Federal Register / Vol. 63, No. 83 /Thursday, April 30, 1998 / Notices 23813

For further details with respect to this

action, see the application for

amendment dated February 10, 1998,

and the licensee’s letter dated March 31,

1998, which withdrew the application

for license amendment. The above

documents are available for public

inspection at the Commission’s Public

Document Room, the Gelman Building,

2120 L Street, NW., Washington, DC,

and at the local public document room

located at the Minneapolis Public

Library, Technology and Science

Department, 300 Nicollet Mall,

Minneapolis, Minnesota 55401.

Dated at Rockville, Maryland, this 24th day

of April 1998.

For the Nuclear Regulatory Commission.

Tae Kim,

Senior Project Manager, Project Directorate

III–1, Division of Reactor Projects—III/IV,

Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation.

[FR Doc. 98–11501 Filed 4–29–98; 8:45 am]

BILLING CODE 7590–01–P

NUCLEAR REGULATORY

COMMISSION

[Docket No. 70–7001 Certificate No. GDP–

1 EA 98–156]

In the Matter of United States

Enrichment Corporation Bethesda,

MD; Confirmatory Order Modifying

Certificate (Effective Immediately)

I

United States Enrichment Corporation

(Corporation) is the holder of Certificate

No. GDP–1 issued by the Nuclear

Regulatory Commission (NRC or

Commission) pursuant to 10 CFR Part

76. The certificate authorizes the

Corporation to operate the Paducah

Gaseous Diffusion Plant (Paducah) for

the purpose of enriching uranium up to

2.75 percent 235U by weight. The

certificate, originally issued on

November 26, 1996, is due to expire on

December 31, 1998.

II

Since transition to NRC regulatory

oversight on March 3, 1997, the

Corporation has been operating its

withdrawal facilities (Buildings C–310/

310A and C–315) with liquid uranium

hexafluoride (UF6) inventories in

process piping, condensers, and

accumulators. The certificate conditions

placed no restrictions on those

inventories, thereby allowing the

accumulators to contain any amount up

to their full capacity. A certificate

amendment request dated October 31,

1997, submitted by the Corporation,

requested an update to the Safety

Analysis Report (SAR) to include a new

Chapter 4, ‘‘Accident Analysis.’’ An

NRC request for additional information

(RAI) dated February 5, 1998, identified

questions about the conservative nature

of assumptions for the seismic accident

scenario in Chapter 4. In response to the

RAI, the Corporation reviewed

Paducah’s liquid UF6 withdrawal

facilities’ records and determined that

the seismic accident analysis

assumption of no liquid UF6 in both

facilities’ accumulators underestimated

the potential source term from the

withdrawal facilities for the seismic

accident scenario. In telephone

discussions with the NRC on February

18, 1998, the NRC made it clear to the

Corporation that a notification pursuant

to 10 CFR 76.9(b) was warranted.

Thereafter, the Corporation provided

verbal notification to NRC Region III on

February 19, 1998, and a follow-up

written report on February 20, 1998,

identifying the potential

nonconservative assumption in the SAR

updated accident analysis. Then, on

February 24, 1998, in telephone

discussions with NRC, the Corporation

also provided information that the

withdrawal facilities’ current operations

were outside the Certification SAR

because the Chapter 4 seismic accident

analysis assumed no liquid UF6 in

Building C–315 withdrawal facility’s

process piping, condensers, and

accumulators. In addition, the source

term from Building C–310/310A was

probably too low.

Based on the NRC’s review of the

certificate amendment request dated

October 31, 1997, submitted by the

Corporation and the current

Certification SAR, the NRC has

concluded that violations of NRC

requirements occurred. The violations

involve an inadequate accident analysis

and a failure to comply with the

conditions of certification. The

Commission’s regulations in 10 CFR

76.85 require the Corporation, as the

certificate holder, to perform an analysis

of potential accidents and consequences

to establish the basis for limiting

conditions for operations and to provide

assurance that plant operation will be

conducted in a manner to prevent or to

mitigate the consequences from a

reasonable spectrum of postulated

accidents, including natural

phenomena. Further, 10 CFR 76.85

requires that the assessment consider

the full range of operations, including

operations at the maximum capacity

contemplated. The Commission’s

regulations in 10 CFR 76.51 require the

Corporation, as the certificate holder, to

comply with the conditions set forth in

the Certificate of Compliance. Condition

8 of the Certificate of Compliance (GDP–

1) for the Paducah Gaseous Diffusion

Plant requires the Corporation to

conduct its operations in accordance

with the statements and representations

contained in the certification

application and subsequent

amendments. The certification

application includes Safety Analysis

Report (SAR) Chapter 4, ‘‘Accident

Analysis,’’ Section 4.6, ‘‘Natural

Phenomena,’’ describing assumptions

made on facility operations to determine

the consequences of postulated

seismically-induced failures. The

Chapter 4 seismic accident analysis is

based on an inappropriately low

assumption of the amount of liquid UF6

in Buildings C–310/310A and C–315

withdrawal facilities’ process piping,

condensers, and accumulators in

calculating the possible releases.

Current facility configuration and

operations are such that significantly

higher volumes (on the order of several

thousand pounds (lbs)) of liquid UF6

may be present. Therefore the accident

analysis in the Certification SAR is not

in compliance with 10 CFR 76.85 and

operation of that facility is not in

compliance with Condition 8.

Furthermore, operation with the larger

amount of liquid UF6 in the withdrawal

facilities is safety significant because

failure could result in potential on-site

fatalities/injuries and off-site injuries.

During a seismic event of 0.05 g peak

ground acceleration, failure of

equipment in both withdrawal facilities

would likely occur with releases of

liquid UF6. If the 0.05 g seismic event

occurred with substantial amounts of

liquid UF6 in those facilities, the on-site

and off-site consequences would exceed

any analyzed accident and be

unacceptable.

III

By letter dated February 25, 1998, the

Corporation committed to implement

the administrative control as stated

below:

1. Access to Buildings C–310/310A

and C–315 will be limited to only those

individuals essential to operations,

inspections, or those personnel

performing any modifications to fix the

identified seismic failures.

By letter dated March 5, 1998, the

Corporation committed to implement

the following additional administrative

controls in order to mitigate the

consequences of a seismic event:

2. When flow of liquid UF6 has been

diverted to the on-line accumulator in

C–310A or C–315 for greater than one

hour (nominal 2,000 and 5,000 lbs

liquid UF6, respectively, at one hour),
23814 Federal Register / Vol. 63, No. 83 /Thursday, April 30, 1998 / Notices

the Corporation will take the following

immediate actions:

a. Notify the Plant Shift

Superintendent (PSS) of accumulator

usage.

b. Begin tracking of quantities by

using calculated withdrawal rates.

c. The PSS will initiate high priority

actions for timely resolution of

unscheduled outages.

d. The Cascade Coordinator will take

actions to reduce tails downflow and/or

product or tails withdrawal rates to

minimize accumulator use as

appropriate.

e. Notify the NRC.

3. If the calculated accumulator

inventory reaches 4,000 lbs liquid UF6

in C–310A or 10,000 lbs liquid UF6 in

C–315, flow of liquid UF6 to the affected

accumulator will be stopped

immediately.

By letter dated March 11, 1998, the

Corporation proposed to install seismic

modifications to the equipment in

Buildings C–310/310A and C–315 by

September 30, 1998. Those seismic

modifications will increase the seismic

capacity of the equipment to withstand

an earthquake producing a peak ground

acceleration of 0.165 g.

I find that the Corporation’s

commitments to install the seismic

modification within the proposed time

frame and these administrative controls

acceptable and necessary and conclude

that with these commitments the public

health and safety are reasonably

assured. In view of the foregoing, I have

determined that the public health and

safety require that the Corporation’s

commitments be confirmed by this

Order. By letter dated, April 1, 1998, the

Corporation consented to the issuance

of this Order confirming its

commitments, as described in Section

IV below. The Corporation further

agreed in that letter that this Order is to

be effective upon issuance.

Implementation of these commitments

will minimize the available liquid UF6

inventories that could be released in a

seismic event and reduce the on-site

and off-site consequences. Based upon

the above and the Corporation’s

consent, this Order is immediately

effective upon issuance.

IV

Accordingly, pursuant to sections

161b, 161i, 161o, and 1701 of the

Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended,

and the Commission’s regulations in 10

CFR Part 76, including specifically 10

CFR 76.70, It is hereby ordered, effective

immediately, that certificate No. GDP–1

is modified as follows:

Condition 13 is added to the

Certificate of Compliance GDP–1 to

require that:

1. The Corporation will by no later

than September 30, 1998, complete

seismic modifications to the equipment

containing liquid UF6 in Buildings C–

310/310A and C–315. Those seismic

modifications will increase the seismic

capacity of the equipment to withstand

an earthquake producing a peak ground

acceleration of 0.165 g.

2. Until such time as the above

seismic modifications are completed,

the following additional administrative

controls shall be followed:

a. When flow of liquid UF6 has been

diverted to the on-line accumulator in

C–310A or C–315 for greater than one

hour (nominal 2,000 and 5,000 pounds

(lbs) liquid UF6 respectively at one

hour), the Corporation will

immediately:

i. Notify the Plant Shift

Superintendent (PSS) of accumulator

usage.

ii. Begin tracking of quantities by

using calculated withdrawal rates.

iii. Ensure that the PSS will initiate

high priority actions for timely

resolution of unscheduled outages.

iv. Ensure that the Cascade

Coordinator will take actions to reduce

tails downflow and/or product or tails

withdrawal rates to minimize

accumulator use as appropriate.

v. Notify the NRC.

b. If the calculated accumulator

inventory reaches 4,000 lbs liquid UF6

in C–310A or 10,000 lbs liquid UF6 in

C–315, flow of liquid UF6 to the affected

accumulator will be stopped

immediately.

c. Access to Buildings C–310/310A

and C–315 will be limited to only those

individuals essential to operations,

inspections, or those personnel

performing any modifications to fix the

identified seismic failures.

The Director, Office of Enforcement,

may, in writing, relax or rescind this

Order upon demonstration by the

Corporation of good cause.

V

Any person adversely affected by this

Confirmatory Order, other than the

Corporation, may submit a written

response within 20 days of its issuance.

Where good cause is shown,

consideration will be given to extending

the time to respond. A request for

extension of time must be made in

writing to the Director, Office of Nuclear

Material Safety and Safeguards, U.S.

Nuclear Regulatory Commission,

Washington, D.C. 20555, and include a

statement of good cause for the

extension. Any response shall be

submitted to the Secretary, U.S. Nuclear

Regulatory Commission, ATTN: Chief,

Rulemaking and Adjudications Staff,

Washington, D.C. 20555. Copies of the

response shall also be sent to the

Director, Office of Enforcement, U.S.

Nuclear Regulatory Commission,

Washington, D.C. 20555, to the Deputy

Assistant General Counsel for

Enforcement at the same address, to the

Regional Administrator, NRC Region III,

801 Warrenville Road, Lisle, Illinois

60532–4351, and to the Corporation.

In the absence of any response, or

written approval of an extension of time

in which to respond, the provisions

specified in Section IV above shall be

final 20 days from the date of this Order

without further order or proceedings. If

an extension of time for submitting a

response has been approved, the

provisions specified in Section IV shall

be final when the extension expires if a

response is not received. If a written

response is received, the Commission

may make a final decision or may adopt

by order further procedures for

consideration of the issues before

making a final enforcement decision.

Written responses shall not stay the

immediate effectiveness of this order.

For the Nuclear Regulatory Commission.

Dated at Rockville, Maryland, this 22nd

day of April 1998.

James Lieberman,

Director, Office of Enforcement.

[FR Doc. 98–11506 Filed 4–29–98; 8:45 am]

BILLING CODE 7590–01–P

NUCLEAR REGULATORY

COMMISSION

[Docket No. 030–34060; [License No. 52–

25113–02; EA–98–183]

In the Matter of Jose ́ M. Colo ́n Vaquer,

M.D., Manatı ́ Puerto Rico; Confirmatory

Order Modifying License Effective

Immediately

I

At present, Jose ́ M. Colo ́n Vaquer,

M.D. (Licensee) is the holder of NRC

License No. 52–25113-02 issued by the

Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC

or Commission) pursuant to 10 CFR Part

35. The license authorizes the Licensee

to possess and use a 125 millicurie

(decay corrected to 91 millicurie)

Strontium-90 (Sr-90) eye applicator for

medical treatment of superficial eye

conditions. The license was issued on

March 28, 1997, and is due to expire on

March 31, 2002. The Licensee first

obtained license No. 52–25113–01 to

possess and use a 125 millicurie Sr-90

eye applicator for medical treatment of

superficial eye conditions on December