UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 09-4338

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff - Appellee,

v.

MATTHEW QUINN MASON, a/k/a Q,

Defendant - Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Northern 

District of West Virginia, at Martinsburg. John Preston Bailey,

Chief District Judge. (3:08-cr-00030-JPB-DJJ-2)

Submitted: March 24, 2010 Decided: April 16, 2010

Before WILKINSON and MOTZ, Circuit Judges, and HAMILTON, Senior 

Circuit Judge.

Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

Lary D. Garrett, GARRETT & GARRETT, Moorefield, West Virginia, 

for Appellant. Sharon L. Potter, United States Attorney, Erin 

K. Reisenweber, Assistant United States Attorney, Martinsburg, 

West Virginia, for Appellee.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
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PER CURIAM:

Following a jury trial, Matthew Quinn Mason was 

convicted of conspiracy to retaliate against a witness, in 

violation of 18 U.S.C.A. § 1513(a)(1)(A), (f) (West 2000 & Supp. 

2009); aiding and abetting in retaliating against a witness, in 

violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1513(a)(1)(A) (2006); and damage to the 

property of another in retaliation for testimony, in violation 

of 18 U.S.C.A. § 1513(b)(1) (West 2000 & Supp. 2009). The 

district court sentenced Mason to concurrent sentences of 

ninety-five months on each count. 

Mason asserts two claims on appeal:1

 1 At the beginning of his brief, Mason indicates that he 

also appeals the jury instructions issued by the district court. 

However, he does not provide any argument pertaining to this 

issue in the body of his brief. See Fed. R. App. P. 

28(a)(9)(A). Therefore, we find Mason has waived this issue on 

appeal. See Wahi v. Charleston Area Med. Ctr., Inc., 562 F.3d 

599, 607 (4th Cir. 2009). 

(1) the district 

court erred in denying his Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 29 

motion for a judgment of acquittal, because the evidence was 

insufficient to support his convictions; and (2) the district 

court abused its discretion in admitting evidence of prior 

interactions between Mason and Darryl Clinkscale, the victim in 

this case. For the reasons that follow, we reject Mason’s 

arguments and affirm. 
3

We review a district court’s decision to deny a Rule 

29 motion de novo. United States v. Midgett, 488 F.3d 288, 297 

(4th Cir. 2007). Where, as here, the motion is based on a claim 

of insufficient evidence, “[t]he verdict of a jury must be 

sustained if there is substantial evidence, taking the view most 

favorable to the Government, to support it.” Glasser v. United 

States, 315 U.S. 60, 80 (1942); see United States v. Kellam, 568 

F.3d 125, 140 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 130 S. Ct. 657 (2009). 

“[S]ubstantial evidence is evidence that a reasonable finder of 

fact could accept as adequate and sufficient to support a 

conclusion of a defendant’s guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.” 

United States v. Delfino, 510 F.3d 468, 471 (4th Cir. 2007) 

(quoting United States v. Burgos, 94 F.3d 849, 862 (4th Cir. 

1996) (en banc)) (internal quotation marks omitted). We “can 

reverse a conviction on insufficiency grounds only when the 

prosecution’s failure is clear.” United States v. Moye, 454 

F.3d 390, 394 (4th Cir. 2006) (en banc) (internal quotation

marks omitted).

To satisfy its burden of proof in this case, the 

Government had to prove that, in retaliation for Clinkscale’s 

testimony against Cecil Ray, Jr.,2

 2 Clinkscale testified at Ray’s 2007 federal drug 

trafficking trial. Ray was convicted and received a life 

Mason: aided and abetted in 

(Continued)
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attempting to kill Clinkscale; conspired with at least one other 

person to attempt to kill Clinkscale; and damaged Clinkscale’s 

property. See 18 U.S.C. § 1513(a)(1), (b)(1), (f). We have 

thoroughly reviewed the record and find the evidence supports 

Mason’s convictions. Clinkscale testified that, prior to his 

involvement in Ray’s trial, he did not know Mason. Clinkscale 

further testified to the three (and only three) interactions he 

had with Mason prior to the incident underlying this appeal. 

These exchanges, which occurred while both men were in custody 

immediately prior to Ray’s trial, all centered around 

Clinkscale’s testimony against Ray. Further, Mason’s codefendant testified that one of the men who shot at Clinkscale 

expressed anger at Clinkscale, because Clinkscale had “told on” 

Ray. 

We agree with the district court’s conclusion that

“the most and perhaps the only[] reasonable inference to be 

drawn by the jury . . . is that Clinkscale was being pursued and 

shot at because he had testified against Cecil Ray.” Viewed in 

the light most favorable to the Government, we find no clear 

failure in the Government’s evidence that would support

reversal. See Moye, 454 F.3d at 394 (“[W]here the evidence 

 

sentence, which this court affirmed on appeal. See United 

States v. Ray, 317 F. App’x 346 (4th Cir. 2009) (No. 07-5155).
5

supports differing reasonable interpretations, the jury will 

decide which interpretation to accept.”). 

Mason next asserts that the district court abused its 

discretion in admitting Clinkscale’s testimony pertaining to his 

three prior exchanges with Mason.3

 3 Mason first challenges the timeliness of the Government’s 

notice regarding its intent to proffer this evidence. However, 

because Mason did not ask for a continuance based on the late 

notice, he will not be heard to complain of it now. Relatedly, 

Mason asserts that the late disclosure of this evidence violated 

Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 16. However, the evidence at 

issue simply does not implicate Rule 16. See Fed. R. Crim. P. 

16(a)(1)(A)-(G). 

This court reviews a district 

court’s evidentiary rulings for an abuse of discretion. United 

States v. Basham, 561 F.3d 302, 325 (4th Cir. 2009) (stating 

standard of review). An abuse of discretion occurs when “the 

district court judge acted arbitrarily or irrationally in 

admitting evidence.” Id. at 326 (internal quotation marks 

omitted). Rule 404(b) of the Federal Rules of Evidence 

prohibits the admission of evidence of “other crimes, wrongs, or 

acts” solely to prove a defendant’s bad character, but “[s]uch 

evidence . . . may ‘be admissible for other purposes, such as 

proof of motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, 

knowledge, identity, or absence of mistake or accident.’” Id.

(quoting Fed. R. Evid. 404(b)). For such evidence to be 

admissible under Rule 404(b), it “must be (1) relevant to an 
6

issue other than character; (2) necessary; and (3) reliable.” 

Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). In addition, the 

evidence must be more probative than prejudicial. Id. (citing 

Fed. R. Evid. 403). 

Assuming, as the district court did, that the 

challenged evidence constituted 404(b) material, there was no 

abuse of discretion in admitting it. Mason’s basic defense was 

that he participated in this crime for no reason. Therefore, 

evidence of Mason’s prior interactions with Clinkscale, which 

established Mason’s knowledge of Clinkscale’s role as a federal 

witness, was admissible because it was relevant and probative of 

an issue other than Mason’s character. 

For these reasons, we affirm Mason’s convictions and 

sentence. We dispense with oral argument because the facts and 

legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials 

before the court and argument would not aid the decisional 

process.

AFFIRMED