19532 Federal Register / Vol. 63, No. 75 / Monday, April 20, 1998 / Notices

Enforcement at the same address, to the

Regional Administrator, NRC Region I,

475 Allendale Road, King of Prussia,

Pennsylvania 19406–1415, and to the

Licensee, if the answer or hearing

request is by a person other than the

Licensee. If a person other than the

Licensee requests a hearing, that person

shall set forth with particularity the

manner in which his or her interest is

adversely affected by this Order and

shall address the criteria set forth in 10

CFR 2.714(d).

If a hearing is requested by the

Licensee or a person whose interest is

adversely affected, the Commission will

issue an Order designating the time and

place of any hearing. If a hearing is held,

the issue to be considered at such

hearing shall be whether this Order

should be sustained.

In the absence of any request for

hearing, or written approval of an

extension of time in which to request a

hearing, the provisions specified in

Section IV above shall be final 20 days

from the date of this Order without

further order or proceedings. If an

extension of time for requesting a

hearing has been approved, the

provisions specified in Part IV of this

Order shall be final when the extension

expires if a hearing request has not been

received.

Dated at Rockville, Maryland this 10th day

of April 1998.

For the Nuclear Regulatory Commission.

James Lieberman,

Director, Office of Enforcement.

[FR Doc. 98–10328 Filed 4–17–98; 8:45 am]

BILLING CODE 7590–01–P

NUCLEAR REGULATORY

COMMISSION

[Docket No. 50–423]

Northeast Nuclear Energy Company;

Notice of Consideration of Issuance of

Amendment to Facility Operating

License, Proposed no Significant

Hazards Consideration Determination,

and Opportunity for a Hearing

The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory

Commission (the Commission) is

considering issuance of an amendment

to Facility Operating License No. NPF–

49 issued to Northeast Nuclear Energy

Company (the licensee) for operation of

Millstone Nuclear Power Station, Unit

3, located in New London County,

Connecticut. The proposed change to

Technical Specification (TS) 3/4.4.4,

Relief Valves, would ensure that the

Power-Operated Relief Valves (PORVs)

will be capable of automatic cycling as

well as manual cycling when in the TS

3/4.4.4 action statements that allow

indefinite continued operation. The

proposed amendment also makes an

editorial change, adds PORV

surveillance requirements, and modifies

the associated Bases section. The

proposed changes provide added

assurance that the pressurizer safety

relief valves will not be damaged due to

water relief during an inadvertent safety

injection event.

Before issuance of the proposed

license amendment, the Commission

will have made findings required by the

Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended

(the Act) and the Commission’s

regulations.

The Commission has made a

proposed determination that the

amendment request involves no

significant hazards consideration. Under

the Commission’s regulations in 10 CFR

50.92, this means that operation of the

facility in accordance with the proposed

amendment would not (1) involve a

significant increase in the probability or

consequences of an accident previously

evaluated; or (2) create the possibility of

a new or different kind of accident from

any accident previously evaluated; or

(3) involve a significant reduction in a

margin of safety. As required by 10 CFR

50.91(a), the licensee has provided its

analysis of the issue of no significant

hazards consideration, which is

presented below:

NNECO has reviewed the proposed

revision in accordance with 10CFR50.92 and

has concluded that the revision does not

involve a significant hazards consideration

(SHC). The basis for this conclusion is that

the three criteria of 10CFR50.92(c) are not

satisfied. The proposed revision does not

involve [an] SHC because the revision would

not:

1. Involve a significant increase in the

probability or consequence of an accident

previously evaluated.

Currently, timely operator action is

required to prevent the pressurizer from

filling and potentially challenging the

pressurizer safety valves under water relief.

The proposed TS changes provide added

assurance that the safety valves will not be

challenged by requiring the PORVs to be

available for automatic pressure control. The

changes to the Surveillance Requirements

add the appropriate requirements to provide

assurance that the automatic capability of the

PORVs is OPERABLE. The quarterly analog

channel operational test for the PORV high

pressurizer pressure channels will not

include valve operation. However, it does

involve changing the opening logic from 2/

4 to 1/3 and, thus, performing the

surveillance increases the probability of the

PORVs opening inadvertently. If the

automatic capability of one PORV is

INOPERABLE for more than 72 hours,

shutdown is required. If the automatic

capability of both PORVs is INOPERABLE for

more than one hour, shutdown is required.

If the block valves have been closed but the

automatic capability of the PORVs is

OPERABLE, an EOP [emergency operating

procedure] change has been made to assure

that the PORV block valve would be opened

within ten minutes of an Inadvertent ECCS

[emergency core cooling system] actuation at

power. The new analysis shows that this is

sufficient to assure that the PORVs would

control RCS [reactor coolant system] pressure

if water relief is experienced and the safety

valves would not be challenged. Thus, it is

concluded that the change provides added

assurance that the safety valves would not

fail due to water discharge.

Evaluations and analysis have been

performed to demonstrate that the PORVs

and the associated piping are qualified for

water relief from an Inadvertent ECCS

Actuation at Power Operation for one hour

from event initiation. This provides

significant margin for operator action to

terminate the event.

The PORV control logic has been upgraded

to be safety grade and single failure proof. A

2/4 logic is used for opening and 3/4 logic

is used for subsequent closure. With the

upgrade of the PORV control logic, there is

added assurance that the PORV will be

capable of providing automatic pressure

control and preventing challenges to the

safety valves, particularly under water solid

conditions. However, there is a small impact

on the probability of inadvertent opening of

both PORVs resulting from multiple channel

failures. With the new safety grade PORV

control logic, two failed high pressurizer

pressure channels will result in inadvertent

opening of both PORVs. With the current

logic, a single failed high pressurizer

pressure channel would result in opening a

PORV. However, the 2/4 closure logic will reclose the PORV when pressurizer pressure

drops below 2200 psia. With the current logic

three failed high pressurizer pressure

channels are required for the PORVs to

inadvertently open and remain open. Thus it

is concluded that there is an increase in the

probability that the PORVs will inadvertently

open and remain open.

However, multiple channels failing high

are required for the PORVs to inadvertently

open and remain open. For failure modes

such as loss of power for the transmitter or

a failure of the instrument tubing, the

channel will fail low. Failure modes that can

result in the channel failing high are highly

unlikely. Further, the new logic will require

energization in order to open the PORVs,

further minimizing the potential for

inadvertent opening. These failures, which

result in the PORVs automatically opening

and remaining open, do not disable the

ability of the operators to close the PORVs by

taking their control switch to the close

position. Thus, it is concluded that the

increase in risk is negligible. The

consequences of inadvertent opening of both

PORVs is bounded by the analysis provided

in Chapter 15.6.1 Inadvertent Opening of

Pressurizer Safety or Relief Valve.

In the event of an inoperable pressurizer

pressure channel, the channel will be placed

in the tripped condition. This will change the

opening logic from 2/4 to 1/3 and the

subsequent closure logic from 3/4 to 3/3.
Federal Register / Vol. 63, No. 75 / Monday, April 20, 1998 / Notices 19533

This means that, when a pressurizer pressure

channel is inoperable, a single failure of a

pressurizer pressure channel high will cause

both PORVs to open and remain open. Thus

it is concluded that the Technical

Requirements Manual (TRM) change which

addresses specific surveillance controls, also

results in an increase in the probability that

the PORVs will inadvertently open and

remain open. However, procedural controls

will be implemented and controlled in the

TRM that will require a plant shutdown if the

channel is inoperable for more than thirty

days.

The setpoint for the PORV opening logic

has been selected to assure that the PORVs

will open prior to the safety valves, taking

into account instrument uncertainties. The

setpoint will be specified and controlled in

the Technical Requirements Manual. This

minimizes the potential challenges to the

pressurizer safety valves under steam as well

as water solid conditions. The PORV closure

logic will be 3/4 that actuates when

pressurizer pressure drops 20 psi below the

opening setpoint. Since the stroke time for

the PORV is very short, the closing pressure

is adequate to assure that the valve will cycle

as designed.

An EOP [Emergency Operating Procedure]

change will direct the operator to open the

PORV block valve if it has been closed due

to excessive seat leakage. The EOP change

will not result in the opening of the PORV

block valve when the power has been

removed when required to prevent a small

break LOCA [loss-of-coolant accident]. This

includes leakage from the PORV such that

there is no assurance that the PORV would

re-close as required to control RCS pressure.

Thus, the PORV block valve would be

opened only when there is assurance that the

PORV will open and re-close as required.

Thus, the EOP change does not impact the

probability of a failed open PORV.

Credit is now being taken for the PORVs

to prevent challenges to pressurizer safety

valves under water relief. If the PORVs were

to fail to control RCS pressure, it is possible

for water relief through the safety valves to

occur. This also can result if both of the

PORV block valves cannot be opened. Since

the safety valves and the associated piping

are not qualified for water relief, the valves

may be damaged and may not reseat,

resulting in an unisolable RCS leak.

However, this would require multiple

failures since the PORVs are redundant. The

accident analysis has shown that DNB

[departure from nucleate boiling] is not a

concern and thus, there would be no failed

fuel associated with this event. In addition,

any RCS leakage would be inside

containment. The analysis provided in FSAR

[Final Safety Analysis Report] Section 15.6.1

for an Inadvertent Opening of a Pressurizer

Safety or Relief Valve bounds the opening of

both PORVs since the capacity of two PORVs

is equivalent to one pressurizer safety valve.

Thus it is concluded that the proposed

changes do not involve a significant increase

in the probability or consequence of an

accident previously evaluated.

2. Create the possibility of a new or

different kind of accident from any accident

previously evaluated.

The changes provide added assurance that

an Inadvertent ECCS Actuation at Power

Operation will be mitigated and meet the

requirement that a moderate frequency event

will not lead to a more serious event without

additional failures. The PORVs and

associated piping have been qualified for

water relief. In addition the PORVs are QA

[Quality Assurance] equipment and are

single failure proof. The TS changes provide

assurance that the PORV automatic function

will be OPERABLE or the plant will be

shutdown. By crediting the PORVs, there is

added assurance that the operators will

terminate the event and prevent water relief

from the safety valves for which they are not

qualified. Since all criteria are met for this

event, this does not represent the possibility

of an accident of a different type.

Because of the change in the PORV

automatic actuation circuitry and the changes

in the channel operability and surveillance

requirements, the change does increase the

probability of an Inadvertent Opening of both

PORVs but the consequences are bounded by

the analysis provided in FSAR Section 15.6.1

for Inadvertent Opening of a Safety or Relief

Valve. Thus, this does not represent an

accident of a different type.

Credit is being taken for the operator to

open a PORV block valve if it has been closed

due to excessive PORV seat leakage. The

PORV block valve will be opened following

a Safety Injection actuation only after it has

been determined that RCS pressure is above

the HPSI [high pressure safety injection] shut

off head. This means that charging is

sufficient to maintain RCS pressure well

above the RCS pressure predicted for the

limiting LOCA analysis. Further, the PORV

block valve would not be opened when

power has been removed because of the

potential for operation of the PORV to result

in a small break LOCA. Further, the potential

for opening the PORV block valve when the

PORV is needed for accident mitigation is

already addressed in the TS and is part of the

licensing basis. Thus, this does not create the

possibility of an accident of a different type.

3. Involve a significant reduction in a

margin of safety.

With the proposed changes, all criteria for

the Inadvertent ECCS actuation at Power

Operation are met. The changes provide

added assurance that a moderate frequency

event would not result in a more serious

event without additional failures. The TS

changes and EOP change provide added

assurance that the PORVs would be available

to mitigate this event. Opening the block

valve when the PORV can be used to mitigate

an accident without the potential for a small

break LOCA is already addressed in the TS

and is part of the licensing basis. Inadvertent

Opening of both PORVs is bounded by the

Chapter 15 accident analysis. Thus, it is

concluded that the changes have no impact

on the margin of safety.

In conclusion, based on the information

provided, it is determined that the proposed

revision does not involve an SHC.

The NRC staff has reviewed the

licensee’s analysis and, based on this

review, it appears that the three

standards of 10 CFR 50.92(c) are

satisfied. Therefore, the NRC staff

proposes to determine that the

amendment request involves no

significant hazards consideration.

The Commission is seeking public

comments on this proposed

determination. Any comments received

within 30 days after the date of

publication of this notice will be

considered in making any final

determination.

Normally, the Commission will not

issue the amendment until the

expiration of the 30-day notice period.

However, should circumstances change

during the notice period such that

failure to act in a timely way would

result, for example, in derating or

shutdown of the facility, the

Commission may issue the license

amendment before the expiration of the

30-day notice period, provided that its

final determination is that the

amendment involves no significant

hazards consideration. The final

determination will consider all public

and State comments received. Should

the Commission take this action, it will

publish in the Federal Register a notice

of issuance and provide for opportunity

for a hearing after issuance. The

Commission expects that the need to

take this action will occur very

infrequently.

Written comments may be submitted

by mail to the Chief, Rules and

Directives Branch, Division of

Administrative Services, Office of

Administration, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory

Commission, Washington, DC 20555–

0001, and should cite the publication

date and page number of this Federal

Register notice. Written comments may

also be delivered to Room 6D59, Two

White Flint North, 11545 Rockville

Pike, Rockville, Maryland, from 7:30

a.m. to 4:15 p.m. Federal workdays.

Copies of written comments received

may be examined at the NRC Public

Document Room, the Gelman Building,

2120 L Street, NW., Washington, DC.

The filing of requests for hearing and

petitions for leave to intervene is

discussed below.

By May 20, 1998, the licensee may file

a request for a hearing with respect to

issuance of the amendment to the

subject facility operating license and

any person whose interest may be

affected by this proceeding and who

wishes to participate as a party in the

proceeding must file a written request

for a hearing and a petition for leave to

intervene. Requests for a hearing and a

petition for leave to intervene shall be

filed in accordance with the

Commission’s ‘‘Rules of Practice for

Domestic Licensing Proceedings’’ in 10

CFR Part 2. Interested persons should
19534 Federal Register / Vol. 63, No. 75 / Monday, April 20, 1998 / Notices

consult a current copy of 10 CFR 2.714

which is available at the Commission’s

Public Document Room, the Gelman

Building, 2120 L Street, NW.,

Washington, DC, and at the local public

document room located at the Learning

Resources Center, Three Rivers

Community-Technical College, 574 New

London Turnpike, Norwich,

Connecticut, and at the Waterford

Library, ATTN: Vince Juliano, 49 Rope

Ferry Road, Waterford, Connecticut. If a

request for a hearing or petition for

leave to intervene is filed by the above

date, the Commission or an Atomic

Safety and Licensing Board, designated

by the Commission or by the Chairman

of the Atomic Safety and Licensing

Board Panel, will rule on the request

and/or petition; and the Secretary or the

designated Atomic Safety and Licensing

Board will issue a notice of hearing or

an appropriate order.

As required by 10 CFR 2.714, a

petition for leave to intervene shall set

forth with particularity the interest of

the petitioner in the proceeding, and

how that interest may be affected by the

results of the proceeding. The petition

should specifically explain the reasons

why intervention should be permitted

with particular reference to the

following factors: (1) the nature of the

petitioner’s right under the Act to be

made party to the proceeding; (2) the

nature and extent of the petitioner’s

property, financial, or other interest in

the proceeding; and (3) the possible

effect of any order which may be

entered in the proceeding on the

petitioner’s interest. The petition should

also identify the specific aspect(s) of the

subject matter of the proceeding as to

which petitioner wishes to intervene.

Any person who has filed a petition for

leave to intervene or who has been

admitted as a party may amend the

petition without requesting leave of the

Board up to 15 days prior to the first

prehearing conference scheduled in the

proceeding, but such an amended

petition must satisfy the specificity

requirements described above.

Not later than 15 days prior to the first

prehearing conference scheduled in the

proceeding, a petitioner shall file a

supplement to the petition to intervene

which must include a list of the

contentions which are sought to be

litigated in the matter. Each contention

must consist of a specific statement of

the issue of law or fact to be raised or

controverted. In addition, the petitioner

shall provide a brief explanation of the

bases of the contention and a concise

statement of the alleged facts or expert

opinion which support the contention

and on which the petitioner intends to

rely in proving the contention at the

hearing. The petitioner must also

provide references to those specific

sources and documents of which the

petitioner is aware and on which the

petitioner intends to rely to establish

those facts or expert opinion. Petitioner

must provide sufficient information to

show that a genuine dispute exists with

the applicant on a material issue of law

or fact. Contentions shall be limited to

matters within the scope of the

amendment under consideration. The

contention must be one which, if

proven, would entitle the petitioner to

relief. A petitioner who fails to file such

a supplement which satisfies these

requirements with respect to at least one

contention will not be permitted to

participate as a party.

Those permitted to intervene become

parties to the proceeding, subject to any

limitations in the order granting leave to

intervene, and have the opportunity to

participate fully in the conduct of the

hearing, including the opportunity to

present evidence and cross-examine

witnesses.

If a hearing is requested, the

Commission will make a final

determination on the issue of no

significant hazards consideration. The

final determination will serve to decide

when the hearing is held.

If the final determination is that the

amendment request involves no

significant hazards consideration, the

Commission may issue the amendment

and make it immediately effective,

notwithstanding the request for a

hearing. Any hearing held would take

place after issuance of the amendment.

If the final determination is that the

amendment request involves a

significant hazards consideration, any

hearing held would take place before

the issuance of any amendment.

A request for a hearing or a petition

for leave to intervene must be filed with

the Secretary of the Commission, U.S.

Nuclear Regulatory Commission,

Washington, DC 20555–0001, Attention:

Rulemakings and Adjudications Staff, or

may be delivered to the Commission’s

Public Document Room, the Gelman

Building, 2120 L Street, NW.,

Washington, DC, by the above date. A

copy of the petition should also be sent

to the Office of the General Counsel,

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission,

Washington, DC 20555–0001, and to

Lillian M. Cuoco, Esq., Senior Nuclear

Counsel, Northeast Utilities Service

Company, P.O. Box 270, Hartford,

Connecticut, 06141–0270, attorney for

the licensee.

Nontimely filings of petitions for

leave to intervene, amended petitions,

supplemental petitions and/or requests

for hearing will not be entertained

absent a determination by the

Commission, the presiding officer or the

presiding Atomic Safety and Licensing

Board that the petition and/or request

should be granted based upon a

balancing of the factors specified in 10

CFR 2.714(a)(1)(I)–(v) and 2.714(d).

For further details with respect to this

action, see the application for

amendment dated April 14, 1998, which

is available for public inspection at the

Commission’s Public Document Room,

the Gelman Building, 2120 L Street,

NW., Washington, DC, and at the local

public document room located at the

Learning Resources Center, Three Rivers

Community-Technical College, 574 New

London Turnpike, Norwich,

Connecticut, and at the Waterford

Library, ATTN: Vince Juliano, 49 Rope

Ferry Road, Waterford, Connecticut.

Dated at Rockville, Maryland, this 15th day

of April 1998.

For the Nuclear Regulatory Commission.

Stephen Dembek,

Project Manager, Special Projects Office—

Licensing, Office of Nuclear Reactor

Regulation.

[FR Doc. 98–10332 Filed 4–17–98; 8:45 am]

BILLING CODE 7590–01–P

NUCLEAR REGULATORY

COMMISSION

[Docket Nos. 50–445 and 50–446]

Texas Utilities Electric; Notice of

Consideration of Issuance of

Amendment to Facility Operating

License, Proposed no Significant

Hazards Consideration Determination,

and Opportunity for a Hearing

The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory

Commission (the Commission) is

considering issuance of an amendment

to Facility Operating License Nos. NPF–

87 and NPF–89, issued to Texas Utilities

Electric Company, (TU Electric, the

licensee), for operation of the Comanche

Peak Steam Electric Station, Units 1 and

2, located in Somervell County, Texas.

The proposed amendment would

allow on a one-time basis, the

verification of the proper operation of

the Unit 2 load shed seal-in contacts

and the diesel generator trip bypass

contacts at power and crediting

performance of Surveillance

Requirements (SR) 4.8.1.1.2f.4)a) and

4.8.1.1.2f.6)a), at power as opposed to

‘‘during shutdown’’ as currently

required by those SR. The proposed

amendment would also allow on a onetime basis the verification of the proper

operation of the Unit 2 lockout relays

and contacts to be deferred until the

startup from 2RFO4 or earlier outage to