UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

JEREMY PINSON : : Plaintiff, : : Civil Action No.: 12-1872 (RC) v. : : Re Document No.: 293 DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, et al. , : : Defendants. :
MEMORANDUM OPINION
G RANTING IN P ART AND D ENYING IN P ART D EFENDANTS ’ T HIRD M OTION FOR S UMMARY J UDGMENT While in prison, pro se plaintiff Jeremy Pinson filed multiple Freedom of Information Act (“FOIA”), 5 U.S.C. § 552, request s seeking records from var ious components of the U.S. Department of Justice (“DOJ”) . In addition to releasing a numb er of records to Pinson, the DOJ asked Pinson to clarify some of her 1 records requests, told her th at it could not find records responsive to some of her reque sts, and informed her that the s ome of the records she sought were exempt from disclosure by law. Pinson filed a complaint c hallenging some of these determinations and alleging that the DOJ improperly withheld re cords. In two prior opinions, this Court has granted in part and denie d in part the DOJ’s first and second requests for summary judgme nt as to the claims against t he Bureau of Prisons (“BOP”).
See Defs.’ Mot. Summ. J. Re spect BOP, ECF No. 147; Pinson v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice , No. 12-1872, 2016 WL 29245, at *1 (D.D.C. Jan. 4, 2016), ECF No. 25 9; Defs.’ 2d Mot. Summ. J.

1 Pinson identifies using fem inine pronouns. The government and this Court follow suit. See Defs.’ Mot. Dismiss or, Alt ., Renewed Mot. Summ. J. at 2 n.1, ECF No. 287. The Court’s use of feminine pronouns is not i ntended to reflect any substan tive or legal characterization.2 Respect BOP, ECF No. 265; Pinson v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice , No. 12-1872, at 21, ECF No. 309. 2
Now before the Court is the DOJ ’s third motion for summary judg ment as to eleven FOIA requests. See Defs.’ 3d Mot. Summ. J. Respect B OP (“Defs.’ 3d MSJ”), ECF No. 293. The DOJ argues that, for each request, t he BOP conducted adequate searc hes reasonably calculated to identify responsive records a nd made proper withholdings pursua nt to FOIA exemptions. See Defs.’ Mem. P. & A., ECF No. 293- 2. For the reasons set forth below, the Court grants in part and denies in part the DOJ’s mo tion for partial summary judgmen t.
I. FACTUAL BACKGROUND This Court has already explai ned the factual background in det ail in its prior Memorandum Opinion. See Pinson , 2016 WL 29245, at *1–5, ECF N o. 259 at 3–12. The Court assumes familiarity with its prior opinion and confines its dis cussion to the facts most relevant to the present motion.
A. Request No. 2010-12533 In August 2010, Pinson submitted a request to the BOP for (1) i nmate handbooks from ADX Florence and (2) documents r elating to the use of force aga inst Pinson during November 2007 and any related Administrative Remedy Requests. See Corr. 2d Am. Compl. at 2, ECF No. 32; 3d Christenson Decl. ¶ 5 & Ex. A , ECF No. 293-3; Christenso n Decl. ¶ 13 & Ex. 2, ECF No.

2 For clarity, the Court summarizes how Pinson’s FOIA requests a gainst the BOP have been winnowed down. This Court’s first opinion with regard to t he BOP dealt with eighteen record requests. See generally Memorandum Opinion, ECF No . 259; Order, ECF No. 258. The Court entered judgment for the BOP on six of those requests in August of 2016, for Request Nos. 2011-4954, 2011-9164, 2011-9398, 2012-3706, 2013-3342, and 2013 -3343. See generally Order, ECF No. 308; Memorandu m Opinion, ECF No. 309. The parties stipulated to the dismissal of Request No. 13-2100 after additional briefing. See BOP’s Supplemental Brief Regarding FOIA Request No. 2013-2011, ECF No. 325; Plaintiff Stipulation to Doc. No. 325, ECF No. 329; Minute Order of Septe mber 28, 2016. The remaining eleven requests—Nos. 2010-12533, 2011-843, 2011-1351, 2011-1886 , 2011-2366, 2011-7156, 2011-7619, 2012-39, 2012-40, 2012-975, and 2013-1684—are the su bject of this opinion.3 147-6. Pinson limited her request to two hours of search time and 100 pages of information. 3d Christenson Decl. ¶ 5. After the BOP was denied summary judgme nt by this Court, it reprocessed the request. 3 See 3d Christenson Decl. ¶ 4. The DOJ released 148 pages of resp onsive records in full and 32 pages in part, and informed Pinson that it w ithheld 15 pages in full. Id . ¶ 12 & Ex. B. Exemption 5 was used to withhold several sections of the After Action Review Reports, i ncluding the determination, recommendations, and results. See Vaughn Index at 1–7, ECF No. 293-3, Ex. C. Exemption 7(C) and 7(F) were used to withhold a variety of information, i ncluding sections of documents naming government employees and inmates. See Vaughn Index at 1–7. Exemption 7(F) was also used to withhold the secti ons of documents which contained “security information used by the BOP to manage inmates and ensure the safety of the institut ion and the times certain activities occurred” as well as “the BOP’s monitoring and class ification assignments for Pinson.” See, e.g. , Vaughn Index at 3, 4, 7. Exemption 7(C) was used to withhold in full a document assessing a staff injury, and Exe mptions 7(C) and 7(F) were use d to withhold the daily assignment rosters for facility staff. See Vaughn Index at 3, 6–7. The DOJ now moves for summary judgment on the grounds that its search was adequate an d that it produced to Pinson all responsive records after properly withholding some records. 4 See Defs.’ 3d MSJ at 1–2; Vaughn Index at 1–7.

3 This Court previous ly rejected the BOP’s rationale for not pro cessing this request, which was based on Pinson’s alleged unpaid fees. See Pinson , 2016 WL 29245, at *16, ECF No. 259 at 36.
4 The BOP also claimed additiona l, redundant exemptions, but as the Court finds that all of the material which was properl y withheld was exempt from dis closure under either Exemption 5 or Exemption 7 it does not addr ess these exemptions.4 B. Request No. 2011-843 5 In October 2010, Pinson submitted a request to the BOP seeking production of the (1) Rated Capacity Computation For m (EMS-36); (2) Site Safety a nd Control Plan (ICS Form 208); (3) Incident Roster and Activity Log (ICS Form 214); and (4) Incident Action Plan Safety Analysis (ICS Form 215a), a ll for FCI Talladega. See 3d Christenson Decl. ¶ 44 & Ex. D; Greene Decl. ¶ 7 & Ex. 1, ECF No. 1 47-5. A Rated Capacity Comp utation Form is completed by institutions “to determine a nd report their rated capacity a nd total capacity for overall strategic planning.” 3d Christenson Decl. ¶ 45. The various ICS forms are part of an incident management system adopted by the B OP that has not yet been acti vated at FCI Talladega. See
id. ¶¶ 47–48. Pinson limited her requ est to two hours of search t ime and 100 pages of information. See id . ¶ 44; Greene Decl. Ex. 1. By letter dated December 2, 2010, the BOP informed Pinson that no responsive documents had been located. See Greene Decl. ¶ 7 & Ex. 2. The DOJ’s Office of Information P olicy (“OIP”) closed Pinson’s appeal of that determination due to pending litigation in this case, see id. ¶ 7 & Ex. 4, but, in light of t he previous litigation, the BOP later conducted another search “in additional areas” fo r responsive documents and located 4 pages that were released to Pinson in full, see Blanco Decl. ¶ 10 & Attach. 1, ECF No. 147-4. The Court denied the DOJ’s first motion for summary jud gment because the BOP failed to provide a detailed affidavit se tting forth the search terms and type of search performed to locate records respons ive to Request No. 2011-843. See Pinson , 2016 WL 29245, at *18; ECF
No. 259 at 40–41.

5 The Government labels this r equest as “Request No. 2011-843 (n ow 2016-2374).” Defs.’ 3d Mot. Summ. J. Respect BOP (“Defs.’ 3d MSJ”), ECF No. 293.5 After the Court issued that opi nion the BOP re-processed Reques t No. 2011-843. See 3d Christenson Decl. ¶ 4. The DOJ r eleased 3 additional pages of responsive records in full and 1 page in part, id . ¶ 49 & Ex. E, and informed Pinson t hat it redacted a staff p hone number under Exemptions 7(C) and 7(F), see Vaughn Index at 8. The DOJ now again moves for summary judgment, this time on the grounds that its search was adequate and that it produced all responsive records not properly withheld

. See Defs.’ 3d MSJ at 1–2; Vaughn Index at 8.
C. Request No. 2011-1351 6 In 2011, Pinson submitted a request to the BOP for the producti on of “[a]ll After-Action Review Reports, pertaining to any i nmate on inmate assault and/ or homicide” occurring at FCI Talladega during 2009–2010. See 3d Christenson Decl. ¶ 53 & Ex. F; Greene Decl. Ex. 5. The BOP initially responded that it would withhold these records in full under Exemptions 6 and 7(C) because the requested records concerned other inmates. See Greene ¶ 8 & Ex. 6. After Pinson appealed this determina tion to the OIP, the BOP conducte d a search for requested After Action Review Reports and located 97 total pages of responsive records. See id. ¶ 8 & Ex. 7. The BOP ultimately released 58 pages in full and 39 pages in part, withholding the names and register numbers of other inmates pursuant to Exemptions 6 and 7(C). See id. ¶ 8; id. Ex. 8; id. Ex. 9, at 1–2. The Court denied the DOJ’s first motion for sum mary judgment because the BOP failed to provide a detailed affida vit setting forth the search terms and type of search performed to locate records res ponsive to Request No. 2011-1351. See Pinson , 2016 WL 29245, at *18;
ECF No. 259 at 40–41.

6 The Government labels this request as “Request No. 2011-1351 ( now 2016-2381).” Defs.’ 3d MSJ at 1.6 After the Court issued that opi nion the BOP re-processed Reques t No. 2011-1351. See 3d Christenson Decl. ¶ 4. By le tter dated May 25, 2016, the DO J released 9 pages of responsive records in part. Id . ¶ 56 & Ex. G. The BOP withhel d the determinations and recomm endations of the After Action Review Reports under Exemption 5. Vaughn Index at 10–11. The BOP redacted the names of other in mates, and file numbers containin g those names, under Exemption 7(C). Vaughn Index at 9–11. Exemption 7(F) w as also applied to withhold “t he correctional management techniques” the BOP used on other inmates, including their classification and monitoring assignments. Vaughn Index at 9–11. The DOJ now a gain moves for summary judgment, this time on the grounds that its search was adequate and that it produced to Pinson all responsive records to which she is entitled after properly withholding some records. 7 See Defs.’ 3d MSJ at 1–2; Vaughn Index at 9–11.
D. Request No. 2011-1886 8 In 2010, Pinson submitted a request to the BOP for the producti on of documents associated with her placement at ADX Florence. See 3d Christenson Decl. ¶ 64 & Ex. H; Greene Decl. ¶ 9 & Ex. 10. The staff at FCI Talladega, where Pinson h ad been housed before she was transferred to ADX Florence, searched its facility for responsi ve documents. See Greene Decl. ¶ 9 & Ex. 10. After this requestwas twice remanded by OIP for reprocessing, the BOP identified 537 responsive pages , released 333 pages in full and 162 pages in part, and withheld 42 pages in full pursuant to Exemptions 6 and 7(C). See id. ¶¶ 10–12 & Ex. 17. The Court denied the DOJ’s first motion f or summary judgment because the BOP failed to provide a

7 The BOP also claimed additional , redundant exem ptions, which t he Court does not address.
8 The Government labels this request as “Request No. 2011-1886 ( now 2016-2372).” Defs.’ 3d MSJ at 1.7 detailed affidavit setting fo rth the search terms and type of s earch performed. See Pinson , 2016 WL 29245, at *18; ECF No. 259 at 40–41. After the Court issued that opi nion the BOP re-processed Reques t No. 2011-1886. See 3d Christenson Decl. ¶ 4. By le tter dated June 2, 2016, the DO J released 52 additional pages of responsive records in full a nd 48 pages in part, and informed P inson that it redacted or withheld records. Id . ¶ 70 & Ex. I. The BOP withheld “ staff member[s’] recommendat ion[s] regarding the future management of Pinson” under Exemption 5. Vaughn Index at 16, 17, 20. Exemption 7(C) was applied to redact the na mes of third-party individuals and inmates and contact information for staff members. Vaughn Index at 12–20. Exemption 7(F) was applied to withhold sections of records cont aining “information regarding gang activity and informant activity within the BOP,” “a sta ff member’s response to questio ns posed by Pinson regarding [her] ADX referral,” “the BOP ’s monitoring and classification a ssignments for Pinson,” “a statement made by a third-party i ndividual to a law enforcement officer,” “discussion of an inmate’s cooperation with law enf orcement officers,” “the type of investigation being conducted,” and “a factual summary of the investigation and con clusions of the investigator.” Vaughn Index at 12–20. Exemption 7(F) w as also used to withhold in f ull a letter containing “gang activity and informant activity within the BOP” and “info rmation used by the Bureau to separate Pinson from other inmate s,” as well as Pinson’s presen tence report. Vaughn Index at 12–20. The DOJ now again moves for summary judgment, this time on the grounds that its search was adequate and that it produced to Pinson all responsive records to which she is entit led

. 9
See Defs.’ 3d MSJ at 1–2; Vaughn Index at 12–20.

9 The BOP also claime d additional, redundan t exemptions, which t he Court does not address.8 E. Request No. 2011-2366 10 In December 2010, Pinson submitted a request to the BOP seeking copies of “any final settlement resulting in a [p]laintiff receiving monetary compen sation arising from litigation against officers or employees of the [BOP] in Lewisburg, PA; Oa kdale, LA; Talladega, AL, from 2006–[2010].” 3d Christenson Decl. ¶ 95 & Ex. J; Greene Decl. ¶ 13 & Ex. 18. Pinson limited her request to two hour s of search time and 100 pages of inform ation. See 3d Christenson Decl. ¶ 95 & Ex. J; Greene Decl. Ex. 18. After an outstanding fee fo r a prior FOIA request was resolved, the BOP issued a letter to Pinson on December 10, 201 3, informing her that no responsive documents were located. See Greene Decl. ¶ 13 & Ex. 20. T he Court denied the DOJ’s first motion for summary j udgment because the BOP failed to provide a detailed affidavit setting forth the search terms and type of search performed to locate records responsive to Request No. 2011-2366. See Pinson , 2016 WL 29245, at *18; ECF No. 259 at 40–41. After the Court issued that opi nion the BOP re-processed Reques t No. 2011-2366. See 3d Christenson Decl. ¶ 4. The BOP located a responsive “Stipul ation for Compromise and Settlement” and a responsive lette r about an administrative tor t claim. Vaughn Index at 21. The BOP released 2 pages of records in full and 4 pages in part. 3 d Christenson Decl. ¶ 101 & Ex. K. The BOP withheld the names and addresses of other inmates and o ther involved individuals under Exemption 6 and Exemption 7(C). Vaughn Index at 21. Exemption 6 and Exemption 7(C) were also used to withhold the cas e numbers and administrative tort claim number. Vaughn Index at 21. The DOJ now agai n moves for summary judgment, thi s time on the grounds that its

10 The Government labels this request as “Request No. 2011-2366 ( now 2016-2371).” Defs.’ 3d MSJ at 1.9 search was adequate and that it produced to Pinson all responsive records to which she is entit led

. 11
See Defs.’ 3d MSJ at 1–2; Vaughn Index at 21.
F. Request No. 2011-7156 In April 2011, Pinson submitted a request to the BOP seeking (1 ) “All ADX Florence placement decisions in which A ssistant Director found placement not warranted since Jan. 1, 2009 with inmate names redacted,” ( 2) “emails between Central O ffice staff regarding [her] ADX referral,” (3) “emails between SERO Regional staff regardin g [her] ADX referral,” (4) “List of psychology treatmen t programs at ADX Florence,” an d (5) “All DHO Reports by FCI Talladega DHO created since 2008 which find a BOP employee statement or memorandum to not be credible.” See 3d Christenson Decl. ¶ 105 & Ex. L; Christenson Decl. ¶ 24 & Ex . 6, ECF No. 147-6. She limited her request to no more than two hou rs search time and no more than 100 pages. See 3d Christenson Decl. ¶ 105 & Ex. L; 3d Christenson Decl. Ex. 6. After this Court denied the BOP summary judgment, 12 the BOP reprocessed Request No. 2011-7156. See 3d Christenson Decl. ¶ 4. The DOJ released 2 pages of responsi ve records in full and 7 pages in part, id . ¶ 117 & Ex. M, and informed Pinson that it redacted staff and inmate names, identifying information, and telephone numbers under Exemption 7(C), Vaughn Index at 22. Exemption 7(F) was also used to withhold the “BOP’s monitoring and classi fication assignments for third party inmates.” Vaughn Index at 22. As to Pinson’s request for emails, the DOJ initially advised Pi nson that technical difficulties prevented it from searching its email archives. Id. ¶ 117 & Ex. M. The DOJ later

11 The BOP also claimed additional, redundant exemptions, which t he Court does not address.
12 The BOP requested summary j udgment because Pinson was behind o n her fees. See Pinson , 2016 WL 29245, at *15–16; ECF No. 25 9 at 33–35. This Court d enied summary judgment because Pinson was not informed that she needed to either request that the BOP reopen the request or submit a n entirely new request. See id.10 stated that the search functiona lity was restored in October of 2016 and that an email search had been performed. Status Report Re garding Bureau of Prisons Emai l System (Email Status Report), ECF No. 353. The DOJ, howev er, also stated that the r esults of the email search were being “reviewed for applicable exemptions,” and Pinson had ther efore not yet received any results. Email Status Report at 1. The DOJ now again moves fo r summary judgment as to all records except for emails, 13 on the grounds that its searc h was adequate and that it produced all records not properly withheld. 14 See Defs.’ 3d MSJ at 1–2; Vaughn Index at 22.
G. Request No. 2011-7619 In May 2011, Pinson submitted a request to the BOP seeking (1) “All Report of Incident (Form 583) regarding homicides w ithin the Bureau of Prisons sin ce 2008,” (2) all documents “related to Report of Incid ent Tracking #BMP 332.07,” (3) “Vide o recording ECN BMP-07599- A,” (4) “All documents menti oning, involving, or relevant to In cident Report Nos. 1639219, 1639220, 2033413,” (5) “Anything relate d to the removal of tele visions from ADX Special Housing Unit at ADX Florence,” and (6) “Anything related to pol icies, procedures or guidelines for issuance of a clock radio t o SHU inmates at ADX Florence.” See 3d Christenson Decl. ¶ 126 & Ex. N; Christenson Decl. ¶ 63 & Ex. 14. She limited her request to no more than two hours search time and no more than 100 pages. See 3d Christenson Decl. ¶ 126 & Ex. N; Christenson Decl. Ex. 14. After this Court deni ed the BOP summary judgment in its previous opinion 15 the

13 The DOJ clarified in its replythat it does not seek summary j udgment as to any responsive emails. See Defs.’ Reply Supp. Defs.’ 3d Mot. S umm. J. Respect BOP (“Defs. ’ Reply”) at 1, ECF No. 321. This filing predated the DOJ’s upda te on the search tool, but because Pinson has not yet received any results summary judgmen t remains premature.
14 The BOP also claimed additional, redundant exemptions, which t he Court does not address.
15 As with Request No. 2011-7156, the BOP unsuccessfully sought s ummary judgment without responding to the request on the grounds that Pinson ha d unpaid fees at the time of the request. See Pinson , 2016 WL 29245, at *15–16; E CF No. 259 at 33–35.11 BOP reprocessed the request. See 3d Christenson Decl. ¶ 4. Th e DOJ released 47 pages of responsive records in full a nd 56 pages in part, and informed P inson that it withheld 5 pages in full. Id . ¶ 131 & Ex. O. Under Exemption 7( C), the BOP withheld the na mes and personal information of other inmates. Vaughn Index at 23–24. Exemption 7(F) was used to withhold information about the types and cau ses of incidents collected i n incident reports, as well as “the BOP’s monitoring and classifica tion assignments of inmates.” Vaughn Index at 23–24. At one time additional records responsive to Request No. 2011-7619 may have existed, but these records were destroyed according to BOP policy during the two y ears Pinson failed to satisfy her delinquent fees. See Defs.’ Reply at 4, ECF No. 321; see also Pinson , 2016 WL 29245, at *2;
ECF No. 259 at 4–5. T he DOJ now again moves for summary judgme nt, this time on the grounds that its search was a dequate and that it produced to Pinson all responsive records to which she is
entitled after properly withholding records. 16 See Defs.’ 3d MSJ at 1–2; Vaughn Index at 23–24.
H. Request No. 2012-40 In September 2011, Pinson submitted a request to the BOP seekin g “production of all emails sent by the North Central Regional Director and Warden o f the U.S. Penitentiary Administrative Maximum during 2011.” See 3d Christenson Decl. ¶ 140 & Ex. P; Christenson Decl. ¶ 115 & Ex. 22. She limited her request to no more thantwo hours search time and no more than 100 pages, and she also a sked for a cost estimate of any pages beyond the 100 pages she requested. See 3d Christenson Decl. ¶ 140 & Ex. P; Christenson Decl. Ex. 22. The BOP has reprocessed this request, see 3d Christenson Decl. ¶ 4, after thi s Court’s previous denial of

16 The BOP also claimed additional, redundant exemptions, which t he Court does not address.12 summary judgment. 17 By letter dated May 16, 2016, the DOJ advised Pinson that tec hnical difficulties prevented the BOP fro m searching its email archive s. Id . ¶¶ 141–42 & Ex. Q. The search capacity was repaired in October of 2016 and the search has now been executed. Email Status Report, ECF No. 353. How ever, as of January of 2017, Pi nson had not yet received any results because the records we re still being reviewed for poten tial FOIA exemptions. Id. The DOJ states in its reply that it did not seek summary judgment a s to this request while the search functionality was inoperable. See Defs.’ Reply at 1. Because no email results have yet been provided to Pinson, summary j udgment remains premature.
I. Request No. 2012-39 In September 2011, Pinson submitted a request to the BOP seekin g (1) “Report of Incident and After-Action Rev iew Report written, produced or ge nerated in connection with the 2008 U.S. Penitentiary Hi gh riot at Florence, CO,” and (2) “All emails, memorandums by ADX Florence Executive Staff and/or Department Supervisors written or generated in connection with the 2011 Accreditation review by the ACA and/or making referenc e or mentioning such review.”
See 3d Christenson Decl. ¶ 143 & Ex. R ; Christenson Decl. ¶ 119 & Ex. 24. She limited her request to no more than two hours search time and no more than 100 pages. See 3 d Christenson Decl. ¶ 143 & Ex. R; Christens on Decl. Ex. 24. The BOP has rep rocessed this request, see 3d Christenson Decl. ¶ 4, after this Court denied the BOP summary judgment in its previous opinion. 18 The DOJ released 1 page of res ponsive records in full and 11 pages in part, and

17 As with several of Pinson’s ot her requests, the BOP was previo usly denied summary judgment after it refused to r espond to the request due to Pins on’s unpaid fees. See Pinson , 2016 WL 29245, at *15–16; ECF No. 259 at 33–35.
18 As with several of Pinson’s ot her requests, the BOP was previo usly denied summary judgment after it refused to r espond to the request due to Pins on’s unpaid fees. See Pinson , 2016 WL 29245, at *15–16; ECF No. 259 at 33–35.13 informed Pinson that it w ithheld 4 pages in full. Id . ¶ 147 & Ex. S. The BOP applied Exemption 5 to withhold “an email discussion b etween BOP staff regarding proposed steps to take in anticipation of the A CA re-accreditation” a nd “the preliminary cause of death of deceased inmates . . . [and] the estimate d cost of the damage associated with incident.” Vaughn Index at 25–26. The BOP also withheld the c onclusion and recommendation s from an After Action Review Report under Exemption 5. Vaughn Index at 26. The BOP withheld the names and personal information of individu als including inmates and third -parties under Exemption 7(C). Vaughn Index at 25–26. The BOP also applied exemption 7(E) to withho ld “the techniques law enforcement officers used to cont ain and control a critical inc ident.” Vaughn Index at 26. The BOP also used exemption 7(F) to w ithhold “classification and mo nitoring assignments for third party inmates.” Vaughn Index at 26. The response to this request wa s also affected by the malfuncti on in the BOP’s email search tool. 3d Christenson Decl . ¶ 147 & Ex. S. That tool ha s since been repaired and a search executed, but the results of that search are still being examin ed for applicable FOIA exemptions and have thus not been released t o Pinson. Email Status Report , ECF No. 353. Prior to repairing the email search tool, the DOJ moved for summary judgment excep t as to any potentially responsive emails, 19 on the grounds that its searchwas adequate and that it produced all records
other than those properly withheld. 20 See Defs.’ 3d MSJ at 1–2; Vaughn Index at 25–26. Because no email results have yet been provi ded to Pinson, summary judg ment remains premature.

19 The DOJ clarified in its rep ly that it is not moving for summa ry judgment regarding emails responsive to Reque st No. 2012-39, only regarding the ot her components of the request. See Defs.’ Reply at 1.
20 The BOP also claimed additional, redundant exemptions, which t he Court does not address.14 J. Request No. 2012-975 In October 2011, Pinson submitted a request to the BOP seeking (1) the “2010–2011 U.S. Penitentiary Admin. Max. – Floren ce, CO Administrative Remedy I ndex,” and (2) “all 2010–2011 Form 583 Report of Incident[s] from ADX Florence repo rting Inmate on Inmate assaults to the NCRO.” See 3d Christenson Decl. ¶ 162 & Ex. T; Christenson Decl. ¶ 123 & Ex. 26. The BOP has reprocessed this request, see 3d Christenson Decl. ¶ 4, af ter this Court denied the BOP summary judgment in its previous opinion. 21 By letter dated May 16, 2016, the DOJ released 171 pages of responsive records in fu ll and 43 pages i n part, and informed Pinson that it redacted or withheld records. Id . ¶ 166 & Ex. U. The BOP applied Exemption 6 to withhold the names of third-party individuals from the administrative remedyindex. Vaughn Index at 27. Under Exemption 7(C), the BOP re dacted the names and personal i nformation of third-party individuals and inmates. Vaughn Index at 27–34. Under Exemption 7(F), the BOP withheld “the BOP’s monitoring and classif ication assignments for third- party inmates” and “information regarding an assault on an inmat e and attachments [to the form] .” Vaughn Index at 27–34. The DOJ now again moves for summar y judgment on the grounds that it s search was adequate and that it produced all responsive records except those properly withheld. 22 See Defs.’ 3d MSJ at 1–2; Vaughn Index at 27–34.
K. Request No. 2013-1684 In November 2011, Pinson submitted a request to the BOP seeking the “production of all information produced on or after February 25, 2011 which is loc ated in the Central File, SIS File,

21 As with several of Pinson’s ot her requests, the BOP was previo usly denied summary judgment after it refused to r espond to the request due to Pins on’s unpaid fees. See Pinson , 2016 WL 29245, at *15–16; ECF No. 259 at 33–35.
22 The BOP also claimed additional, redundant exemptions, which t he Court does not address.15 and any other file maintained on Jeremy Pinson.” See 3d Christenson Decl. ¶ 176 & Ex. V; Christenson Decl. ¶ 132 & Ex. 30. T he BOP has reprocessed thi s request, see 3d Christenson Decl. ¶ 4, after this Court denied the BOP summary judgment in its previous opinion. 23 The reprocessing resulted in an e stimated 8,655 pages of responsive records at an anticipated fee of $427.75. See 3d Christenson Decl. ¶¶ 4, 183–84. B y letter dated May 16, 201 6, the DOJ advised Pinson that it had paused its processing until she prov ided advanced payment, and offered her the option of either pa ying the expected fee, modif ying her request to limit the responsive materials, or receiv ing only the first 100 pages for free. Id . ¶ 184 & Ex. W. By letter dated May 24, 2016, Pinson indicate d she no longer sought docum ents from her Central File on or before October 1, 2014, or her SI S file between February 25, 2011, and October 2013. Id

. ¶ 185 & Ex. X. As of June 10, 2016, t he BOP was waiting for ne w page estimates to determine if an amended fee letter neede d to be sent to Pinson or if the records could be processed. Id

. ¶ 186. Despite not having responded to the request, the DOJ’s briefing suggests th at it moves for summary judgment on this request

. See Defs.’ 3d MSJ at 1–2.
II. LEGAL STANDARD “FOIA cases typically and appropr iately are decided on motions for summary judgment.” Defs. of Wildlife v. U.S. Border Patrol , 623 F. Supp. 2d 83, 87 (D.D.C. 2009) (citing Bigwood v. U.S. Agency for Int’l Dev ., 484 F. Supp. 2d 68, 73 (D.D.C. 2007)). Summary judgment is appropriate where “the movant shows that t here is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 5 6(a). A “material” fact is one capable of affecting the substant ive outcome of the litigation. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc. ,

23 As with several of Pinson’s ot her requests, the BOP was previo usly denied summary judgment after it refused to r espond to the request due to Pins on’s unpaid fees. See Pinson , 2016 WL 29245, at *15–16; ECF No. 259 at 33–35.16 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). A dispute is “ genuine” if there is e nough evidence for a reasonable jury to return a verdict for the nonmovant. See Scott v. Harris , 550 U.S. 372, 380 (2007). The principal purpose of summar y judgment is to streamline liti gation by disposing of factually unsupported claims or defenses and determining whethe r there is a genuine need for trial. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett , 477 U.S. 317, 323–24 (1986). The mova nt bears the initial burden of identifying portions of t he record that demonstrate t he absence of any genuine issue of material fact. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(1); Celotex , 477 U.S. at 323. In response, the nonmovant must point to specific facts in t he record that reveal a genuin e issue that is suitable for trial.
Celotex , 477 U.S. at 324. In considering a motion for summary judgmen t, a court must “eschew making credibility determinati ons or weighing the evidence,” Czekalski v. Peters , 475 F.3d 360, 363 (D.C. Cir. 2007), and all underl ying facts and inferences m ust be analyzed in the light most favorable to the nonmovant, see Anderson , 477 U.S. at 255. Nevertheless , conclusory assertions offered without any evidentiar y support do not establish a genu ine issue for trial. See Greene v.
Dalton , 164 F.3d 671, 675 (D.C. Cir. 1999). When assessing a summary judgmen t motion in a FOIA case, a court makes a de novo assessment of whether the agenc y has properly withheld the requ ested documents. See 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(4)(B); Judicial Watch v. U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec. , 598 F. Supp. 2d 93, 95 (D.D.C. 2009). To prevail on a motion for s ummary judgment, “the defen ding agency must prove that each document that falls within the class requested either has been produced, is unidentifiable or is wholly exempt from the Act’s inspection requirements.” Weisberg v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice , 627 F.2d 365, 368 (D.C. Cir. 1980) (internal quotation marks om itted) (quoting Nat’l Cable
Television Ass’n v. FCC , 479 F.2d 183, 186 (D.C. Cir. 1973)). To meet its burden, a d efendant may rely on declarations that ar e reasonably detailed and non-c onclusory. See Citizens for17 Ethics & Responsibility in Wash. v. Dep’t of Labor , 478 F. Supp. 2d 77, 80 (D.D.C. 2007) (“[T]he Court may award summa ry judgment solely on the basis of information provided by the department or agency in declarat ions when the declarations desc ribe ‘the documents and the justifications for nondisclosure w ith reasonably specific detai l, demonstrate that the information withheld logically falls withi n the claimed exemption, and are not controverted by either contrary evidence in the record nor by evi dence of agency bad faith.’” ( quoting Military Audit Project v. Casey , 656 F.2d 724, 738 (D.C. Cir. 1981))). “Ultimately, an agency ’s justification for invoking a FOIA exemption is sufficient if it appears ‘logical’ or ‘plau sible.’” Wolf v. CIA , 473 F.3d 370, 374–75 (D.C. Cir. 2007) (quoting Gardels v. CIA , 689 F.2d 1100, 1105 (D.C. Cir. 1982)). Generally, a reviewing court shoul d “respect the expertise of a n agency” and not “overstep the proper limits of the judicial role in FOIA review.” Hayden v. Nat’l Sec. Agency/Cent. Sec. Serv. , 608 F.2d 1381, 1388 (D.C. Cir. 1979). Even if the nonmovant does not r espond to the motion for summar y judgment, the court cannot grant the motion for the r eason that it was conceded. See Winston & Strawn, LLP v.
McLean , 843 F.3d 503, 505 (D.C. Cir. 2016) (“Under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, a motion for summary judgment canno t be ‘conceded’ for want of op position. ‘The burden is always on the movant to demonstrate why summary judgment is war ranted. The nonmoving party’s failure to oppose summar y judgment does not shift that burden.’ The District Court ‘must always determine for itself whether the record and any un disputed material facts justify granting summary judgment.’” (quoting Grimes v. District of Columbia , 794 F.3d 83, 97 (D.C. Cir. 2015) (Griffith, J., concur ring) and citing Fed. R. Civ. P . 56(e)(3))).18 III. ANALYSIS
A. Adequacy of the BOP’s Search The DOJ asserts that its searches in response to all eleven req uests were adequate

. See Defs.’ 3d MSJ at 1–2. Even where Pinson does not contest the a dequacy of a search, the Court will nonetheless independently dete rmine whether the record and undisputed material facts justify granting summary judgment. Under FOIA, an adequate sea rch is one that is “reasonably calculated to unc over all relevant documents.” Morley v. CIA , 508 F.3d 1108, 1114 (D.C. Cir. 2007) (internal quotation mark omitted) (quoting Weisberg v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice , 705 F.2d 1344, 1351 (D.C. Cir. 1983)). The agency need not to search “e very record system” for the requested documents, but it “mus t conduct a good faith, reasonable search of those systems of records likely to possess th e requested records.” Marino v. Dep’t of Justice , 993 F. Supp. 2d 1, 9 (D.D.C. 2013) (citing Oglesby v. U.S. Dep’t of the Army , 920 F.2d 57, 68 (D.C. Cir. 1990)). When an agency seeks summary judg ment on the basis that it cond ucted an adequate search, it must provide a “reasonably detaile d” affidavit describing the s cope of that search. Iturralde v. Comptroller of the Currency , 315 F.3d 311, 313–14 (D.C. Cir. 2003) (quoting Oglesby , 920 F.2d at 68). It is not enough, however, f or the affidavit to state in conclusory fashion that the agency “conducted a review of [the file s] which would contain informat ion that [the plaintiff] requested” and did not find anything res ponsive to the request. Weisberg , 627 F.2d at 370. On the other hand, once the agency has provided a reasonably detailed affida vit describing its search, the burden shifts to the FOIA reque ster to produce “countervailing evidence” suggesting that a genuine dispute of material fact exists as to the adequacy of t he search. Morley , 508 F.3d at 1116 (citation omitted).19 Here, the DOJ argues that its searches for records in response to each request were adequate.
See Defs.’ 3d MSJ at 1–2. The Court agrees that the searches cond ucted with respect to seven of these requests were wholly adequa te. However, the Court finds that the BOP has yet to complete its responses to Pinson for Request Nos. 2011-7156, 2012-40, 20 12-39, and 2013-1684.
1. Request Nos. 2010-12533, 2011-843, 2011-1351, 2011-1886, 2011-2 366, and 2012-975. The Court agrees with the DOJ t hat its searches in response to Request Nos. 2010-12533, 2011-843, 2011-1351, 2011-1886, 2011-2366, and 2012-975 were ad equate, which Pinson does

not contest. See Defs.’ 3d MSJ at 1–2; Pl.’s R esp., ECF No. 314. The DOJ provid ed a declaration from the BOP show ing an organized and thorough sear ch for these six requests. See generally 3d Christenson Decl. Specifica lly, the declaration and the DOJ ’s briefing canvass each request in detail, explai n to whom the request was sent, the sp ecific databases searched, and, where appropriate, identify the specific search terms used to l ocate the documents. See Defs.’ Mem. P. & A. at 4–21; 3d C hristenson Decl. ¶¶ 2–13, 44–50, 53–5 7, 64–71, 95–101, 162–167. The declaration’s descriptions s uffice to provide a “reasonably detailed” account of the scope of the BOP’s search for eac h of these six requests. See Hidalgo v. FBI, No. 10-5219, 2010 WL 5110399, at *1 (D.C. Cir. Dec. 15, 2010) ( “[S]ubstantial weight traditionally [is] accorded [to] agency affidavits in FOIA ‘adequacy of search’ cases.” (citing Chambers v. U.S. Dep’t of the
Interior , 568 F.3d 998, 1003 (D.C. Cir. 2009))). For example, with respectto Request No. 2011-2366, which sough t copies of “any final settlement resulting in a [p]laintiff receiving monetary compen sation arising from litigation against officers or employees of the [BOP] in Lewisburg, PA; Oa kdale, LA; Talladega, AL, from 2006–[2010],” Ms. Christenson attest s that both the Southeast R egional Office of the BOP and the Supervisory Attorneys assigne d to the BOP facilities in tho se cities searched for responsive20 records. See 3d Christenson Decl. ¶¶ 95, 98–99. Ms . Christenson explains th at the BOP maintains these types of record s in two different databases cre ated by the BOP’s Office of General Counsel, which trac k civil litigati on handled by BOP at torneys and administrative tort claims received by a BOP legal office. See id. ¶¶ 96–97. Ms. Christenson elaborates on the databases’ search capabilities, s tating that the databases “are searchable by incident institution, date, and case disposition.” Id. at ¶ 98. She asserts t hat the staff ran a search for the sett lement cases based on the criteria provi ded by Pinson, and the search identified responsive cases, the file was opened within the database t o retrieve any documents showin g the final settlement paid. Id. In addition, Ms. Christenson explai ns that the supervisory atto rneys and legal staff in the individual legal office in each of the three cities also review ed their case tracking logs for any cases identified as settled that fit the criteria of Pinson’s r equest and hand search ed the legal file for responsive settlement documents of any case identified. See id. ¶ 99. Ultimately, Ms. Christenson states that “[s]i x pages of responsive documents ha d been located.” Id. ¶ 100. Ms. Christenson provides the same t ype of reasonably detailed information describing the BOP’s searches in response to Request Nos. 2010-12533, 2011-843, 2011 -1351, 2011-1886, and 2012-
975. See id. ¶¶ 2–13, 44–50, 53–57, 64–71, 162–167; Vaughn Index, ECF No. 293-3, Ex. C. The Court thus concludes that the BOP conducted a good faith, r easonable search in response to these requests. Accordingly, the C ourt grants the DOJ’s motionfor summary judgment with respect to the adequacy of the BOP’s search for Request Nos. 20 10-12533, 2011-843, 2011- 1351, 2011-1886, 2011-2366, and 2012-975.
2. Request No. 2011-7619 Pinson does contest the adequac y of the DOJ’s search in respons e to Request No. 2011- 7619, arguing that the BOP impr operly destroyed responsive reco rds. Pl.’s Resp. at 2. This21 complaint centers on the request f or documents related to Repor t of Incident #BMP 332.07 and video recording ECN BMP-07599-A. T he BOP informed Pinson that no records could be found related to either topic because i ts evidence control log indica ted that “the evidence and all information regarding the evide nce had been destroyed,” pursuan t to “routine evidence retention policies.” 3d Christenson Decl . ¶ 127. The BOP explained thatthe records were deleted during the two year period when the reque st was closed because Pinson owed fees for a separate request. Def.’s Reply at 4, ECF No. 321; see also Memorandum Opini on at 33–35, ECF No. 259. The Court agrees with the DOJ that the search was adequate beca use the records were destroyed prior to Pinson paying her overdue fees and in accordance with the BOP’s established record retention policies. It is well established that FO IA does not require an agency to retain records, but only to provide access to records t hat have been retained. Kissinger v. Reporters Comm. for Freedom of
the Press , 445 U.S. 136, 151–52 (1980). It is thu s clear that an agencythat destroys documents prior to receiving a FOIA request covering those documents has committed no error. See id. at 155 n.9 (“[A] ‘withholding’ must he re be gauged by the time at which the request is made since there is no FOIA obligation to retai n records prior to that req uest.”). In this case, the documents were destroyed not before the ini tial FOIA reque st, but while t hat initial request was closed due to Pinson’s unpaid fees. Because the request was closed when t he documents were destroyed—and may never have been reopened, if Pinson’s bills h ad languished unpaid—this situation is equivalent to the situations in which records were destroyed before the request was filed. See Flowers v. IRS , 307 F. Supp. 2d 60, 72 (D.D.C. 2004) (a pproving the agency’s conduct when “the federal documen t-retention machinery lumbered forward on schedule, and the plaintiff's file was destroyed” during a period after the plain tiff filed a FOIA request but before22 the plaintiff corrected procedur al errors with that request). The alternative w ould bind agencies to indefinitely maintain files po tentially related to any proce durally defective FOIA requests, on the possibility that a request might someday ripen into a perfe cted FOIA request. 24 Pinson does not otherwise object t o the adequacy of the search for Request No. 2011- 7619, and the BOP provided a deta iled affidavit sufficiently de scribing its methods, 3d Christenson Decl. ¶¶ 126–132; Vaughn Index, ECF No. 293-3, Ex. C. The Cour t therefore finds that t here is no genuine issue of material fact as to the adequacy of the BOP ’s search in response to Request No. 2011-7619 and grants the DOJ’s mo tion for summary judgment with respect to adequacy.
3. Request Nos. 2011-7156, 2012-40, and 2012-39 Pinson disputes the adequacy of t he BOP’s search in response to Request Nos. 2011- 7156, 2012-40, and 2012-39, Pl.’s Resp. at 1, all of which invo lved searches of emails. The BOP was initially prevented from s earching its email archives by te chnical problems. See 3d

24 Even if the records had been de stroyed after Pinson’s request was reopened by this Court, the BOP would likely not ha ve violated FOIA. Of course, an agency cannot, in bad faith, “avoid a FOIA request by intenti onally ridding itself of a requ ested document.” DiBacco v. U.S. Army , 795 F.3d 178, 192 (D.C. Cir. 2015) (citing Chambers , 568 F.3d at 1004). But, the bar on intentionally destroying material sought by a F OIA request does not forbid a n agency from unintentionally destroying FOIA material in accordance with a n eutral record retention policy. Pinson cites no legal authority i n support of the proposition t hat the documents “should have been automatically preserved pa rticularly once they were the fo cus of a FOIA request.” Pl.’s Resp. at 2. As the BOP notes, “ until the BOP processes a reque st, it has no way of knowing what records may be responsive. ” Defs.’ Reply at 4. Adopting Pinson’s suggestion would thus paralyze agencies. Instead, “[t ]he critical issue . . . in a d ispute over a document that an agency no longer has, is the agency’s m otivation for disposing of or t ransferring that document. If ‘the agency is no longer in po ssession of the document, for a reason that is not itself suspect ,’ FOIA [is satisfied].” DiBacco v. U.S. Army , 795 F.3d 178, 192 (D.C. Cir. 2015) (emphasis added) (quoting SafeCard , 926 F.2d at 1201). An agency’s routine recor d retention policy— like the one at issue here—is the paradigma tic example of a non-suspect expl anation for destroying a document. See Boyd v. Crim. Div. of U.S. Dep’t of Justice , 475 F.3d 381, 392 (D.C. Cir. 2007) (“[E]ven if the documents were de stroyed [after the FOIA reques t and before the initial response], their destruction, if performed in accordance with s pecified guidelines, would not imply bad faith.”).23 Christenson Decl. ¶¶ 117 , 141–42, 145, 147 (“[The] email archiv e system is currently unavailable due to technical i ssues, and it is not clear when i t will be restored. [The BOP] will request a search of the email ar chive system for this portion o f Pinson’s request when it is restored.”). In October of 2016, t he search tool was fixed, an d the BOP subsequently performed searches for records respons ive to Request Nos. 2011-7156, 2012 -40, and 2012-39. Email Status Report, ECF No. 353. Although the sear ches have been performed , Pinson has not yet received any response because the search r esults are still being evaluat ed for potential FOIA exemptions.
Id. The DOJ clarified in its repl y briefing—prior to informing th e Court that the search capability was repaired—that it did not seek summary judgment a s to the emails. See Defs.’ Reply at 1. Because Pinson has not yet received any response t o which she may be entitled, summary judgment is still not appr opriate because the agency ha s not yet fully discharged its FOIA obligations. See Moore v. Aspin , 916 F. Supp. 32, 35 (D.D.C.1996) (citing Weisberg v.
DOJ , 705 F.2d 1344, 1350 (D.C. Cir. 1983)). The Court thus agrees with Pinson and the DOJ that summary judgment is not appr opriate as to the email portio ns of Request Nos. 2011-7156 25

25 In Request No. 2011-7156, Pinson also sought “All DHO Reports by FCI Talladega DHO created since 2008 which find aBOP employee statement or m emorandum to not be credible.” See 3d Christenson Decl. ¶ 105. The B OP attempted a search, but de termined that it “did not maintain records in a f ormat that would allow a search .” 3d Christenson Decl. ¶ 115. This was for three reasons: first , reports of the requested typ e are searchable only by number or inmate, not by facility, and the s earch could thus not be easil y narrowed to FCI Talladega DHO; second, if an employee’s statement was found to be not credible , the report would be expunged and the record would then be indis tinguishable from all reports expunged for other reasons; and third, after a record has bee n expunged, it is not available to be opened to determine the cause for the expungement. 3d Christenson Decl. ¶¶ 115–16. Pinson does not specifically object to the reasonableness of the BOP’s sear ch. The Court thus finds that the BOP has met its burden and need not perform additional searches because Pinson did not des cribe the desired records in a way sufficient to “enable[] a pr ofessional employee of the agen cy who was familiar with the subject area of the request to l ocate the record with a reasona ble amount of effort.” Dale v. IRS , 238 F. Supp. 2d 99, 104 (D.D.C. 2002) (quoting Marks v. United States , 578 F.2d 261, 263 (9th Cir. 1978)).24 and 2012-39. Because all of the records sought under Request N o. 2012-40 are emails, summary judgment is thus not appropriate as to any portion of Request N o. 2012-40. The BOP should file a supplemental motion for summa ry judgment afte r the results ha ve been produced to Pinson. The DOJ does move for summary j udgment as to the non-email port ions of Request Nos. 2011-7156 and 2012-39 on the grounds tha t its search was adequa te and that all records withheld were properly withheld. See Defs.’ 3d MSJ at 1–2; Defs.’ Reply at 1. The DOJ submits affidavits sufficiently descri bing its search terms and methods for the non-email portions of Request Nos. 2011-7156 and 2012-39. 3d Christenson Decl. ¶¶ 10 5–118, 143–148; Vaughn Index. Pinson does not object to t he adequacy of these searche s, and this Court concludes that there is no genuine issu e of material fact. T he Court thus gran ts the DOJ’s motion for summary judgment as to the adequacy of its search for non-email records responsive to Request Nos. 2011-7156 and 2012-39.
4. Request No. 2013-1684 The DOJ asserts that its search in response to Request No. 2013 -1684 was adequate

. See Defs.’ 3d MSJ at 1–2. Although Pinson does not specifically ob ject, the Court notes that the BOP has apparently not yet prov ided any response to Pinson. See 3d Christenson Decl. ¶ 186 (“[A] search was initiated . . . [ and] [a]s of the date of this declaration, [the BO P] [is] waiting for page estimates to determine if an amended fee letter needs to b e sent to Pinson or if the records can be processed.”). Given that summary judgment is available only when “the agency proves that it has fully discharged its obligations under the FOIA,” t he Court must deny the DOJ summary judgment as to Request No. 2013-1684. See Moore , 916 F. Supp. at 35.25 B. FOIA Exemptions Here, the DOJ asserts that the B OP properly invoked Exemptions 5, 6, 7(C), and 7(F) 26 to redact or withhold certain information from responsive records. See Defs.’ 3d MSJ at 1–2; Vaughn Index, ECF No. 293-3, Ex. C. The Cou rt will evaluate each inv oked exemption in turn. “[D]isclosure, not secrecy, is the dominant objective of [FOIA ].” Dep’t of the Air Force
v. Rose , 425 U.S. 352, 361 (1976). “Consistent with this purpose, age ncies may withhold only those documents or portions the reof that fall under one of nine delineated statutory exemptions.”
Elliot v. USDA , 596 F.3d 842, 845 (D.C. Cir. 2010) (ci ting 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)) . “[T]he exemptions are ‘explicitly exclusive.’” U.S. Dep’t of Justice v. Tax Analysts , 492 U.S. 136, 151 (1989) (quoting FAA Adm’r v. Robertson , 422 U.S. 255, 262 (1975)). It is the agency’s burden to show t hat withheld material falls within one of these exemptions. See 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(4)(B); Elliott , 596 F.3d at 845. “The [C]ourt . . . ‘impose[s] a substantial burden on an agenc y seeking to avoi d disclosure’ through the FOIA exemptions.” Morley , 508 F.3d at 1114 (quoting Vaughn v. Rosen , 484 F.2d 820, 828 (D.C. Cir. 1973)) (alteration in origin al). The agency’s documents supporting th e exemption, including the Vaughn index, must “permit adequate a dversary testing of the agency’s claimed right to an exemption.” Citizens for Responsibility & Ethics in Wash. v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice , 840 F. Supp. 2d 226, 230 (D.D.C. 2012) (quoting Kimberlin v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice , 139 F.3d 944, 950 (D.C. Cir. 1988)). Accordingly, disclosure exemptions are “narrowly construed,” and “‘conclusory and generalized allegations of exemptions’ are unacceptable.” See Morley , 508 F.3d at 1114–15

26 The DOJ also invokes Exemptions 2 and 7(E) as grounds for reda cting or withholding materials from its responses. See generally Vaughn Index. Because the Court has determined that the withholding of all record s stands or falls on the appl icability of Exemptions 5, 6, 7(C), and 7(F), the Court does not reac h the question of whether Exem ptions 2 and 7(E) apply. See infra Section III.B.1, III.B.2, and III.B.3.26 (quoting Founding Church of Scientology of Was h., D. C., Inc. v. Nat’l Sec. Agency , 610 F.2d 824, 830 (D.C. Cir. 1979)). However, c ourts generally respect the factual reasoning of agencies, and “[u]ltimately[] an agency’ s justification for invoking a FO IA exemption is sufficient if it appears ‘logical’ or ‘plausible.’” Wolf v. CIA , 473 F.3d 370, 374–75 (D.C. Cir. 2007) (quoting
Gardels v. CIA , 689 F.2d 1100, 1105 (D.C. Cir. 1982)). Thus, “a reviewing co urt should ‘respect the expertise of an a gency’ and not ‘overstep the prop er limits of the judicial role in FOIA review.’” Pinson v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice , 160 F. Supp. 3d 285, 293 (D.D.C. 2016) (quoting Hayden v. Nat’l Sec. Agency/Cent. Sec. Serv. , 608 F.2d 1381, 1388 (D.C. Cir. 1979)). 1. Exemption 5 The DOJ argues that the BOP properly invoked Exemption 5 in its responses to Request Nos. 2010-12533, 2011-1351, 2011-1886, and 2012-39. 27 See Defs.’ Mem. P. & A. at 27–28; 3d Christenson Decl. ¶¶ 17–18, 58, 72, 149–51; Vaughn Index. Exemption 5 permits the withholding of “inter-agency or i ntra-agency memorandums or let ters that would not be available by law to a party other than an agency in litigation with the a gency.” 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(5). This exemption protects documents “normally privileged in the civil discovery context,” Judicial Watch, Inc. v. Dep’t of Justice , 365 F.3d 1108, 1113 (D.C. Cir. 2004), including “what is sometimes called the ‘deliber ative process’ privilege,” Dep’t of the Interior v. Klamath Water
Users Protective Ass’n , 532 U.S. 1, 8 (2001). The deliberativ e process privilege “co vers documents reflecting adviso ry opinions, recommendations, and de liberations comprising part of a process by which governmental decisions and policies are form ulated.” Id. at 8 (quoting NLRB v. Sears, Roebuck & Co. , 421 U.S. 132, 150 (1975)).

27 The analysis of Request N o. 2012-39 deals only with the non-em ail materials. See supra Part III.A.3.27 For the deliberative process pr ivilege to apply, a court must f irst determine whether the document is both predecisional and deliberative. Access Reports v. Dep’t of Justice , 926 F.2d 1192, 1194 (D.C. Cir. 1991). “A document is predecisional if i t is ‘generated before the adoption of an agency policy.’” McKinley v. FDIC , 744 F. Supp. 2d 128, 138 (D.D.C. 2010) (quoting Coastal States Gas Corp. v. Dep’t of Energy , 617 F.2d 854, 866 (D.C. Cir. 1980)). A document is “deliberative” if it “reflects the give-and-take of the consultative process,” id. (quoting Coastal States Gas , 617 F.2d at 866), “by which the decision itself is made,” Jowett, Inc. v. Dep’t of the Navy , 729 F. Supp. 871, 875 (D.D.C. 1989) (quoting Vaughn v. Rosen , 523 F.2d 1136, 1144 (D.C. Cir. 1975)). The DOJ claims that Exempti on 5 justifies withholding sections of multiple After Action Review Reports. See Vaughn Index at 1–7, 10–11, 26 (dealing with e xemptions from Request Nos. 2010-12533, 2011-1351, and 2012-39). After Action Review Reports are “prepared by Bureau staff, and . . . reviewed by additional Bureau staff . . . .” See Statement Mat. Facts Not Genuine Dispute ¶ 11, ECF No. 293-1. The BOP claims that it wi thheld “recommendations regarding whether a use of for ce was appropriate and suggestion s for improving uses of force for the future” from its disclosures of the reports. See, e.g. , 3d Christenson Decl. ¶ 17; see also Vaughn Index at 1–7, 10–11, 26 (describing portions of documents with held in response to Request Nos. 2010-12533, 2011-1351, and 2012-39). Pinson argues that the DOJ must disclose the After Action Revie w Reports in their entirety here because it has pr eviously disclosed similar docum ents during discovery in civil litigation. See Pinson Decl. ¶ 6, ECF No. 314. However, FOIA exemptions are n ot coextensive with civil discovery standards. See Stonehill v. IRS , 558 F.3d 534, 538 (D.C. Cir. 2009). FOIA permits agencies to make “discr etionary disclosures” of informa tion that is exempt from28 mandatory disclosures. See CNA Fin. Corp. v. Donovan , 830 F.2d 1132, 1134 n.1 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (explaining that an agency’ s FOIA disclosure decision can“be grounded either in its view that none of the FOIA exemptions applies, and thus that disclos ure is mandatory, or in its belief that release is justified in th e exercise of its discretion, ev en though the data fall within one or more of the statutory exemptions.”). Therefore, even assuming, arguendo , that the DOJ has disclosed similar documents during discovery in civil lawsuits, that disclosure does not mandate disclosure in the instant case. However, upon its independent inq uiry, this Court is not satisf ied that the DOJ has carried its burden of showing tha t Exemption 5 applies to the A fter Action Review Reports. In dealing with Exemption 5, the n eed for the agency to describe w ithheld records is at its height “because ‘the deliberative process privilege is so dependent up on the individual document and the role it plays in the administrative process.’” Animal Legal Def. Fund, Inc. v. Dep’t of Air
Force , 44 F. Supp. 2d 295, 299 (D.D.C. 1999) (quoting Coastal States , 617 F.2d at 867). The agency must show that the reco rd was “generated as part of a de finable decision-making process.” Gold Anti-Trust Action Comm., Inc. v. Bd. of Governors of Fed. Reserve Sys. , 762 F. Supp. 2d 123, 135–36 (D.D.C. 2011) (citing Petroleum Info. Corp. v. U.S. Dep’t of the Interior , 976 F.2d 1429, 1434 (D.C. Cir. 1992)). This showing typically includes “(1) the nature of the specific deliberative process i nvolved, (2) the function and si gnificance of the document in that process, and (3) the nature of the decisionmaking authority ves ted in the document’s author and recipient.” Nat’l Sec. Counselors v. CIA , 960 F. Supp. 2d 101, 189 (D.D.C. 2013) (citing Senate of P.R. v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice , 823 F.2d 574, 585–86 (D.C. Cir. 1987); Arthur Andersen & Co.
v. IRS , 679 F.2d 254, 257–58 (D.C. Cir. 1982); Coastal States , 617 F.2d at 867–68).29 The BOP’s disclosures regardi ng the After Action Review Reports fall short of meeting this standard. The BOP does not de fine the nature of the delib erative process involved. Is the deliberative process one of how Pinson should be classified? A n ongoing refinement of the BOP’s policies on the use of force in general? 28 While the BOP need not identify a specific policy decision, it must at least describe the decisionmaking p rocess at issue. Furthermore, the BOP does not sufficiently descri be the function or significance of the After Action Review Reports in that process, or the nature of the decisionmaking au thority of the author and recipient. Who drafts the Reports? Who revie ws them? Are the “determinat ions” withheld from the Reports final, or are they revise d later? For t hese reasons, t he BOP has not yet carried its burden of establishing that the After Action Review Reports are proper ly withheld under Exemption 5. The same flaws undercut the BOP’s application of Exemption 5 to other records, including a memorandum from one B OP staff member to another BOP staff member; 29 referrals and recommendations regarding Pinson’s correctional management; 30 a document discussing steps for re-accreditation; 31 and a document describing the pr eliminary cause of death of in mates

28 It is also possible that the wit hheld portions of the reports are not deliberative at all. The BOP’s describes the After Action Review Reports as intended to “review the incident to assess whether staff adhered to policy.” See 3d Christenson Decl. ¶ 54. This description suggests that the After Action R eview Reports are decisional ma terials that contain conclusions rather than pre-decisional mate rials that contain deliberations . Similarly, the BOP’s description of the withheld portions of the reports as “recommendations reg arding whether a use of force was appropriate,” 3d Christenson Decl. ¶ 17, is reminiscent of a conclusion about the use of force, not a deliberative proce ss. Of course, if the materials are not deliberative, the BOP must release them. If they are delib erative, then the BOP must prov ide a sufficiently detailed Vaughn index to explain the deliberativ e function of the withheld port ions.
29 The BOP redacted or withheld t his document from Request No. 20 10-12533. 30 The BOP redacted or withheld t hese materials from Request No. 2011-1886. 31 The BOP redacted or withheld t his document from Request No. 20 12-39.30 and estimating costs. 32 See also, e.g. , Vaughn Index at 4 (“Memorandum from Michael Nalley”); Vaughn Index at 12 (“Email from Chad Lohman to Lee Green”); Vaughn Index at 15 (“Investigative Report, S IS Case No. TDG 09-0011”); Vaughn Index at 16–17 (Documents 22, 23, and 25); Vaughn Index at 19 (“Inmate Investiga tive Report, SIS Case No. TDG 10 -0125”); Vaughn Index at 25 (Documents 1, 2, 3, and 4) . For these records, th e BOP has likewise failed to specify the role of the document in the deliberative process , or the nature of the decisionmaking authority vested in each party. F or example, for one set of do cuments, the BOP states only that “these documents consist of r eferrals and recommendations made from Bureau staff to other Bureau staff” without specifying t he relative position in the d ecisionmaking chain of each staff member. See 3d Christenson Decl. ¶ 72. The Court thus denies the BOP summ ary judgment as to its use of Exemption 5 to wit hhold documents, as reflected i n the table infra at Part IV. 33 2. Exemption 6 The DOJ argues that the B OP properly invoked Exemption 6 to wi thhold the names of individuals, individu al’s addresses, and case numbers in respon se to Request No. 2011-2366, which sought documents relating t o the settlement of legal clai ms against the BOP. 34 In its

32 The BOP redacted or withheld t his information from Request No. 2012-39. 33 The Court grants the BOP summa ry judgment as to its withholdin g of document 28 of Request No. 2010-12533, the Use of F orce Worksheet, because the material is properly exempt under Exemption 7(F). The Court thus does not reach whether Ex emption 5 would also apply to the document. The Court denies the BOP summary judgment as to documents 2, 13 , and 17 shown in the Vaughn Index for Request No. 2010-12533. See Vaughn Index at 1–4. The Court denies the BOP summary judgment as to all of the documents shown in the Vaughn Index for Request No. 2011-1351. See Vaughn Index at 9–11. The Court denies t he BOP summary judgment for documents 3, 21, 22, 23, 25, and 35 shown in the Vaughn Index for Request No. 2011-1886. See Vaughn Index at 12–20. The Court denies the BOP summary judgment as to documents 2 through 5 shown in the Vaughn Index for Request No. 2012-39. See Vaughn Index at 25–26.
34 The BOP also asserts Exempti on 6 in response to other withhold ings, but because the Court finds that the other wit hholdings are ju stified under dif ferent exemptions, it does not address them under Exemption 6.31 response to that request, the BOP produced parts of a “stipulat ion for compromise and settlement” and “letter regarding an administrative tort claim” but withhel d the case number and administrative tort claim number, as well as th e names and addresses of an inm ate, the inmate’s attorney, judges, a notary public, the Assi stant U.S. Attorney, and a BOP employee. Vaughn Index at 21. Pinson does not explicitly challe nge this withholding, but this Court independently considers if the BOP has shown that the undisp uted material facts entitle it to summary judgment. Under Exemption 6, an agency may withhold “personnel and medica l files and similar files” when the disclosure of s uch information “would constitut e a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy.” 5 U.S.C . § 552(b)(6). The exemption has been interpreted broadly to protect “bits of personal inform ation, such as names and addres ses.” Prison Legal News v.
Samuels , 787 F.3d 1142, 1147 (D.C. Cir. 2015) (brackets and internal q uotation mark omitted). “The information in the file ‘n eed not be intimate’ for the fil e to satisfy the standard, and the threshold for determining whether information applies to a part icular individual is minimal.” Milton v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice , 783 F. Supp. 2d 55, 58 (D.D.C. 2011) (quoting N.Y. Times Co. v.
NASA , 920 F.2d 1002, 10 06 (D.C. Cir. 1990)). P rivate information m ust also implicate a “significant privacy interest” to t rigger protection. Multi Ag Media LLC v. Dep’t of Agric. , 515 F.3d 1224, 1229 (D.C. Cir. 2008) (quoting Nat’l Ass’n of Retired Fed. Emps. v. Horner , 879 F.2d 873, 874 (D.C. Cir. 1989)). This standard, ho wever, “means less than it might seem,” as a substantial privacy interest is “anything greater than a de minimis privacy interest.” Id. at 1229–30. Where private information in a r ecord does implicate a signific ant privacy interest, the court determines if disclosi ng the information would constitut e a “clearly unwa rranted invasion of personal privacy,” Wash. Post Co. v. U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs ., 690 F.2d 252, 260 (D.C. Cir. 1982) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(6 )), by balancing32 “the privacy interest that woul d be compromised by disclosure a gainst any public interest in the requested information,” Multi Ag Media , 515 F.3d at 1228. “The scope of a privacy interest under Exemption 6 will always be d ependent on the context in wh ich it has been asserted.” Prison Legal News , 787 F.3d at 1147 (D.C. Cir. 2015) (quoting Armstrong v. Exec. Office of the
President , 97 F.3d 575, 581 (D.C. Cir. 1996)). I n calculating the public interest, the court considers only “the extent to whi ch disclosure of the informati on sought would ‘she[d] light on an agency’s performance of its s tatutory duties’ or otherwise l et citizens know ‘what their government is up to.’” Lepelletier v. FDIC , 164 F.3d 37, 46 (D.C. Cir. 1999) (alteration in original) (quoting U .S. Dep’t of Def. v. Fed. Labor Relations Auth. , 510 U.S. 487, 497 (1994)). “Information that ‘reveals litt le or nothing about an agency’s own conduct’ does not further the statutory purpose.” Beck v. Dep’t of Justice , 997 F.2d 1489, 1493 (D.C. Cir. 1993) (quoting U.S. Dep’t of Justice v. Reporters Comm. for Freedom of the Press , 489 U.S. 749, 773 (1989)). From its response to Request No. 2011-2366, where Pinson sought , in relevant part, “any final settlement resulting in a Plaintiff receiving monetary co mpensation arising from litigation” against certain BOP sites, the B OP withheld “the names and addr esses of individuals involved in the cases” from one “stipulation f or compromise and settlement. ” Vaughn Index at 21. The BOP also withheld the names of a n inmate and a BOP employee fro m a letter regarding “an administrative tort claim. Vaughn Index at 21. The BOP also withheld “the case numbers and administrative claim number, a s this information could be used to circumvent the withholding of the names and identify the invol ved individuals.” 3d Christens on Decl. ¶ 102. The individuals included inmates, court personnel, a prosecutor, BOP employees, and a notary public. Vaughn Index at 21. As to all of these w ithholdings, the BOP states o nly that releasing the information would “constitute an unwarranted invasion into [] personal priv acy.” 3d Christenson Decl.33 ¶ 102. These names and addresses do constitute personal informa tion, 35 and revealing the name of a person involved in litigati on with the BOP or their addres s would implicate more than a de minimis privacy interest. The C ourt thus proceeds to balancing the public and private interests. Pinson’s request is very simila r to the request at issue in Prison Legal News v. Samuels , where the requestors sought “al l documents showing money the [B OP] paid in connection with lawsuits and claims brought again st it” during a particular tim e period. 36 Prison Legal News , 787 F.3d at 1145. In Prison Legal News , the BOP withheld “indivi duals’ names and other personal identifying information that would revea l the identity of a person related to a claim” under Exemption 6. Id. at 1147–48. The BOP provided a mor e thorough explanation of t he private harm possible through disc losure, which the D.C. Circui t characterized as “to prevent the public from knowing an individual s uffered some sort of injury or loss, or was subjected to discrimination, because associati on with the filing of a claim can be stigmatizing.” Id. at 1148. However, the D.C. Circuit reject ed the BOP’s application of Exe mption 6 because the BOP’s categorical approach provided ins ufficient explanation of the d isparate privacy rights involved. For example, the BOP discussed all different types of claims to gether, even though “the privacy interest of tort claimants will be different when they are clai ming injury from a slip and fall as compared to a sexual assault.” Id. at 1150. The BOP also grouped together all involved individuals, “fail[ing] to disti nguish between r edacting the id entity of the alleged victim and the

35 And, as the BOP notes, the case numbers could be used to determine the names from court records.
36 The D.C. Circuit treated lawsu its and other types of claims id entically. See generally Prison Legal News , 787 F.3d 1142. Neither Pinson nor the BOP draws any distinct ion between the administrative claim and lawsuit at issue here. And Pinson does not argue that, for instance, the lawsuit settlement has been placed on the public record. See generally Pl.’s Opp’n. Accordingly, the Court does not a ddress whether these two types of records should be treated differently.34 alleged perpetrator.” Id. at 1150. The D.C. Circuit conclude d that this approach was insufficiently precise because, whe n such a categorical explana tion is used, “[t]he range of circumstances included in the cat egory must ‘characteristically support[] an inference that the statutory requirements for e xemption are satisfied.’” Id. (quoting Citizens for Responsibility & Ethics in Wash. v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice , 746 F.3d 1082, 1088–89 (D.C. Cir. 2013)). The D.C. Circuit did not bar th e possibility of using categories in the future, and provided examples of categories which might share a similar privacy interest, such a s “medical professionals who treat inmates” or “prisoners who testify in FTCA claims.” Id. at 1151. Here, the BOP likewise does not s ufficiently explain the privac y interests of the individuals “involved” in each claim. Neither claim is describ ed, and, as the D.C. Circuit notes, an alleged sexual assault will trigger very different privacy i nterests than an all eged slip-and-fall. Here, as in Prison Legal News , the BOP groups together all of the involved individuals, even though the inmates likely have priv acy interests that differ fr om those of the BOP employee, judge, or notary public. The BOP employee’s interest would als o depend on whether he or she was involved in the case as a w itness or as an alleged perpetrator. As in Prison Legal News , this oversimplification prevents th is Court from understanding the p rivacy interests that weigh against disclosure, and the Court thus cannot correctly balance the public and priv ate interests. 37 The Court will thus deny the BOP summary judgment as to its wit hholding of the names, addresses, and case numbers i n its response to Request No. 2011 -2366. 38

37 Although Pinson does not identify a public interest at issue h ere, the Court notes that there is likely some level of public interest in understanding “what the government is up to” through an examination of the fact patterns surrounding claims the BOP has settled with inmates.
38 This denial of summ ary judgment applies to both documents, 1 a nd 2, listed in the BOP’s Vaughn index. See Vaughn Index at 21. The BOP also claims Exemption 7(C) justifies withholding this material, but as discussed infra Section III.B.3.a, the Court disagrees that the threshold requirement of Exemption 7 is met.35 3. Exemption 7 The DOJ argues that the BOP properly invoked Exemption 7 in res ponse to Request Nos. 2010-12533, 2011-843, 2011-1351, 2011-1886, 2011-2366, 2011-715 6, 2011-7619, 2012-39, and 2012-975. See Defs.’ Mem. P. & A. at 30–31. Exe mption 7 protects from disclo sure certain “records or information compile d for law enforcement purposes.” 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(7)

. a. Threshold Inquiry “In order to withhold documents under Exemption 7, the agency m ust, as a preliminary matter” make a “threshold” show ing demonstrating “that the reco rds were compiled for a law enforcement purpose.” Kay v. FCC , 976 F. Supp. 23, 37 (D.D.C. 1997). Agencies classified as law enforcement agencies receive a special deference in their c laims of law enforcement purpose.
See Pratt v. Webster , 673 F.2d 408, 418 (D.C. Cir. 1982) (expl aining this deference as based on “the generally accurate assumption that federal agencies act wi thin their legislated purposes”). This review, however, although “nece ssarily deferential” is “no t vacuous.” Id. at 421. Not every document compiled by a law enforcement agency satisfi es the law enforcement purpose inquiry. See AIC v. U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec. , 950 F. Supp. 2d 221, 245–46 (D.D.C. 2013) (rejecting ICE’s argument th at all of its records are compiled for a law enforcement purpose (citing Pratt v. Webster , 673 F.2d 408, 419 (D.C. Cir. 1982))); Benavides v. Bureau of
Prisons , 774 F. Supp. 2d 141, 146–47 (D.D.C. 2011) (rejecting a “per s e” rule that all BOP documents are created for law enforcement purposes and finding that the BOP’s recordings of inmates’ telephone conversations fell outside of law enforcemen t purposes (citing Pratt , 673 F.2d at 416)). Instead, the withhe ld records “must be related to the enforcement of federal laws or to the maintenance of nationa l security” and that nexus “mus t be based on information sufficient to support at least a c olorable claim of its rationa lity.” Pinson v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice ,36 No. 12-1872, 2016 WL 4074130, at *6–7 ( D.D.C. July 29, 2016) (i nternal quotation marks and citations omitted) (quoting Pratt , 673 F.2d at 420–21). Records relating to an investig ation are one common type of rec ord compiled for law enforcement purposes. For record s created in the context of anongoing investigation 39 the Pratt test requires an agency to “ide ntify a particular individual or a particular incident as the object of its investigation and [identify] the connection b etween that in dividual or inciden t and a possible security risk or viola tion of federal law” in order to satisfy Exemption 7’s threshold condition.
Pratt , 673 F.2d at 420; see also, e.g. , Ctr. for Nat’l Sec. Studie s v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice , 331 F.3d 918, 926 (D.C. Cir. 2003) (applying the Pratt test when the records i nvolved an investigation of terrorists); Long v. ICE , 149 F. Supp. 3d 39, 48–49 (D.D.C. 2015) (applying the Pratt test when the records related to lawenforcement databases); AIC , 950 F. Supp. 2d at 245 (applying the
Pratt test when the records relate d to immigration detention). Wher e there is no ongoing investigation, materials may still meet the threshold requireme nt of Exemption 7 if they are akin to “guidelines, techniques, and proc edures for law enforcement investigations and prosecutions outside of the context of a s pecific investigation.” Tax Analysts v. IRS , 294 F.3d 71, 78 (D.C. Cir. 2002). With this framework i n mind, the Court turns to th e BOP’s withholdings in this case. Here, the “BOP is a law enforcem ent agency and thus deserves [] deference” on its

39 In 1986, Congress amended Exemption 7 to broaden the reach of the threshold requirement from “ investigatory records compiled for law enfor cement purposes,” 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(7) (1982) (emphasis added) , to simply “records or info rmation compiled for law enforcement purposes,” Anti- Drug Abuse Act of 1986, § 1802(a), Pub. L. No. 99-570, 100 Stat. 3207, 3207-48 (1986); see also Tax Analysts v. IRS , 294 F.3d 71, 79 (D.C. Cir. 2002). The D.C. Circuit has made clear that , after the amendments, the Pratt test applies only “when an agency seeks to invoke Exemption 7 in a s ituation in which there is an ongoing law enforcement ‘investigation,’” but in that cont ext, it “is still good law.” Tax Analysts , 294 F.3d at 77–78.37 claims of law enforcement purpose. 40 Pinson v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice , No. 12-1872, 2016 WL 4074130, at *6 (D.D.C. Jul. 29, 2016); see also Duffin v. Carlson , 636 F.2d 709, 713 (D.C. Cir. 1980); Mem. Op., ECF No. 306 at 12. The BOP explains that the documents it withholds under Exemption 7 were generated as pa rt of the BOP’s “law enforcemen t mission of protecting inmates, staff, and the community.” 3d Christenson Decl. ¶ 26. Furthermore, many of the responsive records were located in the BOP’s databases. See, e.g. , id. ¶¶ 13, 44, 53, 64, 95, 105, 126, 140, 143, 162, 176. Past decisions in this jurisdiction h ave held that similar records were compiled for law enforcement purposes. See, e.g. , Mingo v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice , 793 F. Supp. 2d 447, 453 (D.D.C. 2011) (holding that records “pertain[ing] t o an altercation involving over 50 inmates” and “maintained by the Special Investigative Office at that facility” were compiled for a law enforcement purpose because they were “created in connect ion with the BOP’s responsibility to protect[] inmat es, staff, and the community” (internal quotation marks and citations omitted)); Holt v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice , 734 F. Supp. 2d 28, 41 (D.D.C. 2010) (holding that records “pertain[ing] to t he investigation of an inmate-on -inmate assault” were compiled for law enforcement purposes because they were “created in connecti on with the BOP’s responsibility to protect[] inmat es, staff, and the community” (internal quotation marks and citations omitted)). Ma ny of the records at issue here are sim ilar to those previously found to be compiled for law enforcement purposes. For example, the BOP ap plies Exemption 7 to the administrative remedy index, which collects complaints by inmat es about the conditions of their confinement. 3d Christenson Decl. ¶ 163. Like the documents a t issue in Mingo and Holt , the

40 Pinson attempts to argue that the BOP may not qualify as a law enforcement agency. See Pl.’s Opp’n at 4. However, the cases she cites do not supportthis proposition, but only note the requirement that the BOP and all law enforcement agencies m ust establish a “nexus” between their law enforcement activitie s and the withheld documents. See, e.g. , Ctr. for Nat. Sec. Studies v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice , 331 F.3d 918, 926 (D.C. Cir. 2003).38 administrative remedy index coll ects records pertaining to wron gful conduct within the prison that were affirmatively create d by the BOP to fulfill its law e nforcement responsibility of protecting inmates. In conducti ng its independent evaluation, the Court therefor e finds that the BOP has presented sufficient facts to show that the documents i t withholds under Exemption 7 were compiled for law enforcem ent purposes, with the exception of the settlement-related documents responsive to Request No. 2011-2366. Request No. 2011-2366 sought records about settlements paid by certain BOP sites to end lawsuits. 3d Christenson Decl. ¶ 95 & Ex. J; Greene Decl. ¶ 13 & Ex. 18, ECF No. 147-3. The BOP located a compromise stipul ation and a lette r regarding an administrative tort claim in response to the request, and a pplied Exemption 7 to withhold po rtions of each. Vaughn Index at 21. The BOP makes no attempt to either satisfy the Pratt test by explaining the relationship of the documents to an investigati on, or to show that the document s relate to general law enforcement guidelines or proced ures. Instead, the BOP claims that the settlement records were compiled for law enforcement purposes because “the documents we re generated pursuant to litigation challenging the Bureau’s performance of its law enfo rcement mission.” 3d Christenson Decl. ¶ 103. This goes too far. T he BOP’s position comes clos e to advocating for the rejected

per se rule that, because it is a law enforcement agency, any documen ts it compiles meet Exemption 7’s threshold requirement. Cf. AIC v. U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec. , 950 F. Supp. 2d 221, 245–46 (D.D.C. 2013) (rejecting such a rule); Benavides v. Bureau of Prisons , 774 F. Supp. 2d 141, 146–47 (D.D.C. 2011) (same). If the records rela te to an ongoing investig ation, the BOP’s ex planation does not even attempt to satisfy the Pratt test by identifying “a particular individual or a particular i ncident as the object of its investigati on and [identifying] the connectio n between that indivi dual or incident39 and a possible security risk or violation of federal law.” Pratt v. Webste r, 673 F.2d 408, 420 (D.C. Cir. 1982). If the BOP believe s that these records meet Exemption 7’s threshold requirement because they are rel ated to an investigation, it mu st say much more about the particular incident and threat involved. Nor does the BOP atte mpt to claim that the documents are similar to the general guide lines and procedures that the D .C. Circuit held could still be protected by Exemption 7 in Tax Analysts

. 41 Cf. Tax Analysts , 294 F.3d at 78. On its face, BOP’s role as a defendant in a l awsuit appears distinct from it s role as a law enforcement agency. Because the BOP does notexplain how the settlement do cuments could satisfy Exemption 7’s threshold require ment through either test, Exempt ion 7 cannot be applied to the claimed documents from Request No. 2011-2366.

b. Exception 7(C) The DOJ argues that it properly invoked Exemption 7(C) in respo nse to Request Nos. 2010-12533, 2011-843, 2011-1351, 2011-1886, 2011-2366, 2011-715 6, 2011-7619, 2012-39, and 2012-975. 42 See Defs.’ Mem. P. & A. at 31–32. The BOP used the exemption to wi thhold the names, personal identifying i nformation, and medical inform ation of staff members, other

41 Settlement documents, by their nature, are related to one part icular claim—which makes it difficult to understa nd how they could relate to the B OP’s general law enforcement procedures.
42 The DOJ also invokes Exemptions 6 and 7(F) as grounds for with holding: the names, personal identifying informati on, and medical information of st aff members, third-party inmates, and individuals; information regarding the correctional managem ent of third-party inmates; the names of FBI agents; an injury a ssessment for a staff member; a nd telephone and fax numbers of prison staff members. See 3d Christenson Decl. ¶¶ 21–24, 52, 59, 73–75, 102, 119, 133, 1 52–53, 168; Vaughn Index. Because the Court has dete rmined that all of the withh eld records are protected by Exemption 7(C), the Court does not reach the quest ion of whether Exemption 6 and 7(F) apply to this information a s well, except t o the extent th at the Court has al ready rejected the application of Exemption 6 t o portions of Request No. 2011-2366

.40 inmates, and individuals; 43 information regarding the correct ional management of third-party inmates; 44 the names of FBI agents; 45 an injury assessmentfor a staff member; 46 and telephone and fax numbers of prison employees. 47 See 3d Christenson Decl. ¶¶ 29–33, 52, 61, 77–81, 104, 122–23, 136, 156–57, 171; Vaughn Index. The DOJ asserts that t he release of the withheld information would significantly c ompromise inmates’ and employe es’ privacy interests, see Defs.’ Mem. P. & A. at 31–32, and the Court agrees. Under Exemption 7(C), an agency i s exempt from producing “recor ds or information compiled for law enforcement purposes . . . to the extent that the production of such law enforcement records or informa tion . . . could reasonably be ex pected to constitute an unwarranted invasion of personal privacy.” 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(7)(C). Exemp tion 7(C) is similar to Exemption 6, as both protect private information, but “Exemption 7(C) is more protective of privacy than Exemption 6 and thus establishes a lower bar for withholding ma terial.” Prison Legal News v.
Samuels , 787 F.3d 1142, 1146 n.5 (D.C. Cir. 2015) (quoting ACLU v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice , 655 F.3d 1, 6 (D.C. Cir. 2011)). See also U.S. Dep’t of Def. v. Fed. Labor Relations Auth. , 510 U.S. 487, 496 n.6 (1994) (“Exemptions 7(C) and 6 differ in the magni tude of the public interest that is required to override the respectiv e privacy interests protected by the exemptions.”).

43 The BOP redacted or withheld t his information from Request Nos . 2011-1351, 2011- 1886, 2011-2366, 2011-7156, 2011-7619, 2012-39, and 2012-975.
44 The BOP redacted or withheld t his information from Request Nos . 2010-12533, 2011- 1886, and 2012-39.
45 The BOP redacted or withheld t his information from Request Nos . 2010-12533 and 2011-1886. 46 The BOP redacted or withheld t his document from Request No. 20 10-12533. 47 The BOP redacted or withheld t his information from Request Nos . 2011-843, 2011- 1886, and 2011-7156.41 As in Exemption 6, a court first de termines if there is a priva cy interest in the information to be disclosed, ACLU , 655 F.3d at 6, and then balances the individual’s privacy int erest against the public interest, consideri ng only the public interest “that focuses on ‘the citizens’ right to be informed about what their government is up to,’” Davis v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice , 968 F.2d 1276, 1282 (D.C. Cir. 1992) (quoting U.S. Dep’t of Justice v. Reporters Comm. , 489 U.S. 749, 773 (1989)). It is a FOIA requester ’s obligation to articulate a p ublic interest sufficient to outweigh the individuals’ privacy inter est, and the public interest must be significant. See Nat’l Archives
& Records Admin. v. Favish , 541 U.S. 157, 172 (2004). Moreover, the D.C. Circuit has hel d that the names of “private individua ls appearing in f iles within the ambit of Exemption 7(C)” are categorically exempt from disc losure unless disclosing such inf ormation “is necessary in order to confirm or refute compelling ev idence that the agency is engage d in illegal activity.” See
Pinson , 2016 WL 4074130, at *7 (quoting SafeCard Servs., Inc. v. SEC , 926 F.2d 1197, 1206 (D.D.C. 1991)); ECF No. 306 at 14–15. In response, Pinson articulates only the vague argument that al l of the information withheld under Exemption 7(C) should be disclosed because “the public absolutely should know how the BOP treats its inmates especially in situ ations where i t uses live ammunition to kill them.” See Pl.’s Resp. at 3–4, ECF No. 314. P inson does not identify any specific redactions that are problematic or provide a ny arguments that would help the Court weigh the public and private interests. Pinson doe s not explain why identifying par ticular staff members would serve the public interest or reveal w hat the government is up to in a way that understa nding the actions of high-ranking BOP offi cials alone does not. Here, because Pinson has not presented any compelling evidence of illegal activity by the BOP, the names of the third-par ty inmates and individuals are c ategorically exempt from42 disclosure. See Pinson , 2016 WL 4074130, at *7 (holding thatthe names of third-party inmates within memoranda were categorical ly exempt from disclosure abse nt compelling evidence of illegal activity by the BOP); SafeCard , 926 F.2d at 1206 (holding that names of “private individuals appearing in files within the ambit of Exemption 7( C)” are categorical ly exempt from disclosure unless disclosing such information “is necessary in order to confirm or refute compelling evidence that the age ncy is engaged in illegal activ ity”). As to the other withheld information, the DOJ has presented su fficient detail to demonstrate that its redactions p rotect the privacy interests o f inmates, staff members, and thirdparty individuals. In its own i ndependent evaluation, the Court does not identify any public interest in disclosure that woul d outweigh that private interes t. Cf. Davis , 968 F.2d at 1282 (holding that “even if a partic ular privacy interest is minor, nondisclosure remains justified where . . . the public interest i n disclosure is virtually none xistent); see also 3d Christenson Decl. ¶¶ 29–33, 52, 61, 77–81, 104, 122–23, 136, 156–57, 171. The Co urt thus grants the BOP summary judgment as to its use of Exemption 7(C). c. Exemption 7(F) Finally, the DOJ claims that t he BOP properly invoked Exemption7(F) to withhold records in response t o Request Nos. 2010-12533, 2011-1351, 2011 -1886, 2011-7156, 2011-7619, 2012-39, and 2012-975. See Defs.’ Mem. P. & A. at 35–37. FOIA Exemption 7(F) protects from disclosure information cont ained in law enforcement record s that “could reasonably be expected to endanger the life or physical safety of any individ ual.” 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(7)(F). The D.C. Circuit has described the reach of Exemption 7(F) as “expa nsive.” See Elec. Privacy Info. Ctr. v. U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec. , 777 F.3d 518, 526 (D.C. Cir. 2015), cert. denied 136 S. Ct. 876 (2016). “That language is ver y broad,” and the exemption “ does not require that a particular43 kind of individual be at risk of ha rm; ‘any individual’ will do .” Public Emps. for Envtl. Responsibility v. U.S. Section, Int’l Boundary & Water Comm’n , 740 F.3d 195, 205 (D.C. Cir. 2014). Moreover, “[d]isclosure need not definitely endanger life or physical safety; a reasonable expectation of endangerment suffices.” Id . Unlike Exemption 7(C), whi ch involves a balancing test, Exemption 7(F) “is an absolut e ban against [disclosure of ] certain information,” Raulerson v. Ashcroft , 271 F.Supp.2d 17, 29 (D.D.C. 2002), and “[w]ithin limits, cou rts defer to the agency’s assessment of danger,” Sanchez–Alaniz v. Fed. Bureau of Prisons , No. 13-1812, 2016 WL 1222214, at *7 (D.D.C. Mar . 28, 2016) (citations omitted). The DOJ argues that the BOP properly withheld: 48 monitoring and c lassification assignments for Pinson and third-party inmates; 49 correctional manageme nt techniques used for Pinson and third-party inmates, 50 the names and roles of staff who participated in uses of force ; 51 information regarding the secur ity procedures of the institutio n; 52 Daily Assignment Rosters; 53 specific procedures used duri ng a calculated use of force; 54 witness statements used to support

48 In addition, while the BOP label s its withholding of “the techniques law enforcement officers used to contain and contro l a critical incident” from documents responsive to Request No. 2012-00039 as based in Exemption 7(E), Vaughn Index at 26, the Court finds that Exemption 7(F) would justify t he withholding and thus does not address Exemption 7(E). Pinson does not object to this withholding.
49 The BOP redacted or withheld t his information from Request Nos . 2010-12533, 2011- 1351, 2011-1886, 2011-7156, 2011-7619, 2012-39, and 2012-975.
50 The BOP redacted or withheld t his information from Request Nos . 2011-1351, 2011- 1886, and 2011-7156.
51 The BOP redacted or withheld t his information from Request Nos . 2010-12533 and 2012-39. 52 The BOP redacted or withheld t his information from Request No. 2010-12533. 53 The BOP redacted or withheld t hese documents from Request No. 2010-12533. 54 The BOP redacted or withheld t his information from Request No. 2010-12533.44 Pinson’s ADX referral; 55 information regarding gang and inf ormant activity within the B OP; 56
statements that Pinson and third -party inmates and individuals made to law enforcement officers; 57 information regarding law en forcement investigations; 58 the classification of various reported incidents; 59 Pinson’s presentence inve stigation report (“PSR”); 60 and factual descriptions of inmates’ assaultive behavior. 61 See 3d Christenson Decl. ¶¶ 39–43, 63, 86–94, 125, 138–39, 160–61, 174–75; Vaughn Index. The DOJ asserts that d isclosure of the withheld information could reasonably be e xpected to endanger the life o r physical safety of staff and inmates. See Defs.’ Mem. P. & A at 35–37. Pinson first objects to the wit hholding of the Daily AssignmentRosters and Report of Incident documents, on the basis th at the DOJ has disclosed the se types of documents in other litigation. See Pinson Decl. ¶¶ 2, 10, ECF No. 31 4. However, as discussed supra at Section III.B.1, an agency may make a disc retionary disclosure of mater ial that would be protected by FOIA without waiving the right to withhold similar documents inthe future. Cf. CNA Fin. Corp.
v. Donovan , 830 F.2d 1132, 1134 n.1 (D.C. Cir. 1987). Therefore, even if the BOP has previously disclosed different D aily Assignment Rosters or Repo rt of Incidents, that disclosure need not control the result here.

55 The BOP redacted or withheld t his information from Request No. 2011-1886. 56 The BOP redacted or withheld t his information from Request No. 2011-1886.
57 The BOP redacted or withheld t his information from Request No. 2011-1886. 58 The BOP redacted or withheld t his information from Request No. 2011-1886. 59 The BOP redacted or withheld t his information from Request Nos . 2011-1886 and 2011-7619. 60 The BOP redacted or withheld t his document from Request No. 20 11-1886. 61 The BOP redacted or withheld t his information from Request No. 2012-975.45 In this case the DOJ has sufficiently demonstrated that the inf ormation withheld from the Daily Assignment Rosters could reasonably be expected to endang er the life or physical safety of one or many individuals and thus falls within Exemption 7(F). As the BOP’s declarations explain, the Daily Assignment Ros ters “reveal the institution’s staffing levels, including how many correctional officers are present on each shift and where those officers are posted throughout the institution. This information could assist indiv iduals in planning incidents, including assaults, homicides, a nd escape attempts.” 3d Christ enson Decl. ¶ 42; cf. Anderson v. Fed. Bureau of Prisons , 806 F. Supp. 2d 121, 128 (D.D.C. 2011) (holding that Exemptio n 7(F) was properly invoked to withhold a B OP’s prison incident reportbecause “it would likely result in harassment and/or retaliation, to possibly include physical assaults, directed towards individual(s) identified in the investigation and resulting in a threat not only to the named individual but also to the safe operation of the institution”); see also Schotz v. Samuels , 72 F. Supp. 3d 81, 89 (D.D.C. 2014) (Exemp tion 7(F) “affords broad pr otection to the identities of individuals mentioned in law e nforcement files . . . , includin g any individual reasonably at risk of harm.” (quoting Quinto v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice , 711 F. Supp. 2d 1, 8 (D.D.C. 2010))); 3d Christenson Decl. ¶¶ 42, 138–39. A ccordingly, the Court finds there is no genui ne issue of material fact regarding the DOJ ’s invocation of Exemption 7(F) to withhold the Daily Assignment Rosters and grants the BOP summary judgment. 62

62 Pinson also cursorily argues th at the BOP’s claims “about enda ngering inmate safety or in some way revealing its pract ices and techniques [are] contra dicted by its public policies which identify ‘disruptive groups.’” See Pinson Decl. ¶ 7. However, as explained previously, Exemption 7(F) does not operate a s a balancing test, but as an absolute ban against disclosure of certain information. See Raulerson , 271 F. Supp. 2d at 29; see also Sanchez–Alaniz , 2016 WL 1222214, at *8 (holding that the BOP pr operly withheld informat ion under Exemption 7(F) where the BOP determined that “d isclosure of the redacted information would endanger the life or physical safety of inmates and s taff members named within th e report”). Nor has Pinson demonstrated that the precise i nformation withheld here has bee n previously made public.46 Pinson also contests the DOJ’s use of Exemption 7(F) to withhol d her PSR in response to Request No. 2011-1886. See Pl.’s Resp. at 2; Vaughn Index at 20. The BOP replies that giving Pinson her PSR could lead to another inmate assaulting her or c oercing her into sharing the information. See 3d Christenson Decl. ¶ 94. In fact , the BOP has a policy prohi biting inmates from possessing their PSRs, to avoi d precisely these harms. Th e BOP further argues that if Pinson wishes to review her PSR, she may request to do so “acco rding to the procedures outlined on pages 12–13 of Program Statement 1351.05.” Id. However, “[a]n agency’s duty to release information is not predicated on t he identity of the requester or the purpose for the request.” Maydak v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice , 362 F. Supp. 2d 316, 320–21 (D.D.C. 2005) (citing United States Dep’t of Justice v. Reporters Comm. for Freedom of the Press , 489 U.S. 749, 771-72 (1989)). The BOP may therefore not withhold the PSR because Pi nson in particular, or an inmate in general, requested it . This Court previously noted t hat whether records “must be disclosed pursuant to FOIA is a s eparate matter from whether [] Pinson, who is incarcerated, is entitled under BOP rules and regul ations to possess the corresp ondence at issue while [she] is incarcerated,” ECF No. 203 at 6, an d therefore appointed Pinsoncounsel “for the limited purpose of receiving and reviewing correspondence withheld by the BOP a nd FBI and determining compliance with FOIA,” Order of Appointment of Pro Bono Counsel , ECF No. 204; see also Sample v. Bureau of Prisons , 466 F.3d 1086, 1089 (D.C. Cir. 2006) (dist inguishing between the BOP’s role as a FOIA administrat or and its role as a custodian of inmates). Past cases in this circuit have permitted inmates conditional a ccess to their PSRs, rather than permitting the document t o be withheld entirely under Exem ption 7(F). See, e.g. , Martinez v. Bureau of Prisons, 444 F.3d 620, 625 (D.C. Cir. 2006) (“FOI A does not entitle [th e requester] to have copies of his [or her] PSRs” as long as the requester i s “afforded a meaningful47 opportunity to review his [or he r] PSR and to take notes on the m.” (internal citations omitted)); Schotz , 72 F. Supp. 3d at 89 (finding that the PSR was not improperly withheld when plaintiff could access it through BOP’s pro cedures). In this case, in ad dition to BOP’s procedures for review, the Court has appointe d Pinson counsel t o receive corre spondence from BOP that Pinson may not receive in prison. The BOP should thus use Pinson’s pr o bono counsel to meet its FOIA obligation with regard to Pinson’ s PSR, rather than simply deny ing Pinson’s request. As this is in accordance with the BOP’s policy for PSR retention, it would apparently satisfy the BOP’s safety concerns. The DOJ’s reque st for summary judgment as to the withholding of the PSR— document 36 listed in the Vaughn Index for Request No. 2011-1886—under Exemption 7(F) is thus denied. See Vaughn Index at 20. Although Pinson does not specifical ly challenge the BOP’s other withholdings under Exemption 7(F), this Court must independently consider if any g enuine issues of material fact exist. The Court identifies signi ficant oversights in several of the BOP’s jus tifications for withholding documents. First, in response to Request No. 2011- 1886, the BOP withheld several “staff member[s’] response[s] to questions posed by Pinson rega rding [her] ADX referral.” Vaughn Index at 12–20. These statement s appear to have addressed whe ther or not Pinson should be placed in the ADX. The DOJ elaborates that “the safe ty of the staff-witnesses” would be “at risk” if their “opinions ” “regarding whether [Pinson’s] placement at ADX was appropriate” were disclosed. State ment Mat. Facts Not Genuine Dispute ¶ 75, ECF No. 293-1;
see also 3d Christenson Decl. ¶ 86, ECF No. 293-3. However, given that the BOP has anonymized other documents by rem oving the names of staff under Exemption 7(C), the Court finds that the BOP’s potential ha rm is too speculative in the absence of some explanation as to48 why these responses could not likewise be anonymized. 63 At a minimum, BOP must demonstrate that the opinions are so fact specific that even re daction would not conceal the identity of the persons e xpressing the opinions. Second, the BOP insufficientl y explained its withholding of certain information from the Report of Incident documents. T he BOP withheld the checkboxes for “Type of Incident” and “Cause of Incident” from several Reports of Incident responsive to Request No. 2011-7619. Vaughn Index at 23–24. The BOP argues th at revealing which incidents were classified as sexual assault “increases the r isk of further harm to the alleg ed victim.” 3d Christenson Decl. ¶ 138. However, the BOP does not explain why this risk could no t be addressed by redacting the name of the victim under Exemp tion 7(C) instead of withholding the entire classification. 64 In response to Request No. 2012-975 the BOP similarly used Exempti on 7(F) to withhold “information regarding an assaul t on an inmate and attachments [to the form].” 65 Vaughn Index

63 The Court thus denies summary j udgment to the BOP for document s 8 through 17, inclusive, listed in the Vaughn index for Request No. 2011-1886.
64 It appears that the documents containing these redactions were responsive to Pinson’s request for “All Report of Inc ident (Form 583) regarding homici des within the Bureau of Prisons since 2008” as part of Request No. 2011-7619. See, e.g. , 3d Christenson Decl. ¶¶ 126, 130. Given that these records relate to homicides, the possibility o f revictimization must be at its nadir. Furthermore, given that Pinson did not request reports pertaining to specific incidents, there is no reason to believe that Pinson is already familiar w ith the identities of any of the victims. Both of these factors suggest that redacting the name s would suffice. The Court also notes that the BO P’s rationale for withholding t he Type of Incident and Cause of Incident boxes from a ll of the homicide reports of inc idents appears to be described in the third Christenson Declara tion at ¶ 138, although that parag raph explicitly refers only to the records responsive to a di fferent portion of Request No. 2011-7 619. 65 The BOP also claims that Exe mption 7(E) justifies its withhold ing of the information regarding the assault and attach ments. This provision exempts r ecords that “would disclose techniques and procedures for law enforcement investigations or prosecutions, or would disclose guidelines for law enforcement i nvestigations or prosecutions i f such disclosure could reasonably be expected to risk circumven tion of the law.” 5 U.S.C. § 552( b)(7)(E) (2016). However, the Court is similarly unable to dete rmine from the one scant line of description provided by the BOP how “information regarding assault on an inmate” or an unde scribed attachment would49 at 27–34. The DOJ conclusorily asserts that “[d]isclosure of [ the factual descri ption of inmates’ assaultive behavior] could resu lt in further vic timization for the victim of the described assault. Further, disclosure of the fact ual information could have the e ffect of educating inmates on new ways to assault other inmates or staff.” Statement Mat. Facts Not Genuine Dispute ¶ 164. These assertions are too vague to allow t he Court to subject them to the adversarial process, and do not explain why the BOP could not sim ply anonymize the names of the inmates (for example, if the assault is a “routin e” physical attack in arecreation yard, co uld that description reasonably educate another inmate about new methods of assault?). In addit ion, the BOP gives no description of the contents of the attachments at all, much les s an explanation of the danger posed by their release. See Maydak v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice , 362 F. Supp. 2d 316, 321 (D.D.C. 2005) (denying summary judgment t o the agency on its withholdin g of psychiatric reports on an inmate, because its argument that the inmate could learn to man ipulate the treatment system was “too speculative and not based upon competent evidence”). Because the BOP has not shown that it has a “reasonable expectation” of harm from disclosure, the Court will deny the BOP summary judgment as to its withholdings of the answers to questions andthe information regarding assault and attachments. 66
C. Segregability FOIA requires that any reasonabl y segregable portion of a recor d shall be provided to any person requesting such record aft er removal of exempt portions, unless the non-exempt portions are inextricably intertw ined with exempt portions. See 5 U.S.C. § 552(b); see also Johnson v.

disclose law enforcement tech niques or guidelines, and thus can not grant the BOP summary judgment on this ground.
66 This denial applies to document 4 listed in the Vaughn index for Request No. 2011- 7916 and documents 2 through 18 listed in the Vaughn index for Request No. 2012-975.50 Exec. Office for U.S. Attorneys , 310 F.3d 771, 776 (D.C. Cir. 2002). “Agencies are entitled t o a presumption that they complie d with the obligation to disclose reasonably segregable material.” Sussman v. U.S. Marshals Serv. , 494 F.3d 1106, 1117 (D.C. Cir. 2007). In order to demonstrate that all reasonably s egregable material has been re leased, the agency must provide a “detailed justific ation” for its non-segregability. Mead Data Cent., Inc. v. Dep’t of the Air
Force , 566 F.2d 242, 261 (D.C. Cir. 1977). However, the agency is n ot required to provide so much detail that the exempt ma terial would be effectively discl osed. Id

. Here, the DOJ provided Pinson with a comprehensive Vaughn index, describing each document withheld in part or in f ull, as well as the exemption under which it was withheld. Vaughn Index, ECF No. 293-3, Ex. C. Ms. C hristenson attests to havin g personally prepared the Vaughn Index and that “[e]very effort ha s been made to release all se gregable information without releasing [the pr otected information].” See, e.g. , 3d Christenson Decl. ¶ 17. Pinson raises no objection as to the segregability of the information withheld. See Pl.’s Resp.; Pinson Decl. The combination of the Vaughn Index and the declarati on of Ms. Christenson are sufficient to fulfill the agency’s obligation to show with “rea sonable specificity” why a document cannot be further segregated. See Armstrong v. Exec. O ffice of the President , 97 F.3d 575, 578–79 (D.C. Cir. 1996).
IV. CONCLUSION In light of this Court’s conclu sions regarding the adequacy of the BOP’s searches and the exemptions BOP has invoked, the Court grants summary judgment t o the DOJ as shown in the following table:51 Request No. Document Nos. Summary Judgement for BOP 2010-12533 2, 13, 17 DENIED , insufficient showing to apply Exemption 5 All others (1, 3–12, 14, 15, 16, 18–30) GRANTED 2011-843 All GRANTED
2011-1351 All DENIED , insufficient showing to apply Exemption 5 2011-1886 3, 21, 22, 23, 25, 35 DENIED , insufficient showing to apply Exemption 5 36 DENIED , insufficient showing to apply Exemption 7(F) 8–17 DENIED , insufficient showing to apply Exemption 7(F) All others (1, 2, 4–7, 18, 19, 20, 24, 26–34) GRANTED
2011-2366 All DENIED , insufficient showing to apply Exemption 6 or 7(C) 2011-7156 All GRANTED
2011-7619 4 DENIED , insufficient showing to apply Exemption 7(F) All others (1–3) GRANTED 2012-40 N/A DENIED , BOP has not yet responded to request 2012-39 2–5 DENIED , insufficient showing to apply Exemption 5 All others (1) GRANTED
2012-975 1 GRANTED All others (2–18) DENIED , insufficient showing to apply Exemption 7(F) 2012-1684 N/A DENIED , BOP has not yet responded to request

As discussed supra at Section III.A and reflecte d in the table, the BOP’s search was not adequate as to Request N os. 2012-1684 or 2012-40 in their entir ety, because the BOP has not yet responded to the requests. Furth ermore, although—as discussed above—the Court grants the BOP summary judgment as to the a dequacy of its non-email searchfor records responsive to52 Request Nos. 2011-7156 and 2012-39, summa ry judgment is denied as to the adequacy of the BOP’s email search responsive to those two requests because the BOP has not yet completed its processing of the requests. Sim ilarly, while—as shown in the t able—the Court grants the BOP summary judgment as to some of its withholdings from Request No s. 2011-7156 and 2012-39, summary judgment would be prematur e as to any withholdings the BOP may assert from any responsive emails it may identify. 67 When the BOP has fulfilled a ll of its FOIA obligations, it should file a supplemental motion f or summary judgment as to th ese requests. For the foregoing reasons, the DOJ ’s motion for summary judgmen t is GRANTED IN
PART AND DENIED IN PART . An order consistent with this Memorandum Opinion is separately and contemporaneously issued.

Dated: February 17, 2017 RUDOLPH CONTRERAS United States District Judge

67 The Court notes that Pinson ha s recently filed a motion seekin g “supplemental briefing” on the issue of whether or not Pinson is entitled to a fee waiver. See Motion for Additional Briefing on Request s, ECF No. 354. Based on that mo tion’s reference to the BOP’s Email Status Report, ECF No. 353, this Court concludes that Pin son seeks a fee waiver as to Requests No. 2011-7156, 2012-40, and 2012-39. Because the Court denies the BOP summary judgment as to each of these requests, as discussed above, it d oes not address Pinson’s motion for supplemental briefing in this opinion.