Opinion filed Dec ember 10, 20 09



### In The 

# Eleven th Court of Appeals

____________ 

### No. 1 1- 07 -0 03 79 -CV

____ ____ __ CLA REN CE O. BRIGH T A ND INTE RV ENO R CLA REN CE D. BRIGHT, Ap pellants

V.
FLOY HUBE RT JO HNSO N AND SHIRLEYA. JOHNS ON, Ap pellees

On App eal from the 266th Distric t Court Erath County, Texas Trial Court Cause No. CV 28227

O P I N I O N F loy Hu be rt John so n a

nd Shi rl e y A. John so n f

ile d th is s uit

a g a ins t Cla

re nc e O. B ri g ht t o
re fo rm a de e d d a te d M ay

2, 20 02 , b y

wh ic h th e y

c onve y e d th ir

ty -t hr e e a c re s to Clar e nc e O. B ri g ht. They alleg ed that the sa les contra ct betwe en the pa rties ca lled for a ll mi n era ls to be rese rved or reta ined by

the J ohnsons; but, through a scrivene r’s e rror, the war ranty deed f ailed to re serve or
re ta in t he min e ra ls. Cla

re nc e O. B ri g ht a c kn ow le dg e d th a t he ha d a g re e d th a t th e John so ns wo uld keep a ll the minerals and that, e ven at c losing, he still believed the y had.2

Clarenc e O. B rig ht’s son, Clarenc e Dwa ine Brig ht, intervene d in the suit. He testified that he purc ha se d o ne -h a lf

of wh a t hi s f a the r h a d p ur c ha se d fr om the John so ns
. Cla re nc e B ri g ht ha d p a id $59,400 to the J ohnsons for the thirty -three acr es, and Dwaine Br ight paid $30,000 for the undivided one-ha lf interest. Clare nce B rig ht and Dwa ine B rig ht executed a doc ument, which wa s not
rec orded, but which was dated J une 13, 2003, to r efle ct Dwaine Br ight’ s acquisition from Clarenc e. After the J ohnsons filed this suit and a notice of lis pende ns, Clarenc e B rig ht executed and c aused to be re corde d two “cor

rec ted” de eds without warr anty conv ey ing to Dw aine B rig ht one-ha lf of Clarenc e Brig ht’s interest in the t hirty -three acr es. In an amended petiti on, the J ohnsons also sought

a de c larator

y jud g me nt t

hat D wa ine B ri g ht w a s n ot a bo na fi de purc ha se r o f t

hat in te re st. The trial court g rante d summary judgme nt to the J ohnsons on their ref ormation claims and ref ormed their de ed to show that they reta ined all of the minerals that they owned at the time of the conveyance . The trial c ourt also g rante d summary judgme nt to the J ohnsons on Dwaine B rig ht’s claim that he wa s a bona f ide purc haser . Additionally , the trial cour t denied Clare nce a

nd Dwaine Br ight’ s motion for summary judgme nt. I n the B rig hts’ first two iss u es , t h ey ar g ue that the tria l

c ourt sh ou ld h ave de nie d th e John so ns ’ mot ion fo r s umm ary

jud g me nt a

nd sh ou ld h ave g ra

nte d th e ir own motion. I n their third issue, they contend that the trial court err ed in denying D waine B rig ht’s

rec overy of his attorney ’s fees. In the alternative fourth and fifth issues, they contend that ther e we re fac t issues that preclude d summary judgme nt and that the trial c ourt err ed in its ref ormation of the May 20 02 de e d. Ov e rr

uli nga ll o f t

he B ri g hts ’ i ssu e s, we mod if y and a ff ir m. Standard of Review We review the t rial court’s summary judgme nt de novo. Va le nc e Op e ra tin g Co . v . D or se tt , 16 4 S. W.3 d 6 56 , 6 61 (T e x. 20 05 ); Pr ov ide nt Life &Ac c ide nt I ns . Co . v . Kn ott , 128 S.W .3d 211, 215 (Tex. 2003). The pa

rties filed traditional motions for summary judgme nt. A trial court must g rant a tra ditional moti on for summary judgme nt if the moving pa rty establishes that no g enuine issue of materia l fac t exi sts and that the movant is entitled to j u d gment as a matter of law . T EX
. R. C IV
. P. 16 6a (c ); Lear Siegler, Inc . v. Pe rez , 8 1 9 S

. W

. 2 d 4 7 0 , 4 7 1 (T ex
. 1 9 9 1 ). W h en re v i ew i n g a traditional summary

judgme nt, the appellate court c onsiders all the ev i d en ce and takes as true evi d en ce favor able to the nonmovant. Am . To ba c c o Co . v . G rin ne ll , 9 5 1 S. W. 2 d 4 2 0 , 4 2 5 ( T e x. 1997). The appellate court “must consider whether rea sonable and fair- minded jurors could diff er3

in their conc lusions in l ight of all of the e vidence prese nted” a nd may n o t i g nore “ undisputed evidenc e in the re cord that cannot be disre g arde d.” Goodye ar Tire & Rubber Co
. v. Mayes , 236 S.W .3d 754, 755, 757 (Tex. 2007). When competing motions are filed and one is g rante d and the oth e r i s d e nie d, the re vie wi ng c ourt mus t r e vie w the summa

ry jud g me nt e vid e nc e pr e se nte d b y bo th sides and deter

mine all questions pr esente d. The re viewingcourt should then re nder suc h judgme nt as the trial c ourt should have r ender ed. Comm’rs Court of T itus Count

y v. A gan , 940 S.W .2 d7 7, 81 (Tex. 1997). TheFa rm an d R an c h Co ntrac t of Sa le In their motion for summary judgme nt, the J oh n s o n s argued that in their F arm a nd Ranch Contract of Sale (the Sales Contrac t), the par ties ag ree d that the J ohnsons would reser ve all of the minerals. The ref

ore, a mutual mist ake oc curr ed whe n the per son prepa ringthe dee d to Clarence Br ight did not re serve or re tain the minera ls on behalf of the J ohnsons. T h u s , a scr ivener ’s er ror
occur red a nd the dee d should be ref ormed. The B rig hts argued below, and ar g ue her e, that the Sales Contra ct did not reser ve the min e ra ls to the John so ns ; th e Sa le s Co ntr a c t “ on ly e xce pte d f

ro m th e John so ns ’ c onve y anc e tho se min e ra ls ‘ of

re c or d. ’” Th e y

int e rp re t th e S ale s Co nt ra c t to me an th a t th e John so ns we re on ly excepting f

rom their conve y ance two prior c o n v ey an ces or rese rvations of minera l interests that

a pp e are d o f re c or d in

the c ha in o f t itl e . T he B ri g hts re fe r t o tw o o uts tand ingmin e ra l and /or ro y a lty interests owned by third parties at the t ime: an int ere st ref lected in an instrument dated Ma rch 25, 19 49 , e xec ute d b y

N. M. Col wi c k a

nd wi fe to Sta

nle y Gi e se c ke and

Ne tti e Gi e se c ke and

an inte re st descr ibed in an instrument dated J anuar y 21, 1947, executed by A.P. McCrite and wife to S tanley Gi e se c ke . T he Bri ghts t ake the po sit ion that th e se tw o inte re sts we re the on ly re c or de d inte re sts pr op e rl y e xce pte d f

ro m th e c onve y anc e and

wa rr anty by the John so ns in t

he Sa le s Co ntr a c t. T h e p a r t i es m ad e wr i t t en ad d i t i o n s t o fi l l i n th e bl an k s o f th e pr i n t ed S al es C o n tra ct

. In para g raph 2, the y

descr ibed the prope rty

as being thirty -three acr es out of the H.S. Stauffer Survey i nE ra thC o un ty . T h e r el ev an tp arto f p ar agr ap h2 th en s t at edth e f o l l o wi n g: Al l pr op e rt

y so ld b y thi s c on tr a c t is c a lle d the “ Pr op e rt y .” Th e Pr op e rt

y wi ll be conve y ed subjec t to the following e x ceptions, reserv ations , conditions and restric tions (if none, insert “ none”) :4 A. Min e ra ls, Roya lti e s, and Ti mbe r I nte re sts : (1) Pre sently

outstanding in third par t i es : None [“None ” written in] ( 2 ) T o b e a d d i t i o n a l l y retained by Se ller : Al l of Re c or d [“All of Record” written in] (emphasis added)
Th e pa rt ie s f oll ow e d the ins tr

uc tio ns and wr ote “ No ne ” in pa ra g ra ph 2( A) (1 ) and

wr ote “ Al l of Re c or d ” i np a

r a g r a p h2 ( A ) ( 2 )

. H a d

th e y m e a n tf o r th e Jo h n s o n s n o tt o r e t a i nan y m i n e r a ls,

r o ya l t i e s , an d

t i mb e r i n t e r e s t s , th e y w o u l d h av e w r i t t e n“ N o n e ” i np ar a g r a p h2 ( A ) ( 2 )

. Ap p ar e n t l y, the y did no t kn ow of th e thi rd -p art y Gi e se c ke int e re sts wh e n th e y wr ote “ No ne ” in para g raph 2(A)(1)

. Floy J ohnson testified by deposition that the title company ’s attorne y prepa red the dee d. That attorne y

did list the Giese cke inter ests as exceptions in the deed. We ag ree with the J ohnsons’ rea ding of the Sales Contrac t. As we have sa i d , the Sales Contract conta ins the following la ng uag e: “The Property

will be conveyed subjec t to the following

e xce pti on s, re se rv a tio ns , c on dit ion s and re str ic tio ns (i f n on e , in se rt “ no ne ” ). ” Th a t la

ngua g e is followed by

these ter ms: “A. Minera ls, Roy alties, and Timber interests: (1) Pre sently

outstanding in t hir d p art ie s. ” Th e pa

rt ie s in se rt e d th e wo rd

“ No ne .” Th a t la

ngua g e is the n f

oll ow e d imme diate ly by “(2) To be additionall

y retained by

Se lle r” (e mph a sis a dd e d) . T he pa rt ie s w ro te the wo rd s “

Al l of Recor d” (e mphasis added) . As to mineral lea ses and surf ace lease s, the parties wrote in “N one.” Th en, as to ea se me nts , th e pa rt ie s w ro te the wo rd s “

As of Re c or d” (e mph a sis a dd e d) . T his

a g re e me nt m ig ht n ot b e a mod e l of c lari ty , but we be lie ve that it re fl e c ts the int e nt o f t he pa rt ie s th a t, as to minerals, ther e are no outstanding interests in third parties but that the J ohnsons are retaining all of re cord. The earlier use of the words “subjec t to” apply to those interests outstanding in third pa rt ie s, su c h a s e a se me nts “

As of Recor d” (e mphasis added)

. The words used when ref err ing to the

r e m a i n d e r o f t h e m i n e r a l i n t e r e s t s ar e “ a d d i t i o n a l l y retained by Seller” ( emphasis adde d). The

car eful ti tle examiner or scrivener should know that the Johnsons wer e retaining a ll o f t he min e ra ls of re c or d and that the c onve y anc e a s to oth e r matte rs wa s to be ma de su bje c t to t ho se oth e r m a tte rs
. We note t hat, during t he title examination, the ex aminer a ppare ntly discovere d outstanding mineral intere sts in thi rd par ties that were not shown in t h e s al es contract; these intere sts were sp e c if ic a lly e xce pte d f

ro m th e c onve y ance and

wa rr anty in t he de e d. Th e tw o G ie se c ke int e re stsD uhig v
. Peav y- M oor e Lum ber Co. , 14 4 S.W

. 2 d 87 8 (T ex. 19 4 0 ). 1

A caref ul at t o rney wo ul d have l i st ed i n pa ragraph 2 af t er “ [t ]he f

o l l o wi ng pro p ert y i s no t i ncl ud e d ” t he 2
e x c e p tio n s o f t h e G ie se c k e inte re sts a n d the r e te n ti o n b y the G ra n to rs o f t h e m ine ra ls a n d the n li ste d the m a g a in in p a ra g ra p h s 2 (A )( 1 ) a n d (2 ). H e re , t h e p a rtie s ins e rte d “N /A ” a fter “[t]h e fo llo w ing p ro p e rty is no t i n c lud e d .”

Br ight v. J

ohnson , N o. 11- 07-00379- CV ( T ex . A pp.—E as tla

nd D ec em

ber 10, 2009, no pe t. h.) (dis se ntingopini on). 3
5 should have been lis ted as exceptions in para g raph 2( A)(1) . Paragraph 2( A)(2) provided what was to be re tained by

the Seller (the J ohnsons). At the time of the Sales Contract, the Johns ons owned all of the minera ls ex cept f or the two intere sts owned by Giesec ke. The J ohnsons did not hire an attorney or do a title sea

rch be fore they

enter ed into the Sales Contrac t to sell their thirty -three acr es for $59,400. We understand that, to avoid the Du hig rule, a dee d should have a rese rvation by

the 1 g rantor a nd a “subje ct to” cla

use to protec t the rese rvation. B ut here , we a re a scer taining the intent of the J o h n sons and the B rig hts as expressed in their Sales Contrac t. Neither side r etained a n attorney

. Both parties ag ree d that the J ohnsons wer e to keep all of the minera l interests that they

2 then owned. It is not surprising that they simply wrote in that the J ohnsons were “re taining” all the minerals that they

owned “ of re cord.” As sume that th e pa

rties co rr e c tly

ha d in c lud e d th e tw o o uts tand ingmin e ra l in te re sts in para g raph 2( A)(1) of the contra ct. I t w ould then be cle ar that the later c onvey ance was to be subject to the out standing mineral int ere sts and that, additionally , the J ohnsons wer e to re tai n all of the other min e ra ls. Ev e n if we we re no t to c on sid e r the te sti mony of the pa rt ie s r e g ard ingthe min e ra l in te re sts , as the dissent sug g ests we should not do, we believe that the Sales Contract on its fa ce show s that

3 Cla re nc e B ri g ht w a s to re c e ive no int e re st i n th e min e ra ls; the y we re to be re ta ine d b y

the John so ns
. We ar e aw ar e, as sugg ested by the dissent, that oftentimes the ter ms “rese rvation” a

nd “exception” a

re use d intercha

ng eably

. (

See dissent , n ote 4) . B ut, that de pe nd s o n th e c on te xt in wh i ch th e t erm s ar e u s ed

. He re , th e c o n tra ctgo es fu rt h er an d co n t ai n s n o to n l y

th e l an gu age

“ r e s e r v e d , ” i t a l s o c o n t a i n s th e w o r d s “ a d d i t i o n a l l y retained ” in re fer ence to the minerals. The Br ights have conf

used “e x ceptions” a

nd “re servations.” The parties, under para g raph 2(A)( 2), listed “Al l o f Recor d” that would have excepted the two inter ests owned by Giesec ke. Howe ver, the interests owne d by

Giesec ke would not have been “r et ai ned” by the J ohnsons as the seller . TheyA n exc ep t i o n i s no m o re t han an excep t i o n f rom t he grant ; i t can o p erat e t o t he b enef i t of t he grant o r t o t he 4
e x te n t th a t o w n e rs h ip in th e e x c e p te d inte re st is ve ste d in the gr a n to r a n d is no t o u tstan d ing in a n o the r p e rs o n
. P at r i ck , 7 3 4 S .W .2 d a t 6 4 8 n.1 ; P i ch , 302 S. W

. 2d a t 650. 6 would have be en an e x ception to the prope rty conveyed. It is clear from t he record and the brie fing that the par

ties wer e not using the words “r eser vation” and “ exception” interc hang eably ; they used the words “ rese rved” and “r etained” in such a manne r that no m inera ls wer e to be convey ed to t he B ri g hts . H e re , th e John so ns “ re ta ine d” or “ re se rv e d” the min e ra ls ( that th e y owned of

re c or d) to themselves in par agraph 2( A)(2) of the Sales Contrac t. The conf usion b et we en ex ceptions and

re se rv a tio ns pe rm e a te s th e B ri g hts ’ a rgume nt. An e xce pti on

do e s n ot p a ss t itl e its e lf

; in ste a d, it o pe rate s to pr e ve nt t he e xce pte d inte re st from passingat all. The primary distinction betwe en a rese rvation and exception is that a re servation must alway s be in favor

of and for the benef

it of the g rantor. Pa tri c k

v . B arre tt , 734 S.W .2d 646, 64 7 ( Te x. 19 87 ); Pi c h v . La nk for d , 3 02 S.W. 2d

64 5, 64 8- 50 (T e x. 19 57). Th e Gi e se c ke int e re sts should have be en listed as ex ceptions i n para g raph 2(A)(1)

. A reservation is made in fa vor of the g rantor where he re serve s to himself roy alty interests, minera l rig hts, an d o t h er ri g hts. Bengev. S ch a r bauer , 2 5 9 S. W. 2 d

1 6 6 , 1 6 7

- 6 8 ( T e x. 1 9 5 3 )

. Pa r a g r a p h2 ( A ) ( 2 ) w a s th e p la c e f o r th at 4

rese rvation in their Sales Contrac t. The Johns ons would not have re serve d to themselves the interests owne d by

Giesec ke. T h e Br i gh t s ’ arg ument that the wording“re tained by Seller: All of Re c or d” me ant t

ha t th e John so ns on ly

re se rv e d to the mse lve s G ie se c ke ’s int e re sts is n ot l og ic a l in view of pa

ragraphs 2( A)(1) and 2(A )(2)

. The B rig hts’ confusion is demonstrate d by their relianc e on this c ourt’s opinion in W right v. E.P. Operating L.P. , 978 S.W .2d 684 (Tex. A pp.—Eastland 1998, pet. denied)

. That ca se involved an exception and is not applica ble. The Wrights h ad ex ec u t ed a dee d of trust to Merc antile B ank pledg ing the surfa ce a

nd minerals to sec ure a

promissory

note. They

then sold the land to the Olivers wh o a g re e d to a ssume pa

y me nt of the no te

. Ho we ve r, the Wri g hts fa ile d to se c ur e fr om M e rc anti le Ba nk a par tial relea se of the miner als from the de ed of trust. F ive y ear s later, the O livers def aulted, and the suc cessor

bank for eclose d on the deed of trust lien and re ceive d a substitute trustee’s de ed. The Wrig hts acknowle dg ed that the ba nk’s fore closure a lso forec losed their minera l interests, but they argued that the languag e in the deeds from the ba nk’s subsidiary

to the individual appellees ha d7

the e f f e c t o f e xc lu d in g th e mi n e r a ls f r o m th e c o n v e yan c e
. T h e la n g u a g e in th e d e e d s made the conveyance s “subject to” c erta in exceptions refe rre d to as “Permitted Exceptions.” These permitted

e xc e p ti o n s in c lu d e d

th e p r io r mi n e r a l r e s e r

v a ti o nb y th e Wr igh ts in

th e ir d e e d to th e O li v e r s
. We held that a r efe renc e by

rec ital to mineral interests that had pr eviously been fo re cl osed did not

rese rve those inter ests to the bank’s subsidiary from the c onvey ance . Be cause the dee ds from the subsidiary to appellee s did not reser ve the miner al estate by

a re fer ence to an exception of a miner al interest that wa s no longe r in exist ence , a later quitclaim deed from the subsidiary to the Wrights was ineffe ctive to transf

er title to the mineral interests back to the Wrights. The bank’s subsidiary had limit ed its warr anty

by the exception; it had not r etained the mineral interests that no longe r existed. We fu rt h erheld that subsequent a ctions by appellee s in that case ha d not revived the mineral interests in the Wrights. In contra st, the case now befor e us involves a re tention of the minera ls by the J ohnsons in the Sales Contract, not an e x ception. Perhaps more importantly , as quoted by the dissent, the languag e in the dee ds in W right provided that the conve y ance s were made “ subject to” the va rious rese rvations. W

right , 978 S.W .2d at 688. The la

ng uag e in the ca se bef

ore us is diffe rent. The Sales Contract unde r re view her e provided that there wer e certain thi ng s to which the conveyance would be subj ect, as in W right , but here , unlike W

right , th e John so ns additionall y wer e to re tain all of the minera ls of rec ord. Th e dis se nt a sse rt s th a t the ma jor ity is impr op e rl y

re lyingup on

e xtri ns ic e vid e nc e be c a

us e

“ [t]he John so ns do no t a sk thi s c ourt

to r e fo rm

the un de rl yingpurcha se ag re e me nt. ” Ag a in, it i s appar ent from the J ohnson’s position in the t rial court as well as here that, beca use t hey believe the Sales Contract c orre ctly

ref lects the ag ree ment of the pa rties, the Johnsons have sought to refor m the de e d s o th a t it , to o, mig ht p ro pe rl y c on fo rm to t he a g re e me nt of th e par

tie s. We p oint out th a t in W right there was no claim for re formation due to mutual mistake or othe rwise. In W right , we we re
car eful to note that “ the Wright s d id not plead or see k ref ormation of any

instrument and did not plead f raud, e stoppel, mutual mist ake, a mbiguity , or any cause of ac tion that w ould allow the offer of e x tra ne ou s e v ide nc e to e

x pla in t helangu age in t

he

. . . d e e ds

. ” W right , 978 S

. W

. 2 dat 6 87 (empha s i s added, footnote omitted). There fore , what the W right court wa s called upon to do wa s to interpret instruments and de termine the e ffe ct of the la n gu age i n them. Unlike W right , the J ohnsons’ lawsuit ag ainst Clarenc e B rig ht was one f or re formation of a deed due to mutual mistake.8

The dissent cites to W

rig ht a s su pp or t fo r the po sit ion that we have wr on g fu lly and dif fe re ntl y define d th e phra se “ a ll o f r e c or d. ” Ho we ve r, we no te a g a in t hat W rig ht did not involve a suit for

re fo rm a tio n. We a lso no te a g a in t hat W right was a case involving the use of the phra se “subjec t to” rathe r than “ additionally

reta ined” or

“re serve d” whe n ref

err ing to the inter est under r eview. I t ha s a lso b e e n n ote d th a t th e John so ns have ma de no a tta c k u po n th e me rg e r c la

us e
c on tai ned in the sa le s c on tr a c t. It se e ms t o u s th a t th e re ha s b e e n n o atta c k o n th e me rg e r c la us e be c a us e a pp e lle e s ar e no t atta c kin g the sa le s c on tr a c t; the y wa nt t o r e fo rm

the de e d to c omp or

t w ith it. W e ar e not disreg arding the merg er clause but, r ather , believe that the contra ct explicitl y contains the ag ree me n t o f th e p arti e s an d th a t th e me r g e r c la u s e is n o t r e le v an t to th e c la im s ma d e by the John so ns in t

his laws uit

. A p art y is e nti tle d to re fo rm a tio n o f a de e d w he n it

pr ov e s th a t it

re a c he d a n a g re e me nt w ith the ot her party but the deed does not ref lect the true ag ree ment due to a mutual mistake. Thalman v. Ma rti n , 635 S.W. 2d

41 1, 41 3 ( Te x. 19 82 ); Ramirez v. Flore s , 2006 WL 927295, No. 04-05-00075- CV (T e x. Ap p. —Sa

n A nto nio Ap r. 12 , 2 00 6, no pe t.) (m e m. o p. ); Hatch v. W illiams , 110 S.W .3d 51 6, 52 2 ( Te x. Ap p. —Wa c o 2 00 3, no pe t) . T o r e fl e c t th e ag re e me nt o f t he pa rt ie s, the su

pr e me court in Thalman ref

ormed both dee ds that had been e x chang ed. In Ramirez , the sales c ontrac t ref lected that the Ramirezes ag ree d to convey the surfa ce e state and 1/16 of the mineral e state; the court noted that the parties ag ree d that the Ramirezes reta ined the rema ining 15/16 of the m inera l

e state . B y

a mis take of

the tit le c omp any , the wa rr anty de e d tr ans fe rr e d to F lor e s th e surf a c e e state and the e ntire m inera l estate. The court held t hat t he warra nty deed was properly ref

ormed to reflec t the true a g ree ment of the pa rties. An din Hatch , both parties testified that they had agree d that Wil liams was to convey

only the 87.2-foot tra ct, not the entire t ra ct

. Ho wever, the attorney who ha nd le d th e tr ans a c tio n te sti fi e d th a t hi s o ff ic e ha d e rr on e ou sly

a tta c he d th e wrongpr op e rt y descr iption to t he docume nts; hence, the deed transfe rre d the entire trac t. The Waco c ourt found that the dee d was prope rly

ref ormed by the trial co u rt t o ref

lect their a g ree ment. L ike these c ases, the

case befor e us involved a mutual mistake a nd a scr ivener ’s er

ror. Th e B ri g hts argue that th e mis take in t he de e d b y

the g ra nto r i s a un ilate ra l mi sta

ke , n ot a mutual mist ake, c iting L a t h em v. Richey , 7 72 S.W. 2d 24 9, 25 4 ( Te x. Ap p. —D a lla s 1 98 9, wr it denied)

. Lathem involved the question of whe ther the grantor ha d filed his suit to r efor m the deed9

within the four-year

statute of li mitations. In holding that limit ations prec luded hi s suit, the cour t f o un d th a tLath e m h a d amp l e t i m e t o l e ar n th a t th e d e e d d i d n o t c o n t a i nth e m i n e r a l r e s e r v a t i o n
. It is evident from th e o p i n i o n that, had L athem filed suit bef ore limitations had run, his suit for ref ormation of a deed due t o mutual mistake of the g rante e and grantor w ould have be en hea rd. The Lathem case is not applicable. He re, the J ohnsons filed their suit for re formation within the limit ations period. The Brig hts cite Estes v. Republic Nat’l Bank of Dallas , 450 S.W .2d 397 (Tex. Civ. App.— Dallas 1969), a

f f’d , 462 S.W .2d 273 (Tex. 1970), and Glas go w v . H all , 6 6 8 S. W. 2 d

8 6 3 ( T e x. App.—Austin 1984, writ ref ’d n.r.e .), for the proposition that a par ty ’s fa ilure to see that the words in h is c on tr a c t e xpre ss h is i ntenti on s con st itute s su c h n e g lig e nc e a s w ill ba r h is r ig ht t o r e fo rm

it. That proposition may

or may not be applica

ble in some situations, but t he ca ses do not apply here

. In this case, the pa

rties ag ree d in the Sales Contract that the J ohnsons w ould r etain the minera ls they then owned of rec ord. The f acts in Estes and Glasgow dif fe re d s ub sta

nti a lly fr om t he fa c ts i n th is

case
. I n E

stes , th e e v id e n c e s h o w e d th a t E s te s h a d h a d e xte n s iv e f in an c ia l tr an s a c ti o n s with the bank and had given it many promissory notes. One $30,000 note was secur ed by a deed of trust that

c o n t a i n e d a “ M o th e r H u b b ar d ” c l a

u s e s t a t i n g th a tth e d e e d

o f tr u s ts e c ur e d

a l l f un d s a dv an c e d

to Estes and a ll other indebtedness owing or that might become owing to the bank. Estes a rgued that his ag ree ment with the bank wa s that pay ment of the $30,000 note would rele ase his f arm but that the bank ha d ref

used to r elea se the far

m. The court found that there was no evidenc e that the bank had agree d to that provision. The court also held that, eve n if the bank ha d ag ree d, Estes still failed to prove that the failure of the written contra ct to ref lect the true oral a g ree ment was due to fraud,

a c c id e n t, o r mutu a l mi s ta k e
. T h a t is n o t th e s it

u a ti o n h e r e
. T h e Sa le s Co n tr a c t r e f le c ted the ora l ag ree ment o f t h e J o hnsons and the B rig hts. There was no ora l ag ree ment that differ ed fr om the

wr itt e n c on tr a c t. In Glasgow , K e n G la sg owe nte re d int o an e arn e st mon e y c on tr a c t fo r the purc ha se of a ho me from B elle Hall. The parties executed the usual title paper s, a note, de ed of trust, a nd war ranty deed at closi ng
. G la s g o wc la im e d th a t h e d id

n o t s e e a p ar a g r a p hin th e w ar r an ty d e e d th a t t h e g r an tor
rese rved the rig ht to adjust the interest rate on the note. The court found t h at t h e gr antor’s10

re se rv a tio n o f a ri g ht t o a dju st the int e re st r a te on the no te wa s n e ve r d isc us se d b e fo re or a t th e tim e of c los ing . T he re we re no fi nd ing s o f f a c t or c on c lus ion s o f l aw r e qu e ste d o r f ile d b y the tr ia l c ourt

. Unlike the agree ment in the Sales Contract in the c ase be fore us, th ere was no e vidence of an ag ree ment conce rning the interest clause befor e the de ed wa s executed. Thus, there was no ba sis for ref orming the dee d in Glas

go w. Appellants have argued that the Johnsons have not challeng ed the Sales Contra ct and that failure leads to the demise of the J ohnsons’ claim. The point is also made by the dissent. Howeve r, it is appar ent from the J ohnsons’ arguments that they do not want to ref

orm the contra ct bec ause the y believe that it is the correc t statement of the agr eeme nt of t he parties. The de ed is the instrument that is not corre ct, and the Johnsons seek to ref orm it so that i t m i gh t re fl ec t the true a g ree ment of the pa rt ie s; the y make no c la im that the sa le s contr a c t is an in c or re c t e xpre ssi on

of the ir a g re e me nt w ith B ri g ht. Where a deed does not follow the parties’ ag ree ment, the deed can be reformed. Thalman , 635 S.W

. 2 d at 413. The trial court wa s corr ect in g rantingthe J ohnsons’ motion for summary jud g me nt a

nd in d e nying

the B ri g hts ’ m oti on

fo r s umm ary

jud g me nt. Dw ain e Br igh t’

s Claim Dwaine Br ight claims that he was a bona fide purcha ser for value; there fore , the trial cour t should have g rante d his mo tion for summary judgme nt that he owned one -half of the surfa ce a

nd min e ra ls. On

June 13 , 2 00 3, thi rt e e n mo nth s a ft e r t he John so ns e xec ute d th e May 20 02 de e d to Clarenc e B rig ht, Clarence Br ight e ntere d into a writ t en p u rc h ase c ontrac t with his son, Dwaine Br ight, f or Dwa ine B rig ht to purchase an u n d i v ided one- half intere st in the thirty -three acr es (includingthe minera l rig hts). Dwaine Br ight imm ediately perf ormed unde r the purc hase c ontrac t and fully paid the purc hase price

. Howeve r, Clarenc e Br ight did not g ive a de ed to Dwa ine. Instead, the pa rt ie s in the ir a g re e me nt ha d s tate d th a t no de e d w ou ld b e fi le d b e c a us e the ir name s w e re so simil ar: B oth

pa rt ie s are e nte ri ngint o th is a g re e me nt wi tho ut de e d re c or din g du e to names listed as Clare nce B rig ht. Both owne r and pa rt owner

.11

The Johnsons’ deed to Clarenc e O. Br ight wa s simply to “Clarenc e B rig ht.” Dwa ine B rig ht could also be r efe rre d to as “Clare nce B rig ht.” Dwa ine B rig ht testified as t o the re ason his fathe r did not give him a de ed:

Be cause my

dad boug ht it in C lare nce B rig ht. He said, “ I f any thing e ver ha pp e ns , it’s alre a dy

de e de d Cl are nc e B ri g ht a nd y ou c an g o d ow n a

nd se ll i t, whateve r you’ve g ot to do because y our’r e Clare nce B rig ht, too, y ou kno w. ” And that’s – he sa id that’s why he buy s stuff as Clarenc e Brig ht, in case Iever need to do so me thi ngwi th i t. Dwaine Br ight acknowledg ed that the document was a c ontrac t, not a deed. H e also a dmitted that he ha d n ot loo ke d at his fathe r’ s May 2, 20 02 de e d p ri or to t he e xec uti on

of his purc ha se a g re e me nt. The J ohnsons f

iled this suit on Marc h 28, 2006, and their notice of lis pe ndens on Jul y 31, 2006. On September

12, 2006 (ef

fec tive J une 13, 2003), Clarenc e Br ight e x ecute d a “D eed Without War ra nty” to D wa ine B ri g ht c onve yingthe on e -h a lf int e re st i n th e thi rt

y -thre e a c re s. In Augus t 2007, Clarenc e Brig ht executed a “ Correc tion Deed Without W arr anty” to cor rec t the September 2006 deed. Dw a ine B ri g ht a

rgue s th a t he wa s a

bo na fi de purc ha se r o n Jun e 13 , 2 00 3, be c a us e he fu lly pe rf or me d th a t da

y , r e c e ive d e qu ita

ble tit le , a nd ha d n o n oti c e of

the John so ns ’ c la im t o th e min e ra ls. He then a rgues that his equitable title ar ose by operation of law without depending on the execution

o f ad ee d , ci t i n g Cadle Co. v. Harve y , 4 6 S. W.3 d 2 82 , 2 87 (T e x. Ap p. —F or t W ort h 200 1, pe t. de nie d) ; Gaona v. Gonzale s , 997 S.W .2d 784, 787 (Tex. App.—Aus t i n 1999, no pet.); and Peterson v . Black, 980 S.W .2d 818, 822 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 1998, no pet.). These c ases a

re not pe rsuasive. We disag ree that Dwaine Br ight r ece ived equitable or leg al tit le to t he min e ra ls p ur su ant t o th e ir 20 03 purc ha se c on tr a c t. A s ub se qu e nt p ur c ha se r o rd inaril y a c qu ir e s o nly

the ri g hts , inte re sts , o r t itl e of his pr e de c e sso r, and

un le ss h e sh ow s h ims e lf

to b e a bo na fi de purc ha se r, he c an o nly take su c h r ig hts that his gr antor ha d. Hartel v. Dishman , 145 S.W .2d 865 (Tex. 1940)

. As a subseque nt purcha ser, Dwaine Br ight would have acquire d only the rights of his fathe r unless he w as a bona fide purc haser

. T h e J o h n s ons are corr ect that a subsequent purc haser

is not a bona fide pur chase r if the conveyance is made without warr anty

. W oo dwa rd v . O rti z , 237 S.W .2d 2 8 6 , 291-92 (Te x . 1951) (purc haser

of a quitcla im deed take s with notice of all def ects in the title an d equities of third12

pe rs on s) ; Kidwell v. Black, 1 04 S.W. 3d 68 6, 69 1 ( Te x. Ap p. —F or t Wor th 2 00 3, pe t. d e nie d) ; Hall v. Tucker , 414 S.W .2d 766, 769 (Tex. Civ. App.—Eastland 1967, writ ref ’d n.r.e.). Dw ai n e Brig ht testified that the J une 13, 2003 document was a purcha se contra ct, not a dee d. There are no words of wa rra nty in the J une 2003 document. There are no words of c onvey ance , only a stateme nt “I

. . . am selling” one-ha lf of the interest as deede d in the J ohnsons’ May 2002 deed. T he phra se “I . . . am
se lli ng ” may have me ant “ I have a g re e d to se ll, ” re qu ir ing a de e d o nc e the so n p e rf

or me d. At be st, the docu m en t dated June 2003 was a quitcla im deed fr om Clarence Br ight. In addition, Clarence Br ight e x ecute d two subsequent cor rec tion deeds “wi t h o u t wa rra nty .” I f Clare nce c onvey ed an interest in the thirty -three acr es in J une 2003, which is doubtful, he conveyed without war ranty . To his credit, Clare nce Br ight ha s acknow ledg ed consistently that he and the J ohnsons ag ree d that the John so ns wo uld

ke e p th e min e ra ls. Clarenc e B rig ht paid $59,400 for the thirty -three acr es, excluding the min er als. Dwa ine Br ight pa id Clarence Br ight $30,000 f or the undivided one-half interest and understood that amount to b e ha lf of wh a t his fathe r ha d pa id the John so ns
. Th e John so ns po int out that the fa c ts in t his c a se
are simil ar to the f

acts in Biggs v. Poling , 1 34 S.W. 2d 80 1 ( Te x. Civ. App .—

Am ari llo 19 39 , w ri t d i s m ’d j udg m’t cor.) . In Biggs , P o l i n g h a d b e e n o f f e r i n g f o r s a l e o n e - h a l f o f h i s r o y a l ty in s ma ll units of 1/1536 of his 1/16 roy alty at the rate of $100 pe r unit. He e ntere d into a wri tten contra ct wi th Wy ri c k to c onve y

to Wy ri ck tw o unit s o r a

n und ivi de d 2 /15 36 of

an und ivi de d 1 /16 ro y a lty int e re st fo r $2 00

. Ho we ve r, the de e d c onve y e d 1 ,5 36 un its . Wy ri c k a lso purc ha se d s ome oth e r u nit s fr o mP o l i n g. S u

b s equ en t l y , Bi ggs b o u gh tun i t s fr o mP o l i n g, W y ri ck , an d o th er gra n t ee s o f P o l i n g. The issue in the case was whether Big g s was a bona fide purcha ser f or value of 1,534 units (1,536 min us the 2 unit s that Polin g and Wy ri c k ha d ag re e d on) wh e n his de e d f ro m Wy ri c k c onve y e d a ll the r igh t, ti tl e an d inte r e s t th a t Wy r ic k h e ld in th e r o y a lt

y b y v ir tu e o f th e d e e d to Wy

r ic k from Poling. The c ourt held that B igg s was not a bona fide purcha ser for two rea sons: his knowledg e of the mistake in the dee d from Poling to Wy rick and the assig nment by Wy rick to B igg s “constituted no more than a

quitclaim of whate ver inter est Wy rick ha d in the roy alty .” Biggs , 134 S.W .2d at 805. Under the reasoning in Biggs , equitable title to the minerals never passed to Clare nce B rig ht by the John so ns ’ de e d da te d M ay 2, 20 02 , a

nd Cla re nc e B ri g ht r e c e ive d at mo st o nly the le g a l ti tle to the minerals by

mistake in the dee d. L eg al title to the minerals was not paid for by him, and he13

held them at all times in trust for the J ohnsons. Biggs , 134 S.W .2d at 806. Dwa ine B rig ht testified that he wa s “just buying ha lf of whatever [C lare nce B rig ht] had” in 2003. He admitted that he had not looked at the er

roneous de ed fr om the J ohnsons to his father; there fore , he ca nnot claim t hat he relied on the terms of that de ed whe n he agre ed t o p u rcha se a one -half inter est in the thirty -three

a c re s and pa y on e -h a lf of wh a t hi s f

a the r p a id t

he John so ns
. The fir st two issues of the Br ights are overr uled. Be cause Dwaine Br ight did not pr evail on his claim and there are no fac t issues raised, the third a nd fourth issues ar e over

ruled. The Reformed D eed In their fifth issue, the B rig hts contend that the trial court e rre d in its reformation of the May 2002 deed f

rom the Johns ons beca

use the re formed deed did not “state a nd enfor ce the contra ct the parties have wr itten.” Althoug h the tria l c o u rt’s re formed de ed basic ally followed pa

ragraph 2( A)(2) , we mod if y the tr ia l c ourt ’s re fo rm e d d e e d a s f oll ow s: RE SER VA TIO NS F RO M CO NV EY AN CE AN D W ARRA NT Y SAV E a nd EX CEP T, and

the re is h e re by

re se rv e d unto Gr antor s, the ir he ir s, su c c e sso rs , and ass ig ns , all of the oil, g as and othe r minerals which the y

now own in and under and that may be produc ed f r o mth e a b o v e d e s c r i b e d

p r o p e rty. This Court’s Ruling The judg ment of the trial c ourt is modified, and as modified, a ffirme d.

T E R RY M c C A LL JUSTI CE Dec ember

10, 2009 Panel consists of: Wright, C.J ., McCall, J ., and Strang e, J.14

Opinion filed Dec ember 10, 20 09



### In The 

# Eleven th Court of Appeals

____ ____ __ 

### No. 1 1- 07 -0 03 79 -CV

____ ____ CLA REN CE O. BRIGH T A ND INTE RV ENO R CLA REN CE D. BRIGHT, Ap pellants

V.
FLOY HUBE RT JO HNSO N AND SHIRLEYA. JOHNS ON, Ap pellees

On A ppe al from the 266th D istrict C ourt

Era th C oun ty, Tex as Tria l C ourt Cau se N o. CV 2822 7

D I S S E N T I N G O P I N I O N I respectfu lly dissent. The m aj ority ’s ultim ate conclu sion: that whe n both parties to a pu r c hase ag reem ent b eliev e that it conv ey ed only the surface, then their d eed shou ld tran sfer title o nly to the surface is log ically

sound. F urtherm ore, I find the co nflict between Clarence O. B rig ht’s testim ony that he k newthe Joh ns on s w er e k ee pi ngth e m in er al s an d h is pray er to th is c ourta sk in g f

or c le ar ti tl e to th os e sam e m in er al s problem atic. C onseq

uently , if we were resolv ingthis issue strictly on equ itable p rinciples, Iw ould hav e no trouble reform ingthe deed. B ut, becau se w e are not, becau s e t he J oh nson s do no t challen g e theT hat c la use p r o v i d e d: “ A G RE EMEN T O F PA RT IES : T his c ontra ct c onta ins the e ntir e agre em ent of the parti es and c annot 5 be cha ng ed ex ce pt by

the ir w rit te n a g re em ent .” 15 enforcea bility of the p urchase ag reem ent, and becau se o ur o pinion w ill create uncertain ty in oth er title and

co ntra ct ua l m at te rs , Ir es pe ct fu ll y d is se nt

. My con cerns are tw ofold. F irst, I believ e that we are im prope rly relyin g upon extrinsic e v idence. The Johns on s do n ot

a sk th is co urt to re fo rm th e un de rl y in g purc ha se ag re em en t. We h av e pr ev io us ly h el d that in such an in stance extraneo us e v idence is inad m issible to exp lain the con tract’s lan g uag e. See W right

v. E

. P

. O pe ra ti ng L td

. P ’s hi p , 978 S.W. 2d 684, 68 7 (Tex. App .—Ea stland 1998 , p et. d enied). We reached th is c on cl us io n ba se d up on o ur res po ns ib il ity

to “c ar ry int o ef fe ct the int en t of

the parti es a s expr es se d [i n the agreem ent]. I t is n ot the intent that the parties m ay hav e had but fa iled to express in the in strum ent, but it is the in tent that is e xpresse d b y the instrum ent.” Id. (c i t i ng Pierso n v. Sa nger , 5 3 S

. W. 1 01 2 (Te x. 1 89 9) ). E v e n t ho ugh no c ha ll en g e is m ad e to th e un de rl y in g a g re em en t, o ur o pi ni on d is cu ss es F lo y

Johns on ’s

an d C lare nc e B ri g ht ’s te st im ony d es cr ib in g th ei r su

bjec ti v e in te nt

c on ce rn in g th e re se rv at io n of th e m in er al s
an d th ei r st at em en ts a t c lo si ng , a nd w e cl earl y

r el y up on thi s te st im ony

to re ac h our co nc lu si on
. N ot o nl y does this run

counter to the parol ev idenc e r ule, but also it is in consistent w ith the m erg er clau se that the parties in cluded

in their ag reem ent – a clause whose operatio n is not c halleng ed o n ap peal. Am erg er clau se 5 presum es that all prior neg otiations and ag reem ents relating to the transaction hav e been mer ged in t o the contract; conse quen tly , th e co ntract w ill be enforced a s w r i tten an d cannot be a dded to, v aried, or contrad icted by

parol ev idence. See ISG State Ope rations, Inc. v. Nat’l Heritage In s. Co. , 2 34 S.W. 3d 711, 71 9 (Te x. App
. —E as tl an d 20 07 , p et

. d en ie d)

. O ur con si de ra ti on

o f F lo y Johns on ’s a nd

C lare nc e B ri g ht ’s testim ony is at odd s w ith the term s of this unchallen g ed c ontractu al pro v ision. The m aj ority

correc tly no tes tha t w e m ay

con sider th e facts and circum stances surroun din g the

e xe c ut i on of

a c on t r a c t . T he li mit s of t h i s r u l e a r e no tcl e a r l y de f i ne d. How e ver , c ommen t a t or s ha ve indicated that it is lim ited to pre- conv ey ancingissue s suc h as v ocabu lary peculiar to the conv ey or, utiliz ation of a draftingag ent o r use of a form instrum ent, the sk ill of the scriv ener in the use of languag e or term s of art, th e prev ailingm anners of expressio n at the tim e, and other ev idence that affected the form ulation of the term s of the in strum ent. See Br uc e M. Kram er, The Sisyph ean Task of Interpre ting Mineral D eeds and Leas es: An Ency cloped

ia of C anon s of Con struction , 2 4 T EX
. T EC H L. R EV . 1 , 1 4 (1 993). B ut reg ardless of howthe rule is defined , it is clear that it does not p erm it proo f of the p arties’ su bjective intent. See Ma rk K. Glasse r & Keith A . R owle y , On Paro l: Th e C onstru ction and Interpre tation of W ritten A greem ents a nd the Role of E xtrinsic Evide nce in C

ontrac t Litiga tion , 4 9 B AYLOR L. R EV . 6 57, 66 9 (1 997).See M adis on v . G ordon , 39 S.W .3d 604, 606 (T ex . 2001) (A bona f ide purc has er

is one w ho a cqui re s prope rty

in g ood 6 f aith, for va lue, and w itho ut n otice, actual or constru ctive, of any third -party claim or interest. This status is an af f irm ative defe nse to a ti tle dis pute .).
I not e al s o t hat t he part i es us ed t he t er m “ as of r ecor d” t o des cr i be t he eas ement s t o w hi ch t he gr ant was 7 subject

. T he scr i vener t reat ed t hi s as a r ef erence t o t he easem ent s o n f i l e. T hi s i s co nsi st ent wi t h co m m o n practi ce, and no o ne co m p l ains.

T he p ract i cal d i st i nct i o n b et ween a res ervat i o n and excep t i o n i s q uest i o nab le to d a y. S ee , e. g. , P i ch v. 8 L a n kfo rd , 30 2 S.W

. 2 d 64 5 , 65 0 (T ex. 19 5 7 ) ( t he wo rds “excepti o n” and “ res ervat i o n” are not st ri ct l y s y no ny m o us b ut are oft en used i nt erchangeab l y ); Rey nol ds v
. M cM an O i l & G as Co. , 11 S. W

. 2d 778, 781 ( T ex
. Comm’ n A p p
. 19 28, 16 My app rehensio n is the effe ct our ana ly sis will hav e on future contracts. By bro adenin g the scope of surround ingcircum stances, w e m ak e it m ore d ifficult to determ ine a contra ct’s m eaningbec ause of the uncertain ty

ov er w hat n ow is or i s not a perm issible ev identiary con sideration

. By

disreg ardingthe m erg er clause, w e m ak e it m ore d ifficult for contractin g parties to lim it the risk of subseq uent litig ation. We are also potentially

increa singtransa ctional costs. Assum e Claren ce Brig ht had conv ey ed h is interes t to an innocen t third p arty

befo re the dispute arose
. What burde n do we place upon this third party w hen we unde rcut th e ability to rely up on the d ocum ents in

a chain of title? And how will that increased cost and risk be absorb ed? I realiz e that an innocen t purch aser has defense s to a title challeng e, but ev en s uccessfu l litig ation im poses 6 transaction al cos ts. My seco nd conce rn is that o ur o pinion assig ns a

mea ni ng to the phrase “all of record” that n o pr ac ti ti on er

w ou ld h av e expe ct ed , a nd , th er ef or e, adef in it io n th at

wi ll cau se unc erta in ty

in a ny c ha ino f ti tl e with a do cum ent co ntainin g that phra se. We h old th at the J ohns ons retained all of their m inerals b ecause the co ntract c ontaine d the follow ing phrase: “To be add itionally retaine d b y

Se ller: A LL OF REC ORD. ” We reachthis conclu sion by defin ingthe term

“all of reco rd” to m ean all of the m inerals that the Johnso ns
own ed o f record

. I respe ctfully disagree. The p hr as e “a ll o f re co rd ” is c om m on ly und er st oo d to r ef

er to do cum en ts o n fi le

. F or e xam pl e, in E

. P

. O pe ra ti ng L td

. P ’s hi p , 9 78 S.W. 2d at 68 8, we wrote : The languag e stating that the conv ey ance s we r e m ade subject to an y an d a ll reserv ations presen tly of record

including witho ut limitation that property reserve d b y the Wrig hts d oes not re serv e any

m ineral interest in Oreg on’s predec essors in title, but rather rec og niz es that reserv ations hav e be en m ade in the pas t and are in the cha in of title.
I note that , if

the pa rt ie s hadused“al l of rec ord ” to de scr ibe the i n t e r e s t o u ts ta ndi ng in t hir d par ti es, we
wou ld hav e ap plied its no rm al m eaning

. I app reciate th at there is a differen ce b etwee n an

exc lusion for 7 in te re st s inth ir d pa

rt ie s an d a re se rv at io n of inte re st s to th e sel le r, b ut th is d is ti nc ti on

d oe s no t ju st if

y de f i ni ng “ a l l of

re c or d” di f

f e r e nt l y. 8h ol di n g a ppr ov ed) ( f or t h e pu r pos e of

de t er mi n i n g t h e ex t en t of t h e g r an t , t h e di s t i n ct i on be t we en a n e xcep t i on a n d a res ervat i o n is o f

no p ract i cal imp o rt ance, f o r t he p rop ert y e xcep t ed o r t he est at e res erved i s never i ncl ud ed i n t he grant );
see a lso 8 H o w a rd R . W ill ia m s & C h a rle s J . M e ye rs , O i l and G as Law 3 3 6 (20 0 8 ) ( t he d i st i nct i o n be t ween exc ep t i o ns and res ervat i o ns has l o st m o st of i t s i m p o rt ance i n co nt em p o rary l aw). 17 Moreov er, by

ho ldingthat the m eaningof “all of record” depen ds u pon its place m ent in

the contract
an d th e othe r ci rc um st an ce s of th e tr an sa ct io n, w e cr ea te unc erta in ty in c ha in s of ti tl e. Th e part ie s sh ou ld hav e si m pl y s ai d “a ll” whe n de sc ri bi ngth e m in er al inte re st s to b e re ta in ed b y th e Joh ns on s. B ut

th ey d id not. T hey

instead referred to “all of record. ” The scriv ener properly read this to refer to title d ocum ents o n fi le

. R eg re tt ab ly , th is ef

fe ct iv el y pr ec lu de d any re se rv at io n be caus e it is di ff ic ul t to env is io n a pr ev io us ly filed d ocum ent d escribingthe J ohns on’s retained m ineral in terest, but w e sh ould not c reate uncertainty for ot he r s b y s a yin g “a l l of

re c or d” do e s no tca rry it s no rmal l y ac c e pt e d mea ni ng s i mpl y be c aus e th e la ngu a ge chose n b y the parties m ay not hav e accurately said what they

inten ded to say

. See Can ter v. Lin dsey , 5 75 S.W. 2d 331, 33 4 (Tex. Civ . A pp. —El P aso 1978 , writ ref’d n.r. e.) (the q uestionis n ot w hat th e parties m eant to s ay , b ut

th e m eani ng of w hat th ey d id s ay ); see a lso D ahlber

g v. H olden , 2 38 S.W. 2d 699, 70 1 (Tex. 1951 ) (courts m ust co nstrue contracts as written an d m ay n ot alter the p arties’ lan g uag e by interp olation or
su bs ti tu ti on ). F or th es e re as on s, Ir es pe ct fu ll y d is se nt

.

RI CKST RANGE Dece m ber10, 2009 J UST I CE Pane l con sists of: Wrig ht, C. J ., M c C a l l , J. , a n d

S t r a n g e , J.