United States Court of Appeals

For the Seventh Circuit

Chicago, Illinois 60604

Submitted August 15, 2018∗

Decided August 16, 2018

Before

 MICHAEL S. KANNE, Circuit Judge

 AMY C. BARRETT, Circuit Judge

 MICHAEL B. BRENNAN, Circuit Judge

No. 17-3612

SHANE T. ROBBINS,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

v.

WILLIAM POLLARD, et al.,

Defendants-Appellees.

Appeal from the United States District 

Court for the Eastern District of Wisconsin.

No. 16-C-1128

Lynn Adelman,

Judge.

O R D E R

William Robbins, a Wisconsin inmate, appeals the entry of summary judgment 

against him on two claims arising out of the mistaken delivery of medicine to him. 

The first claim asserts that the prison’s policy of allowing correctional officers to deliver

medicine to inmates violates the Eighth Amendment. The second claim contends that

the correctional officer who gave him the wrong medication acted negligently. 

 

∗ We have agreed to decide this case without oral argument because the briefs 

and record adequately present the facts and legal arguments, and oral argument would 

not significantly aid the court. See FED. R. APP. P. 34(a)(2)(C).

NONPRECEDENTIAL DISPOSITION

To be cited only in accordance with Fed. R. App. P. 32.1
No. 17-3612 Page 2

The district court reasoned that no evidence suggested that the prison’s policymakers

knew or ignored that the policy posed a substantial risk of harm to inmates, and the

negligence claim failed as a matter of state law. We agree and affirm the judgment. 

The Wisconsin Department of Corrections allows correctional officers to deliver 

medicine to inmates at Waupun Correctional Institution. Waupun’s policy requires 

officers to receive repeated training on how to deliver medicine safely. To ensure that 

inmates receive the correct dosage at the right time, officers must compare the label on 

the medication package to the inmate’s treatment record. Prison procedure also dictates

that when an officer shows an inmate his medication, the officer must ask the inmate to 

concur that he is receiving the correct medicine, at the right time, and in the right dose. 

Trevor Standish, a correctional officer, gave Robbins a 10-milligram dose of 

Doxepin in September 2015. This drug treats anxiety, depression, and insomnia. 

Robbins was not prescribed the drug, and Standish should not have given it to him. 

Standish also neglected to ask Robbins to verify that he was prescribed this drug. About 

half an hour after taking it, Robbins says, he experienced a painful headache that lasted 

several hours. The next morning his hands had become red and veiny, and later turned 

dark purple; he also began experiencing ringing in his ears that continues to this day. 

Shortly after Standish gave the Doxepin to Robbins, Standish double-checked the 

records and realized his mistake. He swiftly reported the incident to a nurse who,

within a couple of hours of the drug’s delivery to Robbins, checked his vitals. Robbins 

told the nurse about his headache, and she told him to drink water to flush the drug out 

of his system. After her medical assessment of Robbins, the nurse determined that 

“there should be no issues.” Another nurse followed up with Robbins two days later. 

Robbins told the nurse about the discoloration in his hands and feet. She told him that 

his handcuffs, not the medication, caused that color change. 

Robbins sued over this error, but lost in the district court. He accused William 

Pollard, the warden of Waupun at the time, and Ann Scarpita, a health-services

manager, of violating the Eighth Amendment by allowing officers to deliver medicine

to inmates. Robbins also brought a state-law negligence claim against Standish for 

giving him the wrong medicine. Robbins told the district judge that he had received

incorrect drugs from officers before, though he does not say when, how often, or if any 

harm resulted. He also cited an interrogatory response stating that 15 inmate 

grievances, filed between 2014 and 2016, mentioned a “medication error” but gave no 

further details. The district judge granted summary judgment on the federal claim. 

He observed that Robbins did not state the frequency or harm of any drugs 
No. 17-3612 Page 3

misdelivered to him, and the other inmates’ grievances about medication errors did not 

state whether the “error” was misdelivery. Therefore, a factfinder could not infer that 

the prison’s policy created a substantial risk of serious harm, let alone one that the 

defendants knew about. Finally, Robbins’s negligence claim against Standish failed. His

pre-filing notices of claim mailed to the state’s Attorney General did not identify 

Standish by name, so it did not meet the state-law requirement that the notice include 

“the name of the state officer, employee or agent involved.” WIS. STAT. § 893.82(3).

Robbins’s opening brief on appeal is sparse. But we have reviewed the record 

de novo to assure ourselves that the district court’s decision is sound. See Estate of 

Simpson v. Gorbett, 863 F.3d 740, 745 (7th Cir. 2017). We begin with Robbins’s Eighth 

Amendment claim. He argues that correctional officers do not always follow Waupun’s 

policy requiring that they match the delivered drugs to the recipient’s medical record. 

But to get past summary judgment on his claim against the warden and health-services 

manager, Robbins had to supply evidence suggesting that they knew or recklessly 

ignored that officers often violated this policy to the detriment of prisoners. For only 

then would these two defendants have been deliberately indifferent to a substantial risk 

of harm to Robbins’s health, in violation of the Eighth Amendment. See Farmer v. 

Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 837 (1994); Rosario v. Brawn, 670 F.3d 816, 821 (7th Cir. 2012).

Nothing in the record suggests that the warden and manager knew about or 

ignored signs that correctional officers regularly disregard drug-delivery procedures

and harm prisoners. To the contrary, the single incident detailed in the record reflects 

that, although Standish made one error, he acted appropriately afterward. As soon as 

Standish realized that he had given Robbins the wrong medicine, he notified a nurse, 

who promptly attended to Robbins, and another nurse followed up later. Both nurses 

determined Robbins had no long-term adverse reactions to the drug, and no medical 

opinion contradicts this. Thus, no reasonable jury could conclude that, by allowing 

officers to deliver medicine to inmates, the warden and manager were deliberately 

indifferent to a substantial risk of harm to inmates like Robbins.

Citing Flynn v. Doyle, 630 F. Supp. 2d 987 (E.D. Wis. 2009), Robbins replies that he 

supplied evidence permitting an inference that the warden and manger ignored a 

substantial risk of harm. But the plaintiffs in Flynn presented evidence that correctional 

officers at that prison “routinely” administered “wrong doses to the wrong prisoner at 

the wrong times.” Id. at 990. The 15 grievances that Robbins relies on, from inmates 

citing “medication error,” are not comparable evidence, for three reasons. First, the 

interrogatory response does not describe the errors, so we do not know if, like in Flynn, 
No. 17-3612 Page 4

the errors were the misdelivery of medicine. Second, these grievances are just 

allegations, not findings, of error. Third the misdeliveries in Flynn occurred in a prison 

where officers did not receive training in proper medication delivery; Waupun officers, 

by contrast, do receive repeated training. See id. at 991. Robbins also says that he has 

more than once received the wrong drugs, but this assertion does not help his case 

resemble Flynn either. Robbins does not state how often this happened, whether any 

injury resulted, or who, if anyone, he told. So a trier of fact could not, as in Flynn, find 

that harmful mistakes are “routine” and that prison administrators are liable for them. 

Robbins’s Eighth Amendment claim fails for another reason, too. The claim 

requires that he show that he experienced serious adverse effects because he took

Doxepin. See Berman v. Young, 291 F.3d 976, 982 (7th Cir. 2002) (stating that plaintiff 

must produce evidence that injury had “causal connection” with alleged constitutional 

violation). He points to the painful headaches, skin discoloration, and ringing in his ears

that occurred after he took the drug. But he has not supplied medical evidence that the 

one mistaken dose of Doxepin caused these effects. He submitted printouts from 

medical websites that list Doxepin’s side effects, but the list does not include the effects

that he experienced. And a Waupun physician stated that the small dose of Doxepin 

that Robbins received might have caused temporary drowsiness, dry mouth, blurred 

vision, or urinary retention, but not the side effects that Robbins asserts.

Robbins’s final argument is about his negligence claim. He says that his notices 

of claim did not contain Trevor Standish’s name because the prison would not give it to 

him. And, he continues, when he finally did discover Standish’s name, he amended his 

federal complaint to include it. From this, Robbins contends that Standish received 

actual notice of his claim and therefore suffered no prejudice. But amending his federal 

claim only satisfied the federal procedural requirement; it did not satisfy the separate

state-law requirement that Robbins amend his notice of claim with Standish’s name.

Failure to satisfy this requirement defeats the negligence claim. See WIS. STAT.

§ 893.82(5); Kellner v. Christian, 525 N.W.2d 286, 290 (Wis. Ct. App. 1994) (holding that 

the requirements of § 893.82(5) must be strictly complied with even when it produces 

“harsh consequences”); see also Carlson v. Pepin County, 481 N.W.2d 498, 503 (Wis. Ct.

App. 1992). Moreover, even if we overlooked this defect, Robbins would lose on the 

merits. As with his Eighth Amendment claim, Robbins must show causation—that the 

medication Standish gave him caused the physical harms he experienced. See Coffey v. 

City of Milwaukee, 74 Wis.2d 526, 531 (1976). And as we have explained, he has offered

no such evidence.
No. 17-3612 Page 5

Accordingly, the judgment is AFFIRMED.