PUBLISH
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT

________________ _________________ UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff - Appellee,

v. MONTERIAL WESLEY, Defendant - Appellant. No. 22-3066

________________ _________________ Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of Kansas (D.C. No. 2:07-CR-20168-JWL-2)

________________ _________________ Kayla Gassmann, Assistant Federal Public Defender (Melody Brannon, Federal Public Defender, with her on the briefs), Office of the Federal Public Defender, Kansas City, Kansas, for Plaintiff-Appellee. Jared S. Maag, Assistant United States Atto rney (Duston J. Slin kard, United States Attorney, District of Kansas, and James A. Brown, Assistant United States Attorney, Chief, Appellate Division, with him on the br ief), Office of the Un ited States Attorney, Topeka, Kansas, for Defendant-Appellant.

________________ _________________ Before TYMKOVICH , SEYMOUR , and PHILLIPS , Circuit Judges.

________________ _________________ TYMKOVICH , Circuit Judge.

________________ _________________ A federal jury convicted defendant Monter ial Wesley of drug trafficking. In a post-conviction motion, Wesl ey alleged his prosecutor suborned perjury about the FILED United States Court of Appeals Tenth Circuit 

### February 28, 2023 Christopher M. Wolpert Clerk of Court Appellate Case: 22-3066 Document: 010110818889 Date Filed: 02/28/2023 Page: 12 drug quantities attributable to him, in turn increasing hi s sentencing exposure. But, rather than asking the distri ct court to vacate his sent ence under 28 U.S.C. § 2255, he asked for a sentence reduction under the comp assionate release statute, which permits a sentencing court to reduce a federal pr isoner’s sentence for “extraordinary and compelling reasons.” 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A)(i). Wesley’s motion asserted various grounds for fi nding extraordinary and compelling reasons in his case, including th e alleged prosecutorial misconduct. The district court concluded that the claim of prosecu torial misconduct must be interpreted as a challenge to the constitutionality of his conviction and sentence, which can only be brought un der § 2255. Because Wesley had previously brought a § 2255 motion attacking the same judgmen t, and because this court had not authorized him to file anot her one, the district cour t dismissed that portion of Wesley’s motion for lack of jurisdiction. See United States v. Harper , 545 F.3d 1230, 1232 (10th Cir. 2008) (“In order to file a second or . . . successive § 2255 motion, a petitioner must first move the court of appeals fo r an order authorizing the district court to hear the motion.”). As to the remaining gr ounds for relief, the district court found they did not justify a sentence reduction. On appeal, Wesley challenges the dist rict court’s jurisdictional dismissal. 1 He has not moved for a certificate of appeal ability (COA), but our case law requires one

1 He has not appealed the portion of the district court’s orde r denying relief on the merits, but the upshot of this appeal, if su ccessful for Wesley, would be vacatur of the district court’s order and remand fo r reconsideration based on all asserted “extraordinary and compelli ng reasons,” including allege d prosecutorial misconduct. Appellate Case: 22-3066 Document: 010110818889 Date Filed: 02/28/2023 Page: 23 for this appeal to proceed. See id. at 1233 (“[T]he district court’s dismissal of an unauthorized § 2255 motion is a ‘final order in a proceeding under section 2255’ such that § 2253 requires petitioner to obtai n a COA before he or she may appeal.”). “This in turn requires us first to cons ider whether jurists of reason would find debatable the district court’ s decision to construe [Wesle y’s compassionate release] motion as a motion to vacate, set aside, or correct his sentence pursuant to § 2255.” Id. (internal quotation mark s and ellipsis omitted). We find the question debata ble among jurists of reason, so we grant a COA. On the merits, however, we agree with the district c ourt that Wesley’s motion included a successive § 2255 claim because it attacked the validity of his sentence. Accordingly, we affirm the district court’s jurisdictional dismissal. 

### I. Background A grand jury indicted Wesley on twelve counts relating to a conspiracy to distribute cocaine and cocaine base. After the court impane led the jury but before the parties presented any evidence, Wesley pled guilty to four counts of the indictment without the benefit of a plea agreement. He went to trial on th e eight other counts, and the jury subsequently convicted him of two more drug-related counts. The district court sentenced Wesley to thirty years’ imprisonment, which was within the Guidelines-recomme nded range based on the quan tity of drugs attributed to him. Specifically, the c ourt found that Wesley was ac countable for more than 150 kilograms of cocaine. Few drugs were ente red into evidence, so information about the type and quantity of drugs involved in the conspiracy rested almost entirely on Appellate Case: 22-3066 Document: 010110818889 Date Filed: 02/28/2023 Page: 34 cooperating government witne sses. The court particul arly relied on the trial testimony and sentencing-hearing testim ony of two witnesses the court found credible, Thomas Humphrey and Cruz Santa-Anna. Wesley unsuccessfully requested relief th ree times: on direct appeal, through a § 2255 motion, and in a pandemic-related mo tion for compassionate release. Then, in December 2021, Wesley filed a second comp assionate release moti on. He asserted the district court should re-sentence him to fifteen years (about one year more than what he had already served) based on the co mbined effect of th ree considerations: (1) the prosecutor in his ca se solicited false testim ony about drug quantities, on which the district court reli ed when calculating his Guide lines range; (2) his choice to go to trial resulted in a much longer se ntence as compared to co-defendants who pleaded guilty; and (3) his se ntence was excessive as comp ared to more culpable co-conspirators. The bulk of Wesley’s motion focused on the prosecutor’s alleged misconduct. His theory depended on showing that the tw o witnesses on whom the district court relied in determining the drug quan tity—Humphrey and Sa nta-Anna—knowingly testified to more drugs than were actua lly involved, and they did so because the prosecutor convinced them to. He did not have evidence directly from Humphrey or Santa-Anna, but he did present statements (some of them sworn) from others who testified, or who were asked to te stify, at his tria l. Specifically:

 One witness who testified against Wesley now says he lied a bout the nature of his dealings with Wesley. The witness testified at tria l that he sold cocaine to Wesley when in fact he sold only mar ijuana. The witnes s asserts that the Appellate Case: 22-3066 Document: 010110818889 Date Filed: 02/28/2023 Page: 45 prosecutor knew his testimony was false, but wanted him to testify that he sold cocaine to Wesley. The w itness also states that th e prosecutor asked him to “add weight” to the drug quantities in his trial testimony, R., Vol. I at 513, ¶ 5 (internal quotation marks omitted), althoug h it’s not clear from his statement if he followed that request.

 Another witness who testified against Wesley was pressured by the prosecutor “to make the drug weight to be more than what it really was,” but he refused to do so. Id. at 529.

 A witness who did not testify at trial claims the prosec utor asked him to testify to buying more cocaine fro m Wesley than he did.

 All three witnesses recall ta lking with each other at the county jail, realizing they were there to testify in the sa me case, and discussing the prosecutor’s similar tactics. Wesley said this conduct provides reason to believe the prosecutor took a similar approach with other witnesse s, such as Humphrey and Santa-Anna. Thus, Wesley believed he could show they testified fa lsely, in turn aff ecting his sentence. Wesley further supported his motion w ith allegations that the prosecutor engaged in misconduct or untruthfulness in other cases, including five examples of misconduct or alleged misconduct by the same prosecutor in other cases. Given all this, Wesley asserted th at he had been convicte d and sentenced in “an unconstitutional proceeding.” R. , Vol. I at 412. He sugg ested an evidentiary hearing would be appropriate because “[t]he gravity and charac ter of the prosecutorial misconduct allegations warr ant further inquiry.” Id. at 394. As noted, the district court held that the allegations regarding prosecutorial misconduct amounted to an unauthorized su ccessive § 2255 motion, so the court dismissed that portion of Wesley’s motion for lack of jurisdiction. The district court Appellate Case: 22-3066 Document: 010110818889 Date Filed: 02/28/2023 Page: 56 denied relief on the two other asserted base s for compassionate release. Wesley now appeals from the court’s refusal to consid er the asserted pros ecutorial misconduct alongside the other asserted grounds for relief. 

### II. Analysis If Wesley’s allegations against the pr osecutor are true, her conduct would violate the Fifth Amendmen t’s due process clause. See Giglio v. United States , 405 U.S. 150, 153–54 (1972). This is the sort of claim the court normally sees in a § 2255 context. If a federal prisoner “cl aim[s] the right to be released upon the ground that [his] sentence was imposed in viol ation of the Constitution or laws of the United States . . . or is otherwise subject to collateral attack,” th at section allows him to “move the court which imposed the sent ence to vacate, set as ide or correct the sentence.” § 2255(a). But the right to file a § 2255 motion does not last forever. It must be brought within one year of certain triggering events, su ch as the conviction becoming final, or the discovery of s upporting evidence. § 2255(f). And if the prisoner has previously brou ght a § 2255 motion, any la ter § 2255 motion attacking the same conviction is limited to claims based on (1) newly discovered evidence that, if proven and viewed in light of the evidence as a w hole, would be sufficient to establish by clear and convincing evidence that no reasonable factfinder would ha ve found the movant guilty of the offense; or (2) a new rule of constitutiona l law, made retroactive to cases on collateral review by the Supreme Court, that was previously unavailable. § 2255(h). Appellate Case: 22-3066 Document: 010110818889 Date Filed: 02/28/2023 Page: 67 Wesley insists he is not invoking § 22 55. He asserts th at the evidence of prosecutorial misconduct supports a sent ence reduction under the compassionate release statute, without regard to wh ether the alleged misconduct is also a constitutional violation that might justify § 2255 relief. The advantage of this approach is that he can ra ise the basis for what would otherwise be a § 2255 claim, yet without the restrictions imposed by § 2255. As we di scuss below, we disagree that § 3582 can be used to circumvent the procedural and substantive requirements of § 2255.
A. Statutory and Proced ural Background A prisoner must normally use § 2255 to challenge a conviction and sentence outside a direct appeal. We will begin, therefore, by e xplaining Wesley’s resort to the compassionate release st atute instead of § 2255.
1. The Compassionate Release Statute Congress enacted the original version of the compassionate release statute, 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1), as part of the Sentencing Reform Act of 1984. See Pub. L. No. 98-473, tit. II, ch. II, § 212(a)(2), 98 St at 1837. “[U]pon motion of the Director of the Bureau of Prisons,” the statute permitted a sentencing court to reduce a prisoner’s sentence upon three conditions: (1 ) the existence of “extraordinary and compelling reasons”; (2) “consisten[cy] with applicable policy st atements issued by the Sentencing Commission”; and (3) “consid er[ation of] the factors set forth in [18 U.S.C. §] 3553(a) to the exte nt that they are applicable.” Id. The only limit Congress explicitly put on “extraordinary and compelling reasons ” was a directive Appellate Case: 22-3066 Document: 010110818889 Date Filed: 02/28/2023 Page: 78 that the Sentencing Commission’s explanator y policy statements could not designate “[r]ehabilitation of the defendant alone [as] an extraordinary a nd compelling reason.” 28 U.S.C. § 994(t). The Sentencing Commission did not issu e a relevant policy statement until 2006. That policy statement began with language mimicking the statute (and which would turn out to be significant in the c ontext of later devel opments): “Upon motion of the Director of the Bureau of Prisons . . . .” U.S.S.G. § 1B1.13 (2006). And the original policy statement, without fu rther guidance, only identified as an extraordinary and compelling r eason “[a] determination made by the Director of the Bureau of Prisons that a particular case warrants a reduction for extraordinary and compelling reasons.” Id. cmt. n.1(A). By 2018, the Sentencing Commission had mo re fully fleshed out that standard to include, for example, te rminal illness or the death of the caregiver for the defendant’s minor children. See U.S.S.G. § 1B1.13 cmt. n. 1(A)(i), (C)(i) (2018). But the policy statemen t still began with the words of the statute, “Upon motion of the Director of the Bureau of Prisons . . . .” See id. , main text. The month following the effective date of the 2018 Guidelines, Congress passed the First Step Act. See Pub. L. No. 115-391, 1 32 Stat. 5194 (2018). Among many other things, the First Step Act ame nded the compassionate release statute to permit prisoners to bring motions on their ow n behalf if they ask the BOP to bring a motion and it does not respond within thirty days. See id. , tit. VI, § 603(b)(1), 132 Stat. at 5239 (codified at 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A)). Appellate Case: 22-3066 Document: 010110818889 Date Filed: 02/28/2023 Page: 89 Given this authorizat ion, prisoners understa ndably began bringing compassionate release motions on their own be half. At first, so me district courts continued to apply the Sentencing Commis sion’s 2018 policy statement (§ 1B1.13) when adjudicating these motions. See, e.g. , United States v. McGee , 992 F.3d 1035, 1041 (10th Cir. 2021) (describing such an or der). But others reasoned that the 2018 policy statement, by its own terms, applie s only to motions brought by the BOP. See,

e.g. , United States v. Maumau , 993 F.3d 821, 828 (10th Ci r. 2021) (describing such an order).
In Maumau , we went further and held that Congress intended to affo rd district courts with discretion, in carrying out the fi rst part of the statutory test in § 3582(c)(1)(A)(i), to i ndependently determine the existence of “extraordinary and compelling reasons,” and for that discretion to be ci rcumscribed under the second part of the statutory test by re quiring district courts to find that a sentence reduction is c onsistent with applicable policy statements issued by the Sentencing Commission. Id. at 832. But because the Sentencing Commission had never had enough voting members to form a quorum since enactment of the First Step Act (a situation that persisted until August 2022), no policy statem ent existed to cons train the district court’s evaluation of extraord inary and compelling reasons. Id. at 836. Wesley interprets Maumau to stand for the proposition that “extraordinary and compelling reasons” is limitless, subject onl y to the district court’s discretion. See Aplt. Opening Br. at 20 (“Unde r this open-ended statutory language, district courts are empowered to consider any extraordinary and compelli ng reason for release that a Appellate Case: 22-3066 Document: 010110818889 Date Filed: 02/28/2023 Page: 910 defendant might raise.” (int ernal quotation marks omitted )). Thus, “extraordinary and compelling reasons” could include th e sorts of attacks on a conviction or sentence that prisoners norma lly bring through § 2255 mo tions—yet not subject to any of the statutory restraints imposed by § 2255, such as timing, the content of the motion, and the grounds on which one can bring additional motions. But in Maumau , whether “extraordinary and co mpelling reasons” can include matters that, if true, would demonstrate the invalidity of the conviction or sentence, was not before this court. 2
2. Wesley’s Motion for Compassionate Release Wesley has not yet assert ed the alleged prosecutori al misconduct in a motion for authorization under § 2255(h). Instead, he has insisted that compassionate release and § 2255 are independent forms of relief , so it does not matter if he could have brought his claim through § 2255. See Aplt. Opening Br. at 45–46 (“Whether a particular extraordinary and compelli ng reason could be repackaged as a constitutional claim in a § 2255 petition has nothing to do with a motion for a discretionary reduction under § 3582(c)(1)(A )(i).”). Notably, at oral argument Wesley’s counsel asserted th e district court motion should not have been treated as a § 2255 motion because it coul d not have satisfied § 2255(h). Oral Argument at 32:11. Specifically, counsel pointed to § 2255(h)(1)’s requireme nt that successive

2 In unpublished decisions, this court ha s consistently ruled against Wesley’s position. See, e.g. , United States v. Mata-Soto , 861 F. App’x 251, 255 (10th Cir. 2021). Appellate Case: 22-3066 Document: 010110818889 Date Filed: 02/28/2023 Page: 1011 motions based on new evidence must put th e case in such a new light that “no reasonable factfinder would ha ve found the movant guilty of the offense.” Counsel says Wesley is challenging only his se ntence, not his guilt, so a motion for authorization under § 2255(h)(1) base d on prosecutorial misconduct was not available. 3 Regardless, Wesley does not claim his presumed inability to satisfy § 2255(h)(1) should be accepte d as a reason to deem his circumstances extraordinary and compelling for purposes of compassionate release. Rath er, as noted, he believes this court has already held that “extraordinary and compe lling reasons” is limitless. Thus, from his perspective, in ability to satisfy § 2255(h)(1 ) is irrelevant. Likewise irrelevant is the choice to limit his at tack to the sentence only. Under his interpretation of the compassi onate release statute, he could permissibly claim that some of his convictions are invalid , but he has chosen not to do so.
B. Does § 2255 Control When a Prisoner Asserts an Argument Attacking His Conviction or Sentence? To answer this question, we “must exam ine the disputed language in context, not in isolation,” looking both to the “the language and design of the statute as a whole.” True Oil Co. v. Comm’r , 170 F.3d 1294, 1299 ( 10th Cir. 1999) (internal quotation marks omitted). And we must keep in mind the canon of statutory

3 We have not yet held that “guilty of the offense” in § 2255(h)(1) excludes arguments attacking the length of the sentence only. Other courts have held as much. See, e.g. , Hope v. United States , 108 F.3d 119, 120 (7th Cir. 1997). Appellate Case: 22-3066 Document: 010110818889 Date Filed: 02/28/2023 Page: 1112 construction that specific controls over general. 4 “Where there is no clear intention otherwise, a specific stat ute will not be controlled or nullified by a general one, regardless of the priority of enactment.” Morton v. Mancari , 417 U.S. 535, 550–51 (1974). “What counts for application of the general/ specific canon is not the nature of the provisions’ pr escriptions but their scope .” RadLAX Gateway Hotel, LLC v. Amalgamated Bank , 566 U.S. 639, 648 (2012). Here, the scope of § 2255 is more spec ific, indeed, directly targeted at the claims that Wesley is making. In Wesl ey’s view, a compassionate release motion could include the sorts of claims normally raised in a § 2255 motion, but there is no argument that a § 2255 motion can include the sorts of clai ms raised in a compassionate release motion ( e.g. , rehabilitation, medical challenges, etc.). Similarly, the compassionate release stat ute says nothing about the timing of such motions, or whether a pris oner can bring them seria lly, whereas § 2255 places explicit restrictions on both. Thus, looking at the two stat utes in context, § 2255 is presumptively the vehicle by which federal prisoners must raise challenges to their convictions or sentences. “Of course the general/specific canon is not an absolute rule, but is merely a strong indication of statutory meaning that can be overcome by textual indications that point in the other direction.” RadLAX , 566 U.S. at 646–47. Wesley offers no such textual indications. In our view, moreover, all indi cations point in the other

4 At oral argument, counsel for Wesley claimed the government never briefed the general/specific question. Counsel is incorrect. See Resp. Br. at 14–16. Appellate Case: 22-3066 Document: 010110818889 Date Filed: 02/28/2023 Page: 1213 direction, especially when on e looks at the sort of system that would result from the ability to use the compassionate release statute to assert errors in a conviction or

sentence.
First , Congress required district courts considering compassionate release motions to ensure that any sentence reducti on “is consistent with applicable policy statements issued by the Sentencing Commi ssion.” 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A). If Wesley’s position is correct, this m eans Congress authorized use of the compassionate-release vehicle to raise errors in the conviction or sentence and then delegated to the Sentencing Commission the authority to revoke that use of compassionate release via a policy statement. Wesley gives us no reason to believe that Congress would grant this authority—effe ctively, the authority to decide whether federal postconviction challenges must proceed through § 2255 or not—to an administrative agency. Nor can we find anything from the Sentencing Commission claiming such authority. Cf. Whitman v. Am. Trucking Ass’ns , 531 U.S. 457, 468 (2001) (noting that Congress does not “hide elephants in mouseholes”). Second , a prisoner may not bring a motion on his own behalf without first asking the BOP to bring one. The benefits of an exhaustion require ment such as this include allowing the agency to “apply its special expertis e” and to “produce a useful record for subsequent j udicial consideration.” McCarthy v. Madigan , 503 U.S. 140, 145 (1992), superseded by statute on other grounds , Prison Litigation Reform Act of 1995, 110 Stat. 1321–71, as amended, 42 U.S. C. § 1997e et seq., as recognized in Woodford v. Ngo , 548 U.S. 81, 84–85 (2006). Th e BOP undoubtedly has expertise Appellate Case: 22-3066 Document: 010110818889 Date Filed: 02/28/2023 Page: 1314 in, for example, evaluating prisoner behavior and prisoners’ medical needs, and it can produce a useful record on those topics. The BOP has no expertise in evaluating alleged trial errors. Rath er, federal courts acting unde r § 2255 have the relevant expertise and mechanisms to evaluate claims of error. Third , Wesley asserts that compassionate release and § 2255 can harmoniously coexist because “ultimate relief [in a co mpassionate release pr oceeding] is highly individualized and always remains disc retionary,” in contrast to “a § 2255 proceeding, [in which] a court does not have discretion to refuse to grant relief.” Aplt. Opening Br. at 37, 38. Thus, under the system fo r which Wesley advocates, a district court has discretion to deny relief even if the prisoner proves an error or defect of constitutional magnitude. It is hard to imagine a c ourt denying relief to such an error. Yet this incongruous out come allowed by Wesley’s interpretation of § 3582 as compared to § 2255 seems to be precisely the sort of thing for which we would expect to see a “clear intention,” Morton , 417 U.S. at 550, yet Wesley offers

none. Fourth , the compassionate release statut e requires the district court to “consider[] the factors set fo rth in section 3553(a) to the extent that they are applicable.” § 3582(c)(1)(A ). Those factors are: (1) the nature and circumstances of the offense and the history and characterist ics of the defendant; (2) the need for the sentence imposed— Appellate Case: 22-3066 Document: 010110818889 Date Filed: 02/28/2023 Page: 1415 (A) to reflect the seriousness of the offense, to promote respect for the law, and to provide just punishment for the offense; (B) to afford adequate dete rrence to criminal conduct; (C) to protect the public fro m further crimes of the defendant; and (D) to provide the defendant with needed educational or vocational training, medical care, or other correctional treatment in the most effective manner; (3) the kinds of sentences available; (4) the kinds of sentence and the sentencing range established [by the Sent encing Commission] . . . . (5) any pertinent policy statement [issued by the Sentencing Commission] . . . . (6) the need to avoid unwa rranted sentence disparities among defendants with simila r records who have been found guilty of similar conduct; and (7) the need to provide rest itution to any victims of the offense. 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a). Arguably, none of th ese factors applies to someone wrongfully convicted and sentenced. There is no indi cation Congress intended to create the possibility of a sentencing proceeding in wh ich all § 3553(a) factors are irrelevant. Even if the situation were more like Wesley’s, where he claims an unlawfully long prison term (rather than wrongful conviction), highly un usual results might follow. “[C]onduct since [a defendant’s] in itial sentencing constitutes a critical part of the ‘history and characteristics’ of a defendant that Congress intended sentencing courts to consider [in any re-sentencing proceedings].” Pepper v. United States , 562 U.S. 476, 492 (2011) (quo ting § 3553(a)(1)). Thus, a di strict court considering a Appellate Case: 22-3066 Document: 010110818889 Date Filed: 02/28/2023 Page: 1516 compassionate release motion challenging only the length of the sentence could conclude that a defendant’s poor behavior in prison shows his sentence remains appropriate, even if he has overserved the maximum sentence he c ould have received but for error. Fifth , the most a district court can do for a defendant who merits relief under § 3582(c)(1)(A)(i) is re-sente nce him to time served, thereby releasing him. But there is still a criminal judgment against him—it w ill remain on his record, potentially influencing the rest of his life. Again, as compared to the more-specific remedy in § 2255 (through which the distri ct court can vacate the conviction), we would expect a clear intent from Congress that it intended the compassionate release statute to preserve the tra iling consequences of a crimin al sentence, even for those who were convicted or sentenced erroneously. For all these reasons, we hold that § 2255 applies to Wesley’s claims. 5
C. Other Circuits Our holding is consistent with holdings or considered dicta from the Second, Fourth, Sixth, Seventh, Eighth, and D.C. Circuits—the majo rity of circuits to have

5 The Sixth Circuit offers another interpretive insight. When Congre ss enacted the First Step Act, it did not touch the “extraordinary a nd compelling reasons” standard. Thus, Congress is presum ed to carry forward the Sentencing Commission’s interpretation of that phrase, which cons istently focused on f actors such as the prisoner’s health, age, and fami ly-caretaking responsibilities. See United States v. McCall , 56 F.4th 1048, 1059–60 (6th Cir. 2022) (e n banc). In other words, there is a fair argument that “extraordinary and compelling reasons,” by its own terms, excludes matters that stray too far from the core established by the Sentencing Commission, including assertions that call into doubt the va lidity of the conviction or sentence. Appellate Case: 22-3066 Document: 010110818889 Date Filed: 02/28/2023 Page: 1617 issued a published decision on this issue. See United States v. Amato , 48 F.4th 61, 63 (2d Cir. 2022); United States v. Ferguson , 55 F.4th 262, 270 (4th Cir. 2022); United
States v. Hunter , 12 F.4th 555, 562, 566– 68 (6th Cir. 2021); United States v. Thacker , 4 F.4th 569, 574 (7th Cir. 2021); United States v. Crandall , 25 F.4th 582, 586 (8th Cir. 2022); United States v. Jenkins , 50 F.4th 1185, 1200–06 (D.C. Cir. 2022). Nonetheless, Wesley points to a First Circuit case, which takes a different view. In United States v. Trenkler , 47 F.4th 42, 48 (1st Cir. 2022), the court held that, save for rehabilitation alone, district courts may c onsider literally anything, including errors normally raised thr ough § 2255, when deciding whether extraordinary and compelling reasons exist. Trenkler says its holding is dictated by the statute’s plain language, see id. at 47–48, but we have al ready explained why this view cannot prevail in light of § 2255’s more-specific focus. Furthermore, Trenkler actually departs from the plain language of the compassionate release statute. It says that “correct application of the ‘extraordinary and compelling’ standard for compassiona te release naturally precludes classic post-conviction arguments, without more , from carrying such mo tions to success.” Id. at 48 (emphasis added). But it does not explain where it finds this limitation in the statute’s text. If a defendant can pr ove, say, the prosecutor framed him for a crime he did not commit, we do not see any reason in the text of the statute requiring the defendant to prove something more to mer it relief. Indeed, this is precisely where context matters. Congress designed § 2255 to address that sort of claim, and to provide complete reli ef if appropriate. Appellate Case: 22-3066 Document: 010110818889 Date Filed: 02/28/2023 Page: 1718 The facts and disposition of Trenkler illustrate well the te xtual difficulties we have been pointing out. In that case, no one disputed that the defendant erroneously received a life sentence. And, as described, the First Circ uit held that the district court could properly c onsider that error, among other factors, when considering the defendant’s compassionate rele ase motion. In fact, that is essentially what the district court had done, but th e First Circuit was unsure if the district court had fully weighed all the relevant c onsiderations together, so it vacated and remanded for further proceedings. In doing so, it said it “express[ed] no view as to what should happen on remand.” Id. at 51. In other words, desp ite universal agreement that the defendant was serving an unlawful sentence, the First Circuit remanded to ensure that the district court would take “a holistic approach when reviewing Trenkler’s proposed reasons [for re-sentencing],” id. at 50, potentially includ ing denial of relief. Adhering to § 2255 avoids such unusual results.
D. The Concepcion Decision Wesley also points to the Supreme Court’s recent decision in Concepcion v. United States , 142 S. Ct. 2389 (2022). Concepcion involved a part of the First Step Act permitting district courts to re-sente nce certain defendants convicted of crack cocaine offenses. The basic question was the scope of info rmation the district court could consider in those re-s entencing proceedings. Specifi cally, could district courts consider “intervening change s of law (such as changes to the Sentencing Guidelines) or changes of fact (such as behavior in prison)”? Id. at 2396. Or were they instead required to assume the facts as they were at the original sentenci ng, modified only by Appellate Case: 22-3066 Document: 010110818889 Date Filed: 02/28/2023 Page: 1819 the changes Congress later enact ed to reduce the severity of crack cocaine sentences? See id. at 2397–98. The Supreme Court held that district c ourts could consider intervening changes of law and fact. In doing so, it employe d very broad language: “It is only when Congress or the Constitution lim its the scope of information that a district court may consider in deciding whether, and to what ex tent, to modify a sent ence, that a district court’s discretion to consider information is restrained.” Id. at 2396. Nothing in the First Step Act limited that discretion when re-sentenc ing eligible crack cocaine offenders, so district courts were not limited to taking account solely of the change in law. A compassionate release proceeding is not a re-sentencing proceeding under the First Step Act—again, the only th ing the First Step Act changed about compassionate release was to authorize prisoners to bring their own motions. But a compassionate release proceeding is a proceeding to “decid[e] whether, and to what extent, to modify a sentence.” Id. Thus, in Wesley’s view , the district court cannot be restrained from considering any info rmation the defendant puts before it, including alleged errors in the conviction or sentence. The important distinction between this case and Concepcion is that there was no doubt the district court in Concepcion was applying the correct statute. The parties only disputed its interpretati on. But Wesley ra ises the question Concepcion never had to answer—which is the correc t statute for this kind of claim. We therefore find Concepcion inapplicable. Appellate Case: 22-3066 Document: 010110818889 Date Filed: 02/28/2023 Page: 1920 E. Wesley’s Appeal to Discretion Wesley next points to our statement that “[i]t is the relief sought, not [the] pleading’s title, that determines whet her the pleading is a § 2255 motion,” United States v. Nelson , 465 F.3d 1145, 1149 (10th Cir. 2006). He insists that compassionate release—which is discretiona ry, and which can lead, at most, to a reduced sentence—was the only “r elief sought,” in contrast to claiming a right to be released under § 2 255. So, following Nelson , he says the district court should have treated his motion as a genuine compassionate release motion. We disagree. Our statement in Nelson regarding “relief sought” does not establish a pleading exercise only. When a federal prisone r asserts a claim that, if true, would mean “that the sentence was impos ed in violation of the Constitution or laws of the United States, or that the c ourt was without jurisdiction to impose such sentence, or that the sentence was in excess of the ma ximum authorized by law, or is otherwise subject to collateral attack,” § 2255(a), the prisoner is bringing a claim governed by § 2255. He cannot avoid this rule by insisting he requests relief purely as an exercise of discreti on rather than entitlement. 6 Cf. Wilkinson v. Dotson , 544 U.S. 74, 81 (2005) (discussing “the need to ensure that state prisoners use only habeas corpus (or similar stat e) remedies when they seek to invalidate the duration of

6 This is why Wesley’s presumed in ability to bring a successful motion under § 2255(h)(1), see supra Part II.A.2, makes no differen ce here. If a prisoner claims his sentence “was imposed in violation of the Constitution or laws of the United States, [etc.],” § 2255(a), the district c ourt must apply § 2255, potentially including its restrictions on the kinds of claims that are cognizabl e after the prisoner has filed an earlier § 2255 motion attacking the same judgment. Appellate Case: 22-3066 Document: 010110818889 Date Filed: 02/28/2023 Page: 2021 their confinement—either directly through an injunction compelling speedier release

or indirectly through a judicial determinati on that necessar ily implies the unlawfulness of the State’s custody”).
F. Appropriate Procedure in the District Courts A final question remains. If a district court receiv es a compassionate release motion that comprises or includes a clai m governed by § 2255, should the court (1) treat it as a compassiona te release motion, although w ith a flawed (or partially flawed) basis; or (2) treat the part governed by § 2255 as if expl icitly brought under § 2255 and handle it accordingly (including dismissal for lack of jurisdiction if appropriate)? Here, the dist rict court took the second appr oach, but other courts in this circuit have occasionally taken the first, see Mata-Soto , 861 F. App’x at 253–55. We conclude the district cour t’s approach in this case was correct. In all other contexts in which defendants have (follo wing direct appeal) attempted to raise § 2255-like claims outside of § 2255, we have held th at such a motion, however captioned or argued, must be treated as a § 2255 motion. See, e.g. , United States v. Williams , 790 F.3d 1059, 1066–68 ( 10th Cir. 2015) (motion to withdraw guilty plea); United States v. Baker , 718 F.3d 1204, 1208 (10th Cir. 2013) (Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(d)(3)); Nelson , 465 F.3d at 1148–49 (10th Ci r. 2006) (Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15); United States v. Torres , 282 F.3d 1241, 1245–46 (10th Cir. 2002) (writs of co ram nobis and audita querela); United States v. Gieswein , 814 F. App’x 428, 429–30 (10th Cir. 2020) (Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 52(b)); United States v. Beadles , 655 F. App’x 706, 707–08 (10th Cir. 2016) (Federal Appellate Case: 22-3066 Document: 010110818889 Date Filed: 02/28/2023 Page: 2122 Rule of Criminal Procedure 33). The partie s give us no reason to treat a motion filed under § 3582(c)(1)(A)(i) differently. Thus , as to the portion of Wesley’s motion arguing a defect in his sentence based on pr osecutorial misconduct, the district court correctly refused to ex ercise jurisdiction. 

### III. Conclusion We hold that an 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c )(1)(A)(i) motion may not be based on claims specifically governed by 28 U.S.C. § 2255. We therefore affirm the district

court. Appellate Case: 22-3066 Document: 010110818889 Date Filed: 02/28/2023 Page: 22