1 Pursuant to Federal Rule of AppellateProcedure 43(c)(2), Attorney General Eric H. Holder, Jr., is auto matically substituted for former Attorney General Michael B. Mukasey as Respondent in this case. 

## United States Court of Appeals FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT

___________ No. 08-1002

___________ Amit Kumar Khilan, *
* Petitioner, * * Petition for Review of an Order of v. * the Board of Immigration Appeals.
* Eric H. Holder, Jr., 1 * [PUBLISHED] Attorney General, *
* Respondent. *

___________ Submitted: October 13, 2008 Filed: March 5, 2009

___________ Before MELLOY, BEAM, and GRUENDER, Circuit Judges.

___________ PER CURIAM.

Amit Khilan petitions for review of a decision by the Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) denying his application for asylum and withholding of removal. We deny his petition for review.-2- I.

Khilan is a citizen of India who entere d the United States without inspection on January 5, 2004. The government initiate d removal proceedings against him on January 9, 2004. On September 1, 2004, Khilan concededremovability and filed an application for asylum and re lated relief. In his appli cation, Khilan claimed that he had been kidnapped and held for ransom by “Islamic extremists in the Kashmir region.” At an October 27, 2006, hearing be fore an immigration judge (“IJ”), Khilan testified about his family in India and the facts surrounding his kidnapping.

Khilan’s grandfather and, to a lesser extent, Khilan’s father were active in politics, and both held leadership positions in Shiv Sena, a Hindu political party. (Khilan’s uncle testified that Khilan’s gr andfather had also once run for a mayoral position with the BJP, a large Hindu-nationalis t political party). Khilan testified that his grandfather was well know n throughout the state of Haryana due to his political activities. Khilan’s family is relatively wealthy, and Khilan attended a private school in Lucknow.

On the morning of July 3, 2003, a gr oup of men attacked Khilan on his way to school. The assailants hit Khilan in the head and knocked him unconscious. They bound him and drove him seven or eight hour s away to a village near Kolkata (Calcutta), where they kept him in a dark room within a mosque. At one point, Khilan managed to escape but while attempting to hitchhike away wa s caught again. In retaliation for his escaping, the kidnappers beat him unconscious. According to Khilan, the kidnappers told him that they kidnapped him because his family’s notoriety would bring them fame and b ecause his family’s wealth assured the kidnappers a large ransom. The kidnappe rs demanded a fifty-lakh-rupee ransom, which was later negotiated down to thirty-five lakh rupees. They released Khilan after-3- fifteen or sixteen days of captivity, followi ng payment of the ransom. He eventually made his way back to his family and received medical treatment.

The kidnappers threatened to kill Khilan if Khilan or his family sought help from the police. Out of fear, Khilan di d not report his kidnapping. The police nevertheless became aware of the kidnapping from one of Khilan’s family’s servants. The police came to Khilan’s house to ask ques tions, but Khilan and his family refused to cooperate. The police persisted with their investigation and made a number of arrests. The police asked Khilan to identify the suspects, but he again refused to aid the investigation.

In addition to Khilan’s testimony regarding the kidnapping, Khilan submitted several documents detailing political and religious violence in India. These documents related numerous incidents of mob violence, abuses of police power, and endemic corruption.

The IJ accepted as credible Khilan’s testimony regarding his kidnapping generally but found that Khilan failed to establish that the government was unwilling or unable to control Khilan’s kidnappers. A ccordingly, the IJ determined that Khilan had not suffered governmental “persecution” and did not establish a fear of future persecution. The IJ denied Khilan’s appli cation. The BIA adopted and affirmed the IJ’s decision. Khilan appealed the BIA’ s determination as to his asylum and withholding of removal claims. We review the BIA’s decision, but where, as here, the BIA has adopted the IJ’s factual findings, we review those findings as part of the final decision. Ismail v. Ashcroft , 396 F.3d 970, 974 (8th Cir. 2005).

II.

The Attorney General may grant asylum to an alien who demonstrates that he is a “refugee” as defined by 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42)(A). 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(1).-4- “Refugee” is defined thereby as a person w ho “is unable or unwilling to return to, and is unable or unwilling to avail himself or herself of the protection of” his or her home country “because of persecution or a we ll-founded fear of persecution on account of race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group, or political opinion.” Id. § 1101(a)(42)(A). We have approved the BIA’s definition of “persecution,” which requires that the harm be inflicted “either by the government of a country or by persons or an organi zation that the government was unable or unwilling to control.” Menjivar v. Gonzales , 416 F.3d 918, 921 (8th Cir. 2005) (internal quotations and alterations omitte d). Khilan makes no allegation that the government itself inflicted the harm. He ar gues instead that the harm was inflicted by private individuals that the government wa s unwilling to control. “[A]n applicant seeking to establish persecution by a governme nt based on violent conduct of a private actor must show more than difficulty controlling private behavior. Rather, the applicant must show that the governmentcondoned it or at least demonstrated a complete helplessness to protect the victims.” Id. (internal alterations, quotations, and citation omitted); see also Valioukevitch v. INS , 251 F.3d 747, 749 (8th Cir. 2001) (rejecting an asylum claim where incident s had not “occurred with the imprimatur” of government officials).

Whether the Indian government is “ unable or unwilling” to control the kidnappers is a factual question. SeeMenjivar , 416 F.3d at 921. We review the administrative findings of fact “to determin e whether they are supported by substantial evidence on the record as a w hole,” meaning that the findi ngs “are ‘conclusive unless any reasonable adjudicator would be compe lled to conclude to the contrary.’” Id. at 920–21 (quoting 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(4)(B)).

Here, after a review of the evidence presen ted, the IJ stated that the court had “every reason to believe that the Indi an government, which opposes Kashmir Muslim separatists, would provide protection to people who are being threatened by them.” The record includes significan t evidence of separatist and religious violence, as well-5- as widespread corruption and abuse of poli ce power. There is no indication, however, that the Indian government condones persecution of individuals that oppose or are targeted by Kashmiri separatists. To th e contrary, the record shows that Indian security forces are actively combating Kashmiri insurgents. As the IJ noted, “This is clearly not a situation where the government of India is providing some sort of tacit support to the Kashmiri separatists.” We also note that much of the evidence Khilan presented is inapposite to Khilan’s situ ation. Khilan is a Hindu with family connections to Hindu political parties. The examples of religious persecution he cited involved attacks generally directed at Christians or Muslims, not at members of the Hindu majority. Bad governmental acts by a Hindu-majority government or Hindu political parties against non-Hindu minority re ligious groups add little, if any, support for a claim of governmental acquiescen ce to violence directed at Hindus.

Furthermore, evidence of general probl ems of ineffectiveness and corruption do not, alone, require a finding that the govern ment is “unable or unwilling” where the evidence specific to the petitioner indicat es the contrary to be true. Seeid. at 922 (“We deem the news artic les regarding gang activity too general to dictate a conclusion that [a gang member’s] specific acts directed toward [the petitioner] were persecution by the government.”). Here, not onl y were the police willing to investigate the kidnapping, but they had even arrested a number of suspects. The police attempted to forward their investigation into the kidnapping, and, on the facts before us, the government cannot be faulted for Kh ilan’s own refusal to cooperate with the investigation.

The IJ found that “this is not a situati on where there is any sort of governmental approval or acquiescence in any harm direct ed against the respondent.” Substantial evidence supports this finding, and the r ecord as a whole do es not compel a conclusion to the contrary. Substantial evidence also supports the denial of withholding of removal. To be eligible for withholding of removal, applicants must show a clear probability that they will f ace persecution in the country of removal.-6- Valioukevitch , 251 F.3d at 749. “This ‘clear pr obability’ standard is more difficult to meet than the ‘well-founded f ear’ standard for asylum.” Id. Because Khilan failed to meet the standard for asylum, it follows th at he also failed to meet the standard for withholding of removal. SeeIsmail , 396 F.3d at 975; Behzadpour v. United States , 946 F.2d 1351, 1354 (8th Cir. 1991).

* * *

Substantial evidence on the record as a whole supports the IJ’s conclusion that Khilan did not show that the government was unable or unwilling to control his abductors. We therefore deny the petition for review.

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