[Federal Register Volume 63, Number 75 (Monday, April 20, 1998)]
[Notices]
[Pages 19526-19529]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 98-10329]


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NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

[Docket No. 50-440; License No. NPF-58; EA 97-430]


Centerior Service Company, Perry Nuclear Power Plant, Unit 1; 
Order Imposing Civil Monetary Penalty

I

    Centerior Service Company (Licensee) is the holder of Operating 
License No. NPF-58, issued by the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC or 
Commission) on November 13, 1986. The license authorizes the Licensee 
to operate the Perry Nuclear Power Plant,

[[Page 19527]]

Unit 1, in accordance with the conditions specified therein.

II

    Three inspections of the Licensee's activities were conducted from 
December 28, 1996, to August 27, 1997. The results of the inspections 
indicated that the Licensee had not conducted its activities in full 
compliance with NRC requirements. A written Notice of Violation and 
Proposed Imposition of Civil Penalties (Notice) was served upon the 
Licensee by letter dated November 18, 1997. The Notice states the 
nature of the violations, the provisions of the NRC's requirements that 
the Licensee had violated, and the amount of the civil penalties 
proposed for the violations.
    First Energy on behalf of Cleveland Electric Illuminating Company 
responded to the Notice on December 18, 1997. The NRC notes that 
Centerior Service Company (Centerior) holds NRC License No. NPF-58 
which authorizes the operation of the Perry Nuclear Power Plant, Unit 
1. Therefore, this action is directed to Centerior (Licensee). In its 
December 18, 1997 response, the Licensee admitted Violation A (EA 97-
047) discussed in the Notice and paid the $50,000 civil penalty. 
Violation B (EA 96-542) did not require a response. In that same 
letter, the Licensee denied Violation C, EA 97-430, and requested 
remission of the proposed $50,000 civil penalty for that violation.

III

    After consideration of the Licensee's response and the statements 
of fact, explanation, and argument for remission contained therein, the 
NRC staff has determined, as set forth in the Appendix to this Order, 
that the violation occurred as modified below and that the penalty 
proposed for Violation C designated in the Notice should be imposed. 
The NRC accepts the licensee's explanation that the change of the 
description of the ECCS surge tanks did not involve a potential 
increase of the consequence of a design basis dose to the public. The 
violation was accordingly modified by removing the sentence concerning 
potential increase of the consequences of a design basis dose to the 
public. However, the modification of the violation does not affect the 
validity of the violation or the amount of the civil penalty.

IV

    In view of the foregoing and pursuant to Section 234 of the Atomic 
Energy Act of 1954, as amended (Act), 42 U.S.C. 2282, and 10 CFR 2.205, 
it is hereby ordered that: The Licensee pay a civil penalty in the 
amount of $50,000 within 30 days of the date of this Order, by check, 
draft, money order, or electronic transfer, payable to the Treasurer of 
the United States and mailed to Mr. James Lieberman, Director, Office 
of Enforcement, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, One White Flint 
North, 11555 Rockville Pike, Rockville, MD 20852.

V

    The Licensee may request a hearing within 30 days of the date of 
this Order. Where good cause is shown, consideration will be given to 
extending the time to request a hearing. A request for extension of 
time must be made in writing to the Director, Office of Enforcement, 
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, D.C. 20555, and include 
a statement of good cause for the extension. A request for a hearing 
should be clearly marked as a ``Request for an Enforcement Hearing,'' 
and shall be addressed to the Director, Office of Enforcement, U.S. 
Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, D.C. 20555, with a copy to 
the Commission's Document Control Desk, Washington, D.C. 20555. Copies 
also shall be sent to the Assistant General Counsel for Hearings and 
Enforcement at the same address and to the Regional Administrator, NRC 
Region III, 801 Warrenville Road, Suite 255, Lisle, IL 60532-4351.
    If a hearing is requested, the Commission will issue an Order 
designating the time and place of the hearing. If the Licensee fails to 
request a hearing within 30 days of the date of this Order, or if 
written approval of an extension of time in which to request a hearing 
has not been granted, the provisions of this Order shall be effective 
without further proceedings. If payment has not been made by that time, 
the matter may be referred to the Attorney General for collection.
    In the event the Licensee requests a hearing as provided above, the 
issues to be considered at such hearing shall be:
    (a) Whether the Licensee was in violation of the Commission's 
requirements as set forth in the Notice referenced in Section II above, 
as amended in the Appendix to this Order, and
    (b) Whether, on the basis of such violation, this Order should be 
sustained.

    Dated at Rockville, Maryland this 9th day of April 1998.

    For the Nuclear Regulatory Commission.
James Lieberman,
Director, Office of Enforcement.

Appendix--Evaluation and Conclusion

    On November 18, 1997, a Notice of Violation and Proposed 
Imposition of Civil Penalties (Notice) was issued for violations 
identified during several NRC inspections at the Perry Nuclear Power 
Plant, Unit 1. First Energy on behalf of Cleveland Electric 
Illuminating Company responded to the Notice on December 18, 1997. 
The NRC notes that Centerior Services Company (Centerior) holds NRC 
License No. NPF-58 which authorizes the operation of the Perry 
Nuclear Power Plant, Unit 1. Therefore, this action is directed to 
Centerior (licensee). In the December 18, 1997 response, the 
licensee admitted Violation A (EA 97-047) discussed in the Notice 
and paid the $50,000 civil penalty. Violation B (EA 96-542) did not 
require a response. In that same letter, the licensee denied 
Violation C, EA 97-430, and requested remission of the proposed 
$50,000 civil penalty for that violation.

Restatement of Violation C (EA 97-430)

    10 CFR 50.59 permits the licensee, in part, to make changes to 
the facility and procedures as described in the safety analysis 
report without prior Commission approval provided the changes do not 
involve an unreviewed safety question. Records of these changes must 
include a written safety evaluation which provides the bases for the 
determination that the changes do not involve an unreviewed safety 
question.
    10 CFR 50.59 (a)(2)(I) states, in part, that a proposed change 
shall be deemed to involve an unreviewed safety question if the 
probability of occurrence or the consequences of an accident or 
malfunction of equipment important to safety previously evaluated in 
the safety analysis report may be increased.
    Updated Safety Analysis Report (USAR) Section 9.2.2.3, 
``Emergency Closed Cooling System--Safety Evaluation'' states that 
the emergency closed system cooling surge tanks are designed to 
maintain a seven day supply of water with normal system leakage 
without the need to provide makeup water.
    Contrary to the above, Safety Evaluation No. 96-128 prepared by 
the licensee on October 10, 1996, and approved on October 21, 1996, 
evaluated a change in the design basis for the emergency closed 
cooling system surge tanks. The licensee changed the sizing basis of 
the surge tanks from a seven day supply as stated in USAR Section 
9.2.2.3 to a 30-minute supply, and the licensee's analysis failed to 
identify that the change was an unreviewed safety question. 
Specifically, the safety evaluation did not adequately assess the 
increased probability of a malfunction of equipment important to 
safety associated with an increased potential for operator error as 
operators replenished the surge tanks on a 30-minute post accident 
basis instead of the previously evaluated period of seven days. The 
safety evaluation also failed to recognize the increased 
consequences of a design basis loss of coolant accident associated 
with an increased projected dose to the operators as they

[[Page 19528]]

refilled the surge tanks on an increased frequency.
    This is a Severity Level III violation (Supplement I).
    Civil Penalty--$50,000.

Summary of Licensee's Response to Violation C (EA 97-430)

    The licensee denied this violation as written. The licensee 
provided three reasons to support the denial of the violation:

Summary of Licensee's Reason 1

    The design of the plant, and the corresponding design bases for 
the emergency closed cooling (ECC) system, were not changed by the 
safety evaluation. The plant condition was identified as a non-
conforming condition, and activities were planned to restore the 
system condition to the original licensing basis.
    A determination of operability for the ECC system with increased 
leakage concluded that it was acceptable to allow system leakage of 
3.0 gallons per minute (gpm) for ECC Loop A and 3.5 gpm for Loop B. 
In this degraded condition, the increased leakage would reduce the 
seven day supply of water to a 30 minute supply and introduce the 
need for local operator action to ensure sustained adequate net 
positive suction head (NPSH) to the ECC pumps. The licensee 
indicated that it may have been inappropriate to include the 
operability evaluation in the Updated Final Safety Analysis (USAR); 
however, it was done to preclude the need for preparing additional 
degraded condition operability determinations in the future.
    The licensee concluded that the revision to the USAR preserved 
the original design considerations of a 7 day supply, and distinctly 
identifies leakage in excess of 0.5 gallons per hour (gph) as a 
degraded condition. The licensee indicated that its intention was to 
correct the deficiency during ``refueling outage six'' which began 
on September 12, 1997.

NRC Evaluation of Licensee's Reason 1

    As originally stated in the USAR, the system was designed to 
maintain a seven day supply with normal system leakage. This fact 
was considered and reiterated in the NRC safety evaluation report. 
The USAR change removed the ``design aspect'' of the seven day 
supply and simply provided the mathematics for the 0.5 gph leak 
rate. This was a change in the design criteria. Additionally, the 
USAR now stated that under condition of degraded system leakage, it 
would be acceptable to have leakage such that there would only be a 
30 minute inventory available. This also represents a change to the 
design basis of the facility.
    Although the intention of the licensee was to repair the system, 
the USAR change represented a continued acceptance of a degraded 
condition.

Summary of Licensee's Reason 2

    The change to the description of the ECC system surge tanks in 
the USAR did not involve an unreviewed safety question (USQ) under 
10 CFR 50.59 criteria because it did not involve a potential 
increase in the probability of occurrence of a malfunction of 
equipment important to safety.
    The licensee indicated that an increase in the probability of 
occurrence of a malfunction of equipment important to safety was not 
concluded on the basis that manual actions employed were such that 
failure of an action would be equivalent to that of a single active 
failure. When compared to the original evaluated design, the failure 
of the operator action would result in the loss of one train of the 
ECC system; a loss of no greater consequence than was previously 
evaluated in the USAR.
    The licensee also indicated that significant efforts put forth 
to compensate for the additional actions and reduce the potential 
for error formed the basis to conclude that no increase in 
probability of equipment malfunction was introduced. The licensee 
referenced Part 9900 of the NRC inspection manual guidance for 10 
CFR 50.59, which states in part that the NRC has found compensating 
effects, such as administrative controls, acceptable in offsetting 
uncertainties and increases in probability of occurrence or 
consequences of an accident previously evaluated or reductions in 
margin of safety, provided the negative impact is negligible, and is 
clearly outweighed by the compensatory actions. The licensee stated 
``if these compensating factors can not be considered in determining 
that there is no increase in probability, no additional operator 
actions, for any normal or off-normal operating condition, could be 
permitted without also concluding an increase in the probability of 
a malfunction.''

NRC Evaluation of Licensee's Reason 2

    Under the circumstances required to manually accomplish the ECC 
surge tank refill, the NRC does not agree that the consequences of 
operator error would be limited to a single active failure. The 
licensee did take actions to mitigate potential operator errors; 
however, in this case the NRC does not consider any mitigating 
actions to clearly outweigh the increased probability of losing NPSH 
to the ECC pumps. The increases in probabilities are described 
below:
    <bullet> The reliance on an operator to refill the emergency 
closed cooling surge tanks beginning at 30 minutes (with completion 
occurring within the next 20 minutes) into a design basis accident 
(DBA) introduced a common-mode failure mechanism at a critical time 
in the accident sequence. While the USAR did rely on operators to 
refill the tanks seven days after a DBA, the seven days provided a 
period of time during which no operator action was required. After 
seven days, the plant would be stabilized and a failure on the part 
of an operator to properly refill the ECC surge tanks would still 
allow some margin for recovery. At 30 minutes into a DBA, the plant 
is significantly less stable and an interruption in operation or 
loss of this system increases the potential for core damage. When 
operator response time to perform a task is significantly decreased, 
the probability of an error is also increased.
    <bullet> Due to the limited time into the accident sequence when 
operator actions would be required to refill the ECC surge tanks, 
there was also concern that personnel would not be available to 
perform the activity. Although the actual number of operators on 
site during routine activities might support the refill activity, 
during an accident, these operators would be diverted into 
addressing the more immediate action of responding to the accident 
and might not be available to compensate for a system that was 
designed to operate without operator action until the plant was 
stabilized. Therefore, the potential lack of available personnel 
early in the accident sequence to perform the ECC surge tank refill 
increased the probability of not filling the ECC surge tanks within 
the limited time frame.
    <bullet> Based on the licensee's dose estimates for single 
entries into the ECC surge tank area of 4.4 rem, no single operator 
would be able to accomplish the repetitive refill activity 
sufficient to reduce the potential for error. It would appear that a 
minimum of three operators would be required within the first 2.5 
hours (due to the dose) which increased the potential for errors.
    <bullet> The actual and potential physical conditions of the 
area adjacent to the ECC system surge tanks (e.g., no emergency 
lighting, overfilling the surge tanks could cause slippery floor 
conditions) could result in the operator being unable to refill the 
tanks within the reduced response time.
    In this case, the substitution of manual actions to replace the 
design intention of the tanks, including significantly reducing 
operator response time constitutes an unreviewed safety question 
(USQ). This change should have been submitted to and approved by the 
NRC before implementation.

Summary of Licensee's Reason 3

    The change to the description of the ECC system surge tanks in 
the USAR did not involve a USQ under 10 CFR 50.59 criteria because 
it did not involve a potential increase of the consequences of a 
design basis accident associated with increased projected dose to 
the public due to operator refilling the surge tanks on an increased 
frequency.
    The licensee performed time and motion studies of the activities 
needed to refill the ECC surge tanks and determined that for a 
single entry, the maximum dose was estimated to be 4.4 rem. This 
dose was bounded by the NUREG-0737 defined limit of 5 rem. The 
expected dose projection was within the guidelines of USAR section 
12.6.1.a, for post accident dose rates in areas designated as 
``infrequent occupancy,'' and the activity could be performed at any 
time throughout the accident without exceeding the 5 rem whole body 
exposure limit.
    An increase in the consequences of an accident previously 
evaluated in the USAR was not concluded since doses to the public 
were not increased above the current licensing limit and doses to 
onsite personnel were not in excess of the limits as specified in 
NUREG-0737 or the USAR.
    The consequences as referenced in 10 CFR 50.59 pertain to the 
health and safety of the public. Therefore, the proposed operator 
action from the perspective of receiving the estimated dose, does 
not cause a change in the consequences.

NRC Evaluation of Licensee's Reason 3

    The NRC determined that an increase in dose consequences, as 
used in 10 CFR 50.59,

[[Page 19529]]

refers to the consequences of a design basis accident, and not to 
increased radiation dose to plant staff from in-plant recovery 
actions. NRC agrees that the change in operator actions did not 
involve a potential increase in consequences of a design basis 
accident. The violation is revised as follows:
    10 CFR 50.59 permits the licensee, in part, to make changes to 
the facility and procedures as described in the safety analysis 
report without prior Commission approval provided the changes do not 
involve an unreviewed safety question. Records of these changes must 
include a written safety evaluation which provides the bases for the 
determination that the changes do not involve an unreviewed safety 
question.
    10 CFR 50.59 (a)(2)(I) states, in part, that a proposed change 
shall be deemed to involve an unreviewed safety question if the 
probability of occurrence or the consequences of an accident or 
malfunction of equipment important to safety previously evaluated in 
the safety analysis report may be increased.
    Updated Safety Analysis Report (USAR) Section 9.2.2.3 
``Emergency Closed Cooling System--Safety evaluation'' states that 
the emergency closed cooling system surge tanks are designed to 
maintain a seven day supply of water with normal system leakage 
without the need to provide makeup water.
    Contrary to the above, Safety Evaluation No. 96-128 prepared by 
the licensee on October 10, 1996, and approved on October 21, 1996, 
evaluated a change in the design basis for the emergency closed 
cooling system surge tanks. The licensee changed the sizing basis of 
the surge tanks from a seven day supply as stated in USAR Section 
9.2.2.3 to a 30-minute supply, and the licensee's analysis failed to 
identify that the change was an unreviewed safety question. 
Specifically, the safety evaluation did not adequately assess the 
increased probability of a malfunction of equipment important to 
safety associated with an increased potential for operator error as 
operators replenished the surge tanks on a 30-minute post accident 
basis instead of the previously evaluated period of seven days.

Summary of Licensee's Request for Remission of the Civil Penalty

    The licensee requested full remission of the $50,000 civil 
penalty.

NRC Evaluation of Licensee's Request for Remission of the Civil 
Penalty

    The licensee did not provide a separate justification (i.e., a 
discussion of the civil penalty adjustment factors) to justify 
remission of the civil penalty. Rather, the licensee's reasons for 
denying the violation apparently are the licensee's justification 
for requesting remission of the civil penalty.

NRC Conclusion

    The licensee interpreted the NRC position concerning the 
violation to be that the increases in both the consequences and 
probability of an accident were the direct result of the increased 
presence in the plant of operators who are fully trained and 
qualified for the activities under consideration.
    The NRC did not intend to suggest that the increased presence of 
personnel in the plant would cause an increase in the consequences 
and probability of an accident. Rather, the NRC was concerned with 
the increased potential of failing to refill the ECC surge tanks 
within an extremely limited time constraint, which was much shorter 
than originally described to and accepted by the NRC. In summary, 
the NRC's concern was that during the performance of the additional 
operator actions to refill the ECC surge tanks, the potential for 
errors was increased and could lead to the loss of the safety 
related ECC system. Loss of the ECC system could result in losing 
other safety related systems relied upon to mitigate the 
consequences of an accident. Therefore, the manual operator action 
proposed to compensate for the reduced ECC surge tank water supply 
constituted a USQ.
    The NRC has concluded that this violation occurred as modified 
above, and that an adequate basis for withdrawing the violation, 
reducing the severity level of the violation, or remitting the civil 
penalty was not provided by the licensee. Consequently, the proposed 
civil penalty in the amount of $50,000 should be imposed.

[FR Doc. 98-10329 Filed 4-17-98; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 7590-01-P