### IN THE COURT OF APP EALS OF TENNESS EE AT JAC KSON N ove mb er

7, 200 7 S es sio n YELLO W TRANSPORT ATI ON, INC. v . LARRY WARD

Direc t Appeal from the Chancer y Court for Shelb y County No. CH-04-2536- I Walter L. Evans, Chan cellor

No. W2007-00946-C OA-R3-C V - Filed July 31, 2008

Employ er a

ppeals the tria l court’s g rant of pa rtial summary

judgme nt in favor o f Employ ee. T he parties e ntere d into a settlement ag ree ment o n E m p l o y ee ’s worke rs’ c ompensation claim. The ag ree ment included l an guag e that Employ ee w ould not seek fur ther e mploy

ment with Employ er. I n gra n t i n g p ar t i al s u m m ary j u d gm en tt o E mp l o y ee , th e t ri al co urt fo un d th at th e d i s p u t edl an gu age of the a g ree ment did not c reate a contra ctual oblig ation on the par t of Employ ee. We r ever se and g rant summary

judgme nt in favor of

Employ er.

Te nn. R . A pp. P . 3 ; A ppe al a s o f R igh t; Judg me nt of th e Cha nc e r y C our t R e ve r se d and Rem anded

A LA N E. H I G H ERS , P.J.,W.S., de livered the opinion of the court, in w hich H OL LY M. K IR BY , J., joined, and W. F R ANK C RAW FORD , J., did not participate.
Jeff Weintraub, J. Gregory Grisham, Da niel S. Lovett, Memphis, TN, for Appe llant
Michae l C. S kouteris, J. Chandley Craw ford, Gail O. Mathes, Memphis, TN, for AppelleeT h e first inju rie s, su ff e re d in 1 9 9 9 , ar e n o t t h e su b je c t o f th e c u rr e n t l iti g a tio n e x c e p t t o th e e x te n t t h a t t h is 1

ea r l i er i nj ur y, c oupl ed w i t h t he s ec ond i nj ur y, r es ul t ed i n a pe r m ane nt 40- pound l i ft i ng r es t r i ct i on. -2- OP IN ION

L arr y Ward (“Employ ee” ) was employ ed by Yellow Transpor tation, I n c. (“ Yellow Transpor tation,” or “Employ er” ) as a C ity Driver at i ts Memphis, Tennessee terminal. As a dr iveremploy ee, Mr

. Ward was a member of the barg aining unit r epre sented by L ocal Union #667 of the I nternational Brothe rhood of Te amsters. The terms of Mr. Ward’ s employ ment wer e g overne d by the National Ma ster Freig ht Ag ree ment, as modified by the Southern Reg ion Over- the-Road Motor F re ig ht S up ple me nta l A g re e me nt.
On or a bout November

25, 2000, Mr. Ward suffe red the secon d of two bac k injuries that
wer e found to be compensa ble worke rs’ compensation injuries. As a result of this injury , Mr. Ward 1 underw ent disk laminectomy surg ery (his second such surg ery ). This second sur g ery

was pe rfor

med by Dr. Jo h n Br o p h y
. Fo l lowing the surg ery , on or about August 22, 2001, Dr. B rophy imposed a perma nent, 40-pound lifting restric tion on Mr. Ward.
Yellow Tra

nsportation’s re quirements for the position of Cit y

Driver include a 75- pound lif tin g re qu ir e me nt. B e c a

us e Mr . Ward

wa s li mit e d to a

40 -p ou nd lif tin g re str ic tio n, he wa s una ble to perfor m one of the e ssential functions of his job. Following neg otiations, Yellow Transpor tation and Mr. Ward r eac hed a te ntative settlement of M r. W ard’s worker s’ compensation claim on or about April 19, 2004.

Ac c or din g to t

he a ff ida vit of J oh n Ca

nn on , th e a tto rn e y

on Mr . Ward ’s or ig ina l w or ke rs ’ compensation case, a fter the tentative settlement wa s rea ched, Mr . Ward undermined that ag ree ment by misrepre sent i n g h i s co ndition to Dr. Brophy in order to have the pe rmane nt, 40-pound lifting
re str ic tio n w a ive d, to w it:

After the settlement wa s rea ched, War d went to Dr. B rophy on that same da y , April 19, 2 0 0 4

. Acc ording to Dr. B rophy ’s notes, Ward tol d h im that he ha d be e n wo rk ing the pa st two and a ha lf y e ars a s a t r u c k dr i v e r w i t h i nt h e 4 0

- p o un d

l i f t i n g r e s tr i c t i o n , w i th o u td i f f i c u l ty. Ward further told Dr. Brophy that he needed an unrestric ted clea ranc e to work in order to a

pply for a position wit h the U.S. Post Office, but that the pos ition he was applying for would not require lifting more than 40 pounds. Relying o n t h ese misreprese ntations, Dr. B rophy lif te d th e pe rm ane nt r e str ic tio ns

. Dr. B rophy ’s notes, which w ere attache d as an e x hibit to M r. Cannon’s a ffidavit desc ribe the inc ide nt a s f

oll ow s:-3- Postoperatively , [Mr. W ard’ s] pain i m p ro ved and he reque sted an opportunity

to return to wor

k at full duty . At that time, we discussed the fa c t th a t hi s p ri mary ri sk lon g te rm wa s bac k pa in an d h e sh ou ld ref rain fr om lifting over 40 pounds. Mr. Ward insisted on returning to work at full duty with Y ellow Fr eig ht; however , the job descr iption require d liftin g to 75 pounds. As Mr. Ward ref used to follow the g uidelines, he wa s d esi g nated with a pe rmane nt 40 pound lifting
re str ic tio n w hic h s ub se qu e ntl y dis qu a lif ied him fr om r e tur

n[in g ] to work at Yellow Fr eig ht. H e re turned to my office on 19 April, 2004
re po rt ingtha

t he ha d be e n wo rk ing the pa st two and a ha lf y e ars a s a trucke r within the 4 0 pound lifting re striction and was ha ving no difficulty . He indicated t o me that he wa s now applying f or a job which did not require lifting ove r 40 pounds; h o we v er, he nee ded administrative clea

ranc e to return to work at full duty without restric tion. As stated in my note of 19 Apr il, 2004, we discussed the i mp o rt ance of his phy sical co n d i t i o n i n g an d m i n i m i z i n g h ea v y

l i ft i n g. On April 26, 2004, Mr. Ward f iled a Gr ievanc e under the company ’s collec tive barg aining ag ree ment with Teamster s L ocal 667, se ekingreinstateme nt at Yellow Tra nsportation based upon the fa ct that Dr. B rophy

had wa ived the lifting restric tion. Upon learningof th e fi ling of the Grieva nce, counsel for Ye llow Transportation notified Dr. B rophy of the situation. Dr. B rophy ’s
c ha rt no te s r e a d, in p e rt ine nt p art , a s f oll ow s:
Counsel for Ye llow Fre ight...notified me t o d ay by phone that Mr. War d is no w d e mand ingre ins tate me nt t o h is o ld job a ft e r a g re e ingto
a se ttl e me nt o f h is Wo rke rs ’ C omp e ns a tio n c la im r e late d to his la st surg ery , based on my clea ranc e to return to wor

k on 19 April, 2004. Mr. Ward obtained this clea ranc e under

fal s e p retenses. He ha s a pp are ntl y lie d a bo ut h is e mpl oy

me nt a s a tr

uc ke r fo r t

he pa st 2 -1 /2 y ears as we l l as his plan to apply for a job at the Post Office which did no t r equ ir e lif

tin g ov e r 4 0 p ound s. B a se d o n o ur dis c us sio n in 2001, he cle arly

understood that the job at Ye llow Fre ight e ntailed lif tin g up to 7 5 p ound s. Mr . Wa rd is p layingg ame s a

nd a pp arent ly
c ann ot b e tr

us te d to fo llo w the ba sic me dic a l guid e lin e of lim iti nghis lifting to under

40 pounds. His permane nt 40 pound lifting re striction is theref ore r einstated a s it was chang ed under false pr etense s on 19 April, 2004. On May 26, 2004, Mr. Cannon sent Mr. Ward’ s attorney a l et t er , informing him of Mr. Ward’s conduc t. Mr. Cannon then insisted, as a condition for c ontinuing with the settlement, that the fo llo wi nglangua g e be ins e rt e d into t he Se ttl e me nt A g re e me nt:-4- Sect i o n 2 .4 I ndustrial Disability Rating: The Parties ag ree that the injury has resulted in Plaintiff suffe ring an industrial disability rating of 36.8% to the body

as a whole takinginto account Employ ee’ s ag e, e du c a tio n, sk ill s and

tr a ini ng , lo c a l jo b o pp or

tun iti e s, and c a

pa c ity to work at ty

pes of e mploy

ment av ai lable in Employ ee’ s disabled
c on dit ion

. Th e Em

plo y e e a c kn ow le dg e s that due to his lim itatio ns , he does not be lieve that he c an ca rry out the essential job func tions of any job or position to which he may be qualified, with orwithout
a c c omm od a tio ns wi th the e mpl oy e r, and the re fo re ha s e le c te d n ot t o return to wor

k for Ye llow Fre ight now or in the future.
Wit h the inclusion of the new languag e, the Settlement A g ree ment was fina liz ed. On June 18, 2004, the S ettlement Agre ement was approve d by the Tenne ssee De partment of L abor, D ivision of Workers’ Compensation Sec tion. The Workers’ Compensation c ase, which had be en filed in the Circuit Court at Shelby

County , was dismissed with prejudice by consent orde r of June 21, 2004.

Ba sed upon the Sec tion 2.4 languag e of the S ettlement Ag ree ment, by letter of Aug ust 12, 2004, Yellow Transpor

tation r emoved Mr. Ward from its seniority roster. O n August 26, 2004, Mr. Ward filed a se cond for

mal Grieva

nce w ith the Teamster s L ocal Union No. 6 6 7 , cl aiming that he was improper ly

and unjustifiably

remove d from the se niority roster. Conseque nt l y , M r. Ward
re qu e ste d th a t he be re ins tate d to fu ll d uty wi th se nio ri ty

and a ll l os t e arn ing s. In r e sp on se to t his Grieva nce, on O ctober

6, 2004, Yellow Tra

nsportation fi l ed a Mot ion to Enforce the Settlement Ag ree ment. This motion was denied on the g rounds that, bec ause t h e W o rk er s’ Compensation action had be en dismissed with prejudice, the trial court did not have jurisdiction to rule on the Motion.

On Dec ember

17, 2004, Yellow Tra

nsportation filed a Complaint for Br eac h of Contrac t and I njunctive re lief ag ainst Mr. Ward, asser ting that the Aug ust 26, 2004 G rieva nce f iled by Mr. Ward
v io late d th e Se tt le me n t A g r e e me n t. Co n s e qu e n tl y , Y e ll o w T r an s p o rtati o n a s k e d th e c o urt for an order enfor cingthe Settlement Ag ree ment, and for an injunction prohibiting Mr. Ward f rom seeking further employ ment with Yellow Tra

nsportation and fr om pursuing the Grieva nce. On J anuar

y 18, 20 05 , M r. War d f

ile d h is A ns we r, in whic h h e de nie s th e mate ri a l alle g a tio ns of the Com pla int

. Contemporaneously

there with, Mr. Ward filed a c ounter-c omplaint ag ainst Yellow Tra nsportation, seekingjudicial modification and/or r escission of the Settlement Ag ree ment, and alleg ing c ommonl aw r e t a l i a t o r

y d i s c h ar g e , v i o l a t i o no f

th e T e n n e s s e e H u m anR i g h t s A c t , an d i n v a s i o no f

p r i v a c y. Yellow Tra

nsportation answe red the counter -complaint on Fe bruar y 18, 2005, denying the materia l alleg ations contained the rein.

On Marc h 7, 2005, the trial cour t issued a Tempora

ry Injunction, which enjoined Mr. War d, or other s ac t i n g on his behalf, f rom “pa rticipating in, assisting, or in any way further ing the proce ssing of

Ward’s August 26, 2004 Grieva nce via Teamsters L ocal 667 a g ainst Plainti ff Ye llow Transpor tation, I nc. see kin g reinstateme nt, employ ment, or re -employ

ment on the YellowBec aus e M r
. W ar d’ s M ot i on f or Sum m ar y J udgm ent a ddr es s ed onl y t he r es ci s s i on/ j udi ci al m odi f i ca t i on of 2 t he Se t t l em ent A gr ee m ent , a nd di d not a ddr es s M r
. W ar d’ s cl ai m s for r et al i at or y di s cha r ge, TH RA , or i nvas i on of p riv a c y , t h e trial c o u rt tre a te d M r. W a rd ’s m o tio n a s a m o tio n fo r p a rtia l su m m a ry ju d g m e n t. -5- Transpor tation, I nc. S eniority list, or eng ag ing in a ny other e ffor

ts or activities desig ned to see k such
re i n s t at em en t , em p l o y

m en t , o r r e- em p l o y

m en t ” p en d i n g a f

u l l h ea ri n g.
On Aug ust 10, 2005, Mr. Ward filed a Motion for Summary

J udg ment. In his moti on, Mr.

2 Ward asser

ts that the t rial cour

t should rescind or judicially modify the terms of the Settlement Ag ree ment based, i n t e r

a lia , upon

Mr . Ward ’s a sse rt ion s th a t: ( 1) the Se ttl e me nt A g re e me nt i s unenfor cea

ble beca use the last sentence of Para g raph 2.4 [ se e su pra ] was a “f

orce remova l” clause , wh ic h is ill e g a l un de r Te nn e sse e law; (2 ) t he Se ttl e me nt A g re e me nt l a c ke d mutua l a sse nt b e c a us e the last s en t en ce of Para g raph 2.4 is “va g ue and a mbiguous;” a

nd (3) the Settlement Agree ment lacke d adequate consider ation and, as suc h, did not constitut e an e nforc eable bargai n ed-for exchang e.
On S ep t emb er 3 0 , 2 0 0 5 , Ye l l o w Tr an s p o rt at i o n re s p o n d ed t o M r. W ar d ’s M o t i o n

. In
c on jun c tio n w ith the re sp on se , Ye llo w Tr ans po rt a tio n fil e d its own Mo tio n f or Sum mary

Judg me nt, arguing that the languag e of Par ag raph 2.4 of the Settlement A g ree ment is plain and unambig uous and , th e re fo re , s ho uld

be e nf or c e d a c c or din g to t

he int e nt o f t

he p artie s ( a s e xpre sse d in the pla in lang uag e conta ined in the Settlement Ag ree ment). Followinga hea

ring , on Marc h 30, 2007, the trial cour t entere d its “Order

on Cross-Motions fo r S umm ary

Judg me nt, ” wh ic h O rd e r r e a ds , in re le va nt p art , a s f

oll ow s:
1. As held i n previous hearing s in this m atter, the Court finds that the lang uag e conta ined in the last sentence o f S ec tion 2.4 of the Settlement Ag ree ment enter ed into b y t h e par ties is clear

and
un ambi g uo us

. 2. The Court’s readingof the plain languag e of the last sentence of Section 2.4 i s as follows: Section 2.4 provides Mr. Ward with the option or elec tion to seek employ ment at Yellow and doe s not prec lude Ward fr om seekingemploy ment with Yellow, if he
re a so na bly be lie ve s h e c an p e rf

or m th e essen tia l f

un c tio ns of

his former job.

3. I t is th e Court ’s op ini on that th e la st s e nte nc e of

Se c tio n 2 .4 is a unilatera l rec og nition of Mr. Ward’s belief as t o his condition at the time of the execution of the Settlement A g ree ment. The Settlement Ag ree ment does not say that it is conditi on al upon Mr. Ward’s ag ree ing not to re turn to work at Ye llow.-6- 4. Mr. Ward’s s t at em en t that he now be lieves he c an per form the
e sse nti a l f

un c tio ns of

the dr ive r’ s p os itiona t Y e llo w s e rv e s a s h is elec tion to attempt to s eek e mploy ment with Yellow. The Court and the par ties rec og nize that Mr. Ward rema ins subject to a 40-pound lif tin g re str ic tio n th a t w ou ld c ur re ntl y pr e ve nt h is e mp loy

me nt a s a driver w ith Yellow; however Ward believe s the 40-pound re striction is unenforc eable bec au s e o f his belief that it was re- instated under fa lse pr e te ns e s.
* * *

I T I S, T HE REF OR E, ORDE RED that:
1. Yellow’s Motion for Sum mary J udg ment is denied, and Mr. Ward’s Motion for Summary J udg ment is g rante d. As such, Mr. Ward may

seek e mploy

ment with Yellow.

2. B a se d on Mr. War d’ s att or ne y s’ no tic e in o pe n c ourt , h is Counter-Complaint and all its re maining claims contained the rein a re here by voluntarily

dismiss ed, without prejudice

. Yellow Tra

nsportation appea ls and raise s two issues for re view as state d in its brief:

1. Whe the r t

he tr ia l c ourt

e rr e d in de ny in g s umm ary

jud g me nt t o Appellant, in that it failed to interpr et the plain and una mbiguous langua g e of

the Ag re e me nt b e tw e e n the pa rt ie s, in a c c or da

nc e wi th the law of contra ct interpre tation in Tennessee , to mean that Section 2.4 of the Ag ree ment, rea d in its entirety , constitutes an elec tion by Appellee not to return to work f or Appe llant now or in the future

. 2. Whether t h e t rial cour t erre d in gr anting Appellee ’s motion for partial summary

judgme nt for the same re asons as stated in 1., above

. I t is well settled that a motion for summary judgme nt sh o u l d b e gra n t ed whe n the movant demonstrates that there a

re no g enuine issues of material fa ct and that the movingparty is entitled to a judgme nt a s a matter o f l aw. SeeTenn. R. Civ. P. 56.04. The party moving f

or summary judgme nt bear s the burden of demonstrating that no g enuine issue of materia l fac t exi sts. Se eBai n v . W e lls , 936 S.W .2d 618, 622 (Tenn.1997) . On a motion for summary judgme nt, the court must take the str on g e st l e g iti mate vie w o f e vid e nc e in f avo r o f t he no nmo vin g pa

rt y , a llow a ll r e a so na

ble infere nces in fa

vor of that pa

rty , and disca

rd all counte rvailing evidenc e. See id. I n By rd v . Ha ll , 847 S.W .2d 208 (Tenn.1993) , our Supreme Court state d:-7- Once it is shown by

th e m o v i n g p arty

that there is no ge nuine issue of mater ial fac t, the nonmoving pa rty must then demonstrate, by aff idavits or discovery materia l, that there is a g enuine, mate rial fa ct dispute to warr ant a trial. I n this reg ard, Rule 56.05 pr ovides that the nonmoving pa

rty cannot simply

rely upon his pleading s but must s et forth spec ific fa cts showing that there is a g enuine issue of mater ial fa c t f or tr ia l.

Id . at 211 (c itations omi tted). Summary judgme nt is only

appropr iate when the fac ts a nd the leg al conc lusions drawn fr om the fa cts rea sonably

permit only

one conc lusion. S

e eC a r v e l l v . B o t t o ms , 9 0 0 S

. W .2d 23, 26 (T e nn .1 99 5) . B e c a

us e on ly qu e sti on s o f l aw a

re inv ol ved , th ere i s n o p re sumpt ion of c or re c tne ss reg ardinga trial c ourt’s g rant or de nial of summary judgme nt. Se eBai

n , 926 S.W .2d at 622. There fore , our review of the t rial cour t's grant of summar

y judgme nt is de novo on the rec ord bef ore this Court. Se eWa rren v . Es tat eof Kir k , 954 S.W .2d 722, 723 (Tenn.1997)

. The languag e used in a

contra ct must be taken and understood in its plain, ordinary , and popular sense

. Bob Pearsall Motors , I n c. v. R egal Chrysler-Plymou th, In c. , 521 S.W .2d 578 (Tenn.1975 ). I n construingcontra cts, the words e x pressingthe par ties' intentions should be given the usual, natura l, and ordinar y meaning

. Ballard v. North Am erican L ife & Casualt y Co. , 667 S.W .2d 79 (Tenn.Ct.App.1983). I f the languag e of a written instrument is unambiguous, the Court
mus t in te rp re t it a s wr itt e n rathe r tha n a c c or din g to the un e xpre sse d inte nti on of on e of the pa rt ie s. Sutto n v . Fi rst Na t'l Bank , 620 S.W .2d 526 (Tenn.C t

. Ap p

. 1981). A c ontrac t is not ambiguous
me re ly be c a us e the pa

rt ie s h ave dif

fe re nt i nte rp re tatio ns of

the c on tr a c t' s v ari ou s p ro vis ion s, Cookeville Gynec ology & Obstetrics, P.C. v
. Sout heastern Data S

ys . , I nc. , 884 S.W .2d at 462 (c i t i n g Oman Const

r. Co. v . Te nne sse e V all e y Autho rit y , 486 F.Supp. 375, 382 (M.D.Te nn.1979)),
nor ca n this Court create an ambiguity wher e none e x ists in t he contr act. Coo ke v ill eP. C. , 884 S

. W

. 2 d at 4 6 2 (c i t i n g Edwards v.. Travelers Indem . Co. , 201 Tenn. 435, 300 S.W.2d 615, 617-18 (1957)) . The interpr etation of a written contra ct is a matter of l aw and not of fa ct, see Rainey v
. Sta nse ll , 8 36 S.W. 2d

11 7 ( Te nn .Ct .App .1 99 2) . Co ns e qu e ntl y , c on structi on of the c on tr a c t is p arti c u la r ly s u it e d to d is p o s it io nb y

s u mm ar y ju d g me nt. Id. at 119. Ther efor e, we revie w the trial
cou rt ' s f ind ingc on c e rn ingthe a g re e me nt b e tw e e n th e se pa rt ie s de novo u

p o n th e r e c o r d w ith no presumption of corr ection acc ompanying the trial court' s conclusions of law. SeeTe nn . R. Ap p. P. 13 (d ); Waldron v. Delffs , 98 8 S .W. 2d 18 2, 18 4 ( Te nn .Ct .App .1 99 8) ; Sims v . St e wart , 973 S.W .2d 597, 599-600 (Te nn.Ct.App.1998).
The c ontention betwee n these p ar t i es involves the interpre tation of Paragraph 2.4 of the Settlement Ag ree ment, which Para g raph is set for th in its entirety

above. On appea l, Yellow Transpor tation asserts, inte r a lia , th at t h e p l ain and unambiguous languag e of this par ag raph contra ctually

obligates Mr. Ward to re fra in from s eeking employ ment with Yellow Tra

nsportation not only at the time that the agree ment was e ntere d, but also g oing f orwa rd. Mr. Ward a

rgues, and the trial cour

t found, that the disputed languag e is mere ly an a ck n o wl ed gm ent of Mr. W ard’ sT h e b rie fs o n a p p e a l re fe r to D e p a rtm e n t o f L a b o r p ro c e d u ra l sa fe g u a rd s p e rta in in g to a n e m p lo y e e w h o is 3

r equi r ed t o gi ve up hi s j ob i n or der t o r ec ei ve hi s w or ker ’ s c om pens at i on s et t l em ent

. T h e p refat o ry l angua ge on t he
r eas on f or W ar d’s deci s i on , as w el l as t he use o f t he w ord “el ect i on ” i n t he A gree m ent , m ay have been t o i nd i cat e t hat W ar d w as not “r equi r ed” t o gi ve up hi s j ob

. R egar dl es s , t he t i m e f or W ar d t o r ai s e t he i s s ue of w het her hi s deci s i on w as “f or ce d” or w het her t he D epa r t m ent of Labor s afegua r ds a r e appl i ca bl e w oul d ha ve bee n w hen t he Se t t l em ent A gr ee m ent w as a ppr oved, or i n a n a ppea l or Rul e 60 m ot i on on t he pr i or t r i al c our t ’ s a ppr oval of t he Se t t l em ent A g re e m e n t. It is u n d isp u te d th a t W a rd w a s re p re se n te d b y c o u n se l i n sig n in g th e A g re e m e n t. -8- subjective be lief that he, at the time of the m ak i n g o f the ag ree ment, was una ble to perf

orm the
e sse nti a l fu

nc tio ns of any job a t Ye llo w Tr ans po rt a tio n, re g ard le ss of a c c omm od a tion; and th a t, be c a us e of his c ur re nt b e lie f, he wo uld no t se e k e mpl oy me nt w ithYe llo w T ra

ns po rt a tio n. B e c a

us e the trial court found that the “e lection” not to see k employ ment was ba sed solely

upon Mr. Ward’s subjective opinion as to his ability to pe rfor m sa id job, if and when Mr. Ward subjectively chang ed his mind, and decided that he was, in f act, able to pe rfor

m, he could, ac cordingto the trial court’ s interpre tation, seek e mploy ment with Yellow Tra

nsportation at that time. We ag ree with the trial court that the la ng uag e in Para g raph 2.4 of the Settlement Ag ree ment is plain and unambig uous. We di s agr ee , howeve r, with the trial cour t’s interpre tation of the lang uag e.
The trial court char acte rizes Paragraph 2.4 as a “ unilatera l rec og nition of Mr. Ward’s belief
a s to his c on dit ion

a t th e tim e of

the e xec uti on

of the Se ttl e me nt A g re e ment ,” and say s th a t it “provide s Mr. Ward with the option or elec tion to seek employ ment at Yellow a

nd does not prec lude Ward from see king e mploy ment with Yellow, if he r easona bly believes he can perfor m the essential functions of his forme r job.” We respec tfully

dis ag ree with this analy sis of the Ag ree ment. In the Ag ree ment, Ward “ac knowledg es that due to his limi tation, he does not believe that he ca n car ry out the essential job fu nc tio ns of any job or po sit ion to whic h h e may

be qu a lif ie d, wi th o r w ith out a c c omm od a tio ns wi th [Yellow Tr ansportation]. .

. .” This la ng uag e ref

lects the rea son for Ward’s decision, w h i ch m ay have be en important in rec eiving the prior trial court’s a pproval of the settlement of Ward’s w orker ’s
c omp e ns a tio n c la im, to s ho w that hi s d e c isi on wa s v olu nta ry and ha d a re a so na ble ba sis

. 3 At this point , howeve r, the re ason for Ward’s dec ision is not deter minative. The ope rative lang uag e in the Settlement A g ree ment to be interpre ted at this juncture is the statement that Ward “has e lected not t o re t u rn to work for Yellow F reig ht Sy stems now or in the future .” W EB S TER ’ S D I CT I O N A RY define s the term “e lect” a s “to choose.” W e bs te r’ s I I N e w Co lle geDi c tio na ry

369 (3d ed. 2005). Thus, “ has elec ted” means that Ward has made a choice or dec ision not t o return to wor k for Ye llow Transportation. Addition of the phra se “nowor in the future ” cle arly means that Ward has made a dec ision not t o eve r return to wor

k for Ye llow Transportation.

F ro m ou r r e vie w o f the Se ttl e me nt Agre e me nt a s a wh ole , it i s a lso c le ar t hat th e mon ie s p a id to Wa rd un de r t he Agre e me nt were con sid e ratio n in pa rt fo r Wa rd ’s e le c tio n n ot t o e ve r r e tur n to work for Yellow Tra

nsportation. Havingmade the de cision not to ever r eturn to work f or Ye llow-9-

Transpor ta ti on, and havingacc epted c onsideration fr om Yellow Tra nsportation in return f

or it, Ward
c ann ot n owre ne g e on

his a g re e me nt.
There fore , we r ever se the trial court’s gra nt of partial summary judgme nt in favor of Ward, and re verse the trial court’s denial of Yellow Transpor tation’s motion for summary judgme nt. The
cause is remande d with directions to enter an orde r g rantingYellow Tra nsportati o n ’s m otion for
summa ry jud g me nt.
The de cision of the trial c ourt is reve rsed, a nd the ca use is rema

nded as se t f

o rth above

. Cos ts o f t his a pp e a l are a sse sse d a g a ins t App e lle e L arr y War d, fo r whic h e xecut io n may iss ue if
n e c e s s ar y.



### ______________________________ AL ANE. HI GH ER S, P. J., W. S.