Filed 2/14/24 P. v. Ware CA2/8

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions 

not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion 

has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION EIGHT

THE PEOPLE,

Plaintiff and Respondent,

v.

COBY MORGAN WARE,

Defendant and Appellant.

 B329514

 Los Angeles County

 Super. Ct. No. LA097808

APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of 

Los Angeles County, Neetu S. Badhan-Smith, Judge. Affirmed.

Jolene Larimore, under appointment by the Court of 

Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.

Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief 

Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Senior 

Assistant Attorney General, Jason Tran, Supervising Deputy 

Attorney General, and Taylor Nguyen, Deputy Attorney General, 

for Plaintiff and Respondent.

____________________
2

Coby Morgan Ware used someone else’s identity to run a 

tab at a hotel. He appeals a restitution order to repay the hotel. 

We affirm.

Undesignated statutory citations are to the Penal Code.

Beginning on September 4, 2022, Ware rented hotel rooms 

using Ronald Holloway’s identity. To check in, Ware used an 

identification card and credit card with Holloway’s name. Ware 

sometimes rented multiple rooms at a time. In total, he owed the 

hotel nearly $12,000, which he attempted to pay using Holloway’s 

and another person’s credit cards.

On September 27, 2022, the hotel called the police because 

a credit card company had reversed charges for Ware’s rooms due 

to fraud. Police arrested Ware. They found an identification and 

credit card in Holloway’s name, as well as licenses and credit 

cards in other people’s names.

The prosecution charged Ware with unauthorized use of 

personal identifying information of Holloway on September 4, 

2022 (§ 530.5, subd. (a)) (count one), and three counts of 

possession of personal identifying information with intent to 

defraud after an earlier conviction for unauthorized use of 

personal identifying information on September 27, 2022 (id., 

subd. (c)(2)) (counts two, three, and four).

Ware pleaded no contest to the first count. He said a police 

report was the factual basis for the plea. The court dismissed the 

remaining counts and sentenced Ware to two days in jail and two 

years of formal probation. One condition of Ware’s probation was 

to make victim restitution.

The only victim to seek restitution was the hotel, which 

requested $11,836.90 for more than 40 nights of unpaid room 

rentals as well as food and drink charges. The hotel manager 
3

testified and submitted hotel records of the charges. No one had 

paid the hotel for the charges Ware accrued.

The court granted the hotel’s request.

We affirm the restitution order.

We generally review a victim restitution order for abuse of 

discretion. (People v. Giordano (2007) 42 Cal.4th 644, 663.) 

Whether a purported victim is a “direct victim” is a legal issue 

that we independently review. (People v. Saint-Amans (2005) 131 

Cal.App.4th 1076, 1084.)

Under the California Constitution, courts must order 

restitution when a crime victim suffers a loss. (Cal. Const., art. I, 

§ 28, subd. (b)(13)(B).) Courts broadly and liberally construe 

victims’ right to restitution. (People v. Mearns (2002) 97 

Cal.App.4th 493, 500.)

There are two potentially relevant statutes: section 1202.4 

and section 1203.1. The first statute says courts must require a 

defendant to make restitution when a victim suffers economic 

loss as a result of the defendant’s conduct. (§ 1202.4, subd. (f).) A 

business can be a victim under this section if it is a “direct 

victim” of a crime. (Id., subd. (k)(2).) To be a direct victim, an 

entity must be an immediate object of the defendant’s offense. 

(People v. Runyan (2012) 54 Cal.4th 849, 856.) The second 

statute allows trial courts to impose restitution as a condition of 

probation. (§ 1203.1, subd. (b).) This statute is broader and does 

not incorporate section 1202.4’s definition of “victim.” (People v. 

Anderson (2010) 50 Cal.4th 19, 28–31.)

Although restitution was a condition of Ware’s probation, 

we analyze the restitution order under the first statute. The trial 

court did not discuss section 1203.1 at the restitution hearing and 
4

the prosecution failed to cite or rely on it in the trial court or on 

appeal.

The court properly ordered restitution for the hotel. The 

object of Ware’s crime was not simply to take Holloway’s identity, 

but to use it for unpaid services from the hotel. Ware does not 

dispute that he used Holloway’s identity to charge $11,836.90 to 

the hotel. No one paid the hotel for these charges. Ware 

complains the harm to the hotel was too removed from his 

criminal acts, and cites section 1202.4, subdivision (f)(4) and 

People v. Jones (2010) 187 Cal.App.4th 418. That statutory 

subdivision is about a presumption related to the Restitution 

Fund, which is not part of this case. Jones discussed in dicta the 

issue of proximate causation and intervening causes in the 

context of restitution. (Jones, supra, at pp. 424–427.) Jones is 

immaterial because the hotel’s losses were a direct and 

foreseeable result of Ware’s criminal conduct of using someone 

else’s identity to rent hotel rooms and there was no intervening 

cause. The hotel was a direct victim and is entitled to restitution.

The court did not abuse its discretion by ordering 

restitution for all of Ware’s days at the hotel. On this issue, Ware 

offers a one-sentence statement: “The date alleged for the 

commission of the offense charged in Count One does not include 

the multiple dates of the [hotel] stays.” Ware concludes his brief 

by asking us to remand so the trial court can order restitution for 

“just one night stay at the hotel.” This request discredits Ware’s 

assertion that the hotel was not a direct victim and therefore has 

no entitlement to restitution. On the date issue, Ware’s single 

sentence is not an argument or reasoned legal analysis. He has 

not proven the court abused its discretion by ordering him to pay 

the hotel for the services he took.
5

Ware makes an unsupported argument about how the 

order might negatively affect him. He says restitution was wrong 

because the amount is so high that it will prevent him from 

pursuing rehabilitative programs. He does not offer legal 

authority for reversing a restitution order on this basis. This 

argument appears to be about Ware’s ability to pay. By statute, 

courts cannot consider a defendant’s inability to pay when 

determining the amount of a restitution order. (§ 1202.4, subd. 

(g).) This argument fails.

DISPOSITION

The order is affirmed.

WILEY, J.

We concur: 

GRIMES, Acting P. J.

VIRAMONTES, J.