[Federal Register Volume 62, Number 69 (Thursday, April 10, 1997)]
[Notices]
[Pages 17581-17589]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 97-9258]


-----------------------------------------------------------------------

DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE

International Trade Administration
[A-201-802]


Gray Portland Cement and Clinker From Mexico; Final Results of 
Antidumping Duty Administrative Review

AGENCY: Import Administration, International Trade Administration, 
Department of Commerce.

ACTION: Notice of final results of antidumping duty administrative 
review.

-----------------------------------------------------------------------

SUMMARY: On May 14, 1996, the Department of Commerce (the Department) 
published the preliminary results of its administrative review of the 
antidumping duty order on gray portland cement and clinker from Mexico. 
The review covers one manufacturer/exporter, CEMEX, S.A. (CEMEX), and 
the period August 1, 1993, through July 31, 1994. We gave interested 
parties an opportunity to comment.
    For our final results, we have determined that CEMEX failed to 
cooperate with the Department. As a result, we have assigned CEMEX a 
margin based upon the best information available (BIA) in accordance 
with section 776(c) of the Tariff Act of 1930, as amended (the Act). 
Specifically, when a company refuses to cooperate with the Department 
or otherwise significantly impedes the proceedings, we assign as BIA 
the higher of: (a) The highest rate found for any firm for the same 
class or kind of merchandise in the same country of origin in the less-
than-fair value (LTFV) investigation or a prior administrative review, 
or (b) the highest rate found in this review for any firm for the same 
class or kind of merchandise in the same country of origin. For 
purposes of the instant review, the margin applied is the highest rate 
found for any firm in the second administrative review, i.e., CEMEX's 
margin, as amended pursuant to court-ordered remand proceedings, 109.43 
percent. See CEMEX, S.A. v. United States, Slip Op. 96--179 (CIT Oct. 
24, 1996), appeal pending, Appeal No. 97-1151 (Fed. Cir.) The ``All 
Others'' rate for this order is 61.35 percent.

EFFECTIVE DATE: April 10, 1997.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Nithya Nagarajan or Kristen Smith, 
Import Administration, International Trade Administration, U.S. 
Department of Commerce, 14th Street and Constitution Avenue N.W., 
Washington, DC 20230; telephone: (202) 482-3793.

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:

Applicable Statute and Regulations

    The Department is conducting this review in accordance with section 
751(a) of the Act. Unless otherwise indicated, all citations to the 
statute and the Department's regulations are in reference to the 
provisions as they existed on December 31, 1994.

Background

    On May 14, 1996, the Department published in the Federal Register 
(59 FR 2884) the preliminary results of its administrative review of 
the antidumping duty order on gray portland cement and clinker from 
Mexico (55 FR 35371). The Department has now completed this review in 
accordance with section 751(a).

[[Page 17582]]

Scope of the Review

    The products covered by this review include gray portland cement 
and clinker. Gray portland cement is a hydraulic cement and the primary 
component of concrete. Clinker, an intermediate material product 
produced when manufacturing cement, has no use other than being ground 
into finished cement. Gray portland cement is currently classifiable 
under the Harmonized Tariff Schedule (HTS) item number 2523.29 and 
cement clinker is currently classifiable under HTS item number 2523.10. 
Gray portland cement has also been entered under HTS item number 
2523.90 as ``other hydraulic cements.'' The HTS subheadings are 
provided for convenience and U.S. Customs Service purposes only. Our 
written description of the scope remains dispositive.

Analysis of Comments Received

    The Ad Hoc Committee of AZ-NM-TX-FL Producers of Gray Portland 
Cement and the National Cement Company of California (Petitioners) and 
CEMEX submitted case briefs on June 13, 1996, and rebuttal briefs on 
June 20, 1996. A public hearing was held on July 9, 1996.

Comment 1

    CEMEX contends that the antidumping duty order should be revoked 
and considered void ab initio due to the Department's alleged failure 
to investigate Petitioners' standing in the original LTFV 
investigation. Specifically, CEMEX argues that ``[a]t the time of the 
original investigation, the relevant U.S. statute that prescribed the 
requirement to establish standing to file an antidumping petition 
contained no express language addressing the degree of support 
necessary for a petition to be filed in a regional industry case . . . 
the statute simply required that the petition be filed `on behalf of' 
an industry but provided no express guidance on how compliance with 
this criterion was to be determined.'' Faced with this lacuna in the 
statute, CEMEX asserts, the Department is compelled by the decision in 
Murray v. Schooner Charming Betsy, 6 U.S. 64, 2 Cranch 64 (1804), to 
reinterpret U.S. law in accordance with the international obligations 
of the United States. In the opinion of CEMEX, this means that the 
Department is required (in the fourth review) to revisit the issue of 
initiation in the original investigation and abide by a July 9, 1992 
ruling by a three-member panel convened under the auspices of the 1947 
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (``1947 GATT''). See Report of 
the Panel, United States--Anti-Dumping Duties on Gray Portland Cement 
and Cement Clinker From Mexico, GATT Doc. ADP/82 (July 9, 1992) (``GATT 
Report''). According to CEMEX, this panel held that the initiation of 
the original investigation contravened the requirements of the 1979 
GATT Antidumping Code (``GATT AD Code'') because the Department 
``failed properly to ascertain'' that ``all or almost all'' of the 
regional industry supported the original petition. If the Department 
revisited the issue of initiation in light of the GATT Report, CEMEX 
maintains, it would revoke the order ab initio, terminate all 
proceedings, and refund ``at the very least, all cash deposits posted 
during the POR.''
    CEMEX further maintains that the Department has the authority to 
revoke the antidumping order at this stage of the proceeding. Citing 
Gilmore Steel Corporation v. United States, 583 F. Supp. 607 (CIT 
1984), CEMEX argues that government agencies (like the Department) have 
the authority to correct ``jurisdictional defects'' at any time. CEMEX 
also argues that the decision in Ceramica Regiomontana S.A. v. United 
States, 64 F.3d 1579 (Fed. Cir. 1995) provides ``specific legal 
precedent to revoke the order in this case'' and that its failure to 
challenge the Department's determination on industry support for the 
petition during the original LTFV investigation should be excused given 
the ``exception to the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative 
remedies upheld in Rhone Poulenc v. United States, 583 F. Supp. 607 
(CIT 1984).''
    The Petitioners claim, in response, that these are the same 
arguments the Department considered and rejected in the third 
administrative review of this order. Since ``CEMEX has presented no new 
arguments or information about any change in circumstances that would 
justify a departure from the Department's reasoning in the third 
administrative review,'' Petitioners assert that the Department should 
reject CEMEX's arguments in this review.
    Petitioners note that the GATT Report was never adopted by the GATT 
Antidumping Code Committee. Therefore, given the legal framework of the 
1947 GATT, it imposed no international legal obligation upon the United 
States which might trigger the doctrine of statutory construction 
articulated in the Charming Betsy case.
    Petitioners also contend that U.S. law takes precedence over the 
1947 GATT. ``Accordingly, even adopted GATT panel decisions are not 
binding on the United States to the extent that such decisions are 
inconsistent with U.S. law or with the intent of Congress.''
    Petitioners further note that the Department initiated the 
antidumping investigation in accordance with U.S. law. According to 
Petitioners, neither the courts nor the Congress have required the 
Department to affirmatively establish prior to the initiation of 
regional-industry cases that the petition is supported by all or almost 
all of the relevant industry. Indeed, Petitioners assert, the 
Department's longstanding practice of presuming industry support for a 
petition in the absence of evidence to the contrary has been upheld by 
numerous courts, including the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit 
(``Federal Circuit'') in Suramerica de Aleaciones Laminadas, C.A. v. 
United States, 966 F.2d 660, 663 (Fed. Cir. 1992).
    Finally, Petitioners assert that the Department lacks the authority 
to revoke the order or otherwise rescind its 1989 initiation of the 
LTFV investigation. Quoting from the final results of the third 
administrative review, the Petitioners argue that CEMEX failed to 
challenge the Department's determination on industry support for the 
petition before the Court of International Trade (``CIT'') and, 
accordingly, under sections 514(b) and 516A(c)(1) of the Act, `` `that 
determination is final and binding on all persons, including the 
Department.' ''

Department's Position

    For the following reasons, CEMEX's arguments are without merit. 
First, like the GATT itself, panel reports under the 1947 GATT are not 
self-executing and thus have no direct legal effect under U.S. law.
    Second, neither the 1947 GATT nor the GATT AD Code obligates the 
United States to affirmatively establish prior to the initiation of a 
regional-industry case that all or almost all of the producers in the 
region support the petition. There certainly is no suggestion in either 
instrument that the standing requirements in regional-industry cases 
are any more rigorous than the standing requirements in national-
industry cases.
    Furthermore, a GATT panel report, such as the present one, has no 
legal effect or formal status unless and until it is adopted by the 
GATT Council or, in the case of antidumping actions, the GATT 
Antidumping Code Committee. This follows from the fact that the 1947 
GATT has, throughout its history, operated on the basis of consensus 
for purposes of decision-making in general and the resolution of 
disputes in particular. In the present case, it is undisputed that the 
GATT Report has

[[Page 17583]]

never been adopted by the Antidumping Code Committee. Thus, the 
recommendations contained in the report are not binding, do not impose 
any international obligations upon the United States, and do not 
trigger the rule of statutory construction set forth in the Charming 
Betsy case.
    Third, the object of CEMEX's comment is not the preliminary results 
of this review. Rather, CEMEX complains about an event which occurred 
over six years ago--the initiation of the original LTFV investigation. 
The time to voice such objections before the Department was during the 
investigation. Instead, CEMEX, as well as the other Mexican cement 
producers that participated in the original investigation (Apasco, S.A. 
de C.V. and Cementos de Chihuahua (``CdC'')), sat silent before the 
Department. See Final Determination of Sales at Less Than Fair Value, 
Gray Portland Cement and Clinker From Mexico, 55 FR 29244 (1990) 
(hereinafter ``Final LTFV Determination''). Moreover, neither CEMEX nor 
any other party appealed the agency's final affirmative LTFV 
determination (including the decision to initiate) to the appropriate 
court, and the statute of limitations for doing so has long expired. 
See 19 U.S.C. Sec. 1516a(a)(2)(A).
    The only one who appealed the Department's Final LTFV Determination 
was the Petitioners. They challenged certain aspects of the 
Department's final determination before the CIT and the Federal 
Circuit. See Ad Hoc Committee Of AZ-NM-TX-FL Producers of Gray Portland 
Cement v. United States, Slip Op. 94-152 (CIT), aff'd, 68 F.3d 487 
(Fed. Cir. 1995). CEMEX participated in that litigation as an 
intervenor on the side of the Department. On October 10, 1995, the 
Federal Circuit issued an opinion which disposed of the last issue in 
this case.
    Therefore, even if the Department, of its own volition, were to 
reinterpret U.S. law in light of the GATT Report, it lacks the legal 
authority in this review to revoke the order or otherwise rescind the 
initiation of the underlying investigation. As we stated in the final 
results of the third administrative review and reaffirm here:

    * * * the Department has no authority to rescind its initiation 
of the LTFV investigation. Under sections 514(b) and 516A(c)(1) of 
the Act, a LTFV determination regarding initiation becomes final and 
binding unless a court challenge to that determination is timely 
initiated under 516A. Even if judicial review of a determination is 
timely sought, the Department's determination continues to control 
until there is a resulting court decision ``not in harmony with that 
determination.'' See 19 U.S.C. 1516a(c)(1). In this case, no one 
challenged the Department's determination on standing before the 
CIT. Therefore, that determination is final and binding on all 
persons, including the Department.

    Gray Portland Cement and Clinker from Mexico; Final Results Third 
Review, 60 FR 26865 (1995) (emphasis added).
    Fourth, no court, including the court in Gilmore Steel, has ever 
held that the Department has the authority, in an administrative review 
under section 751(a) of the Act, to reach back more than six years and 
reexamine the issue of industry support for the original petition. 
Gilmore Steel involved a challenge to the termination of a pending 
investigation based upon information obtained in the course of that 
investigation. In particular, the petitioner contended that the 
Department lacked the authority to rescind the investigation based upon 
insufficient industry support for the petition after the 20-day period 
provided for in section 732(c) of the Act (19 U.S.C. 1673a(c)) had 
elapsed. 585 F. Supp. at 673. In upholding the Department's 
determination, the court recognized that administrative officers have 
the authority to correct errors, such as ``jurisdictional defects,'' at 
anytime during the proceeding. Id. at 674-75. The court did not state 
or imply that a change in legal interpretation (in this case a non-
binding one) authorizes administrative officers to reopen prior agency 
decisions which are otherwise final. The court simply held that the 
administering authority may, in the context of the original 
investigation, rescind an ongoing proceeding after expiration of the 
20-day initiation period.
    Similarly, in Ceramica Regiomontana, S.A. v. United States, 64 F.3d 
1579 (Fed. Cir. 1995), the respondent did not ask the Department to 
reconsider and rescind a decision made in a prior proceeding. Indeed, 
the court's entire analysis was based upon the belief that the prior 
decision--the issuance of a countervailing duty order under former 
section 303(a)(1) of the Act against ceramic tile from Mexico--was in 
accordance with law (i.e., ``properly issued''). Ceramica Regiomontana 
concerned the authority of the Department to assess duties pursuant to 
a valid order after Mexico became a ``country under the Agreement'' 
which entitled it to an injury test under section 701 of the Act. The 
court held that the Department lacked such authority and ordered the 
agency, on remand, to revoke the order as to all unliquidated entries 
occurring after this date. Id. at 1583.
    CEMEX also errs when it relies on Rhone Poulenc v. United States to 
support its claim that ``an exception to the doctrine of exhaustion of 
administrative remedies'' permits the ``retroactive application of the 
1992 GATT decision.'' 583 F. Supp. 607 (CIT 1984) (a party may raise a 
new issue on appeal if the applicable law has changed due to a judicial 
decision that arose after the lower court or agency issued the 
contested determination). First of all, whether CEMEX's claim is barred 
by the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies is a matter 
more properly decided by a reviewing court or binational panel under 
Chapter 19 of the North American Free Trade Agreement. Secondly, even 
if the issue is timely, the exception claimed by CEMEX does not apply. 
The GATT Report is not a judicial decision and it did not change U.S. 
law. In fact, as we explain above, it did not even effect a change in 
the law on the international plane (i.e., as between Mexico and the 
United States).
    Finally, we note, as we did in the final results of the third 
review, that numerous courts have upheld the Department's practice of 
assuming, in the absence of evidence to the contrary, that a petition 
filed on behalf of a regional or national industry is supported by that 
industry. See, e.g., NTN Bearing Corp. v. United States, 757 F. Supp. 
1425, 1427-30 (CIT 1991); Citrosuco Paulista v. United States, 704 F. 
Supp. 1074, 1085 (CIT 1988); Comeau Seafoods v. United States, 724 F. 
Supp. 1407, 1410-12 (CIT).
    Indeed, the very issue raised by CEMEX in this review was before 
the Federal Circuit in the Suramerica case. 966 F.2d at 665 & 667. In 
Suramerica the appellees challenged the Department's interpretation of 
the phrase ``on behalf of'' which applies to both national- and 
regional-industry cases. Specifically, the appellees argued that the 
Department's practice of presuming industry support for a petition was 
contrary to the statute and an unadopted GATT panel report involving 
the U.S. antidumping order on certain stainless steel hollow products 
from Sweden. In affirming the Department's practice, the Federal 
Circuit observed that the phrase ``on behalf of'' was not defined in 
the statute. Id. at 666-67. The statute was, in fact, open ``to several 
possible interpretations.'' In the opinion of the court, the 
Department's practice with regard to standing and industry support for 
a petition reflected a reasonable ``middle position.'' 966 F.2d at 667. 
While there was a gap in the statute, the

[[Page 17584]]

court stated, ``Congress did make [one thing] clear--Commerce has broad 
discretion in deciding when to pursue an investigation, and when to 
terminate one.'' Id.
    The court then dismissed the argument that the gap in the statute 
must be interpreted in a manner that is consistent with the 1947 GATT 
or the GATT panel ruling:

    Appellees next argue that the statutory provisions should be 
interpreted to be consistent with the obligations of the United 
States as a signatory country of the GATT. Appellees argue that the 
legislative history of the statute demonstrates Congress's intent to 
comply with the GATT in formulating these provisions. Appellees 
refer also to a GATT panel--a group of experts convened under the 
GATT to resolve disputes--which ``recently rejected [Commerce's] 
views on the meaning of `on behalf of.' ''
    We reject this argument. First, the GATT panel itself 
acknowledged and declared that its examination and decision were 
limited in scope to the case before it. The panel also acknowledged 
that it was not faced with the issue of whether, even in the case 
before it, Commerce had acted in conformity with U.S. domestic 
legislation.
    Second, even if we were convinced that Commerce's interpretation 
conflicts with the GATT, which we are not, the GATT is not 
controlling. While we acknowledge Congress's interest in complying 
with U.S. responsibilities under the GATT, we are bound not by what 
we think Congress should or perhaps wanted to do, but by what 
Congress in fact did. The GATT does not trump domestic legislation; 
if the statutory provisions at issue here are inconsistent with the 
GATT, it is matter for Congress and not this court to decide and 
remedy. See 19 U.S.C. Sec. 2504(a); Algoma Steel Corp. v. United 
States, 865 F.2d 240, 242 * * * (Fed. Cir. 1989).

Id. at 667-68 (emphasis added).

Comment Two

    CEMEX believes that the Department improperly applied BIA to it in 
the current review. Specifically, CEMEX argues that the Department 
abused its administrative discretion by refusing to accept requested 
information on home market sales of Type I bulk cement once it became 
available. In making this argument, CEMEX recognizes that it did not 
provide data on its home market rates of Type I bulk cement within the 
time limits set by the Department. It also recognizes that the 
Department's regulations specify that factual information submitted in 
the context of an administrative review must normally be submitted 
within 180 days of the initiation of the review. However, CEMEX 
maintains, the Department has the authority to request a party to 
submit information at any time during a proceeding and has done so on 
two prior occasions within the course of this review (August 23, 1995, 
supplemental questionnaire and August 23, 1995, request for cost of 
production/constructed value response.) Pursuant to this authority, 
CEMEX claims, the Department should have ``re-requested'' and accepted 
a complete home market sales listing for Type I cement.
    CEMEX also argues that the Department's application of BIA was 
``premature.'' In particular, CEMEX claims that the missing home market 
sales listing ``was not `essential' to the [Department's] review at the 
time that the [Department] applied BIA.'' CEMEX asserts that ``the 
application of BIA by reason of the absence of a home market sales 
listing of Type I cement would be justified under the statute only if 
the [Department] had determined * * * that home market sales of 
merchandise identical to that sold in the United States (Type II and 
Type V cement) could not be used in the calculation of FMV.'' According 
to CEMEX, the statute permits the Department to base foreign market 
value on home market sales of merchandise similar to merchandise sold 
in the United States only if home market sales of identical merchandise 
do not exist, or if the Department determines that sales of identical 
merchandise must be disregarded because they are either (1) 
Insufficient in volume to form a fair basis of comparison with U.S. 
sales; (2) sold at prices below the cost of production; (3) made to a 
fictitious market; or, (4) made outside the ordinary course of trade. 
In making this argument, CEMEX maintains that the purpose behind the 
BIA provision is to prevent a ``hindrance of the proceedings.'' In the 
current review, CEMEX contends that it has not in any way hindered the 
Department's investigation with respect to the calculation of FMV and 
that the determination of whether home market sales were made within 
the ordinary course of trade could have been made without the requested 
information.
    In the current review, CEMEX contends, the Department was provided 
with complete sales and cost information on merchandise identical to 
that sold in the United States during the POR--Type II and Type V 
cement. Despite having this information, CEMEX argues, the Department 
failed either to use it to make an FMV calculation or to prove that 
this information must be disregarded. Therefore, CEMEX concludes, the 
Department's application of BIA was inappropriate since ``CEMEX should 
have only been `at risk' for use of BIA in the event that the 
Department determined Type II cement could not be used as a basis for 
FMV and that data on Type I cement was required.''
    Petitioners counter that CEMEX's refusal to report home market 
sales of Type I cement requires the Department to use BIA. Quoting the 
statute, Petitioners assert that the Department ``[s]hall, whenever a 
party or any other person refuses or is unable to produce information 
requested in a timely manner and in the form required, or otherwise 
impedes an investigation, use the best information otherwise 
available.'' 19 U.S.C. 1677e(b). The purpose behind this statutory 
provision, Petitioners maintain, is to ensure that the Department, not 
the respondent, controls the antidumping proceeding.
    Additionally, Petitioners submit that CEMEX selectively withheld 
Type I sales data for tactical reasons. Indeed, Petitioners allege, 
CEMEX's suggestion that the Department request CEMEX to report its Type 
I sales data after it refused to comply with earlier requests was 
merely designed to influence an appeal to a NAFTA binational panel. In 
making this assertion, Petitioners maintain that CEMEX was fully aware 
of its obligation to report home market sales of Type I cement even 
before the review was initiated. Moreover, Petitioners argue ``[e]ven 
if it were truly difficult for CEMEX to provide Type I information, it 
was incumbent upon CEMEX to demonstrate that fact at a far earlier 
stage of this review, not to belatedly offer to provide the information 
months after its responses to the Department's information requests 
were due.''
    In the current review, Petitioners argue that the Department was 
justified in requesting sales information on Type I cement. This is 
because, Petitioners contend, the Department is in the best position to 
know what information it requires to make its dumping determination. 
Therefore, Petitioners state, ``CEMEX's assertion that the Department 
did not need Type I sales information because its sales of Type II 
cement were within the ordinary course of trade prejudges the outcome 
of an issue that only the Department can decide and in no way excuses 
CEMEX's refusal to supply the Type I information.''
    Moreover, Petitioners continue, the Department is not obligated to 
continuously solicit information from CEMEX after the company 
repeatedly failed to cooperate with information requests. The 
Department, Petitioners assert, has the discretion to set and enforce 
its own deadlines. Citing Mantex, Inc. v. United States, 841 F. Supp. 
1290 (CIT 1993), Petitioners note that a respondent's ``consistent 
failure to provide Commerce with complete and

[[Page 17585]]

timely submissions provided Commerce with ample reason to resort to 
BIA.''

Department's Position

    The Department agrees with Petitioners that the application of BIA 
in the current review was consistent with the law. Section 776 of the 
Act and Sec. 353.37 of the regulations provide that where a respondent 
does not furnish requested information in a timely manner, a 
determination will be made based on BIA. Generally, the Department will 
assign BIA based on the following two-tier methodology: (1) When a 
company refuses to cooperate with the Department or otherwise 
significantly impedes the proceedings, we use as BIA the higher of (a) 
the highest of the rates found for any firm for the same class or kind 
of merchandise in the same country of origin in the LTFV investigation 
or prior administrative review or (b) the highest rate found in this 
review for any firm for the same class or kind of merchandise in the 
same country of origin, and (2) when a company substantially cooperates 
with our requests for information, but fails to provide the information 
requested in a timely manner or in the form required, we use as BIA the 
higher of (a) the highest rate (including the ``all others'' rate) ever 
applicable to the firm for the same class or kind of merchandise from 
either the LTFV investigation or a prior administrative review, or (b) 
the highest calculated rate in this review for any firm for the class 
or kind of merchandise from the same country of origin.
    In the current review, we have found that CEMEX has significantly 
impeded the proceeding by failing to provide data pertaining to sales 
of Type I cement in the home market in a timely manner. As we explained 
in our preliminary results ``given the Department's determination that 
CEMEX's sales of Type II and Type V cement in the home market were 
outside the ordinary course of trade during the second administrative 
review, we believe that it is necessary (as the case in the second 
administrative review) to address the same issue in the fourth 
administrative review.'' Preliminary Results of Antidumping Duty 
Administrative Review, Gray Portland Cement and Clinker from Mexico 61 
FR 24284. An ordinary course of trade determination requires evaluation 
of each review on an individual basis taking into account the relevant 
facts of each case. Nachi-Fujikishi Corp. v. United States, 798 F. 
Supp. 7716,719 (CIT 1992). This means that the Department must review 
all circumstances particular to the sales in question. For this reason, 
we requested information on Type I merchandise in order to conduct the 
same type of analysis that we conducted in earlier reviews to determine 
whether CEMEX's home market sales of Type II and Type V cement had been 
made in the ordinary course of trade. As detailed below, this 
information was requested numerous times. First, the Department sent 
CEMEX a standard antidumping questionnaire on September 30, 1994, 
instructing CEMEX to report all U.S. and home market sales of subject 
merchandise, including sales of Type I cement in Mexico. On November 
22, 1994, CEMEX responded to the questionnaire. However, as in its 
response in the third review, CEMEX limited its reporting to Type II 
sales in the U.S. and home market, and failed to report sales of Type I 
cement in the home market. At this time, CEMEX claimed that its home 
market sales of Type II cement were made in the ordinary course of 
trade, and that it was unnecessary to report home market sales of Type 
I cement.
    Next, on August 23, 1995, the Department issued a supplemental 
questionnaire which indicated that CEMEX must submit, inter alia, home 
market sales of Type I cement in bulk form. The questionnaire warned 
CEMEX that a failure to submit the requested information could result 
in the application of BIA. The Department also asked CEMEX to respond 
to the cost of production/constructed value (COP/CV) section of the 
questionnaire at this time. The due date for the supplemental 
information and the Type I sales data and the COP/CV data, was 
September 14, 1995, and September 30, 1995, respectively--a full year 
after the review was initiated.
    CEMEX requested, in a September 5, 1995 letter, an extension of two 
weeks for its response to the Department's August 23, 1995, 
supplemental questionnaire and an additional four-week extension for 
the submission of Type I sales data. In that letter CEMEX also 
requested a six-week extension for the submission of COP/CV data. CEMEX 
expressed that an extension was required due to the ``enormous burden 
related to the collection and preparation of sales and cost data for 
Type I cement.'' On September 6, 1995, the Department notified CEMEX 
that its request to extend the deadline for submitting the supplemental 
response (including the information on Type I cement) was denied, but 
that it was granted a three-week extension regarding the COP/CV 
submission.
    CEMEX submitted its supplemental questionnaire response on 
September 14, 1995. In its response, CEMEX failed to include the 
required information pertaining to Type I sales. On October 5, 1995, 
CEMEX submitted its COP/CV questionnaire and again failed to include 
information pertaining to sales of Type I cement. In both cases, the 
explanation for the lack of information on home market sales of Type I 
cement was the size of the reporting burden; in both cases CEMEX 
claimed that the Type I information would be forthcoming as soon as 
possible.
    Four months later, on February 8, 1996, CEMEX advised the 
Department that it was prepared to provide a listing of its home market 
sales of Type I cement in bulk form. In a letter dated February 15, 
1996, the Department informed CEMEX that the administrative record was 
closed and that no new information would be accepted.
    As the case history detailed above demonstrates, CEMEX has 
consistently failed to cooperate with the Department despite repeated 
requests for Type I sales information. This lack of cooperation 
significantly impeded the Department's review. Given the Department's 
determination that CEMEX's home market sales of Type II and Type V 
cement were outside the ordinary course of trade in the second 
administrative review, we believe that it is necessary (as in the third 
administrative review) to review the ordinary course of trade issue in 
this fourth administrative review. Gray Portland Cement and Clinker 
from Mexico: Final Results of Antidumping Duty Administrative Review, 
58 FR 47283 (1993). In the second review, CEMEX also sold Types II and 
V cement in the United States, and Types I, II, and V in Mexico. Unlike 
the current review, however, CEMEX cooperated with the Department's 
requests for information in the second review, and supplied information 
for all home market sales, including Type I cement. Having access to 
this data, the Department agreed with Petitioner's allegation that 
CEMEX's Type II and V sales were outside the ordinary course of trade. 
Ibid., at 47255. In a ruling issued on April 24, 1995, the CIT 
sustained the Department's determination. CEMEX, S.A. v. United States, 
Slip Op. 95-72 at 14 (CIT April 24, 1995).
    In the second review, the Department's determination that CEMEX's 
Type II and V sales were outside the ordinary course of trade hinged on 
a comparison between home market sales of Type I cement and Type II and 
V cement. Specifically, the Department analyzed five factors: the 
volume of home market sales, sales patterns, shipping arrangements,

[[Page 17586]]

profitability, and corporate image. Given the Department's analysis in 
the second review, and the CIT's subsequent ruling, the Department 
acted reasonably in requesting similar information (i.e., a complete 
home market sales listing of Type I cement) in the fourth review. Had 
CEMEX cooperated with the Department's request in a timely fashion, the 
Department could have fully analyzed the factors focused upon in the 
second review, and possibly other factors as well. Transaction-specific 
data on home market sales of Type I cement would have enabled the 
Department to fully examine the sizes of the transactions, the number 
of customers, customer identities, category of customers, terms of 
sale, the freight expenses incurred, and the distances shipped. A 
detailed sales listing would also have helped the Department to confirm 
the accuracy of the aggregate sales volume information provided by 
CEMEX. Therefore, we do not agree with CEMEX's assertion that it was 
not required to provide Type I cement sales data because the Department 
has allegedly not demonstrated the relevance of this information to its 
ordinary course of trade determination.
    In addition, we note that, as the Department stated in the final 
results of the third review, it is not incumbent upon the Department to 
demonstrate to CEMEX's satisfaction the relevance of any given 
information sought. In the conduct of an administrative review, the 
Department is routinely confronted with voluminous data and various 
possible interpretations of these data. It would be impossible to state 
with complete confidence, at the outset of a proceeding, precisely what 
information will eventually be deemed relevant in arriving at the final 
results of a review. This presumes a level of prescience neither the 
Department, nor respondents themselves, can legitimately claim. 
Therefore, the Department must frame its request for information after 
considering all the facts at its disposal at the time the information 
requests are made. At times, subsequent requests for information may be 
issued as the Department interprets the data that it has received. 
Generally, however, the statutory and regulatory deadlines of 
antidumping proceedings often do not allow the Department to use such a 
staggered approach. This is especially true where the subsequently 
requested data would be voluminous or itself capable of various 
reasonable interpretations which might require further clarifications. 
Moreover, even if the Department had been able, using the information 
supplied by CEMEX in this review, to determine whether the Types II and 
V cement sales were outside the ordinary course of trade, we would 
still require Type I data to conduct our antidumping duty analysis.
    For all of the foregoing reasons, CEMEX's failure to provide timely 
information regarding its Type I home market sales prevents the 
Department from determining whether CEMEX's home market sales of Type 
II cement were made in the ordinary course of trade. As a result of 
this failure to cooperate, the Department finds it necessary to apply 
first-tier BIA of 109.43, the margin for the second administrative 
review, as affirmed by the CIT on October 24, 1996.
    In addition, the Department does not agree with CEMEX's assertion 
that the Department abused its discretion when it refused to reopen the 
record and issue yet another request for the Type I sales information. 
Throughout the course of the review CEMEX was on notice that this 
information was important to the Department's analysis and that a 
failure to cooperate might result in the application of adverse BIA. 
Despite repeated requests from the Department and the extension of 
numerous deadlines, CEMEX failed to provide the Department with the 
requested information. Its belated offer in February of 1996, to 
provide the requested data came one full year after the original 
deadline for submission of factual information and four months after 
the record has closed.
    The Department's practice not to accept new data after a particular 
deadline ensures timely reporting of data to be considered in the 
administrative process. All parties to antidumping proceedings must be 
given the opportunity to comment on all submitted information. Without 
adhering to deadlines on the submission of new information, the 
Department is unable to ensure that parties have been allotted time to 
review submissions and is unable to perform comprehensive analysis on a 
timely basis. As we noted above, had CEMEX cooperated with the 
Department's request in a timely fashion, the Department could have 
fully analyzed the factors focused upon in the second review, and 
possibly other factors as well. Furthermore, to allow CEMEX to submit 
new information at such a late date would undermine Department 
procedures and would hinder the administration of future administrative 
reviews.

Comment Three

    CEMEX contends that the Department erroneously determined that the 
absence of a home market sales listing for Type I cement prevented the 
Department from determining whether CEMEX's home market sales of Type 
II cement were made within the ordinary course of trade. Rather, CEMEX 
argues that it provided sufficient information to make an ordinary 
course of trade determination with respect to CEMEX's home market sales 
of Type II and Type V cement. Specifically, CEMEX notes that the type 
of information relied upon by the Department to determine whether 
CEMEX's home market sales of identical merchandise were outside the 
ordinary course of trade in the second administrative review period was 
on the record during the present review.
    Pursuant to the Department's August 23, 1995 request, CEMEX argues 
that it submitted information addressing all five factors specified by 
the Department, as well as additional information demonstrating that 
there was a bona fide home market demand for Type II and Type V cement 
in Mexico and that sales of Type II and Type V cement were not 
extraordinary sales of obsolete or sample merchandise, but rather, 
sales meeting the specified needs of its home market customers. In 
particular, CEMEX claims its submissions to the administrative record 
provide information as to whether: (1) CEMEX incurred greater expenses 
in shipping Type II and Type V cement as compared to Type I cement; (2) 
CEMEX shipped Type II and Type V cement over greater distances as 
compared to Type I cement; (3) CEMEX sold Type II and Type V cement to 
a niche market; (4) the relative volume of Type II and Type V cement 
was small as compared to Type I cement; and (5) the profit on sales of 
Type I cement was abnormal relative to the profit it earned on sales of 
Type II and V cement. No additional information relevant to the 
ordinary course of trade issue, CEMEX asserts, would be obtained by 
submission of a sales listing of Type I cement. Therefore, CEMEX 
argues, the Department should have reached a definitive decision 
regarding the ordinary course of trade issue.
    Petitioners also object to the Department's conclusion that CEMEX's 
refusal to report home market sales of Type I cement ``prevents the 
Department from determining whether CEMEX's sales of Type II cement in 
the home market were made in the ordinary course of trade.'' Rather, 
Petitioners maintain, the Department should affirmatively determine 
that Type II sales were outside the ordinary course of trade. 
Specifically, Petitioners argue that the evidence of record for this 
review, and the adverse inference resulting from CEMEX's lack of

[[Page 17587]]

compliance with the Department's repeated requests for Type I sales 
data relevant to the ordinary course of trade issue, compel such a 
determination.
    To support their claim, Petitioners note that CEMEX's September 26, 
1996 submission demonstrates that the five factors the Department 
relied upon in the second administrative review to determine that sales 
of Type II cement were outside the ordinary course of trade continue to 
be present in the current review. According to Petitioners, CEMEX 
concedes that (1) CEMEX ``ships Type II cement over greater distances 
than Type I cement'' and that differences in shipping distances are the 
result of the locations of the plants which produce each type of 
cement; (2) the differences in profit between Type I and Type II cement 
result from ``the higher costs involved to transport cement to 
customers'; (3) there was a promotional quality to CEMEX's sale of Type 
II cement; (4) Type II cement represented a ``specialty market'; and 
(5) CEMEX only began to sell Type II cement in Mexico when it began 
production for export in the mid-1980s despite the fact that there had 
been small domestic demand for the product.
    Petitioners also argue that the determination that sales of Type II 
cement were outside the ordinary course of trade is justified by the 
adverse inference created by CEMEX's refusal to report Type I sales. 
Petitioner's note that the Department made it clear to CEMEX that it 
wanted Type I sales data to use as a benchmark for determining whether 
Type II sales were outside the ordinary course of trade. Based on 
CEMEX's failure to report this data, Petitioners argue, the Department 
should have inferred that the Type I information would have been 
adverse to CEMEX's claim that Type II sales were in the ordinary course 
of trade.

Department's Position

    The Department is not able to conclude whether sales of Type II and 
Type V cement were made within the ordinary course of trade because 
CEMEX failed to supply the requested information on home market Type I 
sales. As the Department stressed in the third review, ``[a]bsent some 
benchmark (i.e., home market sales of similar merchandise, such as Type 
I cement) against which to measure the Type II and Type V sales in 
question, the Department is unable to determine whether sales of Type 
II and Type V cement during this review period were made within the 
ordinary course of trade.'' Had CEMEX cooperated with the Department's 
request in a timely fashion, the Department could have fully analyzed 
the factors focused upon in the second review, and possibly other 
factors as well. Therefore, as CEMEX's actions prevented the Department 
from making an important determination in this review, our resort to 
BIA is justified.

Comment Four

    Petitioners argue that the Department's preliminary results 
unjustifiably rely on the ``first-tier'' BIA rate applied to 
uncooperative respondents under the Department's standard two-tier 
methodology. Specifically, Petitioners insist that the presumption that 
the first-tier BIA rate (i.e., 61.85 percent) is adverse to CEMEX (and 
thus serves the compliance-inducing purposes of BIA) has been 
completely rebutted. To support this claim, Petitioners contend that 
the Department's practice in similar cases, as well as the evidence of 
record, mandate the use of a higher BIA rate that is truly adverse to 
CEMEX.
    Accordingly, Petitioners demand that the Department select a BIA 
rate which will (1) encourage future cooperation with the Department's 
information requests, and (2) enable the Department to accurately 
determine dumping margins. To ensure these goals, Petitioners note that 
the Department applies a rule of reasonable inference where the 
Department infers that the respondent would have complied with 
information requests if it had been advantageous for the respondent to 
do so. Thus, Petitioners conclude, the Department uses as BIA a dumping 
margin that is unfavorable to the noncompliant respondent which ensures 
that the respondent does ``not find itself in a better position as a 
result of its noncompliance than it would have had it provided * * * 
complete, accurate and timely data.'' Petitioners' Case Brief at 47 
citing Silicon Metal From Argentina, 58 FR At 65,338.
    Generally, Petitioners acknowledge, the Department relies on its 
standard two-tier methodology in choosing BIA and applies the highest 
prior margin to a noncompliant respondent. However, Petitioners 
explain, both the Department and the courts have emphasized that this 
standard methodology ``merely establishes a presumption that the 
highest prior margins are the best information available'' which can be 
rebutted by evidence demonstrating that the margin would be higher had 
the respondent complied with the Department's information requests. 
Petitioners'' Case Brief at 48 citing Allied-Signal Aerospace Co. v. 
United States, 996 F.2d 1185,1191 (Fed. Cir. 1993).
    Pointing to evidence on the record, Petitioners insist that they 
have ``unequivocally'' demonstrated that the 61.85 percent first-tier 
BIA rate is not adverse to CEMEX and, therefore, the presumption that 
the highest prior margin is the best information available has been 
rebutted. To support this claim, Petitioners refer to the third 
administrative review where the Department relied on a first-tier BIA 
rate of 61.85 percent, the same rate used in the preliminary results 
for this review. In the third review, Petitioners note, the Department 
stated that ``[we do not believe that the revised margin of 61.85 
percent is insufficient to induce cooperation in a future proceeding.'' 
However, Petitioners insist, this is exactly what happened; CEMEX 
continued to defy the Department's requests for home market sales data 
for Type I cement.
    Based on pricing information supplied in a September 14, 1994 CEMEX 
offering circular for the sale of certain securities in the United 
States, Petitioners calculated a dumping margin of 83.35 percent. 
Petitioners argue that this information is at least as reliable, if not 
more so, than any pricing data reported by CEMEX in the course of the 
administrative review, since both CEMEX and its underwriters and 
outside counsel were under a legal obligation to accurately report 
pricing data in the offering circular.
    Additionally, Petitioners point to administrative and case law 
where they claim the Department, in factually similar cases, has found 
that the presumption in favor of the two-tier methodology has been 
rebutted and has applied a BIA rate higher than the first-tier rate. 
See Certain Malleable Cast Iron Pipe Fittings From Brazil, 60 FR 41,876 
(1995); Cold-Rolled Stainless Steel Sheet From Germany, 59 FR 15,888 
(1994), aff'd, Krupp Stahl A.G. v. United States, 822 F. Supp. 789 (CIT 
1993); Silicon Metal From Argentina, FR 65,336 (1993). In particular, 
Petitioners cite Steel Wire Rope From the Republic of Korea, 60 FR 
63,499 (1995), where, according to Petitioners, the Department 
recognized that in reviews involving a limited number of participants 
and, therefore, a small number of rates available for BIA, the standard 
first-tier methodology may not induce respondents to cooperate. 
Petitioners maintain that the concern in such cases with respect to the 
two-tiered methodology is that the lack of past rates, as well as the 
small number of participants in the current review, could allow a 
respondent to manipulate the

[[Page 17588]]

proceeding by choosing not to comply with the Department's requests for 
information. In such cases the cooperation-inducing function of the BIA 
provision of the Act may not be achieved by use of the two-tiered BIA 
methodology, in which case the Department will resort to alternative 
sources in determining the BIA rate for uncooperative respondents. 
Specifically, Petitioners argue that no respondent other than CEMEX has 
participated in the first three administrative reviews on gray portland 
cement and, therefore, the highest previous margin was CEMEX's own 
margin. This enabled CEMEX, Petitioners argue, to compare the first-
tier rate to the rate it would have received on a price-to-price 
comparison and, as a result, manipulate the outcome by choosing not to 
cooperate.
    Petitioners offer two alternatives to the Department's preliminary 
results. First, Petitioners urge the Department to use as total BIA the 
highest margin from the petition--111 percent. The resulting higher 
margin, argue Petitioners, would have the added effect of inducing 
CEMEX to comply fully in future administrative reviews.
    Alternatively, Petitioners argue that the Department should conduct 
a price-to-price comparison using public home market pricing data and 
CEMEX's reported U.S. prices. As noted above Petitioners calculated a 
rate of 83.35 percent using this approach. Petitioners claim that this 
approach is consistent with other cases in which the Department used a 
respondent's publicly available information when use of the standard 
two-tier methodology would reward the respondent for its refusal to 
cooperate.
    CEMEX, in turn, argues that the Department's analysis of its 
standard two-tier BIA methodology and the application of this 
methodology, as set forth in the preliminary results, was in accordance 
with law. CEMEX argues that under the Department's standard two-tier 
BIA policy for respondents that have been determined to be 
uncooperative or who have impeded the investigation, the Department 
will apply first-tier BIA, namely, the higher of: (1) The highest rate 
found for any firm in the original investigation or in any subsequent 
administrative review of that case; or (2) the highest rate found for 
any firm in the original investigation or in any subsequent 
administrative review of that case. This methodology, CEMEX points out 
was reviewed by the Federal Circuit in Allied Signal Aerospace Co. v. 
United States, 996 F.2d 1185 (Fed. Cir. 1993) and found to be fully in 
accordance with the law.
    In the current review, CEMEX continues, the Department used as 
first-tier BIA the highest margin found for any company in the original 
investigation or subsequent administrative review that was in effect as 
of the date of the Department's preliminary results in the fourth 
review, the 61.85 percent margin assigned to CEMEX in the final remand 
results of the original investigation which was issued by the DOC on 
May 12, 1994 and affirmed by the CIT on September 26, 1994 in Ad Hoc 
Committee of AZ-NM-TX-FL Producers of Gray Portland Cement v. United 
States, Slip Op. 94-152 (September 26, 1994). Since the above-
referenced rate was sufficiently adverse to CEMEX and determined using 
methodology confirmed by the Federal Circuit, CEMEX concludes that in 
the event that the Department decides to continue using BIA for the 
final results, the Department's BIA methodology was appropriate and 
should be incorporated into the final results.
    In addition, CEMEX asserts that the purpose of BIA is not to obtain 
the highest possible margin, but rather, to use an adverse margin to 
encourage future cooperation. In the current case, CEMEX argues, the 
Department's application of first-tier BIA in the third administrative 
review successfully induced CEMEX to cooperate with the Department's 
information requests in the present and subsequent administrative 
reviews. In this regard, CEMEX references its February 8, 1996 offer to 
submit a sales listing covering Type I cement in the present review and 
its complete ``cooperation.''

Department's Position

    We disagree with Petitioners. As in the third review, the 
Department sees no grounds for departing from our well-established 
first-tier BIA methodology of selecting the highest margin found for 
any firm either in the LTFV investigation or in a subsequent review. 
Currently, the highest rate found in any prior review or the 
investigation is the 109.43 percent assigned to CEMEX in the second 
court ordered remand of the second administrative review. Because this 
is a higher rate than the 83.35 percent rate proposed by Petitioners, 
and comparable to the 111.11 percent rate also proposed by petitioners, 
we do not need to address Petitioners' argument that the rate used in 
the preliminary result is insufficient to induce cooperation.
    We also reject CEMEX's argument that the rate assigned to it in the 
preliminary results of this review ``successfully induced'' it to 
cooperate with the Department's information requests. The central 
purpose of the BIA rule, as CEMEX concedes, is to induce respondents, 
in the absence of any subpoena power vested in the Department, to 
provide the necessary factual information so that the investigating 
authority can achieve the fundamental purpose of the Act--namely, 
``determining current margins as accurately as possible.'' Rhone 
Poulenc, Inc. v. United States, 899 F.2d 1185, 1191 (Fed. Cir. 1990). 
In the present case, however, CEMEX did not provide the necessary 
factual information. It significantly impeded the progress of the 
review and only offered to provide requested information one full year 
after the original deadline for submission of factual information and 
four months after the record had closed.
    Petitioners argue that CEMEX's belated offer of cooperation only 
came after the Department issued its February 1, 1996 remand results in 
connection with the second administrative review. See CEMEX, S.A. v. 
United States, Slip Op. 96-132 (CIT Aug. 13, 1996). These results, 
Petitioners assert, put CEMEX ``at risk'' of a higher BIA rate--82.86, 
(the rate from the first court remand of the second administrative 
review,) as opposed to 61.85 percent. They may be right; however, the 
important point is that CEMEX did not cooperate with the Department's 
administrative review. Therefore, under these circumstances, we are 
justified in relying upon BIA and in relying upon our two-tier BIA 
methodology.

Comment Five

    Petitioners argue that if BIA is based on the first-tier rate, the 
Department must use the rate calculated on remand in the second 
administrative review. This is because, Petitioners contend, this 
margin is based on a price-to-price comparison of Type II cement sales 
in the United States to Type I cement sales in Mexico, the same 
comparison CEMEX has thwarted in the current review by refusing to 
supply requested information. In making this claim, Petitioners insist 
that nothing in the statute bars the Department from using the margin 
from the second review remand proceeding as BIA simply because that 
margin has not been finally approved by the courts or published by the 
Department in the Federal Register.
    CEMEX counters that the use of the 82.86 percent margin, (the first 
court ordered remand results of the second administrative review,) 
would be contrary to law. According to CEMEX, the remand results in the 
second review have no legal effect until they are

[[Page 17589]]

affirmed by the CIT. Therefore, CEMEX argues, a margin established by 
the Department in remand results may not serve as the basis for first 
or second-tier BIA unless they are affirmed. CEMEX asserts that the 
Department's use of the 61.85 percent rate continues to be the 
appropriate margin upon which to base first-tier BIA.

Department's Position

    We agree with Petitioners and CEMEX. As noted in our response to 
comment four, the Department is applying a first-tier BIA rate of 
109.43 percent, (the results from the second court ordered remand). 
This rate has been approved by the CIT. See CEMEX, S.A. v. United 
States, Slip Op. 96-179 (CIT Oct. 24, 1996), appeal pending, Appeal No. 
97-1151 (Fed. Cir.)

Final Results of Review

    As a result of our review, we determine the weighted-average 
dumping margin for CEMEX, S.A. for the period August 1, 1993, through 
July 31, 1994, to be 109.43 percent and the all other rate to be 61.35. 
The Department will instruct the Customs Service to assess antidumping 
duties on all appropriate entries. The Department will issue 
appraisement instructions directly to the Customs Service. Furthermore, 
the following deposit requirements will be effective for all shipments 
of the subject merchandise entered, or withdrawn from warehouse, for 
consumption on or after the publication date of these final results of 
review, as provided for by section 751(a)(1) of the Act: (1) The cash 
deposit rate for the reviewed company will be the rate listed above; 
(2) for previously reviewed or investigated companies not listed above, 
the cash deposit rate will continue to be the company-specific rate 
published for the most recent period; (3) if the exporter is not a firm 
covered in this review, a prior review, or the original LTFV 
investigation, but the manufacturer is, the cash deposit rate will be 
the rate established for the most recent period for the manufacturer of 
the merchandise; (4) the cash deposit rate for all other manufacturers 
or exporters will be 61.35 percent (LFTV remand results). These deposit 
requirements shall remain in effect until publication of the final 
results of the next administrative review.
    This notice also serves as a final reminder to importers of their 
responsibility under 19 CFR 353.26 to file a certificate regarding the 
reimbursement of antidumping duties prior to liquidation of the 
relevant entries during this review period. Failure to comply with this 
requirement could result in the Secretary's presumption that 
reimbursement of the antidumping duties occurred and the subsequent 
assessment of double antidumping duties.
    This notice serves as the only reminder to parties subject to 
administrative protective order (APO) of their responsibility 
concerning the disposition of proprietary information disclosed under 
APO in accordance with 19 CFR 353.34(d). Timely written notification of 
return/destruction of APT materials or conversion to judicial 
protective order is hereby requested. Failure to comply with the 
regulations and the terms of the APT is a sanctionable violation.
    This administrative review and notice are in accordance with 
section 751(a)(1) of the Act (19 U.S.C. 1675(a)(1)) and 19 CFR 353.22.

    Dated: April 2, 1997.
Robert S. LaRussa,
Acting Assistant Secretary for Import Administration.
[FR Doc. 97-9258 Filed 4-9-97; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 3510-DS-P