18-27 

Aftab v. Barr 

BIA 

A095 860 015 

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 

FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT

SUMMARY ORDER

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At a stated term of the United States Court of Appeals 

for the Second Circuit, held at the Thurgood Marshall 

United States Courthouse, 40 Foley Square, in the City of 

New York, on the 3rd day of January, two thousand twenty. 

PRESENT: 

JON O. NEWMAN, 

DEBRA ANN LIVINGSTON, 

MICHAEL H. PARK,

Circuit Judges. 

_____________________________________ 

SYED FARHAN AFTAB, 

 Petitioner, 

v. 18-27 

 NAC 

WILLIAM P. BARR, UNITED STATES 

ATTORNEY GENERAL, 

 Respondent. 

_____________________________________ 

FOR PETITIONER: Richard W. Chen, Esq., New York, 

NY. 

FOR RESPONDENT: Joseph H. Hunt, Assistant 

Attorney General; Anthony P. 

Nicastro, Assistant Director; D. 

Nicholas Harling, Trial Attorney, 

Office of Immigration Litigation, 

United States Department of 

Justice, Washington, DC. 
2

UPON DUE CONSIDERATION of this petition for review of a 

Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) decision, it is hereby 

ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED that the petition for review 

is DISMISSED. 

 Petitioner Syed Farhan Aftab, a native and citizen of 

Pakistan, seeks review of a December 6, 2017, decision of the 

BIA denying his motion for reconsideration and reopening. In 

re Aftab, No. A095 860 015 (B.I.A. Dec. 6, 2017). We assume 

the parties’ familiarity with the underlying facts and 

procedural history in this case. 

 Our jurisdiction to review the agency’s denial of 

cancellation of removal for failure to satisfy the hardship 

requirement or as a matter of discretion, including the denial 

of a motion to reconsider a decision denying that relief or 

to reopen to present more evidence in support of that relief, 

is limited to constitutional claims and questions of law. 

See 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(B), (D); Barco-Sandoval v. 

Gonzales, 516 F.3d 35, 38–40 (2d Cir. 2008); Sepulveda v. 

Gonzales, 407 F.3d 59, 64 (2d Cir. 2005) (providing that the 

jurisdictional bar for discretionary denials of relief 

applies equally to denials of motions to reopen or 

reconsider). 
3

 An alien, like Aftab, who entered without inspection, 

may have his removal cancelled if he “(A) has been physically 

present in the United States for a continuous period of not 

less than 10 years immediately preceding the date of such 

application; (B) has been a person of good moral character 

during such period; (C) has not been convicted of [certain] 

offense[s] . . . ; and (D) establishes that removal would 

result in exceptional and extremely unusual hardship to [his] 

spouse, parent, or child, who is a citizen of the United 

States or an alien lawfully admitted for permanent 

residence.” 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(b)(1). “Obtaining . . . 

cancellation of removal is a two-step process. First, an 

alien must prove eligibility by showing that he meets the 

statutory eligibility requirements. Second, . . . the 

Attorney General in his discretion decides whether to grant 

or deny relief.” Rodriguez v. Gonzales, 451 F.3d 60, 62 (2d 

Cir. 2006) (internal citations omitted). 

The BIA declined to reconsider or reopen both because 

Aftab did not show error in, or present new evidence in 

support of, the hardship determination, and because he did 

not establish that cancellation would be warranted as a matter 

of discretion. These determinations regarding hardship and 
4

discretion are independently dispositive grounds for the 

denial of cancellation. See id. Aftab has waived any 

challenge to the BIA’s decision not to reconsider or reopen 

as to its discretionary denial of cancellation by including 

only a single sentence of argument on this point in his brief. 

See Yueqing Zhang v. Gonzales, 426 F.3d 540, 545 n.7 (2d Cir. 

2005) (holding that a party’s “single conclusory sentence” in 

his brief on appeal regarding a claim of error was tantamount 

to a waiver of that claim); Norton v. Sam’s Club, 145 F.3d 

114, 117 (2d Cir. 1998) (“Issues not sufficiently argued in 

the briefs are considered waived and normally will not be 

addressed on appeal.”). We do not reach the hardship 

determination because the discretionary finding is 

dispositive. See INS v. Bagamasbad, 429 U.S. 24, 25 (1976). 

 For the foregoing reasons, the petition for review is 

DISMISSED. All pending motions and applications are DENIED 

and stays VACATED. 

FOR THE COURT: 

Catherine O’Hagan Wolfe, 

Clerk of Court