COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA 

Present: Judges Frank, Humphreys and Agee 

SCOTT ALLAN INGRAM S/K/A 

 SCOTT ALLEN INGRAM 

 MEMORANDUM OPINION* BY 

v. Record No. 2232-01-1 JUDGE G. STEVEN AGEE 

 AUGUST 27, 2002 

COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA 

FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE CITY OF SUFFOLK 

Westbrook J. Parker, Judge 

 (Christopher P. Reagan, Assistant Public 

Defender; Office of the Public Defender, on 

brief), for appellant. Appellant submitting 

on brief. 

 (Jerry W. Kilgore, Attorney General; Marla 

Graff Decker, Assistant Attorney General, on 

brief), for appellee. Appellee submitting on 

brief. 

 

* Pursuant to Code § 17.1-413, this opinion is not 

designated for publication.

 Scott Allan Ingram (Ingram) was convicted, in a bench trial 

in the Suffolk circuit court, of driving after being declared a 

habitual offender, second or subsequent offense, in violation of 

Code § 46.2-357. He was sentenced to serve one year in jail. 

On appeal, he contends the trial court erred by denying his 

motion to suppress statements made by him after an unlawful 

seizure. For the following reasons, we disagree and affirm 

Ingram's conviction. 
I. BACKGROUND 

 As the parties are fully conversant with the record in this 

case and because this memorandum opinion carries no precedential 

value, only those facts necessary to a disposition of this 

appeal are recited. 

 Suffolk Police Officer H.L. Kee observed a gray Honda CRX 

directly in front of his patrol car for approximately 

three-quarters of a mile before it pulled into a market, the 

same destination as the officer. He saw the back of both the 

driver's and passenger's heads and noticed the driver had a 

ponytail. Officer Kee pulled into a parking space on the side 

of the store and went into the store. 

 Once inside the store, Officer Kee looked out the glass 

storefront window and, for the first time, saw "two small 

children in the rear seat" of the Honda. Because he believed 

the children were less than four years old, the officer went 

back outside and approached the car. He noticed that Ingram, 

the individual he had just seen driving the car, was now seated 

in the front passenger seat.1

 Upon approaching the car, Officer Kee did not see any child 

restraint seats in the car. He approached the individual in the 

passenger seat, Ingram, as the driver he had seen earlier, and 

 1

 Officer Kee recognized Ingram as the driver he had 

previously observed by his ponytail. The adult female who was 

traveling with Ingram was not wearing her hair in a ponytail. 

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asked to see Ingram's driver's license and registration. Ingram 

informed Officer Kee that he did not have a valid driver's 

license because it had been suspended. Officer Kee then 

inquired as to the ages of the children and why they were not 

secured in the seats. 

 Officer Kee ran a radio check to determine Ingram's driving 

status and confirmed that Ingram was a habitual offender. The 

officer then arrested Ingram for driving after being declared a 

habitual offender. 

 Ingram filed a motion to suppress all statements he made 

contending Officer Kee unlawfully seized him when he asked for 

his driver's license and vehicle registration. The trial court 

denied the motion to suppress. 

II. ANALYSIS 

 Ingram argues on appeal that the trial court erred in 

denying his motion to suppress. His sole contention is that he 

was unlawfully seized when Office Kee approached him and asked 

for his driver's license. For the following reasons, we affirm 

the trial court's decision to deny the motion to suppress. 

 "At a hearing on a defendant's motion to suppress, the 

Commonwealth has the burden of proving that a warrantless search 

or seizure did not violate the defendant's Fourth Amendment 

rights." Reel v. Commonwealth, 31 Va. App. 262, 265, 522 S.E.2d 

881, 882 (2000). "It[, however,] is well established that, on 

appeal, appellant carries the burden to show, considering the 

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evidence in the light most favorable to the Commonwealth, that 

the denial of a motion to suppress constitutes reversible 

error." Motley v. Commonwealth, 17 Va. App. 439, 440-41, 437 

S.E.2d 232, 233 (1993). "Ultimate questions of reasonable 

suspicion and probable cause . . . involve questions of both law 

and fact and are reviewed de novo on appeal. This Court is 

bound by the trial court's findings of historical fact unless 

plainly wrong or without evidence to support them and we give 

due weight to the inferences drawn from those facts by resident 

judges and local law enforcement officers." Neal v. 

Commonwealth, 27 Va. App. 233, 237, 498 S.E.2d 422, 424 (1998) 

(citations omitted). 

 Interactions between the police and citizens fall into one 

of three categories: (1) consensual encounters, (2) 

investigatory stops requiring reasonable suspicion, and (3) full 

arrests requiring probable cause. Wechsler v. Commonwealth, 20 

Va. App. 162, 169, 455 S.E.2d 744, 747 (1995). The Commonwealth 

argues the encounter between Ingram and Officer Kee was 

consensual, therefore, no seizure occurred. Alternatively, the 

Commonwealth, citing United States v. Sokolow, 490 U.S. 1, 7 

(1989), argues that the officer had ample "reasonable suspicion 

supported by articulable facts, that criminal activity may be 

afoot," which justified an investigatory stop of Ingram. 

 Assuming, without deciding, that Ingram was "seized" when 

the request for identification was made by Officer Kee, we 

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nonetheless find that any "seizure" was lawful as Officer Kee 

had a reasonable articulable suspicion that a crime might be 

afoot requiring his investigation into the matter. 

 "If a police officer has reasonable, 

articulable suspicion that a person is 

engaging in, or is about to engage in 

criminal activity, the officer may detain 

the suspect to conduct a brief investigation 

without violating the person's Fourth 

Amendment protection against unreasonable 

searches and seizures." 

Davis v. Commonwealth, 35 Va. App. 533, 538-39, 546 S.E.2d 252, 

255 (2001) (quoting McGee v. Commonwealth, 25 Va. App. 193, 202, 

487 S.E.2d 259, 263 (1997) (en banc)). 

 "'A brief stop of a suspicious individual, in order to 

determine his identity or to maintain the status quo momentarily 

while obtaining more information, may be most reasonable in 

light of the facts known to the officer at that time.'" Lee v. 

Commonwealth, 18 Va. App. 235, 239, 443 S.E.2d 180, 182 (1994) 

(quoting Adams v. Williams, 407 U.S. 143, 145-46 (1972)). In 

the case at bar, it was apparent to the officer that Ingram and 

his companion were responsible for the two small children with 

them. Once Officer Kee saw the two small children in the back 

seat of the car only moments after it had parked in the lot, he 

became concerned that the children, who appeared to be younger 

than four years of age, had been, and would be, transported 

without the requisite child restraint device for each child, in 

violation of Code § 46.2-1095. Under these circumstances, 

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Officer Kee's detention of Ingram to determine the ages of the 

children was validly made for investigatory purposes and 

supported by a reasonable articulable suspicion. 

 Ingram, however, argues that once he provided the officer 

with the children's ages, ages four and six, the officer was no 

longer permitted to detain him. We disagree. First, Officer 

Kee was not required to believe Ingram's statement that the 

children were ages four and six if they looked otherwise. See

generally, Lowe v. Commonwealth, 33 Va. App. 656, 662-63, 536 

S.E.2d 454, 457-58 (2000). Second, as found by the trial court, 

prior to Ingram's response regarding the children's ages he 

informed the officer that he did not have a valid driver's 

license because his had been suspended. Since Officer Kee 

witnessed Ingram driving only moments before, the officer now, 

with this statement by Ingram, had a reasonable articulable 

suspicion that another offense may have just been committed in 

his presence. This reasonable suspicion authorized Officer Kee 

to continue the detention in order to investigate Ingram's 

driving status. See Hodnett v. Commonwealth, 32 Va. App. 684, 

530 S.E.2d 433 (2000). 

 For these reasons, we would find the investigatory 

detention of Ingram to be supported by a reasonable articulable 

suspicion and permitted under the Fourth Amendment. 

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Accordingly, we affirm the trial court's decision to deny the 

motion to suppress and affirm the judgment of the trial court. 

Affirmed. 

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