IN THE SUPREME COURT OF MISSISSIPPI

NO. 2003-CT-01965-SCT

PERRY LEON BERRYMAN

v.

KATHERINE LYNN (HIBBETT)(SNYDER)

BERRYMAN

ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI

DATE OF JUDGMENT: 07/02/2003

TRIAL JUDGE: HON. MITCHELL M. LUNDY, JR.

COURT FROM WHICH APPEALED: TATE COUNTY CHANCERY COURT

ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT: MARY LYNN DAMARE’

ATTORNEY FOR APPELLEE: H. R. GARNER

NATURE OF THE CASE: CIVIL - DOMESTIC RELATIONS

DISPOSITION: AFFIRMED - 06/30/2005

MOTION FOR REHEARING FILED:

MANDATE ISSUED:

EN BANC.

EASLEY, JUSTICE, FOR THE COURT:

¶1. In this family law case the Court of Appeals’ opinion provides the following facts:

Per ry and Katherine Berryman were married January 29, 1996, in Eureka
Springs, Arkansas. Perr y and Katherine both worked in Memphis, Tennessee,
Perry as a firefighter and Katherine as a nurse, but they lived in Independence, Mississippi. There were no children born during the Berrymans' marriage. In July 2002, Perry and Katherine separated. The parties filed a consent agreement on May 9, 2003, and were granted a hearing on property issues that same day.

On June 9, 2003, in the Chancery Cour t of Tate County, Perry and Katherine

were grante d a divorce on the grounds of irreconcilable differences. The

chancellor divide d the marital property, but declined to award alimony or attorney's fees to either party. Perry now appeals to this Court asserting that the

chancellor erred in awarding commingled marital property and marital assets solely to Katherine, which resulted in an inequitable distribution of assets.2

Berryman v. Berryman , 2004 WL 1879029, (Miss. Ct. App. 2004).

¶2. Perry Berryman (hu sband) requested this Court grant his petition for certiorari. He

argues that the Court

of Appeals opinion was incorrect as to the facts stated in the opinion. He

also contends that the Court of Appeals erred in affirming the chancellor’s decision as it is not

an equitable division of the marital property.

¶3. In rendering its decision, the Court of Appeals without question misstated the

chancellor’s decision reg a rding which spouse would be responsible for the indebtedness on

a twenty-acre tract of land and the amount of the monthly mo rtgage payment. However, that

fact does not affect the decision to affirm the chancellor’s ruling. In fact, the only issue that

the Court of Appeals specifically focu sed on was the award of the equity in the marital home

to Katherine Berryman (wife). We grant certiorari in order to review the Court of Appeals’

judgment. However, we agree that the Court of Appeals was correct in affirming the

chancellor’s decision dividing the marital property.

¶4. The husband alleges that the chancellor did not separate the m arital property from

the

non-marital property. However, the chancellor’s order does separate and specifically

enumerate the property acquired during the marriage. The chancellor only divided the marital

property.

¶5. The Court of Appeals correctly stated that the chancellor aw arded the twenty acres to

the wife, but the Court of Appeals’ misstatement occurred in saying th at the wife was to

maintain the payments of $740 per month on the land. In fact, the payments were $504.41 per

month. The chancellor ordered that “[u]ntil all sales, the party that has been making the3

payments shall continue to d o so.” The husband was to pay the payments until the land was

sold.

¶6. The chancellor did not order t he husband to pay the payments on the twenty acres until

the debt was satisfied. The chancellor ordered the twenty acres sold, as well as, the marital

home and the rental house sold. The husband was awarded the net proceeds from the sale of

the rental home (estimated equity of $20,000) wh en sold. The wife was awarded the equity

in the marital home (estimated $148,000)(less the first and second mortgage on the marital

home) and the equity in the unimproved twenty acres (approximately $48,000) when sold.

¶7. The chancellor found that the wife h ad contributed $145,000 to the purchase of the

marital home as a down payment when the parties married. Therefore, the chancellor

determined that equitable division demanded that she be awarded the equity in the home. The

wife was to be responsible for the first mortgage of $900 per month on the marital home and

have exclusive use and possession of the home until sold.

¶8. The husband argues on appeal that when h e sold the rental home, he only cleared around

$6,000 to $7,000 from the sale. However, the sale did not occur until after the chancery court

made its initial

ruling. At the time the chancellor made his ruling, the equity was estimated

in the chancellor’s decision to be $20,000.

¶9. The parties each were awarded their respective vehicle, wi fe the 1996 Pontiac Grand

Prix and husband the 1994 S-10 Blazer. The chancellor found the 1999 Mercedes to be the

husband’s separate property.

¶10. No alimony was awarded. No children were born to the union. Each were ordered to

be responsible for their own attorney’s fees.4

¶11. The husband was awarded the tractor an d accessories. The husband was responsible for

the payments on the second mortgage on the marital home until it sold.

¶12. The husband was awarded his retirement account acquire d during the marriage of

approximately $24,500. The husband was awarded one bedroom suite, personal effects and his

books. All other furniture was awarded to the wife.

DISCUSSION

¶13. The issue before the Court of Appeals was whether the chancellor erred in awarding

commingled marital property and assets solely to the wife. We find that the Court of Appeals

applied the correct legal analysis in rendering its decision. The Court of Appeals stated:

When reviewing the decisions of a chance llor, this Court applies a
limited abuse of discretion standard of review. M

cNeil v. Hester

, 753 So.2d
1057(¶ 21) (Miss.2000). The findings of the chancellor will not be disturbed

“unless the chancellor was manifestly wrong, clearly erroneous, or applied the wrong legal standard.” Id

....

In his sole issue, Perry argues that the chancellor erred in awarding

certain commingled marital property and marital assets solely to Katherine, resulting in an inequitable dis tribution of the assets. Specifically, Perry claims

that the chancellor failed to make specific findings of fact concerning which property was separate and which was marital before distributing the assets. Equitable distribution in a divorce case is governed by the guidelines set out by

our supreme court in Ferguson v. Ferguson , 639 So.2d 921 (Miss.1994).
These guidelines include:

(1) economic and domestic contributions by each party to the
marriage, (2) expenditures and disposal of the marital assets b y each party,
(3) the market value and emotional value of the marital assets, (4) the value of the nonmarital property,
(5) tax, economic, contractual, and legal consequences o f the

distribution, (6) elimination of

alimony and other future frictional contact
between the parties, (7) the income and earning capacity of each party, and5 (8) any other

relevant factor that should be considered in making an equitable distribution.

Ferguson

, 639 So.2d at 928. Assets acqui red or accumulated during the course

of the ma rriage are marital assets and are subject to an equitable distribution by

the chancellor. Hemsley v. Hemsley , 639 So.2d 909, 915 (Miss.1994).

Perry's chief concern is the marital residence, which he claims should

not have been awarded solely to Katherine. In his order the chancellor noted the

various marital assets accumulated by the parties during the course of the marriage. Pursuant to the Ferguson factors, the chancellor divided the property

as f ollows. Perry was to receive the tractor and accessories valued at $5,000;

his 1994 Chevy Blazer; his entire retireme nt account, of which approximately $24,000 was accumulated during the marriage; the rental house, with equity of approximately $20,000; and his personal effects, including books, alon g with a
bedroom suite from the mar i tal residence. Perry was also ordered to pay the

second mortgage on the tractor. Katherine was awarded the marital residence,

with equity of approximately $148,000; the twenty-acre property, with equity

of approximately $48,000; her car; and furniture. Katherine was also ordered

to maintain the mortgage payments of approximately $900 per mo nth on the marital residence and $740 per month on the twenty-acre property.

In awarding Katherine sole ownership of the marital resi dence, the

chancellor stated as follows:

Based upon all these [Ferguson ] factors especiall y # 1

‘Substa ntial contributions to the accumulation of the property’

and the uncontradicted fact that M rs. Berryman contributed $145,000 to the acquisition of the marital residence (725 Walker

Road ) equity demands that she be entitled to the sole ownership of the residence or the proceeds from the sale thereof, (less 1st and 2nd mortgage).

Althou gh Perry feels that the property should have been divided equally,

we cannot find that the chancellor abused his discretion in awarding Katherine sole ownership of the marital property.

Berryman , 2004 WL 1879029 * 1-2.

¶14. The Court of Appeals’ opinion focused on whether the chancellor’s decision to award

the wife the equity

in the marital home was equitable. The Court of Appeals stated that the6

husband believed that the pr operty was not divided equally. However, the Court of Appeals

held that chancellor had not abused his discretion in awarding the wife the equity in the marital

home. The “Chancery Court has authority, where equities so suggest, to order a fair division

of property accumulated through the joint contributi ons and efforts of the parties,” and the

equitable division is left to the chancellor’s discretion unless there is an abuse of discretion.

See Ferguson

, 639 So.2d 921, 930, 934 (quoting Brown v. Brown , 574 So.2d 688, 690 (Miss.

1990)). We find that the chancellor’s division of the marital property and assets was

equitable. The husband’s assignment of error is without merit.

CONCLUSION

¶15. We find that the Court of Appeals er red in misstating facts regarding the division of the

marital debt and the amount of the monthly payment on the twenty-acre tract of land. However,

we find that the Cou

rt of Appeals correctly affirmed the judgment of the Chancery Court of

Tate County. Therefore, we affirm the judgments of the Court of Appeals and the Tate County

Chancery Court.

¶16. AFFIRMED.

SMITH, C.J., WALLER, P.J., CARLSON, DICKIN SON AND RANDOLPH, JJ.,

CONCUR. COBB, P.J., AND GRAVES, J., CO NCUR IN RESULT ONLY. DIAZ, J., NOT

PARTICIPATING.