[Federal Register Volume 63, Number 78 (Thursday, April 23, 1998)]
[Notices]
[Pages 20219-20221]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 98-10843]


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NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

[Docket No. 50-423]


Northeast Nuclear Energy Company; Notice of Consideration of 
Issuance of Amendment to Facility Operating License, Proposed No 
Significant Hazards Consideration Determination, and Opportunity for a 
Hearing

    The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (the Commission) is 
considering issuance of an amendment to Facility Operating License No. 
NPF-49 issued to Northeast Nuclear Energy Company (the licensee) for 
operation of Millstone Nuclear Power Station, Unit 3, located in New 
London County, Connecticut.
    The proposed change to Technical Specification 3/4.4.3, 
Pressurizer, would replace the pressurizer maximum water inventory 
requirement with a pressurizer maximum indicated level requirement. The 
proposed amendment would also make editorial changes and modify the 
associated Bases section.
    Before issuance of the proposed license amendment, the Commission 
will have made findings required by the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as 
amended (the Act) and the Commission's regulations.
    The Commission has made a proposed determination that the amendment 
request involves no significant hazards consideration. Under the 
Commission's regulations in 10 CFR 50.92, this means that operation of 
the facility in accordance with the proposed amendment would not (1) 
involve a significant increase in the probability or consequences of an 
accident previously evaluated; or (2) create the possibility of a new 
or different kind of accident from any accident previously evaluated; 
or (3) involve a significant reduction in a margin of safety. As 
required by 10 CFR 50.91(a), the licensee has provided its analysis of 
the issue of no significant hazards consideration, which is presented 
below:

    Northeast Nuclear Energy Company (NNECO) has reviewed the 
proposed revision in accordance with 10 CFR 50.92 and has concluded 
that the revision does not involve a significant hazards 
consideration (SHC). The basis for this conclusion is that the three 
criteria of 10 CFR 50.92(c) are not satisfied. The proposed revision 
does not involve [an] SHC because the revision would not:
    1. Involve a significant increase in the probability or 
consequence of an accident previously evaluated.
    The proposed Technical Specification provides added restrictions 
on pressurizer level to ensure that the pressurizer will not 
overfill or empty in a transient and that RCS [reactor coolant 
system] pressure control will

[[Page 20220]]

be maintained. The proposed Technical Specification requires 
pressurizer level to be maintained at the programmed level. The 
programmed level is a curve that varies linearly from 28% at no load 
T<INF>ave</INF> to 61.5% at full power T<INF>ave</INF>. This is more 
restrictive than the current upper limit of 92% of volume and 
provides added assurance that pressurizer overfill will not occur 
for those events where prevention of overfill is a criterion and 
that the pressurizer would not empty due to a transient. In 
addition, it assures that there is enough steam space available to 
prevent RCS overpressurization in a transient. This requirement also 
applies to manual operation to ensure that pressurizer level is 
maintained in a band around the programmed level of +/-6% of full 
scale. A two hour restriction on operation with pressurizer level 
not within programmed level +/-6% of full scale has been added. This 
will provide added assurance that operator error in pressurizer 
level control will not result in a transient. Based on the above, 
the changes do not negatively impact the probability of occurrence 
of the previously evaluated accidents.
    For Modes 1 and 2, the Chapter 15 FSAR [Final Safety Analysis 
Report] accident analysis assumes that pressurizer level is being 
maintained by the automatic control system at the programmed level. 
For most of the accident analysis, pressurizer level is assumed to 
be at 61.5% for power conditions and 28% for hot zero power. For 
events where pressurizer level overfill is a concern, initial 
pressurizer level is assumed to be 6% over the nominal value of 
61.5% at full power. This bounds the automatic control system 
uncertainty as documented in WCAP 14353. Thus, the proposed 
Technical Specification LCO [Limiting Condition for Operation] for 
Modes 1 and 2 is consistent with the Chapter 15 FSAR accident 
analysis. When pressurizer level is being maintained by manual 
operator action, a 6% operating band is specified. This band is 
consistent with the 6% error assumed for the pressurizer overfill 
events, but it does not take into account instrument uncertainty. 
Because of the infrequent use of manual operation combined with the 
multiple main board indications and the randomness associated with 
instrumentation uncertainty, it is unnecessary to apply instrument 
uncertainty effects on top of the operating band. As such, the 6% 
band is bounded by the current Chapter 15 FSAR analysis. Thus, it is 
concluded that the proposed Technical Specification is consistent 
with analysis assumptions.
    With regard to Mode 3 operation, an evaluation has been 
performed for those events analyzed in Chapter 15 for Mode 3. The 
only accident analysis provided in Chapter 15 of the FSAR for Mode 3 
is the boron dilution event. Pressurizer level has no impact on the 
results. As stated in the evaluation, the other events either would 
not occur, or the plant response would be extremely slow or not 
meaningful without power generation.
    For Inadvertent Operation of ECCS [emergency core cooling 
system] that Increases Reactor Coolant Inventory, the MP3 [Millstone 
Unit 3] FSAR Section 15.5.1 clearly identifies this transient as an 
event evaluated at Power Operation. This is consistent with SRP 
[Standard Review Plan] Section 15.5.1-15.5.2 where the initial power 
condition is specified as the licensed core thermal power with 
allowance for measurement uncertainty. Thus, the current licensing 
basis does not require analysis of this event for the shutdown 
modes, including Modes 3 and 4.
    Thus, the current specification which assures that a steam 
bubble exists in Mode 3 is sufficient [ ] to ensure consistency with 
the accident analysis assumptions.
    Therefore, the proposed revision does not involve a significant 
increase in the probability or consequence of an accident previously 
evaluated.
    2. Create the possibility of a new or different kind of accident 
from any accident previously evaluated.
    The Technical Specification changes provide tighter restrictions 
on pressurizer level to ensure that pressurizer level will be 
controlled as intended. The Bases change better reflects what 
assures the validity of the accident analyses assumptions and the 
bases for the maximum level. A two hour restriction on operation 
with pressurizer level not within +/-6% (full scale) has been added. 
This provides added assurance that pressurizer level will be 
maintained consistent with the accident analysis initial condition 
assumption. The changes provide added assurance that RCS pressure 
control will be maintained and reduces the likelihood of pressurizer 
emptying or overfill. These changes modify neither accident 
mitigation nor system response post-accident.
    Therefore, the proposed revision does not create the possibility 
of a new or different kind of accident from any accident previously 
evaluated.
    3. Involve a significant reduction in a margin of safety.
    The Technical Specification changes provided are consistent with 
the initial condition assumed in the Chapter 15 accident analysis by 
placing tighter restrictions on pressurizer level. The Chapter 15 
FSAR accident analysis assumes that pressurizer level is being 
maintained by the automatic control system at the programmed level. 
For most of the accident analysis, pressurizer level is assumed to 
be at 61.5% for power conditions and 28% for hot zero power. For 
events where pressurizer overfill is a concern, initial pressurizer 
level is assumed to be 6% above the nominal value of 61.5% at full 
power. This bounds the automatic control system uncertainty as 
documented in WCAP 14353. Thus, the proposed Technical Specification 
LCO for Modes 1 and 2 is consistent with the Chapter 15 FSAR 
accident analysis. When pressurizer level is being maintained by 
manual operator action, a 6% operating band is specified. This band 
is consistent with the 6% error assumed for the pressurizer overfill 
events, but it does not take into account instrument uncertainty. 
Because of the infrequent use of manual operation combined with the 
multiple main board indications and the randomness associated with 
instrumentation uncertainty, it is unnecessary to apply instrument 
uncertainty effects on top of the operating band. As such, the 6% 
band is bounded by the current Chapter 15 FSAR analysis. For Mode 3, 
the current specification which assures that a steam bubble exists 
in Mode 3 is sufficient to assure consistency with the accident 
analysis assumptions. The Bases are modified to reflect the proposed 
changes and define the consistency with the Chapter 15 accident 
analysis. Therefore, the change does not reduce the margin of 
safety.
    Therefore, the proposed revision does not involve a significant 
reduction in a margin of safety.
    In conclusion, based on the information provided, it is 
determined that the proposed revision does not involve an SHC.

    The NRC staff has reviewed the licensee's analysis and, based on 
this review, it appears that the three standards of 10 CFR 50.92(c) are 
satisfied. Therefore, the NRC staff proposes to determine that the 
amendment request involves no significant hazards consideration.
    The Commission is seeking public comments on this proposed 
determination. Any comments received within 30 days after the date of 
publication of this notice will be considered in making any final 
determination.
    Normally, the Commission will not issue the amendment until the 
expiration of the 30-day notice period. However, should circumstances 
change during the notice period such that failure to act in a timely 
way would result, for example, in derating or shutdown of the facility, 
the Commission may issue the license amendment before the expiration of 
the 30-day notice period, provided that its final determination is that 
the amendment involves no significant hazards consideration. The final 
determination will consider all public and State comments received. 
Should the Commission take this action, it will publish in the Federal 
Register a notice of issuance and provide for opportunity for a hearing 
after issuance. The Commission expects that the need to take this 
action will occur very infrequently.
    Written comments may be submitted by mail to the Chief, Rules and 
Directives Branch, Division of Administrative Services, Office of 
Administration, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, DC 
20555-0001, and should cite the publication date and page number of 
this Federal Register notice. Written comments may also be delivered to 
Room 6D59, Two White Flint North, 11545 Rockville Pike, Rockville, 
Maryland, from 7:30 a.m. to 4:15 p.m. Federal workdays. Copies of 
written comments received

[[Page 20221]]

may be examined at the NRC Public Document Room, the Gelman Building, 
2120 L Street, NW., Washington, DC.
    The filing of requests for hearing and petitions for leave to 
intervene is discussed below.
    By May 26, 1998, the licensee may file a request for a hearing with 
respect to issuance of the amendment to the subject facility operating 
license and any person whose interest may be affected by this 
proceeding and who wishes to participate as a party in the proceeding 
must file a written request for a hearing and a petition for leave to 
intervene. Requests for a hearing and a petition for leave to intervene 
shall be filed in accordance with the Commission's ``Rules of Practice 
for Domestic Licensing Proceedings'' in 10 CFR Part 2. Interested 
persons should consult a current copy of 10 CFR 2.714 which is 
available at the Commission's Public Document Room, the Gelman 
Building, 2120 L Street, NW., Washington, DC, and at the local public 
document room located at the Learning Resources Center, Three Rivers 
Community-Technical College, 574 New London Turnpike, Norwich, 
Connecticut, and at the Waterford Library, ATTN: Vince Juliano, 49 Rope 
Ferry Road, Waterford, Connecticut. If a request for a hearing or 
petition for leave to intervene is filed by the above date, the 
Commission or an Atomic Safety and Licensing Board, designated by the 
Commission or by the Chairman of the Atomic Safety and Licensing Board 
Panel, will rule on the request and/or petition; and the Secretary or 
the designated Atomic Safety and Licensing Board will issue a notice of 
hearing or an appropriate order.
    As required by 10 CFR 2.714, a petition for leave to intervene 
shall set forth with particularity the interest of the petitioner in 
the proceeding, and how that interest may be affected by the results of 
the proceeding. The petition should specifically explain the reasons 
why intervention should be permitted with particular reference to the 
following factors: (1) The nature of the petitioner's right under the 
Act to be made party to the proceeding; (2) the nature and extent of 
the petitioner's property, financial, or other interest in the 
proceeding; and (3) the possible effect of any order which may be 
entered in the proceeding on the petitioner's interest. The petition 
should also identify the specific aspect(s) of the subject matter of 
the proceeding as to which petitioner wishes to intervene. Any person 
who has filed a petition for leave to intervene or who has been 
admitted as a party may amend the petition without requesting leave of 
the Board up to 15 days prior to the first prehearing conference 
scheduled in the proceeding, but such an amended petition must satisfy 
the specificity requirements described above.
    Not later than 15 days prior to the first prehearing conference 
scheduled in the proceeding, a petitioner shall file a supplement to 
the petition to intervene which must include a list of the contentions 
which are sought to be litigated in the matter. Each contention must 
consist of a specific statement of the issue of law or fact to be 
raised or controverted. In addition, the petitioner shall provide a 
brief explanation of the bases of the contention and a concise 
statement of the alleged facts or expert opinion which support the 
contention and on which the petitioner intends to rely in proving the 
contention at the hearing. The petitioner must also provide references 
to those specific sources and documents of which the petitioner is 
aware and on which the petitioner intends to rely to establish those 
facts or expert opinion. Petitioner must provide sufficient information 
to show that a genuine dispute exists with the applicant on a material 
issue of law or fact. Contentions shall be limited to matters within 
the scope of the amendment under consideration. The contention must be 
one which, if proven, would entitle the petitioner to relief. A 
petitioner who fails to file such a supplement which satisfies these 
requirements with respect to at least one contention will not be 
permitted to participate as a party.
    Those permitted to intervene become parties to the proceeding, 
subject to any limitations in the order granting leave to intervene, 
and have the opportunity to participate fully in the conduct of the 
hearing, including the opportunity to present evidence and cross-
examine witnesses.
    If a hearing is requested, the Commission will make a final 
determination on the issue of no significant hazards consideration. The 
final determination will serve to decide when the hearing is held.
    If the final determination is that the amendment request involves 
no significant hazards consideration, the Commission may issue the 
amendment and make it immediately effective, notwithstanding the 
request for a hearing. Any hearing held would take place after issuance 
of the amendment.
    If the final determination is that the amendment request involves a 
significant hazards consideration, any hearing held would take place 
before the issuance of any amendment.
    A request for a hearing or a petition for leave to intervene must 
be filed with the Secretary of the Commission, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory 
Commission, Washington, DC 20555-0001, Attention: Rulemakings and 
Adjudications Staff, or may be delivered to the Commission's Public 
Document Room, the Gelman Building, 2120 L Street, NW., Washington, DC, 
by the above date. A copy of the petition should also be sent to the 
Office of the General Counsel, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, 
Washington, DC 20555-0001, and to Lillian M. Cuoco, Esq., Senior 
Nuclear Counsel, Northeast Utilities Service Company, P.O. Box 270, 
Hartford, Connecticut, 06141-0270, attorney for the licensee.
    Nontimely filings of petitions for leave to intervene, amended 
petitions, supplemental petitions and/or requests for hearing will not 
be entertained absent a determination by the Commission, the presiding 
officer or the presiding Atomic Safety and Licensing Board that the 
petition and/or request should be granted based upon a balancing of the 
factors specified in 10 CFR 2.714(a)(1)(I)-(v) and 2.714(d).
    For further details with respect to this action, see the 
application for amendment dated April 7, 1998, which is available for 
public inspection at the Commission's Public Document Room, the Gelman 
Building, 2120 L Street, NW., Washington, DC, and at the local public 
document room located at the Learning Resources Center, Three Rivers 
Community-Technical College, 574 New London Turnpike, Norwich, 
Connecticut, and at the Waterford Library, ATTN: Vince Juliano, 49 Rope 
Ferry Road, Waterford, Connecticut.

    Dated at Rockville, Maryland, this 17th day of April 1998.

    For the Nuclear Regulatory Commission.
Daniel G. McDonald Jr.,
Senior Project Manager, Special Projects Office--Licensing, Office of 
Nuclear Reactor Regulation.
[FR Doc. 98-10843 Filed 4-22-98; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 7590-01-P