[DO NOT PUBLISH]

In the

United States Court of Appeals

For the Eleventh Circuit

____________________

No. 23-12306

Non-Argument Calendar

____________________

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 

Plaintiff-Appellee,

versus

JANERIO JONES, 

a.k.a. Janerio Lacondre Jones, 

Defendant-Appellant.

____________________

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Middle District of Georgia

D.C. Docket No. 4:22-cr-00005-CDL-MSH-2

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2 Opinion of the Court 23-12306

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Before JORDAN, LAGOA, and BRASHER, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:

Janerio Jones, a federal prisoner proceeding with counsel, 

appeals his convictions and resulting sentence for two counts of 

Hobbs Act robbery and one count of brandishing a firearm during 

and in relation to Hobbs Act robbery pursuant to a guilty plea. He 

argues that his guilty plea was unknowing and involuntary because 

his trial counsel ineffectively assured him that his base offense level 

would only consider the two specific robberies from the charges to 

which he pleaded guilty, and not the five other robberies he committed as stipulated in the plea agreement.

Jones’s arguments fail. To the extent Jones is challenging his 

counsel’s effectiveness, we cannot review that claim on direct appeal. To the extent Jones argues that the district court plainly erred 

in accepting his guilty plea, we disagree. Accordingly, we affirm. 

I.

We will start with Jones’s ineffective assistance claim. The 

merits of a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel present a mixed 

question of law and fact that we ordinarily review de novo. GomezDiaz v. United States, 433 F.3d 788, 790 (11th Cir. 2005). For claims 

of ineffective assistance of counsel, a convicted defendant must 

demonstrate that counsel’s performance was deficient and that the 

deficient performance prejudiced the defense. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984). 

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However, the Supreme Court has reasoned that “[w]hen an 

ineffective-assistance claim is brought on direct appeal, appellate 

counsel and the [C]ourt must proceed on a trial record not developed precisely for the object of litigating or preserving the claim 

and thus often incomplete or inadequate for this purpose.” Massaro 

v. United States, 538 U.S. 500, 504-05 (2003). Our precedent “require[s] the district court to have the opportunity to examine ineffective-assistance claims before” we review them. United States v. 

Padgett, 917 F.3d 1312, 1316 (11th Cir. 2019). Accordingly, “except 

in the rare instance when the record is sufficiently developed, we 

will not address claims for ineffective assistance of counsel on direct appeal.” United States v. Merrill, 513 F.3d 1293, 1308 (11th Cir. 

2008) (alteration accepted) (quotation marks omitted); see also 

United States v. Griffin, 699 F.2d 1102, 1107-08 (11th Cir. 1983) 

(same); United States v. Puentes-Hurtado, 794 F.3d 1278, 1285 (11th 

Cir. 2015) (same). Rather, the proper venue for a federal defendant 

presenting an ineffective-assistance claim is a collateral attack presented in a § 2255 proceeding where necessary evidence on the performance and prejudice prongs of Strickland can be presented. 

Puentes-Hurtado, 794 F.3d at 1285; Merrill, 513 F.3d at 1308; see also 

Griffin, 699 F.2d at 1109 (noting that rejecting ineffective-assistance 

claims on direct appeal does not deny a person’s right to bring their 

claim in a § 2255 proceeding).

We have found a record not sufficiently developed for appellate review “[a]lthough the record contain[ed] some evidence 

concerning [counsel’s] performance.” Puentes-Hurtado, 794 F.3d at 

1285. Additionally, in United States v. Ahmed, we held that a claim 

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of ineffective assistance of counsel was not properly before us on 

direct appeal, even when counsel there made statements on the 

record about his communications with the defendant, because the 

statements “were not made under oath, they were not subject to 

cross-examination, and there [was] no way to assess whether any

communication difficulty prejudiced [the defendant’s] defense.” 73 

F.4th 1363, 1375-76 (11th Cir. 2023).

Here, the record is not sufficiently developed for us to adjudicate whether Jones’s trial counsel was ineffective. See Merrill, 513 

F.3d at 1308. Any claim Jones wishes to raise would best be raised 

in a § 2255 motion, where he would have the opportunity to

properly request an evidentiary hearing on his claim. See Massaro,

538 U.S. at 504-05; Merrill, 513 F.3d at 1308; Puentes-Hurtado, 794 

F.3d at 1285; Griffin, 699 F.2d at 1109. Accordingly, we decline to 

consider Jones’s claim of ineffective assistance of counsel.

II.

We will now turn to whether Jones has established that the 

district court erred in accepting his guilty plea. Ordinarily, “[t]he 

voluntariness of a guilty plea is a question of law reviewed de novo.” 

United States v. Bushert, 997 F.2d 1343, 1352 (11th Cir. 1993). However, when the defendant fails to object to a violation of Rule 11 in 

the district court, we review the court’s compliance with Rule 11 

for plain error. United States v. Monroe, 353 F.3d 1346, 1349 (11th 

Cir. 2003). To establish plain error, a defendant must show that 

there was (1) an error, (2) that is plain, and (3) that affects substantial rights. United States v. Castro, 455 F.3d 1249, 1253 (11th Cir. 

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2006). When all three conditions are met, we may reverse for plain 

error if the error seriously affects the fairness, integrity, or public 

reputation of judicial proceedings. Id. An error is not plain unless it 

is obvious and clear under current law. Id.

“A plea of guilty is constitutionally valid only to the extent it 

is voluntary and intelligent.” Bousley v. United States, 523 U.S. 614, 

618 (1998). In determining that a defendant’s guilty plea is knowing 

and voluntary, the district court must conduct a plea colloquy to 

ensure that the three core concerns of Rule 11 are met: “(1) the 

guilty plea must be free from coercion; (2) the defendant must understand the nature of the charges; and (3) the defendant must 

know and understand the consequences of his guilty plea.” United 

States v. Freixas, 332 F.3d 1314, 1318 (11th Cir. 2003) (quotation 

marks omitted). A defendant’s belief that he can rely on his attorney’s prediction about his sentencing guideline range is insufficient 

to render a plea involuntary when the district court explicitly explains that the sentence it imposes may be different from such a 

prediction. See United States v. Pease, 240 F.3d 938, 941 (11th Cir. 

2001).

We cannot say the district court plainly erred in accepting 

Jones’s guilty plea as knowing and voluntary. See Monroe, 353 F.3d 

at 1349. The district court’s plea colloquy assessed the core concerns of Rule 11 and found that Jones’s plea complied with all of 

them. Accordingly, the district court’s plea colloquy was constitutionally sufficient for the district court to determine that Jones

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voluntarily pleaded guilty. See Bousley, 523 U.S. at 618; Freixas, 332 

F.3d at 1318.

III.

AFFIRMED.

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