Filed 8/31/23 Martinez v. Valenzuela CA2/1

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying 

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rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published 

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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION ONE

RUBEN SANTOS MARTINEZ,

Plaintiff and Respondent,

v.

JAVIER AVIEL VALENZUELA,

Defendant and Appellant.

 B317158

 (Los Angeles County

 Super. Ct. No. 19STCV39214)

APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of 

Los Angeles County. Rafael A. Ongkeko, Judge. Affirmed.

McCormick, Barstow, Sheppard, Wayte & Carruth, 

James P. Wagoner, Timothy J. Buchanan and Lejf E. Knutson 

for Defendant and Appellant.

Engstrom, Lipscomb & Lack, David R. Lira, Brittan 

Cortney and Rachel M. Lannen for Plaintiff and Respondent. 

___________________________________
2

Following a car versus motorcycle accident, Ruben Santos 

Martinez, the motorcyclist, sued Javier Aviel Valenzuela, the 

car driver, for negligence. The jury returned a defense verdict 

but the trial court, finding the evidence compelled a finding that 

Valenzuela was negligent in some degree, ordered a new trial. 

Valenzuela appeals from that order, contending no substantial 

evidence supports it and the court relied on incorrect legal 

principles and failed to consider all the evidence and adequately 

explain its reasoning. We disagree, and thus affirm the order.

BACKGROUND

A. The Accident Site

The accident occurred on Valley Boulevard (Valley) in 

Los Angeles, which runs east and west.

The eastbound and westbound lanes on Valley were divided 

by a double yellow line, the westbound side having five lanes. 

The posted speed limit was 35 miles per hour.

Approaching the accident site from the east (i.e., proceeding 

westbound on Valley), one would pass an intersection with 

Alhambra Avenue (Alhambra) on the right, which had two 

left-turn and two right-turn lanes, then 150 to 200 feet later

would reach a driveway on the right coming from Troy’s Burgers 

restaurant. The accident occurred just off the driveway’s apron. 

Continuing westbound, one would reach an intersection with 

Eastern Avenue (Eastern) about 150 to 200 feet after the 

driveway. 

A driver leaving Troy’s Burgers who wanted to go east on 

Valley would first have to navigate five westbound Valley lanes: 

a right-turn lane, three through lanes (numbered 3, 2, 1), and a 

left-turn lane. The driver could then either: (1) turn right into 
3

the fifth westbound lane (Valley’s left-turn pocket) and make a 

U-turn at Eastern, or (2) cross the fifth westbound lane and turn 

left into Valley’s eastbound lanes, illegally crossing the double 

yellow line to do so.

B. The Accident

Valenzuela, driving a Honda sedan, chose the first option.

Leaving Troy’s Burgers, he paused at the driveway apron, 

looked left then right (and maybe left again), and entered 

straight onto Valley intending to cross four lanes, turn right into 

Valley’s left-turn pocket, make a U-turn at Eastern, and proceed 

east on Valley.

He only made it halfway.

As Valenzuela was leaving the restaurant driveway, 

Martinez, riding a motorcycle on Alhambra from the south, 

turned right on a green light onto Valley from Alhambra’s 

leftmost right-turn lane. He entered Valley’s westbound 

number 2 lane, accelerated, and 150 to 200 feet later collided 

in the middle of Valley with the front left corner of Valenzuela’s 

south-facing Honda, sustaining serious injuries.

The evidence was equivocal as to who struck whom.

C. Trial

Martinez sued Valenzuela for negligence.

At trial, Martinez and Valenzuela presented dueling 

percipient and expert accounts of the accident.

1. Investigation by Officer Victor Munoz

The investigating officer was Los Angeles Police 

Department Officer Victor Munoz, whose report of the accident 

was identified as an exhibit but not admitted into evidence. 
4

Munoz was permitted to read portions of the report aloud and 

testify about them.

When he arrived at the scene, Munoz found Martinez in 

the roadway injured. He took statements from each driver and 

wrote in his report what he described at trial as “a paraphrase 

or synopsis” of what they said.

a. Martinez’s account at the scene

According to Munoz’s report, Martinez said Valenzuela cut 

him off while making a left turn onto Valley. Munoz denied that 

Martinez told him Valenzuela “T-boned” him. “It would be the 

other way around,” Munoz said.

Munoz testified that when he met Martinez again at the 

hospital, he stated he was driving on Valley at 20–30 miles per 

hour when Valenzuela’s Honda entered the roadway “to make 

a left-hand turn directly in front of him.” Martinez told Munoz 

that he decelerated to 10–15 miles per hour before colliding with 

Valenzuela.

b. Valenzuela’s account at the scene

According to Munoz’s report, Valenzuela told Munoz that 

he entered onto Valley from Troy’s Burgers with the intention 

of going to the left-turn pocket and making a U-turn at Eastern. 

Munoz thought this was credible. His report stated, “I observed 

[Valenzuela’s] vehicle . . . was positioned facing slightly right,

consistent with [this] statement.” Clips and still shots of the 

scene showed the position of Valenzuela’s car angled slightly 

to the right towards the left-turn pocket on Valley.

Munoz’s report stated that Valenzuela said he looked “left 

and right” before entering Valley and saw Martinez— “coming off 

Alhambra onto Valley” (i.e., from Valenzuela’s left)— too late to 
5

react. Valenzuela said Martinez was driving between 60 and 65 

miles per hour before he saw Valenzuela, then decelerated to 

approximately 40 to 45 miles per hour before broadsiding him.

Officer Munoz testified that from the Troy’s Burgers 

driveway there was a clear view of traffic merging from 

Alhambra onto Valley. He testified that in the collision report he 

did not note speed as a factor in the crash but would have done so 

had it been a factor.

2. Plaintiff’s Evidence

a. Martinez

Martinez testified that before the accident, he was on 

his motorcycle stopped at a red light at Alhambra and Valley, 

in the lane farthest from the curb. When the light turned green, 

he proceeded onto Valley into the middle lane, going “maybe”

20-25 miles per hour when he first saw Valenzuela’s vehicle in 

the roadway, coming at him, “[a]ll of a sudden,” “out of nowhere,”

“like a kamikaze pilot.” He braked and moved left to attempt 

to avoid the collision but was unable to stop.

At his deposition, in a segment read into the record at trial,

Martinez had said Valenzuela’s car then struck his motorcycle on 

the right side “like a T-bone.” As he testified: “I seen it when it 

came at me and hit me.” He was uncertain if his brakes locked 

up, and made no mention of skidding before the impact. He tried 

to avoid the collision by braking and moving to the left into lane 1

but was unable to stop and was in lane 1 when Valenzuela hit 

him. He went over the hood and landed in the left-hand turn

pocket.
6

Martinez testified that at the hospital he told Officer 

Munoz that Valenzuela’s car was not stopped. Had it been

stopped, Martinez would have stopped too.

b. Plaintiff’s expert

Martinez’s expert, Jon Landerville, testified that the 

accident was caused by Valenzuela crossing Valley in an unsafe 

manner and failing to see Martinez approaching from the left. 

Landerville said Valenzuela’s Honda accelerated to 15–18 miles 

per hour as he entered and moved across Valley, and at impact 

was traveling at 6.9 miles per hour. Martinez was going 35 miles 

per hour but decelerated to 21.2 miles per hour just before 

sideswiping off Valenzuela’s front bumper. Landerville saw no 

problem with the acceleration rate of the motorcycle. He opined 

that Valenzuela’s maneuver was unsafe regardless of whether 

he was turning left or right, and Martinez was “clearly visible”

for six to seven seconds before the collision, giving Valenzuela 

enough time to stop and yield to the motorcycle. Landerville 

had no reason to disbelieve Valenzuela’s deposition testimony in 

which he stated that he looked left, right and left when exiting 

the driveway, but opined that he simply missed seeing the 

motorcycle.

Damage to the wheel cover at the left front wheel of 

the Valenzuela’s Honda, along with damage to the hood, led

Landerville to opine that the car was in motion at the time of 

impact, which occurred very deep into Lane 1, almost into the 

left-turn pocket. Photos of blood on the roadway showed that 

Martinez’s body came to rest in the left-turn pocket.
7

3. Defense Evidence

a. Valenzuela

For the defense, Valenzuela testified that he exited Troy’s 

Burgers intending to turn right onto Valley and make a U-turn 

at Eastern to head east towards his home. He stopped on the 

driveway’s apron, looked left down Valley for two to three 

seconds, looked right, and then looked left again. He could see 

the general area where Alhambra and Valley merged but the

intersection was not entirely visible because “there’s a bend in 

the road at Alhambra, you can only see a certain portion up to 

where the streetlight is at.” Not seeing any vehicles, Valenzuela

proceeded toward the left-turn pocket.

As he entered Valley and got as far as the middle of lane 2, 

Valenzuela heard the exhaust of a motorcycle engine, looked left

again, and for the first time saw Martinez merging at a high 

speed into the center lane of Valley, about 100 feet and two or 

three seconds away. Valenzuela came to a stop, already angling 

slightly toward the left-turn pocket. Martinez shifted slightly to 

his left but struck Valenzuela’s stopped car on the front end.

b. Defense expert

Valenzuela’s expert, Harm Jansen, testified that 

Valenzuela made a proper assessment of the gap in traffic so 

as to safely pull out from Troy’s Burgers. He testified that after 

Martinez turned from Alhambra onto Valley he accelerated to 

39 miles per hour, and Valenzuela had only 3.4 seconds to react. 

Jansen opined that Martinez lost control and skidded before 

impacting Valenzuela’s stopped vehicle.

Jansen concluded that Valenzuela acted as a reasonable 

person would in the same scenario, and “the rate at which . . . 
8

Martinez accelerated into traffic was the causative factor for the 

collision.” Martinez’s failure to anticipate that other road users 

would not be ready for a fast acceleration into traffic, paired with 

his inability to control the motorcycle, caused the collision.

4. Verdict

The jury was asked, “Was . . . Valenzuela negligent in the 

operation of his vehicle?” By a vote of 9-3, it answered no.

D. New Trial Ruling

Martinez moved for a new trial on the grounds of 

(1) irregularity in the proceedings of the jury, (2) jury misconduct,

and (3) insufficiency of the evidence to justify the verdict. He 

argued that Valenzuela negligently violated his right of way 

when he pulled out of the Troy’s Burgers driveway and failed to 

proceed with reasonable caution.

The court found that the evidence established at least the 

following: 

“1. There is, at most, a 200-foot distance between the 

[Troy’s Burgers] driveway and Alhambra . . . .

“2. Plaintiff made his right turn from Alhambra . . . to 

westbound Valley . . . on a green signal and accelerated toward 

what would be the eventual area of impact in the number 1 

westbound lane on Valley . . . .

“3. Defendant exited the driveway of Troy’s Burgers, 

intending to turn right onto westbound Valley . . . and enter 

the left-turn pocket, at least three, if not four, lanes away to

the south, and slightly west of the driveway.

“4. Defendant inched forward from the driveway, but 

states that when he reached the curb, although he looked to 

his left toward Alhambra . . . , he did not see the motorcycle. 
9

But defendant told investigating officer Munoz that he saw the 

motorcycle turning from Alhambra onto Valley at a high rate of 

speed.

“5. Defendant had a clear line of sight as plaintiff would

be coming off Alhambra . . . toward westbound Valley . . . .

“6. Claiming not to see any vehicle, defendant stated he 

crossed the first two lanes of westbound Valley and was halfway 

into the next, or number one, lane when he first heard and then 

saw plaintiff’s motorcycle. Defendant was impeached with his 

deposition testimony where he said he was ‘already in lane 2 . . . ,’

not halfway into lane 1, when he heard or noticed the motorcycle. 

Either way, defendant was unable to clear all . . . traffic lanes 

of westbound Valley to complete his intended turn when the 

collision occurred.

“7. Defendant did not see plaintiff’s motorcycle before 

the collision until it was approximately 100 feet away. But, at 

his deposition, defendant testified the motorcycle was ‘50 to 100 

feet away.’ At trial, defendant described and/or marked on 

exhibit 36–48 and 103 (identical exhibits) the general location 

where he first saw the motorcycle, an area which he described 

and/or marked as just south and west of the crosswalk area 

where plaintiff would begin his right turn onto westbound Valley. 

At that time, defendant testified plaintiff was already crossing 

Valley . . . .

“8. Defendant testified that by the time he saw the 

motorcycle about 50-100 feet away, depending on which 

testimony of his we use, all he could do was brake as a collision 

was inevitable.” (Capitalization & italics omitted.)

The court stated that “[a]fter weighing all of the evidence, 

the court concludes the jury clearly should have reached a 
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different verdict as to whether or not defendant was negligent.”

(Capitalization omitted.)

The trial court stated: 

“There is sufficient and substantial evidence that, 

whether defendant was turning right to cross the entire width 

of westbound Valley to enter the left-turn pocket three lanes 

away, or, even worse, making an illegal (and admittedly unsafe 

and difficult) left turn from the driveway across the same 

lanes and having to be attentive to both west and eastbound 

[Valley/Alhambra] traffic (possibly 5 to 6 traffic lanes in total), 

defendant failed to exercise reasonable care by entering 

westbound Valley and making, or attempting to make, an unsafe 

turn in violation of plaintiff’s right-of-way. He claims he did not 

see plaintiff’s motorcycle before the collision until it was too late, 

but he also told Munoz and testified that he saw the motorcycle 

turn from Alhambra onto Valley. That should have been a red 

flag for any vehicle wanting to cross Valley[’s] . . . three lanes 

(or more to go eastbound). It is undisputed that the motorcycle 

would have been available to be seen at Alhambra, at least 150–

200 feet to defendant’s left. As he ‘inched’ from the driveway and 

decided to begin his turn and cross the lanes of westbound Valley, 

defendant saw the motorcycle but began his crossing anyway. 

Defendant concedes he would not have proceeded forward had he 

seen the motorcycle before he decided to cross. But, importantly, 

according to his statement to Munoz, which was read to the jury, 

he did see the motorcycle ‘turn [westbound] on Valley . . . from 

Alhambra . . . at a high rate of speed.’ These circumstances 

would support a finding of defendant’s negligence.

“If defendant maintains he did not see plaintiff when 

he decided to turn, then defendant simply was not attentive 
11

to westbound Valley traffic west of Alhambra. Such traffic, 

of course, would have the right-of-way over those exiting the 

driveway, 150–200 feet away. Even if defendant looked and 

saw the motorcycle, he clearly miscalculated the available gap 

in westbound traffic coming from his left to safely complete either 

a right or left turn without endangering such traffic. This gap 

becomes even more problematic for the turning maneuver 

defendant intended because defendant has always contended 

that he saw the motorcycle approaching at a high rate of speed. 

While a factfinder might also find plaintiff was partially at fault 

in some way, there was insufficient evidence to absolve defendant 

completely of any negligence inasmuch as plaintiff’s motorcycle 

was available to be seen. In fact, the motorcycle was seen, and, 

as instructed in special instruction [No.] 1, it was ‘close enough’

to constitute an immediate hazard as defendant made his 

decision to enter Valley . . . and make whatever turn he was 

about to make, especially if he intended to cross at least three 

wide lanes of traffic. This decision required defendant to 

‘continue to yield the right-of-way’ to plaintiff (see . . . Veh. 

Code[,] § 21804[, subd.] (a)]) until defendant could cross all lanes

of westbound Valley ‘with reasonable safety.’ He clearly did not 

do the latter.” (Boldface & capitalization omitted.)

The court stated that although “not essential to this 

ruling,” Valenzuela’s testimony about intending to make a right 

turn rather than a left was not credible, and it was “more likely 

that [he] was intending to complete a left.”

The court granted Martinez’s motion for new trial, and 

Valenzuela appeals.
12

DISCUSSION

Valenzuela contends the order granting a new trial must 

be reversed because the court relied on erroneous legal principles

and failed to adequately explain its reasoning, and no substantial 

evidence supports the order.

A. Legal Principles

A new trial may be granted only on grounds specified 

in Code of Civil Procedure section 657, one of them being 

insufficiency of the evidence to justify the verdict. (Code Civ. 

Proc., § 657.) “A new trial shall not be granted upon the ground 

of insufficiency of the evidence . . . unless after weighing the 

evidence the court is convinced from the entire record, including 

reasonable inferences therefrom, that the court or jury clearly 

should have reached a different verdict or decision.” (Code Civ. 

Proc., § 657.)

An order granting a new trial must identify the grounds 

relied upon and specify the reasons why the evidence supports 

those grounds. (Code Civ. Proc., § 657.) “Specifications for new 

trial are sufficient if they make a record sufficiently precise to 

permit meaningful review. [Citation.] Specifications are 

insufficient if simply couched in the form of conclusions or 

statements of ultimate fact.” (Tramell v. McDonnell Douglas 

Corp. (1984) 163 Cal.App.3d 157, 170.) 

An order granting a new trial based “exclusively upon 

an erroneous concept of legal principles applicable to the cause”

must be reversed. (Conner v. Southern Pacific Co. (1952) 

38 Cal.2d 633, 637, see also McCoy v. Gustafson (2009) 180 

Cal.App.4th 56, 94.)

“The standards for reviewing an order granting a new 

trial are well[-]settled. After authorizing trial courts to grant a 
13

new trial on the ground[ ] of . . . ‘[i]nsufficiency of the evidence,’

section 657 provides: ‘[O]n appeal from an order granting a 

new trial upon the ground of the insufficiency of the evidence . . . 

such order shall be reversed as to such ground only if there is 

no substantial basis in the record for . . . such reason[ ].’ . . .

Thus, we have held that an order granting a new trial under 

section 657 ‘must be sustained on appeal unless the opposing 

party demonstrates that no reasonable finder of fact could have 

found for the movant on [the trial court’s] theory.’ [Citation.] 

Moreover, ‘[a]n abuse of discretion cannot be found in cases in 

which the evidence is in conflict and a verdict for the moving 

party could have been reached . . . .’ [Citation.] In other words, 

‘the presumption of correctness normally accorded on appeal 

to the jury’s verdict is replaced by a presumption in favor of 

the [new trial] order.’ ” (Lane v. Hughes Aircraft Co. (2000) 22 

Cal.4th 405, 411–412 (Lane).)

B. The Trial Court Applied Correct Legal 

Principles

1. The Court Employed No Improper 

Presumption

The trial court’s order stated that “[w]hile a factfinder 

might also find plaintiff was partially at fault in some way, there 

was insufficient evidence to absolve defendant completely of any 

negligence.” (Capitalization & italics omitted.)

Valenzuela argues this statement in effect presumed that 

both parties were partially at fault, and therefore shifted the 

burden to Valenzuela to prove he was not negligent, an incorrect 

legal principle. We disagree.

The court’s statement was based on the evidence, not a 

presumption. It was undisputed at trial that when Valenzuela 
14

exited the driveway at Troy’s Burgers, he had a clear view to 

his left for 150 to 200 feet, and Martinez was in his line of sight. 

Valenzuela nevertheless proceeded to the middle of Valley 

before stopping. A reasonable factfinder could conclude from this 

evidence that Valenzuela was negligent to at least some degree. 

No presumption was necessary.

2. The Court Did Not Rely on a U-turn 

Theory

In its order, the trial court stated, “While not essential 

to this ruling, the court finds defendant’s testimony on a key 

point not credible. . . . [¶] . . . Although there was no evidence 

that a U-turn was permitted or prohibited from [the]

left-turn pocket . . . [at Valley and Eastern, where Valenzuela 

stated he intended to make a U-turn], the court does not find 

defendant’s U-turn testimony to be the more credible scenario.” 

(Capitalization omitted.)

Valenzuela argues that because a U-turn was permitted

at the intersection, the court’s order was based on an erroneous 

legal concept.

We disagree. The court expressly did not rely on this point 

but merely recited (correctly) the state of the evidence: The 

propriety of a U-turn at Eastern was not discussed. Whether a 

U-turn was in fact allowed was irrelevant to both the order and 

the case because both sides agreed it did not matter whether 

Valenzuela intended to turn right or left out of the Troy’s Burgers 

driveway—the accident occurred before he could do either.
15

C. The Order Was Sufficiently Specific

Valenzuela argues the order granting a new trial was 

insufficiently specific because it failed to state the relied-upon 

ground and the reasons supporting it. We disagree.

“The requirement for stating the grounds and specifying 

the reasons for each ground is to encourage careful deliberation 

by the trial court before ruling and to provide a record sufficiently 

precise to permit meaningful review.” (Kolar v. County of 

Los Angeles (1976) 54 Cal.App.3d 873, 880.) A “brief descriptive 

statement” will often suffice. (Scala v. Jerry Witt & Sons, Inc. 

(1970) 3 Cal.3d 359, 368 (Scala.) “It is helpful if the court 

declares what witnesses it believed, what testimony was to be 

disregarded or the value of any impeachment. [Citation.] . . . 

[Citation.] The court should briefly identify criticized evidence.” 

(Bigboy v. County of San Diego (1984) 154 Cal.App.3d 397, 404.)

Here, the trial court stated the ground for granting a new 

trial: “insufficiency of the evidence to justify the verdict.”

The court clearly stated the reason supporting this ground:

“There is sufficient and substantial evidence that, whether 

defendant was turning right . . . or . . . left . . . , defendant failed 

to exercise reasonable care by entering westbound Valley and 

making, or attempting to make, an unsafe turn in violation of 

plaintiff’s right-of-way.” (Capitalization omitted.)

Valenzuela argues the trial court failed to identify the 

portion of the record that convinced the court Valenzuela was 

negligent. We disagree. After stating the ground for the new 

trial order and the reason supporting it, the court then described

at length the evidence supporting its conclusion:

Valenzuela “claims he did not see plaintiff’s motorcycle 

before the collision until it was too late, but he also told Munoz
16

and testified that he saw the motorcycle turn from Alhambra 

onto Valley. That should have been a red flag for any vehicle 

wanting to cross Valley[’s] . . . three lanes (or more to go

eastbound). It is undisputed that the motorcycle would have 

been available to be seen at Alhambra, at least 150–200 feet 

to defendant’s left. As he ‘inched’ from the driveway and decided

to begin his turn and cross the lanes of westbound Valley, 

defendant saw the motorcycle but began his crossing anyway. 

Defendant concedes he would not have proceeded forward had he 

seen the motorcycle before he decided to cross. But, importantly, 

according to his statement to Munoz, which was read to the jury, 

he did see the motorcycle ‘turn [westbound] on Valley . . . from 

Alhambra . . . at a high rate of speed.’ These circumstances 

would support a finding of defendant’s negligence.” (Boldface & 

capitalization omitted.)

Even if Valenzuela did not see Martinez, the court 

explained, “then defendant simply was not attentive to 

westbound Valley traffic west of Alhambra. Such traffic, 

of course, would have the right-of-way over those exiting the 

driveway, 150–200 feet away. Even if defendant looked and 

saw the motorcycle, he clearly miscalculated the available gap 

in westbound traffic coming from his left to safely complete 

either a right or left turn without endangering such traffic. 

This gap becomes even more problematic for the turning 

maneuver defendant intended because defendant has always 

contended that he saw the motorcycle approaching at a high 

rate of speed. While a factfinder might also find plaintiff was 

partially at fault in some way, there was insufficient evidence 

to absolve defendant completely of any negligence inasmuch 

as plaintiff’s motorcycle was available to be seen. In fact, the 
17

motorcycle was seen, and, as instructed in special instruction 

[No.] 1, it was ‘close enough’ to constitute an immediate hazard 

as defendant made his decision to enter Valley . . . and make 

whatever turn he was about to make, especially if he intended to 

cross at least three wide lanes of traffic. This decision required 

defendant to ‘continue to yield the right-of-way’ to plaintiff . . . 

until defendant could cross all lanes of westbound Valley 

‘with reasonable safety.’ He clearly did not do the latter.” 

(Capitalization & italics omitted.)

The court’s citation to the record was more than adequate. 

(Cf. Estes v. Eaton Corp. (2020) 51 Cal.App.5th 636, 646

(Estes) [“the trial court ‘should not be burdened with giving a 

comprehensive review of the evidence’ ”].)

Contrast the trial court’s rationale here with the stated 

reasons in an analogous ruling that our Supreme Court held 

were insufficient: “In the case at bar the specification of reasons 

merely recited that under the court’s view of the evidence (1) the 

defendant was not negligent and (2) the plaintiff was guilty of 

contributory negligence proximately causing his injuries.” (Scala, 

supra, 3 Cal.3d at p. 364 [conclusory reasons do not suffice].)

We conclude that the trial court’s statement of reasons 

reflected that the court evaluated all the evidence and was 

sufficiently specific to provide for meaningful appellate review.

Valenzuela argues meaningful review is impossible because 

the trial court’s finding that Valenzuela both saw and did not see 

Martinez was so ambiguous as to obscure the theory on which the 

court relied.

We disagree. The theories are not inconsistent, but 

alternative: Valenzuela was negligent whether or not he saw 

Martinez. If he saw him, he should have yielded. If he did not 
18

see Martinez, he was inattentive because his line of sight was 

clear, and Martinez was in it.

D. The Order Was Supported by Substantial 

Evidence

Valenzuela argues that even if the trial court’s order was 

procedurally proper, it was unsupported by substantial evidence. 

We disagree.

It was undisputed that Martinez made a right turn from

Alhambra to westbound Valley on a green signal and had the 

right-of-way. It was undisputed that Valenzuela entered onto 

Valley and stopped halfway, broadside to oncoming traffic. 

Officer Munoz testified that Valenzuela told him he saw Martinez 

turn westbound onto Valley from Alhambra, approximately 150 

to 200 feet away. This evidence alone supported the trial court’s 

conclusion that Valenzuela saw Martinez in time to yield but 

negligently failed to do so.

Even Valenzuela’s theory at trial—that he did not see 

Martinez until immediately before the accident—supported 

the court’s order. Valenzuela described the scene and placed 

marks on map exhibits showing his clear line of sight to 

Alhambra. Officer Munoz also testified that from the Troy’s 

Burgers driveway there was a clear view of traffic merging from 

Alhambra onto Valley. Thus, even if Valenzuela did not see 

Martinez, the court was justified in concluding he should have.

“ ‘An abuse of discretion cannot be found in cases in which 

the evidence is in conflict and a verdict for the moving party 

could have been reached under the theory expressed in the 

order for a new trial.’ ” (Estes, supra, 51 Cal.App.5th at p. 643, 

italics omitted.) As our high court observed in Lane: “The trial 

court sits much closer to the evidence than an appellate court.
19

Even the most comprehensive study of a trial court record cannot 

replace the immediacy of being present at the trial, watching 

and hearing as the evidence unfolds. The trial court, therefore, 

is in the best position to assess the reliability of a jury’s verdict 

and, to this end, the Legislature has granted trial courts broad 

discretion to order new trials. The only relevant limitation on 

this discretion is that the trial court must state its reasons for 

granting the new trial, and there must be substantial evidence 

in the record to support those reasons.” (Lane, supra, 22 Cal.4th 

at p. 412.)

Here, the trial court watched and heard several witnesses 

describe the accident while interacting with maps and diagrams 

of the scene. From this immersion in the evidence, the court sits 

in a better position than we to assess the factual reliability of the 

verdict.

We conclude that the court considered all of the record, 

relied on correct legal principles, and adequately stated 

its reasons for granting a new trial, and those reasons were 

supported by substantial evidence. It was therefore no abuse 

of discretion to order a new trial.
20

DISPOSITION

The order granting a new trial is affirmed. Respondent is 

awarded his costs on appeal.

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED.

ROTHSCHILD, P. J.

We concur:

BENDIX, J.

WEINGART, J.