NOT PRECEDENTIAL

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT

___________

No. 18-2771

__________

JOHNNIE MICKELL, 

Appellant

v.

JAMES CARL WEAVER; PAUL J. WARE; ROBERT MCMILLIAN, Warden; 

DANIEL B. LIPTION, Attorney; DISTRICT ATTORNEY; DISTRICT ATTORNEY 

OFFICER; SHANE SCANLON, Lackawanna County District Attorney

____________________________________

On Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Middle District of Pennsylvania

(M.D. Pa. Civil Action No. 3-16-cv-00291)

District Judge: Honorable A. Richard Caputo

____________________________________

Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a)

January 22, 2019

Before: CHAGARES, BIBAS and GREENBERG, Circuit Judges

(Opinion filed: January 23, 2019)

___________

OPINION*

___________

PER CURIAM

 

* This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not 

constitute binding precedent.
2

Johnnie Mickell, proceeding pro se, appeals an order of the United States District 

Court for the Middle District of Pennsylvania denying his motion to reopen his civil 

rights action. For the reasons that follow, we will affirm the judgment of the District 

Court.

Mickell filed a complaint in District Court pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against 

the Police Department of Scranton and other defendants alleging that he was unlawfully 

incarcerated for two counts of public drunkenness and that the defendants conspired to 

compel him to plead guilty to offenses he did not commit in order to be released. Mickell 

claimed that the defendants violated his Eighth and Fourteenth Amendment rights and 

sought money damages. The defendants moved to dismiss the complaint.

The District Court adopted the Magistrate Judge’s report and dismissed the 

complaint. The District Court construed Mickell’s complaint as raising violations of his 

Fourth Amendment rights and, relying on state court dockets, ruled that his claims are 

barred by Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477, 486-87 (1994), which precludes a claim 

under § 1983 where a judgment in the plaintiff’s favor would necessarily imply the 

invalidity of a conviction unless the conviction has been overturned. The District Court 

also ruled that Mickell’s complaint suffered from other deficiencies, including that his 

claims fail on immunity grounds and that he had not alleged the personal involvement of 

certain defendants or facts supporting a plausible claim for relief. The District Court 

declined to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over any state law claims. Mickell did not 

appeal.
3

More than eight months later, Mickell filed a motion to reopen his action asserting 

that his complaint reflects that he stated a claim and that the defendants made false 

statements in their motions to dismiss. He noted that Lackawanna County, where the 

charges against him were brought, is known to be corrupt. The District Court denied the 

motion because Mickell had not identified any basis for relief from the judgment under 

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b). This appeal followed. 

We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review the District 

Court’s order denying relief under Rule 60(b) for abuse of discretion. See Budget Blinds, 

Inc. v. White, 536 F.3d 244, 251 (3d Cir. 2008). 

Mickell argues on appeal that the District Court erred in dismissing his complaint 

for failure to state a claim for relief, but his filings are not very clear. He contends that 

there “is no such offense as two counts of public drunkenness at one time” and that the 

District Court decided his case based on “a conflict of interest, bias discrimination, and 

racial prejudice.” Brief at 3. He also states that the docket in another state criminal case 

falsely states the date he made bail and supports his claim of false imprisonment. In a 

subsequent filing, which may be construed as a reply brief, Mickell contends that there is 

no evidence of record that he was convicted of two counts of public drunkenness. 

To the extent Mickell challenges the District Court’s order dismissing his 

complaint, this order is not before us because he did not file a timely notice of appeal. 
4

Our jurisdiction is limited to the review of the District Court’s denial of Mickell’s motion 

for relief from the judgment.1 

Mickell has not shown that the District Court abused its discretion in denying 

relief. As noted above, Mickell asserted in his motion, without elaboration, that his 

complaint reflects that he stated a claim and that the defendants made false statements in 

their motions to dismiss. The District Court correctly stated that he had not identified any 

basis in his motion for relief from the judgment pursuant to Rule 60(b), which allows 

relief on various grounds, including mistake, newly discovered evidence, fraud, or 

another reason justifying relief. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b). Even if we were to consider 

his arguments on appeal as grounds for his motion, he has not shown that relief was due. 

To the extent Mickell asks us to grant his motion for summary judgment, he was notified 

in a Clerk’s Order that no action would be taken on this motion.

Accordingly, we will affirm the judgment of the District Court.2 

 

1The District Court docket reflects that the dismissal order, which was sent to Mickell’s 

place of confinement, was returned to the Court because he had been released. It is not 

clear when Mickell received notice of the order but he did not file a motion to extend or 

reopen the time to appeal in District Court. See Fed. R. App. P. 4(a)(5),(6).

2Mickell’s motion for settlement, motion to remand to District Court for jury trial, 

“Motion for Pracipe Nunce Pro Tunce [sic],” which may be construed as a motion to 

remand for jury trial, and motion to review the Clerk’s Order dated December 14, 2018, 

which may be construed as a motion for reconsideration, are denied.