Filed 3/24/22 United Homeowners Assn. v. Peak Capital Investments CA2/4

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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION FOUR

UNITED HOMEOWNERS 

ASSOCIATION II et al.

Plaintiffs and Respondents,

v.

PEAK CAPITAL INVESTMENTS et 

al.,

Real Party in Interest and 

Appellants.

 B308682

 (Los Angeles County

 Super. Ct. No. BS172990)

APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of 

Los Angeles County, Mitchell L. Beckloff , Judge. Affirmed.

Ervin, Cohen & Jessup, Ellia M. Thompson, Kimberly D. 

Lewis, Allan B. Cooper for Appellants.

Rodrigo A. Castro-Silva, County Counsel, Starr Coleman

Assistant County Counsel, Keever Anya Rhodes Muir, Deputy 

County Counsel for Respondent County of Los Angeles.
2

Strumwasser & Woocher, Fredric D. Woocher, Beverly 

Grossman Palmer, Julia Michel for Plaintiffs and Respondents

United Homeowners Association II. 

INTRODUCTION

United Homeowners Association II (UHA) filed a petition

for writ of mandate under CEQA1 challenging approval of a 

condominium project proposed by real parties in interest Peak 

Capital and The Bedford Group (Peak/Bedford). UHA was 

successful on one part of its challenge, in that the superior court 

issued a writ of mandate and ordered the County of Los Angeles 

and the Los Angeles County Board of Supervisors (collectively,

the County) to withdraw approval of the project and complete a 

limited environmental impact report (EIR) with respect to traffic 

impacts. The superior court rejected UHA’s additional CEQA 

challenges, including those involving air quality, hazardous 

waste, and aesthetics. 

The court then granted UHA’s motion for attorney fees 

under Code of Civil Procedure section 1021.5, and awarded UHA 

fees of $118,089.00. Peak/Bedford appeals that award, asserting 

that (1) UHA is not entitled to fees because it neither enforced an 

important right affecting the public interest nor conferred a 

significant benefit on a large class of persons, and (2) the court 

erred by failing to clearly show how it reached the figure of 

$118,089.00. We find no error and affirm. 

1 The California Environmental Quality Act (Pub. Resources 

Code, § 21000 et seq.) All further statutory references are to the 

Public Resources Code unless otherwise indicated.
3

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

A. Petition, trial, and ruling

UHA filed a petition for writ of mandate on April 8, 2018 

and an amended petition on December 11, 2018 alleging the 

following facts.2

The project at issue is the proposed construction of an 88-

unit, five-story luxury condominium complex on a 1.84-acre 

parcel in the View Park-Windsor Hills neighborhood, an 

unincorporated area of Los Angeles County. The property, 5101 

South Overhill Drive, is across the street from the Inglewood Oil 

Field, Kenneth Hahn State Recreation Area, Norman O. Houston 

Park, the Stocker Corridor Trail, and Windsor Hills Magnet 

School. UHA alleged that “[t]he proposed Project includes 

139,281 square feet of living space and 206 subterranean spaces 

used for vehicle parking within a five-story structure 65 feet in 

height and three levels of subterranean parking. The Project also 

anticipates a pool and spa area with landscaping.” 

Real parties Peak/Bedford applied for approval to build the

project. In general, “[w]hen a local agency considers the 

environmental effects of a proposed project, CEQA provides three 

options. The agency must prepare and certify the completion of 

an EIR if the project ‘may have a significant effect on the 

environment.’ (§ 21151, subd. (a), italics added.) If the agency 

determines the project will not have a significant effect on the 

environment, it must prepare a negative declaration to that 

2 We remind counsel on both sides that each brief must 

reference the record with the “volume and page number of the 

record where the matter appears.” (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 

8.204(a)(1)(C) (emphasis added).) 
4

effect. (§ 21080, subd. (c)(1); [Cal. Code Regs., tit. 14], § 15064, 

subd. (f)(3).[ ] Finally, if the project has potentially significant 

environmental effects but these effects will be reduced to 

insignificance by mitigation measures that the project’s 

proponent has agreed to undertake, CEQA requires the local 

agency to prepare a mitigated negative declaration [(MND)]. 

(§ 21080, subd. (c)(2); [Cal. Code Regs., tit. 14], § 15064, subd. 

(f)(2).)” (Moss v. County of Humboldt (2008) 162 Cal.App.4th 

1041, 1048.)

The County Regional Planning Commission approved the 

project in August 2017 with an MND, and issued a conditional 

use permit (CUP). UHA, “a California nonprofit mutual benefit 

corporation” that is “comprised of approximately 11,000 general 

members,” appealed the decision to the Board of Supervisors, 

which upheld the findings of the commission. 

UHA filed its petition for writ of mandate against the 

County as respondent and Peak/Bedford as real party in interest.

Because the amended petition is relevant to the appeal, we focus 

on the allegations in that version. UHA alleged three causes of 

action: violation of CEQA, injunctive relief, and declaratory relief. 

Under the CEQA cause of action, UHA alleged that six aspects of 

the project failed to meet CEQA requirements: (1) the MND’s 

traffic study was deficient and failed to adequately assess the 

project’s traffic impacts; (2) an EIR was required to address air 

quality impacts on nearby residents and the school; (3) hazards 

and hazardous waste were inadequately evaluated, in light of the 

project’s proximity to the oil field; (4) the MND did not evaluate 

aesthetics and the blockage of neighboring homes’ views; (5) the 

MND failed to adequately evaluate greenhouse gas impacts; and 

(6) impacts on land use were inadequately analyzed. UHA 
5

prayed for a peremptory writ of mandate, an injunction, costs,

and attorney fees. 

The parties filed briefs, and the court held a hearing. UHA 

abandoned its contentions regarding hazardous waste and 

greenhouse gases. The court held in favor of UHA in part. 

Regarding traffic, the court found that the project’s traffic 

engineers failed to account for a nearby redevelopment project. 

The court stated, “There is substantial evidence that had an 

analysis of the cumulative effect of the Baldwin Hills Crenshaw 

Plaza Redevelopment Project at LaBrea and Slauson Avenues 

been included with the Project, the PM peak traffic Level of 

Service would drop to an F,” the lowest level of service.3 The 

court found that UHA failed to meet its burden on its remaining 

contentions under CEQA. In a later minute order, the court 

stated, “As the court found the County’s actions and 

determinations were justified as to Air Quality, Land Use and 

Aesthetics but not as to Traffic and Circulation, the County shall 

prepare an Environmental Impact Report (EIR) addressing the 

significance of environmental impacts regarding Traffic and 

Circulation.” 

The court entered judgment granting a writ of mandate 

and directing the County to “set aside ‘the Project’s entitlements 

(a conditional use permit and a vesting tentative tract map),’” 

“set aside the adoption of the Mitigated Negative Declaration as 

to impacts from traffic and circulation,” “prepare an 

3 “Level of service is a measure of traffic congestion at 

intersections, which ranges from A (little or no delay) to F 

(extreme traffic delay).” (American Canyon Community United 

for Responsible Growth v. City of American Canyon (2006) 145 

Cal.App.4th 1062, 1080.)
6

Environmental Impact Report in full compliance with [CEQA] as 

to traffic and circulation,” and “refrain from taking any action to 

approve or otherwise permit the construction of the Project or a 

substantially similar project until after fully complying with this 

Writ of Mandate.” The court also stated in the judgment that

UHA was entitled to recover its costs and attorney fees. 

B. UHA’s motion for attorney fees 

UHA filed a motion requesting costs and attorney fees 

under Code of Civil Procedure, section 1021.5 (section 1021.5), 

which states in part, “Upon motion, a court may award attorneys’

fees to a successful party against one or more opposing parties in 

any action which has resulted in the enforcement of an important 

right affecting the public interest if: (a) a significant benefit, 

whether pecuniary or nonpecuniary, has been conferred on the 

general public or a large class of persons, (b) the necessity and 

financial burden of private enforcement, or of enforcement by one 

public entity against another public entity, are such as to make 

the award appropriate. . . .” 

UHA requested attorney fees totaling $169,651.50 for 

approximately 230 hours, which included an estimated $22,000 

for preparing and arguing the motion for attorney fees. UHA 

argued that it was entitled to an award of attorney fees under

section 1021.5 because it enforced “an important public right and 

benefitting the residents of Windsor Heights, View Heights, View 

Park, and Ladera Heights, as well as in other adjacent and 

nearby areas in the City and County of Los Angeles.” UHA 

asserted that it had “achieved its objectives: the project’s 

approvals were rescinded and invalidated, and no future project 

can be approved without an adequate environmental review 

under CEQA.” UHA noted that “[i]n the CEQA context . . . 
7

actions requiring a governmental agency to analyze or reassess 

environmental impacts associated with a proposed project confer 

a significant benefit.” (Keep Our Mountains Quiet v. County of 

Santa Clara (2015) 236 Cal.App.4th 714, 737.) 

In addition, UHA asserted that the fee award requested 

was reasonable. Lead counsel Beverly Grossman Palmer stated 

in her declaration that the requested fees included “a total of 230 

hours of combined attorney time, of which 151.3 hours were billed 

by myself at the hourly rate of $695, and 78.7 hours were billed 

by Dale Larson (now a partner) at the senior associate hourly 

rate of $540,” plus the amount for the fees motion, which Palmer 

said would be supplemented in the reply. Palmer attached billing 

records showing the time she and Larson worked on the case. 

Peak/Bedford opposed the motion for attorney fees; the 

County joined. Peak/Bedford argued that UHA “either 

abandoned or lost on almost all of its[ ] CEQA challenges to the 

Project,” in that the “sole relief” was that an EIR must be 

prepared regarding traffic only, and therefore UHA “failed to 

achieve its[ ] primary objective of stopping the entire Project in 

its tracks. It did not even succeed in reducing the Project’s size, 

scope or layout.[ ] Instead, the Project remains exactly as it was 

when initially approved. Therefore, [UHA] cannot establish that 

it was a successful party.” Peak/Bedford further asserted that 

the litigation did not confer a significant benefit on the general 

public or a large class of persons. Finally, Peak/Bedford asserted 

that the requested fees should be reduced due to UHA’s limited 

success in the case, because UHA’s counsel’s hourly rates were 

too high, and because counsel inappropriately block-billed. 

In its reply, UHA asserted that the fees requested were 

reasonable. UHA also asserted that block billing did not require 
8

a reduction. UHA reduced its request for fees relating to the fees 

motion from $22,000 to $14,803.50. 

In a written tentative ruling, the court stated that it was 

inclined to grant the motion and award UHA $89,286.30 in 

attorney fees. The court found UHA to be the successful party, 

and that the action conferred a significant benefit on the public or 

a large class of persons. The court found that Palmer’s and 

Larson’s rates were reasonable, but reduced recovery for several 

of the block-billed entries. The court further stated that “a 

reduction of 40 percent for [UHA]’s limited success on the 

Petition is appropriate.” The court also reduced the fees 

requested for the attorney fees motion. 

At the hearing on the motion, UHA argued the 40 percent 

reduction was excessive. Peak/Bedford argued that an even 

further reduction was warranted based on UHA’s limited success. 

The court took the motion under submission. 

In a written ruling, the court granted the motion and 

awarded UHA attorney fees of $118,089.00. The court found that 

UHA was the successful party in that it “achieved actual and 

practical relief in its challenge to the Project. [UHA] achieved 

enforcement of important environmental statutory protections by 

ensuring compliance by the County with its CEQA obligations.” 

The court found that the litigation concerned the enforcement of 

CEQA, which itself involved “important public rights affecting 

the public interest,” and, “The result of [UHA’s] action requires 

the County further identify and analyze significant effects on the 

environment with regard to traffic and circulation in the context 

of an environmental impact report. Such a result is a significant 

benefit and effectuates an important statutory policy.” Moreover, 

“enforcing CEQA’s requirements for an 88-unit condominium 
9

building in a[n] urban residential area not only affects the 

immediate neighborhood, it affects the residents of Windsor 

Heights, View Heights, View Park, and Ladera Heights,” and 

therefore “the litigation conferred a significant benefit on a large 

class of persons.” 

The court further found that UHA’s claimed attorney fees 

were “to some extent unreasonable and require reductions.” As 

in the tentative, the court found the hourly rates of Palmer and 

Larson reasonable. However, the court agreed with Peak/Bedford 

that block billing is “problematic,” and, in footnote 5 of the 

written order, noted each of the block-billed entries that 

Peak/Bedford cited as inappropriate. The court also noted that 

Peak/Bedford objected to “duplicative billing—occasions when 

both [of UHA’s] attorneys participated in a conference and each 

billed separately for the time.” In footnote 6, the court listed each 

instance of duplicative billing Peak/Bedford cited. The court also 

noted that attorney Larson billed 2.2 hours for a trial setting 

conference on a day when no such conference was scheduled. 

The court noted that UHA convinced the court at oral 

argument that the 40 percent reduction based on limited success 

was not appropriate. The court stated that UHA “narrowly 

prevailed on a single issue pertaining to the mitigated negative 

declaration, despite raising challenges on multiple, separate 

grounds.” However, the court stated that it was “a significant 

issue, [and] ultimately the court required the County to prepare 

an environmental impact report only as to the traffic and 

circulation element.” The court looked at the total time billed for 

the petition, amended petition, and briefing, and found that not 

all time was “reasonable” in light of UHA’s limited success. The 
10

court also found that the amount requested for the fees motion 

was excessive. 

The court concluded, “Based on the foregoing, the court 

makes reductions in hours claimed to reflect a reasonable 

attorney’s fee award. As described above, the court has made 

reductions for block billing (see footnote 5 for specific billing 

entries), duplicative efforts by counsel (see footnote 6 for specific 

billing entries), limited success (as to petition allegations, 

briefing and related activities), Attorney Larson’s billing error 

and an excessive claim for the attorney’s fees motion. The court 

finds Petitioner is entitled to reasonable attorney’s fees in this 

matter in the amount of $118,089.” The court did not further 

explain how it reached this total. 

Peak/Bedford timely appealed. The County did not appeal.4

DISCUSSION

Peak/Bedford asserts that the court erred in finding that 

UHA was entitled to an award of attorney fees, and in calculating 

the amount of those fees awarded. “The determination whether a 

party has met the requirement for an award of fees and the 

reasonable amount of such an award are matters best decided by 

the trial court in the first instance.” (Sweetwater Union High 

School Dist. v. Julian Union Elementary School Dist. (2019) 36 

4 The County filed a respondent’s brief purporting to join 

Peak/Bedford’s opening brief, and asking that the court’s ruling 

be reversed. However, as a general rule, respondents who fail to 

file a cross-appeal cannot claim error on appeal. (See, e.g., 

Prakashpalan v. Engstrom, Lipscomb & Lack (2014) 223 

Cal.App.4th 1105, 1121.) The County’s contentions, which 

consist of little more than joining the opening brief, have not been 

considered. 
11

Cal.App.5th 970, 980 (Sweetwater).) We review a fee award 

under the abuse of discretion standard, and “presume the trial 

court properly applied the law and acted within its discretion 

unless the appellant affirmatively shows otherwise.” (Canyon 

Crest Conservancy v. County of Los Angeles (2020) 46 Cal.App.5th 

398, 409 (Canyon Crest).)5 We find no error and affirm. 

A. Entitlement to attorney fees

Under section 1021.5, a court may award attorneys’ fees to 

a “successful party” in an action which has “resulted in the 

enforcement of an important right affecting the public interest” if

a “significant benefit . . . has been conferred on the general public 

or a large class of persons.” (§ 1021.5.) “Thus, to obtain fees 

under section 1021.5, the moving party must establish all of the 

following: (1) he or she is a ‘successful party,’ (2) the action has 

resulted in the enforcement of an important right affecting the 

public interest, (3) the action has conferred a significant benefit 

on the public or a large class of persons, and (4) an attorney fees 

award is appropriate in light of the necessity and financial 

burden of private enforcement.” (Hall v. Department of Motor 

Vehicles (2018) 26 Cal.App.5th 182, 188.)

Here, Peak/Bedford challenges the second and third 

elements, asserting that the litigation neither resulted in the 

enforcement of an important right affecting the public interest, 

nor conferred a significant benefit on the public or a large class of 

5 Peak/Bedford argues in its opening brief that the court “did 

not apply the proper test” and suggests a different standard of 

review may apply. In its reply, however, Peak/Bedford 

acknowledges the abuse of discretion standard applies. 
12

persons.6 UHA asserts that the trial court’s ruling on these 

elements was correct. We consider each element separately. 

1. Enforcement of an important right affecting the public 

interest

Peak/Bedford asserts that UHA did not meet the second 

element because it “did not prompt a significant change in the 

state of affairs,” and “[i]t is pure speculation as to whether a new 

traffic study will make any new or additional findings.” UHA 

argues the trial court did not abuse its discretion in finding in 

UHA’s favor on this element. 

To determine whether an “important” right is at issue, a 

court must “exercise judgment in attempting to ascertain the 

‘strength’ or ‘societal importance’ of the right involved.” 

(Woodland Hills Residents Assn., Inc. v. City Council (1979) 23 

Cal.3d 917, 935 (Woodland Hills).) When the right at issue is 

statutory, “courts should generally realistically assess the 

significance of that right in terms of its relationship to the 

achievement of fundamental legislative goals.” (Id. at p. 936.)

6 As to the first element, Peak/Bedford asserts in passing 

that UHA was not a successful party because it “did not prompt a 

significant change in the state of affairs,” in that “[t]he only 

‘change’ that occurred is that the traffic study must be updated.” 

This brief argument is copied verbatim from Peak/Bedford’s 

opposition below, and it neither discusses the court’s ruling on 

this point nor argues that the trial court’s finding constituted an 

abuse of discretion. We therefore find this contention forfeited.

(See, e.g., Benach v. County of Los Angeles (2007) 149 

Cal.App.4th 836, 852 [the court will not consider contentions 

lacking “pertinent argument or an attempt to apply the law to 

the circumstances of [the] case”].)
13

Peak/Bedford focuses less on the rights at issue in the 

litigation and more on the results, asserting that “no government 

policy changes were made as a result of this lawsuit,” no 

“untoward acts or improper agency policies” were uncovered, and 

it is “pure speculation as to whether a new traffic study will make 

any new or additional findings.” The trial court identified the 

important right as the enforcement of CEQA, and “as a general 

matter, litigation alleging CEQA violations can involve important 

rights affecting the public interest.” (Canyon Crest, supra, 46 

Cal.App.5th at p. 410; see also Concerned Citizens of La Habra v. 

City of La Habra (2005) 131 Cal.App.4th 329, 335 (CCLH)

[“CEQA involves important rights affecting the people of this 

state and . . . section 1021.5 was enacted to encourage the 

enforcement of such legislation by public interest litigation”].) 

Nevertheless, “enforcement efforts alone do not justify an 

attorney fee award; the benefit gained must be significant and 

widespread.” (CCLH, supra, 131 Cal.App.4th at p. 336; see also 

Woodland Hills, supra, 23 Cal.3d at p. 939 [“the public always 

has a significant interest in seeing that legal strictures are 

properly enforced” but “the Legislature did not intend to 

authorize an award of attorney fees in every case involving a 

statutory violation”].) Thus, in a case where the benefit to the 

public is “the proper enforcement of the law,” the “significant 

benefit and important right requirements of section 1021.5 to 

some extent dovetail.” (La Mirada Avenue Neighborhood Assn. of 

Hollywood v. City of Los Angeles (2018) 22 Cal.App.5th 1149, 

1158.) We therefore turn to the benefit element.
14

2. Conferring a significant benefit on the public or a 

large class of persons

Peak/Bedford contends the litigation did not confer a 

“benefit” in that UHA succeeded only in necessitating a new 

traffic report, which might not have any practical impacts on the 

project. It also asserts that the litigation did not affect “the 

public or a large class,” because UHA “is a small neighborhood 

group comprised of approximately 17 residents” who tried but 

failed to “stop the Project” entirely. UHA correctly points out 

that the trial court rejected this contention, finding that 

Peak/Bedford’s characterization “greatly understates the impact 

of a project of this size in a neighborhood of single family 

residences,” and the “traffic and circulation impact extends well 

beyond the Project and its immediate neighbors.” Peak/Bedford 

argues that requiring a new traffic study is not tantamount to a 

finding that the project actually would impact traffic in the 

surrounding areas. 

“[T]he ‘significant benefit’ that will justify an attorney fee 

award . . . may be recognized simply from the effectuation of a 

fundamental constitutional or statutory policy.” (Woodland Hills, 

supra, 23 Cal.3d at p. 939.) A court should “determine the 

significance of the benefit, as well as the size of the class 

receiving benefit, from a realistic assessment, in light of all the 

pertinent circumstances, of the gains which have resulted in a 

particular case.” (Id. at pp. 939-940.) “[T]he extent of the public 

benefit need not be great to justify an attorney fee award.” 

(RiverWatch v. County of San Diego Dept. of Environmental 

Health (2009) 175 Cal.App.4th 768, 781.) 

Here, the litigation invalidated the MND and required the 

County to complete an EIR regarding traffic. Although the 
15

details of the traffic study are not in the record, the study and 

EIR were relevant to at least one heavily traveled intersection. 

In the judgment, the court noted that the intersection of LaBrea 

and Slauson already had a level of service of D in afternoon peak 

hours, and had the traffic study for the project been done 

differently, it might have shown a level of service of F. In its 

ruling on the attorney fee motion, the court held that the traffic 

issue would affect a significant number of people, including “the 

residents of Windsor Heights, View Heights, View Park, and 

Ladera Heights.” The residents of these areas, plus any other

people using the heavily traveled intersection of LaBrea and 

Slauson, would receive the benefit of ensuring the County 

complied with CEQA in approving the project. 

Peak/Bedford compares this case to CCLH, supra, 131 

Cal.App.4th 329. There, a neighborhood organization, CCLH, 

challenged the approval of a proposed Costco warehouse and 

retail store in the City of La Habra. “CCLH alleged six causes of 

action, one of which was the failure to comply with [CEQA] in 

several respects. While five of the causes of action were 

unsuccessful, the CEQA challenge achieved partial success: The 

superior court agreed with one of the several alleged CEQA 

defects, finding that the mitigated negative declaration certified 

by the City needed revision.” (CCLH, supra, 131 Cal.App.4th at 

p. 331.) The trial court agreed with CCLH that the MND failed 

to adequately assess potential traffic impacts of the project and 

ordered the city to reassess the traffic issue; however, the court 

stopped short of requiring the city to complete an EIR. (Id. at p. 

333.)

CCLH then sought attorney fees under section 1021.5. The 

court denied the request, and CCLH appealed. The Court of 
16

Appeal affirmed the ruling, stating, “[T]he trial court assessed 

the circumstances of the case and determined the gains obtained 

by CCLH did not confer a significant benefit on a large class of 

people. Having heard the evidence in support of CCLH’s 

challenges to the MND, it rejected all of the claimed defects 

except one. The trial court agreed the MND did not adequately 

support the conclusion that the effects of cut-through traffic were 

mitigated, but it felt the inadequacy was a ‘minute blemish’ that 

could be repaired.” (CCLH, supra, 131 Cal.App.4th at p. 335.) 

The court noted that to find a “significant benefit” on the public 

or a large class of persons, “the benefit gained must be significant 

and widespread. The trial court determined it was not. On this 

record, we cannot conclude that the trial court’s determination 

was a prejudicial abuse of discretion.” (Id. at p. 336.) 

Peak/Bedford argues here, as it did below, that CCLH is 

“directly on point.” It asserts that in issuing the writ and 

ordering the County to complete an EIR, the court “did not find 

that there was an environmental impact related to traffic, or even 

that it was likely that there was an impact.” However, the 

completion of an EIR for the purposes of assessing traffic impacts 

of the project is itself a benefit to the public using the streets near 

the project. No further effect on the project is required. (See, 

e.g., RiverWatch v. County of San Diego Dept. of Environmental 

Health, supra, 175 Cal.App.4th at p. 782 [“The significant benefit 

criterion is satisfied where, as here, the litigation permits 

affected parties to provide additional input on remand”]; Keep 

Our Mountains Quiet v. County of Santa Clara, supra, 236 

Cal.App.4th at p. 739 [“The trial court reasonably could have 

concluded this suit conferred a significant benefit on the general 
17

public by requiring the County to further assess . . . ‘important 

environmental consideration[s].’”].) 

Peak/Bedford has not demonstrated that the trial court 

abused its discretion in finding that UHA was entitled to an 

award of attorney fees under section 1021.5. We therefore turn 

to Peak/Bedford’s contentions about the amount of the fee award.

B. Amount of fee award

UHA originally requested attorney fees totaling 

$169,651.50 for approximately 230 hours of work.7 The court

reduced the award based on (1) UHA’s limited success, (2) block 

billing, (3) duplicative billing, (4) Larson’s erroneous bill for the

trial setting conference (striking 2.2 hours, $1,188), and (5) an 

excessive amount requested for the fees motion (awarding $9,880 

rather than the $22,000 initially requested). The court was only 

specific about the hours and amounts for the last two of these 

categories. The court discussed UHA’s limited success, but did 

not specify how much it was reducing the fee award accordingly. 

And although the court listed in footnote 5 the block-billed 

entries to which Peak/Bedford objected and listed in footnote 6

the duplicative bills to which Peak/Bedford objected, the court did 

not specify which of these entries, if any, it was reducing or 

7 “Attorney fee awards are based on the lodestar, i.e., the 

number of hours reasonably expended multiplied by the 

reasonable hourly rate.” (Save Our Uniquely Rural Community 

Environment v. County of San Bernardino (2015) 235 

Cal.App.4th 1179, 1183 fn. 1 (SOURCE).) A court may reduce 

the amount awarded based on a party’s degree of success or if the 

court believes the billing is unjustly inflated. (Id. at pp. 1185-

1186.) 
18

striking. The court awarded UHA attorney fees of $118,089.00, 

over $50,000 less than UHA requested. 

Peak/Bedford challenges several aspects of the court’s 

attorney fee award, but each argument comes down to the 

contention that the trial court failed to clearly explain how it 

arrived at the final amount awarded. Peak/Bedford notes that

although the court stated it was reducing the fee award for the 

factors listed above, for most of those factors the court did not 

explain how many hours were being subtracted. And adding the 

objectionable bills together (the block-billed entries, the 

duplicative bills, the erroneous trial setting conference, and the 

reduction for the fees motion) amounts to $66,952.00— more than 

the court’s reduction of $51,562.50. Peak/Bedford asserts that 

these totals suggest the court did not actually reduce the fee 

award for UHA’s limited success, despite stating that it did so. 

Peak/Bedford asserts, “Although the Trial Court undertook a 

cursory analysis of the hours expended, it never arrived at a 

logical or reasonably defined conclusion that supports the 

ultimate fee awarded.” 

However, a court’s failure to provide a “reasoned 

explanation” for an attorney fee award does not constitute

reversible error; a superior court is not required to issue a 

statement of decision for a fee award. (Ketchum v. Moses (2001) 

24 Cal.4th 1122, 1140.) “[W]e cannot reverse an attorney fee 

award solely for lack of an explanation by the trial court. We can 

reverse only if the record contains some indication that the trial 

court considered improper factors or did, indeed, simply snatch 

its award ‘from thin air.’” (SOURCE, supra, 235 Cal.App.4th at 

pp. 1189-1190; see also Gorman v. Tassajara Development Corp. 

(2009) 178 Cal.App.4th 44, 67 (Gorman) [“The absence of an 
19

explanation of a [fee award] ruling may make it more difficult for 

an appellate court to uphold it as reasonable, but we will not 

presume error based on such an omission”].) 

Peak/Bedford argues that because the court’s math does not 

add up, it essentially snatched the amount “from thin air” and 

therefore abused its discretion in determining the fee award. 

Peak/Bedford relies on Gorman, supra, 178 Cal.App.4th 44, in 

which the court reversed and remanded a fee award because 

“despite close study of the record,” the Court of Appeal was 

“unable to surmise a reasonable explanation” for the amount 

awarded. (Id. at p. 53.) There, the plaintiffs, as prevailing party, 

“requested attorney fees of $1,350,538.83[ ] and costs in excess of 

$266,561.96, including the fees and costs for filing their motion. . 

. . After a contested hearing on their motion, in a 27-word order 

the trial court awarded plaintiffs ‘reasonable attorneys’ fees of 

$416,581.37 and reasonable costs of $142,432.46.’” (Id. at p. 53.) 

The plaintiffs appealed. 

The Court of Appeal noted that the trial court’s award of 

fees was “a little under 61 percent of [the] lodestar amount.” The

court was confused because the precise amount of the award 

“suggests that it is the product of some mathematical 

computations. We have tried in vain for days to recreate this 

result by means of various formulas.” (Id. at p. 99.) The court 

continued, “[A]fter much puzzlement and frustration, we have 

been unable to surmise any mathematical or logical explanation 

for the trial court’s award of $416,581.37. Instead, the number 

appears to have been snatched whimsically from thin air. It is 

the essence of arbitrariness to make an award of attorney fees 

that cannot be justified by the plaintiffs’ request, the supporting 

bills, or the defendant’s opposition. We are unable to ascertain a 
20

reasonable basis for the trial court’s reduction of the lodestar 

amount.” (Id. at p. 101.) The court concluded, “It is not the 

absence of an explanation by the trial court that calls the award 

in this case into question, but its inability to be explained by 

anyone, either the parties or this appellate court. We are 

compelled to conclude that there is no reasonable connection 

between the lodestar amount and the trial court's award.” (Ibid.)

Gorman’s approach was questioned by the court in 

SOURCE, supra, 235 Cal.App.4th 1179. In SOURCE, the 

plaintiff community group was the prevailing party in a CEQA 

case. It sought $231,098 in attorney fees; the trial court awarded 

$19,176. (Id. at p. 1182.) The group appealed, and relying on 

Gorman, argued in part that the trial court’s failure to articulate 

its reasoning for the reduction mandated reversal. (Id. at p. 

1189.) The Court of Appeal rejected this argument, stating, “We 

respectfully disagree with Gorman’s analysis. In our view, the 

precision of the amount awarded [in Gorman] indicates that 

rather than acting arbitrarily, the trial court applied some 

rational calculation, even though the appellate court could not 

discern what it was.” (Id. at p. 1189.) Turning to the case before 

it, the Court of Appeal in SOURCE found that reversal was not 

warranted because “although the [trial] court did not state the 

lodestar amount or explain how it arrived at the amount 

awarded, it did make it clear that it intended to substantially 

reduce the fees based on what it saw as outrageous overbilling.” 

(Id. at p. 1190.) The trial court articulated several “legitimate 

reasons” for reducing the fee award, and the Court of Appeal 

concluded, “Because the record shows that the court acted for 

legitimate reasons, we cannot find an abuse of discretion simply 

because it failed to make its arithmetic transparent.” (Ibid.)
21

This case is more like SOURCE than Gorman. Here, the

trial court articulated multiple reasons for reducing the attorney 

fee award, even though it did not show its calculations. The court

considered the specific allegations in UHA’s petition, noting, for 

example, that UHA had abandoned its greenhouse gas and land 

use allegations, but its “aesthetics challenge” was “strong,” even 

though it was not successful. The court closely reviewed the 

billing records, and observed that UHA’s attorneys billed about 

35 hours for drafting the petition and amended petition, and 

about 70 hours on the opening and reply briefs. Thus, although 

Peak/Bedford argues that the court failed to undertake “a careful 

compilation of the time spent and reasonable hourly 

compensation of each attorney . . . involved in the presentation of 

the case” (Serrano v. Priest (1977) 20 Cal.3d 25, 48), the record 

does not support this contention. The court did not articulate 

how much it was reducing the award based on UHA’s limited 

success, but it was not required to. “In awarding attorney fees in 

a lesser amount than requested, trial courts are not required to 

specify each and every claimed item found to be unsupported or 

unreasonable.” (Gorman, supra, 178 Cal.App.4th at p. 67.) 

We are also not persuaded by Peak/Bedford’s contention 

that the court intended to reduce the fee award by the total of the 

block-billed entries listed in footnote 5, and therefore the court’s 

math does not add up. Peak/Bedford argues that the court’s order 

“directs the parties to ‘see footnote 5 for specific [block] billing 

entries’ leading a party to believe that all $41,169.50 was struck.” 

However, footnote 5 explicitly says it is a list of billing entries 

Peak/Bedford—not the court—identified as “problematic.” The 

court’s order also stated that “several of the block billing entries 

must be reduced”; it did not say all identified block-billed entries 
22

would be stricken. Again, the court’s failure to specify which

block-billed entries were reduced or stricken was not an abuse of 

discretion. 

In short, Peak/Bedford has failed to demonstrate that the 

trial court’s award of attorney fees to UHA, or the amount of fees 

awarded, constituted an abuse of discretion. 

DISPOSITION

The attorney fee award is affirmed. UHA is entitled to its 

costs on appeal. 

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

COLLINS, J.

We concur:

MANELLA, P. J.

CURREY, J.