records showed 
her phone connecting to towers in a neighborhood in Cleveland during the 

Lakewood and Cleveland Heights robberies and it did not connect to any towers 

during the Happy’s Pizza robbery. 

The Happy’s Pizza Robbery

Gurka testified that in November 2021 she was employed as a cook at 

Happy’s Pizza in Cleveland. On November 2, 2021, Gurka was working with 

Ghivens, who was employed as a driver. At closing time, around 11:00 p.m., the two 

of them were counting the money from one of the cash register drawers. They were 

on a FaceTime video call with their manager for assistance because they had never 

closed the store. While they were on the call, three people came into the store 

through the back door. The assailants demanded that Gurka open the registers. 

Gurka testified that she was unable to comply because she did not know how. As a 

result, one of the assailants struck her in the head twice with a pistol. Gurka testified 

that one of the assailants wore a camouflage jacket and a black hoodie. Gurka was 

unable to see any of their faces, which were covered with masks, and was unable to 

determine the gender of any individual. The assailants then asked for the safe and 

took the two of them to the back room to look for it. After realizing that there was 

no safe, the assailants shoved Gurka and Ghivens into the back room, roughed them 

up, closed the door, and then ran out.

After the assailants left the scene, Gurka and Ghivens called the 

police. The manager, who had been on the FaceTime call, remained on the phone 

and also called the police. Gurka testified that the robbery was captured on 
surveillance video, which was played for the jury. The video depicted a blue Nissan 

pulling up near the door of Happy’s Pizza, with three individuals exiting the vehicle. 

Once inside, Gurka can be observed getting hit in the head because she could not 

open the cash register. The assailants then walked them to the back. The assailants 

can also be observed running out the back of the restaurant and leaving in the same 

car.

Ghivens testified that at the time of the incident, she was employed as 

a driver for Happy’s Pizza. Like Gurka’s testimony, Ghivens testified that her and 

Gurka were closing the store with their manager on FaceTime when the assailants 

entered the store. The male assailant pointed a gun at her face. The assailants led 

them to the back in search of the safe. Ghivens testified that she had a gun in her 

possession that was inoperable. She testified that Happy’s Pizza provided it for the 

delivery drivers for protection during night deliveries. While in the back room, the 

assailants pushed and punched Ghivens. The assailants found the gun and took it 

from Ghivens. Ghivens further testified that one of the assailants struck her in the

head with a gun. 

Cleveland Police Officer Jacob Mullins (“Officer Mullins”) testified 

that on November 2, 2021, he and his partner responded to Happy’s Pizza for a 

robbery. His testimony corroborated Gurka’s and Ghiven’s testimony. Officer 

Mullins testified that he spoke to Gurka and Ghivens on the scene and they informed 

them that two black males and one black female entered the restaurant through the 

rear door and approached them at the cash register. One of the black males held a 
small black firearm and pointed it at both victims. Gurka reported she was struck 

in the head two or three times for not being able to open the register. Ghivens then 

grabbed the keys and opened the cash register, where the other male and female

grabbed roughly $300 and placed it in a to-go bag. At that point, the male with the 

handgun asked if there was a safe in the restaurant. Gurka and Ghivens both stated 

that they did not know if there was a safe, so the male with the handgun stuck the 

firearm in Gurka’s back and forced her into the rear office and the other black male 

and female forced Ghivens into the same office. They were unable to locate the safe, 

so the black male with the handgun then searched Gurka and took her keys. The 

other black male and female searched Ghivens and took her gun, and then 

proceeded to strike both Gurka and Ghivens with the gun before running out the 

back door of the restaurant.

Cleveland Police Detective Zachary New (“Det. New”) testified that he 

also responded to Happy’s Pizza on November 2, 2021. Det. New testified that he 

reviewed the surveillance footage that night. In reviewing the video, Det. New was 

able to determine that the suspect vehicle was a Nissan because of a “chrome-like, 

almost a U-shaped accent” on the front of the vehicle, which is unique to Nissans. 

(Tr. 1118.) From that, and other features of the vehicle, Det. New concluded the 

suspect vehicle was a 2018 or 2019 Nissan Sentra SR with a temporary plate. 

Det. New testified that Hite was arrested on November 4, 2021, when 

she returned the vehicle back to Nelson at her house. Instagram video from Hite’s 

cell phone depicted Hite and McLoyd wearing the same clothes as seen in the 
surveillance video of the Happy’s Pizza robbery. McLoyd was “wearing the puffy 

Columbia jacket, the vest with the gray hoodie underneath and the black face 

mask[.]” (Tr. 1140.) Instagram video also depicted Hite and Hagwood wearing the 

same clothes as depicted in the robbery video. Det. New further testified that in 

Hite’s Instagram videos, McLoyd is holding the black Smith & Wesson M&P Shield 

9 mm handgun, which is the same type of gun that Ghivens reported was stolen from 

her. Det. New testified that they were able to identify McLoyd through Nelson and 

through the photographs on Hite’s phone. Det. New stated, “[O]ne of the pictures 

that we found was actually a picture that [Hite] had taken of [McLoyd’s] driver’s 

license that was stored on her own phone, so it gave all the information from there.” 

(Tr. 1150.) Det. New also found a pair of earrings and a wine bottle in the vehicle 

driven by Hite, which he testified belonged to the Lakewood victim. 

Det. New further testified that Hagwood was identified as the third 

suspect. Police recovered a black Glock 17, 9 mm handgun when he was arrested. 

Det. New testified that the gun the police recovered has similar characteristics to the 

one used during the Happy’s Pizza robbery.

Detective Robert Norman (“Det. Norman”) of the Cleveland Police 

Department also responded to Happy’s Pizza on November 2, 2021. Det. Norman 

testified that he learned that the Instagram handle _t.hefner was associated with

McLoyd and maine_cedar_7103 was associated with Hagwood. Det. Norman 

testified that Instagram records from November 2, 2021, the date of the Happy’s 
Pizza robbery, show McLoyd telling Hagwood that she “has a lick,” a common phrase 

used to denote a potential robbery. 

Peggy Lyons Robbery

Lyons testified she was staying at the Alcazar apartment/hotel 

complex in Cleveland Heights at Cedar. On November 2, 2021, she was walking 

home around 11:50 p.m. from the CVS located at Cedar and Lee Roads when she 

observed two people walking behind her. She stepped to the side to let them pass. 

Instead of passing her however, a female, later identified as McLoyd and a male,

later identified as Hagwood, came up to her and said, “We are going to take your 

purse.” (Tr. 742.) One of the assailants put their hand across Lyons’s back, and then 

McLoyd said, “Give him your purse, or he’ll shoot you.” (Tr. 742-743.) Hagwood 

had a gun pointed at Lyons’s chest “and was like, ‘Give us your purse.’” (Tr. 743.) 

She described the gun as “Black. Had kind of a square at the barrel end of it.” (Tr. 

748.)

Lyons testified that her purse contained her original birth certificate, 

cell phone, driver’s license, a ring, bank statements, debit cards, business cards, and 

her personal contacts. She testified that both individuals were African-American, 

wore black hoodies and face masks, and the female subject had short thick 

dreadlocks. Lyons further testified that right after the initial incident, she followed 

her assailants. She stepped out on the street and happened to observe a police car

approaching. Lyons reported to the officer that her purse was stolen. Lyons further 

reported that the assailants’ vehicle was located at the corner of Lamberton and 
Cedar. She testified that it was a four-door sedan with its flashers on and an 

unknown exterior color. The officer then chased after the car. Lyons continued on 

her walk when she was reapproached by the officer, who advised that the chase was 

called off and asked for details about the event. (Tr. 749, 760.)

After the robbery, Lyons received a bank statement for her stolen 

debit card, which included a Dominion Energy transaction for $1,147.65. Cleveland 

Heights police detectives were able to determine that the Dominion Energy charge 

was connected to the utility bill for Jerrelle and B.H., whom Lyons did not know. 

The detectives learned that Jerrelle Harkness (“Jerrelle”) was in a relationship with 

Hagwood in November 2021. Hagwood and Jerrelle lived together at that time. 

Jerrelle testified that the bill was paid over the phone and the account was under her 

daughter’s name, B.H. Jerrelle further testified that she did not know Lyons.

Cleveland Heights Police Officer Michael Dugan testified that while 

on patrol on November 2, 2021, he observed two people running across Cedar Road 

northbound towards Cedar Hill Baptist Church. As he approached that area, a 

female ran up to his car, yelling “‘They stole my purse,’ and pointed to a vehicle 

pulling out of the east parking lot of Cedar Hill Baptist Church.” (Tr. 994.) He 

attempted to stop the vehicle, which was a blue, Nissan four-door sedan, with his 

lights and sirens. He continued to pursue the vehicle until it was terminated by his 

officer-in-charge.

Cleveland Heights Police Detective William Robinson (“Det. 

Robinson”) testified that he was assigned to investigate the Lyons’s robbery. He 
obtained video footage from surveillance cameras at a medical center near the 

incident. The video was played for the jury. In the video, Lyons and two individuals 

can be observed in the general area and time, but it does not capture the robbery. 

Det. Robinson also testified that he worked with Cleveland and Lakewood police 

looking into any similarities in the robberies. He learned that a blue Nissan was 

involved in both the Cleveland and Lakewood incidents. He further learned that the 

car was located and that Nelson was driving it at the time. The text Nelson shared 

from Hite regarding Hite’s involvement in a high speed chase confirmed their belief 

that this was the same car involved in the Lyons’s robbery.

Following the conclusion of trial, the jury found McLoyd guilty of 

aggravated robbery as charged in Counts 1, 2, 5, 8, and 9, with one- and three-year 

firearms specifications, guilty of kidnapping as charged in Counts 3 and 6, with oneand three-year firearms specifications, and guilty of improperly handling firearms 

in a motor vehicle as charged in Count 13. The jury found McLoyd not guilty of 

felonious assault as charged in Counts 4 and 7, and not guilty of aggravated robbery 

as charged in Count 19. The trial court found McLoyd guilty of HWWUD as charged 

in Count 11 and not guilty of Count 21, which also charged McLoyd of HWWUD.

6

At sentencing, the court found that Counts 2 and 3 and Counts 5 and 

6 were allied offenses of similar import, and that Count 8 was an allied offense of 

Counts 2 and 5. The state elected to proceed to sentencing on Counts 2 and 5. The 

6 Hagwood was found guilty of Counts 1, 2, 5-9, 12, 14, 15, 16, 18, 19, and 20 with 

firearm specifications. The trial court sentenced Hagwood to 49 years in prison.
trial court sentenced McLoyd to six years in prison on Count 1, seven years in prison 

on Count 2, eight years in prison on Count 5, eight years in prison on Count 9, and 

12 months in prison on Count 13. The trial court also sentenced McLoyd to 3 years

in prison for each of the accompanying firearm specifications, for a total of 12 years 

in prison. The trial court found Counts 1, 2, 5, and 9 to be qualifying felonies under 

the Reagan Tokes Law and imposed a term of 8 to 12 years in prison. The court 

ordered that McLoyd was to serve all the firearms specifications consecutively and 

prior to concurrent prison terms on the underlying felonies. McLoyd was also 

sentenced on her two other lower court cases, which were combined in an omnibus 

judgment entry of conviction and sentence resulting in “a net prison term of life 

without first parole eligibility until after 47 years.” (Oct. 7, 2022 Omnibus Judgment 

Entry of Conviction and Sentence in Case Numbers 666570, 669261 and 669473, as 

amended on Oct. 11, 2022.)

McLoyd now appeals, raising the following six assignments of error 

for review:

Assignment of Error One: The trial court prejudiced [McLoyd] and 

committed reversible error by incorrectly advising the petit[ ] jury that 

the grand jury’s indictment meant that the grand jury found [McLoyd]

was “more likely than not” guilty.

Assignment of Error Two: Joinder of [McLoyd]’s and codefendant’s cases for trial was impermissibly prejudicial to [McLoyd]

and constituted plain error.

Assignment of Error Three: [McLoyd]’s convictions are not 

supported by sufficient evidence.

Assignment of Error Four: [McLoyd]’s convictions are against the 

manifest weight of the evidence.
Assignment of Error Five: The trial court committed reversible 

error prejudicing [McLoyd] by permitting the State’s use of expert 

testimony and exhibits given and produced by a witness with no 

expertise.

Assignment of Error Six: The trial court committed reversible 

error prejudicing [McLoyd] when it imposed an unconstitutional 

sentence upon [McLoyd] pursuant to the “Reagan-Tokes Law,” which 

is unconstitutional on its face.

II. Law and Analysis

A. Jury Advisement

In the first assignment of error, McLoyd argues that the trial court 

prejudiced her and committed reversible error by incorrectly advising the petit jury 

that the grand jury’s indictment meant that the grand jury found that McLoyd was 

“more likely than not” guilty.

In the instant case, a review of the records reveals that, prior to jury 

selection, the trial court explained to the prospective jurors the process of a criminal 

case, starting with a defendant’s indictment and grand jury proceedings. The court 

stated:

An indictment is returned when the prosecutor presents evidence to a 

grand jury. When the prosecutor presents evidence to a grand jury, 

that proceeding is almost always one-sided. In other words, the 

Defendant or Defendants or their representatives are not present at the 

grand jury proceedings.

Moreover, a grand jury, which is composed of people like yourselves 

who do this duty for several weeks at a time and hear a fair number of 

cases, it does not have to be unanimous, and a grand jury is only asked 

to determine whether there is probable cause to believe that a person 

suspected of committing a crime committed the crime.
If the grand jury does find probable cause to believe that appears more 

likely than not that the person did commit the crime, then that grand 

jury returns an indictment and it comes here for your consideration. 

* * * 

At trial, though, the Defendants are presumed innocent. That 

presumption stays in place until you as a jury have found that the proof 

is such as to exclude every reasonable doubt of the guilt of any 

particular Defendant on a particular charge.

Reasonable doubt is present when after the jurors have carefully 

considered a charge they cannot say that they are firmly convinced of 

the truth of a charge. Reasonable doubt is a doubt based upon reason 

and common sense. Reasonable doubt is not mere possible doubt, 

because everything related to human affairs or dependent upon moral 

evidence is open to some possible or imaginary doubt. Proof beyond a 

reasonable doubt is proof of such character that an ordinary person 

would be willing to rely and act upon it in the most important of his or 

her affairs.

(Tr. 81-82.)

McLoyd argues that “probable cause” and “probably” do not have the 

same meaning because the probable-cause standard depends on the totality of the 

circumstances and is incapable of precise definition or quantification into 

percentages. She further argues that criminal defendants are entitled to a 

presumption of innocence. 

We note, however, that McLoyd did not object to the trial court’s 

comments, and thus, has waived all but plain error on appeal. State v. Ahmed, 103 

Ohio St.3d 27, 2004-Ohio-4190, 813 N.E.2d 637, ¶ 80, citing State v. Slagle, 65 Ohio 

St.3d 597, 604, 605 N.E.2d 916 (1992); Crim.R. 52(B). “Plain error occurs when, 

but for the error, the outcome of the trial clearly would have been otherwise.” State 
v. Allen, 73 Ohio St.3d 626, 635, 653 N.E.2d 675 (1995), citing State v. Long, 53 Ohio 

St.2d 91, 96-97, 372 N.E.2d 804 (1978). 

As the above statements indicate, immediately after explaining the 

grand jury process, the court then explained that defendants are presumed innocent 

and the burden of proof at trial is beyond a reasonable doubt. We cannot say that 

these remarks rise to the level of plain error. Moreover, the court reexplained the 

beyond-a-reasonable-doubt burden of proof during its charge to the jury at the end 

of trial. (Tr. 1601-1602.) The court clearly differentiated “probable cause” from 

“beyond a reasonable doubt,” and did not lower the prosecution’s burden of proof. 

Therefore, we cannot say that but for the court’s comments during its introductory 

instructions to prospective jurors, the outcome of the trial clearly would have been 

different.

Accordingly, the first assignment of error is overruled.

B. Joinder of Trial

In the second assignment of error, McLoyd argues that she was 

prejudiced by the joinder of her trial with codefendants Hite and Hagwood.7

McLoyd claims that she was found guilty by association with Hite and Hagwood 

because she was convicted of numerous robberies and attendant charges without a 

single witness identifying her, a single DNA match, or a single piece of stolen 

property found in her possession. 

7 We note that Hite pled guilty during trial and the trial continued only with 

McLoyd and Hagwood.
Typically, we review the trial court’s ruling on joinder for an abuse of 

discretion. State v. Quinn, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 110692, 2022-Ohio-2038, ¶ 12, 

citing State v. Lee, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 104682, 2017-Ohio-1449, ¶ 15. However, 

“‘to properly preserve the issue of a trial court’s joinder of indictments for appeal, 

the defendant must object to the joinder of indictments at the time of trial, and at 

the close of the state’s case or at the close of evidence.’” Quinn at ¶ 13, quoting State 

v. Frazier, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga Nos. 106772 and 106773, 2019-Ohio-1433, ¶ 11. 

Because McLoyd failed to object to joinder in the instant case, we review for plain 

error. 

Crim.R. 13 provides that a trial court may order two or more 

indictments to be tried together “if the offenses or the defendants could have been 

joined in a single indictment or information.” Under Crim.R. 8(A), “[t]wo or more 

offenses may be charged in the same indictment * * * if the offenses charged * * * 

are of the same or similar character, or are based on two or more acts or transactions 

connected together or constituting parts of a common scheme or plan, or are part of 

a course of criminal conduct.” 

The Ohio Supreme Court has stated that the “[j]oinder of defendants 

and the avoidance of multiple trials is favored in the law for many reasons. Joinder 

conserves judicial and prosecutorial time, lessens the not inconsiderable expenses 

of multiple trials, diminishes inconvenience to witnesses, and minimizes the 

possibility of incongruous results in successive trials before different juries.” State 

v. Thomas, 61 Ohio St.2d 223, 225, 400 N.E.2d 401 (1980). We recognize that “a
‘joinder cannot result in prejudice if the evidence of the offenses joined at trial is 

simple and direct, so that a jury is capable of segregating the proof required for each 

offense.’” State v. Harris, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 104833, 2017-Ohio-2985, ¶ 13, 

quoting State v. Lytle, 10th Dist. Franklin Nos. 15AP-748 and 15AP-754, 2016-Ohio3532, ¶ 65.

We do not find that the joinder in the instant case prejudiced McLoyd. 

Our review of the record demonstrates that the charges against McLoyd and her 

codefendants were similar in character and were based on two or more acts 

constituting parts of a common scheme or plan under Crim.R. 8(A). Here, McLoyd

was convicted for three aggravated robberies that occurred within hours of each 

other on the night of November 2, 2021. In each incident, the evidence at trial 

demonstrated that she acted together with Hite and Hagwood demanding items 

from the victims. 

Moreover, the jury was able to segregate the proof required for each 

offense and found McLoyd guilty of three out of the four robberies she was charged 

with. “Evidence is ‘simple and direct’ if the trier of fact is capable of segregating the 

proof required for each offense.” State v. Belle, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga Nos. 107046 and

107300, 2019-Ohio-787, ¶ 25, citing State v. Gravely, 188 Ohio App.3d 825, 2010-

Ohio-3379, 937 N.E.2d 136, ¶ 39 (10th Dist.), citing State v. Barnes, 94 Ohio St.3d 

21, 759 N.E.2d 1240 (2002). While there were multiple codefendants and numerous 

charges, the jury, in the instant case, was able to segregate the proof required for 
each offense and found McLoyd not guilty of the charges stemming from the 

November 19, 2021 robbery. 

Because the charges against McLoyd and her codefendants were

similar in character and were based on two or more acts constituting parts of a 

common scheme or plan, and McLoyd was found guilty of some counts and not 

guilty on other counts, it is clear that any association with the codefendants did not 

prejudice McLoyd and did not result in plain error.

Therefore, the second assignment of error is overruled.

C. Sufficiency of the Evidence

In the third assignment of error, McLoyd argues that while there was 

ample evidence to link her codefendants to the crimes, there was insufficient 

evidence to sustain her convictions because there was no testimony identifying her 

as one of the perpetrators. McLoyd claims that she was not identified by a single 

witness, she was not identifiable on any of the video surveillance, she does not own 

either vehicle used in the robberies, her DNA was a minor contributor on a pair of 

gloves, which resemble, but were never proven to be the gloves observed on the 

surveillance footage, and her phone “pinged” off some towers in the general area of 

a few robberies. 

The test for sufficiency requires a determination of whether the 

prosecution met its burden of production at trial. State v. Bowden, 8th Dist. 

Cuyahoga No. 92266, 2009-Ohio-3598, ¶ 12. An appellate court’s function when 

reviewing sufficiency is to determine “‘whether, after viewing the evidence in a light 
most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the 

essential elements of the crime proven beyond a reasonable doubt.’” State v. 

Leonard, 104 Ohio St.3d 54, 2004-Ohio-6235, 818 N.E.2d 229, ¶ 77, quoting State 

v. Jenks, 61 Ohio St.3d 259, 574 N.E.2d 492 (1991), paragraph two of the syllabus. 

With a sufficiency inquiry, an appellate court does not review whether 

the state’s evidence is to be believed but whether, if believed, the evidence admitted 

at trial supported the conviction. State v. Starks, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 91682, 

2009-Ohio-3375, ¶ 25, citing State v. Thompkins, 78 Ohio St.3d 380, 387, 678 

N.E.2d 541 (1997). A sufficiency of the evidence argument is not a factual 

determination, but a question of law. Thompkins at 386. 

In State v. Jones, 166 Ohio St.3d 85, 2021-Ohio-3311, 182 N.E.3d 

1161, the Ohio Supreme Court cautioned:

But it is worth remembering what is not part of the court’s role when 

conducting a sufficiency review. It falls to the trier of fact to ‘“resolve 

conflicts in the testimony, to weigh the evidence, and to draw 

reasonable inferences from basic facts to ultimate facts.’” [State v. 

McFarland, 162 Ohio St.3d 36, 2020-Ohio-3343, 164 N.E.3d 316, ¶ 

24], quoting Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319, 99 S.Ct. 2781, 61 

L.Ed.2d 560 (1979). Thus, an appellate court’s role is limited. It does 

not ask whether the evidence should be believed or assess the 

evidence’s “credibility or effect in inducing belief.” State v. Richardson, 

150 Ohio St.3d 554, 2016-Ohio-8448, 84 N.E.3d 993, ¶ 13, citing 

Thompkins, 78 Ohio St.3d at 386, 678 N.E.2d 541. Instead, it asks 

whether the evidence against a defendant, if believed, supports the 

conviction. Thompkins at 390 (Cook, J., concurring).

Id. at ¶ 16.

Because none of the victims in the instant case could identify McLoyd 

as one of their assailants, the state relied on circumstantial evidence to convict 
McLoyd. We note that “‘[p]roof of guilt may be made by circumstantial evidence, 

real evidence, and direct evidence, or any combination of the three, and all three 

have equal probative value.’” Brook Park v. Gannon, 2019-Ohio-2224, 137 N.E.3d 

701, ¶ 24 (8th Dist.), quoting State v. Zadar, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 94698, 2011-

Ohio-1060, ¶ 18, citing State v. Nicely, 39 Ohio St.3d 147, 529 N.E.2d 1236 (1988);

Jenks, 61 Ohio St.3d 259, 574 N.E.2d 492 (1991). Direct evidence exists when “a 

witness testifies about a matter within the witness’s personal knowledge such that 

the trier of fact is not required to draw an inference from the evidence to the 

proposition that it is offered to establish.” State v. Cassano, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 

97228, 2012-Ohio-4047, ¶ 13. 

In contrast, “circumstantial evidence requires the drawing of 

inferences that are reasonably permitted by the evidence.” Id.; see also State v. 

Hartman, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 90284, 2008-Ohio-3683 (“Circumstantial 

evidence is the proof of facts by direct evidence from which the trier of fact may infer 

or derive by reasoning other facts in accordance with the common experience of 

mankind.” Id. at ¶ 37, citing State v. Griesheimer, 10th Dist. No. 05AP-1039, 2007-

Ohio-837, citing State v. Bentz, 2 Ohio App.3d 352, 442 N.E.2d 90 (1st Dist. 1981).) 

The Ohio Supreme Court has “long held that circumstantial evidence is sufficient to 

sustain a conviction if that evidence would convince the average mind of the 

defendant’s guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.” State v. Heinish, 50 Ohio St.3d 231, 

238, 553 N.E.2d 1026 (1990), citing State v. Walker, 55 Ohio St.2d 208, 212, 378 

N.E. 2d 1049 (1978); State v. Graven, 54 Ohio St.2d 114, 374 N.E. 2d 1370 (1978).
The state presented evidence that three individuals acted in concert 

and participated in a crime spree on the night of November 2, 2021. Each of the 

three robberies had similar descriptions for the vehicle and the assailants involved 

— three individuals and a blue Nissan. “In Ohio, when an individual acts to aid or 

abet a principal in the commission of an offense, the individual and principal are 

equally guilty and the individual is prosecuted and punished as if he were a principal 

offender.” State v. Wingfield, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 107196, 2019-Ohio-1644, ¶ 

65, citing R.C. 2923.03(F).8 

Here, the evidence against McLoyd came from her own conversations 

and Instagram records, which indicate she was with her codefendants when the 

robberies occurred and they were in possession of the clothing worn, firearms used, 

and vehicle used during the times of the robberies. During the day 0f the robberies, 

McLoyd told Hagwood that she had a “lick,” which is a robbery to hit. This message 

indicates both her relation to Hagwood as well as her intention to commit a robbery 

with him that day. Additionally, the video and social media evidence produced at 

trial identifies McLoyd as one of the assailants involved in the three aggravated 

robberies. Surveillance video from Happy’s Pizza depicts three individuals enter 

from the rear of the restaurant, approach the front counter, brandish firearms, 

8 The trial court instructed the jury on complicity, stating that “[f]or each count the 

defendants are not only charged as a principal offender, but they are also charged as a 

person who was complicit in the crimes charged by aiding and abetting another person in 

committing the crimes while acting with the same mental state required to commit the 

crimes.” (Tr. 1625.)
empty the registers, and walk two victims to a small office in the back of the 

restaurant before fleeing in a Nissan Sentra.

Instagram records depict Hite and McLoyd together in the Nissan 

Sentra, just after midnight on November 3, 2021, with cash and firearms and 

wearing the same clothes seen in the surveillance video from Happy’s Pizza. 

Instagram videos were recorded and posted minutes after the Cleveland Heights 

robbery occurred. In the video, Hite is wearing the same black pants and black 

Adidas hoodie and McLoyd is wearing the same hoodie under a black puffer vest 

that the assailants are wearing in the Happy’s Pizza footage. Furthermore, Hite had 

a photo of McLoyd’s driver’s license on her phone, which police used to confirm 

McLoyd’s identity. We find that the foregoing circumstantial evidence, when viewed 

in a light most favorable to the state, identifies McLoyd as one of the assailants, who 

acted in concert with Hite and Hagwood, and supports McLoyd’s convictions.

Therefore, the third assignment of error is overruled.

D. Manifest Weight of the Evidence

In the fourth assignment of error, McLoyd refers to events not 

charged, nor presented in the instant case. It is the appellant’s duty to properly cite 

the alleged error in the record. App.R. 16. App.R. 12 provides appellate courts with 

the discretion to disregard an assignment of error for the failure to comply with 

App.R. 16. Because McLoyd has failed to properly cite the alleged error in the record, 

we decline to address her argument. 
However, even if the manifest weight issue was properly raised in the 

matter before us, we find that this is not the exceptional case in which the evidence 

weighs heavily against a conviction. Thompkins, 78 Ohio St.3d at 387, 678 N.E.2d 

541 (1997), citing State v. Martin, 20 Ohio App.3d 172, 175, 485 N.E.2d 717 (1st 

Dist.1983).

Therefore, the fourth assignment of error is overruled.

E. Mapping of Cell Phone Data Testimony and Exhibits

In the fifth assignment of error, McLoyd, citing to Evid.R. 702, 

contends the trial court committed reversible error by permitting expert testimony 

and exhibits to be introduced into evidence from Seabold, who was a lay witness.9 

Specifically, McLoyd argues that by allowing this testimony, the state is abusing the 

business records exception by getting expert testimony without relying upon an 

expert. 

The admission or exclusion of evidence is a matter left to the trial 

court’s sound discretion and will not be disturbed absent an abuse of discretion. 

State v. Dunn, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 101648, 2015-Ohio-3138, ¶ 40, citing State v. 

Frazier, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 97178, 2012-Ohio-1198, ¶ 17. An abuse of discretion 

occurs when a court exercises “its judgment, in an unwarranted way, in regard to a 

matter over which it has discretionary authority.” Johnson v. Abdullah, 166 Ohio 

St.3d 427, 2021-Ohio-3304, 187 N.E.3d 463, ¶ 35.

9 Evid.R. 702 governs expert testimony.
We initially note that McLoyd’s reliance on Evid.R. 702 is misplaced 

because Seabold was not offered as an expert witness and the trial court did not 

recognize him as such. In fact, a review of the record reveals that Seabold repeatedly 

clarified that he was not an expert. Rather, Seabold explained that he takes the 

information from records provided by the cell phone providers and the detectives 

investigating the cases and generates a map of a defendant’s cell phone location.

Our court has repeatedly found this type of testimony admissible. 

State v. Dunn, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 101648, 2015-Ohio-3138, ¶ 43-46 (a 

layperson could compare the locations depicted on the phone records to the 

corresponding location on the analyst’s site map.); State v. Daniel, 2016-Ohio-5231, 

57 N.E.3d 1203, ¶ 68-72 (8th Dist.) (testimony regarding a comparison of cell phone 

date records to locations where crimes occurred does not require “specialized 

knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education” regarding cellular networks); 

State v. Bradford, 2018-Ohio-1417, 101 N.E.3d 710, ¶ 86 (8th Dist.), citing State v. 

Wilson, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 104333, 2017-Ohio-2980 (cell phone tower 

mapping by a lay person permits an inference to be drawn by the factfinder that the 

cell phone owner was in the area at the listed time and to corroborate other evidence 

of the defendant’s presence at a crime scene); State v. Lucus, 2020-Ohio-1602, 154 

N.E.3d 262, ¶ 98 (8th Dist.) (testimony about the defendant’s cell phone records, 

the location of the cellular tower defendant’s phone connected to, or a map based on 

this information was admissible as lay testimony).
In light of the foregoing, we find that Seabold’s testimony was 

admissible as lay testimony. Furthermore, Seabold’s testimony regarding the 

McLoyd’s cell phone did not appear to have a prejudicial effect because her cell 

phone did not place her at any of the robbery locations for which she was convicted.

Therefore, the fifth assignment of error is overruled.

F. Sentence

In the sixth assignment of error, McLoyd challenges the application 

of the Reagan Tokes Law to her sentence. 

1. Reagan Tokes Law

McLoyd first argues that trial court committed reversible error when 

it imposed an unconstitutional sentence under the Reagan Tokes Law because the 

law violates her constitutional rights to a jury trial, due process, and the separationof-powers doctrine.

10 

In State v. Hacker, Slip Opinion No. 2023-Ohio-2535, the Ohio 

Supreme Court recently addressed similar arguments and found the Reagan Tokes 

Law to be constitutional. The Hacker Court determined the law does not violate the 

separation-of-powers doctrine, the right to a jury trial, or the right to due process. 

Id. at ¶ 41. In light of this ruling, as well as the fact that McLoyd’s arguments do not 

present novel issues or any new theories challenging the constitutional validity of 

10 McLoyd argues in the alternative that the matter should be reviewed for plain 

error because “trial counsel failed to object[.]” A review of the record, however, reveals 

that trial counsel did object to the imposition of the Reagan Tokes Law. (Tr. 1840.) 

Therefore, we decline to review for plain error.
any aspect of the Reagan Tokes Law left unaddressed by the Hacker Court, we find 

these arguments unpersuasive.

2. Prison Term

McLoyd next argues that the trial court failed to comply with R.C. 

2929.144(B)(3) when it imposed “presumptive minimum terms and potential 

maximum terms on all qualifying felonies, not just one.” 

For felony offenses sentenced under the Reagan Tokes Law, the trial 

court is required to impose an indefinite sentence with a stated minimum term 

selected by the court and a calculated maximum term determined in accordance 

with R.C. 2929.144, which provides the framework for the calculation of the 

maximum term. R.C. 2929.14(A)(1)(a). R.C. 2929.144(B)(3) governs the calculation 

of the maximum prison term when there are multiple counts that are to run 

concurrently.

McLoyd argues that the court can only impose a single maximum 

term under R.C. 2929.144(B)(3) based on the use of “term” in the singular. This 

section provides in relevant part:

If the offender is being sentenced for more than one felony, if one or 

more of the felonies is a qualifying felony of the first or second degree, 

and if the court orders that all of the prison terms imposed are to run 

concurrently, the maximum term shall be equal to the longest of the 

minimum terms * * * plus fifty per cent of the longest minimum term 

for the most serious qualifying felony being sentenced.

(Emphasis added.) R.C. 2929.144(B)(3).
However, while R.C. 2929.144 governs the calculation of the 

maximum term, R.C. 2929.14(A) governs the imposition of indefinite sentences. 

State v. Wilson, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 111755, 2023-Ohio-1042, ¶ 68. R.C. 

2929.14(A)(1)(a) provides:

For a felony of the first degree committed on or after the effective date 

of this amendment, the prison term shall be an indefinite prison term 

with a stated minimum term selected by the court of three, four, five, 

six, seven, eight, nine, ten, or 11 years and a maximum term that is 

determined pursuant to section 2929.144 of the Revised Code * * *.

(Emphasis added.)

Both sections state that “‘the prison term shall be an indefinite prison 

term with a stated minimum term selected by the court * * * and a maximum term

that is determined pursuant to section 2929.144 of the Revised Code * * *.”’ 

(Emphasis sic.) State v. Gutierrez-Reynoso, 11th Dist. Lake No. 2022-L-130, 2023-

Ohio-3122, ¶ 93. Thus, under these sections, the trial court is required to impose 

both a stated minimum term and a maximum term determined by the formula set 

forth in R.C. 2929.144. Wilson at ¶ 69; Gutierrez-Reynoso at ¶ 93. This is exactly 

what the trial court did in the instant case.

Therefore, based on the foregoing, the sixth assignment of error is 

overruled.

III. Conclusion

The trial court’s advisement to prospective jurors regarding the grand 

jury’s indictment did not constitute plain error. Neither did McLoyd’s joinder of 

trial with Hite and Hagwood. Based on the jury’s verdict, it is clear that McLoyd was 
not prejudiced by the joinder. We also find that there was sufficient evidence in the 

record to identify McLoyd as one of the assailants who participated in this crime 

spree. McLoyd’s manifest weight challenge was not properly raised. However, even 

if we were to consider it, we find that this is not the exceptional case in which the 

evidence weighs heavily against a conviction. We further find that Seabold’s 

testimony regarding the information he took from cell phone records and the map 

he generated of the defendant’s cell phone location was admissible as lay testimony. 

Lastly, McLoyd’s arguments regarding the constitutionality of the Reagan Tokes 

Law do not present novel issues or new theories challenging the constitutional 

validity of any aspect of law left unaddressed by the Hacker Court. In addition, both 

R.C. 2929.144 and R.C. 2929.14(A) require the trial court to impose both a stated 

minimum term and a maximum term determined by the formula set forth in R.C. 

2929.144, which is exactly what the trial court did in the instant case.

Accordingly, judgment is affirmed.

It is ordered that appellee recover from appellant costs herein taxed.

The court finds there were reasonable grounds for this appeal.

It is ordered that a special mandate issue out of this court directing the 

common pleas court to carry this judgment into execution. The defendant’s 

conviction having been affirmed, any bail pending is terminated. Case remanded to 

the trial court for execution of sentence.
A certified copy of this entry shall constitute the mandate pursuant to Rule 27 

of the Rules of Appellate Procedure.

___________________________

MARY J. BOYLE, JUDGE

ANITA LASTER MAYS, A.J., and

FRANK DANIEL CELEBREZZE, III, J., CONCUR