IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

No. 15-30752

Summary Calendar

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff-Appellee

v.

JOCK R. JONES,

Defendant-Appellant

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Middle District of Louisiana

USDC No. 3:14-CR-88

Before WIENER, HIGGINSON, and COSTA, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:*

Defendant-Appellant Jock R. Jones pleaded guilty to possession of a 

firearm by a convicted felon and was convicted following a bench trial of 

carjacking and using a firearm during the commission of a crime of violence. 

He asserts that his carjacking conviction was error because the evidence does 

not show that at the time that he took the vehicle he had the intent to cause 

death or serious bodily harm to the victim.

 

* Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined that this opinion should not 

be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH 

CIR. R. 47.5.4.

United States Court of Appeals

Fifth Circuit

FILED

March 14, 2016

Lyle W. Cayce

Clerk

 Case: 15-30752 Document: 00513422669 Page: 1 Date Filed: 03/14/2016
No. 15-30752

2

Viewed in the light most favorable to the government, the evidence 

shows that Jones intended to harm or kill the victim at the time he demanded 

the vehicle. See United States v. Diehl, 775 F.3d 714, 721 (5th Cir. 2015). 

Jones’s intent to harm or kill the victim may be inferred from his actions when 

he grabbed her by her hair, put her in a chokehold, put a firearm to her temple, 

dragged her to the bus, and threated to shoot her children or to kill the victim 

if her children called the police. Jones’s actions demonstrate that at the time 

that he took the vehicle he had the intent to cause death or serious bodily harm 

and was willing to use violence if necessary. See United States v. Frye, 489 

F.3d 201, 207-08 (5th Cir. 2007). Jones’s assertion that his primary motive

was to hold the victim against her will lacks merit. We have rejected similar 

contentions that a defendant’s primary motivation was not to take the vehicle, 

but to commit another offense or to achieve some other purpose. See id.; United 

States v. Harris, 25 F.3d 1275, 1279 (5th Cir. 1994). The carjacking statute 

does not require that the taking of a motor vehicle “be an ultimate motive of 

the crime.” See United States v. Garcia-Alvarez, 541 F.3d 8, 16 (1st Cir. 2008); 

United States v. Gurule, 461 F.3d 1238, 1243 (10th Cir. 2006); United States v. 

Diaz, 248 F.3d 1065, 1098 (11th Cir. 2001).

Jones also argues that because there was no evidence to show that he 

committed a carjacking, the evidence was insufficient to show that he used a 

firearm during the commission of a crime of violence. The evidence was 

sufficient to support Jones’s carjacking conviction, and “[c]arjacking is always 

and without exception a ‘crime of violence’ as that term is defined in 18 U.S.C. 

§ 924(c)(3),” so Jones has not shown that the evidence was insufficient to 

support his conviction for using a firearm during the commission of a crime of 

violence. See Frye, 489 F.3d at 208-09 (citation omitted).

AFFIRMED.

 Case: 15-30752 Document: 00513422669 Page: 2 Date Filed: 03/14/2016