United States Court of Appeals

for the Fifth Circuit ____________

No. 23-40356

____________

United States of America, 

Plaintiff—Appellee, 

versus

Wesley Perkins, 

Defendant—Appellant. 

______________________________

Appeal from the United States District Court 

for the Southern District of Texas

USDC No. 2:22-CR-189-1 

______________________________

Before Haynes, Willett, and Oldham, Circuit Judges.

Per Curiam:*

Wesley Perkins was charged with possession with intent to distribute 

methamphetamine. After the district court denied his motion to suppress 

contraband found during a search of his car, Perkins pleaded guilty and was 

sentenced. He now appeals the district court’s denial of his suppression 

motion. We affirm. 

_____________________

* This opinion is not designated for publication. See 5th Cir. R. 47.5.

United States Court of Appeals

Fifth Circuit

FILED

July 11, 2024

Lyle W. Cayce

Clerk

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No. 23-40356

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I.

On February 22, 2022, National Park Service Ranger Chris Calkins

initiated a traffic stop of Perkins’s car as he was travelling in Padre Island 

National Seashore. The basis for the stop was a tag violation, as Perkins’s car 

had a 72-hour temporary tag that was not valid until February 24.

As Calkins approached the car, he observed Perkins leaning down to 

grab or shove something under his seat. He ordered Perkins to show his hands 

and asked for identification. Perkins showed his empty hands but did not have 

a driver’s license, so he told Calkins his name and date of birth. Calkins called 

for backup and went to his vehicle to run Perkins’s information.

A second Park Service ranger, Travis Jones, arrived and came to the 

front passenger window to watch Perkins while Calkins ran his information. 

Jones observed that Perkins appeared to be fumbling nervously with his keys.

Jones also noticed that the front passenger window was made of tape, making 

it difficult for him to see into the car and impossible for the window to roll 

down. Accordingly, Jones opened the front passenger door and asked Perkins 

to give him the keys, which Jones then placed on top of the car. As Jones 

spoke with Perkins, he noticed an empty, capped syringe in the side

compartment of the passenger door. When Calkins returned to the car, Jones 

told him about the syringe. Looking at the door compartment, Calkins saw 

the syringe, as well as “little buds of marijuana” or “marijuana shake.”

Calkins then told Perkins that he had probable cause to search the car and 

ordered him out of it. Once Perkins was out, Calkins decided to run his K-9 

unit around the outside of the car to see if she alerted. The dog did not alert, 

and the rangers searched the car. During the search, the rangers found more 

marijuana shake throughout the car and a bag under the driver’s seat. The 

bag contained methamphetamine, drug paraphernalia, and a scale. The 

rangers arrested Perkins.

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A grand jury indicted Perkins on one count of possession with intent 

to distribute more than five grams of methamphetamine. 21 U.S.C. 

§ 841(a)(1) & (b)(1)(B)(vii). Perkins moved to suppress the evidence 

gathered by the rangers during their search. The district court held a 

suppression hearing where both of the rangers testified. Ultimately, the 

district court denied Perkins’s motion, reasoning that the rangers had 

probable cause to search his car. Perkins entered a conditional plea 

agreement, which expressly reserved his right to appeal the unfavorable 

suppression ruling. The district court sentenced him to 84 months in prison 

and 48 months of supervised release. Perkins timely appealed.

II.

A.

In reviewing a district court’s ruling on a motion to suppress, “we 

review factual findings for clear error and conclusions of law de novo.”

United States v. Kendrick, 980 F.3d 432, 439 (5th Cir. 2020). Whether the 

facts support probable cause is reviewed de novo, but we defer to the district 

court on the finding of said facts absent clear error. United States v. Castro, 

166 F.3d 728, 733 (5th Cir. 1999) (en banc) (per curiam). Nevertheless, our 

review is “particularly deferential” where, as here, the district court bases its 

decision on live oral testimony. United States v. Lim, 897 F.3d 673, 685 (5th 

Cir. 2018). “The evidence is viewed in the light most favorable to the party 

who prevailed in the district court,” United States v. Cavazos, 668 F.3d 190, 

193 (5th Cir. 2012), and the denial of a suppression motion will be affirmed

“if there is any reasonable view of the evidence to support [it].” United States 

v. Gratkowski, 964 F.3d 307, 310 (5th Cir. 2020) (quotation omitted).

B.

The Fourth Amendment protects “[t]he right of the people to be 

secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable 

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searches and seizures. . . .” U.S. Const. amend. IV. Generally speaking, 

the Fourth Amendment “requires police to secure a warrant before 

conducting a search.” Maryland v. Dyson, 527 U.S. 465, 466 (1999) (per 

curiam). But the automobile exception allows the police to search a vehicle 

without a warrant, so long as there is probable cause to believe that the vehicle 

contains contraband or evidence of a crime. See California v. Acevedo, 500 

U.S. 565, 569–72 (1991); Pennsylvania v. Labron, 518 U.S. 938, 940 (1996)

(per curiam).

Probable cause exists when, based on the “facts and circumstances 

within the . . . officer’s personal knowledge,” Bailey v. Iles, 87 F.4th 275, 285 

(5th Cir. 2023) (quotation and citation omitted), “there is a fair probability 

that contraband or evidence of a crime will be found in a particular place,” 

Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 238 (1983). The probable cause analysis

incorporates the relevant officer’s training and experience. See United States 

v. Turner, 839 F.3d 429, 433 (5th Cir. 2016). 

When an officer has probable cause to conduct a search, he can search 

parts of the vehicle that may conceal the object of the search. See Acevedo, 

500 U.S. at 570–72. And the plain-view doctrine allows an officer to seize an 

item during a search if: “(1) the police lawfully entered the area where the 

item was located; (2) the item was in plain view; (3) the incriminating nature 

of the items was immediately apparent; and (4) the police had a lawful right 

to access the item.” United States v. Rodriguez, 601 F.3d 402, 407 (5th Cir. 

2010) (quotation and citation omitted).

The rangers lawfully searched Perkins’s car and seized the bag 

containing methamphetamine, drug paraphernalia, and a scale. It is 

undisputed that Calkins had grounds to initiate a traffic stop based on 

Perkins’s tag violation. During that lawful traffic stop, Calkins saw marijuana

in the door compartment of Perkins’s vehicle. Based on his experience and 

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training, cf. Turner, 839 F.3d at 433, Calkins immediately recognized the 

incriminating and illegal nature of the marijuana. Based on that observation 

alone, the rangers possessed knowledge evincing a “fair probability that 

contraband or evidence of a crime” would be found in Perkins’s car, see 

Gates, 462 U.S. at 238, which created probable cause and justified the 

subsequent warrantless search of the car. See Acevedo, 500 U.S. at 569–72; 

Labron, 518 U.S. at 940. During that lawful search, the rangers found the bag 

containing contraband under the driver’s seat. Then the plain-view doctrine 

allowed the rangers to seize that bag: the rangers lawfully searched under the 

driver’s seat, the bag was in plain view under the seat, the incriminating 

nature of the item and its illicit contents was immediately apparent, and the 

rangers could lawfully access it. See Rodriguez, 601 F.3d at 407. Considering

the deference that we must show to the district court, see Gratkowski, 964 

F.3d at 310; Lim, 897 F.3d at 685, we conclude that the district court did not 

err in denying Perkins’s motion to suppress.

C.

Perkins raises several counterarguments. None is persuasive. 

First, Perkins contends that the rangers improperly prolonged the 

traffic stop. As we have held, a traffic stop must be “temporary and last no 

longer than is necessary to effectuate the purpose of the stop, unless further 

reasonable suspicion . . . emerges.” United States v. Brigham, 382 F.3d 500, 

507 (5th Cir. 2004) (en banc). But Perkins presents no evidence that the

rangers prolonged the stop to do anything more than obtain and run his 

information, a normal component of a traffic stop. Cf. Rodriguez v. United 

States, 575 U.S. 348, 355 (2015); Grey Brief at 1 (“It is unclear from the 

record how long the encounter lasted.”). And Calkins only saw the marijuana

in the front passenger door after he returned from checking Perkins’s 

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information. At that point, the rangers had more than reasonable suspicion—

they had probable cause to extend the stop.

Second, Perkins emphasizes that Calkins’s K-9 unit did not alert on 

the outside of his vehicle and argues that this failure to alert dispelled the 

rangers’ probable cause. But while we “may not disregard facts tending to 

dissipate probable cause,” Bailey, 87 F.4th at 286 (citation omitted), a failure 

to alert is not dispositive, see, e.g., United States v. Villafranco-Elizondo, 897 

F.3d 635, 644–45 (5th Cir. 2018) (holding that a failure to alert “did not 

eliminate the officer’s existing probable cause”). Here, the rangers had 

already developed probable cause through Calkins’s visual inspection of the 

marijuana in Perkins’s car. That the K-9 failed to alert did not dissipate this

probable cause, especially when the dog was not trained to detect marijuana, 

it was likely a very windy day at the beach, and the dog did not perform a sniff 

of the car’s interior. Under these circumstances, the rangers still possessed 

probable cause for their search.

Finally, Perkins claims that the relevant moment of Fourth 

Amendment analysis was not when the rangers searched his car, but when 

Jones opened the front passenger door. But such an argument fails. True, we 

have held that the Fourth Amendment is triggered when an officer opens a 

car door to visually search inside a vehicle. See United States v. Hunt, 253 F.3d 

227, 231–32 (5th Cir. 2001). But we have also held that, pursuant to a valid 

traffic stop, an officer can open a car door to visually inspect an occupant

without any additional suspicion. See United States v. Meredith, 480 F.3d 366, 

369–71 (5th Cir. 2007); see also id. at 371 (“[O]pening the door and eyeing the 

occupant is not significantly more intrusive than peering through a window 

and observing items in plain view.”). As Jones testified and the district court 

found credible, Lim, 897 F.3d at 685, the front passenger window was 

nontransparent and impossible to roll down. Thus, Jones opened the door not 

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to search the car, but to better see and interact with Perkins. Under Meredith,

Jones’s action did not trigger the Fourth Amendment.

AFFIRMED.

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