SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY

APPELLATE DIVISION

DOCKET NO. A-0558-15T1

NEWTON G. MOODIE,

Plaintiff-Respondent,

v.

CAROLYN RICHARDS MOODIE,

Defendant-Appellant.

________________________________________________________________

Submitted February 28, 2017 – Decided

Before Judges Espinosa and Guadagno.

On appeal from the Superior Court of New 

Jersey, Chancery Division, Family Part, Essex 

County, Docket No. FM-07-1032-09.

Kiernan & Campbell, attorneys for appellant 

(Jean R. Campbell, on the brief).

Newton G. Moodie, respondent pro se.

PER CURIAM

Defendant appeals from orders that terminated plaintiff's

obligation to pay her alimony and maintain life insurance for her 

benefit and denied her motion for reconsideration. We affirm.

NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE

APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION

This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court." 

Although it is posted on the internet, this opinion is binding only on the 

parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R.1:36-3.

August 1, 2017
2 A-0558-15T1

I.

On June 21, 2010, plaintiff and defendant were divorced and 

entered into a matrimonial settlement agreement (MSA) that was 

incorporated into their final judgment of divorce.

According to the MSA, plaintiff was earning $55,000 from his 

employment as a teacher and defendant was earning $12,000 as a 

substitute teacher. The parties agreed that, beginning on June 

23, 2010, plaintiff would pay $965 per month in alimony to 

defendant for the first twenty-four months, and $1,000 every month 

after that until defendant died or remarried. Both parties were 

required to exchange their end-of-year pay stubs, tax returns, and 

all other proofs of income annually.

The MSA also required defendant to provide plaintiff proof

"of her efforts to find new employment and her job search" and

no later then [sic] every six months, 

commencing November 1, 2010, proof of her good 

faith effort to utilize her recently earned 

M.B.A. Degree to obtain higher paying 

employment. Said proof shall consist of a 

listing of jobs applied for and persons 

contacted. [Plaintiff] may move before the 

Court to seek relief in the form of reduction 

or termination of alimony, in the event 

[defendant] fails to comply and/or make a good 

faith effort to obtain higher paying 

employment.

The MSA is silent on what "higher paying employment" means 

or what would happen if she obtained such employment.
3 A-0558-15T1

In 2011, plaintiff made application to decrease his alimony 

obligations. The trial judge denied his request but required 

defendant to provide plaintiff "with a list of job applications 

as required under the parties' [M]SA" and "proof in writing of 

interviews that she has every two weeks until she is employed full 

time."

In August 2013, plaintiff filed an application to terminate

alimony, claiming defendant violated the MSA by "fail[ing] to seek 

meaningful employment" and her "job search [was] inadequate and 

restrictive with a focus on managerial and sales/marketing 

positions, ignoring other potential areas." Plaintiff also 

claimed his alimony obligation was "burdensome and cause[d] 

significant financial, emotional and physical challenges." 

Defendant opposed plaintiff's motion and cross-moved, asserting 

she was compliant with the MSA.

By order dated October 4, 2013, the trial judge directed

defendant to provide plaintiff and the court "a list of job 

searches, interviews and who [she] has spoken to about seeking 

employment" within two weeks of the order. Both parties were 

ordered to provide each other and the court their tax returns for 

each year since the divorce.

On November 1, 2013, the trial judge held a conference with 

the parties, with defendant appearing by telephone. The judge 
4 A-0558-15T1

observed that defendant's response to his prior order reflected 

that "every two weeks or so, there is some kind of job contact" 

and stated, "that's not the kind of diligence that the Court 

expects to see." The judge advised he would "need to impute income 

to [defendant] based on what [he] think[s] [her] earning power 

is." Plaintiff asked the court to give defendant a year in which 

to make the effort required by the court. The judge welcomed the 

suggestion and emphasized to defendant, 

[I]t's very important that you understand the 

following. You need to, at least in my eyes 

and I think in [plaintiff's] eyes as well, 

step up your efforts to find a job. . . . 

Second of all . . . you need to look in places 

like the school districts since you've been 

working as a substitute teacher.

The trial judge said he would enter an order that required 

defendant to make an average of five job searches a week, amounting 

to 260 job searches over the course of the year, representing 

"real diligence." The judge also advised defendant that to show 

she is "looking in good faith," she had to expand her search to 

include jobs that "may be somewhat below [her] qualifications."

The order stated, 

Defendant shall perform at least 5 job 

searches per week. Once per month, Defendant 

shall provide Plaintiff with a list of the 

name of the employer with whom she has spoken, 

the job for which she applied, the date of the 

application and the contacts with whom she has 

corresponded while seeking employment. . . . 
5 A-0558-15T1

Defendant shall expand her job search to 

employment which is below her qualifications 

as well as jobs for which she is qualified.

In October 2014, plaintiff filed an application to terminate 

his alimony and life insurance obligations to defendant, claiming 

defendant failed to find a higher-paying job within the one-year 

period prescribed by the November 2013 order and that her failure 

"to meaningfully seek adequate employment" violated the MSA.

On December 2, 2014, the trial judge conducted a conference 

with the parties. Defendant still had not secured full-time 

employment. The trial judge advised defendant that the job search 

lists she submitted were missing information required by the 

November 2013 order. He scheduled a plenary hearing "to address 

whether to impute income to the Defendant, whether the Defendant 

looked for a job in good faith and the possible modification of 

alimony and life insurance." The order directed defendant to

"continue to diligently look for a job and provide the Plaintiff 

with proof of 5 job searches per week" and "provide documentation 

to the [Plaintiff] and the Court regarding how [she] is paying 

living expenses." Both parties were ordered to provide each other 

and the court their last tax return and last three paystubs.

The plenary hearing was conducted by a different judge in 

June 2015.

Plaintiff testified he received defendant's job search list 
6 A-0558-15T1

every month, but because the list did not contain the positions

she applied for, he was unable to verify her application efforts.

Plaintiff and defendant co-owned a pharmacy in Jamaica, where 

defendant had previously worked as a licensed pharmacist. 

Plaintiff testified that pharmacists in Jamaica earn approximately 

$50,000 to $60,000 and suggested plaintiff could split her time 

between living in Florida and working part-time as a pharmacist 

in Jamaica.

Defendant testified her license as a pharmacist in Jamaica

expired after she left in 2002. She stated she does not have a 

pharmacy license in the United States and had applied for

pharmaceutical sales jobs without success.

Defendant received an M.B.A. from Nova Southeastern 

University (Nova) in 2006, but remained unemployed until she began 

substitute teaching in January 2009, shortly after she obtained a 

green card and a Florida substitute teaching license. As a 

substitute teacher, she recalled making approximately $11,000 in 

2009, $13,188 in 2013, and $17,447 in 2014, and estimated that she 

made "between $11,000 and $14,000" from 2009 through 2013. 

However, she only submitted evidence of her income for 2013, 2014, 

and 2015. Based on her pay stubs from March and April 2015, she 

was making $11.27 per hour.

Defendant testified she searched for substitute teaching jobs 
7 A-0558-15T1

for approximately three hours every day, and was usually placed 

in short-term positions because long-term positions were hard to 

get. She did obtain a long-term substitute teaching job once, 

which she testified "pays the teacher's salary" of "[t]wenty 

something dollars" but without benefits. Defendant also testified 

she never applied for substitute teaching jobs outside of her 

county because the commuting costs were high and the job market

was weak.

Defendant testified she obtained two "statement[s] of 

eligibility" from Florida in 2011 that permitted her to teach math 

to grades five through twelve before they expired in 2014. While 

eligible, she applied for "numerous" full-time teaching positions, 

received two callbacks, but was not hired because the employers 

told her they preferred certified teachers, which required 

additional schooling. She explained that she could not afford to 

renew her statements of eligibility and was discouraged because 

she "saw certified teachers having a hard time getting jobs."

Outside of applying for teaching jobs, defendant testified 

she went to three job fairs and applied for jobs at Nova and jobs

advertised by Nova, but had no success. In addition, she used the 

website Career Builder to apply to jobs, as well as Monster.com, 

employers' websites, and newspapers ads. She also met with 

employment agencies, but never received a response from them. When 
8 A-0558-15T1

she attempted to apply in-person, employers either did not have 

any openings or directed her to apply online. She testified she 

searched for non-teaching jobs "anytime" and on the weekends, but 

did not say how much time she expended.

Defendant testified that, between March 2010 and November 

2013, she had a few telephone interviews for mostly "sales, 

commission-type work." She recalled applying for a job that sent 

her to Lowe's on her second interview where she had to sell DirecTV 

subscriptions. She was able to attract one customer and was 

offered the job with a commission-only salary, but did not take 

it. She testified she had a few other interviews for similar 

sales jobs and "insurance type jobs," as well as an interview to 

be a resident supervisor for a homeless shelter for addicts. 

However, aside from sales jobs and commission-based jobs, she

received no offers.

Following the November 2013 order, she testified she expanded

her search to include "jobs that just needed . . . a high school 

diploma or GED," such as cashier and receptionist positions. 

However, between November 2013 and April 2015, defendant only 

received offers for commission-based jobs. She explained she did 

not accept these offers because she would have to commit full-time 

and give up her substitute teaching jobs, a move she considered 

"risky" because she did not believe she was very good at the sales 
9 A-0558-15T1

jobs and would earn less money. Furthermore, defendant testified 

that medical issues caused by a serious car accident in 19921

prevented her from working in jobs that required lifting or 

standing for long periods of time, such as nursing aide, childcare, 

and pharmacy technician jobs. 

When asked about expanding her job search geographically, 

defendant testified she searched for jobs "all over Florida" in 

the last year. She said she also applied for jobs outside Florida, 

but could not give specifics other than she "applied in North 

Carolina, not recently." She did state she would relocate from 

Florida if she could secure a job before moving.

Defendant testified that, between March 2011 and November 

2013, she provided evidence of her job search efforts to plaintiff 

in the form of one list that stated the job title and company and, 

after the November 2013 order, she provided an additional list 

that identified who she spoke with. 

The trial judge granted plaintiff's motion to terminate his 

obligation to pay alimony and maintain life insurance, effective 

June 30, 2016, and set forth her reasons in a fourteen-page written 

decision.

 

1 Other than her own testimony, defendant did not provide any 

evidence regarding her health issues and their impact on her 

ability to work.
10 A-0558-15T1

The trial judge found both parties were "highly educated" 

and, represented by counsel, had agreed to the terms of the MSA, 

which memorialized their "understanding that Defendant would 

actively seek a higher-paying job to eventually put the parties' 

financials on equal footing." She concluded the MSA was a valid 

and enforceable contract between the parties in which "Plaintiff 

was to provide alimony to Defendant, while Defendant was to 

actively seek a better job." The judge found 

Defendant did not uphold her end of the 

parties' bargained-for-exchange. As shown by 

the evidence and testimony presented during 

the Plenary Hearing, over the course of five 

(5) years since the parties voluntarily 

entered into their Agreement, Plaintiff's 

$12,000.00 salary has only increased by 

approximately $5,000.00.

In her statement of reasons, the trial judge found defendant's 

testimony regarding her employment search "disingenuous" and 

"lack[ed] credibility," recounting that defendant "could not 

remember" from which employers she received callbacks, she was 

"vague and . . . stumbled over her own answers" when asked about 

her efforts to look for employment outside of her county of 

residence, and she was "unclear regarding the details of her 

increased job search."

The trial judge reviewed defendant's job search efforts in 

the years before the November 2013 order as well as her efforts 
11 A-0558-15T1

following that order. She stated the "only list" defendant 

"provided with specific details of job applications" were all 

dated June 6, 2015,2 just five days before the plenary hearing. 

Aside from that list, the trial judge found the job search lists 

defendant submitted were noncompliant with the MSA and court 

orders, as they were "incomplete," "vague and unspecific," and 

"precluded Plaintiff from verifying any of her job applications." 

Defendant did not provide any other evidence of her application 

submissions from the employers she applied to. The trial judge

also found it "suspect" that defendant did not provide her tax 

returns from 2010 through 2013.3

The trial judge concluded defendant "did not make a good 

faith effort to obtain higher paying employment in violation of 

the [MSA]," that she "was not looking for a job with any sincere 

or honest effort," and her job search efforts were merely "a veiled 

attempt to make this Court and Plaintiff believe she was looking 

for a job to keep receiving alimony." The judge found defendant's 

need for alimony "was a self-imposed need created by her passive 

 

2 As defendant noted in her motion for reconsideration, the list 

actually spanned a time frame of February to June 2015.

3 Defendant challenges this finding by the judge, stating she 

provided other evidence of her income. That argument does not 

refute the trial judge's observation that income tax returns were 

not provided.
12 A-0558-15T1

job search of the past five (5) years" and she "purposefully underinformed Plaintiff."

The trial judge then considered whether plaintiff's alimony 

obligations should be modified or terminated. She found defendant 

to be "voluntarily underemployed" and imputed an income to her of 

$55,286.40, which defendant testified was "the salary of a fulltime teacher in her area." Noting that the imputed income 

reflected an ability to earn a salary similar to plaintiff's, the 

trial judge terminated plaintiff's obligations to pay alimony and 

maintain life insurance for defendant's benefit, effective June 

30, 2016.

On July 17, 2015, defendant moved for reconsideration of the 

June 29th order. She argued the trial judge incorrectly 

characterized her 2015 job search list by failing to acknowledge 

that the list spanned February to June 2015. She also contended 

the judge erred in imputing a full-time teacher's income because 

she was only a substitute teacher and not certified to teach fulltime.

Following oral argument, the trial judge denied defendant's 

motion for reconsideration and set forth her reasons in a written 

opinion. The trial judge readily acknowledged and corrected the 

error she made regarding the dates contained in defendant's 2015 

job search list. However, because the list spanned only five 
13 A-0558-15T1

months and was the "the only job search list" produced by defendant 

that complied with the information requirements of the MSA and 

court orders, the job search was insufficient to constitute a good 

faith effort by defendant in her overall employment search efforts. 

The trial judge also noted that, because the plenary hearing was 

originally scheduled for January 2015 to assess defendant's 

efforts in the year following the November 2013 order, defendant's 

post-January 2015 search efforts should not be considered. The 

trial judge also explained that the length of time of defendant's 

search was only one factor she considered; she also based her 

decision on other factors, such as her findings that defendant's 

testimony was not credible and her job search lists "created 

confusion specifically to avoid accountability." Further, the 

trial judge reaffirmed her finding that defendant was 

underemployed and that the income of a full-time teacher was 

properly imputed to her, noting defendant's testimony that she had 

worked an interim job at a full-time teacher's salary proved that 

she had the potential and capacity to earn a full-time teacher's

income.

In her appeal, defendant argues the trial judge: abused her 

discretion in finding defendant acted in bad faith regarding her 

efforts to obtain higher-paying employment and ignored the 

directions included in prior court orders (Point II); admitted her 
14 A-0558-15T1

error in characterizing defendant's employment search (Point III); 

erred in imputing the salary of a full-time certified teacher to 

defendant (Point IV); erred in allowing respondent to make the 

unsubstantiated allegation he could not verify defendant's job 

search (Point V); made several errors regarding details of 

defendant's job search (Point VI), erred in allowing plaintiff to 

make the unsubstantiated allegation that defendant could earn 

$50,000 to $60,000 as a pharmacist in Jamaica (Point VII); erred 

in considering defendant's lack of job offers as evidence of her 

failure to comply with the prior order (Point VIII); erred in 

finding defendant lacked credibility (Point IX); and erred in 

finding defendant failed to provide tax returns for the period 

from 2010 to 2013 (Point X). 

We are not persuaded by any of defendant's arguments. The 

argument raised in Point III lacks sufficient merit to warrant 

discussion and the arguments presented in Points V, VI, VII, VIII, 

IX and X require only limited discussion. R. 2:11-3(e)(1)(E). 

II.

Appellate review of a trial court's decision to modify an 

alimony obligation "must give due recognition to the wide 

discretion which our law rightly affords to the trial judges who 

deal with these matters." Reese v. Weis, 430 N.J. Super. 552, 

571-72 (App. Div. 2013) (quoting Donnelly v. Donnelly, 405 N.J. 
15 A-0558-15T1

Super. 117, 127 (App. Div. 2009)). Discretion is particularly 

important in the adjudication of matrimonial matters "because the 

trial judge has 'a feel of the case' and is in the best position 

to 'make first-hand credibility judgments about the witnesses who 

appear on the stand.'" Elrom v. Elrom, 439 N.J. Super. 424, 433 

(App. Div. 2015) (quoting N.J. Div. of Youth & Family Servs. v. 

E.P., 196 N.J. 88, 104 (2008)).

Our "review of a trial court's findings of fact is limited."

Reese, supra, 430 N.J. Super. at 567 (quoting Cesare v. Cesare,

154 N.J. 394, 413 (1998)). "The general rule is that findings by 

the trial court are binding on appeal when supported by adequate, 

substantial, credible evidence." Ibid. (quoting Cesare, supra,

154 N.J. at 411-12). Reversal is appropriate only when the factual 

findings prove to be "so manifestly unsupported by or inconsistent 

with the competent, relevant and reasonably credible evidence as 

to offend the interests of justice." Elrom, supra, 439 N.J. Super.

at 433 (quoting Rova Farms Resort, Inc. v. Inv'rs Ins. Co. of Am., 

65 N.J. 474, 484 (1974)).

We are also "obliged to accord deference to the trial judge's 

credibility determinations." Reese, supra, 430 N.J. Super. at 567 

(citing Cesare, supra, 154 N.J. at 412). When credibility is 

important, "the trial court's conclusions must be given great 

weight and must be accepted by the appellate court unless clearly 
16 A-0558-15T1

lacking in reasonable support." Id. at 568 (quoting N.J. Div. of 

Youth & Family Servs. v. F.M., 375 N.J. Super. 235, 259 (App. Div. 

2005)).

We also "grant substantial deference to the trial judge's 

discretion on evidentiary rulings," Bd. of Educ. v. Zoning Bd. of 

Adjustment, 409 N.J. Super. 389, 430 (App. Div. 2009), and will 

not disturb a ruling "unless there is a clear abuse of discretion,"

Dinter v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 252 N.J. Super. 84, 92 (App. Div. 

1991).

However, "the trial judge's legal conclusions, and the 

application of those conclusions to the facts, are subject to our 

plenary review." Reese, supra, 430 N.J. Super. at 568 (citing 

Manalapan Realty, L.P. v. Twp. Comm. of Manalapan, 140 N.J. 366, 

378 (1995)). As always, questions of law are reviewed de novo.

Ibid. (citing Dep't of Envtl. Prot. v. Kafil, 395 N.J. Super. 597, 

601 (App. Div. 2007)).

Applying these principles to defendant's arguments, we 

conclude the arguments presented in Points V and VII challenge 

evidentiary rulings that did not constitute an abuse of discretion; 

the challenges to the trial judge's fact finding in Points VI, 

VIII and X fail because the judge's findings as a whole are 

supported by adequate, substantial, and credible evidence in the 

record; and the argument in Point IX challenging the judge's 
17 A-0558-15T1

credibility finding lacks merit because the judge's assessment is 

not clearly lacking in reasonable support. As a result, these 

arguments merit no further discussion.

III.

We turn to defendant's argument that the trial judge erred 

in finding she failed to make a good faith effort to find a higherpaying job in the years since the 2010 divorce. 

Although defendant argues that plaintiff "presented no 

competent or compelling evidence to assert that [her] job search 

was lacking and amounted to bad faith," the trial judge's finding 

did not require "compelling evidence" for support, but only 

adequate, substantial and credible evidence to be accorded our 

deference. 

The proofs defendant submitted to show her good faith efforts

between November 2013 and January 2015 were not compliant with the 

MSA and the November 2013 order. The job search lists spanning 

from November 2013 to January 2015 contain significantly more 

entries than the job contacts lists of the same date range and 

only a few of the job search list entries can be found in the job 

contacts list. For example, according to the job search list, 

defendant applied to sixty jobs in November 2013, but only lists 

the information for seven job contacts that month on the job 

contacts list. Moreover, only one of the entries on the jobs 
18 A-0558-15T1

contacts list, "Karma Innovations Inc," appears on the job search 

list. Thus, the job search lists from November 2013 to January 

2015 are deficient because they do not include the application 

date or employer contact information. Likewise, the job contacts

lists from November 2013 to January 2015 are deficient because 

they do not contain five searches per week and do not include the 

positions she applied for.

There was, then, adequate support in the record for the 

finding that defendant failed to comply with the requirements for 

searching for a higher-paying job and documenting her efforts.

Nonetheless, defendant challenges the trial judge's finding, 

presenting the following arguments: She contends the judge erred 

in accepting plaintiff's assertion that defendant's job search 

proofs were unverifiable. She also argues the judge 

mischaracterized defendant's job search efforts by (1) stating 

defendant prioritized obtaining substitute teaching jobs; (2) 

making contradictory statements regarding defendant's testimony 

about her job search efforts outside of the county she resided in; 

and (3) stating defendant only searched for "teaching and customer 

services" jobs. 

These criticisms of the trial judge's factfinding are 

unpersuasive. To the extent that the judge's statement of reasons 

failed to acknowledge details of defendant's job searches, these 
19 A-0558-15T1

oversights are inconsequential and do not undermine either the 

findings or the support that resulted in the conclusion that 

defendant failed to comply with the requirements established for 

her good faith job search.

IV.

In Point IV, defendant challenges the trial judge's decision 

to impute income to her that is the equivalent of a salary earned 

by a full-time certified teacher.

In determining a proper alimony award, imputation of income 

is warranted where a spouse "is, without just cause, voluntarily 

underemployed or unemployed." Schochet v. Schochet, 435 N.J. 

Super. 542, 549 (App. Div. 2014) (quoting Child Support Guidelines, 

Pressler & Verniero, Current N.J. Court Rules, comment 12 on 

Appendix IX-A to R. 5:6A at 2589 (2014)). A finding of 

"underemployment" means the spouse "is intentionally failing to 

earn that which he or she is capable of earning." Dorfman v. 

Dorfman, 315 N.J. Super. 511, 516 (App. Div. 1998).

The trial judge made the threshold finding that defendant was 

"voluntarily underemployed" as the basis for imputing income. 

Defendant argues that the decision to impute the level of income 

a full-time certified teacher earns is unsupported by competent 

evidence because she is not a certified teacher and cannot afford 

certification. She argues the temporary position she held as a 
20 A-0558-15T1

"long-term substitute" making $26.58 per hour was not her "usual" 

or "former" income level, as evidenced by her pay stubs which 

showed she typically earned $11.27 per hour as a substitute teacher 

and testimony that higher-paid teaching jobs were difficult to 

obtain. In further support of her argument, defendant cited her 

testimony about the difficulty of getting a teaching job in 

Florida, her lack of contacts to obtain a tutoring job, and her 

inability to work at a preschool or daycare facilities and fast 

food restaurants due to her health issues.

Imputing the income of a spouse "is a discretionary matter 

not capable of precise or exact determination[,] but rather 

require[s] a trial judge to realistically appraise capacity to 

earn and job availability." Elrom, supra, 439 N.J. Super. at 434 

(alterations in original) (quoting Gnall v. Gnall, 432 N.J. Super.

129, 158 (App. Div. 2013), rev'd on other grounds, 22 N.J. 414 

(2015)). This court "will not reverse the decision absent a 

finding the judge's decision rested on an impermissible basis, 

considered irrelevant or inappropriate factors, failed to consider 

controlling legal principles or made findings inconsistent with 

or unsupported by competent evidence." Ibid. (citations and 

internal quotation marks omitted).

Trial judges have "'every right to appraise realistically [a 

spouse's] potential earning power' and examine 'potential earning 
21 A-0558-15T1

capacity' rather than actual income" when imputing income. Id.

at 435 (citations omitted). If "a spouse is not earning to his 

or her true potential and capacity then an imputation of income 

based upon that potential is appropriate." Stiffler v. Stiffler, 

304 N.J. Super. 96, 101 (Ch. Div. 1997). 

Defendant has a master's degree in business administration, 

was a licensed pharmacist in Jamaica and has been able to obtain 

two "statement[s] of eligibility" from Florida that made her

eligible to teach math to grades five through twelve full-time. 

Her employment history includes an interim teaching job that paid 

a "teacher's salary." This undisputed evidence, stripped to its 

essentials, supports the conclusion that she has the potential and 

capacity to earn substantially more than she has. Defendant's 

claim that she cannot afford to become certified or renew her 

statement of eligibility does not undercut that conclusion. See

Elrom, supra, 439 N.J. Super. at 435 ("courts have always looked 

beyond . . . claims of limited resources and economic opportunity" 

in examining potential earning capacity.). 

Although the trial judge's decision properly considered 

defendant's "work history, occupational qualifications, [and] 

educational background" in her income imputation, it made no 

mention of the "prevailing job opportunities in the region." Child 

Support Guidelines, Pressler & Verniero, Current N.J. Court Rules, 
22 A-0558-15T1

comment 12 on Appendix IX-A to R. 5:6A at www.gannlaw.com (2017). 

Defendant consistently testified she had a hard time obtaining 

full-time teaching jobs because employers preferred certified 

teachers and she "saw certified teachers having a hard time getting 

jobs." At the same time, however, she testified she never applied 

for teaching jobs outside of her county due to the high commuting 

costs and weak job market. In light of defendant's admission that 

she limited the scope of her search and the judge's appraisal of 

defendant's credibility, it was within the trial judge's 

discretion to disregard defendant's testimony regarding the job 

market for teachers in Florida.

Because the trial judge's decision to impute a full-time 

teacher's income to defendant is consistent with controlling legal 

principles and is adequately supported by competent evidence, it 

shall remain undisturbed.

V.

Defendant amended her notice of appeal to include an appeal 

from the denial of her motion for reconsideration. However, 

contrary to the requirements of Rule 2:6-2(a)(6), her appellate 

brief does not contain a separate point heading and argument

regarding the denial of her motion for reconsideration. The 

failure to brief an argument may be deemed a waiver of the 

argument. Gormley v. Wood-El, 218 N.J. 72, 95 n.8 (2014). 
23 A-0558-15T1

Further, we "may refrain from considering cursory arguments . . . 

that are not properly submitted under proper point headings." 

Pressler & Verniero, Current N.J. Court Rules, comment 2 on R.

2:6-2 (2017) (citing Solar Energy Indus. v. Christie, 418 N.J. 

Super. 499, 508 (App. Div.), certif. denied, 207 N.J. 190 (2011).

The only argument we have gleaned from defendant's brief 

regarding the motion for reconsideration is included in Point III, 

in which she challenges the trial judge's factfinding and reviews 

exhibits that were submitted in support of the motion for 

reconsideration. These documents were not part of the record from 

the plenary hearing.

Pursuant to Rule 4:49-2, the purpose of a motion for 

reconsideration is to allow parties to bring to the trial court's 

attention "matters or controlling decisions which counsel believes 

the court has overlooked or as to which it has erred." It is not 

an opportunity to relitigate the matter by presenting the court 

with evidence that was not part of the record on which a decision 

has been made. Capital Fin. Co. of Del. Valley, Inc. v. Asterbadi, 

398 N.J. Super. 299, 310 (App. Div.), certif. denied, 195 N.J. 521 

(2008). Thus, denial is appropriate if the motion is based on 

unraised facts known to the movant prior to entry of judgment.

Del Vecchio v. Hemberger, 388 N.J. Super. 179, 188-189 (App. Div. 

2006).
24 A-0558-15T1

Reconsideration is appropriate only in cases "that fall 

within that narrow corridor in which either 1) the [c]ourt has 

expressed its decision based upon a palpably incorrect or 

irrational basis, or 2) it is obvious that the [c]ourt either did 

not consider, or failed to appreciate the significance of 

probative, competent evidence." Asterbadi, supra, 398 N.J. Super.

at 310 (quoting D'Atria v. D'Atria, 242 N.J. Super. 392, 401 (Ch.

Div. 1990)). Moreover, "a litigant must initially demonstrate 

that the Court acted in an arbitrary, capricious, or unreasonable 

manner, before the Court should engage in the actual 

reconsideration process." D'Atria, supra, 242 N.J. Super. at 401.

To the extent that defendant has argued the court erred in 

denying her motion for reconsideration, her argument lacks merit. 

Defendant failed to make the requisite showing that the trial 

judge acted in an arbitrary, capricious or unreasonable manner. 

And, the documents submitted in support of the motion could not 

be relied upon to support a motion for reconsideration.

Affirmed.