UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 18-4016

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff - Appellee,

v.

JAMES PATRICK MONDELL,

Defendant - Appellant.

No. 18-4017

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff - Appellee,

v.

JAMES PATRICK MONDELL,

Defendant - Appellant.

No. 18-4039

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff - Appellee,
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v.

MICHAEL RUIZ, a/k/a Michael Rizzoa,

Defendant - Appellant.

No. 18-4044

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff - Appellee,

v.

MICHAEL RUIZ, a/k/a Michael Rizzoa,

Defendant - Appellant.

Appeals from the United States District Court for the District of South Carolina, at 

Greenville. Henry M. Herlong, Jr., Senior District Judge. (6:09-cr-01078-HMH-1; 6:17-

cr-00638-HMH-2; 6:17-cr-00144-HMH-1; 6:17-cr-00638-HMH-1)

Submitted: July 31, 2018 Decided: August 28, 2018

Before KEENAN and DIAZ, Circuit Judges, and HAMILTON, Senior Circuit Judge.

Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

Christopher R. Geel, LAW OFFICE OF CHRISTOPHER W. ADAMS, Charleston, South 

Carolina; Lora C. Blanchard, OFFICE OF THE FEDERAL PUBLIC DEFENDER, 

Greenville, South Carolina, for Appellants. Beth Drake, United States Attorney, David 

Calhoun Stephens, Assistant United States Attorney, OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES 
3

ATTORNEY, Greenville, South Carolina, for Appellee.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
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PER CURIAM:

James Patrick Mondell and Michael Ruiz (collectively, Defendants) pled guilty to 

two counts of wire fraud, in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 2, 1343 (2012). Ruiz also pled guilty 

to three counts of impersonating an officer or employee of the United States, in violation 

of 18 U.S.C. § 912 (2012). The district court varied upward from Defendants’ advisory 

Sentencing Guidelines ranges, sentencing Mondell to 40 months’ imprisonment and Ruiz 

to 160 months’ imprisonment. Due to this new criminal conduct, the court also revoked 

Defendants’ supervised release and sentenced Mondell to 27 months’ imprisonment and 

Ruiz to 24 months’ imprisonment. The revocation sentences were within Defendants’ 

respective policy statement ranges, and the court ordered the revocation sentences to run 

consecutively to the sentences imposed for Defendants’ new criminal conduct. In these 

consolidated appeals, Defendants challenge the adequacy of the court’s explanations for 

their new sentences and their revocation sentences. We affirm.

I.

We review a criminal sentence, “whether inside, just outside, or significantly 

outside the Guidelines range” for reasonableness “under a deferential abuse-of-discretion 

standard.” Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 41 (2007); see United States v. Blue, 877 

F.3d 513, 517 (4th Cir. 2017). This review ordinarily requires consideration of both the 

procedural and substantive reasonableness of the sentence, but Defendants limit their 

appeals to the procedural reasonableness of their upward variant sentences by challenging 

the adequacy of the court’s explanations. See Blue, 877 F.3d at 517-18.
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“[F]or every sentence—whether above, below, or within the Guidelines range—a 

sentencing court must place on the record an individualized assessment based on the 

particular facts of the case before it.” United States v. Lynn, 592 F.3d 572, 576 (4th Cir. 

2010) (internal quotation marks omitted). The court is obliged to “adequately explain the 

chosen sentence to allow for meaningful appellate review and to promote the perception of 

fair sentencing.” Blue, 877 F.3d at 518 (internal quotation marks omitted). Although the 

sentencing judge “need not robotically tick through the [18 U.S.C.] § 3553(a) [(2012)] 

factors,” United States v. Helton, 782 F.3d 148, 153 (4th Cir. 2015) (internal quotation 

marks omitted), he must “set forth enough to satisfy the appellate court that he has 

considered the parties’ arguments and has a reasoned basis for exercising his own legal 

decision-making authority,” Blue, 877 F.3d at 518 (internal quotation marks omitted). It 

may sometimes be possible to discern a sentencing court’s rationale from the context 

surrounding its decision, including statements the court made during the sentencing 

hearing. United States v. Montes-Pineda, 445 F.3d 375, 381 (4th Cir. 2006). But “an 

appellate court may not guess at the district court’s rationale, searching the record for 

statements by the Government or defense counsel or for any other clues that might explain 

a sentence.” United States v. Carter, 564 F.3d 325, 329-30 (4th Cir. 2009).

“[W]here the district court decides that a sentence outside the Guidelines’ advisory 

range is appropriate, it must consider the extent of the deviation and ensure that the 

justification is sufficiently compelling to support the degree of the variance.” United 

States v. Zuk, 874 F.3d 398, 409 (4th Cir. 2017) (alteration and internal quotation marks 

omitted). If a court’s deviation from the Guidelines range “is a substantial one, we must 
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more carefully scrutinize the reasoning offered by the district court in support of the 

sentence. The farther the court diverges from the advisory guideline range, the more 

compelling the reasons for the divergence must be.” United States v. Hampton, 441 F.3d 

284, 288 (4th Cir. 2006) (alteration and internal quotation marks omitted). However, the 

court “need not find extraordinary circumstances to justify a deviation from the 

Guidelines,” United States v. Spencer, 848 F.3d 324, 327 (4th Cir. 2017) (internal quotation 

marks omitted), and “we will credit an articulation as clear and appropriate[] when the 

reasons can be matched to a factor appropriate for consideration and tailored to the 

defendant’s situation,” United States v. Rivera-Santana, 668 F.3d 95, 105 (4th Cir. 2012) 

(internal quotation marks omitted).

In Mondell’s case, the district court stated that an upward variance was appropriate 

because Mondell has a long history of preying on people and committing fraud to obtain

money, and because he continued his criminal conduct immediately upon his release from 

prison. This explanation addresses the nature and circumstances of the offense and the 

history and characteristics of the defendant, 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(1), the need to afford 

adequate deterrence to criminal conduct, 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(2)(B), and the need to protect 

the public from further crimes of the defendant, 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(2)(C). Furthermore, 

the court’s comments during the hearing support its explanation and establish that it 

considered the majority of Mondell’s arguments in mitigation. 

In Ruiz’s case, the district court offered a lengthy explanation for imposing an 

upward variant sentence. It observed that Ruiz had spent his entire adult life committing 

fraud and stealing by deception; that no sentence had been lengthy enough to deter Ruiz 
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from engaging in additional criminal activity; that the Guidelines do not account for the 

number of convictions that were identical to the instant offense, several of which were 

uncounted; and that the Guidelines do not adequately account for Ruiz’s decision to prey 

on immigrants. The court then identified the sentencing factors of primary concern in 

Ruiz’s case: the nature and circumstances of the offense and the history and characteristics 

of the defendant, 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(1), the need to afford adequate deterrence to criminal 

conduct, 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(2)(B), and the need to protect the public from further crimes 

of the defendant, 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(2)(C). Furthermore, as in Mondell’s case, the court’s 

comments during the hearing support its explanation and establish that it considered the 

majority of Ruiz’s arguments in mitigation.

Ultimately, the court’s explanations for the sentences and its comments during the 

hearings allow for meaningful appellate review and promote the perception of fair 

sentencing. We do not have to guess at the court’s rationale for imposing significant 

upward variant sentences. We therefore affirm the sentences imposed for Defendants’ new 

criminal conduct.

II.

“A district court has broad discretion when imposing a sentence upon revocation of 

supervised release,” and “[w]e will affirm a revocation sentence if it is within the statutory 

maximum and is not plainly unreasonable.” United States v. Webb, 738 F.3d 638, 640 (4th 

Cir. 2013) (internal quotation marks omitted). “[W]e first must determine whether the 

sentence is procedurally or substantively unreasonable,” evaluating the same general 

considerations employed in review of original sentences. United States v. Slappy, 872 F.3d 
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202, 207 (4th Cir. 2017). Only if we find a sentence unreasonable must we determine 

whether it is “plainly so.” United States v. Thompson, 595 F.3d 544, 547 (4th Cir. 2010).

“A revocation sentence is procedurally reasonable if the district court adequately 

explains the chosen sentence after considering the Sentencing Guidelines’ nonbinding 

Chapter Seven policy statements and the applicable 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) factors.” Slappy, 

872 F.3d at 207 (footnote omitted). “A court need not be as detailed or specific when 

imposing a revocation sentence as it must be when imposing a post-conviction sentence, 

but it still must provide a statement of reasons for the sentence imposed.” Thompson, 595 

F.3d at 547 (internal quotation marks omitted). An explanation will be sufficient and allow 

for meaningful appellate review if there is “an assurance that the sentencing court 

considered the applicable sentencing factors with regard to the particular defendant before 

it and also considered any potentially meritorious arguments raised by the parties with 

regard to sentencing.” United States v. Gibbs, ___ F.3d ___, ___, No. 17-4037, 2018 WL 

3421706, at *4 (4th Cir. July 16, 2018) (alterations and internal quotation marks omitted). 

As with original sentences, “less explanation is required for” a within-policy-statementrange sentence than for one that departs from the recommended range. Id.

The district court did not provide a separate explanation for the length of the 

revocation sentences. But we conclude that the court’s explanations for imposing the 

upward variant sentences for the wire fraud and related convictions covered several of the 

relevant § 3553(a) factors and that there was no need for the court to repeat itself, 

particularly considering that the revocation sentences were within Defendants’ respective 

policy statement ranges. See 18 U.S.C. § 3583(e) (2012) (identifying § 3553(a) factors
9

applicable to revocation sentences). Moreover, during both hearings, the court emphasized 

Defendants’ breach of trust. See Webb, 738 F.3d at 641 (recognizing that revocation 

sentences “should sanction primarily the defendant’s breach of trust” (internal quotation 

marks omitted)). 

Defendants further argue that the district court erred by failing to explain why it 

rejected their arguments for concurrent revocation sentences. But we have imposed no 

requirement that a court provide a separate explanation for running a revocation sentence 

consecutively to a sentence for new criminal conduct. Moreover, a court is only required 

to consider nonfrivolous arguments for a different sentence, Blue, 877 F.3d at 518-19, and 

Defendants’ argument for running their revocation sentences concurrently to their new 

criminal sentences is without merit. Nothing in the Guidelines or the commentary indicates

that a defendant may not receive a consecutive revocation sentence when he has also been 

assessed two criminal history points for committing the new offense while on supervised 

release. See U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Manual §§ 4A1.1(d), 7B1.3(f), p.s. (2016); cf.

United States v. Coombs, 857 F.3d 439, 451 (1st Cir. 2017) (concluding that there is no 

legal impediment to imposing consecutive revocation sentence when “conduct committed 

by a person while on supervised release transgresses the criminal law as well as the 

conditions of supervision” and explaining that, “[w]ere the rule otherwise, a defendant 

would effectively escape meaningful punishment for violating his supervised release

conditions”). We therefore affirm Defendants’ revocation sentences.
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III.

We conclude that the district court sufficiently explained its sentencing decisions. 

Accordingly, we affirm the district court’s judgments. We dispense with oral argument 

because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before this 

court and argument would not aid the decisional process.

AFFIRMED