UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT

________________ _________________ FRANK PASCARELLI, Plaintiff - Appellant,

v. MARRIOTT INTERNATIONAL, INC.; JAMES P. KOEHLER, individually, d/b/a TKO, d/b/a Courtyard Casper; TKO MASTER MANAGEMENT, LLC; TKO OFFICE REAL ESTATE, LLC; TKO PROPERTY MANA GEMENT, LLC; CASPER HOSPITALITY, LLC, Defendants - Appellees. No. 20-8004 (D.C. No. 2:19- CV-00127-SWS) (D. Wyo.)

________________ _________________ ORDER AND JUDGMENT *

________________ _________________ Before HARTZ , KELLY , and HOLMES , Circuit Judges.

________________ _________________ Plaintiff Frank Pascarelli appeals from the or der of the United Stat es District Court for the District of Wyoming granting judgment on the pleadings in favor of Defendants

* After examining the briefs and appellate re cord, this panel has determined unanimously that oral argument would not materially assist in the determination of this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2); 10th Cir. R. 34. 1(G). The case is therefore ordered submitted without oral argument. This order and judg ment is not binding precedent, except under the doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. It may be cited, however, for its persuasive value consistent w ith Fed. R. App. P. 32.1 and 10th Cir. R. 32.1. FILED United States Court of Appeals Tenth Circuit 

### August 21, 2020 Christopher M. Wolpert Clerk of Court2 because his claims were barred by Wyomi ng’s applicable statute of limitations. Exercising jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, we affirm. Mr. Pascarelli alleges that in April 2012 he was bitten by bed bugs during his stay at a Courtyard Marriott hotel in Caspe r, Wyoming, and suffered severe medical consequences. In March 2014, Mr. Pascarelli and his wife file d a claim for negligence in Georgia state court against Defendants, who allegedly owned, opera ted, or managed the hotel. In April 2017 the Georgia state cour t dismissed all defendants except Marriott for lack of personal jurisdiction. The dismissal was affirmed on interlocutory appeal in June 2018, and the Pascarellis voluntarily dismisse d their Georgia action in April 2019. Two months later Mr. Pascarelli filed his presen t suit against Defendants for negligence and breach of implied warranty in Wyoming federal court. We review de novo the district court’s judgment on the pleadings. See Leiser v.
Moore , 903 F.3d 1137, 1139 (10th Cir. 2018). It is undisputed that Wyoming’s four-year statute of limitations applies to Mr. Pascarelli’s claims. Thus, his claims are untim ely on their face. His sole response to the limitations bar is to argue that he can bene fit from Wyoming’s saving statute, Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 1-3-118 (West 2019), 1 which allows a plaintiff to revive a claim that was

1 The statute provides in full: If in an action commenced in due time a judgment for the plaintiff is reversed, or if the plaintiff fails othe rwise than upon the merits and the time limited for the commencement of the action has expired at the date of the reversal or failure, the plaintiff, or his representatives if he dies and if the cause of action survives, may commen ce a new action within one (1) year3 originally filed in a timely fashion but failed on a ground other than th e merits, so long as the new claim is filed within one year. Long ago, howeve r, this court held that the Wyoming saving statute “does not apply to actions brought in a state other than Wyoming.” Riley v. Union Pac. R.R. Co. , 182 F.2d 765, 767 (1 0th Cir. 1950). Mr. Pascarelli’s Georgia litigation therefore cannot save his claims. He correctly points out that this court held in Prince v. Leesona Corp., Inc. , 720 F.2d 1166, 1168–69 (10th Cir. 1983), that the Kansas saving statute applies to actions originally brought in foreign states. But that opinion did not purport to change our interpretati on of Wyoming law in Riley

. Mr. Pascarelli argues that Riley should now be overturned. That course, however, is beyond this panel’s author ity. “Following the doctrine of stare decisis , one panel of this court must follow a prior panel’s interp retation of state law, absent a supervening declaration to the contrary by that state’s c ourts or an intervening change in the state’s law.” Koch v. Koch Indus., Inc. , 203 F.3d 1202, 1231 (10th Ci r. 2000). It is undisputed that the Wyoming Supreme Court has never addressed the issue before us, and Mr. Pascarelli identifies no substantive change in the Wyoming saving statute since we decided Riley . (The statute was amended in 1977, but the only change s were stylistic.)

after the date of the failure or revers al. This provision also applies to any claim asserted in any pleading by a defendant. Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 1-3-118 (West 2019).4 We AFFIRM the district court’s judgment. Entered for the Court

Harris L Hartz Circuit Judge