### IN THE COURT OF APP EALS OF TENNESS EE AT JAC KSON Fe br ua ry 17, 200 9 S es sio n

TI M BURRUS, ET AL 

### . v. J IMMY W IS EMAN, ET AL 

### .
Direc t Appeal from the Chancer y Court for Benton Coun ty No. 1698 Donald P. Harris, Jud ge

No. W2008-01707-C OA-R3-C V - Filed Mar ch 26, 2009

This is a lawsuit filed by

eig ht county

officia ls to resolve a b u d get dispute. The off icials filed an

a pp lic a tio n in

Cha nc e ry Court se e kin g jud ic ia l a

uth or iza tio n to hir e a dd iti on a l sta ff and to i nc re a se the salarie s and benef

its pa id to a separ ate g roup of county employ ees. One day afte r th e p et i tion

was filed, the officia ls, a long with the defe ndant County May or, ente red a consent orde r appr oving

eac h petitioner’ s reque sts. One month later, the County Commi ssion attempted to intervene and have the or de r s e t a sid e . T he tr ia l c ourt de nie d the County

Com mis sio n’ s mo tio ns , a nd the County Commi ssio n ap p ea l s

. W e af firm the trial c ourt’s denia l of the motion to int erve ne. Howe ver,
sever al proc edura l and substantive def ects re qu ir e th is Court to vacate the Consent Order and re mand this matter to the trial court

. Tenn. R. App . P. 3. Appeal as of Right; Judgment of the Chancer y Court Af firme d in Part, Vacat ed in Part and Remanded

J. S TE VE N S TA FF O RD , J., delivere d the opinion of the court, in which A LA N E. H I G H ERS , P.J., W.S., and D AVI D R. F ARMER , J., joined.

Br a nd on O. Gi bs on , J a c ks on , T N, fo r A pp e lla nt B e nto n Co un ty

Laur a A. Ke e ton , H un tin gto n, TN , for Ap pe lle e s, Be nto n Coun ty Cle rk a ndMa ste r; Be nto n Co un ty As se sso r o f Pr op e rt y; Be nto n Cou nty Cir c uit Cou rt Cle rk ; Be nto n Co un ty R e gis te r; Be nto n Co un ty Trustee ; and Benton County Cl erk

OP IN ION

Ba ckg round
This appea l arises fr om the eff orts o f several B enton County officia ls to hire additional deputies or a ssistants through a petition filed pursuant to T enn. Code Ann. § 8- 20-101. Th e Pe tit ion

wa s fi le d on Se pte mbe r 18 , 2 00 7 in B e nto n Co un ty

Cha nc e ry Court by e ig ht s e pa

rate-2-

c o u n t y o f f i c i a l s ( c o l l e c t i v e l y, “ P e t i t i o n e r s ” ) : T i m B u r r u s , C l e r k an d M a s t e r f o r B e n t o nC o u n t y; Sherry Be asley , Trustee for B enton County ; L inda Armstrong , Assessor of Prope rty ; Diane L atimer, Ad min istrator

of El e c tio ns ; Ro n D arb y , G e ne ra l Se ssi on s and Juve nil e Court Judg e ; D e bb ie Ha

rg is, Reg ister of Deeds; Terry Hudson, Clerk for the C ircuit, Gene ral S essions, and Juvenile Courts; and Wanda Malin, County Clerk. As require d by Tenn. Code Ann. § 8- 20-102, the Petition named the County May or, Ji mmy

Wis eman, a s the Def

endant. Petitioners re ques t ed t h e authority to hire additional deputies and asked the court to set the s alar y of each new deputy . Petitioner also asked the cour t to alter the sala

ries and be nefits of a

broad g roup of County

employ ees ( d ef

i n ed i n the Pe tit ion a s “ a ll e mpl oy e e s su

bje c t to the Court

ho us e Pol ic y

and Pr oc e dure s H and

bo ok ) a s f oll ow s:

4

. T h at al l em p l o y ee s o f th e of fi ce b e af fo rd ed t h e sa m e he al t h i n s u ra n ce co v er age
a s th e sc ho ol e mpl oy e e s th ro ug h th e State of Te nn e sse e I ns ur anc e Poo l. 5. That all employ ees rec eive at least the following minimum salarie s based on y ear s
wo rk e d w iththe c ounty

re g ard le ss o f wh ic h off

ic e : Star tin g sa lary

$2 0, 00 0; a ft e r f

ir st y ear $21,000, afte r sec ond y ear $22,000, afte r five y ear s $24,000 6. That all employ ees who have worke d for B enton County in any capa city for f ive (5) y ear s or m ore shall rec eive on their employ ment anniver sary longe vity pay in the form of $100.00 f

or ea ch y ear

of ser vice. 7. That said pay

scale be re troac tive to any person not now makingat least the minimum proscr ibed salar y for the le ng th of time employ ed. 8. That all employ ees r ece ive a y ear ly cost of living raise equal to the cost of living incre ase de signated for state employ ees.

Neither the P etition nor t he Final Orde r st ate the number of e mploy ees subjec t to the Handbook or in which offic es they

work.
On September

19, 2007, the day

afte r the Petition w as filed, a Consent Order was e ntere d

a pp ro vin g a ll of the Pe tit ion e rs ’ r e qu e sts . T he Cou nty May or , a s th e name d d e fe nd ant, did no t f ile an Answ e r

to th e Pe ti ti o n , an d

th e tr ia l c o u rt d id

n o t c o n d u c t a h e ar in g o nth e Pe ti ti o n

. T h e tr ia l

c ourt did no t make a find ingthat th e Pe tit ion e rs we re un a ble to d isc ha

rg e the du tie s o f t

he ir

re sp e c tiv e of

fi c e s. L ike wi se , the tr ia l c ourt did no t f ind that th e Pe tit ion e rs ha d s ho wn the ne c e ssi ty for a ssistants and the salary eac h should be paid.

On Octobe r 18, 2007, the B enton County Comm i s s i o n (“ t he Commissi on”), a cting in the name of Be nton County , filed a motion to intervene under both Tenn. R. Civ. P. 24.01 and 24.02. At the same time, the Commission filed a mot ion to set aside, or in the alternative, alter or amend the Consent Orde r. On Apr il 11, 2008, the trial court denied the Commi ssion’s motion t o intervene , beca use Tenn. Code Ann. § 8-20-102 na mes the County May or as the s ole def endant to an of

ficial’s

sa lary pe tit ion . T he tr ia l c ourt c on c lud e d tha t this statut e g ive s the County Ma y or the dis c re tio n to sign a consent orde r appr oving the reque sted relief . The trial c ourt, howeve r, questioned su a s po nte its authority

to gr ant re lief under

Tenn. Code Ann. § 8-20-101 to Diane L atimer, the Administ rator of Elec tions and Ron Darby , the Gene ral Sessions and Juvenile Court J udg e. As a result, Petitioners-3-

L a tim e r and Da

rb y too k a vo lun tary no n- su it on Se pte mbe r 15 , 20 08 and are no t pa rt ie s to this

a pp e a l.
The Commission appeals and ra ises two issues for re view:
1) Whe the r t

he Cha nc e ry Court e rr e d in fa ili ngto a llo w B e nto n County , Te nn e sse e to int e rv e ne in this action. 2) Whether the Cha

ncer y C o u rt err ed in re fusing to set aside a Consent Or der be tween Appellee s/Petit ioners and the County May or in an a ction under Te nn. Code Ann. § 8-20- 101.

L aw a nd An a ly sis

A. I nterve ntion

B ud g e tary

de c isi on s are g e ne ra lly

le ft to t he le g isl a tiv e br anc h o f g ov e rnme nt. Som e c ounty officia ls, however , have two sta tutory alternatives to the ty pical budg eting proce ss: a court orde r or a l et t er o f a gre em en t

. T en n

. C o d e A n n

. § 8 -2 0 -1 0 1

. T h i s s t at u t e de s cr i b es t h e p ro ce d u re t h ro u gh which these officia ls c an “obta in a judg ment or dec ree fix ing the number of [the off icial’s] deputies and the salarie s to be paid them.” Atkin son v. McClanah an , 520 S.W .2d 348, 352 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1974). I n the prese nt c ase, Petitioners opted to seek re lief throug h a cour t order pur suant to Tenn. Cod e Ann. § 8 -2 0- 10 1( a ), wh ic h p ro vid e s:

Where a ny one (1) of the cler

ks and masters of the chanc ery courts, the c ounty

cler ks

and the c le rk s o f t

he pr ob a te , c ri min a l, c ir c uit and sp e c ial court s, c ounty

tr us te e s, reg isters of dee ds, and sher iffs ca nnot proper ly and efficiently conduct the affa irs and transac t the business of such person' s office by devoting such per son' s entire wor king tim e the re to, su c h p e rs on

may e mpl oy su c h d e pu tie s and

a ssi sta nts a s ma y be a c tua lly

nece ssary to the proper

conductingof such pe rson' s office

.... Tenn. Code Ann. § 8- 20-101(a ). He re, the ty pical procedure was complicated by the fa ct that seve ral county officia ls sought re lief tog ether in the same Petition.

When he aring a salary petition br oug ht unde r § Tenn. Code Ann. § 8-20-101, the trial court i s a u t h o r i z e d t o e n t e r an o r d e r f

i x i n g t h e n u m b e r an d s a l ar i e s o f t h e c o u n t y o f f i c i a l ’ s e mp l o y e e s

. In thi s p ro c e e din g , th e c ourt c ann ot e nte r a

n o rd e r c omp e lli ngthe co un ty ’s leg isl a tiv e bo dy to appropr iate the funds nece ssary to hire the ne w employ ees. Jo ne s v . M ankin , No. 88-263-I I , 1989 WL44 92 4, a t *3 (T e nn . Ct . App . M ay 5, 19 89 ); Ledbe tter v. Duncan , 676 S.W .2d 91, 9 3 (T enn. Ct. App. 1984). I f the leg islative body subsequently ref uses to a ppropriate the nec essar

y funds, the officia l may

seek a writ of mandamus compelling it to do so. Moore v. Cates , 832 S.W .2d 570, 572 (T e nn . Ct . App . 1 99 2) ; State ex rel. Ledbe tter v. Duncan , 702 S.W .2d 163, 165 (Tenn. 1985)

. When the officia l seeks an or der c ompelling leg islative action, “t h e members of [the leg islative body ] shoul d be made parties defe ndant and broug ht before the Trial Court prior to the issuanc e of a mandatory

order .” Atkin son , 520 S.W .2d at 352.-4-

Th e statut e a lso de scrib es a sp ecif ic pr oc e dure fo r b oth

the tr ia l c ourt

and the pa rt ie s to follow when a

salary petition is filed:

Eac h of the above named of fice rs shall name in the pe tition t he county executive as the pa rt y de fe nd ant t

he re to. A c op y

of the pe ti ti on sh a ll b e se rv e d o n th e c ounty
e xec uti ve , w ho sh a ll f

ile an a ns we r t o th e pe tit ion

wi thi n fi ve (5 ) da

y s f ro m th e date of ser vice of the petition, either a dmitti ng the alleg ations of the petition or deny ing same, or making suc h answe r as the county executive dee ms advisable under the circ umstances. Where upon, the cour t shall p romptly

in term or at c hamber s have such a he aring

on the application, on the petit ion and answer ther eto, as will deve lop the fa cts, and the c ourt may hear proof e ither for

or aga i n s t t h e petition. The court may allow or disallow the a

pplication, either in whole or i n part, and may allow the whole number

of deputies or

assistants applied for or

a less number , and may

allow t h e s a l ar i e s s e to u ti nt h e a p p l i c a t i o no r

s m a l l e r s a l ar i e s , a l l a s t h e f

a c t s j u s t i f y.
Tenn. Code Ann. § 8- 20-102. Unde r ty pical cir cumstance s, t h is statute envisions “an adve rsar y proce eding betwee n [t he county officia l] and the c ounty executive.” Shelby Co. Deputy Sh eriff’ s Ass ’n v . G ill ess , 972 S.W .2d 683, 685 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1997). The circ umstances in the prese nt case , howeve r, we re f

ar f rom ty pical. The Consent Order was e nter ed o n l y a day

afte r the pe tition was f i l e d , an d t h e C o u n t y M ayo r d i d n o t o b j e c t t o t h e r e qu e s t s m a d e o r d e m an d p r o o f o f t h e i r n e c e s s i t y. The Commission felt that the procee ding w as not adve rsar ial and ar gu ed t h at the County May or exceede d his authority

by signing the C onsent Orde r. Ac cording ly , the Commiss ion filed a motion to intervene and a motion to set aside the or der.

The Tennessee Rules of Civil P roce dure pr ovide two methods of interve ntion: int erve ntion as of r ight unde r Rule 24.01 and permissive intervention under Rule 24.02. The trial c ourt denied the Co mm is s io n ’ s mo ti o n o n b o th g r o u n d s

. O n a p p e a l, th e s ta

n d ar d o f r e v ie w f

o r a d e n ial of int e rv e nti on

a s o f r ig ht i s de novo

. State v. Brown & Will iam son Tobacco Corp. , 18 S.W .3d 186, 191 (Tenn. 2000) . The de nial of per missive intervention is revie wed only for a buse of discr etion. Id

. Tenn. R. Civ. P. 24.01 provides for i nterve ntion as of rig ht under the f ollowing

c ir c ums tanc e s: Upon timely

application any one shall be per mitted to int erve ne in an a ction: (1) whe n
a statut e c on fe rs an un c on dit ion a l ri g ht to int e rv e ne ; or (2 ) w he n th e a

pp lic ant c la ims an intere st relating to the proper ty or transa cti o n wh i ch is the subject of the a ction and the a p p li c an t i s s o s it

u a te d th a t t h e d is p o s it io no f

th e a c ti o nma

y a s a p r a ctical matte r im p a ir o r im

p e d e th e a

p p li c an t' s a

b il it y to p r o te c t th a t in te r e s t, u n le s s the applicant' s interest is adequately repr esente d by exis ting pa rties; or (3) by

stipulation of a ll the pa rt ie s.

Th e Com mis sio n do e s no t have e xplic it s ta tut or y a uth or ity to i nte rv e ne un de r s ub se c tio n ( 1) of Rul e 24.01, and the parties have not stipulated to the i nterve ntion under subse ction (3). The Commi ssion-5-

there fore relies on subsection (2), asserting that its int ere st in the County ’s budg et has be en impaire d by Petitioners and the County May or. To pre vail under this theory , the par ty seekingto intervene “must establish that (1) the application for inter vention was timely ; (2) the pr oposed interve nor has a substantial leg al intere st in the subject matter o f t h e p en d ing litig ation; (3) the pr oposed int e rv e no r' s a

bil ity to p ro te c t th a t in te re st i s im pa ir e d; a nd (4 ) t he pa rt ie s to the un de rl y ingsu it cannot a dequate ly

repr esent the inter

venor’ s interest.” Brown & Will iam son , 18 S.W .3d at 190-91. On appea l, Petitioners have not c halleng ed the tria l court’s implicit finding that the Commission’s motion to i nterve ne wa s timely

. According ly , we will move dire ctly to the Commi ssion’s

su bs tanti ve argume nt.

Th e Com mis sio n ma int a ins that it ha s a su bs tanti a l le g a l in te re st i n th is a c tio n be c a us e it w ill

u l t i m a t e l y b e f

o r c e d t o a l l o c a t e t h e f

u n d s s e ti n t h e C o n s e n t O r d e r

. A s t h e c o u n t y’ s l e g i s l a t i v e b o dy, the Co mm is s io n c o n te n d s th a t it h o ld s th e e xc lu s iv e a u th o r it y to a p p r o p r iate c o u n ty f

u n d s f or the pay ment o f s al ar i es t o county officia ls and employ ees. The trial court’ s order , howeve r, does

no t–a nd c ou ld n ot– c omp e l th e Commis sio n to a pp ro pr ia te fu

nd s f or the c ounty

of fi c ia ls i n th is proce eding

. See Ledbe tter , 6 76 S.W. 2d a t 93

. Th e Com mis sio n th e n d oe s n ot h a ve a dir e c t in te re st in this action; its interest arises once the county officia ls se ek an order compelling leg islative action, at which point t he Commissi on should be made a party

. Atkin son , 5 20 S.W. 2d a t 35 2. As a pr a c tic a l matte r, ho we ve r, the Com mis sio n a rgue s th a t t h e Con se nt O rd e r w ill c omp ro mis e its a bil ity to make budg etar

y decisions in the future

.
The Commission concedes that the statu t e cle arly identifies the County

May or as the defe ndant in actions broug ht under Te nn. Code Ann. § 8-20- 101. Howeve r, the Commission arg ues t h a t t h e e xe c u t i v e i s m e r e l y a n o m i n a l d e f e n d an t w h o s e r o l e i s t o r e p r e s e n t t h e C o u n t y ’ s int e re st. B y a g re e ingto t

he Con se nt Or de r wit

ho ut co ns ult ing the Com mis sio n, the Cou nty May or fa ile d to repr esent the County adequa tely

. To support this arg ument, the Commiss ion points t o Tenn. Code Ann. § 5-6-112, which gra nts the county may or t he power t o employ a county attorney “to re prese nt th e c o u n ty

e it h e r a s p la in ti f

f o r d e f e n d an t i ns u c h s u it s a s ma

y b e b r o u g h t by o r a g a in s t t h e c o u n ty [. ]” This statute, howeve r, does not g ive t he county ’s l eg islative body the authority

to interfer e with the may or’s re prese ntation. Here , the Commiss ion is obje ct i n g t o the quality of the mayor’s pe rf or manc e a s th e c ounty ’s re pr e sent ati ve. Th e qu a lity of the may or ’s pe rf

or manc e , h ow e ve r, is not the issue; T enn. Code Ann. § 8-20-102 unambig uously require s the county may or to be named as the de fenda

nt. I n the absenc e of c lear statutory direc tion, we ar e without authority to subject the county may or’s a

uthority as the pa rty defe n d an t i n a county

officia l’s salary

action to leg islative oversig ht.
The Commission’s posi tion is weakene d by the fac t that c ounty officia ls often file pe titions for f unding unde r Tenn. Code Ann. § 8-20-101 a fter a reque st for fundingwas de ni ed b y the l egi slative body

(her e, the Commission). See Bane v . N esb itt , N o

. M 2 0 0 6

- 0 0 0 6 9

- CO A -R3-CV, 2006 W L 3 6 9 4 4 4 4 , at *7 (Te nn. Ct. App. Dec. 14, 2006) (“Asheriff whose re quest for personne l-related funding is denied by his or her loc al leg islative body may file an application for revie w of the f

unding r equest with the judg e of the circu i t court in the sher iff' s county ....”). I f we

a llo we d th e Com mis sio n to int e rv e ne , a he ari ng on a Te nn

. Cod e Ann. § 8 -2 0- 10 1 p e tit ion wo uld-6-

become y et another

leg islative budg et dispute–only now with judicial involvement. The statute does not contemplate suc h an unwieldy proce eding

.
Th e tr ia l c ourt

a lso de nie d th e Com mis sio n’ s mo tio n to int e rv e ne un de r R ule 24 .0 2. Rul e 24 .0 2 a llo ws fo r p e rm iss ive int e rv e nti on un de r t wo c ir c umst anc e s: “ (1 ) w he n a statut e c on fe rs a conditional rig ht to intervene ; or (2) when an applicant' s claim or defe nse and the main action have

a qu e sti on of law o r f act in c omm on .” Te nn . R. Civ . P. 24 .0 2. Pe rm iss ive int e rv e nti on is inappropriate if it will prejudice the rig hts of the orig inal parties. Id . Under Tenn. Code Ann. § 8- 20-101, county

off icials are expli citly

g iven the rig ht to petition t he cour t for additional deputies wi tho ut l e g isl a tiv e inv olv e me nt. Th e statut e a llo ws c ount y off ici als this jud ic ia l op tio n, in p a rt , beca use they , like the Commiss ioners and County May or, ar e popular ly

elec ted. Jones , 1 9 8 9 WL 44924, at *2. Ac cordingly , Petitioners’ rig hts under Te nn. Code Ann. § 8-20- 101 could be prejudice d if the leg islative body wer e permitted to int erve ne. The ref ore, w e find that the tria l court did not abuse its discretion by denying the Commi ssion’s motion t o intervene under Rule 24.02.

B. Jurisdiction and Validity of the Consent Orde r
Petitioners assert, if the Commission cannot intervene , that this Court’s inquiry must end as none of the remaining parties have soug ht appellate relief

. We disag ree . Although the Commi ssion is not entitl ed to interve ne, we will consider seve ral b l atant def ects–both proc edura l and

su bs tanti ve –in

the pr oc e e din g be low . T he Pe tit ion wa s in iti a lly

fi led by e ig ht s e pa

ra te c ounty officia ls. Several months afte r the Consent Orde r wa s entere d, the trial court prope rly questioned the a u t h o ri ty

of Ron Dar

by , Gene ral Sessions and Juvenile Court J udg e, and D iane L atimer, Administrator of Elec tions, to petit ion for funds unde r Tenn. Code Ann. § 8-20-101. I f Petitioners

co u ld n o t p r o p e r ly

f il e in Ch an c e r y Co u rt, th e nth e tr ia l c o u rt l a c k e d s u b je c t m a tt e r

jurisdiction. Under Tenn. R. App. P

. 13(b), this Court must consider whether the trial cour

t has jurisdiction over the subject matter . Fur

thermore , this Court m ay , in our di scre tion, consider other issues not raised by the pa rt ie s f or the fo llo wi ngre a so ns : “ (1 ) to pr e ve nt ne e dle ss lit ig a tio n, (2 ) t o p re ve nt i nju ry to the int e re sts of

the pu bli c , a nd (3 ) t o p re ve nt p re

jud ic e to t

he jud ic ial pr oc e ss. ” Te nn . R. Ap p. P. 13(b).
Among the six rema ining Petitioners, five (the Clerk a nd Master, County

Clerk, Reg ister of Dee ds, Trustee and Circuit Court Clerk) proper ly filed in Chancer y Court pursuant to Tenn. Code Ann. § 8 -2 0- 10 1( 3) . Pe tit io ner Arm st ro ng , a s A sse sso r o f P ro pe rt y , h ow e ve r, is n ot p e rm itt e d to

se e k r e lie f b e c a

us e Te nn . Co de Ann. § 8 -2 0- 10 1 d oe s n ot l ist a sse sso rs of

pr op e rt y a s e lig ibl e petitioners. An asse ssor of prope rty may employ a deputy or assistant o n l y i f au t horized by the county leg islative body or by Tenn. Code Ann. § 67-1-506. This statute sets a mi nimum number of deputies for

the assessor

and desc ribes the method throug h wh i ch t h e assessor ma y employ

a dd iti on a l de pu tie s. Te nn . Co de Ann. § 67 -1 -5 06

. Ac c or din g ly , Pe tit ion e r Ar mst ro ngimp ro pe rl y filed under

Tenn. Code Ann. § 8- 20-101 , an d t h e t ri al court did not have jurisdiction to gra nt the reque sted relief

. The C o n s en t Or d er, insofa r as it re lates to Petitioner Armstrong , is theref ore
vacated.The l angua ge of t he Cons ent O r der i s b o t h b road a n d am bi guous

. I t i s unc l ea r w het her t hi s por t i on of t he 1
O r der covers “a l l co u n t y e m p l o y ees ” or j ust t ho s e “ em pl oy ees s ub j ect t o t he C ou r t ho use Pol i cy and Procedures H andbook. ” U nder ei t her m ea ni ng, t he t r i al cour t w as not aut hor i ze d t o s et t he s al ar i es of s uch an am or phous gr oup
o f e m p lo y e e s.
-7- Withre sp e c t to the ot her fi ve Pe tit ion e rs , w e a lso fi nd that th e tr ia l c ourt

e rr e d w he n it g rante d their re quested re l i ef

. Un d er the statute, a petitioner ma y reque st additional deputies or assistants a

nd the salary eac h should be paid. Tenn. Code Ann. § 8-20-101. H ere , Petitioners asked the tr ia l c ourt

to s e t sa lari e s and be ne fi ts (in the fo rm of lon g e vit y pa y , a nnua l c os t of

liv ingra ise s, and hea lth insurance) for a ll county employ ees “ reg ardle ss of which off ice.” Neither

the Petition 1

nor the Consent O rder explain, in any way , the relationship betwe en this g roup o f e m p l o y ee s and Petitioners. The statute’s c overa g e is not so broad. The trial court lac ks authority to set the salar ies of an unsp ec i fi ed (a nd potentially larg e) numbe r of e mploy ees. A ccor dingly , the portions of the Consent Order

addre ssing “ all employ ees” is vacated.
Finally , we f

ind the rema ining por

tions of th e consent order invalid bec ause of additional proce dural de fec ts. Officia ls petitioni ng under Te nn. Code Ann. § 8-20- 101 must meet their burde n befor e re lief ca

n be g rante d. Tenn. Code Ann. § 8-20-101( a)( 3). F urthermor e, Te nn. Code Ann. § 8- 20 -1 03 (a ) p ro vid e s tha t “[n]o de pu ty or de pu tie s or as sis tants sh a ll b e a llo we d to any of fi c e , unle ss the actual office r is unable to per sonally discharg e the duties of the office by devoting such off

icer ’s entire working time the reto....” Id . I n Boarm an v. Jaynes , 109 S.W .3d 286 (Tenn. 2003) , the Court int e rp re te d th e statut or

y burd e n a s f

oll ow s:

The off ice holder

must demonstrate: (1) a n inability

to discharg e the dutie s of a particula r office by devoting his or her e ntire workingtime thereto; and, ( 2) the off ice holder must petition the court and show the nece ssity fo r as s i s tants, the number of assistants require d, and the sa lary eac h should be paid.

Id . at 291 (c itations omi tted). Only afte r the pe t i t i o n er e stablishes nece ssity is the trial court “empowe red t o deter

mine the number of

assistants neede d and their sa laries.” Id . Her e, the tria l court did not make a

ny finding s as to w hether Petitioners me t this burden. Fur thermore , neither the Petition nor the Consent Order se t forth any fac ts s h o wi ng the nec essity of the re quested de puties and assistants.

Fo l l o wi n g Boarm an , w e fi nd that th e tr ia l co urt err e d w he n a pp ro vin g the Pe tit ion e rs ’

re qu e sts wi tho ut f

ir st m a kin g a

de te rm inatio n o n n e c e ssi ty . We re a c h th is c on c lus ion, i n p a rt , beca use of the pa

rties’ de viation from the proce dure set forth in Tenn. Code Ann. § 8-20-102. A s the named de fenda

nt, the Co u n t y M ay o r fa i led to file an a nswer to the Petition as re quired by the statute. Be cause an Answer was not f iled, it could not be included in the cour t’s perma nent re cords

as re q u i re d by

Tenn. Code Ann. § 8- 20-104. Additionally , the trial cour t did not conduct the

s t a tu t o r i l y r e qu i r e d h e ar i n g o nt h e p e t i t i o nt o d e v e l o p t h e f a c t s

. T e n n

. C o d e A n n

. § 8

- 2 0

- 1 0 2

. In J o h n i c a n v . W i l l ia ms , No. 02A01-9110-CR-00221, 1992 W L94715 (Tenn. Ct. App. May 8, 1992), we he ld the lang uag e of Te nn. Code Ann. § 8-20- 102 “re quires the court be fore whom the petition-8-

is broug ht to conduct a f

ull evidentiary

hear ing on the matter.” Johni can , 1992 WL 94715, at *2. These pr ocedur es he l p t h e t ri al cour t rea ch an inf

ormed a nd rea soned dec ision; t hey cannot be ignor ed simply

to fac ilitate a hasty

–and priva

te ly deter mined–ag ree ment betwee n Petitioners and the County May or. B eca

use these statutory

require ments were not followed, we find that the trial cour t
err ed whe n it signed the parties’ Consent Order

.
F or the se re a so ns , th e Con se nt O rd e r e nte re d into b y the County

May or and P etition e rs is

va c a te d in it s ent ir e ty . T his ma tte r i s th e re fo re re mand e d to the B e nto n Co un ty Cha nc e ry Court

. Cos ts o n a

pp e a l are ta xed

on e -h a lf to t he Ap pe lla

nt, B e nto n Co un ty Com mis sio n, and on e -h a lf to the six Appellee s/Petit ioners, for which execution may

issue if nec essar

y

.



### ______________________________ J. S T E V E N S T A FF O RD , J.