NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT

No. 17-2655

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

v. SUSAN C. KEVRA-SHINER, Appellant

________________ Appeal from the United States District Court for the Middle District of Pennsylvania (D.C. Criminal Action No. 3-14-cr-00257-001) District Judge: Honorable Malachy E. Mannion

Submitted Under Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) June 4, 2018 Before: AMBRO, JORDAN, and VANASKIE, Circuit Judges (Opinion filed: July 10, 2018)

OPINION *

________________ AMBRO, Circuit Judge Susan Kevra-Shiner was indicted and, following a jury trial, convicted for seven counts of mail fraud on seven individual consumers under 18 U.S.C. § 1341. Through

* This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not constitute binding precedent.2 her company, GK Abstract, Inc. (“GKA”), she sold these seven individuals and sixty

- two others title insurance as a purported agent of Stewart Title Guaranty Company , eve n though it had terminated her authorization to sell its insurance. Her central defense at trial was that she mistakenly believed she was still authorized to sell the policies despite contractually agreeing to the termination. On appeal, she challenges h er conviction, the evidence admitted at trial, and her sentence. 1 Because the District Court did not err , we affirm.
Kevra

- Shiner raises t wo arguments for the first time on appeal, which we review for plain error. Fed. R. Crim. P. 52(b). First, she a s s e rts that the indictment , which charged fraud on consumers, was constructively amended after trial to includ e fraud on both consumers and institutions

. S he claims the Government requested and the District Court read a jury instruction that included fraud o n institutions , but cites neither an explicit request nor an explicit instruction. Instead, Kevra

- Shiner relies on the prosecutor ’s statement during closing argument that she did not pay Stewart Title its standard fees for the insurance policies in disput e

— suggesting she was under no illusion that she could still issue those policies . Kevra

- Shiner also points to the Court’s comment, when instructing the jury that she need not profit from her fraudulent scheme to be liable for mail fraud , that “ it so happe ns that the government does contend that the proof established that persons and institutions were defrauded and that the defendant profited [from] it. ” A pp. 57.

1 The District Court had jurisdiction over the criminal proceeding under 18 U.S.C. § 3231, and we have juri sdiction over the appeal und er 2 8 U.S.C. § 1291.3 An indictment i s constructively amended only if “ the evidence and j ury instructions at trial m odif y essential terms of the charged offense ” such that “ there is a substantial likelihood that the jury may have convicted the defendant for an offense differing from the offense the indictment returned by the grand jury actually charged.” United States v. Daraio , 445 F.3d 253, 259

– 60 (3d Cir. 2006). Here t he indictment listed
seven counts of fraud on specific individual consumers

. T hose seven individuals testified at trial , and the verdict slip completed by the jury foreperson listed th e same individua ls
in the seven counts of mail fraud for which Kevra

- Shiner was convicted

. Further, i n its closing, t he Government consistently described the victims of Kevra

- Shiner’s scheme as “people”

— specifically, the homeowners who purchased title insurance from GKA. It is not substantially likely the jury could have convicted Kevra

- Shiner for fraud on institutions. Th us the Cour t did not err , let alone plain ly err. 2 Second, Kevra

- Shiner argues for the first time on appeal that the District Court erroneously permitt ed the Government to admit a certain email as evidence

. 3 In it she

2 According to Kevra

- Shiner, because the indictment was improperly amended to include fraud on both institutions and consumers, the District Court ought to have given an augmented unanimity instruction to ensure all the jurors agree d o n the grounds for her conviction. This argument fails, however , because t he indictment was not amended a nd no juror could have con victed for anything other than mail fraud on the seven consumers named in the indictment and verdict slip. See United States v. Barel , 939 F.2d 26, 35 (3d Cir. 1991).

3 Kevra

- Shiner claims she objected in part before the District Court, but because she did not preserve an objection on the record under Federal Rule of Evidence 106 , we review for plain error. S ee, e.g. , United States v. Mitchell , 365 F.3d 215, 257 (3d Cir. 2004). When the Government moved for the email’s admission into evidence, the Court asked if Kevra

- Shiner was familiar with the exhibit. App. 25. Her counsel answered, “I don’t know how this came about bein g copied as an e

- mail if it was part of a thread. I don’t object that she believes this was sent to her, a copy of what she may have seen on a4 appears to apologize to a Stewart Title employee after the company sued to enjoin her from issuing further policies without authorization. She claims the email was part of a larger chain that Stewart Title could not produce because, per its document retention policies, emails on its servers are automatically deleted after sixty days. She argues t hat the Court should have denied the lone email’s admission altogether under Rule 106 of the
F ederal Rules of Evidence , which permits counsel to require that evidence submitted by an adversary be complete. However, t o establish plain error, Kevra

- Shiner must show the admission of this email “ affect[ed] [her] substantial rights.” Fed. R. Crim. P. 52(b). In other words, she must show a “reasonable probability of a dif ferent outcome absent ” its admission. Molina

- Martinez v. United States , 136 S. Ct. 1338, 1345 (2016). She has not made this showing. At trial, her counsel challenge d the email’s re liability thoroughly when cross

examining the Stewart Title employee who received it . Kevra

- Shiner’s b rief further acknowledges that the recipient c ould have described its content to the jury even if it were not admitted. And t he email was but one piece of evidence, among others, that she
k new she lacked authorization to act as Stewart Title’s agent : for example, the termination agreement between Stewart Title and GKA, witness testimony that Stewart

computer screen. But there may be more.” Id. At no point did he mention Rule 106. The Government then stated its argument for the email’s admission. Id. The Court asked Kevra

- Shiner’s counsel whether he wished to respond, and he replied, “I don’t have any response to that, Judge. I will clarify in cross, points I would like to make.” Id

. Thus even assuming counsel initially preserved a Rule 106 objection, see Fed. R. Evid. 103(a)(1) (requiring counsel to raise a specific objection, or otherwise make the ground for objection apparent in context), he then waived it in favor of cross

- examination, s ee New York v . Hill , 528 U.S. 110, 115 (2000) (noting counsel has the last word as to what evidentiary objections to raise ).5 Title confiscated its materials from GKA’s offices, Kevr a - Shiner’s failure to remit a standard payment to Stewart Title for the policies, and her own deposition testimony in a separate civil case that she knew she lacked authorization. Thus she fails to show a reasonable probability that the email’s admission caused prejudice , and there is no plain

error . Kevra

- Shiner next challenges the District Court’s application of a perjury enhancement and its loss calculation at sentencing. B oth matters were preserved . We therefore review the C ourt’s factual determinati ons in applying the Sentencing Guidelines for clear error and review its legal conclusions de novo

. United States v. Miller , 527 F.3d 54, 75 (3d Cir. 2008) ; United States v. Napier , 273 F.3d 276, 278 (3d Cir. 2001)

. Because Judge Kosik, who presided over the trial , was on inactive status and no longer available at sentencing, Judge Mannion determined Kevra

- Shiner’s sentence. He applied a n obstruction

- of

- justice enhancement for perjury under U.S.S.G. § 3C1.1

. Kevra

- Shiner argues that a judge who was not p resent at trial to observe a testifying defendant’s demeanor cannot properly impose a perjury enhancement

. It is well established that “a defendant’s right to testify does not include a right to commit perjury.” United States v. Dunnigan , 507 U.S. 87, 96 (1993). “A defendant who testifies under oath at trial commits perjury within § 3C1.1 if he ‘gives false testimony concerning a material matter with the willful intent to provide false testimony, rather than as a result of confusion, mistake, or faulty m emory.’” United States v. Napolitan , 762 F.3d 297, 312 (3d Cir. 2014) (quoting Dunnigan , 507 U.S. at 94). W hile the defendant’s demeanor when testifying may play a role in the § 3C1.1 analysis, w e are aware of no6 binding case law precluding a perjury enh ancement if the judge who presided over trial is no longer available to sentence the defendant. Kevra

- Shiner cites none. Further , although Judge Mannion had only a cold record to review at sentencing, that record was surely sufficient here. A s he noted, there was “overwhelming evidence” that Kevra

Shiner knew she could no longer issue Stewart Title policies

. A pp. 83. S he herself testified under oath during a civil deposition that she knew. Y et she took the stand at trial and told the ju rors the opposi te

— a defense the y roundly rejected. W e find it incredible that Kevra

- Shiner’s demeanor alone could have le d a ny judge to conclude she had not perjured herself. Finally, Kevra

- Shiner disputes the District Court’s loss calculation under U.S.S.G. § 2B1.1 , wh ich Judge Mannion based on the aggregate amount her consumer victims paid for title insurance after she was no longer authorized to issue it. According to the Guideline’s commentary, “loss is the greater of actual loss or intended loss ,” and “‘ actual loss ’ means the reasonably foreseeable pecuniary harm that resulted from the offense .” U.S.S.G. § 2B1.1 cmt. n. 3 (A)

. Kevra

- Shiner argues it is not clear here that any co nsumer victim suffered either an actual or intended loss because the record does not sho w whether Stewart Title might still honor the p olicies she fraudulently issued

. This argument is unsupported by either the record or common sense. Stewart Title employees testified that the poli cies in question were invalid and legally ineffective

. Kevr a - Shiner’ s victims paid for valid , effective title insurance and did not receive it. The District Court did not err by calculating loss as the total amount Kevra

- Shiner c harged consumers for invalid policies , which was their actual loss

.7 W e thus affirm.