FILED U.S. COURT OF APPEALS ELEVENTH CIRCUIT AUGUST 4, 2000 THOMAS K. KAHN CLERK [PUBLISH] IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT

________________________ No. 98-3062

________________________ D. C. Docket No. 95-01086-CIV-J-21B RASIKH ABDUL HAKIM, f.k.a. Kenneth D. Quince, Plaintiff-Appellee, Cross-Appellant,

versus MILTON HICKS; W.C. DIXON; H. D. SKEEN; LISA M. SANDERS; C. CORNETT; RICHARD TUCKER; T. B. LONG; CELESTE KEMP; and TED KEY, et al., Defendants-Appellants, Cross-Appellees,

________________________ No. 99-12050

________________________ D. C. Docket No. 95-01086-CIV-J-21B RASIKH ABDUL HAKIM, f.k.a. Kenneth D. Quince,2 Plaintiff-Appellee,

versus MILTON HICKS, W. C. DIXON, H. D. SKEEN, C. CORNETT, RICHARD TUCKER, et al., Defendants-Appellants.

________________________ Appeals from the United States District Court for the Middle District of Florida

_________________________ (August 4, 2000)

Before BLACK, CARNES and KRAVITCH, Circuit Judges. BLACK, Circuit Judge:1 See Quince v. State , 414 So. 2d 185 (Fla. 1982). 3 Appellee is a death row inmate of the Fl orida Department of Corrections (DOC) confined in the Union Correctional Ins titution in Raiford. When convicted and committed to incarceration for a 1979 murd er and sexual battery, his name was Kenneth D. Quince. 1 While incarcerated, Appellee c onverted to Islam and took the religious name Rasikh Abdul Hakim. In 1993, he obtained from the State of Florida a legal name change to his Muslim name. In November 1995, Hakim filed suit pro se under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against various DOC officers, alleging the DOC was violating his constitutional right to the free exercise of religion under the First and Fourteenth Amendments by refusing to r ecognize his legally ch anged religious name within the prison. The district court c onstrued Hakim’s complaint for relief as a demand that the prison follow a “dual-name policy” of permitting Hakim to identify himself by both his commitment name and hi s religious name—that is, “Kenneth D. Quince a.k.a. Rasikh Abdul Hakim” or the converse. In this appeal, we are concerned only with a limited issue: the portion of the district court’s July 17, 1998, order (the July 17 Order) that directed the DOC to comply with the dual-name policy on Haki m’s prison identification card and its use in obtaining prison services. In case num ber 98-3062, the DOC has appealed that order insofar as it mandated the addition of Hakim’s religious name to comply with2 With respect to Hakim’s cross-appeal in case number 98-3062, we affirm without discussion the portion of the district court’s September 15, 1997, order dismissing under the doctrine of qualified immunity Hakim’s claims against DOC officers in their individual capacities. See 11th Cir. R. 36-1. 4 the dual-name policy on the identification card. Later, the district court rejected the DOC’s proffered compliance with that orde r, after which the DOC filed a Rule 60(b) motion for relief from judgment. In case number 99-12050, the DOC has appealed the district court’s June 11, 1999, order denying the Rule 60(b) motion. We affirm the district court in both cases. 2
I. BACKGROUND Hakim’s complaint challenged the DOC’s policies on inmates’ name usage in a number of areas. He sought to compel the DOC to follow a dual-name policy for incoming and outgoing mail, in the “Alpha Run” master database of prisoner information, and on his prisoner identification card and those related prison services obtained using the card. The district court’s September 15, 1997, order granted summary judgment in favor of the DOC withrespect to mail because the DOC already had in place a dual-name policy for mail. Inthe July 17 Order, the district court granted summary judgment to the DOC on th e database claim. The database, although primarily using the commitment name, incl udes a (non-searchable) field for aliases, to which Hakim’s religious name had beenadded. Hakim has not appealed these rulings, which in any event were correct. See, e.g. , Malik v. Brown , 71 F.3d 724, 7305 (9th Cir. 1995) (denying qualified immunitybecause requirement that prison comply with dual-name policy for mail was clearly established under Ninth Circuit standard); Salaam v. Lockhart , 905 F.2d 1168, 1174 (8th Cir. 1990) (holding that prison acted unreasonably in refusing to add religious name a.k.a designation to files). The district court’s July 17 Order also addressed Hakim’s claim alleging that [T]he dual name system (the use of a commitment name in conjunction with a legal religious name) has not been adopted by the [DOC] with respect to the inmate identification card and the services related to that card (canteen, notary and banking servi ces). [Hakim] asks that the dual name policy be extended to the iden tification card so that the card will have his legal religious name, in conjunction with his commitment name, allowing for transactions and services to be utilized through the dual name policy. The DOC’s policy of issuing identification cards onlyin the commitment name precluded use of all forms of related serv ices under the dual-name policy because “to access internal services such as the inmate bank and the can teen, an inmate must use an identification card.” Similarly, the DOC’s own documentation in support of summary judgment revealed that it requires “a laborious process to obtain notary services in a legal name without possessing anidentification card in that name.” The district court ultimately granted summary judgment in favor of Hakim “with respect to the claim concerning the id entification card. The claim concerning internal services is absorbed by the identification card claim si nce the internal services are operated and received through possession of an identification card.” The DOC has appealed this6 order, as well as the district court’s June 11, 1999, order denying the DOC’s Rule 60(b) motion for relief from the summary judgment order. We review de novo the district court’ s summary judgment order, applying the same legal standards as the district court. See Wolf v. Coca-Cola Co. , 200 F.3d 1337, 1339 (11th Cir. 2000). We review for abuse of discretion the district court’s denial of the motion for relief from judgment. See Davis v. Florida Power & Light Co. , 205 F.3d 1301, 1304 n.4 (11th Cir. 2000)

. II. ANALYSIS A. Case Number 98-3062: The Order Requi ring the DOC to Follow the DualName Policy for the Identification Card and Related Services

. In his complaint as construed by the district court, Hakim demanded the DOC follow a dual-name policy for his prison identification card and its use in obtaining related prison services. Hakim asserted the DOC’s failure to follow a dual-name policy violated his constitutional right to the free exercise of religion by denying him his Muslim identity and recognizing only his pr ior, forsaken self. This type of free exercise of religion claim within a prison has been recognized consistently in the federal courts. See, e.g. , Malik v. Brown , 71 F.3d 724, 727-29 (9th Cir. 1995) (collecting cases); Salaam v. Lockhart , 905 F.2d 1168 (8th Cir. 1990). Unlike the strict standards of scrutiny applicable to the constitutional rights of persons in free society, the Supreme Court has adopted a deferential standard for3 The DOC has not argued in this case that the Supreme C ourt’s decision in Employment Division v. Smith , 494 U.S. 872, 110 S. Ct. 1595 (1990), requires application of a different standard. Accordingly, we do not decide the issue. Cf. Harris v. Ostrout , 65 F.3d 912, 918 n.5 (11th Cir. 1995); cf. also Sasnett v. Litscher , 197 F.3d 290, 292-93 (7th Cir. 1999); Ward v. Walsh , 1 F.3d 873, 876-77 (9th Cir. 1993); Salaam , 905 F.2d at 1171 n.7. 7 determining whether a prison regulation violat es an inmate’s constitutional rights. A prison regulation, even th ough it infringes the inmate’s constitutional rights, is an actionable constitutional violation onl y if the regulation is unreasonable. 3 See Turner v. Safely , 482 U.S. 78, 89, 107 S. Ct. 2254, 2261 (1987); O’Lone v. Estate of Shabazz , 482 U.S. 342, 107 S. Ct. 2400 (1987) (applying Turner standard to free exercise of religion claim). This Court has described the standard as follows: The Turner Court identified several factors that serve to channel the reasonableness inquiry: (1) whether there is a “valid, rational connection” between the regula tion and a legitimate governmental interest put forward to justify it; (2 ) whether there are alternative means of exercising the asserted constituti onal right that remain open to the inmates; (3) whether and the exte nt to which accommodation of the asserted right will have an impact on prison staff, inmates, and the allocation of prison resources genera lly; and (4) whether the regulation represents an “exaggerated response” to prison concerns. Pope v. Hightower , 101 F.3d 1382, 1384 (11th Cir. 1996) (citing Turner , 482 U.S. at 89-91, 107 S. Ct. at 2261-62; Harris v. Thigpen , 941 F.2d 1495, 1516 (11th Cir. 1991)); accord, e.g. , Onishea v. Hopper , 171 F.3d 1289, 1299 & n.17 (11th Cir. 1999) (en banc).4 See City of Boerne v. Flores , 521 U.S. 507, 536, 117 S. Ct. 2157, 2172 (1997). 8 The federal courts accordi ngly have determined the Turner standard limits the scope of inmates’ free exercise right to us e a religious name in prison. The Ninth Circuit summarized the decisi ons in the following manner: The cases have consistently supported three propositions. First, an inmate has a First Amendment intere st in using his religious name, at least in conjunction with his committe d name. Second, an inmate cannot compel a prison to reorganize its fili ng system to reflect the new name. Third, in states where inmates ar e allowed to change names legally, prisons are generally required to recognize only legally changed names.

Malik, 71 F.3d at 727 (citations omitted). This Court has held thata dual-name policy always is sufficient to satisfy an inmate ’s free exercise claim involving use of a religious name. See Fawaad v. Jones , 81 F.3d 1084 (11th Cir. 1996). In Fawaad , we concluded, even under the strict scrutiny standard applicable under the (now-defunct 4 ) Religious Freedom Restoration Act, th e prison’s dual-name policy adequately vindicated the inmate’s religi ous-name free exercise right. See id. at 1086-87. Therefore, this case does not raise questions on two issues. First, it is established by Fawaad that the DOC’s complian ce with a dual-name policy would resolve Hakim’s free exercise claim. Cf. also Mujihadeen v. Compton , 627 F. Supp. 356 (W.D. Tenn. 1985) (holding that identification card issu ed under dual-name policy did not violate inmate’s Free Exercise Clause rights). Second, although under the case law it appears5 Much of the identification car d’s area (about the size of a driver’s license) is comprised of the inmate’s photograph and, in large type, the word “INMATE,” the inmates’ prisoner number, and the commitment name. This permits rapid identifi cation of the inmate from a safe distance. In addition, the face of the card contains the electroni c bar code used to obtain prison services and, in considerably smaller type, the other identifying char acteristics of race, hair and eye color, height, weight, and date of birth. 9 the DOC would be required to recognize onl y legally changed names to satisfy the
Turner reasonableness standard, we need not decide that question because Hakim obtained a legal name change from the State of Florida. Cf. Matthews v. Morales , 23 F.3d 118 (5th Cir. 1994) (holding that statute prohibiting felons from obtaining legal name changes did not violate Free Exercise Clause). In the district court and on appeal, the DOC has maintained it should not be required to follow a dual-name policy for identification cards or related services. The DOC asserts its policy that iden tification cards will be issued onlyin the commitment name, and that related se rvices may be obtained onlyin the commitment name, does not violate Hakim’s free exercise of religion right under the Turner standard. The district court rejected the DOC’s argument in its July 17 Order and concluded the DOC’s po licy was unreasonable under Turner . The court first considered “whether there is a valid, rational connecti on between the policy and the penological objectives of maintaining or der and security” relied upon by the DOC. The DOC asserted the identification card wa s an integral part of prison order and security because it is necessary to be able rapidly to identify inmates. 5 To the extent10 related prison services require identificati on, such as notary services, the card fulfills that purpose as well. The DOC then argue d the addition of any other name—even in the a.k.a. designation form under a dua l-name policy—would undermine these interests by creating confusi on, delay, and possible security problems such as gang affiliations or prisoners demanding that guards address them by the religious name. After considering the evidence in the reco rd, the district court did not credit the DOC’s arguments. The court determined it was “not convinced that the addition of

a legal religious name as an alias would result in ma ss confusion or disruption of the inmate identification system,” found that “the fear of misidentification cannot be supported,” and concluded “the securityarguments presented by the [DOC] for refusing to add a legal religi ous name are not novel and have been rejected by other courts.” The district court next evaluated whethe r the DOC’s policy provided alternative means for Hakim to exercise his right. The court found that the policy did not because Hakim had “been allowed to receive certa in services and benefits only under his committed name because the identification card is issued in his commitment name, rather than under a dual name system.” Th e court also determin ed the DOC had failed to introduce any convincing evidence thatfollowing a dual-name policy and adding Hakim’s legal, religious name to his identification card would create an administrative11 or other burden on the DOC. The court found that the DOC had “neither asserted nor shown with operative facts that the change s required by the ‘a/k/a ’ alternative would clog the system” and that the “administra tive burden of adding an‘a/k/a’ designation of a legal religious name change on an identification card is minimal and will not interfere with the [DOC’s] current record -keeping practices.” Finally, because “the

costs are de minimis ,” the DOC’s policy was an ex aggerated response to prison concerns. In light of the failure of th e DOC’s evidence under all four prongs of the
Turner reasonableness inquiry, the districtcourt concluded the DOC’s policy of refusing to follow a dual-name policy for th e identification card and related services violated Hakim’s constitutional free exercise right. After our review of the record, we conc lude the district court did not err in determining the DOC’s policy was unreasonable under the Turner standard. Cf. also Salaam , 905 F.2d at 1176 (determining that prison’ s refusal to add religious name to commitment name and inmate identificati on number already on inmate’s clothing was unreasonable); id. at 1170 (holding that prison must a dd religious name to prison files to enable prisoner to obtain prison services in religious name); Ali v. Dixon , 912 F.2d 86, 90 (4th Cir. 1990) (concluding that prison’ s refusal to add religious name to files, which precluded inmate from accessing trust account funds in religious name, was unreasonable). We therefore affirm the district court’s July 17 Order granting12 summary judgment in favor of Hakim “with respect to the freedom of religion claim regarding the identification card and relate d internal services ” and mandating the DOC “shall implement” a dual-name policy by “a dding a legal (statutory) religious name, through an ‘a/k/a’ designation, to an inma te’s identification card” upon notification and proof of the change. B. Case Number 99-12050: Whether the District Court Abused Its Discretion by Denying the DOC’s Rule 60(b) Motion

. 1. Background to the Rule 60(b) Motion

. On October 29, 1998, the DOC filed a “defendants’ notice of compliance with court order.” The DOC assert ed it had complied with the July 17 Order, within the time provided by the district court, by affixi ng a computer-printed label to the reverse side of Hakim’s identification card. The la bel read: “This is to certify that the legal religious name of inmate DC #075812 for purpose of notary services is: RASIKH ABDUL HAKIM,” and was signed by the superi ntendent of the Union Correctional Institution. The DOC also supplied to the district court an interim policy which provided that the use of such affixed, printed labels on the reverse side of identification cards would be the regular method of complying with the district court’s order, substituting the appropriate prisoner number and religious name and retaining the reference to notary services.6 In case number 98-3062, the DOC filed its notice of appeal on July 30, 1998, and Hakim filed his notice of cross-appeal on August 3, 1998. 13 On November 20, 1998, the district court issued an order stating that the DOC’s notice of compliance “is hereby found not to be in compliance with the Court’s” July 17 Order. No further statement or explana tion was provided. The district court also stayed the case because the appeal of the July 17 order was pending in this Court. 6 On December 8, 1998, the DOC filed a “mo tion for clarification of court order,” requesting the district court to explain why the DOC’s action wa s not in compliance or what must be done differently to comply . Relying on several exhibits first provided to the court as attachments to the Oct ober 29, 1998, notice of compliance, the DOC stated that the name field on the front of the identification card contains space for only 30 characters (precluding the display of both of Hakim’s names in that field), that modifying the size of the name field on th e front of the card would negatively affect the other fields (hindering security concerns ), and that the front of the card could not be redesigned without re-pr ogramming the computers system used to generate cards. On February 2, 1999, the DOC filed a s upplemental affidavit from DOC information technology official Michael Fansler. The affidavit averred that the costs of reprogramming the computer system to a dd a second name to the front of the7 The DOC previously had filed a motion in this Court seeking to have this Court relinquish jurisdiction of the appeal of the Ju ly 17 Order to enable the district court to modify the judgment and clarify what form of compliance was required. The Clerk of this Court dir ected the DOC to file a Rule 60(b) motion in the district court, citing Lairsey v. Advance Abrasives Company , 542 F.2d 928, 932 (5th Cir. 1976). 14 identification card would be significant and th at the costs of modifying software and hardware to produce the revised cards would be even greater. Without a decision by the district court on the motion for clarification, the DOC filed a motion for relief from judgment unde r Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b) on March 9, 1999 (the Rule 60(b) motion). 7 The Rule 60(b) motion recited the same arguments made in the December 8, 1998, mo tion for clarification: the label on the reverse of the card, providing the religious name for purposes of notary services, was in fact in compliance with th e district court’s July 17 Orde r; the costs of reconfiguring software and hardware to add the name to the front of the card would be great; and the district court had given no explanation to the DOC about how to change its behavior to be in compliance. 2. The District Court’s Order Denying the Rule 60(b) Motion

. On June 11, 1999, the district court lifte d and then re-instituted its stay pending the appeal to issue its order on the DOC’s Rule 60(b) motion. The court ordered simply that the motion “is DENIED.” The district court’s failure to provide reasons for holding the DOC had not complied withits July 17 Order or for denying the15 DOC’s Rule 60(b) motion makes more di fficult our consideration of the DOC’s appeal from the order denying that motion. Under the Turner standard, the district court is not permitted to micro-manage prison affairs or to preclude the DOC fro m using any reasonable prison regulation or policy. The DOC therefore also had c onsiderable discretion in fashioning its compliance with the district court’s July 17 Order, so long as the means selected were reasonable and were in full compliance with the terms of the district court’s order. The district court’s July 17 Order displays a sound understanding of the limits of the court’s authority under Turner . Yet the means of compliance selected by the DOC—the label bearing Hakim’s religious name affixed to the reverse side of his identification card—was reasonable. An or der directing the DOC specifically where on an identification card to place a name w ould have been a quintessential example of improperly micro-managing the prison. Other aspects of the record, however, lead us to the conclusion that ther e are at least two reasons the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying the Rule 60(b) motion. First, and most importantly, the districtcourt properly could have concluded the label used by DOC is deficient on its face because it states the religious name is provided “for notary purposes.” As descri bed above, the district court’s order was quite clear in describing a number of prison services related to the identification card,16 including, for example, banking and canteen serv ices. In addition, the fact that these services could be obtained only in the co mmitment name was a basis for the district court’s finding that no alternative means for exercising the right existed. When the district court ordered that Hakim’s religious name be added as an alias “regarding the identification card and related internal services,” the district court therefore directed the DOC to comply with respect to all of these related services, not merely notary services. Thus, the district court did not abuse its discretion in determining the DOC’s “notary purposes” label was not full compliance with its order. Second, the DOC’s eviden ce of the cost of compliance was not introduced before the court considered the summary judgment motions. The DOC belatedly sought to show the high cost of following a dual-name policy on the identification card only months later, when it had only pa rtially complied with the order. Although the Turner standard is deferential, its third pr ong expressly contempl ates consideration of the costs to the prison of accommodati ng religious rights. The DOC had a full opportunity to introduce evidence of the costs of the dual-name policy for the identification card when making its Turner arguments. The district court might have given the DOC more direction on the issue of compliance or evenhave decided the legal issue differently had this informati on been available. The district court17 accordingly did not abuse its discretion inrejecting the DOC’s post hoc attempt to correct its error in litigation strategy. We conclude the addition of Hakim’s religious name to the reverse of his identification card—so long as he can obtain all related services under the dual-name policy, as ordered by the district court—adequately protects, under the Turner reasonableness standard, Hakim’s free exerci se right regarding his religious name. The DOC’s actual addition to Hakim’s identif ication card, however, contained the “for notary purposes” proviso, which can be inte rpreted as restricting Hakim’s access to related services under the dual-name policy, in contravention of the district court’s July 17 Order that the dual-name policy be a pplied to all related services. To be in compliance with the July 17 Or der, the DOC therefore had to do two things. First, the DOC had to add Hakim’s religious name to his identification card—and its addition to the reverse side of the card would be sufficient compliance w ith the July 17 Order and with Turner . Second, the DOC’s addition had to permit Hakim to obtain all related prison services unde r the dual-name policy. Based on the DOC’s conduct as of June 11, 1999, the DOC had satisfied the fi rst requirement and the district court did not abuse its discretion indetermining the DOC had failed to meet the second requirement. To comply with the district court’s July 17 Order, the DOC must correct its label by, for example, removing any restrictive language or, more clearly, by18 expressly providing that the religious name may be used to obtain all prison services under the dual-name policy. In the abse nce of the satisfaction of the second requirement, however, we must affirm th e district court’s order denying the DOC’s Rule 60(b) motion. III. CONCLUSION We affirm the district court’s order directing the DOC to follow a dual-name policy on Hakim’s prison identification card and its use in obtaining prison services. The DOC attempted to comply with this order by preserving the commitment name on the front of the card and providing th e religious name alias designation on the reverse side with an affixed label. At th e time of the district court’s consideration of the DOC’s Rule 60(b) motion, however, the label mentioned approval for notary services, not all prison services as ordered by the district court. Accordingly, the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying the Rule 60(b) motion. AFFIRMED.19 KRAVITCH, Circuit Judge, Specially Concurring: I agree with the majority’s affirmance of the district court and therefore concur. I write specially, however, to express my disagreement with the majority’s observations regarding the addition of Hakim’s religious name to his inmate identification card. As the majority correc tly notes, the district court’s July 17, 1998, order required the DOC to : (1) add Hakim’s religious name to his inmate identification card and (2) permit Hakim to obtain all prisoner services with his religious name. The DOC provided Hakim w ith a new identification card with a label on the back identifying Hakim’s religious name for notary purposes. Hakim then filed a Notice of Defendants’ Intent to Circ umvent This Court’s Order in which he contended only that the DOC did not complywith the district court’s July 17, 1998, order because it did not place his religious name on the front of the identification card. The DOC responded with a Notice of Comp liance With Court Order in which it contended that its addition of Hakim’s name complied with the court’s order. The district court found to the contrary and issued an order stating simply that “Defendants’ Notice of Compliance W ith Court Order . . . is hereby found not to be in compliance with the Court’s Order filed July 20, 1998.” The district court subsequently denied the DOC’s motion for relief from judgment.20 All of the filings preceding the district court’s finding of noncompliance focused solely on the placement of Hakim’s religious name without reference to the notary services limitation, and the district court’s order finding the DOC in noncompliance did not announce the basis for its finding. In spite of this background and the sparse language of th e district court, however, th e majority asserts that the notary limitation to Hakim’s religious name, rather than the name’s placement, supported the district court’s finding of noncompliance. The majority’s attempt to recast the district court’s order affords the majority an opportunity for its gratuitous opinion that the DOC’s addition of Hakim’s religious name with a label affixed to the back of his identification card satisfied the Turner reasonableness standard. I do not agree that affixing a label bearing Hakim’s religious name to the back of his identification card adequately protects his free exercise rights under Turner . Once Hakim converted to the Mu slim faith, he was required by his religion to adopt a new name reflecting his commitment to the attributes of Allah. Relegating this significant conversion to the back of an identification card, in the absence of compelling evidence by the DOC insupport of this policy, does not in my view comport with the Turner reasonableness standard. Rather, it would be8 We agree with the majority that the notary services limitation was improper. 21 reasonable for the DOC to place Hakim’s relig ious name, using an “a.k.a.” designation following his committed name, on the front of the identification card. 8