IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA

No. 19-0372

Filed May 1, 2019

IN THE INTEREST OF J.W., K.W., and G.J.,

Minor Children,

K.W., Mother,

Appellant,

G.J., Father of G.J.,

Appellant.

________________________________________________________________

Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Johnson County, Jason A. Burns, 

District Associate Judge.

Parents separately appeal the termination of their parental rights to their 

child, and the mother additionally appeals the termination of her parental rights to 

two of her other children. AFFIRMED ON BOTH APPEALS. 

Sara Strain Linder of Bray & Klockau, P.L.C., Iowa City, for appellant 

mother.

Ellen R. Ramsey-Kacena, Cedar Rapids, for appellant father of G.J.

Thomas J. Miller, Attorney General, and Anna T. Stoeffler, Assistant 

Attorney General, for appellee State.

Anthony Haughton of Linn County Advocate, Inc., Cedar Rapids, guardian 

ad litem for minor children.

Considered by Vaitheswaran, P.J., Tabor, J., and Scott, S.J.*

*Senior judge assigned by order pursuant to Iowa Code section 602.9206 (2019).
2

SCOTT, Senior Judge.

Parents separately appeal the termination of their parental rights to their 

child, G.J., born in 2015, and the mother additionally appeals the termination of 

her parental rights to two of her other children, J.W. and K.W., born in 2009 and 

2011.1 The father argues the Iowa Department of Human Services (DHS) failed 

to make reasonable efforts to facilitate reunification and termination is not in G.J.’s 

best interests because a guardianship could have been established in the paternal 

grandmother. The mother challenges the sufficiency of the evidence underlying 

the grounds for termination cited by the juvenile court, argues termination is not in 

the children’s best interests due to the parent-child bond, and maintains she should 

have been granted additional time to work toward reunification. 

I. Background Facts and Proceedings

The parents lived in Illinois when the youngest child was born in 2015. A 

few months later, the mother and children moved to Iowa. The father stayed in 

Illinois, living with his mother; he has never lived on his own and has always relied 

on his mother for stable housing. Thereafter, contact between the father and G.J. 

was infrequent. The mother has a history of involvement with child-welfare 

services in Illinois and suffers from depression. Both parents have histories of

criminal activity. 

The children came to the attention of DHS in August 2017 upon information 

that the mother left the youngest child without proper supervision for at least ninety 

minutes. A subsequent child-abuse assessment was founded for denial of critical 

 

1 The parental rights of the latter two children’s respective fathers were also terminated. 

They do not appeal. 
3

care. The next day, DHS learned the mother intended to turn herself in on criminal 

charges and leave the children with their maternal grandmother. DHS advised the 

maternal grandmother was an inappropriate caregiver and the children should not 

be left with her. The mother agreed she would not leave the children with the 

maternal grandmother. Three days later, however, DHS learned the mother left 

the children with the maternal grandmother. The children were removed from the 

mother’s care and placed in DHS custody on August 28. The mother left the 

children with the maternal grandmother or allowed them to be around her on a 

number of occasions throughout the life of the case despite being told the maternal 

grandmother was an inappropriate person to be around the children. 

Both parents appeared at the September 1 removal hearing, during which 

all parties stipulated to continued removal.2 The court’s removal order noted the 

“father supports a return of the children to their mother if possible; but if that is not 

possible, he requests the children be placed with him [and] specifically requests 

an expedited” home study pursuant to the Interstate Compact on the Placement of 

Children (ICPC). The court authorized DHS to conduct an ICPC study as to the 

father’s home but did not expressly order that one be conducted. The DHS worker 

testified that the mother was doing well in progressing with case-plan goals at this 

time. Ultimately, a trial home placement of the children with the mother 

commenced on September 7. 

 

2 The only transcript contained in the record on appeal is for the termination hearing. We 

are required to discern the details of the remaining hearings from the juvenile court orders 

following those hearings. 
4

An uncontested adjudication hearing was held on September 27. The order 

of adjudication mandated that “upon request of [the father], . . . [DHS] establish a 

visit plan between [the father] and his child. The [DHS] is given discretion to 

determine the frequency, duration, and level of supervision as deemed 

appropriate.” The court also ordered that a social-history report be completed. 

Both parents were provided social-history questionnaires, but only the mother 

completed and returned it to DHS. The social-history report ultimately concluded 

placement with the mother was the best current alternative, while placement with

any of the children’s respective father’s was not an option because none of them 

have had any involvement in the children’s lives. A family team meeting was held 

the day after the adjudication hearing. A case plan subsequently filed by DHS 

noted the father was called several times to be invited to the meeting but he did 

not respond. The plan also noted a visit was set up for the father at his request, 

but he did not show up for it. 

During the trial home placement, there were continuing concerns regarding 

the children’s attendance at school. There were also ongoing concerns for the 

mother’s mental health and who she was allowing to supervise the children. DHS 

requested the mother to undergo a mental-health evaluation early on in the case, 

but the mother did not do so until shortly before the termination hearing. Substance 

abuse also became a concern. Specifically, in December 2017, the mother was 

kicked out of her shelter for testing positive for marijuana. Thereafter, DHS 

requested the mother to submit to drug testing. The mother declined to do so until 

August 2018, at which time she tested positive for marijuana. Thereafter, DHS 
5

requested the mother to submit to random drug testing, but the mother did not 

report to any of the random tests. 

At the dispositional hearing in December 2017, the State and DHS 

requested that the trial home placement with the mother end and the children be 

placed in family foster care. The court declined to terminate the trial home 

placement but provided DHS could terminate the placement upon violations of the 

safety or permanency plans or for the children’s safety. The court noted in its order 

that “reasonable efforts were made” and “[t]here are no requests for additional 

services.” On January 5, 2018, DHS ended the trial home placement and placed 

the children in foster care after learning the mother did not follow through on 

facilitating the youngest child’s attendance at protective daycare and the mother 

and children became homeless. 

A permanency-review hearing was held in February, which neither parent 

attended. The court continued the permanency goal as reunification with the 

mother and granted an additional six months to work toward reunification as to the 

youngest child. Counsel for the mother did not request any additional services, 

but the father’s counsel requested that DHS “follow up on the ICPC home study 

regarding his home.” The court ordered DHS to, within ten days, “follow up on 

ICPC home study request by . . . father to ascertain that Iowa has done its part 

and to expedite the home study progress.” In May, DHS filed an updated case 

plan in which it noted the father had not engaged in services and stated:

This worker has been trying to obtain an ICPC home study of his 

home in Chicago, IL however, this has been unsuccessful. This 

worker no longer has a valid phone number for [the father] and the 

address he supplied to this worker when the case began mail is being 
6

returned to this worker—return to sender, attempted—not known—

unable to forward.

At the termination hearing, the DHS worker testified she has only had limited 

contact with the father, which occurred early on in the case. She testified she sent 

the father letters at his Illinois home every month in an attempt to communicate 

with him and get him involved in the case. However, in July, DHS learned from 

G.J.’s paternal grandmother the father was in prison in Kentucky “and is not going 

to be getting out anytime soon.” The father testified at the termination hearing he 

was imprisoned on charges of fraudulent use of a credit card and tampering with 

evidence but he would be paroled in July 2019. The paternal grandmother asked 

if she could be considered a placement option for G.J. DHS initiated an ICPC 

home study request to Illinois as to the grandmother. The only service the father 

requested after the commencement of his incarceration was to have an ICPC 

home study conducted as to the paternal grandmother’s home. He did not contact 

DHS to request visitation by any medium at his place of incarceration, nor did he 

alert the juvenile court of any concern regarding visitation.

By August 2018, DHS recommended that the permanency goal be modified 

to termination of parental rights. At the subsequent permanency-review hearing, 

the court ordered that the ICPC home study as to the paternal grandmother be 

completed as quickly as possible and authorized visitation between G.J. and the 

grandmother through electronic means. However, the court also directed the State 

to initiate termination proceedings. Thereafter, DHS began facilitating electronic 

communication between the paternal grandmother and G.J. and also initiated the 

ICPC process, which was eventually approved. 
7

The mother was generally consistent in attending visitation with the children 

throughout most of the case, with some exceptions. Although the mother 

progressed from fully-supervised to semi-supervised visitation, her attendance at 

visitations sharply declined in the months leading up to the termination hearing. 

The mother had inconsistent housing and employment during and before the life 

of the case. The mother’s dishonesty with service providers has been a major 

issue throughout the case. The mother made no attempt to address her 

substance-abuse or mental-health issues until shortly before the termination 

hearing. The mother did not follow through with treatment recommended as a 

result of her substance-abuse evaluation, nor did she meaningfully participate in 

mental-health treatment.

The State filed its termination petitions in September. At the termination 

hearing in December, the father requested termination be averted and a 

guardianship of G.J. be established in the paternal grandmother. The two older 

children have stated concern for the youngest child being placed with the 

grandmother in Illinois. Given the young age at which G.J. moved from Illinois with 

his mother, he has a limited relationship with the father and paternal grandmother. 

All three children are currently residing in the same foster home and have a strong 

bond with one another; the establishment of a guardianship in and placement with 

the paternal grandmother would require that the children be separated. All the 

children have adjusted to their foster home and are thriving in that placement. The 

foster parents stated their willingness to provide a “forever home” for all three 

children. 
8

The juvenile court ultimately terminated the mother’s parental rights to J.W. 

and K.W. under Iowa Code section 232.116(1)(e) (2018) and terminated both 

parents’ parental rights to G.J. under section 232.116(1)(e) and (h). As noted, both 

parents appeal.

II. Standard of Review

Appellate review of termination-of-parental-rights proceedings is de novo. 

In re L.T., 924 N.W.2d 521, 526 (Iowa 2019). “We are not bound by the juvenile 

court’s findings of fact, but we do give them weight, especially in assessing the 

credibility of witnesses.” In re A.S., 906 N.W.2d 467, 472 (Iowa 2018) (quoting In 

re A.M., 843 N.W.2d 100, 110 (Iowa 2014)). Our primary consideration is the best 

interests of the children, In re J.E., 723 N.W.2d 793, 798 (Iowa 2006), the defining 

elements of which are the children’s safety and need for a permanent home. In re 

H.S., 805 N.W.2d 737, 748 (Iowa 2011).

III. Analysis

A. Father’s Appeal

On appeal, the father argues DHS failed to make reasonable efforts to 

facilitate reunification3 and termination is not in G.J.’s best interests because a 

guardianship could have been established in the paternal grandmother. 

 

3

In his petition on appeal, the father also includes an argument concerning the sufficiency 

of the evidence underlying the statutory grounds for termination cited by the juvenile court. 

The father does not challenge the State’s establishment of the statutory elements of either 

ground. Instead, he only challenges the sufficiency of the evidence concerning 

reasonable efforts. As such, we consider the sufficiency-of-the-evidence argument 

together with the reasonable-efforts argument. 
9

1. Reasonable efforts

The father argues DHS did not make reasonable efforts to facilitate 

reunification because no visitation plan was established and the ICPC home study 

was not completed at the outset of the case. “DHS is to provide ‘every reasonable 

effort to return the child the child’s home as quickly as possible consistent with the 

best interests of the child.’” L.T., 924 N.W.2d at 528 (quoting Iowa Code 

§ 232.102(7)). 

The juvenile court’s September 27, 2017 order of adjudication noted the 

father’s request “that [DHS] establish a visit plan between [the father] and his 

child.” The court ordered, “The [DHS] is given discretion to determine the 

frequency, duration, and level of supervision as deemed appropriate.” A family 

team meeting was held the day after the adjudication hearing, and the record 

shows DHS called the father several times to attend but he did not respond. The 

record also shows DHS set up a visitation for the father at his request shortly after 

the adjudication hearing, but he did not show up for it. After the adjudication 

hearing, the father was largely uninvolved in the proceedings. DHS continued its 

efforts to contact the father using the information he provided, but it was unable to 

get in touch with him. Neither DHS nor the juvenile court were alerted to any 

complaint by the father regarding the adequacy of visitation services after he 

requested a visitation plan at the beginning of the proceedings; the complaint was 

not raised until the termination hearing. 

“While the State has the obligation to provide reasonable reunification 

services,” a parent carries “the obligation to demand other, different or additional 

services prior to the termination hearing.” In re S.R., 600 N.W.2d 63, 65 (Iowa Ct. 
10

App. 1999). After the father requested a visitation plan, the juvenile court put 

visitation between the father and G.J. within DHS discretion, and the father made 

no objections to the court concerning the inadequacy of visitation he was provided; 

he has consequently waived the opportunity to challenge the adequacy of visitation 

services on appeal. See In re L.M., 904 N.W.2d 835, 840 (Iowa 2017) (concluding, 

where visitation was placed within discretion of DHS and the guardian ad litem, 

failure to voice objections at subsequent hearings concerning the adequacy of 

visitation waives the issue); see also In re C.H., 652 N.W.2d 144, 148 (Iowa 2002) 

(noting complaints must be voiced to the juvenile court).

We turn to the ICPC study. In its early September 2017 removal order, the 

court noted, “[F]ather supports a return of the children to their mother if possible; 

but if that is not possible, he requests the children be placed with him [and] 

specifically requests an expedited” ICPC study. The court authorized DHS to 

conduct an ICPC study as to the father but did not expressly order that one be 

conducted. At the February 2018 permanency-review hearing, the father’s counsel 

requested that DHS “follow up on the ICPC home study regarding his home.” The 

court ordered DHS to, within ten days, “follow up on ICPC home study request by 

. . . father to ascertain that Iowa has done its part and to expedite the home study 

progress.” 

The father complains that the ICPC home study was not completed 

pursuant to these requests. Although we share the juvenile court’s frustration with 

the failure to complete the study in a timely manner, we agree with the juvenile 

court that the study was not a reasonable effort required of DHS at the times they 

were requested. Specifically, the permanency goal at both points was reunification 
11

with the mother, which the father stipulated to, and his initial request was for the 

completion of a home study in the event reunification with the mother became

unattainable. As soon as the permanency goal began to veer toward termination 

of the mother’s parental rights, the maternal grandmother was identified as a 

potential relative placement while the father was incarcerated, and an ICPC home 

study as to her home was pursued and completed by DHS. Chapter 232 provides:

“[R]easonable efforts” means the efforts made to . . . eliminate the 

need for removal of the child or make it possible for the child to safely 

return to the family’s home. Reasonable efforts shall include but are 

not limited to giving consideration, if appropriate, to interstate 

placement of a child in the permanency planning decisions involving 

the child and giving consideration to in-state and out-of-state 

placement options at a permanency hearing and when using 

concurrent planning. If returning the child to the family’s home is not 

appropriate or not possible, reasonable efforts shall include the 

efforts made in a timely manner to finalize a permanency plan for the 

child. A child’s health and safety shall be the paramount concern in 

making reasonable efforts.

Iowa Code § 232.102(12)(a). An ICPC study was not a reasonable effort 

necessary to return G.J. to the home with the mother, a goal the father agreed was 

appropriate. When the viability of that goal began to wane, DHS pursued the 

father’s home as a potential placement. Upon our de novo review of the record, 

we conclude DHS met its reasonable-efforts mandate.

2. Guardianship

Next, the father argues termination is not in the child’s best interests 

because a guardianship could have been established in the paternal grandmother. 

The father cites In re B.T., 894 N.W.2d 29 (Iowa Ct. App. 2017), in support of his 

argument. Upon our de novo review of the record, we disagree with the father. 

First, simply stated, “a guardianship is not a legally preferable alternative to 
12

termination.” A.S., 906 N.W.2d at 477 (quoting B.T., 894 N.W.2d at 32). Next, 

although section 232.104(2)(d) allows for the establishment of a guardianship as 

a permanency option, section 232.104(3) requires “a judicial determination that 

[such a] planned permanent living arrangement is the best permanency plan for 

the child.” See B.T., 894 N.W.2d at 32–33. Determining the best permanency 

plan for a child is a best-interests assessment. In determining what is in the best 

interests of a child, we “give primary consideration to the child’s safety, to the best 

placement for furthering the long-term nurturing and growth of the child, and to the 

physical, mental, and emotional condition and needs of the child.” Iowa Code 

§ 232.116(2). 

G.J.’s relationship with the father and paternal grandmother is limited at best 

given the fact that he has had very limited contact with them for most of his life. 

Establishing a guardianship in the paternal grandmother and placing the child in 

her care would separate G.J. from his two older siblings, who he shares strong 

bonds with. Siblings should be kept together whenever possible. In re T.J.O., 527 

N.W.2d 417, 420 (Iowa Ct. App. 1994). Further, the child has been in the same 

foster placement for most of these proceedings. The child is integrated into this 

home, he is thriving, and the foster parents are willing to provide a “forever home” 

for the child and provide continued stability and permanency. Continued stability 

and permanency in this home are in this child’s best interests. See Iowa Code 

§ 232.116(2)(b); cf. In re M.W., 876 N.W.2d 212, 224–25 (2016) (concluding 

termination was in best interests of children where children were well-adjusted to 

home with their foster parents, the foster parents were “able to provide for their 
13

physical, emotional, and financial needs,” and the foster parents were prepared to 

adopt the children). 

Upon our de novo review of the record, we find establishment of a 

guardianship over G.J. in the paternal grandmother is not in the child’s best 

interests. We affirm the termination of the father’s parental rights. 

B. Mother’s Appeal

The mother challenges the sufficiency of the evidence underlying the 

grounds for termination cited by the juvenile court, argues termination is not in the 

children’s best interests due to the parent-child bond, and maintains she should 

have been granted additional time to work toward reunification.

1. Sufficiency of the evidence

The juvenile court terminated the mother’s parental rights to all three 

children under Iowa Code section 232.116(1)(e) and additionally to G.J. under 

section 232.116(1)(h). “On appeal, we may affirm the juvenile court’s termination 

order on any ground that we find supported by clear and convincing evidence.” In 

re D.W., 791 N.W.2d 703, 707 (Iowa 2010). 

As to termination under paragraph (e), the mother only challenges the 

State’s establishment of the final element of that provision, that she has “not 

maintained significant and meaningful contact with the child[ren] during the 

previous six consecutive months and ha[s] made no reasonable efforts to resume 

care of the child[ren] despite being given the opportunity to do so.” Iowa Code 

§ 232.116(1)(e)(3).

“[S]ignificant and meaningful contact” includes but is not limited to 

the affirmative assumption by the parents of the duties encompassed 

by the role of being a parent. This affirmative duty, in addition to 
14

financial obligations, requires continued interest in the child[ren], a 

genuine effort to complete the responsibilities prescribed in the case 

permanency plan, a genuine effort to maintain communication with 

the child[ren], and requires that the parents establish and maintain a 

place of importance in the child[ren]’s li[ves].

Id. While we acknowledge the mother has had contact with the children during the 

previous six consecutive months, such contact can hardly be described as 

significant and meaningful. The mother has refused to assume the duties 

associated with the role of being a parent. She has been given the opportunity to 

resume care for the children, but she has made no reasonable effort to do so. 

Although the mother made some progress early on, she regressed shortly 

thereafter, resulting in the end of the trial home placement, and there has been no 

progress since; matters have only gotten worse. 

Upon our de novo review, we conclude the State met its burden for 

termination under Iowa Code section 232.116(1)(e).

2. Best interests and statutory exception

The mother argues termination is not in the children’s best interests, see id. 

§ 232.116(2), because termination would be detrimental to the children due to the 

closeness of the parental-child relationship. See id. § 232.116(3)(c). We choose 

to separately address the often-conflated best-interests and statutory-exception 

arguments.

As noted, in determining what is in the best interests of a child, we “give 

primary consideration to the child’s safety, to the best placement for furthering the 

long-term nurturing and growth of the child, and to the physical, mental, and 

emotional condition and needs of the child.” Id. § 232.116(2). The mother’s 

progress in demonstrating her ability to be a responsible parent for these children 
15

has been stagnant for some time. Before DHS intervention, she had a lengthy 

history with child-welfare services in Illinois based on the same concerns. “We 

hold no crystal ball, and to some extent, the [best-interests] determination must be 

made upon past conduct.” In re M.M., No. 16-1685, 2016 WL 7395788, at *4 (Iowa 

Ct. App. Dec. 21, 2016). While we hope the mother is able to prevail in her battles 

with depression, other mental-health issues, and substance abuse, “we cannot 

deprive a child of permanency after the State has proved a ground for termination” 

upon such sentiments. See In re A.B., 815 N.W.2d 764, 777 (Iowa 2012). The 

mother has had ample time to get her affairs in order and learn to be a responsible 

parent. She has been unable to do so. These children need permanency and 

stability now. See id. at 778 (“It is simply not in the best interests of children to 

continue to keep them in temporary foster homes while the natural parents get 

their lives together.” (quoting In re C.K., 558 N.W.2d 170, 175 (Iowa 1997))). 

Finally, as noted above, the children are thriving in their current foster placement, 

and the foster parents are willing to provide continued stability and permanency, 

which is in these children’s best interests. We agree with the juvenile court that 

termination of the mother’s parental rights is in the children’s best interests. 

As to the statutory exception to termination cited by the mother, “The court 

need not terminate the relationship between the parent and child if . . . [t]here is 

clear and convincing evidence that the termination would be detrimental to the 

child at the time due to the closeness of the parent-child relationship.” Iowa Code 

§ 232.116(3)(c). The application of the statutory exceptions to termination is 

“permissive not mandatory.” M.W. 876 N.W.2d at 225. “[T]he parent resisting 

termination bears the burden to establish an exception to termination.” A.S., 906 
16

N.W.2d at 476. We acknowledge the clear bond between mother and children and 

that the disconnect between the mother and children has caused the children 

trauma in the past. That being said, the record shows the children have grown 

accustomed to and expect the mother’s inability to be a responsible parent and 

such conditioning has resulted in the children being less affected by the disconnect 

from their mother. We disagree with the mother that termination would be 

detrimental to the children due to the closeness of the parent-child relationship. 

Alternatively, we conclude the application of the permissive exception would be 

contrary to the children’s best interests.

3. Extension

Finally, the mother argues she should have been granted additional time to 

work toward reunification. If, following a termination hearing, the court does not 

terminate parental rights but finds there is clear and convincing evidence that the 

child is a child in need of assistance, the court may enter an order in accordance 

with section 232.104(2)(b). Iowa Code § 232.117(5). Section 232.104(2)(b) 

affords the juvenile court the option to continue placement of a child for an 

additional six months if the court finds “the need for removal . . . will no longer exist 

at the end of the additional six-month period.”

The mother was already granted an extension as to G.J., and she 

squandered that additional time. 

There are a number of stern realities faced by a juvenile judge 

in any case of this kind. Among the most important is the relentless 

passage of precious time. The crucial days of childhood cannot be 

suspended while parents experiment with ways to face up to their 

own problems. Neither will childhood await the wanderings of judicial 

process. The child will continue to grow, either in bad or unsettled 
17

conditions or in the improved and permanent shelter which ideally, 

at least, follows the conclusion of a juvenile proceeding.

The law nevertheless demands a full measure of patience 

with troubled parents who attempt to remedy a lack of parenting 

skills. In view of this required patience, certain steps are prescribed 

when termination of the parent-child relationship is undertaken under 

Iowa Code chapter 232. But, beyond the parameters of chapter 232, 

patience with parents can soon translate into intolerable hardship for 

their children.

In re A.C., 415 N.W.2d 609, 613 (Iowa 1987). The same reasoning controls the 

mother’s request for an extension. Upon our de novo review of the record, we are 

unable to affirmatively conclude a need for removal would no longer exist after a 

six-month extension. 

IV. Conclusion

We affirm the termination of both parents’ parental rights.

AFFIRMED ON BOTH APPEALS.