48946 Federal Register / Vol. 79, No. 160 / Tuesday, August 19, 2014 / Rules and Regulations 

appellant files an appeal with the Board. 

Following a hearing, the administrative judge 

finds that the agency proved its charge and 

further finds that the appellant established 

that the penalty of removal was unreasonable 

under the circumstances of the case. The 

presumption that the Secretary’s decision to 

remove was warranted is rebutted and the 

action is reversed. 

(b) Appellant. The appellant (a career 

member of the agency’s Senior 

Executive Service corps) has the burden 

of proof, by a preponderance of the 

evidence, concerning: 

(1) Issues of jurisdiction; 

(2) The timeliness of the appeal; and 

(3) Affirmative defenses. 

(c) Affirmative defenses. Under 5 

U.S.C. 7701(c)(2), the Secretary’s 

determination may not be sustained, 

even where the agency met the 

evidentiary standard stated in paragraph 

(a) of this section, if the appellant shows 

that: 

(1) The agency, in rendering its 

determination, committed harmful error 

in the application of its procedures; 

(2) The decision was based on any 

prohibited personnel practice described 

in 5 U.S.C. 2302(b); or 

(3) The determination is not otherwise 

in accordance with law. 

(d) Penalty review. As set forth in 

paragraph (a) of this section, proof of the 

agency’s charge(s) by preponderant 

evidence creates a presumption that the 

Secretary’s decision to remove or 

transfer the appellant was warranted. 

An appellant may rebut this 

presumption by establishing that the 

imposed penalty was unreasonable 

under the circumstances of the case, in 

which case the action is reversed. 

However, the administrative judge may 

not mitigate the Secretary’s decision to 

remove or transfer the appellant. 

§ 1210.19 Bench decisions. 

(a) General. The administrative judge 

may issue a bench decision at the close 

of the hearing. A bench decision is 

effective when issued. 

(b) Transcription of bench decision. A 

transcribed copy of the decision will be 

prepared by the court reporter under the 

administrative judge’s supervision to 

memorialize the oral decision. The 

official issuance of a bench decision is 

the date the administrative judge 

announces the decision and not the date 

the administrative judge signs the 

transcription. 

§ 1210.20 Effective date of a decision 

issued by an administrative judge; 

continuing jurisdiction over certain 

ancillary matters. 

(a) A decision by an administrative 

judge under this part will be effective 

upon issuance. 

(b) Pursuant to 38 U.S.C. 713(e)(2), a 

decision by the administrative judge is 

not subject to further appeal. 

(c) A decision by the administrative 

judge is nonprecedential. Such a 

decision may be cited as persuasive 

authority only in an appeal filed 

pursuant to 38 U.S.C. 713(e)(2). Such a 

decision may not be cited in any appeal 

not filed pursuant to 38 U.S.C. 713(e)(2). 

(d) Following issuance of a decision 

by the administrative judge under this 

part, the MSPB retains jurisdiction over 

the appeal covered by this part for 

purposes of the following ancillary 

matters: 

(1) Enforcement of decisions and 

orders. The procedures set forth in 

subpart F of 5 CFR part 1201 are 

applicable to petitions for enforcement 

filed after the administrative judge 

issues a decision in an appeal filed 

under this part; and, 

(2) Attorney fees, witness fees, 

litigation expenses, and damages. The 

procedures set forth in subpart H of 5 

CFR part 1201 (attorney fees, costs, 

expert witness fees, and litigation 

expenses, where applicable, and 

damages) are applicable to requests for 

fees and damages filed after the 

administrative judge issues a decision in 

an appeal filed under this part. (5 U.S.C. 

7701(g)). 

William D. Spencer, 

Clerk of the Board. 

[FR Doc. 2014–19589 Filed 8–15–14; 8:45 am] 

BILLING CODE 7400–01–P 

DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION 

Federal Aviation Administration 

14 CFR Part 27 

[Docket No. FAA–2014–0596; Special 

Conditions No. 27–035–SC] 

Special Conditions: Robinson Model 

R66 Helicopter, § 27.1309, Installation 

of HeliSAS Autopilot and Stabilization 

Augmentation System (AP/SAS) 

AGENCY: Federal Aviation 

Administration (FAA), DOT. 

ACTION: Final special conditions; request 

for comments. 

SUMMARY: These special conditions are 

issued for the modification of the 

Robinson Helicopter Company Model 

R66 helicopter. This model helicopter 

will have a novel or unusual design 

feature after installation of the HeliSAS 

helicopter autopilot/stabilization 

augmentation system (AP/SAS) that has 

potential failure conditions with more 

severe adverse consequences than those 

envisioned by the existing applicable 

airworthiness regulations. These special 

conditions contain the added safety 

standards the Administrator considers 

necessary to ensure the failures and 

their effects are sufficiently analyzed 

and contained. 

DATES: The effective date of these 

special conditions is August 7, 2014. We 

must receive your comments on or 

before October 3, 2014. 

ADDRESSES: Send comments identified 

by docket number [FAA–2014–0596] 

using any of the following methods: 

• Federal eRegulations Portal: Go to 

http://www.regulations.gov and follow 

the online instructions for sending your 

comments electronically. 

• Mail: Send comments to Docket 

Operations, M–30, U.S. Department of 

Transportation (DOT), 1200 New Jersey 

Avenue SE., Room W12–140, West 

Building Ground Floor, Washington, DC 

20590–0001. 

• Hand Delivery of Courier: Deliver 

comments to the Docket Operations, in 

Room W12–140 of the West Building 

Ground Floor at 1200 New Jersey 

Avenue SE., Washington, DC between 9 

a.m., and 5 p.m., Monday through 

Friday, except federal holidays. 

• Fax: Fax comments to Docket 

Operations at 202–493–2251. 

Privacy: The FAA will post all 

comments it receives, without change, 

to http://regulations.gov, including any 

personal information the commenter 

provides. Using the search function of 

the docket Web site, anyone can find 

and read the electronic form of all 

comments received into any FAA 

docket, including the name of the 

individual sending the comment (or 

signing the comment for an association, 

business, labor union, etc.). DOT’s 

complete Privacy Act Statement can be 

found in the Federal Register published 

on April 11, 2000 (65 FR 19477–19478), 

as well as at http://DocketsInfo.dot.gov. 

Docket: Background documents or 

comments received may be read at 

http://www.regulations.gov. Follow the 

online instructions for accessing the 

docket or go to the Docket Operations in 

Room W12–140 of the West Building 

Ground Floor at 1200 New Jersey 

Avenue SE., Washington, DC, between 9 

a.m., and 5 p.m., Monday through 

Friday, except Federal holidays. 

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: 

Mark Wiley, Aviation Safety Engineer, 

FAA, Rotorcraft Directorate, Regulations 

and Policy Group (ASW–111), 2601 

Meacham Blvd., Fort Worth, Texas 

76137; telephone (817) 222–5134; 

facsimile (817) 222–5961; or email to 

mark.wiley@faa.gov. 

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: 


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Federal Register / Vol. 79, No. 160 / Tuesday, August 19, 2014 / Rules and Regulations 48947 

Reason for No Prior Notice and 

Comment Before Adoption 

The FAA has determined that notice 

and opportunity for public comment are 

unnecessary because the substance of 

these special conditions has been 

subjected to the notice and comment 

period previously and has been derived 

without substantive change from those 

previously issued. As it is unlikely that 

we will receive new comments, the FAA 

finds that good cause exists for making 

these special conditions effective upon 

issuance. 

Comments Invited 

While we did not precede this with a 

notice of proposed special conditions, 

we invite interested people to take part 

in this action by sending written 

comments, data, or views. The most 

helpful comments reference a specific 

portion of the special conditions, 

explain the reason for any 

recommended change, and include 

supporting data. 

We will consider all comments we 

receive by the closing date for 

comments. We will consider comments 

filed late if it is possible to do so 

without incurring expense or delay. We 

may change these special conditions 

based on the comments we receive. 

If you want us to let you know we 

received your mailed comments on 

these special conditions, send us a preaddressed, stamped postcard on which 

the docket number appears. We will 

stamp the date on the postcard and mail 

it back to you. 

Background 

On July 11, 2014, the Robinson 

Helicopter Company applied to amend 

type certificate (TC) Number R00015LA 

to install a HeliSAS AP/SAS on the 

Robinson Helicopter Company model 

R66 helicopter. The Robinson 

Helicopter Company model R66 

helicopter is a 14 CFR part 27 normal 

category, single turbine engine, 

conventional helicopter designed for 

civil operation. This helicopter model is 

capable of carrying up to four 

passengers with one pilot, and has a 

maximum gross weight of up to 2,700 

pounds, depending on the model 

configuration. The major design features 

include a 2-blade, fully articulated main 

rotor, an anti-torque tail rotor system, a 

skid landing gear, and a visual flight 

rule basic avionics configuration. 

Robinson Helicopter Company proposes 

to modify this model helicopter by 

installing a two-axis HeliSAS AP/SAS. 

Type Certification Basis 

Under 14 CFR 21.101, the Robinson 

Helicopter Company must show that the 

model R66 helicopter, as modified by 

the installed HeliSAS AP/SAS, 

continues to meet the applicable 

regulations in effect on the date of 

application for the change to the type 

certificate. The baseline of the 

certification basis for the unmodified 

Robinson Helicopter Company model 

R66 helicopter is listed in TC Number 

R00015LA. Additionally, compliance 

must be shown to any applicable 

equivalent level of safety findings, 

exemptions, and special conditions 

prescribed by the Administrator as part 

of the certification basis. 

The Administrator has determined the 

applicable airworthiness regulations 

(that is, 14 CFR part 27), as they pertain 

to this amended TC, do not contain 

adequate or appropriate safety standards 

for the Robinson Helicopter Company 

model R66 helicopter because of a novel 

or unusual design feature. Therefore, 

special conditions are prescribed under 

§ 21.16. 

In addition to the applicable 

airworthiness regulations and special 

conditions, the Robinson Helicopter 

Company must show compliance of the 

HeliSAS AP/SAS amended TC altered 

model R66 helicopter with the noise 

certification requirements of 14 CFR 

part 36. 

The FAA issues special conditions, as 

defined in § 11.19, in accordance with 

§ 11.38 and they become part of the type 

certification basis under § 21.101(d). 

Novel or Unusual Design Features 

The HeliSAS AP/SAS incorporates 

novel or unusual design features for 

installation in a Robinson Helicopter 

Company model R66 helicopter, TC 

Number R00015LA. This HeliSAS AP/

SAS performs non-critical control 

functions. However, the possible failure 

conditions for this system, and their 

effect on the continued safe flight and 

landing of the helicopter, are more 

severe than those envisioned by the 

present rules. 

Discussion 

The effect on safety is not adequately 

covered under § 27.1309 for the 

application of new technology and new 

application of standard technology. 

Specifically, the present provisions of 

§ 27.1309(c) do not adequately address 

the safety requirements for systems 

whose failures could result in 

catastrophic or hazardous/severe-major 

failure conditions, or for complex 

systems whose failures could result in 

major failure conditions. The current 

regulations are inadequate because 

when § 27.1309(c) were promulgated, it 

was not envisioned that this type of 

rotorcraft would use systems that are 

complex or whose failure could result in 

‘‘catastrophic’’ or ‘‘hazardous/severemajor’’ effects on the rotorcraft. This is 

particularly true with the application of 

new technology, new application of 

standard technology, or other 

applications not envisioned by the rule 

that affect safety. 

To comply with the provisions of the 

special conditions, we require that 

Robinson Helicopter Company provide 

the FAA with a systems safety 

assessment (SSA) for the final HeliSAS 

AP/SAS installation configuration that 

will adequately address the safety 

objectives established by a functional 

hazard assessment (FHA) and a 

preliminary system safety assessment 

(PSSA), including the fault tree analysis 

(FTA). This will ensure that all failure 

conditions and their resulting effects are 

adequately addressed for the installed 

HeliSAS AP/SAS. The SSA process, 

FHA, PSSA, and FTA are all parts of the 

overall safety assessment process 

discussed in FAA Advisory Circular 27– 

1B (Certification of Normal Category 

Rotorcraft) and Society of Automotive 

Engineers document Aerospace 

Recommended Practice 4761 

(Guidelines and Methods for 

Conducting the Safety Assessment 

Process on Civil Airborne Systems and 

Equipment). 

These special conditions require that 

the HeliSAS AP/SAS installed on 

Robinson Helicopter Company model 

R66 helicopter meet the requirements to 

adequately address the failure effects 

identified by the FHA, and subsequently 

verified by the SSA, within the defined 

design integrity requirements. 

Failure Condition Categories. Failure 

conditions are classified, according to 

the severity of their effects on the 

rotorcraft, into one of the following 

categories: 

1. No Effect. Failure conditions that 

would have no effect on safety. For 

example, failure conditions that would 

not affect the operational capability of 

the rotorcraft or increase crew workload; 

however, could result in an 

inconvenience to the occupants, 

excluding the flight crew. 

2. Minor. Failure conditions which 

would not significantly reduce rotorcraft 

safety, and which would involve crew 

actions that are well within their 

capabilities. Minor failure conditions 

would include, for example, a slight 

reduction in safety margins or 

functional capabilities, a slight increase 

in crew workload such as routine flight 

plan changes or result in some physical 

discomfort to occupants. 

3. Major. Failure conditions which 

would reduce the capability of the 

rotorcraft or the ability of the crew to 


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48948 Federal Register / Vol. 79, No. 160 / Tuesday, August 19, 2014 / Rules and Regulations 

cope with adverse operating conditions 

to the extent that there would be, for 

example, a significant reduction in 

safety margins or functional capabilities, 

a significant increase in crew workload 

or result in impairing crew efficiency, 

physical distress to occupants, 

including injuries, or physical 

discomfort to the flight crew. 

4. Hazardous/Severe-Major. 

a. Failure conditions which would 

reduce the capability of the rotorcraft or 

the ability of the crew to cope with 

adverse operating conditions to the 

extent that there would be: 

(1) a large reduction in safety margins 

or functional capabilities; 

(2) physical distress or excessive 

workload that would impair the flight 

crew’s ability to the extent that they 

could not be relied on to perform their 

tasks accurately or completely; or 

(3) possible serious or fatal injury to 

a passenger or a cabin crewmember, 

excluding the flight crew. 

b. ‘‘Hazardous/severe-major’’ failure 

conditions can include events that are 

manageable by the crew by the use of 

proper procedures, which, if not 

implemented correctly or in a timely 

manner, may result in a catastrophic 

event. 

5. Catastrophic—Failure conditions 

which would result in multiple fatalities 

to occupants, fatalities or incapacitation 

to the flight crew, or result in loss of the 

rotorcraft. 

Radio Technical Commission for 

Aeronautics, Inc. (RTCA) Document 

DO–178C (Software Considerations in 

Airborne Systems And Equipment 

Certification) provides software design 

assurance levels most commonly used 

for the major, hazardous/severe-major, 

and catastrophic failure condition 

categories. The HeliSAS AP/SAS system 

equipment must be qualified for the 

expected installation environment. The 

test procedures prescribed in RTCA 

Document DO–160G (Environmental 

Conditions and Test Procedures for 

Airborne Equipment) are recognized by 

the FAA as acceptable methodologies 

for finding compliance with the 

environmental requirements. Equivalent 

environment test standards may also be 

acceptable. This is to show that the 

HeliSAS AP/SAS system performs its 

intended function under any foreseeable 

operating condition, which includes the 

expected environment in which the 

HeliSAS AP/SAS is intended to operate. 

Some of the main considerations for 

environmental concerns are installation 

locations and the resulting exposure to 

environmental conditions for the 

HeliSAS AP/SAS system equipment, 

including considerations for other 

equipment that may be affected 

environmentally by the HeliSAS AP/

SAS equipment installation. The level 

of environmental qualification must be 

related to the severity of the considered 

failure conditions and effects on the 

rotorcraft. 

Applicability 

These special conditions are 

applicable to the HeliSAS AP/SAS 

installed as an amended TC approval in 

Robinson Helicopter Company model 

R66 helicopter, TC Number R00015LA. 

Conclusion 

This action affects only certain novel 

or unusual design features for a HeliSAS 

AP/SAS amended TC installed on one 

model helicopter. It is not a rule of 

general applicability and affects only 

the applicant who applied to the FAA 

for approval of these features. 

List of Subjects in 14 CFR Part 27 

Aircraft, Aviation safety. 

The authority citation for these 

special conditions is as follows: 

Authority: 42 U.S.C. 7572, 49 U.S.C. 

106(g), 40105, 40113, 44701–44702, 44704, 

44709, 44711, 44713, 44715, 45303. 

The Special Conditions 

Accordingly, pursuant to the 

authority delegated to me by the 

Administrator, the following special 

conditions are issued as part of the 

Robinson Helicopter Company amended 

type certificate basis for the installation 

of a HeliSAS helicopter autopilot/

stabilization augmentation system (AP/ 

SAS) on the model R66 helicopter, Type 

Certificate Number R00015LA. In 

addition to the requirements of 

§ 27.1309(c), HeliSAS AP/SAS 

installations on Robinson Helicopter 

company model R66 helicopter must be 

designed and installed so that the 

failure conditions identified in the 

functional hazard assessment (FHA) and 

verified by the system safety assessment 

(SSA), after design completion, are 

adequately addressed in accordance 

with the following requirements. 

Requirements 

The Robinson Helicopter Company 

must comply with the existing 

requirements of § 27.1309 for all 

applicable design and operational 

aspects of the HeliSAS AP/SAS with the 

failure condition categories of ‘‘no 

effect,’’ and ‘‘minor,’’ and for noncomplex systems whose failure 

condition category is classified as 

‘‘major.’’ The Robinson Helicopter 

Company must comply with the 

requirements of these special conditions 

for all applicable design and operational 

aspects of the HeliSAS AP/SAS with the 

failure condition categories of 

‘‘catastrophic’’ and ‘‘hazardous severe/

major,’’ and for complex systems whose 

failure condition category is classified 

as ‘‘major.’’ A complex system is a 

system whose operations, failure 

conditions, or failure effects are difficult 

to comprehend without the aid of 

analytical methods (for example, FTA, 

Failure Modes and Effect Analysis, 

FHA). 

System Design Integrity Requirements 

Each of the failure condition 

categories defined in these special 

conditions relate to the corresponding 

aircraft system integrity requirements. 

The system design integrity 

requirements for the HeliSAS AP/SAS, 

as they relate to the allowed probability 

of occurrence for each failure condition 

category and the proposed software 

design assurance level, are as follows: 

1. ‘‘Major’’—For systems with 

‘‘major’’ failure conditions, failures 

resulting in these major effects must be 

shown to be remote, a probability of 

occurrence on the order of between 1 × 

10¥5 to 1 × 10¥7 failures/hour, and 

associated software must be developed, 

at a minimum, to the Level C software 

design assurance level. 

2. ‘‘Hazardous/Severe-Major’’—For 

systems with ‘‘hazardous/severe-major’’ 

failure conditions, failures resulting in 

these hazardous/severe-major effects 

must be shown to be extremely remote, 

a probability of occurrence on the order 

of between 1 × 10¥7 to 1 × 10¥9

failures/hour, and associated software 

must be developed, at a minimum, to 

the Level B software design assurance 

level. 

3. ‘‘Catastrophic’’—For systems with 

‘‘catastrophic’’ failure conditions, 

failures resulting in these catastrophic 

effects must be shown to be extremely 

improbable, a probability of occurrence 

on the order of 1 × 10¥9 failures/hour 

or less, and associated software must be 

developed, at a minimum, to the Level 

A design assurance level. 

System Design Environmental 

Requirements 

The HeliSAS AP/SAS system 

equipment must be qualified to the 

appropriate environmental level for all 

relevant aspects to show that it performs 

its intended function under any 

foreseeable operating condition, 

including the expected environment in 

which the HeliSAS AP/SAS is intended 

to operate. Some of the main 

considerations for environmental 

concerns are installation locations and 

the resulting exposure to environmental 

conditions for the HeliSAS AP/SAS 

system equipment, including 


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Federal Register / Vol. 79, No. 160 / Tuesday, August 19, 2014 / Rules and Regulations 48949 

considerations for other equipment that 

may be affected environmentally by the 

HeliSAS AP/SAS equipment 

installation. The level of environmental 

qualification must be related to the 

severity of the considered failure 

conditions and effects on the rotorcraft. 

Test and Analysis Requirements 

Compliance with the requirements of 

these special conditions may be shown 

by a variety of methods, which typically 

consist of analysis, flight tests, ground 

tests, and simulation, as a minimum. 

Compliance methodology is related to 

the associated failure condition 

category. If the HeliSAS AP/SAS is a 

complex system, compliance with the 

requirements for failure conditions 

classified as ‘‘major’’ may be shown by 

analysis, in combination with 

appropriate testing to validate the 

analysis. Compliance with the 

requirements for failure conditions 

classified as ‘‘hazardous/severe-major’’ 

may be shown by flight-testing in 

combination with analysis and 

simulation, and the appropriate testing 

to validate the analysis. Flight tests may 

be limited for ‘‘hazardous/severe-major’’ 

failure conditions and effects due to 

safety considerations. Compliance with 

the requirements for failure conditions 

classified as ‘‘catastrophic’’ may be 

shown by analysis, and appropriate 

testing in combination with simulation 

to validate the analysis. Very limited 

flight tests in combination with 

simulation are used as a part of a 

showing of compliance for 

‘‘catastrophic’’ failure conditions. Flight 

tests are performed only in 

circumstances that use operational 

variations, or extrapolations from other 

flight performance aspects to address 

flight safety. 

These special conditions require that 

the HeliSAS AP/SAS system installed 

on a Robinson Helicopter Company 

model R66 helicopter, Type Certificate 

Number R00015LA, meet these 

requirements to adequately address the 

failure effects identified by the FHA, 

and subsequently verified by the SSA, 

within the defined design system 

integrity requirements. 

Issued in Fort Worth, Texas on August 7, 

2014. 

Lance T. Gant, 

Acting Manager, Rotorcraft Directorate, 

Aircraft Certification Service. 

[FR Doc. 2014–19539 Filed 8–18–14; 8:45 am] 

BILLING CODE 4910–13–P 

DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION 

Federal Aviation Administration 

14 CFR Part 27 

[Docket No. FAA–2014–0595; Special 

Conditions No. 27–031–SC] 

Special Conditions: Airbus Helicopters 

Deutschland GmbH Model EC135 

Series Helicopters, Installation of 

HeliSAS Autopilot and Stabilization 

Augmentation System (AP/SAS) 

AGENCY: Federal Aviation 

Administration (FAA), DOT. 

ACTION: Final special conditions; request 

for comments. 

SUMMARY: These special conditions are 

issued for the modification of the Airbus 

Helicopters Deutschland GmbH (Airbus 

Helicopters) Model EC135 series 

helicopters. These model helicopters 

will have a novel or unusual design 

feature after installation of the S–TEC 

Corporation (S–TEC) HeliSAS 

helicopter autopilot/stabilization 

augmentation system (AP/SAS) that has 

potential failure conditions with more 

severe adverse consequences than those 

envisioned by the existing applicable 

airworthiness regulations. These special 

conditions contain the added safety 

standards the Administrator considers 

necessary to ensure the failures and 

their effects are sufficiently analyzed 

and contained. 

DATES: The effective date of these 

special conditions is August 7, 2014. We 

must receive your comments on or 

before October 3, 2014. 

ADDRESSES: Send comments identified 

by docket number [FAA–2014–0595] 

using any of the following methods: 

• Federal eRegulations Portal: Go to 

http://www.regulations.gov and follow 

the online instructions for sending your 

comments electronically. 

• Mail: Send comments to Docket 

Operations, M–30, U.S. Department of 

Transportation (DOT), 1200 New Jersey 

Avenue SE., Room W12–140, West 

Building Ground Floor, Washington, DC 

20590–0001. 

• Hand Delivery of Courier: Deliver 

comments to the Docket Operations, in 

Room W12–140 of the West Building 

Ground Floor at 1200 New Jersey 

Avenue SE., Washington, DC between 9 

a.m., and 5 p.m., Monday through 

Friday, except federal holidays. 

• Fax: Fax comments to Docket 

Operations at 202–493–2251. 

Privacy: The FAA will post all 

comments it receives, without change, 

to http://regulations.gov, including any 

personal information the commenter 

provides. Using the search function of 

the docket Web site, anyone can find 

and read the electronic form of all 

comments received into any FAA 

docket, including the name of the 

individual sending the comment (or 

signing the comment for an association, 

business, labor union, etc.). DOT’s 

complete Privacy Act Statement can be 

found in the Federal Register published 

on April 11, 2000 (65 FR 19477–19478), 

as well as at http://DocketsInfo.dot.gov. 

Docket: Background documents or 

comments received may be read at 

http://www.regulations.gov. Follow the 

online instructions for accessing the 

docket or go to the Docket Operations in 

Room W12–140 of the West Building 

Ground Floor at 1200 New Jersey 

Avenue SE., Washington, DC, between 9 

a.m., and 5 p.m., Monday through 

Friday, except Federal holidays. 

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Matt 

Wilbanks, Aviation Safety Engineer, 

FAA, Rotorcraft Directorate, Regulations 

and Policy Group (ASW–111), 2601 

Meacham Blvd., Fort Worth, Texas 

76137; telephone (817) 222–5051; 

facsimile (817) 222–5961; or email to 

Matt.Wilbanks@faa.gov. 

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: 

Reason for No Prior Notice and 

Comment Before Adoption 

The FAA has determined that notice 

and opportunity for public comment are 

unnecessary because the substance of 

these special conditions has been 

subjected to the notice and comment 

period previously and has been derived 

without substantive change from those 

previously issued. As it is unlikely that 

we will receive new comments, the FAA 

finds that good cause exists for making 

these special conditions effective upon 

issuance. 

Comments Invited 

While we did not precede this with a 

notice of proposed special conditions, 

we invite interested people to take part 

in this action by sending written 

comments, data, or views. The most 

helpful comments reference a specific 

portion of the special conditions, 

explain the reason for any 

recommended change, and include 

supporting data. 

We will consider all comments we 

receive by the closing date for 

comments. We will consider comments 

filed late if it is possible to do so 

without incurring expense or delay. We 

may change these special conditions 

based on the comments we receive. 

If you want us to let you know we 

received your mailed comments on 

these special conditions, send us a preaddressed, stamped postcard on which 


wreier-aviles on DSK5TPTVN1PROD with RULES