Note: Decisions of a three-justice panel are not to be considered as precedent before any tribunal. 

ENTRY ORDER

SUPREME COURT DOCKET NO. 2014-017

OCTOBER TERM, 2014

Edward Johnson } APPEALED FROM:

}

} Superior Court, Orleans Unit,

 v. } Civil Division

}

Andrew Pallito, Commissioner of the 

Department of Corrections

}

} DOCKET NO. 406-11-12 Oscv

Trial Judge: Howard E. Van 

Benthuysen

In the above-entitled cause, the Clerk will enter:

Plaintiff, an inmate committed to the custody of the Commissioner of the Department of 

Corrections, appeals pro se from a superior court judgment upholding a disciplinary rule 

violation. We affirm. 

In November 2012, a correctional officer at the prison facility where plaintiff was housed 

filed a report that plaintiff had committed a disciplinary violation consisting of threatening her 

with harm, based on statements plaintiff made while the officer was touring his unit. Following 

a disciplinary hearing, the hearing officer upheld the violation. Plaintiff filed a Rule 75 

complaint with the superior court, which ultimately granted the State’s motion for summary 

judgment, upholding the violation. The court granted summary judgment because plaintiff failed 

to respond to the State’s motion and there was some evidence to support the hearing officer’s 

conclusion. This appeal by plaintiff followed. 

Our review is limited. “[W]hen reviewing a decision from an inmate disciplinary 

hearing, we need find only that there was ‘some evidence’ in order to uphold a conviction.” 

King v. Gorczyk, 2003 VT 34, ¶ 7, 175 Vt. 220. Furthermore, the weight of the evidence, the 

reasonable inferences to be drawn therefrom, and the credibility of the witnesses are all decisions 

within the judgment of the trier of fact. State v. King, 2006 VT 18, ¶ 18, 179 Vt. 400; State v. 

Merchant, 173 Vt. 249, 257 (2001). 

Although the factual record here is slim, it is sufficient to uphold the disciplinary ruling. 

Plaintiff does not contest the hearing officer’s finding that he stated in front of the correctional 

officer: “I won’t hit [the officer] but I know people who will.” This statement can reasonably be 

interpreted to constitute a distinct threat that plaintiff could arrange for the officer to be attacked 

by other inmates. Nor does plaintiff challenge the hearing officer’s additional findings that 

plaintiff acknowledged he was mad at the officer because of an earlier disciplinary report that

she had filed; that plaintiff admitted he was aggravated with the same officer because she had 

allegedly refused to accept a grievance from him; and that plaintiff’s demeanor at the hearing 

was “agitated” and “angry at [the officer].”
2

Viewed as a whole, the evidence and findings are sufficient to uphold the judgment that 

plaintiff committed a disciplinary violation by threatening an officer with harm. Although 

plaintiff maintains that his statement is subject to other, non-threatening interpretations, the 

hearing officer’s finding to the contrary was reasonable, and thus may not be disturbed on 

appeal. Plaintiff also claims that the correctional officer’s disciplinary reports conflict as to the 

time of the violation, but plaintiff does not demonstrate how the alleged discrepancy undermines 

the ultimate finding of a violation. We thus discern no basis to disturb the trial court’s award of 

judgment to the State.

Affirmed. 

BY THE COURT:

_______________________________________

Paul L. Reiber, Chief Justice

_______________________________________

John A. Dooley, Associate Justice

_______________________________________

Harold E. Eaton, Jr., Associate Justice