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S T A T E O F M I C H I G A N

C O U R T O F A P P E A L S

PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

UNPUBLISHED

February 22, 2018

v No. 335907

Oakland Circuit Court

CAROLYN MARIE VOISIN, LC No. 2016-258730-FH

Defendant-Appellant.

Before: JANSEN, P.J., and SERVITTO and SHAPIRO, JJ.

PER CURIAM.

Defendant appeals as of right her jury trial conviction of possession of less than 25 grams 

of cocaine, MCL 333.7403(2)(a)(v). The trial court sentenced defendant to 17 months to 15 

years’ imprisonment. We affirm.

Defendant was pulled over for speeding on June 6, 2015. When she appeared nervous 

and to be under the influence of a stimulant-type substance, the officer conducting the traffic stop 

had her K-9 dog sniff the exterior of defendant’s vehicle. The dog indicated positively on the 

outside of the vehicle, which led the officer to search the interior of defendant’s vehicle. The 

officer discovered approximately 0.24 grams of cocaine inside defendant’s purse, along with 

various narcotics paraphernalia. Defendant was charged with possession of less than 25 grams 

of cocaine.

At the preliminary examination, defendant moved the district court to suppress all of the 

evidence seized during the traffic stop, which was initially granted, resulting in the dismissal of 

the charge against defendant. However, the prosecution appealed the district court’s ruling to the 

circuit court. The circuit court reversed the district court’s ruling and a jury trial subsequently 

occurred, at which defendant was found guilty of possession of less than 25 grams of cocaine. 

On appeal, defendant argues that her Fourth Amendment right to be free from an 

unconstitutional search and seizure was violated because the police officer who executed the 

traffic stop conducted a canine sniff and a search of her vehicle without reasonable suspicion to 

do so. We disagree.

The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution protects individuals from 

unreasonable searches and seizures. People v Slaughter, 489 Mich 302, 310; 803 NW2d 171

(2011). Stopping a vehicle and detaining the occupants is a seizure under the Fourth 
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Amendment. People v Armendarez, 188 Mich App 61, 69; 468 NW2d 893 (1991). Defendant 

was pulled over by Officer Melinda Weingart for speeding, which is a valid reason for a police 

officer to stop a civilian’s vehicle. As long as an officer has probable cause to believe that a 

traffic violation occurred or is occurring, a traffic stop is constitutionally valid. People v Davis, 

250 Mich App 357, 363; 649 NW2d 94 (2002). Defendant does not dispute that Officer 

Weingart properly executed a traffic stop of her vehicle for speeding, but argues that the stop

was unreasonable because it was primarily a pretext to search for evidence that defendant had 

committed another crime when the officer had no reasonable suspicion to do so. 

Whether a search or seizure is reasonable “is a fact-intensive inquiry,” that is “measured 

by examining the totality of the circumstances.” People v Williams, 472 Mich 308, 314; 696 

NW2d 636 (2005). A reasonable suspicion is:

[A]n objective manifestation that the person stopped was or was about to be 

engaged in criminal activity as judged by those versed in the field of law 

enforcement when viewed under the totality of the circumstances. The detaining 

officer must have had a particularized and objective basis for the suspicion of 

criminal activity. [People v Lewis, 251 Mich App 58, 69; 649 NW2d 792 (2002) 

(citation omitted).]

At both the preliminary examination and at trial Officer Weingart testified that, although 

defendant was initially pulled over for speeding, she immediately noticed that defendant was 

acting suspicious. Officer Weingart observed that defendant’s pupils were constricted, and that 

she was shaking and sweating. Officer Weingart also noticed that defendant was slurring her 

words and acting extremely nervous. In Officer Weingart’s experience, such behavior is 

typically a sign that an individual is under the influence of some sort of stimulant drug. “The 

determination whether a traffic stop is reasonable must necessarily take into account the evolving 

circumstances with which the officer is faced.” People v Williams, 427 Mich 308, 315; 696 

NW2d 636 (2005). In light of defendant’s behavior, it is clear that defendant’s interaction with 

Officer Weingart led to the reasonable suspicion that defendant may have been operating a 

vehicle while under the influence of drugs, which allowed Officer Weingart to extend the traffic 

stop. “[W]hen a traffic stop reveals a new set of circumstances, an officer is justified in 

extending the detention long enough to resolve the suspicion raised.” Id. 

Further, when Officer Weingart asked for consent to search defendant’s vehicle, and 

defendant declined, Officer Weingart did not immediately order a search of the vehicle over 

defendant’s objection. Instead, Officer Weingart executed a canine sniff, which “is not a search 

within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment as long as the sniffing canine is legally present at 

its vantage point when its sense is aroused.” People v Jones, 279 Mich App 86, 93; 755 NW2d 

224 (2008). See also Illinois v Caballes, 543 US 405, 407-408; 125 S Ct 834; 160 L Ed 2d 842 

(2005) (holding that a canine sniff of a vehicle during a traffic stop that reveals contraband does 

not violate the Fourth Amendment). Officer Weingart’s canine partner was legally present at the 

scene of the traffic stop when the canine sniff was executed. The canine sniff returned a positive 

result, and this Court has found that a positive reaction by a police canine is sufficient to 

establish probable cause to execute a search. Jones, 279 Mich App at at 90 n 2. 
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Despite the fact that Officer Weingart had reasonable suspicion to execute the canine 

sniff, and probable cause to search the vehicle, once her police dog indicated the presence of 

drugs, defendant argues that this case aligns with the United States Supreme Court’s analysis in 

Rodriguez v United States, ___US___; 135 S Ct 1609; 191 L Ed 2d 492 (2015). In Rodriguez, 

the defendant was initially pulled over by a police officer when the officer observed the 

defendant’s vehicle veering briefly onto the shoulder of a highway before jerking back onto the 

road. Id. at 1612. The officer completed the traffic stop and had already given the defendant a 

written warning when he asked for permission to walk his police dog around the defendant’s 

vehicle. Id. at 1613. The defendant told the officer that he could not search the vehicle, but the 

officer ordered him out of the vehicle and executed a canine sniff over the defendant’s protests. 

Id. The defendant had not been acting suspicious in any way, and the officer testified at trial that 

he had already completed the traffic stop when he decided to walk the dog around the vehicle. 

Id. The dog alerted to the presence of narcotics and a search revealed a bag of methamphetamine 

in the vehicle. The defendant subsequently entered a conditional guilty plea to one count of 

possession with intent to distribute 50 grams or more of methamphetamine. Id. at 1613-1614. 

The Supreme Court held that “authority for the seizure . . . ends when tasks tied to the traffic 

infraction are—or reasonably should have been—completed.” Id. at 1614. 

Defendant contends that the facts in Rodriguez are similar to her case because Officer 

Weingart lacked reasonable suspicion to search her vehicle, just as the officer lacked reasonable 

suspicion to search the defendant’s vehicle in Rodriguez. However, the facts of defendant’s case 

do not support this assertion. Officer Weingart had reasonable suspicion to search defendant’s 

vehicle by using a canine sniff, based on the signs of drug influence that defendant was 

exhibiting, as well as her extremely nervous behavior and mannerisms. Thus, Officer Weingart 

could reasonably suspect that a crime was occurring, and that the crime was separate and distinct 

from the traffic stop of defendant’s car, which had not yet been completed. The defendant in 

Rodriguez, in contrast, exhibited no signs of intoxication or other suspicious behavior that would

have given the officer reasonable suspicion that a crime was taking place beyond that of a traffic 

violation. Moreover, the traffic stop in Rodriguez had been completed prior to the initiation of 

the canine sniff. Officer Weingart’s reasonable suspicion renders the search of defendant’s 

vehicle lawful.

Defendant also argues, in reliance on Rodriguez, that the traffic stop and the ensuing 

search violated her Fourth Amendment rights because the canine sniff unreasonably prolonged 

the stop. The Rodriguez Court held that “a police stop exceeding the time needed to handle the 

matter for which the stop was made violates the Constitution’s shield against unreasonable 

seizures,” and that “a seizure justified only by a police-observed traffic violation . . . become[s] 

unlawful if it is prolonged beyond the time reasonably required” to issue a ticket for the 

violation. Id. at 1612 (quotation and citation omitted). 

The Supreme Court granted certiorari in Rodriguez specifically to answer “the question 

whether police routinely may extend an otherwise-completed traffic stop, absent reasonable 

suspicion, in order to conduct a dog sniff.” Id. at 1614 (emphasis added). First, at the time of 

the K-9 sniff, the traffic stop had not concluded. Although Officer Weingart did not issue a 

ticket, she testified that given defendant’s visible condition, “[t]here was no way I was going to 

let her drive.” Accordingly, the purposes of the traffic stop had not yet been completed. Thus, 

Rodriguez is inapplicable. A second reason for the inapplicability of Rodriguez is that 
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defendant’s argument rests on the premise that Officer Weingart did not have reasonable 

suspicion to search the vehicle. Because we find that Officer Weingart articulated several factors 

that, considering the totality of the circumstances, sufficiently supported a finding of reasonable 

suspicion to conduct the initial canine sniff, the Rodriguez analysis does not apply. Accordingly, 

defendant’s claim is without merit.

Affirmed.

/s/ Kathleen Jansen 

/s/ Deborah A. Servitto 

/s/ Douglas B. Shapiro