# C_2021108EN.01010301.xml

| 26.3.2021 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | C 108/103 |
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26.3.2021

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 108/103

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P8_TA(2019)0327

Emergency situation in Venezuela

European Parliament resolution of 28 March 2019 on the emergency situation in Venezuela (2019/2628(RSP))

(2021/C 108/09)

The European Parliament,

| — | having regard to its previous resolutions on Venezuela, in particular those of 3 May 2018 on the presidential elections in Venezuela (1), of 5 July 2018 on the migration crisis and humanitarian situation in Venezuela and at its terrestrial borders with Colombia and Brazil (2), and of 25 October 2018 (3) and 31 January 2019 on the situation in Venezuela (4), the latter of which recognises Juan Guaidó as the legitimate interim president of Venezuela, |
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having regard to its previous resolutions on Venezuela, in particular those of 3 May 2018 on the presidential elections in Venezuela (1), of 5 July 2018 on the migration crisis and humanitarian situation in Venezuela and at its terrestrial borders with Colombia and Brazil (2), and of 25 October 2018 (3) and 31 January 2019 on the situation in Venezuela (4), the latter of which recognises Juan Guaidó as the legitimate interim president of Venezuela,

| — | having regard to the declarations by the Vice-President of the Commission / High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy (VP/HR) on Venezuela of 10 January 2019, 26 January 2019 and 24 February 2019, and to the latest Council conclusions, |
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having regard to the declarations by the Vice-President of the Commission / High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy (VP/HR) on Venezuela of 10 January 2019, 26 January 2019 and 24 February 2019, and to the latest Council conclusions,

| — | having regard to the declaration of 20 April 2018 by the Organisation of American States (OAS) on the worsening humanitarian situation in Venezuela, and to the OAS member states’ joint statement on Venezuela of 24 January 2019, |
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having regard to the declaration of 20 April 2018 by the Organisation of American States (OAS) on the worsening humanitarian situation in Venezuela, and to the OAS member states’ joint statement on Venezuela of 24 January 2019,

| — | having regard to the statement of the Lima Group of 25 February 2019, |
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having regard to the statement of the Lima Group of 25 February 2019,

| — | having regard to the statements of the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights on Venezuela of 25 January 2019 and 20 March 2019, |
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having regard to the statements of the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights on Venezuela of 25 January 2019 and 20 March 2019,

| — | having regard to the Venezuelan Constitution, and in particular Article 233 thereof, |
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having regard to the Venezuelan Constitution, and in particular Article 233 thereof,

| — | having regard to the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (ICC), |
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having regard to the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (ICC),

| — | having regard to Rule 123(2) and (4) of its Rules of Procedure, |
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having regard to Rule 123(2) and (4) of its Rules of Procedure,

| A. | whereas Venezuela is facing a profound and unprecedented political, economic, institutional, social and multidimensional humanitarian crisis, shortages of medicines and food, a situation of massive human rights violations, hyperinflation, political oppression, corruption and violence; whereas living conditions have seriously deteriorated and 87 % of the population are now living in poverty; whereas 78 % of children in Venezuela are at risk of malnutrition; whereas 31 of every 1 000 children die before the age of 5; whereas more than 1 million children no longer attend school; |
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A.

whereas Venezuela is facing a profound and unprecedented political, economic, institutional, social and multidimensional humanitarian crisis, shortages of medicines and food, a situation of massive human rights violations, hyperinflation, political oppression, corruption and violence; whereas living conditions have seriously deteriorated and 87 % of the population are now living in poverty; whereas 78 % of children in Venezuela are at risk of malnutrition; whereas 31 of every 1 000 children die before the age of 5; whereas more than 1 million children no longer attend school;

| B. | whereas the EU remains convinced that a peaceful and democratic political solution is the only sustainable way out of the crisis; whereas any speculation about or strategy to initiate a military intervention in Venezuela would generate and escalate violence in the country and would have a disastrous effect on the region as a whole; |
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B.

whereas the EU remains convinced that a peaceful and democratic political solution is the only sustainable way out of the crisis; whereas any speculation about or strategy to initiate a military intervention in Venezuela would generate and escalate violence in the country and would have a disastrous effect on the region as a whole;

| C. | whereas the already limited food supplies in Venezuela are at risk of spoiling; whereas people are struggling to obtain water, food and medicine; whereas, according to the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) and the International Organisation for Migration (IOM), more than 2,7 million Venezuelans have left the country since 2015 and that number could rise to 5 million by the end of the year if the crisis continues to worsen; |
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C.

whereas the already limited food supplies in Venezuela are at risk of spoiling; whereas people are struggling to obtain water, food and medicine; whereas, according to the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) and the International Organisation for Migration (IOM), more than 2,7 million Venezuelans have left the country since 2015 and that number could rise to 5 million by the end of the year if the crisis continues to worsen;

| D. | whereas on 23 February 2019 the humanitarian aid stored in Colombia and Brazil was fiercely rejected and in some cases destroyed by Maduro’s illegal regime using military and paramilitary forces; whereas the repression resulted in several people being killed, dozens injured and hundreds arrested; whereas Venezuelan military operations, organised crime and terrorists represent a risk for the stability of the region, and in particular for the territory of neighbouring Colombia; |
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D.

whereas on 23 February 2019 the humanitarian aid stored in Colombia and Brazil was fiercely rejected and in some cases destroyed by Maduro’s illegal regime using military and paramilitary forces; whereas the repression resulted in several people being killed, dozens injured and hundreds arrested; whereas Venezuelan military operations, organised crime and terrorists represent a risk for the stability of the region, and in particular for the territory of neighbouring Colombia;

| E. | whereas in early March Venezuela suffered from a massive electricity outage for more than 100 hours, aggravating the already dramatic healthcare crisis, which saw hospitals run out of drinking water and their services collapse, and looting; whereas, according to the organisation Doctors for Health, at least 26 people died in hospitals due to the lack of electricity; whereas on 25 March 2019 another long-lasting blackout occurred, leaving Caracas and 20 other regions in the country in full darkness; |
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E.

whereas in early March Venezuela suffered from a massive electricity outage for more than 100 hours, aggravating the already dramatic healthcare crisis, which saw hospitals run out of drinking water and their services collapse, and looting; whereas, according to the organisation Doctors for Health, at least 26 people died in hospitals due to the lack of electricity; whereas on 25 March 2019 another long-lasting blackout occurred, leaving Caracas and 20 other regions in the country in full darkness;

| F. | whereas the outages have been happening for many years and are a direct consequence of mismanagement, lack of maintenance and corruption by the illegal Maduro regime; |
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F.

whereas the outages have been happening for many years and are a direct consequence of mismanagement, lack of maintenance and corruption by the illegal Maduro regime;

| G. | whereas in February 2019 a delegation of four Members of the European People’s Party (EPP) group officially invited by the National Assembly and interim president Juan Guaidó was expelled from the country; |
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G.

whereas in February 2019 a delegation of four Members of the European People’s Party (EPP) group officially invited by the National Assembly and interim president Juan Guaidó was expelled from the country;

| H. | whereas on 6 March 2019 the illegal Maduro regime ordered the German Ambassador to leave the country, accusing him of ‘recurrent acts of interference in internal affairs’; whereas some foreign and local journalists were also arrested, with their media equipment being confiscated, and expelled after their release; |
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H.

whereas on 6 March 2019 the illegal Maduro regime ordered the German Ambassador to leave the country, accusing him of ‘recurrent acts of interference in internal affairs’; whereas some foreign and local journalists were also arrested, with their media equipment being confiscated, and expelled after their release;

| I. | whereas Juan Guaidó appointed Ricardo Hausmann as the country’s representative to the Inter-American Development Bank (IDB) and the Inter-American Investment Corporation (IIC); |
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I.

whereas Juan Guaidó appointed Ricardo Hausmann as the country’s representative to the Inter-American Development Bank (IDB) and the Inter-American Investment Corporation (IIC);

| J. | whereas on 21 March 2019, Venezuela’s intelligence police detained Juan Guaidó’s chief of staff, Roberto Marrero, and forcefully entered the home of Sergio Vergara, member of the National Assembly for the State of Táchira, disregarding his parliamentary immunity; |
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J.

whereas on 21 March 2019, Venezuela’s intelligence police detained Juan Guaidó’s chief of staff, Roberto Marrero, and forcefully entered the home of Sergio Vergara, member of the National Assembly for the State of Táchira, disregarding his parliamentary immunity;

| K. | whereas on 23 March 2019, two aeroplanes belonging to the Russian Air Force arrived at Simón Bolívar International Airport, in Maiquetía, with military equipment and at least one hundred soldiers on board, and whereas this type of action has been repeated in recent months; |
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K.

whereas on 23 March 2019, two aeroplanes belonging to the Russian Air Force arrived at Simón Bolívar International Airport, in Maiquetía, with military equipment and at least one hundred soldiers on board, and whereas this type of action has been repeated in recent months;

| L. | whereas on 21 March 2019, a five-year jail sentence was handed down against the Venezuelan Judge Afiuni Mora on charges of ‘spiritual corruption’; whereas this judge had already served a long jail sentence in the past and was still under unfair house arrest; |
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L.

whereas on 21 March 2019, a five-year jail sentence was handed down against the Venezuelan Judge Afiuni Mora on charges of ‘spiritual corruption’; whereas this judge had already served a long jail sentence in the past and was still under unfair house arrest;

| M. | whereas it was reported on 15 March 2019 that Tomasz Surdel, the Venezuela correspondent for Polish newspaper Gazeta Wyborcza, had been violently assaulted, allegedly by the Special Action Forces of the Venezuelan National Police, while driving his car in Caracas; |
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M.

whereas it was reported on 15 March 2019 that Tomasz Surdel, the Venezuela correspondent for Polish newspaper Gazeta Wyborcza, had been violently assaulted, allegedly by the Special Action Forces of the Venezuelan National Police, while driving his car in Caracas;

| N. | whereas the Cuban police force and military intelligence service are the strategic element that allows Maduro’s illegal regime to persist; |
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N.

whereas the Cuban police force and military intelligence service are the strategic element that allows Maduro’s illegal regime to persist;

| 1. | Confirms its recognition of Juan Guaidó as the legitimate interim president of the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela, in accordance with Article 233 of the Venezuelan Constitution, and reiterates its full support for the National Assembly, the only legitimate democratic body of Venezuela; expresses its full support for Guaidó’s roadmap, namely on putting an end to usurpation, on the establishment of a national transitional government and on the holding of snap presidential elections; welcomes the fact that a significant share of the international community and the overwhelming majority of EU Member States have recognised Guaidó’s legitimacy, and calls for the remaining Member States to do so urgently; |
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1.

| 2. | Condemns the fierce repression and violence, which have resulted in killings and casualties; expresses its solidarity with the people of Venezuela and conveys its sincere condolences to their families and friends; |
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2.

| 3. | Reiterates its deep concerns at the severe emergency humanitarian situation, which is profoundly damaging the lives of Venezuelans; |
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3.

| 4. | Reiterates its call for the full recognition as ambassadors of the diplomatic representatives appointed by the legitimate interim president of the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela, Juan Guaidó, to the EU and its Member States; welcomes the acknowledgment by the Board of Governors of the Inter-American Development Bank (IDB) and the Inter-American Investment Corporation (IIC) of Ricardo Hausmann as Governor of Venezuela in those entities; regrets the suspension of the 2019 IDB Annual Meeting of the Board of Governors by its Chinese hosts; |
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4.

| 5. | Denounces the abuse of law enforcement and the brutal repression by security bodies, which have restrained the entry of humanitarian aid; condemns the use of irregular armed groups to attack and intimidate civilians and lawmakers who have mobilised to distribute assistance; supports the members of the Venezuelan military who have refused to repress the civilian population during this crisis and have deserted; recognises the work of the Colombian authorities in the protection and care of these soldiers loyal to the Venezuelan Constitution and people; |
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5.

| 6. | Strongly condemns the harassment, detention and expulsion of several journalists covering the situation in Venezuela; reiterates its previous calls to the illegal Maduro regime to immediately put an end to its repression of political leaders, journalists and members of the opposition, including Sakharov prize laureate Leopoldo López; calls for the immediate and unconditional release of all persons detained on the grounds that they are relatives of interim president Juan Guaidó or members of his team: |
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6.

| 7. | Condemns the raids by Maduro’s security services and the detention of interim president Juan Guaidó’s chief of staff, Roberto Marrero, as well as the recent forced entry into the house of National Assembly member Sergio Vergara; calls for Marrero’s immediate release; condemns the kidnapping of the National Assembly member Juan Requesens and calls for his immediate release; |
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7.

| 8. | Reiterates its position in favour of a peaceful solution for the country through free, transparent and credible presidential elections based on a fixed calendar, fair conditions for all actors, including a neutral National Electoral Council, transparency and the presence of credible international observers; |
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8.

| 9. | Praises the efforts undertaken by the Lima Group countries as a leading regional mechanism seeking a democratic solution to the crisis under the leadership of Juan Guaidó as legitimate interim president of Venezuela; |
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9.

| 10. | Draws attention to the increased migratory crisis across the entire region and recognises the efforts and solidarity shown by neighbouring countries, and asks the Commission to continue cooperating with these countries, not only by providing humanitarian assistance but also by providing more resources and through development policy; |
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10.

| 11. | Expresses deep concern at the presence of terrorist gangs and organised crime in Venezuela, its expansion and cross-border operation, especially towards Colombia, which puts at risk the stability of the whole region; |
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11.

| 12. | Calls for additional sanctions targeting illegitimate state authorities’ assets abroad and those individuals responsible for human rights breaches and repression; considers that the EU authorities must consequently restrict the movements of these individuals, as well as of their closest relatives, and freeze their assets and visas; |
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12.

| 13. | Takes note of the establishment of the International Contact Group, which must be prevented from being used by Maduro’s illegal regime as a strategy to delay the resolution of the crisis with the aim of staying in power; notes the lack of any tangible results delivered so far by the contact group, whose main purpose should be the creation of conditions that can lead to snap presidential elections and facilitate the delivery of humanitarian assistance to address the pressing needs of the Venezuelan population; asks the International Contact Group to collaborate with the Lima Group, as a leading regional actor; asks, in this framework, the EEAS, in collaboration with the European Parliament, to offer its expertise in the field of electoral assistance; |
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13.

| 14. | Calls on the Member States, the VP/HR and the countries of the region to explore the possibility of establishing an international donors’ conference with the aim of providing broad financial support for reconstruction and the transition to democracy; |
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14.

| 15. | Strongly supports the call by the UN Secretary-General for an independent and full investigation to be carried out into the reported casualties; recalls the EU’s commitment to effective multilateralism in the framework of the UN in order to avoid a humanitarian catastrophe with greater consequences; reiterates its full support for the ICC’s role in the fight against impunity and in bringing the perpetrators of violence and human rights violations to justice, and for the opening of an investigation following the preliminary examinations into crimes committed by the illegal Maduro regime, including some that amount to serious crimes against humanity; |
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15.

| 16. | Decries the influence of the Cuban regime in Venezuela, which, by using its agents, has contributed to destabilising democracy and increasing political repression against the Venezuelan democratic forces; points out that such intervention could have consequences for EU-Cuba relations, including for the Political Dialogue and Cooperation Agreement between the EU and Cuba; |
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16.

| 17. | Instructs its President to forward this resolution to the Council, the Commission, the Vice-President of the Commission / High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, the legitimate interim President of the Republic and National Assembly of the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela, the governments and parliaments of the Lima Group countries, the Euro-Latin American Parliamentary Assembly and the Secretary-General of the Organisation of American States. |
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17.

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(1)  Texts adopted, P8_TA(2018)0199.

(2)  Texts adopted, P8_TA(2018)0313.

(3)  Texts adopted, P8_TA(2018)0436.

(4)  Texts adopted, P8_TA(2019)0061.

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