J-A09011-19

2020 PA Super 14

* Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court.

COMMONWEALTH OF 

PENNSYLVANIA

v.

DAVID PACHECO, 

Appellant

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

 PENNSYLVANIA

 No. 151 EDA 2018

Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence, November 29, 2017,

in the Court of Common Pleas of Montgomery County,

Criminal Division at No(s): CP-46-CR-0002243-2016.

BEFORE: KUNSELMAN, J., MURRAY, J., and PELLEGRINI*, J.

OPINION BY KUNSELMAN, J.: FILED JANUARY 24, 2020

David Pacheco appeals from the aggregate judgment of sentence 

imposed following his conviction of multiple counts of possession with intent 

to deliver (“PWID”)1 and related offenses. Pacheco challenges the warrantless 

search and seizure of his real-time cell site location information (CSLI), the 

limitations on his expert’s testimony, and the length of his sentence. After 

extensive review, we affirm. 

The parties do not dispute the underlying facts of this case. Essentially, 

in 2015, the Montgomery County District Attorney’s Office, Narcotics 

Enforcement Team, working with the DEA, uncovered a large criminal 

conspiracy as part of a heroin-trafficking investigation. The District Attorney’s 

Office learned that a Mexican drug cartel was smuggling heroin into the United 

____________________________________________

1 35 P.S. § 780-113(a)(30).
J-A09011-19

- 2 -

States for distribution. They believed that Pacheco, a Norristown, 

Pennsylvania, resident, played a significant role in this operation by 

transporting drugs from Georgia to New York. 

At various times throughout their nearly year-long investigation, 

Montgomery County prosecutors applied for and obtained several orders 

pursuant to Pennsylvania’s Wiretapping and Electronic Surveillance Control 

Act (“the Wiretap Act”). 18 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 5701-5782. Some of those orders,

issued on August 28 and October 15, 2015, also included “ping” requests that 

specifically authorized the cell phone company to send signals to Pacheco’s 

phone at intervals and times as directed by law enforcement. Orders, 

8/28/2015 and 10/15/2015, at ¶9.

2

 These signals gave investigators realtime CSLI so they would know Pacheco’s location. The Montgomery County 

Court of Common Pleas issued those orders under Subchapter E of the Wiretap 

Act, which authorizes the collection of mobile communication tracking 

information in limited circumstances. 18 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 5771-5775.

“Mobile communications tracking information” is defined by the Wiretap 

Act as “[i]nformation generated by a communication common carrier or a 

communication service which indicates the location of an electronic device 

supported by the communication common carrier or communication service.” 

18 Pa.C.S.A. § 5702. Many types of tracking information are available, 

____________________________________________

2 The orders were identical, except for the date of issue.
J-A09011-19

- 3 -

including historical CSLI and real time CSLI. Historical CSLI is automatically 

generated and routinely collected by wireless service providers whenever a 

cell phone connects to a cell tower. 3In contrast, according to the testimony 

____________________________________________

3 The Supreme Court of the United States explained historical CSLI technology 

in its recent decision, United States v. Carpenter, 138 S.Ct. 2206, 2211-12 

(2018):

There are 396 million cell phone service accounts in the United 

States—for a Nation of 326 million people. Cell phones perform 

their wide and growing variety of functions by connecting to a set 

of radio antennas called “cell sites.” Although cell sites are usually 

mounted on a tower, they can also be found on light posts, 

flagpoles, church steeples, or the sides of buildings. Cell sites 

typically have several directional antennas that divide the covered 

area into sectors.

Cell phones continuously scan their environment looking for the 

best signal, which generally comes from the closest cell site. Most 

modern devices, such as smartphones, tap into the wireless 

network several times a minute whenever their signal is on, even 

if the owner is not using one of the phone’s features. Each time 

the phone connects to a cell site, it generates a time-stamped 

record known as cell-site location information (CSLI). The 

precision of this information depends on the size of the geographic 

area covered by the cell site. The greater the concentration of cell 

sites, the smaller the coverage area. As data usage from cell 

phones has increased, wireless carriers have installed more cell 

sites to handle the traffic. That has led to increasingly compact 

coverage areas, especially in urban areas.

Wireless carriers collect and store CSLI for their own business 

purposes, including finding weak spots in their network and 

applying “roaming” charges when another carrier routes data 

through their cell sites. In addition, wireless carriers often sell 

aggregated location records to data brokers, without individual 

identifying information of the sort at issue [in Carpenter]. While 

carriers have long retained CSLI for the start and end of incoming 

calls, in recent years phone companies have also collected location 
J-A09011-19

- 4 -

by the Commonwealth at Pacheco’s trial, real-time CSLI is actively obtained 

through the following procedure:

At the request and direction of law enforcement, the wireless 

service provider sends a command signal to the targeted cell 

phone. The command signal then reaches the user’s cell phone 

and activates the phone’s location subsystem to determine the 

location of the phone. The phone’s location is ascertained by 

obtaining data from at least three GPS satellites or, in the event 

GPS data cannot be obtained, the location of the Cell Tower the 

phone is currently near. The cell phone then transmits its location 

back to the wireless provider, who in turn e-mails the information 

to law enforcement. The location information generated is 

generally accurate within less than thirty meters. 

Pacheco’s Brief at 9 (citations to record omitted). Here, the orders at issue

authorized the collection of Pacheco’s real-time CSLI. 

Prosecutors and detectives analyzed the information they obtained

through the various orders issued under the Wiretap Act. They identified 

multiple occasions between September 2015 and January 2016 when Pacheco 

traveled to Georgia and New York. On each trip, Pacheco obtained a car 

battery containing three kilograms of heroin in Atlanta, Georgia, returned 

briefly to Norristown, Pennsylvania, and then transported the heroin to the 

Bronx, New York, using his cell phone to facilitate the transactions. 

____________________________________________

information from the transmission of text messages and routine 

data connections. Accordingly, modern cell phones generate 

increasingly vast amounts of increasingly precise CSLI.

Carpenter, 138 S.Ct. at 2211-12.
J-A09011-19

- 5 -

By monitoring intercepted telephone calls from orders not challenged on 

appeal, detectives learned that, on January 10, 2016, Pacheco would be 

driving back from Atlanta, through Norristown, with a retrofitted car battery 

containing three kilograms of heroin. Police assembled a surveillance team 

along Pacheco’s anticipated route and apprehended him in Montgomery 

County. A search of his vehicle revealed three kilograms of heroin hidden in 

the car’s battery.4 

Police arrested Pacheco and charged him with nine counts of PWID and

criminal use of a communications facility, two counts of dealing in unlawful 

proceeds, and one count of conspiracy to commit PWID and corrupt 

organizations.

5

 Among other evidence not challenged on appeal, Pacheco 

moved to suppress the real-time CSLI evidence. Following a suppression 

hearing, the trial court denied Pacheco’s motion. 

The case proceeded to a jury trial beginning on August 7, 2017. Pacheco 

stipulated that he transported three kilograms of heroin on seven of the nine 

trips detected by law enforcement. He also admitted on direct examination 

that he did the things that police said he did. Trial Court Opinion, 3/9/18, at 

____________________________________________

4 The amount of heroin seized from one car battery was equivalent to 

approximately one hundred thousand single-dose bags. See Trial Court 

Opinion, 3/9/18, at 4. The total amount of heroin Pacheco transported and 

possessed, 27 kilograms, was worth $8.9 million on the street. Id. at 31. 

5 See 35 P.S. § 780-11(a)(30), 18 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 7512, 5111, 903, and 911, 

respectively.
J-A09011-19

- 6 -

4 (citation to record omitted). However, Pacheco claimed the defense of 

duress. He argued that the Mexican drug cartels coerced him to act as a drug 

courier by threatening to kill his family members if he did not cooperate. 

Pacheco’s Brief at 12. 

At the conclusion of trial, the jury convicted Pacheco of all charges,

except corrupt organizations. On November 29, 2017, the trial court 

sentenced him to an aggregate prison term of forty to eighty years, followed 

by ten years of probation.

6

 Pacheco timely filed post-sentence motions, which 

the trial court denied on December 12, 2017. He then filed a timely notice of 

appeal. Both Pacheco and the trial court complied with Pa.R.A.P. 1925. 

In his Statement of Questions Involved, Pacheco raises the following 

four issues for our review, which we have reordered for ease of disposition:

I. Whether [Pacheco] waived [his challenge to the denial of 

suppression of the real-time CSLI evidence] when it was 

clearly set forth in his [Rule] 1925(b) statement?

____________________________________________

6 The trial court sentenced Pacheco to serve consecutive prison sentences of

five to ten years on seven counts of PWID; concurrent prison sentences of five

to ten years on the remaining two counts of PWID; a consecutive prison

sentence of three to six years for conspiracy to commit PWID; consecutive

prison terms of one to two years for each of the two counts of dealing in

proceeds of unlawful activity; five years of probation on two counts of criminal

use of a communications facility, consecutive to each other and to the period

of incarceration; and five years of concurrent probation for each of the

remaining seven counts of criminal use of a communications facility. Trial 

Court Opinion, 3/9/18, at 5. All of the sentences fall within the standard range 

of the sentencing guidelines.
J-A09011-19

- 7 -

II. Whether the trial court erred in denying the motion to 

suppress evidence where the Commonwealth illegally 

tracked [Pacheco’s] cell phone(s) in violation of the 

Pennsylvania Constitution, the Fourth Amendment, the 

Pennsylvania Wiretap Act and the recent decision in 

Carpenter v. United States, 138 S.Ct. 2206, 2218 

(2018).[7]

III. Whether the trial court erred by denying the right to present 

a Mexican drug cartel expert whose testimony would have 

supported the duress defense presented at trial?

IV. Whether the trial court abused its discretion by imposing a 

manifestly unreasonable, excessive aggregate sentence of 

forty (40) to eighty (80) years of imprisonment, which was 

a virtual life sentence, without giving adequate reasons for 

that sentence while relying on improper considerations?

Pacheco’s Brief at 5 (footnote added). 

In considering his first issue, we must decide whether Pacheco 

sufficiently preserved his challenge to the warrantless collection of the realtime CSLI evidence. Although numerous orders were issued to law 

enforcement during the course of the investigation, in this appeal, Pacheco 

challenges only the portions of the orders issued pursuant to 18 Pa.C.S.A. 

§§ 5771-5775, Subchapter E of the Wiretap Act, which authorized the realtime CSLI tracking of his cell phone. 

____________________________________________

7 As discussed infra, the Supreme Court of the United States in Carpenter

held that when the government accesses historical CSLI during the course of 

a criminal investigation, it constitutes a search under the Fourth Amendment, 

necessitating a warrant. 
J-A09011-19

- 8 -

Appellate Rule 1925 requires that an appellant “concisely identify each 

ruling or error that the appellant intends to challenge with sufficient detail to 

identify all pertinent issues.” Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b)(4)(ii). This Court has 

considered the question of what constitutes a sufficient Rule 1925(b) 

statement on many occasions. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Hansley, 24 

A.3d 410, 415 (Pa. Super. 2011) (holding that it is well-established that an 

appellant must properly specify in his concise statement the error to be 

addressed on appeal).

In Pacheco’s concise statement, he framed his challenge to the realtime CSLI evidence as follows:

Whether the trial court erred in failing to suppress all evidence 

derived from the warrantless real-time tracking of [his] cell phone 

where such evidence was obtained in violation of the Pennsylvania 

Wiretap Act, Article I, Section 8 of the Pennsylvania Constitution, 

and the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment of the United States 

Constitution?

Concise Statement, 1/31/18, at ¶ 1. 

In its Rule 1925(a) opinion, the trial court concluded that Pacheco 

waived this issue because he stated it too vaguely. Trial Court Opinion, 

3/9/18, at 7-8. According to the trial court, because prosecutors obtained 

multiple court orders authorizing various searches, it was “unclear what 

evidence was obtained without a [c]ourt order or warrant.” Id. at 7.

The Commonwealth also argues that Pacheco waived the claim, albeit

on a different basis; namely, that Pacheco did not raise a Carpenter issue 

before the trial court. Commonwealth’s Brief at 4. 
J-A09011-19

- 9 -

Although Pacheco did not specifically mention the Carpenter decision 

until he filed his appellate brief, based on our examination of the certified 

record, we conclude that Pacheco did, in fact, raise and preserve his challenge 

to the warrantless collection of real-time CSLI evidence from his cell phone 

provider. Pacheco filed a supplement to his motion to suppress in which he 

specifically claimed that prosecutors failed to “seek a search warrant from the 

[c]ourt to legally utilize ‘Mobile Tracking Technology’ . . . or similar technology 

. . . as . . . is required and necessary under Article I, Section 8 of the 

Pennsylvania Constitution and the Fourth Amendment of the United States 

Constitution.” Supplement to Motion to Suppress, 11/18/16, at unnumbered 

1-2. Pacheco additionally claimed that the use of such technology “constitutes 

a ‘search’ under constitutional analysis which . . . cannot be authorized without 

the issuance of a search warrant based on probable cause.” Id. at 

unnumbered 2. 

Following the suppression hearing, Pacheco filed a supplemental brief 

where he again argued that the orders authorizing real-time CSLI tracking of 

his cell phone under Subchapter E of the Wiretap Act violated Article I, Section 

8 of the Pennsylvania Constitution and the Fourth Amendment of the United 

States Constitution “because the [o]rders fail[ed] to satisfy the constitutional 

protections of the warrant requirement.” Memorandum of Law in Support of 

Supplemental Motion to Suppress, 3/6/17, at unnumbered 14. 
J-A09011-19

- 10 -

Based on these averments, Pacheco adequately raised and preserved 

his challenge to the orders authorizing real-time CSLI tracking of his cell 

phone; he claimed this tracking constituted a search under the Fourth 

Amendment and that investigators were required to obtain a warrant before 

the tracking began. We disagree with the trial court’s finding that the issue, 

as Pacheco framed it in his concise statement, was unduly vague. In our view, 

the issue was stated with sufficient clarity to identify the pertinent issue on 

appeal; thus, Pacheco did not waive his claim. Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b)(4)(ii). 

Having concluded that Pacheco sufficiently preserved his challenge that 

prosecutors obtained his real-time CSLI without a warrant, we will address the 

merits of his second issue, i.e., whether the trial court erred in denying his 

motion to suppress this evidence. Pacheco argues that the seizure of his CSLI 

information was a search under the Fourth Amendment, and that the orders 

used by prosecutors were insufficient under Carpenter because they were 

not warrants. Pacheco’s Brief at 28, 31. These issues raise pure questions of 

law, for which our standard of review is de novo. Commonwealth v. Fulton, 

179 A.3d 475, 487 (Pa. 2018). Because these questions challenge the 

decision of the suppression court, our scope of review as to the subject matter 

is confined to the factual findings and legal conclusions of the suppression 

court. See In re L.J., 79 A.3d 1073, 1080 (Pa. 2013). As for the record, we 

may consider only the evidence of the prevailing party at the suppression 
J-A09011-19

- 11 -

hearing and so much of the evidence of the non-prevailing party as remains 

uncontradicted, when read in the context of the record as a whole. Id. 

Pacheco claims the investigators violated his rights under the Fourth 

Amendment of the Constitution of the United States and Article I, Section 8 of 

the Constitution of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania because they obtained 

his real-time CSLI without a warrant. 

Both the Fourth Amendment of the Constitution of the United States and 

Article 1 Section 8 of the Constitution of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania 

protect citizens from unreasonable, searches and seizures. The Fourth 

Amendment provides that:

The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, 

papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, 

shall not be violated, and no warrants shall issue, but upon 

probable cause, supported by oath or affirmation, and particularly 

describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to 

be seized.

U.S. Const. Amend. IV. 

Similarly, the Pennsylvania constitution provides:

The people shall be secure in their persons, houses, papers and 

possessions from unreasonable searches and seizures, and no 

warrant to search any place or to seize any person or things shall 

issue without describing them as nearly as may be, nor without 

probable cause, supported by oath or affirmation subscribed to by 

the affiant.
J-A09011-19

- 12 -

Pa. Const. Art. I, § 8. 8

In support of his argument that law enforcement violated his rights, 

Pacheco relies on the Supreme Court of the United States’ decision in 

Carpenter, supra, which was announced during the pendency of this appeal.9 

There, the High Court addressed the question of whether the government 

conducts a search under the Fourth Amendment when it accesses historical

CSLI during the course of a criminal investigation. Suspecting that Carpenter 

____________________________________________

8 We note that in the argument section of his brief, Pacheco did not set forth 

a separate analysis of whether the Pennsylvania constitution provided him 

with greater protection than the federal constitution. To assert a claim that 

Article I § 8 provides greater protection than its federal counterpart, the 

Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, in Commonwealth v. Edmunds, 586 A.2d. 

887, 895 (Pa. 1991), directed that a party must brief and analyze at least the 

four factors set forth in that decision. Since Pacheco did not undertake this 

separate analysis in his brief, we will presume he is entitled to the same 

protection under both the federal and the state constitution, and will consider 

his claim solely under the Fourth Amendment and its relevant case law. 

9 Although Carpenter was decided subsequent to Pacheco’s conviction and 

sentencing, the Supreme Court of the United States has instructed that a new 

rule for the conduct of criminal prosecution is to be applied retroactively to all 

cases, state or federal, pending on direct review or not yet final. See Schriro

v. Summerlin, 542 U.S. 348, 351 (2004) (citing Griffith v. Kentucky, 479 

U.S. 314, 328 (1987)); see also Commonwealth v. Washington, 142 A.3d 

810, 815 (Pa. 2016) (stating that “new constitutional procedural rules 

generally pertain to future cases and matters that are pending on direct review 

at the time of the rule’s announcement”). Carpenter announced a new rule 

for the conduct of criminal prosecution; therefore, it applies retroactively to 

Pacheco’s case because it was decided while Pacheco’s case was pending on 

direct review with this Court, and he preserved the issue at all stages of 

adjudication. See Commonwealth v. Marshall, 947 A.2d 714, 719 (Pa. 

2008). 
J-A09011-19

- 13 -

was involved in a string of robberies, federal prosecutors sought and obtained 

two court orders pursuant to the federal Stored Communications Act (“SCA”),

18 U.S.C. §§ 2701-2713. These “D orders,” issued under 18 U.S.C. 

§ 2703(d),10 permitted law enforcement to obtain historical CSLI records from

Carpenter’s wireless service provider for the four-month interval during which 

the robberies occurred. The records revealed the location of Carpenter’s cell 

phone whenever it made or received calls, and placed the phone near four of 

the charged robberies. 

Prior to trial, Carpenter moved to suppress the historical CSLI provided 

by the wireless carriers. He argued that the government’s seizure of this 

information violated his reasonable expectation of privacy because it was

____________________________________________

10 That section of the federal wiretap act provided: 

(d) Requirements for court order.--A court order for 

disclosure under subsection (b) or (c) may be issued by any 

court that is a court of competent jurisdiction and shall issue 

only if the governmental entity offers specific and articulable 

facts showing that there are reasonable grounds to believe 

that the contents of a wire or electronic communication, or 

the records or other information sought, are relevant and 

material to an ongoing criminal investigation. In the case 

of a State governmental authority, such a court order shall 

not issue if prohibited by the law of such State. A court 

issuing an order pursuant to this section, on a motion made 

promptly by the service provider, may quash or modify such 

order, if the information or records requested are unusually 

voluminous in nature or compliance with such order 

otherwise would cause an undue burden on such provider.

18 U.S.C.A. § 2703(d). 
J-A09011-19

- 14 -

obtained without a warrant supported by probable cause. The court denied

Carpenter’s motion. On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the 

Sixth Circuit affirmed, finding that the government conducted no “search.” 

That court reasoned that Carpenter voluntarily shared his cell phone location 

information with his wireless carriers, and he therefore had no expectation of 

privacy in his historical CSLI data. See United States v. Carpenter, 819 

F.3d 880 (6th Cir. 2016). 

Reversing, the Supreme Court of United States Supreme Court first 

observed that this type of digital data maintained by a third party did not fit 

neatly under existing precedents. Carpenter, 138 S.Ct. 2206, 2214 (2018). 

To determine whether historical CSLI was protected by the Fourth 

Amendment, the court discussed two line of cases, both involving different 

privacy interests. Id. at 2214-15. The first line of cases addressed an 

individual’s expectation of privacy in his physical location and movements. 

Compare United States v. Knotts, 460 U.S. 276 (1983) (finding no 

expectation of privacy using a beeper to aid in tracking Knotts’ car because a 

person traveling in an automobile on public streets has no expectation of 

privacy in his movements from one place to another) with United States v.

Jones, 565 U.S. 400, 405 (2012) (finding a search occurred when agents 

installed a GPS tracking device on Jones’ car and continuously monitored the 

vehicle’s movements for 28 days). 
J-A09011-19

- 15 -

The second line of cases held that a person does not have a reasonable 

privacy interest in information he voluntarily turns over to third parties, i.e.,

the third-party doctrine. See United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435, 443 

(1976) (finding no expectation of privacy in financial records held by a bank);

see also Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 743-744 (1979) (finding no 

expectation of privacy in records of dialed telephone numbers conveyed to 

telephone company).

Based on how cell phones are used in today’s society, the High Court 

found that an individual maintains a legitimate expectation of privacy in the 

record of his physical movements as captured through CSLI, even more so 

than with a GPS device. As the Court observed, a cell phone has become 

“almost a feature of human anatomy.” Carpenter, 138 S.Ct. at 2218. “While 

individuals regularly leave their vehicles, they compulsively carry cell phones 

with them all the time. A cell phone faithfully follows its owner beyond public 

thoroughfares and into private residences, doctor’s offices, political 

headquarters and other potentially revealing locales.” Id. In fact, “when the 

Government tracks the location of a cell phone it achieves near perfect 

surveillance, as if it had attached an ankle monitor to the phone’s user.” Id.

Accordingly, the Court held when the government accessed Carpenter’s CSLI 

from his wireless carriers without a warrant, it invaded his reasonable 

expectation of privacy in the whole of his physical movements. Id. at 2219. 
J-A09011-19

- 16 -

The High Court rejected the application of the third-party doctrine to 

historical CSLI for two reasons: the lack of limitations on this type of 

information and the fact that an individual does not voluntarily “share” this 

information in the normal sense of that word. Id. at 2219-20. The Court 

observed: 

In the first place, cell phones and the services they provide are 

“such a pervasive and insistent part of daily life” that carrying one 

is indispensable to participation in modern society. Second, a cell 

phone logs a cell-site record by dint of its operation, without any 

affirmative act on the part of the user beyond powering up. 

Virtually any activity on the phone generates CSLI, including 

incoming calls, texts, or e-mails and countless other data 

connections that a phone automatically makes when checking for 

news, weather, or social media updates. Apart from disconnecting 

the phone from the network, there is no way to avoid leaving 

behind a trail of location data. As a result, in no meaningful sense 

does the user voluntarily “assume the risk” of turning over a 

comprehensive dossier of his physical movements.

Id. at 2220 (citations omitted; some formatting).

Having found that the acquisition of Carpenter’s CSLI was a search, the 

Court also concluded that the Government must generally obtain a warrant 

supported by probable cause before acquiring such records. Id. at 2221. The 

Court further determined that the “D orders” issued under 18 U.S.C. § 2703(d) 

were insufficient, because the government only had to show “reasonable 

grounds” for believing that the records were relevant and material to an 

ongoing investigation.” Id. at 2221. The Court found “that showing falls well 

short of the probable cause required for a warrant.” Id. 
J-A09011-19

- 17 -

Notably, the High Court in Carpenter emphasized that its decision was 

a narrow one, and did not extend to matters not before it, including the 

collection of real-time CSLI, which is the technology at issue in this case. Id. 

at 2220. 

Nevertheless, Pacheco asserts that the rationale of Carpenter applies 

with equal or greater force to real-time CSLI tracking. Pacheco’s Brief at 26. 

He argues that a cell phone’s historical CSLI automatically generates as it 

communicates throughout the day with cell towers and the wireless service 

provider as part of its ordinary operations. By contrast, real-time CSLI 

tracking requires the wireless service provider to signal the cell phone at the 

active request of law enforcement. Id. at 26-27. Pacheco asserts that

“[t]hose signals then reached into [his] pocket, home, car, or wherever the 

phone was kept, to activate the phone’s location subsystem . . . without [his] 

knowledge.” Id. at 27. 

In the wake of Carpenter, other courts addressing this question have 

determined that real-time CSLI is subject to the same privacy concerns as 

historical CSLI.

11

 Indeed, even before Carpenter, several courts determined 

____________________________________________

11 See United States v. Thompson, 2019 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 41169, *33 (D.C. 

Minn. March 7, 2019) (extending Carpenter to real-time CSLI, noting “the 

Fourth Amendment was undoubtedly implicated and a warrant based on a 

showing of probable cause was required”); United States v. Williams, 2019 

U.S. Dist. LEXIS 64324, *31 (S.D. Ga. Feb. 27, 2019) (concluding that the 

Carpenter analysis appears to apply equally to the collection of real-time 

CSLI); Sims v. State, 569 S.W.3d 634, 645 (Tex. Crim. App. 2019) (“Even 
J-A09011-19

- 18 -

that when law enforcement obtained real-time CSLI in the context of a criminal 

investigation, it was a search under the Fourth Amendment.

12

 

____________________________________________

though Carpenter dealt with historical CSLI, not real-time location 

information, we believe that the Court’s reasoning in Carpenter applies to 

both kinds of records.”); see also United States v. Chavez, 2019 U.S. Dist. 

LEXIS 33210, at *41 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 1, 2019) (discussing Carpenter’s 

application to historical CSLI and noting, in dicta, that “[e]ventually, the same 

may be expected of real-time cell-site location information, where an 

individual has arguably an even greater expectation of privacy”); State v. 

Brown, 202 A.3d 1003, 1014 n.9 (Conn. 2019) (stating, in dicta, that “we 

see no difficulty in extending the rationale of Carpenter as applied to 

historical CSLI to prospective orders”).

12 See, e.g., United States v. Ellis, 270 F. Supp. 3d 1134, 1145 (N.D. Cal. 

2017) (holding “that cell phone users have an expectation of privacy in their 

cell phone location in real time and that society is prepared to recognize that 

expectation as reasonable”); In re Application of U.S. for an Order 

Authorizing Disclosure of Location Info. of a Specified Wireless Tel., 

849 F. Supp. 2d 526, 539 (D. Md. 2011) (finding a “reasonable expectation of 

privacy both in [subject’s] location as revealed by real-time [CSLI] and in his 

movement where his location is subject to continuous tracking over an 

extended period of time”); In re Application of U.S. for an Order 

Authorizing the Release of Historical Cell-Site Info. (In re Application 

(E.D.N.Y.)), 809 F. Supp. 2d 113, 119-20 (E.D.N.Y. 2011) (concluding that 

cell-phone users maintain a reasonable expectation of privacy in long-term 

CSLI records and that the government’s obtaining these records constitutes a 

Fourth Amendment search); Tracey v. State, 152 So. 3d 504, 525-26 (Fla. 

2014) (holding that real-time CSLI data was protected by the Fourth 

Amendment, and thus, its use by law enforcement constituted a search which 

required a warrant based upon probable cause); Commonwealth v. 

Augustine, 4 N.E.3d 846, 866 (Mass. 2014) (holding that the governmentcompelled production of the defendant’s CSLI records constituted a search in 

the constitutional sense which required a warrant); State v. Earls, 70 A.3d 

630, 644 (N.J. 2013) (holding that police must obtain a warrant based on a 

showing of probable cause, or qualify for an exception to the warrant 

requirement, to obtain tracking information through the use of a cell phone).
J-A09011-19

- 19 -

Our research revealed only two Pennsylvania appellate decisions that 

discussed real-time CSLI. In Commonwealth v. Rushing, 71 A.3d 939, 961-

64 (Pa. Super.) rev’d on other grounds, 99 A.3d 416 (Pa. 2014) the judge who 

wrote for the majority concluded that the collection of real-time CSLI required 

probable cause, but no other panel member joined that portion of the judge’s

decision. The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania granted allocatur and reversed 

on a separate limited issue. In Commonwealth v. Cole, 167 A.3d. 49 (Pa. 

Super. 2017), this Court decided that a warrant allowing real-time tracking 

issued in Maryland could extend to tracking in Pennsylvania when the subject 

voluntarily crossed state lines. The issue of whether real-time CSLI was a 

“search” was not before the panel. 

We find no meaningful distinction between the privacy issues related to 

historical and real-time CSLI. In our view, the High Court’s rationale in

Carpenter extends to real-time CSLI tracking. Applying that Court’s analogy, 

obtaining real-time CSLI is the equivalent of attaching an ankle monitor to the 

cell phone’s user; it allows the government to track the user’s every move as 

it is happening. See Carpenter, 138 S.Ct. at 2218. Therefore, we hold that 

an individual maintains a legitimate expectation of privacy in the record of his 

physical movements as captured through real-time CSLI. As such, when 

prosecutors sought and obtained real-time information about Pacheco’s 

location by pinging his cell phone, they conducted a “search” under the federal 

and state constitutions. 
J-A09011-19

- 20 -

Because a search occurred, we must decide whether the orders 

prosecutors used to seize that information under the Pennsylvania Wiretap Act 

satisfied the warrant requirement of the Fourth Amendment. Pacheco argues 

that mere orders are insufficient under Carpenter, and that the government 

specifically needs a warrant. “[B]ecause detectives had no warrant to obtain 

[Pacheco’s] real-time CSLI, all evidence derived therefrom must be 

suppressed pursuant to Carpenter.” Pacheco’s Brief at 28. “Moreover, unlike 

in Jones where the Court did not address the warrant requirement, the 

holding in Carpenter unequivocally requires a warrant to obtain CSLI.” Id. at 

31.

13

 

Our research discloses that the Supreme Court of the United States 

previously has held that “orders” issued under the federal wiretap act were,

in fact, warrants under the Fourth Amendment, provided certain requirements 

were met. Dalia v. United States, 441 U.S. 238, 255-256 (1979). In Dalia, 

____________________________________________

13 In his brief, Pacheco discusses two additional arguments regarding these 

orders, namely that, as written, they provide “target-specific” surveillance 

which can only be issued by the Superior Court under Subchapter B of the 

Wiretap Act, and that they were overly broad. Pacheco’s Brief at 18-20; 32-

41. However, Pacheco did not raise these specific issues in his concise 

statement. Thus, they are waived. See Commonwealth v. Lord, 719 A.2d 

306, 309 (Pa. 1998) (holding that, if an appellant is directed to file a concise 

statement of matters to be raised on appeal pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b), 

any issues not raised in that statement are waived). See also Pa.R.A.P. 

1925(b)(4)(ii), which requires an appellant filing a concise statement to 

identify each error the appellant intends to challenge with sufficient detail to 

identify all pertinent issues for the judge. 
J-A09011-19

- 21 -

the government obtained orders under Title III of the Omnibus Crime Control 

and Safe Streets Act of 1968 (Title III), 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510–2520, which 

permitted courts to authorize electronic surveillance by government officers 

in specified situations. Id. at 240. The district court found probable cause to 

believe that the defendant was a member of a conspiracy stealing goods in 

interstate commerce. Id. at 241. It granted the government’s request for 

authorization to intercept all oral communications concerning the conspiracy 

at the defendant’s office. Id. at 242. The defendant was convicted. On 

appeal, the defendant challenged, among other things, the government’s 

covert entry to his office, claiming it violated his Fourth Amendment privacy 

rights. Id. at 254-55.14 The Third Circuit affirmed. The Supreme Court of 

the United States, in affirming his conviction, observed that three things were 

required to meet the warrant requirement under the Fourth Amendment:

The Fourth Amendment requires that search warrants be issued 

only “upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and 

particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons 

or things to be seized.” Finding these words to be “precise and 

clear,” this Court has interpreted them to require only three 

things. First, warrants must be issued by neutral, disinterested 

magistrates. Second, those seeking the warrant must 

demonstrate to the magistrate their probable cause to believe that 

“the evidence sought will aid in a particular apprehension or 

conviction” for a particular offense. Finally, “warrants must 

____________________________________________

14 The defendant claimed the warrant was invalid because he did not have 

notice that it was being executed. Dalia, 441 U.S. at 247. Pacheco does not 

argue lack of notice regarding law enforcement’s interception of his real-time 

CSLI. In any event, under the Fourth Amendment, such argument would fail. 

Id. at 248-59. 
J-A09011-19

- 22 -

particularly describe the ‘things to be seized,’” as well as the place 

to be searched. 

Id. at 255 (citations omitted). 

It concluded that the court order authorizing the interception of oral

communications at the defendant’s office was “a warrant issued in full 

compliance with these traditional Fourth Amendment requirements.” 

Id. at 255 (emphasis added). As the Court observed:

[The order] was based upon a neutral magistrate’s independent 

finding of probable cause to believe that [defendant] had been 

and was committing specifically enumerated federal crimes, that 

petitioner’s office was being used “in connection with the 

commission of [these] offenses,” and that bugging the office 

would result in the interception of “oral communications 

concerning these offenses.” Moreover, the exact location and 

dimensions of [defendant’s] office were set forth, and the extent 

of the search was restricted to the “[i]ntercept[ion of] oral 

communications of [defendant] and others as yet unknown, 

concerning the above-described offenses at the business office of 

[defendant]. . . .” 

Id. at 256 (citations to record omitted; some brackets in original). Thus, the 

High Court found that some orders may, in fact, be warrants. 

Turning to the case before us, the court orders in question were 

obtained by Montgomery County District Attorney’s Office pursuant to 

Subchapter E of the Wiretap Act.15 18 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 5771-5775. We find that 

____________________________________________

15 Subchapter E of Wiretap Act allows a district attorney to apply to a court of 

common pleas or the Superior Court, depending on the circumstances, for an 

order authorizing the collection of mobile communications tracking 

information. 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 5772(a). Orders issued under this subchapter, 

must contain the following specific information: 
J-A09011-19

- 23 -

these “orders” met the requirements identified in Dalia. First, the orders were 

issued by a judge of the Court of Common Pleas of Montgomery County, a 

neutral, disinterested, judicial officer authorized to issue such orders under 

the Pennsylvania Wiretap Act. 18 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 5772 (a), 5773. Second, the 

orders specifically state that the court found “probable cause” that the 

information sought would aid in the apprehension of a particular individual for 

a particular offense. Orders, 8/28/19 and 10/15/19, at ¶¶ 1-4. They identify

the individual, “David Pacheco . . . a source for heroin.” Id. at ¶ 3. And, they 

identify the criminal offenses “including but not limited to the Manufacture, 

____________________________________________

(i) That there is probable cause to believe that information 

relevant to an ongoing criminal investigation will be obtained from 

the targeted telephone.

(ii) The identity, if known, of the person to whom is leased or in 

whose name is listed the targeted telephone, or, in the case of the 

use of a telecommunication identification interception device, the 

identity, if known, of the person or persons using the targeted 

telephone.

(iii) The identity, if known, of the person who is the subject of the 

criminal investigation.

(iv) In the use of pen registers and trap and trace devices only, 

the physical location of the targeted telephone.

(v) A statement of the offense to which the information likely to 

be obtained by the pen register, trap and trace device or the 

telecommunication identification interception device relates.

18 Pa.C.S.A. § 5773(b). 
J-A09011-19

- 24 -

Delivery and or Possession with Intent to Deliver a Controlled Substance; 

Criminal Conspiracy; and Criminal Use of a Communication Facility.”16 Id. at 

¶ 4. Third, the orders described the place to be searched (Pacheco’s cell 

phone) and the items to be seized (the real-time CSLI for that phone). Id. at 

¶¶ 1, 9. Because the orders met the three requirements of Dalia, they were 

in fact warrants under the Fourth Amendment.

17 Therefore, the search in this 

case was legal. 

Furthermore, the instant orders were obtained pursuant to affidavits of 

probable cause, each more than thirty pages long, detailing the specifics of 

the criminal investigation into this Mexican drug cartel’s activities in the United 

States, and Pacheco’s suspected role in that operation. The affidavits attested 

to the personal observation of the affiant, information provided by other 

investigators and law enforcement agencies, several confidential and reliable 

informants, and information from other electronic and physical surveillance. 

____________________________________________

16 35 Pa.C.S.A. § 780-113; 18 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 903, 5111, 7512.

 

17 We note that this Court previously ruled that orders issued under the 

Pennsylvania Wiretap Act may serve as “the functional equivalent of 

traditional search warrants,” provided the orders were issued by the court 

upon a showing of the requisite level of suspicion. See Commonwealth v. 

Burgos, 64 A.3d at 655 (emphasis added). We clarify that ruling today by 

holding, pursuant to Dalia, that orders duly issued by the court under the 

Pennsylvania Wiretap Act, supported by probable cause, and particularly 

describing the place to be searched and the items to be seized, are “warrants”

under the Fourth Amendment. The nomenclature of the statute is irrelevant. 
J-A09011-19

- 25 -

Finally, and most importantly, these orders, when read in their totality,

18

indicate that the court found probable cause that the information obtained

would lead to evidence that Pacheco was violating specific provisions of the 

crimes code and would enable law enforcement to track and locate him 

through his cell phone.

The warrants issued here under the Pennsylvania Wiretap Act differ 

substantially from the “D orders” issued under the federal SCA in Carpenter. 

The court that issued the “D orders” compelling Carpenter’s records merely 

found there were “reasonable grounds” to believe that the records sought 

were relevant and material to an ongoing criminal investigation.” 18 U.S.C. 

§ 2703(d). Unlike the Pennsylvania Wiretap Act, the federal statute did not 

require, and the government did not provide, an affidavit of probable cause 

individualized to Carpenter and his suspected crimes for the issuance of the 

“D orders”. Compare 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 5772, with 18 U.S.C. §2703(d). Again, 

in the High Court’s opinion, the showing of reasonable grounds fell “well short 

of the probable cause required for a warrant,” noting that “[t]he Court usually 

____________________________________________

18 In Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213 (1983), the Supreme Court of the United 

States adopted a “totality of the circumstances” standard under the federal 

constitution in analyzing probable cause for search warrants based on 

information from confidential informants. Gates, 462 U.S. at 238. See also

Commonwealth v. Gary, 503 A.3d. 921 (Pa. 1985). Additionally, Gates

held that the duty of the reviewing court is simply to ensure that the 

magistrate had a “substantial basis for . . . concluding that probable cause 

existed.” Gates, 462 U.S. at 238-39. We note that Pacheco did not 

specifically preserve an issue challenging the finding of probable cause. 
J-A09011-19

- 26 -

requires some quantum of individualized suspicion before a search or seizure 

may take place.” Carpenter, 138 S.Ct. at 2221 (citation and internal 

quotation marks omitted). 

In sum, we find the government conducted a search when it obtained 

Pacheco’s real-time CSLI and that search was constitutional, because it was 

conducted pursuant to warrants properly issued in accordance with the 

Pennsylvania Wiretap Act and the Fourth Amendment. Accordingly, Pacheco’s 

second issue has no merit.

In his third issue, Pacheco argues that the trial court erred in limiting 

the scope of testimony provided by defense witness Robert O. Kirkland, Ph.D., 

who was qualified as an expert on Mexican drug cartels. Our review of a trial

court’s evidentiary ruling is limited to determining whether the trial court

abused its discretion. See Commonwealth v. Dengler, 890 A.2d 372, 379

(Pa. 2005). 

In order to preserve a challenge to an evidentiary ruling, a litigant must

make a timely and specific objection to the court’s ruling. See

Commonwealth v. Baumhammers, 960 A.2d 59, 73 (Pa. 2008) (holding 

that issues are preserved when objections are made timely to the error or 

offense); Commonwealth v. May, 887 A.2d 750, 761 (Pa. 2005) (holding 

that an “absence of contemporaneous objections renders” an appellant’s 

claims waived); Commonwealth v. Bruce, 916 A.2d 657, 671 (Pa. Super. 

2007) (holding that a “failure to offer a timely and specific objection results in
J-A09011-19

- 27 -

waiver of” the claim). Additionally, “if the ruling excludes evidence, a party 

informs the court of its substance by an offer of proof, unless the substance 

is apparent from the context.” Pa.R.E. 103(a)(2). 

At trial, Dr. Kirkland testified generally about Mexican drug cartels. He 

explained that the cartels normally operate in the United States through crossborder family connections or individuals with dual citizenship. He further 

testified as to the coercive tactics used by the most powerful Mexican drug 

cartels, including killing, extortion, and threats of violence both in Mexico and 

in the Unites States against individuals and their family members. N.T. Trial, 

8/9/17, at 217-18. The evidentiary rulings at issue arose when defense 

counsel attempted to ask Dr. Kirkland certain hypothetical questions:

[Defense counsel]: So, if there was an individual who lived in the 

United States who had a family member who was living in Mexico, 

that person would be at risk of kidnapping if the cartel wanted 

such, correct?

[Prosecutor]: Objection.

The Court: Sustained. Don’t answer that Doctor.

Q: Sir, I want you to assume the following facts in terms of this 

hypothetical question: Assume that specifically an individual lived 

in Norristown and –

[Prosecutor]: I’m going to object right now, Your Honor.

Id. at 221. In sustaining the Commonwealth’s objections, the trial court ruled 

that, based on the area of expertise for which Dr. Kirkland was qualified, he 

could testify generally about the cartels, but could not testify specifically to 

Pacheco’s case. See id. at 222; see also Trial Court Opinion, 3/9/18, at 17. 
J-A09011-19

- 28 -

The following day, after Dr. Kirkland’s testimony was completed, 

defense counsel placed a formal objection on the record regarding the court’s 

limitation of Dr. Kirkland’s testimony, and its refusal to let him respond to 

hypothetical questions specific to Pacheco’s case. N.T. Trial, 8/10/17, at 16-

17. Defense counsel indicated that he had intended to elicit Dr. Kirkland’s 

opinion as to whether Pacheco would have been a potential target of extortion 

by the cartel. Id. at 17. The trial court ruled that because Dr. Kirkland never 

interviewed Pacheco, and had no direct contact with him, it would be a “great 

leap” for him to render an opinion as to whether Pacheco was, in fact, 

threatened by the cartels. Id. at 18. 

Pacheco asserts that the hypothetical questions his counsel intended to 

ask were framed to demonstrate that an individual residing in the United 

States, who has family members living in Mexico, is at risk of having his 

relatives kidnapped should he refuse to cooperate with cartel associates. 

Pacheco argues that his sole defense was duress, and the trial court prevented 

Dr. Kirkland from opining as to whether Pacheco was threatened by the cartels 

so as to establish this defense.19 

The trial court ruled that Pacheco waived his evidentiary claim, since he 

failed to make a timely objection or offer of proof regarding the hypothetical 

____________________________________________

19 Notably, prior to questioning Dr. Kirkland, defense counsel specifically 

stated “I’m not going to ask [Dr. Kirkland] to give an opinion as to whether 

this particular defendant was under duress because that’s up to the jury to 

decide.” N.T. Trial, 8/9/17, at 193.
J-A09011-19

- 29 -

questions he intended to ask Dr. Kirkland. Trial Court Opinion, 3/9/18, at 18. 

The trial court noted that defense counsel made no objection or offer of proof 

when the trial court made its evidentiary rulings, but waited to do so until the 

following day of trial. Id. 

We agree with the trial court’s waiver determination. Counsel waited

until the day after Dr. Kirkland had been excused from the witness stand to 

object to the limitation of his testimony. Under our jurisprudence, this was 

simply too late to lodge an objection to the ruling that limited the scope of the 

witness’s direct examination. See Commonwealth v. Tucker, 143 A.3d 955, 

962 (Pa. Super. 2016) (holding that claim was waived where appellant waited 

until the completion of direct examination and cross-examination of the 

subject witness and the next witness before raising objection). By failing to 

place this argument on the record contemporaneously with the trial court’s 

ruling, Pacheco has waived it. See Commonwealth v. McGriff, 160 A.3d 

863, 868 (Pa. Super. 2017) (finding issue waived for failure to make a timely

and specific objection at time of witness’s testimony).20

In his final issue, Pacheco challenges the discretionary aspects of his 

sentence. “Challenges to the discretionary aspects of sentencing do not entitle 

an appellant to review as of right.” Commonwealth v. Moury, 992 A.2d 

____________________________________________

20 Even if the claim had not been waived, we would have concluded that it 

lacks merit for the reasons expressed by the trial court in its opinion. See

Trial Court Opinion, 3/9/18, at 18-19. 
J-A09011-19

- 30 -

162, 170 (Pa. Super. 2010). Prior to reaching the merits of a discretionary 

sentencing issue, this Court conducts a four-part analysis to determine:

(1) whether appellant has filed a timely notice of appeal, 

see Pa.R.A.P. 902 and 903; (2) whether the issue was 

properly preserved at sentencing or in a motion to 

reconsider and modify sentence, see Pa.R.Crim.P. [720]; 

(3) whether appellant’s brief has a fatal defect, [see]

Pa.R.A.P. 2119(f); and (4) whether there is a substantial 

question that the sentence appealed from is not appropriate 

under the Sentencing Code, [see] 42 Pa.C.S.[A.] § 9781(b). 

Id. (citation omitted). When an appellant challenges the discretionary aspects 

of his sentence, we must consider his brief on this issue as a petition for 

permission to appeal. Commonwealth v. Yanoff, 690 A.2d 260, 267 (Pa. 

Super. 1997); see also Commonwealth v. Tuladziecki, 522 A.2d 17, 18 

(Pa. 1987); 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9781(b). 

“The determination of what constitutes a substantial question must be

evaluated on a case-by-case basis.” Commonwealth v. Prisk, 13 A.3d 526,

533 (Pa. Super. 2011). Further, “[a] substantial question exists only when

the appellant advances a colorable argument that the sentencing judge’s

actions were either: (1) inconsistent with a specific provision of the Sentencing

Code; or (2) contrary to the fundamental norms which underlie the sentencing

process.” Id. (internal citations omitted).

In the instant case, Pacheco filed a timely notice of appeal, preserved 

his claims in a timely post-sentence motion, and included in his appellate brief 

a Rule 2119(f) statement. As such, he technically complied with the first three 

requirements to challenge the discretionary aspects of his sentence. See
J-A09011-19

- 31 -

Commonwealth v. Rhoades, 8 A.3d 912, 916 (Pa. Super. 2010). Thus, we 

will proceed to review his Rule 2119(f) statement to determine whether 

Pacheco has presented a substantial question for our review. 

In his Rule 2119(f) statement, Pacheco claims that the trial court 

improperly relied on a heroin study provided by the Commonwealth which 

indicated sentences imposed on defendants in different jurisdictions where 

little information is known. Pacheco also claims that, rather than focusing on 

Pacheco’s rehabilitative needs in fashioning his sentence, the trial court sought 

to send a message that severely harsh sentences will be imposed for drug 

mules. Pacheco contends that the trial court improperly considered as an 

aggravating factor the potential harm that Pacheco could have caused had he 

not been caught by law enforcement, rather than the actual harm he caused

by his drug trafficking activities. Pacheco asserts that, in failing to consider 

his rehabilitative needs and in holding him accountable for a severe heroin 

epidemic, the trial court’s consecutive sentencing scheme, even though within 

the standard range of the guidelines, renders his sentence manifestly 

excessive, and a virtual life sentence.

This Court has held on numerous occasions that a claim of inadequate 

consideration of rehabilitative needs does not raise a substantial question for 

our review. See Commonwealth v. Haynes, 125 A.3d 800, 807 (Pa. Super. 

2015). Similarly, an allegation that a sentencing court failed to consider or 

did not adequately consider certain mitigating factors does not raise a 
J-A09011-19

- 32 -

substantial question that the sentence was inappropriate. See 

Commonwealth v. Lewis, 911 A.2d 558, 567 (Pa. Super. 2006). 

However, an allegation that the court considered an impermissible

sentencing factor raises a substantial question. See Commonwealth v.

Macias, 968 A.2d 773, 776 (Pa. Super. 2009); see also Commonwealth v.

Matroni, 923 A.2d 444 (Pa. Super. 2007). With regard to the imposition of

consecutive sentences, this Court has stated:

A court’s exercise of discretion in imposing a sentence 

concurrently or consecutively does not ordinarily raise a

substantial question. Rather, the imposition of consecutive rather

than concurrent sentences will present a substantial question in

only the most extreme circumstances, such as where the

aggregate sentence is unduly harsh, considering the nature of the

crimes and the length of imprisonment.

[An appellant] may raise a substantial question where he receives

consecutive sentences within the guideline ranges if the case

involves circumstances where the application of the guidelines

would be clearly unreasonable, resulting in an excessive sentence;

however, a bald claim of excessiveness due to the consecutive

nature of a sentence will not raise a substantial question.

Commonwealth v. Swope, 123 A.3d 333, 338-39 (Pa. Super. 2015)

(citations and quotations omitted).

Because Pacheco claims that the court considered an impermissible

sentencing factor and that his standard range consecutive sentences are 

unreasonable as applied to him, we find he raises a substantial question and 

will address the merits of his discretionary sentencing claim. 
J-A09011-19

- 33 -

The trial court determined that Pacheco’s excessiveness claim, if 

reviewable,21 lacks merit because the trial court did not abuse its discretion in 

fashioning his sentence. The court explained its determination, as follows:

[Pacheco] is incorrect to claim that his sentence is unduly harsh 

in light of the conduct at issue. This court presided over the jury 

trial in this case and heard all the evidence. This court noted the 

Defendant’s age, his family, and his prior job and company. It 

also noted that it did not believe [Pacheco] started his criminal

activity with the intent of joining a cartel. This case involved a 

large amount of money and [Pacheco’s] own words that he hoped 

there would be more, more work, more money. This court noted 

the huge amount of money that the heroin was worth, specifically, 

the 27 kilograms of heroin that [Pacheco] transported and 

possessed was worth 8.9 million dollars on the street.

While the opiate issue within Montgomery County was mentioned 

and this court considered that there is an effect from opiate 

addiction on the people of this community, this court did not

provide that consideration undue weight. It was merely one of 

many factors considered. This court also possessed a presentence investigation [(“PSI”)], heard the [allocution] of 

[Pacheco], and the testimony from [Pacheco’s] wife and halfbrother. This court did not improperly rely on the severity of the 

heroin epidemic in fashioning its sentence. Rather, this court 

noted that the conduct of [Pacheco] contributed to the drug 

problem within the community, and that his trafficking of massive 

amounts of heroin contributed to that problem. It is proper for 

this court to consider the effect of [Pacheco’s] criminal actions on 

the community. 

However, this court also considered the individual characteristics 

of [Pacheco] as laid out in the PSI, arguments of counsel, and 

statements of [Pacheco] and his family. Finally, this court did note 

that the jury acquitted [Pacheco] of corrupt organizations and 

heard evidence that the police did not recover large sums of 

money from [Pacheco]. Nevertheless, the lack of evidence that 

____________________________________________

21 We note that the trial court believed Pacheco failed to raise a substantial 

question, but provided an analysis in the event we determined he has. 

See Trial Court Opinion, 3/9/18, at 29.
J-A09011-19

- 34 -

[Pacheco] was in possession of large amounts of money is not

relevant to the sentence. What is relevant to the sentence, among 

the other factors already discussed, is the conduct of [Pacheco] in 

this case.

In particular, [Pacheco] trafficked 3 kilograms of heroin 9 different 

times. He made long trips to Georgia and New York in his 

trafficking. Each trip, which resulted in the trafficking of 3

kilograms of heroin, deserved a separate sentence. Still, rather 

than imposing all 9 possession with intent to distribute counts 

consecutively, this court imposed a mixture of consecutive and

concurrent sentences in order to effectuate a particular sentencing 

scheme that reflected the seriousness of the criminal conduct. 

[Pacheco] should not receive a volume discount for his crimes 

because he committed the same crime more than once. 

Considering the quantity of drugs in this case, it was reasonable 

to run sentences for seven of the nine separate acts consecutively. 

Additionally, the two trips in which [Pacheco] transported large 

sums of drug money were equally deserving of their own 

consecutive sentences. Dealing in proceeds of criminal activity is

a separate action to the drug trafficking behavior of [Pacheco]. 

Finally, the conspiracy charge was also deserving of its own 

sentence. [Pacheco] did not just traffick [sic] 27 kilograms of

heroin, he engaged in a far reaching conspiracy to achieve his 

criminal goals. Therefore, that action was also deserving of 

separate punishment. This court did not run every sentence

consecutive, nor did this court even impose a prison term for each 

count. Additionally, all sentences were guideline range sentences. 

Considering the criminal conduct at issue, this sentence was 

appropriate.

Trial Court Opinion, 3/9/18, at 30-32 (citations to record and some 

capitalization omitted).

We discern no abuse of discretion by the trial court in imposing 

Pacheco’s sentence. Importantly, the sentencing court had the benefit of a 

PSI. It is well-settled that where a sentencing court is informed by a PSI, “it 

is presumed that the court is aware of all appropriate sentencing factors and 

considerations, and that where the court has been so informed, its discretion 
J-A09011-19

- 35 -

should not be disturbed.” Commonwealth v. Ventura, 975 A.2d 1128, 1135

(Pa. Super. 2009) (citing Commonwealth v. Devers, 546 A.2d 12, 18 (Pa. 

1988)). Moreover, in light of the criminal conduct at issue, we cannot 

conclude that the trial court’s imposition of standard range sentences is clearly

unreasonable, or that Pacheco’s aggregate sentence is unduly harsh. Swope,

123 A.3d at 338-39. Accordingly, Pacheco’s final issue entitles him to no 

relief. 

Judgment of sentence affirmed.

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 1/24/20