[Cite as McLean v. McHugh, Inc., 2011-Ohio-2478.]

COURT OF APPEALS 

MUSKINGUM COUNTY, OHIO 

FIFTH APPELLATE DISTRICT 

SHANE MCLEAN, ET AL. : 

 : 

 Plaintiffs-Appellants : 

 : 

-vs- : 

 : 

MCHUGH, INC., ET AL. : 

 : 

 Defendants-Appellees : 

JUDGES: 

Hon. Sheila G. Farmer, P.J. 

Hon. Julie A. Edwards, J. 

Hon. Patricia A. Delaney, J. 

Case No. CT2011-007 

O P I N I O N 

CHARACTER OF PROCEEDING: Appeal from the Court of Common Pleas, 

Case No. CC2010-0387 

JUDGMENT: Affirmed 

 

DATE OF JUDGMENT ENTRY: May 20, 2011 

APPEARANCES: 

For Plaintiffs-Appellants For Defendants-Appellees 

BRIAN W. BENBOW RONALD GREGORY 

605 Market Street 5005 Rockside Road 

Zanesville, OH 43701 Suite 600 

 Independence, OH 44131 
Muskingum County, Case No. CT2011-007 2

Farmer, P.J. 

{¶1} On February 19, 2010, appellant, Shane McLean, suffered injuries when 

he slipped on ice and fell while shopping for a vehicle at McHugh, Inc., dba McHugh 

Jeep, appellee herein. 

{¶2} On June 16, 2010, appellant, together with his wife, Angela McLean, filed 

a complaint against appellee and others, alleging negligence in maintaining its 

walkways and pathways free from ice and snow. 

{¶3} On November 10, 2010, appellee filed a motion for summary judgment. A 

hearing was held on February 18, 2011. By judgment entry filed same date, the trial 

court granted the motion. 

{¶4} Appellant filed an appeal and this matter is now before this court for 

consideration. Assignment of error is as follows: 

I 

{¶5} "THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED PREJUDICAL (SIC) ERROR BY 

GRANTING APPELEE'S (SIC) MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT BY NOT 

CONSIDERING APPELLANT'S PROPERLY FORMATTED AFFIDAVIT AND 

AMENDED AFFIDAVIT AND BY CONSTRUING THE EVIDENCE IN A LIGHT MOST 

FAVORABLE TO THE MOVING PARTY --- NOT THE NON-MOVING PARTY." 

I 

{¶6} Appellant claims the trial court erred in granting summary judgment to 

appellee. We disagree. 
Muskingum County, Case No. CT2011-007 3

{¶7} Summary Judgment motions are to be resolved in light of the dictates of 

Civ.R. 56. Said rule was reaffirmed by the Supreme Court of Ohio in State ex rel. 

Zimmerman v. Tompkins, 75 Ohio St.3d 447, 448, 1996-Ohio-211: 

{¶8} "Civ.R. 56(C) provides that before summary judgment may be granted, it 

must be determined that (1) no genuine issue as to any material fact remains to be 

litigated, (2) the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law, and (3) it 

appears from the evidence that reasonable minds can come to but one conclusion, and 

viewing such evidence most strongly in favor of the nonmoving party, that conclusion is 

adverse to the party against whom the motion for summary judgment is made. State 

ex. rel. Parsons v. Fleming (1994), 68 Ohio St.3d 509, 511, 628 N.E.2d 1377, 1379, 

citing Temple v. Wean United, Inc. (1977), 50 Ohio St.2d 317, 327, 4 O.O3d 466, 472, 

364 N.E.2d 267, 274." 

{¶9} As an appellate court reviewing summary judgment motions, we must 

stand in the shoes of the trial court and review summary judgments on the same 

standard and evidence as the trial court. Smiddy v. The Wedding Party, Inc. (1987), 30 

Ohio St.3d 35. 

{¶10} As stated by our brethren from the Ninth District in Austin v. Peterson

(1999), Medina App. No. 2735-M: 

{¶11} "The party that moves for summary judgment bears the initial burden of 

identifying evidence that demonstrates that there is no genuine issue of material fact 

regarding an essential element of the nonmoving party's claim. Vahila v. Hall (1997), 77 

Ohio St.3d 421, 429, 674 N.E.2d 1164, citing Dresher v. Burt (1996), 75 Ohio St.3d 280, 

293, 662 N.E.2d 264. Once the moving party has satisfied its burden, the nonmoving 
Muskingum County, Case No. CT2011-007 4

party bears a reciprocal burden to set forth facts demonstrating that there is a genuine 

issue for trial. Vahila v. Hall, 77 Ohio St.3d at 429, 674 N.E.2d 1164, citing Dresher v. 

Burt, 75 Ohio St.3d at 293, 662 N.E.2d 264. When the nonmoving party fails to meet 

this burden, summary judgment may be appropriately granted in favor of the moving 

party. Dresher v. Burt, 75 Ohio St.3d at 293, 662 N.E.2d 264." 

{¶12} Appellee filed its motion for summary judgment with discovery documents 

attached on November 10, 2010. Appellant filed his memorandum contra, along with 

his own affidavit, on December 1, 2010. Appellee filed a reply on December 10, 2010. 

{¶13} A hearing was held on February 18, 2011. On same date at 1:37 p.m., the 

trial court filed its judgment entry granting appellee's motion for summary judgment. At 

1:50 p.m., appellant filed a motion to amend his affidavit, to include the omitted word 

"not" from ¶9. By judgment entry filed February 23, 2011, the trial court granted 

appellant's motion to amend his affidavit. Appellant filed his notice of appeal on the 

February 18, 2011 judgment entry on February 28, 2011. 

{¶14} Appellant now argues the trial court erred by not considering his properly 

formatted affidavit and amended affidavit in rendering its decision. The omission of the 

word "not" was brought to the trial court's attention and discussed during the hearing. T. 

at 28-29, 40-41. At the conclusion of the hearing, the trial court permitted appellant to 

file a motion to amend. T. at 41-42. The trial court was clearly aware of the omission 

prior to rendering its decision. 

{¶15} Appellant's argument is three-fold: 1) appellee created an unnatural 

accumulation of ice by shoveling snow through an area of the parking lot which was not 

a sidewalk, thus creating black ice; 2) appellee's salesman warned appellant's wife and 
Muskingum County, Case No. CT2011-007 5

mother-in-law of the slippery pathway which evidences that appellee had superior 

knowledge that the path was slippery; and 3) the salesman failed to warn appellant and 

motioned for him to come inside using the same pathway without giving him the 

opportunity to inspect the pathway. Appellant's Brief at 7-8. 

{¶16} In order to establish a claim for negligence, one must show the existence 

of a duty, a breach of the duty, and an injury resulting proximately from the breach. 

Feldman v. Howard (1967), 10 Ohio St.2d 189. 

{¶17} Appellee owed appellant, as a business invitee, the duty "of ordinary care 

in maintaining the premises in a reasonably safe condition so that its customers are not 

unnecessarily and unreasonably exposed to danger." Paschal v. Rite Aid Pharmacy, 

Inc. (1985), 18 Ohio St.3d 203, 203. "Where a danger is open and obvious, a 

landowner owes no duty of care to individuals lawfully on the premises." Armstrong v. 

Best Buy Company, Inc., 99 Ohio St.3d 79, 2003–Ohio–2573, syllabus. The dangers 

from natural accumulations of ice and snow are ordinarily open and obvious: 

{¶18} "The dangers from natural accumulations of ice and snow are ordinarily so 

obvious and apparent that an occupier of premises may reasonably expect that a 

business invitee on his premises will discover those dangers and protect himself against 

them." Sidle v. Humphrey (1968), 13 Ohio St.2d 45, paragraph two of the syllabus. 

{¶19} However, there are two exceptions to the general rule that landowners do 

not owe a duty to business invitees regarding natural accumulations of ice and snow. 

The first is when "an owner or occupier of property is shown to have had actual or 

implied notice that a natural accumulation of ice or snow on his or her property has 

created a condition substantially more dangerous than a business invitee should have 
Muskingum County, Case No. CT2011-007 6

anticipated by reason of knowledge of conditions prevailing generally in the area, 

negligence may be established." Kaeppner v. Leading Management, Inc. Franklin App. 

No. 05AP–1324, 2006–Ohio–3588, ¶11. In order to be liable under this exception, the 

landowner must have had superior knowledge of the existing danger. Moore v. Kroger 

Company, Franklin App. No. 10AP–431, 2010–Ohio–5721, ¶8. 

{¶20} Appellant argues that the "warning" by appellee's salesman to his wife and 

mother-in-law to be careful while traversing the slippery pathway shows that appellee 

had superior knowledge of the dangerous condition. Appellant's Brief at 8. In support 

of his memorandum contra filed December 1, 2010, appellant attached his affidavit 

wherein he stated at ¶1 that he had "firsthand personal knowledge of the matters 

affirmed to herein." At ¶6, appellant attested to the following: 

{¶21} "Defendant had actual notice that ice had created a condition substantially 

more dangerous than Plaintiff could have anticipated. This is evidenced by the fact that 

Defendant's employee, the salesman, warned Plaintiff's wife and mother-in-law about 

the slippery walkway. Defendant had superior knowledge that an accumulation of ice 

had occurred, which is evidenced by the warning given to two members of Plaintiff's 

group." 

{¶22} If appellant had firsthand personal knowledge that the salesman warned 

his wife and mother-in-law, then he overheard and had knowledge that the walkway was 

slippery. The salesman displaying common courtesy does not equate to superior

knowledge of a condition "substantially more dangerous," especially given the fact that 

the salesman and the two women traversed the same pathway without incident. The 

first exception to the open and obvious rule does not apply in this case. 
Muskingum County, Case No. CT2011-007 7

{¶23} The second exception to the open and obvious rule is that a landowner 

has a duty to exercise reasonable care to protect business invitees from unnatural 

accumulation of ice and snow. Kaeppner, supra. "[S]ince the build-up of snow and ice 

during winter is regarded as a natural phenomenon, the law requires, at the very least, 

some evidence of an intervening act by the landlord (or a property owner) that 

perpetuates or aggravates the pre-existing, hazardous presence of ice and snow." 

Porter v. Miller (1983), 13 Ohio App.3d 93, 95. 

{¶24} In his affidavit at ¶4, appellant averred that appellee "created an unnatural 

accumulation of ice by shoveling snow through the parking lot on an area that was not a 

sidewalk and has never been used as a sidewalk per Plaintiff's knowledge." Appellant 

further averred the following at ¶5: 

{¶25} "Defendant created an unnatural accumulation of ice by failing to salt the 

underlying ice after clearing snow through an area of the parking lot that was not a 

sidewalk thus creating black ice that was not visible to Plaintiff. The pathway had 

melted overnight and had re-frozen creating a slippery, icy walkway, due to it being 

cleared the day before and not being re-salted." 

{¶26} As explained by our brethren from the Sixth District in Jackson v. J-F 

Enterprises, Inc., Lucas App. No. L-10-1285, 2011-Ohio-1543, ¶28: 

{¶27} "Even if this court accepts that appellees did actively place the snow 

between the parking bumper and the sidewalk, this second exception to the open and 

obvious rule does not apply because any resulting accumulation of black ice from 

typical melted run-off is still not unnatural. Flint v. Cleveland Clinic Found. [Cuyahoga 

App. Nos. 80177 & 80478, 2002–Ohio–2747], supra, concluding, '[s]imply piling snow 
Muskingum County, Case No. CT2011-007 8

on either side of the sidewalk, without more, does not constitute an "unnatural" 

accumulation of ice.***[Where] run-off from the melting snow pile created the icy patch, 

several courts, including this one, have concluded that this does not constitute an 

"unnatural" accumulation of ice. When snow is removed, it has to be placed 

somewhere, and "a certain natural run-off of water is to be expected." ' " 

{¶28} See also the analysis in Hoenigman v. McDonald's Corporation (1990), 

Cuyahoga App. No. 56010, wherein our brethren from the Eighth District explained the 

following: 

{¶29} "After snow is removed from the surface of the parking lot, it must be 

disposed of. Snow must be placed somewhere. In this case, that place was the 

elevated island in the parking lot. This court has stated: 

{¶30} "The accumulation of ice and snow is a condition created by the elements, 

a natural hazard faced by anyone who would venture about the streets while such 

conditions exist.... Snow cannot be removed from the sidewalks without being put 

somewhere. A certain natural run-off of water is to be expected. Water freezes if the 

temperature drops too low. The removal of snow is not an act of negligence, per se, but 

an act of consideration for the safety of the public, generally, and of one's customers, in 

particular.... To create liability it must appear that negligence intervened, that the snow 

was disposed of in a negligent manner, or that the removal was negligently done, but it 

also must appear that the resulting risk of injury was substantially increased or a 

violation of the duty of due care, if not proximate cause, is not established. 

{¶31} "Ramsdorfer v. Standard Oil Co. (March 22, 1973), Cuyahoga App. No. 

31751, unreported, slip op. at 2 (emphasis added)." 
Muskingum County, Case No. CT2011-007 9

{¶32} There is no evidence that the shoveling of the snow was negligent and 

created an "unnatural" accumulation of ice. The second exception to the open and 

obvious rule does not apply in this case. 

{¶33} Upon review, in construing all the evidence most strongly in favor of 

appellant, we find no evidence that creates a genuine issue of material fact and 

therefore, the trial court did not err in granting summary judgment to appellee. 

{¶34} The sole assignment of error is denied. 

{¶35} The judgment of the Court of Common Pleas of Muskingum County, Ohio 

is hereby affirmed. 

By Farmer, P.J. 

Edwards, J. and 

Delaney, J. concur. 

 _s/ Sheila G. Farmer__________________ 

 _s/ Julie A. Edwards__________________ 

 _s/ Patricia A. Delaney________________ 

 

 JUDGES 

SGF/sg 425
Muskingum County, Case No. CT2011-007 10

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS FOR MUSKINGUM COUNTY, OHIO 

FIFTH APPELLATE DISTRICT 

SHANE MCLEAN, ET AL. : 

 : 

 Plaintiffs-Appellants : 

 : 

-vs- : JUDGMENT ENTRY 

 : 

MCHUGH, INC., ET AL. : 

 : 

 Defendants-Appellees : CASE NO. CT2011-007 

 For the reasons stated in our accompanying Memorandum-Opinion, the 

judgment of the Court of Common Pleas of Muskingum County, Ohio is affirmed. Costs 

to appellant. 

 _s/ Sheila G. Farmer__________________ 

 _s/ Julie A. Edwards__________________ 

 _s/ Patricia A. Delaney________________ 

 

 JUDGES