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| 10.3.2020 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | C 79/50 |

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Opinion of the European Committee of the Regions – Action Plan against Disinformation

(2020/C 79/10)

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| Rapporteur | : | Randel LÄNTS (EE/PES), Member of Viljandi City Council |
| Reference document | : | Joint Communication to the European Parliament, the European Council, the Council, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions: Action Plan against Disinformation JOIN(2018) 36 final |

POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS

THE EUROPEAN COMMITTEE OF THE REGIONS

Comments

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| | 1. | welcomes the European Commission’s initiative to counter disinformation [(1)](#ntr1-C_2020079EN.01005001-E0001) which raises awareness of the problem and warns against the deteriorating effects disinformation can have on electoral processes and the integrity of democratic institutions. The CoR welcomes the multi-stakeholder approach towards disinformation that encourages participation of governments, civil society, and the private sector, and builds on cooperation, education and regulation; |

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| | 2. | reaffirms the points made in its opinion Tackling online disinformation: a European approach [(2)](#ntr2-C_2020079EN.01005001-E0002). In particular, the CoR would like to point out that people need to be made more aware of this problem and that one way of increasing awareness is through education in schools; |

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| | 3. | notes favourably that the issue of disinformation, both as regards processes within the European Union and developments beyond its borders, and involving actors from within and outside the Union, is high on the agenda of the incoming European Commission; looks forward to working closely with the newly constituted team of European Commissioners on bringing the experience and concerns of sub-national levels of governance to bear on these matters; |

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| | 4. | welcomes the European Parliament’s resolution on foreign electoral interference and disinformation in national and European democratic processes and reiterates the need for a coordinated multi-level, multi-stakeholder approach to tackle the phenomenon, including the perspective of local and regional authorities; |

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| | 5. | notes that disinformation, as a problem embedded in complex and rapid socioeconomic changes, has to be tackled holistically. The CoR believes that local and regional authorities are well suited to take part in discussions on the threat of disinformation, and to initiate and coordinate counter-measures; |

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| | 6. | points out the existence of fully-fledged operations set up to spread false information, and that countering them requires joint and sustained efforts by institutions, social media platforms and civil society; |

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| | 7. | notes that new ways of accessing and disseminating information will require empowering citizens to counter online disinformation through knowledge, digital skills and actions. Development of media literacy fosters critical thinking by citizens and allows them to examine in depth information and its sources. This process enables citizens to make informed choices about the consumed content, notably strengthening their societal resilience. The urgency of the matter is highlighted by the fact that more than half of the EU population are getting their daily news from social media; |

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| | 8. | considers, however, that people’s habits and skills in media use are still influenced by the trustworthiness of ‘traditional’ media, which in turn is based on the editorial responsibility associated with the press. That we have so far operated in a reliable and constructive public information space comes from the knowledge that a business providing journalistic content is accountable in legal, economic, ethical and reputational terms for ensuring that the information published is true; |

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| | 9. | notes that there is little or no monitoring of editors or the reliability of the information disseminated in the new media. At the same time, recent years have seen the emergence of new ways and means by which false information can be presented as credibly and realistically as possible; |

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| | 10. | points to experience to date from various issues and campaigns in the field of citizenship education which show that only a long and complex process can raise people’s awareness and change their behaviour, inter alia, by imparting ‘media literacy’ skills. The media, politicians and decision-makers can talk as much as they like about false information, but they only have limited impact in changing people’s behaviour; |

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| | 11. | acknowledges that it has not yet been possible to get all these aspects included in citizenship education programmes or to make them part of people’s general awareness or the day-to-day practice of the new media. Education for citizenship and outreach are needed to achieve long-term changes in behaviour. In addition to the education system and the fostering of civic attitudes and behaviour, it is also crucial that outreach work is broadly framed and target groups are appropriately addressed through their preferred media channels; |

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| | 12. | stresses that social media platforms generate substantial profits in the European Union, but do not provide any user services that would deliver quick assistance in relation to content. Communication with social media platforms is unsystematic, individual and only occasional; there is no standardised, swift and effective procedure against false information or hate speech; |

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| | 13. | deems it essential for securing a balanced, evidence-based public information space that, for social media platforms on which political posts are published for a fee, uniform requirements apply regarding the veracity of the information contained in such posts. Should a political post which has been paid for prove not to comply with these requirements, the social media platform must be obliged to remove the content concerned; |

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| | 14. | is concerned that social media platforms have so far been successful in sidestepping legislation that would require them to support users in relation to content and to address their problems in real time and in the language of the relevant Member State; |

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| | 15. | is concerned that individuals often lack the necessary skills and knowledge and do not know how to react to false information or how to behave when they or those close to them are victims of such information or hate speech. It is smaller municipalities in particular that still often lack the necessary experience and do not know how to react to global social media platforms in a crisis situation; |

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| | 16. | regrets that problems are often exacerbated by the fact that social media platform staff do not understand the cultural context and the specificities on the ground and that communication is mostly in English and very time-consuming. A response must be found quickly when disinformation is spread, but so far social media platforms have been passive and short on transparency; |

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| | 17. | regrets that local authorities, who are best informed of what is happening on the ground, play only a secondary role in combating the spreading of false information – they are often lacking in knowledge, skills and resources. What is more, the fight against disinformation, unlike social services, education and welfare, is not one of the traditional competences of local and regional authorities; |

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| | 18. | points out that there is a lot local and regional authorities could do against disinformation. They could help people to distinguish between real information and disinformation by making their own work more open and transparent and holding citizens’ dialogues and public debates live and online. They should collaborate in these efforts with local and regional journalists, academia and think tanks, civil society, national authorities and EU bodies, institutions, activists and political commentators; |

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| | 19. | points out, however, that combating and pursuing disinformation requires specific skills and tools which the average official or specialist in a regional or local authority does not yet have. Skills and knowledge gaps and lack of experience are important strategic disadvantages which hinder the effective identification of disinformation and prevention of its dissemination; |

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| | 20. | notes that the importance of the public infosphere and the speed with which information is disseminated have a considerable impact on the conduct of politics and on the mood in society. It is vital, therefore, that the ability of regional and local authorities and other local stakeholders to tackle disinformation is urgently expanded; |

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| | 21. | stresses that combating the spread of disinformation must on no account amount to the monitoring of beliefs or censorship or give any such impression. The possible spread of disinformation must be systematically and continuously monitored in the run-up to elections and in times of crisis and abrupt social change, but not all the time. Preventing disinformation can in no sense be equated with restricting freedom of speech, monitoring political views or a move towards a surveillance society; on the contrary, it is a prerequisite for freedom of expression and opinion; |

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| | 22. | stresses that the fight against disinformation must be waged in complete transparency, with the public having access to comprehensive information and being kept abreast of, for instance, data protection, personal data processing and financing aspects. Without sufficient transparency, there is a great risk that measures to counter disinformation themselves fall victim to hostile information attacks; |

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| | 23. | takes the view that regional and local media and civil society must be involved in the fight against disinformation as fully as possible. Because of their day-to-day work and professional experience in recognising disinformation, journalists are trained and more aware and attentive than others that are not operating in the infosphere on a daily basis. |

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| | 24. | points out that financial resources, greater cooperation and strengthening of know-how should be used to promote various initiatives for fact-checking by journalists and civil society, the debunking of myths and the dissemination of reliable information; |

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| | 25. | considers it important to involve civil society actors including at local and regional level, in building networks of fact-checkers, thereby increasing transparency and providing knowledge about local circumstances. The so-called credibility principle which means that fact-checkers could be compensated according to the intensity and accuracy of their activity – could be borrowed from the collaborative economy in order to increase the number of people involved. In such a system, the fact-checking community would be regulating its own work and would also ensure its own standards through peer review. Furthermore, it is crucial to further develop institutional networks and tools at national and European level; |

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| | 26. | points out that the training and awareness-raising of civil society representatives help to expand the network against the spreading of fake news and incorrect information and to reduce the risk of official censorship or attempts to curtail freedom of expression; |

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| | 27. | stresses that there are also certain publicly available technologies that enable the timely and easier detection of large-scale disinformation campaigns and would facilitate the fight against disinformation. The relevant algorithms to monitor activity on social media could be further developed to identify large scale disinformation campaigns and, where serious cases are detected, trigger appropriate responses; |

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| | 28. | stresses that the rapid and effective pooling of information and experience in countering disinformation is essential. Analysis of experience in regions and municipalities, as well as cases where false information has been disseminated, could bring to the fore the similarities, patterns, mistakes and successes of these campaigns. The European Union should therefore deploy funding and its network to help local and regional authorities and Member States share experience and learn from one another; |

Proposals

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| | 29. | suggests that policy recommendations or regulatory measures be used to encourage social media platforms to do far more outreach work to educate users on disinformation and verification of sources. In the run-up to elections or referenda, as well as in times of crisis, social media could show content explaining the specific context and warning users of sources of disinformation; notes in this context that early analysis of the recent European election campaign suggests that many platforms did provide information to alert users to the specific situation, which helped to limit the impact of any disinformation activity; |

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| | 30. | believes social media platforms must be encouraged, through policy recommendations or regulatory measures if necessary, to contribute more than hitherto to the development of comprehensive networks of fact-checkers which will probably require some form of compensation system based on revenue generated by new media; considers it also crucially important to promote reliable media operators at national, regional and local level, where public service operators in particular play a significant role, and will continue to do so in future; |

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| | 31. | recommends the adoption of regulatory measures aimed at detecting disinformation campaigns and countering them, including through cooperation with social media platforms and reporting. By introducing common reporting standards on combating disinformation, it would be possible to follow the activities of social media platforms over a longer period of time, where appropriate have them monitored by independent third parties and thus obtain a comprehensive overview of the extent of the problem; |

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| | 32. | recommends a Europe-wide legal framework that obliges global social media platforms to provide a helpdesk and contact point in every Member State, operating in the language of the country. Every citizen, councillor and representative of a non-governmental organisation should be able to easily turn to customer helpdesks, which should be based on similar principles throughout the European Union. Providing such customer support in the mother tongue and the physical presence of a helpdesk would greatly facilitate the fight against false information and strengthen citizens’ rights; |

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| | 33. | recommends that social media platforms provide means for people to report (attempts at) the dissemination of false information without major inconvenience; |

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| | 34. | calls for consideration to be given to providing financial support to regional and local authorities and citizens’ associations across Europe in order to increase the capacity to detect disinformation, combat its dissemination and improve collaboration, including across borders, between public authorities and citizens’ associations; |

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| | 35. | recommends providing ‘Guidelines for dealing with Disinformation’ through the network of fact-checkers, to generate learning through educational establishments and local authorities in order to encourage critical thinking in combating disinformation; |

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| | 36. | notes the need to develop in the younger generations the ability to analyse facts, critical thinking and common sense in order to enable them to decipher and compare the information they receive, and considers it necessary to this end to foster awareness-raising measures (debates, dialogues, etc.) in education and training establishments to combat disinformation. |

Brussels, 5 December 2019.

The President

of the European Committee of the Regions

Karl-Heinz LAMBERTZ

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[(1)](#ntc1-C_2020079EN.01005001-E0001)  Joint Communication to the European Parliament, the European Council, the Council, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions: Action Plan against Disinformation.

[(2)](#ntc2-C_2020079EN.01005001-E0002)  Opinion of the European Committee of the Regions: Tackling online disinformation: a European approach.

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