RECORD IMPOUNDED

SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY

APPELLATE DIVISION

DOCKET NO. A-1465-19T2

 A-1467-19T2

NEW JERSEY DIVISION 

OF CHILD PROTECTION 

AND PERMANENCY,

Plaintiff-Respondent,

v.

D.J. and E.M.G., Jr.,

Defendants-Appellants,

and

R.N.-I.,

Defendant.

_______________________________

IN THE MATTER OF THE 

GUARDIANSHIP OF A.S.G.,

E.A.G., and D.M.J., minors.

_______________________________

Argued November 19, 2020 – Decided

Before Judges Haas and Mawla.

NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE

APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION

This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court." Although it is posted on the 

internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R. 1:36-3.

December 4, 2020
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A-1465-19T2

On appeal from the Superior Court of New Jersey, 

Chancery Division, Family Part, Essex County, Docket 

No. FG-07-0116-19.

Dianne Glenn, Designated Counsel, argued the cause 

for appellant D.J. (Joseph E. Krakora, Public Defender, 

attorney; Dianne Glenn, on the brief).

Daniel DiLella, Designated Counsel, argued the cause 

for appellant E.M.G., Jr. (Joseph E. Krakora, Public 

Defender, attorney; Robyn A. Veasey, Deputy Public 

Defender, of counsel; Daniel DiLella, on the briefs). 

Julie B. Colonna, Deputy Attorney General, argued the 

cause for respondent (Gurbir S. Grewal, Attorney 

General, attorney; Melissa H. Raksa, Assistant 

Attorney General, of counsel; Julie B. Colonna, on the 

brief). 

Nancy P. Fratz, Assistant Deputy Public Defender,

argued the cause for minors (Joseph E. Krakora, Public 

Defender, Law Guardian, attorney; Meredith Alexis 

Pollock, Deputy Public Defender, of counsel; Nancy P. 

Fratz, of counsel and on the brief). 

PER CURIAM

Defendants D.J. ("Diana")1and E.G. ("Edward") appeal from a November 

20, 2019 judgment of guardianship terminating their parental rights to A.S.G. 

1 We use fictitious names to protect the privacy of the biological parents and the 

children. R. 1:38-3(d)(12).
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A-1465-19T2

("Amy") and E.A.G. ("Elizabeth"), who were three and two years of age at the 

time of entry of the judgment.2 We affirm.

Diana and Edward have a prior history with the Division of Child 

Protection and Permanency (Division). In 1999, Diana's parental rights to three 

older children were terminated and they were adopted by their paternal 

grandmother in 2002. In 2014, the Division received a referral indicating that 

Diana and her newborn, Dora, were evicted and homeless. The pair were living

with Diana's friend. The Division provided baby supplies and a referral to the 

Board of Social Services, and ultimately closed its case. 

In 2017, the Division received a referral from a hospital reporting that

Diana had a high-risk pregnancy with Elizabeth requiring a caesarian section, 

but missed the scheduled delivery and appeared a week later. Diana was living 

with Edward at the time and Amy was just seventeen months old. Elizabeth was 

born healthy. The Division conducted a home visit and noted the family had 

inadequate sleeping provisions, clothing, and formula for the baby. 

The Division also learned Edward had substantiated allegations of sexual 

abuse of minors in 1984 and 2008, and a September 29, 2006 judgment of 

2 D.M.J. ("Dora") was dismissed from the litigation and placed with her 

biological father.
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conviction for child endangerment. Regarding the 1984 incident, Edward told 

the Division he masturbated onto the child's leg but did not penetrate her, but 

later denied ever being charged and claimed he was out of the country at the 

time of the alleged incident. Edward pled guilty to the 2006 child endangerment

offense and received three years' probation and time served. He claimed he 

entered the plea in order to be released from jail and denied he was a sex 

offender. Edward completely denied the 2008 allegation, which involved abuse 

of his sister. 

Edward attended a psychosexual evaluation scheduled by the Division 

with Cassandra Hutchins, Psy.D. in July 2017. She concluded there was no 

evidence to support his denials of the prior history of sexual abuse. Dr. Hutchins 

opined the risk of Edward abusing an infant or toddler was "likely low" but noted 

there was a risk "as it pertains to his interactions with other children that he may 

come into close contact with" and recommended he be referred to sex offender 

therapy. The Division referred Edward for treatment, but he did not attend,

claiming he was not a sexual offender.

In December 2017, Diana contacted her Division case worker and stated

it was "'not safe' for her children or herself in the home" and requested removal 

of the children. When the worker arrived at the home, she observed a cast on 
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Diana's arm. Diana denied domestic violence and stated she was injured when 

she fell while running after her children. Although the Division offered Diana 

an opportunity to meet with a domestic violence liaison and parenting classes,

she refused to engage in either service. During this time, Edward relocated to 

North Carolina, and claimed to be living with his wife and that he was no longer 

in a relationship with Diana. 

In February 2018, Newark police arrested and incarcerated Diana and 

Edward due to an altercation in which she stabbed him in the eye and collar 

bone. Edward claimed the incident began as a verbal altercation, but when he 

returned to the residence the following day, Diana stabbed him during a physical 

altercation. He claimed the children were asleep upstairs during the fight and 

denied domestic violence or a history of domestic violence. However, Edward 

stated he was concerned for Dora's safety because Diana punched the child and 

slammed Amy down in a chair. Edward also said Diana used marijuana and 

cocaine. Diana claimed she stabbed Edward in self-defense because he

assaulted her. Diana claimed she was angry with Edward because he was 

unfaithful and expressed her anger by throwing a microwave on the ground. She 

stated Amy and Elizabeth were in the kitchen and witnessed the incident and 

were crying. Diana stated Edward pushed her onto a couch and punched her
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when she tried to call the police, grabbed the phone, and continued hitting her. 

She then grabbed a knife and swung at him three times as he ran out of the house. 

The Division removed the children and placed them in a resource home. 

After Diana's release from incarceration, she was granted visitation beginning 

in March 2018, but was consistently late. Edward began his visitation in 

November 2018. The Division asked Diana to sign consent forms in order to 

perform health assessments for Amy and Elizabeth, but she refused. 

In June 2018, the Division referred the parties to Alison Strasser Winston, 

Ph.D. for parenting capacity evaluations and psychological assessments. Diana

denied domestic violence and stated she did not believe Edward sexually abused 

children. Edward gave inconsistent answers during the assessment and his test 

results showed he "failed to respond in an open and honest manner." Dr. 

Winston found Edward minimized the domestic violence in an attempt to 

expedite reunification of the children with Diana, and demonstrated no insight 

into his "history of anger management difficulties" and the impact of the 

domestic violence on the children. Edward denied the need for sexual offender 

treatment and stated he would not comply with the service. Although Edward 

"demonstrated adequate emotional attachments to his children," Dr. Winston 

found his refusal to comply with services concerning because it "prolonged the 
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suspension of his contact with his daughters." She concluded Edward's lack of 

involvement in the children's lives resulted in his lack of knowledge of their

emotional and physical needs, and if he "feels overwhelmed by his parenting 

responsibilities, he is at risk of lashing out at them due to his anger issues." She 

concluded Edward's noncompliance with services rendered him "incapable of 

providing his children with a safe and stable environment." 

Dr. Winston concluded Diana could not parent the children because her 

"inability to admit to the level of violence in her relationship . . . suggests that 

she is unable to protect her children and herself from harm." Dr. Winston also 

concluded it was "extremely troubling that [Diana] and [Edward] remain in a 

relationship" because it exposed the children to domestic violence. She found 

Diana lacked insight into the level of risk posed by Edward's history of sexual

offenses. She concluded "[Diana's] tendency to defend [Edward] and to 

rationalize his behavior highlights her dependency on him . . . and . . . 

demonstrates her tendency to place her need to be in a relationship over her need 

to protect her children from harm." Although Dr. Winston found Diana 

"demonstrated adequate emotional attachments to her children . . . [she] 

demonstrates no remorse about the level of risk at which she had placed her 
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children as a result of her involvement in an abusive relationship with a 

convicted sexual offender." 

Dr. Winston recommended couples counseling when the parties'

counselors deemed it appropriate. She recommended Diana obtain housing for 

herself and the children and psychotherapy, psychiatric evaluation, domestic 

violence counseling, and parenting skills classes. She also recommended 

Edward attend sex offender treatment, anger management, batterer's 

intervention, psychotherapy, and parenting classes. The Division made referrals 

based on these recommendations, but neither Diana nor Edward complied. The 

Division also referred the parties to the Youth Development Clinic (YDC), but 

they attended inconsistently and were discharged from the program. 

In July 2018, the parties failed to attend a five-month review meeting with 

the Division. In October 2018, Diana informed the Division she was attending 

substance abuse and mental health treatment at Team Management 2000. The 

Division provided Diana with a bus pass in order to attend treatment, but her 

attendance was inconsistent. The court ordered Edward to comply with services 

in August and November 2018, and February 2019, but he refused. As a result 

of the parties' failure to participate in services, the court approved the Division's
9

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permanency plan of termination of parental rights followed by adoption in 

February 2019. 

Despite their prior claims, Diana and Edward resumed living together and 

presented as a couple in April 2019. As a result, the Division referred them to 

parenting classes from April through July, but the parties did not attend. In June, 

the family began supervised visitation, but Diana was late to nearly all 

visitations. Diana's records from Team Management revealed all positive urine 

screens, including a July 2019 screen that was positive for alcohol, cocaine, and 

marijuana. 

In July 2019, Elizabeth Stilwell, Psy.D. performed psychological and 

bonding evaluations. Her report explained she reviewed the Division's records, 

including court records and orders, prior evaluations, and treatment records. Dr. 

Stilwell also conducted behavioral observations of the parties and the children 

and an observation of Elizabeth and her resource parents. The third component 

of the evaluation included clinical interviews of the parties and psychological 

testing. Diana failed to complete the psychological testing, claiming she had to 

meet a social worker in a library to look up a "reference" and canceled her 

rescheduled evaluation despite the doctor informing her of the importance of the 

evaluation given the looming guardianship trial. Edward partially completed 
10 A-1465-19T2

the testing but "left an excessive number of items blank, despite being instructed 

to answer every question. As such, his protocol could not be scored." 

Dr. Stilwell concluded Diana's "judgment and decision-making are 

significantly impaired" and Diana lacked "insight into why it was important for 

her to participate in the . . . evaluation." She also found Diana had not 

ameliorated the causes for the children's removal and the prognosis for her 

ability to parent or provide them with permanency was poor because of her 

failure to complete the services offered by the Division. Although Diana was 

engaged with the children during the bonding evaluation, Dr. Stilwell concluded 

"this does not suggest that she would be able to handle the stresses and demands 

of full-time parenting."

Dr. Stilwell found Edward's representations of the history of domestic 

violence and relationship with Diana "illogical and incomprehensible." Despite 

prior admissions to the contrary, he claimed Diana stabbed him while they were 

practicing marital arts as a family.3 Dr. Stilwell noted 

the narratives that [Edward] has contrived are poorly 

formed and not well thought out. It is clear that [he] is 

intentionally trying to deceive the [c]ourt, [the 

Division], and the undersigned . . . . It appears that 

[Edward] is not interested in maintaining a relationship 

with [Diana]. He reports that while they technically 

3 Diana offered a similar narrative.
11 A-1465-19T2

reside at the same residence, they never see each other 

. . . and that he is questioning whether he even wants to 

co-parent with her. 

Dr. Stilwell concluded 

[t]he totality of the data suggests that [Edward] presents 

with numerous parenting deficits that would put any 

child placed in his care at a risk of harm. There is a 

significant risk for ongoing domestic violence between 

[the parties] . . . . While [Edward] was determined to 

be low-risk for offending against a biological child, his 

risk to his daughter[]s as they mature . . . is moderate to 

high . . . . Furthermore, [Edward] does not appear to 

have a sufficient understanding of children's emotional

or developmental needs or the importance of caregiver 

consistency and reliability. [He] interacted minimally 

with the children during the bonding evaluation and 

appeared to be annoyed that he had to attend an 

appointment outside of their regularly scheduled visit. 

Dr. Stilwell opined Elizabeth was securely attached to her resource 

parents, who became her psychological parents and wished to adopt her. She 

noted "[t]here is no evidence . . . that there is any other consistent and healthy 

parental figure in [Elizabeth's] life . . . to mitigate the harm of being separated 

from her psychological parents. [I]f [Elizabeth was] separated from her 

psychological parents, she would suffer a traumatic loss that would produce 

significant and enduring harm." Although Amy was not in a pre-adoptive 

resource home, Dr. Stilwell concluded "it is unlikely that [Diana] and [Edward] 

will become viable parenting options . . . in the foreseeable future . . . and . . . 
12 A-1465-19T2

[Amy should] be freed for adoption and have a chance at achieving 

permanency." 

At trial, Dr. Stilwell testified consistently with her report. The Division 

also called an adoption worker and a supervising family service specialist 

assigned to the case. Neither Diana nor Edward testified or called witnesses. 

The trial judge issued an oral decision in which he found the Division had clearly 

and convincingly proven all four best interest prongs codified in N.J.S.A. 30:4C15.1(a). 

The judge recounted the parties' history with the Division and their failure 

to comply with any of the services offered. He also credited Dr. Stilwell's 

testimony, which he characterized as "comprehensive," "articulate," "very 

knowledgeable" and found he was an "extraordinarily credible witness." 

The judge found the Division proved the first best interests prong because 

the children were exposed to domestic violence and physical abuse by their 

parents who failed to shield them from the harm. He found the children would 

continue to be harmed because both parents refused to cooperate with the 

Division and Diana and Edward had not "availed themselves of any therapy to 

help them better deal with their issues as parents." He noted Diana and Edward's 

failure to engage in services "deprived the children of their parents, of the 
13 A-1465-19T2

permanency that they deserve, of them being able to experience . . . a 

relationship between the children and their parents[.]" The judge concluded

because the parties were "presenting as a couple . . . that reunifying this couple 

would put the children at unjustifiable risk."

The judge found the Division proved the second prong because neither 

parent "is able to provide care for the children today, nor will they be able to do 

so in the foreseeable future." The judge credited Dr. Stilwell's "unrebutted 

expert opinion . . . that . . . [Diana] is unlikely to . . . provide her children with 

permanency, as she is ill-equipped to handle the stresses that come with being 

parents to young children." He also credited Dr. Stillwell's view that Edward 

"has not demonstrated any ability or indication that he is willing to be able to 

make himself fit to provide care for the children." He noted Edward "obviously 

was convicted of endangering the welfare of a child." The judge concluded 

"[n]either parent has presented the Division or the [c]ourt with a plan as to how 

they might care for these children if they were returned. Their current housing 

status is unknown." 

Citing Dr. Stilwell's unrebutted testimony, the judge found the Division 

proved Elizabeth "would suffer . . . irreparable harm if removed from her 

resource parents." He concluded "[t]o deny [Amy] and [Elizabeth] permanency 
14 A-1465-19T2

in the hope that [Edward] or [Diana] will be stable parents, in light of their 

histories, in light of the time that has expired since the last removal, is not in the 

. . . children's best interest." 

The judge found the Division proved the third best interests prong. He 

credited the adoption worker's testimony, which he characterized as "candid" 

and explained "the extensive history of the Division's attempts to bring these 

parents into a position so that they might be able [to parent]." He stated:

The Division has made the reasonable efforts to help 

[Diana] and [Edward] correct the circumstances that led 

to the removal.

They tried providing over and over services to the 

family, psychological evaluations on more than one 

occasion, therapy sessions, substance abuse

assessment, parenting skills, visitation, relative 

assessment, placement transportation service, family

team meetings, domestic violence services, offers for 

sex offender treatment. And, despite all of these 

services being provided, neither parent is in a position 

to care for the children today, nor will they be able to 

do so in the near future.

There are no alternatives to termination of 

parental rights. The Division has assessed several 

relatives . . . and many of them were just dead end 

streets, it was a name. They tried to get them to do it, 

they didn't provide anything, they were people who had 

other violations, they couldn't be licensed. . . . [T]he 

Division in this case did an awful lot of hard work to 

look for alternatives.
15 A-1465-19T2

The judge found the Division proved the fourth prong and that a 

termination of parental rights would not do more harm than good to the children. 

He noted Elizabeth's "resource parents have unequivocally expressed a desire to 

adopt her and provide her with stability and permanency" whereas neither Diana 

nor Edward "could safely parent the child today, nor will they be able to in the 

future." Regarding Amy, the judge found as follows:

I heard testimony today that, in fact, when a child is 

legally ready to be adopted, the chances in this instance 

of finding them an adoptive home is . . . much more 

likely.

So, in this case, even without a specific home to 

name, I find that the Division has also proven by clear 

and convincing evidence that termination of parental 

rights, when it comes to [Amy], would do no more harm 

than good. 

On appeal, both defendants challenge the trial judge's findings under all 

four best interests prongs. Diana argues as follows: 1) there was no evidence 

she harmed the children and the one incident of reported domestic violence did 

not affect the children because they are young and unaware; 2) she and Edward 

are no longer in a relationship and she is no longer reliant on him; 3) the court 

could not rely on the expert's testimony because Diana did not complete the 

psychological testing with the expert; 4) she can parent despite being 

occasionally overwhelmed; 5) the Division removed the children without 
16 A-1465-19T2

consideration of Diana's pre-arranged plans for her family to care for them; 6)

the Division failed to provide housing assistance and did not keep her apprised 

of the children's progress; 7) the Division offered inadequate visitation and 

impeded visitation; and 8) a termination of parental rights will do more harm 

than good because only Elizabeth is in an adoptive home while Amy is in foster 

care awaiting adoption, and an adoption by separate homes will terminate the 

sibling bond.

Edward argues the Division wrongfully concluded he was a sex offender 

and failed to review his criminal record and prior substantiations. He asserts he 

is not on the sex offender registry and not required to have treatment by virtue 

of his prior conviction, and maintained custody of his other children without 

incident. Edward claims the Division erroneously recommended he attend sex 

offender services he did not need, and when he failed to do so, it assumed he 

was an offender and denied him visits with the children. He argues because the 

services provided by the Division were predicated on an assumption he was a 

sex offender he did not receive appropriate services, which prevented 

reunification and affected visitation. Edward contends the physical altercation 

with Diana was caused by her post-partum depression and there is no history of 

domestic violence. He asserts the Division did not consider his plans to 
17 A-1465-19T2

financially support the family. He alleges adoption would do more harm than 

good because the judge did not consider the advanced age of Elizabeth's resource 

parents and that they have no plan of succession in the event of their demise 

while caring for a young child. 

In reviewing the parties' challenges to the judge's decision, we must defer 

to his factual findings unless they "'went so wide of the mark that a mistake must 

have been made.'" N.J. Div. of Youth & Fam. Servs. v. M.M., 189 N.J. 261, 279 

(2007) (citation omitted). So long as "they are 'supported by adequate, 

substantial and credible evidence,'" a trial judge's factual findings will not be 

disturbed on appeal. In re Guardianship of J.T., 269 N.J. Super. 172, 188 (App.

Div. 1993) (citation omitted). We owe special deference to the trial judge's 

expertise in handling family issues. Cesare v. Cesare, 154 N.J. 394, 411-13 

(1998).

In striking a balance between a parent's constitutional rights and a child's 

fundamental needs, courts employ the four-part guardianship test articulated in

N.J. Div. of Youth & Fam. Servs. v. A.W., 103 N.J. 591, 604-11 (1986) and 

codified as N.J.S.A. 30:4C-15.1(a), which states:

The division shall initiate a petition to terminate 

parental rights on the grounds of the "best interests of 

the child" pursuant to subsection (c) of section 15 of 
18 A-1465-19T2

P.L. 1951, c. 138 (C. 30:4C-15) if the following 

standards are met:

(1) The child's safety, health, or development has been 

or will continue to be endangered by the parental 

relationship;

(2) The parent is unwilling or unable to eliminate the 

harm facing the child or is unable or unwilling to 

provide a safe and stable home for the child and the 

delay of permanent placement will add to the harm. 

Such harm may include evidence that separating the 

child from [their] resource family parents would cause 

serious and enduring emotional or psychological harm 

to the child;

(3) The division has made reasonable efforts to provide 

services to help the parent correct the circumstances 

which led to the child's placement outside the home and 

the court has considered alternatives to termination of 

parental rights; and

(4) Termination of parental rights will not do more 

harm than good.

In their application, the four factors above "'are not discrete and separate, but 

relate to and overlap with one another to provide a comprehensive standard that 

identifies a child's best interests.'" N.J. Div. of Youth & Fam. Servs. v. I.S., 202 

N.J. 145, 167 (2010) (quoting N.J. Div. of Youth & Fam. Servs. v. G.L., 191 

N.J. 596, 606-07 (2007)).

Having reviewed the record, we conclude the judge's factual findings are 

based on sufficient credible evidence, and in light of those findings, his legal 
19 A-1465-19T2

conclusions are unassailable. The record amply supports his decision that a 

termination of Diana and Edward's parental rights is in the children's best

interests. The defendants' arguments do not lead us to a different conclusion. 

Affirmed.