UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

TENTH CIRCUIT

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff - Appellee,

v. DANIEL WAYNE LOWE, Defendant - Appellant. No. 13-2163 (D.C. No. 1:07-CR -00484-MCA-1) (D.N.M.)

ORDER AND JUDGMENT *

Before LUCERO , TYMKOVICH , and PHILLIPS , Circuit Judges.

Daniel Wayne Lowe appeals the district court’s judgment revoking his supervised release and imposing eight months’ impris onment followed by two years of additional supervised release. His counsel moves for l eave to withdraw in a brief filed pursuant to

* After examining appellant’s brief and the appellate record, this panel has determined unanimously that oral argument wo uld not materially assi st the determination of this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a )(2) and 10th Cir. R. 34 .1(G). The case is therefore ordered submitted without oral argu ment. This order and judgment is not binding precedent, except under the doctri nes of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. It may be cited, however, for its persuasive value consistent with Fed. R. App. P. 32.1 and 10th Cir. R. 32.1. FILED United States Court of Appeals Tenth Circuit 

### May 9, 2014

Elisabeth A. Shumaker Clerk of Court- 2- Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967). Exercising jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, we dismiss the appeal and grant counsel’s mo tion to withdraw.

I Lowe pled guilty in 2008 to being a felon in possession of a firearm and

ammunition in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 922(g)(1) and 924( a)(2). He was sentenced to seventy months’ imprisonment and three years of supervised release. On May 30, 2013, Lowe’s probation officer petiti oned the district court for re vocation of his supervised release. The petition alleged that Lowe faile d to: (1) participate in and successfully complete a substance abuse tr eatment program by failing to su bmit to drug testing, twice testing positive for use of illegal drugs, and testi ng positive for use of alcohol; and (2) refrain from the use and possession of alcohol. At a hearing before the district court, 1 Lowe admitted the violations. Because his

most serious offense was a Grade C violatio n and Lowe had a crim inal history category of VI, his U.S. Sentencing Guidelines range was eight to fourteen months’ imprisonment, which could be followed by up to three years of supervised release, less any prison term imposed. The court revoked Lowe’s supervised release and sentenced him to eight months’ imprisonment and two ye ars of supervised release with special conditions.

1 The judge who sentenced Lowe for his s upervised release violations was not the same judge who sentenced him on his original conviction.- 3- II After conscientiously examining a criminal case, an attorney who concludes that any appeal would be frivolous may request permission to with draw. Anders, 386 U.S. at

744. Counsel must submit to the court and th e client a brief identifying any potentially appealable issues. Id. The defendant may then file a pro se brief. Id. If, upon careful examination of the full record, the court determines that the case is “wholly frivolous,” it may grant the request to withdraw and dismiss the appeal. Id. Although Lowe’s counsel raises several i ssues at his client’s request, we agree

with counsel that none of them constitutes a meritorious ground for appeal. Lowe believes his counsel provided ineffective assi stance by failing to correct the district court’s misunderstanding of how much presente nce credit he possessed to offset his term of imprisonment. During sentencing, the distri ct court stated that Lowe had almost three months’ credit against his prison sentence, but he actually had approximately a month. The district court imposed a sentence at the bottom of the Gu idelines range and demonstrated no intent to impose a below-Gu idelines sentence. Lowe was therefore not prejudiced by his counsel’s fa ilure to correct the error. See Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 692 ( 1984) (“any deficiencies in counsel’s performance must be prejudicial” to warrant relief). Moreover, th e issue is moot because Lowe’s term of imprisonment has ended.- 4- Lowe believes he was prejudiced by the replacement of his original sentencing judge because that judge would have understo od the significance of his post-violation attempts to enter inpatient substance abuse treatment and thus would have imposed such a program rather than incarceration. Lowe’s rights were not violat ed, however, by virtue of the fact that his supervised release wa s revoked by a different judge than the one who sentenced him for his underlying crime. Unite d States v. Pearson, 203 F.3d 1243, 1256 (10th Cir. 2000) (“Congress has granted broad di scretion to the federal district courts in the assignment of cases to particular judg es.”); United States v. Diaz, 189 F.3d 1239, 1243-44 (10th Cir. 1999) (rejecting argument that “the assignment of five district judges to handle various portions of [defendant’s ] case violated his due process rights” and concluding that “District Judges have the inhe rent power to transfer cases from one to another for the expeditious administration of justic e” (quotation omitted)). We also disagree with Lowe’s contention th at the district court’s imposition of 120 days in a “halfway house” adds four months to his term of incarceration. District courts are specifically authorized to in clude conditions as part of “a term of supervised release after imprisonment,” 18 U.S.C. § 3583, in cluding a requirement that the defendant “reside at . . . a community corrections facilit y (including a facility maintained or under contract to the Bureau of Prisons) for all or part of the term” of supervised release, § 3563(b)(11); § 3583(d) (cour t may order, as condition of supervised release, any discretionary condition of probation in § 3563(b)). The Guidelin es explicitly permit- 5- “community confinement,” includ ing “residence in a . . . halfway house” to “be imposed as a condition of probation or s upervised release.” U.S.S.G. § 5F1.1 & cmt. n.1; see also United States v. Garcia, 531 F. App’x 869, 870 (10th Cir. 2013) (unpublished) (characterizing “require[d] placement in a re sidential reentry center” as modification of supervised release). In th e instant case, the requirement that Lowe spend time at a residential reentry center to a ssist his transition back into the comm unity was explicitly listed as one of the special conditions of hi s supervised release both at his sentencing hearing and in the district court’s written judg ment. The district court acted within its statutory authority in requiring that Lowe’s supervised release include four months in a halfway house. “We will not reverse a sentence following revocation of supervis ed release if the

record establishes the sentence is reasoned a nd reasonable.” United States v. Handley , 678 F.3d 1185, 1188 ( 10th Cir. 2012) (quotation omitted). In light of Lowe’s criminal history, the nature of his violations, a nd his demonstrated difficulty adjusting to supervision, we are satisfied that his sent ence meets this sta ndard. Nor have we uncovered any potentially meritorious issues in our independent re view of the record.- 6- III For the foregoing reasons, we conclude th at there are no nonfrivolous grounds for appeal. We therefore GRANT counsel’s motion to withdraw and DISMISS the appeal.

Entered for the Court

Carlos F. Lucero Circuit Judge