2024 IL App (4th) 231479-U 

NO. 4-23-1479 

IN THE APPELLATE COURT

OF ILLINOIS

FOURTH DISTRICT

THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, 

Plaintiff-Appellee, 

v. 

JAYSON TRIPP, 

Defendant-Appellant. 

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Appeal from the

Circuit Court of

Winnebago County 

No. 23CF2448 

Honorable 

Scott Paccagnini, 

Judge Presiding.

 JUSTICE DeARMOND delivered the judgment of the court.

 Justices Harris and Knecht concurred in the judgment.

ORDER

¶ 1 Held: The appellate court affirmed, finding the circuit court did not abuse its discretion 

in denying defendant pretrial release. 

¶ 2 Defendant, Jayson Tripp, appeals the circuit court’s order denying him pretrial 

release pursuant to article 110 of the Code of Criminal Procedure of 1963 (Code) (725 ILCS 

5/art. 110 (West 2022)), as amended by Public Act 101-652, § 10-255 (eff. Jan. 1, 2023), 

commonly known as the Pretrial Fairness Act (Act). See Pub. Act 102-1104, § 70 (eff. Jan. 1, 

2023) (amending various provisions of the Act); Rowe v. Raoul, 2023 IL 129248, ¶ 52, 223 

N.E.3d 1010 (setting the Act’s effective date as September 18, 2023).

¶ 3 On appeal, defendant argues this court should overturn the circuit court’s decision 

because the State failed to prove by clear and convincing evidence (1) the proof was evident or 

FILED

February 16, 2024

Carla Bender

4th District Appellate

Court, IL

NOTICE

This Order was filed under 

Supreme Court Rule 23 and is 

not precedent except in the 

limited circumstances allowed 

under Rule 23(e)(1). 
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the presumption great defendant committed a detainable offense under section 110-6.1(a) of the 

Code (725 ILCS 5/110-6.1(a) (West 2022)), (2) defendant was dangerous and thereby posed a 

threat, and (3) no condition of release or combination thereof could mitigate the threat defendant 

posed if granted pretrial release. We affirm.

¶ 4 I. BACKGROUND

¶ 5 On October 18, 2023, the State charged defendant with one count of domestic 

battery (720 ILCS 5/12-3.2(a)(2) (West 2022)), alleging defendant grabbed Tabitha Hawkins by 

the back of the head and headbutted her with his own head.

¶ 6 On November 20, 2023, defendant’s arrest warrant was served, and defendant was 

detained. The next day, the State filed a petition to deny defendant pretrial release under section 

110-6.1 of the Code (725 ILCS 5/110-6.1 (West 2022)). The State alleged defendant was 

charged with a qualifying offense, and defendant’s pretrial release posed a real and present threat 

to the safety of persons or the community (725 ILCS 5/110-6.1(a)(4) (West 2022)). In support of 

its petition, the State provided the following factual basis:

“On the 3rd of September, 2023, Machesney Park Deputies *** 

were dispatched to 7415 Rogers Street, Machesney Park, Illinois, 

61115 in response to call for Domestic Battery. Deputies met with 

Tabitha Hawkins who stated that she and her boyfriend, 

[defendant], had been involved in a heated argument throughout 

the evening of the 2nd of September into the early morning hours 

of the 3rd of September, 2023. Tabitha stated that she attempted 

multiple times to remove herself from the argument by going into 

separate rooms from [defendant] but he kept following her. Tabitha 
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said that at one point [defendant] grabbed [her] by the back of the 

head and he pulled her head into hers [sic] violently and 

headbutted her. [Defendant] left the residence shortly afterward.”

The State’s factual summary further provided defendant had numerous arrests for domestic 

battery, two prior convictions for domestic battery, and one conviction for battery. 

¶ 7 At the detention hearing, the State emphasized defendant’s penchant and prior 

convictions for domestic violence and proffered what evidence would be presented. This proffer 

was consistent with the factual basis for the State’s petition. The State further informed the

circuit court defendant had another pending felony case against him (Winnebago County case 

No. 23-CF-2132) for aggravated fleeing, where police pursued defendant at speeds in excess of 

90 miles per hour in a 40-mile-per-hour zone after attempting to speak with defendant shortly 

after the instant domestic battery. The State also noted defendant scored an 18 on the Domestic 

Violence Screening Instrument (DVSI), which placed defendant in the “high risk” category. 

¶ 8 Defense counsel countered that since defendant’s alleged battery of Tabitha on 

September 3, 2023, defendant had appeared “numerous times for other cases” and “turned 

himself in *** when he found out about the warrant on the aggravated fleeing charge.” Counsel 

emphasized defendant had been “a lifelong Rockford resident,” with significant ties to the 

community. Counsel further asserted defendant had been self-employed for 10 years “doing the 

same type of work.”

¶ 9 In determining whether defendant should be released from pretrial detention, the 

circuit court stated it considered the parties’ arguments, the factual basis, and the information 

contained in the pretrial services report. The court then held the following before granting the

State’s petition. First, the court found the State proved by clear and convincing evidence the 
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proof was evident or the presumption great defendant committed a detainable offense, noting 

defendant “grabbed the alleged victim by the back of the head and headbutted her after the 

alleged victim attempted to leave.” Next, the court pointed out defendant’s “two prior 

convictions for domestic battery and prior convictions for resisting[,] battery[,] and criminal 

damage to property that are spanning at least two decades.” The court further observed defendant 

was “on pretrial release for aggravated fleeing *** which offense allegedly occurred after the 

defendant left the residence” in the instant case. Defendant also scored an 8 out of 14 on the 

Virginia Risk Assessment Instrument (VPRAI), “which is moderate to high, and [defendant] has 

a DVSI of 18, which is high.” Finally, the court noted: 

“Given the nature and circumstances of the offense, but primarily 

the history and characteristics of the defendant ***, the Court finds 

that there are no conditions or combinations of conditions that 

reasonably assure the safety of the alleged victim or the 

community for that matter, as it appears that the defendant’s priors 

involved different individuals.”

¶ 10 The circuit court then entered a written order summarizing its reasons for denying 

pretrial release and finding (1) defendant was charged with a detainable offense and the proof 

was evident or presumption great that defendant committed the offense, (2) defendant posed a 

real and present threat to the safety of any person or the community, (3) no conditions or 

combination of conditions could mitigate the real and present threat, and (4) pretrial release 

should be denied because less restrictive conditions would not avoid that threat. After the court 

entered its written order denying defendant pretrial release, defendant filed his notice of appeal 

under Illinois Supreme Court Rule 604(h)(1)(iii) (eff. Oct. 19, 2023).
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¶ 11 This appeal followed.

¶ 12 II. ANALYSIS

¶ 13 On December 5, 2023, defendant filed a notice of appeal pursuant to Illinois 

Supreme Court Rule 604(h)(2) (eff. Oct. 19, 2023). The notice of appeal indicated three relevant 

bases for vacating the circuit court’s detention order: the State failed to prove by clear and 

convincing evidence (1) the proof was evident or the presumption great defendant committed a 

detainable offense under section 110-6.1(a) of the Code (725 ILCS 5/110-6.1(a) (West 2022)), 

(2) defendant was dangerous and thereby posed a threat, and (3) no condition of release or 

combination thereof could mitigate the threat defendant posed if granted pretrial release. The 

Office of the State Appellate Defender, defendant’s appointed counsel on appeal, filed a 

supporting memorandum laying out the reasons for reversing the court’s decision. 

¶ 14 All criminal defendants are presumed eligible for pretrial release. 725 ILCS 

5/110-6.1(e) (West 2022). Before denying pretrial release, the State must prove by clear and 

convincing evidence (1) “the proof is evident or the presumption great that the defendant has 

committed an offense listed in subsection (a),” (2) “the defendant poses a real and present threat 

to the safety of any person or persons or the community, based on the specific articulable facts of 

the case,” and (3) “no condition or combination of conditions set forth in subsection (b) of 

Section 110-10 of this Article can mitigate (i) the real and present threat to the safety of any 

person or persons or the community.” 725 ILCS 5/110-6.1(e)(1), (2), (3)(i) (West 2022). Section 

110-6.1(g)(1)-(9) of the Code instructs the circuit court to consider “the specific articulable facts 

of the case” and provides nine factors the court may consider when assessing the real and present 

threat allegation. 725 ILCS 5/110-6.1(g)(1)-(9) (West 2022). If the court determines the 

defendant should be denied pretrial release, the court must make written findings summarizing 
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the reasons for denying pretrial release, including why less restrictive conditions would not avoid 

the danger posed by the defendant to any person or the community. 725 ILCS 5/110-6.1(h)(1) 

(West 2022). 

¶ 15 We have held the determination of whether pretrial release should be granted or 

denied is reviewed under an abuse-of-discretion standard. See People v. Jones, 2023 IL App 

(4th) 230837, ¶¶ 27, 30. “An abuse of discretion occurs when the circuit court’s decision is 

arbitrary, fanciful or unreasonable or where no reasonable person would agree with the position 

adopted by the [circuit] court.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) People v. Simmons, 2019 IL 

App (1st) 191253, ¶ 9, 143 N.E.3d 833. Under this standard, a reviewing court will not substitute 

its own judgment for that of the circuit court simply because it would have analyzed the proper 

factors differently. People v. Inman, 2023 IL App (4th) 230864, ¶ 11. Likewise, “we will not 

substitute our own judgment for the trier of fact on issues regarding the weight of the evidence or 

the credibility of the witnesses.” People v. Vega, 2018 IL App (1st) 160619, ¶ 44, 123 N.E.3d 

393. 

¶ 16 Here, we find no abuse of discretion. The record demonstrates the circuit court 

weighed the statutory factors and considered the parties’ arguments, the factual basis, and the 

information contained in the pretrial services report. Not only did the court determine defendant 

committed a detainable offense based on the State’s proffered evidence, but defendant 

acknowledged in his accompanying memorandum “defense counsel agreed that the charged 

offense was detainable under the [Act].” See 720 ILCS 5/12-3.2(a)(2) (West 2022); 725 ILCS 

5/110-6.1(a)(4) (West 2022). The court then found defendant presented an ongoing threat to not 

only the victim of this case, but to the community as well, and it concluded no conditions of 

pretrial release could mitigate defendant’s threat to the victim or the community given 
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defendant’s repeated domestic-violence convictions against multiple individuals. Specifically, 

the court noted the circumstances of the offense and the pending case against defendant for 

aggravated fleeing, which stemmed from the instant domestic battery. See 725 ILCS 5/110-

6.1(g)(1) (West 2022). The court also pointed out defendant’s “two prior convictions for 

domestic battery and prior convictions for resisting[,] battery[,] and criminal damage to property 

*** spanning at least two decades.” See 725 ILCS 5/110-6.1(g)(2) (West 2022). The court also 

noted defendant was on pretrial release in the aggravated fleeing and driving on a suspended 

license case when he was arrested for this offense. Further, the court noted defendant scored an 8 

out of 14 on the VPRAI, which indicated defendant presented a “moderate to high” risk, as well 

as an 18 on the DVSI, “which is high.” See 725 ILCS 5/110-6.1(g)(9) (West 2022).

¶ 17 Accordingly, because the circuit court complied with the requirements of the 

Code and made all the necessary findings, based on this record, we find no reason to conclude 

the court’s decision was “arbitrary, fanciful, or unreasonable.” Simmons, 2019 IL App (1st) 

191253, ¶ 9. 

¶ 18 III. CONCLUSION

¶ 19 For all these reasons, we affirm the circuit court’s judgment.

¶ 20 Affirmed.