1

Filed 4/24/15 I n re L .C. CA1/1

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT

DI VISION ONE

In re L.C., et al., Person s Coming Under the Juvenile Court Law.

CONTRA COSTA COUNTY BUREAU OF CHILDREN AND FAMILY SERVICES, Plaintiff and Respondent,

v. D.C. , et al., Defendants and Appellants. A142376
(Contra Costa County Super. Ct. No s . J12

- 00992, J12

- 00993, J13

- 01010)

L.J. (mother) and D .C. (father) appeal from juvenile court orders terminating their parental rights to their daughter, four

- year

- old L

. D. C. (sister) , and their sons, three

- year

old D.C. , Jr. (older brother) and one

- year

- old L.C. (younger brother). Mother argues that the order terminating her parental rights to sister was improper because she was entitled
to the beneficial

- rela tionship exception to termination

. Father argues that all three orders terminating his parental rights must be reversed because (1) the requirements of the Indian Child Welfare Act (ICWA) and related st ate laws were not satisfied; (2 ) the proceedings failed to adhere to the “statutory framework” of Welfare and Institutions2

Code 1 section 300 et sequitur
, and he was given improper notice of the selection

- and

implementation hearing under section 366.26 (section 366.26 hearing) ; and ( 3 ) the court had a sua sponte duty to appo int a guardian ad litem for him . He also claims his trial
counsel rendered ineffective assistance of counsel. 2 We reject all these claims and
affirm.
I. F ACTUAL AND P ROCEDURAL B ACKGROUND In May 2012, the Contra Costa County Children & Family Services Bu reau (Bureau) received a report that mother, who was living in a domestic violence shelter
with the two o lder children, had left sister, who was then almost two years old, unattended “in a bathtub full of water for [10 to 15 minutes] while she answered a p hone call out of the room.” In mid

- June, after mother failed to attend a meeting with the social
work er , the social worker went to the motel where mother was staying and spoke to two women who said they were friends with mother . The friends reported that mother had
retrieved sister and older brother from father and had then left them at the motel the previous night in the care of one of the frien ds . At approximately 1 a.m., while mother was still gone, father came to the room and “was banging on the door , shouting and ‘acting a fool.’ He appeared to be high on methamphetamine. He was yelling, screaming[,] and t hreatening to blow up the motel

. . . [a nd] seemed so out of control[,]

. . . like ‘a devil.’ ” Fath er picked up ten

- month

- old older brother and “was swinging [him] from [his] legs in a swooping/swinging motion.” The friends were unable to prevent father from taking the children, and the police stated they could not help because father’s address and phone number were unknown

.

1 All further statutory references are to the Welfare and Institutions Code unless otherwise noted.

2 Father raised similar issues in two other appeals we recently decided, one involving a paternal half sister ( In re D.C. (Jan. 2 9, 2015, A141365) [nonpub. opn.]) (half sister) and one involving a paternal half brother ( In re D.C. (Mar. 27, 2015, A141989) [nonpub. opn.]) (half brother). Much of our discussion of father’s claims is drawn from the opinions in those cases.3

Two days later, while the two children were still missing , the Bureau filed juvenile dependency pe titions for them , alleging jurisdiction under section 300,
subdi v ision (b) (failure to protect)

— based on the bathtub incident, the motel incident, father’s su bstance abuse , and both parents’ homelessness and inability to provide for the
children

— and under subdivision (g) (no provision for support) because the parents’ and
children’s whereabouts were unknown. The children were soon located and placed in
foster care, and the juvenile court ordered them detained.
At a n August 2012 jurisd ictional hearing
, mother admitted to an amended allegation that she “ha [d] been unable to provide the children with adequate care, supervision, and protection [,]

. . . plac[ing] t he chi ld ren at risk of harm.” Jurisdic tion as

t o father , who had not yet been appointed counsel, remained pending

. The juvenile court
found sister and older brother to be children described by section 300, subdivision (b)

. A t an October 2012 hearing, fa ther was declared the presumed father of bot h
children. He had not request ed visitation, however, and was soon arrested for violating parole and jailed. Meanwhile, m other, who had temporarily moved to San Joaquin County , visited the children consistently. In December 2012, t he Bureau filed subsequent petitions under secti on 342 for
sister and older brother alleging ju risdiction as to father under section 300,
subdivision (b) (failure to protect) based on the motel incident and f ather’s subst ance abuse and under subdivision (j) ( abuse of sibling) based on half sister’s dependency case
, which involved father’s domestic violence against that child’s mother. The next month
, the juvenile court dismissed the original petitions’ remaining allegatio ns against father and found the allegations in the subsequent petitions true. It also ordered reunification services for both p arents, continued visitation for mother, 3 and ordered visitation for
father , to begin once he request ed it

.

3 The juven ile court had previously entered dispositional orders as to mother only, but it vacated those orders after recognizing that only one dispositional order per child should be entered.4

Mother made progres s on her case plan by, among other things, completing a parenting education program, participating in a domestic violence program, and beginning individual therapy. She al so continued to visit with sister and older brother. Father, wh o was released from prison in early June 2013, did not stay in touch with the
Bureau and did not show any progress on his case plan or request visits with the children. An August 2013 status

- review report recommended that mother’s services be continued
and father’s services be terminated. At a hearing later that month , the juvenile court ordered mother’s services continued. After a contested hearing in September at which father testified, the court terminated his services, although it permitted him to have monthly supervise d visits.
I n June, mother had given birth to younger brother, who was “medi cally fragile” and required regular medication for seizures. The social worker in the older children’s

case s repeatedly told mother not to leave the baby with father

. When younger brother
was two months old
, however, father brought hi m to a court hearing in half brother’s case, and younger brother was detained and p laced with his two siblings. At the end of August 2013, t he Bureau filed a juvenile dependency petition for

yo unger brother alleging jurisdiction under section 300, subdivision (b) (failure to protect) based on father’s domestic violence and drug use, father’s failure to engage in
reunification services in half sister’s case, and mother’s placement of younger brot her in father’s care despite being told unsupervised visits should not occur. Jurisdiction was also alleged u nder section 300, subdivision (j ) (abuse of sibling) based on father’s failure to engage in reunification services in half sister’s case

. At a No vember 2013 hearing,

m other pleaded no contest to the a llegation that she “placed [younger brother ] at serious risk by leaving the child in the care of the father, in that the child’s father has an ongoing
substance abuse issue.” No jurisdictional finding s were ever m ade as to father, who
remained an alleged father throughout younger brother’s case. The next month, the juvenile court ordered that no visitation between father and younger brother occur based on a finding of detriment.5

A December 2013 status

- review report filed in the two older children ’s cases recounted the circumstances surrounding younger brother ’s detention, highlighting mother’s “susceptibility” to father and willingness to put younger brother at risk by leaving him in father’s care. Mother was visiting only once a month with the two older
children and had failed to continue individual therapy. The report observed that a lthough mother “ha[d] completed the majority of her case plan goals, it seem [ed] that she ha[d]

o nly gone throu gh the motions

. . . [and] clearly ha[d] no understanding of why [the Bureau] became involved with her family.” The report recommended terminat ing
mother’s reunification services and setting a section 366.26 hearing for the two older
childre n

. Mother opposed the termination of her services, and she and the social worker testified at a January 2014 hear ing on the issue. According to the social worker, mother
left younger brother with father many times, despite the social worker’s repeatedly cautioning her not to do so. Mother, on the other hand, testified that she had left the baby in father’s care only once and had done so only because of circumstances outside her
control. At the conclusion of the hearing, the juvenile court found that the social worker
was credible and mother was not . It also characterized father as “a viole nt, vicious, out

of

- control man

. . . [who] should not have contact with the children.” As to the two older
children , the court found that reasonable services had bee n provided to mother, terminated her services, and set a section 366.26 hearing. Mother was permitted to have supervised visits with the m once a month. The next month, the court adopted the Bureau’s recommendation that no services be provided to the parents in younger
brother ’s case and set a section 366.26 hearing for younger brother as well. In May 2014 , mother filed section 388 petition s seeking extension of her
reunification services for the two older children

. At a hearing on the petitions
, mot her
testified that she was receiving individual therapy again, that she had been consistently visiting the children
, and that she had not known about father’s domestic violence or ongoing substance abuse when she left younger brother with him and that lyin g to the
social worker about the number of times he took the child had been a mistake. In6

contrast, t he social worker testified that she had discussed father’s domestic violence and drug problem s with mother and had repeatedly told her to keep younger bro ther away from father. The juvenile court denied the petition, fi nding that mother continued to be

not credible and that there had not “been a significant c hange of circumstances.” It suspended her visitation and continued the section 366.26 hearing to t he next month so that father, who had recently been in carcerated again, could attend. A section 366.26 hearing for all three children was held at the end of Jun e 2014. Father did not appear despite having been ordered to do so at a hearing held four days
before
, and the juvenile court denied his request for a continuance based on his claim that he did not have enough money to take public transportation to court

. His trial counsel objected to the termination of his parental rights but did not submit any e vidence. Mother appeared and argued that her parental rights to all three children should not be terminated based on the strength of her bond with them as demonstrated in the Bureau’s reports

. The court terminated mother’s and father’s parental rights after f inding that the c hildren were adoptable and their relationship with mother did not preclude termination

. II. D ISCUSSION
A. The Juvenile Court Correctly Determined that Mother Failed to Establish the Beneficial

- Relationship Exception to Termination of Parental Rights. Mother argues the juvenile court erred by terminating her parental rights to sister, relying on the statutory exception that applies when there is “a compelling reason for determining th at termination would be detrimental to the child” because “[t]he parents have maintained regular visitation and contact with the child and the child would benefit
f rom continuing the relationship ” ( the beneficial

- relationship exception). (§ 366.26,
subd. (c)(1)(B)(i).) We disagree. Between June 2012, when sister was removed, and August 2013, mother was permitted to have twice

- monthly, supervised visits with sister. Throughout this period,
mother visited about a dozen times . She cancelled one visit because she had a doctor’s appointment, two visit s because she had court the same day, three more because of7

younger brother ’s birth and medical needs, and another one because she failed to confirm
it in advance. At the August 2013 hearing, the juvenile c ourt gave the Bureau authority to allow mother to have unsupervised, overnight visitation for up to 30 days. The Bureau never exercised that authority , however, because of the event s surrounding younger brother ’s
removal

. From September through December 2013, mother appeared for only two visit s , and several others were cancelled due to her responsibilities fo r younger brother, her own illness, and her failure to show up or confirm in advance. At the December 2013 hearing,

t he court ordered supervised vis its reduced to once a month . Mother visited with the children a few more times but missed the April 2014 visit because she failed to confirm
it. The court suspended her visi tation in May 2014. During all the visits she attended , mother was affectionate, played with sister, and otherwise behaved appropriately. She helped sister interact with older brother, helped
sister use the restroom, and brought food and gifts. At the end of some visits, sister expressed reluctance to leave. For example, at the Dec ember 2013 visit, she “told

. . . mother on two occasions [ , ] ‘I want to go home wi th you now. ’ ” At the January 2014 visit, sister told mother
, “ ‘I love you mommy,’ ” and at the March 2014 visit, sister “asked

. . . mother if she could go to her house.” Summarizing the visitation history in the section 366.26 report, the social worker concluded that sister “ does have a relationship with

. . . mother, but the relationship does not outweigh the benefits of l egal

perm anency for the child.” At the section 366.26 hearing, mother argued that the benefit to all three children from an ongoing relationship with her outweighed t he benefit of legal permanence
, emphasizing that visitation went well and that she had a “close bo nd” with them
, particularly sister. After hearing argument from the other parties, the juvenile court ruled
that mother had not established the be n eficial

- relationship exception. The court explained its reasoning at length: “I do not find the relationsh ip with [sister ] to be that strong.

. . . [O]ne of the things that struck me

. . . [is that] the visit for April [2014] did not8

occur

. . . because mother did not call to confirm the visit. She had visited them approximately once per month since July 201 2. Even when she was offered more frequent visits, she didn’t take advantage of it. And on several occasions,

. . . mother missed visits and did not see the children for over one month.

. . . . .
Half of [sister ’s] life, she’s been in this home with these caretakers, so I don’t know what you are all talking about, a bond.

I think

. . . her mother is a very nice lady, probably, and [ sister ] enjoys visiting with her, and I’ll bet she’s lovely with her, but that doesn’t give a parental bond. That do esn’t do the day

- to

- day caring.
The real issue here is mother is not credible, has very poor judgment, and I don’t feel the children are safe in her care. That is the real big issue. I think that there [are] always

. . . some incidental benefits from a visit, but they certainly do not outweigh the ben efits of [the current] home, where [sister ] has been for h alf of her life, and where [younger brother ] has been for all of his life and [older brother ] for a lmost all of his life. I don’t

. . . even under stand what you are all talking about, on how strong that is, because I simply do not see it.
There is always an interaction between a natural parent and child. It will incur some incidental benefit, but the significant attachment is certainly the attachment that the children have with the caretakers.
And, also, I don’t find that the relationship of visitation is so very important to the children. I think it’s nice. I think it’s been a nice little visit, but I don’t think

. . . in any way

. . . that the children’s need for permanency should be outweighed by th is occasional visitation.

. . . . I think it’s sad. It’s alway s heartbreaking because I think

. . . mother is not a bad person. Sometimes we have bad people, and it’s not sad. This mother is not a bad person and, frankly, she’s had a heck of a growing up herself, and I think that’s even more heartbreaking, knowing how d ifficult her own growing up was

. . . . But then I have to look to the safety of her children and their best inte rests, and their best interests are [staying] in [their current] home with9

the stability and love and nurturing and safety tha t they have, so I am going to follow the [Bureau’s] recommendations. ” Once a juvenile co urt has determined a child is adoptable b y clear and convincing evidence, it “ must terminate parental rig hts and free the child for adoption” unless a statutory exception, such as the beneficial

- relationship exception, applies. ( In re Jason J. (2009) 175 Cal.App.4th 922, 936; § 366.26, subd. (c) (1).) A parent seeking to show the
beneficial

- relationship exception applies has the burden to establish two prongs: “regular
visitation” and “ benefit to the minor[]

. . . that outweigh[s] the benefits of adoption.” ( In
re I.R. ( 2014 ) 226 Cal.App.4th 20 1, 212; Jason J. , at p. 936.)
Courts of A ppeal have reviewed determinations about the applicability of the
beneficial

- relationship exception for substantial evidence, abuse of discretion, or a combination of both. ( In re G.B. (2014) 227 Cal.App.4th 1147, 1166, fn. 7 [discussing cases].) Here, the parties do not ask us to decide whi ch standard of review applies , and we conclude the juvenile court’s determination was proper under either . (See In re
Jasmine D. (2000) 78 Cal.App.4th 1339, 1351 [“practical d ifferences between”
substantial

- evidence standard and abuse

- of

- discretion standard “are not significant”].) The visitation prong requires a s howing that the parent “visit[ed] consistently and to the extent permitted by court orders.” ( In re I.R. , supra , 226 Cal.App.4th at p. 212.) The juvenile court explicitly found that mother had failed to visit the children as often as she could have, and she does not c hallenge this finding. Indeed, although mother was permitted twice

- monthly visitation from June 2 012 to December 2013, she averaged only one visit per month

. And although some of the visits she missed were exc usable based on her own and younger brother ’s m edical issues, mother missed several visits without providing a valid excuse. Finally, in Augus t 2013 mother was given the opportunity to begin unsupervised and overnight visits, but she failed to take advantage of it because she made the poor decision to leave younger brother in father’s care . In sum, the court correctly found that mother failed t o visit with the children as often as permitted , and that finding alone is fatal to her claim. ( I bid. )10

The juvenile court’s finding that mother’s bond with sister was not sufficiently strong was also proper. “The ‘benefit’ prong of the [beneficial

- relat ionship] exception requires the parent to prove his or her relationship with the child ‘promotes the well

being of the child to such a degree as to outweigh the well

- being the child would gain in a permanent ho me with new, adoptive parents.’ ” ( In re K.P. (2012) 203 Cal.App.4th 614, 621, quoting In re Autumn H. (1994) 27 Cal.App.4th 567, 575.) “The factors to be considered when looking for whether a relationship is important and beneficial are: (1) the age of the child, (2) the portion of the child ’ s life spe nt in the parent’s custody, (3) the positive or negative effect of interaction between th e parent and the child, and (4) the child’s particular needs.” ( In re Angel B. (2002) 9 7 Cal.App.4th 454, 467, fn. omitted.)

“ ‘ “ Interaction between [a] natural parent and child will always confer some
in cidental benefit to the child, ’ ’ ” and “[i]t is not enough to show that the parent and child have a friendly and loving relationship.” ( In re J.C. (2014) 226 Cal.App.4th 503, 529.) Instead, a parent must estab lish that he or she “ ‘occup[ies] “a parental role” in the child’s life,’ ” a “ ‘ relationship [that] characteristically aris[es] from day

- to

- day interaction, companionship[,] and shared experiences. ’ ” ( In re K.P. , supra , 203 Cal.App.4th at p. 621 .) “ ‘[ B]ecause a section 366.26 hearing occurs only after the [juvenile] court has repeatedly found the parent unable to meet the child’s needs, it is only in an extraordinary case that preservation of the parent’s rights will prevail over the Legislature’s pref

erence for adoptive placement.’ ” ( Ibid. ) Initially, mother argues the statutory language has been incorrectly interpreted to “requir[e] the benefit of the parental relationship to outweigh the benefits of adoption.” (Underlining in original.) She stat es that “benefit” means “ ‘anything contributing t o an improvement or advantage,’ ” apparently arguing that the exception exists as long as a
child derives some benefit from a relationship with the parent. Her p osition ignores the full provision, however, which requires termination of parental rights unless it would be “detrimental” to the child. (§ 366.26, subd. (c)(1)(B).) Termination is detrimental only if
the benefit to the child from maintaining the relationship with the parent is greater than11

the b enefit from being adopted. 4 We therefore reject mother’s interpretation of the statut e and decline to depart from well

- settled precedent on the issue. In her briefing, mother recounts the details of the many positive visits she had with
sister. She argu es that they demonstrate she “occup ied a parental role with [sister ]”
because she did thi ngs a mere “ ‘friendly visitor’ ” would not ( In re Autumn H. , supra , 27 Cal.App.4th at p. 573), including helping sister use the toilet and correcti ng her
misbehavior. But taking a parental role at visits is not enough. In t he primary decision mother relies on, In re S.B. ( 2008 ) 164 Cal.App.4th 289, the Court of Appeal reversed an order terminating parental rights where the record showed the father “continued [a] sign ificant parent

- child relationship” with his daughter , w hom he consistently visited two
to three times a week , “ despite the lack of day

- to

- day contact with [her] after she was removed from his care.” ( Id. at pp. 293

- 295, 299 , italics omitted .) Here, in contr ast, mother visited sister only approximately once a month throughout the case and did not take advantage of the opportuni ty to have more frequent visits or to progress to unsupervised visits. We agree with the juvenile court that occasion al, pleasant visits do

not establish the requisite parent

- child bond

. Mother also argues that “[t]he mother

- child relation ship

. . ., coupled with [sister ] ’s repeated desire to live with

. . . mother, present[ed] a compelling reason for finding that termi nation of

. . . mother’s parental rights [would be] detrimental

. ” But the case she cites, In re Scott B. (2010) 188 Cal.App.4th 452, involved a much older, emotionally unstable child who “had spent nearly all of his life living with [ his m]other,”
had “co nsistent weekly visits with her,” and had “repeated[ly] insiste[d] that his preference would be to live with [his m]other.” ( Id. at p. 471.) Here, while sister expressed a desire to stay with mother on a few occasions and sometimes had difficulty ending visits , she adjusted well to her foster placement , which she had been in for two

4 Mother also suggests that comparing the benefit of the relationship wit h a parent to the benefit of adoption “is not possible because the actual benefit[] of adoption

. . . is, in the end, unknowable,” given that adoption may be traumatic in some ways. We do not believe juvenile courts must be prescient to assess the impact adoption is likely to have on a child.12

years when parental ri ghts were terminated, and never expressed a lev el of wanting to return to mother even approaching that displayed in Scott B. In any event, as we discuss ed above, whatever benefit sister derived from her relationship with mother ultimately had to be balanced against the benefit sister would derive from adoption

. Even if we accept mother’s position that sister had a “significant, positive relationship” with mother
, the r ecord does not demonstrate that the relationship

was s trong enough to prevent termination of mother’s parent al rights, particularly given sister’s young age and her bond with her prospective adoptive family. The j uvenile court did not err by concluding the beneficial

- relationship exception was inapplicable.

B

. The Juvenile Court’s Failure to Determine Whether ICWA Applies Was Harmless Because Father Did Not Pro vide Information in These Children’s Cases Indicating He Might Have Indian Heritage

. Father argues the orders terminating his parental rights to all three children must be conditionally reversed because the juvenile court and the Bureau failed to comply with
ICWA

- related requirements. We conclude the court erred by not making an express or implied finding whether ICWA applie s but that the error was harmless. None of the information provided in these three children’s cases suggested that they might be Indian children

. On August 10, 2012, f ather completed an d filed in the two
older children ’s cases an ICWA

- 020 form, “Parental Notification of Indian Status,” in
which he checked the box indicating he is not aware of having any Indian ancestry. A t a hearing on the same date, father responded “No” when the juven ile court asked him whether he had any Indian ancestry. Finally, the petition for younger brother filed in August 2013 included an ICWA

- 010(A) form, “Indian Child Inquiry Attachment,” stating that an ICWA inquiry had been made and that “[t]he child has no known Indian ancestry.” 5 No additional ICWA

- related information about father was provided in any of

5 The October 2012 disposition report for the two older children states that the previous month, mother had “stated to th[e] social worker that she does not have Indian Ancestry.” Father does not rely on any potentia l Indian heritage of mother’s in making his claim.13

the Bureau’s reports, and the court never made any ICWA

- related finding s or orders or mentioned ICWA issues again in any of the three cases

. In December 2012, however, the Bureau filed a request for judicial notice of “[a]ll
orders and findi ngs” in half sister’s case. At a hearing later that month, the juvenile court took judicial notice of “the half sibling file,” which it indicated it had before it. As discussed in our previous opinion invol ving half sister, father provided conflicting information about Indian heritage in that case. Although father apparently told the social
worker on at least one occasion that half sister did not have Indian heritage, on August 29, 2012 , he completed and file d an ICWA

- 020 form in which he checked the following three boxes: (1) “I am or may be a member of, or eligible for membership in, a federally recognized Indian tribe”; (2) “I may have Indian ancestry”; and (3) “Th e child is or may be a member of, or eligible for membership in, a federally recognized Indian tribe.” In addition, the November 2012 disposition report in that case stated that father said he “believe[d] that he has American Indian Ancestry on his father ’s side,” although father also reported that “[h]e never knew his father and only met him once.” The purpose of ICWA is “to protect the best interests of Indian children and to promote the stability and security of Indian tribes.” (25 U.S.C. § 1902.) “I CWA presumes it is in the best interests of the child to retain tribal ties and cultural heritage and in the interest of the tribe to preserve its future generations, a most important resource.” ( In re Desiree F. (2000) 83 Cal.App.4th 460, 469.) To furth er these goals, tribes are entitled to take exclusive jurisdiction over or intervene in state dependency proceedings involving Indian children. (25 U.S.C. § 1911(a) & (c).) “Because [a] tribe’s right to assert jurisdiction over

. . . or to intervene in s uch proceedings would be meaningless if the tribe has no notice that the action is pending,” ICWA requires notice “where the [juvenile] court knows or has reason to know that an Indian child is involved.” (25 U.S.C. § 1912(a); In re B.R. (2009) 176 Cal.Ap p.4th 773, 780; see § 224.2; Cal. Rules of Court, rule 5.481(b). 6 )

6 All further rule references are to the California Rules of Court.14

State law also imposes on both the juvenile court and the county welfare agency “an affirmative duty to inquire whether a dependent child is or may be an Indian child.” ( In re Nikki R. (2 003) 106 Cal.App.4th 844, 848; § 224.3, subd. (a); rule 5.481(a).) If the agency or the court “knows or has reason to know that an Indian child is involved, the
social worker

. . . is required to make further inquiry regarding the possible Indian status

o f the child” to facilitate the provision of notice. (§ 224.3, subd. (c); see also In re
Alice M. (2008) 161 Cal.App.4th 1189, 1200.) An “Indian child” is any unmarried minor who “is either (a) a member of an Indian tribe or (b) is eligible for membership in an Indian tribe and is the biological child of a member of an Indian tribe.” (25 U.S.C. § 1903(4).) Among the circumstances that “may provide reason to know that the child is an Indian child” is when a relative “provi des information suggesting the ch ild is a member of a tribe or eligible for membership in a tribe or one or more of the child’s biological parents, grandparents, or great

- grandparents are or were a member of a tribe.” (§ 224.3, subd. (b)(1); see also rule 5.481(a)(5).)
As in both half s ister’s and half brother’s case s , the juvenile court failed to determine in the first instance whether ICWA applies to any of these three children’s

cases . Although a juvenile court is not “required to make an express finding that ICWA [does] not apply[,]

. . . the record must reflect that the court considered the issue” and has
at least implicitly so found. ( In re Asia L. (2003) 107 Cal.App.4th 498, 506, italics added;
In re Antoinette S. (2002) 104 Cal.App. 4th 1401, 1413.) The court here made no express finding about ICWA’s applicability, and once again we are unable to conclude th at it made an implied finding. The only distinction between this case and the ha lf siblings’ cases regarding the consideration of ICWA ’s applicability is t hat here the court specifically a sked father whether he had Indian heritage. We disagree with the Bureau’s suggestion that this exchange establishes that an impl ied finding was made. Even assuming it might otherwise have sufficed, t he i nformation indicating mother had no Indian heritage, on which any determination that ICWA was inapplicable would have depended, was not pr ovided until later.15

Having concluded that the juvenile court’s failure to make an express or implied ICWA finding con stituted error, we turn to consider whether the error was harmless. In younger brother’s case, it clearly was. Father remained an alleged father throughout the proceedings, and “an alleged father’s claims of Indian heritage” do not trigger ICWA

related n otice or inquiry requirements because “absent a biological connection, [a] child cannot claim Indian heritage through [such a] father.” ( In re E.G. (2009)
170 Cal.App.4th 1530, 1533.) Indeed, father concedes that his ICWA claim fails as to younger brothe r if we reject his claim that the juvenile court erred in relation to his paternity status , which we do in part II.C

. of th is opinion.
We also conclude that the juvenile court’s failure to make an express or implied ICWA finding was harmless in the two ol der children’s cases , although we acknowledge
that it is a closer c all. R eversal is not required when a juvenile court fails to comply with ICWA and related state laws but a parent does not represent that he or she has Indian heritage

. (See, e.g., In re N.E. (2008) 160 Cal.App.4th 766, 769

- 770; In re Rebecca R. (2006) 143 Cal.App.4th 1426, 1430

- 1431.) Here, father said he did not have Indian heritage both in writing, on the ICWA

- 020 form filed in the two older children’s cases
, and orally
, in respo nse to the court’s question s . As a result, whether the error was harmless depends on the effect of the record from half sister’s case , which was judicially noticed in the older children’s cases . In half sister’s case, the ICWA

- 020 form and a November 201 2 report provided information that raised the possibility that father’s

c hildren might be Indian children

. (See In re Gabriel G. (2012) 206 Cal.App.4th 1160,
1167

- 1168 [court and agency have duty to inquire further when parent provides conflicting informa tion about Indian heritage].) Initially, t he Bureau argues that the ICWA

- 020 form and t he November 2012 report in half sister’s case were not encompassed in the juvenile court’s judicial

- notice ruling because the Bureau’ s written request for judicial noti ce asked the juvenile court to take judicial notice of th e “orders and findings” in half sister’s case

. But at t he hearing,
the Bureau clarified it was “requesting judicial notice of

. . . [¶]

. . . [t]he half sibling file,” and the court specifically granted that request. And, contrary to the Bureau’s position,16

the court could properly take judicial notice of the documents filed in half sister’s case. (Evid. Code, § 452, subd. (d) [“[r]ecords of

. . . any court of this state” proper subjects of judic ial notice]; see, e.g., In re Z.N. (2009) 181 Cal.App.4th 282, 298

- 299 [taking judicial
notice of trib al ICWA notices filed in half siblings’ cases].) As a result, we conclude the two documents are part of the record in the two older children’s cases

. 7

B ut that conclusion does not end our analysis. We agree with the Bureau that
neither it nor the juvenile court was required to “page through” the entire judicially
noticed record of half sister’s case for additional ICWA

- related information
, especially
sin ce the request for judicial notice had nothing to do with ICWA issues and father never
hinted that any different I CWA information existed in half sister’s file

. Courts and county welfare agencies do not have a duty to act upon information about Indian her itage

t hat a parent never provides to them. (See , e.g., In re X.V. (2005) 132 Cal.App.4th 794, 805 [rejecting claim that order terminating parental rights should be reversed based on information about Indian heritage that mother never shared with agency]. ) In these children’s cases, father disclosed no information suggesting he had Indian heritage even though he was given an ICWA

- 020 form to fill out and was specifically asked about his heritage by the court. He argues the ICWA

- 020 form he filed in half sister’s case should have sufficed, complaining that “[n]o one admonished [him] that any forms filed in court one day for one child

. . . would not be considered for his other children.” But the form
he filed in these two children’s cases tells pa rents, i n bold face at the top , that “[i]f you get new information that would change your answers, you must let your attorney, all the attorneys on the case, and the social worker

. . . know immediately and an updated form must be filed with the court.” Even if f ather believed he was complying with his duty to file an updated form in the se cases by filing an ICWA

- 020 form in half sister’s case, there is no evidence that he ever notified any of the relevant parties of the new

7 The Bureau also argues that we cannot consider the two documents because they are not “part of the record in this appeal,” apparently r eferring to the fact they were not included in the clerk’s transcript for this case. They were included in the clerk’s transcript from half sister’s case, however, and we discussed them in our previous opinion. The Bureau cites no authority to suggest we cannot consider them in this case as well.17

information. As a result, he cannot no w rely on information from half sister’s case to
make his claim. We recognize and agree with the principle that appellate courts should be reluctant to determine that “parental inaction” results in the forfeiture of ICWA

- related claims, given that ICWA “p rotect[s] the interests of Indian children and tribes.” 8 ( Dwayne P. v. Superior Court (2002) 103 Cal.App.4th 247, 251, 259

- 261; see, e.g., In re B.R. , supra , 176 Cal.App.4th at p. 779; In re Marinna J. (2001) 90 Cal.App.4th 731, 736

- 739.) But
th is princi ple has limits : a parent cannot provide specific information in one case denying Indian heritage and expect the juvenile court and county welfare agency to ferret out possible contrary information in other files in other cases, even those that are judicia lly noticed, when there has been no suggestion that any such contrary information
exists. If father truly discovered new information about his heritage in the 19 days
between the day he g ave his negative responses in th ese case s and the day he filed the
ICWA

- 020 form in half sister’s case , he was required to raise the issue. Because he
fa iled to do so, we conclude the information about his potential heritage provided in half sister’s case did not give the cour t or Bureau reason to know the two older children might be Indian children. As a result, the absence of an ICWA finding in their case s was also
harmless.
C

. Father Forfeited His “Statutory Framework” Claims and His Claim of Deficient Notice b y Failing to File a Petition for Extraordinary Writ Review of the January 2014 or February 2014 Order s

. Father argues the juvenile court “committed reversible error when it failed throughout the dependency matter to adhere to the statutory fr amew ork provided in section 300[] et seq.” (Capitalization omitted.) As to the two older children , he claims the court erred by failing to timely order reunification services and to ensure a case plan was provided to him and by finding that reasonable services were provided. As to younger brother
, he claims the court erred by failing to conduct a paternity inquiry or

8 A case related to this issue is currently pending before our state Supreme Court. ( In re Isaiah W. , S221263.)18

provide him with information about raising his paternity status and by bypassing
reunification services. Finally, as to all three children, he argue s the court erred by failing to consid er their potential placement with relatives

. He also claim s he was denied due process because the Bureau failed to give him notice of the section 366.26 hearing (notice claim)

. Father concedes that the claims would be considered forfeited if he lacked j ustification for failing to file petitions for extraordinary writ review of the January 2014 or February 2014 order s setting a section 366.26 hearing

. But h e argues that his failure to file these petitions was justified because the juvenile court failed t o properly notify him
of the writ requirement and his trial counsel provided ineffective assistance by not filing the petitions on his behalf

. We reject father’s “statutory framework” and notice claims
because we conclude that father receive d proper notic e of the writ requirement in all three

cases and cannot establish that his failure to file the writ petitions was due to ineffective
assistance of counsel. 9 An order setting a section 366.26 hearing and “any [other] order, regardless of its nature, made a t the hearing at which a setting order is entered” must be challenged by filing a petition for extraordinary writ review. ( In re Anthony B. (1999) 72 Cal.App.4th 1017, 1021, 1023

- 1024; § 366.26, subd. ( l ); see rules 8.450, 8.452.) Generally, a party

cann ot challenge such orders in an appeal unless the party timely filed a petition for writ review and “[t]he petition

. . . was summarily denied or otherwise not decided on the merits.” (§ 366.26, subd. ( l )(1)(A), (C), ( l )(2).) The failure to file a writ pe tition may be excused for “good cause,” however, such as where the juvenile court fails to inform the party of the need to file such a petition to challenge the order setting the section 366.26 hearing. ( In re Cathina W. (1998)
68 Cal.App.4th 716, 722

- 723 .) After entering such an order, the court is required to

9 Father also argues his trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance by failing to raise objections related to several of these claims. We need not consider this issue because we determine the claims are foreclosed by father’s failure to file a writ peti tion, not by his failure to object below.19

“advise all parties of the requirement of filing a petition for extraordinary writ review

. . . in order to preserve any right to appeal in these issues.” (§ 366.26, subd. ( l )(3)(A).) If a party is not in court when the order is made, notice must be made “by first

- class mail by the clerk of the court to the last known address” of that party. (§ 366.26, subd. ( l )(3)(A); see also rule 5.590(b).) In August 2012, father filed a JV

- 140 form, “Notific ation of Mailing A ddress,” in
the two older children ’s cases that identified a permanent ma iling address in Pinole. In September 2013, fa ther filed a JV

- 140 form in younger brother ’s case identifying a permanent mailin g address in San Francisco with a zip code of 94103. The next month,
he filed another JV

- 140 form in younger brother ’s case that identified the same San
Francisco address except with a zip code of 94102. After the juvenile court set a section 366.26 hearing in the two older children’s cases , notice s of the writ requirement w ere mailed to father at the Pinole address. And after the court set a section 366.26 hearing in younger brother ’s case, notice of the writ requirement was mailed to father at the San
Francisco ad dress with a zip code of 94103. Father argues the juvenile court failed to provide proper notice in any of the three
cases because the notices should have been sent to the address on the JV

- 140 form filed
in younger brother’s case in October 2013 , that is, the San Francisco addre ss with a zip
code of 94102. Father never claims , however, that he actually failed to receive any of the notices, and there is no evidence that they were returned to sender. Indeed, in his reply brief, father states that he “does not have a declaration t o submit addressing whether [he] received the notice[s].” Nor does he claim he was unaware of the writ requirement, and he did not attempt to appeal from the January 2014 or February 2014 order s

. As we e xplained in more detail in half sister’s case, under In re T.W. (2011)
197 Cal.App.4th 723, 730, such facts permit the inference that father r eceived the notices.
As to the notice about younger brother , father attempts to distinguish T.W. on the basis that it involved a missing zip code. ( Id. at p. 729.) We fail to see how using a zip code that is off by one number makes it any less likely that mail will be delivered than not using a zip code at all. And as to the notices about sister a nd older brother , which were20

mailed in January 2014, we note that father argued in half sister’s appeal that th e notice
there , which was mailed in November 2013, should have been mailed to the same Pinole
address he says should not have been used here

. In any event, given father’s failure to claim he did not receive the notices, t here is no reason to th ink they did not reach him
, and he therefore has not established good cause for his failure to file either writ petition. Father’s claim that his trial cou nsel rendered ineffective assistance by not filing a writ petition also fails. Although ineffective

- assistance claims are normally raised by a petition for writ of habeas corpus because they depend on evidence outside the record, such a claim “may be revi ewed on direct appeal when there is no satisfactory explanation for trial counsel’s act or failure to act.” ( In re N.M. (2008) 161 Cal.App.4th 253, 270; In
re Arturo A. (1992) 8 Cal.App.4th 229, 243.) But, just as we concluded in half sister’s
and half b rother’s case s , the obvious possible explanation for why father’s trial counsel did not file a writ petition is that he did not have the required authorization from father to do so. ( Arturo A. , at p. 243; In re Cathina W. , supra , 68 Cal.App.4th at p. 724; see also rule 8.450(e)(3).) Again, “[w]e cannot assume that the decision [not to file a writ petition] was the result of negligence, when it could well have been based upon some practical or tactical decision governed by client guidance.” ( Arturo A. , at p. 243.) In sum, father cannot establish as to any of the three children that he failed to receive proper notice of the writ requirement or that his trial counsel provided ineffective assistance by not filing a writ petition. Therefore, his “statutory f ramework” and notice
claim s fa il because , as he concedes, he did not seek appellate review of the January 2014 or February 2014 order s or any earlier orders . (See In re Janee J. (1999) 74 Cal.App.4th 198, 207

- 209; In re Meranda P. (1997) 56 Cal.App.4th 1143, 1150

- 1151 [discussing waiver rule preventing challenges to previous orders of which timely appellate review not sought].)21

D

. The Juvenile Court Had No Sua Sponte Duty to Appoint a Guardian Ad Litem for Father

. Finally, father contends the juvenile court erred by not sua sponte appointing a guardian ad litem for him due to his mental incompetency. 10 He also argues that his trial counsel’s failure to raise the issue of competency constituted ineffective assistance of
counsel. Both claims fail because , as in half sister’s and half brother’s case s , the record fails to disclose any evidence that father was unable to understand or participate in the proceedings or to assist his trial counsel.
Fat her’s claim is premised on evidence in the case involving h alf sister . The detention/ju risdiction report in that case stated that while father was a dependent child, he “was placed in high level residential treatment programs” and was diagnosed with “PTSD, Depressive Disorder, and Oppositional Defiant Disorder.” The six

- and twelve

month status

- review report provided further details: father “had a mental health conservator” from the time he was 14 years old until the time he emancipated in 2003,

w hen he was almost 19 years old. “The recommendation was that [fat her] continue[] to be under the care of a conservator even after he emancipated,” but “the continued conservatorship was not pursued” because father was living on the E ast Coast when he emancipated. “Code of Civil Procedure section 372 provides that in an y proceeding in which an incompetent person is a party, that person shall appear by a guardian ad litem appointed by the court in which the action is pending.” ( In re Sara D. (2001) 87 Cal.App.4th 661, 665; Code of Civ. Proc., § 372, subd. (a).) A person may be found incompetent under either Penal Code section 1367, which applies to criminal defendants, or Probate Code section 1801, which applies to conservatees. In the dependency context, the key question in determining whether an adult parent requires a guardian ad litem is “whether the parent has the capacity to understand the nature or consequences of the proceeding and to assist

10 For the same reasons we gave in half sister’s case, father’s failure to file a writ petition does not foreclose this claim. (See In re A.C. (2008) 166 Cal.App.4th 146, 156

- 157; In re M.F. (2008) 161 Cal.App.4th 673, 681

- 682.)22

counsel in preparing the case.” ( In re James F. (2008) 42 Cal.4th 901, 910; Sara D. , at
p. 6 67.) “When a dependency court has knowledge of a party’s

. . . incompetence under [Code of Civil Procedure] section 372, the dependency court has an obligation to appoint a [guardian ad litem] sua sponte.” ( In re A.C. , supra , 166 Cal.App.4th at p. 155.) We
review the failure to appoint a guardian ad litem for an abuse of discretion. ( In re
Ronell A. (1996) 44 Cal.App.4th 1352, 1366

- 1367; see also In re Christopher I. (2003) 106 Cal.App.4th 533, 568.) Assuming, without deciding, that the in formation about father’s mental health
disclosed in half sister’s case could ever give rise to a duty to appoint a guardian ad litem
in these three children’s cases
, we conclude , as we did in her case, that that information did not trigger the juvenile court’s sua sponte duty to appoint a gua rd ian ad litem

. In formation about father’s mental

- he alth issues and his earlier conservatorship did not require appointment of a guardian ad litem absent an indication that father was unable to understand the proceedings or assist his trial counsel. ( In re Ronell A.
, supra , 44 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1367

- 1368; In re R.S. (1985) 167 Cal.App.3d 946, 979.) Here,
f ather app eared at multiple hearings , during which he apparently acted normally and responded appropriately when questioned. And once again , his trial c ounsel ( the same attorney in all five cases ) did not raise any concerns about his competency. As the
record s in these children’s cases and half sister’s case fail to disclose any evidence that father was unable to participate in or understand the proceedi ngs, we conclude the juvenile court did not abuse its discretion by not sua sponte appointing a guardian ad
litem for him. Father’s claim of ineffective assistance of counsel similarly fails. As mentioned above, such claims “may be reviewed on direct app eal when there is no satisfactory explanation for trial counsel’s act or failure to act.” ( In re N.M. , supra , 161 Cal.App.4th at p. 270.) Here, given the lack of evidence that father was unable to participate in or understand the proceedings, his trial c ounsel may have reasonably believed that father23

was competent, and father therefore cannot establish he received ineffective assistance based on counsel’s failure to raise the issue of his competence.
III. D ISPOSITION
The orders terminating parental rights to L.D.C., D.C., Jr. , and L.C. are affirmed.

_________________________ Humes, P.J.

We concur:

_________________________ Margulies, J.

_________________________ Banke, J.