DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF FLORIDA

FOURTH DISTRICT

RICHARD WHEELER,

Appellant/Cross-Appellee,

v.

CITY OF FORT LAUDERDALE,

Appellee/Cross-Appellant.

No. 4D20-2676

[July 12, 2023]

Appeal and cross-appeal from the Circuit Court for the Seventeenth

Judicial Circuit, Broward County; Jeffrey R. Levenson, Judge; L.T. Case 

No. CACE-10-039694.

William R. Amlong, Karen Coolman Amlong, and Jennifer Daley of The 

Amlong Firm, Fort Lauderdale, for appellant/cross-appellee.

Debra P. Klauber, Misti Z. Barnett, and Kenneth J. Miller of Haliczer,

Pettis & Schwamm, P.A., Fort Lauderdale, for appellee/cross-appellant.

DAMOORGIAN, J.

This appeal concerns a Whistle-blower’s Act (“the Act”) claim initiated 

by Richard Wheeler (“Wheeler”) against the City of Fort Lauderdale (“the 

City”). A jury found Wheeler engaged in a protected activity and suffered 

an adverse employment action as a result. The trial court thereafter 

entered final judgment in Wheeler’s favor consistent with the jury’s verdict.

Wheeler appeals the final judgment and the denial of several post-trial 

motions in which he sought additional damages. The City cross-appeals,

arguing the trial court erred in denying its motion for directed verdict and 

associated post-trial motion based on Wheeler’s failure to comply with the 

Act’s requirements. For the reasons discussed below, we reverse the final 

judgment and remand for entry of judgment in the City’s favor. 

Accordingly, all issues raised by Wheeler on direct appeal are moot.

The City employed Wheeler as an IT systems administrator in the Public 

Works Department. The position provided Wheeler unrestricted access to 

the City’s computer server infrastructure—including employees’ private 
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storage drives. Wheeler also had the authority to request and obtain 

phone records of Public Works employees.

After a colleague informed Wheeler that she suspected her supervisor

was working a second job on the City’s time, Wheeler took it upon himself 

to investigate. Wheeler obtained the supervisor’s phone records and 

created spreadsheets listing suspicious incoming and outgoing calls from 

her extension. Wheeler also accessed the supervisor’s private computer

files and found documents unrelated to her employment with the City. He

took screenshots of the files, downloaded the data to an external drive, and 

kept the drive in his possession. Wheeler did not notify his superiors of 

his suspicions prior to his investigation.

Thereafter, Wheeler contacted the Assistant Director of the Public 

Works Department (“AD”) via e-mail requesting to meet with her. Wheeler 

did not indicate the reason for the meeting and informed the AD he had 

not spoken to his direct supervisor. At the meeting, Wheeler verbally 

explained his suspicions. He presented the AD with screenshots of the 

supervisor’s computer drive which included files seemingly related to a 

school—although the screenshots did not indicate the significance of the 

files nor allege the storage of the files on the supervisor’s computer violated 

any policy, law, or procedure.

Wheeler also provided call log spreadsheets indicating the date, time, 

duration, phone number, and other basic information about phone calls 

from the supervisor’s extension. However, like the screenshots, the 

spreadsheets did not indicate the significance of the phone calls, allege 

any violation of policy, law, or procedure, nor reflect to whom the phone 

calls were made. Importantly, neither the screenshots nor spreadsheets

included a written and signed explanation of why these documents 

indicated any wrongdoing.

After the meeting, the AD informed Wheeler he was under investigation 

for a violation of the City’s computer usage policy. In due course, the City 

terminated Wheeler. The City also determined the supervisor’s computer 

usage did not violate any of its policies.

Following termination, Wheeler brought a claim against the City under 

the Act. The case proceeded to trial. At the close of Wheeler’s case, the 

City moved for a directed verdict, arguing Wheeler failed to submit a valid 

“written and signed complaint” as the Act requires. The trial court denied 

the City’s motion after which the City presented its case. At the close of 

all the evidence, the City renewed its directed verdict motion. The trial 

court denied the motion a second time. The jury rendered its verdict 
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finding Wheeler proved a violation under the Act and awarded him

damages for lost wages and benefits.

After the verdict was rendered, the City moved to set aside the verdict

for the same reasons advanced in the motions for directed verdict. The 

City also moved for a new trial on the same grounds. The trial court denied

the City’s motions. This appeal and cross-appeal follow.

We review a trial court’s denial of a motion for directed verdict de novo. 

Meruelo v. Mark Andrew of Palm Beaches, Ltd., 12 So. 3d 247, 250 (Fla. 

4th DCA 2009).

On cross-appeal, the City argues the trial court erred in denying its 

motions for directed verdict and related post-trial motion because Wheeler 

failed to comply with the Act’s requirements. We agree.1

Florida’s Whistle-blower’s Act governs relief for adverse employment 

actions against employees following the disclosure of protected 

information. See § 112.3187, Fla. Stat. (2009). Significantly, section 

112.3187(7) “protects employees and persons who disclose information on 

their own initiative in a written and signed complaint.” § 112.3187(7), Fla. 

Stat. (2009) (emphasis added). “The purpose of the statutory requirement 

of a signed writing ‘is to document what the employee disclosed, and to 

whom the employee disclosed it, thus avoiding problems of proof for 

purposes of the Whistle-blower’s Act.’” Walker v. Fla. Dep’t of Veterans’ 

Affs., 925 So. 2d 1149, 1150 (Fla. 4th DCA 2006) (quoting Hutchison v. 

Prudential Ins. Co. of Am., Inc., 645 So. 2d 1047, 1050 (Fla. 3d DCA 1994)). 

Accordingly, in order to qualify as a “written and signed complaint” under 

the Act, the document must identify alleged wrongdoing. See 

§ 112.3187(5)(a)-(b), Fla. Stat. (2009) (providing that “[t]he information 

disclosed under this section must include” either a “violation or suspected 

violation of any federal, state, or local law, rule, or regulation committed 

by an employee or agent of an agency or independent contractor which 

creates and presents a substantial and specific danger to the public’s 

health, safety, or welfare” or an “act or suspected act of gross 

mismanagement, malfeasance, misfeasance, gross waste of public funds, 

suspected or actual Medicaid fraud or abuse, or gross neglect of duty 

committed by an employee or agent of an agency or independent 

contractor”); see also Walker, 925 So. 2d at 1150; Henley v. City of N. Mia., 

329 So. 3d 791, 793 (Fla. 3d DCA 2021); Pickford v. Taylor Cnty. Sch. Dist., 

298 So. 3d 707, 711 (Fla. 1st DCA 2020).

1 We reject, without further comment, Wheeler’s argument that the City failed to 

preserve this issue.
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We conclude that Wheeler failed to comply with the Act’s “written and 

signed complaint” requirement because the screenshots and spreadsheets 

submitted by Wheeler failed to identify any violation of law, rule, or policy, 

nor identify any act of misfeasance, malfeasance, or other gross conduct 

that would trigger the Act’s protections. In short, merely providing 

documents potentially supporting a protected disclosure without any 

written explanation bearing the signature of the complainant fails to

qualify as a “written and signed complaint” within the meaning of section 

112.3187(7), Florida Statutes. Accordingly, the documents do not qualify 

as a protected disclosure under the Act. See Walker, 925 So. 2d at 1150 

(holding two repair invoices submitted to a superior did “not qualify as a 

‘written and signed complaint’ within the meaning of section 112.3187(7)” 

because the invoices, standing alone, did not “document the nature of 

[appellant’s] protected disclosure”); Henley, 329 So. 3d at 793 (holding an 

employee’s alleged e-mails and a text message relating to deficits in the 

proposed budget did “not identify any violation of law or any act of 

suspected gross mismanagement, misfeasance” and therefore did not 

constitute protected activity under the Act); Pickford, 298 So. 3d at 711 

(holding a former substitute teacher’s letter to the school’s principal 

disputing his pay rate did “not rise to the level of a statutorily protected 

disclosure under the Act” because it “fail[ed] to identify any violation of 

law, rule, or policy” nor did “it identify any act of misfeasance, 

malfeasance, or other gross conduct that would trigger the Act’s 

protections”); see also Castro v. Sch. Bd. of Manatee Cnty., Fla., 903 F. 

Supp. 2d 1290, 1303 (M.D. Fla. 2012) (holding e-mails sent by an 

employee complaining about the school board’s implementation of certain 

state educational policies did not constitute protected activity under the 

Act because the e-mails did not involve complaints about the school 

board’s violations of the law).

While we recognize the Legislature’s intent that “the statute should be 

construed liberally in favor of granting access to the remedy,” Martin Cnty. 

v. Edenfield, 609 So. 2d 27, 29 (Fla. 1992), “it is a well-recognized rule of 

statutory construction that exceptions or provisos should be narrowly and 

strictly construed.” Samara Dev. Corp. v. Marlow, 556 So. 2d 1097, 1100 

(Fla. 1990); see also Walker, 925 So. 2d at 1150 (“Even the liberal 

construction of the statute that [appellant] urges cannot stretch the 

statutory requirement of a ‘written and signed complaint’ to cover the 

invoices here at issue.”).

Accordingly, we reverse the final judgment awarding Wheeler damages

and remand to the trial court for entry of judgment in favor of the City.
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Reversed and remanded.

LEVINE and KUNTZ, JJ., concur.

* * *

Not final until disposition of timely filed motion for rehearing.