RECORD IMPOUNDED

SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY

APPELLATE DIVISION

DOCKET NO. A-2414-15T3

NEW JERSEY DIVISION OF CHILD

PROTECTION AND PERMANENCY,

Plaintiff-Respondent,

v.

C.M.,

Defendant-Appellant,

and

S.J.,

Defendant.

____________________________________

IN THE MATTER OF R.C., N.A.J., 

J.J.-C., S.J.-C. and S.J.-C.,

Minors.

_____________________________________

Argued November 8, 2017 – Decided

Before Judges Fisher and Fasciale.

On appeal from Superior Court of New Jersey, 

Chancery Division, Family Part, Essex County, 

Docket No. FN-07-0220-15.

Mary Potter, Designated Counsel, argued the 

cause for appellant (Joseph E. Krakora, Public 

Defender, attorney; Ms. Potter, on the brief).

NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE

APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION

This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court." 

Although it is posted on the internet, this opinion is binding only on the 

parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R. 1:36-3.

November 21, 2017
2 A-2414-15T3

Michael Antenucci, Deputy Attorney General, 

argued the cause for respondent (Christopher 

S. Porrino, Attorney General, attorney; Andrea 

M. Silkowitz, Assistant Attorney General, of 

counsel; Mr. Antenucci, on the brief).

James J. Gross, Designated Counsel, argued the 

cause for minors (Joseph E. Krakora, Public 

Defender, attorney; Mr. Gross, on the brief).

PER CURIAM

The Division of Child Protection and Permanency commenced 

this Title Nine action against defendant C.M. (Carolyn, a 

fictitious name, as are all names used in this opinion), alleging 

that in October 2014 she abused or neglected her then six-yearold child, Samuel, by striking him with a belt. We conclude the 

evidence fully supported the trial judge's factual findings, and 

we agree with the trial judge that this form of physical punishment 

was excessive within the meaning of controlling legal principles.

Title Nine defines an abused or neglected child, in part, as 

a child "whose physical, mental, or emotional condition has been 

impaired" by a parent's failure to "exercise a minimum degree of 

care . . . in providing the child with proper supervision or 

guardianship, by unreasonably inflicting or allowing to be 

inflicted harm, or substantial risk thereof, including the 

infliction of excessive corporal punishment." N.J.S.A. 9:6-

8.21(c)(4)(b). This appeal focuses not so much on whether Carolyn 

inflicted physical punishment on the six-year-old child with a 
3 A-2414-15T3

belt – there seems to be no dispute about that – but whether such 

conduct violates the statute's "excessive corporal punishment" 

provision.

The judge heard from only one witness during a brief, oneday evidentiary hearing. That witness, a Division representative, 

briefly testified about photographs she took of the child a day 

after the abuse. She testified that the photographs, which were 

admitted in evidence, revealed the child still retained red marks 

on his arms and legs from having been struck by Carolyn with a 

belt the day before. The Division representative also testified 

that Carolyn admitted inflicting this punishment:

[Carolyn] stated that she held [Samuel's] 

hands down and beat him on his hands with the

belt. And she admitted to, also, hitting 

[Samuel's twin sister] with the belt. She, 

also, stated that she can't believe that she 

can't beat her own children.

This punishment, according to the information obtained from 

Carolyn by the witness, was inflicted because Samuel misbehaved 

by "ripp[ing] up" some "collectible comics."

In addition, the Division representative testified that, in 

the aftermath of a February 2014 referral, Carolyn entered into 

an agreement not to physically punish her children.1

 

1 Carolyn argues the existence of this agreement was not proven 

because such a document was not moved into evidence. But, the 
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Carolyn did not testify, nor did she call any witnesses.

After hearing summations, the trial judge rendered an oral 

decision, finding that events occurred as recounted by the Division 

representative. Referring to Carolyn's agreement not to physically 

punish her children, and her insistence of a right to "beat her 

own children," the judge concluded that Carolyn had used excessive 

corporal punishment.

Carolyn appeals the order memorializing this finding of 

abuse, arguing:

[SAMUEL] WAS NOT AN "ABUSED OR NEGLECTED 

CHILD" DUE TO HIS MOTHER'S DISCIPLINE AS HIS 

PHYSICAL CONDITION WAS NOT "IMPAIRED," HE 

REQUIRED NO MEDICAL TREATMENT, [CAROLYN] 

ACCEPTED FULL RESPONSIBILITY AND COMPLIED WITH 

COUNSELING RESULTING IN [SAMUEL'S] RETURN 

HOME.

We find insufficient merit in this argument to warrant further 

discussion in a written opinion. R. 2:11-3(e)(1)(E).

We write further only to emphasize our rejection of Carolyn's 

contention that the Supreme Court's decision in New Jersey Division 

of Youth & Family Services v. P.W.R., 205 N.J. 17, 36 (2011) 

compels a different result because, there, the Court concluded 

 

Division representative testified that such an agreement existed, 

defense counsel did not object to that testimony, and Carolyn did 

not testify or otherwise refute the Division representative's 

testimony. Consequently, the trial judge was entitled to find that 

such an agreement existed.
5 A-2414-15T3

that a parent's "slap of the face of a teenager as a form of 

discipline – with no resulting bruising or marks – does not 

constitute 'excessive corporal punishment' within the meaning of 

N.J.S.A. 9:6-8.21(c)(4)(b)." We find a qualitative difference 

between slapping the face of a teenager without sufficient force 

to leave a mark and the striking of a six-year-old with a belt 

with enough ferocity to leave visible marks a day later. These 

distinguishing circumstances and Carolyn's breach of her earlier 

agreement not to physically punish her children, fully supported 

the judge's conclusions.

Affirmed.