### TEXA S C OU R T OF A PPEAL S, THIR D DIST R ICT , AT AU STIN

NO. 03-0 7 -00 605 -CR

Da vid Bar th olo m e w Ro ush , A ppe lla nt

v. The State of Texas, App ellee

FR OM T HE C OU N T Y C OU R T A T L A W OF BU RN E T C OU N T Y NO. M- 2192 5 , HO NORAB LE W. R. SAVAGE , JUDGE PRESIDI NG

M E M O R

A N D U M O P I N I O N A j ur y c o n v i c t e d D a v i d B arth o l o m e w R o u s h o f t h e o f f e n s e o f dr i v i n g wh ile intox icated. See Te x. Pe na l Co de Ann. § 4 9. 04 (We st 2 00 3) . Puni sh me nt w a s a sse sse d at 60 da y s’ confine ment and a $2,000 f ine, but the trial cour

t suspended imposition of the sentence and plac ed Roush on community

supervision for 12 months
. I n two issues on appea l, Roush challeng es the tr ia l c ourt ’s de nia l of

his mot ion

to s up pr e ss e vid e nc e . We wi ll a ff ir m th e jud g me nt.
BACK GR OUND At the su pp re ssi on he ari ng , th e tr ia l c ourt

he ard e vid e nc e that, a t aro un d 12 :00 a .m.
on October 14, 2006, Texas Highw ay Patrol Trooper

Shannon Simps on was dispatche d to the scene of a tw o- ve hic le c ar a c c ide nt o n H ig hw ay 28 1 in Burn et Co un ty . T ro op e r S imp so n te sti fi e d th a t, when he arr ived at the sc ene, he observe d that “[b] oth vehi cl es had ma jor damag e.” O ne of the vehicle s, a pickup truc k, “had da mag e in the fr ont end,” while the other ve hicle, aThe horizontal g aze ny stag mus, the walk and turn, a nd the one- leg stand. 1 See M iranda v. Arizona , 384 U.S. 436 (1966). 2 2 For d Ex pedition, “had da mag e on the dr iver’s side.” Simpson also noti ced that EMS was on the
scene “tre ating one person,” later identified as Carlos Her nandez. Acc ording to Simpson, “I believe when I g ot there, the y

wer e putting him on a st retc her from the s houlder of the road and then loade d him up in the ambulance.” Simps on did not speak to Herna ndez at the sce ne, but he testified that he wa s told by

the driver of Hernande z’s vehicle that Herna ndez “had wa lked over

and just kind of collapsed on the g round say ing that he fe lt . . . terrible.” Whil e Troope r Simpson was investigating the c rash, he made c ontact with Roush, the driver of the F ord Expedition. Simps on testified that, upon contac ting Roush, he ha d conce rns for R o u s h “a s fa r as his speech and the smell of alcohol.” When Simpson asked Roush if he had bee n drinking , Roush told hi m that he had. At that point, Simpson ha d R o ush perf orm the sta nd ard ize d f

ie ld s ob ri e ty

te sts
. Ac c ordi ngto S imp so n, Rou sh ’s pe rf or manc e on a ll thr e e te sts 1 indicated to him that Roush was intox icated.

Tr oo pe r S imp so n th e n to ld R ou shtha t he wa s tak in g h im t o th e ho sp ita l to

“ do a dr aw. ” “ Duri ngthe ri de ov e r t he re ,” Simp so n te sti fi e d, “ I tol d h im that he wa s und e r a rr e st fo r D WI .” Simp so n f

ur the r t e sti fi e d th a t, d

ur ing the ri de to the ho sp ita l, R ou sha dmi tte d, in r e sp on se to q ue sti on ingfr om S imp so n, to dr ink ing “ thr e e or fo ur marg ari ta s” a t a

we dd ingpa

rt y that ni g ht. Simps on testified that, prior to makingthis statement, Roush had been r ead the Miranda wa rn ing s. 2 Simp so n a lso te sti fi e d that he a sk e d Rou sh qu e sti on s fr om a DWI int e rv ie w fo rm and that he wr ote3

on the fo rm the ans we rs that Rou sh pr ov ide d. Af te r Simp so n c omp le te d the fo rm , h e a sk e d Ro us h to sign it, and Roush did so.

When they

arr ived at the hospital, Troope r Simpson ordered a mandatory blood draw from Roush afte r R o u s h re fu s ed conse nt to a voluntary blood draw. See Tex. Transp. Code Ann. § 724.012(b) ( West S upp . 2 0 0 7 ). Roush’s blood specimen wa s subsequently analy zed and found to contain .17 g rams of a lcohol per hundr ed millili ters of w hole blood. The leg al limit i s .08.

Prior to trial, Roush moved to suppress the results of the blood test, arg uing that the State failed to comply with one of the statutory require ments for obtaininga mandatory blood draw. Se e id . The trial c ourt denied the motion. L ater , during trial, Roush moved t o s u p p re ss the state me nt h e ma de to S im ps on tha t he ha d c on sume d “ thr e e or fo ur marg ari ta s, ” arguin g that, pr ior to o bta ini ngthe state me nt, Simp so n h a d n ot c omp lie d w iththe re qu ire me nts of art ic le 38.22 of the c ode of c riminal proce dure. See Tex. Code Crim. P roc. A nn. art. 38.22 (West 2005). The trial c ourt denied the motion.

Roush was subsequently

convicted o f t he off

ense of driving while intox icated a nd place d on community

supervision for 12 months. This appea l followed.

STA ND AR

D O F RE VI EW A tri a l c ourt ’s ru lin g on a mot ion to su ppre ss i s r e vie we d o n a pp e a l f or a bu se of discr eti on. State v. Dixon , 206 S.W .3d 587, 590 (Tex. Crim. App. 2006). I n other wor ds, the trial court’ s ruling w ill be upheld if it is rea sonably supported by the record and is corre ct under any applicable leg al theory
. Id . T hat ru le ho lds tr ue e ve n if the tr ia l c ourt g a ve the wr on g re a so n f or its ruling
. Ar

me nd ar iz v . S tate , 123 S.W .3d 401, 404 (Tex. Crim. App. 2003). The trial judg e is the4

so le tr ie r o f f

a c t and jud g e of the c re dib ility of th e wi tnes se s and the we ig ht t o b e g ive n to the ir testimony
. Sta te v . R os s , 32 S.W. 3d 85 3, 85 5 (T e x. Cr im. Ap p. 20 00 ); Gu zm an v . S tate , 955 S.W .2d 85, 89 (Tex. Crim. App. 1997). We give trial courts a lmo st complete def ere nce in de termining historical facts, but we review de novo the t rial court’s application of the law. Car mo uc he v . S

tate , 10 S.W .3d 323, 327 (Tex. Crim. App. 2000).
AN AL YSI S Blood specim en

I n h is f ir st i ssu e , Ro us h a sse rt s th at th e tr ia l c ourt sh ou ld h a ve su

pp re sse d th e re su lts of the blo od te st a dmi nis te re d by Tr oo pe r S imp so n b e c a

us e , a c c or din g to R ou sh , th e State fa ile d to satisfy one of the statutory

require ments for obtaining a mandatory blood draw. I n r e le va nt p art , s e c tio n 7 24 .0 12 of the tr ans po rt a tio n c od e pr ov ide s: (b) A pe ace office r shall re quire the taking of a spec imen of the pe rson’s bre ath or blood if:

. . . . (3) at the time of the a rre st the office r rea sonably believes that as a dire ct re su lt o f t he a c c ide nt:

. . . . (B ) an indi vid

ua l othe r tha

n the pe rs on

ha s su ff e re d s e ri ou s b od ily injury ; . . . . Tex. Transp. Code Ann. § 724.012(b) (3) ( em p h as i s added) . Acc ording to Roush, the blood draw was improper

beca use, at t h e t i m e R oush’s blood was dra wn, Troope r Simpson did not have a5

rea sonable belief that Her nandez had suff

ere d “ser ious bodily

injury .” Roush asser

ts that Si mpson did not ha ve enoug h information at the sc ene to de termine whe ther He rnande z had suffer ed ser ious bodily injury
. And, R oush further asser ts, once Sim pson arr ived at the hospital and inquired a bout the nature of He rnande z’s injuries, he was i n fo rm ed that the injuries Her nandez sustained we re a broken f inge r and a sore neck, w hich, ac cordingto Roush, do not qualify as “se rious bodily

injury .” I n response , the State ar g ues that sec tion 724.012 requires only that Trooper S i m p s o n h ad a
rea sonable be lief, at t

he tim e of R ou sh ’s arre

st , t h a tH e r

n an d e z h a d

s u f f e r e d s e r i o u s b o d i l y i n

j u r y, and that Simpson did. I n th e alt ernative, the State asser ts that Si mpson continued to have a
rea sonable ba sis to believe that Her n a n d e z h a d s u f f e r e d s e rious bodily

injury afte r lea rning additional f a c ts a t t h e h o s p it a l p r io r

to th e b lo o d

dr aw . I t o b s e r

v e s th a t, f

o r e xa mp le , a

b r o k e nf ing er
can c onstitut e ser ious bodily injury under some c ircumstance s. See, e .g. , Al le n v . S tate , 736 S.W .2d 22 5, 22 7 ( Te x. Ap p. —Co rp us Chr ist i 19 87 , pet. ref ’d ) ( ho ldi ngtha

t in jur y wh ic h c a us e d v ic tim to h a ve dy sf

un cti on “ in h e r b ro ke n f ing e r f or mor e tha

n thre e mon ths c on sti tut e s a protrac ted impairment.”)
.

“W h en i n t er

p re t i n g a s t at u t e, we l o o k

t o t h e l i t er al t ex to f t h e s t at u t e f o r i t s m ea n i n g,
an d we o rd i n ar i l y

gi v e e ff ec t t o t h at p l ai n m ea n i n g, u n l es s ap p l i ca t i o no f t h e s t at u t e’ s p l ai nl an gu age
wo uld le a d to a bs ur d c on se qu e nc e s th a t th e L e g isl a tu re c ou ld n ot p os sib ly have int e nd e d, or

if the plain languag e is ambig uous.” Ba dg e tt v . S tate , 42 S.W .3d 136, 138 (Tex. Crim. App. 2001). Acc ording to transportation code section 724.012(d) , “ser ious bodily injury ” has the meaning
a ssi g ne d b y

the pe na l c od e . T e x. Tr ans p. Cod e Ann. § 7 24 .0 12 (d ). “ Seri ou s bo di ly inj ur y ” is define d in the penal c ode as “ bodily injury that cre ates a substantial r isk of death or that cause s death,6

se ri ou s p e rm ane nt d is fi gurem ent , o r p ro tr a c te d lo ss o r i mpa ir me nt o f t he fu nc tio n o f a

ny bo dil y
me mbe r o r o rg an. ” Te x. Pe na l Co de Ann. § 1 .0 7( a )( 46 ) ( Wes t Su pp. 2 00 8) . We ob se rv e tha t,
a c c or din g to t

he pl ain l angua g e of

se c tio n 7 24 .0 12 (b )( 3) , it

is n ot n e c e ssa

ry that a pe rs on a c tua lly suffe r ser ious bodily

injury . Rather, the statute provides that the office r have a re as on ab le be lie f that a per son has suffe red se rious bodily injury
. See Tex. Transp. Code Ann. § 724.012(b) (3)( b). The statute also plainly

states that the re levant re asonable belief is that for med by the offic er at the time of t hearre st . Se e id
. Thus, our inquiry on appea l is whether the rec ord supports the trial court ’s fi nding that, at the time of Roush’s ar rest, Troope r Simpson had a re as o n ab l e belief that Her nandez had suff ere d serious bodily

injury
. We f

ind that it does. Simps on testified that, when he arr ived at the scene , two vehicles had been involved in a cra sh and their respe ctive front s i d es h ad s u ff ere d

“ ma jo r d a ma g e . ” E M S p e r s o n n e l h a d a lr e a dy ar r iv e d a t t h e s c e n e an d

w e r e tr e a ti n g H e rnan d e z. Acc ording to Sim pson, “they wer e putting him on a stre tcher from the shoulder of the roa d and then loaded him up in the ambulanc e.” Although Si mpson did not persona lly speak to He rnande z about the nature of his injuries at the sce ne, he di d s p ea k to the driver of Her nandez’s vehic le, who,
acc ording to Sim pson’s testimony , told h im that He rnande z had “collapse d on the g round.” Simpson
a lso de sc ri bed “see in g t he EMT s p ic k u p a n in div idu a l, p ut h im o n a str e tc he r a

nd take him to the e me r g e n c y

r o o m, li g h ts an d

s ir e n s . ” A s th e tr o o p e r p u t i t, “ T h a t t e ll s me th a t t h e re’ s something w rong . We did not know what. So they wer e takinghim to have furthe r eva luation and treatment. And so that constituted serious bodily injury in my mind.”7 To summarize, at the time of Roush’s ar rest, Simpson had i n fo rm ati on that Her nandez had be en involved in a two- car collision in which the fro n t sides of the ve hicles had suffe red “ major dama g e,” that Herna ndez had “c ol l ap s ed on the g round,” a nd that Her

nandez was be ing tr eat ed b y E MS personnel, had be en loade d into an ambulance on a stretc her, a nd had been taken to t he eme rg ency room while the ambulance’ s lights and sire ns were activate d. We c on c lud e that th e a

bo ve e vid e nc e of

fa c ts p e rc e ive d b y

Troop e r S imp so n at th e tim e of arr e st
su pp or ts the tr ia l c ourt ’s fi nd ingthat Sim ps on ’s be lie f t

hat H e rn and e z ha d s uf

fe re d s e ri ou s b od ily injury was re asonable
. I n the alternative, even if

evidenc e of f

acts late r lea

rned by Simps on at the hospital prior to the blood dr aw are considere d along with his observations at the acc ident site, we c onclude that the trial court would not ha ve err ed in ove rruling Roush’s suppression motion. The evidenc e
re g ard ingpr e c ise ly

wh a t Sim ps on le arn e d at th e ho sp ita l w a s dis pu te d. Simp so n te sti fi e d th a t w hil e he had le arne d at the hospital that Mr. He rnande z had a br oken fing er a nd would be discha

rg ed, “I di dn ’t kn o w a n y

t h i n g el s e ab o u t
. . . wh at h i s d i agn o s i s wa s ” an d t h at t h es e fa ct s “d i d n o tch an ge my opinion about the blood draw.” There was also evidenc e that Simps on had lear ned at the hospital that H e rn and e z wa s si xty -t wo y e ars of age. Th is ev ide nc e , c on sid e re d in the c on te xt of

the fa c ts Simps on had asce rtained at the acc ident scene , was sufficie nt to support a finding that Simps on was
rea sonable in continuing to believe, ba sed on the totalit y of these f

acts, that He rnande z’s injuries
wer e of a deg ree constituting ser ious bodily injury
. See A llen , 736 S.W .2d at 227. We overrule Roush’s first issue.Se c tio n 2 of art ic le 38 .2 2 o f t

he c od e of

c ri min a l pr oc e dure pr ov ide s: 3 No wr itt e n s tate me nt m a de by an accus ed a s a re su lt o f c us tod ia l in te rr og a tio n is admissible as evidenc e ag ainst him in any criminal proc eedingunless it is shown on the fa c e of

the state me nt t

hat: (a) the acc used, prior to ma king the statement, either

rec eived f

rom a mag istrate the war ning pr ovided in Article 15.17 of this code or rec eived f

rom the per son to whom the state me nt i s ma de a

wa rn ingthat: (1) he has the rig ht to rema in silent and not make any statement at all and that any state me nt h e make s ma

y be us e d a g a ins t hi m at hi s tr ia l; (2 ) any

state me nt he make s may

be us e d a s e vid e nc e a g a ins t hi m in c ourt ; (3) he has the rig ht to have a la wy er pr esent to advise him prior to a nd d u ri n g an y qu es t i o n i n g; (4) if he is unable to employ a lawy er, he has t he right t o have a lawy er appointed to advise him prior to a nd during any

questioning; a

nd (5) he has the rig ht to terminate the intervie w at any time; and ( b ) t h e a c c u s e d , p r i o r

t o an d d u r i n g t h e m a k i n g o f

t h e s t a t e m e n t , kn o w i n g l y, intelligently , and voluntarily waived the rig hts set out in the warningpresc ribed by Subsection (a) of this section.
Te x. Cod e Cr im. Pr oc . A nn . a rt . 3 8. 22 , § 2 ( Wes t 20 05 ). Se c tio n 3 (a ) o f a rt ic le 38 .2 2 p ro vid e s: 8 Co m plia nc e with Miranda and article 38.22

I n h i s second issue, Roush asse rts that the trial cour t abused its discretion in not suppressing his statement to Trooper Simps on that he had cons umed “thre e or f our marg aritas.” Specifica lly , Roush arg ues that the st at ement should have been suppr essed be cause he did not make a knowing , intelligent, and voluntary waiver of his rig hts under Miranda v. Arizona , 3 84 U. S. 436, 444 (1966), a

nd article 38.22 of the Te x as Code of Criminal Proce dure. 3No ora l or sign la ng uag e stateme nt of an a ccuse d made a s a re sult of custodial interrog ation shall be a d m i s s i ble ag ainst the ac cused in a criminal proc eeding unless . . . (2) pr ior to the statement but duringthe re cording the accused is g iven the w ar n i n g i n S u b s e c t i o n( a ) o f S e c t i o n2 a

b o v e an d t h e a c c u s e d

k n o w i n g l y, intelligently , and voluntarily waives a ny rig hts set out in the warning
. . . . Id . art. 38.22, § 3(a ).
9

State me nts ari sin g fr om a c us tod ia l in te rro g a tio n ma y no t be us e d b y

the State unless proce dural saf

eguards we re in place t o s ecure the a ccuse d’s Fif th Amendment p r iv il e g e a g a in s t s e lf

- in c r im in a ti o n . See U. S. Co ns t. a me nd . V ; Miranda , 3 84 U. S. at 44 4; see also Tex. Code Crim. P roc. Ann. art. 38.22. Any waiver of Miranda rig hts on behalf of an ac cused must be made knowingly , intelligently , and voluntarily
. See M iranda , 384 U.S. at 475. Our inquiry into whether a

n acc used has e ffe ctively waived his rig hts has two distinct di m en s i ons: first, the relinquishment of the rig ht must have been v o l u n t ar y in the sense that it was the product of a fre e and de liberate choice rathe r than intimidation, coerc i o n , o r dece ption. Moran v. Burbine , 47 5 U .S. 41 2, 42 1 (1 98 6)
. Se c on d, the wa ive r m us t ha ve be e n ma de wi th a

fu ll a wa re ne ss o f b oth the nature of the ri gh t b ei n g ab andoned a nd the conse quence s of the dec ision to abandon it. Id
. An express waive r is not nece ssary ; waiver may be infe rre d from the actions and words of the pe rson interrog ated. North Carolina v. Butler , 4 41 U. S. 3 69 , 3 73 (1 97 9) ; Ro c ha v . S tate , 16 S.W .3d 1, 12 (Tex. Crim. App. 2000).

As su pp or t fo r his argume nt that he did no t kn ow ing ly , in te lli g e ntl y , a nd vo lun tari ly waive his rig hts, Roush relies on Ga rc ia v . S tate , in which the court of criminal appea ls state d that “t h e cl ea rl y

pref era ble pra ctice” was “ for a written statement, to mee t unambiguously the10

require ments of Section 2(b), to c ontain the following lang uag e, nea r or a d j ac en t t o the sig nature of the individual g iving the statement: ‘I knowing ly , voluntarily an d i n t el l ige ntly waived the rig hts describe d above be fore and duringthe making of th i s s tatement.’” 919 S.W .2d 370, 387 (Tex. Crim. Ap p . 1 996) (op. on r eh’g ). The statement at issue in Ga rc ia did no t c on ta in t

his “pre fer red” lang uag e. Se e id . H ow e ve r, de sp ite fi nd ingthat th e sta te me nt w a s “ by

no me ans a model of cla

rity ,” the court in Ga rc ia he ld t hat th e state me nt w a s “ su ff ic ie nt t o c omp ly

wi th Article 38.22.” Id . This was bec ause the statement conta ined the ar ti cl e 38.22 war

nings a nd “additional languag e” indicating that the de fenda nt “under s t ood his rights a nd knew what he was doing w hen he g ave his stateme nt.” Id
. at 386. The c ourt conc luded that the district cour t did not abuse its discre tion in admitt ing the statement. Id . at 387.

I n this case, a s in Ga rc ia , the statement did not contain the “pr efe rre d” wa iver la n g u a g e . H o w e v e r , th e s tate me n t c o n ta in e d th e arti c le 3 8
. 2 2 w ar

n in g s an d

th e f ollowing “additional languag e”: “ The a bove leg al war

nings w ere either r ead by me or to me. I

understand
eac h of these rig hts a

nd ag ree to w aive ( g ive up) these rig hts and answe r the followingquestions.” Roush signe d the document, thus indicating that he understood and was w aiving his rights. The re is no indication in the recor d that Ro u s h ’s waiver wa s the product of “intimidation, coerc ion, or dece ption.” See M

oran , 475 U.S. a

t 421. Additionally , Trooper Simps on testified that he re ad the Miranda war

nings to Roush prior to Roush’s statement that he had co n s u m ed three or four
marg ari ta s. We c on c lud e tha t th e a bo ve e vid e nc e su

pport s th e tr ia l c ourt ’s fi nd ingthat Ro us h knowing ly , intelligently , and voluntarily waived his rig hts prior to making the statement. See Ga rc ia , 919 S.W .2d at 386-87; Ma rx v . S tate , 953 S.W .2d 321, 334-35 (Te x . App.—Austin 1997),11

aff’d on other grounds , 987 S.W .2d 577 (Tex. Crim. App. 1999) (finding “suff icient evidenc e” of compliance with a

rticle 38.22 when office r testified that he re ad re quired wa rning s to defenda

nt and statem en t i t s elf contained wa rning s, additional lang uag e similar to lang uag e in Ga rc ia , and defe ndant’s sig nature ). Thus, t he trial court did not abuse its discre tion in deny ing Roush’s motion to s up pr e ss t

he state me nt. We overrule Roush’s second issue.
CO NC LU SION We a ff ir m th e jud g me nt o f t

he tr ia l c ourt
.

_______ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ ________________________ Bob Pembe rton, J ustice Be fore Chief J ustice L aw, Justi ces Pembe rton and Waldrop Affir med Filed: August 29, 2008 Do No t Pu

bli sh