MAINE	SUPREME	JUDICIAL	COURT Reporter	of	Decisions

Decision: 2023 ME	61

Docket: And-22-396

Argued: June	7,	2023

Decided: September	5,	2023

Panel: STANFILL,	C.J.,	and MEAD,	JABAR,	HORTON,	CONNORS,	and	DOUGLAS, JJ.

DANIEL	WOOD

v.

DEPARTMENT	OF	INLAND	FISHERIES	AND	WILDLIFE

DOUGLAS,	J.

[¶1]	 Daniel	 Wood	 appeals	 from	 a	 judgment	 of	 the	 Superior	 Court	

(Androscoggin	County,	Stewart,	J.)	affirming	the	decision	of	the	Commissioner	

of	the	Department	of	Inland	Fisheries	and	Wildlife	to	revoke or	suspend Wood’s	

hunting	license	 for	three	years	and	his	guide	license	 for	one	year.		He	argues	

that	 the	 Commissioner misinterpreted	 a	 statute as	 requiring	 a	 mandatory	

revocation	 of	 his	 hunting	 license; that	 the	 statute	 governing	 revocation	 of	

hunting	 licenses is	 unconstitutionally	 vague;	 and	 that Department rules	

establishing	standards	of	competency,	which	the	Commissioner	relied	upon	in	

revoking	 his	 guide	 license, result from an	 unconstitutional	 delegation	 of	

authority	by	the	Legislature.	 We	affirm	the	judgment.
2

I.		BACKGROUND

[¶2]	 Based	on	an	incident	in	November	2018,	the	State	charged	Wood	

with	discharge	 of	a	 firearm	 or	crossbow	near	a	dwelling	 (Class	E),	12	M.R.S.	

§ 11209(1)(A),	(2) (2023).1		Through	a	subsequent	plea	agreement,	Wood was	

charged	 with,	 and	 pleaded	 guilty	 to,	 reckless	 conduct	 (Class D),	 17-A M.R.S.	

§ 211	(2023),2 and	the	State	dismissed	the	initial	charge.		On January	6,	2022,	

the	court	(Lawrence,	J.)	signed	the	judgment	and	commitment,	ordering	Wood	

to	pay	a	$1,000	fine.		

[¶3]		By letter	dated	January	25,	2022,	the	Commissioner	notified	Wood	

that	pursuant	 to	12	M.R.S.	 §	10902	(2023)	his	 “privilege	 to	obtain	a	hunting	

license	and	[his] right	to	apply	for	or	obtain	a	hunting	license	from	the	Maine	

Department	 of	 Inland	 Fisheries	 and	 Wildlife	 [was] revoked	 effective	

1		Although	this	statute	was	amended	after	the	conduct	at	issue	here,	we	cite	the	current	statute	

because	the	amendment	was	merely	syntactical	 to	accommodate	an	additional	paragraph	and	did	

not	make	any	substantive	change	to	the	offense	charged.		See	P.L.	2021,	ch.	74,	§ 2	(effective	Oct.	18,	

2021)	(codified	at	12	M.R.S.	§ 11209(1)(A) (2023)).		The	statute	provides,	with	certain	exceptions	

not	relevant	here,	that	“[a]	person	may	not	.	.	.	discharge	a	firearm	.	.	.	or	cause	a	projectile	to	pass	as	

a	 result	 of	 that	 discharge	 within	 100	 yards	 of	 a	 building	 or	 residential	 dwelling	 without	 the	

permission	of	the	owner	or,	in	the	owner’s	absence,	of	an	adult	occupant	of	that	building	or	dwelling	

authorized	to	act	on	behalf	of	the	owner.”		12	M.R.S.	§ 11209(1)(A).

2		“A	person	is	guilty	of	reckless	conduct	if	he	recklessly	creates	a	substantial	risk	of	serious	bodily	

injury	to	another	person.”		17-A	M.R.S.	§ 211(1)	(2023).		“A	person	acts	recklessly	with	respect	to	a	

result	 of	 the	 person’s	 conduct	 when	 the	 person	 consciously	 disregards	 a	 risk	 that	 the	 person’s	

conduct	will	cause	such	a	result.”		17-A	M.R.S.	§ 35(3)(A)	(2023).		“[T]he	disregard	of	the	risk,	when	

viewed	in	light	of	the	nature	and	purpose	of	the	person’s	conduct	and	the	circumstances	known	to	

the	 person,	 must	 involve	 a	 gross	 deviation	 from	 the	 standard	 of	 conduct	 that	 a	 reasonable	 and	

prudent	person	would	observe	in	the	same	situation.”		Id. § 35(3)(C).
3

01/06/2022	 to	 01/06/2025” because	 of	 his	 conviction	 for	 reckless	 conduct.

The	 letter	 explained	 that	 the	 one-year	 period	 from	 January	 6,	 2022,	 to	

January 6,	2023,	represented	a	mandatory	revocation	under	section	10902 and	

that	 the	 additional,	 three-year, concurrent	 suspension period	 ending	 on	

January 6,	2025, was	nonmandatory	and	was	being	imposed	in	the	discretion	

of	the	Commissioner.		In	a second	letter	of	the	same	date	(January 25,	2022),	

the	Commissioner	notified	Wood	 that his	 “privilege	 to	obtain	a	guide	license	

and	[his]	right	to	apply	for	or	obtain	a	guide	license	from	the	Maine	Department	

of	 Inland	 Fisheries	 and	 Wildlife	 [were] revoked	 effective	 01/25/2022	 to	

01/25/2023”	because	of the	same conviction.		See	12 M.R.S.	§§ 10902,	10908	

(2023). Both	letters	informed	Wood	of	his	right	to	an	administrative	hearing	if	

requested	in	writing	within	thirty	days	“after	receipt	of	notice”	of	the	decision	

to	revoke	or	suspend	the	license.3		

3	 	By	 statute,	 the	 hunting	license	 could	 be	 revoked for	 a	mandatory	 one-year	 period	 upon	 the	

conviction	of	a	crime	that	was	committed	“while	.	.	.	in	the	pursuit	of	wild	animals,”	12	M.R.S.	§ 10902	

(4)(A) (2023),	but	it	could	also	be	suspended for	a	nonmandatory	period,	id. § 10902(1),	whereas	the	

guide	license	could	be	either	revoked	or suspended	based	on	a	violation	of	standards	of	competency,	

12 M.R.S.	§ 10908 (2023).

In	 her	 decision	 and	 her	 letters	 to	 Wood,	 the	 Commissioner	 appears	 to	 conflate	 the	 terms	

“revocation”	and	“suspension”	as	used	in	the	pertinent	statutes.		See	id. §§	10902(1),	(4)(A),	10908.		

For	example,	in	her	final	decision	signed	on	May	27,	2022,	she	reported	that	Wood’s	hunting	license,	

and	right	to	apply	for	or	obtain	a	hunting	license,	had	been	“revoked”	for	a	three-year	period	but	then	

specified	that	she	had “imposed	a	one-year	mandatory	suspension	.	.	.	and	an	additional	[concurrent]	

three-year	 non-mandatory	 suspension”	 of	 that	 license.	 	 She	 later	 referred	 to	 a	 “three-year,	

non-mandatory	revocation”	of	the	hunting	license.		Her	January	25,	2022,	letter	to	Wood	concerning	

the	 hunting	 license	 bore	 a	 heading	 referencing	 mandatory	 and	 nonmandatory	 periods	 of	
4

[¶4]	 	 Wood	 timely	 requested	 an	 administrative hearing as	 to	 the	

Commissioner’s	 decision	 on	both	licenses.	 At	 the	 hearing,	held on	 April	 27,	

2022,	both Wood	and	the	game	warden	who	investigated	the	November	2018	

incident	testified; and	the	Department introduced	without	objection	its file	on	

the	matter,	which	included	the game	warden’s	report.	 The	following	facts	are	

supported	by	the	record	and	are	not	in	dispute.

[¶5]	 Wood,	a	registered	Maine	Guide,	shot	a	deer	from	a	public	road	in	

Lewiston.	 	 According	 to	 the	 game	 warden’s	 report,	 a	 witness	 had	 observed	

“[r]evocation,”	but	it	also	referred	to	a	one-year	“mandatory	minimum	suspension	period	required	

by	State	law.”		Similarly,	the	Commissioner’s	January	25,	2022,	letter	to	Wood	regarding	his	guide	

license	bore	a	heading	referring	 to	 “[r]evocation”	of	 the	license,	but	it	also	included	 the	 following	

paragraph	referring	to	a	“suspension”	of	that	license:

Maine	is	a	member	state	of	the	Interstate	Wildlife	Violator	Compact	(IWVC)	and	as	

such	has	entered	your	name	and	terms	of	suspension	into	the	IWVC	database.	 Your	

hunt/fish/trap	privileges	may	be	suspended	in	all	member	states	for	the	duration	of	

your	suspension	in	Maine.	 If	you	wish	to	hunt/fish/trap	in	another	state	during	the	

period	 of	 time	 your	 Maine	 hunt/fish/trap	 privileges	 are	 revoked,	 it	 is	 your	

responsibility	 to	 contact	 that	 state[’]s	 fish	 and	 wildlife	 agency	 to	 determine	 your	

eligibility	to	purchase	a	recreational license.

The	two	terms	are	not	defined	in	Title	12,	but	the	dictionary	definitions	of	the	terms	highlight	the	

difference	 between	 the	 two.	 	 See	 Suspend,	 American	 Heritage	 Dictionary	 of	 the	 English	 Language

(5th ed.	2016)	(defining	“suspend”	to	mean	“[t]o	bar	for	a	period	from	a	privilege”);	Revoke,	American	

Heritage	Dictionary	of	the	English	Language (defining	“revoke”	to	mean	“[t]o	invalidate	or	cause	to	

no	longer	be	in	effect,	as	by	voiding	or	canceling”).		Thus,	based	on	the	terms’	ordinary	meanings,	a	

suspended	license	would	be	returned	to	active	status	at	the	end	of	the	suspension	period	(unless	it	

had	expired	according	to	its	original	terms),	whereas	a	revoked	license	would	be	canceled and	the	

holder	 required	 to	 apply	 for	 the	 license	 anew	 after	 the	 period	 of	 the	 revocation.	 	 Although	 the	

distinction	between	the	two	terms	has	not	been	raised	as	an	issue	in	this	appeal,	we	endeavor	to	use	

the	 terms	 consistently	 with	 the	 statutes,	 and	 we	 understand	 the	 Commissioner	 to	 have	 revoked	

Wood’s	 hunting	 and	 guide	 licenses	 for	 one	 year,	 though	 she	 imposed	 a	 nonmandatory	 period	 of	

suspension of	the	hunting	license.
5

Wood’s	 truck	 stopped	in	 the	 roadway,	 facing	in	 the	wrong	direction	with	its	

driver’s	door	open.		While	leaning	on	the	passenger-side	mirror and	pointing

his	firearm	in	the	direction	of	a	residence,	Wood	aimed	and	fired,	killing a	deer.		

Subsequent	measurements	established	 that	 the	deer was	 standing	eighty-six

yards	from	the	residence when	struck	by	the	bullet	fired	by	Wood.		

[¶6] Wood did	not	dispute	that	he	shot	the	deer	in	the	manner	described	

in	 the	 game	 warden’s	 report or that	 the	 deer	 was	 within	 100	 yards	 of	 the	

residence	when it	was hit.		See	12	M.R.S.	§	11209(1)(A).

4		He	did	not	dispute

that	 he	pleaded	 guilty	to	 and	was	 convicted	 of	 reckless	 conduct	under	 17-A	

M.R.S.	§	211	based	on the	same	conduct.		Rather,	he	argued	that	the	statutes	

and	 regulations	 under	 which	 his	 licenses	 were	 revoked	 or	 suspended	 are

overbroad,5 vague,	and	standardless.		He	further	argued	that	the	revocation	of	

his	hunting	license	would	be	mandatory	only	if	he	were	convicted	of a	crime	for	

which the	act	of hunting	was	an	element of	the	offense.		

4		See	also 12	M.R.S.	§	11208	(2023)	(classifying	shooting	at	an	animal	from	any	public	paved	way	

as	a	Class	E	crime).

5	 	Wood	also	 contends in	 his	 brief	 here that	 the	 statute	is	 overbroad,	 but	 he	 cites	 no	 cases	 on	

overbreadth.	 	 An overbreadth	 argument	 is	 inapposite	 here	 because	 it	 is grounded	 in	 the	 First	

Amendment, see	 State v. Cropley,	 544	 A.2d	 302,	 304	(Me.	 1988),	 and	 nothing	 in	Wood’s	 conduct	

involved	speech.	 Accordingly,	we	consider	Wood’s	argument	on	appeal	to	be	based	on	vagueness.
6

[¶7]	 	In	 a May	 27,	 2022,	 decision,	 the	 Commissioner determined that	

(1) Wood’s	 conviction	 for reckless	 conduct,	 17-A	 M.R.S.	 §	 211, in	 these	

circumstances	 “is	 sufficient	 grounds	 for	 the	 revocation	 of	 Wood’s	 hunting	

license,	and	of	his	right	to	apply	for	or	obtain	a	hunting	license” under	12	M.R.S.	

§	 10902(4)(A)	 and	 (2) section	 10902	 “was	 properly	 applied” as	 to	 the	

mandatory	one-year	revocation.		Given	the	nature	of	Wood’s	actions,	she	also	

found	that	an	additional,	three-year,	concurrent	nonmandatory	suspension of	

the right	to	apply	for	a hunting	license	was	appropriate.		She	then	reasoned	that	

the	 revocation of	Wood’s	guide	license	was	justified	 because	Wood	 failed	 to	

meet	 the	 Department’s	 standards	 of	 competency	 for	 a	 guide,	 which	 require,	

among	other	 things,	 that	a	guide	have	“experience based	judgment” that	will	

ensure	safety	and	that	 the	guide	understand	and	abide	by	all	laws	and	rules	

involving	 the	 licensed	 activities.	 	 09-137	 C.M.R.	 ch.	 24,	 § 24.08(A)(3),	 (5)	

(effective	April	13,	2021).

6

[¶8]	 	 Wood	 timely	 petitioned	 the	 Superior	 Court	 for	 review	 of	 the	

Department’s	 final	 agency action.	 	 See	 5	 M.R.S.	 §§ 11001,	 11002	 (2023);

6		Although	section	24.08	has	been	amended	since	the	2018	incident	that	led	to the	revocation	or	

suspension	of	Wood’s	licenses,	the	relevant	subsections	were	not	affected.		Compare 09-137	C.M.R.	

ch.	 24,	 § 24.08(A)(3),	 (5)	 (effective	 April	 13,	2021),	with 09-137	 C.M.R.	 ch.	 24,	 § 24.08(A)(3),	 (5)	

(effective	July	25,	2020).
7

M.R. Civ.	P.	80C.	 After	accepting	briefs	from	the	parties,	the	court	(Stewart,	J.)	

entered	 a	 judgment on	 November	 21,	 2022, affirming	 the	 Commissioner’s	

decisions.		Wood	 timely	appealed.		See 5 M.R.S.	 §	11008	 (2023);	M.R.	App.	P.

2B(c)(1).	

II.		DISCUSSION

[¶9]	 	 We	 begin	 by	 summarizing	 the	 statutes	 at	 issue	 on	 appeal,	 then	

address	each	of	the	issues	Wood	raises.

A. Statutes	 Governing	the	 Revocation	 or	 Suspension	 of	 Hunting	 and	

Guide	Licenses

[¶10]	 Section	10902	of	Title	12	of	the	Maine	Revised	Statutes	sets	out	

the	 circumstances	 under	which	 the	 Commissioner	may revoke	 or	 suspend a	

person’s	 hunting	 license	 (or	 the	 right	 to	 apply	 for	 a	 hunting	 license).7		

Subsection	 1	 provides,	 in	 part,	 that	 “[a]ny	 conviction	 or	 adjudication	 for	 a	

violation	of	this	Part	is	grounds	for	suspension	of	any	license	or	permit	issued

under	 this	 Part.	 	 Except	 where	 provided	 by	 law,	 the	 commissioner	 shall	

determine	 the	 suspension	 period.”	 	 12	 M.R.S.	 §	 10902(1).	 	 Subsection	 4

provides:

A	 person’s	 license	 must	 be	 revoked	 under	 the	 following	

circumstances.

7 See	supra n.3.
8

A.		If	a	person	holding	a	license	or	permit	under	.	.	. chapter

[913] is	convicted	of	 the	 violation	of	any	provision	of	Title	

17-A	while	on	a	hunting	or	 fishing	 trip	or	in	 the	pursuit	of	

wild	 animals,	 wild	 birds	 or	 fish,	 the	 commissioner	 shall	

revoke	the	license	or	permit	held	by	that	person	for	a	period	

of	at	least	one	year,	except	when	the	killing	or	wounding	of	a	

human	being	has	occurred,	in	which	case	the	commissioner	

shall	revoke	the	license	or	permit	for	at	least	5	years.

Id. § 10902(4);	see	12	M.R.S.	§§ 10751-10759	(2023)	(establishing,	in	chapter	

913,	 the Department’s authority	 to	 issue	 licenses	 under	 part	 13	 of	 Title	 12,	

which	 governs	 inland	 fisheries	 and	 wildlife);	 12	 M.R.S.	 § 11101	 (2023)	

(particularly	authorizing,	within	part	13	of	Title	12,	the	issuance	of	a	hunting	

license).

[¶11]	 A	 person	 holding	 a	 guide	 license	 is	 subject	 to	 professional	

standards	 of	 conduct	 adopted	 by	 the	 Commissioner through	 the	 agency	

rulemaking	 process.	 	 See	 12 M.R.S.	 § 12851	 (2023); 5	 M.R.S.	 §§ 8051-8064,	

8071(3)	(2023);	09-137	C.M.R.	ch.	24,	§ 24.08.		Section	12851	authorizes	the	

Commissioner,	 with	 the	 advice	 and	 consent	 of	 the	 Advisory	 Board	 for	 the	

Licensing	of	Guides,	to	adopt	rules	in several areas,	including	rules	setting	out	

standards	of	competency for	guides.		12	M.R.S.	§	12851(3).		Among	other	things,	

the	 standards	 of	 competency that	 were	 adopted require	 a	 guide to	 “[h]ave	

experience	based	judgment	 that	helps	prevent	unsafe	situations”	and	“[f]ully	

understand	 and	 abide	 by	 all	 state	 and	 federal	 laws	 and	 rules	 involving	 the	
9

activities	in	the	classification(s)	for	which	the	Guide	is	licensed.”		09-137	C.M.R.	

ch.	24,	§ 24.08(A)(3),	(5).

B. Wood’s	Appeal

[¶12]	 	 Wood	 challenges	 (1)	 the	 Commissioner’s	 interpretation	 of	 the	

statute	 mandating	 revocation	 of	 his	 hunting	 license	 for	 one	 year;	 (2)	 the	

constitutionality	 of	 the statute governing	 hunting	 license	 revocation and	

suspension;	 and	 (3)	 the	 constitutionality	 of	 the	 legislative	 delegation	 of	

authority	to	establish	standards	of	competency	for	licensed	guides.		

1. Interpretation	of Section	10902(4)(A)

[¶13]		Wood	contends that	the	revocation	of	his	hunting	license	was	not	

required	by	section	10902(4)(A)	because	the	Title	17-A	offense	of	which	he	was	

convicted	 did	 not	include	 as	one	 of	its elements that	 he	was	 engaged	in	 the	

pursuit	 of	 a	 wild	 animal.	 	 Wood argues	 that	“while	 he	 was	 convicted	 of	 an	

offense	under	Title	17-A,	he	was	not	convicted	of	doing	so	while	hunting,	fishing	

or	pursuing	wild	animals,	as	the	statute	clearly	requires.”		

[¶14]	 	“[W]hen	 the	 trial	 court	 has	 acted	 in	 an	 intermediate	 appellate	

capacity,	we review	 directly	 the	 original	 decision	 of	 the	 fact-finding	 agency,	

without	deference	to	the	ruling	on	the	intermediate	appeal	by	the	court	from	

which	the	appeal	is	taken.”		Black	v.	Bureau	of	Parks	&	Lands,	2022	ME	58,	¶	25,	
10

288	 A.3d	 346	 (quotation	 marks	 omitted).	 	 We review de	 novo questions	 of	

statutory	interpretation	involved	in	Rule	80C	appeals.		Ouellette	v.	Saco	River	

Corridor	Comm’n,	2022	ME	42,	¶	8,	278	A.3d	1183.		In	interpreting	a	statute,	we	

look	 to	 its plain	 meaning,	 reading	 its	 language in	 harmony	 with	 the	 entire	

statutory	scheme in	which	it	appears,	and	interpret the	statutory language	“to	

avoid	absurd,	illogical	or	inconsistent	results.”		Jackson	Lumber	&	Millwork	Co.	

v.	 Rockwell	 Homes,	 LLC,	 2022	 ME	 4,	 ¶ 10,	 266	 A.3d	 288	 (quotation	 marks	

omitted).

[¶15]	 	The	language	 of	 section	 10902(4)(A) is very	 clear.	 	It	does	 not	

require	 that an	element	of the	predicate	Title	17-A	offense	involve	 the	act	of	

“hunting,	 fishing or	 pursuing	 wild	 animals”	 as	 Wood	 suggests.	 	 Rather,	 the	

statute	 plainly	 says	 that	 if	 a	 licensee	 “is	 convicted	 of	 the	 violation	 of	 any	

provision of	Title	17-A while	on	a	hunting	or	fishing	trip	or	in	the	pursuit	of	wild	

animals,” a	 mandatory	 one-year	 license	 revocation	 is	 triggered.	 12	 M.R.S.	

§ 10902(4)(A)	 (emphasis	 added).	 In	 other	 words, nothing	 in	 section	

10902(4)(A) requires	that	the	underlying	criminal	conviction	involve	the	act	of	

hunting,	 fishing,	 or	 pursuit	 of	 wild	 fish,	 fowl, or	 game.	 	 A	 violation	 of	 “any	

provision	of	Title	17-A”	is	sufficient	so	long	as	it	was	committed	“while	on	a	

hunting	or fishing	trip	or	in	the	pursuit wild	animals,	wild	birds or	fish.”		Id.
11

[¶16]		This	interpretation	makes	sense	in	the	context	of	section	10902,	

which	includes	multiple	provisions	authorizing the	Commissioner	to	revoke	or	

suspend	 a	 license	 when	 a	 licensed	 person’s conduct while	 hunting has	

threatened	public	safety.		See,	e.g.,	12	M.R.S.	§ 10902(5)	(authorizing	revocation	

or	suspension	if	a	person	“killed,	wounded	or	recklessly	endangered	the	safety	

of	 another	 human	 being	 while	 hunting”);	 id. § 10902(6)(B)	 (requiring	

suspension	of	a	hunting	license	for	at	least	a	year	when	a	person	is	convicted	of	

hunting	while	 under	 the	influence	 of	intoxicating	liquor	 or	 drugs).	 	 It	is	also	

consistent	 with	 the	 administrative	 duties	 and	 responsibilities	 of	 the	

Commissioner	to	enforce	fish	and	game	laws	in	a	manner	that	protects	public	

safety.	 	 See	 12	 M.R.S.	 § 10103(2)	 (2023) (“[T]he	 commissioner	 has	 general	

supervision	of	the	administration	and	enforcement	of	the	inland	fisheries	and	

wildlife	laws	.	.	.	.”);	see also 12	M.R.S.	§ 10108(1),	(6-A)	(2023)	(requiring	the	

Commissioner	to	establish	training	programs	in	firearm	and	crossbow	hunting	

safety);	12	M.R.S.	§ 10104(1)	(2023)	(authorizing	the	Commissioner	to	adopt	

rules	necessary	for	the	enforcement	of	the	laws	the	Department is	responsible	

for	 administering);	 09-137	 C.M.R.	 § 16.04	 (2023)	 (requiring	 those	 using	 a	

firearm	 or	 crossbow	 to	 wear articles	 of	 hunter	 orange	 clothing	 during	

designated	seasons).
12

[¶17]	 	 Here,	 Wood	 does not dispute that	 the	 conduct	 underlying	 his	

Title 17-A	conviction	for	reckless	conduct involved	his	pursuit	of	a	wild	animal;	

he	 has	 admitted that	 he acted	 recklessly	 in	 shooting a	 deer.	 	 There	 was	

substantial	 evidence—as	 required	 for	 an	 administrative	 determination—to	

support	 the	Commissioner’s	finding	 that Wood was convicted of	a	Title	17-A	

offense—reckless	conduct	under	17-A	M.R.S.	§ 211—and	that	the	underlying	

conduct	 occurred	while	Wood	 was	 engaged	 in	 the	 pursuit	 of	 a	 wild	 animal.		

See 12	M.R.S. § 10902(4)(A); Richard v. Sec’y of State,	2018	ME	122,	¶	21,	192	

A.3d	611	(“Substantial evidence exists when a reasonable mind would rely on

that evidence as sufficient support for a conclusion.” (quotation marks

omitted)).	 	 The Commissioner’s interpretation of section 10902(4)(A) was

correct, and her action revoking Wood’s hunting license for the mandatory

minimum one-year period was supported by substantial evidence adduced at

the administrative hearing.

2. Constitutionality	 of	 the	 Statute	 Governing	 Hunting	 License	

Revocation and	Suspension

[¶18]	 	 Wood	 argues	 that	 section	 10902	 is	 unconstitutionally	 vague	

because	(1)	 it	 does	 not	 convey	 to	 a	 reasonable	 person	 that	 a	 conviction	 of	

reckless	 conduct,	 17-A	 M.R.S.	 §	 211,	 which	 includes	 no	 requirement	 of	 a	

connection	 to	 hunting,	 can result	in	 a	mandatory	hunting	license	 revocation
13

(and	an	additional	discretionary	license	 suspension); and	 (2)	it	provides	 the	

Commissioner	with such	wide	discretion	that	individuals,	including	Wood, can	

be	targeted	arbitrarily	for license	revocation.

8		

[¶19]		We	review	issues	of	constitutional	interpretation	de	novo.	 In	re	

Weapons	 Restriction	 of	 J.,	 2022	 ME	 34,	 ¶	 12,	 276	 A.3d	 510.	 The	 party	

challenging	 the	 constitutionality	 of	 a	 statute	 has	 “the	 heavy	 burden	 of	

overcoming	the	 presumption	 that	 the	 statute	is	 constitutionally	 valid.”	 Ford	

Motor	Co.	v.	Darling’s,	2014	ME	7,	¶ 33,	86	A.3d	35	(quotation	marks	omitted).

[¶20]	 Due	 process	 under	 the	 United	 States	 Constitution,	 U.S.	 Const.	

amend.	 XIV,	 §	 1, requires that	 a	 statute “provide	 reasonable	 and	 intelligible	

standard[s]	to	guide	the	future	conduct	of	individuals	and	to	allow	the	courts	

and	enforcement	officials	to	effectuate	the	legislative	intent	in	applying	these	

laws.”		Me.	Real	Est. Comm’n	v.	Kelby,	360	A.2d	528,	531	(Me.	1976)	(quotation	

marks	 omitted).	 	 “[A]	 statute	 is	 vague	 when	 its	 language	 either	 forbids	 or	

requires	 the	 doing	 of	 an	 act	 in	 terms	 so	 vague	 that	 people	 of	 common	

intelligence	 must	 guess	 at	 its	 meaning,	 or	 if	 it	 authorizes	 or	 encourages	

8		Although	Wood	has,	through	his	case	citations,	alluded	to both	the	federal	Due	Process	Clause	

and article	1,	section	6-A	of	the	Maine	Constitution,	he	has	developed	no	independent	analysis	of	the	

Maine	clause.		Any	reliance	on	the	Maine	Constitution	to	support	his	claim	is	therefore	waived,	and	

we	 focus	 on	 the	 federal	Due	Process	Clause,	applicable	here through	 the	 Fourteenth	Amendment.	

See U.S.	Const.	amend.	XIV,	§ 1;	State	v.	Moore,	2023	ME	18,	¶	20,	290	A.3d	533.
14

arbitrary	and	discriminatory	enforcement.”	Uliano	v.	Bd.	of	Env’t	Prot.,	2009	ME	

89,	¶	15,	977	A.2d	400	(quotation	marks	omitted).		The	focus	is	“on	the	need	

for	adequate	notice.”	 Doane	v.	Dep’t	of	Health	& Hum. Servs.,	2021	ME	28,	¶ 17,	

250	A.3d	1101.

[¶21]		As	discussed	above,	the	meaning	of	section	10902(4)(A) is	clear.		

If	one	is	convicted	of	“any”	Title	17-A	offense	while	in	pursuit	of	a	wild	animal,	

a	license	 revocation	is	 required.	 	12	M.R.S.	 § 10902(4)(A).	 	As	 applied	 here,	

Wood,	a	registered	Maine	Guide,	was	convicted	of	a	Title	17-A	offense	that not	

only	occurred	while	he	was	in	pursuit	of	a	deer,	but	the	conduct	itself—shooting	

at	a deer	near	a	residence—was	the	basis	for	the	conviction.		See	17-A	M.R.S.	

§ 211;	see	also	12	M.R.S.	§ 10902(4)(A).		He	admitted	to	the	conduct.		A person

of common intelligence, and especially a person in Wood’s position, reading the

statute in the context of the entire statutory scheme, see Jackson	

Lumber & Millwork	Co.,	2022	ME	4,	¶	10,	266	A.3d	288, would not have to guess

at the statute’s meaning to understand that the Commissioner could make

findings that form part of the basis for Wood’s license revocation, particularly

in the circumstances presented here.	 	 See 12 M.R.S. § 10902(4)(A), 10905

(2023).	 	Nor would a person have to guess at whether the statute requires

revocation if a person is convicted of a crime for shooting toward a residence
15

while hunting a deer that was less than 100 yards away from that residence.

9		

See id. § 10902(4)(A);	Uliano,	2009	ME	89,	¶ 15,	977	A.2d	400.

[¶22]	 	 Section	 10902(1)—the	 authority for	 the	 Commissioner’s	

discretionary	 suspension of	 Wood’s	 hunting	 license for	 an	 additional	 two	

years—provides	that	upon adjudication	of	a	violation	of	an	Inland	Fisheries	and	

Wildlife	statute,	the	Commissioner	may either	suspend a	license, id. § 10902(1),

or refuse	to	issue	one,	id. § 10902(2).		Thus,	the	Commissioner	was	authorized,	

based	 on	 her	 adjudication	 that	 Wood	 violated section	 10902(4)(A),	 to	

determine	 that	Wood would	 not	 be	 eligible	 to	 apply	 for	 or	 obtain	 a	 hunting	

license	for	a	period	of	time	beyond	the	mandatory	revocation	period.		Although	

the	 Commissioner’s	 discretion	 might not	 be	 defined	 with	 particularity	 for	

purposes	of	the	nonmandatory	suspension period,	some	guidance	is	provided	

by	the	minimum	revocation	period	of	five	years	that	applies	when	“the	killing	

or	wounding	 of	a	 human	 being	 has	 occurred.”	 	Id. § 10902(4)(A).	 	Given	 the	

statutory	 scheme	 and	 the	 circumstances	 presented	 here,	 the	 discretionary	

authority	in	section	10902(1)	to	suspend a	hunting	license	for	additional	years	

9		We	do	not	opine	on	the	more	ambiguous	situation	in	which	a	person	“on	a	hunting	or	fishing	

trip”	commits	a	crime	unrelated	to	hunting	or	fishing	while	on	that	trip.		12	M.R.S.	§	10902(4)(A).		

Presumably,	the	Commissioner	will not	be	inclined	to	revoke	a	license	if	a	person’s	conduct	is not	

connected	in	any	way	to	activities	that	a	hunting	or fishing	license	regulates.
16

is	 not so	 vague	 as	 to	 fail	 to	 provide	 notice	 or	 encourage	 arbitrary	 or	

discriminatory	enforcement, id. § 10902(1),	(2),	(4)(A); see	Doane,	2021	ME	28,	

¶	 17,	 250	 A.3d	 1101, and the	 three-year	 term	 of	 revocation and	 suspension

ultimately	imposed	on	him	is	consistent	with	the	statutory	scheme.		Wood	has	

not	 overcome	 the	 presumption	 of	 constitutionality	 to	 demonstrate	 that	 the	

statute	is	unconstitutionally	vague.		See Irish v.	Gimbel,	1997	ME	50,	¶	6,	691	

A.2d	664.

3. Delegation	of	Authority

[¶23]	 	 The	 Commissioner	 revoked	 Wood’s	 guide	 license	 for	 violating	

standards	of	conduct that	were	established	through	agency rulemaking.		Wood

contends	 that the	 Legislature	 unconstitutionally	 delegated to	 the	

Commissioner its	legislative	authority	 to	adopt	the	standards	of	conduct and	

that	 those	 standards,	 as	 applied, allowed	 the	 Department	 to	 target	 Wood

arbitrarily	for	license	revocation.		

[¶24]		With	respect	to	the	regulation	of	guides,	the	Legislature	conferred	

rulemaking	authority	on	the	Commissioner:

The	commissioner	shall,	with	the	advice	and	consent	of	the	

Advisory	Board	for	the	Licensing	of	Guides,	adopt	rules	necessary	

to	 administer	 this	 chapter.	 .	 .	 .	 The	 commissioner	 shall	 establish	

safety	 standards	 to	 provide	 the	 clients	 of	 guides	 reasonable	

protection	from	hazards.
17

12	M.R.S.	§ 12851.10		The	Legislature	specifically	authorized	the	Commissioner	

to	“establish	standards	of	competency	that	must	be	provided	to	each	applicant.”		

Id. § 12851(3).	 	Among	 other	 standards	 of	 competency	adopted	 through	 the	

rulemaking	process	are	the	requirements	that	a	guide	“[h]ave	experience	based	

judgment	 that	 helps	 prevent	 unsafe	 situations”	 and	 “[f]ully	 understand	 and	

abide	 by	 all	 state	 and	 federal	 laws	 and	 rules	 involving	 the	 activities	 in	 the	

classification(s)	 for	 which	 the	 Guide	 is	 licensed.”	 	 09-137	 C.M.R.	 ch.	 24,	

§ 24.08(A)(3),	 (5).	 	 The	 question	 is	 whether	 these	 standards	 were	 adopted	

through	a	lawful	delegation	of	authority.

[¶25]	 	 “An	 ‘excessive	 delegation’	 claim	 is	 based	 on	 the	 separation	 of	

powers	 clause	 of	 the	 Maine	 Constitution,	 which	 precludes	 a	 statutory	

delegation	to	a	regulator	so	broad	or	amorphous	that	it	amounts	to	a	surrender	

of	legislative	authority	to	the	executive	branch.”		Doane,	2021	ME	28,	¶	17,	250	

A.3d	1101;	see	Me.	Const.	art.	 III,	§	2.		 “[L]egislation	delegating	discretionary	

authority	 to	an	administrative	agency	is	unconstitutional	if	it	 fails	 to	contain	

standards	sufficient	to	guide	administrative	action.”		Uliano,	2009	ME	89,	¶	15,	

977	 A.2d	 400	 (quotation	 marks	 omitted).	 	 “[I]n	 delegating	 power	 to	 an	

10		The	Advisory	Board	for	the	Licensing	of	Guides	includes	four	public	members	in	addition	to	a	

subordinate	officer	of	the	Department,	two	wardens,	and	a	marine	patrol	officer	of	the	Department	

of	Marine	Resources.		See	12	M.R.S.	§ 10153(1)	(2023).
18

administrative	 agency,	 the	 legislative	 body	 must	 spell	 out	 its	 policies	 in	

sufficient	detail	to	furnish	a	guide	which	will	enable	those	to	whom	the	law	is	

to	be	applied	to	reasonably	determine	their	rights	thereunder,	and	so	that	the	

determination	of	those rights	will	not	be	left	to	the	purely	arbitrary	discretion	

of	the	administrator.”		Stucki	v.	Plavin,	291	A.2d	508,	510	(Me.	1972).		“[W]hile	

the	amount	of	discretion	the	Legislature	can	bestow	upon	a	state	agency	is	not	

boundless,	latitude	must	be	given	in	areas	where	 the	statutory	enactment	of	

detailed	specific	standards	is	unworkable.”		Doane,	2021	ME	28,	¶	27,	250	A.3d	

1101.

[¶26]		In	addition	to	legislative	specificity	in	a	delegation	of	authority,	the	

rulemaking	 process	 required	 by	 Maine’s	 Administrative	 Procedure	 Act

enhances accountability	 and	 ensures	 that	 the	 resulting	 regulations	

appropriately	limit	the	authority	of	the	agency	and	avoid	arbitrary	standards.11		

See	Uliano,	2009	ME	89,	¶	28,	977	A.2d	400	(stating	that	the	rulemaking	process	

provides	 “significant	 protection	against	abuses	 of	 discretion	 by	 the	Board	in	

exercising	its	 rule-making	 authority”	 and	 “compensates	 substantially	 for	 the	

11	 	 Cf. Kosalka	 v.	 Town	 of	 Georgetown,	 2000	 ME	 106,	 ¶¶	 5,	 17,	 752	 A.2d	 183 (holding	 that	 a	

municipal	ordinance	provision	requiring	that	proposed	campgrounds	“conserve	natural	beauty”	was	

so	“totally	lacking	in	cognizable,	quantitative	standards”	that	it	was	arbitrary	and	amounted	to	an	

unlawful	delegation	of	authority	(quotation marks	omitted)).
19

want	 of	 precise	 legislative	 guidelines”	 (alteration	 and	 quotation	 marks	

omitted));	see generally	5	M.R.S.	§§ 8051-8064.	 	 “The	 possibility	 of	arbitrary	

administrative	 decision-making	 common	 to	 both	 void-for-vagueness	 and	

excessive-delegation	 concerns	 is	 assuaged	 by	 the	 formal	 APA	 rulemaking	

process.”		Doane,	2021	ME	28,	¶	22,	250	A.3d	1101.		The rulemaking process	

includes	 the	 provision	 of	 notice to	 the	 public	 and	 pertinent	 legislative	

committees,	5 M.R.S.	§§	8053,	8053-A;	a	comment period,	see	id. § 8057-A(3);

and	 an opportunity for	 aggrieved	 persons to	 seek	 judicial	 review,	 see	 id.	

§ 8058.12

[¶27]		Here,	 the	Legislature	acted	well	within	constitutional	bounds	in	

delegating	 authority	 to	 the	 Commissioner	 to	 adopt	 competency	 standards

through	 the	 APA	 rulemaking	 process based	 on	 the	 Department’s	 expertise.		

Uliano,	2009	ME	89,	¶	28,	977	A.2d	400;	Doane,	2021	ME	28,	¶	22,	250	A.3d	

1101.		The	standards	are	among	the	authorized	“safety	standards”	that	“provide	

the	clients	of	guides	reasonable	protection	from	hazards.”		12	M.R.S.	§	12851.

The	standards at	issue	here—requiring	that	a	guide	avoid	committing	crimes	

while	 hunting	 and	 possess	 “experience based	 judgment” to	 prevent	 unsafe	

12		These	procedures	apply	 to	 the	“routine	 technical	rules”	adopted	by	 the	Commissioner here.		

12 M.R.S.	§ 12851	(2023);	5	M.R.S.	§ 8071(3)	(2023)	(providing	that	only	subchapter	2	of	the	APA	

applies	to	routine	technical	rules);	see	5	M.R.S.	§§ 8051-8064	(2023)	(subchapter	2	of	the	APA).
20

situations,	09-137	C.M.R.	ch.	24,	§ 24.08(A)(3),	(5)—are	neither arbitrary nor	

unreasonable;	they	are	directly	related	to	the	safety	concerns	the	Legislature	

directed the	 Commissioner	 to	 safeguard	 through	 rulemaking.	 	 See	 12	 M.R.S.	

§ 12851;	 Stucki,	 291	 A.2d	 at	 510.	 	 As	 applied	 to	 Wood,	 the standards	 were	

sufficiently	 clear	 to	 warn	 of	 the	 revocation	 of	 his	 guide	 license if	 he	 either	

(1) showed	 poor	 judgment by deciding,	 despite	 his	 years	 of	 experience,	 to	

create	a	 threat	 to	 the	safety	of	others or (2) committed	 the	crime	of	reckless	

conduct,	17-A M.R.S.	§	211, in	shooting	at	a deer from	a	public	roadway	and	in	

the	 direction	 of	 a	 residence.	 	 See 09-137	 C.M.R.	 ch.	 24,	 § 24.08(A)(3),	 (5);

12 M.R.S.	 § 10902(4)(A);	 see	 also	 Kelby,	 360	 A.2d	 at	 532	 (holding	 that	 the	

“terms	 ‘bad	 faith,’	 ‘incompetency,’	 ‘untrustworthiness,’	 and	 ‘dishonest,	

improper	 or	 fraudulent	 dealings’	 are	 neither	 so	 general	 that	 persons	 of	

common	intelligence	must	guess	at	their	meaning,	nor	so	indefinite	as	to	defy	

evenhanded	interpretation”).

The	entry	is:

Judgment	affirmed.
21

Verne	E.	Paradie,	Jr.,	Esq.	(orally),	Lewiston,	for	appellant	Daniel	Wood

Aaron	M.	Frey,	Attorney	General,	and	Mark	Randlett,	Asst	Atty.	Gen.	 (orally),	

Office	 of	 the	 Attorney	 General,	 Augusta,	 for	 appellee	 Department	 of	 Inland	

Fisheries	and	Wildlife

Androscoggin	County	Superior	Court	docket	number	AP-2022-04

FOR	CLERK	REFERENCE	ONLY