COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA 

Present: Judges Coleman, Bumgardner and Lemons 

Argued at Salem, Virginia 

RONLYN HICKS BROWN EATON, S/K/A 

 RONLYN BROWNE EATON 

 MEMORANDUM OPINION* BY 

v. Record No. 0132-98-3 JUDGE RUDOLPH BUMGARDNER, III 

 MARCH 9, 1999 

COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA 

FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE CITY OF SALEM 

Robert P. Doherty, Jr., Judge 

 (Rena G. Berry, on brief), for appellant. 

Appellant submitting on brief. 

 Daniel J. Munroe, Assistant Attorney General 

(Mark L. Earley, Attorney General, on brief), 

for appellee. 

 

 *Pursuant to Code § 17.1-413, recodifying Code § 17-116.010, 

this opinion is not designated for publication.

 Ronlyn Hicks Brown Eaton appeals the judgment of the trial 

court which revoked her suspended sentences and ordered them to 

be served. Concluding that the trial court did not abuse its 

discretion, we affirm. 

 The trial court convicted the defendant of three counts of 

petit larceny and one count of failure to appear in February 

1996. The defendant entered guilty pleas, and pursuant to a plea 

agreement, the trial court sentenced her to twelve months in 

jail. The court suspended the sentences conditioned on the 

defendant paying the court costs within twelve months, and it 

placed her on probation. 
- 2 - 

 In October 1997, the Commonwealth moved to revoke the 

suspension because the defendant had failed to pay any court 

costs and had received a subsequent conviction for uttering a bad 

check. The trial court revoked her suspended sentences. At a 

motion to reconsider, the defendant tendered full payment of the 

court costs, but the trial court declined to modify its decision. 

The trial court stated, "the revocation was not solely because 

[the defendant] had not paid [her] court costs, but it was 

because of other convictions, other crimes, similar type crimes." 

The defendant argues that the court is unjustly imprisoning her 

for financial circumstances beyond her control. We disagree. 

 "A trial court has broad discretion to revoke a suspended 

sentence and probation based on Code § 19.2-306, which allows a 

court to do so 'for any cause deemed by it sufficient.' The 

court’s findings of fact and judgment will not be reversed unless 

there is a clear showing of abuse of discretion." Davis v. 

Commonwealth, 12 Va. App. 81, 86, 402 S.E.2d 684, 687 (1991) 

(citation omitted). The only limitation upon the trial court’s 

revocation is that it be "reasonable." Marshall v. Commonwealth, 

202 Va. 217, 220, 116 S.E.2d 479, 484 (1960). 

 The defendant has failed to demonstrate that the trial court 

abused its discretion in revoking the suspended sentences. It is 

undisputed that she obtained a subsequent conviction during the 

probationary period. See Coffey v. Commonwealth, 209 Va. 760, 

762, 167 S.E.2d 343, 345 (1969). In addition, she paid no court 

costs for twenty months, but obtained the full sum by the hearing 
- 3 - 

on the motion to reconsider. The court did not believe the 

defendant’s explanations for not paying her court costs. The 

trier of fact is not required to accept a party’s evidence in its 

entirety, see Barrett v. Commonwealth, 231 Va. 102, 107, 341 

S.E.2d 190, 193 (1986), but is free to believe and disbelieve in 

part or in whole the testimony of any witness. See Rollston v. 

Commonwealth, 11 Va. App. 535, 547, 399 S.E.2d 823, 830 (1991). 

The record establishes that the trial court had sufficient, 

reasonable cause to revoke the suspended sentences. Accordingly, 

we affirm that decision. 

Affirmed.