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NON - PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37 IN THE MATTER OF: TH E ADOPTION OF G.T., IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA Appellee

APPEAL OF: A.T., NAT URAL FATHER No. 941 WDA 2016

Appeal from the Decree May 27 , 2016 In the Court of Common Pleas of Erie County Orphans’ Court at No(s): 97 In Adoption 2015

BEFORE: SHOGAN, MOULTON, and STRASSBURGER, * JJ. MEMORANDUM BY SHOGAN, J.: FILED JANUARY 24, 2017 Appellant, A.T. (“Father”), appeals from the decree entered on May 27, 2016, in the Erie County Court of Common Pleas that terminated his parental rights to his minor son, G.T. (“Child”), born in March 2008. Appellant’s counsel has filed a petition to wit hdraw representation and a brief pursuant to Anders v. California , 386 U.S. 738 (1967), and Commonwealth v. Santiago , 978 A.2d 349 (Pa. 2009), which govern withdrawal from representation on direct appeal. 1 Appellant has not filed a
pro se response to counsel’s petition to withdraw. Following our review, we

* Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court.

1 This Court extended the Anders principles to appeals involving the termination of parental rights in In re V.E. , 611 A.2d 1267, 1275 (Pa. Super. 1992).J

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grant counsel’s petition to withdraw and affirm the decree terminating Father’s parental rights. After the entry of the decree terminating Father’s parental rights on May 27, 2016, Fat her filed a timely appeal. 2 Contained within Father’s notice of appeal was a statement of counsel’s intention to withdraw pursuant
to Anders v. California , 386 U.S. 738 (1967). 3 See In the Interest of
J.T ., 983 A.2d 771, 772 (Pa. Super. 2009) (applying A nders procedure and Pa.R.A.P. 1925(c)(4) to appeals involving the termination of parental rights). On September 2, 2016, counsel filed an Anders brief, and on September 6, 2016, counsel filed a petition to withdraw followed by an amended petition on Septe mber 26, 2016. By letter dated July 13, 2016, the orphans’ court informed this Court that it would not draft an opinion because counsel sought to withdraw. Letter, 7/13/16. Due to the permanency of an order involuntarily terminating parental rights, and because the orphans’ court’s rationale for termination under 23 Pa.C.S. § 2511(a)(1), (2), and (b) could not be

2 Father’s notice of appeal was due b y June 26, 2016, which fell on a Sunday. Father’s notice, filed the next day on June 27, 2016, therefore was timely filed. 1 Pa.C.S. § 1908 (when thirtieth day of appeal period falls on a Saturday or Sunday, those days are excluded from computation).

3 Anders sets forth the requirements for counsel to withdraw from representation on direct appeal. See also Commonwealth v. Santiago , 978 A.2d 349 (Pa. 2009).J

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ascertained in the notes of testimony, 4 we remanded to the orphans’ court for a thorough opinion on December 16, 2016. 5 The orphans’ court has diligently and timely complied, and this matter is now ready for disposition. The orphans’ court explained the procedural history as follows: G.T. was born [i]n March [of] 2008. Amended Petition for Involuntary Termination of Parental Rights, 12/7/15, ¶ 3 . On September 26, 2008, a custody order was entered in Crawford County, Pennsylvania, giving the mother and the Appellant shared [legal] custody of G.T. The mother retained primary physical custody of G.T. and the Appellant was granted periods of visi tation with G.T. by the parties’ mutual consent. If the parties could make no such agreement, the order stated Appellant was entitled to visitation on Mondays and Wednesdays from one until four p.m., Thursdays from one until six p.m. and on Sunday from tw elve noon until six p.m. each week. See Petitioner’s Exhibit A

. On December 7, 2015, the mother filed a petition for involuntary termination of parental rights. Appellant received appointed counsel and a termination hearing was held on May 27, 2016. Appellant’s parental rights were terminated by Decree that same day. Appellant filed a timely Notice of Appeal and Statement of Intent to File an Anders brief June 27, 2016. Trial Court Opinion, 12/29/16, at 1

– 2. Before we address the questions raised on appeal, we first must resolve appellate counsel’s request to withdraw. Commonwealth v. Cartrette , 83 A.3d 1030 (Pa. Super. 2013) ( en banc ). See

4 N.T., 5/27/16, at 84

– 85.

5 We note that the filing of a statement of intent to withdraw as counsel pursuant to Anders and Pa.R.A.P.1925(c)(4) does not relieve the orphans’ court of its duty to provide the rationale for its decision under Pa.R.A.P. 1925(a)(2).J

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Commonwealth v. Rojas , 874 A.2d 638, 639 (Pa. Super. 2005) (stating, “When faced with a purported Anders brief, this Court may not review the merits of the underlying issues without first passing on the request to withdraw.”). There are procedural and briefing requirements imposed upon an attorney who seeks to withdraw on appeal. The procedural mandates are that counsel must: 1) petition the court for leave to withdraw stating that, after making a conscientious examination of the record, counsel has determined that the appeal would be frivolous; 2) furnish a copy of the b rief to [his client]; and 3) advise [his client] that he or she has the right to retain private counsel or raise additional arguments that the [client] deems worthy of the court’s attention. Cartrette , 83 A.3d at 1032 (citation omitted). In addition, our Supreme Court, in Commonwealth v. Santiago , 978 A.2d 349 (Pa. 2009), stated that an Anders brief must: (1) provide a summary of the procedural history and facts, with citations to the record; (2) refer to anything in the record that counsel believes arguably supports the appeal; (3) set forth counsel’s conclusion that the appeal is frivolous; and (4) state counsel’s reasons for concluding that the appeal is frivolous. Counsel should articulate the relevant facts of record, controlling case law, and /or statutes on point that have led to the conclusion that the appeal is frivolous.J

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Santiago , 978 A.2d at 361. The Supreme Court reaffirmed the principle that indigents “generally have a right to counsel on a first appeal, [but] . . . this right does not include the right to bring a frivolous appeal and, concomitantly, does not include the right to counsel for bringing such an appeal.” Santiago , 978 A.2d at 357 (citation omitted). The Court stated: In the Court’s view, this distinction gave meaning to t he Court’s long

- standing emphasis on an indigent appellant’s right to “advocacy.” . . . As the Court put it, “although an indigent whose appeal is frivolous has no right to have an advocate make his case to the appellate court, such an indigent does, in al l cases, have the right to have an attorney, zealous for the indigent’s interests, evaluate his case and attempt to discern nonfrivolous arguments.” Santiago , 978 A.2d at 357

– 358 (citation omitted). Father’s counsel has complied with the first prong of S antiago by providing a summary of the procedural history and facts in the Anders brief. She has complied with the second prong by referring to any evidence in the record that she believes arguably supports the appeal. Counsel also set forth her conclusio n that the appeal is frivolous and stated her reasons for that conclusion, with appropriate support. Moreover, counsel filed a separate motion to withdraw as counsel, wherein she stated that she examined the record and concluded that the appeal is frivolo us. Further, counsel has attempted to identify and fully develop any issues in support of Father’s appeal. Additionally, counsel sent a letter to Father, and she attached a copy of the letter to her motion. Counsel states that she informed Father that s he has filed a motion to withdraw and an AndersJ

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brief, and she apprised Father of his rights in light of the motion to withdraw as counsel. Thus, Father’s appellate counsel has satisfied the requirements of Anders and Santiago . We thus conclude that the procedural and briefing requirements for withdrawal have been met. In the Anders brief, counsel presents the following issues for our
review:
1. Whether the orphans’ court erred and/or abused its

discretion when it concluded that sufficient grounds were estab [l]ished for termination pursuant to 23 Pa.C.S.A. §2511(a)(1)?
2. Whether the orphans’ court erred and/or abused its discretion when it concluded that sufficient grounds were established for termination pursuant to 23 Pa.C.S.A. §2511(a)(2)? 3. Whether the orph ans’ court erred and/or abused its discretion when it concluded that termination of A.T.’s parental rights was in [C]hild’s best interests pursuant to 23 Pa.C.S.A. §2511(B)? Anders Brief at 4. We address whether the orphans’ court erred in granting the
t ermination petition because the evidence was insufficient to support the
termination. In reviewing an appeal from an order terminating parental rights, we adhere to the following standard: [A]ppellate courts must apply an abuse of discretion standard whe n considering a trial court’s determination of a petition for termination of parental rights. As in dependency cases, our standard of review requires an appellate court to accept the findings of fact and credibility determinations of the trial court if th ey are supported by the record. In re: R.J.T. , 608 Pa. 9, 9 A.3d 1179, 1190 (Pa. 2010). If the factual findings areJ

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supported, appellate courts review to determine if the trial court made an error of law or abused its discretion. Id. ; In re R.I.S. , 614 Pa. 275, 36 A.3d 567, 572 (Pa. 2011) (plurality). As has been often stated, an abuse of discretion does not result merely because the reviewing court might have reached a different conclusion. Id. ; see also Samuel - Bassett v. Kia Motors America, Inc. , 613 Pa. 371, 455, 34 A.3d 1, 51 (Pa. 2011); Christianson v. Ely , 575 Pa. 647, 838 A.2d 630, 634 (Pa. 2003). Instead, a decision may be reversed for an abuse of discretion only upon demonstration of manifest unreasonableness, partiality, prejudice, bias, or i ll

- will. Id. As we discussed in R.J.T. , there are clear reasons for applying an abuse of discretion standard of review in these cases. We observed that, unlike trial courts, appellate courts are not equipped to make the fact

- specific determinations on a cold record, where the trial judges are observing the parties during the relevant hearing and often presiding over numerous other hearings regarding the child and parents. R.J.T. , 9 A.3d at 1190. Therefore, even where the facts could support an opposit e result, as is often the case in dependency and termination cases, an appellate court must resist the urge to second guess the trial court and impose its own credibility determinations and judgment; instead we must defer to the trial judges so long as the factual findings are supported by the record and the court’s legal conclusions are not the result of an error of law or an abuse of discretion. In re Adoption of Atencio , 539 Pa. 161, 165, 650 A.2d 1064, 1066 (Pa. 1994).
In re I.E.P. , 87 A.3d 340, 343

– 3 44 (Pa. Super. 2014) (quoting In re Adoption of S.P. , 47 A.3d 817, 826

– 827 (Pa. 2012)). The burden is upon the petitioner to prove by clear and convincing evidence that the asserted grounds for seeking the termination of parental rights are valid. In re R.N.J. , 985 A.2d 273, 276 (Pa. Super. 2009). We have explained that the “standard of clear and convincing evidence is defined as testimony that is so ‘clear, direct, weighty and convincing as to enable the trier of fact to come to a clear conviction, with out hesitance, ofJ

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the truth of the precise facts in issue.’” Id . (quoting In re J.L.C. , 837 A.2d 1247, 1251 (Pa. Super. 2003)). Moreover, this Court may affirm the trial court’s decision regarding the termination of parental rights with regard to
any one subsection of section 2511(a). In re B.L.W. , 843 A.2d 380, 384 (Pa. Super. 2004) ( en banc ). The orphans’ court terminated Father’s parental rights pursuant to 23 Pa.C.S. § 2511(a)(1), (2), and (b). Order, 5/27/16, at 1. Section 2511(a)(1), (2), and (b ) provide as follows: § 2511. Grounds for involuntary termination (a) General rule.

-- The rights of a parent in regard to a child may be terminated after a petition filed on any of the following grounds: (1) The parent by conduct continuing for a period of at least six months immediately preceding the filing of the petition either has evidenced a settled purpose of relinquishing parental claim to a child or has refused or failed to perform parental duties. (2) The repeated and continued incapacity, abuse , neglect or refusal of the parent has caused the child to be without essential parental care, control or subsistence necessary for his physical or mental well

- being and the conditions and causes of the incapacity, abuse, neglect or refusal cannot or will not be remedied by the parent. * * * (b) Other considerations.

-- The court in terminating the rights of a parent shall give primary consideration to the developmental, physical and emotional needs and welfare of the child. The rights of a parent shall no t be terminated solely on the basis of environmental factors such as inadequate housing, furnishings, income, clothing and medical care if found to be beyond the control of the parent. With respect to any petition filed pursuantJ

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to subsection (a)(1), (6) or (8), the court shall not consider any efforts by the parent to remedy the conditions described therein which are first initiated subsequent to the giving of notice of the filing of the petition. 23 Pa.C.S. § 2511. This Court has explained that the foc us in terminating parental rights under section 2511(a) is on the parent, but under section 2511(b), the focus is on the child. In re Adoption of C.L.G. , 956 A.2d 999, 1008 (Pa. Super. 2008) ( en banc ). The orphans’ court has provided a thorough evaluatio n supporting termination of Father’s parental rights pursuant to 23 Pa.C.S. § 2511(a)(1), (2) and (b). We have reviewed the notes of testimony and conclude that the orphans’ court’s findings and conclusions are supported by the testimony of record, and we adopt the orphans’ court opinion as our own. 6 Moreover, after conducting an independent review of the record, we discern no non

frivolous issues overlooked by counsel. Accordingly, we grant counsel’s motion to withdraw. Decree affirmed. Motion to with draw as counsel granted.

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq. Prothonotary

6 The parties are directed to attach a copy of the orphans’ court’s opinion of Decemb er 29, 2016, to any future filings in this matter.J

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Date: 1/24/2017

### 2016.

rights. Appellant received appointed counsel and a termination hearing was held on 

### May 27, 

# I L DEC 29 

## 2016 Regiiter of Wms ;

·• 1 On December 7, 2015, the mother filed a petition for involuntary termination of parental 

### See Petitioner's Exhibit A. Thursdays from one until six p.m. and on Sunday from twelve noon until six p.m. each week. stated Appellant was entitled to visitation on Mondays and Wednesdays from one until four p.m., with G. T. by the parties' mutual consent. If the parties could make no such agreement, the order retained primary physical custody of G. T. and the Appellant was granted periods of visitation County, Pennsylvania, giving the mother and the Appellant shared custody of G.T. The mother 

### Parental Rights, 12/7 II 

### 5, 

## 13. On September 26, 2008, a custody order was entered in Crawford 

### Procedural History
G.T. was born on March "2008. 

### Amended Petition for Involuntary Termination of BACKGROUND requested the Superior Court affirm the Decree. termination under 23 Pa. C.S.A. §251 l(a)(l), (a)(2), and (b). It is therefore respectfully the natural mother, 

## Kii Tll•••(mother), met her burderi. in establishing grounds for Notice of Appeal and Statement of Intent to File an Anders Brief. A review of the record shows On May 27, 2016, a decree was entered terminating the parental rights of the natural father, 

# AIII TIIII (Appellant), to his minor child, 

## CIII T-(G.T.). He filed a timely 1925{a} OPINION

IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS OF ERIE COUNTY, PENNSYLVANIA ORPHANS' COURT DOCKET NO. 97 IN ADOPTION 2015 JfN THE MATTER OF · THE ADOPTION OF

# G-TCirculated 01/12/2017 03:22 PM

### Proceedings Transcript, 5/27116, p. 7-8.

2



### relationship with the mother, which continued for some time. Involuntary Termination Appellant attended G.T. 's preschool graduation. As of 2009, Appellant had a good, working Appellant took G.T. to his mother's home, or, would remain at her home with the child. She stated Appellant saw the child about two times a month. During some of these visits, In 2009, mother testified Appellant still remained sporadically involved in the child's life. Termination Proceedings Transcript, 5/27/16, p. 7. 

### visited mother's home for the better part of the first year of the child's life. Involuntary become upset about having to · come to her home to visit the child. Nevertheless, Appellant as "sporadic." She described instances in which Appellant cancelled his visits and would Termination Proceedings Transcript, 5/27/16, p. 5-6

. 

# .. After the custody order was entered, mother still characterized Appellant's involvement Mother characterized Appellant ' s involvement with G.T. as "very sporadic." Involuntary Crawford County, Pennsylvania. At that time, mother and Appellant were not living together. Shortly after G.T. was born, Appellant and mother obtained a formal custody order in

. . • ·· l ' 

### The testimony at the termination hearing revealed the following: Facts 16, 2016, the Superior Court remanded this matter to the orphans'/trial court for the preparation

l ~ · ,i l '

. , , 

### of a 1925( a) opinion within thirty 

### (30) days. record, and of its intent not to submit a 1925(a) Opinion. 

### By Judgment Order dated December The trial court submitted a letter notifying the Superior Court its intent to rest on the timely Noti¢e of Appeal and Statement oflntent to File 

### en Anders brief June 27, 2016. Appellant's parental rights were terminated by Decree that same day. Appellant filed a3

Mother testified that in 

### 2013 her working relationship with Appellant deteriorated. Mother learned Appellant became involved with the criminal justice system and was criminally charged. She also learned Appellant struggled with drug addiction. After these events, Appellant did not have contact with mother and G.T. for a period of at least eight months , even though Appellant lived down the street from mother and child. Involuntary Termination Proceedings Transcript, 5/27/16, p. 8. Eventually, mother learned Appellant was arrested in Tennessee, and was being extradited back to Pennsylvania. Involuntary Termination Proceedings Transcript, 5/27/16 , p. 9. Appellant was released from the Crawford County Jail around Thanksgiving or Christmas, 2014. At that time, mother and her new husband invited Appellant to their h o me in

an attempt to work on Appellant's relationship with the child and "promote him to be a good father." Involuntary Termination Proceedings Tran s cript, 5 / 27 /16, p. 9. Communication between mother and Appellant further deteriorated in March, 2015. Appellant attended a birthday party mother and her husband gave G.T., but did not bring a present for the child. The next month, Appellant contacted the mother asking to spend time with G.T. over Easter. However, G.T. told Appellant he would rather go to Florida to see his grandmother with the rest of the family. Mother testified she heard Appellant screaming at the child through the phone, saying "I don't care that you want to go see your grandma, you ' re coming to my house whether you like it or not." Involuntary Termination Proceedings Transcript, 5/27/16, p. 10-11. Mother testified G.T. became so upset he started "bawling." Involuntary Termination Proceeding s Transcript, 5/27/16, p. 17. When mother took the phone
away from the child, Appellant continued to yell at her, until mother's husband took the phone from her. Involuntary Termination Proceedings Transcript, 5/2 7 I 16, p. 17-18, 3 3.

### 5/27/16, p. 80.

County to modify the standing custody order. 

### Involuntary Termination Proceedings Transcript,

4 

### Proceedings Transcript, 5/27116, p. 16-17, 20. At no time did mother file anything in Crawford information from any family member Appellant tried to contact her. 

### Involuntary Termination Appellant with new addresses when relevant, and did not receive any cards, presents, or 

### 5/27/16, p. 

### 17, 78. Mother also testified her phone number stayed the same, she updated the prohibit contact between Appellant and child. 

### Involuntary Termination Proceedings Transcript, Mother denied telling Appellant at 

### any time to stay away from the child or otherwise 

### own. Involuntary Termination Proceedings Transcript, 5/27/16, p. 22. of the child's football games, but Appellant made no effort to continue his involvement on his 

### Involuntary Termination Proceedings Transcript, 5/27/16, p. 22. He never appeared for a parent/teacher conference or the child's medical appointments.

Prior to April, 2015, mother and husband picked up Appellant and transported him to one the child's progress in school. 

### Involuntary Termination Proceedings Transcript, 5/27/16, p. 13. the child's school or sports activities for at least two years, and did not at any time inquire as to to do well in school and in his extracurricular sports activities. Appellant did not attend any of I L ; 

### 5/27/16, p. 11-12. After April, 2015, Appellant did not contact the child at any holiday. The child continued · termination of Appellant's parental rights. 

### Involuntary Termination Proceedings Transcript, ' served Appellant with a post-adoption letter, indicating mother wished to move forward with message to mother asking why he hadn't seen his son. Around this time, mother's attorney exercise any rights under the existing custody order until September, 2015, when he sent a text Since the argument at Easter, 2015, Appellant did not contact mother or attempt to5



### Appellant's testimony did little to support his belief his parental rights to the child should
not be terminated. At the time of the hearing, Appellant was incarcerated in the Erie County Prison on charges of Possession With Intent to Deliver heroin, a theft offense, and endangering the welfare of a child. Involuntary Termination Proceedings Transcript, 5/27/16, p. 

### 47. He knew a custody order was in place to allow him regular visitation with his son since 2008, yet never exercised his right to enforce the order, despite his assertions mother kept him from seeing the child. Involuntary Termination Proceedings Transcript, 5/27/16, p. 

### 40, 45. Though Appellant denied an ongoing problem with drug addiction, he admitted being ordered into drug and alcohol
treatment in conjunction with a prior conviction. Involuntary Termination Proceedings Transcript, 5/27/16

, p. 49-50. Most recently, Appellant attended treatment for drug addiction, but did not do so until after the termination petition was filed in December, 2015. Involuntary Termination Proceedings Transcript, 5/27/16, p. 76-77. Mother described the ways in which Appellant's minimal contact and incarceration took

a great emotional toll on G.T. Mother testified to an instance in which someone on the child's
school bus told G.T. his father was in jail. Mother stated G.T. understood what it meant to be in prison and had a lot of anxiety about it. G. T. currently sees a doctor every three months for medication and was in individual therapy twice a week at one point. 

### Involuntary Termination Proceedings Transcript, 5/27/16, p. 24-26. Appellant never participated in or inquired as to G.T. 's progress in therapy. Involuntary Termination Proceedings transcript, 5/27 / 16, p. 

### 28. The child frequently asks when mother ' s husband will become his father and when his last name will be the same as his. Involuntary Termination Proceedings Transcript, 5/27/16, p. 83.Appellate courts must apply an abuse of discretion standard when considering a trial court's determination of a petition for parental rights. [The] standard of review requires an appellate court to accept the findings of fact and credibility

6 In reviewing an appeal from an order terminating parental rights, STANDARD OF REVIEW under subsections (a)(l), (a)(2), and (b). on appeal is one challenging the sufficiency of the evidence supporting the trial court's findings After review of the record, the only issue of possible arguable merit that could be raised ISSUE PRESENTED parental rights under 23 Pa.C.S.A. §2511 (a)(l), (a)(2) , and (b). This timely appeal followed. testimony was more credible than the Appellant's. An o r der was entered terminating Appellant's At the close of testimony, a finding was made on the record determining the mother's custody process. 

### Involuntary Termination Proceedings Transcript, 5/27/16, p. 72. and/or modification in any other court in Pennsylvania, though he already had knowledge of the refused. However, Appellant never returned to Crawford County, or petitioned for custody month at best. 

### Involuntary Termination Proceedin g s Transcript, 5/2 7 /16, p. 64. Appellant testified he tried to keep in contact with mother to see G.T., but mother when he did see the child, it was only two or three weekends and an occasional Wednesday per over the years. 

### Involuntary Termination Proceedings Transcript, 5/27/16, p. 57, 69-70. Even further inquiring as to the child's health and well-being, as Appellant insisted he participated in Appellant from attending the child's sporting events, asking about his progress in school, or 

### Termination Proceedings Transcript, 5/27/16, p. 53-54. However, mother never prevented the mother telling him a court order existed prohibiting him from seeing the child. 

### Involuntary Appellant admitted he had no contact with the child since April , 2015, and blamed this on

### relationship." Id

reasonabl e firmness in resisting obstacles placed in the path of maintaining the parent-child must utilize all available resources to preserve the parental relationship, and must exercise even in difficult circumstances." In re B.NM, 85 6 A.2d 847, 855 (Pa. Super. 2004). "A parent

7 

### every problem, in order to maintain the parent-child relationship to the best of his or her ability, duty requires that the pare n t act affirmatively with good faith interest and effort, and not yield to re B.L. W, 843 A

. 2d 380, 384 (Pa: Super. 2004)(en bane), app. den. 863 A.2d 1141 (2004). Preserving Appellant ' s parental r ights is not an acceptable option in 

### this case. "Parental the termination of parental rights with regard to any one subsection of23 Pa.C.S.A. §251 l(a). In severing any such bond." Id 

### The Superior Court may affirm the trial court's decision regarding between parent and child, with close attention paid to the effect on the child of permanently may analyze whether it is i n the best interests of the child for parental rights to be terminated. Id 

### One major aspect of this analysis includes the "nature and status of the emotional bond In re L.M, 923 A.2d 505, 511 (Pa. Super. 2007). Once these statutory grounds-exist, the court parent's conduct satisfies the statutory grounds fo r termination delineated in Section 251 l(a)." parent. The party moving for termination must "prove by clear and convincing evide n ce that the In a termination of parental rights hearing, the initial focus is on the conduct of the If the factual findings are supported, appellate courts review to determine if the trial court made an error of law or abused its discretion. Id An 

### abuse of discretion does not result merely because the reviewing court might have reached a different conclusion. Id 

### Instead, a decision may be reversed for an abuse of discretion only upon determination of manifestunreasonableness, partiality, prejudice, bias, or ill-will. DISCUSSION determinations of the trial court if they are supported by the record. 

### In re: R.JT., 608 Pa. 9, 9 A.3d 1179, 1190 (2010).8

While Appellant was somewhat involved in the child's life shortly after his birth, the mother's credible testimony indicated Appellant never had more than sporadic contact with the
child and failed to perform any meaningful parental duties on the child's behalf. Despite Appellant's assertions mother kept the child from him, it was clear to the trial court the mother made every effort to keep the Appellant in the child's 

### life, even inviting him to dinner at her home and providing transportation for him to and from the child's sporting events. Involuntary Termination Proceedings Transcript, May 27, 2016, p. 9, 22. Despite mother's assistance, Appellant had no steady, meaningful presence in the child's 

### life. Though a custody order was entered in 2008 giving Appellant regular visitation with the child, Appellant did not see the child more than a few times per month at best, and never petitioned for modification or enforcement of the order despite his claims mother withheld the child from him. He did not regularly attend medical appointments or school conferences for the child, no r did he regularly send gifts, cards, or letters to the child for holidays or his birthday. Mother testified the last time Appellant had contact with the child was in March, 2015, over one year before the termination proceedings. Involuntary Termination Proceedings Transcript, May 27, 2016, p. 5, 7-8, 13, 22, 28, 53

- 54, 84-85

. Furthermo r e, the child has significant issues with anxiety, which stem from the Appellant ' s minimal presence in his life and frequent incarceration. The child, at one point, was involved with therapy to address these issues. Involuntary Termination Proceedings Transcript, 5/27116, 

### p. 24-26. The testimony indicated the child is bonded with mother and her husband and is looking forward to the day when mother's husband can finally become his "father." Involuntary Termination Proceedings Transcript, 5/27/16, p. 83.cc: Patrick Kelley, Esquire

2503 West 26th Street Erie, PA 16506

9 BY THE COURT: 

# 1~1l~il(l 1 l L

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### ,;1:j& 

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..;; "- ;.... C$ '<1 ?,.,_, f' 

### J. ROBERT A. SAMBROAH{ 

### JR. 201 ~~) the Appellant's parental rights to the children.

. . (- ...... 

### D t 

### d thi ~ l} 

### f::l_ -..d f f ]t> .{ , : 1 / VY! !,,l,_ t/ -1 a e s f..,.( 1 ay o 1 :;. . ,. ,.
_ ._. • , .•
. , •.
. , - .... r ights be terminated. It is respectfully requested the Superior Court affirm the decree terminating Given the lack of bond Appellant and child share, it is in the child's best interests Appellant's justic e system is additional evidence of his settled purpose to relinquish his parental rights. time with the child at all, to the child's detriment. Appellant's involvement with the c r iminal with his child. He barely exercised his rights under the current custody order, or failed to spend Appellant demonstrated his unwillingness to put forth effort in maintaining a relationship CONCLUSION 45, 47. provide for his child's needs. Involuntary Termination Proceedings Transcript, 5 / 27/16, p. 40, demonstrated his inability or refusal to conform his conduct the requi r ements of the law and a year leading up to the termination hearing. Appellant's incarceration on new charges could he offer a credible explanation as to why he did not have contact with the child for at least contempt in any court in Pennsylvania if he felt mother wa s keeping the child from him, nor terminated. 

### He offered no e x planation as to why he did not file for cu s tody modification or Appellant's testimony did little to suppo r t the position his parental rights should not be