UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

v. No. 99-6096

TIMOTHY W. MCCOY,

Defendant-Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Northern District of West Virginia, at Clarksburg.

Irene M. Keeley, District Judge.

(CR-92-189, CA-97-85-1)

Submitted: July 20, 1999

Decided: August 16, 1999

Before WIDENER, ERVIN, and WILKINS, Circuit Judges.

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Dismissed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

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COUNSEL

Timothy W. McCoy, Appellant Pro Se. Samuel Gerald Nazzaro, Jr.,

Assistant United States Attorney, Wheeling, West Virginia, for

Appellee.

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Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit. See

Local Rule 36(c).

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OPINION

PER CURIAM:

Timothy W. McCoy appeals the dismissal of his 28 U.S.C.A.

§ 2255 (West Supp. 1999) action. McCoy was convicted by a jury of

operating a continuing criminal enterprise ("CCE") and conspiracy,

involving the manufacture and distribution of marijuana, as well as

various other crimes, including money laundering, tax evasion, and

suborning perjury. On appeal, we vacated the conspiracy conviction

as a lesser-included offense of operating a CCE and affirmed the

remaining convictions. See United States v. Heater, 63 F.3d 311, 332

(4th Cir. 1995). McCoy then filed this § 2255 motion, arguing a plethora of grounds. The district court denied the motion, without a hearing and without requesting a response from the Government.

I.

McCoy, his girlfriend Connie Heater, and other individuals were

involved in the cultivation, possession, and distribution of marijuana

in West Virginia. McCoy's operation was substantial, and the evidence showed that it involved nearly six million dollars worth of marijuana. McCoy supervised at least five workers who constructed

irrigation systems, painted fences, harvested the crops, laundered drug

money, and distributed marijuana. See Heater, 63 F.3d at 315-16.

McCoy was tried along with Heater, his father Richard McCoy,

and other indicted co-conspirators. Other co-conspirators testified

under grants of immunity or plea agreements with the Government.

McCoy and his father Richard retained, respectively, J. Michael

Benninger and Clark B. Frame, of the law firm of Wilson, Frame &

Metheney. The court conducted a Fed. R. Crim. P. 44(c) hearing prior

to trial, presenting to both defendants the potential for a conflict of

interest. Both defendants signed waivers. After the case went to the

jury, Benninger requested permission to leave the courthouse and

have Frame represent his client during deliberations. With the consent

of both defendants, the court agreed.1 

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1 The McCoys' consent to dual representation during deliberations is

contained in the record. However, although McCoy and the district court

 2
The jury consisted of eleven women and one man, Matthew Smith.

During trial, Smith approached several of the defendants. According

to an affidavit filed by Harvey John, a co-defendant, Smith first

approached John, and they briefly discussed mutual acquaintances.

Smith again approached John and attempted to talk to him, but John

told him that the discussion was improper and promptly left. According to John, Benninger witnessed the second exchange and inquired

as to whether Smith had tried to talk to John. John answered "he tryed

[sic]." After closing arguments, Smith met with Tim McCoy, Heater,

and John in a car. They smoked marijuana, and Smith allegedly told

Tim and the others that Richard McCoy would be acquitted. Smith

also indicated that he felt all the defendants were not guilty.2

McCoy alleges that he immediately informed Frame (as Benninger

was not present) that Richard McCoy would be found not guilty.

McCoy then allegedly began to explain to Frame that his information

was based on juror contact, but Frame stated, "Don't tell me, I don't

want to hear it."

During deliberations, the jury sent out an unsigned note, stating

that one hold-out juror was convinced of the Defendants' innocence.

After Frame objected to the rereading of any portions of the jury

charge, the court instructed the jury to continue deliberating. Subsequently, Smith sent out a signed note stating that he could not attend

the next day, due to a scheduled job interview. The court did not

respond to this note. Several hours later, the jury returned their verdicts, which inter alia found Tim McCoy guilty on all charges and

acquitted Richard McCoy.

After the verdicts were returned, Benninger filed a motion for a

new trial based on juror misconduct. However, he did not support his

motion with factual specifics or affidavits, asserting that he was concerned about McCoy incriminating himself. Benninger stated at the

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agree that a second Rule 44(c) hearing was held, the record does not contain a transcript of any discussion between counsel and the court regarding this issue.

2 Smith has pled guilty to obstruction of justice. Tim, Heater, and John

all testified at his grand jury proceeding.

 3
hearing that he was attempting to negotiate some sort of an immunity

agreement for McCoy, but the Government had not yet agreed. The

court denied the motion for lack of a factual basis. On appeal, Benninger again raised this issue. At the time, only John had testified

before Smith's grand jury, and Benninger related that information to

this court, but still presented no affidavits in support of his factual

allegations. We denied the appeal on this issue for lack of factual support but stated that a collateral attack might still be possible. See

Heater, 63 F.3d at 321-22.

II.

McCoy raises several claims attacking the performance of Frame

during jury deliberations. In order to succeed on a claim of ineffective

assistance of counsel, McCoy must show: (1) that his counsel's performance fell below an objective standard of reasonableness and (2)

that counsel's deficient performance was prejudicial. See Strickland

v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984). Under the first prong of

Strickland, McCoy must demonstrate that counsel's performance fell

below an objective standard of reasonableness under"prevailing professional norms." Id. at 688. To satisfy the second prong of

Strickland, McCoy must demonstrate that there is a "reasonable probability that, but for counsel's unprofessional errors, the result of the

proceeding would have been different." Id. at 694. However, this

court cannot grant relief solely because the outcome would have been

different absent counsel's deficient performance. See Lockhart v.

Fretwell, 506 U.S. 364, 369-70 (1993). Instead, this court can only

grant relief under the second prong of Strickland if the "result of the

proceeding was fundamentally unfair or unreliable." Id. at 369.

Assuming McCoy has satisfied the first prong of Strickland by

alleging that Frame knew of the juror misconduct, and failed to disclose it, we find that McCoy cannot satisfy the second prong of

Strickland. He was a party to the misconduct, and he was present in

court when the jury was instructed not to discuss the case with anyone. Furthermore, any bias created by the presence of Smith on the

jury would have been in favor of McCoy. In addition, McCoy could

have informed the court of the misconduct, even if Frame declined to

do so. We therefore find the verdict was neither unfair nor unreliable.

 4
McCoy next contends that Frame failed to object to an off-therecord discussion concerning the fact that the jury was split eleven to

one for conviction. Because the discussion was off the record, there

is not much information available about what occurred. McCoy

attaches to his informal brief a letter from Benninger relating Heater's

trial attorney's recollections of this off-the-record discussion.

According to this letter, at approximately 11:20 a.m., the court conducted a discussion regarding the jury note that indicated one juror

believed that all defendants were not guilty. The judge then recommended rereading part of the jury charge. Frame objected, stating that

it would be non-productive and coercive. The judge then decided not

to reread any particular portion of the charge. The jury was not

brought back into open court, but instead the judge prepared a written

note which read as follows:

You have been instructed as to your deliberations, you have

a copy of the Charge, consider it as a whole, including

Pages 1-14 and Pages 61-63 for a response to your question.3

According to McCoy, after the judge had responded to the jury's

question, Smith sent out a signed note stating that he was unavailable

the next day. This note was apparently never answered. The jury

returned their verdicts at approximately 7:00 that evening.

The district court states the facts somewhat differently in its opinion. The judge recalls receiving the note disclosing the numerical

division and then telling the jury they should keep deliberating. Subsequently, Smith sent out a note stating that he could not attend the

next day. Over Frame's objection, the court then allegedly gave an

Allen charge, pursuant to Allen v. United States, 164 U.S. 492 (1896),

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3 This is not a precise quote but merely based on Heater's lawyer's recollections. The written note was not made part of the record. In addition,

although McCoy and the district court quote from portions of the jury

charge, the charge was never recorded, transcribed, or made part of the

record. It is possible that McCoy and the district court have saved copies

of the charge from the trial, but neither has submitted these instructions.

In any event, we do not know what is contained on pages 1-14 or 61-63.

 5
in the modified form stated in United States v. Stollings, 501 F.2d 954

(4th Cir. 1974).4

McCoy has not alleged what prejudice he suffered when his attorney failed to object to the discussion regarding the jury split. While

for purposes of appellate and collateral review, it would certainly

have been simpler if this discussion were on the record, McCoy has

failed to show how a transcript of the proceeding would have resulted

in a different outcome. Even assuming the facts are as McCoy presents them, Frame objected to a rereading of the charge to the jury, his

objection was sustained, and the court told the jury to consider the

charge as a whole and to keep deliberating. While it would be error

for the judge to inquire into the numerical division of the jury, see

Brasfield v. United States, 272 U.S. 448, 450 (1926), here the judge

was inadvertently told about the split and then discussed the ramifications with counsel. Because McCoy has failed to show any prejudice

from the failure to object to this discussion being off the record, this

claim fails.

McCoy asserts that Frame erred by failing to move for a mistrial

after the district court's coercive Allen charge.5 As discussed above,

however, there is very little evidence as to what the judge's charge

contained. According to Heater's attorney's notes, there was no Allen

charge, but merely a note to the jury telling them essentially to keep

deliberating. According to the district court, the Allen charge was

noncoercive and carefully instructed the jury that both the majority

and minority should reexamine their positions in light of the other

side's views, but admonished the jury not to surrender well-founded

convictions. McCoy asserts that any charge was improper based on

the judge's knowledge of the jury split and the fact that the jury

returned quickly thereafter.

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4 There is no record of an Allen charge being made to the jury.

5 Generally, an Allen charge informs the jury that a new trial would be

expensive for both sides, there is no reason to believe that another jury

would do a better job, that it is important that a unanimous verdict be

reached, and that the jurors should consider the opinions of the jurors on

the other side. See United States v. Burgos, 55 F.3d 933, 936 (4th Cir.

1995).

 6
The judge's knowledge of the jury split is just one factor that could

show a coercive charge. The fact that the judge knew of the jury split,

standing alone, does not make the Allen charge coercive. See United

States v. Lorenzo, 43 F.3d 1303, 1307 (9th Cir. 1995) (upholding

Allen charge to 11-1 deadlocked jury). In addition, McCoy mistakenly

alleges that the jury did not deliberate following the charge. The

record reveals that the jury did not return with the verdicts until nearly

eight hours after the court instructed them to keep deliberating. Thus,

McCoy has failed to show that Frame erred in deciding not to request

a mistrial following the Allen charge.

McCoy next asserts that Frame should have requested polling of

the jury regarding the Allen charge. In addition, because several of his

co-defendants were acquitted, McCoy contends that the jury should

have been questioned regarding the basis for his conspiracy and CCE

convictions.

In fact, the jurors were polled and asked if they agreed with the

verdict. McCoy presents no authority for the conclusion that he would

have been entitled to any further questioning if Frame had so moved.

While the trial court has substantial discretion to decide how the jury

should be polled, any motion by Frame for further inquiries would

likely have been denied. See United States v. Carter, 772 F.2d 66, 68

(4th Cir. 1985) (best practice is for court or clerk of court to ask each

juror individually whether verdict announced is his verdict); see also

Fed. R. Evid. 606(b) (juror may not testify as to the jury's deliberations or as to the effect of anything on the juror's mind or emotions).

Thus, McCoy is unable to show either attorney error or prejudice on

this claim.

McCoy next argues that, in representing both him and his father,

Frame labored under an impermissible conflict of interest during jury

deliberations. According to McCoy, because Frame knew that Richard McCoy would be acquitted, he did not move for a mistrial or

object to the Allen charge, even though these actions might have benefitted Tim.

In general, to prevail on a claim of conflict of interest, a petitioner

must present convincing evidence of an actual conflict and a resulting

adverse effect on performance. See Beaver v. Thompson, 93 F.3d

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1186, 1192 (4th Cir. 1996). First, McCoy cannot show an actual conflict. If Frame were aware that Richard McCoy would be acquitted,

he was also aware that Smith believed Tim to be innocent of the

charges. Therefore, it would be reasonable to avoid a mistrial so that

Smith, who had declared his allegiance to the defense, would be on

the jury. Second, even if Frame operated under a conflict of interest,

there was no adverse effect. As discussed above, McCoy cannot show

prejudice from Frame's failure to object to the off-the-record discussion, request a mistrial following the Allen charge, or request further

polling of the jury. McCoy presents no other actions that Frame

would have taken had he not had a conflict. Accordingly, because

McCoy cannot show adverse effect, this claim must fail.

III.

McCoy also attacks the trial court's decision regarding the Allen

charge and disclosure of the jury split. As discussed above, there was

no error in the disclosure of the jury split to the attorneys and parties.

While it is unclear what the Allen charge contained or even if it

existed, McCoy has not specifically alleged any improper language.

In any event, as outlined above, McCoy suffered no harm from the

court's actions, and thus, he is not entitled to relief.

IV.

McCoy twice waived his right to conflict-free representation: once,

pretrial, and then again before jury deliberations. A defendant may

waive his right to assistance of counsel unhindered by conflicts of

interest. See Holloway v. Arkansas, 435 U.S. 475, 483 n.5 (1978). The

district court found that the requirements of Rule 44(c) were met and

the ensuing waiver was valid.

McCoy contends, however, that his second waiver was unknowing

and involuntary. Yet, he presents no support for this statement.

McCoy does not assert that anything was not disclosed to him, and

he does not allege precisely what he supposedly did not understand.

In fact, the only undisclosed conflict that McCoy points to is the allegation that Frame's knowledge of Richard McCoy's likely acquittal

affected his own representation. However, the court had no knowledge of jury impropriety until after the trial had ended and, therefore,

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could not have so informed McCoy. Further, as discussed above,

McCoy suffered no harm from the dual representation.

V.

McCoy also attacks many actions by Benninger under the umbrella

of ineffective assistance of counsel. First, McCoy asserts that Benninger knew of the improper juror contact, and therefore, when Benninger returned to the courthouse, he should have investigated what

had occurred and corrected Frame's alleged mistakes. McCoy's basis

for alleging that Benninger knew of Smith's contact with the Defendants is John's affidavit. As outlined above, John alleged that Benninger saw him with Smith, Benninger asked if Smith tried to talk to

him, and John responded, "he tryed [sic]."

There is no allegation that Benninger knew either that Smith had

discussed jury deliberations with the Defendants or that Smith had

smoked marijuana with them. While Benninger should have informed

the court that Smith tried to talk to John, the court likely would have

just examined Smith and reinstructed the jury. Further, for the reasons

discussed above, even if the court took further action, such as replacing Smith or declaring a mistrial, McCoy still could not show prejudice under Strickland, because the result of his trial was neither unfair

nor unreliable.

Because, at most, Benninger only knew that Smith had tried to talk

to John, there was no basis for him to take any further action once he

returned to the courtroom regarding the juror notes or the Allen

charge. There were simply no grounds for Benninger to conclude that

Frame or the court had erred.

McCoy next asserts that Benninger improperly failed to file a brief

or an affidavit in support of the factual allegations of juror misconduct at either the post-trial motion stage or on appeal. However, Benninger was understandably concerned about McCoy implicating

himself. He attempted to secure immunity for McCoy, but when that

attempt failed, he determined that it would be too dangerous for

McCoy to file an affidavit. We find that such a strategy was reasonable.

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On appeal, Benninger informed the Court that John had testified

before Smith's grand jury. McCoy argues that Benninger could and

should have obtained the transcripts of these proceedings. However,

grand jury transcripts are generally secret and cannot be disclosed

absent a court order. See Fed. R. Crim. P. 6(e). Therefore, failure to

obtain these transcripts was not error.

McCoy asserts that Benninger should have objected to many portions of the Government's closing argument. Most significantly, the

Government stated in its closing argument that McCoy sold marijuana

around schools. This evidence was allegedly testified to by Randy

Foster, Bob Bailey, Jerry Burkhammer, and Bobby Timms. However,

these witnesses testified that they bought marijuana from McCoy

while he was a high school student, but they never testified that they

bought the marijuana near a school. While the Government's statement was incorrect, it was merely one sentence in an argument that

covers sixty-three pages of transcript. Based on the overwhelming

evidence against McCoy, we find that failure to object to this statement did not prejudice his defense. We have carefully reviewed the

remainder of McCoy's arguments that Benninger erroneously failed

to object to the Government's closing argument, as well as the district

court's decision on these points, and we are in agreement with the district court's reasoning, which we hereby adopt.

McCoy next contends that Benninger showed him plea offers by

the Government but never fully informed him about the advantages

of the pleas or the dangers of going to trial. McCoy contends that, had

he known all the implications, he would have pled guilty. Specifically, he states that he should have been told that he would be eligible

for an acceptance of responsibility reduction and told that he would

not have to testify against his girlfriend and father.

Professional standards require that counsel present a plea offer to

a defendant, outline its terms, give an opinion of probable outcomes,

advise on the pros and cons of the alternatives, and allow a defendant

to make the ultimate choice for accepting or rejecting a plea. See

Jones v. Murray, 947 F.2d 1106, 1110 (4th Cir. 1991). However, even

if Benninger failed to comply with Jones, McCoy must also show that

he would not have pled guilty absent Benninger's incompetence. See

Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52, 59 (1985). This McCoy cannot do.

 10
If McCoy had pled guilty, there is no certainty that he would have

been granted a reduction for acceptance of responsibility. At trial, he

denied selling or manufacturing marijuana, and the evidence showed

that he suborned perjury at the grand jury stage. If he had pled guilty

after his indictment, his grand jury actions would have made a reduction unlikely. Further, as part of a standard plea agreement, he would

likely have been debriefed by the Government and would not have

been able to shield his girlfriend and father. At the very least, by

refusing to give details about his business and co-conspirators, he

could ensure that he would not be entitled to an acceptance of responsibility reduction. Because McCoy would not have been entitled to

the benefits he now says would have induced him to plead guilty, he

has not shown prejudice from his counsel's alleged failure to fully

inform him about the plea offers.

McCoy asserts that Benninger erred by failing to appeal on the

basis of prosecutorial misconduct during the closing argument and

alleged error in delivering the Allen charge. For the reasons discussed

above, McCoy cannot show that these claims would have been successful on appeal. Counsel succeeded on appeal in obtaining a reversal of McCoy's conspiracy conviction. We, therefore, find that

Benninger's appellate strategy was sound and not ineffective.

McCoy contends that much of the evidence at trial described a

buyer/seller relationship with the witnesses, rather than a continuing

criminal enterprise. However, he asserts that the jury instructions permitted the jury to use the evidence of buyer/seller relationships to find

that McCoy was a manager or supervisor, for purposes of the CCE

charge. See 21 U.S.C. § 848(c) (1994). Therefore, McCoy contends

that Benninger should have requested an instruction that a mere

buyer/seller relationship was insufficient for purposes of § 848(c).

McCoy references two portions of the jury charge as erroneous,

because they allegedly permitted a CCE conviction to be based on

only a buyer/seller relationship. The first contested part stated that the

jury should consider the evidence that distinguishes a manager from

a mere underling. Examples given by the court of managerial duties

were negotiating large-scale purchases or sales of narcotics, making

arrangements for transportation, organizing money-laundering, and

instructing participants. The jury was then instructed that these factors

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were not conclusive but could be used to think about the defendant's

role and his relationship to the other persons involved. The other contested language defined the term "distribution."

The jury instructions, as quoted by McCoy, were not erroneous.

The jury was specifically instructed that they must find McCoy to be

a manager and that a manager was to be distinguished from a mere

underling in an enterprise. Furthermore, instructing participants in

relation to large-scale purchases and arranging the transportation and

laundering of the money does not describe a mere buyer-seller relationship. See United States v. Butler, 885 F.2d 195, 201 (4th Cir.

1989) (exercising control over the how, when and from whom elements of a drug deal is sufficient to show management role). Even if

the jury could have been somewhat confused by this language, they

were then instructed that these inquiries were not conclusive and that

they must still determine that McCoy was a manager viewing the evidence as a whole. Finally, the definition of distribution was apparently used in the context of defining the required underlying felony

violations of narcotics laws, which are a separate element of a CCE

charge. See 21 U.S.C. § 848(c)(1). Therefore, these instructions were

not in error.

McCoy was charged with a conspiracy dating from 1979 and a

CCE beginning in 1986. McCoy did not turn eighteen until sometime

in the early 1980's. On these facts, McCoy asserts that Benninger

erred by failing to move to suppress evidence of crimes preceding his

eighteenth birthday.

When a conspiracy begins before a defendant's eighteenth birthday, but continues beyond that date, evidence of pre-majority conduct

may not be used to provide the sole basis for a guilty verdict. However, such conduct may be relevant to proving defendant's knowledge

of the conspiracy and the conspiracy's purpose. See United States v.

Spoone, 741 F.2d 680, 687 (4th Cir. 1984). In Spoone, this court

approved the use of a limiting instruction regarding the pre-majority

conduct as a method of ensuring that the defendant was not convicted

solely on the basis of that conduct. See id.

In this case, there was no limiting instruction, and the Government's argument and the jury instructions permitted pre-majority con-

 12
duct to be considered for the purposes of determining guilt. However,

McCoy has failed to show prejudice from Benninger's failure to

object, because McCoy's conspiracy conviction has already been

vacated. While he still stands convicted of CCE, that charge only

related to post-1986 conduct, and therefore, while his pre-majority

conduct may have been considered in determining his knowledge and

plan, it could not have properly been used to determine the actual elements of CCE. Accordingly, McCoy has failed to satisfy the requirements of showing ineffective assistance.

McCoy contends that Benninger should have moved for acquittal

or to dismiss the indictment of counts based on pre-majority conduct.

While Benninger likely should have taken some action regarding

McCoy's pre-majority conduct, the issue is now moot as the conspiracy conviction has been vacated. McCoy presents no reason to

believe that the jury considered pre-majority conduct as evidence of

guilt on the CCE charge, and therefore, McCoy can show no prejudice from Benninger's failure to address this issue.

McCoy asserts that the evidence did not show a conspiracy before

the mid-1980's, and thus, Benninger should have requested an

instruction that pre-conspiracy conduct was barred by the statute of

limitations. Since McCoy was not charged with any substantive distribution counts, it is unclear what benefit McCoy hoped to gain through

this instruction. In any event, as the conspiracy charge was dismissed,

any argument McCoy has with the proof on that charge is moot, and

he cannot show prejudice from Benninger's actions.

McCoy next contends that Benninger erred by failing to object to

misleading, contradictory and confusing portions of the jury charge.

We affirm the dismissal of these claims on the reasoning of the district court.

Next, relying on 18 U.S.C. § 201(c)(2) (1994), McCoy contends

that Benninger should have moved to suppress the testimony of coconspirators who received immunity or recommended sentence reductions from the Government in exchange for their cooperation and testimony. Every circuit that has addressed this issue has concluded that

Government promises of the kind offered in this case do not violate

§ 201. See United States v. Lowery, 166 F.3d 1119, 1122-23 (11th

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Cir. 1999) (citing cases); United States v. Singleton, 165 F.3d 1297,

1302 (10th Cir. 1999) (en banc court reversing three judge panel),

cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 1999 WL 185874 (U.S. June 21, 1999)

(No. 98-8758). Especially considering that McCoy's trial predated the

recent explosion of § 201 analysis that followed the unprecedented

holding of the original Singleton decision, we find that Benninger's

performance in not objecting to these witnesses did not fall below

objective standards of reasonable conduct.

McCoy asserts that Benninger should have requested a special verdict form in order to determine whether the jury improperly relied

upon pre-majority conduct, improperly merged the conspiracy and

CCE charges, or were confused regarding the requirements for a CCE

conviction. This argument is basically a retread of many of McCoy's

other arguments which have been addressed in detail above. Because

the jury instructions were not in error, there is no reason to believe

that the jury was laboring under any misconceptions. Thus, any

motion by Benninger for a special verdict form would likely have

been denied.6

VI.

McCoy next asserts that the Government committed prosecutorial

misconduct during the closing argument. To prevail on a claim of prosecutorial misconduct, a defendant must show that the remarks were

improper and that they prejudicially affected his substantial rights so

as to deprive him of a fair trial. See United States v. Mitchell, 1 F.3d

235, 240 (4th Cir. 1993). For the reasons discussed above regarding

ineffective assistance, we find that the few improper comments made

by the prosecutor were isolated and did not affect McCoy's right to

a fair trial.

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6 The trial court noted post-trial that it was possible the jury convicted

of conspiracy based on the same exact acts as the CCE and that, in the

future, the court would use a special verdict form when a pre-existing

conspiracy merges into a CCE. However, since the conspiracy conviction

was vacated, any error has already been rectified.

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VII.

Finally, McCoy contends that the cumulative effect of all of the

alleged errors entitles him to relief. As discussed above, in his multitude of claims, McCoy has alleged several meritorious trial errors, i.e.

improper closing argument, failure to inform the court of juror misconduct, failure to request a limiting instruction on pre-majority conduct, etc. However, our review of the record leaves us convinced that

he cannot show prejudice even from the combination of all of the

alleged errors.

Accordingly, we deny a certificate of appealability and dismiss the

appeal. We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal

contentions are adequately presented in the materials before the court

and argument would not aid the decisional process.

DISMISSED

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