[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it may be cited as State 

ex rel. Stevenson v. King, Slip Opinion No. 2022-Ohio-3093.]

NOTICE

This slip opinion is subject to formal revision before it is published in an 

advance sheet of the Ohio Official Reports. Readers are requested to 

promptly notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of Ohio, 65 

South Front Street, Columbus, Ohio 43215, of any typographical or other 

formal errors in the opinion, in order that corrections may be made before 

the opinion is published.

SLIP OPINION NO. 2022-OHIO-3093

THE STATE EX REL. STEVENSON, APPELLEE, v. KING, MAYOR, ET AL.,

APPELLANTS.

[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it 

may be cited as State ex rel. Stevenson v. King, Slip Opinion No. 

2022-Ohio-3093.]

Mandamus—Public Records Act, R.C. 149.43—Attorney fees—Petition seeking to 

compel the East Cleveland mayor and finance director to produce records 

to the city-council president related to funds received and spent by the city 

under the Coronavirus Aid, Relief, and Economic Security Act, 15 U.S.C. 

9001 et seq. (“the CARES Act”) was correctly granted because the mayor 

and finance director failed to present sufficient evidence to support their 

claim that no written records existed pertaining to the application for and 

award of CARES Act grant money and because they failed to authenticate 

the evidence submitted in support of their claim that records pertaining to 

the appropriation and expenditure of CARES Act money had already been 

shared with the city council through regular financial reports—Attorney 
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2

fees were improperly awarded for pro se litigant who failed to demonstrate 

the existence of an attorney-client relationship between the attorney who 

was awarded fees and herself individually or the city council.

(No. 2021-1138—Submitted June 14, 2022—Decided September 7, 2022.)

APPEAL from the Court of Appeals for Cuyahoga County, No. 110221,

2021-Ohio-1093.

__________________

Per Curiam.

{¶ 1} Appellee, Korean Stevenson, brought a mandamus action in the 

Eighth District Court of Appeals seeking to compel appellants, East Cleveland 

Mayor Brandon King and East Cleveland Finance Director Charles Iyahen, to 

produce records related to certain public expenditures. The court of appeals denied 

two of Stevenson’s claims for relief but granted a third, issuing a writ of mandamus 

directing King and Iyahen to produce documents in response to a public-records 

request. In a subsequent order, the court of appeals ordered King and Iyahen to pay 

attorney fees.

{¶ 2} The matter is now before this court on King and Iyahen’s appeal of 

right. We affirm the Eighth District’s judgment granting a writ of mandamus, but 

we reverse the court of appeals’ judgment granting an award of attorney fees.

I. Background

{¶ 3} Stevenson is president of the East Cleveland City Council (“the city 

council”). She was elected to the position in September 2020.

{¶ 4} In March 2020, in response to the COVID-19 pandemic, the United 

States Congress passed the Coronavirus Aid, Relief, and Economic Security Act, 

15 U.S.C. 9001 et seq. (“the CARES Act”). East Cleveland received funds from 

the CARES Act. According to Stevenson, she learned in November 2020 that King 

was spending money without authorization from the city council and that King’s 

expenditures included CARES Act funds that had not been appropriated by the city 
January Term, 2022

3

council. Stevenson requested documentation from King showing how certain funds 

had been spent.

{¶ 5} On November 6, 2020, the city council approved Resolution 39-20, 

authorizing it to retain the law firm McDonald Humphrey, L.L.C., as special 

counsel and approving a budget of $50,000 to pay the firm. Three days later, King 

vetoed the resolution.

{¶ 6} On November 18, 2020, Jonathan M. McDonald, an attorney with

McDonald Humphrey, sent a letter to Iyahen stating:

As you are aware, the East Cleveland City Council has 

engaged the attorneys at McDonald Humphrey, LLC and the 

undersigned lawyer as special legal counsel. In that regard, we have 

been tasked with facilitating the production of documents 

concerning financial records related to federal funds (i.e., money) 

sent to the City of East Cleveland by and through the enactment of 

the federal Coronavirus Aid, Relief and Economic Security 

(CARES) Act.

It is our understanding that the Finance Department is in 

possession of those documents. As such, we are requesting all 

documents including, but not limited to, award letters, grant 

applications, executed contracts, disbursement receipts, and 

financial reports which outline where, when, and how the money has 

been disbursed to date.

(Footnotes omitted.) On the same day, East Cleveland’s law director advised 

Iyahen that McDonald Humphrey was not retained by the city council because the 

mayor had vetoed the resolution that would have allowed the firm to be retained. 

“Nevertheless,” the law director wrote, “Mr. McDonald is certainly welcome to 
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submit a public records request as a private citizen as long as he understands he has 

not been retained by the East Cleveland City Council; and will not be reimbursed 

for his efforts.”

{¶ 7} On January 11, 2021, Stevenson filed a complaint for a writ of 

mandamus in the Eighth District against King and Iyahen. Stevenson asked for 

three forms of relief: (1) a writ compelling King and Iyahen to allocate and provide 

the city council with $50,000 to pay for the services of special counsel, (2) a writ 

compelling King and Iyahen to submit all contracts and expenditures for amounts 

in excess of $2,500 to the city council for approval,1and (3) a writ compelling King 

and Iyahen to produce any and all financial documents relating to CARES Act 

money, including financial reports showing where, when, and how the money has

been disbursed.

{¶ 8} King and Iyahen filed a motion to dismiss. The motion included 9

exhibits, totaling more than 100 pages. The motion did not include an affidavit 

authenticating the exhibits. The court of appeals sua sponte converted the motion 

to dismiss to a motion for summary judgment and then held the motion in abeyance 

pending discovery. King and Iyahen filed a counterclaim, alleging that Stevenson 

was preventing the city council from appropriating funds by refusing to schedule 

regular council meetings. They demanded a writ of mandamus compelling

Stevenson to put a permanent appropriations ordinance on the city council’s 

agenda.

{¶ 9} Stevenson filed a brief in opposition to the motion for summary 

judgment, with affidavits, as well as a cross-motion for summary judgment on her 

1. Section 72 of the East Cleveland City Charter requires the mayor to seek the city council’s

approval before making any contract or purchase in excess of $2,500. American Legal Publishing, 

Charter of the City of East Cleveland, Section 72, available at 

https://codelibrary.amlegal.com/codes/eastcleveland/latest/eastcleveland_oh/0-0-0-382 (accessed 

Aug. 18, 2022) [https://perma.cc/9MFT-AVNM]; see also The City of East Cleveland, Ohio, City 

Charter & Codified Ordinances, at https://eastcleveland.org/government/city_charter___codified

_ordinances/index.php (accessed Aug. 18, 2022) [https://perma.cc/7P4L-UYNY].
January Term, 2022

5

own claims and a motion to dismiss the counterclaim. King and Iyahen filed an 

omnibus response to the motions, which included hundreds of pages of exhibits,

but again, they did not provide an affidavit authenticating their exhibits.

{¶ 10} On March 29, 2021, the court of appeals issued a decision and 

judgment entry disposing of the motions. 2021-Ohio-1093. The court granted 

Stevenson’s motion to dismiss the counterclaim for a writ of mandamus compelling 

her to schedule items on the city council’s agenda. Id. at ¶ 74. With respect to the 

cross-motions for summary judgment, the court ruled in favor of King and Iyahen 

as to counts one and two of Stevenson’s complaint (i.e., the counts seeking to 

compel the mayor to allocate $50,000 to pay for special counsel and to submit all 

contracts and expenditures in excess of $2,500 to the city council for approval),

denying the request for a writ of mandamus. Id. at ¶ 26, 37. But the court granted 

summary judgment in favor of Stevenson on count three, “granting a writ of 

mandamus directing Iyahen to produce records responsive to the records request

submitted to him on November 18, 2020.” Id. at ¶ 58.2 In addition, the court 

awarded Stevenson court costs and attorney fees and ordered briefing to establish 

the amount of the attorney fees. Id. at ¶ 62.

{¶ 11} On July 30, 2021, the court of appeals awarded attorney fees to 

Stevenson in the amount of $7,996.86. King and Iyahen appealed, challenging the 

Eighth District’s judgment granting a writ of mandamus on the public-records claim 

and awarding attorney fees to Stevenson.

II. Legal analysis

A. Standard of review

{¶ 12} To be entitled to a writ of mandamus, a party must establish by clear 

and convincing evidence (1) a clear legal right to the requested relief, (2) a clear 

2. Although the court issued the writ of mandamus against both King and Iyahen, the court directed 

Iyahen specifically to respond to the public-records request because the request was submitted to 

him and he is the custodian of the records being sought.
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legal duty on the part of the respondent to provide it, and (3) the lack of an adequate 

remedy in the ordinary course of the law. State ex rel. Love v. O’Donnell, 150 Ohio 

St.3d 378, 2017-Ohio-5659, 81 N.E.3d 1250, ¶ 3. We review de novo a court of 

appeals’ grant of summary judgment in a mandamus action. State ex rel. Ames v. 

Portage Cty. Bd. of Commrs., 165 Ohio St.3d 292, 2021-Ohio-2374, 178 N.E.3d 

492, ¶ 11. Likewise, we review de novo a court of appeals’ determination regarding 

attorney fees. State ex rel. Armatas v. Plain Twp. Bd. of Trustees, 163 Ohio St.3d 

304, 2021-Ohio-1176, 170 N.E.3d 19, ¶ 12.

B. The decision to grant a writ of mandamus

{¶ 13} In their motion to dismiss, King and Iyahen argued that, as of the 

date of the public-records request, there were no contracts or receipts relating to 

CARES Act funds, “as can be seen from Respondent Iyahen’s Financial responses 

to same as well as his regular reports.” The motion referred to the month-to-date 

and year-to-date fund reports and the combined expenditures ledger for the period 

ending December 31, 2020, which were attached as exhibits, as proof of this

assertion. As for the requested financial records showing CARES Act 

disbursements, King and Iyahen argued that “the disbursement[s] of CARES ACT

monies are fully set forth in the financial reports that are regularly submitted to 

Council.”

{¶ 14} In their omnibus motion, King and Iyahen renewed their claim that 

records concerning grant applications and award letters did not exist. But this time, 

they argued that applications and contracts did not exist because

[t]he City did not have to contract with itself to put the CARES ACT 

money in the General Fund for its First Responders payroll, Hazard 

Pay and purchase of PPE equipment. For the latter, masks, hand 

sanitizer, glass partitions, etc., were procured by City personnel and 
January Term, 2022

7

the invoices for same were paid as they arrived with no pre-existing 

“contract.”

King and Iyahen also suggested that complying with the public-records request for 

financial records was unnecessary because the stated reason for seeking the records 

was to ferret out any misappropriation of CARES Act funds and there were no 

inappropriate expenditures to find. They stated:

The CARES Act FAQS disseminated by the state’s Office of Budget 

and Management, which was shared with Council, set forth specific 

guidelines as to how the money could be spent. It was unequivocally 

spent in that manner.

King and Iyahen again claimed that the information sought through the publicrecords request had already been shared with the city council, and they referred the 

court to the exhibits submitted with their converted motion for summary judgment.

{¶ 15} The Eighth District granted summary judgment in favor of 

Stevenson, finding that a proper public-records request had been sent to Iyahen and 

that Iyahen had not responded to that request. 2021-Ohio-1093 at ¶ 42. It 

explained: “This is all the court is left with to determine the action because King 

and Iyahen have not provided this court with any evidence that can properly be 

considered on summary judgment.” Id. at ¶ 43. The court admonished King and 

Iyahen for failing to authenticate the exhibits even after the court had issued two 

separate journal entries reminding the parties that exhibits must be authenticated 

and after Stevenson had argued that their exhibits were unauthenticated. Id. at 

¶ 44. The Eighth District specifically rejected the suggestion that responsive 

records do not exist, because King and Iyahen had conceded that grants were 
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8

awarded but they presented no evidence that the grants were awarded based on 

anything other than written applications. Id. at ¶ 50-51.

{¶ 16} On appeal to this court, King and Iyahen claim that McDonald seeks

“nonexistent” records through the public-records request. In response to the Eighth 

District’s finding that their exhibits were unauthenticated, King and Iyahen argue 

that their exhibits were self-authenticating.

{¶ 17} King and Iyahen claim that the “CARES Act fund records provided 

to Stevenson were indeed authenticated” pursuant to Evid.R. 901(A). That rule

provides that authentication requires “evidence sufficient to support a finding that 

the matter in question is what its proponent claims.” Id. But King and Iyahen do 

not identify what evidence allegedly authenticated the exhibits that were attached 

to their converted motion for summary judgment.

{¶ 18} Alternatively, in their merit brief, King and Iyahen quote Evid.R. 

902(2) for the proposition that “ ‘[e]xtrinsic evidence of authenticity * * * is not 

required with respect to * * * [d]omestic public records not under seal.’ ” However, 

King and Iyahen truncate the quote by omitting crucial phrases. Evid.R. 902(2) 

provides that public records lacking a seal but purporting to bear the signature of a 

government officer or employee in his or her official capacity are selfauthenticating “if a public officer having a seal and having official duties in the 

district or political subdivision of the officer or employer certifies under seal that 

the signer has the official capacity and that the signature is genuine.” King and 

Iyahen do not assert that their exhibits fall into this category, and we will not review 

the exhibits to determine whether they contain signatures, because “[i]t is not the 

role of this court to ‘search the record or formulate arguments on behalf of the 

parties.’ ” State ex rel. McKenney v. Jones, __ Ohio St.3d __, 2022-Ohio-583, __ 

N.E.3d __, ¶ 28, quoting State v. Quarterman, 140 Ohio St.3d 464, 2014-Ohio4034, 19 N.E.3d 900, ¶ 19. And even if the exhibits attached to the motions do
January Term, 2022

9

contain official signatures, King and Iyahen have not identified the Evid.R. 902 

certification of those signatures.

{¶ 19} King and Iyahen also argue that a select number of documents 

attached as exhibits to their counterclaim were properly authenticated. The 

counterclaim contains affidavits from both King and Iyahen “verify[ing] that the 

exhibits attached to [their] Complaint and Petition for a Writ of Mandamus, are true 

and accurate copies of the original[s] to the best of [their] personal knowledge.” 

According to King and Iyahen’s merit brief, these affidavits serve to make the East 

Cleveland Permanent Appropriations record and the proposed East Cleveland 

Fiscal Recovery Plan self-authenticating under Evid.R. 902. But Evid.R. 902 is 

inapplicable to these documents because they are unsigned.

{¶ 20} Finally, King and Iyahen argue that the public-records request “kept 

shifting” throughout the case “because this action was instituted for nefarious 

purposes.”3 As the Eighth District observed, neither King nor Iyahen objected to 

the original request as being vague or overbroad, although they made that argument 

later in a motion for a more definite statement. 2021-Ohio-1093 at ¶ 57.

{¶ 21} In their merit brief, King and Iyahen argue that the Eighth District 

should have granted the motion for a more definite statement because the CARES 

Act information “had already been disseminated to [the city council] in the ordinary 

course of financial reporting” and because “much of the information [Stevenson] 

claimed she wanted still did not exist.” Those two affirmative defenses—that King 

and Iyahen had fully complied with the request and that the request sought 

nonexistent documents—have nothing to do with a purported need for clarification 

of the request.

3. Stevenson’s motive for seeking the records is irrelevant. See Rhodes v. New Philadelphia, 129 

Ohio St.3d 304, 2011-Ohio-3279, 951 N.E.2d 782, ¶ 20; R.C. 149.43(B)(4). It follows logically 

that her motive for filing suit to compel release of the requested records is equally irrelevant.
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10

{¶ 22} For these reasons, we affirm the judgment of the Eighth District 

granting a writ of mandamus for the production of public records.

C. The award of attorney fees

{¶ 23} If a court renders a judgment ordering a public official to comply 

with the Public Records Act, R.C. 149.43, the court may award reasonable attorney 

fees to the requester. R.C. 149.43(C)(3)(b); State ex rel. Summers v. Fox, 164 Ohio 

St.3d 583, 2021-Ohio-2061, 174 N.E.3d 747, ¶ 13. In this appeal, King and Iyahen 

do not challenge the reasonableness of the hours expended or the rates charged by 

the McDonald Humphrey law firm. The sole issue on appeal is whether there is an 

attorney-client relationship between Stevenson and McDonald Humphrey.

{¶ 24} Attorney fees are not recoverable under the Public Records Act when 

there is no evidence that the requester “either paid or was obligated to pay” its 

attorney. State ex rel. O’Shea & Assocs. Co., L.P.A. v. Cuyahoga Metro. Hous. 

Auth., 131 Ohio St.3d 149, 2012-Ohio-115, 962 N.E.2d 297, ¶ 45. For example, a 

corporation cannot recover attorney fees when it is represented by its salaried, inhouse counsel, absent evidence of a fee agreement or the actual payment of fees to 

counsel in addition to payment of his or her regular salary and work benefits. State 

ex rel. Beacon Journal Publishing Co. v. Akron, 104 Ohio St.3d 399, 2004-Ohio6557, 819 N.E.2d 1087, ¶ 62, superseded by statute on other grounds as explained 

in State ex rel. DiFranco v. S. Euclid, 138 Ohio St.3d 378, 2014-Ohio-539, 7 N.E.3d 

1146, ¶ 13. Likewise, a prevailing party cannot recover attorney fees under the 

Public Records Act without evidence of a fee agreement when he or she is 

represented by his or her spouse. See State ex rel. Besser v. Ohio State Univ., 87 

Ohio St.3d 535, 542, 721 N.E.2d 1044 (2000).

{¶ 25} In her motion for attorney fees, Stevenson submitted timesheets 

showing the hours that attorneys with McDonald Humphrey spent on the case. The 

motion also included affidavits from McDonald and another attorney attesting to 

the accuracy and reasonableness of the billing records. But in his affidavit, 
January Term, 2022

11

McDonald does not aver the existence of an attorney-client relationship or a fee 

agreement between himself and Stevenson or between himself and the city council.

{¶ 26} In its journal entry and opinion dated July 30, 2021, the Eighth 

District held that the record supported the existence of an attorney-client 

relationship because King and Iyahen attached to their memorandum opposing fees 

“an engagement letter executed by Stevenson facially establishing an attorneyclient relationship.” That letter, dated November 5, 2020, purports to establish an 

attorney-client relationship between McDonald Humphrey and the city council. 

Stevenson signed the agreement in her capacity as the city council’s president on 

November 8, two days after the city council passed Resolution 39-20 approving the 

retention of the McDonald Humphrey law firm on its behalf. But on November 9,

Mayor King vetoed that resolution.

{¶ 27} The East Cleveland City Charter, Section 113(E), authorizes the 

mayor to veto any resolution and ordinance. American Legal Publishing, Charter 

of the City of East Cleveland, Section 113(E), available at 

https://codelibrary.amlegal.com/codes/eastcleveland/latest/eastcleveland_oh/0-0-

0-520 (accessed Aug. 18, 2022) [https://perma.cc/P7VD-2Z5X]; see also The City 

of East Cleveland, Ohio, City Charter & Codified Ordinances, at 

https://eastcleveland.org/government/city_charter___codified_ordinances/index.p

hp (accessed Aug. 18, 2022) [https://perma.cc/7P4L-UYNY]. If the mayor vetoes 

a measure, the city council may override the veto with a vote of four-fifths of its 

members approving the measure on reconsideration. Id. Stevenson has not alleged 

that the city council overrode the veto, nor has she explained how the city council

might have had authority to retain McDonald Humphrey despite the veto.

{¶ 28} McDonald Humphrey was not retained by the city, as a matter of 

law. There is no evidence that the firm was retained by Stevenson individually. At 

times in this litigation, King and Iyahen have taken the position that because 

Stevenson did not enter into an agreement retaining the services of McDonald 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO

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Humphrey in her individual capacity, the public-records request from attorney 

McDonald is void. There is no authority for the proposition that the lack of a 

retainer agreement would excuse King and Iyahen from their obligations under the 

Public Records Act. Absent an attorney-client relationship between McDonald 

Humphrey and either Stevenson in her individual capacity or the city council, the 

public-records request would have been made by attorney McDonald on his own 

behalf, and Stevenson as a pro se litigant is not entitled to attorney fees. See State 

ex rel. Ullmann v. Klein, 160 Ohio St.3d 457, 2020-Ohio-2974, 158 N.E.3d 580, 

¶ 15.

{¶ 29} For these reasons, we reverse the award of attorney fees.

III. Conclusion

{¶ 30} We affirm the Eighth District Court of Appeals’ judgment granting a 

writ of mandamus, and we reverse the court of appeals’ judgment granting an award 

of attorney fees.

Judgment affirmed in part

and reversed in part.

O’CONNOR, C.J., and KENNEDY, FISCHER, DEWINE, DONNELLY, STEWART, 

and BRUNNER, JJ., concur.

_________________

Willa M. Hemmons, East Cleveland Director of Law, and Heather 

McCollough, Assistant Director of Law, for appellants.

_________________