* This order and judgment is not binding precedent, e xcept under the

doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and col lateral estoppel. The court generally disfavors the citation of orders and judg ments; nevertheless, an order and judgment may be cited under the terms and condi tions of 10th Cir. R. 36.3. 

## F I L E D United States Court of Appeals Tenth Circuit 

### SEP 23 2004 

### PATRICK FISHER Clerk UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT

KATHLEEN CAUSEY,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

v. JO ANNE B. BARNHART, Commissioner, Social Security Administration,

Defendant-Appellee. No. 03-7131 (D.C. No. 02-CV-291-S) (E.D. Okla.)

ORDER AND JUDGMENT *

Before KELLY , HARTZ , and TYMKOVICH , Circuit Judges.

After examining the briefs and appellate record, th is panel has determined unanimously to grant the parties’ request for a dec ision on the briefs without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(f); 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G). The case is therefore ordered submitted without oral argument.-2-

Plaintiff-appellant Kathleen Causey appeals from anorder of the district court affirming the Social Security Administration’ s decision denying her application for supplemental security income benefi ts. We exercise jurisdiction under 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) and 28 U.S.C. § 1291 and a ffirm. Plaintiff claims that she has been unable to work s ince June 28, 1993, due to chronic obstructive pulmonary disease or asthma, multiple sclerosis, hypertension, and body pain. After her applicationwas denied initially and on reconsideration, a de novo hearing was held before an administrative law judge (ALJ). Subsequently, in a decision dated May 16, 2 001, the ALJ denied plaintiff’s application for disability benefits, co ncluding that plaintiff was not disabled. The ALJ determined that plaintiff suffer ed from severe impairments which prevented her from performing her past relevant light work as a housekeeper and office cleaner. However, she retai ned the residual functional capacity (RFC) to perform a wide range of sedentarywork, and based on the testimony of the vocational expert at the hearing b efore the ALJ, she was capable of performing other jobs that existed in significant numbers in the national
economy. The Appeals Council denied review, making the ALJ’s decision the Commissioner’s final decision. See Doyal v. Barnhart , 331 F.3d 758, 759 (10th-3-

Cir. 2003). Plaintiff then filed a complaint in th e district court, which entered an order affirming the ALJ’s decision. This appeal fo llowed. In reviewing the ALJ’s decision, “we neither reweig h the evidence nor substitute our judgment for that of the agency.” Casias v. Sec’y of Health &
Human Servs ., 933 F.2d 799, 800 (10th Cir. 1991). Instead, we review the ALJ’s decision only to determine whether the correct lega l standards were applied and whether the ALJ’s factual findings are supported bysubstantial evidence in the record. Doyal , 331 F.3d at 760. Plaintiff raises one narrow issue: whether the ALJ failed to give appropriate consideration to one aspect of her treating physician’s opinion, so we confine our analysis of this case to a resolution o f this specific issue. “In deciding how much weight to give a treating source opinion, an ALJ must first determine whether the opinion qualifies for ‘controlling weight.’” Watkins v. Barnhart , 350 F.3d 1297, 1300 (10th Cir. 2003). An ALJ is required to give the opinion of a treating physician controlling weight when it is both: (1) “well-supported by medically acceptable clinica l and laboratory diagnostic techniques;” and (2) “consistent with other substantial evidence in the record.” Id . (quotation omitted). “[I]f the opinion is defic ient in either of these respects, then it is not entitled to controlling weight.” Id.-4-

Even if a treating physician’s opinion is not entit led to controlling weight, it is “still entitled to deference and must be weig hed” using the following factors: (1) the length of the treatment relationship and t he frequency of examination; (2) the nature and extent of the treat ment relationship, including the treatment provided and the kind of ex amination or testing performed; (3) the degree to which the phys ician’s opinion is supported by relevant evidence; (4) consistency between the opinion and the record as a whole; (5) whether or not the p hysician is a specialist in the area upon which an opinion is ren dered; and (6) other factors brought to the ALJ’s attention wh ich tend to support or contradict the opinion. Id . at 1301 (quotations omitted). After considering these factors, “the ALJ must give good reasons in [his] . . . decision for the w eight he ultimately assigns the opinion.” Id . (quotation omitted). Here, plaintiff’s treating physician, Dr. Waldrop, provided a medical source statement form evaluating plaintiff’s ability to li ft, stand, walk, sit, and push or pull. The form also reflected Dr. Waldrop’s check -mark agreement to a statement that plaintiff was “required to lie down during the normal workday to manage pain.” Aplt. App., Tab 3 at 276, ¶ 2(A)(7). Dr. Waldrop, however, did not follow the form’s instruction to “[b]riefly des cribe the principal, clinical and laboratory findings and symptoms or allegations (in cluding pain) from which [the described] impairment-related capacit[y] and limitation[]” was derived. Id. at ¶ 2(E). The ALJ adopted all of the restrictions li sted by Dr. Waldrop except for plaintiff’s need to lie down. With regard to that “extreme limitation,” the ALJ-5-

stated that Dr. Waldrop “was unable to provide any substantiating documentation.” Id. at 18. Implicit in the ALJ’s decision is a finding that Dr . Waldrop’s opinion on plaintiff’s need to lie down during the normal work day is not entitled to controlling weight. Further, the ALJ considered th e Watkins factors in his decision, albeit in an abbreviated and scattered fa shion. He noted that claimant had “been under the care of [Dr.] Waldrop for many years.” Id. at 17. He also evaluated the medical record, primarily compiled by Dr. Waldrop, and the credibility of plaintiff’s testimony on her subject ive claims. Id. at 17-18. With this background, the ALJ determined that the recorddid not support the claimed need for plaintiff to lie down during the workday. Id. at 17. The ALJ could have been more meticulous in followi ng the established Tenth Circuit framework for evaluating a treating p hysician’s opinion. However, his decision provides legally sufficient and factua lly supported reasons for rejecting this one aspect of Dr. Waldrop’s opinion. Our careful review of the record on appeal, in light of the deferential appel late standard, leads us to AFFIRM the judgment of the district court. Entered for the Court
Paul J. Kelly, Jr. Circuit Judge