Filed: June 24, 1998

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 97-4316

(CR-95-84-4)

United States of America,

Plaintiff - Appellee,

versus

Laura B. Anderson,

Defendant - Appellant.

ORDER

The court amends its opinion filed February 23, 1998, as

follows:

On page 2, first full paragraph, line 7 -- the word “between”

is corrected to read “before.”

On page 3, first paragraph, line 5, and first full paragraph,

line 2 -- the word “parole” is corrected to read “probation.”

For the Court - By Direction

/s/ Patricia S. Connor

Clerk
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UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

v. No. 97-4316

LAURA B. ANDERSON,

Defendant-Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Western District of North Carolina, at Shelby.

Lacy H. Thornburg, District Judge.

(CR-95-84-4)

Submitted: December 23, 1997

Decided: February 23, 1998

Before WILKINS, LUTTIG, and MOTZ, Circuit Judges.

_________________________________________________________________

Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

_________________________________________________________________

COUNSEL

Robert C. Ervin, BYRD, BYRD, ERVIN, WHISNANT, MCMAHON

& ERVIN, P.A., Morganton, North Carolina, for Appellant. Mark T.

Calloway, United States Attorney, Brian L. Whisler, Assistant United

States Attorney, Charlotte, North Carolina, for Appellee.

_________________________________________________________________

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit. See

Local Rule 36(c).
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OPINION

PER CURIAM:

Laura B. Anderson challenges her sentence to a twenty-four month

term of imprisonment, which exceeded the Sentencing Guidelines

range of four to ten months arising from the original offense. Anderson's sole issue on appeal is whether the sentence imposed after committing probation violations exceeded the maximum sentence

permitted under the applicable law. A change in the law occurred

before the time of Anderson's initial sentence and resentencing after

probation violations.

The controlling statute at issue, 18 U.S.C.A. § 3565 (West Supp.

1997), states:

(a) If the defendant violates a condition of probation at any

time prior to the expiration or termination of the term of

probation, the court may, after a hearing pursuant to

Rule 32.1 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, and

after considering the factors set forth in section 3553(a) to

the extent they are applicable--

(1) continue him on probation, with or without

extending the term or modifying or enlarging the

conditions; or

(2) revoke the sentence of probation and resentence the defendant under subchapter A.

The current language of subsection (a)(2) was the result of a legislative amendment effective September 13, 1994, in which Congress

altered the language from the original text. The prior version provided

that the district court could: "(2) revoke the sentence of probation and

impose any other sentence that was available under subchapter A at

the time of the initial sentencing."

For probation violations occurring prior to this Amendment in September 1994, this Circuit's law is clear: "[w]hen probation given

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under a guideline sentence is revoked [in pre-Amendment cases], the

court is limited at resentencing to a sentence that was available at the

time of the original sentence." See United States v. Alli, 929 F.2d 995,

997 (4th Cir. 1991). However, since the amendment, the district

court's options at sentencing after probation revocation have been

expanded.

Since the passage of the 1994 Amendment, this Court has

addressed the application of the amendment to probation revocation

cases. We have held that the "amended provision plainly permits a

district court to begin the sentencing process anew and to impose any

sentence appropriate under the provisions of subchapter A, i.e., one

that satisfies statutory and guideline requirements." United States v.

Schaefer, 120 F.3d 505, 507 (4th Cir. 1997). Anderson challenges her

sentence only on the basis that the twenty-four month sentence is

invalid under existing law. However, the sentence is within the statutory maximum, see 18 U.S.C.A. § 1029(a)(2), (c) (West Supp. 1997),

and the guidelines range on probation revocation is merely advisory.

See United States v. Davis, 53 F.3d 638, 640-42 (4th Cir. 1995). We

therefore affirm the sentence.

We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before the court and

argument would not aid the decisional process.

AFFIRMED

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