FILED DECEMBER 29, 2010
S T A T E O F M I C H I G A N
SUPREME COURT

STEVEN KING, Plaintiff-Appellee,
v No. 140684 STATE OF MICHIGAN, MICHIGAN DEPARTMENT OF LABOR AND ECONOMIC GROWTH, and COMMISSIONER OF THE OFFICE OF FINANCIAL AND INSURANCE REGULATION, Defendants-Appellants.

BEFORE THE ENTIRE BENCH
D AVIS , J.
Defendants appeal a Court of Appeals judgm ent affirming the trial court’s grant of summary disposition in favor of plaintiff, which enjoined defe ndants from revoking plaintiff’s resident insurance producer 1 license. We affirm.

1 A “resident insurance produ cer” is more commonly known as an insurance agent. Michigan Supreme Court Lansing, Michigan 

# Opinion Chief Justice: Marilyn Kelly Justices: Michael F. Cavanagh Maura D. Corrigan Robert P. Young, Jr. Stephen J. Markman Diane M. Hathaway Alton Thomas Davis2 The issues in this case are (1) whether in 2004 the Commissioner of the Office of
Financial and Insurance Services 2 was required by statute to deny plaintiff’s application for a resident insurance producer license on th e basis of plaintiff’s fully disclosed prior felony conviction, (2) whet her the commissioner is now required by statute to affirmatively revoke plainti ff’s license on the basis of th e same prior felony, and (3) whether the commissioner is now permitted to revoke plaintiff’s license on the basis of the same prior felony. We answer all three questions in the negative.

I. FACTS AND PROCEEDINGS In 2000, plaintiff was conv icted of operating a motor vehicle under the influence of liquor (OUIL), a felony . MCL 257.625. In 2004, he a pplied to the Mich igan Office of Financial and Insurance Services (OFIS) 3 for a resident insurance producer license. Plaintiff fully disclosed his conviction. Plai ntiff applied for a waiver pursuant to 18 USC
1033. 4 The director of OFIS’s licensing division sent plaintiff a letter that read in part: Please be apprised that pursuan t to 18 U.S.C. Section 1033 and 1034, specifically Section 1033(3)(2), pe rmission to engage in the business of insurance is hereby granted to yo u by the Commissioner of the Office of

2 This position was held by Linda Watters from April 2003 until October 2007, when Ken Ross was appointed.

3 OFIS is now the Office of Financial and Insurance Regulation, but at most of the relevant times, including in the Court of Appeals, it was referred to as OFIS.

4 This section provides, among other things, that a person who has been convicted of any crimin al felony involving dishonesty or a breach of trust . . . may engage in the business of insurance or participate in such business if such person has the written consent of any insurance regulatory official authorized to regulate the insurer, which consent specifically refers to this s ubsection. [18 USC 1033(e).]3 Financial and Insurance Services under this federal statute in response to your application for such wa iver. OFIS reviewed your 3 rd OUIL felony conviction. Please note that it is highly re commended that this letter be safeguarded and kept together with y our license as proof of this waiver under 18 U.S.C. 1033/1034 in case your record and/or ability to engage in the business of insurance is ever ch allenged by someone in the industry, state government, or federal government. Thus, defendants unquestionably had been ma de aware of plaintiff’s felony. The commissioner granted plaintiff’s license. Plaintiff then pursued a career as an insurance agent for a number of years. In the meantime, he has not been convicted of any other felonies or provided any new grounds
for revocation of his license th at we are aware of. In 2008, defendants began proceedings to revoke plaintiff’s license, and plaintiff initiated the inst ant suit. The gravamen of defendants’ argument is that a change to the Insurance Code in 2002 had required the commissioner to deny plaintiff’s application, that failing to do so was a mistake, and that the current provisions of the Insurance Code require the commissione r to correct that
mistake. The trial court ru led that even if the commiss ioner had made a mistake in granting plaintiff’s license, equity precl uded defendants from revoking it now, and the Court of Appeals affirmed.

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

The trial court’s decision on a motion for su mmary disposition is reviewed de

novo. Coblentz v City of Novi , 475 Mich 558, 567; 719 NW 2d 73 (2006). This Court reviews de novo questions of statutory interpretation. Id . The trial court’s exercise of its equitable authority is discretionary within th e confines of equity jurisprudence and the4 facts of the particular case, Youngs v West , 317 Mich 538, 545; 27 NW2d 88 (1947), and this Court reviews a trial court’s grant of inju nctive relief for an abuse of that discretion, Pontiac Fire Fighters Union Lo cal 376 v City of Pontiac , 482 Mich 1, 8; 753 NW2d 595 (2008). The trial court’s findings of fact are reviewed for clear error. Beason v Beason , 435 Mich 791, 801-80 3; 460 NW2d 207 (1990 ), citing MCR 2.613(C).

III. THE INSURANCE CODE

A. INSURANCE CODE LICE NSURE PROVISIONS IN 2004
Before 2002, the Insu rance Code’s licensure provisions had required applicants to have “good moral character.” See former MCL 500.1204(4), as amended by 1986 PA 173. It remains the law today that no licen sing agency may make a finding as to an applicant’s moral character on the sole basis of a criminal conviction. MCL 338.42. It also remains the law that “[o ]rders, decisions, findings, rulin gs, determinations, opinions, actions, and inactions of the commissioner in [the Insurance Code] shall be made or
reached in the reasonable exercise of discretion.” MCL 500.205. The “good moral character” requirement in the Insurance Code’s licensure provisions was replaced by 2001 PA 228. When plaintiff applie d for his license, MCL 500.1205(1)(b) provided that an application “shall not be ap proved” if the applicant had “committed any act that is a ground for deni al, suspension, or re vocation under [MCL 500.1239].” While this seems mandatory wh en read in isolation, MCL 500.1239(1) provided that “the commissioner may place on probation, suspen d, revoke, or refuse to issue” a license for a list of possible reasons , including an appli cant’s “having been convicted of a felony.” MCL 500.1239(1)(f) (emphasis adde d). Consistent with MCL5 500.205, the licensure requirement mandates that the commissioner make a discretionary judgment call when reviewing an application and deny the application if he or she
concludes—in the exercise of that discre tion—that denial, suspension, or revocation would be appropriate. In other words, 2001 PA 228 replaced the ambiguous judgment call of “good moral character” with a more rigorously define d judgment call that entailed consideration
of enumerated scenarios under which adverse action may be found appropriate. When the applicable versions of MCL 500.1205 , MCL 500.1239, and MC L 500.205 are read together , they set forth a licensure procedure th at requires the commissioner to exercise judgment within a framework , rather than exercising judgment in a more nebulous environment. We reject defenda nts’ contention that the Insurance Code in effect in 2004 required the commissioner to deny plaintiff’s app lication. The Insurance Code did not,
and the commissioner’s exercise of discretion in granting plaintiff a license was therefore permissible. We recognize that shortly befo re plaintiff applied for hi s license, the commissioner
rendered a decision 5 concluding that 200 1 PA 228 removed the discretion to permit felons to receive licenses. An agency’s inte rpretation of a statute is entitled to deference, but generally only if that interpretation ha s been relied on for a long time, and in any event no such interpretation may overcome the plain meaning of the statute itself. Ludington Serv Corp v Acting Ins Comm’r , 444 Mich 481, 505 & n 35; 511 NW2d 661 (1994). Defendants acknowledge that this unpublished decisi on has not been extensively

5 Mazur v Office of Fin & Ins Servs , issued May 14, 2004 (Docket No. 2003-1515).6 relied on or applied consistently, and our revi ew of the record indicates that the opinion was not even widely circulated internally. Furthermore, it was clearly not relied on when the commissioner considered plaintiff’s applic ation and granted his license. Finally, the
decision was incorrect. Therefore, we answer the first questi on, whether in 2004 the commissioner had been required by statute to deny plaintiff’s appli cation, in the negative.

B. INSURANCE CODE LICENSURE PROVISIONS IN 2008 AND TODAY

Subsequently, 2008 PA 422 and 2008 PA 423 amended MCL 500.1205 and MCL 500.1239. MCL 500.1205 now pr ovides in relevant part th at “[a]n application for a resident insurer [sic] produ cer license shall not be ap proved unless the commissioner finds that the individual . . . [h]as not comm itted any act listed in [M CL 500.1239(1)].” And MCL 500.1239(1 )(f) provides that “the commissioner shall refuse to issue a license” for “[h]aving been convicted of a felony.”
These two statues are now co nsistent, and were a convict ed felon to apply for an insurance producer license today , the commissioner would be required to deny it. Indeed, plaintiff concedes as much. But no language in these statutes rebuts the general rule of construction that changes to a statute should onl y apply prospectively. Even if we were to engage in a speculation th at the amendment was intended to clarify the Legislature’s prior intent, amendments may not be applied retrospectively if doing so would impair a vested right. Brewer v A D Transp Express, Inc , 486 Mich 50, 56- 57; 782 NW2d 475 (2010). The fact that an app licant like plaintiff would nece ssarily be denied a license7 today does not automatically invalidate defenda nt’s decision to exerci se its discretion to grant him a license in 2004. Although the current statutes require denial of a license, they do not require an existing license to be revoked. The first cl ause of MCL 500.1239(1) states in full: “In addition to any other powers under this act, the co mmissioner may place on probation, suspend, or revoke an insura nce producer’s license or may levy a civil fine under [MCL 500.1244] or any combination of actions, an d the commissioner shall refuse to issue a license under [MCL 500.1205 or 500.1206a ], for any 1 or more of the following causes[.]” Denial is mandatory if any of a number of enumer ated conditions is satisfied; however, revocation is still as discretiona ry as it was in 2004. Therefore, we answer the s econd question, whether defenda nt is currently required by statute to revoke plaintiff’s license, in the negative.

IV. REVOCATION We observe initially that th e plain language of the pres ent Insurance Code gives the commissioner the discretion to pursue revoc ation of plaintiff’s resident insurance producer license for a variety of possible re asons, including plaintiff’s having been convicted of a felony. However, we empha size that doing so must be a “reasonable exercise of discretion.” MCL 500.205. Here , the gravamen of defendants’ argument is that the commissioner is required to revoke pl aintiff’s license. This erroneous abdication of discretion is, in itself, an abuse of discretion. People v Stafford , 434 Mich 125, 134 n 4; 450 NW2d 559 (1990 ). Therefore, in this case, the commissioner cannot be said to be engaging in a “reasonable exercise of discretion.”8 With regard to this issue, we hold on ly that the commissi oner may not revoke a
license on the basis of the erroneous belief th at he must do so when, in fact, he has discretion. Because this result is mandated by the plain terms of th e Insurance Code, we make no pronouncement about whether equity app lies here or what effect it might have. On that limited basis, we therefore answer the third question, whether the commissioner is now permitted to revoke plaint iff’s license, in the negative.

V. CONCLUSION Plaintiff’s license was properly grante d by the commissioner in 2004. The Insurance Code does not requ ire plaintiff’s license to be revoked now. The commissioner
could have exercised r easonable discretion and decided to pursue revocation of plaintiff’s license; however, in this case, the commissi oner necessarily abused that discretion by proceeding on the basis of an erroneous belief that he was required to revoke plaintiff’s
license. For the reasons stated, we affirm the courts below.

Alton Thomas Davis Diane M. HathawayS T A T E O F M I C H I G A N
SUPREME COURT

STEVEN KING, Plaintiff-Appellee,
v No. 140684 STATE OF MICHIGAN, MICHIGAN DEPARTMENT OF LABOR AND ECONOMIC GROWTH, and COMMISSIONER OF THE OFFICE OF FINANCIAL AND INSURANCE REGULATION, Defendants-Appellants.

C AVANAGH , J. ( concurring ). I concur in affirming the judgment of the Court of Appeals, but write separately to express my view that the Office of Financial and Insurance Services (OFIS) 1 may not—in the absence of additional cause—revoke plainti ff’s license solely on th e basis of the fully disclosed and waived felony co nviction known to OFIS when it issued plaintiff’s license in 2004. I would additionally hold that a governmental licen sing agency is estopped from revoking a license solely on the basis of th e same fully disclosed and accurate facts for which it had previously granted an express wa iver if the licensee has reasonably relied to
his detriment on the license issued.

1 Now known as the Office of Financial and Insurance Regulation.2 First, I note that the stark conflic t between MCL 500.1205(1)(b) and MCL
500.1239 as it existed in 2004 creates an ambiguity. Compar e MCL 500.1205(1)(b) (“license shall not be approved”) with the 2004 version of MCL 500.1239 (“the commissioner may . . . refuse to issue [a] . . . licens e”). One provision allows discretionary licensing of convicted felons; th e other precludes all discretion. By even the narrowest definition of ambiguity, the statutory provisions at issue here are ambiguous because “one [‘i rreconcilably conflicts’] w ith another . . . .” Petersen v Magna Corp , 484 Mich 300 , 311 & n 23; 773 NW2d 564 (2009), quoting Lansing Mayor
v Pub Serv Comm , 470 Mich 154, 166; 680 NW2d 840 (2004). 2 Defendants argue that the mandatory-denial provision applies only to resident insurance producers, whereas the discretionary-denial provision would apply to nonresident insurance producers. Statutes , however, “must be construed to prevent
absurd results . . . .” People v Tennyson , 487 Mich 730, 741; 790 NW2d 354 (2010) (quotation marks and citation omitte d). An interpretation of a statute is absurd when “it is clearly inconsistent with the purposes and policies of the act in question.” Cameron v
Auto Club Ins Ass’n , 476 Mich 55, 128-129; 718 NW2d 784 (2006) (K ELLY , J., dissenting). One of the main purposes anima ting our statutory insurance scheme is to protect Michigan citizens from unscrupulous insurers. See title of 1956 PA 218 (“An

2 I continue to adhere to the definition of “ambiguity” ex pressed in Chief Justice K ELLY ’ S lead opinion in Petersen , 484 Mich at 329 (stating that am biguity exists “‘when a statute is capable of being underst ood by reasonably well-informed persons in two or more different senses’”) (citation omitted). But beca use the statute at issu e here is ambiguous under any standard, it is unnecessary to consider this issue further.3 act . . . to provide for the protection of polic yholders, claimants, and creditors of unsound or insolvent insurers . . . .”); In re Certified Question , 413 Mich 22, 38; 319 NW2d 320 (1982) (“The extensive regulation of the insura nce industry provided for in [the Insurance Code] indicates a legislative purpose to protect policyholders.”). It would indeed be an absurd result to conclude that the Legislatur e intended to allow discretionary licensing of
out-of-state felons to sell insurance in Mi chigan while mandating that no licenses could
be issued to resident felons. Such an intention would provide less protection to Michigan policyholders, in direct conf lict with the purposes anima ting the Insurance Code. The state is much better equipped to exercise oversight of in-sta te insurance producers, to discipline them when n ecessary, and to bring th em and their property within reach of the Michigan courts. I therefore decline to adop t an absurd interpreta tion of the licensing provisions in order to a void a finding of ambiguity. Second, I believe that equitable remedies may be available when a statute is ambiguous. See Stokes v Millen Roofing Co , 466 Mich 660, 672; 649 NW2d 371 (2002) (opinion by W EAVER , J.) Third, a court may, in its sound discretion, grant equita ble relief if no legal remedy is available or if an available remedy at law is doubtful or uncertain. See Tkachik v
Mandeville , 487 Mich 38, 45; 790 NW2d 260 (2010), quoting Powers v Fisher , 279 Mich 442, 448; 272 NW 737 (1937); Edsell v Briggs , 20 Mich 429, 433 (1 870). In th e instant case, the only statutory remedy available to pl aintiff after revocation is an administrative appeal to “determine the reasonablene ss of the commissioner’s action.” MCL 500.1239(2). Because defendants argue that they must revoke plaintiff’s license,4 however, the only “reasonableness” determinati on to be made at such an appeal would be
whether the commissioner reason ably concluded that plainti ff had a felony conviction. Because there is no questi on that the felony convicti on exists—as plaintiff fully disclosed—the licensing statutes provide him no meaningful remedy whatsoever. Fourth, in certain cases, equitable est oppel may be an appropriate remedy where one party has changed its positi on in reasonable reliance on a governmental mistake. See, e.g., Pittsfield Twp v Malcolm , 375 Mich 135, 147-1 48; 134 NW2d 166 (1965) (estopping a municipality from enforcing its z oning regulations against a kennel owner who was erroneously issued a building permit after he had re lied on the permit and built a kennel). There is no question here that plain tiff has reasonably relied on the license issued to develop a career and that revocation would cause plaintiff an extreme detriment. I would thus hold that a governmental lic ensing agency is estopped from revoking a license solely on the basis of the same fully disclosed and accurate facts for which it had previously granted an express waiver if the licensee has reasonably relied to his detriment on the issued license. The language “fully disclosed and accurate” requires that the licensing agency have be fore it all the information necessary when making its decision to grant a waiver. The phrase “reasonably relied” is equally important. Contrary to the dissent’s concerns, I cannot imagine a situation in which it would be
reasonable for a child molester who was issu ed a daycare license or a dangerous felon who was issued a license to carry a firearm to rely on such a wrongf ully issued license. The situation here is vastly diffe rent. First, all the materials available to the public at the time plaintiff applied for his license indicate d that a waiver of felony convictions was5 possible. 3 Indeed, defendants informed plaintiff th at a waiver was possible. In addition,
the waiver letter that OFIS sent to plaintiff expressly indicat ed that OFIS was fully aware of plaintiff’s felony conviction when granti ng the waiver. Plaintiff had absolutely no
reason to think that the waiver was not ava ilable or that it was improperly granted when he relied on the license issued to invest year s of his life developing a career. Conversely,
a convicted child molester or violent felon w ould have little reason to believe that he or she would be eligible for a daycare or firearms license. A court’s discretionary use of equity a llows “complete justice” to be done.
Tkachik , 487 Mich at 46 (quotation marks and c itation omitted). Achieving “complete justice” necessarily requires a co urt to examine and balance co mpeting interests. It is beyond cavil that the n eed to protect children from chil d molesters would outweigh any interest of a child molester in keeping an erroneously issued licen se and the need to protect society from dangerous felons woul d outweigh any interest the felon has in keeping such a license. Any arguments posited that the rule I would apply to this case
could allow such absurd re sults is pure hyperbole.

3 The Court of Appeals noted (1 ) that the agency’s interpretation of the licensing statute in Mazur v Office of Fin & Ins Servs , Case No. 03-384-L, Dock et No. 2003-1515 (May 14, 2004), had not been published or communica ted to the public in the form of a rule, new guideline, or OFIS letter or directiv e, (2) that the interpretation was never communicated internally at OF IS, and (3) that waivers of felony convictions remained possible following Mazur

. King v Michigan , unpublished opinion per curiam of the Court of Appeals, issued January 21, 2010 (Docket No. 288290), p 2.6 Accordingly, I concur in affirming th e judgment of the Court of Appeals.

Michael F. Cavanagh Marilyn KellyS T A T E O F M I C H I G A N
SUPREME COURT

STEVEN KING, Plaintiff-Appellee,
V No. 140684 STATE OF MICHIGAN, MICHIGAN DEPARTMENT OF LABOR AND ECONOMIC GROWTH, and COMMISSIONER OF THE OFFICE OF FINANCIAL AND INSURANCE REGULATION, Defendants-Appellants.

Y OUNG , J. ( dissenting ). This case requires this Court to interpret the relevant licensing provisions of the amended Insurance Code, which preclude persons who have been convicted of a felony from receiving a resident insurance produce r license, in the c ontext of the entire
Insurance Code. In this ca se, the Office of Financial and Insurance Services (OFIS) 1 failed to discharge its statutory duties and en force relevant statutory mandates when it granted plaintiff an insurance license in 2004, despite plain tiff’s previous conviction of a felony. The decision by OFIS to seek revocation of that li cense, while unfortunate for the improperly licensed plaintiff, is nonetheless proper because the or iginal licensure was

1 The Office of Financial and Insurance Servic es has since been reorganized and is now part of the Official of Financial and Insura nce Regulation, one of the named defendants in this case.2 invalid. Governmental administrators, like t hose in OFIS, cannot act in derogation or
contravention of their statutor y authority when issuing licen ses. Because the majority justices fail to render meaning to all relevant provisions of the Insurance Code by holding contrarily, and thereby exercise judicial power to avoid the application of a valid statute, I respectfully dissent.

I. ANALYSIS

A. STATUTORY ANALYSIS This case requires that we interpret the Insurance Code—specifically MCL 500.1205 and MCL 5 00.1239—as it existed in 2004. When “interpreting statutory language, this Court’s primary goal is to give effect to the Legislature’s intent. If the Legislature has clearly expressed its intent in the language of a statute, that statute must be enforced as written, free of any ‘contrary judicial gloss.’” 2 MCL 500.1205 governs the licensing of insu rance agents who re side in Michigan; in 2004, MCL 500.1205(1) pr ovided, in relevant part:

An application for a resident insurer [sic] producer license shall not be approved unless the commissioner finds that the individual meets all of the following: * * *

2 Dep’t of Agriculture v Appletree Mktg, LLC , 485 Mich 1, 8; 779 NW2d 237 (2010), quoting Morales v Auto-Owners Ins Co (After Remand) , 469 Mich 487, 490; 672 NW2d 849 (2003) (citation omitted).3 (b) Has not committed any act that is a ground for denial, suspension, or revocation under [MCL 500.1239]. [3] In 2004, MCL 500.1239 prov ided, in relevant part: (1)In addition to any other powers under this act, the commissioner may place on probation, suspend, revoke, or refuse to issue an insurance producer’s license or may levy a civil fine under [MCL 500.1244] or any combination of actions for any 1 or more of the following causes : * * * (f) Having been convicted of a felony

. [4]
At its most basic level, this case turns on the answer to a singl e question: in 2004, did these provisions of the Insurance C ode prohibit OFIS from issuing a resident insurance producer license to an applicant who had been convicted of a felony? Defendant OFIS argues that these provisions required OFIS to deny plaintiff a license because he had been convicted of a felony. Plaintiff argues, however, that these provisions, when read together, did not const itute a statutory mandate that required OFIS to deny plaintiff a license, and therefore OF IS is equitably estopped from revoking it now. Thus, the primary disput e here is whether OFIS was mandated by statute to reject plaintiff’s application in 2004, or whether OF IS had discretion to approve or reject the application at that time. If defendants’ statutory interpretati on is correct and the Insurance Code mandated that OF IS not grant licenses to former felons, then there exists a clear statutory mandate that ne ither equity nor this Court can avoid. In that situation,

3 (Italics and bold added.)

4 (Emphasis added.)4 OFIS must be allowed to retract the license th at should not have been issued in the first place. For the reasons set forth be low, I agree with defendants. If MCL 500.1205(1)(b) is read in isolation, there is no question that OFIS cannot
issue a license to a convicted felon. In e ffect, it provides that an application for a resident insurance producer license shall not be approved unless the commissioner finds that the individual has not committed a felony . Here, OFIS approved a license without making the requisite finding that plai ntiff had not committed a felony . Indeed, the opposite is
true: OFIS knew that plaintiff had in fact committe d a felony, as plaintiff honestly disclosed and as OFIS recognized in the letter it sent to plaintiff wh en informing plaintiff that he was being granted a “waiver.” However, MCL 500.1205(1)(b) cannot be read in isolation, but must be interpreted in light of the language of MCL 500.1239(1)(f), to which it ma kes direct reference. By itself, MCL 500.1239(1)(f) perm its the OFIS commissioner to refuse to issue a license when an applicant has a felony conviction, but it does not forbid OFIS to grant the license as MCL 500.1205 does.
The OFIS commissioner reso lved the apparent conf lict between MCL 500.1205 (no discretion) and MCL 500.1239 (some di scretion) in favor of applying the “no discretion” standard of MCL 500.1205 becaus e it is “more particular” and “particularly concerned with establishing standards for licensure.” 5 The commissioner’s Mazur decision attempted to establish harmony be tween the two statutes by concluding that

5 Mazur v Office of Fin & Ins Servs , Case No. 03-384-L, Dock et No. 2003- 1515 (May 14, 2004), p 3.5 OFIS must exercise the discretion confe rred by MCL 500.1239(1) in light of the standards conferred by MCL 500.1205(1)(b). I would hold that OFIS correctly resolv ed the apparent conflict between MCL 500.1205 and MCL 500.1239 in the way that most closely adheres to the Legislature’s
stated intent. 6 In coming to this conclusion, it is necessary to consider the entire statutory structure of the licensing provisions in th e Insurance Code. As noted, MCL 500.1205 governs the licensing of resident insurance producers for individuals who reside in Michigan. The Insura nce Code also allows the licensing of nonresident insurance producers who are licensed in another state but transact business in Michigan, which is separately governed by MCL 500.1206a. 7 MCL 500.1239 applies both to resident and
nonresident insu rance producers.

6 Mazur is a nonbinding administrative decision. Nevertheless, when interpreting a statute that a governmental agency has the powe r to interpret and duty to enforce, this Court accords “respectful consideration” for the agency’s statutor y interpretation, and will provide “cogent reasons” for overruli ng an agency’s interpretation. Furthermore, when the law is “doub tful or obscure,” the agency’s interpretation is an aid for discerning the Legislature’s intent. However, the agency’s interpretation is not binding on the courts, and it cannot conflict with the Legislature’s intent as expressed in the language of the statute at issue. [ In re Complaint of Rovas Against SBC Mich , 482 Mich 90, 103; 754 NW2d 259 (2008), citing and quoting Boyer-Campbell Co v Fry , 271 Mich 282; 260 NW 165 (1935).] Contrary to the standard c ited in the lead opinion, see ante at 5, Rovas and BoyerCampbell remain good law and therefore articul ate the proper standard by which this Court reviews an administrative agency’s in terpretation of a statute. See generally Rovas , 482 Mich at 104-109.

7 Individuals who receive nonresident insurance producer licenses are subject to separate requirements to obtain and main tain a license that are di fferent from applicants from6 The Legislature has chosen to apply differing standards to resident and nonresident insurance producers. While MCL 500.1205 provides that a resident applicant “ shall not ” be licensed if he has committed an act described in MCL 500.1239, MCL 500.1206a(1) contrarily provides that “[ u ] nless denied licensure under [ MCL
500.1239 ], a nonresident person shall receive a nonresident insurance producer
license . . . .” 8 Thus, the Legislature specifically used discretionary language in MCL 500.1239 to permit the commissioner to determ ine, in his discretion, whether to “refuse
to issue an insurance producer’s license” to a nonresident applicant who has been convicted of a felony. At th e same time, the Legislature prohibited such issuance to resident applicants by using mand atory language in MCL 500.1205. This interpretation avoids rendering any language nugatory or mere surplusage. 9 In particular, it accords m eaning both to MCL 500.1205 and MCL 500.1239. The primary purpose of MCL 500.1 239 is to provide grounds for probation, suspension, revocation, or refusal to issue a license. Thus, und er this interpretati on, every word in MCL 500.1239 has meaning because its provisions cover when OFIS may take disciplinary action against a licensee and its pr ovisions covering initial licensing clearly refer to nonresident applicants. MC L 500.1205, on the other hand, covers solely the

Michigan who receive resident insurance producer licenses. See, generally, MCL 500.1204e and MCL 500.1206a.

8 (Emphasis added.)

9 See Wickens v Oakwood Healthcare Sys , 465 Mich 53, 60; 631 NW2d 686 (2001) (observing that this Court must “avoid a co nstruction that would re nder any part of the statute surplusage or nugatory”).7 initial licensing of resident agents, and it merely incorporates by reference the requirements of MCL 500.1239, not its discretionary standard. By according meaning to each of these statutory provisions, it becomes cl ear that the Legislatur e wished to provide
no discretion to the commissioner when licensing in dividuals from Michigan, but allow
the commissioner to retain some discretion in taking discip linary action or in licensing a nonresident applicant. Theref ore, the statutory scheme removes the discretion explicitly contemplated in MCL 500.1239 in the initial licensing phase for resident applicants, but does not render it nugatory for all purposes. Further, this construction is in accord w ith the rule of statutory construction providing that where “‘a statut e contains a general provision an d a specific provision, the specific provision controls.’” 10 When read together, the mandatory standard of MCL 500.1205 controls over the discretionary st andard of MCL 500.1239 because it is more specific: MCL 500.1205 ex clusively addresses the issuance of resident insurance producer licenses, whereas MCL 500.1239 in cludes language regarding probation, suspension, issuan ce of civil fines, revocation of in surance licenses, and issuance of

10 Jones v Enertel, Inc , 467 Mich 266, 270; 650 NW2d 334 (2002), quoting Gebhardt v O'Rourke , 444 Mich 535, 54 2-543; 510 NW2d 90 0 (1994); see also People v Ellis , 224 Mich App 752, 756; 569 NW2d 917 (1997) (“The specific statute is treated as an exception to the general one.”). This Court has further explained that “[i]n order to determine which provision is tr uly more specific and, henc e, controlling, we consider which provision applies to the more narrow re alm of circumstances, and which to the more broad realm.” Miller v Allstate Ins Co , 481 Mich 601, 613; 751 NW2d 463 (2008). Of note, the applicable versions of both MCL 500.1205 an d MCL 500.1239 became effective March 1, 2002, and therefore the rule of statutory interpretation that the latter enacted statute prevails in th e face of a statutory conflict is inapposite in this case.8 nonresident licenses. Because it relates to discipline gene rally, MCL 500.12 39 thus has a broader application that cannot displace the st andard of MCL 500.1205, which is specific to licensing resident insurance producers. Sim ilarly, this specific directive controls over the general provision in MCL 500.205 that OF IS must act within the reasonable exercise of its discretion when making de cisions or reaching conclusions. 11 The lead and concurring opinions fail to consider the entire structure of the Insurance Code when coming to their respective conclusion s that the code allows a discretionary standard to be applied to n onresident applicants, and that the code is ambiguous. As the above analysis demonstrat es, and contrary to the argument made by the concurring justice, these statutory provis ions are reconcilable and thus certainly not ambiguous. 12 “Conflicting provisions of a statute mu st be read together to produce an harmonious whole and to reconcile any inconsistencies wherever possible.” 13 A statute is

11 MCL 500.205 generally directs that “[ o]rders, decisions, findings, rulings, determinations, opinions, actions , and inactions of the commiss ioner in this act shall be made or reached in the reasonable exercise of discretion.” For the reasons stated in the text, I reject the lead opinion’s represen tation of MCL 500.205 as trumping the limitations imposed by MCL 500.1205.

12 The concurring justice merely notes the c onflict in wording, but provides absolutely no attempt at statutory interpretation or reconci liation of the separate statutory provisions before declaring that the statutes “irrec oncilably conflict[]” with each other. See ante at 2 (C AVANAGH , J., concurring) (citation and quota tion marks omitted). Nor does the concurring justice accord any si gnificance to the fact that th e code treats resident and nonresident applicants under separate standard s, instead merely finding this Legislative choice “absurd.”

13 World Book, Inc v Dep’t of Treasury , 459 Mich 403, 416; 590 NW2d 293 (1999).9 not ambiguous simply because it is susceptible to more than one interpretation. 14 Such an inexact standard would simply leave to o much legislative work product open to reinterpretation or unwarranted intervention by the judiciary, as this case illustrates. Under this opinion’s analysis, every provis ion of the code—incl uding both the mandatory
standard of MCL 500.1205 and the discretionary sta ndard of MCL 500.1239—is accorded its plain meaning, but only when done with the understanding that there are two types of insurance producers licensed in Michig an and the code treats them differently. The lead and concurring opinions simply do not acc ount for this. Moreover, plaintiff’s contrary attempt to reconcile these statut ory provisions is not convincing. Plaintiff chiefly argues that OFIS has the discretion to determine whether grounds exist to deny a license and thus may “find” that an applicant has not committed a felony for the purposes of licensing. Howeve r, the relevant factual inquiry that OFIS must undertake does not leave room for ambigu ity: either an applican t has been convicted of a felony or he has not. If the applic ant has been convicted of a felony, the commissioner can hardly be said to have the di scretionary power to “find” that he has not been convicted of a felony. In deed, a decision so out of acco rd with reality would clearly
constitute obvious erro r requiring reversal. Aside from failing to consider the entire st ructure and separate provisions of the Insurance Code, the l ead opinion’s statutory analysis does not otherwise withstand scrutiny. The lead opinion generally conclude s that OFIS initially ha d broad discretion to

14 See, e.g., Lansing Mayor v Pub Serv Comm , 470 Mich 154, 166; 680 NW2d 840 (2004).10 render its licensing decision, but that the 2002 amendments to the Insurance Code replaced the “nebulous environment” in which OFIS made its decisi ons with the current “framework” in which OFIS now makes its decisions. 15 This argument appears to be little more than judicial glo ss masking as interpretation in derogation of this Court’s stated duty to determine the Legislature’s intent. 16 The lead opinion fails to explain how the relevant statutor y provisions are “read together ,” 17 and why , when the various statutory provisions are read together, they should
not be construed as having required OFIS to deny plaintiff’s license. 18 Nor does the lead opinion employ or discuss any of the traditional canons of construction that guide this Court’s interpretation of statutes. Instead, the majority justices simply and summarily reject defendants’ argument, but support this conclusion with little else than their own ipse dixit.

15 Ante at 5.

16 See Wayne Co v Hathcock , 471 Mich 445, 456; 684 NW2d 765 (2004) (“In interpreting this statutory lang uage, this Court’s primary goal is to give effect to the Legislature’s intent. If the Legislature has clea rly expressed its intent in the language of a statute, that statute must be enforced as wr itten, free of any ‘contrary judicial gloss.’”) (citation omitted); In re Certified Questio n from the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit , 468 Mich 109, 119; 659 NW2d 597 (2003) (“The imposition of a contrary judicial gloss is inappropriate wh ere the Legislature has clearly expressed its intentions in the words of the statute.”).

17 Ante at 4.

18 The lead opinion simila rly determines that the Mazur decision “was incorrect” with, literally, no explanation why. See ante at 6.11 Perhaps more egregious, the lead opinion’s ultimate inte rpretation fails to accord meaning to all the words of the statute. In par ticular, the statement in MCL 500.1205
that the insurance license “ shall not be approved” if the applican t has been convicted of a felony is rendered functionall y without meaning by the l ead opinion’s interpretation. 19 Nor do the majority justices who join either the lead or concurring opinions accord any significance to the fact that the code treats resident and nonresident applicants under separate standards, or address why this fact does not resolve the a pparent conflict in the statutory provisions as discussed above. Moreover, the admonition of MCL 500.205 that OFIS must not abuse its discretion when maki ng decisions can hardly be said to allow
OFIS to make whatever determination it fe els is reasonable under the circumstances given that the Legislature has instructed in MCL 500.1205(1) that OFIS “shall not” take certain action. Nevertheless, th e majority justices read these general st atements in such a way as to displace the more specifi c statutory provisions.

B. ANALYSIS OF THIS COURT’S PRIOR CASES This Court has long held in cases invol ving similar licensing decisions that revocation procedures must be invoked if a license was granted in excess of an agency’s statutory authority. As far back as the early twentieth century, this Court decided that a facially valid license that was nevertheless issued in violation of a statute should be
revoked. 20 In Gamble v Liquor Control Comm , this Court reaffirmed that principle,

19 (Emphasis added.)

20 See George v Travis , 185 Mich 597; 152 NW 207 (1915).12 stating that the proper questio n before a court in such case s is to determine whether the
license was issued in violation of the relevant statute. 21 Having determined that it was, the Court held that the licen se should have been revoked. 22 In Elliott v Liquor Control
Comm , having determined that granting the plaintiff a license in that case was “forbidden,” the commission was “required to revoke, rescind and cancel the license
heretofore issued . . . .” 23 Similarly, the Court applied Elliott in Big Bear Markets of Mich, Inc v Mich Liquor Control Comm , holding that the plai ntiff’s license “was improperly granted and was, in consequence, subject to revocati on” notwithstanding a showing that the party that the statute was designed to protect was willing to waive its

21 323 Mich 576, 579; 36 NW2d 297 (1949).

22 Id. at 580. This case, like others at the tim e, held that a licensee has no vested or property interest in a license and that due process protections are not necessary to revoke a license. As defendant correctly note, courts have since held that a licensee has a vested property interest in the licen se, which entitles the holder to due process protections. See, e.g., Bundo v Walled Lake , 395 Mich 679; 238 NW2d 154 (1976). This latter change in the law does not render the earlier decisions i rrelevant. Specifically, recognizing that licenses provide an interest to the licensee a nd that a licensee is entitled to due process protections before revocation does not affect the analysis regarding the revocation of invalid licenses, although revocations must now comport with due process. Moreover, courts have held only th at a person is entitled to procedural due process in these situations. See generally Bundo . Thus, a licensee is entitle d to timely written notice detailing the reasons for the proposed administ rative action, an effective opportunity to defend and present supportive eviden ce, and a statement of findings. Bundo , 395 Mich at 696-697. This “rudimentary” due process balances the interest s of a person who has invested in a license th at is necessary for his livelihood with the community’s interest in proper regulation. Id. at 696; see also Bois Blanc Island Twp v Natural Resources Comm , 158 Mich App 239; 404 NW2d 719 (1987). Therefore, improperly issued licenses— including the one issued to plaintiff here—may be revo ked as long as the licensee is accorded procedural due process.

23 339 Mich 78, 82-83; 62 NW2d 594 (1954).13 rights under the statute. 24 In Kassab v Acho , the Court of Appeals more recently reaffirmed these principles, stating: [The defendant-licensee] argue s that the commission has the authority to continue the license on the ground of ma nifest injustice. We disagree. As an agency, the commission has no inherent powers and, therefore, any authority must come from the Legislature. The commission’s plenary power to regulate li quor traffic is subject to statutory restraints. The commission’s rules a nd regulations, promulgated pursuant to the Liquor Control Act, MCL 436.7; MSA 18.977, prohibit the commission from issuing an SDD license in violation of the one-half[-]mile rule. None of the exceptions to the rule applied and, thus, the commission had no discretion to waive the rule. Where a liquor license is issued in violation of a statute, it must be revo ked. Manifest injustice is not a means by which the commission may avoid legi slative mandate as well as its own regulations. [25] In short, these cases have continually reaffi rmed the principle that a governmental entity cannot act in contravention of its statutory powers. When an agen cy does not act in
accordance with its limited statut ory powers, its decision shoul d not stand, even if that action will result in a harsh outcome. This principle is particular ly important because of the structure of our government, which provides for a separation of powers among the three branches. This system requires that the Legislature and Governor make policy choices and that the courts enforce those political decisions as written. In this case, because the statute as written at the time of plaintiff’s licensi ng in 2004 mandated that OFIS decline to license anyone who had been convicted of a felony, OFIS should not have licensed plaintiff, and this

24 345 Mich 569, 576; 77 NW2d 135 (1956).

25 150 Mich App 104, 112- 113; 388 NW2d 263 (1986) (citations omitted).14 Court cannot use equity to displace the statutory mandate or otherwise validate that improper decision. This Court has reaffirmed th is basic principle underlying the separation of powers throughout its history. In Stokes v Millen Roofing Co , this Court held the trial court’s analysis invalid because “equity is invoked to avoid application of a st atute. Courts must be careful not to usurp the Le gislative role under the guise of equity because a statutory penalty is excessively punitive.” 26 As this Court elaborated in Bilt-More Homes, Inc v
French , and readopted in Stokes , it is not a court’s place to begin the process of attrition whereb y, in appealing cases, the statutory bite is made more gentle, until eventu ally the statute is made practically innocuous and the teeth of the strong legislative policy effectively pulled. If cases of such strong equities eventua lly arise that the statute does more harm than good the legislature may amend it . . . . [27]

Similarly, in Martin v Secretary of State , this Court again reaffirmed the guiding principle that courts cannot us e equity to displace a statutor y requirement designed by the Legislature. 28 There, the plaintiff was a candidate for elective office who had been misled by the Secretary of State regarding th e number of signatures needed to qualify to be placed on the ballot. As a consequence, he failed to collect enough signatures by the

26 Stokes v Millen Roofing Co , 466 Mich 660, 671-672; 649 NW2d 371 (2002).

27 Bilt-More Homes, Inc v French , 373 Mich 693, 699; 130 NW 2d 907 (1964) (quotation marks and citation omitted), quoted and reaffirmed in Stokes , 466 Mich at 672.

28 482 Mich 956 (2008), adopting the opin ion in relevant part of Judge O’C ONNELL , in Martin v Secretary of State , 280 Mich App 417, 430; 760 NW2d 726 (2008) (O’C ONNELL , P.J., dissenting).15 statutory deadline and the Secretary of State re fused to place his name on the ballot. We explained that courts could not use equity to compel th e government to perform an act that the law clearly forbid, ev en when the state itself was the root cause of the problem—
as is the case here. 29 Moreover, our decision affirmed that an administrative agency is not permitted to expand its ow n authority beyond what the Legislature granted. As
Justice M ARKMAN explained, it is not ‘manifestly unjust’ for this C ourt to conclude that the plain words of a law enacted by the Legislature ca nnot be modified by a clerk in the Secretary of State’s office (or indeed by the Secretary of State herself). . . . There cannot be as many laws as ther e are public servants who dispense guidance or advice on the meaning of the law.” [30] It would indeed be a strange system of gove rnment if every administrator or bureaucrat had the power to make decisions in derogati on of the limited statutory powers provided by the Legislature. Yet the lead and concu rring justices would essentially give every governmental bureaucrat the ex traordinary power to counter mand what the Legislature has proscribed. It is an abr ogation of the legitimate exercise of judicial power to allow agency decisions to be the u ltimate authority in licensing wh en those decisions are made in a manner contrary to a legislative mandate. In contravention of these principles, both plaintiff and the concurring justice cite approvingly Pittsfield Twp v Malcolm for the proposition that th ere are cases that present “exceptional circumstances” whereby courts ma y employ equity to avoid unjust results. 31

29 See Martin , 482 Mich at 956-957 (Y OUNG , J., concurring).

30 Id. at 957 (M ARKMAN , J., concurring).

31 375 Mich 135, 144-148; 134 NW2d 166 (1965).16 Malcolm is indicative of the occasional discord in this Court’s caselaw. In particular, it characterizes the unevenness by which this Court has occasi onally treated the interplay between positive law and equity over the course of its history. However, I do not believe that the holding of Malcolm can overcome the general prohi bition against applying equity to circumvent a statutory mandate, nor can it overcome the more applicable line of cases from this Court requiring improperly issued licenses to be revoked. Additionally,
Malcolm is largely distinguishable on its facts because it involved a local zoning
ordinance—under which discreti onary exceptions (zoning vari ances) are often sought and obtained—and did not involve a legislatively enacted mandate. Similarly, the plaintiff’s and the Court of Appeals’ reliance on Kern v City of Flint , 32 is inapposite, even if it remains good law, because equity was used ther e to prevent the enfor cement of terms in a contract. The Court in Kern did not use equity to overcome a statutory mandate, which implicates the Legislature’s c onstitutional authority to make po licy for the citizens of this

state. On the basis of my statutory construc tion, which I believe properly accords meaning to all the Legislature’s chosen words in the relevant statutes and considers the
entire structure of the Insurance Code, I would hold that the Court of Appeals erred by failing to analyze the relevant statutory pr ovisions as they exis ted in 2004 and then invoking equity to avoid the result of that analysis.

32 125 Mich App 24; 335 NW2d 708 (1983).17 I. RESPONSE TO THE LEAD OPIN ION’S ADDITIONAL ARGUMENTS The lead opinion asks and answers three questions, only one of which is actually necessary for the disposition of this case: di d the Insurance Code e xpressly prohibit OFIS from issuing a license to plain tiff in 2004? As discussed ear lier, the lead opinion refuses to engage in any meaningful statutory constr uction in answering this question and thereby draws a conclusion that fails to give effect to all the words of the relevant statute. The lead opinion then engages in a discussion of two questions—whether OFIS is required to revoke plaintiff’s license and whether OFIS may revoke plaintiff’s license under the statute as currently written—that no party or justice disputes. In short, the lead opinion’s cursory attempt at statutory interpretation an d other analysis theoretically supporting its disposition in this case does not scour. The lead opinion asks “whe ther the commissioner is now required by statute to affirmatively revoke plaintiff’s license on the basis of the same prior felony.” 33 As far as I can tell, no party or justice disputes that th e answer to this question is quite obviously “no,” nor is the answer to this question relevant to a disposition here. OFIS admits that it does not seek to revoke plaintiff’s license on the basis of any pos t-licensure conduct by plaintiff, nor does OFIS argu e that the statute, as it is currently written, requires revocation. Instead, OFIS argues that because it was illegal to license plaintiff in the first place under the statute as it existed in 2004 , the issuance of the license was outside OFIS’s administrative authority and the lic ense therefore must be revoked.

33 Ante at 2.18 Additionally, the lead opinion asks “whether the commissioner is now permitted to revoke plaintiff’s license on the basis of the same prior felony.” It then curiously and circularly answers this question by stating that “the commissioner may not revoke a
license on the basis of the erroneous belief th at he must do so when, in fact, he has
discretion.” 34 Again, the question posed and answer provided by the lead opini on is irrelevant to the actual argument that OFIS makes as authority for its ab ility to revoke plaintiff’s
license in the instant case. As OFIS argued in its brief a nd as OFIS’s attorney readily noted at oral argument, the OFIS commissi oner in this case is not exercising his discretionary authority under MCL 500.1239. Instead, counsel for OF IS urged at oral argument that the commissioner was being guided by the mandato ry language of [MCL 500.]1205 and further guided by this Court’s decisions in similar licensing cases where this Court has clearly said when a license is granted in excess of the statutory authority or in violation of it, it’s not discretionary and the agency is bound to revoke it. * * * [While] procedurally this is a revocation proceeding, . . . the revocation proceeding is t ouched off by the grant of an improper license. So it’s not – this proceed ing is not governed by the normal discretionary standard for revocation because the license here wa s never validly issued by the agency

.
Indeed, counsel for OFIS further admitted that if this were a typical revocation proceeding governed by the disc retionary standard employed in such proceedings, then

34 Ante at 8.19 the commissioner would have “ no grounds to revoke Mr. King’ s license . . . .” However, as OFIS argues and the above analysis demons trates, that does not dispose of the true issue in this case: whether the statute, as it was written in 2004, mandated that plaintiff not be given a license, thus ma king his subsequent licensure invalid. And as previously discussed, this Court’s caselaw has continua lly reaffirmed that ev en though statutory revocation provisions may be written as di scretionary, those re vocation procedures must be invoked if the original lic ense was granted in excess of an agency’s authority. By invoking a premise that OFIS readily concedes and by ignoring the argument OFIS actually proffers in defense of its action here, the au thor of the lead opinion renders an opinion that is larg ely unresponsive to the issues raised by this appeal. This error is further complicated by the fact that the lead opini on declines to address whether equity may otherwise be invoked to save plaintiff’s license. Indeed, the le ad opinion makes “no pronouncement about whether equity applie s here or what effect it might have.” 35 It does so notwithstanding the fact that the linchpin of plaintiff’s en tire argument is that OFIS is equitably estopped from revoking his license because of pl aintiff’s truthful disclosure of his felony and OFIS’s full review and waiver of the same. Similarly, equity was also the only basis on which the lower courts rendered their decisions. However, as the above statutory analysis demonstrat es, and contrary to the concurring justice’s position, equity cannot be properly invoked in this case because the stat ute mandates a particular

outcome . The lead opinion avoids this established principle by disclaiming that it is

35 Ante at 8.20 using equity even though its statutory an alysis fails to establish a sufficient and
alternative basis to do so. Finally, the lead opinion also fails to di stinguish (or even di scuss) any of the relevant caselaw holding that a license issued in violation of a statute should be revoked. Nor do the justices jo ining the lead and concurring opin ions appear willing to recognize the implications of their decision today, and I question whether those justices would draw the same conclusions if plaintiff here were less sympathetic. Cons ider, for example, a
convicted child molester who re ceived a license to open a daycare center, contrary to a clear statutory mandate preventing such licensure. 36 Would the majority justices here prevent the government from revoking the invalid license? Similarly, consider a dangerous felon who was ina ppropriately and illegally prov ided a license to carry a firearm, contrary to the clear stat utory mandate preventing such licensure 37 and the fact that possession of a firearm by such a person is a separate crime punishable by up to five years in prison. 38 Would the majority justices here allow the felon to retain his firearm license? In these scenarios, would the concu rring justices in partic ular still unequivocally “hold that a governmental licensing agency is estopped from revoking a license solely on the basis of the same fully disclosed and accurate facts for which it had previously granted an express waiver if the licensee has reasonably re lied to his detriment on the

36 See MCL 722.115g(3).

37 See MCL 28.425b; MCL 28.425b(7)(f) and (11).

38 See MCL 750.224f.21 issued license”? 39 Indeed, such a rule ha s the potential to establis h an untenable state of affairs in which every burea ucrat would become a king unto himself whose decisions— no matter how contrary to establishe d law—are insulated from challenge.

III. CONCLUSION The proper interpretation of the relevant statutory provisi ons as articulated in this dissent would admittedly produce a result in this case that is harsh for this plaintiff who properly disclosed a condition that made him ineligible for the license he was improvidently granted. While th is result is unfortunate for this particular plaintiff, it is also what the law require s. The inflexibility purposely built into this statute by the Legislature and approved by th e Governor is the result of policy determinations made by those political branches of government. 40 Save those statutes that are an affront to the

39 Ante at 1 (C AVANAGH , J., concurring).

40 The purposefulness of this inflexibility and the bright-line nature of this rule was reaffirmed when the Legislature amended MC L 500.1239(1) in 2009 in order to remove any dispute that OFIS must deny convicted felons a license to be a resident insurance producer. MCL 500.1239 now provides: (1) In addition to any other po wers under this act, the commissioner may place on probation, suspend, or revoke an insurance producer’s license or may levy a civil fine under section 1244 or any combination of actions, and the commissioner shall refuse to issue a license und er section 1205 or 1206a, for any 1 or more of the following causes: * * * (f) Having been convicted of a felony. [Emphasis added.] This amended language unanimously passed both chambers of the Michigan Legislature, and was signed into law by G overnor Granholm on January 5, 2009. See 2008 PA 423.22 constitution, no court can employ its limited j udicial power to overcome a valid statutory mandate. Nor can the rule of law, as pres cribed by MCL 500.1205(1)(b) when read in the context of MCL 500.1239(1) and MCL 500. 1206a, be displaced by the actions of
OFIS administrators. An ad ministrative agency may exerci se only the powers provided to it and must act within the paramete rs conferred upon it by statutory law. 41 Action in excess of these powers or outside these parame ters in situations in which the Legislature has mandated a specific outcome is not valid . Because the major ity justices here effectively sanction such impermissible conduct, I dissent. Robert P. Young, Jr. Maura D. Corrigan Stephen J. Markman

41 See, e.g., Union Carbide Corp v Pub Serv Comm , 431 Mich 135, 146; 428 NW2d 322 (1988); Mason Co Civic Resear ch Council v Mason Co , 343 Mich 313, 326-327; 72 NW2d 292 (1955); Taylor v Pub Utilities Comm , 217 Mich 400, 402 -403; 186 NW 485 (1922).