1

Filed 11/26/13 Marriage of Caffery and Burns CA1/4

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for 

publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication 

or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115. 

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION FOUR

In re the Marriage of LILA DE 

LESSELINE CAFFERY and DONALD 

EDWARD BURNS.

LILA DE LESSELINE CAFFERY,

Appellant,

v.

DONALD EDWARD BURNS,

Respondent.

 A133610

 (San Francisco County

 Super. Ct. No. FMS-79-754294)

The petition for rehearing is denied. The opinion filed herein on October 29, 

2013, is ordered modified to include a footnote after the first sentence on page four:

The record reflects that Burns may have made several $800 payments to Caffery 

in 2010. The evidence, however, is lacking for us to determine if in fact the payments 

were made, and if so, the nature or purpose of any payments. 

This modification does not effect a change in the judgment. 

Dated: ___________________ Signed: _______________________
1

Filed 10/29/13 Marriage of Caffery and Burns CA1/4 (unmodified version)

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for 

publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication 

or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115. 

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION FOUR

In re the Marriage of LILA DE 

LESSELINE CAFFERY and DONALD 

EDWARD BURNS.

LILA DE LESSELINE CAFFERY,

Appellant,

v.

DONALD EDWARD BURNS,

Respondent.

 A133610

 (San Francisco County

 Super. Ct. No. FMS-79-754294)

Lila De Lesseline Caffery appeals from a final statement of decision regarding 

spousal support. While generally a statement of decision is not an appealable order, we 

have discretion to treat the statement of decision as appealable when it is signed and filed 

and when it constitutes the trial court’s final decision on the merits. (Alan v. American 

Honda Motor Co., Inc. (2007) 40 Cal.4th 894, 901; Estate of Lock (1981) 122 

Cal.App.3d 892, 896–897.) The court’s statement of decision here meets those 

requirements. Accordingly, we treat the decision as appealable. 

Caffery contends that she is entitled to recover unpaid spousal support due from 

1982 to the present, and that respondent Donald Edward Burns has a continuing 

obligation to pay support. We conclude that the matter must be remanded for further 

proceedings on the issue of laches.
2

I. FACTUAL BACKGROUND

The parties were married in December 1965, and had two children, born in 1967 

and 1968. They separated in January 1972, and dissolved their marriage in 1975 in the 

State of Maryland. In a Voluntary Separation and Property Settlement Agreement (the 

agreement) executed by the parties in February 1975, Burns agreed to pay Caffery the 

sum of $1,500 per month as alimony and child support. The amount was subject to 

annual increases based on the consumer price index, and the payments for Caffery’s 

support were to continue indefinitely until her remarriage or death. In consideration of 

the execution of the agreement and of the property received by Caffery in the settlement, 

Caffery agreed to a “release of all claims and demands of every kind or nature against the 

Husband, including claims and demands against any inheritance which the Husband may 

receive, and further including all liability now or at any time hereafter existing or 

occurring, either on account of support, maintenance, alimony, temporary or permanent, 

either statutory or arising in common law incident to the marriage relation, it being 

understood that this settlement is a total and complete release of the Husband by the Wife 

of all matters and charges whatsoever, and that the Wife shall, after this settlement, 

require nothing of the said Husband, as though the marriage relation had never existed 

between them.” The agreement provided that it was to be interpreted and governed by 

Maryland law. The provisions of the agreement were “incorporated by reference” but not 

“merge[d]” into the judgment. 

By 1980, the parties had moved to San Francisco. In that year, the parties agreed 

to have the Maryland divorce judgment entered as a California judgment, and settled 

various issues pertaining to arrearages and property division, the terms of which were 

also entered as a judgment. 

In 1982, Burns and Caffery stipulated to the entry of another judgment setting 

forth an updated amount of arrears, setting the consumer price index increase in the 

family support payment, and setting additional sums owed from Burns to Caffery. Also 

in 1982, Burns moved to modify the support obligation, contending that due to 

inflationary increases, his obligation had nearly doubled and was beyond Caffery’s needs 
3

and his ability to pay. The trial court concluded that of the $1,500 support payment, $800 

was attributable to spousal support and was non-modifiable under Maryland law.1 The 

court determined that the remaining $700 was modifiable and the matter of child support 

arrears and modification was continued for further proceedings. Burns appealed only that 

part of the court’s order finding that the spousal support provisions were non-modifiable. 

(In re Marriage of Lila and Donald Burns (May 24, 1984, A023340 [nonpub. opn.] 

(Burns I).) Division One of the First Appellate District affirmed, holding that the 

provisions of the agreement considered together indicated that the parties intended the 

spousal support payments to be contractual and therefore non-modifiable by the court. 

(Id. at pp. 1, 4, 9.)

In March 1985, the trial court entered an order modifying the amount of child 

support to $860 per month per child; calculating the spousal support payments at 

$1,536.28 for the period April 1, 1983 through March 31, 1984, and $1,551.64 thereafter, 

pending a further adjustment on April 1, 1985, and calculating arrearages of child and 

spousal support as $19,022.82. The court noted that the arrearages were exclusive of the 

balance due on the prior stipulated arrearages of $47,276.75. 2 Burns was also ordered to 

pay an additional $700 per month per child for medical, clothing, and other expenses. 

According to Caffery’s records, she received a total of $66,694.12 in spousal 

support and $108,434.00 in child support for the period from October 31, 1984 to 

December 29, 1995. At that point, the two children of the marriage were 27 and 28 years 

old.3

 

1 Maryland law now provides that a court may modify an agreement for support 

made after April 13, 1976. (See Md. Ann. Fam. Law, § 8-103, subd. (c).)

2

 The $19,022.82 in arrearages included more than $13,000 in payments owed on 

the previous arrearages of $47,276. Therefore the court’s statement that the current 

arrears were “exclusive” of the prior arrears was not entirely accurate.

3 Under the agreement, Burns was obligated to pay the children’s college and 

professional school tuition and expenses through the age of 25 years. In March 1985, the 

court, in its order modifying child support, noted that the parties agreed that payments for 

child support after the children reached 18 years of age were subject to modification. 
4

Burns ceased to make any payments for spousal support or arrearages after 

December 1995. In late 1994 or 1995, Burns informed Caffery that he could no longer 

afford to make payments. Caffery acknowledged that Burns told her in 1996 or 1997 that 

he had no money. 

In or about 2008, Caffery learned that Burns had inherited some property from his 

late wife, Hilary Goldstone. She contacted an attorney to determine if she could collect 

support arrearages. On October 1, 2008, she obtained an abstract of support judgment 

indicating that Burns owed $553,646.76 in spousal support arrearages, of which 

$315,494.14 constituted accrued interest. Burns did not become aware of the abstract 

until May 2010, when he was served with an order to appear for a judgment debtor 

examination and a petition to enforce the support order in the Alameda County Probate 

Court. The probate matter arose because Caffery sought to obtain the support arrearages 

out of Burns’s inheritance. Caffery had also recorded a lien against the home Burns was 

living in with his current wife, Sally Smith. The property was Smith’s separate property 

before her marriage with Burns, but was transferred to community property in late 2007. 

At the time, Burns believed that he had no outstanding obligation to Caffery. 

On November 29, 2010, Burns moved to vacate the abstract of judgment, to find 

that he had no outstanding spousal support obligation to Caffery, and to enjoin her from 

any further enforcement actions. Caffery, in turn, moved for an order determining the 

amount of support arrearages owed by Burns for the years 1985 through 2010. On 

August 10, 2011, following extensive briefing and a hearing on the issues, the trial court 

issued a final statement of decision. The court found that the issues were governed by 

Maryland law. The court further ruled that the court of appeal’s decision of May 24, 

1984 was the law of the case. Applying Maryland law, the court found that Caffery’s 

case was barred by the 12-year statute of limitations applicable to a contractual spousal 

support obligation. This appeal followed.

II. DISCUSSION

Caffery’s primary contention is that the California Family Code governs 

enforcement of her claims for spousal support arrearages. She argues that the prior 
5

support orders in this case entered in California require that they be enforced in 

accordance with the Family Code. Specifically, Caffery argues that the support 

agreement is enforceable under Family Code section 4500 because it is a “support order” 

as that term is defined in Family Code section 155. Section 155 defines a support order 

as a “judgment or order of support in favor of an obligee, whether temporary or final, or 

subject to modification, termination, or remission, regardless of the kind of action or 

proceeding in which it is entered.” We conclude, however, that California law does not 

apply.

In the appeal before Division One the parties agreed that Maryland law controls 

the interpretation of the parties’ marital settlement agreement, and the court applied 

Maryland law in reaching its decision. (Burns I, at pp. 4–9.) The court agreed with 

Caffery that the agreement was for “contractual support,” which is modifiable only by 

consent of the parties; it rejected Burns’s contention that the agreement was intended as 

“technical support,” which is subject to modification by the court. (Burns I, supra, at 

pp. 4, 9.) In all of those respects, that decision is the law of the case. Hence, Caffery’s 

arguments that various California Family Code sections are applicable to enforceability 

of her Maryland support judgment are without merit. 

“The law of the case doctrine states that when, in deciding an appeal, an appellate 

court ‘states in its opinion a principle or rule of law necessary to the decision, that 

principle or rule becomes the law of the case and must be adhered to throughout its 

subsequent progress, both in the lower court and upon subsequent appeal.’ ” (Kowis v. 

Howard (1992) 3 Cal.4th 888, 892–893.) “The doctrine promotes finality by preventing 

relitigation of issues previously decided.” (Yu v. Signet Bank/Virginia (2002) 103 

Cal.App.4th 298, 309.) “The validity or invalidity of a document, judgment, or order, 

and the proper construction of it, are obviously questions of law to which the doctrine of 

law of the case applies.” (9 Witkin, Cal. Procedure (5th ed. 2008) Appeal, § 466, p. 524 

and cases cited.) 

Caffery concedes that the law of the case applies to the court of appeal’s decision 

insofar as it concludes that the support provisions are non-modifiable, but contends 
6

nonetheless that the issue of whether she had a right to spousal support as opposed to a 

“mere contractual right” to such support payments was not decided. Caffery’s contention 

is belied by the record.

In the prior appeal, one of the main issues before the court was whether the 

provision for spousal support under the agreement was modifiable, e.g., “technical 

alimony” or if it provided a fixed contractual payment that could not be modified by the 

court. (Burns I, supra, at pp. 4–9.) The Court of Appeal, applying Maryland law, as 

required by the agreement, explained the distinction under Maryland law between 

technical alimony (modifiable) and contractual spousal support (non-modifiable). (Id. at 

p. 4.) Under Maryland law, spousal support is considered technical alimony only if 

certain conditions are met, including that it terminate on the remarriage or death of the 

wife or the death of the husband, and that it can be modified by the court in light of 

changed circumstances. (LaChance v. LaChance (Md. App. 1975) 346 A.2d 676, 679–

680.) However, if the agreement for alimony does not meet all of the requirements of 

alimony, “the obligation to pay rests upon the agreement of the parties, and does not 

become alimony” and may not be modified by the court in the absence of collusion, 

mistake or fraud. (Id. at p. 680.) 

The court of appeal in Burns I concluded that the agreement did not provide for 

technical alimony because it specifically stated that its terms could be modified or waived 

only upon an agreement signed by the parties. (Burns I, supra, at pp. 2, 7–8.) The court 

held, “[t]he several provisions [of the agreement], considered together, clearly indicate 

that the parties did not intend that the agreed spousal support payments were subject to 

later court modification upon the request of either party.” (Id. at p. 8.) The court also 

noted that Caffery expressly released any claims “on account of support, maintenance, 

alimony, temporary or permanent, either statutory or arising in common law incident to 

the marriage relation. . . .” (Burns I, at p. 8 & fn. 5 [underlining in opinion].) 

Consequently, the court determined that the spousal support provision was not technical 

alimony. (Id. at p. 9.) The court therefore necessarily concluded that the spousal support 

provision of the agreement provided contractual spousal support. 
7

Caffery nevertheless argues that the three California orders characterize the 

payments to be made by Burns as “orders for support” and not as “orders for mere 

contractual money payments,” and Burns’s failure to appeal “the trial court’s 

classification of the nature of the monies due to [her] as ‘spousal support’ ” means that 

Burns’s contractual obligations have been converted to a California spousal support 

order. We disagree, for three reasons. 

First, the courts’ orders did not, and indeed, could not, modify the nature of 

Burns’s obligation. As has been described, Division One of this court determined in the 

prior appeal that Caffery’s right to support was contractual under Maryland law. Both we 

and the trial court are bound by that determination; it is the law of the case. (Kowis v. 

Howard, supra, 3 Cal.4th at pp. 892–893.) 

Second, as the prior appeal noted, “[t]he label given to the allowance is not 

determinative.” (Burns I, supra, at p. 6; see, also, Rasmussen v. Rasmussen (1969) 275 

Cal.App.2d 443, 449–450 [res judicata barred a party from relying on a reference in a 

court order to an obligation as alimony when a prior decision had determined the 

obligation was not alimony].) We note that the agreement itself characterizes the 

payments due as “alimony” and “support.” Thus, the courts’ use of the term “spousal 

support” is entirely consistent with the notion that the courts were setting and enforcing 

Caffery’s right to support under the agreement, and not issuing California family law 

support orders. 

Third, Caffery herself argued in the prior appeal that the agreement “manifests an 

expressed intention by the parties to effect an immediate waiver and release of technical 

alimony rights (and its attendant uncertainties) in exchange for contractual support. . . .” 

(Emphasis added.) As Burns points out, “Caffery cannot ‘have it both ways’ by arguing 

that the obligations were contractual in 1984 and yet some how converted to spousal 

support in the intervening [25] years. . . .” (Italics omitted.) Caffery cannot now change 

course. (Cf. Ernst v. Searle (1933) 218 Cal. 233, 240–241 [“A party is not permitted to 

change his position and adopt a new and different theory on appeal. To permit him to do 
8

so would not only be unfair to the trial court, but manifestly unjust to the opposing 

litigant”]; 9 Witkin, Cal. Procedure, supra, Appeal, § 407, pp. 466-468.)

We therefore reject Caffery’s contention that simply by “domesticating” her 

Maryland Decree in California pursuant to which enforcement orders were issued, she 

has acquired the right to unmodifiable spousal support under the California family law. 

Knodel v. Knodel (1975) 14 Cal.3d 752, 766, cited by Caffery, stands for the 

proposition that our state courts will give comity to the law of a sister state and give full 

force and effect to an agreement made under the law of the sister state. It does not mean 

as Caffery argues, that we will enforce a sister state’s contractual agreement for support 

in accordance with California’s laws for spousal support. 

Caffery argues that the language in the agreement releasing Burns from any claims 

or demands for support in consideration for executing the agreement did not mean that 

the parties intended to waive her right to receive “spousal support or alimony as such”; 

rather, the agreement established that her “right to support arising out of the parties’ 

divorce was solely as prescribed in the Agreement, which mandated that [Burns] pay 

certain monies to her . . . for ‘support, maintenance and alimony.’ ” This is in contrast to 

the first appeal, in which Caffery was adamant that the agreement “expresses the 

intention to completely settle and release all marital rights . . . prior to and independent 

of the divorce decree.” (Emphasis added.) She also argued that the release was intended 

to waive her right to “Court-imposed technical alimony . . . rather than contractual 

alimony which is a creature of consent.” The court of appeal agreed, adopting Caffery’s 

position that her right under the agreement was not technical alimony but a nonmodifiable contractual support obligation. The court of appeal’s conclusion that her right 

was a contractual one to be construed under Maryland law forecloses her argument that 

she is now entitled to enforce her right under California’s statutory provisions for 

support. As the trial court stated in its statement of decision, “To accept [Caffery’s] 

argument would be to give her the benefit of the Court of Appeal decision that her right 

to this money is not subject to modification or termination; to find that [she] also has a 

right to ‘support, maintenance and alimony’ in California by the mere filing of the 
9

Maryland decree in California; and to hold that a material term of the [agreement] — the 

release — is therefore rendered meaningless. The law of the case is meant to avoid such 

a result.” 

Caffery also contends that the trial court erred in relying on Nedlloyd Lines B.V. v. 

Superior Court (1992) 3 Cal.4th 459 (Nedlloyd) in determining whether Maryland or 

California law controlled the applicable statute of limitations. We discern no error. 

Nedlloyd set forth the test for determining whether a parties’ contractual choiceof-law provision was enforceable. (Nedlloyd, supra, 3 Cal.4th at pp. 464–466.) As the 

trial court correctly found, the decision in the prior appeal is consistent with the analysis 

in Nedlloyd concerning enforcement of choice of law provisions.4 (Burns, supra, at p. 4.) 

Moreover, Caffery’s argument to the contrary is inconsistent with her position in the prior 

appeal in which she did not dispute that Maryland law controlled the interpretation of the 

agreement. (Ibid.) 

The Maryland statute of limitations applicable here provides that an action shall be 

filed within 12 years after the cause of action accrues. (Maryland Courts and Judicial 

Proceedings Code, § 5-102(a).) In O’Hearn v. O’Hearn (Md. App. 1995) 653 A.2d 446, 

450–451, the court applied the 12-year statute of limitations of section 5-102 in an action 

to enforce an agreement for child support payments incorporated into a Maryland divorce 

judgment. There, the court explained that the 12-year statute of limitations applies to 

claims for support arrearages. (Id. at p. 449.) In applying that statute, the court 

concluded that claims for arrearages were not barred as to those payments which have 

 

4

 California favors enforcement of choice-of-law provisions and follows the 

Restatement Second of Conflict of Laws, section 187, subdivision (2) under which the 

court first determines either: “(1) whether the chosen state has a substantial relationship 

to the parties or their transaction, or (2) whether there is any other reasonable basis for 

the parties’ choice of law.” (Id. at p. 466.) If either test is met, the court enforces the 

choice-of-law provision unless it conflicts with a fundamental policy of California. 

(Ibid.) If there is a conflict, the court then must determine whether California has a 

materially greater interest than the chosen state in the determination of the issue, and if 

so, the court will not enforce the choice-of-law provision. (Ibid.)
10

become due within the 12 years preceding the proceedings for enforcement. (Id. at 

pp. 449–451.)5 Applying these principles, Caffery’s claims for arrearages are not barred 

as a matter of law by the Maryland statute. 

The trial court thus erred in ruling that Caffery could not bring her claim for 

arrearages after 12 years of nonpayment had passed. We conclude, however, that there is 

a substantial issue as to whether the evidence in the record supports a defense of laches 

under Maryland law. While the parties briefed the issue below, the court did not address 

the issue in its statement of decision. 

The Maryland courts have considered the defense of laches in cases involving 

alimony and child support. While we have not found a case factually similar to the 

matter here, in Jensen v. Jensen (Md. App. 1995) 654 A.2d 914, there was a post-divorce 

order in which the trial court terminated alimony but reserved jurisdiction over the parties 

to address the matter in the future. (Id. at pp. 917, 919.) Seventeen years later, the 

former wife petitioned for alimony claiming that due to changed circumstances she was 

no longer able to support herself. (Id. at p. 917.) The trial court denied the petition, 

concluding the reservation of jurisdiction did not include circumstances that were not 

foreseen at the time of the order. (Id. at p. 918.) The appellate court disagreed and 

remanded the matter to the trial court to consider whether the wife was entitled to an 

award of alimony based on a change of circumstances despite a 17-year delay and 

whether the claim was barred by laches because the husband would be prejudiced due to 

a change in his position based on the wife’s inaction. (Id. at pp. 921, 922.) In so 

deciding, the court took note of Maryland’s then-current policy of limiting alimony to a 

definite term in order to provide each party with an incentive to become fully selfsupporting, and permitting a reservation of jurisdiction based only upon foreseeable 

changes in circumstances. The court concluded, however, that under the law existing at 

 

5

 The trial court found that Caffery’s action accrued in 1994 or 1995. The record 

reflects that Burns’s last regular payment to Caffery for spousal support was made in 

December 1994. 
11

the time of the order, the 17-year delay did not per se abrogate the wife’s right to pursue 

support. (Id. at pp. 921–922.) 

Other Maryland support arrearage cases have rejected the application of the laches 

defense where the obligors could not show a change in position in reliance on the belief 

their obligations had ended. (See, e.g., Bland v. Larsen (Md. App. 1993) 627 A.2d 79, 

82–84; Weidner v. Weidner (Md. App. 1989) 553 A.2d 263, 267–268.) Here, however, 

there is evidence suggesting that Burns has been prejudiced by Caffery’s delay in filing 

this action. For example, Burns averred that in reliance on his belief that Caffery had 

allowed the support obligation to lapse—due to her successful business and ability to be 

self-supporting and his lack of significant income—he made substantial cash payments to 

the parties’ adult children, and made the decision to put his current wife’s separate 

property home in joint title as an estate planning measure. We therefore conclude a 

remand is appropriate to allow the trial court to conduct proceedings to determine 

whether Caffery’s claim is barred by laches.6

We briefly address one additional issue raised by Caffery. She argues that the 

support provisions of the agreement must be enforced in accordance with the Uniform 

Interstate Family Support Act, 42 U.S.C. § 666(f); Fam. Code, § 4900, et seq. (UIFSA). 

The UIFSA governs child and spousal support orders in interstate cases. (In re Marriage 

of Newman (2000) 80 Cal.App.4th 846, 849.) It was enacted in Maryland in 1996 and in 

California in 1997. (Md. Code Ann. Fam. Law, §§ 10-301 et seq.; Fam. Code, § 4900.) 

It governs the jurisdiction of the courts to modify spousal support orders. (In re 

Marriage of Rassier (2002) 96 Cal.App.4th 1431, 1437.) As relevant here under both 

California and Maryland law, “[t]he law of the issuing state governs the nature, extent, 

 

6

 We also note there is an issue concerning whether the release in the agreement 

has any bearing on this action. In the agreement, Caffery released all “claims and 

demands of every kind or nature against [Burns] including claims and demands against 

any inheritance which [Burns] may receive,” in consideration of “the execution of [the 

agreement] and of the property set apart to [Caffery] under the terms [t]hereof. . . .” We 

express no views on the effect, if any, of this provision.
12

amount, and duration of current payments and other obligations of support and the 

payment of arrearages under the order.” (Fam. Code, § 4953, subd. (a); Md. Code Ann. 

Fam. Law, § 10-343(a), see In re Marriage of Rassier, supra, 96 Cal.App.4th at 

pp. 1436–1437.) 

Caffery seeks to benefit from the provisions of the UIFSA that provide a longer 

statute of limitations for collecting support arrearages. (See Fam. Code, § 4953, subd. (b) 

[In a proceeding for arrearages, the statute of limitations under the laws of the state or of 

the issuing state, whichever is longer, applies], Md. Code Ann. Fam. Law, § 10-343, 

subd. (b) [same].) The UIFSA, however, does not apply to this case. As the prior appeal 

determined that the support payments under the agreement were fixed contractual 

payments and not alimony, they were not subject to modification by the court or the 

UIFSA, which governs the jurisdiction of the courts to modify support payments. (In re 

Marriage of Rassier, supra, 96 Cal.App.4th at p. 1437.)

Trend v. Ball (1997) 57 Cal.App.4th 1092, cited by Caffery, is distinguishable. 

The Trend court relied on the Federal Full Faith and Credit for Child Support Orders Act, 

28 U.S.C. § 1738B, in holding that the trial court was required to apply the forum’s 

statute of limitations or that of the issuing state, whichever statute provided the longer 

period of limitation. (Id. at p. 1097.) There, a Montana child support order was registered 

in California after the Montana statute of limitations for collection had expired. (Id. at 

pp. 1093–1094.) Inasmuch as California law provided that a judgment for child or 

spousal support is enforceable until paid in full (Fam. Code, §§ 291, 4502), the court held 

that the father was required to pay the child support arrearages. (Id. at pp. 1097–1098.) 

The court noted that the federal law altered choice of law rules. Trend, however, did not 

involve a situation where the parties had a contractual agreement for spousal support 

which contained a choice-of-law provision. 

Nor, as explained in Scheuerman v. Hauk (2004) 116 Cal.App.4th 1140, 1144–

1145, did Trend involve a case where the issue of the enforceability of the order had 

previously been decided. Thus, the Scheuerman court determined that California could 

not disregard a ruling by the Arizona court that a judgment for child support—which the 
13

wife sought to enforce in California—had already expired in Arizona, the issuing state. 

(Id. at p. 1145.) The court reasoned that “reviving expired and unenforceable judgments 

in this manner could lead to untenable results that are inconsistent with the intent of the 

law. For example, parties could attempt to enforce out-of-state judgments that had been 

expired for many years.” (Ibid.) 

Here, Caffery seeks to take advantage of a California statute of limitations to 

enforce a judgment setting amounts due under a spousal support agreement that has been 

adjudicated to be subject to Maryland law, while having failed to take any enforcement 

actions for more than a decade. As the trial court found, Caffery cannot now be heard to 

argue that she is entitled to support in accordance with California law when she argued in 

the prior appeal that California law did not apply and the court had no power to modify or 

terminate spousal support. (Burns I, supra, at pp. 3, 7–8; see, also Levin v. Ligon (2006) 

140 Cal.App.4th 1456 [ex-husband was barred from arguing that he had interest in exwife’s financial assets when he received compensation in a prior action after asserting 

that he had lost all his rights to those assets].)

III. DISPOSITION

The judgment is reversed and the matter is remanded for proceedings consistent 

with this opinion. The parties shall bear their own costs on this appeal. 

_________________________

Rivera, J.

We concur:

_________________________

Ruvolo, P.J.

_________________________

Reardon, J.