### TEXA S C OU R T OF A PPEAL S, THIR D DIST R ICT , AT AU STIN

ON MOTION F OR REHEARING
NO. 03-0 5 -00 430 -CV

Be c ht e l C or por at ion ; M as Te c No r th Am e r ic a, Inc ., d/b/a Wil de Co nst r uc ti on; C&S Net work Con struct ion an d Bechtel Telec om m uni cations , Appellan ts
v. CITGO P roducts P ipelin e Com pany, Ap pellee

F ROM THE DISTRICT CO URT OF CALDWELL COUNTY , 22ND JUDICIAL DISTRICT NO. 01-0-2 13 , HO NORAB LE TODD A. B LOM ERTH , JUDGE PRESIDI NG

O P I N I O N
We withdraw o u r o p i n ion dated Oc tober 3, 2008; our suppleme ntal opinion dated No ve mbe r 7 , 2 00 8; a

nd our j ud g me nt date d No ve mbe r 7 , 2 00 8; a nd su bs tit ute the fo llo wi ngin t

he ir p l ac e. W e o v erru l e C I T GO P ro d u ct s P i p el i n e C o m

p an y ’s m o t i o nfo r r eh ea ri n g. A work c rewemploy ed by MasTec North Amer ica, Inc. d/b/a Wilde Construction (M a sT e c /Wild e ) r

u p t u r e d a n u n d e r gr o u n d g a so lin e pip e lin e ow ne d a nd op e ra te d b y CI TG O Pr od

uc ts Pipeline Company

(CI TGO) w hile excavating fo r an unde rg round telec ommunications line. Ap pr oximate ly

39 0 b arr e ls o f g a so lin e e sc a pe d in to th e surr ound ingare a be fo re the sp ill c ou ld be conta ined. CI TGO incur red substantial e x penses in re sponding to the spill and re mediating contamination to soil and g roundwater. CI TGO sued MasTec /Wi lde; C&S Networ k Construction,2

a MasT ec / Wil de af

filiate also involved in the proje ct; and B echte l Corporation and B echte l Telec om m unications (collec tively , Be chtel), the construction mana g er on the projec t. CI TGO’s claims wer e tried to a

jury . Ba sed on the ve rdict and e vidence it subsequently hear d on attorney ’s fees , the district court a war ded CI TGO a

total of $1,461,955.80 in actua l damag es fr om MasTec /Wi lde (whic h had assumed C& S’s liabilit ies in addition to it s o wn), $115,919.48 from B echte l, prejudg ment interest on these amount s , and $295,357.25 in attorney ’s fe es fr om MasTec /Wi lde. MasTe c/Wilde, C&S, and Be chtel have jointly appea led the j u d gm ent, bringing fi ft e e n c omm on

iss ue s. For th e re a so ns e xpla ine d h e re in, we wi ll r e ve rs e and re nd e r j ud g me nt i n pa rt , r e fo rm the jud g me nt a

nd , a s r e fo rm e d, a ff

ir m th e jud g me nt i n p art
. BACK GR OUND T h e p ipeline rupture occur red in May

1999, while appe llants were laying a n underg round fiber -optic cable for Enr on Br oadband Ser vices, Inc., as pa

rt of Enron B roadba

nd’s

“ Te xas L oo p Pr oje c t.” Enro n B ro a db and hir e d M a sT e c /Wild e to l ay the c a ble . Mas Te c /Wild e , in tu rn, su bco nt ract ed w it h C &S t o wor k on th e pro jec t. Atall rel evan t t im es, Mas Tec/ W il de an d C &S
wer e ea ch wholly -owne d subsidiaries of MasTec , I nc. As their working arr ang ement wa s descr ibed
a t t r i a l , M a s T e c / W i l d e o p e r a t e d “ r i p c r e w s ” w h o w o u l d p l o w o r “ r i p ” t r e n c h e s i n the g ro un d in which the c able would be place d, while C&S oper ated “ bore c rew s” that would drill or bore hole s
un de rg ro un d a s n e c e ssa

ry to l ay c a ble be ne a th o bs ta c le s. Enro n B ro a db and a lso hir e d B e c hte l a s it s
c on str uc tio n ma na g e r f or the Te xas L oo p Pr oje c t. B e c hte l’ s job inc lud e d sup e rv isi ng the pr og re ss of the c a ble -l ay ingop e ratio ns .The one -ca ll act def ines “e x cavate” or

“excavation” to me an “to use explos ives or a motor, 1 eng ine, hy draulic or

pneumatica lly

power ed tool, or other mecha nized e quipment of

any kind and i n cl u d es au gu ri n g, b ac k fi l l i n g, b o ri n g, co mp re s s i n g, d i ggi n g, d i t ch i n g, dri l l i n g, dra ggi n g, dre d gi n g, g ra din g , me c ha

nic a l pr ob ing , plo wi ng -i n, pu lli ng -i n, ri pp ing , sc ra pin g , tr e nc hin g , a

nd tunne lin g to remove or otherwise disturb soil to a depth of 16 or more inc hes.” A ct of Apr . 23, 1999, 76th L eg ., R.S., ch. 62, § 18.17(a), 1999 Te x . Gen. L aws 392, 393 (“ For mer a rt. 9033”). 3 The nature of the work t o b e p er formed on the Texas L oop Project implicated the Un de rg ro un d F a c ili ty Da

ma g e Pr e ve nti on and

Sa fe ty Ac t, c omm on ly

kn ow n a s th e Te xas “ on e -c a ll” statute. The c urre nt iteration of the one -ca ll statute is codified in chapte r 251 of the utilities code. Se e ge ne ra lly T ex . Util. Code Ann. §§ 251.001-.203 (West 2007). At the time this case arose , howeve r, the one -ca ll statute was containe d in article 9033 of t h e re v ised civil statutes, Act of Ap r. 23 , 1 99 9, 76 th L e g ., R.S. , ch . 6 2, § 1 8. 17 (a ), 19 99 Te x. Ge n. L aws 39 2, 39 2- 40 2 ( “ F or me r a rt
. 90 33 ” ), and

the c a se wa s tr ie d, su

bmi tte d, and

br ie fe d o n a

pp e a l w ithe xten siv e re fe re nc e to that ve rs ion

of the sta tut e . A lth ou g h th e tw o v e rs ion s a re larg e ly id entic a l in

su bs tanti ve re sp e c ts
m a t e r i a l t o t h i s p r o c e e d i n g , w e w i l l r e f e r t o t h e f o r m e r art i c l e 9 0 3 3 v e r s i o nf

o r c l ar i t y. T he one- call statute g ener ally require s that any

person intendingto “excavate ” (a s MasTec /Wi lde and C& S undisput edly wer e ) to g ive notice to a “ notification ce nter” not ear lier 1 than the 14th day

befor e the date excavation is to b egi n or later than the 48th hour be fore the time excavation is to beg in. Forme r ar t. 9033, § 9(a). Such notice shall include (1) the name of the person serving the notice; (2) the “location of the proposed a rea of excavation,” including a street
a dd re ss , if ava ila

ble , o r “ an a c c ur a te de sc ri pti on of the e xcavatio n a

re a us ingany

a va ila ble desig nations such as the closest street, road, or intersec tion”; (3) the name, addr ess, and tele phone
numbe r o f t

he e xcavator

or e xcavator ’s c omp any ; ( 4) the e xcavator ’s “ fi e ld te le ph on e numbe r, ” ifA per son may deliver this information “by any appr o priate me thod, including the use of 2 elec tronic mea

ns of data tr ansfe r,” a

nd the notice i s co n s idere d to have be en provide d when “ the pe rs on de liv e rs the re qu ir e d inf

or ma tio n an d a noti fi c a tio n ce nte r re c e ive s tha t in fo rm a tio n w ith in the time limit s presc ribed by this Act.” Id . § 11. See id. § 2(2). 3 4 available ; (5) “the starting date a nd time and the anticipated completion d at e of the e x cavation”; and (6) a stateme nt as to whether explos ives will be used. Id . § 9(b). 2 A “notification center ” u n d er the one-c all statute ref ers to an e ntity

in which “oper ators” of

“Class A under g round fa cilities”—which include underg round g asoline pipelines —must “ participate,” as a condition of doing business in T exas, by providing the

3 notification ce nter maps, gr id locations, or ot her identifiers i ndicating the l ocations of the operator’s underg round fa cilities; updates reg arding an y chang es in such information; and the name a nd telephone number of a conta ct per son or per sons. Id. § 7(a ), (b ). Th e no tif ic a tio n ce nte r, in tur

n, is require d, within two hour s afte r rec eiving a notice of intent to ex cavate, to transmit the information
rec eived f rom the excavator to “ea ch member operator that may have an underg round facility in the vicinity of the propose d excavation oper ation.” Id . § 8(b), ( c). A C&S employ ee, Clint Fe rg uson, had the res ponsibili ty as “c onstruction locator” t o m ak e t h e re quired “ one-c alls” for both the MasTec /Wi lde rip cr ews a nd the C&S bore cre ws working on the Texas L oop Project. A portion of the projec t, a pproxi mately 8.5 miles in leng th, was to run throug h southern Caldwell County —the L uling a rea —along the north side of State H ighw ay 90. Work on this portion of the proje ct commenc ed in April 1999. B eg inning a s ear ly as April 12, 1999, Fe rg uson made a

series of on e- ca l l s t o a noti fication center in advanc e of a

nd duringTh e one-c all statute has since been a mended to re quire a

n opera tor who does not 4 de e m ma rk ingits fa c ili tie s “ ne c e ssa ry” to g ive no tice o f su c h a c tio n to the e xcavator wi thi n 48 hours. Act of May 22, 2001, 77th L eg ., R.S., ch. 858, § 2, 2001 Tex. Gen. L aws 1707, 1707-08, codified at Tex. Util. Code Ann. § 251.157(d) (West 2007). No such pr ovision was contained in the version of the one-c all statute applica ble to this case, howe ver.

5 the c re ws ’ w or

k in Ca ldw e ll Co un ty . T he no tif ic a tio n c e nte r, in t

ur n, g e ne ra te d n oti ficati ons to operators of under g round fa cilities in the area
.

East of L u li n g , th e r o u te o f th e p la n n e d T e xa s L o o p Pr o

je c t e xc a v a ti o n c r o s s ed a g asoline pipeline, known a s the CASA Pipeline, that was owne d and oper ated by CI TGO. As one of the ope rators w ho had underg round facilities in the ar ea, CI TGO re ceive d the notices tra nsmitt ed by the notification ce nter in re sponse to Fe rg uson’s one-c alls. The information transmitted by the notification ce nter re flec ted t hat t he wor k was to be pe rfor

med by “C& S Const ruction” f

or “Enr on,” and provided Clint Fe rg uson’s name and a phone numbe r as the de signated contac t. The location of the pr op os e d e xcavatio n wa s de sc ri be d in the se no tic e s a s the e nti re ri g ht- of -w ay a lon g the no rt

h sid e of Hi g hw ay 90 ru nn ingfr om t

he Ca ldw e ll- Gu a da lup e County lin e e a ste rl y to th e Ca ldw e llGonzalez Count y

line. The one -ca l l s t at ute re quires an ope rator who rec eives a one-c all notice must—ge nera lly

within 48 hours after

the time the excavator g ave notice to the notification ce nter of its intent to ex cavate, or “ at a time ag ree d t o b y t h e o p er ator a nd the excavator ”—“ma

rk the
a pp ro xima te loc a tio n o f i ts und e rg ro un d f a c ili ties at or n e ar t

he sit e of the pr op os e d e xcavatio n if the operator believes that marking the location is nec essar y .” F ormer a

rt. 9033, § 14(a)
. Th e statut e 4

a lso a ff or ds an o pe rator

the ri g ht t o b e pr e se nt at an e xcavatio n s ite if it m e e ts c e rt a in c on dit ion s:6

To have a re prese ntative present during the excavation, the ope rator sha ll contact the excavator a

nd advise the excavator of the oper ator’s intent to be pr esent during e xcavatio n a

nd c on fi rm the sta rt tim e of the e xcavatio n. I f t

he e xcavato r wan ts to c ha ng e the sta

rt time, the e xcavator

sh a ll n oti fy

the op e rator

to s e t a mut ua lly ag ree d-to time to beg in the excavation.
Id. § 9(c) . I mportantly , if “[a]n ex cavator . . . has fully complied wi t h t h e Ac t , ” the act furthe r pr o v id e s , th e e xc a v a to r “ ma y n o t b e li a

b le f o r d a ma g e to an u n d e r g r o u n d f a c il it y th a t w a s not marke d in acc ordanc e with the Ac t.” Id. § 14(c)
.

I t is un dis pu ted th at, on May 7, 19 99 , a

Ma sT e c /Wild e ri p c re w s tr uc k th e CA SA Pip e lin e wi th a

“ ri p c a t,” a

pie c e of ma c hin e ry , w e ig hin g 70 ,0 00 to 8 0, 00 0 p ound s and havin g an 8 to 10 foot blade, use d in trenchingoperations to “rip” or b re ak u p gro u nd in advanc e of a bulldoz er or plow. The impac t ruptured the pipel i n e. Although there was for tunately no explos ion,
a pp ro xima te ly

39 0 b arr e ls o f g a so lin e e sc a pe d be fo re the sp ill c ou ld b e c on ta ine d. CI TG O w a s a ble to r e c ov e r o nly

a bo ut 4 0 b arr e ls o f t

he g a so lin e . Th e e sc a

pe d g a so lin e c a

us e d co nta

min a tio n to so il and g roundwater. I n addition to its lost product and pipeline repa irs, CI TGO incurr ed s u bstantial
e xpe ns e s in

re sp on din g to a

nd re me diatin g the sp ill
. Trial ce ntered

l ar gel y o nwh et h er

ap p el l an t s o r C I T GO we re re s p o n s i b l e f o r r u p turing the pip e l i n e an d

th e e xt e n tt o w h i c h C I T G O , C & S , an d M a s T e c / W i l d e h a d

e a c h c o mp l i e d

w i th the ir res pecti ve ob lig a tio ns un de r t he on e -c a ll s ta

tut e . T o s umm ari ze, CI TG O m a int a ine d th a t it s employ ees a

nd ag ents had promptly

responde d to e ach one-c all notification by contac ting F erguson to inquire about the de tails of his crew s’ upcoming w o rk
. During these c onversations, accor ding to C I TG O, F e rgus on

wa s in fo rm e d th a t CI TGO in ten ded to h a ve a

re pr e se ntativ e pr e se nt i f h is
c re ws e xcavate d n e ar t

he CA SA P ipe lin e and

that F e rgus on

ha d a g re e d th a t no su c h w or k w ou ld7

occur without prior notice to C I TGO. I t further claimed that in re sponse to a one- call notification it r ece ived on the morning of May 7, CI TGO’s Sam B entley called Fe rg uson and obtained a ssuranc es that Fe rg uson’s cr ew s wo u l d b e working sever al miles to the east of the CASA Pi peline ar ea that day
. Under CI TGO’s theory , appellants breac hed these understanding s or promises and violate d the
one-c all statute when the MasTec /Wi lde rip cre w excavated in the are a later that day without prior
no tic e and

wi tho ut a CI TG O r e pr e se ntativ e pr e se nt. Ap pe lla nts , b y c on tr a st, argue d th a t CI TG O w a s to bla me fo r the accide nt b e c a

us e it had failed to loc ate and mark the CASA Pipeline in compliance w ith the one-c all statute and ha d even pla ced stakes at the site that cre ated the misleading impression reg arding are as wher e the cr ews could safe ly

work. Ac cordingto appellants, F erg uson’s understa

nding w it h C I T GO was that he would contac t CI TGO before his cre ws worke d within the s taked area . Appellants fur ther c ontended that the MasTe c/Wilde rip crew had hit the CASA Pipeline outside the staked ar ea. A pivotal ev en t i n b o t h side’s ver sions of the underly ing f acts wa s an April 22 meeting betwee n CI TGO subcontr actor Alton Schulle and Fe rg uson i n the g ener al ar ea of the CASA P i p el i n e crossing . Schulle and F erguson arr ang ed the mee ting to discuss excavation near the pipeline. An unde rstanding of the conf igur ation of the Hig hway

90 rig ht-of-w ay

and the aboveg round fe ature s signify

ing t h e p re sence of the pipeline is helpf ul in understanding the subsequent events. In this area , Hig hway 90 runs in roug hly

an ea st-west direc tion. A fenc eline, located seve ral fee t north of the highway , ran r oug hly para llel to the highwa

y . I n the fe nceline w as a me tal pipeline
mark e r, and

so me fe nc e po sts on

e ith e r s ide we re top pe d in wh ite —a n in dic a tio n o f a

pip e lin e ri g ht-8

of-wa y . Nea r the metal pipeline marker was a vent pipe extending out of the g round. Another

vent pipe appe are d on the south side of Hig hway 90, at an a

ng le southeast of the other ve nt pipe. During this meeting, Schulle attempted to locate the pipe line with a n elec tronic “line finder.” He wa s unsucce ssful. Schulle place d a woode n, flag g ed stake roug hly eig ht fee t south of the ve nt p ipe on the no rt

h sid e of Hi g hw ay 90 and , la

te r, tw o a dd iti on a l st a ke s— on e a pp ro xima te ly 17 fee t to the west of the f irst stake, and the other 15 a nd one half

fee t to the east of the orig inal sta ke . T he pa

rt ie s g a ve c omp e tin g a c c ounts re g ard ingwh a t Sc hu lle ha d i nt end ed the sta ke s to signify . Acc ording to Fer g uson, after Schulle had attempted u n succe ssfully to locate the pipe line with his line-finder , Schulle approximated the pipeline route by standing on the hig hway and “lining up” the ve nt pipe on eac h side of the hig hway with his arms. Ba sed on this estimation, Ferguson
rec ounted, Schulle place d the middle stake to indicate wher e he thoug ht the pipeline ra n. Fe rg uson fu rt he r t e sti fi e d th a t he a sk e d Sc hu lle to m ark a “ sa fe ty zon e ” that his c re ws wo uld kn owto a

vo id and outside of whic h they could work. The pair pa

rted wa y s after their mee ting, F erguson claimed, with Schulle indicating he would return w ith a differ ent line-finde r and attempt ag ain to loc ate the pipeline. L ater

that day , Fe rg uson rec ounted, t h e t wo ad d itional stakes had appe are d at the site. Acc ording to Fer g uson, althoug h he knew the prec ise location of the pipeline had not bee n located, he understood the t hree stakes to signify that the pipeline wa s located somew here within that area
and that hi s c re ws c ou ld w or k s a fe ly ou tsi de of

it. Sc hu lle , b y

c on tr a st, de nie d th a t he ha d e ve r a g reed or pur po rt e d to mark

a “ sa fe ty
zon e ” wh e re the pip e lin e a c tua lly ra n. He cla im ed th at he ha d p la c e d th e sta ke s so le ly

to c a ll attention to the CASA Pi peline rig ht-of-w ay beca use the m et al pipeline marke r in the fe nce, a sSchulle compar ed his use of the s takes to “the way y ou would use a hig hlighter on a piec e 5 of pape r” a

nd “wa s in no way

to tell any one whe re the pipeline was spe cifica lly located.” 9 well as the white-toppe d fenc eposts, wer e obscur ed by brush. Schulle and other CI TGO witnesse s 5 claimed that Fe rg uson had a clea r understanding that the C ASA Pipeline had not y et bee n located and that it would be nec essar y to fin d the line by

car efully digg ing w ith a backhoe or by hand to u ne art h it be fo re the c a

ble pr oje c t c ou ld cr os s it . Su c h e ff or ts, CI TG O c la ims it r e pe a te dly
e mph a size d to F e rgus on , s ho uld have oc c ur

re d o nly wh e n it s r e pr e se ntativ e s w e re pr e se nt. Acc ording to CI TGO, Ferg uson share d that understandingand had a g ree d that his crew s would not digne ar t he CA SA P ipe lin e wi tho ut p ri or notic e to C I TG O a nd wi tho ut a

re pr e se ntativ e pr e se nt. I t c la ims that, in re lia

nc e on thi s un de rs tand ing , CI TG O did no t pe rc e ive a ne e d to m ark the pr e c ise route of the pipeline, as it anticipated that it would work with Fer g uson’s cre ws to unear th the line
a t th e a pp oin te d ti me . F e rgus on , a lth ou g h n ot d isp uting th a t he ha d p ro mis e d to g ive no tic e to CI TG O b e fo re his c re ws e xcavate d o ve r t he pip e lin e , c la ime d that th is obl ig a tio n a pp lie d o nly

to work his cr ews would pe rfor m within the staked are a. On May 6, Sc hu lle and CI TG O’ s Sam B e nn e tt ar ra ng e d with F e rgus on to me e t w ith Chad Tre adwe ll, the drilling super intendent of the C&S bore cre ws. Tre adwe ll recounte d that the purpose of

the meetingwas to discuss how the c rewwas to bore under or cross the CASA Pipeline. H e a c kn o w le d g e d th a t F e r g u s o n h a d to ld h im th a t th e p r e c is e lo c a ti o n o f th e p ip e li n e h a d not y et been loc ated. Dur ing the meeting , Schulle and Be ntley tried to find the pipeline with a line- finder, ag ain without succe ss. Fer g uson, at Be ntl ey ’s re quest, dug a tre nch with a ba ckhoe in f ront of the middle stake in an attempt to locate the pipeline. The y did not find it. Ba sed on this information,Consequently , if, as Fe rg uson alleg ed, Schulle had estimated the pipeline route by lining 6 up the two vent pipes, Schulle would have identified the l ong side of a tria ng le whose othe r two sides wer e for med by the pipeline’s a ctual route
. 10 Be ntley conclude d that the pipeline wa s l o ca t ed som ewhe re to the e ast of the middle stake . He permitted the boring cre w to dig in the west part of the staked are a in or der to bor e under a TXDOT g ra ve l or dir t pile to the imm e diate we st. Th e CI TG O a g e nts did no t a dju st o r m ov e the sta ke s, ho we ve r. B e ntl e y

e xpla ine d th a t he did

no t be lie ve it n e c e ssa

ry to read jus t th e sta

ke s b e c a us e CI TGO ha d been a ssured that no excavation would take pla ce at the location without prior notice.

As it t ur ne d o ut, the po rt ion

of the CA SA P ipe lin e no rt

h o f H ig hw ay

90 ra n mo stl y to the east of the staked a rea . Fr om the south, the pipeline passes ne ar the v en t p i p e s o uth of Hig hway 90 and cr osses at a r ight a ng le to the roa dway , conti nues runningnorthwar d into the h i gh wa y ri gh t -o f-wa

y for se vera l fee t, then veer s at a shar p ang le to the northwe st. The pipeline continues in a northwe sterly direc tion so as to cross the fe nceline some distance to the w est of the plane on which it had cr ossed Hig hway 90 and fr om which it bent northwestwa rd. Be cause of the 6 configuration of the pipeline, all or subs tantially all of the pipeline se g ments south of the stakes lay to the east of the staked a rea . CI T G O p r e s e nt e d

e v i d e n c e o f

ho w i ts e mpl oy e e s and

a g e nts re sp on de d to the on e -c a ll
no tif ic a tio ns g e ne rate d b y

F e rgus on , inc lud ing c op ie s of the on e -c a ll n oti fi c a tio ns . O n v ir tua lly a ll is a sta mpe d f or m e lic iti ng“ Pe rs on

Con ta c te d, ” “ Date ,” “ B y ,” and “ Re mark s. ” Ea c h f

or m is completed by

hand. Acc ording to the handwritten notations, Fer g uson assured CI TGO on numer ous
occa sions that his crews would be working in are as ot her than near the C ASA Pipeline and that he would contac t CI TGO be fore his crew s beg an wor k near t h e l i ne. One notification, dated Ma y 5,11

1 9 9 9 , a t1 6 : 3 0 ( 4 : 3 0 p . m . ) , c o n t a i n e d h an dw r i t t e n n o t a t i o n s i n d i c a t i n g t h a tC IT G O ’ s “ D e n n i s E l l y” contac ted “Clint” and was advised that “they wer e about 1 mile w est of line.” Another notification, dated Ma y 7, at 10:15 a.m., contains h an d wr i tten notations indicating that CI TGO’s Sam B entley contac ted C lint Fe rg uson that day and was advised: “This work is east of our line in Ha rwood a rea . Wil l not be working near our line today .” Ha

rwood is a Caldwe ll Count y community

located on Hi g hw ay 90 se ve ra l mil e s e a st of the CA SA Pip e lin e are a . B e ntl e y te sti fi e d th a t he ob ta ine d th e se
a ssu ra nc e s d ur ingthe mor

nin g of May 7. F e rgus on

de nie d g ivi ngsu c h a ssu

ra nc e s. L ater that same da

y , at appr ox imately

3:00 p.m., the Ma s T ec / W i l d e cr ew hit the CASA Pi peline with its rip cat. The operator as we ll as his supervisor, testified that they had assumed the thre e woode n stakes at the site ref lected the actua l pipeline route, and that no one had inf or me d th e m th a t th e pip e lin e ha d, in f a c t, n ot y e t be e n lo c a te d. Th e re wa s a lso e vid e nc e that, consistent with this belief, the operator had attempted to avoid the staked a rea and begun ripping at
or nea r the e astern stake g oing e astwar d. Although the prec ise location wher e the r ip cat struck the pip e lin e wa s disp ute d, the re wa s evi de nc e that the imp a c t ha d o c c ur re d in an a re a of the pip e lin e e a st of the stake d are a.

CI TGO subseque ntly

sued a number of pa

rties for da

mag es it incurre d in connec tion wi th t he pip e lin e ru

ptu re . I t a sse rt e d c a

us e s o f a c tio n f

or ne g lig e nce , n e g lig e nc e pe r s e , tr e sp a ss, brea ch of c ontrac t, and promissory estoppel ag ainst MasTec /Wi lde and C&S. I n addition, CI TGO
asser ted ca uses of a ction for ne g lige nt hiring, ne g li g ent re tention, and neg lige nt supervision
a g a ins t B e c hte l. As to a ll de fe nd ants , CI TG O a lle g e d ma lic e and so ug ht e xemp lary dama g e s.12

Ma sT e c /Wild e , C& S, a

nd B e c hte l r a ised affi rm ati ve d efen ses , i ncl ud in g im mu ni ty un der t he on e -c a ll statute. Th e dis tr ic t c ourt su bmi tte d jur

y iss ue s re g ard ing ne g lig e nc e a g a inst C& S, Ma sT e c /Wild e , B e c hte l, a nd CI TG O; pr o m i s s o r

y e s t o p p e l a g a ins t C& S and Ma sT e c /Wild e ; tr e sp a ss
a g a ins t C& S and Ma sT e c /Wild e ; and a pp e lla nts ’ a ff ir ma tiv e de fe ns e of immun ity un de r t he on e -c a ll statute. Predicated on af firmative f

indings a s to either neg lige nce or trespass as to one or more defe ndants, the cour

t also submitt ed whether such conduct had been committed with malice. The jury found that the ne g lige nce of all p arties ha d proxi mately cause d the pipeline rupture , and a pp or tio ne d r e sp on sib ili ty

30 pe rc e nt t o M a sT e c /Wild e, 50 perc ent to C& S, 1 0 p e rc e nt t o Be chtel, and 10 pe rce nt to CI TGO. The jury awa rded $1,159,194.75 in past neg lige nce da mag es and $668,250.00 in future neg lige nce damag es. The jury failed to find that either C&S or Ma sTec/Wilde had committed trespa ss or that any defe ndant had acte d with malice in committing neg lige nce. A s for promissor

y e s to p p e l, th e ju

r y f o u n d th a t C I T G O h a d

f o r e s e e a b ly r e li e d to it s d e tr im e n t on a pr o m i s e b y both MasTec /Wi lde and C& S and awa rded $871,413.99 in pa st damag es and $668,250.00 in future damag es. CI TGO ha d reque sted attorney ’s fe es under its promissory

estoppel the or y , a nd the pa rt ie s su bs e qu e ntl y

tr ie d th e a mou

nt o f s uc h f

e e s to the dis tr ic t c ourt
. Re g a r d in g appellants’ c laims of immunit y under the one-c all statute, the district court instructed the jury

by quoting pertinent portions of t he st atute and submitt ing, ove r objec tion, a series of three questions that followed a bur den-shifting framework: (1) did Ma sTec/Wilde and C&S ea ch

“ g ive the no tic e re qu ir e d b y Se c tio n 9 (a ) a

nd 9( b) of the Te xas O ne -C a ll Statut e ? ” (i .e ., the on e -c a ll notice); (2) if so, “Did CI TGO re spond in acc ord wit h Section 9(c) [reg ardingthe rig ht to be prese nt13

a t th e e xcavatio n] and

14 [re g ard ing mark ing its fa c ili tie s] of the Te xas O ne -C a ll St a tut e ? ” ; and (3 ) i f so, did Ma sTec/Wilde and C&S eac h “then respond in a ccor d with r equire ments for e x cavators as de sc ri be d in

Se c tio n 9 (c ) o f t

he Te x as One -C all Stat

ute .” I n th e fi rs t qu e sti on , th e jur y fo un d in the af firmative a s to both MasTec /Wi lde and C&S. I n the sec ond, the jury found in the af

firmative. I n the third question, the j ury found t hat neither MasTec /Wi lde nor C& S had responde d in acc ord with section 9(c)
.

The district cour

t rende red judg ment on the ver dict. Beca use MasTe c/Wilde had assumed all of C&S’s liabiliti es, the court imposed judgme nt a g ainst MasTec /Wi lde for the damag es the jury h ad awa

rded a g ainst both affiliates. Ag ainst MasTec /Wi lde, the district cour t awar ded CI TGO $927,355.80 in p as t d am ages a nd $534,600.00 in future damag es, amounts re flec ting the total perc entag es of r esponsibility that the j ury

had imposed ag ainst MasTec /Wi lde and C& S for neg lige nce ( 30 perc ent + 50 pe rce nt = 80 per cent) applied to the j u ry ’s awa rds of pa st and future neg lige nce da

mag es. Simil arly , the district court a war ded C I TGO $115,919.48 in past damag es and $6 6, 82 5. 00 in f

utu re dama g e s f

ro m B e c hte l, r e fl e c tin g the 10 pe rc e nt o f n e g lig e nc e re sp on sib ili ty t h at t h e j u ry

h adap p o rt i o n edt o t h at p ar t y . Fu rt h er , b as ed o n t h e j u ry ’s p ro m i s s o ry es t o p p el fi n d i n gs aga i nst MasTec/Wilde and C& S, the district court awa rded CI TGO $295,357.25 in trial-le vel attorney ’s fee s, plus a total of another $75,000 in conditional appellate attorney ’s fe es. F inally the
c ourt awa rd e d pre jud g me nt int e re st of $2 36 ,6 29 .1 8 ag a ins t Ma sT e c /Wild e and $2 9, 57 7. 46 a g a ins t Be chtel, and a ssessed cour t costs ag ainst MasTec /Wi lde MasTec , C&S, and B echte l appea led.14 AN AL YSI S Appe lla nts br inga

tot a l of fi ft e e n is su e s th a t c an b e c a te g or ize d in to f our g ro up s: (1) issues c oncer

ning the aff

irmative def

ense of immuni t y

under the one-c all statute; (2) a n issue challeng ing the imposit ion of neg lige nce liability ag ainst them; ( 3) issues contesting the amount of past and futur e dama g es awa rded in the judgme nt; a

nd (4) issues attacking the attorne y ’s fe e aw ard
and the un de rl y ingjur

y fi nd ing s r e g ard ingpr omi sso ry e sto pp e l.
One-call statute

As noted, the one -ca ll statute has provided at all releva nt times that “[a] n excavator wh o h a s f

ull y c omp lie d w iththi s A c t ma y no t be l iab le for dama g e to a n und e rg ro un d f

a c ili ty t h at wa s n o t m arke d in acc ordanc e with this Act.” F ormer a rt. 9033, § 14(c) . The district cour t
s u b m i t t e d t h e f a c ti s s u e s c o n t r o l l i n g t h e a p p l i c at i o n o f t h i s d e f

e n s e i n Q u e s t i o n 1 2 o f

t h e c h ar g e . In Qu e sti on 12 , th e c ou

rt ins tr uc te d th e jur

y a s f oll ow s:
Yo u a re ins tr uc te d th a t T e xas U nd e rg ro un d D a ma g e Pr e ve nti on and Sa fe ty Ac t, c omm on ly

kn ow n a s th e “ Te xas O ne -C a ll St a tut e ,” state s a s f oll ow s:
SECTI ON 9: DUTY OF AN EXCAV ATOR. (a) A person who intends to e x cavate shall notify a notification ce nter not ear lier than the 14th day befor e the date the excavation i s to beg in or l ater than the 48 th ho ur be fo re the tim e the e xcavatio n is to be g in, e xclu din g Sat urd ay s, Sun da y s, and le g a l ho lid ay s. Pr ov ide d, ho we ve r, if an ex cav a tor

make s a Saturday notification, the excavator may beg in the excavation the following Tuesday at 11:59 a.m. unless the interve ning Monda y is a hol i day . I f the interveningMonday

is a holiday , the excavator may beg in the excavation the fo llo wi ngWed

ne sd ay a t 11 :59 a .m.15

(b) The notice require d under this sec tion shall include: (1) the name of

the per son serving the notice; (2 ) t h e l o ca t i o no f t h e p ro p o s edar eao f e x ca v at i o n , i n cl u d i n g; (A) the street addre ss, if available , and the location of the excavation at the stre et addr ess; or (B ) if there is no street addre ss, an ac curate desc ription using any available desig nations such as the c losest street, road, or intersec tion; (3) the name, a ddress, a nd telephone num b er o f t he excavator or the e x c a v a t o r ’ s c o mp an y; (4) the excavator ’s field tele phone number , if one is ava ilable; (5) the starting date a nd time and the anticip at ed compl etion date of excavation; and (6) a stateme nt as to whether explos ives will be used. (c ) To have a repre se ntativ e pr e se nt d ur ingthe e xcavatio n, the op e rator sh a ll contac t the excavator a

nd advise the e x cavator of the operator’s intent to be prese nt during excavation and c onfirm t he st art ti me of the ex cavation. I f the excavator w ants to chang e the star t tim e, the excavator

shall notify

the operator to set a mutually ag ree d-to time to beg in the excavation.
S EC TI ON 14 . DU TY OF OPE RAT OR TO PERS ON EX CAV AT IN G. (a) Not later that t h e 4 8 t h h our af ter the time the e x cavator g ive[s] to the no ti fi cat ion

sy ste m no tic e of

int e nt t o e xcavate , e xclu din gSa tur da y s, Sunday s, and leg al holiday s, 11:59 a.m. on the Tue sday following a Saturda

y notification unless the interve ning Monda y is a holiday , or at a

time ag ree d to by the oper ator and the ex cavator, ea ch Class A under g round fa cility owner shall mark the approximate location of its underg round fa cilities at or nea r the site of t h e proposed e x cavation if the operator believe s that marking the location is nece ssary . (b) An oper ator shall re fe r t o the Amer ican Public Works Association color co d i n g s t an d ar d s wh en m ar k i n g. (c) An ex cavator who ha s fully complied with this Act may not be liable for dama g e to a

n und e rg ro un d f

a c ili ty that w a s n ot m arke d in a c c or da nc e wi th the Ac t.Th e fi rs t dif fe re nc e wa s th a t th e fi rs t se nte nc e of se c tio n 9 (a ) o mitte d a

qu a lif ie r f ound in 7 the statute, “Except as pr ovided in sections 12 and 13 of this Act . . .
. ” Fo rm er ar t
. 9033, § 9(a)
. Th e se c on d w a s in

se c tio n 14 (a ). Th e ins tr

uc tio n omi tte d the statut or y de a dli ne fo r the op e rator to mark their f

acility applicable when a

n excavator makes a Saturday notification and the intervening Monday is a holiday

—Wednesday

at 11:59 a.m. Id. § 14(a) . I t is undisputed that the excavation at i s s u e h e r e o c c u r

r e d o na F r i d ay. 16 Wit h the exception of two textual differe nces t hat ar e not mater ial to this case, these instructions tr a c ke d ve rb a tim se c tio ns 9 and 14 of fo rm e r art ic le 90 33 , the ve rs ion of the on e -call stat ute applicable to this ca se. See, e .g. , Borneman v . Steak &Ale of Tex. , 22 S.W .3d 411, 413 (Tex. 2000) 7 (“A s a g ener al rule, w hen a statutory caus e of action is submit ted, the cha rg e should ‘tra ck the l an gu age o f t h e p ro v i s i o n as cl o s el y as p o s s i b l e. ’” ) ( qu o t i n g Spence r v. Eagle Star Ins. Co. of Am. , 876 S.W .2d 154, 157 (Tex. 1994)).

F oll ow ingthe se ins tr

uc tio ns , th e dis tr ic t c ourt

su bmi tte d th e fo llo wi ngqu e sti on : QUEST ION NO. 12A Did the Def

endants listed below g ive the notice r equire d by Section 9(a) and 9(b) of the Texas One- Call St atute? Answer “Ye s” or “ No” a s to eac h: MasTec /Wi lde

_____ C&S

_____ Predicated on an a ffirmat i ve finding as to either de fenda nt, the jury

was instructe d to answer the fo l l o wi n g:17

QUEST ION NO. 12B Di d CI TG O r e sp on d in

a c c or d w ithSe c tio n 9 (c ) a nd 14 of th e Te xas O ne -C a ll Statute? Answer “Ye s” or “ No”:
P re d i ca t edo nan af

fi rm at i v e a n s we r t o 1 2 B, t h e j u ry wa s i n s t ru ct edt o an s we r t h e f o l l o wi n g: QUEST ION NO. 12C Did the Defen d ants listed below then re spond in acc ord with requir ements for excavators a s descr ibed in Section 9(c) of the Te x as One -Call Statute? Answer “Ye s” or “ No” a s to eac h: MasTec /Wi lde

_____ C&S

_____ The jury found in the af

firmativ e as t o b o t h MasTec /Wi lde and C& S in Question 12A—that
eac h had “g ive[n] the notice r equire d by Section 9(a) and 9(b) of the Te x as One -Call Statute”—and found in Question 12B that CI TGO h ad “t h en re spond[ed] in acc ord with Section 9(c) and 14 of the Texas One- Call St atute,” but f ound in Q uestion 12C that neither MasTe c/Wilde nor C&S had “then r espond[e d ] i n acc ord with requir ements for excavators a s descr ibed in Section 9(c) of the Te xas O ne -C a ll St a tut e .” B a se d o n th e se fi nd ing s, the dis tr ic t cou rt did no t g ive e ff

e c t to a pp e lla nts ’ aff irmative def

ense of immunit y

under the one-c all statute. At trial, appellants objected to Q uestion 12A, 12B, and 12C on the g round that “the specia l interrog atory structure of t he question does not comply with broad form requir ements thatAppellants’ pr oposed submission al s o contained a “fur ther instruction” that “a joint 8 ventur e is a leg al entity

that meets the de finition of a ‘pe rson’ unde r the Te x as One -Call Statute,” with a def inition of the essential eleme nts of “joint venture.” Be cause we conclude that the district court did not abuse its discretion in submit ting Que stion 12, we nee d not addre ss whether , as CI TGO c on te nd s, the pr op os e d “

joi nt v e ntu

re ” ins tr uc tio n w a s n ot i n s ub sta

nti a lly c or re c t f or m. 18 are c ur re ntl y dic ta te d b y

the Te xas r

ule s a nd c ourt s. ” Th e y

te nd e re d w hat th e y

re g ard e d a s a
su bs tanti a lly

c or re c t ve rs ion

of the qu e sti on

c on ta ini ngthe fo llo wi ngint e rr og a tor ie s:
Did the Def

endants listed below f

ully comply with the Texas One-Call Statute? An s we r “ Ye s ” o r “ No ” f

o r e ac h o f t h e f

o l l o wi n g: C&S

_______ MasTec /Wi lde _______
Predicated on an affirmative answer as t o either de fenda nt, the jury

would then have answe red the following question:
Did CI TGO mar

k its pipeline in accor dance with the Texas One-Call Statute? Answer “Ye s” or “ No”

________ 8 Appellants bringth i s co m p laint forwa rd in their seve nth issue on appea l, arguing that the dis tr ic t c ourt

a bu se d it s d isc re tio n in f

ail ingto s ub mit

the c on tr oll ingiss ue s r e g ard ingimmun ity under the one-c all statute in broad f orm. They further

contend on a

ppeal that Que stion 12C “did not trac k the s tatutory

lang uag e at a ll” or “implied to the jury that Def endants we re oblig ated to re spond under Sec tion 9(c).” We cannot conc lude that the district cour t abused its discretion.19 Our a naly sis of appellants’ c ontentions relating to the one-c all statute turn, in the first instance, on statutory construction. Statutory construction presents a question of law that we revie w de novo. See State v. Shumak e , 199 S.W .3d 279, 284 (Tex. 2006). Our pr imary objective in statutory

construction is to g ive ef fec t to the le gi s l ature’s intent. Id. We s e e k th a t in te nt “ fi rs t and for emost” in the statutory text
. Le x ing ton In s. Co. v . S

tra y ho rn , 209 S.W .3d 83, 85 (Tex. 2006). We consider the words in contex t, not in is olation. State v. Gonzalez , 82 S.W .3d 322, 327 (Tex. 2002). We rely

on the plain meaningof th e t ext, unl ess a diff ere nt meaning is supplied by leg islative definition or is appar ent from c ontext , or unless such a construction lea ds to absurd
r e s u lt s . C i t

y o f R ockwall v. Hughe

s , 2 4 6 S
. W
. 3 d

6 2 1 , 6 2 5 -2 6 (T ex . 2 0 0 8 ) ( ci t i n g Texas De p’t of Transp. v. Cit

y of Sunset Valley , 1 46 S.W. 3d 63 7, 64 2 (T e x. 20 04 ); Tay lor v . F ire me n’ s & Policeme n’s Civil Serv. Comm’n of City of Lubbock , 6 16 S.W. 2d 18 7, 18 9 ( Te x. 19 81 ); Un iv e rsi ty of Tex. Sw. Med. Ctr. v. Loutzenhiser , 1 40 S.W. 3d 35 1, 35 6 ( Te x. 20 04 )) ; see Tex. Gov’t Code Ann. § 3 11 .0 11 (We st 2 00 5) (“ [w]or ds and ph ra se s sh a ll b e re a d in

c on te xt an d c on str

ue d a c c or din g to the rules of

g rammar and common usag e”)
. Section 14(c) of the one -c al l s t at u t e s t at es t h at “[ a] nex ca v at o r w h o h as fu l l y co mp lied wi th t his Ac t ma

y no t be li able fo r d a ma g e to a n und e rg ro un d f

a c ili ty that w a s n ot m ark e d in
acc ordanc e with this Act.” For mer art. 9033, § 14(c ). Section 14(c ) thus provides immunity from “liability for damag e to an unde rg round fa cility ” if a n excavator can p rove two elements: (1) the “excavator . . . has fully complied wit h this Act”; and (2) the underg round facility “wa s not marked in a c c or da

nc e wi th t

his Ac t.” Th e te rm

“ fully complied” plainly

denotes c omplete compliance with th e o n e - c a ll s tatute in

a ll r e s p e c ts , a s c o n tr a s te d w it h p arti a l c o mp li an c e o r

substantial20

compliance
. See U

nited States v. L o cke , 471 U.S. 84, 100-01 (1985) ( discussing the conce pt of
su bs tant ial ve rs us fu ll c omp lia nc e in t he c on te xt of

statut or y de a dli ne s) ; CenterPoint Energy Houston Elec., LLC v. Gulf Coast Coalit ion of Ci ties , 252 S.W .3d 1, 15 (Tex. App.—Austin 2008, pet. filed) ( “We pre sume that eve ry word wa s deliberately

chosen a nd that excluded words we re le ft out on purpose.”) ( c i t i n g

U S A W a s t e S e r v s . o f H o u s t o n , I n c . v . Str ay ho rn , 1 5 0 S.W .3d 491, 494 (Tex. App.—Austin 200 4 , pet. denied) ). Whether or how an e x cavator “fully

complied” with the
one-c all statute beg ins with section 9 of the statute, titled “Duty

of an e x cavator.” Sec tion 9(a), a s discussed, re quires an excavator to g ive at least 48 hours notice to a notification ce nter of its intent to excavate, while se ction 9(b) spe cifies the c ontent of such notifications. Id. § 9(a) , (b). Que stion 12A appr o p ri ately

inquired whe ther MasTe c/Wilde and C&S ea ch g ave “ the notice r equire d by S e c t i o n9 ( a ) an d

9 ( b ) o f t h e T e x a s O n e - C a l l S t a tu t e ?” A one- call no t i ce i n co mpliance with sec tion 9(a) a nd (b), in turn, trig g ers a n operator’s d u t y

under se ction 14 to “mark the approximate locations of its underg round fa cilities at or ne ar the site of the propose d excavation.” Id. § 14(a) , (b). Sec tion 9(c) a lso provides that an oper ator ha s a rig ht “[t] o hav e a represe ntative pre sent during the excavation” if the operator—presuma

b l y i n response to the one-c all notification it rece ived af ter the e x cavator complied with section 9(a ) and ( b)—“c ontact[s] the excavator ” and ( 1) advises it of the oper ator’s “intent to be pre sent during excavation” a nd (2) “ confirm[ s] t he start time of the excavation.” Id. § 9(c)
. Co n d it io n e d u

p o n an a f f ir mati v e f in d in g in Q u e s ti o n 1 2 A th a t o n e - c a ll n o ti f ic a tion was g iven, Quest io n

1 2 B s u b mitted both of the operator’s duties, inquiring whether CI TGO “ respond[ed] in a c c or d w ithSe c tio n 9 (c ) a nd 14 of the Te xas O ne -C a ll S tat ut e.” B y ans we ri ng“ y e s” to t

his21

c on jun c tiv e su

bmi ssi on , th e jur

y fo un d th a t CI TG O c omp lie d w ithbo th t he mark ingre qu ir e me nts of secti o n 14 and

the conditions for invoking its right to be pr esent at the excavation under section 9(c ). I f an ope rator invoke s its right to be pr esent duringthe excavation by meeting the c on dit ion s und e r s e c tio n 9 (c ), a s th e jur y fo un d h e re , th e e xcavator the n h a s a

mand a tor

y du ty not to “chang e the star

t time” without “notify [i ng ] t h e o p er ator to set a mutually ag ree d to time.” See id. § 9(c) . Whether MasTe c/Wilde or C&S eac h compl i ed wi t h t h es e duties wa s the fo c us of Qu e sti on

12 C. T hat qu e sti on was con dit ion e d u po n a n a ff ir ma tiv e re sp on se in Question 12B—w hich, aga in, incorporated an a ffirmative finding that CI TGO ha d invoked section 9( c)

— an d inquired whe ther e ach “ then re spond[ed] in acc ord with requir ements for excavators a s descr ibed in Section 9(c) of the Te x as One -Call Statute.”

Th e burd e n- sh if

tin g , c on dit ion e d s e quence tha t th e dis tr ic t c ourt

e mpl oy e d in Qu e sti on 12 g e ne ra lly

tr a c ke d th e statut or

y fr a me wo rk

and su bmi tte d th e fa c t is su e s w ho se
re so lut ion c on tr oll e d w he the r M a sT e c /Wild e and C& S we re e nti tle d to immun ity fr om l ia bil ity
u n d e r t h e o n e - c a l l s t a tu t e i n t h i s c a s e . Q u e s t i o n 1 2 d i d d e v i a t e f r o m t h e s t a tu t e , h o w e v e r , i nits conditioning of

Question 1 2 C (MasTe c/Wilde and C&S’s complianc e with sec tion 9(c)) on a
con ju nctive fi nd ingin Q ue sti on 12 B that in c or

po rate d f ind ing s th a t CI TG O c omp lie d w ith bo th section 9(c ) and section 14. I t is CI TGO’s c ompliance with sec tion 9(c) that trig g ere d MasTec /Wi lde and C& S’s duties under sec tion 9(c), r eg ardle ss whether CI TGO a lso complied with section 14. Althoug h CI TGO’s co m p l i an ce w ith section 14 went to another element of appellants’ immunity defe nse, it did not control whether appellants’ duties a

rose unde r sec tion 9(c).22

Questi on 12C thus would have more c losely trac ked the one -ca ll statute if it had been pr edicated solely upon a finding that CI TGO ha d complied with section 9(c ). Ap p el l an t s em p h as i z e t h i s fe at u re o f Q u es t i o n1 2 i nt h ei r m o t i o nfo r r eh ea ri n g. Howeve r, their objec tion at trial was that “the specia l interrog atory structure of the que stion does not comply with broad f

orm requir ements that ar e cur rently dictated by

the Texas rules and c ourts.” Appellants tende red a

proposed submission with a single br oad-f orm question reg arding MasTec /Wi lde and C&S’s compliance with the one-c all statute—“Did the D efe ndants listed below fully comply with the Tex as One-Call Statute? ”—followe d by an issue inquiring whether CI TGO
mar ked it s pi peline a s r e qu ir e d b y se c tio n 1 4. Th e dis tr ic t c ourt did no t a bu se its dis c re tio n in ref using to submit the controlling issues in the broad- form manne r appe llants proposed.

Although t

r ia l c o u rts mu s t s u

b mi t f a c t i s s u e s to th e ju

r y in b r o a d f o r m “ w h e n e ver fea sible,” Tex. R. Ci v. P. 277, “‘it is not alway s prac ticable to submit every issue in a ca se broa dly ,’
and br oa d- fo rm

su bmi ssi on s c ann ot b e us e d to bro ade n th e ha rm le ss e rr or

ru le to d e ny

a pa rt y the corr ect char g e for which it other wise would be e ntitled.” Romero v. KPH Consolidat ion, Inc. , 1 6 6 S
. W
. 3 d 2 1 2 , 2 3 0 (T ex . 2 0 0 5 ) ( qu o t i n g Ha rri s Co . v . S mi th , 96 S.W .3d 230, 235 (Tex. 2002)). He re , b ro a d- fo rm

su bmi ssi on a s p ro po se d b y

a pp e lla nts wa s n ot p ra c tic a

ble fo r t wo re a so ns . F ir st, appellants’ pr oposal omitted any issue or i nstruction for the jury to deter mine whether

CI TGO ha d complied wit h its duties under section 9(c) to notify appellants that it desired to be prese nt during the e xcavatio n. CI TG O h a d th e burd e n o f p ro vin g and ob ta ini ng a fi nd ing that it ha d c omp lie d w ith section 9(c ) bef

ore a ppellants would be re quired to prove that they complied with their duties under section 9(c ). CI TGO would h av e wa i v ed t h i s issue if it failed to obtain that finding
. See Te x. R.This is il lustrated by the amicus cu ri ae brief f iled by the National Utility

Contractor’ s 9 Association, discussed inf ra . 23 Civ . P. 27 9. As dis c us se d be low , the re wa s le g a lly su ff ic ie nt e vid e nc e that CI TG O c omp lie d w ith section 9(c ), and it wa s entitled to have this issue submitt ed. See Tex. R. C iv. P. 278.

Second, eve n if the propose d submissi on included prope r instructions reg arding CI T GO’s c ompliance with sec tion 9(c), a ppellants’ propose d issue as to whethe r C&S and Ma sT e c /Wild e “ fu lly

c omp lie d” wi th t

he on e -c a ll s ta tut e wo uld have su bs ume d thr e e iss ue s: (1 ) w he the r a

ppell ants c omp lie d w ithse c tio n 9 (a ) a nd (b ); (2 ) w he the r C I TG O c omp lie d w ith
se c tio n 9 (c ), so a s to g ive ri se to ap pe lla nts ’ dut ie s und e r that pro vis ion ; and (3 ) w he the r a

pp e lla nts complied with section 9(c ). An a ffirmative finding on such an issue would leave an appe llate cour t unable to dete rmine whe ther the jury found that (1) appellants c omplied with sections 9(a) a nd (b)
an d CI T G O d id

n o t c o mp ly

w it h s e c ti o n9 ( c ) s o a s to g iv e r is e to a p p e ll an ts ’ d

u ti e s u n d e r

that provision, or (2) a

ppellants complied with sections 9(a ) and (b), CI TGO c omplied with section 9(c) , and a pp e lla nts c omp lie d w ithse c tio n 9 (c ). At tim e of tr ia l, t

he dis tr ic t c ourt

ha d li ttl e , if

any , c a se law g uidance reg ardingthe nature of the duties i m p o s ed by section 9(c ) on either

CI TGO or
a pp e ll ant s und e r t

he pr e se nt f

a c ts, and the re wa s r oo m f

or de bate re g ard ingthe se iss ue s. 9 Ap pe lla nts ’ p ro po se d b ro a d- fo rm su bmi ssi on thu s pre se nte d a ris k o f c omm ing lin g po te nti a lly va lid and invalid theorie s. See Crown Life Ins. Co. v. Casteel , 22 S.W .3d 378, 388 (Tex. 2000). Unde r these c ircumstance s, the district court did not abuse its di scre tion in reje cting a broa d-for m approa ch.24 Fur thermore , we f

ail to see any harm to appellants fr om the form of Q uestion 12 as submitt ed. The failure to submit a question in broad f orm does not nec essar ily

constitute harmful
err or if the charg e subm its the controlli ng fac t issues and incorporates corre ct leg al standar ds. See H.E. Butt G rocery Co. v. W arner , 845 S.W. 2d

25 8, 25 9- 60 (T e x. 19 92 ). Qu e sti on 12 su bmi tte d to the jur y the fact ual is su e s c on tr oll inga pp e lla nts ’ i mmunit

y un de r t he on e -c a ll s ta tut e in t

his
case —whether

(1) Ma sTec/Wilde and C& S complied with se ctions 9(a) and (b) ; (2) whe ther CI TGO complied with section 9(c ) so as to give rise to appellants’ duties under that provision, and whether Ma sT e c /Wild e and C& S c omp lie d wi th tho se du tie s; and (3 ) wh e the r CI TG O c om pl ied wi th sectio n 1 4. Qu e sti on

12 a lso inc or

po rate d th e c or

re c t su bs tanti ve le g a l st a

nd ard s g ov e rn ingthe se issues, with the exception of predic ating Question 12C on affir mative finding s in 12B that C I T GO had complied with bo th section 9(c ) and s e c t i o n 1 4
. A p p e l l an t s w e r e n o t h ar m e d b y thi s conditioning instruction, howe ver, beca u s e the jury —rig htly or wrong ly

—rea ched a

nd answe red Question 12C any

way . This was t o appellants’ benef it. Be cause the jury

found in Question 12B that CI TGO ha d complied with section 9(c ) so as to inv o k e appellants’ duties unde r that provision,
a pp e lla nts c ou ld p re va il o n th e ir immun ity

de fe nse on ly if the y

ob ta ine d f

a vo ra ble fi nd ing s in Qu e sti on 12 C that Ma sT e c /Wild e and C& S ha d c omp lie d w ithse c tio n 9 (c )— oth e rw ise , a pp e lla nts would not ha

ve established that they

“fully complied’ with the one -ca ll statute. Although the jury ult imate ly

ma de fi nd ing s in

Qu e sti on 12 C a dv e rs e to a

pp e lla nts , ap pe lla

nts wo uld have wa ive d th e ir immunit y defe nse altog ether if they had failed to obta in those finding s. See T e x. R. Ci v . P. 2 7 9
. We
overr ule appe llants’ seventh issue.25 I n their fifth issue, appellants argue that the district c ourt err ed in f ailing to disreg ard t h e j u ry ’ s an s we rs t o Qu es t i o n s 1 2 B a n d 1 2 C an d re n d er j u d gm en tt h at C I T GO t ak e n o t h i n g. Ap pe lla nts argue prin c ipa lly

that th e e vid e nc e c on c lus ive ly e sta bli sh e s th a t th e y

c omp lie d w ith the notification re quirements of se ction 9 ( a) and ( b) and that there is le g ally

and fa ctually

insufficient evidenc e that CI TGO c om p l i ed wi th section 14 by proper ly marking the CASA Pipeline. Ag ain, Question 12B submitted whe ther CI TGO ha d comp l i ed wi t h its duti es under both section 9(c) and se c tio n 1 4. B y fi nd ing in the a ff ir ma tiv e , the jur

y fo un d tha t CI TG O ha d c omp lie d w ithbo th sets of duties. I t is not clear that a ppellants are challeng ing the evidenc e supporting the jury ’s other finding in Question 12B that CI TGO c omplied with section 9 ( c) so as to g ive rise to MasTe c/Wilde and C& S’s duties under that provision. To the ex tent appellants are challeng ing the jury ’s finding
re g ard ingCI TG O’ s c omp liance wi th sec tio n 9 (c ), we c on c lud e the re is l e g a lly and fa c tua lly
su ff ic ie nt e vid e nc e to s up po rt it. When a par

ty challeng es the leg al suffic iency of the e vidence supporting a n issue on wh ic h th e op po sin g pa

rt y ha d th e burd e n o f p ro of, the pa rt y mus t de mon str a te : ( a ) t

he c omp le te
a bs e nc e of a vit a l f a c t; ( b) the c ourt

is barr e d by ru le s of l aw o r o f e vid e nc e fr om g ivi ngwe ig ht t o the only evidenc e off

ere d to prove a v i t al fa ct; (c) the evidenc e off ere d to prove a

vital fac t is no
mor e tha n a mer e sc int ill a ; or

(d ) t he e vid e nc e e sta

bli sh e s c on c lus ive ly

the op po sit e of

the vit a l f a c t. City of Keller v. W

ilson , 168 S.W .3d 802, 810 (Tex. 2005). I n conducting a lega l sufficie ncy revie w of the e v i d en ce , a co u rt must consider all of the evidenc e in the lig ht most favorable to the fac t finding and indulg e eve ry rea sonable infe renc e that would support it. Ci ty of Keller , 168 S.W .3d at 822.I n a n ami cus c ur ia e br ie f, the Natio na l U til ity Con tr a c tor ’s As so c ia tio n a rgue s th a t “ in 10 or de r t o e sta

bli shc omp lia

nc e wi th t he stat ut e, Citg o h a d to pr ov e that it a dv ise d App e lla

nts of its intent to be prese nt during the excavation that actually occur red and that Citgo confirmed the star t 26 W h en re v i ew i n g a c h al l en ge t o t h e fa ct u al s u ff i ci en cy o f t h e e v i d en ce s u

p p o rt i n g a vit a l fa c t th a t, w e mus t c on sid e r, we ig h, and e xami ne a ll o f t

he e vid e nc e in t

he re c or d, bo th supporting a

nd ag ainst the finding , to decide w hether the ver dict should be set aside. Plas-Tex, Inc

. v. U.S. Stee l Corp. , 7 72 S.W. 2d 44 2, 44 5 ( Te x. 19 89 ); Pool v. Ford Motor Co. , 715 S.W .2d 629, 635 (Tex. 1986). When a par

ty attacks the fac tual sufficie ncy of an adver se finding on an issue on which the opposing party

has the burde n of proof

, we should set aside the ver dict only if the evide nce supporting the jury

finding is so weak a s to be clea rly wrongand manife stly

unjust. Se e Cai n
v . B ain , 709 S.W .2d 175, 176 (Tex. 1986).

To pr ov e that it ha d c omp lie d w ithse c tio n 9 (c ), CI TG O p re se nte d e vid e nc e that, i n response to one-c all notifications and in a fa ce -t o-fa ce me eting , it had repe atedly informed Clint Fe rg u s on of its intent to be present at any excavation nea

r the CASA Pipeline and that F erguson
a nd CI T G O h a d

ano n g o i n g u n d e r s t an d i n g t h a th i s c r e w s w o u l d n o te xc a v a t e n e ar

t h e C A SA Pip e lin e wi tho ut p ri or

no tic e and

a CI TG O r e pr e se ntativ e pr e se nt
. F ur the r, in t he c on te xt of

thi s understanding , CI TGO’s Sam Be nnett testified t hat he responde d to a one- call notification during the morning of the acc ident by calling Fe rg uson and obtaining Fe rg uson’s assura nces that his crews would be wor

king se vera l miles a

way from the pipeline that day . I n terms of sec tion 9(c), CI TGO had conta cted F erguson, informed F erguson of its intent to b e present when his c rew s were
e xc a v a ti n g n e ar th e CA SA Pi p e li n e , an d c o n f ir me d th a t th e r e w o uld be no “start time” f or such
e x c a v a t i o nt h a td ay. Although F erguson disputed Be nnett’s ver sion of this conversation, the jury 10time of that excavation” a nd that “[o] nly if Citgo complied with these require ments and there was a c o n fi rm ed s t ar t t i m e, wo u l d Ap p el l an t s h av e h ada d u t y t o n o t i fy C i t go t h at t h ey

wa n t edt o ch an ge the start ti me and rea ch an ag ree ment as t o when to beg in excavation.” We ge nera lly ag ree that the burden is initially

upon the oper ator to comply with th e re q u i re m ents of sec tion 9(c) be fore any du tie s ari se un de r it on the pa rt of the e xcavator
. As we have e xpla ine d, the dis tr ic t c ourt c or re c tly place d this burden in the jury char g e. The Association further urg es that “the re is no evide nce or insufficient e vidence that Citgo ever made a request t o be pre sent during the excavation tha t ac tua lly took place ne ar the Luling si te or that Citg o co mpl ie d with its ob lig a tio n to ‘c on fi rm the sta rt tim e of the e x cavation.’” (Empha sis added). The Association’s appa rent prem i s e is that an ope rator’ s c on fi rm a tio n th a t no excavation will be occ urringat a location on a particula r day does not suffice to “ c on fi rm the sta

rt tim e ” of an e xcavatio n. Simi larl y , it su g g e sts tha

t if the e xcavator

su bs e qu e ntl y re ne g e s and e xcavate s the re any wa y wi tho ut inf

or min g the op e rator , the op e ra tor wi ll h a ve fa ile d to advis e t he excavator of its intent to be prese nt “during the excavation that ac tually took place” despite havingbeen a ssured that the e x cavation would not be occur ring at all. To the contra

ry , we conclude from the tex t and st ructure of section 9(c) that an oper ator would ne cessa rily “conf irm the sta rt tim e ” of an e xcavatio n if it c on fi rm e d tha t the e xcavat or w ou ld st art no e xcavatio n at a particula r location on a particula

r day , to the same e x tent as if the e x cavator provided a time at which it a c tua lly wo uld sta

rt e xcavatin g . I n eithe r ca se , if the e xcavator su bs e qu e ntl y

de c ide d to de viate fro m th at un de rs tand ing , s e c tio n 9 (c ) w ou ld r e qu ir e it t o “ no tif y the op e ra

tor to s e t a mut ua lly ag ree d-to time.” 27 could have rea sonabl y cre dited Be nnett’s ac count, and it was the jury ’s province to resolve the conflict in the manne r it did. See City of Keller , 168 S.W .3d at 819, 822 (we may not substit ute our judgme nt for the jury ’s, and we must defer to the jury ’s deter

minations of

the cr edibility

of the witnesses, the we ight to be g iven the testimony , and the r esolution of evid en t i ar y conflicts.) The evidenc e wa s leg ally

and fa ctually

sufficie nt to support the jury ’s finding in Questi o n 1 2 B that CI TGO ha d complied with section 9(c ).

I n lig ht of the jur

y ’s fi nd ing that CI TG O h a d c omp lie d w ithse c tio n 9 (c ), a pp e lla nts would not have “ fully

complied” with the one-c all statute unless they also complied with their duties
un de r s e c tio n 9 (c ). Qu e sti on 12 C su bmi tte d w he the r M a sT e c /Wild e or C& S “ the n r e sp on d[e d] in
acc ord with requir ements for excavators as descr ibed i n Section 9(c) of t he Tex as One -Call Statute.”28

Appellants had the burden of proof on these issues. When a party challeng es the leg al suffic iency of the e vidence supporting a n adver se finding on an issue on which it has the burden of proof, that party must demonstrate on appe al that the evidence conclusively established, as a matter of law, all vital fac ts in support of the issue. Do w Ch e m. Co. v . F ra nc is , 46 S.W .3d 237, 241 (Tex. 2001). When a par

ty attacks the fac tual suffici en cy o f an adve rse f inding on a

n issue on which he ha s the burde n of proof

, he must demo n s t ra t e o n appea l that the adver se findingis ag ainst the g reat weig ht and pre pondera

nce of the evidenc e. Id
. Th e e vid e nc e is le g a lly and fa c tua lly su ff ic ie nt, if
no t un dis pu te d, that CI TG O was n e ve r n oti fi e d th a t a Ma sT e c /Wild e ri p c re w w ou ld, c on tr ary to F e rgus on ’s state me nts , b e e xcavatin g ne ar the pip e lin e a ft e r a ll. Ap pe lla nt d o n ot d isp ute that th is
e vid e nc e su

pp or ts the jur y ’s fi nd ing s in 12C beyon d ass e rt ing that “th e jur y ’s ans we r to 1 2C s ho uld be dis reg arde d ” bec ause “ [t ]hough the jury found that De fenda

nts failed to notify

the pipeline opera tor o f

th e e xc a v a ti o ns ta

rt t im e , th e r e c o r d

s h o w s D e f

e n d an ts g a v e n u me r o u s n o ti f ic a ti o ns wi thi n the tim e fr a me re qu ir e d by statut e .” I n sup po rt , a pp e lla nts c ite to t

he c op ie s o f t

he on e -c a ll notifications in e vidence , which, it emphasizes, “Citgo c oncede d that it rece ived.” Althoug h copies of the one-ca ll notifications may be probative of whe ther MasTe c/Wilde or C&S complied with the notification requir ements of se ction 9(a) or (b) , so as to support the jury ’s finding s in Question 12A, the jury ’s finding in 12C instead turned on the nature of the communications betwee n CI TGO a nd Fe rg uson after

CI TG O’ s r e c e ipt

of F e rgus on ’s on e -c a ll n oti fi c a tio ns . Appellants als o ar gu e that we must disreg ard the jury ’s finding s in Question 12C be c a us e (1 ) t he e vid e nc e is l e g a lly

and fa c tua lly su ff ic ie nt t o s up po rt th e ju ry ’s fi nd ingin Question 12B that CI TGO complied with se ction 14; a nd (2) Question 12C w as predic ated on theCI TG O b ri ng s a c ro ss- po int

in w hic h it

c on te nd s th e e vid e nc e is l e ga lly and fa c tua lly 11 sufficie nt to support the jury ’s finding s in Question 12A that both Ma sTec/Wilde and C&S g ave “ the notice re quired by

Section 9(a) and 9(b) of the Texas One-Call Statute.” Spec ifically , CI TGO a rg ues that th e re is n o e vid e nc e that any on e oth e r t ha n Cl int F e rg us on , a C&S emp loy e e , ma de on e -c a ll notifications in c onnection with the Texas L oop Project work a nd that these c alls by

C&S did not suffice when the “ excavator” who damag ed its pipeli n e was MasTec /Wi lde. B eca use we have o v e r r u l e d a p p e l l an t s ’ c h a l l e n g e t o t h e j u r y f i n d i n g s t h a ts u

p p o rtt h e j u d g m e n tr e g ar d i n g i m m u n i t y, we ne e d n ot r e a c h CI TG O’ s c ro ss- po int
. 29 jury ’s conjunctive f

inding in 12B that CI TGO complied with both section 9(c) and section 14. Even assuming these contentions to be valid, howeve r, the rema ining jury finding s would still support the judgme nt, for re asons we ha ve pre viously

sug g ested. B eca

use the jury

found in Question 12B that CI TGO ha d compl i ed with section 9(c) so as to invoke appe llants’ duties under that pr ovision, appellants c ould not prevail on their immunity defe nse—i.e., that t

h e y “ fully complied” with the one

call statute—unless they

obtained fi n d i n gs in Question 12C that they complied with section 9(c ). Con se qu e ntl y , if

the jur y ’s a dv e rs e fi nd ing s in

Qu e sti on 12 C w e re dis re g ard e d, thi s w ou ld n ot a id appellants, but would instead r esult in the waiver of their i m m u n i t y d efense. See Te x. R. C iv. P. 279. Alternatively , beca

use fa ct u a ll y s u f f ic ie nt e vidence supports them, findings that MasTec /Wi lde and C& S failed to comply with section 9(c) would be de emed in support of the judgme nt. See id. We overrule appellants’ f ifth issue. 11 Finally , in their si x th issue, appellants urge that CI TGO’s r ecove ry should be barr ed
as a matter of “ public policy ” bec ause, the y ag ain urg e, CI TCO failed to mar k the CASA Pipeline in compliance w ith section 14 of the one-c all statute. Appellants invoke common-law c oncepts that have bee n applied to bar rec overy under a n insurance policy

wher e the c overe d loss was ca used b y th e p o li c y b e n e f

ic ia r y ’ s o w n in te n ti o n a l conduct. See Norman v . State Farm Fire &Cas. Co. ,30

804 F.2d 1365, 1366 (5th Cir. 1986). Equating CI TGO’s a lleg ed fa ilure to mark the CASA Pipeline
a s re qu ir e d by se c tio n 14 to su c h c on du c t a s ars on , a pp e lla nts re a so n th a t CI TG O s ho uld sim ila rl y be barr ed from “bene fitting from its own wrong doing” by rec overing damag es fro m t h e p i p eline rupture unde r neg lige nce a nd promisso ry es t o p p el t heorie s. Appellants cite no a uthority for extending the c oncept of Norman in this m anner , and we are awa re of none. We also obser ve that T ex as l aw al re ad y

ac co u n t s fo r t h e t y

p e o f “ wr o n g d o i n g” o f w h i ch ap p el l an t s co mp l ai nt h ro u gh pr op or tio nate re sp on sib ili ty . H e re , th e jur y a ttr ibu te d te n p e rc e nt o f t

he ne g lig e nc e tha

t pr oximate ly
c a u s e d t h e p i p e l i n e r

u p tu r e t o C IT G O , an d

r e d u c e d i t s r e c o v e r

y a c c o r d i n g l y. We further

observe that g iving e ffe ct to the common-law“public policy ” limitations on which appe llants rely would y iel d a re sult inconsist ent with the leg islative public policy judgme n t s ref

lected in the one -ca ll statute. The leg islature—the pr incipal ar biter of public policy under our tripartite sy stem of g overnme nt—has not seen f it to provide excavators immunity based
so le ly on the fa ilure of an o pe rator to m ark its un de rg ro un d f

a c ili tie s. I ns te a d, the e xcavator mus t also “fully

co m p l y ” with the statute. See fo rm e r a rt . 9 03 3, § 1 4( c ). Th e ne t e ff e c t of a pp e lla nts ’
ana ly sis wo uld

be to jud ic ia lly e lim inate or c ir c umv e nt one of the tw o s ta tut or

y e le me nts of

on e -c a ll act immunity . Finding no support for such a holding in either the one -ca ll statute or Texas common law, we overr

ule appe llants’ six th issue. Negligence liabi lity

I n their four

th issue, appellants contend that the jury ’s apportionment of fa ult under the neg lige nce f

indings wa s ag ai n s t t h e gre at weig ht and pre pondera nce of the evidenc e and w as manifestly unjust. As discussed, t he jury apportioned responsibility 50 perc ent to C&S, 30 perc ent31

to MasTec /Wi lde, 10 per cent to Bec htel, and 10 per cent to CI TGO. Appe llants urg e that “the g reat weig ht an d p re p o n d erance of the e vidence establishes that CI TGO wa s at least 51% at fault,” a perc entag e that would bar CI TGO from re cover ing in ne g lige nce. See Tex. Civ. P rac . & Re m. Code § 33.001 (West 2008).

I f a jury ’s ver dict is so ag ainst the great weig ht and pre pondera nce of the evidenc e as to be manife stly

unjust, we must rever se the judg ment. Se e In re Kin g’ s E sta te , 244 S.W .2d 660, 661 (Tex. 1951). I n deter

mining whe ther a finding was ag ainst the g reat weig ht and pre pondera nce of the evidenc e, the court of appea ls must consider and we igh a ll of the evidenc e, and c an set a side a finding only

if the evide nce is so we ak th at it is clearly wrongand unjust. Dow Chem. Co. , 46 S.W .3d at 241. Appellants e mphasize evidence that CI TGO re ceive d one-c all notifications reg ardingthe ong oing T exas L oop Project excavation, that CI TGO n ev er l o ca ted or mar ked the ac tual location of the CASA Pipeline, that Schulle place d and left in place stake s that cre ated a misleading impression reg ardingthe pipeline’s l ocation, and that CI TGO a nd not appellants had
acc ess to the maps and othe r information from which the pipeline’ s actua l location could have be e n de te rm ine d. I nd e e d, CI TG O d oe s n ot c ha lle ng e the jur y ’s fi nd ingthat it s w a s c on tr ibutor ily
ne g lig e nt. Howeve r, the jury also hea rd evide nce CI TGO and F erguson had an unde rstanding that Fe rg uson’s cre ws would not excavate ne ar the CASA Pi peline without prior notice to CI TGO and CI TGO’s r epre sentatives beingprese nt, a fa ctor that the jury rea sonably

could have c onsidered in d ra wi nginferences fr om t

he a c ts o r a lle g e d o mis sio ns of CI TG O p e rs on ne l th a t a pp e lla ntsFor example, Be ntley

testified that he did not believe it necessa ry t o re adjust the stakes 12 afte r dete rmining on Ma

y 6 that pipeline lay

to the east of the middle stake bec ause CI TGO ha d been assure d that no excavation would take pla ce at the location without prior notice. 32 attack. There was also evidence that both Fer g uson and B echte l employ ees ha d been inf ormed that 12 CI TGO had not y et located the pipeline’s prec ise location. Nonethele ss, both the rip cat operator and his supervisor testified that they had not bee n informed the pipe line had not been located. The jury
a lso he ard

e vid e nc e of

a ne ar- mis s w ithano the r u nd e rg ro un d fa c ili ty

on Ma y 6 th a t th e jur

y c ou ld
rea sonably

have c oncluded wa s cause d by simil ar c ommunication brea kdowns bet we en Fe rg uson
and his c re ws . We c ann ot c on c lud e that th e jur y ’s fa ilure to a llo c a te a t le a st 5 1 p e rc e nt o f f a ult to CI TGO is ag ainst the gre at weight and preponde ranc e of the evidence and is manifestly unjust. See R o s el l v. Central W

. Motor Stages, Inc. , 89 S.W .3d 643, 659-60 (Te x . App.—Dallas 2002, pe t. d e nie d) (t

he de te rm inatio n o f n e g lig e nt p art ie s’ pr op or tio nate re sp on sib ili ty

is a matte r w ith in the jury ’s sound discre tion). Negligence dam ages “Tulsa overhead” I n their third issue, appe llants attack the jury ’s award of past neg lige nce da mag es on the basis that there is leg ally and fa ct u al ly

insufficient e vidence to support the full amount of that
awa rd
. At tr ia l, CI TG O pr e se nte d s pr e a ds he e ts, ba c ku p d oc ume ntatio n, and

te sti mony

fr om a sa fe ty environmenta l manag er, K enny Holtgr eve, indicating that CI TGO had incurre d a tot al of $1,159,194 in e xpe ns e s f

ro m th e pip e lin e ru

ptu re and gasol in e sp ill un til date of tr ia l. T he jur

y ult imate ly
awa rd e d th is e nti re a mou

nt a s p a st n e g lig e nc e dama g e s.Th is i s th e te rm CI TG O u se s in

its sp re a ds he e t to ide nti fy thi s c a te g or

y of e xpe ns e s. 13 33 CI TGO’s c alculations pre sented to the jury included roug hly

$80,000 it claimed in emerg ency

response costs, $766,000 in remediation costs, $10,000 in los t product, and $15,000 in pay ments to the adjoining la ndowner to ga in ac ce s s t o the prope rty . The re maining
a mou nt— $2 87 ,7 80 .7 6—

wa s a fi g ur e int e nd e d to re fl e c t th e va lue of e mpl oy e e tim e , e quipme nt, materia ls, and other ove rhea d that CI TGO ha d to divert from norma l b u s i n ess operations when r esponding to the larg e g asol i n e s pill. I t is only the latter c omponent of past neg lige nce dama g e s—

wh ic h th e pa

rt ie s r e sp e c tiv e ly ter m “pr oje c t ma na g e me nt e xpe ns e s” or “ Tu lsa overhe ad” —that appellants c halleng e.

13 Ho ltg re ve te sti fi e d r e g ard ingthe ba se s f or CI TG O’ s c la im f

or $2 87 ,7 80 .7 6 in “ Tu lsa
ov e rh e a d. ” He te sti fi e d th a t CI TG O i nc ur re d s ig nif ic ant a dd iti on a l in te rn a l cos ts w he n h a vin g to div e rt e mpl oy e e s and

c omp any re so ur c e s f

ro m no rm a l bu sin e ss op e ra tio ns to r e sp on d to the sp ill
. Holtgr eve, f

or example, observe d that “[o] ne hundred perc ent of my time” was devoted to the pr oject in the spill’s im mediate a ftermath. He added that “people in the operations area in the field,” suc h
a s “ Sa m B e ntl e y

and his pe op le ” we re inv olv e d in the proje c t, a s w e ll a s “ a c c ounti ngpe op le who would have to keep track of the i nvoices,” “administrative pe ople who would g et the invoices to proce ss them,” and “ other manag ers who would manag e, over see w hat we did.” As Holtg reve put it, “ [i ]f the person’ s time is allocate d to do this proje ct instead of his norma l job, this is tim e lost by Citgo. Ther efor e, that is money that Citgo has lost beca use of the event.” Holtgr eve further noted that the work r equire d incre ased use of CI TGO tele phones and othe r equipment. To ref lect the va lue34

o f t h e s e l o s tco mp an y

re s o u rc es , Ho l t gre v e e x p l ai n ed , C I T GO i mp o s eda p er ce n t age s u rc h ar ge
or mark -u p in the same mann e r that it did wh e n pe rf or min g pr oje c ts, su c h a s r e loc a tin g pip e lin e s, f o r a t h i r d p art y. Holtgr ev e ex p lained that on such pr ojects, CI TGO would ordina rily char g e a
mana g e me nt fe e of 34 pe rc e nt that “ c ov e rs the sta ff ty pe of fu nc tio ns , the a c c ounti ng fu nc tio ns , the le g a l f

un c tio ns , t he hu man re so ur c e fu nc tio ns , ma

na g e me nt f

un c tio ns that are no t di re c tly
a sso c ia te d to Citg o, be c a

us e Citg o wo rk s fo r C itg o a nd we are no t in

the bu sin e ss o f d oin g pr oje c ts for other companies.” Holtgr eve opine d that such fees were “a common practice in the industry .” To approximate the value of i ts employ ees’ time and over head e x pended in the spill response and
reme diation, CI TGO, e ssentially treating the g asoline spill as i f i t was a projec t being perf ormed for a third par

ty , multipl ied those costs by 34 perc ent, yielding the $287,780.76 fig ure. Appellants ar g ue that there is leg ally and fa ctually

insufficient e vidence that CI TGO incurre d $287,780.76 in lost employ ee time a n d re s o u rc es . They

point out that C I TGO did not attempt to qua

ntify or prove the actua l a mount or value of its lost overhe ad eve n though H oltgr eve acknowl ed ged t h at CI TGO’s a ccountingdepar tment could have tr acke d those fig ures. As f or the basis of the 34 pe rce nt mark-up, Holtg reve conce ded that he ha d no persona l knowledg e re g arding how that perc entag e figure ha d been de rived, e x plaining only that “[i] t’s a number

that [C I TGO] had g ener ated in the pa st based off of some study

that [i t] had done some wher e in the past” a nd “wa s associate d with the projec ts w hen I started dealing with the m.” CI TGO did not elabor ate fu rt h er reg ardingthe orig ins of the “Tulsa ove rhea d.”35 CI TGO responds that there was suff icient evidenc e that CI TGO incur red substantial lost employ ee time a

nd resour ces w hen re sponding t o t h e pipeline r upture. I t also sugg ests that appellants wa ived any

complaint reg ardingthe orig ins of the “Tulsa ove rhea d” bec ause they did not prese rve obje ctions to the admission of Holtgr eve’ s testimony or the submission of a broa d-for m question on neg lige nce da mag es. Que stion 3 of the char g e aske d: “What sum of money , if paid not in c a sh , w ou ld fai rl y and rea so na bly c omp e ns a te CI TG O f

or the dama g e s in c ur

re d in the pa st
re su lti ng fr om the ru

ptu re of the CA SA Pipe lin e .” Th e jur y wa s instru c te d to c on sid e r t he re a so na

ble
c os ts i n Ca ldw e ll Co un ty , T e xas ( 1) “ to r e sto re the CA SA P ipelin e to t he c on dit ion

it w a s in immediat el y befor e the oc curr ence in question” and (2) “to re spond to and reme diate the spill,” including “ rea sonable a

nd nece ssary

clea n-up costs and monitoring expenses.” B e cause Holtgr eve’ s testimony reg ardinglost employ ee time a nd the 34 per cent mar

k-up wa s i n ev i dence and the char g e per

mitted the jury

to consider it, CI TGO re asons, appe llants cannot now c ompla i n that the jury did so. I n t h i s reg ard, both pa rties emphasize that appe llants objected to and obta ined an i n s t r u c t i o ni nt h e p a s tp r o m i s s o r y e s t o p p e l d a m a g e s qu e s t i o n , “ D o n o ti n c l u d e T u l s a o v e r h e a d
. ” In response to appellants’ objec tion, the district court stated that it “didn’t hear any evidenc e” of

“what the 34 per cent wa s” or how this fee C I T GO char g ed to third parties w as probative of dama g es CI TGO incur

red in c onnection with the spill. Howeve r, appe llants did not request a simi l ar i n s t r u c t i o ni nt h e o t h e r

w i s e - p ar a l l e l qu e s t i o nf

o r p a s tn e g l i g e n c e d a m a g e s . A s i ttu r n e d o u t , t h e j u r

y, wh ile awa

rd ing$1 ,1 59 ,1 94 .7 5 in

pa st n e g lig e nc e dama g e s, awa rd e d o nly $8 71 ,4 13 .9 9 in

pa st36

promissory

estoppel dama g es—a diff ere nce of $287,780.76, corr esponding prec isely to the amount of “Tulsa overhe ad.” On this recor d, sufficie nt evidence would support the jury ’s awa rd of $1,159,194.75 in p a st n e g lig ence da

ma g e s o nly

if the re wa s su ff

ic ie nt e vid e nc e tha

t CI TG O i nc ur

re d at le a st $2 87 ,7 80 .7 6 in

“ Tu lsa ov e rh e a d. ” Th e e vid e nc e su pp or ts n o mo re tha

n s pe c ulatio n a s to that f

a c t. Although H oltgr eve did allude g ener ally to “people in the operations area in the field,” “ acc ounting people,” “administrative pe ople,” a nd “other manag ers” having to devote all of their time to the projec t for some unspecified period afte r t he accident, he provided no ba sis to quantify the value of that time, such as salarie s and the like, other than the 34 per cent mar k-up that CI TGO used on thirdparty projec ts. CI TGO’s me thodology i n d et ermining that perc entag e wa s never explained. Nor does CI TGO re fer

us to any other evidence in the record from which the jury rea sonably

could have inf e rr e d t hat th e c omp any

ha d in c ur

re d at le a st $ 28 7, 78 0. 76 in l os t e mpl oy e e tim e or ov e rh e a d in
connec tion with the pi peline rupture. Consequently , the evidence is leg ally insufficient to support the jur y ’s awa rd of the fu ll amou

nt o f $ 1, 15 9, 19 4. 75 in p a st n e g lig e nc e dama g e s. Appel l an t s do not dispute, however , that leg ally and fa ctually

sufficie nt evidenc e supports the a

war d of the other

components of pa st neg lige nce d am age s , wh ich total $8 71 ,4 13 .9 9. Whe re , a s h e re , w e c on c lud e tha t th e re is i ns uf

fi c ie nt e vid e nc e to s up po rt the fu ll
a mou nt o f a dama g e s awa

rd bu t su ff ic ie nt e vid e nc e to s up po rt a les ser award , we may

su g g e st a remittitur. See Spring W indows Fashions Div., Inc . v. The Blind Make r , 184 S.W .3 d 8 40, 889- 90 (T e x. Ap p. —A us tin

20 06 , p e t. g ra

nte d, rem and e d b y

a g r. ); Te x. R. A

pp . P. 46 .3 . T he pa

rt y pr e va ili ngin t

he tr ia l c ourt

mus t be g ive n th e op tio n o f ac c e pti ng the re mittit ur or havin g the c a seAp p el l ants asser ted this challeng e ag ainst the jury ’s finding s reg ardingboth future 14 neg lige nce a

nd future pr omissory

estoppel dama g es. As t o ea ch , the jury awa rded the sum of $668,250.00. 37 rema nded for a new tria l. Sp rin g W ind ows , 184 S.W .3d at 889-90. Acc ording ly , in our opi nion on orig inal submissi on, we sug g ested a remittitur of $ 2 8 7 , 780.76, the diffe renc e betwe en the jury ’s
awa rd of $1,159,194.75 in past ne g lige nce da mag es an d t h e amount of such damag es that the
e vid e nc e su

pp or ts. I n response t o o u r s u g g estion of re mitti tur, CI TGO filed w ith the district clerk a
re mit tit ur of $2 87 ,7 80 .7 6 o f t

he pa st n e g lig e nc e dama g e s awa rd e d in the dis tr ic t c ourt ’s jud g me nt. Acc ording ly , we ref

orm this portion of the district c ourt' s judgme nt to awa rd CI TGO $871,413.99 in p a st n e g lig e nc e dama g es ins te a d o f $ 1, 15 9, 19 4. 75 . Si mil arl y , a s w e have ov e rr ule d a pp e lla nts ’
c ha lle ng e s to the po rt ion s o f the dis tr ic t c ourt ’s jud g me nt a pp or tio nin g 80 pe rc e nt r e sp on sib ili ty to MasTec for CI TGO’s ne g lige nce damag es and 10 perc ent re sponsibili ty to Be chtel, we ref

orm the district court’s judg ment to awar d CI TGO $697,131.19 in past neg lige nce da mag es fr om MasTec rathe r than $927,355.80, a nd $87,141. 4 0 in past neg lige nce da mag es fr om Be chtel rather than $1 15 ,9 19 .4 8. We l ike wi se re fo rm the dis tr ic t cou rt’ s awa rd of pr e jud g me nt i nte re st o n th e se
a mou nts to a wa rd CI TG O $ 17 8, 08 1. 64 fr om M a sT e c and $2 2, 26 0. 21 fr om B e c hte l.
Fut ure dam ages I n their sec ond issue, appellants a rg ue that CI TGO c annot re co v er fut ure da mag es beca use the testimony

of CI TGO’s damag es expert, David Sweeten, w as unre liable and should have been e x cluded. Ap pe lla nts br ou g ht a

pr e tr ia l mo tio n to e xclu de Swe e te n’ s te sti mony a s unr e lia ble 14MTBE sta nds for methyl-tertiar

y -butyl-ether , a common additive to g asoline. 15 38 on groun ds th at t here was no bas is for an as su mp ti o n t h a t t h e “pl um e” of ben z ene an d M TBE 15 contamination from the g asoline that had esc aped the ruptured CASA Pipeline had e x tended into the
surr ound ingare a

be y on d Pl um C re e k, an a re a wate rw ay . I f Swe e te n’ s tes tim on y ha d b e e n p ro pe rl y
e xclu de d, a

pp e lla nts c on te nd , th e re is n o e vid e nc e of futur e dama g e s. A tri a l court ’s de c isi on to ad mit or e xclu de e xpe rt

te sti mony

is r e vie we d f

or an a bu se of discre tion. Helena Che m. Co. v. W ilkins , 47 S.W.3 d 486 , 499 (T e x. 20 01 ). “ Th e te st f or a bu se of discre tion is whether the trial co u rt acte d without refe renc e to any g uiding r ules or princ iples.” E.I. du Pont de Nem ours & Co. v. Robinson , 923 S.W .2d 549, 558 (Tex. 1995). I f a party opposes and objects to the admission of expert testimony , the proponent be ars the bur den of de monstrating its admissi bility
. Robinson , 923 S.W .2d at 557.

Expe rt te sti mony

is a dmi ssi ble if

(1 ) t he e xpe rt is q ua lif ie d, and (2 ) t he te sti mony

is rele vant and ba sed on a r eliable f oundation. W

ilkins , 4 7 S. W.3 d at 49 9; Robinson , 923 S.W .2d at 556. Scientific testimony is unreliable if it is not gro unded “in the me thods and proce dures of scienc e,” a

nd amounts to no more than a “subjec tive belief or unsupported spec ulation.” Robinson , 9 2 3 S
. W
. 2 d

at 5 5 7 (q u o t i n g Daubert v. M errell Dow Pharm., Inc

. , 509 U. S
. 5 7 9, 590 (1993))
. Expe rt te sti mony

is a lso un re lia

ble if “ the re is s imp ly too g re a t an an a ly tic a l ga p b e tw e e n th e data and the opinion proff

ere d.” Gammill v. Jack W illiams C hevrole t , 972 S.W .2d 713, 727 (Tex. 1998) (q u o t i n g Gene ral Elec. Co. v. J oiner , 522 U.S. 136, 146 (1997)). F a c tor s u se d b y

c ourt s to de te rm ine wh e the r e xpe rt te sti mony

is r e lia ble inc lud e :39 1. the extent to which the theory has bee n or ca

n be tested; 2. t h e ex t en t to which the technique relies upon the subjective int e rp re ta tio n o f t

he e xpe rt ; 3. whether

the theory has bee n subjected to pe er r eview a nd/or publication; 4. the technique ’s potential rate of e rror ; 5. whe th er t he u nd erl y in g theo ry or t echn iq ue h as b een generall y acc epted a s valid by

the re levant scie ntific community ; and 6. the non-judicial uses which have been made of the theory or technique.
Robinson , 923 S.W .2d at 557. These fac tors are non-exclusive and fle x ible. Id.

Sweeten te stified conce rning two estimates of futur e c l ea n -up costs that he ha d prepa red. I n his f irst e stimate, which he had prepa red in e arly 2004, Sweeten calc ulated total future costs as $668,250.00. In his second estima te , which he pr epar ed in Novembe r 2004, Swee ten re vised these c alculations i n light of intervening developments to y ield a tot al of $1,270,000.00 in estimated future c lean- up costs. T h e fo cu s of appe llants’ challeng e is Sweete n’s assumption in his second
c os t e sti ma te tha

t c on tamin a tio n h a d e xten de d f ro m th e ru ptu re sit e be y on d Pl um C re e k. Ap pe lla nts attack this assumption in light of Swee ten’s admission that h e h ad not completed a de lineation of the plume beyond the cr eek.

The jury ultimately

awa rded $ 668,250.00 in future damag es under both CI TGO’s
ne g lig e nc e and

pr omi sso ry e sto pp e l the or ie s, an a mou nt c or re sp on din g pr e c ise ly to S we e te n’ s f ir st
c os t e sti mate. Con se qu e ntl y , if Swe e te n’ s te sti mony

re g ard inghis fi rs t c os t e sti ma te is r e le va nt, is reliable, a

nd was prope rly

admitted, that evidenc e alone could support the jury ’s future damag es40

awa rd. We conc lude t h at t h e district court did not abuse its discre tion in admitt ing Swe eten’ s testimony reg ardinghis first cost estimate. Sweeten’ s first cost estimate was based on an are a on the spill si de of Plum Creek, on which we ll testing had shown that MTBE a nd benzene we re a

bove ac cepta

ble TCEQ-a

pproved levels. The da

ta retrie ved fr om these tempora ry wells included points within a specific are a betwe en the rele ase site and Plum Cree k and exhibi ted levels of both MTB E and benzene t h at ex cee ded the TCEQ ac cepta

ble levels. The se data

points created a c ircular are a of contamination from whic h Swe e te n c a lc ulate d th e e sti ma te d c le an- up c os ts. Ap ply ing his e xpe ri e nc e to t

he se data po int s, Sweeten te stified to future e nvironmental cle an-up c osts totaling $668,250.00.

A c c o r d i n g t o t h e r e p o rtp r e p ar e d b y S w e e t e n a s w e l l a s h i s a c c o mp an yi n g t e s t i m o n y, some of the f

actor s he consider ed in ar riving at the $668,250.00 estimate w ere :

• Groundwater monitoring and re porting : collecting semi-annua l g roundwater samples f

rom the per

manent m o n itoring w ells, as require d by

TCEQ for the life of the c lean- up projec t

• L abora

tory costs : costs incurre d from submission of the g ather ed sampl e s to a

la b f or ana ly sis

• Pilo t testi ng , a qu if e r p ump te st, and

re me dia l de sig n: t e sts to de te rm ine me tho ds of

ru nn ingsh or

t- sc a le or sh or t- dura tio n te sts to deter mine the appr opriate technolog y for inter im corre ctive ac tion, as require d by

TCEQ

• Sub mis sio n of APA R (Af fe c te d Pro pe rt

y As se ssm e nt Re po rt ) o r r isk a sse ssm e nt: c omp ilatio n o f a ll c oll e c te d d a ta

• Prepar e re sponse ac tion plan (RAP): prepa ra t ion of a re port, as require d by

the TCEQ41

• P re p ar e s i t e- s p ec i fi c d i s ch ar ge p er m i t : co s t s i n cu rr ed i no b t ai n i n g a permit to pump the water out so that contaminated water doe s not rea ch Plum Creek

• Remedial sy stem desig n, capital e quipment and construc tion: based on the data g ather ed, a r eport setting out the response action plan, including c apital costs for e quipment to be used

• Gene ral p r o

je c t m a n a g e me nt r eg ulatory

interfa ce: mana g ing the tasks and coor dinating the people a nd e q u ip me nt, including communications with TCEQ
Sw eete n testifie d

th a t h e th e nto o k

th e a b o v e li n e it e ms an d

p r o je c te d th e m o u t o v e r

th e n e xt few y ear s, to the extent that they wer e ong oing events. Sweeten a lso testified that he had pr epar ed sim ila r c os t e sti ma te s fo r CI TG O on ano the r p ipe lin e pr oje c t and on oth e r p ro je c ts f or oth e r c lie nts and that, ba s e d

o nth is e xp e r ie n c e , h e w a s g e n e r a ll y f a mi li ar w it h h o w mu c h th e s e c le an-up pr oc e dure s c os t.

Al tho ug h th e re ha d n ot y e t be e n a “ c omp le te de lin e a tio n” su ch tha t CI TG O d id not y et know the “ full ex t en t ” of the problem, some testing and delineation activities had bee n
c omp le te d—

no ta bly , th os e in t

he are a of the c on c e ntr a tio n c ir c le s o n w hi ch S weet en’s f ir st c os t estimate wa s based. Even assuming t hat appellants are corr ect in their a ssertion that there was no
e vid e nc e ho w f

ar the c on tamin a tio n e xten de d, the re wa s a t le a st e vid e nc e that the are a c on ta ine d in the conc entration circles—a nd the ar ea on w hich Sweete n’s firs t cost estimate was ba sed—wa s contaminated a ccor ding to TCEQ standa rds. C ontrary

to appellants’ a ssertion, Sweete n ag ree d that he nee ded more i n fo rm ati on to determine a final re medial technolog y , not that he nee ded more inf or ma tio n to cr e a te a re lia

ble c os t est imate a s to the de sig nate d ar e a . Wit h th e data po int s ava ila

ble to S we e te n, he wa s a

ble to c re a te a

re lia ble ini tia l c os t e sti ma te , wh ic h pr oje c te d c le an- up c os ts t oAppellants’ thirtee nth issue. 16 42 be $668,250.00. Although the full ext ent of the c ontamination may have be en unknown at the time, the figur e o f $668,250.00 was based on known, obje ctive data points. W e, ther efor e, conc lude that, b a s e d o n Sw e e te n ’ s e xp e r ie n c e an d th e kn o w n d a ta p o in ts , h is te s ti mo n y w it h r e s p e c t to the initial cost estimate was re liable, and the district court acte d within its discretion in admitting it. See Gam mill , 9 7 2 S. W. 2 d

a t 7 2 6 ( “ E xp e r ie n c e a lo n e ma y p r o v id e a

s u f f ic ie n t b a s is f

o r ane xp e rt’s testimony ”). A ccor dingly , we ove rrule a ppellants’ sec ond issue.

Attor ney’s fees

I n their re maining nine issues, appellants cha lleng e the district cour t’s awa rd of $295,357.25 in trial-level attorney ’s fe es an d another $75,000 in conditional appellate a ttorney ’s fee s. This awar d was ba sed on the jury ’s favorable finding s reg arding CI TGO’s pr omissory estoppel theory of recover

y , section 38.001(8) of t he civil prac tice and r emedies c ode, see Tex. Ci v. Prac. & Rem. Code Ann. § 38.001(8) ( West 2008) (authoriz ing attorney ’s fe es for claims for “ an ora l or
wr itt e n c on tr a c t” ), and

the e vid e nc e that th e dis tr ic t c ourt he ard re g ard ingthe a mou

nt o f s uc h f

e e s. Appellants asse rt essentially four ty pes of c halleng es to the attorne y ’s fe e aw ard. First, appe llants bring a

number of issues attacking CI TGO’s r ight to re cover under a promissory

estoppel theory . Appellants ar g ue that CI TGO presented no evidenc e of any damag es
c o mp e n s a b l e u n d e r a p r o m i s s o r

y e s t o p p e l t h e o r

y, that th e e vid e nc e is l e g a lly and fa c tua lly 16 ins uf fi c ie nt t o s up po rt th e jur y ’s fi nd ingthat CI TG O r e a so na bly re lie d o n a

ny pr omi se to i tsI ssue twelve. 17 Is s u e n i n e . In f

a c t , C IT G O h a d s o u g h t s u b m i s s i o n o f a n e g l i g e n t m i s r e p r e s e n t a t i o nt h e o r y, 18 to which appe llants objected on the gr ound that it had not been pled. T he district cour t refuse d the submissi on, and CI TGO doe s not complain of that ruling on appea l. I ssue eleve n. 19 I ssue ten. 20 I ssue fourte en. 21 As appe llants emphasize, Texas courts cu rr en t ly are split on t hat question. Com pa re 22 Doctors Hosp. 1997, L.P. v. Sambuca H ouston, L.P. , 154 S.W .3d 634, 635-38 (Te x . App.—Houston [14t h Dist.] 2004, pet. abat ed ) (h o lding that attorney ’s fe es ar e not re cover able unde r s ec t i on 38.001(8) f

or a pr omissory

estoppel cla im because such cla ims presuppose no “ o r a l or wr i t t en co n t ra ct ”) (q u o t i n g Subaru of Am ., Inc. v. David McD avid Nissan, Inc. , 84 S.W .3d 212, 226 (Tex. 2002) (“pr omissory estoppel doctrine presumes no c ontrac t exi sts”)), with Preload T ech., I nc. v. A.B. & J. C o nstr. Co. , 696 F.2d 1080, 1094- 95 (5th Cir. 1983) (Te x as law) (upholding awa rd of a tto rn e y ’s fe e s f

or pr omi sso ry

e sto pp e l c la im e nf

or c inga pr omi se that th e c ourt

c omp are d to 43 de tr ime nt, that C I T GO ’s “promissory estoppel” c laim “sounded in tort,” and that CI TGO’s 17 18
rec overy in neg lige nce eliminates any “injustice” that would justi fy the application of the promissory estoppel doctrine
. See, e .g. , Tra mm e l Cr ow C o. No. 60v . W

ill iam J e ffe rso n H ar k ins on an d J

e ff 19 Harkinson Inv estments, Inc

. , 9 4 4 S
. W
. 2 d 6 3 1 , 6 3 6 ( T e x . 1 9 9 7 ) ( p r o m i s s o r y e s t o p p e l “ m ay a

p p l y. . . if injustice can be avoided only by enfor ceme nt of the promise”) . Appellants also urg e that the jur y ’s c on tr ibutor

y ne g lig e nc e fi nd inga g a ins t CI TG O b ars its re c ov e ry un de r pr omi sso ry e sto pp e l,
as a matter of law , and , r e la te dly , th a t th e dis tr ic t c ourt a bu se d it s d isc re tio n in

re fu sin g to s ub mit 20

an“ u n c l e anh an d s ” i n s t r

u c t i o nt o t h e j u r

y. 21 I n the alter

native, in their e ighth issue, a ppellants argue that a p rom issory estoppel claim i s n o t a cla im for “a n oral or w ritten contra ct” that c an support an a war d of attorne y ’s fe es under section 38.001(8) of the civil prac tice and r emedies c ode. I n the fu rt he r a lte rn a tiv e , in

the ir 22an optio n c o n tr a c t)
. I n u np u b li s h e d o p in io n s , th is Co u rt h a d u p h e ld a tt o r

n e y ’ s f e e aw ar ds on promissory estoppel claims. See SafeEnv’t v . Pelzel &Assocs., Inc

. , No. 03-09-00721- CV, 1999 Tex. App. L EXI S 7628 (Tex. App.—Austin 1999, no pet.) (mem. op.). CI TGO disputes this conclusion, but maintains t h at if it must elect betwe en the two 23 theories, it would rec over ag ainst MasTec /Wi lde and C&S under promissory esto p p el (i n cludi ng attorney ’s fe es) a

nd ag ainst Be chtel in neg lige nce. 44 first issue, appe llants ur g e that CI TGO cannot “mix and match” rec overy of actua l damag es base d on its neg lige nce the ory

and attorne y ’s fe es under its promissory

estoppel theory , b u t m u s t be require d to elec t to rec over under only one of the theories. See JHC Ventures, L.P. v

. Fast Trucking, Inc. , 94 S.W .3d 762, 774 (Tex. App.—San Antoni o 2002, no pet). Finally , in the ir fiftee nth issue, 23

a pp e lla nts c omp la in t

hat CI TG O f

a ile d to segr e g a te its a tto rn e y ’s fe e s amon g va lid and inv a lid g r o u n d s o f

r e c o v e r y. We ag ree with appellants that CI TGO c annot re cover un d er a p ro missory

estoppel the or y be c a us e CI TG O p re se nte d n o e vid e nc e of the ty pes of dam ag e s th a t are c omp e ns a ble under suc h a theory
. As it ha s been rec og nized by the Texas Supreme Court, “[t] he func tion of the doctrine of

promi ssory

estoppel is . . . defe nsive in that it estops a promisor from deny ing the enfor cea bility of the promise.” See W hee le r v . W

hit e , 398 S.W .2d 93, 96 (Tex. 1965) (citing Re state me nt (Se c on d) of Con tr a c ts § 90 ( 19 81 )) ; see also I n re W eek ley Hom es, L.P. , 180 S.W .3d 127, 133 (Tex. 2005) (“w e have long rec og nized .
. . the defe nsive theory of promissory

estoppel.”)
. That is, promissory estoppel preve nts a promisor who has induced substantial ac tion or fore bear ance by another from deny

ing that promise if “injustice ca n be avoided only by

enfor ceme nt,” id. (citing Harkinson , 944 S.W .2d at 636), but “ it doe s not create a c ontrac t rig ht that does not otherwise e x ist,” Sun Oil Co. (Delaware) v. Made ley , 6 26 S.W. 2d 72 6, 73 4 ( Te x. 19 81 ); se e Hr us k a v . F irs t St ate45

Ba nk of D e an v ill e , 747 S.W .2d 783, 785 (Tex. 1988) . Rather, it mere ly “pre vents a pa

rty from ins ist ingup on

his str ic t le g a l r ight s”— i.e ., the ri g ht t o avo id h is p ro mis e a s n ot c on tr a c tua lly bindin g— “when it would be unjust to allow him to enforc e them.” In re W eek ley Hom es, L.P. , 1 8 0 S
. W
. 3 d

at 1 3 3 (q u o t i n g W

heele r , 398 S.W .2d at 96). A lt h o u g h p r o mi s s o r

y e s to p p e l m ay

b e th e b a s is f

o r ana f f ir mati v e c la im, W

h eele r , 398 S.W .2d at 96, the s upreme court ha s restricte d the ty pes of damag es a pr omissory estoppel plaintiff ca n rec over to “ enfor ce” a promise: “the promisee is to be a llowed to rec over no more than re liance da

mag es m easur ed by the detriment sust ained.” W heele r , 398 S.W .2d at 97. “Relianc e damag es, similar to out-of-poc ket re cover y , reimburse one for

exp en d i tures made toward the execution of the c ontrac t in order to restore the status quo befor e the c ontrac t.” Ha rt v . M oo re , 95 2 S. W.2 d 9 0, 97 (T e x. Ap p. —A mari llo 19 97 , p e t. d e nie d) ; see Re state me nt ( Se c on d) of Con tr a c ts § 3 49 (r e lia

nc e da ma g e s “ inc lud [e] ex pen di tur e s ma de in p re pa ra tio n f or pe rf or manc e or in perf ormanc e, less any loss that the party in brea ch can prove with rea sonable certainty the injured pa rt y wo uld have su ff

e re d h a d th e c on tr a c t be e n p e rf or me d” ); see a ls o Q uig le

yv . B e nn e tt , 227 S.W
. 3 d

5 1 , 5 6 ( B r is te r , J. , c o n c u r r in g an d d is s e n ti n g ) ( “ r e li an c e d a ma g e s ” f o r f raud “compe nsate for the pl aintiff’s out-of-pocke t expenditures”). In this way , relianc e dama g es protec t
a pr omi se e ’s “ re lia

nc e int e re st” in a c on tr a c t or pr omi se , o r h is i nte re st i n b e ingre imb ur se d f or los s
cause d by relianc e on the pr omise by being put in as good a position as he would have be en had the contra ct not been f

ormed or pr omise relied upon. Restate ment (Second) of Contrac ts §§ 344, 349; see Q uigley , 2 27 S.W. 3d

a t 56 (B ri ste r, J., c on c ur

ri ngand dis se nti ng ); O’Farrill Avila v. Gonzalez , 974 S.W .2d 237, 247 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 1998, pet. denied)
.46 Reliance damag es ar e distinguished f rom expectanc y

or “be nefit-of

-the-ba rg ain” damag es, which se rve to prote ct the promisee ’s “ex p ec tation interest,” or his interest in having the bene fit of his barg ain by being put in as g ood a position as he would have been ha d the contra ct or promise be en performe d. Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 344. Consequently , expectancy damag es like lost profits, for e x ample, ar e not re cover able ba sed on promissory estoppel. See Sun Oil Co. , 626 S.W .2d at 734 (“ The damag es re cover able by a par ty claiming estoppel ar e not
me a sure d b y

the pr of its that su c h p art

y ’s re lia nc e le d h im t o e xpe c t, b ut i nste ad are lim ite d to the a mou nt n e c e ssa

ry to c omp e ns a te that pa

rt y fo r a los s al rea dy

su ff e re d. ” ); Fretz Constr. Co. v. Southern Nat ’l Bank of Houston , 626 S.W .2d 478, 483 (Tex. 1981) (“D amag es re cover able in a
cas e o f p r o mi s s o r

y e s to p p e l a

r e n o t t h e p r o f it th a t t h e p r o mi s e e e xp e c te d , b u t o n ly th e a mount
nece ssary to restore him to the posit ion he wo u l d h av e bee n in had he not ac ted in relianc e on the pr omi se .” ). Simi larl y , co ns e qu e nti a l dam a g e s re su lti ng fr om the fa ilure to p e rf or m th e pr omi se
are likewise not rec overa

ble. Id. The limit ation of promissory estoppel dama g es solely

to relianc e damag es, rather than c ompensating for the loss of th e full bene fit of the bre ache d or unper formed
c on tr a c t or

pr omi se , r e fl e c ts the vie w that “[s]in c e the pr omi se e in s uc h c a se s is pa rt ly re sp on sib le for his fa ilure to bind the promisor to a leg ally sufficie nt contrac t, it is rea sonable to conc lude that all that is r equire d to a chieve justice is to put the promisee in the position he would have been in ha d he not ac ted in relianc e upon the pr omise.” W heele r , 398 S.W .2d at 97. As its pr omi sso ry

e sto pp e l “ re lia

nc e dama g e s, ” CI TG O ob ta ine d ju ry awa rd s f or its damag es re sulting fr om the pipeline rupture . Question 10 asked the jury t o deter mine the sum of money that “would fa irly and re asonably

compensate CI TGO for the damag es incurr ed in the47

pa st r e su lti ng fr om the de tr ime nta l re lia nc e fo un d in

Qu e sti on 9” (t he pr omi sso ry

e sto pp e l li a

bil ity iss ue ), inc lud ing“ the re a so na ble c os t in

Ca ldw e ll Co un ty , T e xas t o r e sto re the CA SA P ipe lin e to the condition it wa s in immediately befor e the oc curr ence ” and “ to respond to and r emediate the spill.” W ith the exception of the “Tulsa ove rhea d” instruction, pre viously discussed, Que stion 10 pa ra lle le d th e qu e sti on

on pa st n e g lig e nc e dama g e s, and the jur y awa rd e d dama g e s that dif

fe re d o nly with respec t to the “Tulsa over hea d ” am o u n t. Sim ilarly , Question 11 asked the jury to determine the sum of mo n ey that “would fa irly and re asonably

compensate CI TGO for

the damag es which in r e a so na

ble pr ob a bil ity wi ll b e inc ur

re d in the futur e res ultin g fr om t he ru ptu re of the CA SA Pipeline found in Question 9.” The jury awa rded identical future damag es for both ne g lige nce a nd pr omi sso ry

e sto pp e l. CI TG O d id n ot p re se nt e vid e nc e of “ re lia nc e dama g e s” a

pa rt from th e damag e s it
a ttr ibute s to the pip e lin e ru ptu re . I n CI TG O’ s vie w, the pip e lin e ru ptu re wa s “ a dir e c t r e su lt o f i ts relianc e on Clint Ferguson’s statement that Appe llants’ cre ws would not be working near CI TGO’s pip e lin e that da

y ” be c a us e it “ a c te d in

re lia nc e on Clin t F e rgus on ’s pr omi se and did no t se nd ou t a repr esentative to demand and supe rvise the uncovering of t he pipeline pr ior to excavation.” In turn, it contends that “[t] he envir onmental damag es found by the jury wer e a dir ect r esult of t he line rupture f rom respondingto the emer g ency , repa iring the line, reme diation of the soil, bioremediation of th e groundwater, testing and monitoring , to future monitoring and re mediation to remove the contamination.” We ca

nnot ag ree that the damage s from the pipeline r upture a re r eliance damag es t h a tC IT G O c anr e c o v e r

u n d e r i t s p r o m i s s o r

y e s t o p p e l t h e o r

y.48 CI TGO’s pr omissory

estoppel dama g es theory is that it shoul d rec over i t s costs of repa iring the pipeline and c leaningup the spill because (1) if F erguson had kept his promise to give CI TG O p ri or

no tic e be fo re it ex cavat e d n e ar t he CA SA P ipe lin e , ( 2) CI TG O w ou ld h a ve se nt a repr esentative to the site, (3) who, in tu rn , woul d have loc ated a nd uncover ed the pipeline, a nd (4) e nsured that a

ny excavation on the site would not ha ve ruptured the pipeline. CI TGO’s da mag es
are not reimburseme nt for any amounts it e x pended in r eliance on the promises, but compensation fo r c on se qu e nti a l lo sse s CI TG O c la ime d it inc ur re d w he n a

pp e l l a nt s f a i l e d t o p e r f o r m t he ir pr omi se s. Suc h d a ma g e s are in the natur e of e xpe c tanc y

dama g e s: the y

pla c e CI TG O i n th e po sit ion it c la ims i two u l d h av e b ee nh adt h e p r o m i s es b ee nk ep t
. S u ch d am age s ar e n o tre co v er ab l e t h ro u gh promissory

estoppel. See Sun O il Co. , 6 26 S.W. 2d a t 73 4; Fretz Constr. Co. , 626 S.W .2d at 483. Be cause there was no e vidence that CI TGO incur red r elian ce d amage s that can support rec overy

under its promissory

estoppel theor y , we sustain appellants’ thirtee nth issue. Consequently , the district court e rre d in awar d i n g C I T GO attorney ’s fe es. We do not rea ch and express no opinion reg ardingappellants’ othe r cha lleng es to the attorne y ’s fe es aw ard.
CO NC LU SION We reve rse the por

tion of the district court’s judgment awardingCI TGO attorney ’s f e e s o ni t s p r o m i s s o r

y e s t o p p e l t h e o r

y an d r e n d e r j u d g m e n tt h a tC IT G O t a k e n o t h i n g o nt h a tt h e o r y. As for CI TGO’s ne g lige nce c laim, we hold that the evide nce is leg ally insufficient to support the jury ’s awa

rd of $1,159,194.75 in past damag es, but there is sufficient evi d en ce t hat CI TGO incurre d $871,413.99 in suc h damag es—a differ ence of $287,780.76. In light of CI TGO’s r emittitur of $287,780.76 i n past neg lige nce damag es, we ref orm this portion of the district cour t’s judgme nt49

to awar d CI TGO $871,413.99 in pa st ne g lige nce damag es instead of $1,159,194.75. Simi larly , as we have overruled appellants’ cha lleng es to the portions of the district cour t's judg ment apportioning 80 pe rc e nt r e sp on sib ili ty

to M a sT e c fo r C I TG O’ s neg lig e nc e dama g e s and 10 pe rc e nt r e sp on sib ili ty to Be chtel, we ref

orm the di strict court’s judgment to awa rd C I TGO $697,131.19 in past neg lige nce damag es from MasTec rathe r than $927,355.80, a nd $87,141.40 in past neg lige nce da mag es fr om Be chtel rather than $1 1 5 , 9 1 9
. 48. We likewise ref orm the district court’ s awa rd of pr ejudg ment int e re st on the se a mou

nts to a wa rd CI TG O $ 17 8, 08 1. 64 fr om M a sT e c and $2 2, 26 0. 21 fr om B e c hte l. As re fo rm e d, we a ff

ir m th e dis tr ic t c ourt ’s jud g me nt.

_______________________________________ Bob Pembe rton, J ustice Be fore J ustices Pemberton, Waldrop and Smith; (J u s t i ce B. A. S m i t h No tp ar t i ci p at i n g) Reverse d and Rende red in pa rt; Reformed a

nd, as Refor

med, Affir med in part on Motion for Rehe aring Filed: De cembe r 19, 2008