IN THE

TENTH COURT OF APPEALS

No. 10-19-00307-CR

THE STATE OF TEXAS,

Appellant

v.

ZACHARY JONES,

Appellee

From the 12th District Court

Walker County, Texas

Trial Court No. 29062

MEMORANDUM OPINION

The State appeals from the trial court’s order granting Zachary Jones’s motion to 

suppress. We reverse and remand.

Background Facts

Deputy Ryan Dowdy, with the Walker County Sheriff’s Office, testified at the 

hearing on the motion to suppress that on June 6, 2018, he conducted a traffic stop based 

on his observation of a defective license plate lamp. Deputy Dowdy explained that the 
State v. Jones Page 2

vehicle had two license plate lamps; one of the lamps was in working order, and one was 

not. Deputy Dowdy also observed the vehicle “swaying” from side to side in the lane; 

however, he initiated the traffic stop based on the defective license plate lamp.

During the stop, Deputy Dowdy determined that Jones could possibly be 

intoxicated so he called for a city police officer to come to the scene to investigate. Jones 

was arrested and charged with the offense of driving while intoxicated third offense of 

more. He filed a motion to suppress the evidence obtained during and after the 

detention. The trial court granted the motion to suppress.

MOTION TO SUPPRESS

In the sole issue on appeal, the State contends that the trial court erred in granting 

the motion to suppress. A trial court's ruling on a motion to suppress is reviewed on 

appeal for abuse of discretion. State v. Cortez, 543 S.W.3d 198, 203 (Tex. Crim. App. 2018).

The record is viewed in the light most favorable to the trial court's determination, and a 

trial court's ruling should be reversed only if it is arbitrary, unreasonable, or outside the 

zone of reasonable disagreement. Id. We give almost total deference to the trial court's 

rulings on (1) questions of historical fact, even if the trial court's determination of those 

facts was not based on an evaluation of credibility and demeanor; and (2) application-oflaw-to-fact questions that turn on an evaluation of credibility and demeanor. Amador v. 

State, 221 S.W.3d 666, 673 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007); Richardson v. State, 494 S.W.3d 302, 304 

(Tex. App. —Waco 2015, no pet.). But when application-of-law-to-fact questions do not 
State v. Jones Page 3

turn on the credibility and demeanor of the witnesses, such as the determination of 

reasonable suspicion, we review the trial court's ruling on those questions de novo. 

Hereford v. State, 339 S.W.3d 111, 118 (Tex. Crim. App. 2011); Carmouche v. State, 10 S.W.3d 

323, 328 (Tex. Crim. App. 2000). If the trial court makes findings of fact, as it did here, we 

determine whether the evidence supports those findings. Richardson v. State, 494 S.W.3d 

at 304. We then review the trial court's legal rulings de novo unless the findings are 

dispositive. Id. We will sustain the trial court's decision if we conclude that the decision 

is correct under any applicable theory of law. State v. Cortez, 543 S.W.3d at 203.

The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution as well as Article I, 

Section 9 of the Texas Constitution protect against unreasonable searches and seizures 

conducted by the government. U.S. CONST. amend. IV; TEX. CONST. art. I, § 9. For Fourth 

Amendment purposes, a traffic stop is a seizure and must be reasonable to be lawful.

Chung v. State, 475 S.W.3d 378, 383 (Tex. App. —Waco 2014, pet. ref’d). An officer 

conducts a lawful temporary detention when he has a reasonable suspicion to believe 

that a person is violating the law. Derichsweiler v. State, 348 S.W.3d 906, 914 (Tex. Crim. 

App.), cert. denied, 565 U.S. 840, 132 S.Ct. 150, 181 L.Ed.2d 67 (2011); State v. Varley, 501 

S.W.3d 273, 278 (Tex. App. — Fort Worth 2016, pet ref’d). The State does not have to 

establish with absolute certainty that a crime has occurred but must elicit testimony of 

sufficient facts to create a reasonable suspicion of a traffic violation. State v. Varley, 501 

S.W.3d at 278. The reasonableness of the officer's suspicion is gleaned only from 
State v. Jones Page 4

information known to the officer at the time of the detention. See Crain v. State, 315 S.W.3d 

43, 52-53 (Tex. Crim. App. 2010); State v. Varley, 501 S.W.3d at 278. The standard is purely 

objective and does not take into account the officer's subjective intent. State v. Varley, 501 

S.W.3d at 278.

Section 547.322 provides in part that:

(f) A taillamp or a separate lamp shall be constructed and mounted to emit 

a white light that:

(1) illuminates the rear license plate; and

(2) makes the plate clearly legible at a distance of 50 feet from the 

rear.

(g) A taillamp, including a separate lamp used to illuminate a rear license 

plate, must emit a light when a headlamp or auxiliary driving lamp is 

lighted.

TEX. TRANSP. CODE ANN. § 547.322 (f) (g) (West 2011). 

In its findings of fact and conclusions of law, the trial court found that the only 

reason for the stop was that one license plate lamp was not illuminating. The trial court 

concluded that a traffic violation does not occur when a vehicle’s headlamp is lighted and 

simultaneously one of the vehicle’s license plate lamps is emitting a light. The trial court 

further found that Deputy Dowdy was not reasonable in his belief that a traffic violation 

had occurred was occurring or was about to occur and that Deputy Dowdy did not have 

reasonable trustworthy information sufficient to warrant a reasonable belief that Jones 

was committing or committed an offense.
State v. Jones Page 5

Deputy Dowdy testified that it was a violation of § 547.322 (g) to have a license 

plate lamp that was not in working order. The trial court found that it was not a violation 

of § 547.322 if the license plate is illuminated by one lamp. The case before us is similar 

to that in State v. Varley, 501 S.W.3d 273, 278 (Tex. App. — Fort Worth 2016, pet ref’d). In 

State v. Varley, the police officer observed that a brake light on the rear of the vehicle was 

not working and initiated a traffic stop. State v. Varley, 501 S.W.3d at 276. The officer 

testified the statute requires two working brake lights and that he did not consider the 

brake light in the center of the rear cab window because it was not affixed to the rear of 

the vehicle. See TEX. TRANSP. CODE ANN. § 547.323 (West 2011). The trial court found that 

there was no reasonable suspicion to stop the defendant because there was a second stop 

lamp on the vehicle. The trial court noted that the cab could be the rear of the vehicle. 

The Fort Worth Court of Appeals found that the defendant did not violate § 547.323 

because he had at least one brake light mounted on the rear of his vehicle and two brake 

lights overall. State v. Varley, 501 S.W.3d at 279. However, the Court held that under 

Heien v. North Carolina, the officer’s mistake of law was reasonable. Id at 283. The court 

reversed the trial court’s order granting the motion to suppress. Id.

Assuming without deciding that Jones did not commit a traffic violation, pursuant 

to Heien v. North Carolina there was no violation of the Fourth Amendment if it was 

reasonable for the officer to suspect that the conduct was illegal. Heien v. North Carolina, 

574 U.S. 54, 66 (2014). Under Heien, if Deputy Dowdy’s mistake of law was reasonable, 
State v. Jones Page 6

then the trial court erred in granting the motion to suppress. See Heien v. North Carolina, 

574 U.S. at 67.

Like the statue in question in Heien, no court has determined whether it is an 

offense under § 547.322 (g) to have a license plate lamp that was not in working order 

even though the license plate was illuminated by another license plate lamp. Because §

547.322 (f) requires a separate lamp, singular, to illuminate the license plate so that it is 

legible from a distance of 50 feet, but § 547.322 (g) requires a separate license plate lamp 

to illuminate when the headlamps are lighted, we find that the mistake of law by Deputy 

Dowdy, if any was made, was reasonable. Therefore, pursuant to Heien we find that the 

trial court erred by granting the motion to suppress. See State v. Varley, 501 S.W.3d at 283. 

We sustain the State’s sole issue on appeal.

CONCLUSION

We reverse the trial court’s order granting Jones’s motion to suppress and remand 

to the trial court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

JOHN E. NEILL

Justice

Before Chief Justice Gray,

Justice Davis, and

Justice Neill

Reversed and remanded

Opinion delivered and filed September 9, 2020

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