# FILED July 28, 1997 Cecil Crowson, Jr . App ellate C ou rt Clerk IN THE COURT OF CRI MINAL APPEA LS OF TENNESSEE ATJA CKSON JUNE SE SSION, 1997
AL BERT HOLS TON, ) C.C.A. NO. 02C01-9609-CR-00298 ) Ap pella nt, ) ) ) SHELBY COU NTY VS. ) ) HON. W. F RED AXLEY STATE OF TENNESSEE, ) JUDGE ) Appell ee. ) (Post- Convict ion)

ON AP PEA L FROM THE J UDGMENT OF THE CRIMINAL COURT OF SHELBY CO UNTY
FOR THE APP ELLA NT : FOR THE APPELLEE : W AY NE CH AS TA IN JOHN KNOX W ALKUP 66 Monroe, Sui te 804 Attor ney General and Reporter Memphis, TN 38103 KENNETH W . RUCKER Assist ant Attor ney General 450 James Robertson Par kway Nashvil le, TN 37243-4351 JOHN W. PI EROTTI Dist ri ct Attor ney General JOHNNY MCFARLA ND Assist ant Di str ictAtto rney General Criminal Justi ce Complex, Suit e 301 201 PoplarStreet Memphis, TN 38103
OPINION FILED ________________________ AFFI RMED DAVI D H. WELLES, JUD GE1 See Tenn . Code A nn. §§ 40-30-2 02 and -20 6(b) (Supp. 199 6). -2- 

# OPINION

The Peti ti oner, Albert Hols ton, appeals as of r ightpursuantto Rul e 3 of t he Tennessee Rules of Appellat e Procedure from the tr ial co urt ’s deni al o f his peti ti on forpost- convi cti on relief. He fi led a pet it ion f or post -convi cti on rel iefon Ju ly12, 1996. On July 30, 1996 , t he tr ial courtdismis sed the pet it ion wi thout
con duc ti ng an evid enti ary hear ing, fi nding t hat i t was bar red by the st atut e of li mitati ons. 1 W e affirm the jud gm ent o f the trial c ourt.

On April 30, 1992, the Pet it ioner was convi cted bya ShelbyCounty j ury of aggravat ed rape and was s entenced t o eight een yearsimpr ison ment. A panel ofthi s Court a ff ir med his convi cti on on Se ptem ber 1 5, 19 93. See State v. A lbert B. Holst on , C.C.A . No. 02 C0 1-921 0-CR -0 0247, Sh el byCou nty ( Ten n. Cr i m. Ap p., Jac kso n, Se pt. 15, 1 993 ). Itap pe ars from the rec ord tha t the Pe tition er d id not s eek perm ission to ap pea l to our sup rem e co urt.

On July 12 , 19 96 , the Pe tition er file d a pe titio n forpo st- convi cti on rel ief which is t he subject of the case sub judice . I n the pet it ion, he argued t hat hi s tr ial counsel rende red ineffec tive assistan ce bo th prior t o tria l a nd at tr ial. He also argued thatthe t ri al court’ s int imidat ing demeanor c ontr ibut ed to his c ou ns el’s defi cientrepre sentat ion, the reb y viola ting his due p roces s rights. Th e trial court found thatthe pet it ion was bar red by the st atut e of l imit ati ons and dismis sed i t wit ho ut conducting an evi dentiaryhearing. It i s from the tr ial court’ s order o f-3-

dismis sal thatthe Pet it ioner appeals, rai sing t he fol lowi ng four issue s for

our considerati on: 1) Th at th e tria l cou rt erred in findin g tha t his pe tition for p ostconvict ion rel ief was barred by the stat ute of l imitat ions; 2) that the one-year st atute of li mitati ons viol ates due process; 3) thatthe one- year s tat ute ofli mitat ions v iol ates t he Tennessee Co ns titutio n’s proh i bi t i on ag ai ns t t he r et r os pe ct i ve i mpa i r me n t of contractual obli gati ons; and, 4) thatthe new Post -Convi cti on Procedur e Act’ s prov isi on eli minati ng tol li ng of t he stat ute ofli mitat ions is i n co ntr aventi on of Tennessee case law and viol ates due process.
The Peti ti oner f irst cont ends tha t t he tr ial cou rt err ed in find ing tha t his peti ti on forpost- convi cti on rel iefwas barred bythe st atut e of l imit ati ons. Atthe t i me the P etitione r’s con victions bec am e fina l, the sta tute of lim itatio ns ap plica ble to post- convi cti on proceedi ngs was thr ee years . Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-30- 102 (repeal ed 199 5). Th e th ree -yea r sta tute of lim itatio ns wa s su bs eq ue ntly short ened to o ne yea r by th e n ew Po st-C on victio n Proc edure Act , whi ch took effecton May 10, 1995. See Tenn. Code Ann. § 40- 30-201 et seq. (Supp. 1996 ). At the t ime the new Acttook effect , t he previ ous three-year stat ute ofli mitat ions had not exp ired for the P etitioner.

Ofcourse, t he new Post-Convict ion Procedure Act gover ns thi s peti ti on and all petition s filed a fter M ay 10 , 199 5. See Tenn. Code Ann. § 40- 30-201 et seq. (Su pp. 1 996 ). This Act provi des, i n pert inentpart , t hat “ notwi thst anding any otherpr ovision of this p art to the co ntrary, any p erson having g round for r elie f recogni zed unde r this part shall have atleastone (1) yea r from Ma y 10, 1 995 , to file a p etitio n o r a m otio n to reo pe n a pe tition un de r this pa rt.” C om pile r’s Notes to Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-30- 201 (Supp. 1996) ( ref erri ng to Act s 1995, c h. 207, § 3). Because the previ ous three-year stat ute ofli mitat ions had not ex pired for2The Peti ti oner al so argues t hat t he tr ial courterred in f ail ing to enter a prel iminary

order and to direc t the dis trict attorn ey gen eral to r esp ond to the p etition. See Te nn. C ode Ann . §§ 4 0-30 -207 , - 208. Because the pet it ion cl earl y shows t hat i t was f il ed aft er t he expi rati on of t he one-year st atut e of li m itati ons, we be li eve that the tri al court properly di sm issed the petiti on upon preliminary con side ration
. See Tenn . Code A nn. § 40-30-20 6(b). -4- the Peti ti oner atthe t ime the new Acttookeffect , his righ t to pe tition for p ostconvi cti on rel iefsurvi ved und er the new Act. See Betsy J ane Pen dergra st v. Sta te , C.C. A. No . 01C 01-9 607 -CC -002 89, R uthe rford C oun ty(Te nn. C rim. A pp., Nashvil le, Ma y 16, 1 997 ); cf
. Do yle C arter v. S tate , C.C. A. No. 01C0 1- 951 1- CC00398, Da vidso n C oun ty (Te nn. C rim. A pp., N ash ville, Feb . 12, 1 997 ); Eri c C. Pendlet on v. State , C. C.A. No. 01C01-9604- CR-00158, Davi dson County (Tenn. Cr i m. Ap p., N ash ville, Feb . 12, 1 997 ); Wa lla ce Butl er v. RickyBell , Warden , C.C. A. No. 02 C01 - 95 10 - CC- 00 29 7, Fa ye t t e Co un t y ( Ten n. Cr i m. App., Jackson, No v. 19, 1 996 ); Joh nny L. Bu tler v. Sta te , C.C.A. No. 02C01-9509-CR-00289, She lby Cou nty (Te nn. C rim. Ap p., Jacks on, D ec. 2, 19 96).

As a resul t, the Pet it ioner had one year

from the eff ecti ve dat e ofthe new Ac t, Ma y 10 , 19 95 , to file for p os t-co nvic ti on rel ief
. See Co m piler’s N otes to Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-30- 201 (Supp. 1996) ( ref erri ng to Acts 1 995 , ch. 207 , § 3); Tenn. Co de An n. § 40 -30 -20 2(a ) (S up p. 1 99 6). H e fil ed his p etition fo r pos tconvi cti on relie f on July 12, 1996, a few weeks aft er t he expi rat ion ofthe one-year peri od. Th e Peti ti oner has notall eged thathis c lai ms fitwit hin one of the enumerated except ions t o t he one -yea r statu te of lim itations
. See Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-30- 202(b), (c) (Supp. 199 6 ). Acco rdi ngly , we concl ude thatthe t ri al court correctlyfound that t he petit ion was barred by t he statute ofli mitati ons. 2

As his s econd is sue, t he Peti ti oner ar gues in t he alt ernat iv e thatifthe tr ial court cor rec tly dismis sed the pet it ion as h avi ng been tim e-b arre d, th e n ew Ac t’s-5-

one-year

statu te of limita tions violate s du e pro ces s gu aran tees
. See U.S . Co nst. amend. XIV, § 1; Tenn. Const. art . I , § 8. The State, on the ot herhand, argues thatit wa s with in the legisla ture’s pow er to e nac t the o ne-y ear s tatute o f li mitat ions and thatthe stat ute does not v iol ate due process because i t provi des a reasonabl e peri od of t ime in whi ch post- convi cti on clai ms can be assert ed.

Itis wel l- establ ished t hat t he ident if icat ion ofthe precise dict ates ofdue process requi res con side ration of bo th the gov ernmental int erest s involv ed and the private intere sts a ffecte d by th e officia l action
. Bu rford v. S tate , 845 S.W .2d 204, 207 (Tenn. 1992) ( cit ing Fus ari v. Steinbe rg , 419 U.S . 379 , 389, 95 S .Ct. 533, 539, 4 2 L.Ed .2d 52 1, 529 (1975 )). W ith regard to post-c onvi cti on proceedings, the pri vate i nterest atstake is apriso ner’s opp ortun ityto a ttac k his or herconvi cti on and incarcerat ion on t he grounds t hat he or she was depri ved ofa constit utional rightduring t he convicti on proce ss. Id
. The governmental interest repre sented by t he stat ute ofli mitat ions i s the preventi on of t he li ti gati on of sta le an d gro und less claim s, with th e ac com pan ying c ost. Id.

Further more, alt hough fre edom fro m bod ily restra int an d pu nish m ent by th e Sta te wit hout due process oflawis a fu nd am en tal rig ht, it is clear that sta tes have
no con stitution al du ty to provi de pos t-con viction re lief proc edu res. Id. (ci tat ions
om itted). Thus, as our supreme courtheld i n Burford , the o ppo rtunity to collaterally asse rtconsti tut ional vi olat ions whi ch occurred duri ng the conv ict ion process is not a f undamental r ightenti tl ed to hei ghtened due processprot ecti on. Id.-6- Itis al so cle ar t hat t he Stat e has a l egit imate i nter est i n prevent ing t he li ti gati on of stal e or fraudulent clai ms. Id. at 208 ( cit ing Jime nez v. W einberger , 417 U.S. 628, 6 36, 94 S.Ct. 24 96, 25 01, 41 L.Ed.2 d 363 , 370 (19 74)). Th e S tate may therefore erectreasonabl e procedural requirements for tr igger ing the r ight to an adjudicati on, such as stat utes ofli mitat ions, and may ter minate a c lai m for failure to compl y wi th a reasonable procedural rul e wit hout v iol ati ng due process right s. Id. (ci ti ng Logan v. Zimmerman Brush Co. , 455 U.S . 422 , 437 , 102 S.C t. 1148, 1158, 71 L. Ed.2d 265, 2 79 (19 82)). Be fore a sta te m ay te rm ina te a claim forfai lure to compl y wi th procedural requi rements such as stat utes ofli mitati ons, how ever, due processrequi res thatpotent ial li ti gants be prov ided an o ppo rtunity forthe present ati on of cl aims at ameaningful ti me and in a me aning ful ma nne r. Id.

As was the c ase in Burford , wh en ou r s upreme courtconsi dered t he
con stitution ality of t he three-year stat ute ofli mitat ions, the quest ion be fore us is “whethe rthe State’ s policyrefle cte d in the sta tute affo rds a fa ir an d re as on ab le opp ortun ityfor ... bringing ... suit.” Id. (quot ing Pick ettv. Brown , 638 S. W .2d 369, 376 (Te nn. 1 982 ), rev’ d on equal prot ecti on grounds , 462 U.S. 1, 103 S.Ct. 2199, 76 L.Ed. 2d 37 2 ( 19 83 ) )
. Th e t es t i s w he t he rt he t i me peri od provi des a peti ti oner a reasonabl e opport unity tohave t he clai med issue heard and de t er mi ned
. Id. (ci ti ng Michel v. Louisi ana , 350 U. S. 91, 93, 76 S .Ct. 158, 160, 100 L.Ed. 2d 83, 89 (1955) ). Having c onsidered the pr iv ate and gov ernmental int erest s at stake,
we concl ude thatthe one- year s tat ute ofli mitat ions c ont ained in Tenn essee Code Annotat ed secti on 40-30- 202 provi des a reason able opportuni ty for t he present ati on of p os t-con viction c laim s. Cf. Burford , 845 S. W .2d at208. Acc ordingly, we be lieve tha t the on e-ye ar s tatu te o f lim it ati ons on peti ti ons for-7-

post- convi cti on rel iefdoes not viol ate the due process guarant ees of t he Unit ed States and Tennessee C onstit utions.

More over, we do not bel iev e thatthe appl icat ion ofthe one- year s tat ute of li mitat ions in the pres ent case v iol ated thi s Pet it ion er’ s due process ri ghts . As we stat ed above, the Pet it ioner ’s con vi cti on became fi nal on Sept ember 15, 1993. At thatti me, the previ ous three-year statute of limitations applied to the Pe titioner, meaning that he w ould ord inarily have had u nti l Sept ember 15, 1996 t o fi le f or post- convi cti on reli ef. The new Post-Convicti on Proce dure Act took eff ect on May 10, 19 95 , an d g ove rne d a ll peti ti ons fi led aft er that date, i ncluding t he Petiti oner’s, which was f il ed on Jul y 12, 1996. The newAct had t he eff ect ofshort ening t he statutory pe rio d a ppli cable t o the Pet it ioner from September of 1996 t o May of 1996. The Petit ioner ’s cl aims regarding hi s tr ial counsel ’s represent ati on and the tri al cou rt’s d em ea no r we re re ad ilyapparentas of t he concl usion of his t ri al and directap pe al. W e ca n o nly con clud e tha t the a pplica tion o f the o ne-y ear s tatute ofli mitat ions di d not v iol ate t he Peti ti oner’ s due proces s ri ghts. The Pe tition er’s
sec ond issue there fore la cks me rit.

As his t hird issu e, t he Peti ti oner cont en ds th at the one- year s tat ute of li mitat ions impa irs contractual obli gati ons in v iol ati on Arti cle I , sect ion 20 ofthe Tennessee Consti tut ion. That con st it uti onal provi sion provi des that“no retrospe ctive law, o r law im pairin g th e ob ligation s of co ntrac ts, sha ll be m ade .” Tenn. Co nst. a rt. I, § 20. T he p rovisio n ha s be en in terpre ted to me an th at “n o retrospe ctive law which i mpairs the obli gation of contracts, or any other law which impa irs their o bliga tion, sh all be m ade .” Ham il ton County v. Gerlach , 176 Tenn. 288, 140 S.W .2 d 1 08 4, 10 85 ( 19 40 ) ( ci t at i on s o mi t t ed )
. Th e P et i t i on ercl ai ms3 See Tenn . Code A nn. § 40-30-10 2 (repealed 199 5). -8- thatthe p ass age of a law cons ti tut es “a cont ractbetween t he Leg islature and its
con stituen cy.” He assert s thatthe pass age of t he previ ous three-year stat ute of li mitat ions on peti ti ons for post- convi cti on rel ief 3 confer red on pri soners t he ri ght to chall enge their co nviction s with in a thr ee-y ear p eriod
. The Petit ioner argues thatthe subs equentpassage of the new Po st-C onv iction P roce dure Act w ith its one-year

statut e of li mitati ons, ther eby curtai li ng the previ ous three-year peri od,
wa s tan tam oun t to an imp airm ent o f a co ntrac t.

In our vi ew, the Peti tioner is once again arguing t hat the o ne-y ear s tatute ofli mitat ions doesnot provi de suff ici ent t ime in whi ch to f il e for po st- convi cti on relief. As we expl ained duri ng our d is cussi on ofthe second is sue on a ppeal , we believe that th e on e-ye ar sta tu t e o fl i mi t at i on s d oe s p r ov i de a rea so na bl e t i me perio d for th e filing o f pos t-con viction p etitions
. Furth ermore, alt hough the new Act shor tens t he previ ous stat ute ofli mitat ions, itdoes prov ide t hose pri sone r s who were st il l wi thi n the prior three-y ear statut ory peri od, such as the Pet it ioner in the cas e a t ba r, a re as on ab le opp ortun ity to fi le f or post -convi cti on rel iefaft er the effective date of the ne w on e-year s tatutory perio d. See Co m piler’s N otes to Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-30 -201 ( Supp. 1996 ) (referring to Ac ts 1995 , ch. 207 , § 3); cf. Pa cific Ea stern Co rp. v. G ulf L it e Hol ding Co. , 902 S. W .2d 946, 956 (Tenn. Ap p. 19 95) (c itations om itted). A cco rding ly, this issu e lac ks m erit.

The Pe titioner’s fourth and fi nal cont enti on on appeal is anot herchall enge to the consti tut ional ity ofthe new Post -Convi cti on Procedur e Act. The Petit ioner focuseson lang uag e in the new Act w hich prov ides that th e on e-ye ar “sta tute of li mitat ions shal l notbe tol led f or any reason, incl uding anytol li ng or sav ing-9-

provi sion otherwise avai labl e at l aw orequity.”Tenn. Code Ann. § 40- 30-202(a ) (Supp. 1996 ). He argues t hat t he eli mination of tolli ng in the new Act i s in di rect contraventi on of a deci sion rend ered by ou r sup rem e co urt, W atki ns v. State , 903 S.W .2d 302 (Tenn. 1995), and is t herefore vi olati ve of due process.

In W atki ns , oursupreme courtheld t hat t he tol li ng provi sion c odif ied at Tennessee Code Annotat ed secti on 28-1- 106 was appli cable t o post- convi cti on proceedi ngs governed by the prev ious Post-Convict ion Pro ced ure A ct. See W atki ns , 903 S.W .2d a t 3 05; T enn. Code Ann. § 40-30- 101 et seq. (repe aled 1995). That tol li ng provisi on reads as foll ows:

Persons und er disa bility on acc rual o f right. -- Ifthe person entit led to commence an act i on i s, att he t i me the caus e of acti on ac crued, eit her wi thi n the age of eight een (18) years , orof unsound mind, such person, or hi s repr esentat iv es and pri vi es, as the ca se maybe , mayco mm enc e th e acti on, afterthe removal of suc h disability, within the time o f limitation for the pa rticular c aus e ofaction, unless it exc ee d th ree (3) y ea rs, a nd in th at c as e w ithin three (3) ye ars from the rem oval of suc h disab ility. Tenn. Cod e An n. § 28 -1-106 (1980 ). W atk insinv olv ed a peti ti oner who was
m en tally incompeten t f or a per iod ofti me dur ing t he runni ng of t he previ ous thr ee-year

sta tute of lim itatio ns on po st-c on victio n p etitio ns . W atki ns , 903 S.W .2d at303. A pan el ofthi s Court h as appli ed the W atki ns reasoni ng to a
case inv olv ing a pet it ioner who fi led f or post -convi cti on rel iefmore tha n thre e years aft erhi s c on vi ct i on ha d b ec ome fina l bu t with in thr ee yearsof hi s tur ning eight een years of age, holdi ng thatthe previ ous thr ee-year stat ute ofli mitat ions was tol led whi le t he peti ti oner was a m inor. Sta te v. D avid W ayn e B ritt , C. C.A. No. 02C01-9410-CC-00234, Ha rde m an Co un ty (T en n. C rim . Ap p., J ac kso n, J uly 26, 19 95).-10- Forpurposes of

the case sub judice , ev en ifwe were t o concl ude thatthe l ang uage of Tennessee Code Annot ated sect ion 40- 30-202(a ) el iminat ed the tolli ng provisi on codifi ed at Tennessee C ode Annotated se cti on 28-1-106 and tha t the eli minati on of t he tol li ng provi sion viol ated due process guarant ees, we do not believe that th e P etitione r wou ld be entitled to se ek p ost-c onv iction re lief. The Peti ti onerdoes not all ege thathe was a minorormentall y i ncompetent dur ing t he runni ng of the one -yea r statu te of l imit ati ons appli cable t o his c ase. Further more, the new Post- Convict ion Procedure Actdoes cont ain a se verabi li ty c lause. 1995 Tenn. Pub. Act s ch. 207 , § 2. As a resul t, ifwe concl uded thatthe el iminat ion of the tol li ng provi sion was unconsti tut ional , t he otherwise c on sti tut ional one-year statu te of l imit ati ons coul d apparent lybe giv en eff ect wi thoutthatlanguage an d would, therefor e, continue t o apply to t he Petiti oner. Because the Pet it ioner has not all eged thathe was a minoror mental lyincompeten t duri ng the runni ng of t he statu te of l imit ati ons, t he tol li ng provi sion codif ied atTennessee Code Annotat ed secti on 28 -1-1 06 ha s no ap plica tion in the present cas e and would notalt er t he
s tatutory p eri od for

the Pet it ioner . Accordingl y, we can onlyconcl ude thatthe fourth con tentio n is w ithou t me rit.

Forthe reasons setforth i n the di scussi on above, we concl ude thatthe t ri al court did not er r in di smiss ing th e petit ion for post-convi ction relief . W e also conclude thatthe P etitione r’s cha lleng es to the cons ti tut ional ity ofthe one- year statu te of l imit ati ons on peti ti ons for post- convi cti on rel ief lack meri t. The judgment ofthe t ri al court i s therefor e aff ir med.-11- ____________________________________ DAVI D H. WELLES, JUD GE

CONCUR:

___________________________________ PAULG. SUMME RS, JUD GE

___________________________________ JOE G. RI LEY , JUD GE