UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 14-2152

CHELSEA ELIZABETH GREENE,

Plaintiff - Appellant,

v.

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE,

Defendant - Appellee.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern 

District of North Carolina, at Raleigh. James C. Fox, Senior

District Judge. (5:14-cv-00246-F)

Submitted: May 29, 2015 Decided: June 12, 2015

Before GREGORY and HARRIS, Circuit Judges, and DAVIS, Senior 

Circuit Judge.

Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

Christopher J. Anglin, Raleigh, North Carolina, for Appellant. 

Thomas G. Walker, United States Attorney, R.A. Renfer, Jr., 

Matthew L. Fesak, Assistant United States Attorneys, Raleigh, 

North Carolina, for Appellee. 

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
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PER CURIAM:

Chelsea Elizabeth Greene appeals the district court’s order 

dismissing her Federal Tort Claims Act (“FTCA”) claim for lack 

of jurisdiction and for failure to state a claim upon which 

relief can be granted. On appeal, Greene only raises arguments 

concerning the Department of Justice’s (“DOJ”) failure to 

prosecute and intervene in a qui tam action against her former 

employer, Omni Visions, Inc. (“Omni”). See Edwards v. City of 

Goldsboro, 178 F.3d 231, 241 n.6 (4th Cir. 1999) (failing to 

raise an argument in the opening brief constitutes abandonment 

of that argument). For the reasons stated herein, we affirm.

In her complaint, Greene alleged that, while employed at 

Omni, she witnessed her employer fraudulently billing Medicaid. 

In 2007, Greene filed a False Claims Act claim against Omni (the 

“qui tam action”). On August 29, 2007, the Government filed 

notice declining intervention in the qui tam action. Greene 

then voluntarily dismissed her action. As a result of her 

participation in the qui tam action, Greene alleged Omni and 

subsequent employers terminated her. The latest adverse 

employment action cited by Greene appears to have occurred, at 

the latest, at the end of 2008. Greene filed her administrative 

claim with the DOJ in September 2012.

We conduct a de novo review of the dismissal of a complaint 

pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1), (6). Taylor v. Kellogg 
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Brown & Root Servs., Inc., 658 F.3d 402, 408 (4th Cir. 2011); 

Giarratano v. Johnson, 521 F.3d 298, 302 (4th Cir. 2008). To 

bring a claim under the FTCA, a plaintiff must first “present an 

administrative claim to an appropriate federal agency within two 

years of the date the cause of action accrues.” Muth v. United 

States, 1 F.3d 246, 249 (4th Cir. 1993). The plaintiff’s “cause 

of action accrues when the plaintiff knows, or in the exercise 

of due diligence, should have known, first, of the existence of 

the injury, and second, of the cause thereof.” Id. Plaintiff’s 

administrative claim was first brought in September 2012, and 

thus her claim is beyond the two-year limitations period.

Greene, however, argues that the DOJ’s conduct constitutes 

a continuing violation, thus rendering her claim timely. To 

establish a continuing violation, a plaintiff must establish 

that the “‘illegal act was a fixed and continuing practice.’” A 

Soc’y Without A Name v. Virginia, 655 F.3d 342, 348 (4th Cir. 

2011) (quoting Nat’l Adver. Co. v. City of Raleigh, 947 F.2d 

1158, 1166 (4th Cir. 1991)). “A continuing violation is 

occasioned by continual unlawful acts, not continual ill effects 

from an original violation.” Nat’l Adver. Co., 947 F.2d at 1166

(internal quotation marks omitted). Here, there is one discrete 

act that is alleged to be unlawful: the DOJ’s failure to 

prosecute or intervene in Greene’s qui tam action. This is not 

a series of separate acts. A Soc'y Without A Name, 655 F.3d at
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348. Thus, even though Greene may have suffered, and may 

continue to suffer, harm after the DOJ opted not to intervene in 

her qui tam action, she alleges but one unlawful act. Thus, any 

claim accrued, if at all, when the DOJ opted not to intervene in 

the qui tam action, and Greene’s current claim is untimely.∗

Therefore, we affirm the order of the district court. We 

dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal 

contentions are adequately presented in the materials before 

this court and argument would not aid the decisional process.

AFFIRMED

 ∗ We have considered United States v. Kwai Fun Wong, 135 S. 

Ct. 1625, 1632-33 (2015), decided after the conclusion of 

briefing, but it does not change our decision.