Federal Register / Vol. 63, No. 10 / Thursday, January 15, 1998 / Notices 2423

www.nrc.gov) under the FedWorld

collection link on the home page tool

bar. The document will be available on

the NRC home page site for 60 days after

the signature date of this notice.

Comments and questions about the

information collection requirements

may be directed to the NRC Clearance

Officer, Brenda Jo. Shelton, U.S. Nuclear

Regulatory Commission, T–6 F33,

Washington, DC, 20555–0001, or by

telephone at 301–415–7233, or by

Internet electronic mail at

BJS1@NRC.GOV.

Dated at Rockville, Maryland, this 8th day

of January, 1998.

For the Nuclear Regulatory Commission.

Brenda Jo. Shelton,

NRC Clearance Officer, Office of the Chief

Information Officer.

[FR Doc. 98–1048 Filed 1–14–98; 8:45 am]

BILLING CODE 7590–01–P

NUCLEAR REGULATORY

COMMISSION

[Docket No. 50–302]

Florida Power Corporation; Notice of

Consideration of Issuance of

Amendment to Facility Operating

License, Proposed No Significant

Hazards Consideration Determination,

and Opportunity for a Hearing

The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory

Commission (the Commission) is

considering issuance of an amendment

to Facility Operating License No. DPR

72, issued to the Florida Power

Corporation (FPC or the licensee), for

operation of the Crystal River Nuclear

Generating Unit 3 (CR3) located in

Citrus County, Florida.

The licensee proposed a revision to

the description of the starting logic for

the Reactor Building (RB) Recirculation

System Fan Coolers, as discussed in the

CR3 Final Safety Analysis Report

(FSAR), Chapters 5, 6, 7 and 9, and

Improved Technical Specification (ITS)

Bases Section 3.6. The change to the

starting logic would ensure that only

one RB Fan starts on an Engineered

Safeguards (ES) Reactor Building

Isolation and Cooling (RBIC) signal. A

modification to the plant will install

components that could increase the

probability of occurrence of a

malfunction of equipment important to

safety previously evaluated in the

FSAR. FPC has determined that

proposed changes to associated

electrical controls involve an

Unreviewed Safety Question (USQ).

Therefore, NRC review and approval are

required.

Before issuance of the proposed

license amendment, the Commission

will have made findings required by the

Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended

(the Act) and the Commission’s

regulations.

The Commission has made a

proposed determination that the

amendment request involves no

significant hazards consideration. Under

the Commission’s regulations in 10 CFR

50.92, this means that operation of the

facility in accordance with the proposed

amendment would not (1) involve a

significant increase in the probability or

consequences of an accident previously

evaluated; or (2) create the possibility of

a new or different kind of accident from

any accident previously evaluated; or

(3) involve a significant reduction in a

margin of safety. The licensee made its

request on December 5, 1997, and as

required by 10 CFR 50.91(a), and

provided its analysis of the issue of no

significant hazards consideration which

is presented below:

1. Does not involve a significant increase

in the probability or consequences of an

accident previously evaluated.

The change to the starting logic for the RB

Fans affects the ES equipment that responds

to mitigate an accident. The RB Fans are not

accident initiators and the change to the

starting logic cannot initiate an accident.

Therefore, the probability of occurrence of an

evaluated accident is not increased.

The RB Fan start logic change selects an

available RB Fan to run upon an RBIC

actuation, but only allows the operation of

one RB Fan to prevent overloading the SW

[Nuclear Services Closed Cycle Cooling]

System. The containment analysis for CR–3

assumes that one train of ES equipment is

available for accident mitigation, specifically,

one RB Fan and one RB Spray train for

containment cooling. The combination of two

RB Spray trains with no RB Fans is also

evaluated and found to be acceptable. These

available containment cooling equipment

combinations represent the minimum that

would be available for accident response

both before and after the implementation of

this change.

In addition to the same equipment being

available to mitigate an accident, there is no

change to the analyzed containment

response. The time delay in the start of an

RB Fan of up to several seconds due to the

modification has been evaluated through

containment analysis sensitivity studies. The

results of these studies show that

containment peak pressure and temperature,

and long term temperature profiles, are not

affected. The consequences of an accident are

directly related to containment pressure and

temperature conditions. Since containment

conditions following an accident are not

affected by this modification, there will be no

change to the consequences of any analyzed

accident.

2. Does not create the possibility of a new

or different kind of accident from any

accident previously evaluated.

The modification changes the RB Fan start

logic in the event of an accident. The new

start circuit ensures that one RB Fan is

operating in response to an RBIC actuation,

but prevents the operation of two fans. This

modification prevents the thermal

overloading of the SW System in order to

preserve the operability of equipment cooled

by the SW System. Several potential new

failure modes were evaluated and

determined not to create the possibility of a

new or different kind of accident.

Additionally, the RB Fans are engineered

safeguards equipment designed to mitigate an

accident, and the SW System is an accident

mitigation support system. These systems are

not accident initiators. The ES electrical

busses and the EDG [emergency diesel

generator] are not affected by this change. All

containment design conditions are met with

this change.

Therefore, this change cannot create the

possibility of an accident of a different kind

than previously evaluated in the SAR.

3. Does not involve a significant reduction

in the margin of safety.

Technical Specification 3.6.6 states that

two RB Spray trains and two RB containment

cooling trains must be operable. This

specification ensures diversity and

redundancy of the containment cooling

system. Following the modification, all

margins will be maintained. Two RB Fans

will be operable and capable of starting on

an RBIC signal. The modified circuitry

maintains the RB Fan redundancy. The RB

Sprays are not affected by this modification.

The margin of safety associated with the

containment maximum pressure and

temperature in response to a LOCA [loss-ofcoolant accident] is not affected since any

failure of this modification results in

equipment combinations that have been

analyzed and determined to be acceptable.

Containment LOCA response sensitivity

studies have verified that the small start

delay, associated with the modified RB Fan

start circuit, has no effect on the post-LOCA

peak temperature and pressure in

containment. Also, the failure of SW valves

that results in the loss of the ability of the

RB Fan Coolers to remove heat or the failure

of either RB Fan to run, will not affect the

containment peak temperature and pressure

conditions since two trains of RB Spray are

available.

The proposed modification allows only

one RB Fan to operate post-accident. This

ensures that the SW System is not overloaded

and SW temperatures remain within design

basis limits. Therefore, there is no reduction

in the margin of safety for the SW System

equipment cooling function after the

implementation of this change.

The small additional electrical loads, and

the out-of-sequence loading of an RB Fan

associated with this change have been

evaluated and determined to be within the

load limits of the EDG and ES electrical

busses. Therefore, there is no reduction in

the electrical system margin of safety.

Based on the above evaluation, there is no

reduction in the margin of safety associated

with the equipment and systems affected by

this change.
2424 Federal Register / Vol. 63, No. 10 / Thursday, January 15, 1998 / Notices

The NRC staff has reviewed the

licensee’s analysis and, based on this

review, it appears that the three

standards of 10 CFR 50.92(c) are

satisfied. Therefore, the NRC staff

proposes to determine that the

amendment request involves no

significant hazards consideration.

The Commission is seeking public

comments on this proposed

determination. Any comments received

within 30 days after the date of

publication of this notice will be

considered in making any final

determination.

Normally, the Commission will not

issue the amendment until the

expiration of the 30-day notice period.

However, should circumstances change

during the notice period, such that

failure to act in a timely way would

result, for example, in derating or

shutdown of the facility, the

Commission may issue the license

amendment before the expiration of the

30-day notice period, provided that its

final determination is that the

amendment involves no significant

hazards consideration. The final

determination will consider all public

and State comments received. Should

the Commission take this action, it will

publish in the Federal Register a notice

of issuance. The Commission expects

that the need to take this action will

occur very infrequently.

Written comments may be submitted

by mail to the Chief, Rules Review and

Directives Branch, Division of Freedom

of Information and Publications

Services, Office of Administration, U.S.

Nuclear Regulatory Commission,

Washington, DC 20555–0001, and

should cite the publication date and

page number of this Federal Register

notice. Written comments may also be

delivered to Room 6D22, Two White

Flint North, 11545 Rockville Pike,

Rockville, Maryland, from 7:30 a.m. to

4:15 p.m. Federal workdays. Copies of

written comments received may be

examined at the NRC Public Document

Room, the Gelman Building, 2120 L

Street, NW., Washington, DC.

The filing of requests for hearing and

petitions for leave to intervene is

discussed below.

By February 17, 1998, the licensee

may file a request for a hearing with

respect to issuance of the amendment to

the subject facility operating license and

any person whose interest may be

affected by this proceeding and who

wishes to participate as a party in the

proceeding must file a written request

for a hearing and a petition for leave to

intervene. Requests for a hearing and a

petition for leave to intervene shall be

filed in accordance with the

Commission’s ‘‘Rules of Practice for

Domestic Licensing Proceedings’’ in 10

CFR part 2. Interested persons should

consult a current copy of 10 CFR 2.714

which is available at the Commission’s

Public Document Room, the Gelman

Building, 2120 L Street, NW.,

Washington, DC, and at the local public

document room located at the Coastal

Region Library, 8619 W. Crystal Street,

Crystal River, Florida.

If a request for a hearing or petition

for leave to intervene is filed by the

above date, the Commission or an

Atomic Safety and Licensing Board,

designated by the Commission or by the

Chairman of the Atomic Safety and

Licensing Board Panel, will rule on the

request and/or petition; and the

Secretary or the designated Atomic

Safety and Licensing Board will issue a

notice of hearing or an appropriate

order.

As required by 10 CFR 2.714, a

petition for leave to intervene shall set

forth with particularity the interest of

the petitioner in the proceeding, and

how that interest may be affected by the

results of the proceeding. The petition

should specifically explain the reasons

why intervention should be permitted

with particular reference to the

following factors: (1) The nature of the

petitioner’s right under the Act to be

made a party to the proceeding; (2) the

nature and extent of the petitioner’s

property, financial, or other interest in

the proceeding; and (3) the possible

effect of any order which may be

entered in the proceeding on the

petitioner’s interest. The petition should

also identify the specific aspect(s) of the

subject matter of the proceeding as to

which petitioner wishes to intervene.

Any person who has filed a petition for

leave to intervene or who has been

admitted as a party may amend the

petition without requesting leave of the

Board up to 15 days prior to the first

prehearing conference scheduled in the

proceeding, but such an amended

petition must satisfy the specificity

requirements described above. Not later

than 15 days prior to the first prehearing

conference scheduled in the proceeding,

a petitioner shall file a supplement to

the petition to intervene which must

include a list of the contentions which

are sought to be litigated in the matter.

Each contention must consist of a

specific statement of the issue of law or

fact to be raised or controverted. In

addition, the petitioner shall provide a

brief explanation of the bases of the

contention and a concise statement of

the alleged facts or expert opinion

which support the contention and on

which the petitioner intends to rely in

proving the contention at the hearing.

The petitioner must also provide

references to those specific sources and

documents of which the petitioner is

aware and on which the petitioner

intends to rely to establish those facts or

expert opinion. Petitioner must provide

sufficient information to show that a

genuine dispute exists with the

applicant on a material issue of law or

fact. Contentions shall be limited to

matters within the scope of the

amendment under consideration. The

contention must be one which, if

proven, would entitle the petitioner to

relief. A petitioner who fails to file such

a supplement which satisfies these

requirements with respect to at least one

contention will not be permitted to

participate as a party.

Those permitted to intervene become

parties to the proceeding, subject to any

limitations in the order granting leave to

intervene, and have the opportunity to

participate fully in the conduct of the

hearing, including the opportunity to

present evidence and cross-examine

witnesses.

If a hearing is requested, the

Commission will make a final

determination on the issue of no

significant hazards consideration. The

final determination will serve to decide

when the hearing is held.

If the final determination is that the

amendment request involves no

significant hazards consideration, the

Commission may issue the amendment

and make it immediately effective,

notwithstanding the request for a

hearing. Any hearing held would take

place after issuance of the amendment.

If the final determination is that the

amendment request involves a

significant hazards consideration, any

hearing held would take place before

the issuance of any amendment.

A request for a hearing or a petition

for leave to intervene must be filed with

the Secretary of the Commission, U.S.

Nuclear Regulatory Commission,

Washington, DC 20555–0001, Attention:

Rulemakings and Adjudications Staff

may be delivered to the Commission’s

Public Document Room, the Gelman

Building, 2120 L Street, NW.,

Washington, DC, by the above date. A

copy of the petition should also be sent

to the Office of the General Counsel,

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission,

Washington, DC 20555–0001, and to R.

Alexander Glenn, General Counsel,

Florida Power Corporation, MAC—A5A,

P.O. Box 14042, St. Petersburg, Florida

33733–4042, attorney for the licensee.

Nontimely filings of petitions for

leave to intervene, amended petitions,

supplemental petitions and/or requests

for hearing will not be entertained

absent a determination by the
Federal Register / Vol. 63, No. 10 / Thursday, January 15, 1998 / Notices 2425

Commission, the presiding officer or the

presiding Atomic Safety and Licensing

Board that the petition and/or request

should be granted based upon a

balancing of the factors specified in 10

CFR 2.714(a)(1)(i)–(v) and 2.714(d).

For further details with respect to this

action, see the application for

amendment dated December 5, 1997,

which is available for public inspection

at the Commission’s Public Document

Room, the Gelman Building, 2120 L

Street, NW., Washington, DC, and at the

local public document room, located at

the Coastal Region Library, 8619 W.

Crystal Street, Crystal River, Florida.

Dated at Rockville, Maryland, this 9th day

of January 1998.

For the Nuclear Regulatory Commission.

L. Raghavan,

Senior Project Manager, Project Directorate

II–3, Division of Reactor Projects—I/II, Office

of Nuclear Reactor Regulation.

[FR Doc. 98–1046 Filed 1–14–98; 8:45 am]

BILLING CODE 7590–01–P

NUCLEAR REGULATORY

COMMISSION

[Docket No. 50–271]

Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power

Corporation; Vermont Yankee Nuclear

Power Station; Environmental

Assessment and Finding of No

Significant Impact

The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory

Commission (the Commission) is

considering issuance of an exemption

from certain requirements of its

regulations for Facility Operating

License No. DPR–28, issued to Vermont

Yankee Nuclear Power Corporation (the

licensee), for operation of Vermont

Yankee Nuclear Power Station located

in Windham County, Vermont.

Environmental Assessment

Identification of the Proposed Action

The proposed action would exempt

the licensee from the requirements of 10

CFR 70.24, which requires in each area

in which special nuclear material is

handled, used, or stored a monitoring

system that will energize clear audible

alarms if accidental criticality occurs.

The proposed action would also exempt

the licensee from the requirements to

maintain emergency procedures for each

area in which this licensed special

nuclear material is handled, used, or

stored to ensure that all personnel

withdraw to an area of safety upon the

sounding of the alarm, to familiarize

personnel with the evacuation plan, and

to designate responsible individuals for

determining the cause of the alarm, and

to place radiation survey instruments in

accessible locations for use in such an

emergency.

The proposed action is in accordance

with the licensee’s application for

exemption dated December 16, 1997.

The Need for the Proposed Action

The purpose of 10 CFR 70.24 is to

ensure that if a criticality were to occur

during the handling of special nuclear

material, personnel would be alerted to

that fact and would take appropriate

action. At a commercial nuclear power

plant the inadvertent criticality with

which 10 CFR 70.24 is concerned could

occur during fuel handling operations.

The special nuclear material that could

be assembled into a critical mass at a

commercial nuclear power plant is in

the form of nuclear fuel; the quantity of

other forms of special nuclear material

that is stored on site in any given

location is small enough to preclude

achieving a critical mass. Because the

fuel is not enriched beyond 5.0 weight

percent Uranium-235 and because

commercial nuclear plant licensees have

procedures and design features that

prevent inadvertent criticality, the staff

has determined that it is unlikely that

an inadvertent criticality could occur

due to the handling of special nuclear

material at a commercial power reactor.

The requirements of 10 CFR 70.24,

therefore, are not necessary to ensure

the safety of personnel during the

handling of special nuclear material at

commercial power reactors.

Environmental Impacts of the Proposed

Action

The Commission has completed its

evaluation of the proposed action and

concludes that there is no significant

environmental impact if the exemption

is granted. Inadvertent or accidental

criticality will be precluded through

compliance with the Vermont Yankee

Technical Specifications, the design of

the fuel storage racks providing

geometric spacing of fuel assemblies in

their storage locations, and

administrative controls imposed on fuel

handling procedures. Technical

Specifications requirements specify

reactivity limits for the fuel storage

racks and minimum spacing between

the fuel assemblies in the storage racks.

Appendix A of 10 CFR part 50,

‘‘General Design Criteria for Nuclear

Power Plants,’’ Criterion 62, requires the

criticality in the fuel storage and

handling system shall be prevented by

physical systems or processes,

preferably by use of geometrically-safe

configurations. This is met at the

Vermont Yankee Station, as identified

in the Technical Specifications and the

Updated Final Safety Analysis Report

(UFSAR).

The change will not increase the

probability or consequences of

accidents, no changes are being made in

the types of any effluents that may be

released offsite, and there is no

significant increase in the allowable

individual or cumulative occupational

radiation exposure. Accordingly, the

Commission concludes that there are no

significant radiological environmental

impacts associated with the proposed

action.

With regard to potential

nonradiological impacts, the proposed

action does involve features located

entirely within the restricted area as

defined in 10 CFR part 20. It does not

affect nonradiological plant effluents

and has no other environmental impact.

Accordingly, the Commission concludes

that there are no significant

nonradiological environmental impacts

associated with the proposed action.

Alternatives to the Proposed Action

Since the Commission has concluded

that there is no measurable

environmental impact associated with

the proposed action, any alternatives

with equal or greater environmental

impact need not be evaluated. As an

alternative to the proposed action, the

staff considered denial of the proposed

action. Denial of the application would

result in no change in current

environmental impacts, The

environmental impacts of the proposed

action and the alternative action are

similar.

Alternative Use of Resources

This action does not involve the use

of any resources not previously

considered in the Final Environmental

Statement for the Vermont Yankee

Nuclear Power Station.

Agencies and Persons Consulted

In accordance with its stated policy,

on January 9, 1998, the staff consulted

with the Vermont State official, Mr.

William K. Sherman, of the Department

of Public Service, regarding the

environmental impact of the proposed

action. The State official had no

comments.

Finding of No Significant Impact

Based upon the environmental

assessment, the Commission concludes

that the proposed action will not have

a significant effect on the quality of the

human environment. Accordingly, the

Commission has determined not to

prepare an environmental impact

statement for the proposed action.