NOTICE: NOT FOR OFFICIAL PUBLICATION.

UNDER ARIZONA RULE OF THE SUPREME COURT 111(c), THIS DECISION IS NOT PRECEDENTIAL

AND MAY BE CITED ONLY AS AUTHORIZED BY RULE.

IN THE

ARIZONA COURT OF APPEALS

DIVISION ONE

STATE OF ARIZONA, Appellee,

v.

LISA MAE KINGSTON, Appellant.

No. 1 CA-CR 20-0178 

Appeal from the Superior Court in Yavapai County

No. P1300CR201900874

The Honorable Christopher L. Kottke, Judge Pro Tempore

AFFIRMED

COUNSEL

Arizona Attorney General’s Office, Phoenix

By Jana Zinman

Counsel for Appellee

Law Offices of Stephen L. Duncan PLC, Scottsdale

By Stephen L. Duncan

Counsel for Appellant

FILED 1-21-2021
STATE v. KINGSTON

Decision of the Court

2

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Judge Randall M. Howe delivered the decision of the Court, in which 

Presiding Judge Jennifer M. Perkins and Judge Maria Elena Cruz joined.

H O W E, Judge:

¶1 Lisa Mae Kingston appeals her convictions of the sale or 

transportation of dangerous drugs and the sale or transportation of narcotic 

drugs. She argues the superior court erred in denying her motion for 

judgment of acquittal under Rule 20 of the Arizona Rules of Criminal 

Procedure for those two charges. Because substantial evidence supports the 

convictions, we affirm.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

¶2 We view the facts in the light most favorable to sustaining the 

verdict. State v. Payne, 233 Ariz. 484, 509 ¶ 93 (2013). Arizona State Trooper 

Williams pulled Kingston over on I-17 between Sedona and Phoenix 

around 10:00 a.m. in July of 2019. Kingston was driving a rental car, had 

three air fresheners hanging on the car’s rearview mirror, appeared 

nervous, and could not stand still. While issuing her a traffic warning, 

Trooper Williams asked Kingston about her travels. Kingston said that she 

and her passenger had made a “day trip” to Sedona and were returning to 

Phoenix. Trooper Williams found the travel pattern strange, considering it 

was only 10:00 a.m. and they were returning from Sedona, so he spoke to 

the passenger, who gave an inconsistent account of the travels. The 

passenger also admitted to having a partially smoked “joint.”

¶3 Because of Kingston’s behavior and the passenger’s 

marijuana cigarette, Trooper Williams believed he had probable cause to 

search Kingston’s vehicle and called Trooper Huijkman for K-9 backup to 

help search the vehicle. In the trunk of Kingston’s vehicle, the troopers 

found $13,000 in cash, 9.55 grams of methamphetamine, 21 pills of fentanyl, 

and four pills of oxycodone. Kingston stated that everything in the vehicle 

belonged to her. The State subsequently charged Kingston with the sale or 

transportation of dangerous drugs, the sale or transportation of narcotic 

drugs, and two counts of possession of drug paraphernalia. 
STATE v. KINGSTON

Decision of the Court

3

¶4 At trial, Trooper Huijkman testified that the cash smelled of 

drugs. An Arizona Department of Public Safety forensic scientist testified 

that she tested three items of evidence and found them to be 

methamphetamine, oxycodone, and fentanyl. Detective Winfrey with the 

Partners Against Narcotic Trafficking Task Force testified that a normal 

dosage of methamphetamine was about .1 to .2 grams, an average 

methamphetamine user generally used 1-1.5 grams a day, and a user

normally possessed only a couple days of supply. He further testified that 

the current cost for a gram of methamphetamine was $40, an oxycodone pill 

was $10 - $20, and a fentanyl pill was $15 - $20. 

¶5 After the State rested, Kingston moved for a directed verdict 

of acquittal under Rule 20 of the Arizona Rules of Criminal Procedure on 

the sale or transportation of dangerous drugs and the sale or transportation 

of narcotic drugs. The court denied the motion, and the jury, after 

deliberating, found Kingston guilty of all charges. The trial court sentenced 

her to concurrent terms of 6 years’ imprisonment each on the convictions 

for the sale or transportation of narcotic drugs and sale or transportation of 

dangerous drugs convictions, and concurrent 1-year terms for each of the 

possession of drug paraphernalia convictions, with 226 days of 

presentence-incarceration credit for each count. Kingston timely appealed. 

This Court has jurisdiction under Arizona Constitution article VI, Section 9, 

and Arizona Revised Statutes §§ 12–120.21(A)(1), 13–4031, and 13–4033(A). 

DISCUSSION

¶6 Kingston argues that the court erred in denying her Rule 20 

motion for acquittal. The trial court’s ruling is a question of law reviewed 

de novo, considering all facts and resolving all evidentiary conflicts in the 

light most favorable to sustaining the conviction. See State v. Pena, 235 Ariz. 

277, 279 ¶ 5 (2014); see also State v. West, 226 Ariz. 559, 562 ¶ 15 (2011). 

¶7 A trial court may enter a directed verdict of acquittal only if 

no substantial evidence supports the conviction. See State v. Davolt, 207 Ariz. 

191, 212 ¶ 87 (2004). Substantial evidence is “evidence that reasonable 

persons could accept as sufficient to support a guilty verdict beyond a 

reasonable doubt. See Pena, 235 Ariz. at 279 ¶ 5 (quoting State v. Hausner, 

230 Ariz. 60, 75 ¶ 50 (2012)). “When reasonable minds may differ on 

inferences drawn from the facts, the case must be submitted to the jury, and 

the trial judge has no discretion to enter a judgment of acquittal.” West, 226 

Ariz. at 563 ¶ 18. Direct and circumstantial evidence are equally probative, 

State v. Bible, 175 Ariz. 549, 560 n.1 (1993), and wholly circumstantial 

evidence can support differing, yet reasonable inferences, State v. Anaya, 
STATE v. KINGSTON

Decision of the Court

4

165 Ariz. 535, 543 (App. 1990); see also State v. Olivas, 119 Ariz. 22, 23 (App. 

1978).

¶8 A person is guilty of transportation of dangerous drugs for 

sale if the person (1) knowingly, (2) transported for sale, (3) dangerous 

drugs. See A.R.S. § 13–3407(A)(7). Methamphetamine is a dangerous drug. 

See A.R.S. § 13–3401(6)(b)(xxxviii). A person is guilty of transportation or 

sale of narcotic drugs if the person (1) knowingly, (2) transported for sale, 

(3) narcotic drugs. See A.R.S. § 13–3408(A)(7). Oxycodone and fentanyl are 

narcotic drugs. See A.R.S. § 13–3401(20)(ww), (ttt), and (21)(dd).

¶9 The court correctly denied Kingston’s motion. Trooper 

Williams testified that Kingston knowingly possessed both narcotic and 

dangerous drugs and was transporting them in her trunk along with 

$13,000 of drug-contaminated cash. See Beijer v. Adams, 196 Ariz. 79, 84 ¶ 25 

(App. 1999) (“[T]he presence of the drugs in the trunk of the car the 

Defendant was driving was sufficient, in and of itself, to support a 

conclusion beyond a reasonable doubt that [s]he was knowingly 

transporting the drugs.”). 

¶10 Detective Winfrey testified that Kingston had almost 100 

doses of methamphetamine and at least 21 doses and four doses of fentanyl 

and oxycodone respectively. In the absence of pipes, lighters, and snort 

tubes indicating personal use, a reasonable jury could reasonably infer that 

the drugs were being transported “for sale.” Finding the drugs in the trunk 

along with an unusual amount of drug-contaminated cash further supports 

this inference. 

¶11 Kingston nonetheless argues that the state failed to provide 

substantial evidence that the drugs were “for sale.” She argues that while 

the state’s expert testified to the normal usable amount of a 

methamphetamine user, it did not do so for oxycodone or fentanyl and 

therefore failed to establish sufficient evidence for a jury to infer that she 

transported the narcotic drugs for sale. She also argues that the state failed 

to provide evidence of small plastic baggies, ledgers, or scales indicative of

drug sales. While such evidence would independently support a finding of 

substantial evidence, see State v. Martinez, 226 Ariz. 221, 224 ¶ 14-15 (App. 

2011) (small plastic baggies, ledger, or scales), it is not required, id. at 15 

(evidence “is not insubstantial simply because reasonable persons might

have drawn a different conclusion from the evidence.”). The contaminated 

cash alongside the amount of drugs and lack of personal use evidence and

testimony provided sufficient circumstantial evidence for a jury to find that 

Kingston transported the drugs with the intent to sell.
STATE v. KINGSTON

Decision of the Court

5

CONCLUSION

¶12 The State provided sufficient evidence for a jury to find that 

Kingston transported dangerous and narcotics drugs for the purpose of 

selling those drugs beyond a reasonable doubt, and we, therefore, affirm 

the convictions and sentences.