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*********************************************** 
RICHARD KENT v. FLORENCE DIPAOLA

(AC 38347)

DiPentima, C. J., and Kahn and Sullivan, Js.*

Syllabus

The plaintiff appealed to this court from the judgment of the trial court

dissolving his marriage to the defendant and issuing certain financial

orders regarding the defendant’s pensions, the marital home and the

percentage of the marital estate that was awarded to him. Held:

1. The plaintiff could not prevail on his claim that the trial court improperly

failed to include the defendant’s pensions in its division of the parties’

marital property and to credit the testimony of his pension actuary as

to the present value of the defendant’s pensions: that court did in fact

value and distribute the defendant’s pensions, as it accounted for the

pensions in its financial orders when it awarded all of the income from

the pensions to the defendant and, in exchange, offset the monthly

income from the pensions by ordering that the plaintiff would not be

required to pay child support, which constituted a downward deviation

from the presumptive amount in the child support guidelines, and by

considering that the pensions had accrued substantially prior to the

marriage and that it had ordered little financial contribution from the

plaintiff to the defendant, and there was no merit to the plaintiff’s claim

that the court should have made that distribution more clear or placed

specific values on its determinations, the plaintiff having failed to move

for an articulation; moreover, the plaintiff’s claim that the court improperly failed to credit the testimony of his pension actuary as to the present

value of the defendant’s pensions was unavailing, as the method of

valuation for pension benefits is left to the discretion of the trial court,

which considered the testimony of the actuary and elected to use a

modified present division method in its valuation of the pensions, and,

therefore, it was not necessary for the court to rely on the testimony

from the actuary.

2. The plaintiff could not prevail on his claim that the trial court abused its

discretion in awarding him 33 percent, and not 50 percent, of the marital

home; the court, which thoughtfully and carefully considered the testimony, exhibits and relevant statutory factors in dividing the marital

property, found that the defendant had purchased the home prior to

the marriage, that she had made a 20 percent down payment on the

home, and that, although the plaintiff made minor financial contributions

to home improvements, the defendant was solely responsible for major

home improvements and made greater economic and noneconomic contributions during the marriage.

3. The trial court did not abuse its discretion in its division of the marital

estate; the plaintiff’s claim that the trial court improperly awarded him

only 33 percent of the marital estate by failing to account adequately

for his age, health, station, occupation, amount and sources of income,

earning capacity, vocational skills and employability was essentially a

recitation of his testimony during the trial, the plaintiff failed to cite

any authority for his claim that the court should have ordered a more

equitable distribution of property and assets, and the trial court considered the evidence and applied the relevant factors set forth in the statute

(§ 46b-81) governing the distribution of assets in a dissolution action.

Argued September 20—officially released December 5, 2017

Procedural History

Action for the dissolution of a marriage, and for other

relief, brought to the Superior Court in the judicial district of Stamford-Norwalk and tried to the court, Colin,

J.; judgment dissolving the marriage and granting certain other relief, from which the plaintiff appealed to

this court. Affirmed.
David V. DeRosa, for the appellant (plaintiff).

Samuel V. Schoonmaker IV, with whom, on the brief,

was Wendy Dunne DiChristina, for the appellee

(defendant).
Opinion

DiPENTIMA, C. J. The plaintiff, Richard Kent, appeals

from the judgment of the trial court setting forth financial orders incident to the dissolution of his marriage

to the defendant, Florence DiPaola. On appeal, the

plaintiff claims that the court erred with respect to its

orders regarding the defendant’s pensions, the marital

home and the percentage of the marital estate that was

awarded to him. We disagree and, accordingly, affirm

the judgment.

The following facts, as set forth in the court’s memorandum of decision, and procedural history are relevant

to our discussion. The parties met in March, 1989, and

soon thereafter, the plaintiff moved into the defendant’s

home.1 The parties were married in March, 1998, and

have a minor child.2 During the course of their relationship, the parties kept their finances separate. They also

maintained records of ‘‘virtually everything’’ that they

purchased, and the ‘‘receipts were then tallied by the

plaintiff and monitored by him through a monthly

spreadsheet so that each party could pay their share.

This included keeping track of such small details as

how much was spent on phone calls, hot dogs, stamps,

dog food and cookies.’’

In the late 1990s, the plaintiff worked in the financial

sector, earning $168,000 in 1998. In 2004, he switched

careers and became a realtor. In 2013, he earned approximately $76,000, but in 2014, only $7437. As a result of

this decreased income, the plaintiff, who was sixtythree years old at the time of trial and had no health

conditions that significantly impacted his ability to

work,3 had been using his retirement accounts to pay

his living expenses. The defendant, who was nearly

seventy-two years old at the time of trial,4 was retired

following ‘‘an impressive and accomplished work history that spanned forty-four years. She worked her way

up the corporate ladder from a junior entry level position to a managing director.’’

The defendant had several pensions in pay status

that provided her with approximately $50,000 in gross

annual income. The plaintiff presented a pension actuary as an expert witness. The pension actuary testified

that the present value of the defendant’s pensions

totaled $662,606. The defendant also received social

security benefits for the child of approximately $1350

per month.

With respect to its financial orders,5

the court

expressly considered all of the relevant factors set forth

in General Statutes § 46b-81. The court stated: ‘‘In addition, the orders reflect the following specific considerations: (1) as previously noted, the defendant’s

contributions to the acquisition, preservation and

appreciation of the assets is far greater than the plaintiff’s contributions; (2) the defendant is being ordered
by this decision to be more responsible than the plaintiff

for the financial support of the parties’ minor child;

(3) the plaintiff’s age, health and current employment

status lead this court to conclude that he has a greater

opportunity than the defendant to acquire assets and

income postdissolution; (4) the plaintiff is more responsible than the defendant for the causes of the breakdown of the marriage;6

(5) the defendant’s noneconomic

contributions to the marriage are far greater than those

made by the plaintiff; (6) each party had a career and

wealth at the time of the marriage, and the defendant

had substantially greater premarital assets; (7) each

party is fully capable of supporting themselves; (8) the

length of the marriage; (9) the plaintiff has provided

little to no financial support to the defendant for the

benefit of the child since 2012; and (10) the unusual

financial structure of this marriage where each party

essentially kept their finances separate from each other,

except for a sharing of some expenses for a substantial

period of time.’’ (Footnote added.)

The court concluded that it was not necessary to

calculate the value of the parties’ assets at the time of

the marriage with ‘‘mathematical precision . . . .’’ The

court stated: ‘‘Based upon the evidence, the court does

find, however, that the defendant came to this marriage

with far greater assets than the plaintiff, including, most

significantly, the Stamford home where the parties

resided together, and that the defendant’s economic

and noneconomic contributions to the acquisition, preservation and appreciation in the value of the parties’

estates were substantially greater than those made by

the plaintiff.’’

The court divided the combined current assets of the

parties, totaling $4,619,655,7 awarding 33 percent to the

plaintiff and 67 percent to the defendant. To effectuate

this division, the court ordered a distribution from the

defendant to the plaintiff in the amount of $300,000

pursuant to § 46b-81.

The court did not include the defendant’s pensions

in this division. Instead, the court accounted for the

defendant’s pensions in a separate calculation. The

court stated: ‘‘The present value of the defendant’s pensions that are all currently in pay status are not included

in this total since those pensions were substantially

accrued prior to the marriage and are being treated

as an income stream that will be used to support the

defendant and the minor child with little financial contribution being ordered today to be paid by the

plaintiff.’’

The court stated that, as a result of the division of

assets and the defendant’s receipt of social security

income for the minor child, it was ordering that the

defendant be responsible for the child’s educational

expenses and would not order the plaintiff to pay child

support. In further explaining this order, the court noted
the presumptive child support award under the applicable guidelines8 would require the plaintiff to pay $257

per week to the defendant. The court stated: ‘‘Based

upon the division of assets set forth in this decision,

including the recognition that the defendant has a

steady pension income stream and the plaintiff does

not, a strict application of the guidelines in this case

would be unfair and inappropriate, and a deviation on

that basis from the presumptive support award is warranted.’’ The court deviated from the child support

guidelines on an equitable basis: the defendant, fully

retired with a debt-free home, did not need financial

support from the plaintiff, who was not similarly situated. Finally, the court ordered the defendant to be

liable for the child’s unreimbursed medical and dental

expenses, and awarded the plaintiff $40,000 for attorney’s fees.9 This appeal followed.

Before addressing the specific claims raised by the

plaintiff, we set forth certain relevant legal principles

and our standard of review. ‘‘The purpose of a dissolution action is to sever the marital relationship, to fix

the rights of the parties with respect to alimony and

child support . . . [and] to divide the marital estate

. . . .’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Rozsa v.

Rozsa, 117 Conn. App. 1, 11, 977 A.2d 722 (2009).

Section 46b-81 governs the distribution of the assets

in a dissolution case. Gyerko v. Gyerko, 113 Conn. App.

298, 303, 966 A.2d 306 (2009). That statute authorizes

the court to assign to either spouse all, or any part of,

the estate of the other spouse. Id., 312. ‘‘In fixing the

nature and value of the property, if any, to be assigned,

the court, after considering all the evidence presented

by each party, shall consider the length of the marriage,

the causes for the annulment, dissolution of the marriage or legal separation, the age, health, station, occupation, amount and sources of income, earning

capacity, vocational skills, education, employability,

estate, liabilities and needs of each of the parties and

the opportunity of each for future acquisition of capital

assets and income. The court shall also consider the

contribution of each of the parties in the acquisition,

preservation or appreciation in value of their respective

estates.’’ General Statutes § 46b-81 (c); see also Coleman v. Coleman, 151 Conn. App. 613, 616–17, 95 A.3d

569 (2014).

Our standard of review is well established. ‘‘An appellate court will not disturb a trial court’s orders in domestic relations cases unless the court has abused its

discretion or it is found that it could not reasonably

conclude as it did, based on the facts presented. . . .

In determining whether a trial court has abused its

broad discretion in domestic relations matters, we

allow every reasonable presumption in favor of the

correctness of its action. . . . This standard of review

reflects the sound policy that the trial court has the
opportunity to view the parties first hand and is therefore in the best position to assess all of the circumstances surrounding a dissolution action, in which such

personal factors such as the demeanor and the attitude

of the parties are so significant. . . .

‘‘Importantly, [a] fundamental principle in dissolution

actions is that a trial court may exercise broad discretion in . . . dividing property as long as it considers

all relevant statutory criteria. . . . While the trial court

must consider the delineated statutory criteria [when

allocating property], no single criterion is preferred

over others, and the court is accorded wide latitude in

varying the weight placed upon each item under the

peculiar circumstances of each case. . . . In dividing

up property, the court must take many factors into

account. . . . A trial court, however, need not give

each factor equal weight . . . or recite the statutory

criteria that it considered in making its decision or make

express findings as to each statutory factor.’’ (Citation

omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Wood v.

Wood, 160 Conn. App. 708, 720–21, 125 A.3d 1040 (2015);

see also O’Brien v. O’Brien, 326 Conn. 81, 121–22, 161

A.3d 1236 (2017); Emerick v. Emerick, 170 Conn. App.

368, 378, 154 A.3d 1069, cert. denied, 327 Conn. 922,

A.3d (2017). With these principles in mind, we

now turn to the specific claims of the plaintiff.

I

The plaintiff first claims that the court erred with

respect to its orders regarding the defendant’s pensions.

Specifically, he contends that the court improperly

failed (1) to include the pensions in the division of the

marital property and (2) to credit the testimony of his

pension actuary as to the present value of the pensions.

We conclude that, contrary to the plaintiff’s claim, the

court accounted for the pensions in its financial orders

and, considering the totality of its orders, did not abuse

its discretion in its valuation or distribution of the pensions. Further, we are not persuaded that the court

improperly disregarded the testimony of the plaintiff’s

pension actuary.10

The following additional facts are necessary for our

discussion. During her career, the defendant worked for

a number of companies, including GE Capital, Xerox,

Citibank, Bank of America and MetLife.11 As a result,

she received several pensions that were in pay status

at the time of trial and provided her with $961 per week,

or approximately $50,000 per year, of gross income.

The plaintiff presented a pension actuary as an expert

witness. The court stated: ‘‘The pension [actuary] testified as to the current present value of the defendant’s

pension benefits and also applied a coverture fraction

to determine what [the pension actuary] described as

the marital portions of those pensions with the numerator being the number of years that the benefit was

earned during the marriage and the denominator being
the number of total years that the benefit was earned

with that employer.’’

The pension actuary determined that the defendant’s

Citigroup pension had a present value of $68,415, but

that the marital value was $0 because it had been earned

prior to the marriage. The pension actuary further concluded that a pension from Aegon and the GE pensions

had present values of $181,060 and $413,131, respectively. The pension actuary concluded that the present

value of the pensions was $662,606.

The court, without specifically discrediting or

rejecting the testimony of the pension actuary, noted

some concerns with her conclusions. First, the court

observed that ‘‘as to the GE pension, the [pension] actuary incorrectly assumed that the defendant’s career at

GE was all during the marriage, a significant error since

the vast majority of the defendant’s career at GE took

place prior to the marriage.’’ It also stated that the

pension actuary, in calculating the present value of the

pensions, used ‘‘widely accepted mortality tables that

do not account for the health of the employee whose

benefit is being analyzed. In this case, with a nearly

seventy-two year old woman who has a history of past

and current cancer, those assumptions may not be

entirely accurate.’’

As we noted previously, the court did not include the

defendant’s pensions in the property division. Instead,

the court determined that the pensions had been

accrued substantially prior to the marriage and treated

them as income to support the defendant and the minor

child to offset the ‘‘little financial contribution being

ordered today to be paid by the plaintiff.’’ The court

explained that its order regarding the pensions played

a role in its decision to depart from the child support

guidelines and to not order the plaintiff to pay $257 per

week in child support to the defendant.

Before addressing the plaintiff’s specific arguments,

we first set forth the legal principles relevant to this

issue. ‘‘As a general framework, [t]here are three stages

of analysis regarding the equitable distribution of each

resource: first, whether the resource is property within

. . . § 46b-81 to be equitably distributed (classification); second, what is the appropriate method for

determining the value of the property (valuation); and

third, what is the most equitable distribution of the

property between the parties (distribution).’’ (Internal

quotation marks omitted.) Cunningham v. Cunningham, 140 Conn. App. 676, 681, 59 A.3d 874 (2013); see

also Anderson v. Anderson, 160 Conn. App. 341, 352,

125 A.3d 606 (2015).

Pension benefits constitute property under § 46b-81.

Cifaldi v. Cifaldi, 118 Conn. App. 325, 331, 983 A.2d 293

(2009).12 ‘‘Pension benefits constitute a form of deferred

compensation for services rendered. . . . Pension ben-
efits are widely recognized as among the most valuable

assets that parties have when a marriage ends. . . .

Nevertheless, there is no set formula that a court must

follow when dividing the parties’ assets, including pension benefits.’’ (Citations omitted; internal quotation

marks omitted.) Martin v. Martin, 101 Conn. App. 106,

111, 920 A.2d 340 (2007); Casey v. Casey, 82 Conn. App.

378, 386–87, 844 A.2d 250 (2004); see also Stamp v.

Visconti, 51 Conn. App. 84, 86, 719 A.2d 1223 (1998)

(pension benefits are form of deferred compensation,

not mere gratuities because employee receives lesser

present compensation in exchange for future benefits).

In Krafick v. Krafick, 234 Conn. 783, 663 A.2d 365

(1995), our Supreme Court discussed the various methods of valuing and distributing pension benefits. Under

the present value method, the court is required to

‘‘determine the present value of the pension benefits,

decide the portion to which the nonemployee spouse is

entitled, and award other property to the nonemployee

spouse as an offset to the pension benefits to which

he or she is otherwise entitled.’’ (Internal quotation

marks omitted.) Id., 800. This calculation for the present

value method requires generally accepted actuarial

principles.13 Id., 801.

A second method, known as the present division,

requires the court to determine, at the time of trial, the

percentage share of the pension to which the nonemployee spouse is entitled. Id., 803. ‘‘In other words, the

court will declare that, upon maturity, a fixed percentage of the pension be distributed to each spouse.’’ Id.;

see also Bender v. Bender, 258 Conn. 733, 758, 785 A.2d

197 (2001). This method credits both parties for the

proportionate labors toward the pension. Bender v.

Bender, supra, 759. This method does not require expert

testimony from an actuary. Id., 762–63.

Our Supreme Court determined that the method of

valuation is to be left to the discretion of the trial court.

‘‘We conclude that it is within the trial court’s discretion

. . . to choose, on a case-by-case basis, among the present value method, the present division method of

deferred distribution, and any other valuation method

that it deems appropriate in accordance with Connecticut law that might better address the needs and interests of the parties. . . . The touchstone of valuation,

as well as the ultimate distribution of pension benefits,

is the court’s power to act equitably.’’ (Citation omitted;

emphasis added; internal quotation marks omitted.) Id.,

760. It further noted that there was no general consensus among other jurisdictions as to the preferred valuation and division method, thereby leaving it to the

discretion of the trial court. Id., 775 n.11. With these

principles in mind, we turn to the plaintiff’s specific

arguments.

A
The plaintiff first argues that the court improperly

failed to include the pensions as property of the marriage. Specifically, he contends that in dividing the marital property 33 percent to him and 67 percent to the

defendant, the court erred in not including the pensions.

We are not persuaded.

This argument requires us to interpret the judgment

of the trial court. ‘‘The construction of a judgment is a

question of law for the court. . . . We review such

questions of law de novo. . . . As a general rule, judgments are construed in the same fashion as other written instruments. . . . The determinative factor is the

intention of the court as gathered from all parts of the

judgment. . . . The judgment should admit of a consistent construction as a whole. . . . To determine the

meaning of a judgment, we must ascertain the intent

of the court from the language used and, if necessary,

the surrounding circumstances.’’ (Citation omitted;

internal quotation marks omitted.) Lewis v. Lewis, 154

Conn. App. 233, 243, 105 A.3d 344 (2014); see also Avery

v. Medina, 174 Conn. App. 507, 517, 163 A.3d 1271, cert.

denied, 327 Conn. 927, A.3d (2017).

The plaintiff correctly states that the court excluded

the defendant’s pensions from the marital assets when

it awarded one third of the assets to the plaintiff and

two thirds to the defendant. His claim falters, however,

with his contention that the court failed to account for

the pensions in its financial orders.14 To the contrary,

the court offset the monthly income from the pensions

by ordering a downward departure from the child support guidelines, and in consideration of its finding that

the pensions had been accrued substantially prior to

the marriage and that it had ordered ‘‘little financial

contribution’’ from the plaintiff to the defendant.

In discussing the defendant’s pensions, the court

summarized the testimony of the pension actuary and

noted that certain aspects were problematic. It then

stated that the plaintiff had done ‘‘nothing to assist’’

the defendant’s career and in fact had jeopardized it by

making unauthorized stock trades that subjected her

to possible discipline. The court also noted that the

plaintiff had provided little to no noneconomic contributions, and that the defendant was primarily responsible for the upbringing of the child and the running of

the household.

The court awarded all of the income from the defendant’s pensions, $961 per week or approximately

$50,000 in gross annual income, to the defendant. In

exchange, the court ordered that the plaintiff would not

be required to pay child support, a downward deviation

from the presumptive amount of $257 per week. In

making its orders, the court also relied on its finding

that the defendant’s pensions had been accrued substantially prior to the marriage. This modified version
of the present division method is well within the court’s

discretion in applying the factors of § 46b-81 (c). See

Bender v. Bender, supra, 258 Conn. 760–61.

Contrary to the plaintiff’s argument, the court did

in fact value and distribute the defendant’s pensions.15

Rather than include them in those marital assets subject

to the percentage division between the parties, the court

offset the pensions with the order of no child support

and the consideration that the pensions had been

accrued substantially prior to the marriage. See Ranfone v. Ranfone, 103 Conn. App. 243, 253, 928 A.2d 575

(touchstone of valuation and ultimate distribution of

pension benefits is court’s power to act equitably), cert.

denied, 284 Conn. 940, 937 A.2d 698 (2007); Kunajukr

v. Kunajukr, 83 Conn. App. 478, 481–82, 850 A.2d 227

(issues involving financial order entirely interwoven

and carefully crafted mosaic, each element of which

may be dependent on the other), cert. denied, 271 Conn.

903, 859 A.2d 562 (2004).16

To the extent that the plaintiff argues that the court

should have made this distribution more clear, or placed

specific values on its determinations, we simply note

that he could have moved for an articulation, but failed

to do so. See Practice Book § 66-5. ‘‘[T]he appellant

bears the burden of providing an appellate court with

an adequate record for review. . . . It is, therefore, the

responsibility of the appellant to move for an articulation or rectification of the record where the trial court

has failed to state the basis of [a] decision . . . [or] to

clarify the legal basis of a ruling. . . . [I]t is incumbent

upon the appellant to take the necessary steps to sustain

[her] burden of providing an adequate record for appellate review. . . . [A]n appellate tribunal cannot render

a decision without first fully understanding the disposition being appealed. . . . Our role is not to guess at

possibilities, but to review claims based on a complete

factual record developed by a trial court.’’ (Citations

omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Tonghini

v. Tonghini, 152 Conn. App. 231, 237–38, 98 A.3d 93

(2014). Accordingly, we conclude that this argument

has no merit.

B

The plaintiff next argues that the court improperly

failed to credit the testimony of the pension actuary as

to the present value of the pensions.17 Specifically, he

contends that the court ‘‘abused its discretion in not

valuing the retirement assets when the court had the

present value of the assets, and all the evidence necessary to make the present value calculation with the

coverture fraction for the [GE] pension.’’ He further

claims that the court’s stated reasons for not crediting

the pension actuary’s use of the present value of the

pensions, that is, that the majority of the GE pension

was earned prior to the marriage and that the pension

actuary used a widely accepted mortality table that
did not account for the specific health conditions and

history of the defendant, were not sufficient reasons to

reject her testimony. We conclude that this argument

is without merit because the court, in its discretion,

used the present division method to value the defendant’s pensions.

As previously stated, a court may value and distribute

pension benefits according to either the present value

or present division methods. Krafick v. Krafick, supra,

234 Conn. 800–803. The method of valuation for pension

benefits is left to the discretion of the trial court. Bender

v. Bender, supra, 258 Conn. 760. Here, the court heard

and considered the testimony of the pension actuary

and elected to use a modified present division method in

its valuation of the defendant’s pensions. Accordingly,

it was unnecessary for the court to rely on the testimony

from the pension actuary. See id., 762; see also Ranfone

v. Ranfone, supra, 103 Conn. App. 253. We conclude,

therefore, that the plaintiff’s claims regarding the testimony of the pension actuary fail.

II

The plaintiff next claims that the court abused its

discretion in awarding him 33 percent, and not 50 percent, of the marital home. Specifically, he argues that

‘‘he is entitled to 50 [percent] and not 33 [percent] of

the marital home because he paid a substantial portion

of the mortgage until it was paid off and thereby contributed to the preservation and appreciation of the marital

home because [he] helped [extinguish] the mortgage

over a twenty-four year period.’’ We are not persuaded.

The court noted that the marital home had been purchased by the defendant in 1988, prior to the marriage,

for $595,000, with a 20 percent down payment. It also

found that ‘‘[t]he plaintiff declined the defendant’s offer

earlier in the marriage to purchase an equity interest

in the home; as a result, the home has always been in

the defendant’s sole name. The mortgage was paid off

in 2009. The plaintiff’s rental payments to the defendant

throughout the parties’ relationship were of some assistance to the defendant and helped to make sure the

mortgage was paid early. However, the defendant was

able to pay off her mortgage nine years early primarily

due to her additional principal payments over the years

as a result of her substantial income. It is likely that,

even without the plaintiff’s assistance, she would have

paid off the mortgage well before the end of the thirty

year term.’’ The court determined the value of the marital home to be $787,500 at the time of trial.

We have iterated that ‘‘[t]here is no set formula the

court is obligated to apply when dividing the parties’

assets and . . . the court is vested with broad discretion in fashioning financial orders.’’ (Internal quotation

marks omitted.) Bonito v. Bonito, 140 Conn. App. 697,

707, 59 A.3d 882 (2013); see also Sapper v. Sapper, 109
Conn. App. 99, 107–108, 951 A.2d 5 (2008) (courts not

bound to specific formula and not required to ritualistically recite statutory criteria considered in dividing marital assets).

In the present case, the court found that the defendant had purchased the home prior to the marriage and

made a 20 percent down payment.18 It also determined

that although the plaintiff had made ‘‘some relatively

minor financial contributions to home improvements,’’

the defendant was solely responsible for major home

improvements such as a new roof. It also found that

the defendant had made greater economic and noneconomic contributions during the marriage.

Under these facts and circumstances, the plaintiff

has failed to demonstrate an abuse of discretion with

respect to the division of the marital home. We are

mindful that ‘‘[o]n the basis of the plain language of

§ 46b-81, there is no presumption in Connecticut that

marital property should be divided equally prior to

applying the statutory criteria.’’ (Internal quotation

marks omitted.) Desai v. Desai, 119 Conn. App. 224,

238, 987 A.2d 362 (2010). The court thoughtfully and

carefully considered the testimony, exhibits and relevant statutory factors in dividing the marital property.

The court’s memorandum of decision sets forth the

reasoning underlying its exercise of discretionary powers. See, e.g., Bento v. Bento, 125 Conn. App. 229, 233,

8 A.3d 531 (2010). Accordingly, we disagree with the

plaintiff that the court abused its discretion with respect

to the division of the marital home.

III

The plaintiff finally claims that the court improperly

awarded him only 33 percent of the marital estate. Specifically, he argues that the court failed to account adequately for his age, health, station, occupation, amount

and sources of income, earning capacity, vocational

skills and employability. We disagree.

This section of the plaintiff’s brief essentially recites

his testimony during the trial and fails to cite any authority for his claim that the court should have ordered a

more equitable distribution of property and assets. As

we stated in parts I and II of this opinion, the court

considered the evidence and applied the relevant factors set forth in § 46b-81, and its financial orders did

not constitute an abuse of discretion. The plaintiff’s

brief appears to ask this court to afford him a ‘‘second

bite at the apple.’’ Significantly, he did not direct our

attention to any authority that would support this

request. Accordingly, we conclude that the court did

not abuse its discretion as to its division of the marital estate.

The judgment is affirmed.

In this opinion the other judges concurred.

* The listing of judges reflects their seniority status on this court as of
the date of oral argument.

1 The court stated: ‘‘The [defendant’s] Stamford home where the parties

lived together throughout the marriage was purchased by the defendant in

1988, long before the parties’ marriage, for $595,000 with 20 [percent] down.

The plaintiff declined the defendant’s offer earlier in the marriage to purchase an equity interest in the home; as a result, the home has always been

in the defendant’s sole name.’’

2 The parties used a surrogate, and the child was born when the plaintiff

was fifty-one years old and the defendant was sixty years old.

3 The court noted that the plaintiff took medication daily for a number

of issues and, at some point, had prostate cancer.

4 With respect to the defendant’s health, the court stated that she ‘‘was

diagnosed with breast cancer in 2008. She had surgery at that time. In late

2014, she learned that the cancer had recurred and she [was] considering

another operation. She also needs eye surgery and surgery on each hand.’’

5 The court accepted and incorporated into the dissolution judgment the

parenting plan of the parties, which provided for joint legal custody, with

the defendant having primary physical custody of the minor child.

6 The court noted that this factor was not significant in the overall disposition of the present case.

7 The court determined that the defendant’s assets totaled $3,393,418 and

that the plaintiff’s assets totaled $1,226,247.

8

‘‘The child support guidelines are the rules, principles, schedule and

worksheet established under sections 46b-215a-1, 46b-215a-2b, 46b-215a-3,

46b-215a-4a and 46b-215a-5b of the Regulations of Connecticut State Agencies for the determination of an appropriate child support award, to be used

when initially establishing or modifying both temporary and permanent

orders. Regs., Conn. State Agencies § 46b-215a-1 (5); see also General Statutes § 46b-215b.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.)Budrawich v. Budrawich, 156 Conn. App. 628, 630 n.1, 115 A.3d 39, cert. denied, 317 Conn. 921,

118 A.3d 63 (2015).

9 The court did not award alimony to either party.

10 As a result of these conclusions, we need not address the plaintiff’s

claim that the court’s deviation from the child support guidelines would

remain valid and severable from any error with respect to the division of

the parties’ assets.

11 The court noted that ‘‘the plaintiff did nothing to assist in his wife’s

career advancement; in fact, at times he jeopardized his wife’s career by

making unauthorized stock trades that subjected the defendant to possible

disciplinary action.’’

12 Our Supreme Court, however, has stated explicitly that ‘‘[t]raditional

property principles, although relevant . . . are not determinative of

whether an interest constitutes property under § 46b-81.’’ (Citation omitted.)

Bender v. Bender, 258 Conn. 733, 748, 785 A.2d 197 (2001); see also Ranfone

v. Ranfone, 103 Conn. App. 243, 251, 928 A.2d 575 (when dividing marital

property pursuant to § 46b-81, court, in effort to observe equitable purpose

of statutory distribution scheme, looks to substance and not mere form),

cert. denied, 284 Conn. 940, 937 A.2d 698 (2007).

13 ‘‘Calculating [the present value of a pension] may require taking actuarial

testimony, which generally involves: (1) determining future benefits, taking

into consideration the date of the employee spouse’s retirement, postmarital

salary, future taxes and the duration of benefits; and (2) discounting for

present value, the probability of mortality and the probability of forfeiture.’’

Bender v. Bender, supra, 258 Conn. 756–57.

14 See, e.g., Purnell v. Purnell, 95 Conn. App. 677, 683, 897 A.2d 717

(because fact on which party based claim did not find support in record,

claim must fail on appeal), cert. denied, 280 Conn. 903, 907 A.2d 91 (2006).

15 In Krafick v. Krafick, supra, 234 Conn. 805–806, the trial court failed

to consider the plaintiff’s pension interest as an asset because it did not

have a liquid value and the court did not employ a substitute value. Our

Supreme Court concluded that it was an abuse of discretion ‘‘to reject

present value or any value for vested pension benefits merely because the

asset is nonliquid, thereby effectively removing that property interest from

the scales in determining an equitable division of all of the property before

the court.’’ Id., 806. Unlike the trial court in Krafick, the court in the present

case did not remove the defendant’s pensions from the scales, but instead

balanced them against the order of no child support, and in consideration

of the fact that the majority of the pensions had been earned prior to

the marriage.

16 The plaintiff argues that ‘‘[t]here is no precedent to support the Superior
Court’s legal authority to treat the pensions in repayment as an ‘income

stream’ instead of classifying [them] as marital property and assessing the

value of that property for purposes of equitable distribution.’’ We iterate

that the court did value and distribute the defendant’s pensions in accordance with the factors set forth in § 46b-81 (c). See, e.g., Thompson v.

Thompson, 183 Conn. 96, 100, 438 A.2d 839 (1981) (‘‘General Statutes §§ 46b81 [c] and 46b-82 both require the trial court to consider, inter alia, the

occupation and the amount and sources of income of each of the parties

when ordering property assignments and alimony. Just as current and

future wages are properly taken into account under these statutes, so may

unaccrued pension benefits, a source of future income, be considered.’’

[Emphasis added; footnote omitted.]).

Additionally, in Brady-Kinsella v. Kinsella, 154 Conn. App. 413, 421–24,

106 A.3d 956 (2014), cert. denied, 315 Conn. 929, 110 A.3d 432 (2015), which

is cited in the defendant’s brief, we concluded that it was not an abuse of

discretion for the court to award the defendant her gross weekly pension

payment of $1197, offset by the following payments to the plaintiff: ‘‘$125,841

. . . to equalize the distribution of the real property, deferred compensation

accounts, and automobiles. In addition, the court ordered the defendant to

pay a weekly sum of $172 in child support, maintain life insurance and pay

61 percent of the minor child’s unreimbursed medical expenses, as well as

the extracurricular expenses.’’ Id., 424. We conclude, therefore, that the use

of a pension in repayment as an offset to other financial orders does have

support in our law.

17 We note that ‘‘[i]t is the quintessential function of the finder of fact to

reject or accept evidence and to believe or disbelieve any expert testimony.

. . . The trier may accept or reject, in whole or in part, the testimony of

an expert.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Sander v. Sander, 96 Conn.

App. 102, 107, 899 A.2d 670 (2006).

18 We also note that the court ‘‘found the defendant to be a credible,

thoughtful and careful witness. The plaintiff was not as credible as the

defendant.’’