PRELIMINARY PRINT 

Volume 599 U. S. Part 1 

Pages 465–532 

OFFICIAL REPORTS 

OF 

THE SUPREME COURT 

June 22, 2023 

REBECCA A. WOMELDORF 

reporter of decisions 

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OCTOBER TERM, 2022 465 

Syllabus 

JONES v. HENDRIX, WARDEN 

certiorari to the united states court of appeals for 

the eighth circuit 

No. 21–857. Argued November 1, 2022—Decided June 22, 2023 

In 2000, the District Court for the Western District of Missouri sentenced 

petitioner Marcus DeAngelo Jones after he was convicted on two counts 

of unlawful possession of a frearm by a felon, in violation of 18 U. S. C. 

§ 922(g)(1), and one count of making false statements to acquire a frearm. The Eighth Circuit affrmed Jones' convictions and sentence. 

Jones then fled a motion pursuant to 28 U. S. C. § 2255, which resulted 

in the vacatur of one of his concurrent § 922(g) sentences. Many years 

later, this Court held in Rehaif v. United States, 588 U. S. –––, that a 

defendant's knowledge of the status that disqualifes him from owning a 

frearm is an element of a § 922(g) conviction. Rehaif's holding abrogated contrary Eighth Circuit precedent applied by the courts in Jones' 

trial and direct appeal. Seeking to collaterally attack his remaining 

§ 922(g) conviction based on Rehaif's statutory holding, Jones fled a 

petition for a writ of habeas corpus under 28 U. S. C. § 2241 in the district of his imprisonment, the Eastern District of Arkansas. The District Court dismissed Jones' habeas petition for lack of subject-matter 

jurisdiction, and the Eighth Circuit affrmed. 

Held: Section 2255(e) does not allow a prisoner asserting an intervening 

change in interpretation of a criminal statute to circumvent the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996's (AEDPA) restrictions 

on second or successive § 2255 motions by fling a § 2241 habeas petition. 

Pp. 471–492. 

(a) Congress created § 2255 as a remedial vehicle by which federal 

prisoners could collaterally attack their sentences by motion in the sentencing court, rather than by a petition for a writ of habeas corpus under 

§ 2241 in the district of confnement. The “sole purpose” of § 2255 was 

to address the “serious administrative problems” created by district 

courts collaterally reviewing one another's proceedings without access 

to needed evidence and “aggravated” by the concentration of federal 

prisoners in certain judicial districts that therefore faced “an inordinate 

number of habeas corpus actions.” United States v. Hayman, 342 U. S. 

205, 212–214, 219. To make this change effective, Congress generally 

barred federal prisoners “authorized” to fle a § 2255 motion from fling 

a petition under § 2241. But—in a provision of § 2255(e) now known as 

the saving clause—Congress preserved access to § 2241 in cases where 
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466 JONES v. HENDRIX 

Syllabus 

“the remedy by motion is inadequate or ineffective to test the legality 

of [a prisoner's] detention.” 

Congress later enacted AEDPA, which, as relevant here, barred second or successive § 2255 motions unless based on either “newly discovered evidence,” § 2255(h)(1), or “a new rule of constitutional law,” 

§ 2255(h)(2). Some courts faced with AEDPA's second-or-successive restrictions held that § 2255 was “inadequate and ineffective” under the 

saving clause when AEDPA's restrictions barred a prisoner from seeking relief based on a new interpretation of a criminal statute that circuit 

precedent had foreclosed at the time of the prisoner's trial, appeal, and 

frst § 2255 motion. 

Section 2255(e)'s saving clause does not authorize that end-run around 

AEDPA. The clause preserves recourse to § 2241 in cases where unusual circumstances make it impossible or impracticable to seek relief 

in the sentencing court, as well as for challenges to detention other than 

collateral attacks on a sentence. But § 2255(h) specifes the two limited 

conditions in which federal prisoners may bring second or successive 

collateral attacks on their sentences. The inability of a prisoner with a 

statutory claim to satisfy § 2255(h) does not mean that the prisoner may 

bring the claim in a § 2241 petition. Pp. 471–480. 

(b) Jones and the United States each advance unpersuasive theories 

of when and why § 2255(h)'s exclusion of statutory claims sometimes 

renders § 2255 inadequate or ineffective for purposes of the saving 

clause. Pp. 480–492. 

(1) Jones argues that § 2255 is necessarily “inadequate or ineffective to test” a prisoner's claim if the § 2255 court fails to apply the correct substantive law. But the saving clause is concerned with the adequacy or effectiveness of the remedial vehicle (“the remedy by motion”), 

not any court's asserted errors of law. Next, Jones argues that courts 

of equity would afford relief from “inadequate” legal remedies in a broad 

range of circumstances; to the extent relevant to § 2255(e), this proves 

at most that a variety of practical obstacles might trigger the saving 

clause, cf. Hayman, 342 U. S., at 215, n. 23, not that the clause offers an 

exemption from AEDPA's limits on second or successive collateral attacks. Jones further argues that the saving clause's use of the present 

tense (“is inadequate or ineffective”) means that § 2241 is available 

whenever a prisoner is presently unable to fle a § 2255 motion. That 

argument would nullify AEDPA's limits on collateral relief. 

Jones suggests that denying him the chance to raise his Rehaif claim 

in a § 2241 petition would violate the Suspension Clause, U. S. Const., 

Art. I, § 9, cl. 2. This argument fails because it would extend the writ 

of habeas corpus far beyond its scope when the Constitution was drafted 
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Syllabus 

and ratifed. Department of Homeland Security v. Thuraissigiam, 591 

U. S. –––, –––. When the Suspension Clause was adopted, Jones' Rehaif 

claim would not have been cognizable in habeas at all. At the founding, 

a sentence after conviction “by a court of competent jurisdiction” was 

“ `in itsel f sufficient cause' ” for a prisoner's continued detention. 

Brown v. Davenport, 596 U. S. –––, ––– (quoting Ex parte Watkins, 3 

Pet. 193, 202). Of particular relevance here, a habeas court had no 

power to “look beyond the judgment” to “re-examine the charges on 

which it was rendered” for substantive errors of law—even “if . . . the 

[sentencing] court ha[d] misconstrued the law, and ha[d] pronounced an 

offence to be punishable criminally, which [was] not so.” Id., at 202, 

209. While Jones argues that pre-founding practice was otherwise, he 

fails to identify a single clear case of habeas being used to relitigate a 

conviction after trial by a court of general criminal jurisdiction. 

The principles of Ex parte Watkins guided this Court's understanding 

of the habeas writ throughout the 19th century and well into the 20th. 

See Brown, 596 U. S., at –––, n. 1 (collecting cases). It was not until 

1974, in Davis v. United States, 417 U. S. 333, that the Court held for 

the frst time that a substantive error of statutory law could be a cognizable ground for a collateral attack on a federal court's criminal judgment. See id., at 342–347. The Suspension Clause neither constitutionalizes that innovation nor requires its extension to a second or 

successive collateral attack. 

Jones' remaining constitutional arguments are no more persuasive. 

He argues that denying him a new opportunity for collateral review of 

his Rehaif claim threatens Congress' exclusive power to defne crimes, 

but a court does not usurp legislative power simply by misinterpreting 

the law in a given case. Next, Jones points to Fiore v. White, 531 U. S. 

225 (per curiam), which applied the rule that due process requires that 

the prosecution prove every element of a crime beyond a reasonable 

doubt. But due process does not guarantee a direct appeal, McKane v. 

Durston, 153 U. S. 684, 687, let alone the opportunity to have legal issues 

redetermined in successive collateral attacks. Finally, the Eighth 

Amendment's constraint on the kinds of punishments governments may 

infict creates no independent entitlement to a second round of postconviction review. Pp. 480–488. 

(2) The Government asks the Court to adopt a novel interpretation 

of § 2255(e)'s saving clause based on an elaborate argument. Starting 

from the premise that the words “inadequate or ineffective” imply reference to a “benchmark” of adequacy and effectiveness, the Government 

equates that benchmark with the types of claims cognizable in federal 

habeas petitions by state prisoners under the general habeas statutes. 
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Syllabus 

The Government ultimately concludes that § 2255(h) renders § 2255 “inadequate or ineffective to test” a federal prisoner's statutory claim in 

cases where the prisoner has already fled one § 2255 motion and the 

claim otherwise satisfes pre-AEDPA habeas principles, which generally 

will require “a `colorable showing of factual innocence.' ” McCleskey v. 

Zant, 499 U. S. 467, 495 (quoting Kuhlmann v. Wilson, 477 U. S. 436, 

454 (plurality opinion)). 

The Court sees no indication that the saving clause adopts the Government's state-prisoner-habeas benchmark. In any event, that benchmark has uncertain relevance to the question presented here because 

federal habeas relief does not lie for errors of state law. The Government's theory ultimately rests instead on its assertion that § 2255(h) is 

simply not clear enough to support the inference that Congress entirely 

closed the door on pure statutory claims not brought in a federal prisoner's initial § 2255 motion. That assertion is unpersuasive. 

The Government asserts that the Court must require “the clearest 

command” before construing AEDPA to “close [the] courthouse doors” 

on “a strong equitable claim” for relief. Holland v. Florida, 560 U. S. 

631, 646, 649 (internal quotation marks omitted). But AEDPA's restrictions embody Congress' policy judgment regarding the appropriate balance between fnality and error correction. The Court declines to adopt 

a presumption against fnality. Further, the Court typically has found 

clear-statement rules appropriate when a statute implicates historically 

or constitutionally grounded norms that the Court would not expect 

Congress to unsettle lightly. See, e. g., Alabama Assn. of Realtors v. 

Department of Health and Human Servs., 594 U. S. –––, ––– (per curiam). As far as history and the Constitution are concerned, “there is 

nothing incongruous about a system in which this kind of error—the 

application of a since-rejected statutory interpretation—cannot be remedied after fnal judgment,” George v. McDonough, 596 U. S. –––, –––, 

and thus nothing fundamentally surprising about Congress declining to 

make such errors remediable in a second or successive collateral attack. 

Pp. 488–492. 

8 F. 4th 683, affrmed. 

Thomas, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Roberts, C. J., 

and Alito, Gorsuch, Kavanaugh, and Barrett, JJ., joined. Sotomayor and Kagan, JJ., fled a dissenting opinion, post, p. 492. Jackson, J., fled a dissenting opinion, post, p. 494. 

Daniel R. Ortiz argued the cause for petitioner. With 

him on the briefs was Jeremy B. Lowery. 
Cite as: 599 U. S. 465 (2023) 469 

Opinion of the Court 

Deputy Solicitor General Feigin argued the cause for respondent. With him on the briefs were Solicitor General 

Prelogar, Assistant Attorney General Polite, Sopan Joshi, 

and John M. Pellettieri. 

Morgan L. Ratner, by invitation of the Court, 597 U. S. 

–––, argued the cause and fled a brief as amicus curiae in 

support of the judgment below. With her on the brief was 

Judson O. Littleton.* 

Justice Thomas delivered the opinion of the Court. 

This case concerns the interplay between two statutes: 28 

U. S. C. § 2241, the general habeas corpus statute, and § 2255, 

which provides an alternative postconviction remedy for federal prisoners. Since 1948, Congress has provided that a 

federal prisoner who collaterally attacks his sentence ordinarily must proceed by a motion in the sentencing court 

under § 2255, rather than by a petition for a writ of habeas 

corpus under § 2241. To that end, § 2255(e) bars a federal 

prisoner from proceeding under § 2241 “unless . . . the 

[§ 2255] remedy by motion is inadequate or ineffective to test 

the legality of his detention.” 

Separately, since the Antiterrorism and Effective Death 

Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA), second or successive § 2255 

motions are barred unless they rely on either “newly discovered evidence,” § 2255(h)(1), or “a new rule of constitutional 

law,” § 2255(h)(2). A federal prisoner may not, therefore, 

fle a second or successive § 2255 motion based solely on a 

*Briefs of amici curiae urging reversal were fled for the National Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers et al. by Jeffrey L. Fisher, Kendall 

Turner, David D. Cole, and Jennesa Calvo-Friedman; and for the National Association of Federal Defenders by Shelley Fite, Davina T. Chen, 

Devi M. Rao, Keith M. Donoghue, Joanna Munson Perales, Andrew L. 

Adler, Janice Bergmann, Joshua B. Carpenter, Brianna Mircheff, and 

Paresh Patel. 

Kent S. Scheidegger and Kymberlee C. Stapleton fled a brief of amicus 

curiae urging affrmance for the Criminal Justice Legal Foundation. 

Gregory Silbert fled a brief of amici curiae for Habeas Scholars. 

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more favorable interpretation of statutory law adopted after 

his conviction became fnal and his initial § 2255 motion was 

resolved. 

The question presented is whether that limitation on second or successive motions makes § 2255 “inadequate or ineffective” such that the prisoner may proceed with his statutory claim under § 2241. We hold that it does not. 

I 

In 2000, the U. S. District Court for the Western District 

of Missouri convicted petitioner Marcus DeAngelo Jones of 

two counts of unlawful possession of a frearm by a felon, 

in violation of 18 U. S. C. § 922(g)(1), and one count of making false statements to acquire a frearm, in violation of 

§ 922(a)(6). The Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit affrmed his convictions and sentence of 327 months' imprisonment. See United States v. Jones, 266 F. 3d 804 (2001). 

After losing his appeal, Jones fled a timely § 2255 motion to 

vacate, set aside, or correct his sentence, which resulted in 

the vacatur of one of his concurrent § 922(g) sentences but 

no other relief. See United States v. Jones, 403 F. 3d 604 

(CA8 2005); United States v. Jones, 185 Fed. Appx. 541 (CA8 

2006) (per curiam). 

Years later, in Rehaif v. United States, 588 U. S. ––– (2019), 

this Court held that a defendant's knowledge of the status 

that disqualifes him from owning a frearm is an element of 

a § 922(g) conviction. In doing so, it abrogated the Eighth 

Circuit's contrary precedent, which the Western District of 

Missouri and the Eighth Circuit had applied in Jones' trial 

and direct appeal. See Jones, 266 F. 3d, at 810, n. 5. 

After Rehaif, Jones hoped to leverage its holding into a 

new collateral attack on his remaining § 922(g) conviction. 

But Rehaif 's statutory holding satisfed neither of § 2255(h)'s 

gateway conditions for a second or successive § 2255 motion: 

It was neither “newly discovered evidence,” § 2255(h)(1), nor 

“a new rule of constitutional law,” § 2255(h)(2) (emphasis 

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added). Unable to fle a new § 2255 motion in his sentencing 

court, Jones instead looked to § 2255(e)'s “saving clause,” 

which provides that a federal prisoner may fle a petition for 

a writ of habeas corpus under § 2241 if—and only if—§ 2255's 

“remedy by motion is inadequate or ineffective to test the 

legality of his detention.” Invoking this clause, Jones petitioned the U. S. District Court for the Eastern District of 

Arkansas, the district where he was imprisoned, for a writ 

of habeas corpus under § 2241. 

The District Court dismissed Jones' habeas petition for 

lack of subject-matter jurisdiction, and the Eighth Circuit 

affrmed. 8 F. 4th 683 (2021). The Eighth Circuit rejected 

Jones' argument that the saving clause permits recourse to 

§ 2241 to present a § 2255(h)-barred claim based on an intervening decision of statutory interpretation, as well as his 

argument that foreclosing relief on his Rehaif claim would 

violate the Suspension Clause, U. S. Const., Art. I, § 9, cl. 2. 

In doing so, the Eighth Circuit deepened a split among the 

Courts of Appeals about whether prisoners in Jones' circumstances may resort to § 2241 via the saving clause. 

We granted certiorari. 596 U. S. ––– (2022). The Solicitor General then noticed her intent to defend the Eighth Circuit's judgment but not its rationale. We appointed Morgan 

Ratner as amicus curiae to argue in support of the Eighth 

Circuit's reasoning. 597 U. S. ––– (2022). She has ably discharged her responsibilities. 

II 

Consistent with the Eighth Circuit's reasoning, we hold 

that § 2255(e)'s saving clause does not permit a prisoner asserting an intervening change in statutory interpretation to 

circumvent AEDPA's restrictions on second or successive 

§ 2255 motions by fling a § 2241 petition. We begin by considering the role of the saving clause in § 2255 prior to AEDPA's enactment. We then consider the impact of AEDPA on 

the statutory scheme. 

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A 

In relevant part, § 2255 provides: 

“(a) A prisoner in custody under sentence of a court 

established by Act of Congress claiming the right to be 

released upon the ground that the sentence was imposed 

in violation of the Constitution or laws of the United 

States, or that the court was without jurisdiction to impose such sentence, or that the sentence was in excess 

of the maximum authorized by law, or is otherwise subject to collateral attack, may move the court which imposed the sentence to vacate, set aside or correct the 

sentence. 

. . . . . 

“(e) An application for a writ of habeas corpus in behalf of a prisoner who is authorized to apply for relief 

by motion pursuant to this section, shall not be entertained if it appears that the applicant has failed to apply 

for relief, by motion, to the court which sentenced him, 

or that such court has denied him relief, unless it also 

appears that the remedy by motion is inadequate or ineffective to test the legality of his detention.” 

In understanding this statutory text, “a page of history is 

worth a volume of logic.” New York Trust Co. v. Eisner, 

256 U. S. 345, 349 (1921). Section 2255 is an outgrowth of 

the historic habeas corpus powers of the federal courts as 

applied to the special case of federal prisoners. The First 

Judiciary Act authorized the federal courts “to grant writs 

of habeas corpus for the purpose of an inquiry into the cause 

of commitment,” with a proviso that such writs could “extend to prisoners in gaol” only “where they [were] in custody, 

under or by colour of the authority of the United States, or 

[were] committed for trial before some court of the same, or 

[were] necessary to be brought into court to testify.” Act of 

Sept. 24, 1789, § 14, 1 Stat. 82. In 1867, Congress expanded 

the federal courts' habeas powers to cover “all cases where 

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Opinion of the Court 

any person may be restrained of his or her liberty in violation of the constitution, or of any treaty or law of the United 

States.” Ch. 28, 14 Stat. 385. For most of our Nation's history, a federal prisoner “claiming the right to be released,” 

§ 2255(a), in a collateral attack on his sentence would have 

relied on these Acts and their successors. 

That changed with the 1948 recodifcation and reorganization of the Judiciary Code. See generally 62 Stat. 869. In 

enacting the present Title 28 of the United States Code, Congress largely recodifed the federal courts' pre-existing habeas authority in §§ 2241 and 2243, which, respectively, confer the power to grant the writ and direct the issuing court 

to “dispose of the matter as law and justice require.” Id., 

at 964–965. At the same time, however, Congress created 

§ 2255 as a separate remedial vehicle specifcally designed for 

federal prisoners' collateral attacks on their sentences.1 Id., 

at 967–968. 

The “sole purpose” of this innovation, as this Court acknowledged a few years later, “was to minimize the diffculties encountered in habeas corpus hearings by affording 

the same rights in another and more convenient forum.” 

United States v. Hayman, 342 U. S. 205, 219 (1952); see also 

Davis v. United States, 417 U. S. 333, 343 (1974) (“[Section] 

2255 was intended to afford federal prisoners a remedy identical in scope to federal habeas corpus”); accord, United 

States v. Addonizio, 442 U. S. 178, 185 (1979); Hill v. United 

States, 368 U. S. 424, 427 (1962). Experience had shown that 

processing federal prisoners' collateral attacks on their sen1 As frst enacted, § 2255 applied to any “prisoner in custody under sentence of a court of the United States.” 62 Stat. 967. In 1949, Congress 

substituted “court established by Act of Congress” for “court of the United 

States,” making no other changes. § 114, 63 Stat. 105 (internal quotation 

marks omitted). Section 2255 was not again amended until AEDPA, and 

the only post-AEDPA amendment simply added the current lettering and 

numbering to what were previously undesignated paragraphs. Court Security Improvement Act of 2007, § 511, 121 Stat. 2545. For simplicity, we 

use § 2255's current internal designations throughout this opinion. 

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tences through habeas proceedings—and, therefore, through 

the judicial districts in which they were confned—resulted 

in “serious administrative problems.” Hayman, 342 U. S., 

at 212. Most signifcantly, a federal prisoner's district of 

confnement was often far removed from the records of the 

sentencing court and other sources of needed evidence. Id., 

at 212–213. These diffculties were “greatly aggravated” by 

the concentration of federal prisoners in a handful of judicial districts, which forced those District Courts to process 

“an inordinate number of habeas corpus actions.” Id., at 

213–214. 

Section 2255 solved these problems by rerouting federal 

prisoners' collateral attacks on their sentences to the courts 

that had sentenced them. To make this change of venue effective, Congress generally barred federal prisoners “authorized to apply for relief by motion pursuant to” § 2255 from 

applying “for a writ of habeas corpus” under § 2241. 

§ 2255(e). But, in a provision that has come to be known as 

the saving clause, Congress preserved the habeas remedy in 

cases where “the remedy by motion is inadequate or ineffective to test the legality of [a prisoner's] detention.” Ibid. 

Traditionally, courts have treated the saving clause as covering unusual circumstances in which it is impossible or impracticable for a prisoner to seek relief from the sentencing 

court. The clearest such circumstance is the sentencing 

court's dissolution; a motion in a court that no longer exists 

is obviously “inadequate or ineffective” for any purpose. 

See, e. g., Witham v. United States, 355 F. 3d 501, 504–505 

(CA6 2004) (fnding § 2255 inadequate or ineffective after 

court-martial was dissolved); Edwards v. United States, 1987 

WL 7562, *1 (EDNY, Feb. 9, 1987) (fnding § 2255 inadequate 

or ineffective after District Court of the Canal Zone was 

dissolved); cf. Spaulding v. Taylor, 336 F. 2d 192, 193 (CA10 

1964) (fnding § 2255 inadequate or ineffective after Alaska 

territorial court was dissolved and federal and state successor courts declined § 2255 and state-habeas jurisdiction, rePage Proof Pending Publication
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Opinion of the Court 

spectively). The saving clause might also apply when “it is 

not practicable for the prisoner to have his motion determined in the trial court because of his inability to be present 

at the hearing, or for other reasons.” 2 Hayman, 342 U. S., 

at 215, n. 23 (internal quotation marks omitted). 

In addition, the saving clause ensures that § 2255(e) does 

not displace § 2241 when a prisoner challenges “the legality 

of his detention” without attacking the validity of his sentence. To give a few examples, a prisoner might wish to 

argue that he is being detained in a place or manner not 

authorized by the sentence, that he has unlawfully been denied parole or good-time credits, or that an administrative 

sanction affecting the conditions of his detention is illegal. 

See generally Samak v. Warden, FCC Coleman–Medium, 

766 F. 3d 1271, 1280 (CA11 2014) (Pryor, J., concurring) (explaining that “[t]he `detention' of a prisoner encompasses 

much more than a criminal `sentence' ”). The briefs before 

us debate whether these types of challenges depend on the 

saving clause or proceed under § 2241 “directly.” Compare 

Brief for Petitioner 31 and Brief for Respondent 37–38 with 

Brief for Court-Appointed Amicus Curiae 17–18. It is diffcult to imagine a case in which this logical distinction would 

make any practical difference. That said, were it not for the 

saving clause, a literal reading of § 2255(e) might be thought 

2 It bears mentioning that § 2255 was enacted “eight years before President Eisenhower signed legislation funding the Interstate Highway System.” Brief for Court-Appointed Amicus Curiae 17. At that time, it 

would not be surprising if removing a prisoner from the penitentiary, 

transporting him to the sentencing court for a hearing, and taking him 

back to prison again sometimes posed diffculties daunting enough to make 

a § 2255 proceeding practically unavailable. Cf. Stidham v. Swope, 82 

F. Supp. 931, 932–933 (ND Cal. 1949) (describing the diffculty and delay 

involved in transporting a prisoner “upwards of 1,500 miles” from the federal penitentiary in Alcatraz to the sentencing court in Missouri, a journey 

that “well could be two weeks” by rail). That this sort of practical inadequacy would be highly unusual today should not blind us to the world in 

which Congress was legislating when it enacted the saving clause. 

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to bar any “application for a writ of habeas corpus in behalf 

of a [federal] prisoner,” § 2255(e), whether or not it challenged the “sentence . . . imposed,” § 2255(a). If nothing 

else, then, the saving clause guards against the danger that 

§ 2255(e) might be construed to bar manner-of-detention 

challenges even though they are not within § 2255's substantive scope. 

B 

In 1996, Congress enacted AEDPA, which made signifcant 

reforms to the process of federal-court postconviction review 

for both state and federal prisoners. Most relevant here, 

AEDPA strictly limited “second or successive” § 2255 motions to those that “contain— 

“(1) newly discovered evidence that, if proven and 

viewed in light of the evidence as a whole, would be 

suffcient to establish by clear and convincing evidence 

that no reasonable factfnder would have found the movant guilty of the offense; or 

“(2) a new rule of constitutional law, made retroactive 

to cases on collateral review by the Supreme Court, that 

was previously unavailable.” § 2255(h). 

Importantly, AEDPA left the text of § 2255(e) unchanged. 

But AEDPA's new second-or-successive restrictions indirectly gave rise to a novel application of the saving clause. 

Mere months before AEDPA's enactment, this Court decided Bailey v. United States, 516 U. S. 137 (1995). That 

case interpreted the offense of “us[ing]” a frearm “during 

and in relation to any crime of violence or drug traffcking 

crime,” in violation of then-existing 18 U. S. C. § 924(c)(1), 

more narrowly than many Circuits' previous case law. See 

516 U. S., at 142 (describing the Circuits' approaches). 

Under this Court's § 2255 precedent, Bailey's narrowing interpretation was grounds for a collateral attack by federal 

prisoners who had been convicted under the Courts of Appeals' broader interpretations. See Davis, 417 U. S., at 342– 

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Opinion of the Court 

347 (holding a claim of legal error based on an intervening 

change in statutory interpretation cognizable under § 2255). 

Many prisoners with Bailey claims, however, had already exhausted their frst § 2255 motion, and Bailey's statutory holding plainly did not satisfy either of § 2255(h)'s conditions for 

a second or successive motion. 

Several Courts of Appeals found a workaround for those 

prisoners in the saving clause. With minor differences in 

reasoning and wording, they held that § 2255 was “inadequate and ineffective” under the saving clause—and that 

§ 2241 was therefore available—when AEDPA's second-orsuccessive restrictions barred a prisoner from seeking relief 

based on a newly adopted narrowing interpretation of a 

criminal statute that circuit precedent had foreclosed at the 

time of the prisoner's trial, appeal, and frst § 2255 motion. 

This application of the saving clause took shape in In re Dorsainvil, 119 F. 3d 245, 251 (CA3 1997); Triestman v. United 

States, 124 F. 3d 361, 378–380 (CA2 1997); and In re Davenport, 147 F. 3d 605, 609–611 (CA7 1998), and it was later 

adopted by most of the other Circuits. See Ivy v. Pontesso, 

328 F. 3d 1057, 1059–1060 (CA9 2003); Martin v. Perez, 319 

F. 3d 799, 804–805 (CA6 2003); Reyes–Requena v. United 

States, 243 F. 3d 893, 904 (CA5 2001); In re Jones, 226 F. 3d 

328, 333–334 (CA4 2000); Wofford v. Scott, 177 F. 3d 1236, 

1242–1245 (CA11 1999), overruled by McCarthan v. Director 

of Goodwill Industries–Suncoast, Inc., 851 F. 3d 1076 (CA11 

2017) (en banc); but see Prost v. Anderson, 636 F. 3d 578, 

584–595 (CA10 2011) (Gorsuch, J.) (holding that § 2255(e) does 

not permit recourse to § 2241 in these circumstances). 

We now hold that the saving clause does not authorize 

such an end-run around AEDPA. In § 2255(h), Congress 

enumerated two—and only two—conditions in which a second or successive § 2255 motion may proceed. Because 

§ 2255 is the ordinary vehicle for a collateral attack on a federal sentence, the straightforward negative inference from 

§ 2255(h) is that a second or successive collateral attack on a 
478 JONES v. HENDRIX 

Opinion of the Court 

federal sentence is not authorized unless one of those two 

conditions is satisfed. See Jennings v. Rodriguez, 583 U. S. 

–––, ––– (2018) (“ `The expression of one thing implies the 

exclusion of others' ” (quoting A. Scalia & B. Garner, Reading 

Law: The Interpretation of Legal Texts 107 (2012))). Even 

more directly, § 2255(h)(2)'s authorization of a successive collateral attack based on new rules “of constitutional law” implies that Congress did not authorize successive collateral 

attacks based on new rules of nonconstitutional law. Had 

Congress wished to omit the word “constitutional,” it easily 

could have done so. 

The saving clause does not undermine this strong negative 

inference. Basic principles of statutory interpretation require that we construe the saving clause and § 2255(h) in harmony, not set them at cross-purposes. See, e. g., United 

States v. Fausto, 484 U. S. 439, 453 (1988); Bend v. Hoyt, 13 

Pet. 263, 272 (1839) (Story, J.). That task is not diffcult 

given the distinct concerns of the two provisions. Subsection (h) presumes—as part of its background—that federal 

prisoners' collateral attacks on their sentences are governed 

by § 2255, and it proceeds to specify when a second or successive collateral attack is permitted. The saving clause has 

nothing to say about that question. Rather, like subsection 

(e) generally, it addresses the antecedent question of the relationship between §§ 2241 and 2255. 

After AEDPA, as before it, the saving clause preserves 

recourse to § 2241 in cases where unusual circumstances 

make it impossible or impracticable to seek relief in the sentencing court, as well as for challenges to detention other 

than collateral attacks on a sentence. Because AEDPA did 

not alter the text of § 2255(e), there is little reason to think 

that it altered the pre-existing division of labor between 

§§ 2241 and 2255. AEDPA's new restrictions on § 2255, 

therefore, are best understood as just that—restrictions on 

§ 2255—not as expansions of § 2241's applicability. 

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Any other reading would make AEDPA curiously selfdefeating. It would mean that, by expressly excluding second or successive § 2255 motions based on nonconstitutional 

legal developments, Congress accomplished nothing in terms 

of actually limiting such claims. Instead, it would have 

merely rerouted them from one remedial vehicle and venue 

to another. Stranger still, Congress would have provided “a 

superior remedy” for the very nonconstitutional claims it 

chose not to include in § 2255(h). McCarthan, 851 F. 3d, at 

1091. After escaping § 2255 through the saving clause, nonconstitutional claims would no longer be subject to AEDPA's 

other express procedural restrictions: the 1-year limitations 

period, see § 2255(f), and the requirement that a prisoner obtain a certifcate of appealability before appealing an adverse 

decision in the District Court, see § 2253(c)(1).3 We generally “resist attributing to Congress an intention to render 

a statute so internally inconsistent.” Greenlaw v. United 

States, 554 U. S. 237, 251 (2008). 

That resistance is particularly acute here, where allowing 

nonconstitutional claims to proceed under § 2241 would mean 

“resurrecting the very problems § 2255 was supposed to put 

to rest.” Wright v. Spaulding, 939 F. 3d 695, 707 (CA6 2019) 

(Thapar, J., concurring). Section 2255 owes its existence to 

Congress' pragmatic judgment that the sentencing court, not 

the District Court for the district of confnement, is the best 

venue for a federal prisoner's collateral attack on his sentence. Channeling a particular class of second or successive 

attacks back into § 2241 would mean once again “[c]oncen3 It is no answer to say that the saving clause must apply sometimes 

and that these procedural restrictions are inapplicable whenever it does. 

Cf. Reply Brief for Petitioner 12; Reply Brief for Respondent 9–10. 

Allowing second or successive nonconstitutional claims to circumvent 

§ 2255(h) under the saving clause would confer favored treatment for nonconstitutional claims as a class, a result directly at odds with the manifest 

tenor of § 2255(h). 

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trat[ing] `an inordinate number of habeas corpus actions' 

in districts with large prison populations” and requiring 

District Courts “to review each other's proceedings—often 

without access to the witnesses, the sources of evidence, or 

other local information that may be critical.” Id., at 707– 

708 (quoting Hayman, 342 U. S., at 214). “The illogical results of applying such an interpretation . . . argue strongly 

against the conclusion that Congress intended these results.” 

Western Air Lines, Inc. v. Board of Equalization of S. D., 

480 U. S. 123, 133 (1987). 

Here, as often is the case, the best interpretation is the 

straightforward one. Section 2255(h) specifes the two limited conditions in which Congress has permitted federal prisoners to bring second or successive collateral attacks on their 

sentences. The inability of a prisoner with a statutory claim 

to satisfy those conditions does not mean that he can bring 

his claim in a habeas petition under the saving clause. It 

means that he cannot bring it at all. Congress has chosen 

fnality over error correction in his case. 

III 

Resisting this reading, Jones and the United States both 

argue that § 2255(h)'s exclusion of statutory claims sometimes renders § 2255 inadequate or ineffective, though they 

advance different theories of when and why it does so. 

Their arguments are unpersuasive. 

A 

Jones begins with a textual interpretation of the saving 

clause that, if accepted, would convert § 2255(e) into a license 

for unbounded error correction. He argues that § 2255 is 

necessarily “inadequate or ineffective to test” a prisoner's 

claim if the § 2255 court fails to apply the correct substantive 

law. This argument ignores that the saving clause is concerned with the adequacy or effectiveness of the remedial 

vehicle (“the remedy by motion”), not any court's asserted 

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errors of law. Cf. Swain v. Pressley, 430 U. S. 372, 383 (1977) 

(holding a District of Columbia-court remedy modeled on 

§ 2255 not to be “ `inadequate or ineffective' ” because the 

D. C. courts were “competent to decide all issues”). Even 

when “circuit law is inadequate or defcient” because a Court 

of Appeals' precedents have resolved a legal issue incorrectly, that is not a fault in “the § 2255 remedial vehicle” 

itself.4 Prost, 636 F. 3d, at 590. 

Next, Jones offers a wide-ranging discussion of the concept 

of “inadequacy” as a term of art in traditional equity jurisprudence. While Jones demonstrates that courts of equity 

would afford relief from “inadequate” legal remedies in a 

broad range of circumstances, we fnd this excursus irrelevant to the question presented here. To the extent that 

Congress' use of “inadequate” in the saving clause harkens 

back to equity's historic use of that term (an issue we need 

not address), the most Jones' evidence proves is that a variety of circumstances might make it impracticable for a prisoner to seek relief from the sentencing court. Cf. Hayman, 

4 Despite occasional gestures in its direction, and despite its critical role 

in persuading the Courts of Appeals to expand the saving clause, Jones' 

textual arguments place relatively little emphasis on whether binding 

precedent foreclosed a prisoner's statutory argument at trial, on appeal, 

and in an initial § 2255 motion. See In re Davenport, 147 F. 3d 605, 610– 

611 (CA7 1998) (making such foreclosure an express precondition of 

saving-clause relief); see also Triestman v. United States, 124 F. 3d 361, 

380 (CA2 1997) (emphasizing that the prisoner “had no [prior] effective 

opportunity to raise his [Bailey] claim”); In re Dorsainvil, 119 F. 3d 245, 

251 (CA3 1997) (similar). Rather, under Jones' interpretation of “test,” it 

appears that § 2241 would be available to correct any asserted error of 

law by a § 2255 court, even on an issue of frst impression. Untenable as 

that consequence is, the erroneous-foreclosure approach fares no better. 

To hold that binding precedent renders a judicial proceeding “ `inadequate 

or ineffective' to test the rights of parties” would be a shock for “our entire 

justice system,” in which “precedent is ubiquitous.” Wright v. Spaulding, 

939 F. 3d 695, 709 (CA6 2019) (Thapar, J., concurring). Nothing in the 

text or history of the saving clause suggests that it uniquely embodies 

that far-reaching proposition. 

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342 U. S., at 215, n. 23. Nothing in Jones' survey of equity 

jurisprudence, however, even begins to suggest that the saving clause offers an exemption from AEDPA's clear limits on 

second or successive collateral attacks. 

Trying a different tack, Jones suggests that the saving 

clause's use of the present tense (“is inadequate or ineffective”) means that § 2241 is available whenever a prisoner is 

presently unable to fle a § 2255 motion. Even the Circuits 

with an expansive view of the saving clause have uniformly 

rejected this argument, and for good reason. See, e. g., In re 

Jones, 226 F. 3d, at 333; In re Dorsainvil, 119 F. 3d, at 251. 

Were this argument accepted, AEDPA's changes to § 2255 

would be entirely futile, as § 2241 would be available any 

time the second-or-successive restrictions precluded relief. 

We decline to infer that Congress intended AEDPA's carefully crafted limits on collateral relief under § 2255 to be 

mere nullities. 

As a backstop to his scattershot textual arguments, Jones 

invokes the constitutional-doubt canon, arguing that denying 

him the chance to raise his Rehaif claim in a § 2241 petition 

raises serious constitutional questions. It does not.5 

Jones' primary constitutional argument is that denying 

him any opportunity to seek postconviction relief based on 

Rehaif would violate the Suspension Clause, which provides 

that “[t]he Privilege of the Writ of Habeas Corpus shall not 

be suspended, unless when in Cases of Rebellion or Invasion 

the public Safety may require it.” U. S. Const., Art. I, § 9, 

cl. 2. This “Suspension Clause argument fails because it 

would extend the writ of habeas corpus far beyond its scope 

5 As Court-appointed amicus curiae observes, Jones' use of the 

constitutional-doubt canon is somewhat anomalous, in that it aims at a 

different result from what a direct constitutional challenge would achieve. 

If a prisoner persuaded a court that the exclusion of statutory claims from 

§ 2255(h) was unconstitutional, the result would not be that he could proceed under § 2241, but simply that he could fle a second or successive 

§ 2255 motion on an equal footing with §§ 2255(h)(1) and (2) claims. 

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`when the Constitution was drafted and ratifed.' ” Department of Homeland Security v. Thuraissigiam, 591 U. S. 

–––, ––– (2020) (quoting Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U. S. 723, 

746 (2008)). When the Suspension Clause was adopted, and 

for a long time afterward, Jones' Rehaif claim would not 

have been cognizable in habeas at all. 

At the founding, a sentence after conviction “by a court of 

competent jurisdiction” was “ `in itself suffcient cause' ” for 

a prisoner's continued detention. Brown v. Davenport, 596 

U. S. –––, ––– (2022) (quoting Ex parte Watkins, 3 Pet. 193, 

202 (1830)). As Chief Justice Marshall explained in the seminal case of Ex parte Watkins, the criminal judgment, “in its 

nature, conclude[d] the subject on which it [was] rendered,” 

“pronounce[d] the law of the case,” and “pu[t] an end to the 

inquiry concerning fact.” Id., at 202–203. Of particular 

relevance here, a habeas court had no power to “look beyond 

the judgment” to “re-examine the charges on which it was 

rendered” for substantive errors of law—even “if . . . the 

[sentencing] court ha[d] misconstrued the law, and ha[d] pronounced an offence to be punishable criminally, which [was] 

not so.” Id., at 202, 209. 

In rebuttal, Jones argues that pre-founding practice did 

allow habeas courts to “look beyond the judgment” to ensure 

that the convicting court had proved every element of the 

crime for which a prisoner was committed. But Jones fails 

to identify a single clear case of habeas being used to relitigate a conviction after trial by a court of general criminal 

jurisdiction. Rather, the cases he cites mostly involve commitments by justices of the peace,6 a distinction refected in 

Watkins itself. See id., at 208 (discussing Ex parte Burford, 

6 See Rex v. Brown, 8 T. R. 26, 101 Eng. Rep. 1247 (1798); Rex v. Hall, 

1 Cowp. 60, 98 Eng. Rep. 967 (1774); Rex v. Hall, 3 Burr. 1636, 97 Eng. 

Rep. 1022 (1765); Rex v. Collier, 1 Wils. K. B. 332, 95 Eng. Rep. 647 (1752). 

The cursory report in Rex v. Catherall, 2 Str. 900, 93 Eng. Rep. 967 (1730), 

is silent as to the authority under which the petitioner was convicted, and 

so cannot help Jones overcome Watkins. 

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3 Cranch 448, 453 (1806), where the Court examined on habeas the suffciency of a warrant of commitment by justices 

of the peace while noting that no judgment of a federal court 

was in question). At common law, justices of the peace were 

not courts of record and did not possess general criminal 

jurisdiction. Capital Traction Co. v. Hof, 174 U. S. 1, 16–17 

(1899); see also United States v. Mills, 11 App. D. C. 500, 507 

(1897). As such, their commitments were “not placed on the 

same high ground with the judgments of a court of record,” 

and the fact that superior courts sometimes used habeas to 

examine commitments by such inferior magistrates furnishes 

“no authority for inquiring into the judgments of a court of 

general criminal jurisdiction.” Watkins, 3 Pet., at 209. 

Jones also appeals to Bushell's Case, Vaugh. 135, 124 Eng. 

Rep. 1006 (C. P. 1670), which has long been understood as a 

case about the independence of criminal juries in determining questions of fact. Clark v. United States, 289 U. S. 1, 

16–17 (1933); see also Sparf v. United States, 156 U. S. 51, 

90–93 (1895); 1 J. Stephen, A History of the Criminal Law 

of England 375 (1883) (Stephen). There, a judge fned and 

imprisoned the members of a jury for acquitting William 

Penn and William Mead on indictments for “assembling unlawfully and tumultuously,” a verdict ostensibly against the 

“manifest evidence.” Vaugh., at 137, 124 Eng. Rep., at 1007. 

A juror refused to pay the fne, applied to the Court of Common Pleas for a writ of habeas corpus, and obtained discharge in an opinion by Chief Justice Vaughn. Jones points 

to one part of Vaughn's opinion, which criticized the return 

of the writ for not specifying that the jurors “kn[e]w and 

believe[d] th[e] evidence to be full and manifest against the 

indicted persons,” without which the jurors' verdict was “no 

cause of fne or imprisonment.” Id., at 142, 124 Eng. Rep., 

at 1009. Jones asks us to read this passage as refecting a 

supposed common-law rule that habeas relief was available 

whenever a convicting court had not found the necessary 

mens rea of a crime. That reading, however, entirely misses 

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the actual basis of Vaughn's opinion, which was the judge's 

absolute want of power to question the jury's determination 

of the facts. See id., at 149, 124 Eng. Rep., at 1013 (“It is 

absurd a jury should be fned by the Judge for going against 

their evidence, when he who fneth knows not what it is . . . . 

[I]f it be demanded, what is the fact? the Judge cannot answer it”); see also Stephen 375 (“[T]he judges who heard the 

argument . . . decided that the discretion of the jury to believe the evidence or not could not be questioned”). Thus, 

Bushell's Case no more undermines Watkins than do the 

justice-of-the-peace cases. 

The principles of Watkins guided this Court's understanding of the habeas writ throughout the 19th century and well 

into the 20th. See Brown, 596 U. S., at –––, n. 1 (collecting 

cases); see also Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U. S. 458, 465–466 

(1938). Even in Ex parte Siebold, 100 U. S. 371 (1880), 

which held that the constitutionality of a prisoner's statute 

of conviction could be reviewed on habeas (as going to jurisdiction),7 the Court acknowledged Watkins and took pains to 

reconcile its holding with the traditional rule. See 100 U. S., 

at 375–377. And, when asked to review convicting courts' 

substantive errors of statutory law in habeas corpus proceedings, this Court consistently held that it could not do so.8 

7 The Court seemingly abandoned that notion in Glasgow v. Moyer, 225 

U. S. 420 (1912), which explained that “[t]he principle” that nonjurisdictional errors of substantive law are not cognizable in habeas “is not the 

less applicable because the law which was the foundation of the indictment 

and trial is asserted to be unconstitutional . . . . [I]f a court has jurisdiction of the case the writ of habeas corpus cannot be employed to re-try 

the issues, whether of law, constitutional or otherwise, or of fact.” Id., 

at 429 (emphasis added). 8 See, e. g., Knewel v. Egan, 268 U. S. 442, 446 (1925) (“It is fundamental 

that a court upon which is conferred jurisdiction to try an offense has 

jurisdiction to determine whether or not that offense is charged or 

proved”); In re Gregory, 219 U. S. 210, 213 (1911) (“[W]e are not concerned 

with the question whether the information was suffcient or whether the 

acts set forth in the agreed statement constituted a crime, that is to say, 

whether the court properly applied the law, if it be found that the court 

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It was not until 1974, in Davis, that the Court broke with 

that tradition, holding for the frst time that a substantive 

error of statutory law could be a cognizable ground for a 

collateral attack on a federal court's criminal judgment. 

See 417 U. S., at 342–347. 

had jurisdiction to try the issues and to render the judgment”); In re 

Eckart, 166 U. S. 481, 483 (1897) (explaining that habeas would not offer 

relief from “a trial and conviction upon an indictment, the facts averred in 

which are asserted to be insuffcient to constitute an offence against the 

statute claimed to have been violated”); Ex parte Yarbrough, 110 U. S. 

651, 654 (1884) (“Whether the indictment sets forth in comprehensive 

terms the offence which the statute describes and forbids . . . is in every 

case a question of law . . . within [the trial court's] jurisdiction”); Ex parte 

Parks, 93 U. S. 18, 20–21 (1876) (“It would be an assumption of authority 

for this court, by means of the writ of habeas corpus, to review every case 

in which the defendant attempts to controvert the criminality of the offence charged in the indictment”). 

Ignoring this authority, Justice Jackson's dissent cites a handful of 

inapposite cases to suggest that 19th-century American courts would have 

treated claims such as Jones' as cognizable in habeas. See post, at 524, 

n. 19, 526, 529–530, n. 25. Grant v. United States, 58 F. 694 (CA9 1893), 

was a case on a writ of error, not habeas corpus. Ex parte D'Olivera, 7 

F. Cas. 853 (No. 3,967) (CC Mass. 1813), was another justice-of-the-peace 

case. Ex parte Randolph, 20 F. Cas. 242, 254 (No. 11,558) (CC Va. 1833), 

involved detention unsupported by any “judgment” or “judicial process” 

whatsoever. United States v. Bainbridge, 24 F. Cas. 946 (No. 14,497) (CC 

Mass. 1816), involved a collateral attack on a sentence imposed by a naval 

court martial; Justice Story's opinion turned on the validity of the petitioner's contract of enlistment, which, in turn, went to the court martial's 

jurisdiction. Id., at 949–952; see also Ex parte Watkins, 3 Pet. 193, 209 

(1830); Wise v. Withers, 3 Cranch 331, 337 (1806). Ex parte Bollman, 

4 Cranch 75 (1807), relieved two alleged traitors from pretrial orders of 

commitment on the ground that there was “not suffcient evidence . . . to 

justify [their] commitment on the charge of treason.” Id., at 135. Matter 

of Corryell, 22 Cal. 178 (1863), granted relief from a pretrial order of commitment after holding that the acts of which the petitioner stood accused 

did not constitute the charged crime. Id., at 180, 183. (Incidentally, this 

use of habeas was not free from controversy. See, e. g., In re Hacker, 73 

F. 464, 465–469 (SD Cal. 1896); “In re Kearney,” The Writ of Habeas Corpus—Its Uses and Abuses, 5 Pac. Coast L. J. 549, 565–570 (1880).) Finally, In re Wahll, 42 F. 822 (D. Minn. 1890), considered but rejected a 
Cite as: 599 U. S. 465 (2023) 487 

Opinion of the Court 

The Suspension Clause does not constitutionalize that innovation of nearly two centuries later. Nor, a fortiori, does 

it require the extension of that innovation to a second or 

successive collateral attack. 

Jones' remaining constitutional arguments are no more 

persuasive. He argues that denying him a new opportunity for collateral review of his Rehaif claim threatens 

separation-of-powers principles—specifcally, Congress' exclusive power to defne crimes. Cf. United States v. Hudson, 7 Cranch 32, 34 (1812). But the authority to determine 

the facts and the law in an individual case, and to render a 

fnal, binding judgment based on those determinations, 

stands at the core of the judicial power. See Plaut v. Spendthrift Farm, Inc., 514 U. S. 211, 218–219 (1995); Watkins, 3 

Pet., at 202–203. A court does not usurp legislative power 

simply by misinterpreting the law in a given case. See id., 

at 206 (“If its judgment was erroneous, a point which this 

court does not determine, still it is a judgment”). 

Next, Jones points to Fiore v. White, 531 U. S. 225 (2001) 

(per curiam), which applied the rule that due process requires that the prosecution prove every element of a crime 

beyond a reasonable doubt. See id., at 228–229. Whether 

a due process error has occurred at trial, however, is an entirely different issue from Congress' power to restrict collateral review. Due process does not guarantee a direct appeal, McKane v. Durston, 153 U. S. 684, 687 (1894), let alone 

the opportunity to have legal issues redetermined in successive collateral attacks on a fnal sentence. 

Jones' last constitutional contention—that the Eighth 

Amendment's prohibition on cruel and unusual punishments 

may entitle him to another round of collateral review—fails 

similar argument for ordering pretrial release. Id., at 824–826. In sum, 

like Jones' pre-founding English cases, the dissent's 19th-century American cases include no example in which a prisoner under sentence of a court 

of general criminal jurisdiction was permitted to relitigate the elements 

of his offense on habeas corpus. 

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for a similar reason. By its terms, the Cruel and Unusual 

Punishments Clause expresses a substantive constraint on 

the kinds of punishments governments may “infic[t].” It 

creates no freestanding entitlement to a second or successive 

round of postconviction review, and thus it adds nothing to 

Jones' unavailing Suspension Clause argument. 

B 

The Government agrees with the Eighth Circuit that 

Jones is not entitled to relief, but, somewhat surprisingly, it 

asks us to adopt a novel, alternative interpretation of the 

saving clause, which it constructs via a roundabout argument. It begins with the premise that the words “inadequate or ineffective” imply reference to a “benchmark” of 

adequacy and effectiveness. It proceeds to identify that 

benchmark as the ability to test the types of claims cognizable under the general habeas statutes—specifcally, those 

governing federal habeas petitions by state prisoners. The 

Government then reasons that § 2255(h)'s limitations on second or successive motions asserting newly discovered evidence or new rules of constitutional law do not trigger the 

saving clause because Congress has imposed analogous limitations on analogous claims by state prisoners and—by doing 

so—has redefned § 2255(e)'s implicit habeas benchmark with 

respect to such “factual” and “constitutional” claims. See 

28 U. S. C. §§ 2244(b)(2)(A)–(B). Since, the Government asserts, Congress has imposed no analogous limitation on statutory claims by state prisoners, it has not redefned the implicit habeas benchmark with respect to statutory claims like 

Jones'. And, we should be unwilling to infer that AEDPA 

limited such claims without a clearer textual indication. 

The Government concludes that § 2255(h) renders § 2255 “inadequate or ineffective to test” a federal prisoner's statutory 

claim in cases where the prisoner has already fled one § 2255 

motion and the claim otherwise satisfes pre-AEDPA habeas 

principles, which generally will require “a `colorable showing 

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of factual innocence.' ” McCleskey v. Zant, 499 U. S. 467, 

495 (1991) (quoting Kuhlmann v. Wilson, 477 U. S. 436, 454 

(1986) (plurality opinion)).9 

This elaborate theory is no more convincing than Jones' 

arguments. Its most striking faw is the seemingly arbitrary linkage it posits between the saving clause and state 

prisoners' statutory postconviction remedies. While it is 

true that § 2255, as enacted, afforded the same rights federal 

prisoners previously enjoyed under the general habeas statutes, see Hayman, 342 U. S., at 219, nothing in § 2255's text, 

structure, or history suggests that Congress intended any 

part of it to implicitly cross-reference whatever modifcations 

to state prisoners' postconviction remedies might be made in 

the future. Understanding the saving clause to do so would 

9 The Government also argues that Davis v. United States, 417 U. S. 333 

(1974), and Sunal v. Large, 332 U. S. 174 (1947), read together, dictate that 

only an intervening decision of this Court, rather than a Court of Appeals, 

can work such a change in the law as to justify an otherwise-barred § 2241 

petition. But this attempt to articulate an additional limiting principle 

for the Government's theory requires turning the cases inside out. In 

Davis, where this Court allowed a statutory claim to proceed under § 2255, 

the relevant narrowing decision came from the Ninth Circuit. See 417 

U. S., at 341 (discussing United States v. Fox, 454 F. 2d 593 (CA9 1971)). 

In Sunal, where two petitioners' statutory claims were barred from proceeding in habeas, it was this Court that had issued the relevant decision. 

See 332 U. S., at 176 (discussing Estep v. United States, 327 U. S. 114 

(1946)). As we have recognized, see Reed v. Farley, 512 U. S. 339, 354 

(1994), the holding of Sunal rested on what we would today call the petitioners' procedural default without cause: By not appealing their convictions, they had forfeited the argument that ended up prevailing in Estep, 

and they had shown no “exceptional circumstances which excuse[d] their 

failure” to appeal. 332 U. S., at 183–184. The Sunal Court thus had no 

occasion to defnitively resolve whether the petitioners' claims would have 

been cognizable in habeas but for their default. And, to the extent Sunal 

addressed that question in dicta, it appeared to be of two minds. See 

id., at 181–183 (suggesting, in a single unelaborated sentence, that the 

petitioners' “cases would be quite different” had they appealed and lost, 

then spending two paragraphs emphasizing that the trial courts' “error of 

law” was neither jurisdictional nor constitutional). 
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have highly counterintuitive implications: On the Government's view, §§ 2255(h)(1) and (2) do not create an adequacy 

or effectiveness problem only because of the parallel stateprisoner provisions in § 2244(b). It seems to follow that if 

Congress relaxed § 2244(b)'s second-or-successive restrictions for state prisoners tomorrow, and did nothing else, 

§ 2255 would suddenly become “inadequate or ineffective to 

test” at least some second or successive fact-based claims 

that did not satisfy § 2255(h)(1) or constitutional claims that 

did not satisfy § 2255(h)(2), and that those claims would then 

be allowed to proceed under § 2241. We see no indication 

that the spare language of the saving clause creates such a 

Rube Goldberg contrivance, whereby changes to other statutory provisions (which do not apply to federal prisoners at 

all) could fow back into § 2255 and undermine § 2255(h). 

In any event, as the Government acknowledges, a state 

prisoner could never bring a pure statutory-error claim in 

federal habeas, because “ `federal habeas corpus relief does 

not lie for errors of state law.' ” Estelle v. McGuire, 502 

U. S. 62, 67 (1991) (quoting Lewis v. Jeffers, 497 U. S. 764, 780 

(1990)). As a result, it is unclear what work the Government's state-prisoner-habeas benchmark is even doing in its 

answer to the question presented here. 

Rather, the narrow base on which the Government's topheavy theory ultimately turns out to rest is its assertion that 

§ 2255(h) is simply not clear enough to support the inference 

that Congress entirely closed the door on pure statutory 

claims not brought in a federal prisoner's initial § 2255 motion. See Brief for Respondent 28–29, 39. That assertion 

is unpersuasive for the reasons we have already explained: 

§ 2255(h) specifes the two circumstances in which a second 

or successive collateral attack on a federal sentence is available, and those circumstances do not include an intervening 

change in statutory interpretation. 

The Government asserts that we require “the clearest 

command” before construing AEDPA to “close [the] court-
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house doors” on “a strong equitable claim” for relief. Holland v. Florida, 560 U. S. 631, 646, 649 (2010) (internal quotation marks omitted). The only two cases the Government 

relies on for its clear-statement rule do not sweep as broadly 

as it suggests. In Holland, we applied the general presumption of equitable tolling to AEDPA's 1-year statute of 

limitations for state prisoners' habeas claims. Id., at 645– 

649. Afterward, in McQuiggin v. Perkins, 569 U. S. 383 

(2013), we held that “a convincing showing of actual innocence” could enable a prisoner to evade AEDPA's statute of 

limitations entirely. Id., at 386. 

Undoubtedly, McQuiggin's assertion of equitable authority to override clear statutory text was a bold one. But 

even taking Holland and McQuiggin for all they are worth, 

there is a signifcant difference between reading equitable 

exceptions into a statute of limitations, on the one hand, and 

demanding a clear statement before foreclosing workarounds 

to AEDPA's second-or-successive restrictions, on the other. 

Statutes of limitations merely govern the timeframe for 

bringing a claim. AEDPA's second-or-successive restrictions, by contrast, “constitute a modifed res judicata rule,” 

Felker v. Turpin, 518 U. S. 651, 664 (1996), and thus embody 

Congress' judgment regarding the central policy question of 

postconviction remedies—the appropriate balance between 

fnality and error correction. Insisting on a heightened 

standard of clarity in this context would effectively mean 

adopting a presumption against fnality as a substantive 

value. We decline to do so. “[T]he United States has an 

interest in the fnality of sentences imposed by its own 

courts,” Johnson v. United States, 544 U. S. 295, 309 (2005), 

and how to balance that interest against error correction is 

a “judgmen[t] about the proper scope of the writ” that is 

“ `normally for Congress to make.' ” Felker, 518 U. S., at 664 

(quoting Lonchar v. Thomas, 517 U. S. 314, 323 (1996)). 

Accepting the Government's proposal to apply a clearstatement rule would be particularly anomalous in light of 

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492 JONES v. HENDRIX 

Sotomayor and Kagan, JJ., dissenting 

the precise question this case presents. Typically, we fnd 

clear-statement rules appropriate when a statute implicates 

historically or constitutionally grounded norms that we 

would not expect Congress to unsettle lightly. See, e. g., Alabama Assn. of Realtors v. Department of Health and 

Human Servs., 594 U. S. –––, ––– (2021) (per curiam) (presumption that Congress does not casually assign executive 

agencies “powers of vast economic and political signifcance” 

or “signifcantly alter the balance between federal and state 

power” (internal quotation marks omitted)); Landgraf v. 

USI Film Products, 511 U. S. 244, 265–266 (1994) (presumption against statutory retroactivity); Atascadero State Hospital v. Scanlon, 473 U. S. 234, 243 (1985) (presumption 

against abrogation of state sovereign immunity). But, as 

shown above in discussing Jones' Suspension Clause argument, there is no historical or constitutional norm of permitting one convicted of a crime by a court of competent jurisdiction to collaterally attack his sentence based on an alleged 

error of substantive statutory law. As far as history and 

the Constitution are concerned, “there is nothing incongruous about a system in which this kind of error—the application of a since-rejected statutory interpretation—cannot be 

remedied after fnal judgment.” George v. McDonough, 596 

U. S. –––, ––– (2022). A fortiori, there is nothing fundamentally surprising about Congress declining to make such errors remediable in a second or successive collateral attack. 

IV 

We affrm the judgment of the Court of Appeals. 

It is so ordered. 

Justice Sotomayor and Justice Kagan, dissenting. 

We respectfully dissent. As Justice Jackson explains, 

today's decision yields disturbing results. See post, at 516– 

517 (dissenting opinion). A prisoner who is actually innocent, 

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Sotomayor and Kagan, JJ., dissenting 

imprisoned for conduct that Congress did not criminalize, is 

forever barred by 28 U. S. C. § 2255(h) from raising that 

claim, merely because he previously sought postconviction 

relief. It does not matter that an intervening decision of 

this Court confrms his innocence. By challenging his conviction once before, he forfeited his freedom. 

Though we agree with Justice Jackson that this is not 

the scheme Congress designed, we see the matter as the Solicitor General does. As all agree, Congress enacted § 2255 

to “afford federal prisoners a remedy identical in scope to 

federal habeas corpus.” Davis v. United States, 417 U. S. 

333, 343 (1974). To ensure that equivalence, Congress built 

in a saving clause, allowing recourse to habeas when the 

“remedy by motion” under § 2255 is “inadequate or ineffective” compared to the remedy it replaced: an “application 

for a writ of habeas corpus.” § 2255(e). So, as this Court 

has explained, if § 2255 bars a claim cognizable at habeas, 

such that the remedies are not “commensurate,” the saving 

clause kicks in, and the prisoner may “proceed in federal habeas corpus.” Sanders v. United States, 373 U. S. 1, 14–15 

(1963); see United States v. Hayman, 342 U. S. 205, 223 

(1952). 

With that understanding in mind, consider a prisoner who, 

having already fled a motion for postconviction relief, discovers that a new decision of this Court establishes that his 

statute of conviction did not cover his conduct. He is out of 

luck under § 2255, because § 2255(h) will bar his claim. But 

that claim is cognizable at habeas, where we have long held 

that federal prisoners can collaterally attack their convictions in successive petitions if they can make a colorable 

showing that they are innocent under an intervening decision of statutory construction. See Davis, 417 U. S., at 344– 

347; McCleskey v. Zant, 499 U. S. 467, 493–495 (1991). Congress did not abrogate that principle in § 2255(h). Thus, we 

have precisely the kind of mismatch the saving clause was 

designed to address. 
494 JONES v. HENDRIX 

Jackson, J., dissenting 

In this case, the petitioner says he is that prisoner, with 

that mismatch. But the Court of Appeals never considered 

that question, laboring under a mistaken view of the saving clause that, like the majority's, assigns it almost no 

role. Accordingly, we would remand for the lower courts 

to consider the petitioner's claim under the proper framework. See Cutter v. Wilkinson, 544 U. S. 709, 718, n. 7 

(2005). 

Justice Jackson, dissenting. 

Today, the Court holds that an incarcerated individual who 

has already fled one postconviction petition cannot fle another one to assert a previously unavailable claim of statutory innocence.1 The majority says that result follows from 

a “straightforward” reading of 28 U. S. C. § 2255. Ante, at 

477, 480. But the majority reaches this preclusion decision 

by “negative inference.” Ante, at 477. And it is far from 

obvious that § 2255(h)'s bar on fling second or successive 

postconviction petitions (with certain notable exceptions) 

prevents a prisoner who has previously sought postconviction relief from bringing a newly available legal innocence 

claim in court. See Part II, infra. 

In any event, putting aside its questionable interpretation 

of § 2255(h), the majority is also wrong to interpret 

§ 2255(e)—known as the saving clause—as if Congress designed that provision to filter potential habeas claims 

through the narrowest of apertures, saving essentially only 

those that a court literally would be unable to consider due 

to something akin to a natural calamity. See Part I, infra. 

This stingy characterization does not refect a primary aim 

of § 2255(e), which was to “save” any claim that was available 

prior to § 2255(h)'s enactment where Congress has not ex1 I use the terms “statutory innocence” and “legal innocence” in this 

opinion interchangeably. Both refer to a situation where an individual 

was convicted under a statute that, properly interpreted, did not reach 

his conduct. 

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Jackson, J., dissenting 

pressed a clear intent to foreclose it. Jones's legal innocence 

claim fts that mold. 

I am also deeply troubled by the constitutional implications of the nothing-to-see-here approach that the majority 

takes with respect to the incarceration of potential legal innocents. See Part III, infra. Apparently, legally innocent 

or not, Jones must just carry on in prison regardless, since 

(as the majority reads § 2255) no path exists for him to ask a 

federal judge to consider his innocence assertion. But forever slamming the courtroom doors to a possibly innocent 

person who has never had a meaningful opportunity to get a 

new and retroactively applicable claim for release reviewed 

on the merits raises serious constitutional concerns. 

Thus, in my view, all roads lead to an interpretation of 

§ 2255 that is diametrically opposed to the one that the majority announces. Whether one gets there by virtue of a 

proper reading of § 2255(e) or an informed understanding of 

§ 2255(h), or by affording due respect to the core constitutional interests at stake, Jones's successive petition alleging 

legal innocence should have been considered on the merits.2 

Therefore, I respectfully dissent. 

I 

Section 2255(e) saves postconviction claims by authorizing 

the fling of a habeas petition under § 2241 if the procedures 

§ 2255 affords are “inadequate or ineffective to test the legality of [a prisoner's] detention.” § 2255(e). I see no reason 

why the only circumstance in which § 2255's procedures qualify as inadequate or ineffective for saving clause purposes is 

when it is impossible or impractical for a prisoner to fle a 

§ 2255 motion. Contra, ante, at 474–475. Quite to the contrary, the enactment history of § 2255 plainly establishes that 

Congress wanted to ensure that a prisoner's claim was 

2 I take no position as to whether Jones's legal innocence claim is actually 

meritorious. This case is about whether § 2255 should be interpreted to 

prevent him from bringing the claim to a court in the frst place. 

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Jackson, J., dissenting 

“saved” in at least one additional set of circumstances: 

Where the prisoner would have been able to bring such a 

claim prior to the enactment of § 2255 (or any subsequent 

changes, like those made by the Antiterrorism and Effective 

Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA)), but somehow cannot 

bring that claim after a change to the statutory framework 

(unless Congress has clearly expressed its intent to restrict 

the scope of relief in that regard). As the majority has interpreted § 2255(h), that is precisely the situation here. 

A 

To understand why Congress meant for Jones to be able 

to invoke the saving clause and bring his statutory innocence 

claim in a habeas petition fled under § 2241, a frm grasp 

of the text, history, and intended operation of § 2255(e) is 

required. 

1 

The saving clause is the latter part of § 2255(e), which 

states in full: 

“An application for a writ of habeas corpus [o]n behalf 

of a prisoner who is authorized to apply for relief by 

motion pursuant to this section, shall not be entertained 

if it appears that the applicant has failed to apply for 

relief, by motion, to the court which sentenced him, or 

that such court has denied him relief, unless it also appears that the remedy by motion is inadequate or ineffective to test the legality of his detention.” § 2255(e) 

(emphasis added); see also § 2255 (1946 ed., Supp. II) 

(§ 2255 (1948)). 

Before § 2255 was enacted in 1948, federal prisoners collaterally attacked their convictions by fling a habeas petition. 

See United States v. Hayman, 342 U. S. 205, 210–213 (1952). 

Such petitions sought judicial review of the legality of the 

individual's detention, and were fled in the district where 

the person was incarcerated. Ibid. This led to some probPage Proof Pending Publication
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Jackson, J., dissenting 

lems: Districts that housed large federal prisons were disproportionately burdened with habeas petitions. Id., at 

213–214. Also, in many cases, the court deciding the petition was both unfamiliar with the underlying facts and far 

away from the relevant record, evidence, and witnesses. 

Ibid. 

Congress created § 2255—an entirely new process for federal prisoners to use when seeking postconviction judicial 

review—to solve these practical problems. Ante, at 473– 

474. Under the procedures laid out in § 2255, in lieu of fling 

a traditional habeas petition, federal prisoners must fle a 

§ 2255 motion. And any such motion is to be fled in the 

sentencing court, not in the district of confinement. 

§ 2255(a) (2018 ed.); see Hayman, 342 U. S., at 219. 

Congress crafted (what is now) § 2255(e) to ensure that the 

new § 2255 procedure successfully ousted the outdated habeas regime it replaced. Per the frst part of that provision, 

as a general matter, § 2255 becomes the exclusive procedure 

by which federal prisoners can collaterally attack their convictions. See § 2255(e) (providing that “[a]n application for 

a writ of habeas corpus . . . shall not be entertained” where, 

in essence, the prisoner fails to bring an authorized § 2255 

motion, or does so and is denied relief). Yet Congress also 

specifed that, in a circumstance in which § 2255 is “inadequate or ineffective to test the legality of his detention,” an 

individual could still fle a habeas petition. Ibid. 

There are multiple ways in which § 2255 might be “insuffcient” or “[n]ot capable of performing the required work” 

of postconviction review of federal convictions. Webster's 

New International Dictionary 1254, 1271 (2d ed. 1934) (defning “inadequate” and “ineffective” in this manner); see also 

Funk & Wagnalls New Standard Dictionary of the English 

Language 1239, 1255 (1942) (similar). For example, § 2255 

would not be up to the task if it would be impossible or impracticable for a federal prisoner to fle a § 2255 petition. 

Ante, at 474, 479. 

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Jackson, J., dissenting 

The case before us involves another way that § 2255 can be 

inadequate or ineffective—where the newly created § 2255 

procedure, perhaps inadvertently, blocks a prisoner from 

bringing a claim that was previously cognizable in habeas. 

This is an inadequacy concerning the operation of § 2255 from 

Congress's perspective, because the “sole purpose” of § 2255 

“was to minimize the diffculties encountered in habeas corpus hearings” while still “affording the same rights in another and more convenient forum.” Hayman, 342 U. S., at 

219 (emphasis added); see also Davis v. United States, 417 

U. S. 333, 343 (1974) (“Th[e] history makes clear that § 2255 

was intended to afford federal prisoners a remedy identical 

in scope to federal habeas corpus” (emphasis added)); Sanders v. United States, 373 U. S. 1, 14 (1963) (“[I]t conclusively 

appears from the historic context in which § 2255 was 

enacted that the legislation was intended simply to provide 

in the sentencing court a remedy exactly commensurate 

with that which had previously been available by habeas corpus” (emphasis added; internal quotation marks omitted)). 

That much is not in dispute—the majority acknowledges 

that Congress intended to maintain equivalence with the 

claims available in habeas when it enacted § 2255. See ante, 

473–474. Consequently, in any circumstance in which the 

new § 2255 procedure actually operates to foreclose a postconviction claim that a prisoner could have brought previously in a habeas petition, the § 2255 process is patently 

inadequate to accomplish Congress's aim of allowing prisoners to test the legality of their detention under § 2255 to the 

same extent as they could have in the habeas regime that 

§ 2255 replaced. 

Thus, the saving clause can be properly interpreted as effectuating Congress's intent in this regard. As the Government persuasively argues, by inserting a provision that 

allows prisoners to still fle habeas petitions, Congress “ensure[d] that Section 2255 does not disadvantage federal prisoners as compared to habeas.” Brief for Respondent 17; see 

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Jackson, J., dissenting 

also Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U. S. 723, 776 (2008) (noting 

that the purpose of § 2255 was “to strengthen, rather than 

dilute, the writ's protections” and further recognizing that 

the saving clause served that purpose). That is, where a 

federal prisoner could have brought a particular habeas 

claim prior to 1948, but could not bring such a claim in a 

§ 2255 petition after that date, the saving clause kicks in to 

permit that individual to resort to habeas to raise that 

claim. 

This reading of § 2255(e) means that the saving clause operates (at the very least, and as it was enacted in 1948) to 

preserve from inadvertent extinguishment postconviction 

claims that would have been previously cognizable for federal prisoners but cannot be brought by operation of § 2255. 

And the fip side of that interpretation—that § 2255 is inadequate or ineffective if it sub silentio extinguishes previously 

available habeas claims, triggering the saving clause—inexorably follows. This interpretation tracks Congress's clear 

claim-preservation goal. And, as an added bonus, it also has 

the beneft of being in accordance with how saving clauses 

usually work. See 2 J. Sutherland, Statutory Construction 

§ 4830, pp. 376–377 (3d ed. 1943) (defning “saving clause” as 

a provision “said to preserve from destruction certain rights, 

remedies or privileges which would otherwise be destroyed 

by the general enactment”); see, e. g., Andrus v. Shell Oil 

Co., 446 U. S. 657, 666 (1980) (noting that Congress included 

a “savings clause” in the statute at issue to “preserv[e] preexisting claims”); United States v. Menasche, 348 U. S. 528, 

535 (1955) (noting that the purpose of a saving clause in the 

immigration context was to “manifes[t] a well-established 

congressional policy not to strip [noncitizens] of advantages 

gained under prior laws”). 

2 

Fast forward to 1996: Congress reenacted the saving 

clause—using identical language—when it passed AEDPA. 

§ 2255(e); § 2255 (1948). Thus, because the saving clause opPage Proof Pending Publication
500 JONES v. HENDRIX 

Jackson, J., dissenting 

erated in 1948 to “save” from inadvertent extinguishment 

habeas claims that were available before the enactment of 

§ 2255, the same was true when Congress revised those procedures in the mid-1990s, while keeping the saving clause 

intact. In other words, both in 1948 and to this day, the 

saving clause operates to (among other things) ensure that 

§ 2255—or the AEDPA amendments—did not, through inapt 

language, substantively alter the scope of available postconviction relief for federal prisoners. 

This is not to say that Congress necessarily carried forward all of its previous policy determinations with respect 

to the availability of postconviction claims, or that it did not 

change its mind at all about the appropriate dimensions of 

postconviction relief. Indeed, habeas is a dynamic remedy, 

and congressional enactments contribute to its evolution. 

See Felker v. Turpin, 518 U. S. 651, 664 (1996); see also 2 R. 

Hertz & J. Liebman, Federal Habeas Corpus Practice and 

Procedure § 28.4[a], p. 1738 (7th ed. 2020) (Hertz & Liebman) 

(“Anglo-American law . . . has imposed an evolving set of 

restrictions on second and subsequent petitions”). But, 

again, the saving clause—which served an important equalizing function—remained intact when Congress reenacted 

§ 2255 in 1996. Thus, while Congress can certainly act to 

change the scope of habeas or its statutory equivalent if it 

wants to do so, in order to overcome the operation of the 

saving clause (which, again, was inserted to maintain equivalence in the absence of intent to make a change), Congress 

has to make said change to the availability of postconviction 

relief deliberately and clearly, thereby unequivocally expressing its intent to do so. See Holland v. Florida, 560 

U. S. 631, 646 (2010); infra, at 518–521. 

All this means that today (as in 1948) the saving clause is 

best interpreted as allowing for the fling of a habeas petition 

under § 2241 where a claim that was cognizable prior to 

AEDPA cannot be brought under § 2255, unless Congress has 

clearly expressed its intent to foreclose that particular claim. 

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Jackson, J., dissenting 

B 

That brings us to the situation at issue here. When Congress amended § 2255 by enacting AEDPA, it legislated 

against a legal background in which a federal prisoner could 

bring a statutory innocence claim in a § 2255 petition. The 

majority does not dispute this. See ante, at 485–486. Nor 

could it, because this Court made crystal clear in 1974 in 

Davis that statutory innocence claims are legally cognizable 

in a § 2255 motion. 417 U. S., at 343–347.3 

Moreover, prior to AEDPA's enactment, a federal prisoner 

could bring such a postconviction claim of statutory innocence in a successive petition. This Court had generally 

restricted successive postconviction flings by the 1990s, but 

a prisoner who had previously fled at least one petition could 

still fle another one in order to assert innocence. That was 

because any bar to the fling of a successive petition was 

typically lifted if enforcing that bar would result in a “miscarriage of justice.” McCleskey v. Zant, 499 U. S. 467, 494– 

495 (1991); Hertz & Liebman § 28.4[g], at 1757; see Brief for 

Respondent 22–24. And under our settled precedent, legal 

innocence claims ft that category. See Davis, 417 U. S., at 

346 (“There can be no room for doubt” that “conviction and 

punishment . . . for an act that the law does not make criminal” “ `inherently results in a complete miscarriage of justice' ”); see also Bousley v. United States, 523 U. S. 614, 

623–624 (1998). 

These background principles relate to the successive petition that Jones seeks to bring here as follows. If the majority is right that (by virtue of § 2255(h)) prisoners like Jones 

3 In this regard, Davis merely acknowledged what had been true since 

the founding. See infra, at 523–527; Davis v. United States, 417 U. S. 

333, 343–345 (1974); see also L. Litman, Legal Innocence and Federal Habeas, 104 Va. L. Rev. 417, 488, n. 334 (2018) (“[A]t the time Section 2255 

was enacted, federal prisoners could raise a claim, in successive petitions, 

that they were mistakenly convicted or sentenced because of an error of 

statutory interpretation”). 

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Jackson, J., dissenting 

are now unable to bring a successive § 2255 petition to make 

the same kind of legal innocence claim that they could have 

brought prior to AEDPA, then Congress's enactment of 

§ 2255(h) has dramatically altered the legal landscape in a 

manner that seems, at best, inconsistent with its original intent. To repeat: The saving clause expresses a congressional intent to maintain equivalence between what a prisoner could claim before and after § 2255(h); yet under the 

majority's reading, § 2255(h)'s “second or successive” bar 

would effectively operate to preclude successive legal innocence claims—shrinking the universe of previously available 

claims—the opposite of what Congress set out to do when it 

set up § 2255. 

In my view, that is where the saving clause comes in. 

Reading the saving clause to perform its normal, intended 

function of “saving” previously available claims solves this 

problem, because it allows prisoners who could have brought 

a claim prior to the enactment of AEDPA (like Jones) to fle 

a habeas petition to the extent that § 2255 now precludes 

such a fling under that particular statutory mechanism. 

Thus, interpreting § 2255(e)'s “inadequate and ineffective” 

language to permit the fling of a habeas petition that raises 

a legal innocence claim in these circumstances seems perfectly consistent with Congress's intent. 

This understanding of the saving clause also explains the 

clause's application—or, more precisely, its inapplicability— 

to the types of claims specifcally mentioned in §§ 2255(h)(1) 

and (2). Congress has expressly overridden operation of the 

saving clause with respect to those two provisions, because 

it has clearly expressed its intent to narrow the scope of 

postconviction relief where a federal prisoner brings a successive petition raising a claim of new evidence or new 

constitutional law.4 “A legislature may adopt a policy dif4 Prior to AEDPA, an individual who wished to fle a successive petition 

claiming factual innocence on the basis of new evidence needed only to 

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Jackson, J., dissenting 

ferent from that embodied in the general saving statute.” 

M. Ruud, The Savings Clause—Some Problems in Construction and Drafting, 33 Texas L. Rev. 285, 299 (1955). And 

here, no one questions that, with §§ 2255(h)(1) and (2), Congress clearly did so. Brief for Respondent 26–28. But the 

majority now reasons that, merely by omitting statutory innocence claims from that authorized-flings list, Congress 

should be deemed to have exhibited a narrowing intent with 

respect to those claims as well. See ante, at 469–470, 480. 

I disagree. Indeed, in my view, it is precisely because the 

text of §§ 2255(h)(1) and (2) speaks unequivocally to the narrowing Congress wished to effect with respect to newevidence and new-constitutional claims that we should not 

ascertain that Congress meant for the second or successive 

bar to have the same effect with respect to legal innocence 

claims—which, importantly, the statute does not mention. 

To put it bluntly: Congress knows how to speak clearly when 

it wants to disrupt the continuity of claims that are available 

to prisoners before and after it enacts legislation that addresses postconviction review procedures. And rather than 

providing any such clear statement as to how an intervening claim of statutory innocence should be treated vis-à-vis 

show that it was “more likely than not” that the jury would have acquitted 

him. Schlup v. Delo, 513 U. S. 298, 327 (1995). But, with AEDPA, Congress narrowed the scope of available relief for factual innocence claims 

by requiring prisoners to make their showing by the more stringent “clear 

and convincing evidence” standard. § 2255(h)(1); see also § 2244(b)(2) 

(B)(ii); 141 Cong. Rec. 15040, 15042 (1995) (statement of Sen. Levin). 

Similarly, before AEDPA, an intervening change of circuit precedent arguably could warrant a successive petition raising a new constitutional 

argument. See Davis, 417 U. S., at 339–341, 346–347; Sanders v. United 

States, 373 U. S. 1, 17 (1963); United States v. Nolan, 571 F. 2d 528, 530 

(CA10 1978); see also Hertz & Liebman § 28.3[c][ii], at 1709–1710, and 

n. 108. Yet AEDPA permits successive petitions raising new constitutional claims only when premised on retroactive Supreme Court opinions. 

§§ 2255(h)(2), 2244(b)(2)(A). 

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Jackson, J., dissenting 

§ 2255(h)'s second or successive bar, Congress was conspicuously silent.5 

C 

The majority advances an entirely different theory of the 

work that § 2255(e) does with respect to the postconviction 

review scheme—a theory that I do not fnd even remotely 

persuasive. Opting for the narrowest possible view of Congress's intent regarding the saving clause, the majority generally claims that the saving clause only authorizes the fling 

of a habeas petition if fling a § 2255 motion would be “impossible or impracticable.” Ante, at 477, 478. And in the 

majority's telling, that circumstance only occurs, say, if the 

courthouse where a § 2255 motion would have otherwise 

been fled has burned to the ground or been carried away by 

a mudslide. The majority's parsimonious perspective on the 

meaning of “inadequate or ineffective” is fawed in many 

respects. 

First and foremost, it is entirely atextual. The majority 

cites exactly zero dictionary defnitions of the terms “inadequate” or “ineffective.” And while it does reference an earlier draft of the legislation that became § 2255, ante, at 475 

(quoting Hayman, 342 U. S., at 215, n. 23), it fails to mention 

5 The text of § 2255(h) says nothing about legal innocence claims, 

let alone clearly expresses an intent to narrow the scope of available postconviction relief for that category of claims, in contrast to what the statute 

says about claims of new evidence or new constitutional rules. Congress 

could have easily stated somewhere in § 2255(h) or § 2244 that “no circuit 

or district judge shall be required to consider a second or successive motion premised only on statutory claims, even claims suggesting innocence,” 

or that “a court of appeals shall not certify or authorize a second or successive § 2255 petition that raises a statutory claim only.” Yet nothing close 

to this kind of language, or distinction, appears on the face of the statute. 

Nor does an intent to foreclose statutory innocence claims appear in the 

legislative history of § 2255(h), even though that history does clearly refect 

a congressional intent to narrow the scope of postconviction relief for the 

categories expressly mentioned in §§ 2255(h)(1) and (2) (like new evidence 

claims), see, e. g., 141 Cong. Rec., at 15040, 15042 (statement of Sen. Levin). 

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Jackson, J., dissenting 

that Congress specifcally rejected language that embraced 

the majority's “impracticable only” proposition. See Hayman, 342 U. S., at 215, n. 23; In re Dorsainvil, 119 F. 3d 245, 

250 (CA3 1997). 

Furthermore, while the majority opinion accurately recites the history and purpose of § 2255, see ante, at 473–474, 

it ignores the import of that history. As explained above, 

when Congress enacted § 2255 in 1948, it intended to ensure 

equivalence between traditional habeas and the new § 2255 

mechanism for postconviction review. Supra, at 498. Accordingly, Congress inserted the saving clause to ensure that 

certain pre-existing postconviction claims (say, a claim of 

statutory innocence) could still be heard even if the statutory 

language Congress was adopting inadvertently barred them. 

Supra, at 496–499. And Congress preserved the language 

of § 2255(e)—the language that performs the equalizing function—in 1996, even as it made other signifcant changes to 

§ 2255. Supra, at 499–500. 

Ignoring all this, the majority grounds its analysis of 

§ 2255(e) in a scattershot of lower court cases that the majority claims “[t]raditionally” viewed the saving clause as solving only for practical fling problems. Ante, at 474–475. To 

be sure, a handful of lower courts applied the saving clause 

where the sentencing court was dissolved. Ibid. But 

lower courts have also “[t]raditionally,” ante, at 474, treated 

the saving clause as permitting individuals with previously 

unavailable statutory innocence claims to fle habeas petitions in light of § 2255(h)'s successive-petition bar. Prost v. 

Anderson, 636 F. 3d 578, 605 (CA10 2011) (Seymour, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).6 The majority also 

6 See also, e. g., Triestman v. United States, 124 F. 3d 361, 363 (CA2 

1997); In re Dorsainvil, 119 F. 3d 245, 250–252 (CA3 1997); In re Jones, 

226 F. 3d 328, 333–334 (CA4 2000); Reyes-Requena v. United States, 243 

F. 3d 893, 904 (CA5 2011); Hill v. Masters, 836 F. 3d 591, 599–600 (CA6 

2016); In re Davenport, 147 F. 3d 605, 610–611 (CA7 1998); Stephens v. 

Herrera, 464 F. 3d 895, 898 (CA9 2006); Wofford v. Scott, 177 F. 3d 1236, 

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Jackson, J., dissenting 

fails to grapple with this Court's own opinions that suggest 

a broader interpretation of the saving clause is proper. See 

Swain v. Pressley, 430 U. S. 372, 381–382 (1977); Sanders, 373 

U. S., at 14–15; Hayman, 342 U. S., at 223; Brief for Respondent 17–18. 

It appears the majority's interpretation of § 2255(e) is primarily attributable to its concern that interpreting the saving clause to permit Jones to fle a habeas petition might 

authorize an “end-run” around § 2255's procedures. Ante, at 

477–478, 482. I think those fears are vastly overblown. 

Properly interpreted, a § 2255 motion is only “inadequate 

or ineffective” when the potential procedural bar does not 

provide a prisoner with any meaningful opportunity to present a claim. And that circumstance does not exist any time 

a procedural limitation in § 2255 screens out a claim. For 

example, if an individual does not raise his legal innocence 

claim in a § 2255 motion in a timely fashion, see § 2255(f), he 

cannot resort to the saving clause to fle a habeas petition; 

that individual did have a meaningful opportunity to raise 

his claim pursuant to the § 2255 process, but missed the window of opportunity. Similarly, where Congress has clearly 

narrowed the scope of postconviction relief—as it has done 

for claims of new evidence and new constitutional rules— 

it has overridden the equivalence aim that would otherwise 

render § 2255 inadequate or ineffective, such that the saving 

clause does not apply. On top of this, given the congruence 

purpose underlying § 2255(e), an individual can resort to habeas via § 2255(e) only where the particular claim he seeks 

to bring would have been cognizable under pre-AEDPA 

principles. 

Thus, the majority has no good answer to interpreting the 

saving clause as doing what Congress crafted it to do— 

among other things, ensuring equivalence between § 2255 

and the prior postconviction remedy being replaced or modi1245 (CA11 1999), overruled by McCarthan v. Director of Goodwill 

Industries-Suncoast Inc., 851 F. 3d 1076 (CA11 2017) (en banc). 

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Jackson, J., dissenting 

fed, unless Congress clearly establishes otherwise. A successive statutory innocence claim could have been brought 

prior to the 1996 addition of § 2255(h), and Congress has not 

clearly foreclosed such claims in the text of § 2255. Therefore, the saving clause applies, and Jones should have been 

permitted to raise his legal innocence claim by fling a habeas 

petition under § 2241. 

II 

The foregoing analysis assumes, as the majority does, that 

the only hope of a prisoner in Jones's position is to assert his 

statutory innocence claim via a habeas petition fled under 

§ 2241 per the saving clause, because § 2255(h) prevents the 

fling of such a successive § 2255 motion. But I would not be 

so quick to assume that a successive § 2255 motion asserting 

statutory innocence is impermissible due to § 2255(h). Here 

is why. 

Nothing in the whole of § 2255 suggests that Congress ever 

considered the scenario presented in this case—one in which 

a prisoner who has already fled a postconviction motion suddenly gets a new claim of legal innocence (after his frst petition was fled) based on a development in Supreme Court 

case law. Therefore, it is not at all clear that Congress determined that such an individual is simply out of luck. Far 

from making the decision that a prisoner in this circumstance 

should not be permitted to raise that newly available claim 

by fling another § 2255 motion—as the majority maintains— 

Congress has simply never spoken to what is supposed to 

happen with newly available claims of legal innocence. 

To reach today's conclusion, then, the majority draws a 

“negative inference” that Congress intended for § 2255's “second or successive” bar to preclude successive flings that contain legal innocence claims. Ante, at 477. But the majority's inferential reasoning is highly problematic in at least 

two respects. 

First, negative inferences drawn without proper context 

can be notoriously unreliable. And, as detailed below, there 

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Jackson, J., dissenting 

are myriad reasons for skepticism here. Section 2255(h)'s 

anti-claim-splitting purpose is one. Another is the likely 

reason that legal innocence claims do not appear in the text 

of the statute (spoiler alert: they were inadvertently omitted). Background equitable principles and the practical consequences of preventing the fling of successive petitions in 

this circumstance are additional key contextual clues that 

the majority seems to have missed. 

Second, I am suspicious of the majority's choice to resort 

to inferential reasoning at all, given that this Court has long 

held that we will not read a statute to displace access to “the 

great writ” unless Congress has been clear about its intention to accomplish this result. Ex parte Yerger, 8 Wall. 85, 

95, 102 (1869). The clear-statement rule is plainly applicable 

here, and the majority offers the fimsiest of explanations for 

its decision to deviate from its application at the threshold 

of today's interpretation. 

In short, as shown below, the initial assumption that Congress necessarily meant for § 2255(h) to bar Jones's successive petition asserting statutory innocence is shaky, at best. 

I would have held that Jones's petition can proceed, even 

without reliance on the saving clause, because § 2255(h) does 

not bar it. 

A 

The majority says that “since [AEDPA], second or successive § 2255 motions are barred unless they rely on” one of 

two (and only two) circumstances: “ `newly discovered evidence,' § 2255(h)(1), or `a new rule of constitutional law,' 

§ 2255(h)(2).” Ante, at 469. Legal innocence claims are 

barred, the majority holds, pursuant to this “straightforward 

negative inference.” Ante, at 477. But there is a good reason that the negative-inference canon “must be applied with 

great caution.” A. Scalia & B. Garner, Reading Law: The 

Interpretation of Legal Texts 107 (2012). And the reason is 

that “its application depends so much on context.” Ibid. 

In this case, for instance, there are several strong contextual 

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Jackson, J., dissenting 

clues that substantially undercut the majority's purportedly 

“straightforward” inferential reasoning. 

1 

First of all, while the majority interprets § 2255(h) as if 

Congress designed that provision to impose “fnality” without regard to the claims at issue (other than the two listed 

situations), see ante, at 480, as it turns out, that is not the 

primary purpose of § 2255(h). Instead, § 2255(h)'s “second or 

successive petition” bar was inserted into AEDPA to ensure 

that all available claims a prisoner has are brought in a single postconviction petition. In circumstances where the 

prisoner seeks to assert a claim that was previously unavailable (i. e., a claim that could not have been raised before), 

Congress permitted successive petitions. 

Explaining this fully requires me to make a preliminary 

big-picture point. Section 2255 (originally and as amended 

by AEDPA) is not a gauntlet of arbitrary hurdles that Congress has erected to stymie prisoners who seek to obtain 

judicial review of their detention. Indeed, as explained, 

when Congress frst enacted § 2255, it had no intention of 

shrinking the catalog of available postconviction claims. 

Ante, at 473–474; see also Part I, supra. To be sure, Congress has undertaken to restrict the writ's availability somewhat since § 2255 was frst enacted, but it has nevertheless 

continued to appreciate the signifcance of access to postconviction review of the legality of a prisoner's detention. 

Hence, even after AEDPA, Congress permits all incarcerated individuals—including those who have been convicted 

of serious crimes and who are serving sentences that have 

been imposed by courts of competent jurisdiction—to seek 

collateral relief. See §§ 2254(a), 2255(a). 

Still, when it enacted AEDPA in 1996, Congress was 

aware of how § 2255's postconviction processes had been operating on the ground since § 2255's enactment. Thus, Congress quite rationally sought to “ `balance' ” the “ `individual 

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Jackson, J., dissenting 

interest in justice that arises in the extraordinary case' ” 

with “ `the societal interests in fnality, comity, and conservation of scarce judicial resources.' ” McQuiggin v. Perkins, 

569 U. S. 383, 393 (2013) (quoting Schlup v. Delo, 513 U. S. 

298, 324 (1995)). 

Section 2255(h) refects this balancing. “What emerges 

from a review of the debates over the successive petition 

restrictions is a clear sense that” Congress wanted to “preven[t] manipulation of the system through relitigation of previously presented claims or strategic withholding of claims 

for later presentation,” while still creating “a mechanism 

that would allow prisoners to have one full, fair chance to 

present their meritorious . . . claims to the federal courts.” 

B. Stevenson, The Politics of Fear and Death: Successive 

Problems in Capital Federal Habeas Corpus Cases, 77 

N. Y. U. L. Rev. 699, 772 (2002). As Senator Hatch said at 

the time: “We have provided for protection of Federal habeas 

corpus, but we do it one time and that is it—unless, of course, 

they can truly come up with evidence of innocence that could 

not have been presented at trial. There we allow successive 

petitions.” 141 Cong. Rec. 15042 (1995). Then-Senator 

Biden similarly explained that the goal of AEDPA was “essentially giving one bite out of the apple to drastically reduce 

the ability to have successive petitions unless there is some 

egregious action that is learned about after the petition is 

fled, the frst petition.” Id., at 15027.7 

Thus, Congress enacted § 2255(h) to prevent prisoners 

from engaging in manipulative fling practices—such as claim 

splitting, i. e., the ineffcient business of prisoners with time 

on their hands doling out their existing postconviction claims 

in a series of successive motions fled in court seriatim. See 

7 See also H. R. Rep. No. 101–681, pt. 1, p. 111 (1990) (explaining that 

the purpose of a predecessor bill was “to promote fnality” but also “to 

ensure that habeas corpus petitioners have one fair opportunity to present 

their Federal claims to the Federal courts”). 
Cite as: 599 U. S. 465 (2023) 511 

Jackson, J., dissenting 

Sanders, 373 U. S., at 18 (noting that a prisoner may “deliberately withhol[d]” or “deliberately abando[n]” claims in a 

frst postconviction petition “in the hope of being granted 

two hearings rather than one”).8 And, tellingly, because 

Congress was focused on that problem—not attempting to 

impose “fnality” writ large—it did not bar all successive petitions; to the contrary, it proceeded to identify particular 

circumstances in which another collateral challenge would be 

authorized. §§ 2255(h)(1)–(2). 

Additional doubts about the majority's negative inference 

surface when one recognizes that the two circumstances 

Congress carved out of the successive-petition bar share an 

important common thread: Both situations relate to the newness of the claim that the prisoner seeks to assert in a successive petition. That is, both prongs of § 2255(h) that authorize a successive petition do so where a petitioner brings a 

claim that arose after the time in which the prisoner would 

or could have fled his frst petition. Ibid. (authorizing successive petitions raising “newly discovered evidence” or “a 

new rule of constitutional law” (emphasis added)). 

In light of this key observation, the majority's assumption 

that § 2255(h) bars Jones's claim is signifcantly hobbled. 

Jones's statutory innocence claim is also “new”—in the sense 

that it was not available to him when his frst § 2255 petition 

was fled.9 And Jones's claim shares other features of the 

8 It appears that, in enacting restrictions on successive petitions, Congress was primarily worried about successive petitions fled by state prisoners on death row, because a petition could delay the execution of a death 

sentence. See Stevenson, 77 N. Y. U. L. Rev., at 723–730. Indeed, the 

law is called the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act. That 

concern does not apply to a situation like Jones's, since he is not serving 

a death sentence, and nothing about a successive petition delays the execution of his sentence of imprisonment. 9 Prior to this Court's holding in Rehaif v. United States, 588 U. S. ––– 

(2019), well-established Circuit precedent had barred Jones's claim. 

United States v. Jones, 266 F. 3d 804, 810, n. 5 (CA8 2001) (citing United 

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Jackson, J., dissenting 

circumstances that Congress exempted from the “second or 

successive” general prohibition as well—including that it implicates innocence, see § 2255(h)(1), and stems from a retroactively applicable Supreme Court opinion, see § 2255(h)(2). 

Nor does the fling of Jones's successive petition implicate 

any anti-claim-splitting rationale, as Jones did not manipulatively withhold his legal innocence claim during his initial 

§ 2255 proceedings. Indeed, he could not possibly have done 

so, since this Court did not decide Rehaif v. United States, 

588 U. S. ––– (2019), which provided the basis for his claim, 

until nearly two decades after Jones fled his frst petition. 

In short, it is hard to believe that a Congress that expressly authorized “new” claims involving innocence or those 

that arise from developments in Supreme Court case law 

despite § 2255(h)'s successive-petition bar also meant for 

§ 2255(h) to preclude Jones from bringing the claim that he 

seeks to fle here. 

2 

The majority's negative inference also rests on the bald 

assumption that Congress intentionally left statutory innocence out of its list of carveouts, because it wanted those 

claims to be barred if brought in a successive petition. 

Ante, at 480 (asserting that “Congress has chosen fnality over 

error correction” with respect to statutory innocence claims 

brought in successive petitions (emphasis added)). But 

there is a perfectly logical alternative explanation for why 

States v. Kind, 194 F. 3d 900, 906 (CA8 1999)). After Jones's conviction 

became fnal, this Court decided Rehaif, which interpreted the elements 

of Jones's crime of conviction more narrowly than some Courts of Appeals 

had, and thereby recognized a potential basis for Jones and other similar 

defendants to claim legal innocence. And because Rehaif was a Supreme 

Court ruling that changed the scope of a criminal statute, it applied retroactively to individuals (like Jones) whose convictions had become fnal at 

the time it was issued. Schriro v. Summerlin, 542 U. S. 348, 351–352 

(2004); Bousley v. United States, 523 U. S. 614, 620–621 (1998). 

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Jackson, J., dissenting 

statutory innocence claims do not appear as express exclusions in the text of § 2255(h), an explanation that is based on 

another important contextual reference point: the enactment 

history of the statute. 

Section 2255(h) was enacted in the same Public Law as 

§ 2244(b), a provision that contains analogous second-orsuccessive petition limitations for state prisoners. Indeed, 

Congress “appears to have modeled § 2255(h)(2)” on those 

state-prisoner provisions. Chazen v. Marske, 938 F. 3d 851, 

863 (CA7 2019) (Barrett, J., concurring) (citing R. Fallon, 

J. Manning, D. Meltzer, & D. Shapiro, Hart and Wechsler's 

The Federal Courts and the Federal System 1362 (7th 

ed. 2015) (Hart & Wechsler)). Like § 2255(h), § 2244(b)— 

the model provision—does not address statutory innocence claims in any fashion. But that is simply because 

there is no such thing as a statutory innocence claim in 

the realm of federal collateral relief for state prisoners. 

See Hart & Wechsler 1362; see also Estelle v. McGuire, 

502 U. S. 62, 67 (1991) (“[F]ederal habeas corpus relief does 

not lie for errors of state law” (internal quotation marks 

omitted)). 

Thus, as others have observed, when Congress crafted 

§ 2255(h) based on the state-prisoner model in § 2244(b), it 

seems to have “ `lost sight of the fact that' ” federally incarcerated individuals “ `can raise federal statutory claims in 

their collateral attacks.' ” Chazen, 938 F. 3d, at 863 (quoting 

Hart & Wechsler 1362; emphasis added); Chazen, 938 F. 3d, 

at 863 (suggesting that the omission of legal innocence claims 

from § 2255(h) was due to “congressional oversight”); Reply 

Brief for Respondent 15. 

To me, this contextual revelation rocks the foundation of 

the majority's negative inference. That is, it is plausible 

(and perhaps even likely) that Congress did not appreciate 

fully that the modeled-after language establishing a 

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Jackson, J., dissenting 

able claims for federal prisoners.10 And, of course, if Congress simply overlooked statutory innocence claims when it 

crafted § 2255(h), then the omitted language that the majority puts so much stock in is not actually indicative of Congress having “chosen fnality” with respect to statutory innocence claims. Ante, at 480. Instead, the absence of any 

textual reference to statutory innocence would be wholly 

unremarkable. 

3 

Given the purpose and history of § 2255(h) as I have just 

described them, I fnd quite compelling the Government's observation that “[n]othing in AEDPA [actually] justifes an inference that Congress silently repealed the traditional [postconviction] remedy for federal prisoners who have been 

imprisoned for conduct that Congress did not criminalize.” 

Brief for Respondent 28. I proceed here to add that nothing 

outside of AEDPA—not the background legal principles that 

existed at the time Congress enacted the statute, nor the 

practical consequences of reading § 2255(h) in this manner— 

supports that inference either. 

Take equity, for instance. When Congress crafted 

§ 2255(h), it legislated against an important background equitable principle pertaining to postconviction relief: Courts 

should not interpret statutory provisions governing habeas 

review to even “ `run the risk' ” of causing prisoners to “ `for10 The rushed and emotionally charged manner in which AEDPA came 

into fruition makes Congress's lack of attention to this detail a very realistic possibility. AEDPA was passed in reaction to the Oklahoma City bombing, and President Clinton had “demand[ed]” its passage by the 1-year 

anniversary of that event. J. Liebman, An “Effective Death Penalty”? 

AEDPA and Error Detection in Capital Cases, 67 Brooklyn L. Rev. 411, 

413 (2011); see also Stevenson, 77 N. Y. U. L. Rev., at 701. Both this 

Court and commentators have observed that, likely as a result, AEDPA 

is “shoddily crafted and poorly cohered.” L. Kovarsky, Death Ineligibility 

and Habeas Corpus, 95 Cornell L. Rev. 329, 342 (2010); see also Lindh v. 

Murphy, 521 U. S. 320, 336 (1997) (“[I]n a world of silk purses and pigs' 

ears, [AEDPA] is not a silk purse of the art of statutory drafting”). 

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Jackson, J., dissenting 

ever los[e] their opportunity for any federal review of their 

. . . claims.' ” Panetti v. Quarterman, 551 U. S. 930, 945–946 

(2007) (quoting Rhines v. Weber, 544 U. S. 269, 275 (2005)); 

see also Stewart v. Martinez-Villareal, 523 U. S. 637, 645 

(1998). This means that Congress was well aware that 

courts consistently “rel[y] on equitable doctrines to carve out 

. . . ways petitioners can bypass [otherwise applicable] procedural obstacles” when a prisoner has “not had a full and fair 

opportunity to litigate their federal claims.” E. Primus, Equitable Gateways: Toward Expanded Federal Habeas Corpus 

Review of State-Court Criminal Convictions, 61 Ariz. L. Rev. 

291, 305 (2019).11 Knowing that courts are equitable tribunals that tend to operate in this fashion should have 

prompted Congress to express its intention to override that 

value (assuming that it actually intended to completely foreclose new legal innocence claims). Congress did not do so; 

yet the majority reads its silence to accomplish that same 

extraordinarily inequitable result.12 

The practical consequences that inure from the majority's 

reading also undercut substantially the negative inference 

upon which the majority relies. We have consistently 

warned that courts should “resis[t] an interpretation of 

[AEDPA] that would `produce troublesome results' [and] 

`create procedural anomalies.' ” Panetti, 551 U. S., at 946 

11 Many of the Courts of Appeals that had read § 2255(e) as saving legal 

innocence claims invoked this equitable principle. See, e. g., In re Davenport, 147 F. 3d, at 609; Triestman, 124 F. 3d, at 378; In re Dorsainvil, 119 

F. 3d, at 251. As lower courts also recognized, the impetus to provide a 

meaningful opportunity for review of a postconviction claim was especially 

strong when failure to hear the claim might result in a “miscarriage of 

justice.” See Reyes-Requena, 243 F. 3d, at 904; In re Dorsainvil, 119 

F. 3d, at 251. 12 Theoretically, Jones had “an” opportunity to raise his claim. But, in 

my view, it was not a meaningful one. Well-established Circuit precedent barred the claim at the time of Jones's direct appeal and frst petition. 

See n. 9, supra. Jones has never had any opportunity, meaningful or 

otherwise, to rely on Rehaif's authoritative construction. 

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Jackson, J., dissenting 

(quoting Castro v. United States, 540 U. S. 375, 380 (2003)). 

The majority does not speak to this at all, but its interpretation of § 2255 produces bizarre outcomes. 

First, there is the quirky procedural anomaly that arises 

due to the fact that statutory innocence claims are fully authorized in the postconviction review context. This Court's 

recognition that a statute covers a narrower scope of criminal conduct than was previously acknowledged falls within 

the narrow subset of criminal law decisions that are fully 

retroactive, meaning that a federal prisoner can rely upon 

that new determination whether his case is still on direct 

review or not. Schriro v. Summerlin, 542 U. S. 348, 351– 

352 (2004); Bousley, 523 U. S., at 620–621. But reading 

§ 2255(h) to bar a successive petition raising legal innocence 

would mean that most prisoners who would (remarkably) be 

eligible for such retroactive relief would turn out to have no 

mechanism for actually requesting it. A strange practical 

conundrum, to say the least. 

Inferring that § 2255(h) bars legal innocence claims when 

brought in a successive petition also produces stunningly disparate results that bear no relationship to Congress's purported fnality goals. Consider two individuals who have 

been convicted of the same federal crime—perhaps two codefendants who were tried and sentenced together. Both 

complete their direct appeals, but only one fles a § 2255 motion within AEDPA's statute of limitations, while the other 

one decides not to or misses the deadline. If § 2255(h) bars a 

successive petition raising a legal innocence claim, then when 

Rehaif is handed down—altering the elements of the crime 

of conviction such that both prisoners have a colorable claim 

of legal innocence—only the one who did not previously fle 

a § 2255 petition can raise this retroactive statutory innocence claim. 

Reference to Congress's interest in “fnality” cannot explain this odd unequal treatment. Under the Court's interpretation, a prisoner whose conviction became fnal 30 years 

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Jackson, J., dissenting 

ago can assert a Rehaif claim if he never previously fled a 

§ 2255 motion, whereas someone whose conviction became 

fnal 2 years ago cannot if he has already had a § 2255 petition adjudicated.13 

Interpreting § 2255(h) as completely foreclosing successive 

petitions bringing statutory innocence claims also places 

prisoners in an untenable catch-22 that cannot be what any 

rational Congress actually intended. Consider what has 

happened in this very case. Per AEDPA's statute of limitations, Jones had to fle his frst § 2255 petition within one 

year of his conviction becoming fnal. § 2255(f). He did so, 

and that petition was successful; the Eighth Circuit found 

that Jones had received ineffective assistance of counsel. 

United States v. Jones, 403 F. 3d 604, 605 (2005). In the 

majority's view, by seeking to vindicate his Sixth Amendment rights in this way, Jones has forfeited, forever and for 

all time, his right to rely on any new retroactive Supreme 

Court opinion that suggests he is incarcerated for noncriminal behavior. There is no indication that Congress meant 

for Jones and other prisoners in his position to have to choose 

between pursing an ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claim 

and a claim of legal innocence. 

* * * 

Despite all this, the majority clings to its “straightforward” negative inference and interprets § 2255(h) as a bar to 

a court's consideration of Jones's legal innocence claim. My 

point is that, with so many contextual indicators that Congress did not really mean for § 2255(h) to be read to preclude 

new claims of statutory innocence, the Court should have 

simply determined that Jones's petition, which asserts such 

13 Accommodating the possibility of retroactively applicable Supreme 

Court opinions, § 2255 runs the statute of limitations not just from the 

date on which the conviction became fnal, but also from the date a new, 

retroactively applicable right was recognized by the Supreme Court. 

§ 2255(f)(3). 

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Jackson, J., dissenting 

a claim, was not plainly barred by § 2255(h), and could thus 

proceed in a successive § 2255 petition. 

B 

Instead of drawing an inference about the operation of 

§ 2255(h), the most “straightforward” way of determining 

whether Jones's legal innocence claim is precluded by statute, ante, at 480, would have been to apply our clearstatement rule to today's interpretation. 

1 

A “longstanding rule” of this Court, INS v. St. Cyr, 533 

U. S. 289, 298 (2001), the clear-statement rule directs that, 

before interpreting a congressional enactment as “ `clos[ing 

the Court's] doors to a class of habeas petitioners,' ” the 

Court must search for a “ `clear indication that such was Congress' intent,' ” Panetti, 551 U. S., at 946 (quoting Castro, 540 

U. S., at 381). This principle recognizes that Congress must 

“speak unambiguously when it seeks to effect a result that, 

although constitutional, would undermine a constitutionally 

derived value.” J. Manning, Textualism and the Equity of 

the Statute, 101 Colum. L. Rev. 1, 121–122 (2001) (Manning). 

And, before today, this Court has repeatedly recognized the 

importance of the clear-statement rule with respect to any 

analysis of an Act of Congress that potentially restricts access to the writ of habeas corpus or its statutory equivalent.14 In fact, “where a provision precluding review is 

claimed to bar habeas review,” we have “required a particularly clear statement.” Demore v. Kim, 538 U. S. 510, 517 

(2003) (emphasis added). 

14 See, e. g., Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U. S. 723, 738 (2008); McQuiggin 

v. Perkins, 569 U. S. 383, 397 (2013); Holland v. Florida, 560 U. S. 631, 

646 (2010); Panetti v. Quarterman, 551 U. S. 930, 946 (2007); Hamdan v. 

Rumsfeld, 548 U. S. 557, 575 (2006); Demore v. Kim, 538 U. S. 510, 517 

(2003); Castro v. United States, 540 U. S. 375, 381 (2003); INS v. St. Cyr, 

533 U. S. 289, 298 (2001); Ex parte Yerger, 8 Wall. 85, 102 (1869). 

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Jackson, J., dissenting 

The clear-statement rule is plainly implicated here. 

Under the state of the law at the time AEDPA was enacted, 

prisoners were entitled to bring a petition to assert a new 

claim of legal innocence, even a second or successive petition. 

Supra, at 501–502. Congress could change that state of affairs, but, under the clear-statement rule, if it intended to do 

so, it needed to speak clearly to effectuate that result. 

At a more general level of analysis, the clear-statement 

rule also applies to these circumstances because the interpretive question in this case touches upon the venerated writ 

of habeas corpus—the only writ that is expressly mentioned 

in the Constitution. Art. I, § 9, cl. 2; Holland, 560 U. S., at 

649. We have long recognized that the clear-statement rule 

serves the core liberty interests protected by the writ of 

habeas corpus. See Ex parte Yerger, 8 Wall., at 103 (holding, more than 150 years ago, that the Court had jurisdiction 

over a particular habeas petition and relying on the clearstatement rule to reach that conclusion, explaining that, to 

conclude otherwise, would “greatly weaken the effcacy of 

the writ” and “deprive the citizen in many cases of its benefts”). Likewise, in modern times, we have been especially 

careful to reference clear-statement principles, and thereby 

eschew statutory interpretations that would (perhaps unintentionally) foreclose judicial review of postconviction claims, 

even where the text of the statute might (sometimes even 

strongly) suggest otherwise.15 

15 For example, we cited the clear-statement rule when declining to read 

§ 2244(b)(2), which generally prohibits second or successive habeas petitions fled by state prisoners, as blocking a second-in-time habeas petition 

that raised an incompetent-to-be-executed claim, even though, literally 

read, the statute could have done so. Panetti, 551 U. S., at 942–943, 945– 

946. Similarly, in Holland, the Court relied on the clear-statement rule 

when evaluating AEDPA's 1-year statute of limitations, holding that 

the unequivocal statutory limitations period can be equitably tolled, even 

though the text of AEDPA did not include equitable tolling among 

the enumerated exceptions. 560 U. S., at 646–649. Likewise, in Castro, 

the Court used the clear-statement rule to reject the argument that 

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Jackson, J., dissenting 

Furthermore, and signifcantly for present purposes, we 

have already determined that the necessary “clear statement” here—i. e., the signal from Congress that justifes 

reading a statute as foreclosing access to venerated postconviction review processes—cannot be derived from negative 

inferences drawn from statutory text. In Ex parte Yerger, 

for instance, we declared that interpreting a statute to “[r]epea[l] by implication” habeas jurisdiction is “not favored.” 

8 Wall., at 105. More recently, we warned (again) that “[i]mplications from statutory text or legislative history are not 

suffcient to repeal habeas jurisdiction; instead, Congress 

must articulate specifc and unambiguous statutory directives to effect a repeal.” St. Cyr, 533 U. S., at 299 (citing 

Ex parte Yerger, 8 Wall., at 105). And, again, in Holland, 

this Court explained that the clear-statement rule generally 

prohibits a court from inferring that the “inclu[sion of] one 

item . . . is to exclude other similar items” in order to read a 

statute as forbidding review of a postconviction claim. 560 

U. S., at 648; see also id., at 649 (“counsel[ing] hesitancy before interpreting AEDPA's statutory silence as indicating a 

congressional intent to close courthouse doors”). Yet, here, 

as the majority appears to admit, the only way to read 

§ 2255(h) as barring Jones's statutory innocence claim is to 

infer that such preclusion is what Congress intended. Ante, 

at 478, 490. 

This case would have been easily resolved if we had applied the clear-statement rule at the outset, as we have al-

§ 2244(b)(3)(E)—which prohibits habeas petitioners from seeking certiorari 

review of a “ `grant or denial of an authorization by a court of appeals 

to fle a second or successive application' ”—prevented this Court from 

reviewing whether the lower courts had mistakenly concluded that the 

federal prisoner's petition was in fact a “second or successive” petition. 

540 U. S., at 379–381. Finally, in St. Cyr, the Court utilized the clearstatement rule to dispense with the contention that AEDPA stripped federal courts of jurisdiction to review a noncitizen's habeas petition raising 

a pure question of law. 533 U. S., at 298–299, 314. 

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Jackson, J., dissenting 

ways done in cases of this nature. Doing so would have 

appropriately eliminated a reading of § 2255(h) that forecloses access to habeas relief by negative implication. Use 

of the rule would have thus protected core constitutional 

norms by “ensur[ing] Congress does not, by broad or general 

language, legislate on a sensitive topic inadvertently or without due deliberation.” Spector v. Norwegian Cruise Line 

Ltd., 545 U. S. 119, 139 (2005) (opinion of Kennedy, J.); see 

also Will v. Michigan Dept. of State Police, 491 U. S. 58, 

65 (1989). 

2 

In the last few pages of its opinion, the Court makes the 

unceremonious (but still startling) announcement that the 

clear-statement rule is inapplicable to today's analysis of 

§ 2255(h). Ante, at 490–492.16 Try as it might, in my view, 

the majority has failed to provide a single persuasive reason 

for this dramatic break. 

First, the majority suggests that the clear-statement rule 

is not appropriate when interpreting provisions related 

to “fnality”—and seems to draw a line between AEDPA's 

statute of limitations, which does get clear-statement treatment, and its provisions governing successive petitions. 

Ante, at 490–491. This is nonsense. Both AEDPA provisions use similar language. § 2255(f) (“A 1-year period 

of limitation shall apply to a motion under this section”); 

§ 2255(h) (“A second or successive motion must . . . contain 

. . . ”). And both procedural limitations relate to Congress's 

interest in fnality. Ante, at 491; Wood v. Milyard, 566 

U. S. 463, 472 (2012) (noting that AEDPA's statute of limitations “lends fnality to . . . court judgments within a rea16 It appears that no one but the Court's majority even thought it possible to sidestep the clear-statement rule with respect to today's interpretive exercise. Both Jones and the Government expressly invoked it. 

And Court-appointed amicus did not dispute its applicability. 

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Jackson, J., dissenting 

sonable time” (emphasis added; internal quotation marks 

omitted)).17 

Next, the majority conspicuously downplays the stakes in 

this case. Not once does its opinion make direct mention of 

the fact that the claim the majority says § 2255(h) silently 

precludes is one that implicates core values because it involves legal innocence. Instead, the majority repeatedly 

describes Jones's bid for access to the postconviction review 

process as bringing a mere “statutory” claim. Ante, at 470, 

480, 488, 490.18 But statutory claims that suggest a person's 

innocence are different in kind from more run-of-the-mill 

statutory claims, such as a technical, nonprejudicial violation 

of a criminal procedure rule. See United States v. Addonizio, 442 U. S. 178, 186–187 (1979); Davis, 417 U. S., at 346– 

347 (citing Hill v. United States, 368 U. S. 424, 428–429 

(1962)). In any event, the majority does not cite a single 

case that suggests that an Act of Congress that threatens to 

cut off access to habeas (or its statutory equivalent) should 

be treated any differently for purposes of application of the 

clear-statement rule if a petitioner's claim has a statutory 

basis. 

The majority's most full-throated defense of its jettisoning 

of clear-statement principles lies in its attempt to cast statu17 This Court has also treated these two provisions as similarly susceptible to equitable exceptions; for instance, the “miscarriage of justice” 

principle that permits bypassing procedural barriers applies to both. McQuiggin, 569 U. S., at 386, 392–393; Schlup, 513 U. S., at 320. 18 The euphemistic manner in which the Court's opinion tiptoes around 

what Jones is actually arguing is noteworthy. The majority says that, by 

operation of § 2255(h), prisoners in Jones's position cannot take advantage 

of “a more favorable interpretation of statutory law,” ante, at 469–470, 

which it also obliquely characterizes as “an intervening change in statutory interpretation,” ante, at 471, or “a newly adopted narrowing interpretation of a criminal statute,” ante, at 477. In fact, the word “innocence” 

only appears in the Court's opinion when recounting the Government's 

arguments. Ante, at 489, 491. If the majority has spared a thought for 

the appropriate standard when a petitioner is claiming legal innocence, I 

could not fnd it in the Court's opinion. 

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Jackson, J., dissenting 

tory innocence claims as not “historically or constitutionally 

grounded.” Ante, at 492. The frst and most obvious 

problem with this effort is that the historical pedigree of a 

claim is irrelevant for clear-statement purposes. The clearstatement rule is applicable here because the statute being 

interpreted involves access to the writ of habeas corpus— 

a signifcant constitutional value that we would not assume 

Congress would discard without careful consideration. See 

Manning 121–122; see also Holland, 560 U. S., at 646–649. 

And, so triggered, our clear-statement canon of construction 

is not rendered inapplicable just because the particular type 

of claim that a prisoner seeks to advance in the context of a 

habeas or postconviction proceeding (if he is afforded one) 

might not date back to the founding era. This must be why 

the majority cites no precedent that splices the clearstatement rule in this fashion. 

Looking back to the time of the founding to determine 

whether the clear-statement rule applies to our interpretation of a statute passed in 1996 also makes no sense. The 

clear-statement question relates to what Congress intended 

with respect to the meaning of the statute at the time it was 

enacted. When Congress introduced § 2255(h), it codifed or 

changed the law that existed at that time (i. e., in 1996). 

See, e. g., Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U. S. 473, 483 (2000) (noting 

that AEDPA's certifcate-of-appealability provisions codifed 

the prevailing judicial standard). Thus, when this Court has 

previously applied the clear-statement rule and analyzed the 

meaning of particular AEDPA provisions, the feelings of the 

Framers were of no moment. Instead, we properly examined the law leading up to AEDPA's enactment, not 

founding-era sources. See, e. g., Panetti, 551 U. S., at 944; 

Magwood v. Patterson, 561 U. S. 320, 337 (2010) (plurality 

opinion). 

Even if the majority was right with respect to its assumption that founding-era practices bear on whether the clearstatement rule applies here, historical practice plainly underPage Proof Pending Publication
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524 JONES v. HENDRIX 

Jackson, J., dissenting 

mines its assertion that legal innocence claims are of recent 

vintage. Supreme Court Justices riding circuit in the early 

19th century repeatedly considered the merits of habeas petitions fled by individuals who argued they were being 

wrongfully incarcerated because the laws that had been invoked to justify their confnement, properly construed, did 

not reach their conduct.19 Moreover, and importantly, since 

the mid-19th century, the statutory scheme for postconviction review has permitted petitions based not only on a “violation of the constitution” but also on a “violation of the . . . 

law of the United States.” Judiciary Act of Feb. 5, 1867, 

ch. 28, § 1, 14 Stat. 385; see also § 2255; W. Church, Writ of 

19 Ex parte D'Olivera, 7 F. Cas. 853, 854 (No. 3,967) (CC Mass. 1813) 

(Story, J.) (construing a 1790 statute criminalizing desertion from a merchant ship by “seamen engaged in the merchants' service of the United 

States” as not covering certain “foreign seamen in foreign vessels” and 

granting habeas relief to such persons); United States v. Bainbridge, 24 F. 

Cas. 946, 951–952 (No. 14,497) (CC Mass. 1816) (Story, J.) (considering on 

the merits, but ultimately rejecting, a habeas petitioner's argument that 

an enlistment law did not apply to minors enlisted without parental consent); Ex parte Randolph, 20 F. Cas. 242, 254–257 (No. 11,558) (CC Va. 

1833) (Marshall, C. J.) (granting habeas relief to an individual civilly imprisoned because the statute at issue, properly interpreted, did not apply 

to the petitioner); see also, e. g., Grant v. United States, 58 F. 694, 695–697 

(CA9 1893) (granting writ of error to individuals who had been convicted 

following a trial, on the ground that the law at issue, “fairly interpreted,” 

did not reach the petitioners' conduct because “the case does not come 

within the letter of the statute,” and citing cases reaching the same conclusion); In re Wahll, 42 F. 822, 825–826 (Minn. 1890) (considering, but rejecting on the merits, a convicted prisoner's claim that his acts did not amount 

to a violation of a federal law criminalizing the mailing of obscene letters). 

The majority has plainly expended a considerable amount of effort to 

distinguish all of these cases. See ante, at 485–486, and n. 8. Still, its 

vigorous attempt falls short. For example, the majority tries to distinguish Wahll on the ground that the court “considered but rejected a similar argument for ordering pretrial release.” Ante, at 486, n. 8. But it 

ignores that the Wahll court still considered the merits of the statutory 

argument; the court did not dismiss the case on the ground that such 

statutory arguments were not cognizable after the prisoner's conviction. 

42 F., at 825–826. 
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Jackson, J., dissenting 

Habeas Corpus § 169, p. 249 (2d ed. 1893) (“The issue raised 

on the hearing of a habeas corpus may be one of law 

simply”).20 

To the extent the majority's assessment of the purportedly 

nascent nature of statutory innocence claims rests on its 

view that, at the time of the founding, habeas relief was 

rarely available when a petition was brought by a convicted 

individual (as opposed to a pretrial detainee), ante, at 482– 

487, there are two additional problems. For one thing, even 

assuming that a detainee-versus-convict scope-of-habeas distinction existed at the dawn of our Nation, Congress has now 

squarely rejected it.21 However grounded in history and 

tradition the Court's own view of the scope of habeas might 

be, it is obviously not shared by the Legislature that enacted 

the statute we are now interpreting. 

20 This argument that statutory claims are not cognizable in the postconviction or habeas context has already been considered—and rejected—by 

this Court. For example, in St. Cyr, this Court cited various 17th- and 

18th-century cases to conclude that the “issuance of the writ” of habeas 

corpus “encompassed detentions based on errors of law, including the erroneous application or interpretation of statutes.” 533 U. S., at 302. And, 

in Boumediene, the Court reiterated that it is “uncontroversial . . . that 

the privilege of habeas corpus entitles the prisoner to a meaningful opportunity to demonstrate that he is being held pursuant to `the erroneous 

application or interpretation' of relevant law.” 553 U. S., at 779 (quoting 

St. Cyr, 533 U. S., at 302; emphasis added). Not once does the majority 

engage with the propositions stated in these cases. Nor does the majority 

grapple with the express statutory language in both the Judiciary Act of 

1867 and § 2255 authorizing claims premised on violations of the “ `law of 

the United States.' ” Supra, at 524. 21 Section 2255 explicitly authorizes a convicted prisoner to “move the 

court which imposed the sentence” for the prescribed relief, and it allows 

petitions to be fled after “the date on which the judgment of conviction 

becomes fnal.” §§ 2255(a), (f)(1). Also, the major procedural change accomplished by Congress's adoption of § 2255 in 1948 was to transfer the 

fling of postconviction petitions from the district of confnement to the 

sentencing court, see United States v. Hayman, 342 U. S. 205, 215–216 

(1952)—a shift that only makes sense if Congress contemplated postconviction challenges. 
526 JONES v. HENDRIX 

Jackson, J., dissenting 

Second, here again, the majority evaluates the historical 

pedigree of legal innocence claims based on faulty history. 

It maintains that, historically, a court could review a habeas 

petition fled by a convicted individual only for “jurisdictional” errors (which the majority defnes narrowly). Ante, 

at 482–485, 491–492; cf. Edwards v. Vannoy, 593 U. S. 

–––, ––– – ––– (2021) (Gorsuch, J., concurring). But those 

who have researched this contention have called it “narrative 

and myth but not history.” L. Kovarsky, Habeas Myths, 

Past and Present, 101 Texas L. Rev. Online 57, 79 (2022) (Kovarsky); see also J. Siegel, Habeas, History, and Hermeneutics, 64 Ariz. L. Rev. 505, 524–532 (2022) (Siegel); Brown v. 

Davenport, 596 U. S. –––, ––– – ––– (2022) (Kagan, J., 

dissenting).22 

At the very least, this take on early habeas practice appears contradicted by United States v. Bainbridge, 24 F. Cas. 

946 (No. 14,497) (CC Mass. 1816) (Story, J.). There, Justice 

Story considered a statutory innocence claim on the merits 

even though the individual had already pleaded guilty. Id., 

at 949, 951–952. And the postconviction/preconviction distinction also runs headlong into other precedents that have 

looked back on history and do not subscribe to such a narrow 

view. St. Cyr, 533 U. S., at 302 (“[T]he issuance of the writ 

was not limited to challenges to the jurisdiction of the custodian”); Fay v. Noia, 372 U. S. 391, 404 (1963) (“Nor is it true 

that at common law habeas corpus was available only to inquire into the jurisdiction, in a narrow sense, of the commit22 The majority relies heavily on Ex parte Watkins, 3 Pet. 193 (1830), to 

support its purported “jurisdictional” line. Ante, at 483–485. But Watkins does not stand for the broad proposition that the majority derives. 

Watkins “itself relies on contested habeas history,” and is (as scholars 

have explained) distinguishable. Kovarsky 70–71. That Watkins cannot 

mean what the majority says is confrmed by the numerous “19th and 

early 20th century cases . . . that undeniably decided the merits of constitutional claims that were not premised on the detaining authority's lack of 

jurisdiction or application of an unconstitutional statute or sentence.” 

Hertz & Liebman § 2.4[c], at 44. 

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Jackson, J., dissenting 

ting court” (citing Bushell's Case, Vaughn. 135, 124 Eng. Rep. 

1006 (C. P. 1670))). 

Thus, assuming, arguendo, that the historical grounding of 

the particular type of claim Jones sought to bring even matters, the majority is mistaken when it contends that a statutory innocence claim (including one brought in a successive 

petition) is not suffciently historical to warrant application 

of our clear-statement rule. 

* * * 

If the majority had applied the clear-statement rule, as it 

should have, to determine whether § 2255(h) precludes successive postconviction petitions that assert statutory innocence claims, today's interpretive task would have merely 

involved answering one simple question: Is there an unambiguous sign in the text of § 2255 that Congress meant for 

§ 2255(h) to strip an incarcerated individual of any opportunity to raise a new claim of legal innocence in a motion 

brought in federal court? No such sign exists.23 Therefore, 

we could have (and should have) easily concluded that there 

is no statutory impediment to Jones's § 2255 motion being 

entertained by a court. 

III 

Finally, I believe that the canon of constitutional avoidance 

also does important work to guide—and constrain—the 

Court's interpretation of § 2255 in this case. See Zadvydas 

v. Davis, 533 U. S. 678, 689 (2001); cf. Pressley, 430 U. S., at 

381–382 (relying on the saving clause to conclude that the 

District of Columbia's postconviction statute, which mirrored 

§ 2255, was constitutional). The majority's bottom line, 

reading “the interplay” between § 2255(h) and § 2255(e), ante, 

23 The majority does not appear to dispute this conclusion, as it only 

engages with the clear-statement rule to categorically reject its applicability. Ante, at 490–492. The majority does not—and cannot—establish 

that, if applied here, the clear-statement rule is satisfed. 

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Jackson, J., dissenting 

at 469, is that a person in prison for noncriminal conduct 

cannot ask a federal court to review the legality of his detention if he has previously fled a § 2255 petition. This position 

is stunning in a country where liberty is a constitutional 

guarantee and the courts are supposed to be dispensing justice. It also raises hackles under at least two provisions of 

our founding charter. 

First, the Eighth Amendment. There is a nonfrivolous 

argument that the Constitution's protection against “cruel 

and unusual punishment” prohibits the incarceration of innocent individuals. See In re Davis, 557 U. S. 952, 953 (2009) 

(Stevens, J., concurring) (citing Triestman v. United States, 

124 F. 3d 361, 377–380 (CA2 1997)); see also Herrera v. Collins, 506 U. S. 390, 432, n. 2 (1993) (Blackmun, J., dissenting) 

(“It . . . may violate the Eighth Amendment to imprison 

someone who is actually innocent”); Robinson v. California, 

370 U. S. 660, 667 (1962). This is not to say that the Eighth 

Amendment creates a “freestanding entitlement to a second 

or successive round of postconviction review.” Ante, at 20. 

But here Jones seeks a single meaningful opportunity to 

have a federal court consider his claim of legal innocence. 

The majority's interpretation also implicates the Suspension Clause. Art. I, § 9, cl. 2. The majority admits that, at 

a minimum, the Suspension Clause protects the right of habeas corpus as it existed at the time of the founding.24 See 

24 I reject the majority's suggestion that the Suspension Clause protects 

only the scope of the great writ as it existed in the founding era. Historical habeas practice provides the foor, and not the ceiling, of Suspension 

Clause protection. St. Cyr, 533 U. S., at 301 (“[A]t the absolute minimum, the Suspension Clause protects the writ `as it existed in 1789' ” 

(quoting Felker v. Turpin, 518 U. S. 651, 664 (1996); emphasis added)). 

The habeas remedy has “a dynamic element which itself was adopted by 

the framers,” W. Hurst, The Process of Constitutional Construction, in 

Supreme Court and Supreme Law 61 (E. Cahn ed. 1954) (statement of 

P. Freund), such that “to truly understand the scope of the writ `as it 

existed in 1789' is to understand its protean dynamism, not any of its 

specifc applications,” S. Vladeck, The New Habeas Revisionism, 124 

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Jackson, J., dissenting 

ante, at 483. The majority also seems to acknowledge that, 

in the late 18th century, an individual—even one who had 

been convicted of a crime—could invoke habeas to raise a 

“jurisdictional” error. Ante, at 483, 491–492. Historically, 

the term “ `jurisdictional' ” when used by habeas courts 

“meant something much broader then than it means now.” 

Kovarsky 75; see also Siegel 524. And, importantly, a court 

lacked “jurisdiction”—and thus the writ could issue—when 

a person was incarcerated for noncriminal behavior.25 

Thus, it appears that, by its own lights, the majority today 

renders an interpretation of § 2255 that has potentially signifcant constitutional implications. 

IV 

I conclude with an observation. Today's ruling follows a 

recent series of troubling AEDPA interpretations.26 All of 

Harv. L. Rev. 941, 991 (2011); see also P. Halliday, Habeas Corpus: From 

England to Empire 160 (2010). But resolving that debate is unnecessary 

because Jones's claim implicates even the majority's crabbed view of the 

Suspension Clause. 25 See, e. g., Ex parte Siebold, 100 U. S. 371, 376–377 (1880) (noting that 

a court's “authority” to “try and imprison” an individual stems from a 

particular statute and therefore a court has “no jurisdiction” if the law 

does not lawfully apply to the prisoner); Ex parte Bollman, 4 Cranch 75, 

136 (1807) (“[A]s the crime with which the prisoners stand charged has 

not been committed, the court can only direct them to be discharged”); 

Matter of Corryell, 22 Cal. 178, 181 (1863) (“The Court derives its jurisdiction from the law, and its jurisdiction extends to such matters as the law 

declares to be criminal, and none other, and when it undertakes to imprison for an offense to which no criminality is attached, it acts beyond its 

jurisdiction”); Bushell's Case, Vaughn. 135, 124 Eng. Rep. 1006 (C. P. 1670); 

W. Church, Writ of Habeas Corpus § 236, p. 327 (2d ed. 1893) (“[T]he prisoner may be discharged on habeas corpus, either before or after judgment, 

where the statute or ordinance under which the proceedings are inaugurated against him, is unconstitutional, as this is a jurisdictional defect”). 26 See, e. g., Shoop v. Twyford, 596 U. S. –––, ––– (2022) (restricting the 

ability of federal courts to use the All Writs Act in AEDPA cases); Shinn 

v. Martinez Ramirez, 596 U. S. –––, –––, ––– – –––, ––– – ––– (2022) (holding 

that, although ineffective assistance of postconviction counsel can be cause 
530 JONES v. HENDRIX 

Jackson, J., dissenting 

these opinions have now collectively managed to transform 

a statute that Congress designed to provide for a rational 

and orderly process of federal postconviction judicial review 

into an aimless and chaotic exercise in futility. The route to 

obtaining collateral relief is presently replete with imagined 

artifcial barriers, arbitrary dead ends, and traps for the unwary. And today's turn makes the journey palpably absurd: 

It begins with the Supreme Court's (rare) announcement 

that a certain claim for release exists and is retroactively 

available to incarcerated individuals on collateral review, and 

ends with the realization that only an arbitrarily determined 

sliver of eligible prisoners (those who have not had the temerity to fle a prior motion) are actually in a position to 

even ask a court to consider whether any such relief might 

be provided. 

It is quite clear that the Court's rulings in this area of the 

law refect a general ethos that convicted prisoners should 

not be permitted to fle § 2255 motions or obtain postconviction relief at all. But what matters is what Congress wants 

with respect to the operation of the statutory provisions it 

enacts. And, as I have shown, Congress's aim in crafting 

§ 2255 was to permit convicted prisoners to fle postconviction motions asserting claims for collateral relief in a manner 

that also curbs abusive flings. Congress did not speak— 

one way or the other—as to what should happen if a prisoner 

to excuse a procedural default of a trial-ineffective-assistance-of-counsel 

claim, a federal court cannot gather evidence to establish postconviction 

counsel's ineffectiveness); Brown v. Davenport, 596 U. S. –––, –––, ––– – 

–––, –––, ––– (2022) (holding that a state prisoner who shows that a trial 

error prejudiced him under this Court's federal-habeas harmless-error 

standard must also run an AEDPA-derived gauntlet before receiving habeas relief); Edwards v. Vannoy, 593 U. S. –––, ––– – –––, ––– (2021) (eliminating, without any party requesting it, the ability of prisoners to argue 

that a new rule of criminal procedure announced by this Court should 

be fully retroactive as a “watershed” rule); see id., at ––– – ––– (Kagan, 

J., dissenting). 

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Jackson, J., dissenting 

who has previously fled a § 2255 motion gets a new claim of 

legal innocence due to an intervening change in the law. 

Given Congress's silence on this matter, in my view, there 

is simply no justifcation for drawing a negative inference 

that Congress meant for § 2255 to operate in a manner that 

is patently inconsistent with the reasons it passed that statute, or the background principles that animated the law more 

broadly at the time of the statute's enactment, or even (possibly) core constitutional principles. Instead, § 2255(e) should 

be read—consistent with Congress's general intent to ensure 

equivalence between the claims available in habeas and those 

that its new postconviction mechanism allowed—to permit 

prisoners who have a new and retroactive statutory innocence claim to fle a habeas petition in lieu of a § 2255 motion. 

Alternatively, we should honor Congress's clear interest in 

preserving a prisoner's ability to have one meaningful opportunity to have all of his claims presented to a court, by allowing Jones to fle a petition asserting his new and retroactive 

claim of statutory innocence, notwithstanding what might 

otherwise be perceived as an ironclad bar in § 2255(h). 

In other words, as I see it, the negative inference that 

the majority draws today rests on nothing—and certainly 

nothing that actually derives from Congress's intent. Nothing in the text of § 2255, background principles concerning 

habeas relief, or AEDPA's enactment history compels (or 

even supports) the conclusion that Congress intended to 

completely foreclose claims like Jones's. And it is especially 

perverse to read the statute to lead to that result when doing 

so gives rise to legally dissonant, arbitrary, and untenable 

outcomes. So, the majority's “straightforward” determination that this statute does preclude a prisoner in Jones's position from fling a successive petition to assert a legal innocence claim (which it reaches by refusing to follow the 

procedural norm that would have correctly framed the issue 

as a matter of congressional intent relative to clearPage Proof Pending Publication
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Jackson, J., dissenting 

statement principles) appears to stem from the Court's own 

views concerning fnality, not the will of Congress. 

Ultimately, of course, this all begs the question of how (and 

whether) Congress will respond to the Court's systematic 

neutering of the balanced postconviction processes that the 

Legislature has established. It seems to me that today's 

opinion—which unjustifably closes off all avenues for certain 

defendants to secure meaningful consideration of their innocence claims—creates an opening for Congress to step in and 

fx this problem. 

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Reporter’s Note 

The attached opinion has been revised to refect the usual publication 

and citation style of the United States Reports. The revised pagination 

makes available the offcial United States Reports citation in advance of 

publication. The syllabus has been prepared by the Reporter of Decisions 

for the convenience of the reader and constitutes no part of the opinion of 

the Court. A list of counsel who argued or fled briefs in this case, and 

who were members of the bar of this Court at the time this case was 

argued, has been inserted following the syllabus. Other revisions may 

include adjustments to formatting, captions, citation form, and any errant 

punctuation. The following additional edits were made: 

None