RECORD IMPOUNDED

NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE

APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION

SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY

APPELLATE DIVISION

DOCKET NO. A-3666-13T3

NEW JERSEY DIVISION OF CHILD

PROTECTION AND PERMANENCY,

Plaintiff-Respondent,

v.

N.C.M.,

Defendant-Appellant,

and

T.E. and J.C.,

Defendants.

____________________________________________

IN THE MATTER OF THE GUARDIANSHIP

OF T.M., M.L.W., and M.A.J.M., minors.

_____________________________________________

Argued telephonically November 19, 2014 –

Decided

Before Judges Sabatino, Simonelli, and 

Guadagno.

On appeal from the Superior Court of New 

Jersey, Chancery Division, Family Part, 

Hudson County, Docket No. FG-09-210-14.

Eric R. Foley, Designated Counsel, argued 

the cause for appellant (Joseph E. Krakora, 

Public Defender, attorney; Mr. Foley, on the 

brief).

APPROVED FOR PUBLICATION

December 16, 2014

APPELLATE DIVISION

December 16, 2014
2 A-3666-13T3

Renee Greenberg, Deputy Attorney General, 

argued the cause for respondent (John J. 

Hoffman, Acting Attorney General, attorney; 

Andrea M. Silkowitz, Assistant Attorney 

General, of counsel; Ms. Greenberg, on the 

brief).

Catherine Davila, Designated Counsel, argued 

the cause for minors T.M., M.L.W., and 

M.A.J.M. (Joseph E. Krakora, Public 

Defender, Law Guardian, attorney; Ms. 

Davila, on the brief).

The opinion of the court was delivered by

GUADAGNO, J.A.D.

Defendant N.C.M. (Nora)

1 appeals from the April 1, 2014 

judgment of guardianship which terminated her parental rights to 

her daughters T.M. (Tara) and M.L.W. (Mary), and her son, 

M.A.J.M. (Matt). At the time of the guardianship trial, Tara, 

Mary, and Matt were nine, seven, and thirteen months,

respectively.

Defendant contends that the Division of Child Protection 

and Permanency (Division) did not prove by clear and convincing 

evidence the third and fourth prongs of the best interests test

required for termination. N.J.S.A. 30:4C-15.1(a). 

Specifically, she claims that the Division's failure to provide 

reasonable efforts to prevent placement and effectuate 

reunification with her children is a direct result of an earlier 

 

1 We employ pseudonyms to protect the privacy of the minors and 

for ease of reference. 
3 A-3666-13T3

failure by the Division to provide adequate services to her when 

she was a minor and under the Division's care and supervision.

We are satisfied that the Division proved the requisite 

statutory factors required to terminate defendant's parental 

rights by clear and convincing evidence. The circumstances of 

this case, however, compel us to discuss the Division's 

obligation to provide services, specifically mental health 

evaluations and treatment to minors under its care, and whether 

the failure to provide such services can be considered in 

evaluating reasonable efforts if the minor later becomes a 

defendant in a guardianship proceeding.

I.

Nora was born in 1989. Although the record is sparse from 

this period, it appears that shortly after her birth, the 

Division took custody of Nora and placed her with B.J.M. (Beth) 

and her husband, who later adopted her. Nora's birth parents 

died during her early childhood and her adoptive father died in 

2001. Nora grew up with five siblings, all of whom were adopted 

by Beth.

After experiencing problems completing the fourth grade,

Nora was placed in special education classes and was diagnosed 

with a reading disorder. It appears that, at some point, Nora 
4 A-3666-13T3

was classified as disabled, and Beth received benefits on her 

behalf.2

The Division was again involved with Nora in February 2002, 

when it received a referral that Nora, who was then twelve, had 

been beaten. After determining that Nora was uninjured, the 

Division found the allegation to be unsubstantiated. In June 

2003, the Division received another referral alleging that Nora 

had been injured internally. This time, the Division confirmed 

that Nora had been injured, and Beth was responsible. The 

record does not indicate what, if anything, the Division did in 

response, although Nora continued to reside with Beth.

Later that year or in early 2004,

3 the Division removed Nora 

and her siblings from Beth's custody due to Beth's alcoholism. 

Details on Nora's initial placement are not included in the 

record, but in November 2004, when she was fifteen and still 

under the Division's care, Nora gave birth to Tara. The 

Division placed Nora and Tara in a high school program for teen 

mothers, but Nora withdrew from the program in 2005.

 

2 This conclusion is drawn from Nora's statement to an evaluating 

psychologist that Beth took her social security check and used 

it to pay Beth's mortgage.

3 The record only indicates that Nora was removed at age 

fourteen.
5 A-3666-13T3

In December 2006, Nora gave birth to Mary. Shortly after 

Mary's birth, Beth made a referral to the Division alleging that 

Nora had moved back into her home without permission. Due to 

Beth's substance abuse issues, the Division removed Tara but 

permitted Nora, who was then seventeen, to continue living with 

Beth.

In May 2007, Beth made another referral to the Division

after an altercation with Nora. Beth told the caseworker that 

she wanted Nora out of her house. A Division report indicates 

that Tara had been returned to Nora and witnessed the incident

but does not indicate whether the Division took any action.

In December 2010, Beth made another referral to the 

Division alleging that Nora "leaves the children with anyone 

that is available." Nora had been living at her sister's home 

with Tara and Mary, but was thrown out and moved back in with 

Beth. Beth also alleged that Nora would not get out of bed to 

take care of the children, which she attributed to drug and 

alcohol abuse.

The Division investigated the same day. Nora told the 

caseworker that she had nowhere to live if she could not stay 

with Beth. The caseworker presented Nora with the option of 

going to a shelter or paying for a hotel. If she did not find 
6 A-3666-13T3

housing, the caseworker told Nora that the Division would remove 

her children.

Although Nora moved in with a relative, the Division 

substantiated her for neglect due to "inadequate shelter" because 

"her shelter problem is chronic as she has a pattern of 

homelessness for the past six years . . . [and] has been in 

shelters, stayed with family members and in friends' homes."

After the December 2010 incident, the Division referred 

Nora for homemaker services and psychological and substance 

abuse evaluations. Although she attended the homemaker 

services, Nora refused to submit to a drug screen and did not 

appear for her psychological evaluation. In March 2011, Nora

became homeless for the third time in two months.

The current litigation resulted from a referral received by 

the Division in April 2012 alleging that Nora was under the 

influence when she picked up her daughters from school. Nora

was so impaired that she could not write her daughters' names to 

sign them out of school. Division caseworkers learned that Nora 

had been escorted out of the building by police and the girls' 

maternal aunt had picked them up. Two days earlier, Nora had 

picked up one of her daughters from school and later returned to 

the school claiming the child was missing. The child was found 

wandering alone near a local daycare center. The Division also 
7 A-3666-13T3

learned that Tara had missed thirty-nine days of school and 

would be held back in the first grade.

Nora admitted to smoking a mixture of marijuana and PCP 

known as "dip" earlier in the day. The caseworker observed that 

Nora remained under the influence during the interview, as she 

continually opened and closed her eyes, swayed in place, and 

alternatively laughed, yelled, or said nothing in response to 

the worker's questions. Nora also admitted that she had been 

staying in various homes. Tara and Mary confirmed that they had 

been staying in Jersey City, but did not know where.

As a result of the investigation, the Division executed an 

emergency Dodd removal4 of Tara and Mary. The children were 

placed with a resource parent and family friend of Nora's, N.M. 

(Natalie), where they remain to date. T.E. (Tom), the 

biological father of Tara and Mary, was incarcerated at the time 

of removal.

The Division offered services following the removal, 

including weekly supervised visitation, substance abuse and 

psychological evaluations, substance abuse treatment, parenting 

 

4 A Dodd removal is an emergency removal of a child from the home

without a court order or the consent of the parent or guardian. 

It is authorized "if the child is in such condition that the 

child's continuance in the place or residence or in the care and 

custody of the parent or guardian presents an imminent danger to 

the child's life, safety, or health, and there is insufficient 

time to apply for a court order." N.J.S.A. 9:6-8.29.
8 A-3666-13T3

skills classes, and two letters to welfare regarding housing 

assistance. The Division also assessed three relatives as 

potential placement options, but all were ruled out.

Nora failed to appear for her first scheduled psychological 

evaluation, but attended the rescheduled visit with Dr. Robert 

Kanen. Dr. Kanen diagnosed Nora with marijuana and PCP abuse, 

based on the April 2012 incident and her admission that she used 

those drugs on a daily basis for six months in 2011. He found 

that Nora has an IQ of sixty-seven, is functionally illiterate, 

and is "cognitively and learning disabled." Dr. Kanen 

recommended substance abuse treatment and parenting skills 

classes, but stated that her capacity to benefit from either is 

limited due to her cognitive impairments. Nora was referred for 

parenting skills classes but was discharged from the program for 

non-compliance.

Nora began substance abuse treatment at Health Path in 

October 2012, but was discharged from the program after one 

month for non-compliance. The Division referred Nora for a new 

drug abuse evaluation, after which she began treatment at New 

Pathways in December 2012. She successfully completed this 

intensive outpatient program two months later.

Nora also participated in daily counseling and group 

therapy from June 2012 through February 2013. She attended 
9 A-3666-13T3

their Women's Group, Narcotics Anonymous Group, and Anger 

Management Group for those nine months.

In February 2013, the Division received a referral from 

Jersey City Medical Center regarding the birth of Nora's third 

child, Matt.

5 The referent alleged that Nora had not received 

any prenatal care and suggested that Nora was suffering from 

cognitive or psychological impairments that would limit her 

ability to care for the child.

A Division caseworker investigated and Nora admitted that 

she did not receive prenatal care but explained that she did not 

have health insurance. A nurse observed that Matt appeared 

healthy and that Nora acted appropriately with him. Drug 

screens of Nora and Matt were negative.

Nora claimed to be staying with a friend named James, but 

could not provide his last name or address. Nora offered to 

stay with a family friend if James' home was deemed 

inappropriate. Although the family friend had adopted four 

Division children already, her resource parent license had 

expired and, as a result, the Division ruled her out as a 

placement. The Division took custody of Matt upon his discharge 

 

5 Nora listed J.C. as Matt's putative birth father, but he could 

not be located.
10 A-3666-13T3

from the hospital and initially placed him in a separate foster 

home, but later placed him in the same home as Tara and Mary.

Nora submitted to a psychological evaluation with Dr. 

Jemour Maddux, who concluded that Nora's reunification with her 

children could occur within six months if Nora remained drugfree. He recommended unsupervised visitation leading to 

overnight visits, concurrent supervised visitation, therapy with 

the children, adult literacy classes, and a support group upon 

reunification.

In April 2013, the court approved the Division's permanency 

plan of reunification and found the six-month time frame 

appropriate. Nora never received unsupervised visitation as the 

Division had concerns that she was still using drugs. Nora 

tested positive for PCP later that month and again in May 2013. 

A supervised visit that month was terminated because she was 

visibly under the influence. Nora was referred to the inpatient 

program at Straight and Narrow.

As a result of her relapse, the court changed the 

permanency goal to termination of parental rights and the 

Division filed a complaint seeking guardianship of all three 

children.

During evaluations with Dr. Maddux, Tara and Mary disclosed 

exposure to Nora while she was "under the influence." Dr. 
11 A-3666-13T3

Maddux concluded that this indicated neglect. Both girls also 

stated that their mother no longer abuses drugs and were 

optimistic about reunification. Reports of Nora's visitation 

with the girls were positive, with the children displaying a 

close bond, loving interactions, and Nora demonstrating good 

parenting skills.

Nora was discharged from Straight and Narrow in October 

2013 for non-compliance and fraternizing with a male patient. 

She tested positive for PCP at a subsequent evaluation. While 

she was consequently referred to an inpatient program at Turning 

Point, Nora did not attend. Her urine screen was positive for 

PCP again later in October 2013.

Nora was again referred for parenting classes, but was 

terminated after one month for non-compliance. She was rereferred for substance abuse treatment at Integrity House, but 

was non-compliant, and her case was closed in December 2013. 

She was re-referred for parenting classes in March 2014, but was 

discharged for failure to attend.

On January 27, 2014, Tom executed an identified surrender 

of his parental rights of Tara and Mary to Natalie. Nora's 

guardianship trial began in March 2014. The court first heard 

from caseworker Raymond Brown, who testified to the services 

offered to Nora to effectuate reunification, including parenting 
12 A-3666-13T3

classes, substance abuse assessments, substance abuse treatment, 

supervised visitation, psychological evaluations, relative 

assessments, transportation assistance, and referrals for 

housing assistance. He stated that Nora was transient, had 

failed to complete parenting classes or inpatient substance 

abuse treatment, and could not provide proof of employment. He 

indicated that Tara and Mary had expressed their desire to be 

adopted by Natalie.

Dr. Kanen testified that Nora's severe parenting deficits 

made it very difficult for her to provide her children with a 

stable home. He noted Nora's history of drug abuse, and that 

she did not believe she needed drug treatment. Dr. Kanen also 

noted that Nora remained dependent on living with others due to 

her continued homelessness, and that she was aware of the 

services that the Division wanted her to complete but believed 

they were unnecessary. Dr. Kanen concluded that based on Nora's 

cognitive impairments, unstable housing, and continued use of 

PCP, she was incapable of providing the three children with a 

permanent, safe, and secure home. He also testified that her 

ability to parent is unlikely to change in the foreseeable 

future because her psychological issues are chronic and she has 

not addressed her drug problem.
13 A-3666-13T3

Dr. Kanen testified that the bonding evaluation revealed 

that the girls displayed "avoidant attachment" as shown by their 

withdrawal after witnessing Nora's oppositional behavior toward 

a Division caseworker. He concluded that Nora and Matt have no 

attachment, and that the girls' attachment to her "at best is 

very, very insecure."

By contrast, Dr. Kanen testified that the girls engaged in 

conversation with Natalie and appeared excited and happy. He 

concluded that they are securely attached to Natalie and,

although Tara and Mary would likely experience some grief if 

Nora's parental rights were terminated, they would not suffer 

serious and enduring harm and Natalie could ameliorate what 

grief arose. Due to a lack of any attachment, Dr. Kanen noted 

that Matt would suffer no harm upon termination. He testified 

that all three children would be at risk for serious and 

enduring harm if returned to Nora's care.

Neither the law guardian, who supported the Division's 

request for termination, nor Nora presented any witnesses. The 

court found that the Division had met its burden of proving all 

four prongs of N.J.S.A. 30:4C-15.1 by clear and convincing 

evidence, and entered a judgment of guardianship terminating 

Nora's rights to Tara, Mary, and Matt.
14 A-3666-13T3

On appeal, Nora presents the following bifurcated argument:

POINT I

THE DIVISION FAILED TO MEET ITS BURDEN OF 

PROOF WHERE THERE WAS NOT CLEAR AND 

CONVINCING PROOF SUFFICIENT TO SATISFY THE 

FOUR PRONGS OF N.J.S.A. 30:4C-15.1(A).

A. THE DIVISION FAILED TO PROVIDE 

REASONABLE EFFORTS TO PREVENT 

PLACEMENT AND TO EFFECTUATE 

REUNIFICATION BECAUSE THE 

UNDERLYING PREDICATE CIRCUMSTANCES 

OF THIS CASE THAT LEAD TO ANY 

ALLEGED HARMS TO THE CHILDREN WERE 

A DIRECT RESULT OF THE DIVISION'S 

FAILURE TO PROTECT N.M. AND HER 

CHILDREN DURING N.M.'S MINORITY.

B. THE DIVISION FAILED TO PROVIDE 

REASONABLE EFFORTS TOWARDS 

REUNIFICATION AFTER THE CHILDREN 

WERE REMOVED.

C. THE DIVISION FAILED TO PROVE

BY CLEAR AND CONVINCING EVIDENCE 

THAT TERMINATION OF PARENTAL 

RIGHTS WILL NOT DO MORE HARM THAN 

GOOD DUE TO THE DIVISION'S 

INTERFERENCE IN THE COMPARATIVE 

BONDING EVALUATIONS.

II.

Our review of a trial court's judgment terminating parental 

rights is limited. N.J. Div. of Youth & Family Servs. v. M.M., 

189 N.J. 261, 278 (2007). The trial court's factual findings 

are binding on appeal if supported by adequate, substantial, and 

credible evidence. Cesare v. Cesare, 154 N.J. 394, 412 (1998)

(citing Rova Farms Resort, Inc. v. Investors Ins. Co., 65 N.J.
15 A-3666-13T3

474, 484 (1974)). Particular deference is afforded to family 

court fact-finding because of the family courts' special 

jurisdiction and expertise in family matters. Id. at 413. A 

trial court's legal conclusions, however, are not entitled to 

deference. N.J. Div. of Youth & Family Servs. v. I.S., 202 N.J.

145, 183 (2010).

A parent's right to raise and maintain a relationship with 

his or her child is constitutionally protected. In re 

Guardianship of K.H.O., 161 N.J. 337, 346 (1999). That right is 

not absolute, however, and must be balanced against the State's 

parens patriae responsibility to protect the welfare of its 

children. N.J. Div. of Youth & Family Servs. v. G.M., 198 N.J.

382, 397 (2009). Courts apply the "best interests of the child" 

standard to properly balance parental rights against the State's 

interest. K.H.O., supra, 161 N.J. at 347. That standard 

permits termination of parental rights only where the State 

proves the following elements by clear and convincing evidence:

(1) The child's safety, health or 

development has been or will continue 

to be endangered by the parental 

relationship;

(2) The parent is unwilling or unable to 

eliminate the harm facing the child or 

is unable or unwilling to provide a 

safe and stable home for the child and 

the delay of permanent placement will 

add to the harm. Such harm may include 

evidence that separating the child from 
16 A-3666-13T3

his resource family parents would cause 

serious and enduring emotional or 

psychological harm to the child;

(3) The division has made reasonable 

efforts to provide services to help the 

parent correct the circumstances which 

led to the child's placement outside 

the home and the court has considered 

alternatives to termination of parental 

rights; and

(4) Termination of parental rights will not 

do more harm than good.

[N.J.S.A. 30:4C-15.1(a).]

These four factors are neither discrete nor separate, but 

instead overlap to provide a comprehensive standard that 

identifies a child's best interests. N.J. Div. of Youth & 

Family Servs. v. G.L., 191 N.J. 596, 606-07 (2007). The 

analysis is "extremely fact sensitive and require[s]

particularized evidence" for the given case. Id. at 606. For 

involuntary termination, the "cornerstone of the inquiry [is]

whether the parent can cease causing his or her child harm and 

become fit to assume the parental role within time to meet the 

child's needs." N.J. Div. of Youth & Family Servs. v. L.J.D.,

428 N.J. Super. 451, 479 (App. Div. 2012) (citation omitted).

Nora does not contest that the Division proved prongs one 

and two by clear and convincing evidence. Therefore, we address 

only her challenge to the proofs as to prongs three and four.
17 A-3666-13T3

A.

Under the third prong of the best-interests standard, the 

Division must make "reasonable efforts to provide services to 

help the parent correct the circumstances" that necessitated 

removal and placement of the child in foster care. N.J.S.A.

30:4C-15.1(a)(3). "Reasonable efforts" may include parental 

consultation, plans for reunification, services essential to 

achieving reunification, notice to the family of the child's 

progress, and visitation facilitation. N.J.S.A. 30:4C-15.1(c). 

More specific services include day care, housing assistance, 

referrals to drug treatment, medical or health care, parenting 

classes, financial assistance, and the like. In re Guardianship 

of D.M.H., 161 N.J. 365, 391 (1999).

The reasonableness of the Division's efforts "is not 

measured by their success." L.J.D., supra, 428 N.J. Super. at 

488. Even if the Division's efforts are deficient, the best 

interests of the child standard still controls whether 

termination is appropriate. Ibid. Defendant's challenge to the 

prong-three proofs is based on her claim that the Division 

failed to protect her and her children during her minority when 

she was under the Division's care. She alleges that these 

failures caused any alleged harm suffered by the children during 

the pendency of this litigation. Defendant does not contest 
18 A-3666-13T3

that the Division provided multiple psychological evaluations, 

with follow-up treatment. Simply stated, Nora's argument is 

that the Division's failure "to protect [her] and provide 

reasonable services when she was a child-parent caused the 

almost inevitable issues that arose in [her] early adulthood 

years."

We acknowledge that the Division's apparent failure to 

provide services to Nora after her removal from Beth's home when 

she was fourteen gilds this argument with superficial appeal. 

However, we are aware of no statutory authority or precedent 

holding that the Division's failure to provide services to a 

child under its care can be considered in a subsequent 

guardianship matter involving that same child in her later 

capacity as a parent when assessing the adequacy of services 

required under Title 30.

We also view defendant's argument that her problems would 

have been lessened or even abated had she received adequate care 

during her minority as speculative. The fact remains, and Nora 

does not dispute, that during the pendency of this litigation 

the Division provided ample services to her and she failed to 

take full advantage of them. While Nora's argument that the 

Division's services were offered too late to functionally assist 

her in becoming a suitable parent finds ample support in the 
19 A-3666-13T3

record, we are compelled to reject it as untethered to statutory 

or other existing legal authority.

The Division removed Nora from Beth's custody when she was

fourteen, and remained involved with her and her siblings over

the next three years. The record is devoid of any evidence of 

services provided to Nora during this time when she gave birth 

to two children. Nor is there any explanation why the Division 

removed Tara from Beth's home because of her alcoholism but 

allowed Nora, also a minor under the Division's care, to remain.

Even a cursory examination of Nora's history would have 

alerted the Division to her struggles in school and apparent 

learning disability. Had the Division provided a psychological 

evaluation when Nora was first removed, there would have been 

insight into her low IQ, and help could have been provided.

N.J.A.C. 10:122D-2.5(a) requires such evaluations and 

follow-up services:

The Division representative shall make every 

reasonable effort to assure that each child 

in out-of-home placement receives 

appropriate and necessary health care, 

including mental/behavioral health services.

This obligation is reaffirmed in subsection (f):

The Division representative shall assure 

that the child receives a medical 

examination at least annually after the 

initial medical examination performed at the 

time of placement . . . . The Division 

representative shall assure that each child 
20 A-3666-13T3

with a suspected mental/behavioral health 

need receives a mental/behavioral health 

assessment and identified follow-up care. 

At a minimum, the child's examinations shall 

comply with the Early and Periodic Screening 

and Diagnostic Treatment periodicity 

schedule in accordance with N.J.A.C. 10:54-

5.10 through 5.13.

After the Division removed Nora from Beth's custody, the 

only record of Division interaction with Nora thereafter came as 

the result of Beth's numerous referrals. The only 

"substantiated" allegation against Nora during this period is 

that she was homeless from ages fourteen to nineteen, a highly 

questionable finding. Other than the placement in a high school 

for teen mothers in 2004, the record is devoid of Division 

efforts to assist Nora with any of her problems during these 

formative years.

In 2012, Dr. Kanen determined Nora's IQ was sixty-seven, 

she was functionally illiterate, and cognitively and learning 

disabled. While it is regrettable that the Division did not 

identify and address these deficiencies earlier, we decline to 

recognize a causal link between those failures and the adequacy 

of the services that were ultimately offered to Nora as a 

defendant parent in this proceeding.

B.

Nora challenges the Division's proofs under the fourth 

prong and argues that a Division caseworker's interjection into 
21 A-3666-13T3

her bonding evaluation "caused a skewed result that was then 

relied upon by the court" in determining that termination would 

not do more harm than good. We disagree.

To satisfy the fourth prong of the best-interests test for 

termination, the Division must prove by clear and convincing 

evidence that "[t]ermination of parental rights will not do more 

harm than good." N.J.S.A. 30:4C-15.1(a)(4). "The question to be 

addressed . . . is whether, after considering and balancing the 

two relationships, the child will suffer a greater harm from the 

termination of ties with her natural parents than from the 

permanent disruption of her relationship with her foster 

parents." K.H.O., supra, 161 N.J. at 355.

The child's "paramount need" for permanent, stable, and 

defined parent-child relationships is key. Ibid. It is 

therefore against a child's best interests to prolong permanent 

placement because the natural parent is unable to care for the 

child for a protracted period. N.J. Div. of Youth & Family 

Servs. v. B.G.S., 291 N.J. Super. 582, 592 (App. Div. 1996). 

A court must inquire into the child's relationship with 

both the natural and foster parents on prong four. K.H.O., 

supra, 161 N.J. at 355. To that end, the Division should offer 

the testimony of a "well qualified expert who has had full 

opportunity to make a comprehensive, objective, and informed 
22 A-3666-13T3

evaluation of the child's relationship with the foster parents." 

In re Guardianship of J.C., 129 N.J. 1, 19 (1992). "[W]here it 

is shown that the bond with foster parents is strong and, in 

comparison, the bond with the natural parent is not as strong, 

that evidence will satisfy the requirement of N.J.S.A. 30:4C15.1(a)(4) that termination of parental rights will not do more 

harm than good to the child." K.H.O., supra, 161 N.J. at 363.

Here, the trial court relied on Dr. Kanen's conclusions 

from the bonding evaluations he conducted with the foster parent 

in January 2014 and with Nora in February 2014. Dr. Kanen 

testified that the children are securely attached to Natalie but 

have only an insecure attachment to Nora and would not suffer 

serious or enduring harm if permanently separated from Nora, but 

would suffer such harm if returned to her care. He further 

opined that Natalie is able to ameliorate any emotional harm 

resulting from the termination of Nora's parental rights. The 

court noted that Nora failed to present any evidence to the 

contrary and found that the Division had satisfied this prong.

Nora asserts that the court's comparative bonding analysis 

is flawed because a Division caseworker interfered with her 

evaluation. Dr. Kanen testified that he permitted caseworker 

Kim Johnson to enter the room in which the bonding evaluation 

was to take place immediately behind himself and the family. 
23 A-3666-13T3

The evaluation began in the hallway two to three minutes 

previously. Johnson and Nora argued for a few minutes, at which 

point Johnson left to get her supervisor. The supervisor and 

Johnson returned and continued to argue with Nora for several 

minutes more, while Tara and Mary became continually more 

withdrawn. Dr. Kanen did not stop or move the conversation 

elsewhere to avoid exposing the children to the conflict. He

testified that he allowed the argument to continue because he 

did not anticipate the discussion would escalate, he had never 

conducted an evaluation that had been interrupted by the

Division, and did not know whether to acquiesce or object.

Dr. Kanen noted that the girls were initially happy at the 

evaluation, but became withdrawn and depressed upon witnessing 

Nora's oppositional behavior toward the Division workers. In 

his report, Dr. Kanen wrote that this incident was "an example 

of how [Nora's] oppositional behavior can have a detrimental 

impact on the emotional development of these two girls. [Nora] 

had no insight into the reaction of [Tara] and [Mary]. She 

showed no evidence of sensitivity to how her behavior and

emotions affect her children."

Although it would have been preferable that any discussions 

between the caseworker and defendant had not interfered with the 

evaluations, we do not find the procedure so flawed that it 
24 A-3666-13T3

should have been disregarded by the trial court. Ultimately, 

Dr. Kanen's testimony remains unrebutted and the trial court 

credited his testimony in concluding that the children would not 

suffer more harm than good from terminating Nora's parental 

rights. The record contains substantial, credible evidence to 

support this conclusion.

Affirmed.