2019 WI 45 

SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN

CASE NO.: 2017AP002006-CR 

COMPLETE TITLE: State of Wisconsin, 

 Plaintiff-Appellant-Petitioner, 

 v. 

John Patrick Wright, 

 Defendant-Respondent. 

REVIEW OF DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS 

Reported at 383 Wis. 2d 602,918 N.W.2d 128 

 (2018 – unpublished) 

OPINION FILED: April 30, 2019 

SUBMITTED ON BRIEFS: 

ORAL ARGUMENT: January 16, 2019 

SOURCE OF APPEAL: 

 COURT: Circuit 

 COUNTY: Milwaukee 

 JUDGE: Hannah C. Dugan 

 

JUSTICES: 

 CONCURRED: 

 DISSENTED: 

 NOT PARTICIPATING: 

 

ATTORNEYS: 

For the plaintiff-appellant-petitioner, there were briefs 

filed by David H. Perlman, assistant attorney general, with whom 

on the briefs is Brad D. Schimel, attorney general. There was an 

oral argument by David H. Perlman. 

For the defendant-respondent, there was a brief filed by 

Carly M. Cusack, assistant state public defender. There was an 

oral argument by Carly M. Cusack. 
2019 WI 45

NOTICE

This opinion is subject to further 

editing and modification. The final 

version will appear in the bound 

volume of the official reports. 

No. 2017AP2006-CR 

(L.C. No. 2016CM2845) 

STATE OF WISCONSIN : IN SUPREME COURT 

State of Wisconsin,

 Plaintiff-Appellant-Petitioner, 

 v. 

John Patrick Wright, 

 Defendant-Respondent. 

FILED 

APR 30, 2019 

Sheila T. Reiff 

Clerk of Supreme Court 

REVIEW of a decision of the Court of Appeals. Reversed and 

cause remanded. 

¶1 SHIRLEY S. ABRAHAMSON, J. This is a review of an 

unpublished decision of the court of appeals affirming an order 

of the Circuit Court for Milwaukee County, Hannah Dugan, Judge, 

granting John Patrick Wright's motion to suppress evidence.1 The 

 

1 State v. Wright, No. 2017AP2006-CR, unpublished slip op. 

(Wis. Ct. App. June 12, 2018). 
No. 2017AP2006-CR 

2 

appeal was decided by one judge, Joan F. Kessler, pursuant to 

Wis. Stat. § 752.31(2)(f) (2015-16).2

¶2 John Patrick Wright, the defendant, was charged with 

unlawfully carrying a concealed weapon in violation of Wis. 

Stat. § 941.23(2). The weapon was discovered in Wright's 

vehicle's glove compartment during a traffic stop. Wright did 

not hold a valid permit to carry a concealed weapon, commonly 

referred to as a CCW permit. 

¶3 Wright filed a motion to suppress the evidence. 

Wright admitted that the traffic stop was lawfully initiated 

because it was supported by reasonable suspicion that Wright was 

violating the traffic code. 

¶4 Wright argued, however, that the police violated the 

Fourth Amendment by taking three actions unsupported by 

reasonable suspicion of criminal activity: (1) the police asked 

Wright whether he had a weapon in the vehicle; (2) the police 

asked Wright whether he held a permit to carry a concealed 

weapon; and (3) the police verified whether Wright in fact had a 

valid CCW permit (a CCW permit check). 

¶5 The circuit court, relying on Rodriguez v. United 

States, 135 S. Ct. 1609 (2015), held that the officer unlawfully 

extended the traffic stop by asking Wright whether he had a 

weapon in the vehicle and whether he held a permit to carry a 

 

2 All subsequent references to the Wisconsin Statutes are to 

the 2015-16 version unless otherwise indicated. 
No. 2017AP2006-CR 

3 

concealed weapon. The court of appeals affirmed, adopting the 

same reasoning as the circuit court. 

¶6 The case presents three Fourth Amendment issues: (1) 

in the absence of reasonable suspicion of criminal activity, may 

an officer ask a lawfully stopped motorist about the presence of 

weapons; (2) in the absence of reasonable suspicion of criminal 

activity, may an officer ask a lawfully stopped motorist whether 

the motorist holds a CCW permit; and (3) in the absence of 

reasonable suspicion of criminal activity, may an officer 

conduct a CCW permit check. 

¶7 We conclude that, in the instant case, none of the 

officer's questions or actions violated the Fourth Amendment. 

¶8 A traffic stop constitutes a seizure for Fourth 

Amendment purposes.3 The United States Supreme Court has 

described a routine traffic stop as more akin to a Terry4 stop 

than a formal arrest. It has held that, like a Terry stop, "the 

tolerable duration of police inquiries in the traffic-stop 

context is determined by the seizure's 'mission'——to address the 

traffic violation that warranted the stop and attend to related 

safety concerns."5 

 

3 Rodriguez v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 1609, 1614 (2015); 

State v. Floyd, 2017 WI 78, ¶20, 377 Wis. 2d 394, 898 

N.W.2d 560. 

4 Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968). 

5 Rodriguez, 135 S. Ct. at 1614 (citations omitted); see 

also Arizona v. Johnson, 555 U.S. 323, 330 (2009); Illinois v. 

Caballes, 543 U.S. 405, 407 (2005); Knowles v. Iowa, 525 

U.S. 113, 117 (1998). 
No. 2017AP2006-CR 

4 

¶9 The "mission" of a traffic stop includes: (1) 

addressing the traffic violation that warranted the stop; (2) 

conducting ordinary inquiries incident to the stop; and (3) 

taking negligibly burdensome precautions to ensure officer 

safety.6 Authority for the seizure ends when these tasks are, or 

reasonably should have been, completed.7 

¶10 This is not to say, however, that police action 

unrelated to the traffic stop's mission necessarily violates the 

Fourth Amendment. To the contrary, the Supreme Court has 

recognized "that the Fourth Amendment tolerate[s] certain 

unrelated investigations that [do] not lengthen the roadside 

detention."8 In other words, "[t]he seizure remains lawful only 

'so long as [unrelated] inquiries do not measurably extend the 

duration of the stop.'"9

¶11 We conclude that Wright's Fourth Amendment rights were 

not violated when the officer asked Wright about the presence of 

weapons in the vehicle. As this court stated in State v. Floyd, 

2017 WI 78, ¶28 377 Wis. 2d 394, 898 N.W.2d 560, questioning a 

 

6 Rodriguez, 135 S. Ct. at 1614-15; Caballes, 543 U.S. at 

408. 

7 Rodriguez, 135 S. Ct. at 1614; see also United States v. 

Sharpe, 470 U.S. 675, 686 (1985) (in determining the reasonable 

duration of a stop, "it is appropriate to examine whether the 

police diligently pursued [the] investigation"). 

8 Rodriguez, 135 S. Ct. at 1614; see also Johnson, 555 U.S. 

at 327-28; Caballes, 543 U.S. at 406-08. 

9 Rodriguez, 135 S. Ct. at 1615 (brackets in original) 

(quoting Johnson, 555 U.S. at 333). 
No. 2017AP2006-CR 

5 

lawfully stopped motorist about the presence of weapons relates 

to officer safety and is negligibly burdensome. The question is 

part of the traffic stop's mission.10

¶12 Neither the officer's question nor the subsequent CCW 

permit check "measurably extend[ed] the duration of the 

[traffic] stop."11 Thus, neither the officer's questioning 

whether Wright held a CCW permit, nor the officer's subsequent 

CCW permit check, violated the Fourth Amendment. 

¶13 Accordingly, we reverse the decision of the court of 

appeals, vacate the circuit court's order granting Wright's 

motion to suppress, and remand the cause to the circuit court 

for further proceedings. 

I 

¶14 The following facts are taken from the transcript of 

the evidentiary hearing on Wright's motion to suppress, as well 

as the transcript of the circuit court's oral decision granting 

Wright's motion. 

¶15 On June 15, 2016, Milwaukee Police Officers Jesus 

Gloria and Kristopher Sardina stopped Wright's car because the 

passenger-side headlight was out. 

¶16 While Officer Gloria approached the passenger-side 

window of Wright's vehicle, Officer Sardina approached the 

driver's-side window and made contact with Wright. Officer 

 

10 Floyd, 377 Wis. 2d 394, ¶28. 

11 Johnson, 555 U.S. at 333. 
No. 2017AP2006-CR 

6 

Sardina asked Wright for his driver's license, asked whether he 

was a CCW permit holder, and asked whether Wright had any 

weapons in the car. Officer Sardina testified on crossexamination that although he does not recall how many questions 

he asked or the order in which he asked them, all of these 

questions usually "come pretty fast" after he makes initial 

contact with a motorist. 

¶17 Wright responded to the officer that he had just 

finished the CCW permit class and that he did have a firearm in 

his vehicle.12 Officer Sardina asked Wright if the officers had 

his permission to remove the firearm from the vehicle for the 

duration of the stop. Wright consented, stating that the 

firearm was in the glove compartment; Officer Gloria retrieved 

the firearm.13

¶18 Officer Sardina took Wright's license and went back to 

the squad car to "run [Wright's] information."14 During this 

 

12 At this point, Officer Sardina arguably had reasonable 

suspicion that Wright was violating Wis. Stat. § 941.23(2). The 

State, however, does not argue that reasonable suspicion 

existed. We therefore do not resolve the issues in the instant 

case on that basis. 

13 The firearm was loaded. 

14 We infer that Officer Sardina was checking Wright's 

driver's license and/or determining whether Wright had any 

outstanding warrants. See Rodriguez, 135 S. Ct. at 1615 

(quoting Caballes, 543 U.S. at 408) (explaining that the 

"ordinary inquiries" incident to the traffic stop include 

"checking the driver's license [and] determining whether there 

are outstanding warrants against the driver"). 
No. 2017AP2006-CR 

7 

time, Officer Sardina also ran a CCW permit check to see if 

Wright was a valid CCW permit holder. Officer Sardina 

discovered that Wright did not have a valid CCW permit. Officer 

Sardina then arrested Wright under suspicion of unlawfully 

carrying a concealed weapon. Wright was later charged with 

unlawfully carrying a concealed weapon in violation of Wis. 

Stat. § 941.23(2). 

¶19 Wright moved to suppress the gun evidence, and, after 

an evidentiary hearing, the circuit court granted Wright's 

motion. The circuit court concluded, relying on Rodriguez, that 

asking the CCW permit question and the question about the 

presence of weapons unlawfully extended the traffic stop in 

violation of the Fourth Amendment. 

¶20 The State appealed, and the court of appeals affirmed. 

The court of appeals, relying on Rodriguez, concluded that 

asking the CCW permit question and the question about the 

presence of weapons unlawfully extended the traffic stop. 

Although the State briefed the application of this court's 

decision in State v. Floyd, 2017 WI 78, ¶28, 377 Wis. 2d 394, 

898 N.W.2d 560, a decision that was released after the circuit 

court's decision but before the court of appeals' decision, the 

court of appeals failed to address Floyd. 

¶21 The State petitioned this court for review. 

II 
No. 2017AP2006-CR 

8 

¶22 Whether evidence should be suppressed is a question of 

constitutional fact.15 When presented with a question of 

constitutional fact, this court engages in a two-step inquiry. 

"First, we review the circuit court's findings of historical 

fact under the clearly erroneous standard. Second, we 

independently apply constitutional principles to these 

historical facts."16

III 

¶23 The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution 

prohibits unreasonable seizures.17 A traffic stop constitutes a 

seizure for constitutional purposes, and "[a] seizure for a 

traffic violation justifies a police investigation into that 

violation."18 The United States Supreme Court has characterized 

a routine traffic stop as more akin to a Terry stop than to a 

 

15 State v. Reed, 2018 WI 109, ¶51, 384 Wis. 2d 469, 920 

Wis. 2d 56; State v. Johnson, 2007 WI 32, ¶13, 299 Wis. 2d 675, 

729 N.W.2d 182; State v. Knapp, 2005 WI 127, ¶19, 285 

Wis. 2d 86, 700 N.W.2d 899. 

16 Reed, 384 Wis. 2d 469, ¶51 (footnotes omitted); Johnson, 

299 Wis. 2d 675, ¶13; Knapp, 285 Wis. 2d 86, ¶19. 

17 U.S. Const. amend. IV. 

Wright also argues that his rights under Article 1, Section 

11 of the Wisconsin Constitution were violated. However, 

Wright's only developed argument pertains to the Fourth 

Amendment. See State v. Grandberry, 2018 WI 29, ¶30 n.19, 380 

Wis. 2d 541, 910 N.W.2d 214 (explaining that we typically do not 

address undeveloped arguments). Thus, we confine our analysis 

to the Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution. 

18 Rodriguez, 135 S. Ct. at 1614. 
No. 2017AP2006-CR 

9 

formal arrest. It has held that, like a Terry stop, "the 

tolerable duration of police inquiries in the traffic-stop 

context is determined by the seizure's 'mission'——to address the 

traffic violation that warranted the stop and attend to related 

safety concerns."19

¶24 The "mission" of a traffic stop includes: (1) 

addressing the traffic violation that warranted the stop; (2) 

conducting ordinary inquiries incident to the stop;20 and (3) 

taking negligibly burdensome precautions to ensure officer 

safety.21 Authority for the seizure ends when these tasks are, 

or reasonably should have been, completed.22

¶25 Because traffic stops are "especially fraught with 

danger to police officers,"23 the Supreme Court has explained 

that "an officer may need to take certain negligibly burdensome 

precautions in order to complete his mission safely."24 Indeed, 

 

19 Rodriguez, 135 S. Ct. at 1614 (citations omitted) 

(emphasis added). 

20 "Typically such inquiries involve checking the driver's 

license, determining whether there are outstanding warrants 

against the driver, and inspecting the automobile's registration 

and proof of insurance." Rodriguez, 135 S. Ct. at 1615 (quoting 

Caballes, 543 U.S. at 408). 

21 Rodriguez, 135 S. Ct. at 1614-15; Caballes, 543 U.S. at 

408; Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 658-60 (1979); see also 4 

Wayne R. LaFave, Search & Seizure § 9.3(c) (5th ed. 2012). 

22 Rodriguez, 135 S. Ct. at 1614. 

23 Johnson, 555 U.S. at 330 (quoting Michigan v. Long, 463 

U.S. 1032 (1983)). 

24 Rodriguez, 135 S. Ct. at 1616. 
No. 2017AP2006-CR 

10 

the Supreme Court has stated that the Fourth Amendment 

categorically authorizes the police to order the driver25 and all 

passengers26 out of the vehicle for the duration of the traffic 

stop in order to ensure the safety of the officer. 

¶26 The police may take these precautions because "the 

government's officer safety interest stems from the mission of 

the stop itself."27 As this court has explained, questions 

related to officer safety are part of the traffic stop's 

mission, and therefore, those questions do not cause an 

extension of the stop.28

¶27 Moreover, the Supreme Court has "concluded that the 

Fourth Amendment tolerate[s] certain unrelated investigations 

that [do] not lengthen the roadside detention."29 That is, the 

seizure remains lawful despite these unrelated inquiries "so 

 

25 Pennsylvania v. Mimms, 434 U.S. 106, 111 (1977). 

26 Maryland v. Wilson, 519 U.S. 408, 411 (1997). 

27 Rodriguez, 135 S. Ct. at 1616. 

28 Floyd, 377 Wis. 2d 394, ¶28 ("[B]ecause the questions 

related to officer safety and were negligibly burdensome, they 

were part of the traffic stop's mission, and so did not cause an 

extension."). 

29 Rodriguez, 135 S. Ct. at 1614; see also Johnson, 555 U.S. 

at 327-28; Caballes, 543 U.S. at 407-08. 
No. 2017AP2006-CR 

11 

long as those inquiries do not measurably extend the duration of 

the stop."30

¶28 With these principles in mind, we now examine whether 

the questions posed by Officer Sardina fall under the "mission" 

of the stop, and if they do not, whether they "measurably 

extend[ed] the duration of the stop."31 If they constitute part 

of the mission of the stop, they will not be considered an 

extension of that stop. If, however, they are unrelated to the 

mission of the stop, they will violate the Fourth Amendment if 

they measurably extended the duration of the stop. 

IV 

A 

¶29 We first address Officer Sardina's question regarding 

the presence of weapons in Wright's vehicle. We conclude that 

this question constitutes part of the stop's mission because the 

question is a negligibly burdensome precaution taken to ensure 

officer safety. 

¶30 In Pennsylvania v. Mimms, 434 U.S. 106, 111 (1977), 

the Supreme Court created a rare bright-line, categorical rule 

under the Fourth Amendment: In the interest of officer safety, 

 

30 Johnson, 555 U.S. at 333; see also Rodriguez, 135 S. Ct. 

at 1615 ("An officer, in other words, may conduct certain 

unrelated checks during an otherwise lawful traffic stop."); 

Caballes, 543 U.S. at 407 (cautioning that a traffic stop "can 

become unlawful if it is prolonged beyond the time reasonably 

required to complete th[e] mission" of the stop). 

31 Johnson, 555 U.S. at 333. 
No. 2017AP2006-CR 

12 

a police officer may order a driver out of his or her vehicle 

for the duration of the traffic stop. This rule was 

subsequently expanded in Maryland v. Wilson, 519 U.S. 408, 411 

(1997), to include all passengers in the vehicle. 

¶31 Asking a lawfully stopped motorist about the presence 

of weapons is significantly less burdensome than ordering all 

occupants out of the vehicle for the duration of the stop. If a 

police officer may, in the interest of officer safety, order all 

occupants out of the vehicle for the duration of the stop 

without violating the Fourth Amendment, the officer may take a 

less burdensome precaution to ensure officer safety. 

¶32 The State correctly points out that this court's 

recent decision in State v. Floyd, 2017 WI 78, ¶28, 377 

Wis. 2d 394, 898 N.W.2d 560, supports the conclusion that a 

police officer may ask about the presence of weapons during a 

traffic stop without violating the Fourth Amendment. 

¶33 In Floyd, "Deputy Ruffalo asked Mr. Floyd if he had 

any weapons or anything that could harm him. When Mr. Floyd 

said he didn't, Deputy Ruffalo asked if he could perform a 

search for his safety."32 The Floyd court explained that "[b]oth 

questions specifically related to the officer's safety."33 The 

Floyd court concluded that "because the questions related to 

officer safety and were negligibly burdensome, they were part of 

 

32 Floyd, 377 Wis. 2d 394, ¶28. 

33 Id. 
No. 2017AP2006-CR 

13 

the traffic stop's mission, and so did not cause an extension" 

of the stop.34 

¶34 Floyd controls. Officer Sardina's question to Wright 

regarding whether Wright was carrying any weapons directly 

related to officer safety and was negligibly burdensome. As 

such, it was part of the traffic stop's mission. It did not 

cause an extension of the stop. 

B 

¶35 We now turn to Officer Sardina's question about the 

CCW permit and the CCW permit check. 

¶36 Neither the question regarding the CCW permit nor the 

CCW permit check addresses the traffic violation that warranted 

the stop.35 Further, the parties agree, as do we, that the CCW 

permit question and the CCW permit check are not part of the 

"ordinary inquiries incident to [the traffic] stop."36

¶37 Instead, the parties focus on whether the CCW permit 

question and the CCW permit check further the interest of 

 

34 Id. 

35 Rodriguez, 135 S. Ct. 1614 (traffic stop's "mission" 

includes "address[ing] the traffic violation that warranted the 

stop"). 

36 Caballes, 543 U.S. at 408; see also Rodriguez, 135 S. Ct. 

at 1615 ("Typically such inquiries involve checking the driver's 

license, determining whether there are outstanding warrants 

against the driver, and inspecting the automobile's registration 

and proof of insurance. These checks serve the same objectives 

as enforcement of the traffic code: ensuring that vehicles on 

the road are operated safely and responsibly."). 
No. 2017AP2006-CR 

14 

officer safety.37 On this issue, we agree with Wright. Knowing 

whether or not an individual has a valid CCW permit does not 

make the officer any safer than the officer otherwise would have 

been in the absence of that knowledge. It is the potential 

presence of a weapon that implicates the safety of the officer, 

not whether that weapon is being lawfully carried under Wis. 

Stat. § 941.23. In the absence of reasonable suspicion of 

criminal activity, asking whether a motorist holds a CCW permit 

and conducting a CCW permit check constitute an unrelated 

investigation into whether the motorist is unlawfully carrying a 

concealed weapon. 

¶38 Our conclusion that the CCW permit question and CCW 

permit check are unrelated to the mission of the stop does not, 

however, mean that the question and the permit check violated 

the Fourth Amendment. "[T]he Fourth Amendment tolerate[s] 

certain unrelated investigations that [do] not lengthen the 

roadside detention."38 Inquiries unrelated to the original 

justification for the stop are permissible under the Fourth 

Amendment "so long as those inquiries do not measurably extend 

the duration of the stop."39

¶39 To illustrate this principle, it is helpful to compare 

the facts of Illinois v. Caballes and Rodriguez v. United 

 

37 Rodriguez, 543 U.S. at 1614 (traffic stop's "mission" 

includes "safety concerns" related to the stop). 

38 Id. 

39 Johnson, 555 U.S. at 333. 
No. 2017AP2006-CR 

15 

States. Both of these cases involved a K-9 dog sniff unrelated 

to the mission of the traffic stop, but the cases reached 

different results as to the constitutionality of the dog sniff. 

¶40 In Caballes, the Supreme Court concluded that the dog 

sniff did not violate the Fourth Amendment. The Supreme Court 

acknowledged that "[a] seizure that is justified solely by the 

interest in issuing a warning ticket to the driver can become 

unlawful if it is prolonged beyond the time reasonably required 

to complete that mission."40 However, the dog sniff at issue in 

Caballes did not prolong the stop beyond the time reasonably 

required to complete the mission of the stop. Rather, the dog 

sniff occurred while the traffic stop's mission was still being 

completed. That is, while one officer was in the process of 

writing Caballes a warning ticket, a different officer arrived 

at the scene and walked his K-9 around Caballes's car. There 

was no extension of the stop beyond the time reasonably 

necessary to complete the mission of the stop. The Caballes 

Court explained: 

In the state-court proceedings, however, the judges 

carefully reviewed the details of Officer Gillette's 

conversations with respondent and the precise timing 

of his radio transmissions to the dispatcher to 

determine whether he had improperly extended the 

duration of the stop to enable the dog sniff to occur. 

We have not recounted those details because we accept 

the state court's conclusion that the duration of the 

stop in this case was entirely justified by the 

 

40 Caballes, 543 U.S. at 407. 
No. 2017AP2006-CR 

16 

traffic offense and the ordinary inquiries incident to 

such a stop.41

¶41 In Rodriguez, however, the Supreme Court concluded 

that the dog sniff did violate the Fourth Amendment. The 

Rodriguez Court reached this conclusion because, unlike the dog 

sniff at issue in Caballes, the dog sniff in Rodriguez prolonged 

the stop beyond the time reasonably required to complete the 

mission of the stop. 

¶42 The officer in Rodriguez admitted that by 12:27 a.m. 

or 12:28 a.m., he finished explaining the warning that he had 

issued to Rodriguez and returned both Rodriguez's and the 

passenger's documents.42 At this point, the "mission" of the 

traffic stop was complete. However, the officer continued to 

conduct an investigation into unrelated criminal activity. The 

officer asked Rodriguez for permission to walk his K-9 around 

Rodriguez's vehicle.43 When Rodriguez said no, the officer 

instructed Rodriguez to turn off the ignition and wait for a 

second officer to arrive.44 At around 12:33 a.m., the second 

officer arrived, the two officers led the K-9 around Rodriguez's 

vehicle, the dog alerted to the presence of drugs, and the 

 

41 Id. at 408. 

42 Rodriguez, 135 S. Ct. at 1613. 

43 Id. 

44 Id. 
No. 2017AP2006-CR 

17 

officer discovered a large bag of methamphetamine in Rodriguez's 

car.45

¶43 The key fact driving the different conclusions in 

Caballes and Rodriguez is that in Caballes, the dog sniff added 

no time at all to the traffic stop because it was conducted 

simultaneously with mission-related activities. In Rodriguez, 

all mission-related activities had been completed, and thus, the 

dog sniff unlawfully extended the duration of the stop. 

¶44 Accordingly, although we have concluded that the CCW 

permit question and the CCW permit check were unrelated to the 

mission of the traffic stop, they are nonetheless permissible 

under the Fourth Amendment "so long as those inquiries do not 

measurably extend the duration of the stop."46

¶45 In the instant case, there is no evidence that the CCW 

permit question or the CCW permit check measurably extended the 

duration of the traffic stop. Although the circuit court record 

is not richly detailed, the record is sufficient to conclude 

that the CCW permit question and the CCW permit check in the 

instant case were conducted while mission-related activities 

were occurring. 

¶46 Although Officer Sardina admitted that he could not 

recall the order in which he asked his questions when he first 

approached Wright's vehicle, he testified that all of the 

 

45 Id. 

46 Johnson, 555 U.S. at 333. 
No. 2017AP2006-CR 

18 

questions "come pretty fast" after he makes initial contact with 

a motorist. That is, within a few moments of approaching the 

vehicle, Officer Sardina asked for Wright's driver's license, 

asked whether Wright was carrying any weapons, and asked whether 

Wright had a CCW permit. 

¶47 We conclude that Officer Sardina's question about 

whether Wright held a CCW permit did not "measurably extend the 

duration of the stop."47 Obviously, Officer Sardina's CCW permit 

question took some amount of time to ask. However, we view the 

time it took Officer Sardina to ask the CCW question as de 

minimis and virtually incapable of measurement. Thus, the CCW 

question did not violate the Fourth Amendment in the instant 

case. 

¶48 As for the CCW permit check, Officer Sardina testified 

that he took Wright's license and returned to his squad car in 

order to "run [Wright's] information." Officer Sardina 

testified that, in addition to "run[ning] [Wright's] 

information[,]" he also ran a CCW permit check. 

¶49 We conclude that the CCW permit check in the instant 

case did not violate the Fourth Amendment because it was 

conducted concurrently with mission-related activities, namely, 

running Wright's information. Like the dog sniff in Caballes, 

it cannot be said that the CCW permit check measurably extended 

the duration of the stop in violation of the Fourth Amendment. 

 

47 Id. 
No. 2017AP2006-CR 

19 

¶50 Because neither the CCW permit question nor the CCW 

permit check measurably extended the duration of the traffic 

stop in the instant case, Wright's Fourth Amendment rights were 

not violated. 

¶51 Accordingly, we reverse the decision of the court of 

appeals, vacate the circuit court's order granting Wright's 

motion to suppress, and remand the cause to the circuit court 

for further proceedings. 

By the Court.—The decision of the court of appeals is 

reversed and the cause is remanded to the circuit court. 
No. 2017AP2006-CR 

1