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### S T A T E O F M I C H I G A N

**C O U R T O F A P P E A L S**

PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,

Plaintiff

- Appellee, UNPUBLISHED February 22, 2018

v No. 335907

Oakland Circuit Court CAROLYN MARIE VOISIN, LC No. 2016

- 258730

- FH

Defendant

- Appellant.

Before: J ANSEN

, P .J., and S ERVITTO and S HAPIRO , JJ.

P ER C URIAM

.

Defendant appeals as of right her jury trial conviction of possession of less than 25 grams of cocaine, MCL 333.7403(2)(a)( v ). The trial court sentenced defendant to 17 months to 15

years ’ imprisonment. We affirm.

Defendant was pu lled over for speeding on June 6 , 2015. When she appeared nervous

and to be under the influence of a stimulant

- type substance, the officer conducting the traffic stop

had her K

- 9 dog sniff the exterior of defendant’s vehicle. The dog indicated positively on the outside of the vehicle, which led the officer to search the interior of defendant’s vehicle. The

officer di scovered approximately 0. 24 grams of cocaine inside defendant ’ s purse, along with various narcotics paraphernalia. Defendant was charged with possession of less than 25 grams of cocaine.

At the preliminary examination, defendant moved the district court to suppress all of the evidence seized during the traffic stop, which was initially granted, resulting in the dismissal of the charge against defendant. However, the prosecution appealed the district court’s ruling to the

circuit court. The circuit court reversed the district court’ s ruling and a jury trial subsequently occurred, at which defendant was found guilty of possession of less than 25 grams of cocai ne

.

On appeal, d efendant argues that her Fourth Amendment right to be free from an

un constituti onal search and seizure was violated because the police officer who executed the traffic stop conducted a canine sniff and a search of her vehicle without reasonable suspicion to

do so . We disagree.

The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution protects individuals from

unreasonable searches and seizures. People v Slaughter , 489 Mich 302, 310; 803 NW2d 171 (2011) . Stopping a vehicle and detaining the occupants is a seizure under the Fourth- 2

- Amendment. People v Armendarez , 188 Mich App 61, 69; 4 68 NW2d 893 (1991). Defendant was pulled over by Officer Melinda Weingart for speeding, which is a valid reason for a police officer to stop a civilian ’ s vehicle . As long as an officer has probable cause to believe that a

traffic violation occurred or is occurring, a traffic stop is constitutionally valid. People v Davis

, 250 Mich App 357, 363; 649 NW2d 94 (2 002) . Defendant does not dispute that Officer Weingart properly executed a traffic stop of her vehicle for speeding, but argues that the stop

was unreasonable because it was primarily a pretext to search for evidence that defend ant had committed another crime when the officer had no reasonable suspicion to do so.

Whether a search or seizure is reasonable “ is a fact

- intensive inquiry, ” that i s “ measured by examining the totality of the circumstances. ” People v Williams , 472 Mich 308, 314; 696 NW2d 636 (2005). A re asonable suspicion is :

[A] n objective manifestation that the person stopped was or was about to be engaged in criminal activity as judged by those versed in the field of law enforcement when viewed under the totality of the circumstances. The detaining officer must have had a particularized and objective basis for the suspicion of criminal activity. [ People v Lewis , 251 Mich App 58 , 69; 649 NW2d 792 (2002) (citation omitted).]

At both the preliminary examination and at trial Officer Weingart testified that, although defendant was initially pulled over for speeding, she immediately noticed that defendant was acting suspicious. Offi cer Weingart observed that defendant ’ s pupils were constricted, and that she was shaking and sweating. Officer Weingart also noticed that defendant was slurring her words and acting extremely nervous. In Officer Weingart ’ s experience, such behavior is
ty

pically a sign that an individual is under the influence of some sort of stimulant drug. “ The determination whether a traffic stop is reasonable must necessarily take into account the evolving

circumstances with which the officer is faced. ” People v Will iams , 427 Mich 308, 315 ; 696 NW2d 636 (2005) . In light of defendant ’ s behavior, it is clear that defendant ’ s interaction with Officer Weingart led to the reasonable suspicion that defendant may have been operating a

vehicle while under the influence of dr ugs , which allowed Officer Weingart to extend the traffic
stop. “ [W]hen a traffic stop reveals a new set of circumstances, an officer is justified in extending the detention long enough to resolve the suspicion raised. ” Id.

Further, when Officer Weing art asked for consent to search defendant ’ s vehicle , and defendant declined, Officer Weingart did not immediately order a search of the vehicle over defendant ’ s objection. Instead, Officer Weingart executed a canine sniff, which “ is not a search

within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment as long as the sniffing canine is legally present at its vantage point when its sense is aroused. ” People v Jones , 279 Mich App 86, 93; 755 NW2d 224 (2008)

. See also Illinois v Caballes , 543 US 405, 407

- 408; 125 S Ct 8 34; 160 L Ed 2d 842 (2005) (holding that a canine sniff of a vehicle during a traffic stop that reveals contraband does not violate the Fourth Amendment). Officer Weingart ’ s canine partner was legally present at the scene of the traffic stop when the cani ne sniff was executed. The canine sniff returned a positive result, and this Court has found that a positive reaction by a police canine is sufficient to establish probable cause to execute a search. Jones , 279 Mich App at at 90 n 2.- 3

- Despite the fact t hat Officer Weingart had reasonable suspicion to execute the canine sniff, and probable cause to search the vehicle

, once her police dog indicated the presence of drugs, defendant argues that this case aligns with the U nited S tates Supreme Court ’ s analysis in Rodriguez v United States

, ___US___ ; 135 S Ct 1609; 191 L Ed 2d 492 (2015)

. In Rodriguez

, the defendant was initially pulled over by a police officer when the officer observed the

defendant ’ s vehicle veering briefly onto the shoulder of a highway before jerking back onto the

road. Id. at 1612. The officer completed the traffic stop and had already given the defendant a written warning when he asked for permission to walk his police dog around the de fendant ’ s vehicle. Id. at 1613. The defendant told the officer that he could not search the vehicle , but the

officer ordered him out of the vehicle and executed a canine sniff over the defendant ’ s protests.
Id. The defendant had not been acting suspici ous in any way, and the officer testified at trial that he had already completed the traffic stop when he decided to walk the dog around the vehicle.

Id. The dog alerted to the presence of narcotics and a search revealed a bag of methamphetamine

in the v ehicle

. T he defendant subsequently entered a conditional guilty plea to one count of possession with intent to distribute 50 grams or more of methamphetamine. Id. at 1613

- 1614

. The Supreme Court held that “authority for the seizure . . . ends when tasks tied to the traffic

infraction are

— or reasonably should have been

— completed.” Id. at 1614.

Defendant contends that the facts in Rodriguez are similar to her case because Officer Weingart lacked reasonable suspicion to search her vehicle , just as the o fficer lacked reasonable suspicion to search the defendant ’ s vehicle in Rodriguez. However, the facts of defendant ’ s case do not support this assertion. Officer Weingart had reasonable suspicion to search defendant ’ s vehicle by using a canine sniff, base d on the signs of drug influence that defendant was exhibiting, as well as her extremely nervous behavior and mannerisms

. Thus, Officer Weingart could reasonably suspect that a crime was occurring, and that the crime was separate and distinct

from the tra ffic stop of defendant’s car, which had not yet been completed. The defendant in Rodriguez , in contrast, exhibited no signs of intoxication or other suspicious behavior that would

have give n the officer reas onable suspicion that a crime was taking place b eyond that of a traffic

violation. Moreover, t he traffic stop in Rodriguez had been completed prior to the initiation of

the canine sniff . Officer Weingart ’ s reasonable suspicion renders the search of defendant ’ s vehicle lawful.

Defendant also argues, in reliance on Rodriguez , that the traffic stop and the ensuing search violated her Fourth Amendment rights because the canine sniff unreasonably prolonged the stop. The Rodriguez Court held that “a police stop exceeding the time ne eded to handle the matter for which the stop was made violates the Constitution’s shield against unreasonable seizures,” and that “a seizure justified only by a police

- observed traffic violation . . . become[s] unlawful if it is prolonged beyond the time r easonably required” to issue a ticket for the

violation

. Id. at 1612 (quotation and citation omitted).

The Supreme Court granted certiorari in Rodriguez specifically to answer “ the question whether police routinely may extend an otherwise

- completed tra ffic stop

, absent reasonable suspicion , in order to conduct a dog sniff. ” Id. at 1614 (emphasis added). First, at the time of

the K

- 9 sniff, the traffic stop had not concluded. Although Officer Weingart did not issue a ticket, she testified that given d efendant’s visible condition, “[t]here was no way I was going to

let her drive.” Accordingly, the purposes of the traffic stop had not yet been completed. Thus, Rodriguez is inapplicable. A second reason for the inapplicability of Rodriguez is that- 4

- d efe ndant ’ s argument rests on the premise that Officer Weingart did not have reasonable suspicion to search the vehicle

. Because we find that Officer Weingart articulated several factors that, considering the totality of the circumstances, sufficiently support ed a finding of reasonable suspicion to conduct the initial canine sniff , the Rodriguez analysis does not apply. Accordingly,

defendant ’ s claim is without merit.

Affirmed.

/s/ Kathleen Jansen

/s/ Deborah A. Servitto /s/ Douglas B. Shapiro