RECOMMENDED FOR FULL-TEXT PUBLICATION

Pursuant to Sixth Circuit Rule 206

File Name: 11a0003p.06

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT _________________

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

 Plaintiff-Appellee,

v.

JOHN REECE ROTH,

 Defendant-Appellant.

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No. 09-5805

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Eastern District of Tennessee at Knoxville.

No. 08-00069-001—Thomas A. Varlan, District Judge.

Decided and Filed: January 5, 2011 

Before: MARTIN, GIBBONS, and KETHLEDGE, Circuit Judges.

_________________

COUNSEL

ON BRIEF: Thomas H. Dundon, Joshua J. Phillips, NEAL & HARWELL, PLC,

Nashville, Tennessee, for Appellant. Jeffrey E. Theodore, A. William Mackie,

ASSISTANT UNITED STATES ATTORNEYS, Knoxville, Tennessee, for Appellee.

_________________

OPINION

_________________

BOYCE F. MARTIN, JR., Circuit Judge. This case involves violations of the

Arms Export Control Act, which imposes export controls on “defense articles and

services” without a license. Defendant-appellant John Roth worked as a consultant on

a United States Air Force defense research project, which had been awarded to

Atmospheric Glow Technologies, Inc. in Knoxville, Tennessee. The project entailed

developing plasma technology for use on military aircraft. The government charged

Roth with exporting data from the project on a trip to China and allowing two foreign

1
No. 09-5805 United States v. Roth Page 2

nationals in Knoxville access to certain data and equipment in violation of the Act. A

jury in United States District Court for the Eastern District of Tennessee convicted him

of one count of conspiracy, fifteen counts of exporting defense articles and services

without a license, and one count of wire fraud. He appeals his convictions. For the

following reasons, we AFFIRM.

I. BACKGROUND

Roth is a published author in the field of plasma technology and was a professor

of electrical engineering at the University of Tennessee at Knoxville during the events

underlying this case. His former student, Daniel Sherman, was a principal at

Atmospheric, of which Roth was a minority owner. The two men had co-authored a

paper explaining how plasma technology devices can be used to affect

electrohydrodynamic flow, a topic relating to aircraft flight.

In October 2003, the Air Force solicited contract proposals to develop plasma

actuators that could be used to control the flight of small, subsonic, unmanned, military

drone aircraft. The project would be broken down into Phase I, which entailed

developing the design of the actuators, and Phase II, which entailed testing the actuators

in a wind tunnel and on a non-military aircraft. 

Atmospheric submitted the winning Phase I proposal and the Air Force awarded

it the contract in May 2004 with Roth working as a consultant for the project. At or

around that time, Sherman told Roth that the project would be paid for with “6.2” funds,

which Roth knew implied that the research would be subject to export control laws that

prohibit allowing access to the research outside of the United States or to foreign

nationals unless a license has been obtained.

When Phase I was completed, Roth assisted Atmospheric in drafting the contract

proposal for Phase II, which the Air Force also assigned to Atmospheric. Roth also

assisted in writing, and signed, Task Order 102, a subcontract between him and

Atmospheric acknowledging that Phase II work was subject to export controls. The Air

Force identified some of the technical data reports in the Phase II contract as being
No. 09-5805 United States v. Roth Page 3

export controlled, such as the Quarterly Reports, Technology Transfer Reports, Final

Report, and Test Plan. Jesse Crump, who worked for the Department of Defense,

testified at trial that the data contained in the Weekly Reports and Quarterly Reports was

unquestionably export controlled information, partly because it could only be intended

for military use. Additionally, the contract and the subcontract incorporated federal

regulations prohibiting foreign nationals from working on the project. Nevertheless,

Roth proposed that two of his graduate research assistants—Truman Bonds, an

American, and Xin Dai, a Chinese national—would work with him on the project.

Sherman originally protested Dai’s involvement, so it was decided that Bonds was to

work at Atmospheric on the export controlled data and Dai would work at the University

without access to the export controlled data. Bonds testified at trial that the main reason

for the separation of work was because of Dai’s foreign citizenship and the export

controlled data. Roth did not think that Dai needed to be shielded from the data and Dai

eventually gained access to the Weekly Reports from Atmospheric. 

As part of the testing of the plasma actuators, a device called the Force Stand was

developed for the project and installed in labs at Atmospheric and the University in the

fall of 2005. It was used to test the actuators and gather data before proceeding to the

stage in which the actuators would be tested in a wind tunnel. Dai worked with the

Force Stand, and another graduate student named Sirous Nourgostar, an Iranian national,

had access to it multiple times. Crump testified that the Force Stand was a defense

article because it was designed specifically to collect data for this project, which had a

military purpose.

In anticipation of Dai’s completion of his doctorate, Roth informed Sherman and

Atmospheric that he intended to replace Dai with Nourgostar. After meeting with

reluctance and opposition from Sherman because of Nourgostar’s foreign citizenship,

and especially because of America’s contentious affairs with Iran, Roth sought support

from Carolyn Webb, an administrator at the University who supervised research

contracts. Webb worried that some parts of the project might concern export controlled

data and referred Roth to Robin Witherspoon, the University’s officer in charge of export
No. 09-5805 United States v. Roth Page 4

controls. At their initial meeting, Roth explained to Witherspoon that the project was

military in nature, but that the subject of the research was part of the public domain,

which meant it was publicly available, and, thus, not export controlled. Witherspoon

indicated that she was concerned that the data from the research was export controlled.

She later followed up with Roth via e-mail and phone to explain that she had concluded

that the data was export controlled. At that time, Dai was removed from the project.

Additionally, knowing of Roth’s upcoming trip to lecture in China, Witherspoon warned

him that he could not take anything from Phase II abroad. In a similar vein, Sherman

obtained agreement from Roth that he would not take any data from the project to China.

Aside from the Phase II project, Sherman and Atmospheric submitted another

contract proposal in May 2005 to the Defense Advance Research Projects Agency, an

arm of the Department of Defense that assigns and funds advanced weapons projects.

Roth and Sherman spoke about Roth working on the project, and Roth sent Sherman a

plan for part of the project that was incorporated into the Agency Proposal. Sherman emailed Roth a completed copy of the Proposal, which contained export controlled

information from the Boeing Company’s weapons division, and marked all but one of

the pages with “Proprietary and Export Controlled Information.” 

On May 16, 2006, Roth traveled to China to lecture at universities regarding his

work. He took with him a paper copy of a Phase II Weekly Report, a flash drive with

electronic copies of Phase II reports, and a laptop computer on which was stored a copy

of the Agency Proposal. Neither Roth nor anyone else accessed any of the electronic

files stored on the thumb drive or the laptop, but Roth had Dai send him a copy of a

paper containing Phase II data by way of a Chinese professor’s e-mail address. Roth

later gave Nourgostar access to the paper in the fall of 2007.

On May 20, 2008, a grand jury in United States District Court for the Eastern

District of Tennessee returned an indictment against Roth and Atmospheric claiming that

Roth had taken Phase II data and the Agency Proposal to China, and both Roth and

Atmospheric had allowed Dai and Nourgostar access to the data and the Force Stand.

Roth was charged with one count of conspiracy to export defense articles in violation of
No. 09-5805 United States v. Roth Page 5

the Act, fifteen counts of exporting defense articles in violation of the Act, and one count

of wire fraud. Before the court delivered instructions to the jury, Roth requested an

instruction regarding willfulness that required the government to prove beyond a

reasonable doubt that he knew the data and items he allegedly exported were listed on

the United States Munitions List. Additionally, he requested a separate instruction

regarding ignorance of the law as a defense. However, the district court declined to

deliver a separate instruction on ignorance of the law as an affirmative defense, and gave

the jury the following instruction regarding willfulness:

To prove that defendant acted knowingly and willfully, the government

must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant voluntarily and

intentionally violated a known legal duty. In other words, the defendant

must have acted voluntarily and intentionally and with the specific intent

to do something he knew was unlawful, that is to say, with intent either

to disobey or disregard the law. Negligent conduct, or conduct by

mistake or accident, or with a good faith belief that the conduct was

lawful, is not sufficient to constitute willfulness.

The jury found Roth guilty of all counts on September 3. He timely filed a

motion for judgment of acquittal on grounds of legal and factual insufficiency. He also

filed a motion for a new trial, arguing that the district court’s jury instructions were

improper because the court failed to read to the jury the proper instruction for willfulness

and declined to give a separate instruction on ignorance of the law as a defense. The

district court denied both motions.

II. DISCUSSION

On appeal, Roth claims that: (1) the Phase II data and the data included in the

Agency Proposal are not defense articles or services as a matter of law; (2) the district

court incorrectly instructed the jury as to willfulness and improperly failed to deliver his

proposed instruction regarding ignorance of the law; and (3) there was insufficient

evidence to support the jury’s conclusion that he willfully exported the Agency Proposal.
No. 09-5805 United States v. Roth Page 6

A. Defense Articles and Services Under the Act

We review questions of statutory interpretation de novo. United States v.

Gagnon, 553 F.3d 1021, 1025 (6th Cir. 2009) (citing United States v. Parrett, 530 F.3d

422, 429 (6th Cir. 2008)).

The Act allows for the President of the United States to identify “defense articles

and defense services” on the United States Munitions List that cannot be exported

without a license from the United States. 22 U.S.C. § 2778(a)-(b) (2006). Furthermore,

section 2778(c) imposes criminal penalties for “[a]ny person who willfully violates any

provision of [the Act].” In part, the Munitions List identifies as defense articles:

(a) Aircraft, including . . . drones . . . which are specifically

designed, modified, or equipped for military purposes. 

. . . .

(h) Components, parts, accessories, attachments, and associated

equipment (including ground support equipment) specifically designed

or modified for the articles in paragraphs (a) through (d) of this category,

excluding aircraft tires and propellers used with reciprocating engines.

(i) Technical data (as defined in § 120.10) and defense services

(as defined in § 120.9) directly related to the defense articles enumerated

in paragraphs (a) through (h) of this category (see § 125.4 for

exemptions), except for hot section technical data associated with

commercial aircraft engines. Technical data directly related to the

manufacture or production of any defense articles enumerated elsewhere

in this category that are designated as Significant Military Equipment

(SME) shall itself be designated SME.

22 C.F.R. § 121.1, Category VIII (2010). Section 120.10 of the Code of Federal

Regulations proceeds to define “technical data” as:

(1) Information . . . which is required for the design, development,

production, manufacture, assembly, operation, repair, testing,

maintenance or modification of defense articles. This includes

information in the form of blueprints, drawings, photographs, plans,

instructions or documentation.

And section 120.09 instructs that a “defense service” is, in relevant part, “[t]he

furnishing to foreign persons of any technical data controlled under this subchapter (see

§ 120.10), whether in the United States or abroad.”
No. 09-5805 United States v. Roth Page 7

Initially, we take note that courts may not review whether items are properly

designated as defense articles on the Munitions List. 22 U.S.C. § 2778(h). Our query,

therefore, is not whether technical data and components are defense articles, but whether

the data from Phase II and the Agency Proposal and the Force Stand fall under the

definitions of technical data and components. See United States v. Pulungan, 569 F.3d

326, 328 (7th Cir. 2009) (referencing 22 U.S.C. § 2778(h)). 

Roth argues that the Phase II data, Agency Proposal, and Force Stand were not

defense articles because they were not developed to put plasma actuators on anything

designated on the Munitions List. He draws this conclusion because during the time he

worked on the project, future stages of Phase II envisioned testing actuators on

commercially available aircraft, which are not covered on the Munitions List, before

incorporating the actuators into military aircraft. He asserts that his removal from Phase

II before actuators were ever applied to any aircraft signifies that his actions could have

no connection to a military aircraft. 

However, the federal regulations extend export controls to all stages of defense

projects that are covered by the Act, not just the final stages when military devices are

directly involved. In pertinent part, the federal regulations define “technical data,”

which is a category of defense article, as “[i]nformation . . . which is required for the

design, development, production, manufacture, [and] assembly . . . of defense articles”

such as drones. 22 C.F.R. §§ 120.10, 121.1. These terms envision that research requires

multiple stages before a project reaches completion, and apply export controls to all

those phases. Furthermore, the regulations define “components” as “parts, accessories,

attachments, and associated equipment . . . specifically designed or modified for the

articles” such as drones. Id. The regulations have been written to cover a broad range

of articles at all stages of research and development in projects covered by the Act.

Somehow, Roth ignores the fact that the final goal of Phase II was to incorporate

plasma actuators on military drone aircraft. While the project might have called for the

data to be tested on a commercially available drone plane at some point in the project,

Roth admits that all the data collected, as well as the Force Stand that was developed to
No. 09-5805 United States v. Roth Page 8

collect it, were derived for eventual military use. What is more, he does not argue that

the data and Force Stand would not have been defense articles once they were used in

conjunction with a military aircraft. This omission implies that the data and the Force

Stand would have qualified as defense articles at some point. It seems that Roth thinks

that barriers exist between the stages of the project that prevent the defense article

qualification from being imputed from one stage to another, which is incorrect according

to 22 C.F.R. §§ 120.10, 121.1.

Because the final objective of this project was incorporating plasma actuators

into military drones, the district court properly concluded that the underlying data and

component were defense articles and services pursuant to 22 C.F.R. § 121.1, Category

VIII.

B. Jury Instructions

When a party claims a jury instruction improperly or inaccurately stated the law,

we review that claim de novo. United States v. Blanchard, 618 F.3d 562, 571 (6th Cir.

2010); H.C. Smith Invs., L.L.C. v. Outboard Marine Co., 377 F.3d 645, 650 (6th Cir.

2004) (citing Fisher v. Ford Motor Co., 224 F.3d 570, 576 (6th Cir. 2000)). On the other

hand, “[a] district court’s refusal to give a jury instruction is reviewed for abuse of

discretion.” H.C. Smith Invs., L.L.C., 377 F.3d at 650 (citing Fisher, 224 F.3d at 576).

Roth’s claim that the court instructed the jury on the incorrect definition of willfulness

is reviewed de novo. His claim that the court erred by not giving the jury an instruction

on ignorance of the law as a separate and complete defense is reviewed for abuse of

discretion.

1. Willfulness

Neither the Supreme Court nor our Court has defined “willfulness” under section

2778(c). Roth argues that it requires the defendant to intentionally export defense

articles or services that he specifically knows are on the Munitions List. The

government counters that willfulness under the statute only requires a defendant to know
No. 09-5805 United States v. Roth Page 9

of the general unlawfulness of his conduct, not to know of the specific statutory

provision he is violating.

“[A] fundamental canon of statutory construction is that ‘when interpreting

statutes, the language of the statute is the starting point for interpretation, and it should

also be the ending point if the plain meaning of that language is clear.’” Thompson v.

Greenwood, 507 F.3d 416, 419 (6th Cir. 2007) (citing United States v. Boucha, 236 F.3d

768, 774 (6th Cir. 2001)). Here, the language cannot be our ending point as the Supreme

Court has commented that willfulness can be “‘a word of many meanings’ whose

construction is often dependent on the context in which it appears.” Bryan v. United

States, 524 U.S. 184, 191 (1998) (quoting Spies v. United States, 317 U.S. 492 (1943)).

Generally though, in criminal cases, “in order to establish a ‘willful’ violation of a

statute, ‘the Government must prove that the defendant acted with knowledge that his

conduct was unlawful.’” Id. (quoting Ratzlaf v. United States, 510 U.S. 135, 137

(1994)). 

Other circuits have interpreted the willfulness element of section 2778(c) and

produced different results. Multiple circuits have interpreted willfulness as requiring a

defendant to know generally that the act of exporting the underlying items is unlawful

without requiring that the defendant know the items are on the Munitions List. See

United States v. Murphy, 852 F.2d 1, 7 (1st Cir. 1988) (holding that willfulness was

sufficiently established under section 2778(c) if the defendant “knew he had a legal duty

not to export the weapons”); see also United States v. Hsu, 364 F.3d 192, 198 n.2 (4th

Cir. 2004) (rejecting the defendants’ argument that “the [jury] instructions as to

‘willfulness’ were deficient because the ‘jury was not instructed that the government had

to show that the defendants knew that the KIV-7HS was covered by the Munitions List

. . . [or that] the device was designed for military use’”); United States v. Tsai, 954 F.2d

155, 160-62 (3d Cir. 1992) (affirming court’s instructions that the defendant did not have

to have read the Munitions List or know all the details of the law, and holding that the

“[district] court did not err in instructing the jury that it could convict if it found that

defendant knew that the export was illegal”); United States v. Smith, 918 F.2d 1032,
No. 09-5805 United States v. Roth Page 10

1038 (2d Cir. 1990) (finding jury instructions were proper because “[t]he jury was told

that defendant must have known that the helicopters to be exported were subject to the

licensing requirements of the Arms Export Control Act and that he intended to export

them in a manner inconsistent therewith” even though the Munitions List was not

referenced).

Conversely, in United States v. Gregg, 829 F.2d 1430, 1437 & n.14 (8th Cir.

1987), the Eighth Circuit appears to have interpreted willfully to require that a defendant

knew the underlying exported items were on the Munitions List. In applying section

2778(c), the court approved of a jury instruction that “plainly directed acquittal if the

jury was not satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant knew that the items

exported were on the Munitions List and required license.” Id. at 1437 n.14 (emphasis

added). 

Additionally, it is helpful to consider Bryan, 524 U.S. at 194-95, in which the

Supreme Court decided the meaning of willfulness in a statute analogous to section

2778(c). In Bryan, the defendant was convicted of conspiring to willfully deal firearms

without a license in violation of the Federal Firearms Statute, 18 U.S.C. §§ 922(a)(1)(A),

924(a)(1)(D). Id. at 190-91. At that time, the statute criminalized multiple types of acts,

but in pertinent part, it made it illegal for anyone to “willfully violate[] any other

provision of this chapter.” 18 U.S.C. § 924(a)(1)(D) (1994). The Supreme Court held

that the willfulness requirement of section 924(a)(1)(D) only required that a defendant

know his act was unlawful. Bryan, 524 U.S. at 195. The defendant argued that the

Court should extend to section 924(a)(1)(D) the exception from Ratzlaf and Cheek v.

United States, 498 U.S. 192, 200 (1991), that requires knowledge of a law to satisfy

willfulness requirements. Id. at 194. The Court refused, however, and distinguished

those cases by explaining that they involved “highly technical statutes,” such as tax laws

and banking regulations, “that presented the danger of ensnaring individuals engaged in

apparently innocent conduct.” Id. at 194-95. The Court stated that those cases could not

apply to the defendant in Bryan because a jury had already found that he knew what he
No. 09-5805 United States v. Roth Page 11

did was unlawful, therefore, precluding him from mistaking his action as innocent. Id.

at 195.

In our view, the arguments in the multiple cases from the other circuits deciding

the section 2778(c) willfulness issue and the Supreme Court’s interpretation of

analogous section 924(a)(1)(D) are persuasive. All that section 2778(c) expressly

requires is that someone willfully violate a provision of the Act. Congress did not

instruct courts to apply the willfulness requirement to any specific provision, let alone

the Munitions List, even though it could have. Furthermore, no court has conclusively

held that willfulness requires knowledge that an item is on the Munitions List.

Additionally, as in Bryan, the underlying conduct concerned in the Act—exporting

defense articles and services without a license—is not innocent in the way an everyday,

uninformed citizen may unintentionally violate complex, confusing tax laws. Rather,

exporting defense articles can only be achieved by educated parties with atypical access

to proprietary military weapons, systems, and data. By Roth’s own admission, he knew

that receiving “6.2” funds from the Air Force imposed regulations on his research.

Finally, the Federal Firearms Act considered in Bryan is extremely similar to the statute

considered here. Both impose criminal sanctions for actions involving highly regulated

weapons, and both have similar willfulness requirements that apply broadly to violations

of their respective statutes. It follows, then, that the Supreme Court’s analysis in Bryan

applies to the Act.

Accordingly, following Bryan and the swath of cases from other circuits

interpreting section 2778(c), we hold that section 2778(c) does not require a defendant

to know that the items being exported are on the Munitions List. Rather, it only requires

knowledge that the underlying action is unlawful.

The instruction given by the district court defined willfulness as doing something

intentionally that the defendant knew was unlawful, which falls in line with Bryan, the

other circuits’ interpretations of section 2778(c), and now our holding here. As a result,

the district court’s jury instruction regarding willfulness was proper.
No. 09-5805 United States v. Roth Page 12

2. Ignorance of the law

When a district court refuses to give a requested jury instruction, we will reverse

that decision “only when (1) the requested instruction is a correct statement of the law;

(2) the requested instruction is not substantially covered by other instructions actually

delivered; and (3) the failure to give the requested instruction impairs the defendant’s

theory of the case.” United States v. Tarwater, 308 F.3d 494, 510 (6th Cir. 2002) (citing

United States v. Chesney, 86 F.3d 564, 573 (6th Cir. 1996)).

The ignorance of the law as a defense instruction would not have been a correct

statement of law. Roth incorrectly asserts that multiple circuits have held that ignorance

of the law is a separate defense to charges under the Act. In fact, no circuit court has

decided this issue. Indeed, the Supreme Court has identified only a few areas, such as

tax law, where “ignorance of the law is a defense,” and that is because the tax system is

so complex. United States v. Abboud, 438 F.3d 554, 581 (6th Cir. 2006) (citing Cheek,

498 U.S. at 199-200). Only when “highly technical statutes . . . present[] the danger of

ensnaring individuals engaged in apparently innocent conduct,” as in the example of tax

laws and banking regulations, has the Supreme Court “held that . . . statutes ‘carve out

an exception to the traditional rule’ that ignorance of the law is no excuse.” Bryan, 524

U.S. at 194-95 (citing Cheek, 498 U.S. at 200; Ratzlaf, 510 U.S. at 149).

It should be noted that two cases from the Fifth Circuit have addressed ignorance

of the law in the context of charges brought under the Act. In United States v. Davis,

583 F.2d 190, 194 (5th Cir. 1978) (citing United States v. Schilleci, 545 F.2d 519, 524

(5th Cir. 1977)), the court noted that, with specific intent crimes, juries should not be

instructed that ignorance of the law is not a defense. Later, in United States v.

Hernandez, 662 F.2d 289, 292 (5th Cir. Oct. 1981), the Fifth Circuit cited Davis and

commented that a “court should put squarely before the jury the relevance of ignorance

of the law” in cases charging specific intent crimes. Both cases instructed that ignorance

can be critical when instructing a jury about the defendant’s state of mind when specific

intent is an element of the crime. However, neither case went so far as to hold that

ignorance is a separate, affirmative defense that juries must be instructed about when
No. 09-5805 United States v. Roth Page 13

considering specific intent crimes. They left open the possibility that a court may

instruct a jury regarding ignorance of the law in some other fashion, such as when

explaining the required mens rea of the crime.

Furthermore, it appears that the instruction given by the district court regarding

willfulness substantially covered Roth’s proposed ignorance instruction. Roth admits

as much in his brief. The first two sentences of the proposed instruction actually concern

willfulness as an element of the crime. It is not until the third and fourth sentences of

the proposed instruction that Roth really addresses and explains ignorance of the law as

an affirmative and separate defense. There, he would have instructed the jury that:

An innocent or negligent mistake by the Defendant is insufficient to

support a finding of a knowing and willful export. So if Defendant was

ignorant of the requirements of the Arms Export Control Act or was

aware of the requirements of the Act but believed that he was complying

with those requirements, he did not act knowingly or willfully, and you

must find him not guilty.

This, however, is extremely similar to the court’s instruction that “[n]egligent conduct,

or conduct by mistake or accident, or with a good faith belief that the conduct was

lawful, is not sufficient to constitute willfulness,” which was delivered to the jury

through the willfulness instruction. Both the proposed and actual instructions address

negligence, mistake, and a good faith belief regarding compliance with the law.

Roth’s proposed instruction was not a correct statement of the law, and the

portion that was correct was substantially covered by another instruction. Furthermore,

because the district court addressed much of the proposed instruction in the willfulness

instruction, failing to deliver Roth’s proposed ignorance of the law instruction to the jury

impaired his case only slightly, if at all. Therefore, the district court did not abuse its

discretion in declining to deliver Roth’s proposed instruction on ignorance of the law as

a separate defense.
No. 09-5805 United States v. Roth Page 14

C. Sufficiency of the Evidence Supporting Roth’s Conviction for Exporting the

Agency Proposal

When reviewing a conviction for sufficiency of evidence, we ask “‘whether, after

viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, and after giving the

government the benefit of all inferences that could reasonably be drawn from the

testimony, any rational trier of fact could find the elements of the crime beyond a

reasonable doubt.’” United States v. Ross, 502 F.3d 521, 529 (6th Cir. 2007) (quoting

United States v. M/G Trans. Servs., Inc., 173 F.3d 584, 589 (6th Cir. 1999)). This is a

“‘very heavy burden.’” Id. (quoting United States v. Davis, 397 F.3d 340, 344 (6th Cir.

2005)).

Roth claims that there was insufficient evidence to support the jury’s finding that

he willfully exported the Agency Proposal because he never opened the electronic file

and could not have known its contents until after he returned from China. However, the

purpose of the Agency Proposal was to eventually build military munitions, and it was

premised upon the Phase II technology, which University officials had told Roth was

export controlled. Furthermore, University officials instructed Roth to take nothing

concerning Phase II with him to China. Moreover, Roth and Sherman had discussed the

Boeing information and it is not disputed that Roth knew it was export controlled. While

Roth might not have opened the Proposal to see that the Boeing information was

contained therein, it would only make sense that Roth and Sherman discussed it in regard

to either Phase II or the Proposal. Ultimately, Roth knew that the research he was

conducting in Phase II was export controlled, and it was essentially the same technology

used in the Proposal. He also knew that the information from Boeing was export

controlled. Roth’s conviction could be sufficiently supported by nothing more than

circumstantial evidence. Tucker v. Palmer, 541 F.3d 652, 657 (6th Cir. 2008) (citing

United States v. Kelley, 461 F.3d 817, 825 (6th Cir. 2006)). Therefore, when viewing

all the facts in the light most favorable to the government, a rational jury could find

beyond a reasonable doubt that Roth knew that the Proposal contained export controlled

information.
No. 09-5805 United States v. Roth Page 15

III. CONCLUSION

The data from Phase II and the Agency Proposal, as well as the Force Stand, are

defense articles and services as a matter of law because the ultimate objective of the

project was to apply plasma actuators to military aircraft. Additionally, the district court

did not err in its jury instructions. Finally, there was sufficient evidence to support

Roth’s conviction for exporting the Agency Proposal. Accordingly, we AFFIRM.