NO. 96-599 

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF MONTANA 

1997 

LARRY ROEDEL, 

Plaintiff and Respondent, 

JOHN R. BENNETT, dkla Jolm Rockwell Bennett, and 

KAREN WOODCOCK, RUSSELL FEDERATION and 

LYNN E. FEDERATION, DONALD J. BISSELL and 

CYNTHIA F. BISSELL, and DOES I to IV, 

Defendants and Appellants. 

APPEAL FROM: District Court of the Twentieth Judicial District, 

In and for the County of Lake, 

The Honorable C. B. McNeil, Judge presiding. 

COUNSEL OF RECORD: 

For Appellants: 

Kathleen OtRourke-Mullins, Attorney at Law; Polson, Montana 

(for Appellants Bennett and Woodcock) 

For Respondent: 

Richard DeJana, Attorney at Law; Kalispell, Montana 

Filed: 

Submitted on Briefs: August 14, 1 997 

Decided: October 10, 1997 
Justice Terry N. Trieweiler delivered the opinion of the Court. 

Pursuant to Section I, Paragraph 3(c), Montana Supreme Court 1995 Internal 

Operating Rules, the following decision shall not be cited as precedent and shall be published 

by its filing as a public document with the Clerk of the Supreme Court and by a report of its 

result to State Reporter Publishing Company and West Publishing Company. 

The plaintiff, Larry Roedel, filed a conlplaint in the District Court for the Twentieth 

Judicial District in Lake County to establish his exclusive right to use his own property and 

the right to use adjoining property. By counterclaim, the defendants asserted a right to a 

thirty-foot easement across Roedel's property. After a hearing, the District Court recognized 

a prescriptive easement over Roedel's property for the benefit of the defendants, John 

Bennett, Karen Woodcock, and Donald and Cynthia Bissell, and awarded Roedel a right of 

use over an adjoining parcel to which an ownership interest is claimed by Bennett. Both 

parties appeal the District Court's decision. We affirm in part and reverse in past the 

judgment of the District Court. 

There are three issues on appeal: 

1. Did the District Court err when it recognized a prescriptive easement for a 

twelve-foot right-of-way across Roedel's property? 

2. Did the District Court err when it recognized Bennett as an owner of Parcel G? 
3. Did the District Court err when it awarded Roedel a right of use, construction, 

and maintenance over the entire Parcel G? 

FACTUAL BACKGROUND 

This case involves two parcels of land. The first parcel is a 60-foot strip known as 

Parcel G. The second parcel is a 30-foot strip referred to herein as the 30-foot Right-of-way. 

In July 1972, the Clydesdales had Deed Exhibit H-1998 prepared. Exhibit H-1998 

depicts all the property at issue in this case.' Exhibit H-1998 indicated that Parcel G was 

"[rleserved for hture road." It was filed on April 18, 1973. 

'The following is an approximate illustration of the relevant property as depicted 

on Exhibit H-1998: 
On July 31, 1972, the Clydesdales transferred Parcel E, as described on Exhibit 

H-1998, by wall-anty deed to the Palins (Karen and Walter). Later, the Clydesdales also 

made a specific grant of Parcel G by warranty deed to the Hubbards and the Palins. The 

deed, which was recorded on December 28, 1973, declared that the Hubbards and the P a 1' ins 

were "tenants in common" and that "they shall equally share all taxes and n~aintenance 

costs." 

In 1975, the Hubbards transferred to the Richardsons "a use in common for the 

purpose of ingress and egress over that tract of land described as Tract G shown on Deed 

Exhibit H-1998 (209094)." Finally, in 1977, the Hubbards transferred to Vera Connolly "an 

undivided one-half interest in Tract G as shown on Plat No. 1998, Reception 209094, 

Records of Lake County." Thus, title in Parcel G prior to the transfers at issue in this case 

rested in Vera Connolly and the Palins as owners of undivided one-half interests, and in the 

Richardsons as owners of a right to use for ingress and egress. 

On February 20, 1976, the Palins filed Certificate of Survey ("COS") 2482 to create 

Parcel A for occasional sale. Parcel A contains 0.723 acres, borders Parcel G on the north 

and east, and had previously been a part of Parcel E. Certificate of Survey 2482 also shows 

a 30-foot "FUW" that borders Parcel A and runs over both Parcel E and a northern part of 

Parcel G to access Highway 209 and the southern portion of Parcel G. That same day, the 

Palins also filed COS 2483 for the purpose of "parcel creation for easement purposed [sic]." 
Certificate of Survey 2483 creates the 30-foot Right-of-way parcel along the southern border 

between Parcel A and Parcel E; it contains 0.33 acres. Both COS 2482 and 2483 reference 

Exhibit H-1998 for its description of Parcel G and show the remainder of Parcel E retained 

by the Palins. 

Also on February 20, 1976, the Palins recorded a deed to the Hubbards which 

transferred Parcel A and the 30-foot Right-of-Way. The deed referred to COSs 2482 and 

2483 and defined the propelties according to the Certificates "attached and made a part 

hereof." A week later, the Hubbards recorded a deed which transferred Parcel A and the 

30-foot Right-of-way to Robert and Arline Richardson. The deed was identical to the deed 

from the Palins to the Hubbards, except for the different parties and language inserted before 

the land descriptions granting "a use in common with others for roadway purposes." The 

Hubbards had signed the deed on January 26, 1976. 

Arline Richardson, who was then the sole owner of the property, transferred Parcel A 

and the 30-foot Right-of-way to Larry Roedel on June 3, 1991. In the warranty deed, the 

description of Parcel A includes "[als shown on Certificate of Survey No. 2482" and the 

description of the 30-foot Right-of-way includes "[als shown on Certificate of Survey 

No. 2483." In addition, the deed is qualified by making it "[slubject to all reservations, 

restrictions, covenants, conditions, rights-of-way and easements apparent or of record." 
Roedel is the respondent on appeal, and the current owner of Parcel A and the 30-foot 

Right-of-way. 

On November 17, 1980, the Palins filed COS 3321 to create Parcel 1 for occasional 

sale and Parcel 2 as a remainder: Parcels 1 and 2 constitute all of the fo~mer Parcel E.' 

2The following is an approximate illustration of the relevant property as depicted 

on Certificate of Survey 3321: 
I Parcel 1 is a one-acre parcel whose eastern edge borders the southern portion of Parcel G and I 

which is otherwise surrounded by the 12.596 acre Parcel 2. The parcel referred to as the 

30-foot Right-of-way is labeled on COS 3321 as a "30.00' roadway per C. of S. No. 2483," 

while the northern border of Parcel 2, which abuts the 30-foot Right-of-way, is labeled 

"Southerly FUW Line of that parcel shown on C. of S. No. 2483." The description of Parcel I 

on COS 3321 states "TOGETHER WITH a 60.00 foot easement as shown hereon and shown 

as Parcel G per H-1998 and described in Microfilm No. 214584, records of Lake County, 

Montana," while the description of Parcel 2 on COS 3321 states "TOGETHER WITH a 

60.00 foot road easement as shown hereon and shown as Parcel G per H-1998 and described 

in Microfilm No. 214584, records of Lake County, Montana." (Emphasis added.) The 

descriptions of both Parcel 1 and 2 on COS 3321 state "TOGETHER WITH a 30.00 foot 

road easement as shown hereon and on Certificate of Survey No. 2483 and also described in 

Microfilm No. 225994, records of Lake County, Montana." Parcels 1 and 2 are the property 

currently owned by the appellants in this case, and each parcel borders Parcel G; only 

Parcel 2 borders the 30-foot Right-of-way. 

On November 19, 1980, the Palins transferred Parcel 1 to Glenna Palin, "TOGETHER 

with a right to use a 60.00 foot easement shown as Parcel G per H-1998 and described in 

Microfilm No. 214584 records of Lake County, Montana." On February 27, 198 1, the Palins 

also transferred Parcel 2 to Glenna Palin, "TOGETHER WITH a 60.00 foot road easement 
shown as Parcel G per H-1998 and also desclibed in Microfilm No. 214584, records of Lake 

County, Montana." 

On July 21, 1983, Glenna Palin transferred her interest in Parcel 1 to the Runnels, 

"TOGETHER with a right to use a 60.00 foot easement shown as Parcel G per H-1998 and 

described in Microfile No. 214585 records of Lake County, Montana." On August 12, 1986, 

the Runnels transferred their interest in Parcel 1 to the Bissells, "TOGETHER with a right 

to use a 60.00 foot easement shown as Parcel G per H-1998 and described in Microfile 

No. 214585 records of Lake County, Montana." On August 20, 1987, Glenna Palin 

transferred her interest in Parcel 2 to John Bennett, "TOGETHER WITH a 60.00 foot road 

easement (112 undivided interest) shown as Parcel G per H-1998 and also described in 

Microfilm No. 214584, records of Lake County, Montana." The Bissells and John Bennett, 

along wit11 Karen Woodcock, are the current owners of Parcels 1 and 2, respectively, and are 

the appellants in this case. Bennett has represented Woodcock's interests throughout this 

case. 

On August 7, 1989, the Palins, clearly believing that they had transferred all of their 

use and ownership rights in Parcel G to Glenna Palin, executed with John Bennett, as Glenna 

Palin's successor in interest, an Addendum to Warranty Deed: Reservation of Right of Way. 

The Addendum states: 

WHEREAS, [Palins], as Seller, executed a Contract for Deed with 

Glenna R. Palin, as Purchaser, on March 5, 1981; 

WHEREAS, such Contract for Deed provided as follows: "Purchaser 

agrees to convey to Seller the right to use the 60.00 foot easement shown on 
Parcel G per H-1998 and described in Microfilm N.214584, records of Lake 

County, Montana"; 

WHEREAS, John R. Bennett, assignee of the contract interest of 

Glenna R. Palin, is presently satisfying in full all amounts due to Seller under 

the terms of such contract; 

WHEREAS, in consideration thereof, John R. Bennett has received a 

warranty deed from the escrow agent; 

WHEREAS, easement rights upon Parcel G have been conveyed to 

purchaser by the warranty deed given to him; 

WHEREAS, however, such warranty deed does not contain a paragraph 

regarding rese~vation by Seller of a right-of-way over Parcel G; 

NOW THEREFORE, in consideration of the above, John R. Bennett, 

as assignee of the contract purchaser, hereby agrees to the following addendum 

to said warranty deed: 

"The grantors, [Palins], expressly reserve unto themselves, their heirs, 

executors, administrators, personal representatives and assigns, the right, at 

their own risk, to cross the strip or parcel of real property known as Parcel G, 

and more particularly described as follows: . . . for the purpose of having 

access to such other part or portion of real property belonging to grantors as 

may be serviced by such Parcel G easement. 

At the time they executed the Addendum, the Palins owned only a small strip of Swan River 

access land adjacent to the eastlwest portion of Parcel G. 

Finally, on August 25, 1993, Roedel executed an agreement with the Palins. Their 

Consent to Build a Roadway and Indemnity states: 

[Palins] hereby authorize Larry Roedel to co~~st~uct a roadway that 

certain Parcel G more particularly described on the Exhibit A. 

By giving this consent [Palins] expressly warrant that they have the 

rights as more particularly stated on Exhibit A. 

Larry Roedel agrees to hold Palins harmless from any and all damages 

and recognizes that, John R. Bennett also John Rockwell Bennett and Karen 

E. Woodcock are the owners in fee and further recognizes that the consent by 

Palin is not a warranty that they can give full consent and assumes at his own 

risk any actions taken without the consent of Bennett and Woodcock. 
The Exhibit A to which they refer is the Addendum to the Warranty Deed, which descl-ibes 

the Palins' reservation over Parcel G. Roedel constructed a roadway over Parcel G in the fall 

of 1995, and has since maintained and plowed the roadway. 

For as long as the parties here have owned their respective properties, they have used 

the 30-foot Right-of-way as a roadway. Roedel was aware of their use when he acquired 

Parcel A and the 30-foot Right-of-way. At no time was the roadway more than twelve feet 

wide. Roedel has placed corrals, fencing, and other objects within the 30-foot Right-of-way, 

but they do not obstruct the twelve-foot roadway. The appellants have performed 

maintenance on the roadway, although Roedel has been its primary caretaker. 

Roedel filed a conlplaint to teminate the appellants' use of the 30-foot Right-of-way, 

or, in the alternative, to gate the roadway. The appellants counter-claimed that Roedel had 

wrongly restricted their usage rights over the 30-foot Right-of-Way. The District Court 

found that the appellants were entitled to a prescriptive easement over the existing 

twelve-foot roadway at its present location within the 30-foot fight-of-Way, and that Roedel 

could not interfere with the appellants' use or maintenance of the roadway by using any 

obstructions. 

Roedel also sought an order from the District Court allowing him to constluct a 

roadway over Parcel G. The appellants responded by asserting an ownership right to 

Parcel G and claiming that Roedel has a limited right, since he can exercise no more rights 

than passed to him through his agreement with the Palins. The District Court relied on 
language in the RoedelIPalins ageement that recognized Bennett's ownership in Parcel G to 

find that Bennett had a "claim to ownership of an undivided one-half interest in and to 

Parcel G in common with others not parties to this suit." Against appellants' assertions, 

however, the District Court found that Roedel has an unrestricted right of use, constn~ction, 

and maintenance for roadway purposes over Parcel G, so long as Roedel does not interfere 

with appellants' ownership and use rights. 

ISSUE 1 

Did the District Court err when it recognized a prescriptive easement for a twelve-foot 

Right-of-way across Roedel's property? 

The standard of review of a district court's conclusions of law is whether they are 

correct. See Carbon County v. Union Reserve Coal Co. (1995), 271 Mont. 459, 469, 898 

P.2d 680, 686. See also Kreger v. Francis (1995), 271 Mont. 444,447, 898 P.2d 672, 674; 

Steel; Znc. v. Department ofReveme (1990), 245 Mont. 470,474-75, 803 P.2d 601, 603-04. 

An easement is a right that one person has to use another person's land for a specific 

purpose. See Ruana v. Grigo~zis (1996), 275 Mont. 441,447,913 P.2d 1247, 1251. It can 

be created by grant, reservation, exception or covenant, implication or prescription. See 

Kuhllnarz v. Rivera (1985), 216 Mont. 353, 359, 701 P.2d 982, 985. We stated in Baclze v. 

Owetzs (1994), 267 Mont. 279, 883 P.2d 817, that a property owner can create an easement 

by a COS if the COS clearly and specifically describes the easement and the document of 

conveyance refers to the properly recorded COS. We went on to state in Halversorz v. Tu~wer 
(1994), 268 Mont. 168, 172, 885 P.2d 1285, 1288, that an express easement of reservation 

may be created in favor of the grantors if the deed refers to the COS describing the easement, 

even if the property description in the deed contains no language of an easement reservation. 

In addition, we stated in Halverson, 268 Mont. at 172, 885 P.2d at 1288, that the grantee 

whose property is being burdened by the easement must have knowledge of its use or its 

necessity. 

Here, the appellants assert that their predecessors in interest, the Palins, expressly 

reserved an easement over the 30-foot Right-of-way when they recorded COSs 2482 and 

2483 and then sold the parcels while retaining the adjacent remainder, Parcel E. "An 

easement by reservation must arise from the written documents of conveyance." Hnlversorz, 

268 Mont. at 172, 885 P.2d at 1289. Therefore, we stated in Runrza, 275 Mont. at 448, 913 

P.2d at 1252, that this Court's role is to examine the chain of title in question. 

The District Court found that the deed from the Palins to the Hubbards referenced 

COSs 2482 and 2483, and that the descriptions of Parcel A and the 30-foot Right-of-way 

defincd the properties according to the "attached" certificates. In addition, the granteeHubbards had knowledge of the Palins' use of the 30-foot Right-of-way, as evidenced by the 

District Court's finding that the Hubbards' subsequent deed to the Richardsons referred to "a 

use in common with others for roadway purposes." The District Court found that the 

Hubbards signed thcir deed to the Richardsons approximately a month before they were 

conveyed thc land by the Palins, and thus, the inclusion of the roadway language in the 
second, but previously existing, deed indicates that the Hubbards had knowledge of the 

Palins' use when they received the property from the Palins. Accordingly, the deed referred 

to the Certificates of Survey and the grantees had knowledge of the use. 

Roedel contends that the description of the easement on COSs 2482 and 2483 did not 

meet the requirement in Bache that the easement be clearly and specifically identified on the 

COS. In Baclze, we relied on the graphical depiction of the easement's scaled location on the 

COS, as well as n~ultiple references to language of "easement" and its width, to find that the 

description was clear and specific enough to create an easement. Bache, 267 Mont. at 286, 

883 P.2d at 820-21. Here, COS 2482 depicted in detail the 30-foot path over Palins' Parcel 

E and Parcel G, and bordering the newly created Parcel A. It also labeled the path as a "WW 

extend[ing] 15' each side of [center-line]." The "RIW" clearly stands for either right-of-way 

or roadway, either of which indicates others' use of the strip, and thus, COS 2482 clearly 

identifies the easement. Certificate of Survey 2483 depicts the 30-foot Right-of-way parcel 

in the same position on Parcel E over which COS 2482 extended the "WW" and states that 

the purpose of the survey is for "Parcel creation for easement purposed [sic]." Therefore, it 

also specifically identifies the easement. 

The Palins' transfer of Parcel A and the 30-foot Right-of-way to the Hubbards 

occurred si~nultaneously with the filing of the COSs, and the Hubbards' transfer to the 

Richardsons occurred at virtually the same time. Roedel contends that the predetermined 

combination of COS 2482, COS 2483, and the transfers manifests that the Palins intended 
to create an easement for the Hubbards' benefit, which would then immediately merge into 

their fee ownership when they received the 30-foot Right-of-Way parcel. Although we are 

unable to determine the true purpose for the manner in which the parties structured their 

transactions, Roedel's contention is both unreasonable and beyond the scope of analysis in 

Bache and Halverson, where the inquiry was limited to whether the COS clearly and 

specifically identifies an easement, and whether the deed refers to the COS. Those 

requirements have been met here. Accordingly, we conclude that the Palins reserved an 

easement over the 30-foot Right-of-Way. 

In Halverson, we held that an express easement of reservation created by reference 

to a COS runs with the land and entitles successors in interest to the land to the benefit of the 

appurtenant easement. Halverson, 268 Mont. at 174, 885 P.2d at 1289. Here, the Palins 

reserved for Parcel E, the dominant tenement, use over the 30-foot Right-of-Way, the 

servient tenement, and thus, the Palins' successors in interest to Parcel E are entitled to use 

the 30-foot Right-of-Way. In addition, the District Court found that when the Palins filed 

COS 3321 to create Parcels 1 and 2, COS 3321 referred to COS 2483, and that each parcel 

was granted an easement over the 30-foot Right-of-Way. Accordingly, Glenna Palin, who 

is the direct successor to the Palins' interest in Parcels 1 and 2, received easement rights over 

the 30-foot Right-of-way, as did the appellants, who are Glenna Palin's successors in interest 

in Parcels 1 and 2. 
The District Court's judgment limited the appellants to a prescriptive right over the 

existing twelve-foot roadway based upon their past use. We stated in Lindley v. Maggert 

(1982), 198 Mont. 197, 199,645 P.2d 430,431, that the owner of a reserved easement may 

use the easement to the full extent of the right retained. In addition, "the owner of the 

dominant tenement is not required to make use of the easement as a condition to retaining 

his interest in the easement." Halverson, 268 Mont. at 175, 885 P.2d at 1290. Here, the 

Palins originally reserved a thirty-foot right of way, and then transferred to the owners of 

Parcels 1 and 2, via COS 3321, the same thirty-foot easement. Therefore, the appellants are 

entitled to use the full thirty-foot easement that was retained by the Palins and passed with 

the land, regardless of whether the entire width of the roadway has been used in the past. 

Accordingly, we conclude that the District Court erred when it limited the appellants' rights 

to a twelve-foot prescriptive easement. We reverse that part of the District Court's judgment 

and hold that appellants are owners of an appurtenant easement over the 30-foot 

Right-of-way. 

ISSUE 2 

Did the District Court err when it recognized Bennett as an owner of Parcel G? 

The standard of review of a district court's findings of fact is whether they are clearly 

erroneous. Daines v. Knight (1995), 269 Mont. 320, 324, 888 P.2d 904, 906 (citing 

Columbia Grain Zntrl v. Cereck (1993), 258 Mont. 414, 417, 852 P.2d 676, 678). 
Bennett asserts his ownership right in Parcel G as a successor in interest to Glenna 

Palin. Glenna Palin received Parcel 1, "TOGETHER with a right to use a 60.00 foot 

easement shown as Parcel G per H-1998 and described in Microfilm No. 214584 records of 

Lake County, Montana." She then received Parcel 2, "TOGETHER WITH a 60.00 foot road 

easement shown as Parcel G per H-1998 and also described in Microfilm No. 214584, 

records of Lake County, Montana." 

We stated in Bodine v. Bodine (1967), 149 Mont. 29,39,422 P.2d 650, 655, that "[a] 

deed must be construed as it is written, and a reviewing court can neither put words into the 

deed which are not there nor can it put a construction on words directly contrary to their 

obvious meaning." Here, the interest is described in each deed as an easement, and in the 

transfer of Parcel 1, specifically as "a right to use." Other evidence in the record indicates 

that the Palins had the ability and probably intended to transfer their undivided ownership 

interest in Parcel G to Glenna Palin but, as written, the deeds fail to do so and transferred 

only an easement. The language in the deed between Bennett and Glenna Palin adds 

"(112 undivided interest)" to its description of the easement, which is otherwise identical to 

the description of the easement acquired by Glenna from the Palins. Although the insertion 

suggests that an ownership right was transferred, Glenna Palin clearly lacked any such 

ownership rights to transfer. 

The District Court relied on language in subsequent, non-deeded agreements to find 

that Bennett owned an undivided one-half interest in Parcel G. Section 70-20-202, MCA, 
however, requires that when a deed unambiguously reduces to writing the terms of a grant, 

no other evidence of the terms of the deed shall be used in construing the deed. Accordingly, 

neither the addendum to the warranty deed, which clearly was executed on assumptions by 

the Palins that they had transferred all rights in Parcel G and that Bennett was the current 

owner, nor the consent to build a roadway, which also referred to Bennett as the owner of 

Parcel G, can transform the nature of the interest originally acquired by Glenna and retained 

by the Palins. 

Bennett refers to these agreements as "confirmation" that the Palins transferred their 

ownership interest. However, this Court must rely on the written deeds and, according to 

those deeds, the Palins transferred only rights of use and retained their undivided one-half 

ownership interest in Parcel G. Therefore, we conclude that the District Couit was clearly 

erroneous when it found that Bennett was owner of an undivided one-half interest in 

Parcel G. We reverse that part of the District Court's judgment and conclude that Bennett 

owns only an easement over Parcel G. 

ISSUE 3 

Did thc District Court err when it awarded Roedel a right of use, construction, and 

maintenance over the entire Parcel G? 

Appellants assert that the District Court erred when it did not limit Roedel's rights in 

Parcel G to only the eastlwest portion of Parcel G. They rely on the fact that the Palins could 

only consent to transfer to Roedel the rights that they owned, which, per the addendum to the 
warranty deed, were limited to the eastlwest portion of Parcel G, since that was the only 

access required for the property they owned at the time of the addendum. They also assert 

that the District Court erred in awarding Roedel a right to use and maintain a roadway when 

the Consent to Build a Roadway and Indemnity only "authorize[d] Roedel to construct a 

roadway" over Parcel G. 

First, the appellants' contention that the Palins' limited ownership restricted what 

portion of Parcel G Roedel could have acquired an interest in is unfounded as a result of this 

Court's conclusion that the Palins have always retained their undivided one-half interest in 

Parcel G. The consent does not, on its face, restrict Roedel's rights to a certain portion of 

Parcel G. Rather, any potential restriction in the consent between Palins and Roedel as to 

what portion of Parcel G the agreement covers must derive solely from the addendum 

between Bennett and Palins, as incorporated by the consent. However, the addendum is 

meaningless because the Palins always retained ownership of Parcel G. Accordingly, we 

conclude that the Palins had the ability to give Roedel an interest over all of Parcel G, and 

thus, the District Court did not err when it did not restrict Roedel's rights to just the eastlwest 

portion of Parcel G. 

Second, the appellants lack standing to challenge the extent of the rights that Roedel 

received from the Palins in their Consent to Build a Roadway and Indemnity. In Ludwig v. 

Spolclie (Mont. 1996), 930 P.2d 56, 53 St. Rep. 1420, we discussed a property owner's 

standing to sue over an agreement entered into between two easement-holders on the 
property. We held that the owner, who was neither a party nor an intended beneficiary of the 

agreement between the easement-holders, lacked standing "to enforce the specific terms and 

conditions contained within [the agreement]." Ludwig, 930 P.2d at 59, 53 St. Rep. at 

1421-22. See also Pattoiz v. Madison Counfy (1994), 265 Mont. 362, 877 P.2d 993. 

Here, the Palins and Roedel executed the consent. Therefore, the Palins, as a party 

to the consent, would have standing to challenge the District Court's interpretation of the 

agreement. The appellants, however, were not a party to the agreement, and unless Roedel 

interferes with their rights to use Parcel G, the appellants lack standing to challenge the 

extent of Roedel's rights. The appellants do not claim that Roedel has interfered with their 

right to use Parcel G. They assert only that he has interfered with their ownership interest. 

Furthermore, the District Court qualified its finding and made Roedel's rights to use, 

construct, and maintain on Parcel G conditional upon the fact that he not interfere with 

appellants' rights in Parcel G. Therefore, the appellants' rights in Parcel G have been 

sufficiently protected, and without a challenge from a party in interest to the agreement, we 

have no basis for setting aside the District Court's judgment regarding Roedel's rights on 

Parcel G. 

Although the District Court's determination of the parties' rights in Parcel G relied, 

at least in part, on the clearly erroneous finding that Bennett was an owner of Parcel G, we 

"will affirm a district court's decision which reaches the right result, regardless of the court's 

reasoning." In re Mawiage ofShupe (1996), 276 Mont. 409,419, 916 P.2d 744, 750. 
As we have stated, the Palins retained an undivided one-half ownership interest in the 

whole of Parcel G and were free to transfer rights of use to Roedel over all of Parcel G. 

Accordingly, we affirm that part of the District Court's judgment which awarded Roedel a 

right to use, construct, and maintain over all of Parcel G. 

In sum, we reverse the District Court's judgment that the appellants are limited to a 

twelve-foot prescriptive easement over the 30-foot Right-of-way, and hold that the 

appellants are owners of an appurtenant easement over the entire 30-foot Right-of-way. We 

also reverse the District Court's finding that Bennett owns an undivided one-half interest in 

Parcel G. We conclude that the Palins retained an undividcd onc-half ownership intcrcst in 

Parcel G, and that Bennett, along with the other appellants, owns only a right to use Parcel 

G. We affirm the District Court's finding that Roedel has a right to use, construct, and 

maintain over all of Parcel G and, finally, we order that this opinion is binding on only the 

parties to this litigation. 

We Concur: 

\ 

Justices