FILED 

 U.S. COURT OF APPEALS

 ELEVENTH CIRCUIT 

 MAY 27, 2003 

 THOMAS K. KAHN 

 CLERK

[PUBLISH]

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT

_____________________________

No. 00-13064

_____________________________

D. C. Docket No. 00-00156-CV-J-20A 

LOUIS NAPIER,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

versus

KAREN J. PRESLICKA,

Jacksonville Sheriff’s Officer,

SANDRA M. POMEROY, Jacksonville

Sheriff’s Officer, #6720,

Defendants-Appellees.

_________________________________________

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Middle District of Florida

_________________________________________

(May 27, 2003)

ON PETITION FOR REHEARING EN BANC

(Opinion December 10, 2002, 11th Cir.)
2

Before EDMONDSON, Chief Judge, TJOFLAT, ANDERSON, BIRCH,

DUBINA, BLACK, CARNES, BARKETT, HULL, MARCUS and WILSON, 

Circuit Judges.

BY THE COURT:

The Court having been polled at the request of one of the members of the

Court and a majority of the Circuit Judges who are in regular active service not

having voted in favor of it (Rule 35, Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure;

Eleventh Circuit Rule 35-5), the Petition for Rehearing En Banc is DENIED.
3

BARKETT, Circuit Judge, dissenting from the denial of rehearing en banc:

I believe the issue in this case merits en banc consideration. While in

prison, Napier filed a § 1983 suit against two deputies based on activities which

occurred months before the events leading to his present confinement. Thus his

lawsuit has nothing to do with the circumstances of his present incarceration. The

Napier panel interpreted 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(e), a provision of the 1995 Prison

Litigation Reform Act, Pub.L. No. 104-134, 110 Stat. 1321 (1996) (“PLRA”), to

bar Napier’s claim, holding that when § 1997e(e) states that “[n]o Federal civil

action may be brought by a prisoner confined in a jail, prison, or other correctional

facility, for mental or emotional injury suffered while in custody without a prior

showing of physical injury,” the word “custody” refers to any instance of

“Miranda custody,” including prior, unrelated arrests. See Napier v. Preslicka,

314 F.3d 528, 532-34 (11th Cir. 2002). This unjustified expansion of § 1997e(e)

to prevent prisoners from seeking remedies for violations that predate and have no

relation to the events leading to their current incarceration finds little support in

the language, structure or history of the PLRA. The panel’s holding also conflicts

with this Court’s previous interpretations of § 1997e(e) and has troubling

implications that reach far beyond the specific facts of this case. Accordingly, I
4

believe that en banc review of the panel’s decision is warranted to reconsider the

appropriate reach of § 1997e(e).

I. The Panel’s Holding Finds Little Support in the 

Language, Structure, or History of the PLRA

The starting point for statutory interpretation is the language of the statute

itself. United States v. DBB, Inc., 180 F.3d 1277, 1281 (11th Cir. 1999) (citing

Watt v. Alaska, 451 U.S. 259, 265 (1981)). When the meaning of a statute is

unambiguous, there is no need to examine legislative history, since “we do not

resort to legislative history to cloud a statutory text that is clear.” Ratzlaf v.

United States, 510 U.S. 135, 147-48 (1994). When a statute is unclear or

ambiguous, however, resort to legislative history is required. Toibb v. Radloff,

501 U.S. 161, 162 (1991); Blum v. Stenson, 465 U.S. 886, 896 (1984). Moreover,

whether statutory language is clear or ambiguous cannot be determined apart from

its circumstances. “In determining whether Congress has specifically addressed

the question at issue, a reviewing court should not confine itself to examining a

particular statutory provision in isolation. The meaning–or ambiguity–of certain

words or phrases may only become evident when placed in context.” FDA v.

Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 529 U.S. 120, 132 (2000). Accord Bailey v.
5

United States, 516 U.S. 137, 145 (1995) (“We consider not only the bare meaning

of the word but also its placement and purpose in the statutory scheme.”); Brown

v. Gardner, 513 U.S. 115, 118 (1994) (“The meaning of statutory language, plain

or not, depends on context.”); DBB, Inc., 180 F.3d at 1281 (“We do not look at

one word or term in isolation, but instead we look to the entire statutory context.”).

The Napier panel’s interpretation of 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(e) runs counter to

these well-established principles. Section 1997e(e) states that:

No Federal civil action may be brought by a prisoner confined in a jail,

prison, or other correctional facility, for mental or emotional injury suffered

while in custody without a prior showing of physical injury.

42 U.S.C. § 1997e(e). The key word for our purposes is “custody.” Does its

extension include arrests occurring years before the events leading up to a

prisoner’s current incarceration, so that, for example, an individual who was

falsely arrested in 1996 and subsequently convicted and imprisoned for unrelated

conduct in 1999 would be precluded from seeking relief for the 1996 violation? 

Or did Congress intend “custody” in the context of § 1997e(e) to refer merely to

“prison custody,” as its antecedent “a prisoner confined in a jail, prison, or other

correctional facility” implies?

Relying on “the plain language” of § 1997e(e), the Napier panel opts for the

former, vastly more expansive interpretation, holding that the word “custody” in §
 

1

 As the panel majority acknowledges, “custody” as it occurs in § 1997e(e) could refer to any

formal arrest or restraint on freedom of movement related to a prisoner’s current incarceration (first

interpretation), or it could refer to any such arrest or restraint related or unrelated to his current

6

1997e(e) encompasses all of a prisoner’s prior arrests, whether or not they are

related his current confinement “in a jail, prison, or other correctional facility.” 

Napier, 314 F.3d at 532-34. In my judgment, this holding depends on interpreting

a statutory word out of its context in exactly the manner cases such as Brown &

Williamson Tobacco Corp., Bailey, Gardner, and DBB, Inc. warn against.

The panel’s decision involves two steps. First, the panel presumes that

Congress used “custody” in § 1997e(e) “in the settled sense” to mean “Miranda

custody” or any “‘formal arrest or restraint on freedom of movement.’” Id. at 532-

33 (quoting Minnesota v. Murphy, 465 U.S. 420, 430 (1984)). Accordingly, the

panel finds that § 1997e(e) applies to prisoner lawsuits that allege injuries suffered

while in custody “even if such custody occurred outside prison walls.” Id. at 533. 

Second, because § 1997e(e) “by its plain language does not provide a temporal

restriction on the custodial episode to which it relates,” the panel determines that

its scope extends even further to include prior, unrelated arrests, such as Napier’s. 

Id. at 533-34.

The panel’s reasoning is unsupported and unpersuasive. As the panel

implicitly concedes, “custody” as it occurs in § 1997e(e) is plainly ambiguous.1
incarceration (second interpretation). Napier, 314 F.3d at 532-34. Additionally, it also could refer

to a prisoner’s current “prison custody,” i.e., to his current incarceration in what § 1997e(e) terms

“a jail, prison, or other correctional facility” (third interpretation). Id. at 532. As Judge Propst

observes in his dissenting opinion, “custody” also could refer to any prison custody, i.e., to a

prisoner’s current or previous confinement in a correctional facility (fourth interpretation). Id. at

535. Finally, in light of Jones v. Cunningham, 371 U.S. 236 (1963), and its progeny, § 1997e(e)’s

custody requirement could conceivably be satisfied where a petitioner alleges injuries that were

suffered while he was released on probation, parole, or bail (fifth interpretation). Id. at 536. Only

under the second interpretation–which the panel majority insists is mandated by § 1997e(e)’s “plain

language”–would Napier’s lawsuit necessarily be precluded.

 

2

See tape of oral argument in Napier v. Preslicka, No. 00-13064, 9/11/02.

 

3

See, e.g., Mitchell v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 294 F.3d 1309, 1317 (11th Cir.

2002) (“We conclude that § 1997e(e) does not apply to prisoner lawsuits unrelated to prison

conditions filed in state court based solely on state law and removed by defendants to federal court

based on diversity jurisdiction.”); Harris v. Garner, 216 F.3d 970, 979-80 (11th Cir. 2000) (en banc)

(“Because section 1997e(e) applies only to claims filed while an inmate is confined, it does not

prevent a former prisoner from filing after release a monetary damages claim for mental and

emotional injury suffered while confined, without a prior showing of physical injury.”); Harris v.

Garner, 190 F.3d 1279, 1285 (11th Cir. 1999) (“In light of the overwhelming clarity of the statutory

text, we join the Seventh Circuit in holding that section 1997e(e) applies only to prisoners who are

incarcerated at the time they seek relief, and not to former prisoners who seek damages for injuries

suffered while they were incarcerated.”) (emphases added).

 

4

The panel attempts to defend its conclusion that § 1997e(e) unambiguously precludes lawsuits

by prisoners for injuries suffered during arrests unrelated to their present confinement by reasoning

that had Congress intended otherwise, it could have drafted § 1997e(e) more clearly:

One could argue that the phrase “in custody” is meant to refer to the present custody, that

custody for which the prisoner is in fact currently a prisoner, or that the phrase “in custody”

is meant to refer, without reference to the other parts of the statute, to past or present

instances of custody. The first interpretation might reflect a narrow purpose of the PLRA to

7

Indeed, the government’s attorney repeatedly acknowledged this ambiguity at oral

argument.2 Further, this Court has repeatedly assumed that “custody” as it is used

in § 1997e(e) refers to prison custody.3

 The panel’s “plain language” argument

would imply that these paraphrases are not only incorrect but inconceivable.4
reduce frivolous prison condition litigation, those suits brought by prisoners to challenge

what they view as unacceptable or, indeed, unconstitutional circumstances of their present

confinement. However, the first interpretation is not supported by the plain language of the

statute . . . . Congress could have drafted the statute to say “while thus imprisoned” or “while

in that custody” or “during the aforementioned confinement” to specifically tie the clause in

question to the antecedent in order to ensure that the first interpretation was followed. Even

more simply, Congress could have used “while imprisoned” as it uses “prisoner” earlier in

the statute if its intent was to limit the claims subject to the PLRA to those arising from harm

accrued only in that limited venue.

Napier, 314 F.3d at 533. The argument is plainly fallacious. That Congress could have drafted a less

ambiguous statute does not prove that this statute is unambiguous. Moreover, the panel’s reasoning

is invalid even on its own terms. Had Congress replaced “while in custody” with any of the panel’s

proposed substitutions, then that phrase’s extension would be fixed by its antecedent, “confined in

a jail, prison, or other correctional facility.” In that case, however, what the panel calls “the first

interpretation” of § 1997e(e), according to which “custody” is meant to refer to “that custody for

which the prisoner is in fact currently a prisoner,” id., would not be ensured but excluded, since such

custody would (normally) not occur during confinement “in a jail, prison, or other correctional

facility.” Simply put, if Congress intended related but not unrelated arrests to fall within the scope

of § 1997e(e), it necessarily would prefer that provision’s current language to any of the panel’s

proposed alternatives.

 

5

 “Congress is presumed to know the settled legal meaning of the terms it uses in enacted statutes

and to use those terms in the settled sense.” Napier, 314 F.3d at 532.

 

6 Compare, for example, Minnesota v. Murphy, 465 U.S. 420, 430 (1984) (equating custody “for

purposes of receiving Miranda protection” with “formal arrest or restraint on freedom of

movement”) with Justices of Boston Mun. Court v. Lydon, 466 U.S. 294 (1984) (holding that a

person released on his own recognizance was “in custody” within the meaning of 28 U.S.C. §§

2241(c)(3) and 2254(a)); Hensley v. Municipal Court, 411 U.S. 345 (1973) (same); Jones

v.Cunningham, 371 U.S. 236 (1963) (holding that a parolee was “in custody” within the meaning

8

Moreover, the panel’s reliance on “the settled legal meaning” of “custody”

is misplaced.5 Unlike the word “brought,” which this Court noted in Harris had a

“long history of established meaning,” 216 F.3d at 974, the judicial definition of

“custody” has been anything but settled. Instead, it has been fluid and contextdependent.6

 Since there is no single, settled legal meaning of “custody,” the
of 28 U. S. C. §§ 2241); McNally v. Hill, 293 U.S. 131 (1934) (equating custody with incarceration

or detention in prison); and Wales v. Whitney, 114 U.S. 564, 571 (1885) (equating custody with “any

physical restraint,” including “[w]ives restrained by husbands, children withheld from the proper

parent or guardian, [and] persons held under arbitrary custody by private individuals”).

9

notion that Congress should be credited with knowing and applying that meaning

is inapposite.

Rather than invoke the plain meaning doctrine where it does not apply,

thereby expanding the scope of a statute Congress may have meant to apply more

narrowly, this Court should candidly acknowledge that § 1997e(e) as written is

open to several different interpretations, only some of which would preclude

Napier’s lawsuit. It should then apply a different interpretive canon to determine

which of those competing interpretations is most plausible. This case is a

textbook example of the principle that the meaning of an ambiguous word is

known by its companions–the doctrine of noscitur a sociis. Both the Supreme

Court and this Court have frequently relied on this commonsense principle to

ascertain the meaning of ambiguous statutory provisions “in order to avoid the

giving of unintended breadth to the Acts of Congress.” Jarecki v. G.D. Searle &

Co., 367 U.S. 303, 307 (1961). See, e.g., Gutierrez v. Camacho, 528 U.S. 250,

255 (2000); Gustafson v. Alloyd Co., 513 U.S. 561, 575 (1995); Clay v.

Riverwood Intern Corp., 157 F.3d 1259, 1266 (11th Cir. 1998); City of Delray
10

Beach, FL v. Agriculture Ins. Co., 85 F.3d 1527, 1534 (11th Cir. 1996). The panel

neglects to do likewise because it insists that the meaning of § 1997e(e) is clear

“without reference to the other parts of the statute.” Napier, 314 F.3d at 533. But

whether a statutory provision is clear or ambiguous cannot be determined apart

from its context. See Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 529 U.S. at 132;

Bailey, 516 U.S. at 145; Gardner, 513 U.S. at 118; DBB, Inc., 180 F.3d at 1281. 

The panel’s reliance on the plain meaning doctrine to justify interpreting §

1997e(e) apart from the remaining provisions of 42 U.S.C. 1997e puts the cart

before the horse.

In his dissent to the panel’s decision, Judge Propst reviewed each of the

major provisions of § 1997e and found that, viewed as a whole, they suggest that

Congress intended “in custody” in § 1997e(e) to mean at least “prison custody,” if

not “prison custody related to the present incarceration.” Napier, 314 F.3d at 535. 

I agree with this conclusion, which is only reinforced when § 1997e(e) is read in

light of the PLRA’s legislative history. There is no evidence that Congress meant

the PLRA to restrict lawsuits unrelated to prison conditions. All of the examples

of frivolous litigation cited in the record involve prison conditions; none involves

custody occurring “outside prison walls,” let alone arrests unrelated to a prisoner’s

current confinement. See 141 Cong. Rec. S7498-01 (daily ed. May 25, 1995)
 

7

The PLRA was introduced in May 1995 by Senators Dole and Kyl as Senate Resolution 866.

In his remarks, Senator Dole made clear that the target of the proposed legislation was frivolous

lawsuits involving prison conditions. See 141 Cong. Rec. S7498-01, S7524 (daily ed. May 25, 1995)

(Statement of Senator Dole) (“Prisoners have filed lawsuits claiming such grievances as insufficient

storage locker space, being prohibited from attending a wedding anniversary party, and yes, being

served creamy peanut butter instead of the chunky variety they had ordered.”). Senator Kyl reiterated

this limitation in his remarks by relying on a Justice Department report on § 1983 litigation entitled

“Challenging the Conditions of Prisons and Jails.” See 141 Cong. Rec. S7498-01, S7527 (daily ed.

May 25, 1995) (Statement of Senator Kyl). Senator Kyl also placed into the record two newspaper

editorials describing the rationale of the Dole-Kyl bill. The first, a column published in The Wall

Street Journal, referred exclusively to “suits initiated by people claiming a deprivation of their rights

while in prison.” 141 Cong. Rec. S7498-01, S7527 (daily ed. May 25, 1995) (Article from The Wall

Street Journal) (Attached to the Congressional Record) (emphasis added). The second, an editorial

appearing in the Tucson Citizen, listed sixteen examples of the type of frivolous prison lawsuit that

the Arizona statute on which the Dole-Kyl bill was modeled was intended to deter, all of which

involved prison conditions. See 141 Cong. Rec. S7498-01, S7527-28 (daily ed. May 25, 1995)

(Article from the Tucson Citizen) (Attached to the Congressional Record).

In Harris, this Court observed that “‘[b]ecause Congress enacted [the] PLRA as a rider to an

appropriations bill, floor debate is more indicative of legislative intent than it otherwise would be.”

216 F.3d at 977 n.5 (quoting Alexander v. Hawk, 159 F.3d 1321, 1325 n.8 (11th Cir. 1998)). We

also said that “[t]he statements of Senators Dole and Kyl are due special consideration, because they

. . . were the architects of the PLRA.” Id.

11

(Statements of Senators Dole and Kyl); 141 Cong. Rec. S14408-01 (daily ed. Sept.

27, 1995) (Statements of Senators Dole, Hatch, Kyl, and Abraham); 141 Cong.

Rec. S14754-01 (daily ed. Dec. 4, 1995) (Conference Report on H.R. 2076).7

In sum, the Napier panel’s expansive interpretation of § 1997e(e) finds little

support in the language, structure, or history of the PLRA. By confining itself to

examining a particular statutory word in isolation, the panel unjustifiably

disregards the “‘fundamental canon of statutory construction that the words of a

statute must be read in their context and with a view to their place in the overall
12

statutory scheme.’” Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 529 U.S. at 133 (quoting

Davis v. Michigan Dept. of Treasury, 489 U.S. 803, 809 (1989)). Read in context,

§ 1997e(e) is plainly ambiguous; furthermore, its most plausible interpretation

suggests Congress meant “custody” to refer to prison custody. The PLRA’s

legislative history reinforces this conclusion, casting further doubt on the panel’s

dubious interpretation.

II. The Panel’s Holding Conflicts with This Court’s 

Previous Interpretations of § 1997e(e)

As indicated, the panel’s holding that the “plain meaning” of § 1997e(e)

precludes equating “custody” with “prison custody” or treating “suffered while in

custody” as synonymous with “suffered while incarcerated” or “suffered while

confined in a jail, prison, or other correctional facility” conflicts with this Court’s

previous interpretations of § 1997e(e). See Mitchell v. Brown & Williamson

Tobacco Corp., 294 F.3d 1309, 1317 (11th Cir. 2002) (interpreting § 1997e(e) to

preclude only lawsuits relating to prison conditions); Harris v. Garner, 216 F.3d

970, 979-80 (11th Cir. 2000) (en banc) (paraphrasing “suffered while in custody”

as “suffered while confined”); Harris v. Garner, 190 F.3d 1279, 1284-85 (11th Cir.

1999) (paraphrasing “suffered while in custody” both as “suffered while they were
13

prisoners” and as “suffered while they were incarcerated”). Mitchell in particular

appears in direct conflict with Napier, further warranting en banc review.

In Mitchell, a federal prisoner sued cigarette manufacturers in state court on

state law claims. After defendants removed to federal court, the district court

dismissed the suit because the prisoner did not allege a physical injury as required

by § 1997e(e). The Eleventh Circuit reversed, holding that “§1997e(e) does not

apply to prisoner lawsuits unrelated to prison conditions filed in state court based

solely on state law and removed by defendants to federal court based on diversity

jurisdiction.” Mitchell, 294 F.3d at 1312. By its very language, this holding does

not extend to all state law-claims removed from state court on the basis of

diversity jurisdiction, but only to such claims that are “unrelated to prison

conditions.” Id. The Court made the importance of this qualification quite clear:

Mitchell raises several challenges to the district court’s application of § 

1997e(e) to this matter. The only contention that is dispositive, however, is

his argument that § 1997e(e) does not apply to actions that were removed

from state court. We agree, insofar as the action filed in state court by

Mitchell solely alleged state-law claims unrelated to prison conditions.

Id. at 1315 (emphasis added). 

After Mitchell, a defendant sued in state court on state law claims related to

prison conditions who removes to federal court is not automatically precluded

from moving to dismiss. For example, a government contractor responsible for
14

providing prisoner meals who is sued for mental injury allegedly caused by

serving tasteless or rotten food is not necessarily barred by Mitchell from

removing to federal court and moving to dismiss, since the alleged injury relates to

prison conditions. Hence the qualification “unrelated to prison conditions,” which

Mitchell uses on three separate occasions, see id. at 1312, 1315, 1317, is properly

considered part of that case’s holding, which does in turn conflict with Napier.

III. The Panel’s Holding Has Troubling Implications That 

Reach Far Beyond the Specific Facts of This Case

In Jones v. Cunningham, 371 U.S. 236 (1963), the Supreme Court held that

a parolee was in custody within the meaning of 28 U.S.C. §§ 2241, a provision of

the federal habeas corpus statute. Likewise, in Hensley v. Municipal Court, 411

U.S. 345 (1973), the Supreme Court held that a person released on his own

recognizance was in custody within the meaning of 28 U.S.C. §§ 2241(c)(3) and

2254(a). See also Justices of Boston Mun. Court v. Lydon, 466 U.S. 294 (1984). 

Hence, as we observed in Duvallon v. Florida, 691 F.2d 483 (11th Cir. 1982), “[i]n

the context of habeas proceedings, the ‘in custody’ requirement may also be met

where a petitioner is on probation, parole, or bail.” Id. at 485 (citing Hensley, 411

U.S. at 349).
15

As a result of these decisions, the Napier panel’s already expansive

interpretation of § 1997e(e) has troubling implications that reach far beyond the

narrow confines of this case. In particular, as Judge Propst warns in his dissenting

opinion, the panel’s holding implies that prisoners could be precluded from

enforcing violations of their civil rights that occurred while they were released on

probation, parole, or bail. For example, a prisoner would be unable to sue her

employer in federal court for mental injury associated with sexual harassment or

racial discrimination, if the alleged injury occurred while she was “in custody” by

virtue of an unexpired term of probation or parole, or while she was released on

bail. Napier, 314 F.3d at 536 (Propst, J., dissenting).

This is just one of many such examples. If the panel is correct, then

prisoners could be prevented from pursuing an indefinite number of legal claims,

against both public and private actors, having absolutely nothing to do with the

conditions of their current incarceration. For example, they would be precluded

from seeking recovery for mental injury stemming from humiliating, torturous, or

otherwise illegal pre-detention searches and interrogations, as well as from, inter

alia, false imprisonment, defamation, invasion of privacy, intentional infliction of

emotional distress, malicious prosecution, breach of contract, and many similar

claims. I do not believe Congress intended to negate such rights. “[I]f Congress
16

had intended this one provision at § 1997e(e)” to have these profound effects, “it

would have clearly said so.” Id. at 537, n.6 (Propst, J., dissenting). 

IV. This Issue is Exceptionally Important and Warrants En Banc Review

According to Rule 35 of the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure, en banc

review is warranted if such a hearing “is necessary to secure or maintain

uniformity of the court’s decisions” or “involves a question of exceptional

importance.” F.R.A.P. 35. Eleventh Circuit Rule 35-3, our companion to

F.R.A.P. 35, likewise describes en banc consideration as a procedure intended to

alert the entire court to “a precedent-setting error of exceptional importance” or “a

panel opinion that is allegedly in direct conflict with precedent of the Supreme

Court or of this circuit.” 11th Cir. R. 35-3. In my judgment, Napier involves

exactly the type of errors these rules are intended to address.

For the forgoing reasons, I respectfully dissent from the Court’s denial of

rehearing en banc in this case.