1 IN TH E COURT OF APPEALS O F THE ST ATE OF NEW MEXICO

2 O pin ionN um

be r: ___ ____ ____ ____ 3 Fi lin g D at e: O ct obe r 5, 201 5 4 N O. 32, 838 5 STA TE OF NE W MEX ICO, 6 Plaintiff-Appellee, 7 v
. 8 GRE GOR

Y M . H OBBS, 9 D ef

en dant- Appe llant. 10 AP PE AL FR OM T HE D ISTRICT C OUR T OF CH AV ES C OUN TY 11 F re dd ie J. R om er o, D ist ri ctJu dg e 12 He ctor H . B alderas, Attorney Ge neral 13 Paula E . G anz, Assistant Attorney Ge neral 14 Santa Fe , N M 15 for Appellee 16 Jorge A. Alvar ado, Chief Public De fender 17 Tania Shahani, A ssistant Appellate D efender 18 Santa Fe , N M 19 fo r Appe llant1 OPIN ION

2 VA NZ I, Jud ge. 3 { 1} De fendant Gr egory Marvin H obbs appeals h i s co nvictio n for volunt ary 4 m an sl au gh te r wit h a fir earm en ha nc em en t, con tra ry to NMSA 197 8, § 3 0

- 2

- 3 ( A) 5 (1994), and NMSA 1978 , § 31-18-16(A) (1993). D efendant raises three issues, which 6 w e ha ve re or ganiz ed an d ad dr es s a s f oll ow s: ( 1) w he the r D ef

en dant’ s r igh t t o apub lic 7 tr ia l w as vio la te d w he n th e dis tr ic t c ourt part ia lly c los ed the c ourtr oom

dur ing the 8 te sti m ony

of one of his w itn es se s, ( 2) w he the r D ef en dant r ec ei ve d in ef

fe ct ive 9 as s i s t an ce o f c o u n s el , a n d(3 ) wh et h er t h e d i s t ri ct co u rt er re di n d en yin g De fe n d an t ’s 1 0 r e qu e s tf

o r an e wt r i a l
. We a f

f i rm. 11 BACKGRO UND 12 { 2} It is un di sp ut ed th at Defen da nt sh ot an d ki ll ed Rube n Archu le ta , Jr
. (Ru be n J r.) 13 and Ruben Archuleta, Sr. , a lso kn own as Ham m er (Victim ), during an alterc ation that 1 4 o cc u rr ed o n J u n e 1 5 , 2 0 1 2 . Th e S t at e d i d n o tp ro s ec u t e D ef

en d an tfo r R

ub en J r. ’s 15 de ath be ca

use it de te rm ine d th at

the kil lin g of Ruben Jr
. w as le ga lly j ust if ie d. 16 D ef en dant w as , how ev er , ch ar ge d w ith an d co nvi ct ed fo r vol unt ar y m an sla ught er f or 17 causing Victim ’ s death. D efendant appeals h i s conviction and raises three 18 in de pe nd en t i ss ue s. Th e fac ts rel ev an t t o e ach is su e wil l b e d is cu ss edbe lo w.2

1 DISC US SION 2 Cour troom Closure 3 { 3} Br iti ni S
. , am ino r, w itn es se d th e str uggl e be tw ee n D ef

en dant and V ic tim
. S he 4 te sti fi ed

a t D ef en dant’ s pr el im inary he ar ing an d w as la te r subp oe na ed by D ef en dant 5 to t es tif

y a t hi s tr ia l. D ef

en dant c onsi de re d B ri tin i’ s te sti m ony to be c ru ci al to his 6 theory of self-def

ense. 7 { 4} Br iti ni f

ai le d to ap pear

on the f ir st d ay of tr ia l, so the dis tr ic t c ourt i ssu ed a 8 be nc h w ar

rant f or he r ar re st. A ft er

he r fathe r ca lle d th e j udge ’ s c ham be rs to ex pr es s 9 co nc er n f or his daught er ’ s sa fe ty , the jud ge he ld a c onf er en ce r eg ar din g th e 10 co ndi tio ns unde r w hic h B ri tin i w oul d te sti fy
. T he j udge an d c ouns el f or the S ta te a nd 11 De fendant interviewed B ritini in th e presence of D efendant and Britini’ s m other. 12 { 5} Br iti ni, w ho w as six a nd o ne -h al f m onths pr eg na nt atthe ti m e of tr ia l, 13 ex pla ine d th at

she w as not

c om fo rt ab le te sti fy ing in fr ont of a n audi en ce be ca

use she 14 fear ed retaliation from Vic tim ’ s fam ily . S he stated that a pp r ox i m at e l y

two w eeks after 15 she te sti fi ed at the pr el im inary he ar ing she w as phy sic al ly as sault ed by agir l w hom 16 she did no t know, but who w as with two o f V ictim ’ s sons . B ritini inform ed the court 17 that she w as afra id that she would not b e able to defend herself if she w ere attacked 18 again due to her pregnancy , and she felt like she had to watch her back. Likewise,3

1 Britini’ s m other expressed concern for Britini’ s safety and the safety

of her unborn 2 gr an dc hil d. 3 { 6} De fens e c ouns e l p r op os e d t hatB r i t i ni b e d e e m e d un a va i l abl e a nd s ug ge sted 4 tha t B ri tin i’ s te sti m ony f ro m the pr el im inary

he ar ing be a dm itt ed

in lie u of t es tim ony 5 at the tr ia l. T he S ta te a gr ee d th at Br iti ni’ s f

ear of r et al ia tio n w as r ea sona

ble be ca use 6 her attacker h ad been in the com pany of Victim ’ s sons . Howe ver, the State opposed 7 usi ng Br iti ni’ s tes tim ony fr om the pr el im inary he ar ing an d ar gue d th at the sit ua tio n 8 did not ri se to the le ve l of dee m ing Br iti ni una va ila ble
. T he j udge a lso e xpr es se d hi s 9 co nc er n f or Br iti ni’ s sa fe ty

but state d th at

he did not thi nk tha t he ha d th e au tho ri ty 10 to e xc lud e the p ub lic f ro m the pr oc ee din gs. I n r es pons e, de fe nse c ouns el a ske d th e 11 j udge, “ [n] ot even upo n stipu lation of the parties[, ] y our hono r?” Couns el then stated 12 tha t “ the de fe nse w oul d be ha ppy to sti pul at e fo r the pur

pose of he r te sti m ony

that the 13 co urt c oul d be c le ar ed
. . . of ev er

y one but the ba ili ff

s [and] part ie s[
. ] ” T he S ta te a lso 14 ag re ed

to the sti pul at ion
. 15 { 7} Th e ju d g e a n dco u n s el fo r t h e S t at e a n dDe fe n d an td i s cu s s ed De fe n d an t ’s 16 ri ght s, V ic tim ’ s r igh ts, the publ ic ’ s rig hts , an d how the se r igh ts c oul d be a ff ec te d if 1 7 t h e d i s t r i c tc o u rta g r e e dt o p a rt i a l l y c l o s e t h e c o u rt r o o m du r i n g B r i t i n i ’s t e s t i mo n y. 18 Af ter careful consideration, and based upon the parties’ stipul ation to a partial closure 19 of the c ourtr oom , the distri ct c ourt de ci de d to e xc lud e m em be rs of V ic tim ’ s and4

1 De fendant’ s fam ilies from the courtroom while Br itini testi fied. The j udge explain ed 2 to Britini that he w ould exclude Victim ’ s and Def endant’ s fam ilies while she testified 3 but that he c oul d no t se al the c ourtr oom . T he j udge f urthe r sa id tha t i f som eo ne f ro m 4 the ne w spa

pe r w as in the audi en ce , the attor ne y s c oul d a sk tha t pe rs on “ [t ] o gi ve 5 som e co nsi de ratio n so th at [ he r] na m e [w as not pub lis he d] in the ne w spa pe r. ” T he 6 following day , B ritini testified on b ehalf of De fendant. H er testim ony and the partial 7 co urtr oom

c los ur e la ste d le ss than tw en ty m inu te s. 8 { 8} On ap p ea l , De fe n d an tar g u es t h at t h e p ar t i al co u rt ro o m cl o s u re du ri n g Br i t i n i ’s 9 testim ony violated his Sixth Am endm ent right to a public trial, despite the fa ct that 10 his defense co u n s el stipul ated to the closure. H e claim s that the uncon stitut ional 11 closure constitu tes structural err or requi ri n g a newtrial. He further argues that 12 structural err ors are subject to a r elaxed preservation requirem ent and tha t t hey are 13 not su bje ct to a harm less error analy sis. T he State, on the oth er h an d, asserts that 14 De fendant did not preserve this issue for appellate review , that D efendant stipulated 15 to the cl osur e, an d tha t D ef en dant’ s sti pul at ion ha s the ef fe ct of a w ai ve r of

thi s is sue 16 on a ppe al
. 17 { 9} “ Inac ri m ina l tri al , the a cc use d sh al l e nj oy the r igh t t o aspe edy

a nd p ubl ic 18 trial.” Sta te v . T

urr ie tta , 201 3- N MS C- 036, ¶ 1, 308 P
. 3d 9 64 ( ci tin g U
. S. Co nst . 19 am en d. V I; N
. M. Co nst . a rt . I I, § 14 ). The r igh t t o apub lic tr ia l, how ev er , “ is n ot5

1 absolut e and m ay

give way in certain ca ses to oth er r ights or interests.” Id

. Whether 2 D ef en dant’ s c onst itu tio na l r igh ts w er e vio la te d is aque sti on o f lawa nd, the re f o r e, our 3 rev ie w is de no vo . Id

. ¶ 14. 4 { 10} A s an in iti al m atte r, D ef en dant a ppe ar s to c onc ed e tha t he did not pr es er ve thi s 5 is su e fo r ap pe ll at e rev ie w, an d we a gr ee. See Ru le 12- 216( A ) N MR A ( “ T o pr es er

ve 6 a question for review it m ust appear that a ruling or decision by the district court was 7 fairly invok ed[. ] ”); se e als o State v . V ande nbe rg , 2003-NMS C-030, ¶ 52, 134 N.M. 8 566, 81 P
. 3d 1 9 ( “ In an al y zi ng p re se rv at ion , w e loo k to the a rg um en ts m ad e by 9 D ef en dant b el ow . ”) ; Sta te v . J ac obs , 200 0- N MS C- 026, ¶ 12, 129 N
. M. 448 , 10 P
. 3d 10 127 (“ Inor de r to p re se rv e aniss ue f or appe al , it is es se nti al that a

party m ust m ak e 11 a tim el y

obj ec tio n th at

spe ci fi ca lly

appr ises th e [d istri ct ] c ourt of the c la im ed

e rr or 12 an d in voke s an in te lli ge nt r uli ng the re on. ”)
. D es pit e D ef en dant’ s f ai lur e to p re se rv e 13 his Si xth Am endm ent claim , how ever, we address his assertion th at the alleged 14 uncons titutio nal closure violates his right to a publ ic trial and constit utes a structural 15 erro r req ui rin g a ne w tri al
. Se e W all er v . G eo rgi a , 467 U. S. 39, 49 (1984). 16 { 11} “ A structura l error is a defec t affe cting the fram ew ork with i n wh i ch the trial 17 proceeds, r ather than sim ply an err or in the trial process itself. ” St a t e v . N g u yen , 1 8 200 8

- N M C A

- 0 7 3 , ¶ 9 , 1 4 4 N
. M
. 1 9 7 , 1 8 5 P
. 3 d 3 6 8 ( i n t e rn a l qu o t a t i o n m arks a nd 19 ci ta tio n om itt ed ). “ If a he ar ing is cl ose d in vio la tio n of the Co nst itu tio n, the de nia l of6

1 the r igh t t o apub lic tr ia l i s a str uc tur al er ro r; thu s, it is not subj ec t to a harm le ss e rr or 2 analy sis.” Sta te v. H

ood , 201 4- N MC A -0 34, ¶ 6, 320 P
. 3d 5 22. T he re fo re , if 3 De fendant’ s right to a pub lic trial w as violated, such error would be a s tructural er ror. 4 { 12} Wh e n d e t e rmi n i n g t h e c o n s t i tu t i o n a l i ty o f a c o u rt r o o m c l o s u r e , o u r S up r e me 5 Co urt i n Tu rri et ta adopted the “ overriding interest” s tandard, dis cussed by the United 6 St at es S upr em e Co urt i n W aller , 467 U
. S. 39, a nd P ress- E nte rpr ise Co

. v . Sup er ior 7 Co urt of Ca lif orni a , 4 64 U.S. 5 01 (19 84 ). Se e Tu rri et ta , 201 3- N MS C- 036, ¶ ¶ 17, 19. 8 In W aller , the U nit ed

S ta te s S upr em e Co urt he ld tha t a cl osur e “ ove r the obj ec tio ns 9 of the a cc use d” m

ust m ee t the f

oll ow ing “ ove rr idi ng i nte re st” f our -p ro nge d te st: 10 [1 ] the party

se ek ing to cl ose th e he ar ing m ust a dvanc e anove rr idi ng 11 interest that is likely to be prej udiced, [2] the closure m ust be no b roader 12 than ne ce ssary to pr ote ct

that i nte re st, [ 3] the [ dis tr ic t] c ourt m ust 13 co nsi de r re as ona ble a lte rn at ive s to c los ing the pr oc eed ing , a nd [ 4] it 14 m

ust m ake findings adequ ate to suppo rt the closure. 15 W aller , 46 7 U.S. at 47 -4 8. 16 { 13} D ef

en dant a sse rt s th at

non e of the se pr ongs w er e sa tis fi ed
. S pe ci fi ca lly , he 17 ar gue s th at : (1 ) ne ith er party de m onstrate d anove rr idi ng i nte re st f or the c los ur e; ( 2) 18 the c los ur e w as ove rl y br oa d; (3) the dis tr ic t c ourt f ai le d to a de qua te ly

a sse ss p oss ibl e 19 al te rn at ive s to c los ur e; a nd ( 4) the dis tr ic t c ourt f ai le d to m ak e ad equa te f

ind ing s to 20 supp ort c los ur e. Co nve rs el y , the S ta te c ont en ds tha t the fo ur pr ongs w er e m et in thi s 21 ca se . I t c ont en ds tha t: (1 ) Br iti ni’ s sa fe ty an d the sa fe ty of he r unbo rn ch ild w er e the7

1 ove rr idi ng i nte re sts f

or the c los ur e; (2 ) the part ia l c los ur e w as not ove rl y br oa d in 2 scope or duration; (3) the dist rict court considered alternatives and determ ined that 3 the part ia l c los ur e w as the be st o pti on; a nd (4) the dis tr ic t c ourt i nte rv ie w ed Br iti ni 4 an d he r m oth er

in the pr es en ce of

c ouns el f

or D efe ndant and the S ta te a nd m ad e 5 su ffi ci en t fa ctua l fi nd in gs to su pp or t t he clo su re. Fo r th e rea so ns th atfol lo w, we 6 co nc lud e tha t D ef

en dant w ai ve d hi s r igh t t o apub lic tr ia l wh enhis a tto rn ey e xpr es sly 7 co nse nte d to the part ia l c ourtr oom cl osur e dur ing Br iti ni’ s tes tim ony . T he re fo re , his 8 structural err or argum ent fails and consideration of the “ overriding in terest” standard 9 is n ot r equir ed
. W e ex pla in. 10 { 14} “ Fundam ental rights, includin g constit ution al rights, can be w aived.” State v. 11 Sin gle ton , 200 1- N MC A -0 54, ¶ 11, 130 N
. M. 583 , 28 P
. 3d 1 124. Whil e “ [s ] om e ri ght s 12 ar e co nsi de re d so pe rs ona l t o th e de fen da nt the y ne ce ssi ta te inquir

y int o th e 13 ind ivi dua l de fe ndant’ s de ci sio n- m ak ing pr oc es s[ , ]
. . . [ o]ther r igh ts g en er al ly 14 pertaining to th e conduct of trial m ay be w aived throug h counsel and with out an 15 inqu iry

on the record into t he validityof the w aiver. ” Id

. ¶ 1 2
. “ D e f e n s e a t t o rn e ys 16 m ak e a w ide vari ety

of ta ct ic al de ci sio ns d

ur ing the c our se of

ac ri m ina l tri al , a nd 17 m any of these decisions im

plicate the constitu tional rights of a defendant.” Nguyen , 18 2008 -N MC A -0 73, ¶

24. “ A pe rs ona l w ai ve r by the de fe ndant i s no t r equir ed f or a ll 19 of these decisions.” Id

. F urthe rm or e, the U nit ed

S ta te s Su pr em e Co urt ha s “ uni fo rm ly8

1 reco gn iz ed th e pu bl ic -tr ia l gu aran te e as on e cre at edforth e b en efi t o f th e d efen da nt .” 2 P resle y v. G eo rgi a , 558 U
. S. 209 , 213 ( 2010 ) (i nte rn al quo ta tio n m ar ks and c itatio n 3 om itt ed ). T he ri ght to “ a publ ic tr ia l is fo r the be ne fi t of the a cc use d; tha t the pub lic 4 m ay see he is fa irly

dealt w ith an d not u njustly condem ned,” and “ encourages 5 witnesses to com e forw ard [while] discourag[ing] per j ury .” W aller , 467 U.S. a t 46 6 (internal quot ation m arks and citations om itted); see a lso Peretz v. United States , 501 7 U
. S. 923 , 936 ( 1991 ) (r ec ogni zi ng tha t a de fe ndant m ay wa ive m ost ba sic r igh ts, 8 inc lud ing his or

he r ri ght to a publ ic tr ia l) ; Levine v. United States , 362 U
. S. 610 , 611 , 9 619-20 (1960) (holdin g that the defendant’ s due process and pu blic trial rights were 10 not vi olated after the publ ic had been excluded from the courtroom , in what began as 11 a grand j ury

proceeding and contin ued as a h ea ri ng for the defendant’ s crim inal 1 2 c o n t e mp t ; t h e S up r e me C o u rtn o t e dt h a tt h e d e f e n d a n tma d e n o r e qu e s ta ta n y t i me 13 to o pe n th e co urtr oom a nd sim ply “ ra ise [d ] a n a

bstra ct c la im onl y a s an a ft er

tho ught 14 on appeal”). 15 { 15} Inthi s c as e, D ef en dant b el ie ve d th at

Br iti ni’ s te sti m ony

w as c ri tic al a nd w oul d 16 b o l s t er h i s t heory

of self-def

ense. B ut Britini did not want to testify in front of an 17 audience because she fe ared r etaliation from Vic tim ’ s fam ily . After the district court 18 de nie d de fe nse co unse l’ s re que st to use he r pr el im inary he ar ing te sti m ony

in lie u of 19 ha vin g he r te sti fy

at tri al , def

en se c ouns el pr opos ed

c los ing the c ourtr oom

f or9

1 Br iti ni’ s te sti m ony . Co unse l f urthe r sta te d th at

D ef en dant w oul d st ipu la te to 2 ex cl u d i n g ev er yon e f

ro m t h e c o u rt ro o m

ex ce p tt h e b ai l i ff

s an dp ar t i es . De fe ndant was 3 pr es en t w he n hi s att or

ne y pr opos ed thi s stipu la tio n, an d th er e is n o in dic at ionin the 4 record that he obj ected to it. B ased on these facts, it is clear t hat Def endant waived 5 his right to a public trial when his counsel ex p re ssly stipul ated to—and even 6 en co ur ag ed

—t he pa rti al co ur tro om

clo su re. Se e Kn igh te n v

s. Co m m anda nt , 142 Fe d. 7 Ap p x . 3 4 8 , 3 5 1 (1 0 t h Ci r. 2 0 0 5 ) ( u np ub l i s h ed ) ( h o l d i n g t h at t h e d ef en d an t ’s 8 co unse l’ s e xpr es s w ai ve r of obj ec tio n to the tr ia l c ourt’ s c los ur e of c ourtr oom

dur ing 9 the vic tim ’ s te sti m ony

dur ing co urt- m ar

tia l on cr im ina l charg es pr ec lud ed r ev ie wof 10 cl ai m on m ili tary pr iso ne r’ s a

ppl ic at ionf

or w ri t of ha be as c or pus) ; id. ( “ T he r igh t t o 11 a p ub li c tr ia l . . . m ay be waiv ed , so lo ng as th e waiv er is kn owi ng an d in te ll ig en t. . . . 12 Counsel can waive the ri g h t o n b ehalf of a client, at least in the absence of an 13 obj ec tio n by the c lie nt. ” (c itatio ns o m itt ed )) ; see also Addai v. Schm alenberg er , 776 14 F. 3d 5 28, 533 ( 8th Ci r. 2015 ) (“ A de fe ndant m ay ce rt ai nly co nse nt to the cl osur e of 15 the courtroom

if he believes it to be in his favor, and if he chooses t o d o s o , he can 16 hardly claim on appeal that the closure viol ated his Sixth A m en d m en t right.”) ; 17 Craw ford v. M inn es ota , 498 F. 3d 851, 855 (8th Cir. 2007 ) (stating that, in Minnesota, 18 a de fe ndant’ s pa ssi ve f ai lur e to o bj ec t t o c los ing the c ourtr oo m doe s no t w ai ve 19 co m pli an ce w iththe pub lic tr ia l m an da te s se t f orth b y statut e an d W

aller , “ [b ] ut i f the10

1 de fe ndant a ct ing thr ough his attor ne y ag re es to cl osur e (and a ssu m ing no m em be r of 2 the publ ic lodges a First Am endm ent objec tion), the issue is procedurally defaulted 3 on a ppe al ”)
. G ive n th at

de fe nse c ouns el did

not obj ec t t o the pa rtia l c ourtr oom 4 cl osur e dur ing Br iti ni’ s te sti m ony an d af fi rm at ive ly

e nc our ag ed

it , D ef en dant i s inno 5 posi tio n to now cl ai m tha t his Si xth A m en dm en t ri ght to a publ ic tr ia l w as vio la te d. 6 { 16} Be ca

use w e co nc lud e tha t D ef en dant e xpr es sly

c onse nte d to the c los ur e to 7 m ak e his w itn es s f

ee l m or e co m fo rt ab le dur ing he r te sti m ony , w e ne ed not de te rm ine 8 whether the W

aller “ ov erri di ng in te res t” fou r-p ro ng edst an da rdwas m et . See W aller , 9 467 U
. S. at 47 (h old ing that, und er the S ixth A m en dm en t, ac ourtr oom c los ur e m

ust 10 m ee t the fo ur -p ro ng te st whe n th e ac cu se d ha s ob j ec te d to the c ourtr oom

c los ur e) ; see 11 als o A ddai , 776 F
. 3d a t 53 4 ( ex pla ini ng tha t, in a ca se w he re the de fe ndant e xpr es sly 12 co nse nts to a co urtr oom c los ur e, the c ourt i s no t r equir ed to ba lanc e the int er es ts 13 de sc ri be d in W

aller ). Ac cordingly , w e af firm on this issue. 14 Ineff ective A ssistance of C ounsel 15 { 17} D ef

en dant c la im s th at

he re ce ive d ine ff

ec tiv e as sis tanc e of

c ouns el be ca

use his 16 atto rn ey fai le d to r et ai n or c al l an e xpe rt

on b ull et tr aj ec tor ie s. D ef

en dant c ont en ds 17 tha t su che xpe rt

te sti m on y

c oul d have c or

ro bor at ed his se lf -d ef en se the or

y a nd 18 ef fe ct ive ly r eb utt ed the S ta te ’ s e vid en ce . D ef en dant r ai se s th is i ssu e as ana lte rn at ive 19 to h is n ew ly

dis co ve re d e vid en ce a rg um en t, w hic h w e dis cu ss l at er in thi s O pin ion
.11

1 { 18} It

is well esta

bli she d th at

c ri m ina l de fe ndants ha ve ac onst itu tio na l r igh t t o 2 effe ct iv e as si st an ce o f co un se l. See P atterso n v. LeM aster , 200 1- N MS C- 013, ¶ 16, 3 130 N.M. 179, 21 P.3d 1032 (“ The S ixth Am end m en t to the United States 4 Constitu tion, applicable to the states through the Fourteenth Am endm ent, guarantees 5 no t o nl y

th e ri gh t t o c ou ns el bu t t he rig ht to th e eff ect i ve ass is ta nc e o f co un se l.” 6 (internal quo t at i on m arks and citation om itted)). ” W e re view the legal issues invol ved 7 w ithc la im s of

ine ff ec tiv e as si st an ce of co unse l de nov o. . . [ an d]
. . . de fe r to the 8 fi n d ings o f fa ct of the [district] court if substantial evid ence supports th e court’s 9 finding s.” State v. Crocco , 2014-NMS C-016, ¶ 11, 327 P.3d 1068 (citations om itted). 10 { 19} De fendant bears the burden of showing that his counsel’s per form ance w as 11 de fic ie ntan d t ha t h e s u f f e r e d p reju di ce as a res ul t o f th e d efi ci en cy . See State v. 12 R o y b al , 2 002-N MS C- 027, ¶ 19, 132 N
. M. 657 , 54 P
. 3d 6 1. “ Whe n an in ef fe ct ive 13 as sis tanc e cl ai m

is fi rs t r ai se d ondir ec t a

ppe al , w e ev al ua te the f

ac ts tha t are part

of 14 the record. ” Id

. “ If

f ac ts n ec es sary

to a fu ll de te rm ina tio n are not part of the r ec or d, 15 anine ff

ec tiv e as sis tanc e cl ai m

is m or e prop er ly

br ough t thr oughaha

be as c or pus 16 petition [. ] ” Id

. ; se e als o State v . H

erre ra , 2001 -N MC A -0 73, ¶ 37, 131 N
. M. 22, 33 17 P. 3d 2 2 ( “ Whe n th e re cord on a ppe al doe s no t e sta

bli sh a pr im a fa ci e ca se of 18 ine ff ec tiv e as sis tanc e of

c ouns el , thi s C ourt ha s e xpr es se d its pr ef er en ce f or12

1 resolution of the issue in habeas c orpus procee ding s over rem and for an evidentiary 2 hearing.”)
. 3 { 20} H er e, the j ur

y c onvi ct ed D ef

en dant of vol unt ar y m an sla ught er on F eb ru ar

y 1, 4 2013
. O n F eb ru ar

y 14, 201 3, de fe nse c ouns el f iled a m otion f

or ane wtr ia l and 5 asserted that, while prepar ing for a differ ent trial on February 6, 2013, she discovered 6 tha t N el son W el ch , a n e xpe rt w itn es s w hom

she ha d r et ai ne d inadiffe ren t ca se , is 7 qua lif ie d to giv e ex pe rt

opi n i o ns r eg ar din g si tua tio ns whe re tw o pe opl e ar e str uggl ing 8 over a w eapon, as w ell as weapon discharges, traje ctory , and angles of b ullets. Ha d 9 she known a

bout his expertise in this area before D efendant’ s trial, defense counsel 10 say s sh e w oul d have hir ed W el ch to te sti fy on beh al f of D ef en dant bec au se he w oul d 11 ha ve pr ovi de d usef

ul inf orm at ion ce ntr al to D ef

en dant’ s th eo ry

of se lf -d ef en se . F or 12 the reasons that follow, w e ar e not persuade d t h at defense c ouns el’ s failure to hire 13 W el chr ise s to the le ve l of ine ff ec tiv e as sis tanc e of

c ouns el
. 14 { 21} E ve n if

D ef en dant c ould sh owthat c ouns el ’ s pe rf orm an ce w as de fi ci en t 15 be ca use the re w as no t ac tic al or str at eg ic ba sis f

or f ai lin g to r et ai n or co nsul t w ith 16 W el ch or a no th er t raject ory ex pe rt, se e Sta te v . A rago n , 2009 -N MC A -1 02, ¶¶ 9- 15, 17 147 N.M. 26, 216 P.3d 276, D efe n dant “ m ust dem onstrate that his cou nsel’ s errors 1 8 p r e j u d i c e dh i s d e f

e n s e s u c h t h a tt h e r e w a s ar e a s o n ab l e p r o b ab i l i t y t h a tt h e o u t c o me 19 of the trial would have been differe nt.” Id

. ¶ 16 ( int er na l qu ota tio n m ar

ks and c itatio n13

1 om itt ed ). I n th e pr es en t c as e, D ef en dant cl ai m s tha t he suf

fe re d pr ej udi ce as ar es ult 2 of counsel’ s failure to ca ll an expert w itness to corroborate his theory of self-def

ense; 3 however, there is no evidence in the record that the outcom e wo u l d h av e been 4 differe nt if counsel had retained or called a traj ectory expert to testify

on his b ehalf. 5 To the contrar

y , D r. Sam

Andrew s from

the Of fice of the Medical Investigator (O MI) 6 te sti fi ed

r eg ar din g th e pa th o f the bul le ts thr oughV ic tim ’ s bo dy , inc lud ing that the 7 fata l bu lle t w as sho t ve ry c los e to the body

a nd fr om a posi tio n abov e V ic tim ’ s c he st. 8 Furthe r, the re w as e vid en ce pr es en te d re gard ing the str uggl e be tw ee n D ef

en dant and 9 Victim for the f irear m , which would have supported Dr. Andrew s’ testim ony . O ther 10 th an be in g p os si bl y

cu m ul at iv e o r co n t rad ic to ry , Defen da nt do es no t s ho w a 11 pr oba bil ity that an e xpe rt ’ s te sti m ony r eg ar din g a

str uggl e fo r a fi re ar

m a nd the 12 tr aj ec tor

y of bul le ts w oul d c hange the out co m e if ane wtr ia l w as gr an te d. 13 { 22} D ef

en dant’ s c la im

of pr ej udi ce is ba se d onm er e spe cu la tio n. W ith out 14 specify ing what an expert would have testified to, De fendant asserts that the expert 15 “ could have prov ided useful inform ation . .
. central to the theory of d ef en s e[ ; ]” 1 6 “ co u l d h av e r ev i ew ed Dr . An d re ws ’ an al ysi s t o co n fi rm orco n t es th i s fi n d i n g s [; ]” 1 7 “co u l dh a v e c o rr o b o r a t e dDr
. An d r e w s ’ t h e o r i e s i f a c c u r a t e , a n di f

c o n t r a d i c t o ry, 18 w oul d have pr ovi de d ne ce ssary a ssi stanc e fo r ef

fe ct ive c ro ss- ex am inati on of those 19 the or ie s” a nd “ co uld

ha ve of fe re d scie nti fi c evi de nc e” tha t w oul d have bol ste re d hi s14

1 se lf- de fen se th eo ry . Thi s co njec tu re i s n ot en ou gh to e s tabl is h p reju di ce. Se e In re 2 E rnesto M

. , J r. , 199 6- N MC A -0 39, ¶

10, 121 N
. M. 562, 915 P. 2d 318 (“ A n a sse rt ion 3 of prej udice is not a sho wing of prej udice.”)
. 4 { 23} T he re fo re , w e co nc lud e tha t D ef en dant h as not

e sta bli she d apr im a fa ci e ca se 5 of in effe ct iv e as si st an ce o f co un se l. Se e Sta te v . G roga n , 200 7- N MS C- 039, ¶ 11, 142 6 N. M. 107, 163 P. 3d 49 4 (“ The defendant has the burden to sho w both incom petence 7 an d pr ej udi ce . ”)
. Abse nt a pr im a fa ci e ca se of

ine ffectiv e as sis tanc e of c ouns el , 8 Defen da nt ’s rem ed y

is th ro ug h h ab eas pro ceed in gs . State v. M artin ez , 19 96 -NMCA9 109, ¶ 25, 122 N
. M. 476 , 927 P
. 2d 3 1 ( sta tin g th at “ [t ] his Co urt ha s expr es se d it s 10 prefer ence f

or habeas corpus proceedings ov er r em and wh en t h e record on appeal 11 does not establish a prim a fa cie ca se of ineffe ctive assistance of counsel”). 12 D en ial of

R eq ue st f

or N ew Tr ial 13 { 24} D ef

en dant a sse rt s that th e distr ic t c ourt a buse d it s di sc re tio n inde ny ing his 14 request for a new trial on three grounds : (1) j uror bias, ( 2) newly discovered evidence, 15 and (3) the district court’ s failure to instruct the j ury regar ding the tim ing of a break 16 during D ef

en d ant’ s closing argum ent. “ The gener al rule is that a m otion for a new 17 trial is not favored and this Court will onlyrever se a denial of a m otion for newtrial 18 upon a showing of a clear abuse of discretion bythe trial court. ” Sta te v . Cu rry , 200 2- 19 N MC A -0 92, ¶

18, 132 N
. M. 602 , 52 P
. 3d 9 74.15

1 Ju ro r Bi as 2 { 25} D ef

en dant a sse rt s th at his ri ght to a fa ir tr ia l w as c om pr om ise d be ca

use aj ur or 3 fai le d to di sc lo se du rin g v oi r di re t ha t h e kne w on e o f th e St at e’s wit ne ss es . Se e Sta te 4 v. J ohns on , 2 01 0- N MS C- 016, ¶ 35, 148 N
. M. 50, 229 P
. 3d 5 23 ( “ T he S ixth 5 Am endm ent of the United States Constitu tion guarantees defendants the r ight to trial 6 by af ai r an d im

part ia l j ur

y a nd i s im

pli cate d duri ng v oir

dir e. ”) ; St a t e v . M

c F a ll , 7 1960 -N MSC- 084, ¶ 6, 67 N .M. 260, 354 P. 2d 54 7 (em phasizing that the NewMexico 8 Constitu tion g uarantees a trial by an “ im partial” jury ). Specifica lly , he contends that 9 the j uror concealed that he knewwitness T risha Hart during vo ir dire. 10 { 26} Tr icia H art investigated the c rim e scene on behalf of the OMI and was c alled 11 to test i f

y by t he S t a t e . P r i or t o t e st i f y i ng , a nd ou t si de t he pr e se nc e of t he j ur y , Ha rt 12 disclos ed that she knew th e juror from church and that the j uror p robably knew her 13 “ as Jerry ’ s wife .” De fense counsel stated that she had no objec tion to the j uror, as 14 lon g a s th e re la tio nshi p w as not a cl ose an d pe rs ona l one . A lth oughD ef en dant d id n ot 15 obj ec t t o th e j ur or

a t the ti m e, he la te r ar gue d inhis pos t- tr ia l m oti on and n owon 16 appeal that the district c ourt e rred by not asking the j uror whether his acquaintance 17 w ithH ar

t w oul d a ff

ec t hi s im

part ia lity . A ddi tio na lly , D ef en dant c ont en ds tha t he 18 would have used a perem ptory challenge to excuse the j uror if the j uror had disclos ed 19 his conn ection to Hart during vo i r d i re. In its response to Defe ndant’s m otion for a16

1 ne wtr ia l onthi s i ss ue , t he S ta te a tta ch ed a n a ff idavit f ro m the j ur or . T he a ff

idavit 2 sta te d that the j ur or onl y re al iz ed tha t he and H ar t a tte nde d th e sa m e chur cha ft er the 3 conclusio n of the trial. It also stated that his verdict and consideration of t he evidence 4 w as not

inf lue nc ed by a ny pr ior kno w le dge of

H ar t. 5 { 27} While we recognize that “ a lone biased juror underm ines the im

partiality of an 6 entire j ury ,” State v. G ardn er , 200 3- N MC A -1 07, ¶ 10 , 1 34 N
. M. 294 , 76 P
. 3d 4 7, 7 “ D ef en dant b ears the bur de n to es ta bli sh tha t the j ur

y w as not fa ir an d im

part ia l, a nd 8 m u s t d emonstrate bias or prej udice on the part of the rem aining jurors.” State v. 9 G all egos , 200 9- N MS C- 017, ¶ 22, 146 N
. M. 88, 206 P
. 3d 9 93. H er e, D ef en dant d id 10 not ob j ect to H art’ s disclos ure about the j uror and m ade n o attem pt to inqu ire further 11 int o any re la tio nshi p be tw ee n H ar t and the j ur or . F ur

the r, he m ak es no r ea l arg um en t 12 tha t the j ur or

w as bia se d no r doe s he c ha lle nge the j ur or ’ s sw or n st at em en t tha t the 13 j uror did not rec ogni ze H art at the time of trial and only rea lized that they

attended 14 the sam e church w hen Har t introdu ced herself on the Sund ay af t er the trial had 15 concluded. De fendant has not com e forth w ith any evidence that the j uror rec ogni zed 16 o r kn ewHart during the trial or that they had any relationship requiring the district 17 co urt t o ho ld an e vid en tiary he ar ing . Ac co rd ing ly , w e hol d th at D ef en dant h as not 18 su st ai ne d hi s bu rd en of sh owi ng th at th is juro r was bi as edor i m pa rti al
. See State v. 19 M ann , 2002-NMS C-001, ¶ 20, 131 N. M. 459, 39 P. 3d 1 2 4 (“ The e ssence of case s17

1 i n v o l v i n g ju ro r . . . b i as i s wh et h ert h e c i rc u m s t an ce u n fa i rl y af fe ct ed t h e ju ry’s 2 de lib er at ive pr oc es s and r es ult ed in anunf ai r j ur y . ”)
. T he dis tr ic t co urt did not abuse 3 its dis cr et ionin de ny ing D ef en dant a ne wtr ia l onthi s ba sis
. 4 Ne w ly Discovered Evidenc e 5 { 28} This is an alternative a r gum ent to Def

endant’ s ineffec tive assistance of counsel 6 cl ai m . I t i s un cl ear w he n c ouns el le ar ne d a bout W el ch ’ s tr aj ec tor

y e xpe rt ise
. I n th e 7 State’ s response to th e m otion for a new trial, the State argued that defense counsel 8 knew about W elch and h i s ex pertise before De fendant’ s trial because W elch had 9 pe rf orm ed a n e xa m ina tio n of a fi re ar m an d vie w ed ev ide nc e in the oth er c as e m onths 10 be fo re D ef

en dant’ s tri al
. D ur ing the he ar ing on D ef en dant’ s m oti on f

or ane wtr ia l, 1 1 d e f e n s e c o u n s e l a d v i s e dt h e d i s t r i c tc o u rto n l y t h a t s h e h i r e dWe l c h a s af i r e a rms 12 ex pe rt in the oth er ca se , W el ch ha s be ena n e xpe rt w itn es s si nc e 1974 , a nd tha t sh e 13 did no t learn about his tra j ectory expertise until after De fendant’ s trial. The district 1 4 co u rtd i dn o tm ak e a fi n d i n g as t o wh en d ef en s e c o u n s el l ea rn ed ab o u tWel ch ’s 15 traj ectory

expertise. Instead, the district court deter m ined that the pr o ff

er ed expert 16 te sti m ony

did not c onst itu te ne w ly

dis co ve re d e vid en ce or

gr ound s f

or ane wtr ia l. 17 The c ourt based its decisio n on t he fac t that defense counsel had already argued 1 8 t r a je c t o ry i s s u e s i n c l o s i n g a r g u men tb a s e do n t e s t i mo n y p r e s e n t e dt o t h e ju ry.18

1 { 29} In his ineff

ective assistance of counsel cla im , De fendant acknowled g es that 2 traj ectory

experts existed before his tria l. And he states specifically that his attorney 3 “ dis co ve re d the us efu ln ess of abul le t tra

j ec tor y e xpe rt in a se parate c as e pr ior

to 4 [D efendant’ s] trial. ” N ow, however, De fendant claim s that this is n ew ly discovered 5 evidence and that his attorney did no t learn about traj ectory experts u n t i l after 6 De fendant’ s t ri al and this di scovery constitu tes newly

discovered evidence that 7 w ar rants ane wtr ia l. D ef

en dant c an not

ha ve it both w ay s. 8 { 30} A m otion for a new trial based on an allegation of n ew ly discovered evidence 9 m ust m eet six requirem ents to be granted: (1) “ it will probably change the result if a 10 ne wtr ia l i s gr an te d;” ( 2) “ it m ust ha ve be endis co ve re d si nc e the tr ia l;” (3 ) “ it co uld 11 not ha ve be endis co ve red be fo re the tr ia l by the e xe rc ise of

due dil ige nc e; ” (4 ) “ it 12 m ust be m at er ia l;” ( 5) “ it m

ust not be m er el y

c um ula tiv e; a nd” ( 6) “ it m

ust not be 13 m ere l y i m

p eaching or contradictory .” Sta te v . G arc ia , 200 5- N MS C- 038, ¶ 8, 138 14 N.M. 65 9, 1 25 P.3d 63 8 (i nt ern al qu ot at io n m ark s an d c it at io n o m it te d)
. 15 { 31} The a llegedl y newly discovered evidence wa s W elch, an expert in bullet 16 traj ectory

who had p revi ouslybeen reta ined by defense counsel in a separate case. 17 D ef en dant cl ai m s that W el ch co uld ha ve te sti fi ed ab out the tr aj ec tor y in thi s c as e an d, 1 8 i n p a rt i c u l a r , t h e p o s i t i o n o f Vi c t i m’s b o d y wh e n t h e b u l l e t s e n t e r e dh i s b o d y. 19 Ac cording to Defendan t, the angle of the lethal shot could have assist ed his self-19

1 defense ar gum ent. W e conclude that counsel’s re alization that a traj ectory expert m ay 2 ha ve bol ste re d D ef

en dant’ s th eo ry

of se lf- de fe nse doe s no t c onst itu te ne w ly 3 di sc ov ered ev id en ce. Se e Cu rry , 2 0 0 2

- N M C A

- 0 9 2 , ¶ ¶ 1 7
- 1 9 ( h o l d i n g t h a tthe 4 te sti m ony

of a w itn es s known be fo re tr ia l, but w ho w as not av ai la ble at tr ia l, did not 5 co nst itu te ne w ly

dis co ve re d e vid en ce ). E ve n if de fe nse c ouns el did

not le ar n a bout 6 W elch’ s traj ectory

expertise until after D efendant’ s trial, the existence of traj ectory 7 experts could have been disco vered before trial by the exerc ise of due diligence. 8 Mor eo ve r, be ca

use it is unc le ar

w ha t W el ch , or

a nothe r tr aj ec tor

y w itn es s, w oul d 9 ha ve te sti fi ed , w e cannot a sse ss whe the r the ev id en ce w oul d pr oba bly c hange the 10 result if a new trial is granted or whether the evidence would be m aterial, cum ulative, 11 im pe ach in g, o r co nt rad ic to ry . Se e G arc ia , 200 5- N MS C- 038, ¶ 8. 12 { 32} “ G ive n th e w ide la tit ude w e pr ovi de to dis tr ic t co urts i n r es olv ing m oti ons fo r 13 a ne wtr ia l ba se d onne w ly dis co ve re d e vid en ce , w e ca nnot c onc lud e tha t an a

buse 14 of discretion occurred on these facts. ” Sta te v . G all egos , 201 1- N MS C- 027, ¶ 77, 149 15 N
. M. 704, 254 P.3d 65 5; se e als o State v . Sos a , 1997-NMS C-032, ¶ 16, 123 N. M. 16 564, 943 P
. 2d 1 017 (e xpl ai nin g th at m oti ons fo r a new t ri al ba se d onne w ly 17 dis co ve re d e vid en ce ar e “ not en co ur ag ed ” and the “ de nia l of s uc h am oti on w ill onl y 18 be rever sed if the district court has acted arbitrar ily , capriciously , or bey ond reason”);20

1 Cu rry , 200 2- N MC A -0 92, ¶ 21 (a ff irm ing de nia l of

m oti on f or ne wtr ia l thus re

j ec tin g 2 th e d efen da nt ’s att em

pt to “ ta ke an ot he r bi te at t he ap pl e”). 3 Ju ry Br ea k 4 { 33} During De fendant’ s closing argum ent, the S tate asked for a bench conference 5 an d a m ong othe r iss ue s, as ke d the distri ct co urt to adm oni sh the spe ct at or s f or the ir 6 dis ru pti ve a ct ion s. F oll ow ing the be nc h c onf er en ce , the dis tr ic t c ourt se nt the j ur y out 7 for a br eak in order to address the trial s pectators. The court did not inform the j ury 8 of the r easo n fo r the br eak, a nd D ef en dant d id n ot o bj ec t or r eque st a

c ur at ive 9 ins tr uc tio n to a ddr es s th e tim ing of the br eak. 10 { 34} Af

ter the j ury

convicted him of volun tary m anslaugh ter, De fendant argued that 11 he wa s entitled to a new trial because the tim ing of the break m ay have left the j ury 12 w iththe im

pr es sio n th at

de fe nse c ouns el did

or sa id s om ethin g ina

ppr opr ia te to ca

use 13 the break and that the appearance of im pro p ri et y prej udiced him . T he district court 14 de nie d D ef

en dant’ s r eque st f

or ane w tr ia l, an d D ef

en dant ra ise s the sa m e ar gum en t 15 on a ppe al
. 16 { 35} D ef

en dant ac know le dge s tha t he did not pr es er ve thi s iss ue fo r ap pe ll at e 17 re vie w , a nd h e ra ise s th is c ur sor y a rg um en t a s fund am en ta l er ro r pur suant t o R

ule 12- 18 216(B)(2) N MRA . P arties alleging fundam ental error m ust dem onstrate the existence 19 of c ir cu m stanc es tha t “ shoc k the co nsc ie nc e” or im pli cate a fundam en ta l un fa ir ne ss21

1 wit hi n th e syste m th at wou ld un de rm in e jud ic ia l i nt eg rit y if l eft un ch eck ed
. State v. 2 Cu nni ngha m , 2000 -N MS C- 009, ¶ 21, 128 N
. M. 711, 998 P
. 2d 1 76; see also S tate v. 3 Barber , 2004-NM SC -0 19, ¶ 17, 135 N.M. 621, 92 P.3d 633 (provid ing th at 4 fundam en ta l e rr or

onl y oc curs in “ cases w ithde fe ndants w ho are ind isp uta bly 5 inn oc en t, a n dc a s e s i n w h i c h am i s t a k e i n t h e p r o c e s s m ak e s ac o n v i c t ion 6 fu nd am en ta ll y

un fai r no twi th st an di ng th e ap pa ren t g ui lt of t he accu se d” ). 7 { 36} De fendant provi des no argum ent concerning this hy poth etically

perce ived 8 pr ej u d i c e t o h i m

b a s e do n t h e t i m i n g o f

t h e b r e a ka n dt h e d i s t r i c tc o u rt ’ s f a i l u r e to 9 giv e a curativ e ins tr

uc tio n. I nde ed

he c ont en ds o nly

that the ti m ing “ m igh t

have led 10 the j ur

y to be lie ve that de fe nse c ouns el ’ s c ondu ct c au se d th e br eak. ” (E m pha sis 11 added.) T his equiv ocal statem ent sim ply does not rise to th e level of f undam ental 12 er ro r an d do es not

de m onstrate the e xis te nc e of c ir cu m stanc es that “ shoc k th e 13 co nsc ie nc e. ” T he re fo re , w e hol d th at the dis tr ic t c ourt di d no t a buse it s di sc re tio n in 14 de nyin g Def

en da nt a ne w tri al on th is ba si s. 15 CON CLU SION 16 { 37} F o r

t h e f o r e g o i n g r e a s o n s , w e a f

f i rm. 17 { 38} IT IS S O ORDERE D.
18

____ ____ ____ ____ ____ ____ ____ ___ 19 LI N D A M . V A N Z I, Ju dg e22

1 WE CO NCUR:

2

____ ____ ____ ____ ____ ____ ____ ____ _ 3 M IC HA EL E. V IG IL , C hi ef Ju dg e

4

____ ____ ____ ____ ____ ____ ____ ____ _ 5 M IC HA EL D . BU ST A M A N TE , Ju dg e