UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

TOMAS LEMUS AMAYA Plaintiff,

v. LOGO ENTERPRISES, LLC, et al.

Defendants. Case No. 1:16-cv-00009 (CRC)

MEMORANDUM OPINION Plaintiff Tomas Lemus Amaya wo rked for six years as a kitchen h and at the Pollo Granjero restaurant in Washi ngton, D.C. In this suit, he seeks to recover from the restaurant and its owner unpaid minimum and overt ime wages for a period of app roximately two years. Despite having been served, defendants Logo Enterprises, LLC (“Logo Ent erprises”) and its owner Juan Loyola have not responded to the c omplaint or the clerk’s entry of default. Amaya now petitions the Court to enter a default judgment, seeking a monetary judgm ent against Defendants in the amount of $300,163.82, which includes unpaid minimum and overti me wages, liquidated damages, attorney fees, expenses, and court costs. Because Ama ya has adequately demonstrated Defendants’ liability and that he is entitled to monetary relie f, the Court will enter default judgments against Logo Enterprises and Loyola.

I. Background The Fair Labor Standards Act (“ FLSA”) requires employers to pay a federal minimum wage of $7.25 per hour, and overtime payments at a rate of one- and one-half times the employee’s regular hourly wage for hours worked in excess of 40 hours per week. See 292 U.S.C. §§ 206–207. The statute furth er requires employers to p ay state-established minimum wages if they are higher than t he federal minimum wage. See id. § 218. The District of Columbia Wage Pa yment and Collec tion Law (“DCWP CL”) establishes the minimum wage that employers must pay to persons employed in the District of Columbia. See D.C. Code § 32–1001. During the time periods alleged in Am aya’s complaint, the D.C. minimum wage was $8.25 per hour from January 1, 2013 until June 30, 2014; $9.50 from July 1, 2014 until June 30, 2015; and $10.50 from July 1, 2015 until th e end of Amaya’s employment on October 21, 2015. See D.C. Code § 32–1003. Because the federa l minimum wage was lower during all relevant periods, Amaya ’s minimum hourly wage is est ablished by the DCWPCL. Logo Enterprises and Loyola are employers as defined by the FLS A and the DCWPCL. 1 Logo Enterprises is a limited liability company operating under the name Pollo Granjero. Compl. ¶ 6. Pollo Granjero employed Ama ya as a kitchen hand, starting i n 2009 until approximately October 21, 2015. Compl. ¶¶ 9–11. 2 Amaya filed suit on January 5, 2016 alleging that Defendants violat ed both the FLSA and DCWPCL by p aying him less than the required minimum wage and no over time pay despite his working a n average of 83 hours per week. Id. ¶¶ 6–7, 17, 40–41. Accordingl y, Amaya argues that h e is entitled to $313,128.00,

1 Logo Enterprise is an employer under the FLSA because it had tw o or more employees who handled goods that travelled in or were produced for inters tate commerce, see Pl.’s Compl. ¶ 23, and the annual gross volume of Logo Enterprises’ business e xceeded $500,000, see id. at ¶ 22. See 29 U.S.C. § 203(s)(1)(A)(i )-(ii). Logo Enterprises is likewise an employer under the DCWPCL because it is a corporati on that “act[s] directly or ind irectly in the interest of an employer in relation to an e mployee.” D.C. Code § 32–1002(3). Additionally, because Logo Enterprises is an employer under the FLSA and “the DCWPCL is co nstrued consistently with the FLSA,” it is considered an employer under the DCWPCL as well. Ventura v. Bebo Foods, Inc., 738 F. Supp. 2d 1, 6 (D.D.C. 2010).

2 The record does not specify whe n Amaya began his employment.3 which includes unpaid wages from January 1, 2013 until October 21, 2015, liquidated damages, court costs, and attorney fees and expenses. Loyola and the Company were pr operly served on January 12, 201 6 and February 4, 2016 respectively. Neither Defe ndant filed a response, and the Clerk of the Court entered a default against both. In September 2016, Amaya filed a Motion for Default Judgment, which has received no response i n the past six months.

II. Standard of Review The standard for default judgment is a two-step procedure. See e.g., Ventura v L.A. Howard Constr. Co., 134 F. Supp. 3d 99, 102 (D.D.C. 2015). A p laintiff must request first that

the Clerk of the Court enter a default against an opposing part y who has “failed to plead or otherwise defend,” Fed. R. Civ. P . 55(a), which “establishes th e defaulting party’s liability for the well-pleaded allegations of the complaint.” Boland v. Elit e Terrazzo Flooring, Inc., 763 F. Supp. 2d 64, 67 (D.D.C. 2011). A plaint iff must then petition the court for a default judgment against the parties. Fed. R . Civ. P. 55(b)(2). The purpose of default judgments is to prevent

absentee defendants from es caping liability by refusing to part icipate in judicial proceedings. See Elite Terrazzo Flooring, 763 F. Supp. 2d at 67. Once liability has been establi shed, courts have considerable l atitude in determining the appropriate award through an inde pendent evaluation of the alle ged damages. Courts may choose to hold a hearing or ca n base their assessments on “deta iled affidavits or documentary evidence” submitted by plaintiffs in support of their claims. Boland v. Providence Constr. Corp., 304 F.R.D. 31, 36 (D.D.C. 2014) (quoting Fanning v. Permanent S ol. Indus, Inc., 257 F.R.D. 4, 7 (D.D.C. 2009)). However, the C ourt is not required to hold a h earing “‘as long as it ensures that4 there is a basis for the damages specified in the default judgm ent.’” Elite Terrazzo Flooring, Inc., 763 F. Supp. 2d at 67.

III. Analysis

The Court will first consider D efendants’ liability and then tu rn to evaluating the relevant damages.

A. Liability The FLSA requires that an employer pay his employees for hours worked in excess of forty hours per week “at a rate not less than one and one -half times the regular rat e at which he is employed.” 29 U.S.C. § 207(a). The D CWPCL likewise requires e mployer to compensate employees for overtime “at a rat e not less than 1 1/2 times the regular rate at which the employee is employed.” D.C. Code § 32–1003. Under the DCWPCL, if an em ployer fires an employee, “the employer shall pay the em ployee’s wages earned not later t han the working day following such discharge.” D.C. Code § 32–1303. If an employee quits or resigns, however, “the employer must pay the employee’ s wages due upon the next regula r payday or within 7 days from the date of quitting or resigning, whichever is earlier.” Id. 3 Amaya has submitted an affidavit, summarizing the hours he work ed and attesting that the Company failed to pay him a le gally-mandated minimum wage o r overtime for work done

3 Amaya cites to D.C. Code § 32–1303( 2) for the proposition that employers must pay an employee who quits or resigns all wages due upon the next regul ar pay day, but he does not reference D.C. Code § 32–1303(1), wh ich sets forth a separate t imeline for employees who are fired. Regardless of whether Ama ya resigned or was fired thoug h, any deadline to pay earned wages has passed.5 between January 2013 and October 21, 2015, resulting in approxi mately $82,198.50 in unpaid wages. See Pl’s Mot. Default J . (“MDJ”), Amaya Aff. ¶¶ 10, 19. For Juan Loyola to be liable in an individual capacity, he must qualify as an employer under the FLSA and the DCWPCL. See Ventura v. Bebo Foods, Inc. , 738 F. Supp. 2d 1, 5 & n. 2 (D.D.C. 2010) (applying individu al liability analysis under t he FLSA to individual liability analysis under the DCWPCL). Typi cally, an individual “who exer cises operational control over an employee’s wages, hours, and terms of employment qualifies a s an ‘employer,’ and is subject to individual liability.” Gu evara v. Ischia, Inc., 47 F. Supp. 3d 23, 26–27 (D.D.C. 2014) (internal citation omitted); see also Per ez v. C.R. Calderon Construction , Inc., 2016 WL 7410544, at *20 (D.D.C. Dec. 22, 2016) (“[T]he overw helming weight of authority is that a corporate officer with operational control of a corpora tion’s covered enterprise is an employer along with the corporation, jointly and severa lly liable under the FLSA for un paid wages.”) (quoting Ruffin v. New Destination, 800 F. Supp. 2d 262, 269 (D.D.C. 2011). To de termine individual liability,

courts in this district have cons idered whether the employer wa s responsible for hiring and firing, controlling work schedules, est ablishing pay rates, and maintai ning employment records. See Ventura, 738 F. Supp. 2d at 6. Here , Amaya alleges that Loyola was the owner of Logo Enterprises and “exercise[d] exclusive control over its operations a nd pay practices.” Compl. ¶ 7 (emphasis added). For example, L oyola was physically present a t the restaurant every day, and he was responsible for hiri ng Amaya, assigning him tasks, super vising his work, setting his work schedule, and paying him. See Amaya Aff. ¶¶ 4—12. Such facts sufficiently establish that Loyola is an employer under the FLSA because he had “a signific ant ownership interest in [Logo Enterprises]” and “operationa l control” over it. Ventura, 738 F. Supp. 2d at 6; see also Martinez v. Asian 328, LLC, 2016 WL 4621068, at *4 (D.D.C. Sep. 6, 2016) . With no response from6 Defendants, the Court accepts Ama ya’s well-pleaded allegations as true and holds that Logo Enterprise and Juan Loyola are liable to Amaya. See, e.g., Eli te Terrazzo Flooring, Inc., 763 F. Supp. 2d at 67–68; Fanning, 256 F.R.D. at 7.

B. Damages “When a defendant has failed to respond, the Court must make an independent determination—by relying on affidavits, documentation, or an ev identiary hearing—of the sum to be awarded as damages.” Ventura, 134 F. Supp. 3d at 104. I n his affidavit, Amaya avows that he typically worked 83 hours pe r week, for which he was pa id $800 twice per month (the equivalent of $369.20 per week or $4.56 per hour) from January 1, 2013 through August 31, 2015, and $900.00 twice per month ($415.35 per week or $5.00 pe r hour) from September 1, 2015 through October 21, 2015. 4 Amaya Aff. ¶¶ 10–11, 15; see als o U.S. Dep’t. of Labor Wage and Hour Div. Coefficient Table. Under the DCWPCL, he is owed $82,198.89 in unpaid wages

for his 83-hour work weeks. The Court independently confirmed Amaya’s calculations and accepts the accuracy of the $82,198.89 figure. See infra App. 1. In addition to unpaid wages, Amaya seeks liquidated damages. U nder the FLSA, liquidated damages equal the amount of unpaid wages. See 29 U. S.C. § 216. Under the current version of the DCWPCL, which came into effect on December 23, 2 014, liquidated damages are “an amount equal to treble the unpaid wages.” F iscal Year 2014 Budget Support Emergency Act of 2013, D.C. Code § 32–1303; see, e.g., M artinez v. Asian, 2016 WL 7167969, at *5 (D.D.C.

4 Amaya’s original complaint states that from September 1, 2015 t hrough October 21, 2015, his effective hourly rate was $5.13. In Amaya’s motion f or default judgment, the effective rate for that time period i s calculated at $5.00 per hour. Bec ause Amaya has established how he calculated the latter figur e, the Court will use the $5.00 hour ly rate for its o wn calculation of damages.7 Dec. 8, 2016). 5 The prior DCWPCL, like the FL SA, defined liquidated damages a s the amount of unpaid wages. Amaya argues that the DCWPCL came into effect on October 1, 201 3, so his liquidated damages equal his unpaid wages from January 1, 2013 to Septembe r 30, 2013, and treble any unpaid wages after that. He cal culates his liquidated damages at $208,148.13. But the “treble damages provision” did not become effective until December 24, 2013. See Ventura, 134 F. Supp. 3d at 105 n.3. The source of Amaya’s confusion, however, could be due to the fact that the District enacted an emergen cy act—the Fiscal Year 2014 Budg et Support Emergency Act of 2013 (“A20–130”)—which authorized tre ble damage awards between October 1, 2013 and October 28, 2013. See Fiscal Year 2014 Budget Support Emergenc y Act of 2013, §§ 11001, 11003. The relevant time periods an d applicable provisions are therefore as follows: From January 1, 2013 to September 30, 2013, liquidated damages equal unpaid wages under both the FLSA and the DCWPCL; from October 1, 2013 until October 28, 201 3, liquidated damages equal treble the unpaid wages under the A20–130; from October 2 9, 2013 until December 23, 2014, liquidated damages equal unpa id wages under both the FLSA and DCWPCL; and finally, from December 24, 2014 to Octobe r 21, 2015, liquidated damages equal treble the unpaid wages

5 More precisely, under the DCWPCL, liquidated damages e qual either “10 per centum of the unpaid wages for each working day during which such failure shall continue after the day upon which payment is hereunder re quired, or an amount equal to treble the unpaid wages, whichever is smaller.” D.C. Code § 32–1303. Using the former calculation, if Amaya we re owed roughly $82,000 in unpaid wages for over a year, he would be owed at a minimum $2,900,000 in liquidated damages ($82,000 x 10% x 365 days). B ecause the second calculation would result in a smaller damage s award, the Court will treble Amaya’s unpaid wages to determine his liquidated damages. See Ventura, 738 F. Supp. 2d at 22.8 under the DCWPCL. With the dama ges provisions properly applied to the relevant time periods, Amaya’s liquidated damages total $200,261.25. See infra App. 2

. C. Attorney’s Fees, Court Costs, and Expenses

Both the FLSA and the DCWPCL aut horize reasonable attorney’s fe es and costs to employees whose rights are violated. See 29 U.S.C. § 216(b); D .C. Code § 32–1012(c). “Under FLSA, an award of attorney’s f ees to the prevailing party is ma ndatory.” Escamilla v. Nuyen, 2017 WL 23739, at *14 (D.D.C. Ja n. 3, 2017) (citing Driscoll v. George Washington Univ., 55 F. Supp. 3d 106, 112 (D.D.C. 2014)). Because the Court finds A maya is entitled to relief under the FLSA and the DCWPCL, he is lik ewise entitled to reasonable attorney’s fees.

“The initial estimate of a reasona ble attorney’s fee is properl y calculated by multiplying the number of hours reasonably expended on the litigation times a reasonable hourly rate.” Ventura, 134 F. Supp. 3d at 105 (ci ting Blum v. Stenson, 465 U. S. 886, 888 (1984)). “An attorney’s usual billing rate is presumptively the reasonable r ate, provided that th e rate is in line with those prevailing in the co mmunity for similar services by lawyers of reasonably comparable skill, experience, and reputat ion.” Id. (citing Kattan by Thom as v. District of Columbia, 995 F.2d 274, 278 (D.C. Cir. 1993) (intern al quotation marks omitte d)). “[A] moving party must affirmatively ‘demonstrate that [his] suggested rates [are] app ropriate’ by est ablishing their conformity with rates charged i n the community for similar serv ices.” Id. (quoting Eley v. District of Columbia, 793 F.3d 97, 104–05 (D.C. Cir. 2015)). Amaya seeks $9,816.80 in attorney’s fees for the 22.2 hours wor ked by attorneys

Jonathan Tucker and Justin Zelikovits and the 4.4 hours worked by their paralegal Tre Holloway. Zelikovitz has provided an affida vit detailing the hours worked , the description of the activity,

and the total costs. See MDJ , Ex. C, at 1. The Court is satis fied that Amaya has adequately9 justified the hours expende d on his case. In addition, in supp ort of their $406.00 hourly rate, Amaya’s attorneys have submitted the Legal Service Index Laffey Matrix as evidence of the prevailing rates for similar se rvices in the community. Id. at 2–4. “The Laffey Matrix sets out a general guideline for awarding a ttorneys’ fees based on experie nce.” Salazar ex rel. Salazar v. D.C., 809 F.3d 58, 62 (D.C. Cir. 2015) (citing Eley, 793 F.3d a t 101–02). There are two predominant versions of the La ffey Matrix: “(i) the Laffey Matr ix as updated by the Legal Services Index (“LSI”) of the Nationwide Consumer Price Index ( “CPI”) (the “LSI Laffey Matrix”), and (ii) the All–Item s CPI for the Washington, D.C. a rea (also known as the “USAO Laffey Matrix”).” Id. Without additi onal evidence to justify applyi ng the LSI Matrix’s higher rates for complex federal litigat ion, the Court will apply the standard USAO Laffey Matrix to calculate Amaya’s legal fees . See USAO Laffey Matrix—2015-2017 (“USAO Laffey Matrix”), available at https://www.justi ce.gov/usao-dc/file/889176/downlo ad. Both Tucker and Zelikovits have at least six years of leg al experience, see MDJ 9, and the refore, their Laffey Matrix rate is $332.00 per hour for work perfor med in 2015 and $339.00 for wor k performed in 2016, see USAO Laffey Matrix. Paralegal Ho lloway’s Laffey Matrix rate is $157.00 per hour (all of her work occurred in 2016). Based on these rates, Amaya’s attorney s’ fees total $8,181.60. Accordingly, the Court will award Amaya a total of $291,121.74; including $82,198.89 in unpaid wages, $200,261.25 in liquidated damages, $8,181.60 i n attorneys’ fees, $400.00 in court filing fees, and $80.00 i n service expenses.10 IV. Conclusion For the foregoing reasons, the Court will grant Amaya’s Motion for Entry of Default Judgment. The Court will issue a separate Order consistent wit h this Memorandum Opinion.

CHRISTOPHER R. COOPER United States District Judge Date: May 4, 201711 Appendix 1 Date Range D.C. Minimum Wage D.C. Overtime Wage Amount Owed Per Week 6 Number of Weeks Wages Owed

1/1/13 – 10/30/13 ($369.20 per week) $8.25 $12.375 $492.93 39 $19, 224.27

10/1/13 – 10/28/13 ($369.20 per week) $8.25 $12.375 $492.93 4 $1,971.72

10/29/13 – 12/23/13 ($369.20 per week ) $8.25 $12.375 $492.93 8 $3,943.44

12/24/13 – 6/30/14 ($369.20 per week) $8.25 $12.375 $492.93 27 $13,309.11

7/1/14 – 6/30/15 ($369.20 per week) $9.50 $14.25 $623.55 52 $32, 424.60

7/1/15 – 8/31/15 ($369.20 per week) $10.50 $15.75 $728.05 9 $6,552.45

9/1/15 – 10/21/15 ($415. 35 per week) $10.50 $15.75 $681.90 7 $4, 773.30

Total $82,198.89

6 Wages owed = (40 hours x applicable minimum wage) + (overtime hours [43 hours] x one and one- half times the min imum wage) - wages paid.12 Appendix 2 Date Unpaid Wages Liquidated Damages Total

1/1/13 – 9/30/13 $19,224.27 $19,224.27 $38,448.54

10/1/13 – 10/28/13 $1,971.72 $5,915.16 $7,886.88

10/28/13 – 12/23/13 $3,943.44 $3,943.44 $7,666.88

12/24/13 – 6/30/14 $13,309.11 $39,927.33 $53,236.44

7/1/14 – 6/30/15 $32, 424.60 $97,273.80 $129,698.40

7/1/15 – 8/31/15 $6,552.45 $19,657.35 $26,209.80

9/1/15 – 10/21/15 $4, 773.30 $14,319.90 $19,093.20

Total: $82,198.89 $200, 261.25 $282,460.14