17790 Federal Register / Vol. 62, No. 70 / Friday, April 11, 1997 / Notices

1The term ‘‘failed’’ means that the cladding on

the fuel has been breached. The ROD, 60 Fed. Reg.

65300 (December 19, 1995), stated that failed fuel

is indicated by gas releases from a fuel storage

canister or visible failure of the cladding or

canisters.

select samples for specialized surveys

for example on children’s services or on

access for persons with disabilities.

[FR Doc. 97–9341 Filed 4–10–97; 8:45 am]

BILLING CODE 4000–01–P

DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY

Savannah River Operations Office

Interim Management of Nuclear

Materials at the Savannah River Site

AGENCY: Department of Energy.

ACTION: Supplemental record of decision

and supplement analysis determination.

SUMMARY: The U.S. Department of

Energy (DOE) prepared a final

environmental impact statement (EIS),

‘‘Interim Management of Nuclear

Materials’’ (DOE/EIS–0220, October 20,

1995), to assess the potential

environmental impacts of actions

necessary to manage nuclear materials

at the Savannah River Site (SRS), Aiken,

South Carolina, until decisions on their

ultimate disposition are made and

implemented. Some of the particular

materials considered in the EIS could

present environmental, safety and

health vulnerabilities in their current

storage condition.

On December 12, 1995, DOE issued a

Record of Decision (ROD) and Notice of

Preferred Alternatives, 60 FR 65300

(December 19, 1995), on the interim

management of several categories of

nuclear materials at the SRS, including

Taiwan Research Reactor (TRR) spent

nuclear fuel rods. DOE decided to

stabilize 81 TRR spent fuel rods because

the TRR fuel had failed,1 presenting

environmental, safety and health

vulnerabilities that should be corrected.

At the time of this decision, DOE stated

that, if additional TRR spent fuel failed,

DOE would categorize the failed fuel as

Candidates for Stabilization and

perform appropriate National

Environmental Policy Act (NEPA)

review and evaluation for stabilization

of the material.

On February 8, 1996, DOE issued a

Supplemental ROD, 61 FR 6633

(February 21, 1996), for the stabilization

of Mark–16 and Mark–22 fuels, and

other aluminum-clad targets. On

September 6, 1996, DOE issued a second

Supplemental ROD, 61 FR 48747

(September 13, 1996), for the

stabilization of plutonium-239

solutions, a neptunium-237 solution

and obsolete targets.

DOE has now further decided,

because of health and safety

vulnerabilities, to stabilize the

remaining TRR spent nuclear fuel

located in the Receiving Basin for

Offsite Fuels (RBOF) at the SRS, using

the F-Canyon and FB-Line facilities. The

TRR spent nuclear fuel to be stabilized

consists of the equivalent of 310 fuel

rods (some of the rods were fragmented

due to conditions in Taiwan) in 62

aluminum canisters stored underwater

in RBOF. DOE has decided to stabilize

the TRR spent nuclear fuel because

additional TRR spent fuel in at least two

of the canisters has failed, and DOE

believes that the rest is likely to exhibit

signs of failure at unpredictable

intervals in the near future. All 62

canisters contain TRR fuel that was

subjected to the same poor storage

conditions in Taiwan, and the same

physical stress due to transportation

conditions during shipment from

Taiwan to SRS, creating a propensity for

corrosion of the fuel elements’ cladding.

Once the cladding has failed, the failure

cannot be arrested, even by the excellent

water quality conditions in RBOF. Thus,

fission products will continue to be

released into RBOF.

By stabilizing the TRR fuel, DOE is

taking prudent management steps to

alleviate the environmental, safety and

health vulnerabilities associated with

the continued wet storage and

degradation of the TRR spent fuel. DOE

considered interim measures to improve

storage conditions, such as those

described in the Interim Management of

Nuclear Materials (IMNM) EIS, but DOE

believes that an alternate storage

arrangement that eliminates contact

between the fuel and water cannot be

implemented in a timely manner. For

example, dry storage facilities being

planned on an aggressive schedule for

domestic and foreign research reactor

spent fuel will not be available until

approximately 2003. In contrast, DOE

expects that stabilizing the fuel by

processing it in the F-Canyon and FBLine facilities can be accomplished in 6

to 12 months.

The plutonium separated by the

stabilization process (about 15

kilograms) will be stored at the SRS in

existing vaults and then in the new

Actinide Packaging and Storage Facility,

when it becomes operational, until DOE

implements long-term storage and

disposition decisions on weapons

usable forms of plutonium, which were

published in the ROD for the Storage

and Disposition of Weapons-Usable

Fissile Material (62 FR 3014, January 21,

1997). A Departmental commitment to

prohibit the use of plutonium-239 and

weapons-usable highly enriched

uranium separated and/or stabilized

during the phaseout, shutdown, and

cleanout of weapons complex facilities

for nuclear explosive purposes was

approved by the Secretary of Energy on

December 20, 1994, and DOE is

considering options for placing this

material under international safeguards.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: For

further information on the interim

management of nuclear materials at the

SRS or to receive a copy of the final EIS,

the initial ROD or the subsequent

supplemental RODs contact: Andrew R.

Grainger, NEPA Compliance Officer,

U.S. Department of Energy, Savannah

River Operations Office, P.O. Box 5031,

Aiken, South Carolina 29804–5031,

(800) 242–8259, Internet:

drew.grainger@srs.gov

For further information on the DOE

NEPA process, contact: Carol M.

Borgstrom, Director, Office of NEPA

Policy and Assistance, EH–42, U.S.

Department of Energy, 1000

Independence Avenue, SW.,

Washington, DC 20585, (202) 586–4600,

or leave a message at (800) 472–2756.

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: DOE

prepared a final environmental impact

statement (EIS), ‘‘Interim Management

of Nuclear Materials’’ (DOE/EIS–0220,

October 20, 1995), to assess the

potential environmental impacts of

actions necessary to manage nuclear

materials at the SRS, Aiken, South

Carolina, until decisions on their

ultimate disposition are made and

implemented. In the Interim

Management of Nuclear Materials

(IMNM) EIS, DOE evaluated the impacts

of several stabilization alternatives and

a ‘‘No Action’’ alternative for all Taiwan

Research Reactor (TRR) spent nuclear

fuel in RBOF. The estimates of the

potential impacts included normal

operations, waste generation, potential

accidents, and cumulative impacts. In

each case, the potential impacts for each

stabilization alternative were estimated

based on the entire SRS inventory of

TRR spent fuel, the equivalent of 391

spent fuel rods in 143 aluminum

canisters. As a result, the potential

impact of stabilizing all the TRR spent

fuel by processing the material in FCanyon and FB-Line, as well as the

potential impacts from the other

alternatives, was analyzed and

documented in the IMNM EIS.

DOE previously has issued three

RODs based on the IMNM EIS, regarding

the stabilization of nuclear materials at

the SRS. In the first ROD, 60 Fed Reg

65300 (December 19, 1995), DOE

determined, as relevant here, that 81
Federal Register / Vol. 62, No. 70 / Friday, April 11, 1997 / Notices 17791

failed TRR spent nuclear fuel rods

(contained in 81 canisters) would be

stabilized by processing the material to

a metal through F-Canyon and FB-Line

to address environmental, safety and

health vulnerabilities. In that ROD, DOE

also determined that the remaining

intact TRR fuel rods would remain in

interim wet storage in RBOF unless they

failed. As stated in the ROD, if DOE

determined that additional fuel, targets,

or canisters have failed, as indicated by

gas releases from a canister, or visible

failure of cladding or canisters, DOE

would categorize those materials as

Candidates for Stabilization. The ROD

further states that DOE would perform

the appropriate NEPA review and

evaluation for the stabilization of any

additional materials in RBOF that may

be determined at a later date to have

failed (e.g., Supplement Analysis).

Stabilization of the 81 canisters of failed

TRR spent fuel is currently being

completed.

Two canisters of TRR fuel, previously

believed to contain intact fuel, are now

releasing gas, and therefore have been

categorized as containing failed fuel.

DOE believes that the remaining TRR

spent fuel is likely to fail at

unpredictable times in the near future.

All 62 canisters contain TRR fuel that

was subjected to the same poor storage

conditions in Taiwan, and the same

physical stress due to transportation

conditions during shipment from

Taiwan to SRS, creating a propensity for

corrosion of the fuel elements’ cladding.

Once the cladding has failed, the failure

cannot be arrested, even by the excellent

water quality conditions in RBOF. Thus,

fission products will continue to be

released into RBOF.

Interim Management of Nuclear

Materials EIS

The IMNM EIS considered the interim

management of certain nuclear materials

at the SRS. These materials included

143 canisters containing TRR spent

nuclear fuel rods that were stored in

RBOF. The TRR spent nuclear fuel rods

are natural uranium metal clad in

aluminum.

At the time the EIS was prepared,

DOE knew the cladding on at least 81

of the fuel rods was failed as a result of

storage conditions in Taiwan. In about

1990, prior to shipping the TRR spent

fuel to the United States, the failed fuel

was placed in aluminum canisters, one

failed fuel rod per canister. Each

canister was then drained of any water

that entered the canister, filled with an

inert gas, and sealed so that water in the

storage pool would not come into

contact with the failed fuel.

The 310 TRR fuel rods that were

believed to be intact (i.e., those that

indicated no visible breach in the

cladding) were placed in aluminum

canisters for handling and storage

purposes. Five rods were loaded in each

of the canisters, for a total of 62

canisters. The canisters were designed

to be loaded from the side. The opening

for loading the rods extended almost the

entire length of the canister, and a cover

was latched in place after loading was

completed. The covers (and the

canisters) were designed with slots to

allow water into the canisters. The

overpack canisters were designed to

facilitate handling and storage, not to

prevent the contact of the fuel rods with

storage pool water.

The IMNM EIS evaluated the

potential environmental impact of

several alternatives for stabilizing the

failed TRR fuel. These alternatives

included processing the fuel to either a

metal or oxide form, placing the

material in dry storage, processing the

material for vitrification at the Defense

Waste Processing Facility, and

vitrification in F-Canyon. DOE also

considered continued wet storage of the

material, i.e., the ‘‘No Action’’

alternative. DOE performed the

evaluation of the potential impacts of

these alternatives, assuming all the

material—i.e., all 143 canisters of TRR

spent fuel—would be stabilized,

although the proposed action involved

only 81 canisters (containing 81 failed

fuel rods). A summary of the potential

impacts from the alternatives was

presented in Table 2–12 of the IMNM

EIS.

By mid-1995, DOE had determined

that 16 (of the 81) canisters containing

failed TRR spent nuclear fuel had

deteriorated to the point that the

canisters were releasing gas and, as a

consequence, radionuclides into the

water of RBOF. DOE proposed the 81

canisters of TRR spent fuel as

Candidates for Stabilization because: the

release of hydrogen gas indicated that

the canisters likely would not prevent

water from coming into contact with the

failed fuel or prevent radionuclides

from being released into the storage

pool; the presence of hydrogen gas

indicated fuel corrosion was occurring;

and the failure of any more canisters

was certain to result in additional

radionuclides being released into RBOF,

since once corrosion has begun, it

cannot be arrested. DOE also decided

that the remaining 62 canisters of

presumed ‘‘intact’’ TRR fuel should be

considered stable for interim wet storage

over about the next ten years.

In a ROD issued on December 12,

1995, 60 FR 65300 (December 19, 1995),

DOE decided to stabilize the 81 failed

TRR spent fuel rods by implementing

the Processing to Metal alternative

described and analyzed in the IMNM

EIS. In addition, DOE concluded that if,

‘‘after removing * * * failed TRR fuel

* * * from RBOF, DOE determines that

additional fuel * * * or canisters have

failed, as indicated by gas releases from

a canister, or visible failure of cladding

or canisters, DOE would categorize

those materials as Candidates for

Stabilization. DOE would perform the

appropriate * * * [NEPA] review and

evaluation for the stabilization of any

additional materials in RBOF that may

be determined at a later date to have

failed (e.g., a Supplement Analysis).’’ Id.

At 60 FR 65313.

Environmental Impacts of Alternatives

In the IMNM EIS, DOE evaluated the

impacts of several stabilization

alternatives (i.e., Processing to Metal,

Processing to Oxide, Improving Storage,

Processing and Storage for Vitrification

in the Defense Waste Processing

Facility, and Vitrification in F-Canyon)

and a ‘‘No Action’’ alternative. For each

alternative, the IMNM EIS estimated the

potential impacts of stabilizing all of the

TRR spent nuclear fuel (both failed fuel

and that believed to be intact), including

normal operations, waste generation,

potential accidents, and cumulative

impacts. In each case, the potential

impacts for each stabilization alternative

were estimated based on the entire SRS

inventory of TRR spent fuel. As a result,

the potential impact of stabilizing all the

TRR spent fuel by Processing to Metal,

as well as the potential impacts from the

other alternatives, was analyzed and

documented in the IMNM EIS.

Since discovering that additional TRR

fuel has failed, DOE has re-evaluated the

stabilization alternatives in the IMNM

EIS to ensure that the analysis remains

valid. In the IMNM EIS, DOE concluded

that these alternatives would take from

four to nine years to implement

completely for the TRR spent nuclear

fuel, while the preferred alternative of

processing TRR spent fuel to a metal

could be implemented more quickly.

DOE believes that the estimates of time

to implement TRR spent nuclear fuel

stabilization alternatives in the IMNM

EIS are still accurate. DOE expects that

stabilization of the remaining TRR spent

fuel in RBOF could be completed in 6

to 12 months.

As part of its re-evaluation, DOE

considered interim storage methods that

could be implemented in accordance

with the No Action alternative. Interim

storage methods would involve canning

the TRR spent nuclear fuel in RBOF and

placing the material back in wet storage.
17792 Federal Register / Vol. 62, No. 70 / Friday, April 11, 1997 / Notices

2The term ‘‘failed’’ means that the cladding on

the fuel has been breached. The ROD, 60 Fed. Reg.

65300 (December 19, 1995), stated that failed fuel

is indicated by gas releases from a fuel storage

canister or visible failure of the cladding or

canisters.

To assure safe storage of the TRR spent

fuel, vacuum drying capability would be

needed in RBOF. High temperature

treatment, e.g., heating to ≥200 °C,

would also likely be required for failed

TRR fuel. Drying and heating would be

necessary because water, beyond a

minimal amount, must be removed from

the fuel to prevent continued corrosion

and gas generation that could create

unpredictable and unmonitored

conditions inside the fuel storage

container. The SRS does not currently

have the capability to either dry or heattreat spent fuel, and could not develop

such a capability for several years.

Additionally, the technology to heattreat uranium metal fuel with failed

cladding is undeveloped and requires

research. DOE does not believe that

treatment and canning could be

satisfactorily implemented before

stabilization by processing to a metal

could be accomplished.

Continuing to store the fuel in RBOF

is not desirable because it would

exacerbate the corrosion of the fuel and

result in continued releases of fission

products and, eventually, metal and

oxide particles in the basin water. These

releases would subject workers to

unnecessary radiation exposure and

would present an environmental, safety

and health vulnerability. Therefore,

continued storage would do nothing to

resolve current concerns regarding wet

storage of TRR spent fuel.

Furthermore, it would not be practical

to remove individual failed rods from

the TRR fuel canisters because no

efficient method to identify a failed fuel

rod exists. An inspection of the cladding

surface of each and every rod through

magnification or, more likely,

nondestructive testing would be

required to identify the existence and

location of cladding penetration. Based

on previous experience with

contaminated, but unirradiated, fuel, an

inspection of this magnitude could take

a year to complete, and stabilization

actions would still be required for the

failed TRR fuel. As a result, this method

would not resolve current concerns

regarding TRR fuel corrosion.

Decision

In the 1995 ROD, 60 FR 65300

(December 19, 1995), DOE decided to

stabilize 81 TRR spent nuclear fuel rods

by implementing the ‘‘Processing to

Metal’’ alternative described in the

IMNM EIS. DOE stated that this

alternative was selected for reasons

similar to those for the Mark-31 targets

(a material very similar to the TRR spent

nuclear fuel). That is, by processing the

TRR spent fuel to a metal, the material

could be stabilized earlier than under

the other alternatives, and four to nine

years earlier than the environmentally

preferred alternative, i.e., Improving

Storage. Further delay in removing the

fuel from wet storage would serve no

practical purpose. Other reasons for

selecting Processing to Metal include

the fact that the selected stabilization

alternative relies on existing operating

equipment and trained personnel, the

technical uncertainty is low, costs are

well established, and the small amount

of plutonium metal produced would be

a small fraction of the DOE inventory

and would not present nuclear

nonproliferation concerns. DOE believes

that the reasons for choosing the

Processing to Metal alternative for

initial failed TRR fuel still apply to the

remaining TRR spent nuclear fuel.

DOE therefore has concluded that all

the TRR spent nuclear fuel in RBOF is

‘‘at risk’’ material. DOE bases its

conclusion on the following:

• The poor TRR spent fuel use and

storage conditions in Taiwan are known

to have caused gross failure for other

TRR fuel;

• The TRR fuel that DOE believed to

be intact was exposed to the same poor

conditions in Taiwan;

• Poor storage conditions facilitate

the start of corrosion sites on the spent

fuel cladding;

• The high quality of the RBOF

storage basin water would not be

sufficient to arrest existing fuel

corrosion because uranium metal

corrosion and existing corrosion sites

established on aluminum would

continue to progress even with excellent

water quality;

• Hydrogen gas generation around

TRR spent fuel, previously believed to

be intact, indicates that fuel cladding

has failed and that the uranium metal

beneath the fuel cladding is corroding;

• Water monitoring data indicate that

storing the TRR spent fuel in RBOF

caused radioactivity releases into RBOF

water to more than double; and

• The continued presence of fission

products in the RBOF pool water

indicates that fuel failure is continuing.

Corrosion of the TRR fuel creates

radiation exposure, safety, waste and

environmental concerns which dictate

the expeditious resolution of the

corrosion problem. Continued wet

storage would facilitate the TRR fuel

corrosion process. Other storage

arrangements would be impractical

because of the protracted

implementation schedule. Therefore,

DOE has decided to stabilize the TRR

spent nuclear fuel in the 62 canisters by

the IMNM EIS Processing to Metal

alternative using the F-Canyon and FBLine facilities at the SRS.

Issued at Washington, DC, April 2, 1997.

Alvin L. Alm,

Assistant Secretary for Environmental

Management.

Supplement Analysis for Stabilization

of TRR Fuel

Background

The U.S. Department of Energy (DOE)

prepared a final environmental impact

statement (EIS), ‘‘Interim Management

of Nuclear Materials’’ (DOE/EIS–0220,

October 20, 1995), to assess the

potential environmental impacts of

actions necessary to manage nuclear

materials at the Savannah River Site

(SRS), Aiken, South Carolina, until

decisions on their ultimate disposition

are made and implemented. Some of the

particular materials considered in the

EIS could present environmental, safety

and health vulnerabilities in their

current storage condition.

On December 12, 1995, DOE issued a

Record of Decision (ROD) and Notice of

Preferred Alternatives, 60 FR 65300

(December 19, 1995), on the interim

management of several categories of

nuclear materials at the SRS, including

Taiwan Research Reactor (TRR) spent

nuclear fuel rods. DOE decided to

stabilize 81 TRR spent fuel rods because

the TRR fuel had failed,2 presenting

environmental, safety and health

vulnerabilities that should be corrected.

At the time of this decision, DOE stated

that, if additional TRR spent fuel failed,

DOE would categorize the failed fuel as

Candidates for Stabilization and

perform appropriate National

Environmental Policy Act (NEPA)

review and evaluation for stabilization

of the material.

The IMNM EIS categorized 62

canisters of TRR spent nuclear fuel as

suitable for interim storage, based on the

absence of obvious gas generation or

obvious damage to the fuel or the

storage canisters. However, no

evaluation was conducted of the

integrity of the fuel rods within the

canisters. Instead, DOE relied on the

results of inspections completed prior to

shipping the fuel to the United States

for classifying the fuel as intact.

TRR fuel failure in Taiwan was the

result of poor reactor operations or poor

storage and handling conditions. For

example, some TRR fuel was stored in

outdoor dry storage consisting of a

concrete pad into which carbon steel

cylinders were vertically inserted below
Federal Register / Vol. 62, No. 70 / Friday, April 11, 1997 / Notices 17793

3Spent fuel from foreign research reactors

currently being returned to the United States is

shipped in an entirely different manner that does

not allow the fuel rods to come into direct contact

with one another or contribute in any other way to

their degradation.

4 J.P. Howell, ‘‘Corrosion Surveillance in Spent

Fuel Storage Pools,’’ NACE Corrosion/97 paper 107

(Houston, Texas: National Association of Corrosion

Engineers, 1997).

grade. TRR spent fuel rods, held in

metal baskets, were lowered into the

cylinders. The cylinders were then

capped and welded closed. Over time,

water intruded into the cylinders and

severely damaged some of the fuel.

Failed cladding on TRR spent fuel was

common, and some of the rods were so

damaged that they had literally

disintegrated into rubble.

Prior to loading all the TRR spent fuel

for shipment to the United States, the

Nuclear Assurance Corporation (NAC)

evaluated the fuel to determine its

integrity. NAC first visually inspected

each rod to detect cladding failures on

the rods which are approximately one

inch in diameter and 10 feet long. NAC

conducted its visual inspection from a

safe distance of at least 10 feet, using

magnification devices such as

binoculars. Any failed fuel detected in

this fashion was canned immediately.

If no obvious defects were discovered,

NAC then subjected each rod to a ‘‘sip’’

test. For this test, a fuel rod was first

placed in a container filled with water.

A sample of the water in the container

was drawn and analyzed to detect

fission products such as cesium-137.

After three or four hours, another

sample was drawn and analyzed. If the

difference between the two samples was

greater than two times the background

radiation level, NAC considered the rod

to be failed. Any failed fuel detected in

this fashion was canned, one failed fuel

rod per canister.

Rods that passed the visual and ‘‘sip’’

inspections were placed in an

aluminum ‘‘overpack’’ canister about 5

inches in diameter and 11 feet long.

Five intact rods were placed in one

canister. There were no baffles or

separators installed to provide any

cushion between the rods during

shipment. The canisters were loaded in

dry shipping casks for the 12,000 mile

trip to the SRS. During shipment, the

fuel rods were subjected to physical

stress, such as impact between the rods

in each canister,3 due to transportation

conditions. The TRR fuel was shipped

to the United States during 1990 and

1991.

Upon receipt at the SRS, the

transportation casks were placed

underwater in RBOF. The canisters were

unloaded from the transportation casks,

and a visual inspection of the canisters’

exterior was performed prior to placing

the canisters in underwater storage in

RBOF.

The results of the tests on TRR spent

fuel integrity that were performed in

Taiwan only provided an assessment of

the TRR fuel rods at the time they were

loaded into the canisters. The tests

could not predict cladding performance

after the canisters were loaded into the

shipping casks, or after six to seven

years of wet storage at the SRS,

especially in light of the historically

poor storage and handling conditions in

Taiwan.

Current Conditions

The Westinghouse Savannah River

Company (WSRC), DOE’s management

and operating contractor at the SRS, has

observed occasional gas bubbles coming

from the locations in RBOF where the

TRR fuel previously believed to be

intact is stored. Until recently, the

source of the gas bubbles was not

specifically identified because gas

generation was sporadic. When the TRR

fuel canisters were placed in storage in

1990 and 1991, DOE was planning to

reprocess the TRR spent fuel, and

therefore did not expect the fuel to

remain in wet storage for a prolonged

period. However, in 1992, the Secretary

of Energy decided to phase out

reprocessing activities, and

consequently the TRR fuel has remained

in wet storage much longer than

anticipated.

In November 1996, WSRC noted a

marked increase in the gas generation

rate from two of the canisters containing

TRR fuel that was previously thought to

be intact. Gas bubbles that previously

appeared on a sporadic basis appeared

on a continuous basis at intervals

ranging from about every 40 seconds to

1 minute. The likely reason for the

increase in the generation of gas bubbles

from the two TRR fuel canisters is that

corrosion of either the fuel cladding or

the uranium metal fuel is accelerating.

DOE believes that corrosion sites on the

TRR spent fuel occurred as a result of

damage during handling, or poor storage

conditions in Taiwan or in transit to the

SRS. Pre-existing corrosion sites on the

fuel cladding would have continued to

progress after the material was placed in

RBOF, because once a corrosion site had

been formed, corrosion would continue

despite the excellent water quality in

RBOF.

Corrosion of uranium metal clad in

aluminum was studied extensively for

the Mark-31 targets that were stored in

the L-Reactor Disassembly Basin.4 These

targets, which have recently been

dissolved for stabilization, were very

similar in nature to the TRR spent

nuclear fuel in that both consisted of

uranium-238 metal clad with

aluminum. WSRC reported that the

typical corrosion phenomenon occurred

in two phases: an initiation stage,

corresponding with the penetration of

the fuel cladding either by corrosion or

by storage and handling damage,

followed by the beginning of uranium

corrosion; and a propagation stage,

corresponding with a significant growth

of the corrosion’s extent. The first stage

was usually of unpredictable duration.

During that stage, deformation of the

cladding did not usually occur, but

occasional bubbles of hydrogen could

evolve. The reaction involved:

U+2H2O‰UO2+2H2

The second phase, that is, the

propagation phase, was characterized by

growth of a blister at the location of

cladding penetration. Once swelling

started, the blister grew at a fairly steady

rate until the accumulated uranium

oxide caused the cladding to split. After

the cladding split, the uranium oxide

was released into the water, and a larger

area of uranium metal was exposed to

attack. In either phase, the progression

of uranium metal corrosion would

continue to occur regardless of the basin

water quality. In sum, once the uranium

metal is exposed to water, a more rapid

reaction takes place liberating hydrogen,

and once that corrosive process has

started, there is no practical way to stop

the process as long as the fuel is in

contact with water.

The increase in the generation of gas

bubbles from TRR fuel canisters is an

indication that corrosion of the fuel is

progressing from the initiation stage to

the propagation stage. As this process

continues, uranium oxide production

will cause the cladding to split and

expose more uranium metal to the basin

water. As the corrosion products form,

they will continue to carry

radionuclides into the storage basin

water. Canisters that display only

occasional bubbles contain fuel that is

earlier in the initiation stage of

corrosion. In any case, the presence of

hydrogen gas provides a strong

indication that uranium metal corrosion

has been initiated in the TRR fuel.

Another indication of corroding fuel

is the release of fission products into the

RBOF water. The basin filtration system

removes fission products to maintain

radioactivity levels in the water at

acceptable limits, but this system must

be turned off on a periodic basis for

maintenance. During these periods, the

rate of radioactivity release has been

determined by establishing the rate of
17794 Federal Register / Vol. 62, No. 70 / Friday, April 11, 1997 / Notices

change in the basin radioactivity levels.

Currently, a steady increase in basin

radioactivity levels always follows

shutdown of the RBOF filtration system.

This increase is due to the constant

release of fission products by failed fuel

in the basin. DOE believes that the

source of this radioactivity is the TRR

fuel, because the average RBOF water

radioactivity levels more than doubled

when the TRR spent fuel was placed in

storage in the early 1990s.

Environmental Analysis

The CEQ regulations for

implementing NEPA, 40 CFR 1502.9(c),

direct federal agencies to prepare a

supplement to an EIS when an agency

‘‘makes substantial changes in the

proposed action that are relevant to

environmental concerns, or there are

significant new circumstances or

information relevant to environmental

concerns and bearing on the proposed

action or its impacts.’’ The DOE

regulations for compliance with NEPA,

10 CFR 1021.314, direct that when it is

unclear whether or not a supplemental

EIS is required, the Department is to

prepare a supplement analysis.

This Supplement Analysis (Analysis)

evaluates new information regarding the

condition of TRR spent fuel. In addition,

this Analysis compares this new

information with the IMNM EIS’

evaluation of failed TRR spent fuel.

In the IMNM EIS, DOE evaluated the

impacts of several stabilization

alternatives (i.e., Processing to Metal,

Processing to Oxide, Improving Storage,

Processing and Storage for Vitrification

in the Defense Waste Processing

Facility, and Vitrification in F-Canyon)

and a ‘‘No Action’’ alternative. For each

alternative, the IMNM EIS estimated the

potential impacts of stabilizing all of the

TRR spent nuclear fuel (both failed fuel

and that believed to be intact), including

normal operations, waste generation,

potential accidents, and cumulative

impacts. In each case, the potential

impacts for each stabilization alternative

were estimated based on the entire SRS

inventory of TRR spent fuel. As a result,

the potential impact of stabilizing all the

TRR spent fuel by Processing to Metal,

as well as the potential impacts from the

other alternatives, was analyzed and

documented in the IMNM EIS.

Since discovering that additional TRR

fuel has failed, DOE has re-evaluated the

stabilization alternatives in the IMNM

EIS to ensure that the analysis remains

valid. In the IMNM EIS, DOE concluded

that these alternatives would take from

four to nine years to implement

completely for the TRR spent nuclear

fuel, while the preferred alternative of

processing TRR spent fuel to a metal

could be implemented more quickly.

DOE believes that the estimates of time

to implement TRR spent nuclear fuel

stabilization alternatives in the IMNM

EIS are still accurate. DOE expects that

stabilization of the remaining TRR spent

fuel in RBOF could be completed in 6

to 12 months.

Conclusion

Based on the foregoing, DOE finds

that stabilizing the TRR fuel by the

Processing to Metal alternative in the

IMNM EIS will result in neither

significantly greater environmental

impacts than analyzed in the IMNM EIS

nor a substantial change in the proposed

action relevant to environmental

concerns. Stabilizing all the TRR fuel by

processing it to a metal is consistent

with the goals of the proposed action in

the IMNM EIS. Furthermore, stabilizing

all the TRR fuel by processing it to a

metal is consistent with the stabilization

action selected in the December 12,

1995, ROD, which clearly allowed for

the stabilization of additional TRR spent

fuel. Consequently, DOE has concluded

that the stabilization of the remaining

TRR fuel does not require the

preparation of a supplemental EIS.

[FR Doc. 97–9340 Filed 4–10–97; 8:45 am]

BILLING CODE 6450–01–P

DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY

Office of Defense Programs; Inertial

Fusion Science in Support of Stockpile

Stewardship Grant Program

AGENCY: Department of Energy (DOE).

ACTION: Notice of solicitation

availability.

SUMMARY: The Department of Energy

Office of Defense Programs hereby

announces its interest in receiving grant

applications for performance of

unclassified innovative research in high

energy-density science relevant to

inertial fusion within the stockpile

stewardship program.

The objectives of this new Inertial

Fusion Science in Support of Stockpile

Stewardship Financial Assistance

Program are to (1) increase U.S. efforts

in high-energy-density science relevant

to Inertial Confinement Fusion (ICF)

through funding of small research

projects at universities and other private

sector institutions; (2) promote

interactions between such investigators

and scientists at the Department of

Energy weapons laboratories, and; (3)

assist in training scientists in areas of

long-term research relevant to stockpile

stewardship.

Subject to the availability of

appropriated funds, the Office of Inertial

Fusion and the NIF Project intends to

provide up to $2 million in FY98 for

multiple grant awards under this

Inertial Fusion Science in Support of

Stockpile Stewardship Financial

Assistance Program. Applicants will

compete for one-to three-year grant

awards through open competition with

peer review.

The solicitation document invites

applications from all segments of the

U.S. private sector (non-federal). Any

U.S. university or other institution of

higher education or other non-profit or

for-profit organization, non-federal

agency or entity will be eligible for a

grant award under this new financial

assistance program. Non-U.S. citizens at

U.S. institutions are eligible.

Investigators at foreign institutions may

not apply as a principal investigator, but

may receive funding as a coinvestigator. DOE must be notified of

any foreign nationals involved in the

funded work, and there may be some

restrictions on their participation at

certain facilities and conferences.

DATES: A solicitation will be available

on or about April 11, 1997.

Preapplications referencing DE-FG03–

97DP00167, should be submitted by

May 1, 1997. Full applications under

this notice should be received by 4:30

pm Eastern Standard Time, June 30,

1997. Initial grant awards under this

new financial assistance program are

planned for about November 15, 1997.

ADDRESSES: The complete solicitation

document will be available on or about

April 11, 1997 on the Internet by

accessing the ICF grant program home

page (http://www3.dp.doe.gov/ifnif/

grants.htm) or by accessing the DOE/

OAK home page (http://

www.oak.doe.gov/procure/

proclmain.html). Prospective

applicants may also submit a written

request including a self-addressed

stamped envelope and an MS-DOS

formatted high density 31⁄2’’, virus free

diskette to the contracting officer for a

diskette copy of the solicitation (U.S.

Dept. of Energy, Oakland Operations

Office, 1301 Clay Street 700N, Oakland,

CA 94612–5208, Attn: Bill O’Neal).

Completed applications referencing

Solicitation Notice DE-PS03–97DP00167

must be submitted to: Office of Inertial

Fusion, DP–18, U.S. Department of

Energy, 19901 Germantown Road,

Germantown, MD, 20874–1290, Attn.:

Grant Program.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Ann

Satsangi, 301–903–8059,

ann.satsangi@dp.doe.gov or Bill O’Neal

510–637–1880, bill.o’neal@oak.doe.gov