PUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 

Plaintiff-Appellant,

v.  No. 08-5038

STEVE MAURICE COLEMAN,

Defendant-Appellee. 

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the District of South Carolina, at Columbia.

Matthew J. Perry, Jr., Senior District Judge.

(3:08-cr-00478-MJP-1)

Argued: October 15, 2009

Decided: December 4, 2009

Before TRAXLER, Chief Judge, WILKINSON,

Circuit Judge, and HAMILTON, Senior Circuit Judge.

Reversed and remanded by published opinion. Judge Wilkinson wrote the opinion, in which Chief Judge Traxler and

Senior Judge Hamilton joined.

COUNSEL

ARGUED: Thomas Ernest Booth, UNITED STATES

DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, Washington, D.C., for Appellant. David Truitt, SALLEY LAW FIRM, Lexington, South
Carolina, for Appellee. ON BRIEF: W. Walter Wilkins, III,

United States Attorney, Robert C. Jendron, Jr., Assistant

United States Attorney, OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES

ATTORNEY, Columbia, South Carolina, for Appellant.

OPINION

WILKINSON, Circuit Judge:

This case involves the consensual search of a bedroom by

police and the seizure of a pistol resulting from the search. As

explained below, we reverse the district court’s grant of the

motion to suppress the pistol. The district court viewed the

evidence through the lens of its later significance, but we hold

that the officers acted reasonably in seizing it based on what

they knew at the time.

I.

Steve Coleman, a convicted felon, lived with his girlfriend,

Amy Broome, in her Batesburg, South Carolina home.

Around 10:00 p.m., on September 21, 2006, two men broke

into Broome’s garage, and hid there while Coleman was at a

store with a friend. Upon Coleman’s return, he asked Broome

to open the garage for him. When Broome reached into the

garage to push the opener button, she was attacked and forced

back into the house by the two men. Coleman entered the

garage through the opened door and saw Broome in the house

struggling with the men. One of the men was pointing a gun

at Broome’s face. Coleman entered the home, pulled the

assailants from Broome, and ordered her to run outside.

Broome ran out to Coleman’s friend and called 911.

Meanwhile, Coleman started to leave the kitchen to check

on Broome’s sleeping son but was shot in the chest and hand

by one of the intruders. His assailants then fled through the

2 UNITED STATES v. COLEMAN
front door and to this day have not been apprehended. Bleeding, Coleman repaired to the master bedroom and retrieved a

9mm pistol from a night stand. In doing so, he left blood from

his wounds around the bedroom. Coleman took the gun and

went to the garage to make sure the intruders were gone.

Broome and Coleman’s friend entered the house, and Coleman gave Broome the gun and told her to "put it up." Broome

hid the gun under the mattress in the bedroom.

Because Broome’s home was some distance from a hospital, Coleman’s brother was called, and he took Coleman to

meet an ambulance. The Batesville police were the first to

arrive after Coleman left. Broome told them about the breakin and Coleman’s shooting. Lexington County Sheriff officers

from the Major Crimes Unit arrived next. They asked Broome

to sign a consent form to allow them to search the house for

evidence, which she did. Broome then spoke to Detective

Michelle Horton and gave a statement but omitted any mention of Coleman’s firearm.

The consent form gave officers the right "to conduct a complete search of the premises and the property, including all

buildings and vehicles, both inside and outside." Additionally,

it granted the officers "permission to take from my premises

and property, any letters, papers, materials or any other property or things which they desire as evidence for criminal prosecution in the case or cases under investigation." Broome later

testified that she did not verbally limit the police officers’

search in any way. In fact, she gave them permission to search

"anywhere in the house." Similarly, she testified that she did

not verbally limit the search to any particular officers.

Sergeant Oscar McIntosh, the supervisor on the scene, and

Detective Laura Grimes-Gould, the crime scene investigator,

entered Broome’s home pursuant to the consent form. Sergeant McIntosh testified that they found a large pool of blood

on the kitchen floor, with trails of blood leading from there

through the living room and out the front door, through the

UNITED STATES v. COLEMAN 3
mud room and into the garage, and into the master bedroom.

McIntosh did not know at the time whose blood was on the

floor. The officers knew that Coleman had been taken to the

hospital with gunshot wounds, but McIntosh testified that

there also was a suggestion that an intruder may have been

shot.

McIntosh and Grimes-Gould followed the blood trail into

the master bedroom. The blood went around the bed and was

also on the bedspread. From the location of the blood on and

around the bed, McIntosh believed that "someone . . . put

something under there." Detective Grimes-Gould lifted the

mattress and found the gun hidden beneath it.

The next day, September 22, 2006, officers from the Lexington County Sheriff’s Department interviewed Coleman and

Broome. Both admitted that Coleman grabbed the gun during

the course of the home invasion.

Coleman was indicted by a grand jury on May 22, 2008 for

being a felon in possession of a firearm, in violation of 18

U.S.C. § 922(g)(1). Because of his prior convictions, the

charge carried a mandatory minimum of fifteen years’ imprisonment. Coleman filed a motion to suppress all evidence

found in the search of his residence, which the district court

granted after an evidentiary hearing.

The district court emphasized that the gun turned out not to

have been used by the home invaders and that police came to

realize it was not evidence in the shooting of Coleman. Further, the court believed there was no reason for the police to

search the master bedroom and that the search exceeded the

scope of Broome’s consent. The district court also suppressed

Coleman and Broome’s statements to police the day after the

incident as fruits of the purportedly unlawful search and seizure. This appeal followed.

4 UNITED STATES v. COLEMAN
II.

In evaluating an appeal from a suppression order, we

review the district court’s factual findings for clear error and

its legal conclusions de novo. U.S. v. Moses, 540 F.3d 263,

268 (4th Cir. 2008); U.S. v. Kimbrough, 477 F.3d 144, 147

(4th Cir. 2007).

A.

Coleman first claims that the search of the master bedroom

was beyond the scope of the consent Broome gave to police.

He asserts that Broome only "authorized the police to search

the entire premises for any items relating to the crime against

Broome and Appellee that had recently occurred" and that the

search of the master bedroom was not related to that crime.

Br. of Appellee 10.

As courts have long recognized, "The touchstone of the

Fourth Amendment is reasonableness." Florida v. Jimeno,

500 U.S. 248, 250 (1991) (citing Katz v. U.S., 389 U.S. 347,

360 (1967)). Searches pursuant to consent are allowed

because "it is no doubt reasonable for the police to conduct a

search once they have been permitted to do so." Id. at 250-51

(citing Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 219 (1973)).

Of course, it would be patently unreasonable for police to

proceed to search a home pursuant to an involuntary consent.

But Coleman does not challenge the voluntariness of

Broome’s consent, nor could he. Viewed under the totality of

the circumstances, as required by Schneckloth v. Bustamonte,

412 U.S. 218, 227 (1973), Broome’s consent was voluntary.

In fact, it was in her interest to have officers search her house

for evidence that might lead to the apprehension of the men

who assaulted her and shot her boyfriend. In addition, the

consent form Broome signed stated, "Knowing of my lawful

right to refuse to consent to such a search, I willingly give my

permission." Such written consent to a search "supports a

UNITED STATES v. COLEMAN 5
finding that the consent was voluntary." See United States v.

Boone, 245 F.3d 352, 362 (4th Cir. 2001), and there is nothing

to suggest that any coercive tactics were employed here.

Where there is no question that consent was voluntary, the

real issue becomes the scope of the authorization given to the

officers. The Supreme Court has noted that "[t]he standard for

measuring the scope of a suspect’s consent under the Fourth

Amendment is that of ‘objective’ reasonableness – what

would the typical reasonable person have understood by the

exchange between the officer and the suspect?" Jimeno, 500

U.S. at 251 (citing cases); see also U.S. v. Smith, 395 F.3d

516, 519 (4th Cir. 2005).

In addition, contrary to the district court’s view, determinations about the objective reasonableness of a search are made

as of the time when the search takes place, based on the information available to officers at that time. U.S. v. Di Re, 332

U.S. 581, 595 (1948); cf. U.S. v. McCraw, 920 F.2d 224, 227

(4th Cir. 1990) (probable cause for arrest evaluated based on

facts and circumstances known at the time). Just as facts

uncovered at a later date cannot justify an unreasonable

search, so also they cannot undermine a reasonable one. Di

Re, 332 U.S. at 595; Michigan v. DeFillippo, 443 U.S. 31

(1979) (search incident to arrest not invalid even though law

violated by arrestee was later held unconstitutional).

B.

Here, the officers reasonably interpreted the scope of

Broome’s consent to search. Most importantly, the language

of the consent form is quite broad, belying Coleman’s claim

that the search exceeded the scope authorized. The document

Broome signed gave permission "to conduct a complete

search of the premises and the property, including all buildings and vehicles, both inside and outside." (emphasis added).

Broome also testified at the suppression hearing that she gave

officers permission to search "anywhere in the house" and did

6 UNITED STATES v. COLEMAN
not verbally restrict the search in any way. Given the breadth

of this authorization, it is difficult to say that the police were

anything but reasonable.

"The scope of a warrantless, but consensual, search is generally defined by its expressed object," U.S. v. Marshall, 348

F.3d 281, 287 (1st Cir. 2003) (citing Jimeno, 500 U.S. at 251).

That legal limitation was satisfied here. The "expressed

object" of the search in the present case was evidence relating

to an assault and shooting, and blood trails that lead to firearms are obvious examples of objects that are well within the

scope of a shooting investigation.

That having been said, the giver of consent, in this case

Broome, controls the scope of consent. It is perfectly within

a homeowner’s rights to give a limited consent to search. As

the Supreme Court has stated, an individual "may of course

delimit as he chooses the scope of the search to which he consents." Jimeno, 500 U.S at 252. No such limits being imposed

here, however, there is no reason why we should invent them.

Again, it is not surprising that Broome gave such a broad consent. It was in her interest to allow a wide search because her

home had been invaded, she had been assaulted, and her boyfriend had been shot.

Not only was the bedroom within the scope of the consent

search, but the officers also would have been derelict in their

duty not to follow a blood trail from the kitchen. Far from not

being part of the crime scene, as Coleman argues, see Br. of

Appellee 15, nothing less than a trail of blood led to the master bedroom from the kitchen where the shooting occurred.

Further, at the time of the search the officers had no way

of knowing whose blood trail they were following. They

knew that Coleman had been shot, but Sergeant McIntosh also

testified that there were reports that one of the intruders may

have been shot as well. At a minimum, the trail of blood was

likely to lead to evidence of some kind, even if nothing more

UNITED STATES v. COLEMAN 7
than physical corroboration of events as told by witnesses.

Furthermore, for all that the officers knew, the trail of blood

could have led directly to a suspect, or it could have led to

another victim in need of assistance. In short, there were any

number of reasons why officers, based on what they knew,

behaved reasonably by following the blood trail.

C.

For the same reasons, it was reasonable for Detective

Grimes-Gould to lift the mattress in the master bedroom

where the gun was found once the officers reached the end of

the blood trail. As already noted, Broome consented to a

"complete search" of her home, and Sergeant McIntosh

believed from the blood stains on the bed and floor that

"someone . . . put something under [the mattress]." It was reasonable for officers investigating a shooting pursuant to a

complete consent to look under a mattress where it appeared

that a wounded individual may well have hidden something.

What exactly the mattress concealed, and what its significance might be, was at the time uncertain. Things whose significance is not clear at the outset may, in light of other

evidence, be very significant indeed. Conversely, evidence

that may seem significant at first may turn out not to be so.

To hold that lifting this mattress was unreasonable, however,

would be to halt an investigation in its tracks, indeed at the

very point when an objectively reasonable officer would surmise that fruitful evidence might be forthcoming. The fact

that the gun the police found in the bedroom later turned out

to be unrelated to Coleman’s shooting is simply irrelevant to

the question of whether the officers acted reasonably at the

time. Judgments are best rendered by understanding circumstances confronting actors at the time that they act, see, e.g.,

U.S. v. Buckner, 473 F.3d 551, 555 (4th Cir. 2007); Altman

v. High Point, 330 F.3d 194, 206-07 (4th Cir. 2003), and

nothing in the Fourth Amendment departs from that sound

principle.

8 UNITED STATES v. COLEMAN
III.

Having established that the search was reasonable, we may

readily resolve the related issues of the seizure of Coleman’s

gun and the suppression of Coleman and Broome’s subsequent statements to police. With regard to the seizure,

Broome gave officers "permission to take . . . any letters,

papers, materials or any other property or things which they

desire as evidence for criminal prosecution in the case or

cases under investigation." Thus the issue becomes whether

the officers at the time reasonably believed the evidence

seized might be related to the crime. As the Supreme Court

explained in Warden v. Hayden, police must have "cause to

believe that the evidence sought will aid in a particular apprehension or conviction." 387 U.S. 294, 307 (1967).

It was entirely reasonable for the officers to believe the gun

would aid in their investigation. First, they were at the scene

to investigate a shooting, and pistols clearly relate to shootings. Second, it was objectively reasonable to seize a gun at

the end of a blood trail. Finally, the officers had no way of

knowing whether or not the pistol they found had been used

to shoot Coleman, an intruder, or someone else entirely. The

events of the evening were chaotic, to say the least, and it was

hardly incumbent on the officers to clear up the confusion on

the spot. Based on what the officers knew, the seizure of the

gun was plainly reasonable.

Both the search and the seizure being reasonable, Coleman

and Broome’s subsequent statements are not fruit of any poisonous tree. See Wong Sun v. U.S., 371 U.S. 471 (1963). No

violation of the Fourth Amendment having occurred, admissions regarding Coleman’s possession of the gun in response

to police questioning about it should not have been suppressed.

UNITED STATES v. COLEMAN 9
IV.

While we note the irony of a shooting victim being arrested

while his assailants are never apprehended, that unfortunate

result does not change the proper outcome. Coleman was a

convicted felon and as such it was unlawful for him to "possess . . . any firearm or ammunition." 18 U.S.C. § 922(g). The

fact that other serious wrongdoers remain free does not

impeach the lawfulness of the officers’ conduct or bear upon

the resolution of Coleman’s legal claims. Because the officers

who searched Broome’s home acted in an objectively reasonable manner, the district court’s suppression ruling must be

reversed, and the case remanded for further proceedings consistent with this decision.*

REVERSED AND REMANDED

*Because we hold that the search and seizure were objectively reasonable, we need not address the government’s alternative claim that the seizure of the pistol was justified under the Fourth Amendment’s plain view

doctrine. 

10 UNITED STATES v. COLEMAN