IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE

HANNA LAYTON and LINDA COSTAS, 1 Respondents Below, Appellants,

v. JACKSON P. LAYTON, Petitioner Below, Appellee. § § Nos. 87, 2018; 100, 2018; § and 125, 2018 § Consolidated § § Court Below—Family Court § of the State of Delaware § § C.A. No. CN15-04403 § Petition Nos. 17-22998 and § 17-24587 § Submitted: August 17, 2018 Decided: October 23, 2018

Before VAUGHN , SEITZ , and TRAYNOR , Justices.

ORDER Upon consideration of the parties’ briefs and the record on appeal, it appears to the Court that: (1) The appellants, Hanna Layton (“Mother”) and Linda Costas (“Grandmother”), filed these consolid ated appeals from three Family Court orders. The underlying case involves Jack son Layton (“Father”) and Mother’s two daughters (“the Children” ) and Father’s efforts to visit and reunify with

the Children. At the time these appeals were filed, the Children were under

1 The Court previously assigned pseudonyms to the parties under Supreme Court Rule 7(d).2 the guardianship of Grandmother. 2 In the orders on appeal, the Family Court

found Mother and Grandmother in cont empt of its prior orders regarding

Father’s visitation and reunification ther apy with the Children. The Family Court also ordered Mother to pay a ttorneys’ fees to Father’s counsel 3 and ordered Grandmother to pay $2000 to secure the services of a new reunification therapist. After careful co nsideration, we find no merit to these consolidated appeals. Accordingly, we affirm the Family Court’s judgments. (2) The Children were born on Apr il 28, 2004 and March 25, 2007. The family’s history is long and compli cated. It appears that Mother and Father became estranged from one anot her in 2011, and Mother was awarded sole custody of the Children in November 2013. In August 2015, Grandmother, through counsel, file d a petition for guardianship of the

Children. Mother’s whereabouts were unknown at the time. Although she failed to file an answer to the guard ianship petition, she later appeared in person to support the petition. Fath er, through counsel, objected to the

2 Although the Family Court initially stayed its consideration of Father ’s petition to rescind Grandmother’s guardianship pending reunificati on therapy, the Family Court later lifted the stay and granted Father’s pe tition for rescission after these appeals were filed. Mother and Grandmother filed several different appeal s from the rescission proceedings, which are pending before the Court. 3 Father’s counsel is representing Father on a pro bono basis by assignment from a group providing services to mi litary veterans. In turn, Father’s counsel was directed to forward Mother’s installment payments of $200 per mont h to the Veteran’s Clinic associated with the Delaware Law School.3 petition. In March 2016, the parties re ached an agreement for a temporary guardianship order pending a hearing in July 2016. The temporary order included the parties’ stipulation that Fa ther and the Children would engage in reunification therapy with Dr. Samuel Romirowsky in consultation with the Children’s therapist, Jennifer Cutrona. (3) After a two-day trial, the Family Court granted Grandmother’s petition for guardianship on August 10, 2016 (“the Guardianship Order”). 4 As part of the Guardianship Order, th e Family Court cautioned Mother and Grandmother to cooperate with the prev iously agreed-to reunification therapy

between Father and the Children. The Fa mily Court stated that it would “not

tolerate interference with Father’s attempts to impr ove” his relationship with

the Children. 5 The Family Court further warned Mother and Grandmother that, while it did not want to uproot the Children and remove them from Grandmother’s home at present, “the Court will seriously consider moving the children to Ohio [where Father lives ] on a permanent basis if the maternal family acts as an impedime nt to Father’s efforts.” 6 The Guardianship Order

awarded Father visitation with the Child ren “as determined appropriate by Dr. Romirowsky,” and stated that, if Dr. Romirowsky believed that the maternal

4 Costas v. Layton , File No. CN15-04403, Pet. No. 15-24413 (Del. Fam. Ct. Aug. 10, 2016). 5 Id . at 22. 6 Id

.4 family was interfering with Father’s vi sitation, then the Court would consider imposing sanctions that might include granting “additional visitation to Father, fines, incarceration, or a change in custody....” 7 (4) In December 2016, Father file d a petition for a rule to show cause, alleging that Grandmother and Mother were in contempt of the Guardianship Order by thwarting the progress of his reunification with the Children. After two days of hearings, the Family Court issued an order dated June 5, 2017, finding bot h Mother and Grandmother in contempt (“the First Contempt Order”). 8 The Family Court warned them against “continuing to display a negative and hateful attitude towa rds Father to the girls” and stated that the Court would “tolerate no contempt of this Order.” 9 The Court ordered that “Dr. Romirowsky shall schedule reunification therapy/visits between Father and the girls at his discretion a nd shall solely be responsible for setting the frequency, date, time a nd length of the contact.” 10 (5) Thereafter, Mother and Grandmother filed a petition for a rule to show cause in July 2017, alleging that Father was in contempt of the First Contempt Order and reque sting, among other things, that the reunification

7 Id . at 23-24. 8 Layton v. Costas , File No. CN11-03412, Pet. No. 16- 38190 (Del. Fam. Ct. June 5, 2017). 9 Id. at 13. 10 Id.5 therapy with Dr. Romirowsky be discontinue d. Father, in turn, filed a petition for a rule to show cause, alleging th at Mother and Grandmother were in contempt of the First Contempt Order. Among other things, Father asked the Family Court to rescind Grandmother’s guardianship as a sanction for her ongoing contempt and interference with Fa ther’s attempts to reunify with the

Children. (6) The Family Court held three days of hearings in January and February 2018 on the parties’ cross-petit ions. Dr. Romirowsky testified that,

before Mother and Grandmother cut off his contact with the Children, he had had more than twenty sessions with the Children and Father. When they started therapy, the Children indicated th ey had no memories of Father, either good or bad, but they were interested in developing their relationship with him. Dr. Romirowsky testified that , on multiple occasions, the therapy sessions would be interrupted by member s of the maternal family. On one occasion, when Father was participa ting in the session via Skype, Mother

walked into the session unannounced a nd ended it prematurely, stating that

the Children needed to have their dinne r. Dr. Romirowsky finally told the maternal family members that they were not allowed in his office but had to wait outside during his sessions with the Children and Father.6 (7) Dr. Romirowsky testified that , while sometimes the sessions started with the Children protesting, the sessions quickly dissipated into warm, playful and affectionate interac tion between Father and the Children. Based on his experience with the partie s and in light of the Family Court’s order giving him the discretion to do so, Dr. Romirowsky testified that he approved Father taking the Children for visits in the community on two dates in July 2017. Those visits were to be followed by debriefi ng with the parties in his office, and if Dr. Romirowsky de termined those visits had gone well, then Father would be perm itted to have two overnight visits with the Children in August 2017. Dr. Romirowsky testif ied that Grandmother refused to cooperate with his approved visitati on plans, telling him that the Children would not attend any of those visits. (8) In September 2017, Grandmother and Mother appeared at Dr. Romirowsky’s office without an appoint ment while he was in session with another patient, demanding that he tu rn over the Children’s files. Dr. Romirowsky explained that he could not release the files unless a proper release was signed by both Grandmother and Father. One of the women then called the police on her cell phone and be gan yelling into the phone that the doctor was a liar. Dr. Romirowsky testif ied that one of his patients in the waiting room was so disturbed by the ruc kus that he left the office. Dr.7 Romirowsky also testified that he rece ived a letter from Mother in November 2017 stating that he was not permitted to have any fu rther contact with the

Children. (9) Dr. Romirowsky expressed the opinion that Mother and

Grandmother had created a toxic envir onment for the Children’s reunification efforts and had placed enormous pres sure on the Children not to have a relationship with Father. He believed that the mate rnal family was planting false memories in the Children and, in short, that the Children were being “brainwashed.” Dr. Romirowksy tes tified that, because Grandmother was blocking the reunification process, he would not continue undertaking reunification therapy while the Child ren remained under Grandmother’s guardianship. (10) In addition to Dr. Romirows ky, the Family Court also heard testimony from Father, Mother, Grandmothe r, Father’s stepfather, Mother’s father, the Children’s therapist, and Dr . Romirowsky’s office assistant. The Family Court also spoke briefly with the Children and listened to numerous recorded Skype conversations between Father and the Children, which had

been made without Fathe r’s knowledge and were o ffered into evidence by

Mother and Grandmother.8 (11) On February 8, 2018, the Fami ly Court issued a twenty-six page opinion, setting forth all of the testim ony and evidence presented during the three-day hearing (“the Second Contempt Order”). 11 The Court concluded that the First Contempt Order gave Dr. Romirowsky sole discretion for scheduling therapy and visits between Father and the Children. Dr. Romirowsky had determined that it was a ppropriate for Father to go straight to community visits with the girls ra ther than engaging in further therapy sessions in Dr. Romirowsky’s office. Thus , Father was not in contempt of the First Contempt Order for failing to en gage in further c ounseling with the Children before attempting to schedule community visits. The Family Court denied Mother and Grandmother’s pe tition for a rule to show cause. (12) As to Father’s petition for a rule to show cause against Mother and Grandmother, the Family Court c oncluded that several of Father’s allegations were not supported by clear and convincing evidence. Nonetheless, as to Mother, the Fam ily Court found that her letter to Dr. Romirowsky, stating that the doctor did not have her permission to engage in further therapy sessions with the Children, was a clear violation of the First Contempt Order, which provided that Mother and Grandmother were to

11 Costas v. Layton , File No. CN15-04403, Pet. Nos. 17-22998, et al. (Del. Fam. Ct. Feb. 8, 2018).9 follow the schedule set by Dr. Romirowsky and to follow his

recommendations for treatment. The Family Court ordered Mother to

reimburse Father’s counsel’s fees and costs incurred in filing and prosecuting his contempt petition. (13) As to Grandmother, the Fami ly Court concluded that there was clear and convincing evidence that she ha d violated the First Contempt Order in multiple ways, including refusing to follow Dr. Romirowsky’s schedule for visitation by declaring that further vi sits “were not going to happen,” by disrupting what was left of Dr. Romi rowsky’s therapeutic relationship with the Children when she appeared unann ounced in his office and demanded the Children’s files in a belligerent and harassing manner, and by making or permitting other family members to make disparaging remarks about Father within the Children’s hearing. (14) The Family Court further found that Grandmother had failed in her statutory responsibilities as guardian of the Children to provide for their emotional well-being and to comply with all Court orders because she failed to support the Children’s reunification efforts and she allowed Mother daily access to the Children and participat ed with Mother in the continued poisoning of the Children against Father. Despite this conclusion, the Family Court stayed further considerati on of Father’s petition to rescind10 Grandmother’s guardianship, pending furt her reunification efforts with a new therapist. To retain a new therapis t, Grandmother was ordered to pay $10,000 to Father’s counsel, who would hold th e money in escrow until further order of the Court. The Family Court stated that it would schedule a review hearing for each Monday following every appoint ment with the new therapist. (15) On February 20, 2018, the Fa mily Court entered its final order on attorney’s fees, requiring Mother to pay Father’s attorney $8900 in fees and costs, payable at a rate of $200 per month until paid in full (“the Attorney’s Fees Order”). Thereafter, on February 23 , 2018, the Family Court, following a review hearing with the pa rties on the progress of the reunification therapy, issued a modification to the Second Contempt Order, reducing Grandmother’s obligation fr om $10,000 to $2,000 to pay for the reunification therapy (“the Revised Contempt Or der”). The Family Court gave Grandmother until March 14, 2018 to make the payment and noted that the first therapy appointment was to be scheduled for March 16, 2018.

Grandmother never made th e payment, and reunifica tion therapy with a new therapist never occurred. (16) Mother and Grandmother file d these appeals, challenging the Second Contempt Order, the Attorney’s Fees Or der, and the Revised Contempt Order. Althou gh they raise six issues, only four were properly11 raised in this appeal. 12 First, they contend that the Family Court abused its discretion by completely disregarding the testimony of Jennifer Cutrona, the Children’s therapist, in favor of Dr. Romirowsky’s testimony. Second, they contend that the Family Court erred in finding them in contempt because the First Contempt Order required three a dditional therapy sessions before Dr. Romirowsky could approve community visits between Father and the Children. Third, they contend that the Family Court’s conclusion that the three therapy session anticipated by the First Contempt Order were not mandatory reflects judicial bias. And fourth, they contend that the Family Court did not conduct a proper interview of the Children. (17) In his answering brief, Father raises several points. First, he contends that the appeals should be di smissed for Mother and Grandmother’s ongoing contempt of the Guardianship Or der, the First Contempt Order, the Second Contempt Order, and the Revise d Contempt Order. Second, Father

12 There are six claims raised in the body of th e Argument section of the appellants’ opening brief on appeal. These six arguments do not co rrespond to the six argum ents contained in the opening brief’s Summary of Argument section. See Murphy v. State , 632 A.2d 1150, 1152 (Del. 1993) (noting that, under Supreme C ourt Rule 14(b)(vi)(A)(3), any argument that is not raised in the body of the argum ent section of the opening brief will not be considered by the Court on appeal). The follo wing arguments were not properly raised in this appeal - the Family Court abused its di scretion in accepting Fathe r’s completion of an out-of-state domestic violence course as an ad equate substitute for a Domestic Violence Coordinating Council course, which was previ ously addressed but was not part of the Second Contempt Order, and the Family Court erred in discharging the guardian ad litem who was appointed to represent the Children during the guardianship proceedings in 2016, which was not raised in and was irrelevant to the Second Contem pt Order. Supr. Ct. R. 8.12 contends that any issue about Gran dmother’s payment for reunification therapy is moot because, after these appeals were filed, the Family Court

rescinded Grandmother’s guardianship of the Child ren and awarded Father custody. Finally, Father asserts that, if this Court reaches the merits of the appeals, the judgments of the Family Court should be affirmed because: (i) the Family Court did not err in denying the petition for contempt against Father; (ii) the Family Court did not err in finding both Mother and Grandmother in contempt of the First Contempt Order; and (iii) the Family Court did not err in ordering Mother to pay $8900 in legal fees as a sanction for her contempt. (18) Our review of a Family Court order extends to the facts and the

law as well as to the inferences and deductions made by the trial judge. 13 If

the Family Court has correctly applied the law, our standard of review is

abuse of discretion. 14 Although we have a duty to review the sufficiency of

the evidence and to the test the propriety of the trial court’s factual findings, we will not overturn those findings unless they are unsupported by the record or are clearly wrong. 15 When the determination of facts turns on a question of the credibility and the acceptance or rejection of the test imony of witnesses

13 Wife (J.F.V.) v. Husband (O.W.V., Jr.) , 402 A.2d 1202, 1204 (Del. 1979). 14 Jones v. Lang , 591 A.2d 185, 186 (Del. 1991). 15 Wife (J.F.V.) , 402 A.2d at 1204.13 appearing before the trial court, we w ill not substitute our opinion for that of

the trier of fact. 16 (19) Father argues that we should dismiss these consolidated appeals without reaching the merits because of Mother’s and Grandmother’s ongoing contempt of the Family Court’s orders . Father relies upon this Court’s ruling

in Schmidt v. Schmidt , 17 where we held that a party who displays defiance of a trial court’s order by refusing to co mply with the order should not be permitted to appeal the substance of that ruling while persisting in his

defiance. 18 In Schmidt , the appellant sought review of a property division order without also seeking review of the Family Court’s order finding him in contempt of the property division or der. Under those circumstances, we concluded that the appellant could not use the judicial process to appeal the merits of the underlying property division order. We further noted, however, that our dismissal of the appeal was not to be construed as a ruling that one held in contempt could not seek review of the contempt determination itself. 19 (20) The circumstances in this case are distinguishable from Schmidt

. In the present case, the parties are onl y appealing the Family Court’s orders

16 Id

. 17 610 A.2d 1374 (Del. 1992). 18 Id. at 1377. 19 Id.14 finding them in contempt of the c ourt-ordered reunification therapy and awarding attorney’s fees and imposin g sanctions. The validity of the reunification therapy, which was part of a consent order en tered in 2016, was never appealed and is not at issue here. The parties have a right to seek review of the Family Court’s orders rela ted to the contempt proceedings. (21) Thus, we have considered the substance of Mother’s and Grandmother’s fairly-raised issues on appeal, but we find no merit to their arguments. The record reflects, contrary to their assertions, that the Family Court carefully considered all of th e witnesses’ testimony presented during the three-day hearing on the parties’ cross-petitions resulting in the Second Contempt Order. The Family Court’s findings that Mother and Grandmother were each in contempt of its prior orde rs regarding the reunification therapy, but that Father was not, are supported by clear and convincing evidence in the record and are not clearly wrong. (22) The First Contempt Order gave Dr. Romirowsky the sole

discretion to direct the reunificati on process and warned Mother and Grandmother about the potential conseque nces of their continued interference and contempt of the court-ordered re unification. Dr. Romirowsky’s testimony at the hearing reflected that Mother wrote to him, saying that he was not permitted to have further contact with the Children. Dr. Romirowsky also15 testified that Grandmother, among othe r things, refused to make the Children

available for visits with Father that were approved by Dr. Romirowsky. (23) Under these circumstances, we find no error in the Family Court’s findings of contempt. Contra ry to the appellants’ argument, the Family Court did not abuse its discretion in finding Dr. Romirowsky’s testimony to be credible and in giving that testimony more weight than the testimony of the witnesses presented by Mother and Grandmother. Such credibility determinations are entir ely within the judge’s discretion. 20 We also find no merit to the appellants’ concluso ry argument that the weight afforded Dr. Romirowsky’s testimony is evidence of judicial bias or their contention that the judge conducted an “improper” interview of the Children. Instead, we find that the record supports the Family Court’s conclusion that Dr. Romirowsky testified credibly about Mo ther’s and Grandmother’s continuing

interference with Father’s reunificati on efforts. The Family Court also properly interviewed the Children. We also find no error in the Family Court’s rejection for lack of cred ibility Mother’s and Grandmother’s purported justifications for their contemptuous conduct. (24) Moreover, we find no abuse of the Family Court’s discretion in ordering Mother to pay Father’s attorn ey’s fees. The Family Court has broad

20 Wife (J.F.V.) , 402 A.2d at 1204.16 discretion in deciding whether to award attorney’s fees and costs. 21 The award in this case was to compensate Father’s counsel for the time and effort that counsel expended in prosecuting a se cond contempt petition. Because Father’s counsel is representing Father on a pro bono basis, the Family Court ordered that Mother would pay a reduced fee, to be forwarded by Father’s counsel to a veterans’ legal clinic. There is nothing in the record to support Mother’s contention that the Family Co urt abused its discretion in awarding reasonable attorney’s fees, payable in $200 monthly installments until paid in full. The award was not arbitrary or unreasonable. 22 (25) We also find no abuse of th e Family Court’s discretion in sanctioning Grandmother fo r her contemptuous conduct. 23 The Family Court found that Grandmother’s ongoing de fiance and disruption of the courtordered reunification process led Dr. Romi rowsky to refuse to provide further reunification therapy. As a result of he r contempt, the Family Court required Grandmother to pay $10,000 (later reduc ed by the Revised Contempt Order to $2000) in order to retain the servic es of a new reunification therapist.

21 Thomas v. Thomas , 102 A.3d 1138,1150 (Del. 2014). 22 Id . at 1150-51. 23 Father argues that this issue was rende red moot by the Family Court’s subsequent rescission of Grandmother’s guardianshi p, which nullified the need for further reunification services. Because the rescissi on of Grandmother’s guardianship is still pending appeal in this Court, the Family C ourt’s contempt sanction against Grandmother arguably remains a “continuing justiciable controversy,” which we will address on the merits. See Family Court v. Alexander , 522 A.2d 1265, 1268 (Del. 1987).17 Under the circumstances, the compen satory sanction was justified and

reasonable. There is no basis in the record to overturn the Family Court’s finding that Grandmother could afford to pay $2000. NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS ORDERED that the judgments of the Family Court are AFFIRMED.

BY THE COURT: /s/ Collins J. Seitz, Jr. Justice