Filed 6/28/18

CERTIFIED FOR PUBLICATION

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION ONE

THE PEOPLE,

Plaintiff and Respondent,

v.

DYLAN M. LITTLEFIELD,

Defendant and Appellant.

 B280646

 (Los Angeles County

 Super. Ct. No. BA194621)

APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of 

Los Angeles County, Karla D. Kerlin, Judge. Dismissed.

Brad Kaiserman, under appointment by the Court of 

Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.

Xavier Becerra, Attorney General, Gerald A. Engler, 

Chief Assistant Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, 

Assistant Attorney General, Paul M. Roadarmel, Jr. and 

Allison H. Chung, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and 

Respondent.

____________________
2

Dylan M. Littlefield moved under the doctrine of laches to 

vacate a victim restitution order approximately 16 years after 

that order was entered and after Littlefield served his sentence 

for forgery. The trial court found it did not have jurisdiction to 

entertain Littlefield’s motion. We agree and dismiss his appeal. 

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

Littlefield was charged with four counts of forgery.1

(Pen. Code,2 § 470, subd. (d).) He pled guilty to one count, and 

the remaining three counts were dismissed pursuant to a plea 

agreement. On January 5, 2000, the trial court sentenced 

Littlefield in accordance with the negotiated plea to the low term 

of 16 months. The trial court ordered Littlefield to pay victim 

restitution in the following amounts: $2,154 to Portobello, 

$1,350 to Wolfe Properties, and $3,000 to Group 3 Aviation. 

The trial court stayed a $200 restitution fine contingent upon

Littlefield’s paying the victim restitution. 

On December 15, 2016, then no longer in custody, 

Littlefield moved then in propria persona to vacate the victim 

restitution order in his forgery case under the doctrine of laches. 

Littlefield asserted that on or about July 20, 2016, the 

Franchise Tax Board (FTB) sent him a court-ordered debt 

collection letter demanding payment of $8,416.94. He argued the 

failure “to make any efforts to collect this debt” by the FTB “or 

the state agency that has had actual custody of the defendant 

from January 2007 until June 26, 2015” foreclosed the FTB “from 

now seeking to enforce this judgment.” Littlefield stated he had 

 

1 We do not address the facts underlying these forgery 

charges because they are not pertinent to the issues on appeal.

2 Undesignated statutory citations are to the Penal Code. 
3

suffered from cancer and only recently was able to begin working. 

Any effort to garnish his wages or attach his bank account thus 

would “be a significant hardship on [his] recovery and return to 

self-support.” He also asserted that laches was his only remedy 

because “there is no codified method for vacating stale direct 

victim restitution orders.”

On January 12, 2017, the trial court found it lacked 

jurisdiction to consider Littlefield’s motion and referred 

Littlefield to “the civil courthouse in order to research remedies.” 

In doing so, the trial court queried whether the demand letter 

was fraudulent because the amount demanded did not match the 

amount of restitution ordered in Littlefield’s criminal case,3 and 

it was not clear why the FTB was acting as a collection agency for 

Littlefield’s forgery victims. On January 18, 2017, Littlefield 

filed this appeal.4 

DISCUSSION

A. The Trial Court Did Not Have Jurisdiction To Vacate 

Littlefield’s Victim Restitution Obligation

On appeal, Littlefield relies on People v. Ford (2015) 

61 Cal.4th 282 (Ford) to argue, inter alia, that the trial court had 

“fundamental jurisdiction” to entertain his motion to vacate his 

criminal restitution order. He further argues under sections 

 

3 We observe that in his declaration attached to his motion 

to vacate, Littlefield refers to criminal restitution orders in two 

other cases, one in superior court and the other in the federal 

district court. 

4 On February 5, 2018, the People moved to dismiss this 

appeal; Littlefield filed his opposition on February 9, 2018. We 

deferred ruling on the motion. 
4

1202.46 and 1214, the trial court had authority to consider his 

motion on the merits, principally relying on People v. Turrin 

(2009) 176 Cal.App.4th 1200 (Turrin) for this proposition. The 

Attorney General counters that these sections and Turrin provide 

no authority for a criminal defendant to evade a court-ordered 

criminal restitution obligation, and accordingly, we must dismiss 

the instant appeal.5 

The issue before us is not whether a trial court lacks 

“fundamental jurisdiction” described by Justice Cuellar in Ford

to mean “no authority at all over the subject matter or the 

parties, or when it lacks any power to hear or determine the 

case.” (Ford, supra, 61 Cal.4th at p. 286.) Clearly, trial courts 

have subject matter jurisdiction over victim restitution orders, 

and the parties do not contend otherwise.

As Justice Cuellar further explained in Ford, jurisdiction 

has a second meaning: “Even when a court has fundamental 

jurisdiction, however, the Constitution, a statute, or relevant case 

law may constrain the court to act only in a particular manner, or 

subject to certain limitations.” (Ford, supra, 61 Cal.4th at 

pp. 286-287.) It is this aspect of jurisdiction that is before us. 

In Turrin, defendant sought to modify court-ordered 

restitution fines 10 months after judgment was entered and while 

he was serving his prison sentence on the theory that he was 

financially unable to pay those fines. The appellate court held 

the trial court did not have jurisdiction to entertain that motion 

and the appeal had to be dismissed. In doing so, it announced 

 

5 The Attorney General further argues that a laches 

defense may be asserted only in a suit in equity, and not in this

criminal case. In light of our ruling, we do not address the merits 

of this contention. 
5

general principles applicable here: “ ‘[G]enerally a trial court 

lacks jurisdiction to resentence a criminal defendant after 

execution of sentence has begun.’ ” (Turrin, supra, 

176 Cal.App.4th at p. 1204.) 

The Turrin court acknowledged the following limited 

exceptions to that general principle: (1) when upon its own 

motion, pursuant to section 1170, subdivision (d), a court recalls a

sentence within 120 days after committing a defendant to prison; 

(2) a court corrects “a clerical error, but not a judicial error, at 

any time” with clerical error defined as “one that is made in 

recording the judgment”; and (3) the court “at any time” corrects 

an unauthorized sentence. (Turrin, supra, 176 Cal.App.4th 

at pp. 1204-1205.) The appellate court described unauthorized 

sentences as those involving obvious legal error and capable of 

correcting without reference to factual findings in the record or 

remanding for further factual findings. (Id. at p. 1205.)6 None of 

these exceptions applies here, and Littlefield does not appear to 

contend otherwise. 

Littlefield argues that despite these well-established 

principles, the trial court had jurisdiction pursuant to sections 

1202.46 and 1214 to vacate his criminal restitution order. 

Section 1202.46 provides: “Notwithstanding Section 1170, 

when the economic losses of a victim cannot be ascertained at the 

time of sentencing pursuant to subdivision (f) of Section 1202.4, 

the court shall retain jurisdiction over a person subject to a 

 

6 Other courts have similarly held that the trial court loses 

jurisdiction to modify a sentence after execution of the sentence 

has begun. (People v. Cabrera (2018) 21 Cal.App.5th 470, 476; 

People v. Scarbrough (2015) 240 Cal.App.4th 916, 923; see 

People v. Howard (1997) 16 Cal.4th 1081, 1089.)
6

restitution order for purposes of imposing or modifying 

restitution until such time as the losses may be determined. This 

section does not prohibit a victim, the district attorney, or a court 

on its own motion from requesting correction, at any time, of a 

sentence when the sentence is invalid due to the omission of a 

restitution order or fine pursuant to Section 1202.4.”

On its face, section 1202.46 does not apply to Littlefield’s 

efforts to erase his criminal restitution obligation because the 

trial court set the amount of Littlefield’s restitution obligation 

before Littlefield’s sentencing hearing and imposed that 

restitution obligation at that hearing. Thus, there was no need to 

continue jurisdiction under section 1202.46 until “the losses may 

be determined.” In addition, under section 1202.46, only a 

victim, the district attorney, or the court may move to correct a 

sentence that omits “a restitution order or fine pursuant to 

Section 1202.4.” In contrast, here there was no such omission, let 

alone any right conferred on a defendant to eliminate an 

unsatisfied criminal restitution obligation.

Section 1214 does not rescue Littlefield either. That 

statute affords a victim the opportunity to enforce a restitution 

order “as if ” it were “a civil judgment.” (§ 1214, subd. (b).) 

“A victim shall have access to all resources available under the 

law to enforce the restitution order, including, but not limited to, 

access to the defendant’s financial records, use of wage 

garnishment and lien procedures, information regarding the 

defendant’s assets . . . .” (Ibid.) The statute merely enumerates 

tools available to a victim to enforce a criminal restitution 

obligation. The statute does not provide a basis for Littlefield to 

eschew that obligation.
7

Littlefield relies on Turrin’s observation that 

“section 1202.46 provides that a court retains jurisdiction to 

impose or modify victim restitution.” (Turrin, supra, 

176 Cal.App.4th at p. 1208.) Littlefield takes that observation 

out of the context in which it arose. 

There, the appellate court was interpreting section 1202.42, 

subdivision (d) regarding income deductions to pay restitution 

obligations,7 and whether the term “restitution order” in the 

latter statute includes restitution fines. The appellate court held 

that it did not because that term should be read in pari materia 

with other statutes using the same term such as sections 1202.46 

and 1214. (Turrin, supra, 176 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1207-1208.) 

Nothing in Turrin expanded the continuing jurisdiction described 

in those statutes to allow a criminal defendant to avoid his victim 

restitution obligation after he has served his sentence on the 

theory that the unsatisfied victim restitution obligation has 

become stale for lack of enforcement.8

 

7 Section 1202.42, subdivision (d) provides, “[t]he income 

deduction order shall be effective so long as the order for 

restitution upon which it is based is effective or until further 

order of the court.” There was no income deduction order in this 

case, and we fail to discern how section 1202.42, subdivision (d) 

otherwise aids Littlefield’s cause. 

8 Littlefield contends because a court has “authority to 

impose restitution after the completion of a sentence under 

certain circumstances [set forth in section 1202.46],” it follows 

that “criminal courts similarly retain jurisdiction when a 

defendant wishes to challenge the enforcement of a restitution 

order after the completion of his sentence.” This argument 

ignores the language of the cited statute. 
8

Finally, contrary to Littlefield’s argument, Ford, supra,

61 Cal.4th 282, does not command a different conclusion. In 

Ford, the defendant appealed from a victim restitution order 

entered in a felony hit and run case after his probation had 

expired one week earlier. Pursuant to a negotiated disposition 

providing for victim restitution, the trial court initially ordered 

defendant to pay the victim’s medical expenses and pursuant to 

the victim’s and defendant’s requests, continued the restitution 

hearing several times to determine lost wages, and extended 

defendant’s probationary term with defendant’s consent. (Id.

at pp. 286.) The trial court ultimately determined the amount of 

the victim’s lost wages, but continued the restitution hearing at 

defendant’s request to allow defendant to rebut the victim’s 

information and to procure a defense witness’s appearance. 

(Ibid.) This continued hearing postdated expiration of 

defendant’s probation. (Ibid.) 

Defendant asserted that the trial court had no authority to 

order further victim restitution after his probation expired. 

Although recognizing that “the expiration of a probationary 

period does not terminate a court’s fundamental jurisdiction,” the 

Supreme Court refused to decide “whether expiration of the 

probationary period rendered the trial court’s award of 

restitution an act in excess of jurisdiction.” (Ford, supra, 

61 Cal.4th at p. 287.) Defendant was estopped from arguing lack 

of jurisdiction because “having obtained the benefit of his plea 

bargain and agreeing to continue the hearing to a date certain to 

present that rebuttal—defendant cannot be heard to complain 

that the trial court thereby lost jurisdiction when it set a hearing 

to consider his rebuttal on the agreed-upon date.” (Id. at p. 289.) 
9

Estopping a criminal defendant from avoiding his 

restitution obligation by seeking to postpone a continued 

restitution hearing as in Ford is not authority for Littlefield’s 

efforts here to evade a valid and unsatisfied victim restitution 

order several years after he served his sentence. As our Supreme 

Court observed in Ford, applying estoppel there “further[ed] the 

objective of ensuring victims of crime receive the restitution they 

are due.” (Ford, supra, 61 Cal.4th at p. 290.) In contrast, the 

relief Littlefield seeks here undermines that objective. 

B. Absent Jurisdiction, The Order Denying Littlefield’s 

Motion Is Non-Appealable And The Instant Appeal 

Must Be Dismissed

Section 1237, subdivision (b) authorizes an appeal in a 

criminal case “[f]rom any order made after judgment, affecting 

the substantial rights of the party.” Because the trial court 

lacked jurisdiction to vacate Littlefield’s victim restitution order, 

the order denying Littlefield’s motion to vacate that obligation 

did not affect Littlefield’s substantial rights and was thus nonappealable. (Turrin, supra, 176 Cal.App.4th at p. 1208 [because 

trial court lacked jurisdiction to modify restitution fines, its 

“order denying defendant’s motion requesting the same did not 

affect his substantial rights and is not an appealable 

postjudgment order”].) Accordingly, we dismiss Littlefield’s 

appeal. (Ibid.; People v. Dynes (2018) 20 Cal.App.5th 523, 528 

[“the court’s order denying defendant’s ex parte request for relief 

[under section 32] is not an appealable order, and we dismiss this 

appeal”]; People v. Mendez (2012) 209 Cal.App.4th 32, 34 

[dismissing appeal from order denying motion to reduce 

restitution fine to the minimum provided by law filed years after 

execution of sentence had begun].) 
10

DISPOSITION

The appeal is dismissed.

CERTIFIED FOR PUBLICATION.

BENDIX, J.

We concur:

ROTHSCHILD, P. J.

CHANEY, J.