PUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

MELISSA H. TRAIL, 

Plaintiff-Appellant,

v.

LOCAL 2850 UAW UNITED DEFENSE

WORKERS OF AMERICA; UAW  No. 12-1632

REGION 8; THE INTERNATIONAL

UNION UNITED AUTOMOBILE

AEROSPACE AND AGRICULTURAL

IMPLEMENT WORKERS,

Defendants-Appellees. 

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Western District of Virginia, at Abingdon.

James P. Jones, District Judge.

(1:11-cv-00058-JPJ-PMS)

Argued: January 31, 2013

Decided: March 21, 2013

Before WILKINSON, SHEDD, and DIAZ, Circuit Judges.

Affirmed by published opinion. Judge Wilkinson wrote the

opinion, in which Judge Shedd and Judge Diaz joined.
COUNSEL

ARGUED: Richard F. Hawkins, III, HAWKINS LAW

FIRM, PC, Richmond, Virginia, for Appellant. Robert

Edward Paul, ZWERDLING, PAUL, KAHN & WOLLY, PC,

Washington, D.C., for Appellees. ON BRIEF: Jordan M.

Kaplan, ZWERDLING, PAUL, KAHN & WOLLY, PC,

Washington, D.C., for Appellees.

OPINION

WILKINSON, Circuit Judge:

While working for General Dynamics Armament and Technical Products, Melissa H. Trail belonged to a local affiliate

of the United Automobile, Aerospace, and Agricultural

Implement Workers of America ("UAW"). After being fired

by General Dynamics, Trail sued the local affiliate, the UAW,

and the UAW’s regional office, alleging that two local union

officials violated the Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure Act (LMRDA) of 1959, Pub. L. No. 86-257, 73 Stat.

519 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 29 U.S.C.),

by retaliating against her for reporting their supposed misconduct to the regional office. The district court dismissed Trail’s

complaint for failure to state a claim. While we think the district court ruled too broadly against the speech rights of union

members under the Act, we shall nonetheless affirm its judgment on much narrower grounds.

I.

In reviewing the district court’s decision to grant defendants’ motion to dismiss Trail’s complaint under Federal Rule

of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), "we accept the allegations of the

2 TRAIL v. LOCAL 2850 UAW
plaintiff’s complaint as true." Minor v. Bostwick Labs., Inc.,

669 F.3d 428, 430 n.1 (4th Cir. 2012).*

A.

Trail worked for General Dynamics, a defense contractor,

at its facility in Marion, Virginia, from 1989 until 1992, and

again from 1995 until she was suspended, on March 26, 2009.

Like all other hourly workers at the plant, Trail belonged to

Local 2850 of UAW/United Defense Workers of America

("Local 2850" or "the Union"), an affiliate of the UAW within

the jurisdiction of UAW Region 8 ("Region 8"). From 2004

to the summer of 2010, she also served as Local 2850’s

Recording Secretary, the Union’s third-highest-ranking officer.

In April 2008, most of the Marion plant’s unionized

employees went on strike after the Union rejected a proposed

collective bargaining agreement. At some point during the

strike, someone posted lists of the names, salaries, and Social

Security numbers of all of the facility’s salaried employees on

shacks that the striking workers had erected around the facility’s perimeter. As part of its criminal investigation into this

security breach, the Virginia State Police interviewed Trail.

Although she denied any involvement in the episode, a Virginia grand jury indicted her, in March 2009, for felony identity theft, in violation of Va. Code Ann. § 18.2-186.3. General

Dynamics suspended Trail’s employment pending the outcome of the prosecution, noting that she could return to her

job "in the event she is exonerated on all charges."

The Virginia prosecutor subsequently entered a nolle

*After entry of judgment, Trail asked for leave to file an amended complaint. We do not think the district court abused its discretion in denying

that leave on the basis of futility. Moreover, even considering the allegations in the amended complaint, it would make no difference to the resolution of this case. 

TRAIL v. LOCAL 2850 UAW 3
prosequi order dismissing the charges against Trail and

informed her lawyer that the state would not refile them. General Dynamics, however, refused to let Trail return to work on

the ground that the order allowed the prosecutor to reinstate

the charges and that she thus had not been fully "exonerated."

The company ultimately fired Trail in a letter dated September 15, 2009. 

While still suspended from work, but before being fired,

Trail had an encounter with two Local 2850 officials that gave

rise to this suit. Specifically, on entering the Union office on

August 13, 2009, she alleges that she saw the Union’s thenpresident and vice president viewing pornographic images on

a Union computer. Trail reported the incident to Region 8 representatives, but they declined to investigate. After she made

this report, Trail alleges, the president and vice president

began to retaliate against her in various ways. The vice president, for instance, criticized Trail at a meeting of the Union’s

executive board, sought to obtain a special parking pass at the

Marion facility by falsely claiming that he had been threatened by Trail’s husband, and told the management of General

Dynamics that he believed that only thirty percent of the

unionized employees wanted Trail to return to work. For his

part, the president chastised Trail for reporting the pornography incident. 

In addition, after General Dynamics fired Trail, the Union

filed a grievance on her behalf to challenge her termination.

Trail alleges that the president and vice president attempted to

obstruct the grievance process by allowing it to be needlessly

delayed, forbidding her to attend meetings with General

Dynamics, prohibiting her from having her own legal representation, and holding meetings with a Union-designated legal

representative in her absence. After Trail failed to have her

termination overturned through the grievance process, she

decided not to pursue the matter further through arbitration.

4 TRAIL v. LOCAL 2850 UAW
B.

Trail sued Local 2850, Region 8, and the UAW in U.S.

District Court for the Western District of Virginia, alleging

that Local 2850’s president and vice president violated the

Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure Act (LMRDA)

of 1959, Pub. L. No. 86-257, 73 Stat. 519 (codified as

amended in scattered sections of 29 U.S.C.), by retaliating

against her for reporting their putative misconduct to Region

8. As relevant here, section 101 of the LMRDA, part of the

statute’s "Bill of Rights of Members of Labor Organizations,"

guarantees a union member the following "free speech" rights

against his union: "the right to meet and assemble freely with

other members; and to express any views, arguments, or opinions; and to express at meetings of the labor organization his

views, upon candidates in an election of the labor organization or upon any business properly before the meeting." 29

U.S.C. § 411(a)(2). Section 102, in turn, provides a civil right

of action to "[a]ny person whose rights secured by the provisions of th[e] subchapter [that includes section 101] have been

infringed by any violation of this subchapter." Id. § 412.

Finally, section 609 makes it "unlawful for any labor organization, or any officer, agent, shop steward, or other representative of a labor organization, or any employee thereof to fine,

suspend, expel, or otherwise discipline any of its members for

exercising any right" enshrined in the chapter containing section 101 and renders any violation of this guarantee actionable

pursuant to the terms of section 102. Id. § 529.

After defendants moved to dismiss Trail’s complaint, the

district court held that the complaint failed to state a claim

under any of these provisions. First, it explained that she

could not state a claim under section 609 because that provision prohibits not "‘ad hoc’ retaliation by individual union

officers," but only retaliation that is "the result of an established union disciplinary process," which Trail had not

alleged. Trail v. Local 2850, UAW/United Def. Workers, 849

TRAIL v. LOCAL 2850 UAW 5
F. Supp. 2d 644, 647 (W.D. Va. 2012) (internal quotation

marks omitted). 

Second, in attempting to avoid section 609’s "discipline"

requirement, Trail had argued that section 101 creates a "freestanding" claim for nondisciplinary retaliation, which a plaintiff may then bring under section 102. But the district court

declined to follow those circuits that have recognized such a

claim, holding that section 609 provides the exclusive avenue

for challenging retaliation by a union against a member who

exercises her rights under section 101. Id. at 647-48. 

Finally, the district court concluded that, even assuming the

existence of a "freestanding" retaliation claim, Trail would

still not be entitled to relief under the LMRDA, because her

report to Region 8 was "not the type of ‘view[ ], argument[ ],

or opinion[ ]’ in need of protection in order to promote union

democracy"—the statute’s primary purpose. Id. at 648 (alterations in original) (quoting 29 U.S.C. § 411(a)(2)). The district court accordingly granted the defendants’ motion to

dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6). Id. This appeal followed. 

II.

Trail argued before the district court, and again argues on

appeal, that she need not allege that she was formally "discipline[d]" within the meaning of section 609 in order to state

a retaliation claim under the LMRDA. Sections 101 and 102

of the statute, she says, together create a "freestanding" retaliation claim, completely independent of section 609’s claim

for retaliatory "discipline." The Supreme Court has indicated

that there is a freestanding retaliation claim under sections

101 and 102. See Sheet Metal Workers’ Int’l Ass’n v. Lynn,

488 U.S. 347, 353-55 & n.5 (1989); Finnegan v. Leu, 456

U.S. 431, 439 & n.10 (1982). This makes perfect sense, for

Congress did not intend to provide union members an extensive list of free-speech rights only to then permit all sorts of

retaliation against them so long as such retaliation fell short

6 TRAIL v. LOCAL 2850 UAW
of formal discipline. In this respect, therefore, the district

court went too far in curtailing the free-speech rights of union

members under the Act. 

In the wake of the Court’s decisions, the circuits have disagreed as to what precisely constitutes actionable retaliation

under sections 101 and 102. See, e.g., Gilvin v. Fire, 259 F.3d

749, 759 n.14 (D.C. Cir. 2001) ("[An elected union officer’s]

free speech claim depends only upon whether he can show

retaliation against protected expression. He need not demonstrate any broader ‘scheme.’"); Maddalone v. Local 17,

United Bhd. of Carpenters & Joiners, 152 F.3d 178, 183-84

(2d Cir. 1998) (deeming actionable retaliation that either (1)

"direct[ly] interfere[d] with union membership rights" or (2)

"was part of [a] ‘purposeful and deliberate attempt . . . to suppress dissent within the union’" (last alteration in original)

(quoting Schonfeld v. Penza, 477 F.2d 899, 904 (2d Cir.

1973))). We need not, however, address what qualifies as

actionable retaliation, because Trail’s complaint falters over

the threshold question of whether her allegations fell within

the ambit of section 101 in the first place.

III.

To state a retaliation claim under section 102 or section

609, a plaintiff must allege that the retaliation was in response

to her exercise of a right guaranteed by some other provision

of the LMRDA. See LMRDA § 102, 29 U.S.C. § 412 ("Any

person whose rights secured by the provisions of this subchapter have been infringed by any violation of this subchapter may bring a civil action . . . ." (emphases added));

LMRDA § 609, 29 U.S.C. § 529 (making it unlawful to "discipline" someone "for exercising any right to which he is entitled under the provisions of this subchapter" (emphasis

added)). Trail argues that, in reporting the pornography incident to Region 8 representatives, she exercised her "free

speech" right under section 101(a)(2) "to express any views,

arguments, or opinions." Id. § 411(a)(2). 

TRAIL v. LOCAL 2850 UAW 7
A.

Although this court has yet to articulate a precise test for

determining when a union member’s speech falls within section 101(a)(2), the text and purpose of that provision lead us

to hold that it protects speech that pertains to matters of union

concern. The Supreme Court has declared the provision’s purpose to be "to promote union democracy" by ensuring that

"union members are free to discuss union policies and criticize the leadership without fear of reprisal." United Steelworkers v. Sadlowski, 457 U.S. 102, 112 (1982). Thus

formulated, this purpose obviously "restate[s] a principal First

Amendment value—the right to speak one’s mind" without

fear of retribution. Id. at 111. To be sure, section 101(a)(2)

does not "incorporate[e] the entire body of First Amendment

law." Id. at 109. But at the same time, because the provision

"was patterned after the First Amendment," Reed v. United

Transp. Union, 488 U.S. 319, 326 (1989), "First Amendment

principles may be helpful, although they are not controlling,"

Sadlowski, 457 U.S. at 111. 

In light of these pronouncements, the Eighth Circuit has

analogized the section 101(a)(2) rights of union members to

the First Amendment rights of government employees. See

Hylla v. Transp. Commc’ns Int’l Union, 536 F.3d 911, 916-17

(8th Cir. 2008). Recently summarizing the latter body of doctrine, this court explained that the First Amendment protects

a government employee’s speech only when she "speak[s] as

a citizen on matters of public concern." Brooks v. Arthur, 685

F.3d 367, 370 (4th Cir. 2012) (citing Connick v. Myers, 461

U.S. 138, 143 (1983)). This rule, the Eighth Circuit held, suggests an analogous one for LMRDA free-speech claims

whereby "the threshold inquiry in the LMRDA context is

whether the speech at issue may be fairly characterized as a

matter of union concern"—that is, whether the speech "relates

to the general interests of the union membership at large."

Hylla, 536 F.3d at 917 (internal quotation marks omitted). 

8 TRAIL v. LOCAL 2850 UAW
We agree with the Eighth Circuit that this test best effectuates section 101(a)(2)’s purpose of promoting union democracy. See id. at 917-18. For "a union’s democratic governance

will not be undermined" when a member suffers retaliation

for having discussed a matter unrelated to general union policy and management. Id. at 917. We believe furthermore that

the test follows directly from section 101(a)(2)’s text and

structure. The phrase "views, arguments, or opinions" immediately follows the articulation of a union member’s "right to

meet and assemble freely with other members" and immediately precedes the articulation of his right "to express at meetings of the labor organization his views, upon candidates in

an election of the labor organization or upon any business

properly before the meeting." 29 U.S.C. § 411(a)(2). Though

held by individual union members, both of these rights have

a collective cast, contemplating the exchange of views about

union policies among a union’s membership. This statutory

context demonstrates that in protecting the expression of

"views, arguments, or opinions" by a union’s members, Congress meant to facilitate discussion on matters not of idiosyncratic concern to any individual member, but of collective

concern to all the members. 

Not every issue that remotely relates to union affairs and

governance, however, qualifies as a matter of union concern.

Just as the First Amendment does not protect government

employee speech that "touche[s] upon matters of public concern in only a most limited sense," Connick v. Myers, 461

U.S. 138, 154 (1983), so section 101(a)(2) does not protect

union member speech that is of only limited significance to

the union. In the government employment context, for

instance, "[t]he mere fact that ‘the public may always be interested in how government officers are performing their duties

. . . will not always suffice to show a matter of public concern.’" Brooks, 685 F.3d at 372 (quoting Borough of Duryea,

Pa. v. Guarnieri, 131 S. Ct. 2488, 2501 (2011)). The same

holds true in the union context: a union official’s every action

does not become a matter of union concern simply because

TRAIL v. LOCAL 2850 UAW 9
members may always be interested in how officers spend

every moment of their day. The test is whether the speech

touches in some way the Act’s overarching concern for union

democracy, or whether it is of purely tangential import to

union governance. 

B.

Trail insists that her report to Region 8 satisfies this test,

since the report alleged misconduct by Local 2850’s two

highest-ranking officials. She equivocates about the precise

nature of their wrongdoing, sometimes suggesting that it consisted of their viewing pornography per se, while at other

times decrying the fact that they were "engaging in inappropriate personal activities on Union time while being paid with

Union dues," Appellant’s Reply Br. at 3. Ultimately, however,

Trail contends that the president and vice president abused

their offices either way, a matter of great concern to Local

2850’s membership.

In determining whether a government employee’s speech is

on a matter of "public concern" for First Amendment purposes, courts "consider the ‘content, form, and context of a

given statement.’" Brooks, 685 F.3d at 371 (quoting Connick,

461 U.S. at 147-48). Considering these factors with respect to

Trail’s speech, we conclude that Trail did not speak on a matter of union concern when she reported the alleged pornography incident to Region 8.

The content of Trail’s speech—that the president and vice

president viewed pornography on a Union computer on a single occasion—was not a matter of union concern. As the district court rightly noted, "Trail does not allege that she . . .

raised issues with respect to union policies," the kind of

speech most "in need of protection in order to promote union

democracy." Trail, 849 F. Supp. 2d at 648. Of course, Trail

does contend that the president and vice president violated

Local 2850’s rules by engaging in personal activities while

10 TRAIL v. LOCAL 2850 UAW
they were supposed to be performing Union functions, but she

does not claim to have voiced any substantive disagreement

with the direction in which they were leading the Union. Nor

does she allege that they ever committed other, more serious

wrongdoing, such as embezzlement or corruption, or even the

same wrongdoing on any other occasion. These omissions are

telling, given that, as Local 2850’s Recording Secretary, Trail

was perhaps the member best positioned to uncover any other

malfeasance. 

To be sure, it would have been preferable for the Union

officers to have been poring over the Union’s books and

finances at the precise moment Trail alleges that she happened upon them. But, alas, human imperfection must be kept

in some perspective. The allegation in Trail’s report to Region

8 reduces to a single instance of engaging in personal activities at work, an indiscretion that is anything but rare in the

contemporary workplace, where employees regularly gossip

around the water cooler, browse the latest news on the internet, and make personal phone calls. Were this enough to constitute a matter of union concern and thus to render her speech

protected under section 101(a)(2), nearly every criticism by a

union member regarding an official’s conduct could be transmuted into a federal case—a result Congress could not possibly have intended in enacting the LMRDA. 

Nor does the fact that the president’s and vice president’s

wrongdoing involved pornography alter this analysis. Trail

did not claim that their conduct was in any way illegal. She

did not claim that it constituted the kind of "severe or pervasive" sexually harassing behavior sufficient to create a "hostile work environment" under Title VII. Pa. State Police v.

Suders, 542 U.S. 129, 133 (2004). Had she made such allegations in her report to Region 8, the report might have stated

a matter of union concern and thus might have been protected

speech under section 101(a)(2). See Campbell v. Galloway,

483 F.3d 258, 268-70 (4th Cir. 2007) (considering when a

government employee’s report of sexual harassment constiTRAIL v. LOCAL 2850 UAW 11
tutes a matter of "public concern" and thus protected speech

under the First Amendment). Instead, Trail reported behavior

that was anything but admirable, and yet at the same time fell

short of the concern with the formulation of union policies

and functioning of union democratic mechanisms that lies at

the heart of the Act. That the officers’ activity was less benign

than, say, playing solitaire or browsing a celebrity gossip blog

is not by itself enough to elevate Trail’s single allegation to

a federal case. 

The "form and context" of Trail’s speech confirm our conclusion that her report to Region 8 did not involve a matter of

union concern. The district court noted that "Trail does not

allege that she made statements at a union membership meeting," but rather claims that she voiced her complaint through

an informal union grievance process. Trail, 849 F. Supp. 2d

at 648. We need not decide whether section 101(a)(2) protects

such complaints, as opposed to statements made before the

general union membership or at least a segment thereof. See

Brooks, 685 F.3d at 371-72 (noting the Supreme Court’s

skepticism that the First Amendment protects petitions filed

by government employees through internal grievance procedures). In light of the content of Trail’s allegations against the

president and vice president, the fact that she voiced them to

the UAW’s regional representatives rather than her fellow

members of Local 2850 adds to the impression that she was

not speaking on a matter of concern to Local 2850’s general

membership.

Our review of the "content, form, and context" of Trail’s

report to Region 8 also shows why the cases she cites are

inapposite. She relies on this court’s decision in Kowaleviocz

v. Local 333 of the International Longshoremen’s Ass’n,

which held that a union member’s profane criticism of a union

officer was protected speech under section 101(a)(2) of the

LMRDA. 942 F.2d 285, 290 (4th Cir. 1991). But whereas the

member’s criticism was part of "a history of opposition to certain official actions taken by" the officer, id., Trail’s report

12 TRAIL v. LOCAL 2850 UAW
was a one-off response to a one-off event involving union

officers’ personal conduct. Moreover, in Kowaleviocz, the

member had voiced at least some of his criticisms at union

meetings, leading this court to hold his speech to be protected

under section 101(a)(2) not as a general "view[ ], argument[ ],

or opinion[ ]," but more specifically as "an expression ‘at

meetings of the labor organization’" of a member’s "‘views

. . . upon any business properly before the meeting.’" Id.

(alteration in original) (quoting 29 U.S.C. § 411(a)(2)). Trail,

of course, never alleges that she expressed her objections to

any other member of Local 2850, let alone the membership as

a whole. Finally, she cites a number of cases in which courts

have held that allegations of official corruption in the use of

public funds involve matters of public concern for First

Amendment purposes. See, e.g., Robinson v. Balog, 160 F.3d

183, 188-89 (4th Cir. 1998). But that is precisely the point:

Trail never alleged malfeasance rising to such a level of seriousness. 

C.

Our holding should not be over-read. While at its core section 101(a)(2) covers speech in which union members "discuss union policies and criticize the leadership" regarding the

general direction of the union, Sadlowski, 457 U.S. at 112, we

do not suggest that the provision never protects a member’s

report of officers’ malfeasance. To the contrary. For one

thing, a single instance of wrongdoing might be sufficiently

serious to affect a union’s general affairs and thus to constitute a matter of union concern. If, for instance, a union member overheard officials plotting to rig a union election, section

101(a)(2) would protect her report of the incident, since it

would concern a matter directly implicating union democracy.

Trail’s allegation, however, bears no resemblance to this. 

The dangers of accepting Trail’s allegation as actionable

thus become apparent. Were we to do so, there would be no

point of principled limitation to the number of LMRDA

TRAIL v. LOCAL 2850 UAW 13
claims that could be brought. As the Supreme Court has

observed in the First Amendment context, "[t]o presume that

all matters which transpire within a government office are of

public concern would mean that virtually every remark—and

certainly every criticism directed at a public official—would

plant the seed of a constitutional case." Connick, 461 U.S. at

149. We similarly cannot presume that all matters that transpire within a union office are of union concern, lest every

allegation of every minor misstep by an official lay the

groundwork for a federal suit. Moreover, many organizations

have their share of rivalries and other assorted antagonisms.

We cannot begin to sort out the obvious discord among the

union officers in this case, other than to say that their various

disputes are not ultimately actionable. The LMRDA seeks to

safeguard union democracy, but it cannot aspire to monitor

union officers’ productivity in minute detail. Such judicial

micromanagement would risk supplanting the very union

democracy that the statute aims to maintain.

IV.

Finally, section 609 makes it "unlawful for any labor organization or any officer . . . to fine, suspend, expel, or otherwise discipline any of its members for exercising any right to

which he is entitled under the provisions of this chapter." 29

U.S.C. § 529. Trail contends on appeal that, by retaliating

against her for reporting the pornography incident to Region

8, Local 2850’s president and vice president "discipline[d]"

her within the meaning of section 609 for exercising her

speech rights, as guaranteed by section 101.

We disagree. Trail not only fails to allege a right protected

"under this chapter"; she has also failed to recognize that the

term "discipline" in section 609 does not "include all acts that

deter[ ] the exercise of rights protected under the LMRDA,

but rather . . . denote[s] only punishment authorized by the

union as a collective entity to enforce its rules." Breininger v.

Sheet Metal Workers Int’l Ass’n Local Union No. 6, 493 U.S.

14 TRAIL v. LOCAL 2850 UAW
67, 91 (1989). The term, in other words, "signif[ies] penalties

applied by the union in its official capacity rather than ad hoc

retaliation by individual union officers." Id. at 92 n.15. Thus,

to state a claim under section 609, a plaintiff cannot allege

simply that "he was the victim of the personal vendettas of . . .

union officers"; rather, he must allege that he suffered "[t]he

opprobrium of the union as an entity." Id. at 94. In particular,

as the district court observed, the courts of appeals generally

require plaintiffs to allege retaliation that was "the result of an

established union disciplinary process." Trail, 849 F. Supp. 2d

at 647 (internal quotation marks omitted). 

None of the president’s and vice president’s alleged actions

constituted "discipline," so defined. Instead, Trail has alleged

various forms of "ad hoc retaliation" and "personal vendettas"

by the two officers. This is obviously true in the case of the

vice president’s rebuke at the board meeting and his statements to General Dynamics regarding Trail’s husband and her

support among the unionized workers, as well as the president’s reproach—none of which involved formal punishment

"by the union as a collective entity" or "in its official capacity." 

Nor were the president’s and vice president’s supposed

attempts to subvert Trail’s grievance process official punishment on the part of the Union as a whole. Although she was

fired, an undoubtedly formal disciplinary action, Trail’s own

complaints make clear that that action was taken by General

Dynamics alone, independently of the Union and its officers,

in response to the identity-theft charges against her. She does

not plausibly allege that the president and vice president, not

to mention the Union as an entity, caused General Dynamics

to fire her. 

In short, Trail has issues with individual union officers. But

she points to not a single action by the Union as a whole, let

alone a Union action that was "the result of an established

union disciplinary process." The district court thus did not err

TRAIL v. LOCAL 2850 UAW 15
in holding that she failed to state a claim under section 609

of the LMRDA.

V.

For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the district court

is affirmed.

AFFIRMED

16 TRAIL v. LOCAL 2850 UAW