NOT FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

In re: BARD IVC FILTERS PRODUCT 

LIABILITY LITIGATION, 

______________________________ 

DORIS JONES, 

Plaintiff-Appellant, 

 v. 

C. R. BARD, INC., a New Jersey 

corporation; BARD PERIPHERAL 

VASCULAR, INC., a subsidiary and/or 

Division of defendant C.R. Bard, Inc., an 

Arizona corporation, 

Defendants-Appellees.

No. 18-16461 

D.C. Nos. 2:15-md-02641-DGC 

2:16-cv-00782-DGC 

MEMORANDUM*

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the District of Arizona

David G. Campbell, District Judge, Presiding

Argued and Submitted February 3, 2020

Phoenix, Arizona

Before: GRABER, HURWITZ, and MILLER, Circuit Judges.

Doris Jones asserted product-liability claims against C.R. Bard, Inc. and 

* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent 

except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.

FILED

AUG 13 2020

MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK

U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
2 

Bard Peripheral Vascular, Inc. (collectively, “Bard”), based on injuries she 

suffered from an intravascular filter, a medical device designed and manufactured 

by Bard. Following a jury verdict in Bard’s favor, Jones appeals the district court’s 

order excluding certain evidence under Federal Rule of Evidence 403. We have 

jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, and we affirm.

The district court has discretion to exclude otherwise relevant and 

admissible evidence “if its probative value is substantially outweighed by a danger 

of . . . unfair prejudice.” Fed. R. Evid. 403. A district court’s application of Rule 

403 “is subject to great deference, because ‘the considerations arising under Rule 

403 are susceptible only to case-by-case determinations, requiring examination of 

the surrounding facts, circumstances, and issues.’” United States v. Hinkson, 585 

F.3d 1247, 1267 (9th Cir. 2009) (en banc) (quoting R.B. Matthews, Inc. v. 

Transam. Transp. Servs., Inc., 945 F.2d 269, 272 (9th Cir. 1991)).

Jones was injured when Bard’s “Eclipse” filter broke apart and one of the 

pieces moved to her lung. She sought to introduce evidence of a different outcome

(deaths of patients) caused by a different kind of complication (caudal migration) 

from a different device made by Bard (the “Recovery” filter, last sold more than 

four years before Jones received her Eclipse filter). In a careful and thorough order, 

the district court concluded that the evidence would have “at most, marginal 

relevancy,” and posed a danger of “prompt[ing] a jury decision based on emotion” 
3 

because it involved patients who had died. Because “it appears from the record as a 

whole that the trial judge adequately weighed the probative value and prejudicial 

effect of [the] proffered evidence . . . we conclude that the demands of Rule 403 

have been met.” Boyd v. City & Cty. of San Francisco, 576 F.3d 938, 948 (9th Cir. 

2009) (quoting United States v. Verduzco, 373 F.3d 1022, 1029 n.2 (9th Cir.

2004)).

Jones contends that Bard opened the door to the introduction of the evidence 

by suggesting that intravascular filters were lifesaving devices. The district court 

permitted Jones to respond to Bard’s suggestion by “presenting evidence that 

[intravascular] filter complications can also cause death,” but it determined that the

other evidence Jones sought to introduce remained of limited relevance. That was 

not an abuse of discretion. See United States v. Sine, 493 F.3d 1021, 1037–38 (9th 

Cir. 2007).

AFFIRMED.