### IN THE COURT OF APP EALS OF TENNESS EE AT KNOXVI LLE Marc h 24 , 200 4 S es sio n

WANDA MOODY v . TIMO THY HUT CHI SON, SHER IFF OF KN OX COU NTY
Appeal f romthe Chancer y Court for K nox Coun ty No. 153315-2 Dar yl R. F ansler, Chancellor

F ILED MAY 25, 2004

No. E2003-01325-COA- R3-CV

Kn o x C o u n t yCommi ssioner Wanda Moody (“Plaintiff” ) made a Public Records A ct re quest for

nu me ro us do c ume nts in the po sse ssi on of Ti mothy Hu tc his on , th e Sheriff of Knox Coun ty (“ Defen dant” ). De fe nd a nt r e sp on de d a ndpr ov ide d s ome , b ut n ot a ll o f the re qu e ste d d oc ume nts

. Pla int if f e ve ntu a lly

so ug ht t o h a ve De fe nd a nt h e ld in c ri min a l c on te mpt c la imi ng a t le a st f

if ty of his response s to the various docume nt reque sts were fals e. Af t er a trial on the criminal contempt char g es, the Trial Court concluded D efe ndant made “ at least six” fal s e re p re sentations which amounted to criminal contempt, and i mposed the m axim um fine of $50 for each of fense , for a

total of $300. Def

endant appea ls c laiming, among other things, that the proof failed to e stablish that he was g ui l t y b ey o n d a re asonable doubt of criminal conte mpt. W e af firm the judg ment of the Trial Cou rt

.

Te nn. R . A pp. P . 3 App e al a s o f Rig ht ; J udgm e nt of t he Chancery Court

Aff irm ed; Case R em anded

D. M I CH A EL S WI NEY , J ., delivere d the opinion of the court, in which H E R SC H EL P. F RAN KS , P.J ., E.S., and B EN H. C A N T RE LL , S P

. J ., joined.

Mary Ann S t ackhouse , Dea n B. F arme r, and K eith L . Edmiston, Knox ville, Tennesse e, for the A p p e l l a n tT i m o t h y H u t c h i s o n , S h e r i f f o f K n o x C o u n t y.

H e r b e r tS

. M o n c i e r , K n o x v i l l e , T e n n e s s e e , f o r t h e A p p e l l e e W a n d a

M o o d y.-2- OP IN ION

Bac kgr ound

Th e e ve nts g ivi ng ri se to this lit ig a tio n b e g a n w he n Pl a int if f s ou g ht n ume ro us pu bli c
rec ords from De fendant Tim Hutchison, the S heriff of Knox County . By letter dated Dec ember

21, 20 01 , Pl a int if

f, by a nd thr ou g h h e r atto rn e y , s e nt D e fe nd a nt a le tte r s e e kin g pr od uc tio n o f c e rt a in documents pursua nt to the Tennesse e Public Records Act, Te nn. Code Ann. § 10-7- 503. Plaintiff

so ug ht d isc los ur e of

, a mon g oth e r thin g s:

lease s, rental or

use ag ree ments or any

other written documents for the use of a

barn loc ated at 3633 Topside R oad ... and for the use of propert y l ocate d off Ma scot Road and/or Mine Roa d along the Holston River where y our helicopte rs a re curr ently located and a projec t is curre ntly

underw ay

....
Plaintiff attache d a ride r to the re quest desig nating 26 specific g roups or c lasses of do c ume nts wh ic h Pla int if f a lso so ug ht t o in sp e c t a nd /or c op y . In th e ri de r, Pla int if f s ou g ht i nv oic e s,
c a nc e lle d ch e c ks , re c e ipt s, e tc ., re g ard ing the a c qu isi tio n a ndup ke e p o f h or se s b y the Kn ox Cou nty She ri ff ’s De pa

rt me nt (“ KC SD” ). Pla int if f a lso so ug ht i nv oic e s, c a nc e lle d c he c ks , r e c e ipt s, bid p r o p o s a l s , r e c o r d s o f i n m a t e l ab o r o r c o n tr a c t l ab o r , e t c

. , p e r t a i n i n g t o t h e c o n s tru c t i o n of ho rs e stables off Ma loney ville Road as well as t he conversion of a temporary jail and training fac ilityon Maloney ville Road to a dormitory . Plaintiff also sought origina l bank ac count statements, cancelled chec ks, deposit tickets, etc., for all bank ac counts of any

type maintained by KCSD. W hile the above is by no means e x haustive of the inf ormation reque sted by Plaintiff, suffice it to say that a sig nificant number of doc uments were reque sted to be produc ed for inspection.

W h en response s to the Publi c Rec ords Act r equest we re not forthcoming, Plaintiff f i l e d w i t h t h e T r i a l C o u r t o n Ja n u ar y 7 , 2 0 0 2 , a P e t i t i o n f o r A c c e s s t o P u b l i c R e c o r d s . I n th is petition, Plaintiff soug ht the documents ref ere nced in the Dec ember 2001 letter and ac companying rider. T he next day , in acc ordanc e with Tenn. Code A nn. § 10-7-505, the T rial Court en t ere d an Or de r r e qu ir ing De fe nd a nt t o a pp e ar i n c ou rt to sh ow c a us e , if he ha d a ny , wh y the pe tit ionsh ou ld not be g rante d. The Trial Court set the show cause hea ring for January

14, 2002.

O n J a n u ar y

1 1 , 2 0 0 2 , D e f

e n d a n t f i l e d a w r i t t e n r e s p o n s e t o P l a i n t i f f ’ s p e t i t i o n

. In
sever al of the s pecif

ic re sponses, Def

endant c laimed KCSD did not maintain the requeste d rec ords

a n d r e f e rr e d P l a i n t i f

f t o t h e K n o x C o u n t y

P u r c h a s i n g o r

K n o x C o u n t y

F i n a n c e D e p ar t m e n t s

. In
sever al other r esponses, De fendant claimed ther e simpl y we re n o documents re sponsive to a particula r re quest. For

example, Defe ndant indicated the re w ere no documents pe rt aining to the construction of hor se st ab l es on Maloney ville Road. Whi le Def endant c laimed there was no
conver sion of a temporar

y training fac ility into a dormit ory , Def endant did admit that a tempor ary jail had bee n remode led into a dormitory for trainees. De fendant denied conduc ting any projec t on Mascot Road and/or Mine Road. The doc uments produce d by Def endant in the r esponse c omprised-3-

a total of twenty -two (22) pag es. The r esponse wa s not signed by Def endant but instead w as sig ned by attorney Carleton B ry ant

as Administrative Assistant to the Sheriff, and by Mary Ann Stackhouse, Deputy L aw Dir ector , who sig ned the plea ding “ As to Form” only

. Plaintiff f iled a re ply

claiming De fe nd a nt’ s r e sp on se wa s a lto g e the r i na de qu a te be c aus e De fe nd a nt wa s re qu ir e d to pr od uc e pu bli c
rec ords in his possession reg ardle ss of whethe r additional copies we re ma intained in other Knox Countydepartments. Pl aintiff also moved to strike the respon s e cl ai m i n g the sig nature s did not comply with Tenn. R. Civ. P . 11.02. Plaint i ff ’s m o t i o n to strike was de nied af ter the Trial Court permitted De fendant to amend his response at w hich time D eputy L aw Direc tor Stackhouse did not limit the scope of her

signature.

On J anuary

18, 2002, Def

endant f iled a Second A mended Response to Open Rec ords Act Reque st ( “S econd A mended Response ”). D efe ndant ac tually signe d the Second Ame nded Response and it is this document which forms the ba sis for seve ral issues on appe al. The Sec ond Amended Response stated many of the documents Plaintiff r equeste d wer e made available to her on J anuary 14 and 17 of 2002. D efe ndan t aga in denied a hor se stable wa s being constructe d off M al o n ey v i l l e R o ad o r t h ata t em p o ra rytra i n i n g fa ci l i t y h ad b ee n co n v er t ed t o a d o rm i t o ry , al t h o u gh “[t] here was a

remode ling of the t empora ry jail to a dormit ory for trainees.” Def endant de nied the exis tence of any projec t off Masc ot Road or Mine Road in Knox C ounty and, conse quently , stated there wer e no docume nts responsive to the re quests seeking information on such a projec t.

Plaintiff’ s Request No. 13 conta ined in the rider and De fendant’s response in the Se c on d A me nd e d Re sp on se are a s f oll ow s:

13. All orig inal bank ac count statements, cancelled chec ks, deposit ticke ts, and chec kbook stubs for banking acc ounts or (sic) any type maintained by

the Knox C ounty

Sheriff’ s Depa

rtment since January

1, 1996 ....

RES PON S E: Pe tit ion e r’ s a tto rn e y wa s p ro vid e d a ll o f this information within the last eig hteen months

. Mr. Moncier [attorney fo r P la int if

f/Pe tit ion e r] s a t in the Sheri ff’s of fi c e fo r t wo da y s w ith [Carl e ton ] B ry a nt t o ins pe c t the se re c or ds

. Mr

. Mo nc ie r b ro ug ht h is copier /scanne r an d copied the doc uments described. I f petitioner wants to update the information from the last date of information

rec eived, de fendant will make arr ang ements for petitioner to do so. To the ex t en t maintained by the Sheriff ’s Depa

rtment, to be made available J anuary

17, 2002.

Af te r s e tti ng fo rth s e pa

rate re sp on se s to the tw e nty -s ix dif fe re nt d oc ume nt r e qu e sts contained in the rider, De fendant ended his Second A mended Response with the following para g raph:-4- AS T O A LL

REQ UE STS:
Every eff ort has been made to supply petitioner throug h h er
co u n s el wi t h t h e i n fo rm at i o n re q u es t ed

. An ex t en s i v e se ar ch t h ro u gh the files of the Sheriff’ s De p ar t m ent has been conduc ted, and the documents found to be r esponsive to petitio n er ’s re quest have been provided. The rema ining invoice s from the S h er i ff’ s Offic e have been made available to pe titioner. Petitioner has been giv en the opportunity

to searc h the files. I f any further do cu ments are found that respond to any

of these Re quests, petitioner will be notified and same will be made available promptly

.
On J anuar

y 24, 2002, Plaintiff filed a “ Report on Def endant’ s Record In s p ec t i o n” de sc ri bin g De fe nd a nt’ s r e c or d p ro du c tio n w hic h h a d ta ke n p la c e the pr e vio us we e k. Ac c or din g to Plaintiff, she, her attorney , and her attorney ’s staff wer e provide d a spac e appr ox imately 5 fee t by 5 fee t in which to inspect 15 banke r’s boxes filled with various rec ords. Prior to the do cument inspection, Plaintiff and her attorney wer e informed that they would be video a nd audio-tape d during the entire proce ss. I n this report , P l ai ntiff claimed ma ny rec ords still had not been produc ed and those that wer e produce d wer e “in no pa rticular or der and wer e not org anized by the topics used by Plaintiff to request re cords.” Acc ording to Plainti ff, she and her attorney wer e unable to determine which re q u e s t ma ny

of the doc uments pertaine d to and, making matters wor se, De fendant intermix ed

nu me ro us do c ume nts wh ic h Pla int if f ne ve r re qu e ste d. Pla int if f c la ime d “ [De fe nd a nt] d e lib e rate ly included these voluminous i rre levant re cords to make Plaintiff’s inspection as diffic ult as possible; to cre ate the pe rce ption to the public that Pl aintiff wa s making [an] unre as o n ab le and e x pensive req u e s t; a n d to d e te r o th e r s f r o m r e v ie w in g r e le v a n t r e c o r d s

. T h is p r a c ti c e is o f te n called a ‘discovery

dump’ in civil lit igation.”

A hearing was held on J anuary 28, 2002, and the Trial Court specifica lly noted that Def endant wa s not objecting to providing the reque sted documents. In response to Plainti ff’ s
re pe a te d p ro te statio ns that a ll d oc ume nts ha d n ot b e e n p ro vid e d, the Tria l Co urt e mph a size d that it was g ranting the P ublic Records Act reque st and “[ i] f t hey have not provided what y ou asked f or, the n y ou fi le y ou r a

pp ropri ate pe tit ionfo r c on te mpt .” Th e Tria l Co urt st ro ng ly su g g e ste d to Def endant’ s attorney

that she “e x plain to the sheriff that they either be produce d or there will be a petition for contempt forthcoming.”

On Fe bruary

8, 2002, the T ri al C o u rt enter ed a Me morandum Opinion and Or der whi c h g r a n te d Pl a in ti f

f ’ s Pu b li c Re c o r d s A c t r e q u e s t. I n th is o r d e r , th e T r ia l C o u r t d is c u s s e d the pe rt ine nt his tory of the lit ig a tio n, the va ri ou s le tte rs a ndc ommun ic a tio ns be tw e e n th e pa rt ie s, a s w e ll

a s th e re le va nt p ro vis ion s o f the Pub lic Re c or ds Ac t. The Tri al Cou rt a lso no te d th a t a

se pa rate lawsuit was pending in the Knox C ounty C h an ce ry Court in which Plaintiff reque sted these ve ry
s a m e d o c u m e n t s f

r o mD e f e n d a n t , b u t t h e C h a n c e l l o r i n t h a t c a s e h a d s t a ye d a l l d i s c o v e r y. Notwithstanding the stay

in the other law suit, Defendant had ac knowledg ed in the pre sent ca se that the do c ume nts so ug ht b y

Pla int if f w e re pu bli c re c or ds pu rs ua nt to law a ndPla int if f w a s e nti tle d toIn l i ght o f D efend ant ’ s agreem ent t hat t he reco rds were s ub ject t o t he P ub l i c R eco rds A ct and t here was no 1

o b je c tio n to the ir p ro d u c tio n , t h e T ria l C o u rt h e ld in a su b se q u e n t o rd e r th a t, a t l e a st a s o f Ja n u a ry 1 4 , 2 0 0 2 , an y sta ys i n t he ot her l aws ui t coul d not be us ed as a defens e t o pr od uct i on of t he do cumen t s i n t he pres ent ca s e. T hi s par t i cul ar
c o n c lus io n b y the T ria l C o u rt is no t at issu e in the p re se n t ap p e a l.

V ol u me I of t h e T e c h n i c a l Re c or d e n ds w i t h pa g e 11 9 a n d t h e T r i a l Cou r t ’ s di s mi s s a l of t h i s l aws ui t af t er 2
order i ng product i on of

t he r eques t ed do cumen t s

. T he “ acr i mo ni ous ” beh avi or qui t e obvi ous l y cont i nu ed, as ev i dence d by t he f act t hat t he T ech ni cal Record on appeal comp r i s es ni ne ( 9) v ol umes t otali ng 1, 23 6 pages , not coun t i ng t wo b a n k e r’s b o x e s fil le d w ith tra n sc rib e d tes tim o n y a n d e x h ib its.

T e n n . C o d e A n n . § 2 1 -1 -1 0 8 w a s re p e a le d e ff e c tive J u ly 1 , 2 0 0 2

. 3

-5- a c c e ss to the se re c or ds

. Th e Tria l Cou rt a lso ob se rv e d that the lit ig a tio n pr oc e ss “ ha s be e n qui te 1

acrimonious for counsel, if not the parties themselves ... [and] counsels’ deportment has fallen short of that e xpe c te d o f m e mbe rs of the ba r p ra c tic ing be fo re thi s c ou rt .” Ac c or din g to the Tria l Co urt:

Common civil ity

on the part of all counsel would, a nd should, have pr e ve nte d the ne c e ssi ty fo r fi lin g thi s a c tio n. F or the re a so ns se t f

orth above, and for this re ason, t he aw ard of attorney ’s fe es will not be considere d in this action.

* * * *

Cou n s e l f o r p e ti ti o n e r h a s s u g g e s te d th a t d e f e n d a n t h a s not p r o v i d e d a c c e s s t o a l l r e c o r d s r e q u e s t e d

. A s n o t e d p r e v i o u s l y, defe ndant was or dere d to produce the re quested re c o r d s f o r inspection pursuant to the Public Records A ct. C o u n s el for both parties are reminded of

the proc edure s for e nfor ce ment of court orders and the

reme dies attenda nt thereto.

Pet i t i o n er’s reque st for ac cess to public re cords of the defe ndant having been g rante d, this case is conc luded. 2

On Fe bruary

19, 2002, Plaintiff filed a pe tition s eeking entry of an or der r eq uiring D e f e n d a n t to s h o w c au s e w h y h e w a s n o t in c o n te mp t o f c o u r t f o r f a il in g to p r ovide all of the reque sted documents. In this pe tition, P laintiff also cla imed many of De fendant’s response s to the various docume nt reque sts were false. Plainti ff de tailed the spec ific re sponses which she be lieved

wer e fa lse and whic h constituted contemptuous conduct.

On Fe bruary

27, 2002, Plaintiff filed a motion pursuant to Tenn. Code A nn. § 21-1- 108 ( 2 ) ( B ) ( ii ) f

o r a h e ar in g “ a n d/o r T

. R. Crim

. P. Ru le 4 2 ( b ) Sh o w Cau s e O r d e r ”

. I n th is motion 3 Pla int if f s ta te d, a mon g oth e r thin g s, that:

3. Up on fi lin g of the Pe tit ion T. C.A . § 21 -1 -1 08 (B )( ii) p rovides that the Court, if suff icient cause is shown, shall order the-6- issuance of

an attac hment of the body of the c o n t em n o r, fix ing the time and place of the appearance to answe r, and also the amount and char acte r of the bail bond to be taken.

4

. T.R.C r im

. P. 4 2 ( b ) p r o v id e s f o r th e Co u r t t o is s u e an order to a def endant to show c ause or an order of a rre st on a notice of contempt.

* * * *

Pla int if f m ov e s th a t th e Cou rt

e nte r a S ho w Caus e Or de r t o Def endant for Ma

rch 15, 2002 at 9:00 a.m. for De fendant to appear and show c ause w hy

he is not in contempt of court.
The pa rties continued to file nume rous motions and variou s other plea dings. The stay in the other Chanc ery

Court lawsuit eventually was lifted a n d d i s co very in that case continued as well. W hile discovery in the other law suit was proce eding , numerous docume nts were produce d by De fe nd a nt w hic h Pl a int if

f c la ims s h o u ld h a ve be e n p ro du c e d mo nth s e arl ie r i n r e sp on se to the Pub lic Re c or ds Ac t r e qu e st i n th e pr e se nt c a se . Pl a int if f a lso c la ime d de po sit ion te sti mon y in the oth e r c a se further proved that Defe ndant made f alse re sponses to Plainti ff’ s document re qu es t s here in. Acc ording ly , Plaintiff sought t o have this new ly discovere d evidenc e admitted in the conte mpt proce eding

.
The he aring on the criminal contempt char g es beg an in October of 2002. We will not dis c us s a ll o f the te sti mon y of the wi tn e sse s w hic h to ok pla c e ov e r s e ve ra l day s, bu t w e wi ll summarize the t es t i m o n y of a f ew ke y witnesses. The f

irst witness at trial was Scott Walker (“ Wal ke r” ), wh o te sti fi e d to a la nd ing fee agreemen t he e nte re d in to w ith KC SD. Wal ke r a lso te sti fi e d to a

“ sid e a g re e me nt” wi th K CSD wh e re in Wa lke r a g re e d to pr ov ide c on str uc tio n s e rv ic e s. W a l k e r i d e n t i f

i e d a m e m o r a n d u m f

r o m t h e S h e r i f

f ’ s D e p ar t m e n t i n t e n d e d “ t o ho ld m e to m y ag ree ment to provide the improveme nts. And it a lso spe lls out the improveme nts that the sheriff ’s department was supposed to provide.” Walker testified he was told that the improvements c ould not be par t of the landing fee ag ree ment “as it would become a lease . And if it had to be a lease , it had to go be fore county

commission, and they didn’t want to do that.” Walker also incurre d attorney fee s in h a vin g the le a se c ha ng e d to the la nd ing fe e a g re e me nt s o th e c ou nty c omm iss ion didno t be c ome inv olv e d. Wal ke r’ s a tto rn e y se nt h is b ill to the She ri ff ’s De pa rt me nt a ft e r K CSD a g re e d to pa y tho se fee s. Walker testified Captain Spang ler wa s overs ee i n g all improvements in the projec t off Mine Road andM a s c o t R o a d

. O r ig in a ll y , th e mo n th ly r e n t f o r th e lan d in g f

e e w a s to b e inthe neig hborhood of $600 to $700. Howe ver, Sheriff Hutchison wanted Walker to build an air cra ft ha ng ar andof

fi c e s fo r the a viatio n un it, bu t the se imp ro ve me nts c ou ld no t be pa rt of the a g re e me nt. Ac c or din g to Wa lke r, De fe nd a nt H utc his on a sk e d W alk er if h e wo uldbu ildthe se a dd iti on s in exchang e for

highe r monthly

rent. Walker a g ree d. The re nt eventually ag ree d to by Def endant a nd Walker wa s $2,700 per month. Walker identified ma ny documents ass o ci at ed with the imp ro ve me nts . A t th e tim e the a lle g e dly c o n t e mptuo us state me nts we re ma de by De fe nd a nt, the va st-7-

majority of the doc uments pertaining to the projec ts off Mine Road or Ma s co t Road had not bee n produce d.

The next witness was Trac y Haynes (“H ay nes”) , manag er of the new se rv ice d ep ar t m en tfo r K n o x v i l l e Ut i l i t y Bo ar d (“ KU B” ). Ha y n es i s t h e c u s t o d i an o f r ec o rd s an d t h ro u gh his testimony , sever al documents we re a dmitted which showed work perf ormed by KUB off Mine Road and/or Mascot Road for the Sheriff’ s Depa rtment. One of

these doc uments was sent to KCSD. After Haynes’ testimony , the Court inquired of de fense counsel if it wa s still her c lient’s position t hat there was no proje ct off Mine Road. Def endant’ s position remained the same

.
Carol Holbert (“Holbe rt”) is the custodian of rec ords in the law off ice of Plaintiff’s attorney . Holbert maintained, org anized, etc., the rec ords produce d by Def endant. As Holbert wa s
or g a nizi ng the re c or ds pr od uc e d o n Jan ua ry 17 , 2 00 2, sh e dis c ov e re d many mi ssing do c ume nts

. Some but not all of those documents were found. Holbert also discover ed the r esponses to the document request di d not contain any information from thre e bank a ccounts. Holbe rt learned of the exis tence of these thr ee a ccounts by asce rtaining wher e some of the chec ks which had be en produc ed

wer e deposited. H olber

t testified that additional banking rec ords wer e not provided until depositions

wer e take n in April of 2002. With reg ard to a couple of

the che cking acc ounts th at were not produce d when the Sec ond Amended Re sponse was f iled, Holbert testified that these account we re op e ne d inthe na me s o f K CSD e mpl oy e e s u sin g the ir pe rs on a l so c ia l se c urity

nu mbe rs

. Anthony Parker (“Par ker” ) t estified that he worked f or KCSD from Aug ust of 1994 until S eptember

of 2002. P ar k er ’s t es timonycontinued in more de tail. Parker w orked on the

c on str uc tio n c re w during 20 01 a nd20 02 . Pa rk e r b e g a n c on str

uc tin g ho rs e sta

ble s o n M a lon e y vil le Roa d f or KC SD in 2 00 1. Park e r w a s in str uc te d b y Chi e f M e rritt

to “ bu ilda

ho rs e sta ble a ndto b uil d it post hastil y .” Parke r and other office rs obtained the building materia ls. Parker w ould obtain from the personnel department a purchase order or a pay able warrant, depending on how much money was neede d. “And we would g o to those place s and g ive them the number s, sign the ticke t, and g et what

w e n e e d

. ... M o s t o f

th e ti me w e w o u ld n o t te ll [p e o p le in th e s h e r if f ’ s d e p ar tm e n t d o w n to w n ] ... what we wer e building beca use we wer e told not to.” Par ker te stified he knew KCSD did not have permission to build the horse stables. Parke r testified he had discussions with his superiors that the ho rs e sta ble s w e re no t a

pp ro ve d b y

the c ou nty c omm iss ion . Re c or ds fo r the pu rc ha se s w e re ke pt i n a four inch folder

which wa s “full of

... co p i es o f all the invoices” and the origina ls were sent downtown. A couple of months after the horse sta

bles wer e complete d, Parker went bac k and

re mod e le d th e sta

ble s to ho ld thr e e mor e ho rs e s. I nmate s a lso we re us e d to he lp c on str uc t th e ho rs e stables. Records of inmate labor w ere maintained at the old pe nal fa rm. I nmates g ener ally

worke d with the construction cre w on other projec ts a s well. Parker also testified that an airport or he lipad was be ing built for K CSD off Mine or Mascot Road. The construction cre w also assisted with the Mine Road/Mascot Road proje ct. Plaintiff’s counse l stopped by the construc tion p ro

j ect severa l tim e s. Whe n this ha

pp e ne d, Park e r wa s ord e re d to “pu t the inm a te s u p [a nd ] sit i n th e of fi c e un til we tell y ou otherwise.” They also would stop the construction.P la intiff ’s ch a llen g e to D e fen d a n t’s ve ra c ity w a s n o t l im ited to the S e c o n d A m e n d e d R e sp o n se . A ll in a ll, 4
i n t he si xt een areas where P l ai nt i f f cl ai m ed do cum ent s were no t pro d uced , s he i d ent i f i ed ove r f

i f t y s t at em ents she

c la im e d w e re false

. -8-

On Fe bruary

12, 2 0 0 3 , th eT ria l Court issued an extensive Memorandum Opinion and Orde r and be g an by

summarizing the proce dural history of this case . The Tr ial Court took particular notice of the following , which we para phrase :

1. Whe n D e f

e n d an t f i l e d his ini tia l r e sp on se to the Pub lic Re c or ds Ac t r e qu e st o n Jan ua ry 11 , 200 2, he pu rp orte d to a dd re ss a ll twen t y -six g roups of doc uments reque sted in the rider . Def endant cl a im e d th a t th e tw e n ty

- tw o p a g e s o f d o c u me n ts a tt a c h e d to the response wer e all of the documents in his possession which wer e
re sp on siv e to the re qu e sts . De fend a nt i nd ic a te d th a t c e rt a in documents previously had been s upplied to Plainti ff a nd, for many of the r e q u e s ts , e ith e r n o s u c h r e c o r d s e xis te d o r th e y w e r e in the possession of other Knox Countydepartments.

2. The parties appea

red at the initial show cause he aring on J anuary

14, 2002. At t h at time, “[c]ouns el for de fendant made

sever al re pres en tations reg arding the completene ss of defe ndant’s response s . I t was re prese nted that while the Sheriff’s De partment might have copies of some of the re cords the D epart m en t d i d not maintain orig inals. At any rate , counsel a cknowledg ed that def endant would respond to plaintiff’ s reque st for ac cess....”

3. On J anuary

17, 2002 , Def

endant made numerous
re c or ds a va ila

ble , p ro du c ing fi ft e e n b a nk e r’ s b oxe s o f d oc um e nts

. On J a n u ar y

1 8 , 2 0 0 2 , D e f

e n d a n t f il e d th e Se c o n d A me nded Re sp on se , w hic h w a s si g ne d b y De fe n d an t

w h o c on tin ue d to ma int a in there wer e no horse stables being constructe d, y et alleg ed that re cords pertinent to the mount ed patrol had bee n produce d on J anuary 17. A simil ar a ssertion was made to the re q uested doc uments reg arding

conver sion of a tempora

ry training fac ilityto a

dormitory . Def

endant continued to deny

any projec t taking place off Ma scot Road and/or Mine Road. “In some instances thoug h, defe ndant ag ree d to make available rec ords ... in respo n s e to plaintiff’s re quest reg arding the allege d projec t .... I n other instance s, defe ndant denied that any documents existed.”

The Trial Cou rt then re viewed Plaintiff’ s petition for contempt and the six teen specific are as whe re Plaintiff c laimed Def endant’ s response s wer e false. The Trial Court discussed 4 some of the va

rious deposition testimo n y w h ic hPlaintiff c laimed re veale d the exist ence of numerousAt t h i s po i n t i n t h e l i t i g a t i on i t a pp e a r e d t h a t a l l of t h e r e qu e s t e d d oc u me n t s f i n a l l y h a d b e e n pr od u c e d. As 5

s u ch , Pl a i n t i f

f a c k n o w l e d g e d t h a t i f De fe n d a n t h a d b e e n i n c i v i l c o n t e m p t , h e p u r g e d h i m s e l f o f t h a t c o n t empt by

c o m p lying w ith the T ria l C o u rt’s o rig ina l o rd e r.
-9- d o c u m e n t s w h i c h h a d n o tb e e n p r o d u c e d , n o t w i t h s t a n d i n g D e f e n d a n t ’ s a s s e r t i o n s t o t h e c o n tr ar y. The Trial Court also determined that while Plaintiff’s petition for contempt did not specify whether she wa s seeking to have Defe ndant held in civil or criminal contempt, it neverthele ss was cle ar f rom the pleading s and the proof that Plaintiff was pursuing criminal contempt charg es. The Trial Court 5 the n d isc us se d th e la w app lic able to c ri min a l c on te mpt pr oc e e din g s, no tin g that c on du c t pu nis ha ble as conte mpt was set forth in Te nn. Code Ann. § 29-9- 102, and g uilt for criminal conte mpt must be established by

proof be y ond a re asonable doubt.

Ne xt, th e Tria l Co urt r e vie we d D e fe nd a nt’ s ini tia l r e sp on seto the do c ume nt r e qu e st in light of the proof established at t he hearing , concluding the responses to 23 of t he 26 requests wer e either “ totally

or partially

false.” For

example, Defe ndant claimed his department did not keep orig inals of many

documents, but the proof “throug hout t h e co u rse of this case ha s established be y on d a re a so na ble do ub t th a t th is s tateme nt w a s f a lse .” I n a dd iti on , a

str uc tur e wa s b e ing bu ilt which could be “desc ribed a s nothing but a hor se stable.” The Trial Court d i scussed many other statements in the initial response and the proof which e stablished those statements we re f alse. F or the sake of bre vity , we will not discuss eac h of them her e.

Once the Trial Court dete rmined which of the re sponses by

Def endant we re false, the Trial Court foc used on whe ther c riminal contempt had be en esta blished. Rely ing on Ma

ple s v . S tate , 565 S.W .2d 202 (Te n n

. 1 9 78), the Trial Court emphasized that false state ments alone we re insufficient to support a f inding of criminal contempt. There also must be “an a dditional element of ob str uc tio n of jus tic e or int e rf

e re nc e wi th the pr oc e sse s o f the c ou rt .” B e c a us e ma ny do c ume nts
wer e produced el ev en d ay s after the fa lse statements in the initial response we re ma de, the Trial Court concluded the re ha d been no obstruc tion of t h e administration of justice or unlaw ful interfe renc e w ith th e p r o c e e d in g s o f th e c o u r t. I n o th e r

w o r d s , e v e n th o u g h th e r e w e r e n u me r o us pate ntl y fa lse st ate ments in the Janu ary 11 re sp on se , th e se fa lse state me nts didno t a mou nt t o
c ri min a l c on te mpt

.

The Trial Court the n shifted its foc us to D efe ndant’s Second Amende d Response, a document which, “ for the f irst time, bore the signature of Sheriff Hutchison” and which indicated that cer tain documents whose e x istence pr eviously had been denied wer e produced on J anuary 17, 2002. The proof

at trial, howe ver, w as that numerous bank acc ounts and public rec ords pertaining to tho se a c c ou nts we re pr od uc e d w e ll a ft e r that date . D uring the de po sit ion of Captain S pa ng le r i n April of 2002, he testified about a chec kbook for an acc ount with the Knox ville Poli ce D epartment Credit Union. Captain Spang ler testified that a few day s afte r his deposition he g ave the chec kbook to someone with KCSD, but could not reca ll who that person wa s

. C ap t ain Spang ler ha d no explanation a s to w hy the chec kbook had not bee n produce d prior to Aug ust of 2002. Mitz i Tay lor testified she is the administrative assistant to Chief Ruble who also serve s as leg al counse l for Def endant. Ms. Tay lor was r esponsible for maintaining the chec kbook for KCSD’s state and fede ralT he T r i al Co ur t not ed t hat i n a dd i t i on t o a maxi mum fi ne of $50
, i mp r i s onment of

up t o t en day s for e ach 6

o f fense was al so aut ho ri zed b y st at ut e. T he T ri al C o urt de cl i ned t o i m p ri son t he She ri f f af t er conc l ud i ng t hat s end i ng h im to ja il w o u ld b e a d isse rv ic e to the c iti z e n s o f K n o x C o u n ty.
-10- acc ounts. Ms. Tay lor ac knowledg ed re ceiving letters re questing various documents and, while she claimed to have done her best in loc ating these doc uments, as of Nove mber 4, 2002, seve n banker ’s box es had not be en produc ed. L ikewise, testimony from construc tion divis ion worker s established that th e re we re re c or ds of inm a te la

bo r o n th e pa

rticu lar job s r e fe re nc e d b y

Pla int if f d e sp ite Def endant’ s denial of the e x istence of such re cords in par ag raphs 17 a nd 18 of the Sec ond Amended Response.

After revie wing the pertinent testimony , the Trial Court conclude d Def endant did not produce s ome of the r equeste d documents until many months after the date he claimed they wer e pr od uc e d. B e c aus e of the se fa lse state me nts , Pla int if f w a s r e qu ir e d to take de po sit ion s in or de r t o discover the exis tence of the non-pr oduced public r ecor ds. The Tria l Court then stated:

Th e re i s no w a y

to e sc ape the c on c lus ion that th e re we re wi llf ull y false statements made in the January 18, 2002 pleading signe d by She ri ff Hu tc hi son a ndthat th e e ff e c t of the se wi llf

ull y fa lse statements was to obstruc t and inter fe re with the processe s of the Cou rt . Re g re tta

bly , the Cou rt thu s fi nd s that the makin g of the se fa lse statements constitutes a contempt pursuant to T enn. Code Ann. § 29- 9-102(1) and (4)

.
* * * *

I n the J anuary

18, 2002 pleading , the only one sig ned by the S herif f, the Cou rt

de te rm ine s th a t f

a lse state me nts we re ma de in ref ere nce to the bank acc ounts (Para g raph 13) and under the ca ption “As To All Reque sts”, eac h and eve ry statement there afte r conta ined false r epre sentations. Thus, the Court determines that there [are ] at least six (6) f

alse re prese ntations in the J anuary 1 8 , 2002 pleading alone a nd acc ording ly

sets the maxim um fine allowa ble bystatute at $300.00. T h e C o u rt reiter ates that the Petition for Contempt has

6 not ch ar g e d d e f

e n d a n t w ith w il lf

u ll y f a il in g to o b e y a n o r d e r of the

c ou rt a ndthe re fo re pe na lti e s f

or su c c e ssi ve c on te mpt s f or faili ng to obey the C ourt’s order from J anuary 18, 2002 until November 4, 2002

are not available.

After t h e T ri al C ourt issued its ruling, the pa rties continued their

standard pr actice and filed nume rous post-trial motions. The only post-trial motion at issue on this appeal is a motion by Plaintiff seeking to have De fenda n t held per sonally responsible for

paying any

fines, attorne y fee s, and court costs. This moti on was de nied by the Trial Court.-11- Def endant a ppeals raising thre e issues. F irst, Defe ndant claims there was in s u f f ic ient pr oo f that he wa s g uil ty of c ri min a l c on te mpt be y on d a re a so na ble do ub t. Se c on d, De fe nd a nt c la ims that Plaint if

f’ s p ro pe r r e me dy

wa s c ivi l c on te mpt , n ot c ri min a l c on te mpt

. Th ir d, De fe nd a nt c la ims there was insuffic ient notice for h i m t o b e found g uiltyof criminal contempt in his i ndividual

c apa c ity . Pl a int if

f r a ise s tw o is su e s, the fi rs t b ein g wh ether the re is a fi na l app e a la

ble jud g me nt. Plaintiff’s second issue is her claim that the Trial Court erre d when it denied he r motion to have Def endant he ld personally

responsible for

any fines, attorne y

fee s, and court costs.

Discussion

The fa ctual finding s of t he Tria l Court are a ccor ded a pr esumption of corr ectne ss, and

we will not overturn those fa ctual finding s unless the evidenc e pre ponderates ag ainst them. See Te nn

. R. Ap p. P. 1 3( d) ; Bogan v. Bogan , 60 S.W .3d 721, 727 (Tenn. 2001) . Wit h respe ct to leg al issues, our re view is conduc ted “unde r a pur e de novo standard of revie w, according no defe renc e to the conclusions of law made by the lower courts.” So uth e rn Con str uc tor s, In c . v . Lo ud

on Cou nty Bd. Of Educ. , 58 S.W .3d 706, 710 (Tenn. 2001)

.

The fir st issue we will addre ss is Defendant’s claim that Plaintiff failed to pr ove he

wa s g uil ty

of c ri min a l c on te mpt

be y on d a rea so na

ble do ub t. A s th is C ou rt re c e ntl y ob se rv e d in Barber v. Chapman , No. M 2003-00378-COA- R3-CV, 2004 Tenn. App. LEXI S 111 (Tenn. Ct. App. Fe b. 23, 2004), no appl. perm appeal filed :

I n a criminal contempt case, t he guilt of the a ccuse d must be established bey ond a re asonable doubt. Black v . Blount , 938 S.W .2d 3 9 4 at 3 9 8 (T en n

. 1 9 9 6 ) ( ci t i n g Robinson v. Air Draulics Engineering Co. , 214 Tenn. 30, 377 S.W.2d 908, 912 (Tenn. 1964) . Howeve r, on
app e a l, i nd ivi du a ls c on vic te d o f c ri min a l c on te mpt los e the ir presumption of inn o ce nce and must overcome the presumption of g uilt. "Appellate courts do not review the e vidence in a light favor abl e t o the ac cused and will rever se criminal contempt convictions only

when the e vidence is in s u ff i ci ent to support the trier- of-f ac t ' s finding of

contempt bey ond a re asonable doubt." Thigpen v. Thigpen , 874 S.W .2d 51, 53 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1993) ( citing Tenn. R. App. P. 13( e)) . Furthermore , appellate courts re view a trial court' s decision of whe ther to im pose conte mpt sanctions using the

more re laxed abuse of discr etion standard of revie w. Ha wk

v . H awk , 855 S.W .2d 573, 583 (Tenn. 1993)

.
Barber , 2004 Tenn. App. L EXI S 111, at *8. Ac c or

d , Freem an v. Free man , No. M2002-02558- COA-R3-CV, 2003 Tenn. A pp. LEXI S 660, at * 22 ( T en n

. C t. App. Sept. 16, 2003), appl. perm. appeal denied M

arch 22, 2004 (“A ppellate Courts revie w a trial court’s dec ision to i mpose contempt
sa nc tio ns us ing the mor e re la xed‘a bu se of dis c re tio n’ stand ardor

re vie w.

... Th e c ou rt

of app e a ls-12-

has ‘a ppellate jurisdiction over

civil or criminal conte mpt arising out of a civil matter.’ See T.C.A. § 16-4-108( b)...”)

.

I t is clear that the Trial Court painstakingly revie wed the signific ant evidenc e which had bee n prese nted at the c ontempt proce eding s. I t is true Defendant and KCSD employ ees te stified that Def endant ne ver instruc ted any one not to produce any documents and that they tried to g ather the reque sted documents. Foc using on this testimony , and asking this Court t o disreg ard e verything that do e s n ot p e rt a in t o th e six r e sp on se s f or wh ic h D e fe nd a nt w a s h e ld i n cri mi na l c on te mpt , De fe nd a nt a sse rt s the pr oo f a lto g e the r f a ils to p ro vec ri min a l c on te mpt be y on d a re a so na ble do ub t.

I n rea ching its conclusions, the Trial C o u r t h a d th eo p p o r tu n it y to assess the deme anor and cre dibilit y of all the witnesses who testified at trial. The Trial Court undoubtedly was pre sented with confli ct i n g p ro o f. On the one hand, Def endant a nd his employ ees painted a picture of cooper ation and sig nificant attempts to provide the voluminous reque sted documents as quic kly as possible and attributed doc uments w hich wer e not produc ed to mere oversig hts or inadvertent mistakes. On the other

hand, P laintiff painted a picture of

extreme obstructive be havior by Def endant a nd one intentional r oadblock afte r anothe r either preve nting or

delaying pr oduction of the documents notwithstanding Def endant’ s repr esentations to t he contr ary . "U nlike this Court, t he tr ia l c ou rt ob se rv e d th e ma nn e r andde me a no r o f t he wi tne sse s a ndwa s in th e be st p os iti on to evaluate their c redibility ." Union Planters Nat' l Bank v. Island Mgmt. Auth., Inc. , 43 S.W .3d 498, 502 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2000). A t ri al court's dete rminations reg arding cre dibilit y are acc orded defe renc e by

this Court . Id.; Dav is v. Liberty Mutual Ins. Co. , 38 S.W .3d 560, 563 (Tenn. 2001)

.
We d e c lin e to v ie w D e fe nd a nt’ s six sta te me nts wh ic h w e re he ld t o b e c ri min a lly

c on te mptuo us in t ota l is olatio n f ro m th e big g e r p ic tur e . T he Tria l Co urt ce rt a inl y wa s ent itl e d to re ly on Def endant’ s conduct throug hout the proce eding s and any l egi t i m at e inferenc es to be dra wn there from. In resolving this iss ue, we cannot ignor e the infere nces to be draw n from all of the proof

. By way of example only , the Trial Court found that 23 of the 26 re sponses in the first re sponse wer e either “ totally

or partially false” even though these particula r fa lse statements did not rise to the leve l of c ri min a l c on te mpt . T his ty pe of c on du c t by

De fe nd a nt, a lbe it c ri mi nal ly no n- c on te mptuo us , nevertheless g ives rise to leg itimate infere nces w hich could impact the ultimate f inding.

Def endant comes to this Court w ithout the presumption of innocenc e, and w e do not revie w the evide nce in a light fa vorable to him. This C ourt’s func tion on this issue is to determine whether there was sufficie nt e vidence to support the Trial Court’s six separ ate f indings of c riminal contempt b e y o n d a r e a s o n ab le d o u b t. B a s e d u p o n o u r r e v ie w o f th e e n ti r e r e c o r d b e f o r e u s as alre ady discussed i n this Opinion, we conclude that there wa s sufficient e vidence to support the Trial Cou rt ’s fi nd ing s o f c ri min a l c on te mpt

.

The ne x t issue is Def

endant’ s arg ument that the judg ment of the Trial Court must be

reve rsed be cause he did not rec eive pr oper notice of the criminal contempt char g es as require d by Te nn . R. Cr im. P. 4 2( b) . T e nn . R. Cr im. P. 4 2 p ro vid e s a s f oll ow s:O u r Su pr eme Cour t h as h el d t h at i n a ddi t i on t o t h e pr os ec u t or s n ame d i n Rul e 4 2 (b), a cr i mi n al c on t empt 7

c h a rg e a risin g o u t o f a c ivil m a tter c a n b e p ro se c u te d b y a n a tto rn e y re p re se n ting the o the r p a rty. See Wi l s on v

. Wi l s on , 9 8 4 S.W

. 2 d 89 8 (T enn. 19 9 8 ).
-13-

Rule 42. Crim inal Con tem pt. – (a) Summary Disposition.

–A c ri m i n al co n t em p tm ayb e p u n i s h ed s u m m ar i l y i f t h e j u d ge
certifies that he or s h e s aw o r hea rd the c onduct constituting the contempt and t h at it was committed in the actua l presenc e of the court. The order of contempt shall rec ite the fa cts and shall be sig ned by the judg e and e ntere d of re cord.
(b) Disposition u p o n Not ice a nd Hea ring . – A criminal contempt except as provide d in subdivisi on (a) of thi s ru le shall be prosec uted o n n o t ice. The notice shall state the time a nd place of hearing, a llowing a rea sonable ti me for the pre paration of the defe nse, and shall state the e ssential fac ts c onstitut ing the criminal conte mpt char g ed and de scribe it as suc h. The notice shall be g iven ora lly by the judg e in open c ourt in th e p re s en ce of the def endant or , on application of the district attorney g ener al or of an attorney

appointed by th e c o u r t f

o r th a t p u rp o s e , b y a n o r d e r to s h o w c a u s e o r a n order of ar rest. The de fendant is entitl ed to admission to bail as provided 7 in these r u l es

. I f the c ontempt char g ed involves disrespe ct to or criticism of a judg e, that judg e is disqualified fr om presiding at the hearing e x cept with the de fendant's c onsent. Up o n a ver dict of fi nd ing of g uil t the c ou rt sh a ll en te r an or de r fi xing the pu nis hme nt.

Pla int if f a rg ue s D e fe nd a nt r e c e ive d a mpl e no tic e a nd , e ve n if he didno t, this de fe ns e should be dee med waive d in acc ordanc e with Tenn. R. Crim. P. 12 beca use i t was not ra ised prior to trial. Tenn. R. Crim. P. 12(b) and (f ) provide, int e r a lia , that defe nses and objec tions based on “def ects in the instit u t i o n of the prose cution” ar e wa ived if not raise d prior to trial, althoug h the “court for ca

use shown may

g rant re lief fr om the waiver .”

A c h ar ge o f c ri m i n al co n t em p t i s s o m ew h a t p ec u l i arb ec au s e s u ch a c h ar ge encompa sses aspec ts of both criminal law and civil law. In a criminal contempt case , many of the constitutional protections aff orded a crim i n al defendant must be obser ved. F or example, as discussed above , g uilt mus t b e p ro v en bey ond a re asonable doubt. Se e Sh ifl e t v . S tat e , 217 Tenn. 690, 400 S.W .2d 542 (Tenn. 1966). I n State v. W ood , 9 1 S. W.3 d 7 69 (T e nn . Ct . A pp . 2 00 2) , th is Cou rt no te d th a t c ri min a l c on te mpt wa s “e no ug h of a crime ” fo r the do ub le je op ard y pr ov isi on s in the fe dera l and state c onstitut ions to apply

. Id. at7 7 3 (c i t i n g Ah e rn v . A he rn , 15 S.W .3d 73 (Tenn. 2000)). On the other ha nd, criminal conte mpt is “not enoug h of a c rime” to re quire initiation by an indictment or presentment, and ther e is no rig ht to a trial by jury

. State v. W

ood , 91 S.W .3d at 773. Case law is c lear , howeve r, that criminal contempt is “ enoug h of a c rime” to re quire prope r notice.In C oo ner v. Co on er , N o. 01- A- 01- 9701- CV

- 00021, 1997 T en n

. App. LEX I S 690 ( T en n

. Ct

. App. O ct

. 10, 8
1 9 9 7 ), no app l

. per m app eal f i l ed , t hi s C our t o bse r ved t hat ci vi l and cr i mi nal cont emp t procee di ng s s houl d not be t r i ed t oget her becau s e of t he s i gn i f i can t di f fer enc es i n t he r es pect i ve procedur al r i gh t s an d burden s of proof

. W e a dd ed t hat gi vi ng T enn. R

. C rim. P

. 42 noti ce as s o o n as p o ss i b l e el i m i nat es any po ss i b l e co nf usi o n regardi ng t he nat ure of t he p ro c e e d ing s, th e re b y e n a b ling th e a lleg e d c o n te m n o r to in v o k e h is p ro c e d u ra l righ ts. C oo ner , 1 9 9 7 T enn. A p p

. LE X IS 690, a t * 16.
-14- I n Gompers v . Buck

s's St ove & Range Co. , 221 U.S. 418 (1911) the United States Supreme Court state d th a t:
manifestly every citizen, however

unlearned in the law, by mere ins pe c tio n o f the pa

pe rs in c on te mpt

pr oc e e din g s o ug ht t o b e able to
se e wh e the r i t w a s in sti tut e d f or private li ti gatio n o r f

or pu bli c pr os e c uti on , w he the r it so ug ht to be ne fi t the c omp la inant or vin dic a te t h e court's authority . He should not be lef t in doubt as to whether relief or punishment was the object in view. H e is not only entitled to be info rm ed o f the nature of the c harg e ag ainst him, but t o know that it is a c ha rg e a ndno t a

su it.

Go mp e rs , 221 U. S

. at 4 4 6. See also Storey v. Storey , 835 S.W .2d 593, 599-600 (Te nn. Ct. App. 1992).

When Plainti ff f iled the petition for conte mpt, she did not specify whether she wa s seeking to have De fendant held in civil or criminal contempt. At the hearing on J une 21, 2002, the Trial Court inquired a

bout Plainti ff’ s intentions along this line and de fensec o u n s e l s ta te d “[c]rimi nal contempt, Your Honor, and civil c ontempt both. We do make a pray er for r elief f or punishment as well as civil, y es, sir.” The Court and counsel then beg an discussing the rules applica ble to criminal 8 contempt proc eeding s and the following dialog ue took place :

THE COURT: [W e] h ave to

... advise the defendant of wh a t he is c ha

rg e d w ith . A ndth e defe nda nt i n th e c a se is repr esente d by

the county

law department and I

presume is a war e, but may be he’s not. May

be I need to a dvise the sheriff of w hat he’ s being confr onted with in terms of the re quest for c riminal sanctions.

MR. MO NC IER: We d id that , Y o u r H o n o r. No w, we did that by – we c omplied with [ 42(b)] in terms of –

THE COURT: Setting forth –

MR. MONCIER: Yes, sir. it’s set out – the rea son I used the sp e c if

ic atio n form at, the re [ar e ] 17 s pe c if ic a tio ns of

fa lse statements , t h e basis of those f alse stateme nts, and the fa ctual predic ate f

or the fa lse statements as r equire d by Rule 42 ....-15- THE COURT: Ms. Stackhouse

... I take it that y ou’re here t o re prese nt the sheriff understands the nature of the c harg es be ing ma de a g a ins t hi m in the se pr oc e e din g s.

MS. S TACKHOUSE: He does, Your H onor....

Plaintiff’s counsel further pointed out that in the first 14 specif ications, Plaintiff claimed De fendant
ma de fa lse state me nts to the c ou rt whi ch had the e ff e c t of imp e din g “ the pr og re ss o f the Pub lic Records A ct and the pr oduction of public re cords a nd this court’s proc esses.”

The trial on the c riminal contempt cha rg es beg an almost four months af ter the a bove dis c us sio n too k pla c e

. Du ri ng c los ing arg ume nts De fe nd a nt’ s c ou ns e l arg ue d, a mon g oth e r thin g s, that Plaintiff had not met her burden “on the subject of c riminal contempt, the plaintiff ha s not met her bur den of g uiltybey ond a re asonable doubt.” It is appare nt that defe nse counse l prepa red f or and tried a c riminal contempt ca se, and in fa ct succ essfully defe nded he r cl i en t ag ainst most of the char g es. When the Tria l Co u rt i s s u ed it s judgme nt, it specifically pointed out that to the ext ent Def endant ha d been in c ivil contempt, he purg ed himself of that contempt when he finally produce d all of the re quested doc uments. There fore , the Trial Court a ppropriate ly

focuse d only

on whether Def endant wa s proven g uiltyof criminal contempt bey ond a re asonable doubt.

As best we unde rstand De fendant’s arg ument, he cla ims t h at since the reque st for public rec ords was ma de to hi m in his official c apac ity as Sheriff

, then any criminally

contemptuous
co n d u c t o n h is p ar t mu s t n e c e s s ar il y h a v e b e e n d o n e in th a t o f f ic ia l c ap a c it y , a s o p p o s e d to an individual c apac ity

. There fore , he assumed the criminal contempt proce eding s wer e being broug ht ag ainst him only in his officia l capa city

. Taking that one st ep further, De fendant insist s that he wa s entitled to a separate Tenn. R. Crim. P. 42(b) notice informing him that Pl aintiff wa s seeking to have him held in criminal contempt in his indivi dual ca pacity . We disa g ree

. Clearly Def endant knew that he wa s the individual who signe d the Second Ame nded Response. Equally as cle ar is the f

act that at l east part of t he basis for the a lleg ed criminal contempt was the a lleg edly false statements made in the Second Amende d Response sig ned by Def endant. The ref

or e , D e f e n d ant clearly

had notice that the ba sis fo r the c la ime d c ri min a l c on te mpt wa s his a lle g e dly fa lse state me nts . D e fe nd a nt w a s h e ld in criminal contempt becau s e t h e T ri al Court conclude d he made f alse stateme nts which had the

e ff e c t of ob str uc tin g the pr oc e e din gs of th e cou rt . I f D e fe nd a nt h a d ma de the e xac t same fa lse state me nts wi th the sa me ob str uc tiv e e ff e c t in lit ig a tio n wh ic h d id n ot i nv olv e his de pa rt me nt, his statem en t s wo u l d b e no less conte mptuous. I n other wor ds, it is entirely immaterial that the do c ume nt c on ta ini ng the fa lse state me nts ha pp e ne d to be a re sp on se to a Pub lic Re c or ds Ac t r e qu e st. Def ense counsel s pecif

ically repr esente d to the Trial Court that her client understood the nature of the cha rg es plac ed ag ainst him. I t is hard to imag ine what else the Trial C ourt could have done af ter this concession to fu rt h er assure Def endant ha d proper

notice of the char g es. We conc lude De fe nd ant was pr ov ide d w itha mpl e no tic e a s r e qu ir e d b y Te nn . R. Cr im. P. 4 2. I n li g ht o f this conclusion, we prete rmit the issue of whethe r De fendant waived this defe nse.-16- Def endant’ s next issue is his claim that the proper reme dy for Plaintiff to pursue w as civi l contempt, not criminal conte mpt. The diffe renc e betwe en civil and c riminal contempt was

rec ently discussed by our S upreme Court in Do e v . B d. of P ro fe ssi on al R e sp on sib ili ty , 104 S.W .3d 46 5 ( Te nn . 2 00 3) a s f

oll ow s:

We have on numer ous occa sions state d that a contempt may either be civil or criminal in nature

. See W ilson v. W

ilson , 984 S

. W

. 2 d 8 98, 90 6 ( Te nn . 1 99 8) (B ir c h, J., d iss e nti ng ); Black , 938 S. W

. 2d at 39 8- 40 1; Turner , 914 S.W .2d at 954. Civil contempt occ urs when a person doe s not comply

with a court orde r and an action is broug ht by a private party to e nforc e rig hts unde r the order that has bee n violated. See B lack , 93 8 S. W.2 d at 39 8; Robinson v. Air Draulics Eng'g Co. , 21 4 T e nn . 3 0, 37 7 S. W.2 d 9 08 , 9 12 (1964) ; Turner , 914 S.W .2d at 995. Punishm ent for civil contempt i s desig ned to coerce compliance with the court' s order

and is imposed at the insistence and for the benef it of the private pa

rty who has suff

ere d a violation of rights. See Black , 938 S.W. 2da t 39 8; Turner 91 4 S.W. 2da t 95 5; Sh e rro d v . W ix , 84 9 S. W

. 2 d 7 8 0 , 7 8 6 n

. 4 ( T e n n

. C t

. A p p

. 1 9 9 2 )

. A l s o , i n c ivi l

c on te mpt c a se s, the qu a ntu m of

pr oo f n e c e ssa

ry to convi c t is a preponde ra n ce of the e vidence . On the other hand, criminal contempts are "intende d to preserv e t h e power and vindicate the dignity and authority

of the law, and the court as an or g an of soc iety ." Black , 938 S.W. 2da t 39 8. Pun ish me nt f or c ri min a l c on te mpt

is b oth punitive and unconditional in nature and ser ves to adjudicat e "an is su e bet ween th e pu bl ic and th e accus ed. " Id

. I n criminal conte mpt proce eding s, the defe ndant is presum ed to be innocent a nd must be proven g uiltybey ond a re asonable doubt. Se e Sh ifl e t v . S tat e , 217 Tenn. 690, 400 S.W.2d 542, 543 (1966).

Doe , 104 S.W .3d at 473-74.

There is no doubt that P laintiff wante d acc ess to the documents which Defe ndant ag ree d, but f

ailed, to pr ovide. I f Def

endant had provided what he af firmatively

repr esente d that he had provide d, then t his case would have e nded long ag o when the T rial Court initiallydismiss ed the

case aft er it gr anted Plaintiff’s pe tition. See footnote 2, su pr a . Neve rtheless, we do not see how Pla int if f’ s de sir e fo r the re qu e ste d do c ume nts me a ns c ri min a l c on te mpt c ha rg e s we re no t pr op e rl y pursued. Civil and criminal conte mpt have sepa rate g oals, eleme nts, and burdens of proof. Since

a ll the e le me nts a ndthe bu rd e n of pr oo f ne c e ssa ry to es ta bli sh c ri min a l con te mpt

ha ve be e n me t in this c ase, we se e no leg itimate rea son for this Court to invalidate both Plainti ff’ s choice to pursue criminal conte mpt and the Trial Court’s finding of criminal contempt by holding that c ivil contempt was the only

appropriate re medy

beca use produc tion of documents is all P laintiff “r eally ” wa nted. I f that we re the case , then Plaintiff would not have p u rs u ed cr i m i nal contempt cha rg es once she

a c kn ow le dg e d a ll o f the re qu e ste d d oc ume nts fi na lly ha d be e n p ro du c e d p ri or to the c on te mpt

tr ia l.T he T ri al C o urt severed the cri m i nal co nt em p t charges whi ch p ert ai ned t o D efend ant ’ s res p o nses regardi ng 9

a pr oj ec t t ak i n g pl ac e on T ops i de Road. N ei t h er pa r t y a ppea l s t h e dec i s i on of t h e T r i al Cour t t o s ev er t h e con t empt i s s ues on t hat proj ect

. I f D ef endan t i s found in cr i mi nal cont emp t as i t per t ai ns t o t hat proj ect , t hen t her e wi l l be a

s epar at e f

i nal appeal abl e j udgment once t he puni s hment i s ent er ed. T he s eve r i ng of t he i s s ues pert ai ni ng t o t hat proj ect d o e s n o t affe c t t h e fi n a lit y o f t h e ju d g m e n t at issu e o n this a p p e a l.
-17- The Trial Court’s finding of g uilt b ey o nd a re asonabledoubt will, hopefully , “pre serve the power and vi nd ica te t he d igni tyand aut ho ri tyof th e law , and the cou rt as an organ of soc iet y ." Black , 938 S.W .2d at 398. We aff

irm the judg ment of the Trial Court on this i ssue.

Th e fi rs t is su e raise d b y Pla int if f i s h e r c lai m that

the re is n o f

ina l app e a la

ble judgme nt as of y et bec ause the Trial C ourt has not ruled on her moti on seeking attorney fee s incurre d to prosecute the criminal contempt action. Our Supre me Court has held that attorney fee s can be

awa rded to c ompensate a

private attorney

appointed by a trial court to prosecute criminal conte mpt actions. See B lack v . Blount , 9 3 8 S

. W.2d 394 (Tenn. 1996). The Black Court determined that attorney fee s were availableunder the authority of Ferguson v. Pay chec k , 672 S.W .2d 746 (Tenn. 1984), which a dopted the followi n g ru l e s et t ing f orth when a

trial court c an appoint and or der

c omp e ns a tio n o f c ou ns e l:

[T] here must ex ist a nece ssity for the service s of a membe r of the ba r to serve the court in re aching a prope r re solutio n o f q u es tions or issues prese nted and pe nding be fore the court, in which case the court may awa rd compe nsatio n t o b e paid by the party

or parties

re s p o n sible for the situation that prompted the c ourt to make the appointment. The rule excludes the appointm ent of counsel to ser ve the int e re sts of

lit ig a nts , w itn e sse s, or

a ny oth e r p ri vate pa

rt ie s.
Ferguson , 6 72 S.W. 2da t 74 7- 48 ; Black , 938 S.W .2d at 403. I n Black , our Supreme Court f urther stated that bec ause attorney fee s for prose cuting a criminal contempt action wer e available under Ferguson , it did not have to decide whether they wer e also available as costs under Tenn. Code Ann. § 29-9-103, whic h is the statutory provision f ix ing punishment f

or criminal conte mpt. See B lack , 938 S.W .2d at 403 n.5. We also dec line to decide w hether attorney fee s are available under Te nn. Cod e An n. § 2 9- 9- 10 3 a s c os ts o r an a dd iti on al form of pu nis hme nt s inc e the y

are oth e rw ise available in acc ordanc e with Black and Ferguson . I n State v. Gre en , 68 9 S.W. 2d18 9 ( Te nn . Crim. App. 1984), the Court of Criminal Appe als stated that “a jud gm ent of c ontempt, summary or otherwise be comes fina l upon the entering of punishment theref

or, 17 C.J .S. Contempt

§ 114 (1963), and is thus appea lable as of rig ht under Rule 3 T.R.A.P. I t matters not that the proc eeding s out of whi ch the contempt arose a re not c omplete.” Gree n , 689 S.W .2d at 190. B ased on Gree n , we
c on c lud e the re is a

fi na l app e a la

ble jud g me nt f

or pu rp os e s o f the c ri min a l c on te mpt c ha rg e s. 9

Plaintiff’s final issue is her c laim that the Trial Court er red w hen it denied her

motion seeking to have De fendant held persona lly responsible for : (1) fine s, attorney fee s, costs , etc.,
a sso c ia te d w iththe c on te mpt pr oc e e din g s; and(2 ) atto rn e y fe e s, c os ts, e tc ., pu rs ua nt t o the Pub lic Records A ct. As set forth above, attorney fee s for the c ri m inal contempt ac tion can be a war ded-18-

p u r s u a nt to B l ack

and Ferguson . Attorney fee s can a lso be awa

rded a g ainst the nondisclosing g ov e rn me nta l e nti ty

pu rs ua nt t o th e Pub lic Re c or ds Ac t, w hic h p ro vid e s a s f oll ow s:

I f th e c o u r t f

in d s th a t th e g o v e r n me n ta l e n ti ty , o r a g e n t th e r e o f, ref using to disclose a rec ord, knew that such re cord w as public and willfullyref

used to disclose it, such court may , in its di scre tion, assess all rea sonable costs involved in obta ining the re cord, inc luding

rea sonable atto rn ey s' fee s, ag ainst the nondisclosing g overnme ntal

e n t i t y.
Tenn. Code Ann. § 10- 7-505(g ).

Acc ording to Plainti ff, the Knox CountyL aw Dir ector h as indicate d that Knox Countywould pay

the $300 fine imposed by the Trial Court. Plaintiff challeng es this potential action

a ndfu rt he r se e ks to p ro hib it Kno x Coun ty c iti zen s f ro m ha vin g to p a y

a ny oth e r c os ts, a tto rn e y

fe e s,
e tc ., wh ic h may be imp os e d. Pla int if f cl a ims Kn ox Cou nty

do e s n ot h a ve the auth ority to a pp ro pria te money to pay Def endant’ s fine or any

of the other

potential costs or attorne y fee s. Plainti ff a

rg ues sta te l a w , t h e K n o x C o u n t y C o d e , a s w e l l a s p u b l i c p o l i c y w o u l d p r o h i b i t K n o x C o un tya nd , in eff ect, the c itiz ens, fr om pay ing the se expenses.

We have a ffirme d the impositi on of the $300 fine ag ainst Defe ndant in his indivi dual capa city

. We believe Defe ndant i s persona lly responsible for pay ment of t his fine and so hold. The question then bec omes whethe r o r not Knox Countyhas authority to reimburse D efe ndant out of ta xpa y e r d oll ars fo r the $3 00 fi ne

. B a se d on Plai nti ff ’s brie f, it doe s not a pp e ar that K no x Coun ty
a c tua lly ha s r e imb ur se d D e fe nd a nt f or the $3 00 or that it de fi nit ive ly ha s dec ide d to do so . U nle ss and until that happens, we do not believe this issue is ripe for revie w. With reg ard to the r equest for attorney fee s, costs, etc., ag ain and for the same reasons, we do not believe these various issues ar e ripe for revie w at this point in the l itigation. When and if attorney fee s and other costs are assessed ag ainst Defe ndant, and whe n and if a ny or all of these expenses are paid by Knox C ounty

or Knox Countydefinitively

ag ree s to pay

them, those issues then will be ripe f or re view.

Conclusion
The judg ment of the Trial Court is aff irmed and this cause is remande d to the Trial Court f or further proce eding s consistent with this Opinion and for collection of the costs b el ow. Ex erc ising our disc retion, costs on appe al a re a ssessed one- half a g ainst the Appellant Tim Hutchison and his surety , and one- half a g ainst the Appellee Wanda Moody

.

___________________________________ D. MI CHAEL

SW I NEY, JUDGE