IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO 

Docket No. 34451 

DARRELL EUGENE MC CABE, 

 

 Plaintiff-Appellant, 

 

v. 

 

OLIVIA CRAVEN, CATHERINE KELLY, 

SGT. FLETCHER, TOM GILISPIE, 

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 Defendants-Respondents. 

 

 

Boise, April 2008 Term 

Opinion No. 80 

Filed: June 12, 2008 

Stephen W. Kenyon, Clerk 

Appeal from the District Court of the Fourth Judicial District of the State of 

Idaho, Ada County. Hon. Cheri C. Copsey, District Judge. 

The decision of the district court is vacated and the case remanded for 

further proceedings. Costs to appellant. 

Darrell McCabe, Boise, appellant, pro se.

Hon. Lawrence G. Wasden, Attorney General, Boise, for respondent. 

W. JONES, Justice 

I. NATURE OF THE CASE 

 Darrell McCabe committed multiple offenses that resulted in his imprisonment. Prior to 

sentencing, McCabe was detained and eventually granted credit for the time that he served prior 

to his sentence. He sued the State, alleging that the State falsely imprisoned him, because the 

State failed to afford him credit for the time that he served before his sentence was imposed and 

failed to release him timely. The district court held that his claims were barred by the statute of 

limitations. McCabe appeals that decision to this Court. 

II. PROCEDURAL HISTORY & STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 

On or about March 14, 1997, Darrell McCabe (McCabe) committed the felony of 

possession of a controlled substance (Case No. CR97-720). He pled guilty and on May 12, 1997 

was ordered to be committed to the Idaho State Board of Correction “for a period not to exceed 

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six (6) years [and a] minimum of three (3) years . . . . The precise period of time on the 

indeterminate portion of said sentence to be determined by other authorities according to law.” 

The court also held that McCabe was entitled to “209 days jail credit for time served prior to 

sentencing.” 

 McCabe admits that on January 6, 2003, he noticed that he was not given credit for time 

already served. On January 23, 2003, McCabe composed a letter to Rhonda Smoot, Idaho 

Department of Correction sentencing specialist, complaining that he had not received the benefit 

of the 209 days jail credit previously ordered by the district court. After authorities investigated 

his complaint, McCabe was released from custody on March 7, 2003. 

 Believing he had been unlawfully incarcerated, McCabe on January 4, 2005 mailed a 

complaint to the district court alleging a § 1983 violation and a claim of false imprisonment. 

Though McCabe had been released on March 7, 2003 after the Department of Correction 

reviewed his letter, he was back in prison on another charge at the time he attempted to file his 

complaint. McCabe finally filed the complaint by mail on March 7, 2005.1

 The district court sua sponte dismissed McCabe’s complaint on June 20, 2005, holding 

that “the action fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted and is frivolous.” In its 

order, the district court held that McCabe’s asserted § 1983 claim actually was a simple tort 

claim against a state agent, a claim governed by the Tort Claims Act. According to the district 

court, the claim was untimely regardless of whether the statute of limitations applicable to the § 

1983 claim applied, or whether the Tort Claims Act statute of limitations applied (I.C. § 5-219 

and I.C. § 6-911, respectively). McCabe timely filed his petition for review to this Court, and 

this Court granted review. Our review will be limited to the § 1983 claim, however, since the 

only evidence in the record suggests that McCabe did not file a State cause of action, and since 

the evidence demonstrates that he did file a § 1983 claim. 

III. STANDARD OF REVIEW 

The standard of review is explained in Gibson v. Ada County, 142 Idaho 746, 133 P.3d 

1211 (2006): 

In reviewing the district court’s order granting the motion to dismiss, the standard 

of review is the same as that used in summary judgment. Rim View Trout Co. v. 

 

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 McCabe’s claim was filed on March 7, 2005 because Idaho has adopted the “mailbox rule,” which states that a 

petition for post-conviction relief is “deemed filed as of the date it was submitted to prison authorities for the 

purpose of mailing.” Munson v. State, 128 Idaho 639, 641, 917 P.2d 796, 798 (1996). 

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Idaho Dep't of Water Res., 119 Idaho 676, 677, 809 P.2d 1155, 1156 (1991). The 

standard of review on appeal from an order granting summary judgment is the 

same standard that is used by the district court in ruling on the motion. Baxter v. 

Craney, 135 Idaho 166, 170, 16 P.3d 263, 267 (2000). Summary judgment is 

appropriate only when the pleadings, depositions, affidavits and admissions on 

file show that there is no genuine issue of material fact and the movant is entitled 

to judgment as a matter of law. I.R.C.P. 56(c); McCann v. McCann, 138 Idaho 

228, 232, 61 P.3d 585, 589 (2002). 

“This Court has free review over the construction of a statute, Waters Garbage v. 

Shoshone County, 138 Idaho 648, 650, 67 P.3d 1260, 1262 (2003), which includes 

whether a statute provides for judicial review, and the standard of review to be 

applied if judicial review is available.” Hayden Lake Fire Protection Dist. v. 

Alcorn, 141 Idaho 388, 400, 111 P.3d 73, 85 (2005). 

“Summary judgment is proper ‘if the pleadings, depositions, and admissions on 

file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to 

any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of 

law.’” Samuel v. Hepworth, Nungester & Lezamiz, 134 Idaho 84, 87, 996 P.2d 

303, 306 (2000) (internal citations omitted). 

Id. at 751-52, 133 P.3d at 1216-17. 

 This Court freely reviews the legal issues related to the statute of limitations. See, Nerco 

Minerals Co. v. Morrison Knudsen Corp., 140 Idaho 144, 148, 90 P.3d 894, 898 (2004). 

IV. ANALYSIS 

Legal Framework 

 Idaho Code § 5-219(4) states the statute of limitations for personal injury cases: 

Within two (2) years: . . . 

An action to recover damages for . . . an injury to the person . . . . 

In a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 case, the applicable statute of limitations is found in Idaho Code § 

5-219(4) above. Henderson v. State, 110 Idaho 308, 311, 715 P.2d 978, 981 (1986). 

The statute of limitations issue for 42 U.S.C. § 1983 actions involves both state and 

federal law. Wallace v. Kato, 127 S.Ct. 1091, 1095 (2007). “Aspects of § 1983 which are not 

governed by reference to state law are governed by federal rules conforming in general to 

common-law tort principles.” Id. The length of the statute of limitations “is that which the State 

provides for personal-injury torts.” Id. at 1094. The date at which a § 1983 cause of action 

accrues “is a question of federal law that is not resolved by reference to state law.” Id. at 1095. 

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The general principle of federal law states that “it is the standard rule that accrual occurs 

when the plaintiff has a complete and present cause of action.” Id. (internal quotations removed). 

The plaintiff has a complete and present cause of action when he can “file suit and obtain relief.” 

Id. (internal quotations removed). Accrual of a cause of action occurs, and therefore the statute 

of limitations begins to run, “when the wrongful act or omission results in damages. The cause 

of action accrues even though the full extent of the injury is not then known or predictable.” Id.

at 1097 (internal quotations omitted). 

These general rules are refined in false imprisonment cases, however. Under federal law, 

false imprisonment is detention without legal process, id. at 1095, and a cause of action begins to 

run against an action for false imprisonment when the alleged false imprisonment ends. Id. at 

1096. 

Finally, “States and municipalities have a strong interest in timely notice of alleged 

misconduct by their agents.” Id. at 1100 (internal quotations omitted). 

Application

The Court of Appeals correctly noted that “McCabe reasonably could have commenced 

his action on the first day of wrongful imprisonment (or when he reasonably should have 

discovered the injury), rather than waiting until after his last day of imprisonment.” However, 

under controlling federal law regarding accrual of his cause of action, the statute of limitations 

did not begin to run against McCabe’s cause of action until the false imprisonment ended on 

March 7, 2003. Since the claim was filed exactly two years later,2

 the § 1983 claim was timely, 

and McCabe’s cause of action consists of the entire period of false imprisonment, not the last day 

of false imprisonment as the Court of Appeals held. 

Finally, McCabe attempted to argue that the district court lacked jurisdiction to dismiss 

his case sua sponte. However, he did not raise this issue to the Court of Appeals and the issue 

therefore is not preserved for appeal. State Dept. of Health and Welfare v. Housel, 140 Idaho 96, 

100, 90 P.3d 321, 325 (2004). 

 

2

 The claim literally was filed two years and one day later, as two years elapsed on March 6, 2005. March 7, 2005 

was the day after two years had elapsed. However, Idaho Code § 73-109 states that time is computed as follows: 

“The time in which any act provided by law is to be done is computed by excluding the first day, and including the 

last unless the last is a holiday and then it is also excluded.” The claim therefore was legally filed within two years, 

though not within two years in the ordinary sense. 

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V. CONCLUSION 

For the foregoing reasons, the district court’s decision is vacated and the case remanded 

for further proceedings. Costs to appellant. 

Chief Justice EISMANN, Justices BURDICK, J. JONES and HORTON CONCUR..