J-S35019-18

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA

v.

MATTHEW POORE 

Appellant

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 IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

 PENNSYLVANIA

 No. 1682 MDA 2017

Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence September 27, 2017

In the Court of Common Pleas of Berks County

Criminal Division at No(s): CP-06-CR-0003966-2016

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA

v.

MATTHEW POORE 

Appellant

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 IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

 PENNSYLVANIA

 No. 1683 MDA 2017

Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence September 27, 2017

In the Court of Common Pleas of Berks County

Criminal Division at No(s): CP-06-CR-0001127-2016

BEFORE: BENDER, P.J.E., PANELLA, J., and MURRAY, J.

MEMORANDUM BY PANELLA, J. FILED: JANUARY 18, 2019

After a bench trial, the court found Matthew Poore guilty of two counts, 

at two separate docket numbers, of defiant trespass. These charges arose 

from allegations he repeatedly entered his parents’ home after they instructed 

him he was not welcome there. He challenges the sufficiency and the weight 

of the evidence supporting the verdicts. Additionally, his court-appointed 
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attorney, Catherine J. Nadirov, Esquire, seeks permission from this Court to 

withdraw pursuant to Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967), and 

Commonwealth v. Santiago, 978 A.2d 349 (Pa. 2009). We affirm and grant 

counsel’s petition to withdraw at both docket numbers.

Prior to addressing the merits of Poore’s requested appeal, we must 

examine Attorney Nadirov’s request to withdraw. Attorney Nadirov has 

substantially complied with the mandated procedure for withdrawing as 

counsel. See Santiago, 978 A.2d at 361 (articulating Anders requirements); 

Commonwealth v. Daniels, 999 A.2d 590, 594 (Pa. Super. 2010) (providing 

that counsel must inform client by letter of rights to proceed once counsel 

moves to withdraw and append a copy of the letter to the petition). Poore did 

not file a response. 

As counsel has met her technical obligation to withdraw, we must now 

“make a full examination of the proceedings and make an independent 

judgment to decide whether the appeal is in fact wholly frivolous.” 

Commonwealth v. Flowers, 113 A.3d 1246, 1248 (Pa. Super. 2015) 

(citation omitted). 

Counsel has identified two issues Poore believes entitle him to relief.1

First, Poore believes the evidence at trial was insufficient to sustain his 

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1 As discussed more fully below, Poore wishes to challenge the sufficiency and 

the weight of the evidence to support his convictions. Attorney Nadirov 

combines both issues into a single argument in her Anders brief. These issues 
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convictions. Poore’s challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence raises a pure 

question of law. See Commonwealth v. Jacoby, 170 A.3d 1065, 1076 (Pa. 

2017). We review the claim de novo, and review the entire record before us. 

See id. 

We examine whether the evidence admitted at trial is capable of 

supporting a finding on every element of the offense at issue. See 

Commonwealth v. Doughty, 126 A.3d 951, 958 (Pa. 2015). In doing so, we 

view the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict winner, drawing 

all reasonable inferences in the verdict winner’s favor. See id. 

The Commonwealth’s burden may be met solely through circumstantial 

evidence. See id. The finder of fact is entitled to believe all, some, or none of 

the evidence presented. See Commonwealth v. Diggs, 949 A.2d 873, 877 

(Pa. 2008).

A defendant is guilty of defiant trespass if the Commonwealth 

establishes he “enters or remains in any place” where he knows he has no 

right to be, after he has received actual notice that his presence would be 

considered a trespass. See Commonwealth v. Wanner, 158 A.3d 714, 718 

(Pa. Super. 2017).

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are distinct. In fact, a challenge to the weight of the evidence concedes the 

sufficiency of the evidence. See Commonwealth v. Kinney, 157 A.3d 968, 

971 (Pa. 2017). Thus, the two arguments cannot be merged into one. 

Nonetheless, this misstep does not hamper our ability to review the issues in 

the context of an Anders brief, and we therefore proceed.
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With respect to the conviction appealed at 1683 MDA 2017, the 

Commonwealth presented the testimony of two police officers and Poore’s 

father, Richard. Officer Christian Lengel testified that he responded to a report 

of a domestic disturbance at Poore’s parents’ home on February 6, 2016. See 

N.T., Bench Trial, 9/27/17, at 16. Upon arriving he discovered Richard and 

Matthew in conflict. Richard informed the officer that Matthew would not leave 

the residence. See id., at 17. After Matthew refused to leave his parents’ 

home, Officer Lengel arrested him. See id.

Officer Larry Kutz testified he was summoned to Poore’s parents’ 

residence shortly after midnight on March 3, 2016 to respond to an alarm. 

See id., at 5. Before arriving, dispatch notified him that Poore was in the 

home, and that Poore did not have permission to be there. See id.

When Officer Kutz arrived at the scene, Poore greeted him at the door. 

See id., at 6. Officer Kutz recognized Poore, as he had been summoned to 

Poore’s parents’ home on other occasions. See id. He knew from the previous 

incident that Poore was not permitted to be in his parents’ home. See id., at 

7. Officer Kutz escorted Poore off the property. See id., at 7-8.

Later that afternoon, Officer Kutz was able to contact Poore’s father. 

See id., at 8. Richard, who had been in Florida, came to the police station and 

provided a written statement indicating that Poore was not permitted in his 

parents’ home. See id., at 8-9, 13.
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Finally, Richard Poore testified he had informed Matthew he was not 

allowed in his parents’ home without another family member present. See id., 

at 22. This was communicated directly to Poore prior to March 3, 2016. 

Poore argues he was confused as to whether he had permission to be 

on the property, due to the on-again/off-again nature of his relationship with 

his parents. However, the court, sitting as fact-finder, was entitled to infer 

Poore knew he was not privileged to be in his parents’ home while they were

in Florida. We agree with counsel that this issue is frivolous.

Turning to Poore’s challenge to the weight of the evidence in 1683 MDA 

2017, he believes the Commonwealth’s witnesses were not credible. However, 

Poore failed to preserve this claim by raising it at sentencing or in a postsentence motion. See Pa.R.Crim.P. 607(A)(1)-(3) (“A claim that the verdict 

was against the weight of the evidence shall be raised with the trial court in a 

motion for a new trial: (1) orally, on the record, at any time before sentencing; 

(2) by written motion at any time before sentencing; or (3) in a post-sentence 

motion.”) Therefore, because Johnson has waived this claim, we agree with 

Counsel’s conclusion that it is frivolous. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. 

Kalichak, 943 A.2d 285, 291 (Pa. Super. 2008) (observing that when an issue 

has been waived, “pursuing th[e] matter on direct appeal is frivolous”).

Thus, we affirm the judgment of sentence at 1683 MDA 2017, and grant 

counsel’s petition to withdraw in that matter.
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We reach a similar conclusion in the appeal at 1682 MDA 2017. There, 

Officer Michael Wiley testified he responded to a report of domestic violence 

at Poore’s parents’ house on August 24, 2016. See N.T., Bench Trial, 9/27/17, 

at 3. Upon arriving at the home, he observed Poore standing in the driveway. 

See id., at 5. Officer Wiley heard Poore’s mother indicate Poore was no longer 

welcome on her property. See id., at 7. He therefore escorted Poore to the 

edge of the property and instructed him to leave. See id., at 8.

Poore ignored Officer Wiley’s command, and walked towards his mother 

in her driveway. See id. Officer Wiley again escorted Poore to the end of the 

driveway and told him to leave the property. See id. Poore again ignored 

Officer Wiley and walked towards his mother in her driveway. See id. At this 

point, Officer Wiley arrested Poore for defiant trespass. See id.

We need not even consider Poore’s mother’s testimony that she had 

previously instructed Poore to stay away from her home, see id., at 13, to

conclude the evidence was legally sufficient to support his conviction for 

defiant trespass. Poore’s failure to heed Officer Wiley’s instructions establishes 

all necessary elements of the crime.

Poore’s challenge to the weight of the evidence supporting this verdict 

is waived for the same reason the weight challenge is waived in 1683 MDA 

2017: he failed to preserve the issue in a post-sentence motion.

After examining the issues contained in the Anders brief and 

undertaking an independent review of the record, we concur with counsel’s 
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assessment that the appeal is wholly frivolous. Accordingly, we affirm Poore’s 

judgment of sentence. 

Judgment of sentence affirmed at 1682 MDA 2017. Judgment of 

sentence affirmed at 1683 MDA 2017. Permission to withdraw as counsel 

granted at both docket numbers.

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 01/18/2019