[Cite as State v. Madrigal, 2023-Ohio-488.]

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO

SIXTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

LUCAS COUNTY

State of Ohio Court of Appeals No. L-22-1014

 L-22-1071

 Appellee

Trial Court No. CR0199605761

v. CR0200701081

 

Jamie R. Madrigal DECISION AND JUDGMENT

Appellant Decided: February 17, 2023 

* * * * *

Julia R. Bates, Lucas County Prosecuting Attorney, and

Brenda J. Majdalani, Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, for appellee.

Jamie R. Madrigal, pro se.

* * * * *

DUHART, P.J.

{¶ 1} Appellant, Jamie Madrigal, appeals from a judgment entered by the Lucas 

County Court of Common Pleas, denying his motion to compel the state of Ohio to honor 

the terms of his plea agreement. For the reasons that follow, we affirm the judgment of 

the trial court.
2.

Statement of the Case and Relevant Facts

{¶ 2} On April 30, 1995, during an armed robbery of the Pacific Crab House 

restaurant in Maumee, Ohio, a restaurant employee was ordered to the floor by the 

perpetrators. Upon his refusal to lie down on the floor, the employee was immediately 

shot at close range and killed.

{¶ 3} On April 12, 1996, during the course of an armed robbery of a Kentucky 

Fried Chicken restaurant in Toledo, Ohio, a female manager was shot at point-blank 

range in the back of the head and killed as she attempted to open the restaurant safe at the 

command of the robber.

{¶ 4} In case No. CR0199605761 (the “KFC case”), appellant was charged with, 

and convicted of, murder with a firearm specification and aggravated robbery, for the 

crimes that occurred at the Kentucky Fried Chicken. A jury recommended that appellant 

be sentenced to death. The judgment was affirmed by the Supreme Court of Ohio in 

State v. Madrigal, 87 Ohio St.3d 378, 721 N.E.2d 52 (2000). Appellant filed a petition 

for writ of habeas corpus. A federal district court granted the writ on appellant’s claim 

that his rights under the Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment were denied when 

the trial court allowed out-of-court statements by a co-defendant who refused to testify at 

trial. See Madrigal v. Bagley, 276 F.Supp.2d 744 (N.D. Ohio 2003), aff’d 413 F.3d 548 

(6th Cir. 2005).
3.

{¶ 5} On September 9, 2005, counsel was appointed to represent appellant in the 

retrial of the KFC case. Numerous motions were filed and various hearings and pretrials 

were held. Retrial was set for January 17, 2007.

{¶ 6} On January 11, 2007, appellant was indicted in case No. CR200701081, for 

the crimes that occurred at the Pacific Crab House (the “Crab House” case). The 

following day, appellant withdrew his previous plea of not guilty and entered a plea of 

guilty in the KFC case. In addition, he entered a plea of guilty, pursuant to North 

Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25, 27 L.Ed.2d 162, 91 S.Ct. 160 (1970), in the Crab House 

case. In return for his pleas, the state agreed to dismiss the death penalty specification in 

the KFC case. 

{¶ 7} A sentencing hearing was held. The trial court found that appellant’s guilty 

pleas were made knowingly, voluntarily, and with an understanding of the nature of the 

charges, the maximum penalties involved, and the effect of the pleas of guilty. In the 

KFC case, appellant was convicted of aggravated murder with a firearm specification and 

aggravated robbery. He was sentenced to 20 years to life in prison on the murder charge, 

10-25 years in prison on the aggravated robbery charge, and three years in prison for the 

firearm specification. The sentences were ordered to be served consecutively to one

other, for a total minimum term of 33 years, and, further, were ordered to be served

consecutive to the sentences imposed in the Crab House case. 

{¶ 8} In the Crab House case, appellant was convicted of aggravated murder with 

a firearm specification, aggravated robbery, and seven counts of kidnapping. At the 
4.

sentencing hearing, one count of kidnapping was merged with the murder charge. 

Appellant was then sentenced to 20 years to life in prison on the murder charge, 10-25 

years in prison on the aggravated robbery charge, 10-25 years in prison on each of the 

remaining six kidnapping charges, and three years in prison for the firearm specification. 

The sentences were ordered to be served consecutively to one another, for a total 

minimum term of 93 years. It was further ordered that the sentences in the Crab House 

case be served consecutively to the sentences in the KFC case, for a total minimum term 

of 126 years in prison. 

{¶ 9} Appellant filed a notice of appeal on March 6, 2007. This court dismissed 

the appeal as untimely. On December 26, 2007, appellant, pro se, filed a motion for leave 

to file a delayed appeal. In support of his motion, appellant claimed that the charges 

brought against him in the Crab House case were “maliciously fabricated and utilized as a 

tool to maintain [his] original conviction” in the KFC case and to “coerce” his guilty 

pleas. We granted appellant’s motion for leave and appointed counsel. In his brief on the 

merits, appointed counsel asserted only that the trial court erred in stacking the six 

kidnapping sentences and that the indictments were defective because they failed to 

allege a mens rea for the aggravated robbery counts. We found the appeal to be without 

merit and affirmed the judgment of the trial court. See State v. Madrigal, 6th Dist. Lucas 

Nos. L-07-1417, L-07-1418, 2008-Ohio-6394.

{¶ 10} On February 9, 2009, appellant filed an application to reopen his direct 

appeal pursuant to App.R. 26(B). On March 10, 2009, we denied his application.
5.

{¶ 11} On January 29, 2010, appellant filed his first motion to withdraw his guilty 

pleas, in the trial court. Appellant alleged that his sentences were contrary to law, 

contrary to the ex post facto clause of the U.S. Constitution, and that he was denied 

effective assistance of trial counsel. The trial court denied the motion without a hearing. 

Appellant appealed. In State v. Madrigal, 6th Dist. Lucas Nos. L-10-142, L-10-143, 

2011-Ohio-798, we held that appellant’s claims were wholly barred by the doctrine of res 

judicata. We explained: “claims submitted in support of a Crim.R. 32.1 motion to 

withdraw plea that could have been raised on direct appeal, but were not raised on direct 

appeal, are barred by res judicata.” Id. at ¶ 16, citing State v. Bryukhanova, 6th Dist. 

Fulton No. F-10-002, 2010-Ohio-5504.

{¶ 12} On August 11, 2011, appellant filed a motion to correct illegal sentences. 

The motion was denied by the trial court on October 27, 2011.

{¶ 13} On October 18, 2016, appellant filed a “Motion to Withdraw Guilty Pleas 

and/or Motion for New Trial,” in the trial court. Appellant’s claims for relief were based 

on what he describes as “recently discovered new, exculpatory evidence.” Appellant 

asserted the he was innocent, that the state fabricated his involvement in the Crab House 

robbery, and that his trial counsel failed to conduct any investigation or discovery 

regarding the Crab House case before advising him to plead guilty. In support of his 

motion, appellant submitted 23 exhibits, including six affidavits of individuals known to 

appellant at the time of the plea.
6.

{¶ 14} On October 27, 2016, the state filed its opposition to appellant’s motions. 

Shortly thereafter, appellant filed a reply. On January 4, 2017, the trial court issued 

findings of fact and conclusions of law denying appellant’s second Crim.R. 32.1 motion 

to withdraw plea. The trial court found that the affidavits submitted by appellant were 

“neither credible nor supportive” of claims of prosecutorial misconduct, ineffective 

assistance, or actual innocence. In regard to his request for a new trial, the court below 

found that because appellant entered pleas of guilty, “Crim.R. 33(B) has no application.”

{¶ 15} Appellant, pro se, appealed from the January 4, 2017 judgment of the trial 

court. He asserted seven multi-part assignments of error for review. He alleged 

prosecutorial misconduct, ineffective assistance of counsel, lack of due process, actual 

innocence, and failure to comply with Crim.R. 11. Appellant further alleged that his pleas 

were not knowingly, intelligently, or voluntarily entered. He sought remand and a new 

trial.

{¶ 16} On February 16, 2018, this court affirmed the trial court’s denial of 

appellant’s second motion to withdraw plea, concluding that all of the claims raised by 

appellant could have been raised on direct appeal and, thus, were barred under the 

doctrine of res judicata. This court further found that the evidence that appellant claimed 

as new was either in existence or available to him at the time of the plea, or was 

inadmissible hearsay.

{¶ 17} On April 2, 2019, appellant filed a motion captioned “MOTION TO 

VOID/VACATE SENTENCING JUDGMENT” claiming that the sentences for 
7.

aggravated murder were imposed contrary to law. Specifically, appellant argued that for 

each charge of aggravated murder a sentence of “‘20 years mandatory incarceration to 

life in prison’ was issued, for which there exists no statutory authority in Ohio’s 

sentencing scheme for aggravated murder” and that his sentences for kidnapping were 

contrary to law because they were allied offenses and should have been merged. On 

December 31, 2019, this court determined that both of these claims were barred by the 

doctrine of res judicata. See State v. Madrigal, 6th Dist. Lucas Nos. L-19-1193, L-19-

1194, 2019-Ohio-5426. 

{¶ 18} On October 15, 2021, appellant filed a motion to compel the state of Ohio 

to honor the terms of the plea agreement in the Crab House case, and on October 18, 

2021, appellant filed a third motion to withdraw plea. The trial court denied both 

motions on December 8, 2021. An appeal to this court followed, and on April 14, 2022, 

this court dismissed the appeal as to the portion of the trial court’s order denying 

appellant’s motion to withdraw plea, on the grounds that the trial court’s ruling on a 

motion to withdraw a guilty plea rendered after appellant’s conviction was affirmed on 

appeal was void for lack of jurisdiction. 

{¶ 19} We consider, herein, the remainder of the trial court’s order, which denied

appellant’s motion to compel the state to honor the terms of the plea agreement.
8.

Assignments of Error

{¶ 20} Appellants asserts the following assignments of error on appeal:

I. Appellant is denied [his] Const. Guarantee to Equal Protection of the law 

and Due Process where a bargain/contract of “33 years to life” specifically stated 

as being the “maximum * * *” in the journalized plea agreement forms is not 

honored...[Art. 1, §2; Art. 1, §16; U.S. Amend 5 and 14].

II. The Const. Guarantees to Equal Protection of the Law and Due Process 

are violated in [a] plea deal/bargain (contract) where the Court, the prosecution, 

and counsel misunderstood “the maximum penalty [***]” relative to the 

applicable nondiscretionary statutory authority [of §2929.03]. [Art. 1, §2; Ar. 1, 

§16; U.S. Amend 5 and 14].

III. Appellant’s Const. Guarantee to counsel [in the first instance] is denied 

upon C/A trial and appellate counsel’s failure to understand the nondiscretionary 

statutory authority applicable to the terms of the plea bargain/contract ... [Art. 1 

§10; U.S. Amend. 6].

IV. Non-performance of the stated “maximum penalty which can be 

imposed by law, which is 33 years to life,” as set-forth in the plea 

agreement/contract forms effected a breach of the terms of the plea 

bargain/contract, as to case CR-07-1081, particularly...in violation of Appellant’s 

Const. Guarantee to Due Process...[Art. 1, §16].
9.

V. Where Appellant has been (1) denied effective assistance of trial and 

appellate counsel in the first instance; has (2) diligently sought remedy of the 

underlying issue(s), Pro Se; and (3) has not had such determined on the merits, the 

application of res judicata is unwarranted and unfairly deprives appellant Due 

Process...[Art. 1, §10; Art. 1, §16; U.S. Amend 6 and 5, 14].

Analysis

{¶ 21} Appellant’s five assignments of error all involve the underlying claim that 

the state violated the terms of his plea agreement. In making this assertion, appellant 

argues that the terms of his plea agreement required him to serve a term of imprisonment 

of 33 years to life in each case, with a combined term of 66 years to life, rather than 126 

years to life, as was imposed by the trial court. 

Appellant’s claims are barred by the doctrine of res judicata

{¶ 22} “Under the doctrine of res judicata, a final judgment and conviction bars a 

convicted defendant who was represented by counsel from raising and litigating in any 

proceeding, except an appeal from that judgment, any defense or claimed lack of due 

process that was raised or could have been raised by the defendant at trial, which resulted 

in that judgment of conviction, or on appeal from that judgment.” State v. Barcus, 5th 

Dist. Licking No. 09-CA-115, 2010-Ohio-122, ¶ 16, citing State v. Szefcyk, 77 Ohio St.3d 

93, 95, 671 N.E.2d 233 (1996); and State v. Perry, 10 Ohio St.2d 175, 180, 226 N.E.2d 

104 (1967). Inasmuch as “appellant would have known that the state breached its 

agreement with him at his sentencing hearing, he could have brought such a claim in a 
10.

direct appeal from his conviction and sentence.” State v. Dodson, 10th Dist. Franklin No. 

16AP-160, 2016-Ohio-5953. Having failed to do so, res judicata bars him from doing it 

now.

Appellant was properly sentenced under the terms of his plea agreement

{¶ 23} Appellant’s claim also fails on its merits. “[P]lea agreements represent 

bargained-for exchanges whereby defendants limit their legal exposure and prosecutors 

obtain guaranteed convictions * * *.” State v. Elliott, 1st Dist. Hamilton No. C-190430, 

2021-Ohio-424, ¶ 6. These agreements can be specifically enforced. Id. at ¶ 7, citing 

Santobello v. New York, 40 U.S. 257, 263, 92 S.Ct. 495, 30 L.Ed.2d 427 (1971). When 

the prosecutor’s agreement is “‘“part of the inducement or consideration, such promise 

must be fulfilled.’”’ State v. Dye, 127 Ohio St.3d 357, 2010-Ohio-5728, 939 N.E.2d 

1217, ¶ 22, quoting State v. Thomas, 61 N.J. 314, 323, 294 A.2d 57 (1972), quoting 

Santobello at 262; see also State v. Soto, 158 Ohio St.3d 44, 2019-Ohio-4430, 139 

N.E.3d 889, ¶ 19 (“[B]ased on principles of contract law[,] * * * when a plea rests on a 

promise made by the prosecutor, that promise must be fulfilled.”) (Internal citation 

omitted.). If there is a breach, “‘[t]he trial court may either allow the negotiated plea to be 

withdrawn or, alternatively, may require the specific performance of the plea bargain by 

ordering the prosecution to fulfill its promise.’” State v. Pinchon, 11th Dist. Trumbull No. 

2019-T-0030, 2019-Ohio-4928, ¶ 12, quoting State v. Olivarez, 11th Dist. Lake No. 97-

L-288, 1999 WL 262158, *3 (Mar. 31, 1999), citing Santobello at 263.
11.

{¶ 24} In the instant case, the state fully complied with the terms of its agreement 

with appellant. As agreed, once appellant entered his pleas, the state dismissed the death 

specification in the KFC case. 

{¶ 25} As for the sentence that was ultimately imposed, we note that when 

appellant entered his pleas of guilty, the trial court found that the pleas were made 

knowingly, voluntarily, and with an understanding of the nature of the charges, the 

maximum penalties involved and the effect of the pleas of guilty. As indicated above, in 

the KFC case, appellant was sentenced to serve 20 years to life in prison on the murder 

charge, 10-25 years in prison on the aggravated robbery charge, and three years in prison 

for the firearm specification. The sentences were ordered to be served consecutively to 

each other, for a total minimum term of 33 years, and consecutive to the sentences 

imposed in the Crab House case. 

{¶ 26} In the Crab House case, appellant was sentenced to serve 20 years to life in 

prison on the murder charge, 10-25 years in prison on the aggravated robbery charge, 10-

25 years in prison on each of the six kidnapping charges that did not merge with the 

murder charge, and three years in prison for the firearm specification. The sentences in 

the Crab House case were all ordered to be served consecutively to one another, for a 

total minimum term of 93 years. When added to the total minimum term of 33 years that 

was imposed in the KFC case, appellants’ aggregate minimum term was, in fact, 126 

years, a figure which was included in each of the trial court’s January 26, 2007 judgment 

entries relating to each case. 
12.

{¶ 27} The state points out that in the plea agreement forms that were signed by 

appellant prior to sentencing, appellant stated that he understood that “* * * any sentence 

that the court may impose in this case, being CR1996-5761, may be ordered to be served 

consecutively with any sentence imposed in CR2007-1081, for a total maximum period 

of incarceration for both cases totaling 126 years to life and fines totaling $130,000.” 

{¶ 28} Appellant, on the other hand, asserts that the first paragraph in each of the 

two plea agreements includes an initial paragraph stating, “I have been advised of the 

maximum penalty which can be imposed by law, which is 33 years to life with a 

maximum fine of $35,000.00 * * *.” Unfortunately for appellant, although the first page 

of the plea agreement in the KFC case is in the record before this court, the first page of 

the plea agreement in the Crab House case is not. “An appellate court can only review 

claims of error which are based on facts which appear in the record and not on facts as 

alleged in an appellate brief.” State v. Walker, 6th Dist. Lucas No. L-98-1210, 1999 WL 

278120, *5 ((May 7, 1999). 

{¶ 29} Even assuming, without deciding, that appellant’s allegations are true, and 

that both plea agreement documents contained identical initial paragraphs stating “I have 

been advised of the maximum penalty which can be imposed by law, which is 33 years to 

life * * *,” the inconsistency as related to the Crab House case is properly viewed as

nothing more than a harmless typographical error which, in light of all of the other 

evidence set forth in the record, did not result in any actual misunderstanding of the 

potential sentence on the part of appellant, or in any unfair prejudice to him, as he was 
13.

aware of the plea he was entering. As set forth at Crim.R. 52(A), which addresses 

harmless error, “[a]ny error, defect, irregularity, or variance which does not affect 

substantial rights shall be disregarded.” Id.; see also State v. Snyder, 11th Dist. Ashtabula 

Nos. 2017-A-0041, 2017-A-0042, 2018-Ohio-2826, ¶ 29 (citing Crim.R. 52(A), court 

found that typos contained in a plea agreement of no contest referencing “guilty plea” had 

no prejudicial effect on defendant, who was aware of the plea he was entering). Thus, 

even assuming appellant’s allegations are true, under the harmless error standard, the 

alleged typographical error does not warrant withdrawal of appellant’s plea.

Appellant’s Equal Protection claims are without merit

{¶ 30} “Generally, the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment 

protects inmates from invidious discrimination based upon race.” Watson v. Campbell, 

6th Cir. No. 98-6132, 1999 WL 801578 (Sep. 28, 1999), at *1; see also Wolff v. 

McDonnell, 418U.S. 539, 556, 41 L.Ed.2d 935, 94 S.Ct. 2963 (1974). To prove his claim 

of a denial of Equal Protection, appellant must prove a racially discriminatory intent or 

purpose in order to prevail in an equal protection case. Watson at *1. Appellant must 

show that the state intentionally discriminated against him because of his membership in 

a protected class. Id. Appellant’s brief fails to make any such claim. His Equal Protection 

claims, therefore, fail. 
14.

Appellant was not denied the effective assistance of counsel, nor has he proven such a 

claim

{¶ 31} “In order to substantiate a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, a 

defendant must demonstrate [both] that counsel’s performance was deficient and that the 

deficient performance resulted in prejudice to the defendant.” State v. Liskany, 916 Ohio 

App.3d 609, 2011-Ohio-4456, 964 N.E.2d 1073, ¶ 174 (2d Dist.), citing Strickland v. 

Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984). “In order to 

show counsel’s conduct was deficient or unreasonable, the defendant must overcome the 

presumption that counsel provided competent representation and must show that 

counsel’s actions were not trial strategies prompted by reasonable professional 

judgment.” State v. Harrington, 3rd Dist. Logan No. 8-20-37, 2021-Ohio-343, ¶ 20. 

“Prejudice results when ‘there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s 

unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different.’” State v. 

Liles, 3d Dist. Allen No. 1-113-04, 2014-Ohio-259, ¶ 48, quoting State v. Bradley, 42 

Ohio St.3d 136, 142, 538 N.E.2d 373 (1989), citing Strickland at 691. “‘ A reasonable 

probability is a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome.’” Id., 

quoting Bradley at 142, and citing Strickland at 694.

{¶ 32} In light of our earlier discussion, we conclude that appellant’s counsel was 

not deficient for failing to object to a breach of the plea agreement where there was none. 

As stated by the Supreme Court of Ohio, “Counsel is certainly not deficient for failing to 

raise a meritless issue.” State v. Taylor, 78 Ohio St.3d 15, 31, 676 N.E.2d 82 (1997). 
15.

Furthermore, appellant has not demonstrated that even if his attorney had at sentencing 

clarified the agreement or objected to the prosecutor’s statements, the trial court would 

have sentenced him differently. Consequently, appellant has not demonstrated prejudice.

{¶ 33} For all of the foregoing reasons, appellant’s five assignments of error are 

found not well-taken, and the judgment of the Lucas County Court of Common Pleas is

affirmed. Appellant is ordered to pay the costs of this appeal pursuant to App.R. 24.

Judgment affirmed.

A certified copy of this entry shall constitute the mandate pursuant to App.R. 27. 

See also 6th Dist.Loc.App.R. 4.

Thomas J. Osowik, J. ____________________________

JUDGE

Christine E. Mayle, J. 

____________________________

Myron C. Duhart, P.J. JUDGE

CONCUR. 

____________________________

JUDGE

This decision is subject to further editing by the Supreme Court of

Ohio’s Reporter of Decisions. Parties interested in viewing the final reported

version are advised to visit the Ohio Supreme Court’s web site at:

http://www.supremecourt.ohio.gov/ROD/docs/.