2013 Decisions

Opinions of the United

States Court of Appeals

for the Third Circuit

1-22-2013

James Coppedge v. Deutsche Bank Natl Trust Co

Precedential or Non-Precedential: Non-Precedential

Docket No. 12-3066

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1

GLD-035 NOT PRECEDENTIAL

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT

___________

No. 12-3066

___________

JAMES COPPEDGE,

 Appellant

v.

DEUTSCHE BANK NATIONAL TRUST;

MARTHA E. VON ROSENSTIEL, ESQ.;

JACQUELINE F. MCNALLY, ESQ.

____________________________________

On Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania

(D.C. Civil No. 2:12-cv-03268)

District Judge: Honorable Thomas N. O'Neill, Jr.

____________________________________

Submitted for Possible Dismissal Due to a Jurisdictional Defect and for Possible 

Summary Action Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 27.4 and I.O.P. 10.6

November 8, 2012

Before: FUENTES, FISHER and ROTH, Circuit Judges

(Opinion filed: January 22, 2013 )

_________

OPINION

_________

PER CURIAM

James Coppedge appeals the denial of his request for a preliminary injunction. 
2

We will affirm.

In June 2012, Coppedge filed suit in the United States District Court for the 

Eastern District of Pennsylvania. Basing his action on, inter alia, 42 U.S.C. § 1983, 

Coppedge appeared to challenge a mortgage-related proceeding that was currently 

ongoing in Pennsylvania state court, and raised several arguments associated with the 

“sovereign citizen” or “redemptionist” movements.1

 For example, he contested a writ of 

judgment that used his “corporate issue name” (using all upper-case letters, see Ford v. 

Pryor

Shortly after paying the filing fee, Coppedge lodged two other documents with the

District Court. The first document was captioned “Motion for Injunction and Emergency 

Stay” (ECF No. 006), and seemed to request that the District Court enjoin the pending 

state-court writ of possession. Its attachments included an affidavit submitted to the 

Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County—in which Coppedge represented that he 

intended to “appeal” that court’s decision to the Federal District Court—and a July 2012 

order denying a request for summary judgment. The second document was captioned 

“Motion to Dismiss Writ of Possession due to Fraud . . . Emergency Stay and Injunction”

, 552 F.3d 1174, 1179 (10th Cir. 2008)) and proclaimed that there was “no lawful 

money.” He demanded that each defendant “produce a Certified Copy of each of [his or 

her] OATHS OF OFFICE with an attached Bond to PROVE they have legal and lawful 

standing to operate in commerce against [Coppedge], a Secured Party Creditor.” 

 1 See, e.g., United States v. Benabe, 654 F.3d 753, 766–67 (7th Cir. 2011); Bey v. 

Stumpf, 825 F. Supp. 2d 537, 539–46 (D.N.J. 2011).
3

(ECF No. 007). It argued that a writ of possession was voided in 2010 and that the state 

courts were erroneously allowing the voided writ to be acted upon. The District Court 

denied both motions, citing two grounds for declining to issue the requested injunction: 

abstention under Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971), and a possible jurisdictional bar

under the Rooker-Feldman2 doctrine. In so doing, it acknowledged Coppedge’s similar 

actions in other District Courts. See, e.g., Coppedge v. Beaumont

“[O]rders granting or denying preliminary injunctions are immediately appealable 

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1292(a)(1).” 

, No. 10–394, 2010 WL 

2382944 (D. Del. June 11, 2010). Coppedge timely appealed; the case otherwise remains 

open in District Court at the time of writing.

Nutrasweet Co. v. Vit-Mar Enters., 112 F.3d 689, 

692 (3d Cir. 1997).

3

 We review generally for abuse of discretion, but we examine the 

Court’s underlying factual findings for clear error and address questions of law de novo. 

N.J. Retail Merchs. Ass’n v. Sidamon-Eristoff

Coppedge has not shown that he is entitled to a preliminary injunction, as he did 

not meet the burden, which he bears, of establishing his right to injunctive relief. 

, 669 F.3d 374, 385 (3d Cir. 2012). 

See

Joseph Bancroft & Sons Co. v. Shelley Knitting Mills, Inc.

 

, 268 F.2d 569, 574 (3d Cir. 

2 D.C. Ct. of App. v. Feldman, 460 U.S. 462 (1983); Rooker v. Fid. Trust Co., 263 U.S. 

413 (1923).

3 Having analyzed Coppedge’s original filings and the order of the District Court, we 

conclude that he was requesting preliminary injunctive relief and not merely a temporary 

restraining order. Were this not the case, we would lack jurisdiction. Nutrasweet, 112 

F.3d at 692. 
4

1959). “A plaintiff seeking a preliminary injunction must establish that he is likely to 

succeed on the merits, that he is likely to suffer irreparable harm in the absence of 

preliminary relief, that the balance of equities tips in his favor, and that an injunction is in 

the public interest.” Winter v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 555 U.S. 7, 20 (2008). 

Neither Coppedge’s complaint nor his subsequent submissions demonstrated a likelihood 

of success on the merits. In fact, he explicitly stated that he wanted the District Court to 

sit in appellate review of state-court proceedings, a role specifically prohibited by 

Rooker-Feldman. See Great W. Mining & Mineral Co. v. Fox Rothschild LLP, 615 F.3d 

159, 169 (3d Cir. 2010) (discussing the “prohibited exercise of appellate jurisdiction by 

the district court”). Further, in order for Younger abstention to apply (subject to certain 

exceptions that are not implicated here), there must be 1) ongoing state judicial 

proceedings, 2) implicating important state interests, 3) that give the parties an adequate 

opportunity to raise the relevant federal claims. Lazaridis v. Wehmer, 591 F.3d 666, 670

& n.4 (3d Cir. 2010) (per curiam). The District Court identified “pending state court 

proceedings involving Coppedge and Deutsche Bank raising issues directly related to 

those raised by Coppedge in this matter,” and observed that Pennsylvania has “an 

important interest in resolving real estate issues” in its courts. Coppedge has not cast any 

doubt on the existence and adequacy of the Pennsylvania judicial proceedings, and when 

the first and third prongs of the Younger

 

test are met, “neither injunctive nor declaratory 

relief will be available in cases in which the federal relief would render the state court’s 
5

orders or judgments nugatory.” Id. at 671 (citations omitted).

4

Thus, finding no substantial question to be presented by this appeal, we will 

summarily affirm the order of the District Court. See Murray v. Bledsoe

 4 We separately observe that real estate, and especially the regulation, titling, and sale 

thereof, has traditionally been regarded as an important state interest. See, e.g., BFP v. 

Resolution Trust Corp., 511 U.S. 531, 544 (1994) (citing Am. Land Co. v. Zeiss, 219 

U.S. 47, 60 (1911)); Burkart v. Coleman (In re Tippett), 542 F.3d 684, 689 (9th Cir. 

2008) (citing BFP); Stroman Realty, Inc. v. Martinez, 505 F.3d 658, 664 (7th Cir. 2007) 

(holding that “the regulation of real estate professionals engaged in the business of 

timeshare brokerage” qualifies as “a valid, legitimate state interest” under the second 

prong of the Younger test); see also Lazaridis, 591 F.3d at 671 n.5; Witco Corp. v. 

Beekhuis, 38 F.3d 682, 689 (3d Cir. 1994) (“Probate law, like real estate law and 

domestic relations law, has traditionally been within the province of the individual 

states.”) (emphasis added).

, 650 F.3d 246, 

247 (3d Cir. 2011) (per curiam). Coppedge’s additional submissions to this Court, to the 

extent that they request any independent relief, are denied. In closing, we note that 

Coppedge’s sovereign-citizen-based averments, which frequently rely on attacks on the 

judiciary and invocations of alchemistic, archaic, and irrelevant formalism, are unlikely 

to bring him relief in any court of law, and he would be wise to direct his energies in a 

more productive direction.