Filed 12/7/15 P. v. Shelton CA4

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for 

publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication 

or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

FIFTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

THE PEOPLE,

Plaintiff and Respondent,

v.

DEDRICK DEBROSE SHELTON,

Defendant and Appellant.

F068364

(Super. Ct. Nos. F13902009, 

F13902238, F13902309, F13902570, 

F13902781 & F13903365)

OPINION

THE COURT*

APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Fresno County. Jonathan M. 

Skiles, Judge.

Rachel Lederman, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and 

Appellant.

Kamala D. Harris, Attorney General, Michael P. Farrell, Assistant Attorney 

General, Eric L. Christoffersen and Sally Espinoza, Deputy Attorneys General, for 

Plaintiff and Respondent.

-ooOoo-

 

* Before Levy, Acting P.J., Poochigian, J. and Detjen, J.
2.

Appellant Dedrick Debrose Shelton was found incompetent to stand trial in six 

different cases and committed to Atascadero State Hospital (ASH). On appeal, Shelton 

contends the court erred: (1) in setting his term of commitment at ASH; and (2) by its 

failure to calculate his conduct credit for the time he was in custody prior to being 

committed to the hospital. We find merit in his first contention and modify his term of 

commitment. In all other respects, we affirm.

FACTS

From March 4, 2013, through April 16, 2013, the Fresno County District Attorney 

filed six separate complaints charging Shelton with numerous felony charges and three 

prior prison term enhancements. 

On April 19, 2013, after a doubt arose as to Shelton’s mental competence, the 

court suspended criminal proceedings and appointed Dr. Harold Seymour and Dr. 

Doriann Hughes to examine Shelton. 

On August 23, 2013, the court found Shelton incompetent to stand trial, 

committed him to ASH, and set his maximum term of commitment at six years. 

On October 23, 2013, Shelton filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus in the 

Fresno County Superior Court. On December 11, 2013, this court deemed Shelton to 

have filed a notice of appeal. 

DISCUSSION

Shelton’s Maximum Term of Confinement 

Shelton contends the court acted in excess of its jurisdiction when it committed 

him to ASH for six years and that his commitment order must be modified to three years, 

the maximum term he could be committed there pursuant to Penal Code section 1370.1 

Respondent concedes and we agree.

 

1 All further statutory references are to the Penal Code.
3.

Section 1370 requires that a person found mentally incompetent to stand trial be 

committed to a state hospital for treatment. (§ 1370, subd. (a)(1)(B)(i).) 

In 2013, when Shelton was involuntarily committed, section 1370, 

subdivision (c)(1) provided:

“At the end of three years from the date of commitment or a period 

of commitment equal to the maximum term of imprisonment provided by 

law for the most serious offense charged in the information, indictment, or 

misdemeanor complaint, whichever is shorter, a defendant who has not 

recovered mental competence shall be returned to the committing court....”

Three years was the maximum term of imprisonment for second degree burglary 

(§§ 461, subd. (b) & 1170, subd. (h)(1)), the most serious offense Shelton was charged

with in the six complaints filed against him. Since the maximum term of imprisonment 

for second degree burglary equaled the maximum commitment term of three years under 

the statute, the court should have committed Shelton to ASH for three years and it acted 

in excess of its jurisdiction when it committed him there for six years.

Shelton’s Conduct Credit

In its commitment order, the court awarded Shelton 138 days custody credit for 

the time he spent in custody prior to being committed to ASH, but it did not award him 

any corresponding conduct credit. Shelton contends that a person committed to a state 

hospital for pretrial treatment is entitled pursuant to section 4019 to conduct credit for the 

time he spent in custody prior to being committed. Thus, according to Shelton, the court 

should have awarded him conduct credit and the matter should be remanded for the trial 

court to calculate his conduct credit pursuant to section 4019.2 We disagree.

A defendant, who is confined in county jail, may be eligible for conduct credit for

“all days of custody from the date of arrest to the date on which the serving of the 

 

2 Shelton does not contend that the trial court was required to deduct his 

precommitment custody and conduct credit from the three-year maximum commitment 

term the court could impose.
4.

sentence commences, under a judgment of imprisonment[.]” (§ 4019, subd. (a)(1).)3

This statute does not apply to Shelton’s case, however, because he has not been convicted 

and begun serving a sentence. As noted by respondent, if he is ever convicted and 

sentenced, the court at that time will be able to calculate any conduct credit to which he is 

entitled. Accordingly, we reject his contention that the matter must be remanded to the 

trial court so that it may calculate his conduct credit.

DISPOSITION

The judgment is modified to reduce Shelton’s maximum term of commitment 

from six years to three years. The trial court is directed to prepare an amended 

commitment order and to forward a certified copy to the appropriate authorities. As 

modified, the judgment is affirmed.

 

3 Section 4019, subdivision (a) provides: “The provisions of this section shall apply 

in all of the following cases: [¶] (1) When a prisoner is confined in or committed to a 

county jail, industrial farm, or road camp, or any city jail, industrial farm, or road camp, 

including all days of custody from the date of arrest to the date on which the serving of 

the sentence commences, under a judgment of imprisonment, or a fine and imprisonment 

until the fine is paid in a criminal action or proceeding.”