In the

United States Court of Appeals

For the Seventh Circuit

No. 13-2553

VICTORIA HARPER,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

v.

FULTON COUNTY, ILLINOIS ,

Defendant-Appellee.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the 

Central District of Illinois.

No. 10-CV-01423 — Michael M. Mihm, Judge.

ARGUED FEBRUARY 20, 2014 — DECIDED APRIL 8, 2014

Before EASTERBROOK, MANION, and SYKES, Circuit Judges.

MANION, Circuit Judge. After the Fulton County Board

voted not to raise the salary of the County Treasurer, Victoria

Harper, she filed a § 1983 action against the County for sex

discrimination. The County moved for summary judgment.

After considering Harper’s sex discrimination claim under

both the direct and indirect methods, the district court concluded that the claim failed as a matter of law, and granted the
2 No. 13-2553

County’s motion for summary judgment. Harper appeals. We

affirm.

I. Facts

Victoria Harper has served as County Treasurer for Fulton

County, Illinois, since 1994. The County Treasurer is elected

and serves a four-year term. See Ill. Const. art. VII, § 4(c); 55

ILCS 5/3-10001. After her election in 1994, Harper was reelected in 1998, 2002, 2006, and 2010. Pursuant to the Illinois

Counties Code, the Fulton County Board—a body composed

of twenty-one members—is empowered to set the salaries for

the County Treasurer, the County Clerk, and other elected

officials. See 55 ILCS 5/4-6001. The Board’s Finance Committee

is composed of five members of the Board and focuses on the

County’s budget, expenditures, andgeneralfinancial situation.

The Finance Committee makes an initial recommendation to

the Board regarding the salaries of the County Treasurer and

County Clerk. From 1983–2002, the County Treasurer and

County Clerk were paid the same salary. In the early 2000s,

Ronald Rumler, the County Clerk, announced his decision to

retire. The County Board voted to increase Rumler’s salary in

order to allow him to receive greaterretirement benefits. Thus,

from 2003–2006, the County Clerk’s salary exceeded the

County Treasurer’s salary. After Rumler’s retirement, the new

County Clerk, James Nelson, and the County Treasurer were

paid the same salary from 2007–2010. 

In the years leading up to 2010, however, disputes arose

between Harper and the members of the Finance Committee

and the Board. These disputes seem to have prompted the

Finance Committee to recommend against increasing the
No. 13-2553 3

County Treasurer’s salary for her term in office commencing

in December 2010. At that time, the members of the Finance 1

Committee were Bob Bucher, Steve Conklin, Mat Fletcher, Ed

Huggins, and Rob Malott. At its May 11, 2010, meeting, the

Board adopted this recommendation by a vote of 10–8. At the

same meeting, the Board voted (16–2) to give the County Clerk

annual pay raises for the term commencing in December 2010.

As a result, Harper’s salary remained $58,300 from 2010–2013,

while Nelson’s salary started at $64,300 and rose to $71,300 for

the same period.

Harper believed that the decision to deny her pay raises

while awarding pay raises to Nelson was the result of sex

discrimination on the part of a critical mass of the male

members of the Board. She responded by filing a § 1983 action

against the County for sex discrimination in compensation in

violation of the Fourteenth Amendment’s Equal Protection

Clause. The County moved for summary judgment. The 2

County identified a number of justifications for denying

Harper pay raises, most of them centered around her work

performance. The district court granted summary judgment in

favor of the County. Harper appeals.

Because the position of County Treasurer is an elected one, there could be

1

no guarantee that Harper would succeed in her 2010 bid for re-election.

However, the County concedes that the Board fully expected Harper to be

re-elected in 2010. 

Her lawsuit included other causes of action that are not at issue in this 2

appeal. 
4 No. 13-2553

II. Discussion

On appeal, Harper contends that the district court erred in

concluding that her sex discrimination claim failed as a matter

of law. We review the decision to grant a summary judgment

motion de novo and construe the evidence in the light most

favorable to Harper, the nonmoving party. See Fed. R. Civ. P.

56(a); Serednyj v. Beverly Healthcare, LLC, 656 F.3d 540, 547 (7th

Cir. 2011). We must determine whether the evidence, so

construed, establishes genuine disputes of material fact with

respect to Harper’s sex discrimination claim. Id. And because

Harper contends that she can establish sex discrimination

under both the direct and indirect methods, we consider both

methods in turn.

A. Direct Method

“Under the ‘direct method,’ the plaintiff may avoid

summary judgment by presenting sufficient evidence, either

direct or circumstantial, that the employer’s discriminatory

animus motivated an adverse employment action.” Coleman v.

Donahoe, 667 F.3d 835, 845 (7th Cir. 2012). “Direct evidence is

evidence that would prove discriminatory intent without

reliance on inference or presumption.” Makowski v.

SmithAmundsen LLC, 662 F.3d 818, 824 (7th Cir. 2011). Such

evidence essentially “‘requires an admission by the decision-maker that [the decision-maker’s] actions were based

upon the prohibited animus.’” Serednyj, 656 F.3d at 548

(quoting Rhodes v. Ill. Dep’t of Transp., 359 F.3d 498, 504 (7th Cir.

2004)). Should the plaintiff lack direct evidence, she may also

point to circumstantial evidence that allows a jury to infer
No. 13-2553 5

intentional discrimination by the decision-maker. Makowski,

662 F.3d at 824.

Harper points to the testimony of two other County

employees in an attempt to establish her sex discrimination

claim under the direct method. First, Sandra Monari, a Board

member from 1998–2010 and the Chairman from 2000–2004,

testified by declaration (made under penalty of perjury

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1746) that, in 2004, Ed Ketchum, a male

Board member, dispensed with the traditional approach to

electing the Chairman and secured the position for himself

through a floor nomination at a special meeting during

“extremely severe weather conditions.” Monari also testified 3

that at some point during Ketchum’s chairmanship, he “and

other male members” of the Board insisted that Teresa

Abudusky, a female Board member, resign because her long

work commute (about one hour and forty-five minutes) caused

her to miss committee and Board meetings. Monari testified

that Doug Manock, a male Board member, was not asked to

resign even though he also had a long commute (about one

hour and fifteen minutes) that caused him to be repeatedly

absent frommeetings.Inaddition, Monaritestified that, during

her twelve years as a Board member, she “observed the

attitude and actions of the male board members” and concluded that “a sufficient number of the male members of the

Board who had influence with the remaining male members of

the Board were biased against women.” Specifically, Monari

See Owens v. Hinsley, 635 F.3d 950, 955 (7th Cir. 2011) (“[A] declaration

3

under § 1746 is equivalent to an affidavit for purposes of summary

judgment.”).
6 No. 13-2553

stated that, based on her observations of the conduct of

Ketchum, George Hall, Doug Manock, Steve Conklin, and

Terry Piff in relation to the incidents wherein Monari lost the

chairmanship and Abudusky was asked to resign, Monari

believed that those particular members “held a bias against

women in positions of authority.” Finally, Monari remarked

that, in 2006, Ketchum, Hall, and Manock “regularly voiced

complaints about Victoria Harper’s accounting reports and her

conduct of the Office of Treasurer.” 

Second, Mary Hampton, the County’s Circuit Clerk since

1988, testified by deposition that whenever the County Clerk’s

salary was set higher than her salary, she would have to make

a presentation to the Board in order to have her salary raised

to the County Clerk’s level. Hampton testified that male

officers were not required to similarly justify their pay raises

to the Board. However, she admitted that she had no “personal

knowledge of whether the other elected officials appeared

before the Finance Committee to explain why they needed a

particular budget or salary increase ... .” Hampton also

testified that she felt that Hall talked down to her and Harper

and adopted a more aggressive tone than when he was

speaking to men. Finally, Hampton testified that in August

2008, when she requested a raise, she felt hostility when she

was in the same room as the members of the Finance Committee, which at that time included Bucher, Hall, Ketchum,

Manock, and Williams. 

None of this testimony is direct evidence that the Board (or

members thereof) denied Harper pay raises because of her sex.

Thus, the question is whether this testimony is strong enough

circumstantial evidence to allow a jury to infer intentional
No. 13-2553 7

discrimination by the Board—or, at least, a critical mass of the

Board’s members. We conclude that this testimony falls far

short of that standard.

Monari’s testimony includes nothing to suggest that the

power struggle resulting in her ouster from the Chairmanship

had anything to do with her sex. To conclude that it did would

be raw speculation. Similarly, Monari fails to link Ketchum,

Hall, and Manock’s complaints about Harper’s performance to

her sex. Furthermore, Monari’s testimony that she believes 4

that a critical mass of male Board members are biased against

women is conclusory. And Hampton’s testimony that male

office-holders were not required to justify their pay raises is

pure speculation in light of her admission that she lacked

personal knowledge. Finally, Hampton does not offer any

evidence linking her sex to her perceptions of hostility from the

Finance Committee members during the August 2008 meeting

to her sex.

All that remains is Monari’s testimony that Ketchum and

“other male members” of the Board asked Abudusky to resign

but did not ask Manock to resign, along with Hampton’s

deposition testimony that Hall spoke more aggressively to her

and Harper than to men. In some circumstances, “behavior

toward or comments directed at other employees in the

protected group” can be one kind of circumstantial evidence

indicating discrimination. Good v. Univ. of Chi. Med. Ctr., 673

F.3d 670, 675 (7th Cir. 2012) (quoting Darchak v. City of Chi. Bd.

 Indeed, that testimony is consistent with the County’s contention that it

4

did not give Harper pay raises due to her poor work performance.
8 No. 13-2553

of Educ., 580 F.3d 622, 631 (7th Cir. 2009)). But Harper offers no

evidence that these “other male members” (whom she fails to

identify) were still on the Board in 2010 or, if so, voted to deny

her pay raises. See id. at 676 (“The direct method of proof ...

requires evidence leading directly to the conclusion that an

employer was illegally motivated, without reliance on speculation.”). Similarly, even supposing this evidence were enough

to establish that Ketchum and Hall held biases against women,

Harper has failed to link those alleged biases to the decision to

deny Harper pay raises. Adams v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 324 F.3d

935, 939 (7th Cir. 2003) (“‘[B]igotry, per se, is not actionable. It

is actionable only if it results in injury to a plaintiff; there must

be a real link between the bigotry and an adverse employment

action.’” (quoting Gorence v. Eagle Food Ctrs., Inc., 242 F.3d 759,

762 (7th Cir. 2001))). This is especially so given that neither

Ketchum nor Hall were on the Finance Committee when the

recommendation was made.

In other words, the testimony does not lead “directly to the

conclusion that” the Finance Committee’s recommendation

and the Board’s vote to adopt that recommendation were

based on Harper’s sex. Good, 673 F.3d at 676. And even if the

testimony had some circumstantial relevance, the totality of

Harper’s evidence is simply insufficient to establish intentional

sex discrimination.

B. Indirect Method

Under the indirect method, also known as the McDonnell

Douglas burden-shifting approach, Harper “must establish a

prima facie case of sex discrimination by producing competent

evidence that (1) she is a woman, (2) she suffered an adverse
No. 13-2553 9

employment action, (3) she was meeting [the County’s]

legitimate business expectations, and (4) a similarly situated

man was treated more favorably.” Weber v. Univs. Research

Ass’n, Inc., 621 F.3d 589, 593 (7th Cir. 2010). If she does so, the

burden shifts to the County to articulate a legitimate, nondiscriminatory justification for denying Harper pay raises. Id.

Once the County offers such a justification, the burden shifts

back to Harper to show that the justification is simply a pretext

and that her sex was the real reason she did not receive pay

raises. Id.

Here the parties focus on whether the County’s justifications for denying Harper pay raises are pretextual. The 5

County offers seven justifications for denying Harper pay

raises. First, Conklin, Huggins, and Hall testified that they

believed Harper should not receive pay raises because of an

incident wherein the Illinois State Police investigated Harper

for requesting a check from the County’s General Fund for

“supplies” even though the check was to reimburse herself for

money she had donated to the County in the early 2000s.

Second, Bucher, Conklin, and Hall testified that they believed

that Harper did not work full-time. Third, Bucher, Conklin,

Fletcher, Huggins, and Hall testified that they believed that

Harper could have chosen betterinvestments but refused to do

so or work with the Finance Committee with respect to the

County’s investments. Fourth, the County asserts that on two

different occasions Harper did not provide reports requested

The denial of a raise—even a purely discretionary one—can be an adverse

5

employment action. Hunt v. City of Markham, Ill., 219 F.3d 649, 654 (7th Cir.

2000).
10 No. 13-2553

by the Finance Committee. Fifth, Harper sued the County in

state court in an effort to overturn a Board resolution directing

that the County Administrator be given “read only” access to

the County Treasurer’s reports. Sixth, Harper often did not

provide monthly reports to the Board members until after the

Finance Committee met and shortly before the Board met.

Seventh, Harper did not assist with the County’s budget and

often did not attend Finance Committee meetings.

Harper has utterly failed to come forward with evidence

tending to prove that the County’s numerous justifications for

denying her pay raises are pretexts masking sex

discrimination . Harper does contend that the testifying Board 6

members were mistaken about a number of the accusations

they level against her. But so long as these accusations were

sincere, it does not matter whether they were wrong. See

Harper argues that the Board was not legally permitted to deny her raises 6

on the basis of her work performance. Harper relies upon an Illinois

Supreme Court decision referencing that “if one is lawfully entitled to a

public office the right to salary attaches to the office and that it may be

recovered in full, irrespective of any service rendered ... .” Kelly v. Chi. Park

Dist., 98 N.E.2d 738, 741 (Ill. 1951). But Kelly is concerned with whether a

public official is actually being paid her full salary—the decision does not

concern an authorized body’s initial decision about what the public office’s

salary should be. At the May meeting, the Board set the salary for the fouryear term commencing in December 2010. Because the elections for that

term had not yet occurred, neither Harper (nor anyone else) was “lawfully

entitled” to the office of County Treasurer for the December 2010 term.

Moreover, apart from imposing minimums not at issue here, the Illinois

Counties Code imposes no substantive limitations on the Board’s power to

set the salaries of certain County officers prior to the commencement of

their terms. See 55 ILCS 5/4-6001.
No. 13-2553 11

Ballance v. City of Springfield, 424 F.3d 614, 621 (7th Cir. 2005)

(observing that a plaintiff cannot prevail if the employer

“honestly believed in the nondiscriminatory reasons it offered,

even if the reasons are foolish or trivial or even baseless”

(quoting Bell v. E.P.A., 232 F.3d 546, 550 (7th Cir. 2000))).

7

Moreover, Harper concedes that many of the accusations were

true, but contends that the problems were not (entirely) her

fault. For example, Harper argues that she did not write the

check giving rise to the state police investigation, she did not

have the technical ability (or, at least, the time) to generate the

requested reports, she was not obligated by statute to assist

with the budget or attend Finance Committee meetings, and

the Finance Committee’s investment views wrongly valued

high interest rates over liquidity. However, the fact that some

of the criticisms leveled against Harper may not be completely

fair does not establish that they are pretextual.

Harper’s only attempt to show pretextrelates to the lawsuit

she filed against the County in resistance to the Board’s

resolution directing that the County Administrator be given

“read only” access to the County Treasurer’s reports.

Specifically, because County Counsel represented the County,

the state court appointed a special attorney to represent

Harper, but who was to be paid by the County (pursuant to

As Ballance makes clear, there is no merit to Harper’s contention that

7

“[t]his court has not addressed the question of whether proof [of] the falsity

of the employer’s stated reasons for the employment action is all that is

required to survive summary judgment.” Showing that the proffered

justifications were mistaken is not enough; to establish pretext a plaintiff

must show that the employer is lying when it claims that the justifications

were the real reasons for the adverse employment action.
12 No. 13-2553

Illinois law). However, the Board resisted the efforts of

Harper’s attorney to collect his fee for about one and one-half

years. Harper contends that the Board’s reluctance to pay her

attorney’s fee interfered with his ability to attempt to negotiate

and reach a settlement, which shows that the Board was not

genuinely interested in ensuring that the County Administrator obtained access to the County Treasurer’s reports. But 8

Harper’s attorney was appointed for the purpose of aiding

Harper in the lawsuit that she brought in order to oppose the

Board’s demands. It is not reasonable to infer from the Board’s

reluctance to pay for the services rendered on behalf of

Harper’s opposition to the Board’s demands that the Board

was not concerned with Harper’s compliance with those

demands. Indeed, as the County has stated, Harper’s decision

to bring the suit was one of the County’s justifications for

denying Harper pay raises. Regardless, Harper still has

completely failed to come forward with evidence that the

County’s other six justifications are pretextual.

Harper also complains that the Board treated Nelson, a

male, better than her by giving him pay raises. But the County

explains that the Board adopted the Finance Committee’s

recommendation to give Nelson (the County Clerk) pay raises

for the term commencing in December 2010 because of his

particularly excellent work performance. The County points to

evidence that Finance Committee members believed that

Nelson went beyond his normal duties and worked overtime

(including on weekends during the election process). The

County offers evidence that Nelson helped the County save

 The parties do not tell us the outcome of the state litigation.

8
No. 13-2553 13

about $160,000 in health insurance premiums. The County also

offers evidence that FinanceCommittee members believed that

Nelson had improved the equipment, processes, and efficiency

of the election process, had guided the County through a major

information technology upgrade, and had spearheaded the

County’s efforts to establish a geographic information system.

Harper offers no contrary evidence. Thus, in addition to the

complaints about her work performance, the County has

offeredundisputedandlegitimate reasons for giving pay raises

to Nelson but not to Harper. And Harper offers no evidence

that these reasons are pretexts masking sex discrimination.

Finally, Harper points out that much of the County’s

evidence regarding its justifications for denying her pay raises

(while giving them to Nelson) comes from the testimony of

individual Finance Committee members and other Board

members. Harper contends that this evidence is irrelevant

because it does not necessarily reflect the views of all ten Board

members who voted to deny her pay raises. Of course, any rule

that only evidence reflecting the views of all of these ten Board

members is relevant would not bode well for Harper’s theory

that only some of those Board members (a critical mass) were

motivated by biases against women. In fact, the testimony of

the individual Board members regarding why they voted to

deny Harper pay raises is certainly relevant to whether that

decision was the product of sex discrimination. Similarly,

because the Board merely voted to adopt the Finance Committee’s recommendation to deny Harper pay raises, the Finance

Committee members’ reasons for making that recommendation shed light on the Board’s ultimate decision to adopt that

recommendation.
14 No. 13-2553

Moreover, at the May 11, 2010, meeting, the Board adopted

three resolutions concerning the content and timeliness of the

Treasurer’s reports. Harper concedes that these resolutions

demonstrate that the Board was concerned about the content

and timeliness of her reports when it voted to deny her pay

raises. But, as explained above, Harper has failed to show that

the Board’s concerns about the content and timeliness of her

reportsweremerely excuses covering sex discrimination.Thus,

even if we were to confine our review of the Board’s justifications to its concerns about the content and timeliness of

Harper’s reports, Harper cannot establish pretext.

III. Conclusion

Because, as a matter of law, Harper cannot establish sex

discrimination under either the direct or indirect method, we

AFFIRM the judgment of the district court.