2009 D e c i sion s O p inion s of the U nit e d S t a t e s C our t of Appe al s for the Thir d C ir c uit

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D ock e t N o . 07-4004

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Thi s de c i sion i s br ou gh t t o y ou for f r e e a nd ope n a c c e s s b y the O p inion s of the U nit e d S t a t e s C our t of Appe al s for the Thir d C ir c uit a t V i l l a no v a U niv e r sit y S choo l of L a

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U N IT E D S T A T E S C O U R T O F A P P E A LS F O R T H E T H IR D C IR C U IT

No. 07-4004

UN I TE D ST AT ES O F AM ERI CA

Appellant

v.
R O N A LD C RA

N D E LL
a/k/ a Ric ky Cr and e ll

Appea l from the United States District Court for the D istrict of NewJ erse y (D.C. Criminal Action No. 06-c r-00232) District J udg e: Honora

ble J oseph A. Gr eena

way

Argued September

25, 2008

Be fore : BARRY, AMB RO, and JOR DAN, Circuit Judges

(Opinion filed: J anuar

y 29, 2009)2 Chr ist op he r J. C hr ist ie United States Attorney Geor g e S. L eone Chief, Appea ls Division Caroline A. Sadlowski (Ar g ued) Assistant U.S. Attorney Offic e of U nited States Attorney 970 Br oad Stree t, Room 700 Newa rk, NJ 07102-0000 Counsel for Appe llant
Ric ha rd Cou g hli n Fe dera l Publi c De fende r L isa M. Mack, Esquire (Argued) L ouise Arke l, Esquire Offic e of F eder al Public Defe nder, 4th F loor 972 Br oad Stree t Newa rk, NJ 07102-0000 Counsel for Appe llee

OPI NI ONOF TH E CO UR T

AMBRO, Circ uit J udg e
Three police off

icer s were on routine patrol in a H o boken, Ne w Je rs e y

ho us ingpr oje c t w he n they re c e ive d a n a no ny mou s ti p t h at a m al e w i t h dre ad l o ck s an d b l o n d e h ai r t i p s wa s s ee n ca rryi n g a handgun somewher e in the are a. The office rs immediately believed t h e d e s c r i p t i o no f

t h e s u s p e c tm a t c h e d

t h e d e f e n d an t , R o n a l d

“ R i c ky”W e have appel l at e j ur i s di ct i on under 18 U

. S. C

. § 3731. 1
3 Crandell, whom they

rec o gnized for his distinctive appear ance and rap she et. While se ar ch i ng for Cra ndell in the neig hborhood, the of fi c e rs sp ott e d h im w a lki ngtow ard th em. Th e y

a pp ro a c he d h im, which led to a pat-down and the rec overy of a gun.
A f ed er al gra n d

j u ry i n d i ct edC ra n d el l fo r p o s s e s s i n g a firea rm as a c onvicted fe lon in vi o l ation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g )(1)

. Prior to trial, he moved to s u ppress e vidence of the ha ndg un as the fr uit of an ille g a l F ourt

h A me ndme nt s e izur e . T he Di str ic t Co ur t he ld a suppre ssion hearing . I n a comprehensive opinion, the Court presumed a

seizure base d on the ano n y mous tip, and gr anted the motion to s uppress.
Th e Go ve rnme nt a

pp e a ls that ru lin g

. I t argue s th a t Cr and e ll 1 was not seiz ed withi n the m eaning of t he F ourth Amendment; rather, based on a ll the circumstanc es, the e ncounter was c onsensual.

We a g ree that the threshold question of whe ther Cra ndell was seized by the offic ers must be de termi n ed by evaluating a ll the circ umstances surrounding the encounter, as a presumption does not suffice in this case. I n so concluding , we e x plore why the tip, which
ra ise d the of

fi c e rs ’ sus pic ion and le d to the e nc ounte r wit h Cr and e ll, does not aff

ect the initial s eizure i nquiry

. We thus remand f or fur ther pr oc e e din g s.

I. F acts

A. The Ano nym ous TipOff i c e r Dr i s h t i d e s c r i b e d t h e Hou s i n g Aut h o r i t y as 2 appr oxi m at el y t w ent y bui l di ngs l ocat ed i n an ar ea t hat m eas ur es f o u r b lo c k s b y tw o b lo c k s

. W hen appr oachi ng C r andel l , O ffi cer V al ez obs er ved t hat he 3

w as w ea ri n g “loo se jea n s” an d a “tan sh ir t. ” V alez w as u n su re
4 On J uly 15, 2005, three Hoboken Police De partment office rs—Arbe nd Drishti, A ng el Valez, and J immy Miller—wer e on routine foot patr o l i n a residential are a known a s the Hoboken Housi ng Authority . Offic er D rishti rece ived an a nony mous and
uncorr ob o ra t ed tip from the police dispatch ce nter a bout an ar

med
man see n somewher e in the Housing Authority

. The police re port 2 descr ibed “a

black male with drea d locks and blonde tips[ ,] wearing
a ta n s h i rt an d b l u e j e an s [, ] i n p o s s e s s i o n o f a h an d g u n on his waistband (sma ll of his back).” Ba sed on this description, Off icer s Dr ish ti and

Va le z imme diate ly

be lie ve d th e arm e d ma

n w a s Cr and e ll. Of fi c e r V a le z re c og nize d Cr and e ll’ s dist inc tiv e de sc ri pti on be c a us e Va le z ha d s e e n Cr and e ll’ s p ic tur e on nume ro us oc c a sio ns in r oll c a ll and knew that he had be en ar

rested se v er al t imes in the are a the office rs patrolled. After rec eiving the dispatch, the three o ff i ce rs we nt t o th e int e rs e c tio n o f F if th a nd Jac ks on Str e e ts i n H ob ok e n to
se ar c h f o r Cr an d e ll b e c a

u s e it is a “ h ig h c r im e ar e a ” that he “fr equents.” Howeve r, they did not see him at that location.

B. The En counter with Police

Th e o f f ic e r s w a lk e d

s o u th f r o m t h e in te r s e c ti o n , c r o s s ing J ackson Stree t toward F ourth Street. “Ap p ro x imately halfwa y betwee n Four

th Stre et and Fifth Street, [they ] saw [ Crandell] walking toward the m.” Un ite d S

tates v . Cran de ll , 509 F. Supp. 2d 435, 439 3w h e t h e r he coul d s ee Cra ndel l ’ s dr eadl ocks benea t h t he t ow el on his head , bu t w as no nethel ess con fi den t i t w as C randel l becau se

“ [ I] k n o w h is f

a c e .”
5 (D.N.J. 2007). Crandell did not re ac t wh en he sawthe three uniformed of

fice rs and ke pt walking in their direc tion. The off icer s approa ched Cra

nd ell in either a

semi-circ le or line for

mation and Offic er V alez spoke to him.

Th e Di str ic t Court no te s that the te sti mony of Of fi c e rs Dr ish ti and Valez differ s slightly with reg ard to what the office rs said prior to patting Cra

ndell down. Id. at 440. Both acc ounts, however , indicate Va lez spoke to Crandell befor e he be g an the pat-down. Offic er V alez testified:
As [ C randell] walked towa rd[] us, Istopped him . . . . and I told him I received infor mation that [ he] might have a we apon on [ h i m ] and I wanted to g ive [him] a pat do wn

fo r o ur pr ote c tio n[.] I

tol d [C rande ll] he was fre e to leave at any time. . . . [ Then Crandell] put his arms up . . . . [ and,] as I was patting [C rande ll] down, he hit my arm, he turned around a nd he ra n [and ] the weap on fe ll f ro m th e ba c k o f h is pants.

Offic er D rishti testified:

Off i ce r Valez said to [ Crandell], is it all rig ht if we pat y ou down for our

safe ty ? You ca

n l ea v e at a

ny tim e . A nd

[Crandel l] sa id, y e ah, wh a t’ s th is a ll about? He star

ted to g et towar ds the fe n ce [; ] t here6 wa s a fe nc e the re . I

wa s o n .

. . Of

fi c e r V a le z’s le ft , Offic er Miller w as on his rig ht, and as he was picking up to p u t h is h an d li k e to w ar d [] th e f e n c e , h e wa s asking , what’s this all about? And Offic er V alez said, we g o t a c a ll y o u mi g h t h a v e a h an d g u n o n y o u
. At that mo me nt, a s O ff

ic e r Va le z sta

rt e d to tr y to p a t hi m down, he may

have touc hed him once or twic e, as soon a s h e g o t li k e to w ar d s th e b a c k ar e a , Mr. Cr andell turned abruptly

and like knocke d [Officer Valez’s] arm to the side and a handgun flew f rom the low e r b a c k a

re a on to the sid e wa lk, and Mr . Cr and e ll then proc eede d to run south on J ackson . . . . According to D ri sh ti ( ob vio us ly sp e a kin g wi th a

t le a st s ome overstate ment), the whole event took “a couple of sec onds.” Off icer Miller rec overe d the g un while Of fi ce rs Drishti and Va lez chased Crandell, but wer e una b l e t o catc h him at that time. Therea fter, a
war rant wa s issued and Crande ll was arr ested.

C. The Suppr e ssi on H e ar ing

Af t er a fe d er al gra n d j u ry i n d i ct ed C ra n d el l fo r p o s s es s i n g a firea rm as a c onvicted fe lon, he moved to suppress ev i d en ce of the handgun as the fruit of an illega l F ourth Amendment seizure. The Di str ic t Co urt he ld a

he ari ngand

g ra nte d h is m oti on

to s up pr e ss, in eff ect dismissin g t h e char g e ag ainst him. The Court ruled that the seizure was illeg al bec ause the anony mous tip di d n o t p ro v ide the office rs with rea sonable suspicion to justify the stop. Id. a t4 3 7

. In so ruling, it pre sumed Crande ll was seized at the outset of the encounte r, as the of

fice rs’ suspicion stemming f rom t h e tip tainted the possibili ty of consensua l inter action. Id. at 446–47 n.9. The7 Go v ern m en tap p ea l s t h at ru l i n g.

II. Discussion

We r e vie w a

dis tr ic t c ourt ’s g ra

nt of “ the mot ion

to s up pr e ss for c lear err or as to t h e underly ing f acts, but exercise [] plenar y revie w as to its leg ality

in light of the court’s pr operly found fa cts.” United Sta t es v. Givan , 320 F.3d 452, 458 ( 3d Cir. 2003) (citation and interna l quotations omi tted) (a lteration in orig inal).

A. Wa s C r ande ll Se iz e d?

The F ourth Amendment prote cts individuals from

“ un re a so na

ble se arc he s and

se izur e s” of “th e ir

pe rs on s, ho us e s, paper s, and ef

fec ts.” U.S. Const. amend. I V. B ec au s e of the Amendment’s lang uag e, we g ener ally use the phrase “sea rc h and
se izur e ” wh e n e va luatin g the F ourt h Ame ndme nt i ssu e s in vo lve d in suppression cases. B ut in certa in circumstanc es, such a s this, our leg al ana l y s i s i s flipped; we be g in with whether a n individual was
se ize d, and , if

so , w he the r i t w a s v a lid , th e n th e se arc h a na ly sis follows.

The F ourth Amendment g ener ally require s that p o li c e office rs obtai n a w ar

r an t b a s e d o n p r o b a

b le c a u s e to ju s ti f

y a s e iz u r e and
sear ch. Te rry

v . O hio , 392 U.S. 1, 20 (1968). Terry held, howeve r, that F ourt

h A me ndme nt s e izur e s c an b e le g a l a bs e nt a wa rr ant i n cer tain cir cumstance s, which may include brie f investig ative detentions. Id. at 20 (de scribing beat cops’ e ncounter s with citiz ens “pre dicated upon . . . on- the-spot observat i ons” as a n example of conduct that would not re quire a war rant).8 A war rantless Four

th A mendment seizure nee ds an objec tive and par ticularized justification. Un ite d S tates v . M

e nd e nh all , 446 U.S. 544, 551 (1980). Unde r Te rry , “ an o ff ic e r m ay , c on sis te nt w ith the Four th Amendment, conduc t a brief , investigatory

stop when the of fi c e r h a s a

re a so na ble , a rt ic ula ble su sp ic ion

that c ri min al ac tiv ity is afoot.” Illinois v. W ardlow , 528 U.S. 119, 123 (2000 ). “Rea sonable suspicion [required f or a Te rry stop] is a less demanding sta nd ard tha n p ro ba ble c a us e [ne c e ssa

ry fo r an arr e st] a

nd re qu ir e s a showing considera

b l y l es s than pre pondera

nce of the evidenc e. . . . [R]ea so na ble su sp ic ion c an ari se fr om inf or matio n that is le ss r e lia

ble than that require d to show probable ca u s e.” United States v. V alentine , 2 3 2 F

. 3 d

3 5 0 , 3 5 3 ( 3 d

Ci r

. 2 0 0 0 ) ( c it a ti o n s an d inte rnal quotations omit ted).

The fir st analy

tical step a c ourt takes to evaluate the issues involved in this t y

pe of moti o n t o suppress is to determine whether
and wh e n a

c iti zen -p oli c e e nc ounte r i mpl ic a te s th e F ourt h Ame n dme n t. “ B e f

o r e e v e n a d dr e s s in g w h e th e r th e p o li c e had
rea sonable suspicion to app roac h [and eng ag e an individual], the Di str ic t Co ur

t [mu st f ir st i nq uir e ] int o w he the r [the ind iv idua l w a s] ‘s e ize d’ by

the po lic e ” wi thi n the me anin g of the F ourt h A me ndme nt. United States v. W

illiams , 4 13 F .3 d 3 47 , 3 52 (3 d Ci r. 20 05 ). Cou rt s re g ula rl y g ra pp le wi th whe the r a

pa rt ic ula r e nc ounte r “ a mou

nt[s ] to
a ‘s e i z u r e ’ ” o f

a p e r s o no r

“ i n t r u d e s u p o nn o c o n s t i tu t i o n a lly protec ted intere st.” Me nd e nh all , 446 U.S. at 552–53. Street
e nc ounte rs be tw e e n c iti zen s a nd po lic e of fi c e rs , li ke the e nc ounte r i n thi s ca se , “are inc re dib ly ri c h in dive rs ity ,” and “ [o]bv iou sly [] no t a ll persona l intercou rs e betwe en policeme n and citizens involves ‘seizures’ of

persons’” implicating the F o u rt h Amendment. Te rry , 392 U.S. at 13, 19–20 n.16.9 The Supreme Court ha s made clea r that a F ourth Amendment “seizure doe s not occur simply beca use a police office r appr oache s an individual a

nd asks a f

ew que stions.” Florida v. Bostick, 5 01 U. S. 429, 434 (1991). The se enc ounters of shor t duration that do not amount to Fourth Ame ndment seizures ca n be cha rac terized as “conse nsual” be cause the citizen has the ability to en g ag e in or terminate the encounte r. See U nited States v. W

ilson , 413 F.3d 382, 386–87 (3d Cir. 2005) (de termining whether the further questioning by the police office r af

ter issuing a tra ffic c itation was a c onsensual
e nc ounte r o r a

F ourt h A me ndme nt s e izur e ). “ Whe n a n e nc ounte r i s con s en s ual, no re asonable suspicion is required.” United States v. Kim , 27 F.3d 947, 950 ( 3d Cir. 1994).

A s ei z u re occur s only

“whe n [a police offic er], by means of phy sical for ce or

show of author ity , h as i n s ome way restra ined the liberty of a citiz en.” Te rry , 3 92 U. S. at 19 –2 0 n .1 6; see also Curley v. Klem , 2 9 8 F. 3 d 271, 279 (3d Cir. 2002) (a “seizure oc curs [w]he ne ve r a

n o ff ic e r r e str a ins the freed om of a pe rs on to w a lk
awa y ” (c itatio ns and

int e rnal quotatio ns omi tte d) (a lte ra tio n in orig ina l) )

. T h e “ s h o w o f a u th o r it y ” te s t “ is an o b

je c ti v e o n e : not wh e the r t he c iti zen pe rc e ive d th a t he wa s b e ingor de re d to re str ic t hi s movement, but whetherthe offic er’ s words and a ctions would have conveyed that to a r easona ble per son” in light of a ll the surrounding circ umstances. Calif

ornia v. Hodari D. , 4 9 9 U

. S. 6 2 1 , 6 2 8 ( 1 991) (c i t i n g Me nd

e nh all , 446 U.S. a

t 554) (s tatin g that th e ind ivi du a l mu st submit t o a s h o w o f authorit y to effe ct a se izure)

. Th e Sup re me Court cited seve ral c ircumstance s in Me nd e nh all that mi g ht i nd ic a te a seizure, e ven whe re the person did not attempt to le ave, inc luding

the threatening prese nce of sever al offic ers, the dis p la y o f a w e a p o nb y ano f f ic e r , s o me p h y s ic al10 touching of the pe rson of the c itiz en, or the use of lang uag e or tone of voice indicating that c ompliance with the office r’s re quest might be compelled. In the absenc e of some such evide nce, othe rwise inoff ensive contac t betwee n a member of the p u b lic and the police ca nnot, as a matter of law, amount to a seizure of that per son. 446 U.S. at 554–55 (interna l citations omit ted).

The labe l a court ulti mately attache s to an enc ounter is more th ana le g a l a b s tr a c ti o no f

p o li c e c o n d

u c t. I nth e e v id e n ti ar

y c o n te xt of the de fe nd ant’ s c ri min a l tr ia l, it c an a ff e c t “ the admissib ili ty ag ainst [a defenda

nt] of the e vidence uncover ed by the sea rch a nd seizure.” Te rry , 392 U.S. at 12 (refer red to a s the “e x clusionary
ru le ” ). I n sit

uatio ns lik e Cr and e ll’ s—

wh e re the c ri min a l c ha

rg e re sts
so le ly on the ph y sic a l evid e nc e tha t is the su

bje c t of a mot ion to suppress—a ruling in the defe ndant’s favor results in dismis sing the entire c ase a g ainst him.

The ba sis of the District Cour t ’s ru l ing to suppre ss the handgun h er e wa s its ini tial presumption that the office rs seized C r a n d e l l w i t h i nt h e m e an i n g o f t h e F o u rt h A m e n dm e n t

. In pr e su min g that a F ourt

h Am e ndme nt se izur e oc c ur re d, the Cou

rt did not evaluate the fa cts and c ircumstance s surroundingthe enc ounter, but instead rea soned that the anony mous tip tainted the appr oach a nd neg ated the possibility

of conse nsual interac tion between the police office rs and Cra

ndell. Cra nd

e ll , 509 F. Supp. 2d at 446–47 n.9 (“A ccept ing the Gover

nment’s ar g ument would, in effe ct, under cut the anony mous tip jurisprudenc e by allowing office rs to side step the
rea s o n ab le suspicion require ment by mere ly asking for c onsent as11 they stopped suspects.”) . The Court then e x amined our a nony mous ti p c a s e la

w in

- d e p th to c o n c lu d e th a t th e o f f ic e r s d id n o t ha ve

“ r e a s o n a b l e s u s p i c i o n , ” a s Terry r e qu i r e s , t o s t o p C r an d e l l l e g a l l y. Id. at 437–51.
Our path differ s from that of the D istrict Court. We believe i t should have c onsidered whether the enc ounter wa s consensua l at the out set instead of presuming that the pol ice seiz ed C rande ll. The Supreme Court re quires us to eva luate all the objec tive circ umstances
surro u n d in g th e e n c o u n te r f r o m t h e p e r s p e c ti v e o f

th e “ r e a s o n a

b le” person who is the rec ipient of the police attention. See B ostick , 501 U.S. at 438 (stating the “F ourth Amendment inq u i ry [ i s] whether a
re a so na ble pe rs on

wo uld have fe lt f

ree t o decli ne the of

fi c e rs ’ reque sts or otherwise te rminate the e n counter”). The subjective intent underlying a

n office r’s a

pproac h d o es not affe ct the seizure analy sis. As noted above, a seizure does not oc cur simply beca use an office r appr oache s an indivi d u al—and gun owne rs ar e no exception—to ask questions. V a le n ti ne , 2 3 2 F.3d at 356 (citing Bostick , 50 1 U. S. at 43 4) ; see also W illiams , 413 F.3d at 353–54. Th e re fo re , a tip po lic e re c e ive d that mot ivate s the ir e nc ount er wi th an individual mere ly

serve s to color the bac kstory at this stage

. The Supreme Court cons i dere d a re lated question in United States v. Drayton , 536 U.S. 194 (2002). I t de alt with a citizen-police encounte r i n t h e more re strictive conf ines of a bus. Thr ee of

fice rs bo ard e d a Gr e y

ho un d bu s to c on du c t ro uti ne dr ug int e rd ic tio n e ff

or ts. Id. a t 19 7. Whe n th e y

a pp ro a c he d D ra

y ton to q ue sti on and re qu e st
c on se nt t o s e arc h h im, the y we re su sp ic iou s th a t he ha d d ru g s o n h im. Id. a t 19 8– 99 . T he of

fi c e rs ha d ju st sear c he d a nd arr e ste d h is trave ling c ompanion and seatmate, B rown, for ca rry ing c oncea led
narc otics. Id. After

arr esting Br own, they

focuse d their attention on12 Dra y ton. I n analy

zing whether the office rs’ e ncounter with Dray

ton
was c onsensual, the Court re iterate d Bostick ’s h olding that police
ne e d n ot h a ve any

su sp ic ion

of wr on g do ing to a

pp ro a c h a nd re qu e st consent to sea

rch a n individual. Id. at 2 0 1 (c i t i n g Bostick , 5 01 U. S. at 434–35). The Court acknowle dg ed that t he off icer s were suspicious of Dra

y ton even be fore they

questioned and r equeste d consent to sea

rch him, y et it concluded that Dra y ton’s encounte r wa s consensua l and he wa s not seized by police. I t rea soned:

I t would be a para dox , and one most puz zli ng to law
e nf orc e me nt o ff

ic ia ls a nd c ourt s a lik e , w e re we to say , afte r holding that Br own’s conse nt was voluntary [wit ho u t t he police ha ving a ny suspicion of wrong doing], that Dra

y ton’s consent was ineffe ctual simp ly b e c a u s e th e p o li c e a t t

h a t p o in t h a d

mor e c omp e lli ngg ro un ds to d e ta in h im.

Id. at 207–08. Moreove r, “[t] he fa ct t h e officer s may have ha d
rea sonable suspicion does not prevent them fr om relying on a citizen’s consent to the sea rch.” Id. at 207. Indeed, “ ‘con s en s ual
e nc ounte rs are imp or

tant t oo ls o f l aw en fo rc e me nt, ’” pa rt ic ula rl y in situations where of

fi cer s are unsure whe ther they have the leg al authority to detain a suspec t forcibly

. W illiams , 4 1 3 F. 3d at 352 (q u o t i n g J

oh ns on v . Ca mp be ll , 332 F.3d 199, 205 ( 3d Cir. 2003)).

The Gove rnment sug g e s ts w e should conc lude that Crande ll’s encounte r w i t h t he police w as conse nsual bec ause a ny finding s of fac t to the contra

ry would be cle arly

err oneous. I t thus requests that
we re ve rs e the Di str ic t Co ur t’ s o rd e r gra

nti ngthe mot ion

to s up pr e ss, rathe r than va cate it and rema nd. We decline. The District Court’s role is to find fac ts and deter min e i n the first instance whetherI n eval uat i ng t hi s i s s ue, t he D i s t r i ct C our t s houl d al s o t ake 4 i nt o cons i der at i on w hat t he Supr eme C ourt found w as not
coer ci ve i n D r ayt on
. For exampl e, at t he s u p p ressi on hear i ng the D ist ri ct C o u rt see m ed inclined to co n clud e tha t t h e m ere pr es ence of t hr ee pol i ce of fi cer s w as s uffi ci ent t o r ender t he
e n c o u n te r a s e iz u re

. See A ppel l ant ’ s A pp. V

. I I 66 ( quot i ng t he D ist ri ct C o u rt (he aring tr an script): “y o u h av e thre e o ff icers appr oach y ou, and i t w oul d appea r , I t hi nk, t o t he obj ect i ve o bserver, t hat t he st at em ent ‘ y ou ’r e free t o g o’ w as m ere ly p e rf u n c to ry” ). D r ayt on a l s o i nv ol ve d t hr e e of fi c e r s

. 53 6 U. S. at 197. T he off

i cer s boar ded t he bus t o ques t i on pas s enger s and conduct nar cot i cs s ear ches , and one o f t he off i cer s pos i t i oned h i ms e l f n e x t t o t h e e x i t a t t h e f

r o n t o f t h e b u s

. Ye t t h e S u p r e me C our t di d not fi nd t he m er e pre s ence of t hr ee of fi cer s coer ci ve. Id

. a t 2 0 3

– 0 5

. W ith th is no te, w e lea v e to th e D istric t C o u rt in th e f irst in sta n c e th e m a rsh a lin g o f e v id e n c e a n d w e ig h in g o f a ll th e c ir c u m s ta n c e s p e rt in e n t to th e s e iz u re is s u e

. 13 Crandell wa s s ei z ed within the meaningof the F ourth Amendment under the totality of the c ircumstance s. See Bostick , 501 U.S. at 437.

We n ote , howe ve r, that th e Sup re me Court ’s ana ly sis in Drayton provides a f

rame work for the District Court to bear in mind when e valuating this iss u e. T h oug h the police e ncounter there
o cc u rred on a bus, the Court conc luded that under all the circ umstances Drayt o n was not seized bec ause “ [t ]here wa s no application of f

orce , no intimi dating movement, no over whelming show o f f o r c e , n o b r an d is h in g o f w e a p o n s , n o b lo c k in g o f e xit s , no threat, no command, not even a n aut h oritative tone of voic e.” 4 Drayton , 536 U.S. at 204. The Court also noted that “ [i ]t is bey ond quest io n th a t h a d th is e n c o u n te r o c c u r r e d o n th e s tr e e t, it w ould beA t t he suppr es s i on hear i ng, one of t he off i cer s t es t i fi ed t hat 5 h e “ h a s n e v e r h a d a n y b o d y s a y , w e ll, th a n k y o u , o f f ic e r, I
c h o o se to w a lk a w a y .” A s th e S u p re m e C o u r t d isc u ss e d , this ty p e o f sta tem e n t d o e s n o t af

f e c t w h e th e r C r a n d e ll w a s f re e to g o

. 14 c o n s ti tutiona l.” Id. (indicatingthe setting , such as a bus, was one fac tor, but not determinative) . Fur thermore , the fa ct t h at in [ an off

icer ’s] ex perie nce only

a fe w pa sse ng e rs have re fu se d to c oo pe ra te do e s n ot s ug g e st t h a t a r e a s o n a

b l e p e r s o n w o u l d n o t f e e l fr e e to terminate the [] encounte r. . . . “While most citiz ens wi ll re sp on d to a

po lic e re qu e st, the fa c t th a t pe op le do so, and do so without being told the y are fre e not to respond, har dly

eliminates the conse nsual nature of the re sponse.”[ ] 5

Id. at 2 0 5 (q u o t i n g INS v. De lgado , 4 66 U. S. 210, 216 (1984))

.
I f the District Court dete rmines that, under all the circu m s t ance s, Crandell wa s seized by the offic ers whe n they approa ched him, then r easo n ab le suspicion to conduct a Terry stop must ex ist. At this stag e, the Court in normal course would consider the sig nificanc e of the anony mous tip i n providing a basis for
rea sonable suspicion.

This no r ma l c o u r s e d o e s n o t a

p p ly h e r e , h o w e v e r

. T he Gover nment opted not to appea l the Distr ict Court’s ruling that the
ano ny mou s ti p did no t pr ov ide the of fi c e rs wi th a

ba sis fo r r e a so na

ble suspicion to s t o p an d frisk C rande ll. Cra nd e ll , 509 F. Supp. 2dW i l s on i s an exampl e of an encount er w her e w e cons i der ed 6

a ci t i zen’s con sent t o s earch. 41 3 F. 3d at 38 8 . W e f ir st d e te rm in e d “ th a t n o s e iz u re o c c u rr e d , i

. e. , that W il so n ’s cont i nued enc ount er w i t h [t he off i cer ] was c o n s e n s u a l , ” a n d t h us w e d id n o t n e e d to re a c h W ilso n ’s a rg u m e n t th a t th e o f f ice r d id
n o t h a v e re a s o n a b le s u s p ic io n to ju s tif y th e q u e s tio n in g

. Id

. at 388 n. 6. W e next eval uat ed w het her W i l s on’s c ons ent t o t he
s e a rc h o f h is b a g w a s v o lu n ta ry. Id

. at 388 ( concl udi ng t hat

15 at 447–51. I t the reby conce des that the offic ers’ basis for suspicion did n o tr i s e t o th e c o n s t i tu t i o n a l l y r e qu i r e d s t an d ar d o f “ r e a s o n a ble
s u s p i cion” to validate a Terry s to p

. Wi th o u t r e a s o n a b le s u s p ic io n, th e s e i z u r e o f C r an d e l l w o u l d b e i l l e g a l an d t h e g u n o b ta ine d in
connec tio n wi t h the ensuingpat-down se arc h would proper ly be suppressed unde r the meta phorica l “fru i t of the poisonous tree ” doctrine. W

ong Sun v. United States , 371 U.S. 471, 487–88 (1963). I n such a c ircumstance , even if Crandell conse nted to the pat-dow n sear ch, his “sea

rch c onsent” would be overbor n e by the unconstitutional stop. See id.

Thus , th is c a se piv ots on

wh e the r C ra

nd e ll w a s sei zed . Onl y if he wa s not seized within t he mea ni n g o f the Four

th Amendment would the Dis trict Court proce ed to the sea rch inquiry

set out below.

B. Assum ing Crandell w as not seized, was the search of him c ons e nsua l?

I f the District Court de termines that Crande ll was not seized duri nghis e nc ounte r w ithpo lic e , th e n th e Cou rt must ev a luate whether h e v o lu n ta r il y c o n s e n te d

to th e p a t- d o w ns e ar c h f or wea pons. “‘[A] sea

rch conducte d pursuant to conse nt is one of the 6W il so n g av e h is v o lun tary co n sen t t o the s ea rch an d thu s the re w a s n o F o u rt h A m e n d m e n t v io la tio n ).
A n offi cer m us t pl ace hi s hands on an i ndi vi dual t o conduct 7 a pat

- dow n s ear ch, w hi ch l eads l ogi cal l y t o t he cont ent i on t hat th is a c t c o n s titu t e s a s e iz u re

. M e n d e n h a lld e a lt w ith th is confl at i on of s ei zur e and s ear ch by expl ai ni ng t hat i n T erry [o] bvi ous l y t he offi cer “s ei zed” T er ry and
s ubj ect ed hi m t o a “s ear ch” w hen he t ook hol d of h im

. . . an d p a tted d o w n th e o u ter su rf a c e s o f h is cl o thi ng. W hat w as not det er m i ned i n t hat cas e, how ever , w as t hat a s ei zur e had t aken pl ace befor e t he off

icer phy s i cal l y r es t r ai ned Ter r y for pu rposes o f searchi ng his person fo r w eapo ns. T he Co u r t “ a s s u me [ d ] t h a t u p t o t h a t p o i n t no in tr u sio n u p o n c o n stitu tio n a lly p ro tec ted rig h ts h a d o c c u rr e d .”

4 4 6 U .S . a t 5 5 2

– 5 3 (i n te rn a l c ita tio n s o m itte d ).
16 specific ally

established ex ceptions to the wa rra nt require ment.’” W ilson , 413 F.3d at 388 (a l t er at i o ni no ri gi n al ) ( qu o t i n g Givan , 320 F.3d at 459). 7

Consent to a sear ch is determ i n ed by examining all the circ u ms ta n c e s , s im il ar

to th e in qu ir

y o f w h e th e r a s e iz u r e o c c u rre d. Givan , 3 20 F .3 d a t 45 9. I f the ini tiatio n o f t he e nc ounte r a

nd the patdown sea rch a re c lose in time, as they

are h ere, then the re spective
c on se nt a na ly se s of the se izur e and se arc h w ill tur

n o n s imi lar f

a c ts. See D rayton , 5 3 6 U. S

. at 2 0 6

. “‘ [ T ] h e c ri t i ca l fa ct o rs co mp ri s i n g a17 totality of the c ircumstance s inquiry include the setting in which the [search] consent wa s o b t ai ned, the pa rties’ ve rbal a

nd non-ver

bal actions, and the ag e, intellige nce, a nd educational backg round of the consenting[party ].’” W

ilson , 413 F. 3 d at 388 (quoting Givan , 320 F.3d at 459). This consent inqui ry does not require office rs to inform
c it i z e n s o f t h e i r r i g h t n o t t o c o o p e r a t e w h e n “ s e e k i n g p e r m i s s i on to conduct a war rantless c onsent sear ch.” Drayton , 536 U.S. at 206 (c itatio ns omi tte d) ; id. at 207 (stating no “e x t ra weig ht” should be g iven “to the a

bsence of this ty

pe of w arning ”).

CO NC LU SION

The District Court nee ds to determine on r emand whe ther the office rs’ e ncounter

with Crandell was consensual or c onstitut ed a Four th Amendment seizure, as this will determine whe ther it nee ds to p ro c e e d to the re ma ini ng su pp res si on iss ue . We thu s v a c a te its ruling that g rante d t h e mot ion to suppress and re mand this case f or further proce eding s consistent with this opi nion.