.-- R-72 

THEA NERAL 

February 17, 1947 

Honorable Maureen Moore Opinion No. V-30 

Commissioner, Bureau of 

Labor Stntistios Re: Inasmuch as the President 

Austin, Texas has by proclamation declared an end of hostillties, does that also mean 

that the state of national emergency has ceased 

to exist? 

Dear Mrs. Moore: 

Your request for our opinion on the above oaptioned matter has been received by this department. We 

quote from your letter as follows: 

wSbction 6 of the Nine, Fifty-four Hour Law, 

enacted by the 40th Legislature, authorizes the 

Labor Commissioner to grant certain exemptions from 

the Nine, Fifty-four Hour Law ‘in time of war and/ 

or when the President of the United States proclaims a state of national emergency to exist.’ 

“Inasmuch as the President has by proolamation declared an end of hostilities, d~oes that also mean that the state of national emergency has 

ceased to exist?” 

Section 6 of the Nine, Fifty-four Hour Law, 

referred to in your letter, sets forth certain exceptions during war or national emergencies. Section 9 0P 

this law deals with the authority of the Commissioner 

of Labor Statistics to make an order granting an exemption in time of war under certain oonditions. 

We are confining our opinion to the meaning 

of “in time of war” and to your question of whether or 

not the state oP national emergency has ceased to exist, 

inasmuch as the President has by proclamation declared 

an end of hostilities. 

Title 38, Chapter 12, Sec. 704, U. S. C. A., 

provides in part as r’ollows: 
Hon. Maureen Moore, page 2 (V-30) 

"The president shall prescribe by re ulation 

(subject to the provisions of section 701 7 e) of 

this title) the date of the beginning and of the 

termination of the period in each war subsequent 

to the Civil War, includiq the B,oxer Rebellion 

and the Philippine Insurrection, . . en 

As stated to you in opinion MO. O-7360, approved October 25, 1946, this department has held in 

several opinions that a war is not concluded in the 

legal sense until some formal action by a competent 

authority terminating the war and re-establishing 

peace is had. The 77th Congress of the United States, 

by joint resolution, formally declared a state of war 

between the United,States and certain foreign governments. 

On May 27, 1941, by proclamation 2487, 1 CFR, 

cum. supp., 2.1, the President prdclaimed a state of 

unlimited national emergency to exist. To date this 

proclamation has not been revoked. 

In Vol. 41, Words and Phrases, the following 

definition of "Time of War" appears: 

"*Time of War' continues Prom the date of the 

declaration of war by Congress until some formal 

proclamation of peace by an authority competent to 

proclaim it." Ex parte Givins, D. C. N. D., Ga., 

262 F. 702, 705. 

Our research discloses that neither Congress 

nor the President has formally declared a terLmination 

of the War referred to above. On December 31, 1946, 

the President of the United States issued Proclamation 

2714,. entitled "Cessation of Hostilities of Wo~rld War 11," 

The proclamation is published in Vol. 12, No. 1, of the 

Federal Register dated January 1, 1947, a portion of 

which is quoted: 

"Although a state of war still exists, it is 

at this time possible to declare, and I find it 

to be in the public interest to declare, that 

hostilities have terminated." (Emphasis supplied) 

"Now, therefore, I, Harry S. Truman, President of the United States of America, do hereby 

proclaim the cessation of hostilities of World 

War II, effective 12 o!clock noon, December 31, 

1946." 
. . 

.’ 

Hon. Maureen Moore, page 3 (V-30) 

In the case of Ribas y Hijo v. United States, 

decided May 16, 1904, 194 U. S. 315, 24 S. Ct. 727, 48 L. 

Ed. 994, Mr. Justice Harlan, in duscussing the case at 

bar, said: 

“It is none the less a case sounding in tort 

because the claim is in form for the use of the 

vessel after actual hostilities were suspended by 

the protocol of August 12th, 1898. A state of war 

did not, in law, oease until the ratification in 

April 1899, of the treaty of peace. ‘A truce or 

suspension of arms ,’ says Kent, *does not terminate 

the war, but ,it is one of the commercia bell1 which 

suspends its op erations. . . . At the expiration 

of a truce, hostilities may recommence without any 

fresh declaration of war.’ 1 Kent, Corn. 159, 161.” 

In the case of Citizens Protecti,ve League et 

al. v. Clark, Attorney General of U. S., and Reimann v. 

Same, decided May 2, 1946, by the United States Court 

of Appeals, District of Columbia, 155 F. R. (2d) 290, 

Associate Justice Prettyman said: 

11 . . . No peace treaty has yet been signed 

with Germany, and a state cf war has not been terminated by an Act of Congress or by executive 

proclamation. Cases involving the termination of 

other wars dispose of Appellants’ point. It is 

not for the Court to determine the end of a war 

declared by the Congress.” 

It is our opinion, therefore, on the basis of 

the authorities and laws,hereinabove cited, that a “Time ’ 

of War” and national emergency still exist, even though 

the President has proclaimed a cessation of hostilities. 

There is a Pundamental difference between the 

“end of hostilities” and the “end of a war.” The 

President’s Proclamation of December 31, 1946, 

declares only cessation of hostilities of World 

War II and recognizes that “a state OP war” still 

exists. Such state of war can be terminated only 

by Congress or Presidential Proclamation pursuant 

to authority of congress, which has not been don? 

in relation to World War II or the national emergenoy proclaimed by President Roosevelt on May 27, 

1941. Therefore, Section 6 of Senate Bill 129, 
Hon. Maureen Moore, page 4 (V-30) 

48th Legislature, setting forth certain exceptions 

during war or national emergencies, and Section 9 

of such Senate Bill authorizing the Commissioner 

of Labor Statistics to make an order granting an 

exemption in time of war under certain conditions, 

are still in effect. 

Yours very truly 

ATTORNEY GENERAL OFTEXAS 

Assistant 

APPROVED FEB. 17, 1947 

5ck-L-Jd 

ATTORNEY GERERAL 

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