NOT FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 

Plaintiff-Appellee, 

 v. 

ANTHONY PELAYO, AKA Raymond 

Jones, 

Defendant-Appellant.

No. 21-30249 

D.C. No. 

2:18-cr-00217-JCC-3 

MEMORANDUM*

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 

Plaintiff-Appellee, 

 v. 

JEROME ISHAM, 

Defendant-Appellant.

No. 21-30252 

D.C. No. 

2:18-cr-00217-RSM-9 

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 

Plaintiff-Appellee, 

 v. 

BRADLEY WOOLARD, 

No. 21-30265 

D.C. Nos. 

2:18-cr-00217-RSM-1 

2:18-cr-00217-RSM 

* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent 

except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.

FILED

JUL 31 2023

MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK

U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
2 

Defendant-Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Western District of Washington

John C. Coughenour, District Judge, Presiding

Argued and Submitted June 7, 2023

Seattle, Washington

Before: HAWKINS, CALLAHAN, and BRESS, Circuit Judges.

Anthony Pelayo, Jerome Isham, and Bradley Woolard appeal their 

convictions, following a jury trial, on multiple counts related to their conspiracy to 

possess fentanyl with the intent to distribute. Pelayo challenges the search of his 

iCloud account. Isham asserts that the government engaged in outrageous conduct

in failing to disclose to the district court his prior counsel’s alleged conflict of 

interest, and also challenges the dismissal of unvaccinated jurors. Woolard 

challenges the search of his home and claims a violation of his speedy trial right 

under the Sixth Amendment. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, and we 

affirm.

I. Anthony Pelayo

Pelayo contends that the district court erred in denying his motion to 

suppress evidence obtained from an allegedly invalid search warrant of his iCloud 

account. We review de novo the validity of a search warrant. United States v. King, 

985 F.3d 702, 707 (9th Cir. 2021). First, “[a] warrant must be supported by 
3 

probable cause—meaning a fair probability that contraband or evidence of a crime 

will be found in a particular place based on the totality of circumstances.” Id. 

(internal quotation marks and citation omitted). Second, “[a] warrant must not be 

overbroad.” Id.

Pelayo asserts that the warrant to search his iCloud account was “an 

unconstitutional general warrant,” which lacked particularity, was overbroad, and 

lacked temporal limitations as to search or retention of seized evidence. We 

disagree. We have upheld searches for “computer hardware,” “computer software,” 

and “records stored in the form of electronic or magnetic coding or on computer 

media.” United States v. Hay, 231 F.3d 630, 637 (9th Cir. 2000); see also United 

States v. Flores, 802 F.3d 1028, 1044–45 (9th Cir. 2015) (allowing search of 

Facebook account). The information sought here, which was stored in an iCloud 

account, is not materially different from the information that can be stored in “the 

device itself.” See Riley v. California, 573 U.S. 373, 397 (2014). Additionally, the 

warrant identified the accounts to be searched by phone number and Apple ID and 

it described the data to be disclosed by Apple and the evidence that the government 

could search for and seize. Although the categories of information that Apple was 

to produce encompassed the entirety of Pelayo’s iCloud account, the search and 

seizure of evidence was limited to the outlined crimes and specified twenty-one 
4 

types of evidence that the government could seize.

1 Thus, the warrant was not a 

general warrant, because it did not allow the executing officer to rummage through 

Pelayo’s iCloud account without discretion. Andresen v. Maryland, 427 U.S. 463, 

480 (1976). 

Pelayo’s argument that the government did not limit its request to Apple to 

exclude allegedly unnecessary information such as iTunes or iGames also lacks 

merit. Here, it is possible that these accounts contained evidence of a crime but, 

even if they did not, the search and seizure of data that was obtained from Apple 

was limited to evidence of the specified crimes. Although we have recognized that 

challenges such as over-seizing exist in electronic searching, we have allowed for 

two-step searches2 of electronically stored data. See Flores, 802 F.3d at 1044–45.

There was nothing improper about the government segregating the information 

provided by Apple. See id. at 1044–46; see also United States v. Schesso, 730 F.3d 

1 Pelayo challenges the warrant’s scope alleging there was no evidence of money 

laundering or firearm offenses. However, he did not raise this issue to the district 

court. See United States v. Oliver, 60 F.3d 547, 549 (9th Cir. 1995). Even if he had, 

based upon the agent’s experience and training, it was reasonable to believe that 

evidence of these crimes could exist in the large drug-trafficking ring at issue here.

See United States v. Parks, 285 F.3d 1133, 1142 (9th Cir. 2002).

2

 The two-step search process allows the government to seize electronically stored 

data and then allows the government to review the materials seized to determine 

what documents are responsive to the search warrant. See Flores, 802 F.3d at 

1044–45; see also Fed. R. Crim. P. 41(e)(2)(B).
5 

1040, 1046 & n.3 (9th Cir. 2013).

We also reject Pelayo’s arguments that an iCloud account is too broad a 

place to be searched. We do not require warrants to specify rooms in a house nor 

do we require warrants to specify files on a computer. See United States v. 

Henderson, 906 F.3d 1109, 1119 (9th Cir. 2018); United States v. Cannon, 264 

F.3d 875, 880–81 (9th Cir. 2001). The warrant was limited to evidence of specific 

crimes and listed twenty-one specific items related to those accounts. Even 

assuming that Apple could have segregated certain files in the iCloud account, 

officers had no way of knowing where they may have found evidence related to the 

alleged crimes. 

We also reject the argument that the warrant was not temporally limited. The 

warrant was limited to evidence after January 2013. That the officers segregated 

the seized evidence based on the relevant date ranges rather than Apple (which 

explained that temporal limitations in the iCloud account were not possible) does 

not undermine the warrant’s validity. 

Here, the warrant properly directed law enforcement to the particular place 

to be searched: Pelayo’s iCloud account. It also specified the time period of the 

documents to be searched, the offenses at issue, and the twenty-one specific items 

to be searched.3 Furthermore, Pelayo does not point to any evidence that was used 

3

 The government’s motion for judicial notice (Dkt. 25) is denied as moot.
6 

against him that was obtained through the allegedly overbroad provisions. 

Accordingly, the district court did not err in denying the motion to suppress. Nor 

did it abuse its discretion in declining to hold an evidentiary hearing on this issue.

II. Jerome Isham

A. Evidentiary Hearing 

The district court did not abuse its discretion in failing to hold an evidentiary 

hearing with regard to the government’s conduct surrounding its knowledge of two 

conflicts of interest concerning Isham’s prior counsel. See United States v. Hagege, 

437 F.3d 943, 951 (9th Cir. 2006). Both conflicts arose out of Isham’s counsel’s 

representation of Woolard and the confidential informant. 

Even assuming that the conflicts existed, the government did not engage in 

outrageous conduct by not notifying the district court of the conflicts. See United 

States v. Stinson, 647 F.3d 1196, 1209 (9th Cir. 2011). First, Isham’s initial 

indictment was dismissed, and Isham has had conflict-free counsel through the 

course of the proceedings on the operative indictment. Second, assuming any 

conflict bled over to the present proceedings, the government’s conduct was proper 

under the circumstances, and at the very least not outrageous. The government 

informed Isham’s counsel of the possible conflicts of interest as it became aware of 

them. Isham’s counsel and Isham had discussed the possible conflict with the 

confidential informant, which Isham’s counsel did not believe was a conflict. And 
7 

when Isham’s counsel questioned Isham about his relationship with Woolard, 

Isham denied knowing Woolard. Isham’s counsel represented to the government 

that there was no known conflict between Isham and Woolard. Cf. Holloway v. 

Arkansas, 435 U.S. 475, 485 (1978) (“An attorney representing two defendants in 

a criminal matter is in the best position professionally and ethically to determine 

when a conflict of interest exists or will probably develop in the course of a trial.” 

(internal quotation marks and citation omitted)). Regardless, Isham’s counsel 

would soon later withdraw from representing Woolard. And he withdrew from 

representing Isham after the government provided further information about the 

confidential source and raised the potential for a conflict. Any additional evidence 

that may have been obtained through an evidentiary hearing (i.e., when the 

government knew of the conflicts, what steps it took to discover the conflicts, why 

it did not inform the court, and whether it was responsible for the almost fifteenmonth delay when Isham’s counsel asked for continuance) would not alter the 

conclusion that the government’s conduct was not outrageous or that it did not 

prejudice Isham.

B. Voir Dire

Isham waived any challenge to the voir dire procedures and jury selection 

when his counsel did not object to the removal of persons unvaccinated for 

COVID-19 and accepted the jury. See United States v. Perez, 116 F.3d 840, 845 
8 

(9th Cir. 1997) (en banc) (“Forfeited rights are reviewable for plain error, while 

waived rights are not.”). Even if not waived and even if the district court 

improperly discharged unvaccinated persons, Isham failed to “establish a prima 

facie violation of the fair-cross-section requirement,” Duren v. Missouri, 439 U.S. 

357, 364 (1979), because, among other things, persons unvaccinated for COVID19 are not a “distinctive group” with similar “attitude[s], ideas, or experience,” see 

United States v. Fletcher, 965 F.2d 781, 782 (9th Cir. 1992).

Isham also failed to establish any prejudice based upon the district court’s 

voir dire procedures. United States v. Padilla-Mendoza, 157 F.3d 730, 733 (9th 

Cir. 1998). Although some confusion existed with regard to seating jurors, which 

the district court acknowledged, the district court remedied the error. The inclusion 

of one juror, who Isham would have excluded if the defense had additional 

peremptory challenges, is insufficient to establish that the jury was “presumptively 

biased.” See id. at 734. 

III. Bradley Woolard

A. Search Warrant

Woolard appeals the district court’s denial of his motion to suppress

evidence following an evidentiary hearing under Franks v. Delaware, 438 U.S. 154 

(1978). The district court found the investigating law enforcement agent’s 

testimony credible and found that the information the agent omitted from the 
9 

warrant affidavit was “innocent, or at worse negligent.” The district court did not 

clearly err in finding that the agent did not intentionally or recklessly omit the 

challenged facts from the warrant affidavit. See Anderson v. Bessemer City, 470 

U.S. 564, 575 (1985). The agent here credibly testified that some facts omitted 

from the warrant affidavit were unknown to the agent at the time of the drafting 

and other facts were determined not to be significant. Still others Woolard did not 

raise below. Having reviewed the omitted evidence, we conclude that the district

court did not err. See United States v. Perkins, 850 F.3d 1109, 1115 (9th Cir. 

2017).

B. Speedy Trial Right

Woolard challenges the denial of his speedy trial right under the Sixth 

Amendment. “To determine whether a defendant’s Sixth Amendment speedy trial 

right has been violated, [the court] balance[s] the following four factors: “[l]ength 

of delay, the reason for the delay, the defendant’s assertion of his right, and 

prejudice to the defendant.” United States v. Mendoza, 530 F.3d 758, 762 (9th Cir. 

2008) (quoting Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 530 (1972)). We review the

“district court’s decision on a Sixth Amendment speedy trial claim” de novo and 

review the findings of fact “underlying the claim . . . for clear error.” Id. The 

district court did not err in finding that Woolard did not establish he had not been 

deprived of his Sixth Amendment right.
10 

Woolard was indicted in September 2018 in a complex drug-trafficking 

conspiracy. The government issued four superseding indictments over the course 

of two years, charging additional defendants. The district court found that the 

majority of the delay was because of the “increased complexity” of the case, as the 

government added additional charges and co-defendants. See Barker, 407 U.S. at 

530–31. Although there was almost a three-year delay between Woolard’s 

indictment and trial, Woolard agreed to a delay of eighteen months and the 

additional delay was caused by a combination of the district court allowing 

additional time for newly charged co-defendants and the COVID-19 pandemic. 

There was no evidence that the government purposefully delayed its investigation 

or caused additional delays. And the district court determined that any prejudice 

suffered by Woolard was not caused by the delay in the trial but rather by COVID19 restrictions. Applying the Barker balancing test, the weight is not in Woolard’s 

favor. Accordingly, Woolard’s Sixth Amendment speedy trial right was not 

violated.

Based on the foregoing, the judgment of the district court is AFFIRMED.