In the

United States Court of Appeals

For the Seventh Circuit

No. 01-1486

Elizabeth Anderson,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

v.

U.S.F. Logistics (IMC), Inc., 

Defendant-Appellee.

Appeal from the United States District Court 

for the Southern District of Indiana,

Indianapolis Division.

No. IP 00-1364 C T/G--John D. Tinder, Judge.

Argued September 11, 2001--Decided December 14, 2001

 Before Cudahy, Easterbrook and Williams,

Circuit Judges.

 Cudahy, Circuit Judge. In this appeal

from a denial of a preliminary

injunction, Elizabeth Anderson argues

that the district court erred in

concluding that she was not likely to

succeed on her claim that her employer,

U.S.F. Logistics ("U.S.F."), engaged in

religious discrimination. We affirm.

I.

 Elizabeth Anderson is a believer in and

follower of the Christian Methodist

Episcopal faith. As an expression of her

faith, Anderson tells people to "Have a

Blessed Day," especially in signing off

on written correspondence or as a way to

end telephone conversations. However, she

does not use the "Blessed Day" phrase all

of the time. For example, sometimes she

does not use the phrase when she is busy.

 U.S.F. is a company that does shipping

for other companies. Anderson has worked

for U.S.F. since December 1995. In March

1999, Anderson was promoted to office

coordinator. As an office coordinator,

Anderson was responsible for being the

liaison between U.S.F. and its customers

and vendors. Microsoft is U.S.F.’s

largest customer. After becoming an
office coordinator, Anderson had regular

contact with Microsoft employees.

 Throughout her tenure with U.S.F.,

Anderson often used the phrase, "Have a

Blessed Day," with her co-employees and

with U.S.F.’s customers. Anderson

continued to use the "Blessed Day" phrase

after she became an office coordinator.

Neither Anderson nor U.S.F. received any

complaints about her use of "Blessed Day"

until June 9, 1999. On that date, Mark

LaRussa, a Microsoft liaison with U.S.F.,

complained to Anderson that her use of

the phrase was "unacceptable" and must

stop. In response to LaRussa’s complaint,

U.S.F. instructed Anderson to remove the

closing "Have a Blessed Day" from

documents sent to Microsoft. The

following Monday, however, Anderson sent

an e-mail to Microsoft containing the

"Blessed Day" phrase.

 After receiving the e-mail, LaRussa

called Jeffery Starnes, Anderson’s

immediate supervisor to complain.

Thereafter, Starnes instructed Anderson

to refrain from using the "Blessed Day"

phrase in her daily business interactions

with Microsoft. In response, Anderson

notified Starnes that the "Blessed Day"

phrase was part of her religious

practice. She told him that if he would

identify the person or persons that the

phrase offended, she would not use the

phrase with them. Starnes did not respond

to Anderson’s proposed accommodation.

 On June 21, 1999, the Monday after her

discussion with Starnes, Anderson again

sent an e-mail to Microsoft containing

the "Blessed Day" phrase. Shortly

thereafter, Chuck Tolley, another of

Anderson’s supervisor, asked her why she

continued to use the phrase in

communications with Microsoft. In

response, Anderson scheduled a meeting

with Tolley and Starnes.

 At the meeting, Anderson notified Tolley

that she had personally contacted several

people at Microsoft who did not object to

her use of the phrase. She reiterated

that it was her religious expression, and

once again stated that, if U.S.F. would

identify those who were offended, she

would not use the phrase with them.

Tolley did not identify any particular

person or persons.

 The following day, Tolley gave Anderson
a written reprimand for her use of the

"Blessed Day" phrase with Microsoft. The

reprimand also notified Anderson that

continued use of the phrase could result

in termination. U.S.F. also issued a

company policy statement to all of its

Indianapolis employees that they should

refrain from using "additional religious,

personal or political statements" in

their closing remarks in verbal or

written communications with any customer

or with fellow employees. Despite the

language in the policy statement, U.S.F.

permitted Anderson to continue to use the

"Blessed Day" phrase with her co-workers.

 Next, Anderson went public with the

dispute. On October 10, 1999, a local

Indianapolis newspaper published an

article about the controversy. In the

article, a spokesperson from Microsoft

was quoted as saying that Microsoft did

not have a problem with Anderson’s use of

the "Blessed Day" phrase. Based on her

reading of the article, Anderson decided

that she could resume using the "Blessed

Day" phrase. The next day, Anderson sent

a new piece of business correspondence to

Microsoft containing the "Blessed Day"

phrase. She was not disciplined then in

any way for her use of the phrase.

However, Tolley refused to withdraw the

earlier reprimand.

 Anderson refrained from using the

"Blessed Day" phrase again until February

15, 2000. On that date, she sent an

e-mail to Microsoft with the phrase "HAVE

A BLESSED DAY" in all capitals,

surrounded by quotation marks. She

received another reprimand. Subsequently,

on August 30, 2000, Anderson filed a

five-count Complaint and a Verified

Motion for a Preliminary and Permanent

Injunction in federal district court. The

Complaint alleged that U.S.F. violated

Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of

1964, 42 U.S.C. sec. 2000e et seq., by

failing to reasonably accommodate her

religious practice. The Motion for

Preliminary and Permanent Injunction

sought an injunction to permit Anderson

to use the "Have a Blessed Day" phrase in

written communications with U.S.F.’s

customers.

 The district court denied Anderson’s

motion for a preliminary injunction. The

court found that Anderson did not have a

likely chance of success on the merits
because U.S.F. reasonably accommodated

her religious practice. Anderson then

filed an interlocutory appeal here.

II.

 This court has jurisdiction to hear an

appeal of a denial of a preliminary

injunction under 28 U.S.C. sec.

1292(a)(1)./1 In examining a denial of

a preliminary injunction, we review the

district court’s findings of fact for

clear error, its balancing of the factors

for a preliminary injunction under an

abuse of discretion standard and its

legal conclusions de novo. Kiel v. City

of Kenosha, 236 F.3d 814, 815 (7th Cir.

2000). The purpose of a preliminary

injunction is to minimize the hardship to

the parties pending resolution of their

lawsuit. Id. at 816 n.4. In assessing

whether a preliminary injunction is

warranted, the party seeking the

injunction must demonstrate that: 1) it

has a reasonable likelihood of success on

the merits of the underlying claim; 2) no

adequate remedy at law exists; and 3) it

will suffer irreparable harm if the

preliminary injunction is denied. See Ty,

Inc. v. Jones Group, Inc., 237 F.3d 891,

895 (7th Cir. 2001). If the court is

satisfied that these three conditions

have been met, it then must consider

whether the irreparable harm the

applicant will suffer without injunctive

relief is greater than the harm the

opposing party will suffer if the

preliminary injunction is granted. Id. In

addition, the court must determine

whether the preliminary injunction will

harm the public interest. Id. Further,

preliminary injunctions are disfavored in

the employment context. See, e.g.,

Hetreed v. Allstate Ins. Co., 135 F.3d

1155, 1158 (7th Cir. 1998) (noting that

interlocutory relief should be rare in

employment-discrimination cases). 

A.

 Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of

1964 makes it unlawful for an employer

"to fail to or refuse to hire or to

discharge any individual, or otherwise to

discriminate against any individual with

respect to his compensation, terms,

conditions, or privileges of employment

because of such individual’s . . .

religion[.]" 42 U.S.C. sec. 2000e2(a)(1). Religion includes "all aspects
of religious observance and practice, as

well as belief." 42 U.S.C. sec. 2000e(j).

A plaintiff alleging religious

discrimination under Title VII must first

establish a prima facie case, after which

the burden is on the employer to show

that a reasonable accommodation of the

religious practice was made or that any

accommodation would result in undue

hardship. Baz v. Walters, 782 F.2d 701,

706 (7th Cir. 1986).

 The district court assumed that Anderson

had established her prima facie case.

Anderson v. U.S.F. Logistics, 2001 WL

114270, *9 (S.D. Ind. Jan. 30, 2001). The

court then denied injunctive relief

because it concluded that U.S.F.

reasonably accommodated Anderson’s

religious practice and therefore Anderson

had a less than promising prospect of

success on the merits. Anderson

challenges the district court’s

conclusion about reasonable

accommodation.

 "A reasonable accommodation of an

employee’s religion is one that

’eliminates the conflict between

employment requirements and religious practices.’"

Wright v. Runyon, 2 F.3d 214, 217 (7th

Cir. 1993) (quoting Ansonia Bd. of Educ.

v. Philbrook, 479 U.S. 60, 70 (1986)).

However, it is well settled that "Title

VII . . . requires only reasonable

accommodation, not satisfaction of an

employee’s every desire." Rodriguez v.

City of Chicago, 156 F.3d 771, 776 (7th

Cir. 1998) (internal citations omitted).

Further, a finding of reasonable

accommodation is a finding of fact

entitled to deference. See Redmond v. GAF

Corp., 574 F.2d 897, 903 (7th Cir. 1978)

(holding that a finding of accommodation

is reviewed under the "clearly erroneous"

standard of review instead of under a de

novo standard).

 Anderson first argues that the district

court erred in concluding that because

Anderson’s sincere religious practice was

not a requirement of her religion, she

was entitled to a lesser "reasonable

accommodation" of this religious practice

than if the practice were required by her

religion. See Appellant’s Br. at p. 22

("In other words, the District Court

determined as a matter of law that

because Ms. Anderson’s religious practice

is unique to her, U.S.F. satisfied its
reasonable accommodation obligation when

it unilaterally restricted her religious

practice."). If the district court in

fact reached that conclusion, it probably

would have erred. However, the district

court did not entertain that conclusion.

Rather, the district court found that her

religious practice was accommodated by

U.S.F., as required under Title VII. In

making this determination, the district

court first defined Anderson’s religious

practice as the sporadic use of the

"Blessed Day" phrase. This definition in

volves a finding of fact and is not

clearly erroneous. See Kiel, 236 F.3d at

815. On the record, there is sufficient

evidence to support such a finding.

Anderson concedes that she does not use

the phrase all the time. Neither has she

made a religious commitment to use the

phrase on every occasion. Nor is she

required by her religion to use the

phrase all of the time. Thus, an

accommodation that allows her to use the

phrase with some people but not with

everyone could be a reasonable

accommodation. The district court so

found, and on these facts, it did not

clearly err in reaching that conclusion.

 In many ways, this case is similar to

Wilson v. U.S. W. Communications, 58 F.3d

1337 (8th Cir. 1995). In Wilson, the

plaintiff was terminated by her employer

for refusing to cover an anti-abortion

button displaying a graphic picture of a

fetus. See 58 F.3d at 1341. Co-workers

found the photograph disturbing and it

disrupted the work environment. See id.

at 1338. To address the co-workers’

concerns, U.S. West proposed alternatives

to Wilson. She could: (1) wear the button

only in her work cubicle, leaving the

button in her cubicle when she moved

around the office; (2) cover the button

while at work; or (3) wear a different

button with the same message but without

the picture. See id. at 1341. However,

Wilson refused the proposed accommodation

and she was terminated. The Wilson court

held that U.S. West reasonably

accommodated Wilson’s religious practice

of wearing the button. See id. at 1341-

42. The Eighth Circuit reasoned that

forcing U.S. West to allow Wilson to wear

the uncovered button throughout the

office would require U.S. West to allow

Wilson to impose her beliefs as she

chose. Id. at 1341. The court found that

"U.S. West did not oppose her religious
beliefs but rather was concerned with the

photograph." Id. U.S. West’s proposal

would allow Wilson to comply with her

commitment to wear the button but

respected the desire of co-workers not to

look at the button. Id.

 Here, Anderson’s religious practice did

not require her to use the "Blessed Day"

phrase with everyone. Further, U.S.F. did

not seek to denigrate Anderson’s

religious beliefs. In fact, U.S.F. has on

at least one occasion encouraged

Anderson’s religious practice by

requesting Anderson to say a prayer,

which was broadcast over company

loudspeakers, prior to a companysponsored event. Rather, U.S.F. was

concerned about its relationship with its

customers, one of whose representatives

had objected to the use of the "Blessed

Day" phrase. U.S.F.’s accommodation

allowed Anderson to comply with her

practice of using the "Blessed Day"

phrase while respecting the wishes of at

least one customer who objected to the

use of the phrase. Thus, U.S.F.

reasonably accommodated Anderson.

 Second, Anderson argues that the

district court erred in concluding that

her use of the "Blessed Day" phrase

imposed her religious beliefs on U.S.F.’s

customers or vendors. Anderson argues

that, to the contrary, the "Blessed Day"

phrase does not in any way impose her

religious beliefs on her co-employees or

U.S.F.’s customers. Further, Anderson

argues that U.S.F. failed to present any

evidence that Anderson’s use of the

phrase would substantially disrupt the

workplace environment or damage U.S.F.’s

relationships with its customers or

vendors. Because hearings on preliminary

injunctions occur at an early stage of a

case, the district court itself noted

that its findings and conclusions on

Anderson’s motion were preliminary and

tentative. See Anderson, 2001 WL 114270,

*9. Thus, it is unsurprising that the

district court did not go into great

detail about how Anderson’s use of the

"Blessed Day" phrase imposed her

religious views upon customers or

vendors. However, a Microsoft liaison had

complained that the use of the phrase was

"inappropriate." Permitting Anderson to

direct the "Blessed Day" phrase towards

LaRussa could surely be an imposition of

Anderson’s religious beliefs upon him.
Further, Anderson has presented no

evidence that Microsoft had officially

informed U.S.F. that it was content with

the use of the "Blessed Day" phrase.

Thus, the evidence suggests that

Anderson’s religious practice could

damage U.S.F.’s relationship with

Microsoft.

 Even if the district court erred in

finding that Anderson’s religious

practice imposed her beliefs upon others,

such a determination does not mean that

Anderson was not reasonably accommodated

by U.S.F. A religious practice that does

not actually impose religious beliefs

upon others can still be restricted if it

impairs an employer’s legitimate

interests, as long as it is reasonably

accommodated. See, e.g., Rodriguez, 156

F.3d at 776 (finding that police

officer’s religious practice of not

guarding abortion clinics was reasonably

accommodated by his ability to get a

transfer to another district that did not

assign officers to that duty).

 Finally, Anderson argues that the

district court erred in holding that her

religious practice was reasonably

accommodated when U.S.F.’s company

policy, as formally announced, does not

provide that accommodation. U.S.F.’s cur

rent company policy has language that

forbids the use of any religious,

personal or political expression, even

among co-workers. Anderson, however,

concedes that the company policy was

never implemented as it is written. She

admits that she has been reprimanded only

after using the "Blessed Day" phrase in

written communications with Microsoft.

Further, she does not dispute that she

has been permitted to use the "Blessed

Day" phrase with co-workers, to hang

objects containing various religious

phrases in her work area, to read the

Bible on her work break and to listen to

a religiously oriented radio station at

her work station. Thus, despite the

language of the company policy, the

district court held that Anderson was

reasonably accommodated in practice. This

accommodation was sufficient to satisfy

the company’s obligations under Title

VII. We agree. The fact that the company

policy, as stated, would not reasonably

accommodate her religious practice is not

controlling. In many cases, a company

must modify its stated policies in
practice to reasonably accommodate a

religious practice. Cf. Minkus v. Metro.

Sanitary Dist. of Greater Chicago, 600

F.2d 80 (7th Cir. 1979) (holding that the

municipal employer failed to accommodate

a Jewish applicant when it followed its

stated policy and scheduled civil service

examinations only on Saturdays). In this

case, U.S.F. disregarded its stated

policy to accommodate Anderson’s use of

the "Blessed Day" phrase. It permitted

her to use the phrase with everyone

except customers and vendors. Thus, we

hold that the district court did not err

in finding that U.S.F.’s selective

enforcement of its company policy was a

reasonable accommodation of Anderson’s

religious practice.

B.

 Further, even if the district court were

incorrect in evaluating the reasonable

merits of Anderson’s claim, we would

still sustain the denial of the

preliminary injunction on the alternative

ground that Anderson can show no

irreparable injury. An appellate court

may affirm on any ground that has a basis

in the record. See Logan v. Caterpillar,

Inc., 246 F.3d 912, 924 (7th Cir. 2001).

In this case, counsel for both parties

concede that the issue of irreparable

injury was raised and argued before the

district court. The record also supports

this conclusion. See Tr. of Hr’g

(November 16, 2000), at pp. 182-83, 206-

09. Thus, even though the district court,

in denying the preliminary injunction,

did not address the irreparable injury

prong of the preliminary injunction

calculus, we may affirm the judgment on

the alternative ground that there was no

irreparable injury.

 To demonstrate irreparable injury,

Anderson must show that she will suffer

harm that cannot be prevented or fully

rectified by the final judgment after

trial. See Roland Mach Co. v. Dresser

Indus., Inc., 749 F.2d 380, 386 (7th Cir.

1984). Anderson’s inability to use the

"Blessed Day" phrase with customers does

not constitute irreparable harm. She was

not terminated from her position for her

earlier use of the phrase. Neither has

she been demoted from her current

position. The only potential harms that

Anderson has suffered are: (1) the

inability to use the "Blessed Day" phrase
and (2) her prior reprimands for the use

of the phrase. Regarding the former,

Anderson has been able to refrain from

using the "Blessed Day" phrase with

vendors from October 1999 to February

2000, and again from February to August

2000. A few more months of restraint

while the trial proceeds does not appear

to impose irreparable injury. As to the

latter, U.S.F. had alternative valid

reasons for issuing the reprimands--

Anderson’s failure to follow her

supervisors’ orders. Thus, Anderson

cannot show that she will suffer

irreparable harm absent preliminary

injunctive relief.

C.

 Anderson also argues that the district

court erred in determining that she may

not have established the first element of

her prima facie case--that she had a bona

fide religious practice that conflicted

with an employment requirement./2 But

the district court did not refuse to

grant a preliminary injunction based on

Anderson’s failure to make a prima facie

case. That court assumed that she had

done so but that U.S.F. reasonably

accommodated her religious practice.

Since we agree with the accommodation

point, we need not reach the issue

whether Anderson could or could not prove

the first element of her prima facie

case. 

III.

 For the foregoing reasons, we AFFIRM the

judgment of the district court denying

preliminary injunctive relief.

FOOTNOTES

/1 28 U.S.C. sec. 1292 provides that: "(a) Except as

provided in subsections (c) and (d) of this

section, the courts of appeals shall have jurisdiction of appeals from: (1) Interlocutory orders

of the district courts of the United States . .

. granting, continuing, modifying, refusing or

dissolving injunctions, or refusing to dissolve

or modifying injunctions, except where a direct

review may be had in the Supreme Court."

/2 To make out a prima facie case, a plaintiff must

show that "(1) a bona fide religious practice

conflicts with an employment requirement, (2) he

or she brought the practice to the employer’s

attention, and (3) the religious practice was the
basis for the adverse employment decision." EEOC

v. United Parcel Serv., 94 F.3d 314, 317 (7th

Cir. 1996).