[PUBLISH]

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT

_________ _______________ No. 14

- 13724

________________________ D.C. Docket No. 9:13

- cv
- 81259

- RNS

GLENAAN ROBBINS, individually and on behalf of all others similarly situated,
Plaintiff

- Appellant,

versus GARRISON PROPERTY AND CASUALTY INSURANCE COMPANY, a fore ign corporation,
Defendant

- Appellee.

_______ _________________ No. 14

- 13725

________________________ D.C. Docket No. 9:14

- cv
- 80279

- KLR Case: 14-13724 Date Filed: 12/30/2015 Page: 1 of 112 SENDY ENIVER T, individually and on behalf of all those similarly situated,
Plaintiff

- Appellant,

vers us PROGRESSIVE SELECT INSURANCE COMPANY, a foreign corporation,
Defendant

- Appellee.

________________________ Appeals from the United States District C ourt for the Southern District of Florida

________________________ (December 30, 2015)

Before ED CARNES, Chief Judge , MARTIN, Circuit Judge, and THAPAR, * District Judge. ED CARNES, Chief Judge : This consolidated appeal by two plaintiffs presents the issue of what limits
the F lorida Motor Vehicle No

- Fault Law, Fla. Stat. § § 627 .730

– 627.7405 , places

on an insured’s personal injury protection (PIP) benefits where no medical provider has made any determination about whether the insured’s injury was an
emergency medical condition

. The applicable statutory provisions are ambiguous

* Honorable Amul R. Thapar, United States District Judge for the Eastern District of Kentucky, sitting by designation.

Case: 14-13724 Date Filed: 12/30/2015 Page: 2 of 113 but the legislative purpose shown in the type of material that Florida courts re ly on to resolve ambiguities is not

. I.
Since the 198 0s, the Florida Motor Vehicle No

- Fault Law has required that

auto mobile insurance policies provide personal injury protection benefits “to a limit of $10,000 for loss sustained .

. . as a result of bodily injury, sickness, disease, or death arising out of the ownership, maintenance, or use of a motor vehicle.”
1987 Fla. Sess. Law Serv. Ch. 87

- 226 (West) ; see Fla. Stat. § 627.736(1)(a) (2015)

. The Florida legislature amended the No

- Fault Law in 2012

. See 2012 Fla.
Sess. Law Serv. Ch. 2012

- 197 (West)

. Those amendments added two subparagraphs to § 627.736(1) (a) , one requiring : 3. Reimbursement for s ervices and care provided

. . . up to $10,000 if a [ physician, dentist, physician assistant, or advanced registered nurse practitioner] has determined that the injured person had an emergency medical condition

. [ 1 ] and the other providing that:
4. Reimbursement for services and care provided

. . . is limited to $2,500 if a [ physician, dentist, chiropractic physician, osteopathic physician, physician assistant, or advanced registered nurse practitioner] determines that the injured person did not have an emergency medical condition

.

1 The statute defines “emergency medical condition” as “ a medical condition manifesting itself by acute symptoms of sufficient severity, which may include severe pain, such that the absence of immediate medical attention could reasonably be expected to result in any of the following: (a) [s] erious jeopardy to patient health [ ; ] (b) [s] erious impairment to bodily functions [ ; or] ( c) [s] erious dysfuncti on of any bodily organ or part.” Fla. Stat. § 627.732(16).

Case: 14-13724 Date Filed: 12/30/2015 Page: 3 of 114 Fla. Stat. § 627.7 36(1)(a)(3 )

– (4) (emphase s added)

. Unfortunately, the amended statute says nothing about what the reimbursement limit is if no listed provider has made any determination about whether the injured person’s medical condition wa s
an emergency. That is why th is case is here.
Glenaan Robbins is insured under an auto insuranc e policy issued by
Garrison Pro perty and Casualty Insurance Company (Garrison). Sendy Enivert is insured under a similar policy issued by Progressive Select Insurance Co mpany (Progressive). Both policies are governed by Florida law. After they were injured
in separate car accidents in 2013, Robbins and Enivert s ought reimbursement for
medical e xpenses from t he i r insurer s
. Neither of them submitted a medical provider’s determination about whether she had suffered an emergency medical
condition

. Relying on their interpretation of Fla. Stat. § 627.736 , as amended, Garrison and Progressive limited Robbins’ and Enivert’s benefits to $2,500.
Robbins and Enivert each filed in the same district court a purported class
action challenging her insurer’ s interpretation of § 627.736

. Each lawsuit sought a declaratory judgment that the insured was entitled to $10,000 in medical benefit s because “no determin ation was made that [ she ] did not have an emergency medical
condition.” Each also sought injunctive relief against future violations o f the

statute , payment of unpaid medical benefits , and attorney’s fees

.

Case: 14-13724 Date Filed: 12/30/2015 Page: 4 of 115 T he lawsuits were assigned to two differe nt judges who entered separate orders dismissing them. Both orders reached the same con clusion, which is that
absent an emergency medical determination by one of the providers listed in § 627.736(1)(a)(3) , the higher limit of $10,000 in benefits does not apply. The judge in the Robbins case c oncluded that , absent an y determination about whether
the condition was an emergency , the insured was entit led to up to $2,500 in benefits. The judge in the Enivert case also concluded that the insured was n ot entitled to more than $2,500 in benefits; the insurance company in that case contends that the judge actually concluded that without a medical emergency
determination the insured is not entitled to any benefits. 2 Both plaintiffs filed appeals, which we consoli dated at their request. 3
II.
We review de novo a Rule 12(b)(6) dismissal , “ accepting the allegations in the complaint as true and construing them in the light most favorable to the

2 The judge in the Enivert case said that “[t]he PIP statute, read in its entirety, clearly indicates t hat a medical provider’s determination is required in order to receive reimbursement under either subsection of the statute” and that because “[a] medical provider did not determine that [the insured] had an [emergency medical condition , ] ” she was “ not entitled to the full $10,000 in benefits

. . . .” That could mean that the insured was entitled to only $2,500 in benefits, or it could mean, as Progressive suggests, that she was entitled to no benefits at all. We need not decide exactly what the di strict judge meant, however, because our review is de novo in any event. 3 We asked the parties to provide us with supplemental briefing addressing whether the plaintiffs had satisfactorily alleged the amount in controversy requ ired for federal jurisdi ction. After reviewing their submissions, we are convinced that the plaintiffs have satisfied the requirements set forth in 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d)(2).

Case: 14-13724 Date Filed: 12/30/2015 Page: 5 of 116 plaintiff. ” Belanger v. Salvation Army , 556 F.3d 1153, 1155 (11th Cir. 2009). We
also review de novo a district court’s interpretation of a statute. Id. We construe a Florida statute according to Florida’s rules of statutory interpretation , not federal
rules , when those rules differ

. See Allen v. USAA Cas. Ins. Co. , 790 F.3d 1274, 1279 (11th Cir. 2015).
A.
Under Florida law, we must “ give effect to the legislative intent of the
statute.” Belanger , 556 F.3d at 1155 (citing Arnold, Matheny & Eagan, P.A. v. First Am. Holdings, Inc. , 982 So. 2d 628, 633 (Fla. 200 8)). To find that intent, we begin where Florida courts do , which is with the statute’s plain language

. See
Borden v. East

- European Ins. Co. , 921 So. 2d 587, 595 (Fla. 2006). “When the statute is clear and unambiguous, [ Florida ] courts will not look behind [its] plain language for legislative intent .” Daniels v. Fla. Dep’t of Health , 898 So. 2d 61, 64 (Fla. 2005). But when the statutory language is ambiguous, Florida courts may

“ resort to the rules of statutory construction, which permit [them] to examine the legislative history to aid in [their] determination regarding legislative intent.” Diamond Aircraft Indus., Inc. v. Horowitch , 107 So. 3d 362, 367 (Fla. 2013)

. T he amend ed language in § 62 7.736 does not address the situation presented here, where no medical provider has determined if the insured ’s medical condition
was, or was not, an emergency. According to the insurer Garrison, “[a] plain

Case: 14-13724 Date Filed: 12/30/2015 Page: 6 of 117 reading of the statute demonstrates that the $10,000 of coverage is available only if a physician or other provider listed has determined that the injured person had an emergency medical condition.” Garrison Br. at 9 (quotations and alterations omitted). T he statutory language , however, plainly does not say that. It would have been a simple matter for the legislature to have said exactly that, but it did not
do so. The insurer Progressive, taking a bolder tack, i nsists that the “[s] tatute is clear; if there is no determination by a qua lified provider

— that an insured either had or did not have an [emer gency medical condition]

— the [s] tatute does not provide any level of benefits.” Progressive Br. at 16. But th e statute is anything
but clear

. Although we agree with the defendants an d the district courts that the
lawsuits ought to have been dismissed, we disagree wi th their interpretations of the statutory scheme

. It is “ axiomatic that all parts of a statute must be read together in order to
achieve a consistent whole.” Forsythe v. Longboat Key Beach Erosion Control
Dist. , 604 So. 2d 452, 455 (Fla. 1992)

. “Where possible, courts must give full
effect to all statutory provisions and construe related statutory provisions i n harmony with one another.” Id. Neither of the defendants’ interpretations does
that. Garrison ’s position would give full effect to subparagraph (1)(a)(3) and no effect to (1)(a)(4)

. But we cannot “engage in a narrow, limited reading of an
individual subsection .

. . which would render another coequal provision of the

Case: 14-13724 Date Filed: 12/30/2015 Page: 7 of 118 statute entirely nugatory.” Am. Home Assurance Co. v. Plaza Materials Corp. , 908 So. 2d 360, 366 (Fla. 2005) ; see a lso State v. Goode , 830 So. 2d 817, 824 (Fla. 2002) (“[T]he Legislature does not intend to enact useless provisions, and courts should avoid readings that would render part of a statute meaningless.”). Progressive asks us to read into the statute an affirmative obligation on the
pa rt of the insured to obtain a medical provider’s determination one way or the
other about whether the condition was an emergency in order to receive any
benefits at all. But that obligation is not in the statute and we cannot add it. See B.C. v. Fla. Dep’t of Children & Families , 88 7 So. 2d 1046, 1052 (Fla. 2004) (“[We are not] permitted to add to a statute words that were not placed there by the Legislature.”) ; State v. C ity o f Fort Pierce , 88 So. 2d 135, 137 (Fla. 1956) (“It is not the p rovince of this Court to rewrite the acts of the Legislature.” ). The statutory langu age simply does not provide an answer to the question presented
here.
Which leads to Robbins and Enivert ’s argument that sub paragraphs (1)(a)(3) and (1)(a)(4) “are directly contradictory, essentially canceling each other out” and “leav[ing] undisturbed the pre

- existing overall maximum of $10,000” regardless of whether there is any determination about an emergency. Appellants’ Br. at 11. But the Florida Supreme Cour t has rejected negation arguments. See Am. Home
Assurance Co. , 908 So. 2d at 368 (“It would defy logic to conclude that the

Case: 14-13724 Date Filed: 12/30/2015 Page: 8 of 119 Legislature intended two contemporaneous amendments to negate one another.”); Alexdex Corp. v. Nachon Enter s ., Inc. , 641 So. 2d 858 , 862 (Fla. 1994) (rejecting an interpretation that would “ignore the latest legislative expression on the subject and run counter to our principle . . . that a statute should not be interpreted in a manner that would deem legislative action useless”).
B. “[W] here the plain text of the sta tute is in inescapable conflict, ” Am. Home
Assur ance Co. , 908 So. 2d at 368 , as it is here, the Florida Supreme Court has repeatedly looked to legislative staff analyses , which it has described as “one
touchstone of the co llective legislative will , ” in order to discover legislative intent,
White v. State , 714 So. 2d 440, 443 n.5 (Fla. 1998) ; see Diamond Aircraft Indus. , 107 So. 3d at 367. We do that here.
The Florida legislature ’s purpose in amending the Motor Vehicle No

- Fault
Law in 2012 was to reduce the payment of fraud ulent claims in order to lower
insurance premiums

. See Staff of H.R. Subcomm. on Ins. & Banking, Final B. Analysis, H.B. 119, at 6 (Fla. 2012) (describing a study produced by the Florida Office of Insurance Regulation , which found that “ PIP fraud is a significant issue ” throughout the state ); id. at 14 ( noting that “ [t] o the extent that the [amendments] eliminate[ ] fraud and abuse in the PIP system, the cost of PIP insurance will
decrease for Florida motorists ” ) ; see also Staff of S. Banking & Ins. Comm., H.B.

Case: 14-13724 Date Filed: 12/30/2015 Page: 9 of 1110 119 B. Summary , at 2 (Fla. 2012) ( stating that the amendments “contain[ ] numerous provisions designed to curtail PIP fraud”). One thing that the amendments did to achieve that purpose was “revise [ ] [the] personal injury protection (PIP) provisions [of the statute] , making the amount of the medical benefit dependent upon the severity of the injury.” Final B. Analysis at 9 ; see a lso S. B. Summary at 1 (“The bill applies two different coverage limits for PIP medical benefits, based upon the severity of the medical condition of the individual.”)

. What the legislature intended was that “[t]he fu ll $10,000 PIP medical benefit ” would be “ only available if [a listed medical provider] dete rmines that the insured has an emergency medical condition

. Otherwise, the PIP medical benefit is limited to $2,500.” S taff of S . Banking & Ins. Comm., H. Message S ummary, H.B. 119, at 1 (Fla. 2012) (quotation marks omitted) ; see a lso S. B. Summary at 1 ( “An individual may receive up to $10,000
in medical benefits

. . . if [a listed medical provider] has determined that the injured person had an emergency medical condition,” but for “ [ a ] n individual who is not diagnosed with an emergency medical condition, the PIP medical benefit limit is $2,500.”).
The legislative history clearly shows that the Florida legislature sought to reduce fraudulent claims by making the full $10,000 amount of benefits avai lable only to those insureds who suffered severe injuries, a restriction defined into the

Case: 14-13724 Date Filed: 12/30/2015 Page: 10 of 1111 term “emergency medical condition.” See supra n.1. Allowing an insured to escape th at restriction on the higher limit would defeat the legislative intent and policy behind the amendments , which we are bound to honor

. See Byrd v.
Richardson

– Greenshields Sec. , Inc. , 55 2 So. 2d 1099, 1102 (Fla. 1989) ( “ [ O ] ur obligation is to honor the obvious legislative intent a nd policy behind an

enactment

. . . . ”). For these reasons, we hold that F la. Stat. § 627.736 , as amended, limit s an insurer ’s obligation to provide personal injury protection benefits to $2,500 , unless one of the medical providers listed in subparagraph (1)(a)(3) has determined that
the injured person had an emergency medical condition. Because neither Robbins ’
nor Enivert ’s claim was sup ported by such a determination, neither Garrison nor Progressive violated Fla. Stat. § 627.736 b y limiting benefits to $2,500. The
district court judge s were correct to dismiss the lawsuits.
AFFIRMED. Case: 14-13724 Date Filed: 12/30/2015 Page: 11 of 11