JAMES 

LEROY 

No. 90-159 

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF MONTANA 

1990 

FORDY 

ICK a 

'CE and THELMA FORDYCE 

Plaintiffs and Appellant 

.nd STEVEN MUSICK, 

Defendants and Responden 

APPEAL FROM: District Court of the Tenth Judicial District, 

In and for the County of Fergus, 

The Honorable Peter L. Rapkoch, Judge presiding. 

COUNSEL OF RECORD: 

For Appellant: 

Timothy J. OIHare, Lewistown, Montana 

For Respondent: 

Robert L. Johnson, Lewistown, Montana 

Submitted on Briefs: September 13, 1990 

Filed: 

Decided: November 15, 1990 
Justice Fred J. Weber delivered the Opinion of the Court. 

Plaintiffs, James and Thelma Fordyce (Fordyces) initiated this 

action for rescission of a Farm Lease Agreement against defendants, 

Leroy and Steven Musick (Musicks), alleging that the Musicks 

breached the agreement. The Musicks counterclaimed alleging breach 

of the agreement and seeking damages for breach. Following a nonjury trial, the District Court for the Tenth Judicial District, 

Fergus County, entered judgment for the Musicks and awarded damages 

in the amount of $69,540.53 plus costs. The Fordyces appeal. We 

affirm. 

The issues are: 

(1) Did the District Court err in finding that the Musicks 

sustained a loss of income for 1987 and 1988 due to acreage 

restrictions imposed under the Conservation Reserve Program (CRP) 

administered by the Agricultural Stabilization and Conservation 

Service (ASCS) ? 

(2) Did the District Court err in awarding damages to the 

Musicks even though their family farm corporation, Bar Elsky Ranch, 

Inc., was shown on the ASCS records as the operator of the farm? 

The Fordyces own farm land in Fergus County, and the Musicks 

have farmed that land under lease for many years. On April 1, 

1977, the parties executed a ten year lease. On April 1, 1982, the 

parties renegotiated and executed a new ten year lease. On January 

10, 1987, the Fordyces wrote a letter to the Musicks, claiming that 

the Fordyces had not signed the 1982 lease and that the lease would 

expire on April 1, 1987, under the 1977 lease. The Fordyces then 

2 
made application with the ASCS to retire their land from 

agricultural production for ten years through the CRP with all the 

payments from the program to be paid to the Fordyces. 

The Musicks made timely protest with the ASCS and submitted 

evidence to the agency that the 1982 lease was indeed executed, and 

that the lease permitted the Musicks to farm the land through 1992. 

The ASCS nevertheless honored the Fordycesl application, and the 

Musicks were unable to plant crops on the leased land for 1987 and 

1988 in order to comply with the rules of the ASCS to receive 

federal deficiency payments for the Musicksl entire farming 

operation. 

On July 23, 1987, the Fordyces, through counsel, sent the 

Musicks a I1Notice of Defaultt1 claiming that the Musicks allowed 

noxious weeks to grow on the Fordycesl land. The lease contains 

a weed control provision making the elimination of noxious weeds 

an eventual goal. The Musicks refused to yield up the land to the 

Fordyces and the Fordyces brought this action for rescission of the 

lease. The Musicks counter-claimed, seeking damages for 1987 and 

1988 while the land was unable to be planted under the CRP 

restrictions. 

I 

Did the District Court err in finding that the Musicks 

sustained a loss of income for 1987 and 1988 due to acreage 

restrictions imposed under the CRP administered by the ASCS? 

The Fordyces argue that there is not substantial credible 

evidence in the record to support the Musicksl claim for damages. 
The Fordyces contend that the record shows that the damages were 

actually caused by the Musicksl bad business decisions. 

The standard of review for a civil case for a judge sitting 

without a jury is whether or not the District Court's findings 

are clearly erroneous. Dennis v. Tomahawk Services, Inc. (1989), 

235 Mont. 378, 379, 767 P.2d 346, 347. This Court will not 

substitute its judgment for that of the trial court absent that 

showing, even where there is evidence in the record to support 

appellant's contentions. Id. 

Because of the CRP and in order to comply with the federal 

rules to receive federal deficiency payments for their entire 

farming operations, the Musicks elected in 1987 to plow up the 83.3 

acres of pubescent wheat grass seed planted on the land leased from 

the Fordyces. The Fordyces argue that if the Musicks would have 

elected to plow up wheat and barley instead, their damages would 

not have been as great. 

The matter of which field to idle was only one of many 

decisions facing the Musicks because of the Fordyces' wrongful 

enrollment of the leased land into the CRP. In making those 

decisions the Musicks had a duty to act reasonably under the 

circumstances so as not to unnecessarily enlarge their damages. 

Bronken's Good Time Co. v. J.W. Brown (1983), 203 Mont. 427, 432, 

661 P.2d 861, 864. The law does not require those decisions to be 

unerringly correct with the benefit of hindsight. If a choice of 

two reasonable courses presents itself, the person whose wrong 

forced the choice cannot complain that one rather than the other 
is chosen. Hogland v. Klein (1956), 49 Wash. 2d 216, 298 P.2d 

1099, 1102. 

Whether the injured party violated his duty to mitigate 

damages is a question for the trier of fact when there is 

conflicting evidence. Bronken's, at 433, 661 P.2d at 861. We have 

carefully reviewed the record and find there is substantial 

credible evidence to support the District Court's findings. We 

hold that the District Court did not err in finding that the 

Musicks sustained a loss of income for 1987 and 1988 due to acreage 

restrictions imposed under the CRP administered by the ASCS. 

I1 

Did the District Court err in awarding damages to the Musicks 

even though their family corporation, Bar Elsky Ranch, Inc., was 

shown on the ASCS records as the operator of the farm? 

The Fordyces claim that Musicksl family farm corporation, Bar 

Elsky Ranch, Inc., is the real party in interest. Bar Elsky Ranch 

was not a party to the lawsuit and thus Fordyces argue that the 

District Court erred in awarding damages to the Musicks under Rule 

17 (a) , M.R. Civ. P., which states in part [elvery action shall be 

prosecuted in the name of the real party in interest." 

It is elementary law that a contract binds no one but the 

contracting parties. Gambles v. Perdue (1977), 175 Mont. 112, 115, 

572 P.2d 1241, 1243. The obligation of the contract is limited to 

the contracting parties, and ordinarily only those who are parties 

to the contract are liable for their breach. Id. Therefore if the 

contracting parties are before the court, they are the proper 
parties even though a party not before the court, such as Bar Elsky 

Ranch, had the benefit of one contracting party's performance. The 

evidence does not show that Bar Elsky Ranch had any ownership 

rights in the lease and therefore Bar Elsky Ranch was not a real 

party in interest in this action. We hold that the District Court 

did not err in awarding damages to the Musicks even though their 

family farm corporation, Bar Elsky Ranch, Inc. , was shown on the 

ASCS records as the operator of the farm. 

Affirmed.