* This order and judgment is not binding precedent, e xcept under the

doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and col lateral estoppel. The court generally disfavors the citation of orders and judg ments; nevertheless, an order and judgment may be cited under the terms and condi tions of 10th Cir. R. 36.3. 

## F I L E D United States Court of Appeals Tenth Circuit 

### APR 9 1999 

### PATRICK FISHER Clerk UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT

LINDA J. TOWNSEND,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

v. KENNETH S. APFEL, Commissioner, Social Security Administration,

Defendant-Appellee. No. 98-6239 (D.C. No. 97-CV-159) (W.D. Okla.)

ORDER AND JUDGMENT *

Before BRORBY , EBEL , and LUCERO , Circuit Judges.

After examining the briefs and appellate record, th is panel has determined unanimously to grant the parties’ request for a dec ision on the briefs without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(f) and 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G). T he case is therefore ordered submitted without oral argument.-2-

Plaintiff Linda J. Townsend appeals from the distri ct court’s order adopting the magistrate judge’s report and recommendation an d affirming the decision of the Commissioner of Social Security denying her cla im for disability and supplemental security income benefits. We exercise jurisdiction under 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) and 28 U.S.C. § 1291, and affirm. Plaintiff filed an application for benefits on Nove mber 23, 1994, alleging an inability to work since September 1989 because o f chronic hepatitis C, which she contracted during a blood transfusion in 1974, and related stress and headaches. Her requests for benefits were denied i nitially and on reconsideration. She then received a hearing before an administrativ e law judge (ALJ), at which she and a medical expert testified. The ALJ denied plaintiff’s claims at step four of t he evaluation sequence. See generally Williams v. Bowen , 844 F.2d 748, 750-52 (10th Cir. 1988). He concluded that plaintiff has severe impairments con sisting of hepatitis C, fatigue, dysthymia, and right upper quadrant pain, but that she retains the residual functional capacity (RFC) to perform a wide range o f light work with no prolonged standing. The ALJ determined that the ex ertional requirements of plaintiff’s past relevant work as a bookkeeper, apartment manager, and receptionist, did not exceed light work and did notrequire prolonged standing.-3-

He therefore concluded that plaintiff was not disab led. The Appeals Council denied review, making the ALJ’s decision the final agency decision. The district court, adopting the report and recomme ndation of the magistrate judge, affirmed the Commissioner’s decis ion. We review the Commissioner’s decision to determine whether his fa ctual findings are supported by substantial evidence and whether he correctly ap plied the relevant legal standards. See Castellano v. Secretary of Health & Human Servs. , 26 F.3d 1027, 1028 (10th Cir. 1994). The ALJ determined that plaintiff’s subjective comp laints concerning her impairments and their impact of her ability to workwere not fully credible. On appeal, plaintiff claims the ALJ failed to set fort h specific evidence in support of this conclusion and that the conclusion is not supp orted by substantial evidence. See Kepler v. Chater , 68 F.3d 387, 391 (10th Cir. 1995) (holding that A LJ must closely and affirmatively link credibility findings to substantial evidence). She also claims the ALJ improperly discredited her subj ective complaints solely on the ground that they were not fully corroborated byobjective medical evidence.
See Luna v. Bowen , 834 F.2d 161, 165 (10th Cir. 1987). The ALJ identified and discussed the factors pertin ent to his evaluation of plaintiff’s subjective complaints of pain and fatig ue. The ALJ cited the lack of objective medical evidence to support the degree orduration of the pain and-4-

fatigue she alleged. None of plaintiff’s physician s placed any restrictions on plaintiff’s activities. Plaintiff’s chronic hepati tis C, which she contracted in 1974, was described by all of her treating physicia ns as stable, with minimal symptoms. The ALJ noted that plaintiff did not exp erience any negative side effects from her medication. The ALJ also discount ed plaintiff’s subjective complaints because her own testimony concerning herdaily activities did not support her claims that she was unable to engage inall work activity. We conclude that the ALJ correctly applied the relevant legal standards. See Kepler , 68 F.3d at 391 (listing factors ALJ may consider inevaluating subjective complaints, including levels of medication and thei r effectiveness, extensiveness of attempts to obtain relief, frequency of medical contacts, nature of daily activities, subjective measures of credibility with in the judgment of the ALJ, motivation of and relationship between claimant and other witnesses, and consistency of nonmedical testimony with objective medical evidence). We further find substantial evidence in the record sup porting the ALJ’s credibility findings. Plaintiff next claims that the ALJ’s determination that she retained the RFC to perform light work is not supported by substanti al evidence because his assessment at “phase one” of the step four analysis failed to take into consideration her subjective complaints and, thus, did not consider what work she-5-

could do on a sustained basis. Plaintiff also clai ms the ALJ’s assessment at “phase two” of the step four analysis failed to dev elop the record on and make findings about the demands of her past relevant work. Step four of the sequential analysis, at which the ALJ found plaintiff not disabled, is comprised of three phases. “In the fi rst phase, the ALJ must evaluate a claimant’s physical and mental residual functiona l capacity (RFC), and in the second phase, he must determine the physical and me ntal demands of the claimant’s past relevant work.” Winfrey v. Chater , 92 F.3d 1017, 1023 (10th Cir. 1996). “In the final phase, the ALJ determines whe ther the claimant has the ability to meet the job demands found in phase two despite the mental and/or physical limitations found in phase one.” Id

. Here, the ALJ complied with the first phase by find ing that plaintiff could perform a wide range of light work so long as the j ob did not require prolonged standing. The ALJ discussed all of plaintiff’s imp airments and his assessment of her credibility with respect to her subjective comp laints in his evaluation of her RFC. As discussed above, the ALJ’s determination that plaintiff’s subjective complaints about the degree and duration of her fat igue and discomfort were not fully credible is supported by substantial evidence . The medical expert consulted by the ALJ at the administrative hearing testified that people with chronic hepatitis C are encouraged to live as normal a life as possible, and the only-6-

limitations on plaintiff’s activities were to reduc e exertion during periods in which she feels some fatigue and to abstain from al cohol. As noted above, none of plaintiff’s treating physicians placed any restr ictions on her activities. We find substantial evidence supports the ALJ’s assessment of plaintiff’s RFC. At phase two, the ALJ found, based on plaintiff’s d etailed testimony concerning her past relevant work as a bookkeeper, apartment manager, receptionist, and jewelry store sales clerk, that a ll of plaintiff’s relevant past work, except for the jewelry store sales clerk, was light work which did not require prolonged standing. We find that the ALJ a dequately considered plaintiff’s RFC, the physical and mental demands of her past work, and whether she has the ability to meet those job demands despi te her RFC limitations, and, therefore, correctly applied the relevant legal standard. See id . We further find that the ALJ’s conclusion that plaintiff is not dis abled at step four is supported by substantial evidence.-7-

The judgment of the United States District Court fo r the Western District of Oklahoma is AFFIRMED for substantially the same reasons stated in the r eport and recommendation of the magistrate judge, as adop ted by the district court’s order dated April 8, 1998.

Entered for the Court

David M. Ebel Circuit Judge