In the

United States Court of Appeals

For the Seventh Circuit ____________

No. 07-1643

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

v.

TRAVIS FARRIS,

Defendant-Appellant.

____________

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Central District of Illinois.

No. 06-CR-20029—Michael P. McCuskey, Chief Judge.

____________

ARGUED APRIL 10, 2008—DECIDED JULY 9, 2008

____________

Before FLAUM, KANNE, and EVANS, Circuit Judges.

FLAUM, Circuit Judge. Defendant Travis Farris was

found guilty on three counts related to a bank robbery and

filing a false insurance claim. Farris committed these acts

with his long-time friend, Jesse Matthew Coartney, who

as part of a plea agreement, testified against Farris at

trial. On appeal, Farris challenges the sufficiency of

the evidence against him and the reasonableness of the

within-Guidelines sentence he received from the district court. For the following reasons, we affirm.
2 No. 07-1643

I. Background

Farris’s convictions stem from his criminal involvement

with his grade school friend, Coartney. The two had met

in the third grade in Mattoon, Illinois, and remained best

friends after graduating from high school in 2000. They

were a striking pair, with Coartney standing at 6 foot,

7 inches and weighing 495 pounds when the crimes

occurred, and Farris checking in at 5 foot, 7 inches and

170 pounds.

According to Coartney’s testimony at trial, in February

2004, he and Farris concocted a plan to obtain the insurance proceeds for Farris’s Kia Sportage, which needed

fixing. On February 17, Coartney drove to southern

Illinois as part of his delivery job with Schwan’s. While

down there, Coartney called Farris, informing him that

he had found a location where they could burn the Kia

to get the insurance money. On February 20, Farris and

his wife, who had been staying at Coartney’s trailer,

drove the Kia down to southern Illinois. That night,

Coartney and Farris drove in separate vehicles to the

rural location Coartney had scoped out. The two then

broke the windows to the Kia, took out the battery,

poured gas on the car, and set it on fire. They then went

back to the hotel, picked up Farris’s wife, and drove in

Coartney’s car back to his trailer.

The next morning, on February 21, Coartney and Farris

launched their bank robbery plan. According to Coartney,

this is something the two of them had discussed doing

since high school, although their plans had turned more

serious in early February. They obtained supplies in

advance—Coartney purchased a police scanner at WalMart, the two stole a mask from the same store, and

Farris bought a nine millimeter gun at Oakley’s Bicycle
No. 07-1643 3

Shop. They also first tried their hand at robbing a Ramada

Inn where Coartney had previously worked, but were

unsuccessful. The morning of February 21, they took the

supplies listed above, as well as gloves, a jacket, and duct

tape, and drove Farris’s Mercury Cougar, with duct-tape

covered license plates, to a U.S. Bank in Mattoon. It was

a little before 10 AM at the time, and Farris reminded

Coartney that they needed to hurry, since Farris had a

meeting with an Army recruiter that morning.

At 9:43 AM, the surveillance video at the U.S. Bank in

Mattoon captured two masked white males robbing the

bank. As the bank teller testified and Coartney corroborated, the first robber (who, according to Coartney, was

Farris) jumped the counter holding a gun, and ordered

the teller to the ground while he proceeded to go through

the drawers for money. The teller identified the first

robber as being about five foot eight inches and of average

build. As for the second robber, the teller did not get a

good look at him, but identified him as being about

the same height, but stockier. He was carrying a police

scanner and asked the teller where the bank’s videotape was located. Meanwhile, a second teller had been

in the bathroom when the robbery began, and when she

came out, she was ordered to the ground at gunpoint by

the first robber. The second teller also described the

first robber as somewhere between five foot seven and

five foot nine, and of average build. Although this second teller heard the second robber’s scanner, she never

got a look at him.

While this robbery was occurring, a customer pulled up

to the bank’s drive-up window. Looking in, she saw the

two masked robbers and noted a large size difference

between them. When the robbers pointed at her, the
4 No. 07-1643

customer drove off to the police station. As Coartney

testified, he and Farris, upon seeing the customer, fled the

bank, got into Farris’s car, and drove about one mile back

to Coartney’s trailer. Once at the trailer, as the two had

already planned, Coartney took all the “equipment” from

the robbery, including the money they had stolen, and

drove his car three or four miles to a garage owned by

Farris’s parents. Farris then drove his Cougar, without

any incriminating evidence in it, to his parent’s garage

by a different route. Once there, the two divided up the

cash they had stolen (approximately $3,600) and reimbursed each other for the costs of the gun and the scanner.

Farris then called his brother James about being late for

the Army recruiting event, and then the two split up.

At first, it appeared Farris and Coartney had gotten

away with the crimes. On February 22, two days after

burning the Kia, Farris reported the vehicle as stolen to the

Mattoon police and filed a claim with his insurance company. Meanwhile, an officer in southern Illinois had found

the Kia in flames the night of February 20. Farris’s insurance company investigated Farris’s claim and on March 8,

2004, issued Farris a check for $4,400. On July 23, 2004,

however, federal and local law enforcement officers

executed a search warrant at Coartney’s trailer, in which

they located the bank’s surveillance videotape, a police

scanner, and a ski mask. That evening Coartney was

arrested, where he confessed to the robbery, identified

Farris as the other robber, and told the officers of their

involvement burning the Kia. Four days later, while Farris

was on leave from the Army, authorities interviewed

Farris, who denied any involvement in burning the Kia or

robbing the bank.

A grand jury indicted Farris on three counts in April 6,

2006, with a superseding indictment including an addi-
No. 07-1643 5

tional count being issued on November 2, 2006. Count 1

alleged that Farris and Coartney conspired to commit

armed robbery at the Ramada Inn and U.S. Bank and to

commit mail fraud (burning the Kia and filing a false

claim report) in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 2, 1341, 1951(a),

and 2113(a). Count 2 charged Farris with committing the

bank robbery in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 2113(a) and 2,

while Count 3 alleged a Hobbs Act violation under 18

U.S.C. § 1951(a) with respect to the robbery of the Ramada

Inn, as well as a violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2. The final count

against Farris was for using a firearm as part of the bank

robbery, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c).

A jury trial followed in which Coartney’s testimony

against Farris was corroborated by many other Government witnesses. At the close of the Government’s case,

Farris’s counsel filed a motion for acquittal under FED. R.

CRIM. P. 29, which was denied. Defendant’s evidence

was then presented, during which Farris took the stand

in his own defense. With respect to his Kia, Farris

denied that he was in southern Illinois on February 20 or

had any role in the vehicle being burned. Farris also

presented an alibi for his involvement in the bank robbery,

claiming that he attended an Army event at 10 AM the

morning of the bank robbery, and that it would have

been impossible for him to have also robbed the bank less

than 20 minutes earlier. Farris’s brother and cousin confirmed that they attended the event and arrived together

with Farris. The Army Sergeant in charge of the recruiting function that day was also called as a witness

by Farris. He testified that these recruiting events

typically started “at about 10:00,” and that this particular

event started sometime between 10:00 and 10:20 at the

latest.
6 No. 07-1643

At the end of the trial, the jury returned a guilty verdict against Farris on all but Count 3. The case then proceeded to sentencing, with the Presentence Investigation

Report (“PSR”) recommending a Guideline range sentence of 63 to 78 months for Counts 1 and 2, and an additional mandatory consecutive sentence of at least 7 years

(84 months) for Count 4. There were no objections to

the PSR or Guidelines calculations, leaving the district

court to determine a reasonable sentence. Farris’s sister-inlaw testified to him being a good family man, and Farris’s

wife further testified to Farris’s attentiveness to her

health problems and the hardship his incarceration

would have on the family. After discussing its reasoning,

the district court sentenced Farris to 63 months, the minimum within-Guidelines sentence, plus an additional

84 months for the gun charge. This appeal followed.

II. Discussion

Farris raises two issues before this Court on appeal: the

sufficiency of the Government’s evidence and the reasonableness of the district court’s sentence. We address each

of these issues in turn.

A. Sufficiency of the Evidence

Farris first argues that the Government presented

insufficient evidence to convict him for participating in

the crimes related to the bank robbery or the burning of

the Kia. Farris faces a steep, uphill battle to prevail on

this claim given the high standard of review. As this Court

has stated, “[o]ur threshold inquiry is whether ‘after

viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the
No. 07-1643 7

prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found

the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable

doubt.’ ” United States v. Curtis, 324 F.3d 501, 505 (7th Cir.

2003) (quoting Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319 (1979)

(emphasis in original)). Moreover, “[w]e will overturn a

conviction based on insufficient evidence only if the record is devoid of evidence from which a reasonable jury

could find guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.” Id. The

Government, however, argues that Farris faces an even

higher burden in this case, contending that Farris

waived his sufficiency of the evidence challenge by

failing to renew his motion for judgment of acquittal

under FED. R. CRIM. P. 29 at the close of all the evidence or

within seven days of the jury’s verdict. United States v.

Hickok, 77 F.3d 992, 1002 (7th Cir. 1996). Farris failed to

respond to the Government’s argument in a Reply Brief,

and accordingly, we find that Farris waived his sufficiency of the evidence challenge, and instead, “may

obtain a reversal only if he demonstrates ‘a manifest

miscarriage of justice.’ ” Id. (quoting United States v.

Archambault, 62 F.3d 995, 998 (7th Cir. 1995)). This heightened standard of review, however, has no impact on the

merits of Farris’s claim, since under either standard, there

was clearly sufficient evidence to support the verdict

and no miscarriage of justice occurred.

Farris’s sufficiency of the evidence arguments do not

dwell on whether discreet elements for each crime were

proved beyond a reasonable doubt. Rather, he broadly

claims that there was insufficient evidence linking him

to either the bank robbery or the burning of the Kia. These

assertions on Farris’s part, however, are directly undermined by Coartney’s testimony, as both a participant and

a witness, regarding Farris’s role in both these crimes.
8 No. 07-1643

Although Farris argues that Coartney’s arguments were

“unreasonable,” it is well settled that on a sufficiency of

the evidence claim, this Court “do[es] not weigh the

evidence or assess the credibility of witnesses.” United

States v. Orozco-Vasquez, 469 F.3d 1101, 1106 (7th Cir. 2006).

Therefore, it is of no significance that, as Farris points

out, “Coartney’s testimony is whole[ly] inconsistent

with the evidence presented by Travis [Farris] at trial.”

Appellant’s Br. at 28.

Moreover, the specific arguments Farris makes with

respect to his convictions all fail to show that the

evidence was insufficient or “a manifest miscarriage of

justice.” With respect to the burning of the Kia and the

accompanying conspiracy charge, Farris makes no effort

to argue that there was insufficient evidence for the jury

to find any of the elements for mail fraud or conspiracy satisfied. Instead, Farris’s sole argument focuses

on motive, claiming that no evidence was presented,

save Coartney’s testimony, to show that there had been

mechanical problems with the vehicle or that Farris’s

financial situation was so dire that he would be compelled to defraud his insurance company. Even if the jury

were to find in Farris’s favor on these issues, however,

this would not be inconsistent with the jury also finding

that Farris burned the vehicle to obtain the insurance

proceeds.

As for the bank robbery, given that we will not reevaluate

credibility determinations as to witness testimony, Farris is

left to argue that Coartney’s testimony “was incredible as

a matter of law, meaning it would have been ‘physically

impossible for the witness to observe that which he claims

occurred, or impossible under the laws of nature for the

occurrence to have taken place at all.’ ” United States v.
No. 07-1643 9

Saulter, 60 F.3d 270, 275 (7th Cir. 1995) (quoting United

States v. Wallace, 32 F.3d 1171, 1173 (7th Cir. 1994)). Farris

tries to make such an argument, claiming that if he had in

fact participated in the bank robbery, it would have been

impossible for him to have also arrived at the Army

recruiting event later that morning when he did. Even

based on Farris’s own time estimates, however, his claim

fails. The bank’s surveillance video reflects that the robbers

were in the bank at 9:44 AM. Despite Farris’s conclusory

assertion that it would have then taken him “well over 30

minutes” to arrive at the Army function, his formal time

calculation is that travel time from the bank to the Army

event would have been more than 28 minutes and 8

seconds. Using this latter figure, Farris would have arrived

at the Army function sometime after 10:12 AM. This fails to

make Coartney’s testimony incredible as a matter of law,

since the Army Sergeant, who was Farris’s own witness,

testified that the event that morning could have begun as

late as 10:20 AM.

At trial, Farris was given the opportunity to present his

own evidence and cross-examine and impeach Coartney’s

testimony. The fact that the jury ultimately credited

Coartney’s testimony is a matter that Farris improperly

tries to re-litigate on appeal. The Government provided

more than ample evidence for a jury to find Farris guilty

of the charged crimes. While Coartney’s testimony alone

would have been sufficient to support the verdict, his

testimony was also corroborated by eye-witness accounts of the robbery, the store owner who sold Farris

the gun, and other witnesses. For these reasons, we

affirm on this claim.
10 No. 07-1643

B. Sentencing

Farris also appeals his sentence, arguing that although

he received a within-Guidelines sentence, the district

court unreasonably failed to properly weigh the mitigating evidence presented by Farris. This argument

warrants little discussion. In reviewing sentences, this

Court applies an abuse of discretion standard, and first

looks at whether the lower court committed any procedural error, such as improperly calculating the Guidelines range or failing to consider the § 3553(a) factors.

Gall v. United States, 128 S.Ct. 586, 597 (2007). Here, no

argument was raised below or on appeal that such a

procedural error occurred. Instead, Farris’s argument is

focused on the second part of this Court’s inquiry—

“the substantive reasonableness of the sentence.” Id. This

Court, however, applies a presumption of reasonableness to a within Guidelines sentence. Rita v. United States,

127 S.Ct. 2456, 2462 (2007). The district court in this

case sentenced Farris to the low end of the Guidelines

range, and while Farris contests the weight the district

court gave to the mitigating evidence he presented, the

sentencing judge was in a superior position to balance

these sentencing considerations, see Gall, 128 S.Ct. at 597,

and we will not second guess his determinations. Accordingly, we affirm the district court’s sentence.

III. Conclusion

For the foregoing reasons, we AFFIRM the district court’s

judgment and sentence.

USCA-02-C-0072—7-9-08