Wit h the conse nt of the par ties, this publi c ver sion is being issued without the re daction * of any information containe d in the confide ntial version of this Opinion and Orde r. Slip Op. 08-132 UNITED STAT ES COURT OF INTERNATIONAL TRADE

Before: Judge Tim othy C. Stanceu Court No. 04- 00494 P UB LIC *

OP IN ION AN D O RD ER [Granting in pa

rt and de nying in pa

rt plaintiff’s a

pplication for attorney s’ fe es and othe r expenses un de r t he Eq ua l A c c e ss t o Just ic e Ac t] Dated: De cembe r 2, 2008 Ne v ille Pe te rso n LLP

( John M. Pe terson , Cur tis W . Kn au ss , GeorgeW

. Thompson , Ma ria E. Ce lis , and Catherine Chess Chen ) for plaintiff. Gregory G . Katsas, Assistant Attorney Gene ral, JeanneE. Davidson , Direc tor, Pa tri c ia M. Mc Carthy , Assistant Director , Commercial L itigation B ranc h, Civil Division, United St ates Depa rtment of Just ice (

Jane C. De mpsey ); Beth Brotman and Paul Pizzeck, Customs and B order Pr ote c tio n, Un ite d St ate s D e pa rtme nt o f H ome land

Se c ur ity , o f c ouns e l, f

or de fe nd ant. Stanceu, Judge : Be fore the cour t is the revised a

pplication of Jaz z P hoto Corporation (“Jazz ” or “ plaintiff”) for attorney s’ fe es and othe r expenses under the Equal Ac cess to Just ice Act (“ EAJA”), 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d) (2000). I n Jazz Photo Corp. v. United States , 31 CI T ___, 502 F. Supp. 2d 1277 (2007) ( “ Jazz IV ”), the court he ld that some of the g overnme nt’s positions in liti g ation befor e the United States Court of A ppeals for the Fe dera l Circuit (“Court of Ap pe a ls” ) i n 2 00 5 a

nd 20 06 we re no t su

bs tanti a lly

jus tif ie d. Th e c ourt

a llo we d p la int if

f t o JA Z Z P HOTO CO RP OR AT ION , Plaintiff,
v. UN ITED STA TES ,

De fe nd ant.Court No. 04- 00494 P age 2

submit a revised EAJA application statement identify ing the attorney s’ fe es and othe r expenses incurre d in liti g ating cer

tain issues befor e the Court of A ppeals on whic h J azz prevailed and on which the g overnme nt’s position was not substantially justified. SeeRevised Application for Fe es and O ther Expenses Pursuant to the Equal Ac cess to Just ice Ac t 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d), Title I I of Public L aw 96- 481, 94 Stat. 2325 and Rule 54.1 (“Revised A pplication”) 2. U

pon consideringthe re vised application, the court dete rmines a f ee a war d of $38,704.76 which
amou nt c on sis ts o f $ 34 ,3 50 .5 1 in c omp e ns a tio n f

or a tto rn e y s’ fe e s a

nd $4 ,3 54 .2 5 in
c omp e ns atio n f

or dis burs e me nts . I. B ACKG ROUND Plaintiff’s EAJA claim arose f rom litigation involving the admissibili ty of Jaz z’s imported merc handise, whic h consisted of c erta in “lens-f itted film packag es,” which ar e more
c o m m o n l y

kn o w na s “ d i s p o s a

b l e c am e r a s , ” “ s i n g l e u s e c am e r a s , ” o r “ o n e - t i m e u s e c am e r a s . ” In its revised EAJA application, plaintiff see ks $123,521.00 for attorney s’ fe es and $9,297.31 f or disbursements. Id. Ar g uin g that Jazz’ s E AJA r e qu e st f a ils to c omp ly

wi th t he c ourt ’s or de r i n Jazz IV , the g overnme nt submit s that the fee awa rd should be re duced to a n amount no g reater than $16,773.75 and oppose s any reimburse ment for other

expenses. SeeDef

.’s Resp. to Pl.’s Revised Application for

Fe es and O ther Expenses Under the Equal Ac cess to Just ice Ac t 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d), Title I Iof Public L aw 96- 481, 94 Stat. 2325 and Rule 54.1 (“De f.’s Resp.” ) 7-16. Ba ckg round information on J azz’s revised EAJA application is presente d in the opinion of the Court of Appe als in Jazz Photo Corp. v. International Trade Commission , 264 F.3d 1094 (F ed. Cir. 2001) (“

J az z I ”), the opinion of the United States Court of International Trade in J az zCourt No. 04- 00494 P age 3

Photo Corp. v. United States , 28 CI T 1954, 353 F. Supp. 2d 1327 (2004) (“ Jazz II ”), a nd the opinion of the Court of Appea ls in Jazz Photo Corp. v. United States , 439 F.3d 1344 ( Fe d. Cir. 2006) (“ Jazz III ”), which af

firmed the c ourt’s judg ment in Jazz II and de c ide d th e a

pp e llate issues on which Jaz z qualifies for an E AJ A awa rd. In Jazz IV , the cour t held that the positions taken by United States Customs and Borde r Protection (“Customs”) in the a dminist rative pr ocee ding r esulting in the Jazz II and Jazz III litigation wer e substantially justified. Jazz IV

, 31 CI T __, 502 F. Supp. 2d at 1293-94. T he cour t
rea ched the same c onclusion with respec t to the gove rnment’s positions in the Jazz II litigation befor e the Court of International Trade
. Id. at __, 502 F. Supp. 2d. at 1284- 91. Concerningthe Jazz III litigation bef

ore the Court of Appea ls, the Court of International Trade ruled in Jazz IV that the United States wa s not substantially justified in pursuing its position on the issue of pe rm iss ibl e re pa ir

and a lso wa s n ot s ub sta

nti a lly jus tif ie d in purs uin g its po sit ion

on the a uth or ity of the c ourt to o rd e r e xpe dit e d a dmi nis tr a tiv e pr oc e e din g s d ir e c tin g Cus tom s to pa rt ic ipate in
se g re g atin gthe a dmi ssi ble po rt ion of Jazz’ s im

po rt e d me rc ha

nd ise fr om t

he ina dmi ssi ble portion. Id. at __, 502 F. Supp. 2d. at 1287- 93. At the conc lusion of the Jazz IV litigation, the court de clined to awa

rd fe es and othe r expenses and instea d allowed plaintiffs to submit a re vised application stateme nt that identifies the spec ific leg al servic es provided, a nd expenses incurre d, in plaintiff’s litigation of those two issues be fore the Court of Appe als. Id. at __, 502 F. Supp. 2d at 1295. II. D I S CUS S I ON I f t he g ov e rnme nt p ur su e s a

lit ig a tio n p os iti on

tha t is no t su bs tanti a lly

jus tif ie d, and if oth e r c on dit ion s se t f

or th i n E AJA a

re satis fi e d, a

c ourt may awa rd a pr e va ili ngpa

rt y “ re a so na bleCourt No. 04- 00494 P age 4

In its revised EAJA application, plaintiff re quests compensation for 363.75 hours. 1 Af fi rm atio n o f John M . Pe te rs on in S up p. of

Ap pli c a tio n f

or F e e s und e r t

he Eq ua l A c c e ss t o Justi c e Ac t, Aug . 2 7, 20 06 (“ Af fi rm atio n” ) ¶

16 . B a se d o n th e a tto rn e y s’ bil lin g state me nts atta c he d to pla int if

f’ s r e vis e d E AJA a

pp lic a tio n, the c or

re c t c a lc ulatio n is 36 3. 15 ho ur s. atto rn e y fe e s. ” 28 U. S.C. § 2 41 2( d) (2 )( A) . Pl a int if f s e e ks c omp e ns a tio n f

or the fe e s p a id t o three partne rs and two a ssociates of pla intiff’s counse l, Neville Peterson L L P. Affirmation of JohnM. Pe te rs on

in S up po rt

of Ap pli c a tio n f

or F e e s und e r t

he Eq ua l A c c e ss t o Just ic e Ac t, Aug . 27, 2006 (“A ffirmation”) ¶ 13. Counsels’ hour ly rate s rang ed fr om $450 for the lea d partne r to $225 for the most juni or assoc iate. Id. In its original EA J A application, plaintiff sought $347,333.00 in attorne y s’ fe es and $34,428.45 in disbursements, totaling $381,761.45, f or ser vices re ndere d from September 30, 2004 throug h Fe bruar

y 8, 2006. Affir

mation of J ohn M. Peterson in Support of Application for F e e s U nd e r t

he Eq ua l A c c e ss t o Just ic e Ac t, M ay 26 , 2 00 6, Ex. Aa t 1. Pla int if f r e du c e d it s orig inal EAJA claim by

shorteningthe re quested c ompensation period to eliminate a ll bill ing entries a nd disbursements that pre cede d the issuance of the Jazz II opinion. Affirmation ¶ 13. Plaintiff’s revised a

pplication seeks c ompensation for se rvice s beg inning Nove mber 18, 2004 and endingFe bruar

y 8, 2006. Id. F or

a tot a l of 36 3. 1 ho ur s o f l e g a l se rv ic e s p ro vid e d in

1
connec tion with the appellate litigation, plaintiff reque sts $123,521.00 for leg al fe es and reimburse ment of $9,297.31 in other e x penses. Id. ¶¶ 16- 17. The g overnme nt advocates an a war d for attorney s’ fe es in an amount not to ex cee d $16,773.75, which would limit plainti ff’ s hourly fee to the $125 EAJA rate and e x clude 229.56 hours of billing f

rom plaintiff’s re quest. Def .’s Resp. 7-14, 16. In seekinga deduc tion of 229.56 hours, def

endant a rgues that plaintiff’s r evised a pplication improperly

includes 130.60 hours forCourt No. 04- 00494 P age 5

The billing e ntries identified by defe ndant as c onstitut ing r epre sentation related to J az z I 2 actua lly acc ount for 7.6 hours of

repr esentation, rather tha n 6.8 hours as de fenda

nt alleg es. The g overnme nt argues, incorr ectly , that plaintiff’s counse l failed to provide the corr espondinghours for the billing entry

of January

14, 2005. See Def

.’s Resp. to Pl.’s Revised Application for F ees and Other Ex penses Unde r the Equa l Acce ss to J ustice Ac t 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d), Title I Iof Public L aw 96- 481, 94 Stat. 2325 and Rule 54.1 (“De f.’s Resp.” ) 8. The billing entry for that date pr ovides that Mr. Peterson billed 0.8 hours. SeeAffir mation, Ex . A at 7. repr esentation pertainingexclusively to liti g ation with a third party , 6.8 hours for r epre sentation related to J

az z I , and 16.5 hours f

or billing by

one of the firm’s attorne y s, Mr. Thompson, on 2 matters unre lated to the appe llate litigation in question. Id. at 7-10. The g overnme nt further alleg es, with respe ct to 97.25 hours, that plaintiff fa iled to seg reg ate the hour s for ser vices rende red on issues f

or which the court pe rmitted EAJ A re cover y in Jazz IV

. Id. at 10-12. The g overnme nt reque sts that the court deduc t 75.66 of the 97.25 hours to ac count for this er ror. Id.
at 13 . A lth ou g h r e

je c tin g so me of

de fe nd ant’ s c a lc ulatio ns , th e c ourt c on c lud e s th a t c e rt a in adjustments to plaintiff’s revised E AJ A claim ar e appr opriate to e nsure that plaintiff doe s not
rec over unde r EAJA leg al fe es and othe r expenses re lated to litigation of issues on whic h the g overnme nt’s position was substantially justified. A. The Spec ial Fa ctor Enha nceme nt I s Warrante d for Re pr e se ntatio n o n th e I ssu e of Se g re g a tio n o f M e rc ha

nd ise EAJA st ates that “ attorney fee s shall not be awa

rded in e x cess of

$125 per hour

unless the court de termines that an inc rea se in the cost of livingor a spe cial fa ctor, such a s the limit ed
ava ila bil ity of qu a lif ie d atto rn e y s f

or the pr oc e e din g s invo lve d, jus tif ie s a highe r f e e .” 28 U. S.C. § 2 41 2( d) (2 )( A) (i i) . Pl a int if f s e e ks c omp e ns a tio n at r a te s a bo ve the $1 25 statut or

y ma ximum , arguin gthat hi g he r r ate s are jus tif ie d b e c a us e of the pr e se nc e of

sp e c ia l f a c tor s a nd inc re a se s in th e c o s to f l i v i n g.Court No. 04- 00494 P age 6

Pla int if f c on te nd s th at a

sp e c ia l- fa c tor

e nh anc e me nt i s w arr ante d b e c a us e , in a dd iti on to basic litigation skil ls, plaintiff’s attorney s “had to have spec ialized knowledg e in International Tr a de Commis sio n 3 37 Ge ne ra l E xclu sio n O rd e rs , inte lle c tua l pr op e rt y ma tte rs su c h a s f

ir st s a le
and un de r p ate nt l aws , p e rm iss ibl e re pa ir , a nd so me e xpe rt ise in t

he mann e r i n whic h Cu sto ms i s called to e x ecute 337 Orde rs at the por ts of entry .” Pl.’s Reply

Mem. in Supp. of I ts Application for a n Awar d of Attorney ’s Fe es Unde r the Equa l Acce ss to J ustice Ac t (“Pl.’s Reply ”) 12. Plaintiff also argues that “the attorney s at Neville Peter son L L P presented a ll these skills” on an
emer g ent trial sche dule and that “ no other lawfirm or attorney would take on suc h an expedited tr ia l ( wh ic h w a s th e fi rs t of its kin d, and

wh ic h invo lve d a lmo st e nti re ly iss ue s o f f

ir st impression) and a

ppeal sc hedule f

or a c lient which was a lrea dy under ba nkruptcy protec tion.” Pl.’s Reply

8, 13. The g overnme nt argues that none of these fa ctors justifies a spec ial-fa ctor enhanc ement. De f.’s Resp. 7-16. In Piercev. Unde rwood , 487 U.S. 552, 572 (1988), the Supre me Court clar ified that the EAJA special fac tor exception for qua lified attorney s “re fer s to attorney s havingsome distinctive knowledg e or spe cialized skill needful for the litigation in question.” The Court noted, a s an example of a spec ial fac tor, expertise in “an ide ntifiable pra ctice spe ciality such as patent law.” Pierce , 4 87 U. S. at 57 2. Th e Cou rt the n li ste d s e ve ra l f

a c tor s th a t it

de e me d in su ff

ic ie nt t o me ri t an incr ease in the statutory cap: “ [t ]he ‘novelty

and diffic ulty

of issues,’ ‘the undesirability of the
case ,’ the ‘w ork and a

bility of counse l,’ and ‘the results obtained.’” Id. at 573 (interna l citation omitted). The Court explained that these “ are fac tors applicable to a broa d spectrum of litigation; they are littl e more than routine re asons why marke t rates a

re what they

are .” Id.Court No. 04- 00494 P age 7

The c ourt consider s customs law to be a spe cialized prac tice ar ea, distinct fr om ge nera l
an d a dm i n i s tr at i v e l aw , f

o r p ur p o s e s o f E A JA . See Nak

amura v. He inrich , 17 CI T 119, 121 (1993). The court fur

ther c oncludes that plaintiff’ s attorney s possess distinct knowledge and litigation experienc e in the fie ld of customs law. The la w firm Ne ville Peterson L L P describes itself as “a

law firm c oncentr ating in international and dome stic trade r egulation matters.” See Neville Peter son L L P, http: //www.npwtra delaw.c om (last visited Dec. 1, 2008) . The biog raphy of the lead billing partne r in the Jaz z li tigation, Mr. Peterson, attests to expertise in international trade and customs topics. Id. Additionally , Mr. Peterson is a me mber of the Customs and International Trade Ba

r Association. Id. Def

endant doe s not question the cre dentials and expertise of plaintiff’s attorney s in customs law. The c ourt next considers whether specia liz ed customs law skills were require d for competent r epre sentation in the ca se. See P ierce , 4 87 U. S. at 57 2; see also Libas, Ltd. v. United States , 2 7 CI T 1 19 3, 28 3 F . Su pp . 2 d 1 32 7 ( 20 03 ) ( fi nd ingthat atto rn e y ’s kn ow le dg e of c us tom s law w a s n e c e ssa

ry to l iti g ate c a se ). Th e c ourt c on c lud e s th a t pl a int if

f’ s atto rn e y s’ e xpe rt ise in customs law war

rants a spe cial-f

actor enhanc ement bec ause know ledg e of c ustoms law was critica l to effe ctive re prese ntation in lit iga ting the issue of

seg reg ation. Plaintiff’s counsel participated in an additional administrative pr ocee ding dir ecte d to the seg reg ation issue. Plaintiff argued succ essfully

on appea l that the Court of International Trade was a uthorized to order expedited administrative proce eding s and that Customs was obligated to supervise the importer’s seg reg ation of comming led g oods stored in a bonde d war ehouse. The court a cce pts that the billing rates of plaintiff’ s attorney s are rea sonable ba sed on the c ustomary compensation charg ed by other c ustoms and international trade lawy ers in other case s. SeeAffir

mation ¶ 12. The c ourtCourt No. 04- 00494 P age 8

calc ulates, later

in this Opini on and Or der, the value of the re prese ntation by

plaintiff’s counse l on the seg reg ation issue. The c ourt dec lines, howeve r, to awa rd a spe cial fa ctor for

plaintiff’s
atto rn e y s’ re pr e se ntatio n o n is su e s o the r t ha n s e g re g a tio n. Pla int if

f’ s a rgume nt t hat th e c a se inv olv e d “ nume ro us qu e sti on s o f p ate nt i nf ri ng e me nt l aw, ” Pl. ’s Re ply 8, is g e ne ra lly

c or re c t; h o w e v e r , p l a i n t i f

f h a s n o ts u

b m i t t e d e v i d e n c e d e m o n s tr a t i n g th a tth e f i r mN e v i l l e P e t e r s o nLLP sp e c ia lize s in

int e lle c tua l pr op e rt

y law g e ne ra lly

or pate nt l aw i n p art ic ula

r, no r h a s it de mon str ate d th at th e bil lin g atto rn e y s in thi s c a se ho ld t

he mse lve s o ut a s sp e c ia lis ts i n th e se
are a s. Wit h the possible exception of plaintiff’s re quest for a specia l-fac tor enha

nceme nt for prepa ringthe trial and a

ppeal in a r elatively

short time period, seePl.’s Reply 8, the re maining jus tif ic atio ns fo r s pe c ia l- fa c tor e nh anc e me nts that pl a int if f a dv anc e s w e re jus tif

ic a tio ns re

je c te d in Pierce . In s up po rt

of its c la ime d s pe c ia l- fa c tor e nh anc e me nt f

or e xpe dit e d tr ia l and

a pp e llate prepa ration, plaintiff a

rgues that “no othe r law f irm or attorne y

would take on suc h an expedited tr ia l.” Pl. ’s Re ply

8. Th e sh or

ta g e of lawye rs wh o w ou ld t ake a pa rt ic ula r c a se ha s b e e n h e ld t o be inade quate to esta

blish a “spec ial fac tor” e x ception to the statutory rate . See Hy att

v . B ar nh ar t , 31 5 F .3 d 2 39 , 2 49 (4 th C ir . 2 00 2) . Pl a int if f’ s a rgume nt i s f

ur the r u nd e rc ut b y

its fa ilure to substantiate the pre mise that no other firm or attorney was available to under

take the repr esentation. See Libas, L td. , 27 CI T at 1198, 283 F . Supp. 2d at 1333 (wher e plaintiff submitt ed af

fidavits of attorne y s from the L os Ang eles a rea who stated that the c ustoms bar was very small in the area ). More over, pla intiff’s rationale that the nee d to prepa re f or expedited trial and appe al satisfies the standa rd for a “spe cial fa ctor” incre ase mig ht be viewe d as akin to the “undesira bility of the c ase” rationale that the Supreme Court found insuff icient. See P ierce , 487Court No. 04- 00494 P age 9

U. S. at 57 3; Role Mode ls America, Inc . v. Brownlee , 353 F.3d 962, 969 ( D.C. Cir. 2004) (“ Pierce made c lear

that an incr ease in the cap is justified only by work re quiring specia liz ed skills or knowledg e beyond what lawyers use on a re g ular ba sis. Producing hig h-quality work on a

short deadline ha

rdly satisfies this standard.” ). B. The Court Allows an Adjustment for Cost of L iving The c ourt conc ludes that a c ost-of-living incre ase is wa rra nted. See28 U. S.C. § 2412(d)( 2)(A) (ii). The c ourt may exercise judicial discr etion in gr anting cost-of- living adjustments so as to effe ctuate the intent of Congr ess “to provide adequate compensation notwithstanding inflation.” Paynev. Sullivan , 977 F.2d 900, 903 ( 4th Cir. 1992) (quoting Sullivan v. Sullivan , 958 F.2d 574, 578 ( 4th Cir. 1992) (interna l quotation marks omitted)). Plaintiff corre ctly

submits t hat the cost-of

-living a djustment in t his case ma y be ca lculated using the Consumer Price I

ndex (“CPI -U” ). See Kerin v. U.S.P.S. , 218 F.3d 185, 194 ( 2d Cir. 2000) (“[T]he district court may choose to a

pply a cost of livingadjustment to [ the statutory rate ], as
measure d by

the Consumer Price I

ndex.”). The c ourt ca lculates a djustments to EAJ A fe es using the CPI -U infor mation available f

rom the B urea u of L abor Statistics for the N orthea st Urban Ar ea pe rtainingto the periods in which the
se rv ic e s w e re pe rf

or me d, wh ic h w e re the se c on d h a lf of 20 04 , th e fi rs t ha lf

of 20 05 , a nd e arl y 2006. Se e Ke rin , 218 F.3d at 194 (“[T]he hourly rate . . . should only

be incr ease d by

the
corr espondingConsumer Price Index for eac h y ear in which the leg al work w as per formed.” (interna l citations omit ted)). A lthough se ekingreimburse ment for at least four billing entries
occur ringin J anuar

y and F ebrua

ry of 2006, plaintiff doe s not identify a CPI -U rate for the y ear 2006 in its revised EAJA application. The cour t concludes that it is appropr iate to ca lculate aCourt No. 04- 00494 P age 10

The c alculate d rate does not include F ebrua ry 2006 beca

use, as discusse d in Part C of 3 this opini on, these billing e ntries ar e disallowed. The c ourt uses the CPI -U data for Ma rch 1996 be cause the EAJA was amende d, 4 eff ective Ma rch 29, 1996, to incr ease the statutory cap on E AJ A attorne y s’ fe es fr om $75.00 per hour to $125.00 per hour
. See28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(2)( A). Plaintiff’s attorney s reque st the use of 155.6, rathe r than 162.8, a s the CPI -U for Marc h 1996. SeePl. ’s Re ply Me m. i n Su

pp . o f Its Application for a

n Awar d of Attorney ’s Fe es Unde r the Equa l Acce ss to J ustice Ac t (“Pl.’s Re ply” ) 1 2. Th e numbe r 1 55 .6 re pr e se nts the CPI -Ufo r “ Al l U rb an Co ns ume rs , U .S. City Av e ra g e , A ll Ite ms. ” Ye t pl a int if f i de nti fi e s th e CPI -Ufo r t he “ Al l U rb an Co ns ume rs , N or the a st Urba n, All I tems” for

the sec ond half of 2004 a nd the first half of

2005. Id. at 11. The more appropr iate CPI -U for

all y ear s is one associate d with the are a whe re the service was pe rfor med, in this case the “ All Urban Consumers, N orthea st Urban, All Items” CPI -U. SeeConsumer Price Index–All Urban Consumers, http:// www.bls.g ov/cpi/cpi_dr.htm (last visited Dec. 1, 2008)
. cost-of- living adjusted r ate f or the 2006 attorney

billing hours bec ause a

portion of these billing entries a re a llowed. To ca lculate the E AJ A fe e adjustment, the c ourt makes a n adjustment to the $125 statutory

EAJA amount. See A llegheny B radford Corp. v. United States , 28 CI T 2107, 2114, 350 F. Supp. 2d 1332, 1339 (2004); 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)( 2)(A) (ii). The a djustment is as follows: $125 per hour ( the statutory amount for f

ees) , multipl ied by

201.7 for the year

2004; 205.3 for the year

2005; and 211 for January 2006 (the re levant y ear s for the N orthea st Urban 3 Are a CPI -U), divided by

162.8 (the Nor

theast Urba

n CPI -U of Ma

rch 1996)
. 4 Acc ording ly , the adjusted EAJA fee rate for 2004 is $154.87 ($125 x 201.7/162.8). The adjusted rate for 2005 is $157.63 ($125 x 205.3/162.8). The adjusted r ate f or 2006 is $162.01 ($125 x 211/ 162.8). The c ourt next considers the numbers of hours re quested in the re vised EAJA application.

C. The Court Reduce s the EAJA Award to Avoid Improper Re imbursement Plaintiff seeks re imbursement for 363.15 hour s of leg al servic es. Plaintiff has the bur den of establishingthe re asonable ness of its fee reque st. He ns le yv . Ec k e rh ar t , 461 U.S. 424, 437Court No. 04- 00494 P age 11

The e ntries in question are Dec ember 13, 2004 (“Numerous memos to client conc erning 5 status of Customs release of merc handise whic h was subjec t of CI T dec ision; m emo to Mr. Kaplan c oncer

ning possible c ross-appe al by J azz”); Dece mber 28, 2004 (“ Dra ft of Notice of Appea l”); January

3, 2005 (“Pre pare and file c ross-appe al in United States Court of Appea ls for the Fe dera l Circuit in respect of came ras made from ‘Seve n Buc ks’ shells”); January 4, 2005 (“ Dr a ft of mot ion to s tay e xec uti on

of jud g me nt w ithre sp e c t to e xclu de d c ame ra s, c a ll t o D e pt. (continued...) (1983). De fenda

nt contends that plaintiff’s EA J A claim for 363.15 hours is unrea sonable a nd excessive bec ause it includes attorney s’ time and expenses for issues unrelate d to the g overnme nt’s appea l in Jazz III . D e f. ’s Re sp . 7 . D e fe nd ingits re qu e st, pla int if f a rgue s th a t, wher e a litig ant has substantially preva iled in its posi tion, “to limi t the awa rd and r educe the fe es
acc ordingto specific issues w ould undermine the spirit of the E AJ A.” Pl.’s Reply 7. Th e c ourt dis a g re e s th at li mit ingan E AJA a wa rd a c c or din g to s pe c if

ic iss ue s w ou ld undermine the spirit of EAJ A. Althoug h the cour t may have disc retion to do otherwise , the cour t conclude s that the better r esult in this case is to avoid a re sult requiringthe g overnme nt to bear the expense of def

endingeven its re asonable positions. See E llis v. United States , 711 F.2d 1571, 1576 (F ed. Cir. 1983). Jazz IV held that the g overnme nt pursued substantially unjustified positions on onl y

two of the issues in the Jazz III appellate litigation, i.e. , whether the proc essing conducte d on J azz’s im ported mer chandise constituted permissible repa ir and whe ther the Court of Inte rn atio na l T ra de ha d a uth or ity to o rd e r e xpe dit e d a dmi nis tr a tiv e pr oc e e din g s to se g re g a te
merc handise. Certain billing e ntries appe ar to be unrelated to the Jazz III litigation in the Court of Ap pe a ls o n th e tw o is su e s f or wh ic h th e c ourt

is a llo wi ngEA JA r e imb ur se me nt. Som e of the se billing entrie s, corr espondingto 7.6 hours, perta in to plaintiff’s participation in the J az z I litigation bef

ore the Court of Appea ls. Additionally , it is appropriate to re duce the EAJA award 5Court No. 04- 00494 P age 12

(...continued) 5 of Jus tice for

consent” ); J anuar

y 5, 2005 (“Completion of dra ft motion to st ay judgme nt for excluded came ras in first c ase. D iscussion with Dept. of J ustice re g ardingconsent for same, sent Notice of Appea l”); January

14, 2005 (“Sec ure a

nd revie w orde r fr om Court of I nternational Tr a de sta yingjud g me nt r e qu ir ingJazz to e xpor t ‘ Se ve n B uc ks ’ c ame ra s p e nd inga pp e a l; l e tte r t o Messrs. Sirota and B enun conc erningsame” ). SeeRevised Application for Fe es and O ther Ex penses Pursuant to the Equa l Acce ss to J ustice Ac t 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d), Title I Iof Public L aw 96-481, 94 Stat. 2325 and Rule 54.1 (“ Revised Application”) , Ex . A 6-7. These e ntries ar e listed for January 27, 2006 (“A ttend meetingin NY offic e w/ Messrs 6 Cone and Aiyer r e issues to addre ss in Fede ral Circuit appe al brief ”); F ebrua

ry 5, 2006 (“Revie w and re vise first dra ft of F eder al Circuit appea l brief” ); Fe bruar y 8, 2006 (“D raf

t and re vise brief in Fede ral Circuit appe al ar ising fr om I TC enforc ement proc eeding ”); a nd an undate d entry (“D raf t, revise a nd file brief

in Fede ral Circuit appe al”)
. Id. , Ex . A at 10. by the 16.5 hours billed by

one of pla intiff’s attorne y s, Mr. Thompson, for leg al servic es re ndere d from January

27, 2006 to Febr

uary 8, 2006, inclusive. Plaintiff’s billing re cord indicates that 6 plaintiff pre sented ora l argument in Jazz III on J anuar

y 5, 2006. SeeRevised Application, Ex. A
at 10 ; se e als o Pl.’s Reply , Ex . A (c ase de tail sheet for the Court of Appe als, ca lendar ing or al argument for January

9, 2006). Ther e is no indication that plaintiff filed a ny brief f ollowing the oral a rgument in the Jazz III

appellate litigation. SeePl. ’s Re ply , E x. A. Th e c ourt c on c lud e s, there fore , that the subject billing e ntries by Mr. Thompson should be delete d from any rec overy under EA J A. See Hensley , 461 U.S. at 434. The g overnme nt challeng es 206.26 of the r emaining339.05 hours in plaintiff’s re vised EA JA a pp lic atio n. Th e bil lin g e ntr ie s f or the se ho ur s d o n ot s e g re g a te the amou nt o f t ime plaintiff’s attorne y s spent in the Jazz III appellate litigation on the issues of pe rmissible repair and
merc handise segreg ation from the a mount of time spent on the other issues involved in the Jazz III litigation. The c ourt rec og nizes that at the time of billing these e ntries, plaintiff’s c ounsel was not
awa re of the future need to identify the spec ific time incurr ed in litigatingeac h of those twoCourt No. 04- 00494 P age 13

issues. SeePl.’s Reply

9. Howeve r, the c ourt consider s an adjustment appr opriate so that plaintiff does not rec over unde r EAJA leg al fe es for issues on which the g overnme nt’s litigatingposition was substantially

justified. In deter mining plaintiff’ s EAJ A awa rd, the c ourt is guide d by

the Supreme Court’s holding in Hensley

on an ana logous issue. Hensley held that EAJA awar ds should not be reduc ed
acc ordingto a mathematica l ratio compar ing the number of issues upon which the plaintiff actua lly preva iled with the total number of issues in the c ase. See Hensley , 461 U.S. at 435-36, n.11. Although this ca se pre sents a diffe rent issue, Hensley is neverthe less instructive on the g ener al question of how EA J A awa rds should be allocated betwe en litigated issues. Fur ther, wh ile de fe nd ant r e qu e sts that “ the ratio of the numbe r o f p a g e s in

Jazz’ s a pp e llate br ie f d e vo te d to
e a c h o f t he iss ue s b e us e d a s a

me ans of me a sure me nt, ” De f. ’s Re sp . 1 3, the Court of Ap pe a ls held in Naeke l v. Departme nt of Tr ansportation , 884 F.2d 1378, 1379- 80 (F ed. Cir. 1989), that trial courts may

not reduc e aw ards by

a fr action cor

respondingto the number of br iefingpag es devoted to succ essful ver sus unsucce ssful issues, beca use the “ count of pa g es” a rgument does not
nece ssarily

indicate the sig nificanc e of the issue. 1. Reduction of Attorne y Hours for

L itigation OpposingFuji Photo Film Co., L td. Plaintiff’s revised statement includes the hour s plaintiff’s counse l billed that resulted from opposing the positions i n the Jazz III appellate litigation that wer e take n by Fuji Photo Film Co., L td. (“F uji”). The g overnme nt alleg es that appr ox imately 130.60 hours of attorney time reque sted in J azz’s revised application related to Jazz ’s opposing motions filed by Fuji on which the g overnme nt either took no position or opposed Fuji’s positions. Def.’ s Resp. 9. Plainti ff contends that attorney

repr esentation on matters conce rningFuji wer e prope rly included in its feeCourt No. 04- 00494 P age 14

application bec ause the g overnme nt worked tog ether with Fuji to overturn the c ourt’s dec ision and fa iled to take a position separ ate f rom Fuji at the a

ppellate leve l. Pl.’s R eply 10. Plaintiff also argues that per

mitti ng it to recove r fe es for litigation opposing Fuji is appropr iate bec ause the g overnme nt and Fuji shar ed ora l argument time during the appe al, the g overnme nt consolidated its appeal with F uji, and the g overnme nt took no posit ion on frivolous motions asserted by Fuji. Id. I t is inappropriate to a war d attorney s’ fe es ag ainst the g overnme nt for those pha ses of litigation in which the c laimant was opposed sole ly by third parties. See J

udicial W atch, Inc . v. United States Dep’ t of Commerce , 470 F.3d 363, 373 ( D.C. Cir. 2006) (providinginstructive
re a so nin gon

EA JA wi th r e g ard

to c la ima nt’ s li tig atio n d isp ute s w iththi rd pa rt ie s) ; se e als o Love
v . R e ill y , 924 F.2d 1492, 1496 ( 9th Cir. 1991) (applying E AJ A and c oncluding that “whe re pla int if fs are lit ig atin g an is su e and are op po se d o nly

by pr ivate de fe nd ants , a

fe e awa rd a g a ins t the g overnme nt would be ‘manife stly unfair a nd contra ry to historic fee -shifting principles.’” (quoting Av oy e lle

s S po rts me n’

s Le aguev . M

ar sh , 786 F.2d 631, 636 ( 5th Cir. 1986)). The c ourt deter mines that the position taken by the g overnme nt with reg ard to F uji at the appellate level wa s not in opposit ion to plaintiff. The Jazz III

litigation involving F uji before the Court of Appe als ce ntere d on the issues of intervention and joinder . The g overnme nt maintained bef ore the Court of Appea ls that Fuji’s intervention wa s barr ed by “the plain languag e of 19 U .S.C. § 2631(j)” and that F uji did not qualify as a ne cessa

ry party to the proce eding . Br . of De f.-Appe llant United States 25, n.2. Al tho ug h th e g ov e rnme nt d id n ot t ake a po sit ion on the iss ue of

joi nd e r, the Court

of Ap pe a ls noted that the g overnme nt and J azz were a ligne d on the position that Fuji was bar red f romCourt No. 04- 00494 P age 15

intervention by

the express languag e of 28 U .S.C. § 2631(j)(1)(A)
. See Jazz III , 439 F.3d at 1357;
se e als o Br . of De f.-Appe llant United States 25, n.2. The Court of Appe als conc luded that wher e a par ty is statutorily

prohibited from interve ning in a proce eding , the par

ty cannot be considere d a
nece ssary party to that proce edingfor pur poses of joinder. Jazz III , 439 F.3d at 1357. On a pp e a l, F uji a lso argue d th a t it s o uts ide c ouns e l sh ou ld h ave be e n g ra nte d a c c e ss t o confide ntial documents under the protec tive order enter ed into under U SCI T Rule 26(c)
. Se e id
. at 13 57 -5 8. Th e pr ote c tiv e or de r w a s inte nd e d to pr ote c t Jazz’ s c omm e rc ia l in fo rm a tio n. F uji
wa s d e nie d a c c e ss t o th is i nf or matio n b e c a

us e it w a s n ot a

pa rt y to t he c a se . T he g ov e rnme nt d id not object to Fuji’s g aining acc ess to confide ntial documents, either a t trial or on appe al. B r. of Def .-Appe llant United States 25, n.2. The primar

y purpose of

EAJA is to eliminate leg al expense as a barr ier to cha lleng es of “unre asonable g overnme nt action.” Se e El lis , 711 F.2d. at 1576. Be cause EAJA contemplates deter ringonly unrea sonable positions taken by the g overnme nt, the court a g ree s with the
rea soning in Judicial W

atch, Inc

. and Love an d

c o n c l u d e s th a ti ti s i mp r o p e r t o g r an tanE A JA
awa rd whe re a

non-g overnme ntal party

litigated the issue and the g overnme nt took no posit ion. See Love , 9 24 F .2 d at 14 96 (h old ingthat th e g ov e rnme nt s ho uld be lia ble on ly fo r f e e s r e late d to third parties insofa

r as they “we re inc urre d in opposing g overnme nt resistence ”). F uji was not repr esente d by

the g overnme nt and broug ht its own appeal, in which it disputed the Court of International Trade ’s ruling s on standing a nd acc ess to cer

tain J azz proprietary

information. The lit ig atio n is su e s invo lvi ngF uji we re ne ith e r i nit iate d n or purs ue d b y

the g ov e rnme nt, F uji wa s a thi rd pa rt y that w a s n ot w ith in t

he g ov e rnme nt’ s c on tr ol o r a uth or ity , a

nd the lit ig a tio n d isp uteCourt No. 04- 00494 P age 16

betwee n Fuji and Jazz did not relate to the two issues f or which the court is per

mitti ng plaintiff’s EAJA recove ry . Acc ording ly , plaintiff’s re vised EAJA application must be reduc ed to exclude
atto rn e y s’ fe e s f

or re pr e se ntatio n o pp os ingF uji
. Th e c ourt de du c ts 1 11 .6 1 h ours fr om p la int if f’ s r e vis e d E AJA a

pp lic a tio n to re fl e c t ti me spent on litigation ag ainst Fuji, as cha lleng ed by defe ndant in its Ex hibit A. SeeDef .’s Resp., Ex . A. In arr iving at this figure , the cour t disallowed rec overy

for c erta in billi ng entries, a g ree ing with defe ndant that these a re “ billing entrie s descr ibing attorney work a nd hours spent on response s to Fuji filings.” See id. For a limited number of the c ontested entrie s, where the billing descr iptions i ndicated that, in addition to Fuji matters, plaintiff’s counse l repre sented Jazz on an iss ue fo r whic h E AJA r e c ov e ry is p e rm itt e d, the c ourt

de du c te d te n p e rc e nt o f t he a tto rn e y s’ ho ur s. Th e c ourt

e sti mate s th at a

te n p e rc e nt r e du c tio n to the se pa rt ic ula r e ntr ie s is a

pp ro pr iate b e c a u s e th e is s u e s inv o lv in g F u ji w e r e n o t m a

jo r is s u e s o na

p p e a l, w e r e n o t p arti c u la

r ly c o mp le x, and could be resolved thr oug h basic statutory interpre tation with only

limit ed ana ly sis of prec edent.

2. Ad dit ion a l Re du c tio n o f A tto rn e y Ho ur s f or Ap pe llate L iti g a tio n o n I ssu e s Related to F uji and Reduction of Attorne y Hours for

Appellate L itigation on the “ First Sale” I ssue Th e g ov e rnme nt i de nti fi e s 9 7. 25 ho ur s in pla int if f’ s r e vis e d E AJA s tate me nt t hat it contends a

re not prope rly

seg reg ated a

mong the issues for whic h rec overy is permitted. The g overnme nt reque sts that the court deduc t 75.66 of the 97.25 hours to ac count for time spe nt by plaintiff on issues for which re cover y is not permitted, i.e. , those related to Fuji and the “ first sale” iss ue . T he c ourt

de du c ts f ro m th e 97 .2 5 h ours an amou nt t o r e fl e c t bi lli ngon

the iss ue of

fi rs t sa le and the issues involving Fuji. B elow, the c ourt discusses its method of ca lculating this deduction.Court No. 04- 00494 P age 17

The c ourt makes no de duction for the 111.20 hour s in plaintiff’s billing statement that 7 we re no t c ha lle ng e d b y

the g ov e rnme nt. The fir st sale issue, on which the g overnme nt’s litigation position in Jazz III wa s h e ld i n Jazz IV to be substantially

justified, involved two questions, deg ree of burde n of proof and application of a

presumption of re g ularity , that wer e issues of f irst impression. See J

azz IV , 31 CI T at __ , 5 02 F . Su

pp . 2 d. at 12 86 . Co ns ide re d a s a wh ole , th e re so lut ion

of the fi rs t sa le issue by the Court of Appe als was a matter of some complexit y . See J azz III , 439 F.3d at 1350-53. B eca

use it cannot identify

the spec ific time entries f or leg al re prese ntation provided in contesting the g overnme nt’s positions on t he first sale issue, the cour t is basing its fee reduc tion
on its un de rs tand ingg a ine d b y pr e sid ingov e r t

he pr e -t ri a l, t ri a l, a nd po st- tr ia l pr oc e e din g s in Jazz II and on its g ener al familiarity with the issues of first sale, pe rmissible repair , and seg reg ation. The c ourt estimates that the issues of f irst sale and pe rmissible repair eac h acc ounted for f orty perc ent of plaintiff’ s appellate repr esentation in Jazz III . T he c ourt

va lue s th e le ss complicated issues involvingFuji and the issue of seg reg ation to eac h repr esent ten pe rce nt of pla int if f’ s a pp e llate re pr e se ntatio n, fo r a tot a l of tw e nty pe rc e nt. On

thi s b a sis , th e c ourt

make s a de du c tio n o f 4 8. 63 ho ur s, wh ic h is fi ft y pe rc e nt o f t

he tot a l of

97 .2 5 h ours . Ins u m , th e c o urti s d e d

u c t i n g a t o t a l o f 1 6 0
. 2 4 h o ur s f

r o mp l a i n t i f

f ’ s r e v i s e d E A JA
a pp lic atio n to a dd

re ss t he inc lus ion

in p la int if

f’ s b ill ingsu

bmi ssi on s o f h ours fo r l iti g a tio n w ith Fuji and f or litigating the issue of

first sale. 7 3. Calculation of Plaintiff’s EAJA Awar d The c ourt will awar d plaintiff re imbursement for 178.81 hour s of attorne y s’ time incurre d in liti g atingthe Jazz III matter be fore the Court of Appe als. The c ourt deter mines that the issue ofCourt No. 04- 00494 P age 18

The c ourt beg ins its calculation by deductingfrom the ba se attorne y s’ hours the billing 8 entries pe rtainingto plaintiff’s par ticipation in the J

az z I lit ig a tio n b e fo re the Court of Ap pe a ls and to unre lated leg al servic es re ndere d by Mr. Thompson. In addition, although pla intiff alleg es that Maria E . Celis bill ed 45.1 hours a nd Catherine Che ss Chen 36.5 hours, based on the attorney s’ billing stateme nts attache d to plaintiff’s af firmation, the cor

rec t calculation is 44.9 hours and 36.1 hour s, respe ctively
. SeeAffir mation ¶ 13. Acc ording ly , the cour t calculates the bil lin gof : Mr . Pe te rs on

(a tot a l of 12 1. 85 ho ur s) to a c c ount f or thi rt y -s ix pe rc e nt, or

12 .8 5 h ours , of the bil le d h ours on

the iss ue of

se g re g a tio n, amou

nti ngto $ 5, 78 2. 50 in atto rn e y s’ fe e s; Mr. Thompson (a total of 18.6 hour s) to acc ount for five perc ent, or 1.96 hours, of the billed hours on the issue of se g reg ation, amounting to $754.60 in attorne y s’ fe es; Mr. Kna uss (a total of 117.6 hours) to ac count for thirty -five pe rce nt, or 12.40 hours, of the billed hour s on the issue of se g re g atio n, amou

nti ngto $ 3, 41 0. 00 in atto rn e y s’ fe e s; M s. Ce lis (a tot a l of 44 .9 ho ur s) to acc ount for thirtee n perc ent, or 4.74 hours, of the billed hours on the issue of se g reg ation, amounting to $1,066.50 in attorne y s’ fe es; and Ms. Chen (a total of 36.1 hours) to ac count for e le ve n p e rc e nt, or

3. 81 ho ur s, of

the bil le d h ours on

the iss ue of

se g re g a tio n, amou

nti ngto $1 ,0 47 .7 5 in

atto rn e y s’ fe e s. seg reg ation, for whic h the spec ial enhanc ement fa ctor is per mitted, accounte d for twe nty perc ent of the 178.81 hours of

appellate repr esentation for which the c ourt is allowing r eimbursement, or
a pp ro ximate ly

35 .7 6 h ours . T he c ourt

wi ll a llo c a te a tto rn e y s’ fe e s f or thi s is su e on

a pr o- rata basis. To ca lculate the a

ppropriate attorney s’ fe es, the c ourt will credit ea ch of the five billing attorney s for their r epre sentation on the issue of se g reg ation based on the ir overa ll perce ntag e of hours billed on this case. In total, plaintiff is awar ded $12,061.35 for repr esentation on the issue 8 of segreg ation. F or the re ma ini ng14 3. 05 ho ur s, the c ourt c a lc ulate s th e tot a l amou nt o f r e imb ur sa

ble attorney s’ fe es as $22,289.16. This amount includes $14,920.80 f or 2004, $7,154.51 for

2005, and $213.85 for

2006. In sum, plaintiff is awar ded $34,350.51 in attorne y s’ fe es for the issues of permissible repa ir and segreg ation.Court No. 04- 00494 P age 19 4. Reduction for Inappropr iate Expenses Plaintiff also reque sts compensation of $9,297.31 for disbursements. Aff

irmation ¶ 17. EAJA permits reimbursement for “fe es and othe r expenses.” See28 U. S.C. § 2412(d)( 1)(A) (2)( A) (se tting for th a list of examples of permissible expenses). The Court of Appea ls has held that “[w]e interpret 28 U.S.C. § 2412 to mean that the tria l court . . . may awa rd only those rea sonable a

nd nece ssary

expenses of an attorney

incurre d or paid in pre paration for trial . . . , which e x penses a re those c ustomarily

char g ed to the client whe re the case is tried.” Oliveira v. U

nited States , 8 27 F .2 d 7 35 , 7 44 (F e d. Cir . 1 98 7) (f oo tno te omi tte d) . T he pla int if f i n Ol iv e ira soug ht to recove r expenses for photocopying, pr inting and bindingbriefs, te lephone, postag e, and ove rnig ht delivery service s. Id. Although the Court of Appea ls did not decide wh e the r t he pla int if

f c ou ld r e c ov e r t

he e xpe ns e s c la ime d, it c ite d w itha pp ro va l a Ni nth Cir c uit opinion that awar ded telephone , postag e, air courie r, and attorney

trave l expenses under § 2412(b). See id. at7 4 4 & n
. 2 7 (c i t i n g Int’l W oodworkers of Am. v. D onovan , 792 F.2d 762, 767 (9th Cir. 1985)). B ased on Ol iv e ira , the terms “f ees a nd other e x penses” in § 2412(d)(1) (A) should be interpre ted broa dly enoug h to include the spec ific categ ories of e x penses c laimed by the plaintiff in its revised EAJA application. See, e.g. , Filtrati on Dev . Co. v. United States , 63 Fe d. Cl. 612, 626 (Fed. Cl. 2005). Plaintiff identifies the basis of its expenses as follows: taxi ($30.00), tra vel ($64.43), postag e ($112.31) , court fe e ($150.00) , fax ($178.00), messeng er ( $215.69), miscellane ous ($588.82), photocopie s ($1,138.20), e x press c ourier ( $352.00), phone c harg es ($2,100.36) , and computerized re sear ch ($4,367.50) . Affir mation, Ex . A. Def

endant a rgues that, due to plaintiff’ s failure to attach to its revised a pplication documentation substantiating its ex penses, the c ourtCourt No. 04- 00494 P age 20

must deduct all reque sted expenses from plaintiff’ s revised a pplication. Def

.’s Resp. 15-16 (c i t i n g Naporano Iron & Metal Co. v. United States , 8 2 5 F
. 2 d 4 0 3 , 4 0 5 ( F e d
. C i r . 1 9 8 7 ) )
. In Naporano , the plaintiff submitted a billing stateme nt that included a r equest for disbursements but did not itemiz e the disburse ments to identify specific expenses, i.e. , a

n amou nt f or ph oto c op ie s, telephone bills, etc. Naporano , 825 F.2d at 404. Unlike the plaintiff in Naporano , J azz has ide nti fi e d e xpe ns e s in

its re vis e d a

pp lic a tio n w ithsu ff

ic ie nt s pe c if

ic ity to a llo w the c ourt

to deter mine whether

these e x penses a

re r easona

ble. An exception is the amount reque sted for mis c e lla ne ou s e xpe ns e s, wh ic h th e c ourt is d isa llo wi ngbe c a

us e it c ann ot m ake a

re a so na ble ne ss deter mination. Base d on the per centa g es discussed pr eviously , the cour t also deducts 50% of

the
rema inder to re flec t estimated expenses relating to re prese ntation opposing F uji’s positi on and repr esentation on the issue of first sale. A ccor dingly , the cour t awar ds plaintiff $4,354.25 for disbursements in its revised EAJA application. III . C ONCL US I ON A ND O R D ER Ba sed on the for eg oing disc ussion, the court conc ludes that plaintiff’s Revised A pplication for a n Awar d of Attorney

Fe es Unde r the Equa l Acce ss to J ustice Ac t should be g rante d in part and denie d in part. Plaintiff is awar ded re imbursement for $34,350.51 of attorney s’ fe es and $4,354.25 for identifie d expenses. Acc ording ly , it is herebyCourt No. 04- 00494 P age 21

OR DE RE D that defe ndant shall pay to plaintiff $38,704.76 in reimburseme nt under EA JA f or atto rn e y s’ fe e s and

dis burs e me nts . /s/ Timot hy C. St ance u Timothy C. St ance u J u d g e Dated: Dec ember

2, 2008 New Y ork, Ne w York