IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA

No. 19-0274

Filed April 17, 2019

IN THE INTEREST OF A.F., A.F., A.F., and S.F.,

Minor Children,

K.F., Mother,

Appellant.

________________________________________________________________

Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Clinton County, Phillip J. Tabor, 

District Associate Judge.

A mother appeals the termination of her parental rights to her children. 

AFFIRMED.

Barbara E. Maness, Davenport, for appellant mother.

Thomas J. Miller, Attorney General, and Meredith L. Lamberti, Assistant 

Attorney General, for appellee State.

J. David Zimmerman, Clinton, guardian ad litem for minor children.

Considered by Vogel, C.J., and Doyle and Mullins, JJ. Tabor, J., takes no 

part.
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DOYLE, Judge.

A mother appeals the juvenile court order terminating her parental rights to 

her children. She contends the State failed to make reasonable efforts and 

termination is contrary to the children’s best interests. She also contends the 

juvenile court should have continued the termination hearing given its observations 

concerning her mental status. We review orders terminating parental rights de 

novo. See In re A.S., 906 N.W.2d 467, 472 (Iowa 2018). 

The children were removed from the mother’s care and adjudicated to be 

children in need of assistance (CINA) in April 2018 due to concerns regarding the 

mother’s substance-abuse and mental-health issues, as well as domestic violence 

in the home. Aside from one attempt at reunification with one of the children that 

lasted less than thirty days, the children have remained out of the mother’s care 

since the initial removal. When the mother failed to make progress on the issues 

that led to the CINA adjudication, the State petitioned the court to terminate the 

mother’s parental rights. At the termination hearing, the mother admitted she was 

using methamphetamine and that the children could not be returned to her care. 

The juvenile court entered an order terminating the mother’s parental rights under 

Iowa Code section 232.116(1)(d),(h), and (i) (2018). 

The mother contends the State failed to make reasonable efforts to return 

the children to her care. See Iowa Code § 232.102(9) (requiring the Iowa 

Department of Human Services (DHS) to “make every reasonable effort to return 

the child to the child’s home as quickly as possible consistent with the best 

interests of the child”). Although the State has an obligation to make reasonable 

efforts toward reunification of the family, “a parent has an equal obligation to 
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demand other, different, or additional services prior to a permanency or termination 

hearing.” In re A.A.G., 708 N.W.2d 85, 91 (Iowa Ct. App. 2005). 

In general, if a parent fails to request other services at the proper 

time, the parent waives the issue and may not later challenge it at 

the termination proceeding. If a parent has a complaint regarding 

services, the parent must make such challenge at the removal, when 

the case permanency plan is entered, or at later review hearings. 

Moreover, voicing complaints regarding the adequacy of services to 

a social worker is not sufficient. A parent must inform the juvenile 

court of such challenge.

In re C.H., 652 N.W.2d 144, 148 (Iowa 2002) (citations omitted). 

It is unclear how the mother asserts she preserved error on her claim 

concerning the State’s failure to make reasonable efforts. However, our review of 

the record does not disclose that she requested additional services at any time 

prior to termination. In each review order, the juvenile court found that the State 

was making reasonable efforts. The juvenile court reiterated this finding in its 

termination order. Nothing in the record documents that the mother requested any 

additional services. Accordingly, we find the mother failed to preserve this issue 

for our review.

The mother next contends termination of her parental rights is contrary to 

the children’s best interests. See In re D.W., 791 N.W.2d 703, 706-07 (Iowa 2010) 

(“If a ground for termination is established, the court must, secondly, apply the 

best-interest framework set out in section 232.116(2) to decide if the grounds for 

termination should result in a termination of parental rights.”). In making this

determination, our primary considerations are “the child’s safety,” “the best 

placement for furthering the long-term nurturing and growth of the child,” and “the 

physical, mental, and emotional condition and needs of the child.” In re P.L., 778 
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N.W.2d 33, 37 (Iowa 2010) (quoting Iowa Code § 232.116(2)). The “defining 

elements in a child’s best interest” are the child’s safety and “need for a permanent 

home.” In re H.S., 805 N.W.2d 737, 748 (Iowa 2011) (citation omitted). 

Throughout the proceedings, the mother failed to participate in the services offered 

to her and failed to show any discernible improvement with regard to the risks she 

presented. The mother conceded the children could not be returned safely to her 

care at the time of the termination hearing. As the court noted in the termination 

order, “recent visits between the mother and the children have deteriorated to the 

point where visits are not in the best interests of the children due to the mother’s 

negative behaviors at these visits.” Considering the children’s safety and need for 

a permanent home, we conclude termination of the mother’s parental rights is in 

the children’s best interests. 

Finally, the mother argues the district court should have continued the 

termination hearing due to her mental-health status. She erroneously contends 

she preserved error by timely filing a notice of appeal. See Thomas A. Mayes & 

Anuradha Vaitheswaran, Error Preservation in Civil Appeals in Iowa: Perspectives 

on Present Practice, 55 Drake L. Rev. 39, 48 (2006). The mother never requested 

a continuance. When asked if the parties were ready to proceed with the 

termination hearing, her attorney responded affirmatively. However, the mother 

argues the court should have continued the hearing on its own motion based on 

the following observation in the termination order:

The mother testified on the stand. She appeared to be in the throes 

of her substance abuse addiction and in the throes of her mental 

health issues and was completely disoriented as to the purposes of 

today’s hearing and what was going on. It is clear that her emotions 

prevented her from participating in the hearing effectively, and her 
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demeanor on the stand is indicative of her failure to participate in the 

case plan in this matter.

Even after the juvenile court entered the termination order, the mother made no 

motion to set aside the ruling based on the claims she now raises on appeal. See 

In re A.M.H., 516 N.W.2d 867, 872 (Iowa 1994) (noting that our rule concerning 

motions to reconsider, enlarge, or amend applies to juvenile court termination 

proceedings). Even assuming there is merit to her argument that the juvenile court 

had a duty to continue the hearing sua sponte based on its observations of the 

mother during her testimony at the hearing, her claim is not preserved for our 

review. See In re T.J.O., 527 N.W.2d 417, 420 (Iowa Ct. App. 1994) (“As a general 

rule, an issue not presented in the juvenile court may not be raised for the first time 

on appeal.”).

To the extent the mother seeks additional time for reunification, we are in 

agreement with the juvenile court and “cannot find any additional time in this matter 

will affect the mother’s ability to have the children returned to her care.” Although 

the law requires a “full measure of patience with troubled parents who attempt to 

remedy a lack of parenting skills,” this patience has been built into the statutory 

scheme of chapter 232. In re C.B., 611 N.W.2d 489, 494 (Iowa 2000). Once the 

grounds for termination have been proved, time is of the essence. See In re A.C., 

415 N.W.2d 609, 614 (Iowa 1987) (“It is unnecessary to take from the children’s 

future any more than is demanded by statute. Stated otherwise, plans which 

extend the [statutory] period during which parents attempt to become adequate in 

parenting skills should be viewed with a sense of urgency.”); see also In re R.J., 

436 N.W.2d 630, 636 (Iowa 1989) (noting that once the time period for reunification 
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set by the legislature has expired, “patience on behalf of the parent can quickly

translate into intolerable hardship for the children”). Children are not equipped with 

pause buttons, and denying a child permanency in favor of a parent is contrary to 

the child’s best interests.

We affirm the order terminating the mother’s parental rights.

AFFIRMED.