J-S92014-16

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

IN THE MATTER OF: THE ADOPTION OF 

G.T.,

IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

PENNSYLVANIA

Appellee

APPEAL OF: A.T., NATURAL FATHER

No. 941 WDA 2016

Appeal from the Decree May 27, 2016

In the Court of Common Pleas of Erie County

Orphans’ Court at No(s): 97 In Adoption 2015

BEFORE: SHOGAN, MOULTON, and STRASSBURGER,*JJ.

MEMORANDUM BY SHOGAN, J.: FILED JANUARY 24, 2017

Appellant, A.T. (“Father”), appeals from the decree entered on May 27, 

2016, in the Erie County Court of Common Pleas that terminated his 

parental rights to his minor son, G.T. (“Child”), born in March 2008. 

Appellant’s counsel has filed a petition to withdraw representation and a 

brief pursuant to Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967), and 

Commonwealth v. Santiago, 978 A.2d 349 (Pa. 2009), which govern 

withdrawal from representation on direct appeal.1 Appellant has not filed a 

pro se response to counsel’s petition to withdraw. Following our review, we 

 

*

 Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court.

1

 This Court extended the Anders principles to appeals involving the 

termination of parental rights in In re V.E., 611 A.2d 1267, 1275 (Pa. 

Super. 1992).
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grant counsel’s petition to withdraw and affirm the decree terminating 

Father’s parental rights.

After the entry of the decree terminating Father’s parental rights on 

May 27, 2016, Father filed a timely appeal.2 Contained within Father’s 

notice of appeal was a statement of counsel’s intention to withdraw pursuant 

to Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967).3 See In the Interest of 

J.T., 983 A.2d 771, 772 (Pa. Super. 2009) (applying Anders procedure and 

Pa.R.A.P. 1925(c)(4) to appeals involving the termination of parental rights). 

On September 2, 2016, counsel filed an Anders brief, and on September 6, 

2016, counsel filed a petition to withdraw followed by an amended petition 

on September 26, 2016.

By letter dated July 13, 2016, the orphans’ court informed this Court 

that it would not draft an opinion because counsel sought to withdraw. 

Letter, 7/13/16. Due to the permanency of an order involuntarily 

terminating parental rights, and because the orphans’ court’s rationale for 

termination under 23 Pa.C.S. § 2511(a)(1), (2), and (b) could not be 

 

2

 Father’s notice of appeal was due by June 26, 2016, which fell on a 

Sunday. Father’s notice, filed the next day on June 27, 2016, therefore was 

timely filed. 1 Pa.C.S. § 1908 (when thirtieth day of appeal period falls on a 

Saturday or Sunday, those days are excluded from computation).

3

 Anders sets forth the requirements for counsel to withdraw from 

representation on direct appeal. See also Commonwealth v. Santiago, 

978 A.2d 349 (Pa. 2009).
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ascertained in the notes of testimony,4 we remanded to the orphans’ court 

for a thorough opinion on December 16, 2016.5 The orphans’ court has

diligently and timely complied, and this matter is now ready for disposition.

The orphans’ court explained the procedural history as follows:

G.T. was born [i]n March [of] 2008. Amended Petition for 

Involuntary Termination of Parental Rights, 12/7/15, ¶3. On 

September 26, 2008, a custody order was entered in Crawford 

County, Pennsylvania, giving the mother and the Appellant 

shared [legal] custody of G.T. The mother retained primary 

physical custody of G.T. and the Appellant was granted periods 

of visitation with G.T. by the parties’ mutual consent. If the 

parties could make no such agreement, the order stated 

Appellant was entitled to visitation on Mondays and Wednesdays 

from one until four p.m., Thursdays from one until six p.m. and 

on Sunday from twelve noon until six p.m. each week. See 

Petitioner’s Exhibit A.

On December 7, 2015, the mother filed a petition for 

involuntary termination of parental rights. Appellant received 

appointed counsel and a termination hearing was held on 

May 27, 2016.

Appellant’s parental rights were terminated by Decree that 

same day. Appellant filed a timely Notice of Appeal and 

Statement of Intent to File an Anders brief June 27, 2016.

Trial Court Opinion, 12/29/16, at 1–2.

Before we address the questions raised on appeal, we first must 

resolve appellate counsel’s request to withdraw. Commonwealth v. 

Cartrette, 83 A.3d 1030 (Pa. Super. 2013) (en banc). See

 

4

 N.T., 5/27/16, at 84–85.

5

 We note that the filing of a statement of intent to withdraw as counsel 

pursuant to Anders and Pa.R.A.P.1925(c)(4) does not relieve the orphans’ 

court of its duty to provide the rationale for its decision under Pa.R.A.P. 

1925(a)(2).
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Commonwealth v. Rojas, 874 A.2d 638, 639 (Pa. Super. 2005) (stating,

“When faced with a purported Anders brief, this Court may not review the 

merits of the underlying issues without first passing on the request to 

withdraw.”).

There are procedural and briefing requirements imposed upon an 

attorney who seeks to withdraw on appeal. The procedural mandates are 

that counsel must:

1) petition the court for leave to withdraw stating that, after 

making a conscientious examination of the record, counsel has 

determined that the appeal would be frivolous; 2) furnish a copy 

of the brief to [his client]; and 3) advise [his client] that he or 

she has the right to retain private counsel or raise additional 

arguments that the [client] deems worthy of the court’s 

attention.

Cartrette, 83 A.3d at 1032 (citation omitted).

In addition, our Supreme Court, in Commonwealth v. Santiago, 978 

A.2d 349 (Pa. 2009), stated that an Anders brief must:

(1) provide a summary of the procedural history and facts, with 

citations to the record;

(2) refer to anything in the record that counsel believes arguably 

supports the appeal;

(3) set forth counsel’s conclusion that the appeal is frivolous; 

and

(4) state counsel’s reasons for concluding that the appeal is 

frivolous. Counsel should articulate the relevant facts of record, 

controlling case law, and/or statutes on point that have led to 

the conclusion that the appeal is frivolous.
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Santiago, 978 A.2d at 361. The Supreme Court reaffirmed the principle 

that indigents “generally have a right to counsel on a first appeal, [but] . . . 

this right does not include the right to bring a frivolous appeal and, 

concomitantly, does not include the right to counsel for bringing such an 

appeal.” Santiago, 978 A.2d at 357 (citation omitted). The Court stated:

In the Court’s view, this distinction gave meaning to the Court’s 

long-standing emphasis on an indigent appellant’s right to 

“advocacy.” . . . As the Court put it, “although an indigent whose 

appeal is frivolous has no right to have an advocate make his 

case to the appellate court, such an indigent does, in all cases, 

have the right to have an attorney, zealous for the indigent’s 

interests, evaluate his case and attempt to discern nonfrivolous 

arguments.”

Santiago, 978 A.2d at 357–358 (citation omitted).

Father’s counsel has complied with the first prong of Santiago by 

providing a summary of the procedural history and facts in the Anders brief. 

She has complied with the second prong by referring to any evidence in the 

record that she believes arguably supports the appeal. Counsel also set 

forth her conclusion that the appeal is frivolous and stated her reasons for 

that conclusion, with appropriate support. Moreover, counsel filed a 

separate motion to withdraw as counsel, wherein she stated that she 

examined the record and concluded that the appeal is frivolous. Further, 

counsel has attempted to identify and fully develop any issues in support of 

Father’s appeal. Additionally, counsel sent a letter to Father, and she 

attached a copy of the letter to her motion. Counsel states that she 

informed Father that she has filed a motion to withdraw and an Anders
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brief, and she apprised Father of his rights in light of the motion to withdraw 

as counsel. Thus, Father’s appellate counsel has satisfied the requirements 

of Anders and Santiago. We thus conclude that the procedural and 

briefing requirements for withdrawal have been met.

In the Anders brief, counsel presents the following issues for our 

review:

1. Whether the orphans’ court erred and/or abused its 

discretion when it concluded that sufficient grounds were 

estab[l]ished for termination pursuant to 23 Pa.C.S.A. 

§2511(a)(1)?

2. Whether the orphans’ court erred and/or abused its 

discretion when it concluded that sufficient grounds were 

established for termination pursuant to 23 Pa.C.S.A. 

§2511(a)(2)?

3. Whether the orphans’ court erred and/or abused its 

discretion when it concluded that termination of A.T.’s 

parental rights was in [C]hild’s best interests pursuant to 

23 Pa.C.S.A. §2511(B)?

Anders Brief at 4.

We address whether the orphans’ court erred in granting the 

termination petition because the evidence was insufficient to support the 

termination. In reviewing an appeal from an order terminating parental 

rights, we adhere to the following standard: 

[A]ppellate courts must apply an abuse of discretion standard 

when considering a trial court’s determination of a petition for 

termination of parental rights. As in dependency cases, our 

standard of review requires an appellate court to accept the 

findings of fact and credibility determinations of the trial court if 

they are supported by the record. In re: R.J.T., 608 Pa. 9, 9 

A.3d 1179, 1190 (Pa. 2010). If the factual findings are 
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supported, appellate courts review to determine if the trial court 

made an error of law or abused its discretion. Id.; In re R.I.S., 

614 Pa. 275, 36 A.3d 567, 572 (Pa. 2011) (plurality). As has 

been often stated, an abuse of discretion does not result merely 

because the reviewing court might have reached a different 

conclusion. Id.; see also Samuel-Bassett v. Kia Motors 

America, Inc., 613 Pa. 371, 455, 34 A.3d 1, 51 (Pa. 2011); 

Christianson v. Ely, 575 Pa. 647, 838 A.2d 630, 634 (Pa. 

2003). Instead, a decision may be reversed for an abuse of 

discretion only upon demonstration of manifest 

unreasonableness, partiality, prejudice, bias, or ill-will. Id.

As we discussed in R.J.T., there are clear reasons for 

applying an abuse of discretion standard of review in these 

cases. We observed that, unlike trial courts, appellate courts are 

not equipped to make the fact-specific determinations on a cold 

record, where the trial judges are observing the parties during 

the relevant hearing and often presiding over numerous other 

hearings regarding the child and parents. R.J.T., 9 A.3d at 

1190. Therefore, even where the facts could support an 

opposite result, as is often the case in dependency and 

termination cases, an appellate court must resist the urge to 

second guess the trial court and impose its own credibility 

determinations and judgment; instead we must defer to the trial 

judges so long as the factual findings are supported by the 

record and the court’s legal conclusions are not the result of an 

error of law or an abuse of discretion. In re Adoption of 

Atencio, 539 Pa. 161, 165, 650 A.2d 1064, 1066 (Pa. 1994).

In re I.E.P., 87 A.3d 340, 343–344 (Pa. Super. 2014) (quoting In re 

Adoption of S.P., 47 A.3d 817, 826–827 (Pa. 2012)).

The burden is upon the petitioner to prove by clear and convincing 

evidence that the asserted grounds for seeking the termination of parental 

rights are valid. In re R.N.J., 985 A.2d 273, 276 (Pa. Super. 2009). We 

have explained that the “standard of clear and convincing evidence is 

defined as testimony that is so ‘clear, direct, weighty and convincing as to 

enable the trier of fact to come to a clear conviction, without hesitance, of 
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the truth of the precise facts in issue.’” Id. (quoting In re J.L.C., 837 A.2d 

1247, 1251 (Pa. Super. 2003)). Moreover, this Court may affirm the trial 

court’s decision regarding the termination of parental rights with regard to 

any one subsection of section 2511(a). In re B.L.W., 843 A.2d 380, 384 

(Pa. Super. 2004) (en banc).

The orphans’ court terminated Father’s parental rights pursuant to 23 

Pa.C.S. § 2511(a)(1), (2), and (b). Order, 5/27/16, at 1. Section 

2511(a)(1), (2), and (b) provide as follows:

§ 2511. Grounds for involuntary termination

(a) General rule.--The rights of a parent in regard to a child may 

be terminated after a petition filed on any of the following 

grounds:

(1) The parent by conduct continuing for a period of at 

least six months immediately preceding the filing of the 

petition either has evidenced a settled purpose of 

relinquishing parental claim to a child or has refused or 

failed to perform parental duties.

(2) The repeated and continued incapacity, abuse, 

neglect or refusal of the parent has caused the child to be 

without essential parental care, control or subsistence 

necessary for his physical or mental well-being and the 

conditions and causes of the incapacity, abuse, neglect or 

refusal cannot or will not be remedied by the parent.

* * *

(b) Other considerations.--The court in terminating the rights of 

a parent shall give primary consideration to the developmental, 

physical and emotional needs and welfare of the child. The 

rights of a parent shall not be terminated solely on the basis of 

environmental factors such as inadequate housing, furnishings, 

income, clothing and medical care if found to be beyond the 

control of the parent. With respect to any petition filed pursuant 
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to subsection (a)(1), (6) or (8), the court shall not consider any 

efforts by the parent to remedy the conditions described therein 

which are first initiated subsequent to the giving of notice of the 

filing of the petition.

23 Pa.C.S. § 2511. This Court has explained that the focus in terminating 

parental rights under section 2511(a) is on the parent, but under section 

2511(b), the focus is on the child. In re Adoption of C.L.G., 956 A.2d 999, 

1008 (Pa. Super. 2008) (en banc).

The orphans’ court has provided a thorough evaluation supporting 

termination of Father’s parental rights pursuant to 23 Pa.C.S. § 2511(a)(1), 

(2) and (b). We have reviewed the notes of testimony and conclude that the 

orphans’ court’s findings and conclusions are supported by the testimony of 

record, and we adopt the orphans’ court opinion as our own.6 Moreover, 

after conducting an independent review of the record, we discern no nonfrivolous issues overlooked by counsel. Accordingly, we grant counsel’s 

motion to withdraw.

Decree affirmed. Motion to withdraw as counsel granted.

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.

Prothonotary

 

6

 The parties are directed to attach a copy of the orphans’ court’s opinion of 

December 29, 2016, to any future filings in this matter.
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Date: 1/24/2017
2016. 

rights. Appellant received appointed counsel and a termination hearing was held on May 27, 

I L 

DEC 29 2016 

Regiiter of Wms ; 

·• 

1 

On December 7, 2015, the mother filed a petition for involuntary termination of parental 

See Petitioner's Exhibit A. 

Thursdays from one until six p.m. and on Sunday from twelve noon until six p.m. each week. 

stated Appellant was entitled to visitation on Mondays and Wednesdays from one until four p.m., 

with G. T. by the parties' mutual consent. If the parties could make no such agreement, the order 

retained primary physical custody of G. T. and the Appellant was granted periods of visitation 

County, Pennsylvania, giving the mother and the Appellant shared custody of G.T. The mother 

Parental Rights, 12/7 II 5, 13. On September 26, 2008, a custody order was entered in Crawford 

Procedural History 

G.T. was born on March "2008. Amended Petition for Involuntary Termination of 

BACKGROUND 

requested the Superior Court affirm the Decree. 

termination under 23 Pa. C.S.A. §251 l(a)(l), (a)(2), and (b). It is therefore respectfully 

the natural mother, Kii Tll•••(mother), met her burderi. in establishing grounds for 

Notice of Appeal and Statement of Intent to File an Anders Brief. A review of the record shows 

On May 27, 2016, a decree was entered terminating the parental rights of the natural 

father, AIII TIIII (Appellant), to his minor child, CIII T-(G.T.). He filed a timely 

1925{a} OPINION 

IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS 

OF ERIE COUNTY, PENNSYLVANIA 

ORPHANS' COURT 

DOCKET NO. 97 IN ADOPTION 2015 

JfN THE MATTER OF · THE ADOPTION OF G-TCirculated 01/12/2017 03:22 PM
Proceedings Transcript, 5/27116, p. 7-8. 

2 

relationship with the mother, which continued for some time. Involuntary Termination 

Appellant attended G.T. 's preschool graduation. As of 2009, Appellant had a good, working 

Appellant took G.T. to his mother's home, or, would remain at her home with the child. 

She stated Appellant saw the child about two times a month. During some of these visits, 

In 2009, mother testified Appellant still remained sporadically involved in the child's life. 

Termination Proceedings Transcript, 5/27/16, p. 7. 

visited mother's home for the better part of the first year of the child's life. Involuntary 

become upset about having to· come to her home to visit the child. Nevertheless, Appellant 

as "sporadic." She described instances in which Appellant cancelled his visits and would 

Termination Proceedings Transcript, 5/27/16, p. 5-6 . .. 

After the custody order was entered, mother still characterized Appellant's involvement 

Mother characterized Appellant's involvement with G.T. as "very sporadic." Involuntary 

Crawford County, Pennsylvania. At that time, mother and Appellant were not living together. 

Shortly after G.T. was born, Appellant and mother obtained a formal custody order in 

. . • ··l ' 

The testimony at the termination hearing revealed the following: 

Facts 

16, 2016, the Superior Court remanded this matter to the orphans'/trial court for the preparation 

l ~· ,i l '., , 

of a 1925( a) opinion within thirty (30) days. 

record, and of its intent not to submit a 1925(a) Opinion. By Judgment Order dated December 

The trial court submitted a letter notifying the Superior Court its intent to rest on the 

timely Noti¢e of Appeal and Statement oflntent to File en Anders brief June 27, 2016. 

Appellant's parental rights were terminated by Decree that same day. Appellant filed a 
3 

Mother testified that in 2013 her working relationship with Appellant deteriorated. 

Mother learned Appellant became involved with the criminal justice system and was criminally 

charged. She also learned Appellant struggled with drug addiction. After these events, 

Appellant did not have contact with mother and G.T. for a period of at least eight months, even 

though Appellant lived down the street from mother and child. Involuntary Termination 

Proceedings Transcript, 5/27/16, p. 8. Eventually, mother learned Appellant was arrested in 

Tennessee, and was being extradited back to Pennsylvania. Involuntary Termination 

Proceedings Transcript, 5/27/16, p. 9. 

Appellant was released from the Crawford County Jail around Thanksgiving or 

Christmas, 2014. At that time, mother and her new husband invited Appellant to their home in 

an attempt to work on Appellant's relationship with the child and "promote him to be a good 

father." Involuntary Termination Proceedings Transcript, 5/27 /16, p. 9. 

Communication between mother and Appellant further deteriorated in March, 2015. 

Appellant attended a birthday party mother and her husband gave G.T., but did not bring a 

present for the child. The next month, Appellant contacted the mother asking to spend time with 

G.T. over Easter. However, G.T. told Appellant he would rather go to Florida to see his 

grandmother with the rest of the family. Mother testified she heard Appellant screaming at the 

child through the phone, saying "I don't care that you want to go see your grandma, you're 

coming to my house whether you like it or not." Involuntary Termination Proceedings 

Transcript, 5/27/16, p. 10-11. Mother testified G.T. became so upset he started "bawling." 

Involuntary Termination Proceedings Transcript, 5/27/16, p. 17. When mother took the phone 

away from the child, Appellant continued to yell at her, until mother's husband took the phone 

from her. Involuntary Termination Proceedings Transcript, 5/2 7 I 16, p. 17-18, 3 3. 
5/27/16, p. 80. 

County to modify the standing custody order. Involuntary Termination Proceedings Transcript, 

4 

Proceedings Transcript, 5/27116, p. 16-17, 20. At no time did mother file anything in Crawford 

information from any family member Appellant tried to contact her. Involuntary Termination 

Appellant with new addresses when relevant, and did not receive any cards, presents, or 

5/27/16, p. 17, 78. Mother also testified her phone number stayed the same, she updated the 

prohibit contact between Appellant and child. Involuntary Termination Proceedings Transcript, 

Mother denied telling Appellant at any time to stay away from the child or otherwise 

own. Involuntary Termination Proceedings Transcript, 5/27/16, p. 22. 

of the child's football games, but Appellant made no effort to continue his involvement on his 

Involuntary Termination Proceedings Transcript, 5/27/16, p. 22. 

He never appeared for a parent/teacher conference or the child's medical appointments. 

Prior to April, 2015, mother and husband picked up Appellant and transported him to one 

the child's progress in school. Involuntary Termination Proceedings Transcript, 5/27/16, p. 13. 

the child's school or sports activities for at least two years, and did not at any time inquire as to 

to do well in school and in his extracurricular sports activities. Appellant did not attend any of 

I 

L 

; 

5/27/16, p. 11-12. 

After April, 2015, Appellant did not contact the child at any holiday. The child continued · 

termination of Appellant's parental rights. Involuntary Termination Proceedings Transcript, 

' served Appellant with a post-adoption letter, indicating mother wished to move forward with 

message to mother asking why he hadn't seen his son. Around this time, mother's attorney 

exercise any rights under the existing custody order until September, 2015, when he sent a text 

Since the argument at Easter, 2015, Appellant did not contact mother or attempt to 
5 

Appellant's testimony did little to support his belief his parental rights to the child should 

not be terminated. At the time of the hearing, Appellant was incarcerated in the Erie County 

Prison on charges of Possession With Intent to Deliver heroin, a theft offense, and endangering 

the welfare of a child. Involuntary Termination Proceedings Transcript, 5/27/16, p. 47. He knew 

a custody order was in place to allow him regular visitation with his son since 2008, yet never 

exercised his right to enforce the order, despite his assertions mother kept him from seeing the 

child. Involuntary Termination Proceedings Transcript, 5/27/16, p. 40, 45. Though Appellant 

denied an ongoing problem with drug addiction, he admitted being ordered into drug and alcohol 

treatment in conjunction with a prior conviction. Involuntary Termination Proceedings 

Transcript, 5/27/16, p. 49-50. Most recently, Appellant attended treatment for drug addiction, 

but did not do so until after the termination petition was filed in December, 2015. Involuntary 

Termination Proceedings Transcript, 5/27/16, p. 76-77. 

Mother described the ways in which Appellant's minimal contact and incarceration took 

a great emotional toll on G.T. Mother testified to an instance in which someone on the child's 

school bus told G.T. his father was in jail. Mother stated G.T. understood what it meant to be in 

prison and had a lot of anxiety about it. G. T. currently sees a doctor every three months for 

medication and was in individual therapy twice a week at one point. Involuntary Termination 

Proceedings Transcript, 5/27/16, p. 24-26. Appellant never participated in or inquired as to 

G.T. 's progress in therapy. Involuntary Termination Proceedings transcript, 5/27/16, p. 28. 

The child frequently asks when mother's husband will become his father and when his 

last name will be the same as his. Involuntary Termination Proceedings Transcript, 5/27/16, p. 

83. 
Appellate courts must apply an abuse of discretion standard when considering a 

trial court's determination of a petition for parental rights. [The] standard of 

review requires an appellate court to accept the findings of fact and credibility 

6 

In reviewing an appeal from an order terminating parental rights, 

STANDARD OF REVIEW 

under subsections (a)(l), (a)(2), and (b). 

on appeal is one challenging the sufficiency of the evidence supporting the trial court's findings 

After review of the record, the only issue of possible arguable merit that could be raised 

ISSUE PRESENTED 

parental rights under 23 Pa.C.S.A. §2511 (a)(l), (a)(2), and (b). This timely appeal followed. 

testimony was more credible than the Appellant's. An order was entered terminating Appellant's 

At the close of testimony, a finding was made on the record determining the mother's 

custody process. Involuntary Termination Proceedings Transcript, 5/27/16, p. 72. 

and/or modification in any other court in Pennsylvania, though he already had knowledge of the 

refused. However, Appellant never returned to Crawford County, or petitioned for custody 

month at best. Involuntary Termination Proceedings Transcript, 5/27/16, p. 64. 

Appellant testified he tried to keep in contact with mother to see G.T., but mother 

when he did see the child, it was only two or three weekends and an occasional Wednesday per 

over the years. Involuntary Termination Proceedings Transcript, 5/27/16, p. 57, 69-70. Even 

further inquiring as to the child's health and well-being, as Appellant insisted he participated in 

Appellant from attending the child's sporting events, asking about his progress in school, or 

Termination Proceedings Transcript, 5/27/16, p. 53-54. However, mother never prevented 

the mother telling him a court order existed prohibiting him from seeing the child. Involuntary 

Appellant admitted he had no contact with the child since April, 2015, and blamed this on 
relationship." Id 

reasonable firmness in resisting obstacles placed in the path of maintaining the parent-child 

must utilize all available resources to preserve the parental relationship, and must exercise 

even in difficult circumstances." In re B.NM, 85 6 A.2d 847, 855 (Pa. Super. 2004). "A parent 

7 

every problem, in order to maintain the parent-child relationship to the best of his or her ability, 

duty requires that the parent act affirmatively with good faith interest and effort, and not yield to 

re B.L. W, 843 A.2d 380, 384 (Pa: Super. 2004)(en bane), app. den. 863 A.2d 1141 (2004). 

Preserving Appellant's parental rights is not an acceptable option in this case. "Parental 

the termination of parental rights with regard to any one subsection of23 Pa.C.S.A. §251 l(a). In 

severing any such bond." Id The Superior Court may affirm the trial court's decision regarding 

between parent and child, with close attention paid to the effect on the child of permanently 

may analyze whether it is in the best interests of the child for parental rights to be terminated. Id 

One major aspect of this analysis includes the "nature and status of the emotional bond 

In re L.M, 923 A.2d 505, 511 (Pa. Super. 2007). Once these statutory grounds-exist, the court 

parent's conduct satisfies the statutory grounds for termination delineated in Section 251 l(a)." 

parent. The party moving for termination must "prove by clear and convincing evidence that the 

In a termination of parental rights hearing, the initial focus is on the conduct of the 

If the factual findings are supported, appellate courts review to determine if the 

trial court made an error of law or abused its discretion. Id An abuse of 

discretion does not result merely because the reviewing court might have reached 

a different conclusion. Id Instead, a decision may be reversed for an abuse of 

discretion only upon determination of manifestunreasonableness, partiality, 

prejudice, bias, or ill-will. 

DISCUSSION 

determinations of the trial court if they are supported by the record. In re: R.JT., 

608 Pa. 9, 9 A.3d 1179, 1190 (2010). 
8 

While Appellant was somewhat involved in the child's life shortly after his birth, the 

mother's credible testimony indicated Appellant never had more than sporadic contact with the 

child and failed to perform any meaningful parental duties on the child's behalf. Despite 

Appellant's assertions mother kept the child from him, it was clear to the trial court the mother 

made every effort to keep the Appellant in the child's life, even inviting him to dinner at her 

home and providing transportation for him to and from the child's sporting events. Involuntary 

Termination Proceedings Transcript, May 27, 2016, p. 9, 22. 

Despite mother's assistance, Appellant had no steady, meaningful presence in the child's 

life. Though a custody order was entered in 2008 giving Appellant regular visitation with the 

child, Appellant did not see the child more than a few times per month at best, and never 

petitioned for modification or enforcement of the order despite his claims mother withheld the 

child from him. He did not regularly attend medical appointments or school conferences for the 

child, nor did he regularly send gifts, cards, or letters to the child for holidays or his birthday. 

Mother testified the last time Appellant had contact with the child was in March, 2015, over one 

year before the termination proceedings. Involuntary Termination Proceedings Transcript, May 

27, 2016, p. 5, 7-8, 13, 22, 28, 53-54, 84-85. 

Furthermore, the child has significant issues with anxiety, which stem from the 

Appellant's minimal presence in his life and frequent incarceration. The child, at one point, was 

involved with therapy to address these issues. Involuntary Termination Proceedings Transcript, 

5/27116, p. 24-26. The testimony indicated the child is bonded with mother and her husband and 

is looking forward to the day when mother's husband can finally become his "father." 

Involuntary Termination Proceedings Transcript, 5/27/16, p. 83. 
cc: Patrick Kelley, Esquire 

2503 West 26th Street 

Erie, PA 16506 

9 

BY THE COURT: 

1~1l~il(l1l L-s.&l 

1l ,;1:j& ti ti.lr!Jft!fJtrz/i!llf/Jl0tr:#' ___ , .....;;"-;....C$ '<1 ?,.,_,f' J. 

ROBERT A. SAMBROAH{ JR. 

201 ~~) 

the Appellant's parental rights to the children. 

. . (- ...... 

D t d thi ~ l} f::l_-..d f f ]t> .{ ,:1 /VY! !,,l,_ t/ -1 a e sf..,.( 1 ay o 1:;..,.,._._. • , .•. , •.. ,- .... 

rights be terminated. It is respectfully requested the Superior Court affirm the decree terminating 

Given the lack of bond Appellant and child share, it is in the child's best interests Appellant's 

justice system is additional evidence of his settled purpose to relinquish his parental rights. 

time with the child at all, to the child's detriment. Appellant's involvement with the criminal 

with his child. He barely exercised his rights under the current custody order, or failed to spend 

Appellant demonstrated his unwillingness to put forth effort in maintaining a relationship 

CONCLUSION 

45, 47. 

provide for his child's needs. Involuntary Termination Proceedings Transcript, 5/27/16, p. 40, 

demonstrated his inability or refusal to conform his conduct the requirements of the law and 

a year leading up to the termination hearing. Appellant's incarceration on new charges 

could he offer a credible explanation as to why he did not have contact with the child for at least 

contempt in any court in Pennsylvania if he felt mother was keeping the child from him, nor 

terminated. He offered no explanation as to why he did not file for custody modification or 

Appellant's testimony did little to support the position his parental rights should not be