Federal Register / Vol. 62, No. 65 / Friday, April 4, 1997 / Notices 16189

discretionary authority for officials to

release registration information.

Information must be released to

members of the public as necessary to

protect the public from registered

offenders. This mandatory disclosure

requirement applies both in relation to

offenders required to register because of

conviction for ‘‘a criminal offense

against a victim who is a minor’’ and

those required to register because of

conviction for a ‘‘sexually violent

offense.’’

States do, however, retain discretion

to make judgments concerning the

circumstances in which, and the extent

to which, the disclosure of registration

information to the public is necessary

for public safety purposes and to specify

standards and procedures for making

these determinations. Several different

approaches to this issue appear in

existing state laws.

One type of approach, which is

consistent with the requirements of the

Jacob Wetterling Act as amended,

involves particularized risk assessments

of registered offenders, with differing

degrees of information release based on

the degree of risk. For example, some

states classify registered offenders in

this manner into risk levels, with (1)

Registration information limited to law

enforcement uses for offenders in the

‘‘low risk’’ level, (2) notice to

organizations with a particular safety

interest (such as schools and other child

care entities) for ‘‘medium risk’’

offenders, and (3) notice to neighbors for

‘‘high risk’’ offenders.

States are also free under the Act to

make judgments concerning the degree

of danger posed by different types of

offenders and to provide information

disclosure for all offenders (or only

offenders) with certain characteristics or

in certain offense categories. For

example, states may decide to focus

particularly on child molesters, in light

of the vulnerability of the potential

victim class, and on recidivists, in light

of the threat posed by offenders who

persistently commit sexual offenses.

Another approach consistent with the

Act is to make information accessible to

members of the public on request. This

may be done, for example, by making

registration lists open for inspection by

the public, by establishing call-in

numbers which members of the public

can contact to obtain information on the

registration status of identified

individuals, or by providing such

information in response to written

requests. As with proactive notification

systems, states that have informationon-request systems may make

judgments about which registered

offenders or classes of registered

offenders should be covered and what

information will be disclosed

concerning these offenders.

States are encouraged to involve

victims and victim advocates in the

development of their information

release programs and in the process for

particularized risk assessments of

registrants if the state program involves

such assessments.

Paragraph (2) of subsection (d) does

not deprive states of the authority to

exercise centralized control over the

release of information, or if the state

prefers, to have local agencies make

determinations concerning public safety

needs and information release.

A proviso at the end of paragraph (2)

states that the identity of the victim of

an offense that requires registration

under the Act shall not be released. This

proviso safeguards victim privacy by

prohibiting disclosure of victim identity

to the general public in the context of

information release programs for

registered offenders. It does not bar the

dissemination of victim identity

information for law enforcement or

other governmental purposes (as

opposed to disclosure to the public) and

does not require that a state limit

maintenance of or access to victim

identity information in public records

(such as police and court records) which

exist independently of the registration

system. Because the purpose of the

proviso is to protect the privacy of

victims, its restriction may be waived at

the victim’s option.

So long as the victim is not identified,

the proviso in paragraph (2) does not bar

including information concerning the

characteristics of the victim and the

nature and circumstances of the offense

in information release programs for

registered offenders. For example, states

are not barred by the proviso from

releasing such information as victim age

and gender, a description of the

offender’s conduct, and the geographic

area where the offense occurred.

Immunity for Good Faith Conduct—

Subsection (e)

Subsection (e) states that law

enforcement agencies, employees of law

enforcement agencies, and state officials

shall be immune from liability for good

faith conduct under the Act.

Compliance—Subsection (f)

States have three years from the date

of enactment (i.e., September 13, 1994)

to come into compliance with the Act

unless the Attorney General grants an

additional two years where a state is

making good faith efforts at

implementation. States that fail to come

into compliance within the specified

time period will be subject to a

mandatory 10% reduction of Byrne

Formula Grant funding, and any funds

that are not allocated to noncomplying

states will be reallocated to states that

are in compliance.

States are requested to submit

descriptions of their existing or

proposed registration systems for sex

offenders to the Bureau of Justice

Assistance as soon as possible. These

submissions will be reviewed to

determine the status of state compliance

with the Act and to suggest any

necessary changes to achieve

compliance before the funding

reduction goes into effect.

To maintain eligibility for full Byrne

Formula Grant funding following

September 13, 1997—the end of the

three-year implementation period

provided by the Act—states must

submit to the Bureau of Justice

Assistance by July 13, 1997, information

that shows compliance with the Act or

a written explanation of why

compliance cannot be achieved within

that period and a description of the

good faith efforts that justify an

extension of time (but not more than

two years) for achieving compliance.

States will also be required to submit

information in subsequent program

years concerning any changes in sex

offender registration systems that may

affect compliance with the Act.

Dated: March 28, 1997.

Janet Reno,

Attorney General.

[FR Doc. 97–8702 Filed 4–3–97; 8:45 am]

BILLING CODE 4410–01–M

Drug Enforcement Administration

[Docket No. 96–24]

Jose R. Castro, M.D.; Denial of

Application

On February 20, 1996, the Deputy

Assistant Administrator, Office of

Diversion Control, Drug Enforcement

Administration (DEA), issued an Order

to Show Cause to Jose R. Castro, M.D.

(Respondent), of Alma, Georgia,

notifying him of an opportunity to show

cause as to why DEA should not deny

his application for a DEA Certificate of

Registration as a practitioner under 21

U.S.C. 823(f), for reason that his

registration would be inconsistent with

the public interest. The Order to Show

Cause alleged, in substance, that: (1)

From August 1989 through February

1990, Federal and state agents made 12

undercover visits to Respondent’s office

and that on each occasion, Respondent

issued the agents prescriptions for
16190 Federal Register / Vol. 62, No. 65 / Friday, April 4, 1997 / Notices

controlled substances for no legitimate

medical use and outside the scope of

professional practice; (2) On or about

January 10, 1991, Respondent was

indicted in the United States District

Court for the Southern District of

Georgia and charged with 12 counts of

illegal distribution of controlled

substances; (3) On May 8, 1991,

Respondent was found guilty in the

United States District Court for the

Southern District of Georgia of four

counts of illegal distribution of

controlled substances; (4) Between 1989

and 1991, Respondent prescribed

numerous different controlled

substances to an individual for no

legitimate medical reason. On May 17,

1991, the individual died of a drug

overdose after consuming a combination

of controlled substances prescribed by

Respondent. A subsequent autopsy

revealed that the individual died of

multiple drug poisoning, consistent

with the controlled substances that

Respondent prescribed; (5) On

September 3, 1991, the Composite State

Board of Medical Examiners, State of

Georgia, ordered the summary

suspension of Respondent’s privileges

to handle controlled substances.

Pursuant to the Order, Respondent was

ordered to surrender DEA Certificate of

Registration AC 9230311. Accordingly,

on September 10, 1991, Respondent

voluntarily surrendered his DEA

registration.

On March 22, 1996, Respondent,

through counsel, requested a hearing on

the issues raised by the Order to Show

Cause, and the matter was docketed

before Administrative Law Judge Mary

Ellen Bittner. Following prehearing

procedures, a hearing was scheduled to

commence on January 29, 1997. On

October 16, 1996, the Government filed

a Motion for Summary Disposition,

alleging that Respondent was not

currently authorized to handle

controlled substances in the State of

Georgia. The Government’s motion was

supported by a copy of a Consent Order

entered into by Respondent and the

Composite State Board of Medical

Examiners for the State of Georgia

(Board) on January 9, 1992, and a copy

of a letter from the Board to DEA dated

October 11, 1996, stating that

Respondent was not authorized to

possess or prescribe controlled

substances. Although provided an

opportunity to do so, Respondent did

not file a response to the Government’s

motion.

On November 22, 1996, Judge Bittner

issued her Opinion and Recommended

Ruling, Findings of Fact, Conclusions of

Law and Decision finding that

Respondent lacked authorization to

handle controlled substances in the

State of Georgia; granting the

Government’s Motion for Summary

Disposition; and recommending that

Respondent’s application for a DEA

Certificate of Registration be denied.

Neither party filed exceptions to her

opinion, and on January 8, 1997, Judge

Bittner transmitted the record of these

proceedings to the Acting Deputy

Administrator.

The Acting Deputy Administrator has

considered the record in its entirety,

and pursuant to 21 CFR 1316.67, hereby

issues his final order based upon

findings of fact and conclusions of law

as hereinafter set forth. The Acting

Deputy Administrator adopts, in full,

the Opinion and Recommended Ruling,

Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Laws

and Decision of the Administrative Law

Judge.

The Acting Deputy Administrator

finds that on January 9, 1992,

Respondent and the Board entered into

a Consent Order whereby Respondent’s

license to practice medicine was

suspended for five years with all but the

first six months suspended and was

then placed on probation. As part of the

Consent Order, Respondent

relinquished, until further order of the

Board, ‘‘his right to prescribe,

administer, dispense, order or possess

* * * controlled substances.’’ A letter

from the Board dated October 11, 1996,

indicated that Respondent was ‘‘not

authorized to possess or prescribe any

controlled substance.’’ There is no

evidence in the record that the Board

has since reinstated Respondent’s

controlled substance privileges.

Therefore, the Acting Deputy

Administrator finds that Respondent is

not currently authorized to handle

controlled substances in the State of

Georgia.

The DEA does not have statutory

authority under the Controlled

Substances Act to issue or maintain a

registration if the applicant or registrant

is without state authority to handle

controlled substances in the state in

which he conducts business. 21 U.S.C.

802(21), 823(f), and 824(a)(3). This

prerequisite has been consistently

upheld. See Dominick A. Ricci, M.D., 58

FR 51,104 (1993); James H. Nickens,

M.D., 57 Fed. Reg. 59,847 (1992); Roy E.

Hardman, M.D., 57 FR 49,195 (1992). In

the instant case, the record indicates

that Respondent is not currently

authorized to handle controlled

substances in the State of Georgia. As

Judge Bittner notes, ‘‘[b]ecause

Respondent lacks this state authority, he

is not currently entitled to a DEA

registration.’’ Because Respondent is not

entitled to a DEA registration, the

Acting Deputy Administrator finds it

unnecessary to address whether

Respondent’s registration would be

inconsistent with the public interest as

alleged in the Order to Show Cause.

Judge Bittner also properly granted

the Government’s Motion for Summary

Disposition. Here, the parties did not

dispute the fact that Respondent was

unauthorized to handle controlled

substances in Georgia. Therefore, it is

well-settled that when no question of

material fact is involved, a plenary,

adversary administrative proceeding

involving evidence and crossexamination of witnesses is not

obligatory. See Phillip E. Kirk, M.D., 48

FR 32,887 (1983), aff’d d sub nom Kirk

v. Mullen, 749 F.2d 297 (6th Cir. 1984);

NLRB v. International Association of

Bridge, Structural and Ornamental

Ironworkers, AFL–CIO, 549 F.2d 634

(9th Cir. 1977); United States v.

Consolidated Mines & Smelting Co., 44

F2d 432 (9th Cir. 1971).

Accordingly, the Acting Deputy

Administrator of the Drug Enforcement

Administration, pursuant to the

authority vested in him by 21 U.S.C. 823

and 824, and 28 CFR 0.100(b) and 0.104,

hereby orders that the application

submitted by Jose R. Castro, M.D. for a

DEA Certificate of Registration, be, and

it hereby is, denied. This order is

effective May 5, 1997.

Dated: March 24, 1997.

James S. Milford,

Acting Deputy Administrator.

[FR Doc. 97–8560 Filed 4–3–97; 8:45 am]

BILLING CODE 4410–09–M

Abbas Helim Demetrios, M.D.;

Revocation of Registration

On June 24, 1996, the Deputy

Assistant Administrator, Office of

Diversion Control, Drug Enforcement

Administration (DEA) issued an Order

to Show Cause to Abbas Helim

Demetrios, M.D., notifying him of an

opportunity to show cause as to why

DEA should not revoke his DEA

Certificate of Registration BD1248029,

and deny any pending requests for

modification of such registration to

change the registered address from

California to Georgia, pursuant to 21

U.S.C. 823(f) and 824(a)(3), for reason

that he is not currently authorized to

handle controlled substances in the

States of California and Georgia. The

order also notified Dr. Demetrios that

should no request for a hearing be filed

within 30 days, his hearing right would

be deemed waived.

The DEA received a signed receipt

indicating that the order was received

on July 1, 1996. No request for a hearing