(Slip Opinion) OCTOBER TERM, 2011 1 

Syllabus 

NOTE: Where it is feasible, a syllabus (headnote) will be released, as is

being done in connection with this case, at the time the opinion is issued.

The syllabus constitutes no part of the opinion of the Court but has been

prepared by the Reporter of Decisions for the convenience of the reader. 

See United States v. Detroit Timber & Lumber Co., 200 U. S. 321, 337. 

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 

Syllabus 

FREEMAN ET AL. v. QUICKEN LOANS, INC. 

CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR 

THE FIFTH CIRCUIT 

No. 10–1042. Argued February 21, 2012—Decided May 24, 2012 

The Real Estate Settlement Procedures Act (RESPA), provides, as relevant here, that “[n]o person shall give and no person shall accept any

portion, split, or percentage of any charge made or received for the 

rendering of a real estate settlement service . . . other than for services actually performed.” 12 U. S. C. §2607(b). Petitioners, three 

couples who obtained mortgage loans from respondent, filed separate

state-court actions, alleging that respondent had violated §2607(b) by

charging them fees for which no services were provided in return. After the cases were removed to federal court and consolidated, respondent sought summary judgment, arguing that petitioners’ claims 

were not cognizable under §2607(b) because the allegedly unearned 

fees were not split with another party. The District Court agreed; 

and because petitioners had not alleged any splitting of fees, it

granted respondent summary judgment. The Fifth Circuit affirmed. 

Held: In order to establish a violation of §2607(b), a plaintiff must

demonstrate that a charge for settlement services was divided between two or more persons. Pp. 3–13.

(a) Section 2607(b) unambiguously covers only a settlement-service

provider’s splitting of a fee with one or more other persons; it cannot 

be understood to reach a single provider’s retention of an unearned 

fee. Pp. 3–11.

(1) Section 2607(b) clearly describes two distinct exchanges.

First, a “charge” is “made” to or “received” from a consumer by a settlement-service provider. That provider then “give[s],” and another

person “accept[s],” a “portion, split, or percentage” of the charge. 

Congress’s use of different sets of verbs, with distinct tenses, to distinguish between the consumer-provider transaction and the feesharing one would be pointless if, as petitioners contend, the two 
 

 

 

 

2 FREEMAN v. QUICKEN LOANS, INC. 

Syllabus 

transactions could be collapsed into one. Their reading—that a 

settlement-service provider can “make” a charge and then “accept” the

portion of the charge consisting of 100 percent—does not avoid collapsing the sequential relationship of the two stages and would destroy the tandem character of activities that the text envisions at

stage two (i.e., a giving and accepting). And if the consumer were the 

person who “give[s]” a “portion, split, or percentage” of the charge to 

the provider who “accepts” it, consumers would become lawbreakers 

themselves. Pp. 3–8.

(2) The normal usage of the terms “portion,” “split,” and “percentage”—which, when referring to a portion or percentage of a 

whole, usually mean less than 100 percent—reinforces the conclusion

that §2607(b) does not apply where a settlement-service provider retains the entirety of a fee received from a consumer. The meaning is 

also confirmed by the “commonsense canon of noscitur a sociis, which 

counsels that a word is given more precise content by the neighboring 

words with which it is associated.” United States v. Williams, 553 

U. S. 285, 294. This connation is not undermined by the canon 

against surplusage. “Portion,” “split,” and “percentage” may all mean

the same thing, but the canon merely favors that interpretation

which avoids surplusage, see Microsoft Corp. v. i4i Ltd. Partnership, 

564 U. S. ___, ___, and petitioners’ interpretation no more achieves 

that end than the Court’s does. Pp. 8–11.

(b) Petitioners’ arguments in favor of their contrary interpretation

are unpersuasive. Section 2607(b), as interpreted here, is not rendered surplusage by §2607(a)’s express prohibition of kickbacks, for

each subsection reaches conduct that the other does not. RESPA’s general purpose—to protect consumers from “certain abusive practices,” 

§2601(a)—also provides no warrant for expanding §2607(b)’s prohibition beyond the field to which it is unambiguously limited: the

splitting of fees paid for settlement services. And giving §2607(b) its

natural meaning would not lead to absurd results. Pp. 11–13. 

626 F. 3d 799, affirmed. 

SCALIA, J., delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court. 
 

 

_________________ 

_________________ 

Cite as: 566 U. S. ____ (2012) 1 

Opinion of the Court 

NOTICE: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the

preliminary print of the United States Reports. Readers are requested to

notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of the United States, Washington, D. C. 20543, of any typographical or other formal errors, in order

that corrections may be made before the preliminary print goes to press. 

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 

No. 10–1042 

TAMMY FORET FREEMAN, ET AL., PETITIONERS v.
 

QUICKEN LOANS, INC. 

ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF
 

APPEALS FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT
 

[May 24, 2012]

 JUSTICE SCALIA delivered the opinion of the Court. 

A provision of the Real Estate Settlement Procedures

Act (RESPA), codified at 12 U. S. C. §2607(b), prohibits 

giving and accepting “any portion, split, or percentage of 

any charge made or received for the rendering of a real

estate settlement service . . . other than for services actually performed.” We consider whether, to establish a violation of §2607(b),1 a plaintiff must demonstrate that a 

charge was divided between two or more persons. 

I 

Enacted in 1974, RESPA regulates the market for real

estate “settlement services,” a term defined by statute 

to include “any service provided in connection with a real 

estate settlement,” such as “title searches, . . . title insurance, services rendered by an attorney, the preparation 

of documents, property surveys, the rendering of credit 

reports or appraisals, . . . services rendered by a real 

estate agent or broker, the origination of a federally re-

—————— 

1This and all subsequent section references pertain to Title 12 unless 

otherwise specified. 
 

 

2 FREEMAN v. QUICKEN LOANS, INC. 

Opinion of the Court 

lated mortgage loan[2] . . . , and the handling of the processing, and closing or settlement.” §2602(3). Among

RESPA’s consumer-protection provisions is §2607, which 

directly furthers Congress’s stated goal of “eliminat[ing] 

. . . kickbacks or referral fees that tend to increase unnecessarily the costs of certain settlement services,” 

§2601(b)(2). Section 2607(a) provides: 

“No person shall give and no person shall accept 

any fee, kickback, or thing of value pursuant to any

agreement or understanding, oral or otherwise, that 

business incident to or a part of a real estate settlement service involving a federally related mortgage

loan shall be referred to any person.” 

The neighboring provision, subsection (b), adds the 

following: 

“No person shall give and no person shall accept 

any portion, split, or percentage of any charge made

or received for the rendering of a real estate settlement service in connection with a transaction involving a federally related mortgage loan other than for 

services actually performed.” 

These substantive provisions are enforceable through, inter alia, actions for damages brought by consumers of 

settlement services against “[a]ny person or persons who 

violate the prohibitions or limitations” of §2607, with

recovery set at an amount equal to three times the charge 

paid by the plaintiff for the settlement service at issue.

§2607(d)(2).

Petitioners in this case are three married couples who

obtained mortgage loans from respondent Quicken Loans, 

Inc. In 2008, they filed separate actions in Louisiana state 

court, alleging, as pertinent here, that respondent had 

—————— 

2The statutory definition of “federally related mortgage loan” is set

forth in §2602(1). 
 

Cite as: 566 U. S. ____ (2012) 3 

Opinion of the Court 

violated §2607(b) by charging them fees for which no 

services were provided. In particular, the Freemans and

the Bennetts allege that they were charged loan discount 

fees of $980 and $1,100, respectively, but that respondent 

did not give them lower interest rates in return. The 

Smiths’ allegations focus on a $575 loan “processing fee” 

and a “loan origination” fee of more than $5,100.3

 Respondent removed petitioners’ lawsuits to federal 

court, where the cases were consolidated. Respondent

thereafter moved for summary judgment on the ground 

that petitioners’ claims are not cognizable under §2607(b)

because the allegedly unearned fees were not split with

another party. The District Court agreed; and because 

petitioners did not allege any splitting of fees it granted

summary judgment in favor of respondent.

A divided panel of the United States Court of Appeals 

for the Fifth Circuit affirmed. 626 F. 3d 799 (2010). We 

granted certiorari. 565 U. S. ___ (2011). 

II 

The question in this case pertains to the scope of

§2607(b), which as we have said provides that “[n]o person 

shall give and no person shall accept any portion, split, or

percentage of any charge made or received for the rendering of a real estate settlement service . . . other than for 

services actually performed.” The dispute between the

parties boils down to whether this provision prohibits the 

—————— 

3Respondent maintains that at least the “loan origination” fee

charged to the Smiths was in fact a mislabeled loan discount fee, like 

the allegedly unearned fees charged to the Freemans and the Bennetts.

Respondent contends that loan discount fees fall outside the scope of

§2607(b) because they are not fees for settlement services, but rather, 

as the Eleventh Circuit has held, are part of the pricing of a loan. See 

Wooten v. Quicken Loans, Inc., 626 F. 3d 1187 (2010). Petitioners 

dispute this point on the merits and further argue that respondent

forfeited the contention in the lower courts. We express no view on this

issue. 
 

 

4 FREEMAN v. QUICKEN LOANS, INC. 

Opinion of the Court 

collection of an unearned charge by a single settlementservice provider—what we might call an undivided unearned fee—or whether it covers only transactions in

which a provider shares a part of a settlement-service

charge with one or more other persons who did nothing to 

earn that part.

Petitioners’ argument that the former interpretation

should prevail finds support in a 2001 policy statement 

issued by the Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD), the agency that was until recently authorized by Congress to “prescribe such rules and regulations”

and “to make such interpretations” as “may be necessary

to achieve the purposes of [RESPA],” §2617(a).4 That 

policy statement says that §2607(b) “prohibit[s] any 

person from giving or accepting any unearned fees, i.e.,

charges or payments for real estate settlement services 

other than for goods or facilities provided or services performed.” 66 Fed. Reg. 53057 (2001). It “specifically interprets [§2607(b)] as not being limited to situations where at

least two persons split or share an unearned fee.” Ibid. 

More broadly, the policy statement construes §2607(b) as

authority for regulation of the charges paid by consumers

for the provision of settlements. It says that “a settlement 

service provider may not mark-up the cost of another 

provider’s services without providing additional settlement services; such payment must be for services that are 

actual, necessary and distinct.” Id., at 53059. Moreover, 

in addition to facing liability when it collects a fee that is 

—————— 

4On July 21, 2011, HUD’s consumer-protection functions under the 

RESPA were transferred to the Bureau of Consumer Financial Protection. See Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection 

Act, §§1061(b)(7) and (d), 1062, 1098, 1100H, 124 Stat. 2038, 2039–

2040, 2103–2104, 2113. That day, the Bureau issued a notice stating

that it would enforce HUD’s RESPA regulations and that, pending 

further Bureau action, it would apply HUD’s previously issued official

policy statements regarding RESPA. 76 Fed. Reg. 43570–43571. 
 

Cite as: 566 U. S. ____ (2012) 5 

Opinion of the Court 

entirely unearned, a provider may also “be liable under 

[§2607(b)] when it charges a fee that exceeds the reasonable value of goods, facilities, or services provided,” ibid., on 

the theory that the excess over reasonable value constitutes a “portion” of the charge “other than for services

actually performed,” §2607(b).

The last mentioned point, however, is manifestly inconsistent with the statute HUD purported to construe. 

When Congress enacted RESPA in 1974, it included a

directive that HUD make a report to Congress within five

years regarding the need for further legislation in the 

area. See §2612(a) (1976 ed.). Among the topics required

to be included in the report were “recommendations on

whether Federal regulation of the charges for real estate

settlement services in federally related mortgage transactions is necessary and desirable,” and, if so, recommendations with regard to what reforms should be adopted. 

§2612(b)(2). The directive for recommendations regarding 

the desirability of price regulation would make no sense

if Congress had already resolved the issue—if §2607(b) 

already carried with it authority for HUD to proscribe the

collection of unreasonably high fees for settlement services, i.e., to engage in price regulation. 

No doubt recognizing as much, petitioners do not fully 

adopt HUD’s construction of §2607(b). Noting that even

those Courts of Appeals which have found §2607(b) not to

be limited to fee-splitting situations have held that the

statute does not reach unreasonably high fees, see Kruse 

v. Wells Fargo Home Mortgage, Inc., 383 F. 3d 49, 56 (CA2 

2004); Santiago v. GMAC Mortgage Group, Inc., 417 F. 3d 

384, 387 (CA3 2005); Friedman v. Market Street Mortgage 

Corp., 520 F. 3d 1289, 1297 (CA11 2008), petitioners acknowledge that the statute does not cover overcharges.

They nonetheless embrace HUD’s construction of §2607(b) 

insofar as it holds that a provider violates the statute by

retaining a fee after providing no services at all in return. 
 

6 FREEMAN v. QUICKEN LOANS, INC. 

Opinion of the Court 

In short, petitioners contend that, by allegedly charging each of them an unearned fee, respondent “accept[ed]” 

a “portion, split, or percentage” of a settlement, service 

charge (i.e., 100 percent of the charge) “other than for 

services actually performed.” §2607(b) (2006 ed.).

The parties vigorously dispute whether the position set 

forth in HUD’s 2001 policy statement should be accorded

deference under the framework announced by this Court 

in Chevron U. S. A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense 

Council, Inc., 467 U. S. 837 (1984). We need not resolve 

that dispute—or address whether, if Chevron deference 

would otherwise apply, it is eliminated by the policy 

statement’s palpable overreach with regard to price controls. For we conclude that even the more limited position

espoused by the policy statement and urged by petitioners 

“goes beyond the meaning that the statute can bear,” MCI 

Telecommunications Corp. v. American Telephone & Telegraph Co., 512 U. S. 218, 229 (1994). In our view, 

§2607(b) unambiguously covers only a settlement-service 

provider’s splitting of a fee with one or more other persons;

it cannot be understood to reach a single provider’s retention of an unearned fee.5 

By providing that no person “shall give” or “shall accept”

a “portion, split, or percentage” of a “charge” that has been

“made or received,” “other than for services actually performed,” §2607(b) clearly describes two distinct exchanges. 

First, a “charge” is “made” to or “received” from a consumer by a settlement-service provider. That provider then

“give[s],” and another person “accept[s],” a “portion, split,

or percentage” of the charge. Congress’s use of different 

sets of verbs, with distinct tenses, to distinguish between 

—————— 

5Petitioners also contend that the position set forth in the 2001 policy

statement is consistent with a HUD regulation, 24 CFR §3500.14(c)

(2011), and with prior administrative guidance. In light of our conclusion that §2607(b) unambiguously forecloses petitioners’ position, we 

have no need to address this issue. 
 

Cite as: 566 U. S. ____ (2012) 7 

Opinion of the Court 

the consumer-provider transaction (the “charge” that is 

“made or received”) and the fee-sharing transaction (the 

“portion, split, or percentage” that is “give[n]” or “accept[ed]”) would be pointless if, as petitioners contend, the

two transactions could be collapsed into one. 

Petitioners try to merge the two stages by arguing

that a settlement-service provider can “make” a charge 

(stage one) and then “accept” (stage two) the portion 

of the charge consisting of 100 percent. See Reply Brief

for Petitioners 6. But then is not the provider also “receiv[ing]” the charge at the same time he is “accept[ing]”

the portion of it? And who “give[s]” the portion of the

charge consisting of 100 percent? The same provider who

“accept[s]” it? This reading does not avoid collapsing the

sequential relationship of the two stages, and it would 

simply destroy the tandem character of activities that the 

text envisions at stage two (i.e., a giving and accepting).

Petitioners seek to avoid this consequence, at stage two

at least, by saying that the consumer is the person who

“give[s]” a “portion, split, or percentage” of the charge to

the provider who “accept[s]” it. See Brief for Petitioners 

21; Reply Brief for Petitioners 5. But since under this 

statute it is (so to speak) as accursed to give as to receive, 

this would make lawbreakers of consumers—the very

class for whose benefit §2607(b) was enacted, see §2601. It 

is no answer to say that a consumer would not face damages liability because a violator is liable only “to the

person or persons charged for the settlement service,” 

§2607(d)(2), and it would not make sense to render a

consumer liable to himself. It is the logical consequence

that a consumer would be liable to himself, not the specter 

of actual damages liability, which provides strong indication that something in petitioners’ interpretation is amiss. 

At any rate, §2607(b) is also enforceable through criminal prosecutions, §2607(d)(1), and actions for injunctive 

relief brought by federal and state regulators, §2607(d)(4). 
 

8 FREEMAN v. QUICKEN LOANS, INC. 

Opinion of the Court 

HUD’s 2001 policy statement asserts that “HUD is, of 

course, unlikely to direct any enforcement actions against 

consumers for the payment of unearned fees,” 66 Fed. Reg. 

53059, n. 6, but that assurance is cold comfort. Moreover, 

even assuming (as seems realistic) that the Justice Department would be similarly reluctant to prosecute consumers for criminal violations of §2607(b), “prosecutorial

discretion is not a reason for courts to give improbable

breadth to criminal statutes.” Abuelhawa v. United 

States, 556 U. S. 816, 823, n. 3 (2009). 

Nor is the problem of consumer criminal liability solved

by petitioners’ suggestion that an unstated mens rea 

requirement be read into the criminal enforcement provision, §2607(d)(1), see, e.g., Staples v. United States, 511 

U. S. 600, 605 (1994). If that would excuse only those

consumers who are unaware that they are paying for 

unearned services, some consumers would remain criminally liable—those who know that the fee is unearned but 

decide to pay it anyway, perhaps because the provider’s

proposal is still the best deal. And if it would immunize 

all consumers, the statute’s criminalization of the entire 

“giving” portion of consumer-provider transactions would

make little sense. We find it virtually unthinkable that 

Congress would leave it to imputed mens rea to preserve

from criminal liability some or all of the class RESPA was 

designed to protect—and entirely unthinkable that Congress would have created that strange disposition through

language as obscure as that relied upon here.

The phrase “portion, split, or percentage” reinforces

the conclusion that §2607(b) does not cover a situation in

which a settlement-service provider retains the entirety of 

a fee received from a consumer. It is certainly true that

“portion” or “percentage” can be used to include the entirety, 

or 100 percent. See, e.g., 18 U. S. C. §648 (“portion”); 5

U. S. C. §8348(g) (2006 ed., Supp. IV) (“percentag[e]”);

5 U. S. C. §8351(b)(2)(B) (2006 ed.) (same); 12 U. S. C. 
Cite as: 566 U. S. ____ (2012) 9 

Opinion of the Court 

§1467a(m)(7)(B)(ii)(II) (same). But that is not the normal 

meaning of “portion” when one speaks of “giv[ing]” or

“accept[ing]” a portion of the whole, as dictionary definitions uniformly show.6 Aesop’s fable would be just as

wryly humorous if the lion’s claim to the entirety of the

kill he hunted in partnership with less ferocious animals

had been translated into English as the “lion’s portion” 

instead of the lion’s share. As for “percentage,” that word 

can include 100 percent—or even 300 percent—when it

refers to merely a ratable measure (“unemployment claims 

were up 300 percent”).7 But, like “portion,” it normally

means less than all when referring to a “percentage” of 

a specific whole (“he demanded a percentage of the profits”).8 And it is normal usage that, in the absence of contrary indication, governs our interpretation of texts. 

Crawford v. Metropolitan Government of Nashville and 

Davidson Cty., 555 U. S. 271, 276 (2009); Asgrow Seed Co. 

v. Winterboer, 513 U. S. 179, 187 (1995). 

—————— 

6See, e.g., Webster’s New International Dictionary 1924 (2d ed. 1954)

(hereinafter Webster’s) (defs. 1, 4: defining “portion” as “[a]n allotted

part; a share; a parcel; a division in a distribution[;] . . . [a] part of 

a whole”); 12 Oxford English Dictionary 154–155 (2d ed. 1989) (hereinafter OED) (defs. 1a, 5: defining “portion” as “[t]he part (of anything) allotted or belonging to one person; a share[;] . . . [a] part of 

any whole”); American Heritage Dictionary 1373 (5th ed. 2011) (def. 1: 

defining “portion” as “[a] section or quantity within a larger thing; a

part of a whole”). 7See, e.g., Webster’s 1815 (def. 1: defining “percentage” as “[a] certain

rate per cent”); 11 OED 521 (def. a: defining “percentage” as “[a] rate or

proportion per cent”). 8See, e.g., Webster’s 1815 (def. 1: defining “percentage” as “a part or

proportion of a whole expressed as so much or many per hundred”); 11

OED 521 (def. a: defining “percentage” as “a quantity or amount reckoned as so much in the hundred, i.e. as so many hundredth parts of 

another, esp. of the whole of which it is a part; hence loosely, a part or

portion considered in its quantitative relation to the whole”); American 

Heritage Dictionary, supra, at 1307 (def. 2: defining “percentage” as

“[a] proportion or share in relation to a whole; a part”). 
 

10 FREEMAN v. QUICKEN LOANS, INC. 

Opinion of the Court 

In the present statute, that meaning is confirmed by the

“commonsense canon of noscitur a sociis—which counsels 

that a word is given more precise content by the neighboring words with which it is associated.” United States v. 

Williams, 553 U. S. 285, 294 (2008). For “portion” and 

“percentage” do not stand in isolation, but are part of a

phrase in which they are joined together by the intervening word “split”—which, as petitioners acknowledge, Brief

for Petitioners 19, cannot possibly mean the entirety. We 

think it clear that, in employing the phrase “portion, split,

or percentage,” Congress sought to invoke the words’ 

common “core of meaning,” Graham County Soil and 

Water Conservation Dist. v. United States ex rel. Wilson, 

559 U. S. ___, ___, n. 7 (2010) (slip op., at 7, n. 7), which is

to say, a part of a whole. That is so even though the 

phrase is preceded by “any”—a word that, we have observed, has an “‘expansive meaning,’” Department of 

Housing and Urban Development v. Rucker, 535 U. S. 125, 

131 (2002). Expansive, yes; transformative, no. It can 

broaden to the maximum, but never change in the least, 

the clear meaning of the phrase selected by Congress here. 

Contrary to petitioners’ contention, the natural connotation of “portion, split, or percentage” is not undermined in 

this context by our “general ‘reluctan[ce] to treat statutory

terms as surplusage.’” Board of Trustees of Leland Stanford Junior Univ. v. Roche Molecular Systems, Inc., 563 

U. S. ___, ___ (2011) (slip op., at 9) (quoting Duncan v. 

Walker, 533 U. S. 167, 174 (2001)). Petitioners rightly

point out that under our interpretation “portion,” “split,”

and “percentage” all mean the same thing—a perhaps

regrettable but not uncommon sort of lawyerly iteration 

(“give, grant, bargain, sell, and convey”). But the canon 

against surplusage merely favors that interpretation

which avoids surplusage, see Microsoft Corp. v. i4i Ltd. 

Partnership, 564 U. S. ___, ___–___ (2011) (slip op., at 12–

13)—and petitioners’ interpretation no more achieves that 
 

Cite as: 566 U. S. ____ (2012) 11 

Opinion of the Court 

end than ours does. It is impossible to imagine a “portion”

(even a portion consisting of the entirety) or a “split” that

is not also a “percentage.” 

Petitioners invoke the presumption against surplusage

a second time, urging that if §2607(b) is not construed

to reach undivided unearned fees, it would be rendered 

“largely surplusage” in light of §2607(a)’s express prohibition of kickbacks. Brief for Petitioners 24. Not so. Section 

2607(a) prohibits giving or accepting “any fee, kickback, or 

thing of value pursuant to any agreement or understanding . . . that business incident to or a part of a real estate

settlement service . . . shall be referred to any person.”

§2607(a). That prohibition is at once broader than 

§2607(b)’s (because it applies to the transfer of any “thing 

of value,” rather than to the dividing of a “charge” paid

by a consumer) and narrower (because it requires an 

“agreement or understanding” to refer business). Thus, a 

settlement-service provider who agrees to exchange valuable

tickets to a sporting event in return for a referral of business would violate §2607(a), but not §2607(b). So too a 

provider who agrees to pay a monetary referral fee that is

not tied in any respect to a charge paid by a particular

consumer—for instance, a “retainer” agreement pursuant

to which the provider pays a monthly lump sum in exchange for the recipient’s agreement to refer any business

that comes his way. By contrast, a settlement-service 

provider who gives a portion of a charge to another person

who has not rendered any services in return would violate

§2607(b), even if an express referral arrangement does 

not exist or cannot be shown. In short, each subsection 

reaches conduct that the other does not; there is no 

need to adopt petitioners’ improbable reading of §2607(b) 

to avoid rendering any portion of §2607 superfluous.

It follows that petitioners can derive no support from

§2607’s caption: “Prohibition against kickbacks and unearned fees.” Subsection (a) prohibits certain kickbacks 
 

 

 

 

12 FREEMAN v. QUICKEN LOANS, INC. 

Opinion of the Court 

(those agreed to in exchange for referrals) and subsection

(b) prohibits certain unearned fees (those paid from a part

of the charge to the customer).9 

Petitioners also appeal to statutory purpose, arguing 

that a prohibition against the charging of undivided unearned fees would fit comfortably with RESPA’s stated 

goal of “insur[ing] that consumers . . . are protected from

unnecessarily high settlement charges caused by certain

abusive practices,” §2601(a). It bears noting that RESPA’s

declaration of purpose is by its terms limited to “certain 

abusive practices”—making the statute an even worse 

candidate than most for the expansion of limited text by 

the positing of an unlimited purpose. RESPA’s particular

language ultimately serves to drive home a broader point:

“[N]o legislation pursues its purposes at all costs,” Rodriguez v. United States, 480 U. S. 522, 525–526 (1987) (per 

curiam), and “[e]very statute purposes, not only to achieve 

certain ends, but also to achieve them by particular

means,” Director, Office of Workers’ Compensation Programs v. Newport News Shipbuilding & Dry Dock Co., 514 

U. S. 122, 136 (1995). Vague notions of statutory purpose 

—————— 

9The United States, as amicus curiae, raises an additional argument

from the statutory context: that coverage of undivided unearned fees 

in §2607(b) can be inferred from the text of §2607(d), which sets out

penalties for the “person or persons” who violate §2607(a) or §2607(b).

§2607(d)(1), (2), and (3) (emphasis added). But Congress’s use of

the singular “person” does not remotely establish that §2607(b) can be

violated by a single culpable actor who accepts an unearned charge 

from a consumer. In fact, any such inference is negated by the history 

of §2607. When RESPA was first enacted, §2607(d) separately provided

for damages liability of “any person or persons who violate the provisions of subsection (a)” and of “any person or persons who violate the

provisions of subsection (b).” §2607(d)(2) (1976 ed.). Because §2607(a),

with its reference to an “agreement or understanding,” has always

required two culpable parties for a violation, Congress’s use of the

phrase “any person or persons” in connection with that subsection

demonstrates that the phrase does not have the significance attributed

to it by the United States. 
 

 

 

Cite as: 566 U. S. ____ (2012) 13 

Opinion of the Court 

provide no warrant for expanding §2607(b)’s prohibition

beyond the field to which it is unambiguously limited: the

splitting of fees paid for settlement services.

Nor is there any merit to petitioners’ related contention

that §2607(b) should not be given its natural meaning 

because doing so leads to the allegedly absurd result of

permitting a provider to charge and keep the entirety of a 

$1,000 unearned fee, while imposing liability if the provider shares even a nickel of a $10 charge with someone else.

That result does not strike us as particularly anomalous.

Congress may well have concluded that existing remedies,

such as state-law fraud actions, were sufficient to deal 

with the problem of entirely fictitious fees, whereas legislative action was required to deal with the problems posed 

by kickbacks and fee splitting. 

In any event, petitioners’ reading of the statute leads to 

an “absurdity” of its own: Because §2607(b) manifestly 

cannot be understood to prohibit unreasonably high fees, 

see supra, at 5, a service provider could avoid liability by

providing just a dollar’s worth of services in exchange for 

the $1,000 fee. Acknowledging that §2607(b)’s coverage is

limited to fee-splitting transactions at least has the virtue 

of making it a coherent response to that particular problem, rather than an incoherent response to the broader 

problem of unreasonably high fees. 

* * * 

In order to establish a violation of §2607(b), a plaintiff 

must demonstrate that a charge for settlement services 

was divided between two or more persons. Because petitioners do not contend that respondent split the challenged charges with anyone else, summary judgment was

properly granted in favor of respondent. We therefore 

affirm the judgment of the Court of Appeals. 

It is so ordered.