Although a timely notice of a

ppeal or dinarily

divests the district court of jurisdiction, a 1 defic ient notice of a

ppeal doe s not. See G ilda Industries, Inc. v. U nited States , 511 F.3d 1348, 13 50 (F e d. Cir . 2 00 8) . B e c a us e the Cou

rt fi nd s th at Pla int if

fs ’ s e c on d n oti c e of

a pp e a l is untimely , the Court has jurisdiction to rule on Def endants’ motion. The notice of appe al was doc keted on August 3, 2009. Howeve r, the notice was 2 re c e ive d b y

the c le rk ’s of

fi c e on July 31 , 2 00 9, sixty

da y s a ft e r t he e ntr y of jud g me nt. ROBERT WI L L IAMS, e t al
. , Pla int if fs , v. THOMAS J . VI L SACK, e t al
. , De fe nd ants . UNITED STAT ES DIS TRICT COURT

F OR THE D ISTRIC T OF CO LU M BIA

Civil Action No. 03-2245 ( CKK)

M EM OR

AN DU M OP IN ION (Nove mber 15, 2009) Be fore the Court is Defe ndants’ Motion to St rike the Plaintiffs’ Amended Noticeof Appea l. For the rea sons expl ained be low, the Court shall GRANT the motion and STRI KE the notice of a

ppeal f iled in this C ourt on Octobe r 8, 2009. 1 The merits of this case we re de cided by this Court i n a Memora

ndum Opinion and Orde r g rantingsummary

judgme nt for De fenda

nts on J une 1, 2009. SeeDkt. 229-30. On July 31, 2009, Plaintiff Robert Wil liams filed a notice of appea l. See Dkt. 231. The notice stated that 2 “Plaintiff, Robert Willi ams, by and through his undersigned counse l, here by appea ls . . . the jud g me nt o f t

his Court e nte re d o n th e [1st ] day

of June , 2 00 9, in f

avo r o f D e fe nd ant a g a ins t sa id Plaintiff gr antingDef

endant’ s Motion for Summary J udg ment and dismissal of the ac tion.” Id. The notice does not ref

er to or othe rwise mention Plaintiff L aVe rne Williams. On October 8,2

Pla int if fs fi le d, wi tho ut l e ave of

c ourt , a se c on d n oti c e of

a pp e a l in dic atin gthat “ Pla int if fs , Robert Will iams and L aVe rne Williams” were appea ling the June 1, 2009 judg ment of the Court. Dkt. 232. On Octobe r 13, 2009, De fenda nts filed a [234] Motion to S trike Plaintiffs’ Amende d No tic e of Ap pe a l. P la int if

fs have fi le d a

n o pp os iti on

and De fe nd ants have fi le d a

reply , s o Def endants’ motion is now ripe f or dec ision. Th e fe de ra l c ourt s o f a

pp e a ls d o n ot h ave jurisd ic tio n o ve r a pa rt y wh o is no t sp e c if

ie d in a notice of

appea l in accor dance with Fede ral Rules of Appe llate Proce dure ( FRAP) 3 and 4. Torres v. Oakland Sc avenge r Co. , 487 U.S. 312, 315 (1988). In Torres , th e Sup re me Court he ld that Rule 3 require s that a notice of appea l specifica lly

indicate e ach pa

rty appea ling a

nd that the use of the te rm “e t al.” would not suffic e to indicate othe r par ties to the appea l. Id. FRAP 3(c)
was amended a fter Torres so as to permit the use of “et a l.” to designate other parties to an appea l in certa in circumstanc es. See FRAP 3(c) advisory cmte. note. The test established by the
c ur re nt r ule fo r d e te rm ini ngwh e the r s uc h d e signatio ns are su ff ic ie nt i s whe the r i t is “ ob

je c tiv e ly clea r that a pa rty intended to appe al.” See id. Howeve r, this standard doe s not assist P laintiff L aVe rne Williams here be cause the phra se “e t al.” wa s not used in the first notice of a ppeal f iled with this C ourt on J uly

31, 2009, and ther e is nothing in that notice that even indica tes the exis tence of anothe r plaintiff (othe r than Rober t Wi lliams) in the case . In fac t, the caption above th e f i r s tn o t i c e o f

a p p e a l l i s t s “ R o b e rtW i l l i am s ” a s th e s i n gu l ar “ P l a i n t i f f ” an d “ T h o m a s J. Vilsack, e t al.” as “ Def

endant” [si c], seeDk

t. 2 31 , s ug g e sti ngthat th e omi ssi on of “ e t a l.” ne xt to the Pla int if

f’ s n ame wa s d e lib e rate . T he on ly ind ic atio n th at L aVe rn e Willi ams i s e ve n a pa rt y to the ca se is that the phra ses “e t al.” and “ Plaintiffs” are used in the ca ption of the ce rtificate of service attache d to the notice of a ppeal. How ever , this does not provide an objec tively clea r3

ind ic atio n o f P la int if

f L aVe rn e Willi ams’ int e nt t o a pp e a l th e June 1, 20 09 jud g me nt o f t his Court . Pla int if

fs ’ s e c on d n oti c e of

a pp e a l, whic h atte mpt s to c ur e the e arl ie r d e fe c t by e xplic itl y namingL aVe rne Williams as an appe llant, was filed one hundred a nd thirty day s after

this Court enter ed its final judg ment. Acc ordingto FRAP 4—which incorpor ates the statutory jurisdictional limi tations on the time for filingan appe al, se eBo wle s v . R us se ll , 551 U.S. 205, 20 8 ( 20 07 )—

the no tic e of

a pp e a l in a c a se wh e re the Un ite d St ate s o r i ts o ff ic e rs are a

pa rt y mus t be fi le d w iththe dis tr ic t c le rk wi thi n 6 0 d ay s a ft e r t

he jud g me nt o r o rd e r a

pp e a le d f ro m is enter ed. F RAP 4(a)(1) . A district court may extend the time for filinga notice of appea l if a party moves for a

n extension no l ater

than 30 day s after

the initial 60-day

period e x pires. See FRAP 4(a) (5)( A). A district c ourt may also reope n the time to file an a ppeal f or a pe riod of 14 day s if it determines that (i) the moving pa rty did not rece ive notice of

the entry of the judgment s o u g h tt o b e a

p p e a l e d w i th i n2 1 d ays o f

i t s e n tr y; ( i i ) th e m o t i o ni s f

i l e d w i th i ne i th e r

1 8 0 d ays a ft e r e ntr y of the jud g me nt o r 7 da

y s a ft e r t he pa rt ie s r e c e ive s n oti c e of

the e ntr y of jud g me nt, wh ic he ve r i s e arl ie r; and

(i ii) that no pa

rt y wo uld be pr e jud ic e d. B e c a

us e Pla int if

fs did no t f ile their sec ond notice of a

ppeal within 60 day s after the entry of final judgment and did not move the Court for a

n extension of tim e within 30 day s after the 60-da y period, the se cond notice of
a pp e a l is untim e ly . F ur

the rm or e , b e c a

us e the re is n o e vid e nc e that Pla int if f L aVe rn e Willi ams fa ile d to re c e ive no tic e of the e ntr y of the fi na l ju dgme nt, the Court c ann ot r e op e n th e tim e to f ile
a no tic e of a pp e a l. In their opposition to Defenda nts’ motion to s trike, Plaintiffs acknow ledg e that L aVe rne Willi ams w a s in a dv e rt e ntl y omi tte d f ro m th e No tic e of

Ap pe a l. P ls. ’ O pp ’n

¶ 2 . N e ve rt

he le ss,4

they ref er to filing s, such as a

cer tificate of parties, submitted to the Court of Appea ls on October 1, 2009 that clea

rly indicate L aVe rne Williams int ended to a ppeal the June 1, 2009 order
. Id. ¶¶ 3, 5. Reg ardle ss of the conte nt of these f ilings, howe ver, the y

do not constitute a proper notice of appea l filed in the district court. Eve n if Plaintiffs had filed these documents in the district court
o nOc t o b er

1 , 2 0 0 9 , th ei r f

i l i n gs wo u l d

b e w el l b ey o n d

th e j uri s d i ct i o n al t i m e l i m i t s fo r f i l i n g a notice of a

ppeal. Plaintiffs cla im that their “ame nded” notice of appe al should be per mitted beca use the only

jurisdictional require ment for f iling an a ppeal is the timely

filing of the notice of
a pp e a l, whic h w a s a c c omp lis he d b y the fi rs t no tic e of

a pp e a l. P ls. ’ O pp ’n

¶ 7 . T his is s imp ly
wr o n g . A s e x p l a i n e d

a b o v e , th e n o t i c e o f

a p p e a l mu s tb e f

i l e d t i m e l y and

name a ll the pa

rt ie s to the appe al. Torres , 487 U.S. at 314 (“The failure to name a pa rty in a notice of

appea l is more tha n e xcu sa ble ‘i nf or ma lity ’; it c on sti tut e s a

fa ilure of that pa rt y to a pp e a l.” ) T he on ly

a uth or ity cited by Plaintiffs is a case from the Ohio Court of A ppeals in which the court he ld that an appellant’ s spouse should not be excluded from an a ppeal a bsent a showingof pre

judice to the opposing pa

rty . See P l s . ’ O p p ’n¶ 7 (c i t i n g Campbell v. Allstate Ins. Co. , No. 99CA0065, 2000 WL646484 (Ohio Ct. App. May 19, 2000)). This ca se is not binding author ity , howeve r, and the Sup re me Court

of Oh io h a s e xplic itl y

state d th at it

do e s n ot i nte rp re t it s st ate ru le s o f a pp e llate proce dure a s strictly

as the Supreme Court of the United States has inter prete d the fe dera l rules. See Transameric a Ins. Co. v. Nolan , 649 N.E.2d 1229, 1231 (Ohio 1995) . Thus, Plaintiffs have
c ite d n o b ind ingor

pe rs ua siv e a

uth or ity fo r t he po sit ion

that th is C ourt

may a c c e pt t he ir untim e ly fi le d s e c on d n oti c e of

a pp e a l. Ac c or din g ly , th e Court

sh a ll G RA

NT De fe nd ants ’ [2 34 ] Mot ion to S tr ike Pla int if

fs ’ Amended N otice of A

ppeal a nd order that the Clerk of the Court STRI KE Plaintiffs’ [232]5

Am e nd e d N oti c e of

Ap pe a l f ro m th e re c or d. An

a pp ro pr iate or de r a c c omp anie s th is Memorandum Opinion. /s/ C O LLE ENK O LLA R
- K O T E LLY Un i t edS t at es Di s tri ctJ u d ge