xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?


C\_2020097EN.01005301.xml


| | | | |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
| 24.3.2020 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | C 97/53 |

---

Opinion of the European Economic and Social Committee on Populism and fundamental rights — suburban and rural areas

(own-initiative opinion)

(2020/C 97/07)

Rapporteur:

Karolina DRESZER-SMALEC

Co-rapporteur:

Jukka AHTELA

| | |
| --- | --- |
| Plenary Assembly decision | 20.2.2019 |
| Legal basis | Rule 32(2) of the Rules of Procedure |
| | Own-initiative opinion |
| Section responsible | Agriculture, Rural Development and the Environment |
| Adopted in section | 27.11.2019 |
| Adopted at plenary | 11.12.2019 |
| Plenary session No | 548 |
| Outcome of vote (for/against/abstentions) | 145/3/6 |

1.   Conclusions and recommendations

| | | |
| --- | --- | --- |
| | 1.1. | Populist parties made significant gains in the 2019 European elections. Populism leads to the undermining of the stability of political institutions, further fragmentation and polarisation of communities and an increasingly risky environment for investment decisions on the part of businesses. |

| | | |
| --- | --- | --- |
| | 1.2. | The causes behind the success of populist movements and parties are manifold. In the most general terms, it is driven by processes of globalisation affecting all types of developed countries. More specifically, populism can be explained by both cultural and identity factors as well as socioeconomic developments. Finally, the populist threat is particularly pronounced in the ‘places that don’t matter’ [(1)](#ntr1-C_2020097EN.01005301-E0001), regardless of whether they are on the periphery or in the very centre of the European Union. |

| | | |
| --- | --- | --- |
| | 1.3. | A clear distinction needs to be made between, on the one hand, fears, anxiety and anger driving people into the arms of populist parties and, on the other hand, those political entrepreneurs who deliberately try to transform these fears into political gains. Citizens’ discontent, which often has rational reasons, needs to be taken seriously. This is different from the rhetoric of populist leaders trying to capitalise on that discontent. |

| | | |
| --- | --- | --- |
| | 1.4. | The geography of discontent combines the continental North-South divide and the East-West divide across the EU with the national centre-periphery divide within each individual Member State. Depending on the location, discontent is rooted in different forms of hardship. Counter strategies need to take account of these complexities if they wish to be successful. The EESC believes that the building of alliances between local authorities, civil society organisations, the social partners and other actors, e.g. local leaders and social movements, is key to addressing the root causes of populism. |

| | | |
| --- | --- | --- |
| | 1.5. | The less people profit from the success of their countries’ growth poles, the more pronounced their negative attitudes vis-à-vis governing elites, party systems and postmodern lifestyles tend to be. Civil society activists are often classified as being part of these groups, which reinforces negative attitudes towards them. |

| | | |
| --- | --- | --- |
| | 1.6. | For civil society, the situation becomes particularly severe where populists have gained power and are able to markedly influence government agendas, sliding towards authoritarianism. Civil society organisations (CSOs) are massively threatened not only by the shrinking of spaces available for their activities but also by personal threats and persecution. |

| | | |
| --- | --- | --- |
| | 1.7. | The EESC considers that civic education on the principles of democracy, fundamental rights and the rule of law should be reinforced to address these developments. It points to the recommendation made in the opinion on ‘Further strengthening the Rule of Law’ [(2)](#ntr2-C_2020097EN.01005301-E0002) for Member States to mainstream these topics in school and higher education curricula and for the European Commission to propose an ambitious communication, education and public awareness strategy on fundamental rights, the rule of law and democracy and the role of independent media. |

| | | |
| --- | --- | --- |
| | 1.8. | Considering the population’s longing for ambitious and effective political visions, the EESC is convinced that the European Union should propose narratives on a desirable future and revive key principles which have played a major role in the European project, such as partnership and subsidiarity. |

| | | |
| --- | --- | --- |
| | 1.9. | The EESC supports the European Parliament’s resolution ‘on addressing the specific needs of rural, mountainous and remote areas’ (2018/2720(RSP) [(3)](#ntr3-C_2020097EN.01005301-E0003)‘to promote socioeconomic development, economic growth and diversification, social wellbeing, protection of nature, and cooperation and interconnection with urban areas in order to foster cohesion and prevent the risk of territorial fragmentation’. The Committee thus joins the Parliament in advocating the establishment of a Smart Villages Pact which involves all levels of government in accordance with the principle of subsidiarity. |

| | | |
| --- | --- | --- |
| | 1.10. | The EESC reiterates its recommendation in the opinion on ‘Resilient democracy through a strong and diverse civil society’ [(4)](#ntr4-C_2020097EN.01005301-E0004) for ‘the establishment of a Democracy Scoreboard that would (...) reflect the framework conditions for civil society activity and lead to specific recommendations for reform.’ |

| | | |
| --- | --- | --- |
| | 1.11. | Authorities should adopt a human-rights based approach [(5)](#ntr5-C_2020097EN.01005301-E0005) to policies — in particular economic reform policies based on systematic human rights impact assessments [(6)](#ntr6-C_2020097EN.01005301-E0006). This should be a prerequisite for informed and inclusive national debates and adjustment of political choices, as well as smooth implementation of the reforms. |

| | | |
| --- | --- | --- |
| | 1.12. | The EESC calls for more emphasis on the new economic activities emerging in rural areas, many of which are based on the principles of mutualism and care. It encourages measures aimed at encouraging better support for and connection of such initiatives, so as to move beyond isolated and experimental phases towards emancipatory political and social alliances. |

| | | |
| --- | --- | --- |
| | 1.13. | The EESC calls on the EU and its Member States to strengthen infrastructure at the subnational level. The suspension of public transport connections, along with the shutdown of schools and health services, have clearly been among the reasons for populist protest in Europe. |

| | | |
| --- | --- | --- |
| | 1.14. | The EU institutions should enhance capacity-building for European, national and local CSOs and equip them with resources to help them improve the scope and quality of their action. They play an important role in recognising and responding to the needs of the communities. They are hit particularly hard when the rule of law, fundamental rights and democracy deteriorate. |

2.   General comments

| | | |
| --- | --- | --- |
| | 2.1. | Populist parties made significant gains in the 2019 European elections. The EESC is seriously concerned by this development and calls for major initiatives to address it, starting with efforts to better understand its underlying causes. |

| | | |
| --- | --- | --- |
| | 2.2. | The EESC considers that particular attention should be paid to the situation of civil society organisations which are hit particularly hard when the rule of law, fundamental rights and democracy deteriorate. CSOs are currently experiencing shrinking space for their activities in many countries. The further rise of populism is also likely to mean less economic stability and more inefficient governance and policies, leading to a negative effect on investments. |

| | | |
| --- | --- | --- |
| | 2.3. | The EESC has already expressed strong concern regarding ‘the deterioration in human rights, the populist and authoritarian drift that is spreading, and [...] the risk this poses to the quality of democracy and the protection of fundamental rights’ [(7)](#ntr7-C_2020097EN.01005301-E0007). It has called on the European institutions to ‘take a proactive and preventive approach in their political activities, in order to anticipate and avoid problems.’ |

| | | |
| --- | --- | --- |
| | 2.4. | In its own-initiative opinion on ‘Resilient democracy through a strong and diverse civil society’ [(8)](#ntr8-C_2020097EN.01005301-E0008), the EESC has underlined that it considers that civil society plays a key role ‘in preserving liberal democracy in Europe’ and that ‘only a strong and diverse civil society can defend democracy and freedom and preserve Europe from the temptations of authoritarianism.’ |

| | | |
| --- | --- | --- |
| | 2.5. | Several dimensions must be considered in order to fully grasp the phenomenon of populism. Some observers primarily turn to cultural factors to identify the source of populism. While not neglecting the importance of these factors, others argue that the primary cause of growing populism is socioeconomic, and rooted in the complexities of the globalisation process. |

| | | |
| --- | --- | --- |
| | 2.6. | Many concerns at the root of people’s discontent are rational and call for political solutions. These legitimate preoccupations must be distinguished from the attempts made by some political entrepreneurs to capitalise on discontent and use it for electoral gain through demagogic but unreasonable proposals. |

| | | |
| --- | --- | --- |
| | 2.7. | The most important factors explaining receptiveness to populism include: age (high), level of education (low), relative wealth (low), unemployment (high) and type of employment (atypical, fixed-term). The prevalence of these socioeconomic factors is higher in rural areas and outside large cities. |

| | | |
| --- | --- | --- |
| | 2.8. | The Brexit vote in the UK, the Yellow Vest movement in France and the success of the AFD in East Germany, of the Lega in Italy and of the Law and Justice Party in Poland differ in many respects. However, what all these developments have in common is that they reflect the dramatic decline in trust in institutions, politicians and the media. |

| | | |
| --- | --- | --- |
| | 2.9. | The less people manage to benefit from the success of their respective country’s growth poles, the more pronounced their negative attitudes vis-à-vis governing elites, party systems and postmodern lifestyles tend to be. Civil society activists are often classified as being part of these groups, which reinforces negative attitudes towards them and has substantial implications for the operation of CSOs. |

3.   General and space-bound factors accounting for populism

| | | |
| --- | --- | --- |
| | 3.1. | The rise of populism can be explained through two main angles. One angle highlights the cultural factors such as identity formation and changes in perceptions as a result of trends in development over the past two to three decades. The other angle underlines the salience of socioeconomic factors as the main causes explaining the success of populism. While both of these explanations are relevant, the political economy factors are clearly more important when it comes to considering the role of space and territory [(9)](#ntr9-C_2020097EN.01005301-E0009). |

| | | |
| --- | --- | --- |
| | 3.2. | Populism is one specific expression of what has come to be called a change of era, a change of epoch or an epochal break. To varying degrees, all countries are affected by the implications of this change, irrespective of the region involved. All major dimensions of social order tend to be subject to that change — the state as much as the market or the community, the latter representing civil society. |

| | | |
| --- | --- | --- |
| | 3.3. | Triggered by processes of commodification of social and political relations, populism first tends to arise within the community dimension. Communities based on choice, such as interest associations, social movements and other civil society organisations, are increasingly subject to disorganisation. They struggle to survive and to retain their members. Communities of destiny, such as families, neighbourhoods and local groups, also suffer from fragmentation, loss of solidarity, alienation and dissolution. |

| | | |
| --- | --- | --- |
| | 3.4. | In an increasingly complex world, such social and political fragmentation tends to cause insecurity, anxiety and the search for non-ambiguous answers. Traditional communities are often no longer able to provide such answers. Irrespective of age and social class, many people look for new ways to belong and for secure identities. Populist political entrepreneurs have specialised in providing such simple answers, which are often related to backward visions of a glorious past that would need to be re-constructed. |

| | | |
| --- | --- | --- |
| | 3.5. | Once translated into political programmes that are attractive, such simple answers feed back into the realms of politics and the state — systems which are themselves affected by fragmentation of party systems and a decline in trust in governance. |

| | | |
| --- | --- | --- |
| | 3.6. | The general causes explaining populism are further reinforced by the territorial fragmentation affecting rural and suburban areas. Their populations feel cut off from economic development and public infrastructures for transport, health, care for the elderly, education and security. This translates into a high prevalence of anti-elitism and prejudices against what is considered to be a cosmopolitan way of life. |

4.   Globalisation and the economic crisis

| | | |
| --- | --- | --- |
| | 4.1. | Globalisation has generated opportunities and threats, the latter weighing more heavily on suburban and rural areas. This has generated disinvestment in these areas and a justified feeling of insecurity when faced with the risks of offshoring of industry infrastructures and jobs, combined with a rejection of unjust tax policies commonly considered to be insufficiently fair. Specific trade agreements, such as the recent one with Mercosur, have also raised concerns in some Member States as they are perceived as jeopardising the livelihoods of European farmers and the European farming family model. |

| | | |
| --- | --- | --- |
| | 4.2. | This ‘political economy of populism’ is explored in a report prepared for the EESC’s Diversity Group [(10)](#ntr10-C_2020097EN.01005301-E0010), which suggests that ‘higher levels of disposable income, employment rate, social benefit expenditure, and GDP [are] all associated with a smaller populist vote share at the regional level’. A decrease in disposable income is associated with an increase in support for populist parties. |

| | | |
| --- | --- | --- |
| | 4.3. | Despite the overall positive developments in the area of employment in Europe, unemployment, atypical employment and social and economic marginalisation are particularly acute among the younger parts of the population in many Member States. Those aged between 20 and 30 may be the first generation since the birth of the EU that could be worse off than the one that came before. Eurostat figures show that 44 % of workers aged between 19 and 24 in Europe only have a temporary contract, compared with 14 % among the population as a whole. |

| | | |
| --- | --- | --- |
| | 4.4. | Rural, suburban and peripheral areas are generally more prone to the influence of populism, which proposes a model that calls into question the very factors on which recent economic growth has been based: open markets, migration, economic integration and globalisation [(11)](#ntr11-C_2020097EN.01005301-E0011). |

| | | |
| --- | --- | --- |
| | 4.5. | In the context of structurally low economic growth, European states generally tend to have less revenue and more expenditure. Pressure on spending stems from multiple factors including aging populations, the weight of debt and the rising costs of public security. At the same time, pressure on revenues stems from factors such as political economy choices, austerity policies and tax evasion or avoidance. As a result, the scarcity of public resources constrains states in their roles as duty-bearers in the area of redistributive policies, which are central to the fulfilment of social and economic rights. Public and private investors are turning away from the industrial fabric, particularly in rural and suburban areas, leading to a feeling of marginalisation and abandonment by state structures and public services on the part of some sectors of the population. |

| | | |
| --- | --- | --- |
| | 4.6. | The EESC calls on European and national authorities to consider inclusiveness, access to rights and the preservation of economic and industrial fabrics and employment pools as key criteria for economic, cohesion and territorial policies. |

5.   The role of migration

| | | |
| --- | --- | --- |
| | 5.1. | Like globalisation, migration is a phenomenon affecting all countries, developed or less developed. It is not likely to disappear and will grow over time. The increasing pressure imposed by populist movements makes it complicated, but no less mandatory, for Member States to agree on a much needed fair, compassionate and responsible European migration and asylum policy which complies with international human rights law. |

| | | |
| --- | --- | --- |
| | 5.2. | The populist rhetoric is not rationally directed at the regulatory aspects of migration policies. Instead, it directly stigmatises migrants as criminals, terrorists or invaders, creating a climate encouraging direct attacks against them. |

| | | |
| --- | --- | --- |
| | 5.3. | With regard to migration, the most important divisions in geographical terms have to do with differences in social welfare systems and labour markets. Welfare systems and labour markets may be relatively open to immigrants in some countries but closed and exclusionary in others. With the arrival of larger numbers of migrants, the reactions of those parts of the local population which are marginalised, or are anxious about becoming marginalised, are different according to the types of political economies. |

| | | |
| --- | --- | --- |
| | 5.4. | In some countries, and in specific areas of those countries, there is a fear that welfare systems will become overburdened while, in others, migrants are perceived as competitors in the labour market. Subjectively, migrants may represent a challenge with respect to stable employment or the receipt of welfare benefits. Fears of this kind may be particularly pronounced among people living in rural and suburban areas. |

| | | |
| --- | --- | --- |
| | 5.5. | This makes for a plethora of potential causes of the growth of populist movements that national governments, European Union institutions and civil society organisations should consider when designing appropriate counter strategies of a political and/or economic nature. Equally important is the fact that, in parts of the EU, feelings of social decline and economic marginalisation do not result from inward migration but rather from outward migration. In parts of Eastern Europe especially, the outflow of highly qualified professionals has assumed dramatic proportions which have upset the socioeconomic fabric of these countries. |

| | | |
| --- | --- | --- |
| | 5.6. | The EESC refutes the idea that there is competition for public resources between migrants and local populations. It calls for civil society organisations to step up their activities intended to address the fear and anxiety present among parts of the population. It also calls for the setting up of education and social programmes addressing the range of motives driving populism, especially in remote parts of the EU. More support should be offered to civil society’s national and European platforms and networks in order to obtain a more detailed analysis of the phenomenon and encourage distribution of reliable information and educational activities aimed at a better understanding of it. |

6.   The geography of discontent

| | | |
| --- | --- | --- |
| | 6.1. | Populist parties have gained above average success in rural and post-industrial peripheral areas of the EU [(12)](#ntr12-C_2020097EN.01005301-E0012). This is the case with regard to the Brexit vote in the UK, as well as in Austria where the FPÖ candidate gained 62 % of the rural vote during the presidential elections in May 2018. |

| | | |
| --- | --- | --- |
| | 6.2. | The geography of discontent combines the continental North-South divide and the East-West divide across the EU with the national centre-periphery divide within each individual Member State. Populism has grown over the years in this multiple fragmentation of societies and territories. Infrastructures and transport policies are therefore of particular importance as they ensure territorial continuity and are a material pre-condition for public access to civil, political, economic and social rights. |

| | | |
| --- | --- | --- |
| | 6.3. | The EESC recommends that European and national authorities consider transport, infrastructure and internet connectivity policies as a means of addressing populism. Authorities should shape these policies as well as cohesion, social and poverty-reduction policies using a human-rights based approach [(13)](#ntr13-C_2020097EN.01005301-E0013). They should also ensure that policies, particularly economic reform policies, are based on systematic ex ante and ex post human rights impact assessments [(14)](#ntr14-C_2020097EN.01005301-E0014), in order to facilitate informed and inclusive national debates on the arbitration and adjustment of political choices. |

| | | |
| --- | --- | --- |
| | 6.4. | One of the consequences of social, economic and territorial fragmentation is an increasing de facto political disenfranchisement of a large part of the population in suburban and rural areas. This takes the form of high abstentionism, the rejection of representative democracy and intermediary bodies including political parties and trade unions, and support for radical populist movements. The EESC considers that civic education on the principles of democracy, fundamental rights and the rule of law should be reinforced so as to address these developments. It points to the recommendation made in the opinion on Further strengthening the Rule of Law [(15)](#ntr15-C_2020097EN.01005301-E0015) for Member States to mainstream these topics in school and higher education curricula and for the European Commission to propose an ambitious communication, education and public awareness strategy on fundamental rights, the rule of law and democracy. |

| | | |
| --- | --- | --- |
| | 6.5. | Precisely because of the intersecting politics of identity, belonging, recognition and redistribution, account must be taken of the fact that religion, gender dynamics, place and cultural identity are important, as are class interests and inequality. Mobilising alternatives to easy capture by regressive political forces is not straightforward. New campaigns and narratives are required. One particularly important way to achieve this is to consider the many new economic activities that are emerging in rural areas, based on the principles of community, mutualism and care. The task then is to connect these, moving beyond isolated and experimental phases, and link them to each other and to emancipatory political alliances. |

7.   How civil society outside the big cities is affected by populism

| | | |
| --- | --- | --- |
| | 7.1. | Civil society is deeply affected by the rise of populist movements and parties throughout Europe and across different territorial levels. As political spaces in many parts of Europe are increasingly affected by authoritarian propaganda, xenophobic and racist attitudes and fascist violence, social movements, trade unions and business associations alike are directly concerned. |

| | | |
| --- | --- | --- |
| | 7.2. | For civil society, the situation has become particularly severe where populists have gained power and are able to markedly influence government agendas. When populist parties occupy key positions in parliament and the executive, they tend to push once liberal societies in the direction of authoritarian regimes. Civil society organisations are massively threatened by the shrinking of spaces available for their activities. At the same time, certain pseudo or fake NGOs which are created from above and often disguise themselves as radically democratic, further complicate the free operation of existing civil society organisations. |

| | | |
| --- | --- | --- |
| | 7.3. | The question of the extent to which civil society is affected by populism in rural and suburban areas is complex. Rural activists often lack the critical resources to build the types of coalition that are more common in metropolitan areas. This also applies to coalitions with, for instance, consumer movements and urban-based food activists who are often more advanced in sustainable food politics. The lack of powerful social movements and political parties that could represent the interests of rural dwellers partially explains the electoral success of right-wing populist parties in rural Europe. |

8.   Opportunities to combat populism

| | | |
| --- | --- | --- |
| | 8.1. | Two sets of policies are recommended as tools to combat populism. The first is related to the populist threat in general and to potential instruments to be used by the European Union. The second set of recommendations refers more directly to specific regions, rural and suburban areas. |

| | | |
| --- | --- | --- |
| | 8.2. | Several strategies may be appropriate for addressing the roots of populism. The first concerns the way politicians and institutions approach and engage with those who are effectively suffering from socioeconomic hardship. Social, economic and political complexities are such that no single institution, the EU included, is capable of finding easy and unambiguous answers that would reduce such complexity by reverting to an idealised socioeconomic status quo ante. While focusing on addressing the root causes of populism, politicians and institutions should deconstruct the rhetoric that claims to propose such immediate and infallible answers to complex problems. |

| | | |
| --- | --- | --- |
| | 8.3. | The second of these strategies relates directly to the image and fate of the European Union. Among the many frustrations felt by those who are more receptive to populist propaganda is the absence of truly desirable political projects proposing a credible hope for a better future and action aimed at improving daily living conditions. Populists have used this frustration to suggest a backward-looking vision located in a seemingly glorious past. To survive, the European Union has no choice but to revive the popular desire for the European project. |

| | | |
| --- | --- | --- |
| | 8.4. | The EU’s founding myth alone is no longer enough to appeal to the people of Europe. The EU should propose narratives on a desirable future and revive key principles that have played a major role in the European project, such as partnership and subsidiarity. |

| | | |
| --- | --- | --- |
| | 8.5. | The EESC calls on the EU, the Member States and all relevant stakeholders to revitalise the principles of subsidiarity and partnership. As mentioned by the Recommendation of the Diversity Europe Group on ‘Regaining Citizens’ Trust and Confidence in the EU’ [(16)](#ntr16-C_2020097EN.01005301-E0016), the EESC considers that efforts should be made ‘to clarify to citizens the principle of subsidiarity and to explain that the EU respects both cultural diversity and local traditions.’ Functional subsidiarity would consist of greater involvement on the part of civil society organisations in both regional planning and EU regional policies, as much as in the defence of democracy, justice and equal treatment of all inhabitants in rural and peripheral areas. Territorial subsidiarity would further empower regional and local authorities to assume co-responsibility in the design, implementation and evaluation of structural policies. |

| | | |
| --- | --- | --- |
| | 8.6. | The EESC recommends strengthening a tool implemented in the context of European cohesion policy, namely Community-Led Local Development (CLLD). Local actors and citizens would thereby have the opportunity to take decisions with respect to problems of direct concern to them and would thus substantially contribute to improving their quality of life. |

| | | |
| --- | --- | --- |
| | 8.7. | Partnership is essential, both with respect to communication and to solidarity and mutual help among CSOs from different countries. Partnership is equally important when it comes to building alliances between public authorities and civil society groups at local level. |

| | | |
| --- | --- | --- |
| | 8.8. | The EU and the Member States must improve their responses to the fundamental rights and rule of law violations resulting from action by populist movements, including those in power. The EESC points to its recommendation in the opinion on ‘Resilient democracy through a strong and diverse civil society’ [(17)](#ntr17-C_2020097EN.01005301-E0017) for ‘the establishment of a Democracy Scoreboard that would (...) reflect the framework conditions for civil society activity and lead to specific recommendations for reform’, as well as its recommendations in the opinion on ‘Further strengthening the rule of law’ [(18)](#ntr18-C_2020097EN.01005301-E0018). |

| | | |
| --- | --- | --- |
| | 8.9. | The EESC recommends integrating the considerations of this opinion into this Democracy Scoreboard and a future rule of law monitoring mechanism. Careful communication should make it clear that the response of the EU and the Member States aims to address violations of fundamental rights and the rule of law carried out by certain populist policies, rather than targeting people who voted for populist parties and whose legitimate concerns must be answered through fair, non-discriminatory and effective policies. |

9.   Supporting a grassroots response to populism

| | | |
| --- | --- | --- |
| | 9.1. | The problem facing civil society in rural areas is not necessarily one of ‘shrinking spaces’. The problem is that spaces have yet to be created. A response to the rise of populism should address the root causes of discontent and come from the grassroots level as far as possible. The EESC encourages action that generates a sense of shared interests and objectives among various groups of food producers and consumers, across class, gender, generational and urban-rural divides. Food sovereignty and the multiple issues surrounding the right to food and to a healthy environment are examples of specific challenges that would be better tackled by enhancing solidarity, collective identity and political participation in rural Europe. |

| | | |
| --- | --- | --- |
| | 9.2. | With respect to enhanced participation by citizens, Member States which consider strengthening direct democracy by means of local referenda should be aware of the fact that this is exactly the tool currently being promoted by populist parties throughout Europe. Direct democracy can be a double-edged sword. Local authorities and civil society actors should take appropriate measures to guarantee that its use is limited to situations where it could be expected to deliver real benefits. |

| | | |
| --- | --- | --- |
| | 9.3. | The EESC believes that building alliances between local authorities, civil society organisations, the social partners and other actors, e.g. local leaders and social movements, is key to addressing the root causes of populism. This will form part of efforts to address the feeling on the part of rural and suburban dwellers that they are being left behind. It will also reinforce the role of the social partners who can help reduce disparities and attract economic investment and development through their dialogue and action. |

| | | |
| --- | --- | --- |
| | 9.4. | The interests and concerns of small business associations, craftworkers and farmers are equally important. Where authoritarian groups have gained power in (local) government, economic actors may be hesitant to invest. Moreover, migrants in search of employment may avoid such places, although there are job opportunities. It is therefore important to break this vicious circle in suburban and rural regions. |

| | | |
| --- | --- | --- |
| | 9.5. | Encouraging private and public investment in the untapped potential of regions that are seen as left behind is an approach that merits further development. The emphasis on transfers or welfare should be complemented by enhancing regions’ opportunities (taking into account the local context), by tackling institutional inefficiencies and bottlenecks and through measures to boost training, the promotion of entrepreneurship and the assimilation of knowledge and innovation [(19)](#ntr19-C_2020097EN.01005301-E0019). |

| | | |
| --- | --- | --- |
| | 9.6. | To address the root causes of populism, factors such as religion, gender dynamics, place of residence, cultural identity and education need to be better considered alongside socioeconomic factors. Mobilising alternatives to the easy answers of regressive political forces is not easy. Answers must be adjusted to the specific mix in which hardship appears in certain local situations. |

| | | |
| --- | --- | --- |
| | 9.7. | New narratives could also help in combating the type of disinformation leveraged by social media campaigns that aim to undermine European values and thus support the emergence of separatist and nationalist claims and attitudes. It is important to strengthen the role of traditional media (public TV, independent newspapers) in order to enable them to fulfil their role in providing unbiased information. Although the Commission has already been active in that respect (see COM(2018) 236), a greater sense of urgency is highly recommended. |

| | | |
| --- | --- | --- |
| | 9.8. | The EESC calls for more emphasis to be placed on the new economic activities emerging in rural areas, many of which are based on the principles of mutualism and care. It encourages action aimed at better supporting and connecting up such initiatives, moving beyond isolated and experimental phases towards emancipatory political and social alliances. |

| | | |
| --- | --- | --- |
| | 9.9. | The EESC calls on the EU and its Member States to strengthen infrastructure at the subnational level. The suspension of public transport connections, along with the shutting down of schools and health services, have clearly been among the reasons for populist protest in Europe. Financial assistance is needed to improve local infrastructures, both material (transport and public services) and immaterial (networks across types of localities, institutions and organisations). |

| | | |
| --- | --- | --- |
| | 9.10. | The EESC, its member organisations and other EU institutions should enhance capacity-building for local CSOs and equip them with resources to improve the scope and quality of their action. More support should be offered to CSOs and their European networks to train the members of local CSOs. |

Brussels, 11 December 2019.

The President of the European Economic and Social Committee

Luca JAHIER

---

[(1)](#ntc1-C_2020097EN.01005301-E0001)  Andrés Rodríguez-Pose 2018, The revenge of places that don't matter (and what to do about it), p. 32 (LSE Research online): http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/85888/1/Rodriguez-Pose\_Revenge%20of%20Places.pdf

[(2)](#ntc2-C_2020097EN.01005301-E0002)  EESC opinion on Further strengthening the Rule of Law within the Union. State of play and possible next steps ([OJ C 282, 20.8.2019, p. 39](http://publications.europa.eu/resource/oj/JOC_2019_282_R_TOC)).

[(3)](#ntc3-C_2020097EN.01005301-E0003)  European Parliament resolution of 3 October 2018 on addressing the specific needs of rural, mountainous and remote areas ([OJ C 11, 13.1.2020, p. 15](http://publications.europa.eu/resource/oj/JOC_2020_011_R_TOC)).

[(4)](#ntc4-C_2020097EN.01005301-E0004)  EESC opinion on Resilient Democracy through a strong and diverse civil society ([OJ C 228, 5.7.2019, p. 24](http://publications.europa.eu/resource/oj/JOC_2019_228_R_TOC)).

[(5)](#ntc5-C_2020097EN.01005301-E0005)  OHCHR, Principles and Guidelines for a Human Rights Approach to Poverty Reduction Strategies https://www.ohchr.org/Documents/Publications/PovertyStrategiesen.pdf

[(6)](#ntc6-C_2020097EN.01005301-E0006)  OHCHR, Guiding Principles on human rights impact assessments of economic reforms, 19 December 2018, https://documents-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/G18/443/52/PDF/G1844352.pdf

[(7)](#ntc7-C_2020097EN.01005301-E0007)  EESC opinion on The European control mechanism on the rule of law and fundamental rights ([OJ C 34, 2.2.2017, p. 8](http://publications.europa.eu/resource/oj/JOC_2017_034_R_TOC)).

[(8)](#ntc8-C_2020097EN.01005301-E0008)  EESC opinion on Resilient Democracy through a strong and diverse civil society ([OJ C 228, 5.7.2019, p. 24](http://publications.europa.eu/resource/oj/JOC_2019_228_R_TOC)).

[(9)](#ntc9-C_2020097EN.01005301-E0009)  Societies outside Metropolises: the role of civil society organisations in facing populism, EESC, Brussels 2019: https://www.eesc.europa.eu/sites/default/files/files/qe-04-19-236-en-n.pdf

[(10)](#ntc10-C_2020097EN.01005301-E0010)  Societies outside Metropolises: the role of civil society organisations in facing populism, EESC, Brussels 2019: https://www.eesc.europa.eu/sites/default/files/files/qe-04-19-236-en-n.pdf

[(11)](#ntc11-C_2020097EN.01005301-E0011)  Andrés Rodriguez-Pose, The revenge of places that don't matter (and what to do about it), p. 32 (LSE Research online): http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/85888/1/Rodriguez-Pose\_Revenge%20of%20Places.pdf

[(12)](#ntc12-C_2020097EN.01005301-E0012)  Caroline de Gruyter, Commentary: The revenge of the countryside, 21 October 2016

[(13)](#ntc13-C_2020097EN.01005301-E0013)  OHCHR, Principles and Guidelines for a Human Rights Approach to Poverty Reduction Strategies https://www.ohchr.org/Documents/Publications/PovertyStrategiesen.pdf

[(14)](#ntc14-C_2020097EN.01005301-E0014)  OHCHR, Guiding Principles on human rights impact assessments of economic reforms, 19 December 2018, https://documents-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/G18/443/52/PDF/G1844352.pdf

[(15)](#ntc15-C_2020097EN.01005301-E0015)  EESC opinion on Further strengthening the Rule of Law within the Union — State of play and possible next steps ([OJ C 282, 20.8.2019, p. 39](http://publications.europa.eu/resource/oj/JOC_2019_282_R_TOC)).

[(16)](#ntc16-C_2020097EN.01005301-E0016)  Regaining Citizens' Trust and Confidence in the EU: 7 priorities of the Diversity Europe Group; Diversity Europe Group.

[(17)](#ntc17-C_2020097EN.01005301-E0017)  EESC opinion on Resilient Democracy through a strong and diverse civil society ([OJ C 228, 5.7.2019, p. 24](http://publications.europa.eu/resource/oj/JOC_2019_228_R_TOC)).

[(18)](#ntc18-C_2020097EN.01005301-E0018)  EESC opinion on Further strengthening the Rule of Law within the Union — State of play and possible next steps ([OJ C 282, 20.8.2019, p. 39](http://publications.europa.eu/resource/oj/JOC_2019_282_R_TOC)).

[(19)](#ntc19-C_2020097EN.01005301-E0019)  Andrés Rodriguez-Pose, The revenge of places that don't matter (and what to do about it), p. 32 (LSE Research online): http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/85888/1/Rodriguez-Pose\_Revenge%20of%20Places.pdf

---