United States Court of Appeals

For the Eighth Circuit

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No. 21-3237

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United States of America

lllllllllllllllllllllPlaintiff - Appellee

v.

Keith Larry

lllllllllllllllllllllDefendant - Appellant

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Appeal from United States District Court 

for the Eastern District of Missouri - St. Louis

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 Submitted: September 19, 2022

Filed: October 17, 2022 

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Before COLLOTON, WOLLMAN, and STRAS, Circuit Judges. 

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WOLLMAN, Circuit Judge.

Keith Larry knowingly exhibited a knife in an angry or threatening manner in

the presence of his wife in 2012. He was thereafter convicted of unlawful use of a

weapon – exhibiting, in violation of Mo. Rev. Stat. § 571.030.1(4). 
Larry pleaded guilty in 2021 to unlawful possession of a firearm as a

previously convicted felon, in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 922(g)(1) and 924(a)(2). 

Applying circuit precedent, the district court1 determined that Larry’s Missouri

offense constituted a “crime of violence” under the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines, see

United States v. Pulliam, 566 F.3d 784 (8th Cir. 2009), and therefore increased his

base offense level. Larry appeals, arguing that Pulliam is no longer good law in light

of Borden v. United States, 141 S. Ct. 1817 (2021), and that the district court thus

committed procedural error in determining his Guidelines sentencing range. We

affirm. 

The Guidelines set a base offense level of 20 for a felon-in-possession if the

defendant “committed any part of the instant offense subsequent to sustaining one

felony conviction of either a crime of violence or a controlled substance offense.” 

U.S.S.G. § 2K2.1(a)(4)(A). The base offense level is lower if the defendant has no

qualifying convictions. The Guidelines define “crime of violence” to include an

offense that “has as an element the use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical

force against the person of another.” U.S.S.G. § 4B1.2(a)(1). This definition is

known as the “force clause.” We held in Pulliam that Mo. Rev. Stat. § 571.030.1(4)

qualified as a “violent felony” under the Armed Career Criminal Act’s (ACCA) force

clause. 566 F.3d at 788; see also Brown v. Krueger, 25 F.4th 526, 530–31 (7th Cir.

2022) (concluding that because the Missouri Supreme Court has equated the

exhibiting weapons offense to assault, the offense may categorically involve

threatened use of force against others) (citing State v. Parkhurst, 845 S.W.2d 31, 36

(Mo. 1992)). We later upheld a determination that, under Pulliam, Mo. Rev. Stat.

1The Honorable Matthew T. Schelp, United States District Judge for the

Eastern District of Missouri.

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§ 571.030.1(4) qualified as a “crime of violence” under the Guidelines’s force

clause.2 United States v. Hudson, 851 F.3d 807, 810 (8th Cir. 2017).

Borden held that the ACCA’s force clause “categorically excludes crimes that

can be committed recklessly.” United States v. Matthews, 25 F.4th 601, 603 (8th Cir.

2022) (quoting United States v. Hoxworth, 11 F.4th 693, 695 (8th Cir. 2021)). 

Missouri Revised Statutes § 571.030.1(4) plainly requires that the crime be

committed with knowledge:

1. A person commits the offense of unlawful use of weapons . . . if

he or she knowingly:

. . . 

(4) Exhibits, in the presence of one or more persons, any weapon

readily capable of lethal use in an angry or threatening manner; 

. . . .

Borden’s holding thus does not affect our circuit precedent in Pulliam. See United

States v. Frazier, No. 21-2187, 2022 WL 4114057, at *2 (8th Cir. Sept. 9, 2022) (“The

upshot of Borden is that a crime committed with a mens rea of recklessness does not

involve ‘the use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical force against the person

of another.’”); United States v. Lopez-Castillo, 24 F.4th 1216, 1219 n.2 (8th Cir. 2022)

(“After Borden v. United States, a crime of violence . . . requires a mens rea greater

than recklessness—e.g., knowledge or intent.”).

Larry argues that Borden requires that the offender’s force be targeted at another

person. He relies on the four-Justice plurality’s conclusion that “[t]he phrase ‘against

another,’ when modifying the ‘use of force,’ demands that the perpetrator direct his

2Because their language is identical, “we view the force clauses in the ACCA

and guidelines interchangeably.” Boaz v. United States, 884 F.3d 808, 810 n.3 (8th

Cir. 2018). 

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action at, or target, another individual.” Borden, 141 S. Ct. at 1825. “So it excludes

conduct, like recklessness, that is not directed or targeted at another.” Id. at 1833. 

Justice Thomas’s concurring opinion, however, did not rely on the phrase “against the

person of another” to reach the conclusion that mere recklessness does not satisfy the

force clause. Id at 1835. He instead rested his analysis on “use of physical force,”

reiterating that the phrase “has a well-understood meaning applying only to intentional

acts designed to cause harm.” Id. (quoting Voisine v. United States, 579 U.S. 686, 713

(2016) (Thomas, J., dissenting)). When the plurality and concurring opinions are read

together, then, Borden holds only that the force clause categorically excludes offenses

that can be committed recklessly. Pulliam thus remains binding precedent.

The judgment is affirmed. 

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