Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 18A-JT-2714 | December 20, 2019 Page 1 of 11

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D), 

this Memorandum Decision shall not be 

regarded as precedent or cited before any 

court except for the purpose of establishing 

the defense of res judicata, collateral 

estoppel, or the law of the case.

ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT

Frederick A. Turner

Bloomington, Indiana

ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE

Curtis T. Hill, Jr.

Attorney General of Indiana

Monika Prekopa Talbot 

Deputy Attorney General 

Indianapolis, Indiana 

I N T H E

COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA

In Re: The Termination of the 

Parent-Child Relationship of: 

C.M., Ki.M., Ka.M., and K.C. 

(Minor Children);

A.C. (Mother),

Appellant-Respondent,

v.

The Indiana Department of 

Child Services,

Appellee-Petitioner.

December 20, 2019

Court of Appeals Case No.

18A-JT-2714

Appeal from the Owen Circuit 

Court

The Honorable Kelsey B. Hanlon, 

Judge

Trial Court Cause Nos.

60C02-1806-JT-139

60C02-1806-JT-140

60C02-1806-JT-141

60C02-1806-JT-142

Pyle, Judge.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 18A-JT-2714 | December 20, 2019 Page 2 of 11

Statement of the Case

[1] A.C. (“Mother”) appeals the termination of the parent-child relationship with 

her four children (collectively, “Children”).

1

 She contends that the Department 

of Child Services (“DCS”) failed to prove by clear and convincing evidence 

that: (1) there is a reasonable probability that the conditions that resulted in 

Children’s removal or the reasons for placement outside Mother’s home will 

not be remedied; (2) a continuation of the parent-child relationships pose a 

threat to Children’s well-being; and (3) terminations of the parent-child 

relationships are in Children’s best interests. Concluding that there is sufficient 

evidence to support the juvenile court’s terminations of the parent-child 

relationships, we affirm the trial court’s judgment.

[2] We affirm.

Issue

Whether there is sufficient evidence to support the terminations of the 

parent-child relationships.

Facts

[3] The evidence and reasonable inferences that support the judgment reveal that 

Mother and Father are the biological parents of: C.M., born in 2009; Ki.M.,

1 R.M. (“Father”) is not a party to this appeal. 
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 18A-JT-2714 | December 20, 2019 Page 3 of 11

born in 2012; Ka.M., born in 2013; and K.C., born in 2015.

2

 On November 22, 

2015, DCS was informed of allegations of domestic violence, drug use in the 

home, a homicide occurring in Mother’s home, and dental neglect.

3

 DCS 

Family Case Manager Charlotte Church (“FCM Church”), who visited the 

home the following day, found it to be in disarray. Mother stated that the 

disarray was the result of a domestic altercation. Based on concerns of safety 

and substance abuse within the home, Children were removed from the home. 

They were initially placed with their maternal grandmother and then later

placed with foster families. 

[4] Thereafter, on November 25, 2015, DCS filed a petition alleging that Children 

were Children in Need of Services (“CHINS”). In February 2016, Children 

were adjudicated to be CHINS. Mother’s dispositional decree required her to, 

among other things, maintain weekly contact with the FCM, undergo and 

successfully complete a substance abuse assessment, abstain from using drugs 

and alcohol, maintain suitable housing, participate in drug screenings, and 

participate in supervised visitations.

[5] Mother initially complied with drug testing and tested negative. However, 

beginning in March 2017 and continuing through February 2018, Mother either 

2

In July 2018, after the petitions for termination were filed, Mother and Father had another child, C.C., who

is not involved in this termination proceeding. 

3

Following an investigation into the alleged homicide, no evidence of a homicide was found, and neither 

Mother nor Father were ever charged. 
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 18A-JT-2714 | December 20, 2019 Page 4 of 11

refused to submit or did not show up to submit to numerous drug screens. In 

addition, in August 2018, Mother tested positive for Oxycodone.

[6] Mother’s participation with other recommended services was inconsistent. For 

example, Mother participated in supervised visitations until late 2017. Mother 

also failed to maintain weekly contact with the FCM. Finally, Mother 

participated in additional assessments but failed to consistently participate in 

the services for which she was referred after the additional assessments. 

[7] In June 2018, DCS filed a petition to terminate the parental rights of Mother 

and Father. Thereafter, in September 2018, the juvenile court held a 

termination hearing. Mother denied that there had been a history of domestic 

violence between her and Father, contradicting her prior statement to FCM 

Church. When discussing her substance abuse issues, Mother admitted that she 

had used methamphetamine as recently as late June 2018 or early July 2018. 

Mother’s testimony also revealed that she had been arrested on December 19, 

2017.4 She further explained that on that date, she had had a three-hour

supervised visit with Children at her residence and that she had not seen them 

since.

4 As a result of her arrest, Mother was charged with Level 2 felony dealing in methamphetamine and Level 6 

felony maintaining a common nuisance under Cause Number 60C01-1712-F2-958. The State later added 

Class C misdemeanor possession of paraphernalia to Mother’s charges. Father was also arrested on 

December 19, 2017 and charged with Level 2 felony dealing in methamphetamine, Level 3 felony dealing in 

methamphetamine, and Level 6 felony dealing in a schedule II controlled substance under Cause Number 

60C01-1712-F2-951. 
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 18A-JT-2714 | December 20, 2019 Page 5 of 11

[8] Michael Campbell (“Campbell”), Mother’s individual therapist from November 

2016 to May 2017, testified that he had performed a parenting assessment and 

had recommended Relapse Prevention Plan services for Mother. Campbell 

testified that before Mother’s therapy was closed, “there were five no-shows

[and] nine cancellations[.]” (Tr. 106). He further explained that when he last 

saw her in May 2017, therapy had not been completed. 

[9] Court Appointed Special Advocate Elizabeth Eaton (“CASA Eaton”) testified 

that she thought it was appropriate for Children’s respective foster families to 

proceed with adoption because it would provide permanency and be in their 

best interests. When asked to explain her reasoning, CASA Eaton expressed a 

similar sentiment for each child that adoption would be successful given the 

length of time spent with their families and the bonds that had been established. 

[10] Finally, FCM Shea Finnegan (“FCM Finnegan”) testified that she has been the 

case manager since 2016. FCM Finnegan stated that Mother had not 

completed her services. She also expressed her concerns on the need for

permanency for Children because both parents faced charges at the time of the 

termination hearing and the fact that the case had been pending for three years. 

FCM Finnegan further explained that she had safety concerns about Children 

returning home, specifically stating:

The basic safety concerns are that the initial reason for DCS’s 

involvement regarding [parents] have not, at all been addressed 

and services have not been completed, [it] is therefore quite 

possible that the same things that happened prior to DCS 

involvement will then again happen to the children and that is 

putting children at risk, that is not safe.
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(Tr. 205). 

[11] Following the hearing, in October 2018, the juvenile court issued four separate 

orders terminating Mother and Father’s parental relationship with Children. 

Mother now appeals. 

Opinion

[12] Mother argues that there is insufficient evidence to support the terminations of 

her parental rights. The Fourteenth Amendment to the United States 

Constitution protects the traditional right of parents to establish a home and 

raise their children. In re K.T.K., 989 N.E.2d 1225, 1230 (Ind. 2013). However, 

the law provides for termination of the right when parents are unwilling or 

unable to meet their parental responsibilities. Bester v. Lake Cty. Office of Family 

& Children, 839 N.E.2d 143, 147 (Ind. 2005). The purpose of terminating 

parental rights is not to punish the parents but to protect their children. In re 

L.S., 717 N.E.2d 204, 208 (Ind. Ct. App. 1999), trans. denied. 

[13] When reviewing the termination of parental rights, we will not reweigh the 

evidence or judge the credibility of the witnesses. K.T.K., 989 N.E.2d at 1229. 

Rather, we consider only the evidence and reasonable inferences that support 

the judgement. Id. Where a trial court has entered findings of fact and 

conclusions thereon, we will not set aside the trial court’s findings or judgment 

unless clearly erroneous. Id. (citing Ind. Trial Rule 52(A)). In determining 

whether the court’s decision to terminate the parent-child relationship is clearly 

erroneous, we review the trial court’s judgment to determine whether the 
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evidence clearly and convincingly supports the findings and the findings clearly 

and convincingly support the judgment. Id. at 1229-30. 

[14] A petition to terminate parental rights must allege: 

(B) that one (1) of the following is true:

(i) There is a reasonable probability that the conditions that resulted in 

the child’s removal or the reasons for placement outside the home of 

the parents will not be remedied. 

(ii) There is a reasonable probability that the continuation of the 

parent-child relationship poses a threat to the well-being of the child.

(iii) The child has, on two (2) separate occasions, been adjudicated a 

child in need of services;

(C) that termination is in the best interests of the child; and 

(D) that there is a satisfactory plan for the care and treatment of the 

child.

IND. CODE § 31-35-2-4(b)(2). DCS must prove the alleged circumstances by 

clear and convincing evidence. K.T.K., 989 N.E.2d at 1231.

[15] Here, Mother first asserts that the evidence is insufficient to show that there is a 

reasonable probability that: (1) the conditions that resulted in Children’s 

removal or the reasons for placement outside the parent’s home will not be 

remedied; and (2) a continuation of the parent-child relationship poses a threat 

to Children’s well-being. 

[16] We note that INDIANA CODE § 31-35-2-4(b)(2)(B) is written in the disjunctive. 

Therefore, DCS is required to establish by clear and convincing evidence only 

one of the three requirements of subsection (B). In re A.K., 924 N.E.2d 212, 220 
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(Ind. Ct. App. 2010). We therefore discuss only whether there is a reasonable 

probability that the conditions that resulted in Children’s removal or the 

reasons for placement outside the home will not be remedied.

[17] In determining whether the conditions that resulted in a child’s removal or 

placement outside the home will not be remedied, we engage in a two-step 

analysis. In re E.M., 4 N.E.3d 636, 642-43 (Ind. 2014). We first identify the 

conditions that led to the removal or placement outside the home and then 

determine whether there is a reasonable probability that those conditions will 

not be remedied. Id. The second step requires trial courts to judge a parent’s 

fitness at the time of the termination proceeding, taking into consideration 

evidence of changed conditions and balancing any recent improvements against 

habitual patterns of conduct to determine whether there is a substantial 

probability of future neglect or deprivations. Id. Habitual conduct may include 

parents’ prior criminal history, drug and alcohol abuse, history of neglect, 

failure to provide support, and a lack of adequate housing and employment. 

A.D.S. v. Ind. Dep’t of Child Servs., 987 N.E.2d 1150, 1157 (Ind. Ct. App. 2013). 

The trial court may also consider services offered to the parent by DCS and the 

response by the parent to those services as evidence of whether conditions will 

be remedied. Id. DCS is not required to provide evidence ruling out all 

possibilities of change. Id. Rather, it need only establish a reasonable 

probability that the behavior of the parent will not change. Id. 

[18] Here, the conditions that led to Children’s removal were allegations of, 

domestic violence, drug use, and dental neglect. Initially, Mother complied 
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with drug screening. However, Mother stopped complying and refused 

numerous drug screens during 2017 and 2018. The trial court could have

reasonably inferred that Mother had refused the drug screens because she would 

have tested positive. See In re A.B., 924 N.E.2d 666, 671 (Ind. Ct. App. 2010) 

(noting that a parent cannot be permitted to refuse to submit to drug testing, 

then later claim that DCS has failed to prove that the drug use has continued). 

Additionally, Mother admitted to methamphetamine use and had tested 

positive for Oxycodone during the Summer of 2018. Based on the foregoing, 

the evidence supports the trial court’s conclusion that there was a reasonable 

probability that the reasons for Children’s placement outside the home would 

not be remedied. We find no error. 

[19] Mother also argues that there is insufficient evidence that the terminations were

in Children’s best interests. In determining whether the termination of parental 

rights is in the best interests of a child, the trial court is required to look at the 

totality of the evidence. In re D.D., 804 N.E.2d 258, 267 (Ind. Ct. App. 2004), 

trans. denied. In so doing, the court must subordinate the interests of the parents 

to those of the child involved. Id. Termination of the parent-child relationship 

is proper where the child’s emotional and physical development is threatened. 

In re R.S., 774 N.E.2d 927, 930 (Ind. Ct. App. 2002), trans. denied. The trial 

court need not wait until the child is irreversibly harmed such that his physical, 

mental, and social development is permanently impaired before terminating the 

parent-child relationship. Id. In addition, a child’s need for permanency is a 

central consideration in determining the child’s best interests. In re G.Y., 904 
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N.E.2d 1257, 1265 (Ind. 2009), reh’g denied. Further, the testimony of the 

service providers may support a finding that termination is in the child’s best 

interests. McBride v. Monroe Cty. Office of Family and Children, 798 N.E.2d 185, 

203 (Ind. Ct. App. 2003). 

[20] Our review of the evidence reveals that at the time of the termination hearing, 

Children had been living in stable and loving homes with their foster families. 

CASA Eaton testified that Children had bonded with their families and that it 

would be detrimental to remove them from their homes. Both CASA Eaton 

and FCM Finnegan testified that adoption would be in Children’s best interests. 

FCM Finnegan also discussed her concerns for permanency for Children 

because at the time of the termination hearing, both parents faced charges.5 

Moreover, Mother testified at the termination hearing that the last time she saw 

Children was in December 2017. The failure to exercise the right to visit one’s 

child demonstrates a “lack of commitment to complete the actions necessary to 

preserve the parent-child relationship.” Lang v. Starke Cty OFC, 861 N.E.2d 366, 

5

Pursuant to Indiana Evidence Rule 201(a)(2)(c), this Court may take judicial notice of records of a court of 

this state. Here, we take judicial notice of Mother’s conviction and sentence in Cause Number 60C01-1712-

F2-958. Our review of those records reveal that Mother pleaded guilty to Level 6 felony maintaining a 

common nuisance and Class C misdemeanor possession of paraphernalia. The trial court sentenced Mother 

to one (1) year for the Level 6 felony and ninety (90) days for the Class C misdemeanor and ordered the 

sentences to run consecutive to each other. Mother’s sentences were suspended to probation. However, she 

is currently incarcerated awaiting an initial hearing on a petition to revoke probation that alleges, among

other things, a positive urine screen. We also take judicial notice of Father’s conviction and sentence in 

Cause Number 60C01-1712-F2-951. Our review of those records reveal that Father was convicted of Level 2 

felony dealing in methamphetamine, Level 3 felony dealing in methamphetamine, and Level 6 felony dealing 

in a schedule II controlled substance. The trial court sentenced Father to two (2) years for the Level 6 felony 

conviction, sixteen (16) years for the Level 3 felony conviction, and thirty (30) years for the Level 2 felony 

conviction and ordered the sentences to run concurrently with each other. Father’s projected release date is 

in March 2037.
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372 (Ind. Ct. App. 2007) (quotations omitted), trans. denied. The testimony of 

the service providers and Mother, as well as the other evidence previously 

discussed, supports the trial court’s conclusion that termination is in Children’s 

best interests.

[21] We reverse a termination of parental rights “only upon a showing of ‘clear 

error’––that which leaves us with a definite and firm conviction that a mistake 

has been made.” Egly v. Blackford Cty. Dep’t of Pub. Welfare, 592 N.E.2d, 1232, 

1235 (Ind. 1992). We find no such error here and therefore affirm the trial 

court.

[22] Affirmed.

Robb, J., and Mathias, J., concur.