FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

JOSEPH BIRDSONG, Individually and 

on Behalf of Others Similarly

Situated; BRUCE WAGGONER,

No. 08-16641 Individually and on Behalf of

Others Similarly Situated, D.C. No.  Plaintiffs-Appellants, 5:06-CV-02280-JW

v. OPINION

APPLE, INC.,

Defendant-Appellee. 

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Northern District of California

James Ware, District Judge, Presiding

Argued and Submitted

October 8, 2009—San Francisco, California

Filed December 30, 2009

Before: J. Clifford Wallace, David R. Thompson and

Sidney R. Thomas, Circuit Judges.

Opinion by Judge Thompson

16867
COUNSEL

Jeff D. Friedman, Berkeley, California, for the plaintiffsappellants.

David Bernick, New York, New York, for the defendantappellee.

BIRDSONG v. APPLE, INC. 16869
OPINION

THOMPSON, Senior Circuit Judge:

Plaintiffs-appellants Joseph Birdsong and Bruce Waggoner

(collectively, the “plaintiffs”) filed a class action complaint

claiming that defendant-appellee Apple, Inc.’s (“Apple”) iPod

is defective because it poses an unreasonable risk of noiseinduced hearing loss to its users. The plaintiffs appeal the district court’s dismissal of their third amended complaint. The

district court determined that the plaintiffs failed to state

claims for breach of the implied warranty of merchantability

and fitness for a particular purpose, and that they lacked

standing to assert a claim under California’s Unfair Competition Law (“UCL”). 

We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, and we

affirm.

I

Background

Apple’s iPod is an electronic device which stores and plays

digital audio files. Each iPod comes with a set of detachable

“earbud” headphones. The iPod can be used without its earbud headphones to play music through different headphones.

According to the third amended complaint, iPods have the

capability of producing sounds as loud as 115 decibels. Apple

includes a warning with each iPod:

Avoid Hearing Damage

Warning: Permanent hearing loss may occur if earphones or headphones are used at high

volume. You can adapt over time to a

higher volume of sound, which may

sound normal but can be damaging to

16870 BIRDSONG v. APPLE, INC.
your hearing. Set your iPod’s volume to

a safe level before that happens. If you

experience ringing in your ears, reduce

the volume or discontinue use of your

iPod.

Apple also provided warnings on its website.

Birdsong bought an Apple iPod in May 2005 and another

in October 2005. Waggoner bought an Apple iPod in January

2005 and, six months later, a set of noise-cancelling headphones to be used with his iPod.

Birdsong, a Louisiana resident, filed this action in the

Western District of Louisiana, seeking to represent a statewide class of iPod consumers. The case was transferred to the

Northern District of California on the parties’ joint motion

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a). Birdsong then filed a first

amended complaint asserting claims under California law.

Apple moved to dismiss the first amended complaint and

Birdsong responded by filing a second amended complaint.

Apple then moved to partially dismiss the second amended

complaint. The district court granted Apple’s motion, and

granted Birdsong leave to amend. 

Waggoner, a California resident, then joined Birdsong in

filing a third amended complaint against Apple, alleging

claims for (1) breach of express warranty, Cal. Com. Code

§ 2313; (2) breach of the implied warranty of merchantability,

Cal. Com. Code § 2314; (3) breach of the implied warranty of

fitness for a particular purpose, Cal. Com. Code § 2315; (4)

violation of the California UCL, Cal. Bus. and Prof. Code

§§ 17220 et seq.; (5) violations of California’s Song-Beverly

Consumer Warranty Act, Cal. Civ. Code §§ 1790 et seq.; and

(6) violations of the federal Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act,

15 U.S.C. §§ 2301 et seq. Birdsong and Waggoner purported

to represent a nationwide class of iPod purchasers. The disBIRDSONG v. APPLE, INC. 16871
trict court dismissed the third amended complaint, and Birdsong and Waggoner appeal.1

II

Implied Warranty of Merchantability

[1] The California Commercial Code implies a warranty of

merchantability that goods “[a]re fit for ordinary purposes for

which such goods are used.” Cal. Com. Code § 2314(2)(c).2

The implied warranty “provides for a minimum level of quality.” Am. Suzuki Motor Corp. v. Superior Court, 37 Cal. App.

4th 1291, 1296 (Cal. Ct. App. 1995) (quotation omitted). A

breach of the warranty of merchantability occurs if the prod1The parties do not dispute that the district court had subject matter

jurisdiction over the class action. We agree. The district court had original

jurisdiction pursuant to the Class Action Fairness Act (“CAFA”), 28

U.S.C. § 1332(d). Plaintiffs’ class action satisfied CAFA’s amount in controversy, numerosity and minimal diversity requirements. See Lowdermilk

v. U.S. Bank Nat’l Ass’n, 479 F.3d 994, 997 (9th Cir. 2007); Abrego

Abrego v. The Dow Chem. Co., 443 F.3d 676, 683 (9th Cir. 2006). Additionally, section 1332(d)’s enumerated exceptions to federal jurisdiction

do not apply. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1332(d)(4)(A)-(B). 

2The substantive elements are the same under the Song-Beverly Act and

Magnuson-Moss Act. Cal. Civ. Code §§ 1791, et seq.; 15 U.S.C. § 2301,

et seq. Under both, the court applies state warranty law. 15 U.S.C.

§§ 2301(7), 2310(d)(1); see Dominguez v. Am. Suzuki Motor Corp., 160

Cal. App. 4th 53, 58 (2008); see Milicevic v. Fletcher Jones Imports, Ltd.,

402 F.3d 912, 918 (9th Cir. 2005). State law requires that the goods (1)

pass without objection in the trade under the contract description; (2) are

fit for the ordinary purposes for which those goods are used; (3) are adequately contained, packaged, and labeled; and (4) conform to the promises

or affirmation of fact made on the container or label. Cal. Civ. Code

§ 1791.1. Both parties agree that the plaintiffs’ claims under California’s

Song-Beverly Consumer Warranty Act, Cal. Civ. Code §§ 1790 et seq.

and the federal Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 2301 et seq.

require the plaintiffs to plead successfully a breach of state warranty law.

Thus, because we conclude that the plaintiffs have failed to state a claim

for breach of an express or implied warranty, their claims under these two

statutes are also properly dismissed. 

16872 BIRDSONG v. APPLE, INC.
uct lacks “even the most basic degree of fitness for ordinary

use.” Mocek v. Alfa Leisure, Inc., 114 Cal. App. 4th 402, 406

(Cal. Ct. App. 2003) (citing Cal. Com. Code § 2314(2)).

The plaintiffs argue the district court erred in determining

that the third amended complaint failed to sufficiently plead

an implied warranty claim. They alleged that the iPod (1)

comes with “stock ear buds . . . designed to be placed deep

into the ear canal rather than over the ears, which increases

the danger of hearing damage,” (2) lacks “noise isolating or

cancelling properties,” and (3) lacks any volume meter that

will inform users they are listening at dangerous levels. 

The plaintiffs contend the district court failed to take their

factual allegations as true, and instead made its own counterfindings that any dangers of hearing loss were “obvious” and

“avoidable.” The district court also determined the danger of

hearing loss did not exist unless the consumer decided to use

the iPod “in an extreme way.” 

[2] The district court did not err. The plaintiffs admit that

the iPod has an “ordinary purpose of listening to music,” and

nothing they allege suggests iPods are unsafe for that use or

defective. The plaintiffs recognize that iPods play music, have

an adjustable volume, and transmit sound through earbuds.

The third amended complaint includes statements that (1) the

iPod is capable of playing 115 decibels of sound; (2) consumers may listen at unsafe levels; and (3) iPod batteries can last

12 to 14 hours and are rechargeable, giving users the opportunity to listen for long periods of time. Taken as true, such

statements suggest only that users have the option of using an

iPod in a risky manner, not that the product lacks any minimum level of quality. See Am. Suzuki, 37 Cal. App. 4th at

1296.

The plaintiffs rely upon Hicks v. Kaufman & Broad Home

Corp., 89 Cal. App. 4th 908 (Cal. Ct. App. 2001), but that

case is distinguishable. In Hicks, homeowners brought a putaBIRDSONG v. APPLE, INC. 16873
tive class action alleging a defect in the foundations of their

homes. The defect arose from the use of a material called

Fibermesh, which, according to the homeowners, caused their

foundations to “crack badly” and resulted in “insect and vermin infestation, bumps in the floor and premature wearing of

carpeting.” Id. at 923. Although some of the foundations had

not yet cracked, the court cited expert testimony suggesting

that the cracks were “most likely” to develop, and stated, “We

see no reason why a homeowner should have to wait for the

inevitable injuries to occur before recovering damages to

repair the defect and prevent injuries from occurring.” Id. at

923. 

The Hicks plaintiffs identified the defect in the foundations,

which was the use of Fibermesh, and the injury inevitably

caused by that defect, a cracked foundation. Id. Hicks distinguished cases in which “there was no history of the products

failing.” Id. 

[3] In the present case, the plaintiffs make no allegations of

any history of malfunction, but merely suggest possible

changes to the iPod which they believe would make the product safer: (1) earbuds with noise-reduction features; (2) volume control software; (3) more and different warnings printed

onto the actual iPod; and (4) a digital meter to display the output volume in decibels. The plaintiffs fail to allege, however,

how the absence of their suggested changes caused any user

an injury. The plaintiffs do not allege the iPods failed to do

anything they were designed to do nor do they allege that

they, or any others, have suffered or are substantially certain

to suffer inevitable hearing loss or other injury from iPod use.

Cf. Hicks, 89 Cal. App. 4th at 923. Accordingly, the district

court correctly determined that the plaintiffs failed to allege

sufficiently the breach of an implied warranty of merchantability. See id.; Am. Suzuki, 37 Cal. App. 4th at 1298.

16874 BIRDSONG v. APPLE, INC.
III

Express Warranty and Implied Warranty of Fitness for a

Particular Purpose

The plaintiffs’ third amended complaint alleged claims for

breach of an express warranty and breach of the implied warranty of fitness for a particular purpose. However, the plaintiffs have apparently abandoned those claims on appeal, as

their opening brief contains no discussion of them. “We

review only issues which are argued specifically and distinctly in a party’s opening brief . . . We will not manufacture

arguments for an appellant, and a bare assertion does not preserve a claim, particularly when, as here, a host of other issues

are presented for review.” Greenwood v. Fed. Aviation

Admin., 28 F.3d 971, 977 (9th Cir. 1994). Thus, we affirm the

district court’s dismissal of those claims.

IV

California’s Unfair Competition Law

[4] California’s UCL prohibits unfair competition by means

of any unlawful, unfair or fraudulent business practice. Cal.

Bus. & Prof. Code §§ 17200-17210. Each prong of the UCL

is a separate and distinct theory of liability. Kearns v. Ford

Motor Co., 567 F.3d 1120, 1127 (9th Cir. 2009). 

[5] To have standing under California’s UCL, as amended

by California’s Proposition 64, plaintiffs must establish that

they (1) suffered an injury in fact and (2) lost money or property as a result of the unfair competition. Cal. Bus. & Prof.

Code § 17204; Walker v. Geico Gen. Ins. Co., 558 F.3d 1025,

1027 (9th Cir. 2009). “In approving Proposition 64, the California voters declared their intent ‘to prohibit private attorneys from filing lawsuits for unfair competition where they

have no client who has been injured in fact under the standing

requirements of the United States Constitution.’ ” Buckland v.

BIRDSONG v. APPLE, INC. 16875
Threshold Enters., Ltd., 155 Cal. App. 4th 798, 814 (Cal. Ct.

App. 2007) (quoting Prop. 64, § 1, (e)) (emphasis in original).

Thus, to plead a UCL claim, the plaintiffs must show, consistent with Article III, that they suffered a distinct and palpable

injury as a result of the alleged unlawful or unfair conduct.

Buckland, 155 Cal. App. 4th at 814 (quoting Havens Realty

Corp. v. Coleman, 455 U.S. 363, 372 (1982)) (internal quotation marks omitted). The requisite injury must be “an invasion

of a legally protected interest which is (a) concrete and particularized, and (b) actual or imminent, not conjectural or hypothetical.” Buckland, 155 Cal. App. 4th at 814 (quoting Lujan

v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560 (1992)) (internal

quotation marks omitted). 

The plaintiffs contend the district court erred in dismissing

their UCL claims for lack of standing.3 The plaintiffs maintain

they alleged that they suffered an injury in fact and argue the

district court incorrectly required a showing of reliance to satisfy the UCL’s requirement that they must have lost money or

property as a result of Apple’s conduct. Cal. Bus. & Prof.

Code § 17204. Because we conclude that the plaintiffs have

not alleged the requisite injury in fact to have standing, and

affirm the district court’s decision on that basis, we need not

decide whether the district court erred in requiring an allegation of reliance, or resolve, more broadly, what standard of

causation applies under the UCL.4

3The plaintiffs assert claims under the UCL’s “unlawful” and “unfair”

prongs. As a threshold matter, the plaintiffs cannot state a UCL claim

under the “unlawful” prong because such a claim is predicated solely on

implied warranty violations of the law, which they failed to allege. See

Webb v. Smart Document Solutions, LLC, 499 F.3d 1078, 1082 (9th Cir.

2007) (noting that the alleged conduct “must violate a law . . . in order for

Plaintiffs to state a claim for relief under Section 17200’s ‘unlawful’

prong”). 

4

In addition to meeting the UCL’s standing requirements, the plaintiffs

must also satisfy the federal standing requirements under Article III. See

Cantrell v. City of Long Beach, 241 F.3d 674, 683 (9th Cir. 2001) (holding

that a party asserting state law claims in federal court “must meet the stric16876 BIRDSONG v. APPLE, INC.
1. The Plaintiffs Have Not Alleged An Injury To Themselves

The plaintiffs do not claim that they suffered or imminently

will suffer hearing loss from their iPod use. The plaintiffs do

not even claim that they used their iPods in a way that

exposed them to the alleged risk of hearing loss. At most, the

plaintiffs plead a potential risk of hearing loss not to themselves, but to other unidentified iPod users who might choose

to use their iPods in an unsafe manner. The risk of injury the

plaintiffs allege is not concrete and particularized as to themselves. See Lujan, 504 U.S. at 561 n.1 (“By particularized, we

mean that the injury must affect the plaintiff in a personal and

individual way.”); Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 501 (1975)

(“[T]he plaintiff still must allege a distinct and palpable injury

to himself, even if it is an injury shared by a large class of

other possible litigants.”) (emphasis added). The plaintiffs do

not dispute this deficiency or claim that they can amend their

pleading to include allegations that they were exposed to the

risk of hearing loss based on their iPod use. 

The plaintiffs have not shown the requisite injury to themselves and therefore lack standing. See id.; Cal. Bus. & Prof.

Code §§ 17203-17204 (authorizing representative UCL

claims on behalf of others only if the claimant meets the

standing requirements, including injury in fact); Buckland,

155 Cal. App. 4th at 812 (noting that California Proposition

64 requires plaintiffs pursuing representative claims to meet

the new standing requirements).

ter federal standing requirements of Article III”); Lee v. Am. Nat. Ins. Co.,

260 F.3d 997, 1001-02 (9th Cir. 2001). Because we conclude the plaintiffs

lack standing under the UCL, we need not reach the question whether they

have standing under Article III. We note that insofar as the UCL incorporates Article III’s injury in fact requirement, see Buckland, 155 Cal. App.

4th at 814, the plaintiffs would lack an Article III injury in fact for the

same reasons discussed below. 

BIRDSONG v. APPLE, INC. 16877
2. The Alleged Injury Is Hypothetical

[6] Although the plaintiffs allege that Apple has sold more

than 100 million iPods, they do not claim that they, or anyone

else, have suffered or are substantially certain to suffer hearing loss from using an iPod. As discussed above, as a result

of this omission, the plaintiffs fail to state an implied warranty

claim, and they have no standing to assert a UCL claim. The

plaintiffs simply do not plead facts showing that hearing loss

from iPod use is actual or imminent, as required. Buckland,

155 Cal. App. 4th at 814. To the contrary, the plaintiffs’ third

amended complaint reveals the conjectural and hypothetical

nature of the alleged injury as the plaintiffs merely assert that

some iPods have the “capability” of producing unsafe levels

of sound and that consumers “may” listen to their iPods at

unsafe levels combined with an “ability” to listen for long

periods of time. 

3. The Alleged Economic Harm Does Not Constitute An

Injury In Fact

The plaintiffs claim that the iPod’s inherent risk of hearing

loss has reduced the value of their iPods and deprived them

of the full benefit of their bargain because they cannot “safely” listen to music. The plaintiffs do not contend in this appeal

that such alleged economic harm satisfies the injury in fact

requirement. Instead, the plaintiffs contend this alleged loss

satisfies the second part of the UCL’s standing test—that they

lost money or property as a result of Apple’s unfair acts. Cal.

Bus. & Prof. Code § 17204. 

[7] The plaintiffs’ alleged economic harm centers on their

claim that the iPod has a defect (an inherent risk of hearing

loss), which caused their iPods to be worth less than what

they paid for them. But the plaintiffs have failed to allege a

cognizable defect under any of their asserted claims. Further,

the alleged loss in value does not constitute a distinct and palpable injury that is actual or imminent because it rests on a

16878 BIRDSONG v. APPLE, INC.
hypothetical risk of hearing loss to other consumers who may

or may not choose to use their iPods in a risky manner.

[8] The plaintiffs’ benefit of the bargain theory fares no

better. They have not alleged that they were deprived of an

agreed-upon benefit in purchasing their iPods. The plaintiffs

do not allege that Apple made any representations that iPod

users could safely listen to music at high volumes for

extended periods of time. In fact, the plaintiffs admit that

Apple provided a warning against listening to music at loud

volumes. The plaintiffs’ alleged injury in fact is premised on

the loss of a “safety” benefit that was not part of the bargain

to begin with. See Animal Legal Defense Fund v. Mendes, 160

Cal. App. 4th 136, 146-47 (Cal. Ct. App. 2008) (rejecting

plaintiffs’ benefit of the bargain theory because the plaintiffs

“d[id] not allege any false or misleading representations that

could be said to have become part of the purchase and sale

agreement”). Cf. Lozano v. AT & T Wireless Servs., Inc., 504

F.3d 718, 734 (9th Cir. 2007) (holding that the plaintiff established an injury in fact where he did not receive the full number of agreed-upon minutes he purchased in a wireless

agreement); Daghlian v. DeVry Univ., Inc., 461 F. Supp. 2d

1121, 1156 (C.D. Cal. 2006).

V

Conclusion

[9] The district court did not err in dismissing the plaintiffs’

third amended complaint. The plaintiffs failed to plead sufficiently a claim for breach of implied warranty of merchantability and they lacked standing to assert a claim under the

UCL.

AFFIRMED.

BIRDSONG v. APPLE, INC. 16879