alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
III 

111TH CONGRESS 

1ST SESSION S. RES. 333 

Designating each of Saturday, November 7, 2009, and Saturday, November 

6, 2010, as ‘‘National Wounded Warrior Day’’. 

IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES 

NOVEMBER 4, 2009 

Mr. ISAKSON submitted the following resolution; which was referred to the 

Committee on the Judiciary 

RESOLUTION 

Designating each of Saturday, November 7, 2009, and Saturday, November 6, 2010, as ‘‘National Wounded Warrior 

Day’’. 

Whereas recognizing ‘‘National Wounded Warrior Day’’ 

would embrace an already existing ‘‘mindset of remembrance’’ for men and women alike that have served our 

Nation; 

Whereas the current conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan have 

seen many wounded warriors whose injuries grow more 

serious as the enemy increases the use of improvised explosive devices; 

Whereas those disabled veterans who have served in previous 

conflicts without any recognition and those disabled veterans who are currently recovering remind us that we, as 


smartinez on DSKB9S0YB1PROD with BILLS
2 

•SRES 333 IS 

people and as a Nation, need to thank and care for our 

disabled veterans; and 

Whereas the number of casualties after 8 years of the current 

conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan is over 4,000 and recognizing ‘‘National Wounded Warrior Day’’ would ensure 

that the sacrifice of wounded warriors would not be forgotten: Now, therefore, be it 

1 Resolved, That the Senate— 

2 (1) designates each of Saturday, November 7, 

3 2009, and Saturday, November 6, 2010, as ‘‘Na4 tional Wounded Warrior Day’’; and 

5 (2) encourages the United States to honor our 

6 wounded warriors who have sacrificed their safety in 

7 order to preserve our freedom. 

Æ 


smartinez on DSKB9S0YB1PROD with BILLS
No. 12-5555.

#### In re Sinquefield.

Motion of petitioner for leave to proceed *in forma pauperis*denied, and petition for -writ of mandamus dismissed. See this Court’s Rule 39.8. As petitioner has repeatedly abused this Court’s process, the Clerk is directed not to accept any further petitions in noncriminal matters from petitioner unless the docketing fee required by Rule 38(a) is paid and the petition is submitted in compliance with Rule 33.1. See *Martin*v. *District of Columbia Court of Appeals,*506 U. S. 1 (1992) *(per curiam).*
#### State v. Bishop

106,810

11/22/13

Denied

Unpublished
Exhibits
**Exhibit 23.5**
**Consent of Registered Independent PublicAccounting Firms**We hereby consent to the incorporation byreference in the Registration Statements on Form S-8(Nos. 333-7410, 333-7412, 333-11022, 333-13384, 333-102183and 333-97935) of Royal Dutch Petroleum Company of our reportdated March 29, 2005, relating to the Financial Statementsof the Royal Dutch/Shell Group of Companies which is included inthis 2004 Annual Report on Form 20-F.
 
 
 
**/s/ KPMG Accountants N.V.**--------------------------------------------------------------------**KPMG Accountants N.V.****The Hague – TheNetherlands**
 
 
**/s/ PricewaterhouseCoopers LLP**--------------------------------------------------------------------**PricewaterhouseCoopers LLP****London – United Kingdom**
 
March 29, 2005 Royal Dutch/Shell Group of Companies **E7**
UNPUBLISHED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. No. 95-5302 TODD ALPHONSO GRIFFIN, Defendant-Appellant. Appeal from the United States District Court for the Western District of North Carolina, at Statesville. Richard L. Voorhees, Chief District Judge. (CR-93-39) Submitted: November 18, 1997 Decided: December 16, 1997 Before HALL, LUTTIG, and MICHAEL, Circuit Judges.

_________________________________________________________________ Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

_________________________________________________________________ COUNSEL James H. Wade, Charlotte, North Carolina, for Appellant. Mark T. Calloway, United States Attorney, Brian L. Whisler, Assistant United States Attorney, Charlotte, North Carolina, for Appellee.

_________________________________________________________________ Unpublished opinions are not binding pr ecedent in this circuit. See Local Rule 36(c).

_________________________________________________________________OPINION PER CURIAM:Todd Alphonso Griffin appeals from his sentence imposed for violation of 18 U.S.C.A. §§ 922(g)(1), 924 (West Supp. 1997). We affirm. Griffin's only argument on appeal is that the district court erred inenhancing his sentence under 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(1) (1994). Specifically, he asserts that a 1987 conviction for felonious breaking and entering of a commercial establishment in violation of N.C. Gen. Stat. § 14-54 (1993), was not a violent felony under the statute, especiallywhere the business was closed and no one was present on the premises. We find that Griffin's argument is erroneous under Taylor v. United States , 495 U.S. 575, 598-99 (1990), which specifically holds that conviction of any crime having the elements of unlawful entryinto a building or structure with the intent to commit a crime constitutes burglary for purposes of a § 924(e) enhancement. See United States v. Bowden , 975 F.2d 1080, 1083 (4th Cir. 1992). BecauseNorth Carolina's definition of felonious breaking and entering contains just these elements, we find that Griffin's 1987 conviction was a prior "violent felony." We therefore conclude that the § 924(e) enhancement was properly applied and we affirm Griffin's sentence.*We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before the court and argument would not aid the decisional process.
AFFIRMED

_________________________________________________________________ *Griffin has also filed a petition for mandamus in relation to this appeal which requests that this court compel the district court to rule on his motion to correct sentence under Fed. R. Crim. P. 35(c). B ecause the district court now lacks jurisdiction to consider that motion, we deny Griffin's petition. See United States v. DeMartino , 112 F.3d 75, 81 (2d Cir. 1997).

2
(function ($, Drupal, drupalSettings, once) {
  Drupal.behaviors.mtSliderRevolutionInternalBanner = {
    attach: function (context, settings) {
      once('mtSliderRevolutionInternalBannerInit', "#slideshow-internal .slider-revolution", context).forEach(function (item) {
        var settings = {
        sliderType:"standard",
        sliderLayout:"auto",
        gridwidth: [1170,970,750,450],
        gridheight: drupalSettings.levelplus.sliderRevolutionInternalBannerInit.slideshowInternalBannerInitialHeight,
        delay: drupalSettings.levelplus.sliderRevolutionInternalBannerInit.slideshowInternalBannerEffectTime,
        disableProgressBar:'off',
        responsiveLevels:[1199,991,767,480],
        navigation: {
          onHoverStop:"off",
          arrows:{
            enable:true,
            tmp: '<div class="tp-title-wrap"><span class="tp-arr-titleholder">{{title}}</span></div>',
            left:{
              h_align:"left",
              v_align:"center",
              h_offset:0,
              v_offset:0
            },
            right:{
              h_align:"right",
              v_align:"center",
              h_offset:0,
              v_offset:0
            }
          },
          bullets:{
            style:"",
            enable:true,
            direction:"horizontal",
            space: 15,
            h_align: drupalSettings.levelplus.sliderRevolutionInternalBannerInit.slideshowInternalBannerBulletsPosition,
            v_align:"bottom",
            h_offset: 0,
            v_offset: 20,
            tmp:"",
          },
          touch:{
            touchenabled:"on",
            swipe_treshold:75,
            swipe_min_touches:1,
            drag_block_vertical:false,
            swipe_direction:"horizontal"
          }
        }
      }
      $(item).show().revolution(settings);
      });

      $(".transparent-bg").css("backgroundColor", "rgba(0,0,0," + drupalSettings.levelplus.slideshowCaptionOpacity + ")");

    }
  };
})(jQuery, Drupal, drupalSettings, once);
<TABLE> <S> <C>


<ARTICLE>                                           BD
<LEGEND>
    THIS  SCHEDULE  CONTAINS  SUMMARY  FINANCIAL   INFORMATION  EXTRACTED  FROM
CONSOLIDATED   STATEMENT  OF  FINANCIAL   CONDITION  -  DECEMBER  31,  1998  AND
CONSOLIDATED  STATEMENT OF INCOME AS ENDED DECEMBER 31, 1998 AND IS QUALIFIED IN
ITS ENTIRETY BY REFERENCE TO SUCH FORM 10K DECEMBER 31, 1998.
</LEGEND>
<NAME>    First Montauk Financial Corp.
<CIK>     0000083125                     
<MULTIPLIER>                       1,000
       
<S>                             <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                   Year
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                              DEC-31-1998
<PERIOD-START>                                 JAN-01-1998                         
<PERIOD-END>                                   DEC-31-1998
<CASH>                                         614
<RECEIVABLES>                                  3,127
<SECURITIES-RESALE>                            0
<SECURITIES-BORROWED>                          0
<INSTRUMENTS-OWNED>                            2,733
<PP&E>                                         2,074
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                                 11,544
<SHORT-TERM>                                   0
<PAYABLES>                                     3,701
<REPOS-SOLD>                                   0
<SECURITIES-LOANED>                            0
<INSTRUMENTS-SOLD>                             327
<LONG-TERM>                                    1,034
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                          0
<PREFERRED>                                    0
<COMMON>                                       4,981
<OTHER-SE>                                     1,206
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>                   11,544
<TRADING-REVENUE>                              8,796
<INTEREST-DIVIDENDS>                           1,572
<COMMISSIONS>                                  30,741
<INVESTMENT-BANKING-REVENUES>                  767
<FEE-REVENUE>                                  0
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                             131
<COMPENSATION>                                 31,766
<INCOME-PRETAX>                                (3,367)
<INCOME-PRE-EXTRAORDINARY>                     (3,367)
<EXTRAORDINARY>                                0
<CHANGES>                                      0
<NET-INCOME>                                   (2,763)
<EPS-PRIMARY>                                  (0.28)
<EPS-DILUTED>                                  (0.28)
        


</TABLE>
RONNIE DAVENPORT

,

Appellant,

v.

STATE OF FLORIDA

,

Appellee

. IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL

FIRST DISTRICT, STATE OF FLORIDA

NOT FINAL UNTIL TIME EXPIRES TO

FILE MOTION FOR REHEARING AND

DISPOSITION THEREOF IF FILED

CASE NO. 1D 16

- 2570

_______ ______________________/

Opinion filed November 3, 2016.

An appeal from an order of the Circuit Court for Escambia County

. Darlene Dickey , Judge

.

Ronnie Davenport, pro se

, Appellant.

Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General, Tallahassee , for Appellee.

PER CURIAM.

AFFIRMED.

LEWIS, ROWE, and KELSEY, JJ., CONCUR.
#### State v. Little

104,794

07/19/13

Denied. .

Unpublished
<TABLE> <S> <C>

<ARTICLE> 5
<LEGEND>
This Schedule contains Summary Financial Statements of Watermark Investors
Realty Trust for the year ended December 31, 1997 and is qualified in its
entirety by reference to such financial statements.
</LEGEND>
       
<S>                             <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                   12-MOS
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                          DEC-31-1997
<PERIOD-START>                             JAN-01-1997
<PERIOD-END>                               DEC-31-1997
<CASH>                                              74
<SECURITIES>                                         0
<RECEIVABLES>                                        0
<ALLOWANCES>                                         0
<INVENTORY>                                          0
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                                     0
<PP&E>                                               0
<DEPRECIATION>                                       0
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                                      74
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>                                0
<BONDS>                                              0
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                                0
<PREFERRED>                                          0
<COMMON>                                       196,235
<OTHER-SE>                                   (314,469)
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>                        74
<SALES>                                              0
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                                     0
<CGS>                                                0
<TOTAL-COSTS>                                        0
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                                23,046
<LOSS-PROVISION>                                     0
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                               7,722
<INCOME-PRETAX>                               (30,768)
<INCOME-TAX>                                         0
<INCOME-CONTINUING>                           (30,768)
<DISCONTINUED>                                       0
<EXTRAORDINARY>                                      0
<CHANGES>                                            0
<NET-INCOME>                                  (30,768)
<EPS-PRIMARY>                                    (.06)
<EPS-DILUTED>                                        0
        

</TABLE>
Exhibit 32.1
            CERTIFICATION OF CHIEF EXECUTIVE OFFICER PURSUANT TO
         18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350, AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO SECTION 906
                     OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002

I, Kenneth R. Risk, certify, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section 1350, as adopted
pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that the annual
report of George Risk Industries, Inc. on Form 10KSB dated April 30, 2007
fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or Section 15(d) of the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and that information contained in such Form
10KSB fairly presents in all material respects the financial condition and
results of operations of George Risk Industries, Inc.

Date:  August 10, 2007			By:  /s/  Kenneth R. Risk
					Kenneth R. Risk
					President and Chief Executive Officer
# mecs48
Exhibit 10.15  AMENDMENT NO. 1 TO STOCK UNIT AGREEMENT pursuant to THE RYLAND GROUP, INC. [________] EQUITY INCENTIVE PLAN  The STOCK UNIT AGREEMENT (the Agreement),
dated as of [________________], by and between The Ryland Group, Inc. (the
Corporation), and [__________________] (the Executive), is amended to
comply with the requirements of Internal Revenue Code section 409A.  NOW, THEREFORE, the Agreement is amended as follows:  1.Section 4, Cash
Dividend Equivalents, is amended by adding the following sentence to the end of
that Section:  The Executive must be employed on a cash
dividend payment date to be eligible for the cash dividend payment described in
this Section 4.  2.Section 9, Dispute Resolution, is amended by adding the
following provisions to the end of that Section:  The Executive shall be entitled to
reimbursement of the fees and expenses described under this Section 9
during the period commencing on the effective date of this Agreement and ending
on his or her death.  Any reimbursement
of fees under this Section 9 shall be made on or before the last day of
the year following the year in which the expense is incurred.  The amount of expenses eligible for
reimbursement during a year shall not affect the expenses eligible for reimbursement
in any other year.  The right to
reimbursement under this Section is not subject to liquidation or exchange
for another benefit.  IN WITNESS WHEREOF, this Amendment No. 1
has been duly executed by the Corporation, to be effective as of [_______________________]
[insert the effective date of the Stock Unit Agreement, or, if later, insert January 1,
2005].   ATTEST/WITNESS
  
  THE RYLAND GROUP, INC.By:R. Chad
  DreierChairman and
  Chief Executive OfficerPrint Name:Date:
EXHIBIT 32.1

CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO

18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350,

AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO SECTION 906

OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002

In connection with the quarterly report of Longview Fibre Company (the
Company) on Form 10-Q for the quarter ended June 30, 2006 as filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the Form 10-Q), I, R. H. Wollenberg, President, Chief Executive Officer and
Chairman of the Company, certify, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. 1350, as adopted pursuant to § 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that:



|(1) | The Form 10-Q fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (15 U.S.C. 78m or 78o(d)); and
|--- | --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------



|(2) | The information contained in the Form 10-Q fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the Company.
|--- | -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Dated: August 9, 2006



/s/ R. H. WOLLENBERGR. H. WOLLENBERGPresident, Chief Executive Officerand Chairman of the Board
Exhibit 10-b


 


 


April 18, 2003


 


VIA
FACSIMILE


 


Asset Funding Corporation


c/o Wachovia Bank, N.A.


100 North Main Street


Winston-Salem, NC 27150


Attn. Douglas K. Johnson


Facsimile (704) 365-1362


 


Re:                               Termination
of Receivables Purchase Agreement dated December 12, 2001 (the “Receivables
Purchase Agreement”) among ADC Receivables Corp. I, ADC Telecommunications,
Inc. Blue Ridge Asset Funding Corporation and Wachovia Bank, N.A.


 


Reference is
hereby made to the Receivables Purchase Agreement.  Capitalized terms used herein and not defined shall have the
meaning assigned to such terms in the Receivables Purchase Agreement.


 


ADC
Receivables Corp. I hereby provides notice and elects pursuant to Section
1.1(b) of the Receivables Purchase Agreement to immediately and irrevocably
reduce the Purchase Limit to $0.00 from its present level.  To the extent necessary or otherwise
required, ADC Receivables Corp. I also hereby provides notice and elects to
immediately and irrevocably terminate the facility evidenced by the Receivables
Purchase Agreement thereby triggering an Amortization Date and the Facility
Termination Date.


 


 


	
   

  	
   

  	
  Sincerely,

  
	
   

  	
   

  	
   

  
	
   

  	
   

  	
   

  
	
   

  	
   

  	
  /s/ Gokul V.
  Hemmady

  
	
   

  	
   

  	
  Gokul V.
  Hemmady

  
	
   

  	
   

  	
  Vice
  President and Treasurer of

  ADC Receivables Corp. I
Memorandum to File

- Composed January 7, 2013

Ammonia Phone Conversation between Omer Shalev, EPA Region 9 and Dave Brown, Sierra Pacific Industries, Inc.
Date of Phone Conversation

- November 13, 2012

In response to a voicemail message from Dave Brown, I provided a brief summary regarding the status of EPA’s documents summarizing and responding to comments received during the public comment period for the proposed PSD major modification at SPI

- Anderson. I inquired about the type of ammonia that SPI intends to use for the SNCR system to be installed in the new proposed stoker boiler. Mr. Brown stated that SPI intends to use anhydrous ammonia because it has found
it to be more effective at its other lumber mill facilities. In particular, Mr. Brown mentioned that three SPI facilities in California (Quincy, Lincoln and Anderson) along with another facility in Aberdeen, Washington successfully employ anhydrous ammonia for the SNCR system. Mr.
Brown also stated that each of the California facilities keep less than 10,000 lbs of the anhydrous ammonia on site at any particular point in time.
#### Allen v. State

110,370

07/24/2015

Denied.

Unpublished
DISSENT; Opinion File d November 4, 2021 

# S

In The 

### Court of Appeals Fifth District of Texas at Dallas No. 05-20-00486-CV ELIZABETH JONES BOYCE, Appellant V. VIKI LIVESAY EBERSTEIN AND KAREN LIVESAY SHUFORD, Appellees On Appeal from the 95th District Court Dallas County, Texas Trial Court Cause No. DC-17-00957 DISSENTING OPINION Before Justices Schenck, Pedersen, III, and Garcia Opinion by Justice Schenck My colleagues do an excellent job of addressing what little law exists regarding Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 141 and the good cause that may support a trial court’s decision to adjudge costs othe r than as provided by Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 131. Here, the trial judge stated two reasons for adjudging costs pursuant to Rule 141, neither of which the majority concludes may support the cost award. I agree with that conclusion. Where I depart from the majority is its conclusion that all of the costs awarded should be upheld on a basis that was argued to, but not relied upon by, the trial court in making the award.–2– Assuming that a benefit to the trust ma y ever be a valid basis for awarding costs in a manner other than that provided by Rule 131, 1 and given that basis was not the one upon which the trial court made the award, I question what amount the trial court would have awarde d had it made the award on a be nefit to the trust basis. Would it have been the full award of $12 1,000 or some other amount? Because the trial court did not state “benefit to the trus t” as good cause to support the cost award, we do not know how much the trial court would have awarded had it adjudged the cost award for that reason. As the trial co urt informed us that he believed that the award was premised on the respective partie s’ ability to pay and potential merit, either of which, if valid, would have su pported a full award, it seems unlikely that the costs would have been divided in th is manner had the cour t’s discretion been properly directed to the extent of benefit achieved. In other words, we do not know what amount the trial court would have aw arded on that basis, and thus we cannot determine the ultimate question of abuse of discretion. Therefore, I would reverse and remand this case to the trial court to determine whether the benefit to the trust here c onstitutes good cause to deviate from Rule 131, and, if so, to make a dete rmination of the appropriate amount of the cost award against the trust. See, e.g. , Rankin v. FPL Energy, LLC , 266 S.W.3d 506, 516 (Tex.

1 While I do not necessarily agree with it, I cannot fau lt the majority’s decision in this respect given the lack of an authoritative answer or meaningful guidanc e on this point. Nevertheless, this will now be the first case to so hold and involves a substantial award made on an apparently improper stated basis.–3– App.—Eastland 2008, pet. de nied) (reversing and remand ing to trial court to reconsider allocation of taxable costs wh ere stated reason was improper but record contained other information that could support Rule 141 good cau se determination). Accordingly, I dissent.

200486DF.P05 /David J. Schenck / DAVID J. SCHENCK JUSTICE