Filed 3/26/24 P. v. Contreras CA2/6

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not 

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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION SIX

THE PEOPLE,

Plaintiff and Respondent,

v.

ROBERTO CARLOS 

CONTRERAS,

Defendant and Appellant.

2d Crim. No. B317846

(Super. Ct. No. 19CR05914)

(Santa Barbara County)

Roberto Carlos Contreras appeals his convictions by a jury

of sodomy by use of force (Pen. Code1, § 286, subd. (c)(2)(A); count 

2), assault and battery (§§ 240 & 242; counts 3 and 4), forcible 

oral copulation (§ 287, subd. (c)(2)(A); counts 5 and 6), assault 

(§ 240; counts 7, 10, and 13), corporal injury to spouse (§ 273.5, 

subd. (a); counts 8, 9, 11, and 12), assault with a deadly weapon

(§ 245, subd. (a)(1); count 14), and spousal rape (former § 262, 

1 Further unspecified statutory references are to the Penal 

Code.
2

subd. (a)(1); count 15). On count 6, the jury found true 

allegations he used a deadly weapon (§ 667.61, subds. (b), (e)(3)) 

and inflicted torture (§ 667.61, subds. (a), (d)(3).) He was 

sentenced to an aggregate term of 50 years to life in state prison.

Appellant contends: (1) the prosecutor committed 

misconduct under Griffin v. California (1965) 380 U.S. 609

(Griffin); (2) the trial court erred in denying appellant’s petition

for juror identifying information; (3) the trial court erred in 

denying his motion for a new trial based on juror misconduct; and 

(4) cumulative error. We disagree and will affirm.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

Jane Doe and appellant were married with two young 

children. From approximately November 2018 to June 2019, 

appellant severely abused Jane. In one incident appellant kicked 

Jane in the face, breaking her glasses and cutting her. She still 

has a scar. Appellant hit her with shoes, vacuum accessories, 

tennis rackets, and extension cords. On other occasions he 

stomped on her, raped her, forced her to have anal sex, and 

punched her. 

During the week of June 15 to June 21, 2019, Jane suffered 

hours-long beatings nearly every day. Appellant made her watch 

her reflection as he beat her. He said beating her gave him 

pleasure. He searched her body for unbruised skin to strike her.

He held a knife to her neck. He placed a belt around her neck 

and made her eat off the floor like a dog. He kicked her in her 

vaginal area and he forced her to orally copulate him. 

When Jane dropped her children off at daycare on the 

morning of June 21, a daycare worker noticed Jane had a black 

eye. She had previously seen Jane with bruises and asked her

what was going on. Jane told her about the abuse and when they 
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were both done with work for the day, the daycare worker 

accompanied Jane to file a police report. 

The next day, an emergency medical doctor treated Jane for 

injuries consistent with blunt trauma from assault and sexual 

assault. Jane’s injuries were extensive and covered most of her 

face and body. A Sexual Assault Nurse Examiner documented 

Jane’s injuries. 

Jane’s boss and co-workers testified to having personally 

observed Jane with black eyes and bruises. Appellant’s ex-wife 

testified to having experienced similar abuse. During closing 

rebuttal argument the prosecutor said, “Defense, I’d also like to 

point out, not at one point in time during their closing argument 

said, the defendant didn’t beat Jane Doe, right? That was never 

said. Not once.” Defense counsel objected on the basis of 

“improper argument, burden shifting, and Griffin error.” The 

trial court found that while the prosecutor may not have intended 

a Griffin error, her comment could be misconstrued as such. The 

court instructed her to “move away from commenting on the 

Defense’s argument regarding the defendant being the only one 

who could have done this, or anything along those lines.” The 

court then instructed the jury to disregard the prosecutor’s 

statement. 

The prosecution and defense counsel spoke with eight of 

the twelve jurors after trial. Juror No. 8 said there was a 

compromise. Juror No. 2 said there were “three of us” who did 

not believe great bodily injury was proven beyond a reasonable 

doubt as to the torture special allegation on count 6, so they 

agreed to compromise. Juror No. 9 said she did not believe great 

bodily injury was proven beyond a reasonable doubt for the 

torture special allegation on count 6 and agreed to compromise. 
4

She said she and three other jurors wanted to vote not guilty but 

compromised because there was group pressure during 

deliberations. She felt she should have been “stronger in what I 

believe.” 

When asked how they arrived at their decision, the jurors 

answered, “there was a compromise . . .” Juror No. 2 said Juror 

No. 12, “was adamant to compromise so that they wouldn’t have 

to retry the case.” Juror No. 2 also stated regarding Juror No. 12 

that he “[r]ight away” discussed his personal history of 

experiencing family violence as a child and he “kept it up. It was 

like he had a hidden agenda.” 

Appellant petitioned the trial court for an order disclosing 

personal juror information under Civil Procedure Code section 

237. He argued the information was necessary for defense 

counsel to prepare a motion for a new trial based on jury 

misconduct. The court denied the petition. It found the evidence 

regarding Juror No. 12 “speculative” and the other evidence 

inadmissible under Evidence Code section 1150. It later denied 

appellant’s motion for new trial.

DISCUSSION

Alleged Griffin Error

Appellant contends the prosecutor committed a prejudicial

Griffin error when she commented on appellant’s failure to 

testify. We disagree with appellant’s characterization of the 

prosecutor’s comments and accordingly find no error. We also 

determine that even if Griffin error occurred it was harmless.

Prosecutors may not comment “on the accused’s silence or 

instructions by the court that such silence is evidence of guilt.” 

(Griffin, supra, 380 U.S. at p. 615.) Griffin violations occur where 

a prosecutor’s or trial court’s remarks draw attention to a 
5

defendant’s Fifth Amendment privilege while implying the 

exercise of that privilege infers guilt. (People v. Murtishaw

(1981) 29 Cal.3d 733, 757-758, superseded on other grounds in 

People v. Boyd (1985) 38 Cal.3d 762, 772-773.) Griffin errors also 

occur when prosecutors comment either directly or indirectly on a 

defendant’s failure to testify (People v. Hubbard (2020) 52 

Cal.App.5th 555, 563), or argue certain testimony or evidence is 

uncontradicted when defendant is the only witness who could 

contradict it (People v. Bradford (1997) 15 Cal.4th 1229, 1339), or 

where there is a reasonable likelihood the comments could have 

been understood to refer to defendant’s failure to testify. (People 

v. Clair (1992) 2 Cal.4th 629, 663). 

Griffin does not extend to comments on the state of the 

evidence or the defense’s failure to introduce material evidence or 

call logical witnesses. (People v. Vargas (1973) 9 Cal.3d 470, 475

(Vargas).) 

Here, the prosecutor’s comment did not draw attention to 

appellant’s failure to testify. Counsel merely pointed out that 

appellant’s counsel did not argue appellant did not beat Jane.

(Cf. Vargas, supra, 9 Cal.3d at p. 474, italics omitted [prosecutor’s 

argument that “there was no denial” is improper when it 

connotes a personal response by the defendant].)

Appellant contends the only possible source of evidence 

necessary to support an argument he did not beat Jane would 

have been his own testimony. Not true. As appellant’s trial 

counsel argued, evidence could have come from “third-party 

culpability [evidence]” of which there was none. Had he 

presented such evidence, appellant would not have needed to 

testify for his counsel to argue in closing he did not beat Jane.
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The prosecution was entitled to comment on his attorney’s failure 

to argue he did not inflict Jane’s injuries.

Even if the prosecutor’s comment could be construed as 

Griffin error, courts have consistently held “‘indirect, brief and 

mild references’” to a defendant’s failure to testify, without 

suggesting an inference of guilt, is a harmless Griffin error. 

(People v. Bradford (1997) 15 Cal.4th 1229, 1340.) It is settled 

that a prompt jury admonition will cure any Griffin-related 

concerns. (People v. Carr (2010) 190 Cal.App.4th 475, 484.) We 

review alleged Griffin errors de novo. (People v. Hubbard (2020) 

52 Cal.App.5th 555, 562.)

The prosecutor’s comment was isolated and brief. She 

made no claims of uncontradicted evidence that could only have

been contradicted by appellant’s testimony. The court promptly 

admonished jurors to disregard the statement. (Vargas, supra, 9 

Cal.3d at p. 479 [Griffin error harmless where remark was brief, 

mild, and indirect and followed by prompt admonition]; People v. 

Sandoval (1992) 4 Cal.4th 155, 184-185 [prompt admonition to 

jury sufficient to alleviate Griffin concerns].) We presume the 

jury followed the trial court’s instructions. (People v. Yeoman

(2003) 31 Cal.4th 93, 138-139; Francis v. Franklin (1985) 471 

U.S. 307, 324, fn. 9.)

“[F]or Griffin error to be prejudicial, the improper 

comment or instruction must either ‘serve to fill an evidentiary 

gap in the prosecution’s case,’ or ‘at least touch a live nerve in the 

defense.’” (Vargas, supra, 9 Cal.3d. at p. 481.) “The effect of 

Griffin error is assessed under the standard of prejudice set forth 

in Chapman v. California (1967) 386 U.S. 18 . . . . That is, ‘before 

a federal constitutional error can be held harmless, the court 

must be able to declare a belief that it was harmless beyond a
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reasonable doubt.’ [Citations.] That standard is met when the 

evidence of defendant’s guilt is so strong as to leave no doubt that 

the jury would have reached the same result in the absence of the 

error.” (People v. Denard (2015) 242 Cal.App.4th 1012, 1022.)

Appellant asserts there was a paucity of evidence and the 

jury’s request for a rereading of Jane’s testimony establishes this 

was a close case. We disagree. 

Jane’s testimony alone was sufficient to support appellant’s 

conviction, but there was also abundant evidence corroborating 

her testimony. The jury saw Jane’s medical records and

photographs of her injuries. They viewed the household items 

used as weapons to beat her, including a tennis racket deformed 

by repetitive blows to her body. Neighbors backed Jane’s 

testimony with their own. Appellant’s ex-wife testified to an 

incident of abuse that left a permanent scar on her face and was

eerily similar to an incident Jane endured. Jane’s boss, coworkers, and a day care worker observed Jane with black eyes 

and bruises and heard her contemporaneous statements that 

appellant was responsible for her injuries. The jury heard from 

police investigators, an emergency doctor, and the sexual assault 

nurse examiner who treated Jane. The evidence against 

appellant was so strong, we have no doubt the jury would have 

reached the same conclusion even without the prosecutor’s 

comment. Unless a witness’s testimony is “physically impossible 

or inherently improbable” one witness’s testimony is enough to 

support a conviction. (People v. Ramirez (2022) 13 Cal.5th 997, 

1118; see also Evid. Code § 411.) 
8

Denial of Petition for Order Disclosing 

Personal Juror Information

Appellant contends the trial court abused its discretion by

denying his petition for an order disclosing personal juror 

information. He alleges two potential incidents of misconduct: 

(1) juror pressure leading to a compromise verdict, and (2) juror 

bias on the part of Juror No. 12. We conclude the trial court 

exercised sound discretion in denying the petition. 

In criminal cases, the court’s records containing juror 

identifying information are sealed once the jury has returned its 

verdict. (People v. Carrasco (2008) 163 Cal.App.4th 978, 989

(Carrasco).) Disclosure of juror personal identifying information 

is governed by Civil Procedure Code sections 206 and 237. A 

defendant may “petition the court for access to personal juror 

identifying information within the court’s records necessary for 

the defendant to communicate with jurors for the purpose of 

developing a motion for new trial or any other lawful purpose.”

(Code Civ. Proc., § 206, subd. (g).) “The petition shall be 

supported by a declaration that includes facts sufficient to 

establish good cause for the release of the juror’s personal 

identifying information.” (Id., § 237, subd. (b).) An adequate 

petition must “establish a prima facie showing of good cause.” 

(Ibid.)

2 “[G]ood cause” exists if the petition supports “‘a 

reasonable belief that jury misconduct occurred, that diligent 

efforts were made to contact the jurors through other means, and 

2 Upon receipt of an adequate petition the court shall set 

the matter for hearing unless the court finds there is a 

“compelling interest against disclosure.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 237, 

subd. (b).)
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that further investigation is necessary to provide the court with 

adequate information to rule on a motion for new trial.’” 

(Carrasco, supra, 163 Cal.App.4th at p. 990.) We review the 

denial of a petition filed pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure 

section 237 for abuse of discretion. (People v. Jones (1998) 17 

Cal.4th 279, 317; Carrasco, at p. 991).

We agree appellant failed to make a prima facie showing of 

good cause to release juror identifying information and find no 

abuse of discretion. Even crediting the jurors’ statements that 

they felt “pressured,” their verdicts were reached by compromise, 

and Juror No. 12 discussed his personal life experiences, these 

statements are not evidence of juror misconduct. Evidence 

showing a juror’s thought process in reaching a verdict is 

irrelevant and inadmissible. (Evid. Code, § 1150, subd. (a);

3

People v. Johnson (2013) 222 Cal.App.4th 486, 494.) Compromise 

verdicts are valid. (People v. Abilez (2007) 41 Cal.4th 472, 513 

[valid jury verdicts may reflect “jury lenity, compromise, or 

mistake”].) Jurors may rely on their own experiences in 

evaluating evidence presented at trial. (People v. Leonard (2007) 

40 Cal.4th 1370, 1414.) 

Appellant’s assertion the trial court’s denial of his petition 

for juror information denied him effective assistance of counsel is 

3 Evid. Code § 1150 subdivision (a) states: “Upon an 

inquiry as to the validity of a verdict, any otherwise admissible 

evidence may be received as to statements made, or conduct, 

conditions, or events occurring, either within or without the jury 

room, of such a character as is likely to have influenced the 

verdict improperly. No evidence is admissible to show the effect 

of such statement, conduct, condition, or event upon a juror 

either in influencing him to assent to or dissent from the verdict 

or concerning the mental processes by which it was determined.”
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unfounded. He cites no relevant supporting authority. His

petition seeking additional information regarding jurors’ thought 

processes and rationales in reaching their verdicts was properly 

denied. 

Denial of Appellant’s Motion for a New Trial

Appellant asserts his Sixth Amendment rights to an 

impartial jury and due process were violated when the trial court 

denied his motion for a new trial based on jury misconduct under 

section 1181, subdivision 3. We again disagree.

When a party seeks a new trial based upon jury 

misconduct, the trial court must determine whether evidence 

presented for its consideration is admissible, whether the facts 

establish misconduct, and whether misconduct was prejudicial. 

(People v. Duran (1996) 50 Cal.App.4th 103, 112-113.) We review 

the court’s denial of a motion for new trial independently to 

determine whether alleged misconduct prevented the appellant 

from having a fair trial. (People v. Ault (2004) 33 Cal.4th 1250, 

1263-1264.)

Evidence Code section 1150 allows juror misconduct to be 

shown by juror affidavit. “‘Upon an inquiry as to the validity of a 

verdict, any otherwise admissible evidence may be received as to 

statements made, or conduct, conditions, or events occurring, 

either within or without the jury room, of such a character as is 

likely to have influenced the verdict improperly. No evidence is 

admissible to show the effect of such statement, conduct, 

condition, or event upon a juror either in influencing him to 

assent to or dissent from the verdict or concerning the mental 

processes by which it was determined.’” (People v. Hutchinson

(1969) 71 Cal.2d 342, 349.) The “moving party must present 

admissible evidence that misconduct occurred.” (People v. Von 
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Villas (1992) 10 Cal.App.4th 201, 251.) The motivation and 

reasons that bear on a juror’s decision about the case are “beyond 

the competence of affidavits to show . . . jury misconduct.”

(People v. Brown (1976) 61 Cal.App.3d 476, 482.) 

Appellant submitted a juror declaration in support of his 

motion for new trial repeating the same information regarding 

the jury’s agreement to compromise and Juror No. 12’s discussing 

his personal history of domestic violence, and adding that the 

juror did not believe infliction of great bodily injury or use of a 

knife had been proven. The trial court correctly found the 

declaration consisted of hearsay, speculation, and the juror’s 

subjective mental processes during deliberation. This single, 

inadmissible declaration was insufficient to establish juror 

misconduct. The trial court properly denied the motion.

Cumulative Error

Appellant claims cumulative error. We have determined 

each of his contentions lack merit. There is no cumulative error. 

(People v. Avila (2006) 38 Cal.4th 491, 608.)

DISPOSITION

Judgment is affirmed.

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED.

CODY, J.

We concur:

YEGAN, Acting P. J. BALTODANO, J.
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The Honorable Patricia Kelly, Judge

Superior Court County of Santa Barbara

______________________________

Jennifer A. Mannix, under appointment by the Court of 

Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.

Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief 

Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Senior 

Assistant Attorney General, Steven D. Matthews, Supervising 

Deputy Attorney General, Ryan M. Smith, Deputy Attorney 

General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.