SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY

APPELLATE DIVISION

DOCKET NO. A-1912-19

STATE OF NEW JERSEY,

Plaintiff-Respondent,

v.

ANTOINE A. PARSLEY, a/k/a

ANTWIONE A. PARSLEY 

Defendant-Appellant.

__________________________

Submitted January 27, 2021 – Decided February 11, 2021

Before Judges Alvarez and Geiger.

On appeal from the Superior Court of New Jersey, Law 

Division, Salem County, Indictment No. 11-04-0229.

Antoine A. Parsley, appellant pro se.

John T. Lenahan, Salem County Prosecutor, attorney 

for respondent (David Galemba, Assistant Prosecutor, 

of counsel and on the brief).

PER CURIAM

NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE

APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION

This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court." Although it is posted on the 

internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R. 1:36-3.
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Defendant Antoine A. Parsley appeals from a December 20, 2019 order 

dismissing his second petition for post-conviction relief (PCR) as time-barred

pursuant to Rule 3:22-4(b). We affirm for the reasons stated by Judge Sandra 

Lopez in her well-reasoned written decision. 

Defendant was convicted of fourth-degree aggravated assault (count four), 

N.J.S.A. 2C:12-1(b)(4); second-degree possession of a firearm for an unlawful 

purpose (count five), N.J.S.A. 2C:39-4(a); second-degree unlawful possession 

of a handgun (count six), N.J.S.A. 2C:39-5(b); and second-degree possession 

of a weapon by a certain person (count seven), N.J.S.A. 2C:39-7(b)(1). The 

jury was unable to reach a verdict on three other counts; those charges were 

subsequently dismissed. 

On March 20, 2012, defendant was sentenced to an aggregate nine-year

term subject to the No Early Release Act (NERA), N.J.S.A. 2C:43-7.2. We 

affirmed defendant's conviction on direct appeal but remanded for merger of 

counts four and five. State v. Parsley, No. A-2001-12 (App. Div. April 6, 2015).

On May 15, 2015, defendant was resentenced to add the mandatory parole 

supervision under NERA and to merge counts four and five. On December 15, 

2015, we affirmed the modified sentence on an oral argument sentencing 
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calendar pursuant to Rule 2:9-11. The Supreme Court denied certification. State 

v. Parsley, 224 N.J. 247 (2016). 

We recounted the underlying facts in our prior opinion: 

Defendant had accused the victim of having provided 

the authorities with information regarding his illegal 

activities. Defendant ended the argument by throwing a 

bicycle and a stroller at the victim, and telling him he 

was "about to clear the street." The victim heard 

defendant make a phone call during which he told 

someone to "bring Roscoe," which he understood to be 

a reference to defendant’s handgun. Later on, the 

victim saw defendant’s car, was told to "watch out,"

and saw defendant standing behind a school bus 

between two houses and pointing a gun in his direction. 

The victim and another person fled the area when they 

heard gunshots.

When the incident occurred, the Salem County 

Prosecutor’s Office had coincidentally been 

intercepting defendant’s cell phone communications 

pursuant to a warrant, related to an ongoing narcotics 

investigation as well as an investigation related to 

another shooting. Approximately half an hour after the 

shooting, the victim called defendant. Defendant was 

recorded making reference to the fact that the person 

defendant had been shooting at was not the victim, but 

someone else. Some of the intercepted conversations 

were played to the jury. All had been obtained pursuant 

to an electronic wiretap warrant. 

[State v. Parsley, No. A-3659-17 (App. Div. May 8, 

2019) (slip op. at 2-3).] 
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Defendant filed his first PCR petition on March 14, 2016. Counsel was 

appointed to represent him. On June 13, 2017, the PCR court issued an order 

and accompanying comprehensive written decision denying the petition without 

an evidentiary hearing. We affirmed substantially for the reasons expressed by 

the PCR judge. Id. at 2. The Supreme Court denied certification. State v. 

Parsley, 240 N.J. 91 (2019). 

On November 15, 2019, defendant filed a pro se second PCR petition. In 

it he claimed that first PCR counsel was ineffective by failing to investigate trial 

counsel's failure to investigate and call three potential fact witnesses. He 

contended that an investigator should have been used to interview the potential 

witnesses, but PCR counsel failed to apply to the Public Defender for ancillary 

services. Defendant claimed that the witnesses, Jamaal Shockley, Dondi 

Cabbell, and George Booker, would have provided statements attesting that 

defendant was not in the area at the time of the alleged crime. 

In his petition, defendant states that he requested trial counsel to interview 

the witnesses but counsel, who was privately retained, advised that he required 

an additional $7500 immediately to do so. Defendant does not contend that sum 

was paid. Counsel continued to represent defendant through trial but did not 
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retain a private investigator or personally investigate, interview, or call any of 

the potential witnesses. 

Defendant further asserts that he advised first PCR counsel of trial 

counsel's failure to investigate his witnesses. Defendant provided PCR counsel 

with a copy of Shockley's certification and asked counsel to interview Cabbell 

and Booker. Shockley's certification stated he was never contacted by trial 

counsel. It also stated he was willing to testify in court to the following facts:

On August 28, 2010 I was sitting on my kids' mother's 

porch . . . with her, our kids, Leslie Bundy and others 

around [9 p.m.] until [2 a.m.]. A few hours later like 

[12 a.m.] or [1 a.m.] a dark skin tall guy with a black 

hat on dressed in all black was on the side of the house 

further down the street by a yellow school bus shooting 

a gun in the air. [Antione] was never on Sinnickson 

Street this night and was not the person shooting.

Defendant submitted a certification by Booker that stated he was willing 

to testify in court to the following facts:

I was on Sinnickson Street around [10 p.m.] till 

[2 a.m.] in front of Jovan Roots' house on August 28, 

2010. Jovan Roots, her daughter, Jamaal Shockley, 

Leslie Bundy, me and a few people [were] hanging out 

in front of Jovan's talking. Sometime around [1 a.m.] I 

[saw] a [six-foot] tall black male with all black on, with 

a black hat come from a side of a[] house by the corner 

of Sinnickson Street on the same side where we [were]

standing firing a gun in the air by a yellow school bus. 

Leslie Bundy and I ran[] up Sinnickson Street to Olive 

Street and went our separate way. I['ve] known 
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[Antione] Parsley since he was a kid and he was not the 

shooter in this incident. [Antione] Parsley wasn't on 

Sinnickson Street at all during this day and time.

Defendant stated he advised PCR counsel that had trial counsel 

interviewed Cabbell, he was prepared to testify that there was no altercation 

between Cabbell and defendant that night and that Cabbell was not on 

Sinnickson Street that night. 

Defendant argued that PCR counsel was ineffective by failing to 

independently investigate, review and raise his claims. He further alleged that 

he had not received a copy of PCR counsel's or the State's briefs prior to the 

hearing and thus had no prior knowledge of the evidence or arguments that PCR 

counsel would be presenting. Defendant also alleged that he was informed by 

attorney Suzannah Brown that he could raise the issue of ineffective PCR 

counsel in a second PCR petition if he were not successful on his first petition. 

Defendant took that "to mean that he would need to file a second PCR only if 

and when he lost his PCR appeal." Defendant stated he was unaware there was 

a one-year time limitation to file a second PCR petition and the delayed filing 

was due to excusable neglect. He argued that enforcement of the time-bar would 

result in a fundamental injustice. 
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Judge Lopez found that defendant's petition was time-barred because: (1)

it was not based on a new rule of constitutional law, R. 3:22-12(a)(2)(A); (2) 

"defendant knew PCR counsel failed to conduct an independent review of his 

claims over one year before filing his second PCR petition," R. 3:22-

12(a)(2)(B); and (3) "defendant's second petition was not filed within one year 

of the date of the denial of his first PCR on June 13, 2017," R. 3:22-12(a)(2)(C). 

As to defendant's claim of excusable neglect, Judge Lopez explained that 

Rule 1:3-4 precluded enlarging the time limitations specified in Rule 3:22-12

and "are not subject to relaxation" under Rule 1:1-2. In addition, Rule 3:22-

12(b) provides that the time limits imposed by the rule "shall not be relaxed, 

except as provided herein." A second PCR petition must be dismissed pursuant 

to Rule 3:22-4(b) unless "it is timely under [Rule] 3:22-12(a)(2)" and "it alleges 

on its face" one of the three grounds enumerated in Rule 3:22-4(b)(2). Relying 

on State v. Jackson, 454 N.J. Super. 284 (App. Div. 2018), the judge held that 

"neither excusable neglect nor fundamental injustice permits enlargement of 

time for filing a second or subsequent PCR petition." This appeal followed. 

In this appeal, defendant raises a single point:

THIS MATTER SHOULD BE REMANDED AS THE 

PCR COURT'S HOLDING THAT "EXCUSABLE 

NEGLECT NOR FUNDAMENTAL INJUSTICE 

PERMITS ENLARGEMENT OF TIME FOR FILING 
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A SECOND OR SUBSEQUENT PCR PETITION" 

CONTRAVENES CLEARLY ESTABLISHED LAW.

We agree with Judge Lopez that defendant's second PCR petition was 

time-barred pursuant to Rule 3:22-4(b). The record fully supports her findings 

that: (1) defendant did not file his petition within one year after the date of the 

denial of his first PCR petition; (2) "defendant knew PCR counsel failed to 

conduct an independent review of his claims over one year before filing his 

second PCR petition"; and (3) the petition was not based on a new rule of 

constitutional law. See R. 3:22-12(a)(2). Accordingly, the one-year filing 

deadline imposed by Rule 3:22-12(a)(2) could not be extended by a showing of 

excusable neglect or that enforcement of the time-bar would result in 

fundamental injustice. See Jackson, 454 N.J. Super. at 293-94. For these 

reasons, the petition was properly dismissed without conducting an evidentiary 

hearing. 

Defendant's argument lacks sufficient merit to warrant further discussion 

in a written opinion. R. 2:11-3(e)(2). 

Affirmed. 
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