United States Court of Appeals 

for the Federal Circuit ______________________

MANUEL ALMANZA, AND OTHER SIMILARLY 

SITUATED PERSONS,

Plaintiffs-Appellants

v.

UNITED STATES,

Defendant-Appellee

______________________

2018-1803

______________________

Appeal from the United States Court of Federal Claims 

in No. 1:13-cv-00130-EDK, Judge Elaine Kaplan.

______________________

Decided: August 21, 2019

______________________

DANIEL M. ROSENTHAL, James & Hoffman, PC, Washington, DC, argued for plaintiff-appellant. Also represented by RYAN EDWARD GRIFFIN, ALICE HWANG; DAVID L.

KERN, Kern Law Firm, El Paso, TX. 

 ALBERT S. IAROSSI, Commercial Litigation Branch, 

Civil Division, United States Department of Justice, Washington, DC, argued for defendant-appellee. Also represented by JOSEPH H. HUNT, STEVEN JOHN GILLINGHAM,

ROBERT EDWARD KIRSCHMAN, JR. 

 ______________________
2 ALMANZA v. UNITED STATES

Before NEWMAN, CLEVENGER, and REYNA, Circuit Judges.

REYNA, Circuit Judge.

Manuel Almanza represents a group of United States 

Border Patrol Agents who seek compensation from the 

United States for activities they claim were performed during “hours of work” while attending a voluntary canine instructor course. The United States Court of Federal 

Claims granted summary judgment in favor of the government and denied Almanza’s claims. Because the court correctly determined that Almanza is not entitled to 

compensation as a matter of law, we affirm.

BACKGROUND

I. Border Patrol Agents, Canine Handlers, 

and Canine Instructors

Border Patrol Agents (“agents”) of the United States 

Customs and Border Protection (“CBP”) are responsible for 

patrolling the international borders of the United States. 

In performing those responsibilities, some agents choose to 

be paired with a trained detection canine. Those agents 

are referred to as “canine handlers.” Trained canines assist the canine handlers in detecting controlled substances 

and concealed individuals attempting to enter the United 

States illegally. Agents who wish to work with canines 

must attend a seven-week program of field and classroom 

training at a canine training program center. Successful 

graduates of the training program are certified canine handlers. 

Canine handlers perform the same duties as agents 

who do not work with canines. Canine handlers also receive the same compensation as agents who do not work 

with canines, except that canine handlers receive additional pay for hours dedicated to canine care and maintenance training. 
ALMANZA v. UNITED STATES 3

Certified canine handlers may seek additional certification as “canine instructors.” Seeking canine instructor 

certification is voluntary. Certified canine instructors may 

take on collateral duties to help canine handlers maintain 

their certification, but canine instructors do not receive a 

pay raise, new title, or any other additional compensation

absent a promotion. Agents who do not seek or secure canine instructor certification do not suffer any adverse consequences with respect to their existing jobs. They are not 

demoted, disciplined, or precluded from later seeking certification. Agents are nonetheless motivated to obtain canine instructor certification in order to “mak[e] that next 

step in [their] career” and to potentially become a “course 

development instructor or . . . to be maybe an assistant director, even director.” J.A. 165–66 (Bordeaux Dep. Tr.).

II. Detection Canine Instructor Course

To obtain canine instructor certification, agents must 

enroll in CBP’s Detection Canine Instructor Course 

(“DCIC”), a voluntary, twelve-week training program. CBP 

solicits interest in the DCIC by circulating memoranda 

that advertise the program and advise agents how to apply. 

Agents interested in attending the DCIC must submit an 

application and undergo a competitive interview process. 

The DCIC trains student instructors through a combination of classroom instruction, hands-on training, and fieldwork.

During the time period relevant to this case, student 

instructors were required to meet certain performance 

standards and to pass all exams with a minimum score of 

90%. Students were also graded on their completion of paperwork that certified instructors used to evaluate the performance of the detection canines (“white sheets”) and 

canine handlers (“green sheets”). 

A regular day at the DCIC lasted eight hours (6:00 am 

to 2:00 pm). Student instructors received their full compensation for those hours. But students testified that 
4 ALMANZA v. UNITED STATES

successful passage of the exams required substantial studying during off-hours. Students also testified that they 

spent substantial off-hours time completing green sheets 

and white sheets. Students were not compensated for any 

off-hours time spent studying or completing green sheets 

and white sheets (“off-hours activities”).

III. Fair Labor Standards Act and OPM Regulation 

5 C.F.R. § 551.423

The Fair Labor Standards Act (“FLSA”) entitles employees to overtime pay for their hours of work that exceed 

forty hours per week. 29 U.S.C. § 207(a)(1). The Office of 

Personnel Management (“OPM”) administers the FLSA

with respect to federal employees. 29 U.S.C. § 204(f). OPM

regulations provide that “[h]ours of work means all time 

spent by an employee performing an activity for the benefit 

of an agency and under the control or direction of the 

agency.” 5 C.F.R. § 551.104. Two provisions of the OPM 

regulations are relevant here: 5 C.F.R. § 551.423(a)(2) and 

(a)(4). 

First, under 5 C.F.R. § 551.423(a)(2), time spent in 

training outside of regular working hours is considered 

“hours of work” if both of the following conditions are satisfied:

(i) The employee is directed to participate in the 

training by his or her employing agency; and 

(ii) The purpose of the training is to improve the 

employee’s performance of the duties and responsibilities of his or her current position.

An employee is “directed to participate” in the training 

when “the training is required by the agency and the employee’s performance or continued retention in his or her 

current position will be adversely affected by nonenrolment 

in such training.” Id. § 551.423(b)(1). 
ALMANZA v. UNITED STATES 5

Second, under 5 C.F.R. § 551.423(a)(4), “[t]ime spent by 

an employee performing work for the agency during a period of training” is “considered hours of work.” For an activity to constitute “work for the agency,” it must be, among 

other things, undertaken “primarily for the benefit of the 

employer.” Tenn. Coal, Iron & R. Co. v. Muscoda Local No. 

123, 321 U.S. 590, 598 (1944); Bull v. United States, 68 Fed. 

Cl. 212, 222, decision clarified, 68 Fed. Cl. 276 (2005), aff’d, 

479 F.3d 1365 (Fed. Cir. 2007). 

IV. Claims Court Proceedings

Manuel Almanza and about two hundred other similarly situated persons (collectively, “Almanza”) filed suit in 

the United States Court of Federal Claims (“Claims Court”) 

on February 20, 2013, arguing entitlement to overtime pay 

because the off-hours activities constituted “hours of work” 

under 5 C.F.R. § 551.423(a)(2) and (a)(4). Almanza filed a 

motion for summary judgment on December 8, 2015, and 

the government filed a cross-motion for summary judgment 

on January 18, 2016. On July 26, 2016, the Claims Court 

granted summary judgment in favor of the government, 

finding no material facts in dispute and determining that, 

as a matter of law, Almanza was unable to show that any 

of the off-hours activities constituted “hours of work” under 

5 C.F.R. § 551.423. 

With respect to Almanza’s claim under 5 C.F.R.

§ 551.423(a)(2) (training outside of work hours), the Claims 

Court concluded that Almanza failed to satisfy either of the 

two independently required conditions. First, the Claims 

Court determined that the agents were not “directed to participate” in the DCIC because undisputed facts showed

that “participation in the DCIC was voluntary in the first 

instance and [the agents’] failure to apply or enroll would 

have had no effect on their existing jobs as canine handlers.” J.A. 8. Second, the Claims Court determined that 

the purpose of training was not to improve the agents’ performance of their existing position, but instead “was to 
6 ALMANZA v. UNITED STATES

provide the [agents] with new skills and knowledge needed 

to take on additional collateral duties as canine instructors, perhaps leading to promotion within the canine program.” J.A. 9. 

With respect to Almanza’s claim under 5 C.F.R. 

§ 551.423(a)(4) (performing work for the agency), the 

Claims Court determined that the off-hours activities were 

not “work” that benefited the agency, and thus were not 

compensable. The court based its decision in part on Almanza’s admission in summary judgment briefing that 

completion of the green sheets and white sheets “was a 

form of study and homework because correctly filling out 

such paperwork was part of learning to be a Canine Instructor.” J.A. 9 n.3 (quoting J.A. 3199 n.54).

Almanza timely appealed. We have jurisdiction under 

28 U.S.C. § 1295(a)(3). 

DISCUSSION

Almanza raises three issues on appeal: (i) whether 

5 C.F.R. § 551.423(a)(2) is invalid under Billings v. United 

States, 322 F.3d 1328 (Fed. Cir. 2003); (ii) whether the 

Claims Court erred in concluding on summary judgment 

that Almanza’s time spent on off-hours activities was not 

“hours of work” under 5 C.F.R. § 551.423(a)(2); and (iii) 

whether the Claims Court erred in concluding on summary 

judgment that Almanza’s time spent on off-hours activities 

was not “hours of work” under 5 C.F.R. § 551.423(a)(4).

We review a grant of summary judgment by the Claims 

Court de novo. FastShip, LLC v. United States, 892 F.3d 

1298, 1302 (Fed. Cir. 2018). Summary judgment is appropriate “if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to 

judgment as a matter of law.” Id. (quoting Rule of the 

Court of Federal Claims 56(a)). In applying this standard, 

“the evidence of the non-movant is to be believed, and all 

justifiable inferences are to be drawn in the non-movant’s 
ALMANZA v. UNITED STATES 7

favor.” Cross Med. Prods., Inc. v. Medtronic Sofamor 

Danek, Inc., 424 F.3d 1293, 1302 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (brackets 

omitted) (quoting Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 

242, 255 (1986)). In the event of cross-motions for summary judgment, the court must evaluate each motion on its 

own merits, taking care in each instance to view the evidence in favor of the non-moving party. Id.

I. Almanza’s Challenge to the 

Validity of § 551.423(a)(2)

Almanza asserts that 5 C.F.R. § 551.423(a)(2) is inconsistent with the FLSA and with Department of Labor regulations governing the compensability of training time. 

Almanza asks us to therefore invalidate § 551.423(a)(2) under Billings. Appellant Br. 38–42 (citing 322 F.3d at 1334.)

We hold that Almanza waived its newly raised challenge to the validity of § 551.423(a)(2). Our precedent generally counsels against entertaining arguments not 

presented to the trial court. M-I Drilling Fluids UK Ltd. v. 

Dynamic Air Ltda., 890 F.3d 995, 1000 n.1 (Fed. Cir. 2018) 

(citing Sage Prods., Inc. v. Devon Indus., Inc., 126 F.3d 

1420, 1426 (Fed. Cir. 1997) (“In short, this court does not 

‘review’ that which was not presented to the district 

court.”)). We “retain[] case-by-case discretion over whether 

to apply waiver.” Harris Corp. v. Ericsson Inc., 417 F.3d 

1241, 1251 (Fed. Cir. 2005). Only rarely do we exercise 

that discretion to decide an argument newly raised on appeal. Mass. Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. United States, 782 F.3d 

1354, 1369 (Fed. Cir. 2015). 

Almanza concedes that he never challenged the validity of § 551.423(a)(2) to the Claims Court. In fact, Almanza 

admits that he expressly relied on § 551.423(a)(2) when he

sought compensation for the off-hours activities. Specifically, Almanza contended in his Claims Court briefing that 

“a key federal regulation, 5 CFR 551.423, supports payment to Plaintiffs under each one of three independent sub-
8 ALMANZA v. UNITED STATES

components: (1) 5 CFR 551.423(a)(2); (2) 5 CFR 

551.423(a)(4); (3) 5 CFR 551.423(d).” J.A. 3180–81. 

Almanza now asks us to consider the validity of 

§ 551.423(a)(2). Almanza attempts to avoid waiver by 

claiming he relied on § 551.423(a)(2) only “in the alternative,” and only after the Government “invoked” that section. Reply Br. at 9. We are unpersuaded. Almanza does 

not provide any authority or further explanation for his assertion that we should decline to find waiver on either basis. 

We also reject Almanza’s argument that his challenge 

to the validity of § 551.423(a)(2) constitutes one of the exceptional situations in which we consider an argument in 

the first instance on appeal. See Reply Br. 9–11. While 

Almanza argues that finding waiver would “result in a miscarriage of justice,” Reply Br. 10, we believe the opposite is 

true. Fairness and other policy considerations compel us 

to find Almanza’s untimely challenge to § 551.423(a)(2) 

waived because Almanza previously sought relief from the 

Claims Court under that exact provision. See HTC Corp. 

v. IPCom GmbH & Co., 667 F.3d 1270, 1281–82 (Fed. Cir. 

2012) (explaining that our rule against considering new arguments on appeal ensures finality, conserves judicial resources, and “discourages parties from inviting an alleged 

error below only to raise it on appeal”); Finnigan Corp. v. 

Int’l Trade Comm’n, 180 F.3d 1354, 1363 (Fed. Cir. 1999)

(“A party’s argument should not be a moving target. The 

argument at the trial and appellate level should be consistent.”); Sierra Club v. Yeutter, 926 F.2d 429, 438 (5th 

Cir. 1991) (finding the government’s argument waived because the government originally “sought review under the 

standard it now challenges”).

The cases cited by Almanza do not persuade us otherwise. For example, Almanza cites Forshey v. Principi for 

the proposition that “appellate courts may apply the correct law even if the parties did not argue it below and the 
ALMANZA v. UNITED STATES 9

court below did not decide it.” Reply Br. 10 (quoting 284 

F.3d 1335, 1356 (Fed. Cir. 2002)). But Almanza’s quotation 

omits a critical aspect of the Forshey holding, which states

in full that “appellate courts may apply the correct law 

even if the parties did not argue it below and the court below did not decide it, but only if an issue is properly before 

the court.” 284 F.3d at 1356 (emphasis added). In Forshey, 

we explained that an issue is not properly before the court

where, for example, the appellant argued to this court that 

the Court of Appeals for Veterans Claims applied the 

wrong standard of review, yet “raised no issue below concerning the correct standard of review.” Id. at 1357. For 

these reasons, we find that Almanza waived his challenge 

to the validity of § 551.423(a)(2). 

II. Almanza’s Claim for Compensation 

Under § 551.423(a)(2)

Turning to the merits of Almanza’s claim for compensation under § 551.423(a)(2), Almanza asserts that a triable issue exists with respect to both required conditions. 

We disagree. We conclude that Almanza fails as a matter 

of law to satisfy either condition required under 

§ 551.423(a)(2), and we therefore hold that the Claims 

Court properly granted summary judgment in favor of the 

government with respect to that provision.

As to the first requirement of § 551.423(a)(2)—that the 

employee is “directed to participate” in the training activities—Almanza argues that off-hours studying was “doubly”

required because student instructors were required to attend and participate in the course, and then required to 

study during off-hours in order to pass the exams and to 

avoid failing the course. Appellant Br. 49. Almanza further contends that failure to engage in these required activities would have likely resulted in discharge from the 

program. According to Almanza, this in turn would have 

adversely affected the student instructors in their position 

as “course participants” (by being discharged from that 
10 ALMANZA v. UNITED STATES

position) and as “canine-handling agents” (by remaining

only “competent” canine handlers, rather than “expert” canine handlers like their peers who graduated from the 

DCIC). Id. at 51. 

We agree with the Claims Court that the student instructors were not “directed to participate” in off-hours 

studying within the meaning of § 551.423(a)(2). There is 

no dispute that participation in the DCIC was voluntary,

not required. Merely because a voluntary training program has certain required tasks does not alone render the 

program “required by the agency.” See § 551.423(b)(1). We

expect that nearly all voluntary training programs will 

have at least some requirements regarding attendance, 

participation, or tasks that must be completed. Our adoption of Almanza’s argument would thus render the “directed to participate” requirement of § 551.423(a)(2)(i) 

essentially meaningless. 

It is also undisputed that agents who declined to enroll 

in the DCIC, or who enrolled in but failed the DCIC, were 

not adversely affected in the performance of their current 

duties or in their continued retention as canine handlers. 

Those agents were not demoted or disciplined in any way. 

E.g., J.A. 166; 230; 318. To the contrary, they continued to 

work as canine handlers with the same pay and responsibilities as agents who completed the DCIC program, and 

they were permitted to reapply to the DCIC at a later date.

J.A. 3–4. We reject Almanza’s argument that agents are 

“adversely affected” under § 551.423(a)(2)(i) merely because DCIC graduates attain certain skills not attained by 

agents who did not enroll or who failed out of the course. 

As to the second requirement of § 551.423(a)(2)—that 

the “purpose of training is to improve the employee’s performance of the duties and responsibilities of his or her current position”—Almanza argues that a triable issue exists 

as to whether the purpose of training was to improve the 

skills of agents as canine handlers. Appellant Br. 43. 
ALMANZA v. UNITED STATES 11

Specifically, Almanza contends that agents who completed 

the DCIC program “improved vastly” in their canine handling skills and that the program “allowed them to perform 

new functions.” Id. 

Even viewing these facts with all justifiable inferences 

in Almanza’s favor, we conclude that the primary purpose 

for enrolling in the DCIC was for career advancement, i.e., 

for agents to “mak[e] that next step in [their] career.” 

J.A. 165 (Bordeaux Dep. Tr.); see also J.A. 166 (Bordeaux 

Dep. Tr.) (completion of DCIC was “necessary” for “moving 

on to course development instructor or . . . to be maybe an 

assistant director, even director”); J.A. 318 (Kraus Dep.

Tr.) (“I wanted to further my career, further my 

knowledge.”); J.A. 404 (Salas Dep. Tr.) (“I would like to further my career in the canine department . . . [and attending DCIC] was a big part of that.”). This type of “upward 

mobility training” is expressly exempted from the type of 

training compensable under § 551.423(a)(2)(ii). 5 C.F.R. 

§ 551.423(b)(2).

Evidence of incidental improvements to the employees’ 

performance of their current responsibilities does not convert “upward mobility training” into the type of training 

compensable under § 551.423(a)(2)(ii). We agree with the 

government that “[r]are indeed is the training which has 

no beneficial effects on an employee’s current job.” Appellee Br. 36 (emphasis omitted).

Because we conclude that Almanza is unable, as a matter of law, to satisfy either of the two requirements of 

§ 551.423(a)(2), we affirm the Claims Court’s decision on 

summary judgment that the off-hours activities were not 

compensable as “hours of work” under § 551.423(a)(2). 

III. Almanza’s Claim for Compensation 

Under § 551.423(a)(4)

Almanza also seeks compensation by asserting that the 

off-hours time spent completing green sheets and white 
12 ALMANZA v. UNITED STATES

sheets constituted “hours of work” under § 551.423(a)(4). 

Almanza contends that the agents’ off-hours completion of 

this paperwork benefits the CBP in two ways. First, Almanza asserts that the green sheets and white sheets “advance[] the Government’s efforts to train canines and 

canine handlers during the instructor course.” Appellant 

Br. 33. Second, Almanza argues that the “white sheets” are

“essential to the Government’s interdiction efforts” because 

they provide documentary support in criminal proceedings 

for the government to show training history for the canines 

and also the “the fruits of the canine detection program.” 

Id. at 35; see also id. at 13.

We agree with the Claims Court that the record evidence, even when drawing all justifiable inferences in Almanza’s favor, shows that the agents’ off-hours completion 

of green sheets and white sheets was a form of homework 

and practice for the agents, rather than “primarily for the 

benefit” of CBP. See Tenn. Coal, 321 U.S. at 598. The evidence shows that the agents practiced completing green 

sheets and white sheets during off-hours “to learn how to 

do it and learn how to do it correctly.” J.A. 311 (Kraus Dep.

Tr.). The agents were graded on how well they completed 

this practice paperwork. J.A. 1164 (Shaw Dep. Tr.) (confirming “student instructors [are] graded on how well they 

fill out the white sheets”); J.A. 218 (Cuevas Dep. Tr.) (DCIC 

instructors would “review those [green] sheets and look at 

how [student instructors were] documenting, see if I’m 

evaluating properly . . . how I speak to them, my knowledge 

that I’m giving.”). 

Almanza conceded in briefing to the Claims Court that

off-hours completion of this paperwork “itself was a form of 

study and homework because correctly filling out such paperwork was learning to be a Canine Instructor.” J.A. 3199 

n.54. And while Almanza contends that the CBP generally 

uses green sheets and white sheets for certain purposes, 

Almanza has not identified any evidence that shows the 

specific green sheets and white sheets completed by DCIC-
ALMANZA v. UNITED STATES 13

enrolled agents during off-hours were used for those purposes. Instead, the evidence shows that paperwork completed by DCIC-enrolled agents during off-hours was for 

practice and grading purposes, not primarily for the benefit 

of CBP. See J.A. 517 (Smith Dep. Tr.) (“Q. If you had given 

repeatedly low scores to a handler, is it possible that handler would have failed the course? A. I don’t think we had 

that power, because we were being graded on our grading 

of students. So no, it would take a certified instructor observing the same thing that I’m observing to make that decision.”); J.A. 310 (Kraus Dep. Tr.) (“The green sheets are 

part of our recordkeeping score as a student instructor. . . . And if you did a poor job on your green sheets, it 

got reflected on your score as an instructor.”). 

Almanza also cites the testimony of Laren Shaw, CBP’s 

Assistant Director for Headquarters Canine Program, who 

indicated that CBP has used white sheets (canine evaluations) in court proceedings. Appellant Br. 13 (citing 

J.A. 1164). But the record does not support Almanza’s assertion that the specific white sheets completed by DCICenrolled agents during off-hours were used in court proceedings. To the contrary, Ms. Shaw testified that each canine had “two canine training records, two white sheets, 

two versions,” and that only “[o]ne is for the student instructors,” which was graded on “how well they fill out the 

white sheets.” J.A. 1163–64. The white sheets that Ms. 

Shaw testified were used in court proceedings, on the other 

hand, were “closed out at the end of every day”; they were

not completed during off-hours. J.A. 1165. We find no record evidence that the government has ever used in a criminal proceeding a white sheet completed by a DCICenrolled agent during off-hours.

On this record, we agree with the Claims Court that 

any “work” performed by the student instructor agents was 

“performed during regular duty hours for which [the 

agents] were compensated.” J.A. 9. We affirm the Claims 

Court’s decision on summary judgment that off-hours time 
14 ALMANZA v. UNITED STATES

spent completing green sheets and white sheets was not

“hours of work” under § 551.423(a)(4).

CONCLUSION

We have considered Almanza’s other arguments and 

find them unpersuasive. We conclude that Almanza 

waived his challenge to the validity of 5 C.F.R. 

§ 551.423(a)(2) and that the Claims Court correctly 

granted summary judgment in favor of the government after concluding that Almanza’s time spent on after-hours activities was not “hours of work” compensable under 

§ 551.423(a)(2) or (a)(4). We affirm.

AFFIRMED

COSTS

No costs.