IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

No. 13-41020

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

v.

ISRAEL NOE JUAREZ-VELASQUEZ,

Defendant-Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Southern District of Texas

Before STEWART, Chief Judge, and WIENER, and COSTA, Circuit Judges.

CARL E. STEWART, Chief Judge:

This is an appeal from the district court’s revocation of Defendant Israel 

Juarez-Velasquez’s (Juarez) supervised release. Juarez argues on appeal that 

his supervised release expired prior to the date the United States Probation 

Office (Probation) petitioned the district court for revocation—thereby 

divesting the district court of jurisdiction over his supervised release. For the 

reasons explained herein, we vacate the district court’s order revoking Juarez’s 

supervised release. 

I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

In June 2007, Juarez, an undocumented Mexican national, was deported 

from the United States after being convicted of an aggravated felony—

Possession of Methamphetamine with Intent to Sell/Deliver. Approximately 

United States Court of Appeals

Fifth Circuit

FILED

August 14, 2014

Lyle W. Cayce

Clerk

 Case: 13-41020 Document: 00512733614 Page: 1 Date Filed: 08/14/2014
No. 13-41020

one month after his deportation, Juarez unlawfully reentered the United 

States. On June 27, 2008, United States Customs and Border Protection 

Agents apprehended Juarez in Texas. On July 8, 2008, the government 

indicted him for being “an alien” unlawfully present in the United States “who 

had previously been . . . deported, and removed, after having been convicted of 

an aggravated felony.” On July 15, 2008, Juarez pleaded guilty to the July 8, 

2008 indictment (2008 reentry case). The district court sentenced Juarez to 

twenty-four months’ imprisonment to be followed by a three-year term of 

supervised release. Juarez completed his twenty-four month term of 

imprisonment and was released from federal custody on March 25, 2010. He 

was immediately taken into custody by the Palm Beach County, Florida 

Sheriff’s Department to face charges for homicide and burglary. Juarez was 

acquitted of those charges on September 3, 2010. He remained in state custody 

until the conclusion of his homicide and burglary trial, and on September 15, 

2010, Juarez was deported to Mexico. 

In August 2012, Juarez unlawfully reentered the United States again 

and was apprehended in Texas on October 3, 2012, during a traffic stop. Juarez 

was arrested for public intoxication and possession of marijuana, and placed 

in the Harlingen City Jail. On October 4, 2012, Immigration and Customs 

Enforcement (ICE) agents encountered Juarez while he was in state custody 

in Texas and ascertained that he was unlawfully present in the United States. 

An immigration detainer was issued against Juarez that day. He remained in 

state custody until his state charges were dismissed. On April 12, 2013, the 

day after his state charges were dismissed, Juarez was transferred to federal 

custody pursuant to the immigration detainer. On May 7, 2013, the 

government charged him with being unlawfully present in the United States 

after being deported for committing an aggravated felony. Juarez pleaded 

guilty to that charge on May 30, 2013 (2013 reentry case). The district court 

2

 Case: 13-41020 Document: 00512733614 Page: 2 Date Filed: 08/14/2014
No. 13-41020

sentenced him to 42 months’ imprisonment to be followed by a three-year term 

of supervised release. 

On May 31, 2013, Probation petitioned the district court to revoke 

Juarez’s supervised release in his 2008 reentry case. Probation moved for 

revocation on the grounds that Juarez violated his probation in four ways: (1) 

he was an “alien unlawfully found in the United States after deportation, 

having previously been convicted of an aggravated felony; (2) he unlawfully 

possessed marijuana; (3) he reentered the United States illegally; and (4) he 

drove a motor vehicle without Probation’s permission.” 

Juarez admitted to all of the alleged supervised release violations with 

the exception of marijuana possession. On September 4, 2013, the district 

court revoked Juarez’s supervised release in the 2008 reentry case and 

sentenced him to eight months’ imprisonment to be served consecutively to the 

forty-two month sentence imposed in the 2013 reentry case. Juarez filed a 

motion to reconsider the sentence imposed in his 2013 reentry case. Therein, 

he requested an order clarifying that his sentence began on October 4, 2012—

the day he encountered ICE agents while in the Texas jail—for the purpose of 

receiving credit for time served. The district court granted Juarez’s request 

and stated: 

While initially arrested by local authorities, [Juarez] was never 

prosecuted by those authorities and was held in jail pursuant to 

the detainer placed upon him by the ICE authorities. Therefore, 

this Court concludes that his time in federal custody began on 

October 4, 2012, the day he was encountered by federal agents, and 

this Order will be reflected in this Court’s ultimate judgment. 

3

 Case: 13-41020 Document: 00512733614 Page: 3 Date Filed: 08/14/2014
No. 13-41020

II. DISCUSSION

A.

Juarez challenges, for the first time on appeal, the district court’s 

jurisdiction to revoke his supervised release in the 2008 reentry case. Although 

Juarez failed to raise an objection to the district court’s jurisdiction below, we 

review his claim de novo. See In re Berman-Smith, 737 F.3d 997, 1000 (5th 

Cir. 2013) (per curiam) (“Jurisdiction may not be waived, and federal appellate 

courts have a special obligation to consider not only their own jurisdiction, but 

also that of the lower courts.”); United States v. Meza, 620 F.3d 505, 507 (5th 

Cir. 2010) (reviewing jurisdictional challenge to Appellant’s sentence de novo 

even though she failed to object below). 

The district court, “in imposing a sentence to a term of imprisonment for 

a felony or a misdemeanor, may include as a part of the sentence a requirement 

that the defendant be placed on a term of supervised release after 

imprisonment.” 18 U.S.C. § 3583(a). “A district court has jurisdiction to revoke 

a defendant’s supervised release during the term of supervised release, or 

within a reasonable time [thereafter] if a summons or warrant regarding a 

supervised release violation was issued prior to the expiration of the term of 

supervised release.” United States v. Jackson, 426 F.3d 301, 304 (5th Cir. 

2005) (per curiam) (citing 18 U.S.C. §3583(i)). As provided for by the applicable 

statute: 

The term of supervised release commences on the day the person 

is released from imprisonment and runs concurrently with any 

Federal, State or local term of probation or supervised release or 

parole for another offense to which the person is subject or becomes 

subject during the term of supervised release. A term of 

supervised release does not run during any period in which the 

person is imprisoned in connection with a conviction for a Federal, 

State, or local crime unless the imprisonment is for a period of less 

than 30 consecutive days.

4

 Case: 13-41020 Document: 00512733614 Page: 4 Date Filed: 08/14/2014
No. 13-41020

18 U.S.C § 3624(e) (emphasis added). Section 3624(e) makes clear that tolling 

a term of supervised release is appropriate only when the defendant’s 

imprisonment is connected to a criminal conviction. See United States v. 

Molina-Gazca, 571 F.3d 470, 474 (5th Cir. 2009) (“Pretrial detention falls 

within ‘any period in which the person is imprisoned’ and tolls the period of 

supervised release, provided a conviction ultimately occurs.”).

Juarez argued in his original brief that his three-year term of supervised 

release commenced in March 2010 and concluded in March 2013. Therefore, 

according to Juarez, the district court erred by revoking his supervised release 

in May 2013—after his term expired in March. His original brief asserted that 

although he was released from federal custody to pretrial detention in Florida 

to face state charges in 2010, he was never convicted of the offenses for which 

he was detained. Therefore, according to Juarez, his detention in Florida was 

not in connection with a conviction—as required by § 3624(e)—and did not toll 

his term of supervised release.

The government seemingly conceded Juarez’s argument that his pretrial 

detention in Florida did not toll his supervised release. In its briefing, 

however, the government “strenuously disagree[d] with Juarez that his 

supervised release expired on March 25, 2013, three years to date [sic] after he 

was released from BOP imprisonment.” The government claimed that Juarez’s 

supervised release was tolled on October 4, 2012 when federal agents in Texas 

issued an immigration detainer against him. The government noted that “[o]n 

that date Juarez had served 2 years, 5 months, and 9 days of his three-year 

supervised release term.” According to the government, Juarez’s incarceration 

from October 4, 2012 through September 4, 2013 was “in connection with” his 

2013 reentry conviction. Therefore, the government claims, his term of 

supervised release tolled during that period pursuant to § 3624(e). 

5

 Case: 13-41020 Document: 00512733614 Page: 5 Date Filed: 08/14/2014
No. 13-41020

In reply, Juarez argued that the government failed to respond to his 

initial claim that his period of incarceration in Florida did not toll his 

supervised release. Instead, according to Juarez, the government raised “a 

new, factually-distinct period of pretrial detention . . . to argue for a separate 

period of tolling as a defensive argument.” Accordingly, Juarez fully addressed

the government’s newly-presented theory in his reply brief. He argued that 

the Texas state charges for which he was detained resulted in no conviction. 

Juarez emphasized the fact that “[d]uring the entire time that [he] was in state 

custody, the [2013 reentry] charge . . . was not even in existence.” 

“Consequently, [according to Juarez,] there was no factual relation between 

the period of state pretrial detention and the federal illegal reentry charge 

because the federal charge did not come into existence until after the period of 

pretrial detention had terminated.” 

B.

It is well-established that any period of incarceration that tolls 

supervised release must be “in connection with a conviction.” Jackson, 426 

F.3d at 304; 18 U.S.C. § 3624(e). In 2009, we addressed, inter alia, the question 

of whether a term of pretrial detention could toll supervised release. MolinaGazca, 571 F.3d at 472. Answering in the affirmative, we adopted the Sixth 

Circuit’s rationale in United States v. Goins, 516 F.3d 416 (6th Cir. 2008) and 

made clear that pretrial detention indeed tolls a term of supervised release so 

long as it is in connection with a conviction. Molina-Gazca, 571 F.3d at 473–

74. The question before us today focuses squarely on whether, under these 

facts, the immigration detainer imposed against Juarez resulted in 

imprisonment in connection with a conviction. 

To properly address this issue, we must consider the practical and legal 

implications of an immigration detainer. We have explained that ‘“[f]iling a 

detainer is an informal procedure in which the INS informs prison officials that 

6

 Case: 13-41020 Document: 00512733614 Page: 6 Date Filed: 08/14/2014
No. 13-41020

a person is subject to deportation and requests that officials give the INS notice 

of the person’s death, impending release, or transfer to another institution.’”1 

Zolicoffer v. U.S. Dep’t. of Justice, 315 F.3d 538, 540 (5th Cir. 2003) (per 

curiam) (quoting Giddings v. Chandler, 979 F.2d 1104, 1105 n.3 (5th Cir. 

1992)). We have also stated that for purposes of § 3624(e), “administrative 

detention by ICE is not the same as imprisonment by the BOP.” See United 

States v. Garcia-Rodriguez, 640 F.3d 129, 132 (5th Cir. 2011) (per curiam). In 

Garcia-Rodriguez, the defendant, after completing his federal sentence, was 

transferred from BOP custody to ICE custody to await deportation. Id. at 130. 

After being deported, the defendant illegally reentered the United States and 

was arrested in Texas for criminal trespass. Id. Probation filed a warrant 

petition alleging that the defendant violated his supervised release. Id. The 

defendant challenged the revocation warrant on the grounds that the district 

court did not have jurisdiction to revoke his supervised release because the 

warrant issued after his term of supervised release expired. Id. at 130–31. He 

argued that his supervised release commenced the moment he was transferred 

from BOP custody to ICE custody based upon the immigration detainer. Id. at 

131. The government argued that his administrative detention “continued his 

confinement.” Id. at 132. We held “that administrative detention by ICE 

does not qualify as imprisonment and that, for purposes of § 3624(e), 

Garcia was ‘released from imprisonment’ the moment he was transferred from 

BOP custody to ICE custody to await deportation.” Id. at 134 (emphasis 

added). 

1 “On March 1, 2003, most of the functions of the Immigration and Naturalization 

Service were transferred to the Bureau of Immigration and Customs Enforcement, and the 

Immigration and Naturalization Service ceased to exist.” Kawashima v. Holder, 132 S.Ct. 

1166, 1171 n.1 (2012). Therefore, for purposes of our analysis in this case, INS and ICE are 

synonymous. 

7

 

 Case: 13-41020 Document: 00512733614 Page: 7 Date Filed: 08/14/2014
No. 13-41020

Similarly in this case, Juarez was held in pretrial detention on state 

charges when ICE agents imposed the immigration detainer. Throughout the 

duration of Juarez’s pretrial detention in Texas, no federal criminal charges 

were pending. The immigration detainer was simply an administrative 

mechanism that ensured that upon the completion of his state criminal matter, 

Juarez would be transferred to federal custody to face any immigration 

consequences that accrued as a result of his illegal reentry. See Zolicoffer, 315 

F.3d at 540. Indeed, the day after Juarez’s Texas charges were dismissed, he 

was released and immediately transferred to federal custody. The day after 

Juarez was transferred to federal custody, the United States filed illegal 

reentry charges against him. At that point, and not before, Juarez was 

imprisoned in connection with a conviction—the 2013 reentry case to which 

he eventually pleaded guilty. 

C.

The government also argues that because Juarez received credit—in his 

2013 reentry case—for time served during his pretrial detention in Texas, that 

period of detention tolled his supervised release in the 2008 reentry case. We 

disagree.

The district court, upon Juarez’s motion requesting credit for time 

served, entered an order stating that Juarez’s detention in the 2013 reentry 

case began on October 4, 2012, when he was held in a Texas jail. The district 

court stated: 

While initially arrested by local authorities, [Juarez] was never 

prosecuted by those authorities and was held in jail pursuant to 

the detainer placed upon him by the ICE authorities. Therefore, 

this Court concludes that his time in federal custody began on 

October 4, 2012, the day he was encountered by federal agents. . . .

8

 Case: 13-41020 Document: 00512733614 Page: 8 Date Filed: 08/14/2014
No. 13-41020

The wisdom of the district court’s order is not at issue in this appeal.2 

Nonetheless, the Supreme Court has made clear that the Attorney General, 

not the district court, holds the responsibility for administering sentences. 

United States v. Wilson, 503 U.S. 329, 335 (1992) (citing 18 U.S.C. § 3621(a));

see also United States v. Setser, 607 F.3d 128, 132–33 (5th Cir. 2010) (holding 

that 18 U.S.C. § 3585(b) does not authorize a district court to award credit for 

time served); United States v. Binion, 981 F.2d 1256, *1 (5th Cir. 1992) (per 

curiam) (unpublished) (“The district court acted beyond its jurisdiction in 

undertaking to consider crediting time previously served regardless of its 

conclusion.”). Pursuant to Supreme Court and Fifth Circuit precedent, the 

district court likely exceeded its jurisdiction by ordering that Juarez receive 

credit for time served during his pretrial detention in Texas. Therefore, we 

decline to consider the district court’s potentially erroneous order in our 

analysis of whether Juarez’s pretrial detention in Texas tolled his supervised

release.3

2 We note, however, that the district court incorrectly found that Juarez was held in 

jail pursuant to the detainer placed upon him by the ICE authorities. Such a finding 

necessarily implies that the ICE detainer kept Juarez in jail—during the relevant time 

period—when he would have otherwise been released. The record indicates that the Cameron 

County District Attorney’s Office dismissed their charges against Juarez on April 11, 2013. 

He was released from state custody on April 12, 2013—the very next day. Therefore, the 

state charges were the impetus for the entire duration of Juarez’s pretrial detention in 

Texas—not the immigration detainer. 3 The government also argued that Juarez waived appellate review of his challenge to 

the district court’s jurisdiction for two reasons. First, according to the government, Juarez 

failed to adequately brief his claim on appeal. We disagree. Juarez’s initial brief made 

arguments challenging the district court’s jurisdiction to revoke his supervised release 

pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3624. Additionally, Juarez provided Fifth Circuit case law and other 

persuasive authority to support his position that the district court exceeded its jurisdiction. 

Any arguments raised for the first time in his reply brief were in direct response to newlyraised arguments in the government’s brief. 

Second, the government alleged that Juarez’s request that he receive credit for the 

time he spent in pretrial detention in Texas affirmatively waived any challenge on appeal to 

the district court’s jurisdiction to revoke his supervised release. The government’s argument 

is without merit. The government cites no authority supporting the proposition that a 

defendant’s decision to seek credit for time served in one case necessitates waiver of 

9

 

 Case: 13-41020 Document: 00512733614 Page: 9 Date Filed: 08/14/2014
No. 13-41020

III. CONCLUSION

For the reasons explained above, we conclude that Juarez’s terms of

pretrial detention—in Florida and Texas—did not toll his supervised release. 

Neither period of detention was in connection with a conviction and the 

immigration detainer imposed during Juarez’s Texas pretrial detention was an 

administrative hold that did not amount to imprisonment in connection with a 

conviction for purposes of § 3624(e). Therefore, we hold that the district court 

did not have jurisdiction to revoke Juarez’s supervised release. 

Accordingly, we vacate the district court’s revocation of Juarez’s 

supervised release. We also vacate the 8-month sentence imposed as a result 

of the revocation. 

potentially valid arguments regarding the district court’s jurisdiction in a separate case. As 

stated previously, “[j]urisdiction may not be waived, and federal appellate courts have a 

special obligation to consider not only their own jurisdiction, but also that of the lower courts.” 

In re Berman-Smith, 737 F.3d at 1000.

10

 

 Case: 13-41020 Document: 00512733614 Page: 10 Date Filed: 08/14/2014