IN THE COMMONWEALTH COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA

Jill Mancini, :

Appellant :

 :

v. : No. 1292 C.D. 2022

 : Submitted: May 7, 2024

County of Northampton Personnel :

Appeals Board :

BEFORE: HONORABLE RENÉE COHN JUBELIRER, President Judge

HONORABLE CHRISTINE FIZZANO CANNON, Judge

HONORABLE BONNIE BRIGANCE LEADBETTER, Senior Judge

OPINION NOT REPORTED

MEMORANDUM OPINION BY

PRESIDENT JUDGE COHN JUBELIRER FILED: June 7, 2024

Jill Mancini, representing herself, appeals from an Order1 of the Court of 

Common Pleas of Northampton County (common pleas) denying her petition for 

review (Petition) of a final determination (Determination) of the Office of Open 

Records (OOR), which denied her appeal from Northampton County’s (County) 

denial of requests for communications pursuant to Pennsylvania’s Right-to-Know 

Law2(RTKL). Mancini sought records of communications between counsel for the 

County, counsel for the County’s Personnel Appeals Board (PAB), County officials, 

and the PAB related to an underlying complaint in mandamus she filed against the

PAB. Mancini argues that the requested communications are not, as common pleas’ 

1 Common pleas’ Order was entered on October 17, 2022, along with a Statement of 

Reasons. For succinctness, we will refer to the Order and Statement of Reasons collectively as the 

Order. 

2 Act of February 14, 2008, P.L. 6, 65 P.S. §§ 67.101-67.3104. 
2

held, protected by the attorney-client privilege or the attorney-work product 

doctrine. After review, we affirm. 

I. BACKGROUND

A. Underlying Litigation

This matter is another in a complicated history of litigation in multiple courts 

between Mancini and the County. Mancini was hired in 2007 as a full-time career 

service assistant solicitor for the County. (Reproduced Record (R.R.) at 303a.)3 In 

2014, she became aware that the newly elected County Executive was going to 

terminate her position. (Id.) Mancini filed a grievance pursuant to the County’s 

policies4 because she anticipated that her position was going to be terminated. (Id.

at 303a-04a.) Mancini’s position was officially terminated, a hearing was held, and 

her grievance was denied. (Id. at 304a.) Mancini timely appealed to the PAB, and 

the PAB held two hearings. (Id.) The PAB did not render a final decision regarding

Mancini’s appeal or issue findings of fact or conclusions of law, which Mancini 

maintained that the PAB is required to do under the County’s policies.5(Id.; Order 

at 2.) 

After two years without a final decision, (R.R. at 304a), Mancini filed a 

complaint in mandamus in common pleas against the PAB seeking an order to 

compel the PAB to issue a final determination in her grievance appeal. (Order at 2.) 

3 For context purposes only, we glean some of the underlying facts from common pleas’ 

prior decisions related to the previous litigations that were not specifically mentioned in the Order. 

The following facts are derived from common pleas’ February 14, 2018 Order filed in Mancini v. 

Northampton County Personnel Appeals Board, Dkt. No. CV-2016-10211. 

4 These policies included the Northampton County Home Rule Charter, Article X, §

1005(a), (R.R. at 350a-97a), the Northampton County Career Service Regulation 15.01, (R.R. at 

398a-417a), and the Northampton County Employee Policy 3.15, (R.R. at 422a).

5 Specifically, Northampton County Career Service Regulation 15.01 and the Northampton 

County Employee Policy 3.15. 
3

William Kennedy, Esq. (Mr. Kennedy), of Ballard Spahr LLP, a contract attorney 

for the County, and Juan Camacho, Esq., a solicitor appointed by then County 

Executive John Brown, represented the PAB in the mandamus action. (Id. at 2 n.3, 

3.) Common pleas granted Mancini’s complaint in mandamus and ordered the PAB 

to render a final adjudication in her grievance action. (R.R. at 322a.) Thereafter, 

the PAB unanimously denied Mancini’s grievance appeal and rendered a final 

decision. (Id. at 323a-29a.) 

B. RTKL Requests and OOR Determinations

During the above litigation, Mancini filed with the County, in 2017, requests 

for disclosure of communications relating to the mandamus action against the PAB

with the County. (R.R. at 176a-79a.) Specifically, Mancini sought “electronic 

voicemail, handwritten or typed notes, email or letters, text messages or records of 

appointments” from October 2016 to July 2017 “between former County Executive 

John Brown and his agents, . . . and individuals representing the PAB, including 

Solicitor Juan Camacho and Ballard Spahr attorneys [Mr.] Kennedy and Elizabeth 

McManus.” (Order at 2.) The County denied these requests because the 

communications were protected by, relevantly, the attorney-client privilege and the 

attorney-work product doctrine. (Id. at 2; R.R. at 180a-81a.) Mancini appealed to 

the OOR, and the OOR issued multiple determinations following remands from 

common pleas. The OOR ultimately concluded that none of the requested

communications were protected by the attorney-client privilege or the attorney-work 

product doctrine. (Order at 5-6.) The County appealed. 

In 2020, Mancini filed another request for communications, which 

significantly overlapped the communications sought previously. Mancini requested 

“communications between contract attorneys for the County, attorneys for the PAB, 
4

attorneys for the County, and members of the PAB and [the] Executive Branch of 

the County” from October 2016 to June 2020. (Id. at 6; R.R. at 205a-06a.) The 

County granted the request in part and denied it in part claiming most

communications were protected by the attorney-client privilege or the attorney-work 

product doctrine. (R.R. at 206a-08a.) Mancini appealed to the OOR, and the OOR 

determined that the County established the attorney-client privilege protected most 

communications and that the attorney-work product doctrine protected many other 

communications. (Order at 6-7.) Mancini appealed. 

C. Common Pleas’ Order 

Common pleas consolidated the RTKL appeals as they “raise[d] identical 

legal issues, involve[d] the same parties, and include[d] substantial factual overlap.” 

(Order at 7.) In its Order, common pleas analyzed Mancini’s first argument “that 

communications between the contracted attorneys and the County cannot be 

privileged because these attorneys represented the PAB, not the County or the 

County Executive in the mandamus action” and there is an “inherent conflict of 

interest [that] prevents attorneys from representing both the PAB and the County 

and County [E]xecutive.” (Order at 9.) After reviewing the legal principles related 

to the application of the attorney-client privilege and the attorney-work product 

doctrine, and the County’s submitted evidence, including affidavits from Mr. 

Kennedy and other outside counsel and contracts between the County and Mr. 

Kennedy’s law firms, common pleas concluded that “Mr. Kennedy and his 

associates[] were retained to represent the County as a whole, includ[ing] the PAB 

as an arm of the County.” (Id. at 12.) Since the County and the PAB provided 

sufficient evidence to show an attorney-client relationship had been established, and 

the County and the PAB met the other requirements of establishing the attorney-
5

client privilege as established in a prior common pleas’ opinion, issued September 

19, 2018, common pleas concluded many of the communications were protected by 

the attorney-client privilege. (Id. at 12-13 & n.13.) 

Common pleas then addressed Mancini’s argument that the attorney-client

privilege cannot apply here because the PAB and the County cannot be co-clients of 

Mr. Kennedy as the PAB “function[s] as an independent grievance hearing board 

that adjudicates grievances between the County and disgruntled personnel” creating 

a conflict of interest. (Id. at 13.) Mancini rested her argument on her assertion that 

“any decision in the mandamus action act[ed] as a de facto decision of the merits of 

the underlying grievance claim and to allow such a relationship denies her such a 

hearing.” (Id.) Common pleas concluded that Mancini’s mandamus action is

“wholly separate from the merits of [her] grievance claim” and, thus, Mr. Kennedy’s 

representation of the PAB in the mandamus action did not create a conflict of 

interest. (Id. at 13-14.) 

Common pleas continued to explain that even if the attorney-client privilege 

did not apply, the attorney-work product doctrine would apply to preclude disclosure 

of many of the communications. (Id. at 14.) Common pleas stated that Mancini did 

not specifically challenge the OOR’s conclusion that the attorney-work product 

doctrine applied to some of the communications, but “summarily” asserted that the 

privilege was waived due to the communications disclosure. (Id. at 16.) Common 

pleas concluded that none of the communications were disclosed to Mancini, who 

was the adversary in the mandamus action, and thus the privilege was not waived. 

(Id. at 15-16.) 

In sum, common pleas concluded that the attorney-client privilege applied to 

several of the requested communications, and the work product doctrine protected 
6

other communications, and denied Mancini’s Petition.6 Based on these conclusions,

and its in camera review of the communications, common pleas attached to its 

opinion a list of the communications it precluded, or did not preclude, from being 

disclosed and the reason for doing so. (See id. Ex. A.) 

Mancini appealed and filed her concise statement of errors pursuant to 

Pennsylvania Rule of Appellate Procedure 1925(b), Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b). Common 

pleas issued an opinion on December 9, 2022, affirming and incorporating its Order 

pursuant to Pennsylvania Rule of Appellate Procedure 1925(a)(1), Pa.R.A.P. 

1925(a)(1). 

II. DISCUSSION

A. Mancini’s Arguments7

Mancini argues that common pleas erred in concluding that the attorney-client 

privilege applies to many of the requested communications as there exists a conflict 

of interest where outside counsel, namely, Mr. Kennedy, represented the PAB in the 

mandamus action. According to Mancini, the County8 cannot assert the attorneyclient privilege because the County was not a party to the mandamus action and 

could not be a client of Mr. Kennedy. Mancini argues that common pleas assumed, 

“[w]ithout any analysis or authority, . . . that the County [] was a party to the 

6 Common pleas also concluded that some of the communications were protected as being 

communications between the County and its insurance carrier. See Section 708(b)(27) of the 

RTKL, 65 P.S. § 67.708(b)(27); (Order at 17). Mancini does not pose any issue regarding common 

pleas’ conclusion that certain requested communications were protected as insurance-related 

communications. (See Mancini’s Brief (Br.) at 64 n.5 (“Mancini is not asking for [r]ecords 

protected by the [i]nsurance carrier exception. 65 P.S. § 67.708(b)(27).”).) 

7 The PAB was precluded from participating in this matter because it did not file a brief. 

(See 9/11/2023 Order.) 

8 Mancini uses County and County Executive interchangeably throughout her filings. We 

will refer to both as the County. 
7

mandamus action because the PAB was a County agency” and the fact that the PAB 

is a County agency does not make it a party to the mandamus action. (Mancini’s 

Brief (Br.) at 31.) Mancini contends the affidavits common pleas considered “are 

nothing more than bald assertions of [the] attorney-client privilege” and that “mere 

belief that one is a party to the mandamus action and that [Mr.] Kennedy represented 

both the [County] and the PAB most certainly do not make it so.” (Id. at 33 (citing 

Est. of Paterno v. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n (NCAA), 168 A.3d 187 (Pa. Super. 

2017)) (In re Estate of Paterno).) Mancini maintains that because the County was 

not Mr. Kennedy’s client in the mandamus action, the attorney-client privilege is

inapplicable as the privilege only extends to attorneys and their clients. (Mancini’s 

Br. at 33-34.) 

Mancini also argues that there is an inherent conflict of interest here because

“[a]n attorney who represents a party before an adjudicatory body may not advise 

the adjudicatory body during the decisional process” and “the County [] and, at [its]

command, [Mr.] Kennedy, litigated the mandamus action with the clear goal of 

winning a denial of mandamus, hence a victory for the County [] in the grievance.” 

(Id. at 43.) Mancini cites Pennsylvania Rules of Professional Conduct 1.7, 1.8, 1.13, 

and 5.4, Pa.R.P.C. 1.7, 1.8, 1.13, and 5.4, which generally prohibit attorneys from 

representing clients where there are conflicts of interest, to support her argument that 

there is an inherent conflict of interest here precluding the use of the attorney-client 

privilege. (Id. at 50-54.) Mancini further argues that if the attorney-client privilege 

did apply here, her due process rights would be violated based on her conclusion that 

an inherent conflict of interest exists. (Id. at 49, 64.) 

Regarding common pleas’ conclusion that the attorney-work product doctrine 

applies to most communications, Mancini contends this privilege was waived “by 
8

[disclosing] communications between or among parties with adverse interests.” (Id. 

at 58.) According to Mancini, “[t]he mandamus action asked the PAB to judge the 

County[’s] conduct, hence there was a conflict between [it] and the PAB.” (Id. at 

60.) Mancini contends that common pleas incorrectly determined that “Mancini 

[was] the only adversary in the mandamus action” because if the County became a 

party to the mandamus action, it “would have stood in the same shoes as Mancini, 

[a] litigant before the PAB” and the disclosure of communications between the PAB 

and the County waived the attorney-work product doctrine. (Id. at 61-62.)

We address Mancini’s arguments in turn.9

B. Analysis

1. Applicable RTKL Principles

Section 302 of the RTKL requires local agencies to disclose “public records

in accordance with th[e RTKL.]” 65 P.S. § 67.302. Section 102 provides that a

“[l]ocal agency” includes “[a] political subdivision, intermediate unit,” or “[a]ny

local, intergovernmental, regional or municipal agency, authority, council, board, 

commission or similar governmental entity[,]” 65 P.S. § 67.102. Section 102 also 

defines a “[r]ecord” as “[i]nformation, regardless of physical form or characteristics, 

that documents a transaction or activity of an agency and that is created, received or 

retained pursuant to law or in connection with a transaction, business or activity of 

the agency” and includes “document[s], paper[s], [and] letter[s.]” Id. A “public 

record,” is a narrower category of record, and, relevant here, is “[a] record, including 

9

“Our . . . review from a decision of a trial court in a case under the RTKL is []limited to 

determining whether findings of fact are supported by [substantial] evidence or whether the trial 

court committed an error of law, or an abuse of discretion in reaching its decision.[]” Kaplin v. 

Lower Merion Twp., 19 A.3d 1209, 1213 n.6 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2011) (internal quotation marks and 

citation omitted). 
9

a financial record, of a . . . local agency that . . . is not protected by a privilege.” Id. 

A “[p]rivilege” may be “[t]he attorney-work product doctrine, the attorney-client 

privilege . . . or other privilege[s] recognized by a court interpreting the laws of this 

Commonwealth.” Id. Common pleas here concluded that the attorney-client 

privilege and the attorney-work product doctrine were properly invoked by the 

County and precluded disclosure of certain of the communications that Mancini 

requested. 

2. Attorney-Client Privilege 

To invoke the attorney-client privilege, the asserted holder must show: 

(1) The asserted holder of the privilege is or sought to become a 

client.

(2) The person to whom the communication was made is a member of 

the bar of a court, or his subordinate.

(3) The communication relates to a fact of which the attorney was 

informed by the client, without the presence of strangers, for the 

purpose of securing either an opinion of law, legal services or assistance 

in a legal matter, and not for the purpose of committing a crime or tort. 

(4) The privilege has been claimed and is not waived by the client.

Dep’t of Educ. v. Bagwell, 114 A.3d 1113, 1123-24 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2015) (emphasis 

added). The attorney-client privilege protects communications from the client to 

their attorney, and from the attorney to their client. Id. at 1124. The privilege allows 

for “candid communications between counsel and client, so that counsel may 

provide legal advice based upon the most complete information from the client.” In 

re Thirty-Third Statewide Investigating Grand Jury, 86 A.3d 204, 216 (Pa. 2014). 

If the asserted holder meets their burden to invoke the privilege, the opposing party 
10

must prove an applicable exception. Township of Neshannock v. Kirila Contractors, 

Inc., 181 A.3d 467, 474 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2018). To invoke the privilege “the party 

asserting the privilege must show, by record evidence such as affidavits, []sufficient 

facts as to bring the [communications at issue] within the narrow confines of the 

privilege.[]” Id. (internal quotation marks, emphasis, and citation omitted). 

Government entities are entitled to assert this privilege and “may claim privilege for 

communications between their attorney and their agents or employees who are 

authorized to act on behalf of the entities.” Gould v. City of Aliquippa, 750 A.2d 

934, 937 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2000). 

Although Mancini is correct that Mr. Kennedy did not represent the County 

in the mandamus action because the PAB, not the County, was Mancini’s adversary,

the County provided evidence that an attorney-client relationship exists generally 

between Mr. Kennedy and the County, including in matters relating to the PAB. 

Mancini cites In re Estate of Paterno10 to support her argument that the evidence 

supplied by the County does not prove an attorney-client relationship was invoked. 

Common pleas addressed Mancini’s reliance on In re Estate of Paterno, finding that 

case distinguishable from the present matter. 

There, Pennsylvania State University (“PSU”) hired an outside law firm 

to represent a special task force that handled investigating PSU’s 

handling of the Jerry Sandusky scandal. [In re Estate of Paterno, 168 

A.3d] at 191. In a subsequent defamation suit filed by the Estate of Joe 

Paterno, among others, against the [NCAA] . . . and PSU, [the] 

plaintiffs sought documents containing communications between PSU 

and attorneys for PSU and the outside law firm representing the task 

force.

10 Pennsylvania Superior Court cases are not binding on this Court; however, when such 

cases discuss analogous issues, they offer persuasive precedent. Stahl v. Workers’ Comp. Appeal 

Bd. (E. Hempfield Twp.), 242 A.3d 3, 13 n.6 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2020) (citing Lerch v. Unemployment 

Comp. Bd. of Rev., 180 A.3d 545, 550 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2018)). 
11

[The d]efendant’s asserted that PSU, by extension, was represented by 

this outside law firm because, inter alia, PSU created the task force 

which has no legal identity or budget of its own. PSU also relied on the 

facts that it paid the task force’s fees and that the chair of PSU’s board 

of trustees, who was not a member of the task force, signed the 

engagement letter on behalf of PSU. The Superior Court ultimately 

found that PSU was not a client of the outside law firm that was 

representing the task force based upon the express language of the 

applicable engagement letter, which specifically stated that outside 

counsel represented the task force, not PSU. Id. at 195-[]97.

A review of the record for both appeals show that the instant matter is 

readily distinguishable from the facts of the [In re] Estate of Paterno

case. To support its invocation of the attorney-client privilege, the 

County provided: (1) affidavits from Tim Brennan, Assistant County 

Solicitor, [] Solicitors to the PAB, William Kennedy, Esq.[,] other 

outside counsel, and the Northampton County Director of 

Administration; along with (2) contracts between the County and 

Ballard Spahr[] LLP and Montgomery, McCracken, Walker & Rhoads 

(“MMWR”), respectively.[] These documents show that outside 

counsel, such as Mr. Kennedy and his associates, were retained to 

represent the County as a whole, includ[ing] the PAB as an arm of 

the County. The Ballard Spahr contract shows that Mr. Kennedy, and 

his colleagues, were initially retained in April [] 2016. The Scopes and 

Services section of this contract states that “the County anticipates 

needing the services of highly qualified outside legal counsel to advise 

and assist with Human Resources related matters . . . the County may

ask counsel to (1) conduct negotiations . . . (9) represent the County

before the [PAB.”] . . . Such language shows that the attorneys at 

Ballard Spahr were retained to generally represent the County in any 

matters relating to employment law, which may include mandamus 

actions against an arm of the County such as the PAB.

[11]

Further, the County also entered into a contract with MMWR, the firm 

which Mr. Kennedy eventually went to, on August 8, 2018[,] to serve 

as general counsel. The Scope of Work and Objectives section of this 

contract states that the County was seeking counsel for multiple areas 

of expertise ranging from general litigation to election law that would 

11 Mancini admits that “the County retained [Mr.] Kennedy to litigate the mandamus action, 

ostensibly representing . . . the PAB,” and that the “general terms of the contract [between the 

County and Ballard Spahr] could cover representation of the PAB[] or the County[.]” (Mancini’s 

Br. at 12, 30.) 
12

be supervised by the County Solicitor, or another attorney designated 

by the Solicitor. . . . These contracts, when taken together with the 

multiple affidavits submitted, show that Mr. Kennedy, and other 

outside counsel from Ballard Spahr and MMWR, created an attorneyclient relationship with the County and its officers, through which 

they came to represent the PAB in the underlying mandamus 

action. Thus, communications between Mr. Kennedy, and his 

colleagues from Ballard Spahr and MMWR, the PAB and its Solicitors, 

and the County and its agents may be privileged under 42 Pa.C.S.[] 

§ 5928 if they meet the remaining criteria.

[12]

 

(Order at 11-13 (some emphasis added).) We agree with common pleas that In re 

Estate of Paterno is distinguishable based on the County’s affidavits and contracts, 

which establish an attorney-client relationship between Mr. Kennedy and the 

County. 

Mancini still contends, however, that the attorney-client privilege cannot be 

invoked by either the County or the PAB because there is an inherent conflict of 

interest if both the PAB and the County are clients of Mr. Kennedy, and thus the 

County cannot be a client and cannot invoke the attorney-client privilege. Mancini’s 

argument rests on her assertion that if common pleas denied her mandamus action, 

the denial would act as an adjudication on the merits of her grievance. (Mancini’s 

Br. at 13.) As common pleas explained, “the purpose of a mandamus action is to 

compel a governmental entity to perform a mandatory, ministerial duty. See 

Chadwick v. Dauphin Cnty. Off. of [] Coroner, 905 A.2d 600, 603 (Pa. [Cmwlth]. 

2006.” (Order at 14 n.14.) A mandamus action is not an adjudication of the merits. 

See Sinkiewicz v. Susquehanna Cnty. Bd. of Comm’rs, 131 A.3d 541, 546 (Pa.

Cmwlth. 2015) (“ [W]here a public official is clothed with discretionary powers, and 

12 Common pleas explained that it had “already decided that an attorney-client relationship

exists between the County Solicitor’s office and the PAB[,]” (Order at 13 n.13), based on its order 

entered September 19, 2018, located at pages 32a-42a of the Reproduced Record. 
13

has exercised those powers, mandamus will not lie to compel a revision of the 

decision resulting from such exercise of discretion, though in fact, the decision 

may be wrong.”) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted, some emphasis 

added). What transpired below is consistent with this notion. Mancini filed the 

complaint in mandamus seeking an order compelling the PAB to perform its 

mandatory, ministerial duty of issuing a decision, common pleas granted Mancini’s 

complaint in mandamus and directed the PAB to issue a final decision in her 

grievance appeal, and the PAB issued its adjudication. But this did not equate to an 

adjudication of the merits, nor could it because mandamus cannot be used to direct 

the use of discretion in a particular way. Sinkiewicz, 131 A.3d at 546. 

On the issue of the alleged conflict of interest, common pleas explained that 

[u]nder the Northampton County Home Rule Charter, the PAB’s 

function is to hear appeals from career service employees regarding the 

County’s employment decisions such as those to demote, suspend, or 

dismiss and is invested with the power to “sustain or dismiss an appeal, 

to modify a penalty, to award back pay, and to reinstate an employee.” 

[(]Northampton County Home Rule Charter[, Article XI[,] § 1105)]. 

Any conflict of interest between the County and the PAB lies within 

these discretionary powers, not as to whether the PAB was 

required to issue a written decision pursuant to Career Service 

Regulation No. 15.02 and employee policy No. 3.15.[] The 

mandamus action upon which these RTKL requests center do not 

implicate the PAB’s ability to exercise these discretionary powers 

and are wholly separate from the merits of a grievance claim. 

While communications between the County and the PAB regarding the 

merits of any underlying grievance action would not be privileged, the 

[trial c]ourt finds that, in the context of the mandamus action,[] [Mr. 

Kennedy]’s representation of the County and the PAB does not present 

an inherent conflict that would eviscerate the attorney-client 

relationship. Accordingly, the attorney-client privilege is applicable in 

this matter and exempts the disclosure of certain material as stated in 

the table appended [] as Exhibit “A.” 
14

(Order at 13-14 (footnotes omitted, emphasis added).) We discern no error of 

common pleas’ above reasoning as the evidence provided by the County shows that 

the attorney-client privilege was properly invoked, and that no conflict of interest 

prevented the invocation of the privilege where Mr. Kennedy represented the PAB 

in the mandamus action, which had nothing to do with the merits of the underlying 

grievance appeal against the County. 

3. Attorney-Work Product Doctrine

The attorney-work product doctrine, “while closely related to the attorneyclient privilege, provides broader protection.” Levy v. Senate of Pa., 94 A.3d 436, 

443 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2014). The attorney-work product doctrine is described in 

Pennsylvania Rule of Civil Procedure 4003.3, Pa.R.Civ.P. 4003.3, and precludes 

“disclosure of the mental impressions of a party’s attorney or his or her conclusions, 

opinions, memoranda, notes or summaries, legal research or legal theories.” Under 

the RTKL, “the doctrine protects the []mental impressions, theories, notes, 

strategies, research and the like created by an attorney in the course of his or her 

professional duties, particularly in anticipation or prevention of litigation[] from 

disclosure.” Levy, 94 A.3d at 443 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). 

“[T]he work product doctrine is waived when the work product is shared with an 

adversary, or disclosed in a manner which significantly increases the likelihood that 

an adversary or anticipated adversary will obtain it.” BouSamra v. Excela 

Health, 210 A.3d 967, 978 (Pa. 2019) (emphasis added). 

Mancini also challenges common pleas’ conclusion that even if the County 

did not establish the attorney-client privilege, the attorney-work product doctrine 

would apply to many of the requested communications because the attorney-work 
15

product doctrine was waived through disclosure of communication to the County. 

Again, common pleas’ analysis is persuasive:

[Mancini] does not specifically fault the OOR for finding that certain 

documents constitute work[ ]product under Pennsylvania law. She 

does, however, summarily contend that any work[ ]product privilege 

has been waived. The [trial c]ourt readily disagrees. Even if the 

County, and members of its executive branch, were strangers to the 

attorney-client relationship between the several contract attorneys, 

County Solicitors, and the PAB, the record does not show that such 

material was either disclosed to [Mancini], as the adversary in the 

mandamus matter, or that its disclosure increased the likelihood 

that [Mancini] would obtain it. Thus, where applicable, the [trial 

c]ourt finds that the work product doctrine has not been waived. 

(Order at 16-17 (emphasis added).) Mancini maintains that if the County had 

become a party to the mandamus action, it would have stood in the same shoes as 

she and would have potentially been an adverse party to the PAB. However, the 

County did not bring the mandamus action against the PAB, Mancini did—making 

her the adverse party. Thus, disclosure of communications to the County does not 

waive the attorney-work product doctrine. 

III. CONCLUSION

We discern no error or abuse of discretion in common pleas’ conclusions that 

the attorney-client privilege and attorney-work product doctrine applied in this 

matter. Therefore, common pleas’ Order is affirmed. 

__________________________________________

RENÉE COHN JUBELIRER, President Judge

Judge Wallace did not participate in this decision. 
IN THE COMMONWEALTH COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA

Jill Mancini, :

Appellant :

 :

v. : No. 1292 C.D. 2022

 : 

County of Northampton Personnel :

Appeals Board :

O R D E R

NOW,June 7, 2024, the Order of the Court of Common Pleas of Northampton 

County, entered October 17, 2022, is AFFIRMED. 

__________________________________________

RENÉE COHN JUBELIRER, President Judge