COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA 

Present: Judges Benton, Annunziata and Senior Judge Coleman 

Argued at Richmond, Virginia 

JANICE C. TAYLOR 

 MEMORANDUM OPINION* BY 

v. Record No. 1733-02-2 JUDGE ROSEMARIE ANNUNZIATA 

 APRIL 22, 2003 

HARRY H. CACCIA 

FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF HANOVER COUNTY 

John R. Alderman, Judge 

 Augustus S. Anderson (Lieding & Anderson, 

P.C., on briefs) for appellant. 

 Steven M. Marks for appellee. 

Taylor appeals a final decree of divorce, which 

incorporated an earlier separation agreement. She contends the 

trial judge erred in ruling she waived any entitlement to her 

husband's military pension benefits. For the reasons that 

follow, we affirm.

The material facts underlying this appeal are not in 

dispute. The parties were married in Ohio on January 23, 1959. 

They adopted one child, Michael H. Caccia, who was born on 

October 21, 1964. During the marriage, Caccia served as a 

member of the United States Air Force. 

 

* Pursuant to Code § 17.1-413, this opinion is not 

designated for publication.
 On November 21, 1968, the parties entered into a separation 

agreement ("agreement") in Maryland, which provided in part: 

SIXTH: That the said Janice May Caccia 

shall not claim any interest as wife; widow; 

heir; next of kin; distributee or successor 

in the real, personal or mixed property of 

the said Harry Henry Caccia; and assigns to 

hold or dispose of his property, free and 

clear of all rights of hers, or which she 

may have had except for this covenant. 

* * * * * * * * * 

NINTH: That in further consideration of the 

premises, the parties hereto covenant and 

agree that the property of the said Harry 

Henry Caccia, real, personal and mixed, now 

held by him absolutely, or subject to the 

marriage rights of the said Janice May 

Caccia, or which shall in any manner 

hereafter devolve on him or the said Janice 

May Caccia, in his right, shall be his sole 

and separate property, wholly free from any 

rights of the said Janice May Caccia, with 

full power to him to convey, assign, charge 

or will the same as if unmarried. And that 

the said Janice May Caccia shall not, at any 

time, claim any right in any of the property 

as his wife, widow, heir, next of kin, 

distributee or successor . . . . 

 Caccia filed a bill of complaint for divorce in Virginia on 

March 9, 2001, on the ground that the parties had lived separate 

and apart, without cohabitation, since their separation on 

November 1, 1968.1 Taylor filed a cross-bill of complaint on May 

18, 2001 and an amendment to the cross-bill of complaint on 

 1

 The trial judge found that Caccia purportedly obtained a 

divorce in Alabama in 1969, that both parties agreed the Alabama 

divorce was fraudulent, and that neither Caccia nor Taylor was a 

participant in the fraud. 

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July 10, 2001, alleging that Caccia's military pension should be 

equitably distributed between the parties pursuant to Code 

§ 20-107.3. 

 On July 23, 2001, the trial court entered an order stating 

that Taylor was not entitled to a distribution of Caccia's 

military pension, based on the separation agreement entered into 

by the parties in 1968 and 10 U.S.C. § 1408. The court 

incorporated the agreement into its order by reference. On June 

11, 2002, the trial court entered a final divorce decree. No 

objections were noted to the decree. 

Analysis

 On appeal, Taylor raises three arguments: 1) the plain 

language of 10 U.S.C. § 1408 prohibited her from waiving an 

interest in Caccia's military pension via the separation 

agreement; 2) the agreement does not cover Caccia's military 

pension because the pension was not Caccia's "property" when the 

parties signed the agreement; and 3) Maryland law governs the 

interpretation of the agreement because it was executed in 

Maryland. Caccia contends each of Taylor's arguments is barred 

procedurally by Rule 5A:18 because she failed to timely object 

to the entrance of the order and final divorce decree at the 

trial level. We agree the appeal is barred. 

 Rule 5A:18 states: 

No ruling of the trial court . . . will be 

considered as a basis for reversal unless 

the objection was stated together with the 

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grounds therefor at the time of the ruling, 

except for good cause shown or . . . to 

attain the ends of justice. A mere 

statement that the award is contrary to the 

law and the evidence is not sufficient to 

constitute a question to be ruled upon on 

appeal. 

"The purpose of Rule 5A:18 is to allow the trial court to 

correct in the trial court any error that is called to its 

attention." Lee v. Lee, 12 Va. App. 512, 514, 404 S.E.2d 736, 

737 (1991). "A perhaps more compelling reason for the rule is 

that it is unfair to the opposing party, who may have been able 

to offer an alternative to the objectionable ruling, but did not 

do so, believing there was no problem." Id. (citing Weidman v. 

Babcock, 241 Va. 40, 44, 400 S.E.2d 164, 167 (1991)). 

 Code § 8.01-384 gives the following guidance for complying 

with Rule 5A:18: 

Formal exceptions to rulings . . . [are] 

unnecessary; but for all purposes for which 

an exception has heretofore been necessary, 

it shall be sufficient that a party, at the 

time the ruling or order of the court is 

made or sought, makes known to the court the 

action which he desires the court take or 

his objections to the action of the court 

and his grounds therefor. 

An individual may satisfy the requirements of Rule 5A:18 and 

Code § 8.01-384 in many ways. "Counsel may, if he or she has 

previously failed to do so, include an objection and reasons 

therefor in the final order or at least tender such an order to 

the trial judge." Lee, 12 Va. App. at 514, 404 S.E.2d at 737 

(citing Highway Comm'r v. Easley, 215 Va. 197, 207 S.E.2d 870 

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(1974)); see also Campbell v. Commonwealth, 12 Va. App. 476, 

480, 405 S.E.2d 1, 5 (1991) (en banc) (motion to strike the 

evidence sufficient objection); McGee v. Commonwealth, 4 

Va. App. 317, 321-22, 357 S.E.2d 738, 740 (1987) (motion to set 

aside the verdict sufficient objection).

 In the case at bar, Taylor made no objections to the trial 

court's first order on July 23, 2001. The statement of facts 

included in the record contains no indication that Taylor 

presented her arguments to the trial court. Likewise, Taylor 

did not "include an objection and reasons therefor in the final 

order or at least tender such an order to the trial judge." 

Lee, 12 Va. App. at 514, 404 S.E.2d at 737. The record is 

devoid of any mention of the arguments Taylor now raises on 

appeal. 

 Taylor contends that the trial court's order, reflecting 

that counsel appeared and argued, and stating that it considered 

the separation agreement and 10 U.S.C. § 1408, is sufficient to 

satisfy Rule 5A:18.2 We disagree. We cannot assume that, at the 

hearing, counsel argued the same issues now raised on appeal and 

simply did not include those arguments in the record. 

 Taylor further contends that we should invoke the "ends of 

justice" and "good cause" exceptions to Rule 5A:18, on the 

 2

 Taylor concedes in her opening brief to this Court that 

the issues she raises on appeal were not preserved at the trial 

level but later argues in her reply brief that the issues were 

preserved. 

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ground that the order and divorce decree denying her an interest 

in Caccia's pension were void because they were not endorsed by 

trial counsel. We disagree with Taylor's contention. 

 Rule 1:13 states: 

Drafts of orders and decrees shall be 

endorsed by counsel of record, or reasonable 

notice of the time and place of presenting 

such drafts together with copies thereof 

shall be served . . . to all counsel of 

record who have not endorsed them. 

Compliance with this rule . . . may be 

modified or dispensed with by the court in 

its discretion. 

 As the Virginia Supreme Court noted, in Napert v. Napert, 

261 Va. 45, 540 S.E.2d 882 (2001), there is no express 

requirement that "a court must affirmatively state in its order 

that it is exercising its discretion to take such action," in 

order to modify or dispense with the requirements of Rule 1:13. 

Id. at 47, 540 S.E.2d at 883. 

Although a better practice would be for a 

trial court to include a statement 

reflecting its decision to exercise its 

discretion, it properly exercised its 

discretion to dispense with the Rule's 

requirements. Courts are presumed to act in 

accordance with the law and orders of the 

court are entitled to a presumption of 

regularity. 

Id. at 47, 540 S.E.2d at 884 (citing Beck v. Semones' Adm'r, 145 

Va. 429, 442, 134 S.E. 677, 681 (1926)). Thus, we presume the 

trial court dispensed with the requirements of Rule 1:13 and 

find that the absence of endorsements was not error. 

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 Taylor also argues that since she did not receive notice of 

the entry of the final decree of divorce, we should hear her 

appeal for "good cause" shown or to attain the "ends of 

justice." Taylor does not support her argument with authority; 

therefore, we need not consider it on appeal. See Buchanan v. 

Buchanan, 14 Va. App. 53, 56, 415 S.E.2d 237, 239 (1992) 

("Statements unsupported by argument, authority, or citations to 

the record do not merit appellate consideration. We will not 

search the record for errors in order to interpret appellant's 

contention and correct deficiencies in a brief."). 

 Furthermore, the record clearly shows Taylor received 

notice that the final divorce decree had been entered and thus 

could have timely objected to it and to the failure, if any, to 

send an earlier notice. The trial court entered its final 

decree on June 11, 2002. On June 29, 2002, while the matter 

remained within the trial court's jurisdiction, Taylor timely 

filed her notice of appeal, evidencing that she received notice 

of the final divorce decree. Thus, at that time, she also could 

have made objections or exceptions to the decree and failed to 

do so. 

 Accordingly, we affirm the decision of the trial court. 

 Affirmed.

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