COURT OF APPEALS

SECOND DISTRICT OF TEXAS

FORT WORTH

NO. 2-08-490-CV

ANGELA RACHELL MARTIN APPELLANT

V.

TRAVIS RYAN MARTIN APPELLEE

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FROM THE 322ND DISTRICT COURT OF TARRANT COUNTY

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MEMORANDUM OPINION1

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In five issues, Appellant Angela Rachell Martin complains about the trial

court’s order enforcing the agreed divorce decree that both she and Appellee Travis

Ryan Martin signed and requiring her to sign a special warranty deed reserving for

herself only a one-twelfth (1/12) mineral interest in the property known as “the

Ranch.” Because we hold that the trial court did not abuse its discretion, we affirm

the trial court’s order.

1 See Tex. R. App. P. 47.4.
The trial court signed a divorce decree on May 22, 2007, awarding Travis

“[a]ny and all OF THE PARTIES[‘] interest in the property known as ‘The Ranch’”

and “[a]ny and all OF THE PARTIES[‘] mineral interest, in the property known as

‘The Ranch’ . . . , save and except those interest[s] awarded to ANGELA . . .

herein.” The words “OF THE PARTIES” in both paragraphs are handwritten and

initialed by both parties, their attorneys, and the trial judge.

The decree awarded Angela “[a] portion of the mineral interest, in the property

known as ‘The Ranch’ . . . , more specifically described as a 1/6 undivided mineral

interest in the entire 107 acres in which the parties own an interest which mineral

interest shall be reserved in the special warranty deed from wife to husband and his

parents.” [Emphasis added.] The italicized portion of the previous sentence is

handwritten and initialed by the parties, their attorneys, and the trial judge. The

decree does not specify the extent of the parties’ ownership in “the entire 107 acres.”

We have no record of an appeal of the divorce decree.

After a post-divorce enforcement hearing that was not recorded, the trial court

signed a November 24, 2008 order granting Travis’s motion and ordering Angela to

sign a special warranty deed conveying to Travis, in relevant part, “[a]ll of [her] right,

title and interest in and to . . . 107.123 acres of land out of the WRIGHT WILLIAMS

SURVEY, A-574, Hood County, Texas, and being that same tract of land as

described in Volume 1519, Page 114 of the Deed Records of Hood County, Texas”

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except “an undivided ONE TWELFTH (1/12th) interest in and to all of the oil, gas,

and other minerals in, on, and under the subject land.”

At our direction, the trial court entered a clarification order, which provides,

1. On September 24, 2008, the Court held a hearing at the bench

on Travis Martin’s Second Amended Motion to Sign Special Warranty

Deed. At the hearing, the Court questioned the parties’ attorneys about

the interest in the 107.123 acres that was owned by Travis and Angela

Martin prior to the Decree of Divorce. The parties agreed that Angela

and Travis owned at most a one-half (1/2) interest in the surface and

mineral estate of the entire 107.123 acres.

2. Given the parties’ representation of ownership, the Court

reviewed the Decree of Divorce, the contents of the court’s file, the

pleadings related to Travis Martin’s Motion to Sign, the proposed order,

and the proposed warranty deed. Based on the foregoing, the Court

interpreted the Decree of Divorce with John Clark’s (Angela’s attorney)

handwritten insert to conclude that the agreement between the parties

and the language used in the decree intended only to transfer one-sixth

(1/6th) of the parties’ one-half (1/2) interest in the property, for a onetwelfth (1/12th) overall mineral interest to Angela. The Court signed the

order granting Travis Martin’s Motion to Sign because it was consistent

with the property division in the decree. This one-sixth (1/6th) mineral

interest reservation was taken from the parties’ one-half (1/2) interest,

which was the only portion of the 107.123 acres before the Court for

division.

3. Neither party suggested that the decree was ambiguous, and the

Court declined an invitation to award Angela a greater interest than the

parties owned or than the decree awarded.

4. No party asked to submit evidence at the hearing, nor did any

party request findings of fact or conclusions of law.

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Agreed judgments are interpreted in accordance with contract law.

2 As the

Supreme Court of Texas has explained,

We construe the decree as a whole to harmonize and give effect to the

entire decree. If the decree is unambiguous, the Court must adhere to

the literal language used. If the decree is ambiguous, however, the

decree is interpreted by reviewing both the decree as a whole and the

record. Whether a divorce decree is ambiguous is a question of law.

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Further, if a divorce decree is ambiguous, that is, susceptible of multiple

interpretations, courts should construe it to correctly apply the law.

4

The Martins’ divorce decree does not describe or define the extent of the their

ownership in the “entire 107 acres in which the parties own an interest.” The decree

is therefore ambiguous.

5 Because only the property of the divorcing spouses is

subject to division by the trial court,

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the trial court properly relied on the parties’

2 Murray v. Murray, 276 S.W.3d 138, 144 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2008, pet.

dism’d).

3 Hagen v. Hagen, 282 S.W.3d 899, 901–02 (Tex. 2009) (citations omitted).

4 Shanks v. Treadway, 110 S.W.3d 444, 447 (Tex. 2003).

5 See id.

6 See Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 7.001 (Vernon 2006) (providing that “[i]n a

decree of divorce . . . , the court shall order a division of the estate of the parties in

a manner that the court deems just and right”); K.B. v. N.B., 811 S.W.2d 634, 641

(Tex. App.—San Antonio 1991, writ denied) (noting that divorce courts frequently

divide marital assets in which a third party claims an interest, holding that the thirdparty claims “do not deprive the court of jurisdiction to divide among the litigants

whatever interests they may have in the property,” and explaining that “[t]he court’s

adjudication of the issues before it does not prejudice the right of non-party third

persons to be heard later”) (emphasis added), cert. denied, 504 U.S. 918 (1992).

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agreement “that Angela and Travis owned at most a one-half (1/2) interest in the

surface and mineral estate of the entire 107.123 acres” to enforce the intended

division of the parties. That is, the trial court properly interpreted the agreed decree,

which states that Angela would retain one-sixth (1/6) of the parties’ interest in the

tract’s mineral estate, to mean that Angela would retain one-sixth (1/6) of the parties’

one-half (1/2) interest, or one-twelfth (1/12) of the total tract’s mineral estate.

Angela argues that the grammatical rules of construction and the other

provisions of the decree support her contention that the decree is unambiguous in

her favor. But contrary to her contention, in the entire phrase, “a 1/6 undivided

mineral interest in the entire 107 acres in which the parties own an interest,” the

short phrase “in which the parties own an interest” restricts the prepositional object,

“the entire 107 acres,” limiting the one-sixth (1/6) undivided mineral interest to only

that portion of the 107 acres, in this case one-half (1/2) of the entire tract, in which

the parties own an interest.

7 Further, the other provisions of the decree, as

presented above, support the trial court’s interpretation.

We hold that the trial court did not abuse its discretion by relying on the record

and the parties’ agreement in court that they “owned at most a one-half (1/2) interest

7 See Tex. L. Review, Manual on Usage and Style § 1.21 (11th ed. 2008)

(noting that a “restrictive . . . phrase limits or identifies which of several possible

persons, things, or ideas the . . . phrase refers to; it is therefore essential to the

meaning of the sentence”).

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in the surface and mineral estate of the entire 107.123 acres” to construe and

enforce the Martins’ divorce decree. We overrule all of Angela’s issues.

Having overruled all of Angela’s issues, we affirm the trial court’s order

enforcing the divorce decree.

LEE ANN DAUPHINOT

JUSTICE

PANEL: DAUPHINOT, GARDNER, and WALKER, JJ.

GARDNER and WALKER, JJ. concur without opinion.

DELIVERED: June 10, 2010

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