IN THE SUPREME COURT OF TENNESSEE

AT JACKSON

MAX NORTON and LONG ) FOR PUBLICATION

OUTDOOR ADVERTISING, )

)

Plaintiffs/Appellees, ) Filed: February 14, 2000

)

v. ) Madison Chancery

)

JOHN A. McCASKILL, d/b/a ) Hon. Joe C. Morris,

CITY SIGN COMPANY, ) Chancellor.

)

Defendant/Appellant. ) No. W1997-00151-SC-R11-CV

For Plaintiffs-Appellees: For Defendant-Appellant:

Larry A. Butler James T. Ryal, Jr.

Spragins, Barnett, Cobb & Butler, PLC Adams, Ryal & Flippin, PC

Jackson, Tennessee Humboldt, Tennessee 

Justin S. Gilbert

The Gilbert Firm

Jackson, Tennessee

O P I N I O N

TRIAL COURT AND COURT OF APPEALS 

AFFIRMED. DROWOTA, J.

We granted this appeal to determine the time frame within which a lessee

must exercise the option to renew a lease that does not designate a specific time

frame for renewal but requires that the option be exercised “at the end of” or “at

the termination of” the original lease term. We have concluded that in the

absence of a specific time designation in the lease, an option to renew remains

FILED

February 14, 2000

Cecil Crowson, Jr.

Appellate Court Clerk
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effective only during the term of the lease. Accordingly, when a lease merely

stipulates that it must be renewed at the end of its term, the lessee must exercise

the option on or before the day the lease expires. We find that the lease in this

case was not renewed because the lessee did not exercise the option until after

the lease had expired. We therefore affirm the judgments of the trial court and

Court of Appeals. 

FACTUAL BACKGROUND

On June 12, 1985, Richard D. Norton, Jr., who rented billboard space,

entered into a lease with City Sign Company (City Sign), which was owned by

James H. McCaskill. The lease involves billboard space on commercial property

adjacent to the Highway 45 by-pass in Jackson, Tennessee. Under the terms of

the lease, City Sign, as lessee, agreed to pay monthly rent in exchange for the

right to maintain billboard advertising on the property. The lease was for a period

of ten years beginning on July 1, 1985, and ending on June 30, 1995. Although

the lease was a printed form, City Sign inserted a typewritten “option to renew”

provision within the form that stated: “City Sign Company reserves an option to

renew this lease at the end of 10 years for a like period.” 

On July 5, 1995, Max Norton, who had become the owner of the subject

property, notified City Sign by letter that the ten-year lease had expired five days

earlier, on June 30, 1995. Norton further advised that since City Sign had not

exercised its option to renew, the lease was no longer in force. Shortly thereafter

Norton leased the subject property to Long Outdoor Advertising (LOA), an

appellee in this action. Nonetheless, on July 10, 1995, John McCaskill, who had

become the owner of City Sign, notified Norton by letter that City Sign intended to

exercise its option to renew the lease. He enclosed a check to pay the July 1995
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rent. Norton rejected the check, maintaining that the lease and the option to

renew had expired. Since then, McCaskill has continued to tender the monthly

rent in accordance with the terms of the disputed lease. Norton has rejected each

payment. 

On September 11, 1995, Norton and LOA filed suit in the Madison County

Chancery Court against McCaskill and City Sign alleging breach of contract and

trespass based upon City Sign’s refusal to remove its billboard from the leased

premises. The complaint further alleged that City Sign’s failure to leave the

premises has interfered with Norton’s ability to fulfill his contractual obligations to

LOA and has prevented LOA from obtaining sign permits and using the leased

premises for its own purposes. In addition to all monetary damages arising from

City Sign’s actions, Norton and LOA also sought an order ejecting City Sign from

the premises. 

Norton and LOA then moved for partial summary judgment on February 13,

1996, asserting that there was no dispute that the lease terminated on June 30,

1995, and that the “only remaining issue to be tried is damages.” City Sign then

filed its own motion for summary judgment, maintaining that the lease was

effectively “renewed within a reasonable period of time following June 30, 1995.” 

On August 1, 1996, the trial court granted Norton’s and LOA’s motion for

partial summary judgment and denied City Sign’s motion. The parties then

entered into a consent judgment stipulating the amount of damages to be

awarded should the trial court’s decision be affirmed on appeal. City Sign then

perfected this appeal to determine whether it had effectively exercised its option to

renew the lease with the appellee, Max Norton.
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The Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court’s award of partial summary

judgment to Norton and LOA because it concluded that City Sign had failed to

effectively exercise its option to renew the lease. The intermediate court relied on

the fact that City Sign did not exercise the option until ten days after the lease had

expired and five days after receiving a letter from Norton notifying City Sign that

the lease had terminated and that the option was no longer valid. 

STANDARD OF REVIEW

The standards governing an appellate court's review of a motion for

summary judgment are well settled. Since our inquiry involves purely a question

of law, no presumption of correctness attaches to the lower court’s judgment, and

our task is confined to reviewing the record to determine whether the requirements

of Tenn. R. Civ. P. 56 have been met. See Cowden v. Sovran Bank/Central

South, 816 S.W.2d 741, 744 (Tenn.1991). Tennessee Rule of Civil Procedure

56.03 provides that summary judgment is appropriate where: (1) there is no

genuine issue with regard to the material facts relevant to the claim or defense

contained in the motion, see Byrd v. Hall, 847 S.W.2d 208, 210 (Tenn.1993); and

(2) the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law on the undisputed

facts. See Anderson v. Standard Register Co., 857 S.W.2d 555, 559

(Tenn.1993). The moving party has the burden of proving that its motion satisfies

these requirements. See Downen v. Allstate Ins. Co., 811 S.W.2d 523, 524

(Tenn.1991). When the party seeking summary judgment makes a properly

supported motion, the burden shifts to the nonmoving party to set forth specific

facts establishing the existence of disputed, material facts which must be resolved

by the trier of fact. See Byrd v. Hall, 847 S.W.2d at 215.
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The standards governing the assessment of evidence in the summary

judgment context are also well established. Courts must view the evidence in the

light most favorable to the nonmoving party and must also draw all reasonable

inferences in the nonmoving party's favor. See Byrd v. Hall, 847 S.W.2d at

210-11. Courts should grant a summary judgment only when both the facts and

the inferences to be drawn from the facts permit a reasonable person to reach

only one conclusion. See id.

EXERCISE OF THE RENEWAL OPTION

An option to renew a lease is a unilateral contract under which the lessee

retains an irrevocable right to extend the lease during the option period. See

American Oil Co. v. Rasar, 203 Tenn. 37, 45, 308 S.W.2d 486, 490 (Tenn. 1957);

Abou-Sakher v. Humphreys County, 955 S.W.2d 65, 68 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1997). 

The right to renew will be lost, however, if the lessee fails to give timely notice in

accordance with the terms of the option. See American Oil Co. v. Rasar, 203

Tenn. at 45, 308 S.W.2d at 490; Corim, Inc. v. Sam Blair Co., Inc., 721 S.W.2d

256, 260-61 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1986). 

The lease in this case did not specify a time period within which City Sign

was required to exercise the option to renew. The renewal provision merely

provided that City Sign could renew the lease “at the end of 10 years.” The

parties properly recognize that no Tennessee case has clarified the requisite time

frame within which an option must be exercised if the lease provides only for

renewal “at the end of” the original lease term. As the Court of Appeals

acknowledged, a split of authority exists in other jurisdictions concerning

construction of the option language in these types of leases. 
 

1

See generally 49 Am. Jur. 2d Landlord and Tenant § 168, at 1 73 n.96 ( 1995) (c iting cases ). 

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Relying on one line of cases, City Sign argues that the renewal provision’s

phrase “at the end of 10 years” does not mean “prior to the end,” and permitted it

to exercise the option within a reasonable time after the expiration of the lease’s

original term. Because it exercised the option within ten days after the ten-year

term of the lease had expired, City Sign contends that it complied with the

“reasonable time” requirement and effectively renewed the lease. 

Citing a separate line of cases, Norton and LOA assert that the language

“at the end of 10 years” required City Sign to exercise the renewal option within

the original term of the lease. They assert that since City Sign did not give notice

of renewal prior to the termination of the lease, the option to renew expired with

the lease and was never properly exercised. After reviewing the cases espousing

this view, we agree.

OTHER JURISDICTIONS

Most jurisdictions recognize that absent unusual circumstances, the option

to renew a lease must be exercised prior to the expiration of the lease.1 However

provisions designating a time frame within which notice to renew must be given

are strictly construed. See American Oil Co. v. Rasar, 308 S.W.2d at 490. When

a lease requires the lessee to exercise the option “at the end of” or “at the

termination of” the original lease, courts addressing the issue have adopted one of

two views on the time frame for renewal. At least two courts have interpreted this

language to require that the option be exercised before the expiration of the

original lease. See Music Tree, Inc. v. Tallman Piano Store, Inc., 608 P.2d 1228,

1230 (Or. Ct. App. 1980) (holding that under an option requiring renewal “at the

expiration” of the lease but providing no more specific time requirement, the
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lessee had a reasonable time to exercise the option within the term of the lease);

I.X.L. Furniture & Carpet Installment House v. Berets, 91 P. 279, 282 (Utah 1907)

(holding that under an option requiring renewal “at the expiration” of the lease, the

lessee was required to exercise the option on or before the last day of the lease). 

The reasoning behind this view is that the option to renew is part of the lease and

therefore expires at the same time the lease expires. See Douglass v. Jones,

422 So.2d 352, 354 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1982); I.X.L. Furniture & Carpet

Installment House v. Berets, 91 P. at 282.

A separate group of courts have concluded that such an option may be

exercised within a reasonable time after the expiration of the lease. See Maddox

v. Hobbie, 152 So. 222, 224-25 (Ala. 1934) (holding that an option to renew at the

expiration of the original lease was effectively exercised because the lessee’s

holding over, without express notification of renewal, was deemed an election to

renew the lease); Heritage Square Invs v. Trouard, 406 So.2d 309, 311-12 (La.

Ct. App. 1981) (acknowledging that if a lease does not expressly designate a time

frame for renewal, the lessee must exercise the option within a time which, under

all the circumstances, the lessor intended to give the lessee to communicate the

intent to renew); Kearney v. Hare, 144 S.E.2d 636, 639 (N.C. 1965) (stating that

with a lease containing a renewal option that did not require specific notice from

the lessee, a presumption existed that the option was exercised where the lessee

held over after the original term and continued to pay rent); Caito v. Ferri, 116 A.

897 (R.I. 1922) (recognizing that a lease providing for renewal at the “termination”

of the lease did not require the lessee to exercise the option before the lease

expired, nor did it require renewal at the precise hour of termination, but gave the

lessee “a reasonable time after the termination of the lease in which to make his

election”). Cf. Coulter v. Capitol Fin. Co., 146 S.E.2d 97, 100 (N.C. 1966)

(recognizing that a lessee’s holding over, without giving the prescribed notice of
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renewal, gave rise to a presumption that the lessee was exercising the option to

renew, but also recognizing that in such a situation the lessor could elect to treat

the lessee as a trespasser or to waive the notice requirement and treat the lease

as having been extended.) 

TENNESSEE LAW

After considering the two prominent views espoused by the courts

confronted with this issue, we conclude that in the absence of a specific time

designation in the lease, an option to renew remains effective only during the term

of the lease. Accordingly, we agree with those courts concluding that when a

lease stipulates that an option to renew must be exercised “at the end of” or “at

the termination of” the lease, the lessee must exercise the option on or before the

day the original lease term expires. Obviously, parties are free to negotiate any

number of other arrangements for renewal options by including specific and

pertinent language in the lease agreement. Our holding is confined to those

leases that require renewal “at the end of” or “at the termination of” the lease or

that contain similar language conveying the same requirement. 

Applying this rule to the instant case, we conclude that City Sign did not

effectively renew its lease with Norton because it did not exercise the option within

the original term of the lease. As discussed, the renewal provision stipulated that

City Sign could renew the lease “at the end of 10 years for a like period.” 

McCaskill, acting on behalf of City Sign, did not notify Norton of the intent to

exercise the option to renew the lease until July 10, 1995, ten days after the lease

had expired and five days after Norton had informed McCaskill that the option to

renew, like the lease, had expired. We agree with Norton that after the lease
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terminated on June 30, 1995, the option was no longer in force and McCaskill’s

attempt to renew was ineffective. 

City Sign next argues that even if it did not comply with the renewal option,

it is nonetheless entitled to equitable relief. As support for this contention, City

Sign relies upon South Region Indus., Inc. v. Chattanooga Warehouse & Cold

Storage Co., Inc., 612 S.W.2d 162, 164-65 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1981), in which the

Court of Appeals concluded that a commercial lease had been renewed despite

the lessee’s failure to comply with an option provision requiring notice of renewal

at least ninety days prior to the expiration of the lease. Although the lessee

prepared and mailed a letter expressing an intent to renew in a timely fashion,

receipt by the lessor was delayed through no fault of the lessee. The intermediate

court determined that equitable relief was warranted because the lessee had

made a good faith effort to comply with the option requirement and because the

lessor was not prejudiced by the delay. City Sign also directs us to the

unreported case of Chen Corp. v. Kiyono Corp., No. 84-137-II, slip op. at 5 (Tenn.

Ct. App. 1981), for the proposition that equitable relief should be afforded lessees

when the failure to timely exercise the renewal option does not result from the

lessee’s actions or when the failure stems from mere negligence on the part of the

lessee. 

We have considered these cases and recognize that under some

circumstances a failure to timely exercise a renewal option may warrant equitable

relief. However no such circumstances exist in the instant case. City Sign has not

offered a reason for waiting ten days until after its lease had expired to exercise

the renewal option. In fact, City Sign did not give notice of its intent to renew until

after Norton had informed it that the lease and option to renew had expired. 

Moreover, affording equitable relief to City Sign would prejudice Norton because
 

2

Tennessee Rule of Appellate Procedure 36(a), which concerns an appellate court’s power to grant

relief, provides , in pertinent p art: “Nothing in this ru le shall be construed as requiring relief be granted

to a party responsible for an error or who failed to take whatever action was reas ona bly ava ilable to

preven t or nullify the harm ful effect o f an error.”

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he has entered into another lease agreement with LOA for the same property. 

We conclude that this is not a case warranting equitable relief.

AUTOMATIC RENEWAL PROVISION

Although this appeal concerns the option provision requiring renewal “at the

end of 10 years,” the lease contains another provision that may have affected the

outcome of this case. An automatic renewal clause in the lease provides:

After the original term hereof, this lease shall continue in force from

year to year for a period of seven (7) consecutive years unless

terminated at the end of the original term, or any additional year

thereafter, upon written notice of termination to Lessor by Lessee,

served not less than thirty (30) days before the end of such term or

additional year.

Despite its potential significance in this suit, neither party addressed this

clause in the trial court or during the intermediate appeal. In its opinion, the Court

of Appeals, sua sponte, asserted that pursuant to Tenn. R. App. P. 36(a) the

parties had waived the issue.2 

We agree with the Court of Appeals that the issue of the automatic renewal

provision has been waived and will not be considered in this appeal because

neither party raised the issue at trial. See Simpson v. Frontier Community Credit

Union, 810 S.W.2d 147, 153 (Tenn. 1991); Lawrence v. Stanford, 655 S.W.2d

927, 929 (Tenn. 1983); Harrison v. Schrader, 569 S.W.2d 822, 828 (Tenn. 1978). 

CONCLUSION
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For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the judgment of the Court of Appeals

upholding the trial court’s grant of partial summary judgment in favor of the

appellees, Max Norton and Long Outdoor Advertising. Costs are taxed to the

appellant, John A. McCaskill, d/b/a City Sign. 

_________________________________

Justice Frank F. Drowota, III

Concur:

Anderson, C. J.

Birch, Holder, Barker, JJ.