UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 21-4225

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 

Plaintiff - Appellee, 

v. 

GARRETT MICHAEL CARRIGAN, 

Defendant - Appellant. 

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Northern District of West Virginia, at 

Wheeling. Irene M. Keeley, Senior District Judge. (5:09-cr-00043-IMK-MJA-1) 

Submitted: July 27, 2022 Decided: August 17, 2022

Before MOTZ and HEYTENS, Circuit Judges, and FLOYD, Senior Circuit Judge. 

Affirmed in part, vacated in part, and remanded by unpublished per curiam opinion. 

ON BRIEF: Kristen M. Leddy, Assistant Federal Public Defender, OFFICE OF THE 

FEDERAL PUBLIC DEFENDER, Martinsburg, West Virginia, for Appellant. William 

Ihlenfeld, United States Attorney, Wheeling, West Virginia, Zelda E. Wesley, Assistant 

United States Attorney, OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES ATTORNEY, Clarksburg, 

West Virginia, for Appellee. 

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit. 

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PER CURIAM: 

Garrett Michael Carrigan appeals the judgment revoking his supervised release and 

imposing a 12-month prison term and a 25-year term of supervised release. Counsel 

initially filed a brief pursuant to Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967), stating that 

there are no meritorious issues for appeal but questioning whether the 25-year term of 

supervised release is unreasonable. Although advised of his right to file a pro se 

supplemental brief, Carrigan did not do so. The Government declined to file a response 

brief. After conducting our Anders review, we ordered supplemental briefing to address 

the potentially meritorious issues of whether the district court adequately considered the 

policy statement range applicable to Carrigan and whether there is reversible error in this 

case under United States v. Rogers, 961 F.3d 291 (4th Cir. 2020), and United States v. 

Singletary, 984 F.3d 341 (4th Cir. 2021). The parties filed supplemental briefs on these 

issues. We affirm in part, vacate in part, and remand for resentencing. 

“A district court has broad discretion when imposing a sentence upon revocation of 

supervised release.” United States v. Patterson, 957 F.3d 426, 436 (4th Cir. 2020). This 

court “will affirm a revocation sentence if it is within the statutory maximum and is not 

plainly unreasonable.” Id. Before deciding “whether a revocation sentence is plainly 

unreasonable, this [c]ourt must first determine whether the sentence is procedurally or 

substantively unreasonable.” Id. 

“A revocation sentence is procedurally reasonable if the district court adequately 

explains the chosen sentence after considering the Sentencing Guidelines’ nonbinding 

Chapter Seven policy statements and the applicable 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) factors.” United 

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States v. Coston, 964 F.3d 289, 297 (4th Cir. 2020) (internal quotation marks omitted), 

cert. denied, 141 S. Ct. 1252 (2021). “A revocation sentence is substantively reasonable 

if, in light of the totality of the circumstances, the [district] court states an appropriate basis 

for concluding that the defendant should receive the sentence imposed.” Id. (internal 

quotation marks omitted). Only if this court finds a revocation sentence unreasonable does 

it consider whether the sentence “is plainly so, relying on the definition of plain used in 

our plain error analysis—that is, clear or obvious.” United States v. Slappy, 872 F.3d 202, 

208 (4th Cir. 2017) (cleaned up). “If a revocation sentence-even an unreasonable one-is 

not plainly unreasonable, we will affirm it.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). 

Where, as here, a defendant fails to preserve a claim of procedural sentencing error, 

our review is for plain error. United States v. Webb, 738 F.3d 638, 640 (4th Cir. 2013). To 

satisfy this standard, Carrigan “must show (1) that the district court erred, (2) that the error 

is clear or obvious, and (3) that the error affected his substantial rights, meaning that it 

affected the outcome of the district court proceedings.” Id. at 640-41 (internal quotation 

marks omitted). “Even when this burden is met, we retain discretion whether to recognize 

the error and will deny relief unless the district court’s error seriously affects the fairness, 

integrity or public reputation of judicial proceedings.” Id. at 641 (cleaned up). 

A district court imposing a sentence on revocation of supervised release “must 

consider the Chapter Seven policy statements . . . applicable to revocation sentences.” 

United States v. Thompson, 595 F.3d 544, 547 (4th Cir. 2010); see 18 U.S.C. 

§ 3553(a)(4)(B). This duty requires that the policy statement range the district court 

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considers be correctly calculated. See Rosales-Mireles v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 1897, 

1904 (2018). 

The Guidelines require consideration of the policy statement range established 

under § 7B1.4. U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Manual § 7B1.3(b), p.s. (2018); see Thompson, 

595 F.3d at 547. A defendant, like Carrigan, with Grade C violations of supervised release

and a criminal history category of III is subject to an advisory policy statement range of 5 

to 11 months’ imprisonment. USSG § 7B1.4(a), p.s. (sentencing table). In sentencing 

Carrigan, however, the district court applied criminal history category IV to Carrigan’s 

Grade C violations, calculated his advisory policy statement range at 6 to 12 months’ 

imprisonment, and considered that range as the applicable policy statement range. The 

district court thus committed error qualifying as plain. See United States v. 

Ramirez-Castillo, 748 F.3d 205, 215 (4th Cir. 2014) (describing “plain” error). 

The district court also stated that Carrigan’s history and characteristics demanded 

an incarceration term at the “high end” of the policy statement range, which it determined 

was 12 months rather than the 11-month term that applied. The record does not disclose 

the sentence the district court would have imposed had it calculated and considered the 

correct policy statement range. The district court’s error therefore affected Carrigan’s 

substantial rights. See Molina-Martinez v. United States, 578 U.S. 189, 201 (2016). 

Further, we conclude that the error seriously affected the fairness of the proceeding, 

warranting correction. See Rosales-Mireles, 138 S. Ct. at 1903, 1907-08, 1911. 

As noted, in the Anders brief, counsel also questions the reasonableness of 

Carrigan’s supervised release term. Although the term falls within the supervised release 

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range authorized for Carrigan, see USSG §§ 5D1.2(b), 7B1.3(g)(2), p.s., because we find 

his revocation sentence otherwise procedurally unreasonable, we have no occasion to 

address whether the supervised release portion is otherwise procedurally unreasonable. 

We also have no occasion to address the substantive reasonableness of the supervised 

release portion of the sentence. See United States v. Provance, 944 F.3d 213, 218 (4th Cir. 

2019). 

Next, we review de novo whether there is reversible error here under Rogers and 

Singletary. United States v. Cisson, 33 F.4th 185, 193 (4th Cir. 2022). In Rogers, this 

court held that a district court must orally pronounce all discretionary conditions of 

supervised release at the defendant’s sentencing hearing. 961 F.3d at 296-99. 

Discretionary conditions of supervised release that appear for the first time in a written 

judgment are nullities; a defendant has not been sentenced to those conditions, warranting 

vacatur and a remand for resentencing. Singletary, 984 F.3d at 344, 346 & n.4 (stating that 

remedy for Rogers error “is to vacate the sentence and remand for the district court to 

resentence” defendant and rejecting Government’s contention that vacatur should be 

limited to supervised release portion of sentence). 

Carrigan asserts in his supplemental brief that reversible error under Rogers and 

Singletary is present because the district court erroneously imposed a prohibition on 

viewing adult pornography as a condition of supervised release that it both failed to orally 

pronounce or include in the written judgment. However, because the claimed prohibition 

on the viewing of this pornography was neither orally pronounced as a condition of 

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supervision nor included in the written judgment, Carrigan’s claim of reversible error under 

Rogers and Singletary is without merit. 

In accordance with Anders, we also have reviewed the entire record in this case and 

have found no meritorious grounds for appeal. We thus affirm the revocation of Carrigan’s 

supervised release, vacate his sentence, and remand for resentencing.*

 In so doing, we 

express no opinion as to the appropriate length of Carrigan’s revocation sentence. 

This court requires that counsel inform Carrigan, in writing, of the right to petition 

the Supreme Court of the United States for further review. If Carrigan requests that a 

petition be filed, but counsel believes that such a petition would be frivolous, then counsel 

may move in this court for leave to withdraw from representation. Counsel’s motion must 

state that a copy thereof was served on Carrigan. 

We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are 

adequately presented in the materials before this court and argument would not aid the 

decisional process. 

AFFIRMED IN PART,

VACATED IN PART, AND REMANDED

* Carrigan’s release from prison during the pendency of this appeal neither moots 

his sentencing challenges nor eliminates the need for resentencing. See United States v. 

Ketter, 908 F.3d 61, 65-66 (4th Cir. 2018). 

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