UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 

FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT 

_________________________________ 

FRANK PASCARELLI, 

 Plaintiff - Appellant, 

v. 

MARRIOTT INTERNATIONAL, INC.; 

JAMES P. KOEHLER, individually, d/b/a 

TKO, d/b/a Courtyard Casper; TKO 

MASTER MANAGEMENT, LLC; TKO 

OFFICE REAL ESTATE, LLC; TKO 

PROPERTY MANAGEMENT, LLC; 

CASPER HOSPITALITY, LLC, 

 Defendants - Appellees. 

No. 20-8004 

(D.C. No. 2:19-CV-00127-SWS) 

(D. Wyo.) 

_________________________________ 

ORDER AND JUDGMENT*

_________________________________ 

Before HARTZ, KELLY, and HOLMES, Circuit Judges. 

_________________________________ 

Plaintiff Frank Pascarelli appeals from the order of the United States District Court 

for the District of Wyoming granting judgment on the pleadings in favor of Defendants 

*

 After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has determined unanimously 

that oral argument would not materially assist in the determination of this appeal. See

Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2); 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G). The case is therefore ordered submitted 

without oral argument. This order and judgment is not binding precedent, except under 

the doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. It may be cited, 

however, for its persuasive value consistent with Fed. R. App. P. 32.1 and 10th Cir. R. 

32.1. 

FILED 

United States Court of Appeals 

Tenth Circuit 

August 21, 2020

Christopher M. Wolpert 

Clerk of Court
 2 

because his claims were barred by Wyoming’s applicable statute of limitations. 

Exercising jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, we affirm. 

Mr. Pascarelli alleges that in April 2012 he was bitten by bed bugs during his stay 

at a Courtyard Marriott hotel in Casper, Wyoming, and suffered severe medical 

consequences. In March 2014, Mr. Pascarelli and his wife filed a claim for negligence in 

Georgia state court against Defendants, who allegedly owned, operated, or managed the 

hotel. In April 2017 the Georgia state court dismissed all defendants except Marriott for 

lack of personal jurisdiction. The dismissal was affirmed on interlocutory appeal in June 

2018, and the Pascarellis voluntarily dismissed their Georgia action in April 2019. Two 

months later Mr. Pascarelli filed his present suit against Defendants for negligence and 

breach of implied warranty in Wyoming federal court. 

We review de novo the district court’s judgment on the pleadings. See Leiser v. 

Moore, 903 F.3d 1137, 1139 (10th Cir. 2018).

It is undisputed that Wyoming’s four-year statute of limitations applies to Mr. 

Pascarelli’s claims. Thus, his claims are untimely on their face. His sole response to the 

limitations bar is to argue that he can benefit from Wyoming’s saving statute, Wyo. Stat. 

Ann. § 1-3-118 (West 2019),1

 which allows a plaintiff to revive a claim that was 

1

 The statute provides in full: 

If in an action commenced in due time a judgment for the plaintiff is 

reversed, or if the plaintiff fails otherwise than upon the merits and the time 

limited for the commencement of the action has expired at the date of the 

reversal or failure, the plaintiff, or his representatives if he dies and if the 

cause of action survives, may commence a new action within one (1) year 
 3 

originally filed in a timely fashion but failed on a ground other than the merits, so long as 

the new claim is filed within one year. Long ago, however, this court held that the 

Wyoming saving statute “does not apply to actions brought in a state other than 

Wyoming.” Riley v. Union Pac. R.R. Co., 182 F.2d 765, 767 (10th Cir. 1950). Mr. 

Pascarelli’s Georgia litigation therefore cannot save his claims. He correctly points out 

that this court held in Prince v. Leesona Corp., Inc., 720 F.2d 1166, 1168–69 (10th Cir. 

1983), that the Kansas saving statute applies to actions originally brought in foreign 

states. But that opinion did not purport to change our interpretation of Wyoming law in 

Riley. 

Mr. Pascarelli argues that Riley should now be overturned. That course, however, 

is beyond this panel’s authority. “Following the doctrine of stare decisis, one panel of 

this court must follow a prior panel’s interpretation of state law, absent a supervening 

declaration to the contrary by that state’s courts or an intervening change in the state’s 

law.” Koch v. Koch Indus., Inc., 203 F.3d 1202, 1231 (10th Cir. 2000). It is undisputed 

that the Wyoming Supreme Court has never addressed the issue before us, and Mr. 

Pascarelli identifies no substantive change in the Wyoming saving statute since we 

decided Riley. (The statute was amended in 1977, but the only changes were stylistic.) 

 

after the date of the failure or reversal. This provision also applies to any 

claim asserted in any pleading by a defendant. 

Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 1-3-118 (West 2019). 
 4 

We AFFIRM the district court’s judgment. 

Entered for the Court 

Harris L Hartz 

Circuit Judge