Circuit Judge Evans died on August 10, 2011, and did not 

participate in the decision of this case, which is being

resolved by a quorum of the panel under 28 U.S.C. § 46(d).

The Honorable Charles N. Clevert, Jr., United States District



Court for the Eastern District of Wisconsin, sitting by designation.

In the

United States Court of Appeals

For the Seventh Circuit

No. 10-3848

SYNTHIA G. ROSS, JAMES KAPSA, and SHARON WELLS,

on behalf of themselves and all others similarly situated,

Plaintiffs-Appellees,

v.

RBS CITIZENS, N.A. d/b/a CHARTER ONE and

CITIZENS FINANCIAL GROUP, INC.,

Defendants-Appellants.

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division.

No. 09 CV 5695—Joan Humphrey Lefkow, Judge.

ARGUED APRIL 12, 2011—DECIDED JANUARY 27, 2012

Before KANNE and EVANS , Circuit Judges and



CLEVERT, District Judge.


2 No. 10-3848

Plaintiff Wells worked for Charter One in Ohio. She is not a 1

party to this appeal because she has no claim against Charter

One under the Illinois Minimum Wage Law.

KANNE, Circuit Judge. Synthia Ross, James Kapsa, and

Sharon Wells filed this class action against RBS Citizens, 1

N.A. doing business as Charter One (a related entity,

Citizens Financial Group, Inc. is also named but for

simplicity, it need not be mentioned) for allegedly

violating the Fair Labor Standards Act, 29 U.S.C. § 216(b),

and the Illinois Minimum Wage Law (“IMWL”), 820 ILCS

§ 105/1 et seq. The central claim is that the plaintiffs

and other similarly situated employees and former employees of Charter One were denied overtime pay to

which they were entitled. For the IMWL claim, the

district court granted the plaintiffs’ motion to certify

two classes. Charter One challenges the district court’s

class certification order solely on the ground that it

did not comply with Rule 23(c)(1)(B) of the Federal Rules

of Civil Procedure. Following oral argument, the

Supreme Court clarified the Rule 23(a) commonality

element in Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 131 S. Ct.

2541 (2011). Shortly thereafter, we requested the

parties file statements of position addressing

whether the class certification order satisfied Dukes.

We now affirm. 
No. 10-3848 3

I. BACKGROUND

Charter One operates more than 100 bank branches in

Illinois. Most are traditional stand-alone branches, and

the rest are small “in-store” branches usually located

inside places like supermarkets. The branches are organized into seven regions, each with a regional manager

who reports to the state director. Employees at the

Illinois branches are organized, for overtime purposes, into two categories: “exempt” and “non-exempt.”

The non-exempt category is comprised of employees

who do more routine tasks—like tellers and personal

bankers—all of whom are eligible to receive overtime

pay when they work more than forty hours per week.

The exempt category is comprised of branch managers

and assistant branch managers (“ABMs”). These employees are ineligible to receive overtime pay.

Synthia Ross began working as a teller at a Chicago

branch in 2000 and was later promoted to teller manager

before her employment terminated in 2007. James Kapsa

was hired as an ABM at a branch in St. Charles, Illinois,

in 2007 and became acting branch manager for a short

period of time before switching roles to become a

personal banker. Kapsa spent time at several other

Illinois branches before his employment terminated in

2009. Ross alleges that Charter One has an unofficial

policy of denying overtime pay to its non-exempt employees by: (1) instructing them not to record hours

worked per week over forty; (2) erasing or modifying

recorded overtime hours; (3) giving them “comp time”

instead of paying overtime; and (4) requiring them to
4 No. 10-3848

perform work during unpaid breaks. Kapsa alleges

that Charter One illegally denies ABMs overtime pay by

misclassifying their positions as exempt even though

ABMs spend the majority of their time performing nonexempt work. Charter One denies that any such

unofficial policy exists, and further contends that ABMs

are correctly classified as exempt employees.

Plaintiffs sought to certify two classes for the IMWL

claim—the “Hourly” class and the “ABM” class. The

proposed Hourly class definition is:

All current and former non-exempt employees of

[Charter One] who have worked at their Charter

One retail branch locations in Illinois at any time

during the last three years, who were subject to

[Charter One’s] unlawful compensation policies

of failing to pay overtime compensation for all

hours worked in excess of forty per work week.

The proposed ABM class definition is:

All current and former Assistant Branch Manager

employees of [Charter One] who have worked at

their Charter One retail branch locations in

Illinois at any time during the last three years,

who were subject to [Charter One’s] unlawful

compensation policies of failing to pay overtime

compensation for all hours worked in excess of

forty per work week.

In a carefully reasoned seventeen-page opinion and

order, Judge Lefkow found that the plaintiffs satisfied

the four class-action prerequisites of Federal Rule of
No. 10-3848 5

In the guise of suggesting that a remand would be futile, 2

Charter One devotes a fair portion of its briefs arguing

that both certified classes are fundamentally unsuitable for

class treatment. But, our November 30, 2010, order granting

defendant’s motion for leave to appeal pursuant to

Rule 23(f) limited our review to “the sole issue of whether

the district court complied with Rule 23(c)(1)(B).” Thus,

(continued...)

Civil Procedure 23(a), namely: numerosity, commonality,

typicality, and adequacy of representation. She also

found that the plaintiffs satisfied Rule 23(b)(3), which

requires that “questions of law or fact common to

class members predominate over any questions affecting only individual members, and that a class action

is superior to other available methods for fairly and

efficiently adjudicating the controversy.” The district

court then certified both classes as opt-out classes under

Rule 23(b)(3) based on the proposed class definitions.

Charter One filed this timely interlocutory appeal

pursuant to Rule 23(f). On September 14, 2011, following

oral argument, we asked the parties to file statements

of position describing whether the certified classes

satisfy the Dukes conception of commonality.

II. ANALYSIS

Charter One appealed the district court’s certification

order, and this interlocutory appeal is now before us on

(1) the very narrow issue of whether the district court

judge’s certification order complied with Rule 23(c)(1)(B)2
6 No. 10-3848

(...continued) 2

we decline to review Charter One’s suitability argument

to the extent it does not directly respond to our September 14, 2011, order requesting position statements discussing whether Dukes alters the district court’s commonality

analysis.

In Spano, referring to classes certified under Rule 23(b)(1), we 3

wrote, “[T]he most important part of that order is the place

where it defines the class. This is a vital step. Both the scope

of the litigation and the ultimate res judicata effect of the

(continued...)

and (2) whether the two certified classes satisfy the commonality prerequisite post-Dukes. We review class certification decisions for an abuse of discretion. Ervin v.

OS Rest. Servs., Inc., 632 F.3d 971, 976 (7th Cir. 2011).

But, “[i]f a district court’s findings rest on an erroneous

view of the law, they may be set aside on that basis.”

Cooter & Gell v. Hartmarx Corp., 496 U.S. 384, 402 (1990)

(quotation marks omitted); Ervin, 632 F.3d at 976.

A. Defining the Class and the Class Claims, Issues, or Defenses

Rule 23(c)(1)(B) was added to the Federal Rules in 2003.

The Rule provides, “An order that certifies a class action

must define the class and the class claims, issues, or

defenses, and must appoint class counsel under Rule

23(g).” Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(c)(1)(B). Although we touched

briefly on the importance of properly defining the class,

claims, issues, and defenses in Spano v. Boeing Co.,

633 F.3d 574 (7th Cir. 2011), the exact contours of 3
No. 10-3848 7

(...continued) 3

final judgment depend on the class definition.” 633 F.3d at 583-

84 (citations omitted). We ultimately reversed the district

court’s certification order, and thus, had no need to fully

interpret Rule 23(c)(1)(B).

The First Circuit, in dictum, adopted the reasoning in 4

Wachtel. In re Pharm. Indus. Average Wholesale Price Litig., 588

F.3d 24, 38-41 (1st Cir. 2009).

Rule 23(c)(1)(B) is an issue of first impression for us.

See also Simer v. Rios, 661 F.2d 655, 670 (7th Cir. 1981) (presubsection (c)(1)(B) case finding that proper class identification “alerts the court and parties to the burdens

that such a process might entail” and “insures that

those actually harmed by defendants’ wrongful conduct will be the recipients of the relief eventually provided”).

Only the Third Circuit has fully addressed the meaning

of Rule 23(c)(1)(B). Wachtel ex rel. Jesse v. Guardian Life

Ins. Co. of Am., 453 F.3d 179 (3d Cir. 2006). The Wachtel 4

court started its analysis, as it must, with the rule’s text.

See Barnhart v. Sigmon Coal Co., 534 U.S. 438, 450 (2002).

The Third Circuit reasoned:

To “define” a thing or concept is “to state precisely

or determinately [its boundaries]; to specify” or

“[t]o frame or give a precise description” of a thing.

Oxford English Dictionary (2d ed. 1989). According

to the Rule, those things to be defined in a certification order include the “class and the class claims,

issues, or defenses. . . .” Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(c)(1)(B)
8 No. 10-3848

(emphasis added). The above elements occur in

a conjunctive, undifferentiated list, indicating

that the requirement to “define” the “class claims,

issues or defenses” is identical to the requirement

to define the “class” itself within a given certification order. Id. Furthermore, the use of the definite

article “the” before “class claims, issues, or defenses” connotes comprehensiveness and specificity, rather than illustrative or partial treatment,

in defining those aspects of class action certification.

Wachtel, 453 F.3d at 185.

We find this interpretation persuasive, especially when

read in conjunction with the history and purpose of the

2003 amendments to Rule 23. Although the Advisory

Committee Notes accompanying these amendments

do not specifically address subsection (c)(1)(B), the published report of the Standing Committee on Rules

of Practice and Procedure introduced the proposed

Rule 23 amendments by noting that the Rule 23(c)(1)(B)

requirement “facilitates application of the interlocutoryappeal provision of Rule 23(f) by requiring that a court . . .

define the class it is certifying and identify the class

claims, issues, and defenses.” Comm. on Rules of

Practice and Procedure, Judicial Conference, Report of the

Judicial Conference, 8, 11 (Sept. 2002). Without a precise

definition of the class, claims, issues, and defenses, it

would be exceedingly difficult for this court to review

the propriety of a class certification order.
No. 10-3848 9

The Third Circuit’s plain reading of the Rule is also

supported by the Federal Rule’s apparent move

towards the creation of voluntary trial plans. In observing courts’ increased use of class-action trial plans,

the Advisory Committee noted that the “critical need is

to determine how the case will be tried.” Fed. R. Civ.

P. Rule 23 advisory committee’s note. The justification

for a clear trial plan applies with equal force to subsection (c)(1)(B). In other words, there is a critical need

to define the class, claims, issues, and defenses so the

parties can adequately prepare for trial. See also Simer,

661 F.2d at 670.

Given the text, history, and purpose of Rule 23 and

the importance we ascribed to precise class definitions

in Spano and Simer, we agree with the Third Circuit’s

interpretation of subsection (c)(1)(B). Wachtel, 453 F.3d

at 187-88. Therefore, we hold that the appropriate substantive inquiry for Rule 23(c)(1)(B) is “whether the

precise parameters defining the class and a complete list

of the claims, issues, or defenses to be treated on a class

basis are readily discernible from the text either of the

certification order itself or of an incorporated memorandum opinion.” Id. at 185. This means that an order

(or incorporated opinion) must include two elements:

“(1) a readily discernible, clear, and precise statement of

the parameters defining the class or classes to be

certified, and (2) a readily discernible, clear, and complete list of the claims, issues or defenses to be treated on

a class basis.” Id. at 187-88. The question confronting

us now is whether the district judge’s certification

order meets this standard. Although there might be
10 No. 10-3848

some room for the district court to have drafted a

clearer certification order, we find the trial court

did not abuse its discretion in defining the class and

the class claims, issues, or defenses for both the Hourly

and ABM classes.

1. Defining the Class

Charter One first challenges whether the class was

properly defined. The district court’s certification order

created an Hourly class and an ABM class both of

which included employees and former employees “who

were subject to defendants’ unlawful compensation policies” (emphasis added). Charter One contends that the

class certification order creates a conditional class that

hinges on whether its overtime policy was unlawful. To

the defendant, the term “unlawful” suggests that the

court must first determine liability before class membership can be determined. Without a precise class definition, Charter One warns that it is impossible to send

notice to class members as required by Rule 23(c)(2)(B).

Although there is perhaps some minor ambiguity in

the certification order, the district court’s memorandum

opinion accompanying the order eliminates any

potential for confusion. In fact, Judge Lefkow concluded

in her Rule 23(b)(3) predominance analysis that an unlawful policy could be inferred based on “the number of

people making the same allegations across branches,

managers, positions, and time frames.” Ross v. RBS

Citizens, N.A., No. 09 CV 5695, 2010 WL 3980113, at *6

(N.D. Ill. Oct. 8, 2010). For purposes of class certification,
No. 10-3848 11

The plaintiffs’ Motion for Approval of Class Notices and the 5

attached proposed notice for the Hourly class is directed to

“current and former Charter One Illinois bankers, personal

bankers, tellers, teller managers, head tellers and senior tellers

working at Charter One’s Illinois retail branch locations

(continued...)

Judge Lefkow found that all current and former employees who have worked at an Illinois Charter One

location within the last three years were subject to an

unlawful overtime policy, and as such, qualify as class

members. Thus, the certification order, when read in

conjunction with the memorandum opinion, leaves no

doubt about which employees and former employees

constitute the class.

Furthermore, the potential harms of a poorly-defined

class are not implicated by the district court’s alleged

lack of precision. For example, our review of the certification order and memorandum opinion was in no way

diluted by an imprecise class definition. As we have

already made clear, we read Judge Lefkow’s wellreasoned seventeen-page opinion and order to define

both classes as consisting of all Hourly and ABM employees and former employees who have worked at

Charter One during the previous three years. Similarly,

the Simer justifications for a clear class definition do

not come into play. Here, employees and former

employees within the past three years are on notice of

how their rights might be affected by litigating this

dispute as a class because the plaintiffs’ proposed

notice mirrors the district court’s certification order.5
12 No. 10-3848

(...continued) 5

who were employed in this position from October 23, 2006 to

the present.” Further, the description of the Hourly claim

specifically mentions four mechanisms Charter One allegedly

employed in failing to pay overtime. Likewise, the proposed

notice for the ABM class is directed to “all current and former

Charter One Illinois assistant branch managers who were

employed in this position from October 23, 2006 to the present.” The description of the ABM lawsuit explains the claim

as one of incorrect classification of ABMs as exempt personnel. Both class-notice documents leave little room for confusion among potential class members.

Ultimately, we find that the district court defined the

class in a manner that is “readily discernible from the

text either of the certification order itself or of an incorporated memorandum opinion.” Wachtel, 453 F.3d at 185.

2. Defining the Class Claims, Issues, or Defenses

Charter One also asserts that the district court abused

its discretion by identifying only two claims for trial

instead of identifying a comprehensive list of claims,

issues, or defenses. See Wachtel, 453 F.3d at 188 (affirming

the district court’s definition of the class, but remanding

because the district court failed to identify a comprehensive list of claims, issues, or defenses). Charter One concedes that the district court properly identified two

claims, but it identifies seven additional questions that

the district court purportedly should have discussed as
No. 10-3848 13

For example, Charter One contends that it is unclear whether 6

its actual or constructive knowledge of each alleged IMWL

violation will be tried on a common basis or through some

type of individual proceeding.

claims or issues. Without a comprehensive list of 6

issues, Charter One warns that the parties cannot adequately prepare for trial and potential class members

cannot make informed decisions about whether to opt

out of the class.

Like the district court’s definition of the class, we find

no abuse of discretion in how Judge Lefkow defined the

class issues, claims, or defenses. To begin, Charter One’s

heavy reliance on Wachtel is misplaced. There, the Third

Circuit chided the district court for using the Latin

phrase inter alia (“among other things”) because the very

use of that phrase suggests that the list of common

issues is intentionally incomplete. 453 F.3d at 189. The

district court in this case did not make the same mistake. The Wachtel court also found the district court’s

treatment of the claims, issues, and defenses to be

“unclear, intermittent, and incomplete,” with nothing in

the certification order that “evidences an intent to explicitly define which claims, issues, or defenses are to be

treated on a class basis.” Id.

Here, the district court’s opinion does not suffer from

the same deficiencies as the Third Circuit found in

Wachtel. Rather, the plaintiffs’ claims that will be tried

as a class are “readily discernible” from the district

court’s order and accompanying opinion. For example,
14 No. 10-3848

Judge Lefkow clearly identified the Hourly class’s

claim that they were subject to a company policy that

intentionally failed to pay lawfully earned overtime.

Ross, 2010 WL 3980113, at *6 (“[T]he common issue of

whether a company-wide policy existed to deny

overtime will predominate over the variations in

methods used to accomplish the alleged policy.”). The

district court went so far as to identify four possible

ways in which the plaintiffs claimed they had been

forced to work off-the-clock, although Judge Lefkow

appropriately left room for the introduction of other

types of evidence illustrating the nature of Charter

One’s unlawful policy. Id. Explicit identification of this

claim and four possible types of evidence is exactly

the type of clarity and completeness required by

Rule 23(c)(1)(B). Likewise, the district court clearly identified the ABM class’s claim that their primary duty was

to perform non-exempt work under an unlawful

company policy. Id. at *7 (“[T]he relevant inquiry is what

an ABM’s primary duty is.”). The district court also

stated that the application of any IMWL exemptions

(e.g., executive or administrative exemptions) should

be tried as a class rather than through individualized

inquiries. Id.

Ultimately, the claims identified by the district court

are the only claims that require resolution at trial and

the district court appropriately found that these claims

will be litigated as a class. The seven questions raised

by Charter One are merely issues of trial strategy or

proof, rather than overall claims or issues necessitating

resolution. If we read Rule 23(c)(1)(B) to require a
No. 10-3848 15

district court to list any possible method of proof, as

Charter One appears to suggest, the length of such an

order would border on the absurd. Here, the district

court rightfully identified the two critical claims and

the potential for an exemption defense, and found that

it is all best litigated as a class.

B. Commonality

Following oral argument in this case, the Supreme

Court clarified the Rule 23(a)(2) commonality prerequisite

in Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 131 S. Ct. at 2541.

Shortly thereafter, we issued an order asking the parties

to file brief statements of position describing whether

the certified classes satisfy Dukes. We find that Dukes

does not change the district court’s commonality result,

and as such find that the district court properly certified

both classes.

The commonality prerequisite requires the plaintiff

to show that “there are questions of law or fact common

to the class.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a)(2). The Supreme

Court has interpreted commonality as requiring the

plaintiff to show that class members “have suffered the

same injury,” Gen. Tel. Co. of Sw. v. Falcon, 457 U.S. 147,

157 (1982); Dukes, 131 S. Ct. at 2551, but notably “[t]his

does not mean merely that they have all suffered

a violation of the same provision of law,” Dukes, 131

S. Ct. at 2551. “What matters to class certification . . . is

not the raising of common ‘questions’—even in droves—

but, rather the capacity of a classwide proceeding to

generate common answers apt to drive the resolution
16 No. 10-3848

of litigation.” Id. (emphasis in original). To satisfy the

commonality element, it is enough for plaintiffs to

present just one common claim. Id. at 2556.

In Dukes, a nationwide class of 1.5 million current

and former female employees from 3,400 stores sued WalMart, alleging that the company engaged in a pattern

or practice of gender discrimination in violation of Title VII

of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. Id. at 2547. A Title VII

disparate-treatment suit of course requires that

plaintiffs show proof of discriminatory motive or intent.

Int’l Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 335-

36 (1977); Dukes, 131 S. Ct. at 2552 (“[I]n resolving an individual’s Title VII claim, the crux of the inquiry is

the reason for a particular employment decision.”). In

Dukes, the Court reversed the district court’s certification order on the grounds that the plaintiff could not

offer “significant proof that Wal-Mart operated under

a general policy of discrimination.” Dukes, 131 S. Ct. at

2553, 2556 (a policy allowing discretion “is just the opposite of a uniform employment practice that would

provide the commonality needed for a class action”)

(quotation marks omitted). In reversing class certification,

the Court found that there was no unifying motive

theory holding together “literally millions of employment decisions.” Id. at 2552.

In the present case, Charter One attempts to find significant similarities with Dukes. Charter One’s principal

contention is that both classes’ claims require the same

significant and time-consuming individualized liability

inquiries that the Supreme Court found problematic

in Dukes. For the Hourly class, Charter One argues
No. 10-3848 17

Misreading Dukes, Charter One also contends that it has a 7

statutory right to present its affirmative exemption defenses

on an individualized basis, and thus, there is no commonality. However, the Dukes passage the defendant cites in

support of its argument discusses how the Ninth Circuit

improperly certified a Rule 23(b)(2) class that sought equitable

relief. In so ruling, the Court struck down the Ninth Circuit’s

attempt to circumvent 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g)(2)(A) by holding

that Wal-Mart had a statutory right to avoid equitable

damages by showing that “it took an adverse employment

action for any reason other than discrimination.” Dukes, 131

S. Ct. at 2560-61 (emphasis added). Charter One has no such

statutory right because both classes are seeking only monetary

relief through a Rule 23(b)(3) class.

that there are at least four ways in which plaintiffs

were denied overtime, and sifting through such individualized evidence should preclude a commonality finding. Similarly for the ABM class, Charter One contends

that a factfinder would be required to individually determine whether each ABM performed non-exempt duties.7

The defendant makes one additional argument regarding the ABM class. Namely, Charter One branch

managers are vested with the same kind of discretion as

the store managers in Dukes and such discretion limits

the ability of the court to find common claims.

Despite Charter One’s best efforts to fit the present

case into the Dukes mold, there are significant distinctions. Perhaps the most important distinction is the size

of the class and the type of proof the Dukes plaintiffs

were required to offer. See, e.g., Youngblood v. Family
18 No. 10-3848

Dollar Stores, Inc., No. 09 Civ. 3176 (RMB), 2011 WL

4597555, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 4, 2011) (distinguishing

Dukes on the ground that New York’s version of the

FLSA does not require “an examination of the subjective

intent behind millions of individual employment decisions”); Bouaphakeo v. Tyson Foods, Inc., No. 5:07-cv-04009-

JAJ, 2011 WL 3793962, at *2 (N.D. Iowa Aug. 25, 2011)

(reasoning that because “Dukes was a Title VII case, the

focus of the inquiry in resolving each individual’s

claim was ‘the reason for [the] particular employment

decision’ ”). In Dukes, 1.5 million nationwide claimants

were required to prove that thousands of store managers

had the same discriminatory intent in preferring men

over women for promotions and pay raises. Here, there

are 1,129 Hourly class members and substantially

fewer ABMs, all of whom are based only in Illinois. The

plaintiffs’ IMWL claim requires no proof of individual

discriminatory intent. Instead, the plaintiffs’ theory,

supported by ninety-six Hourly class declarations and

twenty-four ABM class declarations, is that Charter

One enforced an unofficial policy in Illinois denying

certain employees overtime pay that was lawfully due.

All ninety-six Hourly declarations specifically allege

that the declarant had been denied lawfully due

overtime compensation. Eighty-nine declarations

further allege that Charter One had a policy instructing

the declarant not to record earned overtime. Meanwhile, the majority of the ABM declarants assert that

they primarily performed non-exempt work. Although

there might be slight variations in how Charter One

enforced its overtime policy, both classes maintain a
No. 10-3848 19

common claim that Charter One broadly enforced an

unlawful policy denying employees earned-overtime

compensation. This unofficial policy is the common

answer that potentially drives the resolution of this

litigation. Dukes, 131 S. Ct. at 2551.

Appellant’s final criticism of the ABM class equating

Wal-Mart managers’ promotion discretion with the

limited discretion vested in Charter One branch

managers is misplaced. Specifically, the plaintiffs in

Dukes alleged that the discretion given to Wal-Mart

managers is what caused female employees to experience

disparate treatment. Id. at 2548. The Supreme Court

was clearly unable to infer a common claim from an

allegation that on its face suggested store managers

exercised significant discretion. Id. at 2554. Here, the

ABM class contends, and is supported in part by twentyfour ABM declarations, that a company-wide policy in

Illinois requires ABMs to perform non-exempt work in

violation of the IMWL. Although there again might be

slight variations in the exact duties that each ABM performs from branch to branch, the ABMs maintain a common claim that unofficial company policy compelled

them to perform duties for which they should have

been entitled to collect overtime. Contrary to Charter

One’s assertion, an individualized assessment of each

ABM’s job duties is not relevant to a claim that an

unlawful company-wide policy exists to deny ABMs

overtime pay.

Ultimately, the glue holding together the Hourly and

ABM classes is based on the common question of

whether an unlawful overtime policy prevented em-
20 No. 10-3848

ployees from collecting lawfully earned overtime compensation. For that reason, we find that the district

court’s certification order satisfies the commonality

prerequisite and the district court properly granted

class certification.

III. CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, we AFFIRM the district

court’s order certifying an Hourly and ABM class for

the plaintiffs’ IMWL claims.

1-27-12