No. 2-- 06--0699 Fil ed: 9-24-07

______________________________________________________________________________ IN THE APP ELL ATE C OURT

OF IL LINO IS SECOND DI STRICT

______________________________________________________________________________ ALTENHEIM

GERM AN HOME, ) Ap peal f rom th e Ci rcui t Court ) o f D u P ag e C o un t y. Pl ai n ti f f -A pp el l an t, )

) v. ) No. 05-- CH--1029 ) BANK O F AME RIC A, N .A. , a nd ) TONYA HINTZPE TER, ) Ho no r ab le ) Ke nne t h L
. P o pe

jo y, Defendan ts-Appellees. ) Judge, Presi din g.

________________________________________ _____ ___________________________________ _ JU STI CEBY

RNE de l i v ered th e op i n i on of th e c our t: Herman C. Hi ntzp eter, t he t rus t o r , ex ec ut ed a t rus t ag r ee men t in 19 61 t o dis t r ibu t e in co me and pr inc ipa l o f a t rus t fun d t o his childre n, g ra ndchildr en, and g re at -g ra ndchildr en. The agr eement provides that plai

ntif f, A ltenh ei m Ge rman Home (Al

tenhei m), i s enti

tled to t he pri

nci pal an d
un dis t r ibu t ed inc o me o f a p o r t io n o f t he t rus t fun d if t her e is no gr eat -g ra ndchild eligible t o r ece ive it
. Defend ant Tonya Hin

tzpet er (To ny

a) is an adopted gr eat-g randchild of the trust or and claim s a ri gh t to the di spute d por

ti on of the trust f un d. D ef en da nt B an k of A meri ca , N. A ., i s th

e suc ce ss or in inter est t o t he t ru st ee a nd su ppo rt s To nya's po sitio n. Al tenhei m f il ed a compl

ai nt for declarator y a

nd i nj unctiv e reli ef to establis

h i ts rights un

der t he trust agreem

ent. Defen

dants responded

with a motion to dism

is s under se cti on 2 --6 19( a)( 9) of t he Co de o f Civ il

Procedure (Co de) (735 ILCS 5/2--619(a)(9) (West 2006)), arguing that the tr ustNo. 2-- 06--0699

-2-

agr eement was affirmative mat t er defea t ing Altenhe im's cla im. T he t r ial c o ur t co nc lu de d t ha t T o nya was a be nef ic ia ry un der the trust agreemen

t. The co ur t gr ant ed d efenda nt s' mot ion t o d ismi ss, and Al tenheim appeals. The par t ies ag re e t hat t he t ru st agr eement is unambiguo us. Ho weve r, t heir int er pr et at ions of the in strumen t lead them

to opposite legal

con cl us i on s a s to whet her ado pt ed g re at -g ra ndchildr en, such as Ton ya, are bene f i ciaries. On a

ppea l , Al tenh ei m argue s tha

t the pl ai n l anguag e of

the tru s t agr eement shows that the trusto r did n ot in tend to t reat adopted great -grandchi ldren as benef ici aries, because the agreem

ent expressl

y i ncl ude s a dop ted gr an dc h i l dr en as b en ef i ci ari es b ut is s i l en

t as to adopted gr ea t - gr an dc hild r en . I n r es po nse , de fen da nt s a r gu e t ha t ( 1) bo t h t he 19 55 Pr o ba t e A ct ( I ll. Rev. Stat . 1955, ch. 3, par. 165) and the current Probate Act of 1 975 (7 55 IL CS 5/2 --4 (West 200 6))
crea te a p r es umpt io n t ha t ad o pt ed ch ildr en an d n at ur al c hild r en ar e t o be t r ea t ed simila r ly f or th e pu rpo se of distrib

uting proper ty under tru st agre emen ts and (2) the tr ust agr eemen t co ntains n o la ngua ge showi

ng an in tent t o rebut t he statuto ry presum ption and e

xcl ude adopted great
grandchil dren as benef

ici aries. In lightof t he pa rt ies' shar ed p os itio n t hat t he inst ru ment is u na mbig uo us , we co nsid er o nly t he leg al is su e o f wh et he rt he pla in langua ge o f the instr ument , w hen viewe d t hro ugh t he pr ism of t he statutory presum ption, establ

is hes that the trusto r in

tended to includ e adopted grandchildren but excl ude adopted gr ea t - gr an dc hild r en as be ne ficia r ies
. While t he iss ue is a c l ose one , se cti

on 2 --4of t he cur re nt A ct re qui

res cl ea r an d c onv i nc i ng ev i de nc e to re

bu t the pre su m ption i n f av or of including adopt eds, and thi s hi

gh standard l

eads us to conclude that

the in strumen t's m ere sile nce as to adopted gr ea t-gra n dc h i l dr en

doe s n ot re b ut th e p re su m pti on . We af

f i rm th e d i sm i ss al of th e c om pl ai n t. FA CTSNo. 2-- 06--0699

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On July 20, 200 5, Altenhe im f iled a co mplaint fo r d eclar at or y and injunc tiv e re lief. The factual allegat ions a s set for t h in t he com pl ai nt are general

ly uncontested. On August 14, 1961, Herman C. Hi n tzp ete r, th e tr us tor, a n d C on ti n en tal Il l i n oi s N ati on al Ba n k a n d Tr us t C ompany

of Chi cago (Cont in

ental), the t rustee , entere d in to the tr ust agr eement . I n t he ag re ement , t he trustor establ is hed a fund and a ut hor ized t he t ru st ee t o u se t he inco me and p rincipa l for t he bene fit o f the t rus t o r , his wif

e, an d t he ne xt t hr ee ge ne r at io ns o f t he fa mily. Under the tr ust agree

men t, upon the dea

th of the trustor, th e tr

us t f un d w as to b e d i v i de d i n to three se pa ra t e fu nds f

o rt he be ne fit o f t he t rus t o r 's t hr ee ch ildr en , E dw ar d H int zp et er , E r vin Hi ntzp eter, and Herm

an C. Hi ntzp eter III (H erm

an III). T he t rus t fun d e st ab lishe d fo rt he be ne fit of Herman III was des i gna ted "Tru st Fu

nd C ," whi

ch is the subjec t of t his dispu t e. The t ru st agr eement provides that t he i ncom e, and in so me case s t he pri n ci pal , of Tru st F un d Cwa s to b e d

i str i b ute d to Herman III and hi s wif

e, Barbara, d uring thei

r li ves. Sec ti on "Se ven th (G) ," t he r elevant sec t ion o f the t ru st agr eement , p ro vides fo r t he distributi on of Trust Fund C as f ollows: "(G) All of the remai

ni ng i ncome of 'Trust Fund C' shal l b e distributed as foll

ows: (1) To [He

rm an III] , son of sa i d Tr us tor, a nd [Ba rb ara ], d augh ter- i n- l aw of said Trusto r, o r to the survivor of them, for and during thei r natur al l iv es. * * * (4) Afte r t he de at h of [ Her man II I a nd Ba rba ra ], leaving [ a] sur viving l eg i ti mate chi ld or chi ldren born to or leg al

l y adopted b

y [Herm an III an d Bar ba ra], t o su ch ch ild o rch ildr en , living fr o m t ime t o t ime, eq ua lly bet we en t he m. ***No. 2-- 06--0699

-4- (6) If at th e ti me of th e dea th of [ Her man II I a ndBarbara], a chi ld or chi ldren of t heirs a s afo re said sha ll have pr ede cea sed t he su rvi vor of [H erm an III an d Bar ba ra], leaving is sue survi

vi ng, and i f n ot , then as a ch

il d of thei rs die s l eavi

ng i ssuesurvi

vi ng, t he Tru ste e sh al

l f orth wi th di v i de th i s ' Tru st F und C'

in to as m any equal parts as [Herman I I I an d B ar ba r a] sha ll

l ea ve ch i l dre n th en su rvi vi ng an d c hi l d or chi ldren then deceased l

eavi ng i ssue then

l i vi ng. The in

come of thi

s 'Trust Fund C ' sh

all c ontinue to be di stributed

by the T ru st ee t o t he living childre n of [ Her man II I a nd Ba rba ra ] a nd t o t he living

is sue of an

y c hi ld or chi ldren of a deceas ed chi

ld of theirs , such

i ss ue to take thei r parent' s sh

are e qual l y between them
. As eac

h su ch gr ea t gr an d- ch ild o f sa id Tru stor , wh

ose pa ren t, as af ores ai d, sha l l be the n d ec ea se d, a

rri ve s a t the ag e of t went y-o ne yea

rs , or h av i ng at the ti me suc h g

rea t gra nd -ch i l d i s to tak e al

ready arriv ed at t he ag e o f tw ent y-o ne years, the Tru stee s ha l l f orthwi th tran sf er, pay over, deliv er an d c onv ey to such gre at gran

d-chi l d, h i s or he r s ha re of t he pr inc ipa l an d a ll
accum ula ted and undistributed ne

t incom e of thi s Trust Fund.
*** (8) In case this Trust shal l l apse f or want o f a l

iv in g per so n t o t ake as aforesai d, then all p r inc ipa l an d u nd ist r ibu t ed inc o me t o [ Alt en he im] * **
. " ( E mph as is adde d.) Herman III and Barbara are n

ow deceased, but they h

ave two natural ch

il dren: Herm

an C. Hin tzpeter IV (Charles) and Li sa Hi ntzpeter. Pursuant t o t he trust agreemen t, Co ntin ental was appoin ted tru st ee o f T ru st Fund C up on t he de at h of H er man II I. Bank of Amer ica is t he cu rr ent t rus t ee o f T rus t Fu nd C a s t he su cc es so rin int er es t t o Co nt ine nt al.No. 2-- 06--0699

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The t ru st agr eement pr o vid es fo rt he dis t r ibu t io n o f t he inc o me and p rincipa l of Tr ust Fund C up on th e dea th s of Herm an III an d B ar b ara. The i

n com e w as to b e d i str i b ute d under

ce r t ain ci rcum stan ces to any "su rvi vi ng l egi tim ate ch i l d or ch i l dren born to or legally ado pt ed by " Herm an III and Barb ara. (Emphas is added.) The prin

ci pal was t o be dis t r ibu t ed un de rce r t ain ci rcumstances to (1) any

"sur vi vi ng l egi tim ate ch i l d or ch i l dren born to or legally ado pt ed by " He rman I II and Barb ara and (2) an

y "de sce nda nts" of a ny "su rvi vi ng l egi tim ate ch i l d or ch i l dren born to or leg ally adopted by " Herm

an III an d Bar ba ra. (Em phasi s ad ded.) The re is no dis pute that Charles an

d Li sa, the trusto r's grandc

hi ldren, are benef

ic ia ries as "ch il dren born to" Herman

III and Barbara. Ch arl es an d L i sa are b oth livi ng, and ne ither has a ny natu ra l children. The t ru st agr eement provides t hat if Charles o r Lisa dies w itho ut leaving any "issue ," t he income o f Tr ust Fund C is t o be dis tributed to the sur

vi vi ng s i bl i ng. Upo n the deat h of the surviv in g sib li ng, the princi

pal of Trust Fund C is t o be dist ribut ed t o a ny surviving "issu e" o f the sur viving sibli ng upon rea ch i ng the ag e of 21. If ei ther C ha rl es or L i sa d

i es l eav i ng " i ssue," T rus t Fu nd C is t o be div ide d e qu ally t o ( 1) t he
sur viving si bl in g (either Ch

arles or Lisa) and ( 2) t he "issu e" o f the de ce as ed si bl i ng . The di stri

bu ti on of t he pr incipal to any

survi vi ng "issue" of

Charl es and Lis a i s to o ccur when the person reaches

t he age of 21. Ho wever, if

Trust Fund C "shal

l l apse for want of a l

iv in g person to t ake as af

oresaid, then all p r inc ipa l an d u nd ist r ibu t ed inc o me" sha ll be d ist r ibu t ed t o Alt en he im. Charl es ha d n o ch ildr en un t il Fe br ua ry 20 04 wh en he ad o pt ed T o nya, t he 32
- yea r - o ld da ugh ter of hi s curren t wif e, Li nd a H i ntz pe ter. Ba nk of Am erica in dic ated that it vie

wed Tonya as an "i ssue" of Charl es and i ntended to make distributions to T onya , i nc l udi ng a f i na l di stri bu ti on of t he pr incipal upo n Char les's de at h.No. 2-- 06--0699

-6-

Altenh eim'scompl

ai nt all eges that Tonya is not a benef ic ia ry un der the trust agreem

en t because , as an adopt ed great -grandchil d of the t rusto r, she is n

ot Charles' s "is sue." On Decem ber 5, 2005, Tonya f

il ed a moti on to dis mi ss unde r section 2--615 of the Code of Ci vi l Procedure (Code) (735 ILCS 5/2-- 615 (Wes t 200 6) ). She a rg ued t hat t he t ru st agr eement co nt ra dict ed Alt enheim's pos i ti on that ad opt ed great -grandchil dren are excluded. The trial court deni ed the motion t o dismi ss without prejudi

ce. On Fe b ru ar y 21 , 20 06 , Ton

ya f i l ed a m oti on to dism iss under section 2--619(a)(9) o f the C ode (7 35 I LCS 5/ 2- -6 19( a) (9 ) ( West 200 6) ). She a rg ued t hat t he t ru st agr eement is "o t her affirmative
matter" t ha t de fea t s Alt en he im's c laim because, under sections 2--4 (a) and (e) o f the Act (755 ILCS 5/2--4 (a), (e) (West 2006)) , she is consi dered a chil

d born of Ch arlesan d thus i s an i ssue, a des cen den t, and the g reat-gra ndc hi l d of the trustor. On Ju ne 21, 200 6, th

e tri al cou rt gran ted the moti on to dis mi ss, and A ltenh ei m f il ed it s t imely notice of appe al

on Jul y 14, 2006. AN

AL YSIS Alt en he im

a pp ea l s f rom th e d i sm i ss al of i ts c om pl ai n t. A m oti on to dism i ss pu rsua n t t o se cti on 2-- 619of th e C ode ad m i ts the le gal

suf fi ci ency of the compl

ai nt but asserts aff

irm ative ma tt er to avoid or def eat the clai m . La mar W hi tec o Ou tdoor Corp. v. City

of West Chi cago , 355 Ill . App. 3d 352, 359(20 05) . The d ec i si on to d i sm i ss a c om pl ai nt u nd er s ec ti on 2-- 619i s s

ub j ec t to de novo revi ew. Lam

ar , 355 Ill . App. 3d at 359. Sec ti on 2--619 (a)(9), i

n pa rtic ular, allo ws a d ismis sa l wh en "t he cla im as se r t ed ** * is barred by ot her affirmative mat t er avo iding t he legal eff ect o f or defeating the claim." 735 ILCS 5/2--619No. 2-- 06--0699

-7-

(a)(9) (W est 200 6). Thi s court

has def in ed the term "af

fi rmati ve m atter " i n section 2--619(a)(9) as a type of def

ense that ei

ther negates an a

ll eged cause of

act io n com

ple tely or refutes crucial
co nclusio ns of law or conclusi ons of m aterial fact uns upport ed by

alle gations of

spec ific fact contain ed i n or infer re d fr om th

e com plai nt. K ril i ch v. A meri ca n Nati ona l Ba nk & Trust Co. of Chi cago , 334 Il

l . Ap p. 3d 56 3, 570 ( 2002)
. In rul i ng on a moti on t o d ismi ss u nder sec t ion 2
-- 619 , t he trial court may consider pleadi

ngs, depositions, and aff

idav its. The question on appeal is " ' "whe t her t he exist ence of a genu ineis sue of ma terial fact sh ould ha ve precl uded the dis mi ssal or, absent such an

is sue of f act, whether dis

mi ssal is pro per as a matter of law." ' " Krili ch , 334 Ill. App . 3 d at 570 , q uo t ing Ze de l l a v . Gi bs on , 16 5 I ll. 2d 181, 185-86 (1995), quo ting Kedz ie & 103 d Cu rr ency Exc hange , I nc. v. Hodge , 156 Ill . 2d 112, 116-1 7 (199 3). In r eviewing t he dismissal o f Altenheim's co mplaint, we mus t det er mine t he t ru st or 's inte nt to i nc l ude or ex cl ude adopte d gr

ea t-gran dc hi l dre n as b en ef i ci ari es . A cou rt' s p r imar y co nc er n in constr uin g a tr ust inst rume nt is to dis cove r the i nten t of the gran tor. Har ris T ru st & Sa vings Ba nk
v. Donovan , 14 5 I ll. 2d 166 , 172 (1 991). In d et er mini ng t hat intent , t he co ur t must first co nsider t he plain and or dinar y meaning of t he wo rd s us ed a nd must co nsider t he en tire docum en t. Eychane r v. Gross , 202 Ill . 2d 228, 256 (2002). Wh ere the trust co ntain

s l anguage

t hat is unambiguo us a nd

clear, t he int en t mu st be asce rt ained fr om t hat langua ge; e xt rinsic evide nce may be a dmitt ed t o a id t he i nte rpreta ti on onl y i f the d ocum en t is am bi guous. St ein v . Sc ott , 252 Ill . App. 3d 611, 61 5 (199 3). As mentio ned, t he pa r t ies ag r ee t ha t t he inst rume nt is u na mbig uo us , bu t t he ir inter pr et at ions o f the pla in l anguag e dif

f er. We rev

ie w de novo the

tri al cou rt' s c ons tructi on of

t he t ru st instr ument . St ein , 252 Ill . App. 3d at 614.No. 2-- 06--0699

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Bef ore 19 55 , a

pr es um pti on ca l l ed th e " stran

ger-to -a dop ti on

ru l e" pr ov i de d th

at a dop te d chi ldren were n ot cons i dered

bene f i ciaries i n a testam en tary do cument or in a do cument pr ovid ing for t he di str

i b uti on of pr operty unless t he inst ru ment c ont ained lang uag e t hat made it clear t hat t he tes tator or t rustor in

tended to incl

ude the adopted chi l d. Se gu rv. Mc Gill , 304 Ill . App. 3d 298, 300 (1999 ). In 195 5, th e l eg i sl atu re a men de d the A

ct to re ve rs e the p res

um ption of the stra

ng er- toadoption ru l e. The a

men dm en t crea ted a n ew pr es um pti o n that an adopted child was deem ed a "des cen da n t" for purposes of i

nhe ritance a nd deem ed a "natural

child" for pur po ses o f dist ribut ing pr operty under a wri

tt en i nstrume nt. The 1955 versi

on of the statute w as ineff ect when the t rust agreement was executed. S ection 14 of the Act p rovided in relevan t par t as follows: "AdoptedCh

i l d a n d A dop ti ng Par ent.) A chi

ld l awful ly adopted is deem

ed a des cend ant of

the adopti ng pa ren t f or pu rpos esof inherit ance fro m the a do pt ingpar ent and f rom l i n ea l an d c oll ate ra l ki n dr ed of th e adop ti

n g p aren t. * * * Fo r the pur

pos e of deter m i n i n g th e p rop er ty ri gh ts of any person under an

y w ritten instr ument executed on or after Septembe r1, 1955, an adopted chil

d is deem ed a na t ur al c hild unl ess t he co nt ra ry inte nt plai nl y appe ars b y the term s the reof . This A mendatory

Act of 1955 sha ll not be us ed i n d eterm i ni ng the taker of pr ope rty un der a n y i n str um en t ex ecute d p rior to Septembe r 1, 1955." Ill . Rev. Stat. 1955, ch. 3, par. 165. Over the yea rs , se cti on 1 4 w asam

en de d f rom t ime t o t ime, an d it was eve ntuall y recodifi ed as section 2--4 o f the Act. To day, section 2--4 o f the Act provides as fol lows:No. 2-- 06--0699

-9- "(a) An ado pt ed ch ild i s a

de sc en da nt of the adopti ng pa ren t f or pu rpos esof in heri tance fro m the a do pt ing par ent and f rom the l in eal and colla teral ki ndred of t he ad op t ing par ent an d f or th e pur pos e of deter m i n i n g th e p rop er ty ri gh ts o f any per so n unde r a ny i n str um en t, un le ss t he ado pt ed c hild is ado pt ed a fte r a t t aining t he ag e o f 18 year s and t he ch ild never reside d with the a

dopt in g paren t before attaini

ng the age of

18 ye ars, in

whi ch
case t he ad o pt ed ch ild

i s a ch i l d of the adopti ng pa ren t bu t i s n ot a de sce ndant of t he ad op t ing par ent for t he pu rp os es o f inheriting fr om t he lineal or co llater al kindr ed o f the ado pt ing pa re n t. *** For the purpose o f determ in in g the propert y ri

ghts of an y pe rson under an

y i n str um en t, the changes m

ade by th i s a men da tory A ct of 19 97 appl

y to al l i n str um en ts executed on or after January 1, 1998. * * * (e) Fo r t he pu rp os e o f det er mini ng t he pr op er t y right s o f any per so n unde r a ny instr ument execute d on

oraft er Se pt emb er 1, 19 55 , an ad o pt ed ch ild is deem ed a c hi l d born to the ado pti

n g p aren t un l es s th e c on tra ry i n ten t i s dem on strate d b

y th e te rm s of th e i nstrumen t by clear a nd c onv i nc i ng e vi den ce." 755 IL CS 5/2 --4(a), (e) (We st 2006 ). The 195 5 vers i on of

se cti on 1 4 a nd toda y's ve rs i on of se cti on 2- -4 (e ) of

th e A ct d i f f er as to t he standard used to deter mi ne wh ether the la

nguageof a wr itt en inst ru ment reb utsthe pre su m ption that anado pt ed c hild is to be t re at ed t he sa me as a na t ur al child. U nder t he fo rmer sec t ion 1 4, t he pre su m ption wa s r eb ut t ed o nly

i f "the contrar y i nten t pl ai nl y appe arsby the t er ms the re of. " Ill. R ev. Stat . 1955, ch. 3, par . 1 65. Unde r t he new sec t ion 2
-- 4( e) , t he pr esu mpt ion is r ebut t ed o nly i f "the contrar y intent is demo nst ra t ed by t he t er ms of t he inst ru ment byclear and convi nci ng evi dence." 755 ILCS 5/2--4(We st 2006 ).No. 2-- 06--0699

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Al thoughthe parties do not address the i ssue, we consi der whether the c ur ren

t ve rs i on of
se cti on 2- -4 (e ) o r t he 1955 version of the stat ute app li es to the tr ust agr eemen

t. We m ust dec ide t he i ssuebecause

the two st atutes employ diff erent standards of proof f or rebutt in

g the statutor y pre su m ption in fav or o f adopteds. Fo r t he fo llowing r eas ons , w e co nclude t hat t he cu rr ent ve rs i on of secti on 2--4(e) applies retroact iv el y i n thi s case. In de t er mining wh et he ra s t at ut e a pp lie s re t ro act ively, ou r su pr eme co ur t has a do pt ed t he approachset forth by

the Uni ted St at es S upr eme Co ur t in Land gr af v. US I F i l m Pro du cts , 511 U.S. 244, 128 L. Ed. 2d 229, 114 S. Ct. 1483 (19 94). Al le gis Real ty Inv estors v. Novak , 223 Ill . 2d 318, 330 (2006). The Landgraf an al y sis c on sists

of two step s. Fi

rs t, if th e leg isla t ur e h as ex pr es sly prescrib ed

the sta tute' s tem pora l rea ch , th e e xpres si

on of le gis la tive i ntent mus t be giv en effect abse nt a con sti tution al prohi bi tion
. Alleg is , 223 Ill. 2d at 330 . S eco nd, if the st at ut e co nt ains no express prov i si on re gar ding it s t empo ra l reac h, t he cour t must det er mine whet her t he new st at ut e wo uld have
re t ro act iveeffe ct , ke ep ing in mind the ge ne r al p r inc iple t ha t pr o sp ec t ivit y is t he ap pr o pr iat e d efa ult rule. Alleg is , 223 Ill. 2d at 330-3 1. In answering these questions, a court should consider whether
re t ro act iveapplic at ion o f the n ew statut e wi ll

im pai r righ ts that a part y posse ssed wh en acti ng, in crease a par t y's li ability for p ast co nduc t , o r impo se ne w du t ies for t ra nsac t ions al ready c ompleted. If retrospective appl

ic ation of the n

ew l aw has i

nequi table consequenc es, a court will presum e that t he statute does

not gove rn a bs en t cl ear l egi slati ve i nten t fa vori ng s uch a res ul t. Landgraf

, 511 U.S. at 280 , 12 8 L. Ed. 2d at 262 , 11 4 S. Ct . at 150 5; Alleg is , 223 Ill . 2d at 331. Up on adopting the Landgraf

fram ework, ou r su pr eme co ur t co nsider ed t he ef f ec t of se cti on 4 of the Statute on

Statutes (5 I LCS 70/4 (W est 200 6)) on th

e retroacti vi ty a na l y si s. Alleg is , 22 3 I ll.No. 2-- 06--0699

-11-

2d at 331. Sect ion 4, wh

ic h i s often ref

erred to as t he "g ener al saving cl ause of Il li nois ," provides

as foll ows: "No new

la w shal l b e construed to repeal

a fo rmer law , wh et he rsu ch fo rmer law is
ex pr es sly repeal ed or not , as to an

y of f ense com m i tted ag ai n st th e f orm er l aw , or as to any act done, any pena lty, fo rfeit ur e o r p unishment incur re d, or any right acc ru ed, or claim arising under the form er law, or i

n an y way whatever to aff ect any such of fen se or act so co mm

itted
ordo ne , o ran y pe na lt y, f

o r feit ur e o rpu nish men t so inc ur r ed , o ran y rig ht ac cr ue d, o rcla im
a rising bef

ore t he n ew l aw takes eff

ect, save onl

y tha t t he proceedi

ngs thereaf

ter shal l
co nfo rm, so far as

practicab le , to the la

ws in force at t he tim

e of such proceeding." 5 ILCS 70/4 (W est 200 6). Our supreme court has vi

ewed section 4 as a clear legislati ve di rective as to th e te mporal reach of stat uto ry am

endm en ts an d repe al s wh

en none i s other

wi se s peci f i ed: th ose tha t are procedu ral may be appl i ed retroactiv

el y , whi l e those

that are sub stan tiv e m ay not. Alleg is , 22 3 I ll. 2d at 331. This pri

nci ple applie s t o bo t h civil and

cri m i na l enactm en ts. Alleg is , 223 Ill . 2d at 331. In l i ght of section 4, the supr em e court has h el d that anIllinois co ur t need not pr oc eed beyond t he fi rst step of the Landgraf

test, be ca us e t he leg isla t ur e w ill al ways hav e cl early in dic ated the temporal reach o f an ame nd ed st at ut e, eit he rex pr es sly in t he new legislat iveen

ac tmen t or b y de f aul t i n s ec ti on 4 of the Statut e on Statut es . Alleg is , 22 3 Ill. 2d at 331 -32 ; Caven ey v. Bower , 207 Ill . 2d 82, 95 (2003 ). Because it is a d efault st anda rd , se ct ion 4 of t he Statute on Statutes i s i na ppl i cab l e wh eret he l egi slaturehascl

ea rl y i n di ca ted th e tem poral re ach of a statu tory am en dm en t. Whe ne ve ra c o ur t is
ca l l ed up on to as se ss th e a pp l i ca b i l i ty of a statuto ry ch

ange, the court must therefore stil l m ake anNo. 2-- 06--0699

-12-

in itial determ i na tion as to whethe

r the l egi slaturehas cl

early in dic ated the am

ended statute's temporal
re ach. If i t h as , there is n

o n ee d to i

n v oke se cti on 4 of th e S tatu te on Statutes . Rather, in

accordance wi th Landgraf

, t he exp re ssio n of leg islative int ent must be given e ffect abse nt a constitutional prohi bi tion
. Alleg is , 223 Ill . 2d at 332. The app ro ach s et for t h in Landgraf and a do pt ed byour sup rem e court i s "ti

me-neutral," whi ch means t hat its a pplicability is not affect ed by whe t her t he ex pre ss i on o f leg isla t ive int en t ca lls f orpros pe cti ve orre t ro act iveappl

i ca ti on. If the Gene ral A ss em bl y has c l ea rl y ex pre ss ed an i nte nti on that a stat ute be given retroact iv e eff ect, we must honor t hat intention unl ess t he co nst it ution prohi bi ts us f rom d oin g so. Alleg is , 223 Ill . 2d at 332. In this case, the Gene

ral Assem bl y s tated t hat section 2--4(e) app lies to "any instr ument executed on or after Septembe r 1, 1955." 75 5 ILCS 5/2--4(e) (West 2006). We vi ew the General Assembly's langua ge a s exp re ssly pre scr ibing the statute's

tem poral reach a s retroactiv

e. No p ar ty sugges ts that t he retroact iv e applic ation of s ection 2--4(e) is constitutional

ly prohib ited, and therefore, wegi

ve ef f ec t to the ex pre ss i on of leg islative in

tent. See Alleg is , 223 Ill . 2d at 330. Our
con cl us i on is co nsist ent wit h W i el

ert v . La rs on , 84 Ill . App. 3d 151 (1 98 0) , i n wh i ch th e a pp el l ate courtin terpret ed a will

under the ve

rsion of section 2--4 i

n ef fect at the time of the contro versy rather than the versi on in

eff ect when the i

nstrume nt was created. W i th the statutory f

ram ework in mi nd, we c ons ider t he pa rt ies' ar gument s. I n asse rt ingthat T o nya is a beneficiar y as an adopted gre at -g ra ndchild, defend ant s re ly upo n Wi elert , where we acknowl edged

the ne w p res um ption that adopt ed chi

ldren are to be tr eated as descenda nts or natural children under written in

struments.No. 2-- 06--0699

-13-

Alt en he im

responds that, because the trust agreemen t identifi es adopted grandch ildren as ben efi ci aries but do es n ot al so iden

tif y a dopt ed great -gran

dc hi l dre n, the trustor di

d n ot i nte nd f or adopted gre at-grandc hildren t o be beneficiar ies und er t he t ru st agr eement . R elying upo n t he well-kn ownmaxi m of c onstruc

tion , inc lus io uni

us est ex clu sio al

terius , o r t he inclusio n of o ne is t he
excl us i on of the other (Fo sse v. Pens abene , 362 Ill . App. 3d 172, 184 (2005)), Altenh ei m c oncl udes that the om i ss i on of adopted great -grandchi ldren in dic ates the trust or's in

tent t o excl

ude that class. De f en da n ts rel y upon Martin

v. Gerdes , 169 Ill . App. 3d 38 6 ( 19 88 ), i

n wh i ch th e a pp el l ate courtst at ed t ha t , "[ b] y de let ing t he [ st at ut o ry] proviso that adopted ch i l dr en sh al l n ot tak e p rop er ty ex pr es sly lim ited t o t he bod y of t he adopti n g p aren t ** *, t h e l eg i sl atu reob v i ous l

y i n ten de d to preclude su ch t er mino lo gy, st anding a lone , f rom h av i n g a deter m i n ati v e e f f ec t wi th regard to whether
an adopted chil

d ma y take un der a written i nstrumen t." (Em phasi s ad ded.) Ma r t in , 169 Ill . App. 3d at 393. If the tr usto r in thi s case ha d u se d t he t er ms " de sc en da nt s" o r"is su e" st an din g a lo ne , his intent
wo uld have be en

cl ea r an d w oul d have c onf

orm ed wi th th e p res um ption f av ori ng the i nc l us i on o f adopted ch

i l dre n. How ever, the

trustor' s u se

of thos e terms shou

l d n ot be viewe d in isolat ion. In t he t rus t ag r ee men t , t he gr an dc hildr en pr o visio n a dd r es se s t he po ss ibilit y o f ad o pt ed s a nd immed iat ely precedes t he gr eat -g ra ndchildr en pr ovisio n, which is silent as t o t he po ssibili t y of ad op t eds . We agree w i th Al tenhei m that the proxi

mi ty of the two sections an d the express i

ncl usi on of adopted grandchi ldren asbe ne f i ci ari esi n on e s ec ti on supports its position that

the trusto r in

tended to exclude adopt ed gr ea t-gra n dc h i l dr en

i n th e n ex t se cti on . H owev er , Ton

ya' s p osi ti on i s s uppor te d b y th e statutory presum ption that adopt ed chi

ldren are deem ed natural chi ldren for purposes of takin

g under
a w ri tten i n str um en t.No. 2-- 06--0699

-14-

T his is a cl

ose case that turns on the standard of proof appl ie d to evi dence of fered to rebut t he presumption of se ct io n 2- -4 (e ) t hat favo rs includ ing ado pt ed c hildren a s bene ficiaries. In a ny giv en pr oc eed ing, t he du e pr oc ess c lause pr esc ribes a mini mum st anda rd of p ro of t hat re flect s t he weight of t he priv

ate and publ

ic in terests aff ected, as well

as a soci etal

judgm ent about how the risk of error sh oul d be al l ocated b etween the parti

es. Santosky v . Kram

er , 455 U.S. 745, 755, 71 L. Ed. 2d 599, 60 7, 102 S . Ct. 1388 , 1395 ( 1 982 ); In reD.T. , 212 Il l . 2d 347 , 361 (2 004). " 'Th e m ore st ringe nt th e b

urden of pr oof a p ar ty m us t b ea r, th e m oreth at p ar

ty bears the ri sk of an

erroneous deci sion.'" D.T. , 21 2 I ll. 2d at 361, quot in g Cr uz an v . D i re ctor , M i ss ouri

De pa rtm en t of He al th , 497 U.S. 261 , 283, 11 1 L. Ed . 2d 224 , 245, 11 0 S. Ct. 284 1, 2854 (1990 ). For instance, in a crim

in al case the priv

ate interest s of the defendant are so great th at s oci ety im poses the risk of error alm ost ent irely on it self by requ iring t he St at e t o p ro ve t he de fen da nt 's g uilt

" 'bey ond a reaso nabl

e doubt .' " D.T. , 212 Ill . 2d at 362, quot in g Addi ngton v. Texas , 441 U.S. 418, 423- 24, 6 0 L. Ed. 2d 323, 329, 99 S. Ct. 1804, 1808 ( 1979). This h igh standard of proof reduces t he risk o f fi

nding an inno cent per so n guilt y, but increa ses t he r isk o f acqu itt ing a g ui l ty pers on. D.T. , 212 Ill . 2d at 362. "In co nt r as t , civ il

cases gen

erall y requi re the les ser 'preponderan ce' st an da r d o f pr o o f. T his stan dard all ocat es the risk

of er ror r oug h l y eq ual l y b etween th e l i ti ga n ts ( Santosky , 455 U.S. at 755, 71 L. Ed. 2d at 607, 102 S. Ct. at 1395), reflectin g the vi ewtha t the i nte res ts a t sta keare of r ela t ive ly equal societal i

mportance." D.T. , 212 Ill . 2d at 362. In so me civil cases like t his one , however, the i ntere sts at stake ar

e dee med to be

more su bst an t ial, re quir ing a higher st anda rd t han a pr epo nder ance . I n t hese cas es, a clea r- and- co nvincing stan dard i s i m posed
. A ddi

ng ton , 441 U.S. at 424, 60 L. Ed. 2d at 329 -30 , 99 S. Ct . at 180 8; D.T. ,No. 2-- 06--0699

-15-

212 Ill . 2d at 362. T he cl

ear-and-convi

nci ng standard requi

res pr oo f gre at er t han a preponderance, but n ot qui te approachi

ng th e cri m i na l stan dard of bey ond a reas onab l e doubt. D.T. , 212 Ill . 2dat 362. A pa rty bu rde ne d w i th a cl ea r-a nd -con vi nc i ng sta nd ard sh oul de rs a grea

ter s ha re of the ri sk of
an errone ous determ

i na tion
. Cruzan , 497 U.S. at 283, 111 L. Ed. 2d at 245, 110 S. Ct. at 2854; D.T. , 212 Ill . 2d at 362. In the in stance of se ction 2--4(e), the General Asse mbly created a pre su

m ption favo ring t he i nc l us i on of adopted chil

dren as b enef

ic ia ries un de rt rus t ag r ee men t s. T he Ge ne r al As se mbly wei ghed t he pr ivate and publ

ic in terests aff ected, as well

as a s oci etal j udg men t ab out how the ri

sk of err or sho uld be alloca t ed be t wee n t he pa rties , a n d dec i de d th

at th e p re su m pti on cou l d b e reb utte d on l y wi th cl ear and convi nci ng evi dence. By in vokin g the cl ear-and-convi

nci ng standard, the Gen

eral Ass emb ly shi fted a gr eat er shar e o f the risk o f err one ou s de t er minatio ns t o p ar t ies suc h as Alt enheim, w ho att empt to thwart the clai ms of adopted chil

dren under such in

struments. If we were to apply

the preponderance-of-the-ev ide nce standa

rd, we mi ght deci de that t he express in cl usi on of grandch

il dren and s il

ence as to great-grandchildren

showed an i

ntent to excl

ude t he l atter as b enef

i ciaries. Ho we ve r , se ct io n 2
- - 4( e) r eq uir es Alt en he im t o e st ablish the exclus ion by cl ear and conv

in ci ng ev ide nce. We concl

ude that, as a matter of law , the plai n l anguage o f t h e instr ument is

not clear an

d convi nci ng ev ide nce suf fi ci ent to r ebut the presum ption that adopt ed great -grandchil

dren are t o be incl

uded as benef

ici aries. Our co nc lu sion is su ppo rt ed by t he st at ut or y pre sumpt ion in effect in 196 1 whe n th e instr ument wa s e xe cu t ed
. At t ha t t ime, t he st at ut e w o uld h av e p ut th e pr act itio ner dr aft ing t he instr ument on

not ice t hat t he exc lusion o f ado pt ed g re at -g ra ndchildr en must be st at ed e xpr essly andNo. 2-- 06--0699

-16-

that sile nce would not suff

ic e . We re

ject Altenhe im's argu ment t hat t he t ru st or co nsider ed t he possibi li ty of adopt ed great -grandchil dren and man

if ested an intent to omit them as b enefi ciaries. Next , w e co nsider and r eject Altenhe im's claim t hat t he ne

w s ec ti on 2--4 demonstrates that t he 195 5 amend ment t o t he st at ut e cr eat ed a "dicho t omy o f pre sumpt ions " regardin g adopted childre n. At the t im

e the tr ust agreem

ent was exe cuted in

1961, the statut e provided that adopted chi ldren were deem ed to be "de sce nda nts" f or purpose s of

i nh eri tance but de em

ed to be "natural chi ldr en" for pur po ses o f ta king p ro per t y under a wr itt en inst ru ment. The new s ect ion 2--4(a ) removed the distinction, declaring that adop ted children are "desc enda nt s" in th e c on tex t of b oth in heri tance and taki

ng property under an

in strumen t. The new secti on 2--4(e) further provides tha t
a n ad o pt ed ch ild is de eme d t o be "a ch ild b o rn t o t he ad o pt ing pa r en t " u nle ss a c o nt r ar y in ten t i s in dic ated. Alt en he im

emphas izes t hat t he trust or identi fi ed his g r ea t - gr an dc hild r en as "d es ce nd an t s" in
se cti on Se ve nt h ( G) ( 5) an d a s " iss ue " insection Seven th (G)(6 ). Al

tenh ei m argue s tha

t "[i ]n 1961, adopte dswere n

ot consi de red to be 'i ss ue ' or 'd es cend an ts' f orpur po ses o f ta king property und er a written i nstrumen t such as the trust ag

reem en t. Ra t he r , ad o pt ed s w er e o nly considered to be 'is sue'
or'descendants' f

or p urpo ses of i

nheri tance." Thus, Al

tenheim concludes, the tr usto r's u se o f the t er ms "descen

dants" an d "i ssue" ma

nifes ts hi s i ntent to excl

ude ado pt ed g re at -g ra ndchildr en fro m the cl as s of b en ef i ci ari es un der the tr us t ag re em en t. Acco rd ingto Al

ten he i m , ad opte d gr ea t-gran dc hi l dre n woul d b e d eemed

be ne f i ci ari esf ort he purpo se of i

nhe ritance but not t aking p ro per t y under a wr itt en inst ru ment. We vi ew thi s d i sti nc ti on as st ra ined at best . I n Wi elert , we emph

atical ly hel d that "[t] he un

deni abl e e ff ect of the 1 955 amendment t o t he Pr o ba t e A ct wa s t o t r an sfo rm a pre su m ption agai nst i ncl usi on of adopted chil

drenNo. 2-- 06--0699

-17-

in wri tten i n str um en ts i nto a pre su m ption i n f avor of such

i nc l usi on." (E m phasi s ad ded.) Wi elert , 84 Ill. App . 3 d at 155 . B y using t he br oa d t er m "writ t en ins tru men ts, " w h i ch en com pa ss es b oth testam en tary documen ts and trust agreements, we concl uded that the legisl ature intende d to chan ge t he pr es ump t io n in

t he co nt ext s o f bot h inherit ance and t ru st s. I n any even t, b oth th e 1 955 ve rs i on of sec tion 14 and the

new section 2--4 me

rely create pr esu mpt ions for t he pu rp os e o f inter pr et ing written in strumen ts. Those presumptions

ma y b e rebutted by the

unam bi guous pla in

la nguage of a

n instrument o r by ex

trinsic evidence if

the instrumen

t is am biguous. For the precedin

g reasons, the order of the circui t cour t o f Du Page C ounty i s af fi rmed. Af fi rmed. GILL ERA N JO HNSO

N an d ZEN OFF , JJ., c oncu

r.