UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 14-4513

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff – Appellee,

v.

IDER VAZQUEZ MATOS, a/k/a The Cuban, a/k/a I.D., a/k/a 

Cono, a/k/a Compa,

Defendant - Appellant.

No. 14-4514

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff – Appellee,

v.

IDER VAZQUEZ MATOS, a/k/a The Cuban, a/k/a I.D., a/k/a 

Cono, a/k/a Compa,

Defendant - Appellant.

Appeals from the United States District Court for the Middle 

District of North Carolina, at Greensboro. Thomas D. Schroeder, 

District Judge. (1:13-cr-00337-TDS-1; 1:14-cr-00004-TDS-1)

Submitted: April 24, 2015 Decided: May 20, 2015

Before SHEDD, FLOYD, and THACKER, Circuit Judges.
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Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

Cindy H. Popkin-Bradley, CINDY H. POPKIN-BRADLEY ATTORNEY AT 

LAW, Raleigh, North Carolina, for Appellant. Ripley Rand, United 

States Attorney, Sandra J. Hairston, First Assistant United 

States Attorney, Greensboro, North Carolina, for Appellee.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
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PER CURIAM:

In these consolidated appeals, Ider Vazquez Matos appeals 

his conviction and 60-month sentence imposed following his 

guilty plea to bulk cash smuggling and aiding and abetting, in 

violation of 31 U.S.C. § 5332(a)(1) (2012), 18 U.S.C. § 2 

(2012), and the concurrent 130-month sentence imposed following 

his guilty plea to conspiracy to possess with intent to 

distribute 5 kilograms or more of cocaine hydrochloride, in 

violation of 21 U.S.C. § 846 (2012). Matos raises two arguments 

on appeal: (1) that the district court erred in accepting his 

guilty plea to bulk cash smuggling and aiding and abetting 

because the record failed to provide an independent factual 

basis for this count, and (2) that the district court abused its 

discretion in denying Matos’ request for a downward variance and 

in imposing an unduly harsh sentence. Finding no reversible 

error, we affirm.

“Before entering judgment on a guilty plea, the court must 

determine that there is a factual basis for the plea.” Fed. R. 

Crim. P. 11(b)(3). The court has broad discretion in 

determining whether a factual basis exists and may rely on 

anything appearing in the record. United States v. Ketchum, 550 

F.3d 363, 366-67 (4th Cir. 2008). The court is not required to 

“satisfy itself that a jury would find the defendant guilty, or 

even that [the] defendant is guilty by a preponderance of the 
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evidence,” but “must assure itself simply that the conduct to 

which the defendant admits is in fact an offense under the 

statutory provision under which he is pleading guilty.” United 

States v. Carr, 271 F.3d 172, 178-79 n.6 (4th Cir. 2001) 

(internal quotation marks omitted). The court “need only be 

subjectively satisfied that there is a sufficient factual basis 

for a conclusion that the defendant committed all of the 

elements of the offense.” United States v. Mitchell, 104 F.3d 

649, 652 (4th Cir. 1997).

Because Matos did not seek to withdraw his guilty plea or 

timely assert any infirmity in the plea colloquy, we review his 

challenge to the plea’s factual basis for plain error. United 

States v. Mastrapa, 509 F.3d 652, 657 (4th Cir. 2007). To 

establish plain error, Matos must demonstrate that (1) an error 

occurred, (2) the error was plain, and (3) the error affected 

his substantial rights. United States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725, 

732 (1993). Even if Matos meets these requirements, we will 

correct the error only if it “seriously affects the fairness, 

integrity or public reputation of judicial proceedings.” 

Henderson v. United States, 133 S. Ct. 1121, 1126-27 (2013)

(alteration and internal quotation marks omitted).

In the guilty plea context, a defendant establishes that an 

error affected his substantial rights if he shows “a reasonable 

probability that, but for the error, he would not have entered 
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the plea.” United States v. Davila, 133 S. Ct. 2139, 2147 

(2013) (internal quotation marks omitted). To meet this 

standard, the defendant “must . . . satisfy the judgment of the 

reviewing court, informed by the entire record, that the 

probability of a different result is sufficient to undermine 

confidence in the outcome of the proceeding.” United States v. 

Dominguez Benitez, 542 U.S. 74, 83 (2004) (internal quotation 

marks omitted). 

Assuming, without deciding, that the presentence report 

failed to provide an adequate factual basis for Matos’ plea to 

the bulk cash smuggling offense, we conclude Matos fails to 

establish that his substantial rights were affected. Rather, 

our review of the record in its entirety — including the 

presentence report and Matos’ statements during the plea and 

sentencing hearings — establishes no reasonable probability that 

Matos would not have pled guilty but for the alleged error. 

We review a sentence for reasonableness, applying “a 

deferential abuse-of-discretion standard.” Gall v. United 

States, 552 U.S. 38, 41 (2007). Because Matos does not argue 

that the district court committed procedural error, our review 

is limited to the substantive reasonableness of Matos’ sentence.* 

 * The Government asserts that we lack the authority to 

review the sentencing court’s denial of Matos’ request for a 

below-Guidelines sentence. Because Matos sought a downward 

(Continued)
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United States v. Howard, 773 F.3d 519, 528 (4th Cir. 2014). A 

sentence must be “sufficient, but not greater than necessary,” 

to satisfy the purposes of sentencing. See 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) 

(2012). In evaluating substantive reasonableness, we must 

consider whether, viewing the totality of the circumstances, 

“the sentencing court abused its discretion in concluding that 

the sentence it chose satisfied the standards set forth in 

§ 3553(a).” United States v. Mendoza-Mendoza, 597 F.3d 212, 216 

(4th Cir. 2010). 

We “can reverse a sentence only if it is unreasonable, even 

if the sentence would not have been [our] choice.” United 

States v. Yooho Weon, 722 F.3d 583, 590 (4th Cir. 2013) 

(internal quotation marks omitted). A within-Guidelines 

sentence is presumed reasonable on appeal. United States v. 

Louthian, 756 F.3d 295, 306 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 135 S. Ct. 

421 (2014). Matos bears the burden to rebut this presumption 

“by showing that the sentence is unreasonable when measured 

against the 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) factors.” Id. 

 

variance, not a departure, we retain authority to review the 

court’s denial of that request. See United States v. Brewer, 

520 F.3d 367, 371 (4th Cir. 2008). That inquiry is encompassed 

in Matos’ overarching argument that the court imposed an unduly 

harsh sentence.
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We conclude that Matos fails to make such a showing. Matos 

does not demonstrate that any deficiency in the factual basis 

for his guilty plea had an appreciable impact on the court’s 

sentencing calculus. The district court grounded the sentence 

squarely in the relevant § 3553(a) factors, including Matos’ 

history and characteristics and the legitimate need to reflect 

the seriousness of the offense, to promote respect for the law, 

to provide just punishment, to deter others from similar 

conduct, and to protect the public. While Matos identified 

numerous mitigating facts related to his personal history and 

characteristics and his acceptance of responsibility, these 

facts are not sufficiently compelling to require a sentence 

lower than that imposed by the district court. Thus, Matos has 

not rebutted the presumption of reasonableness accorded his 

within-Guidelines sentence. See Louthian, 756 F.3d at 306.

Accordingly, we affirm the district court’s judgment. We 

dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal 

contentions are adequately presented in the materials before 

this court and argument would not aid the decisional process.

AFFIRMED