[DO NOT PUBLISH]

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT

________________________

No. 18-12147

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D.C. Docket No. 3:13-cv-00119-TCB

WILLIE JAMES PYE, 

 Petitioner - Appellant,

versus

WARDEN, GEORGIA DIAGNOSTIC PRISON, 

 Respondent - Appellee.

________________________

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Northern District of Georgia

________________________

(April 27, 2021)

Before WILSON, MARTIN and JILL PRYOR, Circuit Judges.

JILL PRYOR, Circuit Judge: 

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Willie James Pye, incarcerated on Georgia’s death row, appeals the district 

court’s denial of his 28 U.S.C. § 2254 habeas petition. He seeks habeas relief on 

several grounds, including that his trial counsel provided ineffective assistance at 

the penalty phase of his capital trial. After careful review, and with the benefit of 

oral argument, we conclude that the district court erred in denying relief on this 

claim, so we reverse. We otherwise affirm the district court’s judgment.1

I. BACKGROUND

Mr. Pye was convicted in Georgia of malice murder, kidnapping with bodily 

injury, armed robbery, burglary, and rape. The jury unanimously recommended a 

death sentence for the malice murder conviction, and the trial court accepted the 

recommendation. Below we recount the events that led to Mr. Pye’s convictions

and sentence, his state postconviction proceedings, and the course of his federal 

habeas proceedings.

1 The district court correctly denied Mr. Pye relief on his claims that trial counsel 

provided ineffective assistance at the guilt phase of trial, the State violated Brady v. Maryland, 

373 U.S. 83 (1963), by failing to disclose two prior inconsistent statements made by Mr. Pye’s 

codefendant, Mr. Pye was denied his Sixth Amendment right to conflict-free counsel, and 

cumulative error deprived Mr. Pye of a fair guilt-phase trial. We affirm in those respects and do 

not discuss these claims further. 

We also do not address the Georgia state court’s conclusion that Mr. Pye is not 

intellectually disabled and therefore ineligible for the death penalty. We need not reach this 

issue because he is entitled to relief from his death sentence on his claim of ineffective assistance 

of counsel at the penalty phase of his trial, and this issue also “deal[s] with the penalty phase.” 

Cooper v. Sec’y, Dep’t of Corr., 646 F.3d 1328, 1331 n.1 (11th Cir. 2011). And we do not 

address Mr. Pye’s cumulative error claim as it pertains to the penalty phase because Mr. Pye has 

shown prejudice stemming from a single claim.

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A. Mr. Pye’s Trial

The facts underlying Mr. Pye’s convictions were described by the Supreme 

Court of Georgia on direct appeal. See Pye v. State, 505 S.E.2d 4, 9–10 (Ga. 

1998). Mr. Pye had dated Alicia Lynn Yarbrough, the victim, on and off for some 

time. At the time of the murder, however, Ms. Yarbrough was living with another 

man, Charles Puckett, and their infant child. Mr. Pye and two companions, 

Chester Adams and Anthony Freeman, drove to the home of Ms. Yarbrough and 

Mr. Puckett, intending to rob Mr. Puckett. Mr. Pye also was upset that Mr. Puckett 

had signed the birth certificate of Ms. Yarbrough’s child. When they arrived, Mr. 

Puckett was not home. Mr. Pye forcibly took Ms. Yarbrough from the home, 

leaving the infant behind. The three men rented a hotel room, where they each 

repeatedly raped Ms. Yarbrough. The men eventually took Ms. Yarbrough from 

the hotel room, put her into Mr. Adams’s car, and left the hotel. At Mr. Pye’s 

direction, Mr. Adams pulled the car onto a dirt road. Mr. Pye ordered Ms. 

Yarbrough out of the car, made her lie face down, and shot her three times, killing 

her. Mr. Pye was charged after Mr. Freeman confessed and implicated the other 

two men. 

The trial court appointed Johnny B. Mostiler, the Spalding County public 

defender, to represent Mr. Pye. Mr. Mostiler, the sole attorney on Mr. Pye’s 

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defense team, was assisted by investigator Dewey Yarbrough.2 While representing

Mr. Pye, Mr. Mostiler represented thousands of other people charged with felonies 

and misdemeanors and maintained an active private civil practice. He was 

representing four other capital defendants during his representation of Mr. Pye. 

According to his billing records, Mr. Mostiler spent just over 150 hours preparing 

for Mr. Pye’s trial. 

At the guilt phase of his trial, the State presented several witnesses,

including Mr. Freeman, who discussed Mr. Pye’s involvement in the crime. Mr. 

Pye, who maintained his innocence despite the evidence against him, testified in 

his own defense. A jury found him guilty. 

At the penalty phase, the State presented testimony from three witnesses. 

Kimberly Blackmon, Ms. Yarbrough’s niece, testified about an argument she saw 

between Ms. Yarbrough and Mr. Pye in which Mr. Pye threatened Ms. Blackmon, 

her mother, and Ms. Yarbrough with a gun; fired the gun toward Ms. Blackmon; 

and struck Ms. Yarbrough, who was pregnant at the time, in the back with the gun. 

Through Ms. Blackmon, the State presented photos of Ms. Yarbrough’s three 

children. Griffin Police Department Corporal Timothy Trevillion testified that he 

had responded to a call the police received regarding the incident Ms. Blackmon 

described. Georgia Bureau of Investigation official Sam House, a former field 

2 Mr. Yarbrough is not related to the victim.

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agent, testified that Mr. Pye was arrested and charged with burglary in 1984—

about a decade before the murder—and at that time had a reputation within the 

community for violence. 

Trial counsel presented testimony from eight lay witnesses: Mr. Pye’s sister 

Pam Bland, sister Sandy Starks, brother Ricky Pye, father Ernest Pye, 15-year-old 

niece Cheneeka Pye, nephew Dontarious Usher, sister-in-law Bridgett Pye, and 

family friend Lillian Buckner. These witnesses testified to Mr. Pye’s good moral 

character and asked the jury for mercy. Some said Mr. Pye and Ms. Yarbrough 

seemed to have a good relationship. 

Mr. Mostiler asked a couple of the witnesses about Mr. Pye’s early life. He 

asked Ms. Bland “how big a house” the family lived in growing up, and Ms. Bland 

testified that the family “had a four-bedroom” home. Doc. 13-11 at 30.3 Ms. 

Starks testified that she and her siblings “came up in a household where we didn’t 

have the things like a lot of people had.” Id. at 67. She testified that the family 

had no “running water in the bathroom” or central heat (they had “a wooden 

heater” instead), but, she said, “one thing we did have, we had love, if we didn’t 

have nothing else.” Id. Five of the eight witnesses told the jury they did not 

believe Mr. Pye was guilty. 

3

“Doc.” numbers refer to the district court’s docket entries.

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In closing, the prosecutor, William McBroom, “went back to the last death 

penalty case [he and Mr. Mostiler] had and . . . saw what the arguments that he 

made on that were.” Id. at 83. From there, he told the jury what he “anticipate[d]” 

Mr. Mostiler would argue. Id. He anticipated Mr. Mostiler would quote from

William Shakespeare’s The Merchant of Venice, “the quality of mercy is not 

strained,” and from the Bible’s Beatitudes, “blessed are the merciful for they shall 

obtain mercy.” Id. Mr. McBroom told the jury: 

[T]here’s one thing that I fear more than anything else in this case, that 

if you give him life without parole, if he killed a woman on a dirt—

lonely, dirt road, that he loved, he’ll for sure kill a guard to get out. And 

if he ever has the chance and a guard stands between him and freedom, 

you know what he’ll do. And what I fear in this case is you read—pick 

up the paper and you see where he’s killed some guard and you try to 

think this, I wish I could have done something when I had the chance. 

He is going to be a danger to everybody around him until the day he is 

executed. Now, I’m sorry, but that is a cold, hard fact.

Id. at 86–87. Mr. McBroom also set a timer for five minutes, sat in silence, and 

explained that Ms. Yarbrough had suffered for longer than that after being shot. 

Mr. Mostiler asked the jury to have mercy on Mr. Pye and suggested that 

Mr. Pye had never been violent except against Ms. Yarbrough. He acknowledged 

that he and Mr. McBroom had “faced off against each other in several death 

penalty cases,” and then—just as Mr. McBroom predicted—he quoted from The 

Merchant of Venice and the Beatitudes. Id. at 91–94. Of Mr. McBroom’s 

argument that Mr. Pye would kill a prison guard, Mr. Mostiler said, “Willie James 

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Pye is not a danger to you, he’s not a danger to me, he’s not a danger to a prison 

guard.” Id. at 93–94.

The jury found the following statutory aggravating circumstances in support 

of the death penalty: the murder was committed while Mr. Pye was engaged in the 

commission of (1) kidnapping with bodily injury, (2) rape, (3) armed robbery, and 

(4) burglary. The jury recommended a sentence of death, and the trial court 

imposed that sentence.4 On direct appeal, the Supreme Court of Georgia affirmed, 

and Mr. Pye’s petition for a writ of certiorari to the Supreme Court of the United 

States was denied. See Pye, 505 S.E.2d at 4, cert. denied, 526 U.S. 1118 (1999).

B. State Habeas Proceedings

Mr. Pye timely petitioned for a writ of habeas corpus in Butts County 

Superior Court. He asserted, among other claims, that Mr. Mostiler was 

ineffective for failing to investigate and present mitigating evidence at the penalty 

phase of his trial, including evidence of his family background and cognitive 

impairment, as well as evidence to “counter the State’s evidence of aggravated 

culpability.” Rompilla v. Beard, 545 U.S. 374, 380–81 (2005).

4 The court also sentenced Mr. Pye to three terms of life imprisonment for kidnapping 

with bodily injury, armed robbery, and rape, and 20 years’ imprisonment for burglary, all to be 

served consecutively. Nothing we hold today disturbs those sentences.

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i. The Evidentiary Hearing

The state habeas court held an evidentiary hearing on Mr. Pye’s petition. 

Mr. Mostiler was deceased by then, but habeas counsel offered for admission into 

evidence his case file and billing records, which included one hour for meetings 

with each of two of Mr. Pye’s brothers, one and a half hours the day before the 

penalty phase began to “[d]iscuss mitigation with family,” and one hour the day of 

the penalty phase for a “[f]inal interview with family witnesses.” Doc. 19-11 at 

78–79. 

Mr. Yarbrough testified about the defense team’s work on Mr. Pye’s case. 

He testified that the primary focus of the defense was to prove Mr. Pye’s 

innocence. He did not recall Mr. Mostiler’s mitigation strategy, whether the team 

received school records, or whether they pursued leads about any mental health 

issues. He acknowledged that despite it being Mr. Mostiler’s general practice to do 

so, the defense obtained no independent psychological evaluation of Mr. Pye. Mr. 

Yarbrough recalled discussing Mr. Pye’s childhood “a little bit,” including by

asking Mr. Pye questions about where he and his family lived, how many family 

members there were, “how they were raised, how they were living at the time, 

mostly how things were at that particular time with the family.” Doc. 19-11 at 22. 

He acknowledged visiting Mr. Pye’s home, which had “no water, no electricity”—

facts that left Mr. Yarbrough “a little amazed” by “the sad situation in the home.” 

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Id. at 22–23; Doc. 14-41 at 75. Mr. Yarbrough testified that Mr. Pye told him “to 

go out and contact his family members,” and he contacted four or five of them, 

including Mr. Pye’s mother, father, and two to three siblings. Doc. 19-11 at 23.5 

Mr. Yarbrough testified that the family “didn’t put any effort forth on any of 

the contacts I made with them.” Id. at 24. He recalled one family member saying 

“that [Mr. Pye] got himself into this, and he can get himself out of it.” Id. When 

asked to explain how that affected the defense, Mr. Yarbrough clarified that the 

family was unhelpful “as far as helping prove [Mr. Pye’s] innocence.” Id. at 25. 

“I can remember thinking, and I want to say this was during, right before the 

sentencing phase, you know, I just don’t care about going back over there and 

trying to get them here.” Id. Mr. Yarbrough surmised that he spoke with other 

people, including neighbors of the Pye family, but he did not recall specifics. He 

also testified that both he and Mr. Mostiler spent more time working on the case 

than their billing records reflected, although he did not specify the focus of those 

extra work hours. 

5 The state habeas court found that an entry in both Mr. Mostiler and Mr. Yarbrough’s 

billing records for a meeting with “Mr. and Mrs. Robert Pye” instead referred to a meeting with 

Mr. and Mrs. Ernest Pye, Mr. Pye’s parents. 

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Habeas counsel also offered undisputed evidence that Mr. Pye is of low 

intellectual functioning, bordering on intellectual disability.

6

 And they presented 

affidavit testimony from 27 affiants, 24 of whom testified about matters relevant to 

the penalty phase investigation and presentation. The affiants described in detail

Mr. Pye’s traumatic childhood and adolescence, during which near-constant 

physical and emotional abuse, extreme parental neglect, endangerment, and abject 

poverty pervaded his daily life, as well as his resulting troubled adulthood. The

affiants included Mr. Pye’s mother, six of his siblings,

7 nieces and nephew,

teachers, school social worker/truancy officer, friends, family friends, neighbors,

and corrections officers. A police officer from the community in which Mr. Pye 

was raised also provided an affidavit. Nearly every story in each account is 

corroborated by another affiant’s account, and numerous details are corroborated 

by school records, Georgia Department of Corrections (“DOC”) records, or other 

documentary evidence that habeas counsel introduced. Every affiant expressed a 

willingness to testify to the details in their affidavits.

6 Mr. Pye’s primary witness on intellectual disability, Dr. Victoria Swanson, in fact 

testified that Mr. Pye is intellectually disabled. The State’s expert disputed her conclusion. Even 

so, as the state habeas court explained, “[i]t is undisputed among the mental health professionals 

who have evaluated Petitioner that Petitioner’s intellectual functions are in the low to borderline 

range.” Doc. 20-40:18. Here, we focus on Mr. Pye’s undisputed low intellectual functioning as 

a mitigating circumstance.

7 Mr. Pye was one of 10 children in the Pye family. One of his siblings was deceased at 

the time of the state habeas proceedings, and another is intellectually disabled. 

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The evidence submitted at the evidentiary hearing showed the following. 

Mr. Pye was born to Ernest Pye Sr. and Lolla Mae Pye. He was the seventh of 10 

children born to Lolla Mae, and his challenges began before birth. Whether 

pregnant or not, Lolla Mae drank alcohol. When she was pregnant with Mr. Pye, 

Lolla Mae struggled as the sole provider for her six children. Ernest, whom people 

called “Buck,” was incarcerated and working on a chain gang. Lolla Mae took 

whatever work she could get. She worked all the way up until Mr. Pye’s birth and 

then resumed working immediately afterward.

Lolla Mae had to walk to her jobs from the family’s two-room house, which 

had no running water, and the jobs “were not close by. She stayed gone from 

before the sun came up until late in the evening.” Doc. 16-24 at 32. While she 

was gone, the older children (Randy, at about 10 years old, was the oldest) cared 

for the younger ones, including Mr. Pye, then just an infant. Lolla Mae’s job paid 

very little, and “the little ones’ milk had more water in it than milk.” Id. at 90. 

The family primarily ate bread and gravy. They had no money for medical care. 

Buck returned from the chain gang when Mr. Pye was about three years old, 

and the family moved to a nicer home with indoor plumbing. Their stay was shortlived, however, and when Mr. Pye was about five years old the family moved 

again, this time to a house in Indian Springs. Indian Springs was “where the 

poorest black families lived,” and “[o]ut of the families in Indian Springs, the 

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Pye[s] were one of the worst off.” Id. at 28–29. The Indian Springs home lacked 

heat and indoor plumbing and was in a constant state of disrepair. The family 

burned fires or used dangerous propane heaters to heat the house; used “a spout 

near the road” to get water for drinking, cooking, and bathing; and divided the 

house into rooms “using boards and sheets.” Id. at 56, 108. The family crammed 

itself into the house: “whoever was the baby” at the time slept with Lolla Mae and 

Buck, the two Pye daughters shared a room, Randy slept on a couch in the hallway, 

and the rest of the Pye boys slept in one bed. 

Worse, according to a police officer, “[t]he conditions were filthy and the 

rooms in total disarray every time we entered.” Id. at 22. According to the 

school’s social worker, who visited the home multiple times a week for years, 

“[t]he house was never clean; piles of filth, scraps and garbage were strewn 

everywhere.” Id. at 62. He described the condition of the house as “deplorable.” 

Id. at 61. On one visit, finding that “the small children had not been bathed and 

there was spoiled food sitting around,” the social worker reported the conditions of 

the Pye home to the Department of Family and Children Services (“DFACS”). Id.

at 62. Despite his concern that the home was “so unsanitary” that it created a risk 

to “the health of the children,” DFACS did not intervene. Id.

As she had more children, Lolla Mae’s health began to fail. She stopped 

working shortly after the family moved to Indian Springs and often would stay in 

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bed all day due to various ailments, including arthritis, asthma, high blood 

pressure, and “nerves.” Id. at 38. She once had a debilitating asthma attack in 

front of Mr. Pye and his siblings. As she described it, “I couldn’t breathe for 

several minutes and I nearly died. Everyone in the house was screaming and 

carrying on. It was very scary for us.” Id. at 94. On the days Lolla Mae stayed in 

bed, the children were tasked with her care. 

Lolla Mae continued to drink nonetheless, often leaving the children at home 

to visit a juke joint with friends. Buck—who drank steadily even before Mr. Pye 

was born—began to drink even more. Buck was notorious for his drinking, as well 

as his abusive behavior. Buck “would spend every cent [his] famil[y] had in bars 

and bootlegging houses, and then come home stinking drunk and mean.”8 Id. at 

25–26. When he drank, he was verbally and physically abusive. “Beatings and 

tirades were [Buck’s] only interaction with his children.” Id. at 60. 

Buck’s verbal assaults were “downright cruel.” Id. at 21. He “had no 

problem calling his wife and small children every foul expletive he could manage,” 

carrying on “about how worthless the kids” and Lolla Mae were. Id. at 22. But

“Willie definitely got the worst of his father’s nasty comments.” Id. at 26. Buck 

8 Buck spent the meager earnings he made from cutting down trees, Lolla Mae’s meager

wages, and the government assistance check the family received because of son Ernest Pye, Jr.’s 

disability. “It was general knowledge in the [community] that Junior . . . limped because his 

father hit him with a tire iron while he was still recovering from a broken hip and the hip never 

healed properly.” Doc. 16-24 at 73.

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“would tell Willie that he was so stupid that he just couldn’t be his kid.” Id. Buck 

would say “that Willie was born because [Lolla Mae] was messing around while he 

was in prison, and that he was sick of looking at a kid that belonged to some other 

guy.” Doc. 16-25 at 2. Buck “would tell the rest of [the Pye] kids that there was 

stuff wrong with Willie James, and that [they] shouldn’t pay attention to him, all 

with Willie standing right in front of him.” Id.

Unfortunately, Buck’s abuse did not stop at words. He was extremely 

physically violent, and “calls [to police] about violence in the Pye home were 

constant.” Doc. 16-24 at 20. He “beat the devil out of [the] children,” id. at 60,

and again, “Willie definitely got the worst of [those] violent outbursts,” id. at 26. 

Buck also would hit Lolla Mae and throw things at her, all in front of the children. 

On at least one occasion he attacked Lolla Mae with a knife; on another occasion 

he hit her over the head with a bottle. When Buck hit her with a bottle “[t]here was 

blood from her head everywhere and [the children] all freaked out”; the wound 

required stitches. Id. at 36. Lolla Mae responded to Buck’s violence in kind, 

sometimes with a knife. She, too, beat the children. The school social worker 

counseled Lolla Mae about the abuse, but nothing changed. 

Sometimes when their parents fought, the children would try to break up the 

fight. As the older boys reached their teenage years, though, they too began to 

drink heavily and engage in physical violence, beating their father when he was 

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drunk and abusive. When police responded to calls at the Pye house, what they 

found “was absolute chaos,” id. at 20, with brawling between Mr. Pye’s parents 

and older siblings. For their part, “[t]he younger kids would head for the hills 

when the fighting started,” often hiding in a clearing in the woods near the home. 

Id. at 22. 

Mr. Pye, unlike his older brothers, was not violent. As a young boy, he was 

among the children who hid from his family’s explosive violent episodes. As he 

got older, he tried to play the role of peacemaker, “pull[ing] [his] parents apart” 

when they fought. Id. at 36. In response, Buck would “blast Willie right across 

the head and he’d go flying.” Doc. 16-25 at 2. Mr. Pye “took the comments about 

not belonging to [his] father hard.” Id. “He was quieter and took things to heart. 

The most important thing to Willie was to be like everyone else, and [Buck] was 

constantly telling him that he wasn’t.” Id. When he got upset, Mr. Pye “would 

find any place he could . . . be alone—the bed, the woods, under the porch. Then 

he’d lie down and curl up and just stare at nothing.” Id. If a sibling tried to talk to 

him, he would act like no one was there. Id. 

Nearly all of the Pye children, Mr. Pye included, struggled to attend school 

and to perform academically when they did. The children did not attend school 

sometimes “because they were embarrassed that they were behind academically or 

that their clothing was second-hand.” Doc. 16-24 at 63. Mr. Pye was teased for 

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both. “Much of the time, however, the problem was very basic: the children 

didn’t leave the bed and get on the bus because it was cold. The home had no heat 

and no one got up early to make a fire.” Id. And no one made them go. When Mr. 

Pye managed to attend school, he was enrolled in “Title I” classes, which were 

“designed to target socially and educationally at-risk children who were 

performing significantly below grade level.” Id. at 45. Mr. Pye “tried hard,” but 

“he just never did grasp most of the operations” the classes covered. Id. at 46. 

Toward the end of junior high, Mr. Pye dropped out—he “finally got so far behind 

the rest of [his peers] and so frustrated that it made more sense for him to stop 

going.” Id. at 29. Mr. Pye’s school records corroborate his low attendance, 

academic challenges despite effort (including standardized test scores placing him 

in the lowest one percentile nationally in reading and language), general lack of 

family support, and completion only of eight years of schooling. 

Mr. Pye received little support at school and even less support at home. He 

also received virtually no support from other community members. Mr. Pye, like 

his siblings, was ostracized by members of the community because of the family’s

reputation for poverty, alcoholism, and violence. Even as he reached adulthood, 

Mr. Pye continued to experience “long, quiet depressed times” when he “wasn’t 

himself”—he “didn’t talk, didn’t interact with other people,” and “would go off 

somewhere to be alone.” Id. at 79–80, 103. 

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Mr. Pye endured hardship and trauma beyond his early years. When he was 

about 20 years old, he was convicted of burglary and sentenced to five years in 

prison. The environment in which Mr. Pye was incarcerated was dangerous. 

“New inmates could be expected to be terrorized upon arrival by the guys that 

were already there. Most were either physically or sexually assaulted, or both.” 

Id. at 50. Mr. Pye, “a smaller guy,” was considered by prison staff “to be at risk 

for victimization.” Id. at 70. 

DOC records from Mr. Pye’s 1985 incarceration, which trial counsel did not 

attempt to obtain, corroborate that corrections officials considered Mr. Pye to be at 

risk of victimization. DOC’s “Consulting Psychologist” evaluated Mr. Pye shortly 

after he arrived at the prison. She opined that Mr. Pye was “very weak,” 

“confused,” and “vulnerable,” and suggested that he may need “protective 

placement.” Doc. 15-19 at 9, 11. The records also document corrections officials’ 

impressions that Mr. Pye was generally trustworthy and not an escape or safety 

risk. The psychologist opined that Mr. Pye was “[n]ot likely to be violent or 

potentially dangerous” and was “very unlikely to become a predator”; she found 

“[n]o evidence of escape.” Id. A psychological report indicated that Mr. Pye 

“should be able to adapt to average security arrangements.” Id. at 15. And adapt 

he did. During his time in prison, despite his challenges, Mr. Pye made a notably 

positive impression on prison staff. Guards regarded Mr. Pye as “completely 

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respectful . . . in a way that most of the inmates were not.” Doc. 16-24 at 49. “He 

was never menacing, never made any threatening remarks, never did anything but 

joke around and take care of his assigned work.” Id. Guards had “no reservations 

about [Mr. Pye] working throughout the dorm area, even during times when he was 

not closely supervised.” Id. at 71. He helped the guards “keep the rest of the unit 

safe” by disclosing knowledge of other prisoners’ weapons or plans for disruption. 

Id. at 49. 

In addition to his adaptability to prison, Mr. Pye’s DOC records from his 

previous incarceration thoroughly document his severe depression. The consulting 

psychologist indicated that Mr. Pye “was very depressed when he entered [the 

prison].” Doc. 15-19 at 11. Mr. Pye’s psychological report stated that his

depression was “severe enough to suggest consideration of 

[psychopharmacological therapy],” as well as “special counseling.” Id. at 15–16; 

see id. at 13 (opinion of consulting psychologist the Mr. Pye should receive “more 

counseling than the average” because of his depression). The psychologist opined 

that Mr. Pye may be coping with his depression “by emotional withdrawal” and 

that he seemed “unstable,” reported hearing voices, and was “very homesick.” Id.

at 12. (In fact, when Mr. Pye left prison in 1990 his depressive episodes continued 

and, by some accounts, worsened.) 

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Mr. Pye’s low intellectual functioning is also well-documented in the 

records. The counseling psychologist noted that although Mr. Pye expressed an 

interest in learning, “[i]ntellectually, he is probably in the low average range but 

his test scores are significantly lower.” Id. at 13. For example, he was reading and 

writing at a fourth-grade level. She opined that Mr. Pye “may need special ed 

help, probably in the learning disabled area.” Id. at 11.9 Because trial counsel did 

not obtain the records, his defense strategy could not account for the information in 

them.

Nor had trial counsel contacted most of the affiants whose testimony habeas

counsel presented. Some were not contacted even though they knew Mr. Mostiler 

or Mr. Yarbrough or had attended the guilt phase of the trial. 

Mitigation witnesses who had some interaction with the defense team before 

the penalty phase began explained how limited that contact was. In his affidavit, 

Mr. Pye’s younger brother Ricky, who had testified at trial, recounted Mr. 

Yarbrough’s visit to the family’s house. Mr. Yarbrough “talked to my dad about 

the charges against Willie. He didn’t ask about Willie James and how he came up, 

or how we all were raised. [Mr. Yarborough] never spoke to me about those 

things.” Doc. 16-24 at 99; see id. at 100 (“We had it real tough growing up and 

9 DOC records showed that Mr. Pye asked to be given job training for barbering but 

failed the aptitude test for it. The record stated that Mr. Pye “[a]ppears to need educational 

upgrading and adjustment prior to retesting.” Doc. 15-19 at 14.

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Mr. Mostiler and Dewey never asked about that.”). Ms. Bland, who also had 

testified at trial, reported that she was contacted by Mr. Yarbrough a “week or two 

before the trial started,” at which point he asked her to find witnesses who may 

testify to Mr. Pye’s good character. Id. at 39. Despite the short notice, she tried to 

locate people who could help. Because of her efforts, Cheneeka Pye, Sandy 

Starks, Ricky Pye, Dontarious Usher, and Lillian Buckner testified. Ms. Bland,

Ricky, and the other witnesses who had testified at trial explained at the 

evidentiary hearing that although they met with a member of the defense team for a 

few minutes before their testimony—a meeting corroborated by Mr. Mostiler’s 

billing records—they were asked no specific questions about Mr. Pye or his

background and were not told what kind of evidence would be mitigating other 

than to say “nice” things about him. Doc. 16-24 at 78. The record reflects that 

during the motion for new trial proceedings Mr. Yarborough admitted to the Office 

of Multicounty Public Defender10 that the defense team “made a big mistake by not 

talking to Willie’s oldest sister [Sandy Starks] before putting her on the stand 

during sentencing.” Doc. 17-9 at 89.

10 This office is now known as the Office of the Georgia Capital Defender. See O.C.G.A. 

§ 17-12-121.

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ii. The State Habeas Court’s Order

The state habeas court denied Mr. Pye’s habeas petition, concluding that he 

failed to show his counsel was deficient or that the deficiency prejudiced him. As 

to deficient performance, the court decided that Mr. Pye’s “family members were 

not helpful to the[] investigation” and were “generally unwilling to cooperate in 

[Mr. Pye’s] defense.” Doc. 20-40 at 58–59. Even so, the court found, Mr. 

Mostiler asked Mr. Pye questions about his background, made requests for school 

records, and interviewed some family members. The court emphasized that Mr. 

Mostiler’s case file contained notes indicating that Mr. Pye had no military or 

psychiatric history and that there was nothing to suggest Mr. Pye had suffered

serious illness or major traumas. The court pointed to two entries in counsel’s time 

records showing he spoke with Mr. Pye’s family. The court therefore concluded 

that defense counsel’s investigation was reasonable.

As to prejudice, the court found that evidence of low intellectual functioning 

would not have swayed the jury. The court noted affidavit testimony that rebutted 

the State’s contention of future dangerousness but emphasized that Mr. Pye’s 

corrections records showed several instances of “mouthing off” to or ignoring 

officers, including one instance that required officers to forcibly restrain him. The 

court thus found no reasonable probability that Mr. Pye’s resulting sentence would 

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have been different had the jury heard testimony like that of the two prison guards 

who provided postconviction affidavits. 

With respect to Mr. Pye’s family background, the state habeas court 

explained that trial counsel “did learn, to some extent, of the family’s 

impoverished circumstances, and presented those facts to the jury through [Mr. 

Pye’s] sisters.” Id. at 64 (citation omitted). The court also “reviewed [Mr. Pye’s] 

affidavit evidence with caution.” Id. at 66. First, it observed that the existence of 

affidavits in postconviction proceedings “usually proves little of significance.” Id.

at 65 (quoting Waters v. Thomas, 46 F.3d 1506, 1513–14 (11th Cir. 1995)). 

Second, the court found that three of the mitigation affidavits “were misleading.” 

Id. at 65. Regarding the first of these affidavits, “Curtis Pye testified . . . ‘No one 

talked to me . . . before [Mr. Pye’s] trial. Johnny Mostiler and his assistant Dewey

[Yarborough] know me . . . He didn’t get in touch with me.’” Id. at 65 (purporting 

to quote Curtis Pye’s affidavit). “However, Mr. Mostiler’s billing records in 

Petitioner’s case reflect that Mr. Mostiler interviewed Curtis Pye for one hour 

approximately one month prior to trial.” Id. In the second affidavit, “Ricky Pye 

testified . . . ‘I never spoke to Mostiler about what to say [at trial], and he didn’t 

meet with me or ask me any questions before my turn for testimony.’” Id. at 66 

(quoting Ricky Pye’s affidavit). But “[t]he affidavit makes no mention of Mr. 

Mostiler’s one hour interview with him, also approximately one month prior to 

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23

trial.” Id. Finally, although Lolla Mae testified in the third affidavit that “[n]o one 

took the time to talk to me about all [sic] anything before Willie’s trial,” Mr. 

Yarbrough’s testimony and Mr. Mostiler’s billing records showed otherwise. Id.11

The court found “little, if any, connection between [Mr. Pye’s] impoverished 

background and the premeditated and horrendous crimes in this case.” Id. It 

further determined that because Mr. Pye “was 28 years old at the time of these 

crimes, trial counsel could have reasonably decided, given the heinousness of this 

crime and the overwhelming evidence of [Mr. Pye’s] guilt, that remorse was likely 

to play better than excuses.” Id. Thus, the court found no prejudice stemming 

from counsel’s performance. 

Georgia’s Supreme Court denied Mr. Pye a certificate of probable cause to 

appeal the state habeas court’s order. 

C. Federal Habeas Proceedings

After he exhausted his state appeals, Mr. Pye filed a petition for a writ of 

habeas corpus in federal district court, raising several claims including his penalty11 The state habeas court also noted—accurately—that Mr. Lawson’s affidavit was 

“corrected through additional affidavit testimony.” Doc. 20-40 at 65. Mr. Lawson initially 

testified that he observed Ms. Pye drunk while pregnant, but later corrected his testimony to say 

he “had no direct knowledge” that she drank while pregnant. Doc. 20-6 at 17–18. 

The court further observed that Mr. Pye’s codefendant Mr. Adams’s affidavit 

“contain[ed] multiple material inconsistencies when compared to his video-taped statement” 

made to police in the hours after the murder. Doc. 20-40 at 66. The court was correct in this 

observation as well. Mr. Adams testified to guilt-phase issues, however; thus, his affidavit is not 

material to the penalty-phase prejudice analysis. And even if it was, there is no indication from 

the record that the reliability issues with Mr. Adams’s affidavit pervaded the other affidavits.

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phase ineffective assistance of counsel claim. The district court, focusing 

primarily on prejudice, rejected the petition but granted Mr. Pye a certificate of 

appealability on the claim. This is Mr. Pye’s appeal.

I. STANDARD OF REVIEW

“When reviewing a district court’s grant or denial of habeas relief, we 

review questions of law and mixed questions of law and fact de novo, and findings 

of fact for clear error.” Reaves v. Sec’y, Fla. Dep’t of Corr., 717 F.3d 886, 899 

(11th Cir. 2013) (internal quotation marks omitted). An ineffective assistance of 

counsel claim “presents a mixed question of law and fact that we review de novo.” 

Pope v. Sec’y, Fla. Dep’t of Corr., 752 F.3d 1254, 1261 (11th Cir. 2014). 

Because the state habeas court decided Mr. Pye’s ineffective assistance of 

counsel claim on the merits, we must review that court’s decision under the highly 

deferential standards set by Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 

(AEDPA). See Wilson v. Sellers, 138 S. Ct. 1188, 1191–92 (2018). AEDPA bars 

federal courts from granting habeas relief to a petitioner on a claim that was 

adjudicated on the merits in state court unless the relevant state court’s 

adjudication:

(1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an 

unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, 

as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States; or

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(2) resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable 

determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented 

in the State court proceeding.

28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). “‘[C]learly established Federal law’ under § 2254(d)(1) is 

the governing legal principle or principles set forth by the Supreme Court at the 

time the state court renders its decision.” Lockyer v. Andrade, 538 U.S. 63, 71–72 

(2003). A state court’s decision is “contrary to” clearly established federal law “if 

the state court arrives at a conclusion opposite to that reached by [the Supreme 

Court] on a question of law or if the state court decides a case differently than [the 

Supreme Court] has on a set of materially indistinguishable facts.” Williams v. 

Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 412–13 (2000). A state court’s decision “involves an 

unreasonable application of” clearly established federal law “if the state court 

identifies the correct governing legal principle from [the Supreme Court’s] 

decisions but unreasonably applies that principle to the facts of the prisoner’s 

case.” Id. at 407, 413. “[A]n unreasonable application . . . must be objectively 

unreasonable, not merely wrong; even clear error will not suffice.” Woods v. 

Donald, 575 U.S. 312, 316 (2015) (internal quotation marks omitted).

With respect to § 2254(d)(2), “[s]tate court fact-findings are entitled to a 

presumption of correctness unless the petitioner rebuts that presumption by clear 

and convincing evidence.” Conner v. GDCP Warden, 784 F.3d 752, 761 (11th Cir. 

2015). “This deference requires that a federal habeas court more than simply 

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26

disagree with the state court before rejecting its factual determinations.” Rose v. 

McNeil, 634 F.3d 1224, 1241 (11th Cir. 2011). “Instead, it must conclude that the 

state court’s findings lacked even fair support in the record.” Id. Even so, 

“deference does not imply abandonment or abdication of judicial review,” nor does 

it “by definition preclude relief.” Miller-El v. Cockrell, 537 U.S. 322, 340 (2003).

“A federal court can disagree with a state court's credibility determination and, 

when guided by AEDPA, conclude the decision was unreasonable or that the 

factual premise was incorrect by clear and convincing evidence.” Id.

“Deciding whether a state court’s decision involved an unreasonable 

application of federal law or was based on an unreasonable determination of fact 

requires the federal habeas court to train its attention on the particular reasons—

both legal and factual—why [a] state court[] rejected a state prisoner’s federal 

claims, and to give appropriate deference to that decision.” Wilson, 138 S. Ct. at

1191–92 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted); see also Mays v. Hines, 

141 S. Ct. 1145, 1149 (2021). If “a federal court determines that a state court 

decision is unreasonable under § 2254(d),” it is “unconstrained by § 2254’s 

deference and must undertake a de novo review of the record.” Daniel v. Comm’r, 

Ala. Dep’t of Corr., 822 F.3d 1248, 1260 (11th Cir. 2016) (internal quotation 

marks omitted); see also Cooper v. Sec’y, Dep’t of Corr., 646 F.3d 1328, 1353

(11th Cir. 2011) (“When a state court unreasonably determines the facts relevant to 

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a claim, we do not owe the state court’s findings deference under AEDPA, and we 

apply the pre–AEDPA de novo standard of review to the habeas claim.” (internal 

quotation marks omitted)).

III. DISCUSSION

Mr. Pye claims that his trial counsel was ineffective in failing to investigate 

and present evidence about his traumatic childhood and adolescence, mental health 

problems, and low intellectual functioning. He also claims that his counsel failed 

to investigate and present evidence to rebut the State’s claim of future 

dangerousness. And, he argues, there is a reasonable probability that, had the jury 

heard this evidence, it would have recommended a sentence other than death.

Under Strickland v. Washington, a defendant has a Sixth Amendment right 

to effective assistance of trial counsel. 466 U.S. 668, 686 (1984). Counsel renders 

ineffective assistance, warranting vacatur of a conviction or sentence, when his 

performance falls “below an objective standard of reasonableness,” taking into 

account prevailing professional norms, and when “there is a reasonable probability 

that, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would 

have been different.” Id. at 688, 694. 

As to deficient performance, courts must “indulge a strong presumption that 

counsel’s conduct falls within the wide range of reasonable professional 

assistance.” Id. at 689. “To overcome that presumption, [Mr. Pye] must show that 

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counsel failed to act reasonably considering all the circumstances.” Cullen v. 

Pinholster, 563 U.S. 170, 189 (2011) (alteration adopted and internal quotation 

marks omitted). “[S]trategic choices made after thorough investigation of law and 

facts relevant to plausible options are virtually unchallengeable,” but, importantly, 

“strategic choices made after less than complete investigation are reasonable 

precisely to the extent that reasonable professional judgments support the 

limitations on investigation.” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 690–91. “In other words, 

counsel has a duty to make reasonable investigations or to make a reasonable 

decision that makes particular investigations unnecessary.” Id. at 691. The 

Supreme Court has cautioned that “[j]udicial scrutiny of counsel’s performance 

must be highly deferential.” Id. at 689. 

To establish prejudice, Mr. Pye “need not show that counsel’s deficient 

conduct more likely than not altered the outcome in the case”; he need only show a 

reasonable probability of a different outcome. Id. at 693. “A reasonable 

probability is a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome.” Id.

at 694. In determining whether there is a reasonable probability of a different 

result, “we consider ‘the totality of the available mitigation evidence—both that 

adduced at trial, and the evidence adduced in the habeas proceeding’—and 

‘reweig[h] it against the evidence in aggravation.’” Porter v. McCollum, 558 U.S. 

30, 41 (2009) (alteration in original) (quoting Williams, 529 U.S. at 397–98). 

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Because AEDPA applies to the state habeas court’s decision, Mr. Pye is 

“entitled to relief only if the state court’s rejection of his claim of ineffective 

assistance of counsel was ‘contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of,’

Strickland, or rested on ‘an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the 

evidence in the State court proceeding.’” Id. at 39 (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)). 

“Federal courts may not disturb the judgments of state courts unless each ground 

supporting the state court decision is examined and found to be unreasonable.” 

Shinn v. Kayer, 141 S. Ct. 517, 524 (2020) (emphasis omitted) (internal quotation 

marks omitted). “Thus, if a fairminded jurist could agree with either [the state 

court’s] deficiency or prejudice holding, the reasonableness of the other is beside 

the point.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).

The district court reviewed the state habeas court’s decision through the lens 

of AEDPA deference. Focusing its analysis “primarily” on prejudice, Doc. 68 at 

26, the court concluded that the state court’s decision withstood deference. For the 

reasons below, we disagree. But because Mr. Pye is not entitled to habeas relief 

unless he also can show that counsel performed deficiently and that the state 

habeas court’s decision otherwise was unreasonable, we start there.

A. Deficient Performance

Mr. Pye contends that his trial counsel failed to undertake a basic mitigation 

investigation, ignored signs that further investigation would prove fruitful, and 

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failed entirely to attempt to rebut what counsel knew the State would present in 

aggravation. We first decide whether the state court’s rejection of Mr. Pye’s 

argument withstands AEDPA deference. Because it does not, we then conduct a 

de novo review of Strickland’s deficient performance prong. See Kayer, 141 S. Ct. 

at 523–24 (admonishing that courts must first subject state court merits 

determinations to review under AEDPA and then, only if the court’s error lies 

beyond any fairminded disagreement, proceed to conduct a de novo review). 

i. AEDPA Analysis

Again, in rejecting Mr. Pye’s ineffective assistance of counsel claim, the 

state habeas court concluded that trial counsel was not deficient because he asked 

Mr. Pye questions about his background, requested school records, and interviewed 

some family members despite his family’s “unwilling[ness] to cooperate” in Mr. 

Pye’s defense. Doc. 20-40 at 58–59. In support of its decision about deficient 

performance, the state habeas court pointed to Mr. Mostiler’s case file, in which he 

noted that Mr. Pye had no military or psychiatric history and no indication of 

serious illness or major traumas, and Mr. Mostiler’s time records, which showed he 

met with family members. We conclude, however, that the state habeas court’s 

decision involved an unreasonable application of clearly established law and rested 

on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the state court record.

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As a preliminary matter, the state habeas court’s factual premise that Mr. 

Pye’s family members were uncooperative in the mitigation investigation—from 

which the court surmised that Mr. Mostiler did what he could with what little he 

had—was unreasonable in light of the record. The fact that seven of Mr. Pye’s 

family members testified at the penalty phase conclusively disproves that the entire 

family was uncooperative. Every family-member affiant testified under penalty of 

perjury that he or she would had been willing to speak to the defense team before 

trial, and nothing in Mr. Yarbrough’s testimony called those affidavits into 

question in that respect. Although Mr. Yarbrough testified that the family 

members were uncooperative, when asked to elaborate he clarified that they were 

unhelpful in the investigation of Mr. Pye’s innocence defense, not in the 

investigation of mitigating circumstances (which counsel barely inquired about). 

Mr. Yarbrough asked Ms. Bland to corral potential penalty-phase witnesses a mere

two weeks before the trial began. By his own testimony, he didn’t “care” about 

trying to get Mr. Pye’s family members to testify. Doc. 19-11 at 25. There is no 

“fair support in the record” for the state habeas court’s sweeping statement that Mr. 

Pye’s family refused to cooperate, Rose, 634 F.3d at 1241; thus, we do not defer to 

that finding.

The remaining weight of the state habeas court’s determination that Mr. 

Mostiler’s performance was not deficient—that he performed a reasonable 

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investigation—rested primarily on Mr. Mostiler’s file notes in which he concluded

that Mr. Pye had no military or psychiatric history and no indication of serious 

illness or major traumas. But counsel’s conclusion does not answer whether his 

investigation to arrive at that conclusion was reasonable; it simply begs the 

question. The state habeas court unreasonably applied Strickland and its progeny 

by taking counsel’s conclusions as evidence that the investigation supporting those 

conclusions was reasonable. See Wiggins v. Smith, 539 U.S. 510, 526–27 (2003)

(“In rejecting petitioner’s ineffective assistance claim, the [state court] appears to 

have assumed that because counsel had some information with respect to 

petitioner’s background . . . they were in a position to make a tactical choice not to 

present a mitigation defense. In assessing the reasonableness of an attorney’s 

investigation, however, a court must consider not only the quantum of evidence 

already known to counsel, but also whether the known evidence would lead a 

reasonable attorney to investigate further.” (citation omitted)). 

“Even assuming [trial counsel] limited the scope of [his] investigation for 

strategic reasons, Strickland does not establish that a cursory investigation 

automatically justifies a tactical decision with respect to sentencing strategy.” Id.

at 527. “Rather, a reviewing court must consider the reasonableness of the 

investigation said to support that strategy.” Id. It is undisputed that Mr. Mostiler 

met with some of Mr. Pye’s family members. The fact that the meetings occurred, 

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however, is not enough to show that Mr. Mostiler’s investigation was reasonable. 

It is not enough in light of the wealth of evidence in the record from Mr. 

Yarbrough and Mr. Pye’s family members—including siblings Sandy Starks, Pam 

Bland, Curtis Pye, and Ricky Pye; niece Cheneeka Pye; and nephew Dontarious 

Usher—that those meetings focused on Mr. Pye’s innocence defense rather than 

potential penalty phase mitigation. To the contrary, Mr. Pye’s family members 

recounted in their affidavits that when Mr. Mostiler and Mr. Yarbrough touched on 

potential mitigation evidence during a meeting, they asked no searching questions 

and failed to explain to family members the significance of certain facts as 

mitigating circumstances. Contemporaneous documentary evidence corroborates 

these accounts. When viewed in context, the mere fact that Mr. Mostiler met with 

some members of Mr. Pye’s family does not support the conclusion that the 

investigation was reasonable. The state habeas court’s decision otherwise involved 

an unreasonable application of clearly established federal law regarding the 

reasonableness of the mitigation investigation. See id.

The state habeas court reached the conclusion that counsel’s meetings with 

family members amounted to an adequate investigation in part because it 

discredited the affidavit testimony of Curtis, Ricky, and Lolla Mae Pye regarding 

these family members’ contacts with the defense team. Doc. 20-40 at 66. The 

court’s factual determinations as to each of these affidavits were, however,

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unreasonable in light of the factual record. In concluding that Curtis had 

apparently lied in his affidavit about his contact with Mr. Mostiler, the state habeas 

court omitted (with ellipses) a key portion of testimony. Curtis did not testify that 

no one talked to him before Mr. Pye’s trial—the lie the state habeas court 

purported to identify—rather, he testified that “[n]o one talked to me about any of 

this [information about the family and Mr. Pye’s upbringing] before Willie James’s 

trial. . . . [Mr. Mostiler] didn’t get in touch with me or ask me any questions about 

the house Willie James was raised in or what he was like as a child.” Doc. 16-24 

at 83 (emphasis added). No reasonable factfinder would have drawn the 

conclusion the state habeas court drew given the totality of Curtis’s testimony.

The state habeas court discredited Ricky’s testimony for a similar 

unsubstantiated reason. The court faulted Ricky for failing to mention his onehour meeting with Mr. Mostiler about a month before trial when he testified that 

“[n]o one talked to me about my testimony before I went. I never spoke to Mr. 

Mostiler about what to say, and he didn’t meet with me or ask me any questions

before my turn for testimony.” Id. at 99. It is clear from this quote, however, that 

Ricky meant Mr. Mostiler did not meet with him to discuss his “testimony” before 

he testified at the penalty phase. Looking at the quote in the context of his entire 

affidavit removes any doubt that it concerned Mr. Mostiler’s failure to discuss Mr. 

Pye’s family background with him. Ricky testified in his affidavit that “[w]e had it 

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35

real tough growing up and Mr. Mostiler and Dewey never asked about that.” Doc. 

16-24 at 100. (Here he seems to be acknowledging rather than denying the 

meeting the state habeas court referenced because Mr. Mostiler and Mr. Yarbrough 

both were present at that one-hour meeting.) He also recounted a time when Mr. 

Yarbrough visited the family’s home but “didn’t ask about Willie James and how 

he came up, or how we were all raised.” Id. at 99. There is simply no evidence in 

the record that Mr. Mostiler’s meeting with Ricky a month before trial concerned 

this kind of potential mitigating evidence or Ricky’s penalty-phase testimony. The 

state habeas court’s decision to discredit Ricky’s affidavit lacks fair support in the 

record, and so we do not defer to it. Rose, 634 F.3d at 1241.

The same is true for the state habeas court’s rejection of Lolla Mae’s 

affidavit. Her affidavit contains an apparent typographical error: she testified that 

“[n]o one took the time to talk to me about all anything before Willie’s trial.” Doc. 

16-24 at 97 (emphasis added). The court interpreted her statement to mean that she 

was never contacted by the trial team—a fact refuted by Mr. Mostiler’s billing 

records and Mr. Yarbrough’s testimony. But the next three sentences in her 

affidavit leave no room for doubt that Lolla Mae meant she was never asked about 

mitigating circumstances:

Nobody ask me all about how I grew up, how I came to be married to 

Ernest, and how I raised Willie and my other children. I would have 

been willing to talk about my life with Willie James’s lawyer or 

investigator, or with any doctor or psychologist working on his case. I 

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36

would have told about all the things I described here, and testified to 

the jury about them if they wanted me to. 

Id. The state habeas court’s reading of the affidavit is entirely divorced from 

context. We do not defer to it. Rose, 634 F.3d at 1241.

The state habeas court’s deficient performance analysis was based on an 

error in the application of Strickland and its progeny that is “beyond any possibility 

for fairminded disagreement.” Kayer, 141 S. Ct. at 520 (quoting Harrington v. 

Richter, 562 U.S. 86, 103 (2011)). And the factual underpinnings of the court’s 

decision are completely lacking in support from the record. For these reasons, we 

conclude that the state habeas court’s deficient performance decision is not entitled 

to deference under AEDPA.

ii. De Novo Review

Because the state habeas court’s decision involved an unreasonable

application of Strickland and was unreasonable in light of the factual record, “we 

are unconstrained by § 2254’s deference and must undertake a de novo review of 

the record” to decide whether trial counsel’s performance was deficient. Daniel, 

822 F.3d at 1260. And the state habeas court did not reach the issue of whether 

trial counsel was deficient for failing to rebut the State’s future-dangerousness case 

(deciding that issue on prejudice alone), so we conduct a de novo review of that 

aspect of Mr. Pye’s claim as well.

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On a de novo review, we have little trouble concluding that trial counsel was 

deficient.12 “[C]ounsel has a duty to make reasonable investigations or to make a 

reasonable decision that makes particular investigations unnecessary.” 

Strickland, 466 U.S. at 691. “In assessing the reasonableness of an attorney's 

investigation, . . . a court must consider not only the quantum of evidence already 

known to counsel, but also whether the known evidence would lead a reasonable 

attorney to investigate further.” Wiggins, 539 U.S. at 527. Here, counsel knew 

little given the cursory investigation he undertook—speaking briefly with a few 

family members, possibly obtaining school records, and once visiting the family’s 

home. Even given the limited quantum of evidence counsel knew, however, 

reasonable counsel would have investigated further. Because Mr. Mostiler,

overwhelmed with an enormous caseload, ceased his investigation at an 

“unreasonable juncture,” id., we conclude that his performance at Mr. Pye’s trial 

was deficient.

Trial counsel effectively outsourced the mitigation investigation to one of 

Mr. Pye’s sisters, Ms. Bland. He did so too late and with virtually no instruction. 

Mr. Yarborough testified that Mr. Pye asked trial counsel to contact his family in 

12 We disagree with the district court’s suggestion that Mr. Mostiler’s death “works to 

[Mr. Pye’s] disadvantage.” Doc. 68 at 36. Although the absence of trial counsel’s testimony 

certainly can work to a petitioner’s disadvantage, it does not in cases such as this one, where the 

record is well-developed as to counsel’s actions.

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search of potential mitigating evidence. Yet neither Mr. Mostiler nor Mr. 

Yarbrough meaningfully interviewed family members about mitigation. In fact, 

Mr. Yarbrough—to whom Mr. Mostiler had delegated investigative 

responsibilities—testified that he effectively gave up on the effort before 

sentencing. Rather than undertaking the investigative effort himself, Mr. 

Yarbrough tasked Ms. Bland with finding potential mitigation witnesses only a 

week or two before trial. He did so without informing her what types of mitigating 

evidence may be compelling to the jury, and without allowing her adequate time to 

find people who would testify. When Ms. Bland secured several family members 

and one family friend to testify, neither Mr. Yarbrough nor Mr. Mostiler inquired

into what the witnesses knew so that Mr. Mostiler could elicit testimony that might

sway the jury to recommend a penalty of life imprisonment rather than death. 

This, simply put, was deficient.

Even though trial counsel conducted only the most cursory of investigations, 

he knew enough to know he should have dug deeper. Mr. Mostiler failed to obtain 

a mental health evaluation of Mr. Pye despite it being his usual practice to do so. 

Had he followed his usual practice, he would have discovered Mr. Pye’s borderline 

intellectual functioning. His low intellectual functioning also was apparent from 

his school records. The record does not reveal conclusively whether Mr. Mostiler 

had Mr. Pye’s school records before the start of the penalty phase, but whether or 

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not he did, counsel’s deficiency is clear. If counsel had gotten the records, he 

would have known that Mr. Pye was chronically absent from school and performed 

poorly—in some instances in the lowest one percentile—when he did attend. 

Further investigation would have revealed that Mr. Pye is of borderline intellectual 

functioning and was severely neglected during his school-age years. Mr. Mostiler

would have discovered the names of teachers who could have been called to testify

about Mr. Pye’s struggles in school. But Mr. Mostiler followed none of the leads

Mr. Pye’s school records contained. Conversely, if counsel did not have the 

records, it was due to his too-late request for them: a mere ten days before voir 

dire began. 

In addition to—or without—the school records, Mr. Mostiler had other 

evidence in hand that would have led reasonable counsel to investigate further. 

Counsel had visited Mr. Pye’s family home and knew of its conditions of extreme

poverty and neglect. See Ferrell v. Hall, 640 F.3d 1199, 1217, 1230 (11th Cir. 

2011) (finding mitigating evidence that “[i]n an area where many people were 

poor, [the petitioner’s family was] even worse off than others”). Had Mr. Mostiler

explained to potential witnesses the mitigating value of the circumstances in which 

the Pye siblings were raised, he could have more fully investigated and developed 

that evidence. If he had, according to Ms. Bland’s uncontroverted testimony, she 

would have revealed more to him, including the abuse Mr. Pye suffered. 

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Mr. Mostiler’s shortcomings in the investigation of Mr. Pye’s family 

background were compounded by his complete failure to attempt to rebut the case 

in aggravation that he knew was coming. Mr. Mostiler knew in advance that Mr. 

McBroom likely would argue to the jury that Mr. Pye would be dangerous if 

sentenced to life imprisonment. Mr. McBroom had a habit of making this 

argument in capital cases, and he and Mr. Mostiler were frequent opponents. Less 

than six months before Mr. Pye’s trial, in a capital trial in which Mr. Mostiler 

represented the defendant, Mr. McBroom argued to the jury: “How do you explain 

[a sentence less than death] to the prison guard if he has to kill one to get out of 

jail? . . . He killed a defenseless woman, he wouldn’t think twice about killing a 

guard to get out.” Doc. 17-10 at 50. This is nearly word-for-word what Mr. 

McBroom argued to Mr. Pye’s jury. Plus, Mr. McBroom had given the defense 

notice that it would introduce Mr. Pye’s prior burglary conviction, providing Mr. 

Mostiler a peek at the State’s strategy in aggravation in this very case. 

Predictably, then, Mr. McBroom anticipated what Mr. Mostiler would say in 

his closing argument in Mr. Pye’s trial, down to the very quotes Mr. Mostiler 

would employ. But Mr. Mostiler, knowing full well what Mr. McBroom likely 

would argue, never sought nor obtained DOC records, or witnesses who would 

testify, to show that Mr. Pye would not pose an escape risk or a threat to a guard—

even though such records and witnesses existed. Indeed, Mr. Mostiler knew Mr. 

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McBroom had his hands on at least some of the records because of the notice that 

the prosecution would introduce the prior burglary conviction. As the Supreme 

Court has explained, counsel performs deficiently when he fails to make 

reasonable efforts to review evidence he knows the State will use in aggravation. 

Rompilla, 545 U.S. at 388–90. 

Considering the paltry mitigation investigation Mr. Mostiler conducted, that 

he failed to pursue the leads he managed to uncover, and that he failed entirely to 

rebut the State’s case in aggravation, we conclude that Mr. Mostiler performed

deficiently in Mr. Pye’s case.

B. Prejudice

Having decided that counsel was deficient under a de novo review of the 

record, we turn to the prejudice prong of Strickland, first examining the state 

habeas court’s conclusion that Mr. Pye failed to show prejudice through the lens of 

AEDPA deference and then conducting a de novo review.

i. AEDPA Analysis

Just as with its analysis of Strickland’s deficient performance prong, the 

state habeas court’s prejudice conclusion both involved unreasonable applications 

of well-established federal law and was based on unreasonable determinations of 

fact. As discussed above, in concluding that Mr. Pye failed to show prejudice 

stemming from counsel’s performance, the state habeas court unreasonably

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characterized as “misleading” several of the affidavits habeas counsel obtained, 

and so we do not defer to that determination or to the factual findings that underpin 

it.

13

More globally, the state habeas court unreasonably discounted all the 

mitigation affidavits based on the proposition that they “‘usually prove[] little of 

significance.’” Doc. 20-40 at 65 (quoting Waters, 46 F.3d at 1513–14). In 

context, the Waters quote states the unremarkable: that grants of federal habeas 

corpus are rare because we must avoid the distorting effects of hindsight. Waters, 

46 F.3d at 1514 (citing Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689). The state habeas court, 

though, wielded the quote like a hammer, using it—along with the unreasonable 

fact-findings relating to three of the 24 affidavits—to discount the whole lot. This 

was unreasonable under Strickland and its progeny, which direct courts to consider 

evidence adduced during state postconviction proceedings and reweigh it, along 

with the evidence admitted at trial, against the evidence in aggravation. See 

Wiggins, 539 U.S. at 534.

13 As we noted above, the state habeas court accurately noted that Mr. Lawson “corrected

[his original testimony] through additional affidavit testimony.” Doc. 20-40 at 65. In contrast to 

the three affidavits it found to be misleading, however, the state court made no factual findings

about Mr. Lawson’s testimony or credibility to which AEDPA deference would apply. The state 

court’s blanket decision to assign little weight to Mr. Pye’s affidavit testimony is not itself a factfinding. Rather, “weighing the prosecution’s case against the proposed witness testimony,” as 

the state habeas court did here, “is at the heart of the ultimate question of the Strickland prejudice 

prong, and thus is a mixed question of law and fact not within the Section 2254(e)(1) 

presumption.” Ramonez v. Berghuis, 490 F.3d 482, 491 (6th Cir. 2007).

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The state habeas court also found “little, if any, connection” between Mr. 

Pye’s impoverished background” and the crime he committed. Doc. 20-40 at 66. 

Supreme Court law clearly establishes, however, that no such connection is 

required. See Williams, 529 U.S. at 367–68, 395–98 (granting habeas relief despite 

lack of any nexus between petitioner’s “nightmarish childhood” and the robbery 

and murder he committed); cf. Tennard v. Dretke, 542 U.S. 274, 287 (2004) 

(“[W]e cannot countenance the suggestion that low IQ evidence is not relevant 

mitigating evidence . . . unless the defendant also establishes a nexus to the 

crime.”). The state habeas court further found that because Mr. Pye “was 28 years 

old at the time of these crimes, trial counsel could have reasonably decided . . . that 

remorse was likely to play better than excuses.” Doc. 20-40 at 66. The court’s 

premise, that Mr. Pye’s age meant evidence of his childhood and family 

background would not be mitigating, is patently unreasonable under the Supreme 

Court’s decision in Porter, and its conclusion—that remorse was a reasonable 

tactic for counsel to pursue—has no support in the factual record of this case.

In Porter, the state court “discounted the evidence of Porter’s abusive 

childhood because he was 54 years old at the time of the trial.” Porter, 558 U.S. at 

37. The Supreme Court held that “[i]t is unreasonable to discount to irrelevance 

the evidence of Porter’s abusive childhood, especially when that kind of history 

may have particular salience for a jury evaluating Porter’s behavior in his 

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relationship with [his ex-girlfriend, the murder victim].” Id. at 43. Here, just as in 

Porter, evidence that Mr. Pye experienced abuse as a child could have been 

particularly salient to the jury’s evaluation of the crime he committed against a 

former girlfriend.

As to the state habeas court’s conclusion that Mr. Mostiler reasonably could 

have pursued a strategy grounded in remorse, it is abundantly clear from the record 

that Mr. Mostiler focused on remorse not at all.

14

 Mr. Pye’s testimony in his own 

defense at the guilt phase of the trial, in which he denied before the jury that he had 

been present for the rape and murder, was utterly inconsistent with remorse. At the 

penalty phase, most of the defense witnesses stated their belief that Mr. Pye was 

innocent—again, inconsistent with remorse. Not surprisingly, Mr. Mostiler did not 

even mention remorse in his closing argument; instead, he urged the jury to 

exercise mercy. Thus, the state habeas court’s determination that remorse was a 

reasonable defense strategy was unreasonable in light of the record, which 

demonstrates that counsel could not have pursued a strategy based on remorse.

15

14 We recognize that the state habeas court’s conclusion sounds more like a determination 

that trial counsel was not deficient than a conclusion as to prejudice. We include it in our 

discussion here because the state court tied its remorse discussion to the premise, clearly 

grounded in a prejudice determination, that Mr. Pye’s age decreased or eliminated the mitigating 

impact of his family background. The court’s finding relating to counsel’s purported remorse 

strategy was unreasonable regardless of whether it related to deficient performance or prejudice.

15 The State, for its part, argues that Mr. Mostiler reasonably pursued a mitigation 

strategy based on residual doubt. But “in other cases where courts have accepted the efficacy of 

residual doubt defenses [to the death penalty], actual residual doubt was urged by defense 

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Finally, the state habeas court found no prejudice stemming from counsel’s 

failure to rebut the State’s future-dangerousness argument, reasoning that DOC 

records showed Mr. Pye was sometimes insubordinate. Doc. 20-40 at 60–61. The 

state habeas court failed to consider that it was not just evidence about Mr. Pye’s 

carceral conduct in the DOC records, but also the mitigating evidence about Mr. 

Pye’s mental health and intellectual functioning the records contained, that could 

have swayed the jury. The court’s failure to consider the full breadth of mitigating 

evidence in the DOC records was contrary to Rompilla, in which the Supreme 

Court ruled that “[i]f the defense lawyers had looked in the file on Rompilla’s prior 

conviction, it is uncontested that they would have found a range of mitigation leads 

that no other source had opened up,” including a picture of their client’s mental 

health that was “different[] from anything defense counsel had seen or heard.” 

Rompilla, 545 U.S. at 390.

The state habeas court unreasonably cast aside Mr. Pye’s mitigation 

affidavits, required a temporal and topical connection between the crime and 

counsel.” Ferrell, 640 F.3d at 1232. Here, Mr. Mostiler did not urge the jury to vote for a 

sentence other than death on a theory of residual doubt. Instead, “counsel’s argument can be 

more accurately described as evincing a ‘mercy-despite-guilt-strategy—asking the jury to spare 

[Mr. Pye’s] life, even if he did it.” Id. Importantly, aside from the lack of evidence that Mr. 

Mostiler adopted a residual-doubt strategy, the state habeas court opined that counsel acted 

reasonably in highlighting remorse, not residual doubt. See Wilson, 138 S. Ct. at 1191–92 

(requiring us “to train [our] attention on the particular reasons” the state habeas court gave in 

adjudicating a claim and defer to those reasons (emphasis added) (internal quotation mark 

omitted)).

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mitigating circumstances, buoyed trial counsel’s performance based on a 

nonexistent remorse strategy, and failed to consider the full breadth of mitigating 

evidence in Mr. Pye’s DOC records. The court’s errors lie “beyond any possibility 

for fairminded disagreement.” Richter, 562 U.S. at 103. Thus, the state habeas 

court’s prejudice decision involved an unreasonable application of federal law and 

was based on unreasonable determination of fact. Id.; see Wilson, 138 S. Ct. at 

1191–92.

ii. De Novo Review

Here, as with Strickland’s deficient performance prong, we are 

unconstrained by the deference afforded by § 2254 and now conduct a de novo 

review. The question we must answer in conducting a de novo review “is whether 

the entire postconviction record, viewed as a whole and cumulative of mitigation 

evidence presented originally, raised a reasonable probability that the result of the 

sentencing proceeding would have been different if competent counsel had 

presented and explained the significance of all the available evidence.” Debruce v. 

Comm’r, Ala. Dep’t of Corr., 758 F.3d 1263, 1275 (11th Cir. 2014) (internal 

quotation marks omitted). Habeas counsel compiled evidence of severe physical 

abuse, neglect and endangerment, low intellectual functioning, depression, and 

extreme poverty—evidence that “paints a vastly different picture of [Mr. Pye’s] 

background” than the evidence presented at the penalty-phase hearing. Id. at 1276; 

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see also Wiggins, 539 U.S. at 535. “[H]ad the jury been confronted with this 

considerable mitigating evidence, there is a reasonable probability that it would 

have returned with a different sentence.” Wiggins, 539 U.S. at 536. 

The mitigating evidence habeas counsel adduced “is consistent, unwavering, 

compelling, and wholly unrebutted.” Ferrell, 640 F.3d at 1234. It is precisely the 

kind of mitigating evidence the Supreme Court and this Court have held 

demonstrates prejudice. Mr. Pye was raised in abject poverty by parents who 

managed to feed and clothe their 10 children by the slimmest of margins. See 

Rompilla, 545 U.S. at 390. The family lived in a house that had no indoor 

plumbing or central heating, and the children did not have functional clothing. Id.

at 392. Whether to go to work or out drinking (Lolla Mae drank even while 

pregnant), Mr. Pye’s mother left him alone with his siblings all day, leaving the 

older children—10, at the oldest—to care for the younger ones. See Wiggins, 539 

U.S. at 516–17 (“[P]etitioner’s mother, a chronic alcoholic, frequently left Wiggins 

and his siblings home alone for days.”). A school social worker found the 

conditions of the Pye home so deplorable that he reported the family to DFACS, 

which did nothing.

Experts and lay witnesses unanimously agree that Mr. Pye is of low 

intellectual functioning, bordering on intellectual disability. He “attended classes 

for slow learners and left school when he was 12 or 13.” Porter, 558 U.S. at 33–

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34; see also Williams, 529 U.S. at 396 (“Counsel failed to introduce available 

evidence that Williams was ‘borderline [intellectually disabled]’ and did not 

advance beyond sixth grade in school.”). He was teased at school for his academic 

challenges and for his tattered clothing. He often did not make it onto the school 

bus because his house was too cold to get out of bed.

Mr. Pye’s father, a violent and explosive alcoholic, regularly abused his 

children and his wife. In fact, the record shows that Buck Pye had virtually no 

other meaningful interactions with his children. “[B]y his siblings’ account, [Mr. 

Pye] was his father’s favorite target, particularly when [Mr. Pye] tried to protect 

his mother.” Porter, 558 U.S. at 33; see also Ferrell, 640 F.3d at 1234 (explaining 

that the petitioner was “especially” targeted for abuse by his father). Buck Pye told 

his son he “was so stupid that he just couldn’t be [Buck’s] kid” and would tell the 

other children to ignore him. Doc. 16-24 at 26; Doc. 16-25 at 2. Mr. Pye also

“routinely witnessed his father beat his mother,” Porter, 558 U.S. at 33, at least 

once so severely that she required medical treatment, despite the family’s inability 

to pay for medical care and resulting inclination not to seek it. See Rompilla, 545 

U.S. at 392 (listing as a mitigating circumstance that the petitioner’s “father, who 

had a vicious temper, frequently beat Rompilla’s mother, leaving her bruised and 

black-eyed”). “His parents fought violently,” and on at least one occasion his 

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mother attacked his father with a knife. His mother also beat the children. In time, 

his older siblings began to join in the violent domestic abuse.

Mr. Pye’s depression was evident from an early age. His siblings recall his

hiding from the family violence, curling up and staring into space. He would not 

speak in those moments. By the time he was incarcerated on a burglary charge, 

psychologists considered him to be severely depressed and in need of 

psychopharmacological treatment. The prison was a brutal environment where, 

even by accounts of the guards, new prisoners could expect to be physically or 

sexually assaulted, or both. The guards considered Mr. Pye, who was small in 

stature, to be a target. The prison’s psychologist agreed, calling Mr. Pye “very 

weak” and suggesting that he may need protective custody. See Wiggins, 539 U.S. 

at 517. Despite the violence of the prison environment, prison guards and officials

did not consider Mr. Pye to present an escape or violence threat. See Williams, 529 

U.S. at 396.

The jury heard virtually none of this powerful mitigating evidence. Instead, 

the jury heard little more than “naked pleas for mercy.” Rompilla, 545 U.S. at 393. 

Worse, what the jury did hear about Mr. Pye was at best misleading. Unprepared 

to testify, Ms. Bland told the jury that Mr. Pye was raised in a “four-bedroom” 

house, not one in deplorable condition with makeshift sleeping quarters divided by 

boards and sheets. Ms. Starks, also unprepared to testify, acknowledged that the 

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family lacked running water and central heating, but followed up her description of 

what the family did not have with what it supposedly did have—love. Further 

misleading the jury about the supposedly loving upbringing Mr. Pye experienced,

Mr. Pye’s primary abuser, his father, testified without mentioning the trauma he 

caused his son. No other family member who testified at trial mentioned it either.

To top it off, the jury heard from the prosecution that, if given the opportunity, Mr. 

Pye would kill a prison guard to escape without hearing any of the available 

evidence that he posed no serious risk to anyone in prison. 

Of course, in assessing prejudice we must reweigh the evidence in 

mitigation against the evidence in aggravation, including evidence the State would 

have introduced to rebut the defense’s new mitigating evidence. Wiggins, 539 U.S.

at 534. There is no doubt that this was an aggravated crime. Mr. Pye and his 

companions kidnapped and raped Ms. Yarbrough at gunpoint, and then Mr. Pye 

shot her multiple times when she was lying on a roadside. The State presented 

compelling evidence that Mr. Pye had been violent with Ms. Yarbrough before and 

that on this night she remained alive for 10 to 30 minutes after he shot her, was 

conscious for most that time, and attempted to stand or crawl to safety. Mr. Pye’s 

conduct resulted in the imposition of four statutory aggravating circumstances. 

But the Supreme Court and this Court have found prejudice in very aggravated

cases. See, e.g., id. at 514–15, 535 (finding prejudice even though defendant 

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robbed and drowned an elderly woman); Ferrell, 640 F.3d at 1204–05, 1234–36 

(finding prejudice even though defendant robbed and murdered, execution-style, 

his elderly grandmother and young cousin). Moreover, the extreme domestic 

violence Mr. Pye experienced—in part because his father, imprisoned around the 

time of his conception and birth, questioned his parentage—would have 

contextualized some of the circumstances of the undeniably horrific crime Mr. Pye 

committed. See Ferrell, 640 F.3d at 1235; see also O.C.G.A. § 17-10-30(b) 

(requiring the judge to instruct the jury that it can consider “any mitigating 

circumstances”).

Undoubtedly, had Mr. Mostiler introduced evidence that Mr. Pye posed no

serious threat while incarcerated and had trusting, congenial relationships with 

guards, the State would have introduced evidence that while serving his time for 

burglary Mr. Pye was investigated twice for assaulting a fellow prisoner. Doc. 15-

19 at 51. Here on appeal the State points to these alleged infractions.16 A close 

reading of the disciplinary reports does little to bolster the State’s argument, 

however. 

16 The state habeas court noted in passing that Mr. Pye had at least twice assaulted a 

guard while incarcerated on death row. These incidents, which resulted in no injuries and 

minimal use of force, occurred after sentencing and so would not have been available to Mr. 

McBroom. Even considering them now, the incidents do not change our rationale or result

because their aggravating nature pales in comparison to the mitigating value of information the 

DOC records contained.

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In the first incident, the investigating officer found that “horse-playing led to 

fighting” with a fellow prisoner and, after both prisoners “refused to stop when 

told,” Mr. Pye “got smart mouthed” with an officer. Id. There were no injuries. 

Mr. Pye pled guilty to the disciplinary committee. In the second incident, Mr. Pye 

was observed fighting with another prisoner, and an officer “only held inmate 

Willie Pye back away from [the other] inmate to keep the inmates separated,” 

while another officer restrained the other man. Doc. 15-20 at 8. During the 

investigation, Mr. Pye took responsibility, and the disciplinary committee found

him not guilty of assault. We do not find convincing the State’s argument that the 

aggravating nature of these documents would blunt the mitigating value of the 

evidence and leads they contained.

What is more, this is not a case where the type of mitigating evidence 

adduced during the state habeas proceedings would have undermined counsel’s 

strategy at sentencing. Mr. Mostiler focused his penalty-phase presentation on 

mercy; mitigating evidence of the type habeas counsel uncovered “would have 

easily and directly supported the approach counsel offered at sentencing.” Ferrell, 

640 F.3d at 1235. To the contrary, with scant details from poorly prepared 

witnesses, counsel’s focus had the weakest of evidentiary support, and the State’s 

argument in closing was made even more powerful. See id. at 1236 (finding 

prejudice, despite numerous strong aggravators, when “the testimony from 

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witnesses at the penalty phase . . . actually was very sparse”). When the 

prosecution asked the jury, “If Willie James Pye does not deserve the death 

penalty, who are you saving it for?,” Doc. 13-11 at 90, the jury knew almost 

nothing about Mr. Pye. Thus, “[t]he jury labored under a profoundly misleading 

picture of [Mr. Pye’s] moral culpability”—exacerbated by the State’s strategy of 

suggesting future dangerousness—“because the most important mitigating 

circumstances were completely withheld from it.” Ferrell, 640 F.3d at 1236.

The evidence trial counsel failed to investigate and present “adds up to a 

mitigation case that bears no relation to the few naked pleas for mercy actually put 

before the jury.” Rompilla, 545 U.S. at 393. It “is possible that a jury could have 

heard it all and still have decided on the death penalty,” but “that is not the test.” 

Id. The “mitigating evidence, taken as a whole, might well have influenced the 

jury’s appraisal of [Mr. Pye’s] moral culpability.” Wiggins, 539 U.S. at 538

(internal quotation marks omitted). Because he has shown “a reasonable 

probability that at least one juror would have struck a different balance” between 

life and death, Mr. Pye has shown prejudice under Strickland. Id. at 537. He is 

entitled to a new penalty phase.

IV. CONCLUSION

“[I]t will be a rare case in which an ineffective assistance of counsel claim 

that was denied on the merits in state court is found to merit relief in a federal 

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habeas proceeding. This is one of those rare cases.” Johnson v. Sec’y, Dep’t of 

Corr., 643 F.3d 907, 911 (11th Cir. 2011). The district court’s denial of Mr. Pye’s 

petition for a writ of habeas corpus is reversed in part. We remand to the district 

court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

AFFIRMED IN PART, REVERSED IN PART, REMANDED.

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