(Slip Opinion) OCTOBER TERM, 2021 1 

Syllabus 

NOTE: Where it is feasible, a syllabus (headnote) will be released, as is 

being done in connection with this case, at the time the opinion is issued. 

The syllabus constitutes no part of the opinion of the Court but has been 

prepared by the Reporter of Decisions for the convenience of the reader. 

See United States v. Detroit Timber & Lumber Co., 200 U. S. 321, 337. 

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 

Syllabus 

SOUTHWEST AIRLINES CO. v. SAXON 

CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR 

THE SEVENTH CIRCUIT 

No. 21–309. Argued March 28, 2022—Decided June 6, 2022 

Respondent Latrice Saxon, a ramp supervisor for Southwest Airlines, 

trains and supervises teams of ramp agents who physically load and 

unload cargo on and off airplanes that travel across the country. Like 

many ramp supervisors, Saxon also frequently loads and unloads cargo 

alongside the ramp agents. Saxon came to believe that Southwest was 

failing to pay proper overtime wages to ramp supervisors, and she

brought a putative class action against Southwest under the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938. Because Saxon’s employment contract required her to arbitrate wage disputes individually, Southwest sought 

to enforce its arbitration agreement and moved to dismiss. In response, Saxon claimed that ramp supervisors were a “class of workers

engaged in foreign or interstate commerce” and therefore exempt from 

the Federal Arbitration Act’s coverage. 9 U. S. C. §1. The District 

Court disagreed, holding that only those involved in “actual transportation,” and not those who merely handle goods, fell within §1’s exemption. The Court of Appeals reversed. It held that “[t]he act of loading

cargo onto a vehicle to be transported interstate is itself commerce, as 

that term was understood at the time of the [FAA’s] enactment in 

1925.” 993 F. 3d 492, 494. 

Held: Saxon belongs to a “class of workers engaged in foreign or interstate commerce” to which §1’s exemption applies. Pp. 3–11.

(a) This Court interprets §1’s language according to its “ordinary, 

contemporary, common meaning.” Sandifer v. United States Steel 

Corp., 571 U. S. 220, 227. To discern that ordinary meaning, those 

words “ ‘must be read’ ” and interpreted “ ‘in their context.’ ” Parker 

Drilling Management Services, Ltd. v. Newton, 587 U. S. ___, ___. 

Pp. 3–7. 
 

 

 

 

 

2 SOUTHWEST AIRLINES CO. v. SAXON 

Syllabus 

(1) The parties dispute how to define the relevant “class of workers.” Saxon argues that because the air transportation industry engages in interstate commerce, airline employees, as a whole, constitute 

a “class of workers” covered by §1. By contrast, Southwest maintains 

that the relevant class includes only those airline employees actually

engaged day-to-day in interstate commerce. This Court rejects Saxon’s 

industrywide approach. By referring to “workers” rather than “employees,” the FAA directs attention to “the performance of work.” New 

Prime Inc. v. Oliveira, 586 U. S. ___, ___. And the word “engaged” similarly emphasizes the actual work that class members typically carry 

out. Saxon is therefore a member of a “class of workers” based on what 

she frequently does at Southwest—that is, physically loading and unloading cargo on and off airplanes—and not on what Southwest does 

generally. Pp. 3–4.

(2) The parties also dispute whether the class of airplane cargo 

loaders is “engaged in foreign or interstate commerce.” It is. To be 

“engaged” in “commerce” means to be directly involved in transporting 

goods across state or international borders. Thus, any class of workers 

so engaged falls within §1’s exemption. Airplane cargo loaders are 

such a class. 

Context confirms this reading. In Circuit City Stores, Inc. v. Adams, 

532 U. S. 105, the Court applied two well-settled canons of statutory

interpretation to hold that §1 exempted only “transportation workers,” 

rather than all employees. The Court indicated that any such exempted worker must at least play a direct and “necessary role in the 

free flow of goods” across borders. Id., at 121. Cargo loaders exhibit 

this central feature of a transportation worker.

A final piece of statutory context further confirms that cargo loading 

is part of cross-border “commerce.” Section 1 of the FAA defines exempted “maritime transactions” to include “agreements relating to 

wharfage . . . or any other matters in foreign commerce.” Thus, if an 

“agreemen[t] relating to wharfage”—i.e., money paid to access a cargoloading facility—is a “matte[r] in foreign commerce,” it stands to reason that an individual who actually loads cargo on vehicles traveling 

across borders is himself engaged in such commerce. Pp. 4–7. 

(b) Both parties proffer arguments disagreeing with this analysis, 

but none is convincing. Pp. 7–11.

(1) Saxon thinks the relevant “class of workers” should include all 

airline employees, not just cargo loaders. For support, she argues that 

“railroad employees” and “seamen”—two classes of workers listed immediately before §1’s catchall provision—refer generally to employees 

in those industries. Saxon’s premise is flawed. “Seamen” is not an 

industrywide category but instead a subset of workers engaged in the 

maritime shipping industry. For example, “seamen” did not include 
 

Cite as: 596 U. S. ____ (2022) 3 

Syllabus 

all those employed by companies engaged in maritime shipping when 

the FAA was enacted. Pp. 8–9. 

(2) Southwest’s three counterarguments all fail. First, Southwest 

narrowly construes §1’s catchall category—“any other class of workers

engaged in foreign or interstate commerce”—to include only workers 

who physically transport goods or people across foreign or international boundaries. Southwest relies on the definition of “seamen” as 

only those “employed on board a vessel,” McDermott Int’l, Inc. v. Wilander, 498 U. S. 337, 346, and argues that the catchall category should 

be read along the same lines to exclude airline workers, like Saxon, 

who do not ride aboard an airplane in interstate or foreign transit. But 

Southwest’s acknowledgment that the statute’s reference to “railroad

employees” is somewhat ambiguous in effect concedes that the three 

statutory categories in §1—“seamen, railroad employees, or any other 

class of workers engaged in foreign or interstate commerce”—do not

share the attribute that Southwest would like read into the catchall 

provision. Well-settled canons of statutory interpretation neither demand nor permit limiting a broadly worded catchall phrase based on 

an attribute that inheres in only one of the list’s preceding specific 

terms. Second, Southwest argues that cargo loading is similar to other 

activities that this Court has found to lack a necessary nexus to interstate commerce in other contexts. But the cases Southwest invokes all 

addressed activities far more removed from interstate commerce than 

physically loading cargo directly on and off an airplane headed out of

State. See, e.g., Gulf Oil Corp. v. Copp Paving Co., 419 U. S. 186. Finally, Southwest argues that the FAA’s “proarbitration purposes” 

counsel in favor of an interpretation that errs on the side of fewer §1 

exemptions. Here, however, plain text suffices to show that airplane

cargo loaders, and thus ramp supervisors who frequently load and unload cargo, are exempt from the FAA’s scope under §1. Pp. 9–11. 

993 F. 3d 492, affirmed. 

THOMAS, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which all other Members joined, except BARRETT, J., who took no part in the consideration or 

decision of the case. 
 

 

 

_________________ 

_________________ 

Cite as: 596 U. S. ____ (2022) 1 

Opinion of the Court 

NOTICE: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the 

preliminary print of the United States Reports. Readers are requested to 

notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of the United States, Washington, D. C. 20543, of any typographical or other formal errors, in order that 

corrections may be made before the preliminary print goes to press. 

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 

No. 21–309 

SOUTHWEST AIRLINES CO., PETITIONER v. 

LATRICE SAXON 

ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF 

APPEALS FOR THE SEVENTH CIRCUIT 

[June 6, 2022]

 JUSTICE THOMAS delivered the opinion of the Court. 

Latrice Saxon works for Southwest Airlines as a ramp supervisor. Her work frequently requires her to load and unload baggage, airmail, and commercial cargo on and off airplanes that travel across the country. The question

presented is whether, under §1 of the Federal Arbitration 

Act, she belongs to a “class of workers engaged in foreign or

interstate commerce” that is exempted from the Act’s coverage. We hold that she does. 

I 

Southwest Airlines moves a lot of cargo. In 2019, Southwest carried the baggage of over 162 million passengers to 

domestic and international destinations. Dept. of Transp.,

Bureau of Transp. Statistics (BTS), Passengers Southwest 

Airlines—All Airports (May 2, 2022) (online source archived at www.supremecourt.gov). In total, Southwest 

transported more than 256 million pounds of passenger, 

commercial, and mail cargo. BTS, Air Carriers: T–100 Domestic Market (U. S. Carriers) (May 2, 2022) (online source 

archived at www.supremecourt.gov). 

To move that cargo, Southwest employs “ramp agents,” 
 

2 SOUTHWEST AIRLINES CO. v. SAXON 

Opinion of the Court 

who physically load and unload baggage, airmail, and 

freight. It also employs “ramp supervisors,” who train and

supervise teams of ramp agents. Frequently, ramp supervisors step in to load and unload cargo alongside ramp 

agents. See 993 F. 3d 492, 494 (CA7 2021).

Saxon is a ramp supervisor for Southwest at Chicago

Midway International Airport. As part of her employment

contract, she agreed to arbitrate wage disputes individually. Nevertheless, when Saxon came to believe that Southwest was failing to pay proper overtime wages to her and 

other ramp supervisors, she brought a putative class action

against Southwest under the Fair Labor Standards Act of

1938, 52 Stat. 1060, 29 U. S. C. §201 et seq.

Southwest sought to enforce its arbitration agreement 

with Saxon under the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA), 9 

U. S. C. §1 et seq., and moved to dismiss the lawsuit. In response, Saxon invoked §1 of the FAA, which exempts from 

the statute’s ambit “contracts of employment of seamen, 

railroad employees, or any other class of workers engaged 

in foreign or interstate commerce.” Saxon argued that 

ramp supervisors, like seamen and railroad employees, 

were an exempt “class of workers engaged in foreign or interstate commerce.” Ibid. 

The District Court disagreed, holding that only those involved in “actual transportation,” and not the “mer[e] handling [of] goods,” fell within the exemption. 2019 WL 

4958247, *7 (ND Ill., Oct. 8, 2019). The Court of Appeals

reversed. It held that “[t]he act of loading cargo onto a vehicle to be transported interstate is itself commerce, as that 

term was understood at the time of the [FAA’s] enactment

in 1925.” 993 F. 3d, at 494. Citing Saxon’s “uncontroverted 

declaration” that ramp supervisors at Midway “frequently” 

load and unload cargo, the Court of Appeals reserved the

question “whether supervision of cargo loading alone” 

would also fall within the FAA’s §1 exemption. Id., at 494, 

497. 
 

 

Cite as: 596 U. S. ____ (2022) 3 

Opinion of the Court 

The Seventh Circuit’s decision conflicted with an earlier 

decision of the Fifth Circuit. See Eastus v. ISS Facility Services, Inc., 960 F. 3d 207 (2020). We granted certiorari to

resolve the disagreement. 595 U. S. ___ (2021). 

II 

In this case, we must decide whether Saxon falls within 

a “class of workers engaged in foreign or interstate commerce.” 9 U. S. C. §1. We interpret this language according

to its “‘ordinary, contemporary, common meaning.’” Sandifer v. United States Steel Corp., 571 U. S. 220, 227 (2014) 

(quoting Perrin v. United States, 444 U. S. 37, 42 (1979)); 

see also New Prime Inc. v. Oliveira, 586 U. S. ___, ___–___ 

(2019) (slip op., at 6–7). To discern that ordinary meaning,

those words “‘must be read’” and interpreted “‘in their context,’” not in isolation. Parker Drilling Management Services, Ltd. v. Newton, 587 U. S. ___, ___ (2019) (slip op., at 

5) (quoting Roberts v. Sea-Land Services, Inc., 566 U. S. 93, 

101 (2012)).

We begin by defining the relevant “class of workers” to

which Saxon belongs. Then, we determine whether that 

class of workers is “engaged in foreign or interstate commerce.” 

A 

First, the parties dispute how to define the relevant “class

of workers.” Saxon argues that because air transportation

“[a]s an industry” is engaged in interstate commerce, “airline employees” constitute a “‘class of workers’” covered by 

§1. Brief for Respondent 17. Southwest, by contrast, maintains that §1 “exempts classes of workers based on their 

conduct, not their employer’s,” and the relevant class therefore includes only those airline employees who are actually 

engaged in interstate commerce in their day-to-day work.

Reply Brief 4. The Court of Appeals rejected Saxon’s industrywide approach, see 993 F. 3d, at 497, and so do we. 
 

 

4 SOUTHWEST AIRLINES CO. v. SAXON 

Opinion of the Court 

As we have observed before, the FAA speaks of “‘workers,’” not “ ‘employees’ or ‘servants.’ ” New Prime, 586 U. S., 

at ___–___ (slip op., at 9–10). The word “workers” directs 

the interpreter’s attention to “the performance of work.” 

Id., at ___ (slip op., at 10) (emphasis altered); see also Webster’s New International Dictionary 2350 (1922) (Webster’s) 

(worker: “One that works”); Funk & Wagnall’s New Standard Dictionary 2731 (1913) (worker: “One who or that which

performs work”). Further, the word “engaged”—meaning 

“[o]ccupied,” “employed,” or “[i]nvolved,” Webster’s 725; see 

also, e.g., Black’s Law Dictionary 661 (3d ed. 1933) (defining 

“engage”)—similarly emphasizes the actual work that the

members of the class, as a whole, typically carry out. Saxon 

is therefore a member of a “class of workers” based on what 

she does at Southwest, not what Southwest does generally. 

On that point, Southwest has not meaningfully contested 

that ramp supervisors like Saxon frequently load and unload cargo. See 993 F. 3d, at 494, 497 (noting Saxon’s “uncontroverted declaration assert[ing] that she and the other 

ramp supervisors . . . frequently fill in as ramp agents” for 

up to three shifts per week). Thus, as relevant here, we 

accept that Saxon belongs to a class of workers who physically load and unload cargo on and off airplanes on a frequent basis.1 

B 

Second, the parties dispute whether that class of airplane 

cargo loaders is “engaged in foreign or interstate commerce”

under §1. We hold that it is. 

As always, we begin with the text. Again, to be “engaged” in something means to be “occupied,” “employed,” or

“involved” in it. “Commerce,” meanwhile, includes, among

other things, “the transportation of . . . goods, both by land 

—————— 1Like the Seventh Circuit, we “need not consider . . . whether supervision of cargo loading alone would suffice” to exempt a class of workers 

under §1. 993 F. 3d 492, 497 (2021). 
 

 

Cite as: 596 U. S. ____ (2022) 5 

Opinion of the Court 

and by sea.” Black’s Law Dictionary 220 (2d ed. 1910) 

(Black’s); see also, e.g., Webster’s 448 (commerce: “the exchange of merchandise on a large scale between different 

places or communities”). Thus, any class of workers directly involved in transporting goods across state or international borders falls within §1’s exemption.

Airplane cargo loaders are such a class. We have said 

that it is “too plain to require discussion that the loading or 

unloading of an interstate shipment by the employees of a 

carrier is so closely related to interstate transportation as

to be practically a part of it.” Baltimore & Ohio Southwestern R. Co. v. Burtch, 263 U. S. 540, 544 (1924). We think it 

equally plain that airline employees who physically load

and unload cargo on and off planes traveling in interstate 

commerce are, as a practical matter, part of the interstate

transportation of goods. They form “a class of workers engaged in foreign or interstate commerce.”2 

Context confirms this reading. In Circuit City Stores, Inc. 

v. Adams, 532 U. S. 105 (2001), we considered whether §1

exempts all employment contracts or only those contracts 

involving “transportation workers.” Id., at 109. In concluding that §1 exempts only transportation-worker contracts, 

we relied on two well-settled canons of statutory interpretation. First, we applied the meaningful-variation canon. 

See, e.g., A. Scalia & B. Garner, Reading Law 170 (2012) 

(“[W]here [a] document has used one term in one place, and 

a materially different term in another, the presumption is 

—————— 2We recognize that the answer will not always be so plain when the

class of workers carries out duties further removed from the channels of 

interstate commerce or the actual crossing of borders. Compare, e.g., 

Rittmann v. Amazon.com, Inc., 971 F. 3d 904, 915 (CA9 2020) (holding 

that a class of “last leg” delivery drivers falls within §1’s exemption), 

with, e.g., Wallace v. Grubhub Holdings, Inc., 970 F. 3d 798, 803 (CA7

2020) (holding that food delivery drivers do not). In any event, we need 

not address those questions to resolve this case. 
 

 

6 SOUTHWEST AIRLINES CO. v. SAXON 

Opinion of the Court 

that the different term denotes a different idea”). We observed that Congress used “more open-ended formulations” 

like “‘affecting’” or “‘involving’” commerce to signal “congressional intent to regulate to the outer limits of authority

under the Commerce Clause.” Circuit City, 532 U. S., at 

115–116, 118. By contrast, Congress used a “narrower” 

phrase—“‘engaged in commerce’”—when it wanted to regulate short of those limits. Id., at 118. Second, we applied 

the ejusdem generis canon, which instructs courts to interpret a “general or collective term” at the end of a list of specific items in light of any “common attribute[s]” shared by

the specific items. Ali v. Federal Bureau of Prisons, 552 

U. S. 214, 225 (2008). As applied to §1, that canon counseled that the phrase “‘class of workers engaged in . . . commerce’” should be “controlled and defined by reference” to

the specific classes of “‘seamen’” and “‘railroad employees’” 

that precede it. Circuit City, 532 U. S., at 115. 

Taken together, these canons showed that §1 exempted 

only contracts with transportation workers, rather than all 

employees, from the FAA. See id., at 119. And, while we 

did not provide a complete definition of “transportation 

worker,” we indicated that any such worker must at least 

play a direct and “necessary role in the free flow of goods” 

across borders. Id., at 121. Put another way, transportation workers must be actively “engaged in transportation”

of those goods across borders via the channels of foreign or 

interstate commerce. Ibid. 

Cargo loaders exhibit this central feature of a transportation worker. As stated above, one who loads cargo on a 

plane bound for interstate transit is intimately involved

with the commerce (e.g., transportation) of that cargo.

“[T]here could be no doubt that [interstate] transportation 

[is] still in progress,” and that a worker is engaged in that 

transportation, when she is “doing the work of unloading” 

or loading cargo from a vehicle carrying goods in interstate

transit. Erie R. Co. v. Shuart, 250 U. S. 465, 468 (1919). 
Cite as: 596 U. S. ____ (2022) 7 

Opinion of the Court 

A final piece of statutory context further confirms that

cargo loading is part of cross-border “commerce.” The first 

sentence of §1 of the FAA defines exempted “maritime 

transactions” to include, among other things, “agreements

relating to wharfage, supplies furnished vessels or repairs 

to vessels, collisions, or any other matters in foreign commerce.” (Emphasis added.) The use of “other” in the 

catchall provision indicates that Congress considered the

preceding items to be “matters in foreign commerce.” And 

agreements related to the enumerated “matte[r] in foreign 

commerce” of “wharfage,” to take one example, included

agreements for mere access to a wharf—which is simply a 

cargo-loading facility. See Black’s 1226 (wharfage:

“[m]oney paid for landing wares at a wharf, or for shipping

or taking goods into a boat or barge from thence”); Webster’s 2323 (similar); see also, e.g., Black’s 1226 (wharf: “A 

perpendicular bank or mound . . . extending some distance

into the water, for the convenience of lading and unlading 

ships and other vessels”). It stands to reason, then, that if 

payments to access a cargo-loading facility relate to a 

“matte[r] in foreign commerce,” then an individual who actually loads cargo on foreign-bound ships docked along a 

wharf is himself engaged in such commerce. Likewise, any

class of workers that loads or unloads cargo on or off airplanes bound for a different State or country is “engaged in

foreign or interstate commerce.”

In sum, text and context point to the same place: Workers, like Saxon, who load cargo on and off airplanes belong 

to a “class of workers in foreign or interstate commerce.” 

III 

Both Saxon and Southwest proffer arguments that disagree with portions of our analysis. Neither of them convinces us to change course. 

A 

For her part, Saxon thinks that we should define the 
 

 

8 SOUTHWEST AIRLINES CO. v. SAXON 

Opinion of the Court 

“class of workers” as all airline employees who carry out the 

“customary work” of the airline, rather than cargo loaders

more specifically. Tr. of Oral Arg. 56. That larger class of

employees potentially includes everyone from cargo loaders 

to shift schedulers to those who design Southwest’s website.

See id., at 51–52; but cf. ibid. (conceding that those who run 

the Southwest credit-card points program likely would not

count).

To support this reading, Saxon invokes the ejusdem generis canon. She argues, first, that “railroad employees” and 

“seamen” refer generally to employees in those industries 

providing “dominant mode[s] of transportation” in interstate and foreign commerce. Brief for Respondent 17. She 

then reasons, second, that all “workers who do the work of 

the airlines have the same relationship to commerce as 

those who do the work of the railroad or ship.” Ibid. 

Saxon’s attempted invocation of ejusdem generis is unavailing because it proceeds from the flawed premise that 

“seamen” and “railroad employees” are both industrywide

categories. The statute’s use of “seamen” shows why that 

premise is mistaken. In 1925, seamen did not include all 

those employed by companies engaged in maritime shipping. Rather, seamen were only those “whose occupation

[was] to assist in the management of ships at sea; a mariner; a sailor; . . . any person (except masters, pilots, and apprentices duly indentured and registered) employed or engaged in any capacity on board any ship.” Webster’s 1906; 

see also, e.g., Black’s 1063 (seamen: “[s]ailors; mariners;

persons whose business is navigating ships”). 

Because “seamen” includes only those who work on board 

a vessel, they constitute a subset of workers engaged in the

maritime shipping industry. Regardless of whether “railroad employees” include all rail-transportation workers, 

the narrow definition of “seamen” shows that the two terms 

cannot share a “common attribute” of identifying transportation workers on an industrywide basis. Ali, 552 U. S., at 
 

Cite as: 596 U. S. ____ (2022) 9 

Opinion of the Court 

224. We therefore reject Saxon’s argument that §1 exempts

virtually all employees of major transportation providers. 

B 

While Saxon defines the relevant class of workers too 

broadly, Southwest construes §1’s catchall category—“any

other class of workers engaged in foreign or interstate commerce”—too narrowly. The airline argues that only workers who physically move goods or people across foreign or 

international boundaries—pilots, ship crews, locomotive 

engineers, and the like—are “engaged in foreign or interstate commerce.” So construed, §1 does not exempt cargo

loaders because they do not physically accompany freight 

across state or international boundaries. 

Southwest’s reading rests on three arguments. None persuades us. First, taking its turn with ejusdem generis, the 

airline argues that because “seamen” are “employed on 

board a vessel,” McDermott Int’l, Inc. v. Wilander, 498 U. S. 

337, 346 (1991) (emphasis added), and “‘railroad employees’ 

is somewhat ambiguous,” Brief for Petitioner 26, we should

limit the exempted class of railroad employees to those who

are physically on board a locomotive as it crosses state lines. 

Then, having limited railroad employees in that way,

Southwest likewise urges us to narrow §1’s catchall provision to exclude those airline-transportation workers, like 

Saxon and other cargo loaders, who do not ride aboard an

airplane in interstate or foreign transit. 

Southwest’s application of ejusdem generis is as flawed as 

Saxon’s. It purports to import a limitation from the definition of “seamen” into the definition of “railroad employees” 

and then engrafts that limit onto the catchall provision.

But by conceding that “railroad employees” is ambiguous, 

Southwest sinks its own ejusdem generis argument. Again, 

the “inference embodied in ejusdem generis [is] that Congress remained focused on [some] common attribute”

shared by the preceding list of specific items “when it used 
 

 

10 SOUTHWEST AIRLINES CO. v. SAXON 

Opinion of the Court 

the catchall phrase.” Ali, 552 U. S., at 225. By recognizing

that the term “railroad employees” is at most ambiguous,

Southwest in effect concedes that it does not necessarily

share the attribute that Southwest would like us to read 

into the catchall provision. Ejusdem generis neither demands nor permits that we limit a broadly worded catchall

phrase based on an attribute that inheres in only one of the 

list’s preceding specific terms.

Second, Southwest argues that cargo loading is similar to

other activities that this Court has found to lack a necessary nexus to interstate commerce in other contexts. But 

the cases Southwest invokes all addressed activities far 

more removed from interstate commerce than physically

loading cargo directly on and off an airplane headed out of 

State. In Gulf Oil Corp. v. Copp Paving Co., 419 U. S. 186 

(1974), for instance, this Court held that a firm making intrastate sales of asphalt was not “engaged in [interstate]

commerce,” id., at 194 (internal quotation marks omitted),

merely because the asphalt was later used to make interstate highways, id. at 198. Being only “perceptibly connected to . . . instrumentalities” of interstate commerce was 

not enough. Ibid. Similarly, in United States v. American 

Building Maintenance Industries, 422 U. S. 271 (1975), this

Court held that “simply supplying localized [janitorial] services to a corporation engaged in interstate commerce does

not satisfy the ‘in commerce’ requirement” in §7 of the Clayton Act, 38 Stat. 731, as amended, 15 U. S. C. §18. 422 

U. S., at 283. In each case, the Court explained that the 

relevant firm was not “engaged in” interstate commerce because it did not perform “activities within the flow of interstate commerce.” Id. at 276 (internal quotation marks 

omitted); Gulf Oil, 419 U. S., at 195. 

But unlike those who sell asphalt for intrastate construction or those who clean up after corporate employees, our 

case law makes clear that airplane cargo loaders plainly do

perform “activities within the flow of interstate commerce” 
Cite as: 596 U. S. ____ (2022) 11 

Opinion of the Court 

when they handle goods traveling in interstate and foreign

commerce, either to load them for air travel or to unload 

them when they arrive. See Burtch, 263 U. S., at 544. 

Third, Southwest falls back on statutory purpose. It observes that §2 of the FAA broadly requires courts to enforce 

arbitration agreements in any “contract evidencing a transaction involving commerce,” while §1 provides only a narrower exemption. This structure, in its view, demonstrates 

the FAA’s “proarbitration purposes” and counsels in favor

of an interpretation that errs on the side of fewer §1 exemptions. Brief for Petitioner 16, 30–33. 

To be sure, we have relied on statutory purpose to inform 

our interpretation of the FAA when that “purpose is readily 

apparent from the FAA’s text.” AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 563 U. S. 333, 344 (2011). But we are not “free to 

pave over bumpy statutory texts in the name of more expeditiously advancing a policy goal.” New Prime, 586 U. S., at 

___ (slip op., at 14). Here, §1’s plain text suffices to show

that airplane cargo loaders are exempt from the FAA’s 

scope, and we have no warrant to elevate vague invocations 

of statutory purpose over the words Congress chose. 

* * * 

Latrice Saxon frequently loads and unloads cargo on and 

off airplanes that travel in interstate commerce. She therefore belongs to a “class of workers engaged in foreign or interstate commerce” to which §1’s exemption applies. Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the Court of Appeals. 

It is so ordered.

 JUSTICE BARRETT took no part in the consideration or decision of this case.