Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 49A02-1704-CR-726 | September 5, 2017 Page 1 of 15

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D), 

this Memorandum Decision shall not be 

regarded as precedent or cited before any 

court except for the purpose of establishing 

the defense of res judicata, collateral 

estoppel, or the law of the case.

ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT

Jane H. Conley

Indianapolis, Indiana

ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE

Curtis T. Hill, Jr.

Attorney General of Indiana

George P. Sherman

Deputy Attorney General

Indianapolis, Indiana

I N T H E

COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA

Angela Kinney,

Appellant-Defendant,

v.

State of Indiana,

Appellee-Plaintiff.

September 5, 2017

Court of Appeals Case No.

49A02-1704-CR-726

Appeal from the Marion Superior 

Court

The Honorable Christina R. 

Klineman, Judge

Trial Court Cause No.

49G17-1701-F6-2268

Bradford, Judge.
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Case Summary

[1] Appellant-Defendant Angela Kinney and Michael Kinney were married and 

are the parents of two children, C.K. and K.K. (collectively, “the Children”). 

At some point, Kinney and Michael separated, after which Michael was 

awarded custody of the Children. In January of 2017, Michael and the 

Children resided with Michael’s mother, Carol Henderson.

[2] On January 16, 2017, Kinney went to Henderson’s residence and, while there, 

engaged in a number of unlawful acts including punching and choking 

Henderson and choking and biting Michael. Appellee-Plaintiff the State of 

Indiana (“the State”) subsequently charged Kinney with Level 6 felony 

domestic battery, two counts of Level 6 felony strangulation, Level 6 felony 

battery against a public safety official, and two counts of Class A misdemeanor 

battery resulting in bodily injury. Following a bench trial, Kinney was found 

guilty as charged. The trial court subsequently merged one of the Class A 

misdemeanor battery charges with the Level 6 felony domestic battery charge 

and sentenced Kinney to an aggregate term of 365 days with credit for time 

served and the remainder suspended to probation.

[3] On appeal, Kinney contends that the trial court abused its discretion by failing 

to conduct a competency hearing prior to the start of trial. Kinney also 

contends that the evidence is insufficient to sustain her conviction for Level 6 

felony domestic battery. Concluding otherwise, we affirm.
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Facts and Procedural History

[4] Kinney and Michael were married and are the parents of the Children. At 

some point, Kinney and Michael separated, after which Michael was awarded 

custody of the Children. In January of 2017, Michael and the Children were 

living with Henderson. 

[5] On January 16, 2017, Kinney went to Henderson’s residence. When Kinney 

arrived at the residence, the Children were both in K.K.’s bedroom. After 

knocking on the front door, Kinney “barged in” the residence. Tr. Vol. II, p. 

27. Kinney then attempted to go “back to [K.K.’s] bedroom.” Tr. Vol. II, p. 

27. The situation turned violent after Michael requested that Kinney leave the 

residence. 

[6] While standing in the living room, Kinney indicated that she “wasn’t leaving 

without her children and she was going to take them home.” Tr. Vol. II, p. 10. 

Henderson positioned herself between Kinney and the Children and stated 

“You’re not taking your children home. You lost that parental rights seven (7) 

years ago” when Michael was awarded custody. Tr. Vol. II, p. 10. Kinney 

then “punched [Henderson] in the eye and ran” back toward K.K.’s bedroom.1 

Tr. Vol. II, p. 10. Kinney ran back into K.K.’s bedroom and “slammed the 

door.” Tr. Vol. II, p. 11. 

 

1

 As a result of being punched in the eye, Henderson suffered bruising and a cut that ran “from the center of 

the eye all the way to the side of [her] brow.” Tr. Vol. II, p. 11.
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[7] Michael and Henderson followed Kinney to the bedroom. Kinney resisted their 

attempts to enter the room. Eventually, Henderson and Michael were able to 

open the door. Michael pushed Kinney away from the door and stated “You 

don’t hit my mom.” Tr. Vol. II, p. 11. Henderson then indicated that she was 

going to call the police, after which Kinney attacked her. Kinney “grabbed 

[Henderson] by the throat with one (1) hand.” Tr. Vol. II, p. 12. Henderson 

gagged and had difficulty breathing because Kinney was squeezing her neck. 

Henderson later indicated that “it felt like [Kinney] was trying to rip my 

esophagus off of me.” Tr. Vol. II, p. 12.

[8] Kinney next “went after” Michael. Tr. Vol. II, p. 13. Kinney “put her hands 

around [Michael’s] neck and started choking [him].” Tr. Vol. II, p. 30. 

Michael “couldn’t breathe” and “felt like [Kinney] was tearing [his] skin.” Tr. 

Vol. II, p. 30. Kinney “had a hold of [Michael’s] neck while [they] were 

standing for at least a minute.” Tr. Vol. II, p. 31. While squeezing Michael’s 

neck, Kinney said, “Die, b[****], die.” Tr. Vol. II, p. 31. Eventually, Michael 

was able to take Kinney to the ground. Once on the ground, Michael 

attempted to restrain Kinney until police arrived. While on the ground, Kinney 

“swung a few times” at Michael and bit his left shoulder. Tr. Vol. II, p. 31. 

Kinney continued to struggle until responding officers arrived.

[9] When Indianapolis Metropolitan Police Officers Jason Hitchcock and Shane 

Nicholsen arrived at Henderson’s home, they were met by Henderson who was 

“seemed very upset.” Tr. Vol. II, pp. 47-48. Henderson “was crying and [ ] 
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was screaming that she needed help and that [the officers] needed to hurry.” 

Tr. Vol. II, p. 48. 

[10] Upon entering the home, Officer Hitchcock observed

Ms. Kinney on the ground, uhm, screaming and there was, uhm, 

blood all over her hands and then [Michael] was holding on to 

her, uhm, trying to, uhm, I guess like contain her and, uhm, he 

was saying that – he was yelling at us saying, “I need your help. 

You need to come help me.”

Tr. Vol. II, p. 48. Kinney was “squirming, fighting, [and] screaming.” Tr. Vol. 

II, p. 48. She was “very agitated, uhm, very belligerent. Uh, she – she was 

speaking in tongues, saying that, uh, she was God and that, uhm, that we were 

– meaning us as officers and the others in the room – we were all going to hell 

and, uhm, that there was nothing that we could do, uhm, to her.” Tr. Vol. II, 

p. 49. Kinney was “acting belligerent, yelling a lot of things that didn’t really 

make sense.” Tr. Vol. II, p. 49.

[11] [A]s Officer Nicholsen was getting information from those that 

were in the residence, uhm, Ms. Kinney was sitting down at the 

time. She immediately stood up and started to state, uhm, yell at 

[Henderson] and [Michael] that she was going to kill them and 

was saying that she is God and that everybody was going to Hell. 

Tr. Vol. II, p. 50. Officer Hitchcock then told her “Ma’am, you need to relax 

and have a seat.” Tr. Vol. II, p. 50. Kinney ignored Officer Hitchcock’s 

commands and “continued to yell and act belligerent, uhm, screaming 

profanities.” Tr. Vol. II, p. 50. Officer Hitchcock “then told her, ‘Ms. Kinney, 
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you need to sit down now.’” Tr. Vol. II, p. 50. At that point, Kinney 

“immediately turned to [Officer Hitchcock], yelled profanities in [his] face and 

then with her right leg kicked [Officer Hitchcock] in [his] right shin.” Tr. Vol. 

II, p. 50. The kick to the shin caused Officer Hitchcock to suffer pain. After 

Kinney kicked him, Officer Hitchcock “performed an IMPD-taught leg sweep” 

and “took Ms. Kinney to the ground.” Tr. Vol. II, p. 51. Kinney was then 

placed under arrest. 

[12] The next day, the State charged Kinney with Level 6 felony domestic battery, 

two counts of Level 6 felony strangulation, Level 6 felony battery against a 

public safety official, and two counts of Class A misdemeanor battery resulting 

in bodily injury. The matter proceeded to a bench trial on February 28, 2017. 

Before the trial commenced, the State indicated that it had “concerns as to 

competency, uh, given some of the statements that were made at the time of the 

arrest.” Tr. Vol. II, p. 4. The State further indicated that its concerns had been 

addressed with defense counsel. Defense counsel, however indicated that he 

did not “have any concerns about Ms. Kinney’s competency.” Tr. Vol. II, p. 4. 

Defense counsel further indicated that Kinney understood the nature of the 

proceedings and had been able to assist in developing a defense. The trial court 

stated that “given that [defense counsel] doesn’t seem to share [the State’s] 

concerns and he’s the one in, uhm, contact with, uhm, Ms. Kinney, I’m, uhm, 

going to proceed with trial.” Tr. Vol. II, pp. 5-6.

[13] Following the conclusion of trial, Kinney was found guilty as charged. The 

trial court subsequently merged one of the Class A misdemeanor battery 
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charges with the Level 6 felony domestic battery charge and sentenced Kinney 

to an aggregate term of 365 days with credit for time served and the remainder 

suspended to probation. This appeal follows. 

Discussion and Decision

I. Competency Hearing

[14] Kinney first contends that the trial court abused its discretion by failing to 

conduct a competency hearing prior to the start of trial. “The trial court must 

hold a competency hearing when the court has reasonable grounds to believe 

that defendant lacks the ability to understand the proceedings and assist in the 

preparation of [her] defense.” Timmons v. State, 500 N.E.2d 1212, 1217 (Ind. 

1986) (citing Ind. Code § 35-36-3-1). 

However, the right to a hearing is not absolute. Goodman v. State

(1983), Ind., 453 N.E.2d 984, 985. A hearing is required by 

statute and due process only when there is evidence before the 

court that creates a reasonable doubt as to the defendant’s 

competency. Pate v. Robinson (1966), 383 U.S. 375, 385, 86 S. Ct. 

836, 842, 15 L. Ed. 2d 815; Perry v. State (1984), Ind., 471 N.E.2d 

270, 273. Evidence sufficient to require a hearing must be 

determined on the facts of each case, and the decision lies within 

the province of the trial judge. Absent an abuse of discretion, the 

trial court’s decision will not be disturbed. Perry, 471 N.E.2d at 

273.

Fine v. State, 490 N.E.2d 305, 308 (Ind. 1986). “The tests for competence to 

stand trial are whether the defendant has sufficient present ability to consult 

with defense counsel with a reasonable degree of rational understanding and 
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whether defendant has a rational as well as a factual understanding of the 

proceedings against him.” Brown v. State, 485 N.E.2d 108, 110 (Ind. 1985) 

(citing Dusky v. U.S., 362 U.S. 402 (1960); Johnson v. State, 262 Ind. 516, 520,

319 N.E.2d 126, 128 (1974)). In determining whether a competency hearing is 

necessary, the trial court may “observe a defendant’s demeanor, including any 

uncooperative behavior[.]” Timmons, 500 N.E.2d at 1217 (citing Brown, 485 

N.E.2d at 110.

[15] On the morning of Kinney’s trial, the State indicated that it had concerns 

regarding Kinney’s competency in light of her behavior in the days leading up 

to and the time of the January 16, 2017 incident. In discussing the State’s 

concern, the parties and the trial court engaged in the following exchange: 

[The State]: Uh, yes, your Honor. I – the State would like 

to put on the record that, uhm, that we have concerns as to 

competency, uh, given some of the statements that were made at 

the time of the arrest. Uhm, it has been addressed this with 

Defense counsel.

[Trial Court]: Okay. [Defense Counsel]?

 

[Defense Counsel]: I – I don’t have any concerns about Ms. 

Kinney’s competency. I know my colleague, Ms. Frick, went 

and spoke with Ms. Kinney at the jail and there were some things 

said but she did understand the – my job, the prosecutor’s job, 

your job, everything that is – she understands the nature of 

what’s going on, I guess, and she’s been able to assist me in – in 

developing a defense.

[Trial Court]: Is the only basis for your concern the events 

of the day in question?

[The State]: Uhm, our concern started two (2) weeks 

before. Uh, she’s alleged to have, uh, told the family numerous 
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times that she was God and Collin Kinney was Jesus. Uhm, 

when the cops arrived, she’s alleged to have said the cops could

not do anything to her because she, uhm, will be going on an 

island. Uh, this gives the State–

** **

[Trial Court]: Okay. Uhm, well given that [Defense 

Counsel] doesn’t seem to share those concerns and he’s the one 

in, uhm, contact with, uhm, Ms. Kinney, I’m, uhm, going to 

proceed with trial.

Tr. Vol. II, pp. 4-6.

[16] “Mental illness itself is not a unitary concept. It varies in degree. It can vary 

over time. It interferes with an individual’s functioning at different times in 

different ways.” Ind. v. Edwards, 554 U.S. 164, 175 (2008). As such, one who 

suffers from mental illness may be competent to stand trial at times and 

incompetent to stand trial at others. Again, the standard for deciding whether 

one is competent to stand trial is whether the defendant, at the time of trial, 

possesses the ability to consult rationally with counsel and factually 

comprehend the proceedings against him or her. Brewer v. State, 646 N.E.2d 

1382, 1384 (Ind. 1995) (citing Mato v. State, 429 N.E.2d 945, 946 (Ind. 1982)). 

[17] The trial court noted the State’s concern about Kinney’s prior mental state but 

found that, as of the morning of trial, Kinney was competent to stand trial. 

However, Kinney’s counsel, who was in direct contact and discussions with 

Kinney, explicitly stated that he did not share the State’s concerns. Specifically, 

defense counsel noted that Kinney understood the proceedings against her and 

was able to competently assist in her defense. Kinney, herself, seems to 
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acknowledge that she was competent at the time of trial, noting that she was 

capable of and in fact did testify “coherently” during trial. Appellant’s Br. p. 8. 

The trial court was in the best position to judge Kinney’s then-mental state as it 

could observe Kinney’s demeanor, statements, and behavior. Given the record 

before us, we agree with the trial court’s assessment of Kinney’s mental state on 

the morning of trial. We therefore conclude that the trial court did not abuse its 

discretion by failing to conduct a competency hearing prior to the start of trial.

II. Sufficiency of the Evidence

[18] Kinney also contends that the evidence is insufficient to sustain her conviction 

for Level 6 felony domestic battery.

When reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence to support a 

conviction, appellate courts must consider only the probative 

evidence and reasonable inferences supporting the verdict. It is 

the fact-finder’s role, not that of appellate courts, to assess 

witness credibility and weigh the evidence to determine whether 

it is sufficient to support a conviction. To preserve this structure, 

when appellate courts are confronted with conflicting evidence, 

they must consider it most favorably to the trial court’s ruling. 

Appellate courts affirm the conviction unless no reasonable factfinder could find the elements of the crime proven beyond a 

reasonable doubt. It is therefore not necessary that the evidence 

overcome every reasonable hypothesis of innocence. The 

evidence is sufficient if an inference may reasonably be drawn 

from it to support the verdict.

Drane v. State, 867 N.E.2d 144, 146-47 (Ind. 2007) (citations, emphasis, and 

quotations omitted). “In essence, we assess only whether the verdict could be 

reached based on reasonable inferences that may be drawn from the evidence 
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presented.” Baker v. State, 968 N.E.2d 227, 229 (Ind. 2012) (emphasis in 

original). Upon review, appellate courts do not reweigh the evidence or assess 

the credibility of the witnesses. Stewart v. State, 768 N.E.2d 433, 435 (Ind. 

2002).

A. Whether the Evidence is Sufficient to Prove Kinney Acted 

Knowingly

[19] “[A] person who knowingly or intentionally: (1) touches a family or household 

member in a rude, insolent, or angry manner; or (2) in a rude, insolent, or angry 

manner places any bodily fluid or waste on a family or household member;

commits domestic battery, a Class A misdemeanor.” Ind. Code § 35-42-2-

1.3(a). However, the offense is a Level 6 felony if “[t]he person who committed 

the offense is at least eighteen (18) years of age and committed the offense 

against a family or household member in the physical presence of a child less 

than sixteen (16) years of age, knowing that the child was present and might be 

able to see or hear the offense.” Ind. Code § 35-42-2-1.3(b)(2). “A person 

engages in conduct ‘knowingly’ if, when he engages in the conduct, he is aware 

of a high probability that he is doing so.” Ind. Code § 35-41-2-2(b). “A person 

engages in conduct ‘intentionally’ if, when he engages in the conduct, it is his 

conscious objective to do so.” Ind. Code § 35-41-2-2(a). 

[20] With respect to this charge, the charging information alleges that

On or about January 17, 2017 [Kinney], being at least eighteen 

(18) years of age, did knowingly touch Michael Kinney, a family 

or household member, in a rude, insolent, or angry manner by 
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biting him, and [Kinney] committed said offense in the presence 

of [C.K.], a child less than 16 years of age; and/or [K.K.], a child 

less than 16 years of age; knowing that the child was present and 

might be able to see or hear the offense.

Appellant’s App. Vol. II – Confidential, pp. 20-21. Thus, in order to prove that 

Kinney committed the charged Level 6 felony domestic battery, the State was 

required to prove that she knowingly touched Michael in a rude, insolent, or 

angry manner in the presence of the Children, both of whom were under the 

age of sixteen.

[21] The evidence most favorable to the trial court’s judgment court indicates that 

on January 16, 2017, Kinney “barged” into Henderson’s residence, where 

Michael and the Children were staying. Tr. Vol. II, p. 27. Kinney subsequently 

punched and choked Henderson. She also choked Michael. In order to stop 

Kinney from choking anyone in the residence, Michael pushed Kinney to the 

ground and restrained her until police arrived. While on the ground, Kinney 

“swung a few times” at Michael and bit his left shoulder. Tr. Vol. II, p. 31. 

Kinney continued to struggle until after she was subdued by responding 

officers. The Children were present in the home when Kinney attacked 

Michael. 

[22] One may reasonably infer from the above-discussed evidence that Kinney acted 

knowingly when she attacked Michael. As such, we conclude that the evidence 

is sufficient to sustain Kinney’s conviction for Level 6 felony domestic battery. 

Kinney’s claim to the contrary amounts to nothing more than an invitation for 
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this court to reweigh the evidence, which we will not do. See Stewart, 768 

N.E.2d at 435. 

B. Whether the Evidence was Sufficient to Rebut Kinney’s 

Claim of Self-Defense

[23] Furthermore, to the extent that Kinney argues that the evidence is insufficient 

to rebut her claim of self-defense, we conclude otherwise. “The standard of 

review for a challenge to the sufficiency of evidence to rebut a claim of selfdefense is the same as the standard for any sufficiency of the evidence claim.” 

Kimbrough v. State, 911 N.E.2d 621, 635 (Ind. Ct. App. 2009) (citing Wilson v. 

State, 770 N.E.2d 799, 801 (Ind. 2002)). “We neither reweigh the evidence nor 

judge the credibility of witnesses. Wallace v. State, 725 N.E.2d 837, 840 (Ind. 

2000). “If there is sufficient evidence of probative value to support the 

conclusion of the trier of fact, then the verdict will not be disturbed.” Id. “If a 

defendant is convicted despite his claim of self-defense, this Court will reverse 

only if no reasonable person could say that self-defense was negated by the 

State beyond a reasonable doubt.” Kimbrough, 911 N.E.2d at 635 (citing Wilson

at 800-01).

[24] A valid claim of self-defense is a legal justification for an 

otherwise criminal act. Henson v. State, 786 N.E.2d 274, 277 

(Ind. 2003). A person is justified in using reasonable force 

against another person to protect the person or a third person 

from what the person reasonably believes to be the imminent use 

of unlawful force. Ind. Code § 35-41-3-2. In order to prevail on 

such a claim, the defendant must show that [s]he: (1) was in a 

place where [s]he had a right to be; (2) did not provoke, instigate, 

or participate willingly in the violence; and (3) had a reasonable 
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fear of death or great bodily harm. Wilson, 770 N.E.2d at 800. 

An initial aggressor or a mutual combatant, whether or not the 

initial aggressor, must withdraw from the encounter and 

communicate the intent to do so to the other person, before [s]he 

may claim self-defense. When a claim of self-defense is raised 

and finds support in the evidence, the State has the burden of 

negating at least one of the necessary elements. Id. The State 

can rebut the defendant’s claim of self-defense by relying on the 

evidence of its case-in-chief. Carroll v. State, 744 N.E.2d 432, 433 

(Ind. 2001).

Id.

[25] The evidence presented during trial demonstrates that at the time of Kinney’s 

attack on Michael, Kinney was not in a place where she had a right to be. Both 

Henderson and Michael testified that Kinney “barged in” to Henderson’s 

residence. Tr. Vol. II, pp. 9, 27. Neither Henderson nor Michael had invited 

Kinney into the residence. Moreover, Kinney refused to leave the residence 

after being instructed to do so. These facts negate Kinney’s self-defense claim.2 

See generally, Dixson v. State, 22 N.E.3d 836, 840 (Ind. Ct. App. 2014) (providing 

that the fact that the defendant did not have a right to be in the cafeteria in 

question when the incident occurred negated defendant’s self-defense claim). 

As was the case above, Kinney’s assertion that the State failed to rebut her 

 

2

 Kinney’s self-defense claim is also rebutted by the evidence demonstrating that Kinney was the initial 

aggressor as she punched and choked Henderson before Michael used any force to attempt to restrain 

Kinney.
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claim of self-defense amounts to nothing more than an invitation for this court 

to reweigh the evidence, which we will not do. See Wallace, 725 N.E.2d at 840.

Conclusion

[26] In sum, we conclude that (1) the trial court did not abuse its discretion by 

failing to order a competency hearing prior to the start of trial, and (2) the 

evidence is sufficient to sustain Kinney’s conviction for Level 6 felony domestic 

battery.

[27] The judgment of the trial court is affirmed.

May, J., and Barnes, J., concur.