U.S. Department of Transportation
FEDERAL AVIATION ADMINISTRATION Office of Aviation Policy and Plans Washington, D.C

. 20591

INITIAL SUPPLEMENTAL REGULATORY IMPACT ANALYSIS

Flightcrew Member Duty and Rest Requirements
PART 117 Final Rule
OFFICE OF AVIATION POLICY AND PLANS October 4 , 2012i 

## Table of Contents Purpose of this Supplemental Regulatory Impact Analysis (RIA)

................................ ..... 1 Disposition of Issues Raised by Comments

................................ ................................ ........ 3 Benefit/Cost Summary

................................ ................................ ................................ ...... 16 Benefit Analysis

................................ ................................ ................................ ................ 18 The Nature of Fatigue

................................ ................................ ................................ ... 19 Causes of Fatigue

................................ ................................ ................................ .......... 20 Fatigue and Transportation

................................ ................................ ........................... 20
Re cent Findings on Fatigue and Occupational Performance

................................ ........ 22 Aviation Safety Reporting System (ASRS)

................................ ................................ .. 24 Effectiveness of Final Rule

................................ ................................ ........................... 26 Quantified Benefits

................................ ................................ ................................ ....... 35 Passenger Operations Base Case Estimate

................................ ............................... 36 Passenger Operations High Case Estimate

................................ ............................... 38 Cargo

- only Operations Base Case Estimate

................................ ............................. 40 High Case Estimate

................................ ................................ ................................ ... 42 Benefit Summary

................................ ................................ ................................ .......... 43 Cost Analysi s ................................ ................................ ................................ .................... 45 Flight Operations Cost

................................ ................................ ................................ .. 47 Crew Scheduling

................................ ................................ ................................ ....... 48 Computer Programming

................................ ................................ ............................ 69 Payroll Cost Savings from Reducing Flightcrew Members Fatigue

........................ 71ii Flight Operations Cost Summary

................................ ................................ .............. 74 Rest Facilities

................................ ................................ ................................ ................ 75 Engineering

................................ ................................ ................................ ............... 78 Installation

................................ ................................ ................................ ................. 79 Downtime

................................ ................................ ................................ .................. 80 Fuel Consumption Costs

................................ ................................ ........................... 81 Fatigue Training

................................ ................................ ................................ ............ 84 Cost Analysis Summary

................................ ................................ ................................ 88 Benefit Cost Summary

................................ ................................ ................................ ...... 90 Appendix A: Relevant Accident History

................................ ................................ .......... 91 Appendix B: Sensitivity Analysis

................................ ................................ ................... 125 Sensitivity #1: Adjusting for Block Hour Discrepancy

................................ .............. 126 Sensitivity #2: Alternative Weighting of Case Results

................................ ............... 129 Sensitivity #3: Alternative Assumptions Regarding Percent of Flightcrew Members Who Are Reserves

................................ ................................ ................................ .................. 132
Se nsitivity #4: Alternative Assumption Regarding Percent of Sick Time that would be Saved Due to the Final Rule

................................ ................................ ................................ ... 135 Appendix C: Deta iled Data Tables

................................ ................................ ................. 1381 

## Purpose **of this Supplemental**  **Regulatory Impact Analysis ( RIA**  **)**
On December 21, 2011, the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) issued a final rule that was published in the Federal Register as Flight Crew Member Duty and Rest Requirements on January 4, 20 1 1 ( 77 Fed. Reg. 330

- 01 ). The regulations, which are limited to passenger operations conducted under 14 CFR 121 ( P art 121), become effective on January 4, 2014. On December 21, 2011, t he FAA also issued a Regulatory Impact Analysis (original RIA) dated November 18, 2011 (FAA

- 2009

- 1093

- 2477)

. The original RIA provides the basis for the FAA’s decision to (1) promulgate the final rule establishing new flight, duty and rest requirements for flight crews in passenger operations; and (2) exclude flight crews in cargo

- only operations from the new mandatory requirements. While cargo - only operations are not required to meet the new regulations, the rule permits these operators to opt in to the rule if they so choose. On December 22, 2011 the Independent Pilots Association (IPA) filed a timely petition for review. During the cou rse of reviewing the administrative record for the purpose of preparing the government’s brief, the FAA discovered errors in the original RIA that supports the final rule. Th e errors were associated with the scope of costs related to the implementation of the regulations for cargo

- only operations. These errors appeared to be of a sufficient amount that the
FAA conclud ed it was prudent to review the portion of the cost

- benefit analysis related to cargo

only operations and allow interested parties an opportun ity to comment on th e corrected analysis. On May 17, 2012, the FAA asked the United States C ourt of A ppeals for the District of Columbia Circuit to suspend the litigation of the final rule while the agency corrected the inadvertent errors it had discovered. The court granted the FAA’s motion on June 8, 2012

. While the passenger operations rule is not at issue in the court proceedings, the FAA , in an abundance of caution, decided to have that portion of the original RIA reevaluated as well.2 The FA A contracted with the John A. Volpe National Transportation Systems Center to review the original RIA for accuracy , correct any errors identified, and prepare a supplemental regulatory evaluation laying out the revised analysis. This Initial Supplemental RIA is the product of that review. While t his Initial Supplemental RIA largely mirrors the original RIA in both content and organizational structure , it provide s more detail on the potential impacts the final rule would have on both passenger and cargo - onl y operations

. In addition, this Initial Supplemental RIA provides expanded discussion of the methodology and information sources used in the analysis,
corrects some reporting of results and minor calculation errors present in the original RIA, and presents sensitivity analysis on key assumptions used in the analysis

. 1 A new Appendix B contains the results of those sensitivity analyses while Appendix C contains detailed data tables, which are summarized in the body of this Initial Supplemental RIA. In the o riginal RIA, the portion of scheduling costs related to cargo

- only operations of air carriers that conduct both passenger and cargo

- only operations (mixed operations carriers) were inadvertently excluded from the reported costs of extending the final rule to cargo

- only operations. This Initial Supplemental RIA fixes that omission and that revision has significantly increased the estimates of the stated costs of extending the final rule to cargo

- only operations. Due to inclusion of impacts on cargo

- only oper ations , a few air carriers were reclassified for ease of explication. This Initial Supplemental RIA does not serve to reevaluate the policy decisions behind the FAA’s decision to issue a final rule implementing new flight, duty and rest requirements for

1 Wherever possible, this Initial Supplemental RIA relies on the same data used for the original RIA. In some cases, new estimates were developed and more recent data sources were used.3 P art 121 carriers engaged in carrying passengers. Table 1 and Table 2 summarize the differences between the original RIA and the Initial Supplemental RIA.

Tabl e 1 : Passenger Operations Nominal Costs and Benefits Over 12 Year Analysis Period Original RIA

(millions) Supplemental RIA (millions) Difference (millions) Total Benefits

- Base Case $376 $401 $25 Total Benefits

- High Case $716 $757 $41 Total Costs $390 $457 $67
Table 2 : Cargo Operations Nominal Costs and Benefits Over 12 Year Analysis Period Original RIA

(millions) Supplemental RIA (millions) Difference (millions) Total Benefits

- Base Case $20.35* $5 Total Benefits

- High Case $32.55* $31 Total Costs $306 $550 $244

* FAA did not detail potential benefits to cargo

- only operations in the original RIA. Rather, the FAA assumed that benefits associated with averting a single catastrophic accident involving a cargo plane would range between $20.35 million and $32.55 million. 

## Disposition of Issues Raised by Comments
The following summ a rizes the FAA’s respo nses to the comments on the economic analysis. These responses address the most substantive comments made in response to the Notice of Proposed Rulemaking (NPR M) . They are largely unchanged from the discussion in the original RIA. The comments addressed he re include those made by Air Transportation Association (ATA), American Airlines, United Airlines, Cargo Airline Association (CAA), Federal Express, United Parcel Service (UPS), National Air Carriers Association (NACA), Atlas Air Worldwide Holdings, Lynden Air Cargo, Omni Air International, Inc., and Southern Air, Inc. Commenters questioned the base year dollar and analysis period

. The final rule uses 2012 (the year the final rule was published) as the base year with some preparatory costs incurred during the period 2012 through 2013. Recurring costs and the benefits of the final rule are4 presented for the 10

- year period 2014 through 2023. We have provided sensitivity analysis based upon a discount rate of both seven percent and three percent

. This 12

- year analysis period is sufficient for the costs and benefits to be in a steady state. The FAA also received comments questioning the validity of the accident set

. To address the criticism of using the historical twenty

- year analysis period, the FAA narrowed the accident set to the most recent ten years

. However, while this approach addressed the issues raised by the
commenters, n arrowing of the analysis time period reduces the number of accidents/observations available for the benefit analysis

. Cons equently, w hile there is a sufficient accident basis to demonstrate a broad benefit basis justifying the cost of this rule, the data does not permit accident analysis for every industry segment. 2 The “high” benefit forecast incorporates expect at ions for la rger airplanes and higher load factors in the future

. Even though the rate of accidents may have declined in the last ten years, the future consequences of an individual crash may well be more catastrophic

. Commenters questioned that the historical accide nt rate is significantly higher than the probable accident rate for the period of analysis because accidents have declined in recent years. The requirements contained in this final rule only address the rates of pilot fatigue

. As Table 7 shows, the preventable accident rate related to fatigue has not significantly decreased in the last 10 years . Th e original RIA also includes a list of appropriate accidents along w ith the final Commercial Aviation Safety Team (CAST) scoring

. Appendix A: Relevant Accident History includes detailed fatigue information and the reasoning behind the final CAST scoring

.

2 In this Initial S upplemental RIA, FAA has provided separate benefits estimates of the final rule for passenger operations and cargo

- only operations.5 After considering the comments on the original RIA for the NPRM, the FAA took a different approach to evaluate the final rule. In the analysis for the NPRM, the FAA attempted to show through statistical analysis and simulation that a broader fatigue problem existed than what could be shown through National Transportation S afety Board ( NTSB ) accident findings

. In response to industry comments objecting to this approach , the FAA Office of Aviation Safety beg a n by narrowing the set of accidents to those with a strong correlation to fatigue and hence narrowed the benefit analys is from a broader fatigue problem to the specific regulatory changes

. As a result, the FAA re

- examined every accident used in the NPRM and applied the CAST methodology only to the accidents whose likelihood would have been reduced if the requirements in th e final rule had been e ffective prior to the accident

. Using this methodology, the FAA re

- analyzed the effectiveness of the provisions in the final rule in mitigating accidents where fatigue was identified as a factor in the accident, and removed accident cases that were not closely correlated with fatigue factor s from the NPRM

. From this exercise, a smaller set of accidents was determined appropriate for further economic analysis of the final rule

. With a smaller number of accidents, a simulation methodolo gy was no longer appropriate

. Instead, the FAA used a commonly

- used benefit methodology

. This methodology is grounded in NTSB findings, uses the CAST methodology, and is also transparent and easily reproducible

. The methodology is discussed in both the ori ginal RIA and this Initial Supplemental RIA. Industry questioned the use of $12.6 million for a statistical life value

. T he use of $12.6 was for a sensitivity test

. For the final rule, the FAA uses the $6. 2 million as the value of an averted fatality as used commonly by the Department of Transportation (DOT)

. Commenters also objected to the FAA’s assumptions regarding the 25 percent cost

savings resulting from long

- term scheduling optimization in the draft RIA evaluating the NPRM

.6 For th e original RIA, the assum ed long

- term schedule optimization factor is dropped . Instead, operation s and scheduling cost s w ere analyzed using a crew scheduling optimizer

. This different approach estimates operation s and schedul ing cost s of the final rule by applying the duty and rest time restrictions of the final rule to industry scheduling data using Cygnus, CrewPairing’s (CP) crew scheduling optimization model

. 3 Cygnus has been used by more than 30 major airlines worldwide over the past 40 years and is currently used by a number of carriers

. Commenters also contended that the FAA underestimated the NPRM costs related to flight operation s in that carriers would be forced to hire new crewmembers and increase flight duty perio ds (FDP). In this Initial Supplemental RIA, t he FAA has re

- estimated the costs reflecting final rule modifications and used the above

- referenced crew scheduling model to better estimate whether the rule would force carriers to hire new crewmembers

. The use of a crew pairing optimizer enabled FAA to more accurately model the impacts of the rule on industry crew scheduling costs than was possible during NPRM cost analysis

. The data in the original RIA included full bid line and pairing information for each fl ightcrew member . Because the crew pairing optimization results show ed that the final rule resulted in relatively small increases in the number of credit hours needed to complete existing flight schedules, FAA determined that certificate holders could condu ct existing operations under the final rule without hiring additional flightcrew

3 A technical report detailing the Cygnus optimization can be found i n the docket. See Summary of Crew Pairings, Inc. Economic Analysis of Flightcrew Member Duty and Rest Requirements Rulemaking , GRA Inc., September 2012.7 members

. The optimization also show s that where pilots worked more days in total under the final rule, they worked shorter days, thus obviating the need for additional pilots

. 4 Commenters did not support the costs related to schedule reliability and argued that they were underestimated

. O ne commenter stated the costs would be as high as $9.6 billion. They argued that by excluding the cost of schedule buffering required by multi ple provisions of the NPRM, the FAA omitted the major source of cost to the industry. As stated in the preamble to the final rule , the FAA has largely removed schedule reliability from th is rule

. The FAA has instead adopted provisions that limit extensions of the FDP and requires reporting of FDP extensions and activities that were not otherwise permitted by the provisions of §117.11, §117.19 and §117.29 in the f inal r ule

. Under this amendment, c os ts to airline carriers are limited to reporting exceptional activities

. As such, these costs are expected to be relatively minor. Some commenters stated the appropriate average wage rate should be $297 per hour

. The FAA notes this wage rate significantly contributed to the industry cost estimates

. The $297 per hour wage rate as an average is almost two times the wage rate from Form 41 narrow - body pilots and four times the wage rate from the 2010 Census Bureau on the airline industry

. Commenters also argue d that the FAA underestimates fatigue training cost described in the NPRM. All carriers already are required to compl y with Public Law 111

- 216 Section 212(b)(2)(B) with respect to the f atigue risk management plan and training (FRMP )

. In this final rule, th e FAA removed the proposed requirement that pilots receive additional fatigue training

4 See Summary of Crew Pairings, Inc. Economic Analysis of Flightcrew Member Duty and Rest Requirements Rulemaking, GRA Inc., September 2012.8 that is not required by the FRMP

. As such , the FAA expects the cost of fatigue education and training to be largely reduced

. The final rule does expand the fatigue educa tion and training requirements to dispatchers and certain members of management

. The FAA made this change because air carriers operating under P art 121 will be in compliance with the statutory pilot training requirement as part of their FRMPs

. Since the final rule extends fatigue training to management and dispatchers, it is expected to be added to existing fatigue risk management education and training program

. Numerous commenters stated that the FAA underestimated the cost of rest facilities due to the loss of first class seating and out

- of

- service time required for infrastructure installation. The FAA re

- analyzed the facility cost based upon the actual numbers and types of facilities that w ill need to be put in by querying the inspectors for the fleet of airplanes

. The FAA assumed the worst case scenario (all Class 1 facilities)

. The FAA recalculated the number of airplanes needing additional upgraded rest facilities

. Based on the existing fleet , the FAA estimates 225 airplanes used in passenger operati ons w ill need Class 1 facilities

. In addition, the
FAA re

- estimated compliance costs of optimizing existing equipment and installing first class facilities

. We have also estimated downtime and additional fuel burn costs

. The final rule rest facility costs include purchase, design and engineering, physical installation of the facilities on the affected aircraft, downtime impact on revenue, and fuel burn cost

. Therefore, the cost of rest facilities was estimated to the full extent in the final rule. The comme nters stated that the FAA’s cost analysis does not factor in the costs of the cumulative limits

. The FAA notes that all known constraints including the final rule monthly and annual constraints were imbedded in CP optimization

.9 The commenters submitted th at the FAA assumed for the NPRM that the industry’s collective bargaining agreements (CBAs) will be renegotiated to permit carriers to adapt to the new rules without any additional costs to the carriers and also assumes that any short term costs that resul t from conflicts between the new rule and existing CBAs should not be “counted” as part of the NPRM

. The final rule does not require renegotiation of current CBAs

. In the final rule the FAA did not calculate potential gains based on the renegotiation of C BAs

. The final rule will give a
two

- year buffer for carriers to implement all provisions

. The FAA still believes that CBA negotiations could result in a change of economic interests between carriers and crewmembers

. Any such change is a transfer of benefit s and costs between carriers and bargaining units

. Such transfers would be negotiated between parties and transfers do not change the total cost and benefits to society

. Many entities conducting supplemental operations stated that the rule would cause the nature of their operations to significantly change, which would result in lost revenue opportunities or much higher cost, or both. The FAA adopted significant modifications in the final rule to mitigate the impact on supplemental operations

. For example, in the final rule, the FAA made compliance with P art 117 voluntary for cargo - only operations

. With regard to supplemental passenger operations, t he FAA increas ed both the augmented and unaugmented FDP limits from the NPRM

. The FAA also increased the split

- duty credit and made that credit easier to obtain

. In addition, the FAA notes that s ection 119.55 provides the mechanism to obtain deviation from existing regulations for military missions

. Taken together the FAA has provided substantial flexibility for su pplemental10 operations, and as a result, permits most existing revenue opportunities relative to flight safety risks based on the past ten years of NTSB accident findings. The commenters contend that the FAA assumes, without any evidence, that there will be a reduction in absenteeism due to “improved fatigue management,” and that reduced absenteeism costs will offset part of the cost of the NPRM. The FAA believes that the final rule will improve productivity and reduce absenteeism by the enhanced fatigue man agement system

. Center f or Disease Control ( CDC ) research shows that chronic fatigue can cause illness and even death. 5 Comments and data received from Air Line Pilots Association (ALPA), the largest independent pilots’ union in the world, devoting more th an 20 percent of its dues income to support aviation safety, validated the FAA’s estimation of cost saving from reducing flightcrew members fatigue and absenteeism

. Commenters questioned that there is no justification provided that sick leave use will be reduced by five percent

. The FAA notes that a study in the railroad industry found that fatigue counter measures reduced a bsenteeism from 4.79 percent to 1.94 percent, a decrease of 40 percent. 6 In addition, this Initial Supplemental RIA provides a sensitivity analysis on this assumption which can be found in Appendix B. Commenters contended that accidents involving two pilots and a flight engineer should be analyzed separately because in the modern era almost all flights are operated without a fligh t engineer

.

5 CDC ’ s MMWR, Weekly, February 29, 2008 / 57(08);200

- 203 6 Sherry, “Fatigue Countermeasures in the Railroad Industry: Past and Current Developments,” Association of American Railroads , 2000.11 This rule does not distinguish between accidents involving a flight engineer and accidents without a flight engineer because it is difficult to attribute specific amounts of fatigue and accident causality to a flight engineer

. More specifically, it is difficult to predict in a fatigue

related accident, how the two pilots would have handled the aircraft in question if a flight engineer had not been present. As such, because it is unclear how much flight

- engineer fatigue contributed to past accidents and that this rule does not prohibit flight engineers from working on the flight deck, the original RIA used for this rule does not distinguish between accidents involving two pilots and those involving a flight engineer

. Some commenters s tated that the FAA simply ignores flight cancellation costs despite the fact that of the NPRM will result in substantial increases in flight cancellations. As discussed above, the FAA calculated the scheduling costs of this rule by running the pertinent da ta through the Cygnus crew scheduling optimization model

. The Cygnus model did not indicate that there would be an increase in cancellations as a result of the changes imposed by this rule

. This is because certificate holders will be able to use their exis ting staff members to cover the scheduled flights. It was argued by commenters that by excluding the cost of schedule buffering required by multiple provisions of the NPRM, the FAA has omitted the major source of cost to the industry. There are a few major changes related to crew scheduling made in the final rule from the NPRM, which significantly reduced the cost to the industry. The pertinent changes from the NPRM are: (1) a flight extension for unexpected circumstances that arise after takeoff, and (2)
t he removal of the requirement that “circumstances beyond the control of the certificate holder” have to be present in order to utilize the 2

- hour FDP extension for certain unforeseen operational circumstances

. Using the crew pairing optimizer to simulate o peration schedule, costs that are12 attributable to the final rule were estimated to the full extent, including the cost of schedule buffering. The schedule optimization included buffers on flight and FDP limits to account for operational delays. The comment ers further stated that the FAA has omitted the cost estimation attributable to the provision of “three consecutive nights” (section 117.27, NPRM), which is more likely to impact cargo carriers partly because they have a substantial concentration of operat ion s during the night time period and flight crew that are accustomed to night time operations. As an initial matter, the FAA notes that, based on the cost

- benefit analysis, cargo - only operations are not covered by the final rule

. However, b ased on industry comments the FAA has mitigated the burden to cargo operators who may choose to operate under P art 117 by reducing (to two hours) the length of “mid

- duty rest” that is necessary to schedule five consecutive nighttime FDPs. Moreover , UPS and FedEx stated in their comments that they currently provide their flightcrew members with a mid

- duty breaks that are , on average, two hours long

. Because the final rule permits five consecutive nights with two

- hour breaks, the impact of the consecutive

- nig ht provision on c argo - only operators such as UPS and FedEx will be minimal should they choose to operate under Part 117. The consecutive nights rule is included in CP optimization. The commenters also argued that, under the FAA’s cost

- benefit methodology, there is no benefit to limiting duty time below 15 hours

. The FAA agrees the risk of accident prevalence in the 15 th hour block and beyond is much greater than that associated with duty times short of the 15 th hour block

. To evaluate this proposition, the FAA computed ratios of accidents to exposure duty hours (dividing accidents in a sequence of flight hour blocks by pilot exposure duty hours), which substantiated the13 conclusion that accident risk steeply increases in the 15 th hour block and beyond

. Howev er, the FAA has also determined that FDPs of less than 15 hours can lead to unacceptably high accident risk

. For example, the statistic al evidence indicates that the ratio of accidents to block hour s rises
at a fast rate in the 13 th to 14 th hour block rang e . Therefore, the regulation of flight duty time being limited under the 15 th hour block is necessary and beneficial. Allied Pilots Association (APA) generally supported the NPRM but stated that the FAA overestimated computer programming cost, fatigue trai ning costs due to overstated training , pay and rest facility installation costs

. In addition, APA commented that the FAA underestimated the schedule optimization factor and the agility of air carriers when motivated to achieve efficiency. The computer prog raming cost is a very small component of airline operation cost

. Overall, the operation cost in the final rule was revised and turned out to be lower than that of
NPRM

. The f atigue training cost was revised to be lower than that of NPRM because of the chan ges made to the proposed fatigue training requirements by the final rule

. The revised rest facility installation cost was also lower than that of the NPRM

. APA’s comment on the overestimation of the NPRM cost was based on the assumption that long

- term opti mization will
occur at a much faster rate than implicit in the cost analysis, which would result in more savings in the long run than in the short run

. The FAA agrees that long

- term optimization of air carriers could be greater than expected

. The FAA belie ves that the crew scheduling optimizer program provides a better estimate to the final rule

. Therefore, the FAA believes that the final rule cost estimates incorporating crew scheduling optimization model accurately reflect the compliance
costs

. ATA's Oli ver Wyman analysis on September 14, 2011, “Estimated Job Loss Resulting from Flightcrew Member Duty and Rest Requirements” attached to the ATA petition on Flight,14 Duty and Rest asserted that the proposed rule would cause the loss of nearly 17,000 U.S. airline jobs, which would result in total job losses to the economy of 398,000 jobs. The FAA believes that ATA’s analysis of the jobs impact from the proposed Flight crew Member Duty and Rest Rule is inaccurate

. ATA’s jobs impact analysis is based on its es timate, derived from its analysis of the NPRM, that this rule will cost $19.6 billion over a 12

- year period

. However, many of the major provisions of the final rule have been significantly altered from the NPRM, and, as discussed elsewhere, the FAA estimat es that the final rule will cost approximately $ 4 57 million in nominal terms over 1 2 years . This $ 4 57 million cost is significantly smaller than the $19.6 billion cost on which ATA based its job impact analysis

. CrewPairing’s analysis of the final rule res ults in no change in pilot employment. Therefore, the FAA does not agree with ATA’s job impact findings. With regard to the accidents that were used to calculate the benefits for this rule, some commenters stated that t he ATI 2/16/95 flight (RT2) was a P ar t 91 ferry flight , and that the issues leading to that flight’s accident have been addressed by other rulemakings

. Consequently, the commenters assert, this flight would not be permitted under current rules. This comment refers to an accident involving ATI in Kansas City during a nighttime Part 91 engine

- out ferry flight in a 4

- engine DC

- 8

. Prior to takeoff, the flight engineer had improperly determined the minimum control speed on the ground (VMCG), which produced a value that was 9 knots too low

. On the f irst takeoff attempt, the pilot applied power too soon to the “asymmetrical engine” (the serviceable engine on the side with the failed engine) and was unable to maintain directional control during the takeoff roll

. He rejected the takeoff and, in preparation for a second takeoff, the pilot agreed to have the flight engineer advance the throttle on the next takeoff attempt

. This conflicted with the prescribed procedure

.15 At 3,215 feet into the takeoff roll, the DC

- 8 s tarted to veer to the left

. At 3 , 806 feet, the aircraft rotated with a tail strike but the tail remained in contact with the runway for another 820 feet

. At 5,250 feet, the aircraft became airborne and climbed to 100 feet, then sank and crashed.
All three crew members were killed. NTSB focused on two core issues

. First, NTSB found that the crew was flying after a shortened rest break, since rest periods were not required for ferry flights

. According to the report, the crew was fatigued from lack of rest and lack of sleep, and from disrupted circadian rhythms

. Second, NTSB found that the crew did not have adequate, realistic training in techniques or procedures for a 3

- engine takeoff

. NTSB added that the crew did not adequately understand 3

- engine takeoff, an d did not adequately understand the significance of VMCG. In response to an NTSB recommendation related to training crews for a 3

- engine takeoff (A

- 95

- 39) , FAA issued a Flight Standards Information Bulletin (FSIB)

. The FSIB directed FAA principal operation s inspectors to inform their respective operators to take additional measures to ensure: (1) that aircraft manual requirements for engine

- out ferry flights are clear; (2) that crew training segments are clearly outlined for engine

- out operations; and (3) t hat operators use only crews specifically trained and certified for engine

- out operations

. This has become FAA policy and NTSB found the action acceptable and closed the recommendation. Consequently, the comment is appropriate to the degree that it address es the issue of training, which is not part of the proposed rule

. However, FAA believes that this flight also illustrates the role and risks associated with fatigue, which the FSIB noted above did not address

. With or without training in three

- engine takeo ffs, NTSB’s findings on fatigue in this accident remain pertinent to this rulemaking.16 

## Benefit/Cost Summary

In this Initial Supplemental RIA , w e have analyzed the benefits and the costs associated with the requirements contained in this final rul e and our e stimates are summarized in Table 3 and Table 4

. The final rule was changed significantly from the NPRM

. The training requirement ha d be en substantially reduced because the FAA has determined that pilots are already receiving the requisite training as part of the statutorily required Fatigue Risk Management Plans

. The FAA also removed cargo - only operations from the applicability section of the new P art 117 because their estimated co mpliance costs as shown in the original RIA significantly exceed the quantified societal benefits. 7 This Initial Supplemental RIA revis e s and corrects the calculations used to estimate the costs and benefits of t he final rule as it applies to passenger operations and to the estimates of costs and benefits if the rule were extended to cargo

- only operations. The costs associated with computer programing and rest facilities occur in the two years after the rule is pu blished

. The other costs of the rule and the benefits are then estimated over the next ten years. We provide a range of estimates for the quantitative benefits of the final rule as it applies to passenger operations

. Our base case estimate is $ 401 million ($ 263 million present value at

seven percent and $ 332 million at three percent ) and our high case estimate is $ 757 m illion ($ 497 m illion present valu e at seven percent and $ 627 million at three percent )

. The total estimated cost of the final rule as it applies to passenger operations is $ 4 57 m illion ( $ 338 million

7 Carriers may choose to have their cargo

- only operations comply with the new Part 117 but are not required to do so. Since the carrier would decide voluntarily to comply with the new requirements, those costs are not attributed to the costs of this rule

.17 present value at seven percent and $ 398 million at three percent )

. Therefore, the costs of the final rule are somewhat higher than the base case benefits estimate but well below the high c ase estimate. If the final rule were extended to cover cargo

- only operations, the base case estimate of benefits for that population is $ 5 million ($ 3 million present value at seven percent and $ 4 million at three percent) and our high case estimate is $ 31 million ($ 21 million present value at seven percent and $ 26 million at three percent). In comparison total estimated cost of the final rule for that same population if it were extended to cargo

- only operations is estimated to be $ 550 million ( $ 377 million present value at seven percent and $ 464 million at three percent ). This cost estimate far exceeds both the base and high case estimates of benefits.
Table 3 : Summary of Benefits and Costs, Passenger Operations

Estimates Total Nominal

Cost (millions) PV Cost at 7% (millions) PV Cost at 3% (millions) Total Benefits

- Base Case $401 $263 $332 Total Benefits

- High Case $757 $497 $627 Total Costs $457 $338 $398
Net Benefits

- Base Case

- $56

- $75

- $66 Net Benefits

- High Case $301 $159 $22918 Table 4 : Summary of Benefits and Costs, Cargo
- only Operations

Estimates Total Nominal

Cost (millions) PV Cost at 7% (millions) PV Cost at 3% (millions) Total Benefits

- Base Case $5 $3 $4 Total Benefits

- High Case $31 $21 $26
Total Costs $550 $ 377 $ 464
Net Benefits

- Base Case

- $545

- $ 37 4

- $ 459 Net Benefits

- High Case

- $ 519

- $ 357

- $ 438 

## Benefit Analysis
This rule is intended to address the problem of fatigued pilots flying in Part 121 commercial service. The nature and extent of the problem is such that t he NTSB continues to list pilot fatigue as one of the Most Wanted Transportation Safety Improvements

. The NTSB recommendations are based on accident investigations and the N TSB safety study on airline safety. The requirements contained in this final rule address both NTSB recommendations and existing public law

. This benefit estimate first examines the nature of fatigue, followed by its causes and how it relates to transporta tion. Second , we summarize some recent findings on fatigue and occupational performance. Next, we look at the magnitude of flight crew fatigue in
Part 121 passenger operations by briefly examin ing fatigue reports in the context of this final rule . We then r e - analyze the likely effectiveness of the requirements contained in this final rule and the potential to decrease these types of accidents in the future. We project a likely number of preventable events that will occur in absence of this final rule

. Finally, we estimate the benefits that will be derived from preventing such events

. We provide a base case estimate, and a high

case estimate, in addition to a threshold/break even analysis

. The Initial Supplemental RIA also19 presents both base and high cas e estimates of the benefits if the final rule were extended to
cargo - only operations. 

### The Nature of Fatigue Most fatigue studies agree that, “fatigue refers to a subjective desire to rest and an aversion to further work, coupled with an objective decrease in performance.” 8 Fatigue is characterized by:

• “increasingly frequent lapses in performance,

• general cognitive slowing, including a lowering of optimum performance,

• memory problems,

• time on task decrements, and

• an increasing inability to maintain the vig ilance required to perform the tasks required.” 9
Fatigue has been described as “a nonspecific symptom because it can be indicative of many causes or conditions including physiological states such as sleep deprivation....[s]ome describe fatigue in terms of ph ysiological data or ‘objective’ observations of...decrements in work or performance....or time

- related deterioration in the ability to perform certain mental tasks.” 10 While physiological criteria related to fatigue can be readily measureable, subjective feelin gs of fatigue are not directly observable, and in some instances individuals who are

8 Jones, et al., “Working hours regulations and fatigue in transportation: A comparative analysis,” Safety Science , Vol. 43, 2005. 9 Ibid. 10 Torres

- Harding, Susan and Leonard A. Jason, “What is Fatigue? History and Epidemiology,” Fatigue as a Window to the Brain , edited by John DeLuca

. The MIT Press, 3

- 18, 2007.20 exhibiting diminished performance levels also feel confident in their ability to focus and perform assigned tasks. 

### Causes of Fatigue

A number of factors increase the risk of fatigue.

• Time of day is very important, because the body follows a rhythm over an approximately
24

- hour period, often referred to as a circadian cycle

.

• The amount of recent sleep that a person has received also affects the level of fatigue risk; most pe ople need an average of eight hours of sleep per 24 hour period

.

• The number of continuous hours awake also increases fatigue risk, and for most individuals, once the number of continuous hours awake exceeds 17, fatigue risk increases significantly

.

• Sleep debt, the difference between the amount of sleep needed to be fully rested and actual sleep, also contributes to fatigue

. Sleep debt accumulates over time, and fatigue risk is higher if sleep debt exceeds eight hours

.

• Work load and time on task can also affect fatigue risk

. If work intensity is high and/or there is a long continuous period of time on task, the risk of fatigue increases. 

### Fatigue and Transportation The nature of work in the transportation sector makes that sector especially susceptible to

r isks to performance, vigilance and response to hazards that are associated with fatigue

. Workdays of those responsible for the safety of transportation operations can be characterized by long work periods, often at nighttime or early morning hours

. Because transportation workers21 must sometimes rest or sleep away from home, conditions for rest and sleep quality are also important. Analysts have examined the links between the specific features of work in the transportation industry, including commercia l aviation, and the general features of human physiology and fatigue for decades

. For commercial aviation, it has been nearly two decades since the first citation of fatigue as a probable cause for a major aviation accident

. This accident, the crash of Ame rican International Airways flight 808 at Guantanamo Naval Air Station, Cuba, on August 18, 1993, was investigated by the N TSB

. Probable causes of the accident identified by the NTSB included “the impaired judgment, decision making, and flying abilities of the captain and flightcrew due to the effects of fatigue...” As part of the investigation of that accident, NASA researchers and contractors performed an analysis of the links between aviation risks and the effects of fatigue on human vigilance and perform ance . This research was reported as part of the NTSB report on the Guantanamo Bay accident and the research was later revised for inclusion in an NTSB report on
DOT efforts to address fatigue issues in t ransportation. 11
This NTSB research and literature sum mary provides a thorough and well

- documented review of these issues

. In the 1999 restatement of the research results in the context of addressing fatigue issues in transportation generally, the following summary is provided: Fatigue, sleep loss and circadi an disruption created by transportation operations can degrade performance, alertness and safety

. An extensive scientific

11 Rosekind, et.al., “Appendix C: Summary of Sleep and Circadian Rhythms,” Evaluation of U.S. Department of Transportation Efforts in the 1990s to Address Operator Fatigue. Washington D.C. NTSB Safety Report NTSB/SR

99/01, May 1999, pp.67

- 81

. http://www3.ntsb.gov/publictn/1999/sr9901.pdf22 literature exists that provides important physiological information about the human operator, which can be used to guide operations an d policy

. For example, there are human physiological requirements for sleep, predictable effects of sleep loss on performance and alertness and patterns for recovery from sleep loss

. Additionally, the circadian clock is a powerful modulator of human perfor mance and alertness, and in transportation operations, it can be disrupted by night work, time zone changes, and day/night duty shifts

. Scientific examination of these physiological considerations has documented a direct relationship to errors, accidents a nd safety

. This scientific information can provide important input to policy and regulatory considerations. 

### Recent Findings on Fatigue and Occupational Performance Fatigue is prevalent in the U.S. workforce, with nearly 38 percent of workers reporting fat igue during a two

- week period. 12 The National Sleep Foundation conducted a poll in 2008, which found that 29 percent have fallen asleep or become very sleepy while at work and two percent did not go to work due to sleepiness or a sleep problem. 13 Numerous st udies have found that fatigue can significantly reduce productivity

. A review of published studies on shift work and productivity found a large decrease in efficiency during the night shift, with the low occurring at 3:00 a m . On average, the authors found that productivity was five percent lower at night. 14

12 Ricci, et al., “Fatigue in the U.S. workforce: prevalence, and implications for lost productive work time,” Occup Environ Med , Vol. 49(1): 1

- 10, 2007. 13 National Sleep Foundation, “2008 Sleep in America Poll: Summary of Findings.” 14 Folkard and Tucker, “Sh ift work, safety and productivity,” Occupational Medicine , Vol. 53, 2003.23 A large

- scale study was conducted at 40 companies and institutions in the Netherlands to investigate the relationship between fatigue and future sickness absence

. The presence of fatigue was measured usin g self

- reported symptoms, with employers providing absence data

. The study controlled for numerous sociodemographic and work characteristics

. The investigators found that higher levels of fatigue were statistically significant predictors of both short

- term and long

- term sickness absence. 15 A study was conducted to estimate fatigue prevalence and associated health

- related lost productive time (LPT) in U.S. workers

. The investigators found that workers with fatigue were much more likely to report health

- relate d LPT, with a cost of $136.4 billion annually

. This amount exceeded health

- related LPT reported by workers without fatigue by $101.0 billion. A study compared the rate of errors made by medical residents working in the ICU on 80

- hour weeks versus those on 63 hour weeks

. The residents with the shorter work week schedule experienced half the rate of attention failures

. The residents with the longer work week schedule made serious medical errors (those causing or having the potential to cause harm to a patient ) at a rate 22 percent higher than the residents with the shorter work week schedule. 16 The railroad industry is at a relatively high risk of fatigue, due to typical 24

- hour per day operations

. A number of railroads have implemented fatigue countermeasures, which generally reduced absenteeism

. For instance, after implementation of fatigue countermeasures for CANALERT, absenteeism decreased from 8.1 to 3.2 percent

. After fatigue countermeasures were implemented for the Conrail

- Buffalo

- Toledo IMPAC project, a statistically significant

15 Janssen, et al., “Fatigue as a predictor of sickness absence: results from the Maastricht cohort study on fatigue at work,” Occup Environ Med , 2003, 60(Suppl I): i71

- i76. 16 Board o n Health Sciences Policy, “Sleep Disorders and Sleep Deprivation: An Unmet Public Health Problem,” The National Academies Press , 2006.24 increase in attendance from 95.21 percent to 98.06 percent was observed. 17 This data demonstrates the potential for fatigue issues, which we will now examine within the specific requirements of this final rule

.


### A viation S afety R eporting S ystem (ASRS) One can observe fatigue in aviation by examining the Aviation Safety Reporting System (ASRS)

. The ASRS collects, analyzes, and responds to voluntarily submitted aviation safety incident reports in order to lessen the likelihood of a viation accidents. It is part of a continuing effort by government, industry, and individuals to maintain and improve aviation safety by collecting voluntarily submitted aviation safety incident/situation reports from pilots, controllers, and others . The d ata in the ASRS is used to:

• Identify deficiencies and discrepancies in the National Aviation System (NAS) so that these can be remedied by appropriate authorities.

• Support policy formulation and planning for, and improvements to, the NAS.

• Strengthen the foundation of aviation human factors safety research. This is particularly important since it is generally conceded that over two

- thirds of all aviation accidents and incidents have their roots in human performance errors.
ASRS assures confidentiality and data cannot be traced back to individual operators

. So although we cannot claim the rule could prevent any specific ASRS events, it is a useful tool in evaluating and validating the presence of fatigue in Part 121 operations

. We performed a query

17 Sherry, “Fatigue Countermeasures in the Railroad Industry: Past and Current Developments,” Association of American Rail roads , 2000.25 for P art 121 ASRS for f atigue

. 18 Since June of 2009, there were a total of 256 reports where fatigue was cited as a factor

. We have neither culled the data nor edited any of the data that was reported to ASRS

. The top seven results are listed in Table 5

. Table 5 : ASRS Part 121 Fatigue Reports Result Total Relative % General None Reported / Taken (No action was taken as a result of the fatigue issue reported) 68 26.6 %
General Work Refused (Fatigue caused a worker to refuse an 21 8.2% General Maintenance Action (Typically a fatigue event related to a maintenance issue

— not related to this final rule ). 14 5.5%
Flight Crew Became Reoriented (Confusion related to some type of malfunction.) 10 3.9%
Flight Crew Took Evasive Action (Crew took action to avoid an accident or incident) 8 3.1%
Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance (Substitute clearance given to get back on track) 5 2.0%

Flight Crew Executed Go Around / Missed Approach 5 2.0%
One captain on an international flight described an onerous flight sequence in the Pacific he believed to be unsafe due to cumulative and predictable fatigue: This report concerns a trans

- Pacific flight assignment including back to back all night pairings (body clock), two un

- augmented inter

- Asia segments and 36 hours of flight time. We started the sequence with a 12.7 hour actual flight, single augmented with a n hour plus delay on the front end. When we arrived we

18 We believe that this is a very conservative approach because other human factors can reveal fatigue, such as confusion and communications breakdown

. 19 Reason, James. “Human Error,” Cambridge University Press, 1990.26 cabbed to downtown for an additional 1.5 hours on the body before rest. The first internal Asia leg is all night, un

- augmented. The return leg is daylight

- but all night body time

- followed by another 1. 5 hour cab ride downtown. The [opportunities for] rest were insufficient to maintain any alertness particularly on the last leg. Both the First Officer and I experienced periods of unintended sleep while at the controls. No amount of coffee or mental disci pline was sufficient to stay awake!!! This is unsafe and made more unsafe by requiring: 1. Over 12 hours single augmented on the first leg. 2. Two un

- augmented legs on the back side of the clock with long preflight awake hours. 3. Over 8 extra hours of "du ty time" in CABS!!! Rework this trip before someone gets hurt. No one in the cockpit for the last 6 hours was at their peak to respond to irregular situations. We weren't even able to stay awake the whole time in the seat.
E ven if no anomalies occur during a flight, a fatigued crew may be poorer problem solvers than well

- rested crews as noted in the research cited above, and thus add a degree of risk to the system. In addition, taking eva sive action and missed approaches because of fatigue are serious safet y events indicating substantial risk manifesting in the current system

. 

### Effectiveness of Final Rule

It is usually the case that multiple factors can be identified as causes of specific accidents, and it is seldom the case that a specific rule is 100 perce nt effective at addressing a variety of accident causal factors. In particular, fatigue is rarely a primary or sole cause of an accident, and therefore this final rule will not likely prevent all future fatigue related accidents

. For this final regulatory evaluation, we have established a modified effectiveness ratio to categorize accidents for which fatigue may be a contributing causal factor. This number represent s the likelihood the27 requirements contained in this final rule would have prevented an accide nt from occurring

. It is applied in the calculation of the number of forecasted fatigue accidents , if no action was taken to address the fatigue problem in Part 121 operations

. In its analysis of the effectiveness of the final rule , the FAA reviewed accid ents that could have be en prevented or could have been influenced by the requirements contained in this final rule

. The effectiveness analysis works by assess ing the likely capa bility of the requirements contained in the final rule to have prevented those accidents

. As part of this analysis, t he FAA Office of Accident Investigation reviewed the accident reports from NTSB and foreign investigative authorities on all accidents where the NTSB cited fatigue or fatigue was thought to be either a cause or factor

. This was done in order to assess the likelihood that the provisions of the final rule w ould have averted those accidents (including positioning flights operating under Part 91)

. A consistent definition was applied to the 20

- year history as the req uirements of the rule apply to all Part 121 operations. As such, we reviewed the accident history for all operations that would currently operate under Part 121

. The final analysis take s into account NTSB findings,
FAA’s independent assessment, and comment s to the docket

. Some accidents reviewed scored “zero” because fatigue could not be established as a significant factor or because the final rule would not prevent such an event had the requirements been in place today

. These accidents were removed from ou r effectiveness analysis and forecast

. This discussion focuses on incidents involving passenger operations, b ecause this final rule does not mandate compliance with Part 117 for cargo - only operations

. H owever, this Initial Supplemental RIA provides estimates of both base and high case benefits if the final rule were extended to cargo

- only operations which

are based on the same methodology discussed here for passenger operations.28 Each accident was then re - evaluated by conducting a scoring pr ocess similar to that conducted by the Commercial Aviation Safety Team (CAST), a well

- documented and well understood procedure , similar to the NPRM

. The FAA Office of Accident Investigation used the NTSB recommendations along with narratives, probable caus e, contributing factors and other pertinent data to score the accidents

. When these accidents were not well defined in the probable cause or contributing factors statements of the NTSB reports, Accident Investigation used a Joint Implementation Monitoring Data Analysis Team (JIMDAT)

- like method

. The JIMDAT

- type scoring system is from zero to five , and the score is based on the likelihood that a proposed action would have mitigated that accident

. The level and percentage of effectiveness criteria are detaile d in Table 6

. Table 6 : JIMDAT
- Type Scoring System

5 90% effectiveness

. The proposed requirement directly addresses the NTSB causal factors and would very likely prevent the accident in the future.
4 75% effectiveness

. The proposed requirement directly addresses the majority of the NTSB causal factors and would probably prevent or is likely to reduce the risk of the respective accident, given the circumstances that prevailed.
3 50 % effectiveness

. The proposed requirement directly addresses one of several NTSB causal factors and is likely to reduce the risk of the respective accident, given the circumstances that prevailed

. 2 35% effectiven ess . The proposed requirement generally addresses the NTSB causal factors and is likely to reduce the risk of the respective accident, given the circumstances that prevailed

. 1 15% effectiveness

. The proposed requirement is likely to have reduced the ris k of the respective accident, given the circumstances that prevailed. 0 0% effectiveness

. The proposed requirement would not reduce the risk of this type of accident in the future.

FAA applied this methodology to each pilot fatigue accident to reach an overall effectiveness ratio for the requirements contained in this final rule

. The qualitative assessments ranged from zero (0) to very low (1), low (2), moderate (3), high (4) , and very high (5)

. The29 qualitative assessments then were converted to quantita tive effectiveness scores as follows: zero; 15%; 35%; 50%; 75%; and 90%.
For both the original RIA and this Initial Supplemental RIA, the F AA presents the quantified benefits and effectiveness analysis for a 10

- year period

. Although we only forecast ten years of benefits, w e have included a 20

- year history of accidents involving passenger operations , as these are the circumstances and events which have led to this final rulemaking

. Table 7 summarizes the past 20 years of pilot fatigue accident s . A ppendi x A contain s a summary of each accident and the corresponding effectiveness analys e s .30 Table 7 : 20
- Ye ar Accident History
Date Location Service Carrier A/C On Bd Ftl Ser Dam
age Scenario Score 02/17/1991 Cleveland, OH 121 Cargo Ryan International DC

- 9

- 15 2 2 0 Dest LOC Climb

- out; Icing 0.5 08/18/1993 GTMO, Cuba 121 Cargo Konnie Kallita DC

- 8 3 0 3 Dest Landed Short 0.9 07/02/1994 Charlotte, NC 121 Pax US Air MD

- 82 57 37 16 Dest LOC on Approach; Icing 0.15 02/16/1995 Kansas City, MO Ferry ATI DC

- 8

- 63 3 3 0 Dest LOC in RTO; Engine Out 0.9 12/20/1995 Cali, Colombia 121 Pax American B757 164 160 4 Dest CFIT High 0.35 08/25/1996 JFK, NY 121 Pax TWA L1011 262 0 0 Sub Tail Strike Landing 0.35 01/22/1999 Hyannis, MA Positioning Colgan Air (Part 91) BE

- 1900 4 0 0 Dest Hard Landing (BETA) 0.15 05/08/1999 JFK, NY 121 Pax American Eagle SF34 30 0 1 Sub RE Landing 0.5 06/01/1999 Little Rock, AR 121 Pax American MD

- 82 145 11 45 Dest RE Landing 0.15

07/26/2002 Tallahassee, FL 121 Cargo FedEx B7 2 7

- 2 00 3 0 3 Dest CFIT Low on Approach 0.75

10/19/2004 Kirksville, MO 121 Pax Corporate Airlines as American Connexion BAE

- 32 15 13 2 Dest CFIT Low on Approach 0. 75

08/27/2006 Lexington, KY 121 Pax Comair as Delta Connection CRJ

- 200 50 49 1 Dest Wrong Runway T/O 0.35

02/18/2007 Cleveland, OH 121 Pax Shuttle America as Delta Connection ERJ

- 170 74 0 0 Sub RE Landing 0.5

04/12/2007 Traverse City, MI 121 Pax Pinnacle as NW Express CRJ

- 200 52 0 0 Sub RE Landing 0.9 06/20/2007 Laramie, WY 121 Pax Great Lakes BE

- 1900 11 0 0 Sub LOC Bounced Landing 0.15 02/12/2009 Buffalo 121 Pax Colgan Air DHC

- 8

- Q400 49 50 0 Dest LOC In Flight; RE Landing 0.5 Passenger Average 52.5%31 James Reason characterizes major accidents and catastrophic system failures as the consequences of multiple, smaller failures that lead up to the actual accident. It is a “ Swiss cheese” model of human error and also a sequential theory of accident causation. 19 Reason’s model describes four levels of human failure, each one influencing the next. O rganizational influences lead to instances of unsafe supervision which in turn lead to preconditions for unsafe

acts and ultimately the unsafe acts of operators . The unsafe acts of operators are where most acciden t investigations are focused . It is a useful framework to illustrate how analyses of major accidents and catastrophic systems fail ures tend to reveal multiple, smaller failures leading up to the actual accident

. The chances of the exact same circumstances happening again and causing the “same accident” are virtually nil but the possibility of preventing a similar set of circumstances is real

. This sequential “Swiss cheese” formulation is a very appropriate tool for characterizing the circumstances leading up to accidents

. The nature of fatigue is such that actions, reactions and the thought processes of fatigued crews are more suscep tible to the types of cascading errors of judgment described in Reason ’s model of catastrophic failure

. The requirements contained in this final rule will decrease pilot fatigue and therefore t he accompanying accidents that are associated with fatigue . Whi le it is very difficult to accurately attribute all past accidents to one or more causes indisputably, we have developed the average effectiveness measure to apply to the estimates and recognize that there are additional uncertainties with preventing a fut ure fatigue related event

. First, w e examine an accident that occurred on October 19, 2004:

19 Reason, James. “Human Error,” Cambridge University Press, 1990.32 At about 1937 central daylight time, a Corporate Airlines BAE Systems BAE

- J3201, struck trees on final approach and crashed short of runway 36 at Kirksville Regiona l Airport, in Kirksville, Missouri. The captain, first officer, and 11 of the 13 passengers were fatally injured, and two passengers received serious injuries. The airplane was destroyed by impact and a post

impact fire. 20
Re search and accident history indic ate that fatigue can ca u se pilot s to make ri sky, impul s ive decisions, to become fixated on one aspect of a s itua tion, and to react s lo w ly to warnings or signs that an approach s hould be discontinued. Fatigue especially affects decision making , and res earch shows t hat people w ho are fatigued be co me le ss able to consider options and are more likel y to become fixated on a course of action or a de s ired outcome. A fatigued pilot might fail to discontinue a flawed approach or might make a risky de c i sion to c ontinue a dangerous approach

. The fatigued crew reported for duty at 0514. The a ccident was near end of 6th sector on a 'demanding' day. Crew had been on duty 14.5 hours and the pilot in command ( PIC ) is said to have slept poorly night before

. The captain was observed resting on a sma ll couch in the
company crew room ; however , the quality of rest the captain obtained during this time could not be determined. Company pilot s state d that the crew room was a noi sy meeting area that was not ide a l for sleeping.

20 The NTSB evaluated fatigue as a possible factor in this accident and looked at the various circumstances present the day of the accident that might have contributed to the pilots ’ fatigue

. The pilots ’ available rest time (from about 2100 to 0400) did not correspond favorably with either pilots ’ reported usual sleeping hours, resulting in much earlier than normal times to go to sleep and awaken

. Additionally, the early wakeup call times would have been challenging to both pilots because the human body is no rmally physiologically primed to sleep between 0300 and 0500

.33 Additionally, the pilots' high workload during their long d ay ma y have in creased their fatigue. The acc iden t occurred during the s ixth flight s egment of the day while the pilots were performing a non

- precision approach in lo w cei lings and reduced visibilit y. The pilot deficiencies observed in this accident are co nsi ste nt with fatigue imp a irment. Similarly, although the fir st officer 's junior stat us wi th the co mpan y ma y have been an
i ss ue in hi s failure to cha llenge the captain during the approach, he may also have been suffering from fatigue; his failure to mon i tor and react to the captain's deviat i ons from non - precision approach procedures was consistent with the degrading effects (slowed reactions and/or tunne l vision) of f at i gue . The NTSB concluded that , on the basis of the l ess than optimal overnight rest time available , the early reporting time for duty , the length of the duty day , the number of flight legs , the demanding conditions (non

- prec i sion instrument approaches flown manually in conditions of
l ow ceilings and reduced v i sib i lities) encountered during the long duty day (an d the two previous day s), it i s likely that fatigue contr i buted to the pilots ' degraded performance and decision

making. Another fatigue related accident occurred in Traverse City, Michigan on April 12, 2007

. The accident occurred well after midnight at the end of a demanding day during which the pilots had flown 8.35 hours, made five landings, had been on duty more than 14 hours, and been awake more than 16 hours. During the accident flight, the cockpit voice recorder ( CVR ) recorded numerous yawns and comments that indicate that the pilots were fatigued. Additionally, the captain made references to being tired at 2332:12, 2341:53, and 0018:43, and the first officer stated, “je ez, I’m tired” at 0020:41. Additionally, the pilots’ high workload (flying in incle ment weather conditions, and in the captain’s case, providing operating experience for the first officer)34 during their long day likely increased their fatigue

. The aircraft ran off the departure end of the runway during snowy conditions. Although there were no injuries among the 49 passengers, the aircraft was substantially damaged

. As we observe a clear accident history and the accompanying science dealing with fatigue, it is apparent that fatigue threatens aviation safety by increas ing the risk of pilot error that could lead to an accident

. Fatigue is characterized by a general lack of alertness and degradation in mental and physical performance

. Fatigue manifests in the av iation context not only when pilots fall asleep in the cockpit while cruising, but perhaps more importantly, when they are insufficiently alert during take

- off and landing

. Each flight segment that is flown by a flightcrew member includes a takeoff and a l anding, which are the most task and safety

- intensive parts of the flight

. A flightcrew member whose FDP consists of a single flight segment only has to perform one takeoff and landing, while a flightcrew member whose FDP consists of six flight segments wil l have to perform six sets of takeoffs and landings

. Because takeoffs and landings are extremely task

- intensive, it logically follows that a flightcrew member who has performed six sets of takeoffs and landings will be more fatigued than the flightcrew mem ber who has performed only one takeoff and landing. Reported fatigue

- related events have included procedural errors, unstable approaches, lining up with the wrong runway, and landing without clearances

. As such, a fatigued crew is dangerous no matter what “type” or segment of operation is examined and the requirements in this final rule will eliminate the distinctions between various operations

. As we have shown, in an airplane acc ident, there is a series of errors (both causes and factors) that contribute to an accident

. Accident scenarios can vary greatly depending on phase of flight, the type of operation , phase of flight and size of the airplane. While pilot fatigue can occur35 during any stage of flight, takeoff and landing are especially critical times for the crew to exhibit good judgment and sound decision making

. The airplane is close to the ground and there is little room for error during these particular phases of flight

. 

### Quanti fied Benefits

In this Initial Supplemental RIA , t he FAA provides a rang e of benefit estimates for both passenger operations and cargo

- only operations

. The base case estimate s only look at the historical events as an exact mirror for the future

. The high case estimate for passenger operations assume s that regional carriers wil l begin flying larger planes

. The high case estimate for cargo

- only operations assumes a catastrophic crash with fatalities, in place of the one historic
cargo - only crash which resulted in a hull loss and injuries , but no fatalities

. We understand that fut ure accidents will not be identical to historical accidents , but our approach provides a conservative look at the benefits of this rule based on a snapshot of the past

. Here the FAA provides a quantitative benefit estimate of historical

- based accidents (base case), and a high case of expected benefits from future averted accidents once this rule is promulgated

. Generally our benefit analysis begins using past history as an important reference from which to begin the benefit analysis

. We believe the base case benefit estimate, which is based solely on the outcome of past accidents, may be low for passenger operations because today passenger load factors and aircraft size are already greater than they were in the past decade

. On the other hand, w e also note that this estimate may not fully take into account changes in regulatory requirements that postdate those accidents and that may mitigate the projected risk

. As such, our base case estimate represents a snapshot of risk. Airplane accidents are somewhat r andom both in terms of airplane size and the number of people on board

. For these reasons, projections of future fatalities may be based on future risk36 exposure, and our projections are typically based on expected distributions around the mean

. Our typical scenario incorporates increasing airplane size, expected load factors, and a breakeven analysis

. However, our evaluation of the historical accidents showed a disproportionate risk among smaller, regional carriers

. Accordingly, as we discuss below, the FAA has decided to base its high case estimate of passenger operations benefits on preventing an accident in a regional jet airplane. In response to comments, we have reduced the analysis period from the 20 years provided in the proposed regulatory analysis t o 10 years here

. We received comments disputing the use of a 20 year time frame for accidents stating the accident rate has declined over time

. While noting the wide range of operations over the last 20 years, we shortened the accident history to the last 10 years . A reduction in the length of the sample period introduces other problems, most importantly with less time there are fewer observations

. Observations are important, as the nature of aviation accidents is that while they are rare events, very often these accidents result in severe, high consequences

. The FAA Office of Accident Investigation assessed the effectiveness of this rule to prevent the six fatigue

- related accidents which occurred on passenger

- carrying aircraft in a
recent 10

- year period

. T his office used the CAST methodology to assign a value to how effective the rule will be at preventing each accident

. On average, we expect this rule would have been 52.5 percent effective in preventing the types of accidents had it been in effect over the last 10
years . 

### Passenger Operations **Base Case Estimate** 
The passenger operations base case estimate only looks at the historical events as a specific reference point

. In this estimate the exact number of fatalities for each past event is37 multiplied by the relative rule effectiveness score to obtain the historical number of deaths that would have been averted with the requirements contained in this final rule, had this rule been in effect at the time

. The base case estimate supposes roughly six deaths will be averted annually

. Multiplying six annual averted deaths by the $6.2 million value of statistical life equals $37 .2 million annually. In addition, had the requirements been in place at the time of these historical accidents, $ 4.0 million in hull damage f or each accident would have been averted, 21 which equals $ 12 million for ten years or $ 1.2 million annually. Finally, we use $ 5.6 million as the estimated accident investigation cost per accident, which equals $ 1.7 million annually

. 22 This estimate is based on the investigation costs of federal agencies and private industries and aircraft wreckage removal

. 23 When summed over the 10

- year period 2014 through 2023 , the base case estimate is $ 401 million ($ 263 million present value at seven percent and $ 332 million present value at three percent )

.

21 This Initial S upplemental RIA revises the base case estimate of hull value found in the original RIA. This estimate of hull damage is derived by averaging the low end estimated value of the a ircraft types involved in the ten year accident history cited in Table 7 as found in Airliner Price Guide (Summer 2012). Note that three of the six hi storic accidents resulted in destroyed aircraft while the other three resulted in substantial damage. As a result, using replacement value of the aircraft as the estimate of the hull damage may overestimate benefits if repairing the damaged aircraft was le ss costly than replacing it after an accident. 22 The inclusion of accident investigation costs as a benefit category is new to this Initial S upplemental RIA; it was not included in the original RIA. Rather, the cost associated with accident investigations was added to address a specific concern raised by pilots for cargo operators in associated litigation who asserted these costs should have been included. Since this cost is reasonably quantifiable, the FAA has determined that it is appropriate to consider in th is Initial S upplemental RIA. 23 The estimated accident investigation cost was derived from “ Economic Values for FAA Investment and Regulatory Decisions, A Guide, ” Oct. 3, 2007 by GRA for the FAA, pp. 8

- 4 and 8

- 5 and inflated using the GDP deflator . Sp ecifically, the value for a major investigation ($10.5 million in 2011 dollars) was used for the three catastrophic crashes and the weighted average for air carriers ($0.6 million in 2011 dollars) was used for the non

catastrophic crashes, resulting in an average cost of $5.6 million in 2011 dollars.38 

### Passenger Operations **High Case Estimate**  Because airplane accidents are relatively rare they are not necessarily representative of actual risk, especially with regard to airplane size and the numbe r of people onboard

. In addition, future conditions will be different than they were when the accident occurred

. Thus, the base

case estimate for passenger operations represents a snapshot of the risk that fatigue introduces in the overall operating enviro nment

. It considers neither the forecasted increase in load factors nor the larger aircraft types

. The future preventable events that this rule addresses will not exactly mirror the past events because the airplane types, utilization, and seating capacity have changed

. To quantify the expected benefits in the passenger operati ons high case scenario, we narrowed the analysis to three of the six historic accidents which were catastrophic (all onboard died)

. In this case the expected number of preventable catastrophic accidents equals the three accidents multiplied by the 52.5 percent effectiveness rate

. Thus over a 10

- year time period the expected number of preventable accidents is 1.575

. Using the Poisson distribution there is roughly a 20 percent chance for no accident; however, there is also a 47 percent probability of two or more accidents

. While the 20

- year accident history has a broader range of catastrophic accidents, in the shorter 10

- year historical period all the three catastrophic accidents were on regional airplanes

. We recognize that as regional airplanes are smaller than the ‘typical’ passenger jet, assuming all future accidents would be on a regional jet understates the relative risk across the fleet of aircraft affected by this rule

. It does , however, represent historical accidents and may be somewhat39 representative of actual future risk, since the mainline carriers typically have collective bargaining agreements that are already largely reflective of the requirements of this rule. 24
The B737 and A320 represent typical sized airplane s in the forecast period with an expected number of passengers and crew of 123 given a forecasted 14 3 seat airplane and a load factor of 83 percent. 25 Even though there was a (relatively large) B757 passenger airpla ne accident in the 20 year history, if one looks at the past 10 years as truly representative of risk, the preventable accident would likely be on a regional airplane

. For the high case the FAA backed away from a benefit outcome based on mean fleet, fligh t hours, and occupant numbers because ultimately we were persuaded there was information which could not be ignored by the three regional passenger accidents occurring without a mainline passenger accident

. For this reason, we selected an 88 seat regional jet (like an ERJ

175) to be the representative airplane for the high case

. This size airplane is also consistent with the fact that regional operators are expected to fly somewhat larger airplanes in the future. The expected benefit from this high case fol lows a simple methodology for estimating and then valuing the expected number of occupants in a prevented accident

. With a total of 0.3 accidents per year over the ten year period multiplied by the 52.5 percent effectiveness rate, the analysis assumes 0.15 75 average accidents per year

. The estimated occupant value for each averted accident equals the average number of seats (88) multiplied by the load factor of 77

24 It is unusual that collective bargaining agreements would closely mirror regulatory requirements

. However, flight and duty limitations are unique because they address both safety considerations, which are regulatory in nature, and lifestyle considerations, which are properly addressed in collective bargaining agreements

. Because of the impact of collective bargaining agreements on the number of hours that pilots work, those agreements were considered by the FAA in calculating both the costs and benefits of this rule

. 25 Table 6 and Table 9, FAA Aerospace Forecasts Fiscal Years 2011

- 203140 percent plus four crew members for a total of 72 averted fatalities

. 26 Each of these prevented fatalities is multiplied by a $6.2 million value of statistical life

. The expected value of a preventable accident equals the sum of the averted fatalities at $446.4 million added to the value of the airplane hull loss ($ 24 .0 million replacement value), 27 and accident investigation costs ($10. 5 million for a major investigation ) for a prevented accident benefit of $ 48 0. 9 million. Over a ten year period the value of preventing the expected 1.575 acc idents equals approximately $7 57 million ($ 497 million pres ent value at seven percent and $ 627 million present value at three percent ).


### Cargo
**- only Operations**  **Base Case Estimate**
Just as in the benefi t analysis for passenger operations, the cargo - only base case estimate

uses historical events to determine the preven table accident benefits for the future benefits. There was one air cargo accident during the ten

- year analysis period, which occurred July 26, 2002. In this accident three crewmembers were seriously injured and the hull and cargo were destroyed

. Thus, t he benefit of preventing such an accident in the future consists of averting serious injur y to three pilots, the value of the hull and the cargo , and the public and private cost of the accident investigation. After estimating the value of each benefit, we app ly an effectiveness rating of 75 percent to the sum of these benefits. The value of averting three seriously injured pilots is $ 1.95 million. This value is based on the DOT policy guidance that states the value of a person losing productivity from a “serious”

26 Assumed load factor of 77 percent is based on forecasted load factors for regional carriers found in Table 25, FAA Aerosp ace Forecasts Fiscal Years 2011

- 2031. 27 This Initial S upplemental RIA revises the high case estimate of hull value found in the original RIA. The value for an ERJ

- 175 taken from Airliner Price Guide (Summer 2012).41 injury is 10.5 percent of the value of statistical life. 28 Thus, the value of a serious injury to one pilot is $0.65 million (10.5 percent multiplied by $6.2 million), o r $ 1.95 million for three pilots. If the rule prevented a catastrophic accident today of a B727

- 200F , 29 the average replacement value of such an airplane produced between 1981 and 1984 is approximately $1.8
million. 30 We estimate the average value of cargo on a B727

- 200F to be $ 2 .7 million

. While the FAA is unaware of published estimates for the value of air cargo, we derived the average value per ton of air cargo by assessing the c ommodity f low v alue and c ommodity f low weight of goods transported by air fro m the 2007 Freight Analysis Framework (FAF) Survey

. 31 Because both the airfreight weight of shipment and airfreight value of commodities vary by origination or destination, the average was used. Inflation adjusted average cargo value per ton of $87,082 was calculated by dividing the origin

- destination averaged airfreight value of commodities by the corresponding averaged airfreight weight of shipment, with inflation rate based upon the Gross Domestic Product deflator. The average cargo value of $2.7 million was calculated by multiplying the maximum cargo weight capacity of a B727

- 2 00F aircraft (31 tons) by the average cargo value per ton ($ 87,082 ). 32 This estimate is based on a cargo load factor of 100 percent.

28 This guidance can be found at http://ostpxweb.dot.gov/policy/reports/vsl_guidance_072911.pdf 29 The only cargo accident during the 10 year history involved a B727

- 200. 30 Airline Price Guide, S ummer E dition 2011, volume 68, pp.81

- 82. As with the passenger base case, use of the replacement value of the aircraft as a component of the estimate of benefits from avoiding a non

- catastrophic crash may be an over estimate, if the costs of repairing the aircraft are lower than th e replacement value of the aircraft. 31 Data based on Freight Analysis Framework 2007, a joint survey conduc ted by the Census Bureau and BTS and updated every 5 years. ( http://www.bts.gov/publications/commodity_flow_survey/2007/state_summaries/ ) 32 NASA/CR

- 1998

- 207655, "Air Cargo Operations Cost Database," Table 5

- 3, pp. 5

- 442 W e include the weighted average cost of accident investigation ($ 0.6 million ) as a benefit

category. 33 The total of the averted costs from three serious injuries of $ 1.9 5 million, complete loss of a B727

- 200 hull valued at $1.8 million, complete loss of $2.7 million in cargo value, and investigation cos ts of $ 0.6 million equals base case benefits of $ 7.1 million

. T h is rule is estimated to have an effectiveness rating of 75 percent

. 34 Multiplying the potential benefits of $ 7.1 million by the 75 percent effectiveness yields a base case benefit estimate of $ 5.3 million. The FAA assumes the likelihood of an accident occurring in any year of the forecast period is equal, or uniformly distributed. T he present value benefits are $ 3.5 million when discounted at

seven percent rate and $ 4.4 million when discounted a t three percent rate. 

### High Case Estimate The high benefit case is based on the same accident scenario as in the base case, that is, a single accident, but with a more severe outcome. T he high case estimate projects preventing one catastrophic air cargo a ccident over a 10

- year period , thus avert ing 2 fatalities and avoid ing the loss of a high valued narrow

- body hull (B757

- 200F) , along with its entire cargo

. In addition, we continue to assume a cargo load factor of 100 percent. Similar to the base case anal ysis, we include accident investigation costs, which include public and private accident investigations
cost, and aircraft wreckage removal

. The estimation of benefits is calculated as follows. First, the value from preventing two fatalities equals $12.4 million (2 x $6.2 million /averted fatality ). Second, the hull value of a

33 “Econo mic Values for FAA Investment and Regulatory Decisions, A Guide,” Oct. 3, 2007 by GRA for the FAA, pp. 8

- 4 and 8

- 5 and inflated using the GDP deflator. 34 This effectiveness rating was determined using the JIMDAT

- t ype process described earlier in this docum ent.43 B757

- 200F equals $15.2 million based on an average replacement value for a B757

- 200F made between 1983 and 1999. 35 Third, at a 100 percent load factor, the complete loss of the cargo carried is value d at about $ 3.7 million . The cargo value is determined based on the maximum cargo weight capacity of 42.9 ton s for a B757

- 200F aircraft, 36 multiplied by an average cargo value per ton of $ 87,081

. Lastly, we add the estimated cost of a major ac cident investigation : $ 10.5 million

. 37 In total, the estimated benefit of preventing an accident in th e high case is $ 41.8 million. Multiplying the estimated benefit of a preventing an accident by a 75 percent effectiveness rating equals $ 31.4 million. Thus the total benefits for the high case equals $ 31.4 million ($ 20.6 million present value at seven percent, and $ 26.0 million present value at three percent). 

### Benefit Summary The new requirements in this final rule will eliminate the current rest and dut y distinctions between domestic, flag and supplemental operations as the requirements appl y universally to all Part 121 certificate holders conducting passenger operations

. The sleep science, while still evolving , is clear in a few important respects: most people need eight hours of sleep to function effectively, most people find it more difficult to sleep during the day than during the night, resulting in greater fatigue if working at night; the longer one has been awake and the longer one spends on task, the greater the likelihood of fatigue; and fatigue leads to an increased

35 Source: Airline Price Guide, summer e dition 2011, volume 68, pp.138

- 141. 36 N AS A /CR

- 1998

- 207655, "Air Cargo Operations Cost Database," Table 5

- 3, pp. 5

- 4 37 Petitioners in the related litigation argued that the FAA should have included the impact of averted hazardous material spills in calculating benefits. Potential costs from hazardous materials on

- board are not included here. There is no historical basis to project any impact, as DOT reporting indicates there were only two “hazmat” accidents involving aviation in the last ten years and there was no cost to the public from those accidents ( Hazmat Intelligence Portal, U.S. Department of Transportation. Data as of 9/10/2012 )

.44 risk of making a mistake. The requirements contained in this final rule and the accompanying analysis are designed to reduce the factors that lead to fatigue in most individuals and f or all flight crew

. The actual benefits of the final rule will depend upon the type and siz e of accident that the rule averts

. Because w e recognize the potential variability in the quantified benefits of this final rule , we provide a base case estimate and a high case estimate for both passenger and cargo

only operations

. Our base case estimate of the benefits of the final rule as applied to passenger operations is $ 401 million ($ 263 million present value at seven percent and $ 332 million at three
perce nt ) and our high case estimate is $ 757 million ($ 497 million present value at seven percent and $ 627 million at three percent ). We also note that saving just 8 4 lives in a 10 year period would cause this rule to be cost beneficial

. 38 Further, even if this rule was only 3 6 percent effective at preventing accidents due to fatigue (as opposed to the 52.5 percent effectiveness estimated in this analysis) the rule would still be cost beneficial. 39 If the final rule were extended to cargo

- only operations, our bas e case estimate of benefits for that population is $ 5 million ($ 3 million present value seven percent and $ 4 million present value three percent) and our high case estimate is $ 31 million ($2 1 million present value
at seven percent and $26 million present value at three percent).

38 This comparison is made assuming the lives saved are distributed uniformly over the 10 year analysis period for benefits and using a seven percent discount rate. 39 This calculation is performed using the parameters from high case benefits analysis and uses s even percent as the discount rate

.45 

## Cost Analysis

The cost of the final rule to Part 121 passenger air carriers can be categorized into three main cost components: flight operations, training, and rest facilities

. Flight operations cost consists of three subcomponent s: crew scheduling cost, computer programming of crew management systems cost, and cost saving s associated with reduced use of sick time by pilots because of reduced fatigue

. T raining cost consists of two subcomponent s: dispatchers and management fatigue training cost, and curriculum development cost

. Rest facilities cost consists of four subcomponent s: engineering cost, installation cost, aircraft downtime cost, and increased fuel usage cost

. The f inal r ule costs were calculated using industry

- provided da ta whenever possible, along with expert analysis. The total estimated cost of the final rule is $ 4 57 m illion for the 12

- year period from 2012
to 2023

. The present value is $ 3 38 million and $ 398 million using a seven percent and a three percent discount rat e, respectively

. If the rule were extended to cover cargo

- only operations, the additional cost of the rule would be $ 550 million in nominal terms, $ 377 million and $ 464 million using seven percent and three percent discount rate s , respectively

. The 2014 effective date of the final rule allows two year s for carriers to become compliant with the final rule

. The FAA classified costs into three main components and estimated the accompanying costs

. Data used for the cost estimation was obtained from various
i ndustry sources , the sources of which are explained in each section.46 Table 8 and Table 9 present the estimates of the three main cost components for passenger operations and cargo

- only operations, respectively

. 40 Flight operations cost s account for approximately 64 percent of the total nominal cost of the rule

. R est facilities account for approximately 32 percent of the total nominal cost of the rule

. Roughly four percent of the nominal costs contained in this analysis are attributable to training

. If the final rule were to be extended to cargo

- only operations, 8 7 percent of the total nominal cost of the rule would be from flight operations costs , 12 percent from rest facility costs, and one percent from training costs. Each of the main cost components are explained in

- depth in the following sections of this docum ent. Table 8 : Cost Summary, Passenger Operations
Cost Component Total Nominal

Cost (millions) PV Cost at 7% (millions) PV Cost at 3% (millions) Flight Operations $ 294 $195 $2 45

Rest Facilities $146 $132 $139 Training $17 $11 $14

Total $457 $338 $398

Table 9 : Cost Summary, Cargo
- Only Operations
Cost Component Total Nominal

Cost (millions) PV Cost at 7% (millions) PV Cost at 3% (millions) Flight Operations $479 $ 315 $ 397

Rest Facilities $66 $59 $62 Training $6 $4 $5

Total $550 $ 377 $ 464

40 Note that for this table and others, items may not sum to reported totals due to rounding.47 

### Flight Operations Cost The flight operations cost component of the final rule is composed of three subcomponent s: crew scheduling costs, crew management system computer programming costs, and payroll cost savings from reducing flightcrew member fatigue

. 41 Table 10 and Table 11 provide a sum mary of the three subcomponent s of the flight operations cost for passenger operations and cargo

- only operations respectively

. The derivations of subcomponent costs are explained in

- depth in the following sections of the document. The explanation for these different cost components found in this Initial Supplemental RIA is structured slightly differently than the explanation found in the original RIA. Additionally, in a few instances, the manner of calculating these cost components has been modified for clarity, consistency, and to correct some calculation and reporting errors

. Table 10 : Summary of Flight Operations Costs, Passenger Operations Flight Operations Cost Subcomponent Total Nominal

Cost (millions) PV Cost at 7% (millions) PV Cost at 3% (millions) Crew Scheduling $479 $3 15 $ 397 Computer Programming $8 $7 $7 Payroll Savings from Reducing Fatigue

- $193

- $126

- $159 Total Flight Operations $294 $ 195 $2 45

41 Operators might be able to reduce their flight operations costs by developing and implementing a fatigue risk management system (FRMS)

. The FAA is not imposing an FRMS program requirement on Part 121 carriers, but does allow carriers the FRMS option. Carriers might develop an FRMS program as an alternative to the final rule flightcrew member duty and rest req uirements when the crew scheduling cost savings equal or exceed the costs of the FRMS program

. Carriers might do this for ultra

- long flights, which have flight times over 16 hours. FRMS is optional and would only be implemented by an operator if their comp liance costs could be reduced as FRMS only provides cost relief

. We did not estimate this potential savings as we do not know how many operators would use FRMS and the cost of FRMS has a wide range.48 Table 11 : Summary of Flight Operations Costs, Cargo
- only Operations Flight Operations Cost Subcomponent Total Nominal

Cost (millions) PV Cost at 7% (millions) PV Cost at 3% (millions) Crew Scheduling $521 $ 342 $ 431 Computer Programming $2 $2 $2 Payroll Savings from Reducing Fatigue

- $44

- $29

- $36 Total Flight Operations $479 $ 315 $ 397 

### Crew Scheduling

Overview Numerous commenters objected to FAA’s assumptions regarding the 25 percent cost

savings resulting from long

- term scheduling optimization in the NPRM

. To address these concerns, the FAA estimated the scheduling compliance costs using a commercial crew scheduling program . T he final rule ’s impact on crew scheduling costs was evalua ted using Cygnus, a pairing and bid line optimizer developed by CrewPairings, Inc. 42 A selection of Part 121 air carriers provided actual crew schedule data to the FAA for assistance in the cost analysis of the Flightcrew Member Duty and Rest Requirements Rulemaking

. Each carrier provided data for one or more “cases

. ” A case is defined as a carrier fleet, which usually consists of one aircraft type

. In some of the cases, the carrier schedules multiple aircraft types using the same pool of flightcrew members; the methodology in the original RIA (also used in this Initial Supplemental RIA) mirrors actual carrier practice. In total, carriers provided data for eight cases

. This analysis is necessarily limited by the willingness of carriers to provide this detailed crew scheduling data. However, w e believe the

42 Cygnus has been used by more than 30 major airlines wor ldwide over the past 40 years.49 cases used in this analysis r epresent the spectrum of cost structure s present in the Part 121 air transportation industry

. Mainline passenger carriers were represented with two short

- haul,

narrow - body aircraft cases and two long

- haul, wide

- body aircraft cases

. Regional passenger carriers were represented with two cases. 43 Freight carriers were represented with one short

- haul,

narrow - body aircraft case and one long

- haul, wide

- body aircraft case. In addition to the eight cases based on actual carrier fleets, a synthetic supplemental carrier case was created because no supplemental carriers provided crew schedule data

. Creation of the synthetic supplemental carrier involved modi fication of the freight wide

- body case

. The flight schedules and crew bases of the freight wide

- body case were retained because cargo carriers comprise the major share of supplemental carriers

. The freight carrier CBA rules were replaced with those reflect ing a representative supplemental carrier CBA

. The representative supplemental carrier CBA reflected rules from a number of actual supplemental carrier CBAs

. These changes reflect the impacts of this final rule on actual supplemental passenger carriers operating wide

- body aircraft with route structures similar to the freight wide

- body aircraft case

. The crew schedule data consisted of one scheduling period (month) per case

. The specific periods varied by carrier, based on data availability

. The data included flight schedules, aircraft flow information, pairings and the carrier’s rule set (contractual, management, and discretionary rules). The use of a pairing and bid line optimizer enabled the FAA to more accurately model the impacts of the fina l rule on industry crew scheduling costs than was possible during NPRM cost analysis. The pairing and bid line optimizer has been used worldwide by many types of airlines

43 Most regional carriers operate code

- share flights for a number of mainline partners; crew scheduling is usually performed separately for each mainline partner

. This analysis was conducted using the same process as the actua l carrier, so each regional carrier case represents a sub

- fleet.50 for their own crew scheduling needs and addresses the optimiz ation and scheduling lim itations in the NPRM cost analysis

. Due to this extensive real

- world experience, results for these eight cases can be expected to accurately portray the impacts of the final rule on crew scheduling costs for the cases studied

. Crew Scheduling Analysis
Accu rately analyzing the final rule ’s impact on crew scheduling costs for each of the cases required isolating the final rule ’s impact from the impacts of various contractual, management, and discretionary crew scheduling practices

. The pairing and bid line o ptimizer was first calibrated to ensure that it was capable of creating crew schedules virtually identical to the crew schedules provided by the carriers

. After calibration, existing federal regulation s relevant to flightcrew member scheduling were removed from the optimizer and replaced with the final rule requirement s . Changes in crew scheduling cost could then be attributed solely to the final rule

. The first step in optimizer calibration was receiving and formatting the input data from carriers

. The inp ut data included flight schedules, aircraft flow information, pairings, regulations, carrier’s unit costs (credit hour pay rate, per diem, and hotel room costs), and the carrier’s rule set from the carriers’ crew management systems

. Carrier rule sets included parameters for crew bases, maximum/minimum flight time, rest time, duty time, and ground time to allow aircraft changes and are based on contractual, management, and discretionary rules

. The pairings that were received directly from the carriers i n this first step are referred to as the “production solution.” Since no modifications were made to the production solution by the FAA or the optimizer, the production solution accurately represents the current crew scheduling environment, including all re gulatory, contractual, management, and discretionary rules.51 Once the production solution was established, the bid lines and pairings were set aside

. The optimizer was run using only the flight schedules, aircraft flow information, federal aviation regulati ons and the carrier’s rule set

. The optimizer then created its own bid lines and pairings, which are referred to as the “ b aseline solution.” The b aseline solution was compared to the production solution using a number of metrics, such as the amount of cred it hours, duty periods, hotel room nights required, distribution of time among crew bases, number of aircraft swaps, etc

. Once the b aseline solution was identical or virtually identical to the production solution, the optimizer was deemed calibrated for ea ch of the cases. This c alibration of the optimizer verified that the optimizer could accurately reproduce the crew scheduling process at each of the carriers

. That is, t he b aseline solution could be substituted for the production solution at each carrier with no material change in crew scheduling
cost

. To determine the impact of the final rule , the regulation s in the b aseline solution were replaced with the final rule

. All provisio ns of the final rule were implemented in this analysis, including maximum flight time, maximum flight duty time, minimum rest time, and cumulative limits

. All other, non

- regulatory rules from the b aseline solution were retained

. Using these inputs, the opt imizer created bid lines and pairings referred to as the “ final rule solution.” Since the only difference between the b aseline solution and the f inal r ule solution was the substitution of the final rule for the existing regulation s, the change in cost components between the solutions is solely attributable to the final rule

. In the course of reviewing the calculations used in estimating scheduling costs in support of drafting this Initial Supplemental RIA , FAA became aware that in the original RIA, in eight of the nine cases, the number of aircraft block hours differed slightly between the baseline run and52 the final rule run. This minor difference i s due to the treatment of so called “carry

- in/carry

- out” flights. Industry practice is to construct ea ch trip pairing such that each flightcrew member starts and ends the scheduling period at their crew base. Consequently, some bid lines outputted by the optimizer would have left flightcrew members away from their crew base at the beginning or end of the sche duling period (month). In those instances, it is airline practice to include those segments as part of the bid lines for the adjoining month (i.e., “carrying” the pilot in or out of the month). While that is reasonable practice for airlines, the practice r esult ed in introducing a source of variation between the baseline and final rule run that was not caused by the final rule. That is, because t he final rule results in different bid lines being constructed, the segments identified as carry

- in or carry

- out o ften differ as well.
FAA continues to use the original results as the basis for this Initial Supplemental RIA

. However, Appendix B contains a sensitivity analysis where by the final rule results are adjusted to explore the possible magnitude of the impact of the difference in aircraft block hours on the crew scheduling cost estimates caused by the carry

- in/carry

- out variation

. Table 12 shows the change in cost components attributable to final rule for each case

. Note that cases which had no changes in either domestic or international time away from base ( TAFB ) were cases th at were either solely domestic or solely international. More details on the analysis of each case used in this analysis can be found in the GRA summary report found in the docket associated with this rule

- making

. 44

44 GRA, Incorporated, “Summary of CrewPairings, Inc. Economic Analysis of Flightcrew Member Duty and Rest Requirements Rulemaking,” September 2012.53 Table 12 : Change in Monthly Flightcrew Scheduling Cost Elements Due to Final Rule, by Case

Industry Group Case Baseline Solution Flightcrew Members Change in Credit Hours Change in Domestic TAFB Hours Change in International TAFB Hours Change in Hotel Stays

Passenger Narrow

- body A 924 2,187 18,660 0 660 B 1,698

- 429

- 15,035 1,030

- 944 Passenger Wide

- body C 1,121

- 70 3,863 8,348 791 D 430

- 965 0

- 2,741

- 34 Regional E 300 57 5,812 0 280 F 240 37 4,148

- 16 144 Supplemental I 806 4,642 3,159 9,759 756 Freight Narrow

- body G 330 560 890 2,390 54 Freight Wide

body H 1,053 984 6,197 862 240

It is interesting to note that in some instances, the rule change results in the potential for cost savings. For instance, while one provision of the final rule requires increased rests between duty periods for domestic operations, the final rule also allows for increased flying time in certain situations as well as reduced rest times between duty periods for some international operations. Given that maximum flight time an d flight duty period time now depend on time of day, acclimation, number of flightcrew members, and number of segments, there are situations where flightcrew members can work more hours per duty period under the final rule than under the previous rule or w here a flight previously requiring additional flightcrew members can now be flown with fewer flightcrew members

. In some cases, the changes are small. For instance, maximum flight time per duty period for domestic flights was extended from 8 to 9 hours fo r duty periods beginning from 0500

- 1959.54 However, the flight time limits now are in effect for actual flight time, rather than planned flight time, which means in practice carriers will not be able to fully schedule the additional hour of flight time but i nstead will leave a buffer to allow for instances of unplanned flight delays. In other cases, though, airlines can potentially see significant savings; international flights with three flightcrew members were previously limited to 12 hours flying and have now been increased to 13 flight hours and up to 17 flight duty hours under certain time of day and rest facility combinations. For some classes of long

- haul flying, this means that instead of needing two additional flightcrew members, only one additional f lightcrew member is needed. Similarly, rest periods have also potentially decreased for some route types (particularly international), reducing the amount of TAFB and credit hours accruing to pilots. As an example, Case D depicted in Table 12 shows savings in terms of credit hours, international TAFB, and hotel stays due to the final rule. The flight segments in Case D were exclusively international flights and the exi sting schedules already allowed rest periods that exceeded the minimum rest period required by the final rule. Additionally, Case D had instances where the increase in flight time allowed by the rule was particularly beneficial and allowed certain flights to Europe to be operated with one less flightcrew member which resulted in significant cost savings. One of the passenger narrow

- body cases and both passenger wide

- body cases (Cases B

– D) demonstrated decreases in credit hours. The other passenger narrow

- body case (Case A) showed an increase in credit hours of 2.9 percent while both regional carriers (Cases E and F) had credit hour increases of only 0.2 percent. The freight and supplemental cases (Cases G

– I) had credit hour increases ranging from 1.2 pe rcent to 7.2 percent. TAFB and hotel rooms rose for some passenger carrier cases and fell for others (but generally less than 7.5 percent in either55 direction), depending largely on the relevant schedule and collective bargaining agreement.
TAFB and hotel r ooms increased for the regional cases (between 5 percent and 9 percent) as their current scheduling practice is optimized around the minimum rest time of the current rule. Freight and supplemental carriers saw across

- the

- board increases in time away from b ase and hotel rooms. In terms of the final rule’s impact on the work schedules of flightcrew members at an individual level, the most striking change is for the supplemental case. Flightcrew members in the supplemental case under the final rule will now ha ve two fewer duty hours per duty period, on average, whereas the other cases showed more modest changes in the number of duty hours per duty period (fewer than 30 minutes increase or decrease). The discrepancy results because the difference between the cur rent rules and final rule was most pronounced for supplemental operations. More details on the specifics of each of the cases can be found in the GRA summary report. 45
Estimates of Unit Costs We made separate estimates of each of the unit costs for each cos t component (credit hour costs, per diem hourly rates, and cost per hotel room) for different types of air carriers. The estimates are based on actual cost data for a variety of air carriers, wherever possible. The first step of the unit cost estimation process was to define a collection of industry groups that would collectively cover all Part 121 air carriers and that would group air carriers

45 GRA, Incorporated, “Summary of CrewPairing s, Inc. Economic Analysis of Flightcrew Member Duty and Rest Requirements Rulemaking,” September 2 012.56 together based on similarity of characteristics that would influence their crew scheduling costs. Air carriers were assigned to one of the resulting e ight industry groups based on a number of metrics such as operating authority, aircraft fleet, aircraft utilization, markets served, collective bargaining agreements, etc. In a few cases, a carrier might have been classified as a freight carrier even if it did not perform any carg o - only operations (or as a passenger carrier even if it did not perform any passenger operations ). In these instances other characteristics of the ai r carrier, such as fleet type or collective bargaining agreement , were considered to be a more influential factor on crew scheduling costs tha n whether the carrier transported passengers or
cargo. Note that the eventual allocation of costs between passenge r and cargo

- only operations was based on what the air carrier actually transports , not its industry group classification. Table
13 lists the number of air carriers in each group and the number of flightcrew members in each
group. 46 Table C.1 in Appendix C presents further detail regarding the air carrier classifications.
Table 13 : Air Carrier Classification into Industry Groups

Industry Group Number of Part 121 Carriers Total Number of Flightcrew Members Passenger Integrated 7 36,013 Passenger Narrow

- body 14 11,899

Passenger Wide

- body 1 150 Regional 38 20,511 Supplemental 8 1,674 Freight Integrated 3 7,230 Freight Narrow

- body 16 846

Freight Wide

- body 3 914 Total 90 79,237

46 The original RIA differed from the classifications used here in a few instances.57 Table 14 presents a summary of the data and calculations used to estimate average credit hour costs per flightcrew member. Bureau of Transportation Statistics Form 41 data ( Item 51230, Pilots and Copi lots, from Schedule P

- 5.2 ) was used to determine the total flightcrew cost for each carrier. Block hours for each carrier were taken from the AirHoursRamp item in the Air Carrier Summary Data, T2: U.S. Air Carrier Traffic and Capacity Statistics by Aircraf t Type report. Both data sources were the most current available at the time of the drafting of the original RIA, reflecting the first three quarters of 2010. 47 Total flightcrew cost data and aircraft block hour data were each summed across carriers by rele vant industry group

. 48 Each industry
group ’s sum of total flightcrew cost was divided by th at industry group ’s sum of aircraft block hours

. For the passenger integrated carriers, this information was summarized separately for

narrow - body and wide

- body aircraft to preserve the distinction between narrow

- body and wide

body flightcrew member pay rates

. 49 These calculations resulted in the average total flightcrew cost per aircraft block hour (Column [A] in Table 14 )

. To determine the average cost per block hour for an individual flightcrew member (Column [C] in Table 14 ) , it was nece ssary to divide

47 There was no adjustment made for inflation, as pilot wages are negotiated through contracts. 48 Note that here and elsewhere where data on aircraft block hours are used, the block hours associated with Beechcraft Beech 18 C

- 185 and Cessna 208 Caravan have been omitted because corresponding Pilot/CoPilot costs were not available. In addition, the records relating to Arrow Air, Inc. have been excluded from this analysis as that carrier ceased operations in the middle of 2010. 49 The Form 41 data for freight in tegrated carriers did not support separate calculations for narrow

- body and wide

body credit hour costs. The resulting pay rates would have inferred that pay rates for narrow

- body pilots are higher than wide

- body pay rates, a finding which does not corresp ond with usual industry practice. The issue appears to lie with the detailed reporting of this block hour and Pilot/CoPilot cost data by aircraft type. To avoid these reporting issues for freight carriers, we use only total Pilot/CoPilot cost and aircraft block hours for each carrier in the freight industry groups.58 the average total flightcrew cost per aircraft block hour by the average number of pilots per flight (Column [B] in Table 14 ). 50 Further adjustments we re necessary to convert the estimates of average cost per block hour per flightcrew member to the average cost per credit hour per flightcrew member. First, estimated monthly credit hours per flightcrew member for each industry group were derived from analysis of AIR Inc. Salary Survey data (Column [D] in Table 14 )

. 51 The AIR Inc. Salary Survey provided estimated monthly credit hours per flightcrew member for 36 carriers. Weighted average estimated monthly credit hours for each industry group were calculated using carrier block hour data from AirHoursRamp item in the Air Carrier Summary Data, T2: U.S. Air Carrier Traffic and Capacity Statistics by Aircraft Type report

. Next, crew scheduling data provided by nine carriers to the FAA were analyzed to estimate the average number of block hours per flightcrew member per month for each industry group (Column [E] in Tab le 14 )

. Each of the nine carriers provided data for two separate scheduling periods, with data for one scheduling period considered to be a "busy" month and data for th e other considered to be a "slow" month

. 52 The estimates of block hour s per pilot for the two months w ere averaged

50 Narrow

- body aircraft (including regional) were assumed to have two pilots per flight in all cases. Note that for narrow - body aircraft that require three flightcrew members (such as B727), the t hird flightcrew member is the flight engineer and is not reported in the Pilots and CoPilots cost item on Form 41 Schedule P

- 5.2. Because no cost data specific to flight engineers is available, this analysis uses the calculated pilot and copilot cost as th e estimated cost for flight engineers. For wide

- body aircraft, t he average number of flightcrew members per flight was estimated using proprietary data provided to the FAA by a number of carriers . The average number of pilots per flight for integrated carr iers is the average of the number of pilots per flight for narrow

- body and wide

- body flights, weighted by narrow

- body and wide

- body block hours from AirHoursRamp item in the Air Carrier Summary Data, T2: U.S. Air Carrier Traffic and Capacity Statistics by Aircraft Type report . The average number of pilots per flight for passenger wide

- body has been revised in this Initial Supplemental RIA to correct a calculation error present in the original RIA. 51 Darby, Kit and Dan Gradwohl, “2006 Salary Survey,” Aviati on Information Resources, Inc., 2007. 52 The data relating to narrow

- body operations of passenger carriers were used as estimates for the passenger narrow - body industry group while the data relating to wide

- body operations of passenger carriers were used fo r59 together. ( Th ese data are provided in Table C. 2 in Appendix C. ) Dividing the average flightcrew member block hours per month by the average flightcrew member credit hours per month resulted in a ratio of block hours per month to credit hours per month, for each of the industry
groups (Column [F] in Table 14 )

. 53 Fina lly, t he average cost per block hour per flightcrew member (Column [C] in Table 14 ) was then multiplied by the ratio of block hours per month to credit hours per mont h (Column [F] in Table 14 ) to derive the average credit hour cost per flightcrew member for each of the industry groups (Column [G] in Table 14 )

. 54

the passenger wide

- body industry group. The data for all operations of passenger carriers was used for the passenger integrated group. The same method was used for the freight industry groups. 53 We note that the estimate of the average credit hours per m onth comes from a 2006 survey, while the average block hours per month comes from carrier data reflecting more recent years. When constructing a ratio, using data from the same time periods would obviously be preferred; however, data from contemporaneous t ime periods were not available. 54 This method for estimating credit hour cost per flightcrew member differs from the method used in the original RIA, and results in higher estimates of crew scheduling costs due to the final rule. The method used in the ori ginal RIA produced separate estimates of credit hour cost per flightcrew member for the passenger wide

- body and passenger narrow - body industry groups. Those two estimates were then combined to produce an estimate of crew scheduling costs for the passenge r integrated industry group. The revised method used in this Initial Supplemental RIA produces separate estimates of credit hour cost per flightcrew member for four different passenger industry groups: carriers operating exclusively passenger narrow

- body a ircraft, those operating only passenger wide

- body aircraft, narrow

- body aircraft operations by air carriers comprising the passenger integrated industry group, and wide

- body aircraft operations of carriers making up the passenger integrated industry group. (Three industry groups are used for freight: carriers operating only narrow

- body aircraft, carriers operating only wide

- body aircraft and carriers that operate both narrow

- body and wide

- body aircraft.)

The impetus for this change was the observation t hat the estimate of credit hours per month per flightcrew member for the passenger wide

- body industry group reported in the original RIA (60 credit hours per month) was much different from the estimate of credit hours per flightcrew member per month for pa ssenger integrated carriers (78 credit hours per month). One would expect the estimate of credit hours per flightcrew member for the passenger integrated group to be approximately equal to the weighted average of the narrow

- body and wide

body estimates. H owever, averaging 60 credit hours per month (the estimate for passenger wide

- body operations) with 82 credit hours per month (the estimate for passenger narrow

- body operations) using the relative weights as shown in Table B.4 in Appendix B results in an es timate of 72 credit hours per month, which is much different than the 78 credit hours per month observed for the passenger integrated industry group. For that reason, the observed 60 credit hours per month did not appear to be an appropriate value to use for calculating costs for the passenger integrated industry group. (Note that the estimate of 78 credit hours per month per flightcrew member for the passenger integrated group that was reported in Table 10 of the original RIA was not used in calculating costs for passenger integrated carriers, because that estimate did not differentiate between narrow

- body and wide

- body operations.)60 Th is approach to calculating the average credit hour cost per flightcrew member addresses NPRM comments made by several commenters. Commenters stated that the salary data used in the NPRM RIA “does not approximate current, real world flightcrew unit costs...” 55 ATA suggested that the FAA use DOT Form 41 data for calculation of cr ew salary costs. The approach to crew salary costs presented in Table 14 responds to this comment by using the most recent 2010 DOT Form 41 data available as of April 2011 for the calculation of average credit hour costs per flightcrew member. This approach does not include payroll taxes , because these represent a transfer rather than a cost. This approach also does not include pension and benefit costs, because these costs will not be affected by the marginal change in credit hours attributable to the final rule.

The methodology used in this Initial Supplemental RIA still relies on the estimate of 60 credit hours per month per flig htcrew member for the passenger wide

- body industry group, but minimizes its influence by using it only to estimate costs for carriers that conduct passenger wide

- body operations exclusively. While using this revised method means that the estimate of credit hours per month per flightcrew member for the passenger and freight integrated industry groups does not distinguish between the narrow

- body and wide

- body operations of carriers in those groups (since separate credit hour per flightcrew member data for the ir narrow

- and wide

- body operations are not available), we believe it results in more reliable estimates of their unit costs. 55 Comments of the Air Transport Association of America, Inc. in the matter of Notice of Proposed Rulemaking for Flightcrew Member Duty and Rest Requirements, Docket No. FAA

- 2009

- 1093, November 15, 2010.61 Table 14 : Average Flightcrew Member Cost per Credit Hour
Industry

Group Total Flightcrew

Cost per Block Hr Flightcrew Members per Flight Average Flightcrew

Member Cost per Block Hr Average Flightcrew

Member

Credit Hrs/Month Average Flightcrew

Member

Block Hrs/month Ratio of Block Hrs/Month

to Credit Hrs/Month Average Flightcrew

Member Cost per Credit Hr [A] [B] [C] [D] [E] [F] [G] Passenger Integrated $499 2.16 $2 31 78 59 0.76 $17 6 Passenger Integrated: Narrow

- body $404 2.00 $202 78 59 0.76 $154

Passenger Integrated: Wide

- body $629 2.3 7 $2 65 78 59 0.76 $ 202 Passenger Narrow

- body $436 2.00 $218 82 60 0.73 $159

Passenger Wide

- body $667 2.3 7 $2 81 60 59 0.98 $2 75

Regional $179 2.00 $89 82 48 0.59 $53 Supplemental $712 2.16 $329 71 44 0.61 $201 Freight Integrated $1,481 2. 09 $ 709 8 8 44 0.50 $ 357

Freight Narrow

- body $734 2.00 $367 62 34 0.55 $201
Freight Wide

body $847 2 .0 9 $405 66 45 0.67 $273

Per

- diem costs were calculated by multiplying the change in TAFB from the baseline solution to the final rule solution by the appropriate per diem rate. Because flightcrew members at some carriers receive different per diem rates based on whether TAFB is domestic or international, the pairings summary in each of the solutions provided domestic and international TAFB separately. The per diem rates used in this analysis were a block hour weighted average of62 carriers reporting per diem rates in the AIR Inc. Salary Survey

. 56 Again the block hours for each carrier were taken from Air Carrier Summary Data, T2: U.S. Air Carrier Traffic and Capacity Statistics by Aircraft Type report

. Table 15 shows the weighted average hourly per diem rates by operator type used in this analysis. 57
Table 15 : Hourly per Diem Rates Operator Type Weighted Average Domestic per Diem Rate Weighted Average International per Diem Rate Passenger $1.94 $2.28 Regional $1.60 $1.99 Supplemental $2.06 $2.28 Freight $1.99 $2.8 7
Hotel costs were calculated by multiplying the change in required hotel room nights from the baseline solution to the final rule solution by hotel room cost. In practice, hotel costs can vary by a number of factors including the carrier ’s negotiat ing power with hotel chains, city size, domestic or international location, etc. The hotel room costs used in this analysis were estimated based on data provided to the FAA by various carrier s and are presented in Table 16

. 58

56 Darby, Kit and Dan Gradwohl, “2006 Salary Survey,” Aviation Information Resources, Inc., 2007. 57 The per diem rates are from the 2006 AIR, Inc. survey. FAA did not adjust those per diem rates for inflation as the rates are negotiated in contracts. However, where the AIR, Inc. survey reported per diem rates for future years that had been negotiated in to contracts as of the time of the survey, those future rates are included. 58 The hotel costs used in th is Initial S upplemental RIA differ slightly from those used in the original RIA, which differed by case. This Initial S upplemental RIA uses a simplifie d hotel room cost structure for ease of explication.63 Table 16 : Hotel Room Costs Operator Type Average Hotel Room Cost Passenger $65.00 Regional $58.00 Supplemental $75.00 Freight $75.00

Cost per Flightcrew Member Estimation
As discussed above, e ight industry groups were created for the final rule cost analysis

. The changes in each of the cost components for the two narrow - body passenger cases were summed for the passenger narrow

- body industry group and for the narrow

- body compo nent of the passenger integrated industry group

. The two wide

- body passenger cases were summed for the passenger wide

- body industry group and for the wide

- body component of the passenger integrated group

. The two regional cases were summed for the regional group . The freight

narrow - body case was used for the freight narrow

- body industry group while the freight wide

body case was used for the freight wide

- body industry group . The freight narrow

- body case and freight wide

- body case were summed for the freight integrated case. Table 17 show s the results of combining the case results to form estimates for each industry group and industry group subcomponent . Appendix B contains a sensitivity analysis to explore an alternative method for combining the individual case results to create an industry group level estimate of crew scheduling costs.64 Table 17 : Change in Flightcrew Scheduling Cost Elements due to Final Rule, by Industry Group

Industry Group Basel ine Solution Flightcrew Members Change in Credit Hours Change in Domestic

TAFB Hours Change in International TAFB Hours Change in Hotel

Stays Passenger Integrated: Narrow

- body 2,622 1,758 3,625 1,030

- 284 Passenger Integrated: Wide

body 1,551

- 1,035 3,863 5,607 757 Passenger Narrow

- body 2,622 1,758 3,625 1,030

- 284

Passenger Wide

- body 1,551

- 1,035 3,863 5,607 757 Regional 540 94 9,960

- 16 424 Supplemental 806 4,642 3,159 9,759 756 Freight Integrated 1,38 3 1,544 7 , 08 7 3,252 2 94 Freight Narrow

- body 330 560 890 2,390 54

Freight Wide

- body 1,053 984 6,197 862 240
To estimate the costs of the final rule for each industry group the changes in cost elements due to the final rule were then multiplied by industry group and subcomponent

- specific estimates of the unit costs for those cost components, namely average credit hour pay rates, average domestic and international per diem hourly rates, and hotel room costs. The derivation s of those estimates of unit costs are explained above. 59 The results of those calculation s are shown
in Table 18

.

59 The original RIA used a different method whereby first the costs for each case were calculated using the respective narrow

- body and wide

- body unit costs and then the costs were summed to create estimat es of the integrated industry groups. This Initial S upplemental RIA changes that method so that the unit costs specific to the integrated carriers are incorporated.65 Table 18 : Monthly Change in Flightcrew Scheduling Cost due To Final Rule

Industry Gr oup Baseline Solution Flightcrew Members Change in Credit Hour Cost Change in Domestic

TAFB Cost Change in International

TAFB Cost Change in Hotel

Cost Total Change in Scheduling Cost Passenger Integrated: Narrow

body 2,622 $270,504 $7,048 $2,346

- $18,460 $261,438 Passenger Integrated: Wide

body 1,551

- $208 , 842 $7,510 $12,774 $49,205

- $1 39 , 353 Passenger Narrow

body 2,622 $280,437 $7,048 $2,346

- $18,460 $271,371 Passenger Wide

body 1,551

- $284 , 705 $7,510 $12,774 $49,205

- $215 , 217 Regional 540 $4,953 $15,972

- $31 $24,592 $45,486 Supplemental 806 $930,922 $6,509 $22,270 $56,700 $1,016,401 Freight Integrated 1, 38 3 $ 551 , 083 $14 , 0 99 $9 , 33 0 $22,05 0 $ 596 ,5 62

Freight Narrow

body 330 $112,588 $1,771 $6,858 $4,050 $125,267 Freight Wide

- body 1,053 $268 , 610 $12, 328 $2,4 72 $18,000 $ 301 , 411
For each industry group, the change in each of the cost components was divided by the number of flightcrew members in the b aseline solution to determine the monthly final rule crew scheduling cost per flightcrew m ember for that industry group . For the passenger integrated industry group, the change in each of the cost elements is summed across sub

- components (narrow

- body and wide

- body) before dividing by the sum of baseline solution flightcrew members. The f inal r u le crew scheduling cost is valued by summing the change in credit hour cost, per diem cost s , and hotel cost from the b aseline solution to the final rule solution

. The annual final rule crew scheduling cost per flightcrew member was calculated by multiplying the monthly cost by 12

. Table 19 show s the monthly change in flightcrew scheduling cost due to the final rule per flightcrew mem ber.66 Table 19 : Monthly Change in Flightcrew Scheduling Cost per Flightcrew Member due t o Final Rule

Industry Group Baseline Solution Flightcrew Members Change in Credit Hour Cost Change in Domestic TAFB Cost Change in International

TAFB Cost Change in Hotel Cost Total Change in Scheduling Cost

Passenger Integrated 4,173 $15 $3 $4 $7 $29 Passenger Narrow

- body 2,622 $107 $3 $1

- $7 $103

Passenger Wide

- body 1,551

- $184 $5 $8 $32

- $139

Regional 540 $9 $30 $0 $46 $84 Supplemental 806 $1,155 $8 $28 $70 $1,261 Freight Integrated 1,383 $398 $10 $7 $16 $431

Freight Narrow

- body 330 $341 $5 $21 $12 $380 Freight Wide

body 1,053 $255 $12 $2 $17 $286 Extrapolation of Crew Scheduling Analysis
The number of flightcrew members presented in Table 20 reflects the number of flightcrew members listed on each Part 121 carrier’s operating certificate in the FAA’s Vital Informat ion Subsystem (VIS) as of December 2010

. The total industry final rule cost would be overstated if extrapolation was based on the number of VIS flightcrew members because not all of these flightcrew members are lineholders

. Recall that the cost estimates a re calculated as the change in crew scheduling cost per lineholding flightcrew member. Each carrier employs a significant number of reserve flightcrew members

. The FAA estimated that , on average, reserves67 comprise 15 percent of flightcrew members f or the a verage Part 121 passenger air carrier based on APA published information

. 60 However, the available information also shows that carriers vary widely in regards to the percent of their pilot workforce that are reserves. Appendix B contains a sensitivity analysis on this key parameter. T he extrapolation of the crew scheduling analysis to the Part 121 passenger air transportation industry used the number of flightcrew members ( lineholders ) shown in Table 20 to determine the final rule crew scheduling cost.
Table 20 : Tally of Flightcrew Members, By Industry Group
Industry Group Number of Part 121 Carriers Total Number of Flightcrew

Members Total Nu mber of Flightcrew Members

Adjusted For 15% Reserves Passenger Integrated 7 36,013 30,611 Passenger Narrow

- body 14 11,899 10,114

Passenger Wide

- body 1 150 128 Regional 38 20,511 17,434 Supplemental 8 1,674 1,423 Freight Integrated 3 7,230 6,146 Freight Narrow

- body 16 846 719

Freight Wide

- body 3 914 777 Total 90 79,237 67,351
The number of flightcrew members in each industry group shown in Table 20 was multiplied by the appropriate annual cost per lineholding flightcrew member in Table 19 to extrapolate the estimated cost to the Part 121 air transportation industry , as shown in the “ Total Annual Crew Scheduling Costs ” column in Table 21

. This total cost figure is then allocated to passenger operations and cargo

- only operations using the share of revenue departures attributable to each class of operation in 2010 as reported i n Database T1: U.S. Air Carrier Traffic and Capacity

60 “Productivity,” American Airlines Negotiations. Accessed on August 1, 2012 at http://www. aanegotiations.com/apaProductivity.asp

.68 Summary by Service Class from the Bureau of Transportation Statistics . The percentage of revenue departures that are passenger and cargo

- only for each carrier is presented in Table C .1 in Appendix C

. As shown in Table 21 , there is a total of $ 48 million a year in flightcrew scheduling costs for all passenger operations due to the final rule associated with flightcrew credit hours, per diem costs, and hotel room costs. If the final rule applied to cargo

- only operations, there would be approximately $ 52 million in additional c osts per year. Table 21 : Annual Crew Scheduling Costs

Industry Group Final Rule Annual Cost per Flightcrew

Member Reserve
Adjusted Flightcrew Members Total Annual

Crew Scheduling Costs (millions) Passenger Operations Annual Crew

Sch eduling Costs (millions) Cargo
- Only Operations Annual Crew

Scheduling Costs (millions) Passenger Integrated $ 351 30,611 $11 $11 $0

Passenger Narrow

body $1,242 10,114 $13 $13 $0 Passenger Wide

- body

- $1,665 128 $0 $0 $0 Regional $1,011 17,434 $18 $17 $0 Supplemental $15,133 1,423 $22 $6 $15 Freight Integrated $5,1 76 6,146 $32 $0 $32 Freight Narrow

- body $4,55 5 719 $3 $0 $3

Freight Wide

- body $3 , 435 777 $3 $1 $2 Total $100 $48 $52

Limitations of Crew Scheduling Analysis
The FAA believes that carriers will be able to reduce mu ch of the cost shown in Table 21

. Carriers will engage in additional network optimization to reduce crew scheduling c osts, which the FAA is unable to quantify at this point

. In the long run, this may involve re

- timing flights, changing schedule frequency, and entering or leaving markets

. However, there may also be costs associated with these actions such as changes in a ircraft utilization and revenue losses

. At this time, the FAA has not estimated potential long

- run optimization of crew scheduling costs.69 The final rule economic costs are best measured as society’s willingness to be compensated for consumption opportuniti es forgone as a result of resources being diverted to the production of improved aviation safety

. Because these opportunity costs are difficult to estimate, our estimates of crew scheduling costs reflect, for the most part, financial costs that will be inc urred by affected air carriers

. These financial costs are likely to overstate the economic costs of the proposed rule. A large part of estimated crew scheduling costs is increased compensation to flightcrew members for the additional time spent in avoiding pilot fatigue

. These compensation costs will reflect economic costs only if flightcrew wage rates are accurate measures of the forgone value of goods and services that could otherwise be produced

. However, it is likely that flightcrew members will be able to use some of the time spent avoiding fatigue in productive activities, including the production of leisure activities

. Our cost estimates do not include offsets for the value of these activities.
Increas ed per diem cost estimates do not include offsets that are likely to occur

. For example, meals consumed on the road by flight crew members are substitutes for meals that would otherwise be consumed at home

. Resource savings (the value of labor and food use d to produce meals at home in this example) are not reflected in our cost estimates

. Similarly, the costs associated with increased hotel expenses do not include offsets for at

- home savings that will likely occur

— e.g., reduced energy and water consumption and avoided cleaning costs.


### Computer **Programming** Carriers will incur computer programming costs as they will need to update their crew management systems and their schedule optimization systems with the constraints imposed by the final rule

.70 A one - time co st will be incurred in 2013 as carriers update their crew management systems

. Crew management system update costs were estimated for each individual carrier, based on the number of flightcrew members listed on the carrier’s operating certificate

. Carriers were assigned to one of three groups based on the number of flightcrew members

. Computer programming c osts , which vary with size of carriers, are estimated using number of person

- days and staff costs. Person

- days required to perform the system update were estimated to be 400, 160 , and 80 days for large (more than 1,000 flightcrew members), average (250 to 1,000 flightcrew members) , and small (less than 250 flightcrew members) carriers, respectively. 61 A daily professional staff cost was assumed to be $625

. As shown in Table 22 , crew management system update costs due to the final rule for passenger carriers is estimated to be approximately $8 million. If the final rule was extended to cargo

- only operations, those carriers who perform just cargo

- only operations would experience an estimated $2 million in

costs. 62

61 The classification of carriers has changed slightly in this Initial S upplemental RIA compared to the original RIA. 62 Since the final rule applies only to passenger operations, a carrier that performs both passenge r and cargo

- only operations was assigned to the passenger carrier category because we assumed they would incur the full programming costs necessary to support compliance of their passenger operations with the final rule

.71 Table 22 : Crew Management System Update Costs Flightcrew Members Cost per Carrier Passenger Carriers (Count) Freight Carriers (Count) Passenger Carriers (millions) Freight Carriers (millions) >1,000 $250,000 16 2 $4 $1 250

- 1,000 $100,000 20 3 $2 $0 <250 $50,000 31 18 $2 $1 Total 67 23 $8 $2



### Payroll **Cost Savings from Reducing Flightcrew Members Fatigue** 
The final rule is designed to reduce the risk to flight operations attributable to fatigued flightcrew members by limiting the maximum number of hours they are permitted to be on duty, the number of hours they actually fly during duty periods, and by ensuring that they receive adequate rest periods before reporting for duty

. According to CDC, “ chronic sleep loss is an under

- recognized public health problem that has a cumulative effect on physical and mental health. Sleep loss and sleep disorders can reduce quality of life and productivity, increase use of health

- care services, and result in injuries, illness, or deaths.” 63 It is expected that the final rule will result in better

- rested flightcrew members and reduce flightcrew member fatigue, thus reducing the use of sick time by flightcrew members

. When a flightcrew member is scheduled for duty and calls in sick or fatigued, the carrier must use a reserve flightcrew member to complete the scheduled duty

. The final rule will reduce th e use of reserve flightcrew members to cover fatigue

- induced sick call

- ins by flightcrew members, which will reduce the flight operations cost associated with fatigue issues for carriers.

63 CDC’s MMWR, Weekly, February 29, 2008 / 57(08);200

- 203.72 While the current share of current sick time attributable to fatigue is unknown, it is al most certainly greater than zero

. Similarly, while the precise amount by which the final rule will reduce sick time is unknown, it is also most likely greater than zero

. Labor representatives have informed the FAA that sick time is app roximately five percent of payroll costs

. This data is consistent with data collected in the rail industry (see footnote 17 ). In light of this information , the FAA adopts the assum ption that sick time accounts for five percent of total industry flightcrew member pay . Moreover, FAA has also assumed for this analysis that the final rule is expected to reduce the use of sick time by five percent. As a result, FAA estim ates the cost savings from reducing use of sick time as 0.25 percent (five percent of five percent) of flightcrew payroll costs. Appendix B presents a sensitivity analysis for this assumption whereby it is assumed that the final rule will instead reduce us e of sick time by three percent or seven percent. Total industry flightcrew member pay was calculated from Form 41 pilot cost data. 64 Form 41 data covers only those air carriers with at least $20 million in annual revenues. These carriers employ approximat ely 96 percent of all pilots; therefore we factor up the Form 41 pilot payroll costs by approximately five percent to account for this small gap in coverage of the data

. 65 These cost savings were then allocated to passenger and cargo

- only operations , again using share of revenue departures for each carrier that were passenger operations or cargo

- only operations in 2010 as reported in Database T1: U.S. Air Carrier Traffic and Capacity Summary

64 The original RIA used a different method for estimating total payroll costs for the industry , but the resulting two cost estimates are very similar 65 The Form 41 data used in the original RIA only covered the first three quarters o f 2010. This analysis factors those three quarters of data to account for a full year of pilot payroll costs. Tables C. 3 in Appendix C provide details of these calculations.73 by Service Class from the Bureau of Transportation Statistics . Eac h carrier’s passenger/cargo

only split was weighted by the number of pilots the carrier employs to create a n overall passenger/cargo

- only split for each industry group. The annual nominal value of the cost savings is approximately $19 million for passenger operations and an additional $ 4. 4 million if the rule were extended to cargo

- only operations. Table 23 provides details of these calculations of c ost

s avings from r ed ucing flightcrew m ember f atigue

.

Table 23 : Payroll Cost Savings from Reducing Flightcrew Member Fatigue

Industry

Group Annual Adjusted Total Pilot and CoPilot Costs 1 (thousands) Annual Total Payroll Cost Savings

from Reducing Fatigue 2 (thousands) Percent of Payroll

Cost Savings Allocated to Passenger Operations Percent of Payroll

Cost Savings Allocated to Cargo
only Operations Annual Passenger Payroll Cost Savings (thousands) Annual Cargo Payroll Cost Savings (th ousands)
Passenger Integrated $4,710 , 694 $11,7 77 100% 0% $11,77 0 $6 Passenger Narrow

- body $1,750,075 $4,375 100% 0% $4,375 $0

Passenger Wide

- body $13,606 $34 100% 0% $34 $0

Regional $1,162 , 836 $2,907 99% 1% $2,87 1 $36 Supplemental $154,248 $386 30% 70% $115 $271 Freight Integrated $1,473, 257 $3,683 0% 100% $0 $3,68 3

Freight Narrow

- body $67,816 $170 15% 85% $25 $145 Freight Wide

body $115,858 $290 21% 79% $61 $228 Total $9,4 48,391 $23,6 21 $19,251 $4,37 0 1 Source: Table C.3 2 Adjusted Total Pilot and CoPilot Costs x 5% x 5%74 

### Flight Operations Cost Summary The total flight operations cost is composed of the additional crew scheduling costs (flightcrew member salary, hotel, and per diem), plus the computer programming costs, and less the cost savings from reducing flightcrew member ’ s fatigue

. The total net nominal flight operations cost for the period of analysis is approximately $ 294 million for passen ger operations. If the final rule were extended to cargo

- only operations the total net nominal flight operations costs over the analysis period would increase by $ 479 million

. Table 24 presents the nominal flight operations cost s attributable to the final rule for passenger operations for each year in the analysis period

. Table 25 p resents the nominal flight operations cost for cargo

- only carriers.
Table 24 : Total Flight Operations Cost, Passenger Operations

Year Scheduling Cost (millions) Computer Programming C ost (millions) Payroll Cost Savings from

Reducing

Fatigue (millions) Total Nominal

Cost (millions) 2012 $0 2013 $8 $8 2014 $48

- $19 $ 29 2015 $48

- $19 $29 2016 $48

- $19 $29 2017 $48

- $19 $29 2018 $48

- $19 $29 2019 $48

- $19 $29 2020 $48

- $19 $29 2021 $48

- $19 $29 2022 $48

- $19 $29 2023 $48

- $19 $29 Total $4 79 $8

- $193 $ 29475 Table 25 : Total Flight Operations Costs, Cargo
- Only Operations

Year Scheduling Cost (millions) Computer Programming Cost (millions) Payroll Cost Savings from

Reducing

Fatigue (millions) Total Nominal

Cost (millions) 2012 $0 2013 $2 $2 2014 $ 52

- $4 $48 2015 $52

- $4 $48 2016 $52

- $4 $48 2017 $52

- $4 $48 2018 $52

- $4 $48 2019 $52

- $4 $48 2020 $52

- $4 $48 2021 $52

- $4 $48 2022 $52

- $4 $48 2023 $52

- $4 $48 Total $521 $2

- $44 $479



### Rest Facilities

The final rule establishes maximum flight

- duty period limits for augmented operations that are dependent on the start time of the flight duty period, the number of flightcrew members assigned to the flight, and the class of rest facility installed on the aircraft

. The final rule establishes detailed specifica tions for each of the three classes of rest facilities

. Class 1 rest facilities are most conducive to reducing the risk of fatigue in augmented operations; accordingly, the maximum flight duty time permitted for augmented operations conducted with Class 1 rest facility

- equipped aircraft is greater than the maximum flight duty time permitted for augmented operations conducted with either Class 2 or 3 rest facility

- equipped aircraft

. The definitions of the rest facilities are as follows:76 o A Class 1 rest facili ty is a bunk or other surface that allows for a flat sleeping position and is located separate from both the flight deck and passenger cabin in an area that is temperature

- controlled, allows the crewmember to control light, and provides isolation from nois e and disturbance.

o A Class 2 rest facility is a seat in an aircraft cabin that allows for a flat or near flat sleeping position; is separated from passengers by a minimum of a curtain to provide darkness and some sound mitigation; and is reasonably free fr om disturbance by passengers or crewmembers.

o A Class 3 rest facility is a seat in an aircraft cabin or flight deck that reclines at least 40 degrees and provides leg and foot support

. There are four subcomponent s of the rest facility cost component of the final rule

. The first subcomponent consists of the rest facility design and engineering costs

. T he second subcomponent consists of the cost resulting from the physical installation of the facilities on the affected aircraft

. The third subcomponent is the value of the aircraft downtime required to install the rest facilities

. The final subcomponent is additional aircraft fuel consumption cost due to the weight of the rest facilities. We estimate that this engineering cost will be incurred in the first year that the rule is published (2012) to allow enough time for the facilities to be installed in the second year after the rule is published (2013). 66 This work will need to be accomplished before the rule is implemented in 2014. Once a facility is install ed on a particular aircraft, additional fuel will be consumed by that aircraft. For that reason, during the second year of the analysis

66 Delay in issuing the final advisory circular related to rest facilities means that carriers may not be able to develop all the necessary engineering work in 2012. This means some of the costs anticipated for 2012 may shift to 2013 and carriers may need to compress the time for installation of rest facilities. This would not change the nominal cost of the rule, and might decrease the net present value slightly due to costs being incurred further in the future.77 period one

- half of the estimated annual incremental fuel consumption is included in this cost analysis. The following pa ragraphs discuss how the FAA estimated each of the rest facility cost subcomponent s, and Table 26 details the total cost of each of subcomponent s for passenger operations while Table 27 presents the total costs for cargo

- only operations

. The total rest

facility cost for passenger operations is approximately $ 146 million in nominal terms, $ 132 million when discounted at seven percent. If the rule were extended to cover cargo

- only operations, the additional cost would be $ 66 million in nominal terms, $ 59 million when discounted at seven percent. 67
Table 26 : Rest Facility Cost Overview, Passenger Operations Rest Facilities Cost Subcomponent Total Nominal

Cost (millions) PV Cost at 7% (millions) PV Cost at 3% (millions) Engineering $13 $13 $13 Installation $100 $94 $97 Downtime $12 $11 $12 Fuel $21 $14 $17 Total $146 $132 $139

67 These cost estimates differ slightly from tho se in the original RIA due corrections of some minor calculation errors present in the original RIA, a more significant error in how fuel costs were calculated, and changes in how carriers were classified.78 Table 27 : Rest Facility Cost Overvi e w, Cargo
- Only Operations Rest Facilities Cost Subcomponent Total Nominal

Cost (millions) PV Cost at 7% (millions) PV Cost at 3% (millions) Engineering $3 $3 $3 Installation $48 $45 $46 Downtime $6 $5 $5 Fuel $10 $7 $8 Total $66 $59 $62 

### Engineering During NPRM cost analysis, the FAA obtained detailed cost estimates from two supplemental type certificate (STC) holders

. For the original RIA and this Initial Supplemental RIA, we delineated between engineering and kit/installation costs, as the engineering cost per operator would be a one

- time, non

- recurring cost for each type (make and model) of aircraft. We continue using the data provided by the STC holders as the basis for engineering and installation. The engineering costs are non

- recurring design costs. These consist of system, development, engineering, analysis, and certification costs

. We conservatively use the engineeri ng cost of $0.5 million per make/model as estimated by the STC holders

. We estimate that 26 designs will be
requ ired for passenger operators while five additional designs w ould be required if the rule was extended to cargo

- only operations. 68 Th e estimates a re derived from information gathered by FAA inspectors and are proprietary. T he estimated engineering cost is approximately $ 13 million ($0.5 million x 26 ) for passenger operators . If the rule were extended to cover cargo

- only operations there would be additional $2.5 million ($0.5 million x 5) in costs.

68 In the original RIA, it was estimated that 25 de signs would be needed. This estimate has changed because of changes in how carriers are classified.79 

### Installation Based upon public comments in response to the NPRM, the FAA has refined the estimate of the number of aircraft that will require rest facility installation. The FAA now estimates , based

on data collected from FAA inspectors, that 225 aircraft used for passenger operations will need crew rest modifications to comply with the final rule

. 69 This is an increase from the estimate of 104 aircraft used in passenger operations in the NPRM cost analys is

. However, it is lower than the estimates of some NPRM commenters

. The FAA believes that the final rule estimate of 225 aircraft represents the worst case scenario because aircraft will be re

- optimized based upon current configurations

. The FAA estimates that any additional aircraft, beyond the approximate
225 aircraft used in this analysis , will already have adequate rest facilities. Once the additional
225 aircraft have rest facilities installed, each fleet will be re

- optimized for the most efficient

us e . As such, we conservatively assume all of these 225 aircraft will have a Class 1 facility installed for an up per - bound estimation

. If the final rule w e re extended to cover cargo

- only operations, 107 additional aircraft would require facilities to be installed. We continue to use the equipment and labor cost provided by an STC holder for our estimate of installation costs to the carriers

. The kit and the installation for each of the individual airplanes will cost roughly $350,000 and $95,000, respecti vely

. As such, the total cost of each installation will be roughly $445,000 ($350,000 + $95,000)

. When multiplied by the affected fleet of 225 aircraft used for passenger operations , the total facility installation cost will be approximately $ 100 million ( $445,000 x 225 )

. If the rule were extended to cover cargo

- only

69 All aircraft used in augmented operations by carriers conducting both cargo - only and passenger operations are included in this estimate , since it is not p ossible to identify whether aircraft are used exclusively in cargo - only operations. In the original RIA it was estimated that 223 aircraft would require facilities to be installed. This estimate has changed because of changes in how carriers are classified

.80 operations, the additional total facility installation cost would be approximately $48 million ($445,000 x 107)

.


### Downtime
Commenters indicated that an aircraft could be out of service for two w eeks during rest facility installation

. The FAA estimates the cost to Part 121 operators for this potential additional planned time out of service, or downtime, to install the rest facilities. STC designers have indicated that with proper planning, a modif ier can install rest facilities in two to four days

. We conservatively use a four

- day estimate for the calculation of the downtime cost

. The FAA conservatively assumes that if an aircraft was to be out of service for any part of a day, th at airplane would be out of service for the entire day. For this analysis, the FAA uses the opportunity cost of capital to approximate the planned downtime cost to the operators

. Using guidelines prescribed by the Office of Management and Budget, the FAA uses seven percent as a proxy for average annual rate of return on capital

. The FAA uses $69 million as the estimated market value of an aircraft in this analysis

. 70 The yearly opportunity cost of capital per aircraft would be $4.83 million, roughly $13,233 per day

. When multiplied by the affected fleet ( 225 aircraft) and the days out of service (4 days), the downtime cost for the fleet is $ 1 2 million ( 225 x 4 x $13,233) for passenger operations. If the final rule were extended to cargo

- only operations, the additional cost would be approximately $6 million.

70 November, 2010 The Airline Monitor. This number represents the appraised value of a 767

- 300. p.3381 

### Fuel Consumption Costs We have analyzed the costs associated with the design and installation of Class 1 rest facilities

. We assume the rest facilities will be installed in the most efficient manner possible, with no im pact on passenger seats or the revenue that they generate. As such, we do not estimate loss of revenue from a Class 1 rest facility because , as defined by the rule, the facilities will be located separate from both the flight deck and passenger cabin and w ill not necessarily require the removal of passenger seats

. For example, a Class 1 rest facility can be located in the aircraft belly or overhead area , neither of which requires the removal of passenger seats

. Although there will be no revenue impact, ther e will be an additional cost that will add to the aircraft operating costs due to the estimated additional impact of weight changes on each aircraft

. Estimates for the additional incremental weight impact are used to calculate the additional fuel consumpti on for the affected fleet

. The estimated cost of fuel us es data from the 2011 FAA Aerospace Forecast. We use the fuel consumption methodology as derived from the FAA’s guidance, 71 along with the estimated average fuel cost of approximately $2. 4 5 per gallon

. 72 To calculate the additional annual cost of fuel per aircraft , we multiply the 300 additional pounds by the fuel consumption factor of 0 .005 gallons per hour per pound (consistent with a two

- engine, wide

- body aircraft) and arrive at 1.5 gallons per hour per aircraft

. This product is then multiplied by the average annual flight hours per aircraft of 2,380 and finally by the cost of fuel ($2. 4 5) to arrive at the total annual estimated

71 GRA, “Economic Values for FAA Investment and Regulatory Decisions, A Guide,” Oct. 3, 2007

. 72 Average of annual system mainline fuel prices forecasts for period 2014 through 2023 (in FY 2010 dollars) from Table 18, FAA Aerospace Forecast 2011

– 2031 . This estimate of fuel price differs from the original RIA.82 additional cost of fuel per aircraft of $ 8,746.50

. 73 When multiplied by th e affected annual fleet ( 225 aircraft), the annual incremental fuel consumption cost is approximately $ 2 million

. If the rule were extended to cover cargo

- only operations, the additional annual incremental fuel consumption would be approximately $1 million

. Table 28 presents the estimated costs of each of the subcomponents described above. Table 29 presents the total rest facility costs for passenger operations while Table 30 presents the additional total rest facility costs if the final rule were extended to cargo

- only operations. Carriers that conduct both passenger and cargo

- only operations have all of these facilities costs ascribed to their passenger operations because FAA was informed that given the small magnitude of the rest facility co sts, carriers would avoid having to manage two separate fleets, i.e. those aircraft with facilities and those aircraft without facilities.
Table 28 : Rest Facilities Costs Rest Facility Cost Subcomponent Unit Cost Passenger Quantity Passenger Cost Freight Quantity Freight Cost Engineering $500,000 26 $13,000,000 5 $2,500,000 Installation $445,000 225 $100,125,000 107 $47,615,000 Down Time $52,932 225 $11,909,700 107 $5,663,724 Annual Fuel Cost $8,746.50 225 $1,967,962.50 107 $935,875.50

73 The estimate of additional weight (300 pounds) was provided by an STC holder. Fuel consumption factor of .005 gallons per hour is from Table 6.1 of “ Economic Values for FAA Investment a nd Regulatory Decisions, A Guide” ( October 2007 ) written by GRA, Inc

. The estimate of 2,380 annual flight hours per aircraft comes from BTS Form 41 S chedule T2

- restricted , based on data for the 12

- month period October 2009 through Sept 2010 using Account 810 (Aircraft Days Assigned) and Account 650 (HoursAirborne) for a select ion of aircraft.83 Table 29 : Rest Facilities Total Costs, Passenger Operations

Year Engineering Installation Downtime Fuel Total Nominal

Cost (millions) 2012 $13 $13 2013 $100 $12 $1 $113 2014 $2 $2 2015 $2 $2 2016 $2 $2 2017 $2 $2 2018 $2 $2 2019 $2 $2 2020 $2 $2 2021 $2 $2 2022 $2 $2 2023 $2 $2 Total $13 $100 $12 $21 $146
Table 30 : Rest Facilities Total Costs, Cargo
- Only Operations

Year Engineering Installation Downtime Fuel Total Nominal

Cost (millions) 2012 $3 $3 2013 $48 $6 $0 $54 2014 $1 $1 2015 $1 $1 2016 $1 $1 2017 $1 $1 2018 $1 $1 2019 $1 $1 2020 $1 $1 2021 $1 $1 2022 $1 $1 2023 $1 $1 Total $3 $48 $6 $10 $6684 

### Fatigue Training In accordance with the Airline Safety and Federal Aviation Administration Extension Act of 2010, Section 212, each air carrier conducting operations under P art 121 must have submitted a fatigue risk management plan (FRMP) to the Administrator for review and acceptance

. A FRMP is an air carrier’s management plan outlining policies and procedures for reducing the risks of flightcrew member fatigue and improving flightcrew member alertness

. In this final rule the FAA kept the requirement for pilots to receive fatigue training, but th e original RIA and this Initial Supplemental RIA do not include an incremental cost of compliance because the operators are already in compliance with FRMP

. The final rule introduces a new requirement for management , schedulers, dispatchers , and any other individual directly involved in operational control of the flight to have fatigue training and the requirement for curriculum development for that fat igue training . Therefore th e original RIA and this Initial Supplemental RIA estimate the costs of these new requirements

. 74 As shown in Table 31 , t his rule change reduces the fatigue training cost requirement to $ 1 7 million in nominal terms for passenger operations , $ 1 1 million when discounted using a seven percent discount rate

. Table 32 shows that there would be an additional nominal cost of $ 6 million in fatigue training costs if the final rule were extended to
cover cargo - only operations , $ 4 million when discounted using a seven percent discount rate

.

74 The NPRM had originally included estimates costs for fatig ue training and curriculum development for pilots.85 Table 31 : Fatigue Training Cost Overview, Passenger Operations
Training Cost Subcomponents Total Nominal

Cost (millions) PV Cost at 7% (millions) PV Cost at 3% (millions) Initial Training (First Year of Rule) $3 $3 $3 Initial Training (New Hires and Churn) $1 $1 $1 Recurrent Training $12 $7 $10 Curriculum Development $0 $0 $0 Total $1 7 $11 $14

Table 32 : Fatigue Training Cost Overview, Cargo
- only Operations

Training Cost Subcomponents Total Nominal

Cost (millions) PV Cost at 7% (millions) PV Cost at 3% (millions) Initial Training (First Year of Rule) $1 $1 $1 Initial Training (New Hires and Churn) $0 $0 $0 Recurrent Training $4 $2 $ 3 Curriculum Development $0 $0 $0 Total $6 $ 4 $5

The final rule requires that dispatchers and upper management having operational control over flightcrew members be given fatigue training

. The number of dispatchers in the U.S. air transportation industry is equal to approximately three percent of the number of pilots

. 75 FAA estimates t he number of management personnel (immediate supervisors and schedulers) to be approximately nine percent of flightcrew members

. Therefore, the total number of dispatchers and management personnel required to receive fatigue training is estimated to be approximately 12 percent of total flightcrew members

. We further estimate that each manager and dispatcher

75 VIS, October 22, 2009.86 will require 5 hours of t raining when compliance with the final rule is required in 2012 which has been valued at a rate of 60 percent of the credit hour cost per flightcrew member for each industry group as found in Table 14 . In out years, this initial training will need to be given to new employees entering the workforce and to employees who switch carriers due to industry churn. We estimate these groups account for 3. 3 and 1.0 percent of th e current workforce respectively. Additionally, in the out years the dispatchers and managers will require two hours of recurring training each year. These initial training costs are allocated to passenger and cargo

only operations, again using percent of revenue departures for each carrier that were passenger operations or cargo

- only operations in 2010 as reported in Database T1: U.S. Air Carrier Traffic and Capacity Summary by Service Class from the Bureau of Transportation Statistics

. Table 33 and Table 34 show the annual costs for these categories of training for passenger and cargo

- only operations, respectively

. For passenger operations, the final rule will result in $3. 4 3 million in nominal fatigue training costs for management and dispatchers in the first year of the rule and additional $13 million in nomin al fatigue training costs during the following nine years. If the final rule were extended to cargo

- only operations, there would be an additional $ 1

. 1 4 million in nominal fatigue training costs for management and dispatchers in the first year of the rule, and an additional $ 4 million in nominal fatigue training costs during the following nine years.

In addition , carriers will incur a one

- time cost to develop a fatigue training curriculum

. According to industry standard, curriculum development takes three ho urs for each hour of course required. Therefore, the time needed to develop the initial training curriculum will be fifteen hours and the time needed to develop the recurrent training curriculum will be six hours

. The FAA assumes that the wage rate of the curriculum developer is approximately $100 per
hour

. Each of the 67 Part 121 air carriers that had passenger operations will need to develop its87 own curriculum

. The total nominal cost of curriculum training is $ 140,700

. If the final rule is extended to car go - only operations then there will be an additional $ 48,300 in nominal curriculum
costs for the 23 carriers that conduct only cargo

- only operations

. 76
Table 33 : Total Fatigue Training Costs, Passenger Operations

Year Initial Training (First Year of Rule) Initial Training (New Hires and Churn) Recurrent Training Curriculum Development Total Nominal

Cost (millions) 2012 $0.00 2013 $0.00 2014 $3, 426 , 813 $140,700 $3.57 2015 $147,353 $1,31 1, 784 $1.46 2016 $147,353 $1,31 1, 784 $1.46 2017 $147,353 $1,31 1, 784 $1.46 2018 $147,353 $1,31 1, 784 $1.46 2019 $147,353 $1,31 1, 784 $1.46 2020 $147,353 $1,31 1, 784 $1.46 2021 $147,353 $1,31 1, 784 $1.46 2022 $147,353 $1,31 1, 784 $1.46 2023 $147 , 35 3 $1,31 1, 784 $1.46 Total $3,426,813 $1, 326 , 177 $11, 806 , 055 $140,700 $16

. 70

76 The curriculum development costs associated with air carriers that conduct both passenger and cargo

- only operations are counted under the costs associated with passenger operatio ns.88 Table 34 : Total Fatigue Training Costs, Cargo
- only Operations

Year Initial Training (First Year of Rule) Initial Training (New Hires and Churn) Recurrent Training Curriculum Development Total Nominal

Cost (millions) 2012 $0.00 2013 $0.00 2014 $ 1,143 , 289 $48,300 $1.19 2015 $49,161 $ 437,651 $0.49 2016 $49,161 $437,651 $0.49 2017 $49,161 $437,651 $0.49 2018 $49,161 $437,651 $0.49 2019 $49,161 $437,651 $0.49 2020 $49,161 $437,651 $0.49 2021 $49,161 $437,651 $0.49 2022 $49,161 $437,651 $0.49 2023 $49 , 161 $437,651 $0.49 Total $ 1,143,289 $ 442 , 453 $3 , 93 8, 859 $48,300 $ 5

. 57



### Cost Analysis Summary

The co st of the final rule to Part 121 passenger operations over the twelve

- year period of analysis is estimated to be $ 4 57 million in nominal value, $ 3 38 million when discounted at seven percent, or $ 398 million when discounted at three percent. F light opera tions account for approximately 6 4 percent of the nominal total cost ( 5 8 percent of present value cost discounted at seven percent ) ; crew scheduling cost is the largest subcomponent of flight operations cost

. Rest facilities account for roughly 3 2 percent of the nominal total cost (3 9 percent of present value cost discounted at seven percent ) ; rest facility installation is the largest subcomponent of rest facilities cost

. Roughly four percent of the nominal cost of the final rule is attributable to training (three percent of present value cost discounted at seven percent)

. If the final rule were extended to cover Part 121 cargo

- only operations, over the twelve

year period of analysis there would be additional costs of $ 550 million in nominal valu e, $ 37789 million when discounted at seven percent, or $ 464 million when discounted at three percent. Flight operations account for approximately 8 7 percent of the nominal total cost ( 84 percent of present value cost discounted at seven percent ) ; crew scheduling cost is the largest subcomponent of flight operations cost. Rest facilities account for roughly 12 percent of the nominal total cost ( 16 percent of present value cost discounted at seven percent ) ; rest facility installation is the largest subcomponent of rest facilities cost. Roughly one percent of the nominal cost of the final rule is attributable to training (one percent of present value cost discounted at seven percent)

. Table 35 and Table 36 summarize the results of the cost estimation for passenger and
cargo - only operations, respectively. All final rule cost c omponents were calculated using industry

- provided data whenever possible, along with expert analysis

. Table 35 : Cost Summary, Passenger Operations
Cost Component Total Nominal

Cost (millions) PV Cost at 7% (millions) PV Cost at 3% (millions) Flight Operations $294 $195 $245

Rest Facilities $146 $132 $139 Training $17 $11 $14

Total $457 $3 38 $ 398

Table 36 : Cost Summary, Cargo
- only Operations
Cost Component Total Nominal

Cost (millions) PV Cost at 7% (millions) PV Cost at 3% (millions) Flight Operations $479 $ 315 $ 397

Rest Facilities $66 $59 $62 Training $6 $4 $5

Total $ 550 $ 377 $ 46490 

## Benefit Cost **Summary**

The total estimated cost of the final rule as it applies to passenger operations over 1 2
years is $ 4 57 million ( $ 338 million present value at seven percent and $ 398 million at three percent ). We provide a range of estimates for our quantitative benefits over the same period

. Our base case estimate of the benefits of the final rule as applied to pas senger operations is $ 401 million ($ 263 million present value at seven percent and $ 332 million at three percent) and our high case estimate is $ 757 million ($ 497 million present value at seven percent and $627 million
at three percent). Therefore, the costs of the final rule are somewhat higher than the base case benefits estimate but well below the high case estimate. We also note that saving just 8 4 lives in a 10 year period would cause this rule to be cost beneficial

. 77 Further, even if this rule was only
3 6 percent effective at preventing accidents due to fatigue (as opposed to the 52.5 percent effectiveness estimated in this analysis) the rule would still be cost beneficial. 78 The total estimated cost of the final rule as it applies to cargo operations over 12 years is $ 550 million ($ 377 million present value at seven percent and $ 464 million at three percent). We provide a range of estimates for our quantitative benefits over the same period. Our base case estimate is $ 5 million ($ 3 mil lion present value at seven percent and $ 4 million at three percent) and our high case estimate is $ 31 million ($ 2 1 million present value at seven percent and $ 2 6 million at three percent). Neither estimate results in positive net benefits.

77 This comparison is made assuming the lives saved are distributed uniformly over the 10 year analysis period for benefits and using a seven percent discount rate. 78 This calculation is performed using the parameters from high case benefits analysis an d uses s even percent as the discount rate

.91 

## Appendix A: **Relevant Accident History**92 1. Accident DCA91MA021
A/C: DC

- 9

- 15, registration: N565PC Injuries: 2 Fatal
Date : 2/17/1991 Accident Summary : After takeoff, aircraft rolled to the right, then severely to the left past (90 degrees) and crashed. An ATC and some witnesses saw a fireball come out of the rear of the plane. Probable Cause : Probable cause was determined to be failure of the flight crew to detect and remove ic e from the aircrafts wings which was largely a result of lack of appropriate response by the FAA, Douglass aircraft company, and Ryan International airlines to the known critical effect that a minute amount of contamination has on the stall characteristics of the DC

- 9 series 10 airplane. NTSB considered possibility that fatigue influenced pilots' judgment & decision not to conduct exterior preflight inspection of A/C. Crew had flown same night

- time schedule for 6 days, & PIC for 12 of 13 days, averaging 3.8 flight hours & 5 landings each night. His schedule had recently increased from flying for 5 days, then 9 days off at home in CA. Though his family said he was used to night flying, recent increase in duty & flight time could have induced fatigue. But BTSB was divided on exact role of fatigue; some wanted fatigue as a cause, others did not. But fatigue's presence was not disputed. In the end, however, the Board could not reach a firm conclusion & excluded fatigue as a cause or factor. Flight Crew/Fatigue Re lated Information: The captain flew six successive night flights the week before the incident, and flew another six successive night flights with the same first officer each night, including the night of the event. The total flight time for the six success ive night flights, which included the night of the incident was 19.6 hrs. The first officer's total flight93 time in the 7 days prior to the incident was 19.6 hrs, accumulated all during six successive night flights with the same captain. On the six successi ve night flights, the captain and first officer came on duty around 2145. On the day before the accident, a van driver for the hotel overheard the pilots talking about how little sleep they get. On the day of the incident, an airline mechanic described the pilots as normal and rested. On the day of the accident, the operations supervisor stated the crew remained in the cockpit; normal crewmembers leave the airplane for a walk around. Supervisor described the captain as quiet and expressionless. The captain was used to flying nights as a result of his military flying. Normal schedule was 5 nights on, 9 nights off. But a few weeks before accident, duty schedule changed as a result of airline contract to carry mail for US Postal Service. Airline subsequently hi red new pilots and extended duty hrs of experienced pilots. The 2 weeks between his last visit home and the accidents were described as the longest period he had been on duty with the airline. SCORE: 0.5 Requirements would place 200

- hour limit on duty time in 672 consecutive hours (4 weeks). That might have changed PIC’s schedule substantially.

August 18,1999 in Guantanamo Bay
A/C: DC

- 8, N814CK Injuries: 3 Serious
Date : 8/18/1993 Accident Summary : Aircraft collided with level terrain after captain lost co ntrol of aircraft while approaching airfield. Probable Cause : Probable cause was determined to be the captains impaired judgment , decision making and flying abilities of the night crew due to the effects of fatigue; the captains94 failure properly assess th e conditions for landing and maintaining vigilant situational awareness of the airplane while maneuvering onto final approach; his failure to prevent the loss of airspeed and avoid a stall while in steep band turn; and his failure to execute immediate acti on to recover from a stall Flight Crew/Fatigue Related Information: At the time of the accident, the crew had been on duty for approx 18 hrs, having flown all night before accepting the accident flight. The board believes that the substandard performance b y the experienced captain may have reflected the debilitating influence from fatigue. Captain testified feeling very lethargic and indifferent during the landing. First officer testified he felt fatigued earlier in the trip but felt exhilarated at the time of the landing. The board’s analysis revealed the captain had been awake for 23.5 hrs at the time of the accident, the first officer 19hrs and flight engineer 21 hrs. the accident occurred at the end of the afternoon psychological low period, the crewmemb ers had been awake the previous 2 nights, and had attempted to sleep during the day complicating their circadian sleep disorders

- thus fitting the 3 scientific criteria for susceptibility to the debilitating effects of fatigue. At 0830, before crew left a irport, chief scheduler found GTMO flight needed crew & was told “no legal problem” as it was “international flight.” Scheduler determined crew could reposition to Norfolk Naval Base (NGU), pick up A/C, fly to GTMO, then ferry under Part 91 to ATL, & remai n just within company 24

- hour duty limit. Crew discussed timing & agreed to take trip, though “it was pushing the edge.” CAUSE: impaired judgment, decision

- making, & flying abilities of PIC & crew due to fatigue; PIC's failure to properly assess condition s; loss of situational awareness while maneuvering onto final; failure to prevent loss of airspeed & avoid stall while in steep bank turn;95 & failure to execute immediate action to recover from stall. Factors; inadequacy of Part 121 flight & duty time regul ations, supplemental air carrier, international operations, & circumstances that led to extended flight/duty hours & fatigue; inadequate CRM training & inadequate training & guidance by carrier for crew on operations at special airports, such as GTMO; & Na vy's failure to provide system that would assure that local tower controller was aware of inoperative strobe light so as to advise crew. SCORE: 0.9 At time of accident, PIC & FO had been awake about 24 hours & on duty 22 hours. After such a long day, crew was offered standard straight

- in approach over ocean but they inexplicably chose very demanding approach in darkness. FE had said he got a rush on approach like they were shooting an approach to an aircraft carrier but FE noted that he was “tired & letharg ic” as A/C approached airport & he “believed that the other 2 crew members were fatigued.” By including ferry flights, the requirements in this final rule affect duty

- day limits would have precluded this crew from taking this flight.
3. Accident DCA94MA065
Date : 7/2/1994 July 2, 1994 in Charlotte, NC
A/C: MD

- 82, N954VJ Injuries: 37 Fatal, 16 Serious Accident Summary : Aircraft collided with trees and a private residence near the Charlotte/Douglas International Airport, Charlotte, North Carolina (CLT), shortly after the flightcrew executed a missed approach from the instrument landing system (ILS) approach to
runway Probable Cause : Probable cause was dete rmined to be the flightcrew’s decision to continue an approach into severe convective activity that was conducive to a microburst: 2) the96 flightcrew’s failure to recognize a windshear situation in a timely manner, 3) the flightcrew’s failure to establish a nd maintain the proper airplane attitude and thrust setting necessary to escape the windshear; and 4) the lack of real

- time adverse weather and windshear hazard information dissemination from air traffic control, all of which led to an encounter with and
f

ailure to escape from a microburst

- induced windshear that was produced by a rapidly developing thunderstorm located at the approach end of runway. Flight Crew/Fatigue Related Information: The captain was off duty for 3 days before the beginning of the acci dent trip. On the morning of June 28, 1994, he flew with his National Guard squadron, which is based at Wright Patterson Air Force Base Ohio, near his home. On the day of the accident he awoke about 0455 drove to the airport in Dayton Ohio, and departed on a flight to Pittsturgh at around 0745. The reporting time for the trip that included the accident flight was 0945, and the departure time for LGA was at 1045. The first officer flew a 4

- day trip that ended around 0930 on July 2. On the day of the accident , he arose about 06 I5 and flew the leg to Pittsburgh that departed St. Louis at 0810. He arrived in Pittsburgh at 0030.
SCORE: 0. 1 5 Fatigue could have affected FO's performance (PF). PIC, who was off

- duty preceding 3 days, was much less vulnerable to fat igue, but he too had already had a long day. Accident occurred 14 hours into PIC’s day. He awoke at 0455, drove to Dayton from home, then flew to PIT to begin duty day. Accident occurred at 1843, at end of third of 4 scheduled legs. His long day may have c ontributed to his failure to make 2 standard call

- outs on approach at 1000 AGL & 100 AGL. As NTSB notes, failure to make these call

- outs contributed to PIC’s loss of situational awareness, his directing FO to go

- around “to the right” instead of following r unway heading as directed, & directing FO to “push down” after FO had initiated 15

- degree nose

- up & right banking turn.97 FO was more vulnerable to fatigue. His duty day ended June 30 at 2230 at Blountsville, TN. NTSB report does not say when that duty day began, nor when FO awoke that day. At Blountville, he went to bed at 0130 & awoke at 0900. His next duty day ended at STL at 2040 EDT. He went to bed at 2230 & awoke at 0615 on accident day. He then flew to PIT & began pairing with accident PIC. Like PIC, FO was nearly 14 hours into his day when accident occurred. He was PF on PIT

- LGA leg & on accident leg from CAE. Fatigue could have contributed to incomplete pre

- flight brief, failure to maintain sterile cockpit below 10,000 feet, approach briefing in whic h he omitted field elevation, FAF altitude, DH, & MAP altitudes, all of which NTSB noted had contributed to lack of situational awareness by both pilots. Finally, all the above contributed to crew’s choice to initiate non

- standard go

- around. Other factors were important, including ATC performance, A/C's inadequate windshear algorithm, & abnormally severe windshear. In short, hard to justify a high score, but equally hard to argue that fatigue was irrelevant.

4. Accident DCA95MA020
Date : 2/16/1995 NTSB Identification: DCA95MA020 , Air Transport International February 16, 1995 in Kansas City, MO
A/C: DC

- 8

- 63, N782AL Injuries: 3 Fatal Accident Summary : Aircraft was destroyed by ground impact and fire during attempted takeoff. Probable Cause : Probable cause was determined to be loss of directional control by pilot in command during the takeoff roll, flightcrews lack of understanding of the three

- engine takeoff98 procedures and their decision to modify these procedures and the failure of the company to ensure that the flight crew had adequate experience, training and rest to conduct the non

- routine flight Flight Cre w/Fatigue Related Information: Safety board believes the captain and other crew members were experiencing fatigue at the time of the accident. The captain’s performance in the accident reveals many areas of degradation in which fatigue is probably a factor

. Accident report notes a demanding Delaware

- Germany overnight round trip flight (6 time zones crossed) and a daytime rest period which caused disruptions in circadian rhythms. Additionally, the captains last rest period was repeatedly interrupted by the company. Report also notes that since flight was non

- revenue flight, it was under different duty rules and the same flight, were it a revenue flight, would have been illegal given the rest periods the crew had. SCORE: 0.9 Fatigue was a significant problem in this accident. With or without crew's inadequate training & knowledge of 3

- engine T/O, NPRM would preclude this crew from this ferry trip. Also, all 3 crew performed poorly & all 3 likely were fatigued, per NTSB, & all 3 exhibited “performance degradati on” symptomatic of fatigue (difficulties in setting proper priorities & continuation of T/O attempt despite disagreement & confusion on important issues).
5. Date : 12/20/1995 NTSB Identification: DCA96RA020, American Airlines December 20, 1995 in Cali, Co lombia
A/C: B757

- 200, N651AA Injuries: 160 Fatal, 4 Serious Accident Summary: Aircraft crashed 38 miles north of Cali, Columbia into mountainous terrain during a descent under instrument flight rules99 Probable Cause : Probable causes were determined to be th e flight crew’s failure to adequately plan and execute the approach to runway 19 at SKCL and their inadequate use of automation; Failure of the flightcrew to discontinue the approach into Cali, despite numerous cues alerting them of the inadvisability of c ontinuing the approach; The lack of situational awareness of the flightcrew regarding vertical navigation, proximity to terrain, and the relative location of critical radio aids; Failure of the flightcrew to revert to basic radio navigation at the time whe n the FMS

- assisted navigation became confusing and demanded an excessive workload in a critical phase of the flight.

Flight Crew/Fatigue Related Information: At 2138 CFIT at 9000; peak at 9190. Night VOR/DME approach from MIA; 2 hrs late. PIC concerned t o get cabin crew on ground to meet AAL rules on cabin crew rest (for next day return flight). Cali in long N/S valley; high terrain west & east. Cleared to Cali VOR; readback "cleared direct," entered "direct;" way points go off display. Later cleared to i nterim Tulua VOR. Expecting “direct,” crew became unsure of location. CVR shows crew fumbled with charts & Tulua ID, but already past Tulua. When crew finally entered Tulua, A/C began turning back to Tulua; PIC overrode. Then ATC offered direct approach fr om north (was 01; now 19). Crew rushed to get down. Put in single

- letter ID for ROSO, but Colombia has 2 navaids with single

letter "R." Per ICAO, software defaults to "R" with more traffic (well north at Romeo VOR

-- Bogota); had to punch in all 4 letters f or ROSO. Again A/C began turning back. Crew now very confused & they knew it. FO (PF): "where are we?" PIC says go S/SE

– now east of valley, 13 miles off course & below terrain between A/C & Cali. Now more confused; reading DME to ROMEO, thinking it was R OSO. Stepped down early, configured to land as GPWS sounded.100 Pulled up but did not retract spoilers; slow climb (184 knots at impact). Hit east slope nose up, skidded over top & down west side. Both pilots, 6 FA & 152 pax fatal; 4 pax serious. CAUSE per Co lombian CAA: 1. crew's failure to adequately plan & execute approach to runway 19 & inadequate use of automation; 2. Failure to discontinue approach, despite numerous cues; 3. lack of situational awareness regarding vertical navigation, proximity to terrai n, & relative location of critical radio aids; 4. Failure to revert to basic radio nav when FMS

- nav became confusing & demanded excessive workload. Factors: 1. crew's ongoing efforts to expedite approach & landing to avoid potential delays from exceeding c ompany duty time limits; 2. execution of GPWS escape maneuver with speed brakes deployed; 3. FMS logic that dropped all intermediate fixes from display(s) upon execution of direct routing; 4. FMS

- generated nav information that used different naming convent ion from that published in nav charts."
SCORE: 0.35 Crew certainly would have been tired, despite being first of their duty tour. PIC had been awake close to 17 hours & FO had been awake at least 15 hours (14 & 17 hours are key thresholds in fatigue). Yet even if each had been operating earlier in their day, they likely would not have sorted out confusion created by single

- letter identifier for Rozo & Romeo. Yet more rested crew may have avoided readback

- hearback error related to “direct” with interim way
p oints. Crew clearly knew they were very confused & that they were uncertain of their position in rugged terrain. More alert crew might have responded more appropriately, either by climbing above terrain to sort things out, or by reverting to radio nav unti l they re

- established their position, or may have recognized that over

- ride of northbound turn had pushed them across ridge line, east of valley. Though crew certainly would be tired, fatigue was less than a show

- stopper. Key factors would have remained wi th or without alert crew: non

- radar environment; confusion from multiple identifiers; self

- induced pressure; unexpected change to unfamiliar step

- down101 approach at night in mountainous terrain; & significantly delayed flight. The requirements might have led to avoiding confusion or to more appropriate response to confusion.

6. NTSB Identification: NYC96FA174, TWA August 25, 1996 in JFK, NY
A/C: L

- 1011, N31031 Injuries: None
Date : 8/25/1996 Accident Summary : Aircraft was substantially damaged when the tail s truck the runway, while landing at John F. Kennedy International Airport, Jamaica, New York (JFK). On arrival in JFK area, wx was 1⁄4

- mile in fog, scattered at 200, & temp/dew of 66/66F. Crew expected 4R, but before reaching FAF, 4R went below minimum & ATC offered 4L (still above minimum). PIC accepted & FO (PF) transitioned to 4L. Inspection methods from Lockheed & adopted by TWA did not adequately specify how to check slat drive system for slack. But crew failed to reset altimeter bug for new runway (100 feet higher than 4R). PIC also missed several required call

- outs on approach & no charts for 4L were on board. When PF asked for charts, PIC said “just fly the approach.” A/C was slow & unstable throughout approach & when altimeter read 50 feet (in fact 15 0 feet), A/C began to flare. FO recognized they were high & pushed nose over. On landing, A/C had tail strike & substantial damage. Failure to reset altimeter & absence of charts were fundamental in this accident. Probable Cause : Probable cause was determi ned to be the failure of the flight crew to complete the published checklist and to adequately cross

- check the actions of each other, which102 resulted in their failure to detect that the leading edge slats had not extended and led to the aircraft's tail cont acting the runway during the computer

- driven, auto

- land flare for landing. Flight Crew/Fatigue Related Information: The captain reported that he had difficulty adjusting to disruptions in his sleeping schedule, and for this reason did not bid to fly intern ational routes. According to his sleep schedule, he had been awake about 24 hours at the time of the accident and reported that he that he felt, ""awful, just tired and exhausted."" The first officer said that the captain attempted to rest during the cruis e portion of the flight to JFK, with his head back in the seat, but that there were visiting crewmembers in the cockpit and the captain might not have received good rest. In addition, the captain commented that he had not slept well in the hotel. The first officer reported that he had flown the LAS layover trip several times during July, and had learned the importance of good sleep for flying it. He reported that he had in excess of 14 hours of rest in the scheduled 24 hours of off duty, which was split ove r two periods. At the time of the accident he had been awake for over 9 hours following a rest in excess of 5 1/2 hours. The flight engineer reported that she had not slept well in the hotel on the layover. Additionally, she reported that she felt rested when the accident trip began; however, at the time of the landing she was getting tired

SCORE: 0.35 Had crew been better rested, they may not have missed altimeter reset, may have recognized or acted upon unstable approach, or may have gone around, as req uired by company procedures when not stable at 500 feet. NPRM's treatment of night operations may have affected this flight. Conversely, crews have made similar errors when well rested & flying at mid

- day. FAA believes that avoidable fatigue contributed to crew’s failures on approach.103 7. NTSB Identification: NYC99LA052 , Colgan Air January 22, 1999 in Hyannis, MA
A/C: BE

- 1900, N215CJ Injuries: None At 1719 (dusk), Beech 1900D by Colgan substantially damaged on landing at HYA. No injury to PIC, FO & 2 employ ees as pax on positioning flight from BOS to HYA in IMC. Started taxi at BOS at 1600. T/O & en route uneventful. But RVR at HYA went below minimum while
en route. Wx was 100

- foot ceiling in fog, with variable winds at 3 knots. On arrival at HYA, PIC perfor med 2 missed approaches. Before trying 3 rd approach, he advised tower & pax that this was last shot, or they return to BOS. On third approach, both PIC & FO visually acquired runway. FO said PIC lined up with centerline & requested flaps. FO said A/C “floa ted at 20 feet over runway at normal transition when I heard PIC taking power levers over flight idle gate by sound of engine/props.' This placed prop in 'BETA' range. A/C then started to sink, & PIC pulled back on control yoke. Main gear struck ground & fractured during +2.9G touchdown, which occurred 2500 feet beyond approach end of 5,252 foot runway. Ran off right side of runway, 4700 feet beyond approach end & stopped. To place throttles in BETA, it was necessary to lift power levers over flight idle s top. Flight manual included warning: 'Do not lift power levers in flight.' On accident day, PIC reported for duty at 0535, with first departure from HYA at 0620. He returned to HYA at 0920, after 3 flights & 2:31 flight time. Then with different FO, PIC T/ O for Boston at 1100. They flew 5 more flights for 3:53 flight hours, then returned to BOS at 1540. Probable CAUSE: PIC’s improper placement of power levers in BETA position while in flight. Factors: fog & dusk conditions.104 SCORE: 0.15 Accident report sum marizes only Captain's flight day, not his preceding 72 hours. Clearly had a long day & difficulty getting into HYA did not help. Started taxi at BOS 12.5 hours into duty day for flight to HYA, so he needed to be on ground at HYA within half

hour to beat n ew NPRM max duty day. May have precuded this PIC from this flight (or not

– close call). Also, though better rested PIC may have handled flare better, others have pulled throttle & props into beta. Fatigue might help explain PIC’s decision to take 3 shots at landing below mimium,

8. NTSB Identification: NYC99FA110, American Eagle May 8, 1999 in JFK, NY A/C: SF34, N232AE Injuries: 1 Serious Accident NYC99FA110 Accident Summary : Aircraft sustained substantial damage during landing at John F. Kennedy International Airport (JFK) Probable Cause : Probable cause was determined to be the pilot

- in

- command's failure to perform a missed approach as required by his company procedures. Facto rs were the pilot

- in

command's improper in

- flight decisions, the pilot

- in

- command's failure to comply with FAA regulations and company procedures, inadequate crew coordination, and fatigue Flight Crew/Fatigue Related Information: On May 6, 1999, the captai n went off duty about 2030, drove home, and was asleep about 2300. On May 7, 1999, he awoke about 0700. He attempted to nap about 1200, but was unsuccessful. He reported for duty about 2200. The first officer was off duty on May 6, 1999. He departed Las Ve gas, Nevada (commuting on a jumpseat) at 1230, and arrived at JFK about 1730. He ate, then rested in the pilot's crew room,105 but did not sleep. There was a 3 hour time difference between Las Vegas and JFK. The trip sequence scheduled the pilots to depart JF K at 2246, arrive at BWI at 2359, on May 7, 1999; and depart BWI for JFK at 0610 on May 8, 1999. They were provided with individual rooms at a local hotel, approximately 10 minutes from the airport. Due to a takeoff delay at JFK, the flightcrew did not arr ive at BWI until 0025. They arrived at the hotel about 0100. The captain stated that he was asleep by 0130. He awoke at 0445 for the scheduled 0530 van ide back to the airport. The first officer stated that he was asleep between 0130 and 0200. He received a wake

up call at 0445. During post

- accident interviews, both pilots stated that they were fatigued. At 0702, SF34 by American Eagle substantially damaged on landing at JFK; 1 pax serious; no injury to 26 pax, FA & 2 pilots. En route from BWI uneventful. O n arrival in NY area, crew completed checklists & briefings for runway 04 when ATC advised crew that RVR for 04 was 1,600. Crew needed 1800 so ATC cleared them to holding fix at 4,000. While flying toward holding fix, RVR increased. ATC offered crew ILS ap proach, but advised that they might be too high. PIC accepted clearance nevertheless. Controller asked if crew could make approach from their position. PIC said yes & continued entire approach with excessive altitude, airspeed, & rate of descent, while rem aining above glide slope. This violated company procedures & FAR 91.175. Crew then failed to respond to 4 audible GPWS warnings. During approach, FO failed to make required callouts, including missed approach callout. Landed 7,000 feet beyond approach end, at 157 knots, & overran. During interviews, both pilots said they were fatigued. Crew was working continuous duty overnight schedule. Continuous duty overnights (CDO) at American Eagle identifies trip sequence that is flown during late night hours, exten ding into early morning hours, with significant elapsed time period between one arrival & next departure. Since break between106 flights is not sufficient to qualify as free from duty rest period, crew remains continuously on duty, though carrier may have pro vide hotel room for rest. On May 6, PIC went off duty at 2030, drove home, & was asleep at 2300. On May 7, he awoke at 0700. He tried to nap about noon but was unsuccessful. He reported for duty at 2200. FO was off duty on May 6. He departed LAS (commutin g on jumpseat) at 0930 local time on May 7 (1230 EDT) & arrived at JFK at 1730. He ate then rested in crew room, but did not sleep. Trip sequence scheduled crew to depart JFK at 2246, arrive BWI at 2359, & then depart BWI for JFK at 0610 on 5/8. They were provided with individual rooms at hotel 10 minutes from airport. But, due to delays at JFK, crew did not arrive at BWI until 0025. They arrived at hotel at 0100 & PIC was asleep by 0130. He awoke at 0445 for scheduled 0530 van ride back to airport. FO said he was asleep between 0130 and 0200. He received wake

- up call at 0445. CAUSE: PIC's failure to perform missed approach as required by company procedures. Factors: PIC's improper in

- flight decisions, failure to comply with FARs & company procedures, inadeq uate crew coordination, & fatigue. SCORE: 0.5 Crew likely was tired, & helps to explain why crew did little right on or before the approach. Yet, the requirements would not reach the practice of “Continuous Duty Overnight, but it would have reached the FO ’s continuous day starting with his commute. This would not have helped PI, but it might have ensured at least one alert crewmember.

9. NTSB Identification: DCA99MA060, American June 1, 1999 in Little Rock, AR
A/C: MD

- 82, N215AA Injuries: 11 Fatal, 45 Se rious Accident DCA99MA060107 Accident Summary: Aircraft crashed after it overran the end of runway Flight Crew/Fatigue Related Information: The captain went to sleep about 2200 the night before the accident and slept until between 0700 and 0730. On nonflying days, he would typically go to sleep between 2130 and 2200, wake up about 0515, and leave for work about 0600. On May 30, 1999, the first officer tra veled from his home outside Los Angeles, California, to Chicago. The first officer indicated that he had been commuting from his home to the Chicago

- O’Hare base for about 3 months and that, as a result, he was adjusted to the central time zone. The first o fficer indicated that he was involved in routine activities while in the Chicago area. He went to bed between 2000 and 2200 the night before the accident and woke up about
0730. The board found that at the time of the accident (2350:44), the captain and th e first officer had been continuously awake for at least 16 hours. Also the accident time was nearly 2 hours after the time that both pilots went to bed the night before the accident and the captain’s routine bedtime (between 2130 and 2200), meaning their circadian systems were not actively promoting alertness. The Safety Board concludes that the flight crew’s degraded performance was consistent with known effects of fatigue. CAUSE: failure to discontinue approach when severe thunderstorms & associated haza rds to flight operations had moved into airport area, & crew's failure to ensure that spoilers had extended after touchdown. Factors: flight crew's (1) impaired performance resulting from fatigue & situational stress associated with intent to land under th e circumstances, (2) continuation of approach when company's max crosswind component was exceeded, & (3) use of reverse thrust greater than 1.3 engine pressure ratio after landing.108 SCORE: 0.15 FO was 5 months into 1

- year probation & paired with Chief Pilot from ORD base. But FO later testified of good working relationship with PIC & said rank of Chief Pilot was no barrier. Accident occurred 14 hours into duty day & nearly 17 hours after awakening. Long day & disrupted flight into & from DFW. FO showed signs on CVR of recognizing that landing was not a good idea, but PIC focused on landing. Was this fatigue or task fixation? Would more rest have made recently hired FO more willing to speak up to PIC

Chief Pilot? Call

- outs were made & SOPs indicate crew was en gaged. Perhaps a less worn

- out PIC would have considered diverting (or not), or may at least have responded to implied warnings from tower. Would have exceeded the requirements contained in this final rule by 12 minutes at impact; may have changed sequence before T/O (had to be released by 2316

- - 2304 might have made a difference).

10. NTSB Identification: DCA02MA054, Federal Express July 26, 2002 in Tallahassee, FL
A/C: B7 2 7

- 2 00, N487FE Injuries: 3 Serious Accident AAR0402
Date : 7/26/2002 Accident Summary: Aircraft struck trees on short final approach and crashed short of runway 9 at airport. At 0537 (night), A/C destroyed by impact & post impact fire when it undershot on visual approach to 0 9, striking trees along extended centerline 3,650 feet short into black hole. FO flying. Wx: calm, visibility 8, clouds few at 100 & scattered at 2500. On arrival at TLH, FO briefed for visual to 27. Minute later he asked PIC if they should use 09 instead. Some discussion1 09 followed but no decision. Ten 10 minutes later, SO asked pilots if they wanted to run approach checklist. FO again raised question of 09 vs 27 & crew decided on 09. Turned onto final 2.5 NM
out. At this point PAPI would have indicated 1 w hite & 3 red (low). But A/C continued to descend below glide slope & was at 200 AGL at 0.9 miles out. PAPI would have shown 4 red. CVR shows no discussion about PAPI or altitude other than comment by FO that '(I'm) gonna have to stay just little bit higher ... I'm gonna lose end of runway', to which PIC replied 'yeah... yeah, okay.' About 18 seconds later PIC commented 'it's startin' to disappear in there little bit (isn't) it? Think we'll be alright, yeah.' Then hit trees 11 seconds later. Crew believed th ey were on glide slope & showed no concern of undershooting. FO later said that 'from time I rolled out (on final), I saw that I was on glide slope... & it never changed.' Approach to 09 is over forest with no ground lights or other visual references (blac k hole), which can lead pilots to believe they are higher than they really are. NTSB notes that PAPI should have prevented this trap but FO's first class medical noted he had color vision defect. After accident, he failed 7 red/green vision tests. Speciali sts' report found that he had severe congenital deuteranomaly that could result in 'difficulties interpreting red/green & white signal lights.' Report added that '... he would definitely have had problems discriminating PAPIs... because red lights would ap pear not to be red at all, ... more indistinguishable from white than red... it would be extremely unlikely that he would be capable of seeing even color pink on PAPI... more likely combination of whites & yellows & perhaps, not even that difference.'
Pro bable Cause : Probable cause was determined to be the captain's and first officer's failure to establish and maintain a proper glidepath during the night visual approach to landing.110 Flight Crew/Fatigue Related Information: The 3 accident flight crewmembers all had different flight, duty and sleep schedules before the accident. Flight and duty times since the last rest period for the caption, first officer and flight engineer are as follows: Captain (flight time

- 1:23, duty time 2:35), first officer (flight time

- 4:02, duty time

- 10:29), flight engineer (flight time

- 3:43, duty time

- 10:41) Captain reported not sleeping very well the 2 night leading up to the day of the accident but reported not feeling fatigued when he reported for the accident flight. Board fou nd evidence of a sleep deficit for the captain based on reported sleep quality and small errors made during the accident flight the otherwise competent captain wouldn't normally make as indicated by past performance. First officer had normal sleep prior to accident, however he reported he felt good but he did not recall feeling alert and he seemed tired according to the captain. Board found the first officers sleep schedule was disrupted and found his performance deficient, which appears inconsistent with c haracterizations of his past performance. Flight engineer slept normally and appeared alert according to the captain and the board found minimal evidence he was fatigues, however his performance deficiencies may have been a result of workload during a rush ed approach. CAUSE: crew’s failure to establish & maintain proper glidepath in night visual approach. Factors: combination of crew fatigue, failure to adhere to SOPs, FO's color vision deficiency & PIC & FO's failure to monitor approach. 3 crew serious

SC ORE: 0.75 Performance of both pilots was deficient & below their usual standard during approach. NTSB believes this was due to fatigue. Besides back

- of

- clock, both pilots had difficulty getting adequate rest before flight. PIC said his sleep 2 days before had 'not really111 (been) good' or had been 'marginal' because he kept being woken by family dog. FO said he had difficulty adjusting his sleep cycle & inferred he did not sleep well during day. Friend described FO as looking tired & PIC commented on same bus that he 'might be little tired.' Even with color

- blindness, causal statement justifies concluding that a better rested crew may have avoided the whole scenario early

- on in the approach. But unsure exactly how NPRM would have addressed this case, since res t periods were reasonable (even if not well managed) & accident occurred on visual approach over a black hole with a color

- blind pilot trying to use a PAPI. The strongest argument for fatigue must rely on the notion that a better rested crew might have

mon itored the glide slope better and/or might have run a more disciplined checklist & pre

landing brief, or that better rested PIC might have chosen the more common instrument approach
to 27. 11. NTSB Identification: DCA05MA004, Corporate Airlines as American Connection October 19, 2004 in Kirksville, MO
A/C: BAE

- 32, N875JX Injuries: 13 fatal, 2 Serious Accident AAR0601 Accident Summary: Aircraft struck trees on final approach and crashed short of runway. At 1937 on LOC/DME final at Kirksville in IMC, hit trees at 33 feet QFE on center line 1.3 NM out. WX: wind 020 at 6, visibility 4, mist & 300 overcast. On final, PIC (PF) maintained

con stant descent of 1200 FPM until impact (met company SOP but exceeded that recommended by FAA for descent below 1000 AGL). At MDA, PIC said 'I can see ground there' (as PF, he should have been on instruments). Continued through MDA & asked FO 'what do you t hink?' FO: 'I can't see (expletive).' Seconds later PIC said 'yeah, there it is. Approach lights in sight' just as GPWS called “200” & FO announced 'in sight, continue'. (Both looking out window; nobody112 on instruments). Never recognized low altitude until seeing trees 2 seconds before impact. Wx complicated approach but crew never seemed too concerned about wx. Flew approach in casual fashion & lack of professionalism: no sterile cockpit (casual conversation); non

- standard phraseology; humming; etc. PIC kno wn for sense of humor & was said to 'emphasize fun in the cockpit'. Crew was fatigued: reported for duty at 0514. Accident was near end of 6th sector on 'demanding' day in IMC. Crew had been on duty 14.5 hours & PIC is said to have slept poorly night befo re. PIC commuted from home in NJ to STL & FO commuted from Ohio. Reported for duty at 1345 on 10/17 (2 days before accident). Flew 3 flights in 8

- hour duty day & arrived at

over - night destination (Quincy) at 2125. On 10/18, departed Quincy at 1415 after mo re than 15 hours off. Flew 3 flights & 6:20 duty day. Arrived at over

- night destination in Burlington at 1945. On 10/19, duty day began at 0514 after 9 hours off. Departed BRL at 0544 to STL & arrived 0644. Next 2 flights cancelled due to wx. T/O for round

- trip from STL

- Kirksville (IRK) at 1236. Landed STL at 1745. Probable Cause: failure to follow procedures & improper non

- precision instrument approach at night in IMC, including descent below MDA before acquiring runway environment.
Factors: non

- standard callouts; unprofessional demeanor; & crew fatigue. Probable cause was determined to be the pilots’ failure to follow established procedures and properly conduct a non

- precision instrument approach at night in IMC, including their descent below the minimum descent altitude (MDA) before required visual cues were available (which continued un moderated until the airplane struck the trees) and their failure to adhere to the established division of duties between the flying and nonflying (monitoring) pilot113 Fligh t Crew/Fatigue Related Information: Captain reportedly did not sleep well the night before the accident but did not report feeling tired. He was later observed resting on a couch the morning of the accident. First officer reportedly did not have any troubl e sleeping the night before the accident and the day of the accident seemed alert and happy. However, the flight crews rest time (2100

- 0400) did not correspond favorably with either ones sleeping patterns and at the time of the accident, they had been on duty 14.5 hrs and it had been 15 hrs since their last rest period. The board suggests that the pilot deficiencies observed could be consistent with fatigue impairment
SCORE: 0. 75 Accident flight T/O STL at 1842 for IRK on 6th flight of day after 6:14 fligh t time & 14.5

- hour day already. Long, brutal day in IMC that started with limited rest period. Crew was familiar with each other & with IRK. WX & PIC's established practice of "fun in the cockpit" also were factors. Fatigue had to be a big player, though P IC's history of "fun in cockpit implies other issues. The requirements in this final rule would have precluded this crew from taking this flight.

12. NTSB Identification: DCA06MA064, Comair as August 27, 2006, Lexington, KY
A/C: CRJ

- 200, N431CA Injuries: 49 Fatal, 1 Serious Accident AAR0705
Date : 8/27/2007 Accident Summary : Aircraft crashed during takeoff from Blue Grass Airport, Lexington, Kentucky.114 At 0607 Comair 5191 crashed on T/O from Blue Grass Airport (LEX) for ATL. A/C ran off end of Runway 26 & was destroyed by impact forces & post crash fire. T/O wrong runway; had been cleared to T/O on Runway 22. PIC, FA & all 47 pax fatal; FO serious. Threshold for 22 & 26 are close & common taxiway h ad construction near thresholds, possibly inviting confusion in darkness after short taxi from nearby terminal. Also, sole controller in tower turned away after clearing A/C for T/O (A/C was the only active A/C on the airport). Runway 22 had minor construc tion work underway preceding week with NOTAM for “some” lights out. Crew also appeared behind the curve early: approached wrong RJ on ramp (corrected by ramp staff); called Toledo tower rather than LEX (corrected by tower); called wrong flight number (corr ected by tower); & vocally ran through checklist on taxi so quickly NTSB had to slow CVR read

- out to understand it. Crew then taxied onto darkened, closed short runway (26). Initiated rolling T/O, further reducing chance to recognize wrong runway, crossed intersection with active runway, lighted 7,000

- foot Runway 22, 500 feet from start of rolling T/O on 26, continued & rotated just as they ran out of pavement. Ran onto grass & nose lifted slightly (with main gear tracks deepening in grass) just as A/C stru ck perimeter fence, then rolled at high speed into trees & burned out. PIC, FA & 47 pax fatal; FO serious. CAUSE: crew's failure to use available cues & aids to identify A/C's location on airport surface during taxi & their failure to

cross - check & verify that A/C was on correct runway before T/O. Factors: crew's non

- pertinent conversation during taxi, which resulted in loss of positional awareness, & FAA's failure to require that all runway crossings be authorized only by specific ATC clearances. Probable Cause : Probable cause was determined to be s the flight crewmembers’ failure to use available cues and aids to identify the airplane’s location on the airport surface during taxi115 and their failure to cross

- check and verify that the airplane was on the corr ect runway before takeoff Flight Crew/Fatigue Related Information: The captain and the first officer received more than the minimum required rest periods during their respective trips in the days before the accident, and their flight and duty times in the week and month before the accident would not have precluded them from obtaining adequate sleep. Also, both pilots had only been awake for about 2 hours at the time of the accident. Two factors in the pilots’ schedules just before the accident could have be en associated with the potential development of a fatigued state: acute sleep loss and circadian disruption

- The captain and the first officer also awakened on the day of the accident at a time when they would normally be asleep.

Overall, The Safety Boar d concludes that, even though the flight crewmembers made some errors during their preflight activities and the taxi to the runway, there was insufficient evidence to determine whether fatigue affected their performance SCORE: 0.35 Fatigue likely was not a n issue for PIC (PNF) but it may have affected FO’s performance (PF). FO began his duty tour on 8/25 at JFK. He drove that morning to FLL near his home for flight to JFK. Departed FLL at 0559 & arrived JFK at 0832. NTB does not note when FO awoke, but it l ikely would have been around 0400 to reach his 0559 departure at FLL. His duty day then began with flight from JFK to ROC at 1305. Return flight to JFK T/O at 1600 but crew had to divert to BDL for fuel & did not land at JFK until nearly 2000. Due to late arrival, crew was asked to reposition A/C to LEX. Departed gate at 2130 but were not able to T/O until 2300; arrived at LEX at 0140. FO reached his hotel at 0210 on 8/26. By the time he got to bed, FO would have had nearly a 23

- hour day. On 8/26, FO had da y off. He told his wife that116 morning by phone that he had “slept in” & planned to go to bed early that night. Phone records, hotel key cards, & credit card records indicate normal day of activity through at least 1830 on his rest day, when FO paid for meal in hotel restaurant (probably asleep no earlier than 2000). On 8/27 he & PIC reported for duty at 0515. FO likely had same wake

- up call as PIC (0415). Though FO had free day before accident, 8/25 was 23

- hour day, with very late time to bed, followed on 8/ 27 by very early start to his day. Despite “sleeping in” on 8/26, FO would have been coping with sleep deficit. This could partly explain his confusion or inattention prior to departing gate. It also could have made him more vulnerable to visual confusion caused by minor construction & related barriers, & his failure to respond to visual cues of unlighted runway & crossing active runway that was fully lighted. Yet other factors also may explain these failures. For example, FO had flown into LEX 2 nights bef ore when “lights were out all over the place.” That was at end of his 23

- hour day; neither he nor that Captain apparently recognized that outages had been NOTAMed on 8/25. On morning of accident, runway end identifier lights were out of service. Closeness of 2 runway ends with single taxiway also increases risk of wrong runway T/Os. Finally, with terminal close to runway ends, taxi time was short, increasing percentage of head

- down time, at least for PNF. The requirements would have precluded FO from taking positioning flight & extending very long duty day on first day. This may have averted the entire scenario. 13. NTSB Identification: DCA07MA072, Shuttle America February 18, 2007, Cleveland, OH
A/C: ERJ

- 170, N862RW Injuries: None Accident AAR0801117 Accident Summary : Aircraft overran the end of the runway during a landing in snowy conditions and stuck an ILS antenna and fence, and the nose gear collapsed. Flight Crew/Fatigue Related Information: The day of the accident, the captain had been awake for all but about 1 hour of the previous 32 hours; he stated that his lack of sleep affected his ability to concentrate and process information to make decisions and, as a result, was not “at the best of [his] game.” The captain also reported that he had insomnia, which began 9 months to 1 year before the accident and lasted for several days at a time. From Feb 11

- 14 the first officer flew a total of 18hrs 27 mins. On Feb, he started a 3

- day 6

- leg trip and by the 18th, his total flight time was 11 hrs 50 mins. At the time of the accident, the first officer had been on duty about 9 hrs 15 mins with a total flight time of 5 hrs 30 mins. The first officer agreed to be the flying pilot because of the captain’s references to fatigue and lack of sleep the night before. A contributing factor to the accident was the pilot’s fatigue which affected his ability to effectively plan and monitor the approach and landing. The Safe ty Board concludes that the captain was fatigued, which degraded his performance during the accident flight.

CAUSE: failure to execute a missed approach when visual cues for runway were not distinct & identifiable. Factors: (1) crew's decision to descend to ILS DH instead of localizer (glideslope out) MDA; (2) FO's long landing on short, contaminated runway & crew's failure to use reverse thrust & braking to max effectiveness; (3) PIC's fatigue, which affected his ability to effectively plan for & monitor approach; & (4) carrier's failure to administer attendance policy that permitted crew to call in as fatigued without fear of reprisals. SCORE: 0.5 A better rested PIC likely would have flown this leg, & likely would have increased chances of going around. However, it but probably would not have changed confusion118 over glideslope & ILS DH versus localizer MDA. Either way, the requirements would have enabled PIC to opt out of flight. 14. NTSB Identification: DCA07FA037, Pinnacle as Northwest Express April 12, 2007, Traverse City, MI
A/C: CRJ

- 200, N8905F Injuries: None Accident AAR

- 0802
Date : 4/12/2007 Accident Summary : Aircraft ran off the departure end of the runway during snowy conditions. Probable Cause : Probably cause was determined to be the pilots’ decision to land at TVC without performing a landing distance assessment, which was required by company policy because of runway contamination initially reported by TVC ground operations personnel and continuing reports of deteriorating weather and runway conditions during the approach. This poor decision making likely reflected the effects of fatigue produced by a long, demanding duty day, and, for the captain, the duties associated with check airman functions Flight Crew/Fatigue Related Information: The accident occurred well after midnight at the end of a demanding day during which the pilots had flown 8.35 hours, made five landings, been on duty more than 14 hours, and been awake more than 16 hours. During the accident flight, the CVR recorded numerous yawns and comments that indicate that the pilots were fatigued. Additionally, the captain made references to being tired at 2332:12, 2341:53, and 0018:43, and the first officer stated, “jeez, I’m tired ” at 0020:41. Additionally, the pilots’ high workload (flying in inclement weather conditions, and in the captain’s case, providing operating experience for the first officer) during their long day likely increased their fatigue.119 SCORE: 0.9 Crew was clearl y tired & had been on duty 15 hours as of accident time & 12:44 hours at pushback; The requirements would have precluded this crew from taking this flight. 15. NTSB Identification: DEN07LA101, Great Lakes Airlines June 20, 2007, Laramie, WY
A/C: BE

- 1900D, N253GL Injuries: None Accident DEN07LA101
Date : 6/20/2007 Accident Summary : The airplane landed long, bounced, and touched down again. The captain tried to slow down and turn the airplane off the runway on to a taxiway at high speed. During the turn attempt, the airplane departed the runway and the airplane's right propeller struck the top of an electrical box that powered the runway approach lighting system. Probable Cause : Probable cause was determined to be The pilot's improper decision, his misjudgment of his speed and distance, and his failure to perform a go

- around resulting in the airplane overrunning the runway and striking an electrical box. Factors c ontributing to the accident were the failure of the crew to perform proper crew resource management, the first officer's failure to intervene before the accident occurred, and the electrical box. Flight Crew/Fatigue Related Information: Only mention of fli ght crew schedule is the crew was on the third day of a three

- day trip, which had started in Cortez, Colorado, that morning at 0520. The crew had flown from Cortez to Denver, Colorado, to Farmington, New, Mexico, back to Denver, then to Laramie, and then t o Worland.
SCORE: 0.15 Given number of days & segments flown, the accident occurred precisely at NPRM's proposed limit of 11

- hour duty day. The requirements might have made a difference.120 16. NTSB Identification: DCA09MA027, Colgan Air as Continental Con nection February 12, 2009, Clarence Center, NY
A/C: DHC

- 8

- 400Q, N200WQ Injuries: 50 Fatal Accident DCA09MA027 Accident Summary : Aircraft crashed int o residence 5 nautical miles northeast of the airport and was destroyed by impact and post

- crash fires. At 2217 Dash 8

- Q400 by Colgan Air as Continental Connection crashed on ILS approach to runway 23 at BUF 5 NM NE of airport in Clarence Center. FO arrive d EWR on red

- eye from West Coast via MEM at 0623. First flight @ 1300 cancelled. Accident flight delayed; T/O EWR at 2120. Newly upgraded PIC (110 hours in M/M); FO (PF) had 700 hours in type. Steady, non

pertinent chatter enroute & throughout approach. FO notes little knowledge of icing. Other pilots describe light

- moderate rime icing b/ 6,500 & 3,500 but none at 2,300. Accident A/C was in icing 9 minutes. De

- icing system was "on" (which increases speed at which crews get low

- speed cue, but does not affect actual stall speed). At 22:15:14 BUF Approach cleared flight for ILS approach to runway 23 (acknowledged). At 22:16:02, engine power levers were reduced to flight idle & Approach instructed crew to contact Tower. Crew extended gear & auto flight system c aptured ILS 23 localizer. PIC then moved engine conditions levers forward to max RPM position as FO acknowledged instructions to Tower. At 22:16:28 FO moved flaps to 10°, & 2 seconds later stick shaker activated (warning of impending stall) & autopilot dis connected, with ”disconnect” horn sounding until impact. Stickpusher then activated (to correct actual stall). Crew added power to 75% torque. At 2216:37, FO told PIC that she had put flaps up; airspeed now 100 knots, & roll121 angle reached 105 degrees right wing down before A/C began to roll back to left & stick pusher activated second time (about 2216:40). Roll angle then reached 35 degrees left wing down before A/C began to roll again to right. FO then asked whether she should put gear up; PIC responded “g ear up” with expletive. Pitch & roll had reached 25 degrees nose down & 100 degrees right wing down, when A/C entered steep descent. Stick pusher activated third time (at 2216:50), followed by impact. All 4 crew & 45 pax fatal; 1 ground fatal. (Not an icin g accident.) Both pilots likely were significantly fatigued. Both pilots were based at EWR. PIC lived near Tampa & FO lived near Seattle. Neither had “crash pad” at EWR & both regularly used crew room to sleep. PIC tried to bid trips that ensured some nig hts in hotels at out

stations. At EWR he usually slept in crew room. FO always slept in crew room at EWR & was open about it. PIC, recently upgraded, commuted to EWR on 2/9 from TPA; arrived EWR at 2005 & spent night in crew room. Phone records & log

- ins to crew tracking system indicate he got little sleep. Reported for duty at 0530 on 2/10, flew 3 flights & arrived at BUF at 1300& had hotel room. Left hotel at 0515 on 2/11 to report at 0615. Again flew 3 flights & returned to EWR at 1544; spent rest of da y & night in crew room. Again, phone, tracking system & contact with others indicate very little sleep. FO commuted to EWR from SEA. She awoke on 2/11/ at 0900, arrived at PDX at 1730 for FedEx flight to MEM; arrived MEM at 0230 EST (2230 PST); had about 90 minutes of sleep on flight. She then T/O MEM at 0418 & arrived EWR at 0623, sleeping for “much of” 2

- hour flight. At EWR, she spent day in crew room & napped, but phone, tracking system & conversations show she got little sleep.122 On 2/12, crew was scheduled for 3 flights: EWR

- ROC; ROC

- EWR; & EWR

- BUF. First 2 cancelled due to winds at EWR & ground delays. Dispatch estimated 1910 departure for accident flight. Multiple delays; pushed back at 1945 & finally T/O 2120 for BUF. FO noted multiple times tha t she was not feeling well & before T/O said she was “ready to be at hotel” at
BUF. CAUSE: Captain’s inappropriate response to activation of stick shaker, which led to stall from which A/C did not recover. Factors: (1) crew’s failure to monitor airspeed i n relation to rising position of low

- speed cue, (2) crew’s failure to adhere to sterile cockpit procedures, (3) PIC’s failure to effectively manage flight, & (4) Colgan’s inadequate procedures for airspeed selection & management during approaches in icing conditions. NOTE: NTSB Cited fatigue in findings, but not in causal statement because NTSB said it could not determine “the extent of their impairment & degree to which it contributed to performance deficiencies.” But clearly suggests it did contribute. NO TE: NTSB was divided on the issue, with some arguing that the overwhelming issue was skills

- based: pulling up to 30 degrees, not pushing power up all the way even well into the stall, and thereby missing several opportunities to allow the aircraft to fly o ut of the stall. In short, debate is this: though the crew clearly was fatigued, would the outcome have been any different if the same crew were better rested? Flight Crew/Fatigue Related Information : On the day of the accident, the captain was scheduled t o report to EWR at 1330. Because his duty period on February 11, 2009, had ended about 1544, he had a 21

- hour, 16

- minute scheduled rest period before his report time. However, at 0310 on February 12, the captain logged into Colgan’s CrewTrac computer syste m. This activity would have meant that he had, at a minimum, a 5

- hour opportunity for sleep followed by123 another sleep opportunity of about 4 hours. During the 24 hours that preceded the accident, the first officer was reported to have slept 3.5 hours on fl ights and 5.5 hours in the crew room. At the time of the accident, the captain would have been awake for at least 15 hours if he had awakened about 0700 and for a longer period if he had awakened earlier. The accident occurred about the same time that the captain’s sleep opportunities during the previous days had begun and the time at which he normally went to sleep. The first officer had been awake for about 9 hours at the time of the accident, which was about 3 hours before her normal bedtime. The captain had experienced chronic sleep loss, and both he and the first officer had experienced interrupted and poor

- quality sleep during the 24 hours before the accident The pilots’ failure to detect the impending onset of the stick shaker and their improper
respo nse to the stick shaker could be consistent with the known effects of fatigue. The NTSB concludes that the pilots’ performance was likely impaired because of fatigue, but the extent of their impairment and the degree to which it contributed to the performa nce deficiencies that occurred during the flight cannot be conclusively determined SCORE: 0.5 Accident had many issues, but fatigue clearly was one of them. Both pilots had to be exhausted when they initiated approach to BUF. PIC was completing 4th day sin ce awakening on 2/ 9. He had opportunity for quality sleep only on night of 2/10, & that was cut short with departure from hotel at 0515 on 2/11. Both pilots essentially stayed up all night on 2/11, with no opportunities for deep sleep, then found themselv es operating late

- night flight after day

- long cancellations & delays. At one level, any rule that might have diminished this crew's fatigue could have been a show

- stopper with a high score. However, crew had other basic problems. PIC clearly was not well v ersed in stall recognition nor response to stall (never went to full power, which likely would have enabled the aircraft to fly out of the stall in at least 2 points124 during the sequence). Same lack of recognition & knowledge appears true of FO; she raised flaps during a stall. Being well rested would not have provided this crew with any more skill than they already had, it would not necessarily have averted the chatter sustained throughout flight, nor would it necessarily have led crew to enter proper ref s peeds for conditions. BUT more rest may have at least kept them tuned in enough to monitor airspeed. That alone could have averted the entire scenario. However, too many other fundamental issues to score above 50%. SCORE: 0.5 Accident had many issues, but fatigue clearly was one of them. Both pilots had to be exhausted when they initiated approach to BUF. PIC was completing 4th day since awakening on 2/ 9

. He had opportunity for quality sleep only on night of 2/10, & that was cut short with departure from h otel at 0515 on 2/11. Both pilots essentially stayed up all night on 2/11, with no opportunities for deep sleep, then found themselves operating late

- night flight after day

- long cancellations & delays. At one level, any rule that might have diminished this crew's fatigue could have been a show

- stopper with a high score

. However, crew had other basic problems

. PIC clearly was not well versed in stall recognition nor response to stall (never went to full power, which likely would have enabled the aircraft to fly out of the stall in at least 2 points during the sequence)

. Same lack of recognition & knowledge appears true of FO; she raised flaps during a stall

. Being well rested would not have provided this crew with any more skill than they already had, it woul d not necessarily have averted the chatter sustained throughout flight, nor would it necessarily have led crew to enter proper ref speeds for conditions. BUT more rest may have at least kept them tuned in enough to monitor airspeed

. That alone could have a verted the entire scenario

. However, too many other fundamental issues to score above 50%.125 

## Appendix B: Sensitivity Analysis126 This appendix presents results from performing sensitivity analysis on four key components of the analysis supporting estimates of the costs of the rule:

• Adjusting for minor di fference in aircraft block hours between baseline runs and final rule runs

• Weighting of individual case results to represent industry group s

• Percent of pilots who are reserves

• Percent of flightcrew sick time costs that could be saved due to the final rule 

### Sensitivity #1: Adjusting for Block Hour Discrepancy As explained the body of this Initial Supplemental RIA , when reviewing the calculations supporting the estimates of crew scheduling costs due to the final rule, FAA became aware of a small di fference in the number of aircraft block hours between the baseline runs and the final rule runs. This minor difference is due to the treatment of so called “carry

- in/carry

- out” flights. Industry practice is to construct each bid line such that each flightcrew member starts and ends the scheduling period at their home base. S ome bid lines outputted by the optimizer would have left flightcrew members away from their home base at the beginning or end of the schedu ling period (month). In those instances, it is airline practice to include those segments as part of the bid lines for the adjoining month (i.e., “carrying” the pilot in or out of the month). While that is reasonable practice for airlines, it introduced a source of variation in costs that was not caused by the final rule. B ecause the final rule results in different bid lines being constructed, the segments identified as carry

- in or carry

- out often differ as well. For all cases , the discrepancy in aircraft b lock hours was well below one percent. In some cases the aircraft block hours was greater in the baseline run while in other cases the final rule run had more aircraft block hours included.127 To explore the possible impacts of this di fference on the estimat es of the cost impacts of the final rule, we factored the final rule run estimates of each of the four cost elements (credit hours, domestic and international TAFB, and hotel rooms) by the ratio of baseline aircraft block hours to final rule aircraft block hours for each case. If the final rule had slightly fewer aircraft block hours than the baseline run , the ratio would be slightly larger than one and the estimates of each cost element would increase slightly. The difference between the adjusted final rul e runs and the baseline runs for each cost element for each case is presented in Table B.1

. Table B.1 Adjusted Change in Monthly Flightcrew Scheduling Cost Elements due to Final Rule, by Case

Industry

Group Case Baseline Solution Flightcrew Members Change in Credit Hours Change in Domestic TAFB Hours Change in International TAFB Hours Change in Hotel Stays

Passenger Narrow

- body A 924 2,203 18,717 0 662 B 1,698

- 503

- 15,215 947

- 952 Passenger Wide

- body C 1,121

- 104 3,811 8,264 787 D 430

- 872 0

- 2,441

- 30 Regional E 300 68 5,857 0 282 F 240 37 4,149

- 15 144 Supplemental I 806 4,656 3,183 9,802 758 Freight Narrow

- body G 330 594 1,014 2,402 59 Freight Wide

body H 1,053 1,014 6,247 943 244

The rest of the scheduling cost estimation methodology is the same as described in the body of the Initial Supplemental RIA except that Table B.1 replaces Table 12 . Th is approach in effect applies the average scheduling cost per aircraft block hour from the final rule run to the small difference in the number of block hours between the baseline and final runs as a method of128 neutralizing the impacts of the carry

- in/carry

- out issue . To precisely estimate the crew scheduling costs of each specific flight segment related to the carry

- in/carry

- out issue, a more in

depth analysis would be required. As shown in Table B.2 , this adjustment increased the estimated cost of the final rule for passenger operations by $ 2 million in nominal terms. Table
B.3 shows that the adjustment increased the estimated cost of the rule for cargo

- only operations by $ 16 million. Table B.2 Cost Summary for Block Hour Adjustment, Passenger Operations

Cost Component Total Nominal

Cost (millions) PV Cost at 7% (millions) PV Cost at 3% (millions) Flight Operations $296 $196 $246

Rest Facilities $146 $132 $139 Training $17 $11 $14 Sensitivity Total $458 $339 $ 399 Initial Supplemental RIA Total $457 $3 38 $ 398 Difference $2 $ 1 $1

Table B.3 Cost Summary for Block Hour Adjustment, Cargo
- only Operations

Cost Component Total Nominal

Cost (millions) PV Cost at 7% (millions) PV Cost at 3% (millions) Flight Operations $494 $ 325 $ 410

Rest Facilities $66 $59 $62 Training $6 $4 $5 Sensitivity Total $ 566 $ 388 $ 477 Initial Supplemental RIA Total $ 550 $ 377 $464 Difference $16 $1 0 $1 3129 

### Sensitivity #2: Alternative Weighting of Case Results As explained in the body of this Initial Supplemental RIA , the estimates of crew scheduling costs from the rule are derived using crew scheduling software to build pairings and bid lines for nine cases for a baseline run that replicates current scheduling practices and a final rule run that replaces the current requirements with the final rule. These nine cases were combined to estimate average costs for each of the eight industry groups used in this analysis. The passenger narrow

- body, passenger

- wide body, and regional industry group each had two representative cases. The change in each of the cost elements w as summed across the cases, multiplied by the appropriate unit price for the industry group, and divided by the combined total number of flightcrew members ( lines ) in the baseline run f or both cases to derive the estimate of average cost per flightcrew member. For the freight integrated industry group, the change in each of the cost elements for the freight narrow

- body case and freight wide

- body case were summed, and then multiplied by the unit costs for the f reight integrated industry group. For the passenger integrated industry group , the unit costs specific to the particular subcomponent of the passenger integrated industry group were applied to the sum of the cost elements of the respective
passenger narrow - body and passenger wide

- body cases. Then the narrow

- body and wide

- body results were summed and then divided by the sum of the number of baseline solution flightcrew members. Such a method implicitly weights each case in relation to the number of flightcre w members in that case, which may or may not be an accurate representation of the prevalence of carriers with similar cost structures for the industry as a whole. As can be seen in Table 12 , in some instances, the final rule caused very different cost impacts even for cases in the same industry group. For example, in the passenger wide

- body industry group, Case C shows modest increases in the cost elements due to the ru le, while Case D shows decreases in the cost elements130 due to the rule. Several different factors contribute to the differing impacts of the rule, including collective bargaining agreements, flight schedules, network s tructure , etc. Many of these attributes are difficult to observe for every carrier in the industry , and the limited number of cases means that an exact matching of every carrier to one of the case results is not possible. Therefore, it is difficult to determine what the appropriate relative wei ghting of the cases should be for extrapolation to the entire industry group. In the absence of information on how to weight the individual cases, an alternative to implicitly weighting the case results by the number of baseline flightcrew members, is to weight the two cases equally when deriving an estimate for those industry groups derived from multiple

cases. An estimate of the change in each of the cost elements per flightcrew member for integrated industry groups was built from a weighted average of the change in cost elements for the respective narrow

- body and wide

- body industry groups. The relative weights for the passenger integrated industry group were based on the number of block hours for both narrow

body and wide

- body aircraft flown by air carriers classified in the passenger integrated industry group multiplied by estimates of average crew size, as shown in Table B.4 . A corresponding procedure was used for the freight integrated industry group. The resulting estimates of average scheduling cost per flightcrew member are found in Table B.5 . The resulting total costs of this sensitivity are found in Table B.6 and Table B.7 . Changing to this weighting scheme reduces the estimated cost to the passenger operations by $ 13 million in nominal terms and $ 9 million when discounted at seven percent. The impact on the esti mated costs to cargo

- only operations was larger , decreasing the costs by $ 39 million , $26 million at 7%

.131 Table B.4 Relative Weight of Narrow
- body and Wide
- body Operations for Integrated Carriers
Industry Group Block Hours 1 Average Crew Size 2 Relative Weight Passenger Integrated : Narrow

- body 4,054,243 2.00 54 %

Wide

- body 2,954,370 2.3 7 46 % Freight Integrated : Narrow

- body 38 , 311 2.00 5 %

Wide

- body 700,230 2 .0 9 95 % 1 Source: Form 41 Q1

- Q3 2010 2 Source: Proprietary Carrier Data

Table B.5 Sensitivity Analysis on Weighting of Cases: Change in Flightcrew Scheduling Cost per Flightcrew Member due To Final Rule
Industry Group Monthly Cost per Flightcrew Member Annual Cost per Flightcrew Member Passenger Integrated $0

- $1 Passenger Narrow

- body $185 $2,226

Passenger Wide

- body

- $2 92

- $3, 507 Regional $83 $994 Supplemental $1,261 $15,133 Freight Integrated $ 379 $ 4 , 544 Freight Narrow

- body $380 $4,555

Freight Wide

- body $286 $3 , 435132 Table B.6 Cost Summary for Alternative Weighting of Case Results, Passenger Operations

Cost Component Total Nominal

Cost (millions) PV Cost at 7% (millions) PV Cost at 3% (millions) Flight Operations $28 1 $18 7 $23 4

Rest Facilities $146 $132 $139 Training $17 $11 $14 Sensitivity Total $44 3 $3 29 $3 87 Initial Supplemental RIA Total $4 5 7 $3 38 $ 398 Difference

- $13

- $ 9

- $ 11

Table B.7 Cost Summary for Alternative Weighting of Case Results, Cargo
- only Operations

Cost Component Total Nominal

Cost (millions) PV Cost at 7% (millions) PV Cost at 3% (millions) Flight Operations $440 $2 89 $ 364

Rest Facilities $66 $59 $62 Training $6 $4 $5 Sensitivity Total $ 511 $ 352 $ 432 Initial Supplemental RIA Total $550 $377 $464 Difference

- $39

- $ 26

- $ 32



### Sensitivity #3: Alternative Assumptions Regarding Percent of Flightcrew Members Who Are Reserves The estimates of costs are calculated on a per flightcrew member basis for each case. To extrapolate the cost impact of the rule to the entire industry, the estimated costs per flightcrew member are multiplied by the number of lin eholder flightcrew members in the industry group as a whole. While the total number of pilots employed by each carrier is readily available from VIS133 data, information on the number of lineholders was not readily available. On average, it is estimated that 15 percent of pilots are reserves, at least for the large passenger network carriers, 79 although this figure apparently varies widely across carriers. Data supplied by nine different carriers shows that the percent of total pilot workforce who are reserves varied from a low of 12 percent at one carrier to as high as 26 percent at another carrier. Table B.8 and Table B.9 show the estimated cost of the final rule using a 12 percent assumption, for passenge r and cargo

- only operations respectively. Using a 12 percent reserve figure increases the total estimated cost of the rule by $1 7 million in nominal terms, and by $1 1 million when discounted at seven percent for passenger operations. For cargo

- only operati ons, using a 12 percent reserve figure increases the total estimated cost of the rule by $1 8 million in nominal terms, and by $ 12 million when discounted at seven percent. Table B.10 and Table B.11 show the estimated cost of the final rule using a 26 percent assumption, for passenger and cargo

- only operations respectively. Us ing a 26 percent reserve figure reduc es the estimated cost of the rule by $6 2 million ($4 1 million when discounted at seven percent) for passenger operations. For cargo

- only operations, using a 26 percent reserve figure reduc es the estimated cost of the ru le by $ 67 million ($ 44 million when discounted at seven percent).

79 “Productivity,” American Airlines Negotiations. Accessed on August 1, 2012 at http://www.aanegotiations.com/apaProductivity.asp

.134 Table B.8 Cost Summary for Alternative Assumption that 12% of Pilots are Reserves, Passenger Operations

Cost Component Nominal Cost (millions) PV Cost at 7% (millions) PV Cost at 3% (millions) Flig ht Operations $31 1 $2 06 $2 59

Rest Facilities $146 $132 $139 Training $17 $11 $14 Sensitivity Total $4 74 $3 49 $4 12 Initial Supplemental RIA Total $457 $338 $398 Difference $17 $11 $14

Table B.9 Cost Sum mary for Alternative Assumption that 12% of Pilots are Reserves , Cargo
- only Operations

Cost Component Nominal Cost (millions) PV Cost at 7% (millions) PV Cost at 3% (millions) Flight Operations $497 $327 $ 412

Rest Facilities $66 $59 $62 Training $6 $4 $5 Sensitivity Total $568 $389 $479 Initial Supplemental RIA Total $550 $ 377 $ 464 Difference $18 $12 $15

Table B.10 Cost Summary for Alternative Assumption that 26% of Pilots are Reserves , Passenger Operations

Cost Component Nominal Cost (millions) PV Cost at 7% (millions) PV Cost at 3% (millions) Flight Operations $2 32 $15 5 $193

Rest Facilities $146 $132 $139 Training $17 $11 $14 Sensitivity Total $395 $29 8 $347 Initial Supplemental RIA Total $457 $338 $398 Difference

- $62

- $41

- $51135 Table B.11 Cost Summary for Alternative Assumption that 26% of Pilots are Reserves, Cargo Operations

Cost Component Nominal Cost (millions) PV Cost at 7% (millions) PV Cost at 3% (millions) Flight Operations $411 $ 270 $ 341

Rest Facilities $66 $59 $62 Training $6 $4 $5 Sensitivity Total $483 $ 333 $ 408 Initial Supplemental RIA Total $ 550 $ 377 $ 464 Difference

- $67

- $ 44

- $ 56



### Sensitivity #4: Alternative Assumption Regarding Percent of Sick Time that would be Saved Due to the Final Rule Since it is not possible to precisely estimate the reduction in sick time that will result from the final rule, this section presents a sensitivity analysis to explore the possible range of impacts. In the central analysis of this Initial Supplemental RIA, it was explained that five percent of payroll costs are generally attributable to sick time and it was assumed that five percent of those sick time payroll costs would be saved because of the final rule. Table B.12 and Table B.13 show the results of assuming that three percent of sick time pilot payroll costs will be saved because of the final rule for passenger operations and cargo

- only operations, respectively. While Table B.14 and Table B.15 provide the same information when assuming that seven percent of sick time will be saved due to the final rule , t he two assumptions result in altering the total estimated cost of the rule by ± $77 million in nominal terms, and by ± $51 million when discounted at seven percent for passenger operations. For cargo

- only operations, these two136 assumptions result in altering the total estimated cost of the rule by ± $17 million in nominal terms, and by ± $11 million when discounted at seven percent. 80

Table B.12 Cost Summary for Alternative Assumptions that 3% Sick Time will be Saved , Passenger Operations

Cost Component Nominal Cost (millions) PV Cost at 7% (millions) PV Cost at 3% (millions) Flight Operations $371 $246 $3 09

Rest Facilities $146 $132 $139 Training $17 $11 $14 Sensitivity Total $534 $389 $462 Initial Supplemental RIA Total $457 $ 338 $ 398 Difference $77 $51 $64

Table B.13 Cost Summary for Alternative Assumptions that 3% Sick Time will be Saved , Cargo
- only Operations

Cost Component Nominal Cost (millions) PV Cost at 7% (millions) PV Cost at 3% (millions) Flight Operations $ 496 $326 $ 411

Rest Facilities $66 $59 $62 Training $6 $4 $5 Sensitivity Total $567 $389 $478 Initial Supplemental RIA Total $550 $ 377 $ 464 Difference $17 $11 $14

80 If there were no cost savings from reduced fatigue, the nominal costs of the ru le for passenger operations would be $ 649 million, $ 465 when discounted at seven percent. These estimated costs are still below the high case benefits estimates for passenger operations.137 Table B.14 Cost Summary fo r Alternative Assumptions that 7 % Sick Time will be Saved , Passenger Operations

Cost Component Nominal Cost (millions) PV Cost at 7% (millions) PV Cost at 3% (millions) Flight Operations $ 217 $145 $1 81

Rest Facilities $146 $132 $139 Training $17 $11 $14 Sensitivity Total $380 $288 $334 Initial Supplemental RIA Total $457 $3 38 $398 Difference

- $77

- $51

- $64

Table B.15 Cost Summary for Alternative Assumptions that 7 % Sick Time will be Saved , Cargo
- only Operations

Cost Component Nominal Cost (millions) PV Cost at 7% (millions) PV Cost at 3% (millions) Flight Operations $461 $ 303 $ 382

Rest Facilities $66 $59 $62 Training $6 $4 $5 Sensitivity Total $352 $36 6 $449 Initial Supplemental RIA Total $550 $377 $464 Difference

- $17

- $11

- $14138 

## Appendix C: Detailed Data TablesTable C.1: Categorization of Air Carriers

ABX AIR INC Freight Integrated 313 0% 100% FEDERAL EXPRESS CORP Freight Integrated 4,227 0% 100% UNITED PARCEL SERVICE CO Freight Integrated 2,690 0% 100% AEKO KULA INC (Aloha Air Cargo) Freight Narrow-body 22 0% 100% AERO MICRONESIA INC (Asia Pacific Airlines) Freight Narrow-body 17 0% 100% AIR TRANSPORT INTERNATIONAL LIMITED LIABILITY CO Freight Narrow-body 208 17% 83% AMERIJET INTERNATIONAL INC Freight Narrow-body 72 0% 100% AMERISTAR AIR CARGO INC Freight Narrow-body 17 17% 83% ASTAR USA INC Freight Narrow-body 120 0% 100% CAPITAL CARGO INTERNATIONAL AIRLINES INC Freight Narrow-body 140 0% 100% CARIBBEAN SUN AIRLINES INC Freight Narrow-body 8 100% 0% fleet type is similar to freight narrow-body case and aircraft utilization is assumed to be more like freight narrow-body case than passenger narrow-body or regional case DYNAMIC AIRWAYS LLC Freight Narrow-body 8 100% 0% aircraft utilization is assumed to be more like freight narrow-body case than passenger narrow-body or regional case FALCON AIR EXPRESS INC Freight Narrow-body 25 100% 0% aircraft utilization is assumed to be more like freight narrow-body case than passenger narrow-body or regional case KALITTA CHARTERS II LLC Freight Narrow-body 35 0% 100% LYNDEN AIR CARGO L L C Freight Narrow-body 77 0% 100% NATIONAL AIR CARGO GROUP INC Freight Narrow-body 31 5% 95% NORTHERN AIR CARGO INC Freight Narrow-body 24 0% 100% SIERRA PACIFIC AIRLINES INC Freight Narrow-body 10 100% 0% aircraft utilization is assumed to be more like freight narrow-body case than passenger narrow-body or regional case SKY KING INC Freight Narrow-body 32 100% 0% aircraft utilization is assumed to be more like freight narrow-body case than passenger narrow-body or regional case ATLAS AIR INC Freight Wide-body 531 2% 98% CBA is assumed to be more like freight wide-body case than supplemental case and operation kind listed on airline certificate is domestic and flag NORTH AMERICAN AIRLINES Freight Wide-body 185 100% 0% CBA is assumed to be more like freight wide-body case than supplemental case, operation kind listed on airline certificate is domestic and flag, and aircraftutilization is assumed to be more like freight widebody case than passenger wide-body case POLAR AIR CARGO WORLDWIDE INC Freight Wide-body 198 0% 100% CBA is assumed to be more like freight wide-body case than supplemental case and operation kind listed on airline certificate is domestic and flag ALASKA AIRLINES INC Passenger Integrated 1,420 99% 1% AMERICAN AIRLINES INC Passenger Integrated 9,463 100% 0% CONTINENTAL AIRLINES INC Passenger Integrated 4,103 100% 0% DELTA AIR LINES INC Passenger Integrated 10,791 100% 0% HAWAIIAN AIRLINES INC Passenger Integrated 403 100% 0% UNITED AIR LINES INC Passenger Integrated 5,456 100% 0% US AIRWAYS INC Passenger Integrated 4,377 100% 0% AIRTRAN AIRWAYS INC Passenger Narrow-body 1,683 100% 0% ALLEGIANT AIR LLC Passenger Narrow-body 326 100% 0% BRENDAN AIRWAYS LLC (USA 3000) Passenger Narrow-body 54 100% 0% CONTINENTAL MICRONESIA INC Passenger Narrow-body 123 100% 0% FRONTIER AIRLINES INC Passenger Narrow-body 681 100% 0% JETBLUE AIRWAYS CORPORATION Passenger Narrow-body 1,979 100% 0% MIAMI AIR INTERNATIONAL INC Passenger Narrow-body 80 100% 0% MN AIRLINES LLC (Sun Country) Passenger Narrow-body 143 100% 0% SOUTHWEST AIRLINES CO Passenger Narrow-body 5,885 100% 0% SPIRIT AIRLINES INC Passenger Narrow-body 453 100% 0% SWIFT AIR L L C Passenger Narrow-body 27 100% 0% CBA is assumed to be more like passenger narrowbody case than freight narrow-body case TEM ENTERPRISES INC (Casino Express) Passenger Narrow-body 40 100% 0% VIRGIN AMERICA INC Passenger Narrow-body 330 100% 0% VISION AIRLINES INC Passenger Narrow-body 95 100% 0% RYAN INTERNATIONAL AIRLINES INC Passenger Wide-body 150 100% 0% AERODYNAMICS INC Regional 5 100% 0% AIR WISCONSIN AIRLINES CORPORATION Regional 753 100% 0% AMERICAN EAGLE AIRLINES INC Regional 2,525 100% 0% ATLANTIC SOUTHEAST AIRLINES INC Regional 1,668 100% 0% AVIATION SERVICES LTD (Freedom Air) Regional 7 97% 3% Explanation 3 Operator 1 Flightcrew Members 1 Industry Group Percent of Revenue Departures: Passenger 2 Percent of Revenue Departures: Cargo-only 2Table C.1: Categorization of Air Carriers

Explanation 3 Operator 1 Flightcrew Members 1 Industry Group Percent of Revenue Departures: Passenger 2 Percent of Revenue Departures: Cargo-only 2
CHAMPLAIN ENTERPRISES INC (CommutAir) Regional 163 100% 0% CHAUTAUQUA AIRLINES INC Regional 638 100% 0% COLGAN AIR INC Regional 440 100% 0% COMAIR INC Regional 1,037 100% 0% COMPASS AIRLINES LLC Regional 408 100% 0% EMPIRE AIRLINES INC Regional 45 0% 100% CBA is assumed to be more like regional case than freight narrow-body case ERA AVIATION INC Regional 54 100% 0% EXECUTIVE AIRLINES INC Regional 286 100% 0% EXPRESSJET AIRLINES INC Regional 2,100 100% 0% GOJET AIRLINES LLC Regional 246 100% 0% GREAT LAKES AVIATION LTD Regional 292 100% 0% GULF AND CARIBBEAN CARGO INC Regional 48 0% 100% CBA is assumed to be more like regional case than freight narrow-body case GULFSTREAM INTERNATIONAL AIRLINES INC Regional 158 100% 0% HAWAII ISLAND AIR INC (Island Air Hawaii) Regional 38 100% 0% HORIZON AIR INDUSTRIES INC Regional 621 100% 0% HYANNIS AIR SERVICE INC (Cape Air) Regional 13 98% 2% LYNX AVIATION INC (Frontier) Regional 29 100% 0% MESA AIRLINES INC Regional 1,257 100% 0% MESABA AVIATION INC Regional 935 100% 0% MOUNTAIN AIR CARGO INC Regional 54 0% 100% PENINSULA AIRWAYS INC Regional 80 93% 7% PIEDMONT AIRLINES INC Regional 505 100% 0% PINNACLE AIRLINES INC Regional 1,255 100% 0% PRESCOTT SUPPORT CO Regional 10 0% 100% CBA is assumed to be more like regional case than freight narrow-body case PSA AIRLINES INC Regional 517 100% 0% REPUBLIC AIRLINES INC Regional 681 100% 0% RHOADES AVIATION INC Regional 2 0% 100% SEABORNE VIRGIN ISLAND INC Regional 25 100% 0% SHUTTLE AMERICA CORPORATION Regional 525 100% 0% SKYWEST AIRLINES INC Regional 2,746 100% 0% TATONDUK OUTFITTERS LTD Regional 56 11% 89% CBA is assumed to be more like regional case than freight narrow-body case TRANS STATES AIRLINES LLC Regional 237 100% 0% USA JET AIRLINES INC Regional 52 26% 74% CBA is assumed to be more like regional case than freight narrow-body case CENTURION AIR CARGO INC Supplemental 47 0% 100% Fleet type is similar to supplemental case and operation kind listed on airline certificate is supplemental EVERGREEN INTERNATIONAL AIRLINES INC Supplemental 185 0% 100% Fleet type is similar to supplemental case and operation kind listed on airline certificate is supplemental FLORIDA WEST INTERNATIONAL AIRWAYS INC Supplemental 32 0% 100% Fleet type is similar to supplemental case and operation kind listed on airline certificate is supplemental KALITTA AIR LLC Supplemental 334 0% 100% Fleet type is similar to supplemental case and operation kind listed on airline certificate is supplemental OMNI AIR INTERNATIONAL INC Supplemental 315 100% 0% Fleet type is similar to supplemental case and operation kind listed on airline certificate is supplemental SKY LEASE I INC (Tradewinds Airlines) Supplemental 59 0% 100% Fleet type is similar to supplemental case and operation kind listed on airline certificate is supplemental SOUTHERN AIR INC Supplemental 281 0% 100% Fleet type is similar to supplemental case and operation kind listed on airline certificate is supplemental WORLD AIRWAYS INC Supplemental 421 43% 57% Fleet type is similar to supplemental case and operation kind listed on airline certificate is supplemental Notes: 1 Source: FAA Vital Information Subsystem (VIS) December 2010 2 Source: BTS, Database T1: U.S. Air Carrier Traffic and Capacity Summary by Service Class (2010) 3 Airline Certificate Source: http://av-info.faa.gov/OperatorsName.aspTable C.2: Block Hours per Pilot from Carrier Supplied Data

Industry Group Pilots 1 Flight Minutes Block Hrs per Pilot Passenger Integrated 12,292 42,834,514 58.1 Passenger Narrow-body 6,144 21,905,688 59.4

Passenger Wide-body 6,149 20,928,826 56.7 Regional 1,195 3,323,147 46.3 Supplemental 682 1,627,920 39.8 Freight Integrated 3,669 10,606,019 48.2 Freight Narrow-body 833 2,090,926 41.8

Freight Wide-body 2,906 8,515,093 48.8

Industry Group Pilots 1 Flight Minutes Block Hrs per Pilot Passenger Integrated 12,267 44,687,045 60.7 Passenger Narrow-body 6,075 22,139,229 60.7

Passenger Wide-body 6,195 22,547,816 60.7 Regional 1,395 4,165,528 49.8 Supplemental 563 1,598,946 47.3 Freight Integrated 3,059 7,322,455 39.9 Freight Narrow-body 636 1,004,179 26.3

Freight Wide-body 2,586 6,318,276 40.7

Industry Group Block Hrs per Pilot Passenger Integrated 59.4 Passenger Narrow-body 60.1

Passenger Wide-body 58.7 Regional 48.1 Supplemental 43.6 Freight Integrated 44.0 Freight Narrow-body 34.1

Freight Wide-body 44.8 First Month of Data

Second Month of Data

Average of Two Months of Data

1 Pilots that flew at least one segment during monthTable C.3: Adjusting Form 41 Pilot and CoPilot Cost Data

Industry Group Pilot and CoPilot Costs Q1-Q3 2010 1 (thousands) Pilot and CoPilot Costs Q1-Q4 2010 2 (thousands) Total Pilots 3 Pilots at Carriers

that Report Form 41 Adjustment Factor Adjusted Total Pilot and CoPilot Costs (thousands) Passenger Integrated $3,498,191 $4,710,694 36,013 36,013 100% $4,710,694 Passenger Narrow-body $1,281,923 $1,726,249 11,899 11,737 101% $1,750,075

Passenger Wide-body $10,104 $13,606 150 150 100% $13,606 Regional $757,814 $1,020,479 20,511 18,000 114% $1,162,836 Supplemental $108,319 $145,863 1,674 1,583 106% $154,248 Freight Integrated $1,094,050 $1,473,257 7,230 7,230 100% $1,473,257 Freight Narrow-body $23,811 $32,064 846 400 212% $67,816

Freight Wide-body $86,037 $115,858 914 914 100% $115,858 Total $6,860,249 $9,238,071 79,237 76,027 105% $9,448,390.64 1 Source: Bureau of Transportation Statistics Form 41 data (Item 51230, Pilots and Copilots, from Schedule P-5.2) 2 Source: Q1-Q3 costs multiplied by approx 1.347 (the ratio of full year costs to Q1-Q3 costs) 3 Source: FAA Vital Information Subsystem (VIS) December 2010