Federal Register / Vol. 63, No. 75 / Monday, April 20, 1998 / Notices 19529

refers to the consequences of a design basis

accident, and not to increased radiation dose

to plant staff from in-plant recovery actions.

NRC agrees that the change in operator

actions did not involve a potential increase

in consequences of a design basis accident.

The violation is revised as follows:

10 CFR 50.59 permits the licensee, in part,

to make changes to the facility and

procedures as described in the safety analysis

report without prior Commission approval

provided the changes do not involve an

unreviewed safety question. Records of these

changes must include a written safety

evaluation which provides the bases for the

determination that the changes do not

involve an unreviewed safety question.

10 CFR 50.59 (a)(2)(I) states, in part, that

a proposed change shall be deemed to

involve an unreviewed safety question if the

probability of occurrence or the

consequences of an accident or malfunction

of equipment important to safety previously

evaluated in the safety analysis report may be

increased.

Updated Safety Analysis Report (USAR)

Section 9.2.2.3 ‘‘Emergency Closed Cooling

System—Safety evaluation’’ states that the

emergency closed cooling system surge tanks

are designed to maintain a seven day supply

of water with normal system leakage without

the need to provide makeup water.

Contrary to the above, Safety Evaluation

No. 96–128 prepared by the licensee on

October 10, 1996, and approved on October

21, 1996, evaluated a change in the design

basis for the emergency closed cooling

system surge tanks. The licensee changed the

sizing basis of the surge tanks from a seven

day supply as stated in USAR Section 9.2.2.3

to a 30-minute supply, and the licensee’s

analysis failed to identify that the change was

an unreviewed safety question. Specifically,

the safety evaluation did not adequately

assess the increased probability of a

malfunction of equipment important to safety

associated with an increased potential for

operator error as operators replenished the

surge tanks on a 30-minute post accident

basis instead of the previously evaluated

period of seven days.

Summary of Licensee’s Request for Remission

of the Civil Penalty

The licensee requested full remission of

the $50,000 civil penalty.

NRC Evaluation of Licensee’s Request for

Remission of the Civil Penalty

The licensee did not provide a separate

justification (i.e., a discussion of the civil

penalty adjustment factors) to justify

remission of the civil penalty. Rather, the

licensee’s reasons for denying the violation

apparently are the licensee’s justification for

requesting remission of the civil penalty.

NRC Conclusion

The licensee interpreted the NRC position

concerning the violation to be that the

increases in both the consequences and

probability of an accident were the direct

result of the increased presence in the plant

of operators who are fully trained and

qualified for the activities under

consideration.

The NRC did not intend to suggest that the

increased presence of personnel in the plant

would cause an increase in the consequences

and probability of an accident. Rather, the

NRC was concerned with the increased

potential of failing to refill the ECC surge

tanks within an extremely limited time

constraint, which was much shorter than

originally described to and accepted by the

NRC. In summary, the NRC’s concern was

that during the performance of the additional

operator actions to refill the ECC surge tanks,

the potential for errors was increased and

could lead to the loss of the safety related

ECC system. Loss of the ECC system could

result in losing other safety related systems

relied upon to mitigate the consequences of

an accident. Therefore, the manual operator

action proposed to compensate for the

reduced ECC surge tank water supply

constituted a USQ.

The NRC has concluded that this violation

occurred as modified above, and that an

adequate basis for withdrawing the violation,

reducing the severity level of the violation,

or remitting the civil penalty was not

provided by the licensee. Consequently, the

proposed civil penalty in the amount of

$50,000 should be imposed.

[FR Doc. 98–10329 Filed 4–17–98; 8:45 am]

BILLING CODE 7590–01–P

NUCLEAR REGULATORY

COMMISSION

[Docket No. 30–33725; License No. 37–

28442–02; EAs 96–110]

J&L Testing Company, Inc.,

Canonsburg, Pennsylvania; Order

Revoking License

I

J&L Testing Company, Inc., (Licensee

or JLT) is the holder of Byproduct

Nuclear Material License No. 37–28442–

02 (License) issued by the Nuclear

Regulatory Commission (NRC or

Commission) pursuant to 10 CFR Part

30. The License authorizes possession

and use of Troxler portable nuclear

density gauges containing cesium-137

and americium-241 in sealed sources.

The License, originally issued on

February 7, 1995, was amended on

August 22, 1995, and is due to expire on

February 29, 2000. The License was

suspended by Order, dated September

27, 1995.

II

J & L Engineering, Inc. (JLE), a

corporation located at the same address

and using the same telephone and

facsimile numbers as the Licensee, held

License No. 37–28442–01 for the same

portable nuclear gauges for which the

Licensee is now licensed. John Boschuk,

Jr., President and owner of JLE, has

acted as an agent of and consultant to

JLT. JLE’s license was revoked on

August 30, 1993, for non-payment of

fees. JLE was ordered, among other

things, to cease use of byproduct

material, dispose of the byproduct

material, and notify the NRC of the

disposition within 30 days of that

Order. Notwithstanding that Order, JLE

continued to possess the byproduct

material and on October 5, 1994, a

Notice of Violation (Notice) was issued

to JLE for possession of licensed

material without a valid NRC license.

By letter dated October 11, 1994, Mr.

Boschuk responded to the Notice,

stating, among other things, that the

‘‘* * * equipment [3-Troxler Nuclear

Density gauges] has not been used for

over 2 years and has not left the storage

area in our office.’’

On November 21, 1994, JLT submitted

an application for a license. The

November 21, 1994, cover letter for the

application, signed by Lourdes Boschuk,

President and owner of JLT and wife of

John Boschuk, Jr., stated the following:

* * * Submitted herein is our application

to restore our expired license to store and

operate three (3) Troxler Nuclear Density

Gages (sic). We understand our license was

revoked on August 30, 1993. Since that date,

these units were not removed from storage

nor used in anyway (sic).

Relying on the application and the

statement that the gauges had not been

removed from storage since the JLE

license was revoked, the NRC issued the

new License No. 37–28442–02 to JLT on

February 7, 1995.

On August 1 and 3, 1995, the NRC

conducted a routine, announced safety

inspection of activities authorized by

the License at JLT’s facility in

Canonsburg, Pennsylvania. During the

inspection, an NRC inspector

determined, based on a review of

Licensee’s documents, that one of the

gauges, which JLE and the Licensee

separately had stated in writing to the

NRC were in storage and had not been

used since revocation of the JLE license,

had been transferred on September 2,

1994, to SE Technologies, Inc., in

Bridgeville, Pennsylvania (which used

the gauge at a temporary jobsite at the

S. Hill Village Sears project), when

neither JLE nor JLT possessed a valid

NRC license. As stated by the Chief

Engineer of SE Technologies, Inc., Mr.

Boschuk had arranged for the rental,

and as stated by a Project Engineer of SE

Technologies, Inc., Mr. Boschuk had

personally transferred the gauge to SE

Technologies, Inc. JLT stated at a

December 18, 1997, enforcement

conference that uses of the gauge(s)

prior to February 7, 1995, and after

revocation of the JLE license were

invoiced by JLT. The transfer of the

gauge to SE Technologies, Inc. was a
19530 Federal Register / Vol. 63, No. 75 / Monday, April 20, 1998 / Notices

deliberate violation of 10 CFR 30.3,

which prohibits, among other things,

transfer of byproduct material without a

valid license from the NRC and a

deliberate violation of the order

revoking JLE’s license in violation of 10

CFR 30.10(a). As a consequence, the

statement by Ms. Boschuk in her

November 21, 1994, letter to the NRC,

that the gauges had not been used and

had not left storage at JLT since August

30, 1993, was inaccurate in violation of

10 CFR 30.9(a), and the statement by

Mr. Boschuk in his October 11, 1994,

letter to the NRC, that the gauges had

not been used for over two years and

had not left storage, was deliberately

inaccurate in violation of 10 CFR 30.9(a)

and 30.10(a).

During the NRC’s August 1995

inspection, three additional violations

of NRC requirements were identified.

These violations involved the failure to

perform leak tests of the gauges at the

required 6-month intervals, as required

by Condition 12 of the license; the

failure to have an approved Radiation

Safety Officer (RSO) (the RSO listed by

the license terminated employment on

May 26, 1995), as required by License

Condition 11A; and the failure to

perform physical inventories of the

gauges at the required 6-month

intervals, as required by Condition 14 of

the license. By letter dated September

11, 1995, JLT admitted that the cited

violations had occurred.

A predecisional enforcement

conference was held with the Licensee

on September 15, 1995, to discuss the

five violations identified during the

August 1995 inspection. At the

conference, JLT’s President admitted all

five violations, but offered no

explanation for why the material had

been used notwithstanding the

revocation of the JLE license and JLT’s

lack of a license.

Based upon the above, the NRC

concluded that JLT’s submission of

materially inaccurate information in its

license application, and JLE’s

submission of materially inaccurate

information in response to a Notice of

Violation, were, if not deliberate, in

careless disregard of Commission

requirements. These violations,

combined with the additional violations

identified during the inspection, caused

the NRC to conclude that the Licensee

was unwilling or unable to comply with

NRC requirements and that the requisite

reasonable assurance that the Licensee’s

operations could be conducted under

License No. 37–28442–02 in compliance

with the Commission’s requirements

was lacking, such that the health and

safety of the public, including the

Licensee’s employees, would not be

protected if the Licensee were permitted

to conduct licensed activities at that

time. Therefore, in the interest of public

health and safety, the License was

suspended, effective immediately, on

September 27, 1995, pending

completion of an investigation by the

NRC Office of Investigations.

III

Subsequently, the NRC Office of

Investigations completed its

investigation of JLT. The NRC staff has

determined that, in addition to the

violations cited above, JLT committed a

number of other violations of NRC

regulatory requirements, as set forth

below.

A. Materially Inaccurate Statements

Made to NRC

(1) A letter to the NRC dated

September 11, 1995, signed by Lourdes

Boschuk and reviewed and edited by

John Boschuk, Jr., stated that the Troxler

gauge that was missing at the time of the

August 1995 NRC inspection was in

Watertown, New York, and was

returned to JLT the next day. This was

a deliberately inaccurate statement in

violation of 10 CFR 30.9(a) and 30.10(a).

In fact, according to the Chief Engineer

of SE Technologies, Inc., Mr. Boschuk

personally transferred the gauge to SE

Technologies, Inc. in July 1995, and

requested return of the gauge on August

14 or 15, 1995. In fact, the gauge was not

returned to JLT until August 17, 1995.

In addition, the September 11, 1995,

letter represented that since the August

1995 NRC inspection, all three Troxler

gauges had been in a locked storage

cabinet at JLT’s premises and would

remain there until the apparent

violations identified in the NRC’s

Inspection Report were resolved. This

inaccurate statement in violation of 10

CFR 30.9(a) was made with careless

disregard for the facts. In fact, one of the

gauges had been transferred to Cashin

Associates, P.C., Hauppauge, New York,

on September 6, 1995, and was not

returned to JLT until September 19 or

20, 1995.

(2) During an enforcement conference

with the NRC on September 15, 1995,

Lourdes Boschuk, President of JLT,

stated that JLT’s operable Troxler gauge

was in storage and was not used ‘‘at

all’’. In fact, that gauge was transferred

by JLT on September 6, 1995, to Cashin

Associates, P.C. for use at the

Brookhaven Landfill in New York State,

and was not returned to JLT until

September 19 or 20, 1995. This

inaccurate statement was in violation of

10 CFR 30.9(a) and was made with

careless disregard for the facts.

(3) In a letter to the NRC dated

September 18, 1995, prepared by John

Boschuk, Jr. and signed by Lourdes

Boschuk, and sent to the NRC in

response to the NRC’s September 15,

1995, letter confirming JLT’s

commitment at the September 15, 1995,

enforcement conference to refrain from

using the Troxler density gauges

pending resolution of the apparent

violations, JLT made several inaccurate

statements. The letter stated that all of

JLT’s gauges have been in the storage

cabinet on the JLT premises since the

visit of the NRC inspector. This was a

deliberate, materially inaccurate

statement in violation of 10 CFR 30.9(a)

and 30.10(a)(2). In fact, Ms. Boschuk

knew no later than September 15, 1995,

during a telephone call to the Director

of JLT immediately after the September

15, 1995, enforcement conference, that

one of JLT’s Troxler gauges had been

transferred on September 6, 1995, to

Cashin Associates, P.C. in New York

State. In fact, Mr. Boschuk learned from

Ms. Boschuk no later than the weekend

ending September 17, 1995, that the

gauge had been transferred to Cashin

Associates, P.C. As explained above, he

also knew that the gauge had been

transferred to SE Technologies, Inc.

between July 18, and August 17, 1995,

although the NRC inspection ended on

August 3, 1995.

In addition, the letter stated that all

three JLT Troxler gauges were currently

locked in the designated storage cabinet

on the JLT premises. This inaccurate

statement was in violation of 10 CFR

30.9(a) and was made with at least

careless disregard as to its truth or

falsity by both Mr. and Ms. Boschuk. In

fact, Lourdes Boschuk sent JLT’s

Radiation Safety Officer (RSO) to

retrieve the gauge which had been

transferred to Cashin Associates, P.C.,

but the RSO did not return to JLT with

the gauge until late in the evening of

September 19 or early in the morning of

September 20, 1995. Mr. Boschuk stated

at the December 18, 1997, predecisional

enforcement conference that although

he checked the storage cabinet before

preparing the letter, and saw three

yellow cases which he assumed

contained the gauges, he did not look

inside the cases to verify the gauges

were there.

(4) Figure 1 of the November 21, 1994,

JLT application, revised January 6, 1995,

depicted a locked steel cabinet on the

JLT premises as the storage site for the

three Troxler gauges. However, the

cabinet did not have a lock. John

Boschuk, Jr. prepared Figure 1. This

materially inaccurate statement was in

violation of 10 CFR 30.9(a) and was
Federal Register / Vol. 63, No. 75 / Monday, April 20, 1998 / Notices 19531

made with at least careless disregard for

the facts by Mr. Boschuk.

B. Unauthorized Use of Byproduct

Material and Related Materially

Inaccurate Statements

JLT admittedly used the Troxler

density gauge(s) on four occasions after

revocation of the JLE license and before

the NRC issued a license to JLT on

February 7, 1995. JLT stated at the

December 18, 1997, enforcement

conference that JLT employees used the

gauges on those occasions and that JLT

invoiced its customers for the usage.

Specifically, JLT admitted to using the

gauge(s) for the following customers:

DelSir Supply in December 1993,

Johnson Construction in May 1994,

Johnson Construction in June 1994, and

PA Soil & Rock Company in July 1994.

These violations of 10 CFR 30.3 were

committed with at least careless

disregard by JLT.

As a consequence, the statement by

Ms. Boschuk in her November 21, 1994,

letter to the NRC, that the gauges had

not been used and had not left storage

at JLT since August 30, 1993, and the

statement by Mr. Boschuk in his

October 11, 1994, letter to the NRC, that

the gauges had not been used for over

two years and had not left storage, were

materially inaccurate in violation of 10

CFR 30.9(a) and made with at least

careless disregard.

C. Violation of License Condition

Condition 19 of the JLT License

requires that, when not in use, the

Troxler gauges be kept in a locked

cabinet on JLT’s premises, as depicted

by Figure 1 of the January 6, 1995,

amended application. Figure 1,

prepared by Mr. Boschuk, pictures a

storage closet with a lock. In violation

of that requirement, JLT failed to

maintain its gauges in a locked storage

cabinet between February 7, 1995 and

sometime before the August 1995

inspection. The failure to maintain the

gauges in a locked cabinet was in

violation of Condition 19 of JLT’s

License and of 10 CFR 30.3.

D. Destruction of Records Relating to

Gauge Usage

According to a witness, Lourdes

Boschuk, John Boschuk, Jr. and others

destroyed, altered, sanitized, or

otherwise disposed of business and

transactional records shortly after the

August 1995 NRC inspection of JLT, in

order to conceal from the NRC the

unauthorized use and/or transfer of

Troxler gauges by JLT. Among the

records destroyed or disposed of were

invoices and a log documenting use of

the Troxler density gauges. According to

a handwritten note, created by a JLT

employee immediately after the

September 15, 1995, enforcement

conference, although utilization records

were made available to the NRC

inspector, those records could not be

subsequently located. The note further

reflected a question whether the

utilization records were ‘‘thrown away

during sanitization of records?’’ Shortly

after the August 1995 inspection, the

NRC inspector requested JLT to provide

a copy of a utilization record found

during the inspection and which

documented the rental of a gauge to SE

Technologies in September 1994, when

neither JLE nor JLT had a valid NRC

license. JLT did not provide the invoice

and claimed it could no longer find the

document. Condition 19 of JLT’s

License requires that JLT conduct its

licensed activities in accordance with

its Application dated January 6, 1995.

The Application mandates that JLT

comply with conditions requiring the

creation of a utilization log for the

gauges and the maintenance of the log

for audit purposes. The destruction of

the utilization log was in violation of 10

CFR 30.3 and 30.9(a). The participation

of John Boschuk, Jr. and Lourdes

Boschuk in the deliberate destruction of

the utilization log was in violation of 10

CFR 30.10(a).

IV

Based on the above, the NRC

concludes that the Licensee willfully

violated NRC requirements, both

deliberately and with careless disregard,

and committed violations of NRC safety

requirements. Among the Licensee’s

willful violations were repeated,

materially inaccurate statements to the

NRC regarding unauthorized use of

byproduct material, unauthorized use of

licensed material, violation of license

conditions regarding the use and storage

of the gauges, and the destruction or

disposal of records related to

unauthorized use of licensed material.

As stated above, among the Licensee’s

violations of safety requirements were

the failure to perform required leak

tests, to have an approved Radiation

Safety Officer, and the failure to perform

required inventories of licensed

material. The NRC must be able to rely

on its Licensee’s integrity and their

compliance with NRC requirements.

The Licensee’s numerous willful

violations and other violations

demonstrate that the Licensee is either

unwilling or unable to comply with

NRC requirements.

Consequently, I lack the requisite

reasonable assurance that the Licensee

is willing and able to conduct

operations under License No. 37–

28442–02 in compliance with the

Commission’s requirements, or that the

health and safety of the public will be

protected if J&L Testing Company, Inc.

continues to engage in licensed activity.

Therefore, the public health, safety and

interest require that License No. 37–

28442–02 be revoked.

V

Accordingly, pursuant to sections 81,

161b, 161i, 161o, 182 and 186 of the

Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended,

and the Commission’s regulations in 10

CFR 2.202 and 10 CFR 30.10, IT IS

HEREBY ORDERED THAT LICENSE

NO. 37–28442–02 IS REVOKED, AND

ALL LICENSED MATERIAL

CURRENTLY IN THE LICENSEE’S

POSSESSION SHALL BE

TRANSFERRED TO AN AUTHORIZED

RECIPIENT WITHIN 7 DAYS OF THE

EFFECTIVE DATE OF THIS ORDER.

FURTHER, THE LICENSEE SHALL

NOTIFY THE NRC WITHIN TWO

BUSINESS DAYS AFTER SUCH

TRANSFER HAS TAKEN PLACE AS TO

WHOM THE TRANSFER WAS MADE.

THE LICENSEE MAY

TELEPHONICALLY CONTACT NRC’S

REGIONAL OFFICE AT 610–337–5000

TO COMPLY WITH THE

NOTIFICATION REQUIREMENT.

VI

In accordance with 10 CFR 2.202, the

Licensee must, and any other person

adversely affected by this Order may,

submit an answer to this Order, and

may request a hearing on this Order,

within 20 days of the date of this Order.

Where good cause is shown,

consideration will be given to extending

the time to request a hearing. A request

for extension of time must be made in

writing to the Director, Office of

Enforcement, US Nuclear Regulatory

Commission, Washington, DC 20555,

and include a statement of good cause

for the extension. The answer may

consent to this Order. Unless the answer

consents to this Order, the answer shall,

in writing and under oath or

affirmation, specifically admit or deny

each allegation or charge made in this

Order and shall set forth the matters of

fact and law on which the Licensee or

other person adversely affected relies

and the reasons why the Order should

not have been issued. Any answer or

request for hearing shall be submitted to

the Secretary, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory

Commission, ATTN: Chief, Rulemaking

and Adjudications Staff, Washington,

DC 20555. Copies also shall be sent to

the Director, Office of Enforcement, U.S.

Nuclear Regulatory Commission,

Washington, DC 20555, to the Deputy

Assistant General Counsel for
19532 Federal Register / Vol. 63, No. 75 / Monday, April 20, 1998 / Notices

Enforcement at the same address, to the

Regional Administrator, NRC Region I,

475 Allendale Road, King of Prussia,

Pennsylvania 19406–1415, and to the

Licensee, if the answer or hearing

request is by a person other than the

Licensee. If a person other than the

Licensee requests a hearing, that person

shall set forth with particularity the

manner in which his or her interest is

adversely affected by this Order and

shall address the criteria set forth in 10

CFR 2.714(d).

If a hearing is requested by the

Licensee or a person whose interest is

adversely affected, the Commission will

issue an Order designating the time and

place of any hearing. If a hearing is held,

the issue to be considered at such

hearing shall be whether this Order

should be sustained.

In the absence of any request for

hearing, or written approval of an

extension of time in which to request a

hearing, the provisions specified in

Section IV above shall be final 20 days

from the date of this Order without

further order or proceedings. If an

extension of time for requesting a

hearing has been approved, the

provisions specified in Part IV of this

Order shall be final when the extension

expires if a hearing request has not been

received.

Dated at Rockville, Maryland this 10th day

of April 1998.

For the Nuclear Regulatory Commission.

James Lieberman,

Director, Office of Enforcement.

[FR Doc. 98–10328 Filed 4–17–98; 8:45 am]

BILLING CODE 7590–01–P

NUCLEAR REGULATORY

COMMISSION

[Docket No. 50–423]

Northeast Nuclear Energy Company;

Notice of Consideration of Issuance of

Amendment to Facility Operating

License, Proposed no Significant

Hazards Consideration Determination,

and Opportunity for a Hearing

The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory

Commission (the Commission) is

considering issuance of an amendment

to Facility Operating License No. NPF–

49 issued to Northeast Nuclear Energy

Company (the licensee) for operation of

Millstone Nuclear Power Station, Unit

3, located in New London County,

Connecticut. The proposed change to

Technical Specification (TS) 3/4.4.4,

Relief Valves, would ensure that the

Power-Operated Relief Valves (PORVs)

will be capable of automatic cycling as

well as manual cycling when in the TS

3/4.4.4 action statements that allow

indefinite continued operation. The

proposed amendment also makes an

editorial change, adds PORV

surveillance requirements, and modifies

the associated Bases section. The

proposed changes provide added

assurance that the pressurizer safety

relief valves will not be damaged due to

water relief during an inadvertent safety

injection event.

Before issuance of the proposed

license amendment, the Commission

will have made findings required by the

Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended

(the Act) and the Commission’s

regulations.

The Commission has made a

proposed determination that the

amendment request involves no

significant hazards consideration. Under

the Commission’s regulations in 10 CFR

50.92, this means that operation of the

facility in accordance with the proposed

amendment would not (1) involve a

significant increase in the probability or

consequences of an accident previously

evaluated; or (2) create the possibility of

a new or different kind of accident from

any accident previously evaluated; or

(3) involve a significant reduction in a

margin of safety. As required by 10 CFR

50.91(a), the licensee has provided its

analysis of the issue of no significant

hazards consideration, which is

presented below:

NNECO has reviewed the proposed

revision in accordance with 10CFR50.92 and

has concluded that the revision does not

involve a significant hazards consideration

(SHC). The basis for this conclusion is that

the three criteria of 10CFR50.92(c) are not

satisfied. The proposed revision does not

involve [an] SHC because the revision would

not:

1. Involve a significant increase in the

probability or consequence of an accident

previously evaluated.

Currently, timely operator action is

required to prevent the pressurizer from

filling and potentially challenging the

pressurizer safety valves under water relief.

The proposed TS changes provide added

assurance that the safety valves will not be

challenged by requiring the PORVs to be

available for automatic pressure control. The

changes to the Surveillance Requirements

add the appropriate requirements to provide

assurance that the automatic capability of the

PORVs is OPERABLE. The quarterly analog

channel operational test for the PORV high

pressurizer pressure channels will not

include valve operation. However, it does

involve changing the opening logic from 2/

4 to 1/3 and, thus, performing the

surveillance increases the probability of the

PORVs opening inadvertently. If the

automatic capability of one PORV is

INOPERABLE for more than 72 hours,

shutdown is required. If the automatic

capability of both PORVs is INOPERABLE for

more than one hour, shutdown is required.

If the block valves have been closed but the

automatic capability of the PORVs is

OPERABLE, an EOP [emergency operating

procedure] change has been made to assure

that the PORV block valve would be opened

within ten minutes of an Inadvertent ECCS

[emergency core cooling system] actuation at

power. The new analysis shows that this is

sufficient to assure that the PORVs would

control RCS [reactor coolant system] pressure

if water relief is experienced and the safety

valves would not be challenged. Thus, it is

concluded that the change provides added

assurance that the safety valves would not

fail due to water discharge.

Evaluations and analysis have been

performed to demonstrate that the PORVs

and the associated piping are qualified for

water relief from an Inadvertent ECCS

Actuation at Power Operation for one hour

from event initiation. This provides

significant margin for operator action to

terminate the event.

The PORV control logic has been upgraded

to be safety grade and single failure proof. A

2/4 logic is used for opening and 3/4 logic

is used for subsequent closure. With the

upgrade of the PORV control logic, there is

added assurance that the PORV will be

capable of providing automatic pressure

control and preventing challenges to the

safety valves, particularly under water solid

conditions. However, there is a small impact

on the probability of inadvertent opening of

both PORVs resulting from multiple channel

failures. With the new safety grade PORV

control logic, two failed high pressurizer

pressure channels will result in inadvertent

opening of both PORVs. With the current

logic, a single failed high pressurizer

pressure channel would result in opening a

PORV. However, the 2/4 closure logic will reclose the PORV when pressurizer pressure

drops below 2200 psia. With the current logic

three failed high pressurizer pressure

channels are required for the PORVs to

inadvertently open and remain open. Thus it

is concluded that there is an increase in the

probability that the PORVs will inadvertently

open and remain open.

However, multiple channels failing high

are required for the PORVs to inadvertently

open and remain open. For failure modes

such as loss of power for the transmitter or

a failure of the instrument tubing, the

channel will fail low. Failure modes that can

result in the channel failing high are highly

unlikely. Further, the new logic will require

energization in order to open the PORVs,

further minimizing the potential for

inadvertent opening. These failures, which

result in the PORVs automatically opening

and remaining open, do not disable the

ability of the operators to close the PORVs by

taking their control switch to the close

position. Thus, it is concluded that the

increase in risk is negligible. The

consequences of inadvertent opening of both

PORVs is bounded by the analysis provided

in Chapter 15.6.1 Inadvertent Opening of

Pressurizer Safety or Relief Valve.

In the event of an inoperable pressurizer

pressure channel, the channel will be placed

in the tripped condition. This will change the

opening logic from 2/4 to 1/3 and the

subsequent closure logic from 3/4 to 3/3.