## In the Court of Appeals Second Appellate District of Texas at Fort Worth

__________________ _

________ No. 02

- 22

- 00236

- CR

__ _________________________

On Appeal from the 371st District Court Tarrant County, Texas Trial Court No. 1671445D
Before Sudderth, C.J.; Kerr and Wallach, JJ. M emorandum Opinion by Justice Wallach 

### D ORIAN 

### R AY 

### W OODARD 

### , Appellant

V



### . T HE 

### S TATE OF 

### T EXAS2 MEMORANDUM OPIN I ON
I. Int roduction
The S t ate c harg ed Appellant Dorian Ray Woodard with capital murder based

on the 3 :30 a.m. shooting of a c onvenience store clerk on Ja n uary 17, 2021

. 1 The shooting was captured on the store ’ s surve illance video

. 2 The sho oter wore a face
mask , gloves, and a red over coat
. Then

- eighteen

- year

- old Woodard confessed to t he police a few days later during a custo dial interrogation.
Woodard so ught to suppre ss his confessi on , but the trial court denied his motion to suppress “ unless something changes in evidence before th e Court. ”
Woodard plead ed n ot gu ilty , and a fter a wee k

- lo ng trial, a jury found him guilty of

mu rder ( a lesser

- included offense ) a nd as sessed his punishment at li fe in prison and a $ 10,000 fine

. See Tex

. Penal Code A n n. § § 12.32 , 19.0 2

. I n a singl e issue, Woodard complains that the trial court erred by denying his motion to suppress
. Because the
trial co urt did not ab use its discreti on by denying Woodard ’ s motion, w e affirm.
II. Discussion
In his si ngle issue, Wood ard complains that h is c onfession was invol untary unde r the Due Process Clause

. Th e S tate respon ds that Woodard faile d to show that

1 A customer re ported the offense to 9 11 at 4:55 a.m. Eight .22

- cali ber shell casing s were f ound at the scene, and f our of the ei ght bu llets hi t the clerk

.
2 The store had a si xteen

- ca mera surveillance system
. A Domino ’ s Pizza in t he same strip m all also pro v ided external su rve illance video.3 his c ustodial statement was involuntary due to police coercion or overreaching th at

ove r bore his will and because the r ecor d shows that his stateme nt was volun tarily
made

. A. St anda rd of review We apply a bifurcated standard of review to a trial cou rt’s ruling on a motion to suppress evidence. S tate v. Martinez , 5 70 S .W.3d 278, 281 (Tex. Crim. A pp. 201 9)

. Because t he trial judge i s the sole trier of fact and ju dge of the witnesses’ cre dibility and the weight to be gi ven their testimony , Wiede v. Sta te , 214 S.W.3d 17, 24

– 25 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007) , we defer almost t ota l ly to a trial court’s ruli ngs o n qu estions of
historical fact and appli cation

- of

- law

- to

- fact que stions that turn on ev alu ating credibility and demeanor, but we review de novo application

- of

- law

- to

- fact questions
that do not turn on cr edibility and deme ano r , Martinez , 570 S.W.3d at 281

. Whe n the trial court makes explici t fact findings, we determine whether the evidence, when viewed in the light most favor able to the trial court’s ruling, supports those findings. Johnson v. State , 414 S .W.3d 184, 192 (Tex

. Crim. App. 2013)

. We then
revi ew t he trial court’s legal ruling d e novo unless its explicit fact findings that are supported by the record are also disp ositive of the legal ruling. State v. Kelly , 204 S.W.3d 808, 818 (Tex. Cri m. App. 2 006)

. In determinin g whether a trial court’s d ecisi on i s supported by t he record, we
g enerall y c onsider only evidence adduced at the suppression hearing because the ruling w as based on it rather than on evidence introduced later. See Guti errez v. State ,4 22 1 S.W.3d 680, 687 ( T ex. Crim. App. 2007); Rach al v. Sta te , 917 S.W.2d 7 99,
809 (Tex. C rim. Ap p. 1996 ). But this general rule does not apply when the parties consensually rel itigate the suppression issue during trial on the merits. Guti errez , 221 S.W.3d at 687; Rachal , 917 S. W .2d at 809 ; see Black v. S tate , 362 S.W. 3d 626,
635 (Tex. Crim. Ap p. 2012 ) ( “ If the parties consen sually broach the sup pression issue again before the fa ct

- finder at trial, the reviewing court shou ld also consider the
evidence adduced b efore the fact

- find e r at trial in gauging the propr iety of t he trial

cour t ’ s ruling on the mo tio n to suppress. ” ). 3
B. Sup pression
The tr ial court heard the motion to suppre ss af te r voir dire but before t rial began

. During trial, defense counsel r e ur ged th e suppression motion. We a bated the appeal for the trial court to make findings of fact and conclusions of law regarding the
voluntariness of Wo odard ’s confession

. See Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 38.22, § 6 ; Vasquez v. State , 411 S.W.3d 918, 9 20 (Tex. Crim. App. 2013)

. We r eins tated the

3 The State argues that th ere was no c onsensual agreement to reopen the suppression issue

. However, this di sreg ards the trial court ’ s in itially den ying the suppression motion “ un less something ch an ges in evide nce before the Court. ” Further, when the prosecutor offered th e interview into evidence outside the jury ’ s pres ence, th e trial court noted to de fens e counsel, “ [O]bviously , y ’ all are not waiving any of your objectio ns . . . outside the presen ce of the jury , so I will take those into consideration again and over rule t h ose. ” Before the jur y, Woodard again reurged “ the objections that [he] mad e in the previous hearing w ith regard to ” the interview , and the tr ial court overruled them again. We wil l accordingly con sider the relevant evidence adduced a t trial.5 appeal upon r eceipt of the supplemental clerk ’s record containing the trial court ’s findings and conclusions

. 1. Findings of fact and conclusions of law
T he trial court made forty

- five fact findings ; th e following , as s ummarized , a re particularly relevant :

• During the interview, Woodard ’s hands were cuf fed, but his legs were not shackled.

• Neither Detective Rodrig uez nor Detective Coleman were armed during the interview , and they did not threaten or coerce Woodard.

• Neither Detective Rod riguez nor Detective Coleman made any promi ses or bri bes in exchange for W oodard ’s st atement.

• The de tectives did not deny Woodard breaks for wate r or to use the bathroom

.

• Detective Rodr i g

uez did not beli eve Wo od ar d was u nder the influence of drugs or alcohol during the interview.

• Detective R odriguez testified that she did not believe at any point during the interview that any of Woodard ’s statements were involuntar ily made.

• Wood ard was 18 years old at t he time of the interview

.

• Detective Rodri g u e z testified that Wood ard ’s age and inexperience with law enforcement did not fa ctor into h ow she interviewed him.

• Detective Rodriguez candidly admitted that one tactic she used during the int e rview was to play on Woodard ’s emotions.

• During the interview , the detectives disc ussed Woodard ’s mother, asked him if he
was remorseful, and as ked “did a monster do this or so me body who cared? ”

• Detect ive Rod riguez was unaware of whether Woodard had gra d uated high
sc hool , and she did not know his IQ.6 • Detective Rodri guez did not attempt to determine if Woodard had any mental health problems prior to the interview.

• At the time of the interview, Detective Rodrig uez was unaware that Wooda rd had prescripti o n medication in h is possession when he was arrested.

• Despite quest ioning Detective Rodrig uez about the possible impact of Woodard ’s education, IQ, and m ental health, Woodard did not put on any evidence demonst rat ing a poor or incomplete education, a low I Q, or a histo ry o f mental health problems.

• The trial court found De tective Rodrig uez ’s testimony credible and supported by the re cord. Based on its findings, the trial court mad e fifty

- one co nclu sions of law, determining that the weight of the credible evidence supported the following
conclu sions and , ultimately , that Wo o dard had voluntarily, knowingly , and intelligently waived his rights:

• Woodar d was not into xica ted or otherwise incapacitated during the interview.

• Wood ard was of average intelligence, thus weighing against a finding that h is wai v er was not intelligently or knowingly made.

• Woodard ’s conduct during the interview demonstrated that h e had the req ui si te level of compre hension to waive hi s Miranda rights.

• Th e detectives did not resort to intimidation , coercion, or physical pressure t o obtain Wooda rd ’s statement a nd , throughout the interview, Woodard and the detectives were civ il, and t he to ne of th e in terview wa s conversationa l.

• Wood ard ’s age did not render him unable to intelligently and voluntarily waive his Miranda rights.

• Woodar d ’s waiver of h i s Miranda r ights was the product of a free and deliberate choice rather than intimidati o n, coercion, or d ec eption.7 • Woodard unde rstood the nature of his rights and the consequ ences of aba ndoning th ose rights when he waived them. The trial court also conclud ed that the amou nt of time that Woo d ard was in th e in terview room (approximat ely two hours) was ins ufficient to give rise to an in ference that his confession was involuntary , and the inter v

iew itself was approximately one hour, a relatively short period of time for an int erview regardin g a c ap ital murder

. The
trial court noted that the det ectives advised Woodard that he could terminate the interview at any time a nd that they never told Woodard that he would not be able to contact his family until he confessed: “both of the se facts de mons trate that his
confes s ion wa s volun tary. ” Further, neither dete ctive engaged in dec eptive interview techniques or t rickery to obtain th e confession , and the weight of the credible
evidence showed th a t they did not en gage in any beh avior that could be classified as

overrea ching or coercive. The trial court concluded that Wooda rd ’s sta tement was not involuntary due to police overreaching or coercion.
2. Suppression hea r ing
At the suppr essi on h earing, Wood ard ’ s counsel asked the trial court to take judicial notice of testimony from a hearing “ in March , ” an d the trial co urt agreed , stating, “ I ’ ll take judicial notice that we

– of the record there, and I ’ ll see what you

m e an when we get th ere. ” W e su p plemented the record with the transcript from t he
March 31, 2022 hearing at which Dr. Jeanin e Galu sha , a p s ychologist with specializ ations in neurop sychology and for ensic psychology, and Dr. Rahn Minaga wa ,8 a clini cal and forensic psycholog ist, testified but did not address the specifics of
Woodard ’ s ca se. 4
A si n gl e witness

— A rli ngton Po lice Detect ive Jen nifer Rodriguez

— testified during the suppres sion hearing. Detective Rodrig u ez stated that on Jan uary 21, 2021, as part of her murder investigation , she interviewed Woodard at the police sta tion
after he w as arrested on a warrant
. D etective Coleman was with her, and the
interview ’ s purpose was to obtain a confessi on. The Sta te o ffered an unredac ted copy
of State ’ s Exhi bit 155 , the recording of Woodard ’ s interview , and noted that a
redact ed version wou ld b e o ffered at trial. S tate ’ s Exhibi t 155 is an hour

- and

- half lon g recording , but the first 26 minutes show an e mp ty interview room.
Wood ard w as in handcuffs during the interview. D etective Rodriguez offered
Wood ard water , a sked if he was comfortable , asked h i m ho w old he was , and asked
him where he went to school

. Wood ard told her that he was eighteen and said the
name of a school

.

4 The Mar ch h earing ’ s purpose was t o challenge Penal Code Sec tion 12.31(a)(2) ’ s constitutionality. See Tex. Penal Code Ann. § 12.31(a)(2) (provi ding that
a n individ ual adjudged guil ty o f a capit al felony in a cas e w here the State does not s eek the dea th penal ty shall be punis h ed by impr isonment for life without parole if the in dividual committed the offense at age 18 or older)

. A t the hearing, Dr. Galusha testified that “ ma jor morpholog i cal and f un ctional chan ges ” to the brai n occur during adole sce n ce and stated that there was not much difference between the brain of a 1 5

- year

- old and the brain of a n 18

- year

- old , particularly regarding impulse control , the abil ity to emotio nally regulate , and the ab i lity to thin k about the potential consequences of behavior

. Dr. Minag a wa testified that factors other than brain de velopment could also shape ado les cent behavior, including a his tory of trauma
.9 Detecti ve Cole man expla ined to Woodard t hat the y were working on a case , that they were comparing information a gainst evidence t h ey had already colle c ted , and
that they wer e asking for him to be honest

. Woodard told th em that he had been

arre sted be fore bu t n ever interrogated

. 5 A t t h a t p o i n t , Detective Rodriguez read to Wood a rd his Miranda rights as he read along fr om a copy provi d e d to him , and
Woodard no dded that he understood each of the rights a s t hey were read to him.
W hen the detectives then asked if he wa nted to talk with them ab out why he was
there , Woodard replied , “ I would like to kn ow w hy

. ”
The detectives each encouraged Woodard to be honest , telling him that the y

a lready knew the answer s to some of the questions they were going t o ask. Wood ard
assured them that he had never “ hit a lick ” 6 within walking dis tance of wh ere he
l iv e d. 7 He told them that he had seen informatio n about the offen se on t he news and
that some memb ers of his family had asked him if he was the pe rpe trator
. Detecti ve Rodriguez asked Wood ard, “ Why do you think that [ yo ur f amily ] w ould be ask in g you if it was you? ” Woodard said that it was bec ause of his hair sty l e, which he had changed t h e same day as the off ense and because he h ad come home nervous after

5 This statement w as redacted fro m the re cordin g t hat was p u blished to the jury during t he trial ’ s guilt

–

innocence phase

.
6 During the trial ’ s p unishment phase, Detective Coleman explained that

“ hitti ng a lick ” generally meant committ in g a theft or a robbery

.

7 Dete ctiv e Rodrigue z t estified before the jury t hat Wooda rd lived in an apartment th at was w ithin a ten

- minute walk to t he convenience store

.10 stealing from vehicles twenty minutes away from home

. He sai d that his fath er found
his account hard to believe

. Detective C o leman cautioned Woodard m o r e than once to be honest because
what Wood ard had see n on tele vision was not all the i nformat ion the police had.
Wo odard admitted he had bee n at the convenience store the same night of the
offen se and did not buy a nything

. He said he thought he had been t h e only person i n the store at that time besides the store employe e . Det ective Coleman a gain cau tion ed
Woodard to be ho nest , t elli ng him , with regard to the surveillance video, “ I ’ ve seen it.
And I ’ m looking a t you now, and I know what I know

. ”
Detective R odriguez chime d in by point ing out to Woodard t hat his mother
and his father had identi fied him from the media clip s howing the perpetrator

. She
told him that she thou ght he wanted to unb urden himself and th at she wa nted to
know if he felt bad

. She ad ded t hat only he could tell them if it was an a ccident but

t hat there was no que stion that he had done it

. Wooda rd replied, “ I was hitting my licks, that ’ s all I know. I rob but I don ’ t kill. ” 8 When Woodard added that his family thought it was h im because of t h e offense ’ s timing , Detective Rodriguez re plied,

“ The y don ’ t believe [ you r den i als ] because it was you. ” When Wo od ard admitted that

8 Thi s portion of Woodard ’ s stateme nt was redacted during the guilt

–

inno cence phase but admitted into ev iden ce during the pun ishment phase.11 he had dele ted hi s social media accou nt that day , D etect ive Coleman told him that
de leting did not d estroy social media rec o rds. 9 Detective Rodrigue z en couraged Woodard to show r emorse because “ [he]

cou ldn ’ t hav e done tha t and not felt bad abo ut it. ” She reached acros s the table to
him , told him t hat sh e knew what had hap pened was scary , and again encouraged him
to unburden h i mself

. Woo dard stated that the convenience store clerk had been
disre spectful in t one and that he shot hi m a f ew tim es. He did n ot remember how many times. Detective Rodriguez asked him where the gun was and how he got it. He
had obt ained the gun “ hitting a l ick ” a round a week before he shot the cle rk. He had

no t i ntende d to rob the store w hen he s hot the clerk out of anger. Wo odard a dmitted that he had shot other people before but had never previously kil led anyone. He said
that he had sh ot fourteen people , includi ng the clerk, 10 and that th ose s hootings had
been anger an d gang

- related

. When asked if h e had ever been diagnosed with a
mental

- health issue, Woodard said that h e ha d not been but that his m o ther “ said [he]

was probably schizophrenic ” because she was sc hi z ophr en ic

. When Wo odard muttered something about getting th e death pe nalty, Detecti ve Rodriguez told him that it was not for them to determin e . Woodard , who was taking a

9 No social media rec o rds were of fered at tri al.

10 T his state ment was also redacted during the guilt

–

innocence phase but shown during the tri al ’ s punishment phase.12 Lyft when he was arrested , told the detectives that he had b ee n headin g for L ufkin to

avo id bringin g drama to his family

. As the int erview neared its conclusion, Detective Rodrig uez summarized
Woodard ’ s te stim ony that he had ar gued wi t h his mother and then walked to the

c onvenience store from the ir apartm ent with the int ent to buy some sna cks and perceived the clerk as disrespectful

. Woodard said that he had been angry, walked behind the counter, and then “ did what [ he] did. ” Wood ar d noted that the clerk migh t not have been disre spectful and that Wood ard had just taken it that way. He dispo sed
of his clothe s and the gun in the apartment dumpster. 11 Detective Rodrig uez test ified t hat at n o p oint du r ing the inter view did
Wood ard ask to terminate the interview or t o have an attorn ey pr esent and, as shown
in the recording, neither she n or Det ect ive Coleman threa tened or coerced him into giving a statement or promi sed or bribed him w ith anythi n g in exchange for making a

statement
. During cross

- ex aminat ion, w hen asked whether Woo d ard ’ s age and
inex perience with law enforcement had pl ayed into how she interview ed him,
De tective Rodrig uez replie d , “ N o. ” She did not know that h e had not graduated from high school and stated that she would have been surprised to l earn tha t his IQ was
consi dered in a low

- a verage range. She agreed that “ I w ould like to k now ” is not a

11 During tr ial, D e tective Rodrig uez stated that t he police never found t he
c lothes that Wo od a rd had worn that nigh t or the gun that he used.13 definitive, “ Ye s, I will answer your questions. ” She also agreed that it was fair to say that one of her interview tactics had be en to pl a y on Woodard ’ s e m otions. Regarding either

- or c hoices that she had giv en Wood ard to respond to during
th e int ervi e w, the following colloquy occurred: Q. And so his options were

-- and whether it was you or Detective Coleman

-- you assume d gui lt, and you say, “ You ’ re either remorseful or you ’ re a bad pe rson, ” or, “ you ’ re a mo nster, ” something alo ng t hose line s. Yo u re member those two approaches he could take to answering your questions? A. Yes. Q. And so with that question, if he refus es to co n fess, he ’ s a monst er or he ’ s a bad person; if he confesse s, he ’ s remorseful. Cor rect? A. That was n ot my inte ntion to say that he was a monster. I ’ m saying t h is is what it looks like on [the surveillance] video. Q. Sure. But those are his two optio ns. If he confesses and tells you he did this, that ’ s remorse ful. If he says, “ No, I had nothing to do wi th this, ” all you hav e is the [surveillance] video and he ’ s a bad person. I mean, those are his two choices, in reality, correct? A. I did not f eel t hat was his two choices. Q. You could understand how a pers on

-- a young person who has never been inte rviewed by de tec ti ves bef ore and there are two trained hom i cide detectives in a small room

-- how a person could potentially feel isolated and see thos e a s their only two options, correct? A. Yes. Detective Rodr iguez did not look up the pr escription me dicin es t hat were
f

ound on W o odard when he wa s arrested but said that she would not be surp rised14 that they were for treating major de press ive disorder, bipolar di sorder, or anxiety
disorder but that she would have been surpr ised that one was for schizo phrenia

. At the conc lu sion of D e tec t ive Rodrig uez ’ s testimony, Woodard ’ s counsel argued that Wood ard ’ s statement had been i nvolu nta r y because the tactics the
dete ctive had used were designe d to elicit inc riminati ng responses and were coer cive , particu larl y given Woodard ’ s youth an d inex peri e nce . Counsel then argued,
With regard to Mr. Woodard ’ s mental capacity , the Co urt, having heard Dr. Galusha testify in our previous hear ing [ 12 ]

-- the C ourt would recall if the record was r eviewed

-- tha t he did, in fact, have low intellig e nce . Low
ave rage intelligence is what I believe the range is. [ 13 ] Those factors are also rele van t when it c omes to an individual ’ s voluntariness in giving a statement.

12 T he cour t re porter has informed us that o ther than the March hearing there were no other pretrial hearings at wh ich Dr. Galusha testified. In a he aring outside the jury ’ s pr esen ce during the tr ial ’ s guilt

–

innocence p hase , Dr. Galusha testifi ed about her ev aluation of Woodard and her determination that he suffered from a fairly si gnificant, largely untreated mood dis order. The trial co u r t did not expressly conside r th is testim ony as to suppression , althou g h the trial court did ask whether Wood ard wanted to p rof fer her t est imony “ for any other reasons ” that had not already been heard

.
13 “IQ” or “ i ntelligence quotient ” testing is “a significant factor in mak ing both the lega l a nd clinical assessment of intelligence or intellectual functioning.” Ro bert M. Sanger, IQ, Intelli gence Tests, “Ethnic Adjustments” and Atkins , 65 Am. U.L. Rev. 87, 101 (2015) (discussing IQ in t he death

- penalty context). During the tri al ’ s punishment p has e, Dr. G al us ha testifi e d that she had determined that Wood ard ’ s IQ fell “ in the low av erage t o the bottom p art of the average range overall , ” wit h a full scale of 88 , and that the average range is 90 to 110

. Woodard was abl e to pronounc e w ords at an 11 th grade l eve l and to understan d written information at th e 10 th grade leve l, but he under stood math a t a 4 th grade level

. Dr. Galusha noted that Woo dard had reported to her multiple su icide attempts and that he ha d sc ars on h is arms from cutting.15 C oupled with his youth, coupled with his intelle ctua l disability, his limited intellect a nd, obviousl y, his limited education are all signif icant factors that the Supreme Court has rev iewed with regard to whether or not a statement is volunta rily given. The prosecutor responded that there was no showing that Woodard was in capac i t ated
to the level that he was unable to give a knowing or voluntary statement.
Th e t rial court denied the mo tion to suppress , stating, “ So far , I found, with regard s to the [mo tion to suppress], that the Stat e p roved b y a preponderance in our h e aring outside the presen ce of the ju ry that the defendant did voluntarily, knowingly,

a nd in tel ligently wa ive his Miranda rights and speak to officers vo luntarily, so I ’ m denying [the mot ion] currently, unless somet hing changes in evidence before th e Cour t
. ”
3. Tr ial evidence
T w ent y
- year

- o l d Sedarius Phillips , who had been Woodar d ’ s b est friend,
le arned about the shoo ting on social media and th ought Woodard was the
perpetrator. Phillips ’ s un c le J aylen Terry contacted the p ol i ce , and they spoke to the police together about Woodard

. D uring cro ss

- examinatio n, Ph il l ips stat ed that
Wood ard ’ s friends “ always knew part of [Woodard ’ s] an ger is sue . ” Phillips testified ,

“ [W oodard ] wa s a little schizophrenic, I g u ess . . . or had violence, but we never judg ed him off that because he didn ’ t give us that demeanor. ” Phillips said that he had

seen cu ts on Wo od ard but di d no t know Wo odard had made them himself , and he16 denied h avin g told Detective Rodr ig uez th a t he had seen self

- infli cted cut marks on
Woodard ’ s arm . Dete ctiv e Rodriguez testified bef o r e the ju ry during the p ubli cation of the

stor e ’ s surveillance vi deo , which showed the shooter en ter the sto re a t 3:17 a.m. , depa rt at 3:33 a

. m. , a nd then r e

- e nter the store and leave a minute later

. At 3:30 a.m.,
the shooter opened fire on the clerk , exit ed, the n re turned to take tobacco produc t s and to attempt to access the cash register

. From the surveillan ce video, the police developed a suspec t p ro f ile

. After Detect ive Rodriguez spoke with Terry and Phillips , she developed Woodard as a person of intere st , acqui red a photo of him , and loc ate d his residence,
which was a ten

- mi nute walk to the e as t of the store
. S he rela yed that information to
SWAT for surveillance to ensure that W ooda rd did not f lee before the ar r est warrant issued. F our d ays after the sh ooting, t he sur veillance unit saw Woodard leave th e apartment with m ultiple bags and get into a red Kia. The K ia , dr iven by a L y ft driver and on its way t o ta ke Woodard to a bus station i n Dallas , was stopped for a t r af fic

v

i olation at 6:5 0 a.m.
Detective Rod r iguez had been drafting Wo odard ’ s arrest warrant that mornin g , and at the time of the traffic stop, the warrant had not yet been issu ed by a judge

. The

arrest warrant is sue d at 8:1 0 a.m. , Detective Rodriguez received it at 8 :1 8 a.m., and
Woodard arriv e d at 8:53 a.m. at the police station , where she a nd De tec t ive Cole man interviewed him after giving him the Miranda war ning s . W h en the p rosecutor offered17 the redacted copy of the interview, the trial court reconsidered the earlier suppression objections , ov erruled t hem , and allowe d the recording to be published t o the jury

. D etec tive Rodriguez stated that wh e n they first met with Woodard, they had

not yet brought up the conven ience

- store incident when Woodard said, “ I saw it on
the news

. ” S he testi fied tha t W oo dard h ad initially denied goin g to the store but
ultimat ely admitted that he w e nt there a f ter a fight with hi s mother , that he brought up that his parents had asked him if he was the shooter , a nd that Woodard said he
had admitte d to his mother that it w as him

. H e had told Phillips about it and as sume d that was how Terry found ou t
. Detective Rodriguez did not show Woodard the
surveillance video , but he told her things th at he wo uld have know n only if he had
eit her seen the video or had been there. Woodard told the police that he h ad thrown the gun behind the n earby Domino ’ s Pi zza but then r eturne d t o retrieve it, and the
Domino ’ s Pi zza s urveillance vi deo , which showed this, was admitted into evidence
and publi shed to t he jury ; Detecti ve Rodrig uez stated th at Wood ar d had not see n th e Domino ’ s Pizza surveillance video

. Wood ard had changed his hair since the night of
the offense , and he had s hu t down his social media on the day of the o ffense

. The Lyft driver gave the police written con s ent to search so they c o uld retr i e ve Woodard ’ s bags from the vehicle , and Det ective Rodr ig u ez obtained a search warrant
for the bags

. Over Woodard ’ s objection, t he trial co urt admitted photos of the bags ’

contents into evidence a nd a llowed the S tate to p ublish th e m . A mong other things,

t he bags contained several packages of cigarillo s and loos e cigarill os. Detective18 Rodriguez testified th at the l oos e cigarillos were “ very similar to what was la ying
around [th e clerk ’ s] head , ” stored behin d the sto re ’ s counter , and stolen by the

s hooter

. D uring cross

- examination, Det ective R odriguez agreed that Woodard ’ s bags contained presc ription med ication that inclu ded moo d stabilizers t o treat depressio n

an d bipolar disorder , medication to trea t a nxiety and major d epressive disorder, and

an an tipsychot ic drug used to treat schi zophrenia and bipolar disorder , but she also stated that they were n o t i n a prescription bottle prescribed for Woodard. 14 When
asked if she had taken into conside ration while interviewing Woodard whether he had any diagnos ed me ntal i llness, De tecti ve R odriguez tes tified that she had asked him
and that he told her no. She sta ted that she had not taken i nto co nsid eration his
education level or h is age in conducting the interview. She agreed that at th e time of
the interview, she had a lready made up her mind as to g uilt and wanted to kn ow

“ why ” and t o obtain a confession.
Defense counse l th en posed the following ques tio n s to Detective Ro driguez
about the custodial interview:

14 During the trial ’ s puni shment phase, Woodard ’ s mo ther testified that she took medi ca ti on for bi po lar schizo ph renia and noted that sh e re cogn ized W ood ard ’ s behavior

— self

- harm, anger, d epression, and c utting

— as similar to her condition

. S he h ad n ever taken Woodar d to a doctor for an official d iagn osis and treatme nt b ut h ad allowed him to u se her prescri ption medica tion Seroquel (a m edicat ion to treat schizophrenia) to medicate himself.19 Q. An d so

-- and, again, more so,

. . . Detect ive Co l eman

-- b ut you posed these two hypothetical s itu ations: Are you remorseful or are you a m onster? Right? You rem embe r Detective Coleman actuall y u s ing that word “ monster ” ? A. Yes. Q. If he doesn ’ t confess, he ’ s a monster, right? If he does confess , he ’ s re morseful. You leave him with no option. Yo u lea ve him with an option of taking the lesser of two evils. I ’ m go ing to be remorseful and I ’ m go ing to confess to this crime; otherwise, he ’ s seen as a monster. Do you not feel that ’ s . . . inappropriate to be d oi ng with a n 18

- year

- old kid? A. No. Q. Yo u do not? A. I do not. Q. Where did you learn these tactics? You s aid you learned techniques and tac t ics to interview people. What technique was it? A. I c an ’ t point to a specific technique for that. I ’ ve bee n to m ul tiple dif ferent training classes and th en just my experience of talking to people. Q. Is it the Reid tec hniq ue? Have you heard of that? A

. I have heard of the Reid technique. Q. Is that what you were taught on? A. That was one of the trai ning c ourses tha t I went to
. Q. You know there ’ s p ro ble ms with that technique, right? A. I was u naware of that

. No evid ence was offere d to explain the Reid techni que. Det ective Rodrigu ez agreed that Woodard had show n tears during the interview but said that she w as not20 s ur e wh ether he wa s remor seful because of what he had done or because he g ot

c aught.
C . Volunt a riness
A defendant may argue that his statement was involuntary based on the Due
Proces s Clause only when there is po lice overreaching , i .e., some coerc ive polic e activity

. Oursbourn v. State , 2 59 S.W. 3d 159, 1 69

– 70 (Te x. C rim. App. 2008)

. 15 Factors

to co n sider in addre ssing whether a suspect ’ s will h a s been overborn e and his capacity
for self

- dete rm ination critically impaired by law

- enforcement overrea chi ng includ e the

accus ed ’ s youth , his lack of education, his low i nte llig ence, the lack of any advice
ab o ut his constitutional rights, the length of th e detention, the rep eated and prolo nged nature of the questioning, and the use of physical punishment such as the
de pr ivation o f food or sleep. Sandoval v. State , 665 S.W. 3d 496, 523 (Tex. Crim. App.
2022 ) ; 16 s e e Oursbourn , 259 S.W.3d at 170

– 71

.

15 Other the ories of involuntariness may be rai s ed under Miranda or Articl e 38 .22 , se e Oursbourn , 25 9 S

. W.3d at 169 , but Woodard does not argue t hat these the ories apply.

16 I n San doval , the court co ncluded that the appellant ’ s con fession was not coerced when he was thirty years old at the time he gav e h i s sta tement and pointed to not hing to suggest that h e la cked education or intelligence ; the combi ned elapsed t ime for all int erviews was approximatel y 2 hours and 25 minutes, w hich, the court noted,

“ does not seem particularly long, especially for a ca pit a l mur der case ” ; the appell a nt was given his full war ning s at the beginning o f each interview ; and the appellan t ’ s claims of m istreatment were based s olely on his t estimony, wh ich the trial court was free to disbelieve. 665 S.W.3d at 523

– 24.21 Due

- Process involuntar iness claims g enerally require an objective assessment of police behavior and not a s weeping inq uir y into t he suspec t ’ s state of mind

. Oursbourn , 2 59 S.W. 3d at 17 1

– 73 ( explaining distinction betwee n Due Process and
Arti c le 38.22 claims )

. We review i nvolunta rines s under the Du e Process Clause by

exa mining the totality of the circumstances surrounding the confe ss ion. Lope z v. State , 610 S.W.3d 487, 494 (Tex. Crim. Ap p. 2 020)

. To prevail on a D ue

- P roce s s

“ involuntary confession ” claim, a defendant must show (1) that police engage d in an activity that was objectively coercive , (2 ) that the statement is c ausally re la ted to th e

coe rcive government misconduct , and (3) th at the coercion overbore the defendan t ’ s will. Id. T he court must carefully consider not only the complained

- of s tat e ments made by the police but also the context in which they were made, inc luding the
d emeanor o f the person who made them and the statement s ’ tru th or falsity because police co n duct cannot be considered in a vac uum. Id. at 496

– 97.
D . Woodard ’ s argument and the State ’ s response
I n support of his argument th at his will was overbor ne, Wo odar d direct s u s to evidence that he was ei ghte en during the interro gation; th a t a n euro p sychologist
determined that his IQ was 88; that people who knew and interacted with him on a daily bas is believed he had sever e and debilitatin g m en tal

- health issu e s; that h e had
lim ited experience at the tim e of t he offense with the adult crimi n al justice system;
that he had fail ed out of high school ; and that D etective Rodriguez had use d the

“ Reid Technique

. ”22 The State respond s t hat Woodard did not present evidence a t the s uppr essio n hearing to support most of these fact s . Spec ifically, he did not present any IQ
evidence or tha t his friends and family believed that he had ment al health i s sues or that he had fai led out of high school. In st ead, during the suppression hearing , Detective Rodriguez testi f ied that she did not know Woodard ’ s IQ , whether he had graduated from hig h school , or his ment al

- health history befo re she interviewed him , and defense c ounsel did not ask her any quest ions a bo ut t he Reid technique

. The
record r ef lects tha t no evide n ce was admitted about Woodard ’ s IQ until the trial ’ s punishment phase.
E . A nalysis
The record shows that W oodard arrived at the police station at 8:53 a .m. and

was questioned in han dcu ffs fo r a li ttle over an hour. See San do v a l , 665 S. W.3d a t
5 2 4 (noting that 2 hours and 25 minutes “does not seem particularly long, especially for a capital murder case ” ). T he interview ’ s pur pose was to secure Woodard ’ s confessio n , and he was asked multiple times to be honest. Detective Rodri g uez learne d at the in terview ’ s beginning that Woodward was eighteen and where he went to high school but not whethe r he had graduated

. She provided to him his Miranda

war ni ngs before beginning the sub stan tive questioning , in qu i red as to his comfort , off er e d him wate r, and had no informati on about his low average IQ

. Phillips denied having t o ld Detect ive Rodriguez that he had s een cutting marks
on Woodard ’ s arms , and when Detective Rodriguez asked Woodard if he had ever23 been diagnosed with a mental

- health issue, Wooda rd said no , b ut then sha red that his mother said he was probabl y schizophrenic because she was. No evidence was de ve lop e d about the Reid technique dur ing the suppression hearing o r at trial

. 17 Woodard did not testify at the suppression hearing , so Detectiv e Rod riguez ’ s testimony and the video are the only evid en ce o f any suppose d mistreatment. Neither

r ef lect s any sort of threat by the police to elicit the confessio n . Cf. Lopez , 610 S.W.3d
at 49 8

– 99 (holding police threats to arrest suspect ’ s wife did not c on s ti tut e obje ct ive

co ercive conduct under t he case ’ s circumsta n ces). Nothing in this record reflects a poli ce ac tivity that was objective ly coercive or that could h a v e overborn e Woodard ’ s will. See id. at 4 94. Further, t he trial court ’ s explicit fact find in gs , which

— as set out abo ve

— a re supported by the record, are di spositive here of its legal ruling : Wooda rd ’ s

statement was not involuntary under the Due Process Claus e . See Johnson , 414 S.W.3d
at 192. Accordingly, we conclude that the trial court did not ab use its disc retion by denying Woodard ’ s suppression motion , an d we ove rrule his so le issue.

17 In a 2019 un p ublished memorandum op inio n , w e observed a summary o f th e Reid Te c h niqu e as having three parts: ( 1) tell the su spect that you already know for
s ure t hat he committed the c rime and cut off any attempts on his part to deny it; (2) off er the suspect more tha n one s cena rio for how he c o mmi tted the crime and sug gest that his conduct was likely the leas t cu lpable and per haps even moral ly justifi ab le; and (3) overstate the strength of the police ’ s evidence that inculpates the suspect by inventing non

- existent phy s ical evidence or witnes s s t atements and assure the s uspe ct that he will be convicted regardless o f whether he t alks. Dock v. S tate , No. 02

- 18

- 004 62

- C R, 2019 WL 6205248, at *8 n.7 (Tex. App.

— Fort Worth Nov. 21, 2019, no pet.) (mem. op., not designate d f or p ublication) ( quot ing Dyl a n J . French, The Cutting Ed g

e of Confession Evidence: Redefining Coercion and Reformin g Police Interr ogation T

e ch niques in th e American Criminal Justice System , 97 Tex. L. Rev. 1031, 1039 (2019)).24 III. Concl u sion Having ov er ruled Woodard ’ s sole issue, we affirm the tri a l court ’ s judgment.

/s/ Mike Wallach Mike Wallach Justice
Do Not Publish Tex. R. App. P. 47.2(b)
Deli ve red : Septem ber 14, 2023