2004 D e c i sion s O p inion s of the U nit e d S t at e s C our t of Appe al s for the Thir d C ir c uit

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w . vi l l a no va . e du/thir dc ir c uit_2004/931NOT PRE CEDENT IAL UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FO R T HE TH IRD CIR CU IT

No. 03-1912

UNITED S TATES OF AMERI CA

v. FR ED DI E S IN KL ER , JR ., Appellant App eal from th e Un ited States District Co urt for the M iddle D istrict of P enns ylvania (D.C. Crimi nal No. 01-cr -00071) Distri ct Judge: Honorable Yvett e Kane Argued February

23, 2004 Be for e: R EN DE LL , BA RR Y a nd R OS EN N, Circu it Judges

.

(Fil ed March 17, 2004)

San fo rdA. Kre vs ky , E sq . [ ARGUED] KREVSKY & R OSEN 1101 North Front St

reet Harrisburg, PA 17102 Counsel for

Appellant Chr is ty H. Faw ce tt , E sq . [ ARGUED] OFFICE OF THE U.S . ATTORNEY Federal Bui lding 228 Walnut Stre et P.O. Box 11754 Harrisburg, PA 17108 Counsel for

Appellee1 The Distri ct Court ha d juri sdict ion under 18 U.S. C. § 3231, and we have j urisdi ction

ove r the app eal p ursu ant to 28 U .S.C . § 12 91 a nd 1 8 U .S.C . § 37 42( a). 2 OPINI ON OF THE COURT

RE ND EL L, Circuit

Judge

. After engagi ng in a high- speed chase wit h Harrisburg police officer s on January 7, 200 1, Fre ddie S inkler, Jr., w as arre sted an d cha rged with poss ession with intent to distribut e cocaine. The cocaine was di scovered, along with marijuana , cash, and drug paraphe rnalia, in a backp ack nea r the location w here Sink ler’s car had flippe d over, endin g his f

light fro m the autho rities. Th e U nited S tates D istrict Co urt for the M iddle Distri ct of Pennsylvania denied a moti on to suppre ss the c ontents of the backpack, and Sinkler subsequent ly

entere d a guilt

y pl ea to the drug charge pursuant to an agre ement that preserved hi s right

to appealthe suppr ession r uling. He was finall y se ntenced on Feb rua ry 19, 2 003 , to 2 12 m ont hs in priso n, fo llow ed b y 5 years of s upe rvise d re leas e. Sinkler now appeals, c halle nging only the deni al of hi s motion t o suppress the narcoti cs. Because we are unable t o discer n the fact

ual underpinnings of se veral of the District Cou rt’s conclusions, and because we ca nnot resolve the questions p resented he re oursel ves on the r ecord as i t st ands before us , we will vacate t he Distr ict Court ’s order and rem and to the D istrict Court for further p roceeding s regarding the issues we explore be lo w. 12 As the D istrict Court noted, app arently the car was ac tually registered to Sinkler’s

father, wh o shares the sa me na me an d address a s Sinkler. 3 I. BACKGROUND Sinkler initiate d the high- speed chase at approxi mately 2 a.m. on January

7, 2001, when officers patrol ling Harrisburg a pproached hi m in thei r car. At the time, Sinkl er was drivi ng a green Jee p Grand Cherokee with a s ki rack on top, which matche d the description of a

car thought

to be dri ven by Cli fford Bradle y, a suspect ed felon who had a hist oryof fleei ng from the pol ice. Officers fol lowed Sinkler ’s Jeep and soon lear ned, based o n the registration nu mber, that the ca r was reg istered to Sinkler. 2 One officer, who late r tes tifi ed at the suppress ion hearing in thi s case, stat ed that he had personal know ledge of S inkler from a prior enco unter w ith him, and w as awa re that Sinkler’s driver’s license had been su spende d. To asc ertain who was d riving the Jeep , the officers pulled up on its pass enger si de, but could only

discer n that t he driverwas an AfricanAm erica n m an w ho w as a lon e an d sp eak ing on a cell p hon e. The basic des cription of the car and i ts driver matched t hat of Bradl ey, so the officers attem pted to in itiate a stop . W hen they tu rne d on their ligh ts, the Jee p sp ed a wa y. An extended high- speed chase e nsued, i nvolving mul tipl e patrolcars and cove ring a signi ficant

dist ance. The offi cers t esti fied that during the chase , the driver of the Jee p made several attempts to swerve into the police car s that were pursuing him. The chase4

ended when Sinkler

lost controlof the Jee p on I-81 North, where the vehi cle col lided wit h apol ic e v an , w en t int o asp in , and c ame to re st turn edove r o nt o i ts dr iv er ’s si de . A s it s pun and turned ove r, t he officer s saw object s flying from the Jeep and landing on the highway medi an. Sinkler was arrest ed immediat ely . Contemporaneous ly with the arrest , offi cers on the scene seized and searched abackpack that was found approximat ely fift een feet from the car , res ting in smooth, undi sturbe d snow. The officer s discove red cocai ne, mari juana, cash , and d rug p araph ernalia inside th e bac kpac k. Sink ler w as sub sequ ently cha rged with possessi on with int ent to di stribute cocaine. He sought to have the cont ents of t he backpack suppre ssed on the grounds that he was il legal ly stopped pr ior t o the chase , rendering his ar

rest unlawful and t

he content s of the bac kpack “frui ts of a poi sonous tr ee” under Wong Sun v. United Stat es , 371 U.S. 471 ( 1963). He als o assert ed in pass ing that no physi cal evi dence li nked him to t he backpack. The Distri ct Court de nied his motion i n a memorandum and order fi led on July 27, 2001. The Court concluded that the offi cers had r easonable suspici on that t he suspect ed felon might

be driving Sinkler ’s car , based on t he informat ion avai lable to them at the time they first approach ed the car, and they were auth orized to con duct an inv estigatory stop und er Terry v. O hio , 392 U .S. 1 (19 68). F urther , the C ourt co nclud ed tha t even if reasonabl e suspic ion had been abs ent, there was no Fourth Amendment violation when the officers a ppro ache d Sin kler, du e to the fact th at he f led an d did not su bm it to their3 At oral argu ment, Sink ler’s counsel rene wed an argum ent mad e at the District Co urt

level, na mely, that th ere w as insu fficien t proo f that th e bac kpac k in fa ct belo nged to Sink ler. Ho we ver, this iss ue w as no t presse d in S inkler’s brief, a nd w e think it is actua lly not pro per ly bef

ore us o n ap pea l of th e issu es re lated to th e su ppr essio n de term inati on. After los ing the s uppressi on motion, Sinkler pled guilty

but res erved the right

to argue on appeal t hat the evidence s hould have been s uppressed. The argument regarding ownership of t

he backpack is not real ly one that impacts s uppressi on – although ownership of an i tem can become an is sue if t he government argues that the defendant lacks s tandin g to b ring a F ourth Am endm ent ch alleng e – bu t, as ma de he re by Sin kler, it 5 authori ty . In ot

her words, ba sed on Cal if orni a v . H odariD. , 499 U.S. 621 ( 1991), no seizur e of Sinkle r actua lly occurred until t

he conclusi on of the chas e. The Court next stat ed, i n conclusor

y fas hion and with no s tate d evident iary basis, that t

he seizur e of the backp ack w as valid beca use Sink ler had “ab andon ed” it. And finally, the Court concluded t

hat, even absent

abandonment, t

he officer s were justifie d in sei zing the backpack as par

t of a search inci dent to t he lawful ar

rest of Sinkler , as t

he backpack was fou nd i n “th e are as a djac ent to [Si nkl er’s] arre st.”

II . D IS CUSSI ON Bas edon t

he Dis tric t C our

t’ s o pi ni on and t

he pa rtie s’ ar gum en ts on a ppe al , w e have ident ifie d four separ ate ar guments or i ssues befor e us for cons ideration: 1) was Sinkler illegally stopped or seized before o r during the ch ase, rendering th e backp ack’s content s frui ts of a poi sonous tr ee?; 2) di d Sinkler abandon the backpa ck?; 3) coul d the backpack be le gally

searched incident

to Sinkl er’s arrest ?; and 4) coul d the search of the backpack be deemed part of a vali d inventor

y se arch? 3 Our standar d of revie w on each ofis an argument as to s uffici ency of t he evidence of gui lt. As such, i t would appear to be subs um ed w ithin his g uilty plea, an d no t really a sup pressio n issue at all. In an y event, we d o no t c ons id er

th is is su e o f o wne rs hi p t o be pr ope rlypr es en te d f orour re vi ew.

4 After oralargument, it i s unclear whether the Government has “abandoned” the abandonment argument , which i s barel y menti oned in it s brie f, or whethe r it will continue to pursue this issue on remand. We also not e that the Government only r eferred to the poss ibility of invo king the inv entory se arch is sue in a sho rt footn ote ne ar the e nd o f its brief. However, the Dist rict Court willbe free t o address t hese is sues if

the parties choose to expl ore them on re mand. 6 these is sues re quires us to lo ok at th e D istrict Co urt’s co nclus ions o f law de no vo, an d to

rev iew its fin din gs o f fa ct fo r clea r erro r. United States v. Coggins , 986 F.2d 651, 654 (3d Cir. 199 3). On appeal, Si nkler r eite rates his i niti al chal lenges, while the government contends t

hat the Distri ct Court properly held that the s earch was val id based on abandonment, incident

to arr est, and as an inve ntory search. 4 We will disc uss each of t he four is sues in t

urn. A. The Stop and Seizur e of Sinkle r We dispose of the firs t is sue rel ative ly easily. Sinkler

points to two rel evant moments in t ime when he contends an i llega l st op or sei zure of hi m occurred: the initial approach of t

he polic e car pri or to t

he chase, which he charact erize s as a st op, and the instant when his car struck a poli ce van to end the chase, which he characterizes as a seizur e. It

is well -est ablis hed that police officer s may conduct warrantl ess st ops of suspect s where they

have reasona

ble suspi cion, based on speci fic articul able fact s, t hat “crimi nal act ivit

y may be afoot. ” Terry , 3 92 U .S . at 3 0. A Terry stop is likewise appropri ate where offi cers have r easonable suspici on to beli eve that a person t

hey5 On ce su ch ph ysical forc e or sh ow of au thority is fou nd, the inqu iry then turn s to

whether a re asonable pe rson in t he suspect ’s posi tion would fe el fre e to le ave; i f not, t hen a se izur e ha s oc cur red

. Un ited Sta tes v. M ende nhall , 446 U .S. 544 , 554 ( 198 0). Th is sec ond stag e of

the s eizu re in qui ry is no t rele van t to o ur a nalysis of th is ca se.

6 Before disc ussing Hod ar i D. and findi ng that Sinkler di d not ini tial ly submit t o the offic ers’ sh ow of au thority, the D istrict Co urt dete rmine d that th e officers h ad rea sona ble suspicion to stop Sinkler prior to the c hase. Be cause w e conclud e that no stop o r seizure 7 enc oun ter w as in vol ved in a c om plete d fe lon y. United States v. Hensl ey , 469 U.S. 221, 229 (198 5). It is also clearly estab lished th at a sus pect is o nly seized , for F ourth Amendment purposes, where there ha s been an appl icat ion of phy sicalforce, or a show of authority to which the suspect submits. 5 Hod ar i D. , 499 U.S. at 626. Regarding the initial uns uccessfulatte mpt by t he officer s to conduct

an in ve sti ga to ry st op , w e f in d t hi s c as e to be sq ua re ly g ov er ne d b y Hod ar i D. There, t he suspect fled upon not icing an unmarked poli ce car appr oaching hi s group of companions on t he s treet , prio r to a ny sto p or con tact b y the p olice

. Id. at 622-23 . The Su preme C ourt determi ned that

he was neithe r stoppe d nor sei zed when the offic ers appr oached and pursued hi m, but rather was onl y act ually seized when he was t ackled by an officer

to end the c has e. Id. at 629. The officers here approached the Jeep and flashed their lights , intending to conduct

a Terry stop . No stop occ urre d, as Sin kler imm edia tely spe d aw ay. Rath er than subm itting to th eir sho w o f auth ority, Sinkle r fled, ju st like the susp ect in Hod ar i D. In fact , Sinkl er admit s in hi s brie f that “he did not

submit t o authori ty

at the stop l ight. ” Thus, we agree wit h the Dist

rict Court that

no ill egal st op or sei zure of Sinkler occurred prior t o the chase

. 6occurred when the officer s fir st appr oached Sinkl er in hi s Jeep, we need not decide

whether the facts he re gave ri se to r easonable suspici on just ify ing a st op at that time. 8 As to the col lis ion that

ended the chas e, Sinkl er conte nds that he was stopped and seized by the ap plication of p hysical fo rce w hen h is Jeep struck the po lice va n. H e poin ts to langu age fr om Hod ar i D. and B ro w er v. C ou nt y of In yo , 489 U .S. 593 (198 9), to support hi s contention that the col lis ion const itut ed a seizure for Fourth Amendment purposes. In both of t

hose cases , the Supreme Court dis cussed what t ypes of polic e behavior r esult

in a sei zure of the suspect . In Brower , the Court he ld that a seizure occurred where pol ice offi cers pl aced a tr actor- trai ler ac ross a hi ghway in or der to s top a flee ing sus pec t by ca usin g hi m to cras h in to it. 4 89 U .S. at 598 -99

. Then in Hod ar i D. , the C ourt n oted th at the “ laying on of h ands or ap plication of p hysical fo rce to re strain movement” is r eadil y cl assif ied as a s eizure . 499 U.S. at 626. Relying on these cases, Sinkler contends t

hat the police , usi ng a van invol ved in the pursuit , appl ied forc e and effectively

seized Sinkler i llega lly at the conclusi on of the chas e. Ho we ver, S inkler’s argu men t related to the co llision fa ils for tw o reas ons. F irst, the Dist rict Court made a finding that t he polic e van accid entally struc k the Jeep when Sinkler lost controlafter

making a u-t

urn. Given t

he testimony of t

he officer s at t

he sup pre ssio n he arin g su ppo rting this d eterm inati on, s uch a fin din g is n ot cle arly err one ous . In li ght of the finding t

hat the colli sion was unintentiona l, t his cas e is di sti nguished fr om Brower , where the Court emphasiz ed that a seizur e “requi res an intentional acquisi tion of9

physical c ontro l.” 489 U.S . at 595 -96 (e mp hasis a dded ). A ro adblo ck co nstruc ted w ith the expre ss purpose of causing asuspect to coll ide with it pres ents a ver y di fferent situa tion fro m a n ac cide ntal c rash wh ere th e su spe ct su dde nly los es c ont rol o f his veh icle. See id. (addressing and disti nguishing accidental coll isions when parties to a chase lose controlof thei r vehicl es). Since we willuphold the Dis tri ct Court’ s findi ng that t he colli sion her e was accident al, we cannot find a s eizure based upon Brower as Sinkl er urges. The second fatal flaw in Sinkler’s argument related to t he conclusion of the chase is the fact that by the time of the crash, even if a seizure had occurred whe n the cars collided, the police o fficers quite clearly had pro bable cau se to arrest Sinkler fo r a multi tude of traffic violations, as well as assaul t of a pol ice offi cer, ba sed on his a ctions during t he chase i tsel f. Furt

her, “unprovoked fli ght upon noti cing the police ” is a fa ctor that is al so significant in determining whether reasonable suspicion or probable cause exis t in a s ituat ion enc oun tered by the pol ice. Cf. Ill inois v. Wardlow , 528 U.S. 119, 124 (2000) (de scribing “headlong fl ight” a s “the cons ummate act of evas ion,” and something that i s reasona

bly suggestive of wrongdoing, in a case i nvolving a Terry stop). Thus, when Sinkler was ul timat ely seized and arres ted fol lowing the c hase, t hat sei zure was just ifie d based on his flight coupled with the obser vations of the pol ice offi cers dur ing their pursuit of him. We ther efore conclude that the Dist rict Court was corr ect i n holding that Sinkler was not

subject ed to any

ill egal st op or sei zure before , duri ng, or after the10

chase. The i ssues t

hat remai n involve a lter native methods of attacki ng the subse quent search of t

he backpack found near Sinkler ’s Jeep.

B. Abandonment Despite t he fact t hat nei ther par

ty rais ed the i ssue of abandonment below, the Distri ct Court, sua sponte , concluded that Sinkler abandoned the bac kpack, and t hat it was therefore p rope rly seized b y the polic e afte r the ch ase. T he D istrict Co urt reac hed th is conclusi on after

discuss ing Hod ar i D. , where a pol ice offi cer saw the de fendant t oss away a rock of crack coc aine w hile the officer w as chasing him. 499 U.S. at 623 . How ever, the Dist rict Court’s memorandum provi des no disc ussion of t he reasoning leadi ng the Court to t

he conclusi on that t

he backpack was abandoned i n this case. Abandonment requ ires som e type of

a sho win g that th e defenda nt intende d to rel inquis h possessi on and

con trol o f the obj ect in que stion

. See Black’s Law Dicti onary 2 (6th ed. 1990) (defi ning “abandoned proper

ty ” as “proper

ty over which the owner has given up domini on and contro l with n o inten tion of recov ering it” ); cf. Abel v. Unit ed State s , 362 U.S. 217, 240- 41 (1960) (finding that a suspect had abandoned items that he left behind in a hoteltrash can when he checked out of hi s room). Here, the re is no evidence as to how the backpack came to leave the car

– whether by

being tos sed out or

by being eject ed by t

he force of t

he crash. Additional ly , the Government, by impli cati on in it s brie f and by admi ssion at oral7 In resp onse to qu estions from the C ourt at o ral argu men t, the G over nm ent w as un able

to point to any direct or cir cumstanti al evi dence showing that Sinkl er thr ew the backpack out of the Jeep or i ntended t o abandon it . Although c ounsel for the Government stopped short of admitt ing that

she was “abandoning” the abandonment argument al togethe r, s he admitt ed that

her pri mary foc us was on the search inci dent to arrest and invent orysearch issues.

8 The Distri ct Court analogiz ed this case to Hod ar i D. and concluded t hat Sinkl er, l ike Hodari, had a

bandoned the cont

raband at the end of t

he chase. However, the re ason for this conclusi on is not

obvious t o us. I t is true t hat poli ce may se arch an i tem that has been aban don ed by a s uspe ct, as the susp ect retain s no re ason able e xpec tation o f priva cy in som ethin g th at he aba ndo ns. See Hod ar i D. , 499 U.S. at 629 (uphol ding the s eizure of drug s that w ere tos sed a wa y by a defe ndan t wh ile he ra n fro m p olice); Abel v. Unit ed States , 362 U .S. 217, 240 -41 (196 0) (upho lding the seizure o f aband oned item s that were left by the defend ant in a hotel trash ca n after the de fendan t had chec ked ou t of the hotel); Hester v. United States , 265 U .S. 57, 58 (192 4) (upho lding the seizure o f items that w ere aban don ed by de fend ants w ho w ere fle eing f rom offic ers w ho w ere pu rsuing defe ndan ts wit hou t a w arra nt). However, these c ases al l res t on the implication that some finding of

intent on the part of t he defendant to abandon the pr operty is re quired bef

ore a court

may conclude that the de fend ant ha s sacrif iced h is exp ectation of p rivacy w ith resp ect to th e pro perty inv olv ed. Not everything t hat is sit uated bey ond the defendant ’s pers on and the ar ea that he occupies or owns is aut omatical ly deemed “abandoned” for Four th Amendment purposes. Here, if

Sinkler in fact threw the ba ckpack out of t he Jeep’s window during or after the col lis ion, t

his cas e would become ident icalto Hod ar i D. and the sei zure of the backpack could be upheld under t he abandonment doctrine. But if the Government ca nn ot pr ov e d ire ctl y or cir cu m sta nt ial ly th at S in kl er in ten de d t o t os s th e b ac kp ac k a w ay, it s eems just

as li kely that t he impact of t

he coll isi on caused the backpack to fly fr om the Jeep. I f that

is the case, it would be t roubli ng to find t

hat Sinkl er somehow “abandoned” it and gave up his Fourth Amen dment rights with respect to i ts contents. 11 argument, may wellhave abandoned it s argument t hat Sinkl er abandoned t he backpack. 7 The record here d oes n ot app ear to in clude evide nce f rom wh ich w e cou ld

conc lude th at Sink ler inten ded to aban don the ba ckpa ck, an d that it d id no t simp ly fly from the car

during t he crash. 8 Because the par ties did not r aise or

explore t

his i ssue at the suppr ession he aring, we find it necessar y t o remand so that

the Court c an give further9 The Distri ct Court s imply concluded t

hat, because Sinkl er’s arrest was lawful, t

he police could prop erly seize th e bac kpac k du ring a s earch of “th e area s adjac ent to h is arres t.” However, we think t he issue of whether the backpack would properly be the sub ject o f a s earc h in cide nt to Sin kler ’s arr est is sub stan tially m ore com plica ted th an th at. We base this view on an exam ination of the case la w re lated to search es incid ent to a rrest, none of which the Dis tri ct Court referenced in its memorandum. The Supreme Court has confronte d the is sue of the proper scope of a s earch i ncident to an arr est on se veral occasions . For pur

poses of this cas e, i t is relevant to not e that , in c onnecti on with a lawful ar rest , the police are jus tifi ed in searching “the arres tee’s person and t he area ‘with in his im med iate co ntrol’ – cons truing th at phra se to m ean th e area from with in which he might gain possessi on of a weapon or destr uctibl e evidence. ” Chimel v. California , 395 U.S. 752, 763 (1969) (striking down a search of portions of a house beyond t he “area i nto which an ar rest ee might r each in or der to gr ab a weapon or

12 cons ideratio n to this poin t. C. Search Incident to Arrest The Distri ct Court a lso concluded that the backpack was pr operly seized during a valid s earch i ncident

to Sinkl er’s arrest , al though the Government did not ac tually i nvoke this exc eption to the w arrant re quirem ent an d Sin kler did not h ave a n op portu nity to respond to it below. A gain, the D istrict Court reached this conclusion in summ ary fash ion, w ithout d iscussin g the la w re lated to search es incid ent to a rrest or h ow the fa cts supported a finding that the search of the backpack could be justifi ed on this basis. Our review of the record does not convince us t

hat the Court could c onclude that the search o f the back pack w as proper b ecause it w as incident to Sin kler’s arrest. There

wa s no te stimo ny indica ting tha t Sink ler w as rem oved from the ca r and arrested with in reach of t

he backpack, whic h would provide t he legaljust ific ation f

or permit ting a s earch on this basis. 9 Again, becaus e the parties did not r aise or explore t

his i ssue befor e theevide ntiary items ”). As we have stated in the pa st, such a searc h is sub ject to g eogr aphic

and tem por al lim itatio ns. United S tates v. Myers , 308 F.3d 251, 266-67 (3d Cir . 2002) (examini ng this doctrine and it s development , and not ing that we should not as sume that the defen dant w as “an acro bat” or “a H oudini”). Where, as her e, a defendant is arres ted in hi s vehicl e, the Court has made cl ear that a contemporaneous search incident to his arres t may include the enti re passe nger compartment of t

he car, as well as “the cont ents of any contai ners found wit

hin the passenger

compartment. ” New Y ork v. Bel ton , 453 U .S. 454, 460 (1981). H owe ver, these “c ar” case s are not automati call y cont

roll ing here. We are unaware of anycases bind ing o n us th at exte nd th e sco pe of a searc h incid ent to th e arres t of a d efen dant in his vehicl e to inc lude items found beyond t he passenger

compartment of t

hat vehi cle. The Go ver nm ent r elies on a Sev enth Cir cuit c ase , United States v. Ric hardson , 121 F.3d 1051 (7th C ir. 1997 ), to sup port a s earch of the back pack base d on the fa ct that it w as likely wit hin Sin kler ’s rea ch ju st pri or to his a rrest , but we find that c ase to b e dis ting uish able

. In Richardson , the seizur e occurre d upon an invent orysearch of t he vehicl e’s cont ents, on the s cen e an d co ntem por ane ous ly with the d efe nda nt’s a rrest . Id. at 10 53- 54. Additional ly , the contai ner at i ssue the re was disc overed in t he passenger

compartment of the ve hicle , id. at 1053, a locat ion that is cl early

within t he scope described by

the Supreme Court in Belton

. Fina lly, we ha ve bin ding prece dent in our o wn circuit th at app ears to squa rely rejec t the Government ’s the orythat t he search s hould include ite ms to which Sinkl er may hav e ha d ac ces s prio r to h is arr est. See Myers , 308 F.3d at 253, 267 (s tri king down the search of a ba g that of

ficer s observed in the defendant ’s hand j ust pri or to hi s arre st, but that he drop ped a fe w fee t away from the spot w here he w as ultimately handcu ffed, w here the defendant

was immediately pi nned to the ground with hi s arms behi nd his back and the officers w aited a short time b efore searc hing the ba g). 13 Distric t Cou rt, and b ecau se the c onclu sion re ache d by the D istrict Co urt is no t clearly proper on this record, we are compelled to remand so that the record, and the parties’ argu men ts, can b e dev elope d m ore fu lly on this po int as w ell. D. Inventor

y Sear ch Presumably

in res ponse to t

he Distr ict Court ’s res ort t o the doctrines of aban don men t and s earch incide nt to arre st, the G over nm ent ad ded a mere foo tnote in its10 It is unc lear w hethe r the G over nm ent tak es the p osition that the police we re actu ally

performing an inventor y se arch of the Jeep’s content s at t he time t he backpack was seized, or that

the backpack would have inevi tably been taken in and searche d when the Jeep was impounded and i ts i nventory was catal ogued. It

is well -est ablis hed that police department s can conduct inventor y se arches of vehi cles t

hat the y i mpound, and that such sea rch es c an in vol ve th e op enin g of con taine rs fo und insid e the veh icle. Florid a v. W ells , 495 U.S. 1, 3- 4 (1990). While the bac kpack here, if it is somehow properly l inked to t he Jeep or t o Sinkler , mayhave been sei zed as part of an invent orysearch, we cannot determi ne whether such asearch would have inevitably led to t he discover

y of t he bac kpa ck’ s co nten ts. See Nix v. Wil li ams , 467 U.S. 431 ( 1984) (di scussi ng the doctrine of ine vitable disco very); United States v. Vasquez de Rey es , 149 F.3d 192 ( 3d Cir. 1998) (same). N one of

the testimony from the suppre ssion hearing indicates that the officers were c onduc ting an inven tory search on the sce ne. Ad ditionally, none of the officers testified as to wh ether and h ow the Harrisburg Police D epartmen t conduc ts inventory searches . On remand, t he burden of proving by a pr eponderance of t he evidence t

hat the backpack would have i nevita bly been the subj ect of an i nventory search wil l res t with t

he Go ver nm ent. Vasquez de Reyes , 149 F.3d at 195. The Gov ernment, of course, will al so bear the burden of provi ng all relevant excepti ons to the warrant r equirement and any other gr ounds for a per

missi ble search that

may appl y her e, i ncluding t he abandonment of the ba ckpa ck, as w ell as its statu s with respe ct to the scop e of a search incide nt to Sink ler’s arre st. 14 brie f on app eal n otin g th at the seiz ure of th e ba g w as a lso p art o f a v alid i nve nto ry sear ch. Counsel for t

he Government pursued t his i ssue at

oral argument as well . But, again, the issue was not

referenc ed by t

he parti es or the Distr ict Court , the Government does not expand on it

here, and Sinkler

has not r esponded to i t. Fur ther, the rec ord contains no evidence related to the H arrisburg Po lice Depa rtment’s policy regarding inventory searches , and the polic e officer s who testi fied at the suppr ession he aring di d not charact erize the search of the backpac k as part of an invent orysearch. 10 As the recor d is not

developed at

all on t his i ssue, the parties shoul d be given an opportuni ty

to explore whether the backpack was (or would have been) found t hrough an11 As we conclude, we note t hat we are t

roubled by

the curs orymanner in which t he Distri ct Court t

reate d many of these is sues, perhaps mis guided by the fai lure of c ounsel for bot h pa rties to reco gni ze a nd e xpl ore wit h pr ecis ion sev eral o f the key iss ues belo w. In a case where t

he defendant i s facing ne arly eighte en years in prison, as in any other crimin al case , care m ust be taken that the reaso ning and c onclu sions a re sufficien tly thorough and well -craft ed. 15 inventory s earch conducted pursuant to this police depart ment’s routine procedures.

II I. CONCLUS ION While we conclude t

hat Sinkl er was not i llega lly stopped or

seized, and that probable c ause exis ted to arrest him foll owing the chase , we are l eft with several

unre solva ble arg um ents as to w hy the sea rch o f the b ackp ack m ay have been perm issible with out a w arrant. 11 Upo n exam ining the D istrict Court’s mem orandu m and the record submitt ed to us on appea l, we remai n unable t o discer n the basi s for conclusions t he Distri ct Court reached involving Sinkl er’s “ abandonment” of the backpack, and the search incident

to Sinkl er’s arrest . If neither of t hese argument s prevai ls, the Go ver nm ent’ s co nten tion that i t wa s a v alid i nve nto ry sear ch w ill ne ed to be d eve lop ed. Accordingly , we will VAC ATE the order of the Dis tri ct Court de nyi ng Sinkler ’s moti on to suppre ss evide nce, and we willREM AND to the Dis tri ct Court f or furt her procee dings consistent with t

his opi nion.16