[Cite as State v. Hill, 2010-Ohio-4871.]

STATE OF OHIO, MONROE COUNTY 

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS 

SEVENTH DISTRICT 

STATE OF OHIO, ) 

 ) CASE NO. 09 MO 3 

 PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE, ) 

 ) 

 - VS - ) OPINION 

 ) 

RICHARD F. HILL, ) 

 ) 

 DEFENDANT-APPELLANT. ) 

CHARACTER OF PROCEEDINGS: Criminal Appeal from Common Pleas 

Court, Case No. 2008-164. 

JUDGMENT: Affirmed. 

APPEARANCES: 

For Plaintiff-Appellee: Attorney Kent L. Reithmiller 

Prosecutor Attorney 

Attorney Thomas Hampton 

Asst. Prosecutor 

P.O. Box 430 

101 North Main Street 

Woodsfield, OH 43793 

For Defendant-Appellant: Attorney Mark Morrison 

Public Defender 

117 North Main Street 

Woodsfield, OH 43793-1002 

JUDGES: 

Hon. Mary DeGenaro 

Hon. Joseph J. Vukovich 

Hon. Cheryl L. Waite 

Dated: September 29, 2010 
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DeGenaro, J. 

{¶1} This timely appeal comes for consideration upon the record in the trial court 

and the parties’ briefs. Defendant-appellant, Richard F. Hill appeals the April 24, 2009 

decision of the Monroe County Court of Common Pleas, imposing a sentence of three 

years of community control after accepting Hill's no contest plea to one count of 

attempted disruption of public services, in violation of R.C. 2909.04 and R.C. 2923.02. 

{¶2} Hill argues that the language of R.C. 2909.04(A)(3) addresses interference 

with public emergency systems themselves and does not address interference with the 

use of a private telephone or mobile telephone. Hill concludes that his act of throwing 

Leslie Pittman's mobile phone during a domestic dispute could not constitute a violation of 

R.C. 2909.04. 

{¶3} The record indicates that Hill seized Pittman's mobile phone as she was in 

the process of calling the police, and threw the phone into a neighbor's lawn where it was 

not able to be located until the following day. Pursuant to the Ohio Supreme Court's 

recent decision in State v. Robinson, 120 Ohio St.3d 76, 2009-Ohio-5937, 919 N.E.2d 

190, Hill's conduct constituted tampering with Pittman's property for purposes of R.C. 

2909.04(A), and Hill's conduct also constituted a substantial impairment of lawenforcement's ability to respond to Pittman's intended emergency call. As Hill's conduct 

constituted a disruption of public services as a matter of law, and thus also constituted an 

attempted disruption of public services, we affirm the judgment of the trial court. 

Facts and Procedural History 

{¶4} Hill was indicted on May 16, 2008 and charged with domestic violence, a 

fourth degree misdemeanor in violation of R.C. 2919.25(C), and disrupting public 

services, a fourth degree felony in violation of R.C. 2909.04. Hill entered a plea of not 

guilty. 

{¶5} The State moved for a temporary restraining order against Hill. In the 

affidavit in support of the motion, Pittman averred the following: "On or about the 4th of 

May, 2008, [Hill] did stab a knife in to a table in a manner threatening to his live-in 

girlfriend, Leslie Rene Pittman, and did take a cell phone from Leslie Rene Pittman's 
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hand when she was attempting to contact law enforcement." The trial court granted the 

TPO. 

{¶6} Hill moved for the State to provide discovery and a bill of particulars. In 

response, the police provided a copy of Hill's complete file, which the State stated would 

satisfy both of Hill's requests, and included pictures of the scene of the incident, police 

statements taken from everyone interviewed, Hill's Miranda waiver and statement, police 

reports summarizing the incident, a custody arrest statement indicating that Hill was 

charged with a violation of R.C. 2909.04(A)(3) and R.C. 2919.25(C), 2909.04(A)(3) Hill's 

computerized criminal history, and the daily phone log of the police on the date of the 

incident. 

{¶7} The police statements made by both Pittman and Hill confirm that there was 

a dispute between the parties at approximately 2:45 a.m., that Hill left for approximately 

30 minutes and returned, and that the dispute continued. Hill brandished a knife in some 

manner and stabbed it into a coffee table. Pittman attempted to use her cell phone, and 

Hill took her cell phone from her when she said she was calling the police. Hill attempted 

to block Pittman from leaving the house, but Pittman eventually escaped and went to a 

neighbor's house to call the police. Pittman's statement also alleges that she locked Hill 

out of the house when he left for 30 minutes, and that he broke through a screen window 

to regain access into their home. A neighbor found Pittman's mobile phone in his yard 

the next day. The neighbor's police statement indicated that he lived across the street 

from Hill and Pittman's residence, and that the mobile telephone did not appear to be 

broken. 

{¶8} Hill filed a motion to dismiss the indictment, arguing that throwing Pittman's 

mobile telephone during their dispute did not constitute a violation of R.C. 2909.04, 

pursuant to the Third District's decision in State v. Robinson, 177 Ohio App.3d 560, 2008-

Ohio-4160, 895 N.E.2d 262. The trial court denied Hill's motion, noting that various other 

districts have held that certain actions preventing a person from using a private telephone 

to contact emergency services may constitute a violation of either R.C. 2909.04(A)(1), or 

R.C. 2909.04(A)(3), thus Hill's actions fell within the conduct prohibited by R.C. 2909.04. 
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{¶9} Hill subsequently entered a plea agreement with the State. At the hearing, 

Hill pleaded no contest to an amended charge of a fifth degree felony violation of 

attempting to disrupt public services, the State dropped the charge of domestic violence, 

and recommended a sentence of three years of community control. The parties 

discussed a conflict among the Ohio courts of appeals regarding the application of R.C. 

2909.04, and noted that Hill pleaded no contest in order to be able to address this 

uncertainty in the law in an appeal. Subsequent to a pre-sentence investigation and 

sentencing hearing, the trial court imposed a sentence of three years of community 

control sanctions. 

Disruption of Public Services 

{¶10} In his sole assignment of error Hill asserts: 

{¶11} "Does the damaging of a single private telephone or cellular telephone 

disrupt 'public services' sufficiently to constitute a violation of R.C. 2909.04(A)(3)." 

{¶12} Hill argues that his act of throwing Pittman's mobile phone did not constitute 

a violation of R.C. 2909.04(A)(3). Because Hill pleaded no contest to the charge, he has 

admitted all alleged facts as true, and asks this court to determine whether those facts 

constituted a violation of R.C. 2909.04(A)(3) as a matter of law. Crim.R. 11(B)(2). 

{¶13} R.C. 2909.04, disrupting public services, states in pertinent part: 

{¶14} "(A) No person, purposely by any means or knowingly by damaging or 

tampering with any property, shall do any of the following: 

{¶15} "(1) Interrupt or impair television, radio, telephone, telegraph, or other mass 

communications service; police, fire, or other public service communications; radar, loran, 

radio, or other electronic aids to air or marine navigation or communications; or amateur 

or citizens band radio communications being used for public service or emergency 

communications; 

{¶16} "(2) Interrupt or impair public transportation, including without limitation 

school bus transportation, or water supply, gas, power, or other utility service to the 

public; 

{¶17} "(3) Substantially impair the ability of law enforcement officers, firefighters, 
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rescue personnel, emergency medical services personnel, or emergency facility 

personnel to respond to an emergency or to protect and preserve any person or property 

from serious physical harm. 

{¶18} "(B) No person shall knowingly use any computer, computer system, 

computer network, telecommunications device, or other electronic device or system or the 

internet so as to disrupt, interrupt, or impair the functions of any police, fire, educational, 

commercial, or governmental operations. 

{¶19} "(C) Whoever violates this section is guilty of disrupting public services, a 

felony of the fourth degree." 

{¶20} Although the indictment, plea and sentencing entry did not specify which 

division of R.C. 2909.04 was charged against Hill, his argument on appeal only addresses 

the application of R.C. 2909.04(A)(3). 

{¶21} Hill cites to Robinson, 177 Ohio App.3d 560, 2008-Ohio-4160, 895 N.E.2d 

262, but notes that the Ohio Supreme Court certified a conflict between the Third District's 

decision in Robinson and the holdings of similar cases in the Second, Fifth and Eighth 

Districts: State v. Thomas, 2d Dist. No. 19435, 2003-Ohio-5746; State v. Johnson, 8th 

Dist. Nos. 81692 and 81693, 2003-Ohio-3241; State v. Yoakum, 5th Dist. No. 01CA005, 

2002-Ohio-249; and State v. Brown (1994), 97 Ohio App.3d 293, 646 N.E.2d 838 (8th 

Dist.). State v. Robinson, 120 Ohio St.3d 1451, 2008-Ohio-6813, 898 N.E.2d 966 

(Table). 

{¶22} Subsequent to Hill briefing this issue, the Ohio Supreme Court reversed the 

Third District's decision in Robinson. State v. Robinson, 124 Ohio St.3d 76, 2009-Ohio5937, 919 N.E.2d 190, syllabus. The decision noted that the reference to "damaging or 

tampering with any property" in R.C. 2909.04(A) includes property such as a private 

telephone or a mobile telephone. Id. at ¶29. Once it is determined that a defendant 

damaged or tampered with a victim's telephone, the next consideration is whether that act 

"substantially impairs the ability of law-enforcement officers, firefighters, rescue 

personnel, emergency-medical-services personnel, or emergency-facility personnel to 

respond to an emergency or to protect and preserve any person or property from serious 
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physical harm" in order to constitute a violation of R.C. 2909.04(A)(3). Id. at ¶32. 

{¶23} In Robinson, the defendant smashed the victim's telephone, destroying it. 

Id. at ¶8. Here, Hill did not destroy Pittman's phone, but merely threw it. The neighbor 

who found the telephone the following day reported that he found it in his yard, across the 

street from the victim, and that the phone appeared to be in working order. Hill generally 

argues that it is unreasonable to conclude that the act of merely throwing a telephone 

could constitute a fourth degree felony. 

{¶24} However, under certain circumstances, the act of throwing a telephone can 

constitute "damaging or tampering with any property" as a matter of law. For example, in 

Yoakum, supra, the defendant threw the victim's cordless phone during a dispute that 

occurred outdoors during daylight hours. Yoakum at *1. The impact dislodged the 

battery from the phone, but nothing indicates that the phone was damaged or impossible 

to locate. Id. The Fifth District concluded that such an act constituted disabling the 

telephone, which rendered the victim unable to initiate or receive contact, thus satisfying 

R.C. 2909.04(A). Id. at *2. In Thomas, Johnson, and Brown, supra, each defendant is 

described as having "pulled" or "ripped" the home telephone from the wall to take it. 

Thomas at ¶62; Johnson at ¶84; Brown at 296. However, even if each defendant had 

gingerly disconnected the telephone cord instead of ripping at it, the effect would have 

been the same; the victim was no longer able to access her personal telephone. 

{¶25} Thus, the deciding factor in these cases is whether the defendant's conduct 

caused the victim to be unable to use that telephone. Here, Hill threw the telephone 

somewhere across the street from the parties' house in the dark of night, and the 

telephone was not located until the following day. Pittman would have been unable to 

locate the telephone and was thus unable to use it. These facts, as admitted by Hill's no 

contest plea, constituted tampering with Pittman's mobile telephone and could support a 

conviction for disruption of public services in violation of R.C. 2909.04(A)(3), and certainly 

supported a conviction for attempted disruption of public services. 

{¶26} Unlike the defendant's argument in Robinson, Hill has only provided an 

argument regarding the applicability of R.C. 2909.04(A)(3) to the situation involving an 
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individual mobile telephone, and has not provided an argument whether "substantial 

impairment" applies to his act of throwing the telephone. Nonetheless, we will briefly 

address the issue. 

{¶27} In Robinson, the victim was already in contact with 9-1-1 when Robinson 

destroyed the victim's mobile telephone, rendering the victim unable to provide complete 

information to the police. State v. Robinson, 124 Ohio St.3d 76, at ¶7-8, 38. However, 

the police were able to locate the scene from the information the victim had provided, as 

well as from a second telephone call from another party about their general whereabouts. 

Id. at ¶9-10, 39. Because the police did not know how many personnel were needed to 

respond, and had to search a neighborhood area instead of immediately going to the 

victim's precise location, the Ohio Supreme Court concluded that their ability to respond 

to the victim's emergency call had been substantially impaired. Id. at ¶37-44. 

{¶28} Here, Pittman had not yet initiated contact with the police but was about to 

or was in the process of calling. Thus Pittman was unable to give any information, let 

alone partial information to the police before Hill took the telephone and threw it. Pittman 

was only able to call the police once she had left her house and used a neighbor's 

telephone. The facts here are an example of "substantial interference" that is even more 

straightforward than that of Robinson. Thus the conduct alleged in the indictment, 

information or complaint, and admitted by Hill's no contest plea, could support a 

conviction for disruption of public services in violation of R.C. 2909.04(A)(3), let alone a 

conviction for attempted disruption of public services. 

{¶29} Accordingly, Hill's conduct satisfied the elements of R.C. 2909.04(A)(3) as a 

matter of law, and the trial court's finding of guilt for attempted disruption of public 

services was appropriate. The judgment of the trial court is affirmed. 

Vukovich, P.J., concurs. 

Waite, J., concurs.