Federal Register / Vol. 62, No. 72 / Tuesday, April 15, 1997 / Notices 18369

7. The estimated number of annual

respondents: 2.

8. An estimate of the total number of

hours needed annually to complete the

requirement or request: An average of 40

hours per response for consultation

requests, 80 hours per response for

license application review participation

proposals, and one hour per response

for statements of representative

authority. The total burden for all

responses is estimated to be 242 hours.

9. An indication of whether Section

3507(d), Pub. L. 104–13 applies: Not

applicable.

10. Abstract: 10 CFR Part 60 requires

States and Indian Tribes to submit

certain information to the NRC if they

request consultation with the NRC staff

concerning the review of a potential

repository site, or wish to participate in

a license application review for a

potential repository. Representatives of

States or Indian Tribes must submit a

statement of their authority to act in

such a representative capacity. The

information submitted by the States and

Indian Tribes is used by the Director of

the Office of Nuclear Material Safety

and Safeguards as a basis for decisions

about the commitment of NRC staff

resources to the consultation and

participation efforts.

A copy of the submittal may be

viewed free of charge at the NRC Public

Document Room, 2120 L Street, NW.

(Lower Level), Washington, DC.

Members of the public who are in the

Washington, DC, area can access the

submittal via modem on the Public

Document Room Bulletin Board (NRC’s

Advance Copy Document Library) NRC

subsystem at FedWorld, 703–321–3339.

Members of the public who are located

outside of the Washington, DC, area can

dial FedWorld, 1–800–303–9672, or use

the FedWorld Internet address:

fedworld.gov (Telnet). The document

will be available on the bulletin board

for 30 days after the signature date of

this notice. If assistance is needed in

accessing the document, please contact

the FedWorld help desk at 703–487–

4608. Additional assistance in locating

the document is available from the NRC

Public Document Room, nationally at 1–

800–397–4209, or within the

Washington, DC, area at 202–634–3273.

Comments and questions should be

directed to the OMB reviewer by May

15, 1997: Edward Michlovich, Office of

Information and Regulatory Affairs

(3150–0127), NEOB–10202, Office of

Management and Budget, Washington,

DC 20503.

Comments can also be submitted by

telephone at (202) 395–3084.

The NRC Clearance Officer is Brenda

Jo. Shelton, (301) 415–7233.

Dated at Rockville, Maryland, this 7th day

of April 1997.

For the Nuclear Regulatory Commission.

Gerald F. Cranford,

Designated Senior Official for Information

Resources Management.

[FR Doc. 97–9660 Filed 4–14–97; 8:45 am]

BILLING CODE 7590–01–P

NUCLEAR REGULATORY

COMMISSION

[Docket No. 50–440]

The Cleveland Electric Illuminating

Company; and Ohio Edison Company,

et al.; Notice of Consideration of

Approval of Application Regarding

Corporate Restructuring

Notice is hereby given that the United

States Nuclear Regulatory Commission

(the Commission) is considering

approval by issuance of an order under

10 CFR 50.80 of an application

concerning the proposed merger

between Centerior Energy Corporation

(the parent corporation for The

Cleveland Electric Illuminating

Company (CEI), Toledo Edison

Company, and Centerior Service

Company (CSC); licensees for Perry

Nuclear Power Plant, Unit No. 1) and

Ohio Edison Company (Perry licensee).

Ohio Edison Company is also the parent

company for OES Nuclear, Inc., and

Pennsylvania Power Company, which

are also licensees for Perry. Perry is a

nuclear-powered generating facility that

is owned and operated in accordance

with Facility Operating License No.

NPF–58.

By letter dated December 13, 1996,

CEI and CSC, on behalf of themselves

and Toledo Edison Company, Ohio

Edison Company, OES Nuclear Inc., and

Pennsylvania Power Company,

informed the Commission of, and are

seeking consent regarding, a proposed

merger of Centerior Energy Corporation

and Ohio Edison Company resulting in

the formation of a new single holding

company, FirstEnergy Corp. Duquesne

Light Company, which is also a licensed

owner of the Perry plant, is not involved

in the merger. Under the proposed

merger, CEI, CSC, Toledo Edison

Company, and Ohio Edison Company

will become wholly-owned subsidiaries

of FirstEnergy Corp. Pennsylvania

Power Company and OES Nuclear, Inc.,

will remain wholly-owned subsidiaries

of Ohio Edison Company. The current

licensees will continue to hold the

license, and no direct transfer of the

license will result from the merger.

According to the application, the

merger will have no adverse effect on

either the technical management or

operation of the Perry plant. The

technical management and nuclear

organization of the plant operators, CEI

and CSC, will continue to remain

responsible for plant operation and

maintenance after the merger.

Pursuant to 10 CFR 50.80, the

Commission may approve the transfer of

control of a license after notice to

interested persons. Such approval is

contingent upon the Commission’s

determination that the holder of the

license following the transfer is

qualified to hold the license and that the

transfer is otherwise consistent with

applicable provisions of law,

regulations, and orders of the

Commission.

For further details with respect to this

proposed action, see the application

from CEI and CSC dated December 13,

1996, and the supplemental letter dated

February 14, 1997, which are available

for public inspection at the

Commission’s Public Document Room,

the Gelman Building, 2120 L Street,

NW., Washington, DC 20555, and at the

local public document room located at

the Perry Public Library, 3753 Main

Street, Perry, Ohio 44081.

Dated at Rockville, Maryland, this 9th day

of April 1997.

For the Nuclear Regulatory Commission.

Jon B. Hopkins,

Senior Project Manager, Project Directorate

III–3, Division of Reactor Projects III/IV, Office

of Nuclear Reactor Regulation.

[FR Doc. 97–9662 Filed 4–14–97; 8:45 am]

BILLING CODE 7590–01–P

NUCLEAR REGULATORY

COMMISSION

[Docket Nos. 50–269, 50–270 50–287, 50–

413, 50–414, 50–369 and 50–370]

Duke Power Company, et al.; (Oconee

Nuclear Station, Units 1, 2, and 3),

(Catawba Nuclear Station Units 1 and

2), and (McGuire Nuclear Station Units

1 and 2)

Exemption

I

Duke Power Company, et al. (DPC or

the licensee) is the holder of Facility

Operating License Nos. DPR–38, DPR–

47 and DPR–55 for the Oconee Nuclear

Station, Units 1, 2, and 3; License Nos.

NPF–35 and NPF–52 for the Catawba

Nuclear Station, Units 1 and 2; and

License Nos. NPF–9 and NPF–17 for the

McGuire Nuclear Station, Units 1 and 2.

The licenses provide, among other

things, that the licensee is subject to all

rules, regulations, and orders of the

Commission in effect now and hereafter.
18370 Federal Register / Vol. 62, No. 72 / Tuesday, April 15, 1997 / Notices

The Oconee Nuclear Station consists

of three pressurized water reactors near

Greenville in Oconee County, South

Carolina. The Catawba Nuclear Station

consists of two pressurized reactors near

Rock Hill in York County, South

Carolina. The McGuire Nuclear Station

consists of two pressurized reactors near

Charlotte in Mecklenburg County, North

Carolina.

II

Section 73.55 of Title 10 of the Code

of Federal Regulations (10 CFR 73.55),

‘‘Requirements for Physical Protection

of Licensed Activities in Nuclear Power

Reactors Against Radiological

Sabotage,’’ paragraph (a), in part, states

that ‘‘The licensee shall establish and

maintain an onsite physical protection

system and security organization which

will have as its objective to provide high

assurance that activities involving

special nuclear material are not inimical

to the common defense and security and

do not constitute an unreasonable risk

to the public health and safety.’’

Section 73.55(d), ‘‘Access

Requirements,’’ paragraph (1), specifies

that ‘‘The licensee shall control all

points of personnel and vehicle access

into a protected area.’’ Section

73.55(d)(5) requires that ‘‘A numbered

picture badge identification system shall

be used for all individuals who are

authorized access to protected areas

without escort.’’ Section 73.55(d)(5) also

states that an individual not employed

by the licensee (i.e., contractors) may be

authorized access to protected areas

without escort provided the individual

‘‘receives a picture badge upon entrance

into the protected area which must be

returned upon exit from the protected

area * * *.’’

The licensee has proposed to

implement an alternative unescorted

access control system that would

eliminate the need to issue and retrieve

badges at each entrance/exit location

and would allow all individuals with

unescorted access to keep their badges

when departing the site.

An exemption from 10 CFR

73.55(d)(5) is required to allow such

individuals who have unescorted access

to take their badges offsite instead of

returning them when exiting the site. By

letter dated August 23, 1996, the

licensee requested an exemption from

the requirements of 10 CFR 73.55(d)(5)

for this purpose.

III

Pursuant to 10 CFR 73.5, ‘‘Specific

exemptions,’’ the Commission may,

upon application of any interested

person or upon its own initiative, grant

such exemptions in this part as it

determines are authorized by law and

will not endanger life or property or the

common defense and security, and are

otherwise in the public interest.

Pursuant to 10 CFR 73.55, the

Commission may authorize a licensee to

provide alternative measures for

protection against radiological sabotage

provided the licensee demonstrates that

the alternative measures have ‘‘the same

high assurance objective’’ and meet ‘‘the

general performance requirements’’ of

the regulation, and ‘‘the overall level of

system performance provides protection

against radiological sabotage

equivalent’’ to that which would be

provided by the regulation.

Currently, unescorted access into the

protected areas at the Oconee, Catawba,

and McGuire units is controlled through

the use of a photograph on a badge/

keycard (hereafter, referred to as

‘‘badge’’). The security officers at each

entrance station use the photograph on

the badge to visually identify the

individual requesting access. The

licensee’s employees and contractor

personnel who have been granted

unescorted access are issued badges

upon entrance at each entrance/exit

location and the badges are returned

upon exit. The badges are stored and are

retrievable at each entrance/exit

location. In accordance with 10 CFR

73.55(d)(5), contractors are not allowed

to take these badges offsite.

Under the proposed biometric system,

each individual who is authorized

unescorted entry into protected areas

would have the physical characteristics

of his/her hand (i.e., hand geometry)

registered, along with his/her badge

number, in the access control system.

When a registered user enters his/her

badge into the card reader and places

his/her hand onto the measuring

surface, the system detects that the hand

is properly positioned, and records the

image. The unique characteristics of the

hand image are then compared with the

previously stored template in the access

control computer system corresponding

to the badge to verify authorization for

entry.

Individuals, including plant

employees and contractors, would be

allowed to keep their badges when they

depart the site and, thus, eliminate the

need to issue, retrieve, and store badges

at the entrance stations to the plant.

Badges do not carry any information

other than a unique identification

number. All other access processes,

including search function capability,

would remain the same. This system

would not be used for persons requiring

escorted access (i.e., visitors).

A Sandia report, ‘‘A Performance

Evaluation of Biometrics Identification

Devices,’’ SAND91–0276•UC–906,

Unlimited Release, June 1991,

concluded that hand geometry

equipment possesses strong

performance and high detection

characteristics. Also, based on its own

experience with the current photo

identification system, the licensee

determined that the proposed hand

geometry system would provide the

same high level of assurance as the

current system that access is only

granted to authorized individuals. The

biometric system has been in use for a

number of years at several sensitive

Department of Energy facilities and,

recently, at other nuclear power plants.

The licensee will implement a process

for testing the proposed system to

ensure continued overall level of

performance equivalent to that specified

in the regulation. When the changes are

implemented, the respective Physical

Security Plans will be revised to include

implementation and testing of the hand

geometry access control system and to

allow plant employees and contractors

to take their badges offsite.

When implemented, the licensee will

control all points of personnel access

into a protected area under the

observation of security personnel

through the use of both badge and a

hand geometry verification system. The

numbered picture badge identification

system will continue to be used for all

individuals who are authorized

unescorted access to protected areas.

Badges will continue to be displayed by

all individuals while inside the

protected areas.

Since both the badge and hand

geometry would be necessary for access

into the protected areas, the proposed

system would provide a positive

verification process. The potential loss

of a badge by an individual as a result

of taking the badge offsite would not

enable an unauthorized entry into

protected areas.

IV

For the foregoing reasons, pursuant to

10 CFR 73.55, the NRC staff has

determined that the proposed

alternative measures for protection

against radiological sabotage meet ‘‘the

same high assurance objective,’’ and

‘‘the general performance requirements’’

of the regulation and that ‘‘the overall

level of system performance provides

protection against radiological sabotage

equivalent’’ to that which would be

provided by the regulation.

Accordingly, the Commission has

determined that, pursuant to 10 CFR

73.5, this exemption is authorized by

law and will not endanger life or

property or common defense and
Federal Register / Vol. 62, No. 72 / Tuesday, April 15, 1997 / Notices 18371

security, and is otherwise in the public

interest. Therefore, the Commission

hereby grants the requested exemption

from the requirements of 10 CFR

73.55(d)(5) to allow individuals not

employed by the licensee (e.g.,

contractors) to take their photo

identification badges offsite, provided

that the proposed hand geometry

biometrics system is in effect to control

access into protected areas at the

Oconee, Catawba, and McGuire nuclear

stations.

Pursuant to 10 CFR 51.32, the

Commission has determined that the

granting of this exemption will not

result in any significant adverse

environmental impact (62 FR 17221).

For further details with respect to this

action, see the request for exemption

dated August 23, 1996, which is

available for public inspection at the

Commission’s Public Document Room,

The Gelman Building, 2120 L Street,

NW., Washington, DC, and at the local

public document rooms located at the

Oconee County Library, 501 West South

Broad Street, Walhalla, South Carolina,

for the Oconee Nuclear Station; the York

County Library, 138 East Black Street,

Rock Hill, South Carolina, for the

Catawba Nuclear Station; and the J.

Murrey Atkins Library, University of

North Carolina at Charlotte, 9201

University City Boulevard, North

Carolina, for the McGuire Nuclear

Station.

This exemption is granted for the

Oconee, Catawba, and McGuire nuclear

stations with the condition that the

corresponding modifications,

procedures, training, and revisions to

the Physical Security Plans necessary

for implementation of the hand

geometry biometrics system at the

facilities will be submitted to the NRC

staff for review and approval.

Dated at Rockville, Maryland, this 9th day

of April 1997.

For the Nuclear Regulatory Commission.

Samuel J. Collins,

Director, Office of Nuclear Reactor

Regulation.

[FR Doc. 97–9659 Filed 4–14–97; 8:45 am]

BILLING CODE 7590–01–P

NUCLEAR REGULATORY

COMMISSION

[Docket No. 50–390]

Tennessee Valley Authority; Watts Bar

Nuclear Plant, Unit 1; Environmental

Assessment and Finding of No

Significant Impact

The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory

Commission (the Commission) is

considering issuance of an amendment

to Facility Operating License No. NPF–

90, issued to Tennessee Valley

Authority, (the licensee), for operation

of the Watts Bar Nuclear Plant, Unit 1,

located in Rhea County, Tennessee.

Environmental Assessment

Identification of the Proposed Action

The current spent fuel pool storage

capacity at the Watts Bar Nuclear Plant

(WBN) is 1312 fuel assembly storage

locations of which 484 are usable. The

Tennessee Valley Authority (TVA)

requested an amendment to the WBN

Unit 1 operating license that would

increase the storage capacity of the

spent fuel pool to 1835 assemblies. The

proposal consists of replacing the

existing racks with spent fuel storage

racks that were designed, manufactured,

and used until 1995 in the Sequoyah

Nuclear Plant, increasing the maximum

initial enrichment of fuel to 5.0 weight

percent (wt%) U–235, changing the

spacing of stored fuel assemblies;

adding limiting condition for operation

(LCO) requirements for the combination

of initial enrichment and burnup in an

acceptable burnup domain, and

requiring the boron concentration to be

greater than or equal to 2000 parts per

million (ppm) during fuel movement.

The submittal also proposed

surveillance requirements to verify the

initial enrichment and burnup and

require chemical analysis to verify

boron concentration. The proposed

action is in accordance with the

licensee’s application for amendment

dated October 23, 1996, as

supplemented by letters dated

December 11, 1996, January 31,

February 10 and 24, and March 11 and

, 1997.

The Need for the Proposed Action

WBN is in its first operating cycle;

therefore, the spent fuel pool is dry and

no fuel assemblies are stored in it.

Under current conditions, the spent fuel

pool capacity will support three to four

cycles of operation before losing the

capacity for a full core offload (193 fuel

assemblies). However, taking into

account loading new fuel into the pool

and component shuffling during an

outage, the ability to accept a discharge

of one full core off-load could be

impacted as early as the year 2000.

There are no commercial independent

spent fuel storage facilities operating in

the U.S., nor are there any domestic

reprocessing facilities; therefore, the

projected loss of storage capacity in the

WBN pool would affect TVA’s ability to

operate WBN. The proposed

amendment is needed to ensure the

capability of full core offload is

available for some time in the future.

Alternatives to the Proposed Action

The licensee considered several wet

and dry storage alternatives to the

proposed action. The following wet

storage alternatives were considered by

the licensee: reracking with new ultra

high density racks, rod consolidation,

and transshipment (pool-to-pool). The

following dry storage alternatives were

considered by the licensee: metal casks,

concrete casks, concrete vaults, and

multi-purpose canisters/overpacks. The

licensee considered several factors

when evaluating the options: effects on

plant systems and operations; impacts

on safety, including fuel handling;

radiation exposure; industry experience;

subsequent actions for further

increasing onsite spent fuel storage

capacity; flexibility for ultimate disposal

of spent fuel; and overall costs. Based

on these considerations, the licensee

determined that reuse of the Sequoyah

Nuclear Plant storage racks was the

most viable option.

In 1975, the staff prepared a Generic

Environmental Impact Statement (GEIS)

on spent fuel storage. The findings were

documented in NUREG–0575, ‘‘Final

Generic Environmental Impact

Statement (FGEIS) on Handling and

Storage of Spent Light Water Power

Reactor Fuel.’’ The storage of spent fuel,

as discussed in the NUREG, is

considered to be an interim action, not

a final solution to permanent disposal.

The methods of expanding spent fuel

storage capacity considered in the

FGEIS identified negligible differences

in the environmental impacts and costs

of the different alternatives, with the

exception that expansion of the spent

fuel pool was less costly and did not

involve transportation issues. The

FGEIS noted that since there are

variations in storage design and

limitations caused by spent fuel already

stored in the pools, licensing reviews

should be performed on a case-by-case

basis to resolve plant-specific concerns.

The staff evaluated the licensee’s list

of alternatives as well as other

alternatives. The following alternatives

were considered by the staff:

Shipment of Fuel to a Permanent

Federal Fuel Storage/Disposal Facility

Shipment of spent fuel to a high-level

radioactive storage facility is an

alternative to increasing the onsite spent

fuel storage capacity. However, the U.S.

Department of Energy’s (DOE’s) highlevel radioactive waste repository is not

expected to begin receiving spent fuel

until approximately 2010, at the earliest.

In October 1996, the Administration did