Filed 8/24/20 P. v. Wollett CA2/6

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions 

not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion 

has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115. 

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION SIX

THE PEOPLE,

 Plaintiff and Respondent,

v.

PATRICK OREN WOLLETT,

 Defendant and Appellant.

2d Crim. No. B299129

(Super. Ct. No. F411505002)

(San Luis Obispo County)

Patrick Oren Wollett appeals from a postjudgment order

denying his petition for resentencing under Penal Code1 section 

1170.95. Wollett contends the court erred in finding that Senate 

Bill No. (SB) 1437, pursuant to which section 1170.95 was 

enacted, is unconstitutional. We agree and accordingly reverse.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

In December 2007, Wollett and codefendant Chad 

Westbrook assaulted Joshua Houlgate with a baseball bat and a 

metal object after discovering him in bed with Wollett’s brother’s 

1 All further undesignated statutory references are to the 

Penal Code.
2

fiancé. When Houlgate tried to escape, Westbrook retrieved a 

shotgun and fatally shot him. Wollett was subsequently 

convicted of first degree murder (§§ 187, subd. (a), 189) and 

assault with a deadly weapon (§ 245, subd. (a)(1)). The jury also 

found true allegations that Wollett personally inflicted great 

bodily injury in committing the assault (§ 12022.7, subd. (a)), that 

he personally used a deadly weapon in committing the murder 

(§ 12022, subd. (b)), and that a principal was armed with a 

firearm in committing the murder (§ 12022, subd. (a)(1)). Wollett

was sentenced to an aggregate term of 32 years to life in state 

prison.

On appeal, we reversed Wollett’s conviction of first degree 

murder due to instructional error regarding the natural and 

probable consequences doctrine of accomplice liability. (People v. 

Wollett (Feb. 16, 2012, B224204) [non-pub. opn.].) In doing so, we 

noted that “the prosecution did not argue that Wollett was liable 

for the murder because of his subjective intent to commit, 

facilitate, or encourage the murder. The prosecution argued that 

Wollett aided and abetted the assault and the murder was a 

natural and probable consequence of the assault, and the jury 

was instructed only on that theory. The instruction stated that, 

to find Wollett guilty of premeditated murder, the jury must find 

that he committed assault with a deadly weapon, a coparticipant 

in the assault committed the offense of murder, and a reasonable 

person in Wollett’s position would have known that murder was a 

natural and probable consequence of the assault. [Citation.]”

(Id. at p. 5.) 

In reversing the first degree murder conviction, “[w]e 

conclude[d] that the trial court erred in failing to instruct the jury 

that to convict [Wollett] of first degree premeditated murder 

under the natural and probable consequences rule, the jury must 

find that first degree premeditated murder, not simply murder, 
3

was a natural and probable consequence of the assault.” (People 

v. Wollett, supra, B224204, at pp. 1-2.) The prosecution was 

given the option of either retrying Wollett for first degree murder 

or accepting a modification of the judgment to reflect a conviction 

of second degree murder. (Id. at p. 11.) After the prosecution 

announced that it would not retry Wollett for first degree murder, 

the trial court resentenced Wollett for second degree murder and 

assault with a deadly weapon to an aggregate term of 21 years to 

life in state prison. 

Following the enactment of SB 1437, Wollett filed a petition 

for resentencing pursuant to section 1170.95. The prosecution 

moved to dismiss the petition on the ground that SB 1437 is 

unconstitutional. In its motion, the prosecution contended that 

SB 1437 unconstitutionally amended Propositions 7 and 115. 

The prosecution also argued that SB 1437 conflicts with the 

Victims’ Bill of Rights Act of 2008 (Marsy’s Law). In its reply to 

Wollett’s opposition, the prosecution further asserted that SB 

1437 violates the separation of powers doctrine by undermining 

the finality of court judgments. 

In denying Wollett’s petition, the trial court concluded that

SB 1437 “violate[s] the California Constitution by violating the 

separation of powers doctrine, the constitutional requirement for 

finality of judgments, and the due process protections accorded 

both the parties, and by unconstitutionally amending 

Propositions 115 and 7. Accordingly, [Wollett] cannot, as a 

matter of law, secure the relief . . . section 1170.95 purports to 

offer.” 

DISCUSSION

Wollett contends the trial court erred in denying his

petition for resentencing under section 1170.95 based on the 

finding that SB 1437 is unconstitutional. We agree.
4

SB 1437, which went into effect on January 1, 2019,

amended the definition of murder in sections 188 and 189 to 

narrow the scope of the felony murder rule and the natural and 

probable consequences doctrine. (Stats. 2018, ch. 1015, §§ 2-3, 

p. 6679.) The measure also added section 1170.95 to establish a 

procedure whereby persons previously convicted of murder, who 

could not be convicted under the new definitions, could petition to 

have their convictions vacated. “If the petitioner is found eligible 

for relief, the murder conviction must be vacated and the 

petitioner must be resentenced ‘on any remaining counts in the 

same manner as if the petitioner had not been previously . . .

sentenced, provided that the new sentence, if any, is not greater 

than the initial sentence.’ (§ 1170.95, subd. (d)(1).)” (People v. 

Bucio (2020) 48 Cal.App.5th 300, 307, review denied July 8, 2020, 

S262499 (Bucio).)

Before Wollett filed his opening brief, our colleagues in 

Division One of the Fourth Appellate District issued two opinions

upholding the constitutionality of SB 1437. (People v. Superior 

Court (Gooden) (2019) 42 Cal.App.5th 270, review denied 

February 19, 2020, S259700 (Gooden) [SB 1437 did not amend 

Propositions 7 and 115]; People v. Lamoureux (2019) 42 

Cal.App.5th 241, review denied February 19, 2020, S259835

(Lamoureux) [SB 1437 did not unconstitutionally amend 

Propositions 7 and 115 and did not violate the separations of 

powers doctrine or Marsy’s Law].) After briefing was completed, 

we issued an opinion following Gooden and Lamoureux in 

rejecting all four of the constitutional challenges at issue in this 

appeal. (Bucio, supra, 48 Cal.App.5th at p. 306.) Since then, 

numerous other courts have issued opinions rejecting identical 

constitutional challenges to SB 1437. (See People v. Superior 

Court (Ferraro) (2020) 51 Cal.App.5th 896; People v. Alaybue 

(2020) 51 Cal.App.5th 207; People. v. Lopez (2020) 51 Cal.App.5th 
5

589; People v. Johns (2020) 50 Cal.App.5th 46; People v. Prado 

(2020) 49 Cal.App.5th 480; People v. Smith (2020) 49 Cal.App.5th 

85; People v. Solis (2020) 46 Cal.App.5th 762 ; People v. Cruz 

(2020) 46 Cal.App.5th 740.) 

Although the People address Gooden and Lamoureux in

their respondent’s brief, they did not submit any supplemental 

briefs addressing Bucio or the numerous other cases uniformly 

holding that SB 1437 is constitutional.2 Because we have already 

rejected all four of the grounds upon which the trial court in this 

case found SB 1437 to be unconstitutional (Bucio, supra, 48 

Cal.App.5th at p. 306), and the People have declined to address 

that decision or the many other recent published decisions that 

have all reached the same conclusion, we deem it sufficient for 

present purposes to once again hold—pending a contrary decision 

by our Supreme Court—that SB 1437 is constitutional.

DISPOSITION

The order dismissing Wollett’s section 1170.95 petition is 

reversed, and the matter is remanded for the trial court to 

consider the merits of the petition.

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED.

PERREN, J.

We concur:

YEGAN, Acting P. J. TANGEMAN, J.

2 We grant the People’s unopposed request for judicial 

notice of documents regarding the legislative histories of 

Propositions 7 and 115 and SB 1437. (Evid. Code, § 452, subs. (c), 

(d).)
6

Dodie Harman, Judge

Superior Court County of San Luis Obispo

______________________________

Nancy J. King, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, 

for Defendant and Appellant.

Dan Dow, District Attorney, Christopher Peuvrelle, Melissa 

Chabra, Deputy District Attorneys, for Plaintiff and Respondent.