Filed 1/12/22 P. v. Esquivel CA4/1

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COURT OF APPEAL, FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION ONE

STATE OF CALIFORNIA

THE PEOPLE,

Plaintiff and Respondent,

v.

JOSE ANTONIO ESQUIVEL,

Defendant and Appellant.

 D079448

 (Super. Ct. No. SS161405A)

APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Monterey County, 

Pamela L. Butler, Judge. Affirmed.

Eric Weaver, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant 

and Appellant.

Xavier Becerra, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief Assistant 

Attorney General, Jeffrey M. Laurence, Assistant Attorney General, 

Catherine A. Rivlin and Basil R. Williams, Deputy Attorneys General, for 

Plaintiff and Respondent.

A jury convicted Jose Antonio Esquivel of kidnapping Jane Doe for the 

purpose of committing rape, sodomy, or oral copulation (Pen. Code, § 209, 

subd. (b)(1)) and multiple counts of forcible rape, sodomy and oral copulation 
2

acting in concert (§§ 264.1, subd. (a), 286, subd. (d)(1); former § 288a, 

subd. (d)(1); see current § 287, subd. (d)(1)).1 In addition, the jury found true 

the allegations that the kidnapping was committed with substantial 

movement and increased risk to the victim and involved the personal 

infliction of great bodily injury. (§ 667.61, subds. (a), (d)(2), (d)(5) and (d)(6).)

The trial court sentenced Esquivel to an indeterminate life sentence pursuant 

to the “One Strike” law (§ 667.61), making him ineligible for a youth offender 

parole hearing under subdivision (h) of section 3051. 

On appeal, Esquivel asserts an equal protection claim. He contends it 

is unlawful to allow defendants convicted of first degree murder to obtain 

youth offender parole hearings, while categorically excluding defendants like 

him who are sentenced under the One Strike law from obtaining those 

hearings. We reject Esquivel’s equal protection claim and affirm the 

judgment.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

On August 23, 2013, 18-year-old Jane Doe and her girlfriend traveled 

from their home in Oakland to Salinas in a car with a friend. Sometime that 

night, the women spent about 45 minutes at a bar, and, because their friend 

“had to use the car,” they arranged to get a ride to their hotel with Esquivel 

and another man. When they left the bar, the women sat in the vehicle’s 

back seat, Esquivel sat in the front passenger seat, and his friend drove. The 

men drove past the hotel where the women were staying, stopped at an ATM, 

then drove to a field. Both women jumped from the car and attempted to flee. 

Doe’s girlfriend escaped, but the men overpowered Doe, forced her back into

the car, and drove off. Doe thought the men would kill her. 

1 Unless otherwise indicated, statutory citations are to the Penal Code. 
3

Doe’s girlfriend flagged down a passing motorist and said, “ ‘Help me, 

‘cause they’re gonna kill my friend.’ ” The motorist told the friend to get in,

and they attempted to follow the men, but they lost track of them. Officers 

responding to a report of a possible kidnapping saw a vehicle flashing its 

headlights and stopped at the side of the road. Doe’s girlfriend exited the 

vehicle from the passenger side yelling that someone had kidnapped her 

girlfriend. 

Meanwhile, Esquivel, who was in the back seat while his friend drove, 

removed Doe’s clothes and underwear and forced her to “snort” something 

that burned her nose. Esquivel forced Doe to orally copulate him and to have 

vaginal sex with him. She cried and pleaded with him not to kill her. 

The driver stopped the car three times. At the first stop, the men 

removed Doe from the car, bent her over the trunk, and both men forced her 

to have vaginal and anal sex with them. Doe pleaded with them to stop. 

When they got back in the car, Esquivel forced Doe to orally copulate him. 

At the second stop, Esquivel pulled Doe from the car and again forced 

her to have vaginal sex with him. When they got back in the car, Esquivel 

again forced Doe to orally copulate him. 

At the third stop, Esquivel again forced Doe to have vaginal sex with 

him and ejaculated inside of her. 

Eventually, the men dropped Doe off near a gas station, where she 

called 911.2 Officers arrived and observed that Doe was visibly upset and 

appeared to have been crying. Doe said that she had been kidnapped and 

2 The timeline of events is unclear from the record. It appears Doe called 

911 sometime during the morning of August 24. The offenses were estimated 

to have occurred “[o]n or about August 24.” 
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raped. Officers brought Doe to the hospital, where she underwent a sexual 

assault examination. 

The nurse that performed the sexual assault examination testified that 

Doe had abrasions, bruises and scratches on her arms and legs. She did not 

have any injuries to her vagina or anus. The nurse testified that she found

such injuries in less than half of the examinations she performed. The nurse

collected Doe’s clothes, which were soiled and contained bits of debris. The 

nurse also collected blood samples and biological swabs from Doe’s vagina 

and anus. Doe’s blood tested positive for low levels of methamphetamine. 

There were two male DNA contributors to the anal swab sample and one 

male DNA contributor to the vaginal swab sample. DNA from the vaginal 

swab matched a sample taken from Esquivel. Esquivel could not be excluded 

as a contributor to the anal sample. 

A jury convicted Esquivel of one count of kidnapping for the purpose of 

committing rape, sodomy, or oral copulation (§ 209, subd. (b)(1); count 1), four 

counts of rape acting in concert (§ 264.1, subd. (a); counts 2-5), one count of 

forcible sodomy acting in concert (§ 286, subd. (d)(1); count 6), and two counts 

of forcible oral copulation acting in concert (former § 288a, subd. (d)(1), see 

current § 287, subd. (d)(1); counts 7-8). With respect to counts 2 through 5, 

the jury found true the allegation that Esquivel inflicted great bodily injury 

(§§ 12022.8, 1192.7, subd. (c)(8)) and, with respect to counts 2 through 8, that 

the kidnapping was committed with substantial movement and increased 

risk to the victim (§ 667.61, subds. (a), (d)(2), and (d)(5)), and involved the 

personal infliction of great bodily injury (id., subds. (a), (d)(6)). 
5

The trial court sentenced Esquivel to a total term of 105 years to life, 

comprised of four consecutive terms of 25 years to life on counts 2 through 5, 

plus five years for the great bodily injury enhancement on count 5.3

DISCUSSION

Esquivel was sentenced pursuant to the One Strike law and is 

consequently ineligible for a youth offender parole hearing as a result of the 

exclusion in section 3051, subdivision (h).4 He contends that this exclusion 

violates his equal protection rights under the United States and California 

Constitutions because certain youth offenders convicted of first degree 

murder are not similarly excluded.5 The Courts of Appeal are divided on the 

issue of whether the exclusion of One Strike sex offenders from the youth 

3 Additional terms on other counts and enhancements were also imposed, 

but the additional terms were ordered to run concurrent to the sentence or 

stayed pursuant to section 654. 

4 There was some dispute as to Esquivel’s date of birth. The trial court 

appeared to accept Esquivel’s assertion that he was born on April 18, 1989, 

making him 24 years old at the time of the offenses. For purposes of our 

analysis, we assume Esquivel was in fact 24 years old at the time of the 

offenses.

5 A defendant who commits first degree murder could be ineligible for 

other reasons which are not at issue here, such as a defendant who was 

sentenced under the “Three Strikes” law (§§ 667, subds. (b)-(i), 1170.12), a 

defendant who was sentenced to life without the possibility of parole and was 

over the age of 18 when he or she committed the offense, and defendants “to 

whom [the statute] would otherwise apply, but who, subsequent to attaining 

26 years of age, commit[] an additional crime for which malice aforethought 

is a necessary element of the crime or for which the individual is sentenced to 

life in prison.” (§ 3051, subd. (h).) 
6

offender parole hearing scheme violates principles of equal protection.6 The 

California Supreme Court is currently considering whether it violates equal 

protection to exclude young adults convicted under the One Strike law from 

youth offender parole consideration under section 3051 when offenders 

convicted of first degree murder are not excluded. (Williams, supra, 

47 Cal.App.5th 475, review granted.) Pending the Supreme Court’s 

resolution of this issue, we continue to follow this court’s decision in Williams

rejecting an equal protection challenge to the exclusion of One Strike 

offenders from youth offender parole hearings. 

The One Strike law (§ 667.61) “sets forth an alternative and harsher 

sentencing scheme for certain enumerated sex crimes perpetrated by force, 

including rape, foreign object penetration, sodomy, and oral copulation.” 

(People v. Mancebo (2002) 27 Cal.4th 735, 741, fn. omitted.) When the jury 

has convicted a defendant of a specified sex crime and has also found certain 

factual allegations to be true, the defendant must be sentenced to 15 years to 

life, 25 years to life, or life without the possibility of parole. (See People v. 

6 See People v. Edwards (2019) 34 Cal.App.5th 183, 194-200 (Edwards) 

[concluding that equal protection renders youthful sex offenders sentenced 

under the One Strike law eligible for youth offender parole hearings]; In re 

Woods (2021) 62 Cal.App.5th 740, 760, review granted June 16, 2021, 

S268740 [same]; People v. Williams (2020) 47 Cal.App.5th 475, 493, review 

granted July 22, 2020, S262229 (Williams) [rejecting equal protection 

challenge to section 3051, subdivision (h) because rational basis exists for 

making One Strike offenders ineligible for youth offender parole hearings]; 

People v. Miranda (2021) 62 Cal.App.5th 162, 186-187, review granted 

June 16, 2021, S268384 (Miranda) [same]; People v. Moseley (2021) 

59 Cal.App.5th 1160, 1169, review granted April 14, 2021, S267309 [declining 

to find that a youthful sex offender is similarly situated to a youthful 

murderer because “they are different crimes,” but nonetheless concluding 

that excluding One Strike offenders from youth offender parole consideration 

is rationally related to a legitimate penal interest]. 
7

Anderson (2009) 47 Cal.4th 92, 102; § 667.61, subds. (a), (b), (j), and (l).) 

Here, it is undisputed that Esquivel was convicted of offenses which 

subjected him to sentences of 25 years to life under the One Strike law.7 

The Legislature enacted section 3051 in 2013 in response to a series of 

decisions establishing constitutional limits on the length of sentences for 

juvenile offenders. (See Stats. 2013, ch. 312, § 4; People v. Franklin (2016) 

63 Cal.4th 261, 277.) Section 3051 establishes “ ‘a parole eligibility 

mechanism that provides a person serving a sentence for crimes that he or 

she committed as a juvenile the opportunity to obtain release when he or she 

has shown that he or she has been rehabilitated and gained maturity . . . .’ ” 

(Franklin, at p. 277.) Under section 3051, youth offenders who committed 

their “controlling offense” when they were 25 years old or younger are 

entitled to a parole hearing after serving a designated period in custody. 

(§ 3051, subds. (b), (e).)8 A “controlling offense” is “the offense or 

enhancement for which any sentencing court imposed the longest term of 

imprisonment.” (§ 3051, subd. (a)(2)(B).) Section 3051, subdivision (b)(3) 

states: “A person who was convicted of a controlling offense that was 

committed when the person was 25 years of age or younger and for which the 

sentence is a life term of 25 years to life shall be eligible for release on parole 

at a youth offender parole hearing during the person’s 25th year of 

7 Esquivel does not challenge the judgment or his sentence, only his 

ineligibility for a youth offender parole hearing.

8 Originally, section 3051 applied when the controlling offense was 

committed before the offender was 18 years old. (Stats. 2013, ch. 312, § 4

(Sen. Bill No. 260).) The Legislature subsequently expanded youth offender 

parole hearings to offenders under 23 years old (Stats. 2015, ch. 471, § 1 (Sen. 

Bill No. 261)), and then to offenders under 26 years old (Stats. 2017, ch. 684, 

§ 1.5 (Sen. Bill No. 394)) at the time of the controlling offense.
8

incarceration. The youth parole eligible date for a person eligible for a youth 

offender parole hearing under this paragraph shall be the first day of the 

person’s 25th year of incarceration.” Individuals sentenced under the One 

Strike law, however, are not eligible for a youth offender parole hearing. 

(§ 3051, subd. (h).)9 

Esquivel challenges this categorical exclusion applicable to defendants 

who are sentenced under the One Strike law as violating principles of equal 

protection, because defendants convicted of first degree murder are not 

excluded from eligibility. 

“ ‘ “The first prerequisite to a meritorious claim under the equal 

protection clause is a showing that the state has adopted a classification that 

affects two or more similarly situated groups in an unequal manner.” 

[Citations.] This initial inquiry is not whether persons are similarly situated 

for all purposes, but “whether they are similarly situated for purposes of the 

law challenged.” ’ ” (People v. McKee (2010) 47 Cal.4th 1172, 1202.) If this 

showing is made and, as here, the “disputed statutory disparity implicates no 

suspect class or fundamental right,” equal protection is denied “ ‘only where 

there is no “rational relationship between the disparity of treatment and 

some legitimate governmental purpose.” ’ ” (Johnson v. Department of Justice

(2015) 60 Cal.4th 871, 881 (Johnson).) “This standard of rationality does not 

depend upon whether lawmakers ever actually articulated the purpose they 

sought to achieve. Nor must the underlying rationale be empirically 

9 One Strike offenders sentenced pursuant to section 667.61 were 

excluded from the youth offender parole hearing scheme under section 3051 

as originally enacted. (Former § 3051, subd. (h); see Stats. 2013, ch. 312, § 4

(Sen. Bill No. 260).) As currently enacted, section 3051 continues to exclude 

such offenders from youth offender parole hearings. (See § 3051, subd. (h).) 

The statute contains other exclusions which are not at issue here. (Ibid.) 
9

substantiated. [Citation.] While the realities of the subject matter cannot be 

completely ignored [citation], a court may engage in ‘ “rational speculation” ’ 

as to the justifications for the legislative choice [citation]. It is immaterial for 

rational basis review ‘whether or not’ any such speculation has ‘a foundation 

in the record.’ ” (People v. Turnage (2012) 55 Cal.4th 62, 74-75 (Turnage).) 

The party challenging the statute “must ‘ “negative every conceivable basis” ’ 

that might support the disputed statutory disparity.” (Johnson, at p. 881.) If 

a plausible basis exists for the disparity, “[e]qual protection analysis does not 

entitle the judiciary to second-guess the wisdom, fairness, or logic of the law.” 

(Turnage, at p. 74.) We review Esquivel’s equal protection claim de novo.

(People v. Laird (2018) 27 Cal.App.5th 458, 469.)10 

Esquivel contends that, as a youthful One Strike offender, he is 

similarly situated to youthful first degree murderers for purposes of the 

youth offender parole hearing law because the purpose of the law was to 

recognize youthful offenders’ lack of maturity. Assuming without deciding 

that Esquivel is similarly situated to other youth offenders eligible for parole 

hearings under section 3051 (see Miranda, supra, 62 Cal.App.5th at p. 183, 

review granted), Esquivel bears the burden to “negative every conceivable 

basis that might support the disputed statutory disparity.” (Johnson, supra, 

60 Cal.4th at p. 881.) 

Esquivel relies on Edwards, supra, 34 Cal.App.5th 183 to support his 

claim that no rational basis exists for the “Legislature to afford youth 

offender parole hearings to first degree murderers while denying them to One 

10 Esquivel “does not differentiate between the state and federal 

Constitutions or suggest the [equal protection] analysis under either should 

differ. Accordingly, we address his state and federal claims together.” (In re 

C.B. (2018) 6 Cal.5th 118, 133, fn. 11.) 
10

Strikers.” In Williams, this court rejected the Edwards court’s conclusion 

that “there is no ‘ “conceivable basis” ’ supporting the disputed statutory 

disparity for [One Strike] offenders, as compared to murderers.” (Williams, 

supra, 47 Cal.App.5th at p. 492, review granted.) This court observed that 

Three Strikes offenders are also excluded from section 3051, suggesting that 

the Legislature “ ‘had recidivism in mind when it excluded [O]ne [S]trike 

offenders.’ ” (Id. at p. 491.) This court further observed “ ‘that the 

Legislature has enacted several comprehensive statutory schemes that all 

seem to focus on the Legislature’s concerns over recidivism by those who 

commit violent sex offenses. The Sexually Violent Predators Act (Welf. & 

Inst. Code, § 660[0] et seq.) provides for the indefinite civil commitment of 

certain offenders who are found to suffer from a qualifying mental disorder 

after the completion of their prison terms. The Mentally Disordered 

Offenders Act (Pen. Code, § 2690 et seq.) permits the continued detention of 

certain other sex offenders until they receive appropriate mental health 

treatment that results in remission of their disorder. Each has the same 

purpose: to protect the public from a select group of sexual offenders who are 

extremely dangerous and to provide treatment for them.’ ” (Id. at pp. 491-

492.) “ ‘[Penal Code s]ection 290 requires the lifetime registration of a large 

class of sex offenders, including those [who] commit assault or kidnapping 

with the intent to commit rape. [Citation.] The purpose of section 290’s 

lifetime registration requirement is to ensure that persons convicted of the 

enumerated crimes be readily available for police surveillance at all times 

because the Legislature has deemed them likely to commit similar offenses in 

the future. [Citation.] [¶] As we see it, the Legislature believes that most 

sex offenders pose a recidivism risk.’ ” (Id. at p. 492.)
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We recognize that the Supreme Court will resolve the issue raised in 

this appeal. Pending the Supreme Court’s ruling, we will continue to follow 

Williams. (See Opsal v. United Services Auto. Assn. (1991) 2 Cal.App.4th 

1197, 1203-1204.) We therefore reject Esquivel’s equal protection claim. 

DISPOSITION

The judgment is affirmed. 

GUERRERO, J.

WE CONCUR:

AARON, Acting P. J.

DATO, J.