J-S20014-20

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA

v.

TYRELL JONES 

Appellant

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

 IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

 PENNSYLVANIA

 No. 2400 EDA 2019

Appeal from the PCRA Order Entered August 7, 2019

In the Court of Common Pleas of Chester County Criminal Division at 

No(s): CP-15-CR-0004523-2007

BEFORE: SHOGAN, J., STABILE, J., and McLAUGHLIN, J.

MEMORANDUM BY SHOGAN, J.: FILED SEPTEMBER 29, 2020

Appellant, Tyrell Jones, appeals pro se from the order denying his 

petition filed pursuant to the Post Conviction Relief Act (“PCRA”), 42 Pa.C.S.

§§ 9541-9546. After review, we affirm the order dismissing the petition, albeit 

on different grounds. See Commonwealth v. Walsh, 125 A.3d 1248, 1253 

(Pa. Super. 2015) (quotation omitted) (We can affirm the PCRA court’s 

decision if there is any basis to support it, even if we rely on different grounds 

to affirm.).

The pertinent facts and procedural history, gleaned from a 

memorandum filed by a prior panel of this Court, see Commonwealth v. 

Jones, 153 A.3d 1104, 2813 EDA 2015 (Pa. Super. filed June 9, 2016) 

(unpublished memorandum), are as follows: On January 14, 2010, a jury 

convicted Appellant of second-degree murder, third-degree murder, robbery, 
J-S20014-20

- 2 -

and criminal conspiracy for his role in a July 8, 2007 murder-robbery.1 On

April 5, 2010, the trial court sentenced Appellant to life in prison on the 

second-degree murder conviction, five to ten years of imprisonment for 

robbery, and five to ten years of incarceration for criminal conspiracy. The 

trial court did not impose a sentence for the third-degree murder conviction. 

On November 4, 2011, this Court affirmed Appellant’s convictions, and our 

Supreme Court denied Appellant’s petition for allowance of appeal on April 26, 

2013. Commonwealth v. Jones, 38 A.3d 911, 1230 EDA 2010 (Pa. Super. 

filed November 4, 2011) (unpublished memorandum), appeal denied, 

Commonwealth v. Jones, 67 A.3d 794, 466 MAL 2012 (Pa. 2013). Appellant 

did not file a petition for a writ of certiorari to the United States Supreme 

Court. 

On July 2, 2014, Appellant timely filed his first pro se PCRA petition. 

Counsel was appointed, and on April 7, 2015, counsel filed an amended PCRA 

petition. On May 28, 2015, the PCRA court held an evidentiary hearing. 

Thereafter, on August 11, 2015, the PCRA court denied the petition. PCRA 

counsel, however, did not receive a copy of the August 11, 2015 order. 

Accordingly, with the agreement of the Commonwealth, the PCRA court 

granted PCRA counsel’s request to file an appeal nunc pro tunc, and an appeal

was timely filed. On June 9, 2016, this Court affirmed the order dismissing 

____________________________________________

1 18 Pa.C.S. §§ 2502(b), 2502(c), 3701(a)(1), and 903(a)(1), respectively. 
J-S20014-20

- 3 -

Appellant’s PCRA petition, and on September 27, 2016, the Pennsylvania 

Supreme Court denied his petition for allowance of appeal. Jones, 153 A.3d 

at 1104, appeal denied, Commonwealth v. Jones, 158 A.3d 75, 422 MAL 

2016 (Pa. 2016). 

On June 21, 2019, Appellant filed a second pro se PCRA petition, alleging 

that the Pennsylvania Supreme Court’s decision in Hudson v. Pennsylvania 

Board of Probation and Parole, 204 A.3d 392 (Pa. 2019) (“Hudson”), 

establishes that his lifetime incarceration, without the possibility of parole, is 

an illegal sentence. PCRA Petition, 6/21/19, at 1–3. On June 26, 2019, the 

PCRA court filed a Pa.R.Crim.P. 907 notice of intent to dismiss Appellant’s 

petition. The PCRA court advised that it was denying the petition because it 

was untimely. Pa.R.Crim.P. 907 Notice, 6/26/19, at 2 n.1. The PCRA court 

also determined that Appellant was unable to demonstrate that any of the 

exceptions to the PCRA’s timeliness requirements applied. Id. at 3 n.1.

2

____________________________________________

2

 Appellant asserted that his petition was timely under section 9545(b)(1) 

(ii)’s “newly discovered-fact” exception. PCRA Petition, 6/21/19, at 

unnumbered 1–2. In its Pa.R.Crim.P. 907 notice of intent to dismiss, the PCRA 

court concluded generally that the PCRA petition was untimely, particularly 

noting that the timeliness exception outlined in section 9545 (b)(1)(iii), 

regarding after-recognized constitutional rights, did not excuse its 

untimeliness. Pa.R.Crim.P. 907 Notice, 6/26/19, at 3 n.1. The PCRA court 

did not specifically address Appellant’s claim that the untimeliness was 

excused by the “newly discovered-fact” exception. While the PCRA court 

misidentified the PCRA subsection underpinning Appellant’s attempt to 

circumvent the jurisdictional time-bar, as an appellate court, we are 

empowered to “affirm [the PCRA court’s] decision on any ground without 

regard to the ground relied upon by [the PCRA court itself.]” Commonwealth
J-S20014-20

- 4 -

Appellant filed a response to the PCRA court’s Rule 907 notice, 

reasserting his argument that Hudson confirms that he is serving an illegal 

sentence. Petitioner’s Response to Rule 907 notice, 8/7/19, at 1–3.3 On 

August 7, 2019, the PCRA court dismissed Appellant’s petition. In its order of 

dismissal, the PCRA court concluded:

On June 25, 2019, this court gave [Appellant] the 

mandatory twenty-day notice of its intent to dismiss his [PCRA] 

petition after finding that there were no genuine issues concerning 

any material fact and that [Appellant] is not entitled to postconviction collateral relief and no purpose would be served by any 

further proceedings. On July 15, 2019, the court received a pro 

se document entitled[,] “Petitioner’s Response to This Court’s 

6/2[6]/19 907 Notice.” [Appellant’s] filing did not include any new 

potential issues to be raised by [Appellant], nor did it include any 

facts that would entitle him to relief. After reviewing [Appellant’s] 

response, the court finds that the information contained therein 

does not alter the court’s opinion that he is not entitled to postconviction collateral relief. The court finds, therefore, as it did 

previously, that he is not entitled to post-conviction collateral 

relief and that no purpose would be served by any further 

proceedings in this matter. Accordingly, [Appellant’s] petition is 

properly dismissed. 

Order, 8/7/19, at 2 n.1.

____________________________________________

v. McKeever, 947 A.2d 782, 786 (Pa. Super. 2008) (quoting 

Commonwealth v. Singletary, 803 A.2d 769, 772–73 (Pa. Super. 2002)). 

3 Although the response was filed more than twenty days after the PCRA court 

issued its notice of intent to dismiss, the PCRA court indicated that it received 

Appellant’s response on July 15, 2019, considered its contents, and concluded 

that it “did not include any facts that would entitle him to relief.” Order, 

8/7/19, at 2 n.1. The official docket indicates that Appellant’s response was 

filed on August 7, 2019, and notes that the pleading was sent to the PCRA 

court directly on July 15, 2019, but it was not received by the Clerk of Courts 

until August 7, 2019. Official Docket Entry #8. 
J-S20014-20

- 5 -

Appellant filed a timely notice of appeal. Both the PCRA court and

Appellant complied with Pa.R.A.P. 1925.4

Appellant raises the following two issues for appellate review, which we 

recite verbatim:

1. Did the PCRA court err in construing Jones’ 2nd PCRA 

petition under §9545 (b)(1)(iii), as opposed to §9545(b)(1)(ii)?

2. To the extent the PCRA court’s decision could be 

construed as addressing Jones’ claim under §9545(b)(1)(ii), did 

the PCRA court err in determining that the following statements 

pronounced by the Pa. Supreme Court (for the 1st time in

Pennsylvania) in [Commonwealth v. Hudson], doesn’t qualify 

as “newly-discovered facts” under §9545(b)(1)(ii):

(a) 42 Pa. C.S. §9756(c) implies that in every other instance 

besides the 4 categories mentioned, a sentencing court may not

impose a sentence which omits a parole eligibility date.

(b) “courts, sentencing defendants to a mandatory term of 

life imprisonment, were ... unable to omit one (i.e. a parole 

availability date) in accordance with law.”

(c) “In §9756(c), the General Assembly unambiguously 

limited a sentencing courts ability to sentencing a person without 

the “right to parole” to 4 categories of offenders. Second degree 

murderers do not fall within one of the 4 categories.”

Appellant’s Brief at 3. 

When reviewing the propriety of an order denying PCRA relief, we 

consider the record “in the light most favorable to the prevailing party at the 

____________________________________________

4 On November 20, 2019, the PCRA court issued its Pa.R.A.P. 1925(a) opinion 

in which it directed this Court’s attention to the PCRA court’s June 25, 2019 

Notice of Intent to Dismiss and its August 7, 2019 order dismissing Appellant’s 

petition “which include the reasons for the court’s decision in this matter.” 

PCRA Court Opinion, 11/20/19, at 1. 
J-S20014-20

- 6 -

PCRA level.” Commonwealth v. Stultz, 114 A.3d 865, 872 (Pa. Super. 

2015) (quoting Commonwealth v. Henkel, 90 A.3d 16, 20 (Pa. Super. 2014) 

(en banc)). This Court is limited to determining whether the evidence of 

record supports the conclusions of the PCRA court and whether the ruling is 

free of legal error. Commonwealth v. Rykard, 55 A.3d 1177, 1183 (Pa. 

Super. 2012). 

We initially must determine whether Appellant has filed a timely petition.

A PCRA petition, “including a second or subsequent petition, shall be filed 

within one year of the date the judgment becomes final[.]” 42 Pa.C.S. § 

9545(b)(1). A judgment of sentence becomes final “at the conclusion of direct 

review, including discretionary review in the Supreme Court of the United 

States and the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, or at the expiration of time 

for seeking the review.” Id. at § 9545(b)(3). 

Beyond the one-year time-bar, a petitioner must plead and prove at 

least one of the time-bar exceptions. These exceptions include: 

(i) the failure to raise the claim previously was the result of 

interference by government officials with the presentation of the 

claim in violation of the Constitution or laws of this 

Commonwealth or the Constitution or laws of the United States;

(ii) the facts upon which the claim is predicated were unknown to 

the petitioner and could not have been ascertained by the 

exercise of due diligence; or 

(iii) the right asserted is a constitutional right that was recognized 

by the Supreme Court of the United States or the Supreme Court 

of Pennsylvania after the time period provided in this section and 

has been held by that court to apply retroactively. 
J-S20014-20

- 7 -

42 Pa.C.S. § 9545(b)(1)(i)–(iii). A petitioner must raise the claim within one 

year that the claim could have been raised. Id. at § 9545(b)(2).

5

In the case sub judice, Appellant was sentenced on April 5, 2010. As 

noted, this Court affirmed the judgment of sentence on November 4, 2011,

and the Pennsylvania Supreme Court of Pennsylvania denied the petition for 

allowance of appeal on April 26, 2013. Appellant did not file a petition for a 

writ of certiorari to the United States Supreme Court; thus, his judgment of 

sentence became final ninety days later on July 25, 2013. 42 Pa.C.S. §§ 

9545(b)(1), (3); U.S. Sup. Ct. R. 13. Pursuant to 42 Pa.C.S. § 9545(b)(1) 

and (3), Appellant had one year within which to file a PCRA petition, i.e., no 

later than July 25, 2014. Thus, Appellant’s petition, filed on June 21, 2019, is 

patently untimely. See 42 Pa.C.S. § 9545(b)(1); Commonwealth v. 

Gamboa–Taylor, 753 A.2d 780, 783 (Pa. 2000) (holding a PCRA petition filed 

more than one year after judgment of sentence becomes final is untimely, and 

the PCRA court lacks jurisdiction to address the petition unless the petitioner 

pleads and proves a statutory exception to the PCRA time-bar). We thus turn 

to whether Appellant has pled and proven that one or more of the exceptions 

to the PCRA’s timeliness requisites applies.

____________________________________________

5 Section 9545(b)(2) was amended to reflect that a petitioner has one year 

rather than the prior deadline of sixty days to raise his claim. This amendment 

became effective on December 24, 2018, and applies to claims arising on 

December 24, 2017, or after. Appellant’s petition was filed on June 21, 2019; 

thus, the amendment applies here. 
J-S20014-20

- 8 -

Appellant’s claim for relief is premised on the theory that he is serving 

an illegal sentence. The PCRA is the sole means allowing for collateral review 

of a judgment of sentence. Commonwealth v. Descardes, 136 A.3d 493, 

497–498 (Pa. 2016). “[A] court may entertain a challenge to the legality of 

the sentence so long as the court has jurisdiction to hear the claim. 

Commonwealth v. Fowler, 930 A.2d 586, 592 (Pa. Super. 2007) (quoting 

Commonwealth v. Berry, 877 A.2d 479, 482 (Pa. Super. 2005) (en banc)).

“In the PCRA context, jurisdiction is linked to the filing of a timely PCRA 

petition.” Id. Although legality of sentence is always subject to review within 

the PCRA, petitioners must initially satisfy the PCRA’s time limits or one of the 

exceptions thereto. “Thus, a collateral claim regarding the legality of a 

sentence can be lost for failure to raise it in a timely manner under the PCRA.” 

Commonwealth v. Infante, 63 A.3d 358, 365 (Pa. Super. 2013) (internal 

citations omitted). 

Appellant urges that his petition meets the exception to the time-bar 

denoted in 42 Pa.C.S. §9545(b)(1)(ii) because it alleges that the Pennsylvania 

Supreme Court’s decision in Hudson is a newly discovered-fact previously 

unknown to the petitioner. However, our Supreme Court has held that 

“subsequent decisional law does not amount to a new ‘fact’ under section

9545(b)(1)(ii) of the PCRA.” Commonwealth v. Brandon, 51 A.3d 231, 

235 (Pa. Super.2012) (quoting Commonwealth v. Watts, 23 A.3d 980, 987 

(Pa. 2011)). Accordingly, Appellant cannot invoke the section 9545(b)(1)(ii) 
J-S20014-20

- 9 -

newly discovered-fact exception to excuse his untimely petition. No relief is 

warranted. 

Moreover, even if the Hudson decision upon which Appellant relies 

could be considered a new fact under section 9545(b)(1)(ii), the Supreme 

Court’s holding in that case is antithetical to Appellant’s position that his 

lifetime imprisonment for second-degree murder, without the possibility of 

parole, is an illegal sentence. The Hudson Court addressed whether section 

9756 of the Sentencing Code, 42 Pa.C.S. § 9756 (relating to sentences of total 

confinement), requires that a defendant be given the right to parole after a 

minimum sentence of no more than one-half of the maximum sentence.

Hudson, 203 A.3d at 395. After analyzing the sentencing statute and the 

relevant case law, the Supreme Court held “that the Legislature did not intend 

for Section 9756(b)’s minimum-sentence provision to apply to mandatory life 

sentences for second-degree murder.” Id. at 398. It further determined that 

“the sole statutory directive for courts in imposing a minimum term of total 

confinement does not apply to mandatory life sentences.” Id. Accordingly, 

the High Court’s decision negates Appellant’s argument that his sentence is 

illegal.

Order affirmed. 
J-S20014-20

- 10 -

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 9/29/20