UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT

_________________________________

SHEKHROZ MUKUMOV, 

 Petitioner,

v.

JEFFREY ROSEN, Acting United States 

Attorney General,1

 Respondent.

No. 20-9517

(Petition for Review)

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ORDER AND JUDGMENT*

_________________________________

Before HARTZ, KELLY, and EID, Circuit Judges.

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Shekhroz Mukumov, a native and citizen of Uzbekistan, petitions for review of 

an order by the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) denying his second motion to 

reopen his asylum proceedings. We have jurisdiction under 8 U.S.C. § 1252 and 

deny Mr. Mukumov’s petition. The BIA did not abuse its discretion in determining 

1 On December 24, 2020, Jeffrey Rosen became Acting Attorney General of 

the United States. Consequently, his name has been substituted for William P. Barr 

as Respondent. See Fed. R. App. P. 43(c)(2). * After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has determined 

unanimously to honor the parties’ request for a decision on the briefs without oral 

argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(f); 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G). The case is therefore 

submitted without oral argument. This order and judgment is not binding precedent, 

except under the doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. It 

may be cited, however, for its persuasive value consistent with Fed. R. App. P. 32.1

and 10th Cir. R. 32.1.

FILED

United States Court of Appeals

Tenth Circuit

January 11, 2021

Christopher M. Wolpert

Clerk of Court
2

that he failed to submit material evidence of changed country conditions in 

Uzbekistan that warranted reopening. And the changed personal circumstances he 

alleged cannot support his untimely second motion to reopen after a final order of 

removal.

I. BACKGROUND

In our prior decision in this case we detailed the facts surrounding

Mr. Mukumov’s application for asylum, withholding of removal, and protection 

under the Convention Against Torture (CAT). See Mukumov v. Barr, 781 F. App’x 

762, 764-65 (10th Cir. 2019). Without repeating those background facts, we describe 

the additional facts necessary to resolve the current petition.

After the BIA affirmed the denial of Mr. Mukumov’s asylum application, he 

filed two motions to reopen the proceedings. In the first motion, he asserted “new 

and changed circumstances” in Uzbekistan. Admin. R., Vol. 1 at 211. These new 

circumstances consisted of the Uzbek authorities’ discovery of his presence in the 

United States, their anticipated discovery that he had applied for asylum, and their 

knowledge that he attended church in the United States. Mr. Mukumov thus alleged 

a threat of harm based on his asylum-seeking and religious practice. This differed 

from the claim raised in his initial asylum application, which alleged persecution by 

his former employer, who owned a construction company in Uzbekistan, based on 

membership in his family and his political opinions. 

The BIA denied for several reasons the first motion to reopen, which was filed 

in December 2018. Mr. Mukumov had failed to submit a new asylum application, as 
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the regulations required. Almost all the evidence was previously available and could 

have been presented to the immigration judge (IJ). Mr. Mukumov’s church 

attendance did not make him prima facie eligible for asylum or related relief; he 

failed to show “that he has actually converted, that he has been baptized, that he has 

actually joined the church, or that he intends to convert to Christianity.” Id. at 193. 

He presented insufficient evidence to show that the Uzbekistan government was 

aware that he requested asylum, or that he had a well-founded fear of persecution 

based on having sought asylum in the United States. Finally, evidence of his 

mother’s brief encounter with a police officer, though previously unavailable, was 

insufficient to satisfy the requirements of reopening. 

Mr. Mukumov did not petition for review of the denial. Instead, in September 

2019 he filed a second motion to reopen, again asserting changed circumstances. He 

cited his conversion to Christianity, his baptism, and the Uzbek authorities’ discovery 

of his church attendance. He also claimed that upon his return to Uzbekistan the 

authorities would discover his application for asylum. All these facts, he alleged, 

placed him in immediate danger because Uzbekistan persecutes known asylum 

seekers and Muslim converts to Christianity. 

The BIA denied the second motion to reopen. It noted that a motion to reopen 

must be filed no more than 90 days after the date of the final order of removal, and 

only one such motion may be filed. These limitations do not apply if the motion is 

based on material, previously unavailable evidence and “the basis of the motion is to 

apply or reapply for asylum or withholding of removal based on changed country 
4

conditions or changed circumstances arising in the country of nationality.” Id. at 3. 

But the BIA concluded Mr. Mukumov had not submitted material evidence of 

changed country conditions in Uzbekistan warranting reopening that could 

circumvent the statutory restrictions on timeliness and number of motions to reopen. 

Rather, his asserted conversion to Christianity represented only a change in his 

personal circumstances. In addition, the BIA concluded that much of the new 

evidence he submitted could have been presented at his former hearing or with his 

first motion to reopen and his evidence did not reflect a change in the treatment of 

asylum seekers or Muslim converts to Christianity. Finally, the BIA noted that 

Mr. Mukumov had again failed to submit a required new asylum application with his 

motion. 

II. DISCUSSION

“We review the BIA’s decision on a motion to reopen only for an abuse of 

discretion. The BIA abuses its discretion when its decision provides no rational 

explanation, inexplicably departs from established policies, is devoid of any 

reasoning, or contains only summary or conclusory statements.” Infanzon v. 

Ashcroft, 386 F.3d 1359, 1362 (10th Cir. 2004) (brackets and internal quotation 

marks omitted).

A noncitizen is ordinarily limited to one motion to reopen, which must be filed 

within 90 days of the final order of removal. See 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(A), (C)(i). 

But this time restriction does not apply “if the basis of the motion is to apply for 

[asylum or withholding-of-removal] relief . . . and is based on changed country 
5

conditions arising in the country of nationality . . . if such evidence is material and 

was not available and would not have been discovered or presented at the previous 

proceeding.” Id. § 1229a(c)(7)(C)(ii); see also 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii) (time and

numerical limitations do not apply if there is new, material evidence of changed 

country conditions). 

Thus, to reopen his proceedings Mr. Mukumov was required to produce 

material evidence that was not available at the time of the previous proceeding and 

that demonstrated changed conditions in Uzbekistan at the time of his September 

2019 motion to reopen.2

 Most of his evidence concerning persecution of Muslim 

converts to Christianity in Uzbekistan or the maltreatement of asylees predates his 

hearing date. But he argues that the evidence was previously “unavailable” because 

it did not become relevant and therefore material to his case until he converted to 

Christianity in August 2019. 

In any event, Mr. Mukumov must also still show that the new evidence

establishes qualifying changed country conditions in Uzbekistan. He contends that 

he satisfied this requirement through evidence of his conversion to Christianity and 

application for asylum, both of which have now become known or will become 

known to authorities in Uzbekistan. But this evidence concerns an alleged change in 

2

 We need not decide whether Mr. Mukumov was required to show a material 

change in country conditions since the denial of his prior motion to reopen. See Xiu 

Mei Wei v. Mukasey, 545 F.3d 1248, 1254 (10th Cir. 2008) (declining to determine 

whether comparison date was original hearing date or date prior motion was 

decided). He has failed to establish the required change from either earlier date.
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his personal circumstances, not changed country conditions. And such “changed 

personal circumstances cannot support an untimely motion to reopen after a final 

order of removal.” Xiu Mei Wei v. Mukasey, 545 F.3d 1248, 1249 (10th Cir. 2008).

Mr. Mukumov urges us to follow authority from other circuits holding that a 

change in personal circumstances can warrant reopening. But the cases he cites 

concern alleged changes in the noncitizen’s personal circumstances that were related 

to alleged changes in country conditions. See Chandra v. Holder, 751 F.3d 1034, 

1035, 1037 (9th Cir. 2014) (noting, in case where noncitizen converted to 

Christianity and persecution of Christians in Indonesia had also worsened since his 

previous hearing, that although the applicable regulation “would prohibit a motion to 

reopen that relies solely on a change in personal circumstances, it does not prohibit a 

motion to reopen based on evidence of changed country conditions that are relevant 

in light of the petitioner’s changed circumstances”); Shu Han Liu v. Holder, 718 F.3d 

706, 709 (7th Cir. 2013) (petitioner’s conversion to Christianity “was a change in her 

personal circumstances, true; but the change would not have exposed her to as great a 

risk of persecution in China had it not been for the change in conditions in that 

country”); En Gao v. Holder, 721 F.3d 893, 895 (7th Cir. 2013) (petitioner who 

converted to Christianity after he reached the United States could seek reopening 

based on “changed conditions in China since the time he left with respect to the 

treatment of Christians”); Yu Yun Zhang v. Holder, 702 F.3d 878, 880 (6th Cir. 2012)

(same); Xue Xian Jiang v. U.S. Att’y Gen., 568 F.3d 1252, 1258 (11th Cir. 2009)
7

(BIA abused its discretion in concluding petitioner had not established changed 

country circumstances in addition to a personal change in circumstances). 

Mr. Mukumov’s circumstances are different. He does not cite evidence that 

persecution of converts to Christianity or asylum-seekers has intensified in 

Uzbekistan. Although his conversion to Christianity and the authorities’ discovery of 

his asylum application may be relevant to his asylum claim, they do not establish a 

qualifying change in country conditions.3

 The BIA therefore did not abuse its 

discretion in denying his untimely second motion to reopen.4

 

III. CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, we deny the petition for review.

Entered for the Court

Harris L Hartz

Circuit Judge

3

 Mr. Mukumov also asserts that the BIA “failed to meaningfully discuss the 

voluminous evidence [he] presented,” that it “failed to accept those facts as true,” and 

that it “failed to meaningfully determine whether [his] alleged facts constituted 

evidence of changed country conditions as a matter of law.” Pet. Opening Br. at 13. 

But the BIA did explain why the evidence he submitted did not show a material 

change in the conditions in Uzbekistan during the relevant period. See R., Vol. 1 at 

2. Mr. Mukumov’s conclusory arguments to the contrary fail to show an abuse of 

discretion. 

4 Given our denial of Mr. Mukumov’s petition on this basis, we find it 

unnecessary to determine the other issues he raises: whether the BIA also properly 

denied the motion to reopen based on his failure to attach a new asylum application,

and whether the BIA properly determined the merits of his CAT claim. See INS v. 

Bagamasbad, 429 U.S. 24, 25 (1976) (per curiam) (“As a general rule courts and 

agencies are not required to make findings on issues the decision of which is 

unnecessary to the results they reach.”).