July 1, 2015

RED HILL FUEL TANK ADMINISTRATIVE ORDER ON CONSENT COMMENT

I attended the public meeting on Thursday, June 18, 2015 at Moanalua Middle School to learn more about the Red Hill fuel tank situation and the Administrative Order on Consent (AOC).

This AOC document was put together entirely by the Navy and DLA. It is totally slanted in their favor. I was suspect of the Department of Health and its roll in addressing the Red Hill Facility, but after

re viewing additional documents it is apparent that the DOH has been trying for many years to get the Navy to improve or correct the Red Hill Facility shortfalls. I’m disappointed that it appears the EPA cannot exercise more clout to mandate that the Navy and Department of Defense demonstrate an aggressive and timely solution to this very important crisis. As stated in their 2008 Final Groundwater Protection Plan and the 2010 Re -evaluation of the Red Hill Tier 3 Risk Assessment the Navy is aware of and has addressed the danger the Red Hill Fuel Facility puts on our very precious water supply. The Administrative Order on Consent and the Statement of Work are necessary documents to get this overdue job completed. All the promises of Best Available Practicable Technology (BAPT) and Tank Upgrade Alternatives (TUA) were inferred in the 2008 document . What have they been doing for the past 7 years? Will we always be waiting for a BAPT and TUA? The Navy WILL CONTINUE to use

excuses, or drag their feet, or other parts to avoid doing what is necessary NOW. We cannot allow them to do this any longer and must set a shorter completion date for all work. They built this huge, massive facility in less years th an the 22 to 28 years they are asking for now. If the decision is to repair and not relocate the tanks they can treat this as a war time situation and get this job done in 5 to 10 years. We need to be looking beyond just monitoring for possible leaks to a secure and complete overhaul to eliminate future leak s.
Nowhere has anyone presented the option of relocating the tanks. Requesting 3 bids to relocate the Red Hill USTs above ground should have been the first item on the agenda at the first meeting. The reason for having the tanks underground in the 1940s is no longer an issue. Enemies know where the tanks are and have penetrating warheads to get to them. New storage tank technology has to be better than in the early 1940’s. Maintenance, repair and monitoring would be much cheaper, easier and safer. Building a solar farm above the tanks would guarantee operational power at all times. Ships and airplanes have the capability to bypass the Islands to get to war zones. The Navy and DLA do not want to abandon the Red Hill USTs because they know it will be expensive to clean up the contaminants left behind. The Navy has to be persuaded that this would be the best, responsible and correct approach to the existing situation. Study the option to relocate the tanks versus total upgrade of 70+ year old tanks. Build it on Federal land not ceded land.I recommend that the DOH and EPA not sign the existing Administrative Order o n Consent as currently

written because:

1. The presence of the Red Hill Underground Storage Tanks is a high risk to the health and environment of our community. 2. The 22

- 28 year possible completion date is too long. 3. The age of the Red Hill USTs will be 100 years old by 2043. 4. Waiting for the perfect BAPT and TUA will present unending options which will allow the Navy to prolong the proj ect. 5. The B oard of W ater S upply ’s concerns and recommendations should be considered.
6. The Navy has not demonstrated a good faith, aggressive solution to Red Hill’s fuel spills.
7. Nowhere has anyone presented the option to relocate the fuel tanks.

My biggest fear is that the res toration work could trigger a catastrophic incident. And the Navy would only say, “Oops” and walk away. Our environment is very fragile. We cannot lose our precious water supply. We cannot go across state lines to obtain water. Losing the Honolulu Boa rd of Water Supply's Waimalu and Moanalua water source would affect the entire island.

Following are some excerpts from the AOC that I have issue with and contributed to my conclusion of not accepting the AOC as written.

Pg 7 #5 (b) (iii) EPA has determined that the Navy and DLA have contributed to and are contributing to the handling, storage, treatment, transportation or disposal of solid waste at the facility. Pg 7 #5 (b) (iv) EPA has determined that the Navy and DLA’s handling, s torage, treatment, transportation or disposal of solid waste may present an imminent and substantial endangerment to health or the environment. Pg 7 #5 (b) (v) Actions required by the AOC MAY be necessary to protect health and the environment.

The above three statements say a lot. Is the EPA stating a valid concern regarding the management of the Red Hill Underground Fuel Storage Tanks (USTs)? If so, get the head of the EPA involved with this issue. And the last statement should be written to read, “A ctions required by the AOC will be taken to ensure the protection of health and the environment.”

Page 17 #12 (a) it is the expectation of the Parties to the AOC that all obligations of the Navy and DLA arising under the AOC will be fully funded. (b) Any funds including penalties may be subject to the availability of appropriated funds . No provision herein shall be interpreted to require obligation or payment of funds in violation of the Anti Deficiency Act, 31 U.S.C.

– 1341. (c) If funds are not availa ble in any YEAR to fulfill Navy and DLA obligation under AOC ...DOH and EPA reserve their respective right to initiate any action against any person(s) or to take any response action which would be appropriate absent this AOC.

I think the DOH and the EPA re linquish their rights in #12 (b) as unavailability of appropriated funds will be the Navy and DLA’s escape clause of choice.Pg 18 #13 (a) Reimbursement of DOH Cost: Why are we limited to $50,000 per calendar year

for reimbursement of DOH cost? It should be dollar for dollar whatever that cost is. One paragraph stating full reimbursement requirement can replace the 2 1⁄2 pages dedicated to giving the Navy and DLA reimbursement escape holes, plus their above mentioned unavailable funds clause.

Pg 22 #15 (a) Compliance with this AOC by Navy and DLA shall include completion of any Work in accordance with this AOC and within the specified time schedules approved under the AOC. A penalty may be assessed in an amount not to exceed $5,000 for a first week (or par t thereof) and $10,000 for each addition al week (or part thereof) for which a failure in this subsection occurs.

The specified time schedules approved under the AOC are too long . Require that work begins in 5 years and is completed no longer then 10 yea rs from the signing of the AOC and Statement of Work (SOW). Why the small penalty amount? The Navy and DLA, or any large Corporation, would laugh at that penalty. Charge them the hundreds of thousands per day the EPA charged the City of Honolulu when it had to divert sewage into the Ala Wai Canal to keep it out of the streets of Waikiki in the hope of contain ing the divert ed sewage while repairing the problem. What is good for one is good for all

. Then after this meager penalty the AOC proceeds to give the Navy and DLA 3 months to dispute a resolution. How generous. And don’t forget the unavailable funds clause also covers penalties.

I have taken the time to read the 2008 Final Groundwater Protection Plan written by the Navy and the 2010 Re

- Evaluatio n of the Red Hill Tier 3 Risk Assessment

. The statements and history reports from these two documents have made me aware of how really bad the fuel tank situation is and also influenced my comments on the Administrative Order o n Consent.

T he 2008 Final Gr oundwater Protection Plan begins by describing the F acility, its purpose, where it was built, why and when activated. It states it installed the Navy ’ s water well 2254

- 01 and tunnels at the same time. The document states that simulation tests concluded that the aging of the Facility will increase the possibility that the release of fuel could occur as a result of leaks breaching both the steel liners and concrete containment of the tanks. While the tank steel liners have been repaired, the concrete containment cannot be maintained.

The document continues in 1.2 Description of the Problem: The potential impact of an inadvertent fuel release to the groundwater system is the main risk driver for the Facility. The Facility is approximately 100 feet above the basal groun dwater table on the boundary of the Waimalu and Moanalua Aquifer Systems of the Pearl Harbor and Honolulu Aquifer Sectors, respectively. Both aquifers are sources of potable water for several public water systems. The Waimalu and Moanalua Aquifer systems are classified as unconfined, basal, and flank. Their status is listed as currently used, fresh drinking water sources that are irreplaceable and have a high vulnerability to contamination. The nature of the fractured basalt beneath the site would make cleanup of a future petroleum release difficult. There are several potable water supply wells in the vicinity of the Facility. The impact of a large release would be very costly and would jeopardize the Navy mission at Pearl Harbor by the potential loss of the potable water supplied by U.S. Navy well 2254

- 01.

The document goes on to state that the Groundwater Protection Plan Scope and Objectives are not intended to address risks associated with a catastrophic release of fuel to the environment resultingfrom a large rupture in the steel tanks or piping system. These catastrophic events would require

emergency response actions that are not within the scope of the document. It goes on to state the Water System Emergency Response Plan provides procedures to mitigate the risk of exposure to contaminated

water within the storage and transport facilities of the PHWS

, but does not address procedures to mitigate risk associated with contamination within the groundwater resource.

These statements are very import ant because in 2008 it confirms the Navy acknowledged the important urgency of addressing the risk factors of the Facility and its’ proximity to a very important potable water supply. If the lack of potable water would jeopardize the Navy’s mission, then the Navy has to decide what is more important, these crumbling fuel tanks or their mission at Pearl Harbor. If Pearl Harbor’s mission is the most important, then the immediate repair or relocation of the fuel tanks should be a no brainer. Also, a catastrophic event which contaminates Honolulu’s groundwater

resource will have no consequence to the Navy and it is not with in their G roundwater P rotection P lan S cope or O bjectives. How sad. If a catastrophic leak occurs, what would Honolulu’s cost be?

The Final Groundwater Protection Plan of 2008 shows the tank maintenance and repair histories. There have been other fuel spills prior to the recent 27,000 gallons spilt in January 2014. The fact that there have been spills of 31,000, 32,000, 20,000, 10 ,000, 6,000, 5,000 gallons and more over the last 40 years or more indicate that the Navy is unable or unwilling to get ahead of the fuel spillage problem at the Facility.

There has been reference to the water flowing to the south and could not affect the Halawa well shaft that is northwest of the Facility. This was re

- stated by a Navy representative , Captain Dean Tufts, at the June 18, 2015 community meeting. However, in the Re

- evaluation of the Red Hill Tier 3 Risk Assessment dated May 4

, 2010; it states further tests proved that in certain circumstances it was determined that water does flow in the northwest direction.

The AOC needs to be re vised because these last tw o documents are very damning, unsettling and an eye opener to how fragil e the situation is

.