COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA 

Present: Judges Elder, Bray and Fitzpatrick 

Argued at Richmond, Virginia 

MARK ANDREW LANKFORD, S/K/A 

 ANDREW MARK LANKFORD 

 MEMORANDUM OPINION* BY 

v. Record No. 0581-95-2 JUDGE RICHARD S. BRAY 

 MARCH 26, 1996 

COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA 

FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF HALIFAX COUNTY 

William L. Wellons, Judge 

 Andrea C. Long (Charles C. Cosby, Jr.; Boone, 

Beale, Carpenter & Cosby, on brief), for 

appellant. 

 Leah A. Darron, Assistant Attorney General 

(James S. Gilmore, III, Attorney General, on 

brief), for appellee. 

 Mark Andrew Lankford (defendant) was convicted by the trial 

court of driving under the influence of alcohol (DUI), third 

offense. On appeal, defendant complains that this conviction was 

barred by a related conviction for reckless driving. We agree 

and reverse the conviction. 

 The pertinent facts are uncontroverted. At approximately 

11:00 p.m. on the evening of March 19, 1994, Trooper D. J. Cline 

observed a Toyota being driven erratically at a "high rate of 

speed." Cline pursued the vehicle in his police cruiser and 

signaled the driver to "pull . . . over." When the Toyota only 

"slowed down," Cline "pulled up beside" the car, and the driver 

 

 *Pursuant to Code § 17-116.010 this opinion is not 

designated for publication. 
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then stopped along a dirt road. However, as Cline walked toward 

the vehicle, it "took off," and Cline quickly resumed the chase, 

during which the Toyota again stopped and sped away. Following a 

final pursuit at speeds in excess of eighty miles per hour, the 

Toyota was trapped by a "rolling roadblock," and the operator, 

defendant, was arrested for reckless driving, DUI, and other 

offenses. The entire incident spanned approximately twenty 

minutes. Defendant admitted that he attempted to escape because 

he was intoxicated1

 and an habitual offender. 

 At trial in the general district court, defendant pled 

guilty to reckless driving and not guilty to DUI, but was 

convicted of both offenses. On appeal of the DUI to the trial 

court, defendant unsuccessfully argued that Code § 19.2-294.1 

required dismissal of that charge following the reckless driving 

conviction. 

 Code § 19.2-294.1 provides that 

 [w]henever any person is charged with a violation of 

§ 18.2-266 or any similar ordinances of any county, 

city, or town and reckless driving growing out of the 

same act or acts and is convicted of one of these 

charges, the court shall dismiss the remaining charge. 

(Emphasis added). Thus, although DUI and reckless driving are 

"separate and distinct" violations, Padgett v. Commonwealth, 220 

Va. 758, 760, 263 S.E.2d 388, 389 (1980), a "conviction of one 

offense . . . preclude[s] conviction of the other, whenever both 

 

 1The sufficiency of evidence to sustain the DUI conviction 

is not in issue. 
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'gr[o]w' from the same 'continuous, uninterrupted course of 

operation of a motor vehicle.'" Harris v. City of Virginia 

Beach, 19 Va. App. 214, 216, 450 S.E.2d 401, 402 (1994) (quoting

Padgett, 220 Va. at 760-61, 263 S.E.2d at 389-90). "It is the 

commonality of the underlying offending conduct, the continuous, 

uninterrupted operation of a motor vehicle, that invokes the 

preclusive effect of the statute." Id. at 216-17, 450 S.E.2d at 

402. 

 Here, defendant was charged and convicted of both offenses 

resulting from the continuous operation of a motor vehicle, 

recklessly and while intoxicated, during an uninterrupted police 

pursuit. The charges were, therefore, "intimately related in 

time and distance, arising from and connected by one continuous, 

uninterrupted operation of defendant's motor vehicle," thereby 

constituting a single offense within the intendment of Code 

§ 19.2-294.1. Id. at 217, 450 S.E.2d at 402. 

 Accordingly, we reverse the DUI conviction. 

 Reversed and final judgment.