In the

United States Court of Appeals

For the Seventh Circuit

No. 99-2532

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

v.

MARK PIKE,

Defendant-Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Northern District of Indiana, South Bend Division.

No. 98 CR 48--Robert L. Miller, Jr., Judge.

Argued December 8, 1999--Decided May 1, 2000

 Before HARLINGTON WOOD, JR., COFFEY and FLAUM, Circuit

Judges.

 COFFEY, Circuit Judge. On September 11, 1998, a

federal grand jury sitting in the Northern

District of Indiana returned a six count

indictment against Mark Ira Danewood Pike./1 On

October 28, 1998, the defendant pled guilty to

counts one, five, and six of the indictment (the

government moved to dismiss counts two and four)

but prior to sentencing, and after he obtained

new counsel, Pike filed a motion to vacate his

plea of guilty pursuant to Fed. R. Crim. P.

32(e). Pike contended that he had a valid defense

to the section 924(c)(1)(A) charge, contained in

count six, in that he did not carry the firearm

"in relation to" his drug trafficking crime. Pike

later filed another motion, in an attempt to

vacate his guilty plea, contending that his plea

was not knowingly and voluntarily made because of

his original trial counsel’s failure to explain

the phrase "in relation to" contained in section

924(c)(1)(A). The district court denied Pike’s

motions, and sentenced him to 87 months’

imprisonment, three years’ supervised release,

and a $300 special assessment. We affirm.

I. BACKGROUND

 On five occasions in the month of July, 1998,

Pike used his Chevrolet Camaro to deliver and

sell marijuana and LSD to an undercover police

officer of the Multi-County Drug Task Force in
Plymouth, Indiana./2 On July 22, 1998,

approximately five minutes after Pike made his

last drug sale to an undercover police officer,

officers from the Plymouth, Indiana, Police

Department arrested Pike and conducted a search

of the vehicle pursuant to the arrest, recovering

a .410 caliber shotgun from the hatchback of his

automobile./3

 As stated before, Pike initially pled guilty,

but before sentencing, on January 5, 1999, Pike’s

original counsel, Timothy P. McLaughlin, filed a

motion to withdraw because Pike informed him that

he wished to retain other counsel. The district

court granted the motion. On January 8, 1999,

Pike’s new counsel, John Theis, filed a Motion to

Vacate Plea of Guilty, arguing that Pike could

not be guilty of the section 924(c)(1)(A) charge

to which he had pled guilty because although Pike

carried his shotgun "during" a drug trafficking

crime, he did not carry it "in relation to" that

crime. On February 1, 1999, Pike filed an amended

motion to vacate his plea of guilty, arguing that

his previous counsel, McLaughlin, had not

provided him with the effective assistance of

counsel by allegedly failing to adequately

explain the "in relation to" element of section

924(c)(1)(A)./4

 The district court held a two-day hearing on

the Rule 32 motion. At the hearing, Pike claimed

that he purchased the shotgun for hunting

purposes only and that the gun was normally kept

at his grandmother’s house and not in his car.

Pike, in an obvious fabrication, further

testified that a friend brought the gun to him

and placed it in the trunk of the Camaro, where

it was found by police officers, in between the

time of the first and second drug transactions on

July 22nd, the date of his arrest. Pike explained

that he only told the officers on the scene that

the shotgun was always kept in his car because he

did not want his grandmother to lose her home; a

concern that has no basis in the law. Finally,

Pike claimed that he would not have pled guilty

if McLaughlin had adequately explained the "in

relation to" element of section 924(c).

 The government countered Pike’s arguments at the

Rule 32 hearing by pointing out that at no other

time during the investigation of this case had

Pike claimed to have used the shotgun for hunting

purposes. The government also pointed out that

Pike purchased the shotgun and ammunition during

the time frame he was engaged in the sale and

distribution of narcotics, and had informed

police officers on the scene at the time of his

arrest that he kept the weapon in his car at all

times during the drug transactions with the

undercover police officer. Finally, the
government argued that Pike, on July 22, 1998,

invited the undercover police officer into his

car to complete the narcotics transaction, and

even though the officer did not observe the

weapon at that time, the gun was found minutes

later when police officers arrested Pike and

searched the hatchback of his Camaro.

 At the hearing, attorney McLaughlin did admit

that he never discussed the "in relation to"

element with Pike "in those terms . . . not with

the words ’in relation to.’" But, contrary to

Pike’s assertion that his original attorney

failed to advise him of the meaning of the phrase

"in relation to", McLaughlin stated that he did

advise Pike that there was a relationship between

Pike’s firearm and his drug trafficking because

Pike carried the shotgun in his car during a drug

transaction: "because the weapon--the firearm was

found in the car at the time of his arrest, that

he was not going to be able to beat this case."

Moreover, Pike admitted that McLaughlin discussed

the "in relation to" element, although not in

those exact terms, with him "two or three times."

 In denying Pike’s amended motion to withdraw

his guilty plea, the judge stated that:

Mr. Pike was his only witness, and he was not a

credible witness in any respect. He contradicted

countless of his own prior statements--statements

reportedly (and admittedly) made to law

enforcement agents, statements made in writing to

his lawyer, statements this court finds to have

been made verbally to his lawyer, and statements

(oral and written) made to the court during the

guilty plea process. His smirking while

testifying further detracted from his

credibility. Whatever support Mr. Pike is to find

for his motion [to withdraw his guilty plea]

then, he must find outside his own testimony."

 The judge went on to conclude that:

[t]he issue before the court, of course, is not

whether Mr. Pike might have been convicted at

trial, but whether fair and just reason exists to

withdraw his plea. Mr. McLaughlin advised that

Mr. Pike--having been arrested minutes later with

a gun in the car in which the drugs were

distributed--probably would not be able to beat

the gun charge. Why should reliance on sound

legal advice warrant the plea’s withdrawal? Mr.

Pike points to Mr. McLaughlin’s concession that

he never explained the "in relation to" element

to Mr. Pike. . . .

* * *

 [But] Mr. Pike plainly understood that "in
relation to" was an element, and recognized that

it might present an impediment to conviction:

notwithstanding having carried the shotgun during

the transaction, he told Mr. McLaughlin that he

did not believe that he was guilty--a belief that

could find logical basis only in this allegedly

inadequate explained element. Perhaps Mr.

McLaughlin might have explained the law more

fully to Mr. Pike, rather than simply stating his

ultimate opinion, but doing so would have

amounted to explaining the absence of a defense

not the availability of a defense.

(Emphasis added). Based on these findings, the

trial judge concluded that Pike failed to

convince the court that a fair and just reason

existed for withdrawing his guilty plea. Pike

appeals.

II. ISSUES

 On appeal, Pike argues that the district court

erred in denying his motion to vacate his guilty

plea because he presented two "fair and just"

reasons: 1) he had a valid defense to the section

924(c)(1)(A) charge; and 2) his plea was not

"knowing and voluntary" because it was the

product of his lawyer’s ineffective assistance.

III. ANALYSIS

A. Standard of Review

 It is axiomatic that defendants do not have an

absolute right to withdraw their guilty pleas.

See United States v. Schilling, 142 F.3d 388, 398

(7th Cir. 1998). Of course prior to sentencing,

a judge may permit an individual to withdraw his

plea, upon the filing of the proper motion, if

the defendant presents a "fair and just" reason

for doing so to the court, see Fed. R. Crim. P.

32(e); United States v. Abdul, 75 F.3d 327, 329

(7th Cir. 1996), but the burden of justifying

relief always rests with the defendant. See

United States v. Coonce, 961 F.2d 1268, 1275 (7th

Cir. 1992). Therefore, we review a district

court’s denial of a defendant’s motion to

withdraw a guilty plea for abuse of discretion.

See United States v. Salgado-Ocampo, 159 F.3d

322, 325 (7th Cir. 1998). "In reviewing the

district court’s decision, findings regarding

whether the defendant has demonstrated a ’fair

and just reason’ will be upheld unless they are

clearly erroneous." United States v. LeDonne, 21

F.3d 1418, 1423 (7th Cir. 1994). "A factual

determination is clearly erroneous only if, after

considering all of the evidence, we are left with

the definite and firm conviction that a mistake

has been committed." United States v. Messino, 55

F.3d 1241, 1247 (7th Cir. 1995).
B. A Legal Defense

 Initially, Pike argues that the district court

committed error in not allowing him to withdraw

his guilty plea and go to trial because he had a

"viable, triable, and valid defense" to the

section 924(c)(1)(A) charge. In so arguing, Pike

contends that he did not carry his shotgun "in

relation to" his drug offense because there is no

relationship between his shotgun and his drug

offense. That is, according to Pike, the fact

that he never "brandished, made reference to, or

committed any act relating to the shotgun during

the drug transaction" requires that he be allowed

to withdraw his guilty plea.

 Contrary to Pike’s assertions, sufficient

evidence exists to satisfy the "in relation to"

element of section 924(c). As the Supreme Court

has noted, the "in relation to" element of

section 924(c)(1)(A) is satisfied by evidence

that the defendant carried his weapon to further

the "purpose or effect" of his crime. See Smith

v. United States, 508 U.S. 223, 238 (1993)

(emphasis added). That is,

[t]he "during and in relation" element of sec.

924(c)(1) has also certainly been met for "if the

drugs and gun are together in the same place it

is nearly an inescapable conclusion that they

satisfy the in relation to prong of sec.

924(c)(1)." Molina, 102 F.3d at 932 (emphasis in

original). The "during and in relation to"

determination is based on the location of the

firearm with respect to the drugs. Id. "The

relation between the firearm and the drugs--which

is, after all, the core of the offense--is best

established by their relation to each other, and

not by the distance between owner and gun at the

moment of arrest." Id. In order for a firearm to

satisfy the "in relation to" prong of the offense

it must at least "’facilitat[e], or ha[ve] the

potential of facilitating,’ the drug trafficking

offense." Smith, 508 U.S. at 238, 113 S. Ct. at

2059 (quoting United States v. Stewart, 779 F.2d

538, 540 (9th Cir. 1985)). "This explanation of

the ’in relation to’ element is valid precedent,

unaffected by Bailey." Cotton, 101 F.3d at 56.

The facts of this case reveal that the gun was

located in a plastic bag positioned directly on

top of the drugs and therefore Wilson would have

had to, at the very least, remove the gun and

hold it in order for him to gain access to the

drugs. Thus, in this case, just as in Molina, the

firearm was "surely carried in relation to the

crime when it was transported in a car in the

same compartment that contain[ed] drugs possessed

with the intent to distribute." Molina, 102 F.3d

at 932.
Wilson, 125 F.3d at 1093 (emphasis in original).

See also United States v. Hayes, 179 F.3d 1045,

1047 (7th Cir. 1999) ("Drug dealers do not bring

guns to a deal unless they wish to instill fear

in their business associates or they feel the

need for protection."); United States v. Hubbard,

61 F.3d 1261, 1270 (7th Cir. 1995) ("[F]irearms

are recognized as tools of the drug trade; thus,

courts have sustained the admission of weapons

evidence in narcotics cases because the

possession of a weapon is often a hallmark of

drug trafficking."); United States v. Cooper, 19

F.3d 1154, 1163 (7th Cir. 1994) ("[t]his Court

has previously held that weapons are ’tools of

the trade’ of drug dealers"). Bearing this

standard in mind, we are convinced that there is

sufficient evidence in the record to support the

"in relation to" element in this case; that is,

that the shotgun in the trunk of the hatchback

and the drugs were sufficiently connected.

 Initially, let us point out that in both his

plea agreement and again during his plea hearing

Pike stated that he was guilty of the section

924(c)(1)(A) charge, specifically stating that he

carried the shotgun in his car during the July

22nd drug transaction. This representation is

entitled to a presumption of verity, see United

States v. Ellison, 835 F.2d 687, 693 (7th Cir.

1987), and "the district court is generally

justified in discrediting the proffered reasons

for the motion to withdraw and holding the

defendant to [his] admissions at the Rule 11

hearing." United States v. Groll, 992 F.2d 755,

758 (7th Cir. 1993).

 In addition to Pike’s own representations, the

evidence reflects that Pike carried the shotgun

with him during each of the five drug

transactions with the undercover officer;/5 that

Pike’s shotgun was "accessible though not

gracefully or rapidly so" from within Pike’s

car;/6 and that Pike bought the shotgun during

the time he was engaging in his drug trafficking

activity. This evidence establishes that the

presence of the shotgun in Pike’s Chevy Camaro

was neither the result of accident nor mere

coincidence. See Smith, 508 U.S. at 238.

Accordingly, we conclude that the district

court’s determination that there was a

relationship between Pike’s shotgun and his drug

offense was not clearly erroneous, and therefore

the trial judge did not abuse his discretion in

denying Pike’s motion to withdraw his guilty

plea.

C. Ineffective Assistance of Counsel

 Pike next argues that the judge should have
allowed him to withdraw his guilty plea because

he was denied the effective assistance of

counsel. "In order to succeed on such a claim,

[Pike] must show that the advice on which his

plea was predicated not only was not within the

range of competence demanded of attorneys in

criminal cases, but also that there is a

reasonable probability that but for

[McLaughlin’s] unprofessional errors, the result

would have been different." United States v.

Malave, 22 F.3d 145, 147 (7th Cir. 1994)

(internal quotations and citations omitted). And,

as we have long held, courts begin with the

presumption that a defendant has not suffered

prejudice. See Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S.

668, 689 (1984).

 In an attempt to demonstrate prejudice, Pike

argues that because his original attorney,

McLaughlin, failed to adequately explain the "in

relation to" element of section 924(c)(1)(A), he

did not understand the meaning of "in relation

to," and his plea was therefore not "knowing and

voluntary." Cf. United States v. Musa, 946 F.2d

1297, 1305 (7th Cir. 1991). But Pike ignores the

facts of this case.

 Let us initially make clear that the record in

this case is entitled to a presumption of verity.

See United States v. Standiford, 148 F.3d 864,

868 (7th Cir. 1998). "When, as here, a defendant

wishes to withdraw his plea after he states at a

Rule 11 hearing that it was given freely and

knowingly, he faces an uphill battle in

persuading the judge that his purported reason is

fair and just." Salgado-Campo, 159 F.3d at 325

(internal quotations and citations omitted).

 Furthermore, we are of the opinion that in

relation to is an understandable phrase common in

ordinary speech; evidenced by the fact that it is

the precise language used in the jury instruction

for section 924(c)(1)(A) offenses. See Seventh

Circuit Federal Jury Instructions: Criminal 236

(1999); see also United States v. Malin, 908 F.2d

163, 168 (7th Cir. 1990) ("The phrase ’in

relation to’ speaks for itself; any further

explanation is superfluous.").

 Additionally, count six of the indictment

charged that Pike "knowingly and intentionally

carried a firearm, specifically, a .410 shotgun,

during and in relation to drug trafficking crimes

. . . ." Moreover, the plea agreement Pike signed

recited that he "told his lawyers the facts and

surrounding circumstances as known to me

concerning the matters mentioned in the

Indictment and the complaint and believe and feel

that my lawyer is fully informed as to all such

matters. My lawyer has since informed me and has
counseled and advised me as to the nature and

cause of every accusation and as to any possible

defense I might have in this case." Furthermore,

in the plea agreement, Pike specifically admitted

that

In particular, I [Pike] acknowledge that on July

10, 1998, I knowingly possessed with intent to

distribute and then distributed to a person who

turned out to be an undercover police officer

approximately 1 oz. of marijuana, all in

Plymouth, Indiana. I also acknowledge that on

July 22, 1998 I knowingly possessed with intent

to distribute and distributed to a person who

turned out to be an undercover police officer 17

hits of LSD acid in Plymouth, Indiana. Further,

I acknowledge that during and in relation to the

drug trafficking crime on July 22, 1998 described

above, I knowingly carried in my car a .410

shotgun which belonged to me[.]

(Emphasis added). Also in the plea agreement,

Pike acknowledged, when referring to his original

counsel, McLaughlin, that "I believe and feel

that my lawyer has done all that anyone could do

to counsel and assist me, and that I now

understand the proceedings in this case against

me." (Emphasis added).

 Not only did Pike acknowledge his understanding

of the charges against him and his guilt by

signing the plea agreement, but at the plea

hearing, the following dialogue took place with

the presiding judge:

THE DEFENDANT: I acknowledge that during and in

relation to the drug trafficking crime on July

22, 1998 described above, I knowingly carried in

my car a .410 shotgun which belonged to me. . .

.

THE COURT: Everything in there is right?

THE DEFENDANT: Yes.

Also during the plea hearing, the prosecutor

listed the essential elements of the section

924(c)(1)(A) charge: 

With respect to count 6, your Honor, carrying a

weapon during a drug trafficking crime, the

government would have to prove that the defendant

knowingly carried a firearm during and in

relation to a drug trafficking crime, in this

case, the distribution and possession with intent

to distribute LSD.

The district court then asked Pike if he still

believed that he was guilty, and Pike responded

that he was.
 Finally, although McLaughlin admitted that he

never discussed the phrase "in relation to" with

Pike "in those terms . . . not with the words ’in

relation to,’" he did, contrary to Pike’s

assertions, clearly admonish and advise Pike that

there was a relationship between Pike’s firearm

and his drug trafficking in view of the fact that

Pike carried the shotgun in his car during a drug

transaction: "because the weapon--the firearm was

found in the car at the time of his arrest, that

he was not going to be able to beat this

case."/7 Moreover, Pike admitted, in further

contrast to his claim that his original counsel

failed to adequately explain "in relation to,"

that McLaughlin had discussed the "in relation

to" element with him "two or three times."

Furthermore, Pike testified at the Rule 32

hearing that he believed there was an "in

relation to" element of the section 924(c)

offense "because of the way it’s stated." 

 After reviewing the record before us, we agree

with the trial judge’s determination that, based

on the facts set forth above, Pike "knowingly and

voluntarily" chose to plead guilty to the section

924(c)(1)(A) charge.

 The district court’s decision is 

AFFIRMED.

/1 The indictment charged the defendant with counts

one and four, distribution and possession with

intent to distribute marijuana, in violation of

21 U.S.C. sec. 841(a)(1); counts two, three, and

five, distribution and possession with intent to

distribute LSD acid, in violation of 21 U.S.C.

sec. 841(a)(1); and count six, possession of a

firearm during a drug trafficking crime, in

violation of 18 U.S.C. sec. 924(c).

/2 Pike made these drug sales on July 10, 1998, July

15, 1998, July 16, 1998, and on two occasions on

July 22, 1998.

/3 Pike testified at the Rule 32 hearing that the

shotgun was accessible from inside his car,

though not from the front seat: "you can reach

from the back of the car and into the hatch."

/4 In Wilson v. United States, 125 F.3d 1087, 1093

(7th Cir. 1997), this circuit held that "[i]n

order for a firearm to satisfy the ’in relation

to’ prong of the offense it must at least

’facilitat[e], or ha[ve] the potential of

facilitating’ the drug trafficking offense."

(quoting Smith v. United States, 508 U.S. 223,
238 (1993) (other quotation omitted).

/5 At the Rule 32 hearing Pike testified that he put

the shotgun in his car "knowing that [he was]

going to conduct [the second July 22 drug]

transaction."

/6 It is not necessary that the defendant have

immediate access to the weapon. See Muscarello v.

United States, 524 U.S. 125, 137-38 (1998).

/7 We note that lawyers are not expected to carry

around dictionaries and the latest electronic

research in order that they be prepared to give

their client multiple descriptions of how their

conduct violated the law. Instead, Pike’s

attorney informed Pike, albeit in layman’s terms,

that there was little likelihood that Pike could

"beat" the gun charge.