Present: All the Justices 

ARTHUR B. McNEW 

OPINION BY JUSTICE LEROY R. HASSELL, SR. 

v. Record No. 951237 March 1, 1996 

TIM McCOY, ET AL. 

FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF TAZEWELL COUNTY 

Donald R. Mullins, Judge 

 In this appeal, we consider whether an access road was 

dedicated as a public way for the benefit of landowners adjacent 

to that road. 

 Tim and Joyce McCoy own a tract of land which formerly 

consisted of six lots in a subdivision, since vacated, known as 

the J. B. Hawley Subdivision, located near the village of Falls 

Mill in Tazewell County. The McCoys claim an interest in a 

gravel access road adjacent to the western boundary of their 

property. This road extends across a farm owned in part by 

Arthur B. McNew. 

 The plat of subdivision for the J. B. Hawley Subdivision was 

recorded in November 1961, before Tazewell County's Board of 

Supervisors had enacted a subdivision ordinance. That plat shows 

a road in the same location as the access road at issue in this 

appeal. In September 1961, Ruth T. Vickers and Roy O. Vickers, 

husband and wife who were the McCoys' predecessors in title, 

acquired the former subdivision. 

 In 1986, the Tazewell County Board of Supervisors vacated 

the plat of subdivision. Ruth Vickers had requested the vacation 

of the plat because an "unopened ten (10) foot wide street as 

shown on said plat encroached upon the porch and possibly a 

corner of [her] dwelling house." 

 A dispute ensued between the McCoys and McNew when McNew 
erected a fence along the eastern boundary of the 16-foot access 

road to prevent the McCoys from using the road. The McCoys filed 

their bill of complaint alleging, inter alia, that they are 

entitled to use the road because it is a publicly dedicated road 

or, alternatively, that they had acquired property rights in the 

road by prescription. 

 Subsequently, the McCoys filed a motion for summary 

judgment, and McNew filed a cross-motion for summary judgment. 

The trial court granted the McCoys' motion for summary judgment, 

holding that the gravel road was dedicated at the time the 

subdivision plat was recorded and that such dedication was for 

the benefit of the owners of the lots shown on that plat. The 

court entered a judgment which included certain injunctive relief 

in favor of the McCoys. We awarded McNew an appeal. 

 McNew argues that the trial court erred in holding that the 

road, which is located on his property, has been dedicated as a 

public way for the benefit of owners of the adjoining property. 

McNew asserts that the McCoys failed to prove there was a 

dedication and acceptance of the access road for public use by 

Tazewell County. The McCoys assert that Tazewell County accepted 

the dedication of the platted access road. We disagree with the 

McCoys. 

 We recently stated the applicable principles which control 

our resolution of this appeal: 

 Dedication, at common law, was a grant to the 

public, by a landowner, of a limited right of user in 

his land. No writing or other special form of 

conveyance was required; unequivocable evidence of an 

intention to dedicate was sufficient. Until the 

dedication was accepted by the public, it was a mere 

offer to dedicate, no matter how finally expressed. 

Prior to acceptance, the offer to dedicate imposed no 

responsibilities upon the public and was subject to 
unilateral withdrawal at any time by the landowner. 2 

Minor on Real Property 1696-1702 (F. Ribble 2d ed. 

1928). See also Bradford v. Nature Conservancy, 224 

Va. 181, 198-99, 294 S.E.2d 866, 875 (1982). 

Acceptance could be formal and express, as by the 

enactment of a resolution by the appropriate governing 

body, or by implication arising from an exercise of 

dominion by the governing authority or from long 

continued public user of requisite character. 

Brown v. Tazewell County Water and Sewerage Authority, 226 Va. 

125, 129-30, 306 S.E.2d 889, 891 (1983). Applying these 

principles, we hold that the McCoys do not have a right to use 

the access road because there is no evidence in this record that 

Tazewell County ever accepted the dedication. The record is 

devoid of any evidence: (1) of a formal and express acceptance 

by the County; (2) that the County exercised dominion of the way 

or; (3) that there has been long continued public user of the 

way. 

 We reject the McCoys' assertion that Tazewell County 

impliedly accepted the access road when it vacated the 

subdivision plat in 1986 at Ruth Vickers' request. The County's 

resolution vacating the subdivision plat was without legal 

efficacy because the County had neither accepted the dedication 

nor acquired any other rights in the access road and, thus, the 

County had acquired no property rights that could be vacated. 

Furthermore, we recently observed that "the doctrine of implied 

acceptance only applies in urban areas. '[A] formal acceptance 

or express assertion of dominion over the road by public 

authority is required before dedication of a rural road is 

complete.'" E.S. Chappell & Son, Inc. v. Brooks, 248 Va. 571, 

574, 450 S.E.2d 156, 158 (1994) (quoting Burks Bros. of Virginia, 

Inc. v. Jones, 232 Va. 238, 248, 349 S.E.2d 134, 141 (1986)). 
 The McCoys argued at the bar of this Court that in the event 

the trial court's judgment is reversed, they are entitled to a 

remand of this proceeding so that they can pursue their claim 

that they acquired rights in the road by prescription. We 

disagree. The trial court did not rule upon this claim, and the 

McCoys did not assign cross-error to the trial court's failure to 

do so. See Loving v. Hayden, 245 Va. 441, 445, 429 S.E.2d 8, 11 

(1993). Accordingly, we will reverse the judgment of the trial 

court and enter final judgment here on behalf of McNew. 

Reversed and final judgment.