MAINE SUPREME JUDICIAL COURT Reporter of Decisions Decision: 201 6 ME 23 Docket: Sag

- 15

- 123 Argued : December 9, 2015 Decided: January 28, 2016 Panel: SAUFLEY, C.J., and ALEXANDER , MEAD, GORMAN, JABAR , and HJELM, JJ.

JULIE LOTHROP

v. DOUG LOTHROP

JABAR , J. [¶1] Doug Lothrop app eals from a judgment of the District Court (West Bath, Dobson, J. ) denying his motion to modify the spousal support award in the parties’ divorce judgment

. Contrary to Doug’s contention, we discern no error in the District Court’s determination that the award remains nonmodifiable because 19

- A M.R.S. § 951

- A(12) (2015 ) does not apply retroactively

. W e affirm the judg ment. I. BACKGROUND [¶ 2 ] This case turns on whether a 2013 amendment to the spousal support statute applies to a spousal support provision in a divorce judgment entered in
2008. 1 The statutory sections, as amended, read as follows:

1 The amendment provisions, P.L. 2013, ch. 327, §§ 1, 2 (effective Oct. 9, 2013), updated the text of 19

- A M.R.S. § 951

- A(4) and added § 951

- A(12).2 An award of spousal support issued before October 1, 2013 is sub ject to modification when it appears that justice requires unless and to the extent the order awarding or modifying spousal support expressly states that the award, in whole or in part, is not sub ject to future modification. An award of spousal support issued on or after October 1, 2013 is sub ject to modification when it appears that justice requires.
19

- A M.R.S. § 951

- A(4) (2015 ) (new language underlined). Cessation upon cohabitation. Wh en it appears that justice requires, an order awarding spousal support is sub ject to modification to terminate spousal support when it can be shown that the payee and another person have entered into a mutually supportive relationship that is the functiona l equivalent of marriage that has existed for at least 12 months of a period of 18 consecutive months.
19

- A M.R.S. § 951

- A(12) (2015 ) (new language underlined). [¶ 3 ] Doug and Julie Lothrop were married on August 30, 1985 , and divorced on May 8, 2008. In the divorce judgment, by agreement, Doug was ordered to pay Julie $250.00 a week in spousal sup port for life based on a twenty[

- ] two year marriage and the Plaintiff’s earning capacity during the marriage and future earning potential. Said amount is non

- modifiable for any reason , thereby meaning that the amount or duration cannot be decreased or increased for any reason by either party. (E mphasis added). At some point after their divorce , Julie began cohabitating with another person in a “mutually sup portive relationship.” 2 On July 18, 2014, Doug filed a motion to modify the divorce judgment, requesting termination or

2 Julie stipulated to being in a qualifying relationship pursuant to sub section 12 during the motion hearing.3 reduction of his spousal suppo rt obligation due to Julie’s co habitation

. See 19

- A M.R.S. § 951

- A(12)

. [¶ 4 ] The District Court (Wes t Bath, Dobson, J. ) held a hearing on February 23, 2015 , after which it denied Doug’s motion to modify , concluding that, because section 951

- A(12 ) did not apply retroactively , Doug’s spousal support obligation could not be reduced or terminated . Doug timely appealed to

us. II. RETROACTIVE APPLICATION OF 19

- A M.R.S. § 951

- A(12) [¶ 5 ] Doug contends on appeal that the court erred in determining that
19

- A M.R.S. § 951

- A(12) applies only to spousal support awards entered on or after October 1, 2013 . He ar gues that the sub section’s language, context , and purpose all indicate a legislative intent that it apply both pro spectively and retrospectively. We review statutory interpretation de novo as a question of law. Morrill v. Me. Tpk. Auth. , 2009 ME 116, ¶ 5, 983 A.2d 1065. “When interpreting a statute, our objective is to give effect to the Legislature’s intent. To determine that intent, we first look to the statute’s plain meaning. If there is no ambiguity, we do not examine legislative history.” Garr ison City Broad., Inc. v. York Obstetrics
& Gynecology, P.A. , 2009 ME 124, ¶ 9, 985 A.2d 465 (quotation marks omitted). Here, we find no ambiguity. Nothing within the amended statute indicate s that the Legislature intended that sub section 12 apply retroa ctively to allow for the4 modification of nonmodifiable spousal support awards entered prior to October 1, 2013. [¶ 6 ] At the time of the Lothrop s ’ divorce, the spousal support statute provided, “[a]n award of spousal support is sub ject to modification whe n it appears that justice requires unless and to the extent the order awarding or modifying spousal support expressly states that the award, in whole or in part, is not sub ject to future modification

. ” 19

- A M.R.S. § 951

- A(4) (2008) (emphasis added). As noted, i n 2013, the Legislature amended the sta tute by enacting P.L. 2013, ch. 327, §§ 1, 2 (effective Oct. 9, 2013) (codified at 19

- A M.R.S. § 951

- A(4) (2015 ) and
19

- A M.R.S. § 951

- A(12) (2015 ) )

. A summary of the amendment provides: [The ame ndment ] provides that all spousal support orders issued on or after October 1, 2013 can be modified as the court determines justice requires. Current law prohibits modification of an order that expressly states it cannot be modified. Current law allows m odification of an order upon cohabitation by the recipient. This amendment makes clear that a spousal support order is sub ject to termination as justice requires when it can be shown that the recipient of the spousal support and another person have entere d into a mutually supportive relationship that is the functional equivalent of marriage that has existed for at least 12 of a period of 18 consecutive months. Comm. Amend. A to L.D. 548, No. H

- 330 (126th Legis. 2013). [¶ 7 ] Doug argues that, because sub s ection 12 “contains no temporal limitation on its application,” the Legislature must have intended that it would be interpreted in the context of the other sub sections, including sub section 10 , which5 provides that section 951

- A, as a whole, applies to “ [o] rders granting or denying spousal support entered on or after September 1, 2000; and [t]he modification, termination and enforcement of orders granting spousal support entered on or after September 1, 2000. ” 3 19

- A M.R.S. § 951

- A(10) (2015 ). He also contends that the trial court’s interpretation of section 12 re nders it inoperative surplusage because sub section 4 provides that spo usal support awards are always “ sub ject to modification when it appears that justice requires. ” [¶ 8 ] Doug’s arg uments are unpersuasive. A plain reading of section
951

- A(4) compels the conclusion that section 951

- A does not app l y to allow a modification of Doug’s spousal support order

. The Legislature has expressly provided that an “ award of spousal support issued before October 1, 2013 is sub ject to modification when it appears that justice requires unless and to the extent the order awarding or modifying spousal support expressly states that the award , in whole or in part, is not sub ject to future modification .” 19

- A M.R.S. § 951

- A(4). The Lothrops’ divorce judgment was entered in 2008, well before October 1, 2013, and the judgment expressly stated that it was not sub ject to future modificat ion; therefore, the provision of 951

- A(4) indicating that all divorce ju dgments are sub ject to modification when justice requires does not apply.

3 This language is ide n tical in both the 2008 and 2015 versions of the statute. 19

- A M.R.S. § 951

- A(10) (2015 ) ; 19

- A M.R.S. § 951

- A(10) (2008).6 [¶ 9 ] Based on the unequivocal language of the provision in the divorce judgment forever prohibiting modification of the spousal support award, coupled with a pl ain reading of sub sec tion 4’s statement that nonmodifiable spousal support awards entered before October 1, 2013 , remain nonmodifiable, we conclude that the District Court did not err as a matter of law when it held that section 951

- A(12) did not apply retroactively. The entry is: Judgment affirmed.

On the briefs: Christopher S. Berryment, Esq., Mexico, for appellant Doug Lothrop William B. Gillespie, Esq., Topsham, and Sheilah R. McLaughlin, Esq., Brunswick, for appellee Julie Lothrop
At oral argument: Christophe r S. Berryment, Esq., for appellant Doug Lothrop William B. Gillespie, Esq., for appellee Julie Lothrop

West Bath District Court docket number FM

- 2010

- 135 F OR C LERK R EFERENCE O NLY