COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA 

Present: Chief Judge Fitzpatrick, Judges Annunziata and 

 Bumgardner 

Argued at Alexandria, Virginia 

JOSEPH COUSAR 

 OPINION BY 

v. Record No. 1766-97-4 CHIEF JUDGE JOHANNA L. FITZPATRICK 

 MARCH 10, 1998 

PEOPLES DRUG STORE and 

 PACIFIC EMPLOYERS INSURANCE COMPANY 

 FROM THE VIRGINIA WORKERS' COMPENSATION COMMISSION 

 John C. Duncan, III (Duncan and Hopkins, 

P.C., on brief), for appellant. 

 Douglas A. Seymour (Law Offices of Harold A. 

MacLaughlin, on brief), for appellees. 

 Joseph Cousar ("claimant") appeals the Workers' Compensation 

Commission's order vacating a twenty percent late payment penalty 

against Peoples Drug Store and its insurer, Pacific Employers 

Insurance Company (collectively "employer"). Claimant asserts 

that his benefit payments became due on the date of the final 

order of this Court and that the commission erred in vacating the 

penalty. We agree and hold that the payments were due at that 

time and reverse the commission. 

 On June 10, 1996, the commission awarded claimant permanent 

total disability benefits beginning February 20, 1995. Employer 

appealed. On February 18, 1997, we affirmed the award. Employer 

did not appeal this decision. On March 21, 1997, employer mailed 

to claimant several checks representing the benefits due, and 

claimant received them March 25, 1997. 
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 At claimant's request, the deputy commissioner assessed a 

twenty percent penalty against employer pursuant to Code 

§ 65.2-524 for failure to make payment within two weeks after it 

became due. Employer appealed the assessment of the penalty. 

The full commission reversed and vacated the penalty order. On 

appeal, claimant requests reinstatement of the twenty percent 

penalty. 

 The sole question before us is whether benefit payments 

become due at the time of the entry of a final order of this 

Court or upon the expiration of the time provided for appeal of 

our decision to the Supreme Court. This is an issue of first 

impression. Claimant contends the awarded benefits became due on 

February 18, 1997, the date of the final order of this Court, and 

that when employer failed to make payment as required within 

fourteen days, by March 4, the twenty percent penalty of Code 

§ 65.2-524 became mandatory. Employer argues that the benefits 

did not become due until March 20, 1997 because the appeal period 

as provided by Rule 5:17(a)(2) for an appeal from the Court of 

Appeals to the Supreme Court acts as a suspension of an award 

until the thirty-day period expires.1

 Further, employer contends 

the commission's decision to vacate the penalty is supported by 

credible evidence and the precedent of Code § 65.2-706. 

 1"[A] petition for appeal must be filed with the clerk of 

this Court . . . in the case of an appeal from the Court of 

Appeals, within 30 days after entry of the judgment appealed from 

or a denial of a petition for rehearing." Rule 5:17(a)(2). 
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 In vacating the penalty order, the commission extended the 

grace period in Code § 65.2-524, limited on its face to the 

two-step process of appeal to the full commission and this Court, 

to the application period for perfecting an appeal to the Supreme 

Court. As a general rule, "'[t]he construction afforded a 

statute by the public officials charged with its administration 

and enforcement is entitled to be given weight by a court.'" 

Lynch v. Lee, 19 Va. App. 230, 232, 450 S.E.2d 391, 392 (1994) 

(citation omitted). However, "[t]his Court should withhold 

deference . . . 'when the commission's statutory interpretation 

conflicts with the language of the statute . . . .'" Lynch, 19 

Va. App. at 232-33, 450 S.E.2d at 393 (quoting Commonwealth v. 

May Bros., Inc., 11 Va. App. 115, 119, 396 S.E.2d 695, 697 

(1990)). 

 Code § 65.2-524 provides that 

 [i]f any payment is not paid within two weeks 

after it becomes due, there shall be added to 

such unpaid compensation an amount equal to 

twenty percent thereof. No such penalty 

shall be added, however, to any payment made 

within two weeks after the expiration of (i) 

the period in which Commission review may be 

requested pursuant to Code § 65.2-705 or (ii) 

the period in which a notice of appeal [to 

this Court] may be filed pursuant to Code 

§ 65.2-706. 

This provision specifically suspends the penalty pending an 

appeal of right to the full commission within twenty days, see

Code § 65.2-705, or to this Court within thirty days. See Code 

§ 65.2-706. It goes no further. "[T]he appeal shall operate as 
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a suspension of the award and no employer shall be required to 

make payment of the award . . . until the questions at issue 

therein shall have been fully determined in accordance with the 

provisions of this title." Code § 65.2-706(C) (emphasis added). 

 Although an employer who files timely appeals to the commission 

and this Court is not obligated to make any payment until the 

Court of Appeals rules, nothing in Code § 65.2-706 or elsewhere 

extends the carrier's right to delay payment without penalty 

beyond the Court of Appeals level of review. 

 "The main purpose of statutory construction is to determine 

the intention of the legislature 'which, absent constitutional 

infirmity, must always prevail.'" Last v. Virginia State Bd. of 

Med., 14 Va. App. 906, 910, 421 S.E.2d 201, 205 (1992) (quoting 

Board of Supervisors v. King Land Corp., 238 Va. 97, 103, 380 

S.E.2d 895, 897 (1989)). "Where a statute is unambiguous, the 

plain meaning is to be accepted without resort to the rules of 

statutory interpretation." Last, 14 Va. App. at 910, 412 S.E.2d 

at 205. "Unless a literal construction of a statute would result 

in internally conflicting provisions amounting to a 'manifest 

absurdity,' courts cannot construe a statute in a manner that 

would result in holding the legislature did not mean what it 

actually expressed." Last, 14 Va. App. at 910, 412 S.E.2d at 205 

(citing Dairyland Ins. Co. v. Sylva, 242 Va. 191, 194, 409 S.E.2d 

127, 129 (1991)). 

 "[W]hen analyzing a statute, we must assume that 'the 
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legislature chose, with care, the words it used when it enacted 

the relevant statute, and we are bound by those words as we 

interpret the statute.'" City of Virginia Beach v. ESG Enters., 

Inc., 243 Va. 149, 153, 413 S.E.2d 642, 644 (1992) (citation 

omitted). "'Courts are not permitted to rewrite statutes. This 

is a legislative function. The manifest intention of the 

legislature, clearly disclosed by its language, must be 

applied.'" Barr v. Town & Country Properties, Inc., 240 Va. 292, 

295, 396 S.E.2d 672, 674 (1990) (quoting Anderson v. 

Commonwealth, 182 Va. 560, 566, 29 S.E.2d 838, 841 (1944)). "We 

may not add to a statute language which the legislature has 

chosen not to include." County of Amherst Bd. of Supervisors v. 

Brockman, 224 Va. 391, 397, 297 S.E.2d 805, 808 (1992). 

 Prior to 1994, payment was not suspended during the period 

of application for review. See, e.g., Sprouse v. Denton Constr. 

Co., 71 O.W.C. 308 (1992). In 1994, the legislature amended Code 

§ 65.2-524 by adding the second sentence, providing for 

suspension of payment during the periods of application for a 

review of right to the full commission and this Court. This 

legislative action clearly manifests the General Assembly's 

intent to shelter employers from payment during these periods. 

Nothing in the amendment, however, permits an inference that the 

legislature intended further relief from the statutory penalty to 

cover the appeal period to the Supreme Court. Indeed, the 

amended statute specifically did not include an appeal to the 
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Supreme Court. "If the legislature had intended to [provide 

relief from payments during the period for appeal to the Supreme 

Court], it could have done so. The legislature did not write its 

statute expansively. We will not so construe it." Solid Gold 

Corp. v. Wang, 18 Va. App. 66, 69, 441 S.E.2d 643, 645 (1994). 

We cannot add such additional protection to a statute so limited 

in scope, nor can we rewrite a statute with language not used by 

the legislature. For the foregoing reasons, we reverse. 

 Reversed.