NO.96-599 

### INTHE SUPREMECOURT OF THE STATE OF MONTANA 1997

LARRY ROEDEL, Plaintiff and Respondent,

JOHN R.BENNETT, dklaJolmRockwell Bennett, and KAREN WOODCOCK, RUSSELL FEDERATION and LYNN E. FEDERATION, DONALD J.BISSELL and CYNTHIAF.BISSELL, and DOES I to IV, Defendants and Appellants.

APPEAL FROM: District Courtofthe Twentieth Judicial District, In and for the County ofLake, The Honorable C. B. McNeil, Judge presiding.
COUNSEL OF RECORD: For Appellants: Kathleen OtRourke-Mullins,Attorney at Law; Polson, Montana (for Appellants Bennett and Woodcock) For Respondent: Richard DeJana, Attorney atLaw;Kalispell,Montana

Filed: Submitted on Briefs: August 14, 1997 Decided: October 10, 1997Justice TerryN. Trieweiler delivered the opinion ofthe Court. Pursuant to Section 

### I, Paragraph 3(c), Montana Supreme Court 1995 Internal Operating Rules, the following decision shall not be cited asprecedent and shallbepublished by its filing as apublic document with the Clerk of the Supreme Court and by a report of its result to StateReporter Publishing Company andWest Publishing Company. Theplaintiff, Larry Roedel, filed a conlplaint in the District Court for the Twentieth Judicial District in Lake County to establish his exclusive right to use his own property and the right to use adjoining property. By counterclaim, the defendants asserted a right to a thirty-foot easement across Roedel's property. After ahearing, the District Court recognized

a prescriptive easement over Roedel's property for the benefit of the defendants, John Bennett, Karen Woodcock, and Donald and Cynthia Bissell, and awarded Roedel a right of

use over an adjoining parcel to which an ownership interest is claimed by Bennett. Both parties appeal the District Court's decision. We affirm in part and reverse in past the judgment ofthe District Court. There are three issues on appeal: 1. Did the District Court err when it recognized a prescriptive easement for a twelve-foot right-of-way across Roedel's property? 

### 2. Did theDistrict Court err when itrecognized Bennett as an owner ofParcel 

### G?3. 

### Did the District Court err when it awarded Roedel aright ofuse, construction, and maintenance over the entire Parcel 

### G? FACTUAL BACKGROUND This case involves two parcels of land. The firstparcel is a 60-foot strip known as Parcel G. Thesecondparcel is a 30-foot stripreferred toherein as the 30-foot Right-of-way. In July 1972, the Clydesdales had Deed Exhibit H-1998 prepared. Exhibit H-1998 depicts all the property at issue in this case.' Exhibit H-1998 indicated that Parcel G was "[rleserved for htureroad." It was filed on April 18, 1973.

'The followingis an approximate illustration ofthe relevant property as depicted on Exhibit H-1998:On July 31, 1972, the Clydesdales transferred Parcel E, as described on Exhibit H-1998, by wall-anty deed to the Palins (Karen and Walter). Later, the Clydesdales also made a specific grant of Parcel 

### G by warranty deed to the Hubbards and the Palins. The

a ins deed, which was recorded on December 28, 1973, declared that the Hubbards and the P 1'

were "tenants in common" and that "they shall equally share all taxes and n~aintenance costs."In 1975, the Hubbards transferred to the Richardsons "a use in common for the purpose of ingress and egress over that tract of land described as Tract 

### G shown on Deed Exhibit H-1998 (209094)." Finally, in 1977, the Hubbards transferred toVera Connolly "an undivided one-half interest in Tract 

### G as shown on Plat No. 1998, Reception 209094, Records ofLake County." Thus, title in Parcel 

### G prior tothe transfers at issue in this case rested in Vera Connolly and the Palins as owners ofundivided one-half interests, and in the Richardsons as owners of a right touse for ingress and egress. On February 20, 1976,the Palins filed Certificate of Survey ("COS") 2482 to create Parcel A for occasional sale. Parcel A contains 0.723 acres, borders Parcel 

### G onthe north and east, and had previously been apart ofParcel E. Certificate of Survey 2482 also shows

a 30-foot "FUW" that borders Parcel A and runs over both Parcel E and a northern part of Parcel 

### G to access Highway 209 andthe southernportion ofParcel 

### G. That same day, the Palins also filed COS 2483 forthepurpose of "parcel creation for easement purposed [sic]."

### Certificate ofSurvey2483 creates the 30-footRight-of-way parcel along the southern border between Parcel A and Parcel E; 

### it contains 0.33 acres. Both COS2482 and 2483 reference Exhibit H-1998 for its description ofParcel 

### G and show the remainder ofParcel 

### E retained by the Palins. Also on February 20, 1976, the Palins recorded a deed to the Hubbards which transferred Parcel A and the 30-foot Right-of-Way. The deed referred to COSs 2482 and 2483 and defined the propelties according to the Certificates "attached and made a part hereof." A week later, the Hubbards recorded a deed which transferred Parcel A and the 30-foot Right-of-way to Robert and Arline Richardson. 

### The deed was identical to the deed from thePalins to the Hubbards, except forthe differentparties and language inserted before the land descriptions granting "a use in common with others for roadway purposes." The Hubbards had signed the deed on January 26, 1976. Arline Richardson, who was then the sole owner of theproperty, transferred Parcel A and the 30-foot Right-of-way to Larry Roedel on June 3, 1991. In the warranty deed, the description of Parcel A includes "[als shown on Certificate of Survey No. 2482" and the description of the 30-foot Right-of-way includes "[als shown on Certificate of Survey No. 2483." In addition, the deed is qualified by making it "[slubject to all reservations, restrictions, covenants, conditions, rights-of-way and easements apparent or of record."Roedel is the respondent on appeal, and the current owner of Parcel 

### A and the 30-foot Right-of-way. OnNovember 17, 1980,the Palins filed COS 3321 to create Parcel 1 for occasional sale and Parcel 2 as a remainder: Parcels 1 and 2 constitute all ofthe fo~mer Parcel E.'

2Thefollowing is an approximate illustration ofthe relevant property as depicted on Certificate of Survey 3321:

## I Parcel 1 is a one-acre parcel whose eastern edge bordersthe southern portion ofParcel G and 

### I which is otherwise surrounded by the 12.596 acre Parcel 2. The parcel referred to as the 30-footRight-of-way is labeled on COS 3321 as a "30.00' roadway per 

### C. of S.No. 2483," while the northern border of Parcel 2, which abuts the 30-foot Right-of-way, is labeled "Southerly

### FUW Line ofthat parcel shownon C. of S. No. 2483." The descriptionofParcel 

### I

on COS 3321 states "TOGETHER WITH a 60.00 foot easement as shown hereon and shown

as Parcel G per H-1998 and described in Microfilm No. 214584, records of Lake County, Montana," while the description of Parcel 2 on COS 3321 states "TOGETHER WITH a 60.00 foot 

### roadeasement as shown hereon and shown as Parcel 

### G per H-1998 and described in Microfilm No. 214584, records of Lake County, Montana." (Emphasis added.) The descriptions of both Parcel 1 and 2 on COS 3321 state "TOGETHER WITH a 30.00 foot road easement as shown hereon and on Certificate of Survey No. 2483 and also described in Microfilm No. 225994, records of Lake County, Montana." Parcels 1and 2 are the property currently owned by the appellants in this case, and each parcel borders Parcel G; only Parcel 2 borders the 30-foot Right-of-way. On November 19, 1980, thePalinstransferredParcel 1to GlennaPalin, "TOGETHER with a right to use a 60.00 foot easement shown as Parcel G per H-1998 and described in MicrofilmNo. 214584 records of Lake County, Montana." On February 27, 1981,the Palins also transferred Parcel 2 to Glenna Palin, "TOGETHER WITH a 60.00 footroad easementshown as Parcel Gper H-1998 and also desclibedin Microfilm No. 214584, records ofLake County, Montana." On July 21, 1983, Glenna Palin transferred her interest in Parcel 1 to the Runnels, "TOGETHER with aright to use a 60.00foot easement shown as Parcel G per H-1998 and described in Microfile No. 214585 records ofLake County, Montana." OnAugust 12, 1986, the Runnels transferred their interest in Parcel 1 to the Bissells, "TOGETHER with a right to use a 60.00 foot easement shown as Parcel G per H-1998 and described in Microfile No. 214585 records of Lake County, Montana." On August 20, 1987, Glenna Palin transferred her interest in Parcel 2 toJohn Bennett, "TOGETHER WITH a 60.00 foot road easement (112 undivided interest) shown as Parcel G per H-1998 and also described in Microfilm No. 214584, records ofLake County, Montana." The Bissells and John Bennett, along wit11 Karen Woodcock, arethe current owners ofParcels 1and 2, respectively, and are the appellants in this case. Bennett has represented Woodcock's interests throughout this

case. OnAugust 7, 1989,the Palins, clearly believing that they had transferred all oftheir

use and ownershiprights in Parcel G to GlennaPalin, executed with John Bennett, as Glenna Palin's successor in interest, an Addendum toWarranty Deed: Reservation of Right ofWay. TheAddendum states: WHEREAS, [Palins], as Seller, executed a Contract for Deed with Glenna

### R. Palin, as Purchaser, on March 

### 5, 1981; WHEREAS, such Contract for Deed provided as follows: "Purchaser agrees to convey to Seller the right to use the 60.00 foot easement shown onParcel G per H-1998 and described in Microfilm N.214584, records ofLake County, Montana"; WHEREAS, John R. Bennett, assignee of the contract interest of Glenna R. Palin, is presently satisfying in full all amounts dueto Sellerunder the terms of such contract; WHEREAS, in consideration thereof, John R. Bennett has received a warranty deed from the escrow agent; WHEREAS, easement rights upon Parcel G have been conveyed to purchaser by the warranty deed given to him; WHEREAS,however, suchwarranty deed does not contain a paragraph regarding rese~vation by Seller of a right-of-way over Parcel G; NOW THEREFORE, in consideration ofthe above, John R. Bennett, as assignee of the contract purchaser, hereby agreesto the following addendum to said warranty deed: "Thegrantors, [Palins], expressly reserve unto themselves, their heirs, executors, administrators, personal representatives and assigns, the right, at their own risk, to cross the strip or parcel of real property known as Parcel G, and more particularly described as follows:

. 

### . . for the purpose of having access to such other part or portion ofreal property belonging to grantors as may be serviced by such Parcel G easement. At the time they executed the Addendum, the Palins owned only a small strip of Swan River access land adjacent tothe eastlwestportion ofParcel G. Finally, on August 25, 1993,Roedel executed an agreement with the Palins. Their Consent to Build a Roadway and Indemnity states: [Palins] hereby authorize Larry Roedel to co~~st~uct a roadway that certain Parcel G more particularly described on the Exhibit A. By giving this consent [Palins] expressly warrant that they have the rights as more particularly stated on Exhibit A. Larry Roedel agrees to hold Palins harmless from any and all damages andrecognizes that, John R.Bennett also John Rockwell Bennett and Karen E.Woodcock are the owners in fee and furtherrecognizes that the consentby Palin is not a warranty that they can give full consent and assumes at his own risk any actions taken without the consent of Bennett and Woodcock.The Exhibit A to which they refer is the Addendum to the Warranty Deed, which descl-ibes the Palins' reservation overParcel 

### G. Roedel constructed aroadway over Parcel 

### G in the fall of 1995, and has since maintained and plowed the roadway. For as long as theparties here have owned their respective properties, they have used the 30-foot Right-of-way as a roadway. Roedel was aware oftheir use when he acquired Parcel A and the 30-foot Right-of-way. At no time was the roadway more than twelve feet wide. Roedel hasplaced corrals, fencing, and otherobjects within the 30-foot Right-of-way, but they do not obstruct the twelve-foot roadway. The appellants have performed maintenance onthe roadway, although Roedel has been its primary caretaker. Roedel filed a conlplaintto teminatethe appellants' use of the 30-foot Right-of-way, or, in the alternative, to gate the roadway. The appellants counter-claimed that Roedel had wrongly restricted their usage rights over the 30-foot Right-of-Way. The District Court found that the appellants were entitled to a prescriptive easement over the existing twelve-foot roadway atits present location within the 30-foot fight-of-Way, and that Roedel could not interfere with the appellants' use or maintenance of the roadway by using any obstructions. Roedel also sought an order from the District Court allowing him to constluct a roadway over Parcel 

### G. The appellants responded by asserting an ownership right to Parcel 

### G and claiming that Roedel has a limited right, sincehe can exercise no more rights than passed to him through his agreement with the Palins. The District Court relied onlanguage in the RoedelIPalins ageementthat recognized Bennett's ownership in Parcel G to find that Bennett had a "claim to ownership of an undivided one-half interest in and to Parcel 

### G in common with others not parties to this suit." Against appellants' assertions, however, the District Court found that Roedel has an unrestricted right ofuse, constn~ction, and maintenance forroadway purposes over Parcel 

### G, solong as Roedel does not interfere with appellants' ownership and use rights. ISSUE 1 Did theDistrict Court err when itrecognized aprescriptive easementfor atwelve-foot Right-of-way across Roedel's property? The standard of review of a district court's conclusions of law is whether they are correct. 

### See Carbon County v. UnionReserve Coal Co. (1995), 271 Mont. 459, 469, 898 P.2d 680, 686. 

### See alsoKreger v. Francis (1995), 271 Mont. 444,447, 898 P.2d 672, 674; 

### Steel; Znc. v. Department ofReveme (1990),245 Mont. 470,474-75, 803P.2d 601, 603-04. An easementis a right that oneperson has to use another person's land for a specific purpose. 

### See Ruana v. Grigo~zis (1996), 275 Mont. 441,447,913 P.2d 1247, 1251. It can be created by grant, reservation, exception or covenant, implication or prescription. 

### See Kuhllnarz v.Rivera (1985), 216 Mont. 353, 359, 701 P.2d 982, 985. We stated in 

### Baclze 

### v. Owetzs(1994), 267 Mont. 279, 883 P.2d 817, that a property owner can create an easement by a COS ifthe COS clearly and specifically describes the easement and the document of conveyance refers to theproperly recorded COS. Wewent ontostatein

### Halversorz v. 

### Tu~wer(1994), 268 Mont. 168, 172, 885 P.2d 1285, 1288, that an express easement ofreservation maybe createdin favor ofthe grantors ifthe deed refers to the COSdescribing the easement,

even iftheproperty description in the deed contains no language of an easement reservation. 

### In addition, we stated in 

### Halverson, 268 Mont. at 172, 885 P.2d at 1288, that the grantee whose property is being burdened by the easement must have knowledge of its use or its necessity. Here, the appellants assert that their predecessors in interest, the Palins, expressly reserved an easement over the 30-foot Right-of-way when they recorded COSs 2482 and 2483 and then sold the parcels while retaining the adjacent remainder, Parcel E. "An easement by reservation must arise from the written documents ofconveyance." 

### Hnlversorz, 268 Mont. at 172, 885 P.2d at 1289. Therefore, we stated in

### Runrza, 275 Mont. at 448, 913 P.2d at 1252,that this Court's role is to examine the chain of title in question. The District Court found that the deed from the Palins to the Hubbards referenced COSs 2482 and 2483, and that the descriptions of Parcel A and the 30-foot Right-of-way defincd the properties according to the "attached" certificates. In addition, the granteeHubbards had knowledge ofthe Palins' use ofthe 30-foot Right-of-way, as evidenced by the District Court's findingthat the Hubbards' subsequent deed to the Richardsons referred to "a

use in common with others for roadway purposes." The District Court found that the Hubbards signed thcir deed to the Richardsons approximately a month before they were conveyed thc land by the Palins, and thus, the inclusion of the roadway language in thesecond, but previously existing, deed indicates that the Hubbards had knowledge of the Palins' use when they received theproperty from the Palins. Accordingly, the deedreferred to the Certificates of Survey and the grantees had knowledge of the use. Roedel contends that the description of the easement on COSs 2482 and 2483 did not meet the requirement in

### Bache that the easement be clearly and specifically identified on the COS. In 

### Baclze,we relied on the graphical depiction of the easement's scaled location on the COS, as well asn~ultiple references to language of "easement" and its width, to find that the description was clear and specific enough to create an easement. 

### Bache, 267 Mont. at 286, 883 P.2d at 820-21. Here, COS 2482 depicted in detail the 30-foot path over Palins' Parcel E and Parcel 

### G, andbordering thenewly created Parcel

### A. It also labeled the path as a "WW extend[ing] 15'each side of [center-line]." The "RIW"clearly stands for either right-of-way or roadway, either of which indicates others' use of the strip, and thus, COS 2482 clearly identifies the easement. Certificate of Survey 2483 depicts the 30-foot Right-of-way parcel in the sameposition on Parcel E over which COS 2482 extended the "WW" and statesthat the purpose ofthe survey is for "Parcel creation for easement purposed [sic]." Therefore, it also specifically identifies the easement. The Palins' transfer of Parcel A and the 30-foot Right-of-way to the Hubbards occurred si~nultaneously with the filing of the COSs, and the Hubbards' transfer to the Richardsons occurred at virtually the same time. Roedel contends that the predetermined combination of COS 2482, COS 2483, and the transfers manifests that the Palins intendedto create an easement for the Hubbards' benefit, which would then immediately merge into their fee ownershipwhen they received the 30-foot Right-of-Way parcel. Although we are unable to determine the true purpose for the manner in which the parties structured their transactions, Roedel's contention is both unreasonable and beyond the scope of analysis in 

### Bache and 

### Halverson, where the inquiry was limited to whether the COS clearly and specifically identifies an easement, and whether the deed refers to the COS. Those requirements have been met here. Accordingly, we conclude that the Palins reserved an easement over the 30-foot Right-of-Way. In 

### Halverson, we held that an express easement ofreservation created by reference to a COSruns with the land and entitles successors in interestto the land to the benefit of the appurtenant easement. 

### Halverson, 268 Mont. at 174, 885 P.2d at 1289. Here, the Palins reserved for Parcel E, the dominant tenement, use over the 30-foot Right-of-Way, the servient tenement, and thus, the Palins' successors in interest to Parcel E are entitled touse the 30-foot Right-of-Way. In addition, the District Court found that when the Palins filed COS 3321 to create Parcels 1and 2, COS 3321 referred to COS 2483, and that eachparcel

was granted an easement over the 30-foot Right-of-Way. Accordingly, Glenna Palin, who is the direct successor to the Palins' interest in Parcels 1 and 2, received easementrights over the 30-foot Right-of-way, as didthe appellants, who are Glenna Palin's successors in interest in Parcels 1 and 2.The District Court'sjudgment limited the appellants to a prescriptive right over the existing twelve-foot roadway based upon their past use. We stated in

### Lindley v. 

### Maggert (1982), 198 Mont. 197, 199,645P.2d 430,431, that the owner of a reserved easement may

use the easement to the full extent of the right retained. In addition, "the owner of the dominant tenement is not required to make use of the easement as a condition to retaining his interest in the easement." 

### Halverson, 268 Mont. at 175, 885 P.2d at 1290. Here, the Palins originally reserved a thirty-foot right ofway, and then transferred to the owners of Parcels 1 and 2, via COS 3321, the samethirty-foot easement. Therefore, the appellants are entitledtouse the full thirty-foot easement that was retained by the Palins andpassed with the land, regardless of whether the entire width of the roadway has been used in the past. Accordingly, we conclude that the District Court erred when it limited the appellants' rights to atwelve-foot prescriptive easement. Wereverse that part of the District Court'sjudgment and hold that appellants are owners of an appurtenant easement over the 30-foot Right-of-way. ISSUE 2 Did the District Court errwhen it recognized Bennett as an owner ofParcel 

### G? The standard ofreview of a district court's findings of fact is whether they are clearly

erroneous. 

### Daines v. 

### Knight (1995), 269 Mont. 320, 324, 888 P.2d 904, 906 (citing 

### Columbia GrainZntrlv. Cereck (1993), 258 Mont. 414, 417, 852 P.2d 676, 678).Bennett asserts his ownershipright in Parcel G as a successor in interest to Glenna Palin. Glenna Palin received Parcel 

### 1, "TOGETHER with a right to use a 60.00 foot easement shown as Parcel G per H-1998 and described in Microfilm No. 214584records of Lake County, Montana." She thenreceived Parcel 2, "TOGETHER WITH a 60.00 foot road easement shown as Parcel G per H-1998 and also described in Microfilm No. 214584, records ofLake County, Montana." We stated in 

### Bodine v. Bodine (1967), 149Mont.29,39,422 P.2d 650, 655, that "[a] deed must be construed as it is written, and a reviewing court can neither put words into the deed which are not there nor can it put a construction on words directly contrary to their obvious meaning." Here, the interest is described in each deed as an easement, and in the transfer of Parcel 1,specifically as "aright to use." Other evidence in the record indicates that the Palins had the ability and probably intended to transfer their undivided ownership interest in Parcel G to Glenna Palin but, as written, the deeds fail to do so and transferred only an easement. The language in the deed between Bennett and Glenna Palin adds "(112undivided interest)" to its description ofthe easement, which is otherwise identical to the description ofthe easement acquired by Glenna from the Palins. Although the insertion suggests that an ownership right was transferred, Glenna Palin clearly lacked any such ownership rights totransfer. TheDistrict Courtrelied on language in subsequent, non-deeded agreements to find that Bennett owned an undivided one-half interest in Parcel G. Section 70-20-202, MCA,however, requires that when a deed unambiguously reduces to writing the terms of a grant,

no other evidence ofthe terms ofthe deed shallbeused in construing the deed. Accordingly, neither the addendum to the warranty deed, which clearly was executed on assumptions by the Palins that they had transferred all rights 

### in Parcel 

### G and that Bennett was the current owner, nor the consent to build a roadway, which also referred to Bennett as the owner of Parcel 

### G, can transform the nature of the interest originally acquired by Glenna and retained by the Palins. Bennett refers to these agreements as "confirmation" that the Palins transferred their ownership interest. However, this Court must rely on the written deeds and, according to those deeds, the Palins transferred only rights ofuse and retained their undivided one-half ownership interest in Parcel 

### G. Therefore, we conclude that the District Couit was clearly

erroneous when it found that Bennett was owner of an undivided one-half interest in Parcel 

### G. Wereverse that part ofthe District Court'sjudgment and conclude that Bennett

owns only an easement over Parcel 

### G. 

### ISSUE 3 Did thc District Court err when it awarded Roedel a right ofuse, construction, and maintenance over the entire Parcel 

### G? Appellants assert that the District Court erred when it did not limit Roedel's rights in Parcel 

### G to only the eastlwest portion ofParcel 

### G. Theyrely on the fact that the Palins could only consent to transfer to Roedel the rights that they owned, which,per the addendum to thewarranty deed, were limited to the eastlwest portion of Parcel 

### G, since that was the only access required for the property they owned atthe time ofthe addendum. They also assert that the District Court erred in awardingRoedel aright to use and maintain a roadway when the Consent to Build a Roadway and Indemnity only "authorize[d] Roedel to construct a roadway" over Parcel 

### G. First, the appellants' contention that the Palins' limited ownership restricted what portion ofParcel 

### G Roedel could have acquired an interest in is unfounded as a result ofthis Court's conclusion that the Palins have alwaysretained their undivided one-half interest in Parcel 

### G. The consent does not, on its face, restrict Roedel's rights to a certain portion of Parcel 

### G. Rather, any potential restriction in the consent between Palins and Roedel as to what portion of Parcel 

### G the agreement covers must derive solely from the addendum between Bennett and Palins, as incorporated by the consent. However, the addendum is meaningless because the Palins always retained ownership of Parcel 

### G. Accordingly, we conclude that the Palins had the ability to give Roedel an interest over all of Parcel 

### G, and thus, the District Court did not err when it did not restrict Roedel's rights to just the eastlwest portion ofParcel 

### G. Second, the appellants lack standing to challenge the extent oftherights that Roedel received from the Palins in their Consent to Build a Roadway and Indemnity. In 

### Ludwig v. 

### Spolclie (Mont. 1996), 930 P.2d 56, 53 St. Rep. 1420, we discussed a property owner's standing to sue over an agreement entered into between two easement-holders on theproperty. Weheld that the owner, who was neither aparty nor an intended beneficiary ofthe agreementbetween the easement-holders, lacked standing "to enforce the specificterms and conditions contained within [the agreement]." 

### Ludwig, 930 P.2d at 59, 53 St. Rep. at 1421-22. 

### See alsoPattoiz v. 

### Madison Counfy (1994), 265 Mont. 362, 877 P.2d 993. Here, the Palins and Roedel executed the consent. Therefore, the Palins, as a party to the consent, would have standing to challenge the District Court's interpretation of the agreement. The appellants, however, were not a party to the agreement, andunless Roedel interferes with their rights to use Parcel 

### G, the appellants lack standing to challenge the extent ofRoedel's rights. The appellants do not claim that Roedel has interfered with their right to use Parcel 

### G. They assert only that he has interfered with their ownership interest. Furthermore, the District Court qualified its finding and made Roedel's rights to use, construct, and maintain on Parcel 

### G conditional upon the fact that he not interfere with appellants' rights in Parcel 

### G. Therefore, the appellants' rights in Parcel 

### G have been sufficiently protected, and without a challenge from a party in interest tothe agreement, we have no basis for setting aside the District Court'sjudgment regarding Roedel's rights on Parcel 

### G. Although the District Court's determination of the parties' rights in Parcel 

### G relied, at least inpart, on the clearly erroneous finding that Bennett was an owner ofParcel 

### G, we "will affirm a district court's decision which reaches the right result, regardless ofthe court's reasoning." 

### In reMawiage ofShupe (1996), 276 Mont. 409,419, 916 P.2d 744, 750.As wehave stated,the Palins retained an undivided one-half ownership interest in the whole of Parcel 

### G and were free to transfer rights of use to Roedel over all of Parcel G. Accordingly, we affirm that part ofthe District Court'sjudgment which awarded Roedel a right touse, construct, andmaintain over all ofParcel 

### G. In sum, we reverse the District Court'sjudgment that the appellants are limited to a twelve-foot prescriptive easement over the 30-foot Right-of-way, and hold that the appellants are owners ofan appurtenanteasement over the entire 30-footRight-of-way. We also reverse the District Court's finding that Bennett owns an undivided one-half interest in Parcel 

### G. Weconclude that the Palins retained an undividcd onc-half 

### ownership intcrcst in Parcel 

### G, and that Bennett, along with the other appellants, owns only a right to use Parcel 

### G. We affirm the District Court's finding that Roedel has a right to use, construct, and maintain over all ofParcel 

### G and, finally, we orderthat this opinion is binding on only the parties to this litigation.

We Concur: \

Justices