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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF IDAHO

Docket No. 46109

STATE OF IDAHO,

Plaintiff-Respondent,

v.

CALEB MICHAEL LEONARD,

Defendant-Appellant.

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Filed: February 27, 2020

Karel A. Lehrman, Clerk

THIS IS AN UNPUBLISHED

OPINION AND SHALL NOT

BE CITED AS AUTHORITY

Appeal from the District Court of the First Judicial District, State of Idaho, 

Kootenai County. Hon. Scott Wayman, District Judge. 

Judgment of conviction for possession of a controlled substance, affirmed. 

Eric D. Fredericksen, State Appellate Public Defender; Reed P. Anderson, Deputy 

Appellate Public Defender, Boise, for appellant. 

Hon. Lawrence G. Wasden, Attorney General; John C. McKinney, Deputy 

Attorney General, Boise, for respondent. 

________________________________________________

LORELLO, Judge 

Caleb Michael Leonard appeals from his judgment of conviction for possession of a 

controlled substance. Leonard argues the district court erred in denying his motion to suppress. 

We affirm.

I.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

An officer stopped the vehicle Leonard was driving after visually estimating that the 

vehicle was speeding and observing the vehicle cross the fog line twice. The officer obtained 

identification from both Leonard and his passenger. While waiting for the passenger (the 

vehicle’s owner) to provide valid proof of insurance, the officer notified Leonard that he was 

being stopped for crossing the fog line, but the officer did not mention the speeding violation. 
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Before receiving proof the vehicle was insured, the officer smelled the odor of marijuana coming

from the vehicle. During a subsequent search of the vehicle, the officer found drug 

paraphernalia and two baggies of white powder that tested presumptively positive for cocaine.

The State charged Leonard with possession of a controlled substance with intent to 

deliver. Leonard moved to suppress the evidence discovered in the vehicle, arguing the officer 

lacked reasonable suspicion to conduct a traffic stop and, even if there was reasonable suspicion, 

the officer unlawfully extended the stop. The district court denied Leonard’s motion to suppress. 

Pursuant to a plea agreement Leonard pled guilty to an amended charge of possession of 

a controlled substance. I.C. § 37-2732(c)(1). Leonard appeals. 

II.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

The standard of review of a suppression motion is bifurcated. When a decision on a 

motion to suppress is challenged, we accept the trial court’s findings of fact that are supported by 

substantial evidence, but we freely review the application of constitutional principles to the facts 

as found. State v. Atkinson, 128 Idaho 559, 561, 916 P.2d 1284, 1286 (Ct. App. 1996). At a 

suppression hearing, the power to assess the credibility of witnesses, resolve factual conflicts, 

weigh evidence, and draw factual inferences is vested in the trial court. State v. Valdez-Molina, 

127 Idaho 102, 106, 897 P.2d 993, 997 (1995); State v. Schevers, 132 Idaho 786, 789, 979 P.2d 

659, 662 (Ct. App. 1999). 

III.

ANALYSIS

Mindful that the officer had reasonable suspicion to stop him for speeding and that the 

officer smelled marijuana before receiving proof the vehicle was insured, Leonard argues the 

district court erred in denying his motion to suppress. Specifically, Leonard contends that, 

although the officer had reasonable suspicion to conduct a traffic stop for speeding, the officer 

“abandoned that basis to pursue the fog line issue only,” and therefore unlawfully prolonged the

stop. The State asserts that the district court correctly concluded that no unlawful extension of 

the stop occurred. We hold that the district court correctly denied Leonard’s motion to suppress 

because the officer did not unlawfully extend the traffic stop, which was based on reasonable 

suspicion. 
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A traffic stop by an officer constitutes a seizure of the vehicle’s occupants and implicates 

the Fourth Amendment’s prohibition against unreasonable searches and seizures. Delaware v. 

Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 653 (1979); Atkinson, 128 Idaho at 561, 916 P.2d at 1286. An officer’s 

authority to seize an individual as part of a traffic stop ends when the tasks related to the 

infraction are, or reasonably should have been, completed. Rodriguez v. United States, 575 U.S. 

348, 354 (2015); see also Illinois v. Caballes, 543 U.S. 405, 407 (2005) (holding that “a seizure 

that is justified solely by the interest in issuing a warning ticket to the driver can become 

unlawful if it is prolonged beyond the time reasonably required to complete that mission”). In 

addition to determining whether to issue a traffic ticket, an officer’s mission during a traffic stop 

includes making ordinary inquiries incident to the stop, including checking the driver’s license, 

determining whether the driver has any outstanding warrants, and inspecting the vehicle’s 

registration and proof of insurance. Rodriguez, 575 U.S. at 355. These inquiries are related to 

roadway safety and are thus part of a traffic stop’s mission. Id. However, officers cannot 

abandon the traffic mission to investigate crimes unrelated to roadway safety without reasonable 

suspicion. State v. Linze, 161 Idaho 605, 609, 389 P.3d 150, 154 (2016).

The district court concluded that the officer lawfully stopped Leonard for suspected 

traffic violations and detected the odor of marijuana coming from the vehicle, which gave rise to 

probable cause for a search. Leonard contends there was only one legal basis for the 

stop--investigation of a speeding violation--a basis the officer abandoned by informing Leonard 

that he had been stopped for crossing the fog line without mentioning the possible speeding 

violation.

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 Consequently, according to Leonard, his continued detention after receiving 

notification of the stop’s purpose and the officer’s detection of the marijuana odor were both

unlawful. We disagree. When an officer informs a suspect of one justification for a stop, the

officer does not abandon other valid justifications by implication. See State v. Spies, 157 Idaho 

269, 272, 335 P.3d 609, 612 (Ct. App. 2014). An officer’s subjective intentions or rationales do 

not determine a seizure’s reasonableness. Id. The critical question in determining whether an 

 

1 Citing State v. Fuller, 163 Idaho 585, 588-90, 416 P.3d 957, 960-62 (2018), Leonard 

contends that observing him cross the fog line twice did not give the officer reasonable suspicion 

of a traffic violation. 
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officer has abandoned the purpose of a traffic stop is not the stop’s stated justification, but 

whether the officer’s investigative conduct serves the traffic stop’s mission. See id. 

The district court’s factual findings show that the officer did not deviate from the mission 

of a traffic stop before detecting the odor of marijuana. The district court found that, after 

stopping Leonard, the officer requested Leonard’s driver’s license and the vehicle’s registration 

and proof of insurance. Officers may demand and inspect a vehicle’s registration and proof of 

insurance during any lawful traffic stop. See Prouse, 440 U.S. at 659; State v. Godwin, 121 

Idaho 491, 494-95, 826 P.2d 452, 455-56 (1992). The district court further found that, while 

waiting for proof of insurance, the officer detected the odor of marijuana coming from the 

vehicle. Because the officer did not deviate from a traffic investigation before detecting the odor 

of marijuana, no unlawful extension of the stop occurred in this case. Consequently, Leonard 

has failed to show the district court erred in denying his motion to suppress. 

IV.

CONCLUSION

The district court correctly concluded that there was no unlawful extension of the traffic 

stop. Thus, Leonard has failed to show that the district court erred in denying his motion to 

suppress. Accordingly, Leonard’s judgment of conviction for possession of a controlled 

substance is affirmed. 

Judge GRATTON and Judge BRAILSFORD, CONCUR.