J-S66027-16

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYVLANIA IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

PENNSYLVANIA

Appellee

v.

SAAD ADDA

Appellant No. 399 MDA 2016

Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence February 5, 2016

In the Court of Common Pleas of York County

Criminal Division at No(s): CP-67-CR-0006319-2014

 CP-67-CR-0006321-2014

 CP-67-CR-0006326-2014

 CP-67-CR-0007831-2014

BEFORE: BOWES, J., PANELLA, J., and JENKINS, J. 

MEMORANDUM BY PANELLA, J. FILED OCTOBER 31, 2016

Appellant, Saad Adda, appeals from the judgment of sentence entered 

after he pled guilty to robbing three banks, as well as possessing heroin with 

the intent to deliver. Adda argues that the trial court failed to consider his 

rehabilitative needs and therefore imposed an excessive sentence. After 

careful review, we affirm.

The following facts are undisputed. Adda and a co-defendant engaged 

in an approximately one-month wave of bank robberies while addicted to 

heroin. After the third robbery, authorities apprehended him and his 

accomplice. He subsequently pled guilty to the robberies, as well as to a 

charge that he had conspired to possess heroin with the intent to sell it.
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The trial court ordered a pre-sentence investigation report (“PSI”),

which recommended an aggregate 41⁄2 to 9 year term of imprisonment. At 

his sentencing hearing, Adda argued that his sentence should include an 

extensive rehabilitation component. The trial court followed the 

recommendation in the PSI, and imposed an aggregate 41⁄2 to 9 year prison 

sentence. Adda’s post-sentence motions were denied, and this timely appeal 

followed.

On appeal, Adda raises one issue: whether the trial court abused its 

discretion by ignoring his rehabilitative needs to impose an excessive 

sentence. Adda concedes that this claim challenges the discretionary aspects 

of Appellant’s sentence. See Appellant’s Brief, at 7. A challenge to the 

discretionary aspects of a sentence must be considered a petition for 

permission to appeal, as the right to pursue such a claim is not absolute.” 

Commonwealth v. McAfee, 849 A.2d 270, 274 (Pa. Super. 2004) (citation 

omitted). 

An appellant challenging the discretionary aspects of his 

sentence must invoke this Court’s jurisdiction by satisfying a 

four-part test:

[We] conduct a four-part analysis to determine: (1) whether 

appellant has filed a timely notice of appeal, see Pa.R.A.P. 902 

and 903; (2) whether the issue was properly preserved at 

sentencing or in a motion to reconsider and modify sentence, 

see Pa.R.Crim.P. [720]; (3) whether appellant’s brief has a fatal 

defect, Pa.R.A.P. 2119(f); and (4) whether there is a substantial 

question that the sentence appealed from is not appropriate 

under the Sentencing Code, 42. Pa.C.S.A. § 9781(b).
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Commonwealth v. Moury, 992 A.2d 162, 170 (Pa. Super. 2010) 

(quotation marks and some citations omitted). 

Here, Adda challenged his sentence in a post-sentence motion and 

filed a timely appeal. Adda’s brief also contains the requisite Rule 2119(f) 

concise statement. We must now determine whether Adda’s challenge to the 

discretionary aspects of his sentence raises a substantial question. 

“A substantial question will be found where an appellant advances a 

colorable argument that the sentence imposed is either inconsistent with a 

specific provision of the Sentencing Code or is contrary to the fundamental 

norms which underlie the sentencing process.” Commonwealth v. Zirkle, 

107 A.3d 127, 132 (Pa. Super. 2014), appeal denied, 117 A.3d 297 (Pa. 

2015) (citation omitted). “[W]e cannot look beyond the statement of 

questions presented and the prefatory 2119(f) statement to determine 

whether a substantial question exists.” Commonwealth v. Christine, 78 

A.3d 1, 10 (Pa. Super. 2013), aff’d, 125 A.3d 394 (Pa. 2015) (citation 

omitted). 

Here, Adda claims in his Rule 2119(f) statement that the “sentences 

imposed are inconsistent with the rehabilitative needs of Appellant in that 

they are: inconsistent with the gravity of the offenses; inconsistent with the 

protection of the public; and are punitive in nature, rather than 

rehabilitative, in light of Appellant’s admission of guilt and other relevant 

factors.” Appellant’s Brief at 7. 
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“[A] generic claim that a sentence is excessive does not raise a 

substantial question for our review.” Christine, 78 A.3d at 10 (citation 

omitted). “Additionally, this Court has repeatedly held that an allegation that 

the trial court failed to consider particular circumstances or factors in an 

appellant’s case go to the weight accorded to various sentencing factors and 

do not raise a substantial question.” Id. at 10-11 (citation omitted). 

While Appellant argues that the sentencing court failed to consider his 

rehabilitative needs and “other relevant factors,” in substance he merely 

argues that the court failed to sufficiently address factors of record. The 

sentencing court had prepared and reviewed a PSI. See N.T., Sentencing, 

2/5/16 at 4. Where the sentencing court had the benefit of reviewing a PSI, 

we must

presume that the sentencing judge was aware of relevant 

information regarding the defendant's character and weighed 

those considerations along with mitigating statutory factors. A 

pre-sentence report constitutes the record and speaks for itself. 

In order to dispel any lingering doubt as to our intention of 

engaging in an effort of legal purification, we state clearly that 

sentencers are under no compulsion to employ checklists or any 

extended or systematic definitions of their punishment 

procedure. Having been fully informed by the pre-sentence 

report, the sentencing court's discretion should not be disturbed. 

This is particularly true, we repeat, in those circumstances where 

it can be demonstrated that the judge had any degree of 

awareness of the sentencing considerations, and there we will 

presume also that the weighing process took place in a 

meaningful fashion. It would be foolish, indeed, to take the 

position that if a court is in possession of the facts, it will fail to 

apply them to the case at hand.
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Commonwealth v. Hallock, 603 A.2d 612, 616 (Pa. Super. 1992) (citation 

omitted). As the trial court in this case did have the benefit of a PSI, we 

must presume that it considered all relevant sentencing factors and 

fashioned an individualize sentence.

Based on the foregoing, we are constrained to find that Appellant’s 

claim that the sentencing court did not adequately consider relevant factors 

of record fails to raise a substantial question. See Commonwealth v. 

Buterbaugh, 91 A.3d 1247, 1266 (Pa. Super. 2014) (en banc), appeal 

denied, 104 A.3d 1 (Pa. 2014) (“[A]rguments that the sentencing court 

failed to consider the factors proffered in 42 Pa.C.S. § 9721 does present a 

substantial question whereas a statement that the court failed to consider 

facts of record, though necessarily encompassing the factors of § 9721, has 

been rejected.”). Appellant’s heroin addiction was put squarely before the 

trial court for its consideration. See N.T., Sentencing, 2/5/16 at 4-5. 

Furthermore, his desire and need for rehabilitation were clearly 

communicated to the trial court. See id., at 5-6. Thus, Appellant’s argument 

is that the trial court did not adequately consider relevant factors that are of 

record, which does not raise a substantial question for our review.

Judgment of sentence affirmed.
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Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 10/31/2016