ALD-157 NOT PRECEDENTIAL 

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 

FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 

__________ 

No. 24-1721 

___________ 

JOSE DANNY COLLADO-LANTIGUA, 

 Petitioner 

v. 

ATTORNEY GENERAL UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 

____________________________________ 

On Petition for Review of an Order of the 

Board of Immigration Appeals 

(Agency No. A040-548-356) 

Immigration Judge David Cheng 

____________________________________ 

Submitted on the Respondent’s Motion for Possible Summary Action

Pursuant to Third Circuit L.A.R. 27.4 and I.O.P. 10.6 

July 25, 2024 

Before: HARDIMAN, MONTGOMERY-REEVES, and NYGAARD, Circuit Judges

(Opinion filed: August 20, 2024) 

_________ 

OPINION*

_________ 

PER CURIAM 

 Jose Collado-Lantigua, a native and citizen of the Dominican Republic, was 

*

 This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not 

constitute binding precedent.
2 

admitted to the United States as a lawful permanent resident in 1987, and he has since 

remained in the United States, raising his United States citizen children largely on his 

own and working for many years as a truck driver. In 2017, after the United States 

Citizenship and Immigration Services denied his application for naturalization, he was 

charged as removable for having been convicted of a controlled substance offense, see 8 

U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(B)(i), and an “illicit trafficking” aggravated felony, see 8 U.S.C. §§ 

1101(a)(43)(B), 1227(a)(2)(A)(iii). The charges were based on the following allegations: 

[] You were, on January 26, 1993, convicted in the Superior Court of New 

Jersey at Middlesex County of the offense of Distribution of CDS On/Near 

School Property, to wit: Cocaine, in violation of N.J.S.A. 2C:35-5al and 

2C:35-7. 

[] You were, on April 8, 1997, convicted in the Superior Court of New 

Jersey at Middlesex County of the offense of Failure to Make Proper 

Disposition of CDS, in violation of N.J.S.A. 2C:35-10c. 

R. 623. He seems to have conceded the allegations through counsel. R. 78 (seeming to 

answer “yes” to the concession question after first saying “Your honor, actually --”).1

 

The IJ sustained the charges. R. 79. Collado-Lantigua applied for a § 212(c) waiver, 

which allows persons convicted of crimes before April 1, 1997, to seek discretionary 

relief from removal if they meet certain criteria.2

 See 8 U.S.C. § 1182(c) (repealed); see 

also INS v. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. 289, 326 (2001) (holding that a § 212(c) waiver remains 

1

 Thereafter, the allegations were considered conceded without objection. 

2

 In his § 212(c) application, he stated that it was his 1993 conviction that rendered him 

removable, and that his 1997 conviction, which was a disorderly persons offense for 

which he received probation, did not qualify as an aggravated felony or trafficking 

offense. R. 115. 
3 

available for certain aliens who were eligible for relief under that section before its repeal 

in 1996); Perez v. Elwood, 294 F.3d 552, 556-57 (3d Cir. 2002) (describing the statutory 

background). 

The Immigration Judge (“IJ”) pretermitted the application, concluding that 

Collado-Lantigua was ineligible for § 212(c) relief because he was convicted of a 

violation of probation on April 22, 1998, which related back to the 1997 offense. R. 73 

& 74. At the same time, the IJ denied a motion for a continuance to brief the issue. Id. 

Collado-Lantigua took an appeal to the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA). In his 

counseled brief (R. 12-22), he pursued one issue, arguing that the IJ erred in relying on 

the violation of probation to rule him ineligible for § 212(c) relief. The BIA did not reach 

the issue, instead reviewing Collado-Lantigua’s eligibility for § 212(c) relief de novo, see 

8 C.F.R. § 1003.1(d)(3)(iii). R. 3-4. In consideration of Perez, see 294 F.3d at 562, and 

the facts of Collado-Lantigua’s case (a guilty verdict in January 1997 and a judgment of 

sentence entered on April 8, 1997), the BIA concluded that he was ineligible for a § 

212(c) waiver because he was convicted after April 1, 1997. Id. 

Collado-Lantigua timely filed a counseled petition for review.3 The Government 

presents a motion to summarily deny it, which Collado-Lantigua opposes. 

Because of the bases on which Collado-Lantigua was ordered removed, our 

jurisdiction is limited to “constitutional claims [and] questions of law.” 8 U.S.C. 

§§ 1252(a)(2)(C), (D); see also Chavez-Alvarez v. Att’y Gen., 783 F.3d 478, 481-82 (3d 

3

 He also submitted a motion for a stay of removal, which we denied. See 3d Cir. Doc. 

No. 16. 
4 

Cir. 2015); Guzman v. Att’y Gen., 770 F.3d 1077, 1082 (3d Cir. 2014). Where, as here, 

the BIA issues its own decision on the merits instead of summarily affirming or adopting 

the IJ’s decision, we review its decision, not that of the IJ. See id. We review legal 

challenges de novo.4 See Chavez-Alvarez, 783 F.3d at 482. Upon review, we will grant 

the Government’s motion and summarily deny the petition for review because it does not 

present a substantial question. See 3d Cir. L.A.R. 27.4; 3d Cir. I.O.P. 10.6. 

As the Government argues, the BIA’s ruling, that Collado-Lantigua is not eligible 

for § 212(c) relief because his judgment of sentence for the 1997 conviction was entered 

on April 8, 1997, is consistent with our ruling in Perez. Even assuming that we could put 

aside Collado-Lantigua’s concession to the factual allegation that he was convicted on 

April 8, 1997, R. 78, he was convicted on that date under the rationale of Perez, as the 

BIA concluded. 

 In Perez, we looked to the definition of conviction in the Immigration and 

Nationality Act and how it applied to the facts of that case. See 294 F.3d at 561-62. 

“Conviction” can mean “a formal judgment of guilt of the alien entered by a court.” 8 

U.S.C. § 1101(a)(48). “[O]r, if adjudication of guilt has been withheld,” there is a 

4

 However, we cannot reach issues that were not exhausted in the agency. See 8 U.S.C. 

1252(d)(1) (providing that a court may review final order of removal only if “the alien 

has exhausted all administrative remedies available to the [non-citizen] as of right”); 

Bonhometre v. Gonzales, 414 F.3d 442, 446-47 (3d Cir. 2005) (noting that, to exhaust 

administrative remedies, an a non-citizen must give the agency “the opportunity to 

resolve a controversy or correct its own errors before judicial intervention.”) (citation 

omitted). Accordingly, we cannot review Collado-Lantigua’s arguments that his 1997 

conviction did not constitute a controlled substance offense because, inter alia, it was 

merely a conviction for disorderly conduct offense, and New Jersey considers it a petty 

offense, not a crime. 
5 

conviction “where (i) a judge or jury has found the alien guilty or the alien has entered a 

plea of guilty or nolo contendere or has admitted sufficient facts to warrant a finding of 

guilt, and (ii) the judge has ordered some form of punishment, penalty, or restraint on the 

alien’s liberty to be imposed.” Id. In Perez, because the non-citizen had been convicted 

in federal court, we defined “formal judgment of guilt” by reference to the definition of 

“judgment of conviction” in Rule 32 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, which 

provides that the judgment of conviction must “set forth the plea, verdict or findings, the 

adjudication, and the sentence.” Id. at 562. 

Collado-Lantigua was convicted in the New Jersey Superior Court, so we similarly 

look to the definition of judgment in the New Jersey Rules of Court to inform the 

understanding of “formal judgment of guilt” in this case. Under New Jersey Rule 3:21-5, 

“[a] judgment of conviction shall set forth the plea, the verdict or findings, the 

adjudication and sentence, a statement of the reasons for such sentence, and a statement 

of credits received pursuant to R. 3:21-8.” Accordingly, Collado-Lantigua’s conviction 

occurred when his “formal judgment of guilt ... [was] entered by a court,” 8 U.S.C. § 

1101(a)(48)(A), (and such a judgment must [“set forth the plea, the verdict or findings, 

the adjudication and sentence, a statement of the reasons for such sentence, and a 

statement of credits received pursuant to R. 3:21-8,” N.J. R. 3:21-5]).” Perez, 294 F.3d at 

562. Like Perez, Collado-Lantigua was found guilty by jury in January 1997 but 

sentenced after April 1, 1997. And, similar to Perez’s case, it was after sentencing that 

the court filed a judgment that included the plea, the verdict, the adjudication, the 

sentence, and a statement of credits received. R. 497. Accordingly, it follows that 
6 

Collado-Lantigua “was convicted after April 1, 1997,” and, because “Congress ... 

removed the possibility of § 212(c) relief for [non-citizens] who were convicted after the 

April 1, 1997 repeal of former INA § 212(c),” the BIA did not err in concluding that he 

was ineligible for a § 212(c) waiver.5

 

In response to the Government’s motion, Collado-Lantigua argues we should not 

apply Perez because his case is more like Ponnapula v. Ashcroft, 373 F.3d 480 (3d Cir. 

2004). He argues that he, like Ponnapula, relied on the availability of § 212(c) relief 

when he rejected a plea agreement and went to trial. Collado-Lantigua is right that, in 

Ponnapula, we held that some non-citizens who affirmatively turned down a plea 

agreement and went to trial are entitled to apply for § 212(c) relief despite its repeal. See

373 F.3d at 494-96. However, even if we accepted his assertions that he rejected a plea 

in favor of trial, he is not in the same group of non-citizens as Ponnapula; that group is 

constituted of non-citizens “who went to trial and were convicted prior to the effective 

date of IIRIRA's repeal of former § 212(c).” Id. at 494; see also id. at 494 n.12; see also 

Cespedes-Aquino v. Att’y Gen., 498 F.3d 221, 224 (3d Cir. 2007) (“We explicitly stated 

in Ponnapula . . . that our holding was limited to cases where the conviction occurred 

before the effective date of section 212(c)’s repeal and that the holding did not impair 

Perez’s precedential value.”) It is the timing of the conviction, not the timing of the 

5

 Because the BIA’s ruling regarding the applicability of § 212(c) relief to the 1997 

conviction is the only question before the Court, we do not consider whether ColladoLantigua could have been eligible for some other relief from removal. 
7 

rejection of any plea, that controls. See Cespedes-Aquino, 498 F.3d at 225 (“[I]f the 

underlying conviction occurs after the repeal, . . . section 212(c) relief is not available.”) 

 For these reasons, we grant the Government’s motion, and we will deny the 

petition for review.