In the

Court of Appeals

Sixth Appellate District of Texas at Texarkana

No. 06-23-00232-CR

KEITH BECHURN TAYLOR, Appellant

V.

THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee

On Appeal from the 124th District Court

Gregg County, Texas

Trial Court No. 49013-B

Before Stevens, C.J., van Cleef and Rambin, JJ.

Memorandum Opinion by Chief Justice Stevens
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MEMORANDUM OPINION

On December 5, 2019, Keith Bechurn Taylor pled guilty to family violence assault with a 

previous conviction. See TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 22.01(b)(2)(A) (Supp.). The trial court 

deferred a finding of guilt and placed Taylor on community supervision. On November 13, 

2023, the trial court adjudicated Taylor guilty of that offense. Taylor was sentenced to five 

years’ confinement. Taylor appeals. 

Taylor’s attorney filed a brief stating that she reviewed the record and found no genuinely 

arguable issues that could be raised on appeal. The brief sets out the procedural history of the 

case and summarizes the evidence elicited during the trial court proceedings. Since counsel 

provided a professional evaluation of the record demonstrating why there are no arguable 

grounds to be advanced, that evaluation meets the requirements of Anders v. California. Anders 

v. California, 386 U.S. 738, 743–44 (1967); In re Schulman, 252 S.W.3d 403, 406 (Tex. Crim. 

App. 2008) (orig. proceeding); Stafford v. State, 813 S.W.2d 503, 509–10 (Tex. Crim. App.

1991); High v. State, 573 S.W.2d 807, 812–13 (Tex. Crim. App. [Panel Op.] 1978). Counsel 

also filed a motion with this Court seeking to withdraw as counsel in this appeal. 

On May 28, 2024, counsel mailed copies of the following to Taylor: (1) her Anders brief,

(2) her motion to withdraw, and (3) a motion for pro se access to the appellate record lacking 

only Taylor’s signature and the date. Counsel also advised Taylor that he had until June 12 to 

mail the motion for pro se access back to this Court. On May 28, this Court advised Taylor that 

his pro se motion for access to the record was “due on or before Thursday, June 13, 2024.” We 

did not receive that pro se motion. On June 25, 2024, we notified Taylor that the case had been 
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set for submission on July 16, 2024. We received neither a pro se response from Taylor nor a 

motion requesting an extension of time in which to file such a response. We have reviewed the 

entire appellate record and have independently determined that no reversible error exists. See 

Bledsoe v. State, 178 S.W.3d 824, 826–27 (Tex. Crim. App. 2005). 

We have also reviewed the certified bill of costs with total costs of $379.00. “Only 

statutorily authorized court costs may be assessed against a criminal defendant . . . .” Johnson v. 

State, 423 S.W.3d 385, 389 (Tex. Crim. App. 2014) (citing TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 

103.002). On appeal, “we review the assessment of court costs . . . to determine if there is a 

basis for the cost.” Id. at 390. 

Of the $379.00 amount, the $25.00 “DC-Time Payment Fee” is not authorized. The 

Texas Court of Criminal Appeals has recently concluded that a time payment fee like the one 

imposed here “must indeed be struck for being prematurely assessed because a defendant’s 

appeal suspends the duty to pay court costs and therefore suspends the running of the clock for 

the purposes of the time payment fee.” Dulin v. State, 620 S.W.3d 129, 129 (Tex. Crim. App. 

2021). “As a consequence, even now, assessment of the time payment fee in this case would be 

premature because appellate proceedings are still pending.” Id. Pursuant to Dulin, we strike the 

time payment fee “in [its] entirety, without prejudice to [it] being assessed later if, more than 30 

days after the issuance of the appellate mandate, the defendant has failed to completely pay any 

fine, court costs, or restitution” owed. Id. at 133. 
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We strike “DC - Time Payment Fee” of $25.00 from the bill of costs. We also modify 

the judgment adjudicating guilt by changing “Court Costs: $379.00” to “Court Costs: $354.00.” 

As modified, we affirm the trial court’s judgment.1

Scott E. Stevens 

Chief Justice

Date Submitted: July 16, 2024

Date Decided: September 5, 2024

Do Not Publish

1Since we agree that this case presents no reversible error, we also, in accordance with Anders, grant counsel’s 

request to withdraw from further representation of appellant in this case. See Anders, 386 U.S. at 744. No substitute 

counsel will be appointed. Should appellant desire to seek further review of this case by the Texas Court of 

Criminal Appeals, appellant must either retain an attorney to file a petition for discretionary review or file a pro se 

petition for discretionary review. Any petition for discretionary review (1) must be filed within thirty days from 

either the date of this opinion or the date on which the last timely motion for rehearing was overruled by this Court, 

see TEX. R. APP. P. 68.2, (2) must be filed with the clerk of the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals, see TEX. R. APP. 

P. 68.3, and (3) should comply with the requirements of Rule 68.4 of the Texas Rules of Appellate Procedure, see 

TEX. R. APP. P. 68.4.