18820 Federal Register / Vol. 62, No. 74 / Thursday, April 17, 1997 / Notices

standards, subject to NSSB approval, for

basic skill certificates. They will also

review and endorse the standards for

specialty certificates established for

more narrowly defined occupations

within the occupational cluster by

groups other than the voluntary

Partnership.

The enabling legislation requires

representation of all key stakeholders

groups as described herein:

Excerpted from the National Skill

Standards Act of 1994

Establishment of Voluntary

Partnerships to Develop Standards.—

(1) In General—For each of the

occupational clusters identified

pursuant to subsection (a), the National

Board shall encourage and facilitate the

establishment of voluntary partnerships

to develop a skill standards system in

accordance with subsection (d).

(2) Representatives—Such voluntary

partnerships shall include the full and

balanced participation of—

(A)(i) representatives of business

(including representatives of large

employers and representatives of small

employers) who have expertise in the

area of workforce skill requirements,

and who are recommended by national

business organizations or trade

associations representing employers in

the occupation or industry for which a

standard is being developed; and

(ii) representatives of trade

associations that have received grants

from the Department of Labor or the

Department of Education to establish

skill standards prior to the date of

enactment of this title;

(B) employee representatives who

have expertise in the area of workforce

skill requirements and who shall be—

(i) individuals recommended by

recognized national labor organizations

representing employees in the

occupation or industry for which a

standard is being developed; and

(ii) such other individuals who are

nonmanagerial employees with

significant experience and tenure in

such occupation or industry as are

appropriate given the nature and

structure of employment in the

occupation or industry;

(C) representatives of—

(i) educational institutions;

(ii) community-based organizations;

(iii) State and local agencies with

administrative control or direction over

education, vocational-technical

education, or employment and training;

(iv) other policy development

organizations with expertise in the area

of workforce skill requirements; and

(v) non-governmental organizations

with a demonstrated history of

successfully protecting the rights of

racial, ethnic, or religious minorities,

women, individuals with disabilities, or

older persons; and

(D) individuals with expertise in

measurement and assessment, including

relevant experience in designing

unbiased assessments and performancebased assessments.

(3) Experts—The partnerships

described in paragraph (1) may also

include such other individuals who are

independent, qualified experts in their

fields.

The NSSB Proposed Criteria in Addition

to Statutory Criteria Necessary for

Recognition as a Voluntary Partnership

The NSSB proposes that there will be

two levels of participation in the

Voluntary Partnerships; (1) general

membership; and (2) voting

membership.

General membership will be open to

all individuals interested in

participating in the discussion and

receiving communications about the

development of a voluntary skill

standards system for the cluster.

Representatives from the trade

associations that have received grants

from the Department of Labor or the

Department of Education to establish

skill standards prior to the date of

enactment of the National Skill

Standards Act of 1994 are specifically

invited to participate at this level, and

may participate in the voting

membership as well.

Voting membership will be

determined by the general membership

through a democratic process. The

voting membership will make decisions

regarding the cluster’s skill standards

systems. The voting leadership must

reflect, to the extent possible, the

criteria defined below.

The NSSB mission statement

indicates that ‘‘voluntary skill standards

will be developed by industry in full

partnership with education, labor and

community stakeholders.’’ The NSSB

expects that, in keeping with its mission

statement, the Voluntary Partnerships

will demonstrate employer leadership,

but will make every effort to include

equal numbers from each of the

following three broadly defined groups

of stakeholders in the voting leadership:

(1) Employer representatives from

large, medium, small companies, public

and private employers, and trade

associations.

(2) Worker representatives from

recognized national labor organizations

and expert workers who are

representatives of employee

associations.

(3) Community representatives from

education and training institutions,

community-based organizations,

relevant state and local agencies, other

policy development organizations with

expertise in the area of workforce skill

requirements, individuals with

expertise in measurement and

assessment, and non-governmental

organizations with a demonstrated

history of successfully protecting the

rights of women, individuals with

disabilities, older persons, and racial,

ethnic or religious minorities.

Specific representation from

community members and institutions

will be determined as is logical for the

cluster, e.g. if training is primarily

delivered in community and career

colleges, then representation should

include individuals from that

community.

The voting members of the Voluntary

Partnerships shall also, to the extent

feasible, be geographically

representative of the United States and

reflect the racial, ethnic, and gender

diversity of the United States.

A copy of the authorizing legislation

will be available at the hearing.

Interested parties may access a copy on

the National Skill Standards Board web

site, www.nssb.org or call (202) 254–

8628 to request a copy.

Signed at Washington, DC, this 14th day of

April, 1997.

Edie West,

Executive Director, National Skill Standards

Board.

[FR Doc. 97–9973 Filed 4–16–97; 8:45 am]

BILLING CODE 4510–23–M

NUCLEAR REGULATORY

COMMISSION

Abnormal Occurrence Reports:

Implementation of Section 208 Energy

Reorganization Act of 1974; Revision

to Policy Statement

AGENCY: Nuclear Regulatory

Commission.

ACTION: Revise policy statement.

SUMMARY: This policy statement

presents the revised criteria the

Commission will use in submitting the

annual abnormal occurrence (AO)

reports to Congress and the public in a

timely manner as stated in Section 208

of the Energy Reorganization Act of

1974, as amended. The AO policy

statement incorporates minor changes to

implement the Commission’s direction

to develop conforming changes as

necessary and revise criteria III., ‘‘For

Fuel Cycle Licensees,’’ to include

facilities that are not licensed but are
Federal Register / Vol. 62, No. 74 / Thursday, April 17, 1997 / Notices 18821

1Copies of NUREGS may be purchased from the

Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government

Printing Office, (P.O. BOX 37082), Washington, DC

20402–9328. Copies are also available from the

National Technical Information Service, 5285 Port

Royal Road, Springfield, VA 22161. A copy is

available for inspection and/or copying for a fee in

the NRC Public Document Room, 2120 L Street, NW

(Lower Level), Washington, DC 20037.

otherwise regulated and will receive

NRC certification such as gaseous

diffusion plants. The revision clarifies

the AO criteria for all fuel facilities

including gaseous diffusion plants.

Such revision provides criteria which

are more specific for fuel facilities in

determining those incidents and events

that the Commission considers

significant from the standpoint of public

health and safety for reporting to

Congress.

EFFECTIVE DATE: April 17, 1997.

ADDRESSES: The final policy statement

published in the Federal Register

(December 19, 1996; 61 FR 67072) may

be examined at the NRC Public

Document Room, 2120 L Street, NW.

(Lower Level), Washington, DC.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT:

Harriet Karagiannis, Office for Analysis

and Evaluation of Operational Data, U.S.

Nuclear Regulatory Commission,

Washington, DC 20555, telephone: (301)

415–6377, internet: hxk@nrc.gov.

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:

I. Background

II. The Commission Policy

I. Background

Section 208 of the Energy

Reorganization Act of 1974 (Public Law

93–438, 42 U.S.C. 5848), as amended,

required the Commission to submit to

Congress each quarter a report listing for

that period any AOs at or associated

with any facility which is licensed or

otherwise regulated pursuant to the

Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended,

or pursuant to this Act. In a letter to the

Senate Subcommittee on Oversight of

Government Management, dated

October 1, 1993, the NRC recommended

to Congress a change in the AO report

publication frequency from quarterly to

yearly. As a result, Senate 790, ‘‘Reports

Elimination Act,’’ Public Law 104–66,

was signed by President Clinton on

December 21, 1995, changing the AO

report to a yearly publication.

For the purposes of Section 208 of the

Energy Reorganization Act of 1974, as

amended, an AO is an unscheduled

incident or event which the

Commission has determined to be

significant from the standpoint of public

health and safety. Each such report shall

contain:

(1) The date and place of each

occurrence;

(2) The nature and probable

consequence of each occurrence;

(3) The cause or causes of each

occurrence; and

(4) Any action taken to prevent

recurrence.

The Commission also shall provide as

wide dissemination to the public of the

information specified in clauses (1) and

(2) of this section as reasonably possible

within 15 days of its receiving

information of each AO and shall

provide as wide dissemination to the

public as reasonably possible of the

information specified in clauses (3) and

(4) as soon as such information becomes

available.

In July 1975, in the exercise of the

authority conferred upon the

Commission by Congress to determine

which unscheduled incidents or events

are significant from the standpoint of

public health and safety and are

reportable to Congress as AOs, the

Commission developed interim criteria

for evaluating licensee incidents or

events. On the basis of these interim

criteria and as required by Section 208

of the Energy Reorganization Act of

1974, as amended, the Commission

began issuing quarterly reports to

Congress on AOs. These reports,1

‘‘Report to Congress on Abnormal

Occurrences,’’ have been issued in

NUREG–75/090 and NUREG–0090–1

through 5 for the period from January

1975 through September 1976. On the

basis of its experience in the preparation

and issuance of AO reports, the

Commission issued a general statement

of policy that described the manner in

which it would, as part of the routine

conduct of its business, carry out its

responsibilities under Section 208 of the

Energy Reorganization Act of 1974, as

amended, for identifying AOs and

making the requisite information

concerning each occurrence available to

Congress and the public in a timely

manner. This general statement of

policy was published in the Federal

Register on February 24, 1977 (42 FR

10950) and provided criteria and

examples of types of events that the

Commission would use in determining

whether a particular event is reportable

to Congress as an AO. The Commission

has since refined this statement of

policy on a number of occasions to

reflect changes in regulation and policy.

On the basis of these criteria, and as

required by Section 208 of the Energy

Reorganization Act of 1974, as

amended, the Commission has issued

quarterly reports to Congress on AOs

since March 1977. These reports,

‘‘Report to Congress on Abnormal

Occurrences,’’ have been issued in

NUREG–0090–6 through 10 and

NUREG–0090, Volumes 1 through 18.

The Commission published a further

revision to the AO policy statement and

criteria in the Federal Register on

December 19, 1996 (61 FR 67072) to

reflect changes in the Commission’s

policy and changes to the regulations. In

the Staff Requirements Memorandum

dated November 7, 1996, SECY–96–193,

approving this most recent revision to

the AO criteria the Commission directed

the NRC staff to determine whether

modifications to criteria III., ‘‘For Fuel

Cycle Licensees,’’ were necessary to

explicitly include fuel cycle facilities

that are not licensed but are otherwise

regulated by NRC such as the gaseous

diffusion plants. The NRC staff

evaluated the criteria applicable to fuel

cycle facilities and has revised the

criteria as follows:

A. AO criteria published December

19, 1996:

III. For Fuel Cycle Licensees.

1. A required plant shutdown as a

result of violating a license condition or

other safety limit.

2. A major condition not specifically

considered in the license that requires

immediate remedial action.

3. An event that seriously

compromises the ability of a

confinement system to perform its

designated function.

B. Revised AO criteria to include

gaseous diffusion plants:

IV. For Fuel Cycle Facilities.

1. A shutdown of the plant or portion

of the plant resulting from a significant

event and/or violation of a law,

regulation, or a license/certificate

condition.

2. A major condition or significant

event not considered in the license/

certificate that requires immediate

remedial action.

3. A major condition or significant

event that seriously compromises the

ability of a safety system to perform its

designated function that requires

immediate remedial action to prevent a

criticality, radiological or chemical

process hazard.

It is expected that as additional

experience is gained, further changes in

the criteria may be required.

Abnormal Occurrence Reporting

The AO statement of policy has been

developed to comply with the

legislative intent of Section 208 of the

Energy Reorganization Act of 1974, as

amended, to keep Congress and the

public informed of unscheduled

incidents or events which the

Commission considers significant from

the standpoint of public health and

safety. The policy reflects a range of
18822 Federal Register / Vol. 62, No. 74 / Thursday, April 17, 1997 / Notices

2 In addition to the criteria listed in Appendix A,

section III, ‘‘For Fuel Cycle Facilities,’’ which are

applicable to licensees and certificate holders, such

as the gaseous diffusion plants (GDPs), other criteria

of the policy statement which reference ‘‘licensees’’

or ‘‘licensed facility’’ or ‘‘licensed material’’ may

also be applied to events at certified facilities such

as the GDPs.

health and safety concerns and is

applicable to incidents and events

involving a single occupational worker

as well as those having an overall

impact on the general public.

The policy statement contains criteria

that include the reporting thresholds for

determining those incidents and events

that are reportable by NRC for the

purposes of Section 208 of the Energy

Reorganization Act of 1974, as

amended. The Commission has

established the reporting thresholds at a

level that will ensure that all events that

should be considered for reporting to

Congress will be identified. At the same

time, the thresholds are generally above

the normal level of reporting to NRC to

exclude those events that involve some

variance from regulatory limits, but are

not significant from the standpoint of

public health and safety.

Licensee Reports

This general statement of policy will

not change the reporting requirements

imposed on NRC licensees by

Commission regulations, license

conditions, or technical specifications

(TS). NRC licensees will continue to

submit required reports on a wide

spectrum of events, including events

such as instrument malfunctions and

deviations from normal operating

procedures that are not significant from

the standpoint of the public health and

safety, but do provide data useful to the

Commission in monitoring operating

trends of licensed facilities and in

comparing the actual performance of

these facilities with the potential

performance for which the facilities

were designed and/or licensed.

Information pertaining to all events

reported to the NRC will continue to be

made available and placed in the public

document rooms for public perusal. In

addition, the NRC publishes annual

reports on events (NUREG–1272 series).

Information can also be obtained by

writing to the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory

Commission, Public Document Room,

2120 L Street, NW. (Lower Level)

Washington, DC 20555–0001. In

addition, the Commission will continue

to issue news announcements on events

that seem to be newsworthy whether or

not they are reported as AOs.

II. The Commission Policy—General

Statement of Policy on Implementation

of Section 208 of the Energy

Reorganization Act of 1974, as

Amended

1. Applicability. Implementation of

Section 208 of the Energy

Reorganization Act of 1974, as

amended, Abnormal Occurrence

Reports, involves the conduct of

Commission business and does not

impose requirements on licensees 2 or

certified facilities. Reports will cover

certain unscheduled incidents or events

related to the manufacture,

construction, or operation of a facility or

conduct of an activity subject to the

requirements of Parts 20, 30 through 36,

39, 40, 50, 61, 70, 71, or 72 of Chapter

I, Title 10, Code of Federal Regulations

(10 CFR).

Through an exchange of information,

Agreement States provide information

to the NRC on incidents and events

involving applicable nuclear materials

that have occurred in their States. Those

events reported by Agreement States

that reach the threshold for reporting as

an AO are also published in the ‘‘Report

to Congress on Abnormal Occurrences.’’

2. Definition of terms. As used in this

policy statement:

(a) An ‘‘abnormal occurrence’’ means

an unscheduled incident or event at a

facility or associated with an activity

that is licensed or otherwise regulated,

pursuant to the Atomic Energy Act of

1954, as amended, or the Energy

Reorganization Act of 1974, as

amended, that the Commission

determines to be significant from the

standpoint of public health and safety;

and

(b) An ‘‘unintended radiation

exposure’’ includes any occupational

exposure, exposure to the general

public, or exposure as a result of a

medical misadministration (as defined

in § 35.2) involving the wrong

individual that exceeds the reporting

values established in the regulations.

All other reported medical

misadministrations will be considered

for reporting as an AO under the criteria

for medical licensees. In addition,

unintended radiation exposures include

any exposure to a nursing child, fetus,

or embryo as a result of an exposure

(other than an occupational exposure to

an undeclared pregnant woman) to a

nursing mother or pregnant woman

above specified values.

3. Abnormal occurrence general

statement of policy. The Commission

will apply the following policy in

determining whether an incident or

event at a facility or involving an

activity that is licensed or otherwise

regulated by the Commission is an AO

within the purview of Section 208 of the

Energy Reorganization Act of 1974, as

amended.

An incident or event will be

considered an AO if it involves a major

reduction in the degree of protection of

the public health or safety. This type of

incident or event would have a

moderate or more severe impact on the

public health or safety and could

include, but need not be limited to the

following:

(1) Moderate exposure to, or release

of, radioactive material licensed by or

otherwise regulated by the Commission;

(2) Major degradation of essential

safety-related equipment; or

(3) Major deficiencies in design,

construction, use of, or management

controls for facilities or radioactive

material licensed by or otherwise

regulated by the Commission.

Criteria by type of event used to

determine which incidents or events

will be considered for reporting as AOs

are set out in Appendix A of this policy

statement.

4. Commission dissemination of AO

information.

(a) The Commission will provide as

wide a dissemination of information to

the public as reasonably possible.

Information on potential AOs (events

that may meet the AO criteria) will be

sent to the NRC Public Document Room

and all local public document rooms as

soon as possible after the staff

determines that the incident is a

potential AO. A Federal Register notice

will be issued on each AO report with

copies distributed to the NRC Public

Document Room and all local public

document rooms. When additional

information is anticipated, the notice

will state that the information can be

obtained at the NRC Public Document

Room and in all local public document

rooms.

(b) Each year, the Commission will

submit a report to Congress listing for

that period any AOs at or associated

with any facility or activity which is

licensed or otherwise regulated

pursuant to the Atomic Energy Act of

1954, as amended, or the Energy

Reorganization Act of 1974, as

amended. This report will contain the

date, place, nature, and probable

consequence of each AO, the cause or

causes of each AO, and any action taken

to prevent recurrence.

Appendix A—Abnormal Occurrence

Criteria

Criteria by types of events used to

determine which incidents or events will be

considered for reporting as AOs are as

follows:
Federal Register / Vol. 62, No. 74 / Thursday, April 17, 1997 / Notices 18823

3 Information pertaining to certain incidents may

be either classified or under consideration for

classification because of national security

implications. Classified information will be

withheld when formally reporting these incidents

in accordance with Section 208 of the Energy

Reorganization Act of 1974, as amended. Any

classified details regarding these incidents would

be available to the Congress, upon request, under

appropriate security arrangements.

4The wrong radiopharmaceutical as used in the

AO criterion for medical misadministrations refers

to any radiopharmaceutical other than the one

listed in the written directive or in the clinical

procedures manual.

I. For All Licensees

A. Human Exposure to Radiation From

Licensed Material

1. Any unintended radiation exposure to

an adult (any individual 18 years of age or

older) resulting in an annual total effective

dose equivalent (TEDE) of 250 millisievert

(mSv) (25 rem) or more; or an annual sum of

the deep dose equivalent (external dose) and

committed dose equivalent (intake of

radioactive material) to any individual organ

or tissue other than the lens of the eye, bone

marrow and the gonads, of 2500 mSv (250

rem) or more; or an annual dose equivalent

to the lens of the eye, of 1 Sv (100 rem) or

more; or an annual sum of the deep dose

equivalent and committed dose equivalent to

the bone marrow, and the gonads, of 1 Sv

(100 rem) or more; or an annual shallow-dose

equivalent to the skin or extremities of 2500

mSv (250 rem) or more.

2. Any unintended radiation exposure to

any minor (an individual less than 18 years

of age) resulting in an annual TEDE of 50

mSv (5 rem) or more, or to an embryo/fetus

resulting in a dose equivalent of 50 mSv (5

rem) or more.

3. Any radiation exposure that has resulted

in unintended permanent functional damage

to an organ or a physiological system as

determined by a physician.

B. Discharge or Dispersal of Radioactive

Material From Its Intended Place of

Confinement

1. The release of radioactive material to an

unrestricted area in concentrations which, if

averaged over a period of 24 hours, exceed

5000 times the values specified in Table 2 of

Appendix B to 10 CFR Part 20, unless the

licensee has demonstrated compliance with

§ 20.1301 using §§ 20.1302 (b) (1) or 20.1302

(b) (2) (ii).

2. Radiation levels in excess of the design

values for a package, or the loss of

confinement of radioactive material resulting

in one or more of the following: (a) a

radiation dose rate of 10 mSv (1 rem) per

hour or more at 1 meter (3.28 feet) from the

accessible external surface of a package

containing radioactive material; (b) a

radiation dose rate of 50 mSv (5 rem) per

hour or more on the accessible external

surface of a package containing radioactive

material and that meet the requirements for

‘‘exclusive use’’ as defined in 10 CFR 71.47;

or (c) release of radioactive material from a

package in amounts greater than the

regulatory limits in 10 CFR 71.51(a)(2).

C. Theft, Diversion, or Loss of Licensed

Material, or Sabotage or Security Breach 3

1. Any lost, stolen, or abandoned sources

that exceed 0.01 times the A1 values, as listed

in 10 CFR Part 71, Appendix A, Table A–1,

for special form (sealed/nondispersible)

sources, or the smaller of the A2 or 0.01 times

the A1 values, as listed in Table A–1, for

normal form (unsealed/dispersible) sources

or for sources for which the form is not

known. Excluded from reporting under this

criterion are those events involving sources

that are lost, stolen, or abandoned under the

following conditions: sources abandoned in

accordance with the requirements of 10 CFR

39.77(c); sealed sources contained in labeled,

rugged source housings; recovered sources

with sufficient indication that doses in

excess of the reporting thresholds specified

in AO criteria I.A.1 and I.A.2 did not occur

during the time the source was missing; and

unrecoverable sources lost under such

conditions that doses in excess of the

reporting thresholds specified in AO criteria

I.A.1 and I.A.2 were not known to have

occurred.

2. A substantiated case of actual or

attempted theft or diversion of licensed

material or sabotage of a facility.

3. Any substantiated loss of special nuclear

material or any substantiated inventory

discrepancy that is judged to be significant

relative to normally expected performance,

and that is judged to be caused by theft or

diversion or by substantial breakdown of the

accountability system.

4. Any substantial breakdown of physical

security or material control (i.e., access

control containment or accountability

systems) that significantly weakened the

protection against theft, diversion, or

sabotage.

D. Other Events (i.e., Those Concerning

Design, Analysis, Construction, Testing,

Operation, Use, or Disposal of Licensed

Facilities or Regulated Materials)

1. An accidental criticality [10 CFR

70.52(a)].

2. A major deficiency in design,

construction, control, or operation having

significant safety implications requiring

immediate remedial action.

3. A serious deficiency in management or

procedural controls in major areas.

4. Series of events (where individual

events are not of major importance),

recurring incidents, and incidents with

implications for similar facilities (generic

incidents) that create a major safety concern.

II. For Commercial Nuclear Power Plant

Licensees

A. Malfunction of Facility, Structures, or

Equipment

1. Exceeding a safety limit of license

technical specification (TS) [§ 50.36(c)].

2. Serious degradation of fuel integrity,

primary coolant pressure boundary, or

primary containment boundary.

3. Loss of plant capability to perform

essential safety functions so that a release of

radioactive materials, which could result in

exceeding the dose limits of 10 CFR Part 100

or 5 times the dose limits of 10 CFR Part 50,

Appendix A, General Design Criterion (GDC)

19, could occur from a postulated transient

or accident (e.g., loss of emergency core

cooling system, loss of control rod system).

B. Design or Safety Analysis Deficiency,

Personnel Error, or Procedural or

Administrative Inadequacy

1. Discovery of a major condition not

specifically considered in the safety analysis

report (SAR) or TS that requires immediate

remedial action.

2. Personnel error or procedural

deficiencies that result in loss of plant

capability to perform essential safety

functions so that a release of radioactive

materials, which could result in exceeding

the dose limits of 10 CFR Part 100 or 5 times

the dose limits of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix

A, GDC 19, could occur from a postulated

transient or accident (e.g., loss of emergency

core cooling system, loss of control rod

system).

III. For Fuel Cycle Facilities

1. A shutdown of the plant or portion of

the plant resulting from a significant event

and/or violation of a law, regulation, or a

license/certificate condition.

2. A major condition or significant event

not considered in the license/certificate that

requires immediate remedial action.

3. A major condition or significant event

that seriously compromises the ability of a

safety system to perform its designated

function that requires immediate remedial

action to prevent a criticality, radiological or

chemical process hazard.

IV. For Medical Licensees

A medical misadministration that:

(a) Results in a dose that is (1) equal to or

greater than 1 gray (Gy) (100 rads) to a major

portion of the bone marrow, to the lens of the

eye, or to the gonads, or (2) equal to or greater

than 10 Gy (1000 rads) to any other organ;

and

(b) Represents either (1) a dose or dosage

that is at least 50 percent greater than that

prescribed in a written directive or (2) a

prescribed dose or dosage that (i) is the

wrong radiopharmaceutical,4 or (ii) is

delivered by the wrong route of

administration, or (iii) is delivered to the

wrong treatment site, or (iv) is delivered by

the wrong treatment mode, or (v) is from a

leaking source(s).

V. Guidelines for ‘‘Other Events of Interest’’

The Commission may determine that

events other than AOs may be of interest to

Congress and the public and be included in

an Appendix to the AO report as ‘‘Other

Events of Interest.’’ Guidelines for events to

be included in the AO report for this purpose

are items that may possibly be perceived by

the public to be of health or safety

significance. Such items would not involve a

major reduction in the level of protection

provided for public health or safety;

therefore, they would not be reported as

abnormal occurrences. An example is an

event where upon final evaluation by an NRC

Incident Investigation Team, or an

Agreement State equivalent response, a

determination is made that the event does
18824 Federal Register / Vol. 62, No. 74 / Thursday, April 17, 1997 / Notices

not meet the criteria for an abnormal

occurrence.

Dated at Rockville, Maryland, this 11th day

of April, 1997.

For the Nuclear Regulatory Commission.

Annette Vietti-Cook,

Acting Secretary of the Commission.

[FR Doc. 97–9912 Filed 4–16–97; 8:45 am]

BILLING CODE 7590–01–P

NUCLEAR REGULATORY

COMMISSION

[Docket Nos. 50–387 and 50–388]

Pennsylvania Power & Light Company;

Notice of Consideration of Issuance of

Amendments to Facility Operating

License; Proposed No Significant

Hazards Consideration Determination,

and Opportunity for a Hearing

The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory

Commission (the Commission) is

considering issuance of an amendment

to Facility Operating License Nos. NPF–

14 and NPF–22, issued to Pennsylvania

Power & Light Company (PP&L) (the

licensee) for operation of the

Susquehanna Steam Electric Station

Units 1 and 2, located in Luzerne

County, Pennsylvania.

The proposed amendment would

clarify the scope of the surveillance

requirements for response time testing

of instrumentation in the reactor

protection system, isolation actuation

system, and emergency core cooling

system in the Technical Specifications

(TSs) for each unit (Sections 4.3.1.3,

4.3.2.3, and 4.3.3.3).

PP&L’s request for a license

amendment for each unit under exigent

circumstances resulted from its recent

discovery that the wording of the TS

surveillance was not reconciled with the

initiative to eliminate selected response

time testing from the TSs. Accordingly,

the licensee determined that this

condition was a TS noncompliance and

that prompt action to correct this

situation was necessary because failure

to satisfy TS surveillance requirements

for response time requires that the

various instruments and systems be

declared inoperable, resulting in the TS

required entry into cold shutdown for

Unit 1 (shutdown from 100% power)

and the prevention of fuel movement

and the imposition of additional

restrictions for Unit 2 currently in a

refueling outage. The staff finds that it

would be more prudent to permit the

licensee to rely upon the existing

response time testing for Unit 1 in lieu

of testing at power, and forcing an

unnecessary plant challenge by shutting

down this plant, and also in lieu of

restricting refueling and other activities

at Unit 2. Further the staff finds the

above sufficient justification for the

licensee’s exigent request for the license

amendments.

Before issuance of the proposed

license amendments, the Commission

will have made findings required by the

Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended

(the Act) and the Commission’s

regulations.

Pursuant to 10 CFR 50.91(a)(6) for

amendments to be granted under

exigent circumstances, the NRC staff

must determine that the amendment

request involves no significant hazards

consideration. Under the Commission’s

regulations in 10 CFR 50.92, this means

that operation of the facility in

accordance with the proposed

amendment would not (1) involve a

significant increase in the probability or

consequences of an accident previously

evaluated; or (2) create the possibility of

a new or different kind of accident from

any accident previously evaluated; or

(3) involve a significant reduction in a

margin of safety. As required by 10 CFR

50.91(a), the licensee has provided its

analysis of the issue of no significant

hazards consideration, which is

presented below:

1. The proposed change does not involve

a significant increase in the probability or

consequences of an accident previously

evaluated.

This proposal does not involve a

significant increase in the probability or

consequences of an accident previously

evaluated. The proposed change only

reconciles the scope of response time testing

described in the surveillance requirements

with the elimination of selected response

time testing, performed in accordance with

the NRC-approved methodology delineated

in the BWROG [Boiling Water Reactor

Owners Group] Licensing Topical Report

(LTR) NEDO–32291, ’System Analyses for

Elimination of Selected Response Time

Testing Requirements,’ dated January 1994.

Implementation of the LTR (i.e., elimination

of response time testing for selected

instrumentation in the Reactor Protection

System, Isolation Actuation System and

Emergency Core Cooling System) does not

increase the probability or consequences of

an accident or malfunction of equipment

important to safety as previously evaluated in

the FSAR.

All SSES component model numbers were

analyzed for the failure mode of a sluggish

response. As documented in the LTR, each

component’s sluggish response can be

detected by other Technical Specification

required tests (functional tests, calibrations

and logic system functional tests). This

supports the contention that the use of such

‘‘qualitative’’ testing does not affect the

capability of the associated systems to

perform their intended function within their

required response time.

Based upon the analysis presented above,

PP&L concludes that the proposed action

does not involve a significant increase in the

probability or consequences of an accident

previously evaluated.

2. The proposed change does not create the

possibility of a new or different kind of

accident from any accident previously

evaluated.

This proposal does not create the

probability of a new or different type of

accident from any accident previously

evaluated. The proposed change only

reconciles the scope of response time testing

described in the surveillance requirements

with the elimination of selected response

time testing, performed in accordance with

the NRC-approved methodology delineated

in the LTR.

Implementation of the LTR methodology

for eliminating selected response time testing

also does not create the probability of a new

or different type of accident from any

accident previously evaluated. A review of

the failure modes of the affected plant

equipment indicates that sluggish response of

the instruments and relays can be detected by

other Technical Specification surveillances.

A review of SSES response time testing

history revealed one response time test

failure. This failure would have been

detectable by the logic system functional test

for this channel. Redundancy and diversity

of the affected channels provide additional

assurance that all affected functions will

operate within the acceptance limits assumed

in the plant safety analyses.

PP&L’s adherence to the conditions listed

in the NRC SER [Safety Evaluation Report]

for the LTR provides additional assurance

that sluggish response of instruments and

relays will be detected by the other required

Technical Specification tests. A review of

various safety analyses performed as part of

PP&L’s 10 CFR 50.59 safety evaluation

revealed that the five-second delay did not

adversely affect the assumptions in the

respective analyses.

Therefore, the proposed change does not

create the possibility of a new or different

kind of accident from any accident

previously evaluated.

3. The proposed change does not involve

a significant reduction in the margin of

safety.

The change does not involve a significant

reduction in the margin of safety. The

proposed change only reconciles the scope of

response time testing described in the

surveillance requirements with the

elimination of selected response time testing,

performed in accordance with the NRCapproved methodology delineated in the

LTR.

Implementation of the LTR methodology

for eliminating selected response time testing

also does not involve a significant reduction

in the margin of safety. The current response

times are based on the maximum allowable

values assumed in the plant safety analyses.

The analyses conservatively establish the

margin of safety. As described above, the

elimination of selected response time testing

does not affect the capability of the

associated systems to perform their intended

function within the allowed response time

used as the basis for the plant safety analyses.

Plant and system response to an initiating