IN THE

ARIZONA COURT OF APPEALS

DIVISION ONE

In re the Matter of:

KATHLEEN MARIE BALL,

Petitioner/Appellee,

v.

SHAWN A. BALL,

Respondent/Appellant.

No. 1 CA-CV 19-0787 FC

Appeal from the Superior Court in Maricopa County

No. FC2017-096436

The Honorable Michael S. Mandell, Judge

AFFIRMED IN PART; VACATED IN PART; REMANDED

COUNSEL

Osborn Maledon, P.A., Phoenix

By David D. Garner (argued)

Co-Counsel for Respondent/Appellant

Riggs, Ellsworth & Porter, PLC, Mesa

By Paul C. Riggs

Co-Counsel for Respondent/Appellant

Rose Law Group, PC, Scottsdale

By Audra E. Petrolle, Logan V. Elia (argued)

Counsel for Petitioner/Appellee

FILED 12-10-2020
BALL v. BALL

Opinion of the Court

2

OPINION

Judge Paul J. McMurdie delivered the Court’s opinion, in which Judge 

Maria Elena Cruz joined. Presiding Judge James B. Morse Jr. specially 

concurred.

M c M U R D I E, Judge:

¶1 Shawn Allen Ball (“Father”) appeals from the superior court’s

order granting Kathleen Marie Ball’s (“Mother”) petition to enforce a

parenting plan and awarding attorney’s fees and costs. We vacate the order 

in part and hold: (1) the superior court erroneously interpreted the 

parenting plan’s religious-education provisions; and (2) the court violated 

the First Amendment of the United States Constitution by failing to abstain 

from deciding whether Father’s decision to have the parties’ children attend

The Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints complied with the parenting 

plan’s provision that the children may be instructed in “the Christian faith.”

For these reasons, we remand the case for further proceedings.

FACTS1 AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

¶2 Mother and Father married in November 1999 and have two 

minor children. In December 2017, Mother petitioned for dissolution. The 

parties represented themselves during the initial dissolution proceedings,

and the court entered a default decree (“Decree”). Filed simultaneously 

with the Decree was a parenting plan, signed by both parents, that they 

prepared using a court-provided form (“Parenting Plan”). The court 

1 We view the facts in the light most favorable to upholding the 

superior court’s ruling. See Baker v. Meyer, 237 Ariz. 112, 113, ¶ 2 (App. 

2015).
BALL v. BALL

Opinion of the Court

3

adopted the Parenting Plan’s terms as part of the Decree. The Parenting 

Plan provisions relevant to this appeal are as follows:

¶3 Approximately one year after the divorce, Father joined The 

Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints (“Father’s Church”), and the 

children occasionally joined him at meetings. After Mother learned the 

children were accompanying Father to his church, she petitioned to enforce

the Parenting Plan, claiming Father’s Church is not Christian. Mother also 

asserted other violations of the Parenting Plan.

¶4 The superior court held two hearings on the enforcement 

petition. During the second hearing, Mother called a youth ministry leader 

from her church to testify that Father’s Church is not Christian. After taking 

the matter under advisement, the superior court held that the Parenting 

Plan directs that “the Children shall only be instructed in the Christian 

faith” and that Father’s Church was not “Christian” within the meaning of 

the Parenting Plan. For these reasons, the court held that Father could not 

take the children to Father’s Church’s services. The court also found that 

Father had violated other Parenting Plan provisions and granted Mother an 

award of attorney’s fees.

¶5 Father appealed, and this court stayed the superior court’s

order. We have jurisdiction under A.R.S. § 12-2101(A)(1).

DISCUSSION

A. The Reference to “Christian” in the Parenting Plan’s Second 

Clause Did Not Abrogate Father’s Right under the First Clause to 

Take the Children to a Place of Worship of Father’s Choosing.

¶6 In Arizona, joint legal decision-making arrangements must 

address each parent’s “rights and responsibilities” for the child’s care and 

decisions regarding education, health care, and religious training. A.R.S. 

§ 25-403.02(C)(1), (2). Courts are directed to adopt a parenting plan that is

“[c]onsistent with the child’s best interests.” A.R.S. § 25-403.02(B). We 
BALL v. BALL

Opinion of the Court

4

review the interpretation of a parenting plan de novo. Jordan v. Rea, 221 Ariz. 

581, 588, ¶ 15 (App. 2009).

¶7 To interpret a parenting plan, we apply the general rules of 

construction for any written instrument.2 See Cohen v. Frey, 215 Ariz. 62, 66, 

¶ 11 (App. 2007) (“To interpret the decree, we apply the general rules of 

construction for any written instrument.”). The court may use its contempt 

power to enforce an obligation only if the responsibility is “clear, specific 

and unambiguous.” Munari v. Hotham, 217 Ariz. 599, 604, ¶ 22 (App. 2008)

(quoting Ex Parte Chambers, 898 S.W.2d 257, 260 (Tex. 1995)). For that reason, 

we first determine whether the plan is ambiguous. See In re Marriage of 

Johnson & Gravino, 231 Ariz. 228, 233, ¶ 16 (App. 2012). A document is 

ambiguous “only when [the language] can reasonably be construed to have 

more than one meaning.” In re Estate of Lamparella, 210 Ariz. 246, 250, ¶ 21 

(App. 2005). “[W]hether . . . language is reasonably susceptible to more than 

one interpretation . . . is a question of law for the court.” Id.

¶8 The superior court found that when the Decree was entered,

“both parties were practicing the Christian faith and agreed the Children 

would be instructed only in that faith.” The court further found that 

“[b]ased on the evidence provided . . . Mormonism does not fall within the 

2 Father argues in his reply brief that the Parenting Plan is part of the 

Decree, not a contract, and thus parol evidence of the parties’ intent is 

inadmissible to interpret the Parenting Plan. See In re Marriage of Zale, 193 

Ariz. 246, 249, ¶¶ 9–12 (1999) (because parol evidence rule does not apply 

to judgments, it cannot be applied to dissolution decrees); LaPrade v. 

LaPrade, 189 Ariz. 243, 247 (1997) (stating that “‘incorporation’ and ‘merger’

are not synonymous” and addressing the legal consequences of each with 

respect to marital settlement agreements and dissolution decrees). It is not 

clear the authority Father cites applies with equal force to a decree, such as 

the one at issue here, which adopted a stipulated parenting plan. In any 

event, the superior court retains continuing authority to enforce or modify 

a parenting plan regardless of the form within which those provisions are 

contained. A.R.S. § 25-317(E)–(F); see also Anderson v. Anderson, 14 Ariz. 

App. 195, 198 (1971) (“Although the parties are proceeding on the 

agreement which is binding on them, the agreement of the parties relating 

to custody matters does not in any case bind the court.”). Because we 

conclude the Parenting Plan is not ambiguous, we need not answer this 

question today, and will not address it further.
BALL v. BALL

Opinion of the Court

5

confines of Christian faith and thus instructing the Children in a faith other 

than Christianity violates the Parenting Plan.”

¶9 The superior court’s ruling is based on an incorrect 

interpretation of the Parenting Plan. The first clause of the 

religious-education section of the Parenting Plan unambiguously states that 

“[e]ach parent may take the minor children to a church or place of worship 

of his or her choice during the time that the minor children is/are in his or 

her care.” This language permits Father to take the children to any “place 

of worship,” be it “Christian” or “non-Christian.” Nothing in the second 

clause explicitly limits or narrows this authority. The superior court erred 

to the extent that it found the Parenting Plan did not permit Father to take 

the children to a church or place of worship of his choice.

¶10 Mother nevertheless cites Cohen v. Frey to argue that we 

should “reject a commonly understood meaning of language when the 

surrounding language demonstrates the words have a particular import.”

215 Ariz. at 66, ¶ 12. Mother argues that the second clause of the 

religious-education section, which states that “[b]oth parents agree that the 

minor children may be instructed in the Christian faith,” modifies the first 

clause such that any church Father takes the children to must be within the 

Christian faith.

¶11 Mother’s reliance on Cohen is misplaced. Contrary to Mother’s

argument, the second clause’s direction that the parents “may” instruct 

their children in the Christian faith does not create ambiguity about the first 

clause’s meaning. The use of the word “may” generally indicates 

permissive intent, while “shall” and “will” denote a mandatory provision.

See City of Chandler v. Ariz. Dep’t of Transp., 216 Ariz. 435, 438–39, ¶ 10 (App. 

2007); see also Hewitt v. Helms, 459 U.S. 460, 471 (1983) (recognizing that the 

word “will,” like “shall” and “must,” is “of an unmistakably mandatory 

character”), overruled on other grounds by Sandin v. Conner, 515 U.S. 472 

(1995). The Parenting Plan repeatedly demonstrates this distinction.

¶12 The Parenting Plan provides that the parents “will make”

major medical and educational “decisions together” and directs that 

“neither parent shall do anything” to hurt the other parent’s relationship 

with the minor children.” (Emphasis added.) To interpret the word “may”

in the religious-education section as mandatory rather than permissive 

would render the distinction between the different words meaningless. See 

Walter v. Wilkinson, 198 Ariz. 431, 432, ¶ 7 (App. 2000) (“If a statute employs 

both mandatory and discretionary terms, we may infer that . . . each term 

carr[ies] its ordinary meaning.”). Thus, as the second clause is 
BALL v. BALL

Opinion of the Court

6

unambiguously permissive, it allows for instruction in the Christian faith 

but does not require it. Therefore, it does not operate to limit the parent’s

rights under the first clause to take the children to any “place of worship.”

¶13 Mother’s argument that this interpretation makes the second 

clause superfluous is unavailing. Adopting Mother’s assertion that the

second clause limits the parents’ rights under the first clause would render 

the first meaningless because the parents could no longer take the children 

to a church or place of worship of their choice. Instead, the second clause is 

permissive and ensures that the “children may be instructed in the

Christian faith.” This interpretation gives effect to both clauses in the 

Parenting Plan’s religious-education section. See Stine, 179 Ariz. at 388 

(noting that the meaning of one part of divorce decree should not render 

another part meaningless).

¶14 Mother dismisses this protection as minimal, but we do not 

find an explicit guarantee that the children may be instructed in the 

Christian faith to be an insignificant distinction from a separate guarantee 

that a parent may take the children to any religious service of the parent’s 

choosing. See Funk v. Ossman, 150 Ariz. 578, 580-82 (App. 1986) (affirming 

order that child could not attend “formal Jewish religious training” but 

noting no objection to the child attending Jewish services). Nor does it 

render either clause meaningless to give full weight to both. See 11 Samuel 

Williston & Richard A. Lord, Williston on Contracts § 32:5 (4th ed.) (“[W]ords 

or clauses are not to be treated as meaningless, or to be discarded, if any 

reasonable meaning can be given them consistent with the whole 

contract.”) (citation omitted).

¶15 Finally, Mother argues that Father waived his argument by 

failing to urge this interpretation of the Parenting Plan before the superior 

court. We disagree. Although Fatherfirst suggested that the court may have

to address the definition of Christianity, he later argued that the Parenting 

Plan “lets [the parents] do whatever they want to do.” Although Father 

admitted that he knew Mother would have a problem if he took the children 

to a non-Christian church and agreed the children should be instructed in 

the Christian faith, he also argued that “being or not being a Christian” was 

not relevant. He discussed the word “may” in the second clause, which he 

described as the “focal point,” and claimed it was permissive, not 

imperative. Thus, even if Father did not zealously press his interpretation 

of the Parenting Plan before the superior court, we do not find he waived 

the right to do so now. See also City of Tempe v. Fleming, 168 Ariz. 454, 456

(App. 1991) (In a civil case, whether a litigant can raise on appeal an 
BALL v. BALL

Opinion of the Court

7

argument not made in the superior court is procedural, not jurisdictional, 

and may be suspended at the appellate court’s discretion.)

¶16 We recognize that the parties’ Parenting Plan was developed 

from a fill-in-the-blank form and prepared by self-represented parties. 

Nevertheless, the Parenting Plan plainly states that each parent (1) may take 

the children to a church or place of worship of his or her choice, and (2) may 

instruct the children in the Christian faith.

¶17 We conclude the superior court erred by holding that the 

Parenting Plan prevented Father from taking the children to his church.

B. The Ecclesiastical-Abstention Doctrine Barred the Superior Court 

from Considering Whether Father’s Church Is Part of “the

Christian Faith” under the Parenting Plan.

¶18 Even if the second clause might constrain Father’s right under 

the first clause, we would nonetheless vacate the superior court’s holding

because the court violated the First Amendment of the United States 

Constitution when it ruled that Father’s Church is not Christian or part of 

the Christian Faith.

¶19 At the outset, we note that the plain language of the parenting 

plan—as detailed above—afforded the superior court with a means to 

resolve this case without engaging with the parties’ religious dispute. “In 

general, . . . we should resolve cases on non-constitutional grounds in all 

cases where it is possible and prudent to do so.” State v. Korzcuch, 186 Ariz. 

190, 195 (1996); see also In re U.S. Currency in the Amount of $315,900.00, 183 

Ariz. 208, 211 (App. 1995) (“Courts should decide cases on 

nonconstitutional grounds if possible, avoiding resolution of constitutional 

issues, when other principles of law are controlling and the case can be 

decided without ruling on the constitutional questions.”).

¶20 However, we conclude departing from this principle of 

judicial restraint is appropriate and necessary here for three reasons. First, 

the ecclesiastical-abstention issue is raised by this case’s facts and fully 

briefed by the parties on appeal. Cf. Schwab v. Matley, 164 Ariz. 421, 422, n.2 

(1990) (finding “[p]rinciples of judicial economy,” including the potential 

for the issue to arise again, that facts “squarely presented” the problem, and 

that it was “specially briefed, argued, and thoroughly explored,” justified 

addressing the constitutional issue). Second, we are not faced here with a 

constitutional challenge to a statute or a novel question of constitutional 

interpretation, but the straightforward application of a well-settled 

constitutional doctrine. See, e.g., Planned Parenthood Ariz., Inc. v. Am. Ass’n
BALL v. BALL

Opinion of the Court

8

of Pro-Life Obstetricians & Gynecologists, 227 Ariz. 262, 269–70, ¶ 13, n.6 (App. 

2011) (declining to address “larger constitutional question” of whether 

Arizona Constitution provides a right to abortion); Petolicchio v. Santa Cruz 

County Fair & Rodeo Ass’n, Inc., 177 Ariz. 256, 259 (1994) (finding correct

construction of relevant statutes negated need to address the constitutional 

issue).

¶21 Finally, our reluctance to address constitutional issues in this 

context is significantly tempered because we are concerned with a potential 

violation of the separation between religious matters and the judiciary 

guaranteed by the First Amendment. “The First Amendment has erected a 

wall between church and state. That wall must be kept high and 

impregnable. We could not approve the slightest breach.” Everson v. Bd. of 

Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 18 (1947). Failing to address the ecclesiastical-abstention 

issue here could risk tacitly endorsing a foray into religious disputes the 

judiciary simply has no place in resolving. That cannot be.

¶22 Accordingly, we address Father’s constitutional arguments 

and conclude the superior court was required to abstain from handling

Mother’s claim once it became clear the dispute concerned an ecclesiastical 

matter, namely, whether Father’s Church is part of “the Christian faith.”

¶23 The Free Exercise and Establishment Clauses of the First 

Amendment of the United States Constitution, as applied to the states 

through the Fourteenth Amendment, “preclude civil courts from inquiring 

into ecclesiastical matters.” Ad Hoc Comm. of Parishioners of Our Lady Sun 

Cath. Church, Inc. v. Reiss, 223 Ariz. 505, 510, ¶ 12 (App. 2010). The Supreme 

Court first described the ecclesiastical-abstention doctrine in Watson v. 

Jones, 80 U.S. 679 (1879). There, the Court set forth the bedrock principle 

upon which the doctrine is based:

In this country the full and free right to entertain any religious 

belief, to practice any religious principle, and to teach any 

religious doctrine which does not violate the laws of morality 

and property, and which does not infringe personal rights, is 

conceded to all. The law knows no heresy, and is committed 

to the support of no dogma, the establishment of no sect.

Id. at 728. Although Watson concerned a relatively narrow dispute, its 

commitment to the judiciary’s separation from religious matters was broad. 

Courts have applied the ecclesiastical-abstention doctrine in many contexts. 

See Serbian E. Orthodox Diocese for U.S. and Can. v. Milivojevich, 426 U.S. 696, 

712-13 (1976); Kedroff v. St. Nicholas Cathedral of Russian Orthodox Church in 
BALL v. BALL

Opinion of the Court

9

N. Am., 344 U.S. 94, 116 (1952) (“The opinion [in Watson] radiates, however, 

a spirit of freedom for religious organizations, an independence from 

secular control or manipulation, in short, power to decide for themselves, 

free from state interference, matters of church government as well as those 

of faith and doctrine.”); Bruss v. Przybylo, 895 N.E.2d 1102, 1111–23 (Ill. App. 

2008) (detailing the evolution of the ecclesiastical-abstention doctrine and

collecting cases).

¶24 This court has held that “ecclesiastical matters include ‘a 

matter which concerns theological controversy, church discipline, 

ecclesiastical government, or the conformity of members of the church to 

the standard of morals required of them.’” Reiss, 223 Ariz. at 510, ¶ 12 

(quoting Watson, 80 U.S. at 733). But “[d]epending on the circumstances, 

civil courts can resolve at least some church-related disputes through 

neutral principles of law so long as the case is resolved without inquiry into 

church doctrine or belief.” Id. at 512, ¶ 19 (emphasis added); cf. Jones v. Wolf, 

443 U.S. 595, 604 (1979) (“[A] State is constitutionally entitled to adopt 

neutral principles of law as a means of adjudicating a church property 

dispute.”); Christakis v. Deitsch, 1 CA-CV19-0344, 2020 WL 7040634, at *1, 

¶ 5 (Ariz. App., Dec. 1, 2020).

¶25 Here, the court dove into an ecclesiastical matter by 

addressing whether Father’s Church is part of the Christian faith. That very 

question has long been a matter of theological debate in the United States.3

A secular court must avoid ruling on such issues to prevent the appearance 

that government favors one religious view over another. Cf. Emp. Div., Dep’t

of Human Res. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 877 (1990) (“The government may 

not . . . lend its power to one or the other side in controversies over religious 

authority or dogma.”); Flynn v. Estevez, 221 So.3d 1241, 1245–53 (Fla. App. 

3 See, e.g., Daniel Burke, Are Mormons Christian? It’s Complicated, The 

Christian Century (Jan. 20, 2012), 

https://www.christiancentury.org/article/2012-01/are-mormonschristian-its-complicated; Michelle Boorstein, After Decades of Behind-theScenes Diplomacy, Leaders of Catholic, Mormon Churches Meet in Rome, Wash. 

Post (March 9, 2019), 

https://www.washingtonpost.com/religion/2019/03/09/after-decadesbehind-the-scenes-diplomacy-leaders-catholic-mormon-churches-meetrome/; Mormons in America—Certain in Their Beliefs, Uncertain of Their Place 

in Society, Pew Research Center (Jan. 12, 2012), 

https://www.pewforum.org/2012/01/12/mormons-in-americaexecutive-summary/.
BALL v. BALL

Opinion of the Court

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2017) (applying ecclesiastical-abstention doctrine to “intramural 

ecclesiastical kerfuffle” over Catholic school’s religion-based immunization 

policy).

¶26 Moreover, although the question was presented within the 

context of interpreting the Parenting Plan, the court did not resolve it 

through neutral principles of law but instead engaged in the exact type of 

inquiry into church doctrine or belief that the First Amendment prohibits. 

At the second evidentiary hearing, the court: (1) described the issue as

“what is or is not within the definition of Christianity”; (2) allowed Mother 

to present testimony from a minister from her church claiming that Father’s

Church was not part of the Christian faith; and (3) admitted into evidence 

a chart purporting to compare the tenets of Father’s Church with Christian 

beliefs. The court’s order specifically found “that Mormonism does not fall 

within the confines of [the] Christian faith.”

¶27 Courts are not the appropriate forum to assess whether 

someone who self-identifies as “Christian” qualifies to use that term. If the 

superior court’s order could stand, the “harm of such a governmental 

intrusion into religious affairs would be irreparable.” McCarthy v. Fuller, 714 

F.3d 971, 976 (7th Cir. 2013). “Such a judgment could cause confusion, 

consternation, and dismay in religious circles.” Id. Accordingly, the 

ecclesiastical-abstention doctrine applies with full force in this case, and we 

vacate the superior court’s order on that basis.

¶28 In so holding, we observe that a parenting plan’s

religious-education provision may be enforced without violating First 

Amendment principles if the dispute does not require a court to wade into 

matters of religious debate or dogma. See A.R.S. § 25-403.02(C)(2) 

(consistent with child’s best interests, a parenting plan includes “each 

parent’s rights and responsibilities . . . for decisions in areas such 

as . . . religious training”). But see Smith v. Smith, 90 Ariz. 190, 193 (1961) 

(“[A] parent may not be deprived of the custody of a child because of the 

court’s disagreement with such parent as to religious beliefs.”). Statutory 

authority and caselaw also permit the court, in limited circumstances, to 

make decisions concerning the religious education of a child. See, e.g., A.R.S. 

§ 25-403.02(D) (empowering the court to determine disputed elements of a 

parenting plan); Paul E. v. Courtney F., 246 Ariz. 388, 395, ¶ 27 (under A.R.S. 

§ 25-403.02(D), “if the court awards joint legal decision-making authority, 

the court is authorized to resolve any conflict”); Funk, 150 Ariz. at 581–82 

(court may interfere in the religious upbringing of a child where there “is a 

clear and affirmative showing that the conflicting religious beliefs affect the 
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Opinion of the Court

11

general welfare of the child”) (quoting Munoz v. Munoz, 489 P.2d 1133, 1135 

(Wash. 1971)).

¶29 But parents who wish to address aspects of their children’s

religious education in a parenting plan should take great care to ensure 

those provisions are as specific and detailed as possible. Failure to do so 

may impermissibly entangle the court in religious matters should a dispute 

ever arise. This case provides a potent example of this possibility made real. 

The ambiguities surrounding the phrase “the Christian faith” thrust the 

court directly into a matter of theological controversy in which it could not

take part. Accordingly, we vacate the court’s order regarding religious 

education also because the First Amendment precluded the court from 

addressing whether Father’s Church is part of “the Christian Faith.”

ATTORNEY’S FEES AND COSTS

¶30 The superior court ordered Father to pay $3000 of Mother’s

attorney’s fees and costs under A.R.S. § 25-414(C). Because the court erred 

by concluding that Father violated the Parenting Plan’s religious-education 

provisions, we vacate the fees award. But because the court found other 

violations of the Parenting Plan not raised on appeal, we remand to the 

superior court to reconsider the award’s amount considering this opinion.

See A.R.S. § 25-414(C) (providing that “costs and attorney fees . . . shall be 

paid by the violating parent” and “may” be awarded if “the custodial 

parent prevails”); Palmer v. Palmer, 217 Ariz. 67, 73, ¶ 22 (App. 2007) 

(vacating and remanding fee award where “[o]ur substantive 

ruling . . . may affect the factors that were considered by the family court”).

¶31 Both parties request an award of attorney’s fees on appeal. In 

the exercise of our discretion, we award Father his reasonable attorney’s

fees incurred on appeal. We remand to the superior court to determine a 

suitable award of Father’s fees after considering the “totality of the 

litigation.” See Schwartz v. Farmers Ins. of Ariz., 166 Ariz. 33, 38 (App. 1990); 

see also Schweiger v. China Doll Rest., Inc., 138 Ariz. 183, 189 (App. 1983) 

(appellate court is somewhat unsuited for the fact-finding inquiry

regarding attorney’s fees). After determining both fee awards, the court 

shall then offset the larger award by the smaller award.

¶32 As the prevailing party on appeal, Father is awarded his costs 

upon compliance with ARCAP 21.
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Opinion of the Court

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CONCLUSION

¶33 We vacate the superior court’s order regarding religious 

education and remand the issue of attorney’s fees. We affirm the court’s

ruling otherwise.

M O R S E, J., specially concurring:

¶34 I fully join the result and paragraphs 1-17 and 30-33 of the 

Opinion. Also, as discussed in paragraph 29, I join in urging parents to 

address religious-education provisions in a parenting plan with great detail 

and specificity to avoid impermissibly entangling courts in ecclesiastical 

matters.

¶35 While I have concerns about the manner in which the superior 

court addressed the parties’ dispute in this case, I decline to join the 

Opinion’s remaining paragraphs. Father acknowledged in his opening brief 

that “[i]f this Court decides to enforce the plain meaning of the Parenting 

Plan, then there is no reason to reach the constitutional issues.” I agree. 

Because paragraphs 1-17 and 30-33 of the Opinion completely resolve this 

case without addressing broader constitutional issues, I would stop there. 

See R.L. Augustine Const. Co., Inc. v. Peoria Unified School Dist., 188 Ariz. 368, 

370 (1997) (“We will not reach a constitutional question if a case can be fairly 

decided on nonconstitutional grounds.”); Goodman v. Samaritan Health Sys., 

195 Ariz. 502, 505 ¶ 11 (App. 1999) (“It is sound judicial policy to avoid 

deciding a case on constitutional grounds if there are nonconstitutional 

grounds dispositive of the case.”).