Breona C. v. Rodney D., No. 0299, September Term, 2021.

Opinion by Fader, C.J. 

CONTEMPT — CIVIL CONTEMPT — NATURE AND ELEMENTS OF 

CONTEMPT — ACTS OR CONDUCT CONSTITUTING CONTEMPT OF 

COURT

An order holding a person in constructive civil contempt must: (1) impose a sanction; 

(2) include a purge provision that gives the contemnor the opportunity to avoid the sanction 

by taking a definite, specific action of which the contemnor is reasonably capable; and 

(3) be designed to coerce the contemnor’s future compliance with a valid legal requirement 

rather than to punish the contemnor for past, completed conduct.
Circuit Court for Montgomery County

Case No. 129247FL

REPORTED

IN THE COURT OF SPECIAL APPEALS

OF MARYLAND

No. 0299

September Term, 2021

 ______________________________________

BREONA C.

v.

RODNEY D.

______________________________________ 

Fader, C.J., 

Nazarian,

Arthur,

JJ.

______________________________________

Opinion by Fader, C.J.

______________________________________

Filed: November 17, 2021
An order holding a person in constructive civil contempt must satisfy certain basic 

requirements, including that it must: (1) impose a sanction; (2) include a purge provision 

that gives the contemnor the opportunity to avoid the sanction by taking specific action of 

which the contemnor is reasonably capable; and (3) be designed to coerce the contemnor’s 

future compliance with a valid legal requirement rather than punish the contemnor for past, 

completed conduct. Here, the Circuit Court for Montgomery County issued an order 

holding the appellant, Breona C. (“Mother”), in constructive civil contempt for violating a 

provision of her custody arrangement with the appellee, Rodney D. (“Father”). Because 

the order did not satisfy any of the three identified requirements, we must reverse it.

BACKGROUND

Mother and Father are the parents of a six-year-old child (“Child”). In December 

2019, the circuit court modified the parties’ pre-existing custody arrangement and granted 

(1) Father primary physical custody of Child and (2) Mother parenting time with Child 

every weekend (“December 2019 Custody Order”). This arrangement remained in effect 

through the date of the March 2021 contempt hearing in this case. 

On Saturday, August 1, 2020, Mother picked Child up from Father for the weekend. 

After the weekend was over, out of concern for Child’s health and safety, Mother did not 

return Child to Father as required by the December 2019 Custody Order.1 

On Monday, August 3, Father filed an emergency petition to hold mother in 

contempt for violating the custody order. The following day, Mother sought and was 

1 Mother’s specific reasons for withholding Child from Father during his custodial 

time are not relevant to our analysis. 
2

granted a temporary protective order that gave her temporary custody of Child. On August 

24, the circuit court denied Mother’s petition for a final protective order, thereby restoring 

the December 2019 Custody Order. 

Despite the circuit court’s ruling, Mother did not immediately return Child to Father. 

As a result, on August 27, Father filed an emergency motion for custody. The following 

day, the circuit court ordered Mother to return Child to Father under a temporary custody 

arrangement. Mother did so. From then through the March 2021 hearing, Mother was in 

compliance with the December 2019 Custody Order.

On February 22, 2021, Mother moved to dismiss Father’s contempt petition. On 

March 31, the circuit court held a hearing on both Father’s contempt petition and Mother’s 

motion to dismiss. After the hearing, the court denied Mother’s motion to dismiss, granted 

Father’s petition, and held Mother “in contempt for violating the December 18, 2019 

Custody Order” by not returning Child immediately once the final protective order was 

denied on August 24, 2020. The written contempt order does not identify a sanction but 

provides that Mother “may purge this contempt by strictly following and complying with 

the ongoing December 18, 2019 Custody Order.” This timely appeal followed. 

DISCUSSION

THE CIRCUIT COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION BY ISSUING AN IMPROPER

ORDER OF CONSTRUCTIVE CIVIL CONTEMPT. 

Mother argues that the circuit court’s contempt order must be reversed because it 

punishes past, completed conduct, and because it includes an impermissible “forever 
3

purge” provision that does not actually permit Mother to purge the contempt.2 We agree 

with Mother and reverse the order of contempt. 

“[T]his Court will not disturb a contempt order absent an abuse of discretion or a 

clearly erroneous finding of fact upon which the contempt was imposed.” Kowalczyk v. 

Bresler, 231 Md. App. 203, 209 (2016). A trial court abuses its discretion when its decision 

encompasses an error of law, Schlotzhauer v. Morton, 224 Md. App. 72, 84-85 (2015), 

which this Court reviews without deference, Walter v. Gunter, 367 Md. 386, 392 (2002).

The contempt order under review is an order of constructive civil contempt. 

Constructive, as opposed to direct,3contempt is contempt that occurs outside of “the 

presence of the judge presiding in court or so near to the judge as to interrupt the court’s 

proceedings.” Md. Rule 15-202; see also County Comm’rs for Carroll County v. Forty 

West Builders, Inc., 178 Md. App. 328, 393 (2008) (quoting In re Lee, 170 Md. 43, 47 

(1936) (“[C]onstructive contempts are those which do not occur in the presence of the 

court, or near it, . . . but at some other place out of the presence of the court and beyond a 

place where the contempt would directly interfere with the proper functioning of the 

court.”)). Civil, as opposed to criminal, contempt proceedings are those that are “intended 

to preserve and enforce the right of private parties to a suit and to compel obedience to 

orders and decrees primarily made to benefit such parties.” Forty West Builders, Inc., 178 

Md. App. at 393 (quoting Archer v. State, 383 Md. 329, 345 (2004)). “[T]he purpose of 

2 Father did not submit an appellate brief. 

3 Direct contempt proceedings are governed by Rule 15-203.
4

civil contempt is to coerce present or future compliance with a court order, whereas 

imposing a sanction for past misconduct is the function of criminal contempt.” Dodson v. 

Dodson, 380 Md. 438, 448 (2004) (“[T]he law concerning contempt is clear, and [] the 

purpose of civil contempt is to coerce present or future compliance with a court order, 

whereas imposing a sanction for past misconduct is the function of criminal contempt.”).

The coercive mechanism of an order of constructive civil contempt is the imposition 

of a sanction that the contemnor is able to avoid by taking some definite, specified action 

of which the contemnor is reasonably capable. See Bryant v. Howard County Dep’t of Soc.

Servs. ex rel. Costley, 387 Md. 30, 46 (2005) (“[A] penalty for civil contempt, if it is to be 

coercive rather than punitive, must provide for purging; it must permit the defendant to 

avoid the penalty by some specific conduct that is within the defendant’s ability to 

perform.”). A written order making a finding of civil contempt must therefore “specif[y] 

the sanction imposed for the contempt,” and “specify how the contempt may be purged.” 

Md. Rule 15-207(d); see also Fisher v. McCrary Crescent City, LLC, 186 Md. App. 86, 

120 (2009) (“Following a finding of contempt, the court must issue a written order 

specifying (1) the coercive sanction imposed for the contempt, and (2) how the contempt 

may be purged.”). 

In sum, an order holding a person in constructive civil contempt is not valid unless 

it: (1) imposes a sanction; (2) includes a purge provision that gives the contemnor the 

opportunity to avoid the sanction by taking a definite, specific action of which the 

contemnor is reasonably capable; and (3) is designed to coerce the contemnor’s future 

compliance with a valid legal requirement rather than to punish the contemnor for past, 
5

completed conduct. Moreover, and critical to our analysis here, to serve the coercive 

purpose of civil contempt, the sanction must be distinct from the purge provision and the 

valid legal requirement the court seeks to enforce. If the sanction imposed is a requirement 

to take the very action the court says will purge the contempt, then undertaking the purge 

action necessarily completes, rather than avoids, the sanction. See Kowalczyk, 231 Md. 

App. at 211. And if the sanction imposed is to act in accord with the same legal requirement 

with which the court seeks to coerce compliance, there is no coercive mechanism at all. 

Instead, there is just a second order directing compliance with an existing order.

With that in mind, we hold that the circuit court’s order of civil contempt must be 

reversed. First, the order lacks a valid sanction. The court did not impose on Mother a 

fine, period of incarceration, or any other penalty. Indeed, the only obligation the court 

imposed on Mother in the order was the purported purge provision, which required Mother 

to comply in perpetuity with the December 2019 Custody Order. In that respect, the order 

was identical to the order this Court reversed in Kowalczyk, which had required the 

contemnor to “abide by” the visitation orders at issue to “purge herself of contempt.” 231 

Md. App. at 208. As we concluded there, where the purge provision is the sanction, there 

is no ability to purge the contempt and the order cannot be sustained.4 Id. at 210-11.

4 To be sure, a court may attempt to coerce compliance with an existing court order 

by a litigant who is not in compliance with it without imposing a present sanction. For 

example, a court may inform a litigant that continued noncompliance may result in the 

court imposing a future civil contempt order that will contain a sanction. But a court may 

not issue an order holding a litigant in civil contempt that does not include a permissible 

sanction, a valid purge provision, and a design to coerce compliance.
6

Second, the order lacks a valid purge provision. “In order for a penalty for civil 

contempt to be coercive rather than punitive, it must provide for purging that permits the 

defendant to avoid the penalty by some specific conduct that is within the defendant’s 

ability to perform.” Id. at 209. A lawful purge provision affords the opportunity for 

exoneration, “to rid [the defendant] of guilt . . . . [I]n this way, a civil contemnor is said to 

have the keys to the prison in [the contemnor’s] own pocket.” Id. at 210 (quoting Jones v. 

State, 351 Md. 264, 281 (1998)). Here, the perpetual obligation to comply with the 

December 2019 Custody Order is not a valid purge provision because it does not permit 

Mother to avoid a defined sanction by engaging in specific conduct. 

Third, the order punishes past noncompliance rather than compelling future 

compliance. “[A] party generally may not be held in constructive civil contempt for 

delayed compliance with a court order if [the party] has complied with the order prior to 

the contempt finding.” State v. Crawford, 239 Md. App. 84, 125 (2018). “Holding the 

party in civil contempt at that point does not have the effect of coercing compliance, but 

rather, of punishing the party for the past failure to comply.” Id. Instead, “imposing a 

sanction for past misconduct is the function of criminal contempt.”5 Dodson, 380 Md. at 

5 A constructive criminal contempt proceeding, which is “intended to ‘punish for 

past misconduct, which may no longer be capable of remedy,’” Crawford, 239 Md. App. 

at 110 (quoting Bradford v. State, 199 Md. App. 175, 193 (2011)), must be accompanied 

by a bevy of procedural protections that are not applicable to a proceeding for civil 

contempt, including: (1) it must be “docketed as a separate criminal action,” rather than 

being included in the “action in which the alleged contempt occurred,” Md. Rule 15-205(a); 

(2) it can be instituted only by the court, by filing an order directing issuance of a summons 

or warrant, or by the State’s Attorney, the Attorney General, or the State Prosecutor, by 

filing a petition, Md. Rule 15-205(b); (3) the order or petition instituting the proceeding 

must satisfy the formal requirements for a charging document set forth in Rule 4-202(a), 
7

448. Here, no order of constructive civil contempt could have been imposed on Mother at 

the time of the March 2021 hearing because, by that point, she had been in compliance 

with the December 2019 Custody Order for several months. Moreover, even if there had 

been any ongoing noncompliance, the court’s order was impermissibly based only on a 

finding of past, completed contempt from August 2020.6

Of course, the various deficiencies in the order of constructive civil contempt here 

were all interrelated: The court could not find a sanction to impose to coerce Mother to 

comply with an order with which she was already in compliance; the court could not craft 

a valid provision to purge a non-existent sanction; and, where the court’s focus was on 

past, completed noncompliance with its order, neither a forward-looking sanction nor purge 

provision could come into play.

Mother posits that the circuit court had mechanisms other than contempt at its 

disposal to address her past, completed noncompliance with the terms of the December 

2019 Custody Order, including awarding Father make-up time, altering the terms of the 

custody order itself, or imposing an award of attorneys’ fees. We need not discuss here 

and must “be served, along with a summons or warrant, in the manner specified in Rule

4-212”, Md. Rule 15-205(d); (4) the defendant in a criminal contempt proceeding has a 

right to counsel and the waiver provisions in Rule 4-215 apply to the proceeding, Md. Rule 

15-205(e); and (5) the defendant in a criminal contempt proceeding has a right to a jury 

trial and the waiver provisions in Rule 4-246 apply to the proceeding, Md. Rule 15-205(f).

6 We are not confronted here with a situation in which a party is engaged in a 

continuing or repetitive pattern of conduct in violation of a court order that, due to its 

continuing or repetitive nature, could reasonably be found to be ongoing at the time of a 

contempt hearing even if the putative contemnor is not technically out of compliance with 

the order at the moment of the hearing. We do not foreclose the possibility that an order 

of constructive civil contempt could be issued in such a circumstance. 
8

precisely what other remedies were available to address Mother’s past, completed 

noncompliance. All we decide today was that civil contempt was not among them. 

Accordingly, we will reverse the court’s order of constructive civil contempt.7 

ORDER OF THE CIRCUIT COURT FOR

MONTGOMERY COUNTY REVERSED;

COSTS TO BE PAID BY APPELLEE.

7 Mother asks this Court to remand with instructions to transfer this matter to another 

judge. Absent a showing of bias, parties may not expect their case to be transferred on 

remand simply because they do not agree with the judge’s rulings. See Att’y Grievance

Comm’n of Maryland v. Shaw, 363 Md. 1, 11 (2001). Mother has not identified any basis 

of support for her request for this Court to direct the reassignment of this case and we 

decline to do so.
The correction notice(s) for this opinion(s) can be found here: 

https://mdcourts.gov/sites/default/files/import/appellate/correctionnotices/cosa/0299s21cn.pdf