NO T R EC OM M EN DE D F OR F UL L- TEX T P UB LIC AT ION File Na me: 10a0708n.06 No. 09-2459 UN ITED STA TES C OU RT OF AP P EA LS F OR THE SI XT H C IR CU IT
UNI TED STATES OF AMERI CA, P laintif f-App ellee,
v. L EL AND J. S MART, J R., Defendan t-Appellant.

_______________________________________ ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ON APPEALFROM THE UN I TE D ST AT ES D I STR I CT CO UR T F OR

TH E WE STE RN DI STRI CT OF MI CHI GAN
O P I N I O N

Be for e : B OG G S, M OOR E, a nd SU TTON , C ir c uitJudg e s. KA REN NELSO N MOORE, Circuit Judge. Def endant L eland Smart a

ppeals the district
c ourt ’s mod if

ic a ti on of hi s su

pe rv ise d r e le a se c on dit ion s to inc lud e a c on dit ion

of e le c tr on ic monitoring by

a Global Posit ioning Sy stem (“G PS”) device for a period of six months. S mart ar g ues that th e dis tr ic t c ourt a

bu se d its disc re tio n in ord e ri ngthe c on dit ion un de r t he c ir c ums tanc e s o f h is
case . Be cause the six -month period for t h e GPS monitoring c ondition has ended, howe ver, w e DI SM ISS Smart ’s a

pp e a l a s mo ot. I. BACKG ROUND & P ROCEDURE I n 1 9 9 3 , Sm a

r t p le a d e d g u il ty to v io la ti n g th e f e d e r a l f e lo n-in-possession-of- a-f

irea rm statute, 18 U.S.C. § 922(g )(1)
. Dist. Ct. Dkt. Doc. (“Doc .”) 21 (Judgment at 1). Sm art a dmitted that he used t h e fi re arm that he was c harg ed with possessing to rob his doctor’s off ice a nd that, in an incident unrelated to his felon-in-possession convic tion, he and a f riend shot out the windows of a Pl annedNo. 09-2459

Un ite d S tates v . S ma rt

2 Parenthood clinic. Doc. 37 (Sent. Tr. July 8, 1993, at 34–36, 39). He was sente nced to 225 months in prison and five y ear s of supervise d rele ase. D oc. 21 (Judgment at 2–3). Smart’s term of imprisonment ende d on J une 13, 2009. Doc. 53 ( Sent. Tr. Nov. 9, 2009, at 4–5). On July

2, 2009, the probation o ff i ce r p eti tioned the district court to modify Smart’s conditions of supervised r elea se, proposing to add conditions that he (1) “n ot associate w ith any individual or g roup whose be liefs ar e assoc iated with white supre macists or any g roup cla ssified as a spec ial threat gr oup”; (2) “ not have a ny contac t with individuals who s upport the use of violence ag ainst repr oductive hea lth care provi ders a nd/or fac iliti es”; (3) “not be within 1,000 fe et of a ny fa c ili ty inc lud ing , b ut n ot l imi te d to , a ho sp ita l, cl ini c , wom e n’ s r e so ur c e c e nte r, re pr od uc tiv e he a lth service provider or

building whe re abortions are perf ormed” ; (4) be “plac ed on home confinement with electr onic monitoring f or a period of six months a nd [be] require d to remain at home at all times
e x c e p tf o r p r e a p p r o v e d a n d s c h e d

u l e d a b s e n c e s f o r e mp l o ym e n t , e d

u c a t i o n , r e l i g i o u s a c t i v i t y, treatment, attorney visits, cour t appea ranc es, Court-orde red oblig ations, or other a ctivities approved in advanc e by

the probation officer ”; and ( 5) “r eside at a re sidence approve d in advanc e by the probation off

icer .” Doc . 28 (Probation Pet. and Or der July 1, 2009, at 1–2). Th e pr ob ati on off

ice r n ote d th a t, a lth ou g h Sm art ha d n ot c omm itt e d a

ny vio latio ns of

his
su pe rv ise d- re le a se c on dit ion s as of the date of the re po rt , h e “ ha s a

his tor y of a sso c iatio n w ithwh ite supremac ist groups a

nd radic al anti-abortion g roups” and was “ previously . . . involved in shooting into an abortion clinic.” Id. at 2. The of fice r stated that she had re ceive d information that “Smart continues to associate with people who a re a nti-abortion/pro life, who c ondone and use violence a ndNo. 09-2459

Un ite d S tates v . S ma rt

The information was larg ely from a “thre at profile” t hat t he probation office r re ceive d from 1 a F lorida ag ency , in which S mart was classified as a “domestic terror ist” for his involvement in the anti-abor tion movement in the 1990s. Doc. 53 (Sent. Tr. N ov. 9, 2 0 0 9, at 13). The information provided to the probation officer that Smart was under investigation for new c harg es wa s later deter mined err oneous. Id. at 23–24. The district cour

t discussed the ot her special conditions to which S mart agr eed as conditions 2 i m posed bec ause of

the “site spec ific” nature of Smar t’s crimes a

nd associations—i.e., involving abortion clinics and the anti-abor tion movement. Doc. 53 (Sent. Tr . Nov. 9, 2009, at 57).

3 ill e g a l a c tiv ity” and

tha t he wa s und e r i nv e sti g a tio n f or ne w c ri min a l c ha

rg e s. Id. T h e o fficer 1

c on c lud e d th a t the pr op os e d co nd iti on s o f “ int e ns ive su pe rv isi on ” we re re qu e ste d “ to b e st s up e rv ise Mr. Smart and in the intere st of his own safe ty and that of the community .” Id. On August 19, 2009, Sm art a g ree d to the imposit ion of t he additional proposed c onditions 2 except the condition of home confine ment with e lectronic monitoring. Doc. 43 (Probation Pet. and Orde r Aug . 20, 2009, at 4). The district court held he aring s reg ardingthis rem ai n ing pr oposed condition on November 2, 2009 and November 9, 2009. Doc. 52 (Sent. Tr. Nov. 2, 2009); Doc. 53 (Sent. Tr. Nov. 9, 2009) . At the conc lus i o n of the Nove mber 9, 2009 he aring , the district court decide d to “place [S mart] on a g lobal positioni ng monitoring for a per iod of six months.” Doc. 53 (S e nt. Tr . N ov . 9 , 2 00 9, a t 61 ). Th e dis tr ic t c ourt state d th a t “ the pr ote c tio n o f t he pu bli c
wa rr ant[e d]” the GPS mon ito ri ng c on dit ion “ to make sure that Mr . Sm art [wa s] in c omp lia nc e wi th [t he spec ial site-spec ific] conditions of supervised re lease ” to which he had ag ree d. Id. at 62. After the district court a

nnounced its decision, Smart asked the court to sta y execution of the modification pending appea l, but the district court de nied the re quest. Id . On Novembe r 13, 2009, the di strict court entered a writt en order modi fying Smart’s conditions of supervised rele ase to plac eNo. 09-2459

Un ite d S tates v . S ma rt

4 him on e le c tr on ic mon ito ri ng , in c lud ingthe us e of GPS techn olo g y , f

or a pe ri od of six mo nth s, during which time Smar

t w as to be on home c onfinement. Doc . 50 (Orde r Modifying Conditions of Supervision). Pursuant to the dis t ri ct court’s order, Smart wa s place d on GPS moni toring on November

19, 2009. Supervised Relea se Violation Report at 2. Smart appea led the imposition of the condition (“Condition 1 0 ”) o n November 13, 2009. Doc. 51 (Notice of Appea l). On Novembe r 23, 2009, Smart filed a motion in t his court to stay the district court orde r pendingre s o l u t i o n of the a ppeal, or in the alternative, to stay the orde r temporar ily

until the transcripts of the t wo di strict court hearing s wer e completed. The g overnme nt did not oppose a tempora ry s t ay p en d i n g compl etion of the tra nscripts. Gov’t Resp. at 2. Upon completion of the transcr ipts, this court enter ed a temporar y stay on Fe bruar

y 12, 2010, to provide Smart fourtee n day s to renew his stay motion. Pursuant to the s tay , Smart’s GPS moni toring device
was re moved on Fe bruar

y 12, 2010. Supervised Relea se Violation Report at 2. Smart fi le d a re ne we d mo tio n to sta

y on Ma rc h 1, 20 10 , and the g ov e rnme nt f ile d it s r e sp on se on Marc h 12, 2010. On May 17, 2010, this court denied Smart’s r enew ed motion to stay and vac ated the Fe bruar

y 12, 2010 temporar

y stay
. Smart was therefor e placed on the GPS monit oring ag ain on J une 3, 2010. Supervised Re lease Violation Re port at 2. On J uly 1, 2010, Smart filed his r eply brief and a Motion to Ex pedite Consideration of Appea l, stating that he had bee n on GPS moni toring for approximately

three months and that without ex pedited considera t i o n , the district court’s or der
wo uld lik e ly e xpir e befo re th is c ourt

c ou ld c omp le te its re vie w. Th is c ourt g ra nte d th e mot ion

to expedite on J uly

7, 2010.No. 09-2459

Un ite d S tates v . S ma rt

5 Also on J uly

1, 2010, the prob ation office petitioned the district court to modify the
c on dit ion s o f S mart ’s su pe rv isi on purs ua nt t o a n a lleg e d v iol a tio n o f h is s up e rv ise d r e le a se conditions. Doc. 58 (Pet. for Warrant or Summons for Offe nder Under Supervision). The pe tition
a lle g e d th a t Sma

rt te ste d p os iti ve fo r m ari

jua na on June 19 , 201 0, and

that, d ur inga me e tin g wi th his probation officer on J une 28, 2010, Smart admitted to using ma rijuana. Id. at 2–3. The probation office r re commended that the conditions of supervised r elea se be modified to c o n t i n ue Condition 10— h o me detention with elec tronic monitoring—until J anuar y 15, 2011. Id. at 3. Smart waive d his r ight to a hear ing on the reque sted modification and ag ree d to the modification. Doc. 65 ( Orde r Mo dif yingCon dit ion s o f S up e rv isi on a t 3)
. Th e dis tr ic t c ourt , the re fo re , e nte re d an or de r o n A ugus t 11, 2010, modify ing Smart’s conditions of supervision as re quested by the probation officer
. Id. at 1–2. On

Oc tob e r 1 5, 20 10 , th e g ov e rnme nt s ub mitte d a lette r to this c ourt purs ua nt t o F e de ra l Ru le of Appe llate Proce dure 2 8(j), ar g uing that beca use the orig inal six -month GPS m onitoring pe riod imposed in the November 13, 2009 order

would have e x pired on Septembe r 7, 2010, Smart’s appe al is n owmoo t. Th e g ov e rnme nt a lso argue d that Sma rt ha s wa ive d the ri g ht to c ha lle ng e the Au g us t 11, 2010 order , which extended the time per iod for the monitoring condition, be cause Smart ag ree d to and has not appe aled that or der. A t oral arg ument, Smart’s counsel stated that Smart is appea ling only the Novembe r 13, 2009 orde r that orig inally imposed the GPS moni toring condition.No. 09-2459

Un ite d S tates v . S ma rt

Smart also alleg es that the district cour t imposed a dditional conditions of home confineme nt 3 and pay ment of costs in its written order that it did not i mpose orally at the hea

ring
. See Appellant Br . at 10–11. Smart raise s the issue in his statement of fa cts, but does not further develop the issue in t he argume nt s e c tio n o f h is b ri e f, no r i n h is r e ply br ie f. We de e m wa ive d “ iss ue s a dv e rt e d to in a per functory

manner , unacc ompanied by some eff ort at deve loped ar g umentation.” United States v. Re ed , 167 F.3d 984, 993 (6th Cir.), cert. de nied , 5 28 U. S. 8 97 (1 99 9) . H ow e ve r, we no te that to the e xten t th a t th e re re ma ins any a mbi g uit y re g ard ingthe c on dit ion, S mar t ha s “ the ri g ht t o a pp ly to the s entenc ing court for a clarification.” F ED . R. C R IM . P. 32 .1 19 79 Ad vis or y Com mitte e No te s. 6 II. AN AL YSI S Smart do e s n ot c ha lle ng e wh e the r t he dis tr ict c ourt

ha d th e po we r t o im

po se a GPS
mon ito ri ngc on dit ion , b ut r a the r d isp ute s th e pr op ri e ty of imp os ingsu c h a

re qu ir eme nt i n h is circ umstances. Appellant B r. at 23; Doc. 53 (Sent. Tr. Nov. 9, 2009, at 44). Smart ar g ues that he 3 is “a model super

visee with no issues whatsoe ver,” Appe l l an t Br. at 2, and that he “had not advocated violence ag ainst any persons or f

acilities related to providing abortion ser vices or counselingor eng ag ed in any other violenc e aga inst such persons or facilities in more than seventee n y ear s.” Id. at 8. He a

rg ues that the imposition of GPS monitoring “ is punitive and is a substantial infring ement on [his] liberty ,” id. a t 20 , a nd that it is “ a g re a ter depri vatio n o f [h is] li be rt y tha n is
re a so na bly ne c e ssa ry to a c hie ve the purp os e s o f s up e rv ise d r e le a se a s se t out in 18 U. S.C. § 3583(e) .” Id. at 23. For example, at ora l argument, Smart’s counsel state d that Smart was fire d from a job be cause the GPS device did not func tion properly when he wa s wi thin the employ er’ s fac ility . The g overnment arg ues that the district cour t did not abuse its discretion beca use the condition was “r easona

bly related to the dual g oals of proba tion: [ S mart’s] reha

bilitation and the protec tion of the public.” Appe llee B r. at 7.No. 09-2459

Un ite d S tates v . S ma rt

7 We must st art with the mootness i ssue because “‘[w]e have no power to adjudicate disputes which ar e moot.’” Rosales-Garc i a v. Ho l l and , 322 F.3d 386, 394 ( 6th Cir.) (en ba nc) ( quoting McPhe rson v. M

i ch

. Hi g h S ch. Athletic Ass’n, I

nc. , 119 F.3d 453, 458 ( 6th Cir. 1997) (en ba nc)) , cert. de nied , 539 U.S. 941 (2003). “‘ Under Article I I Iof the Constit ution, our jurisdiction ex tends only to actual c ases a

nd controve rsies.’” Id. (q u o t i n g McPhe rson , 11 9 F .3 d a t 45 8)
. “ A c a se be c ome s mo ot w hen th e iss ue s p re se nte d a re no lon g e r l ive or

pa rt ie s la c k a

le g a lly c og niza ble interest in the outcome.” Un ite d Sta te s v . Ci ty of D e tro it , 401 F.3d 448, 450 (6th Cir. 2005) (interna l quotation marks omitted). “Eve n if a c ase w as not moot in the district court, if it become s moot on appea l, we must dismis s the ca se unless ‘the r elief soug ht would, if g rante d, make a differ ence to the leg al i ntere sts of the pa

rties.’” Ro sa le

s- Ga rc ia , 3 2 2 F. 3 d

at 3 9 4 (q u o t i n g McPhe rson , 119 F.3d at 458). There is no dispute that the six -month period for the monitoring c ondition im posed by the November

13, 2009 order

has expired. “I f a [defe ndant] does not chall en ge the validity of the conviction but rathe r only challeng es his sentenc e or some aspec t of it, the reque st f or relief is moot
once the challeng ed portion of the se ntence has expired.” Un ite d States v. G old be rg , 239 F. App’ x 99 3, 99 4 (6 th Cir
. 20 07 ) (u np ub lis he d op ini on ) (i nte rn a l qu otatio n mark s o mitte d) ; see also United States v. W

altanen , 356 F. App’ x 848, 8 5 1 (6 t h C i r. 2009) ( unpublished opinion) (same) . When asked to a ddress the mootness issue at oral a rg ument, Smart’s counsel a rg ued that the a

ppeal of the GPS moni toring condition should not be dismiss ed for mootness unde r the exception for c ases that
are capa ble of re petition , y et eva ding r eview. Counsel a rg ued that Smart could be subjected to aNo. 09-2459

Un ite d S tates v . S ma rt

8 seri es o f GP S monit oring conditions, eac h of a shor t duration and e ach e x piring befor e this court could complete its re view. “[T] he [Supreme] Court has long re cog nized an exception to the mootness doctrine for case s that are ‘ca

pable of repe tition, y et eva d i n g re v iew.’” Ro sa le s- Ga rc ia , 322 F.3d at 396. The exception, however , “applies only i n exceptional situations.” Spence r v. Kemna , 523 U.S. 1, 17 (1 99 8) (i nte rn a l qu otatio n marks om itt e d) . I t “ a pp lie s w he re ‘( 1) the c ha lle ng e d a c tio n [is ] in i ts duratio n to o s ho rt to be fu lly lit ig a te d p ri or

to c e ssatio n o r e xpir a tio n, and (2 ) t he re [is] a re a so na ble expectation that the same c omplaining pa rty [wil l] be subj ect to the same a ction ag ain.’” Ro sa lesGa rc ia , 3 2 2 F. 3 d

at 3 9 6 (a l t er at i o n s i n o ri gi n al ) ( qu o t i n g Spence r , 5 23 U. S. at 17 ); see also Suster

v . M ar sh all , 149 F.3d 523, 527 ( 6th Cir. 1998) (same) , cert. de nied , 525 U.S. 1114 (1999). We c onclude that the imposit ion of GPS monitoring as a condition of S m ar t ’s s u pervised
re le a se do e s n ot f

a ll und e r t

he “capa bl e of

re pe tit ion , y e t e va din g re vie w” e xce pti on to m oo tne ss. Wit h respe ct to the test’s first prong , althoug h the district court imposed the c halleng ed condition for a short six -month duration, a GPS monitoring condition might not be imposed on Smart in the future f or a dur ation so short that it could not be fully litigated pr ior to expi ration. See Spe ncer , 523 U.S. at 1 8 (observing that petitioner who wa s challeng ing his pa role re vocation “ha [d] not shown

. . . that the t ime betwee n parole revoc ation and ex piration of sentence is alway s so short as to evade revie w.” )
. A d d it io n a ll y , d e f e n d an ts w h o s e e k

to c h a ll e n g e th e im

p o s it io no f

a G PS mo n itor ing condition can move f

irst in the district court and then, if unsuc cessf ul, in this c ourt for a stay of the condition pending appea l. F ED . R. A PP . P. 8 (c ); F ED . R. C R IM . P. 3 8; see also United States v . Ritter ,No. 09-2459

Un ite d S tates v . S ma rt

9 118 F.3d 502, 504 ( 6th Cir. 1997) (noting that appellant “suc cessf ully moved this court for a stay of the [challeng ed super

vised rele as e] condition pending appea l”). The Supreme Court has state d expli citly that “it ‘has a lway s been he ld, . . . that as part of i t s t ra d i t i o n al equipment for the administration of justice, a f eder al cou rt can sta

y the enf orce ment of a judg ment pending the
ou tc ome of

an a pp e a l’ ” be c a

us e oth e rw ise the a

pp e llate “ c ourt ’s de c isi on may in s ome c a se s c ome too late for the party

seekingrevie w.” Nken v . Holder , -- - U. S. ---, 129 S. Ct. 1749, 1754 (2009) (q u o t i n g Sc rip

ps -H owa rd Ra dio , I nc . v . FCC , 316 U.S. 4, 9–10 (1942)). Withre sp e c t to the se c on d p ro ngof the te st, Smart

ha s not dem on st rate d th a t th e re is a
re a so na ble e xpe c tatio n th a t he wil l be sub je c t to GPS mon ito ri nga g a in d ur inghis su

pe rv ise d- re le a se term
. T h e dis trict court’ s rationale f or orig inally

imposing the GPS monitoring—to ensure compliance with Smart’s other site-spe cific c onditions—i s still applicable beca use Smart remains subject to the other spe cial conditions. But at or al argument, Smart’s counsel a dvised this court that Smart is not currently

being monitored by GPS eve n though the elec tronic monitoring to whic h he
a g r e e d in th e A u g u s t 1 1 , 2 0 1 0 o r d e r , f o ll o w in g h is s u

p e r v is e d

- r e le a s e v io lati o n , c o u ld a u th o r iz e monitoring by

GPS. W e thus have no rea son to ex pect that the d i s t ri ct cour t will modi fy

Smart’s conditions of supervised r elea se ag ain in the future to impose GPS monitoring. Th er ef ore, a s explained above, this ca se does not mee t the mootness exception f o r t h o s e case s “ca

pable of repe tition, y et eva ding r eview.”No. 09-2459

Un ite d S tates v . S ma rt

10

III . C ON CL USI ON Be cause the cha lleng ed six -month period of GPS monitoring has expi red a nd the ca se does not me et the “ca

pable of re petition, y et eva ding r eview” exception, we DI SM ISS Smart’s appe al as moot. W e ther efor e express no views on the me rits of GPS moni toring as a c ondition of supervised rele ase.