NOT FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

IRINA ANATOLEVNA KOCHETKOVA,

MARINA MOCHALOVA, and POLINA 

MOCHALOVA,

Petitioners,

v.

WILLIAM P. BARR, Attorney General,

Respondent.

No. 16-73536

Agency Nos. A205-176-867

 A205-176-869

 A205-176-870

MEMORANDUM*

On Petition for Review of a Final Order of the 

Board of Immigration Appeals

Submitted November 7, 2019

**

Pasadena, California

Before: FARRIS and McKEOWN, Circuit Judges, and KENDALL,*** District 

Judge.

* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent 

except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.

** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without 

oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).

*** The Honorable Virginia M. Kendall, United States District Judge for the 

Northern District of Illinois, sitting by designation.

FILED

NOV 15 2019

MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK

U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
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Irina Kochetkova, Marina Mochalova, and Polina Mochalova,

1 natives and 

citizens of Russia, petition for review of the Board of Immigration Appeals’ 

(“BIA”) dismissal of their appeal from an immigration judge’s (“IJ”) order denying 

their applications for asylum, withholding of removal, and relief under the 

Convention Against Torture (“CAT”). We have jurisdiction under 8 U.S.C. § 

1252, and we deny the petition. 

“When the BIA conducts its own review of the evidence and law rather than 

adopting the IJ’s decision, our review is limited to the BIA’s decision, except to 

the extent that the IJ’s opinion is expressly adopted.” Shrestha v. Holder, 590 F.3d 

1034, 1039 (9th Cir. 2010) (internal quotation marks omitted). We review adverse 

credibility determinations for substantial evidence and apply the standards 

governing adverse credibility determinations created by the REAL ID Act. Id. at 

1039-41. The BIA’s determination is “conclusive unless any reasonable 

adjudicator would be compelled to conclude to the contrary.” Mairena v. Barr, 

917 F.3d 1119, 1123 (9th Cir. 2019) (per curiam) (quoting 8 U.S.C. § 

1252(b)(4)(B)). Given the “healthy measure of deference to agency credibility 

1 Marina and Polina Mochalova are Kochetkova’s children and are included 

as derivative beneficiaries of Kochetkova’s application for relief. They did not 

testify in support of their claims, relying solely on the lead petitioner. This 

disposition therefore focuses on Kochetkova’s testimony. 
3

determinations” that the REAL ID Act requires, Shrestha, 590 F.3d at 1041, we 

conclude that substantial evidence supports the BIA’s adverse credibility 

determination.

In dismissing Kochetkova’s appeal, the BIA cited multiple aspects of 

Kochetkova’s testimony and the record that were inconsistent and inherently 

implausible. Taken together, these inconsistencies and inherently implausible 

aspects support an adverse credibility determination. First, Kochetkova and her

now ex-husband voluntarily returned to Russia twice after trips to the United States

in 2010 and 2011, years after local police and government officials began taking 

retaliatory actions against Kochetkova and her ex-husband for their support of a

political party that opposed United Russia. Kochetkova did not apply for asylum 

during either trip to the United States. The BIA found that voluntary return to 

Russia undermined Kochetkova’s credibility. See Loho v. Mukasey, 531 F.3d 

1016, 1018-19 (9th Cir. 2008) (holding that voluntary returns to one’s home 

country can support an adverse credibility finding). Similarly, Kochetkova’s exhusband abandoned his asylum application, left the United States and went to 

Mexico, and was deported to Russia, where he secured a divorce from Kochetkova. 

The BIA reasonably found that it was inconsistent that he would return to Russia 

and interact with government officials if he and his family had been persecuted for 
4

their political views, and found that Kochetkova could not provide sufficient 

details or explanations for her ex-husband’s actions. Next, the BIA found it 

implausible and not believable that Kochetkova and her husband bought a 

$1,000,000 home in the United States during their 2011 trip despite their plans to 

return to Russia. Kochetkova claimed they purchased the home to try to prevent 

Russian authorities from seizing the funds, but the BIA agreed with the IJ’s finding 

that Kochetkova’s explanation was implausible, given that they voluntarily 

returned to Russia after the purchase and that the authorities left $40,000 

undisturbed in their account. Finally, the BIA found that Kochetkova’s lack of 

corroborating evidence regarding she and her ex-husband’s political affiliation 

undermined her credibility. The BIA noted that Kochetkova’s only corroborating 

evidence consisted of letters from interested witnesses and psychological 

evaluations based on she and her ex-husband’s accounts of relevant events, so they 

should be afforded diminished weight.

Substantial evidence supports the BIA’s adverse credibility determination 

based on these inconsistencies and implausible aspects, which requires that we 

affirm the BIA’s denial of Kochetkova’s applications for asylum and withholding 

of removal. Kochetkova’s contentions that the BIA should have considered certain 

corroborating evidence in assessing the “totality of the circumstances” and 
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accepted her explanations to the IJ fail to demonstrate an “extraordinary 

circumstance[ ]” that “compel[s]” us to disagree with the BIA’s credibility 

determination. Shrestha, 590 F.3d at 1041; 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(4)(B); see also 

Hammad v. Holder, 603 F.3d 536, 544 (9th Cir. 2010) (explaining that, under the 

substantial evidence standard, “the court must affirm the BIA’s order when there is 

such relevant evidence as reasonable minds might accept as adequate to support it, 

even if it is possible to reach a contrary result on the basis of the evidence.” 

(internal quotation marks omitted)). Kochetkova also argues the BIA erred by 

determining that the IJ was not required to give her an additional opportunity to 

provide further corroboration. But Kochetkova is entitled to that opportunity only 

if her testimony is “otherwise credible,” which is not the case here. Lai v. Holder, 

773 F.3d 966, 975-76 (9th Cir. 2014); see also Yali Wang v. Sessions, 861 F.3d 

1003, 1009 (9th Cir. 2017) (“When an IJ has considered the corroborating 

evidence provided by an applicant for relief but deemed that evidence insufficient, 

the IJ need not afford the applicant an opportunity to provide additional 

evidence.”). 

We also deny the petition for review as to Kochetkova’s CAT claim because 

it was based in part on the same testimony that the BIA found not credible, and the 

record does not otherwise compel the conclusion that it is more likely than not that 
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Kochetkova and her family would be tortured by or with the consent or 

acquiescence of the government if returned to Russia. See Shrestha, 590 F.3d at 

1048-49. Substantial evidence supports the BIA’s denial of CAT relief.

The petition for review is DENIED.