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| 18.9.2020 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | C 311/26 |

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Opinion of the European Economic and Social Committee on ‘The effects of campaigns on participation in political decision-making’

(exploratory opinion requested by the Croatian presidency)

(2020/C 311/03)

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| Rapporteur: | Marina ŠKRABALO |
| Co-rapporteur: | Cinzia DEL RIO |

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| Consultation | Letter, 10.9.2019 |
| Legal basis | Article 304 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union |
| Section responsible | Employment, Social Affairs and Citizenship |
| Adopted in section | 3.3.2020 |
| Adopted at plenary | 10.6.2020 |
| Plenary session No | 552 |
| Outcome of vote (for/against/abstentions) | 209/2/3 |

1.   Conclusions and recommendations

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| | 1.1. | The EESC welcomes the Croatian presidency’s initiative to request an opinion on the effects of campaigns on participation in political decision-making, which will hopefully contribute to the timely policy debate in the relevant Council formations and preparatory bodies on key areas of improvement in the EU’s electoral process, based on the Commission’s forthcoming post-electoral report. The policy debate will enable a timely contribution by the Member States to the agenda for the Commission’s Democracy Action Plan and the Conference on the Future of Europe, which will be launched during the Croatian presidency. The time is right for a new, coordinated effort to protect and enhance European democracy throughout the new political cycle of the EU institutions. In this respect, the EESC would encourage the Croatian presidency to act as a catalyst to foster close cooperation between all the EU institutions, including, primarily, the European Parliament and the Commission, but also the EESC, the Committee of Regions, the EU Ombudsman and the Fundamental Rights Agency. |

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| | 1.2. | EU public involvement in the EU’s political decision-making, primarily by means of electoral participation, but also through political debates and policy consultation, is vital for reinvigorating European democracy and ensuring the legitimacy of EU institutions and instruments. The EESC calls on the EU institutions to build on the lessons learned from the 2019 elections with timely political action and a coordinated institutional effort to improve the current state of the EU’s electoral process and maximise a satisfactory voter turnout in the 2024 European elections and beyond. |

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| | 1.3. | While the historical trend of declining voter participation in the European elections is still ongoing, as the relatively high turnout in 2019 is still lower than the turnout between 1979 and 1994 [(1)](#ntr1-C_2020311EN.01002601-E0001), there are lessons that need to be learned from the most recent elections in order to boost informed public participation in the next European election cycle and in the long term. It is important to acknowledge that the substantially lower participation in European elections compared to participation in national elections is a long-standing trend [(2)](#ntr2-C_2020311EN.01002601-E0002), and to consider a higher participation of young and educated voters in the 2019 European elections as potential for a new, positive trend. |

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| | 1.4. | The EESC believes that for the EU institutions to adopt a more effective approach to the European public there needs to be a change in their mind-set, and they need to engage with the public, civil society and social partners in all communications, especially in campaigns, and seek their involvement by means of an emotional as well as a rational appeal. In this respect, the EESC welcomes the European Parliament’s new voter-oriented approach to public information campaigns and strongly supports its comprehensive plan to build upon the success of its most recent election campaign. The EESC calls for adequate budgetary and staffing allocations for the Parliament’s work on campaigns, in order to deepen and broaden its rich network of civil society affiliates, volunteers and opinion-makers, deliver a series of thematic campaigns over the next five years and prepare an agile 2024 election campaign. |

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| | 1.5. | The EESC calls for still closer cooperation between the Parliament, Commission and Member States, as well as with the EESC and the Committee of Regions and all relevant stakeholders, on a well thought-out design and on both decentralised and centralised delivery of future information campaigns on EU affairs and the next European elections, making them more effective in reaching, informing and engaging with a great majority of Europeans. |

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| | 1.6. | In the EESC’s view, disinformation poses a direct threat not only to the ability of people to take informed political decisions, but also to the European integration project and therefore to the European Union’s unity, prosperity and global influence. Weakening the EU’s democratic decision-making capabilities is in the interest of a range of foreign powers, as well as extremist groups that oppose European cooperation and stronger cohesion [(3)](#ntr3-C_2020311EN.01002601-E0003). The EESC would express its firm support for the EU’s current efforts to counter disinformation [(4)](#ntr4-C_2020311EN.01002601-E0004)– external and domestic — and urges the Commission to ensure full compliance and follow-up regulatory action in respect of the Code of Practice on Disinformation, further development of the recently established ‘rapid alert system’ and STRATCOM’s intelligence units, and the expansion of the European External Action Service’s action against disinformation, paralleled by considerable expansion of EU action against domestic disinformation. |

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| | 1.7. | The EESC calls for further action from the European Commission and Parliament on enabling adequate budgetary resources for action to increase societal resilience to disinformation, to expand the scope of monitoring to a wider range of external and domestic players that pose a threat, and to intensify information exchange across the institutions and Member States, and internationally. |

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| | 1.8. | The EESC strongly supports the European Commission’s proposal to develop a ‘European Democracy Action Plan’ which should be comprehensive and continuous, with the capacity to effect change, assured by financial support and inter-institutional coordination. The European Democracy Action Plan and related future initiatives should strive to do much more to achieve a free and plural media and quality independent journalism, effective regulation of social media, particularly to combat disinformation and including regulation of online political advertising and content responsibility, a modernised electoral process, the inclusion of disenfranchised groups, primarily persons with disabilities, and widespread civic education about the European Union and its democratic process in all Member States. The EESC recalls its proposal for an ambitious EU communication, education and public awareness strategy on fundamental rights and the rule of law and democracy [(5)](#ntr5-C_2020311EN.01002601-E0005). |

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| | 1.9. | The EESC calls on the EU institutions and the Croatian presidency to pay continuing attention to the EU’s budget-related negotiations on allocations for education on EU values, institutional affairs and citizenship, as a core vehicle for European democracy. Proper funding for the full spectrum of EU education efforts should be earmarked, as should measures proposed by the European Democracy Action Plan, and better coherence between the different budgetary components should be ensured. An increased share of funding for the successful Erasmus programme should be maintained, with a larger share of other EU programmes and the European Social Fund dedicated to this purpose. |

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| | 1.10. | To foster further political support for enhancing EU civic education, the EESC calls on the EU institutions (and the Croatian presidency) to support the EESC’s proposal for the establishment of a High-Level Expert Group on ‘Teaching Europe’ at European level, with Member State representatives and leading education experts. This group could provide policy proposals and recommendations for discussion by education ministers, which could lead to Council conclusions. The group could also initiate operational improvements, such as a central online platform with an inventory of existing teaching materials generated through EU-funded projects and national curricula, as suggested by the EESC. |

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| | 1.11. | The EESC calls on the Council and the Commission to pay special attention to the burning issue of the inclusion of persons with disabilities, ethnic minorities, migrants, rural poor and other disadvantaged social groups who have been chronically underrepresented in the European elections across the EU Member States. The EESC proposes that, within the scope of the European Democracy Action Plan, the Commission develop (1) a legal proposal on minimum standards for the accessibility of the EU electoral process to persons with disabilities; and (2) an ‘EU Roadmap for a more inclusive electoral process’, accompanied by a funding proposal to support Member States in their electoral modernisation and social inclusion efforts. |

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| | 1.12. | The new Commission should pursue further modernisation of the EU’s campaigning rules and the electoral process as soon as possible, building on the steps taken by the previous Commission [(6)](#ntr6-C_2020311EN.01002601-E0006). In this respect, the EESC strongly supports: (1) continuous, active work by election coordination networks with national focal points, which should act as a catalyst for rapid improvements; (2) enhanced regulatory oversight of European political parties in respect of transparency in campaigning and party finances, compliance with data protection rules and adherence to EU values; (3) additional incentives for European political parties to enhance their political consistency and public involvement across and beyond national member parties, (4) measures to allow full participation in the democratic process of all marginalised and disenfranchised social groups. The Commission should also enhance the enforcement of the rules mandating shared responsibility for developing media literacy not only between the EU and national institutions and civil society, but also among social media and digital platform companies, as well as political players. |

2.   Opportunities to enhance Europeans’ informed participation in elections

2.1.   More effective public information campaigns

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| | 2.1.1. | The EU’s engagement with the public through information and communication campaigns has improved considerably in recent years, with noticeable efforts to relate EU policies to specific areas of impact on everyday life, to use the views of ‘ordinary’ people to show the impact of EU initiatives, and to mobilise new technology to disseminate information. The EU institutions have extensive means for providing public information — through their liaison offices in Member States, through their websites and social media, through their press and media work, through EU agencies and many networks of experts and interested parties, and through their visitor services. |

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| | 2.1.2. | EU institutions and national governments should work further and harder, coordinate better, and cooperate more with civil society, social partners and EU institution offices in Member States to spread accurate information about EU legislation, policies and initiatives and to enable people and organisations to find out about, take an interest in and participate in EU matters. The EU institutions and the Member States should invest more in the capacity-building and empowerment of representative civil society organisations and social partners that promote the European idea in their own bottom-up campaigns for European values, and should use them as partners and catalysts in dialogue with the public. |

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| | 2.1.3. | The EU institutions have extensive budgets for public information, including campaigns, although these budgets are indisputably small compared to Member State government budgets for public information and campaigns (and also Member State local and regional government budgets for such activities). In addition, several Commission DGs support the efforts of civil society and the social partners to inform and engage Europeans in debates on specific EU policy areas through a variety of means. The positive role to be played by the EU institutions, as well as by European and national civil society, the social partners and independent media, should be expanded and duly reflected in the new EU budget. |

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| | 2.1.4. | The European Parliament has been particularly active in promoting interest and participation in the European elections. For its 2019 election campaign it sought to engage voters by means of emotionally charged messages tailored to their specific concerns, involve civil society and trade unions much more actively, and run a decentralised, much less institutional campaign with much greater multiplier effects. The ‘This time I’m voting’ campaign gave civil society organisations the opportunity (and funding) to carry out their own measures and communication to involve the public in the elections and to set out their own ideas and vision for the future of Europe. It has also inspired a wide range of social players, including the business community, to engage in get-out-the-vote campaigning. Based on evidence from the EP post-election survey [(7)](#ntr7-C_2020311EN.01002601-E0007), this broad and interactive campaign may have contributed to the increased voter turnout. |

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| | 2.1.5. | For future action aimed at enhancing Europeans’ political participation, it is important to bear in mind that there is a rising trend of positive identification with the EU, as evidenced by an 11 % increase in voters who said they voted in the European elections as they saw it as their civic duty, an 11 % increase in voters who voted because they were in favour of the EU and a 6 % increase in those who felt they could change things by voting. The key factors most likely to increase respondents’ inclination to vote in the next European Parliament elections were reported as: being better informed about the EU and its impact on daily life (43 %); having more young people stand as candidates (31 %); and having more women candidates (20 %). In addition, Europeans clearly expressed the need for more informed political participation, more inclusive election processes, more accountable political leadership and more effective institutional protection against abuse of the election process through political corruption, disinformation and cyber-attacks [(8)](#ntr8-C_2020311EN.01002601-E0008). |

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| | 2.1.6. | In future public information campaigns, the EU institutions should prioritise topics of special concern to voters, and these campaigns should take place throughout the political cycle, building a shared base of knowledge and affiliation with EU affairs prior to the next European elections. Special attention should be devoted to the penetration of information campaigns in all geographical areas and all layers of society, especially those on the margin of political participation and socioeconomic development who may be particularly vulnerable to malevolent disinformation campaigns due to their overall social exclusion [(9)](#ntr9-C_2020311EN.01002601-E0009). Proactive information outreach by EU institutions requires deeper dialogue with local communities across the EU, through closer collaboration with local media, local civil society groups, local authorities and civic education programmes. |

2.2.   Investing in media freedom and plurality and in journalism

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| | 2.2.1. | A free and plural media that provides Europeans with accurate, unbiased information is vital for informed debate about elections and political decision-making and is an essential weapon against disinformation. A free and plural media must be accountable for its content and transparent on ownership and its economic interests. |

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| | 2.2.2. | Despite the decline of ‘traditional’ (print and broadcast) media as a result of mass access to digital and social media, the websites and social media accounts of broadcasters, newspapers and journalists are heavily used, shared and commented upon by people online. |

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| | 2.2.3. | While European countries dominate the top spots of ‘good’ press freedom in the 2019 World Press Freedom Index [(10)](#ntr10-C_2020311EN.01002601-E0010) (9 EU Member States are among the 15 countries with ‘good press freedom’), and none fall into the worst ‘very serious situation’ category, 12 EU Member States are classified only as ‘fairly good’, while 6 are described as ‘problematic’, and one EU Member State is classified as ‘difficult’. Increasing violence and intimidation directed at journalists in EU Member States is a worrying trend for European democracy, as is any political interference in the media. |

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| | 2.2.4. | According to the 2017 results of the Media Pluralism Monitor [(11)](#ntr11-C_2020311EN.01002601-E0011), ‘market concentration is a source of medium or high risk for media pluralism in all of the EU countries, without exception. The economic difficulties of different traditional media outlets [...] suggest that media concentration is a phenomenon that is unlikely to recede in the future [...] a possible decline in market plurality remains a ubiquitous element of risk’. The EU must take antitrust measures to diversify media ownership and combat concentration and monopolies of media ownership. |

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| | 2.2.5. | Independent journalism is a public good, and the failure to achieve a diverse and plural media represents a clear market failure. Quality and diversity in journalism requires strengthening political and economic independence, and the quality of public service media and its long-term independent funding, which require new economic/business models. The EU should do more to support public service media, including initiatives to find new and sustainable funding models. In this respect, the EESC supports proposals for the 2021-2027 budget period to introduce a EUR 61 million sub-strand for Creative Europe, dedicated to quality journalism, including media pluralism and media literacy [(12)](#ntr12-C_2020311EN.01002601-E0012). However, it calls for much larger and more strategic public investment in professional journalism and media. |

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| | 2.2.6. | The EU should also do more to support independent media and investigative journalism, including transnational collaborative platforms. It should also support initiatives to find new ways to fund quality journalism, including non-profit models and new socially sustainable and inclusive economic models. |

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| | 2.2.7. | In addition, national and EU legislation against media monopolies and dominant market positions should be strengthened, monitored and enforced systematically. EU initiatives on monitoring media independence and ownership in Europe, such as the Media Pluralism Monitor, should be further supported. |

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| | 2.2.8. | The EU should continue to promote self-regulatory measures and bodies such as ethical codes and press councils to reinforce high standards of journalism, including in digital and social media. The EU must promote equal access to information for all media and oppose the arbitrary exclusion of journalists from press conferences and other governmental publications for political reasons. |

3.   Responding to opportunities and challenges posed by digital and social media

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| | 3.1. | Digital and social media open up access for most people to a greater range of information and views, which are also more rapidly available, and enables them to participate much more easily in the democratic debate enabled by social networks. It should also enable individuals to make their own decisions about filtering the information they wish to access. As many as 86 % of EU27 citizens used the internet in 2019 [(13)](#ntr13-C_2020311EN.01002601-E0013) and 90 % of EU27 households have internet access, although there are inequalities, with national household access ranging from 98 % in the Netherlands to 75 % in Bulgaria, which still enables considerable outreach [(14)](#ntr14-C_2020311EN.01002601-E0014). |

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| | 3.2. | Nonetheless, although digital and social media offers more people more opportunities to participate, there is an even greater concentration of ownership among social media platforms than among the traditional print and broadcast media, and complicated, commercially-driven secret algorithms serve to significantly filter the information available on people’s accounts. As a result, the breadth of information to which people are exposed may actually be narrower than via traditional print and broadcast media. The advent of social media has led to a proliferation of disinformation — made-up stories posted for various reasons, including to influence political debate and election results. Behind much of this disinformation are fake accounts. Researchers claim that in the 2016 US presidential election, disinformation had a significant impact on voter behaviour. |

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| | 3.3. | As part of the Commission’s initiatives to curtail disinformation and ensure transparent, fair and trustworthy online campaign activities ahead of recent European elections, in September 2018 online platforms, social networks and the advertising industry (including Facebook and Twitter) signed up to a self-regulatory Code of Practice [(15)](#ntr15-C_2020311EN.01002601-E0015) to tackle the spread of online disinformation and fake news. It sets a wide range of commitments, from transparency in political advertising to the closure of fake accounts and demonetisation of purveyors of disinformation [(16)](#ntr16-C_2020311EN.01002601-E0016). The Code is deemed to be an important pillar of the Commission’s Action Plan against Disinformation and has included an appendix with best practice from signatories [(17)](#ntr17-C_2020311EN.01002601-E0017). |

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| | 3.4. | All platforms took action in advance of the European elections by labelling political ads and making them publicly available via searchable ads libraries [(18)](#ntr18-C_2020311EN.01002601-E0018). Under the self-regulatory policy introduced by Facebook, political ads could be published only in a country for which the parties concerned had a warrant. As it became clear that the rule negatively affected European parties’ capacities to campaign across the EU, an ad hoc decision was made that European parties would be exempt from the rule [(19)](#ntr19-C_2020311EN.01002601-E0019). |

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| | 3.5. | However, the first annual self-assessment reports drawn up by the signatories to the code in October 2019 [(20)](#ntr20-C_2020311EN.01002601-E0020) and the June 2019 report by the European Regulators Group for Audiovisual Media Services (ERGA) [(21)](#ntr21-C_2020311EN.01002601-E0021) indicate that not all of the political ads in the platforms’ political advertising archives were correctly labelled as political advertising and that the archives still did not disclose sufficient data on audience micro-targeting to prevent voter manipulation and ensure greater transparency of political campaigning and advertising, including its financing sources and linkages to special interest groups. Furthermore, no common standards have been adopted by the signatories of the code to allow researchers and journalists to access personal data while respecting users’ right to privacy and consent. |

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| | 3.6. | In light of the shortcomings detected in self-regulation and the current assessment of the Code of Practice undertaken by the Commission, the EESC calls on the Commission to take legislative measures if the voluntary code proves to be insufficient on its own to achieve substantial progress towards the Commission’s aims. Self-regulation in the field of online disinformation needs to be greatly improved. In parallel, a comprehensive approach needs to be adopted regarding its regulation. The time is right to develop and propose the regulation of social media and digital platforms, with a focus on the transparency of all aspects of political advertising (financing, labelling and disclosure rules) and disinformation, in the new Commission’s electoral package and the European Democracy Action Plan. |

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| | 3.7. | Fostering online accountability should not only focus on transparency measures, exposing sources of information, but also consider the accountability of players in the ecosystem who profit from spreading misleading and sensationalist content. Disinformation is a symptom of concentrated, unaccountable digital markets, constant tracking and unlawful handling of personal data. Dominant social media companies make profits by generating profiling data through the spread of attention-grabbing content, regardless of its veracity. This type of data manipulation demands full and proper enforcement of the General Data Protection Regulation as a means of changing the balance of incentives for companies away from a model that relies on sensationalism and shock. If the fundamental business model of the platforms itself facilitates or propagates the problem, it is not sufficient to encourage platforms to adopt mechanisms of removal or verification. In addition, national and EU legislation need to address the dominant market positions of digital and social media companies and consider mandatory interoperability, putting in place common protocols in order to allow communication to flow across platforms. |

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| | 3.8. | It is necessary to ensure greater and broader involvement of EU institutions, civil society, the social partners, independent media, social media, online platforms and the public in order to counter disinformation [(22)](#ntr22-C_2020311EN.01002601-E0022). The Committee welcomes the European Commission’s initiative, undertaken by DG CONNECT, to create the European Digital Media Observatory — ‘a hub for fact-checkers, academics and researchers to collaborate with each other and actively link with media organisations and media literacy experts, and provide support to policy makers’ [(23)](#ntr23-C_2020311EN.01002601-E0023) — and advocates investing further funds in strengthening and developing it. |

4.   Preventing malevolent internet-driven interference in European elections

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| | 4.1. | Another threat enabled by the internet is easier interference in elections via fake accounts, social media trolls and state-run outlets. Although much focus has been placed on foreign interference, the reality is much more complex: domestic disinformation is at least as big a problem, and local proxies, new technologies and other developments (such as the use of closed groups) blur the distinction between foreign and domestic disinformation. Russia, for example, has been accused of influencing the US presidential elections in 2016, the UK Brexit referendum and several recent elections in the EU [(24)](#ntr24-C_2020311EN.01002601-E0024), as well as the European Parliament elections in May 2019 [(25)](#ntr25-C_2020311EN.01002601-E0025), but interference from other domestic and external players poses an equally worrying risk. |

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| | 4.2. | The European Commission’s Action Plan against Disinformation states that ‘according to reports, more than 30 countries are using disinformation and influencing activities’ [(26)](#ntr26-C_2020311EN.01002601-E0026). The European External Action Service has set up a service (East Stratcom Task Force) to monitor and expose ‘pro-Kremlin’ disinformation via its dedicated website [(27)](#ntr27-C_2020311EN.01002601-E0027) as well as ‘Western Balkans’ and ‘South’ strategic communication task forces. |

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| | 4.3. | The EEAS initiative to set up a ‘rapid alert system’ — in effect a network of Member State government officials working on disinformation — is welcome, and deserves to be strengthened and expanded, with Member States encouraged to ensure close information exchange between the rapid alert system and the recently established national election networks, which should in principle also involve specialised civil society organisations and fact-checkers. In the future, regular exchange of information should also be provided for between the rapid alert system and the Digital Media Observatory structures in each country and across the EU. |

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| | 4.4. | Considering the importance of interference prevention mechanisms for European democracy, the work of the European External Action Service’s initiatives against disinformation should be expanded and reinforced, including to monitor and counter disinformation from other countries and regions and to intensify information exchange with other similar prevention mechanisms, such as those set up by Canada and Australia. At the same time, EU action against domestic disinformation needs to be stepped up quite considerably, in a comprehensive way that enables timely monitoring, enhances professional journalism and fosters media literacy. |

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| | 4.5. | The EESC points out that with the COVID-19 crisis, which broke out after this opinion was prepared, it is even more urgent that further action be taken by the Commission to fight disinformation linked to the causes, spread and treatment of the infection, which can be detrimental for public health. The content of social media information related to the pandemic, if not duly monitored and channelled, might lead to harmful forms of behaviour and spread panic, putting at risk the health of the community. The EESC asks the European Commission to be vigilant and work with the Member States and social stakeholders to address the serious impact of such disinformation, coming both from domestic and foreign sources [(28)](#ntr28-C_2020311EN.01002601-E0028). |

5.   Improving Europeans’ media literacy and civic education

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| | 5.1. | The systematic promotion of media literacy and active citizenship among Europeans is vital for building up the EU’s resilience to anti-democratic tendencies and threats. As set out in its recent opinions [(29)](#ntr29-C_2020311EN.01002601-E0029), the EESC is calling for new momentum in activities to educate people about the EU, in the new political cycle of the EU institutions. The EESC interprets the Paris Declaration of 2015 [(30)](#ntr30-C_2020311EN.01002601-E0030) and the 2018 Council Recommendation [(31)](#ntr31-C_2020311EN.01002601-E0031) as a clear mandate from the Member States, supported by the 2016 EP resolution [(32)](#ntr32-C_2020311EN.01002601-E0032), to put teaching and learning about the European Union firmly on the policy agenda. |

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| | 5.2. | The EESC emphasises the need to implement the first principle of the European Pillar of Social Rights (EPSR) to make quality and inclusive education, training and life-long learning a right for all in Europe [(33)](#ntr33-C_2020311EN.01002601-E0033) and recommends incorporating education about the EU and EU identity-building into the EU2030 Strategy and the ET2030 Strategic Framework, and into the European Semester process (among the relevant country-specific recommendations), provided that accurate, systematic data are available [(34)](#ntr34-C_2020311EN.01002601-E0034). |

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| | 5.3. | To foster further political support for enhancing education about the EU, the EESC calls for the establishment of a High-Level Expert Group on ‘Teaching Europe’ at European level, with Member State representatives and leading education experts. This group could provide policy proposals and recommendations for discussion by education ministers, which could lead to Council conclusions. The group could also initiate operational improvements, such as a central online platform with an inventory of existing teaching materials generated through EU-funded projects and national curricula, as suggested by the EESC. |

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| | 5.4. | As a starting point for more comprehensive policy action, the EESC deems it necessary to undertake new, critical research, based on the 2013 Learning Europe at School study [(35)](#ntr35-C_2020311EN.01002601-E0035), into the current situation in the Member States regarding EU education in schools, teacher training and continuing professional development, as well as EU education programmes developed by civil society and the social partners [(36)](#ntr36-C_2020311EN.01002601-E0036). In addition, there is a need for a comprehensive review of educational capacities and funding sources to develop active citizenship skills among adults in the EU, in line with the revised EU Key Competences Framework for Lifelong Learning [(37)](#ntr37-C_2020311EN.01002601-E0037). |

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| | 5.5. | European civil society and the social partners have strongly advocated adequate funding for civic education on EU affairs, culture and citizenship, complementing national resources. The EU should support the Member States to ensure that school leaders, teachers and other educational staff are better equipped to promote critical thinking, democratic values and human rights, civic engagement and the responsible use of new technologies. Programmes that provide mobility support for exchanges of teachers, academics and students to help them experience EU values such as democracy, freedom and tolerance in other learning environments and in other EU Member States should be strengthened and expanded [(38)](#ntr38-C_2020311EN.01002601-E0038). |

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| | 5.6. | Media literacy for all generations in society, as well as training by and for journalists should be strongly promoted and financially supported by the EU across the EU Member States, in a systematic manner and in close cooperation with national education institutions and independent national agencies responsible for media regulation. The objective is to make a quick and broad leap towards higher media literacy amongst Europeans, in light of the growing threats posed by widespread and often malevolent disinformation. |

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| | 5.7. | The EU should provide timely support to Member States in their efforts to meet their new media obligation to promote and take measures for the development of media literacy skills, including new education programmes and effective oversight of video-sharing platforms, as defined in the recently revised Audio-visual Media Services Directive (AVMSD). In this respect, the EESC is expecting clear guidelines from the Media Literacy Expert Group, which will meet in Zagreb, Croatia, on 30 March 2020, during the second Media Literacy Week — a new EU-wide awareness-raising initiative launched last year. |

6.   Making European elections more inclusive

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| | 6.1. | Different social groups may be at risk of electoral exclusion across the EU — persons with disabilities, ethnic minorities (especially Roma), trans-European migrant workers and immigrants, as well as the poor, unemployed, uneducated and rural sections of society. Considering the fact that still half of Europeans do not take part in European elections, structural inequalities influencing electoral behaviour need to be addressed in the upcoming policy initiatives to strengthen European democracy and ensure equal treatment of all Europeans in the next European elections. |

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| | 6.2. | As analysed in the EESC’s detailed information report of March 2019 [(39)](#ntr39-C_2020311EN.01002601-E0039), many people across all the 27 EU countries are not able to take part in the European elections due to legal and organisational barriers which deprive persons with disabilities of their political rights. About 800 000 Europeans from 16 Member States are, on account of national rules, deprived of the right to participate in EP elections because of their disability or mental health problems, while additional millions of Europeans do not have the possibility to vote because of organisational arrangements (technical barriers) which do not take into account the needs resulting from their disability. |

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| | 6.3. | The EESC proposes that the new electoral reform package and the European Democracy Action Plan envisage an ‘EU Roadmap for an inclusive electoral process’ with an accompanying funding proposal to support Member States in the necessary modernisation of election administration, entailing technological adjustments and support services for disadvantaged social groups who tend to be excluded from the electoral process and manifest lower levels of political participation in a given national context. The Roadmap should be based on an in-depth mapping of barriers faced by different social groups at risk of electoral exclusion, undertaken in collaboration with national election authorities, ombudsmen institutions and respective national civil society organisations and their European networks. |

| | | |
| --- | --- | --- |
| | 6.4. | Current EU legislation already addresses a number of issues concerning EP elections. Thus, there are no formal obstacles to this legislation also including guarantees on voting options for persons with disabilities. According to the EESC, if best practice from across all countries were implemented, an ideal system would emerge in which every European with disabilities would not only have the full possibility to vote but also be able to choose for themselves the most convenient way in which to vote. |

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| --- | --- | --- |
| | 6.5. | Hence, in the context of the upcoming political debate on European electoral reform and the new European Democracy Action Plan, the EESC proposes that, in addition to more comprehensive measures set out in the proposed ‘EU Roadmap for an inclusive electoral process’, a legal initiative be considered that would set minimum voting standards for persons with disabilities. The proposal should be developed through a policy dialogue with national election authorities, experts on social inclusion and elections, and civil society organisations representing persons with disabilities. |

7.   Encouraging European political parties to be citizen-oriented and accountable

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| --- | --- | --- |
| | 7.1. | As defined in the 1992 Maastricht Treaty, ‘political parties at European level are important as a factor for integration within the Union. They contribute to forming a European awareness and to expressing the political will of the citizens of the Union.’ The relatively recent and gradual development of European political parties as supranational political players with integrated governance structures that can deliver coherent political agendas and mobilise voters across the EU represents a structural challenge for Europeans’ political participation. Specifically, the regulatory framework for the governance and funding of European parties has evolved only since the Nice Treaty in 2003 and remains rather limited in terms of organisational and programmatic coherence, which should be conducive to European parties’ ability to shape and enhance the EU’s political integration, based on common values and public involvement. |

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| --- | --- | --- |
| | 7.2. | Further regulation should strive to stimulate European political parties’ active promotion of the EU’s values, their transnational political coherence and organisational capacities to engage with people across and beyond their highly diverse national party members in many different parts of the EU. |

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| --- | --- | --- |
| | 7.3. | In this regard, the EESC welcomes the Commission’s proposal to better enforce the European parties’ legal obligation to observe the EU’s founding values as expressed in TEU Article 2, which also applies to their national members. This relates to the values espoused in their political programmes and campaigns, and to their internal practices of gender equality and anti-discrimination, as well as their respect for the rule of law and anti-corruption. If deemed necessary, the Commission could ask the Authority for European Political Parties and European Political Foundations to verify compliance with the conditions set out in the Regulation [(40)](#ntr40-C_2020311EN.01002601-E0040). |

| | | |
| --- | --- | --- |
| | 7.4. | Further regulatory action should take into account the current policy debate and policy proposals, including a range of policy ideas on developing European parties so that they are closer and more accountable to the European public, for example through declarations by national parties of their intended European party affiliation, transnational party lists, transparent fundraising and campaigning, individual membership, grassroots outreach to civil society and the social partners, and accountability for political content that blatantly undermines EU common values [(41)](#ntr41-C_2020311EN.01002601-E0041). These issues should also be put on the agenda of the Conference on the Future of Europe, which will hopefully provide a substantive opportunity for the broad and informed participation of civil society, social partners and European public in the EU’s democratic reform. |

Brussels, 10 June 2020.

The President of the European Economic and Social Committee

Luca JAHIER

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[(1)](#ntc1-C_2020311EN.01002601-E0001)  https://op.europa.eu/en/publication-detail/-/publication/1f2a7ac7-d8f7-11e9-9c4e-01aa75ed71a1/language-en/format-PDF/source-search. It should be noted that the European citizens’ voter turnout in elections has declined since the early 1990s, as evidenced by 20 % decline in the so-called new Member States and 10 % decline in so-called older Member States.

[(2)](#ntc2-C_2020311EN.01002601-E0002)  Voter turnout was 45 % in the 2004 European Parliament elections, 43 % in 2009, 42,6 % in 2014 and then increased in 2019 to 50,66 %, which was the first time since 1979 that the number of voters rose in respect to past elections. Source: https://blogs.eurac.edu/eureka/david-vs-goliath-of-voter-turnout-why-is-the-participation-in-eu-elections-so-low/

[(3)](#ntc3-C_2020311EN.01002601-E0003)  https://medium.com/we-are-the-european-journalism-centre/more-than-meets-the-eye-tips-to-find-eu-funding-for-journalism-92f3f1143042

[(4)](#ntc4-C_2020311EN.01002601-E0004)  EU Action Plan on Disinformation, https://eeas.europa.eu/sites/eeas/files/action\_plan\_against\_disinformation.pdf

[(5)](#ntc5-C_2020311EN.01002601-E0005)  [OJ C 282, 20.8.2019, p. 39](http://publications.europa.eu/resource/oj/JOC_2019_282_R_TOC), Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the European Council and the Council on Further strengthening the Rule of Law within the Union — State of play and possible next steps, 3 April 2019.

[(6)](#ntc6-C_2020311EN.01002601-E0006)  https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/IP\_18\_5681

[(7)](#ntc7-C_2020311EN.01002601-E0007)  https://www.europarl.europa.eu/at-your-service/files/be-heard/eurobarometer/2019/election2019/EB915\_SP\_EUROBAROMETER\_POSTEE19\_FIRSTRESULTS\_EN.pdf

[(8)](#ntc8-C_2020311EN.01002601-E0008)  These are the findings from the same source as above — EU Post-Election Survey from June 2019 — which encompassed 22 464 respondents.

[(9)](#ntc9-C_2020311EN.01002601-E0009)  [OJ C 97, 24.3.2020, p. 53](http://publications.europa.eu/resource/oj/JOC_2020_097_R_TOC).

[(10)](#ntc10-C_2020311EN.01002601-E0010)  https://rsf.org/en/world-press-freedom-index

[(11)](#ntc11-C_2020311EN.01002601-E0011)  https://cmpf.eui.eu/media-pluralism-monitor/mpm-2017-2/

[(12)](#ntc12-C_2020311EN.01002601-E0012)  https://medium.com/we-are-the-european-journalism-centre/more-than-meets-the-eye-tips-to-find-eu-funding-for-journalism-92f3f1143042

[(13)](#ntc13-C_2020311EN.01002601-E0013)  https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/databrowser/view/tin00028/default/table?lang=en

[(14)](#ntc14-C_2020311EN.01002601-E0014)  https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/databrowser/view/tin00134/default/table?lang=en

[(15)](#ntc15-C_2020311EN.01002601-E0015)  https://ec.europa.eu/commission/news/code-practice-against-disinformation-2019-jan-29\_en

[(16)](#ntc16-C_2020311EN.01002601-E0016)  https://ec.europa.eu/digital-single-market/en/news/code-practice-disinformation

[(17)](#ntc17-C_2020311EN.01002601-E0017)  A progress report published in June 2019 claimed, inter alia, that ‘Facebook disabled 2,2 billion fake accounts in the first quarter of 2019 and acted specifically against 1 574 non-EU-based and 168 EU-based pages, groups and accounts engaged in inauthentic behaviour targeting EU Member States’ while ‘Twitter reported on rejecting more than 6 000 ads targeted at the EU for violation of its unacceptable business practices ads policy as well as about 10 000 EU-targeted ads for violations of its quality ads policy.’

[(18)](#ntc18-C_2020311EN.01002601-E0018)  https://ec.europa.eu/digital-single-market/en/news/action-plan-against-disinformation-report-progress

[(19)](#ntc19-C_2020311EN.01002601-E0019)  https://twitter.com/alemannoEU/status/1119270730280132610

[(20)](#ntc20-C_2020311EN.01002601-E0020)  https://ec.europa.eu/digital-single-market/en/news/annual-self-assessment-reports-signatories-code-practice-disinformation-2019

[(21)](#ntc21-C_2020311EN.01002601-E0021)  http://erga-online.eu/wp-content/uploads/2019/06/ERGA-2019-06\_Report-intermediate-monitoring-Code-of-Practice-on-disinformation.pdf

[(22)](#ntc22-C_2020311EN.01002601-E0022)  https://ec.europa.eu/commission/sites/beta-political/files/eu-communication-disinformation-euco-05122018\_en.pdf

[(23)](#ntc23-C_2020311EN.01002601-E0023)  https://ec.europa.eu/digital-single-market/en/news/commission-launches-call-create-european-digital-media-observatory

[(24)](#ntc24-C_2020311EN.01002601-E0024)  https://carnegieendowment.org/files/CP\_333\_BrattbergMaurer\_Russia\_Elections\_Interference\_FINAL.pdf

[(25)](#ntc25-C_2020311EN.01002601-E0025)  https://www.politicalcapital.hu/pc-admin/source/documents/pc\_russian\_meddling\_ep2019\_eng\_web\_20190520.pdf

[(26)](#ntc26-C_2020311EN.01002601-E0026)  https://ec.europa.eu/commission/sites/beta-political/files/eu-communication-disinformation-euco-05122018\_en.pdf

[(27)](#ntc27-C_2020311EN.01002601-E0027)  https://euvsdisinfo.eu/

[(28)](#ntc28-C_2020311EN.01002601-E0028)  https://www.disinfo.eu/coronavirus/

[(29)](#ntc29-C_2020311EN.01002601-E0029)  [OJ C 353, 18.10.2019, p. 52](http://publications.europa.eu/resource/oj/JOC_2019_353_R_TOC); [OJ C 228, 5.7.2019, p. 68](http://publications.europa.eu/resource/oj/JOC_2019_228_R_TOC).

[(30)](#ntc30-C_2020311EN.01002601-E0030)  Paris Declaration, 17.3.2015.

[(31)](#ntc31-C_2020311EN.01002601-E0031)  Council Recommendation of 22 May 2018 on promoting common values, inclusive education, and the European dimension of teaching ([OJ C 195, 7.6.2018, p. 1](http://publications.europa.eu/resource/oj/JOC_2018_195_R_TOC)).

[(32)](#ntc32-C_2020311EN.01002601-E0032)  European Parliament resolution of 12 April 2016 on Learning EU at school (2015/2138(INI)) ([OJ C 58, 15.2.2018, p. 57](http://publications.europa.eu/resource/oj/JOC_2018_058_R_TOC)).

[(33)](#ntc33-C_2020311EN.01002601-E0033)  [OJ C 228, 5.7.2019, p. 68](http://publications.europa.eu/resource/oj/JOC_2019_228_R_TOC).

[(34)](#ntc34-C_2020311EN.01002601-E0034)  [OJ C 228, 5.7.2019, p. 68](http://publications.europa.eu/resource/oj/JOC_2019_228_R_TOC).

[(35)](#ntc35-C_2020311EN.01002601-E0035)  https://op.europa.eu/en/publication-detail/-/publication/83be95a3-b77f-4195-bd08-ad92c24c3a3c

[(36)](#ntc36-C_2020311EN.01002601-E0036)  [OJ C 353, 18.10.2019, p. 52](http://publications.europa.eu/resource/oj/JOC_2019_353_R_TOC).

[(37)](#ntc37-C_2020311EN.01002601-E0037)  Council Recommendation of 22 May 2018 on key competences for lifelong learning ([OJ C 189, 4.6.2018, p. 1](http://publications.europa.eu/resource/oj/JOC_2018_189_R_TOC)).

[(38)](#ntc38-C_2020311EN.01002601-E0038)  https://www.csee-etuce.org/images/attachments/ST\_Citizenship\_2018.pdf

[(39)](#ntc39-C_2020311EN.01002601-E0039)  EESC information report on the ‘Real rights of persons with disabilities to vote in European Parliament elections’, 20 March 2019.

[(40)](#ntc40-C_2020311EN.01002601-E0040)  https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/DOC/?uri=CELEX:52019DC0343&from=EN

[(41)](#ntc41-C_2020311EN.01002601-E0041)  https://www.idea.int/sites/default/files/publications/reconnecting-european-political-parties-with-european-union-citizens.pdf; https://carnegieeurope.eu/2019/11/06/six-ideas-for-rejuvenating-european-democracy-pub-80279; https://euroflections.se/globalassets/ovrigt/euroflections/euroflections\_v3.pdf

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