IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF TENNESSEE

AT NASHVILLE

October 16, 2023 Session

CLATA RENEE BREWER ET AL. v. METROPOLITAN GOVERNMENT 

OF NASHVILLE AND DAVIDSON COUNTY ET AL. 

Appeal from the Chancery Court for Davidson County

No. 23-0538-III I’Ashea L. Myles, Chancellor

___________________________________

No. M2023-00788-COA-R3-CV

___________________________________

This action involves various requests directed to the Metropolitan Government of 

Nashville and Davidson County (“Metro”) for the release of records, pursuant to the 

Tennessee Public Records Act (“TPRA”), related to a school shooting that occurred at a 

private school in Nashville. Before making a determination concerning release of the 

records, the trial court allowed certain interested parties to intervene in the action 

pursuant to Tennessee Rule of Civil Procedure 24.02. The parties requesting the records 

have appealed that ruling pursuant to Tennessee Rule of Civil Procedure 24.05.1 

Discerning no reversible error, we affirm.

Tenn. R. App. P. 3 Appeal as of Right; Judgment of the Chancery Court

Affirmed; Case Remanded

THOMAS R. FRIERSON, II, J., delivered the opinion of the court, in which JOHN W.

MCCLARTY and KRISTI M. DAVIS, JJ., joined.

Paul J. Krog, Brentwood, Tennessee; Nicholas R. Barry, Washington, D.C.; John I. 

Harris, III, and Douglas R. Pierce, Nashville, Tennessee; and Richard L. Hollow, 

Knoxville, Tennessee, for the appellants, Clata Renee Brewer; James Hammond;

Tennessee Firearms Association, Inc.; Michael P. Leahy; Star News Digital Media, Inc.;

The Tennessean; Rachel Wegner; and Todd Gardenhire.

Wallace W. Dietz, Director of Law; Lora Barkenbus Fox, Associate Director of Law; 

Cynthia E. Gross; and Phylinda Ramsey, Nashville, Tennessee, for the appellee, 

Metropolitan Government of Nashville and Davidson County.

 

1 Tennessee Rule of Civil Procedure 24.05 provides: “Any order granting or denying a motion to 

intervene filed pursuant to this rule shall be a final judgment for purposes of Tenn. R. App. P. 3.”

11/30/2023
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Eric G. Osborne, William L. Harbison, Christopher C. Sabis, C. Dewey Branstetter, Ryan 

T. Holt, Micah N. Bradley, Frances W. Perkins, Hunter C. Branstetter, William D. Pugh, 

Edward M. Yarbrough, Sara D. Naylor, and Hal Hardin, Nashville, Tennessee, for the 

appellees, Parents of Minor Covenant Students Jane Doe and John Doe.

Rocklan W. King, III; F. Laurens Brock; and Ashley H. Harbin, Nashville, Tennessee, for 

the appellee, Covenant Presbyterian Church of Nashville.

Peter F. Klett and Autumn L. Gentry, Nashville, Tennessee, and Nader Baydoun and 

Stephen Knight, Brentwood, Tennessee, for the appellee, The Covenant School.

Samuel P. Funk, James K. Vines, Grace A. Fox, and Evan S. Rothey, Nashville, 

Tennessee, for Amici Curiae, Franklin Road Academy, Montgomery Bell Academy, Oak 

Hill School, and St. Paul Christian Academy.

OPINION

I. Factual and Procedural Background

On March 27, 2023, a tragic school shooting occurred in Nashville at The 

Covenant School (“the School”), a private school operated by Covenant Presbyterian 

Church of Nashville (“the Church”). Six people were killed, including three children and 

three adults. The shooter was killed at the scene after opening fire on responding Metro 

officers. A subsequent search of the shooter’s car and home by Metro apparently 

revealed the existence of a “manifesto” and additional writings by the shooter, as well as 

other evidence concerning the shooter’s thoughts and plans, all of which were confiscated 

by Metro officers.

In the weeks following the incident, various individuals sought to gain access to 

these documents in Metro’s possession, including Todd Gardenhire, Chairperson of the 

Tennessee Senate Judiciary Committee; The Tennessean, a Nashville-based newspaper; 

Rachel Wegner, a reporter for The Tennessean; James Hammond and the Tennessee 

Firearms Association, Inc.; Clata Renee Brewer (in conjunction with the National Police 

Association); Star News Digital Media, Inc. (“Star News”); and the chief executive 

officer of Star News, Michael Leahy (collectively, “Petitioners”). When their requests 

for access to the Metro records concerning the shooting were denied, Petitioners filed 

petitions in various Davidson County courts seeking to gain access to the records. These 

petitions were filed pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated § 10-7-503 (Supp. 2023) of 

the TPRA, which provides in relevant part that “[a]ll state, county and municipal records 

shall . . . be open for personal inspection by any citizen of this state.” The petitions were 

subsequently transferred to the Davidson County Chancery Court, Part III (“trial court”), 

and consolidated into one action.
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Meanwhile, on May 12, 2023, the Church filed a motion to intervene, stating that 

it shared a physical facility with the School. In the motion, the Church asserted that it 

should be allowed to intervene in the pending TPRA actions, pursuant to Tennessee Rule 

of Civil Procedure 24.01, because the records in Metro’s custody contained confidential 

information concerning facility schematics and employees of the Church. The School 

filed a motion to intervene a few days later on May 15, 2023, also predicated on Rule 

24.01 and citing largely the same reasons supporting intervention as contained in the 

Church’s motion. On May 17, 2023, a group of parents of students who were attending 

the School at the time of the shooting (“the Parents”) also filed a motion to intervene. 

The Parents stated that they sought to intervene to oppose disclosure of the records 

concerning the shooting in order to prevent the infliction of additional trauma on the 

School’s students and their families.

In response to the petitions seeking access to the records, Metro filed declarations 

on May 17, 2023, stating that Metro was conducting an ongoing criminal investigation to 

determine whether the shooter had assistance in the criminal acts. As such, Metro 

claimed that Tennessee Rule of Criminal Procedure 16 prevented disclosure of the 

records.

The trial court conducted a hearing regarding the motions to intervene filed by the 

Church, the School, and the Parents (collectively, “Intervenors”) on May 22, 2023. The 

trial court subsequently entered an order on May 24, 2023, allowing the permissive 

intervention of the Church and the School predicated on Tennessee Rule of Civil 

Procedure 24.02. The court noted that these parties sought to protect private information 

to which Petitioners would not normally have access inasmuch as the Church and the 

School were private entities. The court also relied upon the affidavits filed by Metro 

establishing that an active, ongoing criminal investigation existed regarding potential coconspirators.

In its order, the trial court explained that Rule 24.02 allowed permissive 

intervention when, inter alia, a movant’s claim or defense maintained common questions 

of law or fact with the main action. The court reasoned that the Church and the School 

maintained common questions of law and fact with the parties because, like Metro, the 

Church and the School had claimed that irreparable injury would occur if there were

public access to the private information contained in the records at issue. The court 

therefore determined that the requirements of Rule 24.02 had been satisfied and granted 

intervention. The court directed the Church and the School to file briefs detailing the 

nature of their claims and defenses in this matter.

The trial court concomitantly entered a second order, granting the Parents’ motion 

to intervene and allowing the Parents to proceed under a pseudonym upon the filing of a 

proper affidavit to be filed under seal. The court noted that the Parents’ claims were 

based on the Victims’ Bill of Rights and Article I, § 35 of the Tennessee Constitution. 
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The court determined that because the Parents’ children were victims of a crime, the 

Parents had a sufficiently personal stake in the litigation to establish standing to 

intervene. The court also determined that the Parents, on behalf of their children, shared 

common questions of law and fact with the parties. The court thus granted permissive 

intervention pursuant to Rule 24.02 and directed the Parents to file a brief setting forth 

their claims and defenses.

The Church subsequently filed a brief in support of its request that the trial court 

deny disclosure of the records at issue. In its brief, the Church explained that the Church 

and the School shared facilities, including a security system, and that employees of the 

Church worked in those facilities. In fact, the Church claimed that one of the shooting 

victims was an employee of the Church. The Church stated as further bases for 

preventing disclosure that (1) Metro was conducting an ongoing criminal investigation; 

(2) school security records are an exception to the TPRA pursuant to Tennessee Code 

Annotated § 10-7-504; and (3) the records contained personal information with respect to 

employees of the Church, which information should be protected based on the 

employees’ right to privacy.

The Parents filed a similar brief on May 30, 2023, stating that the records should 

not be disclosed by reason of the school security exception to the TPRA and the fact that 

the records contained personal information concerning minors. The Parents also argued 

that releasing the shooter’s manifesto could lead to “copycat” crimes. The School 

likewise filed a brief on May 30, 2023, relying on the school security exception to the 

TPRA. Metro also filed a brief, asserting that the records sought should not be disclosed 

due to the ongoing criminal investigation and also because they were not “public records” 

as defined in the TPRA inasmuch as they pertained to school security and contained 

personal information regarding minors and deceased victims.

Meanwhile, Petitioners filed separate notices of appeal, pursuant to Tennessee 

Rule of Civil Procedure 24.05, regarding the trial court’s grant of the motions to 

intervene. Shortly thereafter, Petitioners filed an emergency motion seeking a stay in the 

trial court, arguing that the pending appeal deprived the trial court of jurisdiction in the 

matter. The trial court denied this motion by order entered on June 12, 2023, determining 

that no reason existed to stay the entire proceeding when only the issue of intervention 

had been appealed. On June 21, 2023, this Court entered an order expediting the appeal 

and providing a truncated briefing schedule. This Court also stayed the underlying trial 

court proceedings, reasoning that the matter should not move forward until the proper 

parties to the action had been identified.

II. Issues Presented

Petitioners present the following issues for our review, which we have restated 

slightly:
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1. Whether the trial court erred by concluding that the TPRA 

authorized the intervention of third parties who are neither record 

requesters nor government custodians.

2. Whether the trial court lacked subject matter jurisdiction to permit 

intervention by parties without standing.

3. Whether the trial court erred by allowing Intervenors to intervene 

permissively.

4. Whether Petitioners are entitled to attorney’s fees incurred on 

appeal.

III. Standard of Review

As our Supreme Court has previously explained, a trial court’s decision 

concerning the propriety of a party’s permissive intervention is reviewed for an abuse of 

discretion. See State v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 18 S.W.3d 186, 191 (Tenn. 

2000). The High Court has further explained that a court abuses its discretion “when it 

causes an injustice to the party challenging the decision by (1) applying an incorrect legal 

standard, (2) reaching an illogical or unreasonable decision, or (3) basing its decision on a 

clearly erroneous assessment of the evidence.” Lee Med., Inc. v. Beecher, 312 S.W.3d 

515, 524 (Tenn. 2010).

To the extent that this action involves questions of statutory interpretation related 

to the TPRA, our Supreme Court has instructed:

Statutory construction is a question of law that is reviewable on a de novo 

basis without any presumption of correctness. Gleaves v. Checker Cab 

Transit Corp., 15 S.W.3d 799, 802 (Tenn. 2000); Myint v. Allstate Ins. Co., 

970 S.W.2d 920, 924 (Tenn. 1998). When dealing with statutory 

interpretation, well-defined precepts apply. Our primary objective is to 

carry out legislative intent without broadening or restricting the statute 

beyond its intended scope. Houghton v. Aramark Educ. Res., Inc., 90 

S.W.3d 676, 678 (Tenn. 2002). In construing legislative enactments, we 

presume that every word in a statute has meaning and purpose and should 

be given full effect if the obvious intention of the General Assembly is not 

violated by so doing. In re C.K.G., 173 S.W.3d 714, 722 (Tenn. 2005). 

When a statute is clear, we apply the plain meaning without complicating 

the task. Eastman Chem. Co. v. Johnson, 151 S.W.3d 503, 507 (Tenn. 

2004). Our obligation is simply to enforce the written language. Abels ex 

rel. Hunt v. Genie Indus., Inc., 202 S.W.3d 99, 102 (Tenn. 2006). It is only 
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when a statute is ambiguous that we may reference the broader statutory 

scheme, the history of the legislation, or other sources. Parks v. Tenn. 

Mun. League Risk Mgmt. Pool, 974 S.W.2d 677, 679 (Tenn. 1998). 

Further, the language of a statute cannot be considered in a vacuum, but 

“should be construed, if practicable, so that its component parts are 

consistent and reasonable.” Marsh v. Henderson, 221 Tenn. 42, 424 

S.W.2d 193, 196 (1968). Any interpretation of the statute that “would 

render one section of the act repugnant to another” should be avoided.

Tenn. Elec. Power Co. v. City of Chattanooga, 172 Tenn. 505, 114 S.W.2d 

441, 444 (1937). We also must presume that the General Assembly was 

aware of any prior enactments at the time the legislation passed. Owens v. 

State, 908 S.W.2d 923, 926 (Tenn. 1995).

In re Estate of Tanner, 295 S.W.3d 610, 613-14 (Tenn. 2009).

IV. Construction of the TPRA

Petitioners posit that the TPRA does not permit the intervention of a third party 

because its provisions appear to contemplate solely the governmental entity with custody 

of the records and the person or entity seeking to gain access to the records as parties. 

Petitioners therefore argue that the trial court improperly construed the TPRA’s language 

by allowing intervention. Upon our thorough review of the applicable law, we disagree.

As our Supreme Court has previously clarified regarding the purpose of the 

TPRA:

For more than a century, Tennessee courts have recognized the 

public’s right to inspect governmental records. See, e.g., State ex rel. 

Wellford v. Williams, 110 Tenn. 549, 75 S.W. 948, 959 (1903) (holding that 

Memphis residents concerned about the city’s financial condition had the 

right to inspect the city’s records). In 1957, the General Assembly codified 

this right of public access by enacting the state’s first public records 

statutes. See Swift v. Campbell, 159 S.W.3d 565, 571 (Tenn. Ct. App.

2004) (citing Ballard v. Herzke, 924 S.W.2d 652, 661 (Tenn. 1996)). The 

Public Records Act has been amended over the years, but its intent has 

remained the same—to facilitate the public’s access to government records. 

Swift, 159 S.W.3d at 571 (citing [Memphis Publ’g Co. v.] Cherokee 

Children & Family Servs., Inc., 87 S.W.3d [67,] 74 [(Tenn. 2002)]; 

Memphis Publ’g Co. v. City of Memphis, 871 S.W.2d 681, 687-88 (Tenn.

1994)); see also Cole v. Campbell, 968 S.W.2d 274, 275 (Tenn. 1998) 

(noting that “[t]his Court has upheld this legislative mandate on numerous 

occasions”). The Public Records Act has a noble and worthwhile purpose 
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by providing a tool to hold government officials and agencies accountable 

to the citizens of Tennessee through oversight in government activities.

* * *

There is a presumption of openness for government records.

Memphis Publ’g Co., 871 S.W.2d at 684. Custodians of the records are 

directed to promptly provide for inspection any public record not exempt 

from disclosure. The Public Records Act directs the courts to broadly 

construe the Act “so as to give the fullest possible access to public records.”

The Act allows a person whose request for public records is denied to file 

suit and seek judicial review of the governmental entity’s denial. The 

governmental entity must prove justification for nondisclosure by a 

preponderance of the evidence.

Tennessean v. Metro. Gov’t of Nashville, 485 S.W.3d 857, 864 (Tenn. 2016) (footnotes 

omitted).

With regard to the inspection of public records, the pertinent section of the TPRA, 

Tennessee Code Annotated § 10-7-503(a), provides:

(2)(A) All state, county and municipal records shall, at all times during 

business hours . . . be open for personal inspection by any citizen of 

this state, and those in charge of the records shall not refuse such 

right of inspection to any citizen, unless otherwise provided by state 

law.

(B) The custodian of a public record or the custodian’s designee shall 

promptly make available for inspection any public record not 

specifically exempt from disclosure. In the event it is not practicable 

for the record to be promptly available for inspection, the custodian 

shall, within seven (7) business days:

(i) Make the public record requested available to the 

requestor;

(ii) Deny the request in writing or by completing a records 

request response form developed by the office of open 

records counsel. The response shall include the basis 

for the denial; or

(iii) Furnish the requester in writing, or by completing a 

records request response form developed by the office 
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of open records counsel, the time reasonably necessary 

to produce the record or information.

(3) Failure to respond to the request as described in subdivision (a)(2) 

shall constitute a denial and the person making the request shall have 

the right to bring an action as provided in § 10-7-505.

The TPRA also provides a list of certain records that are confidential and not 

subject to disclosure. See Tenn. Code Ann. § 10-7-504 (Supp. 2023); see also

Tennessean, 485 S.W.3d at 865 (detailing a list of statutory exceptions). Exceptions to 

the TPRA’s disclosure requirements include, inter alia: (1) information related to school 

security (subsection (p)(1)), (2) information concerning victims of criminal acts who are 

minors (subsection (t)(1)), and (3) video taken by a law enforcement body camera that 

depicts minors within a school (subsection (u)(1)). In addition, pursuant to the TPRA’s 

general exception for records protected from disclosure by “state law,” see Tenn. Code 

Ann. § 10-7-503(a)(2)(A), the Supreme Court has explained that governmental entities 

are not required to disclose records related to a pending criminal investigation/action in 

accordance with Tennessee Rule of Criminal Procedure 16. See Tennessean, 485 S.W.3d 

at 871.

With respect to the procedure for obtaining access to public records, Tennessee 

Code Annotated § 10-7-505 (2020) states in pertinent part:

a) Any citizen of Tennessee who shall request the right of personal 

inspection of any state, county or municipal record as provided in § 

10-7-503, and whose request has been in whole or in part denied by 

the official and/or designee of the official or through any act or 

regulation of any official or designee of any official, shall be entitled 

to petition for access to any such record and to obtain judicial review 

of the actions taken to deny the access.

(b) Such petition shall be filed in the chancery court or circuit court for 

the county in which the county or municipal records sought are 

situated, or in any other court of that county having equity 

jurisdiction. In the case of records in the custody and control of any 

state department, agency or instrumentality, such petition shall be 

filed in the chancery court or circuit court of Davidson County; or in

the chancery court or circuit court for the county in which the state 

records are situated if different from Davidson County, or in any 

other court of that county having equity jurisdiction; or in the 

chancery court or circuit court in the county of the petitioner’s 

residence, or in any other court of that county having equity 

jurisdiction. Upon filing of the petition, the court shall, upon request 
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of the petitioning party, issue an order requiring the defendant or 

respondent party or parties to immediately appear and show cause, if 

they have any, why the petition should not be granted. A formal 

written response to the petition shall not be required, and the 

generally applicable periods of filing such response shall not apply 

in the interest of expeditious hearings. The court may direct that the 

records being sought be submitted under seal for review by the court 

and no other party. The decision of the court on the petition shall 

constitute a final judgment on the merits.

(c) The burden of proof for justification of nondisclosure of records 

sought shall be upon the official and/or designee of the official of 

those records and the justification for the nondisclosure must be 

shown by a preponderance of the evidence.

(d) The court, in ruling upon the petition of any party proceeding 

hereunder, shall render written findings of fact and conclusions of 

law and shall be empowered to exercise full injunctive remedies and 

relief to secure the purposes and intentions of this section, and this 

section shall be broadly construed so as to give the fullest possible 

public access to public records.

In this matter, Petitioners filed their petitions seeking access to the subject records 

following Metro’s denial of their requests to review them. The petitions were 

subsequently transferred to the trial court and consolidated into one action. Meanwhile, 

Intervenors filed their motions to intervene, which the trial court granted.2

On appeal, Petitioners argue that allowing intervention was improper because the 

TPRA’s provisions do not expressly allow for the intervention of a third party. 

Petitioners assert that the language of the TPRA contemplates a bilateral procedure with 

only two “sides”—the governmental entity that maintains custody of the records and the 

party who seeks disclosure of the records. By contrast, Intervenors contend that the 

TPRA’s provisions neither forbid intervention nor alter the Tennessee Rules of Civil 

Procedure concerning intervention. We agree with Intervenors.

As Petitioners concede in their brief, this Court must seek to construe statutes “in a 

way that avoids conflict and facilitates harmonious operation of the law.” Lee Med., 312 

 

2 Petitioners argue in their appellate brief that Intervenors were improperly allowed to intervene with 

regard to all of the Petitioners’ requests because all of the cases had not yet been consolidated at the time 

Intervenors’ motions were filed. Inasmuch as Petitioners failed to raise this issue in their statement of the 

issues, we determine that it has been waived. See Hodge v. Craig, 382 S.W.3d 325, 335 (Tenn. 2012)

(“[A]n issue may be deemed waived when it is argued in the brief but is not designated as an issue in 

accordance with Tenn. R. App. P. 27(a)(4).”).
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S.W.3d at 527. Of course, “rules governing practice and procedure in the trial and 

appellate courts of Tennessee were promulgated by the General Assembly and the 

Supreme Court . . . [and] have the force and effect of law.” Frye v. Blue Ridge 

Neuroscience Ctr., P.C., 70 S.W.3d 710, 713 (Tenn. 2002) (quoting Crosslin v. Alsup, 

594 S.W.2d 379, 380 (Tenn. 1980)). Moreover, “[w]e presume that the General 

Assembly was aware of its prior enactments and knew the state of the law at the time it 

passed the legislation.” Highwoods Props., Inc. v. City of Memphis, 297 S.W.3d 695, 

701 (Tenn. 2009). Accordingly, “courts will not construe statutes to change existing law 

more than a statute itself declares or necessarily implies.” Winter v. Smith, 914 S.W.2d 

527, 538 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1995).

As both Petitioners and Intervenors point out, the TPRA clearly provides for an 

expedited hearing and a truncated procedure with regard to disputes concerning the 

disclosure of public records. See Tenn. Code Ann. § 10-7-505; Moncier v. Harris, No. 

E2016-00209-COA-R3-CV, 2018 WL 1640072, at *11 (Tenn. Ct. App. Apr. 5, 2018)

(“The Legislature clearly intended for the expeditious resolution of petitions under 

section 10-7-505 and expressly removed time restraints that normally allow defendants 

time to evaluate a case and prepare a defense.”). Therefore, relative to a typical pre-trial 

discovery process, the Moncier Court concluded that “the plain language of the statute 

precludes such a procedure.” See 2018 WL 1640072, at *11 (“[I]t would make no sense 

to conclude that our General Assembly intended to allow a plaintiff . . . to conduct 

document discovery in preparation for a show cause hearing [in a TPRA action].”). 

With regard to intervention, however, the TPRA neither expressly declares nor 

“necessarily implies” that intervention is disallowed. Instead, the TPRA is silent 

concerning intervention. Presuming that the Legislature was aware of Tennessee Rule of 

Civil Procedure 24 and its provisions concerning intervention, see Highwoods Properties, 

297 S.W.3d at 701, and construing the TPRA so as not to change the state of the law 

more than the statute declares or implies, see Winter, 914 S.W.2d at 538, we determine 

that the Legislature did not intend to completely disregard all procedural rules when 

enacting the TPRA. See, e.g., Tennessean, 485 S.W.3d at 870. In other words, the 

implications of the TPRA concerning document discovery, as recognized in Moncier, see

2018 WL 1640072, at *11, do not lead to the conclusion that none of the procedural rules 

would be applicable in a TPRA action. 

Instead, we determine that the Legislature intended to provide an expeditious 

procedure concerning the disclosure of public records and that Rule 24’s provisions 

respecting intervention do not run counter to that purpose. As such, we conclude that the 

trial court properly considered Intervenors’ requests for intervention in this TPRA action 

pursuant to the requirements of Rule 24.

In further support of this conclusion, we observe that intervention has been 

allowed in prior TPRA cases that have come before Tennessee’s appellate courts. See
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Tennessean, 485 S.W.3d at 859 (noting that the trial court had allowed the intervention of 

a crime victim); Griffin v. City of Knoxville, 821 S.W.2d 921, 921 (Tenn. 1991) (noting 

that the trial court had permitted the intervention of the deceased’s widow); 

Public.Resource.Org v. Matthew Bender & Co., No. M2022-01260-COA-R3-CV, 2023 

WL 7408939, at *1 (Tenn. Ct. App. Nov. 9, 2023) (noting that the trial court had allowed

the intervention of the Tennessee Code Commission). Although the intervention issue as 

presented in this matter was not specifically raised in those cases on appeal, we find it 

instructive that our Supreme Court considered the intervening party’s claim in 

Tennessean without providing any indication that the Court found her to be an improper 

party to the action. See 485 S.W.3d at 873-874. In fact, none of those authorities hinted 

at a conclusion that the trial courts had erred by allowing intervention. We likewise 

determine in this matter that the trial court did not err by concluding that the TPRA 

allowed the intervention of third parties who are neither a record requester nor the 

government custodian.

V. Standing and Subject Matter Jurisdiction

Petitioners claim that Intervenors lacked standing to intervene in this action 

because the Legislature, in enacting the TPRA, created the cause of action and designated 

who may file it: parties who are seeking the disclosure of public records. Petitioners 

argue that because standing is conferred by the statute, it is “interwoven” with subject 

matter jurisdiction and “becomes a jurisdictional prerequisite.” See Osborn v. Marr, 127 

S.W.3d 737, 740 (Tenn. 2004). Petitioners thus assert that because Intervenors were not

seeking the disclosure of records, the trial court had no jurisdiction to consider their 

petitions. By contrast, Intervenors contend that they maintained standing to intervene 

because they possessed a “sufficiently personal stake in the outcome of the controversy to 

warrant the exercise of the court’s power on [their] behalf.” See Shelby Cnty. Deputy 

Sheriff’s Ass’n v. Gilless, 972 S.W.2d 683, 685 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1997). 

Petitioners’ argument contains one fatal flaw—the TPRA actions at issue herein 

were filed by parties seeking the disclosure of public records. Moreover, the statute 

specifically provides that such actions “shall be filed in the chancery court or circuit court 

for the county in which the county or municipal records sought are situated[.]” Tenn. 

Code Ann. § 10-7-505(b). As such, the trial court clearly maintained subject matter 

jurisdiction over this matter. The fact that Intervenors sought to intervene in the action 

would not strip the court of its statutory grant of subject matter jurisdiction concerning 

TPRA disputes.

Furthermore, we determine that Intervenors maintain standing in this matter. As 

this Court has previously explained:

To establish constitutional standing in Tennessee courts, a plaintiff 

must establish three elements:
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1) a distinct and palpable injury; that is, an injury that is not 

conjectural, hypothetical, or predicated upon an interest that a 

litigant shares in common with the general public; 2) a causal 

connection between the alleged injury and the challenged 

conduct; and 3) the injury must be capable of being redressed 

by a favorable decision of the court.[3]

Fisher v. Hargett, 604 S.W.3d 381, 396 (Tenn. 2020). To determine 

whether Plaintiffs have standing to bring this case, we must examine the 

particular allegations of their complaint and evaluate whether they are 

entitled to adjudicate the claims. Id.; Howe v. Haslam, No. M2013-01790-

COA-R3-CV, 2014 WL 5698877, at *6 (Tenn. Ct. App. Nov. 4, 2014) 

(citing Petty v. Daimler/Chrysler Corp., 91 S.W.3d 765, 768 (Tenn. Ct. 

App. 2002)).

The question of whether a party has standing should not be confused 

with the merits of the claim; accordingly, a weak claim does not equate to a 

lack of standing. Metro. Gov’t of Nashville & Davidson Cnty. v. Tenn. 

Dep’t of Educ., 645 S.W.3d 141, 148-49 (Tenn. 2022). Tennessee courts’ 

standing analysis is instead directed towards determining “‘whether a party 

has a sufficiently personal stake in a matter at issue to warrant a judicial 

resolution of the dispute,’” barring those whose rights or interests have not 

been affected from bringing suit. Metro. Gov’t of Nashville v. Bd. of 

Zoning Appeals of Nashville, 477 S.W.3d 750, 755 (Tenn. 2015) (quoting 

State v. Harrison, 270 S.W.3d 21, 27-28 (Tenn. 2008)).

Rutan-Ram v. Tenn. Dep’t of Children’s Servs., No. M2022-00998-COA-R3-CV, 2023 

WL 5441029, at *7 (Tenn. Ct. App. Aug. 24, 2023). 

As the trial court noted in its orders, Intervenors asserted that they would suffer a 

distinct and palpable injury by the disclosure of the records sought and that their injury 

was not predicated upon an interest that they share with the general public. In addition, 

Intervenors also asserted that a causal connection existed between release of the records 

and the injury they were in immediate danger of suffering, which injury could be 

addressed by the trial court’s determination concerning disclosure. Accordingly, 

Intervenors have demonstrated, based on the allegations contained in their pleadings, a 

“sufficiently personal stake in a matter at issue to warrant a judicial resolution of the 

 

3 The “injury” required in the first element has also been described as an “immediate danger.” See 

Mayhew v. Wilder, 46 S.W.3d 760, 767 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2001).
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dispute.” See id. We determine that Petitioners’ issue concerning standing and subject 

matter jurisdiction is without merit.4

VI. Permissive Intervention

The trial court evaluated Intervenors’ motions to intervene pursuant to Tennessee 

Rule of Civil Procedure 24.02, which provides:

Upon timely motion any person may be permitted to intervene in an action: 

(1) when a statute confers a conditional right to intervene; or (2) when a 

movant’s claim or defense and the main action have a question of law or 

fact in common.

The trial court determined that Intervenors had demonstrated that they shared common 

questions of law or fact with the parties and allowed their intervention. This Court 

reviews such decision for an abuse of discretion. See Brown & Williamson Tobacco 

Corp., 18 S.W.3d at 191.

Petitioners posit that Intervenors cannot share a common question of law or fact 

with the parties, as contemplated by Rule 24.02, because Intervenors do not possess a 

“claim” or a “defense” in the TPRA action. We find this argument unavailing. Metro, 

the responding governmental entity with custody of the records at issue, asserted certain 

defenses to the TPRA action based on the statutory exceptions found in Tennessee Code 

Annotated § 10-7-504 and Tennessee Rule of Criminal Procedure 16. Intervenors then 

filed briefs with the trial court detailing their positions concerning the potential disclosure 

of the records in question, some of which align with Metro’s defenses.5 As such, we 

conclude that the trial court properly determined that the “movant’s claim or defense and 

the main action have a question of law or fact in common.” See Tenn. R. Civ. P. 24.02. 

We find Petitioners’ argument that the trial court incorporated an erroneous legal 

standard to be unavailing.

 

4 We acknowledge Petitioners’ postulate that Intervenors have filed what Petitioners refer to as a “reverse 

public records suit” and that such an action has not been allowed pursuant to the federal Freedom of 

Information Act (“FOIA”) and should not be allowed in a TPRA action. However, Petitioners have cited 

no authority based in Tennessee law to support any of their assertions in this regard. Petitioners concede 

that the TPRA is “distinct from FOIA and the open records law of other states.” See Schneider v. City of 

Jackson, 226 S.W.3d 332, 343 (Tenn. 2007). This being the case, we find Petitioners’ arguments 

predicated on federal law respecting FOIA to be unavailing.

5 Although Petitioners postulate that Intervenors failed to file a “pleading setting forth the claim or

defense for which intervention is sought,” as required by Tennessee Rule of Civil Procedure 24.03, our 

review of the record demonstrates that Intervenors filed briefs detailing their positions with respect to the 

records disclosure as directed by the trial court’s orders. These briefs clearly set forth Intervenors’ points 

regarding their intervention in the TPRA action and comport with the “pleading” requirement of Rule 

24.03.
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We find the Supreme Court’s opinion in Ballard v. Herzke, 924 S.W.2d 652 

(Tenn. 1996), instructive. In Ballard, the underlying lawsuit concerned claims of breach 

of fiduciary duty, conspiracy, outrageous conduct, and other civil causes of action. Id. at 

655. During the proceedings, the trial court imposed a protective order and placed certain 

discovery responses filed by the defendant retirement community and its corporate owner 

under seal. Id. The plaintiffs in the suit filed motions seeking to modify or dissolve the 

protective order, and a Tennessee newspaper filed a motion to intervene, also requesting 

that the trial court rescind the protective order. Id. at 656. The trial court allowed the 

newspaper to intervene, and this Court granted an extraordinary appeal. Id. During that 

appeal, this Court determined that the trial court had abused its discretion in allowing the 

newspaper to intervene. Id. at 657. 

The Supreme Court granted permission to appeal in Ballard and considered the 

issue of whether the newspaper’s intervention was proper. Id. When analyzing the 

intervention issue, the High Court explained:

Permissive intervention is governed by Tennessee Rule of Civil 

Procedure 24.02, which provides in pertinent part as follows:

Upon timely application anyone may be permitted to 

intervene in an action: (1) when a statute confers a 

conditional right to intervene; or (2) when an applicant’s 

claim or defense and the main action have a question of law 

or fact in common. In exercising discretion the court shall 

consider whether or not the intervention will unduly delay or 

prejudice the adjudication of the rights of the original parties.

If the would-be intervenor’s claim or defense contains a question of law or 

fact that is also raised by the main action then the requirement of the rule 

has been satisfied and the trial court is afforded discretion to permit 

intervention. 

* * *

[I]ntervention “is not dependent on, nor is it determined by, the status or 

identification of the parties nor the nature of the dispute.” Moreover, the 

question of intervention is collateral to, and does not have any bearing on, 

the primary issue—modification of the protective order. What is necessary 

is that the proposed intervenor demonstrate that its claims have “a question 

of law or fact in common” with the main action.
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Here, as in all such cases, by virtue of the fact that the media entities 

challenge the validity of the protective order entered in the main action, 

they meet the requirement of Rule 24.02, that their claim have “a question 

of law or fact in common” with the main action. Nonetheless, the interest 

of the plaintiffs and the intervenors is not identical. The plaintiffs seek 

access to enhance their ability to prepare for trial. They are not attempting 

to gain access for public dissemination. Were the plaintiffs to settle this 

case, their interest in modifying the protective order would end. By 

contrast, the intervenors seek to gain access on behalf of the general public 

in order to disseminate the information through the media. Therefore, 

though the basic interest is the same, that of overturning the protective 

order, the interests are not identical, and intervention is appropriate.

Where, as here, a common question of law or fact is established, the 

decision to allow intervention is a matter entrusted to the trial court’s 

discretion, and the decision should not be reversed by an appellate court 

absent a showing of abuse of discretion.

Ballard, 924 S.W.2d at 657-58 (other internal citations omitted).

As the Ballard Court clarified, intervening parties can have “a question of law or 

fact in common” with the main action despite the fact that the question may be collateral 

to the primary issue in the case or that the status of the parties is not precisely the same. 

See id; see also In re Estate of Thompson, 636 S.W.3d 1, 8 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2021). In the 

case at bar, Intervenors raised various defenses or objections to the disclosure of the 

subject records that aligned with the defenses raised by Metro in the main TPRA action.6 

As such, we must next examine whether the trial court’s discretion was abused when 

granting intervention.

 

6 Petitioners argue that the various Tennessee victims’ rights laws (Art. I, § 35 of the Tennessee 

Constitution; Tenn. Code Ann. §§ 40-38-101-119; and Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-38-301(a)) do not confer a 

right to intervene and that “Intervenors seek to rewrite the TPRA to include a victims’ rights exception 

that does not exist.” However, we do not need to address this argument because it is not determinative 

herein. Intervenors have raised several defenses that align with the defenses promulgated by Metro, 

including (1) the existence of an ongoing criminal investigation, (2) the TPRA exception concerning 

school security information, and (3) the TPRA exception concerning information relating to crime victims 

who are minors. As such, Intervenors have established the requisite “question of law or fact in common” 

for the purposes of Rule 24.02 intervention, which is the determinative question on appeal. To the extent 

that the trial court determined interpretation of the Tennessee victims’ rights laws to be significant to the 

intervention issue, we note that this Court can affirm the trial court even if it reached the correct result for 

a different reason. See Torres v. Bridgestone/Firestone N. Am. Tire, LLC, 498 S.W.3d 565, 577 (Tenn.

Ct. App. 2016); Biles v. Roby, No. W2016-02139-COA-R3-CV, 2017 WL 3447910, at *6, n.3 (Tenn. Ct. 

App. Aug. 11, 2017).
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We reiterate that a court abuses its discretion “when it causes an injustice to the 

party challenging the decision by (1) applying an incorrect legal standard, (2) reaching an 

illogical or unreasonable decision, or (3) basing its decision on a clearly erroneous 

assessment of the evidence.” Lee Med., 312 S.W.3d at 524. We find no such abuse of 

discretion by the trial court herein. The trial court applied the correct legal standards, as 

outlined above. Moreover, the trial court neither reached an illogical or unreasonable 

decision nor based its decision on a clearly erroneous assessment of the evidence. 

Accordingly, we determine that the trial court’s decision allowing Intervenors to 

intervene in the instant action should be affirmed.

We acknowledge Petitioners’ argument that Intervenors’ interests would be 

adequately represented by Metro in the TPRA action (an argument that seems to belie 

their position that no common questions existed between Metro and Intervenors); 

however, we do not find this argument persuasive. Although Metro did raise many of the 

same defenses to the TPRA action as advanced by Intervenors, there can be no guarantee 

that Metro would continue to oppose disclosure if the criminal investigation were to 

conclude. As such, we determine that the trial court properly allowed interventions so 

that Intervenors could represent their own interests in this action.

VII. Attorney’s Fees

Finally, Petitioners assert that they are entitled, pursuant to Tennessee Code 

Annotated § 10-7-505(g), to recover their attorney’s fees incurred in obtaining public 

records that have been willfully withheld. This statutory section provides:

If the court finds that the governmental entity, or agent thereof, refusing to 

disclose a record, knew that such record was public and willfully refused to 

disclose it, such court may, in its discretion, assess all reasonable costs 

involved in obtaining the record, including reasonable attorneys’ fees, 

against the nondisclosing governmental entity. In determining whether the 

action was willful, the court may consider any guidance provided to the 

records custodian by the office of open records counsel as created in title 8, 

chapter 4.

In this appeal, the only issues properly before this Court concern the trial court’s 

grant of intervention to Intervenors—any issues concerning the disclosure of the sought 

records had not yet been adjudicated at the time this appeal was filed and are not before 

this Court. Despite this fact, Petitioners assert that “this Court should direct that upon 

remand the Petitioners recover their reasonable attorney’s fees incurred on appeal if they 

become entitled to such fees in the action below” (emphasis added). However, inasmuch 

as Petitioners made the decision to file this appeal concerning intervention and were 

unsuccessful in obtaining the relief they sought, we decline to provide the requested 

directive to the trial court regarding an award of fees incurred in this appeal.
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VIII. Conclusion

For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the trial court’s judgment allowing 

intervention. Costs on appeal are assessed to the appellants, Clata Renee Brewer; James 

Hammond; Tennessee Firearms Association, Inc.; Michael P. Leahy; Star News Digital 

Media, Inc.; The Tennessean; Rachel Wegner; and Todd Gardenhire. We remand this 

matter to the trial court for further proceedings.

s/Thomas R. Frierson, II

________________________________

THOMAS R. FRIERSON, II, JUDGE