J-S04031-23

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

IN THE INTEREST OF: K.A.J.P., A 

MINOR

APPEAL OF: J.P., MOTHER

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 IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

 PENNSYLVANIA

 No. 2389 EDA 2022

Appeal from the Decree Entered August 26, 2022

In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County Juvenile Division at 

No(s): CP-51-AP-0000359-2022

BEFORE: MURRAY, J., KING, J., and PELLEGRINI, J.*

MEMORANDUM BY PELLEGRINI, J.: FILED MARCH 16, 2023

J.P. (Mother) appeals from the decree entered in the Court of Common 

Pleas of Philadelphia County (trial court) granting the petition filed by the 

Philadelphia Department of Human Services (DHS) to involuntarily terminate 

her parental rights to K.A.J.P. (Child) (age two; d.o.b. July 2020) pursuant to 

the Adoption Act, 23 Pa.C.S. § 2511 (a)(1), (2), (5), (8) and (b), and changing 

the permanency goal to adoption.1 She argues that the trial court erred in 

____________________________________________

* Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court.

1 The trial court also involuntarily terminated the parental rights of all 

unknown putative fathers on August 26, 2022. On August 30, 2022, the trial 

court granted DHS’s petition to verify the deceased status of Child’s known 

putative father who had been identified on her birth certificate and fatally shot

soon after her birth in 2020 before the completion of ordered paternity testing.
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finding that DHS provided clear and convincing evidence to support 

termination. We affirm.

We take the following factual background and procedural history from 

the trial court’s November 10, 2022 opinion and our independent review of 

the record.

I.

A.

On July 4, 2020, Child and Mother tested positive for oxycodone and 

fentanyl at the time of Child’s birth at the Hospital of the University of 

Pennsylvania (HUP). (N.T. Hearing, 6/27/22, at 16). Mother stated that she 

took both prescribed and illegally obtained oxycodone and several medications

for leg pain and for her diagnoses of anxiety, depression and post-traumatic 

stress disorder (PTSD). She could not explain the presence of fentanyl.

DHS attempted to establish a safety plan with Mother near the time of 

Child’s discharge, but deemed the resources identified by Mother as 

inappropriate. DHS obtained an order of emergency protective custody and 

placed the then two-week-old infant in general foster care with the foster 

parent who was still caring for her at the time of the termination hearing and 

is Child’s pre-adoptive resource (resource parent).

2

 On July 20, 2020, Mother 

____________________________________________

2 Child was briefly placed with maternal kin for four months for an unsuccessful 

attempt to place her in kinship care. (See N.T. 6/27/22, at 41-43, 65); (N.T. 

8/26/22, at 34-35); (DHS Exhibit 1, at Orders, 1/15/21, 6/03/21, 10/06/21).
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appeared with appointed counsel at a shelter care hearing at which the court 

found that emergency foster care placement was necessary and authorized 

temporary removal of Child from Mother’s custody. (See DHS Exhibit 1, at 

Order, 7/20/20).3

The court adjudicated Child dependent at a September 21, 2020 hearing 

and fully committed her to the custody of DHS, finding by clear and convincing 

evidence that Child was “without proper care or control ... necessary for [her] 

physical, mental, or emotional health, or morals” pursuant to the Juvenile 

Act,4 42 Pa.C.S. § 6302. (DHS Exhibit 1, at Order, 9/21/20). The court 

ordered a home assessment and visitation for the putative father’s parents. 

Although Mother’s counsel appeared at the adjudicatory hearing, she did not 

do so or challenge the court’s September 21, 2020 order.

The court held an initial permanency review hearing on January 15, 

2021. Mother appeared and the court ordered her to achieve several goals in 

order to have Child returned to her. Specifically, the court ordered that she 

provide proof of her housing and employment to the Community Umbrella 

Agency (CUA) case manager and report to the family court’s clinical evaluation 

unit (CEU) for a forthwith drug screen, coordination of random screens prior 

____________________________________________

3 The court also appointed the Defender Association of Philadelphia as legal 

counsel and guardian ad litem for Child.

4 42 Pa.C.S. §§ 6301-6375.
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to the next hearing, and monitoring of her self-referred treatment program. 

The court authorized the CUA to obtain a progress report and treatment plan 

from Mother’s drug and alcohol treatment provider and to supervise Mother’s 

visitation with Child unless all parties agreed to modify the visitation terms. 

Mother’s objectives were to address her drug use and mental health through 

treatment, to stabilize her housing and parenting ability through the Achieving 

Reunification Center (ARC), to visit Child as ordered by the court, to sign 

consents and provide documentation for monitoring of her treatment 

programs, and to obtain treatment for Child if needed. (See N.T. 6/27/22, at 

22-23).

The permanency plan stayed the same over the course of the case. At 

each review, the court found that the CUA and DHS were making reasonable 

efforts at reunification, but that Mother’s participation and progress were 

minimal. (See DHS Exhibit 1, at Orders, 6/03/21, 10/06/21, 11/22/21, 

2/07/22, 6/27/22); (N.T. 6/27/22, at 33, 37, 41); (Trial Court Opinion, 

11/10/22, at 13).

Mother did not appear for the June 3, 2021 permanency review hearing, 

at which time Child was approaching her first birthday. That summer, Mother

missed over half of her scheduled visits with Child and the court ordered 

weekly supervised visits on-site at the CUA, withdrawing its permission for 

them to occur in a community setting. Because the CUA caseworker was 

unable to obtain evidence of Mother’s drug and alcohol treatment progress, 
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the court ordered that Mother was to be fully assessed for treatment 

recommendations at the CEU rather than for the CEU to monitor her 

treatment. (See DHS Exhibit 1, at Orders, 6/03/21, 10/06/21, 11/22/21, 

2/07/22, 6/27/22).

Despite an October 6, 2021 hearing being continued by joint request, 

Mother appeared in court. The court ordered her to have a drug screen 

forthwith on-site at the CEU, with an intake assessment and random drug 

screens to be completed before the next hearing. (See DHS Exhibit 1, at 

Order, 10/06/21). Mother failed to appear at the CEU, at the next review 

hearing or at any other review hearings until after the petition for involuntary 

termination was filed.

On November 22, 2021, after the court discovered that Mother attended 

only two out of seven of her most recently scheduled visits with Child, it 

reduced the visits from weekly to twice per month. (See N.T., 6/27/22, at 

37); (DHS Exhibit 1, at Order, 11/22/21). Appellant did not attend any visits 

with Child in December 2021 or January 2022.

In February 2022, the court found Mother’s participation minimal and 

scheduled a goal change hearing for a court listing. Mother’s twice monthly 

visits remained supervised at the CUA, with confirmation required twenty-four 

hours in advance. The court awarded weekly visitation to putative paternal 

relatives that Child had not met. (DHS Exhibit 1, at Order, 2/07/22).
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After her two-month absence, Mother resumed visitation with Child, 

attending five of the six scheduled visits in February and March. In May and 

June, she attended two of the four scheduled visits, arriving late for both. 

(DHS Exhibit 2, at Visitation Summary, 5/03/22 and 6/15/22).

B.

On June 3, 2022, DHS filed a petition to involuntary terminate Mother’s 

parental rights (TPR petition) and to change Child’s permanency goal to 

adoption. The court held two hearings on the TPR petition on June 27, 2022,

and August 26, 2022.5 CUA case manager Kellie Lawson and visitation coach 

Dorian Williams testified on behalf of DHS. Their testimony was “deemed to 

be credible and accorded great weight” by the trial court. (Trial Ct. Op., at 

12).

1.

Ms. Lawson confirmed that Mother’s single case plan objectives included

drug and alcohol and mental health counseling, parenting classes and to sign 

all consents and releases for herself and Child. The only treatment information 

she was able to obtain was that Mother had been discharged from a suboxone 

maintenance program at Temple because it was not medically appropriate for 

her rehabilitative needs. Although Mother signed up at Merakey for drug and 

____________________________________________

5 Mother appeared at the June 27, 2022 hearing but did not testify on her own 

behalf. Mother failed to appear for the August 26, 2022 hearing, but her 

counsel was in attendance.
J-S04031-23

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alcohol treatment, she was discharged for non-attendance and told Ms. 

Lawson that she had not been attending because she had housing problems, 

issues with her legs, work and too many demands on her schedule. Ms. 

Lawson called Mother about random drug screens on April 25, May 16, May 

23 and June 1, 2022, but Mother failed to provide them, stating it was due to 

her schedule of living with her daughter in Delaware because her housing 

situation was not stable.

6

 She did restart drug treatment at Merakey on June 

21, 2022, but it was approximately a week before the TPR hearing (and weeks 

after the TPR petition was filed). She produced positive drug screens on June 

27, 2022 (amphetamines and benzodiazepine) and August 10, 2022 

(benzodiazepine) without an explanation or a prescription. (See N.T., 

6/27/22, at 22-23, 26-28, 26-32, 34, 37, 60-61); (N.T., 8/26/22, at 36).

Mother obtained part-time employment as a home health aide and 

completed housing training with ARC, but she did not have housing for Ms. 

Lawson to assess. She finally attended parenting classes after the TPR petition 

was filed, although they always had been part of the case plan. (See N.T., 

6/27/22, at 31-32, 45, 61-62).

Ms. Lawson testified that it would be in Child’s best interest to terminate 

Mother’s parental rights to free Child for adoption by resource parent and that 

____________________________________________

6 Despite Mother’s representation that she was unavailable for drug testing, 

she had an in-person visit with Child on June 1, 2022, at the CUA in 

Philadelphia. (See Visitation Summary, 6/15/22, Entry 6/01/22).
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Child would not suffer any irrevocable harm if Mother’s parental rights were 

terminated. Child is happy, healthy and bonded with resource parent who 

provides her with care and comfort, takes her to doctor’s appointments, 

supports her speech therapy and provides for all her needs. (See id. at 52-

55, 58-59).

2.

Ms. Williams testified that she supervises almost all of Mother’s visits 

with Child, and that the quality and effort Mother put forth had regressed since 

when the case began. In the beginning of the case, Mother would arrive to 

visits on time, would bring things for Child and was interested in knowing 

about Child and keeping her attention. After those first few months, Mother 

was almost always late to any visits she actually attended, stopped bringing 

Child things like clothes and shoes, and did not interact with or ask questions 

about Child. Instead, she mostly talked about her life with Ms. Williams, 

despite Ms. Williams’s encouragement to pay attention to Child. (See N.T., 

8/26/22, at 8-21).

Ms. Williams explained there was no recommendation to offer increased 

or unsupervised visitation with Child because Mother’s progress remained 

minimal throughout the life of the case, despite her attending five of six visits 

between February and April 2022. For example, in May 2021, Ms. Williams 

noted that Mother had attended ten out of the last sixteen visits and was late 

seven out of the ten times she appeared. (N.T. at 13). Mother’s compliance 
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continued to be minimal, only attending two of seven visits over the summer 

of 2021, failing to attend in December 2021 and January 2022, continually 

arriving late for the visits she would make, and missing approximately half of 

her visits overall. (See id. at 16-21); (see also N.T., 6/27/22, at 37, 40). 

Mother appeared “sluggish” at the visits during the first year of the case and, 

although she started to do Child’s hair during the visits, she was unable to 

finish, which “was significant because [Child] had very little hair, and it took 

her a long time to do the very little that she has.” (N.T., 8/26/22, at 20); 

(see id. at 17). After the TPR petition was filed, Mother continued to miss 

one-third to one-half of her visits, which the court had permitted to occur 

weekly pending the conclusion of the TPR hearings. (See N.T., 6/27/2022, at 

72); (DHS Exhibit 2, at Visit Summary at 6/15/22 and 8/15/22).

Ms. Williams testified that there appeared to be no bond between Child 

and Mother. (See N.T., 8/26/22, at 10). Child is “comfortable,” but quiet and 

“just there” with Mother, who is “polite” with her daughter. However, Child 

engages and plays with her paternal aunt who has visited her since April 2022 

and will hold Ms. Williams’s hand instead of Mother’s. (Id. at 10-12, 19). She 

is “a completely different person with the resource parent.” (Id. at 11). She 

makes sounds, smiles, stomps her feet in excitement, “makes ... a high pitch 

squeaking noise” and “lights up” for the resource parent. (Id. at 22); (see 

id. at 11, 21-22) (Child waits at the door for the resource parent when the 

visit is over, pulling Ms. Williams to the door to see if she can leave). Although 
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Child had not begun talking in June 2022 at the time of the first TPR hearing,7

by August she began early intervention and was repeating whatever the 

resource parent said. (See id. at 11). Child treats the resource parent’s 

home as her own, she “hovers” around the resource parent and follows her 

from room to room, and the resource parent is highly attentive to her. (See

N.T., 6/27/22, at 54, 57-59). Ms. Williams testified that Child’s primary bond 

is with her resource parent. (See N.T., 8/26/22, at 24).

At the conclusion of the August 26, 2022 hearing, the court found clear 

and convincing evidence to involuntarily terminate Mother’s parental rights 

pursuant to 23 Pa.C.S. § 2511(a)(1), (2), (5) and (8) and 23 Pa.C.S. 

§ 2511(b).

Mother timely appealed and filed a contemporaneous Rule 1925(b) 

statement. See Pa.R.A.P. 1925(a)(2)(i). She argues that under the totality 

of the circumstances, the record does not reflect that she has manifested a 

____________________________________________

7 Mother quotes to the language, “is Mom coming?” from the hearing to 

support her assertion that Child was asking about her. (Mother’s Brief, at 8). 

However, a review of the transcript reveals that this quoted language was part 

of DHS counsel’s question to Ms. Lawson about whether Mother attended 

visits. In fact, because Child was not yet speaking at the time of the June 

hearing, Mother’s claim that Child said this is impossible. (N.T., 6/27/22, at 

48); (see id. at 52).
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settled purpose to relinquish her parental claim or a failure or refusal to 

perform parental duties. (See Mother’s Brief, at 10-11).8

II.

A.

It is well-settled that the party seeking termination must provide clear 

and convincing evidence to do so. See In re Adoption of C.M., 255 A.3d 

343, 358 (Pa. 2021). “Clear and convincing evidence is defined as testimony 

that is so ‘clear, direct, weighty, and convincing as to enable the trier of fact 

to come to a clear conviction, without hesitance, of the truth of the precise 

facts in issue.” Id. (citation and brackets omitted). The trial court terminated 

Mother’s parental rights pursuant to Section 2511(a)(1),(2), (5), (8) and (b) 

of the Adoption Act, which provides:

(a) General rule.—The rights of a parent in regard to a child may 

be terminated after a petition filed on any of the following 

grounds:

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8 We review the orphans’ court’s order for an abuse of discretion. See In re

G.M.S., 193 A.3d 395, 399 (Pa. Super. 2018) (citation omitted). Moreover, 

“[w]e give great deference to trial courts that often have first-hand 

observations of the parties spanning multiple hearings.” In re Interest of

D.F., 165 A.3d 960, 966 (Pa. Super. 2017). “We must employ a broad, 

comprehensive review of the record in order to determine whether the trial 

court’s decision is supported by competent evidence.” In re S.H., 879 A.2d

802, 805 (Pa. Super. 2005). “The trial court is free to believe all, part, or 

none of the evidence presented and is likewise free to make all credibility 

determinations and resolve conflicts in the evidence.” In re A.S., 11 A.3d

473, 477 (Pa. Super. 2010). “If competent evidence supports the trial court’s 

findings, we will affirm even if the record could also support the opposite 

result.” Id.
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(1) The parent by conduct continuing for a period of at least 

six months immediately preceding the filing of the petition either 

has evidenced a settled purpose of relinquishing parental claim to 

a child or has refused or failed to perform parental duties.

(2) The repeated and continued incapacity, abuse, neglect 

or refusal of the parent has caused the child to be without 

essential parental care, control or subsistence necessary for his 

physical or mental well-being and the conditions and causes of the 

incapacity, abuse, neglect or refusal cannot or will not be 

remedied by the parent.

* * *

(5) The child has been removed from the care of the parent 

by the court or under a voluntary agreement with an agency for a 

period of at least six months, the conditions which led to the 

removal or placement of the child continue to exist, the parent 

cannot or will not remedy those conditions within a reasonable 

period of time, the services or assistance reasonably available to 

the parent are not likely to remedy the conditions which led to the 

removal or placement of the child within a reasonable period of 

time and termination of the parental rights would best serve the 

needs and welfare of the child.

* * *

(8) The child has been removed from the care of the parent 

by the court or under a voluntary agreement with an agency, 12 

months or more have elapsed from the date of removal or 

placement, the conditions which led to the removal or placement 

of the child continue to exist and termination of parental rights 

would best serve the needs and welfare of the child.

(b) Other considerations.—The court in terminating the rights 

of a parent shall give primary consideration to the developmental, 

physical and emotional needs and welfare of the child. The rights 

of a parent shall not be terminated solely on the basis of 

environmental factors such as inadequate housing, furnishings, 

income, clothing and medical care if found to be beyond the 

control of the parent. With respect to any petition filed pursuant 

to subsection (a)(1), (6) or (8), the court shall not consider any 

efforts by the parent to remedy the conditions described therein 
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which are first initiated subsequent to the giving of notice of the 

filing of the petition.

23 Pa.C.S. § 2511(a)(1), (2), (5), (8) and (b).

It is well-settled that “[w]e need only agree with [the trial court’s] 

decision as to any one subsection of Section 2511(a) and subsection (b) in 

order to affirm the termination of parental rights.” Int. of K.M.W., 238 A.3d

465, 473 (Pa. Super. 2000) (citation omitted). For the following reasons, we 

conclude that the trial court correctly determined that DHS met its burden of 

proof under subsections 2511(a)(1) and (b).

B.

Mother argues that there is little in the record to suggest that she 

manifested a settled purpose to relinquish her parental rights because in the 

period immediately preceding the filing of the TPR petition, she attended five 

out of six of her scheduled visits with her daughter. (See Mother’s Brief, at 

13). She states their recent interactions have been appropriate, with her 

engaged throughout the visit and bringing food and planned activities. (See 

id. at 15). She also maintains that “although there had been somewhat of a 

hiatus,” she has restarted drug and alcohol treatment and parenting classes. 

(Id. at 10). According to Mother, there was “little presented as to what 

conclusions may be gleaned from” her recent positive drug screens because 

Ms. Lawson is not a drug and alcohol professional. (Id. at 15). She also 

points to the fact that she maintained employment, has completed the housing 

program through ARC and would like to continue to apply for housing with the 
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agency’s assistance. (See id.). Under the totality of the circumstances, the 

record does not support Mother’s allegation.

We first address the court’s termination of Mother’s parental rights 

pursuant to Section 2511(a)(1). See Int. of K.M.W., supra at 473. To prove 

grounds for termination under this section, the movant must demonstrate that 

the parent demonstrates a settled purpose to relinquish parental claim to a 

child or fails to perform parental duties for at least six months before the filing 

of the termination petition. See id.; In re K.Z.S., 946 A.2d 753, 758 (Pa. 

Super. 2008) (same); 23 Pa.C.S. § 2511(a)(1).

Although it is the six months immediately preceding the 

filing of the petition that is most critical to the analysis, the court 

must consider the whole history of a given case and not 

mechanically apply the six-month statutory provision. The court 

must examine the individual circumstances of each case and 

consider all explanations offered by the parent facing termination 

of his parental rights, to determine if the evidence, in light of the 

totality of the circumstances, clearly warrants the involuntary 

termination.

In re K.Z.S., 946 A.2d at 758 (citations omitted).

This Court has held that “[p]arental duty is best understood in relation 

to the needs of a child. A child needs love, protection, guidance, and support.” 

In re Adoption of A.C., 162 A.3d 1123, 1129 (Pa. Super. 2017) (citation

omitted). These physical and emotional needs “cannot be met by a merely 

passive interest in the development of the child. Thus, this court has held 

that the parental obligation is a positive duty which requires affirmative 

performance.” Id. (citation omitted). In other words, “[p]arental duty 
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requires that the parent act affirmatively with good faith interest and effort, 

and not yield to every problem, in order to maintain the parent-child 

relationship to the best of his or her ability, even in difficult circumstances.” 

Id. (citation omitted).

A parent must utilize all available resources to preserve the 

parental relationship, and must exercise reasonable firmness in 

resisting obstacles placed in the path of maintaining the parentchild relationship. Parental rights are not preserved by waiting for 

a more suitable or convenient time to perform one’s parental 

responsibilities while others provide the child with [the child’s] 

physical and emotional needs.

Id. (citation omitted).9

While the critical period for evaluating a parent’s conduct is the six

months immediately preceding the filing of the TPR petition, a case’s whole 

history remains relevant and courts should “not mechanically apply the sixmonth statutory provision[.]” In re C.M., 255 A.3d 343, at 364 (Pa. 2021); 

see 23 Pa.C.S. § 2511(a)(1). Finally, “the court should not consider any 

____________________________________________

9 Mother cites In re Adoption of Baby Girl Flemming, 369 A.2d 1200 (Pa. 

1977), for the principle that there must be an “affirmative indication of positive 

intent” before termination of parental rights can occur. (Mother’s Brief, at 

13). However, the version of the Adoption Act containing such language has 

since been repealed and replaced. Any language requiring a movant to prove 

a parent’s “affirmative indication of positive intent” has been replaced by the 

language that it is the parent who has the positive duty to preserve the 

relationship by performing her parental duties. See 23 Pa.C.S. § 2511(a)(1), 

Comment (Section 2511(a)(1)) “is derived from Section 1.2 of the 1925 Act 

which required a finding of abandonment for at least six months as codified in 

clause (1). However, the grounds for abandonment have been broadened; 

relinquishment of parental claim or failure or refusal to perform parental duties 

is now sufficient.”).
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efforts by the parent to remedy the conditions described therein which are 

first initiated subsequent to the giving of notice of the filing of the petition.” 

23 Pa.C.S. § 2511(b).

The trial court explains that:

... The record and testimony presented at the two-day Termination 

Hearing which began on June 27, 2022 and concluded on August 

26, 2022 demonstrated Mother’s ongoing inability to provide care 

for or control her Child. Her failure to remedy the conditions that 

brought the Child into care indicated a continuing disregard of her 

parental duties. Specifically, Mother failed to provide suitable 

housing for her Child, submitted multiple urinalysis positive for 

illegal narcotics, and failed to visit her Child on a consistent basis. 

The Child was adjudicated dependent in 2020. Since then, Mother 

refused or proved unable to address her substance abuse issues 

and never developed a bond with the Child who has never resided 

with Mother at any point in her life. This was despite constant 

recommendations from CUA and the trial court to address her 

substance abuse issues and make positive progress in developing 

a bond and relationship with the Child.

(Trial Ct. Op., at 9). The record supports the court’s conclusion.

DHS filed the TPR petition on June 3, 2022, making December 3, 2021,

to June 3, 2022, the most relevant period for Section 2511(a)(1) purposes. 

However, we cannot mechanically apply this six-month period, as the entire 

life of the case is relevant.

On December 3, 2021, Child was slightly less than a year-and-a-half old

and had been removed from Mother’s custody for all but the first two weeks 

of her life due to both Child and Mother testing positive for oxycodone and 

fentanyl. (See N.T., 6/27/22, at 16). For the life of the case, the court 

ordered that Mother provide proof of housing and employment to the CUA, 
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report to the CEU for a drug screen, coordination of random drug screens, 

treatment monitoring and supervised weekly visitation. (See id. at 33). 

However, the court repeatedly found that Mother’s participation and progress 

were minimal. (See id. at 33, 37, 41); (DHS Exhibit 1, at Orders, 6/03/21, 

10/06/21, 11/22/21, 2/07/22, 6/27/22). Although consistent visitation and 

confirmation of treatment and sobriety would have warranted increased 

visitation, Mother failed to make efforts to move beyond the decreased 

visitation schedule of two visits per month. (See N.T., 8/26/22, at 8-9, 16-

21). After the first year of successful visits, the quality and effort Mother put 

forth with Child regressed, with Mother arriving late, missing visits, failing to 

pay attention to Child, appearing sluggish, unable to accomplish small tasks 

for Child such as doing her hair, and electing instead to try to talk with Ms. 

Williams about her own life. (See id. at 8-21). In fact, although Mother 

originally was granted weekly supervised visits with Child, in November 2021,

visitation was reduced to twice per month because of her failure to attend 

even half of the visits and her overall failure to complete case plan objectives. 

(See Orders, 6/03/21, 11/22/21). Mother then failed to attend any visits with 

Child in December 2021 or January 2022. While she did attend five of six 

visits over February and March 2022, she only attended two out of four 

scheduled visits in May and June 2022, arriving late for them both. (See DHS 

Exhibit 2, Visitation Summary, at 5/03/22 and 6/15/22).
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Mother did not appear at the CEU for the four scheduled random drug 

screens between April 25 and June 1, 2022, blaming it on her work schedule 

and the fact that she was living with a daughter in Delaware despite having 

an in-person visit with Child in Philadelphia on June 1, 2022. (See id. at 

Visitation Summary, 6/15/22, entry 6/01/22); (N.T., 6/27/22, at 28-29).

Prior to the filing of the TPR petition, Mother failed to provide information 

for monitoring of any self-referred drug treatment, with the only information 

the caseworkers were able to obtain being that she had been discharged from 

a Temple suboxone maintenance program because it was not medically 

appropriate and from Merakey for failing to attend. (See N.T., 6/27/22, at 

60); (N.T., 8/26/22, at 14). While Mother points to the fact that she has 

returned to drug treatment and started parenting classes, this was a week 

before the TPR hearing, after the TPR petition was filed, and is not a relevant 

consideration for our review. (See N.T., 6/27/22, at 27). In fact, it bears 

noting that after she began drug treatment in June 2022, Mother produced 

positive drug screens on June 27, 2022 (amphetamines and benzodiazepine) 

and August 10, 2022 (benzodiazepine) despite the drugs not being prescribed. 

(See N.T., 8/26/22, at 31-32). Although she obtained part-time employment 

as a home health aide and completed housing training with ARC, she did not 

obtain housing to enable her to care for Child. (See N.T., 6/27/22, at 29-32, 

45, 61-62).
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Based on the foregoing, DHS provided clear and convincing evidence 

that Mother has failed to complete the objectives set by the court and DHS for 

reunification, and to perform the parental duties necessary to provide Child 

with the essential care necessary for her physical and mental well-being. The 

trial court did not abuse its discretion in finding that DHS presented sufficiently 

clear and convincing evidence to support termination based on Section 

2511(a)(1).

C.

Having determined that the court properly found that termination of 

Mother’s parental rights was appropriate under subsection 2511(a)(1), we 

now consider whether termination is in Child’s best interest pursuant to 

subsection 2511(b).

With respect to Section 2511(b), our analysis focuses on the 

effect that terminating the parental bond will have on the child. 

In particular, we review whether termination of parental rights 

would best serve the developmental, physical, and emotional 

needs and welfare of the child. It is well settled that intangibles 

such as love, comfort, security, and stability are involved in the 

inquiry into needs and welfare of the child.

One major aspect of the “needs and welfare” analysis 

concerns the nature and status of the emotional bond that the 

child has with the parent, with close attention paid to the effect 

on the child of permanently severing any such bond. The fact that 

a child has a bond with a parent does not preclude the termination 

of parental rights. Rather, the trial court must examine the depth 

of the bond to determine whether the bond is so meaningful to 

the child that its termination would destroy an existing, necessary, 

and beneficial relationship. Notably, where there is no evidence 

of a bond between the parent and child, it is reasonable to infer 

that no bond exists.
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It is sufficient for the trial court to rely on the opinions of 

social workers and caseworkers when evaluating the impact that 

termination of parental rights will have on a child. The trial court 

may consider intangibles, such as the love, comfort, security, and 

stability the child might have with the foster parent.

Int. of K.M.W., supra at 475 (case citations and most quotation marks 

omitted).

Ms. Williams testified that there was no bond between Mother and Child. 

(See N.T., 8/26/22, at 10). Although Child was comfortable with Mother, she 

was quiet and “just there,” and while Child would play with her paternal aunt 

whom she had just met in April 2022 and would hold Ms. Williams’s hand 

instead of Mother’s, her relationship with Mother had not improved. (Id. at 

10-12, 19). Conversely, Child is “a completely different person with the 

resource parent,” smiling, excitedly interacting and lighting up with her. (Id.

at 11); (see id. at 21-22). When Mother’s visit would end, Child would wait

at the door looking for her resource parent to see if she could leave. (See id.

at 21-22). Child treats resource parent’s home as her own and hovers around 

resource parent, who is highly attentive to her. Resource parent provides care 

and comfort to Child and takes her to doctor’s appointments. (See id. at 44, 

53). Although Child was not talking at the time of the first TPR hearing in 

June 2022, by August resource parent was taking her for early intervention 

speech therapy and Child was repeating words resource parent said. (See id.

at 11, 33-34); (N.T., 6/27/22, at 57-59). Both Ms. Lawson and Ms. Williams 

testified that Child’s primary bond is with resource parent, who is a pre-
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adoptive resource. (See N.T., 6/27/22, at 54-55, 58-59); (N.T., 8/26/22, at 

24). Ms. Lawson stated that terminating Mother’s parental rights to allow for 

the resource parent to adopt Child would not negatively impact her and would 

be in her best interest. (See N.T., 6/27/22, at 52-53, 58-59). Hence, the 

record supports the trial court’s finding that the credible DHS witnesses 

established that the termination of Mother’s parental rights would best serve 

Child’s interest pursuant to Section 2511(b) and we find no abuse of discretion 

in its decision to terminate Mother’s parental rights to Child and to change her 

goal to adoption.

Decree affirmed.

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 3/16/2023