Filed 12/22/ 23 In re J.J. CA2/5

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115( b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION FIVE

In re J. J.

, a Person Coming Under the Juvenile Court L aw. B328838 (Los Angeles County Super. Ct. No. 20CCJP06178A )

LOS ANGELES COUNTY DEPARTMENT OF CHILDREN AND FAMILY SERVICES,

Plaintiff and Respondent,

v.

A.J

.,
Defendant and Appellant.

APPEAL from an order of the Super ior Court of Los Angeles County, Stephen C. Marpet, Commissioner

. Conditionally affirmed with directions

.2 Konrad S. Lee, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant. Dawyn R. Harrison, County Counsel, Kim Nemoy,
Assistant Count y Counsel, and Avedis Koutoujian, Deputy County Counsel, for Plaintiff and Respondent.

_________________________________________ A.J. (f ather ) appeals from the juvenile court’s order terminating parental rights o ver his son , J.J., under Welfare and

Institu tions Code 1 section 366.26. Father contends it was error to deny him the right to present evidence at the section 366.26 hearing. He further contends the court erroneously failed to ensure compliance with the inquiry provisions of the Indian Child
Welfare Act of 1978 (ICWA; 25 U.S.C. § 1901 et seq.) and related California statutes (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 224 et seq.). We conditionally affirm and remand the matter solely for the court to ensure compliance with ICWA and related California

statutes.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
1. Initial P roceedings and Reunification Period In October 2020, t he Los Angeles County Department of Children and Family Services (Department) received a referral from a reporting party with safety concerns for J.J., a one

- week

old baby, due to mother’s mental health issues and excessive

1 All further statutory references are to the Welfare and Institutions Code unless otherwise specified.3

discipline history with J.J.’s 13

- year

- old half

- sibling

. 2 The half

sibling had already been removed from mother in Ohio on suspicion of excessive physical discipline and child trafficking.
There was also a history of domestic violence b y father a gainst

mo ther. There were two active protective orders protecting
mother from father until August 2022, and March 2030, respectively. In November 2020, J.J. was detained pursuant to a protective custody warra nt and the Department filed a petition under section 300 alleging risk of serious physical harm to J.J. During the jurisdiction and disposition hearing in December 2020, the juvenile court sustained the allegatio ns, declared J.J. a dependent, removed him f rom parents’ custody, and ordered family reunification services and monitored visitation for each parent. By March 2021, J.J. was placed with his paternal grandmother ( PGM ) . At the six

- month review hearing in June 2021, t he court found father to be in su bstantial compliance with
the reunification order and ordered continued family
reunification services , allowing father unmonitored visits with
J.J.
On November 14, 2021, during an unmonitored vi sit with J.J., father called the police complaining mother w as intoxicated and banging on his door demanding to see J.J. F ather was arrested on suspicion of domestic violence and J.J. was returned
to P G M. Charge s were later dismissed but f ather was subsequently arrested on a probation violation instead . In May

2 Mother is not a party to the c urrent appeal.4

2022 , father was sentenced to four years in prison with a

p otential release within 8 to 18 months

. At the combined 12 and
18

- month review hearing in June 2022, the juvenile court followed the Department’s recommendation by terminat ing family reunification serv ices and set the matter for a section 366.26 hearing.

2. Permanency P lanning According to t he Department’s November 29, 2021 service log , aware of the domestic violence incident two weeks prior

, PGM 3 stated she wa s “ willing to provide permanency for [J.J.] whether it is to adopt him or to be his legal guardian

. ” The Department reported as such in its December 16, 2021 Status Review Report for the 12

- month review hearing. Thereafter,
d uring a December 22, 2021 home visit, when a social worker
discussed J.J.’s need for stability whether with father or PGM,
PGM stated she wa s willing to adopt J.J. to keep him safe from
mother and father.
Then

, during a home visit on April 12, 2022, PGM stated although she wa s “open to adoption,” she preferred legal guardianship because father d id not want her to adopt. During a home visit on May 16, 2022

, however, PGM reiterated her willingness to adopt J.J. “to ensure that he is [safe] and not around his [parents’] drama.” She explained that her intentions

we re not to keep J.J. from his parents, but to ensure J.J. wa s

3 The service log indicates contact with “MGM” or the maternal grandmother, then changes mid

- paragraph to “PGM” or the paternal grandmother. J.J. began living with PGM in March 2021, thus, “MGM” appears to be a typographical error.5

raised in a safe and health y environment. She further explained
that although she ha d no doubt J.J.’s parents love d him, they did not make the best decisions regarding J.J. Accordingly, t he Department reported in i ts May 23, 2022 Status Review Report
that PGM “desires to provide permanency for [J.J.] through adoption should the parents be unable to reunify with him” and that “[s]he wants to raise [J.J.] in a safe and loving home environment, where he is not exposed to abusive behaviors.” On June 10, 2022, the juvenile court set a section 366.26 hearing for October 5, 2022 “to address the best permanent plan for the child with the court identifying adoption” and ordered the Department to initiate an adoptive home stu dy. In a J uly 14, 2022 Concurrent Planning Assessment , PGM acknowledged she was aware of the full legal responsibility of adoption; that family reunification takes precedence, but if reunification fails, adoption is the preferred alternative plan ; and that she wa s interested in adopting J.J. if reunification with his parents wa s not possible.
In its September 20, 2022 A ddendum R eport
, the Department requested a continuance of the October 5, 2022 section 366.26 hearing because there were pending reference

c hecks and PGM needed more time to provide documents related to her previous marriages necessary to adopt J.J. The Department also informed the court that PGM appeared to understand the responsibilities inherent with being an adoptive parent and that she wa s “committed to providing [J.J.] with a stable and loving family environment through adoption.” This

status was unchanged in the Department’s Status Review Report
and the 366.26 WIC Report

, both filed on September 26, 2022. During the section 366.26 heari ng o n October 5, 2022, J.J.’s
counsel stated PGM previously indicated to counsel an interest in6

legal guardianship, yet the Department’s report stated PGM is interested in adoption. J.J.’s counsel requested the Department
address this seeming conflict in t heir next report. No contested hearing was requested by mother or father, but the court suggested and ordered the Department to notice PGM to appear
at the continued section 366.26 hearing on January 3, 2023 “so
that she can express what her desire is.”
T hereafter, i n a December 14, 2022 medical evaluation

report 4 for J.J., the clinician reported PGM “does plan to adopt [J.J.]; however, there have been no updates regarding court
dates.” On January 3, 2023, t he Department filed a Last Minute Information (LM I) request ing a continuance to determine if PGM is able to provide the aforementioned documents and to “determine if she is fully invested in pursuing the permanent plan of adoption for [J.J.].” The hearing was continued to April 26, 2023

. On April 12, 20 23, the Department filed a n LMI apprising
the court that it received t he references they were waiting for and
that PGM submitted the documents necessary for adoption. The Department confirmed PGM wa s still interested in adopting J.J. The Status Review Repo rt for the April 26, 2023 hearing reflect ed
the same.

3. Section 366.26 H earing The section 366.26 hearing was held on April 26, 2023.
Father ’s counsel stated during the hearing :

4 The m edical report was attached to the Status Review Report for the April 26, 2023 section 366.26 hearing.7 “ I did discuss the recommendation with the father this morning via telephon e. I discussed with him previously. However, it was supposed to be a legal guardianship rec. The caretaker had been going back and forth for sometime. And if you look at prior notes from, I believe, January, my notes it does state you
ordered the caretaker to come back previously because they weren’t sure whether it was going to be legal guardianship or adoption. The father

-- I spoke to him this morning, he believes that the wishes of the paternal grandmother/caretaker, that he’s very close to, is legal gu ardianship and she’s being pressured by the social worker. And he speaks to [J.J.], his son, on a weekly basis. He used to have unmonitored visits before the arrest. He is asking to set it for contest. And LMI on his weekly phone
contact with his son and a lso the wishes of paternal grandmother/caretaker. ”

The court turned to J.J. ’s counsel for a response as it was
J.J.’s counsel who , on October 5, 2022, originally requested
clarification on whether PGM was interested in legal guardianship or adoption. J .J.’s c ounsel replied:

“ I spoke with the caretaker yesterday. She was still on board with the plan of adoption. In fact, she thought the adoption was happening today based on
her conversation with the social worker. I haven’t spoken to her about legal gua rdianship as an alternative, at this point, because the plan was8 always adoption. I don’t have an objection to

– I do understand that [J.J.] has a relationship with his
father

. T hey talk every single week. So I don’t have an objection to discussing the id ea of legal guardianship. That was not the plan she was on board with as of today. ”

The court responded, “well, it’s not a matter of on board. She’s ready, willing and able to adopt. There’s no real legal basis to continue this matter over, as she indi cates, she’s ready to adopt.” Father’s counsel then changed her approach and attempted to argue the parent al benefit exception based on the father’s regular contact

. 5 The court stated based on the facts of this case, the parental benefit exception would no t apply either.
Thereafter

, the court found by clear and convincing evidence that J.J. was adoptable and terminated parental rights.

4. Facts R elated to ICWA The Department’s Detention Report indicated mother and father denied having any Indian ancestry. Mo ther and father also denied any Indian ancestry on their Parental Notification of
Indican Status form (ICWA

- 020)

. During the detention hearing on November 24, 2020, b ased on the ICWA

- 020 forms, the court found ICWA inapplicable. A December 17, 2020 jurisd iction/disposition report stated mother and father again denied having any Indian ancestry. T he

5 O n appeal, appellant raised an issue only as to the relative adoption exception u nder section 366.26(c)(1)(A), and not as to the parental benefit excep tion under section 366.26(c)(1)(B).9

October 5, 2022 366.26 WIC Report, however, indicated PGM told the dependency investigator that there was Native American ancestry in her family but she did not know which tribe. The investigator did not ask PGM for contact information of other relatives who might have more information. The same report
indicate d m other also stated that she is Native American, but declined to name a tribe or provide relative infor mation. The investigator noted in the report that she left a voicemail for paternal aunt and sent ICWA notices to the Bureau of Indian Affairs (BIA) and Secretary of Interior. These notices are absent in the record, however. In December 2022, mother again indicated she had Indian ancestry in her section 388 petition.
There is no evidence in the record that Department employees made any attempt to contact available maternal or paternal relatives, other than PGM

, to ask whether J.J. had any Indian ancestry.

DISCUSSION
Father asserts the juvenile court violated his due process rights when it refused to set a contested hearing to prove the application of the relative caregiver exception. Father also

asserts , and the Department concedes, the ICWA procedure w as not followed

. 1. Father’s D ue P rocess C laim
Father contends his due process right s were violated when
the court terminat ed his parental rights without permitting a contested evidentiary hearing on the applicability of the relative caregiver exception und er section 366.26, subdivision (c)(1)(A). We disagree.10 A. Standard of R eview We review the denial of a contested hearing by the trial court for abuse of discretion. ( In re A.G. (2020) 58 Cal.App.5th 973, 1003 (

A.G. ) ; In re Grace P. (2017) 8 Cal.App. 5th 605, 611 ( Grace P .) Under that standard , the decision of the trial court is given a high degree of deference unless it was arbitrary, capricious, patently absurd , or exceeds the bounds of reason . ( In

re Stephanie M. (1994) 7 Cal.4th 295, 318

- 319 ; In re Earl L. (2004) 121 C al .App. 4th 1050, 1053. ) “[W]hen two or more inferences can be reasonably deduced f ro m the facts, we may not substitute our decision for the juvenile court’s decision.” ( In re
Josiah S. (2002) 102 Cal.App.4th 403, 419.)
B. R elative C aregiver E xcept ion At a section 366.26 hearing, the juvenile court selects and implements a permanent plan for the dependent child , i.e., adoption, legal guardianship, or long

- term foster care . ( § 366.26, subd. (b); In re Noah G. (2016) 247 Cal.App. 4th 1292, 1299 .) The

p referred plan is adoption. ( In re Breanna S. (2017) 8 Cal.App. 5th 636, 645.) “Because a section 366.26 hearing occurs only after the court has repeatedly found the parent unable to meet the child’s needs, it is only in an extraordinary case that preservati on of the parent’s rights will prevail over the Legislature’s preference for adoptive placement.” ( In re Jasmine D . (2000) 78 Cal.App. 4th 1339, 1350.) O nce the juvenile court determines by clear and convincing evidence “that it is likely the child will be adopted, the court shall terminate parental rights and order the child placed for adoption,” unless a statutory exception applies. (§ 366.26, subd. (c)(1).) Father does not dispute the juvenile court’s finding s of adoptability or inapplicability of excepti ons to termination of parental rights . Father claims the juvenile court denied his due11

process rights by refusing to permit a contested hearing on whether the relative caregiver exception applies. It is the parent’s burden to prove a statutory exception

a pplies. ( In re Tamika T . (2002) 97 Cal.App.4 t h 1114, 1119

- 1120.) To meet the burden of proving the relative caregiver exception, the parent must show (1) “a circumstance exists which makes the
relative unable or unwilling to adopt,” (2) “the relative’s ina bility or unwillingness is not due to a refusal to accept legal or financial responsibility,” (3) “the relative is willing and capable of providing the child with a stable and permanent environment through legal guardianship, and” (4) “removing the child f rom the relative’s custody would be detrimental to the child’s emotional
well

- being.” ( § 366.26, subd. (c)(1) ; In re K.H. (2011) 201 Cal.App.4 th 406, 416 .)

C. Due P rocess and O ffer of P roof A parent has a due process right to present evidence at a
section 36 6.26 hearing. This due process right “includes a meaningful opportunity to be heard, present evidence, and
confront witnesses. However, these procedural rights are subject

to evidentiary principles. Due process is ‘a flexible concept dependent on the circu mstance.’ ( In re Tamika T. (2002) 97 Cal.App. 4th 1114, 1122.) Since due process does not authorize a parent ‘to introduce irrelevant evidence, due process does not require a court to hold a contested hearing if it is not convinced
th e parent will present r elevant evidence on the issue he or she seeks to contest.’ ( Ibid. ) ‘The trial court can therefore exercise its power to request an offer of proof to clearly identify the contested issue(s) so it can determine whether a parent’s representation is
sufficient to warrant a hearing involving presentation of evidence12

and confrontation of witnesses.’ ( Ibid. ) The parent’s offer of proof must be specific, setting forth the actual evidence to be produced, not merely the facts or issues to be addressed and argued.’ ( I d

. a t p. 1124.)” (In re Grace P

., supra , 8 Cal.App. 5th at p. 612; see also
In re Jeanette V

. (1998) 68 Cal.App. 4th 811, 816

- 817 .) The parent must have “relevant evidence of significant value to the issue before the court.” ( In re Tamika T.

, supra , 97 Cal.A pp.4th at

p. 1122.)
Unlike a criminal defendant

, a parent in a dependency proceeding does not have a right ‘to full confrontation and cross

examination’ under the Sixth Amendment of the federal Constitution or article I, section 15 of the California Consti tution. [Citations.]” ( In re Daniela G . (2018) 23 Cal.Ap p .5th 1083, 1092 ; Maricela C. v. Superior Court (1998) 66 Cal.App. 4th 1138, 1146

- 1147 (in dependency proceedings, a parent’s due process rights do not necessarily include the opportunity for full conf rontation and

cross

- examination].) “[T]he state’s strong interest in prompt and efficient trials permits the nonarbitrary exclusion of evidence [citation], such as when the presentation of the evidence will ‘necessitate undue consumption of time.’ (Evid. C ode, § 352.)” ( I bi d. )

D. D enial of a C ontested H earing W as N ot an A buse of
D iscretion Father contends his offer of proof was sufficient to trigger a contested hearing to establish the relative caretaker exception. He argues Grace P

. , supra , 8 Cal.App.5th 605

, and A.G.

, supra , 58 Cal.App.5th 973, are directly on point and it was abuse of discretion for the juvenile court to deny him the opportunity to question PGM on the record regarding her true feelings about13

adoption and whether the Department pressured her into accepting adoption over legal guardianship. Father also argues on appeal that he implicitly requested cross

- examin ation of the preparer of the reports to ascertain how, when

, and why PGM changed her position on legal guardianship.
In Grace P

. , fathe r offered to testify about detailed and specific evidence related to the quality of his visitation and parenting of his children during his visits. ( In re Grace P.

, supra , 8 Cal.App.5th at p. 614.) He also offered testimony by one of his
children on how sh e enjoyed visits by her father and how she
would feel if the visits were terminated . ( Ibid. ) This evidence was
offered to prove the child’s “benefit from continuing the relationship” and the detrimental impact on the child should the
visits terminate , the second prong of the parental benefits exception under section 366.26, subd. (c)(1)(B)(i). ( Ibid. ) In reversing the trial court’s rejection of this offer of proof, the Grace
P. court reasoned that father’s offer of proof “was consequential to and probative of the issue of his relationship with the children and the detriment they would suffer by its severance.” ( Ibid. )
I n A.G.

, mother identified nine potential witnesses to testify about regular contact with her children and the nature and quality of the paren tal relationship. ( In re A .G.

, supra , 58 Cal.App.5th at pp. 990, 1007 .) In rejecting the trial court’s finding that the offer of proof lacked specificity, the A.G. court reasoned that although the offered testimonies arguably lacked specificity,
there were other materials that demonstrated sufficient specificity . ( Ibid. ) Moreover, “the offer of proof was “plainly relevant to the two components of the parental relationship exception.” ( Ibid. ) The A.G. court then cautioned

, in the parental benefit exception c ontext where a parent addressed regular14

visitation and the existence of a beneficial parent

- child relationship, trial courts should be more lenient on reviewing legal sufficiency of the parent’s offer of proof. ( Id. at p. 1009.) In contrast, here, f

ather’s offer of proof in the relative caregiver exception context is devoid of the level of specificity and
relevance shown in Grace P. and A.G

. Critically , father fails to identify the witnesses he would call to testify and the content of
their testimonies. Fat her’s counsel stated during the section 366.26 hearing, “The father

– I spoke to him this morning, he believes that the wishes of the paternal grandmother/caretaker, that he’s very close to, is legal guardianship and she ’ s being pressured by the social wor ker. ” While father argues on appeal that he proposed to call PGM and implicitly the preparer of the
report during the hearing

, he made no such request on the juvenile court

. In fact , father d id not mention any specific witness or the substance of any testi mony during his proffer

. The court could reasonably infer that father was offering himself as a witness to testify to his own belief that PGM was being pressured by the Department to adopt when she preferred legal guardian ship

. In his opening brief, father states multiple times his offer of proof was based on direct conversations with PGM. Notably, t his is not supported by the record either

. T he
fou ndation offered at the hearing for father’s beliefs were based purely o n his perception that he had a close re lationship with
PGM. Such an offer of proof is speculative at best and does not identify relevant, admissible evidence

. Moreover , father’s counsel made unsupported statements to
the juvenile court as a basis for requesting a contested hearing.
Counsel sta ted, “[t]he caretaker had been going back and forth
for sometime. And if you look at prior notes from, I believe,15

January, my notes it does state you ordered the caretaker to come back previously because they weren’t sure whether it was going to be legal g uardianship or adoption.” On the contrary, the record reveals once PGM decided she was willing to adopt, she maintained that position throughout. The only hesitation was when PGM expressed preference for legal guardianship because
father did not want her t o adopt. She never expressed an unwillingness to adopt, however. Based on the record, it appears counsel’s perception that PGM was indecisive was due to J.J.’s
counsel making a request on October 5, 2022 for a follow

- up by the Department to clarify whether PGM wanted legal guardianship or adoption. This is why the juvenile court turned to J.J.’s counsel for a response d uring the section 366.26 hearing

, at which time, J

. J

. ’s counsel confirmed that she “spoke with the caretaker yesterday. She was still on boa rd with the plan of adoption. In fact, she thought the adoption was happening today
based on her conversation with the social worker. I haven’t spoken to her about legal guardianship as an alternative, at this point, because the plan was always adoption.” The uncertainty expressed by J.J.’s counsel was the basis for father’s offer of proof. That uncertain t y proved to be inaccurate, leaving the offer of proof hollow. Even if the offer of proof was that PGM told father her wish or preference was legal guardia nship and she would testify accordingly, it wa s not arbitrary or capricious for the juvenile court to have concluded that such testimony was inadequate. The court could reasonably conclude that such testimony would only be peripheral to the issue of wheth er PGM was unwilling to adopt despite her preference, and thus, would not rebut J.J.’s adoptability

. ( S ee In re Tamika T.

, supra , 97 Cal.App. 4th at pp

.16

1118

- 1119 (affirm ing juvenile court’s denial of contested hearing because mother made no showing rebutti ng minor ’ s adoptability).) Given the statutory preference for adoption and
the record supporting PGM’s consistent willingness to adopt, whether PGM wished or preferred legal guardianship would not have been “plainly relevant” or “probative of the issue” of her willingness to adopt. Indeed, when J.J.’s counsel offered to discuss legal guardianship even though PGM was “on board” with adoption, the court stated, “It’s not a matter of on board. She’s ready, willing and able to adopt. There’s no legal basis to

c ontinue this matter over, as she indicates, she’s ready to adopt.”
T he inadequate offer of proof, coupled with extensive evidence in the record showing PGM’s consistent willingness to adopt, demonstrates that it was not an abuse of discretion for the juv enile court to deny father’s request for a contested hearing on the application of the relative caretaker exception.

2. ICWA “Congress enacted ICWA in 1978 in response to ‘rising
concern in the mid

- 1970’s over the consequences to Indian children, Indian fami lies, and Indian tribes of abusive child welfare practices that resulted in the separation of large numbers of Indian children from their families and tribes through adoption or foster care placement, usually in non

- Indian homes.’” ( In re Isaiah W. (2016) 1 Cal.5th 1, 7.) Both ICWA and California
law define an “‘Indian child’” as a child who is either a member of an Indian tribe or is eligible for membership in an Indian tribe and is the biological child of a member of an Indian tribe. (25 U.S.C. § 1903(4) ; § 224.1, subds. (a) & (b); see In re
Elizabeth M. (2018) 19 Cal.App.5th 768, 783.)17 California statutory law incorporates the requirements of ICWA and imposes some additional requirements. ( In re Abbigail
A. (2016) 1 Cal.5th 83, 91; In re Benjamin M. (20 21)
70 Cal.App.5th 735, 741

– 742.) State and federal law require the court to ask parties and participants at the outset of an involuntary child custody proceeding whether they have reason to know a minor is an Indian child, and to “instruct the parties to inform the court if they subsequently receive information that provides reason to know the child is an Indian child.” (25 C.F.R. § 23.107(a); § 224.2, subd. (c); see Benjamin M. , at p. 741.) Initial inquiry also includes requiring each party to complete th e parental notification of Indian status (ICWA

- 020) form. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 5.481(a)(2)(C).) State law imposes on the Department a first

- step inquiry duty to “interview, among others, extended family members and
others who had an interest in the child.” ( In re H.V. (2022)
75 Cal.App.5th 433, 438; see § 224.2, subd. (b).) Federal regulations explain that the term “extended family member is defined by the law or custom of the Indian child’s Tribe or, in the absence of such law or custom, is a person who has reached

age 18 and who is the Indian child’s grandparent, aunt or uncle, brother or sister, brother

- in

- law or sister

- in

- law, niece or nephew, first or second cousin, or stepparent.” (25 C.F.R. § 23.2 (2017).)
When there is “reason to believe that an Indian child is involved in a proceeding,” further inquiry is also required. (§ 224.2,
subd. (e); In re T.G. (2020) 58 Cal.App.5th 275, 290, fn. 14.) “We review claims of inadequate inquiry into a child’s Indian ancestry for substantial evidence.” ( In r e H.V. , at p. 438.) The Department concedes on appeal that the further inquiry requirements of ICWA and related state law were not18

met in this case and asks us to either conditionally affirm o r reverse the juvenile court’s order terminating parental rig hts, with instructions limiting remand of the matter to ordering the juvenile court to ensure compliance with ICWA’s requirements. We agree that the juvenile court erred in finding ICWA inapplicable . T he record shows mother and PGM claimed Indian ancestry after the court’s November 24, 2020 finding , yet the

court proceeded in the absence of any evidence that the Department asked available extended family members about the possibility that minor has Indian ancestry. (See, e.g., In re H.V.

, supra , 75 Cal.App .5th at p. 438 [prejudicial error when Department fails to discharge its first step duty of inquiry]; In re Benjamin M.

, supra , 70 Cal.App.5th at p. 741 [court must ask each participant in child custody proceeding].)

DISPOSITION The juvenile court’s Apr il 26, 2023 order terminating parental rights under Welfare and Institutions Code section 366.26 is conditionally affirmed with directions. The juvenile
court is directed to ensure that additional inquiry under section 224.2, subdivision ( e ) is made with a vailable paternal and
maternal relatives , as the court in the first instance deems appropriate, and that any necessary notice be made

. Thereafter,
i f the court determines that no further inquiry under section 224.2, subdivision (e), or notice to tribes und er section 224.3 is necessary, the n the jurisdiction and disposition orders shall
remain in place. If the court determines the Department’s investigation was adequate and there is a reason to know the
child is an Indian child as that term is defined under ICWA, then the jurisdiction and disposition orders are reversed and the19

Department shall provide adequate I C WA notice to the tribe or tribes, mother, father, and the regional Bureau of Indian Affairs and shall proceed thereafter in compliance with ICWA and
related California statutes.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED

LEE , J. 

W E CONCUR :

MOOR , Acting P. J. KIM , J.

 Judge of the San Bernardino Superior Court, assigned by the Chief Justice pursuant to article VI, section 6 of the California Constitution.