### T E X A S C O U R T O F A P P E A L S , T H I R D D I S T R I C T , A T A U S T I N

NO. 03-10-00788- CR

Richard Goodwin , Appellan t

v. The State of Texas, App ellee

F ROM TH E DISTRI CT COURT O F TRAVIS CO UNTY, 299 TH JUDICI AL DISTRICT NO. D-1 -DC- 10- 9040 55, H ONO RAB LE CHARLES F . B AIRD, JUDGE P RESIDING

O P I N I O N
Appellan t R ichar d Goodwin, a civilly committed sexually violent preda tor, was convicted by a trial court of violating the terms of his civil commitment. See Tex. Hea lth & Safety Code Ann. § 841.085 (West 2010). The court senten ced Goodwin to six y ear s’ imprisonment, probate d to community supervision for two y ear s. On appea l, Goodwin claims that (1) the evidenc e is insufficient to support his conviction and (2) the trial court err ed in deny ing his motion to suppress the evidenc e obtained dur ing his unlaw ful detention. We aff irm the judg ment of the trial c ourt.

BACK GR OUND
I n 1 9 88, Goodwin was convicted of indece ncy with a child by exposure. See Tex

. Penal Code Ann. § 21.11(a) (2)( A) (West 2011). He was convicted ag ain in 1990 on two counts of 1

We cite to the curr ent versions of the statutes for convenie nce beca use there have been no 1 intervening amendments that a re ma terial to our disposition of this appeal.ag g rava

ted sexual assault of a child, and ag ain in 1995 for indece ncy with a child by exposure. See id. §§ 21.11(a) (2)( A), 22.01(a) (1)( B) (West 2011). Goodwin serve d ten y ear s in prison for his final conviction, and wa s scheduled to be rele ased in 2005.

I n O c to b e r o f 2 0 0 5 , a tr

ia l c o u r t f o u n d th a t G o o d w in w a s a “ s e xu a ll y v io le n t p r e d a to r , ” based on his previous convictions for sexually violent offe nses and his continued “suff er[ing] from

a behavior al abnorma lity that makes [hi m] likely to eng ag e in a preda tory act of sexual violence.” 2
See Tex. Hea lth & Safety Code Ann. § 841.003(a) (West 2010). As a sexu al l y v i o l ent preda tor, Goodwin was civilly committed for outpatient trea tment and supervision u ntil such time as his “beha vioral abnorma lity has chang ed to the extent that [he] is no l o n ger likely to eng ag e in

a preda tory act of sexual violence.” See id. § 841.08 1 (a ) (W es t 2010). The terms of Goodwin’s civil commitment require him to “r es i d e i n a Texas residential fac ility ” and comply with all written require ments imposed by the C o u n cil for Sex Offe nder Treatment (“CSOT”)

. See id. § 8 4 1

. 0 8 2 ( a ) ( 1 )

– ( 4 ) ( We s t 2 0 1 0 )

. A n y v io la ti o n o f th e te r

ms o f h is c iv il c o mm it

me n t is a th ir d

- deg ree felony

. See id. § 841.085 (West 2010).

Goo dwin was orig inally place d in the Be n Reed Halfw ay House in Har ris County (the
“Ha rris County

fac ility ”). The Har

ris County

fac ility allowed Goodw in to live near his re maining family and he wa s p er m itted to leave the premises, provided he alway s wore a GPS trac ker. On October 9, 2009, CSOT transfe rre d Goodwin from the Har ris Count y fa ci l i t y to the work rele ase b u il d in g o f th e T r a

v is Co u n ty Co r r e c ti o n a l F a c il it

y ( th e “ T r a

v is Co u n ty f a c il it y ” )

. T h e T r a

v is Co u n ty

The fac ts rec ited here in are taken from testimony and exhibi ts admitted at t h e p retrial 2 hear ing a nd the benc h trial. 2fac ility was under contra ct with the State to house civil c ommitt ees as well as pre- rele ase parole es

wh o were kept separ ate from the g ener al population of the jail. I n the Travis County fac ility , t h e civil committees wer e permitted some p er sonal items and could leave the premises provided they

wore GPS moni toring device s.

When he arr ived at the Tra v i s County fac ility , My ra Stoddard, a CSOT employ ee, informed Goodwin of CSOT’s supervision require ments for sexually violent preda tors (the “CSOT require ments”). The CSOT r equire ments wer e the same f or all civilly

committed sex ually

violent preda tors, and provide d, in releva nt part:
[a] I shall not unlawfully own, possess, use, sell nor have under my control any firea

rm, prohibited wea

pon or illega l w eapon as define d in the Texas Penal Code. Fur ther, I shall not own, possess or use any to o l, im p le me n t, o r o b

je c t to c a u s e o r th r e a te n to c a u s e in ju r y to my s e lf or other pe rsons.

. . . . [b ] I n th e e v e n t th a t I a m p la c e d in o r a ll o w e d to r e s id e in a c o mm u n it y residential fa ci l ity (halfw ay house), I ag ree to abide by the rules, reg ulations and policies of the f acility

.

Goodwin acknow ledg ed that he understood the CSOT require m en t s and signe d an ag ree ment to abide by their terms.
On J anuar

y 17, 2010, corr ections office rs perf ormed a random, “shake down ”

s ea rch of the entire Travis County fac ility , including Goodwin’s bunk and locker

. The o ff i ce rs discovere d three razorblade s in Goodwin’s belonging s; one wa s hidden within some leg al pape rs,

an o t h er wa s i n an empty soup packe t inside Goodwin’s locker , and the third was attache d to a

3mag net and conce aled u n d er Go odwin’s locker

. The Travis County fac ility ’s rules prohibited all

residents, including civil committees, from possessing razorblade s . W h en the g uards questioned
him about the razorblade s, Goodwin initially claimed that h e wa s all owed to possess them, but subsequently denied that the razorblade s wer e his. Goodwin was indicted for violating the terms of his civil commitment based on his possession of the razorblade s beca use (a) they wer e objects that threa ten to cause injury to himself or others and (b) they constituted a violation of the Travis County fac ility ’s rules. Prior t o t ri al , Go o d win filed a petition for writ of habea s corpus. See Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 1 1

. 0 8 (W es t 2005). I n his petition, Goodwin alleg ed that he was being unlawfully detained in the Travis County fac ility becaus e (1) his transfe r to the Travis County fac ility without notice, opportunity to object, or judicial revie w violated his rig ht to due proce ss and (2) the Travis County fac ility is not a “re sidential fac ility ” in which he could be lawfully place d. See U.S. Const. amend. 14 § 1; see also Tex. Health & Safety Code Ann. § 841.082(a )(1) (noting that sexual preda tors shall reside in “re sidential fac iliti es . . . or at another location or fac ility approve d b y [C SO T ]” )

. G o o d

w in a ls o f il e d a mo ti o n to s u

p p r e s s th e e v id e n c e o b ta in e d d u r in g th e s e a

r c h o f h is locker as fruit of his unlawful detention. See Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 38.23(a) (West 2005).

At t h e b en ch trial, afte r the close of evidenc e, the trial court g rante d Goodwin’s petition for habea s corpus, finding that CSOT’s transfe r of Goodwin from Har ris County to Travis County “in the middle of the night

. . . without [Goodwin] having some say ” violated due proce ss. Howeve r, the co u rt d en ied Goodwin’s motion to suppress, finding that “the illega lity of the confine ment, i.e., the location of [Goodwin’s] confine ment, is [not ] the illega lity that was meant to

4be addre ssed” by the ex clusionary rule. See id. (codify ing “exclusionary rule” which prohibits admission of unlawfully

obtained evide nce)

. The trial court found that the evidenc e was insufficient to prove bey ond a rea sonable doubt that the razorblade that was hidden unde r Goodwin’s locker actua lly belong ed to Goodwin.
Howeve r, the co u rt fo u nd that the State had proven bey ond a rea sonable doubt that the other two razorblade s belo n ged t o Go odwin, and there fore convicted him of violating the terms of his

c o mm u n it y s u p e r v is io n “ a s a ll e g e d in th e in d ic tm e n t. ” S e e T e x . H e a lt

h & Sa f e ty Co d e A nn . § 8 4 1

. 0 8 5

. The trial court sentenc ed Goodwin to six y ear s’ imprisonment, probate d to community supervision for two y ear s. The State did not appea l the trial court’s g rant of Goodwin’s writ of habea s corpus. See Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 44.01(k) (West 2007) (g iving State rig ht to appea l g rant of writ of habea s corpus) ; Tex. R. App. P. 26.2(b) (re quiring State to file appea l within twenty day s of order , ruling , or sentenc e to be a ppeale d). Goodwin filed this appe al of his conviction.

DISCUSSIO N

Suf fi ciency of the evidence

I n his fi rs t i s s u e on appea l, Goodwin asser ts that the evidenc e is insufficient to support his co n v i ct i o n . I n revie wing the sufficie ncy of the evidenc e, we deter mine whether a rational trier of fac t c ould ha ve found that the essential elements of the crime w ere proven be y ond

a rea sonable doubt. Brooks v. State , 323 S.W .3d 893, 895 (Tex. Crim. App. 2010). I n making this deter mination, we consider all evide nce tha t the trier of fac t was permitted to consider, reg ardle ss of whether it wa s rig htly or wrong ly admitted. Clayton v

. State , 235 S.W .3d 772, 778 (Tex. Crim.

5App. 2007); Allen v. State , 249 S.W .3d 680, 688-89 (Tex. A pp.—Austin 2008, no pet.). We vie w the evidenc e in the light most favor able to the verdic t. Mauney v. State , 107 S.W .3d 693, 695 (Tex. App.—Austin 2003, no pet.). The trial court, as the trier of fac t in a bench trial, is the sole judge of the cre dibilit y of the witnesses and the weig ht to be g iven to their tes t i m o n y . Id

. There fore , we presume th at t h e co u rt resolved any conflicting infere nces and issues of credibility in favor of the judg ment. Id.

I n this case , the t er m s of Goodwin’s civil commitment statutorily require d that he follow the writt en requiremen t s o f C S OT. See Tex. Hea lth & Safety Code Ann. § 841.082(a) (4). Thus, any violation by Goodwin of the CSOT require ments would be a per se violation of the terms of his civil commitment. See id. § 841.085. The indictment alleg ed that Goodwin violated t he
CSOT require ments by (a) possessing a “tool, implement, or object” that could cause i n j u ry o r threa ten to cause injury to G oodwin or others and (b) failing to abide by the rules of the residential fac ility in which he wa s place d. There fore , the State was require d to prove bey ond a rea sonable doubt that Goodwin intentionally

and knowing ly

possessed ra zorblades and that his possession of razorblade s violated the CSOT require ments, either beca use they wer e objects that threa ten to cause injury or they wer e prohibited items under t h e rul es of his residential fac ility

. See Tex. Hea lth & Safety Code Ann. 3 § 841.085 (making violation of terms of civil confine ment a third-deg ree felony ). Given that the trial

The statute does not state what the applicable mens rea is for violation of the terms of civil 3 commitment. See Tex. Hea lth & Safety Code Ann. § 841.085 (West 2 0 1 0 ). Ho we v er , the State amende d the indictment to state that Goodwin “intentionally or knowing ly possessed razorblade s,” making intent or knowledg e the ap p l i cable mens rea in this case . See Tex. Penal Code Ann. § 6.03(a) –(b) ( West 2011). 6court convicted Goodwi n o f v i o l ating the terms of his civil commitment “as alleg ed in the

indictment,” we will aff

irm Goodwin’s conviction if the evidenc e i s s u ff i ci ent to prove that he violated the CSOT r equire ments on either theory

. See Herrin v. State , 125 S.W .3d 436, 441 (Tex. Crim. App. 2002) (“W h en a gener al verdict is returne d and the evidenc e is sufficie nt to support a finding of g uilt under any of the para g raph alleg ations submitt ed, the verdic t will b e u p h el d

. ”) (interna l citations omitted). We first deter mine whether th e evidenc e is sufficie nt to support Goodwin’s conviction based on his intentional possession of objects that threa tened to cause injury

.

W hat are objects that threaten to cause injury?

The CSOT require ments prohibited Goodwin from possessing any “tool, implement

or object to cause or threa ten to cause injury ” to himself or others. Neither the CSOT require ments

nor the Texas Hea lth and Safety Code define s what qualifies as an object that threat en s t o ca u s e injury

. There fore , we look to the traditional rules of construction to deter mine what items Goodwin

was prohibited from possessing, considering the lang uag e of the CSOT require ments as a whole and

a s s u me a r e a s o n a

b le me a n in g a n d e f f e c t. S e e , e
. g
. , Lo n e S

ta r Ce m e n t Co r

p
. v
. F a ir , 4 6 7 S. W. 2 d 4 0 2 , 404-05 (Tex

. 1971) (“The same rules of interpre tation apply in const ru i n g t h e m eaning of a court order or judg ment as in asce rtaining the meaning of other written instruments.”). Theore tically , any o b

j ec t ca n be used to cause injury to oneself or others. See
Guzman v. State , 188 S.W .3d 185, 198 (Tex. Crim. App. 2006) (“O ur case s make it clea r t h at ‘any thing’ [capable of causing death] means anything .”). Given that civil committees are permitted
to have some possessions, this CSOT require ment cannot rea sonably mean that civil committees violate t he terms of t heir commit ment mere ly by possessing any object that t h eore tically could be

7used to injure someone. Howeve r, the phrase “tool , i m p l ement, or object” encompa sses a broad

rang e of items, and thus the CSOT require ment should not be interpre ted too narr owly so as to undermine its flexibl e lang uag e. See, e.g., Ramos v. State , 303 S.W .3d 302, 307–08 (Tex. Crim. App. 2009) (conc luding that “instrument” as used in section 32.21(e) (3) of Texas Penal C o d e is broad te rm that enc ompassed Social Secur ity car d). The broad lang uag e of the CSOT require ment is analog ous to the statutory definition of “dea dly wea

pon.” See Tex. Penal Code Ann. § 1.07(a) (17)( B) (West 2011) (def ining deadly

wea pon as “any

thing that in the manner of its use or intended use is capa ble of causing death or serious bodily injury .”). As our case law makes clea r, it is the manner in which a defe ndant uses an object that makes it a deadly wea pon, not the phy sical proper ties of the object itself. See Guzman , 188 S.W .3d at 198 n.28 (noting car , belts, cha i n s , locks, and hot water can be deadly wea pons) (interna l citations omitted). Simi larly , the CSOT require ments should be understood as prohibiting the pos session of obj ects that, in t h e manner of their use or i ntended use, threa ten t o cause injury

. T h er ef o re , we interpre t the CSOT require ment to mean that civil committees are prohibited from possessing obje cts for use as we apons. 4
Are the razorblades objec ts that t hreaten to cause injury?

Given our conclusion that the CSOT require ments prohibit civil committees from possessing objects for use as wea pons, we now deter

mine whether the evidenc e is sufficien t to

We b s te r ’s define s “we apon” as “an instrument of offe nsive or defe nsive co mb a t; s o me th in g 4 to f ig h t w it h ; s o me th in g u s e d in d e s tr o y in g , d e f e a ti n g , o r p h y s ic a ll y in ju r in g a n e n e my . ” S

e e We b s te r ’ s Third New

I nterna tional Dictionary

818 (Philli p Gove Ed. 2002)

.

8establ i s h t h at Go odwin possessed razorblade s for use as wea pons. At trial, the State introduced testimony from the g uards at the Travis County fac ility , all of whom stated that the razorblade s they discovere d wer e among Goodwin’s possessions: one was wit h i n his leg al paper s, another was in an empty soup packet i n s i d e h i s locker , and the third was undernea th his locker

. The gua rds also testified that Goodwin initially claimed that, as a civil committee, he was allowed to possess razorblade s, but later claimed that the razorblade s d i d not belong to him. Additionally , the State introduced testimony from Stoddard, who stated that at the time Goodwin enter ed the Travis County fa cility , he was told that he could not possess “any tool, implement, or obj ect to cause or t hreat en
to cause injury to [hi mself] or others” and that he was require d to follow the “rule s, reg ulations, and policies” of his residential fac ility

. Finally , the State introduced a copy o f t h e T ra v i s County fac ility ’s rules and g uidelines, which stated that all residents wer e prohibited from possessing razorblade s. Goodwin, t es t i fy i ng in his own defense, claimed t hat he did not lock hi s locker , and thus, someone else ma

y have pla ced the razorblade s in his possessions without his knowledge

. Ba sed on the evidenc e prese nted, the trial court could rea sonably have conclude d that Goodwin intentionally possessed the razorblade s, g iven that they wer e among his posse ssions a nd he initially

did not deny

that they wer e his. Fur

thermore , the court could rea sonably have inferr ed that Goodwin possessed the razorblade s for use as a wea pon, rathe r than for a benig n purpose, g iven that Goodwin actively conce aled them in se vera l loc ations. See G uevara v
. State , 152 S.W .3d 45,
50 (Tex. Crim. App. 2 0 0 4 ) (“ At tempts to conce al incriminating evidenc e . . . are probative of
wrong ful conduct and are also circ umstances of g uilt.”); see also Ex parte Hopson , 688 S.W .2d 545,
547–48 (Tex. Crim. App. 1985) (noting that prisoner used razorblade s as deadly wea pon in esca

pe

9attempt). Finally , the court could rea sonably have deter mined that the razorblade s were “o b jects that threa tened to cause injury .” See Hopson , 688 S.W .2d at 548. There fore , viewing the evidenc e in the light most favor able to the verdic t, we conclude t h at t h e trial court could rea sonably have deter mined that Goodwin intentionally possessed razorblade s, and that possession of razorblade s violated the CSOT require ments beca use they wer e objects that threa ten to cause injury

. Given that a

v io la ti o n o f th e CS O T r e q

u ir e me n ts is a p e r s e v io la

ti o n o f th e te r

ms o f G o o d

w in ’ s c iv il c o mm it

me n t,

we conclude that the evidenc e is sufficie nt to support Goodwin’s conviction. There fore , we do not need to deter

mine whether the evidenc e supports Goodw i n ’s conviction based on any other

a ll e g a ti o n . S e e H e r r in , 1 2 5 S. W. 3 d a

t 4 4 1 ( n o ti n g th a

t v e r d ic t u p h e ld if e v id e n c e s u f

f ic ie n t to s u

p p o r t finding of g uilt on any theory in indictment); see also Tex. R. App. P. 47.1 (r eq u i ri n g appellate courts to hand down opinions t hat ar e as br ief a s possible while addressing those issues nece ssary to final dispositi on of appe al). Goodw in’s first point of err or is overr uled. 5

Motion to supp ress

I n his second point of err or, Goodwin claims that the trial court err ed in deny ing his motion to suppress the evidenc e seized from his locker as “fr uit” o f h i s u n l aw ful detention. See 6

Goodwin also appea

rs to asser

t that, as a matter of law, he cannot b e culpable for 5 v i olating the Travis County fac ility ’s rules beca use his detention in that fac ility was unlawful. Howeve r, Goodwin does not cite to any statute, case law, or leg al authority to support this position. A c c o r d in g ly , w e c o n s id e r th is is s u e to b e w a iv e d a s in a d e q u a te ly b r ie f e d

. S e e T e x. R. A

p p . P. 3 8

. 1 ( i)

. Goodwin also claims that the evidenc e should be suppressed as the product of a war rantless 6 sear ch. See Neil v. State , 256 S.W .3d 264, 282 (Tex. Crim. App. 2008) (explaining State’s burden of showing rea sonablene ss of war rantless sear ch). Howeve r, Goodwin did not raise this arg ument in t h e trial court, and thus this complaint was not proper ly prese rved for revie w, and is there fore waived. See Tex. R. App. P . 31.1; Hull v. State , 67 S.W .3d 215, 217 (Tex. Crim. App. 2002). 10T ex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 32.83(a) (re quiring exclusion of evidenc e that was u n l aw fu l l y

obtained). We revie w a trial court’s ruling on a motion to suppress for an abuse of discretion, using a bifurca

ted standard. See V

altierra v. State , 310 S.W .3d 442, 447 (Tex. Crim. App. 2010);
Guzman v. State , 955 S.W .2d 85, 88–89 (Tex. Crim. App. 1997). We g ive almos t total defe renc e
to a trial court’s deter

mination of historical fac ts, but revie w the applica t i o n o f t he law to the fac ts de novo. Maxwell v. State , 73 S.W .3d 278, 281 (Tex. Crim. App. 2002). The ruling will be upheld if it is supported by the evidenc e and is corr ect under any leg al theory

. See State v. Iduarte , 268 S.W .3d 544, 548 (Tex. Crim. App. 2008).

Evidence t h at is seized as a result of an unlawful detention i s g ener ally considere d
“fr uit of the poisonous tree ,” an d t h u s is inadmissable as an indirect product of the unlawful detention. See Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 38.23(a) (re quiring exclusion of evidenc e that was unlawfully obtained); see also Iduarte , 268 S

. W .3d at 550–51 (desc ribing “fr uit of the poisonous
tree ” doctrine) (citing W

ong Sun v. United States , 371 U.S. 471, 488 (1963))

. How ev er , if the

connec tion betwee n the unlawful detention and the sei z u re o f t h e evidenc e “has become so

a tt e n u a te d a s to d is s ip a

te th e ta in t” o f th e u n la w f u l g o v e r n me n t a c t, th e e v id e n c e is d e e me d a d mi s s ib le

. W ong Sun , 3 7 1 U.S. at 491–92 (interna l quotations omitted); see also Iduarte , 268 S.W .3d at 550–51. Thus, the question is not whether the evidenc e would not have been discovere d “but for” the unl awf

ul g overnme nt act, but rathe r, whe ther the seizure of the evidence has been sufficiently
purg ed of the taint of the unlawful act. Iduarte , 268 S.W .3d at 550–51 (quoting W ong Sun , 371 U.S. at 491–92).
I n this case , the trial court g rante d Goodwin ’ s h a b e a s p e ti tion, finding that the transfe r of Goodwin from the Har ris County fac ility to the Travis County fac ility violated due proce ss, and

11therefo re h i s detention i n the Travis County fac ility was unlawful. The S tate failed to appea l this

ruling , and thus it is proce durally barr ed from arg uing that the t rial court err ed in its holding. See
Tex. R. App. P

. 26.2(b) (requiring State to file notice of appea l within 20 day s of final order ); see also R o d

a r t e v. State , 860 S.W .2d 108, 110 (Tex. Crim. App. 1993) (holding that court lacks jurisdiction to enter

tain untimely appea l). Ther e f o r e , w e a n a ly ze G o o d w in’ s suppression of evidenc e claim under

the supposition that Goodwin was unlawfully detained in the T ravis County fac ility

. T h e Texas Court of Criminal Appea ls has held that a “subseque nt independ en t criminal act” that occur s afte r an unlawful g overnme nt action remove s the taint of the g overnme nt act, making evidenc e of the subseq u en t cr iminal act admissible. Iduarte , 268 S.W .3d at 551. I n State v. Iduarte , the defe ndant was convicted of ag g rava ted assault on a peac e office r beca use he poin t ed a gu n at an office r afte r the office r unlawfully enter ed his home. See id. at 547–48. The defe ndant asserted t hat the off icer ’s testimony about t he assault should be ex cluded as fruit of the unlawful entry

. Id. The court of criminal appea ls disag ree d, holding that “evide nce of the [assault] did not exis t befor e the [unl awf ul entry ] beca

use the [assault] had not y et occur red,” and thus the eviden ce wa s not causa lly connec ted to the unlawful entry

. Id. at 551. There fore , the court 7
conclude d that the subsequent independe nt criminal act was not tainted by the initial unlawful entry , and thus evidenc e of the assault was a dmissibl e. Id.

The court noted t h at t h e defe ndant’s arg ument, taken to the extreme, would mean that 7 an individual who was unlawfully detained could kill the d et ai n i n g o fficer and then have all evidenc e of the murder suppressed as fruit of the initial unlawf u l d et en t ion. See State v. Iduarte , 268 S.W .3d 544, 551 n.14 (Tex. Crim. App. 2008) (quoting Martinez v. State , 91 S.W .3d 331, 340 (Tex. Crim. App. 2002)). 12I n this case , the discovery of the razorblade s among st Goodwin’s poss es s i o n s

o c c u r r e d s e v e r a l mo n th s a f

te r h is u n la w f u l tr a n s f e r to th e T r a

v is Co u n ty f a c il it y . G o o d w in c o n c e a le d the razorblade s in his persona l eff ects in violation of the CSOT require ments, both beca use they we re potential wea

pons and beca

use they wer e prohibited by the Travis County fac ility

. Thus, Goodwin’s possession of the razorblade s constitut ed a violation of the terms of his civil commitment, an independe nt criminal offe nse, which occur red afte r his unlawful transfe r. See Tex. Hea lth & Safety Code Ann. §§ 841.082(a) (4), 841.085. There fore , we conclude that the trial court did not abuse its d i s cr etion in admitting the razorblade s as evidenc e of a “subseque nt independe nt criminal ac t ” whi ch wa s n o t tainted by Goodwin’s unlawful detention. See Iduarte , 268 S.W .3d at 550–51. Goodwin’s sec ond point of err or is overr uled.

CONCLUSION We affir m the judgme nt of the trial cour t.

__________________________________________ Diane M. H enson, Jus tice
Be fore J ustices Pury ear , Henson a nd Goodwin
Affir med Filed: Jul y

31, 2012 Publis h

13