IN THE SUPREME COURT OF MISSISSIPPI
NO. 2016-CA-00844-SCT BENARDRICK C. McKINNEY

v. KASEY HAMP

DATE OF JUDGMENT: 04/21/2016 TRIAL JUDGE: HON. W ATOSA MARSHALL SANDERS TRIAL COURT ATTORNEYS: STEPHANIE NICOLE MORRIS TONYA YEVETTE POW ELL DALANEY LEE MECHAM COURT FROM W HICH APPEALED: TUNICA COUNTY CHANCERY COURT ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT: TONYA YEVETTE POW ELL ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE: STEPHANIE NICOLE MORRIS ERICA JEAN W ILSON NATURE OF THE CASE: CIVIL - DOMESTIC RELATIONS DISPOSITION: AFFIRMED IN PART; REVERSED AND RENDERED IN PART; REVERSED AND REMANDED IN PART - 02/08/2018 MOTION FOR REHEARING FILED: MANDATE ISSUED:
C ONSOLIDATED WITH
NO. 2016-CA-01299-SCT BENARDRICK CORNELIUS McKINNEY

v. KASEY HAMP

DATE OF JUDGMENT: 07/27/2016 TRIAL JUDGE: HON. W ATOSA MARSHALL SANDERS COURT FROM W HICH APPEALED: TUNICA COUNTY CHANCERY COURT ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT: TONYA YEVETTE POW ELLATTORNEY FOR APPELLEE: STEPHANIE NICOLE MORRIS

NATURE OF THE CASE: DOMESTIC RELATIONS DISPOSITION: AFFIRMED IN PART; REVERSED AND RENDERED IN PART; REVERSED AND REMANDED IN PART - 02/08/2018 MOTION FOR REHEARING FILED: MANDATE ISSUED:

BEFORE RANDOLPH, P.J., COLEMAN AND MAX W ELL, JJ.
MAX WELL, JUSTICE, FOR THE COURT: ¶1. In these consolidated appeals, we f ind the chancellor properly included a p rof essional athlete’s signing bonus as part of h is gross incom e when craf ting a child-support award. W e also hold that a chancellor’s order f or p rosp e c t i ve m onthly child-support pay m ents cannot be stay e d b y a clerk-approved supersedeas bond u nder Mississippi Rule of A ppellate Procedure 8(a). ¶2. But until today , this Court had not addressed Rule 8(a)’s ef f ect on prospective childsupport pay

m ents. So it w as reasonable f or the f a t her to have relied o n his attorney ’s advice that the award was stay ed. Thus, he should not have been h eld in contem pt f or nonpay m ent of the increased support award. ¶3. W e af

f irm in part, reverse and rem and in part, and reverse and render in part. Background Facts and Procedural History
I. Paternity and Child Support ¶4. Benardrick M cKinney a nd Kasey Ham p’s son, K.M., w as born out of wedlock while

2McKinney attended and play ed f ootball f o r Mississippi S tate University

. 1 In h is junior y ear, McKinney was selected in the second round of the National Football League ( NFL) draf t and signed a contract to play prof essional f ootball f or the Houston Texans. ¶5. Bef

ore McKinney signed his NFL contract, Ham p sought a ssistance t o pay f or K.M.’s support a nd expenses. The Mississippi Departm e nt of H um an Services (DHS) becam e involved in her child-support r equest. And o n October 1 5, 2014, D HS f iled a com

plaint in Tunica County

against McKinney

to determ ine paternity and child support. On March 16, 2015, a paternity test showed a 99.99% probability t hat McKinney was K.M.’s f ather. The paternity test r esults led DHS to return to chancery court. And o n J u ne 15, 2 015, t h e chancellor entered a tem porary order a w a rding Ham p $150 per m onth in child support. McKinney

voluntarily increased his support obligation to $750 per m onth. ¶6. The n ext da y , H a mp , i n d i v i d u a l l y , f iled a com

plaint f or child support i n Tunica County

. She pointed o ut t hat McKinney ’s incom e h ad increased substantially since DHS had
f iled its c om

plaint. McKinney had signed a f our-y e ar, several-m illion-dollar NFL contract, which included a substantial signing bonus. ¶7. McKinney answered the com plaint and r ais e d a c o u

n t e r c l aim seeking custody of K.M.
In his answer, McKinney a rgued that because DHS had already obtained a child-support award i n another suit, Ham p f ailed to both state a claim and join a necessary p arty —DHS.
Ham p petitioned t o am e nd her com plaint t o nam e DHS as a party , but the chancellor denied her request

. On July 30, 2015, the chancellor dism issed Ham p ’s com plaint without

1 K .M . w as b o rn on Septem ber 3, 2013. 3prejudice. Ham p then f iled a petition f

or m odif ication o f child support in the DHS lawsuit on Septem

ber 14, 2015. ¶8. On February 25, 2016, Ham p and McKinney again a

ppeared bef

ore the chancellor on the custody counterclaim

. Both a greed they had resolved custody a nd visitation issues. And though the DHS lawsuit was still pending, the parties asked to proceed on the child-support issue. The DHS attorney was agreeable to m oving f orward on the support m atter. ¶9. Wh e n t h e h e a r i ng concluded, the chancellor asked the parties, including DH S , t o provide brief

s addressing whether M c K i nney ’s signing bonus should be considered gross incom e. But b ef

ore s ubm itting a brief

, McKinney f

i led a m o t i o n t o recuse the chancellor.
He took issue with t he chancellor’s com m e n ts and expressions f rom the b ench—particularly her asking Ham

p w hether her f

ather was K.C. H am

p, the Tu n ica County sherif f

. The chancellor denied McKinney ’s m otion. She insisted she did n ot know the sherif f personally

. She also m aintained, as she had at trial, that she w ould f ollow the statutory a nd caselaw requirem ents when setting child support. ¶10. In DHS’s supplem ental chancery c ourt brief , DHS argued McKinney ’s s igning bonus should be considered gross incom e. McKinney disagreed and argued it s h o u l d n ot. From the record, it does not appear Ham p f iled a brief

. ¶11. O n A

p r i l 2 1 , 2 0 1 6, the chancellor consolidated McKinney ’s c u stody counterclaim a n d the D HS child-support suit. Fo u r d a y s l ater, the chancellor e ntered an agreed order determ ining custody

and visitation. But the child-support issue rem ained unresolved. ¶12. On April 27, 2016, the c hancellor e ntered her f indings and order on the child-support

4claim

. She addressed three m a in issues: (1) whether to include McKinney ’s signing bonus

as regular incom e; ( 2) t he am ount of m onthly child support; and ( 3) who should claim K.M. as a dependent f

or taxes. ¶13. Using McKinney ’s Unif orm Chancery C ourt Rule 8.05 disclosure a nd other f inancial records, t he chancellor f

ound there had been a m aterial change in c ircum s tances. She f ound McKinney ’s s igning a NFL c ontract required the tem porary DHS order t o be m odif ied upward. Citing prim arily Mississippi C ode Section 4 3-19-101(3)(a), the chancellor determ ined M cKinney ’s signing bonus should f actor into the child-support award. But she decided it should be calculated i n d e p e n d ently f rom his nonbonus i ncom e and would be retroactive. She t hen took McKinney ’s signing bonus—af ter taxes a nd deductions—and divided it over f

ive y ears. She ordered m onthly child-support pay m ents of $407.61 f

or f our
y ears and a one-y e ar “retroactive” pay m ent of $4,483.71. ¶14. The chancellor then turne d t o M c K i n n e y ’ s n onbonus incom e a nd determ ined his annual adjusted gros s incom e af ter taxes and d eductions. 2 She also f ound that, because
Ham p was in school and K.M. should benef it f rom McKinney ’s increased f

inancial status, the s tatutory f

ourteen-percent child-support rate f or noncustodial p a

r e n t i n c o m e a

p p lied. The chancellor ultim ately ordered m o n t h ly child-support pay

m ents of $2,410.37 and a r etroactive
pay m ent of $18,264.07. The c h a n c e l l or also ordered that McKinney and Ham p alternate claim ing K.M. as a dependent f or tax purposes e a ch y e ar. McKin n e y d i sagreed with each child-support award and appealed.

2 T h e ch an cello r lo o k ed sp ecif ically at M cK in n e y ’ s salary p r o je c t i ons for th e 2 0 1 5 -1 6 N F L reg u lar seaso n . 5II. Contem pt and Supersedeas Bond

¶15. On June 30, 2 016

— b e f o r e M c K i n n e y h a d s e c u r e d a s u p e r s e d e a s bond f or appeal—Ham

p f iled a m otion f

or contem pt and a ttorney ’s f

ees. She claim ed McKinney had
f ailed to m ake any p ay

m ents required by the c hancellor’s child-suppo r t o r d e r . McKinney ultim ately secured a supersedeas bond, which was a pproved by the T unica County chancery clerk on July 14, 2016. The n ext day he responded to Ham p ’ s motion. He pointed to the supersedeas bond and asked the court to dism iss the contem pt issue. ¶16. The chancell o r h e a r d a r g u me n ts on Ham p’s m otion. In a July 27, 2 016 order, she
f ound McKinney ’s su

p e r s e d e a s b o n d w a s i n e ffe c tive to stay enf orcem ent of the child-support order. C iting Mississippi Rule of Appellate Procedure 8(a), the chancellor held t he m onthly and retroactive c hild-support pay m ents were “not a m o ney j udgm ent or a judgm ent solely f or
pay m ent of m oney .” And even i f Rule 8(a) applied to the child-support order, M cKinney ’s bond did not m e et the rule’s 125-perce n t r e q u i rem ent. Though McKinney ’ s bond was f or $28,434.73, she f

o u nd the child-support pay m ents continually accrued u ntil the contem pt

m otion was heard. So, as she saw it, the b ond should have been at least $36,18 4

. 6 5

. For these reasons, she f

ound his bond was inef

f e ctive—despite that t he b ond had already been approved and the chancery clerk had issued a stay

on enf orcem ent. ¶17. Af ter the A p r i l 2 5 , 2016 child-support order was e ntered, M cKinney continued pay ing
Ham p $750 per m onth—the am ount he had been p ay ing since t he tem porary DHS order in
June 2015. W hile the chancellor c r edited McKinney f o r these pay

m e nts, she ruled the

rem aining delinquent am ount m ust be paid im m ediately

. She then, in turn, awarded Ham p

6attorney ’s f ees. To determ ine a reasonable am ount, she re q u i red Ham p to provide an item ized statem ent a n d a f f idavits. H am

p subm i tted those item s on August 8, 2016. McKinney f

iled a m em orandum r e sponse, with h is own af f idavits, contesting an attorney ’sf ees a ward. On A ugust 22, 2 016, t he c hancellor awarded Ham p $3,316.41 in attorney ’s f ees and required McKinney

to pay within ten day s. Again, McKinney tim ely appealed. ¶18. In t he con s o l i d a t e d a p p eals bef ore this Court, McKinney raises nine issues: (1) his signing bonus was wrongly considered gross incom e; (2) his m andatory retir e ment contributions were not deducted f rom gross i ncom e; (3) the retroactive support pay m ents

were based o n incorrect incom e; ( 4) there were n o written f indings on whether the statutory child-support guidelines should apply ; ( 5 ) only he should claim K.M. as a dependent f or taxes; (6) Ham

p’s Rule 8.05 disclosu r e w a s s u b m itted ex parte; (7) the t rial c ourt lacked jurisdiction to hear the c o n tem pt m otion; (8) his conduct w as not willf ul, deliberate, or
contum acious; and ( 9) the attorney ’s f ees award was excessive and unsupported b y e vidence.
Discussion ¶19. In m a t t e r s o f d i v o r c e , a l i mo n y , and c hild support, this C ourt will not disturb a chancellor’s r

uling unless it was m anif es t l y w r o n g or an erroneous legal standard was applied. Lahm ann v. H

a l l m o n , 7 22 So. 2d 614, 618 (Miss. 1998). Questions of law are reviewed de novo. Lewis v. Pagel , 172 So. 3d 162, 172 (Miss. 2015).
I. Signing Bonus ¶20. Neither party

disputes that McKinney received a substantial signing bonus when he signed with the Houston Texans. But they disagree o ver whether it qualif ies as gross incom e

7f

or child-support purposes. W hile Ham p argues f or its inclusion, M cKinney m aintains the signing bonus was a one-tim e pay m ent—not a recurring bonus. 3 ¶21. Mississippi Code S ection 43-19-101(3) provides the f orm ula f or calculating adjusted
gross incom e f

or child-support awards. 4 This statute d irects that gro s s i n c o me must be

3 M cK i n n ey

receiv ed h is en tire sig n in g b o n u s in 2 0 1 5 , in th ree in s t allm en ts.

4 S ectio n 4 3 -1 9 -1 0 1 (3 ) states, in f u ll:
T h e am o u n t o f “ad

j u sted g ro ss in co m e” a s th at term is u sed in su b sectio n (1 ) o f th is sectio n sh all b e calcu lated as f o llo w s: (a) D eterm i n e g ro s s in co m e f ro m a ll p o ten tial so u rces th a t m ay reaso n a b ly b e ex p ected to b e av a ilab l e to th e ab sen t p aren t i n clu d in g , b u t n o t lim ited to , th e f o llo w in g : w ag es an d salary in co m e; in co m e f ro m self -em p lo y m en t; in co m e f ro m co m m issio n s; in c o m e f ro m i n v estm en t s, i n c lu d in g d iv id en d s , in terest in co m e an d in co m e o n an y tru st acco u n t o r p ro p erty ; ab sen t p a ren t’s p o rtio n o f a n y j o in t i n co m e o f b o th p aren ts; w o rk ers’ co m p en satio n , d isab ility , u n em p lo y m en t, an n u ity an d retirem en t b en ef its, i n c l u d in g an In d iv id u al R e tirem en t A cco u n t ( IR A ); an y o t h e r p a y m en ts m ad e b y an y p erso n , p r iv ate en tity , f ed eral o r state g o v ern m en t o r an y u n i t o f lo cal g o v ern m e n t; alim o n y ; an y in co m e earn ed f

ro m a n in terest in o r f

ro m i n h e r i t ed p ro p erty ; a n y o th er f o rm o f earn e d in co m e; an d g ro ss in co m e s h all ex clu d e an y m o n etary b en ef its d eriv ed f ro m a seco n d h o u seh o ld , su ch as in co m e o f th e ab s e n t p a r e n t’s cu rren t sp o u se; (b ) S u b tract th e f

o llo w i n g leg ally

m an d a ted d e d u ctio n s: (I) F ed eral, state an d lo cal tax es. C o n t rib u tio n s to th e p ay m e n t o f t ax es o v er a n d b ey o n d th e actu a l l iab ility f o r th e tax ab le y ear sh all n o t b e co n s id ered a m a n d ato ry

d ed u ctio n ; (ii) S o cial secu rity

co n trib u tio n s; (iii) R etirem en t

an d d isab ility

co n t rib u tio n s ex cep t

an y v o lu n t ary retirem en t an d d isab ility

co n trib u tio n s ; (c) If th e ab sen t p aren t is su b

j ect to an e x i stin g co u rt o rd er f o r an o th er ch ild o r ch ild ren , su b tract th e am o u n t o f th at co u r t-o rd ered su p p o rt; 8calculated “f rom a ll potential sources that m ay reasonably be expected t o be available to the absent parent.” Miss. Code Ann. § 43-19-101(3)(a) (em phasis added). The c hancellor f ound the s igning bonus qualif

i ed as “any other pay

m ent[ ] ” or “any other f

orm of earned incom e.” Id. And because McKinney h ad already received the b onus, t he chancellor f ound the incom e was “reasonably

. . . expected to be available” to McKinney

. I d. ¶22. Indeed, the record s hows McKinney received a ll of his signing b onus in 2015. And McKinney does n ot c ontest that chancellors m ay consider a n n u a l bonuses as part of gross incom e when awarding child support. See A lderson v . Morgan ex rel. Cham

pion , 739 So. 2d 465, 467-68 (Miss. Ct. A pp. 1999). Instead, he points o ut his signing bonus is not an annual perf

orm a nce bonus or som e other p otentially recurring incom e. And because he has entered a m

ultiy e ar contract, it cannot be “reasonably expected” he will sign a new contract with t he Texans or anothe r t e a m a n n u a lly

. He argues his s ituation is akin to J ohnston v. Johnston , where we f

ound it was “unreasonable and clearly e rroneous” f or a chancellor to include in a child-support award a f ather’s incom e f

rom teaching a one-tim e training course (d ) If th e ab sen t p aren t is also th e p aren t o f an o t h er ch ild o r o th er c h i l d r en resid in g w ith h im , th e n t h e c o u rt m ay su b tract an am o u n t th at it d eem s ap p ro p riate to acco u n t f

o r th e n eed s o f

said ch ild o r ch i ld ren ; (e) C o m p u te th e to tal an n u al am o u n t o f ad j u s t ed g ro ss in co m e b a s ed o n p arag rap h s (a) th ro u g h (d ), th en d iv id e th is am o u n t b y tw elv e (1 2 ) to o b tain th e m o n th ly am o u n t o f

ad j u sted g ro ss in co m e. U p o n co n clu sio n o f th e c alcu latio n o f p arag rap h s (a) th ro u g h (e), m u ltip l y th e m o n th l y am o u n t o f a d

j u s t e d g ro ss in co m e b y th e a p p ro p r iate p ercen tag e d esig n ated in su b sectio n (1 ) to arriv e at th e am o u n t o f t h e m o n th l y c h ild su p p o rt aw ard

. M iss. C o d e A n n . § 4 3 -1 9 -1 0 1 (3 ) (Rev. 2015). 9when “[ the f ather] h ad no c ontract or e xpectation f or this additional em

ploy m ent to continue.” Johnston v. Johnston , 722 So. 2d 453, 4 61 (Miss. 1998). Af ter review, we f

ind McKinney ’s em

ploy m ent situation and s igning bonus a r e f a r dif f erent f rom the general uncertainty of a parent’s supplem e ntal incom e. Nor does his bonus bear m uch resem

blance

to m one y o b t a ined f

rom a p arent’s unexpected corporate buy o ut. See R obertson v. Robertson , 812 So. 2 d 998, 1002 ( Miss. Ct. App. 2001) (f ather’s b uy o ut was n ot “reasonably

e x p ected” and “it was certainly not a y early event” like a bonus). There is really no legitim ate com

parison between these scenarios and McKinney ’s. ¶23. McKinney is an NFL linebacker, n ot a m oonlighting parent. And, accordi n g to the record, his signing b onus accounts f or a m a jor guaranteed p ortion of his incom e a s a prof essional athlete. Under Section 43-19-101(3), gross incom e f or child support m

ust be calculated f

rom “all potential s ources that m ay r easonably be expected to be available to the absent parent

. . . .” Because the bonu s h a s already b een received, it was certainly “reasonably expected to b e available”—as c ontem plated by Mississippi l aw. So we cannot f ind the chancellor was wrong to deem it “gross incom e” f

or child-support purposes. ¶24. However, it appears the chancellor was incorrect about the duration of McKinney ’s
NFL contract. The bulk of the record supports that McKinney ’s NFL contract was f or f our
y ears, not f

ive. So we r everse and rem and f o r the chancellor to recalculate the child-support order to ref

lect McKinney ’s contract as a f our-y ear contract.
II. Retirem ent Contributions ¶25. McKinney n ext argues the chancellor did not de d u c t h i s ma n d a t o r y r e t irem ent

1 0contributions f rom h is g ross incom e. Even Ham p a dm its the chancellor “did not s pecif ically state” that she had considered McKinney ’s retirem ent contributions. 5 ¶26. Under Section 43-19-101(3)(b), “[ r]etirem ent and disability contributions except any voluntary retirem e nt and disability contributio ns” should be deducted f rom gross incom e. McKinney ’s f

inancial statem ents f

rom t h e Houston T exans s how m onthly retirem ent contributions, which he claim s are m andatory

. But t he c hancellor m ade no f indings about these contributions. Because m andatory retirem e nt contributions should be deducted f rom
gross incom e, this Court r everses a nd rem ands f or f indings on whether the contributions are

m andatory

. I f the contribution s a r e i n d e ed m andatory , they should be d educted f rom McKinney ’s gross incom e. III. Retroactive Child Support ¶27. Citing a subs t a n t i a l a n d ma t e r i a l c h a n g e i n c i r c u ms t a n c e s

— r e s u l t i n g f rom McKinney ’s p rof

e ssional f o o tball contract—the chancellor awarded a retroactive increase
in child-support pay

m ents. The award w as ordered retroactive to J une 16, 2 015. McKinney argues this was error. ¶28. Parties m ay s eek a child-support m o dif ication w hen there are substantial and m aterial changes in circum stances. See generally Evans v. Evans , 994 So. 2d 765, 770 (Miss. 2008). And McKinney does not c ontest the substantial and m aterial s alary changes m entioned. His disagreem ent instead m ainly f ocuses on the date of

the retroactive award.

5 H am p a rg u es o n ap p eal t h a t M c K in n ey receiv e d s tate in co m e tax d ed u ctio n s h e sh o u ld n o t h av e receiv ed

. S h e c laim s T ex as d o es n o t assess in co m e tax e s . B u t th is issu e w a s n ev er p resen ted to th e ch an cello r, so w e d o n o t a d d ress it. S e e A d a m s v. B d

. o f S u p erviso rs o

f U n io n C ty. , 1 7 7 M iss. 4 0 3 , 1 7 0 S o . 6 8 4 , 6 8 5 (1 9 3 6 ).

1 1¶29. This Court has looked t o our statutory law and has held that “‘[ a]n upward retroactive

m odif ication may be ordered back to the date of the event j u s t if y ing the upward

m odif icat i o n . ’ ” A.M.L. v. J.W.L. , 98 So. 3 d 1001, 1018 (Miss. 2012) (citing Miss. Code
Ann. § 43-19-34(4) (Rev. 2009)) (em phasis in original). Section 43-19-34(4) still provides the sam e today

. See Miss. Code Ann. § 43-19-34(4) (Rev. 20 1 5 )

. B u t w e h ave also suggested that “ the better rule is to allow m o dif ication am ounting to an increase i n support

as of the date of the petition to m odif y or thereaf

ter, w ithin the s ound discretion o f the trial
court.” L awrence v. L awrence , 574 So. 2d 1376, 1384 (Miss. 1991). T h is is a d iscretionary call. ¶30. Af ter review, we see no e rror in the chancellor awarding a retroactive increase. Nor d i d she a buse her discretion in choosing June 16, 2015—the date Ham p initially f

i l e d h e r separate petition f

or child support—to im

plem ent the retroactive increase.
IV. Statutory Guidelines ¶31. W h en the n oncustodial parent’s i ncom e exceeds $100,000, t he chancellor m ust m ake

a written f

inding on whether Section 43-19-101’s support guidelines apply

. See M iss. Code
Ann. § 43-19-101(4) (Rev. 2015). The r e i s a r ebuttable presum ption these guidelines are appropriate. Id. To o v e r c om e this presum ption and d

eviate f rom t hese guidelines, a chancellor m

ust m ake specif

i c f indings under the criteria in Section 43-19-103. But here, the chancellor did not deviate f rom the guidelines. So McKinney is w rong in his contention that the chancellor was required to m ake specif ic f indings on each f

actor in Section 43-19-103. All that was required was f or the chancellor to f

ind, in writing, that the standard, statutory ,

1 2f

ourteen-percent guideline should apply . And she did. ¶32. F u rtherm ore, the chancellor’s overall written analy sis supports her decision. C o n t r a r y
to McKinn e y ’ s insistence, it is s upported by evidence. T he chancellor considered both
Ham p’s a n d McKinney ’s ages, health, incom es, and living expenses. She a l so considered
K.M.’s age, expenses, and f uture needs related to his and H a mp ’ s m ove to Mem phis f or Ham p to a ttend nursing school. Ham p was not particularly thorough on the cost f o r K.M.’s day care or potential apartm ents i n Mem phis—the only t w o s p ecif i c e xpenses McKinney takes issue with on appeal. B ut there is nothing t hat seriously undercut her testim ony about these costs. Af

ter review, we see no error in the handling of either of these issues.
V. Tax Ex em ption ¶33. Based on the child-support award and h i s o v e r a l l fi n a n c i a l s ituation, McKinney claim s the chancellor erred by alternating who could claim K.M. as a dependent on their taxes. He
say s the c hancellor f

ailed to consider t he f

actors laid out in Louk when c o nsidering the tax issue. S e e Louk v. Louk , 761 So. 2d 878, 883-84 ( Miss. 2000). B ut in truth, t his Court has

not established a specif

ic test f or allocating child tax exem p tions, though w e have discussed

som e suggested considerations. Id. Still, t hough there i s no de f i n itive test, the chancellor

was conf ronted with McKinney ’s substantial incom e and should have p erf orm ed som e analy sis a b o u t t h e e x em

ption, but did not. Thus, we f ind the chancellor’s handling of this issue lacking. The record shows Ham p has no apparent signif

icant independent incom e f rom which she w ould e n

j o y a n y advantage in having the dependent child e xem ptions. But McKinney clearly does. In short, all we have bef ore u s is the chancellor’s conclusion that

1 3the exem

ption should be alternated. On rem and, the chancellor should revisit this i ssue and,

at a m inim

u m , m ake f

indings detailing h er r easo n i n g f or a llocating the dependent tax

exem ption.
VI. Ex Parte 8.05 Disclosure ¶34. McKinney argues t hat Ham p’s Rule 8.05 disclosure was subm itted to the c hancellor

ex parte and it was never m ade pa r t o f t he r ecord. 6 W e note that neither party ’s R ule 8.05 disclosure was part of the record until McKinney f i led his on May 11, 2016—approxim ately

two weeks af

t er the chancellor’s April 25, 2016 child-support o pini o n a nd order. Yet the chancellor still ref

erences McKinney ’s and Ham p’s 8.05 d i s c l o s u r es in t hat opinion. This issue could have been—but was not—raised below. So we will not consider the argum ent

on appeal. See Adam s v. Bd. of Supervisors of Union Cty. , 1 77 Miss. 403, 170 So. 684, 685 (1936).
VII. Jurisdiction for Contem pt Motion ¶35. McKinney f

a iled to a bide by the chancellor’s April 25, 2016 order, r equiring him to
pay m onthly and retroactive c hild support. His nonpay m ent prom

pted Ham p to f ile a m otion
f or contem pt a nd attorney ’s f

ees on June 30, 2016. McKinney secured a s upersedeas bond
f or $28,434.73, which the Tunica County chancery clerk approved and f iled on July 14,

6 T h e tran s crip t also s h o w s an ex ch an g e b e t w een t h e ch an cello r an d th e atto rn ey s, d iscu ssin g each p arty ’s 8 .0 5 d isclo su re at t h e e n d o f trial. H am p ’ s atto rn ey clearly stated th at sh e h ad H a m

p ’s 8 .0 5 w ith h er, an d th e ch an cello r resp o n d ed th at s h e w o u ld n eed it t h at d ay . M c K in n ey ’s atto rn ey w as p resen t an d p articip ated d u r in g th at en tire ex ch a n g e.

1 42016. 7

¶36. A week later, the chancellor heard Ham p ’s m otion. She determ ined that child-support
pay m ents were “not a m oney judgm ent or a judgm e n t solely f or pay m ent of m oney ” under Mississippi Rule o f Appellate Procedure 8(a). Alternatively , the chancellor f ound that, even if a supersedeas bond was e f f ective to stay execution, McKinney ’s b o n d d i d n o t m eet the required 125-percent am ount of $36,189.65. ¶37. This Court has held that “[ t]he am ount of a s u persedeas bond should be suf f icient to protect the appellee in his j udgm ent; theref ore, it should insure the pay m ent of t he j udgm ent and i nterest, and a ny waste that could o ccur pending t he appeal.” In re Estate of Taylor , 539
So. 2 d 1029, 1031 (Miss. 1989). And when a s upersedeas bond f o r appeal is a

ppr o v e d , execution on the underly ing judgm ent or d ecree i s suspended. Lindsey v. Lindsey , 219 Miss. 720, 723, 69 So. 2d 844, 844-45 (1954). ¶38. In a judicial-perf

orm ance case, this Court has m ade very clear that a supersedeas bond stay s execution o f a child-support-m odif ication order. Miss. Com m ’n on J u dicial Perform ance v. Littlejohn , 172 So. 3d 1157, 1160 (Miss. 2015). Indeed, this Court f ound a chancellor abused his power and com m itted m isconduct by holding a p arent in contem pt f or n ot pay ing a support order h e had appealed with a s upersedeas b ond. Id

. That chancellor

was suspended without pay f or disregarding “the clear wording” of Rule 8(a) and t his Court’s application of

it in Lindsey

. L ittlejohn , 172 So. 3d at 1160, 1163.

7 T h e $ 2 8 ,4 3 4 .7 3 su m

is 1 2 5 p ercen t o f th e r etro activ e ch ild -su p p o r t aw ard

. B u t it d o es n o t in clu d e th e th ree m o n th ly ch ild -su p p o rt p ay m en ts b etw een th e A p r il 2 5 , 2 0 1 6 o rd er an d Ju ly 1 4 , 2 0 1 6

. 1 5¶39. There is, however, a signif icant distinctio n b e t w e e n Littlejohn and this case. That distinction i s t he d if

f erence in the ty

pe of child-support pay

m ents appealed. In Littlejohn ,

a child-support order was m odif ied and the f

ather w a s required to pay $15,000 f or an
autom obile f

or his c hild and $1,750 in attorney ’s f ees—together, a d

efinitive mo n e y judgm ent. And rather than p ay this s um , the f ather secured a supersedeas bond under Rule 8(a). But here, we are dealing wit h p r o s p ective, m onthly , child-support obligations, n ot a def initive m oney judgm ent. And this Court has never squarely addressed wh e t her prospective, monthly, child-support obligations can be stay e d by a supersedeas bond under Rule 8(a). ¶40. This Court has, however, recognized t he need f or continued, m onthly , child-support
p a y m ents to provide support f o r the child during t he p endency of a n appeal. Pe t e r s e n v . Petersen , 238 Miss. 1 90, 1 1 8 So. 2d 300, 304 (1960). In P etersen , the c h ancellor entered

a decree awarding m onthly , child-support pay m e nts but stated that such pay m ents “should

rem ain in ef

f ect pending the appeal w ith supersedeas

. . . .” P etersen , 238 Miss. at 198-99,
1 1 8 So. 2d at 304. And this Court held t he chancellor was clearly justif ied i n r e q u i r i n g continued, m onthly , child-support pay m ents pending an appeal with supersedeas. Id

. But until today , this Court h as n ot addressed whether prospective, m onthly child-support
pay m ents can be stay ed a s m oney judgm ents by a Mississippi Rule of A ppellate Procedure 8(a) supersedeas bond. 8

8 T h e C o u rt o f A p p eals h as p rev io u s ly co n clu d ed , i n an u n p u b l ish ed o p in io n , t h at p ro sp ectiv e, m o n th ly -ch ild su p p o rt p ay m en ts are n o t m oney j u d g m en ts an d th eref o re can n o t b e stay ed b y a R u l e 8 (a) s u p e rsed eas b o n d

. S ee B la n d v. M

cC o rd , 9 4

- C A -0 0 9 4 7 -C O A , 9 4

- C A -0 1 1 5 8 -C O A (M iss. C t. A p p . S ep . 1 7 , 1 9 9 6 ). 1 6¶41. Under M ississippi law, child-support pay m e nts becom e f

i x e d a n d vested when the
pay m ents becom e due a nd unpaid. Brand v. Brand , 482 S o. 2d 2 36, 237 (Miss. 1986). And

as each pay

m ent com es due, it becom es “a judgm ent” against the noncustodial parent. Id

. (citations om itted). Once f ixe d and vested, those j udgm ents cannot be m o dif ied. See
Ham brick v. Prestwood , 382 So. 2d 474, 476 (Miss. 1980); s ee also Cunliffe v. S wartzfager , 437 So. 2d 43, 45-46 (Miss. 1983). So, because child-support arrearages and other def initive,

o n e-tim e, child-support p ay m ents can be reduced to m oney judgm ents, a Rule 8 ( a ) supersedeas bond can protect an appellee. But that is not necessarily t he case f o r prospective,

m onthly , child-support obligations. W e f ind these are not m oney judgm e nts and cannot be stay ed by a Rule 8(a) supersedeas bond. ¶42. But this does not necessarily m ean McKinney could n ot have sought a sup e r sedeas bond. However, to do s o, he would have had to m ake a n application to the chancellor f o r a stay under Mississippi Rule of Appellate Procedure 8(b). 9 And the chancellor, not the clerk,

9 M ississip p i R u le o f

A p p ellate P ro ced u re 8 (b ) states: (1 ) A p p licatio n f

o r a stay o f th e j u d g m en t o r th e o rd er o f a trial co u rt p en d in g ap p eal o r f o r a p p ro v al o r d i sap p ro v a l o f a c o n tested su p ersed e a s b o n d o r f o r an o rd er su sp en d i n g , m o d if

y in g , resto rin g , o r g ran tin g an in j u n ctio n d u r in g th e p en d en cy o f an ap p eal m

u st o rd i n arily b e m ad e in t h e f irst in stan ce t o t h e trial co u r t. T h e co u rt sh all req u ire th e g iv in g o f s ecu rity b y th e a p p ellan t in su ch f

o rm an d in s u ch su m as th e co u rt d e em s p ro p e r, an d f o r g o o d cau se sh o w n m ay set a su p ersed eas b o n d in an am o u n t less th an th e 1 2 5 p ercen t req u ired in cases u n d e r R u l e 8 ( a). (2 ) H o w ev er, a b o n d o r eq u iv alen t secu rity req u ired o n an y m o n e y j u d g m en t en tered in w h o le o r in p art o n acco u n t o f p u n itiv e d am a g e s s h all, as to th e p u n i tiv e d am ag es p o rtio n o f

th e j u d g m e n t o n ly , b e th e lo w er o f : (a) 1 2 5 p ercen t o f

th e to tal am o u n t o f

p u n itiv e d am a g e s, o r

1 7would have to decide whether to a pprove the bond, in light of an opposing p arty c ontesting the bond. ¶43. Turning t o t his case, we f ind the c h a n c e l l o r ’s order m odif y ing the m onthly

childsupport award could not b e stay ed by a Rule 8(a) supersedeas bond. Accordingly , McKinney

was required either to apply f or a nd be granted a supersedeas bond u nder Rule 8(b) or to

(b ) t en p ercen t o f th e n et w o rth o f th e d ef en d an t seek in g ap p eal as d eterm in ed b y ap p ly in g g en erally accep t ed acco u n tin g p rin cip les to t h e d e f en d an t’s f in an cial sta t u s a s o f D ecem b e r 3 1 , o f th e y ear p rio r to th e e n try o f th e j u d g m en t f

o r p u n itiv e d am ag es. (c) A b s en t u n u su a l circu m stan ces, t h e to tal a m o u n t o f th e r eq u ired b o n d o r e q u i v alen t s ecu rity f

o r an y c ase as to p u n itiv e d am a g es s h all n o t ex cee d $ 1 0 0 ,0 0 0 ,0 0 0

. (3 ) T o q u a lif

y f o r red u ctio n o f

b o n d o r eq u iv alen t secu r ity

u n d er su b p art (b )(2 )(b ), th ere m u st b e a g o o d an d su f

f icien t sh o w i n g t h a t th e im p o sitio n o f a s u p e r s e d e as b o n d o f 1 2 5 % o f t h e f

u l l j u d g m en t ap p ealed f

ro m w o u ld p lace th at a

p p ellan t i n a co n d itio n o f in so l v en c y o r w o u ld o th e rw ise s u b stan tially th reaten its f u t u re f in an cial v iab ility

. (4 ) Wh en th e ap p ellan t i s allo w ed t h e b en ef it o f a re d u c t i o n in b o n d o r eq u iv alen t secu rity u n d er su b p art (b ) (2 )(b ) o r (c), th e c o u rt ma y r e q u i r e su b m issio n o f su ch rep o rts o r ev id en c e t o t h e c o u r t an d to o p p o s in g p arties as w ill allo w th em to b e p r o p e rly in f

o rm ed o f th e f

in an cial co n d i tio n o f th e ap p ellan t d u rin g t h e p erio d o f su p ersed eas. If at an y tim e af ter n o tice an d h earin g , th e co u rt f in d s th at an ap p ellan t w h o h as p o s t e d a b o n d o r eq u iv alen t secu rity f o r less th an 1 2 5 p ercen t o f th e f u ll am o u n t o f th e j u d g m en t h as tak en actio n s th a t a f f ect th e f in an cial ab ility o f th e ap p ellan t to resp o n d to th e j u d g m en t , o r h as t ak en o t h e r a c tio n s w ith th e in ten t to av o id th e j u d g m en t, th e co u rt sh all in crease th e b o n d o r eq u i v a len t secu rity to th e f u ll 1 2 5 p ercen t o f th e j u d g m en t. If th e ap p e llan t d o es n o t p o st t h e a d d itio n al b o n d req u ired b y

th e co u rt, th e stay sh all b e rev o k ed

. (5 ) If a h earin g is n ecessary

f o r issu es arisin g u n d er su b p art (b ) , th e j u d g m en t sh all b e stay ed d u rin g su ch h earin g an d f o r ten d ay s f

o llo w in g th e trial co u rt’s ru lin g . T h e ru lin g o f th e trial c o u rt o n m o tio n s f iled u n d e r th is su b p art (b ) sh a l l b e rev iew ab le b y th e S u p rem e C o u rt o r th e C o u rt o f A p p eals. 1 8m a k e the increased, m onthly , child-support pay m ents. But, a s to the retroactive c h i l d

- s u p p o r t award, it was a def

i nitive, o ne-tim e pay

m e n t of a m onetary sum . So a R ule 8 (a) supersedeas bond would adequately

protect Ham

p , and ultim ately K.M., during the appeal. ¶44. W e theref

o re af f irm the chancellor’s ruling that prospective, m onthly , child-support obligations are not m oney judgm ents that can be stay ed by a Rule 8(a) supersedeas bond. However, we reverse and render the chancellor’s decision t hat a R ule 8 (a) supersedeas bond could not stay execution on the retroactive child support.
VIII. Contem pt Findings ¶45. At the contem

pt hearing, McKinney testif ied that h e f

ollowed his c ounsel’s, m other’s, and f inancial a dvisor’s advice to secure a supersedeas b ond i nstead o f m a king t he r etroactive and m onthly child-support pay m ents. There were also dif f i culties securing a b o n d , not knowing he could post a cash bond instead. McKinney testif i ed t hat at no point did he intend

to disobey the chancellor’s order. Despite this, the chancellor f ound McKinney in contem pt.
But rather than “order M cKinney be jailed,” t he chanc e l l o r o r dered he pay the delinquent

am ount im m ediately

and Ham p’s attorney ’s f

e es. McKinney

say s this was error. ¶46. In a c ontem

pt a ction f

or u npaid child support, f

ailure to m ake r equired child-support
pay m ents is prim a f

acie evidence of contem

pt. Lahm a nn , 7 22 So. 2d at 620 (citing Guthrie

v. Guthrie , 537 So. 2d 886, 888 (Miss. 1989)). The burden then shif ts to the pay or to show, through clear and convincing evidence, an inability to pay or other def ense to c o ntem

pt. Id

. “W hether a party i s in c o n t e mp t i s lef t to the Chancellor’s substantial discretion.” Id

. (citation om itted).

1 9¶47. The record contains am ple ev i d e n c e t h a t M c K i n n e y was advised and reasonably believed a supersedeas bond would stay the retroactive and m o nthly child-support pay m ents. See gener ally McKnight v . J enkins , 155 So. 3 d 730, 732-33 (Miss. 2013) (holding that a party ’s reliance on counsel’s advice to not pay bill could not be willf ul contem pt). A nd while reliance on counsel’s advice m ay not i n every i nstance protect a party f rom contem pt, here the court clerk approved his b o nd a nd issued a stay on enf orcem ent. Because this Court has, until now, never specif

ically addressed Rule 8(a) ’ s e ffe c t o n m o n t h l y c h i l d

- s u

p p o r t pay m ents,

we c annot say McKinney ’s reliance on the supersedeas bond was contem ptuous or m erely disobedient, as the dissent labels it. ¶48. The dis s e n t c h a r acterizes the contem pt i ssue as one of McKinney not pay ing child support and ignoring the chancellor, by just l istening to his attorney and other advisors. W ith respect, the dissent sim

ply m i s s e s t h e gist of what happened a nd what w e now hold. The record shows McKinney was already s ubject to an existing support order. And he continued

to abide by that order even af ter t he support-m odif

ication order at issue here w a s e n t ered.
So K .M. continued to r eceive child support. R a ther, what McKinney soug h t , a n d w hat he

was granted, was a Rule 8 (a) supersedeas bond. He believed—and this Court has, until now,

never expressly said otherwise—that the supersedeas bond s tay ed enf or c e m ent of the support-modification order

. McKinney ’s conduct w as no d if f erent than any other appellant seeking to stay a judgm ent w hile appealing to this Court. Thus, we f ind it was e rror f

or the chancellor to cast his actions as willf ully and deliberately disobey in g her order. Because McKinney should not have be e n h e l d i n contem pt, we reverse and render t he contem pt

2 0f

inding.
IX . Attorney ’ s Fees ¶49. Chancellors have broad d iscretion to award attorney ’s f e es. Huseth v. Huseth , 135
So. 3d 846, 859 (Miss. 2014). A nd attorney ’s f ees are ordinarily appropriate when there is

a contem pt f inding. See Gardner v. Gardner , 795 So. 2d 618, 619 (Miss. Ct. A pp. 2001).
But here, we f

ind the chancellor wrongly held McKinney in contem pt. Because w e reverse and render that decision, we m ust also reverse and re ma n d t he automatic attorney ’s-f ees award relating to Ham

p ’s contem

pt m otion. Cf. Lahm a nn v. Hallm on , 722 So. 2d 614, 623 (Miss. 1 998). On rem and, the chancellor has discretion to a ward attorney ’s f ees t o H am

p but

m ust consider the McKee f actors in d oing so. S

ee McKee v. M

cKee , 418 S o. 2d 764, 767 (Miss. 1982).
Conclusion ¶50. W e f

ind the chancellor properly conside r e d M c K i n n e y ’ s s i gning b onus as gross incom e when c raf

t ing her child-supp o r t o r d e r. W e likewise af f irm the chancellor’s d e t e r m i n a tion that the statutory child-support guidelines were reasonable and applied, as w e l l as her decision to award a retroactive m o dif ication to June 16, 2015. ¶51. But because the c hancellor wrongly divided t he award o ver f i ve y ears, rather than the
f our y ears of M cKinney ’s c ontract, we reverse i n part and rema n d f o r t h e c h ancellor to recalculate the child-support order to ref lect a f our-y ear contract. Additionally , because the child-support order contains no f indings ab o u t w h e t

h e r McKinney ’ s retirem ent c ontributions

are m andatory o r any d iscussion on the f inancial consequences f

or ea c h p a r t y concerning

2 1K.M. a s a dependent f or taxes, we m

ust rem and o n t hose issues as well. If on rem and the chancellor f

inds the retirem ent contributions a r e ma n d atory , those am o unts should be deducted f

rom McKinney ’s gross incom e . ¶52. As to the superse d e a s b o n d , w e a f f i r m t h e chancellor’s ruling that prospective,

m onth l y , c hild-support pay m ents are not m oney j udgm ents within Rule 8(a) and theref ore
cannot be stay ed by a clerk-appro v e d supersedeas bond. B ut we reverse and render her

contem pt f inding. Because we reverse and render the contem pt f inding, w e m

ust r everse and

rem and the chancellor’s autom atic grant of attorney ’s f

ees to Ham

p. ¶53. A F F I R M E D I N P A R T ; R E VERSED AND RENDERED IN PART ; R E V E R S E D AND REMANDED IN PART. WALLER, C.J., RANDOLPH AND KITCHENS, P .JJ., C OLEMA N , CHAMBERLIN AND ISHEE, JJ., CONCUR. BEAM, J., CONCURS IN PART AND DISSENTS IN P ART WITH SEPARATE WRITTEN OPINION JOINED BY KING, J. BEAM, JUSTICE, CONCURRING IN PART AND DISSENTING IN PART: ¶54. I agree with all of the m ajority opinion except f or the decision to r everse the chancery
court’s contem

pt ruling and award of attorney ’s f ees. Theref

ore, I concur in part and dissent in part. ¶55. As the m ajority reiterates, the need f or continued, m onthly , child-support pay m ents during the pendency of an appeal l ong has b een r ecognized by t his Court. See Maj. Op. ¶ 40 (citing P e t e r s e n v . P etersen , 238 Miss. 1 90, 118 So. 2d 300, 3 04 (1960)). The reason is obvious. Children have to eat and have a roof over their heads, a nd were a stay on childsupport pay

m e nts allowed–as a m atter of course–in every c ase where a party challenges their

2 2court-ordered support obligation b y appeal, those a f f e cted f orem ost by t he wait would be the children. ¶56. “Contem

pt m atters are com m itted to the substantial discretion of t he t rial court which, by institutional circum s t ances a nd both tem p oral and visual proxim ity , is inf initely m ore

com petent to decide the m a tter than [ this C ourt].” V arner v. V

arner , 666 So. 2d 493, 496 (Miss.1995) (quoting Morreale v . Morreale , 646 So. 2 d 1264, 1 267 (Miss.1 9 9 4)). A

contem pt citation is proper only

when the alleged contem nor willf ully and deliberately has ignored the order o f t he court. Mizell v . Mizell , 708 So. 2d 55, 64 (Miss. 1 998). Failure to

c om ply with a court order is prim a f acie evidence o f contem pt. McIntosh v. D e

p ’ t o f
H u m a n S e r v s . , 886 So. 2d 721, 724 (Miss. 2004). To rebut a prim a f acie showing o f

contem pt, a person m

ust show an inability t o perf orm the order , that f

ailure t o com

ply was
not willf ul, or that the order was am biguous or u ncertain. Evans v. Evans , 75 So. 3d 1083,
1087 (Miss. Ct. App. 2011). “Contem pt is a n issue of f

act to be d ecided on a case-by -case basis. R .K. v. J.K. , 946 So. 2d 7 64, 777 (Miss. 2007). Resolution of a contem pt m atter by and large turns u

p on credibility of the contem nor, the assessm e n t of w hich lies within the province of the trial judge sitting as trier of f act. Mizell , 708 So. 2d at 64. ¶57. Here, the chancery court f ound that M cK i n n e y w i l l f u l l y chose n ot to abide by the
court’s child-support o rder because, based on McKinney ’s t estim ony , he had received advice
f rom his m other, f

inancial advisor, and attorney not to abide b y the court’s order. I f ind no

m anif est error in the chancery

court’s ruling. ¶58. W h ile this C ourt h as r ecognized that advice f rom counsel m ay constitute a f actor f or

2 3the trial court’s consideration in its determ ination as to whether the party willf ully ignored the order of the court, it has never h eld or suggested that i t constitutes a n autom a tic def ense. 10
S ee generally R.K. , 946 So. 2 d at 7 7 7

- 7 8 ( c h a n cellor acted within h er discretion but not holding f ather in c ontem

pt when he relied upon advice o f counsel in s topping child support
pay m ents); s ee also Mizell , 708 So. 2d at 64 (sam e). ¶59. As a m atter of practice and com m on sense, courts should b e w a r y o f s uch claim s. United States v. Rem ini , 967 F.2d 754, 758 (2d Cir. 1992), helps illustrate why

. ¶60. There, the Second C i r c u it rejected the claim by a def endant convicted of

crim inal

contem pt that a “good f

aith r eliance on a dvice of counsel i s a def e n se t o crim inal contem

pt.”
At t rial and on appeal, the def endant a r g u ed the Suprem e Court’s decision i n Cheek v. United States , 498 U .S. 1 92, 1 11 S. Ct. 604, 610–11, 112 L

. Ed. 2d 617 (1991), which held that a good f

aith m isunderstanding of the law is a d ef ense in a tax prosecution. R em ini , 967 F.2d at 757. T he Second Circuit f ound the def

endant’s reliance o n C

h e ek m isplaced. Id

. at 758. The Second Circuit noted that Cheek f irst reiterated the general r ule that “ignorance of the law or m i stake of law is no def e nse to crim inal prosecution[ , which] i s deeply rooted
in the Am erican legal sy stem .” Id

. (quoting Cheek, 4 98 U.S. at 199). But Cheek recognized

an exception to this rule in the tax prosecution bef ore it, due to the com

plexity of tax law and prolif eration o f tax s tatutes and regulations that s om etim es have m ade it dif f icult f o r average citizens to know and com prehend. I

d

. D isting uishing C

heek , the Second Circuit said:

10 That McKinney also relied on his m other’s a nd h is f i nancial advisor’s advice need not be s eriously entertained–except to say that it likely e xacerbated the chancellor’s reason f or rejecting McKinney ’s excuse. 2 4“There is nothing so com plex about the law of contem pt as to set it apart f

r om the rest of the crim inal law to which ‘ignorance is no def ense.’” Id

. ¶61. The Second Circuit also noted Uni t e d S t a t e s v. Ryan , 402 U.S. 530, 5 33, 91 S. Ct. 1580, 1582, 29 L. Ed. 2d 85 (1971), as an analogous exam p le in support o f its r easoning f or rejecting the def

endant’s claim

. Rem ini , 967 F.2d at 757-58. The Ryan Court said: [ W ]e have consistently h e l d t h a t the necessity f or expedition i n the adm inistration of t he crim i nal law justif ies putting o ne who s eeks to resist the production o f d e sired inf

o rm ation t o a c hoice between com pliance with a trial court’s order

. . . p rior t o review of tha t o r d e r , and with the c oncom itant possibility of a n adjudication of contem pt if his claim s are rejected on appeal. Ryan , 402 U.S. at 533. ¶62. The s ame p r i n c i p l e mu s t a pply in child-support m atters f or the reasons expressed above. Here, the chancery court’s new child-support order, entered on A pril 2 7, 2016, was
not uncertain or am

biguous, as was the support order at issue in McKnight v. Jenkins , 155 So. 3d 730 (Miss. 2013), cited to by the m ajority

. See Maj. Op. ¶ 47. Nor was McKinney incapable of

com ply ing w ith the c ourt’s o rder, as the record clearly illustrates. McKinney sim ply chose not to do so. ¶63. And this f

orced Ham

p to have to f

ile a m o tion f

o r contem p t on June 30, 2016. It w as
not until af

ter the f act that M c Kinney then sought and obtained a supersedeas bond under Mississippi Rules of A ppellate Procedure. 8(a), a pproved b y the chancery clerk on July 14, 2016, which, as the m ajority f i nds, was not a proper m easure. ¶64. That Mc K i n n e y c o n t i nued to abide by a previous support order is of no m om ent. McKinney becam e subject to t he c h a n cery court’s new support o rder, which the record

2 5illustrates he willf ully and deliberately

disregarded. ¶65. For these reasons, I would not contradict the chancery c ourt’s discretion on this issue. Finding no m anif

est error in t he chancery court’s contem pt r uling, I w ould af

f irm that ruling and the chancery

court’s award of

attorney ’ s f

ees. KING, J., JOINS THIS OPINION.

2 6