The Honor able De nny Chin of the United States District Court for the Southern D istrict * of Ne w York, sitting by

desig nation. 09-2006-c v Go nza le z v. Commis sio ne r o f S oc ia l Se c ur ity U N IT E D S T A T E S C O U R T O F A P P E A LS F O R T H E S E C O N D C IR C U IT SUM M AR

Y O RD ER RULINGS BY SUMM ARY O RDER DO NOT H AVE PRECEDENTIAL EF F ECT. CITATIO N TO A SU MMAR

Y ORDE R FILED ON OR A FT ERJANU AR Y 1, 2007 , I S PERMITT ED A ND IS G OV E RN E D BY FE D E R A L RU L E OF A PPE L LATE P ROC E D U R E 3 2. 1 A N D T HIS C OU R T ’S L O C A L R U L E 32.1.1 . WH EN CITING A SUMMARY ORDER IN A DOCUMENT F ILED WITH THI S COURT, A PARTY M U S T CITE EITHER TH E FEDERAL AP P ENDIX OR AN ELEC T R ONIC DATABASE (W ITH THE NOTATI ON “SUM MARY ORDER”) . A PARTY CITING AS U MMA R

Y OR D E R MU S T S E R

V E A C OPY OF IT ON A N Y PA R T Y N OT RE PR E S E N T E D BY COUNSEL. At a stated te rm of the United States Court of A ppeals for the Second Circuit, held at the Daniel Patric k Moy

nihan Courthouse, 500 Pear l Street, in the City of Ne w York, on the 13 day th of January , two thousand ten. Pr e se nt: ROBERT D. SACK,

ROBERT A. K

ATZ MANN, Circuit Judges , DENNYCHI

N, * District Judge
.

________________________________________________ JO SE G O N Z A L E Z , D e c e a s e d , b y I REN E G U Z M A

N , A dmi n is tr atr ix, Plaintif f-Appellant , v. No. 09-2006-c v SECR ETARY OF THE UNI TED STATES DEPARTMENT OF HEAL TH & HUMAN SERVI CES AND COMMI SSI ONER OF SOCI AL SECURI TY ADMI

NI STRATI ON, Defendants-A

ppellees
.

________________________________________________2

F or Ap pe lla nt: W I L L I AM S. N EA L , Woodhaven, N.Y. F or Ap pe lle e s: K ATHL EE N A. M AHO NEY , Assistant United States Attorney for the E astern D istrict of NewYork (V aruni Nelson, Assistant United States Attorney , of counsel), for Be nton J . Campbell, United States Attorney for the Easter n District of Ne w York, B rookly n, N.Y. Appea l from the United States District Court for the Easter

n District of Ne w York (Sifton, J. ). ON CO NSI DE RA TIO N W HEREOF , i ti s h e r e b y OR DE RE D , AD JU DG ED , and DE CREED that th e or de r o f t he dis tr ic t c ourt

be and he re by is AF F IRM ED
. By order dated Ma rch 25, 2009, the district court g rante d defe ndants’ motion for judgme nt on the pleading s pursuant to Fe d. R. Civ. P . 12(c) and 42 U.S.C. § 405(g ), and de nied plaintiff’s cla im for re troac tive Social Security disability benef its. On appea l, plaintiff Irene Gu zman a

rgue s th at th e dis tr ic t c ourt e rr e d in g ra nti ngde fe nd ants ’ m oti on be c a us e Jose Gonzalez should have bee n deeme d disabled for the per iod in question and the district court failed to a ddress Gonzalez’s application for Supplemental Secur ity Income. We assume the pa rt ie s’ fa mil iari ty wi th t he fa c ts, pr oc e dura l hi sto ry , a nd sp e c if ic atio n o f i ssu e s o n a

pp e a l. This Court’s reviewof a district c ourt’s dete rmination to uphold a decision of the Commi ssioner of the Socia l Security Administration (“Commissi oner” ) is not squarely focuse d on the district court’s opinion; nor is it a de novo revie w of the unde rlying de termination of the claimant’s disability

status. Ha llo ra n v . B ar

nh ar t , 362 F.3d 28, 31 ( 2d Cir. 2004) (per curiam). Rather, it entails a r eview of the administrative re cord to a ssess whether there is substantial evidenc e to support the Commissi oner’ s decision. Id. Thus, the Court “may only set aside a deter mination which is based upon leg al er ror or not supported by

substantial evidence .” Arnone3

v. Bowen , 882 F.2d 34, 37 ( 2d Cir. 1989) (interna l quotation marks omitted). “Substantial
e vid e nc e ,” in t

ur n, is “ mor e tha

n a me re sc int ill a ” a

nd is “ su c h r e le va

nt e vid e nc e a s a

re a so na ble mind might acc ept as a dequate to support a conc lusion.” Richardson v. Pe rales , 402 U.S. 389, 40 1 ( 19 71 ) ( int e rn a l qu otatio n ma rk s o mitte d) . T hu s, a s a

g e ne ra l matte r, the re vie wi ngc ourt is limit ed to a f

airly defe rential standa

rd. See Clark v . Comm’r of Soc. Se c. , 143 F.3d 115, 118 ( 2d Cir . 1 99 8) ; Perez v . Chater , 77 F.3d. 41, 46 ( 2d Cir. 1996). In order to rec eive r etroa ctive disability benef its, plainti ff must show that Gonzalez was disabled prior to Mar ch 31, 1996, whe n his insured status expi red. See42 U.S.C. §§ 42 3( a )( 1) (A ), (c ); see also Arnone , 882 F.2d at 37 (elig ibilit y for be nefits is depende nt on showingthat the claimant wa s insured and disable d duringthe insured pe riod). Thus to qualify for be nefits, Gonzalez was re quired to fur nish evidence , see42 U.S.C.§ 423(d)(5)( A), demonstratingthat he wa s unable to work pr ior to Marc h 31, 1996 due to a phy sical or menta l impairment that is medically deter minable and ha d lasted or ha d been e x pecte d to last for a continuous period of at least 12 months. Id. § 4 23 (d )( 1) (A ). Mo re ov e r, su c h im pa ir me nt m us t have be en seve re e noug h that Gonzalez would not have bee n able to continue pr evious work, or , in light of his bac kg round (i.e., a g e, educ ation, skill set), could not have found othe r g ainful work prior to Marc h 31, 1996. Id. § 423(d)( 2)(A) . Howeve r, if substance abuse w as a material contributingfac tor to the disability , the claimant would not be c onsidered disa bled for pur

poses of the provision. Id. § 423(d)( 2)(C). There is a well-wor

n, five-ste p analy sis used to determine if a person is disabled. See20 C.F .R. § 4 04 .1 52 0. In th is C ir c uit , th e te st i s d e sc ri be d a s f oll ow s: F ir st, the [Comm iss ion e r] c on sid e rs wh e the r t he c la ima nt i s c ur re ntl y e ng a g e d in“ Re sid ua l f un c tio na l c a

pa c ity” is what a

pe rs on is s til l c a pa ble of do ingde sp ite 1 limit ations resultingfrom phy sical and me ntal impairments. 20 C.F.R. § 416.945(a)
. 4 substantial ga inful activity . I f he is not, the [Comm issioner] nex t considers wh e the r t he c la ima nt h a s a “ se ve re imp a ir

me nt” wh ic h s ig nif

ic antl y lim its his phy sical or menta l ability to do basic work a ctivities. I f the c laimant suffe rs such an impairment, the third inquiry is whether, ba sed solely

on medical e vidence , the c l a i m an th a s ani mp a i r

m e n tw h i c hi s l i s t e d

i nAp p e n d i x 1 o f

th e r e gu l at i o n s . If the c la ima

nt h a s su c h a

n im pa ir me nt, the [Comm iss ion e r] w ill c on sid e r h im disabled without consideringvocational f actor s such as a g e, educ ation, and wor k experience . . . . Assuming the c laimant does not have a listed impairment, the fourth inquiry

is whether, de spite the claimant’s se vere impairment, he ha s the re sid ua l f un c tio na l c a

pa c ity to p e rf

or m hi s p a st w or

k. F ina lly , if

the c la ima

nt i s 1 unable to per form his past work, the [C ommissi oner] then deter mines whether there is other work which the cla imant could perf orm. Rosa v. Callahan , 1 6 8 F. 3 d 7 2 , 7 7 (2 d

C i r. 1 9 9 9 ) ( qu o t i n g Berry v . Schweike r , 675 F.2d 464, 467 (2d Cir. 1982) (pe r cur iam)). Thr oug h the fourth step, the claimant ca rries the burdens of pr od uc tio n a nd pe rs ua sio n, but if

the ana ly sis pr oc e e ds to t he fi ft h s te p, the re is a

lim ite d s hif

t in the burde n of proof

and the Commissioner is obligate d to demonstrate that jobs exist i n the national or loca l economies that the c laimant can pe rfor m give n his residual func tional capa city
. See68 F e d. Re g . 5 11 55 (Aug . 2 6, 20 03 ); see also Poupore v . Astrue , 566 F.3d 303, 306 ( 2d Cir. 2009) (pe r cur iam). Thoug h plaintiff appe ars to ar gue that Gonzalez was pe r sedisabled within the meaning of the a pplicable Social Sec urity

provisions due to his difficulties with asthma, depre ssion, and musculoskeletal pain in his bac k and knee , we c annot conc lude that the Commissi oner la cked substantial evidence to find that Gonzalez was not disabled, or that the c onclusion rested on a n
err or of law
. As an initial matter, the r ecor d contains no re levant medica l evidence prior to Novembe r 10, 1994. The e arliest incidenc e of me dical tre atment in the re cord is for a hospitalization fromDue to the e x tensive medica l arg ot involved in these regulations, we will ref rain fr om 2 repr oducingthem here and re fer the re ader

direc tly to the provisions as ref

ere nced. 5 November

11, 1994 to November

14, 1994 for a

n asthma attac k. I t appea rs, howeve r, that the
atta c k w a s tr ig g e re d b y

c oc a ine us e , a

nd thu s th is i nc ide nt c ann ot s up po rt a fi nd ingof

dis a bil ity for the pur

poses of the Socia l Security Act. See42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(2)( C). In the abse nce of any medically objective e vidence , there is no question that Gonzalez could not be found disabled befor e Nove mber 11, 1994. For the per iod from Novembe r 11, 1994 through the expiration of Gonzalez’s insured status on Marc h 3 1, 19 96 , w e a g re e wi th t he dis tr ic t c ourt

that th e Commis sio ne r p ro pe rl y de te rm ine d th at G on zal e z wa s n ot d isa ble d. Th ou g h th e re c or d c onta ins ins tanc e s o f c omp la int s relating to asthma, de pression, and ba ck pain, at no point is there any documented me dical deter mination that meets all of the re quired c riteria of any g iven impairment under

the L isting of Impairments. See Sullivan v . Zebley , 4 93 U. S. 5 21 , 5 30 (1 99 0) (“ An imp a ir me nt t hat ma nif e sts only some of those c riteria, no matter how seve rely , does not qualify .”). Mo re sp e c if

ic a lly , Se c tio n 3 .0 3 o f t

he L ist ingof

Impa ir me nts , 2 0 C. F .R. pt. 40 4, su bp t. P , app. 1 § 3.03, spec ifies the conditions that Gonzalez must m eet in orde r to be de termined disabled on ac count of his asthmatic c ondition. The only pulmonary

function test on re cord f

or 2 Gonzalez does not, however , appea r to satisfy

the cr iteria of Subsec tion 3.02A as requir ed under Sub se c tio n 3 .0 3A . M or e sp e c if ic a lly , a pe rs on wi th G on zal e z’s phy sic a l c ha ra c te ri sti c s w ou ld have to de monstrate that a 1- second f orce d expiratory

volume (F EV1) wa s equal to or less than 1.35 – Gonzalez’s FEV1 w as 1.42 af ter bronc hodilators. Plaintiff also offe rs no re sponsive evidenc e as to the nature a nd fre quency

of the attacks as r equire d under Subsec tion 3.03B6

Acc ording ly , we must conc lude that plaintiff has not suff iciently met the re quirements under Se c tio n 3 .0 3 to sh owthat G on zal e z wa s pe r sedisabled due to his asthmatic c ondition. Plaintiff’s claim that Gonzalez suffer ed a me dically cognizable, pe r seimp a ir me nt d ue to his depression fa

res no be tter. Section 12.04 of the L isting of Impairments, id. § 12.04, specifie s various conditions Gonzalez must m eet to be de termined disabled due to his depressive
c on dit ion . O ne su c h s ub se c tio n, Sub se c tio n A , r e qu ir e s at le a st f our o f a se t of nin e se pa rate medically deter minable ailments to be docume nted and “ persist[ent] , either c ontinuous[ ly ] or intermittent[ ly ].” Id. Th e re c or d r e fl e c ts t hat G on zal e z suf

fe re d f ro m, at mo st, tw o o f t

he se sy mptoms, namely

insomnia and suicidal thoug hts, which clea rly falls well short of satisfying the provision. Moreover , the re cord doe s not adequately demonstrate that either sy mptom persisted, continuously

or intermittently
. In the alter

native, plaintiff c an see k to demonstrate that Gonzalez had a disabling de pr e ssi ve c on dit ion

purs ua nt t o Su bs e c tio n C und e r S e c tio n 1 2. 04 , whic h r e qu ir e s p la int if f t o demonstrate, inte r a lia , a medica lly documented history

of chr onic af

fec tive disorder that lasted at least 2 year s and that ca used more tha

n a demi nim is a dv e rs e imp a c t on Go nza le z’s a

bil ity to work. The rec ord does not, howe ver, c ontain any evidenc e of a

medically

documented history

of depre ssion of at least 2 year s’ duration. Pl aintiff ca nnot, theref

ore, de monstrate that Gonzalez suffe red a per se dis a

bli ngde pr e ssi ve c on dit ion un de r a ny pa rt of the a pp lic a ble pr ov isi on s. Finally , with respec t to Gonzalez’s mus culoskeleta l complaints, we ca nnot find that he
wa s pe r sedisabled due e ither to bac k or knee pain. Section 1.04 of the L ist of I mpairments, id. § 1.04, require s a hig hly

specific , medically

deter minable findingof a spinal disorde r, “( e.g ., he rn iate d nuc le us pu lpo su s, sp ina l ara c hn oid iti s, sp ina l st e no sis , o ste oa rt hr iti s, de g e ne rativ e dis cTh is h oli sti c ana ly sis be lie s p la int if f’ s a rgume nt t hat th e AL J had

fa ile d to c on sid e r a ll 3 of the c laimed impairments tog ether pursuant to 20 C.F.R. § 404.1523.

7 disease, f ace t arthritis, vertebr al fra cture ), re sulting in compromise of a nerve root (includingthe cauda equina) or the spinal cor d.” Id. Ex tensive examination of this medically complex provision is not necessar

y in this case bec ause the re a re no me dical opinions or finding s in the
rec ord that spea

k meaning fully

to the provision’s require ments. Thoug h Gonzalez logg ed intermittent complaints of back pa in, there w ere no rele vant diagnoses that would have supported a findingof pe r seimpairment due to a spinal disorde r pursua nt to Section 1.04. No r i s th e re any

me dic a lly

re le va nt s up po rt

to f ind that G on zal e z wa s pe r sedisabled due to knee pa in. Section 1.02 of the L ist of I mpairments, 20 C.F.R. pt. 404, subpt. P, app. 1, § 1.02, require s, inte r a lia , a

“ g ro ss a natom ic a l de fo rm ity

. . . a nd c hr on ic joi nt p a in a

nd sti ff ne ss w ith signs of limit ation of motion . . . and finding s on appropr iate medica lly acc eptable imag ing of joint space na

rrowing , bony

destruction, or a

nkylosis of the aff

ecte d joint(s).” Id. T h o u gh Gonzalez complained of kne e pain on Ma rch 27, 1996, the resultingmedical e valuation did not
reve al any

“gross anatomical defor

mities,” nor any

other medic ally

rele vant condition that might have othe rwise satisfied the re quirements under Subsection 1.02. T hu s , th e m e d i c a l r e c o r d

b e f o r e u s o f f e r s n o b a s i s u

p o nw h i c ht o s u

b s t an t i at e any pe r se disabling c ondition under the L ist of I mpairments. Indeed, in a dopting a holisti c per spective on the e vid e nc e and

summa ri zingthe re c or d, the AL J note d th at G on zal e z’s a ilm e nts , “ sin g ly or in combination” we re not “ ‘seve re’ enough to meet . . . any of the impairments” listed under the L ist of I mpairments. The AL J , there fore , proper ly proce eded to a ssess Gonzalez’s residual 3At various points, plaintiff complains that the AL J failed to a dequate ly develop 4 Gonzalez’s medical re cord in support of his disability claim. Howeve r, it is, in the first instance, the claimant’ s burden to provide adequate medica l evidence . Moreove r, plaintiff he re ha s failed t o i d e n t i f y w h atr e c o r d s ar e m i s s i n gan d h o wth e y w o u l d

a f f e c tG o n z a l e z ’ s c a s e . A c c o r d i n g l y, we do not find a

ny infirmity in the AL J ’s deve lopment of the re cord. Rule 201.18 of the Medic al-Voc ational Guidelines dire cts a findingof “not disabled” 5 for 45- 49 y ear

old individuals wit h limit ed educ ation and low skills or no work experienc e who can do se dentar

y work. 8 functional c apac ity , ultimately concludingthat Gonzalez was able to ha ndle sede ntary

work. 4 The last step in the disability analy sis – and wher e the bur den par tially shifts – require s the Commis sio ne r t o d e mon str ate that th e re we re job s ava ila ble to G on zal e z, whic h h e c ou ld have ha ndled in light of his re sidual capa city . Thoug h it was deter mined that Gonzalez could no longe r work in his pre vious occupations as a fa bric c utter or mec hanic, the A L J conclude d that “[b] ased on a

residual f unctional ca

pacity for a full rang e of se dentar

y work, Rules 201.18 and 20 1. 21 [of

the Me dic a l- Vo c atio na l Guid e lin e s], u se d a s a fr ame wo rk

fo r d e c isi onmakin g , w ou ld direc t a findingof ‘not disabled.’ ” Where, a s here , the AL J ’s finding s alig n with Rule 201.18, 5 she ca n rely on the rule to dire ct a f

inding that the c laimant is not disabled. See H eck ler v. Cam pb e ll , 4 61 U. S. 4 58 , 4 61 , 4 62 (1 98 3) ; Ferraris v. He ckle r , 728 F.2d 582, 585 ( 2d Cir. 1984). Ba sed on the availability

of sede ntary

jobs appropriate to Gonzalez’s residual ca pacity , we f

ind that there is sufficient evide nce to support the A L J ’s conc lusion that Gonz alez was not disabled befor e Mar ch 31, 1996. Ac cording ly , we have no occ asion to set aside the district c ourt’s orde r aff irming the Commi ssioner’s c onclusion. F ina lly , w e a lso no te that G on zal e z’s 19 98 a pp lic atio n f

or Sup ple me nta l Se c ur ity

Inc ome (“ SSI ” ) w a s n ot p ro pe rl y

be fo re the dis tr ic t c ourt

(whic h th e c ourt

du ly no te d) be c a

us e Go nza le z’s de ath o n F e br ua ry 10 , 1 99 9 e xtinguis he d th e c la im b e fo re the Commis sio ne r c ou ldEven if a ny benef it underpay

ment could be e stablished, only a survivingspouse ca

n, 6 under c erta in circumstanc es, qualify to rec eive the be nefit. See42 U.S.C. § 1383(b)(1)( A); 20 C.F.R. § 416.542(b). Gonzalez, howeve r, neve r marr ied. 9 issue a re viewable final dete rmination. See42 U. S.C. § 1 38 3( c )( 3) ; se eals o W e inb e rge r v . S

alf i , 422 U.S. 749, 757-58 (1975) ( stating that 42 U.S.C. § 405(h) includes an e x haustion provision, which “pr event[s] revie w of de cisions of the [Com missioner] s ave a s provided in the [Social Security] Act, which provision is made in § 405(g )”) . In order for Gonzalez to have obta ined a revie wable de cision, he would have been r equire d to procure an initial determination, a
re c on sid e ratio n o f t

hat de te rm inatio n, a

he ari ngde c isi on

by an A L J, an d a

n App e a ls C ounc il revie w. See20 C.F.R. pt. 416, subpt. N. But her e, Gonzalez’s 1998 SSIclaim did not even
rec eive a n initial determination, and wa s theref ore not the subjec t of a re view by an AL J or the Appea ls Council. Theref ore, the re is no fina l decision of the Commissioner subject to revie w under 42 U .S.C. §§ 405(g) and 1383(c )(3)
. 6 We h ave c on sid e re d p la int if f’ s r e ma ini ngargume nts and fi nd the m to be wi tho ut m e ri t. F or the fo re g oin gre a so ns , th e or de r o f t he dis tr ic t c ourt

is AF F IRM ED
. FOR THE COURT: CA TH ERI

NE O’ HA GA

N WO L F E, CL ERK By :_________________________________