1

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

JUDICIAL WATCH, INC.,

Plaintiff,

v.

U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE,

Defendant.

Civil Action No. 22-1034 (BAH)

Judge Beryl A. Howell

MEMORANDUM OPINION

Plaintiff Judicial Watch, Inc., a nonprofit organization that “seeks to promote transparency, 

integrity, and accountability in government and fidelity to the rule of law” and “regularly requests 

records from federal agencies,” Compl. ¶ 3, ECF No. 1, challenges the response of the Federal 

Bureau of Investigation (“FBI”), a component of defendant U.S. Department of Justice (“DOJ”),

to a request submitted pursuant to the Freedom of Information Act (“FOIA”), 5 U.S.C. § 552, for 

records of communications between FBI officials and the New York Times (“NYT”) regarding the

FBI’s execution of search warrants on November 4 and 6, 2021, at the homes of an employee and 

of the founder of Project Veritas, id. ¶ 5, which is described as “a non-profit non-governmental 

organization headquartered in Mamaroneck, New York,” id.1 After the FBI had searched its 

records system and informed plaintiff of the existence of an active―and claimed 

exempt―investigative file pertaining to Project Veritas, plaintiff brought the instant lawsuit, 

alleging in a one-count complaint that the FBI failed to conduct an adequate search for responsive 

1 Project Veritas “is a § 501(c)(3) organization that conducts investigations into a wide range of matters it 

considers to be of public interest,” Democracy Partners v. Project Veritas Action Fund, 453 F. Supp. 3d 261, 268 

(D.D.C. 2020), using “investigative methods [that] have spawned multiple civil lawsuits and a criminal judgment 

against [its founder],” id. at 269 n.4 (citing cases and criminal judgment). 
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records. Compl. ¶¶ 16–19; Def.’s Mot. Summ. J. (“Def.’s Mot.”), Att. 1, Decl. of Michael G. 

Seidel (“Seidel Decl.”), Ex. C at 1, December 15, 2021 Letter, ECF No. 16-1. 

Pending before the Court are the parties’ cross-motions for summary judgment. See Def.’s 

Mot., ECF No. 16; Pl.’s Opp’n Def.’s Mot. Summ. J. & Mem. Supp. Cross-Mot. Summ. J. (“Pl.’s 

Opp’n”), ECF No. 17.

2

 For the reasons set forth below, defendant’s Motion for Summary 

Judgment is granted and plaintiff’s Cross-Motion for Summary Judgment is denied.

I. BACKGROUND

The background underlying plaintiff’s FOIA request is described below, followed by a 

review of plaintiff’s FOIA request and the FBI’s responses to the request both before and after the 

initiation of this lawsuit.

A. The FOIA Request

The search warrants about which plaintiff’s FOIA request sought records were executed in 

connection with a criminal investigation into the theft of a diary belonging to the President’s 

daughter, Ashley Biden. Pl.’s Resp. SMF ¶¶ 25–27, ECF No. 17-1; Def.’s Resp. Pl.’s SMF ¶¶ 25–

27, ECF No. 20-2. On November 5 and 6, 2021, the NYT published two articles about the search 

warrants executed on November 4 and 6 at the homes of Project Veritas’s employee Spencer 

Meads and founder James O’Keefe, “citing ‘people briefed’ on the matter as its sources.” Pl.’s 

Resp. SMF ¶¶ 29–31 (citing Michael Schmidt et al., People Tied to Project Veritas Scrutinized in 

Theft of Diary from Biden’s Daughter, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 5, 2021, updated Nov. 12, 2021), 

https://www.nytimes.com/2021/11/05/us/politics/project-veritas-investigation-ashley-biden2 Certain memoranda and accompanying attachments filed in support of the cross-motions are docketed twice 

and, to simplify citation, only one of the duplicate submissions is cited. For example, Plaintiff’s Memorandum in 

Opposition to Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment and in Support of Plaintiff’s Cross-Motion for Summary 

Judgment is docketed at both ECF Nos. 17 and 18, but only the former is cited. Defendant’s Reply in Support of its 

Motion for Summary Judgment and Memorandum in Opposition to Plaintiff’s Cross-Motion for Summary Judgment 

is docketed at both ECF Nos. 20 and 21, and only the former is cited. 
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diary.html; Michael S. Schmidt, et al., F.B.I. Searches James O’Keefe’s Home in Ashley Biden 

Diary Theft Inquiry, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 6, 2021, updated Nov. 12, 2021) (“NYT Article, Nov. 6, 

2021”), https://www.nytimes.com/2021/11/06/us/politics/james-okeefe-project-veritas-ashleybiden.html). Each article was updated days following publication.

On November 10, 2021—even before the final updates to the NYT articles were made on 

November 12—plaintiff submitted to the FBI the FOIA request at issue, seeking records, from 

October 1, 2021, to “present,” of communications between FBI officials and the NYT regarding

what plaintiff described as “the FBI search warrants and raid” on the homes of O’Keefe and Meads. 

Compl. ¶ 5. The FOIA request detailed that the requested “communications” included “email (on 

.gov or non.gov email accounts), text message, or instant chat,” with FBI officials, including “in 

the offices of the FBI Director, FBI Deputy Director, Office of General Counsel, Office of Public 

Affairs, and/or the FBI New York Field Office” (“NYFO”). Id.; see also Seidel Decl., Ex. A, 

FOIA Request, ECF No. 16-1. 

Following receipt of plaintiff’s FOIA request, the FBI searched its Central Records System 

(“CRS”) for main index entries via Sentinel, the FBI’s case management system. Seidel Decl. ¶¶ 

17–19. CRS contains “applicant, investigative, intelligence, personnel, administrative, and general 

files,” “spans the entire FBI organization[,] and encompasses the records of FBI Headquarters 

(HQ), FBI field offices, and FBI legal attaché offices (legats) worldwide.” Id. ¶ 14. Information 

in CRS that is “deemed of sufficient significance to warrant indexing for future retrieval” is 

manually indexed by FBI personnel but not “every individual name or other subject matter” is 

indexed. Seidel Decl. ¶ 16. A main index entry is created for each “subject or focus of an 

investigation” and a reference index is created for individuals or non-individuals “associated with 

an investigation, but who or which is not the main subject or focus of the investigation.” Id.
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The FBI searched on CRS for the term “Project Veritas” and applied a cut-off date of 

November 24, 2021, the date of the FBI’s initial search. Id. ¶ 19. The FBI did not search for 

records relating to the Project Veritas employee or founder by name, because plaintiff had not 

supplied a privacy waiver or proof of death for either. Id. ¶ 19 n.6; Def.’s Reply Supp. Mot. Summ. 

J. & Opp’n Pl.’s Cross-Mot. Summ. J. (“Def.’s Opp’n”), Att. 1, Decl. of Joseph E. Bender, Jr. 

(“Bender Decl.”) ¶ 5, ECF No. 20-1. This search identified one responsive file that the FBI 

determined contained “law enforcement records” related to “a pending or prospective law 

enforcement proceeding.” Seidel Decl. ¶ 8; Seidel Decl., Ex. C at 1, December 15, 2021 Letter. 

By letters, dated December 15, 2021, and January 6, 2022, the FBI advised that release of the

material located in the active investigative file “could reasonably be expected to interfere with 

enforcement proceedings,” and that such record was accordingly “exempt from disclosure 

pursuant to [FOIA exemption (b)(7)(A)].” Seidel Decl., Ex. C at 1, December 15, 2021 Letter; 

Seidel Decl. ¶ 8; Bender Decl. ¶ 5; Answer ¶ 11, ECF No. 9. 

Plaintiff appealed the FBI’s denial of the FOIA request to DOJ’s Office of Information 

Policy (“OIP”), which, on February 14, 2022, denied this administrative appeal and affirmed the 

FBI’s determination that the requested records were properly withheld pursuant to exemption 

(b)(7)(A). Seidel Decl. ¶ 11; Seidel Decl., Ex. F, February 14, 2022 Letter, ECF No. 16-1.

B. Procedural History

On April 13, 2022, plaintiff filed the instant lawsuit seeking relief under the FOIA. See 

generally Compl. Following this filing, the FBI determined that plaintiff’s FOIA request had been 

misinterpreted as seeking records “pertaining to Project Veritas, James O’Keefe, and Spencer 

Meads,” as opposed to records “of communications between FBI officials and employees, 

contractors, and representatives of The New York Times regarding” the search warrants executed 
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at the homes of O’Keefe and Meads. Bender Decl. ¶ 6 & n.1; Pl.’s Reply Supp. Cross Mot. Summ.

J. (“Pl.’s Reply”) at 1 n.1, ECF No. 22. Thereafter, the FBI conducted a “page-by-page” review 

of the active investigative file for any records of the requested communications, searching for the 

terms “New York Times,” “NY Times,” and “Times,” and, upon receipt of O’Keefe’s certification 

of identity in February 2023, “James O’Keefe” and “O’Keefe,” which also returned results for 

“James OKeefe.” Seidel Decl. ¶¶ 21–22 & nn.7–8. The FBI also conducted an additional search 

of CRS for the term “James O’Keefe.”3 Id. ¶ 22. The FBI “contacted Plaintiff to explain” that 

CRS contained no responsive records, but that the FBI would additionally “search the classified 

and unclassified email accounts of certain individuals in the offices delineated by Plaintiff.” Seidel 

Decl. ¶ 26. 

The FBI accordingly searched the classified and unclassified email accounts of certain 

individuals within the FBI offices identified in plaintiff’s request for records exchanged between 

October 1, 2021, and November 24, 2021 (the same time period applied to its search of the CRS),

using the search terms “Spencer Meads,” “Meads,” “James O’Keefe,” “O’Keefe,” “OKeefe,” 

“Project Veritas,” and “Veritas.” Bender Decl. ¶ 14; Seidel Decl. ¶ 26. The FBI limited its search 

to individuals who, during that time period, “held a position at the Senior Executive Service (SES) 

level, had been officially acknowledged by the FBI as an FBI employee in the context of the 

records at issue, or held a public-facing position.” Seidel Decl. ¶ 26. The FBI located no 

responsive records from these email searches. Id. ¶ 27. Based on the results of its email searches 

and review of the investigative file pertaining to Project Veritas, the FBI concluded that “a search 

elsewhere would not reasonably be likely to locate responsive records.” Id. ¶ 28.

3 Following the filing of plaintiff’s opposition brief, the FBI conducted a subsequent search of CRS and 

email accounts for the term “Veritas.” Bender Decl. ¶¶ 10 n.7, 13 n.10. 
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II. LEGAL STANDARD

“[A]n agency fulfills its obligations under FOIA if it can demonstrate beyond material 

doubt that its search was reasonably calculated to uncover all relevant documents,” Watkins L. & 

Advoc., PLLC v. U.S. Dep’t of Just., 78 F.4th 436, 442 (D.C. Cir. 2023) (quoting Valencia–Lucena

v. U.S. Coast Guard, 180 F.3d 321, 325 (D.C. Cir. 1999)), and “perform[s] more than a perfunctory 

search” to identify responsive records, Ancient Coin Collectors Guild v. U.S. Dep’t of State, 641 

F.3d 504, 514 (D.C. Cir. 2011); see also In re Clinton, 973 F.3d 106, 116 (D.C. Cir. 2020). 

When an agency’s search for records is challenged, “a district court is not tasked with 

uncovering whether there might exist any other documents possibly responsive to the request, but 

instead, asks only whether the search for [the requested] documents was adequate.” In re Clinton, 

973 F.3d at 116 (internal quotation marks and emphasis omitted) (quoting Weisberg v. U.S. Dep’t

of Justice, 745 F.2d 1476, 1485 (D.C. Cir. 1984)). In this regard, “[a]n agency need not search 

every record system or demonstrate that all responsive documents were found and that no other 

relevant documents could possibly exist,” Watkins L. & Advoc., PLLC, 78 F.4th at 442 (internal 

quotation marks omitted) (quoting Oglesby v. U.S. Dep’t of the Army, 920 F.2d 57, 68 (D.C. Cir. 

1990)), although the agency “may not limit its search to only one record system if there are others 

that are likely to turn up the information requested,” Montgomery v. Internal Revenue Serv., 40 

F.4th 702, 714 (D.C. Cir. 2022) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Oglesby, 920 F.2d at

68). 

At the summary judgment stage, an agency meets its burden of demonstrating beyond 

material doubt that it “made a good faith effort to conduct a search for the requested records, using 

methods which can be reasonably expected to produce the information requested,” Watkins L. & 

Advoc., PLLC, 78 F.4th at 442 (quoting Oglesby, 920 F.2d at 68), by submitting to the court a 
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“reasonably detailed affidavit, setting forth the search terms and the type of search performed, and 

averring that all files likely to contain responsive materials (if such records exist) were searched,” 

Shapiro v. U.S. Dep’t of Just., 40 F.4th 609, 612–13 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 143 S. Ct. 526 (2022) 

(quoting Reps. Comm. for Freedom of Press v. FBI, 877 F.3d 399, 402 (D.C. Cir. 2017)).

“Summary judgment is inappropriate if a review of the record raises substantial doubt as to the 

search’s adequacy, particularly in view of well defined requests and positive indications of 

overlooked materials.” Shapiro, 40 F.4th at 613 (quoting Reps. Comm. for Freedom of Press, 877 

F.3d at 402).

III. DISCUSSION

Plaintiff makes a three-pronged challenge to the adequacy of the FBI’s search, which did 

not uncover responsive records of communications between the NYT and the FBI regarding the 

FBI search warrants, executed in November 2021 at the homes of two Project Veritas personnel, 

and urges that additional searches be conducted at more locations, using more search terms, and 

certain types of communications data sources. Specifically, plaintiff argues the search was 

inadequate for failing (1) to cover the FBI New York Field Office and email accounts of FBI agents 

working on the search warrants, (2) to use every search term plaintiff requested, and (3) to review 

individual FBI agents’ text messages and instant chat messages. Acknowledging that the search 

did not uncover responsive records, DOJ defends the FBI’s search as reasonable, as supported by 

two detailed declarations, totaling 48 pages, describing the searches conducted. Def.’s Opp’n at 

1, ECF No. 20; see generally Seidel Decl.; Bender Decl. None of plaintiff’s challenges to the 

search has sufficient merit to defeat DOJ’s motion for summary judgment.
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A. Plaintiff’s Belief About Existence of Requested Records is Speculative

Plaintiff’s claim that the FBI did not “conduct[] a search ‘reasonably calculated to 

uncover’” responsive communications about the search warrants referenced in its FOIA request, 

Pl.’s Opp’n at 8 (quoting Oglesby, 920 F.2d at 68), rests on plaintiff’s apparent belief that the FBI 

was the source for information relayed by the NYT in its reporting regarding the execution of the 

search warrants. No matter how fervently held, however, plaintiff’s belief does not drive the legal 

assessment of the adequacy of a search for records under the FOIA. A brief review of the record—

including, notably, information plaintiff supplies—demonstrates that plaintiff’s belief is without 

reasonable foundation or, put more bluntly, is pure speculation. 

Plaintiff insists that the requested records must exist based on the premise that “information 

communicated to and published by” the NYT regarding the search warrants’ execution “was 

restricted to everyone except” those involved in the FBI’s investigation of the diary theft. Pl.’s 

Opp’n at 7. This premise is plainly incorrect. Plaintiff’s speculation that the FBI was the source 

for the NYT’s reporting fails to acknowledge the reality, that there was nothing surreptitious about 

execution of the search warrants. To the contrary, the warrants were necessarily executed in broad 

daylight and thus plainly observable to the public. See Pl.’s Opp’n, Decl. of Kathryn Blankenberg 

(“Blankenberg Decl.”), Ex 1, Search Warrant for Spencer Meads’s Residence at 1, ECF No. 17-4 

(directing execution of warrant “in the daytime”); Blankenberg Decl., Ex. 2, Search Warrant for 

James O’Keefe’s Residence at 1, ECF No. 17-5 (same). Indeed, plaintiff’s own exhibit of redacted 

emails, produced by the Executive Office of U.S. Attorneys (“EOUSA”) in another FOIA lawsuit 

brought by plaintiff, references that the NYT had contact with a neighbor of O’Keefe regarding the 

execution of the search. See Blankenberg Decl., Ex. 3, Emails at 5, ECF No. 17-6 (“The Times 
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has his neighbor on record . . . saying that FBI were banging on O’Keefe’s door[.]”).4 Moreover, 

as articles cited by plaintiff make clear, O’Keefe himself spoke directly to the NYT regarding the 

FBI investigation, including even before the search warrant was executed at his residence. See 

NYT Article, Nov. 6, 2021 (“Federal authorities on Saturday searched the home of James O’Keefe 

. . . a day after Mr. O’Keefe acknowledged that the group was under investigation by the Justice 

Department.” (emphasis supplied)); Adam Goldman & Mark Mazzetti, Project Veritas and the 

Line Between Journalism and Political Spying, N.Y. Times (Nov. 11, 2021, updated Nov. 12, 

2021) (“NYT Article, Nov. 11, 2021”), https://www.nytimes.com/2021/11/11/us/politics/projectveritas-journalism-political-spying.html (cited in Pl.’s Resp. SMF ¶ 32) (“Mr. O’Keefe has 

acknowledged receiving a grand jury subpoena in the case.”).

Plaintiff further claims in its Statements of Fact that the emails show that “communications 

between [officials in the U.S. Attorney’s Office for the Southern District of New York (“SDNYUSAO”)] and the [NYT] about the warrants and the FBI investigation began on the morning on 

November 4, at the time of or shortly [after] the execution of the search warrants at the residences 

of Spencer Meads and another Project Veritas” employee. Pl.’s Resp. SMF ¶ 39; Blankenberg 

Decl., Ex. 3, Emails. These redacted emails indicate that these communications were initiated by 

the NYT and reflect efforts by the NYT to do its job and obtain information from the SDNY-USAO 

around the time the Meads search warrant was executed. They offer no evidence that 

correspondence likewise occurred between the FBI and the NYT, let alone confirmation that 

“information . . . published by [the NYT] is the type of information that was restricted to everyone 

4 In that lawsuit, since dismissed by stipulation, plaintiff sought records of communications between the NYT 

and SDNY-USAO regarding, in relevant part, the search warrants at issue in the instant case. Pl.’s Resp. SMF ¶ 38 

(citing Jud. Watch, Inc. v. U.S. Dep’t of Just., No. 22-cv-2652 (RC) (D.D.C. 2022)); see also Stipulation of Dismissal, 

Jud. Watch, Inc., No. 22-cv-2652 (RC) (D.D.C. filed Oct. 24, 2023). 
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except” those on the case participant list for the FBI’s investigation of the Biden diary theft. Pl.’s 

Opp’n at 7. 

Plaintiff nevertheless seemingly insists, through representations in its Statements of Fact, 

that such messages must exist, due to inferences that could be drawn from the NYT reportedly 

publishing excerpts of Project Veritas legal memoranda “just hours after a court ordered the FBI 

to pause its extraction and review of O’Keefe’s cellphones”; “O’Keefe’s lawyers[’]

represent[ation]” in unrelated litigation “that the memoranda were located on the cellphone FBI 

seized from O’Keefe”; and the NYT’s representation, again in unrelated litigation, “that the 

memoranda were acquired by its journalists outside of any discovery process in its ongoing 

litigation against Project Veritas.” Pl.’s Resp. SMF ¶¶ 32–34 (citing NYT Article, Nov. 11, 2021); 

Petitioner’s Motion for Miscellaneous Relief at 1–3, In re Search Warrant dated November 5, 

2021, 21-mag-10685 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 15, 2021); Brief for Appellant at 2–7, Project Veritas v. N.Y.

Times Co., et al., No. 2021-09551 (N.Y. App. Div. 2d Dept. March 11, 2022)).5 Plaintiff’s 

apparent speculation that the FBI obtained Project Veritas legal memoranda from O’Keefe’s 

cellphone and provided such memoranda to the NYT ignores the obvious and publicly cited source 

for information about the legal memoranda, namely, “O’Keefe’s lawyers,” who “represent[ed] that 

the memoranda were located on [O’Keefe’s] cellphone.” Pl.’s Resp. SMF ¶ 34.

Plaintiff is seemingly convinced that records of communications about the search warrants

between the NYT and the FBI must exist despite the sparsity of credible support for this inference. 

Guiding review of plaintiff’s challenge to the search here, is the well-settled law “that an ‘agency’s 

failure to turn up a particular document, or mere speculation that as yet uncovered documents 

5 The docket relating to the search warrant, dated November 5, 2021, No. 21-mag-10685, which plaintiff cites 

for the proposition regarding O’Keefe’s lawyers’ representation, remains sealed. See In re Search Warrant Dated

Nov. 5, 2021, No. 21-misc-813 (ATSLC), 2021 WL 5830728, at *1 n.1 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 7, 2021).
11

might exist, does not undermine the determination that the agency conducted an adequate search 

for the requested records.’” Watkins L. & Advoc., PLLC, 78 F.4th at 446 (quoting Wilbur v. CIA, 

355 F.3d 675, 678 (D.C. Cir. 2004)).

B. Locations Searched

Plaintiff asserts that the FBI failed to search or “contact the New York Field Office,” which

was “likely to possess potentially responsive records, about the requests,” or to search the email 

accounts of “the limited number of FBI officials who would likely possess potentially responsive 

records.” Pl.’s Opp’n at 1–2, 6–8; Pl.’s Reply at 1–2. This contention misconceives the standard 

for the adequacy of an agency’s search under the FOIA. 

At the outset, just because plaintiff pointedly asked the FBI to conduct a search of specific 

locations does not impose an obligation on the agency to do so. See Watkins L. & Advoc., PLLC, 

78 F.4th at 441, 447–49 (rejecting FOIA requestor’s argument that DOJ should have complied 

with direction to “please forward” request to conduct searches of additional components, stating 

“nothing in the statute (or in DOJ’s regulations) enables a FOIA requester to impose that kind of 

obligation on an agency by asking for it”); see also Mobley v. CIA, 806 F.3d 568, 582 (D.C. Cir. 

2015) (an approach that “would allow a requester to dictate, through search instructions, the scope 

of an agency’s search,” would “undermine[]” “the reasonableness test for search adequacy long 

adhered to in this [C]ircuit”).

An agency’s search obligations are dictated by whether the scope of the search is 

“reasonably calculated to uncover all relevant documents,” In re Clinton, 973 F.3d at 116 (internal 

quotation marks and emphasis omitted) (quoting Steinberg v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 23 F.3d 548, 

551 (D.C. Cir. 1994)), a standard that an agency satisfies by searching “all files likely to contain 

responsive materials (if such records exist),” Ancient Coin Collectors Guild, 641 F.3d at 514
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(quoting Valencia–Lucena, 180 F.3d at 326). Although an agency may have an obligation to 

search a particular field office in the “‘rare case . . . in which an agency record contains a lead so 

apparent’—i.e., ‘a lead that is both clear and certain’—that the agency ‘cannot in good faith fail to 

pursue it,’” Watkins L. & Advoc., PLLC, 78 F.4th at 449 (quoting Kowalczyk v. U.S. Dep’t of Just., 

73 F.3d 386, 389 (D.C. Cir. 1996)), that is not the situation here.

In its initial and supplemental declarations, the FBI explained that “a search of [CRS],” 

which contains “records of FBI Headquarters, FBI field offices, and FBI legal attaché offices 

(legats) worldwide,” “would encompass records from the FBI’s New York Field Office and 

investigative records of applicable Supervisory Special Agents, and other individuals who have or 

had an active role in the investigation.” Def.’s Opp’n at 5 (citing Seidel Decl. ¶¶ 14–18; Bender 

Decl. ¶¶ 13–14, 18–19). Plaintiff does not contest the FBI’s description of the scope of its record 

system as covering records in the New York Field Office. Indeed, the search conducted using the 

FBI’s selection of relevant search terms did locate an open investigative file regarding Project 

Veritas, see Bender Decl. ¶ 5; Seidel Decl. ¶ 19, seemingly proof that the FBI’s system and search 

terms used were effective in this case. 

Yet, unable to cite any “positive indication[] of overlooked materials,” Montgomery, 40 

F.4th at 715 (citation omitted), plaintiff seeks a broader search of the New York Field Office, 

arguing that this location is “likely to possess responsive records” of FBI communications with 

the NYT because the search warrants at issue in plaintiff’s FOIA request were executed in New 

York, New York, and were signed by a New York Field Office agent, see Pl.’s Reply at 1–2

(capitalization omitted). This speculation is itself based on the premise, as discussed supra, in Part 

III.A, that the communications plaintiff believes occurred did happen. Such speculation is simply 

not a “clear and certain” lead “indicat[ing] that there were undiscovered responsive records in” the 
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FBI’s New York Field Office.” Watkins L. & Advoc., PLLC 78 F.4th at 449 (quoting Kowalczyk, 

73 F.3d at 389, and citing Campbell v. U.S. Dep’t of Just., 164 F.3d 20, 28–29 (D.C. Cir. 1998), 

as amended (Mar. 3, 1999)). 

Agency declarations explaining search scope and methodology are accorded “a 

presumption of good faith, which cannot be rebutted by purely speculative claims about the

existence and discoverability of other documents.” Shapiro, 40 F.4th at 613 (internal quotation 

marks omitted) (quoting Bartko v. U.S. Dep’t of Just., 898 F.3d 51, 74 (D.C. Cir. 2018)). As 

explained in the FBI’s declarations, the FBI’s search of the CRS captured records from the FBI’s 

New York Field Office and from “individuals who have or had an active role in the investigation.” 

Def.’s Opp’n at 5 (citing Seidel Decl. ¶¶ 14–18; Bender Decl. ¶¶ 13–14, 18–19). Here, “there is

no discernible evidence in the record that” any responsive materials in the FBI’s New York Field

Office exist, and plaintiff’s “continued speculation” that they do is plainly insufficient to overcome 

the presumption of good faith accorded to the FBI’s declarations. Bartko, 898 F.3d at 73–74; see 

also Watkins L. & Advoc., PLLC, 78 F.4th at 450 (“find[ing] no error in the district court’s grant 

of the good faith presumption to the FBI and DOJ declarations” where declarations were 

“relatively detailed and non-conclusory” and plaintiff’s “claims about the purported inadequacies 

of the agencies’ searches raise no concerns about the declarants’ (or the agencies’) good faith”

(quoting SafeCard Servs., Inc. v. S.E.C., 926 F.2d 1197, 1200 (D.C. Cir. 1991)); Evans v. Fed. 

Bureau of Prisons, 951 F.3d 578, 584–86 (D.C. Cir. 2020) (affirming adequacy of search by 

Federal Bureau of Prisons where “[n]othing in the record refutes the Bureau’s repeated assertions 

that it . . . has no records responsive to [plaintiff’s] demands” and plaintiff “has provided us with 

no reason to doubt the veracity of the prison officials’ response”); Hodge v. FBI, 703 F.3d 575, 
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580, 582 (D.C. Cir. 2013) (upholding agency response to FOIA request where requester “has not 

presented sufficient evidence to rebut [the] presumption” accorded to the agency’s averments). 

Plaintiff’s additional challenge that the FBI failed to search the email accounts of “the 

limited number of FBI Case Participants who had prior knowledge” of the search warrants is 

similarly without foundation. Pl.’s Opp’n at 6. Plaintiff dismisses as insufficient the FBI’s search 

of the email accounts of individuals who were in the senior executive service (“SES”) and

permitted, per the FBI’s media policy, “to communicate with the media,” including, among others,

FBI Director Christopher Wray, Deputy Director Paul Abbate, General Counsel Jason Jones, 

Office of Public Affairs Assistant Director Cathy Milhoan, and New York Field Office Assistant 

Director in Charge Michael Driscoll.” Seidel Decl. ¶ 26; Bender Decl. ¶ 10.

6 The FBI explained

that because these individuals were “authorized to communicate with the media (which would 

include contact with employees, contractors, or representatives of [the NYT]),” if such records 

existed, these were the accounts that could be “expected to have responsive records.” Bender Decl. 

¶¶ 10–11; Def.’s Opp’n at 6. In plaintiff’s view, “it was unreasonable for Defendant to limit its 

search to SES officials” because “information communicated to and published by [the NYT] is the 

type of information that was restricted to everyone except” those on the case participant list for the 

FBI’s investigation of the diary theft. Pl.’s Opp’n at 7. As explained, supra, in Part III.A, however, 

plaintiff’s premise that the FBI was the source for the NYT’s reporting ignores the more obvious,

cited sources for the reported information, including a neighbor at the location targeted in the 

6 The FBI also searched the email accounts belonging to Eric Vélez-Villar, Office of Private Sector Assistant 

Director, and Bryan Vorndran, Cyber Division Assistant Director, who were identified in another FOIA request by 

plaintiff, since dismissed by stipulation, that sought records of communications between FBI and Pfizer Inc. regarding 

“O’Keefe and/or Project Veritas,” as well as results from the email searches conducted for that FOIA request. Seidel 

Decl. ¶¶ 26–27; see Compl. ¶ 5, Jud. Watch v. U.S. Dep’t of Just., No. 22-cv-1035 (TSC), ECF No. 1 (filed D.D.C.

Apr. 13, 2022).
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warrant, the founder of Project Veritas and lawyers for Project Veritas, and even information 

potentially relayed in response to the NYT’s inquiries by the SDNY-USAO. 

Plaintiff’s request that additional searches are required of email accounts of individual FBI 

agents and personnel participating in some fashion with the search warrant investigation and 

execution, therefore boils down to speculation that these individuals likely have email accounts 

and likely use email and therefore could have used email to communicate with the NYT. This 

reasoning about the possible use of email “without more[,] does not invariably constitute a ‘lead’ 

that an agency must pursue.” Mobley, 806 F.3d at 582 (quoting Kowalczyk, 73 F.3d at 389); see 

also Cause of Action v. Internal Revenue Serv., 253 F. Supp. 3d 149, 159–60 (D.D.C. 2017) 

(affirming adequacy of search against challenge that IRS failed to search email records despite an

“unrelated Congressional investigation into the agency’s handling of tax-exempt entities, and the 

fact that the investigation unearthed communications on that topic made via email,” where “there 

[was] no actual evidence of wrongdoing in this case, and the obvious fact that employees of any 

government or private entity are likely to use email . . . is not enough to support plaintiff’s call for 

a broad search into email”). Moreover, plaintiff makes no claim that the FBI “ignored indications 

in documents found in its initial search that there were additional responsive documents” located 

in the case participants’ email accounts, but merely speculates that responsive documents are 

missing from the FBI’s search. Montgomery, 40 F.4th at 715; see Pl.’s Opp’n at 6–8; Pl.’s Reply 

at 1–2. Plaintiff’s demand for additional email account searches, after the FBI had already 

informed plaintiff of the existence of the active investigative file “associated with Project Veritas,” 

see Bender Decl. ¶ 5—and thus given plaintiff more information than plaintiff’s FOIA request had 

demanded—is accordingly “mere fiat,” Mobley, 806 F.3d at 582, unsupported by any “positive 

indications of overlooked materials” to substantiate plaintiff’s claim that additional email accounts 
16

would reasonably contain responsive records, Montgomery, 40 F.4th at 715 (quoting Iturralde v. 

Comptroller of Currency, 315 F.3d 311, 315 (D.C. Cir. 2003)). 

Set against the FBI’s detailed declarations demonstrating that the FBI conducted a goodfaith search, plaintiff has not carried its burden of “establish[ing] a sufficient predicate to justify” 

the FBI searching additional email accounts. Campbell, 164 F.3d at 28 (citation omitted); see also 

Nolen v. U.S. Dep’t of Just., 146 F. Supp. 3d 89, 97 (D.D.C. 2015) (“Once an agency has conducted 

a good faith search in response to a FOIA request, the burden is on the requesting party to provide 

evidence that other databases are reasonably likely to contain responsive documents.” (citing 

Campbell, 164 F.3d at 28)). Simply put, plaintiff has failed to raise “substantial doubt as to the [] 

adequacy” of the FBI’s email account searches. Shapiro, 40 F.4th at 613 (quoting Reps. Comm.

for Freedom of Press, 877 F.3d at 402); see also Mobley, 806 F.3d at 581–83 (rejecting plaintiff’s 

claim that FBI “was required to search . . . the record systems he asked it to search,” where plaintiff 

offered no “supporting evidence” justifying its request and the FBI explained that “record systems 

[plaintiff] asked the FBI to search either [we]re captured by the CRS or [] unlikely to contain 

responsive records”). 

C. Search Terms

Next, plaintiff challenges as inadequate the search terms employed by the FBI. The FBI 

searched CRS indices for “Project Veritas,” “Veritas,” and “James O’Keefe”; the investigative 

case file for “New York Times,” “NY Times,” “Times,” “James O’Keefe,” and “O’Keefe”; and 

email accounts for “Spencer Meads,” “Meads,” “James O’Keefe,” “O’Keefe,” “OKeefe,” “Project 

Veritas,” and “Veritas.” Bender Decl. ¶¶ 13 & n.10, 14; Seidel Decl. ¶¶ 19, 21 & n.7. The searches 

“located only the pending [investigative] file.” Bender Decl. ¶ 13. Plaintiff posits that the terms 

used were inadequate for two reasons, arguing that the FBI should have used “logical variations”
17

of the FBI’s search terms, such as “Times” and “PV,” Pl.’s Opp’n at 9; Pl.’s Reply at 3; and that 

the FBI should have used terms “that would encompass communications with the [NYT] 

‘regarding’ the search warrants,” suggesting the FOIA request required a search for records 

regarding the broader investigation into the theft of Ashley Biden’s diary, Pl.’s Opp’n at 2, 8–11; 

see also Pl.’s Reply at 2–5. 

To be sure, as plaintiff contends, an “agency is obligated to construe a FOIA request 

liberally.” Pl.’s Opp’n at 8 (citing Nation Mag., Wash. Bur. v. U.S. Customs Serv., 71 F.3d 885, 

890 (D.C. Cir. 1995)). This legal duty on the part of an agency is cabined, however, by two other 

pertinent legal principles applicable to FOIA cases: first, that “[t]he adequacy of a FOIA search . 

. . is generally determined not by the fruits of the search, but the appropriateness of the methods 

used to carry out the search,” Watkins L. & Advoc., PLLC, 78 F.4th at 444 (internal quotation 

marks omitted) (quoting Ancient Coin Collectors Guild, 641 F.3d at 514); and second, that an 

agency processing a FOIA request is not “required to divine a requester’s intent” nor “expand [its] 

searches beyond the four corners of the request,” Elgabrowny v. CIA, 613 F. Supp. 3d 170, 184 

(D.D.C. 2020) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted); see also Kowalczyk, 73 F.3d at 

389 (“The agency is not required to speculate about potential leads . . . [or] to look beyond the four 

corners of the request for leads to the location of responsive documents.”). These two latter 

guideposts in assessing the adequacy of the search at issue demonstrate that plaintiff’s challenge 

fails. 

Here, the FBI “crafted searches reasonably tailored to locate responsive documents.” 

Watkins L. & Advoc., PLLC, 78 F.4th at 444. In its initial and supplemental declarations, the FBI 

explained its “determin[ation] that [its] search terms would allow the FBI to locate any potentially 

responsive communications in the email accounts” and that it “us[ed] the search terms most likely 
18

to locate responsive records.” Seidel Decl. ¶ 26; Bender Decl. ¶ 14. Moreover, as plaintiff does 

not dispute, plaintiff had “not requested the FBI employ any other search terms besides ‘Meads,’ 

‘O’Keefe,’ and ‘Okeefe’ in either its FOIA request or subsequent negotiations regarding the FBI’s 

searches for responsive records.” Def.’s Opp’n at 12 (citation omitted). When conducting the 

searches, the FBI used these search terms suggested by plaintiff, see id.; Bender Decl. ¶ 14, as 

well as additional search terms that the FBI determined would be “most likely to locate responsive 

records,” see Bender Decl. ¶ 14; Seidel Decl. ¶¶ 25–27. Given the focus of plaintiff’s FOIA request 

for communications between the FBI and the NYT “regarding the FBI search warrants” executed 

at the homes of Meads and O’Keefe, Compl. ¶ 5, the FBI’s search used specific terms (e.g., “New 

York Times,” “Project Veritas,” Seidel Decl. ¶ 21 n.7; Bender Decl. ¶ 13), that were reasonably 

calculated to lead to responsive documents. 

The fact that the FBI did not use the specific search terms plaintiff now suggests during 

litigation to search CRS indices, the investigative file, and email accounts does not, plaintiff’s 

speculation notwithstanding, see Pl.’s Opp’n at 8–11; Pl.’s Reply at 2–5, undermine the conclusion 

that the search was reasonable. See Heffernan v. Azar, 317 F. Supp. 3d 94, 107–08 (D.D.C. 2018)

(“find[ing] the search terms that were employed were reasonable” where agency used more than 

ten “reasonably tailored search terms” and “there is no indication that the plaintiff requested the 

defendant to employ th[e] proposed search terms either in his FOIA request or subsequent 

negotiations regarding the defendant’s searches for responsive documents”).

Moreover, although plaintiff asserts—in an argument subsequently abandoned on reply—

that the FBI improperly “used [terms] to search email records [that] differ[ed] from the terms used 

to search the CRS,” Pl.’s Opp’n at 11, the FBI’s use of “different search terms for different

databases . . . does not undermine the conclusion that the search was reasonable,” Liberation
19

Newspaper v. U.S. Dep’t of State, 80 F. Supp. 3d 137, 146 (D.D.C. 2015) (citations omitted); see

also Jud. Watch, Inc. v. U.S. Dep’t of Hous. & Urban Dev., 20 F. Supp. 3d 247, 254 (D.D.C. 2014) 

(“Though some agencies may choose to search for responsive documents in a centralized fashion 

using consistent search terms and techniques across various departments, nothing in FOIA’s text 

or the relevant case law requires an agency to do so.”); Jud. Watch, Inc. v. U.S. Dep’t of State, No. 

12-cv-893 (JDB), 2017 WL 3913212, at *9 (D.D.C. Sept. 6, 2017) (“[T]he fact that different 

offices used different search terms [does not] undermine the reasonableness of the State 

Department’s search.” (citations omitted)).

The FBI has discretion in crafting a list of search terms that it “believe[s] to be reasonably 

tailored to uncover documents responsive to the FOIA request.” Heffernan v. Azar, 417 F. Supp. 

3d 1, 11 (D.D.C. 2019) (citation omitted); see also Agility Pub. Warehousing Co. K.S.C. v. Nat’l 

Sec. Agency, 113 F. Supp. 3d 313, 339–40 (D.D.C. 2015) (“Although the NSA could have used 

additional variations of the plaintiff’s name or the legal case numbers, the NSA’s search terms 

were reasonably calculated to lead to responsive documents,” where “‘[t]here is no bright-line rule 

requiring agencies to use the search terms proposed’ by a plaintiff.” (quoting Physicians for Hum.

Rts. v. U.S. Dep’t of Def., 675 F. Supp. 2d 149, 164 (D.D.C. 2009))). Where the search terms are 

reasonably calculated to lead to responsive documents, the Court should not “micro manage” the 

agency’s search. Johnson v. Executive Office for U.S. Attorneys, 310 F.3d 771, 776 (D.C. Cir. 

2002) (“FOIA, requiring as it does both systemic and case-specific exercises of discretion and 

administrative judgment and expertise, is hardly an area in which the courts should attempt to 

micro manage the executive branch.”).7

7 Plaintiff relies on several cases, in which the agencies’ searches were held inadequate, to argue “[t]he minimal 

search terms used demonstrates that Defendant did not conduct a search ‘reasonably calculated to uncover all relevant 

documents.’” Pl.’s Opp’n at 8–10 (quoting Oglesby, 920 F.2d at 68) (citing Jud. Watch, Inc. v. U.S. Dep’t of Just., 

373 F. Supp. 3d 120, 125 (D.D.C. 2019), Pulliam v. EPA, 235 F. Supp. 3d 179, 193 (D.D.C. 2017), and Avila v. U.S. 
20

Moreover, although plaintiff asserts that “Defendant was reasonably aware that the 

communications Plaintiff [sought] refer to” the investigation of the Ashley Biden diary theft, Pl.’s 

Opp’n at 9, plaintiff’s FOIA request “did not seek records regarding or referring to Ashley Biden’s 

diary nor . . . imply that Plaintiff [sought] records related to or regarding the investigation[,]” 

Def.’s Opp’n at 11 (citing Seidel Decl. ¶ 6; Bender Decl. ¶ 12). Instead, the FOIA request was 

expressly and far more narrowly targeted at communications between the NYT and FBI regarding 

the execution of two specific search warrants on two separate dates in November 2021. Thus, the 

FBI reasonably construed the scope of plaintiff’s request to encompass “‘communications sent to 

and from FBI officials’ and [the NYT] regarding the . . . execution of search warrants.” Def.’s 

Opp’n at 9 (quoting Seidel Decl. ¶ 6). That the FBI did not use terms that would encompass 

communications with the NYT “regarding” the broader investigation leading to the execution of 

search warrants, “does not render the agency’s search unreasonable, especially because nothing in 

[plaintiff’s] FOIA request indicated that those terms were essential.” Watkins L. & Advoc., PLLC, 

78 F.4th at 444–45. Plaintiff’s apparent “attempts to broaden the scope of its [r]equest . . . in this 

litigation. . . cannot overcome the clear and cabined text of its [r]equest.” DaVita Inc. v. U.S. 

Dep’t of State, No. 17-cv-2685 (RC), 2022 WL 2104483, at *4–7 (D.D.C. June 10, 2022)). This reliance is misplaced, 

however, since those cases are easily distinguishable on their facts and actually confirm the adequacy of the FBI’s 

search here. In Judicial Watch, Inc., the FBI “searched only for the terms ‘assignment,’ ‘reassignment,’ and 

‘appointment’ in conjunction with the phrase ‘special counsel,’” even though plaintiff’s FOIA request “referred to 

Mueller by name” and “one would expect . . . FBI personnel might use the Special Counsel’s name—‘Mueller’—

rather than his title.” 373 F. Supp. 3d at 123, 125. In Pulliam, DOJ “only used two search terms,” and its declaration 

did “not ‘explain the scope and method of the agency’s search in a non-conclusory fashion,’” indicating the agency 

“did not understand the scope” of the request, 235 F. Supp. 3d at 193–94. Finally, in Avila, “many components within 

the State Department used Agent Avila’s name as the only search term” even though plaintiff requested “all records 

concerning Victor Avila, Jr.” and “plainly [sought] information about the February 15, 2011 attack that severely 

wounded Agent Avila,” and the State Department “knew Plaintiffs sought information about the attack.” 2022 WL 

2104483, at *1, 5–6 (emphasis omitted). Unlike in Judicial Watch, Pulliam, and Avila, in all of which the agency’s 

search failed to account for the scope of the request, see Jud. Watch, Inc., 373 F. Supp. 3d at 125; Pulliam, 235 F. 

Supp. 3d at 194; Avila, 2022 WL 2104483, at *6 , here, the FBI employed nearly a dozen search terms calculated to 

“locate any potentially responsive communications,” Seidel Decl. ¶ 26; Bender Decl. ¶¶ 13–14, which search, in fact, 

identified an investigative file that was beyond the scope of the request, see Seidel Decl. ¶ 19; Bender Decl. ¶ 5, and 

the FBI’s declarations reasonably explained “the scope and method of the search conducted,” Perry v. Block, 684 F.2d 

121, 127 (D.C. Cir. 1982).
21

Dep’t of Health & Hum. Servs., No. 20-cv-1798 (BAH), 2021 WL 980895, at *13 (D.D.C. Mar. 

16, 2021) (citations omitted).

8

In short, plaintiff’s “purely speculative claims about the existence and discoverability” of 

documents through alternate search terms does not overcome the “presumption of good faith” to 

which the FBI’s conclusion regarding the adequacy of its search is entitled. Shapiro, 40 F.4th at 

613–14 (upholding agency search against complaint that the FBI “search[ed] its card catalogues 

rather than leaf[ed] through every book in the library” because “an agency’s search need only be 

‘reasonably expected to produce the information requested’” (quoting Reps. Comm. for Freedom 

of Press, 877 F.3d at 402); Eddington v. U.S. Dep’t of Def., 35 F.4th 833, 839 (D.C. Cir. 2022) 

(“[Plaintiff’s] assertions . . . amount to ‘purely speculative claims about the existence and 

discoverability’ of his requests and are insufficient to overcome the presumption of good faith 

accorded to the [agency’s] Declaration.” (quoting SafeCard Servs., Inc., 926 F.2d at 1200, and 

citing Mobley, 806 F.3d at 582)).

D. Other Communications Systems 

Finally, plaintiff challenges as a shortcoming in the search scope that the FBI did not

“search text messages and instant chat messages” or “explain why” such search was not conducted. 

Pl.’s Opp’n at 2. This critique is incorrect and simply ignores the FBI’s explanation. In its initial 

and supplemental declarations, the FBI explained that “searches of the CRS would include a search 

for electronic communications, such as text messages and instant chat messages” that had been 

8 Plaintiff cites Nation Magazine, Washington Bureau v. U.S. Customs Service, 71 F.3d 885, as support for a 

broader search, Pl.’s Opp’n at 8, but this case is inapposite. In that case, the FOIA request sought records “pertaining 

to Mr. [Ross] Perot,” which together with appended materials, were deemed “sufficient to alert the agency that 

[plaintiffs] sought information about Perot, even if it was not indexed under his name.” Id. at 888, 890. By contrast, 

here, plaintiff’s FOIA request neither expressly states nor indicates that plaintiff sought records regarding the Biden 

diary theft investigation generally, nor did plaintiff attach any materials to its request otherwise informing the FBI that 

the request had such a broader scope beyond the explicit focus on the execution of the two search warrants in 

November 2021. See Seidel Decl. ¶ 6; Bender Decl. ¶ 12.
22

imported into CRS and “serialized,” or “assigned a number in the order which the document [was] 

added to” the applicable investigative file, and that the FBI had “found no information indicating 

responsive records would likely reside in any other location” beyond those searched. Bender Decl. 

¶¶ 15–19; Seidel ¶¶ 15, 29; see also Def.’s Opp’n at 13. The FBI’s declarations accordingly 

explained that searches of text and instant chat messages “that [had] been serialized in the 

applicable investigative file” in CRS, Bender Decl. ¶ 18, “would have been redundant” of the 

FBI’s searches of the CRS, Clemente v. FBI, 867 F.3d 111, 118 (D.C. Cir. 2017), and “our FOIA 

precedent, under which an agency’s search need only be ‘reasonably expected to produce the 

information requested,’ does not require what the government represents would be a redundant 

search,” Shapiro, 40 F.4th at 614 (quoting Reps. Comm. for Freedom of Press, 877 F.3d at 402). 

In any event, “[a]n agency need not ‘search every record system,’” Watkins L. & Advoc., PLLC, 

78 F.4th at 442 (quoting Oglesby, 920 F.2d at 68), “but only those records that are likely to have 

responsive documents”—as the FBI did here, Porter v. C.I.A., 778 F. Supp. 2d 60, 69 (D.D.C. 

2011) (citing Oglesby, 920 F.2d at 68); see Seidel ¶ 29; Bender Decl. ¶ 19. Plaintiff’s strained 

effort to tag the FBI as the source for the NYT’s reporting on the search warrants and reported 

publication of Project Veritas legal memoranda, see supra, at Part III.A, does not substantiate 

plaintiff’s speculative hunch that responsive text or instant chat communications in fact exist. See 

Mobley, 806 F.3d at 583 (“In the absence of any supporting evidence, [plaintiff’s] argument that 

files predating his arrest must have existed [] fails to raise a material question of fact regarding the 

adequacy of the search.”).

Moreover, plaintiff’s assertion that a search of CRS would not have encompassed 

responsive text and instant chat messages because records classified as “transitory” pursuant to the 

FBI’s record management policy may not have been entered into CRS, misses the point. Pl.’s 
23

Reply at 5. Plaintiff offers no evidence to support its speculation that responsive text and instant 

chat messages exist, see supra, at Part III.A, and “[a]bsent some reason to believe that [text and 

instant chat messages] are likely to contain responsive materials, [plaintiff’s] arguments are 

insufficient to require the FBI to conduct further searches,” Mobley v. C.I.A., 924 F. Supp. 2d 24, 

44 (D.D.C. 2013), aff’d, Mobley, 806 F.3d 568).

Finally, plaintiff’s singular reliance on Reporters Committee for Freedom of the Press v. 

U.S. Department of Justice, does not save plaintiff’s challenge that the search is inadequate for 

failing to search individual FBI agents’ texts and instant chat messages. See Pl.’s Opp’n at 11; 

Pl.’s Reply at 5–6 (citing Reporters Comm., No. 19-cv-2847 (TFH), 2021 WL 5179237 (D.D.C. 

Nov. 8, 2021)). In that case, the FBI did not “search its email systems or other electronic 

messages,” even though, in response to a separate FOIA request, “responsive emails were found 

[] in the exact location . . . indicated in Plaintiff’s request.” Reporters Comm., 2021 WL 5179237,

at *4. On these facts, the search was easily found to be inadequate, given plaintiff’s “affirmative 

proof that the FBI did not place a number of clearly responsive emails” in the CRS and that the 

FBI’s “search methodology was . . . not ‘reasonably calculated to uncover all relevant 

documents.’” Id. at *4 (quoting Valencia Lucena, 180 F.3d at 325). By contrast to Reporters 

Committee, plaintiff here has offered no indication, let alone “affirmative proof,” that responsive 

text or instant chat messages were not captured by the FBI’s search of the CRS. Id.

Although the FBI’s search “did not produce certain materials [plaintiff] believes exist and 

had hoped to find,” “FOIA is not a wishing well; it only requires a reasonable search for records 

an agency actually has.” Clemente, 867 F.3d at 118 (quoting DiBacco v. U.S. Army, 795 F.3d 178, 

188, 190 (D.C. Cir. 2015)); see also Watkins L. & Advoc., PLLC, 78 F.4th at 445 (“[T]he question 

. . . ‘is not whether there might exist any other documents possibly responsive to the request, but 
24

rather whether the search for those documents was adequate.’” (emphasis omitted) (quoting 

Weisberg, 745 F.2d at 1485)). The FBI’s search satisfies this standard. 

IV. CONCLUSION

For the reasons stated, the Court concludes that “there is no genuine dispute as to any 

material fact,” FED. R. CIV. P. 56(a), regarding the adequacy of the defendant’s search for 

responsive records in response to the plaintiff’s FOIA request. Accordingly, the defendant’s 

Motion for Summary Judgment is GRANTED, and plaintiff’s Cross-Motion for Summary 

Judgment is DENIED. 

An order consistent with this Memorandum Opinion will be entered contemporaneously.

Date: November 27, 2023

__________________________

BERYL A. HOWELL

United States District Judge