F RATERNAL ORDER OF P OLICE

LIBR AR Y O F CO NG RE SS LA BOR CO M M ITTE E, P la in t if f, v. LIBRARY OF CONG RESS , et al.,

De fend ant s. UNITED STAT ES DIS TRICT COURT F OR THE D ISTRIC T OF CO LU M BIA

Ci vi l A cti on 08 -01 13 9 (H HK)

M EM OR

AN DU M OP IN ION AN D O RD ER On its on behalf a

nd on behalf

of its members, the F rate rnal Or der of Police L ibrary

of Congr ess L abor Committee (“ FOP”) bring s this action ag ainst the L ibrary of Cong ress, James H. Billing ton in his official ca pacity as L ibraria

n of Cong ress, the United States Capitol P olice, and the United States Capitol Poli ce B oard ( collectively “def endants” ). The F OP alleg es ra ce discrimination in violation of Titl e VI Iof the Civil Ri g hts Act of 1964 (“ Title VI I ”), 42 U .S.C. § 20 00 e , a nd the U. S. Co ns tit

uti on , a g e dis c ri min atio n in vio latio n o f t

he Ag e Di sc ri min atio n in Em plo y me nt A c t ( “ AD EA ” ), 29 U. S.C. § 6 33 a (a ), and the U. S. Co ns tit

uti on , a nd oth e r c la ims descr ibed below. This ac tion arises fr om the merg er of the L ibrary

of Cong ress Police F orce (“L ibrary Police”) a

nd the United States Capitol Poli ce ( “Capitol Poli ce” ). Pursuant to the fede ral statute mer g ing the two forc es, off icer s of the L ibrary

Police over a

cer tain ag e ar e ineligible to be come membe rs, rather than c ivilian employ ees, of the Capitol Pol ice. B e fo re the Court

are de fe nd ants ’ “ Mo tio n to Di smi ss a nd fo r a Mo re De fi nit e State me nt” [# 2 4 ], w h ic ha d dr e s s e s s e v e r a l o f th e F O P’ s c la im s , an d

mo ti o nf o r s u mm ar y ju d g me n t [ # 3 7 ], which see ks judgme nt as to the claims the motion to dism iss does not address. Upon2

consideration of the motions, the opposit ion thereto, a nd the re cord of

this case, the Court conclude s that the motion to di smiss shoul d be g rante d in part and de nied in part, the motion for summary judgme nt should be g rante d, and the motion for a more de finite statement should be g rante d. I. BACKG ROUND In Jan ua ry 20 08 , Co ng re ss e na c te d th e “ U. S. Ca pit ol P oli c e and

L ibr ary of Con g re ss Pol ic e Me rg e r Impl e me ntatio n A c t of 20 07 ” (“ Me rg e r A c t” ). Pub . L . N o. 11 0- 17 8, 12 1 St at. 2546 (2008). The Merg er A ct re quired tra nsfer of all L ibrary

Police employ ees to the Capitol Police. Id. § 2(a) , 121 Stat. at 2546. Office rs of the L ibrary Police “shall bec ome either a member or

civilian employ ee of

the Capitol Pol ice.” Id. § 2(a) (1). To be elig ible to become a Capitol P olice off

icer rathe r than a

civilian employ ee, a

L ibrary Police office r must be “e ntitled to an annuity

for immediate r etireme nt” bef ore turningsix ty

y ear s old, id. § 2 (b )( 1) (A )( i) ; in
o th e r w o r d s , th e o f

f i c e r mu s tb e a

b l e t o at t a i ntw e n ty ye ar s o f s e r v i c e b e f o r e r e a c h i n ga g e s i x ty, see id. ; 5 U.S.C. §§ 8336(b), 8412(b). In addition, an offic er must succ essfully complete tra ining and mee t qualifications spec ified by the Chief of the Capitol P olice (“ Chief” or “Chief of Police”). Me rg er A ct § 2(b)( 1)(A) (ii), (iii). The L ibrary

Police do not have a

mandatory

retire ment ag e, but a long standing statutory provision mandates that a ll members of the Capitol Police “be separ ated f rom the ser

vice” upon
re a c hin ga g e fi ft

y -s e ve n w itha

po ssi bil ity

of e xten sio n to a g e sixty . 5 U. S.C. § 8 33 5( c ); se e als o Riggin v. Office of SenateFair Employme nt Practices , 61 F.3d 1563 ( Fe d. Cir. 1995) (desc ribing the history

of mandatory

retire ment for f

eder al law e nforc ement off icer s and noting that the
curr ent provision reg ardingCapitol P olice off icer s was ena cted in 1994 (c iting Pub. L . No. 103-The amended c omplaint refe rs elsewhere to discriminatory impact on “ove r 20 1 Afric an Amer ican F OP Office rs and ove r 20 F OP Office rs [over] the ag e of f orty” without makingclea

r whe ther it means to indicate that forty office rs total fac ed discrimination or whe ther more than twe nty

office rs wer e both Afr ican- Americ an and ove r ag e for ty . Compl. ¶ 20. The F OP also alleg es that the Mer g er A ct has “ discriminatory eff ects” on L ibrary 2 P o l i ce b ec au s e i tp ro h i b i t s th em fr o mwo rk i n g as l aw en fo rc em en to ff i ce rs b ey o n d

re t i re m en tage 3 283, § 307, 108 Stat. 1423, 1441-42 (1994))) . A L ibrary Police office r who be comes a civilian employ ee, r ather

than an of

fice r, of the Ca

pitol P olice may

continue to serve past the mandatory
re tir e me nt a g e if

he is n ot e lig ibl e fo r a

re tir e me nt a

nnuit y up on re a c hin gthat a g e . M e rg e r A c t § 2(b)( 2), 121 Stat. at 2547. On June 30 , 2 00 8, the F OP— the ba rg a ini ngun it f

or the L ibr ary

Pol ic e —f

ile d th is s uit , and on Nove mber 17, 2008, it filed an a mended c omplaint. The amende d complaint, which the Court fi nd s n ota

bly la c kin gin o rg anizatio n, c on ta ins a va ri e ty of a lle g atio ns in s up po rt

of c la ims of discrimination. The Court attempts her e to summarize its contents as cohe rently as possible. The F OP alleg es that eig hty -seve n perc ent of L ibrary Police office rs ar e Af

ricanAmeric an, and f

ifty -three perc ent of “ the supervisory rank” of the L ibrary

Police are Afric anA m e r i c an . A m . C o mp l
. ¶ 4
. S e v e n ty - f

i v e p e r c e n to f

Li b r ar y P o l i c e o f f i c e r s ar e o v e r

a g e 4 0
. In the Capitol Pol ice f

orce , twenty -nine pe rce nt of offic ers a nd six teen pe rce nt of members of the “super visory rank” are Afric an-A merica n. Id. ¶ 7. Th e F OP a lle g e s th at ov e r t we nty of its me mbe rs have be e n d e nie d th e op po rt un ity to attend tra ining that is a pr ere quisite, pursuant to the Merg er A ct, of tra nsfer to an offic er position
w i thth e C a

p i t o l P o l i c e . A c c o r d i n gt o th e F O P , L i b r ar y P o l i c e o f

f i c e r s o v e r th e a g e o f

f i f ty- 1
seven w ere not permitted to attend this training , and this denial wa s “base d on rac e and a g e.” Id. ¶¶ 17- 18. 2and ther eby preve nts office rs who will retire as civilian employ ees f rom beingpermitted to ca rry a fire arm unde r District of Columbia law. Id. ¶ 11. 4 Th e ame nd e d c omp la int

a lso inc lud e s a

n a lle g atio n th at de fe nd ants “ have de nie d a ll opportunity

for pr omotion” to L ibrary Police office rs, which “ prec lude[s] those . . . offic ers
acc epted into the ra

nks of [the Capitol P olice] from outrankingsimil arly situated [C apitol Poli ce] office rs.” Id. ¶ 14. Although the amende d complaint appea rs to alleg e only

one cla im under Title VI Iand one under the ADEA , the Court adopts the par ties’ under standing of the c laims it i ntends to set forth. The ref

ore, the Court assumes the F OP alleg es that (1) the Merg er A ct discriminates on the ba sis of ra c e in v iol atio n o f T itl e VI I ; ( 2) the Me rg e r A c t, o n it s f a c e and a s a pp lie d, is r a c ia lly dis c ri min ator

y in v iol atio n o f t

he U. S. Co ns tit

uti on ; ( 3) the Me rg e r A c t di sc ri min ate s o n th e ba sis of ag e in violation of the ADEA ; (4) the Me rg er A ct discriminates on the ba sis of ag e in violation of the U.S. Constitut ion; (5) the Mer g er A ct’s provision g iving the Chief of the Capitol Police “unre viewable discretion” to de termine whe ther a L ibrary Police office r may

become a Capitol Police office r is “ar

bitrary and ca pricious”; and ( 6) the F OP has a c ause of action base d on the de nia l of pr omo tio ns to L ibr ary

Pol ic e of fi c e rs . II. LEGAL STANDARD A. Rule 12(b)(6) D ism issal Un de r R ule 12 (b )( 6) of

the F e de ra l Ru le s o f C ivi l Pr oc e dure , a c ourt may dis mis s a complaint, or any

portion of it, for fa ilure to state a c laim upon which re lief may be g rante d. Fe d. R. Civ. P . 12(b)( 6). Rule 8 of the F eder al Rules of Civil P roce dure r equire s that a complaint contain “a

short and plain stateme nt of the cla im showing that the ple ader is entitled to relief.”5

Fe d. R. Civ. P . 8(a) (2). The United States Supreme Court has e x plained that “the pleading standard Rule 8 a

nnounces doe s not require ‘deta iled fac tual alleg ations,’ but it demands more than an una dorned, the -def endant- unlawfully -har

med-me a ccusation. A pleadingthat offe rs ‘labe ls and conc lusions’ or ‘a f ormulaic re citation of the e lements of a c ause of action will not do.’” Ashcroft v. Iqbal , 1 2 9 S
. C t . 1 9 3 7 , 1 9 4 9 (2 0 0 9 ) ( qu o t i n g Be ll A tl. Cor p. v . Two mb ly , 550 U. S. 5 44 , 5 55 (2 00 7) ) ( int e rn a l c itatio n o mitte d) . Ac ourt c on sid e ri nga

mot ion to d ism iss pursuant to Rule 12(b)( 6) must assume that all fa ctual alleg ations in the complaint are true, e ven if they are doubtful. Twom bly , 550 U.S. at 555. B. Sum m ar y Judg m e nt Summary judgme nt may

be g rante d only

wher e “the pleading s, the discover y and disclosure mate rials on file, a nd any aff idavits show that there is no g enuine issue a s to any
mate ri a l f a c t and that th e mov ant i s e nti tle d to jud g me nt a s a matte r o f l aw. ” F e d. R. C iv. P. 56 (c )( 2) ; se e als o B ur

k e v . G ou ld , 286 F.3d 513, 517 ( D.C. Cir. 2002). A mater ial fac t is one that is capa

ble of a ffe ctingthe outcome of the litigation. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby , 4 77 U. S. 24 2, 24 8 ( 19 86 ). A g e nu ine iss ue is o ne wh e re the “ e vid e nc e is s uc h th at a re a so na ble jur y c ou ld return a verdic t for the nonmovingparty ,” as oppose d to evidence that “is so one-sided that one party must prevail as a

matter of la

w.” Id. at 248, 252. A cour t consideringa motion for summary judgme nt must draw all “justifiable infe renc es” f rom the evide nce in f

avor of the nonmovant. Id. at 255. B ut the non-moving party ’s opposition must consist of more than me re unsupported alleg ations or denials a nd must be supported by

aff idavits or other c ompetent
e vid e nc e se tti ngfo rt

h s pe c if ic fa c ts s ho wi ngthat th e re is a g e nu ine iss ue fo r t

ri a l. F e d. R. C iv. P. 56 (e )( 2) ; Ce lote

x Cor p. v . Ca tre tt , 477 U.S. 317 (1986).6 III . A NA LY SIS Def endants have filed a

motion to di smiss as well as a motion for summary judgme nt. Tog ether , these motions seek dismissal of eve ry claim the par

ties identify

as conta ined in the FOP’s amended c omplaint ex cept f or a c laim reg ardingthe denial of promotions, as to which defe ndants seek a

more de finite statement. The Court first considers de fenda nts’ argument that the FO P lacks standingto bring this suit , then addr esses the via bility of ea ch cla im in turn, and fi na lly tur ns to d e fe nd ants ’ m oti on

fo r a mor e de fi nit e state me nt. A. The F OP Has St andi ng t o Br ing This Suiton Be hal f of it s M e m be r s. Def endants make three arguments in their motion to di smiss contesting the F OP’s standing to bring sever al claims in this suit : (1) the F OP has not established assoc iational standing ; (2) the injuries a lleg ed ar e spec ulative; and (3) the FO P’s claims are not ripe. Eac h argument has as its basic pr emise that the F OP has not sufficiently alleg ed injury

to its m ember s. E ac hfa i l s t o p er s u ad e t h e C o urtth atth e F OP l ac k s s t an d i n g. 1. The FOP has su ff iciently alleged facts to supp ort assoc iational stan din g. As so c iatio na l st and ingru le s are we ll e sta bli sh e d. To br ingc la ims on be ha lf of its
me mbe rs , a

n a sso c iatio n mu st s ho w that “ (1 ) at le a st o ne of its me mbe rs wo uld

have sta nd ingto
su e in [h e r] o wn

ri g ht, (2 ) t

he int e re sts the a sso c iatio n s e e ks to p ro te c t are g e rm ane to i ts purpose, a

nd (3) ne ither the c laim asserte d nor the re lief re quested re quires that an individual member of

the association participate in the la wsuit.” Sierra Club v. E.P.A. , 292 F.3d 895, 898 (D
. C
. C i r. 2 0 0 2 ) ( ci t i n g Hunt v. W ash. State Apple Adve rtising Comm’n , 432 U.S. 333, 342-43 (1977)) . To fulfill the first prongof this test, a member of the association mustsatisfy three
e le me nts c on sti tut ingthe “ ir re du c ibl e c on sti tut ion a l mi nim um o f s tand ing ” mand ate d b y Ar tic le7

I I I : “(1) injury -in-fa ct, (2) c ausation, and ( 3) re dressa bility .” Id. (qu o t i n g an d

ci t i n g Lujan v. De fe nd e rs o f W ild lif e , 504 U.S. 555, 560 (1992)) ( internal quotation mark omitted). Def endants c ontest only

the FO P’s ability

to satisfy the injury -in-fa ct re quirement in orde r to fulfill the first prongof the a ssociational standingtest. They contend that be cause “the amende d complaint does not identify a sing le member

who suffe red [the] alleg ed injuries, or inc lud e an a ff

ida vit or oth e r s pe c if

ic state me nt c or

ro bo ratin gtho se c la ims ,” the F OP h a s f a ile d to d e m o n s tr at e th ati tm ay

b r i n gc l a i m s o nb e h a l f

o f i t s m e mb e r s . D e f

s . ’ M o t . t o D i s m i s s at1 1
. In response , the FO P asserts that “[a]lthough Def endant a rgues that Plaintiff has not identified a ny specific members, De fenda nt has likewise cited no la w re quiring the identification of particular
me mbe rs in o rd e r t o e sta

bli sha sso c iatio na l st and ing .” Pl. ’s Op p’ n to De f. ’s Mo t to Di smi ss (“Pl.’s Opp’n” ) at 12-13. Def endants’ a

rgument fails. Their sug g estion that the FO P is obl iga ted to prese nt evidenc e in support of the a lleg ations in its complaint i n response to a motion to dis miss is not supported by

case law. As the D .C. Circuit has expl ained, the U .S. Supreme Court has made
c le ar t hat “ the burd e n o f p ro du c tio n a pla int if f m us t be ar i n o rd e r t o s ho w i t ha s st and ingto invoke the jurisdiction of the district cour t varies with the pr ocedur al context of the ca se.” Sie rra Club , 2 9 2 F. 3 d

at8 9 8
. “A tth e p l ea d i n g s t age ”— i no th er wo rd s , wh en a p l ai n t i ff

i s o p p o s i n g a motion to di smiss—“ge nera l fac tual alleg ations of injury resultingfrom the de fenda nt’s conduct
may su ff ic e . . . [be c a

us e ] the c ourt

‘p re sum[e s] th at g e ne ra l a lle g atio ns e mbr a c e tho se sp e c if ic fac ts that are ne cessa

ry to support the claim.’” Id. at8 9 8 -9 9 (qu o t i n g De fe nd e rs o f W ild lif e , 540 U.S. at 561) (se cond alter ation in orig inal). Only when a case has proc eede d to the summaryDef endants do not sug g est that loss of a position as a law e nforc ement off icer 3 does not constitute injury
. 8 judgme nt stag e must a plaintiff c ease to rely on alleg ations and “‘ set forth’ by aff idavit[ s] or other e vidence ‘spec ific fa cts.’” Id. (qu o t i n g De fe nd e rs o f W ild lif e , 540 U.S. at 561). As t o th i s i s s u e, d ef

en d an t s s ee k

d i s m i s s al ra th er

th an s u m m ary

j u d gm en t . An d

al th o u gh the FO P’s amended c omplaint may be subjec t to other attac ks, it alleg es that some member s of the FO P will not be per

mitted to become off

icer s of the Capitol Poli ce. It states that more than twenty L ibrary office rs over

ag e fifty -seve n have be en disallowed f rom attendinga Capitol Poli ce trainingprog ram a

nd will not be transfe rre d to the Capitol P olice as of fice rs. Am. Compl. ¶¶ 17- 18. There fore , the Court will not conclude on this g round that the F OP lacks assoc iational 3
s t an d i n g. 2. The in jury alleged is not too speculative to support standin g. Next, defenda

nts argue that any

injury the FO P’s members have alleg ed is speculative and ther efor e insuffic ient to satisfy the “injury -in-fa ct” r equire ment for standingto bring most of the FO P’s claims. Defe ndants contend that beca use transf er of L ibrary Police office rs to the Ca pit ol P oli c e wa s in c omp le te at th e tim e the F OP f ile d it s c a se and

the pa rt ie s su bmi tte d th e ir br ie fi ngon

the mot ion

to d ism iss to t

he Court , “ no of

fi c e r h a d s uf

fe re d a n in jur y .” De fs .’ Mo t. t o Dismiss at 12-13. The F OP responds that its “member s 57 and over have be en denie d the opportunity

to participate in the [C apitol Poli ce]’s Tra ining Ac ademy .” Pl.’s Opp’n at 14. Th e Court

c ann ot a g re e wi th d e fe nd ants . It is we ll e sta bli sh e d th at, f

or sta nd ingpurp os e s, the alleg ed injury

must be “ac tual or imminent, not ‘conjectur al’ or ‘ hy pothetical.’” Defende rs of W ild lif e , 5 0 4 U. S
. at5 6 0 (qu o t i n g W hitmore v. Ark

ansas , 4 95 U. S. 1 49 , 1 55 (1 99 0) ). B ut t he seDef endants’ a

rgument seems to re st in part on their assumption that the alleg ed 4 injury is discrimination that will occur when the Chief

of Police make s decisions as to who may become a Capitol Poli ce of fice r. The Court be lieves def endants have misrea d the FO P’s amende d complaint. The F OP alleg es that the Mer g er A ct itself, not the Chief’s de cisions, is the source of the injury
. See Am. Compl. ¶ 17 (alleg ing that “ra ce a nd/or ag e discrimination has alre ady influence d” the de cisions left to the Chief). Insofar as def endants’ unde rstandingof the amende d complaint is also acc urate , the Court ag ree s that injury arisingfrom discriminatory decisions the F OP predicts the Chief w ill make are the ty pe of c onjectura l injury

that does not suffice to support standing. See W orth v. Jac kson , 451 F.3d 854, 860 ( D.C. Cir. 2006) (holding that w he re a

pla int if f “ c ha lle ng e [d] no statut e , r e g ulatio n, or wr itt e n p oli c y ” re g ard inga lle g e dly discriminatory

employ ment decisions but instead wa s g uessinghow an a g ency would make hir ingde c isi on s in

the futur e , th e po ssi bil ity of inj ur y wa s “ too re mot e and

atte nu ate d to es t ab l i s h ” s t an d i n g (qu o t i n g Bran ton v . FCC , 993 F.2d 906, 909 ( D.C. Cir. 1993))). The ref ore, only claims cha lleng ing the Merg er A ct itself may g o forwa rd. 9 requ ir eme nt s d o n otmea n, as d efen dan ts su gg est , t hatth e in ju ry mu sthav e al ready

occu rred . By statute, ce rtain L ibrary

Police office rs will be denied positions as Capitol Poli ce of fice rs. Acc ordingto the FOP’s amended c omplaint, some older offic ers ha d alre ady been a lerted by

the time of filing that they

would not rec eive tra ining ne cessa ry for tra nsfer , indicatingthat the Chief of Police intends to comply with the rele vant provision of the Mer g er A ct. This situation i s not 4
ana log ou s to tho se in whic h th e Sup re me Court ha s in dic ate d th at an a lle g e d in jur y is s o speculative that it might not occur at all. See, e .g. , De

fe nd e rs o f W ild lif e , 504 U.S. at 564 (c on c lud ingthat th e state d inte nti on s o f i nd ivi du a ls t o v isi t a pa rt ic ula r l oc atio n th at is ho me to endang ere d wildlife, without concre te plans for such a trip, “ do not support a findingof the ‘a c tua l or imm ine nt’ inj ur

y that ou r c a se s r e qu ir e ” ); W

hit mo re , 495 U.S. at 156-57 (c oncluding that in jur y that w ou ld n ot a

ri se un le ss t

he pe tit ion e r w a s g ra

nte d h a be a s r e lie f, re tr ie d f

or a c ri me of which he had bee n convicted, a nd sentenc ed to death was “too spec ulative to invoke the jurisdiction of an Art. I I Icourt” ). B eca use the injury

of being disallowed to bec ome a Capitol Pol ic e of fi c e r i s “ a c tua l or

imm ine nt, ” the Court

wi ll n ot d ism iss any

of the F OP’ s c la ims on

thi s g round.10

3. The FOP ’s claim s are r ipe. Third, def endants make the re lated ar g ument that the FO P’s claims are not ripe. They contend that be cause those claims “hing e upon future events,” they are “not y et fit for judicia l revie w.” De fs.’ Mot. to Dismiss at 17. Defenda nts rely extensively

on W orth v. Jac kson , 451 F .3 d 8 54 (D .C. Cir . 2 00 6) . T he F OP d oe s n ot r e ply dir e c tly to t his argume nt, but be c a

us e it i s so
c los e ly c onne c te d to the iss ue of sp e c ulativ e inj ur

y , th e Court

a ssume s th e F OP’ s a sse rt ion s a s to that question apply

here
. As stated in W

or th , the Supreme Court “ has re peate dly held that ‘[a] claim is not ripe for adjudication if it rests upon conting ent future events that may not occur as anticipated, or indee d may not occur at all.’” W

or th , 4 5 1 F. 3 d

at8 6 1 (qu o t i n g Texas v. U nited States , 523 U.S. 296, 300 (1998)) (alter ation in orig inal). As explained above , there is essentially no question that, as mandated by

the Merg er A ct’s ter

ms, L ibrary

Police office rs above a ce rtain ag e and w ithout requisite y ear s of servic e will not become Ca pitol P olice off

icer s. The motivations behind the statute as we ll as its effec t on L ibrary Police office rs ca

n alre ady be known. This is not an “abstra ct disag ree ment” unsuitable for judicial revie w. Id. (qu o t i n g Abbott Labs. v. Gardner , 387 U. S. 1 36 , 1 48 -4 9 ( 19 67 )) . T he re fo re , th e Court wi ll n ot d ism iss any

of F OP’ s c la ims on

ri pe ne ss g ro un ds
. B. The FOP ’s Title VII Claim F ails as to Defendan ts the Capitol P olice and Capitol P olice Board but Su rvives as to D efendan ts the Library of Congress and L ibrarian of Con gress. Def endants make two arguments for dismissal of the F OP’s statutory claims. Be cause , as explained below, the Court dismisses the FOP’s ADE A claim on other g rounds, the Court
re so lve s th e se iss ue s o nly a s th e y re late to t

he F OP’ s T itl e VI Ic la im.11

1. Libr ar y o f Co ngr e ss e m plo ye e s m aynotbr ing Tit le VI I c lai m s a ga inst th e Ca pit ol P oli c e orCa pit ol P oli c e Boa r d. Def endants a rgue that, base d on sovere ign immunity , the Court lacks subjec t matter jurisdiction over Title VI Iclaims broug ht by employ ees of

the L ibrary

of Cong ress a g ainst the Capitol P olice and the Police Boa rd. Specific ally , defe ndants asser t that the Congr essional Acc ountability

Act (“ CAA”), 2 U .S.C. § 1301 et seq. , waives sove reig n immunit y for pur poses of ce rtain Title VI Iclaims ag ainst the Capitol Pol ice only for “ cover ed employ ees,” a categ ory that does not include L ibrary employ ees. D efs.’ Mot. to Dismi ss at 20 (citing2 U.S.C. § 1301(3)) . The F OP does not contest this argument and has the ref ore c oncede d the point. See Bu gg s v . P owe ll , 293 F. Supp. 2d 135, 141 (D.D .C. 2003) (“It is understood in this C ircuit that wh e n a pla int if f f ile s a n o pp os iti on

to a dis po sit ive mot ion

and a dd re sse s o nly

c e rt a in a rgume nts raised by the def endant, a court may

treat those arguments that the plaintiff fa iled to addre ss as
co n ce d ed
. ” ( ci t i n g FDIC v. Be nder , 1 27 F .3 d 5 8, 67 -6 8 ( D. C. C ir . 1 99 7) ; Stephenson v . Cox , 223 F. Supp. 2d 119, 121 (D.D .C. 2002))). F urthermor e, def endants a re c orre ct that the CAA
cre ates jurisdiction in fede ral c ourt for c laims broug ht pursuant to, inte r a lia , Title VI Iby “a
cover ed employ ee,” 2 U.S.C. §§ 1302, 1408, and the definition of “c overe d employ ee” does not include employ ees of

the L ibrary

of Cong ress, id. § 1 30 1( 3) . T he re fo re , th e Court sh a ll d ism iss the Title VI Iclaim ag ainst the Capitol Pol ice a nd Capitol P olice B oard. 2. The Title VII claim against the Lib rary and Lib rarian of Congress is not bar r e d forfail ur e to e xha ustadm inis tr at ive r e m e die s. Def endants a rgue that the F OP’s Title VI Iclaim ag ainst the L ibrary and L ibraria

n of Con g re ss m

us t a lso fa il b e c a

us e , a lth ou g h L ibr ary

Pol ic e may

br ingsu c h c la ims in f

e de ra l c ourt , the FO P has failed to prope rly exhaust administ rative r emedies a s require d befor e doingso. Def endants note that the FOP filed its complaint in this Court on J une 30, 2008 and its ame nded12

complaint on November

17, 2008. They

argue the F OP theref

ore f ailed to comply

with the statutory provision permitting plaintiffs to file Title VI I claims in fede ral c ourt only afte r 180 da y s h ave pa sse d f

oll ow ingthe fi lin gof

a c ha rg e wi th t he Eq ua l E mpl oy

me nt O pp or

tun ity Commi ssion (“EEOC”) , which in this case oc curr ed on May 30, 2008, or within ninety day s of
rec eivinga dec ision from the EEOC, which in this case occur red on Aug ust 5, 2008. The F OP responds that the time limitations i n Title VI Ireg ardingthe exhaustion of administrative re medies ar e not jurisdictional and so ar e subjec t to equitable consider ations, such
a s e qu ita ble tol lin g . T he F OP f

ur the r a rgue s th at th e c a se s d e fe nd ants c ite in s up po rt of the ir position “involve parties that filed suit afte r the ninety [-] day time line,” wher eas he re, the FOP filed this action bef

ore the ninety -day

deadline ha d passed. Pl.’s Opp’n at 17. Although de fenda

nts are c orre ct that the F OP did not comply prec isely with Title VI I ’s
re qu ir e me nts , th e de fe c t ha s b e e n c ur e d a nd the c la im c an g o f

or wa rd . T he ba sic ru le s a

re no t in dispute: Title VI I

permits an employ ee of

the L ibrary

of Cong ress to file a

n action in fe dera l court e ither “[w]it hin 90 day s of re ceipt of notice of final a ction” re sulting fr om the ad m i n i s tra t i v e p ro ce s s o r “ af t er o n e h un dre d

an d ei gh ty d ay s fr o mth e f

i l i n g o f t h e i n i t i al ch ar ge with the . . . [EEOC] .” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-16( a), ( c). The underly ing f acts a re a lso uncontested: the FO P filed a cha

rg e with the appr opriate EE OC office on May 30, 2008; the FOP filed a complaint in this C ourt on J une 30, 2008; and the E EOC office dismiss ed the c harg e bef ore it on August 5, 2008. I t is clear, the ref ore, that the FOP’s June 30 complaint, filed in this Court, was premature be cause on that date ther e had be en no fina l administrative action and f ewe r than 180 day s had passe d since the F OP filed with the EEOC offic e. See id. § 2 00 0e -1 6( c ); see also Jone s
v . A sh c ro ft , 321 F. Supp. 2d 1, 11-12 (D .D.C. 2004) (dismissing Title VI Iclaim of fe dera l employ ee f

or fa ilure to wait 180 day s from the date of filingan administrative c omplaint whereTh e de a dli ne fo r f ili ngsu c h o pp os iti on , whic h, purs ua nt t o th e e le ve n- da

y tim e 5 limit set in L CvR 7, fell in August 2009, has longpassed. The FOP has ne ither submitted an opposition nor requested a n extension of the time to do so.

13 the EEOC had not issued a final dec ision). But the D.C. Circuit has he ld that “[r] ecie pt of a rig ht-to-sue notice duringthe pende ncy of the Title VI Iaction cur es the de fec t cause d by the failure to rec eive a

rig ht-to-sue notice befor e filinga Title VI Iclaim in fede ral c ourt.” W illiams v. W ash. Metro. Area Transit Auth. , 7 21 F .2 d 1 41 2, 14 18 n. 12 (1 98 3) (c itatio ns omi tte d) . T his
case was still pending when the EEO C issued a dec ision on August 5, 2008, which sustaine d the FOP’s r ight to sue in fe dera l court. See Def s.’ Mot. to Dismis s, Ex . 1 (EEOC De cision) at 11 (explaining the r ight to sue w ithin ninety day s of re ceipt of the opinion). There fore , the Court wi ll n ot d ism iss the F OP’ s T itl e VI Ic la ims a g a ins t th e L ibr ary and L ibr ari an o f C on g re ss o n th is g round. C. The FOP ’s Constitutional Chal lenge to the M erge r Ac t as Racially Discr im inatory on i ts F ac e M ustF ail , butit s A s- App lie d Ch all e nge M ayP r oc e e d. In th e ir mot ion fo r s umm ary

jud g me nt, de fe nd ants argue that th e Me rg e r A c t “ sim ply d o es n o td i s cr i m i n at e a gai n s tAf ri ca nAm er i ca n s ‘o ni t s fa ce ’” b ec au s e i t“c o n t ai n s n o l an gu age that conditions transfer

[t o the Capitol Pol ice] or any other be nefit upon an of

fice r’s ra ce.” Def s.’ Mot. for Summ. J . at 7. The F OP has filed no opposition to the summary judgme nt motion, there by

allowingthe Court to treat the a rguments therein a s conce ded. L CvR 7(b); 5 Steinhorst Assocs. v. Preston , 5 7 2 F. S u p p . 2 d 1 1 2 , 1 2 5 n . 1 4 (D
. D. C
. 2 0 0 8 ) ( ci t i n g Buggs v. Po we ll , 293 F. Supp. 2d 135, 141 (D.D .C. 2003)). F urthermor e, the Supre me Court has instructed that fa cial cha lleng es to statutes on constitutional gr ounds “ar e disfavor ed.” W ash. Sta teGran gev . W

as h. Sta teRe

pu bli c an Pa rty , 5 52 U. S. 4 42 , 4 50 (U .S. 20 08 ). F or the seAs explained in those opinions, t he D.C. Circuit and United States Supre me Court 6 ag ree that Congr ess has e x empted ag e re quirements for fede ral lawenfor ceme nt office rs from the provisions of the ADEA
. See 5 U.S.C. § 3307(d) (“T he hea d of any ag ency may deter mine and fix the minimum and max imum li mits of ag e within which an or igina l appointment may be made to a po sit ion a s a law e nf or c e me nt o ff

ic e r. ” ); Kimel , 528 U.S. at 68-69 (notingin dicta that “[u] nder the curr ent ADEA , mandatory ag e limits for law enf

orce ment office rs and firef ighte rs—at fe dera l, state, and loca l levels—are exempted from the statute’s c overa g e” ( citing 14 rea sons, the Court concludes that defe ndants are entitled to summary judgme nt as to the FO P’s f a c i a l c h a l l e n g e t o th e M e r g e r A c ta s r a c i a l l y d i s c r i m i n at o r y. As to FOP’s a

ppare nt claim that, as applied, the Merg er A ct discriminates on the ba sis of
rac e in violation of the U.S. Constit ution, defenda nts’ only arguments for dismissal are that the FOP lac k standing . As explained above, those a rguments fail. Acc ording ly , the FO P may purs ue , a g a ins t a ll d e fe nd ants , it s a s- a pp lie d c ha lle ng e to t

he Me rg e r A c t a s r a c ia lly discriminatory

in violation of the Consti tution. D. The F OP ’s AD EACl aimM ustF ailBe c aus e th e P r ov isi on o f the M e r ge r Ac t a t I ssu e is Exem pt from the ADEA. Def endants a rgue in their motion for summary judgme nt that the Merg er A ct’s
a pp lic atio n o f t

he mand ator

y re tir e me nt a g e of

Ca pit ol P oli c e to o ff

ic e rs of the L ibr ary

Pol ic e is not subject to a cha lleng e under the ADEAbeca

use ag e limits for law enf orce ment office rs “a

re
ex emp t edfr o mth e s t atu t e’ s co v er age . ” D ef s . ’ M o t . fo r S u m m . J
. at1 2 -1 3 (qu o t i n g Kim e l v . F l. Bd . o f R e ge nts , 528 U.S. 62, 69 (2000)). A s noted, the F OP has not filed an opposition to the motion for summary

judgme nt, so the Court may treat the arguments defe ndants asser t in that mot ion a s c on c e de d. L CvR

7( b) ; Ste inh or

st A sso cs. , 5 7 2 F. S u

p p . 2 d at1 2 5 n . 1 4 (c i t i n g Buggs , 293 F. Supp. 2d at 141). F urthermor e, the Court conc ludes in a joint opinion i ssued in two case s related to this action—

Rovillard v. U.S. Capitol Police Bd. , Ci vil Ac tio n N o. 09 -6 82 ; Perry v
. U.S. Capitol Poli ce B d. , Ci vil Ac tio n N o. 09 -6 83 —th at de fe nd ants ’ p os iti on is c or re c t. 65 U.S.C. § 3307(d), (e) ; 29 U.S.C. § 623(j))); Ste war t v . S mi th , 673 F.2d 485, 490- 94 (1982) (h old ingthat “ se c tio n 3 30 7( d) is a n e xce pti on

to t he AD EA ” be c a

us e to a pp ly the AD EA“ wo uld re qu ir e us to a do pt a

str a ine d r e a din gof

se c tio n 3 30 7( d) and

to i g no re Con g re ss’ c le ar i nte nt t o employ maxi mum entry

ag es as a means towa

rds sec uringa ‘youngand vig orous’ wor k forc e of law enf orce ment office rs”)
. The fe dera l gove rnment must adher e to the Equa l Protection Clause of the 7 Four teenth Amendme nt by

virtue of the D ue Proce ss Clause of the F ifth Amendment. See Bolling v. Sharpe , 347 U.S. 497, 498-99 (1954). 15 E. The FOP ’s Constitutional Chal lenge to the M erge r Ac t Based on Age Discrim ination Must F ail Because the Statute is Rat ionall y Relate d to a Legitim ate Gove rnm ent P urpose. Def endants’ unoppose d motion for summary judgme nt further

argues that an e qual p ro t ec t i o nch al l en ge t o th e M er ger Ac to nth e gr o un d

th ati ti s d i s cr i m i n at o ry

o nth e b as i s o f a ge 7 must fail beca

use the statute survive s rational-ba sis review. This a rgument too is concede d, and it is also correc t. As expl ained in more detail in the Rovillard and Perry opinion, a statute does
n o tv i o l at e t h e E qu al P ro t ec t i o nC l au s e b y “d i s cr i m i n at [ i n g] o nth e b as i s o f a ge . . . i f t h e a ge classification . . . is rationally related to a leg itimate state interest,” Kimel , 528 U.S. at 83 (c itatio ns omi tte d) , a

nd mand ator

y re tir e me nt f

or la w e nf or c e me nt o ff

ic e rs is r atio na lly

re late d to the g overnme nt’s interest in havinga phy sically fit police for ce, c

f. Mass. Bd. of Retireme nt v. Mu rg ia , 427 U.S. 307, 313-14 (1976). F . The F OP ’s “A r bit r ar y a nd C apr ic iou s” Cl aimM ustBe Di sm iss e d. Def endants a ssert that “[u]nl ike final a g ency decisions or re g ulations, feder al statutes
c ann ot b e inv a lid ate d s imp ly be c a us e a c ourt fi nd s th e m ‘ arb itr ary

and c a pr ic iou s. ’” De fs .’ Mo t. to Dismiss at 26. Ther efor e, def endants see k dismiss al of the F OP’s claim alleg ing that the provision of the Mer g er A ct g iving the Chief of Police the a

uthority to determine which L ibraryTh e Court wi ll n ot a ssume that th e F OP i nte nd e d in ste a d to a sse rt thi s c la im 8 ag ainst the Chief for

misusing the discre tion the Merg er A ct provides be cause the amende d c omp la int de sc ri be s n o d isc re tio na

ry a g e nc y de c isi on s to wh ic h th e F OP m ig ht o bje c t. 16 Police office rs will become Ca pitol P olice off

icer s is arbitrar

y and ca pricious. The F OP has not
re sp on de d to thi s argume nt. The Court agree s with defenda nts that it has no power to over turn a statute ba sed on a conclusion that its provisions are “ arbitra ry and ca pricious.” See 5 U.S.C. § 706(2) (mandating

8 that a “r eviewingcourt shall . . . hold unlawf ul and set aside a g ency

action, finding s, and conclusions”—not leg islative acts—“f ound to be,” inte r a lia , “ arb itr ary” or “ c a pr ic iou s” ). Th is claim is dismis sed. G. Defendan ts’ M otion f or a Mor e De fi nite Statem ent Re garding the Denial of P r om ot ion s C lai m is G r ant e d. As to an appa

rent c laim in the FOP’s ame nded complaint re g ardingthe denial of pr omo tio ns to L ibr ary

Pol ic e of fi c e rs , d e fe nd ants have mov e d, purs ua nt t o F e de ra l Ru le of

Civ il Procedur e 12(e ), “f

or a more definite stateme nt before interposinga re sponsive pleading .” F ed. R. Civ. P . 12(e) . Specifica lly , defe ndants asser t that without knowing which of fice rs re quested and we re de nied promotions, when these denials occ urre d, and by whom the dec isions were
ma de , th e y

c ann ot r e sp on d to thi s c la im. Th e F OP r e sp on ds tha t it “ ha s f ile d a sh or t and pla in state me nt o f i ts c la ims su c h th at D e fe nd ant i s g ive n f a ir no tic e of Pla int if f’ s c la ims and

the fa c ts upon which they

rest,” a nd there fore defe ndants’ motion should be denied. Pl.’s Opp’n at 40. The de fenda

nts’ position has merit. Under Rule 12(e ), “[a] party may move for a

more definite stateme nt of a plea ding . . . which is so vague or a mbiguous that the pa

rty cannot
rea sonably

prepa re a response .” F ed. R. Civ. P. 12(e). Althoug h “cour ts are r eluctant to compe l17

a mor e de fi nit e state me nt p ur su ant t o Ru le 12 (e )” out of fe ar s uc h a c tio n w ill be c ome a su bs tit ute for discove ry , Hilska v. J

ones , 2 7 F .R. D. 16 , 2 1 ( D. D. C. 2 00 3) (c itatio ns omi tte d) , it is appropr iate to do so here . The F OP’s amende d complaint mentions promotions t wice. It alleg es that “[s] ince De fenda

nts first contemplated subsumingthe [L ibrary] P olice into the [Capitol P o l i c e ] , D e f

e n d an t s h av e d e n i e d

a l l o p p o rtun i ty f

o r p r o m o t i o nt o m e mb e r s o f th e [ L i b r ar

y] Pol ic e ,” and

“ [t]he c on se qu e nc e of

thi s p oli c y

is t o p re c lud e tho se [L ibr ary] of fi c e rs a c c e pte d into the ra nks of [the Capitol P olice] from outrankingsimil arly situated [C apitol Poli ce] offic ers.” Am. Compl. ¶ 14. I t later states that “[t] he [Merg er] Act and the conduct of Def endants ha s denied Plaintiff’s membe rs the opportunity for pr omotion and advanc ement as [] sworn office rs based on r ace and ag e.” A m. Compl . ¶ 18. These alleg ations are not only devoid of fa ctual details but also fail to explain on what source of law a ny claim re lated to the denia l of promotions is based. Be cause the Court cannot a scer tain what the F OP’s promotion-related claim is, it cannot find that def endants a re a ble to respond to it. There fore , the Court conclude s that the motion for a more definite stateme nt should be g rante d. IV . C ON CL USI ON For the fore g oing r easons, it is this 4 day of Mar ch 2010, her eby th ORDERED that de fe nd ants ’ m oti on to d ism iss [#24 ] is GR

ANTED in part and DENIED in part; and it is further ORDERED that defe ndants’ motion for summary judgme nt [#37 ] is G RA NT ED . The F OP’s claim that the Mer g er A ct is discriminatory on the basis of ra ce in violation of Title VI Isurvives as to def endants the L ibrary

of Cong ress a

nd the L ibraria

n of Congr ess, and its claim that the Mer g er A ct has ra cially discriminatory

eff ect in violation of the U. S. Co ns tit

uti on pr oc e e ds a s to a ll d e fe nd ants .18

I t is further OR

DE RE D that de fe nd ants ’ m oti on fo r a mor e de fi nit e state me nt [# 24 ] is G RA NT ED . The F OP shall provide a r evised plea ding a dequate ly descr ibing a

ny claim it seeks to assert ba sed on the de nial of promotions to L ibrary Police office rs by

no later tha

n Marc h 27, 2010.
Henr y H. Kenne dy , J r. Un i t edS t at es Di s tri ctJ u d ge