[Federal Register Volume 62, Number 61 (Monday, March 31, 1997)]
[Notices]
[Pages 15205-15207]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 97-8053]


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NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

[IA 97-001]


Darryl D. McNeil; Order Prohibiting Involvement in NRC-Licensed 
Activities (Effective Immediately)

I

    Darryl D. McNeil was employed by SBI as a Security Lieutenant at 
Florida Power Corporation's (FPC) Crystal River site. SBI is a 
contractor to FPC and provides security services for the site. FPC 
holds License No. DPR-72 for Crystal River Unit 3, issued by the 
Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC or Commission) pursuant to 10 CFR 
Part 50 on January 28, 1977. The license authorizes FPC to operate 
Crystal River Unit 3 in accordance with the conditions specified 
therein.

II

    10 CFR 73.55(d) requires, in part, that nuclear power plant 
licensees control all points of personnel access into a protected area. 
10 CFR 73.55(d)(5) requires that a numbered picture badge 
identification system be used for all individuals who are authorized 
access to protected areas without escort. The objective of the 
regulation is to provide high assurance that only individuals who 
require access and have been found to be trustworthy and reliable and 
do not constitute an unreasonable risk to the health and safety of the 
public are allowed to enter the protected area. The Crystal River Unit 
3 Operating License Section 2.D, Physical Security, requires FPC to 
maintain in effect all provisions of the Commission-approved Physical 
Security Plan. FPC's Physical Security Plan, Revision 6-9, Section 
5.4.3 states: ``When badges/key cards are allowed to leave the 
Protected Area, they will be under the observation and control of 
Security Force personnel. * * * Lost and missing badges/key cards are 
immediately removed from the Security Computer as soon as Security 
Supervision is made aware of the loss. Prior to removal from the 
Security Computer, an investigation is conducted to determine any 
unauthorized use.''
    On February 9, 1996, a Quality Assurance employee at Crystal River 
Unit 3 left the site while wearing his security badge. During the 
period of March 6, 1996, through December 13, 1996, the Nuclear 
Regulatory Commission (NRC) Office of Investigations (OI) conducted an 
investigation of the circumstances surrounding the loss of control of 
the security badge at the Crystal River site. From its investigation, 
the NRC concludes that contract security employees intentionally and 
deliberately conspired to cover up the loss of the security badge. 
Specifically, the evidence revealed that, prior to the return of the 
employee to the site, two security officers became aware that this 
event had occurred, and notified their supervisor, Darryl D. McNeil, of 
the event. Although Mr. McNeil admitted to the OI investigator that he 
was aware of the requirements to deactivate a missing badge in the 
security access computer, and to initiate an investigation upon being 
informed of the mistake, he did not comply with these requirements. 
Instead, he permitted the security officers: (1) to retrieve the 
individual's badge when he returned to the site later that day; (2) to 
card the badge out as if it had been processed properly upon the 
individual's exit from the plant; and (3) to return the badge to the 
badge rack.
    On January 16, 1997, the NRC sent a certified letter to Mr. McNeil 
advising him that his actions appeared to have violated 10 CFR 50.5, 
Deliberate Misconduct, and offering him the opportunity to attend a 
predecisional enforcement conference. By letter dated February 10, 
1997, Mr. McNeil provided a written response to the January 16, 1997, 
letter in lieu of participation in an enforcement conference. Mr. 
McNeil's letter indicated that he was aware an employee had left the 
facility with his badge and that he had been informed that the security 
officer planned to retrieve the badge and return it to the badge rack. 
Mr. McNeil stated that in his

[[Page 15206]]

judgement, these actions posed no security risk to the plant.

III

    Based on the above, it appears that Mr. McNeil engaged in 
deliberate misconduct in that, although he was aware of badge security 
requirements, he deliberately allowed security officers to improperly 
retrieve, card out, and return a badge which had been taken off-site to 
the badge rack, and deliberately failed to remove the employee's badge 
from the security access computer or initiate an investigation of the 
incident. These actions were not authorized by plant procedures. Mr. 
McNeil's deliberate misconduct caused the Licensee to be in violation 
of Section 5.4.3 of its Physical Security Plan and is, therefore, a 
violation of 10 CFR 50.5(a)(1). The NRC must be able to rely on 
licensees, contractors and their employees to fully comply with NRC 
requirements. This is essential with respect to access authorization 
programs at nuclear power plants because the NRC relies on members of a 
nuclear facility's security force to ensure that all individuals who 
are allowed to access the facility meet high standards of 
trustworthiness and reliability. Mr. McNeil's deliberate misconduct 
raises serious doubt as to whether he can be relied upon to comply with 
NRC requirements.
    Consequently, I lack the requisite reasonable assurance that 
licensed activities can be conducted in compliance with Commission 
requirements and that the health and safety of the public will be 
protected if Mr. McNeil were permitted at this time to be involved in 
NRC-licensed activities. Therefore, public health and safety and the 
public interest require that Mr. McNeil be prohibited from any 
involvement in NRC-licensed activities for a period of one year from 
the date of this Order and, if he is currently involved with another 
licensee in NRC-licensed activities, he must immediately cease such 
activities, and inform the NRC of the name, address and telephone 
number of the employer, and provide a copy of this Order to the 
employer. Additionally, Mr. McNeil is required to notify the NRC of his 
first employment in NRC-licensed activities for one year following the 
prohibition period. Furthermore, pursuant to 10 CFR 2.202, I find that 
the significance of Mr. McNeil's conduct described above is such that 
the public health, safety and interest require that this Order be 
immediately effective.

IV

    Accordingly, pursuant to sections 103, 161b, 161i, 161o, 182 and 
186 of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended, and the Commission's 
regulations in 10 CFR 2.202, 10 CFR 50.5 and 10 CFR 150.20, it is 
hereby ordered, effective immediately, that:

    A. Mr. Darryl D. McNeil is prohibited for one year from the date 
of this Order from engaging in or exercising control over 
individuals engaged in NRC-licensed activities. If Mr. McNeil is 
currently involved in NRC licensed activities, he must immediately 
cease such activities, inform the NRC of the name, address and 
telephone number of the employer, and provide a copy of this Order 
to the employer. NRC-licensed activities are those activities that 
are conducted pursuant to a specific or general license issued by 
the NRC, including, but not limited to, those activities of 
Agreement State licensees conducted pursuant to the authority 
granted by 10 CFR 150.20.
    B. For a period of one year following the period of prohibition 
set forth in Paragraph IV.A. above, Mr. Darryl D. McNeil shall, 
within 20 days of his acceptance of his first employment offer 
involving NRC-licensed activities as defined in Paragraph IV.A 
above, provide notice to the Director, Office of Enforcement, U. S. 
Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, DC 20555, of the name, 
address, and telephone number of the employer or the entity where he 
is, or will be, involved in NRC-licensed activities. The notice 
shall include a statement of his commitment to compliance with 
regulatory requirements and the basis why the Commission should have 
confidence that he will now comply with applicable NRC requirements.

    The Director, Office of Enforcement, may relax or rescind, in 
writing, any of the above conditions upon demonstration by Mr. McNeil 
of good cause.

V

    In accordance with 10 CFR 2.202, Mr. McNeil must, and any other 
person adversely affected by this Order may, submit an answer to this 
Order, and may request a hearing on this Order, within 20 days of the 
date of this Order. Where good cause is shown, consideration will be 
given to extending the time to request a hearing. A request for 
extension of time must be made in writing to the Director, Office of 
Enforcement, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, DC 20555, 
and include a statement of good cause for the extension. The answer may 
consent to this Order. Unless the answer consents to this Order, the 
answer shall, in writing and under oath or affirmation, specifically 
admit or deny each allegation or charge made in this Order and shall 
set forth the matters of fact and law on which Mr. McNeil or other 
person adversely affected relies and the reasons as to why the Order 
should not have been issued. Any answer or request for a hearing shall 
be submitted to the Secretary, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, 
ATTN: Chief, Docketing and Service Section, Washington, DC 20555. 
Copies also shall be sent to the Director, Office of Enforcement, U.S. 
Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, DC 20555, to the Assistant 
General Counsel for Hearings and Enforcement at the same address, and 
to the Regional Administrator, NRC Region II, 101 Marietta Street, NW, 
Suite 2900, Atlanta, Georgia 30323 and to Mr. McNeil if the answer or 
hearing request is by a person other than Mr. McNeil. If a person other 
than Mr. McNeil requests a hearing, that person shall set forth with 
particularity the manner in which his interest is adversely affected by 
this Order and shall address the criteria set forth in 10 CFR 2.714(d).
    If a hearing is requested by Mr. McNeil or a person whose interest 
is adversely affected, the Commission will issue an Order designating 
the time and place of any hearing. If a hearing is held, the issue to 
be considered at such hearing shall be whether this Order should be 
sustained.
    Pursuant to 10 CFR 2.202(c)(2)(i), Mr. McNeil, or any other person 
adversely affected by this Order, may, in addition to demanding a 
hearing, at the time the answer is filed or sooner, move the presiding 
officer to set aside the immediate effectiveness of the Order on the 
ground that the Order, including the need for immediate effectiveness, 
is not based on adequate evidence but on mere suspicion, unfounded 
allegations, or error.
    In the absence of any request for hearing, or written approval of 
an extension of time in which to request a hearing, the provisions 
specified in Section IV above shall be final 20 days from the date of 
this Order without further order or proceedings. If an extension of 
time for requesting a hearing has been approved, the provisions 
specified in Section IV shall be final when the extension expires if a 
hearing request has not been received. An answer or a request for 
hearing shall not stay the immediate effectiveness of this order.

    For the Nuclear Regulatory Commission.


[[Page 15207]]


    Dated at Rockville, Maryland, this 24th day of March 1997.
Edward L. Jordan,
Deputy Executive Director for Regulatory Effectiveness, Program 
Oversight, Investigations and Enforcement.
[FR Doc. 97-8053 Filed 3-28-97; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 7590-01-P