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[Congressional Bills 111th Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
[S. Res. 573 Agreed to Senate (ATS)]

111th CONGRESS
  2d Session
S. RES. 573

Urging the development of a comprehensive strategy to ensure stability 
                  in Somalia, and for other purposes.

_______________________________________________________________________

                   IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES

                             June 29, 2010

Mr. Feingold (for himself, Ms. Klobuchar, Mr. Franken, and Mr. Cardin) 
submitted the following resolution; which was referred to the Committee 
                          on Foreign Relations

                           September 24, 2010

   Reported by Mr. Kerry, with an amendment and an amendment to the 
                                preamble
[Strike out all after the resolving clause and insert the part printed 
                               in italic]
      [Strike the preamble and insert the part printed in italic]

                           September 29, 2010

      Considered, amended, and agreed to with an amended preamble

_______________________________________________________________________

                               RESOLUTION

 
Urging the development of a comprehensive strategy to ensure stability 
                  in Somalia, and for other purposes.

Whereas Somalia has been without a functioning central government since 1991, 
        resulting in lawlessness and an increasingly desperate humanitarian 
        situation;
Whereas, despite the return of the internationally recognized Transitional 
        Federal Government (TFG) to Mogadishu and ongoing diplomatic efforts 
        through the Djibouti Peace Process, supported by the United Nations, 
        there has been little improvement in the governance or stability of 
        southern and central Somalia, and armed opposition groups continue to 
        exploit this situation;
Whereas the traditional mediation role played by Somali elders has been eroded 
        as the dynamics of conflict and the proliferation of weapons make it 
        difficult to influence warring parties;
Whereas, since 2007, armed violence has resulted in the deaths of at least 
        21,000 people in Somalia and the displacement of nearly 2,000,000 
        people, including over 500,000 refugees in Kenya, Yemen, Ethiopia, 
        Eritrea, Djibouti, Tanzania, and Uganda;
Whereas the United Nations estimates that 3,200,000 people, or 43 percent of the 
        population of Somalia, are in need of humanitarian assistance and 
        livelihood support to survive;
Whereas the United Nations reports that almost 1,000,000 displaced Somalis in 
        need of aid cannot be reached by United Nations refugee and food 
        agencies because of growing insecurity and the threat of kidnappings to 
        staff;
Whereas local humanitarian organizations are trying to meet the needs of the 
        Somali people by restoring basic social services in urban and rural 
        communities, which places them on the front lines of the conflict and 
        make them vulnerable targets for killings, kidnappings, or being accused 
        of working for foreign governments;
Whereas al Shabaab, which has been designated as a foreign terrorist 
        organization by the Department of State, and other armed groups continue 
        to wage war against the Transitional Federal Government in Mogadishu and 
        one another to gain control over territory in Somalia;
Whereas al Shabaab has claimed responsibility for many bombings--including 
        suicide attacks--in Mogadishu, as well as in central and northern 
        Somalia, typically targeting officials of the Government of Somalia and 
        perceived allies of the TFG;
Whereas, according to Human Rights Watch, al Shabaab is subjecting inhabitants 
        of areas under its control in southern Somalia to executions, cruel 
        punishments, including amputations and floggings, and repressive social 
        control;
Whereas the human rights situation in Somalia has dramatically worsened over the 
        past several years with increased numbers of killings, torture, 
        kidnappings, and rape;
Whereas the 2009 Department of State Country Terrorism Report notes that 
        ``Somalia's fragile transitional Federal government, protracted state of 
        violent instability, its long, unguarded coastline, porous borders, and 
        proximity to the Arabian Peninsula, made the country an attractive 
        location for international terrorists seeking a transit or launching 
        point for operations in Somalia or elsewhere'';
Whereas the situation in southern and central Somalia, particularly the activity 
        of al Shabaab, poses direct threats to the stability of Puntland and 
        Somaliland regions, as well as the stability of neighboring states and 
        the wider region;
Whereas al Shabaab leaders have stated their intent to provide recruits and 
        support for al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula in Yemen;
Whereas the Government of Eritrea has provided military and financial support 
        for armed opposition groups, including al Shebaab, in part as a proxy 
        front in its continuing tensions with Ethiopia;
Whereas, according to the most recent report by the United Nations Somalia 
        Monitoring Group, arms, ammunitions, and military or dual-use equipment 
        continue to enter Somalia at a fairly steady rate, in violation of the 
        general and complete arms embargo imposed in 1992;
Whereas, in July 2009, the Department of State confirmed that, in addition to 
        other support for the TFG, it had provided cash to purchase weapons and 
        ammunitions for the TFG's efforts ``to repel the onslaught of extremist 
        forces which are intent on destroying the Djibouti peace process'';
Whereas, according to most recent report by the United Nations Somalia 
        Monitoring Group, ``[d]espite infusions of foreign training and 
        assistance, government security forces remain ineffective, disorganized 
        and corrupt -- a composite of independent militias loyal to senior 
        government officials and military officers who profit from the business 
        of war and resist their integration under a single command'';
Whereas, on April 13, 2010, President Barack Obama issued an executive order to 
        sanction or freeze the assets of militants who threaten, both directly 
        and indirectly, the stability of Somalia, as well as individuals 
        involved in piracy off Somalia's coast;
Whereas, in March 2009, at a hearing of the Committee on Homeland Security and 
        Government Affairs of the Senate, Andrew Liepman, Deputy Director of 
        Intelligence at the National Counterterrorism Center, noted that 
        ``[s]ince 2006, a number of U.S. citizens [have] traveled to Somalia, 
        possibly to train in extremist training camps'';
Whereas, in September 2009, at a hearing of the Committee on Homeland Security 
        and Government Affairs of the Senate, the Director of the National 
        Counterterrorism Center Michael Leiter testified that ``the potential 
        for al-Qaeda operatives in Somalia to commission Americans to return to 
        the United States and launch attacks against the Homeland remains of 
        significant concern'';
Whereas al Shabaab has claimed responsibility for the bombings in Kampala, 
        Uganda on July 11, 2010, which killed 76 people, including one American, 
        and wounded scores of other people; and
Whereas the extraordinary and ongoing crisis in Somalia has enormous 
        humanitarian consequences and direct national security implications for 
        the United States and our allies in the region: Now therefore be it
    Resolved, That the Senate--
            (1) acknowledges the urgency of addressing the threats to 
        United States national security in Somalia and the conditions 
        that foster those threats;
            (2) reaffirms its commitment to stand with all the people 
        of Somalia who aspire to a future free of terrorism and 
        violence through advancing political reconciliation and 
        building legitimate and inclusive governance institutions;
            (3) recognizes the difficult, but very important, work 
        being done by the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) to 
        help secure parts of Mogadishu, and reaffirms its support for 
        the mission;
            (4) calls on the Transitional Federal Government in 
        Somalia--
                    (A) to cease immediately any use of child soldiers;
                    (B) to ensure better accountability and 
                transparency for all received security assistance;
                    (C) to renew its commitment to political 
                reconciliation; and
                    (D) to take necessary steps toward becoming a more 
                legitimate and inclusive government in the eyes of the 
                people of Somalia;
            (5) calls on all actors and governments in the region, 
        particularly the Government of Eritrea, to play a productive 
        role in helping to bring about peace and stability to Somalia, 
        including ceasing to provide any financial or material support 
        to al Shabaab and other armed opposition groups in Somalia;
            (6) welcomes efforts by the President to bring greater 
        focus and resources toward understanding and monitoring the 
        situation in Somalia;
            (7) urges the President to develop a comprehensive strategy 
        to ensure that all United States humanitarian, diplomatic, 
        political, and counterterrorism programs in Somalia and the 
        wider Horn of Africa are coordinated and making progress toward 
        the long-term goal of establishing stability, respect for human 
        rights, and functional, inclusive governance in Somalia;
            (8) urges the President and Secretary of State, as part of 
        a comprehensive strategy--
                    (A) to provide greater support for a range of 
                diplomatic initiatives to engage clan leaders, business 
                leaders, and civil society leaders in Somalia and the 
                Somali Diaspora in political reconciliation and 
                consensus-building;
                    (B) to ensure better oversight, monitoring, and 
                transparency of all United States security assistance 
                provided to the TFG;
                    (C) to increase and strengthen the United States 
                diplomatic team working on Somalia, including the 
                appointment of a senior envoy, and to ensure that these 
                officials have the necessary resources, access, and 
                mandate;
                    (D) to pursue opportunities for periodic, temporary 
                United States Government travel to Somalia, consistent 
                with any security concerns;
                    (E) to expand and deepen our engagement with the 
                regional administration of Puntland and other regional 
                administrations in order to promote good governance, 
                effective law enforcement, respect for human rights, 
                and stability in these regions;
                    (F) to provide additional humanitarian, 
                development, and security assistance to the region of 
                Somaliland, recognizing the positive developments in 
                that region with respect to consolidating multi-party 
                democracy, which was evident in the recent election 
                there;
                    (G) to outline punitive measures and incentives 
                that can be used with the Government of Eritrea to 
                bring a halt to its financial and material support for 
                armed opposition groups in Somalia, including steps to 
                improve bilateral relations and to push for a 
                resolution of Eritrea's border dispute with Ethiopia 
                consistent with the arbitration decision of the 
                Ethiopia-Eritrea Border Commission;
                    (H) to explore, in consultation with the Secretary 
                of the Treasury, increased options for pressuring 
                individuals, governments, and other actors who 
                undertake economic activities that support al Shabaab 
                and other armed opposition groups in Somalia; and
                    (I) to develop, in consultation with the 
                Administrator of the United States Agency for 
                International Development, creative and flexible 
                mechanisms for delivering basic humanitarian and 
                development assistance to the people of Somalia while 
                minimizing the risk of significant diversion to armed 
                opposition groups.
                                 <all>
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