19526 Federal Register / Vol. 63, No. 75 / Monday, April 20, 1998 / Notices

III

Based on the above, the NRC

concludes that Lourdes Boschuk,

President and owner of JLT, deliberately

violated NRC requirements, and

otherwise committed willful violations

of NRC requirements. These violations

raise a serious doubt as to whether Ms.

Boschuk can be relied upon to comply

with NRC requirements and to provide

complete and accurate information to

the NRC. The NRC must rely upon the

integrity of persons involved in licensed

activities, especially owners and

officials of NRC licensees. Deliberate

misconduct of the type demonstrated by

Ms. Boschuk cannot be tolerated.

Notwithstanding the revocation of the

JLT license, given Ms. Boschuk’s

repeated failures to adhere to regulatory

requirements, the NRC no longer has the

necessary assurance that Ms. Boschuk’s

participation in licensed activities

would be performed safely and in

accordance with requirements.

Consequently, I lack the requisite

reasonable assurance that licensed

activities can be conducted in

compliance with the Commission’s

requirements and that the health and

safety of the public will be protected if

Ms. Boschuk were permitted at this time

to be involved in NRC-licensed

activities. Therefore, the public health,

safety and interest require that Ms.

Boschuk be prohibited from any

involvement in NRC-licensed activities

for a period of five years from the date

of this Order, and if she is currently

involved with another licensee in NRClicensed activities, she must

immediately cease such activities, and

inform the NRC of the name, address

and telephone number of the licensee,

and provide a copy of this Order to the

licensee. Additionally, Ms. Boschuk is

required to notify the NRC of her first

employment or involvement in NRClicensed activities following the

prohibition period.

IV

Accordingly, pursuant to sections 81,

161b, 161i, 161o, 182 and 186 of the

Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended,

and the Commission’s regulations in 10

CFR 2.202, 10 CFR 30.10, and 10 CFR

150.20, it is hereby ordered that:

1. For a period of five years from the

date of this Order, Ms. Boschuk is

prohibited from engaging in NRClicensed activities. NRC-licensed

activities are those activities that are

conducted pursuant to a specific or

general license issued by the NRC,

including, but not limited to, those

activities of Agreement State licensees

conducted in areas of NRC jurisdiction

pursuant to the authority granted by 10

CFR 150.20.

2. For a period of five years from the

date of this Order, Ms. Boschuk shall

provide a copy of this Order to any

prospective employer or business

partner who engages in NRC-licensed

activities (as described in Section IV.1

above) prior to her acceptance of any

employment (whether involved in

licensed activities or not) by, or

partnership or ownership interest in, a

licensee (as described in Section IV.1

above). The purpose of this requirement

is to ensure that the licensee is aware of

Ms. Boschuk’s prohibition from

engaging in NRC-licensed activities.

3. The first time Ms. Boschuk is

employed in NRC-licensed activities, or

acquires a partnership or ownership

interest in a licensee (as described in

Section IV.1 above), following the five

year prohibition in Section IV.1, above,

she shall notify the Regional

Administrator, NRC Region I, 475

Allendale Road, King of Prussia,

Pennsylvania 19406, prior to acquiring

such an interest or prior to engaging in

NRC-licensed activities, including

activities under an Agreement State

license when activities under that

license are conducted in areas of NRC

jurisdiction pursuant to 10 CFR 150.20.

The notice shall include the name,

address, and telephone number of the

NRC or Agreement State licensee and

the location where licensed activities

will be performed.

The Director, Office of Enforcement,

may, in writing, relax or rescind any of

the above conditions upon

demonstration by the Licensee of good

cause.

V

In accordance with 10 CFR 2.202, Ms.

Boschuk must, and any other person

adversely affected by this Order may,

submit an answer to this Order and may

request a hearing on this Order, within

20 days of the date of this Order. Where

good cause is shown, consideration will

be given to extending the time to request

a hearing. A request for extension of

time must be made in writing to the

Director, Office of Enforcement, U.S.

Nuclear Regulatory Commission,

Washington, DC 20555, and include a

statement of good cause for the

extension. The answer may consent to

this Order. Unless the answer consents

to this Order, the answer shall, in

writing and under oath or affirmation,

specifically admit or deny each

allegation or charge made in this Order

and shall set forth the matters of fact

and law on which Ms. Boschuk or other

person adversely affected relies and the

reasons as to why the Order should not

have been issued. Any answer or

request for a hearing shall be submitted

to the Secretary, U.S. Nuclear

Regulatory Commission, Attn: Chief,

Rulemaking and Adjudications Staff,

Washington, DC 20555. Copies also

shall be sent to the Director, Office of

Enforcement, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory

Commission, Washington, DC 20555, to

the Deputy Assistant General Counsel

for Enforcement at the same address, to

the Regional Administrator, NRC Region

I, 475 Allendale Road, King of Prussia,

Pennsylvania 19406, to Ms. Boschuk if

the answer or hearing request is by a

person other than Ms. Boschuk. If a

person other than Ms. Boschuk requests

a hearing, that person shall set forth

with particularity the manner in which

his or her interest is adversely affected

by this Order and shall address the

criteria set forth in 10 CFR 2.714(d).

If a hearing is requested by Ms.

Boschuk or a person whose interest is

adversely affected, the Commission will

issue an Order designating the time and

place of any hearing. If a hearing is held,

the issue to be considered at such

hearing shall be whether this Order

should be sustained.

In the absence of any request for

hearing, or written approval of an

extension of time in which to request a

hearing, the provisions specified in

Section IV above shall be final 20 days

from the date of this Order without

further order or proceedings. If an

extension of time for requesting a

hearing has been approved, the

provisions specified in Section IV shall

be final when the extension expires if a

hearing request has not been received.

Dated at Rockville, Maryland, this 10th day

of April 1998.

For the Nuclear Regulatory Commission.

James Lieberman,

Director, Office of Enforcement.

[FR Doc. 98–10330 Filed 4–17–98; 8:45 am]

BILLING CODE 7590–01–P

NUCLEAR REGULATORY

COMMISSION

[Docket No. 50–440; License No. NPF–58;

EA 97–430]

Centerior Service Company, Perry

Nuclear Power Plant, Unit 1; Order

Imposing Civil Monetary Penalty

I

Centerior Service Company (Licensee)

is the holder of Operating License No.

NPF–58, issued by the Nuclear

Regulatory Commission (NRC or

Commission) on November 13, 1986.

The license authorizes the Licensee to

operate the Perry Nuclear Power Plant,
Federal Register / Vol. 63, No. 75 / Monday, April 20, 1998 / Notices 19527

Unit 1, in accordance with the

conditions specified therein.

II

Three inspections of the Licensee’s

activities were conducted from

December 28, 1996, to August 27, 1997.

The results of the inspections indicated

that the Licensee had not conducted its

activities in full compliance with NRC

requirements. A written Notice of

Violation and Proposed Imposition of

Civil Penalties (Notice) was served upon

the Licensee by letter dated November

18, 1997. The Notice states the nature of

the violations, the provisions of the

NRC’s requirements that the Licensee

had violated, and the amount of the

civil penalties proposed for the

violations.

First Energy on behalf of Cleveland

Electric Illuminating Company

responded to the Notice on December

18, 1997. The NRC notes that Centerior

Service Company (Centerior) holds NRC

License No. NPF–58 which authorizes

the operation of the Perry Nuclear

Power Plant, Unit 1. Therefore, this

action is directed to Centerior

(Licensee). In its December 18, 1997

response, the Licensee admitted

Violation A (EA 97–047) discussed in

the Notice and paid the $50,000 civil

penalty. Violation B (EA 96–542) did

not require a response. In that same

letter, the Licensee denied Violation C,

EA 97–430, and requested remission of

the proposed $50,000 civil penalty for

that violation.

III

After consideration of the Licensee’s

response and the statements of fact,

explanation, and argument for remission

contained therein, the NRC staff has

determined, as set forth in the Appendix

to this Order, that the violation occurred

as modified below and that the penalty

proposed for Violation C designated in

the Notice should be imposed. The NRC

accepts the licensee’s explanation that

the change of the description of the

ECCS surge tanks did not involve a

potential increase of the consequence of

a design basis dose to the public. The

violation was accordingly modified by

removing the sentence concerning

potential increase of the consequences

of a design basis dose to the public.

However, the modification of the

violation does not affect the validity of

the violation or the amount of the civil

penalty.

IV

In view of the foregoing and pursuant

to Section 234 of the Atomic Energy Act

of 1954, as amended (Act), 42 U.S.C.

2282, and 10 CFR 2.205, it is hereby

ordered that: The Licensee pay a civil

penalty in the amount of $50,000 within

30 days of the date of this Order, by

check, draft, money order, or electronic

transfer, payable to the Treasurer of the

United States and mailed to Mr. James

Lieberman, Director, Office of

Enforcement, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory

Commission, One White Flint North,

11555 Rockville Pike, Rockville, MD

20852.

V

The Licensee may request a hearing

within 30 days of the date of this Order.

Where good cause is shown,

consideration will be given to extending

the time to request a hearing. A request

for extension of time must be made in

writing to the Director, Office of

Enforcement, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory

Commission, Washington, D.C. 20555,

and include a statement of good cause

for the extension. A request for a

hearing should be clearly marked as a

‘‘Request for an Enforcement Hearing,’’

and shall be addressed to the Director,

Office of Enforcement, U.S. Nuclear

Regulatory Commission, Washington,

D.C. 20555, with a copy to the

Commission’s Document Control Desk,

Washington, D.C. 20555. Copies also

shall be sent to the Assistant General

Counsel for Hearings and Enforcement

at the same address and to the Regional

Administrator, NRC Region III, 801

Warrenville Road, Suite 255, Lisle, IL

60532–4351.

If a hearing is requested, the

Commission will issue an Order

designating the time and place of the

hearing. If the Licensee fails to request

a hearing within 30 days of the date of

this Order, or if written approval of an

extension of time in which to request a

hearing has not been granted, the

provisions of this Order shall be

effective without further proceedings. If

payment has not been made by that

time, the matter may be referred to the

Attorney General for collection.

In the event the Licensee requests a

hearing as provided above, the issues to

be considered at such hearing shall be:

(a) Whether the Licensee was in

violation of the Commission’s

requirements as set forth in the Notice

referenced in Section II above, as

amended in the Appendix to this Order,

and

(b) Whether, on the basis of such

violation, this Order should be

sustained.

Dated at Rockville, Maryland this 9th day

of April 1998.

For the Nuclear Regulatory Commission.

James Lieberman,

Director, Office of Enforcement.

Appendix—Evaluation and Conclusion

On November 18, 1997, a Notice of

Violation and Proposed Imposition of Civil

Penalties (Notice) was issued for violations

identified during several NRC inspections at

the Perry Nuclear Power Plant, Unit 1. First

Energy on behalf of Cleveland Electric

Illuminating Company responded to the

Notice on December 18, 1997. The NRC notes

that Centerior Services Company (Centerior)

holds NRC License No. NPF–58 which

authorizes the operation of the Perry Nuclear

Power Plant, Unit 1. Therefore, this action is

directed to Centerior (licensee). In the

December 18, 1997 response, the licensee

admitted Violation A (EA 97–047) discussed

in the Notice and paid the $50,000 civil

penalty. Violation B (EA 96–542) did not

require a response. In that same letter, the

licensee denied Violation C, EA 97–430, and

requested remission of the proposed $50,000

civil penalty for that violation.

Restatement of Violation C (EA 97–430)

10 CFR 50.59 permits the licensee, in part,

to make changes to the facility and

procedures as described in the safety analysis

report without prior Commission approval

provided the changes do not involve an

unreviewed safety question. Records of these

changes must include a written safety

evaluation which provides the bases for the

determination that the changes do not

involve an unreviewed safety question.

10 CFR 50.59 (a)(2)(I) states, in part, that

a proposed change shall be deemed to

involve an unreviewed safety question if the

probability of occurrence or the

consequences of an accident or malfunction

of equipment important to safety previously

evaluated in the safety analysis report may be

increased.

Updated Safety Analysis Report (USAR)

Section 9.2.2.3, ‘‘Emergency Closed Cooling

System—Safety Evaluation’’ states that the

emergency closed system cooling surge tanks

are designed to maintain a seven day supply

of water with normal system leakage without

the need to provide makeup water.

Contrary to the above, Safety Evaluation

No. 96–128 prepared by the licensee on

October 10, 1996, and approved on October

21, 1996, evaluated a change in the design

basis for the emergency closed cooling

system surge tanks. The licensee changed the

sizing basis of the surge tanks from a seven

day supply as stated in USAR Section 9.2.2.3

to a 30-minute supply, and the licensee’s

analysis failed to identify that the change was

an unreviewed safety question. Specifically,

the safety evaluation did not adequately

assess the increased probability of a

malfunction of equipment important to safety

associated with an increased potential for

operator error as operators replenished the

surge tanks on a 30-minute post accident

basis instead of the previously evaluated

period of seven days. The safety evaluation

also failed to recognize the increased

consequences of a design basis loss of coolant

accident associated with an increased

projected dose to the operators as they
19528 Federal Register / Vol. 63, No. 75 / Monday, April 20, 1998 / Notices

refilled the surge tanks on an increased

frequency.

This is a Severity Level III violation

(Supplement I).

Civil Penalty—$50,000.

Summary of Licensee’s Response to Violation

C (EA 97–430)

The licensee denied this violation as

written. The licensee provided three reasons

to support the denial of the violation:

Summary of Licensee’s Reason 1

The design of the plant, and the

corresponding design bases for the

emergency closed cooling (ECC) system, were

not changed by the safety evaluation. The

plant condition was identified as a nonconforming condition, and activities were

planned to restore the system condition to

the original licensing basis.

A determination of operability for the ECC

system with increased leakage concluded

that it was acceptable to allow system leakage

of 3.0 gallons per minute (gpm) for ECC Loop

A and 3.5 gpm for Loop B. In this degraded

condition, the increased leakage would

reduce the seven day supply of water to a 30

minute supply and introduce the need for

local operator action to ensure sustained

adequate net positive suction head (NPSH) to

the ECC pumps. The licensee indicated that

it may have been inappropriate to include the

operability evaluation in the Updated Final

Safety Analysis (USAR); however, it was

done to preclude the need for preparing

additional degraded condition operability

determinations in the future.

The licensee concluded that the revision to

the USAR preserved the original design

considerations of a 7 day supply, and

distinctly identifies leakage in excess of 0.5

gallons per hour (gph) as a degraded

condition. The licensee indicated that its

intention was to correct the deficiency during

‘‘refueling outage six’’ which began on

September 12, 1997.

NRC Evaluation of Licensee’s Reason 1

As originally stated in the USAR, the

system was designed to maintain a seven day

supply with normal system leakage. This fact

was considered and reiterated in the NRC

safety evaluation report. The USAR change

removed the ‘‘design aspect’’ of the seven day

supply and simply provided the mathematics

for the 0.5 gph leak rate. This was a change

in the design criteria. Additionally, the

USAR now stated that under condition of

degraded system leakage, it would be

acceptable to have leakage such that there

would only be a 30 minute inventory

available. This also represents a change to the

design basis of the facility.

Although the intention of the licensee was

to repair the system, the USAR change

represented a continued acceptance of a

degraded condition.

Summary of Licensee’s Reason 2

The change to the description of the ECC

system surge tanks in the USAR did not

involve an unreviewed safety question (USQ)

under 10 CFR 50.59 criteria because it did

not involve a potential increase in the

probability of occurrence of a malfunction of

equipment important to safety.

The licensee indicated that an increase in

the probability of occurrence of a

malfunction of equipment important to safety

was not concluded on the basis that manual

actions employed were such that failure of an

action would be equivalent to that of a single

active failure. When compared to the original

evaluated design, the failure of the operator

action would result in the loss of one train

of the ECC system; a loss of no greater

consequence than was previously evaluated

in the USAR.

The licensee also indicated that significant

efforts put forth to compensate for the

additional actions and reduce the potential

for error formed the basis to conclude that no

increase in probability of equipment

malfunction was introduced. The licensee

referenced Part 9900 of the NRC inspection

manual guidance for 10 CFR 50.59, which

states in part that the NRC has found

compensating effects, such as administrative

controls, acceptable in offsetting

uncertainties and increases in probability of

occurrence or consequences of an accident

previously evaluated or reductions in margin

of safety, provided the negative impact is

negligible, and is clearly outweighed by the

compensatory actions. The licensee stated ‘‘if

these compensating factors can not be

considered in determining that there is no

increase in probability, no additional

operator actions, for any normal or offnormal operating condition, could be

permitted without also concluding an

increase in the probability of a malfunction.’’

NRC Evaluation of Licensee’s Reason 2

Under the circumstances required to

manually accomplish the ECC surge tank

refill, the NRC does not agree that the

consequences of operator error would be

limited to a single active failure. The licensee

did take actions to mitigate potential operator

errors; however, in this case the NRC does

not consider any mitigating actions to clearly

outweigh the increased probability of losing

NPSH to the ECC pumps. The increases in

probabilities are described below:

• The reliance on an operator to refill the

emergency closed cooling surge tanks

beginning at 30 minutes (with completion

occurring within the next 20 minutes) into a

design basis accident (DBA) introduced a

common-mode failure mechanism at a

critical time in the accident sequence. While

the USAR did rely on operators to refill the

tanks seven days after a DBA, the seven days

provided a period of time during which no

operator action was required. After seven

days, the plant would be stabilized and a

failure on the part of an operator to properly

refill the ECC surge tanks would still allow

some margin for recovery. At 30 minutes into

a DBA, the plant is significantly less stable

and an interruption in operation or loss of

this system increases the potential for core

damage. When operator response time to

perform a task is significantly decreased, the

probability of an error is also increased.

• Due to the limited time into the accident

sequence when operator actions would be

required to refill the ECC surge tanks, there

was also concern that personnel would not

be available to perform the activity. Although

the actual number of operators on site during

routine activities might support the refill

activity, during an accident, these operators

would be diverted into addressing the more

immediate action of responding to the

accident and might not be available to

compensate for a system that was designed

to operate without operator action until the

plant was stabilized. Therefore, the potential

lack of available personnel early in the

accident sequence to perform the ECC surge

tank refill increased the probability of not

filling the ECC surge tanks within the limited

time frame.

• Based on the licensee’s dose estimates

for single entries into the ECC surge tank area

of 4.4 rem, no single operator would be able

to accomplish the repetitive refill activity

sufficient to reduce the potential for error. It

would appear that a minimum of three

operators would be required within the first

2.5 hours (due to the dose) which increased

the potential for errors.

• The actual and potential physical

conditions of the area adjacent to the ECC

system surge tanks (e.g., no emergency

lighting, overfilling the surge tanks could

cause slippery floor conditions) could result

in the operator being unable to refill the

tanks within the reduced response time.

In this case, the substitution of manual

actions to replace the design intention of the

tanks, including significantly reducing

operator response time constitutes an

unreviewed safety question (USQ). This

change should have been submitted to and

approved by the NRC before implementation.

Summary of Licensee’s Reason 3

The change to the description of the ECC

system surge tanks in the USAR did not

involve a USQ under 10 CFR 50.59 criteria

because it did not involve a potential

increase of the consequences of a design

basis accident associated with increased

projected dose to the public due to operator

refilling the surge tanks on an increased

frequency.

The licensee performed time and motion

studies of the activities needed to refill the

ECC surge tanks and determined that for a

single entry, the maximum dose was

estimated to be 4.4 rem. This dose was

bounded by the NUREG–0737 defined limit

of 5 rem. The expected dose projection was

within the guidelines of USAR section

12.6.1.a, for post accident dose rates in areas

designated as ‘‘infrequent occupancy,’’ and

the activity could be performed at any time

throughout the accident without exceeding

the 5 rem whole body exposure limit.

An increase in the consequences of an

accident previously evaluated in the USAR

was not concluded since doses to the public

were not increased above the current

licensing limit and doses to onsite personnel

were not in excess of the limits as specified

in NUREG–0737 or the USAR.

The consequences as referenced in 10 CFR

50.59 pertain to the health and safety of the

public. Therefore, the proposed operator

action from the perspective of receiving the

estimated dose, does not cause a change in

the consequences.

NRC Evaluation of Licensee’s Reason 3

The NRC determined that an increase in

dose consequences, as used in 10 CFR 50.59,
Federal Register / Vol. 63, No. 75 / Monday, April 20, 1998 / Notices 19529

refers to the consequences of a design basis

accident, and not to increased radiation dose

to plant staff from in-plant recovery actions.

NRC agrees that the change in operator

actions did not involve a potential increase

in consequences of a design basis accident.

The violation is revised as follows:

10 CFR 50.59 permits the licensee, in part,

to make changes to the facility and

procedures as described in the safety analysis

report without prior Commission approval

provided the changes do not involve an

unreviewed safety question. Records of these

changes must include a written safety

evaluation which provides the bases for the

determination that the changes do not

involve an unreviewed safety question.

10 CFR 50.59 (a)(2)(I) states, in part, that

a proposed change shall be deemed to

involve an unreviewed safety question if the

probability of occurrence or the

consequences of an accident or malfunction

of equipment important to safety previously

evaluated in the safety analysis report may be

increased.

Updated Safety Analysis Report (USAR)

Section 9.2.2.3 ‘‘Emergency Closed Cooling

System—Safety evaluation’’ states that the

emergency closed cooling system surge tanks

are designed to maintain a seven day supply

of water with normal system leakage without

the need to provide makeup water.

Contrary to the above, Safety Evaluation

No. 96–128 prepared by the licensee on

October 10, 1996, and approved on October

21, 1996, evaluated a change in the design

basis for the emergency closed cooling

system surge tanks. The licensee changed the

sizing basis of the surge tanks from a seven

day supply as stated in USAR Section 9.2.2.3

to a 30-minute supply, and the licensee’s

analysis failed to identify that the change was

an unreviewed safety question. Specifically,

the safety evaluation did not adequately

assess the increased probability of a

malfunction of equipment important to safety

associated with an increased potential for

operator error as operators replenished the

surge tanks on a 30-minute post accident

basis instead of the previously evaluated

period of seven days.

Summary of Licensee’s Request for Remission

of the Civil Penalty

The licensee requested full remission of

the $50,000 civil penalty.

NRC Evaluation of Licensee’s Request for

Remission of the Civil Penalty

The licensee did not provide a separate

justification (i.e., a discussion of the civil

penalty adjustment factors) to justify

remission of the civil penalty. Rather, the

licensee’s reasons for denying the violation

apparently are the licensee’s justification for

requesting remission of the civil penalty.

NRC Conclusion

The licensee interpreted the NRC position

concerning the violation to be that the

increases in both the consequences and

probability of an accident were the direct

result of the increased presence in the plant

of operators who are fully trained and

qualified for the activities under

consideration.

The NRC did not intend to suggest that the

increased presence of personnel in the plant

would cause an increase in the consequences

and probability of an accident. Rather, the

NRC was concerned with the increased

potential of failing to refill the ECC surge

tanks within an extremely limited time

constraint, which was much shorter than

originally described to and accepted by the

NRC. In summary, the NRC’s concern was

that during the performance of the additional

operator actions to refill the ECC surge tanks,

the potential for errors was increased and

could lead to the loss of the safety related

ECC system. Loss of the ECC system could

result in losing other safety related systems

relied upon to mitigate the consequences of

an accident. Therefore, the manual operator

action proposed to compensate for the

reduced ECC surge tank water supply

constituted a USQ.

The NRC has concluded that this violation

occurred as modified above, and that an

adequate basis for withdrawing the violation,

reducing the severity level of the violation,

or remitting the civil penalty was not

provided by the licensee. Consequently, the

proposed civil penalty in the amount of

$50,000 should be imposed.

[FR Doc. 98–10329 Filed 4–17–98; 8:45 am]

BILLING CODE 7590–01–P

NUCLEAR REGULATORY

COMMISSION

[Docket No. 30–33725; License No. 37–

28442–02; EAs 96–110]

J&L Testing Company, Inc.,

Canonsburg, Pennsylvania; Order

Revoking License

I

J&L Testing Company, Inc., (Licensee

or JLT) is the holder of Byproduct

Nuclear Material License No. 37–28442–

02 (License) issued by the Nuclear

Regulatory Commission (NRC or

Commission) pursuant to 10 CFR Part

30. The License authorizes possession

and use of Troxler portable nuclear

density gauges containing cesium-137

and americium-241 in sealed sources.

The License, originally issued on

February 7, 1995, was amended on

August 22, 1995, and is due to expire on

February 29, 2000. The License was

suspended by Order, dated September

27, 1995.

II

J & L Engineering, Inc. (JLE), a

corporation located at the same address

and using the same telephone and

facsimile numbers as the Licensee, held

License No. 37–28442–01 for the same

portable nuclear gauges for which the

Licensee is now licensed. John Boschuk,

Jr., President and owner of JLE, has

acted as an agent of and consultant to

JLT. JLE’s license was revoked on

August 30, 1993, for non-payment of

fees. JLE was ordered, among other

things, to cease use of byproduct

material, dispose of the byproduct

material, and notify the NRC of the

disposition within 30 days of that

Order. Notwithstanding that Order, JLE

continued to possess the byproduct

material and on October 5, 1994, a

Notice of Violation (Notice) was issued

to JLE for possession of licensed

material without a valid NRC license.

By letter dated October 11, 1994, Mr.

Boschuk responded to the Notice,

stating, among other things, that the

‘‘* * * equipment [3-Troxler Nuclear

Density gauges] has not been used for

over 2 years and has not left the storage

area in our office.’’

On November 21, 1994, JLT submitted

an application for a license. The

November 21, 1994, cover letter for the

application, signed by Lourdes Boschuk,

President and owner of JLT and wife of

John Boschuk, Jr., stated the following:

* * * Submitted herein is our application

to restore our expired license to store and

operate three (3) Troxler Nuclear Density

Gages (sic). We understand our license was

revoked on August 30, 1993. Since that date,

these units were not removed from storage

nor used in anyway (sic).

Relying on the application and the

statement that the gauges had not been

removed from storage since the JLE

license was revoked, the NRC issued the

new License No. 37–28442–02 to JLT on

February 7, 1995.

On August 1 and 3, 1995, the NRC

conducted a routine, announced safety

inspection of activities authorized by

the License at JLT’s facility in

Canonsburg, Pennsylvania. During the

inspection, an NRC inspector

determined, based on a review of

Licensee’s documents, that one of the

gauges, which JLE and the Licensee

separately had stated in writing to the

NRC were in storage and had not been

used since revocation of the JLE license,

had been transferred on September 2,

1994, to SE Technologies, Inc., in

Bridgeville, Pennsylvania (which used

the gauge at a temporary jobsite at the

S. Hill Village Sears project), when

neither JLE nor JLT possessed a valid

NRC license. As stated by the Chief

Engineer of SE Technologies, Inc., Mr.

Boschuk had arranged for the rental,

and as stated by a Project Engineer of SE

Technologies, Inc., Mr. Boschuk had

personally transferred the gauge to SE

Technologies, Inc. JLT stated at a

December 18, 1997, enforcement

conference that uses of the gauge(s)

prior to February 7, 1995, and after

revocation of the JLE license were

invoiced by JLT. The transfer of the

gauge to SE Technologies, Inc. was a