[Federal Register Volume 63, Number 83 (Thursday, April 30, 1998)]
[Notices]
[Pages 23813-23814]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 98-11506]


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NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

[Docket No. 70-7001 Certificate No. GDP-1 EA 98-156]


In the Matter of United States Enrichment Corporation Bethesda, 
MD; Confirmatory Order Modifying Certificate (Effective Immediately)

I

    United States Enrichment Corporation (Corporation) is the holder of 
Certificate No. GDP-1 issued by the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC 
or Commission) pursuant to 10 CFR Part 76. The certificate authorizes 
the Corporation to operate the Paducah Gaseous Diffusion Plant 
(Paducah) for the purpose of enriching uranium up to 2.75 percent 
\235\U by weight. The certificate, originally issued on November 26, 
1996, is due to expire on December 31, 1998.

II

    Since transition to NRC regulatory oversight on March 3, 1997, the 
Corporation has been operating its withdrawal facilities (Buildings C-
310/310A and C-315) with liquid uranium hexafluoride (UF<INF>6</INF>) 
inventories in process piping, condensers, and accumulators. The 
certificate conditions placed no restrictions on those inventories, 
thereby allowing the accumulators to contain any amount up to their 
full capacity. A certificate amendment request dated October 31, 1997, 
submitted by the Corporation, requested an update to the Safety 
Analysis Report (SAR) to include a new Chapter 4, ``Accident 
Analysis.'' An NRC request for additional information (RAI) dated 
February 5, 1998, identified questions about the conservative nature of 
assumptions for the seismic accident scenario in Chapter 4. In response 
to the RAI, the Corporation reviewed Paducah's liquid UF<INF>6</INF> 
withdrawal facilities' records and determined that the seismic accident 
analysis assumption of no liquid UF<INF>6</INF> in both facilities' 
accumulators underestimated the potential source term from the 
withdrawal facilities for the seismic accident scenario. In telephone 
discussions with the NRC on February 18, 1998, the NRC made it clear to 
the Corporation that a notification pursuant to 10 CFR 76.9(b) was 
warranted. Thereafter, the Corporation provided verbal notification to 
NRC Region III on February 19, 1998, and a follow-up written report on 
February 20, 1998, identifying the potential nonconservative assumption 
in the SAR updated accident analysis. Then, on February 24, 1998, in 
telephone discussions with NRC, the Corporation also provided 
information that the withdrawal facilities' current operations were 
outside the Certification SAR because the Chapter 4 seismic accident 
analysis assumed no liquid UF<INF>6</INF> in Building C-315 withdrawal 
facility's process piping, condensers, and accumulators. In addition, 
the source term from Building C-310/310A was probably too low.
    Based on the NRC's review of the certificate amendment request 
dated October 31, 1997, submitted by the Corporation and the current 
Certification SAR, the NRC has concluded that violations of NRC 
requirements occurred. The violations involve an inadequate accident 
analysis and a failure to comply with the conditions of certification. 
The Commission's regulations in 10 CFR 76.85 require the Corporation, 
as the certificate holder, to perform an analysis of potential 
accidents and consequences to establish the basis for limiting 
conditions for operations and to provide assurance that plant operation 
will be conducted in a manner to prevent or to mitigate the 
consequences from a reasonable spectrum of postulated accidents, 
including natural phenomena. Further, 10 CFR 76.85 requires that the 
assessment consider the full range of operations, including operations 
at the maximum capacity contemplated. The Commission's regulations in 
10 CFR 76.51 require the Corporation, as the certificate holder, to 
comply with the conditions set forth in the Certificate of Compliance. 
Condition 8 of the Certificate of Compliance (GDP-1) for the Paducah 
Gaseous Diffusion Plant requires the Corporation to conduct its 
operations in accordance with the statements and representations 
contained in the certification application and subsequent amendments. 
The certification application includes Safety Analysis Report (SAR) 
Chapter 4, ``Accident Analysis,'' Section 4.6, ``Natural Phenomena,'' 
describing assumptions made on facility operations to determine the 
consequences of postulated seismically-induced failures. The Chapter 4 
seismic accident analysis is based on an inappropriately low assumption 
of the amount of liquid UF<INF>6</INF> in Buildings C-310/310A and C-
315 withdrawal facilities' process piping, condensers, and accumulators 
in calculating the possible releases. Current facility configuration 
and operations are such that significantly higher volumes (on the order 
of several thousand pounds (lbs)) of liquid UF<INF>6</INF> may be 
present. Therefore the accident analysis in the Certification SAR is 
not in compliance with 10 CFR 76.85 and operation of that facility is 
not in compliance with Condition 8. Furthermore, operation with the 
larger amount of liquid UF<INF>6</INF> in the withdrawal facilities is 
safety significant because failure could result in potential on-site 
fatalities/injuries and off-site injuries. During a seismic event of 
0.05 g peak ground acceleration, failure of equipment in both 
withdrawal facilities would likely occur with releases of liquid 
UF<INF>6</INF>. If the 0.05 g seismic event occurred with substantial 
amounts of liquid UF<INF>6</INF> in those facilities, the on-site and 
off-site consequences would exceed any analyzed accident and be 
unacceptable.

III

    By letter dated February 25, 1998, the Corporation committed to 
implement the administrative control as stated below:
    1. Access to Buildings C-310/310A and C-315 will be limited to only 
those individuals essential to operations, inspections, or those 
personnel performing any modifications to fix the identified seismic 
failures.
    By letter dated March 5, 1998, the Corporation committed to 
implement the following additional administrative controls in order to 
mitigate the consequences of a seismic event:
    2. When flow of liquid UF<INF>6</INF> has been diverted to the on-
line accumulator in C-310A or C-315 for greater than one hour (nominal 
2,000 and 5,000 lbs liquid UF<INF>6</INF>, respectively, at one hour),

[[Page 23814]]

the Corporation will take the following immediate actions:
    a. Notify the Plant Shift Superintendent (PSS) of accumulator 
usage.
    b. Begin tracking of quantities by using calculated withdrawal 
rates.
    c. The PSS will initiate high priority actions for timely 
resolution of unscheduled outages.
    d. The Cascade Coordinator will take actions to reduce tails 
downflow and/or product or tails withdrawal rates to minimize 
accumulator use as appropriate.
    e. Notify the NRC.
    3. If the calculated accumulator inventory reaches 4,000 lbs liquid 
UF<INF>6</INF> in C-310A or 10,000 lbs liquid UF<INF>6</INF> in C-315, 
flow of liquid UF<INF>6</INF> to the affected accumulator will be 
stopped immediately.
    By letter dated March 11, 1998, the Corporation proposed to install 
seismic modifications to the equipment in Buildings C-310/310A and C-
315 by September 30, 1998. Those seismic modifications will increase 
the seismic capacity of the equipment to withstand an earthquake 
producing a peak ground acceleration of 0.165 g.
    I find that the Corporation's commitments to install the seismic 
modification within the proposed time frame and these administrative 
controls acceptable and necessary and conclude that with these 
commitments the public health and safety are reasonably assured. In 
view of the foregoing, I have determined that the public health and 
safety require that the Corporation's commitments be confirmed by this 
Order. By letter dated, April 1, 1998, the Corporation consented to the 
issuance of this Order confirming its commitments, as described in 
Section IV below. The Corporation further agreed in that letter that 
this Order is to be effective upon issuance. Implementation of these 
commitments will minimize the available liquid UF<INF>6</INF> 
inventories that could be released in a seismic event and reduce the 
on-site and off-site consequences. Based upon the above and the 
Corporation's consent, this Order is immediately effective upon 
issuance.

IV

    Accordingly, pursuant to sections 161b, 161i, 161o, and 1701 of the 
Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended, and the Commission's regulations 
in 10 CFR Part 76, including specifically 10 CFR 76.70, It is hereby 
ordered, effective immediately, that certificate No. GDP-1 is modified 
as follows:
    Condition 13 is added to the Certificate of Compliance GDP-1 to 
require that:
    1. The Corporation will by no later than September 30, 1998, 
complete seismic modifications to the equipment containing liquid 
UF<INF>6</INF> in Buildings C-310/310A and C-315. Those seismic 
modifications will increase the seismic capacity of the equipment to 
withstand an earthquake producing a peak ground acceleration of 0.165 
g.
    2. Until such time as the above seismic modifications are 
completed, the following additional administrative controls shall be 
followed:
    a. When flow of liquid UF<INF>6</INF> has been diverted to the on-
line accumulator in C-310A or C-315 for greater than one hour (nominal 
2,000 and 5,000 pounds (lbs) liquid UF<INF>6</INF> respectively at one 
hour), the Corporation will immediately:
    i. Notify the Plant Shift Superintendent (PSS) of accumulator 
usage.
    ii. Begin tracking of quantities by using calculated withdrawal 
rates.
    iii. Ensure that the PSS will initiate high priority actions for 
timely resolution of unscheduled outages.
    iv. Ensure that the Cascade Coordinator will take actions to reduce 
tails downflow and/or product or tails withdrawal rates to minimize 
accumulator use as appropriate.
    v. Notify the NRC.
    b. If the calculated accumulator inventory reaches 4,000 lbs liquid 
UF<INF>6</INF> in C-310A or 10,000 lbs liquid UF<INF>6</INF> in C-315, 
flow of liquid UF<INF>6</INF> to the affected accumulator will be 
stopped immediately.
    c. Access to Buildings C-310/310A and C-315 will be limited to only 
those individuals essential to operations, inspections, or those 
personnel performing any modifications to fix the identified seismic 
failures.
    The Director, Office of Enforcement, may, in writing, relax or 
rescind this Order upon demonstration by the Corporation of good cause.

V

    Any person adversely affected by this Confirmatory Order, other 
than the Corporation, may submit a written response within 20 days of 
its issuance. Where good cause is shown, consideration will be given to 
extending the time to respond. A request for extension of time must be 
made in writing to the Director, Office of Nuclear Material Safety and 
Safeguards, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, D.C. 20555, 
and include a statement of good cause for the extension. Any response 
shall be submitted to the Secretary, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory 
Commission, ATTN: Chief, Rulemaking and Adjudications Staff, 
Washington, D.C. 20555. Copies of the response shall also be sent to 
the Director, Office of Enforcement, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory 
Commission, Washington, D.C. 20555, to the Deputy Assistant General 
Counsel for Enforcement at the same address, to the Regional 
Administrator, NRC Region III, 801 Warrenville Road, Lisle, Illinois 
60532-4351, and to the Corporation.
    In the absence of any response, or written approval of an extension 
of time in which to respond, the provisions specified in Section IV 
above shall be final 20 days from the date of this Order without 
further order or proceedings. If an extension of time for submitting a 
response has been approved, the provisions specified in Section IV 
shall be final when the extension expires if a response is not 
received. If a written response is received, the Commission may make a 
final decision or may adopt by order further procedures for 
consideration of the issues before making a final enforcement decision. 
Written responses shall not stay the immediate effectiveness of this 
order.

    For the Nuclear Regulatory Commission.

    Dated at Rockville, Maryland, this 22nd day of April 1998.
James Lieberman,
Director, Office of Enforcement.
[FR Doc. 98-11506 Filed 4-29-98; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 7590-01-P