UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 14-4199

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff – Appellee,

v.

JERMAINE STEPHEN FINCH,

Defendant - Appellant.

No. 14-4212

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff – Appellee,

v.

JEROME ELLIOTT FINCH,

Defendant - Appellant.

Appeals from the United States District Court for the Middle 

District of North Carolina, at Greensboro. William L. Osteen, 

Jr., Chief District Judge. (1:13-cr-00311-WO-1; 1:13-cr-00118-

WO-1; 1:13-cr-00311-WO-2)

Submitted: January 13, 2015 Decided: February 6, 2015

Before WILKINSON, SHEDD, and FLOYD, Circuit Judges.
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Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

George E. Crump, III, LAW OFFICE OF GEORGE E. CRUMP, III,

Rockingham, North Carolina; Craig M. Cooley, COOLEY LAW OFFICE, 

PLLC, Cary, North Carolina, for Appellants. Ripley Rand, United 

States Attorney, Terry M. Meinecke, Assistant United States 

Attorney, Winston-Salem, North Carolina, for Appellee.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
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PER CURIAM:

Jermaine Stephen Finch and Jerome Elliott Finch 

pleaded guilty to possession with intent to distribute cocaine, 

in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a) (2012), conditioned on their 

right to appeal the district court’s denial of their motions to 

suppress evidence seized following a traffic stop. The district 

court sentenced Jermaine Finch to forty-eight months of 

imprisonment and sentenced Jerome Finch to fifty-three months, 

and they now appeal. For the reasons that follow, we affirm.

Both Appellants challenge the district court’s 

conclusion that the arresting officer had reasonable suspicion 

to extend the traffic stop to conduct a narcotics investigation 

and a canine sniff.* “We review the factual findings underlying 

a motion to suppress for clear error and the district court’s 

legal determinations de novo.” United States v. Davis, 690 F.3d 

226, 233 (4th Cir. 2012). When the district court has denied a 

 * To the extent Jermaine Finch challenges the district 

court’s conclusion that the initial stop was valid based on the 

officer’s witnessing the vehicle commit several traffic 

violations, we conclude that this argument lacks merit. See

United States v. Branch, 537 F.3d 328, 335 (4th Cir. 2008) 

(“Observing a traffic violation provides sufficient 

justification for a police officer to detain the offending 

vehicle for as long as it takes to perform the traditional 

incidents of a routine traffic stop.”); see also Whren v. United 

States, 517 U.S. 806, 813 (1996) (traffic-violation arrest not 

rendered invalid “by the fact that it was a mere pretext for a 

narcotics search” (internal quotation marks omitted)). 
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defendant’s suppression motion, we construe the evidence in the 

light most favorable to the government. Id.

“It is well established that the temporary detention 

of individuals during the stop of an automobile by the police 

constitutes a seizure, no matter how brief the detention or how 

limited its purpose.” Branch, 537 F.3d at 335 (internal 

quotation marks and alterations omitted). During a routine 

traffic stop, an officer may request a driver’s license and 

registration, perform a computer check, issue a citation, and 

conduct a canine sniff “if performed within the time reasonably 

required to issue a traffic citation.” Branch, 537 F.3d at 335. 

In order to extend a traffic stop beyond this scope, a police 

officer “must possess a justification for doing so other than 

the initial traffic violation that prompted the stop in the 

first place,” and therefore must have either the driver’s 

consent or reasonable suspicion of illegal activity. Id. 

The officer must have “at least a minimal level of 

objective justification” and “must be able to articulate more 

than an inchoate and unparticularized suspicion or hunch of 

criminal activity.” Illinois v. Wardlow, 528 U.S. 119, 123-24 

(2000) (internal quotation marks omitted). Courts assess 

whether an officer has articulated reasonable suspicion for a 

stop under the totality of the circumstances, giving “due weight 

to common sense judgments reached by officers in light of their 
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experience and training.” United States v. Perkins, 363 F.3d 

317, 321 (4th Cir. 2004). “Judicial review of the evidence 

offered to demonstrate reasonable suspicion must be 

commonsensical, focused on the evidence as a whole, and 

cognizant of both context and the particular experience of 

officers charged with the ongoing tasks of law enforcement.” 

Branch, 537 F.3d at 337. We have thoroughly reviewed the record 

and the relevant legal authorities and conclude that the 

district court did not err in finding that the officer had 

sufficient reasonable suspicion to extend the stop to conduct a 

narcotics investigation.

Accordingly, we affirm the judgments of the district 

court. We dispense with oral argument because the facts and 

legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials 

before this court and argument would not aid in the decisional 

process.

AFFIRMED