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2020 IL App (5th) 170363-U 

NOS. 5-17-0363, 5-17-0364 cons. 

IN THE 

 APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS 

FIFTH DISTRICT 

________________________________________________________________________ 

THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, ) Appeal from the 

 ) Circuit Court of 

 Plaintiff-Appellee, ) Jefferson County. 

 ) 

v. ) Nos. 15-CF-361, 16-CF-197 

 ) 

 ) 

STEVEN MURPHY, ) Honorable 

 ) Jerry E. Crisel, 

 Defendant-Appellant. ) Judge, presiding. 

________________________________________________________________________ 

JUSTICE MOORE delivered the judgment of the court. 

 Presiding Justice Welch and Justice Cates concurred in the judgment. 

 

 ORDER 

¶ 1 Held: Because the trial judge did not err in denying the defendant’s motion for a 

directed verdict where the factual allegations underlying the motion did not 

dictate granting the motion, the defendant’s convictions and sentences are 

 affirmed. 

¶ 2 The defendant, Steven Murphy, brings this consolidated direct appeal following a 

single trial by jury, on joined charges, in the circuit court of Jefferson County. For the 

following reasons, we affirm. 

NOTICE

Decision filed 06/12/20. The 

text of this decision may be 

changed or corrected prior to 

the filing of a Peti ion for 

Rehearing or the disposition of 

the same.

NOTICE

This order was filed under 

Supreme Court Rule 23 and 

may not be cited as precedent 

by any party except in the 

limited circumstances allowed 

under Rule 23(e)(1).
2

¶ 3 I. BACKGROUND 

¶ 4 Although the defendant in this case was convicted, following his September 2016

jury trial, of first degree murder, aggravated arson, and residential arson (the latter of which 

was merged, posttrial, with the aggravated arson conviction), the sole issue raised by the 

defendant in this consolidated appeal relates to his conviction for aggravated arson. He 

does not challenge his murder conviction and sentence. He also does not raise any issue 

regarding the charging instrument. Accordingly, we discuss in detail only those facts 

necessary to our disposition of the issue raised by the defendant, and, for purposes of 

context only, provide as well a brief summary of other facts related to the defendant’s trial 

and convictions. 

¶ 5 On September 28, 2015, the defendant was indicted, in case number 15-CF-361, on 

the charge of aggravated arson. The indictment alleged that “on or about June 28, 2015,” 

the defendant “committed the offense of aggravated arson, in that, while committing an 

arson, said defendant knowingly partially damaged a building of [the victim], being a 

residence, *** knowing that [the victim] was present therein, in violation of 720 ILCS 

5/20-1.1, a Class X felony.” 

¶ 6 On May 19, 2016, the defendant was indicted, in case number 16-CF-197, on two 

counts of first degree murder, related to the death of the victim in case number 15-CF-361. 

¶ 7 On May 24, 2016, the defendant filed a motion for compulsory joinder of his 

aggravated arson and residential arson case with his recently-filed murder case, contending 

that joinder was compulsory because all the charges were based upon “the same act.” Again 

utilizing his “same act” theory, the defendant that same day filed a motion to dismiss the 
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murder charges on speedy trial grounds because of the length of time between the filing of 

the arson charges and the murder charges, during which the defendant was in custody. On 

June 6, 2016, the State filed a combined memorandum of law in opposition to the motions 

for compulsory joinder and dismissal, contending that the charges did not relate to the same 

act, and providing a proffer of the facts the State believed it would be able to prove at trial 

that showed that the charges did not relate to the same act. Following a hearing, the trial 

judge took the defendant’s motions under advisement, and subsequently denied them. Of 

relevance thereto for purposes of the arguments put forward by the defendant in this appeal, 

we note that prior to trial and at trial, the State’s theory was, in essence, that it could prove 

that the defendant met the victim at a small house party at the victim’s residence, returned 

to that residence after the party ended and sexually assaulted, physically assaulted, and 

strangled the victim, then returned to the residence a final time, approximately 9 to 10 hours 

later, and set fire to the residence in an attempt to destroy evidence of his earlier acts. Prior 

to trial, the trial judge granted the defendant’s subsequent motion for permissive joinder, 

and a single trial was held on all three charges. 

¶ 8 At trial, during the State’s presentation of its case, the State attempted to prove its 

theory with, inter alia, the following: (1) testimony of witnesses, including the victim’s 

adult daughter, who had been at the party, as well as a witness who saw the defendant in 

the vicinity of the residence around the time the fire began, and another witness who could 

not identify the defendant, but saw a man resembling the defendant in the vicinity of the 

residence around the time the fire began; (2) testimony from law enforcement officers and 

other officials involved in the investigation; (3) video footage—as well as still photographs 
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derived from that video footage—from the surveillance system of a gas station near the 

victim’s residence, showing the defendant at the gas station shortly before the fire began; 

and (4) documentary evidence from the home security system of the victim’s residence, 

which indicated the times at which the front and back doors of the residence were opened, 

at and around the times in question at trial, and which showed that approximately four to 

five minutes passed between the defendant’s return to the residence at approximately 11:16 

a.m. (approximately 9 to 10 hours after the State contended the physical and sexual assaults 

occurred) and the fire alarm going off within the residence at approximately 11:20 a.m. 

¶ 9 Of significance to the issue raised by the defendant on appeal, the State also 

presented testimony, in support of the theory it believed it could prove, from the following 

three witnesses: Dr. John Heidingsfelder, firefighter Ryan Clinton, and arson investigator 

Bruce Dahlem. Their testimony is described in detail below. 

¶ 10 With regard to Dr. Heidingsfelder, at the request of the State following its 

preliminary questioning of him—and without objection from the defense—Dr. 

Heidingsfelder was qualified by the trial judge as an expert witness in forensic pathology. 

He testified that on June 29, 2015, he conducted the autopsy on the victim at a local funeral 

home. In terms of the background knowledge he had been given before beginning the 

autopsy—knowledge that he testified helped him interpret the autopsy findings in this 

case—he testified that he was told the victim “was found more or less face-down on the 

floor in the living room with burning to her body,” and that he “was told that there were 

areas of burning in the residence that were separate—away from this spot and that arson 

was suspected and accelerants were suspected in the cause of this fire.” 
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¶ 11 Dr. Heidingsfelder testified that during his external examination of the victim’s 

body during the autopsy, he observed that the victim had extensive third degree burns to 

her skin, including some charring of the skin, but that there were also still some pink areas 

of skin. He testified that he believed the pink areas were where the victim “had contact 

with the floor.” He testified as to the other injuries on the victim’s body, including a 

laceration to her scalp. He testified that he collected swabs for a sexual assault kit, which 

he turned over to a police detective who was present at the autopsy. 

¶ 12 Dr. Heidingsfelder testified that during his internal examination of the victim’s body 

during the autopsy, he found damage to the victim’s neck and throat area, including 

fractures to the voice box and hyoid bone. He was asked if he saw damage to the neck and 

throat area that showed evidence of an arson. He testified that “if someone is in a fire and 

they are alive, they will breathe in smoke, and that smoke I can see in the airways, in the 

larynx, or in the trachea, but I did not see soot deposits in those areas.” When asked what 

he believed this meant, Dr. Heidingsfelder testified, “it suggests to me that she may have 

been deceased at the time of the fire.” He testified as to additional bruising he found, in 

various areas, during his internal examination. When asked if it appeared that there were 

“multiple blows to the head,” he answered that he found four distinct areas of bruising to 

the head. 

¶ 13 When asked if he had an opinion as to “what happened to” the victim’s neck, Dr. 

Heidingsfelder testified as follows: 
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“She has evidence of a manual assault to her neck caused by a person—the hand of 

a person squeezing her neck, causing bruising to the tissues of her neck, which 

resulted in a fracture of the hyoid bone.” 

Dr. Heidingsfelder characterized this as “manual strangulation, being strangled by a 

person.” He testified that the weight of her organs supported the conclusion that she died 

as a result of manual strangulation, stating that “[i]f she had died from smoke inhalation, I 

would expect the lungs to have a heavier weight than normal.” With regard to other testing 

he conducted, Dr. Heidingsfelder testified that the carboxy hemoglobin level led him to 

conclude that the victim “did not have smoke inhalation” and “was likely deceased at the 

time of the fire.” He testified that because of the alcohol found in the victim’s system, and 

other drugs found therein, she was “sedated and moderately intoxicated,” which made “her 

an easier victim of an assault.” He testified that the victim “would not have been 

neurologically *** normal” at that time. When specifically asked if he could render an 

opinion as to the time of the victim’s death, Dr. Heidingsfelder testified that one factor that 

is significant is when a victim’s body is found, and that because of the way fire impacts a 

victim’s body, “[s]he could have been deceased for minutes or hours before she was found, 

but I can’t tell you how many.” His expert opinion as to the cause of death, however, was 

that it was “asphyxiation due to a manual strangulation.” Dr. Heidingsfelder was not asked, 

and did not testify with regard to, how long it would take a person with the victim’s 

strangulation injuries to die from those injuries. On cross-examination, Dr. Heidingsfelder 

was not asked questions about, and did not testify further with regard to, the time of death 

of the victim. 
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¶ 14 Ryan Clinton, a firefighter and captain with the Jefferson Fire Protection District, 

testified that he was certified as a fire investigator with the state of Illinois. He testified that 

on the morning of June 28, 2015, he received a dispatch that the Mt. Vernon Fire 

Department “was requesting mutual aid for a house fire with possible people trapped.” He 

testified that he responded to the scene, and although he did not testify as to the exact time 

he arrived, he testified that Mt. Vernon firefighters were already present at the scene. He 

testified that when he arrived, “[t]here was still heavy smoke showing from the second 

floor of the residence from the eaves, the roofline.” He testified that the fire was not 

extinguished. He testified that once the fire “was brought under control,” he was asked to 

accompany a Mt. Vernon firefighter into the residence because the firefighters believed 

“there was still a victim inside” and they wanted to “locate the body.” Clinton testified that 

he and the other firefighter entered the residence through the front door and found a body 

“within four to six feet” of the front door. The defendant’s trial counsel declined to crossexamine Clinton. 

¶ 15 At the request of the State following its preliminary questioning—and again without 

objection from the defense—Bruce Dahlem was qualified by the trial judge as an expert 

witness in fire investigation. He testified that he was an arson investigator with the State 

Fire Marshal’s office on June 28, 2015, and was asked to investigate the fire at issue in this 

case. He testified that he began his investigation at approximately 2:30 p.m. on that date, 

after the fire was extinguished. He did not find an exterior cause for the fire. Once he 

entered the residence, he photographed the victim’s body and the “fire debris” on it and 

surrounding it. He also photographed the victim’s body with the fire debris removed. He 
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checked the basement of the residence to see if the fire might have started there, but found 

“no smoke, no fire, no heat damage in the basement, nothing that *** would have caused 

the fire.” 

¶ 16 Dahlem testified with regard to a sketch he had made of the premises, which showed 

his findings. He testified that the “elongated” flames in his sketch showed the “direction of 

fire travel from the locations of fire origin” on the first floor to various windows, doors, or 

other areas. He testified that there were three separate fires set on the first floor of the 

residence. A fourth fire was set in a bedroom on the second floor of the residence, as 

evidenced by “fire damage” near the foot of the bed in that bedroom. When asked if his 

findings showed that the fire set in the bedroom on the second floor of the residence 

“extended into any room or spread in any manner,” Dahlem testified that the fire “did not.” 

He authenticated photographs he had taken at the residence during his investigation, which 

were admitted into evidence and published to the jury. 

¶ 17 While describing one of the photographs, Dahlem testified that a canine had 

“alerted” to the presence of an accelerant at the source of a fire in an office on the first floor 

of the residence. When asked if that source was “an actual fire” or “just one that may have 

been attempted,” Dahlem testified, “No, no. No, there was very little damage. I don’t think 

—I’m not sure. I don’t recall if it burned much or if it just burned itself out or if it never 

took off at all.” Dahlem testified that his expert opinion was that the fire at the residence 

was “incendiary,” rather than accidental, and that it was caused by: 

“an ignitable liquid poured or splashed on the couch in the living room, an ignitable 

liquid poured or splashed on the victim in the living room, ignitable liquid poured 
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or splashed on the stairway to the second floor, and an ignitable liquid poured onto 

the bed—the foot of the bed in the second floor—in the second floor, center 

bedroom.” 

He was not asked about, and did not testify with regard to, the order in which the fires were 

set. 

¶ 18 After the State rested its case, the defendant’s trial counsel moved for a directed 

verdict. He contended, inter alia, that he believed (1) the trial judge’s prior ruling denying 

the defendant’s motions for compulsory joinder and dismissal, (2) the State’s theory of the 

case, and (3) the evidence presented by the State at trial—in particular the testimony of Dr. 

Heidingsfelder—all proved that the victim “was deceased at the time of the fire.” He 

contended that, as a matter of law, a charge of aggravated arson could not be sustained if 

the victim was already deceased—or, as he put it, was no longer a “person” for purposes 

of the aggravated arson statute—at the time of the fire. He cited legal authority that he 

believed supported this proposition. He did not cite legal authority, or invoke any legal 

theory, for the proposition that the trial judge’s prior ruling on the motions for joinder and 

dismissal, or the State’s theory of the case (as opposed to the evidence actually adduced at 

trial), were relevant considerations for a trial judge when contemplating a defendant’s 

motion for a directed verdict. He also did not cite legal authority, or invoke any legal 

theory, or in fact make any argument at all, in support of the idea that the trial judge might 

be bound by his prior ruling on the defendant’s motions, or in support of the idea that the 

State might be bound by its theory of the case, rather than the evidence adduced at trial. 
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¶ 19 In response to the arguments of the parties, the trial judge stated, inter alia, the 

following: 

“Now, a couple of things I want to mention about the aggravated arson, and that is, 

first off, at least this is my memory that there has not been any evidence presented 

as to the time of death of the victim. The State has argued in their opening when 

they believe it is, but that’s not evidence. I took some careful notes when Dr. 

Heidingsfelder was testifying, and I actually *** I believe that I wrote down his 

exact words as to time of death. He—he addressed it twice. The first time he said, 

‘She may have been deceased at the time of the fire.’ The second time he said, ‘She 

was, likely, deceased at the time of the fire.’ He did not say she was definitely dead 

at the time of the fire.” 

The trial judge subsequently added, “there’s no evidence to show when [the victim] 

breathed her last breath,” and that there was no testimony about how long a person with 

the physical injuries inflicted by the beating and strangulation would have lived. He noted 

that there was no evidence about the order in which the four fires were started, and, with 

regard to the testimony that the victim’s “windpipe, or trachea, was free of soot,” there was 

no evidence “as to whether smoke and soot drops to the level of the floor where the body 

was immediately, or whether it goes up and out the window.” He added, “We don’t know 

when she died.” The trial judge also found that the legal authority cited by the defendant 

was not persuasive, because the trial judge believed the Illinois Supreme Court “has not 

ruled whether or not a dead body is a person” for purposes of the aggravated arson statute.

The trial judge denied the defendant’s motion for a directed verdict. 
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¶ 20 Thereafter, the defendant exercised his right not to testify. The jury found the 

defendant guilty of first degree murder, aggravated arson, and residential arson. He was 

subsequently sentenced to 60 years in prison on the first degree murder conviction and 30 

years in prison on the aggravated arson conviction, to be served consecutively. Posttrial 

motions were denied, and this timely appeal followed. 

¶ 21 II. ANALYSIS 

¶ 22 On appeal, the defendant contends that the trial court erred in denying the 

defendant’s motion for a directed verdict. In support of this contention, he posits that in 

this case, as a matter of law pursuant to the statute in question, aggravated arson cannot be 

charged, and a conviction pursuant to such a charge cannot be sustained, because the victim 

“ceased being a ‘person’ under the aggravated arson statute as soon as she died, so that the 

presence of her body in the home was no longer a statutory factor that would elevate arson 

into aggravated arson.” He concludes his opening brief by arguing that as a result, the trial 

judge “erred in denying the defense motion for directed verdict as to aggravated arson.” 

He asks this court to vacate the defendant’s aggravated arson conviction and remand for 

judgment and sentencing on residential arson. 

¶ 23 We note that the defendant’s arguments on appeal, as in the trial court, are all 

premised upon the defendant’s assertion that there can be no conviction for aggravated 

arson if the victim was already deceased at the time the arson was committed, and rely for 

their viability upon his factual assertion that the victim in this case was in fact deceased at 

the time the arson was committed. We note as well that in response to the defendant’s 

initial brief, the State in its brief addresses the issue of the propriety of the jury instructions 
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in this case. However, in his reply brief, the defendant contends the State “misunderstands” 

the defendant’s argument related thereto, and the defendant asserts unequivocally that he 

is not challenging the jury instructions in this case, stating “The jury instructions were fine. 

It was the court itself that was in error.” He again asserts that his contention on appeal is 

that “it was error for the trial [judge] not to direct a verdict on the aggravated arson charge.” 

We further note that in this appeal, the defendant’s appellate counsel does not put forward 

any arguments with regard to the decision of the defendant’s trial counsel to employ a 

motion for a directed verdict as the procedural mechanism by which to raise the challenges 

trial counsel wished to raise in this case with regard to the applicability of the aggravated 

arson statute, and does not take issue with any of the other choices made by trial counsel 

with regard to this issue. We turn, therefore, to the contested issue, in the form it is raised 

and presented by the defendant on appeal. 

¶ 24 It is certainly true, as the defendant contends, that prior to trial and at trial, the State 

asserted the position that the victim was deceased before the arson was committed. The 

State’s view of what the evidence would prove, however, was not the issue the trial judge 

had to address when asked to render a decision on the motion before him: the defendant’s 

motion for a directed verdict at the close of the State’s evidence. The standard for granting 

a directed verdict is a high one. A court should grant a motion for a directed verdict “only 

if all the evidence, regarded in the light most favorable to the nonmovant, so 

overwhelmingly favors the movant that no contrary verdict could possibly stand.” People 

v. Hancock, 2014 IL App (4th) 131069, ¶ 136. This court’s standard when we review a trial 

judge’s ruling on a motion for a directed verdict is de novo. Id. Therefore, we too “view 
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the evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmovant,” which requires “that, instead 

of deciding for ourselves how credible a witness is and instead of deciding for ourselves 

which evidence to believe or disbelieve,” this court will “construe the evidence in a way 

that supports the nonmovant’s case,” which means as well that we will “draw inferences in 

the nonmovant’s favor insomuch as it would be reasonably defensible to do so.” Id. We 

have held that “[i]f all we can say is that, given the conflicting evidence, the opposite 

verdict would have been more reasonable, we should affirm the denial of the motion for a 

directed verdict.” Id. ¶ 137. We are mindful of the fact that a trial judge “should direct a 

verdict only if [the judge] finds ‘a total failure or lack of evidence to prove any necessary 

element of the plaintiff’s case.’ ” Id. (quoting Perfetti v. Marion County, Illinois, 2013 IL 

App (5th) 110489, ¶ 15). If the trial judge finds that “instead of being presented with no 

evidence whatsoever to support an element of the plaintiff’s prima facie case, the jury has 

to choose among conflicting pieces of evidence, some of which support the element and 

others of which undermine the element, the trial [judge] should deny the motion for a 

directed verdict, and we should affirm the denial.” Id. Along the same lines, a trial judge 

may not grant a motion for a directed verdict if the determination regarding conflicting 

evidence is decisive to the outcome. Id. ¶ 148. 

¶ 25 As the above principles demonstrate, the trial judge—and this court on review—

normally would begin by deciding whether the evidence presented supports the elements 

the State was required to prove. In this case, however, the issue the defendant sought to 

address, by way of a motion for a directed verdict, was essentially a legal one: whether the 

charge of aggravated arson in this case was statutorily sustainable, because the victim was 
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already deceased when the arson was committed. Nevertheless, to address that issue, the 

trial judge first had to determine whether the factual premise underlying that legal 

argument—that the victim was in fact already deceased when the arson was committed—

was a sound factual premise, based upon the facts in evidence. If it was not a sound factual 

premise, then the legal basis for challenging the applicability of the statute was eviscerated, 

and the motion for a directed verdict became, in essence, a hypothetical legal question 

about the applicability of the statute to a set of facts—a victim who was deceased when the 

arson was committed—not necessarily present in the trial over which the judge was 

presiding. Accordingly, the trial judge rightfully considered, under the proper standard for 

reviewing a request for a directed verdict—and in light of the fact that the defendant’s trial 

counsel chose to bring his challenge in a motion for a directed verdict and did not invoke 

any other legal theories or legal authority—whether all the evidence, regarded in the light 

most favorable to the State, so overwhelmingly favored the defendant’s factual premise

that the victim was deceased before the arson was committed, that no contrary verdict—in 

other words, a verdict based upon the fact that the victim was still alive when the arson was 

committed—could possibly stand. See id. ¶ 136. 

¶ 26 On appeal, the defendant takes issue with the trial judge’s factual conclusions 

related thereto. He posits that the trial judge “was fixated on the fact that there was no 

evidence as to [the victim’s] exact time of death,” contending that in this case, there is “no 

question that” the victim was deceased “well before the fire was set.” He argues that “[n]ot 

one single piece of evidence from trial *** tended to show that [the victim] was still alive 

at the time of the fire.” Nevertheless, the defendant concedes, as he must, that the victim’s 
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“exact time of death was impossible to pin down,” but notes that “the autopsy showed no 

signs of soot in her airway, no fire products in her bloodstream, and no fire injury to the 

side of her body that had lain on the floor.” He also contends that other evidence supports 

the inference that she died hours before the arson was committed. The evidence that 

supports the conclusion that she was already deceased, however, is not the only evidence

that was appropriate for the trial judge to consider. 

¶ 27 Mindful of the standard—discussed in detail above—that the trial judge was to 

employ when rendering a decision at the close of the State’s evidence on the defendant’s 

motion for a directed verdict, and that we are to employ when reviewing the trial judge’s 

decision, we conclude that the facts in evidence support the denial of the defendant’s 

motion for a directed verdict, the defendant’s assertions as to the evidence notwithstanding. 

First, we note that in light of that standard, and in light of the procedural posture of this 

case, it is not appropriate to characterize the trial judge as “fixated on the fact that there 

was no evidence as to [the victim’s] exact time of death.” It was the defendant’s trial 

counsel who chose a motion for a directed verdict as the procedural mechanism by which 

to raise this issue—a choice with which the defendant’s appellate counsel has not taken 

issue. As the result of trial counsel’s choice, the fact that there was no evidence as to the 

victim’s exact time of death necessarily had to play an important role in the trial judge’s 

analysis of the defendant’s request for directed verdict, because the defendant’s request put 

the trial judge in a position where he was required to view all the evidence in the light most 

favorable to the State, and could grant the defendant’s request only if he found a total 
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failure or lack of evidence for the proposition that the victim was still alive when the arson 

was committed. See id. ¶¶ 136-37, ¶ 148. 

¶ 28 Second, the defendant is not correct in his assertion that there was a total failure or 

lack of evidence for that proposition. Although he takes issue with the State’s 

characterization of Dr. Heidingsfelder’s testimony, claiming it is taken out of context, in 

fact, as described above, Dr. Heidingsfelder’s testimony makes it clear that he was not 

willing to render an expert opinion that the victim was deceased at the time the fire started, 

declining to testify with that level of certitude on each occasion that he was asked questions 

related thereto. First, with regard to the lack of soot deposits in the airways, larynx, and 

trachea, Dr. Heidingsfelder testified, “it suggests to me that she may have been deceased 

at the time of the fire.” (Emphases added.) Second, with regard to other testing he 

conducted, Dr. Heidingsfelder testified that the carboxy hemoglobin level led him to 

conclude that the victim “did not have smoke inhalation” and “was likely deceased at the 

time of the fire.” (Emphasis added.) Third, when specifically asked if he could render an 

opinion as to the time of the victim’s death, Dr. Heidingsfelder testified that one factor that 

is significant is when a victim’s body is found, and that because of the way fire impacts a 

victim’s body, “[s]he could have been deceased for minutes or hours before she was found, 

but I can’t tell you how many.” (Emphases added.) Although firefighter Ryan Clinton did 

not testify as to the exact time at which he found the victim’s body, he testified that 

firefighters were already on the scene and battling the fire when he arrived, and that he did 

not enter the residence and find the victim’s body until after the fire was under control 

(presumably extinguished). His testimony supports the conclusion that a significant
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interval of time passed before the victim’s body was found, which in turn supports the 

conclusion, in light of Dr. Heidingsfelder’s testimony, that the victim could have been

alive, but unconscious, when the fires were set and still died “minutes or hours before she 

was found.” Moreover, Dr. Heidingsfelder was not asked, and did not testify with regard 

to, how long it would take a person with the victim’s strangulation injuries to die from 

those injuries. 

¶ 29 It was within the context of this expert medical testimony from Dr. Heidingsfelder, 

as well as the expert testimony from arson investigator Bruce Dahlem, that the trial judge 

denied the defendant’s motion for a directed verdict, ruling that “there’s no evidence to 

show when [the victim] breathed her last breath,” and that there was no testimony about 

how long a person with the physical injuries inflicted by the beating and strangulation 

would have lived. He noted that there was no evidence about the order in which the four 

fires were started, and, with regard to the testimony that the victim’s “windpipe, or trachea, 

was free of soot,” there was no evidence “as to whether smoke and soot drops to the level 

of the floor where the body was immediately, or whether it goes up and out the window.” 

He correctly added, “We don’t know when she died.” 

¶ 30 We conclude that from the evidence before the jury at that point in the proceedings, 

the trial judge could have reasoned, without error, that the jury could conclude that the 

victim was still alive (but perhaps unconscious from her other injuries or because she 

remained in the “sedated and moderately intoxicated” state described by Dr. 

Heidingsfelder) when the defendant set the fires, but died prior to being able to ingest 

smoke or other chemicals from the fires. Although this could have been true with any of 
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the four fires, we note in particular that the trial judge could have reasoned, again without 

error, that the jury could conclude that the first fire set by the defendant was the fire set on 

the second floor, and that the victim could have been alive when that fire was set, but died 

either prior to, or simultaneous with, the fires on the first floor being set. Indeed, it seems 

highly unlikely that any would-be arsonist—however inept—would have set multiple fires 

on the first floor and the stairs leading to the second floor, and then gone to the second 

floor to set an additional fire there, before attempting to return to the first floor, navigate 

the fires burning there and in the area of the stairs, and exit the residence to make an escape.

Because, according to the expert testimony of Dahlem, the fire set on the second floor 

caused “fire damage” but did not spread, there was no reason for the jury to believe that 

the victim, on the first floor, would have breathed the smoke from the second floor fire 

were she still alive when it was set. Indeed, this fact may be why Dr. Heidingsfelder 

repeatedly declined to render an expert opinion that the victim was deceased when the fires 

were set. It is clear that he was aware of this, because he specifically testified—without 

objection—that in terms of the background knowledge he was given before beginning the 

autopsy—knowledge that he further testified helped him interpret the autopsy findings in 

this case—he was told the victim “was found more or less face-down on the floor in the 

living room with burning to her body,” and that he “was told that there were areas of 

burning in the residence that were separate—away from this spot.” 

¶ 31 We reiterate the high standard that exists for a directed verdict—the mechanism by 

which the defendant’s trial counsel chose to bring his challenge in this case, and the adverse 

ruling against which the defendant’s appellate counsel has chosen to argue on appeal. As 
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we explained above, a court should grant a motion for a directed verdict “only if all the 

evidence, regarded in the light most favorable to the nonmovant, so overwhelmingly favors 

the movant that no contrary verdict could possibly stand.” Hancock, 2014 IL App (4th) 

131069, ¶ 136. This court’s standard when we review a trial judge’s ruling on a motion for 

a directed verdict is de novo. Id. Therefore, we too “view the evidence in the light most 

favorable to the nonmovant,” which requires “that, instead of deciding for ourselves how 

credible a witness is and instead of deciding for ourselves which evidence to believe or 

disbelieve,” this court will “construe the evidence in a way that supports the nonmovant’s 

case,” which means as well that we will “draw inferences in the nonmovant’s favor 

insomuch as it would be reasonably defensible to do so.” Id. We have held that “[i]f all we 

can say is that, given the conflicting evidence, the opposite verdict would have been more 

reasonable, we should affirm the denial of the motion for a directed verdict.” Id. ¶ 137. We 

are mindful of the fact that a trial judge “should direct a verdict only if [the judge] finds ‘a 

total failure or lack of evidence to prove any necessary element of the plaintiff’s case.’ ” 

Id. (quoting Perfetti, 2013 IL App (5th) 110489, ¶ 15). If the trial judge finds that “instead 

of being presented with no evidence whatsoever to support an element of the plaintiff’s 

prima facie case, the jury has to choose among conflicting pieces of evidence, some of 

which support the element and others of which undermine the element, the trial [judge] 

should deny the motion for a directed verdict, and we should affirm the denial.” Id. 

Likewise, a trial judge may not grant a motion for a directed verdict if the determination 

regarding conflicting evidence is decisive to the outcome. Id. ¶ 148. 
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¶ 32 Applying the foregoing legal principles to the facts in evidence at the close of the 

State’s case—the moment in time at which the trial judge was asked to render the decision 

that is challenged in this appeal, and long before the jury was instructed as to the law and 

the State made its closing argument to the jury about what the State believed the evidence 

in this case showed—we conclude, for the reasons above, that it was appropriate to deny 

the defendant’s motion. Were this a case where the facts in evidence clearly showed that 

the victim was already deceased when the arson was committed—and it is not difficult to 

imagine any number of situations where that would be the case, for example where the 

evidence in a case established that a victim died instantly from a gunshot wound, and the 

evidence also clearly established that the arson in question was not committed until after 

the death—the trial judge would have been required to consider the defendant’s legal claim 

about the applicability of the statute. In this case, however, the legal claim of the defendant 

was not based on such evidence, and therefore the trial judge wisely denied the motion for 

a directed verdict, the granting of which would have required undue and inappropriate 

speculation on the part of the trial judge. 

¶ 33 Because the sole issue raised by the defendant on appeal is whether the trial judge 

erred when he denied the defendant’s motion for a directed verdict, and because we have 

found that the trial judge did not err, we do not believe it is appropriate in this appeal to

consider the State’s alternative arguments in favor of affirming, such as the State’s 

contention that, assuming the victim in this case was already deceased when the arson was 

committed, the decision of the Illinois Supreme Court in People v. Thomas, 137 Ill. 2d 500 

(1990), nevertheless permits a conviction for aggravated arson under such circumstances. 
21

¶ 34 III. CONCLUSION 

¶ 35 For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the defendant’s convictions and sentences. 

¶ 36 Affirmed.