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Filed 1/19/22 P. v. Casillas CA1/2

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for 

publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or 

ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115. 

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION TWO

THE PEOPLE,

Plaintiff and Respondent,

v.

SALVADOR CASILLAS, JR.,

Defendant and Appellant.

 A162338

 (Solano County

 Super. Ct. No. FCR345030)

Defendant Salvador Casillas, Jr. appeals from his sentencing on the 

ground that the trial court failed to order a supplemental probation report 

before imposing sentence. Finding no prejudice, we affirm the judgment. 

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

Defendant was charged with two felony counts of stalking (Pen. Code,1

§ 646.9, subd. (b)), 18 misdemeanor counts of disobeying a domestic relations 

court order (§ 273.6, subd. (a)), two misdemeanor counts of making annoying 

phone calls (§ 653m, subd. (b)), and one misdemeanor count of battery (§ 243, 

subd. (e)(1)). The alleged victim was his former girlfriend, G.K.

1 All statutory references are to the Penal Code.
2

Defendant entered a plea of no contest to one count of felony stalking, 

with a maximum sentence of four years in state prison.2 The remaining 

counts were dismissed with a Harvey3 waiver, and no promises were made as 

to the sentence. 

Sentencing was initially scheduled for February 3, 2020, but was 

continued multiple times, first due to defense counsel’s motion to withdraw 

(which was granted) and, later, at the requests of new defense counsel. 

Defendant was eventually sentenced on February 26, 2021 to the midterm of 

three years in state prison. 

The Underlying Offenses

We draw the essential facts of the offense from the probation 

presentence report prepared in early February 2020.

G.K. ended a three-year relationship with defendant, moving to a 

location with her elderly mother that she believed defendant could not find. 

She feared for her safety after ongoing incidents of domestic violence 

throughout her relationship with defendant. Defendant then “continuously 

harassed” her with “pervasive” phone calls. He used tracking technology to 

track her whereabouts, and “identity hiding applications” on the phone he 

used to harass her. 

2 There were two felony counts of stalking. Count 1 alleged that 

between April 7 through April 23, 2019, defendant “did willfully, maliciously, 

and repeatedly follow and did willfully and maliciously harass G.K., and 

made a credible threat with the intent that she be placed in reasonable fear 

for her safety and the safety of her immediate family,” and that defendant 

was “subject to a temporary restraining order, injunction and other court 

order prohibiting the above described behavior against G.K.” Count 2 alleged 

the same conduct, but for the earlier period between March 1, 2019 and April 

6, 2019, and when there was no court order. 

3 People v. Harvey (1979) 25 Cal.3d 754.
3

On March 26, 2019, G.K. met with defendant, because he said that if 

she would see him, he would agree to end their relationship. When G.K. 

arrived, defendant was “ ‘acting extremely weird.’ ” He told her he needed to 

make a phone call and briefly left the vehicle where he and G.K. had been 

sitting and having a conversation. Moments later, Rio Vista police arrived, 

with sirens and lights. Defendant jumped out of the vehicle and yelled that 

G.K. was holding him at gunpoint in the vehicle, causing the police to place 

G.K. under arrest. His allegation against G.K. was unsubstantiated, and no 

charges were filed against her. G.K. later told police she knew then that she 

had been “set . . . up” by defendant. 

On April 2, 2019, defendant and G.K. each filed for temporary 

restraining orders; only G.K.’s was granted. Even though his temporary 

restraining order had been denied, defendant tried to “serve” the denied order 

on G.K. in a further effort to harass her. 

Although defendant was served in person on April 7, 2019, with the 

restraining order issued by the court to protect G.K., he did not stop 

contacting G.K. or her mother, who was also protected under the court order. 

On April 10, 2019, G.K. informed police that defendant was violating 

the restraining order. She indicated that as of that date he had harassed her 

“at least 150 times by continuously calling and texting her mother’s cell 

phone.” G.K. was so afraid that she slept with her clothes on and armed with 

a firearm, and had hired a security detail to escort her to and from court. 

Between April 11 and April 21 alone, G.K. reported at least 250 missed calls 

and text messages from defendant to her mother’s phone.4 

4 These contacts in violation of the restraining order included the 

following: on April 13, defendant sent text messages to a person “connected” 

to G.K. with a picture of the front of her residence and derogatory names; on 

April 14, there was a text message to G.K.’s mother’s phone stating “come out 
4

On April 23, 2019, G.K.’s mother heard a strange noise outside in the 

middle of the night; she looked through the blinds and saw flames coming 

from the side of the garage. A witness reported that defendant’s son was 

“lurking around the complex sometime before the fire was set.”

Later on in the morning of April 23, defendant was arrested at Family 

Court where he had been ordered to appear. 

Defendant told police G.K. was “crazy” and “lying to him.” He stated, 

“’I love [G.K.] What she did was wrong. She cannot just walk out on me like 

that. It has to do with the way she went about it. If [G.K.] would have told 

me, ‘Fuck you, I am leaving,’ it would have been a different story. She 

planned this since November. She used me and fucked me. None of it meant 

anything.” He blamed G.K. He admitted he had his son try to serve the 

temporary restraining order that had been denied. He denied making calls to 

G.K. or that he had access to license plate technology. He denied calling G.K. 

on April 21. He accused G.K. of having mental health issues and “repeatedly 

denied harassing” her. 

On April 23, defendant’s residence was searched pursuant to a 

warrant, and officers found the phone used to make the harassing calls and 

text messages described above. 

now, and wtf”; on April 15, a text message stating “no pay day”; on April 17, 

text messages to her mother’s phone stating, “bitch, I sorry, text back and I’ll 

stop by” and “hey”; on April 21, several text messages to her mother’s phone 

stating “I want you back,” and “I need you.” G.K. answered one phone call 

and recognized defendant’s voice saying “miss you,” “sorry” and crying 

throughout the call. 
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DISCUSSION

Defendant contends on appeal that the court erred in failing to order 

and consider a supplemental probation report before sentencing him on 

February 26, 2021, and that he was prejudiced as a result.

A. The Trial Court Erred in Not Ordering a Supplemental Report

Section 1203, subd. (b)(1) requires, with exceptions not applicable here, 

that if a person is convicted of a felony and eligible for probation, before 

judgment is pronounced the court shall “immediately refer the matter to a 

probation officer to investigate and report to the court, at a specific time, 

upon the circumstances surrounding the crime and the prior history and 

record of the person, which may be considered either in aggravation or 

mitigation of the punishment.”

California Rules of Court, rule 4.411(a)(2)

5 requires a “supplemental 

report if a significant period of time has passed since the original report was 

prepared.” The Advisory Committee Comment to rule 4.411 states: 

“Subdivision (a)(2) is based on case law that generally requires a 

supplemental report if the defendant is to be resentenced a significant time 

after the original sentencing, as, for example, after a remand by an appellate 

court, or after the apprehension of a defendant who failed to appear at 

sentencing. The rule is not intended to expand on the requirements of those 

cases.” The Advisory Committee comment continues that “The rule does not 

require a new investigation and report if a recent report is available and can 

be incorporated by reference and there is no indication of changed 

circumstances. This is particularly true if a report is needed only for the 

Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation because the defendant has 

5 All further references to rules are to the California Rules of Court.
6

waived a report and agreed to a prison sentence. If a full report was 

prepared in another case in the same or another jurisdiction within the 

preceding six months, during which time the defendant was in custody, and 

that report is available to the Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation, 

it is unlikely that a new investigation is needed.” Therefore, we look to case

law to determine what constitutes a “significant period of time” requiring a 

supplemental report. 

At least one court has concluded that a “period of more than six months 

may constitute a significant period of time.” (People v. Dobbins (2005) 127 

Cal.App.4th 176, 179-181 (Dobbins).) In Dobbins, there was an eight-month 

delay between the original probation report (which resulted in defendant 

being sentenced to probation) and the subsequent sentencing hearing at 

which the court found defendant violated probation, revoked probation, and 

imposed a previously suspended 16-month sentence. For two of those months

after the initial sentencing, Dobbins had been out of custody. The Court of 

Appeal in Dobbins concluded that on these facts the trial court erred by not 

ordering a supplemental or updated report. (Id. at p. 181.)

Here, defendant was out of custody during the year his sentencing was 

continued. The Attorney General has not offered any justification for the 

trial court’s failure in not ordering and reviewing an updated report. We can 

find no justification in the record and conclude that it was error.

B. Reversal is Not Warranted Because There is No Prejudice

A trial court’s error in failing to order a supplemental report is a state 

law error only, and thus our review is governed by the Watson standard of 

harmless error. (Dobbins, supra, 127 Cal.App.4th at p. 182, citing People v. 

Watson (1956) 46 Cal.2d 818, 836.) That means that we will not reverse the

judgment unless defendant establishes there is a reasonable probability he 
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would have obtained a more favorable result if a supplemental report had 

been prepared. (Dobbins, supra, at p. 182.)

1. The Presentence Report

Considering the “criteria affecting probation,” under rule 4.414, the 

probation officer observed that “[t]he nature, seriousness, and circumstances 

of the crime as compared to other instances of the same crime appear 

significantly elevated in seriousness given the large number of violations of 

the Court’s orders in addition to the sustained and pervasive harassment.” 

The probation officer “also noted that during these events, [defendant]

utilized the Rio Vista Police in March 2019 to escalate the harassment of the 

victim.” Additionally, the presentence report concluded that defendant 

“inflicted significant emotional injury upon the victim.” 

In considering circumstances in aggravation under rule 4.421(b), the 

probation officer stated that “defendant has engaged in violent conduct that 

indicates a serious danger to society.” The presentence report continued: 

“The defendant’s behavior throughout this series of events associated with 

the instant offense is egregious and indicative of a substantial public safety 

concern. Though he has a limited history of criminal conduct, it is noted that 

his one prior was for domestic violence, demonstrating a pattern of family 

violence related behavior that has apparently gone undetected and/or 

unreported.”

6 Further, “[w]hen confronted about his behavior, [defendant]

largely minimized his role in the events leading up to his arrest and 

maintained his narrative that the victim pulled a gun on him in Rio Vista.”

6 The probation officer was referring to a “misdemeanor conviction for 

domestic violence over fifteen years ago,” for which there was “no record of 

probation performance” given the age of the conviction. 
8

The report continued, “It is that the defendant has a limited history of 

criminal conduct that probation appears even remotely reasonable in this 

matter. It is also noted that it appears the defendant has not attempted to 

contact the victim since the date of his arrest on 4/23/19. Nonetheless, a 

recommendation for imprisonment was heavily considered and would be 

justifiable. Given the highly marginal nature of appropriateness, it will be a 

highly guarded recommendation for probation with significant restrictions 

and a lengthy probationary period. . . .” (Italics added.) 

2. The Sentencing Hearing

At the sentencing hearing on February 26, 2021, the court heard from 

the victims. G.K. and her mother provided written statements. In her victim 

impact statement, G.K.’s mother described the toll defendant’s conduct had 

taken on her “mentally, emotionally, physically, financially and socially,” as 

well as G.K.’s mother having to experience the “worst nightmare for a mother 

is not being able to help her child in a situation that is beyond her control.” 

G.K. appeared at the sentencing hearing and spoke at length about how 

defendant’s actions had affected her. She described being in a relationship 

with defendant that was “very manipulative, very controlling.” She 

explained: “I would tell him often, I don’t belong here. And he would tell me 

you’re not going anywhere. I tried to get out . . . because I begged him, leave 

me alone, and he wouldn’t. That’s what he said, I promise you, I give you my 

word, you will never hear from me, you will never see me again, just meet me 

for five minutes. I was so desperate at that point for him to leave me alone.” 

Describing what ensued when she agreed to meet with defendant, G.K. told 

the court, “And then . . . everything else happened. He set me up. He lied.

. . . It was just horrible. It totally destroyed my world, my professional world, 

my personal, my family, everything. [¶] I cannot reiterate what it’s like to be 
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the victim of a stalker. I have hired [an attorney]. . . . [A]fter [defendant] had 

me arrested, he called me crying, saying, I am so, so sorry. I’m so sorry, 

crying. Then he texts and said, what can I do to clean this mess up. When I 

wasn’t answering, that’s when I became the enemy. That’s when I because 

the focus of his stalking and his anger.” 

G.K. told the court that she was “terrified.” “We had to move a few 

times. I’m away from my family. I don’t get to see them. I don’t get to see 

friends. I still look over my shoulder.” G.K. told the court that defendant has 

“changed me as a person. Before I was confident, happy; now I’m not like 

that anymore.” 

G.K.’s written victim witness statement contained detailed recitals of 

what she experienced, how her life was affected, and the fear defendant’s 

conduct caused her on a daily basis. She described her two-year “plan” to 

“escape” from defendant, and his relentless conduct directed toward her 

before and after she obtained a temporary restraining order. She described 

defendant calling “my job my director my corporate office,” her daughter, her 

special needs grandson, her daughter’s 92-year-old great grandmother, her 

brother who she hadn’t spoken to in years. At one point he was calling and 

texting her “close to a hundred times a day.” He was “texting pictures of my 

front door ‘saying I’m 10 feet away’ ‘it’s time to come outside.’ ” She implored 

the court, “Imagine receiving threats like this a hundred times a day. This 

put me in panic mode. Fight or flight. Hypervigilant. I was not sleeping or 

eating. I had friends drive around to make sure I could go outside safely.” 

She concluded her written statement, “There are no words to truly explain 

the torment that the Defendant has caused to myself and my family. It will 

be a lifetime of counseling and courage to heal.” 
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At sentencing, the district attorney argued for the maximum sentence 

of four years in state prison. 

Defense counsel argued for probation. About one month prior to 

sentencing, defense counsel filed a Mitigation Statement.7 In this 

submission, defense counsel noted that this was defendant’s first felony 

conviction, and his only other conviction was a misdemeanor from “some 17 

years prior,” “for which he completed court probation.” Defense counsel also 

stated that defendant had “abided by all court orders since arrest.” 

At the sentencing hearing, defense counsel also addressed the court. 

She reiterated that while the criminal case was pending, defendant had not 

stalked G.K. She emphasized defendant’s various obligations to his family, 

his health status, and his employment.

But defense counsel’s comments also made clear that defendant

continued to deny some aspects of his conduct. Counsel attached as an 

exhibit to the Mitigation Statement defendant’s application for temporary 

restraining order against G.K., filed April 2, 2019, the very application the 

superior court denied in favor of issuing a temporary restraining order 

protecting G.K. and her mother. In response to a question on the application 

form asking “[w]hat other orders are you asking for,” defendant responded, 

“[f]or [G.K.] to do jail time for the crimes she has done to me.” (Italics added.)

Defendant’s son spoke on behalf of his father at the sentencing hearing, 

stating that his father was a “great man” and a “real great guy,” and asked 

for leniency.

After hearing from the parties and the victims, the court stated that it 

had “read these reports a number of times, and considered what’s in them, 

7 One of the continuances in defendant’s sentencing date was based on 

his counsel’s desire to have additional time to prepare this statement. 
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which includes the statements from [G.K.] and her mother, includes the 

defendant’s statement, where he asks the Court to grant probation, 

indicating that he’s the sole provider in his home, and that he’s got medical 

issues, talks about his future plans. So I’ve looked at all of that, considered 

what both lawyers have said today.” 

The court then said it was denying probation “because of the 

seriousness of the offense as outlined in this case as related to me by [G.K.], 

what I know about this offense. I just don’t think [defendant will] be 

successful on probation.” 

The court sentenced defendant to the midterm of three years in state 

prison, explaining, “The mitigating factors that I’ve taken into your account 

are the defendant’s health situation, his lack of a serious criminal history, 

and the impact of imprisonment on him.

“However there are circumstances in aggravation, including the 

conduct of the defendant in the offense, which I find to be serious, indicating 

the danger to society and to the victim in this case.

“And based on that, I find the aggravating and mitigating factors 

balance each other out, which is why I’ve chosen the midterm of three years.” 

3. There was No Prejudice

Defendant contends he was prejudiced because of “[t]wo harms” that 

flowed from the trial court’s error. First, a supplemental probation report 

“likely would have provided evidence confirming defense counsel’s argument” 

that defendant had not made any attempt to contact the victims in the year 

since the report was written, and that “affirmation” would have made it 

“reasonably likely . . . [to] have persuaded the court to grant probation or at 

least impose the low term of imprisonment.” Second, the original report did 

not provide any “details or guidance” concerning defendant’s “performance on 
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a grant of probation years before.” Defendant speculates, “Assuming 

appellant successfully completed his one grant of probation,” this factor was 

“reasonably likely to persuade the trial court to impose the low-term” of 

imprisonment (2 years) rather than the midterm. 

Neither argument is persuasive.

As to the first alleged harm, no one—not the victims, not the 

prosecutor—ever contested at the sentencing hearing or otherwise defense 

counsel’s report that defendant had not contacted the victims in the year 

since the original presentence report was prepared. Defense counsel

mentioned defendant’s non-contact with G.K. in the Mitigation Statement,

and stated it again at sentencing. In short, this fact was not kept from the 

court. And even had this apparent fact been stated in a supplemental

probation report, in addition to in defendant’s own uncontested statements, it 

is not reasonably probable that it would have made a difference in the 

sentencing. 

As to defendant’s second “harm”—the asserted lack of information 

about the grant of probation “years before”—this was not the result of the 

trial court’s error in not requesting an updated presentence report. The 

reference to a grant of misdemeanor probation in 2003 was in the original

presentence report, and the probation officer noted at the time of its 

preparation that records were unavailable due to the age of the conviction. 

Defendant amplified in his Mitigation Statement that this was “court” 

probation, which we take to mean not supervised by the probation office, and 

no one contested that assertion, either. Nor is the argument persuasive. It is 

a stretch to see how defendant’s conduct on a court probation sentence in a 

17-year-old misdemeanor conviction so remote that the probation officer did 

not find it to be an aggravating factor for this sentence, makes it reasonably 
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probable that the trial court would have reduced the sentence here. 

Regardless how defendant conducted himself on probation on the 

misdemeanor, he committed even more serious conduct in felony stalking

G.K. 17 years later. In addition, the underlying fact of the misdemeanor 

conviction itself (leaving aside how defendant performed on court probation) 

did not figure much in the judge’s sentencing decision here; if anything, the 

court found defendant’s “lack of a serious criminal history” to be a mitigating 

factor. (Italics added.) 

In sum, the court was aware of all of the arguments that might militate 

in favor of a lesser sentence or probation, and defendant has failed to show 

prejudice from the failure to order a supplemental presentence report.

DISPOSITION

The judgment is affirmed.
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_________________________

Miller, J.

WE CONCUR:

_________________________

Richman, Acting P.J.

_________________________

Kline, J.*

A162338, People v. Casillas

* Assigned by the Chief Justice pursuant to article VI, section 6 of the 

California Constitution.