Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 18A-CR-2099 | March 29, 2019 Page 1 of 7

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D), 

this Memorandum Decision shall not be 

regarded as precedent or cited before any 

court except for the purpose of establishing 

the defense of res judicata, collateral 

estoppel, or the law of the case.

ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT

Karen M. Heard

Evansville, Indiana

ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE

Curtis T. Hill, Jr.

Attorney General of Indiana

Lauren A. Jacobsen

Deputy Attorney General

Indianapolis, Indiana

IN THE

COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA

Kyle James Fravel,

Appellant-Defendant,

v.

State of Indiana,

Appellee-Plaintiff.

March 29, 2019

Court of Appeals Case No.

18A-CR-2099

Appeal from the Vanderburgh 

Circuit Court

The Honorable David D. Kiely, 

Judge

Trial Court Cause No. 82C01-

1512-F2-7795

Riley, Judge.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 18A-CR-2099 | March 29, 2019 Page 2 of 7

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

[1] Appellant-Defendant, Kyle Fravel (Fravel), appeals the trial court’s revocation 

of his probation and imposition of his previously-suspended sentence. 

[2] We affirm.

ISSUE

[3] Fravel raises one issue on appeal, which we restate as follows: Whether the 

trial court abused its discretion in revoking his probation and ordering him to 

serve the totality of his previously-suspended sentence. 

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

[4] On December 14, 2015, sixteen-year-old Fravel and some of his friends robbed 

a nearby residence. Fravel waited in the car while his friends kicked in the door 

of the residence. During the robbery, one of the residents was held at gunpoint, 

while the other had a machete held to his chest. Fravel admitted that he was 

aware of the plan to commit the robbery.

[5] On March 22, 2016, the State filed an amended Information, charging Fravel 

with eight Counts: burglary, a Level 2 felony; aiding, inducing, or causing 

burglary, a Level 2 felony; armed robbery, a Level 3 felony; two Counts of 

aiding, inducing, or causing armed robbery, Level 3 felonies; two Counts of 

armed robbery, Level 3 felonies; and criminal mischief, a Class B misdemeanor. 

On August 16, 2016, the State filed an “Information for Sentencing 

Enhancement for Person Committing Felony Offense While A Member of A 
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Criminal Gang.” (Appellant’s App. Vol. II, p. 71). That same day, Fravel pled 

guilty to aiding, inducing, or causing armed robbery, as a Level 3 felony, and 

the criminal gang enhancement; the State dismissed all other charges. On 

October 18, 2016, the trial court sentenced him to three years for the Level 3 

felony, enhanced by another three years for the criminal gang adjudication. 

Fravel was ordered to serve the first sixteen months of his sentence in a juvenile 

facility, where he obtained his GED. Upon completion of this placement, 

Fravel’s sentence was modified by placing him on probation and he was 

released on October 17, 2017. As a condition of his probation, Fravel was 

required to either find employment or attend school. 

[6] On October 25, 2017, Chanze Merrick (Merrick) and Tyler Flota (Flota) 

arranged to purchase marijuana from Fravel. The meeting took place in 

Fravel’s car. Merrick had not met Fravel previously but found his voice 

distinctive. After Fravel gave Flota the marijuana, Flota and Merrick took off 

running without paying Fravel. While running, Merrick heard several 

gunshots. When police officers responded to the scene, they discovered Flota 

who had been shot in the leg. During a preliminary investigation, Flota 

identified Fravel as the shooter. After Fravel and Merrick were both arrested 

and booked into the jail, Fravel came up to Merrick, asking him “do you 

remember me . . . my name is [Fravel].” (Transcript Vol. I, p. 33). Merrick 

recognized the name and the voice. Merrick entered a guilty plea a couple of 

weeks later, in which he agreed to testify truthfully if called to do so. After 
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Merrick entered his plea and returned to jail, Fravel approached him, advising 

him to back out of his plea agreement and to take his case to trial. 

[7] On October 26, 2017, the State filed a petition to revoke Fravel’s probation. On 

August 2, 2018, the trial court conducted a consolidated bench trial on the 

probation revocation petition and Fravel’s new criminal charges. Flota was 

granted use immunity to testify against Fravel, but he refused to testify for fear 

of retaliation. Because the trial court concluded that without Flota’s testimony 

there was insufficient evidence beyond a reasonable doubt that Fravel was the 

shooter, the trial court only found him guilty of dealing in marijuana, as a Class

A misdemeanor. Thereafter, based on this new misdemeanor conviction, the 

trial court revoked Fravel’s probation in the current cause and ordered him to 

serve the remaining portion of his previously-suspended six-year sentence in the 

Department of Correction (DOC).

[8] Fravel now appeals. Additional facts will be provided if necessary.

DISCUSSION AND DECISION

[9] Fravel maintains that the trial court abused its discretion when it remanded him 

to the DOC to serve the remainder of his previously-suspended sentence. 

Probation is a matter of grace left to the trial court’s sound discretion, not a 

right to which a criminal defendant is entitled. Prewitt v. State, 878 N.E.2d 184, 

188 (Ind. 2007). The trial court determines the conditions of probation and 

may revoke probation if the probationer violates those conditions. Id. We 

review a trial court’s probation violation determination using an abuse of 
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discretion standard. Jackson v. State, 6 N.E.3d 1040, 1042 (Ind. Ct. App. 2014). 

An abuse of discretion occurs where the trial court’s decision is clearly against 

the logic and effect of the facts and circumstances before it or where the trial 

court misinterprets the law. Id. In determining whether a trial court has abused 

its discretion, we neither reweigh evidence nor judge witness credibility. Ripps 

v. State, 968 N.E.2d 323, 326 (Ind. Ct. App. 2014). Instead, we consider 

conflicting evidence in the light most favorable to the trial court’s ruling. Id. 

[10] Probation revocation is a two-step process, wherein the trial court first makes a 

factual determination as to whether the probationer violated the terms of his 

probation. Woods v. State, 892 N.E.2d 637, 640 (Ind. 2008). Then, if a violation 

is found, the court determines whether the violation warrants revocation. Id. 

Because a probation revocation proceeding is civil in nature, the State need only 

prove the alleged probation violation by a preponderance of the evidence. 

Holmes v. State, 923 N.E.2d 479, 485 (Ind. Ct. App. 2010). Proof of a single 

violation is sufficient to permit a trial court to revoke probation. Beeler v. State, 

959 N.E.2d 828, 830 (Ind. Ct. App. 2011), trans. denied.

[11] After Fravel was found guilty of the Class A misdemeanor dealing in 

marijuana, the trial court could impose, in the current cause, one or more of the 

following sanctions: (1) continue Fravel’s probation, with or without 

modifying or enlarging the conditions; (2) extend his probationary period for 

not more than one year beyond the original probationary period; or (3) order 

execution of all or part of the sentence that was suspended at the time of the 

initial sentencing. Ind. Code § 35-38-2-3(h). Pursuant to the statute, the trial 
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 18A-CR-2099 | March 29, 2019 Page 6 of 7

court elected to order the execution of all of Fravel’s previously-suspended 

term. 

[12] Analogizing to recent case law in which we reversed a trial court’s probation 

revocation because it failed to consider the particular facts and circumstances of 

the defendant, Fravel maintains that his specific situation did not warrant the 

imposition of the entire previously-suspended sentence. See, e.g., Ripps v. State, 

968 N.E.2d 323, 328 (Ind. Ct. App. 2012) (Trial court abused its discretion by 

imposing the entire previously-suspended sentence where defendant was 

terminally ill and was attempting to adhere to his probation conditions); 

Sullivan v. State, 56 N.E. 3d 1157, 1162 (Ind. Ct. App. 2016) (Trial court abused 

its discretion by imposing the entire previously-suspended sentence where 

defendant was at a mental health hospital at the time he was required to report 

to probation). Focusing on his age, his success at the juvenile detention facility

where he obtained his GED, and the nature of the misdemeanor conviction, 

Fravel maintains that the imposition of his six-year sentence amounted to an 

abuse of discretion and should be reversed.

[13] We disagree. Unlike the precedents relied upon by Fravel, the circumstances 

leading to Fravel’s probation revocation were not outside of his control; rather, 

Fravel intentionally committed a new crime which resulted in a misdemeanor 

conviction. Just over a week after beginning his probation, Fravel was already 

dealing marijuana and suspected to be involved in a shootout after the deal 

turned sour. After being arrested and while awaiting trial in jail, Fravel 

attempted to influence the victims and witnesses against him.
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[14] Furthermore, we find Fravel’s reliance on his particular situation to be 

misplaced. Pointing to his GED as a circumstance in his favor, he fails to 

acknowledge that obtaining his GED was a requirement under his probation 

and therefore cannot be considered a mitigating circumstance. While his young 

age of nineteen could have been a favorable factor, “for people in their teens 

and early twenties [age] is not the end of the inquiry. There are both relatively 

old offenders who seem clueless and relatively young ones who appear 

hardened and purposeful.” Ellis v. State, 736 N.E.2d 731, 736 (Ind. 2000). 

Fravel appears to fall in this second category. At age nineteen, Fravel has 

already been convicted and served sixteen months for the role he played in an 

armed robbery with an additional enhancement for gang involvement. He then 

committed this second criminal offense—with an allegation of being armed—

just one week after beginning his probation.

[15] Viewing the circumstances of this particular case, we cannot say that the trial 

court abused its discretion by ordering Fravel to serve his entire previouslysuspended sentence.

CONCLUSION

[16] Based on the foregoing, we affirm the trial court’s revocation of Fravel’s

suspended sentence and imposition of his previously-suspended six-year 

sentence.

[17] Affirmed.

[18] Bailey, J. and Pyle, J. concur