UNITED STAT ES DIS TRICT COURT F OR THE DIS TRICT OF COLUM BIA J OSEPH L EE, : : Plaintiff, : Civil Action No.: 09-1832 (RMU) : v. : Re Docume nt No.: 3 : DI STRI CT OF COLUMBI A, :

: Def endant. :

MEMORAN DUM OP INION D E N Y I N G T H E D E F E N D A N T ’ S M O T I O N T O D I S M I S S

I. INTRODUCTION This matter come s befor e the c ourt on the def endant’ s motion t o dismiss the plaintiff’s complaint for f

ailure to state a

claim upon which r elief c an be grante d. The plaintiff br ings suit ag ainst the defe ndant under the Amer icans with Disabilities Act of 1990 ( “ADA ”), 42 U .S.C. §§ 12101 et seq. , challeng ing the defe ndant’s ter mination of his employ

ment with the District of 1 Columbi a De partment of Corr ections. The de fenda nt moves to dismi ss, assertingthat the plaintiff did not timely

file his char g e of discrimination with t he Equa l Employ ment Opportunity Commi ssion (“EEOC”) or commenc e proc eeding s under District of Columbi a law be fore

T he ADA wa s r ece ntl y am end ed b y the ADA Amendm ent s Ac t o f 2 008 (“ ADAAA”), Pub. L. 1 No. 11 0- 325, 122 Sta t. 3 553. T he ADAAA be came ef fe ct ive on J anu ary 1, 2009 , but doe s no t app ly re tr oac ti vely to a ll eged di scr iminat ory con duc t t hatocc urr ed b ef ore th atdat e. Lyt es v. D.C. W ate r & Sewe r Au th. , 572 F.3d936 , 942 (D.C. Cir . 200 9); see als o Lan dgr af v. USI Film Prod s. , 511 U.S. 24 4, 25 0 ( 1994 ) ( not ing th atre tr oac ti vity is con si der ed wi th re gard t o t he d at e when the al le ged dis cr iminat ory con duc t o ccu rr ed) . Bec aus e t he p la int if f wa s t erm ina te d be for e J anu ary 1, 2009 , see inf

ra Par t II , th e pr e- amendm entversi on o f t he ADA appl ie s t o t he pla int if f’ s c la im.bring ing his c laim. Be cause the cour t determines that the pla intiff timely filed his char g e of 2 discrimination with the EEOC and that he pr operly instituted proc eeding s under District of Columbi a law, the court de nies the def endant’ s motion t o dismiss

.

II. F ACTUAL & P ROCEDURAL BACK GR OUND Until 2008, the plaintiff had bee n employ ed as a n office r with the District of Columbia Depa rtment of Corre ctions for a pproxi mately

twenty year s. Compl. ¶¶ 5, 15. On J une 25, 2008, the def endant ter minated the plaintiff’ s employ ment, stating tha

t the plaintiff had f

allen asle ep on the job in March 2008. Id. ¶ 15. Ac cordingto the plaintiff, he suff ers f rom adva nced dia betes, which he c laims constitutes a disability under the ADA, a

nd which ca

uses low blood sug ar levels, re nderingit difficult for him to stay awake. Id. ¶¶ 6, 10- 11. The plaintiff a sserts that he had informe d his superiors and the defe ndant’s human r esourc es per sonnel of his condition prior to his termination. Id. ¶ 11. In Fe bruar

y 2008, the def

endant a ssigne d the plaintiff to a night shift gua rdinginmates

rec eivingtreatment at Howar d University Hospital. Id. The plaintiff c laims that he informed the defe ndant that, as a

result of his diabete s, he would nee d to take mid-shift brea ks betwee n 1:00 a.m. and 3:00 a.m. to ena ble him to stay

aler t. Id. The plaintiff state s that the defe ndant re fused

T he d ef end antcha ra ct er izes it s s eco nd grou nd f or dis m is sal as bot h a “f

ai lur e t o ex hau st 2 adminis tr at ive r emedies ” and afa il ure to “c omm enc e[ ] s ta te pr oce edi ngs wit h t he Di st ri ctof Colu m bia Off ic e of Hum an Ri ghts p ri or to fi li ng his cha rge wit h t he E EOC.” De f.’ s M ot. at3, 7

. Beca use th e l at te r c har act er izat ion is th e more a ccu ra te st at ement of th e s ta tut ory pr ovisi on o n whic h t he d ef

end antre li es in m aking thi s a rgum ent , th e c our t wi ll employ it s t erm ino logy. See 42 U.S. C. § 200 0e- 5(c ) ( st at ing th at“no cha rge m ay be f il ed u nde r” fe der al la w “be for e t he exp ir at ion of

si xty days a ft erpr oce edi ngs have be en c omm enc ed u nde r the S ta te or lo cal la w, unl ess suc h pr oce edi ngs have be en e ar li erte rminat ed” ).
2this request and that, as a re sult, he was ac cused of fallingaslee p on the job and wa s theref ore 3 terminated. Id. ¶ 14-15. The plaintiff state s that he filed a char g e of disability

discrimination with the EEOC on or about J anuar

y 16, 2009, and that af

ter the EE OC issued him a “right to sue” letter, he timely filed a complaint in this court. Id. ¶ 16. On Oc tober 28, 2009, the de fenda nt filed this moti on to dismiss , which is now ripe f or adjudication. See ge nerallyDef .’s Mot. On Octobe r 30, 2009, the plaintiff filed his opposition to t he def endant’ s motion t o dismiss

. See ge nerally Pl.’s Opp’n. The de fenda

nt did not file a reply

in support of its moti on. As the motion is now ripe for adjudication, the c ourt turns to the applica ble leg al standard and the pa rties’ a rguments.

III. ANALYSIS A. Legal Standard f

or a Mot ion to Dism iss Und er Rule 12(b)(6) A Rule 12(b)( 6) motion to dism iss tests the lega l sufficienc y of a c omplaint. Browning v. Clint on , 292 F.3d 235, 242 ( D.C. Cir. 2002). The c omplaint need only set forth a

short and plain statement of the c laim, givingthe def endant f air notice of the c laim and the grounds upon which it rests. Kingman Park Civic Ass’n v. W illiams , 348 F.3d 1033, 1040 (D.C. Cir. 2003) (c iting F E D . R. C I V . P. 8(a) (2) a

nd Conley v. G ibson , 355 U.S. 41, 47 (1957)). “ Such simpli fied notice pleadingis made possible by the libera l opportunity

for discove ry

and the other

pretria l proce dures e stablished by the Rules to disclose more pre cisely the basis of both cla im and defe nse to define more na rrowly the disputed fac ts and issues.” Conley , 355 U.S. at 47-48 (interna l quotation marks omitted). It is not necessar y for the pla intiff to plead all ele ments of his

T he p la int if

f d oes notcon ced e t hathe in fa ctfe ll as le ep o n t he j ob. Com pl. ¶ 15. 3 3prima fa cie c ase in the c omplaint, Swierkiewicz v. Sore ma N.A. , 534 U.S. 506, 511-14 (2002), or

“plea d law or match fa cts to ever y element of

a leg al theory ,” Krieger v. Fade ly , 211 F.3d 134, 136 (D.C. Cir. 2000) (inter nal quotation marks and c itation omit ted). Yet, “[t]o s urvive a

motion to di smiss, a complaint must contain sufficient fa ctual matter , acc epted a s true, to state a claim to relief

that is plausible on its face.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal , 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1949 (2009) (interna l quotation marks omitted); Bell Atl. Corp. v. Tw ombly , 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007) ( abrog atingthe oft-quoted la nguag e fr om Conley , 355 U.S. at 45-56, instructing courts not to dismiss for f ailure to state a

claim unless it appea

rs beyond doubt that “no set of fac ts in support of his claim [ ] would entit le him to relief” ). A c laim is facially plausible when the pleade d fac tual content “a llows the court to dra w the re asonable infere nce that the defe ndant is liable for the misconduc t alleg ed.” Iqbal , 129 S. Ct . at 1949 (c iting Twombly , 550 U.S. at 556). “The plausibilit y

standard is not akin to a ‘ probability require ment,’ but it asks for more than a she er possibility

that a def endant ha s acte d unlawfully .” Id. (citing Twombly , 550 U.S. at 556). In resolvinga Rule 12(b) (6) motion, the cour t must t reat the complaint’s fa ctual alleg ations – including mixed questions of law and f act – a s true and dr aw a ll reasona ble infere nces the ref

rom in the plaintiff’s fa

vor. Macharia v. U

nited States , 334 F.3d 61, 64, 67 (D.C. Cir. 2003); Holy Land Found. for Relief &Dev . v. Ashcroft , 333 F.3d 156, 165 ( D.C. Cir. 2003); Browning , 292 F.3d at 242. Whi le many well-plea ded complaints ar e conc lusory , the court ne ed not ac cept a s true infe renc es unsupported by fac ts set out in the complaint or leg al conclusions ca st as fac tual alleg ations. W arren v. District of Columbia , 353 F.3d 36, 40 ( D.C. Cir. 2004); Browning , 292 F.3d at 242. “Thre adbar e re citals of the e lements of a c ause of action,

4supported by mere conclusory

statements, do not suffice .” Iqbal , 129 S. Ct . at 1949 (c iting Twombly , 550 U.S. at 555).

B. Th e CourtDenies the De fend ant’s Motion to Dism iss 1. The Plaintiff

F iled a Ti m ely Charge of Discrim ination wi th the EEOC The de fenda

nt asserts that the plaintiff did not file a timely char g e of discrimination with the EEOC. De f.’s Mot. at 6. More specific ally , the def endant c ontends that the plaintiff wa s require d to file his char g e within 180 day s after the alleg edly

unlawful e mploy

ment prac tice

occur red, but that the pla intiff filed his char g e 205 day s after his termination. Id. The plaintiff disag ree s with the defe ndant’s view of the applica

ble time limit ation. SeePl.’s Opp’n at 1-3. He

asser ts that the District of Columbia Office of Human Rights (“DCOHR”) has a w orkshar ing agree ment with the EEOC, cre atinga 300-da y window within which discrimination char g es ca n be filed, a nd that his filing wa s theref ore timely

. Id. The timeliness provisions of the ADAare contained in c erta in proce dural provisions of Title VI Iof the Civil Ri g hts Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e et seq. , which ar e incor porate d by ref ere nce into the AD A, see42 U.S.C. § 12117(a); Maye rs v. Laborers’ Health &Safety Funds of N. Am. , 478 F.3d 364, 368 ( D.C. Cir. 2007) (statingthat “[t] he ADA incorporates the proce dural provisions of Title VI I ”). An individual assertinga cla im under the AD A is g ener ally require d to file a c harg e with the EEOC “ within one hundred a nd eighty day s after

the alleg ed unlawful e mploy

ment prac tice occ urre d.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5( e)( 1). B ut when a w orkshar ing agree ment exis ts betwee n the EEOC and a state or loca l Fair

Employ ment Practice s (“F EP”)

5ag ency , the filingwindow widens to 300 day s. Carter v. GeorgeW ashington Univ. , 387 F.3d 4 872, 879 (D.C. Cir. 2004) (c iting 29 C.F.R. § 1601.13(a )(4) (ii)(A) ); Hodge v . United Airlines , 666 F. Supp. 2d 14, 20 n.5 (D.D .C. 2009) (notingthat for Title VI Iclaims, “e mploy ees a re entitled to a 300-da

y window when a

‘worksha ringagree ment’ exists betwee n the EEOC and a local fa ir employ

ment prac tices off

ice” )(c iting Akonji v. Unity H ealthcare, I

nc. , 517 F. Supp. 2d 83, 91 (D.D.C. 2007)) ). The D COHR has enter ed into such an a g ree ment with the EEOC, and there fore the applica

ble time limit ation for f

iling a c harg e of discrimination in t he District of Columbi a is 300 day s. See Carter , 387 F.3d at 879 (stating that the plaintiff had “ up to 300 day s to file” a char g e with the EEOC unde r the Ag e Discr imination in Employ ment Act “[s]i nce the EEOC had [a worksha

ring ] agr eeme nt with the D.C. Office of Human Rights”). The de fenda

nt terminated the pla intiff’s employ ment on J une 25, 2008, and the plaintiff filed his char g e of discrimination with t he EEOC on or a bout J anuar

y 16, 2009, 205 day s later. 5 Mo re spe ci fi cal ly, unde r 4 2 U.S.C. § 20 00e

- 5(e )( 1), a c om pla ini ng part y in a j uri sdi ct ion wit h 4 st at e orlo cal ant i- dis cr iminat ion la ws ha s up to 300 days, r at herth an 1 80 d ays, t o f il e acha rge of dis cr iminat ionwith t he E EOC when th e pa rt y has “ ini ti al ly ins ti tut ed p roc eed ings wi th a St at e or loc al agency wit h au tho ri ty to grantorse ek rel ie f” fr om th e c hal le nged employm entpr act ic e. Wo rkshar ing agree m ent s, wh ic h gener al ly pro vide f or “cr oss - fi li ng” bet ween th e EEOC a nd FE P agenci es, sa ti sf

y this st atuto ry requir ement a nd t hus ent it le complai nin g part ie s t o the 3 00- day fi li ng limita ti on. See , e.g . , Sch ule r v . Pri cewa te rho use Coope rs, LLP , 514 F.3d136 5, 13 72- 73 (D.C. Ci r. 2 008) ; Iv ey v. Distri ct of Col umbi a , 949 A.2d 6 07, 6 11- 12 ( D.C. 200 8). T he d at e acomplai nin g part y subm it s acha rge of di scr iminat ion to th e EEOC i s no t n ece ssa ri ly 5 the dat e us ed t o de te rmine t imeli nes s, b eca use th e EEOC must al low the FEP a gency to pr oce ed unde r s ta te la w bef

ore a c har ge is dee m ed f

il ed wi th the EEOC. See 29 C. F.R. § 1601 .13( a) (3) (i i) . Butth e DCOHR ha s wa ived i ts exc lus ive j uri sdi ct ion dur ing th is “de fe rr al ” per iod , Sch ule r , 514 F.3dat137 3, t hus per m it ti ng the pla int if f’ s c har ge to h ave bee n de emed fi le d wi th the EEOC on th e da y he ac tua ll y subm it te d t he c har ge, Equa l Emp loy ment Oppor tun it

y Comm’n v. Co mmerc ial

Off ic e Pr ods . Co. , 486 U.S. 10 7, 11 2- 122 (19 88) (h old ing th atbec aus e the FEP’ s wa iver of it s e xcl usi ve j uri sdi ct ion “t erm ina te d” s ta te pr oce edi ngs, th e c har ge was dee m ed f il ed o n t he d ay itwas sub m it te d t o t he E EOC); see al so Bank s v . Dis tr ic t o

f Co lumb ia , 377 F. Sup p. 2d85, 91 ( D.D.C. 20 05) ; 2 9 C.F.R. § 16 01.1 3(a )( 4)( ii )( A) ( st at ing th atif “t he doc um enton i ts fa ce con st itute s acha rge wit hin a c at egory of c har ges over wh ic h t he F EP agency has wai ved it s r ights to th e pe ri od o f e xcl usi ve proc ess ing . . . the cha rge i s de emed to be fi le d wi th the [EE OC] up on r ece ipt of th e do cument” ). 6Thus, beca use the plaintiff f

iled his charg e within the 300-da y limit ations period, the de fenda nt’s motion to di smiss on grounds of timeliness fa ils.

2. The Plaintiff

P roperly Instituted P roce edings Un der District of Colu m bia L aw, All owi ng His Claim to P roce ed Under the AD A The de fenda

nt also argues that the plaintiff did not commenc e proc eeding s under District of Columbia law befor e filinga cha rg e of discrimination under the ADA . Def .’s Mot. at 7. The 6 plaintiff re sponds that the worksharing a g ree ment betwee n the DCOHR and the E EOC obviated the nee d to file separ ately under D istrict of Columbia law beca use his char g e of discrimination was “ cross-f

iled” with the DCOHR whe n he filed it with the EEOC. Pl.’s Opp’n at 4. In case s in which state or loc al laws grant re lief fr om discriminatory employ ment prac tices, a c omplaining pa rty cannot f ile a cha rg e of discrimination with t he EEOC see king relief under f eder al law “ befor e the e x piration of six ty day s after

proce eding s have be en

commence d under the State or loca l law, unless such proc eeding s have be en ea rlier ter minated.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(c ). As explained supra note 6, the D.C. Human Rights Act prohibits employ ment discrimination in the District of Columbia, and there fore complainingparties must initially proce ed under

D.C. law bef

ore f iling cha rg es with the EEOC. The EEOC has, howe ver, enter ed into a wor

ksharingagree ment with the DCOHR, and under the terms of this agree ment, char g es filed with the EEO C are de emed simultaneously filed with the DCOHR. See Schuler v

. PricewaterhouseCoopers, LLP , 514 F.3d 1365, 1372- 73 (D.C. Cir. 2008); Fowler v. District of Columbia , 122 F. Supp. 2d 37, 41-42 (D .D.C. 2000). Gene rally , afte r a c omplaining pa rty files a

Alt hough t he d ef

end antdoe s no t s pec if

y underwhi ch Di stri ctof Col um bia la w th e pl ai nti ff 6 purpor te dly fa il ed t o i nit ia ll y proce ed, the cou rtpr esu m es tha t t he d ef end antis re fe rr ing to th e Dis tr ic t o f Co lumbia Hum an Ri ghts Ac t o f 1 977, D.C. C O D E §§ 2

- 1401 et se q. , whi ch p rot ect s D.C. employees fr om

employm entdi scr iminat ion bas ed o n t hei r d is abi li ty.

7char g e, the EEO C must allow the FEP ag ency to proce ss it under state or loc al law be fore the EEOC ca n proce ss it under fede ral law

. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(c ); 29 C.F.R. § 1601.13(a) (3)( ii), (a) (4)( ii)(B ); see also Fowler , 122 F. Supp. 2d at 41. This “de fer ral” period lasts 60 day s, or until the FEP ag ency has terminate d the local pr ocee dings, whicheve r occ urs

ear lier. Id . The DCOHR, howe ver, ha s waived its exclusive jurisdiction over cha rg es duringthe six ty -day defe rra l period, Schuler , 514 F.3d at 1373, and this waiver ha s the eff ect of simult aneously

commencing

and ter minating pr ocee dings unde r District of Columbia law upon an employee’ s filing a

char g e with the EEOC, Fowler , 122 F. Supp. 2d at 41-42 ( stating that “numer ous circuit cour

ts have de termined that wa ivers conta ined in worksharing a gree ments automatically

commence and ter

minate state proc eeding s upon filing with the EEO C”); see also Equal Employme nt Opportunity Comm’n v. Comme rcial Office Products Co. , 486 U.S. 107, 112- 122 (1988) ( holding that a n FEP’s wa iver of its exclusive jurisdiction “terminated” state proce eding s upon the complainant’s f iling a c harg e with the EEOC). T hus, the plaintiff constructively

commence d and ter

minated his proce eding s under District of Columbi a law immediately

upon filing his cha

rg e with the EEOC, satisfy ing the require ment of 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5( c). A s a re sult, the court denies the defe ndant’s motion to dism iss based on the plaintiff’s purpor

ted fa ilure to commenc e proc eeding s under District of Columbi a law be fore filing his cha

rg e with the EEOC.

IV. CONCLUSION For the fore g oing r easons, the c ourt denies the de fenda nt’s motion to di smiss t he plaintiff’s complaint for

failure to state a c laim upon which re lief ca n be grante d. An Orde r 8consistent with this Memorandum Opinion is separate ly and conte mporane ously

issued this 25th day of Aug ust, 2010.

RI CARDO M. URBI NA United States District J udg e

9