IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF TENNESSEE

AT KNOXVILLE

September 20, 2023 Session

LOUISE ANN SEXTON v. MICHAEL BRYANT SEXTON

Appeal from the Chancery Court for Knox County

No. 195468-2 Richard B. Armstrong, Jr., Chancellor

___________________________________

No. E2023-00136-COA-R3-CV

___________________________________

The Chancery Court for Knox County (“the Trial Court”) found in this divorce action that 

Michael Bryant Sexton (“Husband”) was the sole owner of Furious Properties, LLC and 

that he had purchased two Knox County real properties and deeded them to Furious 

Properties, LLC. The Trial Court accordingly found that the entire interest in Furious 

Properties, LLC constituted marital property subject to equitable division and awarded 

the two Knox County properties to Louise Ann Sexton (“Wife”). The Trial Court 

ordered Husband or a representative of Furious Properties, LLC to convey the entire 

interest in the Knox County properties by quitclaim deed to Wife within thirty days of the 

entry of the judgment. Husband’s issues relate primarily to the property division. To the 

extent the Trial Court awarded property of a non-party LLC to Wife, we reverse and 

remand for the Trial Court to clarify its award, while acknowledging that the Trial Court 

may have intended to award Husband’s interest in Furious Properties, LLC, rather than 

the LLC’s properties themselves, to Wife. We further modify the Trial Court’s judgment

to reflect that the Trial Court granted the parties a divorce on stipulated grounds and to 

remove language granting the parties a divorce on the ground of irreconcilable 

differences. We affirm the balance of the judgment. We deny Wife’s request for 

attorney’s fees on appeal.

Tenn. R. App. P. 3 Appeal as of Right; Judgment of the Chancery Court

Affirmed in Part, Reversed in Part, Modified in Part; Case Remanded

D. MICHAEL SWINEY, C.J., delivered the opinion of the court, in which JOHN W.

MCCLARTY and THOMAS R. FRIERSON, II, JJ., joined.

C. Scott Taylor and Jon C. Fromke, Knoxville, Tennessee, for the appellant, Michael 

Bryant Sexton.

01/30/2024
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Chadwick B. Tindell and Michael R. Franz, Knoxville, Tennessee, for the appellee, 

Louise Ann Sexton.

OPINION

Background

On March 14, 2018, Wife filed a petition for divorce against Husband in the Trial 

Court, alleging the ground of irreconcilable differences. Both parties signed a “Notice of 

Automatic Statutory Injunction” pursuant to Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-4-106(d). In June 

2019, Wife filed an amended petition for divorce, adding an alternative ground of 

inappropriate marital conduct. In November 2019, Husband filed an answer to Wife’s 

amended petition for divorce. Husband agreed that irreconcilable differences had 

developed between the two parties but denied being guilty of inappropriate marital 

conduct. 

In May 2021, Wife filed a “Motion for Temporary Injunction and Accounting,”

seeking to restrain Husband from disposing of inventory or other automobile parts at his 

business, “Sexton Auto Salvage,” and to provide an accounting of “all parts or cars or 

other inventory sold” since the parties’ separation. Wife alleged in pertinent part: 

During the course of the parties’ marriage, [Husband] operated an 

auto salvage yard known as Sexton Auto Salvage . . . . [Husband’s]

ownership in this business is in whole or in part marital property, subject to 

division.

Upon information and belief, portions of Sexton Auto Salvage have 

been shut down, but [Husband] and/or his family members are in the 

process of liquidating and selling inventory, including automobile parts and 

crushed cars for salvage. The[r]e are hundreds of cars and parts still 

located at the business.

(Paragraph numbering omitted.) Wife concomitantly filed a separate request for 

inspection of Sexton Auto Salvage pursuant to Tennessee Rule of Civil Procedure 34. 

An agreed order was entered providing, in part, that the parties agreed that Sexton Auto 

Salvage “may represent marital property” and that Husband would be enjoined from 

continued liquidation of inventory unless he provided a detailed accounting to Wife at 

least seven days prior to sale. 

In September 2021, Wife filed a “Verified Petition for Contempt and Appointment 

for Receiver,” making the following allegations:
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Upon information and belief, inventory, either crushed from auto 

parts or otherwise has been sold from Sexton Auto Salvage over the past 

few months, all without any report to [Wife]. [Husband] has previously 

claimed Sexton Auto Salvage is closed and doing no business. With no 

report to [Wife], [Husband’s] actions are in direct contradiction of the 

Orders of this Court. [Husband’s] failure to obey the Orders of this Court 

is willful, knowing, and intentional.

Approximately one week ago, [Wife] learned that a lawsuit had been 

filed in Union County Chancery Court by [Husband’s] mother as trustee for 

a named trust seeking to collect an unspecified debt from [Husband], his 

brother Jimmy Franklin Sexton, and Michael B. Sexton d/b/a Sexton Auto 

Parts. [Husband] and his brother conduct business under both the names, 

Sexton Auto Salvage and Sexton Auto Parts, these businesses being one 

and the same. Herein, the business is referred to as Sexton Auto Salvage. 

[Husband] offered no resistance to this lawsuit and allowed a default 

judgment to be entered. As a result of the default judgment, an execution 

sale was scheduled by the Union County Sheriff for Friday, September 10, 

2021. Counsel for [Wife] successfully obtained an Order in the Union 

County case stopping the sale of the property owned by Sexton Auto 

Salvage. Upon inspection of the collection lawsuit filed by [Husband’s] 

mother, it was discovered that there was no proper service of process, the 

business was incorrectly identified in the lawsuit, among other defenses to 

the unspecified debt purportedly owed by Sexton Auto Salvage. [Wife] 

believes the failure of [Husband] to offer any defense to this defective 

lawsuit brough[t] by his mother was intentional and is an effort to allow the 

disposal of marital property in which [Wife] claims an interest in order to 

defeat [Wife’s] marital interest in such property. Such actions or inaction 

by [Husband] is in direct contravention of the statutory injunctions issued 

in this case requiring that no party to this case allow the dissipation or 

disposal of marital assets.

* * *

In addition to the business known as Sexton Auto Salvage, 

[Husband] owns two (2) lake lots on Norris Lake located in Union County, 

Tennessee. [Wife] claims a marital interest in the two (2) lake lots. Upon 

information and belief, [Husband] has allowed the logging of timber on the 

two (2) lake lots and has received the profits from same. This logging 

would have all been done during the pendency of this divorce, again in 

direct contravention of the statutory injunctions issued in this case 

prohibiting the dissipation or disposal of marital property without 
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agreement of both parties or order of the Court. This action by [Husband] 

in violating this Court’s orders was willful, knowing, and intentional.

(Paragraph numbering omitted.) Based on these allegations, Wife sought a court order 

requiring Husband to defend the collection law suit in Union County and the appointment 

of a receiver to manage Husband’s interest in Sexton Auto Salvage. She also sought 

sanctions against Husband “in the form of returning any monies received from assets 

sold, plus payment of all costs, including attorney’s fees, incurred by” Wife, in the 

halting of the “Sheriff sale” in Union County and in the filing of the petition for 

contempt.

The Trial Court entered an order appointing John Newton as a receiver to 

investigate and make findings related to Husband’s business interests, including: (1) the 

suit initiated by Husband’s mother and alleged debt owed to Husband’s family trust; (2) 

the logging and sale of logs from the two lake lots; and (3) the operations of Sexton Auto 

Salvage, Sexton Auto Parts, or any business related thereto. The Trial Court also ordered 

Husband to defend the collection suit by the “Sexton Family Trust” in Union County.

Wife filed a motion to compel discovery claiming that while Husband had 

responded to her second set of interrogatories and requests for production of documents,

his responses were deficient. These deficiencies ranged “from failing to provide 

addresses and telephone numbers related to identified parties to failing to give any 

explanation with regard to various companies in which [Husband] claim[ed] an 

ownership interest.” The Trial Court granted this motion. Wife thereafter filed a motion 

for sanctions pursuant to Tennessee Rule of Civil Procedure 37, alleging that Husband 

still had failed to provide complete answers to her interrogatories.

Wife then filed a motion to authorize a receiver to liquidate assets of “Furious 

Investments, LLC.” According to Wife, Husband owned an interest in five parcels of 

real estate in Union County, all of which were purchased while the parties were married 

and living together. The parcels of real estate were purchased with a “check from 

Michael Sexton d/b/a Furious Investments” in the amount of $16,643.54 and $10,000.00 

in cash from marital funds. Wife alleged that the check made “no reference to any 

limited liability company and clearly state[d] Furious Investments [wa]s a trade name 

used by” Husband. Wife presented the following averments: 

[Husband] in this case claims that these properties are owned by 

Furious Investments, LLC. However, Furious Investments, LLC was not 

formed until months after the purchase of the properties. It is admitted that 

the Deeds from the Clerk & Master resulting from the tax sale and purchase 

of these properties is made to Furious Investments, LLC. However, 

Furious Investments, LLC was not in existence at the time the property was 

purchased.
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[Husband] in this case claims that Furious Investments, LLC is 

owned by [Husband] and his brother, Stacey Sexton, in equal shares. 

However, despite repeated requests in discovery, [Husband] has failed to 

produce any document to indicate that claimed equal ownership, how the 

properties were conveyed from [Husband] to the alleged limited liability 

company or the consideration paid.

Further, Furious Investments, LLC has been dissolved as a limited 

liability company by the Tennessee Secretary of State and is no longer in 

existence. Despite repeated requests in formal discovery, [Husband] has 

failed to explain where the assets went after the dissolution of Furious 

Investments, LLC.

The Court previously appointed a Receiver in this case to manage 

and/or liquidate certain business interests of [Husband]. The appointed 

Receiver is John Newton. Mr. Newton has in process the liquidation and 

sale of certain assets of [Husband], notably the auto salvage business 

owned by [Husband] and his brother.

Due to the disputed ownership and refusal of [Husband] to cooperate 

in discovery by producing documents confirming ownership of the assets of 

the former limited liability company known as Furious Investments, LLC, 

this Court should order the liquidation and sale of [Husband’s] interest in 

the assets previously owned in whole or in part by Furious Investments, 

LLC. [Husband’s] former interest in the limited liability company and/or 

these real properties is marital property subject to division by this Court. 

Due to [Husband’s] failure to produce sufficient documentation concerning 

his ownership interest, the Receiver should be charged with determining 

[Husband’s] ownership interest and liquidating [Husband’s] interest in 

order that it can be properly divided by this Court in the division of marital 

property.

(Paragraph numbering omitted.) Based on these allegations, Wife asked the Court to 

direct Mr. Newton to determine the ownership of the real properties located in Union 

County owned by “Michael Sexton d/b/a Furious Investments, LLC, Michael Sexton, 

Stacey Sexton and/or ‘Furious Investments, LLC’” and to liquidate and sell Husband’s 

interest in said properties.

In September, 2022, the Trial Court entered an order, providing that Mr. Newton 

would be authorized to investigate and determine the interest in and properties owned by 

Furious Investments, LLC and Furious Properties, LLC. The Court explained: 

“Specifically, the Receiver shall determine what properties are owned and what 
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individuals and/or companies actually own the properties at present.” In addition, the 

Court reserved the issue of sanctions against Husband pending further hearings. 

In October, 2022, the receiver, Mr. Newton, filed his report. Mr. Newton made 

the following findings related to Furious Investments, LLC and Furious Properties, LLC:

II. FURIOUS PROPERTIES, LLC AND INVESTMENTS

Parcels of unimproved properties were purchased by Michael and 

Stacey Sexton in a 2018 tax sale. They set up an LLC called Furious 

Properties in 2018 so Clerk and Master could deed the lots to the LLC.

Receiver has basic public record information available on the 

parties’ real property which will be summarized in Exhibit B, attached. 

Also, the testimony of the two LLC members, Michael Sexton and brother, 

Stacey Sexton.

Receiver confirms that those appear to be validly titled to the LLC as 

stated in the approximate value based on the summaries from these sources. 

The parties have not obtained any appraisals to date. 

IV. SUMMARY/CONCLUSION

* * *

The Furious Properties and Furious Investments, LLC entities has lapsed 

but, it appears that there were funds generated by both Michael Sexton and 

Jimmy Sexton to initiate purchases at tax sales of various properties. The 

LLC had lapsed and was only reinstated under the state records in August 

of 2022 on or about August 22, 2022. It appears that the owners are 50/50, 

Michael Sexton and Jimmy Sexton. Attached as Exhibit B to this is a 

summary of the property addresses and approximate values based on tax 

records and opinions of the two owners based upon the original purchase 

prices and/or current estimates of market value. This is not a formal 

appraisal and appraisals have not been obtained at this time. It is unlikely 

the parties intend to obtain appraisals prior to the trial date and will base 

their valuations based solely on personal opinions of the owners and 

parties. The Receiver believes the estimates of value made by such parties 

are reasonable and within the range of value of such properties in the 

current market.

At trial, Mr. Newton submitted a supplemental report and acknowledged that he had 

overlooked Furious Properties, LLC. He apparently only considered Furious 

Investments, LLC and its properties in his initial report.
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The trial was on October 19, 2022, and the Trial Court heard testimony from Mr. 

Newton, Wife, and Husband. Before presenting proof, Wife presented as an exhibit a list 

of stipulations that the parties agreed to beforehand. The stipulations included, in 

pertinent part:

1. Grounds for divorce exist pursuant to Tenn. Code Ann. 36-4-129.

2. The following real property is titled to the listed party and the 

accompanying Deed represents the conveyance of said property (acreage is 

approximate):

1. Furious Investments, LLC – title owner of:

a. Tanglewood Parcel 54 (10.9 acres, Union County, Norris 

Lake lot). Deed attached as Exhibit “1”;

b. Tanglewood Parcel 53 (12.21 acres, Union County, Norris 

Lake lot). Deed attached as Exhibit “2”;

c. Ousley Gap (9.88 acres, Union County parcel). Deed 

attached as Exhibit “3”;

d. Wood Lane Parcel 14.04 (2.94 acres, Union County).

Deed attached as Exhibit “4”; and

e. Wood Lane Parcel 14.06 (2.03 acres, Union County). Deed 

attached as Exhibit “5”.

2. Furious Properties, LLC – title owner of:

a. 6633 Bay Circle Drive (Knox County, improved by house). 

Deed attached as Exhibit “6”); and

b. 10342 Rather Road (Knox County). Deed attached as 

Exhibit “7”).[1]

 

1

10342 Rather Road is spelled in various ways throughout the record, sometimes being referred 

to as “Rother Road” or “Rother Drive.” We will spell and refer to the property as 10342 Rather 

Road, as it appears in the parties’ stipulations.
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The parties also agreed to admit the depositions of Husband’s brothers, Jimmy Franklin 

Sexton and Stacy Sexton.2

At the outset of Mr. Newton’s testimony, he presented a supplemental report, 

which was entered into evidence as an exhibit. Mr. Newton explained:

Just to give some context, since this was not in my report, I noticed that I 

apparently overlooked in making the report regarding the Knox County 

properties, those are owned in a company called, “Furious Properties.” The 

Union County properties are, “Furious Investments.”

Mr. Newton’s supplemental report provided the tax value and market value for each of 

the Knox County properties owned by Furious Properties, LLC. His report also listed the 

owners of Furious Properties, LLC as “Michael Sexton & Unknown.” Mr. Newton 

testified that the property at 6633 Bay Circle, Knoxville, TN was purchased at a tax sale 

in November 2020 and that the property at 10342 Rather Road, Knoxville, TN was 

purchased at a tax sale in September 2019. 

Mr. Newton testified that the Knox County properties were deeded to Furious 

Properties, LLC. With regards to the ownership of Furious Properties, LLC, Wife’s 

attorney and Mr. Newton had the following exchange:

[Wife’s attorney:] And the Reports that -- we’ve stipulated that they are 

the owners of the two in our stipulations that were 

filed in court. Mr. Newton, in your Report, I noticed 

down here it says, “Michael Sexton, one-half,” 

assumes he is a 50 percent LLC member. Were you 

able to determine that that’s an actual fact or is that 

just an assumption that you put in here with respect to 

these two properties?

[Mr. Newton:] I don’t have his transcript from his deposition to 

specifically recall if he testified he owned a 50 percent 

interest, but -- that’s why I put that assumption down 

there. But I did notice and I looked at the tax records 

for Knox County that in this year, 2022, he paid the 

taxes on both of these properties. It showed the 

receipt. It showed Michael Sexton. It’s public record, 

so again, I don’t -- that would have to be established 

 

2 Stacy Sexton’s name is spelled in various way throughout the record, sometimes being spelled 

as “Stacey.” We will spell his name as “Stacy,” as this is how his name is spelled in Husband’s 

appellate brief. 
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through the remaining record in this case, whether he 

owns that or not.

[Wife’s attorney:] In your experience with real property, the title owner, 

is that the exclusive legal way to prove who’s actually 

-- holds the interest in properties?

[Mr. Newton:] Well, it’s, you know, the underlying LLC records, 

possibly. But again, I think that the deeds that are 

definitely deeded from Clerk and Master of Knox 

County, recorded two previous properties. So, if --

and there’s no liens. I looked at the -- at the Knox 

County Register of Deeds. There’s no liens on the 

properties either, so.

[Wife’s attorney:] Mr. Newton, would you agree with me that a court of 

equity, such as the Chancery Court, could look at 

various indicia of ownership and control over 

properties to determine different parties’ interests in 

properties beyond just who is on the deed?

[Mr. Newton:] Yes. I mean, I would agree with that. That’s certainly 

within the Court’s, you know, legal authority.

Husband testified that he used his personal funds from his portion of the sale of 

the marital residence to purchase the Knox County properties and that Furious Properties, 

LLC owns those two properties. According to Husband, his father is the sole owner of 

Furious Properties, LLC. He further stated that he had purchased the properties for his 

father but acknowledged that his father never paid him back for the properties. He 

confirmed that he spent a “pretty good amount of money trying to renovate and repair” 

the house on Bay Circle with funds from Furious Investments, LLC. He also confirmed 

that he pays the taxes on the Knox County properties. 

Husband testified that there was a period in time in which both Furious 

Investments, LLC and Furious Properties, LLC had been dissolved or rendered inactive 

by the Tennessee Secretary of State because “we forgot to pay the yearly fee, file the 

paper.” Husband confirmed that he had both LLCs reinstated in August 2022. He paid 

the reinstatement fees to the Secretary of State with funds from his own bank account. 

During his testimony, Husband requested that the Trial Court consider the Knox County 

properties as his separate property. 

After the parties filed opposing proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law, 

the Trial Court entered a final judgment of divorce on January 3, 2023, and an amended 
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final judgment on January 11, 2023. Regarding the ground for the divorce, the Trial 

Court concluded:

The parties announced at the beginning of trial that they had agreed 

to stipulate to the grounds for divorce pursuant to Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-4-

129(a) and the parties shall be granted a divorce accordingly. Tr. p. 7. 

Lines 18-22. There are no children at issue in this divorce. The only issues 

before the Court are the Declaration of Divorce and the Equitable 

Distribution of Mar[it]al Property (real and personal) as well as Business 

Assets. Thus, the Court hereby GRANTS the DIVORCE to both parties as 

to Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-4-101(14) Irreconcilable Differences between the 

parties.

With respect to the Knox County properties, the Trial Court found the following:

FURIOUS PROPERTIES, LLC

The parties have stipulated, and the Court finds that Furious 

Properties, LLC is the title owner of two (2) parcels of real property in 

Knox County, Tennessee, specifically 6633 Bay Circle Road and 10342 

Rother Drive. The Court also finds that the Bay Circle property is 

improved by a house, based on the report(s) of the Receiver and testimony 

of [Husband]. Trial Exh. 4; Tr. p. 159, Lines 9-11. These are the only two 

(2) assets of the LLC.

[Husband] claimed in his testimony at trial that Furious Properties, 

LLC was wholly owned by his father. [Husband] offered no evidence 

whatsoever of this alleged ownership by his father. However, [Husband] 

did testify, on cross-examination, that he used his personal funds to buy the 

properties[,] that he personally organized and maintained the LLC, that 

[Husband] further spent personal funds to renovate and repair the properties 

and that [Husband] also has paid all the real estate taxes for the properties. 

Tr. p. 158, Lines 21-24; Tr. p. 160, Lines 4-24; Tr. p. 163, Line 15; Tr. p. 

160, Lines 1-3. [Husband] further testified his father was not at the sale 

when the properties were purchased and has never paid (or repaid) him for 

any of these purchases. Tr. p. 167, Lines 9-11; Tr. p. 159, Lines 5-8; Tr. p. 

167, Lines 12-15. [Husband] also claimed that he used the funds he 

received from the sale of the parties’ former marital residence to buy these 

properties. However, [Husband] could not produce any record or document

to trace these funds to the purchase of the LLC properties. Counsel for 

[Wife] further pointed to bank records, which [Husband] was forced to 

admit, showing proceeds of the sale of the marital residence going into the 

LLC account, but then two (2) months later those same funds being 
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transferred to another of [Husband’s] bank accounts. Tr. p. 215, Lines 4-

21; Tr. p. 217, Lines 2-6. [Husband] could not explain where those funds 

went or how they were purportedly used to buy the Knox County properties 

and offered no evidence showing those funds were used.

The Court is permitted to consider all indicia of ownership in 

concluding the ownership of the properties for the purpose of an equitable 

division of marital property. See Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-4-121. Based on 

all the evidence presented, the Court concludes the entire interest in Furious 

Properties, LLC is the property of [Husband] and is marital property subject 

to equitable division, further addressed below.

The Trial Court awarded the two Knox County properties titled to Furious 

Properties, LLC to Wife, stating the following:

The Court recognizes that Furious Properties, LLC is the title owner 

of both the Knox County properties. However, it is necessary to divide 

these properties for an equitable division in this case. To accomplish this, 

[Husband] or an authorized representative shall, on behalf of Furious 

Properties, LLC convey all the interest in 10342 Rother Road and 6633 Bay 

Circle to [Wife] by Quit Claim Deed within thirty (30) days of the entry of 

Judgment in this case.

The Trial Court also granted Wife’s request for attorney’s fees, in part due to its 

finding that Husband had been “extremely difficult,” noting that a receiver had to be 

appointed to obtain information about Husband’s business interests and that Husband had 

refused to answer discovery in a timely manner. Husband timely appealed. 

Discussion

Although not stated exactly as such, Husband raises the following issues on 

appeal: (1) whether the Trial Court erred in awarding real properties owned by Furious 

Properties, LLC to Wife, (2) whether the Trial Court erred in appointing a receiver over 

Furious Properties, LLC’s assets, and (3) whether the Trial Court erred in granting the

parties a divorce based upon the ground of irreconcilable differences. Upon our review, 

we reverse the Trial Court’s award of real properties owned by Furious Properties, LLC

to Wife and remand for the Trial Court to clarify its award, acknowledging that the Trial 

Court may have intended to award Husband’s interest in Furious Properties, LLC to 

Wife. We further modify the Trial Court’s judgment to remove language from the 

judgment granting the parties a divorce based upon irreconcilable differences. We 

otherwise affirm the Trial Court’s judgment, including his appointment of a 

receiver/special master.
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Our review is de novo upon the record, accompanied by a presumption of 

correctness of the findings of fact of the trial court, unless the preponderance of the 

evidence is otherwise. Tenn. R. App. P. 13(d); Bogan v. Bogan, 60 S.W.3d 721, 727 

(Tenn. 2001). A trial court’s conclusions of law are subject to a de novo review with no 

presumption of correctness. S. Constructors, Inc. v. Loudon Cnty. Bd. of Educ., 58 

S.W.3d 706, 710 (Tenn. 2001). 

A. Award of LLC Properties

Husband contests the Trial Court’s classification of Furious Properties, LLC as 

marital property, first arguing that the evidence was insufficient to prove that he had a 

membership interest in the LLC. In reviewing the Trial Court’s classification of Furious 

Properties, LLC, we note that “[t]rial courts are vested with a great deal of discretion 

when classifying and dividing the marital estate, and their decisions are entitled to great 

weight on appeal.” Sullivan v. Sullivan, 107 S.W.3d 507, 512 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2002). As 

this Court has previously explained:

Dividing marital property is a three-step process: first, the court 

must “identify and classify the parties’ marital and separate property”; 

second, the court must “value the marital property (and, when appropriate, 

the separate property)”; third, the court must “divide or apportion the 

marital property.” Melvin v. Johnson-Melvin, No. M2004-02106-COA-R3-

CV, 2006 WL 1132042, at *10 (Tenn. Ct. App. Apr. 27, 2006) (Koch, J., 

concurring) (citing Kinard v. Kinard, 986 S.W.2d 220, 230 (Tenn. Ct. App. 

1998)). “Marital property” is defined in part as “all real and personal 

property, both tangible and intangible, acquired by either or both spouses 

during the course of the marriage up to the date of the final divorce hearing 

and owned by either or both spouses as of the date of filing of a complaint 

for divorce[.]” Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-4-121(b)(1)(A). By contrast, the 

Code defines “separate property” as including, among other things, “[a]ll 

real and personal property owned by a spouse before marriage.” Tenn. 

Code Ann. § 36-4-121(b)(2).

“Questions regarding the classification of property as either marital 

or separate, as opposed to questions involving the appropriateness of the 

division of the marital estate, are inherently factual.” Bewick v. Bewick, 

No. M2015-02009-COA-R3-CV, 2017 WL 568544, at *7 (Tenn. Ct. App. 

Feb. 13, 2017) (quoting Owens v. Owens, 241 S.W.3d 478, 485 (Tenn. Ct. 

App. 2007)). “As such, we employ the familiar standard of review outlined 

in Rule 13(d) of the Tennessee Rules of Appellate Procedure.” Id. (citing 

Bilyeu v. Bilyeu, 196 S.W.3d 131, 135 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2005)); see also 

Snodgrass v. Snodgrass, 295 S.W.3d 240, 245 (Tenn. 2009).
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Barton v. Barton, No. E2019-01136-COA-R3-CV, 2020 WL 6580562, at *2-3 (Tenn. Ct. 

App. Nov. 10, 2020).

Husband first argues that the evidence preponderates against the Trial Court’s 

finding that Husband owned a 100% interest in Furious Properties, LLC. Husband 

asserts that the only evidence presented at trial related to the ownership of Furious 

Properties, LLC was Husband’s testimony that the entity was entirely owned by his father 

and Mr. Newton’s report and testimony that assumed Husband owned a 50% interest in 

the LLC. According to Husband, his testimony on this point was uncontroverted. We 

disagree.

In its final judgment, the Trial Court made the following findings of fact and 

conclusions of law related to the Furious Properties, LLC:

The parties have stipulated, and the Court finds that Furious 

Properties, LLC is the title owner of two (2) parcels of real property in 

Knox County, Tennessee, specifically 6633 Bay Circle Road and 10342 

Rother Drive. The Court also finds that the Bay Circle property is 

improved by a house, based on the report(s) of the Receiver and testimony 

of [Husband]. Trial Exh. 4; Tr. p. 159, Lines 9-11. These are the only two 

(2) assets of the LLC.

[Husband] claimed in his testimony at trial that Furious Properties, 

LLC was wholly owned by his father. [Husband] offered no evidence 

whatsoever of this alleged ownership by his father. However, [Husband] 

did testify, on cross-examination, that he used his personal funds to buy the 

properties[,] that he personally organized and maintained the LLC, that 

[Husband] further spent personal funds to renovate and repair the properties 

and that [Husband] also has paid all the real estate taxes for the properties. 

Tr. p. 158, Lines 21-24; Tr. p. 160, Lines 4-24; Tr. p. 163, Line 15; Tr. p. 

160, Lines 1-3. [Husband] further testified his father was not at the sale 

when the properties were purchased and has never paid (or repaid) him for 

any of these purchases. Tr. p. 167, Lines 9-11; Tr. p. 159, Lines 5-8; Tr. p. 

167, Lines 12-15. [Husband] also claimed that he used the funds he 

received from the sale of the parties’ former marital residence to buy these 

properties. However, [Husband] could not produce any record or document 

to trace these funds to the purchase of the LLC properties. Counsel for 

[Wife] further pointed to bank records, which [Husband] was forced to 

admit, showing proceeds of the sale of the marital residence going into the 

LLC account, but then two (2) months later those same funds being 

transferred to another of [Husband’s] bank accounts. Tr. p. 215, Lines 4-

21; Tr. p. 217, Lines 2-6. [Husband] could not explain where those funds 
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went or how they were purportedly used to buy the Knox County properties 

and offered no evidence showing those funds were used.

The Court is permitted to consider all indicia of ownership in 

concluding the ownership of the properties for the purpose of an equitable 

division of marital property. See Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-4-121. Based on 

all the evidence presented, the Court concludes the entire interest in Furious 

Properties, LLC is the property of [Husband] and is marital property subject 

to equitable division, further addressed below.

Based upon our review of the record, we conclude that the Trial Court found that 

Husband owned a 100% interest in Furious Properties, LLC and that the evidence does 

not preponderate against this finding. 

Although the Trial Court did not make a specific credibility finding, the Trial 

Court clearly did not accredit Husband’s assertion that his father owned Furious 

Properties, LLC. See Edmunds v. Delta Partners, L.L.C., 403 S.W.3d 812, 824-25 (Tenn. 

Ct. App. 2012) (“The trial court in this case did not make express credibility findings. 

However, a trial court’s finding on credibility may be implied from the manner in which 

the trial court decided the case.”). Furthermore, despite Husband’s claim on appeal that 

his testimony regarding his father’s ownership of the LLC was uncontroverted, this 

argument disregards Husband’s own testimony evincing his ownership of the LLC and its 

properties. As the Trial Court found, Husband testified that he had used his personal 

funds to purchase the two properties titled to Furious Properties, LLC and that his father 

was not at the sale of the properties. Although Husband testified that he purchased the 

properties for his father, he acknowledged that his father never paid him back for the 

properties. Again, the Trial Court clearly did not accredit Husband’s testimony on this 

point.

Husband testified that he pays the taxes on the two properties. He further 

explained that when the Tennessee Secretary of State’s office designated Furious 

Properties, LLC as “inactive,” he applied and paid for the LLC’s reinstatement. He 

testified that Furious Properties, LLC was inactive because he forgot to pay the yearly

fee. Husband also testified that he spent his own money on renovations and repairs to the 

house on Bay Circle. Although he initially testified that his father paid for a foundation 

repair to the house, Husband later conceded that money had been withdrawn from his 

bank account for this repair after being shown a bank statement by Wife’s counsel. 

During oral argument, Husband’s counsel pointed out that Husband’s father 

signed “tax deeds” for the two properties owned by Furious Properties, LLC. Even so, 

this fact alone does not preponderate against the Trial Court’s finding that Husband 

owned Furious Properties, LLC which owned the two properties at issue. See Realty 

Shop, Inc. v. RR Westminster Holding, Inc., 7 S.W.3d 581, 596 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1999) 
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(“[F]or the evidence to preponderate against a trial court’s finding of fact, it must support 

another finding of fact with greater convincing effect.”). The Trial Court’s numerous 

findings of fact related to Husband’s ownership, again based primarily upon Husband’s 

own testimony and his lack of credibility as determined by the Trial Court, are not 

outweighed by Husband’s father’s signature on these two documents.

Furthermore, despite arguing that Furious Properties, LLC is owned solely by his 

father, Husband testified that he had used his separate funds from the sale of the marital 

home for the purchase of the two properties and that they should, therefore, be considered 

separate property, apart from the marital estate. In fact, in his proposed findings of fact 

and conclusions of law, Husband did not suggest that the two properties or the LLC were 

owned by his father. Rather, Husband proposed the following finding:

[Husband’s] interest in the properties purchased by Furious 

Properties, LLC being 6633 Bay Circle Drive and 10342 Rather Road is 

separate property under Tennessee Law. The properties were purchased 

with the proceeds of the sale of the marital home where both parties

received an equal amount from the sale. The money from the sale of the 

marital home was intended to be separate and therefore anything purchased 

with said money would be considered separate and apart from the mar[it]al

estate under Tennessee Law.

Therefore, Husband claimed some interest in these two properties “purchased by Furious 

Properties, LLC” by arguing they should be classified as his separate property, further 

supporting the Trial Court’s implicit credibility finding and its finding that Husband 

owned the LLC which owned the properties.

Husband also argues that Mr. Newton’s report and testimony failed to establish his 

ownership interest insofar as Mr. Newton testified that he had only assumed that Husband 

owned a 50% interest in Furious Properties, LLC and acknowledged Husband’s 

ownership interest would “have to be established through the remaining record in this 

case, whether he owns that or not.” However, the Trial Court did not rely on Mr. 

Newton’s testimony in concluding that Husband was the owner of the entire interest in 

Furious Properties, LLC but rather relied on Husband’s own testimony. We agree, as far 

as it goes, that Mr. Newton’s testimony would not have established Husband’s ownership 

interest at 100%, but this point is irrelevant based upon the Trial Court’s findings

supported by Husband’s own testimony and the record.

Husband also argues that the Trial Court erred by considering all indicia of 

ownership in its finding that Husband owned Furious Properties, LLC. Husband presents 

the following argument:
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The Trial Court explained that Husband’s purchase of the properties, his 

payment of the property taxes, and his use of personal funds to renovate 

and repair the properties, allowed it to conclude that the entire interest in 

Furious Properties, LLC was Husband’s property, subject to an equitable 

division. Id. This is a plainly incorrect application of the statute resulting 

in a clear error of law. None of these cited behaviors by the Husband 

establishes his ownership of a membership interest in the LLC which might 

correctly be considered marital property. See Tenn. Code Ann. § 48-249-

501 of the Tennessee Revised Limited Liability Company Act. A thirdparty cannot acquire a membership interest in a Limited Liability Company 

by simply spending personal funds on certain expenses of the entity, and a 

Trial Court cannot impose such a membership interest on the entity in order 

to effect an equitable distribution of the marital estate. In doing so, the 

Trial Court has essentially directed a nonparty corporate entity to be 

responsible for payment of Husband’s obligations to Wife.

(Footnote omitted.) We find Husband’s argument unavailing. The Trial Court did not 

conclude that Husband had acquired a membership interest by actions such as purchasing 

the property, paying the property taxes, or using his personal funds to renovate and repair 

the properties. Rather, the Trial Court concluded that Husband’s actions, as evidenced by 

Husband’s own testimony, sufficiently proved that Husband was the sole owner of 

Furious Properties, LLC. Husband has offered insufficient evidence in the record to 

preponderate against this finding. We discern no error in the Trial Court’s analysis and 

accordingly affirm its finding that Husband owned the entire interest in Furious 

Properties, LLC. 

Husband next argues that the Trial Court erred in ordering Husband or an 

authorized representative of Furious Properties, LLC to convey the two properties to 

Wife. Husband contends that the Trial Court had no authority to award properties owned 

by a non-party LLC. Wife, on the other hand, argues that ordering Husband to “deed the 

properties held in the name of the LLC to Wife rather than ordering Husband to transfer 

his membership interest in the LLC to Wife is a distinction without a difference.” Wife 

suggests that if this Court finds that the Trial Court over-stepped its authority by 

awarding the LLC properties to Wife, then this Court should simply modify the Trial 

Court’s judgment to either (1) order Husband to convey to Wife his membership interest 

in Furious Properties, LLC or (2) order Husband to pay Wife the sum of $189,000 to 

compensate her for the fair market value of the two properties she was awarded.

We agree with Husband that the Trial Court did not have authority to award to 

Wife the two properties owned by Furious Properties, LLC. This Court has previously 

explained in a similar divorce case that a court does not have jurisdiction over non-party 

LLCs or their assets, rather only over the parties’ ownership interests in the LLCs 

themselves. See Barton v. Barton, No. E2019-01136-COA-R3-CV, 2020 WL 6580562, 
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at *5 (Tenn. Ct. App. Nov. 10, 2020). In Barton v. Barton, this Court reversed a trial 

court’s award to the wife of a portion of a specific asset owned by a non-party LLC, of 

which the husband owned a 100% interest. Id. This Court also reversed the trial court’s 

imposition of liens upon the property of the non-party LLCs. Id. In reversing the trial 

court, this Court explained:

There is no debate that the LLCs were not parties in this case, even 

though Vanquish Worldwide filed a motion to intervene, which was denied. 

Thus, the court did not have jurisdiction over these entities and their assets, 

only the parties’ ownership interest in the LLCs themselves. We, therefore, 

conclude that the real property owned by the LLCs could not be subjected 

to a lien to guarantee payment of Husband’s alimony obligation, and we 

vacate those portions of the trial court’s judgment granting Wife a lien on 

those parcels of real property owned by the LLCs.

Next, Husband argues that the trial court erred in finding that Wife 

has a vested interest in a $32.8 million contractual claim that his business, 

Vanquish Worldwide, was pursuing against the U.S. Government based on 

the LLC’s work for the government in Afghanistan.

Husband argues that the contractual claim is the property of a nonparty, asserting that the claim belongs solely to the LLC. Though the trial

court recited that “Plaintiff, Eric W. Barton, individually and as President 

and CEO of Vanquish Worldwide, LLC has a contingent contractual 

claim,” the evidence does not support such a finding. There was no 

evidence admitted at trial showing that Husband had pursued this appeal in 

his individual capacity.

Because the assets of an LLC are separate from those of its 

members, we conclude that the contractual claim was not marital property 

and was therefore not subject to distribution to Wife. We, therefore, vacate 

the trial court’s award to Wife of any interest in the contractual claim of 

Vanquish Worldwide.

Id. Moreover, Tenn. Code Ann. § 48-249-502(a) provides that a member of an LLC has 

“no interest in specific LLC property” and that “[a]ll property transferred to or acquired 

by an LLC is property of the LLC.” We, therefore, conclude that the Trial Court erred by 

awarding to Wife the specific properties owned by Furious Properties, LLC. 

The evidence established that Furious Properties, LLC owned only these two 

pieces of property and that Husband owned the entirety of the interest in Furious 

Properties, LLC. In this instance, an award of the properties to Wife may have the same 

practical effect as an award of Husband’s interest in the LLC, but we cannot know that 
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for certain. We, therefore, remand for the Trial Court to clarify its judgment consistent 

with the legal principles set forth in this Opinion, while emphasizing that the Trial Court 

does have the authority to award to Wife Husband’s entire interest in Furious Properties, 

LLC even though it cannot directly award Wife property owned by Furious Properties, 

LLC.

B. Appointment of Receiver

We next address Husband’s contention that the Trial Court erred by appointing a 

receiver for Furious Properties, LLC. Husband primarily argues that Wife never sought a 

receivership for Furious Properties, LLC and that no service of any motion or notice of 

any hearing, pursuant to Tenn. Code Ann. § 29-40-103, was provided to Furious 

Properties, LLC. However, we find that the Trial Court’s appointment of and instructions 

to Mr. Newton were more akin to the responsibilities of a special master, at least with

regard to Furious Properties, LLC. Accordingly, we discern no reversible error in the 

Trial Court’s decision to assign Mr. Newton to investigate Furious Properties, LLC and 

its holdings.

In its order appointing Mr. Newton as a “receiver,” the Trial Court provided the 

following instructions:

The Receiver appointed in this case, John P. Newton, shall be further 

authorized to investigate and determine the interest in and properties owned 

by Furious Properties, LLC and Furious Investments, LLC. Specifically, 

the Receiver shall determine what properties are owned and what 

individuals and/or companies actually own the properties at present.

(Paragraph numbering omitted.) Mr. Newton’s responsibilities were therefore limited to 

merely investigating and determining the interest in and properties owned by Furious 

Properties, LLC. In contrast, a true receiver is entrusted with the following duties: 

“safekeeping, collection, management, and disposition of property.” Tenn. Code Ann. § 

29-1-103. Although Mr. Newton was entrusted to sell and appraise the assets of Sexton 

Auto Salvage, Husband does not contest the appointment of Mr. Newton with regard to 

Sexton Auto Salvage. Mr. Newton was not granted the powers to safekeep, collect, 

manage, or dispose of any property owned by Furious Properties, LLC.

Furthermore, Husband contests only the Trial Court’s determination that Husband 

owned a 100% interest in Furious Properties, LLC and its award of the two properties to 

Wife. The Trial Court, however, did not rely on Mr. Newton’s report in coming to this 

conclusion; rather, the Trial Court relied on Husband’s own testimony and lack of 

credibility. Therefore, any error that could be assigned to Mr. Newton’s appointment 

with respect to Furious Properties, LLC is harmless. We discern no reversible error in 

the Trial Court’s appointment of Mr. Newton.
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C. Ground for Divorce

Husband next argues that the Trial Court erred by granting a divorce to the parties 

based upon irreconcilable differences. We review a trial court’s finding of grounds for 

divorce de novo upon the record, accompanied by a presumption of correctness. Hobbs 

v. Hobbs, 987 S.W.2d 844, 846 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1998). At the beginning of trial, the 

parties stipulated that grounds for divorce existed pursuant to Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-4-

129(a), which provides the following: 

In all actions for divorce from the bonds of matrimony or legal separation 

the parties may stipulate as to grounds and/or defenses.

The Trial Court’s judgment reflected this stipulation. The Trial Court found: “The 

parties announced at the beginning of trial that they had agreed to stipulate to the grounds 

for divorce pursuant to Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-4-129(a) and the parties shall be granted a 

divorce accordingly.” 

Nevertheless, the Trial Court went on to grant the parties a divorce also based on

the ground of irreconcilable differences pursuant to Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-4-101(14). 

Pursuant to Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-4-103(b) (West July 1, 2008 to March 5, 2020): “No 

divorce shall be granted on the ground of irreconcilable differences unless the court 

affirmatively finds in its decree that the parties have made adequate and sufficient 

provision by written agreement . . . for the equitable settlement of any property rights 

between the parties.” In the present case, there was no such finding or written agreement 

for the equitable settlement of any property rights between Husband and Wife. In a 

similar situation, this Court previously concluded:

In the absence of the appropriate irreconcilable differences procedure and 

in the presence of stipulated commonly-alleged grounds, we must conclude 

that the trial court inadvertently listed irreconcilable differences as the 

ground for the [parties’] divorce. No proof other than the stipulation was 

taken. As a result the decree of the court below can only operate as a grant 

of divorce under Tennessee Code Annotated section 36-4-129.

Mackie v. Mackie, No. 01-A-01-9810-CV-00536, 1999 WL 675134, at *1 (Tenn. Ct. 

App. Sept. 1, 1999). In Mackie v. Mackie, this Court found the trial court’s listing of 

irreconcilable differences to be an “inadvertent” mistake and simply modified the Trial 

Court’s judgment of divorce to reflect a stipulation of grounds for divorce instead of 

irreconcilable differences. Id. at *2. We likewise find the Trial Court’s inclusion of the 

ground of irreconcilable differences to be an inadvertent mistake and accordingly modify 

the Trial Court’s judgment to reflect that the divorce was granted upon stipulated 
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grounds, pursuant to Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-4-129, and remove the portion reflecting that 

the divorce was granted based upon the ground of irreconcilable differences. 

D. Attorney’s Fees on Appeal

Wife requests that this Court grant her attorney’s fees on appeal, arguing that 

Husband has made the divorce “much more difficult by refusing to cooperate in 

discovery and by attempting to dissipate assets.” We deem Wife’s request waived, 

however, due to her failure to designate this as an issue. See Childress v. Union Realty 

Co., Ltd., 97 S.W.3d 573, 578 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2002) (“We consider an issue waived 

where it is argued in the brief but not designated as an issue.”); see also Barrios v. 

Simpkins, No. M2021-01347-COA-R3-CV, 2022 WL 16846642, at *14-15 (Tenn. Ct. 

App. Nov. 10, 2022) (finding that the appellees waived their request for attorney’s fees 

by failing to include a separate statement of the issues in their responsive brief, despite 

including the issue in their brief’s table of contents). We also note that Husband’s appeal 

was partially successful. We therefore deny Wife’s request for an award of attorney’s 

fees on appeal.

Conclusion

Upon our review, we reverse the Trial Court’s award of the properties owned by 

Furious Properties, LLC to Wife and remand for the Trial Court to clarify its judgment 

with instructions that it may only award Wife Husband’s interest in Furious Properties, 

LLC, rather than the properties themselves. We further modify the Trial Court’s 

judgment to grant the parties a divorce upon stipulated grounds and remove the language 

granting the parties a divorce based upon irreconcilable differences. We affirm the 

balance of the Trial Court’s judgment. We deny Wife’s request for attorney’s fees on 

appeal. This matter is remanded to the Chancery Court for Knox County for further 

proceedings consistent with this Opinion and collection of costs below. Costs on appeal 

are assessed equally against the Appellant, Michael Bryant Sexton, and his surety, if any, 

and Appellee, Louise Ann Sexton.

 _________________________________

 D. MICHAEL SWINEY, CHIEF JUDGE