No. 83-552 

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF ?IOPJTANA 

1984 

IN RE THE J%ARRIAGE OF 

DEAN ERVIN KEIRLE, 

Petitioner and Respondent, 

and 

JEANETTE KALINA KEIRLE, now known 

as JEANETTE KALINA ANDERSON , 

Respondent and Appellant. 

APPEAL FROM: District Court of the Sixteenth Judicial District, 

In and for the County of Fallon, 

The Honorable Alfred B. Coate, Judge presiding. 

COUNSEL OF RECORD: 

For Appellant: 

Denzil R. Young, Baker, Montana 

Richard B. Baer, Bismarck, North Dakota 

For Respondent: 

Gene Huntley & Ira Eakin, Baker, Montana 

Submitted on Briefs: March 15, 1984 

Decided: Nay 29, 1984 

Filed: TiAfiy fl 31984 

- 

Clerk 
Mr. Justice John C. Sheehy delivered the Opinion of the 

Court. 

Jeanette Kalina Keirle a-ppeals from a dismissal of her 

motion for modification of a divorce decree by the District 

Court for the Sixteenth Judicial District, Fallon County. 

Dean and Jeanette Keirle were married and divorced 

twice, the second dissolution effective November 27, 1978. 

Prior to this second dissolution, the parties signed written 

stipulations as to child custody and support, property 

division and maintenance. According to the stipulations, 

Jeanette was to live in the family home, located in Baker, 

until sometime in 1979. She was entitled to an undivided 

one-half interest in the residence, which was eventually to 

be sold, and was entitled to take with her when she moved 

certain items of personal property. The stipulations were 

incorporated into the November 27, 1978 dissolution decree. 

On April 14, 1983, Jeanette filed a motion to amend 

and/or clarify judgment and property division and to increase 

child support. She requested that the decree be amended to 

allow a cash payment in lieu of the household items she was 

entitled to, claiming Dean refused to allow her possession of 

them. She also requested that the value of the home be 

determined and. divided between the parties and that the child 

support payments be increased. On June 28, 1983, a hearing 

was held on the motion. In response to Dean's assertion that 

the time limits cited in Rules 59 and 60, M.R.Civ.P., had 

expired, Jeanette moved to amend her motion to reflect that 

it was brought under sections 40-4-201, 40-4-204, and 

40-4-208, MCA. Her motion was granted. 
The District Court heard argument on the issue of 

whether the dissolution decree should be modified. According 

to stipulation of the parties, the child support payments 

were increased. The District Court ruled that the time 

allowed for appeal of the dissolution decree had passed and 

that it did not have jurisdiction to modify the property 

division. A judgment increasing the child support payments 

according to the stipulation and dismissing the remainder of 

Jeanette's motion was entered October 31, 1983. 

We are faced with the issue of whether the District 

Court properly dismissed Jeanette's motion to amend the 

dissolution decree. Jeanette contends that the dismissal was 

improper according to law and that the District Court erred 

procedurally by not entering a judgment with findings of fact 

or which properly reflected its rulings at the June 28, 1983 

hearing. 

Rule 59(g), M.R.Civ.P., provides that z "motion to alter 

or amend the judgment shall be served not later than 10 days 

after the service of the notice of the entry of the judgment 

... " Rule 60(b), M.R.Civ.P. provides that a motion to 

relieve a party from a judgment must be made within "a 

reasonable time" and in some cases not more than 60 days 

after the judgment or notice of entry of the judgment. 

Jeanette did not satisfy the requirements for either of these 

motions and was therefore properly precluded from making 

them. Armstrong v. High Crest Oil, Inc. (1974), 164 Mont. 

187, 520 P.2d 1081. 

To have a property division modified otherwise a party 

must comply with section 40-4-208, MCA, which provides: 

"(3) The provisions as to property disposition may 

not be revoked or modified by a court, except: 
(a) upon written consent of the parties; or (b) if 

the court finds the existence of conditions that 

justify the reopening of a judgment under the laws 

of this state." 

In finding no existence of conditions that would justify 

reopening the judgment in this case, the District Court was 

not required to enter findings of fact. Rule 52(a), 

In this case the appellant has not claimed. the existence 

of unconscionability, fraud, or any other inequitable 

situation which would give a court a legal basis upon which 

to reopen the judgment. She is attempting to enforce the 

judgment which incorporated the parties' stipulations as to 

the property division by making a motion to modify. She is 

precluded by statutory time limits and by the fact that she 

has no legal basis to compel a court to reopen the judgment. 

In Hadford v. Hadford (Mont. 19811, 633 P.2d 1181, 1184, 38 

St.Rep. 1308, 1312, this Court noted: 

"By section 40-4-201 (2) , MCA, district courts must 

abide by the terms of a property settlement 

agreement unless its terms are unconscionable. 

This statute has a dual purpose. First, it 

expresses a clear policy encouraging property 

settlement agreements. Obviously, a property 

settlement agreement would be useless if the courts 

were free to set them aside whenever the mood 

struck. Under the statute, the property settlement 

decree must be approved unless the District Court 

finds it to be unconscionable. 

"The second purpose has the goal of finality. A 

property settlement agreement would also be useless 

if the courts were free to set them asid.e at any 

time simply on the motion and allegation of one of 

the parties that the property settlement agreement 

merged with the decree is unconscionable.. . ." 

The judgment of the District Court is affirmed. 

L -.. , , , . w.-w. - 

Justice 
We Concur: 

344 

Chief Justice 

QJG.4 4-8Q