ADOPTED APRIL 2012

Southern California Association of Governments

TRANSPORTATION SECURITY

APPENDIX
TRANSPORTATION SECURITY

Threats in the Region 1

Consequences of Disasters 1

Overview of Existing Systems 2

Regional System Description 2

Critical Infrastructure 3

Threat/Hazard Descriptions 7

Asset Categories and Descriptions 8

Applicability of Threats to Assets 8

Security and Emergency Preparedness 8

California Emergency Management Agency 9

Multi-Hazard Mitigation Plans 9

County Offices of Emergency Services 10

National Incident Management System / Standardized Emergency 

Management System 10

Mutual Aid Agreements (MAA) 11

Intelligent Transportation Systems Related to Security 12

Deficiency Analysis 13

Federal Requirements 13

SCAG’s Role in Security 13

Information Sharing Role 13

Regional Security Planning 14

Regional Preparedness 14

Promoter of Regional ITS Solution 15

Regional Provider of Data and Information 15

Transportation Security Strategic Plan 16

Vision 16

Goals and Objectives 16

Outcomes 16

Policies and Recommendations 16
Threats in the Region

The SCAG region is vulnerable to many types of catastrophic events including earthquakes, floods, fires, hazardous material incidents, dam failures, civil unrest, transportation accidents, tsunamis and terrorism. Since 1950, the State of California has 

experienced nearly 300 state or federally declared disasters. Of those, roughly half were 

caused by wildfires, floods, or earthquakes. Together these three hazards account for 

the largest losses of life among all disasters and over $55 billion in disaster costs. As a 

consequence of its experience with disasters, California has initiated a variety of ongoing 

hazard mitigation efforts.1

For the purposes of this chapter, the following definitions are used:

 Safety is defined as the protection of persons and property from unintentional 

damage or destruction caused by accidental or natural events.

 Security is defined as the protection of persons or property from intentional damage 

or destruction caused by vandalism, criminal activity or terrorist attacks.2

Consequences of Disasters

Civic infrastructure is critical to the welfare of urban areas. Transportation, utilities, communications, fuel, and water all provide services essential to the welfare and quality of 

life of residents. Catastrophic incidents often produce a cascading effect on the infrastructure. If one of these support systems breaks down it can have a domino effect on 

other elements, and the failure of multiple elements can be crippling. Some of the ways 

in which the infrastructure can be affected in a disaster or emergency are shown in the 

following tables.3

1 State of California Multi-Hazard Mitigation Plan, California EMA, 2007 2 National Cooperative Highway Research Program Report 525 Volume 3, "Incorporating Security into 

the Transportation Planning Process" Daniel Dornan and M. Patricia Maier, 2005 3 Federal Emergency Management Agency: Community Emergency Response Team (IG-317) Student's 

Guide

TABLE 1 Possible Effects of Damage to the Infrastructure

Service Effect

Transportation  Inability to get emergency service personnel into the affected area

 Inability to transport victims away from the area

Electrical  Increased risk of fire and electrical shock.

 Possible disruption to transportation system if downed lines are 

across roads

Telephone  Lost contact between victims, service providers, and

family members

 System overload due to calls from or to friends or relatives

Water  Disruption of service to homes, businesses, and medical providers

 Inadequate water supply for firefighting.

 Increased risk to public health if there is extensive damage or 

contamination to supply

Fuel Supplies  Increased risk of fire or explosion from ruptured fuel lines

 Risk of asphyxiation from natural gas leaks in confined areas

Each instance of infrastructure damage may severely restrict the abilities of emergency 

responders to provide service following a disaster. Some types of damage and their 

effects on emergency services are included on TABLE 2:

Transportation Security 1
TABLE 2 Possible Effects of Damage on Emergency Service Providers

Type of Damage Effect on Emergency Services

Roadways, Bridges, 

Tunnels, Interchanges 

 Inability to assess damage accurately.

 Ambulances prevented from reaching victims and/or 

victims prevented from reaching emergency medical 

services.

 Police prevented from reaching areas of civil unrest.

 Fire departments prevented from getting to fires.

 Flow of needed supplies is interrupted.

 Inability to deploy assets as part of incident response 

and to manage transportation flows

 Inability for emergency service providers to manage 

an evacuation

Structural  Damaged hospitals unable to receive patients.

 Increased risk of damage from falling debris.

Disrupted 

Communication 

 Victims unable to call for help.

 Coordination of services is hampered.

 Inability for incident command structure to receive 

real time situational information, reducing its effectiveness

Fuel Line Damage  Fire and paramedic services overburdened.

 Inability to sustain emergency response and recovery

Disrupted Water Service  Firefighting capabilities restricted.

 Medical facilities hampered.

Basic assessments of the impacted areas are needed to produce an adequate emergency 

response to a disaster. An assessment of vulnerabilities to security and safety also may 

prevent or limit effects of a catastrophic incident.

Currently, there are numerous agencies that participate in the response to incidents and 

assist with hazard preparedness for individual jurisdictions. Collaboration occurs between 

many of these agencies. The Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) oversees 

coordination. However, FEMA defines metropolitan areas and coordination different 

then the US Department of Transportation, limiting SCAG’s ability to participate at an 

agency level. SCAG seeks to utilize its strengths and organization to assist planners, first 

responders and recovery teams in a supporting role.

SCAG, as a MPO is restricted from undertaking a first response or emergency management role. SCAG has three areas where it can assist both before a major emergency 

and during the recovery period:

1. Provide a policy forum to help develop regional consensus and education on security 

policies and emergency response.

2. Assist in the planning and programming of transportation infrastructure repairs

3. Leverage projects and planning functions (including Intelligent Transportation 

Systems, also known as ITS) that can enhance or provide benefit to transportation 

security efforts and those responsible for planning and responding to emergencies.

a. Integrate security into the regional ITS architecture

b. Become a central repository/mirror for regional geo-data that can be used for 

planning, training, response and relief efforts of law enforcement personnel and 

emergency responders.

Overview of Existing Systems

Regional System Description

The United States is comprised of nearly 3.8 million square miles and has a population 

over 300 million persons. Its transportation systems continue to evolve and expand in 

order to accommodate its populous, workforce, and economy. Security of the nation’s 

transportation systems and the lives of the people that utilize these systems are a top priority of government agencies at all levels. Transportation systems include airports, ports, 

waterways, rail, highways, and pipelines.4 According to the Bureau of Transportation 

Statistics, the United States maintains over four million miles of roadway (streets, roads, 

highways), nearly 600 thousand bridges, 150 thousand miles of railway, over 5,000 public 

airports, 1.3 million miles of gas pipelines, and over 180 thousand mile of gas pipeline.

4 The American transportation sector is dependent on foreign oil sources; in fact 51.5 percent of 

petroleum used in the United States is currently imported (Bureau of Transportation Statistics 2009) 

2 Transportation Security
The SCAG region has 18.5 million residents—almost half of California’s population—and 

encompasses a geographic size equivalent to Ohio. This region remains as one of the 

largest economic engines in the United States and the world. In 2008, the region had a 

Gross Regional Product of $865 billion. It generates 13.5 percent of the nation’s international trade ($value). Indeed, Southern California faces numerous challenges in maintaining its important role in the country and the world including the ability to prevent, or 

recover from, catastrophic events. In the SCAG region, transportation infrastructure also 

encompasses a vast system:

Roadways and Freeway

Freeway Lanes Miles (excluding carpool) 9,424 miles

Carpool Lane Miles (including HOT lanes) 1,033 miles

Road Lane Miles (arterials) 38,871 miles

Public Transit

Buses 5,443 vehicles

Metro Rail 73 miles and 65 Stations

Metrolink 512 miles and 55 Stations

Aviation/Ports

Commercial/General Aviation Ports 57

LAX ranks among world’s airports 5th in passengers and 11th in cargo

Long Beach/Los Angeles ranks among 

world’s container ports

5th

Share of United States Maritime Trade 41 percent

Due to the vast expanse of transportation infrastructure, it would be physically and 

financially impossible to protect all transportation systems from natural disaster or human 

caused incidents. Consequently, there is a subset of transportation infrastructure that is 

of specific interest to national, state and regional leaders. These critical facilities vary in 

degree of importance. In the risk assessment section, critical facilities are examined for 

the Southern California region.

Critical Infrastructure

The USA PATRIOT Act of 2001, passed shortly after the terrorist attacks of September 11, 

defines critical infrastructure as:

“Systems and assets, whether physical or virtual, so vital to the United States that 

the incapacity or destruction of such systems and assets would have a debilitating 

impact on security, national economic security, national public health or safety, or 

any combination of those matters (Sec. 1016(e)).”

Less than one year later in July 2002, the National Strategy for Homeland Security, identified thirteen sectors of critical infrastructure.

Agriculture 

Food 

Water 

Public Health 

Emergency Services

Government

Defense Industrial Base

Information Technology and Telecommunications 

Energy 

Transportation

Banking and Finance

Chemical Industry and Hazardous Materials

Postal and Shipping

While many sectors will be affected at one time or another during any type of incident or 

disaster, the scope of this section is specific to transportation infrastructure (e.g., aviation, maritime, mass transit, highway, freight rail, and pipeline).

Critical Transportation Infrastructure (CTI) consists of transportation facilities whose 

removal from service would severely impact the public safety, national security, economic 

activity, or environmental quality. Examples of Critical Transportation Infrastructure 

include:

1. Major arterial highways and bridges comprising the National Highway System 

(NHS), including Strategic Highway Network (STRAHNET) and National Intermodal 

Connectors.

Transportation Security 3
2. International marine harbors, ports, airports and border crossings.

3. Major railroads, including depots, terminals and stations.

4. Oil and natural gas pipelines.

5. Transportation Control Systems (e.g., air traffic control centers, national 

control center).

As with most regions of the world, the transportation infrastructure in Southern California 

plays a major role in its residents’ quality of life. The region’s expansive urban form 

makes travel critical to daily life. Not surprisingly, a 2006 public opinion survey found that 

the overwhelming concern in the region was transportation. The region has one of the 

highest cost of housing in the nation and high incidents of crime. While these are critical 

issues that must be addressed to improve the Region’s quality of life, exacerbating traffic 

condition is viewed by many as a greater challenge. A failure in the transportation system 

as a result of natural disaster or human-caused event would bring significant disruptions 

to the quality of life of many individuals.

A number of plans, programs, organizations and infrastructure are in place within the 

SCAG region to provide safety and security of the regional transportation system for many 

potential situations. The following sections provide an overall summary of efforts to maintain and increase the transportation safety and security of the region

STRATEGIC HIGHWAY NETWORK

The Strategic Highway Network (STRAHNET) routes within the SCAG region are essential to readily accommodate the movement of military supplies and personnel in times of 

national emergencies. STRAHNET routes were selected by the federal government, and 

include the National Interstate system, as well as key “non-interstate” routes and connectors to ports and military installations.

SCAG, through its planning processes, identifies the operation and maintenance needs 

of the interstate and state highway system within its jurisdiction, including STRAHNET. 

Within the SCAG region, all interstate facilities are part of the STRAHNET. Also, SR-14, 

SR-101 and Route 395 are part of the non-interstate STRAHNET routes. Various connectors between the ports as well as various military installations and STRAHNET are 

also included. 

CALIFORNIA CRITICAL NEEDS ASSESSMENTS

There have also been several assessments of the critical state transportation infrastructure, which include identification of the key transportation facilities. Assessments have 

been conducted by the following bodies:

 The California Emergency Management Agency

 The California Attorney General’s Office

 The California Highway Patrol (CHP) conducted a vulnerability assessment of the 

State’s highway system and has issued a confidential report to the State Legislature

The results of these assessments have been shared with the transportation system 

operators and incorporated into their security planning. However, security considerations have precluded the inclusion or discussion of these critical system elements in 

public documents.

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE

The Department of Defense (DOD) has several installations within the SCAG region. In 

the case of a large scale emergency, the DOD is authorized to provide resources when 

response and recovery requirements are beyond the capabilities of civilian authorities, 

and these efforts do not interfere with the DOD’s core mission or ability to respond to 

operational contingencies.

Requests for Defense Support to Civilian Authorities (DSCA) are made through the 

local, county and State authorities as a request for assistance to the federal coordinating official in the appropriate lead federal agency and is normally accompanied by, or 

submitted after a request from the Governor for a disaster declaration from the President. 

The Defense Coordinating Officer coordinates the DOD resources to be provided. The 

California National Guard may be activated as part of the DSCA and can provide law 

enforcement support, crisis management and consequence management services. 

Activation of the National Guard for local support during emergencies is done by the 

Governor via the California Office of Emergency Services.5

5 San Diego Association of Governments, 2007 Regional Transportation Plan White Paper: Public Safety 

and Homeland Security, July 21, 2006.

4 Transportation Security
INTERNATIONAL BORDER CROSSINGS

Within the SCAG region, there are three international ports of entry along the MexicoImperial County border; Two at Calexico (Calexico and Calexico-East), and; One at 

Andrade (near Yuma, Arizona). Traffic from these ports enters California on the I-8 corridor. U.S. Customs and the Border Protection Agency within DHS are charged with the 

management and control of the official ports of entry. Security planning includes local 

emergency services as well as the CHP.

Caltrans District 11 has developed a Border Master Planning collaboration with local, 

state and federal stakeholders in the United States and Mexico. The plan established 

criteria to be used in future studies to coordinate and prioritize projects related to existing 

and new Ports of Entry (PEMA) as well as roads leading to the California Mexico PEMA.

Future projects will consider operational improvements, design and retrofitting of 

border crossings, as well as roadway improvements designed to ease congestion at 

border crossings.

SEAPORTS

The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) has designated the seaports of Long Beach 

and Los Angeles and Port Hueneme as at risk for potential terrorist actions.6 Security at 

the ports is the joint responsibility of the U.S. Coast Guard, the U.S. Customs and Border 

Protection Agency, federal and state Homeland Security offices, Port police agencies, 

Harbor Patrols and emergency service agencies. The U.S. Coast Guard leads the local 

Area Maritime Security Commission which coordinates activities and resources for all 

port stakeholders.

The Port of Los Angeles is unique in that it has a dedicated police force, the Los Angeles 

Port Police, to patrol the area within the jurisdiction of the Port of Los Angeles. The Port 

Police enforces federal, state and local public safety statutes as well as environmental 

and maritime safety regulations in order to maintain the free flow of commerce and produce a safe, secure environment that promotes uninterrupted Port operations. In addition, 

the Port Police partners with other law enforcement agencies such as the Los Angeles 

6 Fiscal Year 2006 Infrastructure Protection Program. U.S. Department of Homeland Security, 

September 25, 2006.

Police Department, California Highway Patrol, and Customs and Border Protection in the 

Cargo Theft Interdiction Program (CTIP), which investigates cargo theft, and the High 

Intensity Drug Trafficking Area, which targets drug trafficking at the Ports of Los Angeles 

and Long Beach. Furthermore, per the Maritime Transportation Security Act of 2002, the 

Port of Los Angeles works with the Coast Guard to develop security plans for facilities at 

the port.

Similar to the Port of Los Angeles, security at the Port of Long Beach entails physical 

security enhancements, police patrols, coordination with federal, state, and local agencies to develop security plans for the port area and investigate suspicious incidents, and 

obtaining federal funding to pay for these enhancements. As with the Port of Los Angeles, 

the Port of Long Beach works with the Coast Guard to develop security plans for facilities 

at the port.

In contrast to the Port of Los Angeles, however, the Port of Long Beach does not have its 

own dedicated police force. Instead, the Long Beach Police Department is responsible for 

patrolling the port area. In doing so, the Port reimburses the Long Beach Police and Fire 

Departments for their port-related activities and expenses. The Port also funds its own 

Harbor Patrol to supplement law enforcement work conducted by other agencies such as 

the Coast Guard.

In addition, several programs are in place to effectively monitor and screen seaport cargo. 

They include:

 Investigations: The federal Container Security Initiative (CSI) directs Customs 

agents, working with host governments, to inspect and examine all cargo containers 

deemed high-risk before they are loaded on U.S.-bound vessels. The CSI contains 

four core elements: Identifying high-risk containers; pre-screening containers before 

they reach U.S. ports of entry; using technology to pre-screen high-risk containers; 

and developing and using smart and secure containers.

 Inspections: The 24-hour rule requires manifest information on cargo containers to 

be delivered to U.S. Customs 24 hours before the container is loaded onto a vessel 

in a foreign port. Customs has the right to stop any container from being loaded, for 

any reason, while the container is still overseas.

 Partnerships: Most of the largest U.S. importers and their trading partners participate in the Customs-Trade Partnership Against Terrorism (C-TPAT), a public-private 

Transportation Security 5
partnership designed to improve security standards throughout the cargo 

supply chain.

 Technology: U.S. Customs uses X-ray, gamma ray and radiation-detection devices 

to screen incoming cargo at U.S. ports.

AIRPORTS

Airport security planning is the joint responsibility of the federal Transportation Security 

Administration (TSA), the airlines and the individual airports. There are ten airports in the 

SCAG region offering commercial service, and two offering commuter service. In addition, 

over 50 general aviation airports in the region are available for public use, including some 

of the most active general aviation airports in the country. Airports in the SCAG region 

have upgraded their security systems since 9/11 using a variety of strategies in conjunction with local, state and federal law enforcement.

In addition, airports serve a vital role in recovery efforts. Airports can serve as evacuation 

centers, and if in working order after an incident, can serve as staging centers for relief 

efforts. Large flat areas at airports provide excellent staging areas for supplies and equipment, including helicopters.

TRANSPORTATION MANAGEMENT CENTERS

Caltrans, in conjunction with the California Highway Patrol (CHP), has created 

Transportation Management Centers (TMCs) to rapidly detect and respond to incidents 

while managing the resulting congestion.

With the help of intelligent transportation system technologies such as electronic sensors 

in the pavement, freeway call boxes, video cameras, ramp meter sensors, earthquake 

monitors, motorist cellular calls, and commercial traffic reports; as well as Caltrans highway crews, 9-1-1 calls and officers on patrol. The TMC provides coordinated transportation management for general commutes, special events and incidents affecting traffic.

The TMCs are operated within each Caltrans district. For the SCAG region, Districts 7, 8, 

11 and 12 all have TMCs.

RAIL AND MASS TRANSIT SECURITY

Rail and mass transit systems have long been an attractive target for terrorists and 

criminals. According to a RAND Corporation database of worldwide terrorist incidents, 

between 1995 and June 2005, there were over 250 terrorist attacks worldwide against 

rail targets, resulting in almost 900 deaths and over 6,000 injuries (excluding the 2005 

London attacks).7 One of these attacks occurred near Hyder, Arizona, where an Amtrak 

train carrying 300 passengers was intentionally derailed in October, 1995. One person 

died and 78 were injured.

Since the early 1990s, the California Public Utilities Commission has required that transit 

agencies operating rail systems prepare a comprehensive System Safety Program Plan 

(SSPP) that also included a security component.

Most transit agencies have a security and emergency management plan, which details 

how the agency would coordinate with first responder (law enforcement and fire) 

agencies, their respective County Office of Emergency Services and the statewide 

Standardized Emergency Management System (SEMS).

Transit agencies that apply for DHS Transit Security Grants Program (TSGP) funds are 

required to develop a regional transit security strategy. Several transit agencies within 

the SCAG region have worked together to develop a regional transit security strategy. A 

recent rule from the FHWA/FTA requires Metropolitan Planning Organizations, such as 

SCAG, to be consistent with transit safety and security planning and to review processes, 

plans and programs, as appropriate.

After the Chatsworth Metrolink train crash, the Federal Government initiated a requirement for train operators to develop and implement Positive Train Control (PTC) on their 

locomotives. PTC is an automated system that can stop a locomotive if the engineer does 

not respond to warning signals. SCAG anticipates this will eventually expand to light rail 

and integrated PTC into the regional ITS Architecture.

7 Government Accountability Office, Passenger Rail Security: Enhanced Federal Leadership Needed To 

Prioritize And Guide Security Efforts, Sept. 2005 at 10 (GAO-05-851), available at http://www.gao.

gov/new.items/d05851.pdf.

6 Transportation Security
Threat/Hazard Descriptions

As mentioned earlier, numerous threats/hazards were considered for inclusion in the 

matrix, even though not all of them ended up being included for further analysis. What 

follows is a compilation of threats/hazards outlined in local plans that are directly relevant 

to transportation infrastructure. The list of threats/hazards that can disrupt regional 

continuity has been divided into three categories:

 Natural

 Accidental Technological / Infrastructure Failure

 Terrorism and Behavioral

The Transportation Research Board has classified emergency events that affect transportation agencies into several categories, listed below:

TABLE 3 Emergency Events Impacting Transportation Agencies8

Naturally 

Occurring

Human Caused

Intentional Accidental / 

Non-Intentional

 Droughts

 Dust/Wind Storms

 Earthquakes

 Electrical Storms

 Floods

 High Winds

 Hurricanes

 Ice Storms

 Landslides

 Naturally Occurring 

Epidemics

 Snowstorms and 

Blizzards

 Tornadoes

 Tropical Storms

 Tsunamis

 Wildfires

 Bomb Threats and Other 

Threats of Violence

 Disruption of Supply Sources

 Fire/Arson

 Fraud/Embezzlement

 Labor Disputes/Strikes

 Misuse of Resources

 Riot/Civil Disorder

 Sabotage: External and 

Internal Actors

 Security Breaches

 Terrorist Assaults Using 

Chemical, Biological, 

Radiological, or Nuclear 

Agents

 Terrorist Assaults Using 

Explosives, Firearms, or 

Conventional Weapons

 Theft

 Vandalism

 War

 Workplace Violence

 Cyber Attacks

 Accidental Contamination 

or Hazardous Materials 

Spills

 Accidental Damage to or 

Destruction of Physical 

Plant and Assets

 Accidents That Affect the 

Transportation System

 Gas Outages

 Human Errors

 HVAC System Failures or 

Malfunctions

 Inappropriate Training on 

Emergency Procedures

 Power Outages

 Software/Hardware 

Failures or Malfunctions

 Unavailability of Key 

Personnel

 Uninterruptible Power 

Supply (UPS) Failure or 

Malfunction

 Voice and Data 

Telecommunications 

Failures or Malfunctions

 Water Outages

8 National Cooperative Highway Research Program, Report 525, Volume 9, "Guidelines for 

Transportation Emergency Training Exercises," McCormick Taylor Inc., 2006

Transportation Security 7
Asset Categories and Descriptions

As touched upon earlier, the United States’ transportation network is vast and expansive. Because millions of passengers and goods use some aspect of the transportation 

sector each year, critical transportation assets have become highly attractive targets for 

terrorist attacks.

As outlined in the Transportation Systems Sector-Specific Plan, the transportation 

systems sector has been divided into six key sub-sectors: aviation, freight rail, highway, 

maritime, mass transit, and pipeline. Identified below are fifteen critical transportation 

assets found within the SCAG region that fall within one of the sub-sectors.

Public roads/highways

Bridges/interchanges/overpasses

Tunnels

Traffic management and operations 

centers

Intelligent Transportation Systems

Airports

Mass transit bus and rail facilities 

(public)

Mass transit bus and rail facilities 

(operations and maintenance)

Bus and rail transit vehicles

Port and harbor facilities

Rail freight vehicles

Rail cargo facilities

Rail tracks and alignments

Intermodal connections

Pipelines

With all of these different critical transportation assets located throughout the SCAG 

region in which people depend upon for continuity of life it can be a difficult task to determine which ones are most vulnerable to threats / hazards. As can be seen by performing 

risk assessments, the critical transportation assets that become the most important to 

protect are the ones that are utilized by the greatest number of people, contribute significantly to the economic well-being of the region, and provide the greatest connectivity 

between all of the different transportation components.

Applicability of Threats to Assets

Based on an extensive review of local and state documents, including hazard mitigation 

plans, the potential threats/hazards within the SCAG region have been pre-identified. 

Included in the appendix is a threat/hazard asset matrix that can be used to determine 

the potential impact of a disaster to their critical transportation assets. As mentioned 

earlier, SCAG is in a great position to coordinate the cooperation of relevant agencies, 

particularly transportation and emergency management, throughout the six counties of 

the SCAG region. Coordination throughout the SCAG region is vital due to the interconnectedness of transportation critical infrastructure located throughout the SCAG region.

Security and Emergency Preparedness

SCAG’s Regional Preparedness Goal is stated as, “to achieve and sustain at risk target levels of capability to prevent, protect against, respond to, and recover from major 

human-caused or natural events in order to minimize the threat and impact to lives, 

property and the region.”

Prior to the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks on the United States, there was not a 

single incident that impacted transportation facilities as result of a national consequence. 

Prior aircraft incidents involved hostage taking or placing explosives on the plane. The 

use of passenger aircraft as missiles, and recent transit related terrorism in other countries created a new awareness of the vulnerabilities of transportation facilities.

As concerns about the threat of terrorism have grown, government agencies at all levels 

have taken new measures to secure the welfare of its citizens. Hurricane Katrina and 

other natural disaster have also brought attention to how critical emergency preparedness is to the response and recovery of a catastrophic event. Transportation and transit 

agencies throughout the United States are taking increased steps to protect their facilities 

against the threats of crime, terrorist activity, and natural disasters.

As stated earlier, there are numerous agencies that have been developed to participate in 

the response of a disastrous and assist with hazard preparedness for individual jurisdictions. In California, they include the following:

8 Transportation Security
California Emergency Management Agency

Domestic security at the state government level in California is primarily handled by the 

California Emergency Management Agency (EMA). The role of EMA is to ‘coordinate overall state agency responses to major disasters in support of local government. The office 

is responsible for assuring the State’s readiness to respond to and recover from natural, 

man-made, and war-caused emergencies, and for assisting local governments in their 

emergency preparedness, response and recovery efforts. The EMA serves as the central 

contact point in the state for any emergency or imminent disaster. It coordinates the 

notification of appropriate state administering agencies that may be required to respond, 

as well as the emergency activities of all state agencies in the event of an emergency.

In doing so, the EMA does not focus on security specifically, but rather more broadly on 

addressing all potential incidents that could impact the state, such as earthquakes, fires, 

floods, and terrorist attacks. Furthermore, EMA coordinates with federal agencies such 

as the Department of Homeland Security and Federal Emergency Management Agency, as 

well as other state and local agencies such as the California Highway Patrol.

The EMA released the 2010–2015 Statewide Emergency Management Strategic Plan, 

which outlines California’s vision, mission, principles for emergency management, as well 

as goals and objectives for the period of 2010-2015. In addition to the strategic plan, EMA 

has released a local planning guide on terrorism, which provides guidance to local cities 

in planning for potential terrorist acts.

The EMA is required to develop model guidelines for local government agencies and 

community based organizations to develop a (voluntary) disaster registry program for 

long-term and community health facilities and for individuals that are disabled or elderly. 

Individuals registered in the program should be prepared to be self-sufficient for at least 

72 hours.9

9 http://www.calema.ca.gov/LandingPages/Documents/Cal%20EMA%20Strategic%20Plan%202010-

2015.pdf

Multi-Hazard Mitigation Plans

Mitigating hazards before the occurrence of a disaster is the primary step in preparing for 

emergencies, rather than the final step of recovery. The goal of hazard mitigation plans is 

to guide implementation activities in order to achieve the greatest reduction of vulnerability, which will result in saved lives, reduced injuries, reduced property damages, and 

greater protection of the environment.

FEMA requires state and local governments to develop hazard mitigation plans and 

update them every three years.

The Disaster Mitigation Act of 2000 (DMA 2000), Section 322 (a-d) requires that local 

governments, as a condition of receiving federal disaster mitigation funds, have a mitigation plan that describes the process for identifying hazards, risks and vulnerabilities; 

identifies and prioritizes mitigation actions; encourages the development of local mitigation, and provides technical support for those efforts. “Local Governments” are defined 

in the DMA 2000 to typically include counties, local municipalities, and tribal governments; but can also include other local agencies and organizations, including Councils of 

Governments, schools and other special districts.

California updated its State of California Multi-Hazard Mitigation Plan in 2010.10 The State 

is required to adopt a federally-approved State Multi-Hazard Mitigation Plan to be eligible 

for certain disaster assistance and mitigation funding. The Plan is an evaluation the 

hazards California faces and the strategies, goals, and activities the state will pursue to 

address these hazards. The Plan:

 Documents statewide hazard mitigation planning in California

 Describes strategies and priorities for future mitigation activities

 Facilitates the integration of local and tribal hazard mitigation planning activities into 

statewide efforts

 Meets state and federal statutory and regulatory requirements

All six SCAG counties and a number of cities within the SCAG region have completed 

Hazard Mitigation Plans. EMA dictates that these plans must also be updated every 

three years.

10 http://hazardmitigation.calema.ca.gov/plan/state_multi-hazard_mitigation_plan_shmp)

Transportation Security 9
County Offices of Emergency Services

Counties and cities are the first responders to any security or emergency situation. These 

responders include fire departments, police and sheriff department, hospitals, ambulance 

services and transportation agencies. Coordination among public and private agencies 

within various cities and counties make the most use of all available resources in the 

event of any emergency.

While each city and county has their own security procedures, the policies are 

generally similar.

Mutual Aid agreements between cities, counties and private organizations help to maximize resources and reduce the human suffering associated with disaster situations. Each 

SCAG county has a department in charge of security and emergency response:

County Office Information County Office Information

Imperial Office of Emergency 

Services

1078 Dogwood Road

Heber, CA 92249

760.482.2400

Riverside Office of Emergency Services

4080 Lemon Street, Suite 8

P.O. Box 1412

Riverside, CA 92502-1412

951.955.4700

Los Angeles Office of Emergency 

Management

1275 N. Eastern Ave.

Los Angeles, CA 90063

323.980.2261

San 

Bernardino

Office of Emergency Services

1743 W. Miro Way

Rialto, CA 92376

909.356.3998 

Orange Office of Emergency 

Services

2644 Santiago Canyon Road

Silverado, CA 92676

714.628.7055

Ventura Office of Emergency Services

800 South Victoria Ave.

Ventura, CA 93009

805.654.2551

National Incident Management System / Standardized 

Emergency Management System

The National Incident Management System (NIMS) is a tool for states, counties and 

local jurisdictions to respond to catastrophic events through better communication 

and coordination.

NIMS provides a consistent nationwide template to enable Federal, State, local, and 

tribal governments, and private-sector and nongovernmental organizations to work 

together effectively and efficiently to prepare for, prevent, respond to, and recover 

from domestic incidents, regardless of cause, size, or complexity, including acts of 

catastrophic terrorism.11

California has a similar management system called the Standard Emergency Management 

System (SEMS) which is mandated under California Government Code Section §8607(a). 

State of California Executive Order S-2-05 requires the state to integrate, to the 

extent appropriate, the NIMS, into the State’s Standardized Emergency Management 

System (SEMS).12

The NIMS Integration Center strongly recommends that all elected officials who will be 

interacting with multiple jurisdictions and agencies during an emergency incident to take 

the following NIMS courses, at a minimum:

 FEMA IS-700: NIMS, an Introduction13

 ICS-100: Introduction to Incident Command System (ICS)14 or equivalent

(Note: FEMA IS-700 “NIMS, and Introduction” and ICS-100 are used extensively in the 

development of this section)

All federal, state, local, tribal, private sector and non-governmental personnel with a 

direct role in emergency management and response must be NIMS and ICS trained. 

This includes all emergency service related disciplines such as Emergency Medical 

Technicians, hospitals, public health, fire service, law enforcement, public works/utilities, 

11 http://www.fema.gov/pdf/nims/NIMS_basic_introduction_and_overview.pdf 12 http://gov.ca.gov/index.php/executive-order/2000/ 13 http://www.training.fema.gov/emiweb/is/is700.asp 14 http://www.training.fema.gov/EMIWEB/is/is100.asp

10 Transportation Security
skilled support personnel, and other emergency management response, support and 

volunteer personnel.

The NIMS employs two levels of incident management, depending upon the type 

of incident.

Incident Command System (ICS) is a standard, on scene, all-hazard incident management system. ICS allows users to adopt an integrated organizational structure to match 

the needs of single or multiple incidents.

Multi-Agency Coordination Systems are a combination of facilities, equipment, personnel, procedures and communications integrated into a common framework for coordinating and supporting incident management.

ICS has been in use for over 30 years and is used for planned events, fires, earthquakes, hurricanes, acts of terrorism, etc. ICS helps all responders communicate and 

effectuate logistics.

NIMS requires all emergency plans and standard operating procedures to incorporate NIMS components, principles and policies; include emergency planning, training, 

response, exercises, equipment, evaluation, and corrective actions. Chief elected and 

appointed officials in a community need to be directly involved in these NIMS preparedness elements, especially the elements that deal with exercising community emergency 

management policies, plans, procedures and resources.

Jurisdictions will be required to meet the FY 2006 NIMS implementation requirements as 

a condition of receiving federal preparedness funding assistance in FY 2007. However, 

it is important to recognize that the NIMS is a dynamic system, and the doctrine as well 

as the implementation requirements will continue to evolve as emergency management 

capabilities change.

Mutual Aid Agreements (MAA)

Immediately following the 1994 Northridge earthquake, city and county emergency 

managers in the Governor’s Office of Emergency Services (EMA) Coastal, Southern, and 

Inland Regions developed a coordinated emergency management concept called the 

Emergency Managers Mutual Aid (EMMA) system. EMMA provided a valuable service 

in the emergency response and recovery efforts at the Southern Regional Emergency 

Operations Center (REOC), local Emergency Operations Centers (EOCs), the Disaster Field 

Office (DFO), and community service centers.

The purpose of Emergency Managers Mutual Aid (EMMA) is to support disaster operations 

in affected jurisdictions by providing professional emergency management personnel.

In accordance with the Master Mutual Aid Agreement, local and state emergency managers have responded in support of each other under a variety of plans and procedures.

The objectives of the EMMA Plan include:

1. Providing emergency management personnel from unaffected areas to support local 

jurisdictions, Operational Areas, and regional emergency operations during proclaimed emergencies.

2. Providing a system, including an organization, information, and forms necessary 

to coordinate the formal request, reception, assignment, and training of assigned 

personnel.

3. Establishing a structure to maintain this document (the Emergency Managers Mutual 

Aid Plan) and its procedures.

4. Providing for the coordination of training for emergency managers, including 

Standardized Emergency Management System (SEMS/NIMS) training, emergency 

management course work, exercises, and disaster response procedures.

5. Promoting professionalism in emergency management.15

The transportation sector, as other critical sectors of the country, is continuously striving 

to improve prevention, preparedness, response, recovery, and mitigation capabilities at 

all levels of society. As is discussed below, MPOs can play a significant role in promoting 

preparedness and recovery capabilities.

15 http://www.EMA.ca.gov/Operational/EMAHome.nsf/PDF/Emergency Managers Mutual Aid Plan/$file/

Emma.pdf

Transportation Security 11
Intelligent Transportation Systems 

Related to Security

The national Intelligent Transportation Systems (ITS) Program began with the Intelligent 

Vehicle Highway Systems Act included in the Intermodal Surface Transportation Efficiency 

Act (ISTEA) of 1991. Through the Act, the U.S. Congress recognized the importance 

of advanced transportation systems and technologies. The renewed importance of 

Transportation System Management (TSM) and advanced technologies has been made 

possible by major advances in the computer and telecommunications industries including the conversion of previously classified defense technologies for domestic use. Today, 

TSM and advanced technologies offer new and important improvements in safety and 

efficiency for nearly every function of our regional transportation system. Although ITS 

has become customized from defense technologies to primarily improving the safe and 

efficient movement of people and goods, there is now an urgency to include a security 

components in ITS capabilities. Fundamentally, ITS already has security elements within 

its functionalities. The Federal government holds that a comprehensive ITS security 

review and update to the National ITS Architecture is essential for the protection of surface transportation systems throughout the country.

Effective in April 2001, the Federal Highway Administration required the integration of 

the deployment of regional ITS systems through a Final Rule and Policy mandate. In 

the development of an ITS architecture, “agencies that own and operate transportation 

systems must collaborate and consider current and future needs to ensure that today’s 

processes and projects are compatible with future ITS projects.” Under federal mandate, 

responsible transportation agencies had four years to comply with the ITS law. In 2005, 

SCAG completed the regional ITS architecture in compliance with the federal rulings. The 

regional ITS architecture has been regularly updated on a modular basis since 2005. The 

Regional ITS Architecture covers the following user needs of Critical ITS elements:

 Maintenance and management by the ITS working Group made up of Caltrans and 

County Transportation Commission (CTC)

 Limited ITS Maintenance Resources

 Communications standards – XML Regional Approach

 Did not fully examine ITS use for Emergency Management

The SCAG Regional ITS Architecture includes all six counties within its jurisdiction: Los 

Angeles, Orange, Ventura, Riverside, San Bernardino, and Imperial. The region’s ITS 

architecture is a framework for ensuring institutional agreement and technical integration of technologies for the implementation of projects or groups of projects under an ITS 

strategy. All ITS related projects must be consistent with the SCAG Regional ITS architecture in order to be eligible for federal funds. These projects also must comply with federal 

system engineering requirements and applicable federal standards. Local components to 

the ITS architecture exist for Los Angeles County, Orange County, Inland Empire, Ventura 

County, and Imperial County.

Currently, traffic incidents are responsible for a large proportion of the congestion delay 

on the region’s freeways. In order to mitigate non-recurring congestion, such as traffic 

collisions, Transportation Management Centers (TMCs) have been established throughout 

the region. Sensors, Closed Circuit Cameras, news reports and traveler tips are relayed 

to TMCs who initiate a response, often within the first minute of an incident. Freeway 

Service Patrols are pre-positioned to further reduce the response time.

The region needs to reduce the number of incidents that occur as well as to continue 

to reduce the amount of time it takes to clear incidents when they do occur. Special 

attention should be directed to clearing major incidents including those involving injuries, 

fatalities, hazardous materials, or large trucks. A regional 5-1-1 system alerts travelers to 

dangerous road conditions, incidents and general congestion. In the event of an emergency, a reverse 9-1-1 system can notify households of staging locations for evacuations.:

In the SCAG Region, ITS systems may be able to assist in case of emergencies by managing road closures, evacuation management, public transportation security, dissemination 

of real-time information to motorists and first responder agencies, allocation of resources 

for responders’ ingress and evacuation egress, and provide routing information for out-ofarea responders.

12 Transportation Security
In 2008, SCAG updated its ITS Architecture for areas related to security. These systems 

are considered as a resource and are defined into eight security areas:

1. Disaster Response and Evacuation

2. Freight and Commercial Vehicle Security

3. HAZMAT Security

4. ITS Wide Area Alert

5. Rail Security

6. Transit Security

7. Transportation Infrastructure Security

8. Traveler Security

In 2011, SCAG updated the Architecture again, in part to incorporate Positive Train Control 

into the regional Architecture in order to increase Rail safety and security.

Deficiency Analysis

A large scale evacuation would be difficult in the SCAG region, because of the severe traffic congestion and mobility issues that exist. Currently, 18.5 million people reside in the 

region and over 4 million more people are expected to be added by 2035. Among the 50 

states, the region would rank 4th in population, after California, Texas, and New York, and 

ahead of Florida. The region also includes 38,000 square miles and has a diverse geography, ranging from dense urban areas, to mountain ranges, to vast deserts, presenting a 

large are for emergency responders to service and access. Theoretically, there are three 

directions to evacuate people from the region in case of a major catastrophic event: east, 

north and south.

Although the region has extensive experience with natural disasters and has in place 

formal and informal agreements between emergency responders, a common challenge 

still remains communications and collaboration for immediate action. Many emergency 

management service agencies have their individual protocols, but when a multi jurisdictional incident occurs their have been challenges in communication and resource allocation occur.

Federal Requirements

Transportation safety and security emphasis is reflected in the recent transportation authorization bill, known as SAFETEA-LU (Safe, Accountable, Flexible, Efficient 

Transportation Equity Act – A Legacy for Users), signed into law on August 10, 2005.  

SAFETEA-LU authorizes the Federal surface transportation programs for highways, 

highway safety, and transit for the 5-year period, 2005-2009. It specifies that MPOs will 

develop a metropolitan planning process that provides for consideration of projects and 

strategies that will “increase the security of the transportation system for motorized and 

non-motorized users,” as detailed in SAFETEA-LU legislation.

Under SAFETEA-LU, the metropolitan transportation planning process should be consistent with the Strategic Highway Safety Plan, and other transit safety and security planning and review processes, plans, and programs, as appropriate.

SCAG’s Role in Security

SCAG does not have a direct role in first response or emergency management. As a MPO, 

SCAG can potentially play role in providing a coordinating forum working with the region’s 

transportation agencies and planning agencies. In this role, SCAG could offer the capacity 

to identify policy directions and conduct planning regarding resource needs. In addition, 

the agency’s Geographic Information Systems and transportation modeling expertise 

offers a regional tool that may support security and emergency management planning and 

deployment and evacuation preparedness and response.

Information Sharing Role

The region’s transportation system is both an asset that needs to be protected from catastrophic events, as well as a resource used to respond to such events. SCAG’s primary 

focus is on planning for this transportation system. As the regional planning agency for 

transportation system, SCAG houses a wealth of transportation related data and information that could be brought to bear in planning for and preparing for emergency events. So, 

SCAG should be viewed as a resource agency that can provide meaningful assistance in 

preparing emergency preparedness, prevention and evacuation plans.

Transportation Security 13
Regional Security Planning

While there are a number of agencies that have direct roles in safety and security operations, there is no single entity that focuses on broad policies related to disaster prevention 

and response within the region. SCAG could partially fill this void in conjunction with its 

role in security planning as part of its broader transportation planning responsibilities.

SCAG could help bring situational awareness of security to the region for the array of 

potential disasters. It recognizes the fact that the region’s ITS planning and deployments 

provide an opportunity for the region to leverage this investment to enhance situational 

awareness and further the efforts of the emergency management community.

SCAG’s active role in the security planning process (within the policy arena) 

would require:

 Emphasizing transportation as a resource and a stakeholder in security planning 

and operations

 Educating officials about transportation-related issues with regards to safety 

and security

 Participating in a regional security working group

 Assisting with the identification of opportunities and resources that support emergency management

 Leveraging federal funds to support security preparedness

 Increasing its knowledge of best practices and how to implement them, and then 

identifying its role with regard to their implementation

 SCAG would also increase its role as a data source and further serve as a clearinghouse for various types of data sets.16

 SCAG should play a role in supporting situational awareness for safety and security 

purposes by using geospatial data.

16 In its Ten Year Strategic Plan, SCAG has indicated that it wished to be a central source for data and 

information about the southern California Region. SCAG has a strong desire and commitment to be a 

major data repository. However, SCAG will undertake this role where and if appropriate to facilitate 

the planning processes and activities of local and regional stakeholders. SCAG goal is to be an 

acquirer and source for regional level data and information.

Regional Preparedness

SCAG’s regional preparedness goal is to prevent, protect, respond, and recover from 

major human-caused or natural events in order to minimize the threat and impact to lives, 

property and the regional economy. Its transportation security planning plans will help 

ensure that there is a productive movement of persons and goods if a disastrous event 

strikes the region. SCAG has the following opportunities to elevate its role in the region as 

a policy forum and data clearinghouse:

 Develop proactive transportation security strategies that support economic vitality in 

the region

 Enhance the effectiveness of agencies responsible for security preparedness and 

emergency response

 Ensure that regional transportation technology investments meet the needs of emergency responders through interoperable, robust, and strategically redundant ITS and 

communications infrastructure

 Provide a regional forum for members of the transportation and emergency management communities to coordinate transportation and security initiatives, and to reach 

agreement on how to work more closely together during the decision notification 

process prior to and following an event

 Update the regional ITS Architecture and associated County architectures, describing specific systems interoperability requirements to support regional safety and 

security objectives;17 and

 Satisfy SAFETEA-LU requirements for regional transportation planning to incorporate security considerations.

In 2008, SCAG began working with the FEMA and local stakeholders towards developing the (draft) Southern California Catastrophic Emergency Preparedness Plan. The Plan 

looked at possible damage from a major earthquake, the resources the region would need 

and have available to both respond and recover. The draft document is currently being 

finalized by FEMA.

17 The ongoing investment in ITS region-wide provides a resource that needs to be recognized and 

leveraged for enhancing situational awareness and analysis capabilities. 

14 Transportation Security
The Plan examines the initial impacts, inventory of resources, care for those wounded 

and homeless and developed a long term recovery process. The process of Long-Term 

Regional Recovery (LTRR) provides a mechanism for coordinating Federal support to 

State, tribal, regional, and local governments, nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), and 

the private sector to enable recovery from the long-term consequences of extraordinary 

disasters. The LTCR process accomplishes this by identifying and facilitating availability and use of sources of recovery funding, and providing technical assistance (such as 

impact analyses) for recovery and recovery planning support. “Long Term” refers to the 

need to re-establish a healthy, functioning region that will sustain itself over time. Long 

term recovery is NOT debris removal and restoration of utilities, which are considered 

immediate or short-term recovery actions.

Once a disaster has been proclaimed, the LTRR process may be activated for incidents 

that require a coordinated Federal, State, tribal, regional and local government response 

to address significant long-term impacts (e.g., impacts on housing, government operations, agriculture, businesses, employment, regional infrastructure, the environment, 

human health, and social services) to foster sustainable recovery. The three main focus 

areas of LTRR are:

 Housing

 Infrastructure (including transportation)

 Economic Development

When a disaster occurs, the initial operational focus is centered on Response Activities. 

This effort may last from a few hours to an extended period of time (several days or 

longer) depending on the situation. SCAG’s response during this period is to coordinate 

the funding of regionally significant transportation infrastructure repairs. As Response 

activities begin to taper off and non-life safety issues begin to be addressed, the operational focus begins to shift from Response to Recovery. Federal and State support will be 

heaviest during the beginning phase of the recovery effort when:

 Long-term impact analyses are performed;

 When necessary technical support to establish local long-term recovery strategies 

and/or plans is provided;

 When coordination of long-term recovery resources needed by the region to launch 

its recovery efforts are complete.

State and Federal support lessens by the later stages of the LTRR process once the 

region has sufficient capacity to implement its long term recovery plan.18

Promoter of Regional ITS Solution

SCAG also envisions to develop a thorough Intelligent Transportation System (ITS), as it 

controls the regional ITS architecture, funding, and programming. Major elements of its 

role include:

 Identifying more command and control for Critical Transportation Infrastructure (CTI)

 Developing mechanisms to make data available through Traffic Management Centers 

(TMC) to assist first responders and training first responders to take advantages of 

these resources

 Identifying system detection gaps and using this to prioritize funding

 Prioritizing command and control infrastructure through funding

 Supporting County Office of Emergency Services through the programming and 

planning of funding to TMCs and other activities

Continuity of government is another area SCAG may be able to provide leadership within 

the region. There is a lack of agreements between agencies for mutual aid (in many 

cases, especially in the transportation arena). SCAG could play a role to facilitate this 

process and identify needs and prioritize agreements and planning at the regional and 

sub-regional level between agencies, particularly for long-term recovery after events.

Regional Provider of Data and Information

In the Ten Year Strategic Plan: Goals and Strategies, SCAG indicates that it wishes to be 

a central source for data and information about the Southern California Region. SCAG 

has a strong desire and commitment to be a major data repository. However, SCAG will 

undertake this role where and if appropriate to facilitate the planning processes and 

activities of local and regional stakeholders. SCAG’s goal is to be an acquirer and source 

for regional level data and information. This roles is consistent with the one mentioned 

earlier in this section.

18 Adapted from Draft Southern California Catastrophic Preparedness Plan, IWG 14 – Staff Estimate. 

Transportation Security 15
Several relevant transportation and security planning documents illustrate that SCAG has 

a challenging task in serving the region. It also has a tremendous opportunity to not only 

serve the region in transportation security planning efforts, but to serve as an example 

for the rest of the nation. As mentioned above, federal mandates have recently passed 

to make security planning part of the purview of MPOs. However, the mandates do not 

clearly delineate the roles and steps of MPOs. Essentially, SCAG will be breaking new 

ground with its role as a MPO in the arena of transportation security planning.

Transportation Security Strategic Plan

This final section is intended to summarize the existing and future conditions set forth in 

the previous sections. This strategic plan is meant as a guide for envisioning transportation security planning throughout the SCAG region.

Vision

The vision is to define security transportation planning as mandated by federal law that 

does not hinder the activities of existing emergency stakeholders but rather assist them 

in the policy arena and situation awareness through vast repository of data and information on the region. Essentially, SCAG aims to improve the capabilities of local and county 

governments to better protect its region’s transportation systems and critical infrastructure, as well as to enhance the overall level of preparedness for responding to harmful 

incidents or disasters.

Goals and Objectives

 Ensure transportation safety, security, and reliability for all people and goods in 

the region.

 Prevent, protect, respond to, and recover from major human-caused or natural 

events in order to minimize the threat and impact to lives, property, the transportation network and the regional economy.

Outcomes

 Increase per capita funding for transportation system maintenance and preservation 

programs.

 Increase per capita funding for Intelligent Transportation Systems projects that 

enhance or benefit regional transportation security.

 Encourage all local government agencies and organizations to be involved in improving emergency preparedness coordination, collaboration and flexibility.

Policies and Recommendations

SCAG has developed an action plan and constrained policies detailing nine measures that 

the agency will undertake in the regional transportation security planning.

1. SCAG should help ensure the rapid repair of transportation infrastructure in the 

event of an emergency.

a. SCAG, in cooperation with local and state agencies, should identify critical 

infrastructure needs necessary for emergency responders to enter the region, 

the evacuation of affected facilities and the restoration of utilities.

b. SCAG, in cooperation with CTCs, California, and the Federal Government, should 

develop a transportation recovery plan for the emergency awarding of contracts 

to rapidly and efficiently repair damaged infrastructure.

2. SCAG should continue to deploy and promote the use of intelligent transportation 

system technologies that enhance transportation security.

a. SCAG should work to expand the use of ITS to improve surveillance, monitoring 

and distress notification systems and to assist in the rapid evacuation of disaster 

areas.

b. SCAG should incorporate security into the Regional ITS Architecture.

c. Transit operators should incorporate ITS technologies as part of their security 

and emergency preparedness and share that information with other operators.

d. Aside from deploying ITS technologies for advanced customer information, 

transit agencies should work intensely with ethnic, local and disenfranchised 

communities through public information/outreach sessions ensuring public participation is utilized to its fullest. In case of evacuation, these transit dependent 

persons may need additional assistance to evacuate to safety. 

16 Transportation Security
3. SCAG should establish transportation infrastructure practices that promote and 

enhance security.

a. SCAG should work with transportation operators to plan and coordinate transportation projects, as appropriate, with the Department of Homeland Security 

grant projects, to enhance the regional transit security strategy (RTSS).

b. SCAG should establish transportation infrastructure practices that identify and 

prioritize the design, retrofit, hardening, and stabilization of critical transportation infrastructure to prevent failure, to minimize loss of life and property, 

injuries, and avoid long term economic disruption.

c. SCAG should establish transportation infrastructure practices that identify and 

prioritize the design, retrofit, hardening, and stabilization of critical transportation infrastructure to prevent failure, to minimize loss of life and property, 

injuries, and avoid long term economic disruption.

4. SCAG should establish a forum where policy-makers can be educated and regional 

policy can be developed.

a. SCAG should work with local officials to develop regional consensus on regional 

transportation safety, security, and safety/security policies.

5. SCAG will help enhance the region’s ability to deter and respond to acts of terrorism 

and human-caused or natural disasters through regionally cooperative and collaborative strategies.

a. SCAG should work with local officials to develop regional consensus on regional 

transportation safety, security, and safety/security policies.

b. SCAG should encourage all SCAG elected officials to be educated in National 

Incident Management System (NIMS).

c. SCAG should work with partner agencies, federal, state and local jurisdictions to 

improve communications and interoperability and to find opportunities to leverage and effectively utilize transportation and public safety/security resources in 

support of this effort.

6. SCAG will work to enhance emergency preparedness awareness among public agencies and with the public at large.

a. SCAG should work with local officials to develop regional consensus on regional 

transportation safety, security, and safety/security policies.

b. SCAG should work to improve the effectiveness of regional plans by maximizing 

the sharing and coordination of resources that would allow for proper response 

by public agencies. SCAG should encourage and provide a forum for local jurisdictions to develop mutual aid agreements for essential government services 

during any incident recovery.

7. SCAG will help to enhance the capabilities of local and regional organizations, 

including first responders, through provision and sharing of information.

a. SCAG should work with local agencies to collect regional GeoData in a common 

format, and provide access to the GeoData for emergency planning, training and 

response.

b. SCAG should develop and establish a regional information sharing strategy, 

linking SCAG and its member jurisdictions for ongoing sharing and provision of 

information pertaining to the region’s transportation system and other critical 

infrastructure.

8. SCAG should provide the means for collaboration in planning, communication, and 

information sharing before, during, or after a regional emergency.

a. SCAG should develop and incorporate strategies and actions pertaining to 

response and prevention of security incidents and events as part of the on-going 

regional planning activities.

b. SCAG should offer a regional repository of GIS data for use by local agencies in 

emergency planning, and response, in a standardized format.

Transportation Security 17
REGIONAL OFFICES

Imperial County

1405 North Imperial Avenue

Suite 1 

El Centro, CA 92243 

Phone: (760) 353-7800 

Fax: (760) 353-1877

Orange County

OCTA Building 

600 South Main Street

Suite 906 

Orange, CA 92863 

Phone: (714) 542-3687 

Fax: (714) 560-5089 

Riverside County

3403 10th Street

Suite 805 

Riverside, CA 92501 

Phone: (951) 784-1513 

Fax: (951) 784-3925

San Bernardino County

Santa Fe Depot 

1170 West 3rd Street

Suite 140 

San Bernardino, CA 92410 

Phone: (909) 806-3556 

Fax: (909) 806-3572

Ventura County

950 County Square Drive

Suite 101 

Ventura, CA 93003 

Phone: (805) 642-2800 

Fax: (805) 642-2260 

818 West 7th Street, 12th Floor 

Los Angeles, CA 90017 

Phone: (213) 236-1800 

Fax: (213) 236-1825

www.scag.ca.gov

please recycle 2347 2012.04.09