r 

Exhibit 300 Attachment 2 

Business Case Analysis Report 

for 

Future Surveillance 

JRC Phase 2a 

% 

MNS #326, Enhanced Surveillance 

MNS #50, Application of Satellite Navigation Capability for Civil Aviation 

MNS #323, Airport Surface Movement Enhancement and Runway Incursion Prevention 

[NS #42, Aeronautical Data Link System (ADLS) 

Approved By: 

Vice President formications Planning, FAA Air Traffic Organization 

Date: ~g^ W 

U. S. Department of Transportation 

Federal Aviation Administration 

800 Independence Avenue 

Washington, D.C. 20591 

pi 
r H 

Exhibit 300 Attachment 2 

Business Case Analysis Report 

for 

Future Surveillance 

JRC Phase 2a 

MNS #326, Enhanced Surveillance 

MNS #50, Application of Satellite Navigation Capability for Civil Aviation 

MNS #323, Airport Surface Movement Enhancement and Runway Incursion Prevention 

MNS #42, Aeronautical Data Link System (ADLS) 

Approved By: Date: 

Vic Vicee President for Operations Planning} FAA Air Traffic Organization President for Operations Planning? FAA Air Traffic Organization / j 

Approved By: ^Vjg^c^y ^ Date: l/^l 0- * 

^•Senioj^Vice President for Finance, FA^Air Traffic Organization 

I 

U. S. Department of Transportation 

Federal Aviation Administration 

800 Independence Avenue 

Washington, D.C. 205 
Table of Contents 

INTRODUCTION 4 

BACKGROUND 4 

2.1 Alternative 1: ADS-B 4 

2.2 Alternative 2: Radar Replacement 5 

2.3 Alternative 3: Multilateration 5 

MISSION NEED AND REQUIREMENT 6 

3.1 Requirements 6 

3.1.1 Enhanced Surveillance Information for ATC 6 

3.1.2 Enhanced Situation Awareness 7 

3.2 Mission Need and Shortfall 7 

3.3 Assumptions, Constraints, and Conditions 8 

ALTERNATIVES ANALYZED 9 

4.1 Alternative 1: ADS-B 9 

4.1.1 Key Alternative Activities 9 

4.2 Alternative 2: Radar Replacement 9 

4.2.1 Key Alternative Activities 10 

4.3 Alternative 3: Multilateration 10 

4.3.1 Key Alternative Activities 10 

EVALUATION CRITERIA 10 

BUSINESS CASE ANALYSIS 11 

6.1 Schedule Analysis 11 

6.1.1 Alternative 1: ADS-B 11 

6.1.1.1 ADS-B High Level Milestones 11 

6.1.1.2 Avionics Implementation 12 

6.1.1.3 Ground Infrastructure Implementation 12 

6.1.1.4 Automation Implementation 12 

6.1.1.5 Data Products Implementation 13 

6.1.2 ADS-B Segment 1 (FY 2007 through 2012) 13 

6.1.2.1 Element 1: En Route / Oceanic Airspace 13 

6.1.2.2 Element 2: Terminal / Surface Airspace 14 

6.1.2.3 Element 3: Broadcast Services 14 

6.1.2.4 Element 4: Enabling Technology 14 

6.1.3 Alternative 2: Radar Replacement 14 

6.1.4 Alternative 3: Multilateration 15 

6.2 Life Cycle Cost Analysis Summary 15 

6.2.1 Cost Team Composition 16 

6.2.2 Ground Rules and Assumptions 17 

6.2.3 Scope of the Estimate 18 

6.2.4 Cost - Risk Adjustment 19 

6.3 Benefits Analysis 20 

6.4 Economic Analysis 26 

6.5 Risk Analysis 26 
6.5.1 Risk Analysis Ground Rules 27 

6.5.2 Risk Team Composition 27 

6.5.3 Approach 28 

6.5.4 Results 29 

6.5.4.1 Reference Case 29 

6.5.4.2 Alternative 1 - ADS-B 30 

6.5.4.3 Alternative 2 - Radar Replacement 30 

6.5.4.4 Alternative 3 -Multilateration 31 

6.5.4.5 Qualitative Comparison 32 

6.5.4.6 Quantitative Comparison 34 

6.5.5 Summary 34 

6.6 Architecture Assessment 34 

6.7 Other ADS-B Related Assessments 38 

6.7.1 Human Factors Assessment 38 

6.7.2 Information Security Assessment 45 

6.7.3 Safety Assessment 47 

6.7.4 Affordability Assessment 48 

6.7.4.1 F&E and OPS Funding 48 

6.7.4.2 F&E Affordability 48 

7 ALTERNATIVE SELECTED 48 

7.1.1 Criteria 1: Core Surveillance 48 

7.1.2 Criteria 2: Cockpit Based "Third Dimension" 49 

7.1.3 Criteria 3: Business Case 50 

8 RECOMMENDATIONS 50 

9 PROGRAM FUNDING 51 

Appendix A: References 52 

AppendixB: ADS-B Risk Table (Consolidated) 53 
1 INTRODUCTION 

In the early 1980's, civil aviation recognized the increasing limitations of the present 

communications, navigation, surveillance (CNS) and air traffic management (ATM) systems, the 

need to make improvements to overcome present limitations, and the requirement to meet future 

needs. To fulfill its vision and commitments to the global air traffic control system, the Federal 

Aviation Administration (FAA) must evaluate its present air traffic management (ATM) system 

and plan for future capabilities. 

While current surveillance is generally adequate for today's environment, it will not support the 

anticipated growth in aviation without loss of efficiency within the NAS. As the request for 

additional services—including traffic demand—increase, system inefficiencies will increase in 

the form of delays and restrictions across the National Airspace System (NAS) thereby 

increasing cost and reducing airspace users' ability to meet customer demands. There is a need to 

improve the FAA's surveillance capabilities in the surface, terminal, en route and oceanic 

airspace domains while sustaining or enhancing the current levels of safety, capacity, and 

efficiency. Surveillance methods used in today's environment will not support continued 

aviation growth. Additionally, the current surveillance systems do not take advantage of new 

technologies in navigation, communication and flight management. Expansion of surveillance 

coverage is essential to support air traffic control modernization efforts. The purpose of the 

Future Surveillance Capacity Mission Need Statement (MNS) was to exploit a technological 

opportunity that increases the FAA's surveillance capabilities in all domains and to contribute to 

the promotion of global airspace interoperability and commerce. 

2 BACKGROUND 

Three alternative solutions were examined for their ability to support future ATC "core 

surveillance" and "cockpit-based" capabilities that could meet the needs of the FAA and 

National Airspace System users. The following provides a brief background description of the 

three proposed solutions. 

2.1 Alternative 1: ADS-B 

There has been a large body of market survey activity that has occurred in the effort to 

understand, develop and cost this technology. ADS-B is a technology that was initially 

conceived back in the late 1980s. In the early 1990s the FAA in partnership with RTCA began a 

search for a low cost alternative form of surveillance. Several technologies were considered 

including next generation radars, multilateration and ADS-B. In 1995, the FAA initiated a 

program called Halaska, to implement a low-cost surveillance capability in Hawaii and Alaska 

where there is little to no radar coverage due to terrain constraints. At approximately the same 

time, the RTCA Special Committee (SC) 186 was formed to define requirements for the next 

generation surveillance. SC-186 determined that the system should have the capability of high 

updates rates, provide a two-way data-link and should provide accurate position data. SC-186 

has been responsible for much of the standards development for ADS-B. The Halaska program 

received significant Congressional support since its inception. However due to programmatic 

issues, the Halaska program went through several iterations when it finally ended up becoming 
the Safe Flight 21 Program, which included the Alaska Capstone Office and the Ohio River 

Valley Office. When the Safe Flight 21 Program Office (SF-21) was formed, senior 

management of the FAA directed SF-21 to develop ADS-B as a potential future alternative to 

radar. This direction came as a result of a letter sent to the FAA in 1998 from the RTCA Free 

Flight Select Committee recommending that the FAA explore the use of ADS-B. Both SF-21 

sub-offices (Capstone and Ohio River Valley) began to establish test-beds for the technology. 

Capstone, with strong Congressional support, developed and deployed an ADS-B prototype 

infrastructure in the Yukon-Kuskokwim Delta region in Bethel Alaska. The Ohio River Valley 

Office, in partnership with the Cargo Airlines Association (CAA), the Aircraft Owners and 

Pilot's Association (AOPA) and a number of avionics and ground station vendors, developed and 

deployed ADS-B infrastructures in several locations within the confines of the lower 48 CONUS 

and the Gulf of Mexico. CONUS sites include Wilmington, OH, Louisville, KY, Memphis, TN, 

Frederick, MD, William J. Hughes Technical Center and the Gulf of Mexico (domestic offshore 

region). In addition, a test of ADS-B was executed at the Olympics in Atlanta, GA in 1996 and 

there is an ongoing evaluation to investigate the utility of ADS-B in the National Capital Region 

to enhance surveillance below existing radar coverage. Capstone was successful in deploying 

and demonstrating the prototype infrastructure in Alaska and is currently deploying a second site 

in SE Alaska. The Ohio River Valley office was successful in the deployment and demonstration 

of the before mentioned sites. In addition, SF-21 Ohio River Valley office has led the way in a 

number of efforts that fold into the overall development of ADS-B ground infrastructure, 

automation interfaces and avionics. The following highlights a few of these efforts: 

• Standards Development (partnered with RTCA and ICAO) 

• Avionics Development (partnered with vendors and AVS) 

• Automation Interface Development (Common ARTS, STARS) 

• ADS-B Link Decision (provided essential data to justify link decision) 

• Coordination for Permanent Link Frequency Establishment 

As a result of activities performed by both sub-offices, contracts are currently in place for the 

procurement of ADS-B Universal Access Transceiver (UAT) Ground Broadcast Transceivers 

(GBT), avionics, ancillary hardware, software and services. 

2.2 Alternative 2: Radar Replacement 

Radar is the technology currently being used by the FAA. Radar has been in existence since 

World War II. The FAA has several classes of radar which define functionality: ASR 1 through 

11 (terminal radars), ARSR 1 through 4 (en route radar), ASDE 1 through 3X (surface radar), BI 

1 through 6 (beacon radar) and Mode S and Integrated Monopulse radar (beacon radar). Radar 

has gone through a number of evolutionary changes although the core technology has not 

changed since its inception. Because radar is the current technology, no robust market survey has 

been conducted. Actual costs from current acquisitions have been used for cost comparison. 

2.3 Alternative 3: Multilateration 

Multilateration was one of the original technologies that the FAA had looked at when trying to 

identify alternative surveillance sources in the early 1990s. The FAA established several test-
beds for multilateration: Atlanta Airport (1996); Milwaukee Airport (1998), Dallas-Ft Worth 

Airport (2000 - Air Target Identification System (ATIDS)). The incremental development of 

multilateration culminating with the ATIDS eventually led to the certification and deployment of 

ASDE-X and 3X system for surface surveillance. Extensive testing and development of 

multilateration was also conducted by the SF-21 Ohio River Valley and NASA. SF-21 set-up a 

test-bed in Memphis and Louisville, which included multilateration utilization for tracking 

airborne aircraft in the terminal area. Since the area was so large in scope (40-60 mile airport 

radius around an airport), the name wide-area multilateration (WAM) was adopted. SF-21 Ohio 

River Valley partnered with NASA to evaluate and develop both multilateration and ADS-B as a 

low-cost surveillance technology for the Gulf of Mexico. This work was funded partially by the 

FAA and mostly by two Congressional earmarks given to NASA in 2001. The FAA's most 

advanced airborne WAM development took place in this test-bed. During the development 

period for multilateration and WAM, much was learned. We know now that an aircraft must 

have at least 4 ground stations receiving its transponder information. The number of ground 

stations required varies with the topography and other factors. Multilateration has shown promise 

as an alternative surveillance technology; however, there are still unresolved issues that must be 

worked for multilateration to be deployed for extensive airborne surveillance. 

3 MISSION NEED AND REQUIREMENT 

3.1 Requirements 

FAA Office of Aviation Policy and Plans (APO) workload and aviation activity forecasts for FY 

98 - 09 show a substantial air traffic increase in the continental U.S. The ATS Concept of 

Operations (CONOPS) defines the need for increased Air Traffic Management (ATM) services 

because of that traffic growth. The impetus for the FAA needs is based, in part, on the 

increasing demand (traffic) and the benefits to be derived by transition of the NAS toward Free 

Flight. Another driving factor is the safety objectives in an increasingly crowded airspace. 

FAA Mission Need Statement 326 identified the following broad categories of enhanced 

surveillance capabilities for the NAS: 

• Enhanced surveillance information for ATC 

• Enhanced situational awareness 

3.1.1 Enhanced Surveillance Information for ATC 

According to the Joint Government/Industry Roadmap for Surveillance Modernization the Air 

Traffic environment of the future will be increasingly dependent on more accurate and timely 

information being available to Air Traffic (AT) service providers and aircraft operators. 

Information pertaining to a variety of airspace conditions and accurate position data, including 

aircraft intent, will be necessary. This data will need to be shared between service providers and 

users efficiently. Surveillance data will be a key ingredient in this paradigm of information 

sharing. Improved decision tools will be able to take advantage of aircraft intent information to 

provide more accurate situation awareness. This, along with improved accuracy, will allow for 

more accurate trajectory modeling for use in conflict prediction and resolution, metering 
applications, and spacing tools. In addition, sharing the surveillance information with the 

cockpit will increase the pilot's situation awareness, reducing the need for requests for 

information, and will enable the use of cockpit-based procedures that safely support efficiency 

and capacity goals. 

• The FAA's ATC personnel need to have reliable, accurate, timely and cost efficient 

surveillance information of aircraft, flying objects, and vehicles operating in the airspace 

from the surface up, in all types of terrain, in current non-surveillance airspace areas, and 

oceanic control areas, without blind spots or areas of no coverage with an accuracy 

sufficient to safely increase existing airspace capacity. A reliable surveillance system is 

imperative for ensuring separation assurance. 

• ATC personnel need reliable, accurate, timely and cost efficient surveillance information 

for all aircraft and vehicles operating on the airport surface movement area in all weather 

conditions. 

• In order to dynamically adjust traffic flows, reliable, accurate, and timely information is 

essential. 

• With the advent of space operations, ATC personnel need surveillance information on 

flying objects above current ATC surveillance systems capabilities. 

3.1.2 Enhanced Situation Awareness 

• The users of the airspace rely primarily on a "see and be seen" concept and ATC services 

to gain a situational awareness of the other users around or near them. Airspace users 

need an accurate, timely, and efficient means to receive advisory information to increase 

their situational knowledge of the other users around or near them so that they can 

operate efficiently and increase safety to flight. 

• At the airport, pilots and vehicle operators rely on a "see and be seen" concept and ATC 

services for moving about the airport movement area and to gain a situational awareness 

of the other aircraft and vehicles around or near them. Pilots and vehicle operators need 

an accurate, timely, efficient means to increase their situational knowledge of the other 

users around or near them so that they can operate efficiently and increase safety in the 

airport movement area. 

3.2 Mission Need and Shortfall 

The following Mission Need and Shortfalls have been identified in the FAA's NAS Requirements 

Specification (SR-1000), and Mission Need Statement for Enhanced Surveillance Capability 

(MNS 326): 

• Common/Shared Situational Awareness to improve operational efficiencies and 

enhanced operational safety, 
• Collaboration and Timely Communications of Airspace Information (e.g., aircraft 

location, NAS congestion, weather, and airspace information (NOTAMS, SUA, etc.) 

between service providers and airspace operators), 

• Collaboration and Timely Communications of Aeronautical Information (e.g., aircraft 

location, NAS congestion, weather, and airspace information (NOTAMS, SUA, etc.)) 

between service providers and Flight deck crews, 

• The opportunity to further enhance the efficiency of service providers, 

• Cost-effective system to prevent Controlled Flight Into Terrain (CFIT), 

• Cost-effective system to enhance see and avoid, 

• A cost-effective system to improve Terminal Operations in Low/Poor Visibility, 

• A cost-effective system to improve airport surface navigation for the pilot, 

• A cost-effective system to improve airport surface surveillance for controllers, and 

• A cost-effective system to improve surveillance in Non-Radar airspace 

3.3 Assumptions, Constraints, and Conditions 

The following assumptions, constraints and conditions have major impacts on the analyses 

described in this document and their conclusions: 

• The life cycle of FAA's current ground-based surveillance systems is assumed to be 20 

years from their initial service. 

• Legacy systems such as Mode S, ASDE radar and PRM will need to be replaced sooner 

than those systems in the current acquisition cycle such as ASDE-X, ATCBI-6 and 

ASR-11. 

• A selected number of terminal secondary (beacon) radars are assumed to be replaced by 

ADS-B after these radars reach their life cycles. 

• PRM initially will be replaced by multilateration. Multilateration PRM and the 

multilateration portion of ADSE-X/ASDE-3X are assumed to be replaced by ADS-B at 

the end of their life cycles. 

• The initial required operating date for the proposed investment of NAS wide 

implementation of ADS-B is assumed to be in the 5-year segment with Segment 1 

occurring from 2007 to 2012. 

• Avionics mandate for "ADS-B out" in Class A, B, C, D, and E is assumed to be 

approved by the FAA and the external aviation users. 

• ADS-B avionics cost (ADS-B out and CDTI) is assumed to be sufficiently economical 

to encourage timely equipage. 

• All three alternatives, ADS-B, radar replacement, and multilateration can provide air-toground surveillance capability for ATC in all domains, as well as the monitoring of 

independent approaches to closely spaced parallel runways. However, only the ADS-B 

alternative can support air-to-air surveillance applications to improve safety and 

efficiency of flight operations and ATC procedures. 
4 ALTERNATIVES ANALYZED 

As mentioned previously, three alternative solutions were examined for their ability to support 

future ATC "core surveillance" and "cockpit-based" capabilities that could meet the needs of the 

FAA and National Airspace System users. The three alternatives consist of: 

1. Implementing an ADS-B infrastructure in lieu of secondary surveillance radar (SSR) 

2. Continuing with a combined SSR and primary surveillance radar (PSR) system, and 

3. Implementing multilateration systems in lieu of SSR 

4.1 Alternative 1: ADS-B 

The ADS-B alternative includes installing ground stations to receive ADS-B transmissions at 

numerous locations throughout the US. ADS-B transmitters would be mandated to achieve 

nearly universal aircraft equipage that allows the continuation of ground-based separation 

services in addition to new cockpit-based roles and responsibilities. 

Core Surveillance: ADS-B provides a robust highly accurate, timely (once per second), fourdimensional (the three spatial dimensions and time) surveillance data link, based on the downlink 

of the aircraft's Global Positioning System (GPS) parameters. ADS-B message content provides 

distinct aircraft or vehicle-specific identification, and operational data in the air-to-air, air-toground, ground-to-air, and ground-to-ground operations, supporting all NAS domains (Terminal, 

Surface, En Route and/or Oceanic). 

Cockpit-Based Capabilities: The two-way data link portion of ADS-B, also enables a range of 

cockpit based applications. Applications supported include: uplink of graphical weather and 

flight information data, traffic information (radar or other automated surveillance information), 

runway incursion map displays (i.e., surface moving maps), and efficiency applications -

allowing for better sequencing and separation of aircraft. 

4.1.1 Key Alternative Activities 

Assumes airspace MANDATE, for "ADS-B out" (Squit only), for all aircraft in Class A, B, C, D 

and E. Retains all primary radar, divests beacon, PRM and ASDE-class radars in 2018, after 

mandate in effect. Supports "Core" Surveillance, Cockpit "Advisory" applications, and Cockpit 

"Critical" applications. 

• Procure 419 ground stations, 

• Develop 6 automation interfaces, 

• Deploy 3 Broadcast Service Control Facilities. 

4.2 Alternative 2: Radar Replacement 

Core Surveillance: This alternative provides for the next generational replacement of radar 

infrastructure, in accordance with lifecycles of existing radar systems. This alternative would 

continue to maintain the varying classes of radar supporting existing mission areas of Surface, 
Terminal and En Route domains. It recognizes the potential for future growth in overall numbers 

of systems to meet increasing capacity demands in all domains, as well as, support surveillance 

requirements for offshore domestic airspace (i.e., the Gulf of Mexico and Caribbean) may be 

required. 

Cockpit-Based Capabilities: Within the NAS today, there are several systems capable of 

delivering cockpit-based applications, which operate outside of NAS parameters as a commercial 

service. Chief amongst these are the satellite weather providers, which deliver a fee for service 

product, to specially equipped aircraft. In addition, the FAA provides Traffic Information 

Services (TIS) from existing Mode-S radars, which also requires specialized equipment. 

4.2.1 Key Alternative Activities 

Assumes replacement of all classes of radar in accordance to normal 20 year life cycle and full 

procurement quantities. Provides equipage costs for delivery of TIS and commercial FIS, 

including upgrade of 112 ASR-lls to support TIS. Supports "Core" Surveillance and Cockpit 

"Advisory" Services. 

4.3 Alternative 3: Multilateration 

Core Surveillance: This alternative is based upon the use of Multilateration, which is a beaconbased cooperative surveillance system. It can function with both existing and future 

transponders (i.e. Modes A/C, Mode S short and future extended squitter transponders). 

Multilateration functions by triangulating aircraft position based on time difference of arrival of 

signals to multiple ground stations. Multilateration is currently in use as a surface surveillance 

tool through the ASDE-X program, and has been tested for use in supporting the Terminal and 

En Route airspace domains. 

Cockpit-Based Capabilities: Within the NAS today, there are several systems capable of 

delivering cockpit-based applications, which operate outside of NAS parameters as a commercial 

service. Chief amongst these are the satellite weather providers, which deliver a fee for service 

product, to specially equipped aircraft. In addition, the FAA provides Traffic Information 

Services (TIS) from existing Mode-S radars, which also requires specialized equipment. 

4.3.1 Key Alternative Activities 

Develop and procure 1230 Multilateration ground stations, develop 5 automation interfaces. 

Provides equipage cost for delivery of TIS and commercial FIS, including upgrade of 

Multilateration to support TIS. Retains all primary, divests Beacon and PRM. Supports "Core" 

Surveillance and Cockpit "Advisory" Services. 

5 EVALUATION CRITERIA 

The aforementioned three alternatives, ADS-B, Radar Replacement, and Multilateration have 

been evaluated with respect to the following criteria: 

10 
• "Core surveillance" function for detection, tracking and separation of aircraft in 

CONUS, Gulf of Mexico and Caribbean. 

• Cockpit "Advisory" Services to deliver a range of traffic, weather and database products 

which will increase pilot "situation awareness" and decision-making ability. 

• Cockpit "Critical" Services to provide a range of envisioned cockpit display 

applications enabling transfer of spacing/separation responsibilities from ATC to the 

pilot. 

• The Economic Analysis / Business Case Analysis considers FAA life cycle costs and 

user safety and efficiency benefits in estimating the net present value (NPV) and 

benefit/cost (B/C) ratio. The NPV is the difference between the present value (PV) of 

benefits and the present value of costs. The benefit/cost (B/C) ratio is calculated by 

dividing the PV of benefits by the PV of costs. 

6 BUSINESS CASE ANALYSIS 

6.1 Schedule Analysis 

The schedule analysis was highly dependant upon assumptions surrounding currently deployed 

and future proposed radar systems. As a means to minimize any risks associated with 

assumptions concerning these radar systems, representatives from ATO-T, ATO-E, and ATO-P / 

Enterprise Architecture, were asked to and did participate in their development. 

In order to account for a full replacement cycle of surveillance, a life cycle that extended to 2035 

was ground ruled in for all alternatives. 

6.1.1 Alternative 1: ADS-B 

The ADS-B program consists of three segments, each approximately five years in duration. The 

life cycle for the entire program (including steady state operations) starts in FY2007 and ends in 

FY2035. In this alternative, phase out of radar (i.e., SSR, ASDE-3, PRM) begins in 2018. 

6.1.1.1 ADS-B High Level Milestones 

ADS-B implementation is a multi-domain program that requires integration of four major 

components: 1) ground infrastructure, 2) automation, 3) data and 4) avionics. See Figure 1. 

11 
06 07 08 09 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24-35 

I h _, h 

C B « B - Includes Mode d Vail 

Class C, D, 8, ETfarl^RFImhl] 

Awareness Activities 

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IPiodudion 1090 Radio 

lUAT Radio Install I Commission (J10 GBTs 6 261 Sites) 

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M Control Facility linpl (3) . 

^__HadioTech_Rerresh_ 

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Figure 1: ADS-B High Level Milestones 

6.1.1.2 Avionics Implementation 

This activity consists of the development and the issuing of the airspace mandates for ADS-B 

avionics. The affected airspace includes class A, B, C, D and E. This task also includes 

completion of the standards development, procedures, guidance, training material and 

compliance monitoring. All of these tasks will be executed through Service Level Agreements 

with the appropriate FAA organizations; they in turn will use their current existing support 

contract to execute the work. A tiger-team lead by AVS is being considered to accomplish the 

above activities. Key members include Flight Standards, Aircraft Certification, Rule Making and 

the ADS-B Program Office. Other members will be added as needed, which could include 

industry avionics vendors. 

6.1.1.3 Ground Infrastructure Implementation 

The ADS-B ground infrastructure is divided into two areas: Ground Based Transceivers (GBTs) 

and Control Facilities. In accordance with the FAA link policy decision, two links will be 

employed within the GBT for use within this country. The two links selected are UAT (978 

MHz) and 1090 MHz Extended Squitter (ES), resulting in two radios for each GBT. The endstate for Segment 1 deployment of GBTs is 281 locations within the CONUS and Hawaii, and 

three control facilities that integrate ADS-B, radar and weather data for processing and 

dissemination. 

6.1.1.4 Automation Implementation 

12 
ADS-B NAS-wide implementation requires integration into multiple FAA ATC automation 

platforms. Each platform is currently in the FAA inventory and/or under current development. 

ADS-B integration will be achieved through Service Level Agreement (SLA) with each 

appropriate program office, which in turn, will plan for development with the prime vendors for 

the system. It is anticipated that FFP contracts will be used for integration, since requirements for 

ADS-B reporta are well defined in existing standards (MOPS / MASPS). Risk reduction on the 

computer human interface (CHI) will be done using the FAA's Human Factors Laboratory with 

controller participation. This will result in the development of firm specifications, enabling the 

use of FFP contracts. Integration will be done on the following ATC platforms: 

• ERAM (Lockheed-Martin / Prime) 

• STARS (Raytheon / Prime) 

• CARTS (Lockheed-Martin / Prime) 

• ATOP (Lockheed-Martin / Prime) 

• ASDE-X (Sensis / Prime) 

• MicroEARTS (Lockheed-Martin/Prime) (Integration accomplished in the AK Capstone 

effort) 

• ETMS 

6.1.1.5 Data Products Implementation 

Data products that will be utilized in the ADS-B program include Surface Moving Map data for 

the top 200 busiest airports (Segment 3), weather products (METAR, TAF and graphical 

weather) and temporary flight restriction (TFR) / NOT AM data. It is possible that all of these 

data products may be procured through existing government contracts. However, if those 

products are not suitable or available then they will be procured through FFP contracts with full 

and open competition. 

6.1.2 ADS-B Segment 1 (FY 2007 through 2012) 

With a positive investment decision on September 9, 2005, the first segment (OMB Useful 

Segment 1) is planned to begin in 2007 and end in 2012. The first segment is subdivided into 

four strategic elements which are described below and run concurrently. 

6.1.2.1 Element 1: En Route / Oceanic Airspace 

This element is focused on the "core surveillance" en route airspace environment in the U.S., 

which typically controls air traffic traversing the country at altitudes above 18,000 feet. In 

addition, en route air traffic controllers deliver limited services to smaller airports not served by 

terminal air traffic control (approach control). This element will provide installation of 183 GBT 

sites across the Continental U.S. (CONUS) as well as integration of ADS-B data into the En 

Route Automation Modernization (ERAM) and Advanced Technologies & Oceanic Procedures 

(ATOP) ATC automation systems. The goal is to provide continuous coverage of all CONUS en 

route airspace 6000 feet and above, mimicking coverage available today with radar. Because of 

the unique, multifunctional capabilities of the GBT, it is expected that most will be installed at 

Terminal airports sited in a manner to support all three domains (surface, terminal, en route). 

13 
This element also includes the release of an ADS-B avionics mandate for all aircraft operating in 

the following airspace classes: A, B, C, D, and E. (Element Duration: FY07-FY12). 

6.1.2.2 Element 2: Terminal / Surface Airspace 

This Element is focused on the "core surveillance" Terminal and Surface airspace environments 

in the U.S., which typically control traffic from the surface to within 60 miles of an airport. 

Element 2 leverages the airspace mandate for avionics equipage implemented in Element 1. This 

element will provide integration of ADS-B data into several terminal automation systems; 

Common ARTS, STARS, and Airport Surface Detection Equipment. This will support 

continued service delivery to those airports, currently controlling terminal traffic. Ultimately, 

Element 2 is expected to result in the FAA's ability to divest itself of existing beacon, precision 

runway monitoring, and surface detection radars. Full benefit accrual for this divestiture is not 

expected until 2016/18, when airspace mandates come into full effect. (Element Duration: FY07-

FY12). 

6.1.2.3 Element 3: Broadcast Services 

This Element is focused on delivery of cockpit-based "third dimensional" capabilities, aimed at 

significantly improving the FAA's ability to reduce Controlled Flight Into Terrain (CFIT), 

weather and mid-air collision related accidents - especially within the general aviation 

community where an installed base of 50,000+ cockpit MFD's already exists. This is to be 

accomplished through the delivery of uplink broadcast services, which includes Traffic 

Information Service-Broadcast (TIS-B) and Flight Information Services-Broadcast (FIS-B) 

delivered on the 978 MHz UAT link. Delivery of this service requires the establishment of three 

Broadcast Services Control Facilities (CF's), which will be located in existing en route centers in 

the East, Central, and West parts of the country. Establishment of the CF's also creates the 

FAA's first fully networked surveillance data architecture, hosting radar, ADS-B, and weather 

data simultaneously. This capability will be used to support additional surveillance applications, 

such as Traffic Flow Management, Surface Management, and Flight Monitoring capability 

within Segment 2 of the program. (Element Duration: FY07-FY12). 

6.1.2.4 Element 4: Enabling Technology 

This Element focuses on applied research and development that includes the continued 

development of applications, capabilities, standards, and procedures needed in Segments 2 and 3. 

(Element Duration: FY07-FY12). 

6.1.3 Alternative 2: Radar Replacement 

Implementation schedules associated with the Radar Replacement Alternative were based on the 

assumptions outlined in Table 1 and original / current radar system data outlined in Table 2. 

Table 1: Radar Replacement Schedule Assumptions (per radar system) 

14 
rii'»r.iin 

ARSR-2 

FPS 

ARSR-3 

ARSR-4 

ASR-7 

ASR-8 

ASR-9 

ASR-11 

BI-4 

BI-5 

Mode-S 

BI-6 

PRM 

ASDE-3 

AMASS 

ASDE-X/3X 

PRM-A 

ASR-11(71 

Systems) 

ASR-7 (71 

Systems) 

ASR-8 (71 

Systems) 

BI-4 (71 

Systems) 

BI-5 (71 

Systems) 

. Activity: 

Economic Service Life (Years) 

SLEP Lifecycle (Y sars) 

"

 :*~ ~ 

Replacement Duration Increase to SLEP 

Table 2: Radar 

:": Svslrmt 

\ i i ;•!><. 

18 

22 

12 

41 

31 

64 

135 

112 

64 

155 

144 

122 

7 

40 

40 

38 

1 

71 

31 

64 

64 

155 

it lit hi-.inll 

1968 

1982 

1981 

1998 

1971 

1975 

1988 

2002 

1971 

1976 

1992 

2002 

1996 

1994 

2001 

2002 

2006 

2002 

1971 

1975 

1971 

1976 

-

(Years) 

Duration 

20 

15 

6 

Replacement Schedule / Cost Model Inputs 

l.ilM 

lii'lull s 

1968 

1982 

1981 

1998 

1971 

1975 

2000 

2013 

1971 

1976 

1992 

2008 

2006 

2004 

2004 

2010 

2006 

2008 

1971 

1975 

1971 

1976 

M IT 

:ii 1 IJJU2006 

2006 

2008 

2018 

10000 

10000 

2006 

2022 

10000 

10000 

2012 

2022 

2016 

2014 

2021 

2022 

2026 

2022 

10000 

2008 

10000 

10000 

M h V 

|)ili:ilinii • 

5 

5 

5 

5 

10000 

10000 

5 

12 

10000 

10000 

8 

7 

11 

11 

4 

9 

2 

7 

10000 

4 

10000 

10000 

( Mlsllll-MTIIIV 

\i:ir 

2026 

2026 

2028 

2038 

10000 

10000 

2026 

2049 

10000 

10000 

2035 

2044 

2042 

2040 

2040 

2046 

2043 

2044 

10000 

10000 

10000 

10000 

lti-]>l:iu-M:irl 

D.ili 

2018 

2018 

2018 

2018 

10000 

10000 

2025 

2027 

10000 

10000 

2017 

2025 

2021 

2019 

2023 

2026 

2031 

2022 

10000 

2025 

10000 

10000 

Ki-pluri1 > II ml inn 

18 

18 

18 

18 

10000 

10000 

11 

18 

10000 

10000 

14 

13 

10 

11 

10 

15 

4 

13 

10000 

10 

10000 

10000 

6.1.4 Alternative 3: Multilateration 

The schedule for Multilateration implementation mimicked ADS-B's except that the phase out of 

radar could begin in 2009. 

6.2 Life Cycle Cost Analysis Summary 

The Future Surveillance life cycle costs from FY 2007 through FY 2035 for the three alternatives 

are summarized below: 

Table 2: Alternative Cost Analysis Summary (in $M) 

Element 

(Core Surveillance 

ADS-B 

$3,805.21 

Radar Replacement 

$6,932.9 ~ 

Multilateration 

$3,370.84 

F&E $1,008.00 

£662.11: 

$4,117.8 

.1-

$1,816.41 

II^5^43 K 

15 
§$2| 

Services - AdviCcfr^Seitfiieii 

F&E 

*11_ . _ 

$157.21 

rlJS|33©i6 

$38.5 

ill 

" $168.0 

O&M 

User Cost 

$863.31 j 

$922^9 " 1 

$26.3 

"$6,271.8 

$141.4 

$67271.8~ 

Gulf of Mexico 

iO&M 

Caribbean 

P&E^ 

IDTI Enhanced Applications - Critical Service 

=&E 

fp&M 

[User Costs 

rota I Costs 

j $59.75 

F $2938" 

$122.5 

~$57l"" 

$30.37 $65H 

$35.82 

I $17.85 i 

"i $17.97 r 

r"$284^1~~r " 

_$16j 

$10! 

$6.0? 

$0, 

$oi 

$104.92 

"$1^035.7 

$7^269.73 

$01 

;$13, 

$84.73 

t$7§i95:r 

$2i.BJf 

*S!$W" 

mi 

>4 08^723 

6.2.1 Cost Team Composition 

The Cost Estimate was developed by a team with representatives from various FAA 

organizations and contract support organizations. Table 3 lists the cost team members and their 

responsibilities. 

Jim Baird 

Marc Buntin 

Nastaran Coleman 

Leslie Crane 

Kirk Curran 

Kevin Delaney 

Uacob Dorsey 

Paul Fontaine 

Bill Fromme 

David Frostbutter 

Larry Greene 

Table 3: Cost Team Members 

ATO-P/NAS 

Architecture 

JSF 21" " " 

iEn Route/Oceanic, 

jproject SafeGuard 

ATO-P/Benefits 

TMTTRE 

(SF-21 Support 

jATO-F/QuanTech 

(202)385-7205 

1(202) 493-4990 

IJames.B aird@faa. gov 

.Charles .Buntin@faa. gov 

(202)385-7311 jNastaran.Coleman@faa.gov 

(703) 983-7243 

(202)493-4685 

(202) 570-0191 

ATO-T 

iSF-21 

jSF-21/Calibre 

T

SF-21,JHU/APL 

Lescrane@mitre. org 

JKirk. Curran@faa.gov 

jKdeIancy@quantechserv.com 

(202) 493-4549 Jacob.Dorsey@faa.gov 

(202) 267-3468 [Paul.Fontaine@faa.gov 

(703) 797-8500 EXT 8911 bfromme@calibresys.com 

1(202) 528-3537 JDavid.Frostbutter@jhuapl.edu 

Mike Geyer 

Katrina Hall 

Jonathan Hammer 

LAVS/ Safety/ 

Support 

JVOLPE 

(202)646-5831 

ATO-F Cost 

MITRE 

Larry.Greene@baesystems.com 

(617)494-2749 

(202) 385-7282 

1(703) 983-5209 

Michael.Geyer@volpe.dot.gov 

jKatrina.Hall@faa.gov 

phammer@mitre .com 

Michele Heiney SF-21 [(202) 409-8486 MHeiney@subsystem.com 

Kent Hollinger 

Dan Howell 

[Ron Jones 

MITRE Avionics 

3VICRI 

IATO-P/NAS" 

jArchitecture 

1(703) 983-5573 

1(703)416-9500 EXT 272 

(202) 385-7133 

jKenth@mitre. org 

bHowell@MCRI.com 

Ronnie. Jones @faa. gov 

16 
{Phil Leman 

George Lloyd 

|John McCarron 

[James McDaniel 

John McGraw 

INav. Services 

JNATCA 

ATO-Oceanic 

!;SF-21 

AFS-400 

(202) 385-7546 

(202) 493:5079 

Phillip.Leman@FAA.Gov 

George.A.Lloyd@FAA.Gov 

{(202) 385-8441 

|(202) 493-4707 

1(202) 385-4589 

|John.McCarron@faa.gov 

JamesMcDaniel@faa.gov 

jJohn.McGraw@faa.gov 

Ron Mace 

John Marksteiner 

Allen K. Mears 

[NAS Ops Concept 

pev & Validation 

iSF-21 

TAVS 7 Safety/' 

iSupport 

(202) 267-8082 

(202) 493-4647 

1(202) 646-5854 

Ronaldxtr ,Mace@F A A. Gov 

Jeff Mittelman 

John C. Moody 

Huan Nguyen 

Robert (Bobby) Nichols 

Jim Nickum 

Avani Pandya 

MITRE/CAASD 

[MITRE 

IIOT&E 

ISF-21 

Mitre Avionics 

(703) 983-7603 

(703) 983-5506 

(202)^67-849£ 

(202)267-9912 

(703)983-6961 

JJohn.Marksteiner@faa.gov 

amears@cssiinc.com 

imitt@mitre.org 

!CMoody@mitre .com 

Huan.Nguyen@faa. gov 

Robert.Nichols@faa. go v 

|Jdnickum@mitre. org 

;OMB / Support 1(410) 379-0130 Apandya@mcri. com 

Robert (Bob) Pangione 

GaryPaull 

Tom Prevost 

James (Jim) Reagan 

MCR (Cost) |(781) 687-9000 EXT 239 Rpangion@mcri.com 

Benefit / Support 

SF-21 

pVIITRE 

|(703) 416-9500 EXT 223 

(202) 493-4977 

1(703) 983-5840"" . 

GPaull@mcri. com 

Tom.Prevost@faa.gov 

Jreagan@mitre .com 

JeffReeder iATO-F/QuanTech j(202) 370-0181 Jreeder@quantechserv. com 

William (Bill) Russell 

Thomas Ryan 

Heywood Shirer 

Leslie Smith 

ATO-F Support 1(202) 548-5579 

ATO-P / Tech Dev 1(202) 267-9086 

"""*""" ~^2"^38S4583~ 

William.e.russel@baesystems .com 

Thomas.e.ryan@faa.gov 

Heywood. O. Shirer@faa. gov 

Fred Sapp 

Toni Stack 

JA FS-410_ 

jAFS-150 

JSF-21 

[(202)493-5128 

|(202) 267-7920 

Neal Suchy 

Shahan Stepanian 

Ronald L. Stroup 

jSF-21 Support 1(202)329-2306 

William Waldron 

Wes Wright 

Jack Wojciech 

jCost Support 

jSystem Safety 

1ATO-E 

1ATO-F 

JSF-21 Support 

1(781)687-9000 EXT 245 

1(202)385-7186 

Leslie. Smith@F A A. Gov 

Fred. S app@faa .gov 

Toni.Stack@faa.gov 

Neal.ctr.Suchy@faa.gov 

(202)385-8452 

(202)385-7271 

(202) 863-2680 EXT 212 

Gene Wong jSF-21 Support 

Jyoti Vasudeva 

Yen-KhanhVu 

;SF-21 

ttOT&E 

S Stepani@mcri. com 

Ronald L Stroup/AWA/FAA, 

William.Waldron@FAA.Gov 

Westley. Wright@faa. gov 

Jwoj ciech@jil.com 

(202) 267-5339 

(202) 493-4405 

(609)485-8031 

Gene.ctr.wong@faa.gov 

Jyoti.ctr.Vasudeva@faa.gov 

Yen-khanh.vu@faa.gov 

6.2.2 Ground Rules and Assumptions 

General ground rules and assumptions for cost estimates are as follows: 

• Life-cycle through 2035 - To account for full replacement cycle of surveillance 

• Primary radar assumed to be retained in all alternatives, therefore cost excluded 

17 
- Except for ASR-1 l/8s which trade-off in varying alternatives 

As per Mr. Chew direction from IARR, include TIS/FIS cost in Radar/Multilateration 

alternatives, for equal comparison to ADS-B Broadcast Services 

Table 4: Radar: Ground Rules and Assumptions 

* Primary radar excluded from analysis except where systems are integrated with secondary 

surveillance or surface movement 

Kcfrrviiu.'('use ••• \ 1)^-1! k:nl.n Mullil.ili-r.ili'Hi 

Retained Surveillance Systems* 

ASR-8 

ASR-11 

BI-4 

BI-5 

Mode-S 

It 1-0 

PRM 

PRM-A (WAM) 

ASDE-3 (SMR) 

AMASS 

ASDE-X/3X 

Replaced by ASR-11 program 

Procure all 112 systems 

Replaced by ASR-11 program 

Replaced by ASR-11 program 

Sustain (Tech Refresh, SLEP) 

Continue planned acquisition 

Continue planned acquisition 

Continue planned acquisition 

Sustain (Tech Refresh, SLEP) 

Sustain based on current ASDEX/3X 

Continue planned acquisition 

Sustain planned inventory 

Procure 71 systems 

Replaced by ADS-B 

Replaced by ADS-B 

Sustain until replaced by ADS-B 

Continue planned acquisition until 

replaced by ADS-B 

Continue planned acquisition until 

replaced by ADS-B 

Continue planned acquisition until 

replaced by ADS-B 

Sustain until replaced by ADS-B 

Sustain until replaced by ADS-B 

Continue planned acquisition until 

Surface Movement Radar (SMR) 

portion is replaced by ADS-B 

Replaced by ASR-11 

Procure all 112 systems 

Replaced ASR-11 program 

Replaced ASR-11 program 

Replace and Sustain 

Replace and sustain 

Continue planned acquisition until 

replaced by PRM-A after initial 

economic service life 

Replace and sustain 

Continue planned acquisition 

Continue planned acquisition 

Continue planned acquisition with 

Surface Movement Radar (SMR) 

portion 

Sustain planned inventory 

Procure 71 systems 

Replaced by Multilat 

Replaced by Multilat 

Sustain until replaced by Multilat 

Continue planned acquisition until 

replaced by Multilat 

Continue planned acquisition until 

replaced by Multilat 

Continue planned acquisition until 

replaced by Multilat 

Continue planned acquisition 

Continue planned acquisition 

Continue planned acquisition with 

Surface Movement Radar (SMR) 

portion 

6.2.3 Scope of the Estimate 

This estimate addresses the acquisition, implementation, and operations and maintenance costs 

for the three Future Surveillance alternatives. This estimate provides the acquisition and support 

costs for the timeframe FY07 through FY35. Costs are presented in TY dollars with risk in 

millions and by appropriation, WBS element, and phased by year. 

Business justifications for ADS-B, Radar Replacement and Multilateration are given by Tables 

5, 6, and 7 respectively. Specific details concerning these results can be found in each of the 

alternative's corresponding Basis of Estimate (BOE) documents referenced in Appendix A. 

Table 5: Business Justification for ADS-B 
Ris k Adjusted 

Costs (Then-Year $M) 

F A A 

F&E j 

O&U 

Total 

USB I 

Total _ 

Benefit; (Then-Year $M) _] _ 

F A A Avoided Costs _ 

Other Avoided Costs (DHS feUsetJ^ 

Safety 

Efficiency (ADOC & PVT) _ 

Total _ _ _ 1 

Ne t Cash Flow (Then Yea r $M) | 

Economic Analysis 1 

NPV ($M) '' 

» C Raiio 1 

IRR 

Payback 

FY07 

$I28~7 

$0 0 

$128 7 

$122 l_j 

J230 8! 

— — 

Z<?isjL 

$0 0 ' 

$0 0 

$0 0; 

_ <J1S)[ 

i 

| 

$1,034 1 

1 3 ! 

10% i 

23 years 1 

FY08 

$138 7 

$0 0 

$138 7 

$406 2 

$5449 

— •+ 

$60 3 

$ 1 0 

$8 0! 

SO 6j 

$69 9 

(3471 P)j 

J 

1 

FY09 

$1279 

$41 

$132 0 

$412 3 

$5443, 

$874 , 

_$2 4 

$248 

Sis 

$116 4 

(S4 7< ^ 

1 

i 

FYIO 

$2567 

$3 8 

$260 5 

$418 5 

$678 9j 

$710 

$ 4 1 

$61 ll 

$3 7 

$139 9 * 

(WT ) 

-

1 

FY11 

$1246 

$36 3 

$160 9 

$331 4 

$492 3 

$23 2 

$4 6 

$97 2 

_ **V 

_$129 7 _ 

i% e>6) 

t 

FY12 

1 

$36 4 

$45 2 

$816 , 

$336 3 

$417 8 

— 

$24 4 

$ 5 0 

$135 8 

$5 8 

$171 0 

] 

FY13 

, 

$37.6 ~~ 

$44.5 

$821 

$3417 

$423 8 

$24 6 

_ $5 3 ^ 

$176 4) 

$ 6 9 

$213.5 

(%2101)i 

I 

FY14 

$253 

$51 4 

$76 8 

$250 8 

$327 5 

i 

$31 1 1~ 

$5 9 

$218 r 

$81 , 

$2633 

($64 i)\ 

i 

t 

, 

TY15 FY16 FT3 5 

$219 

$544 

$76 4 

$284 a ^ 

$361 1 

L 

-5 

$35 6 

$ 6 2 

$268 3 

$94 , 

$319J 

tel6)l 

1 

I 

$599 J 

$143 9 0 

$2 038_5 

$1 189 7 

$3 228 2 

— ~"' 

$1 083 6 

$1572 

$8,435 0 

$12,830-9 

$22,506 7 ] 

$19278 5 

j 

i 

Total 

$1 497 4 

$167 8 7 

$3 176 0 

$4 093 7 

_ $7 269 7 

— 

$1 439 3 

$192 1 

$9,4243 

$12 871 5 

$23,928 0 

$16 658 3 

Table 6: Business Justification for Radar Replacement 

Ris k Adjusted 

Costs (Then-Year $M) 

Tota l FAA Costs 

F&E 

O S M 

Total 

Tota l Costs 

F A A 

Use i 

Tota l _ 

Benefits (Then Year $M) 

F A A Avoided Costs 

^_ FY0 7 

I 

1 

' $173 3 

' $63 8 

$242 1 

$2421 ~~ 

$139 2~^ 

^_ _$381 3 

_ _i _ — 

$204 3 

Other Avoided Costs (DHS & User) j $0 0 

Safety 

Efficiency (ADOC & P VT) 

Total 

I «1 

$0.8 

J210 2 

FY06 

$2225 

$70 1 

$292 6 

$292 6 

$306 0 

$598 JL 

—-

$247 2 

$ 0 0 

$141 

$ 1 7 

$263 J] 

FY09 

$192 2 

$73 3 

$2656 

$265 6 

$3216 

$537 1 

$242 5 

$ 0 0 

$26 6 

$2.6 

$2717 

FY10 

$143 9 

$777 

$2215 

$221J 

$337? 

$559 4 _ 

$2021 

$ 0 0 

$51 3 

$3.6 

$257 j5 

FY11 

1 

$72 5 

$30 9 

$153 4 

$153 4 

$266 0 

$419 4 

$137 8 

$0 0 

$84 4 

$ 4 7 

$226 3 

FY12 

$45 3 

$S3 5 

$123 9 

$128 9 

$282 2 

$4111 

$1212 

$0 0 

$113 9 

$ 5 7 

$2459 

FY13 

$32 7 

$85 4 

$138 2 

$138 2 

$2991 

$4373 

L 

$1157 

$0 0 

$155 0 

$6 9 

$277 6 

FY14 

$416 

$840 

$125 6 

$125 6 

$301 1 

$426 7 

$123 9 

$00_ 

$191 £ 

$8.0 

$323 8 

FY15 F 

$18 3 

$87 0 

$1053 ^ 

$105 3~ 

$319 1 

$424 4 

$U9 4 

$ 0 0 

$236 5 

$9 3 

$365 2 

T 1 6 FY3S _ 

$3,262.2 

$2,201 6 

$5,463 8 

T54638 

$3 699.6 

$9 163 4 

$3/23 3 

$0 0 

$7 323 2 

$5 095 2 

$16 041 S 

^Total _ 

$4,2246 

$2 912 4 

$7 137 0 

$7 137 0 

$6271 8 

$13 408 3 

$5 137 5 

$0 0 

$8207 6 

$5 133 5 

$13 483 6 

Net Cashflow (The nYearSM) 

Ficonenuc Analysis 

NFV($M) 

B/C Ratio _ 

IRR 

Payback 

{J171 I)' $33_>LT) _$~IJ j § 01 !y ($1926i (tloj Jt ($1396^ _ (3ICU 

$16 0 

10 

7% 

30 ye ais 

_j$30_2) _ $6 87S 4 $5 0748 

Table 7: Business Justification for Multilateration 

Ris k Adjasted 

Costs (Then Year $M) 

F A A 

F&E 

O&M 

Total 1 

Use t 

Total 

Benefits (Then Year $M) 

F A A Avoided Costs 

Other AvoidedCosts (DHS & Usei) 

Safety 

Efficiency (ADOC & PVT) 

Total 

Ne t Cash Flow (Then-Year $M) 

Economic Analysis 

NPV($M) 

B/C Reno 

IRR 

Payback 

FY07 

~~$1517~ 

$0 0 

$1517 

$139 2 

$2910 

-

$ 0 6 

$ 0 0 

$5 1 

$ 0 8 

$6 5 

t$2S4 5) 

11743 7) 

OS 

3 % 

N /A 

FY08 | 

J 

$168 5 

S0 9\ 

$169 5 

$306 0 

$475.5 

$62 7 

$0 0 j 

$13 9 

$17 ; 

$782 

$39 7 2?, 

• 

FY09 

1 

$88 1 

$ 2 2 

$90 3 

$3216 

$4118 

| 

$93 5 

$oo' 

$26 1 

$ 2 6 

$122 5 

($^S 1)J 

FYIO 

$410 3 

$ 1 6 

$4119 

$337 9 

$749 8 

$349 

$00 

$510 

$ 3 6 

$139 5 

(Jb 0 4i a 

FY11 

$448 4 

$721 

$455 6 

$266 0 

$721 6 

_

 $43 7 

$ 0 0 

$829 

$4.6 ( 

$1312 

($5°0 f; 

FY12 

~ $801 

$15 1 

$95 1 

$232 2 

$377 4 

$70 4 

$0 0 

$116 7 

$56 

$1928 

tl£16 ) 

FY13 

$23 5 

$22 4 

$45 9 

$2991 

$345 0 

$716 

$ 0 0 

$152 2 

$ 6 8 

$230 6 

1>il4-*f_ 

___ 

FY14 

$8 4 

$622 

$70 6 

$301 1 

$3717 

$789 

$ 0 0 

$188 4~ 

$7.9 

$275 2 

" ($96 5) 

— 

FY13 FY16-FY33 

$8 3 

$64 9 

$73 2 

$319 1 

$392 3 

— 

$74 7 

$0X1 

$2323 

$9 1 

$316 0 

(T6J& 

— 

t 

$496 3 

$1467 5 

$1963 8 

$3,699 6 

$5 663 4 

— 

$3518 

$ 0 0 

$7 191 8 

$3,003 7 

$12,547 3 

_ $ 6 883 9__ 

— — — 

Total 

$1 3836 

$1644 0 

$3 527 J 

$6,2713 

$9 799 3 

— 

$9332 

$ 0 0 

$8 060 2 

$5,0463 

$14,039 7 

_ $4,2404 

6.2.4 Cost - Risk Adjustment 

19 
Risk analysis was performed to assess the impact of changes to various cost assumptions to the 

overall cost of the program. The point estimate was revised to reflect these uncertainties. 

Probability distributions were defined for certain WBS elements to determine the possible ranges 

of results. A Monte Carlo simulation was then run on these distributions to determine expected 

results with an 80% confidence level. The increased costs associated with the Risk analysis were 

then redistributed across the point estimate yielding the 'Risk adjustment'. 

6.3 Benefits Analysis 

The ADS-B and alternative benefits were estimated relative to the existing ATC system, with 

established procedures currently in effect. Historical data were combined with traffic projections 

to describe the baseline from which benefits could be measured. This reference point was 

modified, prior to estimating benefits, to reflect any approved future improvements to the 

baseline that are scheduled during the analysis time period. An example is mandatory equipage 

with Terrain Awareness Warning Systems (TAWS). System effectiveness measures, the percent 

reduction in either accident rates or typical delay times, were applied to the estimated baseline 

level in order to derive expected benefits. Effectiveness was defined in terms of the 

improvement expected given the technology is adopted. The system effectiveness, the percent of 

the population equipped, and the percent of infrastructure installed are key drivers in all the 

benefit estimates. These factors combine to represent the level of benefits that are expected in 

the future. 

Benefits were estimated in terms of both safety and efficiency gains. Safety benefits are derived 

from the estimated reductions in accident rates and the potential economic savings in terms of 

avoided loss of life, injuries and aircraft damages. The efficiency benefits quantified primarily 

refer to cost avoidance and delay. The delay savings are valued in terms aircraft direct operating 

costs and passenger value of time. 

The historical baselines for the safety benefits were based on a careful review of National 

Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) aviation accident reports, a 16-year period 1989 through 

2004 was used. Appropriate database search methodologies were developed for each accident 

type for which reductions are expected. The set of accidents identified for each category were 

compared to ensure that specific incidents were not counted more than once towards the potential 

benefits. Specifically, in order to avoid overestimating benefits, accidents involving adverse 

weather conditions in-flight that were also categorized as a Controlled Flight Into Terrain (CFIT) 

events were split evenly between historical adverse weather and CFIT accidents. The total 

historical number of accidents for each accident type was tabulated by category of operations or 

accident composition, and region and compared with traffic counts over the same time period to 

estimate accident rates. The mandate such as including Terrain Awareness Warning Systems 

(TAWS) in particular aircraft classes was accounted for prior to estimating the effectiveness of 

ADS-B capabilities. 

The efficiency baseline is primarily defined in terms of total flight hours and total delay hours. 

Flight and delay times were estimated for each user group and by location in order to reflect the 

baselines associated with each benefit element. Flight and schedule data from the Enhanced 

Traffic Management System (ETMS), Airline Service Quality Performance (ASQP), and the 

20 
Official Airline Guide (OAG) were combined with weather observations from the National 

Climatic Data Center (NCDC) to generate baselines under differing operating conditions. The 

FAA Aviation System Performance Metrics (ASPM) database integrates this information and 

was accessed to generate the baseline metrics needed to accurately portray the potential 

efficiency benefits. 

Both the safety and efficiency historical baselines are a function of traffic density. The baselines 

are combined with traffic projections from the FAA Terminal Area Forecasts (TAF) to develop 

forecasts of potential benefits each year. In addition, the timeframe for which each benefit starts 

to accrue is based on when the specific application is to be operationally certified to provide the 

desired outcomes as well as on user equipage and the commissioning of the necessary ground 

equipment. The team developed the outcome phasing schedule based on its coordination with the 

ADS-B program office. The program is divided into three segments based on the timing of 

provided equipment or services, assumed equipage, and assumed application certification. The 

year that each desired outcome is assumed to start providing benefits is listed in Table 8 below. 

Table 8: Outcome Phasing Schedule 

Segment %, p . Outcome Start Year ° Service 

Segment 

1 

Segment 

2 

Segment 

3 

Core 

Surveillance 

Broadcast 

Services 

Gulf of 

Mexico 

Surveillance 

Caribbean 

Surveillance 

Surface 

Moving Map 

CDTI 

Enhanced 

Applications 

Cost Avoidance 

Improved search and rescue services 

Reduction in number of aircraft intercepts 

Fewer aircraft-to-aircraft conflicts 

Fewer controlled flights into terrain (CFIT) 

Fewer encounters with hazardous weather 

More efficient weather deviations 

Cost avoidance - weather subscriptions 

Increased non-radar en route sector capacity 

Increased access to optimal routes 

Increased access to optimal altitudes 

Fewer aircraft-to-aircraft conflicts 

Fewer controlled flights into terrain (CFIT) 

Fewer encounters with hazardous weather 

Increased safety on the surface 

More efficient use of airport surface by 

pilots 

Continuing visual approaches in marginal 

conditions 

More efficient spacing on approaches 

2007 

2010 

2007 

2007 

2007 

2007 

2007 

2007 

2016 

2016 

2016 

2016 

2016 

2016 

2020 

2020 

2020 

2020 

The effectiveness percentages attributed to ADS-B equipment/services and the percent of the 

population anticipated to equip are multiplied with the potential benefits each year to develop 

annual benefit estimates. The effectiveness assumptions are based on a combination of subject 

matter expert assessments and the results from previous studies. The equipage percentages by 

user group and location were combined to reflect the likelihood of the benefits being realized 

depending on whether one or two aircraft are involved in the scenario and whether or not ADS-B 

21 
equipped aircraft can view transponder equipped aircraft through the availability of TIS-B 

functionality. To adequately represent the impact of TIS-B, the interaction of the two aircraft 

must be defined to determine which of the paired aircraft is equipped with ADS-B avionics. 

These relationships are considered in the estimates. 

The following four equipage scenarios were defined to estimate ADS-B benefits: 

• Independent equipage 

• Dependent ADS-B equipage 

• Order Specific Dependent Mixed equipage 

• Non-Order Specific Dependent Mixed equipage 

Independent equipage applies to situations where only one aircraft must be equipped in order to 

realize benefits. For benefit elements such as reducing the number of weather related accidents, 

the likelihood of any given aircraft achieving improvements is independent of whether another 

aircraft is equipped. Therefore, the equipage rates can be applied directly or linearly to 

determine expected benefits. 

However, for benefit elements that involve two aircraft, such as reducing the number of midair 

collisions, the likelihood of realizing benefits is dependent on both aircraft being equipped. This 

benefit requires not only that an aircraft have the capability to see other aircraft but that the 

conflicting aircraft is equipped with the avionics to be seen. Prior to the availability of TIS-B 

functionality, these benefits would be estimated using the dependent ADS-B equipage scenario. 

The probability that any two aircraft are equipped is defined as the product of the probability of 

the first aircraft being equipped and the probability of the second aircraft being equipped. This 

approximation assumes that the likelihood for each aircraft to be equipped is not dependent on 

whether or not the other aircraft is equipped. The dependent ADS-B equipage scenario is 

estimated by multiplying the independent equipage rate for a given user group by the rate for all 

other user groups including itself to create a matrix of values that define the probabilities for the 

possible pairings of aircraft. 

The dependent mixed equipage scenarios incorporate the availability of TIS-B functionality. 

TIS-B provides ADS-B equipped aircraft with the ability to recognize transponder equipped 

aircraft operating without ADS-B. The order specific dependent mixed equipage scenario is 

used to model conditions where the ADS-B equipped aircraft must be specified to achieve the 

benefits. For applications such as approach spacing, the following aircraft in the pair must be 

ADS-B equipped since this aircraft needs to see the preceding aircraft in order to achieve 

improvements. However, given TIS-B functionality, the preceding aircraft can be either ADS-B 

equipped or transponder equipped since it is only required that the preceding aircraft be seen by 

the following aircraft for this application. The non-order specific equipage scenario is reserved 

for cases where the benefit is realized as long as one of the aircraft can see the other regardless of 

which aircraft that may be. As in the benefit addressing a reduction in mid-air collisions, it was 

determined that if either of the aircraft involved in the conflict is made aware of the impending 

situation, then there is a potential for avoiding the accident. 

22 
Figure 2 displays the relationship between the dependent equipage scenarios when both aircraft 

involved are operating as general aviation. Figure 2 is based on the independent equipage 

assumptions for the national equipage estimate. 

Figure 2: Dependent Equipage Curves - Example 

Dependent Equipage Curves 

" Non-Order Specific Mixei 

" Order Specific Mixed 

'ADS-B 

• at M • a a • ! 

•f # ^ ^? -F 4? -F -f 4> -^ -P <p <£ * * * * * -fcr# # # ^ -p 

The order specific dependent mixed equipage scenario is estimated by multiplying the 

probability that the first aircraft is ADS-B equipped by the probability that the second aircraft is 

either ADS-B or transponder equipped. Since some aircraft will be both ADS-B and transponder 

equipped, the probability that an aircraft is equipped with either ADS-B or a transponder is 

equivalent to the probability of being equipped with ADS-B plus the probability of being 

equipped with a transponder minus the probability of being equipped with both. 

The non-order specific dependent mixed equipage scenario includes conditions where either the 

first or second aircraft is ADS-B equipped with the other aircraft being transponder equipped as 

well as cases where both aircraft are ADS-B equipped. The order specific calculation described 

accounts for cases where the first aircraft is ADS-B equipped and the second aircraft is either 

transponder or ADS-B equipped which allows for the possibility of both aircraft being ADS-B 

equipped. Therefore, the non-order specific scenario is estimated as two times the order specific 

dependent mixed equipage estimate minus the dependent ADS-B equipage estimate. 

For each benefit element, Table 9 lists the equipage scenario used in the estimate. 

Table 9: Outcome Equipage Scenarios 

c . Equipment/ „ . Equipage curve Segment A,

 r

 . Outcome i r & Service 

Segment 1 

Core 

Surveillance 

Cost Avoidance 

Improved search and rescue services 

Reduction in number of aircraft 

intercepts 

Independent 

Independent 

Independent 

23 
Segment 2 

Segment 3 

Broadcast 

Services 

Gulf of 

Mexico 

Surveillance 

Caribbean 

Surveillance 

Surface 

Moving Map 

CDTI 

Enhanced 

Applications 

Fewer aircraft-to-aircraft conflicts 

Fewer controlled flights into terrain 

(CFIT) 

Fewer encounters with hazardous 

weather 

More efficient weather deviations 

Cost avoidance - weather 

subscriptions 

Increased non-radar en route sector 

capacity 

Increased access to optimal routes 

Increased access to optimal altitudes 

Fewer aircraft-to-aircraft conflicts 

Fewer controlled flights into terrain 

(CFIT) 

Fewer encounters with hazardous 

weather 

Increased safety on the surface 

More efficient use of airport surface 

by pilots 

Continuing visual approaches in 

marginal conditions 

More efficient spacing on 

approaches 

Dependent/Non-order 

specific dependent mixed 

Independent 

Independent 

Independent 

Independent 

Dependent 

Dependent 

Dependent 

Dependent/Non-order 

specific dependent mixed 

Independent 

Independent 

Dependent/Non-order 

specific dependent mixed 

Independent 

Dependent/Order specific 

dependent mixed 

Dependent/Order specific 

dependent mixed 

The ADS-B and alternatives benefits analysis included the quantification of benefits for the time 

period 2007 to 2035. As indicated in Table 10, the total ADS-B benefits were estimated as 

$16.25 billion in constant year dollars and $4.42 billion in present value dollars. For Radar 

Replacement, the estimate totaled $13.18 billion and $4.30 billion in constant year dollars and 

present value dollars respectively. For Multilateration, the estimate totaled $10.10 billion and 

$4.30 billion in constant year dollars and present value dollars respectively. 

Table 10: Summary Benefits for ADS-B and Alternatives 

4I, .. Total Benefits _ ^ . „ ~4 ._,_. 

Alternative (BY2005 B$) Benefits (PV) 

ADS-B 

Radar Replacement 

Multilateration 

$16.25 

$13.18 

$10.10 

$4.42 

$3.11 

$4.30 

In Table 11, the ADS-B benefits are segregated by segment, equipment or service provided, 

outcome, type (safety or efficiency), and customer. Subtotals are presented for each segment and 

equipment or service provided. In Table 12, the ADS-B alternative benefits are segregated by 

the same elements noting where the alternative does not provide applicable equipment or 

services. 

Table 11: ADS-B Benefits by outcome 

24 
Segmen & t \ ^ . Outcome Type Customer ,„,,„ - *„.. Service

 J v (BY05 $B) 

Segment 1 

Segment 2 

Segment 3 

All 

Core 

Surveillance 

Broadcast 

Services 

Cost Avoidance 

Improved search and rescue services 

Reduction in number of aircraft intercepts 

Efficiency 

Safety 

Efficiency 

FAA 

User 

DHS 

Fewer aircraft-to-aircraft conflicts 

Fewer controlled flights into terrain (CFIT) 

Fewer encounters with hazardous weather 

More efficient weather deviations 

Cost avoidance - weather subscriptions 

Safety 

Safety 

Safety 

Efficiency 

Efficiency 

User 

User 

User 

User 

User 

Gulf of Mexico 

Surveillance 

Caribbean 

Broadcast 

Services 

Increased non-radar en route sector capacity 

Increased access to optimal routes 

Increased access to optimal altitudes 

Efficiency 

Efficiency 

Efficiency 

User 

User 

User 

Fewer aircraft-to-aircraft conflicts 

Fewer controlled flights into terrain (CFIT) 

Fewer encounters with hazardous weather 

Safety 

Safety 

Safety 

User 

User 

User 

Surface Moving 

Map 

CDTI Enhanced 

Applications 

increased safety on the surface 

More efficient use of airport surface by pilots 

Safety 

Efficiency 

User 

User 

Continuing visual approaches in marginal 

conditions 

More efficient spacing on approaches 

Efficiency 

Efficiency 

User 

User 

7.92 

1.56 

1.11 

0.37 

0.07 

6.36 

1.28 

3.28 

1.51 

0.23 

0.06 

3.22 

3.20 

3.06 

0.13 

0.01 

0.02 

0.00 

0.02 

0.00 

5.10 

0.27 

0.12 

0.15 

4.83 

3.47 

1.36 

16.25 

.., ,. Equipment/ Alternative \ r

 . Service 

Table 12: ADS-B Alternatives Benefits 

Outcome Type 

Custo Benefit 

mer (BY05 SB) 

Radar 

Replacement Core Surveillance 

Broadcast Services 

Gulf of Mexico 

Surveillance 

Caribbean Broadcast 

Services 

Cost Avoidance 

Fewer aircraft-to-aircraft conflicts 

Fewer controlled flights into 

terrain (CFIT) 

Fewer encounters with hazardous 

weather 

More efficient weather deviations 

Increased non-radar en route 

sector capacity 

Increased access to optimal routes 

Increased access to optimal 

altitudes 

Fewer aircraft-to-aircraft conflicts 

Fewer controlled flights into 

terrain (CFIT) 

Fewer encounters with hazardous 

weather 

Efficiency 

Safety 

Safety 

Safety 

Efficiency 

Efficiency 

Efficiency 

Efficiency 

Safety 

Safety 

Safety 

FAA 

User 

User 

User 

User 

User 

User 

User 

User 

User 

User 

13.18 

3.96 

0.96 

3.28 

1.52 

0.23 

3.06 

0.13 

0.01 

0.00 

0.02 

0.00 

25 
Surface Moving Map 

CDTI Enhanced 

Applications 

N/A 

N/A 

Multilateration 

Core Surveillance 

Broadcast Services 

Gulf of Mexico 

Surveillance 

Caribbean Broadcast 

Services 

Surface Moving Map 

CDTI Enhanced 

Applications 

Cost Avoidance 

Fewer aircraft-to-aircraft conflicts 

Fewer controlled flights into 

terrain (CFIT) 

Fewer encounters with hazardous 

weather 

More efficient weather deviations 

Increased non-radar en route 

sector capacity 

Increased access to optimal routes 

Increased access to optimal 

altitudes 

Fewer aircraft-to-aircraft conflicts 

Fewer controlled flights into 

terrain (CFIT) 

Fewer encounters with hazardous 

weather 

Efficiency 

Safety 

Safety 

Safety 

Efficiency 

Efficiency 

Efficiency 

Efficiency 

Safety 

Safety 

Safety 

FAA 

User 

User 

User 

User 

User 

User 

User 

User 

User 

User 

10.10 

0.88 

0.96 

3.28 

1.52 

0.23 

3.06 

0.13 

0.01 

0.00 

0.02 

0.00 

N/A 

N/A 

6.4 Economic Analysis 

Using the results of the benefits analysis and the completed cost estimate, programmatic metrics 

(i.e., benefit/cost (B/C) ratio, and the Net Present Value (NPV) were calculated to determine the 

financial benefits of ADS-B and the alternatives. The estimates were also adjusted for risk. 

Table 13 presents the risk-adjusted results. 

Table 13: ADS-B and Alternatives Economic Results 

Metric ADS-B Radar 

Replacement Multilateration 

NPV (PV $M) 

B/C Ratio 

internal Rate of Return 

(IRR) 

Payback 

$1.03B 

1.3 

10% 

23 years 

$.02B 

1.0 

7% 

30 years 

($.74B) 

0.8 

3% 

N/A 

The ADS-B program has the potential to be economically beneficial since the B/C ratio is greater 

than one. The NPV and B/C ratio for ADS-B are greater than both the alternatives. 

6.5 Risk Analysis 

26 
Formal risk management for the ADS-B program began in August 2001 and has continued 

throughout the life of the effort. ADS-B risk management conforms to the process contained in 

the Office of Technology Development Risk Management Process Description (latest update -

Jul 2003) and is exercised in accordance with the Technology Development Risk Management 

Plan (Apr 2004). The exercise of risk management within the Office of Technology 

Development was audited and assessed at FAA Integrated Capability Maturity Model (iCMM) 

Level 3 (Defined, which includes lower levels of 1 - Performed and 2 - Managed, Planned and 

Tracked) in August 2003. 

6.5.1 Risk Analysis Ground Rules 

The following items highlight some important assumptions and ground rules that formed the 

basis for this assessment and the inputs contained within this section: 

• Assessment results should be used along with other evaluation factors (i.e., life cycle 

costs, benefits, schedule, and performance) to narrow the set of alternatives to the most 

viable candidate solution(s) for further analysis. 

• "Risk" is defined as a future event or condition with a likelihood or probability of 

occurrence strictly greater than 0% but strictly less than 100%, and an unfavorable 

consequence with respect to the ability to achieve project objectives if the event or 

condition does occur. 

• Risk assessments and ratings are guided and expressed using the 5x5 Risk Matrix 

outlined by the NAS Systems Engineering Manual, 30 September 2004. 

• Assessments of likelihood, consequence and exposure ratings were developed through 

consensus of the risk team's subject matter experts and through comparison with like 

programs where possible (i.e., ASR-9/Mode-S and ASDE-X programs). 

• Risks outlined within Appendix B should be viewed as evolving and need to be 

monitored and updated routinely to remain relevant to the context and nature of the 

program and its current life cycle phase. 

• For those risks assessed as Medium or High, risk mitigation plans are developed to 

reduce the risk to a Low rating if possible. Low risks are tracked and monitored for 

potential changes in likelihood and/or consequence that may change the exposure rating 

to Medium or High. 

• The major risks and mitigation strategies identified for the preferred alternative will be 

examined in greater detail during the JRC 2b IA for final investment decision, to develop 

program baseline that should remain stable throughout the Solution Implementation 

phase of the program. 

6.5.2 Risk Team Composition 

The ADS-B Risk Team included subject matter experts to evaluate potential risks in the areas of: 

• Schedule; 

• Supportability; 

• Cost and benefits estimation; 

• Funding; 

27 
Operability; 

Producibility; 

Technical; 

Stakeholder; 

Architecture; 

Infosec; 

Human factors; and 

Safety. 

In addition, the following categories of potential risk are specified by OMB Circular A-l 1 for 

special attention: 

Initial costs; 

Life-cycle costs; 

Technical obsolescence; 

Feasibility; 

Reliability of systems; 

Dependencies and interoperability between this investment and others; 

Surety (asset protection) considerations; 

Risk of creating a monopoly for future procurements; 

Capability of the team to manage the investment; and 

Overall risk of investment failure. 

The ADS-B team examined each area of potential risk, using the existing risk information that 

was available from the on-going program risk management effort, as well as risk information 

from previously assessed analogous programs (i.e., ASR-9/Mode-S, ASDE-X). Any updates to 

the existing information or additions to the existing information were captured within the risk 

table in Appendix B. 

6.5.3 Approach 

This risk assessment was conducted at a macro level to be consistent with the level of analysis 

warranted for an initial investment decision, as outlined in the Guidelines for the Investment 

Analysis Team's Alternatives Risk Assessment, October 2002. It was a multi-stage process that 

consisted of: 

1) The identification of various risks and risk sources associated with each program 

alternative (an iterated sequence of steps which includes review of the current state of 

the program and an examination of future program tasks to identify events and/or 

conditions which might adversely affect achievement of program objectives); 

2) The scoring of each risk (likelihood and consequence), as outlined by the National 

Airspace System (NAS) Systems Engineering Manual, November 2002, resulting in a 

risk rating of Low, Medium or High for each risk; 

3) The mapping and characterization (i.e., impact) of individual risks into applicable 

baseline element areas (i.e., cost, benefits, schedule, or technical); 

28 
4) The development of mitigation strategies for each risk; 

5) The characterization and comparison of assessment results between each alternative 

and across all risk facet areas; and 

6) The reporting/categorization of risk as specified by OMB Circular A-l 1. 

6.5.4 Results 

Risks associated with each of four business case scenarios were assessed: 1) Reference Case, 2) 

ADS-B Alternative, 3) Radar Replacement Alternative, and 4) Multilateration Alternative. See 

Appendix B for complete listing of risks associated with this business case and all proposed 

mitigations. 

6.5.4.1 Reference Case 

Twelve risks were identified and assessed for the Reference Case. There were a total of 4 high 

risks, 4 medium risks, and 4 low risks - summary information is highlighted below. 

Reference Case: 12 total risks 

•a 

o 

o 

0) 

k* 

High 

Medium 

Low 

2 3 4 5 

Consequence 

Figure 3: Reference Case Risk Matrix 

Table 14: Reference Case Overall Weighted Risk Score 

„. . _, + Risk Mai 

Risk Facet r—:. ^fm 

Funding 

Cost Estimate 

Human Factors 

Safety 

Benefit Estimate 

INFOSEC 

Operability 

Stakeholder 

Producibility 

Supportability 

Schedule 

Architecture 

Management 

1 

1 

1 

1 

1 

1 

1 

1 

n x Overall Facet _, , _, _ .„,.- . Weighted 

s r a T» x- Facet Score Facet Weight „ . c WMM Rating

 to Facet Score 

1 

3 

-

C3 

D4 

C3 

-

C5 

-

-

-

D4 

-

D4 

-

0 

1.5 

2.8 

1.5 

0 

2.5 

0 

0 

0 

2.8 

0 

2.8 

0 

0.071 

0.071 

0.071 

0.071 

0.071 

0.071 

0.071 

0.071 

0.071 

0.071 

0.071 

0.071 

0.071 

0 

.11 

.20 

.11 

0 

.18 

0 

0 

0 

.2 

0 

.2 

0 

29 
Technical 

nm ii\ • 4. 

0 0.071 

l.llfl 

0 

l.nii 

6.5.4.2 Alternative 1 -ADS-B 

Thirty-seven risks were identified and assessed for Alternative 1. There were a total of 2 high 

risks, 22 medium risks, and 17 low risks. 

Alt 1:41 total risks 

O 

O 

High 

Medium 

Low 

Consequence 

Figure 4: Alternative 1 Risk Matrix 

Table 15: Alternative 1 Overall Weighted Risk Score 

„. , « + Risk Mai Risk Facet s«.- iMf i 

Funding 

Cost Estimate 

Human Factors 

Safety 

Benefit Estimate 

INFOSEC 

Operability 

Stakeholder 

Producibility 

Supportabihty 

Schedule 

Architecture 

Management 

Technical 

t- iTotals: ii"' 

1 

l 

4 

l 

1 

l 

3 

1 

6 

1 

1 

3 

n x Overall Facet „ . „ „ ,„ , . . , Weighted 

..„ i Facet Score Facet Weight _, * i % 1 Rating

 s Facet Score 

1 

2 

3 

5 

1 

2 

1 

2 

-

C4 

C4 

B4 

-

C4 

C4 

C5 

D4 

C4 

C4 

C4 

-

C3 

0 

2 

2 

1.2 

0 

2 

2 

2.5 

2.8 

2 

2 

2 

0 

1.5 

0.071 

0.071 

0.071 

0.071 

0.071 

0.071 

0.071 

0.071 

0.071 

0.071 

0.071 

0.071 

0.071 

0.071 

0 

.14 

.14 

.085 

0 

.14 

.14 

.178 

.2 

.14 

.14 

.14 

0 

.11 

22 ; nj'. " • \ • tf'V: j , ; } ;i;o n \ \ 1.56. -•" 

6.5.4.3 Alternative 2 - Radar Replacement 

30 
Eighteen risks were identified and assessed for Alternative 2. There were a total of 1 high risk, 

10 medium risks, and 14 low risks. 

Alt 2: 25 total risks 

o 

o 

0) 

E 

D 

C 

B 

A 

r? 

X -

•v p 

ff 

If!-

:* f k *": "' if 1 

- • 

M 

Hi 

% I : 

* 

*f 

; 

1 

ia 

High 

Medium 

* 14 • Low 

1 

Consequence 

Figure 5: Alternative 2 Risk Matrix 

Table 16: Alternative 2 Overall Weiehted Risk Score 

„ . , _ . Risk Mai 

Risk Facet •_ H « 

Funding 

Cost Estimate 

Human Factors 

Safety 

Benefit Estimate 

INFOSEC 

Operability 

Stakeholder 

Producibility 

Supportabihty 

Schedule 

Architecture 

Management 

Technical 

f 1"nlals:

 : •) 

1 

Jr 

3 

1 

1 

1 

4 

ll° 

n x Overall Facet „ , „ ^ , .. . . . . Weighted 1 K T J „ ,. Facet Score Facet Weight „ jv, lip i Rating " Facet Score 

2 

3 

3 

1 

1 

2 

2 

- ^ | 

-

C4 

-

C3 

-

C4 

Bl 

-

C4 

C4 

-

D4 

-

B3 

': :' -

;

 j " • •'.-" 

0 

2 

0 

1.5 

0 

2 

.3 

0 

2 

2 

0 

2.8 

0 

.9 

0.071 

0.071 

0.071 

0.071 

0.071 

0.071 

0.071 

0.071 

0.071 

0.071 

0.071 

0.071 

0.071 

0.071 

-

.142 

-

.107 

-

.142 

.021 

-

.142 

.142 

-

.199 

-

.064 

\j"''-

 Lnu ' i;1

 1-^y 

6.5.4.4 Alternative 3 - Multilateration 

31 
Twenty-five risks were identified and assessed for Alternative 3. There were a total of 3 high 

risks, 20 medium risks, and 10 low risks. 

Alt 3: 33 total risks 

T3 

O 

O 

:£ "3 

J* 

E 

D 

C 

B 

A 

K"j * 

-

i 

it 

K A i 

j 

lt\ 

m 

i.i 

f *: 

20 

'jo 

High 

Medium 

Low 

2 3 4 5 

Consequence 

Risk Facet 

Funding 

Figure 6: Alternative 3 Risk Matrix 

Table 17: Alternative 3 Overall Weighted Risk Score 

Risk Matrix Overall Facet „ . _ _ ,„,..„ . Weighted ?H „ ,. Facet Score Facet Weight „ rL Rating

 s Facet Score 

0 0.071 

Cost Estimate 1 D3 2.1 0.071 .149 

Human Factors C4 0.071 .142 

Safety C4 0.071 .142 

Benefit Estimate 0.071 

INFOSEC C4 0.071 .142 

Operability C4 0.071 .142 

Stakeholder 0.071 

Producibility C4 0.071 .142 

Supportabihty C4 0.071 .142 

Schedule C4 0.071 .142 

Architecture E5 45 0.071 .320 

Management 0.071 

Technical n-; 

2U ?I0| ' \ I 

0 M- | 

I .no 

6.5.4.5 Qualitative Comparison 

32 
The following table highhghts several distinctive risks identified across each of the program's 

alternatives. 

Table 18: Notable Risk Variations between Alternatives 

Facet Area Reference Case Alternative 1 Alternative 2 Alternative 3 1 

1 milling 

lifllrlil ( n*l 

1 ^i IIII:I till ii Ell.lll 

1 ;li-|n|t 

Vili-H 

IMUNl l 

^lal.ih'iliUi 

l

>

i.i.|iuil>ilii> 

^ilmhili-, 

\ivhiu-iiinv 

Mjllil^rlllrlll 

I'irliiiii.il 

Increase m Maintamer 

Workload 

Legacy system lacking 

controls against unauthorized 

access / misuse 

-Lack Skills Resources to 

Maintain System 

-NAS incapable of growth to 

3x traffic 

Incomplete CHI for ATC 

Separation 

-Vulnerability to GPSJamnHng 

- Laeklpprawed "3 -roileseparaftojrstandards (AT) 

-Foreign~5irspace 

Interoperability „ ^ 

- Opposition to jStspaee — 

Mandate "" ~ 

- LackAyiomel. Certification & 

Operations Approval 

- Avionics Industrial Base. 

ability© p£0§pc<^-etc """ ~ ; 

-"Non-CotepliaS Avijjfucs 

- BimifeSProgram Office AANI 

Resource Availability 

- TelCo jnstaHationJDelays 

- Inadequale%upgort 

Infrastrjctufe-

-Integration offAutomation 

SystemShps 

-Failure to Reach "end-state" 

Architecture 

- System interference with 

TCAS^r&SRs 

- Insufficient Sprtem 

Perforrnalce :DuaIXinkGBT 

Interopejabihjy 

- UnreliableilT information due 

to GPS Jammings 

- Lack Avionics Certification 

~& Operations Approval 

- Limited ANIResource 

Availability 

- Telco installation Delays 

-Inadequate Support 

Infrastructure 

-NAS incapable of growth to 

3x traffic 

Incomplete CHI for ATC 

Separation 

-Lack:approved 3-imle 

separation standards (AT) 

- Lack Avionics Certification 

& Operations Approval 

-Real Estate J&ase Approvals 

- Limited "Program Office / 

ANI Resource Availability 

- Telco mstallatiOtfTJelays _ 

- Ioadequaje^iipport 

Infrastructure^ 

-Integration of Automation 

Systems Slips 

NAS incapable of growth to 

3x traffic 

-JFailure toTM Reach "end-state" 

Architecture 

- Lack Necessary-Approvals 

to Interrogate at~Requlre& 

Rates 

- Insufficient-SafetyLogic 

Design 

- Deficient System Accuracy 

33 
6.5.4.6 Quantitative Comparison 

An overall weighted nsk score, generated by summing together the weighted facet scores for 

each alternative, was used as a quantitative factor for comparing the alternatives. These results 

are denoted in the following table. 

Table 19: Quantitative Risk Comparison 

12 Risks 41 Risks 25 Risks 33 Risks 

Risk Facets 

Reference 

Case 

Alternative 1 Alternative 2 Alternative 3 

M>\i-l;ill Wi-ii'lHril \llrlll.llhi- ifisk Sum- '" 

6.5.5 Summary 

Based on the qualitative and quantitative risk comparisons highlighted above, Alternative 2 

poses the least risk to the FAA The results, however, contained here should be used with the 

other evaluation factors (i.e., life cycle costs, benefits, schedule, and performance) to narrow the 

set of alternatives to the most preferred one(s) to present to the JRC. 

For each high and medium nsk assessed, the LA's benefits group adjusted their models to reflect 

the potential impact of the risks on achieving service delivery. The cost group also adjusted their 

models to reflect additional costs that would likely be required to mitigate nsks for each 

alternative and where appropriate added cost ranges around different elements of the Work 

Breakdown Structure (WBS) to generate cumulative distributions of total possible program costs, 

allowing for accountability in areas identified as uncertain. Both the cost and benefits models 

considered any necessary adjustments to schedule. 

6.6 Architecture Assessment 

34 
This National Airspace System (NAS) Architecture Impact Assessment (ALA) addresses the 

impacts of the proposed Automatic Dependent Surveillance - Broadcast (ADS-B) NAS Wide 

implementation on the NAS baseline architecture. This assessment will be used as input to the 

Business Case Analysis Report as well as the Initial Investment Decision (JRC 2a) for ADS-B. 

The ADS-B NAS Wide Implementation program offers a bundling of supporting technologies 

which are all directed at lowering the agency's, its operators' and the NAS users' operating cost, 

while enhancing safety, capacity, and efficiency. The ADS-B NAS Wide Implementation 

program is organized into three development segments, each divided into a set of "elements" that 

describe the major areas of effort during each segment: Segment 1 is directed at providing 

terminal airspace surveillance, and initial en-route airspace surveillance, surface management, 

and broadcast services capabilities; Segment 2 will provide expanded en-route coverage, surface 

management, and broadcast services; Segment 3 focuses on the development of cockpit-based 

terminal, en route and oceanic applications. 

Currently, there are several shortfalls that ADS-B NAS Wide Implementation would address. 

These include: a lack of shared situational awareness (traffic, terrain, weather); inability to 

provide surveillance coverage at reduced cost; inability to accurately predict demand and 

capacity values; lack of surveillance coverage within specific regions of the NAS; insufficient en 

route communications in the Gulf of Mexico; and inability to readily access in-flight weather 

data. Three alternatives that would address these shortfalls, at least in part, were assessed: 

(1) ADS-B: This alternative concentrates on the implementation of ADS-B and broadcast 

services capabilities throughout the NAS. Surveillance would be enhanced through the 

implementation of ADS-B via both the 1090 Extended Squitter (ES) the Universal 

Access Transceiver (UAT) data links in accordance with the FAA's ADS-B Link 

Decision. None of the secondary (beacon) radars or Precision Runway Monitor (PRM) 

systems in the NAS (over 300 locations) would any longer be necessary, their 

functionality being replaced by ADS-B. In the aircraft, the broadcast of aircraft data, 

cockpit display of traffic and other applications would be achieved by aircraft equipped 

with ADS-B, GPS, moving maps, and display avionics. ADS-B transmit-only avionics 

would be mandated to achieve nearly universal aircraft equipage. This proposed 

infrastructure assumes that the navigation source used by ADS-B (i.e., GPS) will have 

sufficient availability to support the future NAS. 

(2) Radar Replacement: This alternative consists of continued life-cycle support of the 

existing secondary (beacon) systems, and their replacement at the end of their respective 

life-cycles. This would apply to all classes of secondary (beacon) radars as they exist 

today (i.e., terminal, en route, PRM). 

(3) Multilateration: This alternative concentrates on the implementation of multilateration 

ground infrastructure at all terminal radar locations, rather than on the implementation of 

an ADS-B NAS-wide surveillance infrastructure. This infrastructure would be used as a 

replacement for secondary (beacon) radar and PRM systems at all terminal locations; 

terminal primary radar and en route secondary (beacon) radar systems would be retained. 

It should be noted that Alternative 1 is the only viable alternative that fully addresses all of the 

shortfalls identified for ADS-B NAS Wide Implementation. 

35 
The operations, systems, and programmatic aspects, or "views," of each alternative's proposed 

architecture were assessed to determine their consistency with the existing NAS EA, and to 

highlight any issues and/or risks that may need to be addressed as part of ADS-B NAS Wide 

Implementation: 

• Alternative 1 (ADS-B): 

o 27 operational improvements (OIs) reference ADS-B directly in the NAS EA; 4 

additional OIs will need to be modified to reflect ADS-B as the primary source of 

surveillance, rather than radar. 

o 7 systems (mechanisms) identified by this alternative are defined and accounted in the 

NAS EA; 5 additional mechanisms in the NAS EA would no longer be required; all 

required interfaces have been defined and documented. 

o 5 program/project segments supporting this alternative are accounted for in the NAS 

EA; 7 additional program/project segments in the NAS EA would no longer be 

required; small schedule changes should not adversely impact NAS modernization; 

funds for implementing this alternative have not yet been appropriated; all program 

interdependencies (5 segments and user equipage) are accounted for in the NAS EA, 

except for GPS sustainment and 3rd party weather vendor value-added products. 

• Alternative 2 (Radar Replacement): 

o 12 OIs reference radar directly in the NAS EA; 12 OIs would no longer be viable for 

this alternative. 

o 10 systems (mechanisms) identified by this alternative are accounted for in the NAS 

EA; 7 additional mechanisms in the NAS EA would no longer be required; all 

required interfaces have been defined and documented. 

o 14 program/project segments supporting this alternative are accounted for in the NAS 

EA; 5 additional program/project segments in the NAS EA would no longer be 

required; funds for implementing this alternative have not yet been appropriated; 

there are no program interdependencies for this alternative. 

• Alternative 3 (Multilateration): 

o 4 OIs reference multilateration directly in the NAS EA; 9 additional OIs will need to 

be modified to reflect multilateration as the primary source of surveillance, rather 

than radar; 12 OIs would no longer be viable. 

o 3 systems (mechanisms) identified by this alternative is accounted for in the NAS EA, 

but one would need to be modified to support terminal (rather than surface-only) 

surveillance; 12 additional mechanisms in the NAS EA would no longer be required; 

all required interfaces have been defined and documented. 

o One program/project segment supporting this alternative is accounted for in the NAS 

EA; a new program/project segment would also need to be added; 12 additional 

program/project segments in the NAS EA would no longer be required; funds for 

36 
implementing this alternative have not yet been appropriated; all program 

interdependencies (5 segments) are accounted for in the NAS EA. 

Based on these assessments, the following issues were identified: 

Alternative 1 (ADS-B): 

1. (High Risk) GPS operational availability may not be sufficient to support ADS-B as the 

primary source of surveillance in critical areas of the NAS; an effective backup strategy 

(to maintain sufficient capacity) has not yet been identified. 

Note: Addressed concern within Prosram Office risk table. Program Office did not deem 

this as a high risk item, but rather as a medium risk alons with several associated mitigation 

activities. 

2. (High Risk) An equipage mandate is required to achieve the anticipated benefits, which 

may present significant challenges (economic and political). 

3. (Medium Risk) Air Traffic has not yet agreed to use ADS-B as a primary source of 

surveillance for the separation of aircraft throughout the NAS. 

4. (Medium Risk) Inconsistencies with the program's safety analyses make it unclear 

whether all of the risks have been properly assessed. 

5. (Low Risk) There is no guarantee that GPS services will be sustained throughout the 

lifecycle of this alternative. 

6. (Low Risk) Agency strategic plans will need to be modified to reflect ADS-B as the 

primary source of surveillance in the long term. 

Alternative 2 (Radar Replacement): 

1. (High Risk) This alternative does not support any cockpit applications, thereby seriously 

impacting the success of NAS modernization as envisioned in the NAS EA. 

2. (High Risk) The costs of continuing the use of secondary (beacon) radar for terminal area 

surveillance appears to be significantly higher than that of ADS-B. 

Alternative 3 (Multilateration): 

1. (High Risk) This alternative does not support any cockpit applications, thereby seriously 

impacting the success of NAS modernization as envisioned in the NAS EA. 

2. (High Risk) The costs of implementing multilateration for terminal area surveillance 

appears to be significantly higher than that of ADS-B. 

3. (Medium Risk) Although multilateration for wide area surveillance has gone through 

proof of concept, there may be significant technical issues with applying this concept to 

all conditions to be found in the NAS. 

4. (Medium Risk) Air Traffic has not yet agreed to use multilateration as a primary source 

of surveillance for the separation of aircraft throughout the NAS. 

37 
5. (Low Risk) Agency strategic plans will need to be modified to reflect multilateration as 

the primary source of surveillance in the long term. 

Within the context of a JRC 2a decision, the issues identified above do not present a significant 

enough risk to the success of the ADS-B NAS Wide Implementation program to warrant 

postponing the decision at this time. However, since much of the available data is inconclusive, 

from a NAS Architecture perspective it is recommended that the selection of a specific 

alternative be postponed until such time that the above issues are more fully addressed; also, all 

of the above issues must be fully resolved and an alternative selection approved before 

proceeding with a final investment analysis, leading to a JRC 2b decision. 

NOTE: The ATO Executive Council provided guidance on what program recommendations 

should be presented to JRC members at the September 09, 2005 JRC meeting. See Section 8.0 

(Recommendations) for actual recommendations. 

6.7 Other ADS-B Related Assessments 

The following sections summarize activities and results of the Human Factors Assessment 

(HFA), Information Security Assessment, and Safety Assessment. 

6.7.1 Human Factors Assessment 

As defined in FAA Order 9550.8, human factors is a multidisciplinary effort to generate and 

compile information about human capabilities and limitations and apply that information to 

equipment, systems, facilities; procedures, jobs, environments; staffing; training; personnel and 

organizational management for safe, comfortable, and effective human performance. 

This human factors assessment focuses on the human-system performance that affects the risks, 

costs, and benefits associated with the Automatic Dependent Surveillance - Broadcast (ADS-B) 

National Airspace System (NAS) Wide Implementation objectives. It also supports program risk 

management. 

ADS-B NAS Wide Implementation provides an improved ground and air infrastructure that 

would meet forecasted capacity demands, while enhancing safety, efficiency and productivity, 

and provides the agency, its operators and users the opportunity to reduce operational costs. 

ADS-B NAS Wide Implementation furnishes pilots with better information about the location 

and severity of hazardous weather and traffic information to reduce mid-air collisions. ADS-B 

NAS Wide Implementation also provides improved surveillance information to controllers to 

assist in merging and spacing, sequencing, separation, in-trail climbs and descents, and 

maintaining throughput rates in IMC. The importance of the user's role and performance in 

achieving ADS-B NAS Wide Implementation objectives is clear. The human-system interfaces 

play a major role in the system achieving its stated goals and objectives. Also, because the 

program is focused on safety and efficiency gains in aviation by accelerating the implementation 

and use of modern technology, the usability considerations require special scrutiny. Typical of 

any program, the three major user groups that deserve attention are the Air Traffic Controllers, 

the Airway Facilities personnel, and the pilots or flight crews. 

38 
An extensive body of human factors applied research has been completed in the effort to develop 

the ADS-B human computer interfaces for both air traffic controllers and pilots. These include 

the development of a "Thinspecs" for the implementation of ADS-B on to the Common ARTS 

automation platform. Early integration of ADS-B on to the STARS automation platform had 

been executed but Thinspecs were not generated and will need to be completed. The previous 

work accomplished with terminal automation platforms can be adapted to the next generation en 

route and oceanic automation platforms. 

Significant human factors applied research has been completed for the integration of ADS-B on 

multifunction displays and electronic flight bags for both commercial and general aviation flight 

decks. Aspects that were researched included general computer human interface issues (e.g., 

symbology, color, clutter aspects, knobology, etc.), workload, head-down time, usability, 

acceptability and suitability. Evaluations were accomplished in both simulators and aircraft using 

a large pool of professional and general aviation pilots. Safe Flight 21 human factors specialists 

worked closely with avionics vendors and FAA Flight Standards and Certification. Much of the 

work that was accomplished during the early development has been utilized to establish human 

factors certification guidelines and best practices. Information was disseminated directly to 

avionics manufacturers. One vendor has actually certified two of their products and they are on 

operational aircraft today. 

No human factors research has been done to look at maintenance aspects of ADS-B ground 

equipment. It is anticipated that very little work needs to be accomplished in this area, however, 

this question will be examined should this program be approved. 

A summary of much of the human factors work accomplished by Safe Flight 21 / Ohio River 

Valley can be found in the OMB 300 document in section l.A.3. 

In addition to past and on-going certification and acceptance of equipment essential to the 

solution, further opportunities to achieve the maximum possible benefits associated with ADS-B 

NAS Wide Implementation technologies and applications may result from human factors 

research and engineering activities needed to attain optimal design and implementation affecting 

ATC and Airway Facilities as well as Flight Deck efficiencies and effectiveness. Efforts to 

establish human-system performance requirements, conduct human-system integration, and 

assess user performance should be integral with the continued acquisition and implementation 

process. Accordingly, risks and costs associated with the ADS-B NAS Wide Implementation 

program may be decreased and benefits increased by organizing and managing a human factors 

research and engineering program and plan. Table 20 provides risk ratings for each human 

factors study area identified in the FAA Human Factors Acquisition Job Aid in FAST. It 

provides an identification of areas for consideration of potential human factors study associated 

with and beneficial to the ADS-B NAS Wide Implementation program. Nineteen "medium" 

priority items were identified with comments. Table 21 provides a listing of human factors 

research that needs to be completed. 

Table20: Risk Ratings of Human Factors Study Areas 

39 
Study Areas 

Allocation of 

Function 

Anthropometrics 

and Biomechanics 

CHI (ComputerHuman 

Interaction) 

Communications 

and Teamwork 

General Description 

Assigning those 

roles/functions/tasks for 

which the human or 

equipment performs better 

while enabling the human to 

maintain awareness of the 

operational situation. 

Accommodating the 

physical attributes of its 

user population (e.g., from 

the 1st through 99th 

percentile levels). 

Employing effective and 

consistent user dialogues, 

interfaces, and procedures 

across system functions. 

Applying system design 

considerations to enhance 

required user 

communications and 

teamwork. 

ATC 

L 

L 

M 

M 

AF 

L 

L 

L 

L 

Pilot 

L 

L 

M 

M 

Comment 

(Reference) 

Automation thinspecs 

for STARS, ERAM, 

and ATOP need to be 

generated. The 

thinspecs for CARTS 

need to be validated. 

Advanced CDTI 

applications will 

require CHI 

development. 

Communication 

requirements among 

pilots, between pilots 

and operators, and 

between flight deck 

and ATC should be 

analyzed and 

documented in 

various application 

environments. 

Studies have been 

performed to examine 

the suitability and 

acceptable of a call 

sign procedure which 

allows the use of 

aircraft call sign by 

ATC and pilots for 

aircraft identification. 

The results are 

inconclusive and 

further research is 

40 
Study Areas 

Culture of 

Personnel 

Displays and 

Controls 

Documentation 

Environment 

Functional Design 

Human Error 

General Description 

Addressing the 

organizational and 

sociological environment 

into which any change, 

including new technologies 

and procedures, will be 

introduced. 

Designing and ananging 

displays and controls to be 

consistent with the 

operator's andmaintainer's 

tasks and actions. 

Preparing user 

documentation and 

technical manuals in a 

suitable format of 

information presentation, at 

the appropriate reading 

level, and with the required 

degree of technical 

sophistication and clarity. 

Accommodating 

environmental factors 

(including extremes) to 

which the system will be 

subjected and understanding 

the associated effects on 

human-system performance. 

Applying human-centered 

design for usability and 

compatibility with 

operational and 

maintenance concepts. 

Examining design and 

ATC 

L 

M 

L 

L 

L 

M 

AF 

L 

L 

L 

L 

L 

L 

Pilot 

L 

M 

M 

L 

L 

M 

Comment 

(Reference) 

needed. 

As stated previously, 

thinspecs need to be 

generated for the 

automation and 

advanced CDTI 

applications will 

require additional 

applied research to 

develop appropriate 

avionics design 

guidance. 

A concern has been 

raised by the Flight 

Standards community 

concerning adequacy 

of training 

documentation from 

avionics vendors. 

Flight Standards may 

have to develop 

guidelines as to the 

content of the 

training materials. 

Advanced CDTI 

41 
Study Areas 

Information 

Presentation 

Information 

Requirements 

I/O Devices 

KSAs 

Operational 

General Description 

contextual conditions 

(including supervisory and 

organizational influences) 

as causal factors 

contributing to human error, 

and consideration of 

objectives for error 

tolerance, error prevention, 

and error 

correction/recovery. 

Enhancing operator and 

maintainer performance 

through the use of effective 

and consistent labels, 

symbols, colors, terms, 

acronyms, abbreviations, 

formats, and data fields. 

Ensuring the availability 

and usability of information 

needed by the operator and 

maintainer for a specific 

task when it is needed, and 

in a form that is directly 

usable. 

Selecting input and output 

(I/O) methods and devices 

that allow operators or 

maintainers to perform 

tasks, especially critical 

tasks, quickly and 

accurately. 

Measuring the knowledge, 

skills, and abilities (KSAs) 

required to perform jobrelated tasks, and 

determining appropriate 

selection requirements for 

users. 

Ensuring that the system 

ATC 

M 

M 

L 

L 

M 

AF 

L 

L 

L 

L 

L 

Pilot 

M 

M 

L 

L 

M 

Comment 

(Reference) 

applications will 

require more applied 

research to develop 

suitable avionics and 

ATC display features, 

procedures and 

training in the effort 

to maximize the 

effectiveness of the 

applications and to 

make the procedure 

safe. (Implication -

minimize human 

error) 

Refer to CHI 

comment above. 

More applied 

research is required 

to develop a complete 

set of information 

requirements needed 

for advanced 

applications (ATC 

and flight crew) 

See CHI comments 

42 
Study Areas 

Suitability 

Procedures 

Safety and Health 

Situational 

Awareness 

Special Skills and 

Tools 

Staffing 

Training 

Visual/Auditory 

Alerts 

General Description 

appropriately supports the 

user in performing intended 

functions while maintaining 

interoperability and 

consistency with other 

system elements or support 

systems. 

Designing operation and 

maintenance procedures for 

simplicity, consistency, and 

ease of use. 

Preventing/reducing 

operator and maintainer 

exposure to safety and 

health hazards. 

Enabling operators or 

maintainers to perceive and 

understand elements of the 

current situation, and 

project them to future 

operational situations. 

Minimizing the need for 

special or unique operator 

or maintainer skills, 

abilities, tools, or 

characteristics. 

Accommodating constraints 

and efficiencies for staffing 

levels and organizational 

structures. 

Applying methods to 

enhance operator or 

maintainer acquisition of 

the knowledge and skills 

needed to interface with the 

system, and designing that 

system so that these skills 

are easily learned and 

retained. 

Designing visual and 

auditory alerts (including 

error messages) to invoke 

ATC 

M 

L 

L 

L 

L 

M 

L 

AF 

L 

L 

L 

L 

L 

L 

L 

Pilot 

M 

L 

L 

L 

L 

M 

L 

Comment 

(Reference) 

above 

Procedures in the use 

ofADS-Bhaveyetto 

be developed. 

Stakeholders will be 

involved in this 

process. 

Training procedures 

need to be developed 

specifically for ATC 

and air crews. 

43 
Study Areas 

Workload 

Work Space 

General Description 

the necessary operator and 

maintainer response. 

Assessing the net demands 

or impacts upon the 

physical, cognitive, and 

decision-making resources 

of an operator or maintainer 

using objective and 

subjective performance 

measures. 

Designing adequate work 

space for personnel and 

their tools or equipment, 

and providing sufficient 

space for the movements 

and actions that personnel 

perform during operational 

and maintenance tasks 

under normal, adverse, and 

emergency conditions. 

ATC 

L 

L 

AF 

L 

L 

Pilot 

L 

L 

Comment 

(Reference) 

Risk Levels (H^High; M^Medium; L=Low) 

Table 21: Human Factors Work Activities 

Work Activities 

Generate Automation Thinspecs for STARS, ERAM, 

ATOP 

Validate Thinspecs for CARTS 

Advanced Multifunction Display Application 

Development 

Follow-on Development of Advanced CDTI Displays 

Determine training needs for the operation of automation 

and avionics displays and maintenance. 

Determine health and safety issues. 

Program Events 

Establish CHI requirements (TBD) 

Draft Thinspecs (TBD) 

Validate Requirements (TBD) 

Validate Requirements (TBD) 

Refine ADS-B application descriptions (TBD) 

Identify and mitigate human interface issues associated 

with the air traffic controllers and the flight crews. 

Work with Flight Certification and Standards and 

avionics vendors to develop displays to perform 

advanced ADS-B applications (e.g. approach spacing, 

entrail climb and descents, oceanic CDTI applications, 

etc.) (TBD) 

Training requirements identified during the initial 

deployment - (TBD) 

Develop training materials - (TBD) 

Developed Integrated Safety Program Plan to ensure 

compliance with FAA-G-2100, FAA Order 3900.19, 

and OSHA requirements 29-CFR-1910, and CFR-29-

1926, relating to established safety compliance - (TBD) 

44 
6.7.2 Information Security Assessment 

This investment is currently undergoing security certification and assessment. The ADS-B NAS 

Wide Implementation is based on the Capstone Program which has undergone the Security 

Certification and Authorization Process (SCAP) in accordance with FAA Order 1370.82, 

Information Systems Security Program. Security Authorization was granted for the Alaska 

Region's Capstone Automatic Dependent Surveillance - Broadcast (ADS-B) and Broadcast 

Services System on 15 July 2004 by Vice President for Technical Operations Services ATO, the 

Designated Approving Authority. The information security issues and architecture for the ADSB NAS Wide Implementation are very similar to those for the Capstone ADS-B and Broadcast 

Services System and it is expected that the security certification of the Capstone system will 

carry over to the ADS-B NAS Wide Implementation, which has taken advantage of the lessons 

learned from the certification of the Capstone system and has been designed to incorporate 

information security from the start, rather than adding it on later. 

The SCAP for the initial phase of the ADS-B NAS Wide Implementation covering the Broadcast 

Services System based at the FAA Technical Center and supporting services in the East Coast 

and other pockets of implementation in the CONUS is under development and expected to be 

submitted by September 2005. The Risk Assessment, Risk Mitigation Plan, and Information 

System Security Plan have been developed and the Security Test has been successfully 

completed. A third-party testing firm independently ran the Security Test. The C&A 

methodology being used conforms to the "ARA Guidelines on Information System Security 

Certification and Authorization Packages," prepared for the ARA ISSM, August 2002. This 

process is consistent with National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) guidelines and 

included an Information Security Risk Assessment. 

The NIST 800-26 Security Self-Assessment will be completed each year to evaluate technical 

and non-technical system security features and establish the extent to which the ADS-B NAS 

Wide Implementation meets the security policies, objectives and specific security requirements 

for use in its intended environment. 

In accordance with FAA Order 1370.82 Information Systems Security Program, the SCAP will 

be updated and recertification and reauthorization of the system will be obtained every 3 years or 

sooner, if there is a major system or environmental change that impacts the security posture of 

the system, including new or additional connectivity to other information systems, major 

hardware/software changes, or whenever a major security breach has occurred. 

The Broadcast Services System Information System Security Plan identifies the following 

Security Assignments: 

45 
Table 22: ADS-B NAS Wide Implementation Security Assignments 

Name 

Paul Fontaine 

Robert Nichols 

Robert Nichols 

Shirley McGowan 

Steve Carver 

Michael Praia 

Mark Schoenthal 

Title 

Program Manager 

Implementation 

Lead/System Owner 

System ISSO 

Certification Team Lead 

ISSO (ATO-P) 

ISSM (ATO-W) 

System Coordinator 

System Administrator 

Location 

FAA Safe Flight 21/The Air 

Traffic Organization 

Operations Planning 

Technology Development, 

FAA HQ, Washington, DC 

FAA HQ, Washington D.C. 

FAA HQ, Washington D.C. 

FAA HQ, Washington D.C. 

FAA HQ, Washington D.C. 

WJHTC, Atlantic City, NJ 

WJHTC, Atlantic City, NJ 

Phone 

(202) 267-3468 

(202)267-9912 

(202)267-9912 

(202)385-7239 

(202)267-3814 

(609) 485-5054 

(609) 485-5803 

46 
6.7.3 Safety Assessment 

System Safety is a specialty within systems engineering that supports program risk management. 

It is the application of engineering and management principles, criteria, and techniques to 

optimize safety. The ADS-B NAS Wide Implementation system safety program satisfies the 

requirements of, and in accordance with, the FAA System Safety Management Program (SSMP), 

FAA System Safety Handbook, and FAA Order 8040.4 Safety Risk Management. It is overseen 

by the ADS-B NAS Wide Implementation System Safety Working Group and the ADS-B NAS 

Wide Implementation Program Office. 

The development of ADS-B NAS Wide Implementation operations follows defined System 

Safety practices in order to facilitate risk management. The tasks and activities of System Safety 

management and engineering being used by ADS-B NAS Wide Implementation are defined in 

the ADS-B NAS Wide Implementation Integrated Safety Plan (ISP). The specific elements of 

the ISP include Scope and Objectives, System Safety Organization, Program Schedule, System 

Safety Requirements, Hazard Analysis, System Safety Data Collection, Safety Verification, 

System Safety Training, Incident Reporting, and System Safety interfaces. 

In 2001, an Operational Safety Assessment (OSA) was performed. This included*a system 

description in the form of an Operational Services and Environment Description (OSED). The 

OSA consisted of an Operational Hazard Assessment (OHA) and the Allocation of Safety 

Objectives and Requirements (ASOR). The OSA will be modified and updated to reflect the 

current state of the program. Following completion of a Functional Analysis, a Comparative 

Safety Assessment (CSA) was performed and approved in September 2001 and compared the 

NAS With and Without ADS-B. The CSA is currently being modified to include a third 

alternative for providing surveillance using multilateration and focusing on the most relevant 

ADS-B applications. A Preliminary Hazard Analysis (PHA) of ADS-B was also completed in 

September, 2001 and will be modified accordingly. The ISP and revised CSA will be reviewed 

by the NAS Modernization System Safety Working Group NAS Mod SSWG prior to the initial 

investment decision. 

The ADS-B NAS Wide Implementation is a segment development program, which means that 

development is initiated, tested, modified, added to, and changed during the development cycle. 

It is not designed to be a linear process. Not all hazards associated with a specific phase of 

program development may be closed out before new program elements or capabilities are added, 

consequently Operational Risk Management is an important on-going effort. Any safety 

significant changes from the ADS-B NAS Wide Implementation baseline may require additional 

analysis. 

Table 23: Status of Safety Products 

M-JI #v£ : s :~ Dep'e^JKll : / 

Operational Safety Assessment (OSA) 

Comparative Safety Assessment (CSA) 

Preliminary Hazard Analysis (PHA) 

ii-_ ^S^itl"* JP" ~v 

Completed & Submitted 

Completed & Submitted 

Completed & Submitted 

£"'" 1 ""Status- 1" ? j * -

Approved 9/01 

Approved 9/01 

Approved 8/01 

47 
Comparative Safety Assessment (CSA) - Modified 

Revision 

Integrated Safety Plan (ISP) 

Submission 7/12/05 

Submission 7/12/05 

Review Planned for 7/05 

Review Planned for 7/05 

6.7.4 Affordability Assessment 

Current funding is shown as latest point estimate without risk calculations as provided by the 

program office. Risk calculations could change the final funding requirements. 

6.7.4.1 F&E and OPS Funding 

Table 24: Current and Proposed F&E and Operations Funding: TY ($M) - Non- Risk Adjusted 

Project Name """ ~; 

SI 0.03-01 

F&E Estimate 

Delta 

Current OPS 

OPS Estimate 

Delta 

20|6 

0.0 

0.0 

0.0 

0.0 

2f07 

117.0 

117.0 

0.0 

0.0 

20or 

120 0 

120.0 

0.0 

0.0 

2009 = 

112.1 

112.1 

0 0 

4.27 

2010 

210.2 

210.2 

0.0 

4.5 

Mil" ' 

100.1 

100 1 

0.0 

35.3 

Total 

659.4 

659.4 

0.0 

44.07 

6.7.4.2 F&E Affordability 

F&E levels for FY07 and beyond are sustained at $2.7B levels (FY07 OST submission is 

S2.712B). Offsets from other programs would need to be found if OMB Passback Targets are 

below $2.7B for FY07-11. 

7 ALTERNATIVE SELECTED 

Based on the analyses and assessments conducted on the three investment alternatives, the 

selected alternative was Alternative 1: ADS-B. 

Alternative 1 (ADS-B) was selected because it provides the best technical/cost solution to "NAS 

Transformation", supporting the next 60 years of growth as the nation progresses to the Next 

Generation Air Traffic System. ADS-B is also in concert with trends happening within the 

international community, as nations such as Australia begins to implement the system, while key 

European nations are contemplating implementation. When comparing against alternatives, 

ADS-B scored highest in the following three areas: 

7.1.1 Criteria 1: Core Surveillance 

ADS-B scored highest, due to its ability to simultaneously support surveillance in multiple 

domain areas (Surface, Terminal, En Route), with a single system since the source of 

surveillance data comes from the aircraft. By comparison, radar is limited by physics, in that it 

requires the use of multiple classes of radar types to perform specific surveillance missions 

48 
within domain areas. Multilateration at a minimum requires upwards of (4) ground stations to 

deliver the same volume of coverage as ADS-B, due to the need to "triangulate" the aircraft's 

position. 

From a surveillance accuracy perspective ADS-B is superior: Current Secondary Surveillance 

Radar, ATCBI-6, can meet a horizontal accuracy of 416 ft. Wide Area Multilateration (WAM) 

use in terminal and En Route airspace has been demonstrated to meet a horizontal position 

accuracy of approximately 150 ft, while a WAM application for Precision Runway Monitoring 

has been demonstrated to meet a horizontal position accuracy of 27 ft. ASDE-X surface 

multilateration horizontal accuracy is specified to meet or exceed 20 ft on airport movement 

areas. ADS-B derives position from GPS and GPS horizontal accuracy currently meets or 

exceeds 13 meters (-43 ft) with selective availability (SA) off and can improve to a horizontal 

accuracy of 2-3 meters (~6.5ft to 9.8ft) with a WAAS differential correction provided. 

Therefore, ADS-B horizontal accuracy exceeds all of the surveillance systems under 

consideration except for surface multilateration and WAM for Precision Runway Monitoring 

unless a differential GPS source is provided. 

This key performance parameter, allows the potential for future reduction of Separation 

Standards to improve efficiency. The "broadcast" nature of ADS-B surveillance, also uniquely 

supports the simultaneous transmission of high update rate / performance data not only to ATC, 

but also between aircraft pairs. This enables ADS-B to support a full range of "critical" Cockpit 

Based Applications, in which overlay of surveillance data will be necessary. By comparison, 

while it may be technically feasible to "uplink" surveillance data to the cockpit, derived from 

Multilateration and Radar, latency delays in the data would only support "advisory" level 

services. 

7.1.2 Criteria 2: Cockpit Based "Third Dimension" 

ADS-B satisfies the greatest range of the FAA's performance goals in terms of improving safety 

and efficiency performance in the NAS. ADS-B functions as a two-way data link and is capable 

of supporting a wide range of "uplink" products simultaneous with its core surveillance function. 

By comparison, radar does support traffic "uplink", but it is limited to only 120 locations across 

the country, due to limited deployment of Mode-S radars, which feed the system. Radar does not 

support "Uplink" of weather/NAS status products, however, these services are attainable 

commercially through satellite weather providers, but requires monthly subscription fees and 

additional satellite receivers on the aircraft. Multilateration does not support traffic "uplink", 

and as with the radar alternative, weather products are only available commercially. The high 

monthly recurring costs of satellite weather, has limited market penetration across the NAS. 

ADS-B is also the only alternative, which is uniquely suited to support a full range of "critical" 

cockpit based applications, due to the high data rate of the broadcast (once per second). 

"Critical" applications include those that require a high degree of "Shared Situational 

Awareness", where both the pilot and ATC are viewing a common picture simultaneously while 

interacting with the data. Prime examples include; 1) Surface Moving Map (SMM), where 

pilots can not only determine their position on the airport surface, but can view the movement of 

other aircraft relative to them. 2) CDTI Enabled Flight Rules (CEFR), which will enable pilots 

49 
to continue with visual throughput rates in instrument conditions, thus regaining lost capacity 

when the weather turns bad. NGATS will require core technologies that are flexible / scaleable, 

with additional growth capability to adapt to an ever-changing NAS. ADS-B is the only 

alternative positioned to support these requirements. 

7.1.3 Criteria 3: Business Case 

ADS-B was chosen because it has the highest Net Present Value (NPV) and the highest 

Benefit/Cost Ratio: 

Table 25: Alternative Analysis Results 

memi S i i II ^=»i-Bf:-, iiw r c , Radir -

NPV($B) 1.03 .02 (0.74) 

B/C Ratio 1.3 1.0 0.8 

8 RECOMMENDATIONS 

The following recommendations were provided by the ATO Executive Council on August 23, 

2005: 

• Grant Initial "Future Surveillance" Acquisition JRC-2a approval for ADS-B NAS-Wide 

Implementation Alternative (preferred alternative) 

• Approve establishment of ATO level Surveillance and Broadcast Services Office (to 

include the ADS-B Program) 

o Establish charter and reporting authority for office within 30 days 

• Authorize completion of initial Program Master Plan 

o Proceed with advance airspace rulemaking 

o Complete ADS-B backup analysis 

o Refine business case 

• To include cost alternatives as necessary for rulemaking 

o Complete refinement of safety case 

50 
9 PROGRAM FUNDING 

The following tables outline Safe Flight 21's sources of funding as of 02/18/2005 (i.e., Ohio 

River Valley, ADS-B Standards Development and Surface Moving Maps). 

Table 26: Ohio River Valley 

OmfCCJNin.toHHr^l or \ 

Funding as of 02/18/2005 

FY 05 Appropriation (includes .008 adjustment) 

FY99 

5 

5 

FYOO 

10 

10 

PYCtfl 

22.7 

22.7 

FY02 

12.7 

12.7 

^FY03 

16.3 

16.3 

FY04* 

4.1 

4.1 

FY05 

3.971 

3.971 

FY06 

8 

8 

FYOT 

3.4 

3.4 

Table 27: Automatic Dependent Surveillance -Broadcast (ADS-B) 

ADj^<|lPJnft|iiHor«iJ^.. : FY02= FY03 ? FY04 FY0£ EYQ6 FY07 

Funding as of 02/18/2005 3.5 1.9 2.6 2.8 1.5 1.984 

FY 05 Appropriation (includes 008 adjustment) 

3.5 1.9 2.6 2.8 1.5 1.984 

Table 28: Surface Moving Map (SMM) 

Funding as of 02/18/2005 

FY 05 Appropriation (includes 008 adjustment) 

FYOO FY01 FY02 

1.3 

1.3 

FY03 

2.2 

2.2 

FY04 

2.8 

2.8 

FY115 

1.984 

1.984 

FY06 

2 

2 

FY07 

2 

2 

Table 29: Total SF21 Funding 

Funding in Millions 

Funding as of 02/18/2005 

FY99* 

8.5 

FYOO 

11.9 

FJT01 

25.3 

FY02 

16.8 

FY03 

20 

FY04i 

8.9 

FY05 

7.939 

i ! 

FY06? 

12 

FYim 

7.4 

L. ^ 

j 

51 
Appendix A: References 

1. Preliminary Program Requirements for Automatic Dependent Surveillance-Broadcast 

Services System (ADS-BSS), July 2005. 

2. Implementation Strategy & Planning Document (ISP), 2005. 

3. FAA Acquisition Management System (AMS) Policy and Guidelines, Revised November 

2004. 

4. MNS #326, Enhanced Surveillance, September 2000. 

5. MNS #50, Application of Satellite Navigation Capability for Civil Aviation, October 

1992. 

6. MNS #42, Aeronautical Data Link System (ADLS), May 1998. 

7. MNS #323, Airport Surface Movement Enhancement and Runway Incursion Prevention, 

May 1998. 

8. Investment Analysis Risk Guidelines for Final Investment Decision, April 2003. 

9. Life Cycle Cost Estimates for NAS ADS-B Implementation, September, 2005. 

10. Life Cycle Cost Estimates for NAS Radar Replacement Implementation, September, 2005. 

11. Life Cycle Cost Estimates for NAS Multilateration Implementation, September, 2005. 

12. Life Cycle Cost Estimates for NAS ADS-B Avionics Implementation, September, 2005. 

13. OMB Exhibit 300, ADS-B NAS Wide Implementation, September, 2005. 

14. NAS Wide ADS-B Benefits Basis of Estimates, August 2005. 

15. Architecture Assessment for ADS-B NAS Wide Implementation, August 17, 2005. 

16. Automatic Dependent Surveillance - Broadcast (ADS-B) National Airspace System 

(NAS) Wide Implementation Integrated Safety Plan (ISP), August 19, 2005 

17. Automatic Dependent Surveillance - Broadcast (ADS-B) Design Analysis Report: ADSB Operational Safety Assessment, August 19, 2005 

18. Risk Analysis for Automatic Dependent Surveillance - Broadcast (ADS-B) National 

Airspace System (NAS) Wide Implementation, August 2005. 

52 
Appendix B: ADS-B Risk Table (Consolidated) 

HWi*-""- '•!••",,. . "" • *:i Source'1" "--i.-,..... Risk"1---^- "SoiirxfRiwi ('auM,i..'j«f.- Impai-h -*n, _.-.-. ('(insi-iiui-iici-

• '« . 

••<• ' . •: . 

•Mili!::itiiii]Opiiun Jt Sli:iU-ji> 

lliisi-lint 

Imputl 

(WIlSSsj 

Ref: N/A 

Altl:C5(H) 

Alt 2: N/A 

Alt 3: N/A 

Avionics 

Stakeholder 

Tom Prevost / 

SF-21 Working 

Group 

Old 1,2, 7 

Active opposition 

to airspace 

mandates / Lack 

user acceptance of 

airspace mandates 

Alt 1: Active opposition to 

airspace mandates - airspace 

users / user groups may 

oppose airspace mandates -

oppose if unfunded or lobby 

for date extensions. 

Alt 1: Both the airline and 

general aviation industries 

are struggling financially and 

could oppose the mandates / 

timelines due to cost of 

equipage (affordability -

avionics costs). 

Alt 1: Aviation groups tend 

to oppose equipment 

mandates that require 

additional equipment (e.g. 

new and/or dual equipage) to 

continue fly in airspace 

where this equipment is 

currently not required 

Alt 1: Political Acceptance -

Rulemaking process requires 

policy decision 

Alt 1: Implied requirement 

of TCAS as "last resort" to 

collision avoidance may 

make elimination of 

transponders impossible. 

Cost 

Schedule 

Benefits 

Alt 1: Delay in Policy & / or 

Rulemaking Decisions, thus 

impacting current business 

case justification - ROI 

Alt 1: Proposed cost / 

benefit models and airspace 

transition schedule will not 

be maintained. If mandates 

are successfully defeated, 

the program could fail. 

Control 

Research 

&Know 

Alt 1: Issue an Advanced 

Notice for Proposed Rule 

Making (ANPRM) in 

FY06. 

Alt 1: Demonstrate to the 

airlines - latent equipage 

Alt 1: Garner political 

backing of mandates - via 

policy decision - followed 

by decisive rulemaking 

Alt 1: The Program Office 

has ongoing dialogue 

through DoD/FAA Policy 

Board for Federal Aviation 

(PBFA), where ADS-B 

implementation plan has 

been briefed (including 

avionics mandate). 

Alt 1: Make avionics more 

affordable with Gov't R&D 

$'s to develop ADS-B / 

transponder replacement m 

one box, to incorporate 

future applications, and to 

stimulate competition 

Alt 1: If mandate doesn't 

become policy - obtain 

funding for avionics 

subsidies or set up bulk 

purchasing agreements to 

reduce cost to users 

53 
Ui.sk ;•„ 

• Vli & Risk 

K»tiii!£A" •Souret: KM. SiHim-RuMi (''aiiSL- '•'-liniiiK'L^ J-v i- . ('(ni<iL-i]iu-iiiv yiiti^atiuii 0|)ii(in A SiniU-ut 

Bim-IJiKllll|KU'l 

(\\ « s ssi 

Ref: N/A 

Altl:C3(M) 

Alt 2: B3 (L) 

Alt3:B3(L) 

Avionics 

Producibility 

Tom Prevost 

Old #2, 5 

Suivesllance 

Avionics 

"industrial base" 

is unable to 

produce, certify, 

and install ADS-B 

equipment to 

support airspace 

surveillance 

transitions 

(Role of Industrial 

BaseManufacturers and 

Repair Stations) 

Alt 1: ADS-B avionics are 

relatively new and the 

industrial base will require 

"ramp up" to meet 

production demands required 

by airspace mandate 

schedule. 

Alt 1: GBTs (UAT) - Sensis 

currently is the only active 

vendor of UAT 

"receive/transmit" GBTs 

because they won the 

competitively awarded 

Capstone contract. 

Alt 1: GBTs (1090)-Sensis, 

Thales and Raytheon / 

COSSAR "receive only" 

systems are currently being 

evaluated or are in operation 

Alt 1: AT avionics is there 

(1090)-Rockwell, ACSS, 

Honeywell are producing 

DO260 compatible avionics. 

Anticipate DO260A 

compliance within FY06 

(Rockwell is compliant 

today). 

Alt 2, 3: Avionics is more 

mature - no mandate would 

be issued 

Cost 

Schedule 

Alt 1: Proposed cost / 

benefit models and airspace 

transition schedule will not 

be maintained. 

Control 

Alt 1: Stimulate industrial 

base early in the 

implementation program by 

strategically delivering 

benefits to the maximum 

number of users as soon as 

possible. 

Alt 1: Acquisition strategy 

identifies the need for 

mandate, to ensure common 

starting point across the 

user community. 

Alt 1: Believe that DO260A 

and D0282A MOPS will 

meet avionics requirements 

for program Segments 1 

and 2. 

54 
RNk". 

All & Risk 

' Kali HI; 

SmiriT Risk 1 -.-; Sou m-Ruul.Caiiic liiip:icf' ( UllSl'tllH'IK'l- Mitigation Opii«ii,£ Miaii-yv 

liiiNtliiiiI II i pat r 

t\\liSS»j 

Ref: N/A 

Altl:D4(H) 

Alt 2: C4 (M) 

Alt 3: 04 (M) 

Avionics 

Producibility 

Tom Prevost 

Old #3 

Surveillance 

Avionics 

certification and 

operations 

approval process 

will be unable to 

certify, approve 

and provide 

guidance materials 

required to 

approve sufficient 

ADS-B equipment 

to support airspace 

surveillance 

transitions 

(Role of 

Government) 

Alt 1: ADS-B avionics are 

relatively new technologies 

and the certification, design 

approval, and operations 

approval processes tend to 

move cautiously in 

approving new cockpit 

technologies 

Alt 2,3: Although no 

mandate would be issued -

this new service would 

require new avionics 

components installed on the 

aircraft. 

Cost 

Schedule 

Alt 1: Proposed cost / 

benefit models and airspace 

transition schedule will not 

be maintained. 

Control 

Alt 1: Establish "tiger 

teams" with AVS 

stakeholders to streamline 

and accelerate 

certifications, design 

approvals, operational 

approval processes, and 

guidance materials to 

include AC's and continued 

airworthiness. 

Alt 1: Continue to conduct 

frequent and open technical 

& programmatic reviews so 

all interested parties (FAA 

and other agencies) may be 

kept informed of program 

status and decisions 

55 
RNk -

•Ml &._Risk 

Rilling \uiirtT . Risk 

• „ •••i*-m 

jtfSiilim- Ruul ( au*i: ini[):icl> . 1 tlllM>t|Ut.,

IH,L' MitiiMlioii <->|iii<>ii & Strait«\ 

liii^cliutllllpiH'l 

(W MS «sst 

Ref: N/A 

Altl:C3(M) 

Alt 2: N/A 

Alt 3: N/A 

Avionics 

Supportability 

Tom P. 

Old #6,14 

Surveillance 

Unacceptable 

Number of NonCompliant 

Avionics 

Alt 1: The following 

situations are precursors to 

system non-compliance 

(Improper installation, 

legacy equipment [e.g. DO260], equipment failure, 

improper operation, GPS 

failure [jamming, etc.]). 

Technical 

Cost 

Schedule 

Benefits 

Alt 1: Delay in certification 

of or possibly unable to 

certify ASD-B for intended 

use (radar replacement, 

reduced separation, etc.) 

Control 

Alt 1: Mandate migration to 

DO-260A 

Alt 1: Develop and 

implement a multi-layered 

conformance monitoring 

capability to detect, 

identify, and notify aircraft 

/ operators with nonconforming avionics during 

installation, at periodic 

intervals, on the ground, 

and in flight. 

Alt 1 : Maintain minimal 

radar infrastructure 

Alt 1: Work with the 

Aircraft Certification 

organization to develop 

guidance material for both 

installation and certification 

of ADS-B avionics 

Alt 1: Verify, during 

requirements formulation 

process, system 

redundancy, diversity, 

monitoring and diagnostics 

will be employed to ensure 

data and system integrity. 

Ref: N/A 

Alt 1: C4 (M) 

Alt 2: C4 (M) 

Alt 3: C4 (M) 

Avionics 

Cost Estimate 

Paul F. 

Overstated GA 

Avionics' Cost: 

Assumptions -

Standalone End 

State 

Nomenclature 

Alt 1: Current state GA 

avionics nomenclature -

separate / standalone squit 

box - in the future avionics 

may be combined 

Cost 

Benefit 

Overstated GA avionics 

costs within the cost 

estimate 

Control 

Add risk ranges around GA 

avionics estimate - place 

lower bounds around cost 

estimate 

56 
Risk - , 

6 

1 _ 

^ \lt& Risk'. 

U:itiiin •-: 

Ref: N/A 

Alt 1: B2 (L) 

Alt 2: N/A 

Alt 3: N/A 

Nuui'U! .:•• 

Avionics 

John M. 

Old #13 

NonSurveillance 

Ri'sli 

•.s • ' 

Cockpit based 

applications not 

brought online 

u:SiHI I'lT. Root ('.'lllsi-

. ••* ' -•!-•• • 

Uncertainty associated with 

effects of ADS-B cockpit 

applications on pilot/crew 

workload, call sign and 

phraseology for cockpit 

based ADS-B applications, 

clearly defined cockpit 

procedures for ADS-B 

operations; and how ADS-B 

based cockpit application 

procedures integrate with 

standard practice and pilot / 

ATC roles 

IIII|I:K-K 

Schedule 

Benefits 

<'(lllsi-llllUK'LAlt 1: Difficulty in 

resolving all issues with 

cockpit based ADS-B 

applications (CEFR, 

Merging and Spacing, self 

separation, etc.) could result 

in delay or failure to deploy 

the full spectrum of cockpit 

based ADS-B applications. 

This would result in lower 

benefits form ADS-B and 

reduce user/operator 

incentive to equip. 

Mitiii 

Research 

and 

Know 

Control 

jiion'f >|>lion & Str:ur^>.. 

Alt 1: Ensure that avionics 

and procedures do not 

create requirement for more 

than two-person flight crew 

Alt 1: Limit initial 

implementations of ADS-B 

cockpit based applications 

to benign environments 

(lower density airspace) or 

less demanding 

environments (VMC) 

Alt 1: Develop training 

requirements for each 

application 

Alt 1: Refine and test 

during simulations 

liUM-Nllllmp;ul 

iWliSSs.i 

57 
. . . . •••*)- Alt & Risk Risk T» •• j . . . 

* ; . RatiiiiS 

- * • 

•!'.?* 

Source 

ia*r:-i,. i SuuriT.lli«i[ < aiisi- " !"' Imnat-is 

• ^i ;?i... ....... 

('tillst-tiiit'llt't' Mili^iiiii)ii.4)|)li(>ii \ Sii:IIiy> 

j . Kast'lini' 

!

 \\\ \i> ss) 

Ref: N/A 

Altl:A4(L) 

Alt 2: N/A 

Alt 3: N/A 

Infrastructure 

Technical 

Lose ability to 

utilize GPS signal 

in the future as a 

navigation source 

Alt 1 ADS-B system is 

dependent upon getting 

position information from an 

aircraft navigation source 

(i e , GPS Nav source) 

Technical 

The ability for ADS-B 

system to provide critical 

level AT services would be 

diminished (limited to 

advisory level services until 

another navigation source 

could by integrated) 

Assume 

DOD is required by law to 

"maintain a Standard Positioning 

Service (SPS) (as defined in the 

Federal Radio navigation Plan and 

the Standard Positioning Service 

Signal Specification) that will be 

available on a continuous, 

worldwide basis" and, "develop 

measures to prevent hostile use of 

GPS and its augmentations without 

unduly disrupting or degrading 

civilian uses " 

These strict requirements and 

current augmentation systems 

should actually make DOD use of 

the system transparent to the civil 

user (Note There will, necessarily, 

be localized testing of the system 

by military and development teams 

but the testing will fall undeT strict 

notification guidelines of safety-ofhfe users such as Coast Guard and 

FAA) 

The March 1996 Presidential 

Decision Directive, passed into law 

by Congress in 1998, essentially 

transferred "ownership" of GPS 

from DOD to the Interagency GPS 

Executive Board (IGEB) The 

IGEB is co-chaired by members of 

the Departments of Transportation 

and Defense, and comprised of 

members of the Departments of 

State, Agriculture, Commerce, 

Interior, and Justice as well as 

members from NASA and the Joint 

Chiefs of Staff It allows for both 

civil and military interests to be 

included on all decisions related to 

the management of GPS 

58 
*4*«* • v—^—mwr-m**..-* «• wj^^m.** 4*n-^^.ii-—-w^wiM|<eH}.|mm «i—ismlp.ii.i.iim»'n*^»jfl[*wi.—i»•• — L-imi.MffHJin.wiw•«••*—•—.tw^-"-*—.*•—••—ii-wnmh.—-u^..—.,.••^W-WHWIIHIIW"~ vmi-a H.-U. 

1

 , xitVL'Risk • -

u

"' ./-••'• ' • - HJIMIHURisk" i*- .,*• . * V Suurct 'n Risk •' • sniin-L* Knot (. HUM:. • hntj.u-ls ( (iiisctiiit-iiiT '" Mitigation Omimi •K.-Sir.iu-i'v . Iniii.ict -t.Katins £ "^ •;_ / £ .--•_ ..-• " . - ^{ ^ 

8 

9 

Ref: N/A 

Alt 1: B2 (L) 

Alt 2: N/A 

Alt 3: N/A 

Ref: D4 (H) 

Alt 1: N/A 

Alt 2: N/A 

Alt 3: N/A 

Infrastructure 

Human Factors 

Bobby N. 

Old #19 

NonSurveillance 

Human Factors 

ASR-9 

Surveillance 

Pilot Confusion as 

a result of ownship 

ghosting 

Increase in 

maintainer 

workload (i.e., 

maintenance time) 

Alt 1: Ownship ghosting: as 

a result of inaccuracies in 

avionics provided 

information (e.g., altitude) 

preventing accurate 

correlation of input sensor 

plots 

Ref: Legacy system -

without modification will 

continue to degrade thus 

increasing the amount of 

time needed to maintain the 

system. 

Technical 

Benefit 

Technical 

Cost 

Alt 1: Broadcast Services -

May cause confusion for 

pilots when using displays 

to aid situational awareness 

System down time will 

increase. 

Time to fix problems will 

continue to increase. 

System reliability will 

continue to decrease 

Control 

Control 

Alt 1: Evolve Control 

Facility SW(v 1.7-v 1.x) 

Alt 1: Pilot training -

eventual TIS-B phase out 

Ref: Replace SSR with 

new system 

59 
Risk" : /Cult Ri*k 

• "•' Rating 

Source 

.•. | W Kdfi. » 

':,• Risk 

BlflMll'V*-!»••'•. * •». ^•I'.uV i M Ur y !• ,. J!*! 

'Siiiirci'.'Kooi CiniM.1 linjiacis -i. < 'iiusi-(|iiuiu- Miiiuu(ii)ii:()plion & Mrufryv 

•-*'-Bns.trlitie •• 

.Impact 

(\\ \i> "*s| 

10 

Ref: N/A 

Alt 1: C4 (M) 

Alt 2: N/A 

Alt 3: C4 (M) 

Automation 

Human Factors 

Incomplete CHI 

for ATC separation 

and advanced 

cockpit 

applications 

Alt 1 Undetermined or 

incomplete operational 

requirements and procedures 

for ADS-B integration into 

terminal, Enroute and 

oceanic automation systems, 

particularly on target display, 

to support ATC separation 

provision and advanced 

cockpit applications in 

mixed equipage 

environment 

Alt 1,3 Operational 

requirement (fused track, 

equipage display) and CHI 

for displaying targets for 

separation provision has not 

been developed, but it is 

needed as a basis for 

evaluating separation 

standards in terminal area 

Schedule 

Benefits 

Cost 

Automation integration 

delayed - not able to 

support critical AT services 

- thus decommissioning of 

SSR would be delayed, 

increasing FAA operations 

cost (maintain radars) 

Control 

Alt 1 Initial CHI requirements 

for CARTS have been 

developed m conjunction with 

the ATEAM 

Alt 1 Give high priority to 

developing operational 

requirements, procedures and 

CHI 

Alt I Initial system test foi 

CARTS has been conducted at 

the Tech Center and initial 

flight tests have been 

conducted at Louisville 

Alt 1 Develop Service Level 

Agreements with FAA 

stakeholders (ATO-T & ATOE, etc) on tasks, resources, 

schedule etc 

Alt 1 MOAs have been 

established with the Common 

ARTs (CARTS) and STARS 

programs to integrate ADS-B 

into these automation 

platforms 

11 

Ref: N/A 

AItl:C3(M) 

Alt 2: N/A 

Alt 3: N/A 

Infrastructure 

Technical 

John M 

Old #20 

Suiveillance 

Spectrum 

System 

interference with 

TCAS or SSRs 

Alt 1 Limitations on 

Spectrum occupancy for 

1090es are not known 

Alt 1 Transmit duty cycle 

limits on 1090es are not 

known - without analysis to 

determine, there is nsk the 

spec would result in systems 

that interfere with TCAS or 

SSRs 

Cost 

Alt 1 Limitations may 

require throttling 1090es 

transmissions or use of 

sectorized antennas 

Control 

Alt 1 Fund VOLPE 

complete spectrum analysis 

(~$75k unfunded effort) 

Alt 1 Do not include 1090 

TIS-B uplink m initial spec 

for B/C 1 airports 

60 
"

V

'l! iffj1^ "M^^4{i5f|MI|!r 

K:iliiili 

12 

13 

Ref: N/A 

Alt 1: N/A 

Alt 2: N/A 

Alt 3: D4 (H) 

Ref: N/A 

Altl:C3(M) 

Alt 2: C2 (M) 

Alt3:D3(M) 

& . t -"•"• • . . . .. . • - *:••* '• '•' ' .. ..— ...v--*' ' 

, • ••"•I- -

Infrastructure 

Technical 

ToddK 

Surveil lance. 

Infrastructure 

Cost Estimate 

Bobby N. 

Old #21 

Surveillance 

Lack necessary 

approvals to 

interrogate at the 

required rates 

Underestimation of 

Site Prep Costs 

Alt 3: Spectrum Occupancy 

Issue with ASR-MLAT 

requires more interrogations 

for ATCRBS targets 

Alt 1: Lessons learned: 

ASDE-X - significant 

underestimation of site 

survey costs between 2a & 

2b (hidden / unexpected site 

costs) 

Alt 2: Undocumented local 

changes to system sites -

different site configurations 

in the field may impact 

implementation (site specific 

interface and logistic 

obstacles). 

Alt 2: Infrastructure varies at 

each site - aging 

infrastructures with diverse 

problemsAlt 3: Greenfield unknowns 

- Environnemental Audits 

Alt 3 : Unidentified terminal 

RU placement (unknowns: 

tower, power, & com) 

. - •• •••• ,„ . '• • .. . -,,„, . . lf;is.l-lillt> . 

Technical 

Cost 

Cannot operate system at 

the required settings. 

Therefore system will not 

meet performance 

requirements 

Increased program 

implementation costs 

Control 

Control 

Obtain necessary spectrum 

approval 

Convert ATCRBS 

transponders to Mode S 

transponders via mandate. 

Alt 1: Conduct detailed site 

surveys prior to JRC 2b 

Alt 1,2,3: Apply risk ranges 

around site costs 

61 
• • • 

\ll & Risk 

14 

Ref: A2 (L) 

Altl:A4(L) 

Alt 2: A2 (L) 

Alt 3: A4 (L) 

" 

;.:o«--Sw|irc.

,

r:^;:_i; 

Infrastructure 

Cost Estimate 

Bobby N. 

...;:;:*.ni<'hi\-.-.- c :;:;. 

Underestimation of 

Telco Lease Costs 

- Lease Costs 

Increase Over 

Time 

• • * . 

• • 

The FAA 

Telecommunications 

Infrastructure (FTI) contract 

provides systems with the 

necessary communication 

lines to operate. 

Programs do not manage this 

contract, but rather it is a 

separate contract into which 

programs pay identified 

lease costs. 

.^ImpaclvCost 

Benefits 

1.:.:i'.^iJ.j*n

«'(i

lH,1,i:i"- „ TM 

Cost avoidance benefits 

may not be realized 

!.r.'l...*MU'yi,,'

|lu-*->|iii'»ji & ^K'.l'.E'i*. •.. • 

• • • - : '""""'" " " " 

Assume 

Lock in low leasing costs 

early in the lease term 

liilM-MllL' 

Impact 

(\\»N"SS"; " 

62 
Mi & Risk '.* • 

'•'i^jiS^tosi-ifss 

^..iia.a-ii.-fiBi*"-'.-w. «W(i--Ri'>k:

ff& • • ii,

ias&.|i

o

jtf.r:,,i!'

L

'

!":

-

linpiicts ('misTiiu^-uci-'--' 

^'taJ*

lW!ailttr,J'!

|^y^irnij^UtjltJllHMi..i. ii i 

Mitigation Option A. Slralmiy .... Impact 

liilSi-lilUlinpiiii 

15 

Ref: N/A 

Altl:C3(M) 

Alt 2: B3 (L) 

Alt 3: D3 (M) 

Infrastructure 

Technical 

ToddK &Kirk 

C 

Old #23 

Surveillance 

Creeping System 

Requirements 

Alt I Specification development 

not well coordinated due to a 

lack of accepted overall detailed 

architecture Immature "system" 

top-down requirements flow 

(airplane-GS -CF-automation, 

etc) 

Alt 1 GPS accuracies are 

currently assumed in the 

pPR 

Alt 2 System deployed and 

technology at a more matured 

state 

Alt 3 Technology applied in a 

manner that varies from today -

60 mile coverage required -

additional research is required 

here 

Alt 3 WAM - Time signal from 

GPS maybe required for ophmal 

system performance 

Alt 3 Multilateration consists of 

replacing many secondary radars 

with a new technology that 

measures time-difference of 

arrival of transponder replies at 

different ground stations 

Alt 3 Unclear requirements for 

sector interrogator monitoring 

Generally immature concept that 

needs to be developed (Real 

Time Quality Control) 

Cost 

Schedule 

Alt 1 System will not work 

together efficiently as 

intended (interoperability) 

Alt 1 Increased cost of 

developing ground station 

and Control Facility due to 

constantly changing 

requirements 

Alt 1 Inability of avionics 

and infrastructure to stay 

synchronized against 

common requirements 

Alt 3 Would have the 

same vulnerabilities to GPS 

outage and surveillance 

back-up requirements as the 

ADS-B alternative 

Control 

Alt 1 Reconstitution of an 

architecture team 

Alt 1 Develop detailed 

overall architecture 

Alt 1 In the fPR accuracy 

requirements will be 

developed "by domain" / 

"by application" 

Alt 1 Development of 

functional requirements 

segregation into physical 

units to complete 

specifications 

Alt 3 Conduct additional 

research and formulate a 

team to determine system 

requirements and specs 

Alt 3 Mitigation of the 

GPS time signal 

requirement would require 

all multilateration stations 

in a specific cluster (around 

an airport, or in an en route 

cluster) to have signal lmeof-sight (i e , the station 

would likely have to be 

mounted on a tower) in 

order to self-time 

63 
'''•'""• ' --All & Risk Risk •;.. 

-•-Riiliiiji 

.. .n.>t#l i -•".., ..--^ 

16 

17 

Ref: N/A 

Alt 1: C3 (M) 

Alt 2: N/A 

Alt 3: N/A 

Ref: NA 

Altl:B4(M) 

Alt 2: NA 

Alt3:NA 

- Soinyc 

•Ls...r.Ji.-..,,'

i

7"!ll~.-. 

Infrastructure 

Technical 

Bobby N. 

Infrastructure 

Operability 

Les Crane 

Surveillance 

.-ll-nj. i 

" " Risk- . ... _. 

Non-Interoperable 

GBT - Dual Link 

Unreliable AT 

information due to 

GPS jamming 

vulnerability 

• •• * j- . • .... . • 

Sou ice-Root (<i;iiisi-r.. linp:ictV" 

Alt 1: Dual Link GBT - requires 

interoperability between 

1090MHz and UAT radio 

Alt 1: Transmit duty cycle limits 

on 1090es are not known -

without analysis to determine, 

there is risk the spec would 

result in systems that interfere 

with TCAS or SSRs 

Alt 1: Functional partitioning 

between GBTs and Control 

Facility has not been determined 

Intentional jamming (without 

a planned backup or other 

control to mitigate, the 

likelihood classification 

would be C or D) 

(comment: spoofing GPS 

position could be considered 

a separate risk - A5 low — or 

possibly no risk IMHO) 

Cost 

Schedule 

Technical 

Benefits 

Technical 

Cost 

•"••''•:. /"iiiiwiiiifiiw 

Alt 1: System will not work 

together efficiently as 

intended (interoperability). 

Alt 1: May not reach 

performance requirements 

for critical level AT 

services 

Alt 1: Jamming of GPS 

transmissions results in the 

inability to use the system 

in support of ATC or other 

applications due to the lack 

of reliable position 

information, also this 

perceived vulnerability may 

result in reduced 

stakeholder support for 

system 

Alt 1: Loss of sole position 

data source for ADS-B; 

(also affects primary means 

of navigation where backup 

plan is DME-DME 

navigation and VOR with 

radar vectors when needed) 

Militt 

Control 

Control 

Research 

& Know 

iiifiii..<)pji(in \ Slr;ilt-j:> 

Alt 1: Reconstitution of an 

architecture team. 

Alt 1: pPR document 

completed - Develop fPR 

document 

Alt 1: Develop detailed 

overall architecture. 

Alt I: Development of 

functional requirements 

segregation into physical 

units to complete 

specifications. 

Alt 1: Maintain a limited 

set of radars to serve as a 

backup source of 

surveillance information for 

ATC (study required to 

determine location and 

number of radars required), 

Alt 1: Develop 

CONOPS/procedures that 

will recognize presence of 

jamming and support 

graceful degradation of 

system operations 

Alt 1: Develop alternative 

(backup) navigation sources 

for ADS-B (e.g., RNAV 

and eLORAN) 

Bust-limlnip:ui 

(W HS v\si 

64 
Ujskr 

i 

18 

19 

20 

\lt & Risk • 

! Rutin" 

I--

Ref: N/A 

Alt 1: C3 (M) 

Alt 2: B3(L) 

Alt 3: D3 (M) 

Ref: C3 (M) 

Altl:C3(M) 

Alt 2: C3 (M) 

Alt3:C3(M) 

Ref: NA 

AItl:C4(M) 

Alt 2: C4 (M) 

Alt 3: 04 (M) 

. . Sfinrcc 

• • #5 " 

Infrastructure 

Cost Estimate 

Todd K. 

Old #23 

Surveillance 

Cost Estimate 

Les Crane 

Surveillance 

Infrastructure 

INFOSEC 

Old #28a 

- . ..KM* 

Improper 

segregation of 

requirements 

Erroneous cost 

model for radar 

SLEP and/or full 

replacement 

Exploitation of 

ADS-B / TIS-B 

transmissions 

'*•'Suitriv.Rout ('ausi1''' • 

Alt 1: Specification 

development not well 

coordinated due to a lack of 

accepted overall detailed 

architecture. 

Alt 1,3: Immature "system" 

top-down requirements flow 

(airplane-GS-CFautomation, etc). 

Model derived from noncompetitive market 

Inadequate historical data 

and understanding of future 

needs (including schedule to 

replace components or 

systems) and future market; 

Reliance on only US 

producers market 

ADS-B/TIS-B transmissions, 

which may include both 

identification and position 

information, are unencrypted 

due to the broadcast nature 

of the system 

hnp:icis 

Cost 

Cost 

Technical 

Cost 

' " '-'C'<inst-t|lk-lict: 

Alt 1, 3: Components and 

telecom over-specified 

resulting in higher 

equipment costs and 

monthly recurring costs 

SLEP costs are over- or 

under-estimated by more 

than 10% for comparison 

with other alternatives 

Alt 1: Ability to use ADSB/TIS-B transmissions to 

identify and potentially 

target aircraft could result in 

low equipage rates for 

certain types of aircraft, this 

results in reduced benefits 

for system and impedes 

ability to base ATC on 

ADS-B 

Miliu 

Control 

Control 

Know& 

Research 

Control 

Minn Opium ii Slrau-»'> 

Alt 1: Reconstitution of an 

architecture team. 

Alt 1: In the fPR accuracy 

requirements will be 

developed "by domain" / 

"by application". 

Alt 1,3: Develop detailed 

overall architecture. 

Alt 1,3: Development of 

functional requirements 

segregation into physical 

units to complete 

specifications, 

Apply cost ranges around 

SLEP activity within cost 

model 

Alt 1: Research methods to 

encrypt transmissions for 

sensitive aircraft, 

Alt 1: Research methods to 

assign protected 

identification codes to 

sensitive/all aircraft, 

Alt 1: Filter identification 

information for TIS-B 

transmissions 

ISascliiic 

linpnci 

(WIISSs) 

65 
Risk :-• 

Ml A/ Risk 

Rutin!; 

Source Risk •" •SIIUIIT.ROIJI r'ausf illipikls f'(III^CLIIK-Ill'l-'' Miii»:ilii)ii Option & Slniliuv 

Rast-liiitllllpUil 

(UH^si 

21 

Ref: N/A 

Altl:A3(L) 

Alt 2: A3 (L) 

Alt 3: A3 (L) 

Infrastructure 

INFOSEC 

Old #28b 

Exploitation of TIS 

/ TIS-B 

surveillance 

information 

Alt 2,3 TIS surveillance 

information may be 

exploited when it is provided 

to non-government entities 

Altl ADS-B/TIS-B 

surveillance information may 

be exploited when it is 

provided to non-government 

entities 

Technical 

Cost 

Alt 1 Ability to use ADSB/TIS-B surveillance 

information to identify and 

potentially target aircraft 

results in it not being made 

available to nongovernment entities, this 

results in reduced 

stakeholder support for 

system 

Control 

Alt 1 All surveillance data 

feeds to be subject to the 

protection requirements of 

FAA Order 1200 22C, 

Alt 1 Design ground 

information system 

infrastructure to have 

strong boundary protection 

against unauthorized access 

22 

Ref: N/A 

Altl:A4(L) 

Alt 2: N/A 

Alt 3: N/A 

Infrastructure 

INFOSEC 

Old #28c 

Jamming or 

Spoofing of ADSB data links 

Alt 1 ADS-B data links 

were not designed to be 

impervious to jamming or 

spoofing 

Technical 

Cost 

Alt 1 Jamming or spoofing 

of ADS-B/TIS-B 

transmissions results in the 

inability to use the system 

in support of ATC or other 

applications, also this 

perceived vulnerability may 

result in reduced 

stakeholder support for 

system 

Control 

Alt 1 Maintain a limited 

set of radars to serve as a 

backup source of 

surveillance information for 

ATC, 

Alt 1 Develop CONOPS / 

procedures that will 

recognize the presence of 

jamming / spoofing and 

support graceful 

degradation of system 

operations 

23 

Ref: NA 

Alt 1: A4 (L) 

Alt 2: NA 

Alt 3: NA 

Infrastructure 

INFOSEC 

Old #29 

Jamming or 

Spoofing of GPS 

transmissions 

Alt 1 GPS data link was not 

designed to be impervious to 

jamming or spoofing 

Technical 

Cost 

Alt 1 Jamming or spoofing 

of GPS transmissions 

results m the inability to use 

the system in support of 

ATC or other applications 

due to the lack of reliable 

position information, also 

this perceived vulnerability 

may result in reduced 

stakeholder support for 

system 

Control 

Alt 1 Maintain primary 

radars to serve as a backup 

source of surveillance 

information for ATC 

Alt 1 Develop CONOPS / 

procedures that will 

recognize presence of 

jamming/spoofing and 

support graceful 

degradation of system 

operations 

66 
... . Alt A Risk - • '• Risk ••• • „••"•.•• Source. .:•.• 

. K:IIIII* > •;. -

24 

25 

26 

Ref: B4 (M) 

Altl: A3 (L) 

Alt 2: A3 (L) 

Alt 3: A3 (L) 

Ref: C5 (H) 

Altl: A4(L) 

Alt 2: A4 (L) 

Alt 3: A4 (L) 

Ref: N/A 

Alt 1: B4 (M) 

Alt 2: C4 (M) 

Alt 3: C4 (M) 

INFOSEC 

ASR-9 

INFOSEC 

ASR-9 

Supportability 

ASDE-X 

Risk 

Insertion of 

malicious code 

Theft or misuse of 

anMDT 

Lack ANI 

Resource 

Availability 

...j'.-.Siiiii'vt.- Root fjiiisf.-*--

Ref: System access control -

no user accounts - single, 

virtually static system 

password. 

Alt 1,2,3: security controls 

built into the system 

Ref: External connectivity / 

telecommunication -

intrusion or unauthorized 

access to system resources 

can comprise the integrity 

and availability of service. 

Alt 1,2,3: ADS-B system is 

being designed 

with good controls against 

unauthorized access and 

misuse of system 

control commands from a 

remote location. 

Alt 3: Simultaneous ASDEX implementations 

(construction) occurring 

concurrently in the Southern 

Region 

Alt 1: Doesn't require as 

much ANI support as ASDEX 

Impacts 

Technical 

Technical 

Cost 

Schedule 

-riillsi-ijdi-MU: 

Ref: Integrity and 

availability of service can 

be compromised. 

Ref: Could allow 

unauthorized personnel to 

issue system control 

commands that would 

disrupt the flow of radar 

data to the Tower / 

TRACON. 

Ref: unauthorized access to 

system will allow 

unauthorized personnel to 

issue system control 

commands that would 

disrupt the flow of 

surveillance info 

Alt 3: If Southern Region 

ANI resources are not 

increased, then construction 

and installation activity may 

be delayed and ORD dates 

impacted. 

Miiiu 

Control 

Control 

Control 

iiioii.Opfiun it, Siralc^> 

Ref: Implement stronger 

physical intrusion detection 

such as audible alarms and 

closed circuit television 

(CCTV) at radar facilities 

and at the development site. 

Ref: Ensure technicians and 

end users receive general 

security awareness training 

and system-specific 

technical security training. 

Ref: Ensure technicians and 

end users receive general 

security awareness training 

and system-specific 

technical security training. 

Ref: Monitor the status of 

mitigating RMMS 

vulnerabilities that affect 

the security of ASR-9. 

ANI - The problem is not in 

having enough people but 

rather knowing the scope of 

work and schedule with 

time to plan. Develop and 

coordinate planning 

schedules with ANI well in 

advance 

BiiSL'lint' 

Impact 

(UHSSsi' 

67 
" 

" Ml .V Risk 

Risk- Source Risk 

27 

i 

Ref: B4 (M) 

Alt 1: C4 (M) 

Alt 2: B4 (M) 

Alt 3: C4 (M) 

Suppo liability 

ASDE-X 

Lack Program 

Office / 

Workgroup 

Resources 

i • - .. " 

.- Siiuici- Rom ( :iuw ... Impacts • ( unset |iiciictr • • - Miii^iiiun Option & str:iii'!>% 

. _ • • : •• ' . •* • 

Alt 1: Large Complex 

Acquisition - an effective 

organizational structure 

needs to be put in place for 

management of a crossdomain NAS-wide program. 

Alt 1,2: Upon acquisition 

decision - program office 

would need to fill several 

proposed govt. FTE 

positions 

Alt 3: If Workgroup 

resources are not available 

for Map Planning Meetings 

(MPMs), Site Selection 

Surveys (SSS), and Site 

Engineering Surveys (SER) 

causing delays to these 

activities start dates, then 

pre-construction/start of 

construction could be 

delayed at affected sites. 

Schedule 

Alt 3: Overall, site kickoff 

activities may miss planned 

start dates. The impact 

trickles down through 

TRIOS and Sensis resources 

that are stagnant while 

waiting for the workgroup 

staff. 

Control / 

Assume 

Control 

Alt 1,2: Program Office has 

incorporated staffing 

requirements within 

planning documents - will 

review staffing plan upon 

positive final JRC decision 

Alt 1: The Program Office 

has planned for the 

implementation of an 

appropriate organizational 

structure to efficiently 

execute the program and to 

coordinate effectively with 

the other FAA program 

Alt 3: Plan up to 3 months 

Workgroup members are 

necessary 

IlilSL-lillC 

luipaci 

l\\ Us Ssi 

68 
Ot' t Risl- '"!'.." • •• '""i'.'T"" •• "r""1

"" "....'•• • -"..'• .,.• •• .H " "Ifasfliiif 

Risk"' "•••• ;;*•,. * Swircc Risk "Suurct- Root CiiuVf Impacts ' i-Ctinsvuuciicc" ' . Miri^itioii Option j£Sirnlt»\ [mimcl 

Kiltlll"- --y "•»"'., •• i yvs. • -.A ' .. . • 

-.:/ 1 .' ! . ' •.-:•• .;:•• • (UHSv»i 

28 

29 

30 

Ref: N/A 

Alt 1: B4 (M) 

Alt 2: B3 (L) 

Alt 3: C4 (M) 

Ref: N/A 

Altl:C2(M) 

Alt 2: C2 (M) 

Alt3:C2(M) 

Ref: D4 (H) 

Alt 1: A3 (L) 

Alt 2: B3 (L) 

Alt 3: A3 (L) 

Suppo rtability 

ASDE-X 

Supportability 

ASDE-X / 

ASR-9 

Supportability 

ASR-9 

Lack Real Estate 

Lease approvals at 

Remote Unit Sites 

Delay in Site Telco 

Installation 

Lack 

skills/resources to 

maintain system 

operability 

Alt 3 At ASDE-X sites there 

have been delays in site prep 

due to not having real estate 

leases for the remote unit 

sites Ideally all site prep 

would be completed prior to 

the ASDE-X equipment 

delivery At several sites 

work arounds had to be 

accomplished and in some 

cases equipment installation 

and optimization has been 

delayed The purpose of 

identifying this risk is to 

mitigate it for future ASDEX installations 

Alt 2 Based off of ASDE-X 

lessons learned 

Alt 2 Required interfacing 

communications equipment 

willbeGFE This has 

proven to be a support 

problem on other recent 

COTS hardware FAA 

programs 

Alt 2, 3 Leased 

telecommunication lines at 

Remote Unit Sites 

Ref The legacy system 

requires highly experienced 

maintenance staff to repair 

system - several current staff 

members close to retirement 

age (potential loss of 

valuable corporate 

knowledge) 

Schedule 

Benefit 

Schedule 

Benefit 

Cost 

Benefits 

Schedule 

Technical 

Alt 1, 3 Delays in obtaining 

real estate leases at remote 

unit sites could have an 

adverse affect on the 

equipment delivery date 

Alt 2, 3 Delays in installing 

leased telco lines at ASDEX remote unit sites could 

have an adverse affect on 

the equipment delivery date 

Ref Potential outages, 

delays - possible loss of 

radar 

Ref Impact O&M cost 

Ref Introduction of errors 

and potential safety hazards 

Control 

Control 

Control 

Alt 3 Site implementation 

leads to track legal 

descriptions on ASDE-X 

action item list 

Alt 3 Once legal 

descriptions are sent to 

regional real estate 

specialist, site leads mvite 

the specialist to participate 

on site telecons or to 

provide a bi-weekly status 

update to ANI programs 

manager via email This 

will be added to the 

implementation site lead 

process 

Conduct program weekly 

status reviews 

Work with site / install 

teams to jointly develop 

early implementation and 

risk mitigation plans 

Develop a detailed master 

schedule that is kept 

updated with plan changes 

Ref & Alt 2 Sustain and 

tram sufficient staff to 

maintain radars 

Ref&Alt2 Shift to using 

only cooperative (SSR) 

systems (easier to maintain) 

69 
"-"*••*. _ . "-»In *.•,... ••-••.— .. i..,,,^ „ _ •" "•*••• 1——. « ^ ..„.„,,"" •" —*-*.-... •-"— i- , , . - i" | . 

••-*•!.»• . A Al l & Risk""-! ••-*« - " ' •""• •*•!-'-..„ "•"• ! •"•tab- ... „""""" •"."••HPI •!!•». .. •: -.VS..!.,. „ • i| . .. . 

Risk* "•".: . ... .. Source • . „ Risk'!" Source Rtiol I "a use . ' Impact* •--..- . ('OIIM-HUCIICC . . Milla 

" • - • Runny : - ».. ••••••.•«.., _ ~-u.».., . ^ _ •. i...1: , • ...MIA..- " 

31 

32 

Ref: N/A 

Alt 1: B4 (M) 

Alt 2: C4 (M) 

Alt 3: C4 (M) 

Ref: N/A 

Altl: N/A 

Alt 2: N/A 

Alt3:C5(H) 

Supportability 

ASDE-X 

Technical 

ASDE-X 

Inadequate support 

infrastructure to 

accommodate 

deployment (e g, 

Insufficient Power 

at Remote Unit 

Sites) 

Insufficient Safety 

Logic Design 

Alt 1, 2 Insufficient grounding, 

bonding and lightning protection 

(GB&L) current in place at 

ASR-9 sites 

Alt 1, 2 Outdated electrical 

system - Uninterruptible Power 

Supply (UPS), Engine Generator 

(E/G), etc 

Alt I, 3 At ASDE-X sites there 

have been delays in site prep due 

to not having commercial power 

installed at the remote unit sites 

Ideally all site prep would be 

completed prior to the ASDE-X 

equipment delivery At several 

sites work arounds had to be 

accomplished and in some cases 

equipment installation and 

optimtzanon has been delayed 

Alt 3 Safety logic design 

and associated performance 

may not meet operational 

expectations at MCO 

Alt 3 The requirements for 

the ASDE-X safety logic 

specification were derived 

from the ASDE-X 

Requirements document 

which specified that there 

shall be no more than 2 false 

alerts within a 24 hour 

period Experience with 

deploying AMASS 

nationally has shown that 

this rate of false alerts is not 

acceptable operationally at 

airports This risk addresses 

steps to go from meeting 

spec rqmts to operational 

expectations 

Schedule 

Cost 

Technical 

Alt 3 Delays m establishing 

commercial power at 

ASDE-X remote unit sites 

could have an adverse affect 

on the equipment delivery 

date 

Control 

Control 

UioN'Optiun &..SliMii'<!> 

. • • * • • 

Altl Conduct delayed site 

surveys and coordinated 

with requirements with 

proper organizations 

Alt 3 Site implementation 

leads to track utility 

statement of work on 

ASDE-X action item list 

Alt 3 Once the statement 

of work is sent to regional 

utilities specialist, site leads 

invite utility specialists to 

participate on site telecons 

or to provide a bi-weekly 

status update to ANI 

programs manager via email 

Alt 3 Define requirements 

for operational expectations 

and conduct software code 

reviews, data analyses, and 

hands-on user reviews to 

assess system performance 

These activities are in 

addition to the standard 

design reviews and system 

enhancement test activities 

required by the contract 

Alt 3 Direct Sensis to 

design and implement more 

tools (track confidence 

parameters, projection off 

runways, etc) within SL to 

reduce nuisance and false 

alerts beyond the original 

design proposed to meet 

spec requirements 

Itast'linc 

~ liupiict 

(\\BS\M 

70 
Risk--

:\AltX Ris-kRiil iu» 

i.. 

-Source '.-.HI- Risk 

i i * ' • ••••>•"'. 4. „ 

1

 jiv... Sourcc- Roul ( ausc Impacts '",1*:«.fonM-ipifncc'1 .MUi^aLioiVOpiinn & Su-iilc-y, 

RiiscliiiLImpact 

tWIisSsi 

Ref, Alt 1, 2: Systems deployed 

and technology at a more 

matured state 

Alt 3 Technology applied in a 

manner that vanes from today -

60 mile coverage required -

additional research is required 

here. (En Route environment not 

thoroughly flushed out) 

Alt 3. ASDE-X System is 

experiencing a large number of 

random RU faults. 

Tracking of ATCRBS taigets: 

Alt 31 Synchronous garble 

becomes a problem in high 

density ATCRBS environments 

due to limitations of whisper 

shout interroganon method. 

Alt 3: This is where proximate 

ATCRBS targets are 

unresolvable and perhaps even 

undetectable due to their 

overlapping replies. 

Alt 3: Decoder limitations with 

the generally lower 

signal/interference ATCRBS 

replies in high fruit levels. 

Ait 3: Could be very difficult for 

MLAT processor to properly 

correlate Mode A and Mode C 

replies from the same target 

without a unique address to link 

the two replies 

Alt 3. Range limitation due to 

high interference environment: 

MLAT will impose more 

interference on the 1030 and 

1090 channels than SSR due to 

broader interrogation beam and 

faster interrogation rate needed 

to overcome reply losses at 

individual RO sites 

Alt 3: Unclear requirements for 

sector interrogator monitoring 

Generally immature concept that 

needs to be developed (Real 

33 

Ref: N/A 

Altl : N/A 

Alt 2: N/A 

Alt3:C3(M ) 

Technical 

ASDE-X, Jim 

Regan 

Deficient System 

Performance 

(accuracy) 

Technical 

71 

Alt 3: The ASDE-X system 

may not meet performance 

requirements (i.e., accuracy) 

and/or service availability 

requirements at STL and 

other sites. 

Alt 3: Poor surveillance 

performance for ATC for 

ATCRBS targets. Could 

lead ATC to think there is 

one target rather than two 

Alt 3: Could cause 

momentary loss of 

ATCRBS targets in high 

density ATCRBS 

environments 

Alt 3: Could result in even 

lower effective range for 

ATCRBS than for Mode-S 

txpdrs 

Alt 3: Could cause unstable 

altitude readouts in high 

density ATCRBS 

environments 

Alt 3: Could cause range to 

be reduced to unacceptable 

value during high traffic 

Alt 3: Degraded system 

coverage in a dynamic 

traffic and fruit environment 

Control 

Alt 3. Ask Sensis to provide 

cost estimate for them to gather 

failure data, categorize faults, 

perform analysis, and 

determine root cause of RU 

failures 

Tracking of ATCRBS targets 

Alt 3: Require all users to 

equip with Mode S txpdrs 

Alt 3: Most enhanced decoder 

research for high fruit 

environments has focused on 

decoding of extended squitter, 

not ATCRBS replies 

Alt 3: Begin research for 

ATCRBS replies ($3 M) 

Alt 3: Add additional MLAT 

clusters (1 more cluster at 15% 

of airports equipped) 

Alt 3: Have users shut down 

1090ES since that competes for 

the 1090 channel with MLAT 

replies in order to limit 

interference 
-.'".'" :;:^.Mj:&RKk"' - • ••• :'

:

''-\":... .•!•.••. "'.'":• 

-Ui»k* J- . « ::—*•• .....^Source-• ..; ... \ Risk - ... 

••.-..••..., RllllllJJ"*! . .. .1 . , •_ ---•• .. . 

34 

35 

Ref: D4(H) 

Altl: B2(L) 

Alt2:D4(H) 

Alt 3: E5 (H) 

Ref: N/A 

Altl:C4(M) 

Alt 2: N/A 

Alt3:C4(M) 

Architecture 

Les Crane 

Architecture 

NAS incapable of 

growth to 3X 

traffic 

(ATC 

Surveillance) 

Failure to reach 

End-State 

Surveillance 

Architecture 

•"!'?. SouravRoot.C'iiiisi: • • • liiip;n,i\' ••• ( (msi-i|ut.-i]cc Miii^iiLion Option & Slrak-i>' "" 

"-•. ..."""7" "*" "*s*vn"* r"" ---•..

 ii1-"" ••• •• •-•"" ! 

Ref, Alt 2, 3: ATC concept 

of operation limits number of 

aircraft a single control 

sector can accommodate and 

busy sectors cannot be 

subdivided 

Ref, Alt 2, 3: Abandons the 

potential future to enable the 

benefit of advanced A-G and 

A-A applications 

Altl ,3 - Require the removal 

of SSR radars as part of the 

overall program strategy 

Benefits 

Benefits 

Inadequate Capacity 

Ref, Alt 2, 3: NAS capacity 

limited to less than future 

3X requirement; NAS 

capacity continues with 

periodic reductions in 

terminal area during IMC 

and during convective 

weather disruptions to en 

route flows 

Ref, Alt 2, 3: No 

surveillance enabled future 

benefits. Business as usual 

for next 20-30 years. 

Ref, Alt 2, 3: No reduction 

in controller workload, less 

pilot situational awareness 

and operational efficiency 

Altl: If SSR is not fully 

removed, cost avoidance 

benefits will be greatly 

decreased 

Control 

Control 

Develop concepts for 

improved controller 

productivity and 

autonomous traffic 

operations (airspace 

operating without 

conventional ATC) based 

on improved cockpit 

situational awareness 

Provide these services 

through ADS-B or 

commercial vendors (price 

of Honeywell FIS-B service 

plus other lost benefits) 

Mandate avionics in an 

effort to achieve equipage 

levels required to justify the 

disposition of current SSR. 

A policy agreement needs 

to be reached on both 

Primary and Secondary 

Radar. 

Continue discussions 

through PBFA and DHS. 

Conduct all necessary 

safety analysis required to 

support the removal of 

current SSR. 

• l>iisL-linc 

lin purl 

(WHS Ssi 

72 
Ui*k> '-

M l \ Risk 

Ratiim "• 

Source Risk . . ' ""••** StiiiiYc'Ruof V'UIISL1

. . ' linpiicls .' " ""ConsvniiJiicc " • \liii^ii[i(ii) Option]^ Slraictij 

Itast-liiic 

Impact 

(WKSSsi 

36 

Ref: N/A 

Altl:C4(M) 

Alt 2: N/A 

Alt3:C4(M) 

Automation 

Schedule 

Gene W. 

Old #31, 33, 37, 

38,39,41 

Integration of 

automation 

system/s may slip 

Alt 1 ETMS requirements 

currently undefined Planned as 

part of Segment 2 of the ADS-B 

program. 

Alt 1: Undetermined or 

incomplete operational 

requirements and procedures for 

ADS-B integration into terminal, 

Enroute and oceanic automation 

systems, particularly on target 

display, to support ATC 

separation provision and 

advanced cockpit applications in 

mixed equipage environment. 

Alt 1 • Incomplete CHI for ATC 

separation and advanced cockpit 

applications. 

Alt 1: Dependency on multiple 

interna] FAA organizations 

Alt 3 Undetermined or 

incomplete operational 

requirements and procedures for 

WAM integration into terminal, 

Enroute and oceanic automation 

systems, particularly on target 

display, to support ATC 

separation provision. 

Alt 3 Lack ofCHI for ATC 

separation provision 

Alt 31 Dependency on multiple 

internal FAA organizations 

Cost 

Benefits 

73 

Alt 1,3: Program cost 

increases 

Control 

Alt 1 Develop Service Level 

Agreements with FAA 

stakeholders (ATO-T & ATOE, etc) on tasks, resources, 

schedule etc 

Alt 1: MOAs have been 

established with the Common 

ARTs (CARTS) and STARS 

programs to integrate ADS-B 

into these automahon 

platforms. 

Alt 1. Initial CHI requirements 

for CARTS have been 

developed in conjunction with 

the ATEAM 

Alt 1 • Initial system test for 

CARTS has been conducted at 

the Tech Center and initial 

flight tests have been 

conducted at Louisville. 

Alt 1 Give high priority to 

developing operational 

requirements, procedures and 

CHI. 

Alt 1. Develop equipage 

mandate. 

Alt 1: For ERAM, consider 

Host emulation to make ADSB targets "radar-like" in 

automation processing and 

display. 

Alt 1: Cost estimate for ERAM 

integration "obtained" from 

program office, included in 

estimate. 

Alt 3: Develop Service 

Level Agreements with 

FAA stakeholders (ATO-T 

& ATO-E, etc) on tasks, 

resources, schedule etc. 

Alt 3: Give high priority to 

developing operational 

requirements, procedures 

and CHI. 
..-.-. All & Risk .. . . .. -• ... "'. • •

 , "1

 •-••• „ .. . •"••• - • , , • ..... ... . Risk" ' •—••„•• .• Source. • ••• •. Ri->L . Source.Root I an si- -. Imp:icls- , .... C OIISI-IIIK-IIC<- . . Miuil _-"--»i-.. .K:iT!ii<4 "" „,..! •• . ••*

 s ••• .. . , " •*•••• • •* • • • •••••-.• ....'._, •• - .... ^ 

37 

38 

Ref: N/A 

Alt 1: C4 (M) 

Alt 2: N/A 

Alt 3: C4 (M) 

Ref: N/A 

Alt 1: C2(M) 

Alt 2: N/A 

Alt 3: N/A 

Automation 

Operability 

Gene W. 

Old #32 

Automation 

Operability 

Gene W. 

Old #35 

Lack of an 

approved 3-mile 

separation 

standards in 

terminal area 

Incompatibility 

between ADS-B 

link avionics and 

ground interface in 

foreign airspace 

precludes ATC 

surveillance 

services with 

ADS-B. 

Alt 1,3: Operational 

requirement (fused track, 

equipage display) and CHI 

for displaying targets for 

separation provision has not 

been developed, but it is 

needed as a basis for 

evaluating separation 

standards in terminal area. 

Alt 1,3: Dependency on 

several internal FAA 

organizations 

FAA announced the ADS-B 

dual-link decision (UAT and 

1090 ES) in 2001, but 

countries other than 

Australia have yet to make 

an ADS-B link decision. 

Selecting an incompatible 

link decision by Europe and 

other countries will pose 

interoperability problem. 

Cost 

Benefits 

Schedule 

Technical 

Cost 

Schedule 

Alt 1,3: Schedule for 

implementing ADS-B or 

WAM in terminal 

automation for separation 

provision may be delayed. 

Alt 1,3: Benefits may not 

be realized if 3-mile ADS-B 

or WAM separation 

standards (for ADS-B or 

WAM to Radar) is not 

approved. 

US aircraft flying overseas 

may not receive ATC 

services and vice versa. 

Control 

Control 

• ::-u"h... 

itionOptinii &. Strategy 

Alt 1: AFS-400 approved 

separation standards 

analysis plan. Awaiting 

concurrence from ATO-T. 

Funded an ADS-B safety 

analysis to be performed by 

AFS-440. 

Alt 1,3: Develop Service 

Level Agreements with 

FAA organizations (AFS 

etc) with milestones, cost 

and schedule for 

completing separation 

standards analysis 

Alt 1,3: Assign high 

priority to developing 

operational requirements 

and CHI for ADS-B or 

WAM integration into 

terminal automation 

systems. 

US, Europe, and ICAO 

develop ADS-B standards 

jointly such as MOPS, 

Interoperability 

specifications by RFG, and 

ICAO SARPs. 

.ICAO states/nations adhere 

to Air Navigation 

Conference - 11 

recommendation to use 

1090 ES as near-term 

global link of 

interoperability 

Baseline . 

Impact 

(WHS Ssi 

74 
—~~" 

' • • -li. i »: -

.1,'.';!"; •• AII &»Hhk

 ! *••*»•- . , t

. \ " ,"

s

" . . ...... •Ri.sk.'- ....""' • •«•• . Simrttf •• Risk 

•!'•-•' Riltlll^ ^ -•— ... „. ' ••"*-. • 

39 

40 

41 

Ref: N/A 

Altl: N/A 

Alt 2: N/A 

Alt3:C4(M) 

Ref: N/A 

Alt 1: B2(L) 

Alt 2: B2(L) 

Alt 3: B2(L) 

Ref: N/A 

Altl:Bl (L) 

Alt2:Bl (L) 

Alt3:Bl (L) 

Automation 

Technical 

Gene W. 

Automation 

Technical 

Gene W. 

Old #36 

Data 

Operability 

JimM. 

Old #47 

Automation 

systems (STARS 

& CARTS) may 

not be able to 

provide PRM 

functionality in 

terms of timely 

alerts to 

controllers. 

Failure to identify 

shifting avionics 

and GBT 

builds/versions for 

automation 

interface 

Liability exposure 

related to data 

product 

provisioning 

^-^ 

.,. Source-Root Cause Impacts . ('oiist-iuiciict-

"• 'jAl^^ . «• * .. ' - " J 

Alt 3: Lack of a validated 

end-to-end latency 

requirement between WAM 

and ATC display of targets 

to support PRM 

functionality. 

Alt 3: WAM/Automation 

integration may not satisfy 

the requirement from PRM 

system spec for 0.5 second 

latency from beginning of 

target detection to ATC 

display on glass. 

Alt 1: Program does not have 

a plan for integrating future 

avionics and GBT 

builds/versions 

Alt 1: FAA is responsible for 

the accuracy of FIS-B 

products 

Ref, Alt 2,3: Surveillance 

alternatives only 

Technical 

Cost 

Schedule 

Cost 

Schedule 

Technical 

Cost 

Alt 3: Automation design 

may become more complex, 

driving up cost and delaying 

schedule. 

Alt 1: Cost and schedule 

may be adversely impacted. 

Technical complexities may 

also increase to 

accommodate different 

builds/versions 

Alt 1: FAA may be subject 

to litigation 

— 

llascliiuMiii^iiiion Option & Snalvjiy" Impact • 

...... '"' "" ' .. (\\'HS.SsiControl 

Control 

Control 

Alt 3: Develop Service 

level agreement with AFS 

to conduct WAM 

risk/simulation analysis in 

defining end-to-end latency 

requirements. Perform 

system engineering analysis 

to allocate latency between 

WAM and Automation. 

Alt 3: Consider a 

standalone automation 

processor separate from 

STARS/CARTS, or a 

dedicated module in 

STARS/CARTS. 

Alt 1: Plan for Tech 

Refresh with budgets on 

periodic basis to 

accommodate evolving 

avionics and ground 

infrastructure. 

Alt 1: Requirements / 

Architecture team will 

address as part of JRC-2b 

activities - formulate fPR 

document 

Alt 1: Employ appropriate 

quality control procedures. 

Alt 1: Observe certification 

standards. 

75 
•••'•" • -. . 

Risk «•• 

"•Ofcf . 

'•' " -•••*"" , 

42 

43 

44 

Alt Jt Risk • 

Raiiiiji" •*'••! 

" - • ' r. 

Ref: N/A 

Altl:B3(L) 

Alt 2: N/A 

Alt 3: N/A 

Ref: C3 (M) 

Altl: B2(L) 

Alt 2: C3 (M) 

Alt3:C3(M) 

Ref: Al (L) 

Alt 1: Al (L) 

Alt 2: Al (L) 

Alt 3: A1 (L) 

1

 ^Source ., 

Data 

Supportability 

JimM 

Safety 

Les Crane 

Safety 

Al Mears 

Old #49 

7"'J,:i".Risk ,..,. 

• Hi. . """""•• • '"i IJ. 

Inability to 

Maintain Currency 

/ Accuracy of 

Surface Map 

Database 

Lack critical safety 

information for 

surface operations 

Failure to plan a 

System Safety 

Program 

Smircc-Ruoi ( aiist 

•"•-*•-..... •••-•y-s. . 

Alt 1 Strategy includes the 

development of 200 surface 

maps 

Ref, Alt 2,3 Limited sites 

where surface surveillance 

equipment is deployed 

Alt 1 The program is 

currently developing an 

Integrated Safety Plan (ISP) 

' Inipacis 

Benefit 

Technical 

Technical 

Cost 

Schedule 

" Voiist-jjucncc 

Surface maps will become 

obsolete and unusable for 

surface operations thus 

decreasing overall user 

safety benefits 

Continued likelihood of 

surface accidents and 

incidents 

Altl Management of the 

many safety elements (such 

as assessments and nsk 

mitigation) required of the 

program may be inadequate 

to ensure programmatic and 

technical safety 

Mili-

., .. . 

Control 

Assume 

Control 

iiiun Option & Sii;m'j>\ 

Revert to current less 

desirable / less efficient 

paper based product 

Research the viability of 

this being an industry 

product 

ASDE-3 and ASDE-X 

systems mitigate for 

alternatives 2 and 3 at a 

limited number of locations 

Alt 1 Complete an ISP for 

review by the ATO NAS 

Modernization System 

Safety Working Group 

(ATO NM SSWG) 

Altl Upon receipt of ATO 

NM SSWG concurrence, 

obtain approval of the ISP 

by the Director of Safety 

Risk Management (DSRM) 

or a representative 

liilMlillLllllpilCl 

(WHS'Ssj 

76 
,;.-, . Ui&Ris k Risk* ., .-

Rutins 

•••. . •«»., • mm 

45 

46 

Ref: Al (L) 

Alt 1: Bl (L) 

Alt 2: A1 (L) 

AH3:B1 (L) 

Ref: B2 (L) 

Alt 1: B4 (M) 

Alt 2: Al (L) 

Alt3:C4(M) 

•',• • . Baseline 

Source • Risk:-.-. 'iSunicc Ktiut ( aiisc liiipucts . •"".' ( oiist-tnii-uct- ••= Mitij-iitidii Option & Sii;tu»\ Impart 

•'.... =-. -•' . . j --:!.. . '•:•*.. •••. • L • -•:., , (WKS-ss) 

Safety 

Al Mears 

Old #50 

Safety 

Al Mears 

Old #51 

Failure to execute 

the required 

Business Case or 

Investment 

Analysis Safety 

Assessment 

Failure to identify 

the level of overall 

system safety risk 

for any alternative 

The program is required to 

conform the existing 

Capstone Operational Safety 

Assessment (OSA) for use 

and develop a Comparative 

Safety Assessment (CSA) of 

the alternatives for the initial 

investment decision, but the 

OSA and CSA are not yet 

completed, reviewed and 

approved. 

Alt 1: AFS-400 approved 

separation standards analysis 

plan. 

Alt 1: Comparative Safety 

Assessment (CSA) 

completed - Preliminary 

Hazard Analysis (PHA) will 

be completed for JRC 2b 

Alt 1: Comparative Safety 

Assessment (CSA) 

completed by Program 

Office - currently being 

reviewed by the SSWG. 

Technical 

Benefits 

Technical 

Schedule 

The target level of safety 

that will be identified in the 

OSA has not been 

approved. The relative risk 

of the alternatives have not 

been identified in a CSA, 

thus the investment decision 

cannot be properly made. 

Not completing the required 

safety assessments may 

affect technical 

performance and alter 

expected benefits in safety 

or cost. 

The program might be 

delayed if it goes to the 

initial investment decision 

without knowing the highest 

level of risk for its 

alternatives. Failure to 

know the risks implies 

insufficient program 

management and oversight. 

Control 

Control 

Ensure that the ADS-B 

program office completes 

the OSA and the CSA and 

that each one is reviewed 

by the ATO NM SSWG. 

Complete Preliminary 

Hazard Analysis (PHA) for 

JRC 2b 

Complete ATO NM SSWG 

review and DSRM approval 

of the CSA DAR, which 

will contain the identified 

hazards and their level of 

risk for each alternative. 

77