Opinion filed March 31, 2021

In The

Eleventh Court of Appeals __________

No. 11-20-00226-CV

__________

IN THE INTEREST OF S.N.D. AND L.E.D., CHILDREN

On Appeal from the 446th District Court

Ector County, Texas

Trial Court Cause No. E-19-084-PC

M E M O R A N D U M O P I N I O N

This is an appeal from orders in which the trial court terminated the parental 

rights of the mother of S.N.D. and L.E.D.1

 The mother filed an appeal. On appeal, 

she presents four issues in which she challenges the legal and factual sufficiency of 

the evidence to support the trial court’s findings. We affirm the trial court’s orders

of termination. 

1

We note that the father of S.N.D. voluntarily relinquished his parental rights and that the father of 

L.E.D. was appointed as L.E.D.’s permanent managing conservator. Neither father filed a notice of appeal. 
2

Termination Findings and Standards

The termination of parental rights must be supported by clear and convincing 

evidence. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 161.001(b) (West Supp. 2020). To terminate 

parental rights, it must be shown by clear and convincing evidence that the parent 

has committed one of the acts listed in Section 161.001(b)(1)(A)–(U) and that 

termination is in the best interest of the child. Id. 

In this case, the trial court found that Appellant had committed three of the 

acts listed in Section 161.001(b)(1)—those found in subsections (D), (E), and (O). 

Specifically, the trial court found that Appellant had knowingly placed or knowingly 

allowed the children to remain in conditions or surroundings that endangered the 

children’s physical or emotional well-being, that Appellant had engaged in conduct 

or knowingly placed the children with persons who engaged in conduct that 

endangered the children’s physical or emotional well-being, and that Appellant had 

failed to comply with the provisions of a court order that specifically established the 

actions necessary for her to obtain the return of the children, who had been in the 

managing conservatorship of the Department of Family and Protective Services for 

not less than nine months as a result of the children’s removal from the parents for 

abuse or neglect. The trial court also found, pursuant to Section 161.001(b)(2), that 

termination of Appellant’s parental rights would be in the best interest of each child.

To determine if the evidence is legally sufficient in a parental termination case, 

we review all of the evidence in the light most favorable to the finding and determine 

whether a rational trier of fact could have formed a firm belief or conviction that its 

finding was true. In re J.P.B., 180 S.W.3d 570, 573 (Tex. 2005). To determine if the 

evidence is factually sufficient, we give due deference to the finding and determine 

whether, on the entire record, a factfinder could reasonably form a firm belief or 

conviction about the truth of the allegations against the parent. In re C.H., 89 S.W.3d 

17, 25–26 (Tex. 2002). We note that the trial court is the sole arbiter of the credibility 
3

and demeanor of witnesses. In re A.B., 437 S.W.3d 498, 503 (Tex. 2014) (citing In 

re J.L., 163 S.W.3d 79, 86–87 (Tex. 2005)). 

With respect to the best interest of a child, no unique set of factors need be 

proved. In re C.J.O., 325 S.W.3d 261, 266 (Tex. App.—Eastland 2010, pet. denied). 

But courts may use the non-exhaustive Holley factors to shape their analysis. 

Holley v. Adams, 544 S.W.2d 367, 371–72 (Tex. 1976). These include, but are not 

limited to, (1) the desires of the child, (2) the emotional and physical needs of the 

child now and in the future, (3) the emotional and physical danger to the child now 

and in the future, (4) the parental abilities of the individuals seeking custody, (5) the 

programs available to assist these individuals to promote the best interest of the 

child, (6) the plans for the child by these individuals or by the agency seeking 

custody, (7) the stability of the home or proposed placement, (8) the acts or 

omissions of the parent that may indicate that the existing parent–child relationship 

is not a proper one, and (9) any excuse for the acts or omissions of the parent. Id. 

Additionally, evidence that proves one or more statutory grounds for termination 

may also constitute evidence illustrating that termination is in the child’s best 

interest. C.J.O., 325 S.W.3d at 266. 

Evidence Presented at Trial

The record shows that the Department became involved with Appellant

shortly after she gave birth to L.E.D. According to the intake allegations, both 

Appellant and L.E.D. tested positive for methamphetamine at the time of L.E.D.’s 

birth. Appellant again tested positive for methamphetamine about three weeks later. 

The mother’s urine test results indicated a methamphetamine level of 145,266 ng/ml, 

and her hair follicle test results indicated a methamphetamine level of 17,059 pg/mg.

During the initial investigation in the intake allegations, the Department 

located Appellant’s other child, S.N.D., at the home of that child’s paternal 

grandparents. S.N.D. was eight years old and had lived with her paternal 
4

grandparents since she was a few months old. Although Appellant was still married 

to S.N.D.’s father and Appellant and S.N.D.’s father moved in and out of the paternal 

grandparents’ home on a regular basis, S.N.D.’s father was not L.E.D.’s father. Both 

children were removed. S.N.D. was placed with her paternal grandparents, and 

L.E.D. was initially placed with maternal relatives but was ultimately placed with 

his biological father after DNA testing confirmed paternity.

After the children were removed, Appellant and the Department participated 

in the creation of a family service plan. The trial court made the family service plan 

an order of the court. Appellant, however, did not comply with the provisions of her 

service plan. She failed to submit to drug testing as required, and she tested positive 

for methamphetamine and amphetamines. After her release from jail, Appellant 

tested positive for methamphetamine and amphetamines on both a urine and a hair 

follicle test. The methamphetamine levels in these tests were 8,651 ng/ml and 

24,760 pg/mg, respectively. In addition to her drug-related issues, Appellant failed 

to complete counseling, failed to keep the Department apprised of her address and 

the people with whom she lived, failed to complete a parenting class, and failed to 

visit the children on a regular basis after she was released from jail.

The Department’s plans for S.N.D. were for her to be adopted by her paternal 

grandparents, who were both actively pursuing an adoption license. The 

Department’s plans for L.E.D. were to transfer permanent managing conservatorship

to L.E.D.’s father. The Department’s conservatorship caseworker testified that she

believed it would be in S.N.D.’s and L.E.D.’s best interest for Appellant’s parental 

rights to be terminated.

Analysis

In her first, second, and third issues, Appellant challenges the legal and factual 

sufficiency of the evidence to prove grounds (D), (E), and (O). We need only address 

her challenge to the trial court’s finding under Section 161.001(b)(1)(E). See In re 
5

N.G., 577 S.W.3d 230, 234–35 (Tex. 2019) (addressing due process and due course 

of law with respect to appellate review of grounds (D) and (E) and holding that an 

appellate court must provide a detailed analysis if affirming the termination on either 

of these grounds). 

Under subsection (E), the relevant inquiry is whether evidence exists that the 

endangerment of the child’s well-being was the direct result of the parent’s conduct, 

including acts, omissions, or failures to act. In re D.O., 338 S.W.3d 29, 34 (Tex. 

App.—Eastland 2011, no pet.). Additionally, termination under subsection (E) must 

be based on more than a single act or omission; a voluntary, deliberate, and conscious 

course of conduct by the parent is required. In re D.T., 34 S.W.3d 625, 634 (Tex. 

App.—Fort Worth 2000, pet. denied); In re K.M.M., 993 S.W.2d 225, 228 (Tex. 

App.—Eastland 1999, no pet.). The offending conduct does not need to be directed 

at the child, nor does the child actually have to suffer an injury. In re J.O.A., 283 

S.W.3d 336, 345 (Tex. 2009). Drug use may constitute evidence of endangerment. 

Id. “A mother’s use of drugs during pregnancy may amount to conduct that 

endangers the physical and emotional well-being of the child.” In re J.T.G., 121 

S.W.3d 117, 125 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2003, no pet.). A parent’s drug addiction 

and its effect on the parent’s life and ability to parent a child may establish an 

endangering course of conduct. Id. at 125–26 (citing Dupree v. Tex. Dep’t of 

Protective & Regulatory Servs., 907 S.W.2d 81, 84 (Tex. App.—Dallas 1995, no 

writ)). 

Based upon evidence of Appellant’s use of methamphetamine while she was 

pregnant with L.E.D. and Appellant’s continued use of methamphetamine thereafter,

the trial court could have found by clear and convincing evidence that Appellant had 

engaged in a course of conduct that endangered her children. We hold that the 

evidence is legally and factually sufficient to uphold the trial court’s finding as to 

Appellant under subsection (E). Accordingly, we overrule Appellant’s second issue. 
6

Because only one statutory ground is necessary to support termination and because 

we have upheld the trial court’s finding as to subsection (E), we need not reach

Appellant’s first and third issues. See FAM. § 161.001(b)(1); N.G., 577 S.W.3d at 

234–35; see also TEX. R. APP. P. 47.1.

In her fourth issue, Appellant challenges the legal and factual sufficiency of 

the evidence to support the trial court’s findings that termination of her parental 

rights would be in the best interest of S.N.D. and L.E.D. 

With respect to the children’s best interest, the evidence, as set forth above, 

shows that Appellant used methamphetamine while pregnant with L.E.D. and 

continued to use methamphetamine after her children were removed from her care. 

S.N.D. had lived with her paternal grandparents almost her entire life—while 

Appellant and S.N.D.’s father moved in and out of her life. Appellant failed to 

complete the services that were required for the children to be returned to her, and 

she failed to obtain and maintain a stable environment for her children. Instead, as 

succinctly stated by the conservatorship worker, Appellant “has continued to choose 

drugs over [S.N.D.] and [L.E.D.], and she minimizes the reasons for removal. She 

has had visitations with them, and the visits haven’t been going very well.”

We hold that, based on the evidence presented at trial and the Holley factors, 

the trial court could reasonably have formed a firm belief or conviction that 

termination of Appellant’s parental rights would be in S.N.D.’s and L.E.D.’s best 

interest. See Holley, 544 S.W.2d at 371–72. Upon considering the record as it relates 

to the desires of the children, the emotional and physical needs of the children now 

and in the future, the emotional and physical danger to the children now and in the 

future, the parental abilities of those involved, the plans for the children by the 

Department, Appellant’s continued use of methamphetamine, and the instability of 

Appellant’s situation, we hold that the evidence is legally and factually sufficient to 

support the finding that termination of Appellant’s parental rights is in the best 
7

interest of S.N.D. and the finding that termination of Appellant’s parental rights is in 

the best interest of L.E.D. See id. We defer to the trial court’s findings as to the 

children’s best interest, see C.H., 89 S.W.3d at 27, and we cannot hold in this case 

that the findings as to best interest are not supported by clear and convincing 

evidence. We overrule Appellant’s fourth issue. 

This Court’s Ruling

We affirm the orders of the trial court. 

JOHN M. BAILEY

CHIEF JUSTICE

March 31, 2021

Panel consists of: Bailey, C.J.,

Trotter, J., and Williams, J.