Filed 7 / 27 / 21 CERTIFIED FOR PUBLICATION

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION SIX

HUY FONG FOODS, INC.,

Plaintiff, Cross

- defendant, and Appellant,

v.

UNDERWOOD RANCHES, LP,

Defendant, Cross

co mplainant and Appellant ;

UNDERWOOD & SON , LLC,

Cross

- Complainant and Respondent;

DAVID TRAN,

Cross

- defendant and Respondent. 2d Civ. No. B303096 (Super. Ct. No. 56

- 2017

- 00505141

- CU

- BC

- VTA) (Ventura County)

It has been said that some contra cts are not worth the paper th ey are written on. But oral contracts stemming from previous written contracts and long

- s tanding business practices2

. based on custom and trust are as valid a s contracts that are worth the paper they are written on. When such a contract is
breached

, there are consequences. A pepper farmer sued the manufacturer of a pepper

- based hot sauce for breach of contract and fraud. A unanimous jury
found for the fa rmer , awarding $13.3 million in compensatory damages and $10 million in punitive damages. We affirm the judgment.
FACTS
David Tran founded Huy Fong Foo d s, Inc

. (Huy Fong), a business that produces Srira cha , a jalape ñ o pepper

- based hot sauce. In 1988, H uy Fong contracted with Underwood Ranches

, L

. P

. (Underwood) to purchase 500 tons of jalape ñ os from
Underwood. C raig Underwood (Craig) is Underwood’s principal.
This was the beginning of a relationship that would last for 28

years. For the first 10 years, the parties execute d written agreements specifying the price per poun d and volume to be supplied. Thereafter, the parties dealt with each other informally with oral agreements. Originally , Huy Fong needed more peppers than Underwood could supply, so it contracted with
other farmers as needed

. Underwood’s pepper sales to Huy Fong grew along with the success of Huy Fo n g’s business. Craig testified that, by 2005,
Tran was “ pushing ” Underwood to add more acreage

. In 2006, Tran asked Underwood to significantly increase its

pepper acreage . Underwood was growing 95 percent of Huy
Fon g ’s peppers . But the peppers represented only 25 percent of Underwood’s business. Underwood also farmed diverse crops such as lemons and vegetables. Craig told Tran that he was3

. reluctant to assume the risk of growing more peppers, and rejected H uy F o ng’s offer. Craig suggested that Huy Fong supplement Underwood’s crop with peppers from other sources. Instead of seeking other sources, Huy Fong proposed that it would assume some of the risk. Huy Fong would pay Underwood by the acre grown instead of pounds produced. Thus, the risk of a disappointing yield would be on Huy Fong. Underwood agreed to the arrangement. In 2007, Huy Fong advised Underwood to increase its

acreage by 50 percent. To do this, Underwood had to expand its operations from V entura County to Kern County. Craig testified that the expansion into Kern County was the biggest thing he
had ever done, but he needed to do it to meet Huy Fong’s increasing needs. At the same time, Huy Fong was building a 600,000

-
square

- foot factory in Irwindale. Tran took Craig on a tour of the site. Tran told Craig that Underwood “needed to fil l it up.” Tran told Craig that he should be farming at least 2,000 acres.
Due to Tran’s suggestion and encouragement, Underwood
invested millions of dollars in acquiring additional acres in Kern County and, to a lesser extent, Ventura County. By the end of the 2016 growing season, Underwood had acquired over 1,800 acres in Kern County. It took a year or more to prepare the ground for growing peppers. Many of the leases extended into the 2020’s, 2030’s, and beyond. By 2016, Huy Fong accounted for approximately 80 percent of Underwood’s revenue.
Underwood made these investments because Tran and
Donna Lam , Huy Fon g ’s chief operations officer and Tran’s siste r

in

- law, assured Underwood that Huy Fong would continue to purchase the peppers grown by Underwood into the future

. Craig4

. testified Tran and Lam made sure he knew Huy Fong was going to take all the product Underwood would produce. They repeatedly told C raig, “You grow it , I’ll sell it.” Huy Fong Video Records 2016 Harvest Craig, along with Underwood’s chief operations officer, Jim Roberts, developed a mechanical harvester for the peppers. The
2016 harvest was the first time the entire harvest was perfo rmed by the harvester

. Mechanical harvesting saved substantial

money. In October 2016, Tran requested Underwood’s permission to take video footage from an aerial drone of Underwood’s harvesting and sorting operations. Roberts granted permission for Huy Fong’s personal use only

. Huy Fong had never before requested to record the harvest. Chilico, LLC In 2014 or 2015, Tran form ed a new c o m p any that he later called Chilico, LLC . Chilico ’s purpose was to obtain peppers for Huy Fong. In May 2015, Tran offe red Roberts a job. Roberts declined the job offer and attributed the offer to a mistake. Tran officially formed Chili co in 2016. He gave 100 percent ownership to his sister

- in

- la w Lam. Tran testified that he wanted to give Lam a significant salary incr ease, b ut his son and wife, who were on Huy Fong’s board, would object. Huy Fong contract ed with Chilico to buy all its chilies

peppers from Chilico. The contract diverted millions of dollars from Huy Fong to Chilico.
2017 Contract
On November 1, 2016, Craig, Roberts, Tran

, and Lam met at the Huy Fong factory to plan for the 2017 pepper season. The parties discussed ongoing field preparations for the upcoming5

. season. Underwood was already preparing the ground. Because it is a continuous process

, Under wood could not wait. Underwood and Huy Fong agreed that for the 2017 season Underwood would plant 1,700 acres for $13,000 per acre. Tran also agreed to advance payments of $18 million. Breach of Contract On November 9, 2016, Lam asked Roberts to come to the Huy Fong factory to pick up some equipment. Lam and Tran
k new Craig was on vacation and would not accompany Roberts. When Roberts arrived, Tran told him that he was forming a new company. Lam was going to operate the company. Tran told
Roberts tha t Roberts would be working for the new company.
When Roberts declined the job offer, Tran was not happy

. Tran told Roberts that Underwood would have to deliver peppers for $500 per ton to compete with Chinese pepper mash that sold for $300 per ton

. When Roberts told Tran that Craig makes the decisions for Underwood, Tran replied that he would make Craig take $500 per ton.
Underwood was suddenly facing imminent catastrophic financial consequences. It could not grow peppers for $500 a ton.
Its costs av eraged $610 a ton.
Further negotiations with Huy Fong proved unfruitful.
La m insisted that Huy Fong needed to purchase peppers for under $500 per ton. Tran refused to provide Underwood with prepayments needed to finance the crop. Tran also insisted tha t Underwood contract wi th Chilico rather than Huy Fong. Chilico
did not have the assets to e nsure that Underwood would be paid and Huy Fong refused to guarantee the Chi l ico contract.
Tran made a final attempt to hire Roberts away from
Underwood

.6

. In earl y January 2017, Craig sent an e

- mail to Tran stating that in October 2016 they had an agreement to move ahead with production for 2017; subsequently, Huy Fong decided to change
the agreement ; and it is impossible for Underwood to comply with
the modified t erms. The e

- mail advised Huy Fong that the start date for planting had passed

, there were no plants in the nursery

, and Underwood did not plan on delivering any peppers to H uy Fong. Huy Fong contracted with other farmers to provide

peppers. Tran showed those farmers the drone video of
Underwood’s 2016 harvest that he had promised to keep
confidential to show them how to harvest economically. Consequences of Huy Fong’s Breach After the relationship with Huy Fong ended, Underwood had nothing to plant on t he 1,700 acres it had. Nor did Underwood have the financing to plant acreage on speculation. It tried to get out of its leases, but was largely unsuccessful. It had to immediately lay off 40 employees. It was too late in the season to grow much of anyt hing. Underwood managed to obtain subcontracts for spring and

summer , but it lost 8.5 million in 2017

. Underwood was having
difficulties in 201 8 , and lost over $6 million that year. Roberts explained that with two or three years’ notice,
Underwood could have avoided the losses. He testified : “ [W]e
would have compressed the acreage on the peppers. We wouldn’t
have worried about the [crop] rotation. I could have shed property at the same time as growing peppers and generated

revenue from those. It woul d have given me

– that entire first year when we had absolutely nothing to grow, that would have
been covered. So, that massive loss in the first year would have7

. been eliminated . And in the second year, we would be taking on

new customers. Then if we coul d work it out

, reduce our pepper acres, add the new acres of other crops, it might have been
seamless

. Might not have had any loss.” Roberts testified that growing peppers for Huy Fong required planning three years ahead of time.
Procedure Huy Fong brou ght an action against Underwood seeking a $1. 4 million refund of payments Huy Fong had made for the 2016

season. Underwood cross

- complained alleging breach of contract

, promissory estoppel

, and fraud against Huy Fong, a n d
intentional interference with pro spective economic relations and intentional interference with contractual relations again Tran.
The tria l court granted Tran judgment of nonsuit o n the
tortious interference claims

. Verdict The jury unanimously found in Underwood’s favor on
breach of con tract and fraud. The jury awarded Underwood $13. 32 million in compensatory damages and $10 million in punitive damages. The trial court denied Huy Fong’s motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict. 1

1 Huy Fong’s motion to s upplement the record on appeal, filed April 22, 2020, is denied.8

. DISCUSSION Huy Fong’s Appeal
I
Fraud Huy Fong con tends it is entitled to judgment on
Underwood’s fraud claim. Huy Fong argues that Underwood prevailed on a legally impermissible theory of fraudulent concealment. Huy Fong
mischaracterizes Underwood’s theory. Huy Fong claims
Underwood’s theory is that “ every party to a contract

– solely by
vir tue of the contract’s existence

– has a freestanding state

- law duty to disclose to its counterparty any intention to discontinue
the contractual relationship.” Having mischaracterized Underwood’s theory, Huy Fong
cite s Norkin v. United States Fire Ins. Co. (1965) 237 Cal.App

. 2d 435, to show why the theory it falsely attributes to Underwood is

wrong. In N ork in

, plaintiff made a claim against his homeowner’s insurer. Thereafter, the insu rer refused to renew the policy. Plaintiff brought an action for fraud against the insurer alleging
the insurer failed to disclose it would not do further business with plaintiff if he m ade a claim . The trial court sustained the
insurer’s demurrer without leave to amend. The C o urt of Appel
affirmed , stating the insurer was under no duty to disclose its
intention not to renew

. ( Norkin v. United States Fire Ins. Co.

, supra , 237 Cal.App.2d at p. 438.) Underwood’s theory is not that every contract requires a

p arty to disclose an intentio n not to renew. Instead, Underwood’s theory is that Huy Fong induced Underwood to acquire m ore and more land by continually promising Underwood that Huy Fong9

. would purchase all the peppers Underwood produced. Huy Fong understood that it was inducing Unde rwood to commit itself into the future, while at the same ti m e concealing its plan to terminate its relationship with Underwood

. Had the insurer in N o r k in induced plaintiff to purchase his house on the fraudulent promise that it would continue to insure
i t, we are confident t he result would have been different. More to the point, the question on appeal is not whether the judgment can be upheld on a particular legal theory, but whether the judgment ca n be upheld on any legal theory. (See,

e.g., Internat ional etc . Workers v. L andowitz (1942) 20 Ca l .2d 4 18, 423 [judgment entered on grounds that ordinance is unconstitutional up h eld on other grounds].) (a) Fraudulent Concealment Huy Fong contends it had no duty to disclose that it did not
intend to conti nue its contractual relationship with Underwood
Fraudulent concealment requires the “suppression of a fact, by one who is bound to disclose it.” (Civ. Code, § 1710, subd

. 3.)
Plaintiff must show that defendant had a duty to disclose. ( Linear Technology Corp. v. Applied Materials , Inc. (2007) 152 Cal.App.4th 115, 131.) A duty to disclose may arise from a confidential relationship. Where there exists a relationship of trust and
confidence , it is the duty of one in whom the confidence is reposed
to make a full disclosure of all material fa c ts within his knowledge relating to the transaction in question and any
concealment of a material fact is a fraud . ( Estate of Sanders (198 5 ) 40 Cal.3d 607, 616.) A confidential relationship can exist even though

, stri ctly speaking

, there is no fiduciary relationship

. ( Id. at p. 615.) A confidential relationship may be founded o n10

. m oral, social, domestic

, or merely a personal relationship. ( Barbara A. v. John G

. (1983) 145 Ca l .App.3d 369, 382.)
In Bank of America v . Sanchez (1934) 3 Cal.App.2d 238,
2 43, the court stated, “ [I]t is sufficient to show the existence of such friendly relations during a period of several years between the parties as would entitle the injured person to place confidence in the integrity and honesty of the other party to a contract

. . . .” The court determined that a customer’s business relationship with a bank over a period of years, her husband’s former employment with the bank

, and her acquaintance with and
confidence in officers of the bank were substantial evidence of a confidential relationship. ( Ibid. ) Here the parties’ relationship extended over 28 years. Tran testified his relationship with Craig was like a family, that he trusted Craig

, and saw him as a good friend. Lam describ ed the relationship between Underwood and Huy Fong as a “ concrete bond.” The parties shared financial information. Craig obtained

m ore land in reliance on Huy Fo n g’s assurance that it would buy what Underwood produced. Perhaps the most compelling
eviden ce of a confidential relationship is that for many years the parties entered into transactions involving tens of millions of
dollars without formal written contracts. Huy Fong points out that the jury was instructed on fraudulent concealment , but the inst ruction did not include
confidential relationship.
If this was error

, it is patently harmless. The evidence that Underwood and Huy Fo n g were in a confidential relationship is overwhelming. Even Huy Fong concedes in its opening brief that the parties had enjoyed a “ c lose and friendly ” relationship

, that the parties “successf ully collaborated for decades,” that the11

. relationship g rew less formal as the parties “ d rew closer

, ” and that they “shared the financial burdens a n d risks of jalape ñ o cultivation .” Hu y Fong does not even suggest any contrary
evidence. Huy Fong argues the concealed information must be fact
not intention. But again the authority Huy Fong cites does not support the argument . The cases Huy Fo n g c ites do involve a
concealment of fact b ut none of them hold a concealment of intention is not sufficient. (See, e.g., Hoffman v. 162 North Wolfe
LLC (2014) 228 Cal.App.4th 1178 [cited by Huy Fong ; does not involve concealment of intention].)
Here Huy Fong’s decision to terminate its relations hip with
Underw ood was not some inchoate idea. Huy Fong’s business required a dependable supply of peppers. Huy Fong made the
decision to terminate its relationship with Underwood long before
the end of the 2016 harvest . That decision was a “fact” that Huy Fong had a duty to disclose to Underwood. And the jury had ample evidence to so find. (b) Affirmative Misrepresentation Huy Fong contends there is no evidence of an affirmative misrepresentation. In viewing the evidence, we look only to the evide nce supporting the prevailing party. ( GHK Associates v Mayer Group

, Inc

. (1990) 224 Cal.App.3d 856, 872.) We discard
evidence unfavorable to the prevailing party as not having sufficient verity to be accepted by the trier of fac t. ( Ibid

. ) Where
the tri al court or jury has drawn reasonable inferences from the evidence, we have no power to draw different inferences, even though different inferences may also be reasonable . ( McIntyre v

. Doe & Roe (1954) 125 Cal.App.2d 285, 287.) The trier of fact is12

. not r equired to believe even uncontradicted testimony. ( Sprague v. Equifax, Inc. (198 5 ) 166 Cal.App.3d 1012, 1028.) One who willfully deceives another with intent to induce him to alter his position to his injury or risk is liable for any damage that he there by suffers. (Civ. C o de

, § 1709.) A promise to do something necessarily implies an intention to perform; hence, when a promi se is made without such an intention, it is
fraud . ( Lazar v. Superior Court (1996) 12 Cal.4th 63 1 , 638.) Huy Fong points out that the only fraud Underwood alleges
in its complaint is a July 2016 representation that Huy Fong would purchase peppers from Underwood for the 2017, 2018, 2019 pepper seasons and beyond . Huy Fong argues that at best there was an implied promise based on vag ue reassurances of good feelings between the parties. Huy Fong cites Lonely Maiden Productions, LLC v. Golden Tree Asset Management, LP (2011) 201 Cal.App.4th 368, 375 , for the proposition that California does not recognize a fraud claim based on an impli ed false promise.
But Lonely Maiden cites no authority for the proposition that fraud cannot be based on an implied false promise. Where
the implied promise is certain enough to cause reasonable reliance, there is no reason it cannot be a proper basis fo r fraud.
Parties may not avoid liability for fraud simply because t he y leave to implication what t he y clearly intend to communicate. In any event, here there was far more than an implied promise based on vague reassurances of good feelings between the pa rties. Huy Fong expressly told Underwood numerous times that Huy Fong would purchase all the peppers Underwood could produce. These promises were made in the context of Huy Fong’s
insistence that Underwood obtain m ore land

, a matter that required Underwo od to undertake long

- term financial13

. commitments. In addition

, Huy Fo n g expressly agreed to purchase the 20 17 harvest of 1

, 700 a cres at $13

, 000 per acre

. The jury could reasonably conclude that Huy Fong had no
in tention of keeping those promises when they were made. There is evidence to show that Tran had long planned to cut Huy Fong’s ties to Underwood. As far back as 2014, Tran was planning to
form Chilico

, a company that would purchase peppers from farmers other than Underwood, allowing Huy Fong to cu t its ties to Underwood. In 2015, Tran began his campaign to hire Roberts away from Underwood. Roberts was the key employee in Underwood’s pepper production. Tran informed Roberts that Huy Fong was breachin g the contract to purchase Underwood’s
2017 har vest just days after making it. Tran wait ed unti l he knew Craig was on vacation before informing Roberts. Finally, in 2016, Tran, who had never before showed an interest in harvest operations, used a drone to video Underwood ’s harvest. After he
cut ties with Underwood, he used the video to show other farmers how to harvest efficiently.
T here is more than ample evidence to support a finding of fraud based on affirmative misrepresentation.
II Alleged Inconsistent Jury Findings Huy Fong contends the jury made inconsist e nt findings on the parties’ contract. On the jury’s special verdict form, the jury answered yes to both the following questions : “ Did Underwood Ranches LP and Huy Fong Foods, Inc. enter i n to an ongoing contract ( something

more than annual contracts) whereby Underwood Ranches would grow jalape ñ o peppers for Huy Fong?” “Did Underwood Ranches14

. LP and Huy Fo n g Foods

, I nc. enter into a contract for the 2017 jalape ñ o pepper growing season?” A special verdict is inconsistent if there is no possib ility of

rec on ciling its findings with each other

. ( Singh v

. Southland
Stone U

. S.A.

, Inc. (2 0 10) 186 Cal.App

. 4th 338

, 357.) Here the jury’s findings are consistent a n d easily
reconciled . Read together

, the jury found that the parties had an ongoing cont ractual relationship that included the 2017 jalape ñ o growing season.
III Motion for N ew Trial Huy Fong contends the trial court abdicated its responsibility to s it as a 13th juror in ruling on its motion for a
new trial. Huy Fong made a motion for a new trial on the ground of insufficiency of the evidence to justify the verdict . (Code Civ. Proc., § 657, subd. 6.)
Code of Civil Procedure section 657 provides

, in part: “ A new trial shall not be granted upon the ground of insufficiency of
the evidence to justify the verdict or other decision .

. . unless after weighing the evidence the court is convinced from the entire record, including reasonable inferences therefrom, that the court or jury clearly should have reached a different verdict or decision.” ( Italics added.) Huy Fong’s contention that the trial court abdicated its duty is based on the court’s statement : “ I may be the 13th juror, but I don’t view myself as the super juror where, because I disagree with what the jury has ret urned in the way of a verdict, I can just, you know, run over the top of it and substitute my personal opinion for theirs.”15

. Huy Fong apparently believes the trial court does have the power to substitute the court’s personal opinion for that of t he jury. Huy Fong relies on R y an v. Crown Castle NG Networks

, Inc

. (2016) 6 Cal

. App

. 5th 775. In Ryan

, the Court of Appeal
reversed the trial court’s denial of the plaintiff’s motion for a new trial on the ground of inadequate damages b ecaus e the trial court implied it had no power to question the adequacy of the jury’s
award a n d because the trial court did not evaluate the evidence

. ( Id. at pp

. 783

- 786.)
But here the trial court evaluated the evidence and did not

say it had no power to question the jury’s verdict . The court said it had no power to act as a super juror and substitute its personal opinion for that of the jurors. That is a correct statement of the
law and reflects how all judges are duty bound to act

. To do otherwise would impoverish our system of justice

. Underwo od has a constitutional right to a jury trial. (Cal. Const., art I, § 16.) Code of Civil Procedure section 657 empowers the trial court to grant a new trial only when after independently evaluating the evidence the court conc l u d es the jury’s verdict is

“ clearly” wrong . The court cannot grant a new trial simply because it would have found differently than the jury. ( Dominguez v

. Pantalone (1989) 212 Cal.App

. 3d 201, 216.) That
is what the trial court said. The purpose of Code of Civil Procedure section 657 is not to give the trial court permission to run roughshod over a part y ’s constitutional right to jury determination. Instead , the purpose
is to allow the trial court to grant a new trial on those rare occasions when the jury’s verdict is so at odds w ith any
reasonable view of the evidence that judicial intervention is16

. required to avoid a manifest miscarriage of justice. To the extent Ryan can be read to the contrary

, we decline to follow it.
IV Punitive Damages Huy Foods conte n ds that the $10 milli on punitive damage
award must be vacated

. Huy Fo n g argues that punitive damages cannot be awarded
for brea c h of contr a ct in the absence of an independent tort. But here punitive damages were awarded for fraud, not breach of
contract. Pun i tive damages ma y be awarded for fraud even though the fraud incidentally involves breach of contract. (See
Schroeder v

. Auto D riveaway Co

. (1974) 11 Cal.3d 908

, 921 [defendants who contracted to transport plaintiffs’ goods are l ia b l e for punitive damages for fraud ulentl y concealing they were not authorized by the Interstate Com m erce Commission to transport goods].) Huy Fong’s reliance on Applied Equipment Corp. v. Litton
Saudi Arabia

, Ltd. (1994) 7 Cal.4th 503, 516, is misplaced. In
that case our Supreme Court held tha t a party cannot be liable for conspiracy to interfere with its own contract. This case
involves fraud , not interference with contract. If a party could
interfere with its own contract, every breach of contract would be

a tort. But n ot every breach of c ontract involves fraud. Huy Fong argues that punitive damages were not proven by clear and convincing evidence. (Civ. Code, § 3294, subd. (a) [to recover punitive damages

, fraud must be proven by clear and convincing evidence].) But the jury unanimously found fraud by
clear and convincing evidence. We stated the evidence that supports a finding of fraud by affirmative misrepresentation and
fraudulent concealment

. We view e d the record as a whole and17

. determine that the record contains substantial evidenc e from
which a reasonable trier of fact could have made the finding of the high probability demanded by the clear and convincing evidence standard. ( Conservatorship of O.B. ( 2020) 9 Cal.5th 989, 1005.) Finally, Huy Fon g argues the $10 million punitive da mages award was so excessive as to violate federal due process. The United States Supreme Court has set forth three guideposts for reviewing a punitive damages award : “ ( 1) the degree of reprehensibility of the defendant's misconduct; (2) the disparity
be tween the actual or potential harm suffered by the plaintiff and the punitive damages award; and (3) the difference between the punitive damages awarded by the jury and the civil penalties authorized or imposed in comparable cases.” ( State Farm Mutual
Aut omobile Insurance Co. v. Campbell (2003) 538 U.S. 408, 418.) Concerning the first guidepost, the Supreme Court stated :

“ ‘ [T]he most important indicium of the reasonableness of a punitive damages award is the degree of reprehensibil ity of the
defendant's conduct. ’ [ Citation.] We have instructed courts to determine the reprehensibility of a defendant by considering whether: the harm caused was physical as opposed to economic;
the tortious conduct evinced an indifference to or a reckless disregard of the h ealth or safety of others; the target of the conduct had financial vulnerability; the conduct involved repeated actions or was an isolated incident; and the harm was the result of intentional malice, trickery, or deceit, or mere
accident.” ( State Farm Mut ual Automobile Insurance Co. v. Campbell

, supra , 538 U.S. at p. 419 .) Concerning the first guidepost, the degree of reprehensibility, it is true that Huy Fong’s fraudulent conduct18

. did not directly physically harm anyone

. But in addition to the
mental dis tress Craig felt, 40 people lost their jobs. The harm done by Huy Fong’s deception was not limited to Craig. The emotional distress and loss of jobs were entirely foreseeable. Huy Fong simply did not care. In addition, Underwood was particularly vulner able . Almost all of Underwood’s production was devoted to Huy Fong. Huy Fong encouraged Underwood’s dependence by demanding that Underwood obtain more acreage and by promising to buy all that Underwood produced. Even if Huy Fon g ’s deception may be descr ibed as a single incident, Huy Fong had been planning the deception for some period of time. It did not occur in an aberrant moment. Finally, the harm was the result of intentional deceit, not a mere accident. The degree of reprehensibility is more than sufficient to support the punitive damages award. The second guidepost

, the disparity between the actual harm and the punitive damages award

, also favors affirming the
award . The United States Supreme Court has refused to draw a bright line. ( Simon v

. San Paolo U.S. Holding Co., Inc

. (2005) 35 Cal.4th 1159, 1181.) But few awards exceeding a single

- digit
ratio between puniti v e and compensatory damages will satisfy due process. ( State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co. v. Campbell

, s upra , 5 3 8 U.S. at p. 425.) Past deci sions approving
ratios of three

- or four

- to

- one are “instructive.” ( Ibid

. )
Here the ratio of punitive to compensatory damages is 0.75

- to

- one. Even if we were to consider the reprehensibility factor t o be in the middle range, the lo w p unitive to compensatory damages ratio supports the award. Finally

, the third guidepost is the difference between the punitive damages award and the civil penalties authorized or19

. imposed in comparable cases. Our Supreme Court has noted that the third guid epost is less useful in a case like this where plaintiff prevailed only on a cause of action involving common law
tort duties that do not lend themselves to comparison with statutory penalties. ( Simon v. San Pa ol o U.S. Holding Co., Inc.

supra , 35 Cal.4th at pp. 1184

- 1185.) Nevertheless , “we do note
that California [statutes] typically impose[] treble damages penalties for fraudulen t and bad faith conduct.” ( Bardis v. Oates (2004) 119 Cal.App.4th 1, 24.) There is nothing about statutory penalties that in dicates a 0. 75

- to

- one ratio of punitive to compensatory damages is excessive. Far from it. Here the award of punitive damages is low. Underwood’s Appeal Underwood appeals the judgment of nonsuit on its claims against Tran: intentional interference w ith prospective economic advantage and interference with contract

. Underwood asserts the appeal is protective. If we affirm
the judgment against Huy Fong, it will be unnecessary for us to
consider Underwood’s claims against Tran. Because we affirm the j udgment against H u y Fong, it is unnecessary for us to consider Underwood’s appeal.
DISPOSITION The judgment is affirmed. Costs are awarded to
Underwood

. CERTIFIED FOR PUBLICATION.

GILBERT, P. J.
We concur:

YEGAN, J. TANGEMAN, J.20

. Henry J. Walsh

, Judge

Superior Court County of Ventura

______________________________

L atham & Watkins, Joshua G. Hamilton, Dixie C. Tauber

, Roman Martinez, Charles S. Dameron, Riley T. Keenan ; Pearson,
S imon & Warshaw, Thomas J. Nolan for Plaintiff, Cross

defendant and Appellant Huy Fong Foods, Inc., and Cross

defendant and Respondent David Tran. Ferguson Case Orr Paterson, Wendy C. Lascher, John A. Hribar, James Q. McDermott, Michael A. Velthoen and Jessica
M. Wan for Defendant , C ross

- Complainant and Appellant
Und erwood Ranches and Cross

- complainant and Respondent
Underwood & Son

.