UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 19-4828

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

 Plaintiff - Appellee,

v.

ADRIAN JOSE ROMERO, a/k/a Dre, a/k/a Dri, a/k/a Joseph Wayne Green,

 Defendant - Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Western District of Virginia, at 

Abingdon. James P. Jones, District Judge. (1:19-cr-00011-JPJ-PMS-1)

Submitted: May 29, 2020 Decided: July 9, 2020

Before NIEMEYER, AGEE, and DIAZ, Circuit Judges.

Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

Steven R. Minor, ELLIOTT, LAWSON & MINOR, PC, Bristol, Virginia, for Appellant. 

Thomas T. Cullen, United States Attorney, S. Cagle Juhan, Assistant United States 

Attorney, OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES ATTORNEY, Charlottesville, Virginia, 

for Appellee.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
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PER CURIAM:

Adrian Jose Romero pled guilty pursuant to a plea agreement to conspiracy to 

distribute, and to possess with intent to distribute, “50 grams or more of methamphetamine 

(actual).” He was sentenced to 235 months in prison. On appeal, he raises various claims. 

The Government seeks to enforce the appellate waiver in his plea agreement. Although 

we find that Romero’s claims are not barred by the appellate waiver, we affirm his 

conviction and sentence.

Romero asserts that, while the appellate waiver in his plea agreement is valid and 

enforceable, the claims he raises on appeal are not waivable. While certain claims may not 

be waived in a plea agreement, the limited number of unwaivable claims must allege 

“fundamental issues.” United States v. Thornsbury, 670 F.3d 532, 539 (4th Cir. 2012) 

(noting that, to avoid application of appellate waiver, defendant must allege that sentence 

was beyond the authority of the district court). In addition, even a valid and enforceable 

appeal waiver does not bar the appeal of a sentence based on a constitutionally 

impermissible factor such as race. United States v. Marin, 961 F.2d 493, 496 (4th Cir. 

1992); see also United States v. Johnson, 347 F.3d 412, 415 (2d Cir. 2003) (finding that 

plea agreement cannot waive appeal where defendant alleges that his “sentence is 

constitutionally deficient because it rests improperly upon his status”). 

I.

Romero first contends that the Sentencing Guidelines involve intentional 

discrimination because the penalties for actual/ice methamphetamine were increased by 

the Sentencing Commission with the knowledge that doing so would mean more jail time 
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for increasing numbers of Hispanic offenders. Given that Romero seeks to raise a claim 

that his sentence was the product of racial discrimination, we find the appellate waiver does 

not bar his claim. Thus, this narrow claim will be reviewed on the merits. 

Romero contends that the actual/ice methamphetamine Guidelines result in a 

disparate (and harsher) impact on Hispanic offenders, when compared to the less severe 

sentences for crimes involving a methamphetamine mixture. However, even assuming that 

a disparate impact exists, “disparate impact and foreseeable consequences, without more, 

do not establish a constitutional violation.” Columbus Bd. of Educ. v. Penick, 443 U.S. 

449, 464 (1979); see also United States v. Williamson, 53 F.3d 1500, 1529 (10th Cir. 1995) 

(finding that disparate impact does not imply a finding of intentional discrimination). With 

regard to the crack/powder cocaine disparity in statutory mandatory minimum sentences, 

we have repeatedly rejected claims that a disparate impact on African Americans gave rise 

to an equal protection claim. We instead held that the statute was facially neutral, it was 

not being applied in a discriminatory manner, and there was no evidence of a 

discriminatory motivation on the part of Congress. Without these showings, we examined 

the statute under the rational basis test and determined that Congress could have rationally 

concluded that distribution of cocaine base was a greater menace to society than 

distribution of cocaine powder and, thus, warranted greater penalties. Accordingly, despite 

any disparate impact, no equal protection violation existed. See, e.g., United States v. 

Perkins, 108 F.3d 512, 518-19 (4th Cir. 1997).

Romero does not address the standards for an equal protection claim and contends 

only that the Commission was aware of the disparate impact. Thus, even if true, Romero’s
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contentions are insufficient to show a violation of equal protection. United States v. 

Frazier, 981 F.2d 92, 95 (3d Cir. 1992) (noting that “even conscious awareness” that the 

law will have a racially disparate impact does not invalidate law, so long as “that awareness 

played no causal role” in the passage of the law). Moreover, Romero makes no attempt to 

show that it was irrational to determine that methamphetamine of a higher purity was a 

more serious threat to society than a less potent mixture. Accordingly, this claim is without 

merit.

II.

Next, Romero asserts that the district court erred in accepting his plea without a 

sufficient factual basis as to the methamphetamine type (ice vs. a mixture) and quantity. 

This claim is not barred by his waiver. See United States v. McCoy, 895 F.3d 358, 364 (4th 

Cir. 2018). As such, this narrow issue will be addressed on the merits. 

“A stipulated recitation of facts alone is sufficient to support a plea.” Id. at 365. In 

his plea agreement, Romero stipulated to well over 50 grams of actual methamphetamine. 

Romero’s assertion that, because he was incarcerated at the time of the crimes, he was 

incapable of knowing the purity of the methamphetamine involved is irrelevant. In his plea 

agreement, Romero agreed that witnesses’ testimony would prove that the crime involved 

at least 50 grams of actual methamphetamine. Notably, he does not dispute this on appeal 
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and, instead, admits that the Government already proved nearly 300 grams of ice 

methamphetamine at sentencing. As such, his claim is frivolous.*

III.

Finally, Romero asserts that his attorney was ineffective for failing to object to the 

presentence report and to seek relief from the stipulations in the plea agreement regarding 

his drug type and quantity. The Government concedes that this claim is not barred by his 

appellate waiver. However, claims of ineffective assistance are cognizable on direct appeal 

“only where the record conclusively establishes ineffective assistance.” United States v. 

Baptiste, 596 F.3d 214, 216 n.1 (4th Cir. 2010). A defendant should instead generally raise 

ineffectiveness claims in a 28 U.S.C. § 2255 (2018) motion, to permit sufficient 

development of the record. See Massaro v. United States, 538 U.S. 500, 504-06 (2003). 

We find that Romero’s ineffectiveness claim is not cognizable on direct appeal, as the 

record here does not establish, let alone conclusively so, that his counsel’s performance 

was deficient or that Romero was prejudiced as a result. 

Accordingly, we affirm. We dispense with oral argument because the facts and 

legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before this court and argument 

would not aid the decisional process.

AFFIRMED

* Romero actually seeks to challenge the drug quantity at sentencing, but he frames 

his claim as one attacking the factual basis (presumably to avoid the appellate waiver). We 

note that Romero’s attacks on his drug quantity at sentencing were waived in his plea 

agreement.