NOT FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 

Plaintiff-Appellee, 

 v. 

JUAN RAMON MATTA-BALLESTEROS, 

AKA Don Jose, AKA Matta, AKA Jairo 

Rios Vallejo, 

Defendant-Appellant.

No. 20-50129 

D.C. Nos. 

2:88-cr-00129-JAK-1 

2:88-cr-00129-JAK 

MEMORANDUM*

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 

Plaintiff-Appellee, 

 v. 

JUAN RAMON MATTA-BALLESTEROS, 

AKA Don Jose, AKA Matta, AKA Jairo 

Rios Vallejo, 

Defendant-Appellant.

No. 20-50130 

D.C. Nos. 

2:85-cr-00606-JAK-1 

2:85-cr-00606-JAK 

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Central District of California

John A. Kronstadt, District Judge, Presiding

* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent 

except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.

FILED

FEB 12 2021

MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK

U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
2 

Submitted February 10, 2021**

Pasadena, California

Before: M. SMITH, MURGUIA, and OWENS, Circuit Judges.

Juan Matta-Ballesteros (Matta) appeals from the district court’s denial of his 

motion for compassionate release. The district court determined that 18 U.S.C. 

§ 4205(g), rather than 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c), applies to Matta because the offenses 

for which he was convicted occurred prior to November 1, 1987. Because 

§ 4205(g) allows compassionate release only upon motion by the Bureau of 

Prisons (BOP), the district court denied Matta’s motion. As the parties are familiar 

with the facts, we do not recount them here. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. 

§ 1291, and we affirm.

This appeal hinges on which of two statutory provisions governing 

compassionate release applies to Matta. Section 3582(c)(1)(A), as recently 

amended by the First Step Act, Pub. L. No. 115-391, § 603(b)(1), 132 Stat. 5194, 

5239 (2018), allows courts to reduce a term of imprisonment either upon motion of 

the BOP or the defendant, whichever is earlier. 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A). 

Section 4205(g), however, allows such modifications only upon motion of the 

BOP. 18 U.S.C. § 4205(g).

** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision 

without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
3 

Congress replaced § 4205(g) with § 3582(c) in the Sentencing Reform Act 

of 1984 (SRA), Pub. L. No. 98-473, § 227, 98 Stat. 1837, 1998 (1984). As initially 

passed, the SRA was to “take effect on the first day of the first calendar month 

beginning twenty-four months after the date of enactment,” save for a few 

exceptions inapplicable here. SRA, § 235, 98 Stat. at 2031. Congress then 

changed the delay period from twenty-four to thirty-six months from the date of 

enactment. See Sentencing Reform Amendments Act of 1985, Pub. L. No. 99-217 

§ 4, 99 Stat. 1728 (1985). Soon after, Congress added clarifying language that the 

SRA “shall apply only to offenses committed after the taking effect of this 

chapter.” Sentencing Act of 1987, Pub. L. No. 100-182 § 2(a), 101 Stat. 1266 

(1987). In sum, “18 U.S.C. 4205(g) was repealed effective November 1, 1987, but 

remains the controlling law for inmates whose offenses occurred prior to that date 

[(“old law” defendants)]. For inmates whose offenses occurred on or after 

November 1, 1987 [(“new law” defendants)], the applicable statute is 18 U.S.C. 

3582(c)(1)(A).” 28 C.F.R. § 572.40.

The First Step Act did not change this two-track regime when it amended the 

language of § 3582(c). As amended, § 3582(c)(1) reads: “In any case[,] the court, 

upon motion of the Director of the Bureau of Prisons, or upon motion of the 

defendant . . . may reduce the term of imprisonment.” 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1). 

Matta seizes on the words “in any case,” arguing that the plain text of the statute 
4 

indicates § 3582(c)(1) should now apply to all inmates. But the words “in any 

case” were not added by the First Step Act; they were present in the SRA as 

originally enacted. See SRA, 98 Stat. at 1998. 

“[W]hen the statute’s language is plain, the sole function of the courts—at 

least where the disposition required by the text is not absurd—is to enforce it 

according to its terms.” Schroeder v. United States, 793 F.3d 1080, 1083 (9th Cir. 

2015) (citation omitted). Affording new law defendants greater access to 

compassionate release does not rise to the level of absurdity that would justify 

overwriting a clearly written statute. That inmates in Matta’s position—serving 

non-parolable sentences for pre-1987 offenses—are not eligible for compassionate 

release because the BOP declines to initiate compassionate release for them may 

be “harsh,” but it is not the product of an absurd statutory scheme, and therefore 

does not empower us to “rewrite the statute that Congress has enacted.” Dodd v. 

United States, 545 U.S. 353, 359 (2005).

Matta contends § 3582(c)(1)(A) should apply to him because Congress’s 

sole intent in making the statute non-retroactive was to avoid ex post facto

problems with respect to other sections of the SRA. “Even those . . . who 

sometimes consult legislative history will never allow it to be used to ‘muddy’ the 

meaning of ‘clear statutory language.’” Food Mktg. Inst. v. Argus Leader Media, 

139 S. Ct. 2356, 2364 (2019) (citation omitted). The statutory text here is clear 
5 

and its straightforward application to Matta does not frustrate Congress’s apparent 

intent.

Finally, Matta argues that Congress impliedly repealed the SRA’s nonretroactivity provision in passing the First Step Act. “[W]hen two statutes are 

capable of co-existence, it is the duty of the courts, absent a clearly expressed 

congressional intention to the contrary, to regard each as effective.” Maine Cmty. 

Health Options v. United States, 140 S. Ct. 1308, 1323 (2020) (citation omitted)

(alteration in original). Though the First Step Act was intended in part to expand 

access to compassionate release, Matta points to no “clearly expressed 

congressional intent[],” id., in the First Step Act to repeal the non-retroactivity 

provision of the SRA.

Therefore, § 4205(g) applies to Matta. Because the BOP did not initiate his 

motion for compassionate release, the district court correctly denied it.

AFFIRMED.