United States Court of Appeals

For the Seventh Circuit

Chicago, Illinois 60604

Argued February 28, 2006

Decided March 31, 2006

Before

 Hon. JOHN L. COFFEY, Circuit Judge

 Hon. DIANE P. WOOD, Circuit Judge

 Hon. TERENCE T. EVANS, Circuit Judge

Nos. 05-1988 & 05-1989

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

 Plaintiff-Appellee,

v.

SHANE T. WATKINS,

Defendant-Appellant.

Appeals from the United States District

Court for the Central District of Illinois

Nos. 04 CR 10037 & 04 CR 10001

Joe Billy McDade, 

Judge.

ORDER

Shane Watkins was on supervised release for a federal drug offense when

police officers in Peoria, Illinois, executed a search warrant at his apartment and

found a total of 54.7 grams of crack in two separate bags in the master bedroom

where he was hiding. Federal authorities charged him with possession of 50 or

more grams of crack with intent to distribute. See 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1), (b)(1)(A). 

Watkins moved to suppress incriminating statements made to police during the

search; he argued that an officer elicited the statements after he invoked his Fifth

Amendment rights to remain silent and to have counsel present during questioning. 

The district court granted the motion as to some statements, but denied it as to

others. A jury found Watkins guilty, and given the amount of crack and his prior

drug convictions, the district court sentenced him to a statutorily mandated life

term. The court also revoked Watkins’s supervised release and added one

UNPUBLISHED ORDER

Not to be cited per Circuit Rule 53
Nos. 05-1988 & 05-1989 Page 2

additional day of imprisonment. Watkins appeals both judgments. Because he

makes no argument about the revocation of supervised release, that appeal is

dismissed. As to the new conviction, he challenges the ruling on his motion to

suppress. 

At the suppression hearing, Officer Tim Moore testified that, as part of an

ongoing drug investigation, police obtained and executed a search warrant for

Watkins’s apartment in Peoria. Upon entry, police detained Leemon Daniels as he

ran toward the living room and found Watkins lying on the floor of the master

bedroom between the bed and the wall; on the nightstand next to him was

approximately 28 grams of crack. Officers subsequently found another 28 grams of

crack in the pocket of a jacket hanging in the bedroom closet. Police detained

Watkins in a bathroom where Moore read him a copy of the search warrant as well

as the warnings required under Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966). Moore

testified that Watkins said he did not wish to talk, but asked the officer why the

police were there and why they had a search warrant. Officer Moore explained that

cocaine was being sold from the apartment but advised Watkins that, if he wished

to continue the conversation, Moore would ask a witness to be present. Watkins

responded, “I’m out of the game. I’m through,” which Moore understood to mean

that Watkins did not wish to talk further. Believing Watkins was invoking his

right to remain silent, Moore ceased all interrogation and left after obtaining

Watkins’s permission to search his car.

When Officer Moore returned, he told Watkins he needed to question his

girlfriend and asked if she was at work. Watkins confirmed that she was but asked

why they wanted to question her. Moore explained that officers found cocaine in a

woman’s jacket and needed to question her since he would not give a statement. 

Watkins remarked that she “would take the weight” for him. 

Officer Loren Marion, who was assigned to prepare Watkins for transport to

the jail, also testified at the hearing. Because Watkins was wearing only boxer

shorts, Marion gave him a pair of sweatpants from the bedroom and helped him put

them on. The officer explained that he recognized Watkins from a previous arrest

involving a high-speed car chase and told him: “Man, you really got big. You bulked

up and lost a lot of weight.” Marion told him the car chase was one of his “most

memorable experiences as a police officer,” and asked if he remembered him. 

According to Marion, Watkins laughed and said, “yeah.”

After this exchange, Officer Marion testified, he turned to leave the

bathroom, and Watkins said: “See you in the next lifetime. I’m going away for a

long time.” Marion replied, “All right,” and Watkins continued: “Hey, talk to your

boy for me. Tell him that my girl didn’t have anything to do with this. Let her have
Nos. 05-1988 & 05-1989 Page 3

peace. My guy in the front didn’t have anything to do with this either. It was all

me.” Marion told Watkins he would relay his message to Officer Moore. 

At the conclusion of the hearing, the district court suppressed some but not

all of Watkins’s statements: “The statements made to Officer Moore other than in

reference to searching the car would be suppressed. The statements made to

Officer Marion will not be suppressed.” Although the judge (District Judge Joe

Billy McDade) did not elaborate on his reasoning at the hearing, he explained

during a sidebar discussion during the trial that he did not suppress Watkins’s

statements to Officer Marion because nothing that Marion said was likely to elicit

an incriminating response: “I did not find the conversation that Officer Marion had

with the defendant as inviting [him] to make something inculpating himself.” 

When defense counsel argued that Marion should have videotaped the statement

from Watkins, the judge responded: “[T]hat wasn’t his job . . . . I thought my ruling

was that that was . . . a voluntary statement by the defendant. . . . He wasn’t being

interrogated by Officer Marion.” Defense counsel pressed the issue, leading Judge

McDade to reiterate: “I thought the testimony today was that Marion went back

inside to give the defendant some sweatpants. He commented about the

defendant’s excessive weight loss. The defendant then makes some statements to

him which he did not invite. That’s my ruling.” 

Watkins argues that his statements to Officer Marion should have been

suppressed because they were made in response to interrogation after he invoked

his right to counsel. He also asserts that Judge McDade “failed to make any

findings of fact or to address the credibility of the witnesses” during the suppression

hearing and that this perceived omission provides sufficient grounds to reverse his

conviction and remand the case for a new trial without the government getting the

benefit of his statements to Marion. We disagree. 

In reviewing a suppression ruling, we review legal questions de novo and

underlying factual determinations for clear error. United States v. Cellitti, 387 F.3d

618, 621 (7th Cir. 2004). Where there is evidence to support a factual

determination, it will be deemed clearly erroneous only when “the reviewing court

on the entire evidence is left with the definite and firm conviction that a mistake

has been made.” United States v. Gravens, 129 F.3d 974, 978 (7th Cir. 1997); accord

United States v. Trevino, 60 F.3d 333, 336 (7th Cir. 1995). For purposes of this

court’s review, the “entire evidence” consists of evidence introduced both at the

suppression hearing and at the trial itself. Trevino, 60 F.3d at 336; United States v.

Tilmon, 19 F.3d 1221, 1224 (7th Cir. 1994).

In deciding whether to grant or deny a motion to suppress, a district court

need not make specific factual findings, but must adequately explain its decision so

that we may review the record in “a reasoned and meaningful manner.” United
Nos. 05-1988 & 05-1989 Page 4

States v. Fields, 371 F.3d 910, 916 (7th Cir. 2004); accord United States v. Boden,

854 F.2d 983, 991 (7th Cir. 1988); United States v. Talkington, 843 F.2d 1041, 1048

(7th Cir. 1988). Where a district court fails to do so, the remedy is not a reversal of

a conviction, as Watkins suggests, but rather a limited remand directing the district

court to more fully explain the reasoning behind its decision. See, e.g., United

States v. Johnson, 427 F.3d 1053, 1055 (7th Cir. 2005); Fields, 371 F.3d at 912;

United States v. Brown, 79 F.3d 1499, 1510-11 (7th Cir. 1996); Talkington, 843 F.2d

at 1049-50.

Here, the judge fully explained during the trial sidebar why he did not

suppress Watkins’s statements to Officer Marion—the officer was not interrogating

Watkins when he voluntarily assumed full responsibility for the drugs in the

apartment. Further, Marion’s statements to Watkins were not likely to elicit

incriminating responses. 

Given that we may consider the trial evidence in reviewing a ruling on a

motion to suppress, logic dictates that we also may consider the entire record to

understand the district court’s reasons for its suppression ruling. In civil appeals

where reasons are required by Circuit Rule 50, we look to the entire record for those

reasons if they are not readily apparent from a challenged ruling, see Ross Bros.

Constr. Co. v. Int’l Steel Services, Inc., 283 F.3d 867, 872 (7th Cir. 2002) (explaining

that remand for clarification is not warranted where district court’s reasons for its

decision “are apparent from the record”); United States v. Ettrick Wood Products,

Inc., 916 F.2d 1211, 1218 (7th Cir. 1990) (same), and there is no reason to do less in

the criminal context. A review of the entire record here provides more than enough

explanation for why Watkins’s suppression motion was denied. And this allows us

to engage in meaningful review. See Fields, 371 F.3d at 916.

As to the merits, Watkins argues that his statements to Officer Marion

should have been suppressed because Marion “interrogated” him after he invoked

his right to remain silent. The government concedes that Watkins invoked his Fifth

Amendment right to counsel, and thus the Peoria police officers were required to

cease all interrogation until counsel was present unless Watkins himself reinitiated

the conversation. Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477, 484 (1981); United States v.

Johnson, 415 F.3d 728, 731 (7th Cir. 2005); United States v. Lee, 413 F.3d 622, 625

(7th Cir. 2005); United States v. Briggs, 273 F.3d 737, 741 (7th Cir. 2001). The

parties accordingly frame the debate in terms of whether Marion “interrogated”

Watkins. 

Interrogation includes “express questioning” as well as “any words or actions

. . . that the police should know are likely to elicit an incriminating response from

the suspect.” Rhode Island v. Innis, 446 U.S. 291, 301 (1980). We have interpreted

the question under Innis to be whether an objective observer would have believed
Nos. 05-1988 & 05-1989 Page 5

that the officer’s statement to the defendant was reasonably likely to elicit an

incriminating response. United States v. Abdulla, 294 F.3d 830, 834 (7th Cir. 2002);

United States v. Westbrook, 125 F.3d 996, 1002 (7th Cir. 1997); United States v.

Cooper, 19 F.3d 1154, 1162 (7th Cir. 1994). On the other hand, voluntary

statements made after an accused invokes his Fifth Amendment rights are not

subject to suppression if they were not made in response to police questioning. See

Edwards, 451 U.S. at 485 (explaining that neither the Fifth nor Fourteenth

Amendments prohibit police from “merely listening” to an accused’s voluntary

statements and using them against him at trial); Miranda, 384 U.S. at 478

(“Volunteered statements of any kind are not barred by the Fifth Amendment.”). 

No matter what a police officer’s intention might be, he does not interrogate a

suspect “simply by hoping that he will incriminate himself.” Arizona v. Mauro, 481

U.S. 520, 529 (1987); accord Briggs, 273 F.3d at 741.

Here, Judge McDade held that Watkins’s statement was not made in

response to interrogation from Marion. Watkins argues that the judge should have

concluded that Marion’s statements were “interrogation” because he was merely

playing the role of the “good cop” in an attempt to undermine Watkins’s resolve not

to incriminate himself. But Watkins fails to support this argument with any

discussion of analogous cases—perhaps because the law favors the government’s

position that Marion’s comments about Watkins’s physique and the car chase are

not the type of comments that an objective observer would expect to prompt

Watkins to make incriminating statements. See, e.g., Easley v. Frey, 433 F.3d 969,

971, 974 (7th Cir. 2006) (upholding finding that officer was not interrogating

suspect where he informed him of the charges that he faced and explained that, if

convicted, he could be sentenced to death); Abdulla, 294 F.3d at 832, 834-35

(upholding denial of motion to suppress where defendant spontaneously confessed

to robbing a bank while customs agents searched his bags); Briggs, 273 F.3d at 741

(explaining that suppression of statements not warranted where officer, concerned

that the accused was suicidal, asked him what he meant when he said he was

“going to die” and accused responded with an incriminating statement). 

Furthermore, even if Officer Marion thought his statements might lead to a

confession, that belief would not be enough to conclude that he was interrogating

Watkins unless he should have known the statements were likely to elicit an

incriminating response. See Mauro, 481 U.S. at 529; Easley, 433 F.3d at 974;

Briggs, 273 F.3d at 741; Endress v. Dugger, 880 F.2d 1244, 1248-49 (11th Cir. 1989). 

Marion’s comments did not relate to the search of Watkins’s apartment or the

contraband found there, and they would not seem to an observer likely to elicit a

confession. 

Accordingly, the appeal in case number 05-1988 is DISMISSED and the

judgment in case number 05-1989 is AFFIRMED.