# C_2020047EN.01003001.xml

| 11.2.2020 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | C 47/30 |
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11.2.2020

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 47/30

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Opinion of the European Economic and Social Committee on Leaving no one behind when implementing the 2030 Sustainable Development Agenda

(own-initiative opinion)

(2020/C 47/05)

Rapporteur: Peter SCHMIDT

Co-rapporteur: Lutz RIBBE

| Plenary Assembly decision | 21.2.2019 |
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| Legal basis | Rule 32(2) of the Rules of Procedure
  Own-initiative opinion |
| Sections responsible | Section for Agriculture, Rural Development and the Environment
  Section for Employment, Social Affairs and Citizenship |
| Adopted at plenary | 31.10.2019 |
| Plenary session No | 547 |
| Outcome of vote
  (for/against/abstentions) | 159/21/16 |

Plenary Assembly decision

21.2.2019

Legal basis

Rule 32(2) of the Rules of Procedure

Own-initiative opinion

Sections responsible

Section for Agriculture, Rural Development and the Environment

Section for Employment, Social Affairs and Citizenship

Adopted at plenary

31.10.2019

Plenary session No

547

Outcome of vote

(for/against/abstentions)

159/21/16

1.   Conclusions and recommendations

| 1.1. | The UN Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) are paving the way for a better and more sustainable future for all. At the heart of the SDGs is a commitment to ensure that ‘no one is left behind, by reaching the furthest behind first’ in the shift to a sustainable and resilient path, and that no goal is considered to have been met unless it has been met for all. |
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1.1.

| 1.2. | The EESC believes that social concerns should be addressed in full synergy with environmental and economic ones. The implementation of the SDGs in the EU requires merging the social with the economic and environmental dimensions of sustainability, bringing about a systemic change and overcoming the silo thinking prevalent in current EU strategies. The value of defining measures and policies through the multidimensional lens of the 2030 Agenda is undeniable. Tackling the social question will be absolutely crucial in implementing this agenda. |
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1.2.

| 1.3. | If compared with environmental or economic dimensions, both social issues and regional cohesion have so far been seen more as separate policy areas rather than as a truly integral part of sustainability policy. What defines the social dimension in a comprehensive sustainability policy is not only that it further develops traditional social policies (such as better welfare payments), but that it does more for justice and participation in the economy – to the benefit of people and regions. |
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1.3.

| 1.4. | The transition to a sustainable, carbon-neutral and resource-efficient economy requires fundamental changes in our society and in our economy. Those changes will imply chances but also risks. Leaving no one behind means that all members of society and especially those that are further behind have a real chance to seize the chances and are well prepared for coping with the risks. This requires an active policy. In this context, the most vulnerable groups in society as well as the most disadvantaged regions and territories need special consideration. |
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1.4.

| 1.5. | Leaving no one behind particularly entails re-empowering as many people as possible to play a positive role as active citizens, maximising accessibility of investments, new lifestyles, consumption patterns and sustainable technology to all people, groups and regions in the transition process. The transformation to sustainability cannot and must not be imposed from above; it will only be successful if it is based on broad support and active participation by all. |
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1.5.

| 1.6. | To achieve the implementation of the SDGs and leave no one behind, the EESC calls on the European Commission, Parliament, Council and Member States to:






  — | set up a European Green and Social Deal as part of an overarching ‘EU 2050 Sustainable Development Strategy’ that is truly decoupled from the overuse of natural resources, whose central aim would be to increase the wellbeing of citizens. The EESC is pleased that the new Commission intends to launch a European Green Deal; however, the EESC insists that this should include the social dimensions; |
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1.6.

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set up a European Green and Social Deal as part of an overarching ‘EU 2050 Sustainable Development Strategy’ that is truly decoupled from the overuse of natural resources, whose central aim would be to increase the wellbeing of citizens. The EESC is pleased that the new Commission intends to launch a European Green Deal; however, the EESC insists that this should include the social dimensions;

| — | make a systematic assessment of the potential negative/positive side-effects of the transition on Europe’s population (especially poor and vulnerable groups) and structurally weak regions and better understand the intergenerational drivers of sustainability and inequality; |
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make a systematic assessment of the potential negative/positive side-effects of the transition on Europe’s population (especially poor and vulnerable groups) and structurally weak regions and better understand the intergenerational drivers of sustainability and inequality;

| — | set up the appropriate governance structures and tools to implement the SDGs and the European Green and Social Deal, e.g. using the European Semester, better regulation and the MFF, including the cohesion and social funds to drive transformation; |
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set up the appropriate governance structures and tools to implement the SDGs and the European Green and Social Deal, e.g. using the European Semester, better regulation and the MFF, including the cohesion and social funds to drive transformation;

| — | develop a wider understanding of the ‘just transition’ (beyond coal) and fully implement the European Pillar of Social Rights in support of it, while driving reforms of redistributive systems (tailored taxation, social protection, and sustainable and social investments) as well as work-life balance and gender equality; |
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develop a wider understanding of the ‘just transition’ (beyond coal) and fully implement the European Pillar of Social Rights in support of it, while driving reforms of redistributive systems (tailored taxation, social protection, and sustainable and social investments) as well as work-life balance and gender equality;

| — | ensure equal access as well as equal opportunities regarding adequate education and training for all; |
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ensure equal access as well as equal opportunities regarding adequate education and training for all;

| — | overcome barriers to active participation by citizens who do not have the necessary financial and social capital, the necessary knowledge and information, and access to opportunities; |
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overcome barriers to active participation by citizens who do not have the necessary financial and social capital, the necessary knowledge and information, and access to opportunities;

| — | introduce policies that both benefit citizens and protect the environment, e.g. air pollution plans prioritising vulnerable groups, green social housing policies, etc.; |
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introduce policies that both benefit citizens and protect the environment, e.g. air pollution plans prioritising vulnerable groups, green social housing policies, etc.;

| — | promote a social and collaborative economy within the sustainability transition (e.g. skills, circular economy, energy transition, foster cooperatives); |
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promote a social and collaborative economy within the sustainability transition (e.g. skills, circular economy, energy transition, foster cooperatives);

| — | provide SMEs with support to succeed in the transition and achieve sustainable competitiveness, through better access to skills, finance, innovation and technology; |
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provide SMEs with support to succeed in the transition and achieve sustainable competitiveness, through better access to skills, finance, innovation and technology;

| — | enhance quality job creation; |
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enhance quality job creation;

| — | design a strategy to ensure that not only cities but also rural communities become more inclusive, resilient and sustainable; |
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design a strategy to ensure that not only cities but also rural communities become more inclusive, resilient and sustainable;

| — | strengthen climate protection and adaptation in Europe to fight desertification and address water scarcity and depopulation; |
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strengthen climate protection and adaptation in Europe to fight desertification and address water scarcity and depopulation;

| — | give young people and future generations a meaningful voice and make them count in sustainability decision-making; |
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give young people and future generations a meaningful voice and make them count in sustainability decision-making;

| — | promote a sustainable trade policy, which internalises the positive and negative social and environmental externalities of trade. |
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promote a sustainable trade policy, which internalises the positive and negative social and environmental externalities of trade.

2.   Introduction

| 2.1. | For too long, the social dimension of sustainability has not been sufficiently taken care of, either globally or in the EU. Compared with the environmental and economic dimensions, both social issues and regional cohesion have so far been seen more as separate policy areas than as a truly integral part of sustainability policy, while widespread social inequalities and regional imbalances continue to exist in Europe and in some places they are getting worse. So far, policies have indeed left people, groups and regions behind, not only failing to respect planetary boundaries, but also the basic social needs of significant parts of the EU population. The EU is often held responsible for the gaping chasms between what is promised in cohesion and social policies and what happens in reality. |
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2.1.

| 2.2. | The increasing positive and negative linkages between economic, social and ecological challenges cannot and must not be ignored. Recent protests across Europe should not be seen as signalling an outright rejection of reforms by the public at large. Rather, they are an expression of the fears of many people who are already dissatisfied with their current situation and who are now also afraid that the necessary transformations ahead of them – for example, in moving towards a carbon-neutral economy – will again come at their expense. |
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2.2.

| 2.3. | Therefore, a new sustainable development policy framework must analyse the shortcomings of the current unsustainable policies and lead to a new green and social deal which meaningfully addresses the fears of the people through practical solutions. A fair distribution of the burden and the benefits is the first step in achieving the broadest possible public acceptance and support for these societal measures. People taking part in the transition in a positive way will reduce the risk of even greater dissatisfaction, opposition, or political resignation, for example people abstaining from voting. There is no doubt that lack of participation contributes to a shift towards extremism, populism, racism and nationalism in our society, as can now be seen in many EU Member States. |
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2.3.

| 2.4. | We cannot solve the ecological crisis until the social dimension is addressed, and vice versa. We need a societal debate to accept that the social dimension must rank at least as high as the economic and environmental dimensions. |
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2.4.

| 2.5. | The Committee reiterates that leaving no one behind must not and cannot be just about the particular concerns of individuals and their economic situation and circumstances (1). It is also about households, communities, regions, sectors and minorities being left behind and feeling abandoned – e.g. when public services are closed down or deteriorate, and even essential services are not accessible or affordable (it is not only about money). It begins with physical infrastructure (transport, telecommunications and the internet) and then affects education, health and social care and leisure activities, as well as administrative services, law enforcement agencies, the police, etc. |
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2.5.

| 2.6. | Leaving no one behind entails re-empowering people as active citizens, maximising transparency and the inclusion of people, groups and regions in the transition process. |
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2.6.

| 2.7. | Moreover, leaving no one behind extends to future generations, in line with the definition of sustainable development set out in the Brundtland Commission’s report (2). The EESC believes that the current European policy framework and economy short-changes young people and future generations and welcomes the fact that young people in particular are now clearly voicing their concerns, e.g. through the ‘Fridays for Future’ movement. |
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2.7.

| 2.8. | As people need to be encouraged to face the coming transformation process without fear, political leaders at all levels must breathe life into the ‘leaving no one behind’ principle. Because transformation means change – and by no means everyone will be a winner during the shift to sustainability. It is therefore as wrong as it is unwise to talk just about ‘win-win’ or even ‘win-win-win’ situations. Although society will benefit as a whole, the costs and benefits will not be shared equally without policy interventions to make sure that no one is left behind. |
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2.8.

3.   Worrying trends in social and environmental inequalities in Europe

| 3.1. | Europe has very high levels of human development and the life expectancy of its citizens is among the highest in the world. However, Europe still has a long way to go in achieving the social dimension of the SDGs. According to the latest available Eurostat data (3), 109,2 million people, or 21,7 % of the EU population, were at risk of poverty or social exclusion in 2018. Children and minority groups are most at risk. Severe material deprivation, an absolute poverty measure, decreased since 2008 from 8,5 % to 5,8 % of the EU population in 2018 (4), but is still far from the Europe 2020 target. |
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3.1.

| 3.2. | The percentage of women in employment is only 67,5 % (5) compared to 73 % for men (with only 55 % of women with three or more children employed, against 85 % of men) (6); 32 % of women work part-time (7) compared to only 8 % of men. In 2017, women’s gross hourly earnings were on average 16 % below those of men in the EU due to a combination of stereotypes, segregation in the education and labour market, management and supervisory positions mostly being held by men, longer periods off the labour market, unpaid care responsibilities and pay discrimination (8). The lack of (child)care continues to be a key reason for women not being part of the labour force. One in three inactive women (31,7 %) reported that their inactivity was due to care responsibilities, compared with only 4,6 % of inactive men. The gender pay gap increases over the career and lifetime, leading to a staggering gender pension gap of 39 %, with the gender poverty gap being the highest in the oldest age group (65 or over) (9). |
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3.2.

| 3.3. | Wealth inequality is even greater: 10 % of the wealthiest households hold 50 % of total wealth, while the 40 % least wealthy own only a little over 3 % (10). The income share of the bottom 40 % of the population in terms of total equivalised disposable income has stabilised at a low level, reaching 21,1 % in 2017 (Eurostat SDG 2019). Wide inequalities in the distribution of income exist in the EU, too: in 2016, the top 20 % of the population (with the highest income) received 5,2 times as much income as the bottom 20 % (11). |
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3.3.

| 3.4. | The poor have also become poorer: the depth or severity of poverty (i.e. how far below the at-risk-of-poverty threshold the income of people at risk of poverty is) for the EU as a whole in 2016 was 25 %: this means that half of those living under the poverty line were at least 25 % below the relevant at-risk-of-poverty threshold (12). |
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3.4.

| 3.5. | According to the (partial) evidence available, low-income households tend to live in a less healthy environment than higher income ones and suffer from multiple sources of vulnerability. Poorer households also have greater challenges in terms of affording energy and mobility (13). There is no equality between European citizens when it comes to exposure to pollution or other environmental hazards (14). |
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3.5.

| 3.6. | While economic disparities between EU countries have reduced over time, there are stark differences among Member States (15), as the population at risk from poverty can vary from 32,8 % (Bulgaria) to 12,2 % (Czech Republic) (16). There is a 25,8 % variation in household disposable income across the EU with higher levels in northern and western countries and lower ones in eastern and southern countries. There are also wide differences between Member States when it comes to unemployment rates and to the prevalence of severe material deprivation (17). Overall, 64,9 % of the unemployed EU population is at risk, ranging from 81,8 % in Germany to 51,5 % in Poland (18). |
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3.6.

| 3.7. | Inequalities are a result of our current economic situation. The trickle-down theory of growth that would lift all boats equally does not reflect European reality: indeed, not everyone has benefited from European growth in the same way, with higher income households benefiting much more than the bottom 40 % of the population. Many people struggle to cope, while a very tiny fraction benefits from most of the wealth we all contribute to create. |
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3.7.

4.   The differential impacts of the sustainability transition

| 4.1. | The transition towards sustainability not only follows the necessity to treat our natural resources with more care and responsibility, there is also growing evidence of the respective economic potential. The global market for low-carbon goods and services is already rapidly growing. Some of the jobs that are created within the low-carbon economy are in regions and sectors that have seen decades of underinvestment. A more circular economy will contribute to resource efficiency, reduce negative environmental impacts and increase employment, including through relocation of activities back to Europe and within Member States, including disadvantaged areas. A recent study estimates an increase in net employment of around 650 000-700 000 jobs by 2030 as a result of circular economy policies (19). We should make sure that all people have access and that these are high-quality jobs. By 2030, the transition to a climate-neutral economy is expected to create an additional 1,2 million jobs in the EU, on top of the 12 million new jobs already expected. The transition could mitigate the ongoing job polarisation resulting from automation and digitalisation by also creating jobs in the middle of the wage and skill distribution scale, particularly in construction and manufacturing (20). All sectors will be impacted, with a much larger scale of disruption expected in the automobile industry and agriculture. |
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4.1.

| 4.2. | Nevertheless, we continue to see enormous competitive distortions, because the existing framework of our market economy fails to avoid the wasting, contamination or destruction of natural resources. These distortions come not only at the expense of the environment, they also prevent the rapid deployment of new and sustainable economic options. They exist both within Europe and internationally. Both in internal market policy and in trade policy, there must be no competitive advantages that are filched by acting irresponsibly with people’s wellbeing or by plundering natural resources. The EESC therefore welcomes the fact that the new EU Commission president, for example, has called for the introduction of a Carbon Border Tax, provided that this scheme is designed to accelerate the transition towards sustainability and to achieve greater social justice. As a solid long-term solution, the EESC finds it important for the EU to strive for global carbon pricing. |
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4.2.

| 4.3. | The taxation systems in EU Member States have a problem in that they rely overwhelmingly on taxing labour. In fact, environmental taxes represented only 6,3 % of total tax revenues in 2016 while labour taxation represented 49,8 % of the total. A holistic approach to tax reform, aligned with the SDGs, could indeed shift the focus away from labour to taxes on excessive wealth, consumption, pollution or digitalisation (21). Such a shift would need to take into account the growing income inequality in Europe as well as the correlation between income levels and carbon footprint. In fact, environmental taxes need to be designed to ensure behavioural change among the heaviest users whilst minimising negative impacts on income and asset inequality. For instance, putting an end to subsidies for fossil energy resources, introducing CO2 pricing and allocating the respective revenues to the development of public transportation could have a beneficial impact on income inequality and social outcomes. |
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4.3.

| 4.4. | Only if Europe does its homework on this front, will the EU have the credibility to act as a global leader on sustainability. This is, for one thing, a prerequisite for benefiting from the fast-growing future markets, e.g. in the areas of circular economy, green tech, bio-engineering and sustainable finance. At the same time, a commitment to sustainability at global level helps to achieve EU policy objectives in other areas (such as addressing the causes of migration, fair global trade and reducing dependence on oil-rich countries from a foreign policy perspective). |
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4.4.

| 4.5. | However, the transition towards sustainability requires huge public and private investment or high spending in consumer durables, which will pay off in the long run – at household, company as well as at municipality, regional and country level. The crucial question for social sustainability is: who can invest or spend this money? This question determines who benefits from the economic advantages identified – and who does not. Social sustainability is in jeopardy if:






  — | only large companies are able to invest and SMEs are not, |
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4.5.

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only large companies are able to invest and SMEs are not,

| — | start-ups have no access to the future markets of a sustainable economy, |
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start-ups have no access to the future markets of a sustainable economy,

| — | only the public sector in prosperous rather than in structurally weak regions has the budget to make infrastructure fit for sustainability, |
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only the public sector in prosperous rather than in structurally weak regions has the budget to make infrastructure fit for sustainability,

| — | but most importantly, people with lower incomes and few financial resources, lower education and less knowledge, with lower bankability, lower social capital and less confidence have or perceive no real opportunities to invest or change their consumption patterns to sustainability. In such a scenario, the only ones who benefit from the sustainability transition are those who are already doing well. The social inequalities and injustices would then increase, as would regional disparities. |
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but most importantly, people with lower incomes and few financial resources, lower education and less knowledge, with lower bankability, lower social capital and less confidence have or perceive no real opportunities to invest or change their consumption patterns to sustainability. In such a scenario, the only ones who benefit from the sustainability transition are those who are already doing well. The social inequalities and injustices would then increase, as would regional disparities.

| 4.6. | What defines social sustainability is not whether it further develops traditional social policies (such as better welfare payments), but whether it provides more equal opportunities to participate in the economy. To this end, SMEs, start-ups, the public sector in structurally weak regions and above all citizens (especially the most vulnerable ones) must be enabled to actively participate in the transition towards sustainability. In this context, further factors such as gender, individual capacities and age need to be considered as they might exacerbate existing inequalities in Europe. |
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4.6.

| 4.7. | The territorial impact of the transition also needs to be factored in. Globally, 67 % of people will be living in cities by 2050. In Europe, the rate of urbanisation is expected to reach 80 %. Not all citizens place the same burden on the environment, and policy development needs to reflect this in appropriate ways. For example, Londoners produce just over half the emissions of the UK average (22). However, at the same time, rural populations often play an important role in providing and maintaining ecosystem services. Therefore, rural regions and smaller towns as well as the EU’s outermost regions should not be forgotten but involved in the transition. |
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4.7.

5.   Strategic areas of action — towards solutions

| 5.1. | A common approach in the sustainable development policy is to use economic incentives to encourage environmentally desirable behaviour and/or to penalise behaviour that is harmful to the environment. For example, in the context of CO2 pricing, the underlying belief is that the market price should reflect the cost of CO2 emissions. This approach can be generalised for any externalities on the natural environment to be taken into account by price internalisation. The approach of internalising externalities is popular because it promises high effectiveness and efficiency and is compatible with the basic concept of the market economy. |
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5.1.

| 5.2. | Fortunately, the European Commission has started to take the approach of internalising external effects more seriously, acknowledging for example that renewable energies are disadvantaged as long as the external costs of fossil resources are not fully reflected in the market price (23) or trying to implement the ‘Polluter Pays Principle’ (24) into the transport sector. These approaches are reconciling the ecological with the economic dimension of sustainability, but they do not incorporate the social dimension. We need to provide all societal groups and stakeholders with a framework that gives them a fair chance to produce and consume in a sustainable way. Otherwise, SMEs will lose their competitiveness, structurally weak regions will become even weaker and socially or individually disadvantaged people will have even fewer chances to participate in societal prosperity. |
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5.2.

| 5.3. | Therefore, a sustainability strategy that relies solely on a market where ideally all externalities are internalised is not sufficient because it does not automatically deliver sustainable results for society. In addition to internalising external effects, a policy that also promotes social sustainability needs to take a broader approach. Existing barriers that prevent individual people, social groups, cooperatives, specific companies or the public sector from participating in sustainable development need to be removed. |
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5.3.

| 5.4. | The sustainability transition will be particularly critical in specific sectors, such as food, transport, housing and energy. In particular, three examples from the energy sector illustrate this point:






  — | A higher CO2 price increases the cost of electricity, unless it is produced 100 % CO2-free. This makes the self-supply of electricity from renewable sources, such as solar energy (boosted in the future using electrical storage), more attractive. Prosuming makes sense in terms of environmental and economic sustainability. However, those who live in their own homes or those running bigger businesses and owning sufficiently large (roof) surfaces have much better chances to benefit from prosuming. For tenants or small craft businesses, on the other hand, becoming a prosumer is either harder or even objectively impossible. Therefore, electricity becomes more and more expensive for them, while self-suppliers can save money and pay off their investment while even receiving taxpayers’ money in certain circumstances. This increases social inequality and the competitive disadvantages of small businesses. Very similar problems are also seen in the heating sector. |
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5.4.

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A higher CO2 price increases the cost of electricity, unless it is produced 100 % CO2-free. This makes the self-supply of electricity from renewable sources, such as solar energy (boosted in the future using electrical storage), more attractive. Prosuming makes sense in terms of environmental and economic sustainability. However, those who live in their own homes or those running bigger businesses and owning sufficiently large (roof) surfaces have much better chances to benefit from prosuming. For tenants or small craft businesses, on the other hand, becoming a prosumer is either harder or even objectively impossible. Therefore, electricity becomes more and more expensive for them, while self-suppliers can save money and pay off their investment while even receiving taxpayers’ money in certain circumstances. This increases social inequality and the competitive disadvantages of small businesses. Very similar problems are also seen in the heating sector.

| — | A higher CO2 price also makes fossil fuels expensive. In other words, the cost of purchasing an electric car is recouped more quickly. This, however, requires financial liquidity or at least creditworthiness. Individuals, or even small businesses, that do not have this are not in the position to buy an electric car and must, therefore, shoulder the higher price for petrol. Another option, at least in large cities, is public transport or cycling. But this is not a realistic alternative in many rural areas. The result is that we do not simply encounter the same problems as with electricity or heating; regional cohesion is also placed under further strain. |
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A higher CO2 price also makes fossil fuels expensive. In other words, the cost of purchasing an electric car is recouped more quickly. This, however, requires financial liquidity or at least creditworthiness. Individuals, or even small businesses, that do not have this are not in the position to buy an electric car and must, therefore, shoulder the higher price for petrol. Another option, at least in large cities, is public transport or cycling. But this is not a realistic alternative in many rural areas. The result is that we do not simply encounter the same problems as with electricity or heating; regional cohesion is also placed under further strain.

| — | Finally, the best way to effectively encourage the development of the circular economy is probably to make raw material consumption more expensive, e.g. steering through VAT. However, the avoidance or recycling of raw materials by industry or commerce also often requires investment up front in equipment and technology, which again would benefit large companies to the detriment of SMEs. |
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Finally, the best way to effectively encourage the development of the circular economy is probably to make raw material consumption more expensive, e.g. steering through VAT. However, the avoidance or recycling of raw materials by industry or commerce also often requires investment up front in equipment and technology, which again would benefit large companies to the detriment of SMEs.

| 5.5. | These examples show that – however justified it is to foster renewable energy, electromobility and the circular economy by making emissions or raw materials cost more – social sustainability will suffer if this is the only approach. It needs to be backed up by initiatives that specifically address the situation of disadvantaged market participants and at least compensate for their disadvantages. However, compensation pure and simple is often not enough to make progress on social sustainability. In some places, the disadvantaged must actually have better chances than others. |
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5.5.

| 5.6. | In this context, participation for instance in the energy transition also depends on education and knowledge of potential action, so it is essential to help people improve their confidence about engaging in activities that lead to greater participation in sustainable development. Without this, the hurdles created by administrative procedures and bureaucracy can be all the more onerous. Changing the infrastructure also deserves attention. |
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5.6.

| 5.7. | Another strategic area of action is qualification, education, guidance and assistance. The transition towards a climate-neutral economy will have a major impact on skills needs. There is an urgent need to invest in human capital (education, training, lifelong learning) to equip current and future generations with the necessary skills in green and digital technologies. Schools and universities should include specific SD curricula to also promote work-based learning reflecting the situation on the labour markets. Investing in the reskilling and upskilling of the population is essential so that nobody is left behind. |
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5.7.

| 5.8. | Social transfers (e.g. financed by ‘progressive taxation’ and innovative taxes such as the financial transaction tax) are equally important. The changing nature of work due to technological change will make the issue of new entitlements, such as an adequate income for everyone, a key debate for the next period by fully involving the social partners. Ensuring that their design contributes to, rather than hinders, sustainability will be important. |
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5.8.

| 5.9. | Social policy has been oblivious to environmental challenges. For instance, the European Social Fund does not address climate change, with only an estimated 7 % allocated to a low-carbon and climate-resilient economy through reform of education and training systems, adaptation of skills and qualifications, upskilling of the labour force and the creation of new jobs (25). Moreover, the lack of coherence between policy frameworks means that trade-offs, synergies and the need for flanking measures are either absent from the debate or difficult to assess due to a lack of adapted data, tools or processes. |
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5.9.

| 5.10. | More specifically, to facilitate a paradigm shift away from ex post compensation and mitigation efforts and towards enabling socially disadvantaged people in structurally disadvantaged regions to develop bottom-up projects themselves and gradually create truly sustainable, participatory and inclusive economic models (26), the following elements will be needed:






  — | a guaranteed adequate income for those in need; |
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5.10.

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a guaranteed adequate income for those in need;

| — | guaranteed access to microfinance support or public loans for people with low credit ratings from the point of view of private banks; |
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guaranteed access to microfinance support or public loans for people with low credit ratings from the point of view of private banks;

| — | support for (especially community) self-supply, for example in the fields of energy, housing and agriculture, which could be embodied in different forms of structures within the social economy, in particular cooperatives); |
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support for (especially community) self-supply, for example in the fields of energy, housing and agriculture, which could be embodied in different forms of structures within the social economy, in particular cooperatives);

| — | reducing administrative barriers to these actors; |
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reducing administrative barriers to these actors;

| — | out-reach legal and technical counselling; |
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out-reach legal and technical counselling;

| — | strengthening public investment in infrastructure and social investment. |
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strengthening public investment in infrastructure and social investment.

6.   The role of the European Pillar of Social Rights in the context of sustainability

| 6.1. | The European Pillar of Social Rights (EPSR) proclaimed by the EU in November 2017 is the specific tool to address the social challenges faced by the EU, since it expresses principles and rights essential for fair and well-functioning labour markets and welfare systems in 21st century Europe and it is about delivering new and more effective rights for all citizens on the basis of 20 key principles structured around three categories: i) equal opportunities and access to the labour market, ii) fair working conditions, and iii) social protection and inclusion for all. |
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6.1.

| 6.2. | The implementation of the EPSR requires a robust budgetary base and investment. On one hand, the next Multiannual Financial Framework should secure the needed funding, and, on the other, social investment can be facilitated by a reference to a ‘golden rule’ (27) for public investment with social and environmental objectives. Appropriate taxation policies, including effective measures against tax fraud, tax avoidance and aggressive tax planning, should allow the Member States and the EU to raise additional funds to contribute to the financing of the Social Pillar (28) and the SDGs. Private sector investment can also complement public expenditure/investments in some areas but should be subject to specific and transparent criteria that guarantee a sufficient social return for the benefit of the general interest (29). |
| --- | --- |

6.2.

| 6.3. | Although there is much common ground between the 17 SDGs and the 20 rights and principles of the EPSR, no proposal has yet been made on how to create useful synergies between the two. This could be done by starting to improve the 14 Social Scoreboard indicators to better match the 20 EPSR rights and principles and the SDGs. Based on an extended and more specific set of common indicators, the European Commission should also launch a strategy to better combine these two essential tools for socio-environmental progress, while avoiding confusing overlaps. The website www.inequalityin.eu (30) provides a good example of a tool that measures incomes and environmental parameters as indicators of quality of life within the Member States. |
| --- | --- |

6.3.

| 6.4. | There is a debate about how to operationalise the concept of ‘just transition’ in Europe. Active labour market policies should help ease the transition especially to low-carbon jobs (training and job search assistance, for instance) and increase workers’ participation, as well as Payments for Environmental Services, supporting disadvantaged groups during the transition (31). |
| --- | --- |

6.4.

Brussels, 31 October 2019.

The President

of the European Economic and Social Committee

Luca JAHIER

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(1)  EESC opinion ‘The transition towards a more sustainable European future’ ( OJ C 81, 2.3.2018, p. 44).

1

(2)  The Brundtland report ‘Our Common Future’.

2

(3)  https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/documents/2995521/10163468/3-16102019-CP-EN.pdf/edc3178f-ae3e-9973-f147-b839ee522578

3

(4)  See footnote 3.

4

(5)  Idem.

5

(6)  https://eige.europa.eu/publications/poverty-gender-and-intersecting-inequalities-in-the-eu

6

(7)  Eurostat

7

(8)  https://ec.europa.eu/info/policies/justice-and-fundamental-rights/gender-equality/equal-pay/gender-pay-gap-situation-eu_en

8

(9)  https://www.equalpayday.be/europa/; Eurostat

9

(10)  OECD, Understanding the Socio-Economic Divide in Europe, Background Report, 2017

10

(11)  Income inequality in the EU, Eurostat, 2016.

11

(12)  ‘What is poverty – Poverty facts and trends’, EAPN 2016.

12

(13)  30x30 Actions for a Sustainable Europe, #Think2030 Action Plan, IEEP.

13

(14)  EEA (2018).

14

(15)  Eurostat 2019.

15

(16)  See footnote 3.

16

(17)  ESPAS 2019; Eurostat 2019.

17

(18)  Eurostat 2018.

18

(19)  ‘Impacts of circular economy policies on the labour market’, Report for the European Commission by Cambridge Econometrics, Trinomics, and ICF May 2018.

19

(20)  ESDE 2019.

20

(21)  EESC opinion on Sustainable social security and social protection systems in the digital era (OJ C 129, 11.4.2018, p. 7).

21

Sustainable social security and social protection systems in the digital era

(22)  IIED.

22

(23)  Communication from the Commission — Guidelines on State aid for environmental protection and energy 2014-2020 (OJ C 200, 28.6.2014, p. 1).

23

(24)  White Paper Roadmap to a Single European Transport Area – Towards a competitive and resource efficient transport system (COM(2011) 144 final).

24

(25)  Baldock, David and Charveriat, Céline. 2018. In the report, the data is referred to as: ‘own calculations based on Ricardo (2017). Climate mainstreaming in the EU Budget: preparing for the next MFF’.

25

(26)  EESC opinion on New sustainable economic models (OJ C 81, 2.3.2018, p. 57).

26

New sustainable economic models

(27)  OJ C 227, 28.6.2018, p. 1, point 1.6; OJ C 197, 8.6.2018, p. 33, points 1.8 and 3.6; OJ C 327, 12.11.2013, p. 11; OJ C 227, 28.6.2018, p. 95, point 1.4; OJ C 226, 16.7.2014, p. 21; OJ C 262, 25.7.2018, p. 1, point 3.14 and OJ C 190, 5.6.2019, p. 24, point 1.8; ECO/498 (see page 113 in this OJ).

27

(28)  OJ C 262, 25.7.2018, p. 1, point 1.6.

28

(29)  OJ C 262, 25.7.2018, p. 1, point 1.4.

29

(30)  https://www.inequalityin.eu

30

(31)  ITUC mentioning ILO guidelines for a just transition

31

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