United States Court of Appeals

For the Seventh Circuit

Chicago, Illinois 60604

Submitted November 10, 2020*

Decided November 12, 2020

Before

DIANE S. SYKES, Chief Judge

JOEL M. FLAUM, Circuit Judge

MICHAEL B. BRENNAN, Circuit Judge

No. 20-1894

CARL SELF,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

v.

ZACHARY BERGH, et al.,

Defendants-Appellees.

Appeal from the United States District 

Court for the Eastern District of 

Wisconsin.

No. 18-C-1823

Lynn Adelman,

Judge.

O R D E R

Carl Self, a former pretrial detainee, asserts that officers at the Brown County Jail

in Green Bay, Wisconsin, violated his constitutional rights when they ignored his 

requests for a shower, medical attention, and a new uniform after a guard discharged

oleoresin capsicum spray (“OC” or “pepper” spray) at him. Because Self did not raise 

* We have agreed to decide the case without oral argument because the briefs and 

record adequately present the facts and legal arguments, and oral argument would not 

significantly aid the court. FED. R. APP. P. 34(a)(2)(C).

NONPRECEDENTIAL DISPOSITION

To be cited only in accordance with Fed. R. App. P. 32.1
No. 20-1894 Page 2

any factual dispute about whether the jail officers acted reasonably, we affirm the 

district court’s entry of summary judgment for the defendants.

At summary judgment, Self did not reply to the defendants’ proposed statement 

of undisputed facts or provide his own statement, so the district court deemed the 

defendants’ facts undisputed. See E.D. WIS. CIV. L.R. 56(b)(2)(B).

1 Thus we recount the 

facts as the defendants stated them, still viewing them in the light most favorable to Self

and drawing inferences in his favor. Cady v. Sheahan, 467 F.3d 1057, 1061 (7th Cir. 2006). 

On September 26, 2018, at 9:40 p.m. a guard separated Self and another detainee 

with OC spray. When a guard uses OC spray, under jail policy, he must assess whether 

a detainee was directly hit in the face or eyes. At 9:41 p.m., Corporal Zachary Bergh

observed Self and spoke to the guard, and he concluded that the OC spray did not 

directly hit Self in his face or eyes. (Self maintains that he was sprayed on his face, eyes,

and body.) Bergh asked if Self needed medical attention; Self replied “no.” Bergh did 

not observe any negative effects, so Self was transferred to a segregation unit.

During the transfer, Self was argumentative and noncompliant with instructions. 

Upon arrival in the new pod, he asked for medical care (“OC aftercare”) and a shower. 

Because Self was still verbally abusive, however, Bergh denied his request for a shower 

and said that he could not be safely evaluated at that time. Bergh told Self to rinse off 

using his sink. Self then asked for a clean uniform, so, as he left the pod, Bergh directed 

his staff to get one for Self. Bergh then walked to the medical unit and told the medical 

staff about the fight and that Self requested care.

2 Bergh last saw Self on the night of the 

fight, at around 2:43 a.m. on September 27. He did not work on September 28 or 29.

Correctional officer Wade Delorit checked on Self at around 12:30 a.m. on 

September 27, and Self asked for a shower and a clean uniform. Delroit told him that, 

per the unit’s rules, he could shower during his recreation time in the morning and to

use the sink in the meantime. Detainees are typically provided with a hygiene kit 

1 Self contests this decision on appeal, but we have frequently explained that 

district courts may strictly enforce their local rules against pro se litigants at summary 

judgment. Cady v. Sheahan, 467 F.3d 1057,1061 (7th Cir. 2006). Doing so here was not an 

abuse of discretion. See id.

2 Self settled his claims against the medical staff members he sued, so we omit 

discussion of any medical response after the fight. 
No. 20-1894 Page 3

including soap upon transfer, though Self contends he lacked soap overnight. Still, he 

told Delorit later that he felt better after cleaning up in the sink. 

Delorit looked but could not find a clean uniform in the unit. He did not have 

access to the laundry, where new uniforms are stored, during the overnight shift.

Delorit told Self that he would continue looking during his break at 2:00 a.m. and notify 

the officers working the next shift. When he did not find one, he left a note. Delorit had 

no further contact with Self after his shift: He worked on a different unit on 

September 27 and was off the next two days.

Self took a shower the day after the fight, September 27, but he did not receive a 

clean uniform until late September 28 or early the next day; the correctional officer who 

provided it worked a shift from 6:30 p.m. to 6:30 a.m. With his summary-judgment 

brief, Self submitted recordings of his contemporaneous phone calls to his mother, 

expressing his need for a new uniform because he was covered in blood and OC spray.

OC spray is reddish in color and can look like blood (and vice versa). 

Correctional officers Brian Ostrenga and Alek Pearson also worked at the jail in 

the days after Self’s fight. Self did not ask either of them for medical care, a shower, or a 

new uniform. Self asked Ostrenga for, and received, a blanket and book from his 

property box. Pearson did not work in Self’s unit during the relevant period. 

Self sued Bergh, Delorit, Ostrenga, and Pearson (among others no longer in the 

case) under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging that they subjected him to unconstitutional 

conditions of confinement by failing to timely provide him with medical care, a shower, 

and a new uniform. After discovery, the defendants moved for summary judgment, and 

the district court granted their motion. The court concluded that Self failed to provide 

sufficient evidence from which a reasonable jury could find that the defendants acted 

objectively unreasonably. Self appeals this decision, which we review de novo.

See Machicote v. Roethlisberger, 969 F.3d 822, 827 (7th Cir. 2020). 

Self contends that the way the guards handled his requests for medical care, a 

shower, and clean uniform in the hours and days after his fight violated his 

constitutional rights. Though the record was unclear, the district court inferred, based 

on the timing of his arrest and conviction, that Self was a detainee. Neither side takes 

issue with that inference on appeal. Therefore, we consider whether any defendant 

created conditions of confinement that were “objectively unreasonable.” See Kingsley v. 

Hendrickson, 576 U.S. 389, 396–97 (2015); Hardeman v. Curran, 933 F.3d 816, 823 (7th Cir. 
No. 20-1894 Page 4

2019) (applying an objectively unreasonable standard to all conditions-of-confinement 

claims brought by pretrial detainees.) This means a pretrial detainee must establish that 

a defendant “acted purposefully, knowingly, or perhaps even recklessly[,]” but with 

more than negligence. Miranda v. Cnty. of Lake, 900 F.3d 335, 353 (7th Cir. 2018).

Self contends that he raised a factual dispute that the officers acted unreasonably

because they violated the jail’s policy of providing him medical care immediately after 

contact with OC spray. A violation of jail policy alone does not establish a constitutional 

violation, however. See Pulera v. Sarzant, 966 F.3d 540, 551 (7th Cir. 2020). In any case, 

the evidence shows that Bergh (the only named defendant present immediately after 

the fight) adhered to the policy and acted reasonably. He evaluated Self and concluded

that OC spray hit the side of his head but not his face or eyes. He asked Self if he 

required medical care, and Self declined. When Self changed his mind a short time later, 

Bergh notified medical staff, even though he did not observe any negative reactions to 

the OC spray. Finally, because there is no evidence that Self had an urgent need for 

medical care, Bergh also reasonably adhered to the jail’s policy when he told the 

medical staff that they should postpone treatment until Self no longer posed a safety 

risk. See Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 546–47 (1979); Mays v. Dart, 974 F.3d 810, 820–21 

(7th Cir. 2020). Self counters that he was not argumentative, but the district court need 

not have credited Self’s unsworn allegation in the face of contrary evidence.

Next, Self argues that he raised a factual dispute that the guards unreasonably

delayed his access to a shower. But we agree with the district court that the overnight 

delay was not unreasonable. Bergh considered Self a safety risk at the time he asked for 

a shower. See Bell, 441 U.S. at 546–47; Mays, 974 F.3d at 820–21. Delorit told Self that he 

could shower at the next available time, during morning recreation. Meanwhile, he 

could rinse off in his sink. Self further complains that he did not receive soap until the 

next day, although the evidence shows that the practice is to distribute it upon transfer. 

Even if Self did not receive soap until the next day, though, there is no evidence that 

this resulted from anything more than negligence, which does not establish a

constitutional violation. See McCann v. Ogle Cnty., 909 F.3d 881, 886–87 (7th Cir. 2018).

Next, Self contends that he raised a factual dispute that the defendants

unreasonably delayed giving him a clean uniform. Although the delay here appears 

lengthy, persisting even days after Self showered, neither Bergh’s nor Delorit’s conduct 

was objectively unreasonable. These two defendants were involved only to the extent 

that Self did not get a clean uniform on the night of the fight. After that, Delorit and 

Bergh were not involved. Further, they each acted reasonably when they were. 
No. 20-1894 Page 5

Delorit searched for a uniform as soon as Self requested one at 12:30 a.m. When 

he could not find one, he notified Self and then left a note for the morning shift. The 

laundry, where clean uniforms are kept, was closed overnight. Self says that Delorit 

could have gotten one from the booking department, but that is unsupported. It is also 

undisputed that Bergh told his staff to provide Self a new uniform shortly after Self 

arrived in segregation. Self argues that Bergh must be lying because his staff would 

have followed his order; however, even if someone disobeyed Bergh, subordinates’ 

actions are not imputed onto supervisors. See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 677 (2009).

Self also argues that, because he had blood on his uniform, jail policy required an 

immediate change of clothing. Although Self told his mother that his uniform was 

bloody, there is no evidence he told any defendant. The defendants swore that they did 

not see any blood. Self insists they are lying because a guard who is not a party to this 

case saw blood. But credibility determinations are for a jury after the plaintiff raises a 

dispute of material fact; Self’s speculation is insufficient. See Beatty v. Olin Corp., 

693 F.3d 750, 754 (7th Cir. 2012). 

As to the remaining defendants, we agree with the district court that Ostrenga 

was entitled to summary judgment because, although he interacted with Self, there is 

no evidence that he was asked for, or otherwise knew of a need for, access to a shower 

or a new uniform. And there is no evidence that Pearson participated in the events on 

which Self’s claims are based. See Colbert v. City of Chicago, 851 F.3d 649, 657 (7th Cir. 

2017). 

Finally, to the extent that Self is challenging the denial of his motion to alter or 

amend the judgment, the district court properly denied it. We agree that Self’s motion 

restated his previous arguments and expressed disagreement with the district court’s

ruling, rather than identify any new evidence or a manifest error of law or fact. See FED.

R. CIV. P. 59(e); Vesely v. Armslist LLC, 762 F.3d 661, 666 (7th Cir. 2014).

We have reviewed the rest of Self’s arguments, and none has merit.

AFFIRMED