United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

Argued September 27, 2013 Decided December 3, 2013

No. 11-5102

ABDUL RAZAK ALI, DETAINEE,

APPELLANT

v.

BARACK OBAMA, PRESIDENT, ET AL.,

APPELLEES

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the District of Columbia

(No. 1:10-cv-01020)

H. Candace Gorman argued the cause and filed the briefs 

for appellant.

Sydney Foster, Attorney, U.S. Department of Justice, 

argued the cause for appellees. With her on the brief were 

Stuart F. Delery, Principal Deputy Assistant Attorney 

General, Ian Heath Gershengorn, Deputy Assistant Attorney 

General, and Robert M. Loeb, Attorney, U.S. Department of 

Justice. Matthew M. Collette and Douglas N. Letter, 

Attorneys, U.S. Department of Justice, entered appearances.

Before: KAVANAUGH, Circuit Judge, and EDWARDS and 

WILLIAMS, Senior Circuit Judges.
2

Opinion for the Court filed by Circuit Judge

KAVANAUGH.

Opinion concurring in the judgment filed by Senior 

Circuit Judge EDWARDS.

KAVANAUGH, Circuit Judge: The United States is 

engaged in an ongoing war against al Qaeda, the Taliban, and 

associated forces. In March 2002, as part of that war, Abdul 

Razak Ali was captured by U.S. and Pakistani forces at a

four-bedroom house in Faisalabad, Pakistan. After Ali’s 

capture, the U.S. military detained him as an enemy 

combatant. Since June 2002, Ali has been held at the U.S. 

Naval Base in Guantanamo Bay, Cuba. 

When captured at the house in Pakistan, Ali was with an

al Qaeda-associated terrorist leader named Abu Zubaydah. 

Also present were four former trainers from a terrorist 

training camp in Afghanistan, multiple experts in explosives, 

and an individual who had fought alongside the Taliban. 

Their living quarters contained documents bearing the

designation “al Qaeda,” electrical components, and a device 

typically used to assemble remote bombing devices. At the 

time of his capture, Ali had been at the terrorist guesthouse 

for about 18 days. Soon after the capture, an FBI interrogator 

asked Ali for his name and nationality. Ali falsely identified 

himself as Abdul Razzaq of Libya. Ali maintained that lie for 

the next two years.

That much is undisputed. In addition, the record strongly 

suggests, and the District Court found, two other significant 

facts: Ali, a native Algerian, traveled to Afghanistan after 

September 11, 2001, in order to fight in the war against U.S.

and Coalition forces. And while at the Pakistan guesthouse, 
3

Ali participated in Abu Zubaydah’s terrorist training program

by taking English lessons.

Under our precedents, we conclude that those facts justify 

the President’s decision to detain Ali as an enemy combatant 

pursuant to the 2001 Authorization for Use of Military Force. 

See Pub. L. No. 107-40, § 2(a), 115 Stat. 224 (2001); Hamdi 

v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 518 (2004). We therefore affirm 

the judgment of the District Court denying Ali’s petition for a 

writ of habeas corpus.

I

Shortly after the attacks against the United States on

September 11, 2001, Congress passed and President George 

W. Bush signed the Authorization for Use of Military Force. 

The AUMF provides:

That the President is authorized to use all necessary and 

appropriate force against those nations, organizations, or 

persons he determines planned, authorized, committed, 

or aided the terrorist attacks that occurred on September 

11, 2001, or harbored such organizations or persons, in 

order to prevent any future acts of international terrorism 

against the United States by such nations, organizations 

or persons.

Pub. L. No. 107-40, § 2(a), 115 Stat. 224 (2001); see U.S. 

Const. art. I, § 8.

This Court has stated that the AUMF authorizes the 

President to detain enemy combatants, which includes (among 

others) individuals who are part of al Qaeda, the Taliban, or 

associated forces. See Hussain v. Obama, 718 F.3d 964, 967 
4

(D.C. Cir. 2013).

1

 Detention under the AUMF may last for 

the duration of hostilities. See Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 

507, 521 (2004); Uthman v. Obama, 637 F.3d 400, 402 (D.C. 

Cir. 2011). This Court has assumed without deciding that, to 

justify detention of a member of al Qaeda, the Taliban, or an 

associated force, the Government must prove the detainee’s

status by a preponderance of the evidence. See Hussain, 718 

F.3d at 967 n.3; Uthman, 637 F.3d at 403 n.3; Al-Bihani v. 

Obama, 590 F.3d 866, 878 & n.4 (D.C. Cir. 2010). In a prior 

case involving a Guantanamo detainee captured in the same 

Faisalabad guesthouse as Ali, we recognized that the force 

commanded by Abu Zubaydah constitutes an “associated 

force” for purposes of the AUMF. See Barhoumi v. Obama, 

609 F.3d 416, 423 (D.C. Cir. 2010). Ali does not dispute that

conclusion here. 

The only question, then, is whether Ali more likely than 

not was part of Abu Zubaydah’s force. Ali says that he was 

not. He admits that he was captured with Abu Zubaydah in 

the Faisalabad, Pakistan, guesthouse. Ali also admits that he 

 1 As this Court has explained in prior cases, the President may 

also detain individuals who substantially support al Qaeda, the 

Taliban, or associated forces in the war. The National Defense 

Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2012 expressly permits military 

detention of a “person who was a part of or substantially supported 

al-Qaeda, the Taliban, or associated forces that are engaged in 

hostilities against the United States or its coalition partners.” Pub. 

L. No. 112-81, § 1021, 125 Stat. 1298, 1562 (2011). And our 

earlier cases, citing the Military Commissions Act of 2009, permit 

military detention of a person who was part of or “purposefully and 

materially” supported al Qaeda, the Taliban, or associated forces in 

the war. Al-Bihani v. Obama, 590 F.3d 866, 872 (D.C. Cir. 2010) 

(quoting 10 U.S.C. § 948a(7)); see Almerfedi v. Obama, 654 F.3d 1, 

3 n.2 (D.C. Cir. 2011); Uthman v. Obama, 637 F.3d 400, 402 n.2 

(D.C. Cir. 2011).
5

lied about his identity from the time of his capture in March 

2002 until late 2004, when he admitted that he is really Saeed 

Bakhouche of Algeria, not Abdul Razzaq of Libya.

2

 Ali 

insists, however, that he mistook the Abu Zubaydah facility 

for a public guesthouse, and that he had nothing to do with the

terrorist activity being planned there.

In 2005, Ali filed a habeas petition contesting his 

detention. After the Supreme Court ruled in Boumediene v. 

Bush, 553 U.S. 723 (2008), that the habeas corpus right 

extends to Guantanamo, the District Court took up Ali’s case 

and held a three-day hearing. Based on Ali’s presence at the 

guesthouse with Abu Zubaydah, his participation in Abu 

Zubaydah’s training program, his admission to traveling to 

Afghanistan to fight in the war against U.S. and Coalition 

forces, and other evidence connecting Ali to Abu Zubaydah 

fighters, the District Court concluded that “it is more probable 

than not that” Ali “was in fact a member of Abu Zubaydah’s 

force.” Ali v. Obama, 741 F. Supp. 2d 19, 27 (D.D.C. 2011). 

On appeal, Ali argues that the Government failed to 

justify his detention by a preponderance of the evidence. He 

also contests several procedural aspects of the habeas 

proceeding, including the Government’s alleged failure to 

disclose evidence that could have undermined the credibility 

of two detainees who linked Ali to Abu Zubaydah’s force. 

This Court reviews the District Court’s ultimate habeas 

determination de novo, its underlying factual findings for 

clear error, and its procedural rulings for abuse of discretion. 

See Barhoumi, 609 F.3d at 423.

 2 The District Court spelled Ali’s name as Bakhouche. Ali’s 

brief spells it as Bakhouch.
6

II

The central fact in this case is that Ali was captured in 

2002 at a terrorist guesthouse in Pakistan. This Court has 

explained that a detainee’s presence at an al Qaeda or 

associated terrorist guesthouse constitutes “overwhelming”

evidence that the detainee was part of the enemy force. 

Uthman v. Obama, 637 F.3d 400, 406 (D.C. Cir. 2011)

(quoting Al-Adahi v. Obama, 613 F.3d 1102, 1108 (D.C. Cir. 

2010)); see Alsabri v. Obama, 684 F.3d 1298, 1302 (D.C. Cir. 

2012); Suleiman v. Obama, 670 F.3d 1311, 1314 (D.C. Cir. 

2012); Almerfedi v. Obama, 654 F.3d 1, 6 n.7 (D.C. Cir. 

2011); Al-Madhwani v. Obama, 642 F.3d 1071, 1075 (D.C. 

Cir. 2011); Al-Bihani v. Obama, 590 F.3d 866, 873 n.2 (D.C. 

Cir. 2010). We have previously affirmed the detention of an 

individual captured in the same terrorist guesthouse as Ali. 

See Barhoumi v. Obama, 609 F.3d 416, 425, 427 (D.C. Cir. 

2010).

Ali contends that he simply mistook the Abu Zubaydah 

guesthouse for a public guesthouse. He argues that reliance 

on his capture in the Abu Zubaydah guesthouse unfairly 

presumes guilt by association – or, as he styles it, “guilt by 

guesthouse.” Ali Br. 42. That argument has two flaws. 

To begin with, we are not talking about “guilt.” This is 

not a criminal proceeding in which the Government asks a 

court to find Ali guilty and punish him for past behavior by 

sentencing him to a defined term of imprisonment. In other 

words, this is not a federal criminal trial or a military 

commission proceeding for war crimes. Rather, this case 

involves military detention. The purpose of military detention 

is to detain enemy combatants for the duration of hostilities so 
7

as to keep them off the battlefield and help win the war. 

Military detention of enemy combatants is a traditional, 

lawful, and essential aspect of successfully waging war. See 

Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 518 (2004); WILLIAM 

WINTHROP, MILITARY LAW AND PRECEDENTS 788 (rev. 2d ed. 

1920) (military detention during wartime “is neither a 

punishment nor an act of vengeance, but merely a temporary 

detention which is devoid of all penal character”) (internal 

quotation marks and citation omitted). The standard of proof 

for military detention is not the same as the standard of proof 

for criminal prosecution, in part because of the different 

purposes of the proceedings and in part because military 

detention ends with the end of the war.

Moreover, determining whether an individual is part of al 

Qaeda, the Taliban, or an associated force almost always 

requires drawing inferences from circumstantial evidence, 

such as that individual’s personal associations. Unlike enemy 

soldiers in traditional wars, terrorists do not wear uniforms. 

Nor do terrorist organizations issue membership cards, 

publish their rosters on the Internet, or otherwise publicly 

identify the individuals within their ranks. So we must look 

to other indicia to determine membership in an enemy force. 

As this Court has stated before, a person’s decision to stay 

with the members of a terrorist force at a terrorist guesthouse 

can be highly probative evidence that he is part of that force 

and thus a detainable enemy combatant. One does not 

generally end up at al Qaeda or other terrorist guesthouses in 

Afghanistan or Pakistan by mistake – either by the guest or by 

the host. See Uthman, 637 F.3d at 406.

In any event, we need not address the hypothetical in 

which a detainee’s presence at a terrorist guesthouse

constitutes the only evidence against him. In this case, at least 
8

six additional facts support the conclusion that Ali more likely 

than not was part of Abu Zubaydah’s force:

• Ali’s housemates at the terrorist guesthouse were not 

just foot soldiers, but included the terrorist leader Abu 

Zubaydah himself, as well as the senior leaders of 

Zubaydah’s force.

• Ali had been staying at the guesthouse for about 18 

days.

• The guesthouse in which Ali was captured contained

documents and equipment associated with terrorist 

operations.

• Ali participated in Abu Zubaydah’s terrorist training 

program by taking English lessons at the guesthouse.

• Ali had traveled to Afghanistan after September 11, 

2001, with the intent to fight in the war against U.S. 

and Coalition forces.

• After his capture, Ali lied about his identity, and he 

maintained his false cover story for more than two 

years.

First, it is undisputed that Ali’s housemates at the 

terrorist guesthouse were not just foot soldiers, but included 

Abu Zubaydah himself, as well as the senior leaders of 

Zubaydah’s force. See Ali v. Obama, 741 F. Supp. 2d 19, 26 

(D.D.C. 2011). Abu Zubaydah, an “associate” and “longtime 

ally” of Osama bin Laden, operated terrorist training camps in 

Afghanistan and led a force that engaged in hostilities against 

U.S. and Coalition forces. J.A. 1620; THE 9/11 COMMISSION 

REPORT: FINAL REPORT OF THE NATIONAL COMMISSION ON 

TERRORIST ATTACKS UPON THE UNITED STATES 150, 174

(2004); see Barhoumi, 609 F.3d at 425; J.A. 1548; 9/11

COMMISSION REPORT at 59. Zubaydah-trained fighters 

coordinated with or joined al Qaeda, and at least one 

Zubaydah associate attempted to attack the United States 
9

homeland. See United States v. Ressam, 679 F.3d 1069, 

1072-74 (9th Cir. 2012) (en banc); J.A. 1548-49, 1620; 9/11

COMMISSION REPORT at 261.

3

After U.S. and Coalition forces eviscerated al Qaeda and 

other terrorist training camps in Afghanistan in late 2001, Abu 

Zubaydah retreated to a house in Faisalabad, Pakistan. He 

used the Faisalabad house to prepare for attacks on U.S. and 

Coalition forces using remote-detonated explosives. See Ali, 

741 F. Supp. 2d at 26; J.A. 1600, 1651, 1736, 1741. Ali 

admits that he knew Abu Zubaydah and that they lived

together at the Faisalabad guesthouse. And they were not 

alone. Based on statements by guesthouse occupants and a 

diary kept by an Abu Zubaydah associate, the District Court 

concluded that approximately 10 senior leaders of Zubaydah’s 

force resided at the guesthouse when Ali was captured there. 

Ali, 741 F. Supp. 2d at 26. In an earlier case, we credited the 

diary as “probative record evidence” providing a “veritable 

membership list” for Zubaydah’s force. Barhoumi, 609 F.3d 

at 425-26. The members of Zubaydah’s force named on that 

list were not strangers to Ali. He identified them by name and 

photo, and they identified him.

It strains credulity to suggest that Ali spent time in early 

2002 in a four-bedroom house in Faisalabad, Pakistan, with 

Abu Zubaydah and the leaders of Zubaydah’s force while 

having no idea what the people around him were doing. But 

 3 Courts in this circuit and others have likewise recognized 

Abu Zubaydah’s association with al Qaeda. See United States v. 

Moussaoui, 591 F.3d 263, 306 (4th Cir. 2010); Shafiiq v. Obama, 

No. 05-1506, 2013 WL 3242201, at *1 (D.D.C. June 5, 2013);

Kandari v. United States, 744 F. Supp. 2d 11, 48 (D.D.C. 2010); 

Mohammed v. Obama, 689 F. Supp. 2d 38, 58 (D.D.C. 2009); In re 

Terrorist Attacks on September 11, 2001, 392 F. Supp. 2d 539, 561 

(S.D.N.Y. 2005).
10

even granting Ali the benefit of the doubt, it is nearly 

unfathomable that avowed terrorist leaders like Abu 

Zubaydah would tolerate an unknown couch-surfer crashing 

down the hall in the same house for several weeks. Of course, 

there remains a slender possibility that Ali innocently 

blundered into his extended stay at a heavily fortified terrorist 

den. But one of his housemates offered a far more plausible 

explanation: “all the people in the house were Al-Qaeda 

people or ‘jihadis.’” J.A. 1650-51. 

In sum, the fact that Ali resided with Abu Zubaydah and 

Zubaydah’s top lieutenants during their preparation for active 

conflict with U.S. and Coalition forces strongly buttresses the 

conclusion that Ali was part of Zubaydah’s force. Cf. 

Khairkhwa v. Obama, 703 F.3d 547, 550 (D.C. Cir. 2012)

(affirming detention based on detainee’s “close ties” to 

Mullah Omar); Alsabri, 684 F.3d at 1301 (affirming detention 

based on detainee’s residence with U.S.S. Cole bomber and 

continuing relationships with Taliban or al Qaeda members); 

Al-Adahi, 613 F.3d at 1107 (affirming detention based on 

detainee’s multiple “personal audience[s]” with Osama bin 

Laden); Barhoumi, 609 F.3d at 425 (affirming detention based 

on detainee’s capture in same guesthouse as Abu Zubaydah); 

see generally Uthman, 637 F.3d at 404 (“company” that 

detainee “was keeping” can suggest membership in terrorist 

force); Hussain v. Obama, 718 F.3d 964, 969 (D.C. Cir. 2013) 

(same); Latif v. Obama, 677 F.3d 1175, 1197 (D.C. Cir. 2012)

(same); Suleiman, 670 F.3d at 1314 (same); Al-Madhwani, 

642 F.3d at 1076 (same); Esmail v. Obama, 639 F.3d 1075, 

1077 (D.C. Cir. 2011) (same); Awad v. Obama, 608 F.3d 1, 9-

10 (D.C. Cir. 2010) (same).

Second, it is undisputed that Ali had been staying at the 

guesthouse for about 18 days. J.A. 1666. His stay there was 

no brief layover on a tourist jaunt through Pakistan. On the 
11

contrary, if Ali were there for innocent purposes, he had more 

than ample time to recognize the dangerous company he was 

keeping and leave. Likewise, Abu Zubaydah and the other 

terrorists at the house had more than ample time to eject 

someone who was an errant passer-by. The length of Ali’s

stay makes it all the more implausible that he was an innocent 

bystander to the terrorist activity at Abu Zubaydah’s 

guesthouse. Cf. Hussain, 718 F.3d at 970 (“extended stays” at 

terrorist-linked mosques suggest affiliation with terrorist 

force); Suleiman, 670 F.3d at 1314 (seven-month stay at 

Taliban guesthouse shows detainee was “hardly stopping 

by”); Almerfedi, 654 F.3d at 6-7 (extended stay at mosque 

linked to terrorism suggests terrorist affiliation); Esmail, 639 

F.3d at 1076 (“length of” detainee’s stay at training camp 

constitutes “particularly strong evidence”).

Third, it is undisputed that the guesthouse in which Ali 

was captured contained documents and equipment associated 

with terrorist operations. The District Court found that the 

terrorist guesthouse where Ali resided contained “pro-al 

Qaeda literature, electrical components, and at least one 

device typically used to assemble remote bombing devices.” 

Ali, 741 F. Supp. 2d at 21. Ali does not dispute that those

objects were in the guesthouse. Rather, he suggests that the 

objects have alternative, benign uses. That’s true. But 

electrical components, for example, have a much different 

connotation when found next to an al Qaeda manual in a 

terrorist guesthouse than when found in an electrical 

engineering laboratory. Tellingly, the record included 

evidence that Abu Zubaydah planned to conduct terrorist 

attacks using remote-detonated explosives. J.A. 1549, 1600, 

1736. Considered in context, the presence of pro-al Qaeda 

literature, electrical components, and a device typically used 

to assemble remote bombing devices in the guesthouse where 

Ali spent about 18 days corroborates other evidence 
12

connecting him to Abu Zubaydah’s force. Cf. Obaydullah v. 

Obama, 688 F.3d 784, 792-93 (D.C. Cir. 2012) (explosives 

found outside detainee’s residence suggest membership in 

terrorist force); Khan v. Obama, 655 F.3d 20, 30 (D.C. Cir. 

2011) (incriminating items discovered at detainee’s properties 

suggest membership in terrorist force); Al-Adahi, 613 F.3d at 

1109 (presence of Casio watch identified with terrorist attacks 

suggests membership in terrorist force).

Fourth, the District Court found, and the evidence 

supports the conclusion, that Ali participated in Abu 

Zubaydah’s terrorist training program by taking English 

lessons at the guesthouse. At least one of Ali’s housemates 

provided multiple, specific accounts of having witnessed Ali 

and other housemates taking English lessons from a member 

of Abu Zubaydah’s force. Ali offers no persuasive rebuttal to 

those detailed eyewitness reports. The District Court did not 

clearly err by relying on that evidence. Ali, 741 F. Supp. 2d at 

26. 

Ali argues that there is nothing sinister about learning 

English. That’s true in isolation, but again, the context here is 

important. Otherwise-innocent activity can impart a different 

meaning depending on the circumstances. Here, the record 

included evidence that leaders of Abu Zubaydah’s force 

provided English language training to help prepare their 

members to better infiltrate English-speaking areas and

launch successful terrorist attacks. Ali’s willingness to 

participate in such a training program undercuts his claim of 

ignorance about terrorist activity in the guesthouse and further 

connects him to Abu Zubaydah’s force. Cf. Alsabri, 684 F.3d 

at 1304-06 (training at terrorist facility is compelling evidence 

that detainee was part of terrorist force); Al Alwi v. Obama, 

653 F.3d 11, 17-18 (D.C. Cir. 2011) (same); Al-Madhwani, 
13

642 F.3d at 1075 (same); Esmail, 639 F.3d at 1076 (same);

Al-Adahi, 613 F.3d at 1108-09 (same).

Fifth, the District Court found, and the evidence supports 

the conclusion, that Ali had traveled to Afghanistan after 

September 11, 2001, with the intent to fight in the war against 

U.S. and Coalition forces. Ali admitted as much when, 

shortly after his capture, he told an FBI interviewer that he 

had departed Libya in October 2001 for Karachi, Pakistan, 

and that “he met some Afghans in Karachi who took him to 

Afghanistan to fight in the war.” J.A. 74. Ali does not 

dispute the “damning” significance of traveling to the 

battlefield to engage in combat against U.S. and Coalition 

forces. Hussain, 718 F.3d at 968. Instead, he denies making 

the admission. 

The Government contends that Ali admitted his trip to 

Afghanistan in an FBI interview conducted within 48 hours of 

his capture. The FBI agent’s notes indicate that the interview 

subject was “Abdul Razzaq,” an alias that Ali has admitted 

using and that multiple housemates associated with him. The 

interview notes show that Razzaq was born in La Gilat, Libya, 

in July 1970. The notes also give the names of Razzaq’s 

parents and brother. All of that biographical data matches 

information later provided by Ali at Guantanamo. As Ali 

emphasizes, however, the FBI agent’s notes also indicate that 

the interview subject was captured at a different Faisalabad 

guesthouse where Ali never resided. The Government 

contends that this notation was inaccurate and points to a later

intelligence report correcting the mistake. Ali insists that the 

initial version – with the inaccurate guesthouse location –

proves that he is not the Abdul Razzaq who made the 

incriminating admission.
14

Given that multiple Faisalabad guesthouses were raided 

on the same day, it seems most likely that the agent 

interviewing Ali simply recorded the wrong site of capture in 

his initial report. It strikes us as dramatically less plausible 

that the agent interviewed a different Abdul Razzaq who 

happened to have been born in the same place during the

same month of the same year to a family whose members had

the same names. Ali’s argument amounts to a claim of 

innocence-by-typo. After hearing all the evidence, the 

District Court concluded that Ali had made the admission, and 

that the typo was just a typo. Ali, 741 F. Supp. 2d at 26-27. 

We cannot say that this factual finding amounts to clear error. 

Sixth, it is undisputed that, after his capture, Ali lied 

about his identity and maintained his false cover story for 

more than two years. From the time of his capture in March 

2002 until late 2004, Ali told U.S. interrogators that he was 

Abdul Razzaq of Libya. Then he admitted that he had been 

giving a false identity all that time, and that he is actually 

Saeed Bakhouche of Algeria.

Ali’s willingness to lie in this fashion is telling. If he 

were truly an innocent traveler caught in the wrong place at 

the wrong time, he presumably would have given his real 

name. After all, Ali claims that he had nothing else in his past 

to hide. Ali Br. 67. Our prior cases have discussed the more 

likely explanation for behavior like Ali’s: Terrorists are 

trained “to make up a story and lie.” Al-Adahi, 613 F.3d at

1111. Here, Ali’s sketchy tale bears several of the hallmarks 

of counter-interrogation techniques that this Court has 

observed in past cases: “developing a cover story . . .

recanting or changing answers . . . [and] giving as vague an 

answer as possible.” Id. Whatever his motive, Ali’s 

consistent lying about his name and nationality renders him 

“wholly incredible.” Ali, 741 F. Supp. 2d at 27. Moreover, 
15

his willingness to adopt and repeat a false cover story 

constitutes strong evidence of guilt. See Al-Adahi, 613 F.3d 

at 1107 (“false exculpatory statements are evidence – often 

strong evidence – of guilt”); see Hussain, 718 F.3d at 969

(same); Latif, 677 F.3d at 1195 (same); Almerfedi, 654 F.3d at 

7 (same); Al-Madhwani, 642 F.3d at 1076 (same); Esmail, 

639 F.3d at 1076-77 (same); Uthman, 637 F.3d at 407 (same).

To sum up, as the District Court correctly concluded, the 

record here establishes the following: Ali was captured in a 

terrorist guesthouse in Pakistan where he resided with Abu 

Zubaydah and the senior leaders of Zubaydah’s terrorist force. 

Ali had been there for about 18 days. The guesthouse where 

Ali lived contained materials associated with al Qaeda and 

terrorism, and Ali participated in at least one component of 

Abu Zubaydah’s training program. Moreover, Ali had 

traveled to Afghanistan to fight in the war against U.S. and 

Coalition forces. And after his capture, Ali lied about his 

identity for more than two years. 

Ali maintains that many of those facts, considered

individually, could have innocent explanations. Maybe yes, 

maybe no. But individual pieces of evidence are not

considered in complete isolation from one another. Cf. 

Bourjaily v. United States, 483 U.S. 171, 179-80 (1987) 

(“individual pieces of evidence, insufficient in themselves to 

prove a point, may in cumulation prove it”). As our 

precedents have explained, this commonsense principle 

carries no less weight in habeas proceedings for Guantanamo 

detainees. See Hussain, 718 F.3d at 968; Uthman, 637 F.3d at 

407; Al-Adahi, 613 F.3d at 1105-06. 

Considering the facts collectively and in light of our 

precedents, and exercising de novo review of the District 

Court’s ultimate conclusion, we conclude that the 
16

Government has satisfied its burden to prove that Ali more 

likely than not was part of Abu Zubaydah’s force.4 Any

alternative account would mean that Ali ended up in the 

guesthouse by accident and failed to realize his error for more 

than two weeks; and that Abu Zubaydah and his senior 

leaders tolerated an outsider living within their ranks; and that 

a different Abdul Razzaq who happened to have the same 

biographical information traveled to Afghanistan after 

September 11, 2001, to fight in the war against U.S. and 

Coalition forces; and that, despite knowing that he was an 

innocent man, Ali lied about his true name and nationality for 

two years. Ali’s story “piles coincidence upon coincidence 

upon coincidence.” Uthman, 637 F.3d at 407. We conclude

that the President has authority under the AUMF to detain

Ali.5

III

In addition to contesting the sufficiency of the evidence 

supporting his detention, Ali advances several procedural 

challenges. 

First, Ali argues that he was entitled to a second habeas

hearing because, at his first hearing, the Government

 4 We do not imply that all of the evidence discussed here is

necessary to determine that Ali was part of Abu Zubaydah’s force. 

We hold only that the evidence here is sufficient to demonstrate that 

Ali was part of Abu Zubaydah’s force and therefore sufficient to 

justify his detention. Cf. Uthman v. Obama, 637 F.3d 400, 407 n.8

(D.C. Cir. 2011). 5 We reach this conclusion based solely on the evidence we 

have discussed above. As noted further below, we need not and do 

not rely on evidence from two detainees whose credibility Ali has 

contested, Muhammed Noor Uthman and Musa’ab al-Madhwani.
17

allegedly failed to disclose evidence that could have 

undermined the credibility of two detainees who linked him to 

Abu Zubaydah’s force: Muhammed Noor Uthman and 

Musa’ab al-Madhwani. 

The Constitution entitles a Guantanamo detainee to “a 

meaningful opportunity to demonstrate that he is being held 

pursuant to the erroneous application or interpretation of 

relevant law.” Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723, 779 (2008) 

(internal quotation marks and citation omitted); see U.S. 

Const. art. I, § 9. The court reviewing a habeas petition has 

authority to “admit and consider relevant exculpatory 

evidence.” Al-Bihani v. Obama, 590 F.3d 866, 875 (D.C. Cir. 

2010) (quoting Boumediene, 553 U.S. at 786). In its case 

management order, the District Court required the 

Government to disclose any evidence “that tends materially to 

undermine the Government’s theory as to the lawfulness of 

the petitioner’s detention.” Case Management Order at 2, Ali 

v. Obama, No. 10-1020 (D.D.C. Aug. 25, 2010).

At Ali’s habeas hearing, the Government relied on 

evidence from Uthman and al-Madhwani without disclosing 

to Ali’s counsel certain information that could have 

undermined the credibility of those detainees. But then the

Government formally withdrew reliance on the evidence from

al-Madhwani, and the District Court therefore did not 

consider evidence from him in deciding whether to grant the 

petition. Ali v. Obama, 741 F. Supp. 2d 19, 24 (D.D.C. 

2011); cf. Al-Bihani, 590 F.3d at 881 (district court 

“assiduously avoided” relying on facts related to possible 

error). To be sure, the District Court did initially rely on 

information from Uthman. But the District Court later made 

an express finding that Ali would be detainable even without

considering any evidence from Uthman. See Ali v. Obama,
18

No. 10-1020, 2011 WL 1897393, at *1 (D.D.C. May 17, 

2011). 

Like the District Court, we do not rely on evidence from 

al-Madhwani or Uthman in determining that Ali more likely 

than not was part of Abu Zubaydah’s force. Therefore, any 

asserted error resulting from the Government’s alleged failure 

to disclose evidence undermining the credibility of those two 

detainees had no bearing on the outcome of the case in the 

district court, nor any bearing on the outcome of this appeal.

Cf. Al-Bihani, 590 F.3d at 881 (asserted error would not 

require reversal because it “would not have changed the 

outcome of the case”). 

Second, Ali asserts a variety of challenges related to the 

Government’s presentation of the case, including its decision 

to amend its factual allegations and renumber its exhibits 

before the habeas hearing, which allegedly deprived Ali’s 

counsel of time to prepare. None of those claims constitutes 

an error that justifies reversal on appeal. Far from depriving 

Ali of a fair hearing, the District Court prudently 

accommodated Ali’s counsel’s requests for additional 

preparation time by rescheduling the habeas hearing from 

October 2010 to December 2010 and by delaying closing 

arguments by an extra day. See Tr. of Hearing at 81, Ali v. 

Obama, No. 10-1020 (D.D.C. Dec. 15, 2010); Minute Order, 

Ali v. Obama, No. 10-1020 (D.D.C. Oct. 4, 2010); Motion to 

Reschedule Habeas Hearing, Ali v. Obama, No. 10-1020 

(D.D.C. Sept. 15, 2010). At the same time, the District Court 

appropriately moved the case along promptly, consistent with 

the Supreme Court’s directive in Boumediene. See 

Boumediene, 553 U.S. at 795.

Third, Ali cursorily alleges judicial bias by the District 

Judge. That claim lacks merit. Ali does not identify any 
19

actions that demonstrate improper judicial bias. Consistent 

with Supreme Court precedent, Ali received “a meaningful 

opportunity” to contest his detention. Id. at 779.

* * *

Based on the evidence that we have outlined, Ali more 

likely than not was part of Abu Zubaydah’s force. To be sure, 

as in any criminal or civil case, there remains a possibility that 

the contrary conclusion is true – in other words, that Ali was 

not part of Abu Zubaydah’s force. But the preponderance 

standard entails decisions based on the more likely 

conclusion. In our judgment, the evidence here demonstrates

that Ali more likely than not was part of Zubaydah’s force. 

The President therefore has authority to detain Ali under the 

2001 Authorization for Use of Military Force. 

In reaching our conclusion, we emphasize that this is not 

a federal criminal or military commission proceeding. Ali is 

not being criminally punished for his past behavior. Rather, 

the United States is detaining Ali because of his status as an 

enemy combatant in an ongoing war. Such military detention 

is a traditional, lawful, and essential part of successfully 

waging war. See Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 518

(2004). Importantly, the standard of proof for such military 

detention is not the same as the standard of proof for criminal 

punishment, in part because the purpose of detention is not 

punishment and in part because military detention – unlike a 

criminal or military commission sentence – comes to an end

with the end of hostilities.

We are of course aware that this is a long war with no 

end in sight. We understand Ali’s concern that his 

membership in Zubaydah’s force, even if it justified detention 

as an enemy combatant for some period of time, does not 
20

justify a “lifetime detention.” Reply Br. 28 (capitalization 

altered). But the 2001 AUMF does not have a time limit, and 

the Constitution allows detention of enemy combatants for the 

duration of hostilities. See Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 521; compare

USA PATRIOT Act of 2001, Pub. L. No. 107-56, § 224, 115 

Stat. 272, 295 (numerous provisions set to expire on 

December 31, 2005). The war against al Qaeda, the Taliban,

and associated forces obviously continues. Congress and the 

President may choose to make long-term military detention 

subject to different, higher standards. Indeed, for many years 

now, under the direction of two Presidents, the Executive 

Branch has unilaterally conducted periodic reviews and 

released or transferred to foreign countries a large number –

in fact, the vast majority – of Guantanamo detainees. Many 

releases or transfers have likewise occurred with detainees 

who have been held on U.S. bases in foreign countries (and 

outside of the courts’ habeas jurisdiction, see Al Maqaleh v. 

Gates, 605 F.3d 84 (D.C. Cir. 2010)). But absent a statute 

that imposes a time limit or creates a sliding-scale standard

that becomes more stringent over time, it is not the Judiciary’s 

proper role to devise a novel detention standard that varies 

with the length of detention. The only question before us is 

whether the President has authority under the AUMF to detain

Ali. In conducting that analysis, we must apply the same 

standard in 2013 that we would have applied in the aftermath 

of Ali’s capture in 2002. 

We affirm the judgment of the District Court denying 

Ali’s petition for a writ of habeas corpus. 

So ordered.
EDWARDS, Senior Circuit Judge, concurring in the 

judgment. The Authorization for Use of Military Force 

(“AUMF”) provides:

That the President is authorized to use all necessary and 

appropriate force against those nations, organizations, or 

persons he determines planned, authorized, committed, 

or aided the terrorist attacks that occurred on 

September 11, 2001, or harbored such organizations or 

persons, in order to prevent any future acts of 

international terrorism against the United States by such 

nations, organizations or persons.

Pub. L. No. 107-40, § 2(a), 115 Stat. 224 (2001) (emphasis 

added). In the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal 

Year 2012 (“NDAA”), Pub. L. No. 112-81, § 1021, 125 Stat. 

1298, 1562 (2011), Congress reaffirmed the provisions of the 

AUMF. The NDAA added a provision saying that “covered 

persons” include a “person who was a part of or substantially 

supported al-Qaeda, the Taliban, or associated forces that are 

engaged in hostilities against the United States . . . , including 

any person who has committed a belligerent act or has 

directly supported such hostilities in aid of such enemy 

forces.” Id. § 1021(b)(2) (emphasis added). 

Abdul Razak Ali’s habeas petition has been denied in this 

case because, as the majority says,

Ali was captured in a terrorist guesthouse in Pakistan 

where he resided with Abu Zubaydah and the senior 

leaders of Zubaydah’s terrorist force. Ali had been there 

for about 18 days. The guesthouse where Ali lived 

contained materials associated with al Qaeda and 

terrorism, and Ali participated in at least one component 

of Abu Zubaydah’s training program [by taking English 

lessons]. Moreover, Ali had traveled to Afghanistan to 

fight in the war . . . .
2

Nothing in the record indicates that Ali “planned, 

authorized, committed, or aided the terrorist attacks” of

September 11, 2001, or that he “harbored [terrorist] 

organizations or persons,” or that he was “part of or 

substantially supported al-Qaeda, the Taliban, or associated 

forces,” or that he “committed a belligerent act” against the 

United States. Ali may be a person of some concern to 

Government officials, but he is not someone who transgressed 

the provisions of the AUMF or the NDAA. Ali’s principal sin 

is that he lived in a “guest house” for “about 18 days.” 

The majority attempts to overcome this disjunction 

between Ali’s alleged actions and the conduct prohibited by 

the AUMF and the NDAA by pointing to Ali’s “personal 

associations” with Abu Zubaydah during Ali’s very brief stay 

in the guest house. The majority’s reliance on a “personal 

associations” test to justify its conclusion that Ali is 

detainable as an “enemy combatant” rests on the case law 

from this circuit cited in the majority opinion, which I am 

bound to follow. However, what is notable here is that there is 

a clear disjunction between the law of the circuit and the 

statutes that the case law purports to uphold. In other words, 

the “personal associations” test is well beyond what the 

AUMF and the NDAA prescribe. 

The majority explains that “[t]he purpose of military 

detention is to detain enemy combatants for the duration of 

hostilities so as to keep them off the battlefield and help win 

the war.” This is indisputable, but it is no consolation for Ali 

because the result of our judgment today is that Ali may now 

be detained for life. 

The majority acknowledges, as it must, that the “war 

against al Qaeda, the Taliban, and associated forces obviously 
3

continues,” and there is no end in sight. Our Nation’s “war on 

terror” started twelve years ago, and it is likely to continue 

throughout Ali’s natural life. Thus, Ali may well remain in 

prison for the rest of his life. It seems bizarre, to say the least, 

that someone like Ali, who has never been charged with or 

found guilty of a criminal act and who has never “planned, 

authorized, committed, or aided [any] terrorist attacks,” is 

now marked for a life sentence.

The majority says that “it is not the Judiciary’s proper 

role to devise a novel detention standard that varies with the 

length of detention.” Respectfully, in my view, that is not the 

issue. The troubling question in these detainee cases is 

whether the law of the circuit has stretched the meaning of the 

AUMF and the NDAA so far beyond the terms of these 

statutory authorizations that habeas corpus proceedings like 

the one afforded Ali are functionally useless.