Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 18A-EX-1243 | December 27, 2018 Page 1 of 21

ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLANTS –

NORTHCREST R.V. PARK, BARBEE 

LANDING MOBILE HOME PARK,

AND KUHN LAKE LAKESIDE RESORT

Bette J. Dodd

Joseph P. Rompala

Tabitha L. Balzer

Lewis & Kappes, P.C.

Indianapolis, Indiana

ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLANT – PINE 

BAY RESORT

Jeffery A. Earl

Danville, Indiana

Robert M. Glennon

Danville, Indiana

ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE

Eric M. Blume

Larry L. Barnard

Andrew D. Boxberger

Carson LLP

Fort Wayne, Indiana

ATTORNEY FOR INTERVENOR

Donald J. Tribbett

Tribbett Law Office

Logansport, Indiana

I N T H E

COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 18A-EX-1243 | December 27, 2018 Page 2 of 21

Northcrest R.V. Park, Barbee 

Landing Mobile Home Park, 

Kuhn Lakeside Resort, and Pine 

Bay Resort,

Appellants-Complainants,

v.

Lakeland Regional Sewer 

District,

Appellee-Respondent,

and

Indiana Regional Sewer District 

Association,

Appellee-Intervenor.

December 27, 2018

Court of Appeals Case No.

18A-EX-1243

Appeal from the Indiana Utility 

Regulatory Commission

The Honorable James F. Huston, 

Chairman

The Honorable Sarah E. Freeman

The Honorable David E. Ziegner

The Honorable David Ober,

Commissioners

The Honorable Lora L. Manion, 

Administrative Law Judge

IURC Cause No.

44973

Najam, Judge.

Statement of the Case

[1] Northcrest R.V. Park, Barbee Landing Mobile Home Park, Kuhn Lakeside 

Resort, and Pine Bay Resort (collectively, “the Mobile Home Parks”) appeal 

the decision of the Indiana Utility Regulatory Commission (“IURC”) in favor 

of the Lakeland Regional Sewer District (“the Sewer District”). The Mobile 

Home Parks raise two issues for our review, but we find the following issue 

dispositive: whether the IURC lacked jurisdiction to determine whether the 

Sewer District had erred when the Sewer District classified the Mobile Home 

Parks as “mobile home courts” rather than as “campgrounds” in the course of 
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the Sewer District’s exercise of its ratemaking authority. We hold that the 

IURC lacked jurisdiction to review that issue, and, as such, the IURC properly 

entered summary judgment for the Sewer District and dismissed the Mobile 

Home Parks’ complaints. Thus, we affirm.

Facts and Procedural History

[2] The Sewer District is a regional sewer district in Kosciusko County, and the 

Mobile Home Parks are each located in the Sewer District’s service area. In 

2015, the Sewer District enacted Ordinance No. 2015-02 (“the ordinance”),1

which provided in relevant part as follows:

Section 1. Unless the context specifically indicates otherwise, the 

meaning of the terms used in this ordinance shall be as follows:

* * *

b. “Campground” shall mean any real property that is set 

aside and offered by a Person for direct or indirect 

remuneration of the owner, lessor, or operator thereof for 

parking or accommodation of Recreational Vehicles, tents, 

camper trailers, camping trucks, motor homes, and/or 

similar shelters that are not designed for permanent or 

year-round occupancy.

* * *

 

1

 The Sewer District subsequently enacted several ordinances that amended Ordinance No. 2015-02, but it is 

undisputed that each subsequent ordinance maintained the original definitions as relevant here. 
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m. “Mobile Home” shall mean a residential structure that 

is transportable in one or more sections, is thirty-five (35) 

feet or more in length with the hitch, is built on an integral 

chassis, is designed to be used as a place of human 

occupancy when connected to the required utilities, 

contains the plumbing, heating, air conditioning, and/or 

electrical systems in the structure, and is constructed so 

that it may be used with or without permanent foundation.

n. “Mobile Home Court” shall mean a parcel of land 

containing two or more spaces, with required 

improvements and utilities, used for the long-term 

placement of Mobile Homes.

* * *

t. “Recreational Vehicle” shall mean a travel trailer, park 

model, collapsible trailer, truck-mounted camper, or motor 

home. A “Recreational Vehicle” is not a “Mobile Home.”

Appellants’ App. Vol. IV at 80-82. The Sewer District then implemented 

different rates based on, as relevant here, whether it had classified a property as 

a campground or as a mobile home court. See, e.g., Appellants’ App. Vol. VIII 

at 61-62.

[3] The Sewer District did a site inspection of each of the Mobile Home Parks. 

According to that site inspection, one property “had 45 mobile homes and one 

recreational vehicle”; another “had 28 mobile homes”; a third “had 12 mobile 

homes, two recreational vehicles[,] and one empty lot”; and the fourth “had at 

least 22 mobile homes and at least three recreational vehicles.” Appellants’ 
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App. Vol. II at 90. Based on that information, the Sewer District classified each 

of the Mobile Home Parks as mobile home courts. Some of the Mobile Home 

Parks asked the Sewer District to reconsider their classifications, which requests 

the Sewer District denied in August and September of 2015. 

[4] None of the Mobile Home Parks filed a petition for declaratory judgment 

asking a court to review the ordinance’s definitions. Instead, in late 2015 and 

early 2016, several of the Mobile Home Parks filed complaints with the IURC, 

in IURC Cause Number 44798 (“the first IURC action”), asking the IURC to 

review their classifications under the ordinance. However, the IURC dismissed

those complaints without prejudice on the ground that they were not yet ripe as 

the Sewer District had not yet billed any of the Mobile Home Parks. 

Appellants’ Addend. at 8;2see also Ind. Code § 13-26-11-2.1 (2018).

[5] Shortly thereafter, the Sewer District issued its first bills to the Mobile Home 

Parks at the rates established for mobile home courts, at which time the Mobile 

Home Parks filed their complaints against the Sewer District with the IURC in

Cause Number 44973 (“the second IURC action”). In their complaints, the 

Mobile Home Parks again challenged their classifications under the ordinance

 

2

 Indiana Appellate Rule 50(A)(2)(h) directs appellants to include in their appendices “any record material 

relied on in the brief unless the material is already included in the Transcript.” And Indiana Appellate Rule 

22(C) requires “[a]ny factual statement” by a party to be “supported by a citation” to “an Appendix” or to 

“the Transcript or exhibits.” If such a statement is additionally supported by material included in an 

addendum to a brief, the party’s citation should be “to the Appendix or Transcript and to the Addendum to 

Brief.” Ind. Appellate Rule 22(C) (emphasis added). Here, the Mobile Home Parks have included the 

documents from the first IURC action as well as the Kosciusko Superior Court’s July 2017 order only in an 

addendum to their briefs and not also in their appendices, which is contrary to our appellate rules.
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as mobile home courts rather than as campgrounds.3 Meanwhile, the Sewer 

District moved for declaratory judgment in the Kosciusko Superior Court on 

the ground that the ordinance definitions were a lawful exercise of the Sewer 

District’s authority. The Kosciusko Superior Court stayed the declaratory 

judgment proceeding during the pendency of the second IURC action.

[6] In November of 2017, the Mobile Home Parks and the Sewer District moved 

for summary judgment in the second IURC action. On May 16, 2018, the 

IURC entered summary judgment for the Sewer District. In its order, the 

IURC rejected the Sewer District’s argument that the IURC lacked subject 

matter jurisdiction to review the Sewer District’s classification of the Mobile 

Home Parks. Instead, the IURC concluded that, because Indiana Code Section 

13-26-11-2.1 permits the IURC to review specific billing disputes between

regional sewer districts and “campgrounds,” the IURC had “implicit 

jurisdiction to adjudicate whether a regional sewer district has properly 

classified [an entity] as a campground . . . .” Appellants’ App. Vol. II at 40-41

(capitalization removed). 

[7] Nonetheless, the IURC also concluded that Indiana law “does not authorize 

the [IURC] to approve or revise regional sewer district ordinances regarding

customer rates and classifications” but that, instead, the IURC only “has 

 

3

 Later, the Indiana Regional Sewer District Association (“IRSDA”) moved to intervene in the second 

IURC action, which the IURC permitted. The IRSDA has also filed a brief in this appeal in support of the 

Sewer District.
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authority to resolve billing disputes” under Indiana Code Section 13-26-11-2.1. 

Id. at 44. In light of that conclusion, the IURC decided that the Sewer District 

had “acted within its legal authority to adopt rates and to make classifications.” 

Id. at 46-47. The IURC also concluded that the Mobile Home Parks “did not 

apply the requirements in [the Sewer District’s] definition of Campground to 

their properties” in support of their motions for summary judgment; as such, 

the IURC found that, insofar as it had the authority to determine the question, 

the Mobile Home Parks had failed to support their classification disputes with 

designated evidence. Id. at 47. The IURC then entered summary judgment for 

the Sewer District and “dismissed” the Mobile Home Parks’ complaints. Id. at 

48. This appeal ensued.

Discussion and Decision

Standard of Review

[8] The Mobile Home Parks appeal the IURC’s entry of summary judgment for the 

Sewer District. “This Court reviews summary judgments de novo.” Erie Indem. 

Co. v. Estate of Harris, 99 N.E.3d 625, 629 (Ind. 2018). Summary judgment is 

appropriate only when the designated evidence shows that there is no genuine 

issue of material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a 

matter of law. Id. (citing Ind. Trial Rule 56(C)). We may affirm the IURC’s 

decision on summary judgment “on any theory or basis supported by the 

record.” See Markey v. Estate of Markey, 38 N.E.3d 1003, 1006-07 (Ind. 2015).
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[9] This appeal turns on whether the Indiana General Assembly has conferred 

jurisdiction on the IURC to review the Sewer District’s classifications of its 

users. “‘To the extent the issue turns on statutory construction, whether an 

agency possesses jurisdiction over a matter is a question of law for the courts.’” 

Walczak v. Labor Works-Ft. Wayne LLC, 983 N.E.2d 1146, 1152 (Ind. 2013) 

(quoting Ind. Dep’t of Envtl. Mgmt. v. Twin Eagle LLC, 798 N.E.2d 839, 844 (Ind. 

2003)). That is, the issue of “statutory construction . . . on the question of [an 

agency’s] jurisdiction . . . lies squarely within the judicial bailiwick.” Id. at 

1153.

[10] As the Indiana Supreme Court has explained:

[W]hen we construe any statute, our primary goal is to effectuate 

legislative intent. Shepherd Props. Co. v. Int’l Union of Painters & 

Allied Trades. Dist. Council 91, 972 N.E.2d 845, 852 (Ind. 2012). 

We presume the General Assembly intended the statutory 

language to be applied logically and consistently with the 

statute’s underlying policy and goals, id., and we avoid 

construing a statute so as to create an absurd result. St. Vincent 

Hosp. & Health Care Ctr. Inc. v. Steele, 766 N.E.2d 699, 704 (Ind. 

2002).

Id. at 1154.

The Sewer District’s Broad and Exclusive 

Authority to Classify Users Under the Indiana Code

[11] Regional sewer districts are the entities responsible for setting the rates and 

charges necessary for the collection, treatment, and disposal of sewage in their 

regions. I.C. § 13-26-11-8; see also Appellants’ App. Vol. VI at 230-31. Regional 
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sewer districts are empowered by statute to base their rates and charges for each 

user “on a combination of . . . factors,” namely: the number of connections at a 

premises; the amount of water used; the number and size of outlets; the 

“amount, strength, or character of sewage discharged”; the size of the sewer 

connections; whether a given premises has been or will be required to pay 

separately for the cost of any facilities of the regional sewer district; and any 

“other factors” the regional sewer district “determines is necessary to establish 

nondiscriminatory, just, and equitable rates or charges.” I.C. § 13-26-11-2. A 

regional sewer district’s rates and charges to its users must by law “produce 

sufficient revenue” for the operation of the regional sewer district, and rates and 

charges that fail to do so “are unlawful.” I.C. § 13-26-11-9.

[12] Pursuant to their ratemaking authority, Indiana Code Section 13-26-11-4 

authorizes regional sewer districts, in the “exercise [of] reasonable discretion,” 

to adopt nonuniform rates and charges that correspond with 

“classifications . . . based upon variations in the costs of furnishing the services, 

including capital expenditures required, to various classes of users . . . .” In 

other words, our legislature has committed to regional sewer districts the 

authority to define “various classes of users” within the district. I.C. § 13-26-11-

4. That authority is inexorably intertwined with a regional sewer district’s

ratemaking authority. See I.C. §§ 13-26-11-2, -4. 

[13] We have previously recognized that a regional sewer district’s use of an 

ordinance to define and classify a user as a “mobile home court rather than a 

campground . . . falls under its ratemaking authority.” Yankee Park Homeowner’s 
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Ass’n, Inc. v. LaGrange Cty. Sewer Dist., 891 N.E.2d 128, 130-31 (Ind. Ct. App. 

2008), trans. denied. Indeed, the definitions of “mobile home court” and 

“campground” at issue in Yankee Park were substantially similar to the Sewer 

District’s definitions here. See id. at 132-33. And, in the more-than-ten years 

since this Court’s decision in Yankee Park, the Indiana General Assembly has 

not amended the relevant provisions of the Indiana Code to either supersede 

our analysis or to define “campground” for our regional sewer districts. Cf. 

Myers v. Crouse-Hinds Div. of Cooper Indus., Inc., 53 N.E.3d 1160, 1163-64 (Ind. 

2016) (stating that the Court would not reconsider prior judicial holdings and

would instead apply the doctrine of legislative acquiescence in light of the 

“considerable time” that had passed since the prior holdings without statutory 

amendment) (quotation marks omitted). Our opinion in Yankee Park informs

our disposition of the instant appeal.

[14] Although Section 13-26-11-4 leaves defining classes of users to the discretion of 

regional sewer districts, Indiana Code Section 13-26-11-2 (“Section 2”) states 

that, when a regional sewer district levies a rate or charge against a 

“campground,” the following occurs:

(b) A campground . . . may be billed for sewage service at a flat 

rate or by installing, at the campground’s . . . expense, a meter to 

measure the actual amount of sewage discharged by the 

campground . . . into the sewers. If a campground . . . elects to 

be billed by use of a meter: 

(1) the rate charged by a board [of trustees of a regional 

sewer district] for the metered sewage service may not 
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exceed the rate charged to residential customers for 

equivalent usage;

* * *

(c) If a campground . . . does not install a meter under subsection 

(b) and is billed for sewage service at a flat rate . . . :

(1) each campsite at the campground may not equal more 

than one-third (1/3) of one (1) resident equivalent unit;

* * *

(d) The board may impose additional charges on a 

campground . . . under subsections (b) and (c) if the board incurs 

additional costs that are caused by any unique factors that apply 

to providing sewage service for the campground . . . , including, 

but not limited to:

(1) the installation of:

(A) oversized pipe; or

(B) any other unique equipment;

necessary to provide sewage service for the 

campground . . . ; and

(2) concentrations of biochemical oxygen demand (BOD) 

that exceed federal pollutant standards.
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[15] We also note that Indiana Code Section 13-26-11-13 establishes a procedure by 

which “the lesser of fifty (50) or ten percent (10%) of the ratepayers of the 

district may file a written petition objecting to the initial rates and charges” 

established by a regional sewer district’s initial ratemaking ordinance. The 

regional sewer district’s order on such a petition may then be appealed to an 

Indiana trial court with jurisdiction over the district. I.C. § 13-26-11-13(h). 

Indiana Code Section 13-26-11-15 establishes a similar procedure of 

administrative and judicial review of a regional sewer district’s ordinance, but 

the procedure established in that section is expressly limited to “an ordinance 

increasing sewer rates and charges at a rate that is greater than five percent (5%) 

per year, as calculated from the rates and charges in effect from the date of the 

district’s last rate increase . . . .” That is, the procedure outlined in Section 13-

26-11-15 is limited to petitions to review certain increases over previously 

established rates and charges. However, neither Section 13-26-11-13 nor 

Section 13-26-11-15 prohibits a user from seeking declaratory relief from a 

regional sewer district’s ordinance. See, e.g., Yankee Park, 891 N.E.2d at 130.

The IURC’s Highly Limited Authority to Review 

Specific Assessments and Charges Levied by 

a Regional Sewer District Against a “Campground”

[16] The IURC is

primarily . . . a fact-finding body with the technical expertise to 

administer the regulatory scheme devised by the legislature. 

United Rural Elec. Membership Corp. v. Ind. & Mich. Elec. Co., 549 

N.E.2d 1019 (Ind. 1990); See Ind. Code § 8-1-1-5 (2008). The 

[IURC’s] assignment is to insure that public utilities provide 
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constant, reliable, and efficient service to the citizens of Indiana. 

Ind. Bell Tel. Co. v. Ind. Util. Regulatory Comm’n, 715 N.E.2d 351, 

354 n.3 (Ind. 1999). The [IURC] can exercise only power 

conferred upon it by statute. United Rural Elec. Membership Corp., 

549 N.E.2d at 1021.

N. Ind. Pub. Serv. Co. v. U.S. Steel Corp., 907 N.E.2d 1012, 1015 (Ind. 2009). It is 

well established that, “if the power to act has not been conferred by statute” to

the IURC, “it does not exist. . . . Accordingly, any doubt about the existence of 

authority must be resolved against a finding of authority.” S.E. Ind. Nat. Gas Co. 

v. Ingram, 617 N.E.2d 943, 947 (Ind. Ct. App. 1993) (citations omitted). 

[17] Indiana Code Section 13-26-11-2.1 (“Section 2.1”) is narrowly drawn and

authorizes the IURC to conduct a limited review of certain rates and charges 

levied by a regional sewer district against a “campground.” In particular, 

Section 2.1 states:

(b) This section applies to an owner or operator of a 

campground . . . who disputes:

(1) that the campground is being billed at rates charged to 

residential customers for equivalent usage as required by 

section 2(b)(1) of this chapter;

(2) the number of resident equivalent units determined for 

the campground under section 2(c) of this chapter; or

(3) that any additional charges imposed on the 

campground under section 2(d) of this chapter are 

reasonable or nondiscriminatory.
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* * *

(e) In any case in which the basic monthly charge for a 

campground’s sewage service is in dispute, the owner or operator 

shall pay, on any disputed bill issued while a review under this 

section is pending, the basic monthly charge billed . . . . If the 

basic monthly charge paid while the review is pending exceeds 

any monthly charge determined by the [IURC] . . . the board 

shall refund or credit the excess amount paid to the owner or 

operator. If the basic monthly charge paid while the review is 

pending is less than any monthly charge determined by the 

appeals division or [IURC] . . . the owner or operator shall pay 

the board the difference owed.

* * *

(h) The right of a campground owner or operator to request a 

review under this section is in addition to the right of the 

campground owner or operator to file a petition under section 15 

of this chapter [relating to certain increases in previously 

established rates and charges] as a freeholder of the district . . . .

As with Section 2, Section 2.1 leaves “campground” undefined. See I.C. §§ 13-

26-11-2, -2.1.

The IURC Incorrectly Read Section 2.1 

as a Grant of Jurisdiction to the IURC over

the Sewer District’s Classification of Users

[18] The Mobile Home Parks filed their complaints with the IURC against the 

Sewer District on the theory that they were “campgrounds” under Section 2.1, 

even though they were not campgrounds under the Sewer District’s ordinance. 

According to the Mobile Home Parks on appeal, “the lack of statutory 
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definition [of ‘campground’ in Section 2.1] mandates . . . that the [IURC]—not 

the regional sewer district—must define ‘campground’ for purposes of 

determining whether a regional sewer district’s charges comport with the 

statute.” NBK Complainants’ Br. at 26. The Mobile Home Parks assert that, 

“to hold otherwise . . . effectively nullifies the [IURC’s] statutory duty [under 

Section 2.1] to review rate disputes and would lead to absurd results.” Id. The 

Mobile Home Parks also assert that, under a broad dictionary definition of 

“campground,” they have standing under Section 2.1 to petition for IURC 

review of their assessed rates and charges, even though the Mobile Home Parks

have not been classified as campgrounds by the Sewer District in the first 

instance and have no campground-related rates and charges to dispute.

[19] In its response, the Sewer District argues that, under Section 2 and Indiana 

Code Section 13-26-11-4, it has exclusive jurisdiction over the definition and

classification of its users for ratemaking purposes, and nothing in Section 2.1 

confers jurisdiction on the IURC to review those definitions. In its order on 

summary judgment, the IURC appeared to conclude both that it had 

jurisdiction to interpret “campground” under Section 2.1—and, thus, to impose 

its own definition on regional sewer districts—and also that the IURC was 

required to defer to the Sewer District’s lawfully enacted definition.

[20] We agree with the Sewer District’s reading of the relevant statutes. The 

statutory responsibility for the classification of users of a regional sewer 

district’s services is committed to the regional sewer districts, not to the IURC. 

I.C. § 13-26-11-4. Section 2 then sets out in detail numerous factors a regional 
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sewer district may take into account in setting rates and charges for each class 

of its users. I.C. § 13-26-11-2. And Section 2.1 is in pari materia with the Sewer 

District’s ratemaking authority. Statutes that are in pari materia “relat[e] to the 

same subject matter” and, as such, “should be construed together to produce a 

harmonious statutory scheme.” Campbell Haufeld/Scott Fetzer Co. v. Johnson, 109 

N.E.3d 953, 958 (Ind. 2018) (quotation marks omitted). Section 2.1 is expressly 

premised on rates and charges levied against campgrounds under Section 2; that 

is, Section 2.1 operates in tandem with Section 2 and the rest of the Indiana 

Code’s conferral of ratemaking power on a regional sewer district.

[21] Indeed, Section 2.1(b) is narrowly drawn and grants to the IURC the authority 

to hear appeals from campgrounds over rates and charges levied by a regional 

sewer district only in three highly limited circumstances. First, the IURC may 

review a dispute brought by a metered campground as to whether a regional 

sewer district has properly billed the campground “at rates charged to 

residential customers for equivalent usage as required . . . .” I.C. § 13-26-11-

2.1(b)(1). Second, the IURC may review a dispute from a campground that is 

billed at a flat rate and asserts that a regional sewer district has improperly 

determined “the number of resident equivalent units” for billing purposes. I.C. 

§ 13-26-11-2.1(b)(2). And, third, the IURC may review a dispute brought by a 

campground regarding an “additional charge,” which regional sewer districts 

may bill specifically to campgrounds in certain circumstances, on the ground 

that such charge is unreasonable or discriminatory. I.C. § 13-26-11-2.1(b)(3). 
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[22] None of those three bases for IURC review touches on any of the other 

numerous and expressly identified factors a regional sewer district may consider 

under Section 2 in setting rates or charges. Rather, the three limited bases for 

IURC review under Section 2.1 are simply claims of an incorrect billing 

process. Indeed, each scenario under Section 2.1 is premised on a regional 

sewer district having already classified a user as a campground and then 

improperly assessed or charged the user as a campground. It is that assessment 

or charge, not the classification, that is then the basis for IURC review.

[23] Other provisions of the Indiana Code support the Sewer District’s reading of 

the statutory scheme. Namely, each of the three bases for IURC review under 

Section 2.1 requires the user to initially pay the bill in dispute and then be 

refunded if the appeal to the IURC is successful. I.C. § 13-26-11-2.1(e). This 

process requires an assessment or charge to a user the regional sewer district has 

already classified as a campground to have previously occurred. Similarly, 

subsection (h) of Section 2.1 states that IURC review under that statute is “in 

addition” to administrative and judicial review “under section 15”—as noted 

above, Indiana Code Section 13-26-11-15 relates exclusively to certain increases

in established rates. It does not relate to initial ratemaking, which is when 

classifications are most likely to be first defined, even if subsequent ordinances 

adopt the previously established definitions. See I.C. § 13-26-11-13 (providing 

for administrative and judicial review from initial ratemaking ordinances). In 

other words, the statutory scheme reflects the clear intent of the General 

Assembly to give the IURC jurisdiction to engage in limited review of certain 
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billing disputes, nothing more, between regional sewer districts and 

campgrounds.

[24] The Mobile Home Parks conflate the authority of regional sewer districts to 

enact ordinances that classify users with the IURC’s authority to review specific

billing disputes. Indeed, under the Mobile Home Parks’ argument, each and 

every user in a regional sewer district would have standing to seek IURC review 

of a regional sewer district’s classifications, and thus its rates, so long as that 

user takes some broad act that qualifies as “camping.” See, e.g., NBK 

Complainants’ Br. at 36-38. This reasoning is backwards. IURC review under 

Section 2.1 is limited to users who have already been classified as campgrounds 

by a regional sewer district and then improperly billed in one of three specific 

ways; it does not apply to users who claim to have been improperly classified 

and thus never properly billed at all. 

[25] Moreover, the Mobile Home Parks’ reasoning would confer jurisdiction on the 

IURC under Section 2.1 to redefine a regional sewer district’s classifications 

without considering the myriad of factors that a regional sewer district 

considers under Section 2, which is contrary to the ratemaking directives 

established in the Indiana Code. If the General Assembly had intended for 

Section 2.1 to confer jurisdiction on the IURC to define, review, or otherwise 

interject itself into a regional sewer district’s classifications and corresponding 

ratemaking discretion, we think the General Assembly would have plainly said 

so. See, e.g., S.E. Ind. Nat. Gas Co., 617 N.E.2d at 947. And this conclusion is 
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consistent with the legislative silence following our decision in Yankee Park. See 

Myers, 53 N.E.3d at 1163-64.

[26] Still, on appeal the Mobile Home Parks substantially rely on language from the 

IURC’s dismissal order in the first IURC action. In particular, in that order the 

IURC opined that it might have the authority under Section 2.1 to impose a 

definition of “campground” on regional sewer districts. But that language was 

obvious dicta as it had no bearing on the decision to dismiss due to the absence 

of any billing at the time. As such, it was not binding on the IURC in the 

second IURC action, let alone on this Court now.

[27] The Mobile Home Parks further assert that subsection (i) of Section 2.1 

authorizes the IURC to promulgate rules in furtherance of the authority 

conferred on the IURC under that statute. The Mobile Home Parks reason that 

that rule-making authority means the IURC can use Section 2.1 to impose a 

definition of “campground” on regional sewer districts. This argument is a 

nonstarter. The IURC’s authority under Section 2.1 to promulgate rules in 

furtherance of the statute cannot be expanded to promulgate rules that would 

supersede the statute.

[28] We hold that the IURC erred when it concluded that it had jurisdiction under 

Section 2.1 to independently define a “campground” for purposes of 

ratemaking by regional sewer districts. The Indiana Code expressly commits

the authority to define a regional sewer district’s classes of users to the 

discretion of the ratemaking authority, the regional sewer district. I.C. § 13-26-
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 18A-EX-1243 | December 27, 2018 Page 20 of 21

11-4. The IURC is then authorized to review only certain expressly limited 

assessments or charges levied by a regional sewer district against a user already 

classified as a campground by the regional sewer district. I.C. § 13-26-11-2.1. 

Insofar as the IURC concluded below that it has jurisdiction to consider 

whether a complainant is a “campground” for purposes of standing to seek 

IURC review under Section 2.1, we hold that that review is limited to simply 

determining whether the complainant has been billed as a campground by the 

regional sewer district. As a reviewing body, the IURC may not “substitute its 

own judgment for the municipality’s discretionary authority . . . .” Bd. of Dirs. of 

Bass Lake Conservancy Dist. v. Brewer, 839 N.E.2d 699, 701 (Ind. 2005) (quotation 

marks omitted).

[29] Here, the Mobile Home Parks were not classified as campgrounds by the Sewer 

District. Accordingly, they lacked standing to petition the IURC for review 

under Section 2.1, and their request to have the IURC review their classification 

as mobile home courts is not within the scope of jurisdiction conferred by the 

General Assembly on the IURC in Section 2.1. If the Mobile Home Parks are 

dissatisfied with the Sewer District’s narrow definition of “campground” in the 

ordinance, they may be able to seek declaratory relief. See, e.g., Yankee Park, 891 

N.E.2d at 130; see also Appellants’ App. Vol. VI at 232 (“If a [regional sewer 

district] is to face a challenge to its billing classifications or rates, it is imperative 

that such a challenge be singular and occur as soon as reasonably practical after 

billing classifications are made.”). However, Section 2.1 does not provide them 

with an end-run around our prior holding in Yankee Park that substantially 
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 18A-EX-1243 | December 27, 2018 Page 21 of 21

similar definitions adopted by another regional sewer district were “rational” 

and “not arbitrary or capricious.” Id. at 134-35. As such, we affirm the IURC’s 

entry of summary judgment for the Sewer District and dismissal of the Mobile 

Home Parks’ complaints.

[30] Affirmed.

Pyle, J., and Altice, J., concur.