### IN THE COURT OF APP EALS OF TENNESS EE AT JAC KSON Se pte m be r 20, 200 6 S es sio n ROS ALIN D P RU ITT, IND IVID UA LLY AN D A S M OTHERAN D N EXT OF

KI N OF DOMONI QUE PRUIT T, A MINOR

v. C IT Y OF M EM P HI S An Appeal f

romthe Circ uit Court for Sh elby County No. CT-002855-04 K ay S. Robil io, Jud ge

No. W2005-02796-C OA-R3-C V - F iled Janu ary 18, 2007

This is a neg lige nce case broug ht unde r the Tenne ssee Governmental Tort Liabili t yAc t

. T he plaintiff’s minor daug hter slipped and f ell at a public swimming fac ilityand b ro ke her arm. The plaintiff filed suit ag ainst the defe ndant swimming fac ility , alleg ing that her minor daug hter slipped on a we t concr ete f

loor in the dressing room are a and that the swimming fa cility cre ated a nd maintained a dang erous and defe ctive condition that caused her daug hter’s injury

. At trial, the defe ndant swimming fa cility moved for an involuntary dismiss al at the close of the plaintiff’ s proof. The trial c ourt g rante d the motion and dismiss ed the case
. The plainti ff now appea ls, arg uing that the trial court applied an ad u l t s t andar d of ca re to he r minor daug hter, a nd that she established a prima fa c ie c a se of

ne g lig e nc e a g a ins t th e de fe nd a nt. We a ff ir m, f ind ing that th e plaint if

f f a ile d to make out a prima fac ie ca se of ne g lige nce.
Te nn. R . A pp. P . 3 App e al a s o f Rig ht ; J udgm e nt of t he Tr ial Co ur t i s A ffirm e d.
H OL L Y M. K I RBY , J. , d e li v e r e d th e o p in io n o f th e Co u r t, inw h ic h W. F RAN K C RAW FORD , P.J ., W.S ., and D AVI D R. F ARMER , J ., joined.
Da vidA. Mc L aug hli n a nd Pe te r B . G e e , Jr. , M e mph is, Te nn e sse e , f or Ap pe llants Ros a lin d Pr

uitt, I ndividually

and as Mother

and Ne x t of Kin of Domonique Pruitt, a minor.
J. Mic ha e l F le tc he r, Me mph is, Te nn e sse e , f or Ap pe lle e City

of Me mph is.
OP IN ION
Def endant/Appe llee City

of Memphis (“City ” or “ Def endant” ), owns, ope ra tes, and maintains the L ester Community Center, which includes a swimming pool open to the public. On J u n e 1 5 , 2 0 0 3 , D o m i n i q u e P ru i t t , t h e n a g e 1 0 , e n t e r e d t h e f a c i l i t y t o s w i m
. W h i l e i n t h e f a c i l i t y, Dominique Pruitt fell and injured her rig ht arm, fr acturing it in two place s.Pl ai n t i f f pl ed s ec t i on 29- 20- 205 of t h e T en n es s ee Code An n ot at ed a s t h e bas i s of h er c l ai m. T h i s s ec t i on 1
p rovides t hat “ [i ]mm uni t y f rom sui t o f

a l l go vernm ent al e nt i t i es i s rem o ved for inj ury p roximatel y c aused b y a negl i gent ac t or om i s s i on of

an y empl oy ee wi t h i n t h e s cope of hi s empl oy men t , ” s u bj ec t t o nu mer ou s e x ce pt i on s
. T

. C. A. § 29- 20- 2 0 5 (2 0 0 0 ). A t tr i al a nd o n thi s ap p eal , ho wever, P l ai nt i f f a rgued t hat the i njury w as caused b y a da ngerous and de fect i ve co nd i t i o n of whi ch t he C i t y o f M em p hi s had no t i ce. Se ct i o n 2 9

- 2 0

- 2 0 4 o f the T enness ee C o d e A nno t at ed gove rns t he
r emov al of

g ov er n men t al i mmun i t y f or i n j u r i es ca u s ed by a da n g er ou s or de fec t i v e con di t i on
. Spe ci f i ca l l y , t h i s s ec t i on st ates: (a) Imm uni t y f rom s ui t of a go vernm ent al ent i t y i s rem o ved fo r any i njury caused b y t he d angero us o r def ect i ve co nd i t i o n of any p ub l i c b ui l d i ng, s t ruct ure, da m , res ervoir or o t her pub l i c i m p rovem ent o w n e d a n d c o n tro lled b y su c h go v e rn m e n ta l en tit y. (b ) Im m u n ity i s no t rem o ve d fo r l aten t d efec t i ve co nd i t i o ns, no r shall t his s ec t i o n a p p l y unless
cons t r uct i ve and/ or a ct ual not i ce t o t he gover nment al en t i t y o f su ch condi t i on be al l ege d and prove d i n a ddi t i on t o t h e pr oce du r al n ot i ce r equ i r ed by § 29- 20- 302.

T

. C

. A

. § 2 9

- 2 0

- 2 0 4 (20 0 0 ).

Fro m t he reco rd, we gat her t hat up o n e nt eri ng the L est er C o m m uni t y C ent er, ther e i s a l o ng ha l l way l ead i ng 2 d i rect l y t o t he swi m m i ng p o o l

. O n t he l ef t o r ri ght si d e o f t hat hal l way i s an ent ry way area t hat , upo n ent eri ng i t , veers i n t o t h e g i r l s ’ dr es s i n g r oom. T h e r ec or d i s n ot c l ea r a s t o w h i ch s i de of t h e h al l wa y t h e g i r l s ’ dr es s i n g r oom i s l oca t ed. E ithe r w a y, i t ap p e a rs tha t en try to the d re ssin g ro o m w o u ld re q u ire a tur n fro m the ha llwa y to the d re ssin g ro o m
. 2 O n M a y 1 7 , 2 0 0 4 , Pl a in ti f f /A p p e ll a n t Ro s a li n d Pr

u itt, in d iv id u a ll y a n d a s mo th e r a n d n e xt of kin of Domonique Pruitt (“Plaintiff” or “Pruitt”), filed a lawsuit ag ainst the City pursuant to the Tenne ssee Gove rnmental Tor t L iabilityAct, alleg ing ne g lige nce. I n her c omplaint, Pruit t asserte d 1 that Dominique enter ed the dr essing room of the L es t er C o mmunityCenter and, while in the chang ing a

rea , slipped and fell on a we t, slippery , and slick conc retefloor, fr acturing he r rig ht arm in two places. Pruitt’s complaint alleg ed that there wer e no “anti-slip m easur es” in plac e to protec t the public in g ener al or Domonique in pa rticular. She soug ht compensatory damag es equal to the maxi mum amount allowed under Tenne ssee Code A nnotated § 29-20-403 or $250,000, whicheve r is g re a te r, a s w e ll a s me dic a l e xpe ns e s. The City filed its answer

on J une 25, 2004. In re s p o nse to the complaint, the City denied neg lige nce and asserted that Pruitt failed to state a claim upon which relief could be g rante d. The Cityalso arg ued that Pruitt was g uilty of compar ative fault by failing to properly

supervise he r minor d au g h t e r , a n d t h a tt h e P u b l i c D u t y D o c tr i n e b arr e d a n y r e c o v e r y.
A benc h trial was he ld on October 31, 2005. At the outset, counsel f or the Plaintiff told the tria l c ou rt that th e e vid e nc e wo uldsh ow that, whil e Do mon iqu e wa s in the ha llw a y on the way

to the dressing room, she slipped and f ell on “polished” and wet conc rete

. Counsel arg ued that the 2 evidenc e would show that the slippery and wet concr ete f loor constituted a dang erous a nd defe ctive c o n d i t i o n c r e a t e da n d m a i n t a i n e d b y t h e C i t y. As their first witness, Plaintiff ca lled Domonique Pruitt. Domoniquete s ti f ie d th at on J anuary 15, 2003, she arrived at the L ester Community Center a round 2:00 p.m. to swim. S he said that whe nT h e p h o to g ra p h s ta k e n b y M s. P ru itt ’s inv e stiga to r, w h ic h w e re su b m itt e d a s p a rt o f t h e re c o rd , ap p e a r to 3 d e p ic t t h is e n tryw a y a re a in a d d iti o n to the insid e o f t h e d r e s s in g r o o m a re a . A s n o te d a b o v e , ho w e v e r, M s. P ru itt te stif ie d tha t t h e p h o to g ra p h s d o no t d e p ic t t h e a re a w h e re D o m o n iq u e fell. 3 s h e e n t e r e d t h e f

a c i l i t y, s h e w a l k e d d o w n a h a l l w a y o n h e r

w a y t o c h a n g e c l o t h e s
. In t h e h a l l w a y, sh e state d, sh e sli pp e d o nc e , but “c aug ht [he r]s e lf,” a ndthe n a ft e r a fe w m or e ste ps , s lip pe d a g a in and fell to the floor. Acc ording to Domonique, t here was nothi ng on the floor wher e she slipped; she desc ribed the concr ete f loor as “r oug h” and w et. When she g ot up, she said, the bac k of her sh orts w a s w e t a ndhe r rig ht a rm wa s hu rt ing

. She te sti fi e d that sh e the n tol d a n e mpl oy e e of he r f a ll. The e mploy ee inf

ormed he r that her

arm wa s broken a nd called he r m o t h er
. Af ter Domonique’ s m o t h erarri v ed att h e c o m m u n i t y ce n t er , t h e t wo o f t h em we re t ak en t o L eB o n h eu r C h i l d re n 's Hospital by

ambulance , wher e her

rig ht a rm was put in a cast. On c ross-examination, Domonique a c kn ow le dg e d th a t w he n s he arrive d a t the c ommun ity c e nte r, sh e wa s late me e tin g frie nd s a nddid not pay attention to where she stepped. Next, R osalind Pruit t , Dominique’s mother, took the stand. When she a rrived at the community

cente r, she sa id, her daug hter wa s sitti ng in a chair at the entr ance of the fa cility holding her right a rm. Acc ording to Ms. Pruitt, as she bent down to examine her daug hter’s a rm, she pee red int o th e ha llw a y

of thefa c ili ty “ try ing to i ma g ine wh a t ha pp e ne d” a ndsa w a

we t c on c re te fl oo r l it only by the sunlight c oming from the front door. She maintained that she did not se e a mat of any kin d o n th e c on c re te fl oo r o f the ha llw a y . M s. Pruitt a lso te sti fi e d abo ut he r vis it t o th e c ommun ity cente r threeor four

day s afte r the alleg ed incident, in w hich she was acc ompanied by an investig ator who took photogr aphs of the facility

. Ms. Pruitt looked at the photogra phs taken by

the investig ator. She sa id that the y de pic te d the “ dr e ssi ng are a ,” bu t that no ne sh ow e d th e are a wh e reDo mon iqu e fe ll. Ms. Pruitt’ s te sti mon y su g g e ste d that the fa ll oc c ur re d in the e ntry way

are a of the dr e ssi ng ro om. 3 Plaintiff then called, a s an adve rse witness, Daniel Young , the man age r of the L ester Com mun ity

Ce nte r anda

c e rt if ie d li fe g ua

rd . Y ou ng te sti fi e d tha t, o n th e day of the inc ide nt, Do mon iqu e Pruitt c a me ou t of the dr e ssi ng ro om of the fa c ili ty wi th a br ok e n rig ht a

rm . Y ou ng sa id that he wa s in charg e o f p l ac i n g rubber mats on the conc rete floors of the c ommunitycente r. He testified about whe re the floor mats were typically place d. Acc ording to Young , one mat wa s typically place d in the long ha llway leading to the swimming pool, another mat at the entr ance of the dre ssing r oom, and two or thre e mats on the floor inside the dre ssing r oom. Young asserted that there was a

floor mat in the hallway

on the day

of the incide nt. He conc eded, howeve r, that the floor mats a reno t ph y sic a lly

c on ne c te d to ea c h othe r. He a llo we d th a t, i n th e dr e ssi ng ro om a re a , th e ma ts do not cover the entire floor, and that there is a gap betwee n the floor mat lining the hallway to the swimming pool and the f

loor mat in the entry way

are a lea ding into the dressing room, which exposes the conc rete floor. Finally , Plaintiff presente d the t estimony of Gloria Collins, also an employ ee of the L ester Communi ty Center. On the day of the incide nt, Coll ins was working in the “ca g e,” an are a whe re children de posit their clothes afte r chang ing. Colli ns testified that she saw Domonique walk into the fac ilityand g o around the corne r to the “women’ s side.” Shortlythere afte r, she state d, Domonique4

returne d and informe d her that “sh e fe l l i n t h e dressing r oom.” Collins also t estified about the location of the rubber m ats. She said that, on the day of the incide nt, the rubber mat desig nated f

or the hallway

was in plac e. She could not re call whe ther ther e wa s a mat placed i n the entry way of the dre ssing r oom. Coll ins also conce ded that if ther e wa s a floor mat in the entry way are a lea ding into the dressing room on the day of the incide nt, it would not have been c onnecte d to the mat in the h a l l w a y.
At the conc lusion of the Plaintiff’s proof, the City moved for an involuntary dismiss al under Rule 41.02(2) of the Tenne ssee Rules of Civil Procedure . The trial c ourt g rante d the motion, ruling or a lly a s f oll ow s:
The Court does not f

ind plaintiff’s arg ument persua sive. Domonique J ones Pruitt t estified her self that the c oncre te was r oug h and wet

. All of us have be en around swi m m ing pools a ll of our lives and that’s w hat y ou find is roug h and we t concr ete and that’s what she testified to. And t h at s he wa s not looking whe re she wa s go i n g. An d I thi nk that D omo niq ue —I

thi nk we ve ry su re ly wi ll n e ve r kno w e xac tly what happene d, but the plaintiff has not tipped the scale s in plaintiff’s favor . We find that she, in fac t, testified. Als o , we ha ve to re member—I didn’t want to cause Domonique a ny embar rassment, but Domonique is now 12 y ear s old and in the fourth g rade . So her pe rc e pti on —s he ma y

ha ve to m e e t so me pe rc e ptu a l c ha lle ng e s h e rs e lf, a ndI simply don’t see that plaintiff’s ca rried the burden of

proof. That’s what y ou have at sw imming pool[ s] is roug h, wet concr ete a nd y ou do have to pay

attention to wh er e y o u ’r e go ing and y ou do have to look whe re y ou’re g oing. A nd if there are mats around—and it’s difficult t o know where the mats were , bu t it se e ms that th e way

thee vid e nc e is, that the re we re so me ma ts a ro un d, su pp os e that she wa s in dr essing room, I mean, she has an oblig ation to stand where she is not g oing to f all over. No w, we do n’ t kn ow wh e resh e fe ll. Whe n s he ste pp e d o ut, a nda t on e tim e she was in the dressing are a—in fac t, she said she wa s down in the hall. She ca nnot reme mber he rself. A g ain, Domoni que is 12 y ear s old and in the fourth g rade , so I do not find that plaintiffs car ried the bur den of pr oof. Subsequently , on November 7, 2005, the trial court entere d a written order dismissing the Plaintiff’s c la im andg ranti ng theCity ’s Rul e 41 .0 2( 2) mot ion . Fro m th is o rd e r, the Pla int if f n ow app e a ls.
Onapp e a l, P la int if

f r a ise s th e fo llo wi ng tw o is su e s: ( 1) wh e the r the tr ia l c ou rt e rr e d in g ranting the City ’s motion for involuntary dismiss al pursuant to Te nnessee Rule of Civil P roce dure 41.02(2); and ( 2) whe ther the City rebutted the l eg al pre sumption t hat her minor daug hter, Domonique Pruitt, is not capa ble of ne g lige nce.5

A Rule 41.02(2) motion for involunt ary dismiss al challeng es t he sufficiency of the plaintiff’ s proof. Bu r

to n v . W a r re n F a r me r s Co
- op , 1 2 9 S

. W

. 3 d 5 1 3 , 5 2 0 ( T e n n
. C t

. A p p
. 2 0 0 2 )

. In co n s i d er i n g s u ch a m o t i o n , a t ri al co u rt “n ee d o n l y i m p ar t i al l y w e i gh an d ev al u at e t h e p l ai n t i ff 's ev i d en ce j u s tas i two u l d af t eral l t h e p ar t i es h ad co n cl u d ed t h ei r ca s es an d m ay d i s m i s s t h e p l ai n t i ff 's claims if the plaintiff has failed to make out a prima fac ie ca se by a pre ponderance of

the evidenc e.” Id. (c i t i n g Thom

pson v. Adcox , 63 S.W .3d 783, 791 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2001)) . On appea l, we re view the trial co u rt ’s d ecision to g rant a Rule 41.02(2) motion in acc ordanc e with Tenne ssee Rule of Appellate P ro ce d u re 13(d) “ beca use the trial c ourt has used the same re asoning to dispose of the motion that it would have used to make a final decision at t he close of all the e vidence .” Id. at 521 (c i t i n g Col

le ge Gr ov e Wa te r Ut

il. Di st. v . Be lle nf

ant , 670 S.W .2d 229, 231 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1984); Nold v. Selm er Bank & Tru st Co. , 558 S.W .2d 442, 444 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1977)) . Thus, our standar d of re vie w i s de novo upon the re cord, a ccor ding a presumption of cor

rect n es s to the trial court’s fi nd ing s o f f

a c t. “ We w ill a ff

ir m th e tr ia l c ou rt ' s d e c isi on un le ss the e vid e nc e pr e po nd e rate s a g a ins t the trial court's f

actua l determinations or un l es s t h e trial court has committed an e rror of law aff ecting the outcome of

the ca se.” Id. (c i t i n g Ha s s v . Kn ight on , 676 S.W .2d 554, 555 (Tenn. 1984); Sm ith v. In m an Realty Co. , 8 46 S.W. 2d81 9, 82 1 ( Te nn . Ct . A pp . 1 99 2) ). F ina lly , w e no te that th e tria l c ou rt ’s a sse ssm e nt of the wi tne sse s’ te sti mon y is g ive n g re a t w e ig ht o n a pp e a l, b e c aus e the trial court is in a better position t o evaluate their c redibility

. Id. (c i t i n g Thom pson v. Adcox , 63 S .W.3d78 3, 78 7 ( Te nn . Ct . A pp . 2 00 1) ); see also Whitaker v. Whitaker , 9 5 7 S. W. 2 d 8 3 4 , 8 37 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1997). On appe al, the Plaintiff ar g ues first that she established that the Citycre ated a nd maintained a dange rous and defe ctive condition on the pre mises of the L ester Community Center, namely , a we t c on c re te fl oo r e xpos e d b e tw e e n a g ap intheru bb e r f

loo r m a t in the ha llw a y

a ndtheare a

le a din g int o thedr e ssi ng ro om. She a lso c on te nd s th at she pr ov e d th a t th e City ha d a c tua l no tic e of

thi s dang erous c ondition. P laintiff also asse rts that she established that Domonique P ruitt, a ten- y ear
old minor, slipped and fell in the ar ea le ading into the dressing room, fra cturing her right a rm in two place s. Acc ording ly , Plaintiff assert s , t h e evidence pre ponderates ag ainst the trial court’s finding that sh e faile d to e sta

bli sh a prima fa c ie c a s e o f

n e g l i g e n c e a g a i n s tt h e C i t y.
Pr uit t’ s n egli gence act io n wa s b rou ght p urs uan t t o theTe nn e sse eGo vern me nta l T or t L ia bil ity Act (“ GTLA”) . I n pertinent part, the GTL A removes g overnme ntal immunit y “for any injury cause d by the dang erous or

defe ctive condition of a ny public building, structur e, d am , reservoir or othe r pu b l i c improveme nt owned and c ontrolled by [a] g overnme ntal entity .” T.C.A. § 29-20- 204(a) (2000). In acc ordanc e with common-law princ iples of pre mises liabilit y , section 29-20- 204 require s the p lain ti f

f to p r o v e “ c o n s tr

u c ti v e a n d/o r

a c tu a l n o ti c e to th e g o v e r n me n ta l e n ti ty o f such c on dit ion .” T. C.A . § 29 -2 0- 20 4( b) (2 00 0) ; Col lins v . Me tro
. Go v ’t of

Na shv ill e , No. 01A01-9607- CV -0 0339, 1 99 7 WL

18 73 12 , at *3 (T e nn . Ct . A pp . A pr . 1 8, 19 97 ). F urthe r, theGT LA a lso remove s g overnme ntal immunit y for “ injury

proxi mately

cause d by

a neg lige nt act or omission of a ny e mpl oy e e wi thi n the sc op e of his e mpl oyme nt, ” su bje c t to va ri ou s exce pti on s n ot p e rt ine nt t o this appeal. T.C.A. § 29-20- 205 (2000). As noted above, despite pl eading section 29-20- 205 of the Tenne ssee Code Annotated in he r complaint, at trial it a ppear s that Plaintiff travele d under se ction6

29-20-204. Unde r either section, howe ver, the an al y sis for purposes of this appeal would be the same. To e sta

bli sh a p ri ma

fa c ie case of neg lige nce, the Plaintiff must prove the following five e le me nts : “ (1 ) a

du ty of c are ow e d b y

de fe nd a nt t o p la in ti ff; (2 ) c on du c t be low theapp lic able standard of

car e that amounts to a bre ach of that duty ; (3) an injury

or loss; (4) cause in f

act; and (5) proxi mate, or leg al, cause.” McCall v. Wilder , 9 1 3 S

. W

. 2 d1 5 0 , 1 5 3 (T en n
. 1 9 9 5 ) ( ci t i n g Kilpat rick v . B r y a nt , 868 S.W. 2d59 4, 59 8 ( Te nn . 1 99 3) ; Bradsh aw v. Daniel , 854 S.W .2d 865, 869 (Tenn. 19 93 ); McClenahan v. Cooley , 806 S.W .2d 767, 774 (Tenn. 1991) ). This ca se turns o n the issue of causation. As stated by

the Tenne ssee Supre me Court, a “de fendant’s conduct is the c ause in fac t of the p lain ti f f ’ s in ju r y if , a s a f a c tu a l matt e r , it d ir e c tl y c o n trib u te d to th e p lain ti f f ’ s in jur y .” Hale v. Ostrow , 166 S.W .3d 713, 7 1 8 (T en n . 2005). Thus, the initial question is whether the plaintiff’s injury would n o t h ave oc curr ed “but f or” the defe ndant’s bre ach of duty

. Id. (c i t i n g Wood v. Ne w m a n, Hayes & Dixon In s. Agency , 905 S.W .2d 559, 562 (Tenn. 1995) ). I f the plaintiff e sta bli sh e s “ bu t f

or ” c aus a tio n, the n the qu e sti on be c ome s wh e the r the de fe nd a nt’ s b re a c h o f d uty p r o x i m a t e l y c au s e dt h e p l a i n t i f f ’ s i n j u r y.
Prox imate cause puts a l i m i t o n the causal cha in, such that, eve n though the plaint if f’ s in jury wo uldno t hav e ha

pp e ne d but fo r the de fe nd a nts ’ b re a c h, de fe nd a nts will not be held liable for injuries that wer e not substantially cause d by

their conduc t or we re no t r e a so na

bly fo re se e able re su lts of

the ir c on du c t.
Id. a t 71 9; see also Lowery v. Franks , No. 02A01-9612-CV-00304, 1997 WL 566114, at *5 (Te nn. Ct. App. Sept. 10, 1997).
At trial, the Plaintiff’s proof reg arding the location of the fall can only be char acte rize d as inc on sis te nt. Th e c omp laint a lle g e d that D omo niq ue fe ll i n th e c ha ng ing are a of the dr e ssi ng ro om. Domoniqu e te s ti f

ie d th a t s h e f

e ll inth e h a ll w a y

o n h e r w a y to th e c h a n g in g ar e a
. D o mo n iq ue’s mother see med to assert in her testimony that her daug hter fe ll in the entry way are a of the dressing room. Stil l later, the te stimonyof the two e mploy ees of the L ester Community

Center who w orked on theday

of theinc ide nt t e nd e d to su pp ort th e a lle g a tio n inthec omp la int that D omo niq ue fe ll inside the dressing room.
Furthermore , there was also conflicting testimonyreg arding the location of the rubber floor mats. Do mon iqu e te sti fi e d th a t th e re wa s n oth ing on the fl oo r w he resh e fe ll in the ha llw a y . M s. Pruitt t estified that she did not see a floor mat when she peer ed into the hallway from the e ntranc e of t he communit y cente r as she t ended to her injured daug hter. Daniel Young, however , testified that floor mats ar e ty

pically place d in the hallway leading to the s wimming pool, in the entry way are a of the dre ssing r oom, and inside the dre ssing r oom. Young further testified that, on the day of the inc ide nt, the re wa s a

fl oo r m a t in the ha llw a y
. Gl oria Col lin s re c a lle d tha t th e rewa s a fl oo r m a t in the hallway

on the day

of t he incident, but could not reme mber whether there was a floor mat at the entra nce of

the dre ssing room. The Plaintiff’s proof also included photogr aphs of the “ dressing are a”7

of the L ester Community Center, but Ms. Pruitt said that the photogr aphs w ere not of the plac e wh e reDo mon iqu e fe ll.
After hearing a ll of this proof, the trial court expl icitly found th at i t could not determine wher e in the fa cility

Domonique ac tually

fell. The trial court further found that while the evide nce establi shed that therewer e “some mats around,” their location could not be determined. After tho ro ug hly

re vie wi ng the re c or d, we c a nn ot s a y that th e e vid e nc e pr e po nd e rate s a g a ins t th e se finding s.
As s u m i n g arguendo that the Plaintiff pr oved that there was a n exposed, wet conc rete floor betwee n the g aps in the rubbe r floor mats, the Plainti ff did not establish by a pre ponderance of

the e vid e nc e that th is a lle g e dly da ng e ro us c on dit ion c aus e d D omo niq ue to f a ll andinj ur e he r rig ht a

rm
. B a se d o n th e re c or d b e fo re us , it is u nc le ar w he re Dom on iqu e a c tua lly fe ll andwh e the r o r n ot a rubber floor mat wa s located in that a rea
. Wit hout establishing whe re the injury occur red and whether

there was a

fl o o r m at in that location, the Plaintiff failed to pr ove that the City ’s conduct or the a lleg ed dang erous c ondition was a ca use in fac t of Domonique’s injury , much less a pr ox imate or leg al cause. Cook By and Th rough Uithoven v. Spinn aker's of Rivergate, Inc. , 878 S.W .2d 934, 939 (Tenn. 1 9 9 4 ) (“ T h e finding of proxi mate ca

use must be base d on proof of causation in fact.”) . I nstead, Plaintiff mere ly established tha t D o mo n iq u e f

e ll w h il e in s id e th e L e s te r Co mmu n ity Ce n te r a n d w a s in ju r e d

. A s often noted, “neg lige nce is not presumed from t he mere fact of an acc ident or injury .” Lowery v. Franks , No. 02A01-9612-CV- 00304 , 1 9 9 7 W L 566114, at *4 (Te nn. Ct. App. Sept. 10, 1997). Be cause the Plaintiff d i d n o t es t abli sh causation, we cannot conclude that the trial court e rre d in gr anting the City ’s mot ionfo r i nv olu nta ry dis mis sa l. T his ho ldi ng pr e te rm its a ny oth e r iss ue s raise d o n a

pp e a l.
Th e de c isi on of

thetr ia l c ou rt is a ff

ir me d. Cos ts o f this app e a l areto b e ta xedto P l a i n t i f f /A p p e l l a n tR o s a l i n d P ru i t t , a n d h e r s u r e t y, f o r w h i c h e x e c u t i o n m a y i s s u e , i f n e c e s s ar y.

___________________________________ HOLL Y M. KI RBY, JUDGE