## In the Court of Appeals Second Appe llate District of Texas at Fort Worth

___________________________ No. 02

- 20

- 00178

- CV

___________________________

On Appeal from the 236th District Court Tarrant County, Texas Trial Court No. 236

- 308010

- 19
Before Sudderth, C.J.; Kerr and Womack, JJ. Mem o randum Opinion by Chief Justice Sudderth 

### B RADLEY 

### D RAGOO 

### , Appellant

V


### . C ITY OF 

### F ORT 

### W ORTH 

### , T EXAS 

### , Appellee2 MEMORANDUM OPIN ION
I
. Introduction On July 25, 2017, Appellee the City of Fort Worth installed three chevron warning signs for veh icles crossing the Interstate 30 intersection and trav eling

nort hbound on Fore st P a rk Bou levard

. Che vron signs a re “ directional signs indicating a curve in the roadway. ” City of San Antonio v. Schneider , 787 S.W.2d 459, 461 (Tex. App.

— San Antonio 1990, writ denied)

. Half a year later, in December 2017, a po lice officer who resp ond ed t o an accident at the site noted that a motorist app eared to have knocked down one of the signs , and in January 2 018, Google Maps of the area s how ed that the northernmost sign , demarcating the end of the curve, was missing.
O n Apri l 1 5, 2018, Appellant Brad ley Dr agoo wrecked his motorcycle and suffered personal injuries while dr i v

ing th rough th e ar ea . He sued the City a year later , alleging that it had been negligent when it failed to reinstall the missing sign

. Tw o weeks after Dragoo filed suit, t he City ’ s Transportation and Public Works
D epartment (TPW ) received a rep ort that the northern most sign had bee n kno cked
dow n . TPW replaced the sign two days later.
The City filed several motions to dismiss Dragoo ’ s case for lac k of jurisdictio n, arguing t hat Dra goo ’ s claims against it were barred by governmental immunity
because (1) D r a g o o had f a i l e d t o p r o v i d e the sta tutory formal notice o f h i s c l a i m s

u n d e r t h e T e x a s T o r t C l a i m s A c t ( T T C A ) and therefore had to sho w that the Ci t y had3 received actual notice of his claim but had failed to do so ; (2) that the City lacked

a ctual notice of t he sign ’ s abs ence ; and (3) the City could not have proximately caused
D rag oo ’ s in juries based on the m issing sign because Dragoo crashed before reaching
where the s ign wo uld have be en. 1 Dragoo did not file a res ponse, and t he tr ial court
dis missed Dragoo ’ s claims with preju dice after a hearing

. 2
I n tw o issues, Dragoo now complain s that the trial court erred by dism issing
his claims because “ he has shown sufficient evidence and alleg ations that the City ha d
actual notic e o f the missing chevron warning sign and that the missing warning sign proximate ly caused his injuries. ” We affirm.
II. Plea to the Jurisdiction
The TTCA creates a unique statutory scheme in which governmental immun ity
from s uit is waived and abolished to the ex tent of li ability c reated under th e statutory

sc heme. See Tex. Dep ’ t of Parks & Wildlife v . Miranda , 133 S.W.3d 217, 224 (Tex. 2004) (referencing Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem

. C ode Ann. § § 101.001, .021, .025 ).
Gov ernmental immunity is prope rly asserted in a plea to th e juris dic tion. Id. at 225

– 26.

1 In one of its motions , the City also arg ued th at Dr agoo had brought forth no evidence of which sign had been knocked down , but the City ’ s evidence shows which sign was missin g .
2 Dragoo filed a motion to modify, amend , o r correct the judgment to which he attached evidence , but t ha t motion was denied, and Dragoo do es not ap peal the motion ’ s denial

.4 A. Standard of R eview
A plea to t he jurisdicti on c hallenges whether a plaintiff ha s alleged facts that affirmatively demonstrate the trial court ’ s jurisdiction to hear the case. Mission Consol.
ISD v. Garci a , 372 S.W.3d 6 29, 635 (T ex. 2012) (stating that a plea to the jurisdiction ’ s purp ose generally is to def eat an action “ without reg ard to whether the claims asserted
have merit ” ). Whether a trial court has subject ma tter juri sdiction and whet her a plainti ff has alleged facts t hat affirmatively demonstrate a tri al court ’ s subject matter jurisdiction ar e questions of law that we review de novo. City of Westworth Vill. v. City of White Settlement , 558 S.W.3d 232, 239 (T ex. App.

— Fort Worth 2018, pet. denied) (citing Miranda , 133 S .W

. 3d at 226 ). When a ple a to the jurisdiction challenges th e pleadings, we d etermine if the pleader has alleged facts that affirmatively demonstrate the trial court ’ s jurisdiction to
hear the ca use, cons truing the pleadi ngs liberally in the p lainti ff ’ s fa vor and looking to the pl eader ’ s intent. Id. (citing Mirand a , 133 S.W.3d at 226). If the pleadings do not contain sufficient facts to affirmatively demonstrate the trial court ’ s jurisdiction bu t do not affirmatively dem onstrate incu rable defec ts i n juris dic tion, the issue is one of pleading sufficiency and the pl a intiff should b e afforded the opportunity to amend.
Id. at 239

– 40.
W e al so consider relevant evidence submitted by the par ties when n ecessary to resolve the ju risdictional issues raise d , as the trial court is required to do

. Miranda , 133
S.W.3d at 227

. When the jurisd i ctional challenge implicates the merits of the5 plaintiff ’ s cause of action and the plea to the jurisdiction in clu des e vidence, the trial

court reviews the relevant e viden ce to determine if a fact issue exists. Id. If the evidence creates a fact question regarding the jurisdictiona l issue, then the trial court cannot grant the plea to the jurisdiction , and the fact issue will be res olved by the
fact finder. Id. at 2 27

– 2 8. Ho wever, if the releva nt evidence is undisputed or fails to raise a fact question o n th e jurisdictional issue, the trial cou rt rules on the plea to the jurisdiction as a matter of law

. Id. at 228.
Th is sta n dard generally m i rrors that o f summary judgment unde r Rul e of Civil
Pr ocedure 166a (c) , and after the governmental entit y asserts tha t the tria l court lacks subject matter jurisdiction and supports that assertion with evidence , a plaintiff is

“ require[ d], when the facts un derlying the merits and subject matt er j urisdicti on are inter twined, to show that there is a disputed material fact r egarding th e jurisdictional
issue. ” Id. When reviewing a plea to the jurisdiction in which the pleading requirement has been met and evid ence has been su bmitted to support t h e plea that implicates t he merits of the case, we take as true all evidence fav o rable to t h e nonmovant and indulge every reasonable inference and resolve any doubts in the

no nmovant ’ s fa vor. Id.
B
. Ac tual Notice under the TTCA
Th e sup reme court has explained that to secure the TTCA ’ s limi ted waiver of
governme ntal immunity , a clai m ant must pr ovide timely notice of a claim to the governmental unit under S ection 101.101

. Reyes v. Jefferson C ty

. , 60 1 S.W.3d 795, 7976 ( Tex. 2020)

. The TTCA ’ s notice requirement is a jurisdictional prerequ i site to suit. Worsdale v. City of Killeen , 57 8 S.W.3d 57 , 62 (Tex. 2019)

. Under Sec tion 101 .101, a go vernme ntal unit is entitled to receive formal notic e of a TTCA c la im against it n ot later than s ix months after the da y that the incident giving rise to the claim occurred unless the unit has “ actual n o tice ” t hat the claimant has received some injury or that his property has been d amaged

. Tex. Civ. Prac. &
Rem. Code A n n. § 101.101(a) , (c) ; see Worsdale , 578 S.W.3d at 59 (explaining that the
TTCA provides a limited waiver of governmental immunity but th a t , as p art of its waiver bargain, it requires prompt notice of a claim to allow governmental units to
exp editiously un dert ake remedial measures that may be required t o protect the public ). 3

“ Actual notice ” require s the governmental unit to have subjectiv e awar eness of
its fault (responsibility) as ultimately alleged by the claimant

. See Reyes , 601 S.W.3d at 798 (referen ci ng W orsdale , 578 S .W. 3d at 77 ) ; 4 Worsdale , 578 S.W.3d at 59 ( citing Tex

.

3 P rompt n otice under these provisions connect s a govern mental unit ’ s conduct to an inj ury and “ allows f or swift abatement of dangerous conditions or pra ctices, fosters early termination of litigation th rough sett lemen t of merito ri ous claims, and provides sufficient notice of potential claims to en able gov ernmental entities to make proper bu dgeting and ta x d ecisions. ” Worsdale , 578 S.W.3 d at 64.

4 In the context of the specific informati on required to pro vide “ not ice of a claim ” un d er Section 101.101, actual notice e xists when the governmental unit has know ledge of (1) a death, injury, or p ro perty d amage; (2) the gove rnmental unit ’ s allege d fault in producing or contributing to the specif ic death, injury, or proper ty da m ag e; and (3) the identi ty of the parties i nvolve d. Cathey v. Booth , 900 S.W.2d 339, 340

– 4 2 (Tex. 1995) (holding in medi cal

- m alpract ice case that count y hospital did not7 Dep ’ t of Criminal Justice v. Simons , 140 S.W.3d 338 , 343

– 48 (T e x. 20 04) )

. Subjective

aw areness does not occur j ust because an accide nt is investigated as part of rou tine safety pro ce dures. City of San Antonio v. Tenorio , 543 S.W.3d 772, 776 (Tex. 2018)

. The court recently revisited and reaffirmed its “ actual notic e ” a nalysis in
Worsdale , in which two people were badly inju red when the ir motorcycle collided with

a large dirt moun d that was bloc king an unlit asphalt road in the City of Kil l een. 578
S.W.3d at 60. W ithin days of the crash, the Kil leen police departme n t d ispatche d an
officer to conduct an accident investigation

. Id. The officer photographed th e acci dent site and dir t pile ; const ruc ted a scale dia gram of the sc ene using 3D las er

mapping technology ; observed that at the time of the c rash there w ere no s ign s, barri cades, or cones present to indicate that the ro adway was closed to traffic ; and spok e with several official s f rom variou s c ity depa rtments as part of the investigation, including the deputy city attorney and the city inspector , with regard to r e spo nsibilit y for road maintenance and warning signs and whether the city had aba ndoned the
road

. I d. The city offic ia ls acknowle dge d that the road h ad been obst r ucted for at least two years but said that barri cades and warning signs had not been er ecte d b e fore the

a ccident becau se of an ongoing dispute with the county over jurisdiction and road

m ainten anc e resp o nsibili ty
. Id. The deputy city attorney ’s investigation confirmed the

hav e actual notice from medical records that did not convey to the h osp ital its possib le culpabili ty).8 city ’s annexation of the road but not its legal abandonment of the road , i d

. at 67 , an d

t wo da ys after the accident, the city removed the dirt pile and installed permanent

ro ad

- clo sure signs an d barricade s at the police department ’ s request
. Id. at 60. After
the two people died of their injuries from the accident, their relati v e s sued the city
under the TTCA and argued that despite their having failed to give formal statutor y notice to the c it y , the c ity had received actual notice. Id. at 60

– 61. The city filed a plea to the jurisdiction, which the t rial court denied bu t the cour t of appeals reversed, relying on City of Dall

. v. Carba ja l , 324 S.W.3d 5 37 (Tex. 2010)

. 5 Id. at 61.
The sup r eme co urt exa mined several of its prior ca ses , including Carbajal and
Ten orio , 6 b efore r eiterating that , ultimately, the governmental unit “need only a ch ie ve

5 In Carba jal , in which the plai ntiff sued the city for injuries she sustai ned after driving into an unbarric ad ed gap on an excavated road, the court held th at a routine safety investigation like a police re port is insuffici ent t o pro vide ac tual notice . 3 24 S.W.3d at 537

– 39. The court held that the police report did not provide the city with subjective awarenes s

— actual notice

— o f fault “ because it did no t eve n imply, let alone expres sly state, that the [c] it y was at fault. ” I d. at 53 7 , 539

. The court reasoned,

“ When a police report do es not in dicate that the g overnmental un it was a t fault, the governmental unit has little , if any, incent ive to investigate its potential liability because it is unaware that l iability is even at issue. ” Id

. at 539.

6 In T enorio , the plaintiffs ’ motor cycle was hit head

- on by a vehicle that had been pursued by p olice until its driver ent ered I nter state L oop 410 going the wrong way , at which point the police discontinued pursuit

. 543 S.W.3d at 774

. The su rviving plaintiff sued the city , alleging that the po lice had been negligent in initi ating, continuing, and failing to terminate th e hi gh

- speed chase and that the cit y had actual notice of the claims

. Id. The city responded tha t it had not ha d act ual not ice that it was a t fault and su pported its plea t o th e jurisdictio n with sworn witness statements and police repor ts about the coll isio n. Id. The court held t hat ev idence that the vehicle pursued by the police had been in a col li sion is not, by itself, s ufficient to rais e a fact question about the city ’ s s ub jective awareness that it was in some manner at9 subject ive awareness of fault ” as al leged by the claimant , i.e., that th e plainti ff ’s pleadings m u st dem onstrat e “ subjective awareness connecting alleged governmental
conduct to causation of an a lleged injur y to person or property in the manner
ulti ma te ly asserte d , ” as compared to merely col lecting statistics. Id. at 65 , 73 (noting
th at statistics ke p t by g overnme ntal units are “knowledge, not n otice ”)

. “ T he c ritical inquiry is the govern mental unit ’s actual anticipation of an alleged claim rather th an subjectiv e confi rmation of its actual liability. ” Id. at 68.
T he pleadings in Wors dale did not all e ge fac ts abou t actual notice, but in response to the city ’s plea to the jurisdiction, the plaintiffs responded with ev idence
tha t the city did not disp ut e. Id. at 6 6. Th e record established that almost immediately after the accident

— and well within the s ix

- mon th form al notice deadline
under the TTCA

— the city had been subjectively aware of allegations that the road
condition and absence of war ning signs w er e contribu ting factors to the accident and that the city had been responsible for ma intaining the roa d. Id

. at 6 6

– 67

. The court distinguished Carbajal by observing that whereas the evidence of actual noti ce in that
case was limited to a one

- page repo rt t hat disclo sed only that a vehicle was driven into a street that lacked proper barri c ades, there had b een in Worsda le a “ w ide

- ranging
post

- accident investigation ” sh owing “ an effort among various [c] ity d epartments to
fault for the collision. Id

. at 778 ( “ [N]othing in the crash r eport, witness s tatemen ts, or case report indicate, either expr es sly or impliedly, that th e SAPD subjective l y believed its officers acted in er ro r by initia ting or continuing the pursuit such that they were in some manner responsib l e for the inj uries. ” ). Subjective awareness of potential fault is insufficient. Id. a t 779.10 track down whether the [c]ity was c ha rg ed with ma intaining the road and rem ediating
the hazard ” and “firmly establish[ed] t he [c]ity ’s knowl edge c onnecti ng its alleged
ownersh ip and control of the road to the road condition s identified as contributing

to ” the deaths

. Id. at 67. Fur ther, t he e vidence of subsequent remediation, while
inadmis sible to prove liability, was admiss ible to prove own ership , contr ol, and notice.
Id. a t 68

. Not withstanding “ actual notice ” of the TTCA claim itself , at issue in this case
is another TTCA “ actua l notice ” pr ovision. U nder S ection 101.060 (a)(3) , the TTCA does not apply to (that is

—governmen tal immunity is r etaine d for ) a claim arising
from “ the re moval or destruction of a traffic or road sign, signal, or warning device by a third person unless the governm en tal unit fail s to correct the removal or destruction within a reasonable time af ter act u al no tice

. ” Tex . Civ . Prac. & Rem. Code Ann. § 101.060(a) (3) (emphasis added) ; see In re Te x. Dep ’ t of Transp. , 218 S.W.3d 74, 78 (Tex. 2007) (orig. proceeding ) ( notin g that S e ction 101.060 acts only as a limi tati on on the governme nt ’ s waiver of immunity in some situations in volving the absence, con d it ion, malf unction,

or rem oval of a traffic co ntrol device and does not create a cause of action separate and apart f rom a premises defect cause of action ) ; Tex. Faci lities Comm ’ n v. Speer , 559
S.W.3d 245, 251 (Tex. App.

— Austin 201 8, no pet.) ( explaining that immunity is
retained subject to the lim itations set out in S ection 1 01 .060(a) ) ; Tex. Dep ’ t of Transp. v.
Rammi ng , 861 S.W.2d 460, 464 (Tex. App.

— Houston [14th Dist.] 1993, writ denied) ( stating that “ Sections 10 1.022 [the TTCA p rovision setting out the duty owed in11 claims arising from premise a nd special defect s ] and 101.0 60, read together, establish the duty owed by the State to a plaintiff who sues under a premises liability claim involving a traffic signal ” bu t noting t hat a traffic

- signal claim is not always a premises liability claim ).
S ubs ection (a) (3) , ba s ed on its p lain lang uage, “expres sly applies whenever a third person removes or destroys a traffic si gn or signal

. ” State ex rel. State Dep ’ t of Highways & Pub. Tr ansp. v. Gonzalez , 82 S.W.3d 322, 328

– 29 (Tex. 2002) ( “[S]ubsection (a)(3) imposes a duty o n the [gover nmental entity] to correct a sign ’s remova l or
des truction by a third person upon receiving actual notice

. ” ). Whether a govern mental
unit has “ actual no tice ” about a sign ’ s re moval or d estr uction by a third party is a fact
que stion. See i d. a t 327

. To receive “ a ctual notice ” of the removal of a sign by a third party, information concerning the sign mus t be actually communicated to or obtaine d by an empl oyee

r esponsible for acting on the information

. Montgomery C ty

. Preci nct 1 v. Reed , No

. 09

- 06

- 00 402

- CV, 2006 WL 3823897, at *2 (Tex. App.

— Beaumo nt Dec. 28, 2006, no pet.) (mem. op.) (citing City of Dall

. v. Don ovan , 768 S.W.2d 90 5, 908 (Tex. A pp
. — Dallas
1 989, n o writ), and Martinez v. City of Lubb ock , 9 93 S.W.2d 882, 886 ( Tex. App.

— Amarill o 1999, pet . denied) ).12 C
. Th e Record
1. Drago o ’ s Pleading s In his original petition, Dragoo alleged that on or abo ut Apr il 15, 2 018, he had been riding his motorcycle b elow t he posted speed li mit on North Fore st Park
Boulevard , near o r a round In terst ate 30

. He dr ove up a hill, and “ the roadway dramatically curved to the right down the backside of the hill withou t warn ing, as the previously installed che vron sign in dicating th e severe curv e was not standing. ” Drago o crashed int o the medi an and his leg muscles we re severed by a piece of metal ,

“ wh ich on ce held the aforementioned chevron sign warning of impend ing cu rve , ” an d
which was sticking up from the ground

. Dragoo assert ed t hat the City “ had a c tual knowledge that the a forementioned

c he vron warning si gn was down as the sign was either knocked d own in a prior motor vehicle incident, Case ID 17

- 118644, or wa s noted to be down ” as a result of t hat
incident , which occurred four months prior to Dragoo ’ s accident , and that aft er the prior inci dent, the City had not repl aced the downed sign. He f urther a ll eged that the sharpness of the curve , without appropriate signage, prese nted an unexpecte d and

unusua l danger to or din ary roadwa y users and that there had been mu ltiple m otor vehicle inci dents at the same location before and after his accident

. 2
. The City ’ s Motions to Dismiss and Jurisdictional Evidence The City file d several motion s to dismiss a n d attached jurisdictional evidenc e . In its first and second motion s , the City compla ined that Dragoo had failed to give it13 written notice of the claim w ithin six month s (180 days) of the incide nt giving rise to the claim and therefor e had the burd en to pr ove that the City had received ac tual
notice of the claim

. See Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem . Code A n n. § 101.101(a) , (c)

. To its
second m otion, t he City attached the affid avit of D eirdre O ’ Neal

- Mil ls, a Senior Property and Ca sualty A dj uste r in the City ’ s Risk Manag ement Division, who averred

t hat no written n otice of the claim was given prior to service of a copy of Dragoo ’ s petition a nd th at th e re was no evidence of actual knowledge on th e part of the Ci ty

c oncerning Dragoo ’ s claim or that the a cci dent was cau se d by the City

. The City also

at tached a copy of the police re port from Dragoo ’ s accident

. The police report showed that th e crash occurred on April 15, 2018, at 1:34
p.m
. The officer ’ s narrative s tates, “ U nit 1 was nor thbound in the 2100 Blo ck of N
Forest Park Blvd when the rider lost control and struc k the north side curblin e. ” A graphic marked “ Not To Scale ” s howed the loc ation of the accident on the ro adway at the midpoint of the road ’ s curve . The polic e report did n ot in dicate why Dragoo lost control of his motorcycle.
In its thir d m otion, the City arg ue d lack of causation , asserting, “ To th e e xtent [D ra goo] is claiming that his alleged personal injuries resulted from the absence,
conditi on or malfuncti on of a traf fic control device [under Civil Practice and
Remedies C ode Section 1 01. 060(a)(2) ] , that claim must fail because the sign in questi on was loca te d after the area whe re [he] allegedly lost control of his motorcycle , ”
and “ it was the la st of three separate sig ns alerting motor is ts to approaching road14 conditions , ” def eating cau sat ion. [ Emphasis adde d.] The City stated , “ There i s no

w ay t hat the abs ence of the thi rd sign, the one which [Dragoo] claims injured his knee, can be the cause o f the accide nt because it would have b een located after the point a t which [Dra goo] lost cont rol of his vehicle. ”
T o its third motion, t h e Ci ty a tt ached three exhib its

. Exhibit A was a Google Maps ph otograph of the first two c hevron signs in the curve. Exhibit B was a Google Maps photograph of th e r oadway with no th ird sign at t he cur ve ’ s conclu sion

. Exhibit C was the a ffid avit of Marisa Conlin, a TPW Engineering Manager who ha d
worked in TP W for 19 years and had “ manage [d] the maintenance throughout the City ” since June 2019 as to si gns, mark ings, street l igh ts, and traffic signals. Co nlin

ave rred that sh e had re viewed t he City re cords related to the three chevron signs
located in the 2100

– 2300 b locks of no rthbound Forest Park Boulev ard, which w ere placed there on July 25, 2017 ; t hat “ [ t]he first report the City received of a missing
chevron si gn was May 2 8, 2019 ” ; that “ [t]he chevron sign [that had been ] reported
knocked do wn was the t h ird s ign, or the north ern [] most sign of the three i nstalled ” ; and that there wa s no indication that all t hree signs were m issing on April 15, 2018.
To her affid avit, she atta ched the Ci ty ’ s business re cords relat ing to the sig n as Exhib it
C

- 1

. Exhib it C

- 1 contained a “ sign ticket ” for 2000 Fo rest Park Blvd/I

- 30, dated J uly 25, 2017, which showed that three ch evr on signs were installed that day

. Exhibit
C

- 1 also c ontained an aerial photograph denoting where the signs were in stal led : (1) a t15 the inter section; (2) 100 feet away, at the curv e ’ s midpoint; and (3) 100 feet f arther, at
the end of the c urve. Exhibi t C

- 1 also con taine d a service reques t summar y repor t

cre ated on May 28, 2019 , when a citiz en called in about the sign , requesting serv ice ; it

was logged at 8: 16 a.m. The service reque st was g iven a n “ Emergency ” priority le vel.
T he City also filed a “ su pplement ” in which it a rgu ed that the City had not
receive d actual notice that the sign had been destroy ed or removed unt il after Dragoo ’ s accident , notwithstanding the Dece mber 20 17 acci d ent report that a chevron sign in the median on the relevant stretch of Forest Park Bouleva rd was
down

. See id. § 101.060(a) (3 )

. T he City contended t hat it had brought forth evidence

“ showing that its fir st actual notice that the chevron sign at issue was reported

remov ed or d estroyed ” was after th e date o f Dragoo ’ s acci dent a nd again argued that it would have been impos sible fo r the missing sig n to have caus e d his fall and injuries.
To the supplement , the City attac hed a copy of t he December 16, 2 017 police
rep ort of a cr ash referenced by Dr agoo in his ori ginal petiti on , bearing c ase identification number 17

- 118644 . Tha t report stated t hat the crash occurred at 4:18
p.m
. at the 2000 block o f North Forest Park Boulevard and 2300 I

- 30 West

. The

“ not to scale ” graphic s howed the loc ation of the acciden t on the ro adway , includ ing a downed sign, and the officer ’ s na rra tive states , “ Uni t 1 w as heading northbound on 2000 N Forest Pa rk Blvd. 2100 N Fore st Park is a curved road. Un it 1 c ol li ded in to the median and spun out of control facing southbound. U nk nown if Unit 1 collided into street sign

. Unit 1 driver rela yed that sign was a l ready down. ”16 The Cit y also attached to its supp lement a copy of Dragoo ’ s uncertified
testi mony from his January 31, 2020 deposi t ion

. In his dep osition, D ragoo testified
that he did not see the two earlier che vron signs indic ating the c urve. He stated, “ I
did not s ee those because I was n ’ t l ooking for them when the road is going straight,
I ’ m not going to look f or a curve sign when I ’ m g oing straight. ” Dragoo marked on
an exhib i t whe re the curve started ( “ wher e the sidew alk en ds ” ) and marked where he
sai d the accide nt occurred , wh ich was adjacent to the locat ion of where t he
northern most chevron sign would have been

. He sta t ed that the acc ide nt occurred

“ from the moment the road started to take a corner, millisecon ds aft er that was when [ he] went down. ” He stated that the accident happened “ after the second [c hevron sign] ” b ut could not verify whether any of the signs were there. He stated, “ [T]he only thing I can verify is that the re w [ere] no chevron s igns on the corner itself except
for the one that used to b e there that went inside me. ” Dragoo did not file a response to an y of the City ’ s m otions

. D. Analysis
T he evidence is undisputed that Dr agoo did not provide formal no tice of his
TTCA claim within six months after his April 15, 2018 accide nt ; th er efore, he had to
demon strate throug h his pleadings or jurisdictional evidence that the City had had
actual not ice of his claim

. See i d. § 101.101( a) , (c)

. D ragoo, however, pleaded only that the City had actual kno wledge that the sign was missing, not t hat the City had
actual notice of his claim, and the City brought fo rth evide nce fr om the senior17 property and casu alty adjuster in its risk managemen t division that n o written notice of the claim had been received pri or to service of a copy of the lawsuit

. D ragoo does

not challenge this g round on appeal

. See Ten orio , 543 S.W.3 d at 779 (no actual notice
of claim); Carbajal , 324 S.W.3d at 5 39 (same); cf. Worsd ale , 578 S.W. 3d at 6 7

– 68 (actual
notice of claim). Further, b oth parties focus on Section 101. 0 60( a)(3) in this ap peal . Neith er party disputes, and the City ’s evidence sho ws , t hat the sign was removed or destroyed by a third pers on and n ot by the C ity , m eaning that the City had to have actual notice
for its immunity to be waived

. See Tex. Civ. Prac

. & Rem. Code Ann. § 101. 0 60(a) (3) ; Gonzalez , 82 S.W.3d at 328

– 31

. Although Dragoo alleged that the December 20 1 7 police r eport provided the C ity with “ actual kno wledge ” that th e sign was missing, he did not allege that the police were responsible for rep or ting the missing sign to TPW for replacement , and there is no evidence that they did so

. 7 S e e Tenorio , 543 S. W.3d at
7 76 (noti ng that s ubject ive aw areness does not occur j ust because an accident is investigated as part of routine safety procedures ) ; Ree d , 2006 WL 3823897, at *2 ( requ iring informati on about a sign to be actually communicated to or obtained by an

7 Dragoo states in hi s appellate br ie f ’ s factual recitat ion that Conlin te stified that the City ’s sign department did not communicate with the police de partment regarding signs knocked do wn during motor vehicle incidents and th at the City instead rel ie d on citizen complaint s r egarding missi ng s igns , referencing Co nlin ’ s depositi on that was attached to his post judgment motion to modify, which t he trial cou rt denied and the denial of which he does not appeal. See Tex. R. App. P. 38.1(g) ( stating that i n a civil case, the court w ill accept as true the facts stated unless another party contradicts them)

.18 e mployee resp onsib le for acting on the information for a city to re ceive “ actual
notice ” o f a third party ’ s removal of a sign ). There was no evi de nce that such knowledge, repo rting, and noti ce was required to be shared between the City ’ s various departments, but t he City ’ s jurisdictional evidence showed that within two d ays of the
citizen ’ s comp laint ( 15 days after Dragoo filed suit ) TPW replace d th e s ign

. Finally, the trial court could have concluded

— b ased on photographic ev idence
of the signs ’ initial locations when placed in 20 17 and their locations in December 2019 (including the northernmost sign ’ s absence) and o n Dragoo ’ s t estimony that he
had failed to notice the fir st two signs

— t hat , even if the City h ad received actual
notice about the thi rd sign ’ s absence , t here was no causation between its abse nce and Dragoo ’ s accident

. S e e Tex. Civ. Prac. & R e m. Code A n n. § 101.021(2) (stating that a
gove rnmental u nit is liable for personal inj ury caused by a condi ti on of real property if
it would , were it a private per son, be liable to the claimant according to Texas law). Because the trial court did not err by dismis sing D ragoo ’ s ca se for lack of juris d iction,

w e overrule both of Dragoo ’ s issues

. I II. Conclusion Having overruled both of Dragoo ’ s iss ues, we affirm th e trial court ’ s judgment. /s/ Bonni e Sudderth
Bonnie Suddert h Chief Justice
Delivered: September 30, 2021