In th e S u p re m e Co u rt o f Ge o rg ia

De c id e d: Ju n e 1 , 2 0 1 5

S1 5 A0 13 9 . DYAL v . THE S TATE.

B L ACKW EL L , Ju stic e

.

Ap p e lla n t Le wis Dy a l wa s trie d b y a Be rrie n Co u nty ju ry a n d c o n v ic te d

o f m urd e r, a gg ra v a te d a ssa u lt, a n d th e u n la wfu l p o sse ssio n o f a fire a rm d u rin g

th e c o m m issio n o f a fe lo n y , a ll in c o n n e c tio n with th e fa ta l sh oo tin g o f h is a d u lt

so n , Jo n a th a n

. A p p e lla n t n o w c o n te n d s th a t th e tria l c o u rt e rre d with re sp e c t to

se v e ra l e v id e n tia ry m a t t e rs, wh e n it c h arg e d th e ju ry a b o u t e v id e n c e o f p rio r

d iffic u ltie s be twe e n Ap p e lla n t a n d h is so n , wh e n it u se d a c e rta in v e rd ic t fo rm ,

a n d wh e n it se n te n c e d h im fo r b o th mu r d e r a n d a g gra v a te d a ssa u lt. We a gre e

th a t th e a g g ra v a te d a ssa ult sh o u ld ha v e be e n m e rg e d in to th e m u rd e r, a n d we

th e re fo re v a c a te th e c o n v ic tio n a n d se n te n c e fo r a gg ra v a te d a ssa u lt. We

o th e rwise se e n o e rro r, h o w e ve r, a nd we a ffirm th e ju dg m e n t o f c o n v ic tio n a n d

se n te nc e s a s to m

u rd e r a n d u n la wfu l p osse ssio n o f a fire a rm

. 1

1 Appellant’s son was k illed on Decem ber 17, 2007. Appellant wa s i ndicted on
Novem ber 17, 2008 and c harged with m alice m urder, f elony m urder, a ggravated a ssault, and1

. Vie we d in th e lig h t m o st fa v o ra ble to th e v e rd ic t, th e e v id e nc e sh o w s

th a t Ap p e lla n t liv e d n e a r Ala p a h a with h is wife an d Jo n a th an

. Ap p e lla n t h a d a

stra in e d re la tio n sh ip with Jo n a th a n , a n d th e re h a d be e n se ve ra l in c id e n ts o f

v io le nc e b e twe e n th e m , in c lu d in g an a lte r c at i o n in 2 00 0 th a t re su lte d in

Ap p e lla n t h a v in g to u nd e rg o fa c ia l re c o nstru c tiv e su rg e ry

.

On th e e v e n in g of De c e m b e r 1 7

, 2 0 0 7

, Ap p e lla nt c a rrie d a h an d g u n in to

th e k itc he n o f th e fa m ily h o m e , wh e re hi s w ife a n d so n we re se a te d a t a ta b le

.

Ap p e lla n t’s wife h a d n o t h e a rd Ap p e lla n t a n d he r so n a rg u in g th a t e v e n in g , a n d

sh e d id n o t k n o w wh y A p p e lla n t wa s c a rry in g h is ha n d g u n

. Ap pe lla n t p o in te d

th e g u n a t b o th h is wife a n d so n , p u t h is h a n d o n h is wife ’s sh o u l d e r i n a w a y

th a t m a d e h e r fe e l lik e h e wa n te d h e r to sta y s ea t e d

, a n d s h o t Jo n a th a n in th e

h e a d

. Wh e n Ap p e lla n t’s wife re a c h e d o u t to Jo n a th an, Ap p e lla n t sa id

, “ [l] e a v e

the unlawf

ul p ossession of a f

irearm during the com m ission of a f e lony

. Appellant was tried beginning on March 24, 2009, and the jury returned its verdict the f

ollowing day

. The jury

did not r e a c h a v e r d i c t a s to f elony m urder, but it f

ound Appellant guilty of all the other charges. The t r i a l c o u rt sentenced Appellant to im prisonm e nt f

or lif e f o r m a l ice m

urder, a

concurrent term of im

prisonm e nt f

or ten y ears f

or aggravated assault, and a consecutive term
of im p risonm ent f

or f i ve y ears f

or u n l a w f

u l possession of a f

i rearm

. On May 7, 2009, Appellant requested leave to f ile an out-of

-tim e m otion f

or new trial, the trial c ourt granted

that request on June 11, 2009, Appellant f iled a m o tion f

or new trial on the sam e d ay , and he

am ended that m otion on O ctober 17, 2013. The trial court denied Appellant’s m otion f or new trial on J anuary 14, 2014, and Appellant tim ely f iled a notice of appeal on February 3, 2014.

The case was docketed in this Court f or the January 2015 t erm and orally argued on January 5, 2015.

2h im a lo n e , y ou stu p id b

_ _ _ _ , he ’s de a d.

. . . Y o u wa n t to b e th e n e x t o n e ? ”

Wh e n p o lic e o ffic e rs a rriv e d a t th e h o m e so o n th e re a fte r, th e y n o te d a s t r o n g

o d o r o f a lc o h o l o n Ap p e lla n t’s b re a th

, th a t h is sp e e c h wa s slu rre d, a nd th a t h is

m o to r sk ills we r e i mp a i r ed

. Ap p e lla n t to ld th e o ffic e rs th a t h e k ille d h is so n

b e c a u se “ h e w a s g o in g to b e a t my ta il.” At tria l, Ap p e lla n t p re se n te d a

ju stific a tio n d e fe n se , b u t it wa s re je c te d b y th e ju ry

.

Ap p e lla n t d o e s n o t disp u te th a t th e e v id e n c e is su ffic ie n t to sh o w th a t h e

c o m m itte d e a c h o f th e c rim e s o f wh ic h h e wa s c o n vic te d, b u t h e d o e s a sse rt th a t

th e tria l c o u rt e rre d wh e n it s e n te n c e d h im fo r b o th m a lic e m urd e r a n d

a g g ra v a te d a s s a

u lt. Ge org ia la w p ro sc rib e s m ultip le c o n v ic tio n s wh e re “ [o ] n e

c rim e is in c lu d e d in th e o th e r.” OCGA § 1 6-1 -7 (a ) (1 ). An d a c rim e is in c lu d e d

in a n o th e r c rim e wh e n , a m o n g o th e r th in g s, “ [i] t is e sta b lish e d b y p ro o f o f th e

sa m e o r le ss th a n a ll th e fa c ts

. . . re q uire d to e sta b lish [th e o th e r] c rim e .” OCGA

§ 1 6 -1 -6 (1 ). He re , th e in d ic tm e n t c h a rg e d Ap p e lla n t with m a lic e m u rd e r fo r

fa ta lly sh o o tin g h is so n in th e h e a d

, a n d it c h a rg e d A p p el l a n t with a g g ra v a te d

a ssa u lt fo r p o in tin g th e g u n a t h i s s o n a n d p u llin g th e trig g e r. Ap p e lla n t wa s

c h a rg e d with c o m m ittin g a sin g le a ssa u lt a g a in st h is so n , an d it wa s th is a ssa u lt

th a t re su lte d in h is so n’s d e a th

. A s a re su lt, th e a gg ra v a te d a ssa ult with a d e a d ly

3we a

p on d id no t re q u ire pro o f o f a n y fa c t n o t a lso re q uire d to b e pro v e d fo r th e

m a lic e m u rd e r. Co n se q u e n tly

, th e a g gra v a te d a ssa ult sh o u ld ha v e be e n m e rg e d

in to t h e ma l i c e m

u rd e r, a n d th e se n te nc e im

p o se d fo r a g g ra v a te d a ssa u lt m u st

b e v a c a te d

. S e e Cu lp e pp e r v

. S t a t e , 2 8 9 Ga

. 7 3 6

, 7 38 (2 ) (a ) (7 1 5 S E2 d 1 5 5 )

(2 0 1 1 ); c o m

p a re Willin g h a m v

. S ta te

, 28 1 Ga

. 57 7, 5 7 9 (6 42 SE2 d 43 ) (2 0 0 7 )

(a g g ra va te d a ssa u lt d id n o t m e rg e with m u rd e r wh e re th e in d ic tm e n t a lle g e d th a t

d e fe n d a n t a ssa u lte d v ic tim b y p la c in g h im in re a so n a ble a p p re h e n sio n o f

im m e d ia te ly re c e i v i n g a v i o l e n t in ju ry b e c a u se o n ly th e a g g ra v a te d a ssa u lt c o u n t

re q u ire d th e S ta te to o ffe r p ro o f o f th a t e le m e n t). As to th e c o n v ic tio n s fo r

m u rd e r a n d u nla wfu l p o sse ssio n o f a fire a r m, w e c o nc lu de th a t th e e v id e n c e

a d d u c e d a t tria l is le g a lly su ffic ie nt to a u th o riz e a ra ti o n al t r i e r o f fa c t to fin d

b e y o n d a re a so n a

b le d o u b t th a t Ap p e lla n t wa s g u ilty o f th o se c rim e s. J a c k so n

v . Virg in ia , 4 4 3 U. S . 3 0 7 , 3 1 9 (III) (B) (9 9 S Ct 2 7 8 1 , 6 1 LE2 d 5 6 0) (1 9 7 9 ).

2

. Ap p e lla n t c la im s th a t th e t r i al c o u rt e rre d wh e n it re fu se d to a d m it

e v id e n c e o f p rio r b a d a c ts a lle g e d ly c o m m itte d b y Jo n a th a n a g a in st th ird p a rtie s

th a t c a u se d Ap p e lla n t to fe a r h is s o n

. 2 Th e tria l c ou rt e x c lu d e d th is e v id e n c e

2 I n a related enum eration of error, A ppellant asserts that t he trial court abused its

discretion when it directed the redaction of a statem ent m ade by Appellant f rom the recording

of a phone conversation between A ppellant a nd l aw enf o rcem ent that took place on the night

4a fte r fin d in g th a t Ap p e lla n t fa ile d to g iv e p ro p e r no tic e un d e r Un ifo rm S u p e rio r

Co u rt Ru le 3 1

. 1

, wh ic h re q u ire s th a t a d e fe nd an t no tify th e S ta te te n da y s b e fo re

tria l o f h is in te ntio n to in tro d u c e e v id e nc e o f sp e c ific a c ts o f v i o l e n c e b y th e

v ic tim a g a in st th ird p a rtie s. 3 Ap pe lla n t a c k n o wle dg e s th a t h e fa ile d to p ro v id e

p r o p e r no tic e , h o we v e r, a n d it is we ll-se ttle d th a t a tria l c o u rt h a s “ [b ro a d ]

d isc re tio n in d e c id in g wh e th e r to v a ry th e tim e fo r filin g [u nd e r Ru le 3 1 .1 ]

, a n d

its d e c isio n will n o t b e u p se t a b se n t a b u se .” Da rd e n v

. S ta te

, 2 7 1 G a

. 4 4 9

, 4 5 0

(2 ) (5 1 9 S E2 d 9 2 1 ) (1 9 9 9 ) (c ita tio n om itte d ). He re , th e re c o rd sh o ws th a t th e

tria l c o u rt u n de rsto od th a t it h a d th e d isc re tio n to a dm it e v id e n c e o f p r i o r b a d

a c ts c o m m itte d a g a in st th ird p a rtie s b y Ap pe lla nt’s so n , b u t it d e c lin e d to d o so

a fte r fin d in g th a t Ap p e lla n t h a d n o re a so n fo r h is fa ilu re to p ro vid e t h e S ta te

t h at Appellant k illed his son. Appellant acknowledges that this e num e ration o f error “i s contingent u p o n ” t he issue regarding the adm issibility of evidence of prior bad acts

com m itted by Appellant’s son against third p arties because the portion of the recording that

the trial court suggested w ould have to be redacted was a statem ent in which Appellant said

that his son had b e en o n p robation f or shooting a deputy and b eating up his g irlf riend. In any event, the record s hows t hat this r ecording was never play ed f or the jury

, and the t rial court never actually

redacted any

statem ent as Appellant claim s.

3 W e note t hat this case was tried under our old Evidence Code, which perm itted an accused claim ing justif

ication t o of

f er evidence o f specif

ic a cts of violence by the victim against third parties under t he rule of Chandler v. State, 261 Ga. 402, 407 (3) (b) (405 SE2d 669) (1991). W e do not d ecide today whether Chandler retain s i ts viability under the new Evidence Code.

5with p ro p e r n otic e

. Mo re o v e r, th e u n tim e ly n o tic e th a t Ap pe lla n t p ro v id e d to th e

S ta te d id n o t i n c l u d e sp e c ific in fo rm a tio n a b o u t th e a lle g e d p rio r b a d a c ts a s

re q u ire d b y Un ifo rm S u p e r i o r Co u rt R u le 3 1 .6 (B), b u t it in ste a d m e re ly

in f o r me d th e S ta te th a t Ap p e lla n t in te n de d to in tro d u c e “ e v id e n c e o f [a n

u n sp e c ifie d ] a c t o f v io le nc e b y th e v ic tim .” As a re su lt, th e tria l c o urt d id n o t e rr

wh e n it e x c lu d e d th is e v id e n c e

. 4

3

. Ap p e lla n t a lso c o n te n d s th a t th e tria l c o u rt e rre d wh e n it a llo we d a G BI

a g e n t to te stify th a t, wh il e t h e a g e n t wa s in v e stig a tin g th e 2 0 0 0 a lte rc a tio n

b e twe en A p p e lla n t a n d h is so n th a t re su lte d in Ap p e lla n t h a v in g to u n d e rg o

fa c ia l r e c o n s t

r u c tiv e su rg e ry , Ap p e lla n t’s so n m a d e a writte n sta te m e n t c la im in g

4 It is not altogether clear w hat this evidence w o u l d h ave been, and this uncertainty

is also f atal to Appellant’s c laim that his trial lawy er was inef f ective because her violation

of Rule 31.1 resulted in the exclusion of evidence. The only evidence o f the victim ’s prior

bad acts against third p arties introduced either at t he h earing at which the trial court excluded

evidence of prior b ad acts or at the hearing on Appellant’s mo t i o n f o r new t rial is that Appellant’s son was c harged with the 2 0 0 4 a g g r a vated assault of a Cof f ee County police

of f icer. But no details of this

– or a ny other

– incident were introduced at t hose h earings, and

we can only speculate a

bout what testim ony

could have been provided by any witnesses to

any prior bad acts com m itted by Appellant’s son against third p arties. See Johnson v. State, 290 Ga. 382, 386 (2) (d) (721 SE2d 851) (2012) (“[ s]peculation is i nsuf f icient to establish prejudice under Strickland [ v. W ash i ngton, 466 U. S. 668 (104 SCt 2052, 80 L E2d 674) (1984)]”). In any e vent, i t was the victim ’s relationship with Appellant that appears to have

been historically v i olent, so Appellant’s justif ic a t i o n d e f

ense was not “ def

eated” by his

i n a b ility to present e vidence of bad a cts allegedly com m i tted by the victim a gainst third parties as he now claim s. See Owens v. State, 270 Ga. 199, 201 (2) (509 S E2d 905) (1998) (def endant need not provide the State with notice when he intends to introduce evidence of prior dif f i culties with the victim

to support a claim

of justif ication).

6th a t Ap p e lla n t c a m e in th e h o u se “ d ru n k o u t o f h is m in d ” a n d p o in te d a g u n a t

h im

. A p p e lla n t c la im s th a t e v id e n c e o f th is writte n sta te m e nt sh o uld h a v e b e e n

e x c lu d e d u n d e r th e Co nfro n ta tio n Cla u se a nd a s h e a r s a y, b u t h e m a d e n o

o b je c tio n to th e e v id e n c e a t tria l. As a re su lt, th is e n u me r a tio n o f e rro r is n o t

p re se rv e d fo r o ur re v ie w

. S e e Wa lto n v

. S ta te

, 2 7 8 Ga

. 4 3 2

, 4 34 (1 ) (6 0 3 S E2 d

2 6 3 ) (2 00 4 ). 5

4

. Ap p e lla n t c la im s th a t th e tria l c o u rt c o m m itte d p la in e rro r wh e n it

a p p ro v e d a v e rd ic t fo rm th a t p ro v id e d fo r th e ju ry to c o n sid e r th e c h a r g e o f

v o lu n ta ry m a

n sla u g h te r o n ly if it fo u n d th a t h e wa s n o t g u ilty o f m a lic e m u rd e r

o r fe lo n y m

u rd e r. We h a v e a lre a dy fo u n d th a t “ [a ] se q ue n tia l c h a rg e re q u irin g

th e ju ry to c o nsid e r v o lu n ta ry m a n sla u g h te r o n ly if it h a s c o n sid e re d a n d fo u n d

th e d e fe nd a n t n o t gu ilty o f m a lic e m u rd e r a n d fe lo n y m

u rd e r is n o t a

p p ro p ria te

wh e re th e re is e v id e nc e th a t wo u ld a u th o riz e a c h a rg e o n v o lu n ta ry

m a n sla u g h te r.” Ed g e v

. Sta te

, 2 6 1 Ga

. 8 65

, 8 67 (2 ) (4 14 S E2 d 4 63 ) (1 9 9 2 )

5 I n any event, t he GBI a gent’s testi mony about the w ritten statem e nt provided by Appellant’s son was cum ulative of the testim ony

by Appellant’s wif

e about the sam e 2000

altercation. See Hum

phrey v. S tate, 281 Ga. 596, 599 (3) (642 SE2d 2 3 ) ( 2 0 0 7 ) ( violation

of Crawf ord v. W ashington, 541 U. S. 36 (124 S Ct 1354, 158 L E d2d 177) (2004) is harm less

where evidence is cum

ulative of other testim ony

that was subject to cross-exam i nation).

7(e m

p h a sis in o rg in a l). Bu t, a s Ed g e e xp la in s, th is is so b e c a use if th e ju ry

d e te rm in e s th a t th e d e fe n d a n t is n o t gu ilty o f m a lic e m urd e r, b ut is g u ilty o f

fe lo ny m u rd e r, th e se q u e n tia l c h a rg e wo u ld p re v e nt th e ju ry fro m “ c o n sid e r[in g ]

e v id e n c e of p ro v o c a tio n or p a ssio n w h ic h m ig h t a uth o riz e a v e r d i c t fo r

v o lu n t a ry m a n sla ug h te r [in ste a d o f fe lo n y m u rd e r] .” Id .; se e a lso OCGA

§ 1 6 -5 -2 (a ) (v olu n ta ry m a n sla u g h te r o c c u rs wh e n so m e o ne c a use s th e d e a th o f

a n o th e r “ u n d e r c irc u m sta n c e s wh ic h wo u ld o th e rwise b e m u rd e r” ).

Bu t wh ile th e v e rd ic t fo rm u se d in th is c a se h a d th e p o te n tia l to re su lt in

a situ a tio n su c h a s th a t a d dre sse d in Ed g e (re q uirin g a re v e r s a l o f a fe lo n y

m u rd e r c o n v ic tio n ), 6 th e j u r y in th is c a se fo u n d Ap p e lla n t g uilty o f m a lic e

m u rd e r, n o t fe lo n y m

u rd e r. An d “ [b ] y

fin d in g th a t [A] p p e lla n t h a d c o m m itte d

th e h o m ic id e w ith ma lic e , th e ju ry n e c e ssa rily fo un d th a t [h e ] ha d c o m m itte d th e

h o m ic id e with o u t th e p ro v o c a tio n su ffic ie nt to a u th o riz e a v e rd ic t o f

g u ilty o f

v o l u n t a r y ma n sla u g h te r.” Mc Gill v

. S ta te

, 2 6 3 G a

. 8 1

, 8 3 (3 ) (4 2 8 S E2 d 3 4 1 )

(1 9 9 3 ) (e m

p h a sis in o rig in a l). 7 It wa s th e ju ry ’s fin d in g th a t Ap p e lla n t k ille d h is

6 W e caution y et again that trial courts should not use a sequential verdict f orm that precludes a jury f

rom considering voluntary m anslaughter until a f ter it has reached a verdict

on f elony m urder.

7 In addition, we note that the trial court charged the jury that, “bef ore [ it] would be

authorized to return a verdict [ f inding Appellant] guilty of m urder, [ it] m

u st f i rst determ ine

8so n with m a lic e — n o t th e p o te n tia lly fa u lty ve r d ic t fo rm — th a t e lim in a te d a

d e te rm in a tio n th a t Ap p e lla n t wa s g u ilty o n ly of vo lu n t ar y ma n sla u gh te r. As a

re su lt, th is e n u m e ra tio n o f e rro r h a s n o m e rit. 8

5

. F in a lly

, Ap p e lla n t a rg u e s th a t th e tria l c o u rt e rre d wh e n it in stru c te d th e

ju ry th a t e v id e n c e sh owin g th a t th e re h a d b e e n p rio r d iffic u ltie s be t we e n h im

a n d h is so n h a d b e e n a dm itte d “ fo r th e so le p u rp o se o f illu stra tin g , if it d o e s so

illu stra te

, th e sta te o f fe e lin g b e twe e n th e d e fe n d a nt an d th e a lle g e d v ic tim a n d

th e b e n t o f m in d a

n d c o u rse o f c o n d u c t o n th e p a rt o f th e d e fe nd an t.” Ap p e lla n t

sa y s th a t re fe re n c e s to “ b e n t o f m in d ” a n d “c o urse o f c o n du c t” wo u ld h a v e b e e n

mo re a pp ro p ria te in a c ha rg e o n h o w a ju ry c o u ld c o nsid e r sim ila r tra n sa c tio n

e v id e n c e . Bu t Ap p e lla nt d id n o t o b je c t to th is c h a rg e a t tria l, a nd in a n y e v e n t,

we h a ve h e ld t h at su c h a c h a rg e wa s n o t e rro ne o u s a t th e tim e Ap pe lla n t wa s

trie d a n d th a t it wa s, in fa c t, c o n siste n t with th e pa tte rn ju ry in stru c tio n o n p rio r

d iffic u ltie s a t th e tim e

. S e e Jo n e s v

. S ta te

, 2 8 9 Ga

. 1 4 5

, 14 7 (2 ) (7 1 0 S E 2 d 1 2 7 )

whether m itigating c ircum stances, if any , would c ause t he o f f ense to be reduced to v oluntary

m anslaughter.”

8 Sim ilarly

, Appellant’s claim that his trial l awy er w as inef f ective because she f

ailed

to o bject to the verdict f

o rm m ust also f ail. See Johns o n v. State, 295 Ga. 615, 619 (3) (a) (759 SE2d 837) (2014).

9(2 0 1 1 ). 9 As a re su lt, e v e n if th e c h a rg e w a s e rro r, it wa s no t p la in ly e rro n e o u s.

S e e Mc Kib bin s v . S ta te , 2 9 3 Ga . 8 4 3 , 8 5 4 (7 ) (7 5 0 S E2 d 3 1 4 ) (2 0 1 3).

Ju d g m e n t a ffirm e d in p a rt a n d v a c a te d in p a rt. All th e Ju stic e s c o n c u r.

9 The pattern instruction on prior dif f iculties now provides, in part, that “[ e ]vidence

of prio r d i f

f i c u l t i es (or lack thereof

) between t he def

endant and the alleged v ictim

. . . has

been adm i tted f

or the sole purpose of illustrating, if it d oes, t he state of f eeling between the

d e f e n d ant and the alleged v ictim

. . . [ and] the reasonableness of any alleged f ears by

def endant o r a lleged victim .” Suggested Pattern Jury Instructions, Vol. I I: Crim inal Cases § 1.34.20 (4th ed.; updated January 2015).

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