IV 

116TH CONGRESS 

2D SESSION H. RES. 1222 

Reaffirming the sense of the House of Representatives that the United States 

must lead the world in preventing further nuclear proliferation, while 

also reducing and eventually eliminating all nuclear weapons. 

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 

NOVEMBER 16, 2020 

Mr. BEYER submitted the following resolution; which was referred to the 

Committee on Foreign Affairs 

RESOLUTION 

Reaffirming the sense of the House of Representatives that 

the United States must lead the world in preventing 

further nuclear proliferation, while also reducing and 

eventually eliminating all nuclear weapons. 

Whereas, in the 1984 State of the Union Address, President 

Reagan said, ‘‘A nuclear war cannot be won and must 

never be fought’’; 

Whereas the nonproliferation of nuclear weapons has been a 

bedrock principle of United States foreign policy since 

1945; 

Whereas the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear 

Weapons was ratified by the United States in 1968, and 

extended indefinitely in 1995, and depends upon the full 

implementation by all States Parties of three mutually 


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reinforcing pillars: nonproliferation, access to peaceful 

uses of nuclear energy under safeguards, and disarmament; 

Whereas the United States maintains a safe, secure, and effective nuclear deterrent to provide for the national defense of the United States and to bolster the security of 

the allies of the United States, while also pursuing a 

number of arms control, disarmament, and nonproliferation agreements designed to end dangerous nuclear competition and the spread of nuclear weapons-related technologies and to ensure strategic stability, reduce nuclear 

risks, and protect the United States homeland and allies 

of the United States; 

Whereas the United States is now at risk of losing all the 

agreements that have underpinned strategic stability and 

nuclear risk reduction; 

Whereas the Treaty between the United States of America 

and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Elimination of Their Intermediate-Range and Shorter-Range 

Missiles (in this resolution referred to as the ‘‘INF Treaty’’) successfully led to the total ban on the possession, 

production, and flight-testing of land-based nuclear and 

conventional ballistic missiles, cruise missiles, and missile 

launchers with ranges of 500 kilometers to 5,500 kilometers; 

Whereas, as a result of the INF Treaty, the United States 

and the Soviet Union destroyed a total of 2,692 short- 

, medium-, and intermediate-range missiles by the treaty’s implementation deadline of June 1, 1991; 


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Whereas the United States formally withdrew from the INF 

Treaty on August 2, 2019, with no plan to avert a new 

and destabilizing intermediate-range missile arms race; 

Whereas the Treaty on Open Skies, signed in 1992 and in 

effect since 2002, is a vital instrument of confidencebuilding and verification for the United States and the 

allies of the United States; 

Whereas the Treaty on Open Skies has permitted unarmed 

surveillance flights over the territories of 34 countries, including Russia, with the purpose of enhancing mutual 

understanding of the military forces and activities of concern to them; 

Whereas, on May 22, 2020, the President announced his intent to withdraw from the Treaty on Open Skies in six 

months due to continued concerns over compliance with 

the Treaty’s provisions by Russia; 

Whereas this announcement did not comply with section 1234 

of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal 

Year 2020 (Public Law 116–92; 133 Stat. 1648; 22 

U.S.C. 2593a note) that requires the Secretary of Defense and the Secretary of State to notify Congress at 

least 120 days before a formal notice is sent to treaty depositories about an intent to leave the Treaty on Open 

Skies, and was made despite objections expressed by 

United States allies; 

Whereas the Treaty between the United States of America 

and the Russian Federation on Measures for the Further 

Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms (in 

this resolution referred to as the ‘‘New START Treaty’’) 

entered into force on February 5, 2011, and is scheduled 

to expire on February 5, 2021, unless the United States 


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and Russia agree to extend the Treaty by a period of up 

to five years; 

Whereas the New START Treaty has strengthened the nuclear security and strategic stability of the United States 

by reducing the number of strategic systems in Russia’s 

nuclear arsenal and providing the United States with the 

inspection and monitoring tools necessary to confidently 

verify Russian compliance with the Treaty; 

Whereas maintaining legally binding, verifiable limits on Russian strategic nuclear forces is in the national security interest of the United States; 

Whereas the Department of State has repeatedly verified that 

Russia is in full compliance with the New START Treaty, including most recently in the June 2020 report to 

Congress on ‘‘Adherence to and Compliance with Arms 

Control, Nonproliferation, and Disarmament Agreements 

and Commitments’’; 

Whereas the New START Treaty has not and does not restrict the nuclear modernization programs of the United 

States nor limit the missile defense efforts of the United 

States, and the United States continues to assure allies 

of guarantees by the United States to their security; 

Whereas if the New START Treaty is allowed to expire, the 

United States will be faced with an unconstrained Russian nuclear arsenal for the first time since 1972, and 

the United States will be discarding decades of progress 

to maintain nuclear deterrence at a much lower level of 

strategic nuclear arsenals, from which the United States, 

NATO, and other allies have all benefitted; 

Whereas a perceived retreat by the United States from arms 

control and international affairs more broadly has caused 


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allies and partners across the globe to doubt the United 

States commitment to meet its own nuclear disarmament 

obligations under the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of 

Nuclear Weapons, which could compromise United States 

efforts to strengthen the nuclear nonproliferation system; 

Whereas Congress has historically taken a bipartisan approach to arms control initiatives, including the bipartisan vote of 71–26 in the Senate to provide its advice 

and consent to the ratification of the New START Treaty on December 22, 2010, demonstrating that Congress 

can be a close partner with the executive branch in the 

shaping of the arms control policies of the United States; 

and 

Whereas there are bipartisan bills in Congress to urge an extension of the New START Treaty, the last remaining 

treaty constraining the world’s two largest nuclear arsenals, and former officials who served under Republican 

and Democratic administrations, military leaders, and 

nuclear policy experts agree that the Treaty should be extended: Now, therefore, be it 

1 Resolved, That the House of Representatives— 

2 (1) reaffirms that effective arms control trea3 ties, and other confidence-building and verification 

4 agreements, that successfully limit and reduce nu5 clear weapons and curb nuclear competition are im6 portant tools that strengthen the security of the 

7 United States and international security; 

8 (2) strongly supports a sustained and intensive 

9 dialogue with Russia and China to reduce the 


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1 threats posed by nuclear weapons, and underscores 

2 that effective arms control has always been an area 

3 of crucial and necessary dialogue, even during the 

4 lowest points in bilateral and multilateral relations; 

5 (3) recognizes that the United States and Rus6 sia, which possess more than 90 percent of the 

7 world’s 13,000 nuclear weapons, have a special re8 sponsibility to reduce the nuclear danger, and are 

9 committed to do so under the Treaty on the Non10 Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons; 

11 (4) calls on the President to extend the New 

12 START Treaty for five years without further delay 

13 to give the United States, in consultation with allies, 

14 the time and space needed to pursue a broader, 

15 more comprehensive arms control agenda with Rus16 sia and China that addresses all types of nuclear 

17 weapons and emerging technologies that can affect 

18 strategic stability; and 

19 (5) calls on the current administration to imme20 diately withdraw its declared intent to leave the 

21 Treaty on Open Skies, which allies, partners, and 

22 arms control experts all agree is a vital instrument 

23 of confidence-building and verification for the United 


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1 States and its objectives for promoting international 

2 security and strategic stability. 

Æ 


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