IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON
In re the Marriage of: No. 68424-8-1 Co o
NEHA WAS CHANDOLA, DIVISION ONE Respondent, and ] ri: CO
CTv 

### £3!

—In MANJUL VARN CHANDOLA, i UNPUBLISHED Appellant. i FILED: Mav 13. 2013

Cox, J. — Primarily at issue in this appeal is the trial court's discretionary authority to impose restrictions in the parenting plan between Manjul Varn 

### Chandola (Varn) and NehaVyas Chandola (Neha).1 Thetrial court'sfindings of fact are supported by substantial evidence and supportthe conclusions of law that restrictions are proper. Moreover, there is no evidence that the trial court based its decision on an improper basis. Finally, there is no showing of any denial of either due process or equal protection. We affirm. Varn and Neha were married in 1998. They lived with Varn's parents in Arizona until they moved to the Seattle area in 2002. They are both attorneys.



### 1We adopt the naming conventions of the partiesforclarity.No. 68424-8-1/2 They have one young daughter, P.R.C., who was born in November 2008. 

### Both sets ofher grandparents lived withthe family at their house in Kent during different periods oftime and helped care for her. 

### In February 2011, Neha commenced this dissolution proceeding. Neha told Varn that P.R.C. complained ofvaginal pain and that Neha was concerned about the possibility ofsexual abuse. Varn agreed to Neha's requestfor a temporary order requiring supervision during his visits. A court-appointed parenting evaluator, Dr. JenniferWheeler, concluded that there was insufficient evidence to indicate that Varn engaged in behavior that would be consistent with sexual abuse. The supervised visitation was lifted in December 2011, after mediation. A seven-day bench trial took place in 2012. The central issue at trial was the residential schedule and requested restrictions in the parenting plan. A number ofwitnesses testified, including the parties, family members, friends of the family, and P.R.C.'s doctor. Two parenting evaluators, one on behalfofeach party, also testified. Based on the evidence and controlling law, the trial court ordered restrictions and a residential schedule with three different stages to promote the best interests ofthe child. The first stage consists of two visits with Varn every week with one of those visits being an overnight visit every week. Inthe second and third stages, P.R.C.'s time with Varn will increase, ifVarn meets certain conditions. Varn appeals.No. 68424-8-1/3

PARENTING PLAN 

### Varn argues that the trialcourt's restrictions inthe parenting plan were not supported by the findings. We disagree. 

### An appellate courtwill not retrythe facts on appeal and will acceptthe trial court's findings of fact as verities ifthey are supported by substantial evidence in 

### therecord.2 "Substantial evidence is thatwhich issufficienttopersuade afairminded person of the truth of the matter asserted."3 This courtdoes notreview 

### thetrial court'scredibilitydeterminations, nor does itweigh conflicting evidence.4 Decisions concerning the provisions of a parenting plan are reviewed for abuse ofdiscretion.5 "Atrial court abuses its discretion if its decision is 

### manifestly unreasonable or based on untenable grounds or untenablereasons."6 "Acourt's decision is manifestly unreasonable if it is outside the range of acceptable choices, given the facts and the applicable legal standard; it is based
on untenable grounds ifthe factual findings are unsupported by the record; it is based on untenable reasons if it is based on an incorrect standard or the facts do 

### not meet the requirements of the correctstandard."7

*In re Marriage ofThomas. 63 Wn. App. 658, 660, 821 P.2d 1227 (1991). 

### 3In reMarriage ofKatare. 175Wn.2d 23, 35, 283 P.3d 546(2012), certdenied. 133 S. Ct. 889, 184 L Ed. 2d 661 (2013). 

### 4In reMarriage ofRich. 80Wn. App. 252, 259, 907 P.2d 1234(1996). 5In reMarriage ofLittlefield. 133Wn.2d 39, 46, 940 P.2d 1362(1997). 6jd, at 46-47. 7 Id. at 47.No. 68424-8-1/4

This court's review of whether the trial court's conclusions of law flow from 

### its findings is de novo.8 Adverse Effect on the Child's Best Interest Varn argues thatthere were insufficientfindings and no substantial evidence to justify restrictions under RCW 26.09.191 (3)(g). We disagree. RCW 26.09.191 (3)(g) is a discretionary provision that permits a trial court 

### tolimitthe terms of a parenting plan.9 Thisdiscretionary authority ofthe court is conditioned on the existence of specific factors or conductthat the court 

### expresslyfinds adverse to the bestinterests ofthechild.10 "Imposing such restrictions 'require[s] more than the normal... hardships which predictably 

### resultfrom adissolution ofmarriage.'"11 Here, the trial court found that Neha had established by a preponderance ofthe evidence that restrictions under RCW 26.09.191 (3)(g) should be included inthe parenting plan. More specifically, the court made the following finding, which is supported by substantial evidence: The court finds that the father's parenting history has had an adverse effect on the child's best interests pursuantto RCW 26.09.191 (3)(g). See Memorandum [Findings on Trial entered this 

### date andincorporated by reference.1121 8Watson v. Dep'tof Labor&Indus.. 133Wn. App. 903, 909,138 P.3d 177 (2006).9Katare. 175 Wn.2d at 36. 

### 10Id, 11 jd, (alteration in original) (quoting Littlefield. 133Wn.2d at 55). 12 Clerk's Papers at 80.No. 68424-8-1/5 

### The Memorandum Findings on Trial, which the trial courtexpressly incorporated into the above, identified the factors and conduct of Varn that the court found adverse to the best interests of the child: 

### Prior to separation the father consistently engaged in a 

### pattern of interaction with [P.R.C] which whileloving, caring, affectionate, enriching in an entertainment sense, and nurturing in some respects, nonetheless lacked, in concerningdegree, objectivity with respectto herheaithydevelopment. The father was unwilling orunable to establish boundaries, 

### routines, schedules, andstructure. He discouraged exploration andindependence. Varn may best be described prior to separation as a doting father but ineffective parent. This is not an entirely unusual situation but healso actively undermined 

### the mother's efforts to provide these essentialparenting components resulting in an imbalance thatappears to have hadadverse consequencesfor the child. The court is unable to conclude that itwas the father's design to undermine the mother 

### but the consequences forthe child are the same. It is telling that subsequentto separation the child's behavior repertoire increased dramatically
.... As more than one lay witness observed since 

### separation "[P.R.C] is a changed child, more outgoing, interactive
. .,[13] 

### On appeal, Varn assigns errorto five ofthe trial court's findings regarding his parenting history. But, he only discusses two ofthese findings when he challenges the trial court's determination that he was an "ineffective parent." 

### Thus, we need only address whetherthese two findings are supported by substantial evidence. First, the trial courtfound that Varn "discouraged [P.R.C.'s] exploration and independence." A family friend, Rahul Gupta, testified that itappeared that Varn did not want P.R.C. to explore and engage with otherchildren and adults.

13 Id. at 92-93 (emphasis added).No. 68424-8-1/6 A neighbor, Carol Johnston, testified that Varn would hold P.R.C. a lot and would 

### not let her get down and play. Another family friend, Anjulie Ganti, described 

### Varn as a "hovering" parentwho was "always" holding P.R.C. and not letting her explore. Gupta also testified thatVarn wanted somebody to be in the room with P.R.C. whileshe slept, and he refused to use a baby monitor. Dr.JenniferWheelerwas the court-appointed parenting evaluator. She interviewed both parents, the child, and others in preparing herwritten evaluation and recommendations to the court. At trial, she testified that Varn's constant 

### holding of P.R.C. was behaviorthat appeared to be "more aboutfather's anxiety aboutwhat might happen if he put herdown and regulating his own anxiety

versus recognizing what's really bestfor her in that particular situation." Dr. Marsha Hedrick, a parenting evaluatorthat Varn called on his behalf, agreed that this behavior was problematic in terms of the child's best interests. This evidence is sufficient to persuade a fair-minded person that Varn "discouraged [P.R.C.'s] exploration and independence." Second, the trial courtfound that Varn was "unwilling or unable to establish boundaries, routines, schedules, and structure." Dr. Hedrick, who reviewed Dr. Wheeler's report, testified at trial that Varn appeared to be "overly permissive in his parenting" regarding P.R.C.'s eating and sleeping. Neha's mother, Kuldeep , Johnston, and Ganti agreed that Varn did not set routines or create structure around these activities. For example, they explained that Varn and his mother would chase P.R.C. around the house instead offeeding her at a table or in a high chair. Varn testified that he knewNo. 68424-8-1/7 

### that P.R.C.'s doctor recommended againstgiving P.R.C. a bottle ofmilkat night
as she got older, but he wouldalmost never decline P.R.C.'s requestfor a bottle. Neha testified that she was not able to implement a bedtime routine for P.R.C. until September2010 when Varn and his parents started to leave the house after dinner.

### Dr.Wheeleralso testified thatVarn was "very controlling" with "certain things" like car seats and baby monitors, but "[w]hen itcame to the schedule, there was sort ofthis odd lack of structure and lack of control." 

### Insum, there is substantial evidence in this record to supportthe findings that Varn "discouraged [P.R.C.'s] exploration and independence" and that Varn

was "unwilling or unable to establish boundaries, routines, schedules, and structure." Varn argues that his discouragement of P.R.C.'s "exploration and independence" was not a problem at the time of trial. He points to Dr. Wheeler's testimony that P.R.C. was playing with the visitation supervisor's son. Nevertheless, the trial court was not convinced by his testimony that the "risks and hazards of his parenting choices going forward" would continue to improve. Thus, the trial court made a credibility determination, which this court does not review.14 Varn contends that the professionals who testified at trial thought P.R.C. had "always been a perfectly happy, healthy child, with normal development." A fair reading ofthe entire record, however, shows that Dr. Wheeler, 

### 14 In reMarriage ofRich. 80Wn. App. at 259.No. 68424-8-1/8 

### notwithstanding this observation, believed that parental behavior merited restrictions. Thus, this argument fails. 

### Varn argues that Drs. Wheeler and Hedrickdid not have "any concerns about Varn's parenting [that] rose to a level requiring restrictions." This is inaccurate. 

### The record reflects that Dr. Hedrick criticized Dr.Wheeler's reportfor failing to tie her concerns about Varn to a basis for restrictions. But at trial Dr. Wheelertestified that while restrictions were notjustified based on domestic violence, sexual abuse, or emotional impairment, she believed that Varn's "abusive use of conflict" was a different basis for restrictions. Dr. Wheeler admitted in her testimony that herwritten report did not "do an adequatejob of connecting the dots between what [her] concerns were and the limitations to the schedule that [she was] recommending." But her testimony at trial was clear: My authority for my opinion is that the personality traits that I've been describing all morning in my opinion, the risk to [P.R.C] ofthose traits is ongoing conflictthat is essentially emotionally abusive to her. And I do think that until those traits are better regulated and [Varn is] able to interact with [P.R.C] in a way that does not perpetuate this conflict and parent in a way that does not continue to inflame this conflict, Ido think that father is vulnerable to engaging in abusive use of conflict. That supports generally why Iam limiting his residential schedule relative to what youjust 

### referred to as the normal, typical kind ofrecommendation.115' In any event, it is the ultimate responsibility ofthe court, not the experts, to determine whether restrictions are required. The court did so here on the basis



### 15 Reportof Proceedings (Jan. 31,2012)at305-06.

8No. 68424-8-1/9 

### of allthe evidence, including the testimony of both parenting evaluators. There

was no error in this respect. Varn argues that it is common for parents to have different styles of 

### parenting, and courts musttolerate these different styles. He contends thatthe trial courtwas "imposing [its] own preference regarding parenting style" because his parenting style did not result in any "demonstrable harm" to P.R.C. This argument ignores the record. As discussed previously inthis opinion, the findings offact regarding Varn's parenting history are supported by substantial evidence. Moreover, the findings supportthe conclusion that his parenting had an adverse effect on P.R.C.'s best interests. Thus, the trial court was properly acting under the provisions of governing law, not imposing its own parenting style preference. Varn argues that "[t]o illustrate the concern about imposing restrictions without a sufficient showing of harm, one could easily make arguments for restrictions against Neha as readily as Judge Doerty did against Varn." The premise ofthis argument is incorrect. We have already identified the adverse effectthat Varn's actions had on the child. In contrast, there is no showing that restrictions against Neha should have been imposed. As Drs. Wheeler and Hedricktestified, they did not have any serious concerns about Neha's parenting that would rise to the level of requiring restrictions. Finally, Varn argues that "the due process clause prohibits imposing restrictions under RCW 26.09.191 without a showing that they are necessary toNo. 68424-8-1/10 

### avoid an identified harm to thechild." HecitesTroxel v. Granville16 to support this assertion. 

### But as Varn acknowledges, this court has already rejected a similar 

### argumentin In reMarriage ofKatare.17 There, this courtexplainedthatTroxel does "not support [the father's] argumentthat a parenting plan thatcomplies with the statutory requirements to promote the best interests ofthe children raises an 

### issue ofconstitutional magnitude orviolates a parent's constitutional rights."18 Thus, this argument is not persuasive. As noted above, Varn also assigned errorto two otherfindings of fact. The first is that Varn "lacked, in concerning degree, objectivity with respectto [P.R.C.'s] healthy development." The second is that Varn "actively undermined the mother's efforts to provide these essential parenting components resulting in

an imbalance that appears to have had adverse consequences for the child." Varn fails to supportthese assignments oferrorwith any argument or 

### persuasiveauthority. Thus, we need not address them.19 Restrictions Varn argues that the restrictions inthe parenting plan were not supported by the findings. Specifically, he challenges three restrictions inthe parenting



### 16 530 U.S. 57, 120 S. Ct. 2054, 147 L Ed. 2d 49 (2000). 

### 17 125Wn. App. 813, 105 P.3d 44 (2004). 18 ]d,at 823. 19 See State v. Johnson. 119Wn.2d 167,171, 829 P.2d 1082 (1992).

10No. 68424-8-1/11 plan. None of his challenges are meritorious. All ofthe restrictions are reasonably calculated to address identified harm to the child. 

### "A trialcourt wields broad discretion when fashioning a permanent 

### parenting plan."20 Butthis discretion is guided by several provisions ofthe Parenting Act of 1987, including RCW 26.09.191, which sets "forthfactors which 

### require or permitlimitations upon a parent's involvementwith the child."21 A primaryconcern inestablishing parenting plans is that parenting arrangements 

### servethe bestinterestsofthechild.22 Thiscourthasheld that "[a]ny limitations

or restrictions imposed must be reasonably calculated to address the identified harm."23 The first challenged restriction is the limit on Varn's time with P.R.C, which is approximately 30 hours a week. Underthe court's plan, this visitation
was scheduled to increase in length overthree stages ifVarn continued to 

### comply with certain requirements. This time restriction was supported by the trial court's Memorandum Findings on Trial: While it is cause for optimism that Varn has agreed to parenting plan provisions that recognize the importance of "[P.R.C.'s] set schedule for meal times, bed times, wake up times etc.", his testimony failed to persuade this courtthat he appreciated the down side of his approach before separation orthe risks and hazards of his parenting choices going forward. This assessment of his testimony is consistent with Dr. Wheeler's concerns about his
20 Katare. 175 Wn.2dat35. 

### 21 ]d,at 36. 22 See RCW 26.09.002. 

### 23 Katare. 125Wn. App. at 826.

11No. 68424-8-1/12 

### difficulties with integrating data inconsistentwith hisview ofreality. It is therefore necessaryto impose such restrictions as maybestbe anticipated [to] assure the mother's parenting is not diluted by the father. Certainly a "fifty/fifty" parenting planwould not accomplish this.t24] 

### The timerestriction in the residential schedule was a reasonable way to address Varn's unwillingness or inabilityto establish boundaries, routines, schedules, and 

### structure; and help him develop objectivity with respectto P.R.C.'s development. Varn argues that the evidence shows that he was "the primaryparent during much ofP.R.C.'s life," and this fact does not supportthe time restriction. 

### But at trial, there was conflicting evidence whetherVarnwas the primary parent, and the trialcourtdid not make a findingas to this fact. Inany event, such a finding would not obviate the need for this restriction, given this record. The second challenged restriction was that P.R.C. sleep in her own room at Varn's house unless the case manager recommends otherwise. This restriction was also supported by the trial court's findings which were, in turn, supported by testimony at trial. Inthe Memorandum Findings on Trial, the trial courtfound that Varn was "unwilling or unable to establish boundaries, routines, schedules, and structure," 

### which included P.R.C.'s sleeping routine. At trial, several witnesses' testimony supported this finding. They testified that Varn interfered with P.R.C.'s sleeping schedule by being in the same room as P.R.C. Neha testified that she felt like P.R.C. was not getting enough sleep because Varn would hold her inthe middle ofthe night. Neha went on to explain: 

### 24 Clerk's Papers at 93.

12No. 68424-8-1/13 

### sometimes children have to be soothed to go backto bed, but he 

### would just randomly pick her up. At2 in the morning, he's holding her.... And Ifeltthat the co-sleeping was more disruptive and it 

### wasn't healthy for her because she's not sleeping through the 

### night.1251 She also testified that Varn would show P.R.C. videos on the Internet until 1 

### a.m., which kept herfrom sleeping. Ganti's testimony corroborated this

statement. 

### Several witnesses also testified to other interruptions ofP.R.C.'s sleep. 

### Ganti observed Varn's mom stayingin the room while P.R.C. was sleeping. And, though Ganti offered the family a baby monitor to use while P.R.C. slept, she did not see the Chandolas use it. Johnston testified that P.R.C. often seemed 

### "cranky and tired." Dr.Wheelertestified that she would support a restriction that 

### would require that P.R.C. sleep in her own room ifthe parenttrainer supported this restriction. 

### Incontrast, Varn testified that P.R.C. had a difficulttime sleeping. He asserts that she would go to sleep around 9 p.m. and then wake up again at 11 p.m., midnight, or 1 a.m. He testified itwas his responsibility to help her get back to sleep, and he would use different noises including music from Internetvideos to help her sleep. 

### Given the conflictingtestimony ofthe parties regarding P.R.C.'s sleeping schedule and the testimony of Dr. Wheelerthat supported this restriction, the trial court was well within its discretion to require P.R.C. sleep in her own room. This restriction is reasonably related to the identified harm to the child. 

### 25 ReportofProceedings (Feb. 1,2012) at411 -12.

13No. 68424-8-1/14 

### Varn argues that precluding P.R.C. from sleeping in his room would actually cause more harm to P.R.C. because she has never slept inherown room. But as noted above, this requirement is based on Dr. Wheeler's trial testimony and conditioned on the case manager's recommendation. Moreover, it 

### could be altered depending on the case manager's observations of P.R.C.'s progress. Thus, Varn's argument is not persuasive. 

### The third challenged restriction limited Varn from having his parents presentfor more than 20 percentof his time with P.R.C. during stages one and two ofthe residential schedule. Again, this restriction was supported by the trial court's findings: Varn's opportunities to parent and to learn from the opportunities must in large part be without the presence of his parents. The court recognizes that there are several cultural aspects to the history ofthe marriage and these may or may not include the paternal grandparents approach and influence. Or it may be due to Varn being an only child, or likely a combination of both. Whateverthe antecedents ofthe extended family dynamic the so called "team" approach at this time needs to stop. Therefore Varn's residential time must exclude his parents with occasional exceptions which may include [P.R.C] visiting her grandparents in 

### Tucson consistentwith the otherprovisions oftheplan.[2 ] The trial court's findings appear to provide two reasons for the restriction on the involvement ofVarn's parents: (1) provide Varn with opportunities to parent, and (2) improve the "family dynamic." As discussed above, the trial court found that Varn was "unwilling or unable to establish boundaries, routines, schedules, and structure," but he was willing to work on following P.R.C.'s "set schedule for meal times, bed times, 

### 26 Clerk's Papers at93-94.

14No. 68424-8-1/15 

### wake up times, etc" Ensuring that Varnmostly spends timewith P.R.C. alone
was a reasonable way toensure that Varnestablishes "boundaries, routines, 

### schedules, and structure" for P.R.C. while still allowing the grandparents to be involved in P.R.C.'s life. 

### Moreover, Drs. Wheeler and Hedrickbothtestified that they were concerned about thefamily dynamic. As noted above, Dr. Wheelerreported that 

### "[P.R.C] became increasingly aligned with the father and paternal grandparents and relatively less aligned with the mother and maternal grandparents," which she described as harmful to P.R.C. Dr. Hedrick testified that the data in Dr. 

### Wheeler's report made her "suspicious thatthese in-laws and this father had 

### made itverydifficultfor this mother to have a reasonable relationshipwith the child." Johnston, a neighbor, and , Neha's mother, testified that Varn and his parents seemed to encourage P.R.C. to choose Varn over Neha. 

### Again, restricting the amount of time Varn's parents can spend with Varn 

### and P.R.C. was a reasonable way for the court to change and improve the family dynamic that had developed. 

### Varn argues that Dr.Wheelerdid not identifyany problem with P.R.C.'s relationship withVarn's parents and recommended thatVarn and Neha support this relationship. While Dr.Wheeler noted inher report that P.R.C.'s relationship with her grandparents should be supported by her parents, as discussed above, she also explained that the family dynamic that had developed with Varn and his parents was harmful to P.R.C. Thus, this argument is not persuasive.

15No. 68424-8-1/16 

### Varn argues that any effort to undermine Neha and P.R.C.'s relationship is no longer a problem because Neha and Varn live separately. Again, this view is contrary to Dr.Wheeler's recommendation. Thus, this argumentfails. Varn points outthat Neha did not requestthe grandparent restriction. That is irrelevant. The trial court's duty is to determine whetherthe child's best 

### interests require the imposition ofrestrictions irrespective ofwhether a party asks for such restrictions.27 The trial court did so in this case. Insum, these challenged restrictions were supported by the trial court's findings and were reasonably calculated to address Varn's parenting history, which had an adverse effect on P.R.C.'s best interests. The trial court did not abuse its discretion in imposing these restrictions on Varn inthe parenting plan. UNPROVEN SEXUAL ABUSE ACCUSATIONS Varn argues that the trial courtfailed to considerthe distorting effects of the unproven sexual abuse accusations. There is no support in the record for this argument. Ifsexual abuse accusations are proven, the trial court is "requiredto restrict [a parent's] residential time and to eliminate the mandatory alternative dispute resolution and mutual decision-making provisions ofthe parenting 

### plan."28 Butifthe sexual abuse accusations are unproven, thetrial courtstill has discretion under RCW 26.09.191 (3)(d) to place restrictions or limitations on a

27 See Katare. 175 Wn.2d at 35-36. 

### 28Watson. 132Wn. App. at 232(citing RCW 26.09.191 (1)(b), (2)(a)(ii)).

16No. 68424-8-1/17 

### parent ifthe evidence supports a findingthatthe parent's "involvement or conduct" has an adverse effect on the child's best interests.29 There is nothing inthis record to show that the restrictions here were 

### imposed based on sexual abuse. Rather, they were imposed based on other documented harm to the child's best interests. 

### Varn primarily relieson In re the Marriage ofWatson30 to support his argument. There, Division Two concluded that "the trial court exceeded its 

### authority and abused its discretion inlimiting [afather's] visitation afterfinding 

### that the sexual abuse allegations wereunprove[n]."31 In that case, themother obtained a protection order againstthe father alleging thatthe father had sexually 

### abused theirdaughter after afinal parenting plan was in place.32 Atfirstthe father had no contactwith his daughter and then he had two hours of 

### professionally supervised visits for overtwo years.33 Afterfinding that the allegations were unproven, the courtdid not reinstate the parent's original parenting plan but added more restrictions on the father's visitation under RCW 

### 26.09.191 {3){6).M

29Id, 

### 30 132Wn. App. 222>, 130 P.3d 915 (2006) 31 Watson. 132Wn. App. at 225. 

### 32 Id,at 226. 33id. 34 Id. at 228.

17No. 68424-8-1/18 

### Division Two acknowledged thatthe motherdid not askfor restrictions 

### underRCW 26.09.191, and thus, the issue was notproperly before the court.35 But,Division Two concluded that substantial evidence did not support the trial court's decision to restrict visitation under RCW26.09.191 (3)(d): The court found that conflictbetween the parents escalated 

### following the entry of the parenting plan, but there are nofindings indicating that [the father] caused the conflict. The court also found 

### that [the daughter] had a subjective perception ofsexual abuse and visitation anxiety but not that [the father] caused it. 

### On the contrary, the evidence shows only that [the father] did the "most parenting he could" under the restrictive conditions available to him. In the absence of substantial evidence establishing a nexus between [the father's] "involvement or 

### conduct" and the impairmentof his emotional ties with [the daughter], the trial court erred in imposing visitation restrictions 

### underRCW 26.09.191 (3)(d).[36] Division Two explained thatthe sole basis forthe requested restriction was the sexual abuse allegations, and most ofthe litigationfocused on whetherthe 

### sexual abuseactuallyoccurred.37 The record in thatcase did notsupportthe findingthat emotional ties between the father and daughterwere absentor 

### impaired, which was required for a restriction underRCW 26.09.191 (3)(d).38 Incontrastto Watson, here, the trial did not base any partof its decision
on whether Neha's accusations or concerns about sexual abuse were proven. Instead, the trial court imposed restrictions on the basis thatVarn's "parenting 

### 35id, at 233. 36id, at 234. 

### 37 id, at 232-33. 38 Id. at 233-34.

18No. 68424-8-1/19 history has had an adverse effect on the child's best interest," which fell under the catch-all provision of RCW 26.09.191 (3)(g). Unlike Watson, the trial court 

### expressly found that Varn was an "ineffective parent" for a variety ofreasons unrelated to sexual abuse. As discussed above, the trialcourt's findings are supported by substantial evidence, which in turn supportthe restrictions and limitations. Varn argues that the effect ofthe accusations was that he had nearly one year of supervised visitation with P.R.C. leading up to the trial. He contends that the supervised visitations impacted Dr. Wheeler's observation of Varn, and they did not allow him the opportunity to show the improvements he was making. He argues that the trial court should have "disregarded Varn's marginalized status during the temporary orders
... [and] looked instead to the situation that existed priorto Neha's accusations." But the trial court's findings demonstrate that it did justthat. The trial court looked at the family situation before the temporary order and supervised visitation were in place, and it still found that restrictions were necessary. Varn also contends that the trial court improperly credited all of P.R.C.'s improvement to Neha's parenting and did not consider that her improvements could be developmental. There simply is no support in the record for this assertion. There is no need to further address this argument. Finally, Varn argues that RCW 26.09.002 provides that "the best interests ofthe child is ordinarily served when the existing pattern of interaction between a parent and child is altered" as littleas possible. This is a correct statementofthe

19No. 68424-8-1/20 

### law. Butthat statute does not overcome the requirements of RCW 26.09.191 (3)(g), which control here. CULTURAL CONSIDERATIONS 

### Varn argues thatthe trialcourt's restrictions regarding co-sleeping and his parents' involvementdenied his right to substantive due process and equal protection because the courtfailed to considerthe family's Asian Indian culture. These arguments have no merit. 

### The Fourteenth Amendmentofthe United States Constitution protects the freedom of "'intimate association,'" which is derived from substantive due process 

### concepts.39 TheUnited StatesSupreme Courthasrecognized thattherightto "'intimate association'" protects "'the choices to enter into and maintain certain intimate human relationships [that] must be secured against undue intrusion by 

### theState.'"40 These "intimate human relationships" include "the raising and educating ofone's children"41 and "cohabitationwith one's relatives."42 Additionally, RCW 26.09.184(3) provides that a "court may considerthe cultural heritage and religious beliefs of a child" when establishing a permanent parenting plan. "Moreover, parenting plans are individualized decisions that 

### 39City ofBremerton v. Widell. 146Wn.2d 561, 575,51 P.3d 733 (2002) (quoting Roberts v. United States Javcees. 468 U.S. 609, 618,104 S. Ct. 3244, 82 L Ed. 2d 462 (1984)). 

### 40id, at 576 (quoting Roberts. 468 U.S. at 617-18). 41 id, (citing Pierce v. Societyof the Sisters of the Holy Names ofJesus and Mary. 268 U.S. 510, 45 S. Ct. 571, 69 L Ed. 1070 (1925)). 

### 42id, (citing Moore v.City ofE. Cleveland. 431 U.S. 494, 97 S. Ct. 1932, 52 L Ed. 2d 531 (1977)).

20No. 68424-8-1/21 

### depend upon a wide varietyof factors, including 'culture, family history, the emotional stability of the parents and children, finances, and any of the other 

### factors that couldbearupon the best interests of the child.'"43 As discussed above, the trial court restricted P.R.C. from sleeping in the
same room as Varn and limitedthe involvement ofVarn's parents. Before 

### imposing these restrictions, the trial court appeared to take the family's culture intoconsideration inestablishing the parenting plan. Inthe Memorandum Findings on Trial, the trial court recognized that "there are several cultural 

### aspects to the history ofthe marriage and these may or may not include the paternal grandparents approach and influence." The trial court also heard 

### testimony from Varn and Neha that itwas customary in Indian culture for parents to sleep with their children and to have grandparents live with them and help provide care. 

### The trial courtdid not completely prohibit the paternal grandparents' involvementorco-sleeping with Neha and thus appears to have considered these cultural norms. Instead, the trial court put restrictions on Varn because it found that his approach to these two practices were adverse to P.R.C.'s best 

### interests. As discussed earlier, a parenting plan that complies withthe statutory requirements to promote the best interests of the child does not raise an issue of constitutional magnitude or violate a parent's constitutional rights. 44



### 43 In re theParentage ofJannot. 149Wn.2d 123,127, 65P.3d 664(2003) (emphasis added) (quoting In re the Parentage ofJannot. 110 Wn. App. 16, 19- 20, 37 P.3d 1265 (2002)). 

### 44 See Katare. 125Wn. App. at 823.21No. 68424-8-1/22 

### Varn also argues that the "trialcourt's rulings on these issues amounted to national origin discrimination," which violated Varn's right to equal protection. But Varn fails to cite any authority to supportthis assertion or provide any other 

### argumentbeyond thisstatement. Thus, we need notaddress this argument.45 ATTORNEY FEES Varn requests an award of attorney fees and costs. Neha did not request fees. We conclude Varn is not entitled to an award offees or costs. RCW 26.09.140 provides for fees on appeal in a dissolution matter. "Upon any appeal, the appellate court may, in its discretion, order a party to pay for the costto the other party of maintaining the appeal and attorneys' fees in 

### addition tostatutorycosts."46 We have considered the respective financial declarations that both parties filed and conclude an award of fees is not warranted. We affirm the parenting plan. 

# £z?(,J.

WE CONCUR: 

# <,/A^-/f,Cd stS/AA-fAQe* I

45 See Cowiche Canyon Conservancy v. Boslev. 118 Wn.2d 801, 809, 828 P.2d 549 (1992). 46 RCW 26.09.140.

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