2018 UT App 111

THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

STATE OF UTAH,

Appellee,

v.

HAROLD OTTO BRYSON,

Appellant.

Opinion

No. 20160592-CA

Filed June 14, 2018

Third District Court, Salt Lake Department

The Honorable Paul B. Parker

No. 141906571

Teresa L. Welch, Attorney for Appellant

Sean D. Reyes and Lindsey L. Wheeler, Attorneys

for Appellee

JUDGE KATE A. TOOMEY authored this Opinion, in which 

JUDGES MICHELE M. CHRISTIANSEN and JILL M. POHLMAN 

concurred.

TOOMEY, Judge:

¶1 Harold Otto Bryson appeals the district court’s denial of 

his motion to redact portions of a letter entered into evidence at 

his trial for stalking in violation of a civil stalking injunction. He 

also appeals his conviction. We affirm.

BACKGROUND

¶2 On November 17, 2011, Bryson’s former girlfriend 

(Victim) obtained a civil stalking injunction against him. The 

injunction was effective for three years and ordered Bryson not

to “follow, threaten, annoy, harass, or cause distress” to Victim 
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20160592-CA 2 2018 UT App 111

and not to “contact, phone, mail, e-mail, or communicate in any 

way” with her “either directly or indirectly.”

¶3 On May 13, 2014, Victim received a FedEx package at her

workplace. The package was addressed to her, identified the 

sender with Bryson’s first name and Victim’s last name, and was 

postmarked May 7, 2014. The package contained a letter in 

which Bryson referred to Victim as his “wife.” The letter was 

addressed to “Babe” and signed “Harry,” Bryson’s nickname. In 

the letter, Bryson made a number of references to the Book of 

Mormon and quoted extensively from it. He also told Victim that 

her deceased father and grandfather were going to speak to her 

in a dream and that her father told Bryson to have her read 

certain scriptures.

¶4 Victim reported the letter to police, and ten days later, 

Bryson was arrested. In his interview with police, Bryson 

admitted he sent the letter via FedEx, although he could not 

remember the exact date. When police showed him a copy of it, 

he acknowledged it was the letter he sent and stated, “I sent the 

letter, of course, I will never deny I sent the letter.” He also 

acknowledged he was aware of the injunction and even the date 

it had been entered but explained, “I haven’t paid any mind to 

the injunction the entire time.”

¶5 The State charged Bryson with second-degree felony 

stalking. Before trial, Bryson sought to have the religious 

references and the references to Victim’s family redacted from 

the letter, claiming that these “could arouse an emotion in the 

jury that would be extremely prejudicial to [him].” Specifically, 

he argued, 

[I]n reference to [Victim], it talks about her 

grandfather and her dad. These are deceased 

people. . . . I mean, if people in the jury are 
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20160592-CA 3 2018 UT App 111

members of the LDS faith, they could, you know, it 

could go either way, I mean, it just depends on 

where they are with their faith. It could be 

disturbing to them having deceased people 

brought up within a letter.

The district court denied Bryson’s motion.

¶6 During voir dire, the district court asked the jurors 

whether they had “any prejudice against the LDS Church or 

against the Book of Mormon.” In response, one juror raised his 

hand, and the court dismissed him for cause.

¶7 Following trial, the jury convicted Bryson. Bryson 

appeals.

ISSUES AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW

¶8 Bryson first asserts that the district court erred in denying 

his motion to redact portions of the letter under rules 401, 402, 

and 403 of the Utah Rules of Evidence. “We review the [district]

court’s decision to admit or exclude evidence for abuse of 

discretion.” State v. Miranda, 2017 UT App 203, ¶ 24, 407 P.3d 

1033.

¶9 Bryson further argues that the evidence was insufficient 

to support his conviction. In reviewing the sufficiency of the 

evidence, “we review the evidence and all inferences which may 

be reasonably drawn from it in the light most favorable to the 

verdict.” State v. Noor, 2012 UT App 187, ¶ 4, 283 P.3d 543

(quotation simplified). “We will reverse the jury’s verdict only 

when the evidence, so viewed, is sufficiently inconclusive or 

inherently improbable that reasonable minds must have 

entertained a reasonable doubt that the defendant committed the 

crime of which he was convicted.” Id. (quotation simplified).
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20160592-CA 4 2018 UT App 111

ANALYSIS

I. The District Court Did Not Exceed Its Discretion in Denying 

Bryson’s Motion to Redact Portions of the Letter.

¶10 Bryson first asserts that the district court should have 

granted his motion to redact portions of the letter because the 

evidence was not relevant and its probative value was 

outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice. Evidence is 

relevant if it “has any tendency to make a fact more or less 

probable than it would be without the evidence” and “the fact is 

of consequence in determining the action.” Utah R. Evid. 401. 

Such evidence is generally admissible, id. R. 402, unless “its 

probative value is substantially outweighed by a danger 

of . . . unfair prejudice, confusing the issues, misleading the jury, 

undue delay, wasting time, or needlessly presenting cumulative 

evidence,” id. R. 403.

¶11 Bryson argues that the letter’s contents were irrelevant, 

asserting that the State was required to prove only that he sent 

the letter while subject to the stalking injunction, not that the 

letter contained any particular statements. But the fact that the 

State might have been able to prove its case without publishing 

the contents of the letter does not make those contents any less 

relevant. Cf. State v. Gulbransen, 2005 UT 7, ¶ 38, 106 P.3d 734 

(holding that the State’s ability to establish a fact by testimonial 

evidence rather than more inflammatory photographic evidence 

does not render the photographic evidence irrelevant), abrogated 

on other grounds by Met v. State, 2016 UT 51, 388 P.3d 447; State v. 

Florez, 777 P.2d 452, 455–56 (Utah 1989) (holding that the State is 

not required to accept a defendant’s stipulation to facts in lieu of 

presenting potentially damaging evidence that is otherwise 

admissible). The jury was asked to determine whether Bryson 

sent Victim the letter, and the State therefore had to prove that 

Bryson was the person who sent it. The package’s return address 

included Bryson’s first name only and Victim’s last name. And 
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20160592-CA 5 2018 UT App 111

the letter was signed with Bryson’s nickname, not his actual 

name. The familial references, which included religious 

references, showed that the letter’s author knew details about

Victim, and the letter related information specific to the 

congregation of which Bryson is a member, as well as the 

identities of its ecclesiastical leaders. This information helped to 

establish the identity of the letter’s author and was therefore 

relevant.

¶12 Bryson further argues that, even if relevant, the religious 

and family references were unfairly prejudicial and therefore 

inadmissible under rule 403. But rule 403 bars evidence only 

when its probative value is “substantially outweighed by the 

danger of unfair prejudice; and unfair prejudice results only 

where the evidence has an undue tendency to suggest decision 

upon an improper basis.” State v. Lucero, 2014 UT 15, ¶ 32, 328 

P.3d 841 (quotation simplified), abrogated on other grounds by State 

v. Thornton, 2017 UT 9, 391 P.3d 1016.

¶13 We are not convinced by Bryson’s argument that the 

religious references were likely to encourage the jury to base its 

decision on its religious attitudes, particularly in light of the fact 

that the court took care to question the jurors about their 

religious biases and even dismissed one juror on that basis.

Similarly, while the jury might have found Bryson’s comments 

about Victim’s family to be offensive or upsetting to Victim, he 

has not shown that they were so inflammatory as to have an 

“undue tendency to suggest decision upon an improper basis.” 

See id. (quotation simplified). And the jurors were instructed not 

to let sympathy prejudice their decision. See State v. Menzies, 889 

P.2d 393, 401 (Utah 1994) (“We generally presume that a jury 

will follow the instructions given it.”), superseded on other grounds 

by constitutional amendment, Utah Const. art. I, § 12. Further,

although the letter’s contents may have been prejudicial to 

Bryson, they were not unfairly prejudicial under rule 403. Our 
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20160592-CA 6 2018 UT App 111

supreme court has explained that “[a]ll effective evidence is 

prejudicial in the sense of being damaging to the party against 

whom it is offered,” but “the rule only requires that the [district]

court measure the danger the evidence poses of causing unfair

prejudice to a defendant.” State v. Killpack, 2008 UT 49, ¶ 53, 191 

P.3d 17 (quotation simplified). Here, Bryson has not shown that 

the probative value of the letter’s contents was substantially

outweighed by any danger that the religious and family 

references were unfairly prejudicial. See Lucero, 2014 UT 15, ¶ 32.

II. The Evidence Was Sufficient to Support Bryson’s Conviction.

¶14 Bryson next argues that the evidence was insufficient to 

support his conviction. His argument rests on the assertion that 

Victim’s testimony was “inherently improbable.” Testimony is 

“inherently improbable” when it is “incredibly dubious and, as 

such, apparently false.” State v. Robbins, 2009 UT 23, ¶ 18, 210 

P.3d 288. Courts will disregard such testimony only where there 

is also “a complete lack of circumstantial evidence of guilt.” Id.

(quotation simplified); see also State v. Prater, 2017 UT 13, ¶ 33, 

392 P.3d 398 (explaining that, in the context of inherent 

improbability, “only in instances where (1) there are material 

inconsistencies in the testimony and (2) there is no other 

circumstantial or direct evidence of the defendant’s guilt may 

the district court reevaluate the jury’s credibility determinations” 

(quotation simplified)). 

¶15 In support of his argument, Bryson highlights 

inconsistencies between Victim’s testimony and her initial 

statements in support of her request for a stalking injunction. 

Specifically, in Victim’s request for an injunction, she claimed 

that Bryson “would harass anyone new that [she] dated,” but

she later indicated she was dating only one person, not anyone

“new,” at the time. She also claimed in her request that various 

people witnessed Bryson stalking her, but at trial she suggested 
State v. Bryson

20160592-CA 7 2018 UT App 111

that these people did not in fact witness the incidents.1 But 

inconsistencies alone do not render testimony inherently 

improbable. See State v. Prater, 2017 UT 13, ¶ 39, 392 P.3d 398; see 

also id. ¶ 38 (explaining that for testimony to be inherently 

improbable, there must be “inconsistencies in [the witness’s] 

statements plus patently false statements of [the witness] plus the 

lack of any corroboration”). Indeed, “[t]he question of which 

version of [a witness’s story is] more credible is the type of 

question we routinely require juries to answer.” Id. ¶ 39. Further, 

the inconsistencies Bryson highlights do not even relate to 

Victim’s most relevant testimony—that she received a letter from 

Bryson on May 13, 2014.

¶16 Additionally, Victim’s testimony was not the only 

evidence of Bryson’s guilt. Indeed, the State presented evidence 

that Bryson himself admitted sending the letter to Victim; that it

was signed with his nickname, “Harry”; and that it was 

postmarked May 7, 2014. Bryson challenges the persuasiveness 

of this evidence, claiming that his interview does not corroborate 

Victim’s testimony, because he told officers he did not remember 

the “exact day” he sent the letter and because the copy of the 

letter that he signed was subsequently lost and not entered into 

evidence. But again, these assertions presented mere credibility 

issues to be resolved by the jury. See id. ¶ 41 (“The jury is the 

exclusive judge of witness credibility.” (quotation simplified)).

 

1. Based on these inconsistencies, Bryson also asserts that Victim 

had a motive to fabricate her testimony to “deflect attention 

away from the inconsistent statements that she made in her 

request for the stalking injunction.” But whether a witness has a 

motive to lie “goes to the weight and credibility of the 

testimony,” which is a “question we routinely require juries to 

answer.” State v. Prater, 2017 UT 13, ¶¶ 39, 41, 392 P.3d 398.
State v. Bryson

20160592-CA 8 2018 UT App 111

¶17 In short, Victim’s testimony was not inherently 

improbable so as to render the evidence insufficient to support 

Bryson’s conviction. Victim’s testimony, the letter, and Bryson’s 

own statements were sufficient to support the jury’s verdict.

CONCLUSION

¶18 We conclude that the district court did not err in denying 

Bryson’s motion to redact portions of the letter, because the 

letter was relevant and was not unfairly prejudicial. Further, 

Victim’s testimony was not inherently improbable, and the 

evidence was sufficient to support Bryson’s conviction.

Accordingly, we affirm.