Filed 5/13/16 P. v. Williams CA4/1

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for 

publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication

or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115. 

COURT OF APPEAL, FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION ONE

STATE OF CALIFORNIA

THE PEOPLE,

Plaintiff and Respondent,

v.

CHRIS ANTHONY WILLIAMS,

Defendant and Appellant.

 D068034

 (Super. Ct. No. SCD260413)

APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of San Diego County, 

Frederick Maguire, Judge. Affirmed.

Denise M. Rudasill, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and 

Appellant.

Kamala D. Harris, Attorney General, Gerald A. Engler, Chief Assistant Attorney 

General, Julie L. Garland, Assistant Attorney General, Kristen Chenelia and Scott C. 

Taylor, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
2

INTRODUCTION

A jury convicted Chris Anthony Williams and his codefendant, Charnisha 

Burnettex, of selling a controlled substance.1 (Health & Saf. Code, § 11379, subd. (a).) 

In addition, the trial court found true allegations Williams had a prior narcotics sales 

related conviction (Health & Saf. Code, § 11370.2, subd. (c); Pen. Code, § 1203.07, subd. 

(a)(11)), five prior strike convictions (Pen. Code, §§ 667, subds. (b)-(i), 1170.12), and 

three prior prison commitment convictions (Pen. Code, § 667.5, subd. (b)). After striking 

the prior narcotics sales related conviction finding and two of the prior prison conviction 

findings, the court sentenced Williams to five years in prison.

Williams appeals, contending we must reverse the judgment because the court 

violated his right to due process of law and a fair trial by excluding evidence of a 

recorded conversation between him and Burnettex after their arrest. We are unpersuaded 

by this contention and affirm the judgment.

BACKGROUND

An undercover police officer approached Williams near 5th and C street in San 

Diego and asked where he could buy $20 worth of methamphetamine. Williams turned, 

gestured toward Burnettex, who was standing five to seven feet away, and said she had 

the narcotics.

 

1 Some documents and evidence in the record refer to Williams's codefendant by the 

last name Broadnax, rather than Burnettex. We use Burnettex as she indicated at the 

preliminary hearing Burnettex was her last name and this last name appeared on the jury's 

verdict against her. 
3

As the officer approached Burnettex, Williams told her the officer wanted $20 

worth of methamphetamine. After checking her bra, she told Williams she did not have it

and thought she had left it on the bed. Williams asked her if she was sure. She checked 

her bra again and told Williams she could not find it. The officer told Williams he was 

going to keep looking and started to walk away.

Williams stopped the officer and told him to wait. Williams then looked toward

Burnettex and told her she needed to make sure she did not have it. She turned away 

from the officer and checked again. She ultimately retrieved a small, clear, plastic baggie 

containing .31 grams of methamphetamine and gave it to the officer. The officer then 

gave her two $10 bills with prerecorded serial numbers.

A uniformed police officer subsequently stopped and searched Williams. The 

officer found a cell phone and a hotel room key in one of Williams's front pockets. The 

officer searched the hotel room, which was registered to Williams, and found a black 

backpack on the bed. The backpack contained 10 small plastic baggies of the type 

commonly used for packaging narcotics, several pieces of paper, and a couple of 

prescription bottles with Williams's name on them. The officer did not find any narcotics 

or money either on Williams or in Williams's hotel room.

Another uniformed officer stopped Burnettex and searched her. The officer found 

the two $10 bills with prerecorded serial numbers used by the undercover officer. 

At a subsequent curbside lineup, the undercover officer positively identified

Williams and Burnettex as the people who sold him methamphetamine. The officer was 
4

not wearing a body camera and, although he was wearing a transmitter, his encounter 

with Williams and Burnettex was not recorded. 

The undercover officer looked through Williams's cell phone and found three text 

messages sent and received earlier in the day. The first text message read "Hey, where 

you at? Somebody wants a 40. I'm at 5th and C Street in front of the [drugstore]. 

Hurry." The second text message read, "Nisha, where are you at, baby girl?" The third 

text message read, "Babe, the police is hot out, Nisha."

DISCUSSION

I

After their arrest, Williams and Burnettex were placed in the back of a patrol car 

and the police recorded their conversation. The portion of the conversation relevant to 

this appeal is as follows:

"OFFICER: Okay, you guys are both under arrest for a narcotics 

transaction that took place over here, okay?

"[BURNETTEX]: Wait, what narcotics?

"OFFICER: You guys sold drugs.

"[BURNETTEX]: All I soldall I had was spice.[2]

"OFFICER: Okay, watch out.

 

2 According to the National Institute on Drug Abuse, "Spice is a mix of herbs 

(shredded plant material) and manmade chemicals with mind-altering effects. It is often 

called 'synthetic marijuana' or 'fake weed' because some of the chemicals in it are similar 

to ones in marijuana; but its effects are sometimes very different from marijuana, and 

frequently much stronger." (<http://teens.drugabuse.gov/drug-facts/spice> [as of May 2, 

2016].) 
5

"[BURNETTEX]: Babe, tell 'em.

"WILLIAMS: I don't know. I don't know what they talking about.

"[BURNETTEX]: I don't know what they're talking about either.

"WILLIAMS: I guess they talking about that [B]lack dude that you 

was talking to. 

"[BURNETTEX]: Did they get him?

"WILLIAMS: I don't know. Did you do a transaction with him?

"[BURNETTEX]: I gave it to him but I don't(unintelligible) 

(unintelligible)

"WILLIAMS: I don't knowwasn't even paying attention. I was 

talking to your little niece.

"[BURNETTEX]: They snitched, baby.

"WILLIAMS: Who snitched?

"[BURNETTEX]: Them. They're talking to them. I'm a be like, 'I 

didn't sell anything.' All I had was that and that's money for my 

daughter.

"WILLIAMS: Um, hmm.

"[BURNETTEX]: I can't do this, baby. Officer, what drug 

transaction, please, can you tell me about'cause the only thing I 

had was my baby's diaper money. (Unintelligible), would she even 

talk to us?

"WILLIAMS: (Unintelligible)

"[BURNETTEX]: Iknew we shouldn'tIf we get out of this, 

baby, we going home.

"WILLIAMS: If
6

"[BURNETTEX]: All we gotta do is sayAll you gotta do is say 

that we didn't do anything, babe.

"WILLIAMS: I ain't did nothing. I don't know. Like I said,Did 

you know the boy that you was talking to?

"[BURNETTEX]: (Inaudible)

"WILLIAMS: You didn't?

"[BURNETTEX]: Just don't say anything, babe. Just tell 'em we 

didn't do anything.

"WILLIAMS: I ain't got nothing. I ain't got nothing to say. There 

ain't nothin' I can say. (Unintelligible) narcotic transaction.

"[BURNETTEX]: The only narcotic she (unintelligible) was the 

spice, and that's not even a narcotic. I don't doI'm a tell her I can't 

do drugs. I have a [child protective services] case. This will affect 

my [child protective services] case. They didn't even find 

nothingAll she found was twenty dollars on me and then some 

fuckin' spice.

"WILLIAMS: Who's that your little niece was talking about?

"[BURNETTEX]: Some Mexican dude.

"WILLIAMS: She said a Mexican dude hit her?

"[BURNETTEX]: Um, hmm.

"WILLIAMS: You didn't do no transaction with nobody, did you?

"[BURNETTEX]: Not, not, not(unintelligible) baby, no. That 

twenty dollars, we had.

"WILLIAMS: I wonder who that was that smacked your little 

cousin.

"[BURNETTEX]: I don't know.

"WILLIAMS: Your little niece or whatever.
7

"[BURNETTEX]: I don't know, babe. But I'm not trippin' on that. 

Right now I'm trying to get us out of this.

"WILLIAMS: Yeah, I wanna know what they're talking about too. 

Who they back there talkin' to?

"[BURNETTEX]: Each other. Officer!" 

II

Before trial, Williams's counsel sought to admit and the prosecution sought to 

exclude evidence of the conversation. Williams's counsel argued the conversation, 

particularly the portion where Burnettex admitted giving the undercover officer spice,

was admissible under the hearsay exception for statements against penal interest. (Evid. 

Code, § 1230.) Williams's counsel also argued the conversation was admissible for the 

nonhearsay purpose of showing Williams was not directing or controlling Burnettex's

actions, as Burnettex intended to claim in her defense. The prosecutor argued the 

conversation was not admissible as a statement against penal interest and, even if it were, 

the court should exclude it under Evidence Code section 352.

Burnettex's counsel did not specifically seek to admit or exclude evidence of the 

conversation. Burnettex's counsel believed the jury would find the conversation to be 

staged, but she did not believe admission of the evidence would hurt Burnettex's defense, 

which was that Williams coerced her into handing the undercover officer drugs. 

However, she argued that, if the court allowed Williams to introduce part of the 

conversation, the court should allow her to admit most of the remainder for context, 

except for references to Burnettex's daughter, her child protective services case, diaper 
8

money or spice, which Burnettex's counsel argued were irrelevant and prejudicial under 

any circumstances.

After listening to the recording of the conversation and hearing the parties'

extensive arguments, the court declined to admit any part of it. The court remarked the 

conversation was "an Academy Award performance. They knew that tape was in that car 

and the record should reflect that I'm laughing because they knew. It struck me as being 

very staged." In addition, the court found Burnettex's remarks did not qualify as 

declarations against her penal interest because she did not admit to doing anything she 

regarded as wrong. More particularly, the court found her admissions were not so far 

contrary to her penal interest to be considered reliable. Finally, the court further found 

admission of the conversation for the nonhearsay purpose of showing Williams was not 

directing or controlling Burnettex's actions presented a problem under Evidence Code 

section 352, in part because the conversation included Williams's own inadmissible 

hearsay denials of guilt.

Nonetheless, the court allowed Williams's counsel to cross-examine the 

undercover officer, who had listened to the recording of the conversation, about 

Williams's tone during the conversation. The officer testified that, during the 

conversation, Williams was not aggressive and his tone was not commanding. However, 

the officer also testified Burnettex was not commanding the conversation and at one point 

she "kind of lost it."
9

III

A

" 'Evidence Code section 1230 provides that the out-of-court declaration of an 

unavailable witness may be admitted for its truth if the statement, when made, was 

against the declarant's penal interest. The proponent of such evidence must show "that 

the declarant is unavailable, that the declaration was against the declarant's penal interest, 

and that the declaration was sufficiently reliable to warrant admission despite its hearsay 

character." ' [Citation.] 'The focus of the declaration against interest exception to the 

hearsay rule is the basic trustworthiness of the declaration. [Citations.] In determining 

whether a statement is truly against interest within the meaning of Evidence Code section 

1230, and hence is sufficiently trustworthy to be admissible, the court may take into 

account not just the words but the circumstances under which they were uttered, the 

possible motivation of the declarant, and the declarant's relationship to the defendant.' "

(People v. Geier (2007) 41 Cal.4th 555, 584 (Geier), overruled on another point by 

Melendez–Diaz v. Massachusetts (2009) 557 U.S. 305, as acknowledged in People v. 

Houston (2012) 54 Cal.4th 1186, 1220.) "A trial court's decision to admit or exclude 

evidence is a matter committed to its discretion ' "and will not be disturbed except on a 

showing the trial court exercised its discretion in an arbitrary, capricious, or patently 

absurd manner that resulted in a manifest miscarriage of justice." ' " (Geier, supra, at 

p. 585.)

Here, even if Burnettex's remarks about selling or giving away fake drugs could be 

construed as statements against her penal interest, the circumstances under which she 
10

uttered the remarks undermine their reliability. After listening to the recording, the court 

found Williams and Burnettex knew of the recording and had staged their conversation. 

In addition, Burnettex's remarks were self-serving and intended to be exculpatory as their 

context shows Burnettex did not believe selling or giving away fake drugs justified her

arrest. (People v. Duarte (2000) 24 Cal.4th 603, 611-612 [self-serving statements lack 

trustworthiness, and even facially inculpatory hearsay statements may be exculpatory 

when considered in context].) Accordingly, we cannot conclude the court's decision to 

exclude Burnettex's remarks as hearsay was arbitrary, capricious, or patently absurd. 

(People v. McCurdy (2014) 59 Cal.4th 1063, 1109 [a court does not abuse its discretion 

in excluding extrajudicial statements that are undisputedly against the declarant's penal 

interests, but have indicia of unreliability].) 

B

Further, regardless whether Burnettex's remarks or the other portions of her 

conversation with Williams were admissible as declarations against penal interest or for 

nonhearsay purposes, "the court has broad discretion under Evidence Code section 352 to 

exclude even relevant evidence if it determines the probative value of the evidence is 

substantially outweighed by its possible prejudicial effects. [Citation.] An appellate 

court reviews a court's rulings regarding relevancy and admissibility under Evidence 

Code section 352 for abuse of discretion. [Citation.] We will not reverse a court's ruling 

on such matters unless it is shown ' "the trial court exercised its discretion in an arbitrary, 

capricious, or patently absurd manner that resulted in a manifest miscarriage of 
11

justice." ' " (People v. Merriman (2014) 60 Cal.4th 1, 74; see Geier, supra, 41 Cal.4th at 

p. 584 [a court may exclude a declaration against interest under Evid. Code, § 352].)

Here, as previously discussed, the probative value of Williams and Burnettex's

conversation was minimal because their statements appeared staged and generally lacked 

reliability because of their self-serving nature. Conversely, there was genuine potential 

for admission of the conversation to be unduly prejudicial, confusing, or misleading 

because it included Burnettex's demonstrably false statement about only providing the 

undercover officer with spice, which she wanted excluded and Williams wanted 

admitted. It also included Williams's exculpatory statements, which would be 

inadmissible hearsay but for their possibility of providing context for some of Burnettex's 

remarks. (See Evid. Code, § 356 ["Where part of [a] ... conversation ... is given in 

evidence by one party, the whole on the same subject may be inquired into by an adverse 

party; ... when a ... conversation ... is given in evidence, any other ... conversation ...

which is necessary to make it understood may also be given in evidence"].) Under such 

circumstances, we cannot conclude the court abused its discretion in excluding 

Burnettex's remarks and the other portions of the conversation under Evidence Code 

section 352. 

C

Finally, we are not persuaded by Williams's assertion the exclusion of all or part of 

the conversation deprived him of his federal constitutional right to present a defense. A

criminal defendant does not have a federal constitutional right to present unreliable 

hearsay evidence (People v. Ayala (2000) 23 Cal.4th 225, 269), and " 'a state court's 
12

application of ordinary rules of evidenceincluding the rule stated in Evidence Code 

section 352generally does not infringe upon [a defendant's right to present a 

defense].' " (People v. Linton (2013) 56 Cal.4th 1146, 1183.) This is particularly true 

where, as here, the court allowed Williams to address Burnettex's duress claim by the 

alternative means of cross-examining the undercover officer, who confirmed Williams 

never spoke or behaved aggressively toward Burnettex. 

DISPOSITION

The judgment is affirmed.

McCONNELL, P. J.

WE CONCUR:

NARES, J.

O'ROURKE, J.