IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

No. 12-50954

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff – Appellee,

v.

RAYMOND RODRIGUEZ,

Defendant – Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District Court 

for the Western District of Texas

USDC No. 5:10-CR-794

Before JONES, ELROD, and HAYNES, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:*

Raymond Rodriguez appeals the district court’s denial of his motion to 

suppress evidence seized from his residence. We AFFIRM.

I. Factual and Procedural History

Steve Wilkins, a Texas Department of Public Safety (“DPS”) officer, 

sought a warrant to search a residence located at 318 Amberdale Oak, San 

Antonio, Texas (the “Residence”). In his affidavit in support of the warrant, 

Agent Wilkins stated that probable cause existed to suggest that Rodriguez 

* Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined that this opinion should not 

be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH 

CIR. R. 47.5.4.

United States Court of Appeals

Fifth Circuit

FILED

January 8, 2014

Lyle W. Cayce

Clerk

 

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was living at the Residence in possession of cocaine. Agent Wilkins explained 

that during an unrelated investigation, a cooperating defendant (“CD”) gave 

information to another DPS agent, alleging that Rodriguez was a supplier of 

cocaine in the San Antonio area.1 Based on this information, Agent Wilkins 

began to investigate Rodriguez and determined on August 27, 2010, that he

currently resided at the Residence. Agent Wilkins confirmed this belief 

through surveillance of the Residence. He also conducted a utilities check on 

the location and performed a registration check on the vehicle parked at the 

Residence, which revealed that the utilities and the vehicle were registered to 

Rodriguez. 

On August 31, 2010, Agent Wilkins searched a trash can that had been 

placed against the curb in front of the residence. Agent Wilkins concluded that 

the trash can had been placed there for garbage pickup because the day of his

search was a garbage collection day in the neighborhood and there were other 

trash cans along the street presumably placed there in anticipation of trash

pickup. Agent Wilkins searched two trash bags that he retrieved from the 

trash can and discovered “several clear plastic sandwich style baggies 

containing a white powdery residue.”2 Agent Wilkins found a cell phone bill 

addressed to Rodriguez in the same trash bag as the plastic baggies. One of 

the baggies was field tested, and the residue tested positive for cocaine.

1 The CD also related that he had seen cocaine at Rodriguez’s previous residence and 

that he had previously purchased two ounces of cocaine from Rodriguez. However, Agent 

Wilkins’s affidavit gave no indication as to when the CD had seen cocaine at Rodriguez’s 

previous residence, when the CD purchased the cocaine, when this information was relayed 

by the CD to the other DPS agent, or when the other DPS agent relayed this information to 

Agent Wilkins. The Government concedes that the information provided by the CD standing 

alone is insufficient to constitute probable cause. 

2 The size of the baggies was also consistent with the amount of cocaine the CD stated 

that he had previously purchased from Rodriguez.

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The same day he conducted his trash search, Agent Wilkins signed the

affidavit, stating that he believed that the Residence contained a quantity of 

cocaine intended for distribution. A magistrate judge issued the search 

warrant, and a search of the Residence took place on that same day. During 

the search, the police located over $9000 in cash, a 9 mm Taurus handgun, a 

ledger, two cell phones, and 1755.39 grams of cocaine. 

Rodriguez was charged with possession with intent to distribute over 500 

grams of cocaine in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1) and (b)(1)(B). He moved

to suppress the evidence seized from the Residence. After the district court 

denied his motion, Rodriguez entered a conditional plea of guilty, reserving his 

right to appeal the denial of his suppression motion. He filed a motion for 

reconsideration concerning his motion to suppress, which the district court 

denied. Rodriguez timely appealed.

II. Discussion

The factual findings underlying the district court’s denial are reviewed 

for clear error; the court’s legal conclusions are reviewed de novo. United 

States v. Gibbs, 421 F.3d 352, 356–57 (5th Cir. 2005). When the evidence 

sought to be suppressed was discovered pursuant to a search warrant, “we 

[first] determine whether the good-faith exception to the exclusionary rule 

announced in United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897 (1984), applies.”3 Cherna, 

184 F.3d at 407. 

3 If the good-faith exception applies, “we end our analysis and affirm the district 

court’s decision to deny the motion to suppress” without considering whether the warrant 

was supported by probable cause. United States v. Cherna, 184 F.3d 403, 407 (5th Cir. 1999); 

see also United States v. Payne, 341 F.3d 393, 399 (5th Cir. 2003) (“If [the good-faith exception

applies], we need not reach the question of probable cause for the warrant unless it presents 

a novel question of law, resolution of which is necessary to guide future action by law 

enforcement officers and magistrates.” (citations and internal quotation marks omitted)). 

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The good-faith exception provides that a motion to suppress should not 

be granted if the officer executing the warrant relied upon it in good faith. 

Gibbs, 421 F.3d at 357. “Good faith” is determined by examining the objective 

reasonableness of the officer’s “reliance on the issuing-judge’s probable-cause 

determination and the technical sufficiency of the warrant” in light of the 

totality of the circumstances. Id. at 358. While the issuance of the warrant 

ordinarily suffices to establish good cause, reliance on a warrant issued upon 

a “bare bones affidavit” is not good faith. Id.; United States v. Craig, 861 F.2d 

818, 821 (5th Cir. 1988); see also Payne, 341 F.3d at 399–400. A “bare bones” 

affidavit is defined as one that contains “wholly conclusory statements, 

[lacking] the facts and circumstances from which a magistrate can 

independently determine probable cause.” United States v. Satterwhite, 980 

F.2d 317, 321 (5th Cir. 1992); see also United States v. Pope, 467 F.3d 912, 920 

(5th Cir. 2006) (“[E]xamples of ‘bare bones’ affidavits include those that merely 

state that the affiant ‘has cause to suspect and does believe’ or ‘[has] received 

reliable information from a credible person and [does] believe’ that contraband 

is located on the premises.” (alterations in original) (citation omitted)). 

Whether an affidavit is “bare bones” is determined under “the totality of the 

circumstances, including the veracity, reliability, and basis of knowledge of a 

confidential informant.” United States v. Fisher, 22 F.3d 574, 578 (5th Cir. 

1994). The issuing judge must be allowed to draw reasonable inferences from 

the affidavit, and the ultimate determination of the affidavit’s adequacy is 

entitled to great deference on review. United States v. May, 819 F.2d 531, 535 

(5th Cir. 1987).

Rodriguez argues that Agent Wilkins’s affidavit is “bare bones” because 

it does not establish a sufficient nexus connecting the drugs (and related 

evidence) to the Residence. However, in addition to describing information he 

received from the CD, Agent Wilkins detailed the investigation he performed 

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tying Rodriguez to the Residence, which included performing surveillance of 

the location and conducting utilities and vehicle registration checks. Agent 

Wilkins also described his search of the trash, which revealed drug 

paraphernalia and a bill addressed to Rodriguez leading him to conclude that 

there were probably drugs intended for distribution, as well as drug-related 

evidence, at the Residence. Based on this information, a reasonably objective

officer could conclude that Agent Wilkins’s investigation established a 

sufficient “nexus between the house to be searched and the evidence sought.”4 

See Payne, 341 F.3d at 400.

Rodriguez also argues that the evidence from the trash search is stale 

because Agent Wilkins did not witness Rodriguez place the trash can outside 

for collection, and thus it is possible that the trash waited on the curb for

several days. However, the fact that the trash can and the baggies contained 

therein may have been on the curb for several days does not preclude a 

reasonably objective officer from concluding in good-faith that it was probable 

that the items sought (i.e., drugs and “records, receipts, notes, ledgers, and 

other papers relating to the . . . distribution of controlled substances”) were 

still in the Residence. See Craig, 861 F.2d at 823 (observing that records “can 

4 We have previously applied the good-faith exception under similar circumstances, 

observing that a trash search that revealed plastic baggies containing cocaine residue, 

combined with evidence of the defendant’s prior arrests on narcotics violations, was 

“sufficient to support a reasonable belief that contraband would be found inside the 

residence.” See United States v. Sauls, 192 F. App’x 298, 300 (5th Cir. 2006) (unpublished). 

Moreover, the Eighth Circuit concluded that a search of the garbage left outside a defendant’s 

residence that revealed marijuana seeds and stems was “independently adequate” as standalone evidence to establish probable cause that the defendant’s residence contained drugs 

and related evidence. United States v. Briscoe, 317 F.3d 906, 907–08 (8th Cir. 2003) 

(declining to apply the good-faith exception because stand-alone evidence of drugs in the 

garbage was sufficient to establish probable cause). Because we conclude that the good-faith 

exception applies, we need not decide here whether the drug-related evidence discovered in

the trash can outside Rodriguez’s residence standing alone suffices to establish probable 

cause.

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reasonably be expected to be kept for long periods of time in the place to be 

searched”); United States v. Freeman, 685 F.2d 942, 952 (5th Cir. 1982) 

(evidence is not stale if the issuing judge could reasonably conclude that the

evidence sought under the warrant would still be present at the residence).

In sum, Agent Wilkins’s reliance on the warrant was not objectively 

unreasonable. See Craig, 861 F.2d at 823. Because we conclude that the goodfaith exception applies, we do not address Rodriguez’s argument that the

warrant was not supported by probable cause. See Cherna, 184 F.3d at 407. 

AFFIRMED.

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