1

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

_______________________________________

 )

 )

DEAN KEVIN LURIE, M.D., )

Plaintiff, )

 ) Civil Action No. 06-01386 (RCL)

v. )

 )

MID-ATLANTIC PERMANENTE )

MEDICAL GROUP, P.C., )

Defendant. )

_______________________________________)

MEMORANDUM OPINION

Before the Court is plaintiff’s Motion to Alter or Amend Judgment. Upon consideration 

of the Motion, the Opposition thereto, the Reply brief, applicable law, and the entire record, the 

Court will deny the Motion for the reasons that follow.

I. FACTUAL BACKGROUND

Dr. Kevin Lurie worked as a surgeon for Mid-Atlantic Permanente Medical Group 

(“Mid-Atlantic”) or its predecessor company from 1988 until he was fired in October 2005. 

Lurie Dep. 17, 187, Oct. 6, 2008, ECF No. 68-4. Mid-Atlantic doctors treat patients at over thirty 

Mid-Atlantic-run medical centers in Virginia, Maryland, and the District of Columbia, as well as 

certain other hospitals in the area. Cahiff Aff. ¶ 4, Nov. 21, 2008, ECF No. 68-3. Dr. Lurie had a 

thriving surgical practice, specializing in general and vascular surgery and treating patients 

throughout D.C. and Maryland. E.g., Lurie Dep. 6. Dr. Lurie was also the principal investigator 

on clinical trials to develop a new medical device, a combination graft catheter system, that 

would aid human dialysis. Id. 234–35.
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After working at the Washington Health Center (“WHC”) in the District of Columbia for 

three years, Dr. Lurie began to question the quality of Mid-Atlantic’s medical care. Id. 85–86. 

Dr. Lurie was disturbed by what he believed were “wide variations from [the] standard of 

community care” that were—in his eyes—“perhaps negligent and malpractice.” Id. at 86. In 

addition to being troubled by other doctors’ treatment of their own patients, as any concerned 

colleague would be, Dr. Lurie was also troubled by how WHC doctors and staff treated his own 

patients. To remedy the problem, Dr. Lurie made a presentation to the hospital’s surgical 

oversight committee. Id. at 67–74. 

Dr. Lurie’s presentation was fiercely critical. Not only did Dr. Lurie tell the committee 

that “patients were treated badly and in an unsafe fashion,” but he also stated that the hospital 

treated Mid-Atlantic physicians like “second-class citizens.” Id. at 75. According to Dr. Lurie,

WHC provided “poor,” “incompetent,” and perhaps even “dangerous” staff coverage to doctors 

affiliated with Mid-Atlantic; all seemingly valid grounds for protest. Id. at 74. Yet upon hearing 

of Dr. Lurie’s presentation, Mid-Atlantic scolded Dr. Lurie and warned him not to repeat his 

“destructive” protests, because they jeopardized Mid-Atlantic’s “efforts to build a constructive 

working relationship with WHC.” Mem. from Dr. Manning to Dr. Lurie, July 11, 2001, ECF No. 

68-7. The facts do not indicate whether Dr. Lurie continued to complain, but he certainly never 

reported or threatened to report these issues to governmental bodies or other external entities. 

Lurie Dep. at 218–21.

On top of his difficulties with the hospital staff and administration, Dr. Lurie also did not 

get along with his colleagues, who he described as “inexperienced.” Id. at 116. The other doctors 

and surgical residents had personal gripes with Dr. Lurie too, so much so that the Chairman of 

Surgery, Dr. Kirkpatrick, stated that Dr. Lurie’s mere presence “incites . . . discord, hyperbole, 
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and increasing tension,” as if he walked about with an air of dissonance. Letter from Dr. 

Kirkpatrick to Dr. Manning, June 22, 2001, ECF 68-6.

The reason for this tension is unclear. On the one hand, Dr. Lurie suggests it was a 

reaction to his repeated safety and quality of care complaints—a reaction by those who resented 

Dr. Lurie’s purportedly constructive criticism. Lurie Dep. 85–86. On the other hand, Dr. 

Kirkpatrick maintains that “Dr. Lurie’s practice style in and out of the operating room has 

created tension and concern among the surgical residents.” Letter from Dr. Kirkpatrick to Dr. 

Manning, June 22, 2001. In other words, the way in which Dr. Lurie practiced medicine was 

somehow off-putting and perhaps even unsafe. Dr. Kirkpatrick further suggested that Dr. Lurie’s 

criticisms were meant to “strike back” against colleagues’ belief that he was “an ‘unsafe’ 

surgeon.” Id. Whatever the reason, Dr. Lurie and his superior each ascribed the tense atmosphere 

to the hospital or Dr. Lurie, respectively. To restore the smooth operation of WHC’s surgical 

department, Dr. Lurie was reassigned to Holy Cross Hospital in Silver Spring, MD. Id.; Lurie 

Dep. 85–86.

Nonetheless, Dr. Lurie was transferred back to WHC in 2003 when the hospital needed 

more experienced surgeons. Lurie Dep. 102. Upon his return, Dr. Lurie continued to have 

problems with other doctors. Again, Dr. Lurie complained about the quality of care, and again, 

his superior attributed the tension to Dr. Lurie’s failure to “seek and gain the respect of the 

resident staff.” Letter from Dr. Kirkpatrick to Dr. Manning 2–3, Sept. 9, 2003, ECF No. 68-8.

Within a few short months of Dr. Lurie’s return, Dr. Kirkpatrick warned Dr. Lurie that he was 

engaged in “a crescendo of abusive behavior.” Letter from Dr. Kirkpatrick to Dr. Lurie 2, Nov. 

6, 2003, ECF No. 68-9. It was as if Dr. Lurie had never left: his actions perpetuated a “persistent 

breakdown in relations with the surgical residency dating back at least to 2001.” Id. at 1. 
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According to Dr. Lurie, he “did not get along with the surgical residents, because [he] didn’t 

think it was safe for them to scrub with [him].” Lurie Dep. 116. Indeed, “many of the surgeons . . 

. got fired . . . because they weren’t performing up to par.” Id. at 117. On account of these 

problems, and despite WHC’s need for more experienced surgeons, Dr. Lurie was transferred to 

another D.C. site, Mid-Atlantic’s North Capital Street center. Id. at 119–20.

Later in November 2003, the discord between Dr. Lurie and Mid-Atlantic peaked. A 

quality review committee ordered Dr. Lurie to follow a “performance improvement plan” that 

required him to—among other things—“refrain from blaming others” for work-related incidents. 

Performance Improvement Planning Form, Nov. 24, 2003, ECF No. 68-11. Dr. Lurie disputes 

this assessment, claiming that the committee members would “beat on the drum . . . to find 

something they didn’t like and cite [him]” for it; in Dr. Lurie’s case, this was his commitment to 

raising quality of care issues. Lurie Dep. 98. According to Dr. Lurie, the committee’s sole 

function was actually to “intimidate physicians” who raised quality of care issues. Id. at 99.

Eventually, the beleagered Dr. Lurie was transferred in 2004 to Mid-Atlantic’s Largo, 

Maryland center. Id. at 119–20. But the behavioral problems continued there, too. A few months 

before he was fired, Dr. Lurie was asked to leave a training session for being “uncooperative and 

disruptive.” Written Warning Letter from Dr. Schwartz to Dr. Lurie, May 26, 2005, ECF No. 68-

14. Again, Dr. Lurie blamed the trainer and his superior for blowing the incident out of 

proportion. According to Dr. Lurie, he had been asked to leave because of racial prejudice, his 

age, and because he had been reading a newspaper with his friend’s son’s obituary. Lurie Dep. at 

183–84, 186–87. Dr. Lurie continued to regularly see patients in D.C. until his discharge in 2005. 

Id. at 119. This work consumed a small fraction of his time and did not involve surgery. Id.
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When he was fired, Dr. Lurie was also seeing patients at Holy Cross Hospital in Silver Spring, 

Maryland. Id. at 118. In October 2005, Dr. Lurie was terminated. Id. at 120.

Mid-Atlantic claims it fired Dr. Lurie for his disciplinary problems and for allegedly 

falsifying time sheets. Mem. Supp. Def.’s Mot. Summ. J. 11, Jan. 29, 2010, ECF No. 68-2. MidAtlantic often double-booked patients, and Dr. Lurie would record fake evening appointments as 

extra billed hours to compensate for the increased daytime workload. Lurie Dep. 284–86, 300–

02. In contrast, Dr. Lurie says he followed an accepted billing method and was actually fired 

because he reported quality of care concerns, he was Jewish, and Mid-Atlantic wanted to 

circumvent its responsibilities to pay his pension. Lurie Dep. 86–87, 122, 186, 300.

II. PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

In 2006, Dr. Lurie sued under D.C. and Maryland common law for wrongful discharge, 

breach of contract, and tortious interference. Compl. 10–12, Aug. 4, 2006, ECF No. 1. He also 

sued under federal law for employment discrimination in violation of the Age Discrimination in 

Employment Act (ADEA) and the Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA). Id. at 8–

10. Mid-Atlantic countersued for breach of contract, fraud, negligent misrepresentation, and 

unjust enrichment. Countercl. 10–13, Sept. 5, 2006, ECF No. 2. 

The Court dismissed Mid-Atlantic’s counterclaims for lack of jurisdiction and granted 

Mid-Atlantic’s motion for summary judgment on all of Dr. Lurie’s claims. Lurie v. Mid-Atlantic 

Permanente Medical Group, 729 F. Supp. 2d 304, 313 (D.D.C. 2010). In particular, the Court’s 

ruling on the common law claim for wrongful discharge, which Dr. Lurie now moves to alter, 

was that Dr. Lurie was “unable to identify an appropriate public policy on which to base his 

claim.” Id. at 326. Under both D.C. and Maryland common law, an employee may sue for 

wrongful discharge if the discharge violates a clear mandate of public policy as announced by a 
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constitution, statute, or regulation. Dr. Lurie offered several statutes, regulations, professional 

standards, and internal company policies that the Court found insufficient to support a wrongful 

discharge claim. Id. at 327–28. For instance, one relevant statute was D.C. Code Section 7-161, 

which requires health care providers to report adverse medical events. D.C. Code § 7-161 (2010). 

Dr. Lurie claimed his repeated complaints to hospital administrators and oversight committees 

were protected under this statute. The Court held otherwise, finding that Dr. Lurie “[did] not 

allege that he was terminated for attempting to submit the required reports or otherwise take his 

grievances about patient care to government authorities.” 729 F. Supp. 2d at 327.

Dr. Lurie now moves under Rule 59(e) to alter this Court’s ruling on his wrongful 

discharge claim, relying on a recent Maryland Court of Appeals case that he claims is an

intervening change in Maryland law. In Lark v. Montgomery Hospice, 994 A.2d 968 (Md. 2010), 

nurse Susan Lark was fired by the Montgomery Hospice after discovering and internally 

reporting the improper prescription and shipment of adult doses of narcotics to pediatric patients’ 

homes. 994 A.2d at 970–71. Over the prior year, Lark had reported to her supervisors other 

instances of misconduct, including improper documentation, a lack of clinical supervision, and 

errors in the delivery of other medicine besides narcotics. Id. at 972. After being fired, Lark sued 

for wrongful discharge in violation of public policy under either Maryland common law or the 

Health Care Worker Whistleblower Protection Act, Md. Code Ann., Health Occ. §§ 1-501 to 1-

506 (West 2002), claiming both protected her from being fired for reporting quality of care 

issues. Id. at 971. 

On a motion for summary judgment, the Maryland trial court found that Lark’s internal 

reports did not come within the scope of activity protected by the Act, because Lark did not 

report or threaten to report the issues to an external body. Id. at 974–75. The trial court also 
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found that Lark’s discharge did not violate public policy, so Lark’s common law claim failed as 

well. Id. The Maryland Court of Appeals reversed, stating that “the report of unlawful acts to an 

external board is not a condition precedent to a civil action under the Act.” The Court of Appeals 

then remanded the case to the trial court for further proceedings.

Dr. Lurie argues that Lark is an intervening change in the law governing this Court’s 

decision on his common law wrongful discharge claim. He believes that Lark’s holding about 

external reporting requires the Court to alter its denial of his wrongful discharge claim.

III. THE LEGAL STANDARD FOR RULE 59(e)

Rule 59(e) allows a district court to correct its own mistakes in the period immediately 

following the entry of an order. White v. N.H. Dep’t of Emp’t Sec., 455 U.S. 445, 450 (1982). 

Though a court has considerable discretion in granting Rule 59(e) motions, it only needs to do so 

when it finds that there has been an intervening change of controlling law, that new evidence is 

available, or that granting the motion is necessary to correct a clear error or to prevent a manifest 

injustice. Firestone v. Firestone, 76 F.3d 1205, 1208 (D.C. Cir. 1996) (per curiam). Moreover,

“[a] Rule 59(e) motion to reconsider is [neither] . . . an opportunity to reargue facts and theories 

upon which a court has already ruled,” New York v. United States, 880 F. Supp. 37, 38 (D.D.C. 

1995), nor a vehicle for presenting theories or arguments that could have been advanced earlier. 

Kattan v. District of Columbia, 995 F.2d 274, 276 (D.C. Cir. 1993). And Rule 59(e) motions are 

generally granted only in extraordinary circumstances. Liberty Prop. Trust v. Republic Props. 

Corp., 570 F. Supp. 2d 95, 97 (D.D.C. 2008) (citing Niedermeier v. Office of Max S. Baucus, 153 

F. Supp. 2d 23, 28 (D.D.C. 2001)).
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IV. DISCUSSION

This Court previously held that none of Dr. Lurie’s state law claims, which were before 

the Court because of diversity jurisdiction, could survive summary judgment under Maryland or 

D.C. law, and therefore did not conduct the choice of law analysis for each individual claim. 729 

F. Supp. 2d at 325. Now, to decide whether Lark represents an intervening change of controlling 

law requiring reconsideration, the Court must first decide which jurisdiction’s law—Maryland’s 

or the District of Columbia’s—controls. After concluding that D.C. law applies, the Court 

concludes that Dr. Lurie’s new Maryland case is inapposite. Nonetheless, the Court also explains 

that Dr. Lurie’s Motion would fail even if Lark did apply. Finally, the Court denies Dr. Lurie’s 

request to use his Rule 59(e) motion to bring a new claim under the Health Care Worker 

Whistleblower Protection Act.

A. Choice of Law

D.C. federal courts must use D.C. choice of law rules to decide conflict of law questions. 

Perkins v. Marriott Int’l, Inc., 945 F. Supp. 282, 284 (D.D.C. 1996). D.C. law uses a 

“governmental interests analysis” to choose which jurisdiction’s substantive law applies to tort 

cases, in which a court weighs each jurisdiction’s interest in having its law apply. Id. In this 

analysis, a court must consider the jurisdictions’ interests regarding “the various distinct issues to 

be adjudicated” as well as the jurisdictions’ general interests. Estrada v. Potomac Electric Power 

Co., 488 A.2d 1359, 1361 (D.C. 1985). A court must also consider: “(1) the place where the 

injury occurred; (2) the place where the conduct causing the injury occurred; (3) the domicile, 

residence, nationality, place of incorporation, and place of business of the parties; and (4) the 

place where the relationship is centered.” 945 F. Supp. at 284.
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Applying this test, the Court finds that the District of Columbia’s governmental interest 

outweighs Maryland’s, so the Court will apply D.C. law. Consequently, the Maryland case Dr. 

Lurie offers is irrelevant.

D.C. has a strong interest in applying its law, because Dr. Lurie and Mid-Atlantic’s 

relationship was centered in D.C. Dr. Lurie began his Mid-Atlantic employment at a D.C. site, 

WHC. Lurie Dep. 85–86. He continued seeing patients in D.C. at WHC and at the North Capital 

Street center throughout his employment. Id. at 119. His disruptive actions in D.C.—some of 

which involved calling attention to poor treatment of patients and doctors—prompted MidAtlantic to transfer him out of D.C. For example, in 2001, Dr. Lurie made a highly critical 

presentation to a surgical quality committee in D.C., after which Mid-Atlantic issued a stern 

warning and transferred him to a Maryland hospital. Id. at 75, 85–86. Then, in 2003, after being 

transferred back to a D.C. hospital, Dr. Lurie refused to operate alongside other surgeons, 

because he believed their inexperience endangered his patients. Id. at 116. In response, the D.C. 

hospital took the extraordinary step of banning all of its surgical residents from treating Dr. 

Lurie’s patients. Id. at 114–15. These and other problems again caused Mid-Atlantic to transfer 

Dr Lurie out of D.C. If Mid-Atlantic fired Dr. Lurie for raising quality of care issues, they were 

certainly issues Dr. Lurie faced and challenged while working in D.C. 

D.C. also has a general interest in applying its law. If a multi-state employer could 

circumvent a wrongful discharge claim supported by D.C. public policy by transferring an 

employee to another state and then firing him, D.C.’s wrongful discharge law would be greatly 

weakened. Here, Mid-Atlantic dealt with Dr. Lurie’s complaints for years while keeping him 

based primarily at D.C. sites; only when Mid-Atlantic was almost at its wits’ end, did MidAtlantic transfer Dr. Lurie to Maryland. About a year and a half later, Mid-Atlantic fired Dr. 
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Lurie. This series of actions could plausibly be considered an attempt to circumvent a wrongful 

discharge claim supported by D.C. public policy.1

Although Dr. Lurie’s injury and the conduct causing it—Dr. Lurie’s firing and the 

decision to fire him—happened at Mid-Atlantic’s Rockville, Maryland site, Cahill Aff. ¶15, none 

of the other factors relevant to the “governmental interests analysis” favor Maryland over D.C. 

The domicile, residence, nationality, place of incorporation, and place of business of the parties

do not favor either Maryland’s or D.C.’s interest, because both Dr. Lurie and Mid-Atlantic have 

mixed ties to each jurisdiction. Mid-Atlantic is a Maryland corporation and has Maryland and 

D.C. places of business, and Dr. Lurie lives in D.C., worked mostly at D.C. sites for seventeen 

years, but had been working primarily at Maryland sites for about a year and a half before he was 

fired. Complaint 4; Lurie Dep. 120.

Further, both D.C. and Maryland have a similar interest in maintaining their standards of 

medical care, which a health care provider would jeopardize by firing whistleblowers who 

question standards of care. The facts of this case, though, indicate that most if not all of Dr. 

Lurie’s supposed whistleblowing was centered around Mid-Atlantic’s WHC site in D.C. Indeed, 

Dr. Lurie originally argued that D.C. law, not Maryland law, should apply to his claims.2 Pl.’s 

Opp’n Mot. Summ. J. 22, Mar. 1, 2010, ECF No. 72. An observer unfamiliar with the leeway the 

American legal system accords to plaintiffs raising mutually exclusive arguments might even 

interpret Dr. Lurie’s opportunistic flip-flopping as a waste of the Court’s time.

In any event, in light of the application of D.C. law to Dr. Lurie’s wrongful discharge 

claim, Dr. Lurie’s main contention is nonsensical. This Court previously held that when MidAtlantic fired Dr. Lurie, it did not jeopardize D.C.’s interest—as embodied in D.C. Code § 7-161 

 1 In its prior opinion, this Court found no support under D.C. law for Dr. Lurie’s claim. 729 F. Supp. 2d at 313.

2 Dr. Lurie also argued that California law should apply, because Mid-Atlantic had some affiliation with a 

California-based entity.
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(2010)—in health care providers reporting adverse medical events to the government. 729 F. 

Supp. 2d at 327. This Court explained that Dr. Lurie did not externally report or threaten to 

report his grievances to government authorities, so firing him did not come within the scope of 

the public policy this statute announces. Id. No development in Maryland law could affect this 

conclusion, so Dr. Lurie’s Motion must fail.3

Even if Maryland law did apply, the Lark decision does not change the Maryland 

common law of wrongful discharge such that Dr. Lurie’s claim is now viable. 

B. Common Law Wrongful Discharge Claim

The claim of wrongful discharge under Maryland common law “is inherently limited to 

remedying only those discharges in violation of a clear mandate of public policy which otherwise 

would not be vindicated by a civil remedy.” Makovi v. Sherwin-Williams Co., 561 A.2d 179, 180 

(Md. 1989). A “clear mandate of public policy” is “a preexisting, unambiguous, and 

particularized announcement, by constitution, enactment, or prior judicial decision, directing, 

prohibiting or protecting the conduct (or contemplated conduct) in question, so as to make the 

Maryland public policy on the topic not a matter of judicial conjecture or even interpretation.” 

Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Wholey, 779 A.2d 408, 419 (Md. Ct. Spec. App.). Accordingly, 

Maryland has an exacting standard for how clear and established a public policy mandate must 

be to support a common law wrongful discharge claim. To prevail on this Motion, Dr. Lurie 

must show that, under Lark, his wrongful discharge claim was supported by (1) a clear mandate 

of public policy (2) not otherwise vindicated by a civil remedy. 

 3 Dr. Lurie’s argument that firing him violated the public policy announced by D.C. Code § 3-1205.14(a)(26) 

(1995), Mem. P. & A. Supp. Pl.’s Mot. Alter or Amend J. 7–8, Sept. 7, 2010, ECF No. 87, is flawed for the same 

reason.
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1. A Clear Mandate of Public Policy

Lark does not change the fact that Dr. Lurie’s wrongful discharge claim was not 

supported by a clear mandate of public policy. First, if Dr. Lurie wanted to rely on the public 

policy described in Lark, he should have done so when he filed his original complaint. Although 

Lark had not yet been decided, the statute Lark describes as “an unambiguous and particularized 

pronouncement of Maryland public policy,” the Health Care Worker Whistleblower Protection 

Act, did exist in its current form when Dr. Lurie first sued. Dr. Lurie cannot now introduce a 

source of clear public policy that existed before. A Rule 59(e) motion is not a vehicle to 

introduce arguments that could have been advanced earlier. 995 F.2d at 276.

Second, even if Lark clarifies or changes Maryland’s public policy, that is—at best—

evidence that the prior public policy was a “matter of judicial conjecture or even interpretation” 

and was not sufficiently “unambiguous” to support a claim. 779 A.2d at 419. Moreover, Lark

does not address the common law cause of action for wrongful discharge. Although the Lark

court cites some out-of-state cases about wrongful discharge, it does so while interpreting a 

statute’s wrongful discharge provision, not Maryland common law. 994 A.2d at 978–84. Indeed, 

the Lark Court expressly stated that the case “present us with two questions of statutory 

interpretation.” Id. at 969 (emphasis added). And the court’s relevant holding is “the report of 

unlawful acts to an external board is not a condition precedent to a civil action under the Act.” Id. 

at 970 (emphasis added). Finally, though the plaintiff in Lark had alleged a common law 

wrongful discharge claim in the lower court, that claim was dismissed; and though the plaintiff 

also briefed the issue for the Court of Appeals, it was merely as a request to “create a new public 

policy exception to Maryland’s at-will employment doctrine,” which both the lower court and 

Court of Appeals declined to do. 994 A.2d at 970. The Court will thus follow the Maryland 
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Court of Appeals’s lead and decline Dr. Lurie’s invitation to “create a public policy” for the 

State of Maryland. Mot. to Alter or Amend J. 9. Nor will the Court expand the Maryland public 

policies embodied in other statutes that Dr. Lurie previously cited.4

2. Not Otherwise Vindicated by Civil Remedy

Even if Lark identified a preexisting, unambiguous announcement of Maryland public 

policy that fit Dr. Lurie’s conduct and discharge, the only source of policy discussed in Lark is 

the Health Care Worker Whistleblower Protection Act, which provides its own civil remedy. 

Maryland’s common law wrongful discharge claim is reserved to vindicate public policies that 

are not protected by other causes of action. 561 A.2d at 180. In this case, the Health Care Worker 

Whistleblower Protection Act clearly declares: “Any employee who is subject to a personnel 

action in violation of § 1-502 of this subtitle may institute a civil action.” Md. Code Ann., Health 

Occ. § 1-504(a). There is thus no basis to support a common law claim for the same wrong.

In sum, despite Lark, Dr. Lurie has failed to produce any clear mandate of public policy 

not otherwise vindicated by a civil remedy that supports his claim; thus, even if Maryland law 

did apply, Lark would not rehabilitate this failure.

C. New Statutory Claim under the Health Care Worker Whistleblower 

Protection Act

The decision in Lark does not justify allowing Dr. Lurie to use his Rule 59(e) motion to 

bring a new, statutory, wrongful discharge claim under the Health Care Worker Whistleblower 

Protection Act. Rather than point the Court to an applicable source of public policy to support his 

claim, Dr. Lurie urges the Court to consider a new claim under Section 1-504(a) of the Health 

 4 In his Opposition to Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment, Dr. Lurie pointed to several other Maryland 

statutes purportedly announcing public policies that supported his common law wrongful discharge claim. This 

Court already held that the relationships between those public policies and Dr. Lurie’s conduct were “too attenuated 

to meet the stringent standard for recognizing public policy exceptions to the at-will employment doctrine.” 729 F. 

Supp. 2d at 327. This Court will not revisit that decision without any intervening controlling law.
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Care Worker Whistleblower Protection Act—despite never having invoked the Act before—

because Lark is a change in the Maryland common law interpreting the Act. Reply Opp’n Mot. 

Alter or Amend. J. 2, Sept. 30, 2010, ECF No. 92. The Act was enacted in 2002, so it was 

available when Dr. Lurie sued in 2006, although he did not then invoke it. Unfortunately for Dr. 

Lurie, “Rule 59(e) motions are aimed at reconsideration, not initial consideration.” District of 

Columbia v. Doe, 611 F.3d 888, 898 (D.C. Cir. 2010) (quoting Nat’l Ecological Found. v. 

Alexander, 496 F.3d 466, 477 (6th Cir. 2007)). The Court will not hear Dr. Lurie’s new statutory 

claim for the first time via a Rule 59(e) motion.

Dr. Lurie warns that the public interest would be frustrated if health care providers are 

free to discipline doctors without legal consequences for raising quality of care issues. This 

simply isn’t the case here. Under Maryland law, the Maryland Health Care Worker 

Whistleblower Protection Act is available, and Dr. Lurie simply failed to raise that claim when 

he should have. And whether D.C. offers similar statutory protection is an issue for the D.C. 

legislature. The Court will not take it upon itself to fashion its own remedy.

V. CONCLUSION

For the reasons stated herein, the Court will DENY plaintiff’s Motion to Alter or Amend 

Judgment.

A separate Order consistent with this Memorandum Opinion shall issue this date.

Signed by Royce C. Lamberth, Chief Judge, on May 31, 2011.