UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT 

No. 07-4000

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 

 Plaintiff - Appellee, 

 v. 

MALIK MONTREASE MOORE, 

 Defendant - Appellant. 

 ______________ 

 No. 07-5031

 ______________ 

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 

 Plaintiff - Appellee, 

 v. 

MALIK MONTREASE MOORE, 

 Defendant - Appellant. 

Appeals from the United States District Court for the Western 

District of North Carolina, at Statesville. Richard L. 

Voorhees, District Judge. (5:05-cr-00235-RLV-DCK-3) 

Submitted: November 25, 2008 Decided: December 31, 2008 

Before MICHAEL, MOTZ, and TRAXLER, Circuit Judges. 
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion. 

Andrew B. Banzhoff, DEVEREUX & BANZHOFF, P.L.L.C., Asheville, 

North Carolina, for Appellant. Gretchen C. F. Shappert, United 

States Attorney, Adam Morris, Assistant United States Attorney, 

Charlotte, North Carolina, for Appellee.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit. 

2 
PER CURIAM: 

 Following a jury trial, Malik Montrease Moore was 

convicted of one count of conspiracy to possess with intent to 

distribute at least fifty grams or more of a mixture or 

substance containing a detectable amount of cocaine base, in 

violation of 21 U.S.C. § 846 (2006), for a drug distribution 

conspiracy existing between 1987 and 2005 in Caldwell County, 

North Carolina. Because Moore had two prior felony convictions, 

the district court sentenced him to the enhanced sentence of 

life in prison. Moore timely appealed. 

 On appeal, Moore argues that the district court: (1) 

erred in denying his motion for judgment of acquittal because 

the Government failed to sufficiently prove that he conspired to 

distribute cocaine base; (2) engaged in improper judicial 

factfinding, in violation of his Sixth Amendment rights; and (3) 

erred in using prior convictions to enhance his sentence. 

Finding no error, we affirm. 

 We review de novo a district court’s denial of a Fed. 

R. Crim. P. 29 judgment of acquittal. United States v. Alerre, 

430 F.3d 681, 693 (4th Cir. 2005). In conducting such a review, 

we are obligated to sustain a guilty verdict if, viewing the 

evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, the 

verdict is supported by “substantial evidence.” United 

States v. Burgos, 94 F.3d 849, 862 (4th Cir. 1996) (en banc) 

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(citing Glasser v. United States, 315 U.S. 60, 80 (1942)). 

Whether there is a single conspiracy or multiple conspiracies, 

and whether there was an agreement to participate in the 

conspiracy, are questions of fact for the jury, and we must 

affirm its finding “unless the evidence, taken in the light most 

favorable to the government, would not allow a reasonable jury 

so to find.” United States v. Harris, 39 F.3d 1262, 1267 (4th 

Cir. 1994) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted); see

Glasser, 315 U.S. at 80. In evaluating the sufficiency of the 

evidence, this court does not review the credibility of the 

witnesses and assumes that the jury resolved all contradictions 

in the testimony in favor of the Government. United States v. 

Brooks, 524 F.3d 549, 563 (4th Cir. 2008). The uncorroborated 

testimony of one witness or accomplice may be sufficient to 

sustain a conviction. United States v. Wilson, 115 F.3d 1185, 

1190 (4th Cir. 1997). This court “can reverse a conviction on 

insufficiency grounds only when the prosecution’s failure is 

clear.” United States v. Moye, 454 F.3d 390, 394 (4th Cir. 

2006) (en banc) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). 

 “To prove a conspiracy under 21 U.S.C. § 846, the 

government must prove (1) an agreement between two or more 

persons to engage in conduct that violates a federal drug law, 

(2) the defendant’s knowledge of the conspiracy, and (3) the 

defendant’s knowing and voluntary participation in the 

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conspiracy.” United States v. Strickland, 245 F.3d 368, 384-85 

(4th Cir. 2001); see Burgos, 94 F.3d at 857. A defendant may be 

convicted of conspiracy without knowing all the conspiracy’s 

details, its full scope, or all of its members, and without 

taking part in all of its activities over its entire existence. 

United States v. Nunez, 432 F.3d 573, 578 (4th Cir. 2005). He 

need only enter the conspiracy understanding its unlawful nature 

and willfully join in the plan on at least one occasion. 

Burgos, 94 F.3d at 858; see United States v. Banks, 10 F.3d 

1044, 1054 (4th Cir. 1993). The existence of an unspoken or 

mutual understanding between conspirators is adequate evidence 

of a conspiratorial agreement. United States v. Cardwell, 433 

F.3d 378, 390 (4th Cir. 2005). There is often little direct 

evidence of the conspirators’ agreement. Burgos, 94 F.3d at 

857. The government need not prove a conspiracy’s identifiable 

organizational structure. 

 “A single conspiracy exists where there is one overall 

agreement or one general business venture.” Nunez, 432 F.3d at 

578 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). The 

existence of a single conspiracy “depends upon the overlap of 

main actors, methods, and goals.” Id. “[T]rial evidence is 

sufficient to establish a single conspiracy where the 

conspirators are shown to share the same objectives, the same 

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methods, the same geographic spread, and the same results.” See

United States v. Smith, 451 F.3d 209, 218 (4th Cir. 2006). 

 Here, Moore and his coconspirators were shown to have 

shared the same objectives and methods: distributing crack 

cocaine in Caldwell County for profit. Witnesses explained that 

Moore regularly purchased a vast quantity of drugs to supply to 

numerous individuals for resale. These were not isolated, 

buyer-seller transactions. Howell and Edmisten, coconspirators 

with Moore, pleaded guilty and then testified about their 

involvement with Moore to distribute cocaine. Other witnesses 

testified as to specific details of Moore’s involvement in drug 

distribution: they knew from whom Moore obtained his crack 

cocaine and to whom he sold it. Moore also sold drugs to 

confidential informants working directly for police on more than 

one occasion. The totality of the evidence revealed large 

quantities of crack cocaine regularly being purchased and sold 

among the same individuals, indicating the existence of a casual 

but common plan. Based upon the evidence, the jury was entitled 

to conclude that the actions of Moore and his conspirators in 

the distribution of drugs amounted to a single conspiracy. 

Therefore, the court properly denied Moore’s motion for judgment 

of acquittal. 

 Next, Moore argues that the district court violated 

his Sixth Amendment rights when it engaged in impermissible 

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fact-finding and used prior convictions to enhance his sentence. 

In Almendarez-Torres v. United States, 523 U.S. 224, 243 (1998), 

the Supreme Court held that, when seeking a sentencing 

enhancement based on a prior conviction, the Government “need 

not allege a defendant’s prior conviction in the indictment or 

information that alleges the elements of an underlying crime.” 

The Court reaffirmed this holding when it held that, “[o]ther 

than the fact of a prior conviction, any fact that increases the 

penalty for a crime beyond the prescribed statutory maximum must 

be submitted to a jury, and proved beyond a reasonable doubt.” 

Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 490 (2000) (emphasis 

added). Moore concedes that we observed after Apprendi that 

“the fact of a prior conviction remains a valid enhancement even 

when not found by the jury,” United States v. Thompson, 421 F.3d 

278, 282 (4th Cir. 2005) (internal quotation marks omitted), but 

argues that the overruling of Almendarez-Torres is imminent, and 

that using prior convictions to enhance a sentence is 

constitutionally infirm. 

 Despite Moore’s policy arguments, Almendarez-Torres

remains authoritative, and we have reaffirmed its continuing 

validity after Apprendi. See Thompson, 421 F.3d at 282; United 

States v. Cheek, 415 F.3d 349, 351-54 (4th Cir. 2005). Moore’s 

argument lacks merit. 

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 Moore also argues that the two prior convictions used 

to enhance his sentence were not “prior” to the instant 

conspiracy conviction as they were merely separate convictions 

arising out of the same transaction, citing United States v. 

Blackwood, 913 F.2d 139, 145-46 (4th Cir. 1990). Moore contends 

that because the drug conspiracy as alleged in the indictment 

began in 1987 and continued through 2005, his convictions on 

August 1, 2000, for the sale and delivery of cocaine, and on 

April 14, 2003, for the sale of cocaine, arose out of the same 

criminal enterprise and could not be used to enhance his 

sentence. 

 Moore’s argument is misplaced. We have squarely 

concluded that “[w]hen a defendant is convicted of a drug 

conspiracy under 21 U.S.C. § 846, prior drug felony convictions 

that fall within the conspiracy period may be used to enhance a 

defendant’s sentence if the conspiracy continued after his 

earlier convictions were final.” United States v. Smith, 451 

F.3d 209, 224-25 (4th Cir. 2006); see 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(A) 

(outlining penalties for § 846 violations and stating that 

“final” prior felony convictions may be used to enhance 

sentence). Because the conspiracy for which Moore was convicted 

continued well beyond his 2000 and 2003 convictions for the sale 

of cocaine, we conclude these two convictions were properly 

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considered “prior” convictions for sentencing enhancement 

purposes. 

 Accordingly, we affirm Moore’s conviction and 

sentence. We dispense with oral argument because the facts and 

legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials 

before the court and argument would not aid the decisional 

process. 

AFFIRMED