Filed 2/18/20 CERTIFIED FOR PUBLICATION

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION SIX

GULF OFFSHORE LOGISTICS, LLC

, et al.,

Petitioner s ,

v.

THE SUPERIOR COURT OF VENTURA COUNTY,

Respondent ;

CLAUDE NORRIS et al.,

Real Parties in Interest. 2d Civil No. B298318 (Super. Ct. No. 56

- 2016

- 00484144

- CU

- OE

- VTA) (Ventura County)

Non

- California residents and former crew members of a vessel that provided maintenance services to oil platforms located
in the Pacific Ocean off the California coast filed this action alleging violations of California state wage and hour laws against
thei r employers and the owners of the vessel , petitioners Gulf Offshore Logistics, LLC and JNB Operating, LLC

. Petitioners moved for summary judgment on the theories that Louisiana rather than California law governed the employment2

relationships at issue, and that either the federal Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA) or the dormant commerce clause preempted California law with respect to these employees . The superior court de nied the motion because petitioners “have not
demonstrated that Louisiana law should apply ” or that California law has been preempted. Petitioners sought writ of mandate directing the superior court to vacate its order denying the motion for summary judg ment and to enter a new order granting the motion. We issued an order to show cause and temporarily stayed all trial court proceedings. We conclude the trial court erred because Louisiana law, rather than California law, applies. Accordingly, we grant t he writ of mandate.
Facts Petitioners own and operate the Adele Elise, a vessel that provides services to oil platforms located off the California coast.
The crew members represent a class of persons who were employed by petitioners to work on the Adele Elise after July 14,
2012. They allege petitioners failed to comply with numerous provisions of California’s wage and hour laws, including paying minimum wage, paying wages at the designated rate, paying overtime, providing meal and rest periods, maintain ing adequate payroll records, providing accurate wage statements, and paying all wages due at termination. Petitioners are limited liability companies formed under
Louisiana law. Every member of both companies is also a
Louisiana resident. The companies have their headquar ters in
Louisiana and the Adele Elise, the vessel on which crew members were employed, is registered in that state. Although the Adele Elise operated for a time in the Gulf of Mexico, it was3

repositioned to the Pacific Ocean in March 2 011 and remained
there until October 2017. Petitioners’ administrative functions are performed at their headquarters in Louisiana. Each former crew member traveled to Louisiana to apply in person for a job and to interview for that job. They also compl eted and acknowledged receipt of employment

- related documents in Louisiana including: the employment application; job description; employee safety manual; minimum training requirements; disembarkation policy;

pre

- employment checklist; permission to releas e payroll check;

non

- California state and federal tax forms; Department of Homeland Security forms and direct deposit authorizations. Petitioners conduct job training and orientation for employees in
Louisiana

. In addition, staff at petitioners’ Louisiana offices make arrangements to transport the crew members to and from the vessels to which they are assigned.
The crew members worked on the Adele Elise from March
2011 when it was repositioned from the Gulf of Mexico to the
Pacific Ocean. In October 20 17, the vessel left California.
Between 2011 and 2017 , the Adele Elise was docked at Port Hueneme and provided services to oil platforms located in federal
waters off the California coast. While stationed at Por t Hueneme, the Adele Elise traveled through the Santa Barbara Channel to deliver supplies and pick up refuse from f our oil platforms. Between July 2012 and May 2015, the Adele Elise made approximately three trips each week to the oil platforms.
After an oil spill occurred in May 2015, the average number of weekly trips declined.
The crew members are a class that is represented by three named members: Claude Norris, Douglas Kwaw and James4

Musgrove. None of the named class representatives resides in or owns property in California. Norris, a resident of Texas, was employed as an able

- bodied seaman aboard the Adele Elise while
it was stationed at Port Hueneme for 571.5 days from June 2013 to January 2016

. Norris was paid a flat daily rate for his
service s, ranging from $140 to $350 per day. Kwaw, a resident of Ohio, was employed as an able

- bodied seaman aboard the Adele Elise while it was stationed at Port Hueneme for 580.5 days between July 2013 and August 2015. He was paid a flat daily
rate for his se rvices, ranging between $265 to $350 per day. Musgrove, a resident of Mississippi, was employed as an engineer
aboard the Adele Elise while it was stationed at Port Hueneme for 471.5 days between August 2013 and February 2016. He was paid a flat daily ra te for his services, ranging between $310 to $750 per day. The employment of each class representative was
terminated only because of a reduction in force. The crew members’ wage and hour claims were made after their employment was terminated.
The crew members who were employed as able bodied

seamen typically worked a “hitch” of 42 days on and 21 days off. Those employed as engineers worked 21 days on and 21 days off. Each employee would travel by air from the airport closest to the crew member’s home in Texas, Ohio, and Mississippi to Los Angeles, where they were shuttled to the vessel in Port Hueneme. At the end of their hitch, the employee s would be shuttled back to the Los Angeles airport and flown back to their
home state s . Administ rative em ployees of petitioners

, who were
located in Louisiana

, made t ravel arrangements for the crew
members.5 Once they arrived at the vessel, the crew members were not permitted to leave the vessel without permission for the
remainder of their hitch. Occasionally

, they were asked to disembark when the vessel was in port, to run errands or pick up supplies. They worked at least 12 hours per day each day of thei r hitch. The job duties of crew members who were employed as
deckhands and able

- bodied seamen included handling tow and mooring lines, securing the vessel to docks and wharves, assisting in loading and unloading supplies, equipment and cargo, assisting wi th pumping water and fuel, cleaning the vessel and lifeboats, standing lookout, food preparation and cleaning the galley, repairing machinery and equipment, and performing other maintenance tasks such as painting, sanding, chipping and scraping the vessel.
Other crew members were employed as engineers. These employees’ job duties included general engine maintenance, changing the engine oil, servicing the engine, pumping mud and chemicals off the vessel on the platforms, receiving fuel for the
vessel and fueling the vessel on the platforms. While stationed at Port Hueneme, the Adele Elise would travel through the Santa Barbara Channel to deliver supplies to, and pick up refuse from four oil platforms. The vessel left from, and returned to the same port ; it did not travel to other states. Travel time from port to the first platform was approximately 7 hours. After servicing the first platform, the vessel would travel to the second, third and fourth platforms and
then back to Port Hueneme. The journey from the fourth platform to Port Hueneme typically took about 8 hours. The entire round trip lasted about 24 hours.6 The port of Port Hueneme is located within the State of
California while the oil platforms are located outside the state

. On its route to and from the platforms, the Adele Elise sailed
both inside and outside of California’s state boundaries. The parties dispute how much time the Adele Elise spent outside the

state. It is undisputed, however, that between March 2011 and
October 20 17, the Adele Elise docked exclusively at Port
Hueneme , California

. Discussion Conflict of Laws Petitioners contend summary judgment should have been granted because Louisiana, rather than California law, govern s their employment relationship with the cre w members . The crew members contend California law governs because they performed
most of their work within the State of California. We agree with petitioners. As our Supreme Court explained in Tidewater M arine
Western

, Inc. v. Bradshaw (1996) 14 Cal.4t h 557 ( Tidewater )

, federal law defines California’s territorial boundaries more narrowly than does California state law. Un der California’s state law definition of its own boundaries, “the entire Santa Barbara Channel is within the state.” ( Id. at p. 564.) Under federal law, “the central portion of the Santa Barbara Channel is not within
the state.” ( Ibid

. ) “In defining California’s federal law boundaries, Congress did not, however, suggest that California lacked power to regulate conduct out side those boundaries and within broader state law boundaries.” ( Ibid

. ) To the contrary, “California employment laws implicitly extend to employment occurring within California’s state law boundaries, including all
of the Santa Barbara Channel

, ” unless “ the operation of federal7

law were at issue, as for example if federal law conflicted with
state law

. ” ( Id at p. 565.)
To determine whether California law conflicts with Louisiana law, we apply a governmental interest analysis. ( Sullivan v. Oracle Corp

. (2011) 51 Cal.4th 1191, 1202 ( Sullivan ) .) “ ‘ First, the court determines whether the relevant law of each of the potentially affected jurisdictions with regard to the particular issue in question is the same or different. Second,
if there is a differenc e, the c ourt examines each jurisdiction’ s interest in the application of its own law under the circumstances of the particular case to determine whether a true conflict exists. Third, if the court finds that there is a true conflict, it carefully
evaluate s and compares the nature and strength of the interest of each jurisdiction in the application of its own law “ t o determine which state’ s interest would be more impaired if its policy were
subordinated t o the policy of the other state” [citation], and then ultimately a pplies “ the law of the state whose interest would be the more impair ed if its law were not applied. ” ’ [Citations.]” ( Id. at pp. 1202

– 1203

. See also Chen v. Los Angeles Truck Centers,
LLC (2019) 7 Cal.5th 862, 867

- 868. ) First, California law differs from Louisiana law. California requires the payment of overtime compensation at a rate based on the number of hours worked, consecutive days worked and the employee’s regular hourly wage. (Lab. Code, § 510, subd. (a).) “The right to overtime under California law is unaffect ed by

contract. [Citations.] ” ( Sullivan

, supra , 51 Cal.4th at p. 1202.)
California also requires that employees receive meal and rest periods (Lab. Code, § 512, subd. (a)), and itemized wage

st atements. (Lab. Code, § 226.) Louisiana has no specific laws addressing overtime compensation or other similar terms of8

employment, relying instead on the FLSA and federal maritime
law. The FLSA exempts seamen, like real parties , from overtime

compens ation. (29 U.S.C. § 213 (b)(6).) Second, after considering “ ‘each jurisdiction’ s interest in the application of its own law under the circumstances of the particular case

, ’ ” we conclude that a “true conflict exists” between the two regulatory schemes. ( Sullivan

, supra , 51 Cal.4th at p.
1202 .) California has an interest in “applying its overtime law to all nonexempt workers, and all work performed, within its
borders. [Citations.] California’s interests, as this court has identified them, are in protecting health and saf ety, expanding the labor market, and preventing the evils associated with overwork.” ( Id. at pp. 1203

- 1204.) Louisiana defers to the federal FLSA, which similarly promotes the federal government’s interest in maintaining “the minimum standard of living

n ecessary for health, efficiency and general well

- being of
workers

. . . .” (29 U.S.C. § 202 (a); Barrentine v. Arkansas

- Best Freight System

, Inc. (1981) 450 U.S. 728, 739.) Unlike California’s Labor Code, however, the FLSA expressly exempts from its prov isions, “an y employee employed as a seaman

. ” (29
U.S.C. § 213 (b)(6).)
In both Sullivan and Tidewater , our Supreme Court held there was no “true conflict” between California’s overtime law and a state or federal law that left overtime unregulated. In eac h of those cases, however, the employees performed work inside California and either resided here ( Tidewater ) or worked for a California employer and periodically came into this state to perform work. ( Sullivan. ) Here, the employees reside outside the
Sta te and work for Louisiana

- based employers. Although they perform some of their work inside California’s territorial waters,9

they have no other significant contact with the State. In addition, their employment relationships were formed in Louisiana and all management and administrative functions are performed there. Under the circumstances of this particular case, we conclude Sullivan and Tidewater are d istinguishable
and that a “t rue conflict” exists between California and Louisiana
law

. Sullivan and Tidewater establish that California has strong interests in regulating the working conditions of non

- resident s who work for California employers within the State’s territorial
boundar ies ( Sullivan ), and of residents who work both within and
outside those boundaries. ( Tidwater .) As the court explained in
Tidewater

, “If an employee resides in California, receives pay in California, and works exclusively, or principally

, in California, then that employee is a ‘wage earner of California’ and presumptively enjoys the protection of [California law].” ( Tidewater

, supra , 14 Cal.4th at p. 578.) Here, however, the crew members are not residents of California and they perform work bot h within the boundaries of
the S tate and outside those boundaries. Unlike the employees at
issue in either Sullivan or Tidewater

, the crew members do not leave the vessel, even when it is docked at a California port

, except under very limited circumstances

. They have no significant interaction with the State of California even as they perform work on a vessel that is docked or sailing within the
state’s territorial boundaries. After finishing their “hitch,” the
crew members almost immediately leave the state, again without interacting in any meaningful way with its residents, economy, or
civic life.10 While the work performed by the crew members was performed within the territorial boundaries of California, it was performed on a boat at sea. E very other aspect of their employment relationship with petitioners occur red in Louisiana. Petitioners’ headqua rters are located in Louisiana. The crew members traveled to Louisiana to apply for their jobs, to execute numerous employment

- related document s and to attend training
and orientation. From their offices in Louisiana, petitioners made arrangements for the crew members to travel between their respective homes and the vessel in California. Other administrative functions, including payroll and ben efits , were also performed in Louisiana.
In these circumstances, we conclude Louisiana’s interest in the application of its laws is stronger than California’s. The employment relationships here were formed in Louisiana,
between Louisiana

- based employer s and non

- resident employees
who traveled to that state to apply for, and accept employment. They received training and orientation in Louisiana and the administrative asp ects of their employment were p e r formed in
that state. Cali fornia’s interests are weaker because, although
the crew members performed some of their work in this state, neither the employees nor the employers are residents or taxpayers of this state. As a consequence, we conclude Louisiana law governs the employme nt relationship at issue here, rather than California
law. The trial court erred in concluding petitioners failed to demonstrate that Louisiana law should apply.11 Preemption Petitioners urge us to conclude in addition that the federal FLSA preempts California’s wage and hour regulations with respect to the crew members . Because we conclude that California law does not apply to the crew members , we need not reach the question of whether California law is also preempted by
the federal statute. But we note that our Supreme Court has
held that the FLSA did not preempt California’s state regulation of seamen’s overtime pay. ( Tidewater

, supra , 14 Cal.4th at pp.
567

- 568 [“we find no evidence that Congress intended the FLSA’s seamen exemption to preempt state law”].) We are bound by our Supreme Court’s holding on this issue. ( Auto Equity Sales

, Inc. v. Superior Court (1962) 57 Cal.2d 450, 455

- 4 56.) Disposition The petition for writ of mandate is granted. The trial court
is ordered to vacate its order of May 23 , 2019 denying the motion for summary judgment and to enter a new order granting summary judgment. The order to show cause is discharg ed and the stay heretofore issued is dissolved. Petitioners shall recover
their costs.
CERTIFIED FOR PUBLICATION

.

YEGAN, Acting P. J.

We concur:

PERREN, J. TANGEMAN, J.Vincent J. O'Neil, Jr., Judge

Superior Court County of Ventura

______________________________ Akin Gump Strauss Hauer & Feld and Gregory W. Knopp; Phelps Dunbar and Jolee Land; and David M. Korn for Petitioners.

No appearance for Respondent.

Rothschild & Alwill and Kr isti D. Rothschild for Real Parties in Interest.