J-A25017-19

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

IN THE INTEREST OF: S.A.P., A 

MINOR

APPEAL OF: C.L.M.H., MOTHER

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 IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

 PENNSYLVANIA

 No. 672 MDA 2019

Appeal from the Decree Entered April 2, 2019

In the Court of Common Pleas of York County Orphans' Court at No(s): 

2017-0195a

IN THE INTEREST OF: S.A.P., A 

MINOR

APPEAL OF: C.L.M.H., MOTHER

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 IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

 PENNSYLVANIA

 No. 713 MDA 2019

Appeal from the Order Entered April 3, 2019

In the Court of Common Pleas of York County Juvenile Division at No(s): 

CP-67-DP-0000024-2009

BEFORE: STABILE, J., McLAUGHLIN, J., and MUSMANNO, J.

MEMORANDUM BY McLAUGHLIN, J.: FILED: DECEMBER 23, 2019

C.L.M.H. (“Mother”) appeals from the orders changing the permanency 

goal for S.A.P. (“Child”) to adoption and terminating her parental rights to 

Child. We conclude the trial court did not abuse its discretion in changing the 

permanency goal or in terminating Mother’s parental rights and therefore 

affirm.
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Child was born in July 2006 to Mother and W.C.P. (“Father”). In August 

2016, York County Office of Children, Youth and Families (“CYF”) received a 

referral regarding sexual abuse allegations made by Child’s half-sibling against 

Mother’s boyfriend, A.M., Jr., with whom Mother and her children resided. 

Mother did not permit Child to undergo a forensic interview at that time. A 

CYF caseworker interviewed Child. Child did not disclose abuse, but the 

caseworker had concerns that Child had been “coached.” Trial Court Opinion, 

filed Apr. 2, 2019, at 9 (“1925(a) Op.”). Mother insisted Child’s half-sibling 

was lying about the abuse. 

In December 2016, CYF filed an application for emergency protective 

custody of Child following allegations that A.M., Jr., sexually abused Child. The 

court granted the application. Child underwent a forensic interview, where 

Child disclosed abuse and indicated Mother instructed her to lie about it. 

1925(a) Op. at 10. CYF filed a dependency petition, and in January 2017, Child 

was adjudicated dependent. The initial permanency goal was return to parent 

or guardian. 

CYF filed a petition for involuntary termination of parental rights in 

November 2017, but withdrew this petition. In July 2018, Mother filed a 

petition for reunification. In August 2018, CYF filed a second petition for 

involuntary termination of parental rights and a petition to change goal to 

adoption. The court held a three-day hearing on the petitions.

The program coordinator for Family Engagement Services at Pressley 

Ridge, Melanie Ferree-Wurster, testified. Pressley Ridge provided services to 
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Mother from December 2017 through October 2018. N.T., 11/20/18, at 14.

During the time Pressley Ridge provided services, Mother participated in at 

least 65 to 70 visits with Child and attended meetings. Id. at 16, 18. 

The family engagement specialist at Pressley Ridge, Carla Arp, 

supervised visits between Mother and Child and testified that Mother was 

consistent with visits. Id. at 20. Arp testified that from December 2017 

through May 2018, Mother had fully supervised visits. Id. at 22. Mother then 

had five partially supervised visits. Id. The visits returned to fully supervised 

after A.M., Jr., appeared at a partially supervised visit. Id. Mother then had 

nine fully supervised visits, before the court again ordered that she could have 

partially supervised visits. Id. Mother had nine partially supervised visits, 

which returned to fully supervised after an unauthorized male was at a visit in 

August 2018. Id.

Arp testified that it was “reported to [her] that [Mother] was continuing 

to have some contact with [A.M., Jr.]” Id. at 22-23. In addition, Child

described times where A.M., Jr., would follow Child home from school in his 

car. Id. at 39. The reports of A.M., Jr., following Child were outside of Mother’s 

time with Child. Id.

Arp also testified regarding the man who was in Mother’s home during 

the August 2018 visit. She stated that Child reported that a man, A.T., had 

been at the visit. Id. at 26. Mother initially denied he was there, and later

stated that she spoke with her roommate, who informed her a man had been 

there. Id. at 27. Arp testified that it was later reported to her, and there was 
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testimony at permanency review hearing, that Mother “might possibly have a 

romantic relationship with [A.T.].” Id. at 28. Child reported that she saw A.T.’s 

name in Mother’s phone with hearts around it, and Arp later saw Mother’s 

phone, with A.T.’s name surrounded by hearts. Id. Mother continued to deny 

a romantic involvement with A.T. Id. at 28-29.

Arp further testified that although Child initially said she did not know 

A.T., after a subsequent visit with Mother, Child stated she did not know “why 

the team was causing her mother so much drama,” and she had known A.T. 

since “she was in the womb.” Id. at 38.

Arp testified that because someone who was not authorized was at the 

home during a visit, CYF filed a motion to change the partially supervised visits 

to fully supervised visits, and the court granted the motion. Id. at 21. After 

the change to fully-supervised visits, Mother became difficult to work with, as 

she would not look at or speak to Arp. Id. at 21. This created a hostile 

environment, which was contrary to the goal of creating a positive visit for 

Child and Mother, and Pressley Ridge discontinued services. Id.

Arp testified that Pressley Ridge had concerns during the entire service. 

Id. at 63. The concerns included that Mother did not want to have contact 

with Child’s half-sibling, who was transgender, and that Mother did not want 

Child to have contact with her half-sibling. Id. In addition, at an October 2018 

permanency review hearing, Arp testified that Mother began to teach Child 

some “alarming” things, such as that “when you are in the grave after death, 

your grave squeezes you and tortures you for the sins you committed when 
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you were alive.” N.T., 10/11/18, at 46. She stated she was not “questioning 

the veracity” of the belief, but “the method in which [Child] was told.” Id. at 

46-47. Arp stated the way Mother “told [Child] was so scary to [Child] that 

she got in the car and said she was freaked out.” Id. at 47. She clarified that 

“to say things that give [Child] nightmares, that’s not the way to teach a child 

at any age any religion.” Id. at 57.

The parties stipulated to the admission of a non-offending parent 

evaluation prepared by Camilla Richesson and two exhibits prepared by 

Juanita Jones from SpiriTrust Lutheran, who provided non-offending parent 

counseling, in lieu of testimony. N.T., 11/20/18, at 81.1 The evaluation 

prepared by Richesson included an assessment that the allegations were too 

difficult for Mother to believe, providing that Mother:

[D]enie[d] that she has ever been fully informed of the 

specific nature of the sexual abuse allegations regarding 

[Child], which this evaluator finds difficult to believe. 

Rather, it appears that the allegations are too difficult for 

her to admit happening because she would then have to 

place some culpability on herself for what was happening 

‘right under my nose.’

Non-Offending Parent Evaluation, CYF Exh. 1, at 7. The evaluator believed 

Mother’s disbelief added to Child’s trauma. Id. at 8. Jones’ report included 

that to state Mother was “in denial was overly simplified. She was not so much 

in denial as incredulous and just not understanding how sexual abuse could 

have occurred.” SpiriTrust Report, dated Mar. 23, 2018, at 1.

____________________________________________

1 The parties further stipulated to the psychological evaluation of Child 

prepared by Dr. Casey Flanscha.
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A mental health professional from Pressley Ridge, Mallary Hinkle, also 

testified. Hinkle provided services for Child and Mother from May 2018 through 

October 2018. Id. at 87. Mother was present for the counseling sessions and 

Hinkle testified that communication between Child and Mother “seem[ed] to 

have increased during the sessions,” and she worked with Child to create a 

plan to implement if she felt unsafe. Id. Hinkle testified that Mother seemed 

to recognize the issues posed by A.M., Jr., and his abuse of Child, and was not 

in denial of the abuse. Id. at 90. Hinkle stated that Mother did claim that Child 

had a tendency to lie. Id. Hinkle stated that Mother did not support Child 

continuing to have visits with her half-sibling. Id. at 95.

A mobile therapist with Laurel Life, Rachel Cook, also testified. Cook 

provided cognitive behavioral therapy to Child at school and at home, 

beginning in October 2018. N.T., 11/20/18, at 73. She testified that Child’s 

goals included increasing self-regulation and utilizing coping skills, 

documenting things related to abuse and establishing healthy relationships, 

and increasing compliance with rules. Id. at 75-76. Child is progressing at a 

normal rate in therapy.

Child testified at the hearing. Child testified that she would like to live 

with Mother or Father. Id. at 113. She stated she would like to live with Mother 

because living with her makes Child “feel . . . like a bunch of things [are] in 

front of [her].” Id. She testified Mother lived with a roommate and the 

roommate’s daughters. Id. at 115. Child was unsure whether Mother was 

married to A.T. Id. at 140-41.
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A youth advocate at Pennsylvania Comprehensive Behavioral Health, 

Damaris Clark, testified at the hearing. N.T., 1/24/2019, at 11. She started to 

work with Child in April 2018, and continued to work with her at the time of 

the hearing. Id. at 11. She stated that Child “believes everything that Mom 

says, and when it doesn’t happen the way Mom says, then [Child] gets angry 

with everybody, and everybody is at fault.” Id. at 18.

A CYF caseworker, Bryna Smith, testified. She stated that prior to the 

December 2016 referral to CYF that started the current dependency 

proceedings, CYF had received 26 prior referrals regarding the family. Id. at 

21. Mother’s permanency goals included to support her own mental health 

and to engage in mental health therapy for Child. Id. at 28. Smith testified 

that Mother did attend some counseling sessions at Access York, but did not 

complete a psychological evaluation that CYF requested. Id. at 69.

Smith testified that Mother had lived at various residences, and that CYF 

often learned of the moves through collateral sources, not Mother. Id. at 31.

For her current residence, Mother advised CYF that she was residing with a 

friend from church, and would be able to live there indefinitely. Id. at 32. 

Smith testified that it was reported that the friend no longer lives there, and 

that Mother lives there with her husband. Id. Although the home has space 

for Child, Mother did not provide updated lease information after the 

roommate moved. Id. at 32-33.

Smith also testified that Mother provided paycheck stubs from May and 

April 2018, but has not provided paycheck stubs since that time, even though 
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CYF had requested them. Id. at 40. Smith testified that after A.M., Jr.,

appeared at a partially supervised visits, Mother stated she would contact the 

police, but did not do so. Id. at 45. Mother did report the incident to A.M, Jr.’s

probation officer. N.T., 7/24/18, at 21.

Smith testified that Mother was pregnant. N.T., 1/24/19, at 46. She 

stated that Mother “never confirmed” her pregnancy with CYF, but CYF “ha[d] 

been made aware” of the pregnancy. Id. She stated a Justice Works employee 

informed Smith that Mother was in the hospital with contractions the week 

before the hearing and that the week before that, Mother had taken Child 

shopping for the baby during a supervised visit. Id. at 47-48.

Smith testified that Child has a bond with Mother, but it is an unhealthy 

bond. Id. at 53. She stated that Child “wishes to please [M]other, even if it 

sacrifices her own personal beliefs.” Id. She stated that Child “strives to 

appease her mother, even though it . . . directly affects her mental health and 

positions that she stands for such as her religion and maintaining contact 

specific to her older [half-]sibling.” Id. Smith testified that Child’s “mental 

health declines when she feels like she is not appeasing [M]other.” Id. at 61. 

Smith testified that Child and her current foster mother, her aunt, were 

“definitely bonded.” Id. at 63. She stated Child “did have a spike in behaviors, 

and her aunt is somewhat structured, but, through her therapy and child prep, 

she has very much . . . become bonded with her aunt and interacts with her 

very well.” Id. at 63-64.
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Smith stated that CYF believed that it was in Child’s best interest to 

change the permanency goal from reunification to adoption because “[i]t’s the 

most permanent achievable goal for the child to be able to feel comfortable 

and safe and stable knowing that this is her permanent home.” Id. at 71-72.

She stated Mother was not in a positon to take custody of Child, as Mother 

continued to have supervised visits with Child due to questions concerning

“Mother’s protective capacities,” and the concerns would be better able to be 

addressed had Mother had a mental health evaluation “to see that she would 

be mentally sound to care for” Child.” Id. at 72-73.

Smith further testified that at an October court proceeding, Mother 

testified that if she was reunified with Child, and after Father was released 

from prison, she would send Child to live with Father, and Child would visit 

her and her husband on the weekends. Id. at 74. Further, although Mother 

participated in school-based therapy through Pressley Ridge, she did not want 

Child to continue with the program during the summer because she did not 

believe Child needed treatment. Id. at 75. Smith testified that Mother declined 

to participate in therapy during visitations, and that Mother cooperated with 

services but did not follow through with all the recommendations made by 

CYF. Id. at 75, 97. She testified termination of parental rights would be in 

Child’s best interest so that Child “knows that she is in a stable position to 

gauge the rest of her life.” Id. at 98.

A school psychologist, Holly Ray, also testified. She testified that Child

“started out the year rough, and . . . gradually got better.” Id. at 80. She now 
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was “better than she had been before.” Id. She stated that Child appeared to 

have some stability since she had been placed with her aunt. Id. at 81. She 

has been “more stable and more focused at school,” and Ray has seen Child

less for “just being upset or having drama with other people.” Id.

Mother testified at the hearing. N.T., 2/1/19. Mother testified that she 

does not have contact with A.M., Jr., the individual who abused child. Id. at 

42. Mother testified she believes A.M., Jr., was grooming Child and that she 

“never had any disbelief.” Id. at 42-43. She claims she did not know the 

details of the allegations, which were kept from her until her non-offender 

sessions with Jones. Id. at 43. Mother testified she completed the nonoffender treatment, through sessions with Jones, and she completed domestic 

violence counseling. Id. at 43-44. Mother testified that she believed Child 

would benefit from counseling, stating it would help with Child’s “anger, how 

to process it, instead of just lashing out. Help her to express herself a little bit 

better.” Id. at 44. She would be willing to continue treatment if reunified with 

Child. Id.

Mother testified that she currently lives with A.T., her husband. Id. at 

54-55. Mother testified that she completed a treatment assessment and 

domestic violence and non-offender counseling, she attended visits with Child, 

had positive and supportive interactions with Child, and did not discuss the 

allegations of abuse with the other children. Id. at 55-57. Mother did not 

provide CYF with documentation that she completed domestic violence 

counseling. Id. at 80-81. She stated she never told Child that Child was lying 
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or being dishonest. Id. at 58. Mother also testified that she signed the 

necessary releases, obtained housing separate from A.M., Jr., and completed 

parenting coaching. Id. at 59-60. Mother also testified that she maintained 

contact with CYF and informed it of household composition changes. Id. She 

informed the court and CYF at the October hearing she was living with A.T. 

and provided his information. Id. at 65. She participated with school-based 

therapy, where she apologized to Child. Id. at 61. Mother testified that she 

currently supports visits between Child and Child’s half-sibling. Id. at 79.

Mother testified that she has a job at the Susquehanna Nursing Home, 

but was not able to work at the time of the hearing due to sciatic pain. Id. at 

65-66. Mother testified that she no longer intends to give custody of Child to 

Father. Id. at 96.

The trial court changed Child’s permanency goal to adoption and granted 

CYF’s petition to terminate Mother’s parental rights to Child.2 Mother filed 

timely notices of appeal from the orders. Child also filed notices of appeal, but 

subsequently withdrew the appeals.

Mother raises the following issues on appeal:

I. Did the trial court err when it changed the court ordered 

goal from reunification to adoption?

II. Did the trial court err when it involuntarily terminated the 

parental rights of [Mother]?

____________________________________________

2 The trial court also terminated Father’s parental rights to Child. Father has 

not filed an appeal.
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III. Did the trial court err in determining that termination of 

parental rights would be in the best interest of the child?

Mother’s Br. at 4.

Mother first challenges the order changing the permanency goal to 

adoption. She argues that the evidence did not support a goal change to 

adoption. Rather, Mother claims she satisfactorily completed every task asked 

of her, but CYF “continued to pile up task upon task and held actions outside 

of her control against Mother.” Mother’s Br. at 18. Mother argues she had 

completed the service plan, had an appropriate home, and Mother and Child 

were ready and excited for reunification. The circumstances that necessitated 

placement were dealt with when A.M., Jr., moved from the home. Id. at 19.

“We review an order regarding a placement goal of a dependent child 

under an abuse of discretion standard.” In re H.J., 206 A.3d 22, 25 (Pa.Super. 

2019) (citing In re B.S., 861 A.2d 974, 976 (Pa.Super. 2004)). We conclude 

a court abused its discretion only where “the court’s judgment was manifestly 

unreasonable, . . . the court did not apply the law, or . . . the court’s action 

was a result of partiality, prejudice, bias or ill will, as shown by the record.” 

Id. (quoting In re N.C., 909 A.2d 818, 822-23 (Pa.Super. 2006)).

“[W]e are bound by the facts as found by the trial court if they are 

supported by the record.” Id. (citing In re K.J., 27 A.3d 236, 241 (Pa.Super. 

2011)). The trial court must “evaluate the credibility of the witnesses and 

resolve any conflicts in the testimony.” Id. (citing In re N.C., 909 A.2d at 

823). Where “the trial court’s findings are supported by competent evidence, 

this Court will affirm, ‘even if the record could also support an opposite 
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result.’” Id. (quoting In re Adoption of R.J.S., 901 A.2d 502, 506 (Pa.Super. 

2006)).

“[T]he focus of all dependency proceedings, including goal change 

proceedings, is on the safety, permanency, and well-being of the child and the 

best interests of the child must take precedence over all other considerations.”

Id. (citing In re A.K., 936 A.2d 528, 534 (Pa.Super. 2007)). “At each 

dependency review hearing, the trial court must consider, inter alia, the 

continuing necessity for and appropriateness of the [c]hild’s placement, and 

the appropriateness and feasibility of the current placement goal for the child.” 

Id. (citing 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 6351(f)(1), (4)). Where a court finds “reunification 

with the child’s parent is not in a child’s best interest, the court may determine 

that [a]doption is the appropriate permanency goal.” Id. (citing 42 Pa.C.S.A. 

§ 6351(f)(1)-(2)). Further, “[w]hen the child welfare agency has made 

reasonable efforts to return a foster child to his or her biological parent, but 

those efforts have failed, then the agency must redirect its efforts towards 

placing the child in an adoptive home.” Id. (citing In re N.C., 909 A.2d at

823).

Here, the trial court concluded that CYF proved by clear and convincing 

evidence that it is in Child’s best interest to change the goal placement to 

adoption. The court noted that CYF had “extensive involvement in the past” 

with Mother, Child, and Mother’s other children. 1925(a) Op. at 9. It noted 

that Child’s half-sibling was sexually abused by A.M., Jr., and Mother refused 

to allow Child to undergo a forensic interview at that time. Id. A CYF 
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caseworker interviewed Child, and had concerns that Child had been coached. 

Id. Mother insisted Child’s half-sibling was lying, and did not permit the halfsibling to return home. Id. About five months later, CYF received a referral 

regarding alleged sexual abuse of Child by A.M., Jr. Id. At a forensic interview, 

Child disclosed sexual abuse and indicated that Mother instructed her to lie 

about it. Id. at 9-10. 

The court further noted that the non-offending parent evaluation 

conducted in June 2017 stated that Mother continued to believe both children 

made up the sexual abuse. Id. at 10. The court noted that Mother denied 

being informed of the specific nature of the abuse and noted that it appeared 

the allegations were “too difficult for [Mother] to admit.” Id. (alteration in 

original). The evaluator stated that Mother added to the trauma of Child by 

her non-belief. Id.

The court noted Mother attended the SpiriTrust Lutheran Domestic 

Abuse Program, and the counselor stated that Mother was not in denial of the 

abuse to Child but that she “could not comprehend how the abuse could have 

occurred.” Id. at 11. 

The court also noted that at an October 2017 permanency review 

hearing, Mother stated she never denied Child was abused and denied telling 

Child to lie about the abuse. At a February 2019 hearing, Mother stated she 

never called Child a liar. These statements contradicted her earlier testimony 

and prior statements from Child. Id.
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The court noted Mother’s numerous inconsistent statements—including 

her inconsistent statements regarding her marital status, her pregnancy 

status, and her living/roommate situation. Id. at 12-13. It found Mother 

remarried without informing CYF or Child, and that her spouse did not 

participate in any of the dependency proceedings. Id. at 13. 

The Court noted it was “highly concerned about Mother’s ability to 

appropriately protect [Child], including as it relates to [Child’s] emotional and 

mental health.” Id. The court noted that, although Mother at times had 

unsupervised or partially supervised visits, they were returned to fully 

supervised visits after Child’s report of a man in Mother’s home and Mother’s 

subsequent attempts to deny or explain the man’s presence. Id. at 14-15. 

The court concluded:

Overall, Mother has made minimal to moderate progress 

towards alleviating the circumstances which caused [Child] 

to be placed. . . . [Mother has not] assumed any major 

parental duties for [Child] since approximately December, 

2016, over twenty-seven (27) months ago. [Child] has been 

in placement for approximately twenty-seven (27) months 

and adjudicated dependent for approximately twenty-six 

(26) months. [Child] needs a permanent, safe and stable 

environment. As such, the Court finds that [Child’s] best 

interests demand that the goal be changed from 

reunification with a parent to placement for adoption.

Id. at 16.

The trial court did not abuse its discretion in determining it would be in 

Child’s best interest to change the permanency goal to adoption. Although 

Mother had completed many of her goals, CYF and the trial court continued to 
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have concerns about her ability to protect Child from future abuse. Although 

Mother was no longer living with A.M., Jr., she now was married to a man that 

CYF and the court had not met. She continued to provide testimony that 

contradicted earlier testimony, and continued to provide inconsistent 

information as to her marital status and whether she was pregnant. 

Mother next argues the trial court erred in terminating her parental 

rights. 

A party seeking to terminate parental rights has the burden of 

establishing grounds for termination by clear and convincing evidence. In re 

Adoption of K.C., 199 A.3d 470, 473 (Pa.Super. 2018). Clear and convincing 

evidence means evidence “that is so clear, direct, weighty, and convincing as 

to enable the trier of fact to come to a clear conviction, without hesitation, of 

the truth of the precise facts in issue.” Id. (quoting In re Z.S., 946 A.2d 726, 

728 (Pa.Super. 2008)).

When we review termination of parental rights cases, we “accept the 

findings of fact and credibility determinations of the trial court if they are 

supported by the record.” In re T.S.M., 71 A.3d 251, 267 (Pa. 2013) (quoting 

In re Adoption of S.P., 47 A.3d 817, 826 (Pa. 2012)). “If the factual findings 

have support in the record, we then determine if the trial court committed an 

error of law or abuse of discretion.” In re Adoption of K.C., 199 A.3d at 473. 

A trial court decision may be reversed for an abuse of discretion “only upon 

demonstration of manifest unreasonableness, partiality, prejudice, bias, or illwill.” In re Adoption of S.P., 47 A.3d at 826.
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Our Supreme Court has explained the reasons for applying an abuse of 

discretion standard of review in termination of parental rights cases:

[U]nlike trial courts, appellate courts are not equipped to 

make the fact-specific determinations on a cold record, 

where the trial judges are observing the parties during the 

relevant hearing and often presiding over numerous other 

hearings regarding the child and parents. Therefore, even 

where the facts could support an opposite result, as is often 

the case in dependency and termination cases, an appellate 

court must resist the urge to second guess the trial court 

and impose its own credibility determinations and 

judgment; instead we must defer to the trial judges so long 

as the factual findings are supported by the record and the 

court’s legal conclusions are not the result of an error of law 

or an abuse of discretion.

Id. at 826-27 (citations omitted).

Termination of parental rights is controlled by Section 2511 of the 

Adoption Act. In re L.M., 923 A.2d 505, 511 (Pa.Super. 2007). Under Section 

2511, the trial court must engage in a bifurcated analysis prior to terminating 

parental rights:

Initially, the focus is on the conduct of the parent. The party 

seeking termination must prove by clear and convincing 

evidence that the parent’s conduct satisfies the statutory 

grounds for termination delineated in Section 2511(a). Only 

if the court determines that the parent’s conduct warrants 

termination of his or her parental rights does the court 

engage in the second part of the analysis pursuant to 

Section 2511(b): determination of the needs and welfare of 

the child under the standard of best interests of the child. 

One major aspect of the needs and welfare analysis 

concerns the nature and status of the emotional bond 

between parent and child, with close attention paid to the 

effect on the child of permanently severing any such bond.

Id. (citations omitted).
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In the present case, the trial court terminated Mother’s parental rights 

pursuant to 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2511(a)(2), (5), and (8) and § 2511(b) of the 

Adoption Act. To affirm the termination of parental rights, this Court need only

agree with the trial court’s decision as to any one subsection of Section 

2511(a), as well as Section 2511(b). In re B.L.W., 843 A.2d 380, 384 

(Pa.Super. 2004) (en banc). Here, we affirm that the trial court properly 

terminated Mother’s parental rights pursuant to Sections 2511(a)(2) and (b).

We will first review the trial court’s conclusion that termination was 

proper under Section 2511(a)(2), which provides:

(a) General rule.--The rights of a parent in regard to a 

child may be terminated after a petition filed on any of the 

following grounds:

...

(2) The repeated and continued incapacity, abuse, neglect 

or refusal of the parent has caused the child to be without 

essential parental care, control or subsistence necessary for 

his physical or mental well-being and the conditions and 

causes of the incapacity, abuse, neglect or refusal cannot or 

will not be remedied by the parent.

23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2511(a)(2).

To terminate parental rights pursuant to Section 2511(a)(2), the moving 

party must produce clear and convincing evidence of the following: “(1) 

repeated and continued incapacity, abuse, neglect or refusal; (2) such 

incapacity, abuse, neglect or refusal has caused the child to be without 

essential parental care, control or subsistence necessary for his physical or 

mental well-being; and (3) the causes of the incapacity, abuse, neglect or 
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refusal cannot or will not be remedied.” In re Adoption of M.E.P., 825 A.2d 

1266, 1272 (Pa.Super. 2003); 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2511(a)(2). 

Mother argues that CYF presented no competent evidence to support a 

finding of “repeated and continued incapacity, abuse, neglect or refusal” that 

“caused the child to be without essential parental care, control or subsistence 

necessary for his physical or mental well-being” or that the “conditions and 

causes of the incapacity, abuse, neglect or refusal cannot or will not be 

remedied.” Mother’s Br. at 22. She argues that there was no evidence that 

Mother knew A.M., Jr., would appear at a visit, and that Mother had no control 

over his actions. Id. She claims that the court’s use of this incident against 

her should be “enough to overturn the court’s findings as bias.” Id. at 23. 

The trial court found CYF establish by clear and convincing evidence that 

grounds for termination exist under Section 2511(a)(2):

The Court finds that the conditions which led to [Child’s] 

placement outside the care and custody of Mother and 

Father continue to exist. [Child] has been in placement for 

approximately twenty-seven (27) months and adjudicated 

dependent for approximately twenty-six (26) months. 

[Child] is safe, loved, and well-bonded to the kinship 

mother.

The Court continued to have significant concerns regarding 

Mother’s ability to appropriately parent and protect [Child]. 

Despite Mother’s most recent statements to the contrary, 

the Court fully believes that Mother still does not believe 

that [Child] was sexually abused by [A.M., Jr.].

[Child] has been in placement for approximately twentyseven (27) months and adjudicated dependent for 

approximately twenty-six (26) months. Despite the length 

of [CYF’s] involvement with the family, Mother [has] failed 

to progress to fully unsupervised visits with [Child].
J-A25017-19

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1925(a) Op. at 20.

The court further re-iterated the findings it made to support the goal 

change. It noted Mother did not believe the sexual abuse allegations made by 

Child or her half-sibling, that the allegations were “too difficult for [Mother] to 

admit,” and that Mother added to Child’s trauma by not believing her. Id. at 

22. It noted Mother’s testimony that she never stated Child had not been 

abused or that Child was lying, which was contradicted by her prior testimony. 

Id. at 23. The court noted it did not find Mother credible, due to the many 

inconsistent and misleading statements she made during the course of the 

proceedings. Id. The court noted it was “highly concerned about Mother’s 

ability to appropriately protect [Child], including as it relates to [Child’s] 

emotional and mental health.” Id. at 25. It noted that A.M., Jr., appeared 

outside one of Child’s visits, and Mother informed Child she would contact the 

police. Mother did not contact the police, but did testify that she contacted 

A.M., Jr.’s probation officer twice – the day following the incident and four 

days after the incident. Id. It further noted Mother’s inconsistent statements 

concerning the man Child reported seeing at a visit, who was her husband. 

The court further noted that Mother was speaking to Child about concerning 

topics, such as being tortured for sins. Id. at 26. The court further noted that 

Mother did not provide information to verify her place of employment or salary 

or her residence. Id. at 27. In addition, the court noted that Mother testified 

that, because of her religious beliefs, she intended to turn custody over to 
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Father. Although Mother later testified that she would not do so, the Court did 

not find Mother’s recantation credible. Id.

The court concluded:

Overall, Mother [has] failed to remediate the conditions 

which led to [Child’s] placement and [has] failed to provide 

substantial parental duties on behalf of [Child]. In 

consideration of this testimony, the Court [found] that [CYF] 

clearly and convincingly establish that termination of 

parental rights is justified pursuant to Section[] 2511(a)(2).

1925(a) Op. at 28.

The trial court did not abuse its discretion in finding termination proper 

under Section 2511(a)(2). Mother provided inconsistent testimony, including 

inconsistent testimony concerning her marital status and housing situation. 

Her inability to believe Child was sexually abused, coupled with this 

inconsistent testimony, supports the finding that Mother is not able to protect 

Child. The court’s mention that A.M., Jr., arrived during one of Child’s visits 

with Mother, even though Mother may not have known he would do so, does 

not establish the court was biased. It was one of many pieces of relevant 

information the court used to determine that termination was proper under 

Section 2511(a)(2).

Mother next argues the court erred in finding that termination of her 

parental rights was in Child’s best interests. 

Pursuant to Section 2511(b), the trial court must determine the needs 

and welfare of the child under the standard of best interests of the child. The 

focus under Section 2511(b) is not on the parent, but on the child. In re 
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Adoption of R.J.S., 901 A.2d at 508. Pursuant to Section 2511(b), the trial 

court must determine “whether termination of parental rights would best 

serve the developmental, physical and emotional needs and welfare of the 

child.” In re C.M.S., 884 A.2d 1284, 1286 (Pa.Super. 2005). This Court has 

explained that “[i]ntangibles such as love, comfort, security, and stability are 

involved in the inquiry into [the] needs and welfare of the child.” Id. at 1287. 

The trial court “must also discern the nature and status of the parent-child 

bond, with utmost attention to the effect on the child of permanently severing 

that bond.” Id. Importantly, “[t]he mere existence of an emotional bond does 

not preclude the termination of parental rights.” In re N.A.M., 33 A.3d 95, 

103 (Pa.Super. 2011). Instead, the trial court “must examine the status of the 

bond to determine whether its termination would destroy an existing, 

necessary and beneficial relationship.” Id. (quotation marks and citation 

omitted). Further, “[c]ommon sense dictates that courts considering 

termination must also consider whether the children are in a pre-adoptive 

home and whether they have a bond with their foster parents.” In re T.S.M., 

71 A.3d at 268.

The trial court found termination was in Child’s best interest:

The Court has thoroughly evaluated [Child’s] relationships 

in this matter. The Court finds that [Child] has a relationship 

with mother . . . but [it is not] strong, safe, stable, or 

healthy for [Child]. . . . Mother’s bond with [C]hild is . . . 

unhealthy. Mother has consistently been untruthful with 

[C]hild as it relates to Mother’s current marriage and 

pregnancy. Mother is also unsupportive of [C]hild’s 

relationship with her half-sibling. As such, the Court find 

that [Child] has a healthier parental bond with the kinship 
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mother and that [Child] gains safety and stability from the 

kinship mother. It is the kinship mother who provides for 

[Child’s] daily needs as well as her specialized 

developmental, education, and medical needs.

The Court also finds that the bond between [Child] and 

kinship mother is strong and healthy. Testimony established 

that [C]hild is happy and feels comfortable in the kinship 

mother’s care. The bond that [Child] has with the kinship 

mother can provide safety, security and permanency for 

[C]hild. Termination of parental rights will best meet the 

needs of [Child] and permit [C]hild to achieve the stability 

she deserves.

1925(a) Op. at 28-29.

The trial court’s factual findings are supported by the record and it did 

not abuse its discretion in finding termination would be in Child’s best interest. 

Although Child has a bond with Mother, the bond is not a healthy one. Mother 

did not believe Child when Child informed her she was sexually abused, and 

Mother provided inconsistent information to Child regarding important life 

matters, such as marriage and pregnancy. 

Orders affirmed.

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 12/23/2019