13216 Federal Register / Vol. 62, No. 53, Wednesday, March 19, 1997 / Proposed Rules

DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION

Federal Aviation Administration

14 CFR Parts 401, 411, 413, 415 and

417

[Docket No. 28851; Notice No. 97–2 ]

RIN 2120–AF99

Commercial Space Transportation

Licensing Regulations

AGENCY: Federal Aviation

Administration (FAA), DOT.

ACTION: Notice of proposed rulemaking

(NPRM).

SUMMARY: The Office of the Associate

Administrator for Commercial Space

Transportation (the Office) of the

Federal Aviation Administration,

Department of Transportation (DOT) is

proposing to amend the licensing

regulations for launching commercial

launch vehicles. The Office proposes to

amend its licensing regulations in order

to clarify its license application process

for launch vehicles launching from

federal launch ranges. The proposed

regulations are intended to provide

applicants and licensees greater

specificity and clarity regarding the

scope of a license, and regarding

licensing requirements and criteria.

DATES: Comments must be received on

or before May 19, 1997.

ADDRESSES: An original and four copies

of comments on this NPRM should be

addressed to: Federal Aviation

Administration, Office of the Chief

Counsel, Attention: Rules Docket (AGC–

200), Docket No. 28851, 800

Independence Avenue, SW.,

Washington, DC 20591. Comments may

also be sent electronically to the Rules

Docket by using the following internet

address: nprmcmt@mail.hq.faa.gov.

Comments may be examined in the

Rules Docket in Room 915G on

weekdays between 8:30 a.m. and 5:00

p.m., except federal holidays.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: J.

Randall Repcheck, Licensing and Safety

Division, (AST–200), Associate

Administrator for Commercial Space

Transportation, Federal Aviation

Administration, DOT, Room 5402a, 400

Seventh Street, Washington, DC 20590;

telephone (202) 366–2258; or Laura

Montgomery, Office of the Chief

Counsel, (AGC–200), Federal Aviation

Administration, DOT, Room 10424, 400

Seventh Street, Washington, DC 20590;

telephone (202) 366–9305.

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:

Availability of NPRM: Any person may

obtain a copy of this NPRM by

submitting a request to the Federal

Aviation Administration, Office of

Rulemaking, 800 Independence Avenue

SW., Washington, DC 20591, or by

calling (202) 267–9677.

Communications must identify the

notice number of this NPRM. Persons

interested in being placed on a mailing

list for future FAA NPRMs should

request a copy of Advisory Circular No.

11–2A, Notice of Proposed Rulemaking

Distribution System, which describes

application procedures.

An electronic copy of this document

may be downloaded using a modem and

suitable communications software from

the FAA regulations section of the

Fedworld electronic bulletin board

service (telephone: 703–321–3339) or

the Federal Register’s electronic bulletin

board service (telephone 202–512–

1661). Internet users may reach the

FAA’s web page at http://www.faa.gov

or the Federal Register’s webpage at

http://www.access.gpo.gov/su—docs for

access to recently published rulemaking

documents.

I. Introduction

By this Notice of Proposed

Rulemaking (Notice or NPRM), the

Office proposes to clarify license

application procedures and

requirements for conducting

commercial space launches. This Notice

provides information regarding the

scope of a launch license with respect

to expendable launch vehicles (ELVs)

launching from federal launch ranges,

the criteria for obtaining a license, and

the underlying safety rationale for the

Office’s launch licensing regime.

II. Background

The Commercial Space Launch Act of

1984, as codified at 49 U.S.C. Subtitle

IX—Commercial Space Transportation,

ch. 701, Commercial Space Launch

Activities, 49 U.S.C. 70101-70119 (1994)

(the Act), authorizes the Secretary of

Transportation to oversee, license and

regulate commercial launch activities

and the operation of launch sites as

carried out by U.S. citizens or within

the United States. 49 U.S.C. 70104,

70105. The Act directs the Secretary to

exercise this responsibility consistent

with public health and safety, safety of

property, and the national security and

foreign policy interests of the United

States. 49 U.S.C. 70105. The Office

carries out the Secretary’s

responsibilities for licensing launches

and the operation of launch sites, and

for encouraging, facilitating and

promoting commercial space launches

by the private sector. 49 U.S.C. § 70103.

Prior to November 15, 1995, the

Secretary’s responsibilities were

implemented by the Office of

Commercial Space Transportation,

which was located within the Office of

the Secretary in the Department of

Transportation. Now, the Associate

Administrator for Commercial Space

Transportation is part of DOT’s Federal

Aviation Administration. When this

administrative change was effected, the

Secretary delegated this authority to the

Administrator of the Federal Aviation

Administration, and the Administrator

redelegated this authority to the

Associate Administrator.

On August 4, 1994, President Clinton

announced a new National Space

Transportation Policy reaffirming the

government’s commitment to the

commercial space transportation

industry and the critical role of the

Department of Transportation in

encouraging and facilitating private

sector launch activities. The Office’s

proposed rules, by offering greater

specificity and certainty regarding

licensing requirements and the scope of

a license, should assist the launch

industry in its business and operational

planning. This will facilitate the private

sector’s launch activities by increasing

certainty and by easing its regulatory

burden.

A. Background on the Office’s

Commercial Launch Licensing

The Office licenses commercial

launches and the commercial operation

of launch sites in accordance with 14

CFR Ch. III. In April 1988, when the

Office first issued final rules, no

commercial launches had yet taken

place. Accordingly, the Office

established a flexible regime intended to

be responsive to an emerging industry

while at the same time ensuring public

safety. The Office noted that it would

‘‘continue to evaluate and, when

necessary, reshape its program in

response to growth, innovation and

diversity in this critically important

industry.’’ Commercial Space

Transportation; Licensing Regulations,

53 FR 11004, 11006 (1988). Under the

1988 regulations the Office

implemented a case-by-case approach to

evaluate launch license applications.

All commercial launches at the time

took place from federal launch ranges.

In conjunction with information

guidelines describing the Office’s

application process, the Office’s

regulations reflected the intent of

Congress that the Office evaluate the

policy aspects and safety of a proposed

launch. The Office followed a case-by-
Federal Register / Vol. 62, No. 53, Wednesday, March 19, 1997 / Proposed Rules 13217

case approach to performing these

reviews, tailoring its information

requests to the specifics of a given

launch proposal.

Since then, the Office has taken

further steps designed to simplify the

licensing process for launch operators

with established safety records. For

example, before issuing its final rules in

1988, the Office issued interim

regulations, in which it had

contemplated the possibility that ‘‘one

license could cover a specified series of

launches where the same safety

resources [would] support identical or

similar missions.’’ Commercial Space

Transportation; Licensing Regulations;

Interim Final Rule and Request for

Comments, 51 FR 6870, 6872 (1986).

In 1991, the Office implemented this

option by instituting a launch operator

license for similar launches carried out

by a single licensee. The launch

operator license currently authorizes a

licensee to conduct any number of

launches within defined parameters

over the course of a two year period.

The Office has continued to apply a

case-by-case analysis to licenses

authorizing a single launch or to

licenses authorizing a set of specific

launches.

The Office, in accordance with 49

U.S.C. 70112, imposes financial

responsibility requirements on a

licensee, commensurate with the scope

of the license, pursuant to which a

licensee is required either to purchase

insurance to protect launch participants

in the event of claims by third parties

and to protect against damage to

government property, or to otherwise

demonstrate financial responsibility. In

the event that there were a launch

accident and third party claims arising

out of that launch exceeded the

financial responsibility required by the

Office, the Act contains procedures

through which the government of the

United States may pay those excess

claims up to a statutory ceiling. See 49

U.S.C. 70113. The possible payment of

excess claims by the government for

damages related to a particular launch is

commonly referred to, albeit

erroneously, as ‘‘indemnification’’ of the

launch industry. The payment of excess

claims constitutes, in fact, only a

provisional agreement by the

government of the United States subject

to conditions, including Congressional

appropriation of funds.

In order to enhance the Office’s

communications with the public, the

Office developed an internet-based

information system which provides the

public with electronic access to the

Office. The system provides on-line

information to interested parties, and

allows applicants, through a secure

portion of the system, to submit

applications and related documents

electronically and to check the status of

applications and licenses. The system

currently contains a limited amount of

information, but includes schedules of

upcoming commercial launches, the

Office’s regulations, guidance

documents, and research studies. The

address is: http://www.dot.gov/faa/cst/.

B. Growth and Current Status of Launch

Industry

The number of commercial space

launches has increased over the years

since the first licensed commercial

launch in 1989. As of February 21, 1996,

fifty-seven licensed launches have taken

place from five different federal launch

ranges. Launch vehicles have included

traditional orbital launch vehicles such

as the Atlas, Titan and Delta, as well as

suborbital vehicles such as the Starfire.

New vehicles using traditional launch

techniques include the Lockheed Martin

Launch Vehicle (LMLV1) and

Conestoga. Unique vehicles such as the

Pegasus are also included in this count.

New concepts for launch vehicles are

proposed every year. For example, the

Pegasus air-launched rocket has been

developed since the passage of the Act.

On the horizon are sea-launched

rockets, balloon-launched rockets, and

partially reusable single-stage-to-orbit

vehicles. McDonnell Douglas is

developing the Delta III, the next in the

Delta family of launch vehicles. Several

companies are participating in

partnership with the National

Aeronautics and Space Administration

(NASA) to develop the DC-XA and X-33

launch vehicles incorporating reusable

and single-stage-to-orbit technology.

Currently, commercial launches take

place from federal launch ranges

operated by the Department of Defense

and NASA. Launch operators bring

launch vehicles to federal ranges such

as Cape Canaveral Air Station,

Vandenberg Air Force Base, White

Sands Missile Range or Wallops Flight

Facility for launch. A launch operator

obtains a number of services from a

federal range, including radar, tracking

and telemetry, flight termination and

other launch services. Pursuant to an

agreement between the federal range

and the launch operator, the federal

range has final authority over decisions

regarding whether to allow a launch to

proceed. A federal range operates

pursuant to its own internal rules and

procedures, and the launch operator

must comply with those rules and

procedures.

The U.S. commercial space

transportation industry faces strong

international competition. Ariane, the

European launch vehicle, continues to

be the market leader, with other

competition coming from China, Russia,

and Ukraine. The U.S. industry still

obtains a significant percentage of

launch contracts, and approximately

thirty commercial launches are planned

within the next three years.

Additionally, U.S. participation in

international ventures is increasing. For

example, International Launch Services

(ILS), comprised of Lockheed Martin

Corporation, Khrunichev Enterprise and

NPO Energia, markets Russia’s Proton

rockets and the U.S. Atlas. Another

partnership, Sea Launch Limited

Partnership (Sea Launch), involves

Boeing Commercial Space Company,

S.P. Korolev Rocket and Space

Corporation Energia, KB Yuzhnoye and

PO Yuzhnoye Mashinostroitelny Zavod,

and Kvaerner Moss Technologies a.s.,

which are U.S., Russian, Ukrainian and

Norwegian companies, respectively. Sea

Launch plans to launch commercial

rockets from a modified oil rig located

in the Pacific Ocean.

C. Current Proposal to Revise Licensing

Rules

With six years of experience in

regulating the commercial launch

industry, the Office initiated a process

for standardizing its licensing

regulations. Originally, when the Office

first initiated its licensing program, the

Office did not possess standardized

rules or requirements. Accordingly, it

evaluated each application individually

to ensure that a proposed launch would

not jeopardize public health and safety,

the safety of property, U.S. national

security or foreign policy interests or

international obligations of the United

States. Over the course of time, and with

the input of licensees and federal

launch ranges, the Office has evolved a

standardized approach to licensing

launches from federal launch ranges.

Accordingly, the Office now proposes to

implement that approach through

revisions to its regulations.

On October 13, 1994, in anticipation

of issuing a notice of proposed

rulemaking, the Office announced that it

was holding a public meeting to obtain

industry’s views to assist the Office in

developing an NPRM addressing

specific requirements for launch and

launch site operator licenses. Notice of

Public Meeting, 59 FR 52020 (1994).

The Office stated that it would

streamline its launch licensing process

by standardizing requirements and by

codifying certain information

requirements in its regulations. Id. The

Office also advised the public that it

would promulgate rules concerning
13218 Federal Register / Vol. 62, No. 53, Wednesday, March 19, 1997 / Proposed Rules

licensing the operation of a launch site.

Id. Recently, the Office has been advised

of a number of proposals for commercial

operation of a launch site. The Office

proposes to implement rules of general

applicability for launch site operation

through an additional notice of

proposed rulemaking in order to foster

certainty for this new industry as well.

Id.

The public meeting took place on

October 27, and 28, 1994, and was

attended by representatives of the

commercial launch industry, payload

companies, prospective commercial

launch site operators, interested

government agencies and the public.

Comments received at the meeting and

in subsequent written submissions to

the docket proved informative and

helpful. Public meeting participants

expressed views on a number of topics,

including the appropriate scope of a

launch license and whether Office

oversight duplicates that of the federal

ranges. Comments on the nature of a

safety review were directed for the most

part to proposed new vehicle systems

such as reusable and single-stage-toorbit vehicles. Prospective launch site

operators expressed their interest in a

flexible licensing program, and

addressed some of the particulars of risk

management.

After the meeting, participants took

advantage of the opportunity to submit

written comments. A total of thirteen

written comments were received from a

broad spectrum of the aerospace

industry, including launch services

providers such as Lockheed Martin,

McDonnell Douglas and Orbital

Sciences, and from prospective site

operators such as Alaska Aerospace

Development Corporation, Spaceport

Florida Authority and the Western

Commercial Space Center. The topics

focussed mainly on integration of

federal ranges into the licensing process,

the scope of launch and site licenses,

and the relationship between site

operators and launch operators. The

ideas expressed were consistent with

those voiced at the public meeting,

including the desire for a flexible

regulatory regime, performance

standards rather than design standards,

and a strong interest in avoiding

overlapping or conflicting government

requirements.

D. Subsequent Changes to the Office’s

Rules

The Office’s regulatory agenda

includes other issues as well as the

launch licensing rule amendments

proposed in this Notice. The first phase

of the Office’s agenda addresses

industry’s two most pressing needs: the

Office’s financial responsibility

requirements, which are addressed in a

separate notice of proposed rulemaking,

and standardization of the Office’s

licensing requirements for launches

from federal launch ranges. This Notice

proposes to codify the Office’s current

launch licensing program, and to clarify

how federally operated launch site

services and approval processes fit

within the Office’s licensing regime.

Future efforts will address other

issues. The Office is aware that

enterprises contemplating international

ventures are interested in determining

when a license is required. For example,

if a U.S. citizen plans to launch from a

foreign country, the Act requires that

the U.S. citizen obtain a license to do so.

If a U.S. citizen is conducting the

launch in conjunction with a foreign

entity, when does the involvement of

the U.S. citizen reach the point that the

U.S. citizen should be considered to be

launching the launch vehicle? Must the

U.S. launch operator have the right to

make the lift-off decision or have

control over the flight termination

system before the Office considers the

U.S. company to be launching the

launch vehicle? Must the U.S. company

participate in the manufacture or

integration of the launch vehicle? Must

the U.S. company possess the ability to

impose requirements on the operator of

the launch site? If the launch site

operator is a foreign government does

that divest the U.S. citizen of control

over its launch to the extent that it

cannot be said to be conducting the

launch?

To date, the Office has not received

concrete proposals on these issues, but

has instead dealt only with the

paradigm situation of launch from a

federally owned and operated range.

There, the launch operator provides a

launch vehicle, integrates the vehicle

and payload, and prepares for launch.

Although the federal range has final

authority over whether flight may occur,

the launch operator has the final

decision over whether to commit to

flight. As the Office has interpreted its

responsibilities to date, this

combination of activities and

responsibilities amounts to the launch

of a launch vehicle by the launch

operator. Some or all of the activities

which provide a basis for this

conclusion may be necessary for the

Office to make a determination that a

launch operator is conducting a launch.

Which specific activities are considered

necessary elements of the conduct of a

launch and which are not is a question

the Office has yet to confront in the

context of foreign involvement.

The Office expects that the issue will

arise not only in the international

context but also in the context of

launches occurring from commercial

launch sites. The Office’s initial view is

that it does not want to compel the

formation of business ventures in

particular ways or distort business

decisions by issuing rules regarding

hypothetical situations, and will make

decisions only on the basis of facts

before it. The Office would, however, be

interested in receiving additional

information or opinions on this issue.

The Office will also propose rules

regarding licensing the operation of a

launch site not operated by a federal

launch range. The Office is conducting

research on safety standards to govern

the operation of a launch site. It is also

analyzing the question of who requires

a license to operate a launch site either

at or near a federal launch range or at

a location not associated with federal

operations.

The commercial launch industry has

recently begun work on the

development of reusable components or

launch vehicles, although none are

commercially available yet, and no

applications to launch a reusable launch

vehicle have been filed. In anticipation

of future commercial development, and

in order to develop standards in this

area, the Office has begun a research

program to develop safety regulations

and standards. Until such safety

standards and regulations are

developed, the Office recognizes that

licensing of reusable launch vehicles

would be conducted on a case by case

basis. The Office’s recent move to the

FAA should provide access to helpful

‘‘lessons learned’’ from regulation of

aircraft. In the meantime, an applicant

for a license to launch a reusable launch

vehicle may rely upon parts 413 and

415 to the extent applicable.

The Office will address other issues in

future rulemakings as well. The Office

intends to update its administrative

procedures and will institute new rules

regarding compliance monitoring,

enforcement, and investigation

procedures. It also plans to update the

amateur rocket exemption. In the longer

term, the Office is also actively

pursuing, through research and

coordination with industry and other

government agencies, regulatory

concepts for reusable and single-stageto-orbit vehicles.

III. Launch License

The proposed changes to the launch

licensing regulations address licensing

requirements, including payload

determinations and policy reviews, and

information required from applicants
Federal Register / Vol. 62, No. 53, Wednesday, March 19, 1997 / Proposed Rules 13219

1 In 1994, a House Space, Science and

Technology Committee Report expressed the same

sentiments. The report accompanied H.R. 4489, the

NASA Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1995, a bill

that was not enacted into law.

proposing to launch vehicles employing

established technology and procedures

from federal launch ranges. It is this

segment of the industry with which the

Office has the greatest experience and

which has the most immediate need for

greater specificity. The Office intends at

this time to formalize its practice of

issuing two different types of launch

licenses, the launch operator license

pursuant to which a licensee may

perform any launches that fall within

broad parameters as described in its

license, and the launch-specific license,

which allows a licensee to conduct only

those launches enumerated in the

license. The Office also intends to

advise the industry of a proposed

change in the Office’s interpretation of

the definition of ‘‘launch’’ and thus of

the scope of a launch license.

A. Scope of Launch License and

Definition of ‘‘Launch’’

The Act requires a launch operator to

obtain a license for the launch of a

launch vehicle. Accordingly, the

definition of ‘‘launch’’ reveals the scope

of a launch license. Greater certainty

regarding this definition will allow

licensees to plan better regarding a

number of issues. Because the Office’s

financial responsibility requirements

and eligibility for payment by the

United States of excess claims for

liability for damages to third parties are

coextensive with licensed activities,

knowledge of the scope of a license

allows a licensee to manage its risks

appropriately and to make its own

provisions for financial responsibility or

insurance coverage in addition to that

required under the statute.

The Office’s licensing authority

derives from the Act, which states that

a license is required ‘‘to launch a launch

vehicle.’’ 49 U.S.C. 70104(a). The Act

defines ‘‘launch’’ as ‘‘to place or try to

place a launch vehicle and any

payload—(A) in a suborbital trajectory;

(B) in Earth orbit in outer space; or (C)

otherwise in outer space.’’ 49 U.S.C.

70102(3). The word ‘‘launch’’ is

commonly understood to mean ignition,

lift-off and flight of a launch vehicle, as

well as, perhaps, certain immediately

preliminary activities such as

countdown and other final steps

necessary to effectuate flight.

The Act does not provide for the

licensing of all pre-launch activities.

That the Act addresses pre-launch

activities without mandating that they

be licensed indicates that the statute did

not contemplate licensing all pre-launch

ground operations. For example, the Act

discusses pre-launch activities in its

definition of ‘‘launch services.’’ See 49

U.S.C. 70102(5). ‘‘Launch services’’

mean ‘‘(A) activities involved in the

preparation of a launch vehicle and

payload for launch; and (B) the conduct

of a launch.’’ Id. The Act does not

require, however, a license to provide

launch services. The Act treats as

distinct activities the preparation of a

launch vehicle for launch and the

conduct of a launch, but provides for

the licensing of only the latter of those

activities. Likewise significant is that

preparatory activities described in the

Act’s ‘‘launch services’’ definition do

not also appear within the Act’s

definition of ‘‘launch.’’

The Office’s current practice of

licensing site operations associated with

the conduct of a launch, commonly

referred to as ‘‘gate to gate,’’ is to license

all commercial, launch related activities

by a launch operator operating within

the gates of a federal range. Under this

view, a launch operator’s operations are

licensed, even if ignition and flight are

not imminent and even if the launch

vehicle itself is not present at the range.

‘‘Gate to gate’’ evolved out of an

industry desire for broad license

coverage. Launch licensees requested

some pre-flight coverage, and the

question arose as to when that coverage

began. The Commercial Space

Transportation Advisory Committee

(COMSTAC), which is composed of

industry and public interest

representatives, has historically advised

the Secretary of Transportation that preflight activities should be eligible for

indemnification because the risks could

well exceed available private insurance.

As is evident from testimony by the

Director of the Office to Congress in

March 1990, COMSTAC recommended

as early as April 1989, that a licensee’s

insurance requirements cover third

party claims from the time the licensee

enters the federal range to conduct

authorized launch activities. In

September 1992, COMSTAC reaffirmed

this view when it adopted the

recommendation of its Risk

Management Working Group regarding

the scope of a launch license. The

working group recommended that the

Office’s licensing authority ‘‘applies

without limitation to all operations

conducted by a commercial launch

operator at a federal launch facility in

connection with a licensed launch,

commencing with entry onto the

facility’’ and the COMSTAC adopted

this recommendation. COMSTAC Risk

Management Working Group

Recommendation (adopted Sept. 19,

1992, Full Meeting Transcript 83). In

1992, the Office reached an

accommodation with the Air Force that

an Office license extended ‘‘gate to

gate.’’ At that time, the Air Force

questioned whether the Office had

licensing authority ‘‘gate to gate.’’ The

Air Force agreed to accommodate the

Office and industry by allowing the

Office to evaluate a licensee’s financial

responsibility requirements gate to gate.

This approach has been the Office’s

official position with respect to the

scope of its licenses. On March 6, 1990,

in testimony to the Subcommittee on

Space Science and Applications,

Stephanie Lee-Miller, then Director of

the Office, stated that the insurance

requirements of an Office license

covered claims from the time a licensee

entered a federal range to perform

authorized launch site operations.

Other government sectors, including

NASA, have criticized this approach as

overly broad. In 1995, House Science

Committee Report No. 104–233,

accompanying H.R. 2043, the NASA

Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1996,

noted that members of Congress view

with concern this approach to covering

all licensee activities within the gates of

a federal range, and considered it too

broad.1 Although recognizing that the

report language does not carry the force

and effect of law, the Office is

concerned that launch operators might

be pursuing their pre-launch activities

in reliance on an indemnification that

must be enacted by Congress and that

may or may not be available from

Congress. This prompted the Office to

revisit the issue of the scope of a license

and, thus, necessarily, of the definition

of ‘‘launch.’’ Accordingly, the Office

hopes to reach a new and clear

understanding of the meaning of

‘‘launch’’ and thus of the scope of a

launch license through public

discussion of these issues.

Specifically, the Office proposes to

revise its current policy of licensing all

commercial activities within the gate

and to license only, as the Act

mandates, the ‘‘launch of a launch

vehicle.’’ Id. The definition of ‘‘launch’’

must therefore be stated with

specificity. The Office has taken into

account the views expressed at its

public meeting and in subsequent

written comments favoring an expansive

approach, and proposes to define

‘‘launch’’ as broadly as possible while

still remaining within the confines of

the Act.

At the public meeting, commenters’

concern over the scope of a license was

often grounded in the availability of

indemnification. The then Martin

Marietta advocated a very broad license
13220 Federal Register / Vol. 62, No. 53, Wednesday, March 19, 1997 / Proposed Rules

2References to ‘‘Tr.’’ mean that the information

cited is contained in the transcript for October 27,

1994, the first day of the Office’s public meeting.

References to ‘‘Tr. II’’ mean that the information

cited is contained in the transcript for October 28,

1994, the second day of the Office’s public meeting.

The transcripts are available for public review and

copying in Room PL 401, 7th Street SW,

Washington, DC 20590.

to allow indemnification to attach. Tr. II

at 26.2 Orbital Sciences Corporation

(OSC) requested that government

indemnification be provided for

preparatory activities as well as for

flight. Comments of OSC at 5. Likewise,

the 45th Space Wing of the Air Force

favored extending the scope of a license

to cover off-site payload processing in

order for indemnification to apply. Tr.

II at 43–44. The Air Force Space

Command recommended that the Office

license all commercial pre-launch

processing activity occurring on federal

ranges in order for the Office to impose

its financial responsibility requirements.

Tr. II at 36, Comments of Air Force

Space Command at 2, 4. This

recommendation stems from the Air

Force’s interest in minimizing any

adverse impacts of a commercial launch

accident on national assets. Comments

of Air Force Space Command at 4.

Several commenters, including the

45th Space Wing of the Air Force,

Orbital Sciences Corporation and the

Western Commercial Space Center

(WCSC)/California Spaceport Authority,

suggested tying the license to hazardous

activities rather than to geographical

location or proximity in time to flight.

Tr. II at 31, 43, 46, 53, Comments of

OSC at 6, Comments of WCSC, Inc. at

2. USAIG, an insurance company,

thought the point at which risks change

the most appropriate means of

definition. Tr. 53, 65. OSC advocated

the inclusion of specific activities, such

as integration, testing, fueling and

mating of launch vehicles to carrier

aircraft, in a license because the risks of

fire or explosion are just as great for

certain pre-ignition activities as they are

subsequent to ignition. Comments of

OSC at 6. OSC also advocated that air

and ground launched vehicles be treated

in an equivalent manner under the

definition of ‘‘launch.’’ Comments of

OSC at 6. Although not defining

‘‘launch’’ in this fashion, OSC

recommended that the Office license

commence with the arrival of motors at

the launch site for ground launched

vehicles and aircraft roll forward on the

runway for air-launched vehicles.

Comments of OSC at 1.

Other public meeting participants

urged the adoption of a more narrow

definition of ‘‘launch’’ and thus of the

scope of the license. For example,

Spaceport Florida Authority (Spaceport

Florida), deeming overly inclusive the

licensing of any activity on a federal

range, suggested that ‘‘a launch activity

is the final assembly of a launch vehicle

with the intent to fly.’’ Tr. II at 50.

According to Spaceport Florida, the

storage and maintenance of ordnance,

while hazardous, is less dangerous than

physical assembly of the launch vehicle.

Tr. II at 50. Martin Marietta Commercial

Launch Services, opined that each

launch vehicle possesses a significant

launch event that begins its launch

process, and that for an Atlas rocket that

event might be when the booster is

placed on the stand. Tr. II at 62.

Alaska Aerospace Development

Corporation (AADC) warned that even

as industry received ‘‘indemnification’’

for a license with a broader scope, so

would industry receive more regulation,

which might, in the long run, prove

more expensive than the benefits

received from an expansive license

coverage. Tr. II at 64, AADC Comments

at 1. Likewise, Texas Rocket Company

argued against licensing ‘‘small

sounding type rockets’’ or any vehicle

‘‘which at its maximum calculated range

will not cross the launch range

perimeter,’’ thus exhibiting a lack of

interest in the benefits of

indemnification. Texas Rocket

Company Comments at 1. Goddard

Space Flight Center and Wallops Flight

Facility of NASA and California

Spaceport Authority noted that if

hazardous activities occur outside of a

federal range, other regulatory regimes

exist to ensure safety, and did not

consider necessary a DOT license

extending beyond the boundaries of a

federal range. Tr. II at 47, 53.

In 1995, the House Science

Committee also expressed an opinion on

this issue, suggesting that ‘‘launch’’

could include ‘‘activities that precede

flight that (i) are closely proximate in

time to ignition or lift-off, (ii) entail

critical steps preparatory to initiating

flight, (iii) are unique to space launch,

and (iv) are inherently so hazardous as

to warrant the Department’s regulatory

oversight under Chapter 701.’’ NASA

Authorization Act, FY 1996, H.R. Rep.

No. 233, 104th Cong., 1st Sess., at 60

(1995).

The Office considered three possible

options in defining ‘‘launch’’ for

purposes of developing proposed

regulations. The Office considered

adopting its current ‘‘gate to gate’’

definition but was concerned that ‘‘gate

to gate’’ created a false impression that

indemnification would be available for

all commercial pre-launch activities

taking place within the confines of a

federal range. The Office also weighed

the most narrow approach, which

would employ the ordinary definition of

‘‘launch’’ as only those flight activities

beginning at ‘‘T minus 0 (T–0),’’ or

intentional first stage ignition; but the

Office concluded that this approach

failed to provide regulatory oversight of

hazardous activities and that policy

reasons in the form of international

competition weighed against this

formulation. A less expansive approach

than ‘‘gate to gate,’’ one within the

scope of the Office’s mandate, would

include within a license those activities

that are part of a launch as

contemplated by the Act’s directive to

license the ‘‘launch of a launch

vehicle.’’ Under the approach the Office

proposes in this Notice, because risks

change shortly after the launch vehicle

or its hazardous components enter the

gate of a federal launch range, launch

would begin, for purposes of licensing,

upon the arrival of that vehicle at the

federal launch range. The following

discussion describes each of these three

options and summarizes their

advantages and disadvantages.

1. ‘‘Gate to Gate’’

Certain equities favor continuation of

‘‘gate to gate’’ as the definition of

‘‘launch.’’ The ‘‘gate to gate’’ approach

constitutes an attempt to treat different

launch vehicles similarly. Whether a

launch vehicle undergoes hazardous

integration significantly in advance of

flight, as the Delta and Pegasus do, or

closer in time as an Atlas does, a license

covers the same pre-launch activities:

all launch related activities performed

by a launch operator within the gates of

a federal range. Additionally, ‘‘gate to

gate’’ licensing ensures that the Office

requires launch operators to

demonstrate financial responsibility

through the purchase of insurance

coverage or other appropriate measures

for possible damage arising out of

commercial activities to government

property. ‘‘Gate to gate’’ licensing also

receives support because of the view

that a launch operator would be

indemnified for damage to third parties

caused by pre-flight and post-flight

ground operations.

The Office will not define ‘‘launch’’ to

encompass all pre-flight activities by a

launch operator on a federal range

because not all activities are part of the

launch of a launch vehicle. A launch

operator may be present on the range,

and engaged in preparatory activities,

but not be working on a launch vehicle

or its component parts in preparation

for flight. A licensed launch operator

may be present at a federal range

between launches. The Office is aware

of launch operators who perform
Federal Register / Vol. 62, No. 53, Wednesday, March 19, 1997 / Proposed Rules 13221

3Arianespace indemnification for third party

liability takes effect the day of the launch and

continues for thirty-six months.

construction activities within the gates

of a federal range months or years prior

to any anticipated flight of a launch

vehicle. At that point, the launch

operator may or may not be engaged in

the type of hazardous activities

warranting DOT oversight or

indemnification because construction

activity, however hazardous, is not part

of the process of preparing the vehicle

itself for flight.

In support of ‘‘gate to gate’’ licensing

it has been suggested that pre-launch

licensing authority arises out of the

Act’s directive to license ‘‘operation of

a launch site.’’ See 49 U.S.C. 70104(a).

This argument does not, however,

accord with the Office’s interpretation

of what it means to ‘‘operate a launch

site.’’ Now that the Office is preparing

to license commercial operation of

launch sites, it is necessary to

differentiate between safety and control

issues. The party in control of a site

must be authorized by license to operate

that site. In the case of a launch taking

place from a federal range, the launch

operator is not, in fact, operating a

launch site. The site is operated by the

federal range, under whose rules the

launch operator operates and from

which launch operators must obtain

clearances and approvals. Range

personnel perform services, make

decisions regarding the activities of the

launch operator and enforce the range’s

rules. Control over the site rests with the

federal range rather than with the

launch operator, and the launch

operator does not operate the site.

In addition to exceeding the mandate

of the statute, ‘‘gate to gate’’ also results

in contradictory treatment of similarly

situated persons. The situation of

Astrotech Space Operations, L.P.

(Astrotech), a payload processing

facility, highlights this problem because

Astrotech is located on a federal range,

or ‘‘within the gate,’’ at Vandenberg and

‘‘outside the gate’’ at Cape Canaveral.

Astrotech’s licensee customers at

Vandenberg may well believe they

would be indemnified were there an

accident arising out of hazardous

vehicle integration activities in light of

the fact that current license coverage is

so extensive. Yet Astrotech in Florida,

which is not located on a federal range,

is unable to offer its customers

comparable benefits, even though it

performs the same functions.

In sum, although there are benefits to

‘‘gate to gate’’ licensing, because ‘‘gate to

gate’’ appears to encompass activities

outside of the definition of ‘‘launch,’’

the Office proposes that a launch license

for launch of a launch vehicle will not

commence when the launch operator

enters a federal range.

2. ‘‘T Minus 0 (T–0)’’ or Intentional First

Stage Ignition

The Office also considered defining

‘‘launch’’ as the word is ordinarily

understood. This would limit the scope

of a launch license to activities

commencing at intentional first stage

ignition. Were a launch license to cover

only those activities, the launch

industry would no longer be eligible for

so-called indemnification for damages

arising out of any preparatory activities.

The regulatory burden, however, would

be correspondingly less. A licensee

would not, for instance, be required to

obtain a license as early in the process

as it must for gate to gate, nor would it

be required to provide the Office as

much information. Likewise, this

approach would result in similar

treatment of licensees regardless of the

type of vehicle employed or the timing

or location of hazardous activities. The

Office carefully weighed this approach.

Statutory support for a narrow

definition of ‘‘launch’’ and a

correspondingly limited scope for a

launch license is strong. As discussed

previously, the Act does not provide for

the licensing of all activities related to

launch. The statute distinguishes

between the conduct of a launch and

preparation for a launch, characterizing

the combination as ‘‘launch services,’’

for which no license is intended. See 49

U.S.C. 70102(5). ‘‘Launch’’ may be

defined using the ordinary meaning of

the word. In fact, Arianespace provides

an even later onset for the

commencement of indemnification,

defining the commencement of launch

as the time at which cable clamps open

and release the launch vehicle.3 This

takes place after intentional ignition by

several seconds. That launch starts at

intentional ignition is supported by

industry practice and by comments

made at the Office’s public meeting in

October 1994.

Public meeting participants displayed

consensus on the definition of

‘‘launch.’’ The Space Transportation

Association (STA), which includes a

number of launch providers as

members, recommended that the

Office’s regulation of launches be

limited to the transport elements of a

launch. Tr. 67, 108–09. STA observed

that once a ‘‘transportation service has

been completed, * * *, at that point

the service has been terminated and it’s

up to the user to complete whatever it

has to do,’’ noting that in other

transportation industries other agencies

deal with the particularities of the cargo.

Tr. 108–09. According to STA, only if

the payload itself were hazardous would

there be a role for the Office. Tr. 109.

McDonnell Douglas thought that not all

on-site operations should be considered

pre-launch. Tr. 115. McDonnell Douglas

noted that OSHA already regulates

much of the ground activity. Tr. 116.

With respect to Orbital Science

Corporation’s Pegasus vehicle, NASA

Wallops stated that the takeoff of an

airplane does not constitute the

beginning of a launch, and

recommended that ‘‘launch’’ for such a

vehicle commence when the rocket is

released. Tr. 141–42. Orbital Sciences

Corporation preferred a ‘‘wheels up’’

definition of launch not only ‘‘because

of the indemnification that it provides

but because ‘wheels up’ has been

defined collectively as the stage zero of

the mission.’’ Tr. 144. In written

comments, OSC, in the context of

recommending that a license consist of

two parts, suggested that launch begin at

ignition or aircraft roll forward.

Comments of OSC at 1. In short, there

is not a great deal of variation regarding

what ‘‘launch’’ is commonly understood

to mean.

Despite this consensus, the Office

proposes to define launch more broadly,

and, as the commenters suggested in the

context of license coverage, define

‘‘launch’’ in accordance with the point

in time at which risks change. Weighing

the burden to industry of more

regulatory oversight against the benefits

to it of indemnification and the benefit

to the public of enhanced public safety,

the Office proposes to define ‘‘launch’’

more expansively than the ordinary

definition of the word would suggest.

This would mean that the Office may

license more than simply the ignition,

lift-off and flight portions of a launch.

‘‘Launch’’ would commence when

vehicle components enter the federal

range. Were the Office to define

‘‘launch’’ only in terms of ignition and

flight, it would ignore the fact that it is

shortly after the arrival of the vehicle or

its component parts that the risks to

government property and to the public

increase. With the arrival of the vehicle

begin the inherently hazardous vehicle

integration activities such as fuel tank

testing, fueling, solid rocket motor

handling and processing, and the

installation of ordnance.

A strict construction of the Act would

also ignore considerations of

international competition. The Act

charges the Office with encouraging,

facilitating and promoting launches by

the commercial launch industry of the

United States. 49 U.S.C. 70103(b)(1).

The U.S. launch industry competes

internationally with European, Russian,
13222 Federal Register / Vol. 62, No. 53, Wednesday, March 19, 1997 / Proposed Rules

4The term ‘‘mishap’’ encompasses unplanned

events resulting in injury, occupational illness, or

damage to or loss of equipment or property, or

damage to the environment.

Ukrainian and Chinese launch vehicles.

The European launch vehicle, Ariane,

which is the market leader, provides

indemnification to its payload

customers commencing the day of

launch and extending for thirty-six

months on orbit thereafter. It is

commonly understood that the French

government would accept responsibility

for the payment of damages that may be

awarded for damage caused by

Arianespace launches. For certain

launches, the member states of the

European Space Agency in turn

indemnify the French government, and

Arianespace is obligated to reimburse

the French government for amounts up

to 400 million French francs per launch

for any damages the French government

is required to pay. As the report of the

Senate Committee on Commerce,

Science and Transportation noted,

foreign government support of national

launch systems provides advantages to

vehicles such as the European Ariane

and the Russian Proton. See S. Rep. No.

593, 100th Cong., 2d Sess. (1988).

Although the Act does not provide

indemnification for on-orbit activities of

customers of U.S. launch vehicles,

greater coverage of preparatory activities

would provide U.S. companies some

measure of competitiveness with respect

to their foreign competitors. In the

interest of providing American launch

companies competitive parity, the

Office proposes to define ‘‘launch’’ more

broadly than the common definition.

3. Vehicle at the Gate

The Office proposes to license as

launch those preparatory activities that

may be considered part of a launch. The

Act defines ‘‘launch’’ to mean ‘‘to place

or try to place a launch vehicle and any

payload—(A) in a suborbital trajectory;

(B) in Earth orbit in outer space; or (C)

otherwise in outer space.’’ 49 U.S.C.

70102(3). Although the Act

differentiates between the conduct of a

launch and launch services, and only

directs the licensing of launches, the

definition of ‘‘launch’’ itself speaks only

of placing or trying to place a launch

vehicle and any payload into an orbit or

otherwise in outer space. This definition

is silent as to when the act of launching

or of ‘‘placing’’ commences. Because the

statutory definition is as broad as it is,

this lack of specificity requires the

Office to determine, in the

implementation of its rulemaking

authority and on the basis of its

experience and expertise, when

‘‘launch’’ begins.

The Office proposes to include within

the definition of ‘‘launch’’ the flight of

a launch vehicle, and those hazardous

pre-flight activities that are closely

proximate in time to flight and are

unique to space flight. There are certain

pre-flight activities so integral to the

launch of a launch vehicle that they

should be considered part of the launch

itself even though they do not constitute

flight. Additionally, there are hazards

associated with pre-flight activity that

are proximate in time to flight and

unique to space flight. The Office’s

regulatory charter encompasses more

than flight.

In order to advance the interests of

safety, the Office proposes to define the

commencement of launch as the

moment at which hazardous activities

related to the assembly and ultimate

flight of the launch vehicle begin,

which, for purposes of consistency and

clarity, the Office deems to be when the

major components of a licensee’s launch

vehicle enter, for purposes of preparing

for flight, the gate of a federal launch

range from which flight will occur.

Defining ‘‘launch’’ as the arrival of the

vehicle at the gate is in accord with the

proposals of a number of commenters,

who suggested that the Office define

‘‘launch’’ to begin when hazardous

activities start. The Office is charged by

statute with protecting the public, and

a definition that recognizes hazards will

address concerns regarding public

health and safety. Only if an activity is

so hazardous as to pose a threat to third

parties should regulatory oversight by

the Office be exercised, and

‘‘indemnification’’ to recompense third

parties be available. Because shortly

after vehicle components arrive,

hazardous activities related to the

assembly and ultimate flight of the

launch vehicle begin, the arrival of the

vehicle or its parts is a logical point at

which the Office should ensure that a

launch operator is exercising safe

practices and is financially responsible

for any damage it may cause. These

hazardous activities include, but are not

limited to, fuel tank wet testing,

ordnance installation, spin balancing

and the stacking of motors. They are

hazardous because they expose third

parties and government property to risk

of damage or loss.

For purposes of ascertaining the start

of launch, the Office reviewed the

hazardous activities associated with the

launch of a launch vehicle to determine

when those hazardous activities started.

It is the experience of the Office that

commercial launch vehicles share a

number of hazardous procedures, and

that most of those procedures take place

once the vehicle is at the launch site in

order to minimize hazardous transport

and exposure time.

The Office prepared a study in 1994,

available in draft, titled ‘‘Prelaunch

Hazardous Operations for the Delta,

Atlas, Titan at Cape Canaveral Air

Station, Pegasus at Vandenberg Air

Force Base, Conestoga at Wallops Flight

Facility and Black Brant at White Sands

Missile Range.’’ Copies are available

through the docket. The study analyzed

similarities in the risk profiles for preflight processing of these vehicles, and

compared the pre-flight processing

timelines for the various vehicles. The

results complement information

available in the Office’s ‘‘Hazard

Analysis of Commercial Space

Transportation,’’ May 1988. The amount

of damage that a vehicle may cause

varies among vehicles, depending upon

such factors as the mass of the vehicle,

the number of stages, the presence and

number of solid rocket motors, and the

type and quantity of propellants. The

launch vehicles studied and their preflight processing procedures are similar

in that each has a similar hazardous

potential.

The study showed that even though

pre-flight processing procedures and the

sequence of those procedures may vary

among vehicles, the vehicles studied

share such pre-flight processing

procedures as solid rocket motor

handling and processing, flight

termination system or separation

ordnance installation and checkout, and

fueling. These activities occur at

different times for different vehicles.

The likelihood of a mishap 4 resulting

from these procedures is similar for

each vehicle. These procedures

constitute hazardous operations that

have an identifiable or otherwise

quantifiable probability of occurrence

(Po) of a mishap. The probabilities that

these operations will result in a mishap

are approximately Po=10¥4 to 10¥5 for

solid rocket motor handling and

processing; Po=10¥5 for flight

termination system or separation

ordnance installation and checkout, and

Po=10¥3 to 10¥6 for fueling. ‘‘Eastern

Launch Site Safety Programs,’’ Louis J.

Ullian (Commercial Space Risk and

Insurance Symposium, Cocoa Beach,

Florida, Oct. 26, 1988). These

probabilities are relied upon by launch

companies, federal agencies and federal

ranges for their analyses of hazardous

operations.

The operations are considered

hazardous because their processes may

lead to identifiable mishaps and

dangerous consequences. Solid rocket

motor handling and processing may

result in ignition of the propellant,
Federal Register / Vol. 62, No. 53, Wednesday, March 19, 1997 / Proposed Rules 13223

either explosively or otherwise. This

may be caused by the unconstrained

burning of a major portion of the

propellant if a situation were to develop

that did not allow the proper venting of

the burning propellant. Casualties and

property damage may result if an

installed igniter initiates and causes an

engine or solid rocket motor to become

fully propulsive, as during flight.

Casualties or damage may result from

fire, explosion or toxic fumes that may

be a by-product of combustion. These

events may result in direct damage or

casualties as the consequence of blast

and debris effects. These events may

also lead to secondary effects such as

fires or explosions that may be caused

by the direct blast and debris effects.

Flight termination system or

separation ordnance installation and

checkout may result in lethal or

damaging releases of energy. The

inadvertent ignition of installed or

uninstalled ordnance, including that of

the flight termination system and

explosive bolts installed on various

separation systems could result in

explosion and debris.

Fueling may result in a range of

consequences, including fires, either

pool fires or fireballs, or the release of

vapor clouds, which may be toxic or

which may ignite. These events may

occur because of leakage during fueling

or spills during an accident. If such a

mishap involves toxic propellants, toxic

components of the fuels may be released

into the atmosphere or spilled on the

ground. If a vehicle releases its

hazardous materials into the

atmosphere, it could expose people at a

launch site or in the public at large to

those hazards.

These findings are based on the

Office’s 1994 review of launch vehicle

manufacturers’ data, commercial launch

baseline assessments, past maximum

probable loss determination analyses

and Ullian’s 1988 presentation at the

Commercial Space Risk and Insurance

Symposium. As a general rule,

hazardous operations begin as soon as,

or shortly after, a launch vehicle’s major

systems arrive at a government launch

facility.

The Office will continue to employ a

geographic element by using entry of the

launch vehicle onto a federal range as

part of its definition of ‘‘launch.’’ This

ensures consistency and clarity of

interpretation. Consistency is

guaranteed by the fact that regardless of

vehicle type, each vehicle will receive

the same regulatory coverage. Although

some commenters maintain that launch

begins at different points for different

vehicles, because the Office wishes to

treat launch operators in an equivalent

fashion, the Office will not define

‘‘launch’’ on the basis of the launch

vehicle. Moreover, reliance on a

geographic element provides clarity of

interpretation even for a launch operator

of a new vehicle using different

technology. An applicant seeking a

license for a new vehicle will know to

plan for license coverage at the time its

vehicle enters a federal range.

Additionally, the Office considers it

inappropriate to license pre-flight

activities located outside of the federal

range. Before the vehicle components

are brought together at a federal range

for integration or assembly in

anticipation of flight, flight is not

imminent and the separate components

are thus not part of the process which

Congress intended to protect through

the risk management scheme of the Act.

Additionally, it has not been shown that

insurance is unavailable for

manufacturing activities. Indeed, that

commercial operations exist off-range to

manufacture and process vehicle

components and payloads indicates to

the Office that the hazards are not so

extreme as to stifle the development of

facilities and services off a federal range.

There are pre-flight activities that are

unique to space flight and that may be

considered part of launch, as the term

is commonly understood. Countdown,

for example, occurs prior to ignition and

flight, yet may be considered part of a

launch. Many of the activities that take

place once major systems of a launch

vehicle arrive at a federal range are

unique to space flight as well. These

include vehicle integration and testing,

fueling and the other activities

discussed earlier as hazardous.

Another aspect of the Office’s

definition attempts to capture those

activties that are proximate in time to

flight. If activities are close in time to

flight they are more likely to constitute

necessary or integral elements of the

launch. For example, fueling for liquidfueled vehicles usually takes place not

long before flight to minimize the risks

attendant to the exposure of a fueled

vehicle, and the Office would consider

that activity to be a component of

launch under the Act. On the other

hand, the Office does not intend to

license components stored at a federal

range for a considerable period of time

prior to flight. The Office is aware that

the definition of launch may be

construed to encompass motor storage

as well. However, if motors arrive at a

federal range for purposes of storage

rather than as part of a launch

campaign, the Office does not consider

that storage part of a launch. The Office

is interested in views regarding the

ramifications of this approach to motor

storage and with respect to any other

activity which might arguably not

constitute part of a pending launch

campaign.

Although initially producing licenses

of considerable duration, the Office

believes that its proposed ‘‘vehicle at

the gate’’ definition of launch may, over

time, result in licenses of shorter

duration. As industry practices evolve,

a vehicle’s arrival at the range will be

more closely proximate to the time of

flight. Comments at the public meeting

described industry’s evolution toward

‘‘just in time’’ processing. A

representative of the 45th Space Wing of

the Air Force noted that launch

operators are attempting to bring vehicle

components to the range in final form

with only some assembly required. Tr.

II at 33. Therefore, the arrival of vehicle

components may eventually occur

closer in time to ignition, lift-off and

flight.

Of interest to the Office are the

answers to a number of related

questions. For example, is it likely that

the proposed definition of ‘‘launch’’

might result in changed activity on the

part of licensees? Would a licensee wait

until its vehicle arrives to perform

unrelated hazardous activities? If so,

what are those activities?

4. When Does Launch End?

The current practice of the Office is to

define the end of a launch as the point

after payload separation when the last

action over which the licensee has

direct or indirect control over the

launch vehicle occurs. For a liquidfueled stage, that point may be when

any remaining fuel is emptied from the

upper stage, and the vehicle tank is

vented and otherwise ‘‘safed.’’ For solid

rocket motors, that point may be when

the upper stage is dead or inert and the

payload is released.

Others apply different definitions to

the end of launch. The 1994 House

Committee Report suggests that launch

ends when the payload is placed into

orbit or in its planned trajectory in outer

space. The 45th Space Wing considers

a launch complete when all hazardous

activities are secured and, for purposes

of flight safety, upon orbital insertion.

Tr. II at 66. Orbital insertion takes place

when a launch vehicle achieves orbital

velocity, or when its instantaneous

impact point leaves the earth.

McDonnell Douglas pointed out that

there are a number of post-flight ground

operations which would apply to

reusable launch vehicles, such as

draining propellants, pressuring down

gas systems, securing all systems and

refurbishing the launch pad. Tr. 90.
13224 Federal Register / Vol. 62, No. 53, Wednesday, March 19, 1997 / Proposed Rules

The Office believes that defining

launch to end at orbital insertion

terminates oversight of a launch too

soon for safety. Damage to other orbiting

material may still ensue as the result of

activities subsequent to orbital

insertion. Risk exists of the possible

collision of a launch vehicle or its

components with other objects in space.

The orbit of a launch vehicle may decay,

and its possible reentry would endanger

public health and safety and the safety

of property on earth. Additionally,

dangerous orbital debris might be

generated.

The Office proposes to retain its

current practice of defining the

cessation of launch. From a practical

point of view, the Office believes that

this definition keeps pace with

technology. As the one with control

over the launch vehicle, the licensee is

in the best position to minimize the

probability that the vehicle will cause

harm. If improvements in technology

increase a licensee’s ability to control its

vehicle, then the Office will expect the

licensee to do so in a safe manner.

With respect to ground operations, the

Office’s current practice is to consider

post-flight ground operations part of a

launch license and thus as part of

launch. The Office does not propose to

continue to regard post-flight ground

operations for expendable launch

vehicles as part of ‘‘launch.’’ The Office

considered several options as to when

ground operations were no longer

considered part of a launch. Under the

first option, ground operations would

not be considered part of launch once

the launch vehicle left the ground.

Reentry activities aside, it has not been

the Office’s experience that post-flight

activities involve the same levels of risk

as pre-flight activities, where the

handling, integration and fueling of the

vehicle pose substantial hazards.

Alternatively, ground operations for

launch could end when launch ends in

the context of flight, namely, when the

last act over which the licensee has

control occurs. This alternative would

allow for at least part of the post-flight

ground operations to be covered by the

license. The end of launch for purposes

of flight is not, however, related to

activities on the ground. The Office is

concerned that attempting to create such

a connection would be arbitrary and

might inappropriately influence a

licensee’s post-flight ground operation

procedures. The third option considered

by the Office was to define the end of

ground operations for launch as that

point at which all personnel may

resume operations at the launch pad

and related environs. This approach

recognizes that hazardous operations do

occur subsequent to ignition and lift off.

These operations include securing

ground propellant and pneumatic

systems and verifying through

inspection of the pad that no post-flight

hazards exist. The operations cease

upon a determination that the launch

pad and other launch related facilities

no longer endanger personnel.

Because the hazards associated with

ground operations subsequent to lift off

are not related to the preparation of the

vehicle for flight, the Office proposes to

define the end of launch for purposes of

ground operations as the point at which

the launch vehicle leaves the ground.

This analysis applies to expendable

launch vehicles. For the time being,

judgment is reserved with respect to

reusable launch vehicles.

B. Formalizing Launch and Launch

Operator Licenses

In order to enable the Office to issue

a license for a single mission or for

multiple missions, the proposed

licensing structure provides for two

types of launch licenses, the launchspecific and the launch operator license.

A launch specific license authorizes

the licensee to conduct a single launch,

or a specified number of identical

launches, from a single launch site. The

launch vehicle for each authorized

launch must be the same and launch

parameters must present no unique

public safety issues or other issues

affecting U.S. national interests. The

licensee’s authorization to conduct

launches would terminate upon

completion of all launches authorized

by the license or the expiration date set

forth in the license, whichever came

first.

A launch operator license authorizes

the licensee to conduct launches from a

specified launch site, using the same

family of launch vehicles, carrying

specified classes of payloads, within the

range of launch parameters defined by

the license. A launch operator license

would authorize the conduct of

launches for five years from the date of

issuance.

The option of issuing a launch

operator license provides advantages

both to the licensee and to the Office.

Although the application preparation

for and review of a launch operator

license will be more extensive than for

a launch specific license, use of this

class of license will ultimately result in

cost reductions and efficiency gains for

licensees by reducing the number of

applications that a company with an

active launch schedule must submit,

and that the Office must review. The

Office’s proposal to increase the term of

a launch operator license from the

current practice of two years to five

years reflects the Office’s experience

with its licensees during the past few

years.

During that time, the Office has

encountered no serious safety problems

with launch operator licensees. On the

basis of this record, the Office believes

that a launch operator with a safe

launch record should not be required to

apply for a new license every two years.

The Office will continue to verify,

through compliance monitoring, that a

licensee is operating in accordance with

the terms and conditions of its license.

In this regard, the longer the license

term, the more important compliance

monitoring is to enable the Office to

remain informed regarding how a

licensee implements its procedures.

C. Relationship Between DOT and

Federal Government Launch Ranges

The Office’s proposed launch rules

are limited to launches as they currently

take place from Department of Defense

(DOD) or NASA launch ranges. The

Office intends to be receptive to the

commenters’ express desire to avoid

duplication between the Office and the

federal launch ranges in overseeing the

safety of launches. The participants in

the public meeting strongly supported

avoidance of duplication of effort. The

proposed rule is consistent with that

desire. Although the Office proposes to

require information and analyses not

required by federal ranges to ensure that

all flight safety issues are addressed,

and to impose certain additional

requirements derived from a National

Transportation Safety Board

investigation, the Office will not

duplicate the safety assessments

performed by federal launch ranges.

Federal launch ranges manage the

launch facilities from which commercial

launches now take place. The federal

ranges act, in effect, both as landlords

and as providers of launch facilities and

services. The ranges require compliance

with their safety rules as a condition of

using their facilities and services.

Because different federal ranges

confront different safety issues,

practices are not always standardized,

although recent Air Force efforts

resulted in a joint set of documentation

requirements and procedures, Eastern

and Western Range Requirements 127–

1 (Mar. 1995). In addition to protecting

public safety, the federal launch range

procedures protect government property

and launch capability, and are designed,

to some extent, to ensure mission

success.

Public meeting participants requested

that the Office not duplicate federal

range oversight. The Air Force itself
Federal Register / Vol. 62, No. 53, Wednesday, March 19, 1997 / Proposed Rules 13225

advised against a ‘‘redundant set of

requirements on commercial space

activities on Federal ranges,’’ and

recommended that the Office ‘‘accept

the approval of the responsible

government agency at the launch site to

satisfy all OCST safety approval

requirements,’’ with the exception of

any information required to perform a

financial responsibility analysis.

Comments of Air Force Space

Command at 1, 4. Orbital Sciences

Corporation noted that ‘‘National Range

safety requirements have been

developed over 30 years and OCST

should feel comfortable adopting them

as the core set of safety requirements

needed to protect the public safety.’’

Comments of OSC at 2. Others suggested

that ‘‘[l]aunch licensing should continue

the general approach of requiring the

minimal information needed to fulfill

the mandates of the Act with regard to

public safety, defense and international

treaty, and environmental concerns.’’

Weaver Aerospace Comments at 4.

The Office fully recognizes the

comprehensive and responsible safety

oversight that DOD and NASA have

exercised at their ranges for over thirty

years. The Office also recognizes the

scope of information that a launch

operator employing federal range

services must submit for approval in

order to conduct launch operations.

Therefore, for launches that take place

from DOD or NASA launch ranges, the

Office has designed its proposed

regulatory program to make maximum

use of information provided by an

applicant to the federal launch range

and of federal launch range analyses

and approvals. This means that the

Office would rely on the processes of

the federal range and would not

duplicate those safety analyses

conducted by a federal range.

Federal launch ranges require a

launch operator to provide data

regarding its proposed launch. The

range evaluates the data to ascertain

whether the launch operator will

comply with range requirements. The

range also uses the data to prepare range

support for the mission. DOD ranges

require that a launch operator apply for

and obtain specific mandatory

approvals from the range in order to

conduct certain specified operations.

For example, the Air Force’s Eastern

and Western Range Requirements 127–

1 require a launch operator to obtain

approvals for hazardous and safety

critical procedures before the range will

allow those operations to proceed. In

the event that a launch operator’s

proposal does not fully comply with

range requirements, a range may issue a

deviation or a waiver if the mission

objectives of the launch operator could

not otherwise be achieved. A range may

issue a deviation to allow a launch even

when a launch operator’s designs or

proposed operations do not comply

with range requirements. A range may

issue a waiver when it is discovered

after production that hardware does not

satisfy range requirements or when it is

discovered that operations do not meet

range requirements after operations

have begun at a federal range. A range

will allow a deviation or grant a waiver

only under unique and compelling

circumstances.

The Office performed baseline

assessments of various federal launch

ranges and found their safety services

adequate. The Office will not require an

applicant to demonstrate the adequacy

of the range services it proposes to

employ if the applicable baseline

assessment included those services and

if those services remain adequate.

Certain showings regarding the

applicant’s own capabilities are still

required. The Office proposes to require

specific information regarding the

interface between the safety

organizations of a federal launch range

and of an applicant. In the event that a

service or procedure upon which an

applicant proposes to rely is not within

the documented experience of the

federal launch range that the applicant

proposes to utilize, the applicant would

have to demonstrate the safety of that

particular aspect of its launch. This is

also true if a documented range safety

service has changed significantly or has

experienced a recent failure. In those

cases, the burden of demonstrating

safety shifts to the applicant.

The proposed rules also codify Office

guidelines containing National

Transportation Safety Board

recommendations concerning launch

readiness and countdown procedures.

The Office’s guidelines implement

National Transportation Safety Board

recommendations made following an

investigation of a commercial launch

anomaly occurring during a launch from

a federal launch range. These guidelines

are designed to ensure that a launch

licensee has clear lines of authority and

communication during launch, and has

specific procedures governing other

safety aspects of its launch operations.

IV. Section-by-Section Analysis

A. Part 401—Organization and

Definitions

Section 401.5 contains definitions of

significant terms used in the Office’s

regulations. Proposed amendments

include both changes to existing

definitions and the addition of new

terms. Certain changes are intended

only to reflect changes resulting from

the 1994 codification of the Act. Others

are editorial.

Deletions

The Office proposes to remove the

terms ‘‘Director,’’ ‘‘launch activity,’’

‘‘mission,’’ and ‘‘safety operations.’’

‘‘Director’’ no longer constitutes a title

within the Office of the Associate

Administrator for Commercial Space

Transportation and is therefore deleted.

‘‘Launch activity’’ refers to activities

licensed by the Office. The term is

overly broad and unnecessary.

‘‘Mission’’ is no longer necessary

because the Office proposes to modify

and rename the mission review

contained in part 415, subpart C.

‘‘Safety operations’’ does not appear

in the proposed regulations and the

Office therefore proposes to remove it.

Revisions

Some of the proposed revisions

merely reflect the codification of the

Act. These include ‘‘Act,’’ ‘‘launch site,’’

‘‘launch vehicle,’’ ‘‘payload,’’ and

‘‘person.’’

The Office proposes to revise the term

‘‘launch,’’ not only to reflect the

codification of Pub. L. 98–575, but to

clarify that launch, for purposes of

licensing, includes the flight of a launch

vehicle and those hazardous pre-flight

activities that are closely proximate in

time to flight and are unique to space

flight. For launches from federal launch

ranges, hazardous activities begin with

the arrival of the launch vehicle at a

federal launch range for purposes of

preparation for flight. The term

‘‘launch’’ is addressed in greater detail

earlier in this Notice.

The definition of ‘‘launch site’’

reflects changes resulting from the

codification of the Act, but additional

clarification is in order. The definition

of ‘‘launch site’’ in the original

Commercial Space Launch Act includes

‘‘facilities located on a launch site

which are necessary to conduct a

launch.’’ 49 U.S.C. App. 2603(5)

(emphasis added). The codified

definition of ‘‘launch site’’ merely

includes ‘‘necessary facilities’’ with no

mention of their location. 49 U.S.C.

70102(6). According to a House Report

explaining the codification, the statute

omitted as surplus the words ‘‘includes

all * * * located on a launch site which

are * * * to conduct a launch.’’

Revision of Title 49, United States Code,

‘‘Transportation,’’ H.R. Rep. No. 180,

103rd Cong., 1st Sess., at 463 (Jul. 15,

1994). Although no substantive changes

were intended by the codification (see

id. at 5), omission of ‘‘located on a
13226 Federal Register / Vol. 62, No. 53, Wednesday, March 19, 1997 / Proposed Rules

launch site’’ from the law may create the

impression that facilities may be located

anywhere and still require a license

under the statute. This is not the case.

The Office does not believe that

Congress intended to change the

substance of the statute to provide for

the licensing of all necessary facilities

regardless of their location.

Additions

New terms include ‘‘Associate

Administrator,’’ ‘‘federal launch range,’’

‘‘hazardous materials,’’ ‘‘launch

accident,’’ ‘‘launch incident,’’ ‘‘launch

operator,’’ ‘‘mishap,’’ ‘‘Office,’’ and

‘‘regulations.’’

‘‘Associate Administrator’’ reflects a

change in title of the person in charge

of the Office and arises out of the

transfer of the Office from the Office of

the Secretary to the Federal Aviation

Administration. The term describes the

FAA’s Associate Administrator for

Commercial Space Transportation.

‘‘Federal launch range’’ means an

installation from which launches take

place that is owned and operated by the

government of the United States.

Federal launch ranges include Cape

Canaveral Air Station, Vandenberg Air

Force Base, White Sands Missile Range

and Wallops Flight Facility.

‘‘Hazardous materials’’ means

hazardous materials as defined in 49

C.F.R. 172.101.

‘‘Launch accident,’’ ‘‘launch

incident,’’ and ‘‘mishap’’ all address

related issues. The term ‘‘mishap’’ is a

general term for all unplanned events at

a launch site or a launch resulting in

injury, occupational illness, or damage

to or loss of equipment or property.

Mishaps include but are not limited to

launch accidents and launch incidents.

Launch accidents and launch incidents

are included in the term ‘‘mishap.’’

‘‘Launch accident’’ and ‘‘launch

incident’’ derive from the Office’s

current definition of ‘‘accident’’ and

‘‘incident’’ as the terms appear in the

Office’s accident investigation plan.

Both terms encompass unplanned

events occurring during flight. ‘‘Launch

accident’’ is defined by the seriousness

of the results, and ‘‘launch incident’’

focusses on the failure of a safety system

or process that may or may not have

caused serious harm. Special reporting

and investigation requirements attach if

a launch accident or incident occurs.

‘‘Accident’’ is also defined in a

Memorandum of Understanding with

the National Transportation Safety

Board (NTSB). A launch accident

requires NTSB involvement. A ‘‘launch

incident’’ may or may not require NTSB

involvement, depending on the

seriousness of the safety issues

involved. Other mishaps, such as a

mission failure, have fewer reporting

and investigation requirements.

‘‘Launch operator’’ is defined as a

person who launches or plans to launch

a launch vehicle and any payload. The

term is required in order to distinguish

a launch operator from a ‘‘site operator,’’

a term that the Office intends to define

in a future rulemaking concerning the

operation of a launch site.

‘‘Office’’ means the office of the

Associate Adminsitrator for Commercial

Space Transportation of the Federal

Aviation Administration, U.S.

Department of Transportation.

‘‘Regulations’’ means regulations

adopted by the Office pursuant to the

Act, and describes those regulations

contained in 14 CFR Chapter III.

B. Part 411—Policy

The Office proposes to delete as

unnecessary and to reserve part 411,

which establishes the policies of the

Office for licensing commercial launch

activities. This part identifies two

reviews, safety and mission reviews,

which, pursuant to the proposed rules,

would be addressed in parts 413, 415

and 417.

C. Part 413—License Application

Procedures

Proposed part 413 continues to

describe those license application

procedures applicable to all license

applications. The procedures apply to

license applications to launch a launch

vehicle or to operate a launch site. More

specific requirements applicable to

obtaining a launch license or site

operator license are set forth in parts

415 and 417, respectively. The majority

of the revisions to this part are editorial

or self-explanatory. A few revisions bear

individual mention.

Proposed § 413.3 identifies who must

obtain a license to launch a launch

vehicle or to operate a launch site. Any

person proposing to launch a launch

vehicle or to operate a launch site

within the United States must obtain a

license authorizing the launch or the

operation of the launch site. A U.S.

citizen or entity proposing to launch

outside the United States or to operate

a launch site outside of the United

States must obtain a license authorizing

the launch or the operation of the

launch site. A foreign corporation,

partnership, joint venture, association or

other foreign entity controlled by a U.S.

citizen and proposing to launch from, or

to operate a launch site within,

international territory or waters must

obtain a license if the United States does

not have an agreement with a foreign

nation providing that the foreign nation

shall exercise jurisdiction. A foreign

corporation, partnership, joint venture,

association or other foreign entity

controlled by a U.S. citizen does not

require a license to launch from foreign

territory, unless that foreign nation has

agreed that the U.S. shall exercise

jurisdiction over the launch.

Proposed § 413.5 requires a

prospective applicant to consult with

the Office prior to submitting an

application. This pre-application

consultation would become mandatory

in order to allow both the applicant and

the Office the opportunity to identify

potential issues relevant to the Office’s

licensing determination. Consultations

may be made by telephone.

Proposed § 413.7 contains a change in

the name of the Office. Effective

November 15, 1995, the Office became

a part of the Federal Aviation

Administration, where it now operates

as the FAA’s seventh line of business.

With that move, the Office name was

changed from the Office of Commercial

Space Transportation to the Office of the

Associate Administrator for Commercial

Space Transportation. Proposed

§ 413.5(a) reflects that change.

Proposed § 413.7(b)(2) requires an

applicant to provide the Office with one

or more points of contact who should

receive notices from the Office.

Proposed § 413.9 describes how an

applicant may request confidential

treatment for trade secrets or proprietary

commercial or financial data.

Proposed § 413.11 describes the

process by which applications are

accepted or rejected. Proposed

§ 413.11(a) provides for an initial

screening of an application in order for

the Office to determine whether the

application is sufficiently complete to

allow the Office to initiate the required

reviews. The Act requires the Office to

complete its review of an application

within 180 days. The Office determines

when an application is sufficiently

complete for the 180 days review period

to commence and how those 180 days

will be measured. If the Office receives

an application which fails to provide

sufficient information for the Office to

conduct a meaningful review, then a

review cannot be performed.

Accordingly, the 180-day review period

will start to run only upon receipt of an

acceptable application. The Office

considered the option of not

commencing any review of an

application and thus of not starting to

count the 180-day statutory time limit

until the application was complete to

ensure that the Office did not receive

piecemeal applications. The Office also

considered rejecting or denying an

incomplete application, which would
Federal Register / Vol. 62, No. 53, Wednesday, March 19, 1997 / Proposed Rules 13227

also prevent the 180-day review period

from commencing. The Office

determined that if an applicant

presented sufficient material to allow at

least some meaningful review to

commence, the Office would do so in

the interests of the applicant.

Commencing the review of even an

incomplete application should allow for

earlier identification of required

information not addressed, hasten the

process and increase efficiency. In order

for the Office to review an application,

the application must be sufficiently

complete to allow review to commence.

Although review of an incomplete

application may commence, proposed

§ 413.13 requires an applicant to

complete an incomplete application.

Proposed § 413.15 tolls the review

period of 180 days when an applicant

fails to provide information required for

the Office to complete its review. If an

application does not address requests

for required information in sufficient

detail, or if the application contains

inconsistencies, the Office may advise

the applicant and provide a time by

which the requested information must

be provided. Once the deadline has

passed, and while the Office waits for

any information necessary to complete

its review, the 180-day time limit on the

Office does not run. The Office

considered the option of returning the

application for resubmission if the

requested information were not

submitted within the time provided.

Because of the new submission of the

application, a new 180-day review

period would commence. This course

would provide the applicant a strong

incentive to respond to the Office’s

information request in a timely fashion,

and, perhaps, result in the processing of

only those applications where the

applicant possesses the actual capacity

to respond. This would accordingly

discourage frivolous applications. The

Office determined that most applicants,

provided with information regarding

how soon the Office would require

information necessary to complete a

review, would respond in the time

allotted. Thus, so extreme an incentive

would not be required. However, it has

been the Office’s experience that

applicants do not always respond in a

timely fashion to requests from the

Office for clarification or additional

information. Accordingly, some

incentive to respond promptly is

necessary, and in the event an applicant

fails to respond within the time

provided, the Office proposes to toll the

180-day statutory review period.

Proposed § 413.17 describes an

applicant’s responsibility for the

continuing accuracy and completeness

of the information contained in the

applicant’s license application. The

applicant must advise the Office of any

proposed material change in any

representation contained in its

application, including its launch plans

or operations, launch procedures,

classes of payloads, orbital destinations,

safety requirements, the type of launch

vehicle, flight path, and range, or any

safety related system, policy, procedure,

requirement, criteria or standard, related

to commercial space launch or launch

site operation activities, that may affect

public health and safety, the safety of

property, including government

property, or hazards to the environment.

Because the Office proposes to rely

upon federal ranges for safety

considerations, as discussed in other

parts of this Notice, the applicant must

also notify the Office in the event the

applicant applies to the federal range for

a waiver to, or deviates from the federal

range’s safety requirements or

procedures.

This section also, while permitting an

applicant to modify or supplement its

license application, notes that changes

to an application may lengthen the time

that the Office requires to complete its

reviews. The Office will reserve to itself

the right to toll the 180-day review

period in the event that modifications to

an application so radically change the

applicant’s proposal that the change, in

effect, constitutes a new application.

The Office’s experience, however, has

been that most modifications, while

important, have a relatively minor

impact on the processing time,

particularly if those modifications are

submitted in a timely manner.

Proposed § 413.19 addresses issuance

of a license.

Proposed § 413.21 contains the

procedures employed by the Office

when it denies an applicant a license,

and describes the recourse available to

that applicant. The applicant may

attempt to correct the deficiencies

which resulted in the denial of its

application and request reconsideration

of its application, or it may request a

hearing to show why the application

should not be denied.

Proposed § 413.23 allows a licensee to

apply for renewal of an expiring license.

A licensee seeking authorization to

conduct activities that are substantially

or significantly different from those

authorized under the expiring license is

not eligible for renewal of the license

and must apply for a new license.

D. Part 415—Launch License

Proposed part 415 establishes

requirements applicable to obtaining a

license to launch a launch vehicle and

establishes post-licensing requirements.

The provisions of this part apply to

prospective and licensed launch

operators and, possibly, to prospective

payload owners and operators, and

should be read in conjunction with the

general application requirements of part

413. A flow chart of the launch license

application process is provided in

Figure 1.

Proposed subpart A describes the

scope and types of launch licenses,

required approvals or determinations

and procedures governing issuance or

transfer of a launch license. Proposed

§ 415.1 explains that part 415 prescribes

requirements for obtaining a launch

license and prescribes post-licensing

requirements. Proposed § 415.3

addresses the types of launch licenses

issued, as discussed previously in this

Notice.

Proposed §§ 415.5 and 415.7 identify

the approvals and determinations

required to qualify for a launch license.

These sections would require a license

applicant to obtain policy and safety

approvals from the Office. The applicant

would also be required to obtain a

payload determination unless the

payload were otherwise exempt from

Office consideration. The owner or

operator of the proposed payload may

also apply for a payload determination.

In addition to these approvals or

determinations that the Office requires

of an applicant for a launch license, an

applicant should bear in mind that the

National Environmental Policy Act

(NEPA) requires the Office, prior to

considering a license application, to

perform environmental reviews of major

federal actions such as issuing a launch

license. Accordingly, if a proposed

launch vehicle is not otherwise already

encompassed by the Office’s 1986

Programmatic Environmental

Assessment of Commercial Expendable

Launch Vehicle Programs, then NEPA

may direct the Office to perform the

requisite environmental review. No

other approvals or determinations are

required from the Office in order for an

applicant to obtain a license for launch

of a launch vehicle.

This subpart also contains provisions

for issuance and transfer of a launch

license. Once an applicant has obtained

all required approvals, the Office will

issue a launch license under proposed

§ 415.9. Proposed § 415.11 allows the

Office to amend a launch license at any

time by modifying or adding terms and

conditions to the license to ensure

compliance with the Act and

regulations. Although standard license

terms and conditions, as proposed in

subpart E, apply to all licensees, it is the

experience of the Office that a particular
13228 Federal Register / Vol. 62, No. 53, Wednesday, March 19, 1997 / Proposed Rules

launch proposal or a particular licensee

may present unique circumstances

which apply only to that licensee. In

that event, the Office may issue or

amend a license with terms and

conditions not identified in subpart E to

protect public health and safety, safety

of property, U.S. national security and

foreign policy interests, or international

obligations of the United States. Should

a licensee wish to protest an Office

modification of its license, it is entitled

to a hearing pursuant to § 406.1(a)(3) of

part 406. In the event safety requires

that additional terms and conditions be

applied to all licensees, the Office

would revise subpart E by rulemaking to

implement any such standardized

terms. A licensee may also initiate

license modification. As provided in

part 413, a licensee may request

modification of its license to reflect

changes in its proposed launches.

Under proposed § 415.13 only the

Office may issue or transfer a license,

and only upon application by the

transferee. The prospective transferee

must satisfy all requirements for

obtaining a license as specified in parts

413 and 415.

Subpart B describes the proposed

requirements for a policy review. The

proposed policy review is currently

known as a mission review under 14

CFR part 411. Because the Office

proposes to separate a payload

determination from any mission review,

it proposes to change the name of the

review to policy review to more

accurately identify its purpose. Under

proposed §§ 415.21 and 415.23, a policy

review would address whether some

aspect of a proposed launch presented

an issue affecting U.S. national security

or foreign policy interests or is

inconsistent with international

obligations of the United States. Launch

safety issues would be addressed only

in the safety review although the Office

proposes to address payload safety

issues in the course of a payload

determination. Only a launch license

applicant may request a policy

approval. An applicant must provide

the information required by subpart B so

that the Office may review those aspects

of an applicant’s launch proposal that

are not related to safety. The Office

coordinates this review with other

government agencies, including the

Departments of Defense, State, and

Commerce, the National Aeronautics

and Space Administration and the

Federal Communications Commission.

An applicant may choose to submit an

application for policy review separately

from its license application, or, as do

most applicants, it may submit a

complete license application. The Office

proposes to allow separate submission

of a request for a policy review because

of the possibility that an applicant

might be uncertain about policy issues

surrounding its proposal, and might

wish to allay concerns over reactions to

its proposed launch. An applicant might

then request only a policy review prior

to undertaking the additional effort

necessary to prepare a complete license

application. Past experience indicates

that the Office accomplishes mission

reviews relatively quickly in

comparison with a safety review.

Proposed § 415.25 describes the

information an applicant would be

required to provide to obtain a policy

approval. The information requested

reflects current Office information

requests. The Office requires this

information in order to inform itself and

other agencies as to what is being

launched, by whom, for what purpose,

and where a vehicle and its payload are

going. The State Department, for

example, may be interested in overflight

issues regarding particular countries.

Accordingly, the Office proposes to

require that an applicant supply it with

sufficient information to describe a

proposed launch vehicle and its

mission.

The information requested by

proposed § 415.25(b) is required in the

event there are any policy issues

surrounding the launch vehicle itself.

The Office requires a brief description of

the launch vehicle, including the

propellants used and the vehicle’s major

systems, such as its structural,

pneumatic, propulsion, electrical or

avionics systems. For example, policy

questions may arise over the use of

nuclear power. The Department of

Defense may have concerns over the

allocation of resources to a commercial

launch if a sole source manufacturer is

involved. The Office is interested in

views regarding whether this level of

detail is overly burdensome.

The information requested by

proposed § 415.25(c)(2) is intended to

provide the Departments of State and

Defense the identities of any foreign

interests involved in a licensed launch.

These agencies express interest in

foreign involvement in the U.S. launch

industry. Also, there may be issues with

respect to whether possible government

payment of excess third-party claims is

available to foreign launch participants.

The Office proposes to request the

identity of any foreign owners

possessing a ten percent or greater

interest in a license applicant. The

Office believes that a ten percent

ownership interest is sufficiently high

for a foreign owner to be able to

influence a prospective licensee. The

Office is aware that a publicly traded

corporation will not always know the

identity of each of its smaller

shareholders. However, such an

applicant should be aware of any

shareholders possessing that significant

an interest in the corporation. Reporting

requirements of the Securities and

Exchange Commission and the

Department of Defense are often

triggered by an ownership interest of ten

percent or more and the Office believes

that this constitutes a reasonable

threshold. The Office is interested in

comments addressing whether a ten

percent threshold provides sufficient

information concerning the ability of

foreign interests to influence licensee

decisions.

Proposed § 415.25(d)(3) requires

information regarding the sequence of

major launch events during flight. In

this regard, the Office expects to be

informed of events such as approximate

engine burn times of all stages, stage

separation events, yaw maneuvers and

engine cutoff. The applicant may

provide this information through a text

explanation or through diagrams and

charts.

Proposed § 415.25(d)(4) requests a

description of the range of nominal

impact areas for all spent motors and

other discarded mission hardware. The

area identified for each impacting

component shall include that area

within three standard deviations of the

nominal impact point, a calculation

otherwise known as a 3-sigma footprint.

Proposed section 415.27 contains

procedures employed by the Office

when it denies an applicant a policy

approval and describes the recourse

available to that applicant. If an

applicant fails to obtain a policy

approval, the applicant may attempt to

correct the deficiencies which resulted

in the denial and request

reconsideration of the denial, or, upon

denial of a license, it may request a

hearing.

Proposed subpart C addresses the

Office’s safety evaluation process for

license applications for launches from a

federal launch range. Because of the

history and safety record of the federal

launch ranges, and because the Office’s

baseline assessments provide a written

record of the federal launch range’s

experience relevant to commercial space

transportation, the Office accepts that a

federal launch range will perform its

safety role. Accordingly, the Office’s

information requirements are directed

more toward an applicant’s own safety

capabilities. The Office requires

information regarding the applicant’s

safety organization, vehicle design and

operational safety practices. In this
Federal Register / Vol. 62, No. 53, Wednesday, March 19, 1997 / Proposed Rules 13229

subpart the Office proposes standards

regarding acceptable flight risk and

requires an applicant to submit

procedures and plans that demonstrate

that it will satisfy certain other safety

requirements if it obtains a license.

The Office recognizes that federal

launch ranges provide a number of

safety services for launch operators, and

that these sites have an historically good

record of safety. Proposed § 415.31

explains that the Office will issue a

license to an applicant proposing to

launch from a federal launch range if

the applicant satisfies the requirements

of subpart C and has contracted with the

federal launch range for the provision of

launch services and property, as long as

the launch services and proposed use of

property are within the experience of

the federal launch range. All other

safety services and property associated

with an applicant’s proposal are

evaluated on an individual, case by case

basis.

The Office has assessed the four

federal launch ranges which provide

launch services and facilities. The

federal ranges assessed include Cape

Canaveral Air Station, Vandenberg Air

Force Base, Wallops Flight Facility and

White Sands Missile Range. The Office

does not duplicate federal launch range

analyses nor routinely review those

analyses during the launch safety

review conducted by the Office. Instead,

the Office relies on its knowledge of the

range processes as documented in the

Office’s baseline assessments. The

Office’s assessments provide a basis for

the Office’s reliance on the adequacy of

the services provided by each of the

federal launch ranges. Some safety

issues, however, may not be adequately

addressed by a federal launch range.

The failure of federal launch range

safety systems or procedures may, for

example, affect the Office’s ability to

rely on a federal launch range. The

Office may ascertain this during the

course of a pre-application consultation

or once an applicant submits its

application. The Office may then

require the applicant to demonstrate

safety with respect to those specific

areas of concern on an individual or

case by case basis. In addition to

requiring a showing of safety from the

applicant, the Office will also work with

the federal launch range to address the

issue, and will update the Office’s

baseline assessment as appropriate.

The Office also makes maximum use

of the information an applicant must

provide a federal launch range. The

applicant, to save paperwork, may

submit to the Office either entire, or

appropriate sections of, documents it

prepares and submits to the federal

launch range that are relevant to the

applicant’s launch application. It has

been the Office’s experience that

because information requested by

federal launch ranges provides greater

detail than the Office requires, the

Office’s requirements may be satisfied

by this material.

To aid applicants in identifying those

sections of documents submitted to

federal launch ranges that are relevant

to the applicant’s launch application,

the Office has prepared ‘‘Comparison of

OCST Safety Approval Requirements for

Launches from a Federal Launch Range

with Air Force Range User

Requirements.’’ Figure 2. This

comparison may be used by an

applicant as a guide to satisfying

subpart C requirements. It is illustrative

only, and where it appears to conflict

with the proposed regulations, the

regulations govern. Although the

comparison applies only to launch

ranges operated by the Air Force, the

Office intends it to be helpful for

applicants using all federal launch

ranges. The Office plans to prepare

similar matrices for other federal launch

ranges in the near future, and invites

industry comments on this approach.

Proposed § 415.33 requires an

applicant to document its safety

organization. The applicant must

possess a functioning safety

organization because an applicant

cannot ensure safety without someone

designated as responsible for safety

issues. The Office will evaluate whether

the structure, lines of communication,

and approval authority the applicant

establishes will enable the applicant to

identify and address safety issues and to

ensure compliance with the

requirements of range safety and the

Office’s regulations. How the federal

launch range’s safety services are

integrated with the licensee is also

relevant. The Office expects that for

launches from federal launch ranges the

applicant will structure its safety

organization to ensure compliance with

federal launch range requirements, such

as, for example, Eastern and Western

Range Regulation 127–1 for Air Force

launch ranges. The Office believes that

charts are the most efficient way to

depict much of the required

information. An applicant should

include one or more, as appropriate,

organizational charts that will delineate

the lines of communication and the

internal decision making process. In

providing this information, the

applicant should include those services

of the federal launch range upon which

the applicant proposes to rely, and those

of any other organization providing

flight safety services. The applicant’s

description must include interfaces with

the federal launch range and should

explain how the safety policies and

procedures of all segments of the safety

organization identified above will be

implemented.

Proposed § 415.33(b) would require

an applicant to have a safety official

possessing safety authority. In order to

keep safety concerns separate from

mission goals, the person responsible

for safety should have the ability to

perform independently of those parts of

the applicant’s organization responsible

for mission assurance, and should also

have the authority to report directly to

the person in charge of licensed

launches. The safety official should be

identified by title or position and by

qualifications rather than by name.

Although risk is inherent in the

launch of a launch vehicle, proposed

§ 415.35 establishes limits on how much

risk the Office will allow for a

commercial launch. Proposed § 415.35

explains that acceptable flight risk

through orbital insertion is measured in

terms of collective risk. Collective risk

constitutes the sum total risk to that part

of the public which constitutes an

exposed population over a region

exposed to a launch. The public

includes everyone except essential

launch area personnel. Accordingly,

government personnel who are not

essential to a launch are defined as the

public for purposes of measuring

acceptable risk. The Office proposes to

prohibit certain eventualities to reduce

flight risk following orbital insertion.

Pursuant to proposed § 415.35(a), the

collective risk associated with an

applicant’s proposed launch, measured

by expected casualty (Ec), shall not

exceed 30 × 10¥6. The Office’s proposed

risk threshold reflects acceptable

collective risk. Individual annual risk

describes the probability of serious

injury or death to a single person, and

is, perhaps, the more common measure

of risk. The launch industry’s common

measure of risk is collective risk, which

may then be measured as individual risk

in light of the factors associated with

any given launch. Individual risk may

be correspondingly less than collective

risk, depending on the size of the

population exposed. This means that a

collective risk of Ec of 30 × 10¥6 is more

strict than an individual risk of 1 ×

10¥6 (1 per million). For example, with

a collective risk of 30 × 10¥6, and a

population of one hundred thousand

exposed to a particular launch, the risk

to any one individual is .3 × 10¥9 (three

tenths per billion). For purposes of

comparison, the Office notes that the

Air Force describes the collective risk

level proposed as no greater than that
13230 Federal Register / Vol. 62, No. 53, Wednesday, March 19, 1997 / Proposed Rules

voluntarily accepted in normal daily

activity. Eastern and Western Range

127–1 Range Safety Requirements, Sec.

1.4, 1–12 (Mar. 31, 1995). For example,

a person has a one in 600,000 chance

over a lifetime of being hit by lightning,

which is a greater risk than the Office

proposes to allow for launch. The Office

invites public comment regarding the

adequacy, for purposes of safety, of the

standard it proposes.

This standard derives from launch

risk guidance employed by the Air

Force at Cape Canaveral Air Station and

Vandenberg Air Force Base to define

acceptable risk. The Office proposes to

adopt this standard because the Office

believes that commercial launches

should not expose the public to risk

greater than normal background risk.

NASA employs an Ec of 1 × 10¥6 at its

Wallops Flight Facility, for the launch

of small launch vehicles. Only a few

commercial launches have taken place

at Wallops since 1988. Rather than

employing the standard used by NASA

for its Wallops launches, the Office

decided to use the Air Force standard,

reflecting as it does the standard already

in place for the majority of commercial

U.S. launches, and for the majority of

government launches of vehicles of a

comparable size. No casualties arising

out of a government or commercial

launch have occurred to the public

under this standard.

The Office is aware that the Air Force

implements this standard as ‘‘acceptable

launch risk without high management

(Range Commander) review.’’ Eastern

and Western Range 127–1 Range Safety

Requirements, Sec. 1.4.1, 1–12. This

means that based on national need and

the approval of a range or wing

commander the Air Force may allow a

launch with a predicted expected

casualty risk of greater than 30 × 10¥6.

Id. The Office believes that the proposed

standard should be met for all

commercial launches, however, so that

the general public will not be exposed

to a higher than normal risk from a

commercial activity. The Office

recognizes that many commercial

launches carry government payloads,

and that there may be a national need

to launch a critical national payload

with a predicted launch risk of greater

than 30 × 10¥6. An applicant proposing

to launch such a payload would have to

request a waiver from the Office and

show that national need warranted

waiver of this standard. The Office

would also work with any government

payload owner or operator to resolve

such an issue.

Proposed § 415.35(c) requires an

applicant to submit an analysis

identifying hazards and assessing risks

for flight under nominal and nonnominal conditions. A federal launch

range will sometimes perform a

quantitative analysis for flight until

orbital insertion, or, for a suborbital

mission, until impact, or, for example,

may determine that an analysis of

previously approved missions applies or

may serve as a basis for a comparative

analysis. If an applicant’s previously

submitted application contains a risk

assessment, the applicant need not

submit additional analyses for similar

launches. In such cases, a comparative

analysis may be supplied. So long as a

federal launch range’s analysis takes

into account all aspects of an applicant’s

proposed launch, the Office will accept

a hazard identification and risk analysis

performed by a federal launch range.

As an alternative to relying on federal

launch range procedures, an applicant

may perform its own quantitative risk

analysis. Pursuant to proposed

§ 415.35(c), although an applicant may

submit a federal range risk analysis, the

applicant bears the burden of

demonstrating that predicted risk does

not exceed an expected casualty of 30 ×

10¥6. To assist applicants, the Office

has documented the range safety

process for each of the federal ranges. A

launch hazard event tree, such as the

one described in the Office’s Hazard

Analysis of Commercial Space

Transportation, provides an acceptable

method for identifying hazards and

assessing risks.

The Office is interested in comments

on this proposed approach. Two other

approaches were considered. One was

to have no application requirements for

hazard identification or risk analysis at

all. This approach was not selected

because it would not provide the Office

with the necessary assurance that

predicted risk would remain within

acceptable levels, namely Ec ≤ 30 ×

10¥6. The second approach the Office

considered was to require an applicant

to develop its own criteria and

procedures for identifying hazards and

assessing risks for flight until orbital

insertion, and to demonstrate

compliance with the Office’s standard

without the use of any federal launch

range analysis. The Office, however,

believed that requiring an applicant to

invent its own procedures would ignore

the experience and capability of the

federal launch ranges as documented in

the Office’s baseline assessments and

would put an unnecessary burden on

the industry. Instead, the approach

chosen maximizes the use of federal

launch range analyses, while at the

same time ensuring that the Office

licenses only those applicants who do

not expose the public to risks greater

than Ec ≤ 30 × 10¥6.

Under proposed § 415.35(b), an

applicant’s launch proposal must ensure

that for all launch vehicle stages or

components that reach earth orbit that

there is no unintended physical contact

of the vehicle or its components with

the payload after payload separation.

The applicant’s proposal must also

ensure that debris generation will not

result from the conversion of energy

sources into energy that fragments the

vehicle or its components. Those

involved in commercial, defense and

scientific uses of space are voicing a

growing space safety concern due to the

increasing number of objects being

placed in orbit, which increases the

potential for collisions between objects

in space. Collisions in turn create

additional space debris. The operation

of launch vehicles in space affects and

is affected by hazards associated with

space debris. Accordingly, the Office

proposes the requirements of paragraph

(b) to mitigate hazards associated with

space debris.

Federal launch ranges do not evaluate

risks posed by either the launch vehicle

upper stages or the attached payload

while on orbit or reentering. Federal

launch ranges perform a collision

avoidance analysis, commonly referred

to as a COLA, prior to launch to ensure

that manned or potentially manned

spacecraft will not be affected during

the first 24 hours following orbital

insertion of the launch vehicle.

Proposed § 415.37 requires that an

applicant design and operate its launch

vehicle to ensure that the flight of the

launch vehicle does not exceed

acceptable flight risk. This means that

integration of the applicant’s launch

vehicle, procedures, personnel, support

equipment, and facilities with a federal

launch range’s flight support resources

and services will result in a calculated

flight risk, measured by expected

casualty, for any one launch that does

not exceed 30 × 10¥6, and that the

requirements of § 415.35(b) are satisfied

as well.

Section 415.37(a) proposes to require

an applicant to identify and describe its

launch vehicle structure, the vehicle’s

hazardous and safety-critical systems

and provide drawings and schematics

for each system identified. Because

federal launch ranges require an

applicant to provide a detailed

description of the applicant’s launch

vehicle and its systems, including

drawings and schematics, the

requirements of paragraph (a) may be

satisfied by providing the Office with a

copy of all or appropriate portions of the

documentation provided to a federal
Federal Register / Vol. 62, No. 53, Wednesday, March 19, 1997 / Proposed Rules 13231

5The NTSB is an independent agency, and is not

part of the Department of Transportation.

launch range. The Office would not use

the data to duplicate the federal launch

range’s design approval process, but to

document the characteristics of the

launch vehicle being licensed.

Section 415.37(b) proposes to require

a description of the information

necessary for ensuring that launch

operations satisfy the criteria contained

in proposed § 415.35. Section 415.37(b)

proposes to require an applicant to

describe the launch operations and

procedures that the applicant will

employ to mitigate risks for flight both

before and after orbital insertion. The

applicant should eliminate or control by

design all identified hazards to

acceptable levels. Typical hazard

controls for flight until orbital insertion

used at current launch ranges include

flight termination systems, azimuth and

elevation adjusting based on real-time

wind weighting analysis, evacuating

personnel from high risk areas,

modifying vehicle trajectory to avoid

high risk areas, and delaying launch

until more favorable conditions exist.

Applicants may rely on the methods

used by federal launch ranges to

identify hazard controls and to ensure

that the hazard controls will be

effective. A number of standard industry

practices reduce potential on-orbit risks

arising out of flight following orbital

insertion. A launch operator may

maneuver its launch vehicle orbital

stage after payload separation to

minimize the likelihood that the orbital

stage will recontact the payload. This

avoids the consequences of either a

malfunctioning payload or orbital

debris. In order to reduce the possibility

of future explosions that could create

orbital debris, a launch operator may

render liquid fueled orbital stages as

inert as possible by expelling all

propellants and pressurants and

protecting batteries from spontaneous

explosion. A launch operator may keep

stage-to-stage separation devices and

other potential debris sources captive to

a stage with lanyards or other means.

Also, a launch operator may choose

launch times to geosynchronous earth

orbit designed to align the final orbit of

the orbital stage so as to lower the

perigee of the stage more quickly than

other orbits.

Section 415.37(c) proposes to

implement the Office’s current flight

readiness guidelines. The requirements

proposed arise out of recommendations

from a National Transportation Safety

Board (NTSB)5 investigation of an

anomaly that occurred during a

commercial launch from a federal

launch range. Requirements intended to

ensure the readiness of a launch team

include designation of an individual

responsible for flight readiness, launch

readiness reviews, use of a safety

directive, countdown checklists, dress

rehearsals procedures, and procedures

for crew rest.

The Office recognizes that there are

many reviews conducted of a launch

system from its initial design up to

flight. However, in proposed section

415.37(c)(1), the Office places special

emphasis on a flight readiness review,

or its equivalent. A review is typically

conducted not more than one or two

days prior to scheduled flight. In most

cases a flight readiness review is

standard practice at federal launch

ranges, but the Office considers the

review, and the topics required in this

section, to be so important that the

applicant must, in its application,

commit to a meeting and identify the

topics to be addressed. This review

must ensure that all system and

personnel readiness problems are

identified and are associated with a plan

to resolve them, that all systems needed

for launch have been checked out and

are ready, and that each participant is

cognizant of his or her role on the day

of launch. If this review revealed

unresolved issues, the licensee would

be able to assess its ability to resolve

those issues before the intended launch

time or to delay the launch, as

appropriate.

Proposed § 415.37(c)(2) would require

an applicant to possess procedures that

ensure mission constraints, rules and

abort procedures are contained in a

single document approved by licensee

flight safety and federal launch range

personnel.

Proposed § 415.37(c)(3) would require

an applicant to employ procedures that

ensure that all launch countdown

checklists are current and consistent.

Past inconsistencies in critical

countdown checklists and procedures

have raised serious safety concerns. The

Office recognizes that it may be

impractical for all launch participants to

have identical checklists due to

differences in the roles of launch

participants. The applicant should,

however, have some process, such as a

master countdown manual, to ensure

the currency and consistency of all

participants’ checklists during

countdown to flight. This will ensure

that confusion and uncertainties on

launch day are minimized, that flight

safety critical procedures are completed

successfully, and that those individuals

with launch decision authority know

what is going on and are able to make

sound decisions.

Proposed § 415.37(c)(4) requires an

applicant to have procedures for the

conduct of dress rehearsals. As

demonstrated in the past, the poor

performance of a dress rehearsal may

indicate the lack of readiness of

individuals or systems responsible for

safety. The applicant’s procedures

should include criteria for determining

when dress rehearsals are not necessary.

The Office recognizes that although

dress rehearsals may not be necessary in

every case, they may be critical to those

launch companies which are new to a

launch site, or to those that are

launching a new launch vehicle. A

number of launch companies have been

conducting routine launches of the same

vehicle for many years. If an applicant

does not plan to hold dress rehearsals

prior to any of its launches under any

circumstances, the applicant should

explain why rehearsals are not

necessary. However, even those launch

operators that routinely conduct

launches typically have certain criteria

and procedures in place to verify that

the launch team is ready for launch,

especially if a considerable period of

time has elapsed since the last launch

took place.

For those situations where dress

rehearsals are necessary, the dress

rehearsal should simulate both nominal

and non-nominal conditions, induced

not only by the launch vehicle or

payload, but by the range safety system

as well. Anomalies introduced during

the rehearsal should exercise and prove

the abilities of all launch participants,

including federal launch site personnel,

to recognize an event that compels a

launch hold or delay. The Office is

interested in views as to any need for

future standards relating to rehearsals

and the criteria for deciding, based on

performance during the rehearsal, that it

is acceptable to proceed with the

launch.

Proposed § 415.37(c)(5) responds to

another NTSB recommendation, and

requires that an applicant ensure that its

flight safety personnel adhere to federal

launch range crew rest rules. Experience

has shown that launch crew rest criteria

for all those involved in supporting

launch operations are extremely

important and can have a significant

impact on public health and safety.

Federal launch ranges typically have

such requirements. Based on current

knowledge and the demonstrated safety

history of the federal ranges, the Office

would consider adequate a commitment

by the applicant to adhere to these

requirements. Other rest criteria

proposed by an applicant may be

acceptable if the applicant requests a

waiver of the Office’s rules and
13232 Federal Register / Vol. 62, No. 53, Wednesday, March 19, 1997 / Proposed Rules

demonstrates that the criteria would be

adequate. The Office is interested in any

opinions regarding the need for

established minimum standards for

crew rest.

Proposed § 415.39 requires an

applicant to submit a communications

plan that ensures that licensee and

federal launch range personnel receive

safety-critical information during

countdown and flight. The NTSB, after

its investigation of a launch anomaly,

concluded that effective

communications are critical to the

conduct of a safe flight. Everyone

involved in a launch needs to know not

only what channel has been assigned for

particular communications, but the

proper protocol for communicating on

that channel. The Office recognizes that

a number of different individuals

typically have input and decision

authority with respect to the readiness

of various launch and safety systems.

Past experience has shown that serious

mishaps could result if these

relationships are not clearly defined and

understood by all parties. These

relationships should therefore be

identified by the applicant. Identifying

persons with authority to make ‘‘hold’’

and ‘‘go/no-go’’ decisions is critical to

ensuring that on launch day, everyone

knows who can call a ‘‘hold’’ and, more

importantly, who has the authority to

authorize the resumption of the

countdown. This will help eliminate

confusion and cross-talk that could

cause a miscommunication leading to

an unsafe condition. In addition, at

approximately five or ten minutes prior

to flight, the Office requires that

everyone who has a decision-making

role, or who, by action or inaction can

either prevent or allow a launch to take

place, be on the same predetermined

channel.

Proposed § 415.41 requires an

applicant to submit an accident

investigation plan. The accident

investigation plan should comply with

the reporting requirements identified in

proposed section 415.41(b), and should

contain procedures for responding to a

launch accident, incident or other

mishap.

Proposed § 415.43 contains

procedures employed by the Office

when it denies an applicant a safety

approval and describes the recourse

available to that applicant. If an

applicant fails to obtain a safety

approval, the applicant may attempt to

correct the deficiencies which resulted

in the denial and request

reconsideration of the denial, or, upon

denial of a license, it may request a

hearing.

The Office proposes to conduct a

payload review and determination

pursuant to 49 U.S.C. § 70104(c) of the

Act. The Act provides that the Secretary

of Transportation may prevent the

launch of a particular payload if the

Secretary determines that the payload’s

launch would jeopardize the public

health and safety, safety of property, or

national security or foreign policy

interests or international obligations of

the United States. Proposed subpart D

explains when a payload review and

determination are required and the

elements of that review. Addition of this

subpart constitutes a change from

current practice because the payload

review would no longer be performed as

part of the policy review proposed by

the new rules. This subpart would also

allow either a launch license applicant

or a payload owner or operator to apply

for a payload determination separately

from a launch operator’s license

application. A launch license

applicant’s decision to seek a payload

determination separately from a license

application might be based on

uncertainty with respect to payload

issues and a desire to gain a payload

determination before undertaking the

additional effort required to prepare a

complete launch license application.

Although a payload determination is

required for a license, it is not

necessarily a requirement imposed on a

license applicant. A license applicant

may not receive a license without a

payload determination, unless the

payload is otherwise exempt, but an

applicant need not itself apply for a

payload determination if it has

otherwise been issued. In addition to

the fact that many payloads are exempt

from Office consideration, an applicant

may incorporate by reference a payload

determination issued earlier to the

applicant or to a payload owner or

operator. Alternatively, an applicant

may reference a separate application

submitted by another launch license

applicant for a payload determination

and request that the Office incorporate

its earlier determination.

The Office does not believe that this

flexible approach would affect the

statutory requirement that the Office

complete its license application review

within 180 days. Submission of a

request for a payload determination

does not constitute the filing of a

complete application, and a license

application is not complete without a

request for a payload determination.

The Office is considering issuing

conditional licenses on those occasions

when a request for a payload

determination has yet to be completed.

This would mean that a license would

be issued subject to or conditional upon

issuance of a payload determination.

The Office once issued a conditional

license to an applicant who proposed to

launch a reentry vehicle as its payload.

The reentry vehicle was still under

development, but the Office issued a

launch license conditioned upon

eventual submission of all required

payload information and a final

determination by the Office regarding

the payload.

The Office also addresses payload

safety issues because payload safety is

not otherwise part of the safety

evaluation of the launch. Payload issues

considered during the review include,

but are not limited to, unique launch

safety issues, the payload owner(s), and

the payload function. For example, a

past payload issue included the nature

of the cargo. In that case the payload

cargo consisted of cremains, which are

human remains reduced to small

pellets. A safety issue addressed was

whether the pellets would be dispersed

while in orbit.

Proposed § 415.51 describes the scope

of an Office payload review. Pursuant to

proposed § 415.53, the Office will not

review payloads owned and operated by

the government of the United States or

those that are subject to the regulation

of the Federal Communications

Commission or the Department of

Commerce, National Oceanic and

Atmospheric Administration.

Proposed § 415.55 allows the Office to

make a determination regarding a

proposed class of payloads, including,

for example, communications, remote

sensing or navigation satellites. When

an applicant requests an operator

license to conduct unspecified but

similar launches over a period of five

years, the applicant will not always be

able to identify specifically each

payload to be launched. The applicant

must describe the class or classes of

payloads proposed for launch under the

license and general characteristics of

those payloads. In these cases, the

licensee must later provide additional

descriptive information regarding the

specific payload prior to flight as

described in § 415.79(a).

Proposed § 415.57 provides

procedures an applicant must follow to

obtain a payload determination. The

Office coordinates a payload review

with other government agencies such as

the Departments of Defense, State, and

Commerce, the National Aeronautics

and Space Administration and the

Federal Communications Commission.

The information requested under

proposed § 415.59 is required to identify

and address possible safety and policy

issues related to the payload, and to
Federal Register / Vol. 62, No. 53, Wednesday, March 19, 1997 / Proposed Rules 13233

6Although the Office practice has evolved toward

the multiple license approach contained in the

proposed regulations, it was believed that it would

be more appropriate to use the previous Office

practice as a baseline, so the economic impacts

identified in such a comparison would reflect the

real impacts of the changes from current

regulations.

conduct any necessary interagency

review. In most instances, the

information submitted may be brief, but

in cases which present potential unique

safety concerns considerable detail may

be necessary regarding the physical

characteristics, functional description

and operations of the payload.

Proposed § 415.61(a) explains that the

Office will issue a payload

determination unless policy or safety

considerations prevent launch of the

payload. Proposed § 415.61(b) contains

the procedures employed by the Office

were it to deny an applicant a payload

determination and describes the

recourse available to that applicant. If

an applicant fails to obtain a payload

determination, the applicant may

attempt to correct the deficiencies

which resulted in a denial and request

reconsideration of the denial, or, upon

denial of a license, it may request a

hearing.

Proposed § 415.63 addresses

incorporation of a payload

determination into subsequent license

reviews. It also explains that any change

in information provided to the Office

must be reported in accordance with

applicable rules.

Proposed subpart E addresses postlicensing requirements, including

license terms and conditions. This

subpart describes a licensee’s public

safety responsibilities under proposed

§ 415.71. Proposed § 415.73 describes

the circumstances which require a

licensee to apply for an amendment to

its license. A launch licensee must

ensure the continuing accuracy of

representations contained in its

application for the term of its license,

and must conduct its licensed launches

as it has represented that it will. This

means that if any information a licensee

provides pursuant to part 415 is no

longer accurate, a licensee must apply

for an amendment to its license. For

example, if a licensee intends to alter its

accident investigation plan, it must

request an amendment to do so.

The remainder of subpart E contains

license terms and conditions applicable

to all licensees. Proposed § 415.75

requires a licensee to enter into an

agreement with the federal launch range

from which it proposes to launch.

Proposed § 415.77 requires a licensee to

maintain those records that pertain to

activities carried out under a license

issued by the Office. Proposed § 415.79

requires a licensee to report certain

information before each launch.

Proposed § 415.81 contains

requirements for registration of space

objects, including a new provision that

a licensee need not register objects

owned and registered by the

government of the United States.

Proposed § 415.83 requires a licensee to

comply with financial responsibility

requirements as specified in a license or

license order. Proposed § 415.85

explains that a licensee is required to

cooperate with the compliance

monitoring responsibilities of the Office.

Proposed subpart F describes the

Office’s safety review for a proposed

launch from a launch site not operated

by a federal launch range. The Office

will conduct a review on an individual,

case by case basis until it issues

regulations of general applicability.

Proposed subpart G incorporates the

Office’s environmental review

requirements, current §§ 415.31 and

415.33, which require the Office to

comply with applicable environmental

laws and regulations, and state that the

applicant must provide the Office with

the information required for doing so.

The proposed relocation represents no

substantive change from the current

regulations.

E. Part 417—Site Operator License

Because the Office proposes to

remove and reserve part 411, which

contains § 411.3 governing the licensing

of the operation of a launch site, the

Office proposes part 417 to govern the

licensing of the operation of a launch

site. The Office will license the

operation of a launch site on an

individual, case by case basis until it

issues regulations of general

applicability. Until then, an applicant

for a site operator license should refer

to the Office’s draft guidelines for

application requirements.

V. Statutory Authority for Proposed

Rules

These proposed rule changes are

proposed pursuant to 49 U.S.C. Subtitle

IX, Commercial Space Transportation,

ch. 701—Commercial Space Launch

Activities, §§ 70101–70119, formerly the

Commercial Space Launch Act of 1984,

as amended.

VI. Regulatory Burden and Costs

This NPRM has been reviewed by the

Office of Management and Budget under

E.O. 12866. Under regulatory policies

and procedures of the Department of

Transportation, this proposed rule is

considered significant because there is

substantial public interest in the

rulemaking. 44 FR 11034 (Feb. 26,

1979).

A. Regulatory Evaluation

An assessment of the potential costs

and benefits of the proposed regulatory

action was performed as is required by

Executive Order 12866. A baseline case

was stipulated which assumes that

every licensed commercial space launch

is issued one and only one license, and

that that license covers all activities

(beginning when the launch operator

commences launch-related activities on

the federal range).6 This baseline was

then compared to current practice under

which launch operator licenses for up to

two years are issued to cover launch

activities beginning when the licensee

begins preparation for launch on the

federal range. Then the provisions of the

proposed regulation were compared to

current practice.

The primary impacts of the proposed

regulations are on licensees (generally

launch firms) as the primary regulated

community and on the government of

the United States (the Office as the

implementer of the regulations and the

U.S. Treasury). The effects on launch

companies are reduced paperwork costs,

and increased business certainty (i.e.,

reduced uncertainty relating to license

requirements and resulting costs).

Specific impacts on launch firms

include:

• Reduced paperwork and

administrative costs resulting from the

availability of the launch operator

license,

• Increased certainty regarding

requirements attendant with obtaining

and maintaining a license,

• Increased certainty that would

result from being issued a launch

operator license covering multiple

launches as compared with a license for

each launch,

• Greater certainty regarding the

scope of a launch license,

• Possibly increased risk due to

narrower definition of launch period

(and consequently narrower period

during which licensee might be

indemnified by the government).

The more narrow definition of launch

would result in less time during which

the activities of a licensee would be

subject to the financial responsibility

and risk allocation scheme of the Act.

This means that the possibility of

indemnification is correspondingly

shorter. During the time that a launch

company is present at a federal launch

range, but its launch vehicle is not

present, there would be no possibility of

indemnification under the proposed

definition of launch were an accident to

occur. Instead, a launch operator would
13234 Federal Register / Vol. 62, No. 53, Wednesday, March 19, 1997 / Proposed Rules

7The Statute has a five-year sunset clause of

which one year has already passed—hence the four

year consideration.

have to make its own evaluations

regarding the necessity for and amount

of insurance required for its activities.

The Office believes that insurance for

industrial operations is available, but

does not have information regarding its

necessity or the impacts, if any, on the

price of insurance, financial risk

investment decisions or other financial

impacts of the Office’s proposal to

truncate the possibility of

indemnification. Accordingly, the Office

requests comments regarding these

issues.

Annual savings to industry resulting

from the paperwork and administrative

impacts were estimated to be $536,000

when current practice is compared with

the baseline and $180,000 when the

proposed regulation is compared with

current practice. The benefits of

increased certainty were not

quantifiable. The impact of possibly

higher risk was considered to be so low

as to be considered inconsequential.

The specific impacts on the Office are

greater certainty about future operations

and better ability to plan due to the

institution of launch operator licenses.

Another impact is reduced paperwork

and administrative costs that result from

processing fewer, albeit more costly

licenses. This is expected to result in

cost savings to the Office of about

$1,266,000 annually when current

practice is compared with the baseline,

and $177,000 annually when the

proposed regulation is compared with

current practice. Over the four-year time

horizon 7 of this analysis, total benefits

to both industry and government total

approximately $7,208,000 when current

practice is compared with the baseline

and about $1,428,000 when the

proposed regulation is compared with

current practice. There is also a slightly

lower risk to the U.S. Treasury that it

would be called upon to indemnify for

third-party damages under the

indemnification provision of the statute,

because the launch phase is more

limited under the regulation. This risk

is expected to be extremely low and has

not been quantified. The overall primary

impacts of the regulation are expected to

result in net benefits to industry and the

government.

Limited secondary impacts on

payload owners, new market entrants,

and insurance firms were found but

were not quantified. It was impossible

to predict the direction of impacts on

insurance firms, while identified

potential impacts on payload owners

and new market entrants were likely to

provide net benefits.

A copy of the regulatory evaluation

analysis is filed in the docket and may

also be obtained from the Office.

B. Regulatory Flexibility Act Analysis

I certify that this rule would not, if

adopted as proposed, have a significant

economic impact on a substantial

number of small entities. The Small

Business Administration has defined

small businesses in the space industry

as entities composed of fewer than 1000

employees. The Office licenses

approximately half a dozen entities for

launch from federal ranges. Only one

licensee has fewer than 1000 employees.

In addition, a modest annual savings to

industry resulting from paperwork and

administrative impacts were estimated

to be $536,000 when current practice is

compared with the baseline and

$180,000 when the proposed regulation

is compared with current practice.

Accordingly, the proposed rules are not

expected to have a significant impact on

a substantial number of small entities.

C. International Trade Impact

Assessment

The impact of the proposed rule on

international trade is expected to be

beneficial. The proposed rule

streamlines the launch license

procedures to the benefit of U.S.

industry, and provides prospective site

operators greater information and

certainty to the ultimate benefit of their

ability to plan. These approaches should

redound to the benefit of U.S. industry

as it confronts foreign competition.

D. Federalism Implications

The proposed regulations would not

have substantial direct effects on the

states, on the relationship between the

federal government and the states, or on

the distribution of power and

responsibilities among the various

levels of government. Therefore, in

accordance with Executive Order 12612,

it is determined that the proposed

regulation does not have sufficient

federalism impacts to warrant the

preparation of a federalism assessment.

E. Paperwork Reduction Act

Parts 413 and 415 of the proposed

rules contain information collection

requirements. In accordance with the

Paperwork Reduction Act of 1995, 44

U.S.C. 3501 et seq., the information

collection requirements associated with

these proposed rules are being

submitted to the Office of Management

and Budget for approval under OMB No.

2105–0515, TITLE: Commercial Space

Transportation Licensing Regulations.

The information to be collected includes

data to support policy and safety

reviews, data to support payload

reviews, and environmental impact

information. The required information

will be used to determine if a license

applicant is eligible for a license to

launch a launch vehicle.

The annual cost per year is calculated

by multiplying the estimated cost per

application by the total number of

applications received on a yearly basis.

The estimated cost per application is

calculated by multiplying the estimated

hourly wage rate by the estimated

average hours required for processing by

the government and for industry

preparation of an application. The unit

cost for each launch license application

is calculated by employing a cost of

$59.00 per hour. This cost includes

programmatic costs associated with

government personnel and overhead.

The industry rate is also $59.00 per hour

for industry managerial, engineering

and clerical personnel involved in

gathering, reviewing and formatting the

information required for each

application. Burden hours were

obtained based on engineering

information. The burden is expected to

decrease compared with existing

paperwork requirements because the

proposed regulations clarify the

application requirements. Average

burden hours per application are

expected to approximate 518 hours for

a launch operator license and 421 hours

for a launch specific license.

Comments on the proposed

information collection requirements

should be submitted to: Office of

Management and Budget, Washington,

DC 20503, Attention: Desk Officer for

the Federal Aviation Administration. It

is requested that comments sent to OMB

also be sent to the rulemaking docket for

this proposed action, FAA Rules Docket

Federal Aviation Administration, Office

of the Chief Counsel, Attention: Rules

Docket (AGC–200), Docket No. 49815,

800 Independence Avenue, SW.,

Washington, DC 20591.

BILLING CODE 4910–13–P
Federal Register / Vol. 62, No. 53, Wednesday, March 19, 1997 / Proposed Rules 13235

BILLING CODE 4910–13–C
13236 Federal Register / Vol. 62, No. 53, Wednesday, March 19, 1997 / Proposed Rules

FIGURE 2.—COMPARISON OF FAA/CST SAFETY APPROVAL REQUIREMENTS FOR LAUNCH FROM A FEDERAL LAUNCH

RANGE WITH AIR FORCE RANGE USER REQUIREMENTS

Proposed FAA/CST

regulations

Related Air Force range requirements

(Eastern and Western Range Regulation

(EWRR) 127–1, Mar. 31, 1995)

Requirement comparison

415.33 Safety Organization

(a) Maintain a safety organization and document it by identifying lines of communication

and approval authority for all flight safety decisions. Lines of communication shall ensure

that personnel perform flight safety operations in accordance with range safety and

subpart C requirements. Approval authority

shall ensure compliance with range safety

and subpart C requirements.

§ 1B.1.3.1: The range user is required to describe its system safety organization in a

System Safety Program Plan (SSPP), to include:

• safety organizational and functional relationships;

• lines of communication (§ 1B.1.2c);

• responsibility and authority of personnel;

• staffing of the safety organization;

• the decision process for safety related issues;

• and identification of the organizational unit

responsible for performing each task.

The parts of the SSPP related to flight safety

may meet FAA’s requirement if all of FAA’s

required elements are addressed.

(b) Safety Official. Identify a qualified safety official authorized to:

• examine all aspects of flight safety operations,

• monitor independently personnel compliance with safety policies and procedures,

and

• report directly to the person responsible for

approval of launches, who shall ensure

that all of the safety official’s concerns are

addressed prior to launch.

§ 1B.1.1.2: The range user is required to establish and maintain a key system safety

position for each program. The individual in

this position must be directly responsible to

the range user program manager for safety

matters.

The safety official required by the combination

of § 1B.1.1.2 and § 1B.1.3.1 may meet

FAA’s requirement if all of FAA’s required

elements are addressed.

415.35 Acceptable Flight Risk

(a) Flight risk through orbital insertion.

Acceptable risk level: EC≤30×10¥6.

§ 1.4.1: Acceptable launch risk without high

management review is EC≤30×10¥6.

The Federal Range Commander may approve

risk levels higher than EC≤30×10¥6 where

national interests require.

(b) Flight risk following orbital insertion. Prevent physical contact between vehicle or its

components and payload. Prevent debris

generation from conversion of energy

sources into energy that fragments the vehicle or its components.

§ 1.3.7.2: Range safety control ends at orbital

insertion. A range uses Collision Avoidance

(COLA) data to determine the risk of collision with a manned or mannable object.

FAA’s requirements are not required by the

range.

(c) Hazard analysis and risk assessment.

Submit an analysis assessing risks to public

health and safety and safety of property

associated with nominal and non-nominal

flight.

§ 2.6, 2.8, 2.11: The range user is required to

provide the data necessary for range safety

to perform a hazard analysis and risk assessment for the range user’s specific vehicle.

If the applicant submits the hazard analysis

and risk assessment performed by the

range, the hazard analysis and risk assessment addresses all flight risks and the risk

meets the requirement of EC≤30×10¥6 for a

single launch, the FAA requirement is met.

415.37 Launch Safety Design and Operations

(a) Provide overview of launch vehicle, including structure and hazardous and safety-critical subsystems. Include drawings and schematics for each system.§ 3A.2.3: The range requires the user to provide an overview of the launch vehicle.A copy of the overview that satisfies the range

requirements will satisfy FAA’s requirement.

(b) Identify all launch operations and procedures that must be performed to ensure acceptable flight risks.§ 1.3.8: The range requires the user to submit

documents regarding flight safety for review

and approval. These documents must include the information the range needs in

order to conduct flight safety operations.

The portions of the documents provided to the

range that identify launch operations and

procedures related to flight safety may meet

FAA’s requirement if all of FAA’s required

elements are addressed. Range flight safety

procedures documented in the FAA’s Baseline Assessment may also be referenced to

identify launch operations and procedures

performed by a range.
Federal Register / Vol. 62, No. 53, Wednesday, March 19, 1997 / Proposed Rules 13237

FIGURE 2.—COMPARISON OF FAA/CST SAFETY APPROVAL REQUIREMENTS FOR LAUNCH FROM A FEDERAL LAUNCH

RANGE WITH AIR FORCE RANGE USER REQUIREMENTS—Continued

Proposed FAA/CST

regulations

Related Air Force range requirements

(Eastern and Western Range Regulation

(EWRR) 127–1, Mar. 31, 1995)

Requirement comparison

(c) Flight readiness requirements. Designate

an individual responsible for flight readiness,

and submit (1) through (5):

§ 7.2.2: The Chiefs of Safety of the 45th and

30th Space Wings, or their designated representatives, are responsible for:

• Providing range users with a Range Safety Launch Operations Approval Letter no

later than a Launch Readiness Review

(LRR); and

• Providing the final range safety approval

to launch. Issuance of the Launch Operations Approval Letter depends on the

range user having obtained the previously

required approvals (e.g., § 1.5.2.1 items a

through f; § 1.5.2.2 items a through n).

FAA’s requirement for the applicant to designate an individual responsible for flight

readiness is not a range requirement.

§ 7.2.3: During countdown, a Missile Flight

Control Officer is responsible for determining whether a launch should proceed.

(1) Procedures that ensure a launch readiness

review is conducted with applicant’s flight

safety personnel and federal launch range

personnel involved in the launch. The review

must provide the following to the individual

responsible for flight readiness:

• Flight readiness of federal launch range

property and services;

The range holds a LRR to determine if the

range is ready to support a particular launch

operation. This review covers all elements

of support that the range will provide to the

range user. The requirement for the LRR is

contained in AFSPACECOM Regulation 55–

32 ‘‘Operations Readiness Review of Space

and Missile Systems.’’

FAA requires the applicant to conduct a meeting to verify readiness of the vehicle and

launch team, which includes range support.

The LRR held by the range may meet

FAA’s requirement if all of FAA’s required

elements are addressed.

• Flight readiness of launch vehicle and

payload;

• Flight readiness of flight safety systems;

• Mission rules and launch constraints;

• Abort, hold, and recycle procedures;

• Results of dress rehearsals and simulations;

• Unresolved safety issues and plans for

resolution; and

• Other safety information to determine

flight readiness.

(2) Procedures that ensure mission constraints, rules, and abort procedures are listed and consolidated in a safety directive or

notebook;

§ 6.17 At a minimum, procedures for the

launch countdown and prelaunch count shall

contain the operations safety functions for

the specific launch vehicle and payload systems.

§ 6A.2.4a List all non-hazardous, hazardous,

and safety critical procedures. . . .

The FAA requirement is not required by the

range, but an applicant may rely on the mission rules and operations requirements developed by the range to satisfy a portion of

the FAA requirement and may employ them

in the applicant’s safety directive or notebook.

§ 7.4.5 A copy of the final range user countdown checklist for each operation shall be

provided. . . .

§ 7.2.4.1: The range develops mission rules in

conjunction with the range user.

§ 7.4: Range safety develops a Range Safety

Operations Requirement (RSOR) and an

Operations Supplement (OpsSup).

(3) Procedures that ensure currency and consistency of applicant and federal range

countdown checklists;

§ 7.2.8: The range user is required to provide

telemetry measurement lists, countdown

checklist, and special command requirements and requests.

The FAA requirement is not required by the

range, because the range requirement does

not require procedures that specifically ensure currency and consistency of checklists.

§ 6B1.5: One copy of procedures involving

hazardous or safety critical operations shall

be submitted to range safety and one copy

to operations safety for review and approval. . . . Final approved, published procedures incorporating range safety comments shall be submitted to range safety. . . .

(4) Dress rehearsal procedures; The range does not require dress rehearsals. The FAA requirement is not required by the

range.

(5) Procedures for ensuring the applicant’s

flight safety personnel adhere to federal

launch range crew rest rules.

§ 6.5.1.4: The range user is required to comply

with range work time restrictions.

The FAA requirement is satisfied when the applicant commits to meeting the range requirements.
13238 Federal Register / Vol. 62, No. 53, Wednesday, March 19, 1997 / Proposed Rules

FIGURE 2.—COMPARISON OF FAA/CST SAFETY APPROVAL REQUIREMENTS FOR LAUNCH FROM A FEDERAL LAUNCH

RANGE WITH AIR FORCE RANGE USER REQUIREMENTS—Continued

Proposed FAA/CST

regulations

Related Air Force range requirements

(Eastern and Western Range Regulation

(EWRR) 127–1, Mar. 31, 1995)

Requirement comparison

415.39 Communications Plan

(a) Submit communications plan providing applicant and federal launch range personnel

communications procedures during countdown and flight. Plan must ensure effective

issuance and communication of safety-critical information during countdown including

hold/resume, go/no go, and abort commands, and describe authority of personnel

to issue these commands. Ensure that:

(1) Communication networks are assigned

so that personnel have direct access to

real-time safety-critical information;

(2) Personnel monitor common intercom

channels during countdown and flight; and

(3) A protocol is established for utilizing

clearly defined communications terminology.

The range user requests all range support, including communications support in an Operations Requirement (OR) document; the

range responds in an Operations Directive

(OD). This is a Universal Documentation

System requirement.

§ 7.11: The flight control communication circuits shall be specified in the applicable

Range Safety Operations Requirements

(RSOR). An RSOR shall be developed and

published for each applicable Program Requirements Document (PRD) or OR prepared by a range user.

The federal range sets up a communications

system to support launch operations. The

range also provides any additional communications capabilities required by the range

user as specified in the OR and OD. The

range support may serve as a portion of the

applicant’s communications plan, but because the range does not address the requirements of § 415.39(a)(1)–(3), an applicant must satisfy those additional requirements.

(b) Submit procedures that ensure applicant

and federal launch range personnel receive

the communications plan that has been concurred in by the federal launch range.

§ 7.4.1: The range user requests communications support in an Operations Requirement

(OR) document; the range responds in an

Operations Directive (OD). This is a Universal Documentation System requirement.

The FAA requirement is not required by the

range.

415.41 Accident Investigation Plan (AIP)

(a) Submit an AIP containing the applicant’s

procedures for reporting and responding to

launch accidents, launch incidents, or other

mishaps.

§ 1.10.1: The range investigates all mishaps

involving Air Force personnel and resources

in accordance with Air Force Instruction

(AFI) 91–204.

The range does not require the range user to

submit an AIP.

(b) Reporting requirements. The AIP shall provide for immediate notification to the FAA

Operations Center, and submission of a written preliminary report in the event of a

launch accident or launch incident.

§ 6.4.7.2: The range user must include an accident notification plan in its Ground Operations Plan, and must provide proper and

timely notification to the range of mishaps

involving Air Force property and all significant mishaps.

The FAA’s requirement is not required by the

range.

(c) Response Plans. The AIP shall contain

procedures that:

• ensure the consequences of a launch accident, launch incident, or other mishap

are contained and minimized;

§ 6.4.7.2: The range user notifies the range if

a mishap occurs.

§ 1.10.1: If a mishap involves Air Force personnel or resources, the range responds

and investigates.

If the range conducts a portion of FAA’s required response, then range involvement

would be a component of an applicant’s response plans.

• ensure data and physical evidence are

preserved;

• require applicant to report to and cooperate with the FAA and NTSB;

• designate point(s) of contact; and

• identify and adopt preventive measures.

(d) Investigation Plans. The AIP shall contain

procedures for investigating the cause of a

launch accident, launch incident, or other

mishap, for reporting investigation results to

the FAA, and delineation of responsibilities

for personnel assigned to conduct investigations.

§ 1.10.1: The range investigates all mishaps

involving Air Force personnel and resources. § 1.10.2: Range safety may participate in non-Air Force mishap investigations

and must be provided investigation results.

If the range conducts a portion of FAA’s required investigation, then range involvement

would be a component of an applicant’s investigation plans.

List of Subjects in 14 CFR Parts 401,

411, 413, 415 and 417

Confidential business information,

Environmental protection, Organization

and functions, Reporting and

recordkeeping requirements, Rockets,

Space transportation and exploration.

Proposed Regulation

For the reasons set out in the

preamble, Title 14, Chapter III of the

Code of Federal Regulations is proposed

to be amended to read as follows:

PART 401—ORGANIZATION AND

DEFINITIONS.

1. The authority citation for part 401

is revised to read as follows:

Authority: 49 U.S.C. 70102.

2. Section 401.5 is amended by

removing the terms Director, Launch

activity, Licensee, Mission, and Safety

operations, by revising the terms Act,

Launch, Launch vehicle, Payload, and

Person, and by adding the terms

Associate Administrator, Federal

launch range, Hazardous materials,

Launch accident, Launch incident,

Launch operator, Launch site, Mishap,

and Office:
Federal Register / Vol. 62, No. 53, Wednesday, March 19, 1997 / Proposed Rules 13239

§ 401.5 Definitions.

* * * * *

Act means 49 U.S.C. Subtitle IX,

Commercial Space Transportation, ch.

701—Commercial Space Launch

Activities, 49 U.S.C. §§ 70101–70119

(1994).

* * * * *

Associate Administrator means the

Associate Administrator for Commercial

Space Transportation, Federal Aviation

Administration, or any person

designated by the Associate

Administrator to exercise the authority

or discharge the responsibilities of the

Associate Administrator.

Federal launch range means an

installation from which launches take

place that is owned and operated by the

government of the United States.

Hazardous materials means

hazardous materials as defined in 49

CFR § 172.101.

Launch means to place or try to place

a launch vehicle and any payload in a

suborbital trajectory, in Earth orbit in

outer space, or otherwise in outer space.

The term launch includes the flight of

a launch vehicle, and those hazardous

pre-flight activities that are closely

proximate in time to flight and are

unique to space flight. For launches

from a federal launch range, hazardous

pre-flight activities begin with the

arrival of a launch vehicle at a federal

launch range.

Launch accident means an unplanned

event occurring during the flight of a

launch vehicle resulting in the known

impact of a launch vehicle, its payload

or any component thereof outside

designated impact limit lines; or a

fatality or serious injury (as defined in

49 CFR § 830.2) to any person who is

not associated with the flight; or any

damage estimated to exceed $25,000 to

property not associated with the flight

where the property is not located at the

launch site or designated recovery area.

Launch incident means an unplanned

event occurring during the flight of a

launch vehicle, other than a launch

accident, involving a malfunction of a

flight safety system or failure of the

licensee’s safety organization, design or

operations.

Launch operator means a person who

conducts or who will conduct the

launch of a launch vehicle and any

payload.

Launch site—means the location on

Earth from which a launch takes place

(as defined in a license the Secretary

issues or transfers under this chapter)

and necessary facilities located at the

site.

Launch vehicle means a vehicle built

to operate in, or place a payload in,

outer space and a suborbital rocket.

Mishap means an unplanned event or

series of events resulting in injury,

occupational illness, or damage to or

loss of equipment or property. Mishaps

include, but are not limited to, launch

accidents and launch incidents.

Office means the Associate

Administrator for Commercial Space

Transportation of the Federal Aviation

Administration, U. S. Department of

Transportation.

* * * * *

Payload means an object that a person

undertakes to place in outer space by

means of a launch vehicle, including

components of the vehicle specifically

designed or adapted for that object.

Person means an individual or an

entity organized or existing under the

laws of a state or country.

* * * * *

SUBCHAPTER C—LICENSING

PART 411—[REMOVED AND

RESERVED]

3. Part 411 is removed and reserved.

4. Part 413 is revised to read as

follows:

PART 413—LICENSE APPLICATION

PROCEDURES

Sec.

413.1 Scope.

413.3 Who must obtain a license.

413.5 Pre-application consultation.

413.7 Applications.

413.9 Confidentiality.

413.11 Acceptance of applications.

413.13 Complete application.

413.15 Review period.

413.17 Continuing accuracy of applications;

supplemental information;

modifications.

413.19 Issuance of a license.

413.21 Denial of a license application.

413.23 License renewal.

Authority: 49 U.S.C. 70101–70119.

§ 413.1 Scope.

This part prescribes the procedures

applicable to all applications submitted

under this chapter to conduct licensed

activities. These procedures apply to

applications for issuance of a license,

transfer of an existing license and

renewal of an existing license. More

specific requirements applicable to

obtaining a launch license or a site

operator license are contained in parts

415 and 417 of this chapter,

respectively.

§ 413.3 Who must obtain a license.

(a) Any person must obtain a launch

license to launch a launch vehicle from

the United States or a site operator

license to operate a launch site within

the United States.

(b) An individual who is a United

States citizen or an entity organized or

existing under the laws of the United

States or any state must obtain a launch

license to launch a launch vehicle

outside of the United States or a site

operator license to operate a launch site

outside of the United States.

(c) A foreign entity in which a United

States citizen has a controlling interest,

as defined in § 401.5 of this chapter,

must obtain a launch license to launch

a launch vehicle from or a site operator

license to operate a launch site

within——

(1) Any place that is both outside the

United States and outside the territory

of any foreign nation, unless there is an

agreement in force between the United

States and a foreign nation providing

that such foreign nation shall exercise

jurisdiction over the launch or the

operation of the launch site; or

(2) The territory of any foreign nation

if there is an agreement in force between

the United States and that foreign nation

providing that the United States shall

exercise jurisdiction over the launch or

the operation of the launch site.

§ 413.5 Pre-application consultation.

Prospective applicants shall consult

with the Office before submitting an

application to discuss the application

process and potential issues relevant to

the Office’s licensing decision. Early

consultation enables the applicant to

identify potential licensing issues at the

planning stage when changes or

modifications to a license application or

to proposed licensed activities are less

likely to result in significant delay or

costs to the applicant.

§ 413.7 Applications.

(a) Form. An application must be in

writing and filed in duplicate with the

Federal Aviation Administration,

Associate Administrator for Commercial

Space Transportation, AST–200, Room

5402a, 400 Seventh Street, S.W.,

Washington, D.C. 20590. Attention:

Licensing and Safety Division,

Applications Review.

(b) Administrative information. The

application must identify the following:

(1) The name and address of the

applicant;

(2) The name, address, and telephone

number of person(s) to whom inquiries

and correspondence should be directed;

and

(3) The type of license for which the

applicant is applying.

(c) Signature and certification of

accuracy. The application must be

legibly signed, dated, and certified as

true, complete, and accurate by one of

the following:
13240 Federal Register / Vol. 62, No. 53, Wednesday, March 19, 1997 / Proposed Rules

(1) For a corporation: an officer

authorized to act for the corporation in

licensing matters.

(2) For a partnership or a sole

proprietorship: a general partner or

proprietor, respectively.

(3) For a joint venture, association, or

other entity: an officer or other

individual duly authorized to act for the

joint venture, association, or other entity

in licensing matters.

§ 413.9 Confidentiality.

(a) Any person furnishing information

or data to the Office may request in

writing that trade secrets or proprietary

commercial or financial data be treated

as confidential. The request must be

made at the time the information or data

is submitted, and state the period of

time for which confidential treatment is

desired.

(b) Information or data for which any

person or agency requests

confidentiality must be clearly marked

with an identifying legend, such as

‘‘Proprietary Information,’’ ‘‘Proprietary

Commercial Information,’’ ‘‘Trade

Secret,’’ or ‘‘Confidential Treatment

Requested.’’ Where this marking proves

impracticable, a cover sheet containing

the identifying legend must be securely

attached to the compilation of

information or data for which

confidential treatment is requested.

(c) If a person requests that previously

submitted information or data be treated

confidentially, the Office will do so to

the extent practicable in light of any

prior distribution of the information or

data.

(d) Information or data for which

confidential treatment has been

requested or information or data that

qualifies for exemption under section

552(b)(4) of Title 5, United States Code,

will not be disclosed unless the

Associate Administrator determines that

the withholding of the information or

data is contrary to the public or national

interest.

§ 413.11 Acceptance of applications.

The Office will initially screen an

application to determine whether the

application is sufficiently complete to

enable the Office to initiate the reviews

or evaluations required under any

applicable part of this chapter. After

completion of the initial screening, the

Office notifies the applicant, in writing,

of one of the following:

(a) The application is accepted and

the Office will initiate the reviews or

evaluations required for a licensing

determination under this chapter; or

(b) The application is so incomplete

or indefinite as to make initiation of the

reviews or evaluations required for a

licensing determination under this

chapter inappropriate, and the

application is rejected. The notice will

state the reason(s) for rejection and

corrective actions necessary for the

application to be accepted. The Office

may return a rejected application to the

applicant or may hold it pending

additional submissions by the applicant.

§ 413.13 Complete application.

Acceptance by the Office of an

application does not constitute a

determination that the application is

complete.

§ 413.15 Review period.

(a) 180-day review. Unless otherwise

specified in this chapter, the Office

reviews and makes a determination on

a license application within 180 days of

receipt of an accepted application.

(b) Review period tolled. If an

accepted application does not provide

sufficient information to continue or

complete the reviews or evaluations

required by this chapter for a licensing

determination, or an issue exists that

would affect the licensing

determination, the Office notifies the

applicant, in writing, and informs the

applicant of any information required to

complete the application. If further

review is impracticable, the 180-day

review period shall be tolled pending

receipt by the Office of the requested

information.

(c) 120-day notice. If the Office has

not made a licensing determination

within 120 days of receipt of an

accepted application, the Office informs

an applicant, in writing, of any

outstanding information needed to

complete the reviews or evaluations

required by this chapter for a licensing

determination, or of any pending issues

that would affect the licensing

determination.

§ 413.17 Continuing accuracy of

applications; supplemental information;

modification.

(a) An applicant is responsible for the

continuing accuracy and completeness

of information furnished to the Office as

part of a pending license application. If

at any time information provided by an

applicant as part of a license application

is no longer accurate and complete in all

respects, the applicant shall submit a

statement furnishing the new or

corrected information. As part of its

submission, the applicant shall recertify

the accuracy and completeness of the

application in accordance with § 413.7.

An applicant’s failure to comply with

any of the requirements set forth in this

paragraph is a sufficient basis for denial

of a license application.

(b) An applicant may modify or

supplement a license application at any

time prior to issuance or transfer of a

license.

(c) Willful false statements made in

applications and documents relating to

applications or licenses are punishable

by fine and imprisonment under section

1001 of Title 18, United States Code,

and by appropriate administrative

sanctions in accordance with part 405 of

this chapter.

§ 413.19 Issuance of a license.

After the Office completes its reviews

and issues the approvals and

determinations required by this chapter

for a license, the Office issues a license

to the applicant in accordance with this

chapter.

§ 413.21 Denial of a license application.

(a) The Office informs a license

applicant, in writing, if its application

has been denied and states the reasons

for denial.

(b) An applicant whose license

application is denied may do either of

the following:

(1) Attempt to correct any deficiencies

identified by the Office and request

reconsideration of the revised

application. The Office has 60 days or

the number of days remaining in the

180-day review period, whichever is

greater, within which to reconsider its

licensing determination; or

(2) Request a hearing in accordance

with the applicable rules in part 406 of

this chapter, for the purpose of showing

why the application should not be

denied.

(c) An applicant whose license

application is denied after

reconsideration under paragraph (b)(1)

of this section may request a hearing in

accordance with paragraph (b)(2) of this

section.

§ 413.23 License renewal.

(a) Eligibility. A holder of a launch

operator or site operator license may

apply to renew the license by

submitting to the Office a written

application for renewal of the license at

least 90 days before the expiration date

of the license.

(b) Application. (1) A license renewal

application shall satisfy the

requirements set forth in this part and

and any other applicable part of this

chapter.

(2) The application may incorporate

by reference information provided as

part of the application for the expiring

license or any amendment to that

license.

(3) The applicant must describe any

proposed changes in its conduct of
Federal Register / Vol. 62, No. 53, Wednesday, March 19, 1997 / Proposed Rules 13241

licensed activities and provide any

additional clarifying information

required by the Office. (c) Review of application. The Office

conducts the reviews required under

this chapter for a license to determine

whether the applicant’s license may be

renewed for an additional term. The

Office may incorporate by reference any

findings that are part of the record for

the expiring license. (d) Grant of license renewal. After

completion by the Office of the reviews

required by this chapter for a license

and issuance of the requisite approvals

and determinations, the Office issues an

order amending the expiration date of

the license. The Office may impose

additional or revised terms and

conditions necessary to protect public

health and safety and the safety of

property and to protect U.S. national

security and foreign policy interests. (e) Denial of license renewal. The

Office informs the licensee, in writing,

if the licensee’s application for renewal

has been denied and states the reasons

for denial. A licensee whose application

for renewal is denied may follow the

procedures set forth in § 413.21 of this

part.

PART 415—LAUNCH LICENSES

5. The authority citation for part 415

is revised to read as follows:

Authority: 49 U.S.C. 70101–70119.

6. In part 415, subpart D is

redesignated as subpart G. 7. Sections 415.31 and 415.33 are

redesignated as sections 415.101 and

415.103, respectively. 8. In part 415, subparts A through C

are revised and new subparts D through

F are proposed to be added to read as

follows:

Subpart A—General

Sec.

415.1 Scope.

415.3 Types of launch licenses.

415.5 Policy and safety approvals.

415.7 Payload determination.

415.9 Issuance of a launch license.

415.11 Additional license terms and

conditions.

415.13 Transfer of a launch license.

415.15 Rights not conferred by launch

license.

415.16–415.20 [Reserved]

Subpart B—Policy Review and Approval

415.21 General.

415.23 Policy review.

415.25 Application requirements for policy

review.

415.27 Denial of policy approval.

415.28–415.30 [Reserved]

Subpart C—Safety Review and Approval for

Launch From a Federal Launch Range

415.31 General.

415.33 Safety organization.

415.35 Acceptable flight risk.

415.37 Launch safety design and

operations.

415.39 Communications plan.

415.41 Accident investigation plan (AIP).

415.43 Denial of safety approval.

415.44–415.50 [Reserved]

Subpart D—Payload Review and

Determination

415.51 General.

415.53 Payloads not subject to review.

415.55 Classes of payloads.

415.57 Payload review.

415.59 Information requirements for

payload review.

415.61 Issuance of payload determination.

415.63 Incorporation of payload

determination in license application.

415.64–415.70 [Reserved]

Subpart E—Post-Licensing Requirements—

Launch License Terms and Conditions

415.71 Public safety responsibility.

415.73 Continuing accuracy of license

application; application for amendment.

415.75 Agreement(s) with federal launch

range.

415.77 Records.

415.79 Launch reporting requirements.

415.81 Registration of space objects.

415.83 Financial responsibility

requirements.

415.85 Compliance monitoring.

415.86–515.90 [Reserved]

Subpart F—Safety Review and Approval for

Launch From a Launch Site Not Operated

by a Federal Launch Range

415.91 General.

415.93 Denial of safety approval.

415.94–415.100 [Reserved]

Authority: 49 U.S.C. 70101–70119.

Subpart A—General

§ 415.1 Scope.

This part prescribes requirements for

obtaining a launch license and postlicensing requirements with which a

licensee shall comply to remain

licensed. Requirements for preparing a

license application are contained in part

413 of this subchapter.

§ 415.3 Types of launch licenses.

(a) Launch-specific license. A launchspecific license authorizes a licensee to

conduct one or more launches, having

the same launch parameters, of one type

of launch vehicle from one launch site.

The license identifies, by name or

mission, each launch authorized under

the license. A licensee’s authorization to

launch terminates upon completion of

all launches authorized by the license or

the expiration date stated in the license,

whichever occurs first.

(b) Launch operator license. A launch

operator license authorizes a licensee to

conduct launches from one launch site,

within a range of launch parameters, of

launch vehicles from the same family of

vehicles transporting specified classes

of payloads. A launch operator license

remains in effect for five years from the

date of issuance.

§ 415.5 Policy and safety approvals.

To obtain a launch license, an

applicant must obtain policy and safety

approvals from the Office. Requirements

for obtaining these approvals are

contained in subparts B and C of this

part. Only a launch license applicant

may apply for the approvals, and may

apply for either approval separately and

in advance of submitting a complete

license application, using the

application procedures contained in

part 413 of this subchapter.

§ 415.7 Payload determination.

A payload determination is required

for a launch license unless the proposed

payload is exempt from payload review

under § 415.53 of this part. The Office

conducts a payload review, as described

in subpart D of this part, to make the

determination. Either a launch license

applicant or a payload owner or

operator may request a review of its

proposed payload using the application

procedures contained in part 413 of this

subchapter. Upon receipt of an

application, the Office may conduct a

payload review independently of a

launch license application.

§ 415.9 Issuance of a launch license.

(a) The Office issues a launch license

to an applicant who has obtained all

approvals and determinations required

under this chapter for a license.

(b) A launch license authorizes a

licensee to conduct a commercial space

launch or launches in accordance with

the representations contained in the

licensee’s application, subject to the

licensee’s compliance with terms and

conditions contained in license orders

accompanying the license, including

financial responsibility requirements.

§ 415.11 Additional license terms and

conditions.

The Office may amend a launch

license at any time by modifying or

adding license terms and conditions to

ensure compliance with the Act and

regulations.

§ 415.13 Transfer of a launch license.

(a) Only the Office may transfer a

launch license.

(b) An applicant for transfer of a

launch license shall submit a license

application in accordance with part 413

of this subchapter and shall meet the

requirements of part 415 of this

subchapter. The Office will transfer a

license to an applicant who has

obtained all of the approvals and

determinations required under this
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chapter for a license. In conducting its

reviews and issuing approvals and

determinations, the Office may

incorporate by reference any findings

made part of the record to support the

initial licensing determination. The

Office may amend a license to reflect

any changes necessary as a result of a

license transfer.

§ 415.15 Rights not conferred by launch

license.

Issuance of a launch license does not

relieve a licensee of its obligation to

comply with other applicable

requirements of law or regulations that

may apply to its activities, nor does

issuance confer any proprietary,

property or exclusive right in the use of

any federal launch range or related

facilities, airspace, or outer space.

§§ 415.16–415.20 [Reserved]

Subpart B—Policy Review and

Approval

§ 415.21 General.

The Office issues a policy approval to

a license applicant unless the Office

determines that a proposed launch

would jeopardize U.S. national security

or foreign policy interests, or

international obligations of the United

States. A policy approval is part of the

licensing record on which the Office’s

licensing determination is based.

§ 415.23 Policy review.

(a) The Office reviews a license

application to determine whether it

presents any issues affecting U.S.

national security or foreign policy

interests, or international obligations of

the United States.

(b) Interagency consultation. (1) The

Office consults with the Department of

Defense to determine whether a license

application presents any issues affecting

U.S. national security.

(2) The Office consults with the

Department of State to determine

whether a license application presents

any issues affecting U.S. foreign policy

interests or international obligations.

(3) The Office consults with other

federal agencies, including the National

Aeronautics and Space Administration,

authorized to address issues identified

under paragraph (a) of this section,

associated with an applicant’s launch

proposal.

(c) The Office advises an applicant, in

writing, of any issue raised during a

policy review that would impede

issuance of a policy approval. The

applicant may respond, in writing, or

revise its license application.

§ 415.25 Application requirements for

policy review.

In its launch license application, an

applicant shall—

(a) Identify the model and

configuration of any launch vehicle(s)

proposed for launch by the applicant.

(b) Identify structural, pneumatic,

propellant, propulsion, electrical and

avionics systems used in the launch

vehicle and all propellants.

(c) Identify foreign ownership of the

applicant as follows:

(1) For a sole proprietorship or

partnership, identify all foreign

ownership;

(2) For a corporation, identify any

foreign ownership interests of 10% or

more; and

(3) For a joint venture, association, or

other entity, identify any participating

foreign entities.

(d) Identify proposed vehicle flight

profile(s), including:

(1) Launch site;

(2) Flight azimuths, trajectories, and

associated ground tracks and

instantaneous impact points;

(3) Sequence of planned events or

maneuvers during flight;

(4) Range of nominal impact areas for

all spent motors and other discarded

mission hardware, within three

standard deviations of the mean impact

point (a 3-sigma footprint); and

(5) For orbital missions, the range of

intermediate and final orbits of vehicle

upper stages, and their estimated orbital

lifetimes.

§ 415.27 Denial of policy approval.

The Office notifies an applicant, in

writing, if it has denied policy approval

for a license application. The notice

states the reasons for the Office’s

determination. The applicant may

respond to the reasons for the

determination and reapply for policy

approval.

§§ 415.28–415.30 [Reserved]

Subpart C—Safety Review and

Approval for Launch From a Federal

Launch Range

§ 415.31 General.

(a) The Office conducts a safety

review to determine whether an

applicant is capable of launching a

launch vehicle and its payload without

jeopardizing public health and safety

and safety of property. The Office issues

a safety approval to a license applicant

proposing to launch from a federal

launch range if the applicant satisfies

the requirements of this subpart and has

contracted with the federal launch range

for the provision of safety-related

launch services and property, as long as

those launch services and the proposed

use of launch property are within the

federal launch range’s experience. The

Office evaluates on an individual basis

all other safety-related launch services

and property associated with an

applicant’s proposal. A safety approval

is part of the licensing record on which

the Office’s licensing determination is

based.

(b) The Office advises an applicant, in

writing, of any issue raised during a

safety review that would impede

issuance of a safety approval. The

applicant may respond, in writing, or

revise its license application.

§ 415.33 Safety organization.

(a) An applicant shall maintain a

safety organization and document it by

identifying lines of communication and

approval authority for all launch safety

decisions. Lines of communication, both

within the applicant’s organization and

between the applicant and a federal

launch range, shall be employed to

ensure that personnel perform launch

safety operations in accordance with

range safety requirements and with

plans and procedures required by this

subpart. Approval authority shall be

employed to ensure compliance with

range safety requirements and with

plans and procedures required by this

subpart.

(b) Safety official. An applicant shall

identify a qualified safety official

authorized to examine all aspects of the

applicant’s launch safety operations and

to monitor independently personnel

compliance with the applicant’s safety

policies and procedures. The safety

official shall report directly to the

person responsible for an applicant’s

licensed launches, who shall ensure that

all of the safety official’s concerns are

addressed prior to launch.

§ 415.35 Acceptable flight risk.

(a) Flight risk through orbital

insertion. Acceptable flight risk through

orbital insertion is measured in terms of

the probability of occurrence and the

expected average number of casualties

(Ec) to the collective members of the

public for any one launch. To obtain

safety approval, the risk level associated

with an applicant’s launch proposal

shall not exceed a collective risk of 30

casualties in one million launches (Ec ≤

30 × 10-6).

(b) Flight risks following orbital

insertion. An applicant’s launch

proposal shall ensure that for all vehicle

stages or components that reach earth

orbit—

(1) There is no unplanned physical

contact between the vehicle or its
Federal Register / Vol. 62, No. 53, Wednesday, March 19, 1997 / Proposed Rules 13243

components and the payload after

payload separation; and

(2) Debris generation will not result

from the conversion of energy sources

into energy that fragments the vehicle or

its components. Energy sources include

chemical (e.g., fuel), pressure (e.g.,

pneumatic), and kinetic (e.g.,

gyroscopes) energy.

(c) Hazard analysis and risk

assessment. An applicant shall submit

an analysis assessing risks to public

health and safety and safety of property

associated with nominal and nonnominal flight under its launch

proposal. The methodology used shall

ensure that all flight hazards are

identified and risks to public health and

safety and safety of property are

assessed.

§ 415.37 Launch safety design and

operations.

(a) A launch vehicle, including its

safety systems, shall be designed to

ensure that flight risks satisfy the

criteria set forth in § 415.35 of this part.

An applicant shall identify and describe

the following:

(1) Launch vehicle structure,

including physical dimensions and

weight;

(2) Hazardous and safety critical

systems, including propulsion systems;

and

(3) Drawings and schematics for each

system identified under paragraph (a)(2)

of this section.

(b) A launch vehicle shall be operated

in a manner that ensures that flight risks

satisfy the criteria set forth in § 415.35

of this part. An applicant shall identify

all launch operations and procedures

that must be performed to ensure

acceptable flight risks.

(c) Flight readiness requirements. An

applicant shall designate an individual

responsible for flight readiness. The

applicant shall submit the following

flight readiness procedures for verifying

readiness for safe flight:

(1) Launch readiness review

procedures involving the applicant’s

flight safety personnel and federal

launch range personnel involved in the

launch. The procedures shall ensure a

launch readiness review is conducted

during which the individual designated

under paragraph (c) of this section is

provided with the following information

to make a judgement as to flight

readiness:

(i) Flight-readiness of safety-related

launch property and services to be

provided by a federal launch range;

(ii) Flight-readiness of launch vehicle

and payload;

(iii) Flight-readiness of flight safety

systems;

(iv) Mission rules and launch

constraints;

(v) Abort, hold and recycle

procedures;

(vi) Results of dress rehearsals and

simulations conducted in accordance

with paragraph (c)(4) of this section;

(vii) Unresolved safety issues as of the

launch readiness review and plans for

addressing and resolving them; and

(viii) Any additional safety

information required by the individual

designated under paragraph (c) of this

section to determine flight readiness.

(2) Procedures that ensure mission

constraints, rules and abort procedures

are listed and consolidated in a safety

directive or notebook approved by

licensee flight safety and federal launch

range personnel;

(3) Procedures that ensure currency

and consistency of licensee and federal

launch range countdown checklists;

(4) Dress rehearsal procedures that—

(i) Ensure crew readiness under

nominal and non-nominal flight

conditions;

(ii) Contain criteria for determining

whether to dispense with one or more

dress rehearsals; and

(iii) Verify currency and consistency

of licensee and federal launch range

countdown checklists.

(5) Procedures for ensuring the

licensee’s flight safety personnel adhere

to federal launch range crew rest rules.

§ 415.39 Communications plan.

(a) An applicant shall submit a

communications plan providing

licensee and federal launch range

personnel communications procedures

during countdown and flight. Effective

issuance and communication of safetycritical information during countdown

shall include hold/resume, go/no go and

abort commands by licensee and federal

launch range personnel during

countdown. The communications plan

shall describe the authority of licensee

and federal launch range personnel, by

individual or position title, to issue

these commands. The communications

plan shall also ensure that—

(1) Communication networks are

assigned so that personnel identified

under paragraph (a) of this section have

direct access to real-time safety-critical

information required for issuing hold/

resume, go/no go and abort decisions

and commands;

(2) Personnel identified under

paragraph (a) of this section monitor

common intercom channel(s) during

countdown and flight; and

(3) A protocol is established for

utilizing clearly defined radio telephone

communications terminology.

(b) An applicant shall submit

procedures that ensure that licensee and

federal launch range personnel receive a

copy of the communications plan and

that the federal launch range concurs in

the communications plan.

§ 415.41 Accident investigation plan (AIP).

(a) An applicant shall submit an

accident investigation plan (AIP)

containing the applicant’s procedures

for reporting and responding to launch

accidents, launch incidents, or other

mishaps, as defined in § 401.5 of this

chapter. The AIP shall be signed by an

individual authorized to sign and certify

the application in accordance with

§ 413.7(c) of this chapter, and the safety

official designated under § 415.33(b) of

this subpart.

(b) Reporting requirements. An AIP

shall provide for—

(1) Immediate notification to the

Federal Aviation Administration (FAA)

Operations Center in case of an event

identified in paragraph (a) of this

section.

(2) Submission of a written

preliminary report in the event of a

launch accident or launch incident, as

defined in § 401.5 of this chapter,

within five days of the event. The report

shall identify the event as either a

launch accident or launch incident, and

shall include the following information:

(i) Date and time of occurrence;

(ii) Description of event;

(iii) Location of launch;

(iv) Launch vehicle;

(v) Payload(s), if applicable;

(vi) Vehicle impact points outside

designated impact lines, if applicable;

(vii) Number and general description

of any injuries;

(viii) Property damage, if any, and an

estimate of its value;

(ix) Identification of hazardous

materials, as defined in § 401.5 of this

chapter, involved in the event, whether

on the launch vehicle, payload, or on

the ground;

(x) Action taken by any person to

contain the consequences of the event;

and

(xi) Weather conditions at the time of

the event.

(c) Response plan. An AIP shall

contain procedures that—

(1) Ensure the consequences of a

launch accident, launch incident or

other mishap are contained and

minimized;

(2) Ensure data and physical evidence

are preserved;

(3) Require the licensee to report to

and cooperate with Office or National

Transportation Safety Board (NTSB)

investigations and designate one or

more points of contact for the Office or

NTSB; and
13244 Federal Register / Vol. 62, No. 53, Wednesday, March 19, 1997 / Proposed Rules

(4) Require the licensee to identify

and adopt preventive measures for

avoiding recurrence of the event.

(d) Investigation plan. An AIP shall

contain—

(1) Procedures for investigating the

cause of a launch accident, launch

incident or other mishap;

(2) Procedures for reporting

investigation results to the Office; and

(3) Delineated responsibilities,

including reporting responsibilities for

personnel assigned to conduct

investigations and for any unrelated

entities retained by the licensee to

conduct or participate in investigations.

§ 415.43 Denial of safety approval.

The Office notifies an applicant, in

writing, if it has denied safety approval

for a license application. The notice

states the reasons for the Office’s

determination. The applicant may

respond to the reasons for the

determination and reapply for safety

approval.

§§ 415.44–415.50 [Reserved]

Subpart D—Payload Review and

Determination

§ 415.51 General.

The Office reviews a payload

proposed for launch to determine

whether a license applicant or payload

owner or operator has obtained all

required licenses, authorization, and

permits, unless the payload is exempt

from review under § 415.53 of this

subpart. If not otherwise exempt, the

Office reviews a payload proposed for

launch to determine whether its launch

would jeopardize public health and

safety, safety of property, U.S. national

security or foreign policy interests, or

international obligations of the United

States. A payload determination is part

of the licensing record on which the

Office’s licensing determination is

based.

§ 415.53 Payloads not subject to review.

The Office does not review payloads

that are—

(a) Subject to regulation by the

Federal Communications Commission

(FCC) or the Department of Commerce,

National Oceanic and Atmospheric

Administration (NOAA); or

(b) Owned or operated by the U.S.

Government.

§ 415.55 Classes of payloads.

The Office may review and issue

findings regarding a proposed class of

payload, e.g., communications, remote

sensing or navigation. However, each

payload is subject to compliance

monitoring by the Office before launch

to determine whether its launch would

jeopardize public health and safety,

safety of property, U.S. national security

or foreign policy interests, or

international obligations of the United

States. The licensee is responsible for

providing current information, in

accordance with § 415.59, regarding a

payload proposed for launch not later

than 60 days before a scheduled launch.

§ 415.57 Payload review.

(a) Timing. A payload review may be

conducted as part of a license

application review or may be requested

by a payload owner or operator in

advance of or apart from a license

application.

(b) Interagency consultation. The

Office consults with other agencies to

determine whether launch of a proposed

payload would present any issues

affecting public health and safety, safety

of property, U.S. national security or

foreign policy interests, or international

obligations of the United States.

(1) The Office consults with the

Department of Defense to determine

whether launch of a proposed payload

would present any issues affecting U.S.

national security.

(2) The Office consults with the

Department of State to determine

whether launch of a proposed payload

would present any issues affecting U.S.

foreign policy interests or international

obligations.

(3) The Office consults with other

federal agencies, including the National

Aeronautics and Space Administration,

authorized to address issues identified

under paragraph (b) of this section,

associated with an applicant’s launch

proposal.

(c) The Office advises a person

requesting a payload determination, in

writing, of any issue raised during a

payload review that would impede

issuance of a license to launch that

payload. The person requesting payload

review may respond, in writing, or

revise its application.

§ 415.59 Information requirements for

payload review.

(a) A person requesting review of a

particular payload or payload class shall

identify the following:

(1) Payload name;

(2) Payload class;

(3) Physical dimensions and weight of

the payload;

(4) Payload owner and operator, if

different from the person requesting

payload review;

(5) Orbital parameters for parking,

transfer and final orbits;

(6) Hazardous materials, as defined in

§ 401.5 of this chapter, and radioactive

materials, and the amounts of each;

(7) Intended payload operations

during the life of the payload; and

(8) Delivery point in flight at which

the payload will no longer be under the

licensee’s control.

(b) [Reserved]

§ 415.61 Issuance of payload

determination.

(a) The Office issues a favorable

payload determination unless it

determines that launch of the proposed

payload would jeopardize public health

and safety, safety of property, U.S.

national security or foreign policy

interests, or international obligations of

the United States. The Office advises

any person who has requested a payload

review of its determination, in writing.

The notice states the reasons for the

determination in the event of an

unfavorable determination.

(b) Any person issued an unfavorable

payload determination may respond to

the reasons for the determination and

request another payload review.

§ 415.63 Incorporation of payload

determination in license application.

A favorable payload determination

issued for a payload or class of payload

may be included by a license applicant

as part of its application. However, any

change in information provided under

§ 415.59 of this subpart must be

reported in accordance with § 413.15 of

this chapter. The Office determines

whether a favorable payload

determination remains valid in light of

reported changes and may conduct an

additional payload review.

§ 415.64–415.70 [Reserved]

Subpart E—Post-Licensing

Requirements—Launch License Terms

and Conditions

§ 415.71 Public safety responsibility.

A launch licensee is responsible for

ensuring the safe conduct of a licensed

launch and for ensuring that public

safety and safety of property are

protected at all times during the

conduct of a licensed launch.

§ 415.73 Continuing accuracy of license

application; application for amendment.

(a) A launch licensee is responsible

for the continuing accuracy of

representations contained in its

application for the entire term of the

license. A launch licensee must conduct

a licensed launch and carry out launch

safety procedures in accordance with its

application. A licensee’s failure to

comply with the requirements of this

paragraph is sufficient basis for

revocation of a license.
Federal Register / Vol. 62, No. 53, Wednesday, March 19, 1997 / Proposed Rules 13245

(b) After a launch license has been

issued, a licensee must apply to the

Office to amend the license if:

(1) The launch licensee proposes to

conduct a launch or carry out a launch

safety procedure or operation in a

manner that is not authorized by the

license; or

(2) Any representation contained in

the license application that is material

to public health and safety or safety of

property is no longer accurate and

complete or does not reflect the launch

licensee’s procedures governing the

actual conduct of a launch. A change is

material to public health and safety or

safety of property if it alters or affects

the licensee’s launch plans or

procedures submitted in accordance

with subpart D of this part, class of

payload, orbital destination, safety

requirements, type of launch vehicle,

flight path, launch site, or any safety

system, policy, procedure, requirement,

criteria or standard.

(c) An application to amend a launch

license shall be prepared and submitted

in accordance with part 413 of this

chapter. The launch licensee shall

indicate any part of its license or license

application that would be changed or

affected by a proposed amendment.

(d) The Office reviews approvals and

determinations required by this chapter

to determine whether they remain valid

in light of the proposed amendment.

The Office approves an amendment that

satisfies the requirements set forth in

this part.

(e) Upon approval of an amendment,

the Office issues either a written

approval to the launch licensee or a

license order amending the license if a

stated term or condition of the license

is changed, added or deleted. A written

approval has the full force and effect of

a license order amendment and is part

of the licensing record.

§ 415.75 Agreement(s) with federal launch

range.

For a license to launch from a federal

launch range, prior to conducting a

licensed launch, a launch licensee or

applicant shall enter into an

agreement(s) with a federal launch range

providing for access to and use of U.S.

Government property and services

required to support licensed launch

from the facility and for public safety

related operations and support. The

agreement(s) shall be in effect for the

term of the license. A launch licensee

shall comply with any requirements of

the agreement(s) that may affect public

safety and safety of property during the

conduct of a licensed launch, including

flight safety procedures and

requirements.

§ 415.77 Records.

(a) A launch licensee shall maintain

all records, data and other material

necessary to verify that licensed

launches are conducted in accordance

with representations contained in the

licensee’s application. A launch

licensee shall retain records for three

years after completion of all launches

conducted under the license.

(b) In the event of a launch accident

or launch incident, as defined in § 405.1

of this chapter, a launch licensee shall

preserve all records related to the event.

Records shall be retained until

completion of any federal investigation

and the Office advises the licensee that

the records need not be retained. The

licensee shall make available to federal

officials for inspection and copying all

records required to be maintained under

the regulations.

§ 415.79 Launch reporting requirements.

(a) Not later than 60 days before each

launch conducted under a launch

operator license, a licensee shall

provide the following launch-specific

information:

(1) Payload information in accordance

with § 415.59 of this part;

(2) Flight information, including the

launch vehicle, planned flight path,

including staging and impact locations,

and on-orbit activity of the launch

vehicle including payload deliver

point(s); and

(3) Mission specific launch waivers,

approved or pending, from a federal

launch range from which the launch

will take place, that are unique to the

launch and may affect public safety.

(b) Not later than 15 days before each

licensed launch a licensee shall submit

a completed Department of

Transportation/U.S. Space Command

(DOT/USSPACECOM) Launch

Notification Form.

(c) A launch licensee shall report a

launch accident, launch incident, or

other mishap immediately to the

Federal Aviation Administration (FAA)

Operations Center and provide a written

preliminary report in the event of a

launch accident or launch incident, in

accordance with the accident

investigation plan (AIP) submitted as

part of its license application under

§ 415.41 of this part.

§ 415.81 Registration of space objects.

(a) In accordance with Article IV of

the 1975 Convention on Registration of

Objected Launched into Outer Space,

each licensee shall register with the

Office all objects placed in space by a

licensed launch, including a launch

vehicle and any components, except:

(1) Objects owned and registered by

the U.S. Government; and

(2) Objects owned by a foreign entity.

Registration of objects owned by a

foreign entity is the responsibility of the

foreign entity.

(b) For each object that must be

registered in accordance with this

section, not later than thirty (30) days

following the conduct of a licensed

launch a licensee shall submit the

following information:

(1) The international designator of the

space object(s);

(2) Date and location of launch;

(3) General function of the space

object; and

(4) Basic final orbital parameters,

including:

(i) Nodal period;

(ii) Inclination;

(iii) Apogee; and

(iv) Perigee.

§ 415.83 Financial responsibility

requirements.

A launch licensee shall comply with

financial responsibility requirements

specified in a license or license order.

§ 415.85 Compliance monitoring.

A launch licensee shall allow access

by and cooperate with federal officers or

employees or other individuals

authorized by the Office to observe any

activities of the licensee, or of the

licensee’s contractor or subcontractors,

associated with the conduct of a

licensed launch.

§ 415.86–415.90 [Reserved]

Subpart F—Safety Review and

Approval for Launch From a Launch

Site not Operated by a Federal Launch

Range

§ 415.91 General.

The Office evaluates on an individual

basis the safety-related elements of an

applicant’s proposal to launch a launch

vehicle from a launch site not operated

by a federal launch range. The Office

issues a safety approval to a license

applicant proposing to launch from a

launch site not operated by a federal

launch range whose launch proposal

satisfies the criteria for acceptable flight

risk set forth in subpart C of this part.

A safety approval is part of the licensing

record on which the Office’s licensing

determination is based.

§ 415.93 Denial of safety approval.

The Office notifies an applicant, in

writing, if it has denied safety approval

for a license application. The notice

states the reasons for the Office’s

determination. The applicant may

respond to the reasons for the
13246 Federal Register / Vol. 62, No. 53, Wednesday, March 19, 1997 / Proposed Rules

determination and reapply for safety

approval.

§§ 415.94—415.100 [Reserved]

9. Subchapter C of Chapter III, Title

14, Code of Federal Regulations, would

be amended by adding a new part 417

to read as follows:

PART 417—SITE OPERATOR LICENSE

Sec.

417.101 General.

417.103 Issuance of a site operator license.

417.105 Denial of a site operator license.

Authority: 49 U.S.C. 70101–70119.

§ 417.101 General.

The Office evaluates on an individual

basis an applicant’s proposal to operate

a launch site.

§ 417.103 Issuance of a site operator

license.

(a) The Office issues a license to a

license applicant proposing to operate a

launch site whose operation does not

jeopardize public health and safety,

safety of property, U.S. national security

or foreign policy interests, or

international obligations of the United

States.

(b) A site operator license authorizes

a licensee to operate a launch site in

accordance with the representations

contained in the licensee’s application,

subject to the licensee’s compliance

with terms and condition contained in

license orders accompanying the

license.

§ 417.105 Denial of a site operator license.

The Office notifies an applicant, in

writing, if it has denied a license

application. The notice states the

reasons for the Office’s determination.

The applicant may respond to the

reasons for the determination and

reapply for a license.

Issued in Washington, DC, this 26th day of

February 1997.

Patricia G. Smith,

Acting Associate Administrator for

Commercial Space Transportation.

[FR Doc. 97–6607 Filed 3–18–97; 8:45 am]

BILLING CODE 4910–13–P