PRELIMINARY PRINT 

Volume 599 U. S. Part 1 

Pages 453–464 

OFFICIAL REPORTS 

OF 

THE SUPREME COURT 

June 16, 2023 

REBECCA A. WOMELDORF 

reporter of decisions 

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NOTICE: This preliminary print is subject to formal revision before 

the bound volume is published. Users are requested to notify the Reporter 

of Decisions, Supreme Court of the United States, Washington, D.C. 20543, 

pio@supremecourt.gov, of any typographical or other formal errors. 
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OCTOBER TERM, 2022 453 

Syllabus 

LORA v. UNITED STATES 

certiorari to the united states court of appeals for 

the second circuit 

No. 22–49. Argued March 28, 2023—Decided June 16, 2023 

A federal court imposing multiple prison sentences typically has discretion 

to run the sentences concurrently or consecutively. See 18 U. S. C. 

§ 3584. An exception exists in § 924(c), which provides that “no term of 

imprisonment imposed on a person under this subsection shall 

run concurrently with any other term of imprisonment.” § 924(c) 

(1)(D)(ii). Here, the Court considers whether § 924(c)'s bar on concurrent sentences extends to a sentence imposed under a different subsection, § 924(j). 

Petitioner Efrain Lora was convicted of the federal crime of aiding 

and abetting a violation of § 924(j)(1), which penalizes “a person who, in 

the course of a violation of subsection (c), causes the death of a person 

through the use of a frearm,” where “the killing is a murder.” A violation of subsection (c) occurs when a person “uses or carries a frearm” 

“during and in relation to any crime of violence or drug traffcking 

crime,” or “possesses a frearm” “in furtherance of any such crime.” 

§ 924(c)(1)(A). Lora was also convicted of a second federal crime, conspiring to distribute drugs. 

At sentencing, the District Court concluded that it lacked discretion 

to run the sentences for Lora's two convictions concurrently, because 

§ 924(c)(1)(D)(ii)'s bar on concurrent sentences governs § 924(j) sentences. The District Court sentenced Lora to consecutive terms of imprisonment for the drug-distribution-conspiracy count and the § 924(j) 

count. The Court of Appeals affrmed. 

Held: Section 924(c)(1)(D)(ii)'s bar on concurrent sentences does not govern 

a sentence for a § 924(j) conviction. A § 924(j) sentence therefore can 

run either concurrently with or consecutively to another sentence. 

Pp. 456–464. 

(a) Sections 924(c) and 924(j) criminalize the use, carrying, and possession of frearms in connection with certain crimes. Subsection (c) 

lays out a set of offenses and their corresponding penalties. It also 

mandates that a “term of imprisonment imposed on a person under this 

subsection” must run consecutively with other sentences. § 924(c)(1) 

(D)(ii). Subsection (j) likewise lays out offense elements and corresponding penalties. Unlike subsection (c), subsection (j) contains no 

consecutive-sentence mandate. Pp. 456–458. 
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454 LORA v. UNITED STATES 

Syllabus 

(b) Subsection (c)'s consecutive-sentence mandate applies only to 

the terms of imprisonment prescribed within subsection (c). A sentence imposed under subsection (j) does not qualify. Subsection (j) is 

located outside subsection (c) and does not call for imposing any sentence from subsection (c). And while subsection (j) references subsection (c), that reference is limited to offense elements, not penalties. 

Pp. 458–459. 

(c) Congress did not, as the Government maintains, incorporate 

§ 924(c) as a whole into § 924(j) such that a § 924(j) defendant faces subsection (j)'s penalties plus subsection (c)'s penalties. Subsection (j) nowhere mentions—let alone incorporates—subsection (c)'s penalties. 

Moreover, as subsections (c) and (j) are written, a sentencing court cannot always obey both sets of penalties. To avert potential confict between subsections (c) and (j), the Government points to another provision, § 924(c)(5), as a model. But assuming without deciding whether 

§ 924(c)(5) operates as the Government says, Congress did not implement that design in subsection (j). Equally unavailing is the 

Government's argument that, under double jeopardy principles, a defendant cannot receive both subsection (c) and subsection (j) sentences 

for the same conduct. That view of double jeopardy can easily be 

squared with the conclusion that subsection (j) neither incorporates subsection (c)'s penalties nor triggers the consecutive-sentence mandate. 

Pp. 459–462. 

(d) It is not “implausible,” as the Government asserts, for Congress 

to have imposed the harsh consecutive-sentence mandate under subsection (c) but not subsection (j), which covers more serious offense conduct. That result is consistent with the statute's design. Unlike subsection (c), subsection (j) generally eschews mandatory penalties in 

favor of sentencing fexibility. Of a piece, subsection (j) permits fexibility to choose between concurrent and consecutive sentences. Congress chose a different approach to punishment in subsection (j) than in 

subsection (c), and the Court must implement the design Congress 

chose. Pp. 462–464. 

Vacated and remanded. 

Jackson, J., delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court. 

Lawrence D. Rosenberg argued the cause for petitioner. 

With him on the briefs were Andrew J. M. Bentz, Charles E. 

T. Roberts, and Anne Marie Lofaso. 

Erica L. Ross argued the cause for the United States. 

With her on the brief were Solicitor General Prelogar, As-
Cite as: 599 U. S. 453 (2023) 455 

Opinion of the Court 

sistant Attorney General Polite, and Deputy Solicitor General Feigin.* 

Justice Jackson delivered the opinion of the Court. 

When a federal court imposes multiple prison sentences, 

it can typically choose whether to run the sentences concurrently or consecutively. See 18 U. S. C. § 3584. An exception exists in subsection (c) of § 924, which provides that “no 

term of imprisonment imposed on a person under this subsection shall run concurrently with any other term of imprisonment.” § 924(c)(1)(D)(ii). 

In this case, we consider whether § 924(c)'s bar on concurrent sentences extends to a sentence imposed under a different subsection: § 924(j). We hold that it does not. A sentence for a § 924(j) conviction therefore can run either 

concurrently with or consecutively to another sentence. 

I 

In 2002, members of a drug-dealing group from the Bronx 

assassinated a rival drug dealer. The Government accused 

petitioner Efrain Lora of being one of the group's leaders 

and acting as a scout during the fatal shooting. After a jury 

trial, Lora was convicted of aiding and abetting a violation 

of § 924(j)(1), which penalizes “[a] person who, in the course 

of a violation of subsection (c), causes the death of a person 

through the use of a frearm,” where “the killing is a murder.” See also § 2(a) (an aider and abettor is punishable “as 

a principal”). Lora was also convicted of conspiring to distribute drugs, in violation of 21 U. S. C. §§ 841 and 846. 

At sentencing, the District Court rejected two of Lora's 

arguments about his § 924(j) conviction. Most pertinent 

here, Lora argued that the District Court had discretion to 

*Briefs of amici curiae urging reversal were fled for the American Bar 

Association by Deborah Enix-Ross and Mary-Christine Sungaila; and for 

the National Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers by Bruce P. Merenstein and David M. Porter. 

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run the § 924(j) sentence concurrently with the drugdistribution-conspiracy sentence. The District Court held it 

lacked such discretion. Applying Circuit precedent, it held 

that § 924(c)(1)(D)(ii)'s bar on concurrent sentences governs 

§ 924(j) sentences, such that Lora's two sentences had to run 

consecutively. See United States v. Barrett, 937 F. 3d 126, 

129, n. 2 (CA2 2019). Lora also argued that a § 924(j) conviction is not subject to the mandatory minimum sentences 

specifed in § 924(c). Disagreeing once again, the District 

Court applied the fve-year mandatory minimum under 

§ 924(c)(1)(A) to Lora's sentencing calculation. 

The District Court ultimately sentenced Lora to 30 years 

of imprisonment: 25 years on the drug-distribution-conspiracy count and—consecutively—fve years on the § 924(j) 

count. Lora also received fve years of supervised release. 

The Court of Appeals affrmed, adhering to its precedent 

barring § 924(j) sentences from running concurrently with 

other sentences. That decision reinforced a confict among 

the Courts of Appeals over whether § 924(c)(1)(D)(ii)'s 

concurrent-sentence bar governs § 924(j) sentences.1 We 

granted certiorari to resolve the confict. 598 U. S. ––– 

(2022). 

II 

A 

This case concerns federal laws that criminalize the use, 

carrying, and possession of frearms in connection with certain crimes. The relevant parts of that scheme are spread 

across two subsections of 18 U. S. C. § 924. 

1 Compare, e. g., Barrett, 937 F. 3d, at 129, n. 2 (§ 924(c)(1)(D)(ii)'s 

concurrent-sentence bar governs § 924(j) sentences); United States v. Berrios, 676 F. 3d 118, 140–144 (CA3 2012); United States v. Bran, 776 F. 3d 

276, 280–282 (CA4 2015); and United States v. Dinwiddie, 618 F. 3d 821, 

837 (CA8 2010), with United States v. Julian, 633 F. 3d 1250, 1252–1257 

(CA11 2011) (it does not). 

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Subsection (c) lays out a set of offenses and their corresponding penalties. It begins by making it a crime either 

to “us[e] or carr[y] a frearm” “during and in relation to any 

crime of violence or drug traffcking crime,” or to “posses[s] a 

frearm” “in furtherance of any such crime.” § 924(c)(1)(A). 

The provision then prescribes “a term of imprisonment” for 

that offense: a minimum of fve years. § 924(c)(1)(A)(i). 

Other (more serious) offense elements and “term[s] of imprisonment” follow within subsection (c). If the frearm is 

“brandished,” the “term of imprisonment” jumps to a minimum of seven years. § 924(c)(1)(A)(ii). If the frearm is “discharged,” the minimum becomes 10 years; if the frearm is a 

“machinegun,” 30 years; and so on. §§ 924(c)(1)(A)–(C), (c)(5). 

Subsection (c) also provides that “no term of imprisonment 

imposed on a person under this subsection shall run concurrently with any other term of imprisonment imposed on the 

person.” § 924(c)(1)(D)(ii). In other words, the sentence 

must run consecutively, not concurrently, in relation to other 

sentences. This concurrent-sentence bar (or consecutivesentence mandate) is at issue in this case. 

Subsection (j) was added decades after subsection (c) and 

its consecutive-sentence mandate.2 Subsection (j) likewise 

lays out offense elements and corresponding penalties. It 

provides: 

“A person who, in the course of a violation of subsection (c), causes the death of a person through the use of 

a frearm, shall— 

“(1) if the killing is a murder (as defned in section 

1111), be punished by death or by imprisonment for any 

term of years or for life; and 

2 See 82 Stat. 1224 (enacting subsection (c) in 1968); 84 Stat. 1889–1890 

(adding subsection (c)'s consecutive-sentence mandate in 1971); 108 Stat. 

1973 (enacting subsection (j), originally designated as subsection (i), in 

1994); 110 Stat. 3505 (redesignating as subsection (j) in 1996). 

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“(2) if the killing is manslaughter (as defned in section 

1112), be punished as provided in that section.” 

§ 924(j). 

Subsection (j) contains no consecutive-sentence mandate. 

B 

Here, Lora was convicted of a subsection (j) offense. The 

parties dispute whether the sentence for that offense can run 

concurrently with another sentence, or whether it is subject 

to subsection (c)'s consecutive-sentence mandate. We hold 

the former. 

Subsection (c)'s consecutive-sentence requirement applies 

to a “term of imprisonment imposed on a person under this 

subsection”—i. e., subsection (c). § 924(c)(1)(D)(ii) (emphasis 

added). By those plain terms, Congress applied the 

consecutive-sentence mandate only to terms of imprisonment 

imposed under that subsection. And Congress put subsection (j) in a different subsection of the statute. 

Drilling into the details confrms that straightforward reasoning. To begin, subsection (c) sets forth a host of offenses 

and the corresponding “term[s] of imprisonment” to be imposed. §§ 924(c)(1), (5); supra, at 457. Those are the 

“term[s] of imprisonment imposed . . . under this subsection” 

that the consecutive-sentence mandate references. 

§ 924(c)(1)(D)(ii). That is, by echoing the phrase “term of 

imprisonment” and referring inwards to “this subsection,” 

§ 924(c)(1)(D)(ii) points to the terms of imprisonment prescribed within subsection (c). 

A sentence imposed under subsection (j) does not qualify. 

To state the obvious again, subsection (j) is not located 

within subsection (c). Nor does subsection (j) call for imposing any sentence from subsection (c). Instead, subsection (j) provides its own set of penalties. See §§ 924(j)(1)–(2). 

To be sure, subsection (j) references subsection (c). But it 

does so only with respect to offense elements, not penalties. 

Subsection (j)'s offense elements include causing death “in 

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the course of a violation of subsection (c).” § 924(j). And to 

defne that phrase, one must consult subsection (c)'s offense 

elements (i. e., what it takes to violate that subsection). But 

that is where subsection (c)'s role in subsection (j) stops. 

One need not consult subsection (c)'s sentences in order to 

sentence a subsection (j) defendant. 

Thus, a defendant who is sentenced under subsection 

(j) does not receive a “term of imprisonment imposed . . . 

under [subsection (c)].” Consequently, § 924(c)(1)(D)(ii)'s 

consecutive-sentence mandate does not apply. 

III 

A 

The Government tries to defect this conclusion by blending subsections (c) and (j) together. It claims that “Congress incorporated Section 924(c) as a whole into Section 

924(j).” Brief for United States 15. Under that view, a 

subsection (j) defendant faces subsection (j)'s penalties plus 

subsection (c)'s penalties—including subsection (c)'s mandatory minimum sentences and its consecutive-sentence 

mandate. 

The actual statute bears no resemblance to the Government's vision. Subsection (j) nowhere mentions—let alone 

incorporates—subsection (c)'s penalties. Instead, as just explained, subsection (j)'s only reference to subsection (c) is 

limited to offense elements. Supra, at 458–459. 

Moreover, a sentencing court cannot follow both subsection (c) and subsection (j) as written. Combining the two 

subsections would set them on a collision course; indeed, in 

some cases, the maximum sentence would be lower than the 

minimum sentence. Take voluntary manslaughter using a 

machinegun in the course of a subsection (c)(1) violation, for 

example. Subsection (c), because of the machinegun, would 

command that “the person shall be sentenced to a term of 

imprisonment of not less than 30 years.” § 924(c)(1)(B)(ii). 

Subsection (j), because of the voluntary manslaughter, would 

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command that, per § 1112, the person “shall be . . . imprisoned not more than 15 years.” §§ 924(j)(2), 1112(b). To 

fashion a sentence “not less than 30 years” and “not more 

than 15 years”—that is, to obey both subsections (c) and (j)— 

is impossible. And Congress has not required that unachievable result. Instead, subsection (j) supplies its own comprehensive set of penalties that apply instead of subsection (c)'s. 

To avert potential confict between subsections (c) and (j), 

the Government tries to knit the two provisions together in 

a very particular way. In the Government's view, a court 

sentencing a subsection (j) defendant should jump to subsection (c), apply the penalties listed there, then jump back to 

subsection (j) and add the penalties listed there, then jump 

back to subsection (c) and impose the consecutive-sentence 

mandate listed in that subsection. But nothing in subsection (j) calls for such calisthenics. 

To assuage that concern, the Government maintains that 

Congress has done this elsewhere; it says that another provision, § 924(c)(5), operates this way. Tr. of Oral Arg. 27, 31. 

Even if § 924(c)(5) does work in that fashion—which we do 

not decide—the Government's argument only underscores 

that subsection (j) does not. 

Under § 924(c)(5), a person who, inter alia, uses armor 

piercing ammunition during and in relation to a crime of violence or drug traffcking crime: 

“shall . . . 

“(A) be sentenced to a term of imprisonment of not 

less than 15 years; and 

“(B) if death results from the use of such 

ammunition— 

“(i) if the killing is murder (as defned in section 1111), 

be punished by death or sentenced to a term of imprisonment for any term of years or for life; and 

“(ii) if the killing is manslaughter (as defned in section 1112), be punished as provided in section 1112.” 

(Emphasis added.) 
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According to the Government, § 924(c)(5) adds two penalties 

together when death results: Someone convicted of murder 

resulting from the use of such ammunition faces a 15-year 

mandatory minimum sentence under § 924(c)(5)(A) plus an 

additional sentence for murder under § 924(c)(5)(B)(i). Tr. of 

Oral Arg. 27, 31. 

But subsection (j) is cast from a different mold. Section 

924(c)(5) groups the two penalties together and joins them 

with the word “and.” In contrast, several unrelated subsections separate subsections (c) and (j) structurally, and nothing joins their penalties textually. So even if those features 

of § 924(c)(5) make it operate as the Government contends, 

those aspects of § 924(c)(5) are missing from subsection (j). 

In the Government's own telling, then, § 924(c)(5) shows 

how Congress could have constructed penalties that might 

ultimately add together. Yet Congress did not implement 

that design in subsection (j). 

Equally unavailing is the Government's invocation of double jeopardy principles. According to the Government's 

brief, “Section 924(j) amounts to the `same offense' as Section 924(c) for purposes of the Double Jeopardy Clause,” so 

“a defendant may be punished for either a Section 924(c) offense or a Section 924(j) offense, but not both.” Brief for 

United States 22–26 (emphasis added; alterations and some 

internal quotation marks omitted). The Government argues 

that this conception of double jeopardy confrms subsection 

(j) incorporates all of subsection (c). Ibid. 

We express no position on the Government's view of double jeopardy, because even assuming it, arguendo, the Government's view does not refute our holding on the question 

presented. The Government says someone cannot receive 

both subsection (c) and subsection (j) sentences for the same 

conduct. But that aligns with our conclusion here: If a defendant receives a sentence under subsection (j), he does not 

receive a sentence “imposed . . . under [subsection (c)]” that 

would trigger the consecutive-sentence mandate. § 924(c)(1) 

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(D)(ii). Accordingly, the Government's view of double jeopardy can easily be squared with our view that subsection (j) 

neither incorporates subsection (c)'s penalties nor triggers 

the consecutive-sentence mandate. 

B 

The Government protests that it is “implausible” that Congress imposed the harsh consecutive-sentence mandate 

under subsection (c) but not subsection (j), which covers 

more serious offense conduct. Brief for United States 9, 28– 

35. Yet that result is consistent with other design features 

of the statute. 

Congress plainly chose a different approach to punishment 

in subsection (j) than in subsection (c). Subsection (c), frst 

enacted in 1968, is full of mandatory penalties. It contains 

mandatory minimum years of imprisonment and mandatory 

consecutive sentences. In fact, when subsection (j) was 

enacted in 1994, subsection (c) specifed not just mandatory 

minimums, but exact mandatory terms of imprisonment. 18 

U. S. C. § 924(c)(1) (1994 ed.) (e. g., exactly fve years of imprisonment for the base subsection (c) offense). 

Subsection (j), by contrast, generally eschews mandatory 

penalties in favor of sentencing fexibility. Unlike subsection (c), subsection (j) contains no mandatory minimums. 

Even for murder, subsection (j) expressly permits a sentence 

of “any term of years.” § 924(j)(1) (emphasis added). This 

follows the same pattern as several other provisions enacted 

alongside subsection (j) in the Federal Death Penalty Act of 

1994, 108 Stat. 1959. In those provisions, as in § 924(j)(1), 

Congress authorized the death penalty, but also a fexible 

range of lesser sentences for “any term of years,” with no 

mandatory minimum or consecutive-sentence mandate.3 In 

the same law, Congress also enacted a provision allowing 

3 108 Stat. 1971–1973, 1976, 1978–1982 (Pub. L. 103–322, §§ 60008, 60010, 

60011, 60019–60024). 

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judges to go below the otherwise-mandatory minimum sentence in certain cases.4 Given those choices to favor sentencing fexibility over mandatory penalties, it is not “implausible,” as the Government asserts, that subsection (j) 

permits fexibility to choose between concurrent and consecutive sentences. 

Nor is that fexibility incompatible with the seriousness of 

subsection (j) offenses. Subsection (j) merely refects the 

seriousness of the offense using a different approach than 

subsection (c)'s mandatory penalties. For murder, subsection (j) authorizes the harshest maximum penalty possible: 

death. § 924(j)(1). And for manslaughter, subsection (j) 

imposes the same harsh punishment that the Federal Criminal Code prescribes for other manslaughters. See 

§ 924(j)(2) (aligning penalties with § 1112).5 

Congress could certainly have designed the penalty 

scheme at issue here differently. It could have mandated 

harsher punishment under subsection (j) than under subsection (c). It could have added a consecutive-sentence mandate to subsection (j). It could have written subsection (c)'s 

consecutive-sentence mandate more broadly. It could have 

placed subsection (j) within subsection (c).6 

4 Id., at 1985–1986 (Pub. L. 103–322, § 80001) (enacting 18 U. S. C. 

§ 3553(f)). 5 When Congress enacted subsection (j), it actually imposed higher maximum penalties for manslaughter under subsection (j) than what subsection (c) had authorized for the base offense. A base subsection (c) violation triggered a fxed fve-year sentence, while subsection (j)(2) authorized 

more: up to 10 years for voluntary manslaughter and six years for involuntary manslaughter. 18 U. S. C. §§ 924(c)(1), (i)(2), 1112 (1994 ed.); see 110 

Stat. 3505 (redesignating subsection (i) as subsection (j)). This reinforces 

that Congress designed subsection (j)'s penalties to account for the seriousness of the offense by themselves, without incorporating penalties from 

subsection (c). 6 Congress specifcally considered and rejected that last possibility. 

The 1994 Congress had before it a proposal to add, within subsection (c), 

a provision authorizing the death penalty when a subsection (c) violation 

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But Congress did not do any of these things. And we 

must implement the design Congress chose. 

* * * 

Because the consecutive-sentence mandate in § 924(c)(1) 

(D)(ii) does not govern § 924(j) sentences, the District Court 

had discretion to impose Lora's § 924(j) sentence concurrently with another sentence. We vacate the judgment of 

the Court of Appeals and remand the case for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. 

It is so ordered. 

results in homicide. See 140 Cong. Rec. 11165, 24066. Congress rejected 

that option and enacted a different version of that crime bill—which created subsection (j). 

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Reporter’s Note 

The attached opinion has been revised to refect the usual publication 

and citation style of the United States Reports. The revised pagination 

makes available the offcial United States Reports citation in advance of 

publication. The syllabus has been prepared by the Reporter of Decisions 

for the convenience of the reader and constitutes no part of the opinion of 

the Court. A list of counsel who argued or fled briefs in this case, and 

who were members of the bar of this Court at the time this case was 

argued, has been inserted following the syllabus. Other revisions may 

include adjustments to formatting, captions, citation form, and any errant 

punctuation. The following additional edits were made: 

None