2002 Decisions

Opinions of the United

States Court of Appeals

for the Third Circuit

3-26-2002

USA v. Meyers

Precedential or Non-Precedential:

Docket 01-1727

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Recommended Citation

"USA v. Meyers" (2002). 2002 Decisions. Paper 213.

http://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2002/213
 NOT PRECEDENTIAL 

 UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 

 FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 

 ___________ 

 No. 01-1727 

 ___________ 

 UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 

 

 v. 

 JOHN W. MEYERS, SR., 

 Appellant 

 _______________________________________________ 

 On Appeal from the United States District Court 

 for the Middle District of Pennsylvania 

 D.C. Criminal No. 99-cr-00142 

 (Honorable Yvette Kane) 

 ___________________ 

 Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) 

 January 15, 2002 

 Before: SCIRICA, GREENBERG and BRIGHT*, Circuit Judges 

 (Filed: March 26, 2002) 

 

 *The Honorable Myron H. Bright, United States Circuit Judge for the Eighth Judicial 

Circuit, sitting by designation. 

 __________________ 

 OPINION OF THE COURT 

 __________________ 

SCIRICA, Circuit Judge. 

 This is an appeal from a criminal conviction and sentence. 

 I. 

 John Meyers, a failed general contractor, represented himself as an experienced 

bank debenture trader and the head of RWAI Group, Inc., an "international investment 

group." Meyers provided potential investors a list of his "clients," all affluent individuals

who had invested "billions of dollars" with him. Meyers told potential clients their 

investments, like those on the list, would be protected in escrow accounts and by other 

procedural stratagems, and that he would take no commissions from those sums. Several 

investors deposited a total of $1,625,000 in RWAI, with promises of million-dollar 

returns. Meyers used $475,000 of this money for personal purchases. Only $300,000 

was invested in bank debenture programs. Some clients lost every dollar invested. 
 A jury convicted Meyers of all charges in a thirty-seven-count indictment of wire 

fraud, mail fraud, money laundering, engaging in illegal transactions, and making false 

statements to the Federal Bureau of Investigation. He was ordered to forfeit $1.25 

million, two automobiles and offshore funds. Meyers was sentenced to 131 months’ 

imprisonment and three years of supervised release. This appeal followed. 

 II. 

 The District Court had jurisdiction under 18 U.S.C. 3231. We have jurisdiction 

under 28 U.S.C. 1291. 

 III. 

 The District Court permitted the testimony of Gerald Robinson, an attorney who 

had represented RWAI and Meyers in prior civil litigation. Meyers contends Robinson’s 

testimony violated his attorney-client privilege and the attorney-work-product doctrine. 

But Robinson testified only to Meyers’s prior business practices and history, not "private 

communications." That Meyers had filed for bankruptcy and been involved in lawsuits 

were matters of public record. Neither the attorney-client privilege nor the work-product 

doctrine was implicated in Robinson’s testimony. Accord Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 

495, 508 (1947). We review for abuse of discretion. United States v. Console, 13 F.3d 

641, 659 (3d Cir. 1993). Robinson’s testimony demonstrated Meyers misled potential 

clients about his past qualifications and experience. Investors detrimentally relied on 

Meyers’s representations. We see no error in admitting Robinson’s testimony. 

 IV. 

 Prior to trial, the District Court ruled Herbert Biern could testify as an expert of 

bank debenture programs, but could not testify whether Meyers’s investment plan was 

fraudulent. Meyers suggests Biern "implicitly" violated the order by encouraging an 

inference that Meyers was guilty. Meyers failed to object, so we review for plain error. 

United States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725, 732 (1993). Biern’s testimony focused on banking 

terminology, the accuracy of representations made about the Federal Reserve Board, and 

certain documents. It did not "seriously affect[] the fairness, integrity or public reputatio

of judicial proceedings." Id. (quotation and citation omitted). The Court was well within 

its sound discretion in allowing this testimony. Cf. Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael, 526 

U.S. 137, 158 (1999) ("Rule 702 grants the district judge the discretionary authority, 

reviewable for its abuse, to determine reliability in light of the particular facts and 

circumstances of the particular case."). We see no error. 

 V. 

 Meyers contends the evidence did not demonstrate the offshore trading program he 

"established" constituted an illegal scheme to defraud, because he honestly believed the 

program existed. Reviewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the government, 

United States v. Coyle, 63 F.3d 1239, 1243 (3d Cir. 1995), we find "substantial evidence 

supports the jury’s verdict." United States v. Paramo, 998 F.2d 1212, 1216 (3d Cir. 

1993). Witnesses testified Meyers intentionally misled his clients and federal 

investigators about the offshore trading program. We see no error. 

 VI. 

 Meyers claims statements he made to potential investors concerning his financial 

acumen and his "humanitarian" motives were "puffing," not illegal misrepresentations. 

Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the government, Coyle, 63 F.3d at 

1243, Meyers’s statements were "material" to his conviction. Several of Meyers’s clients 

testified his biographical statements influenced their decision to provide him funds for 

investment. Additionally, the government presented evidence that Meyers had lied to 

investors and federal agents about the disposition of "invested" funds. These statements, 

not Meyers’s self-aggrandizing biographical boastings, provided sufficient evidence for 

his convictions of mail and wire fraud. Cf. In re Weinroth, 439 F.2d 787, 787-88 (3d Cir. 

1971). We will not disturb the verdict. 

 VII. 

 Meyers alleges his sentence was inappropriately enhanced, in violation of 

Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466 (2000). We disagree. The jury found the 

fraudulent scheme involved $1,250,000. The District Court’s calculated loss to RWAI’s 

three joint venture partners ($400,000) was well within this amount, rendering 

Apprendi inapplicable. We see no error. 

 VIII. 

 For the foregoing reasons we will affirm the judgment of conviction and sentence. 
TO THE CLERK: 

 Please file the foregoing opinion. 

 /s/ Anthony J. Scirica 

 Circuit Judge