J-S60026-14

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

PENNSYLVANIA

Appellee

v.

KRISTI L. NEVEL

Appellant No. 90 MDA 2014

Appeal from the Order dated December 16, 2013

In the Court of Common Pleas of Montour/Columbia Counties

Montour County Criminal Division at No: CP-47-SA-0000003-2013

BEFORE: OTT, STABILE, and JENKINS, JJ.

MEMORANDUM BY STABILE, J.: FILED DECEMBER 04, 2014

Appellant, Kristi L. Nevel, appeals from the December 16, 2013 order 

entered on January 9, 2014 in the Court of Common Pleas of Montour 

County dismissing Appellant’s summary appeal and finding her guilty of 

disorderly conduct.1 Following review of Appellant’s sufficiency of evidence 

challenge, we affirm.

On September 23, 2013, Appellant was cited for disorderly conduct 

under 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 5503, which provides, in relevant part: “A person is 

guilty of disorderly conduct if, with intent to cause public inconvenience, 

annoyance or alarm, or recklessly creating a risk thereof, [s]he: . . . (4) 

creates a hazardous or physically offensive condition by any act which 

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1 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 5503(a)(4).
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serves no legitimate purpose of the actor.” 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 5503(a)(4). For 

purposes of § 5503, “the word ‘public’ means affecting or likely to affect 

persons in a place to which the public or a substantial group has access; 

among the places included are highways, . . . any neighborhood, or any 

premises which are open to the public. 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 5503(c).

Appellant filed a notice of summary appeal and a hearing was 

conducted on December 16, 2013. The prosecution’s sole witness was 

Corporal Chad Thomas, the citing officer. Appellant testified on her own 

behalf. No other witnesses testified. The trial judge summarized the 

evidence and announced his credibility determinations as follows:

At the hearing on December 16, 2013, the Commonwealth called 

Cpl. Chad Thomas, the citing officer. Cpl. Thomas testified that, 

on September 23, 2013, he was dispatched to 1333 Bloom Road 

in Mahoning Township, Montour County, PA. There was a report 

of two (2) people arguing loudly outside in the driveway of the 

home. The argument was regarding a property dispute following 

the separation of [Appellant] and her estranged husband. It was 

[Appellant] who initiated the call to the Police Department. Cpl. 

Thomas testified that, when he arrived on scene, he advised the 

parties that he would not intervene in a civil domestic dispute 

over property, but that, if there was a confrontation that 

escalated, then both parties would probably be arrested. That 

conversation occurred prior to 8:00 a.m.

After the first dispatch, Cpl. Thomas was dispatched again 

regarding a “loud argument.” When he arrived, both parties 

were located in the driveway outside the residence and he was 

able to see that they were “still verbally battling back and forth . 

. . .” When Cpl. Thomas arrived after the second dispatch, he 

could hear the parties arguing and the volume was loud enough 

to wake the neighbors and for them to call 911. The neighbors 

were the parties who called the second time. Cpl. Thomas 

testified that he “heard them yelling back and forth at each other 

. . . .”, but could not tell verbatim what was being said.
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After the Commonwealth rested, [Appellant] was called to 

testify. She contradicted Cpl. Thomas and testified that, when 

Cpl. Thomas arrived after his second dispatch, she was not 

located in the driveway as Cpl. Thomas had recollected. Rather, 

[Appellant] testified that she was in her kitchen.

The testimony of Cpl. Thomas is hereby accepted as credible, 

including his testimony that there was a very loud volume in the 

driveway, and that both [Appellant] and her estranged husband 

were engaging in the loud argument, which was loud enough to 

disturb the neighbors at an early morning hour.

Trial Court Opinion (“T.C.O.”), 5/13/14, at 1-2 (references to Notes of 

Testimony omitted).

Appellant filed a timely notice of appeal and presents one issue for this 

Court’s consideration:

The trial court erred as a matter of law and/or abused its 

discretion in finding [Appellant] guilty of disorderly conduct, 

18 Pa.C.S.A. § 5503(a)(4), as the facts of the case, even 

interpreted in the best light to the Commonwealth, do not 

amount to a physically offensive or hazardous condition nor 

did this amount to a public inconvenience.

Appellant’s Brief at 4.2

This Court has explained the applicable standard of review as follows:

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2

“In order to preserve a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence on 

appeal, an appellant's Rule 1925(b) statement must state with specificity the 

element or elements upon which the appellant alleges that the evidence was 

insufficient.” Commonwealth v. Garland, 63 A.3d 339, 344 (Pa. Super. 

2013). Appellant complied with that directive, stating in her 1925(b) 

statement that the Commonwealth failed to “produce[] sufficient evidence 

that [Appellant] created [a] hazardous or physically offensive condition” and 

“never provided evidence that the alleged crime occurred with intent to 

cause public inconvenience.” Appellant’s 1925(b) Statement of Matters 

Complained of on Appeal, 1/29/14, at ¶¶ 2, 3. Appellant presents those 

same two claims of insufficiency in the brief filed with this Court. 
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“The standard we apply in reviewing the sufficiency of the 

evidence is whether viewing all the evidence admitted at trial in 

the light most favorable to the verdict winner, there is sufficient 

evidence to enable the fact-finder to find every element of the 

crime beyond a reasonable doubt.” Commonwealth v. 

O’Brien, 939 A.2d 912, 913 (Pa. Super. 2007). “Any doubts 

concerning an appellant’s guilt are to be resolved by the trier of 

fact unless the evidence was so weak and inconclusive that no 

probability of fact could be drawn therefrom.” Commonwealth 

v. West, 937 A.2d 516, 523 (Pa. Super. 2007). “The trier of 

fact while passing upon credibility of witnesses . . . is free to 

believe all, part or none of the evidence.” Commonwealth v. 

DiStefano, 782 A.2d 574, 582 (Pa. Super. 2001) (internal 

citations omitted). 

Commonwealth v. Garland, 63 A.3d 339, 344-45 (Pa. Super. 2013). 

“[W]e may not weigh the evidence and substitute our judgment for the factfinder. In addition, we note that the facts and circumstances established by 

the Commonwealth need not preclude every possibility of innocence.” 

Commonwealth v. O’Brien, 939 A.2d 912, 913-14 (Pa. Super. 2007) 

(quoting Commonwealth v. DiStefano, 782 A.2d 574, 582 (Pa. Super. 

2001) (additional citations omitted)). 

Appellant contends the evidence does not support a finding that her 

actions created a physically offensive or hazardous condition, citing 

Commonwealth v. Williams, 574 A.2d 1161 (Pa. Super. 1990). 

Appellant’s Brief at 9. In Williams, this Court first considered whether 

Williams’ conduct created a hazardous condition and explained that a 

“hazardous condition” is “a condition that involves danger or risk.” Id. at 

1164. The Court determined that Williams’ action, walking in an apartment 
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building parking lot in his underwear and entering a car belonging to a 

tenant, did not create a hazardous condition. 

This Court then considered whether Williams’ conduct created a 

physically offensive condition, explaining that a “physically offensive 

condition . . . encompasses direct assaults on the physical senses of the 

members of the public.” Id. The Court determined Williams did not directly 

assault the public’s physical senses by entering another person’s car while 

wearing only underwear. Id. at 1165. The Court offered examples of 

conduct sufficient to assault physical senses, including setting off a stink 

bomb, strewing rotting garbage in public places or shining blinding lights in 

the eyes of others. Id. at 1164. The senses offended in those examples are 

smell and sight. Offending the sense of hearing by subjecting others in the 

neighborhood to acrimonious verbal battling that prompted a neighbor to call 

911 is no less offensive to the senses. Such conduct is readily distinguished 

from entering another person’s car wearing only underwear and is 

comparable to subjecting others to the smell of a stink bomb or rotting 

garbage or shining a bright light in someone’s eyes. We conclude that the 

evidence is sufficient to find that Appellant’s actions created a “physically 

offensive condition.” 

Corporal Thomas explained that Appellant and her estranged husband 

were in the driveway, “still verbally battling back and forth,” when he arrived 

at the scene the second time, arguing in a volume “loud enough to wake the 
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neighbors for them to call 911.” N.T., 12/16/13, at 4-5. As the trial court 

noted, “[W]hen a police officer is called for a second (first time by 

[Appellant]; the second time by neighbors) at or around 8:00 a.m. during a 

highly charged altercation between participants in a domestic dispute and 

divorce, the same can (and did) pose a risk of being hazardous.” T.C.O., 

5/13/14, at 3. “The fact was that this was the second dispatch to which the 

police had to respond within an approximate 20 minute period, and that the 

dispute was acrimonious enough to warrant the neighbors to call police the 

second time.” Id. Although the trial court refers to the conduct as posing a 

risk of being hazardous, we do not find it necessary to consider the risk of 

becoming hazardous when we have already concluded Appellant’s actions 

were physically offensive, satisfying that element of the crime of disorderly 

conduct. 

Appellant also asserts that her actions did not amount to a public 

inconvenience and suggests this Court’s decision in Commonwealth v. 

Beattie, 601 A.2d 297 (Pa. Super. 1991), is instructive. Appellant’s Brief at 

14. Appellant’s reliance on Beattie is misplaced. Beattie was arrested and

charged with disorderly conduct for his conduct with officers who arrived at 

his home in response to a “vague radio dispatch apparently occasioned by a 

telephone complaint about some men and an unlicensed car at Beattie's 

address.” Id. at 299. Beattie refused to answer questions or provide 

identification and told the officers to get off his property, all in response to 
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questions posed by the officers in relation to what was later determined to 

be an investigative stop. Id. at 300. This Court concluded that “the police 

lacked the reasonable suspicion required to continue up the private driveway 

and conduct an investigative stop of Beattie.” Id. at 301 (citation omitted). 

“Inasmuch as the officers had no authority to compel Beattie to answer their 

inquiries, Beattie’s conviction for disorderly conduct, which was the result of 

his refusal to answer, must be reversed.” Id. (citation omitted).3 

Appellant argues that no members of the public were affected by her 

actions, contending “[t]he only members who were affected were [Appellant] 

and her husband who had a private disagreement on her private driveway.” 

Appellant’s Brief at 11. The 911 call from a neighbor belies that assertion. 

Appellant may have intended to engage in a private argument with just one 

person, i.e., her estranged husband, but by exposing her neighborhood to 

the argument, as evidenced by the neighbor’s 911 call, her actions can 

properly be classified as causing or risking public annoyance or alarm. See 

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3

In dicta, this Court commented that Beattie’s disorderly conduct conviction 

warranted reversal, even if his investigative stop had been valid, because 

the events took place on his private property such that there was no risk of 

public inconvenience or alarm, based on the definition of “public” in the 

statute. Beattie, 601 A.2d at 301. The episode between Beattie and the 

police occurred in his driveway, away from the street, on Beattie’s two-acre 

property that abutted the South Pittsburgh Water Company and an 

unoccupied two-acre lot. Id. As noted above, the definition of “public” 

includes “neighborhood,” and unlike the facts in Beattie, Appellant’s arrest 

stemmed from a disturbance that presented a risk of public inconvenience, 

annoyance or alarm to a neighborhood. 
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Commonwealth v. Troy, 832 A.2d 1089, 1094 (Pa. Super. 2003) (“The 

specific intent requirement of this statute ‘may be met by a showing of a 

reckless disregard of the risk of public inconvenience,’ annoyance, or alarm, 

even if the appellant’s intent was to send a message to a certain individual, 

rather than to cause public inconvenience, annoyance, or alarm.”) (citing 

Commonwealth v. Kidd, 442 A.2d 826, 827 (Pa. Super. 1982)). The fact 

the dispute was taking place in the driveway on Appellant’s property does 

not change the fact her actions affected the “public” in Appellant’s 

neighborhood. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Alpha Epsilon Pi, 540 A.2d 

580 (Pa. Super. 1988), where this Court, in evaluating a sufficiency 

challenge under § 5503(a)(2) (relating to unreasonable noise) stated: “We 

are satisfied that any residences near enough to receive the noise emanating 

from the fraternity house are within the ‘neighborhood’ for purposes of 

establishing disorderly conduct.” Id. at 583.

Appellant also relies on Commonwealth v. Smith, 811 A.2d 578 (Pa. 

Super. 2002), in support of her assertion that her conduct did not result in 

public inconvenience. Importantly, Smith was charged with a third degree 

misdemeanor under § 5503(b). Id. at 579.4 By contrast, Appellant was 

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4 Section 5503(b) provides: “(b) Grading.--An offense under this section is a 

misdemeanor of the third degree if the intent of the actor is to cause 

substantial harm or serious inconvenience . . . . Otherwise disorderly 

conduct is a summary offense” (emphasis added).

(Footnote Continued Next Page)
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charged with a summary offense. The Court explained that the mens rea for 

a summary charge can be simple recklessness. Id. The Court then 

suggested that the misdemeanor version of the offense “requires a showing 

of specific intent ‘to cause substantial harm to the public or serious public

inconvenience.’ [Commonwealth v. Coon, 695 A.2d 794, 798 (Pa. Super. 

1997) (emphasis in original)].” Id. Our Supreme Court has since 

announced that the grading of disorderly conduct as a misdemeanor does 

not require substantial harm to the public or serious public inconvenience, 

but rather only the intent to create substantial harm or serious 

inconvenience. Commonwealth v. Fedorek, 946 A.2d 93, 100-01 (Pa. 

2008).5 

As our Supreme Court explained in Fedorek: 

Although Section 5503 as a whole is aimed at preventing public 

disturbance, it accomplishes this aim by focusing upon certain 

individual acts, which, if pursued with the intent to cause public 

inconvenience, annoyance, or alarm, or recklessly creating a risk 

thereof, constitute the offense of disorderly conduct. These 

individual acts focus upon the offender’s behavior. . . . 

Significant is the fact that the General Assembly did not require 

(Footnote Continued) _______________________

5 The Supreme Court’s decision in Fedorek reversed this Court’s decision 

reported at 913 A.2d 893 (Pa. Super. 2006), and abrogated not only Smith, 

811 A.2d 578 (Pa. Super. 2002), but also Commonwealth v. Coon, 695 

A.2d 794 (Pa. Super. 1997). Despite that fact, Appellant quotes this Court’s 

opinion in Fedorek on page 13 of her brief and cites both Smith and Coon 

in her brief on pages 15 and 14, respectively, without mentioning our 

Supreme Court’s decision and the impact on the cited cases. 
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that [a] prohibited[] act be directed at a certain number of 

persons that could qualify as “the public.” Therefore, when an 

offender engages in fighting or threatening, or in violent or 

tumultuous behavior in a public arena, even when that conduct 

is directed at only one other person, the offender may be subject 

to conviction for disorderly conduct. . . . Indeed, there are 

numerous appellate decisions of this Commonwealth determining 

evidence to be sufficient to sustain convictions for disorderly 

conduct where the underlying public acts involve, as in the 

instant case, the private melodramas of two or three people that 

also cause or create the risk of public disturbance. 

Id. at 100 (emphasis in original) (citations omitted).

Despite Appellant’s contention that her “private argument” with her 

estranged husband did not constitute a “public inconvenience,” it is clear 

that the argument created enough of a public inconvenience to prompt a 911 

call from a resident of Appellant’s neighborhood. We agree with the trial 

court that the evidence was sufficient to find that Appellant intended to 

cause or created the risk of causing “public inconvenience, annoyance or 

alarm.” 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 5503.

Viewing all the evidence admitted at trial in the light most favorable to 

the verdict winner, we conclude there was sufficient evidence for the trial 

court, as fact-finder, to find every element of disorderly conduct under 18 

Pa.C.S.A. § 5503(a)(4) beyond a reasonable doubt. Therefore, we affirm

the December 16, 2013 order.

Order affirmed.
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Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 12/4/2014