UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 

FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT 

_________________________________ 

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 

 Plaintiff - Appellee, 

v. 

WENDELL RAY CAUDLE, 

 Defendant - Appellant. 

No. 21-7005 

(D.C. No. 6:20-CR-00020-RAW-1) 

(E.D. Okla.) 

_________________________________ 

ORDER AND JUDGMENT*

_________________________________ 

Before MATHESON, PHILLIPS, and MORITZ, Circuit Judges. 

_________________________________ 

Wendell Ray Caudle appeals an order denying his motion to suppress 

incriminating evidence found as a result of a patdown search during a traffic stop. 

Because the district court properly determined that the arresting officer reasonably 

suspected Caudle was armed and dangerous, we affirm. 

* After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has determined 

unanimously to honor the parties’ request for a decision on the briefs without oral 

argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(f); 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G). The case is therefore 

submitted without oral argument. This order and judgment is not binding precedent, 

except under the doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. 

But it may be cited for its persuasive value. See Fed. R. App. P. 32.1(a); 10th Cir. R. 

32.1(A). 

FILED 

United States Court of Appeals 

Tenth Circuit 

February 18, 2022

Christopher M. Wolpert 

Clerk of Court

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Background1

Caudle’s appeal stems from a traffic stop that occurred on Christmas Eve in 

2019. Around 2 a.m., while on patrol in a remote, poorly lit area, Deputy Sheriff John 

Jones noticed a truck whose license-plate tag was obstructed by a “toy skeleton face” 

attached to the truck’s hitch. App. 61. As the truck pulled over, Jones also noticed 

that the driver’s side mirror was shattered into pieces “like a spider web.” Id. at 62. 

Jones approached the truck and informed the driver, later identified as Caudle, about 

the reason for the stop. 

After requesting a driver’s license and proof of insurance, Jones asked where 

Caudle was going. Caudle said he was on his way to visit his cousin in a nearby 

town, which Jones found odd given the late hour and the indirect route Caudle was 

taking. During this initial conversation, Caudle “appeared to be very nervous” and 

was “visibly shaking.” Id. at 66. Jones told Caudle to keep his hands on the steering 

wheel and then returned to his patrol vehicle. 

Once back at his vehicle, Jones gave Caudle’s information to dispatch so they 

could check for outstanding warrants. Jones declined to ask dispatch to look up the 

status of Caudle’s driver’s license (a process that takes longer than a warrants check) 

because he could not see Caudle through the truck’s tinted back window and was 

therefore concerned about staying in his patrol vehicle for too long. Adding to his 

1

 We describe the facts based on the evidence presented at the suppression 

hearing, viewed in the light most favorable to the district court’s ruling. See United 

States v. Young, 964 F.3d 938, 942 (10th Cir. 2020). 

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concern, Jones recognized Caudle’s name from a case he had been working on that 

week—a drug investigation involving “a pretty large quantity” of 

methamphetamine—and knew from training and experience that “meth dealers 

commonly carry weapons to protect both their person and product.” Id. at 66–67. So 

after checking for warrants, Jones returned to Caudle’s truck “to make sure he wasn’t 

doing anything.” Id. at 69. 

At Jones’s request, Caudle stepped out of the truck. When Caudle asked why 

he had been pulled over, Jones again noted the shattered mirror and obstructed 

license-plate tag. Jones walked Caudle to the back of the truck, where Caudle 

removed the skeleton toy and tossed it into the truck bed. Jones then asked Caudle to 

place his hands on the side of the truck so Jones could check for weapons. But when 

Jones reached to pat Caudle’s left pocket, Caudle “slapped [Jones’s] hand away” and 

tried to move towards the driver’s seat. Id. at 71. Concerned about Caudle becoming 

“very combative” and “resisting” in response to the weapons check, Jones briefly 

returned to his vehicle to call for backup. Id. at 73. When Jones returned and tried the 

patdown a second time, Caudle pushed Jones away and again moved towards the 

driver’s seat. 

At that point, Jones pinned Caudle up against the truck. Caudle started 

“kicking his feet and throwing his head back,” so Jones “took [Caudle] to the 

ground” and tried to handcuff him. Id. at 74. After struggling to secure Caudle’s 

hands, Jones threatened to use pepper spray and then did so when Caudle continued 

to fight back. Sometime later, while Jones and Caudle remained on the ground, 

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another officer arrived and warned Caudle that he would be tased if he did not stop 

fighting. Caudle continued fighting, so the other officer tased Caudle on his lower 

back. Once Jones had handcuffed Caudle, he recovered a loaded and cocked firearm 

from Caudle’s left pocket. During an inventory search of Caudle’s truck, Jones also 

found methamphetamine and drug paraphernalia. 

 After the government brought criminal charges against Caudle based on these 

events, he moved to suppress the incriminating evidence found in his pocket and 

truck, arguing (among other things) that they were fruits of an unlawful patdown 

search. The district court denied the motion, rejecting Caudle’s objections to a 

magistrate judge’s determination that Jones had reasonable suspicion to patdown 

Caudle for weapons.2

Ultimately, Caudle pleaded guilty to possession with intent to distribute 

methamphetamine and possession of a firearm in furtherance of a drug-trafficking 

crime, reserving the right to appeal the order denying his suppression motion.3

 The 

district court imposed a 118-month prison sentence, and Caudle appeals. 

Analysis

When, as here, a defendant challenges an order denying a motion to suppress, we 

accept the district court’s factual findings unless they are clearly erroneous and 

2

 Caudle’s suppression motion also disputed the validity and length of the stop, 

but he did not object to the magistrate judge’s findings on those issues and does not 

pursue those issues on appeal. 

3

 In exchange for Caudle’s guilty plea, the government dismissed a separate 

charge for being a felon in possession of a firearm or ammunition. 

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review the ultimate determination of Fourth Amendment reasonableness de novo. 

United States v. Fager, 811 F.3d 381, 384–85 (10th Cir. 2016). Caudle’s challenge 

centers on his argument that the district court should have suppressed the 

incriminating evidence found in his pocket and truck because Jones obtained those 

items by conducting an unconstitutional patdown search. We assess that argument 

below after setting out the relevant Fourth Amendment principles. 

A patdown is a search and is thus subject to the Fourth Amendment’s 

reasonableness requirement. United States v. Garcia, 751 F.3d 1139, 1142 (10th Cir. 

2014). To avoid a constitutional violation, an officer conducting a patdown must have 

“reasonable suspicion that an individual is ‘armed and dangerous.’” Id. (quoting United 

States v. Rice, 483 F.3d 1079, 1082 (10th Cir. 2007)). This standard is not onerous: It 

does not demand “absolute[] certain[ty] that the individual is armed,” nor even probable 

cause to that effect. Id. at 1143–44 (quoting Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 27 (1968)). 

Instead, reasonable suspicion merely requires some “minimum level of objective 

justification” for the patdown. Id. at 1143 (quoting Rice, 483 F.3d at 1083). When 

assessing whether such a justification exists, we consider the totality of the 

circumstances, accounting for the officer’s “reasonable inferences based on training, 

experience, and common sense.” Id. (quoting Rice, 483 F.3d at 1083). Here, the district 

court identified several circumstances contributing to Jones’s reasonable suspicion that 

Caudle was armed and dangerous. 

One contributing factor is the time and place of the patdown. See Fager, 811 F.3d 

at 386. Our precedents recognize that “a nighttime stop in a sparsely travelled area 

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. . . heighten[s] a reasonable officer’s concerns for safety.” Garcia, 751 F.3d at 1145–

46. Similar concerns arose here because, as the district court found, Jones was patrolling 

alone, late at night, in a remote, poorly lit area. What’s more, Jones could not see through 

the truck’s tinted back window, meaning he could not ensure that Caudle’s hands stayed 

on the steering wheel while he confirmed Caudle’s information from his vehicle. Cf. 

United States v. Stanfield, 109 F.3d 976, 981 (4th Cir. 1997) (“[W]e can conceive of 

almost nothing more dangerous to a law[-]enforcement officer in the context of a traffic 

stop than approaching an automobile whose passenger compartment is entirely hidden 

from the officer’s view by darkly tinted windows.” (emphasis omitted)). These conditions 

provide some support for Jones’s decision to patdown Caudle to make sure he did not 

have a weapon. See Garcia, 751 F.3d at 1146 (citing conditions officer faced, which 

included “working alone on a sparsely travelled street and having to turn his back to [the 

suspect],” as factors “support[ing] reasonable suspicion”); United States v. Gurule, 935 

F.3d 878, 887 (10th Cir. 2019) (holding that reasonable suspicion for patdown existed in 

part because search occurred at night, in dark gas-station parking lot, near “a darkened 

field”). 

Caudle’s ties to Jones’s ongoing drug investigation also contribute to reasonable 

suspicion. We have explained that prior encounters between a defendant and an officer 

may affect reasonable suspicion. Fager, 811 F.3d at 386. Although the record reveals 

no prior encounters between Jones and Caudle, the district court credited Jones’s 

testimony that Jones had recently been investigating Caudle as a suspect in a 

methamphetamine-sales investigation and recognized his name from that 

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investigation.4

 Caudle’s potential involvement in this recent activity bolstered Jones’s 

suspicion that Caudle was armed because Jones’s training and experience taught him 

that “meth dealers commonly carry weapons [for] protect[ion].” App. 66–67. 

One additional factor supporting reasonable suspicion is also worth noting: 

Caudle was “very nervous” and “visibly shaking” during his initial conversation with 

Jones. Id. at 66. While nervous behavior in the presence of a police officer is usually “of 

limited significance” in the reasonable-suspicion analysis, it takes on added weight when 

a suspect displays “unusually severe or persistent” nervousness of the kind exhibited by 

Caudle. Garcia, 751 F.3d at 1146 n.11 (quoting United States v. Kitchell, 653 F.3d 1206, 

1220 (10th Cir. 2011)). And here, Jones testified that Caudle’s behavior was not “a 

normal type of nervousness.” App. 106. Accordingly, Caudle’s nervous behavior further 

adds to reasonable suspicion.5

4

 Caudle tries to undercut this testimony in two ways. First, he asserts that 

Jones’s drug investigation was “a dead end[,] as no drugs were ever bought or 

delivered.” Aplt. Br. 19. But as the government points out, Jones’s testimony that 

Caudle had quoted a price for an ounce of methamphetamine to an informant is 

sufficient to establish Caudle’s involvement in drug activity, regardless of whether 

the deal went through. See United States v. Garcia, 459 F.3d 1059, 1065 (10th Cir. 

2006) (“[A]n individual’s known connection with drug transactions is a factor 

supporting reasonable suspicion to frisk that individual for weapons.” (emphasis 

added)). Second, Caudle notes that Jones failed to mention his personal involvement 

with the drug investigation in his incident report. Caudle does not explain, however, 

why that omission undermines Jones’s testimony about his involvement or affects the 

reasonable-suspicion analysis. Nor does he explain (as he must) why the district court 

clearly erred in crediting Jones’s testimony. See United States v. Benard, 680 F.3d 

1206, 1209–10 (10th Cir. 2012) (“In reviewing the denial of a defendant’s motion to 

suppress, we . . . accept the district court’s findings of fact and credibility 

determinations unless clearly erroneous.”). 

5

 Notably, the district court only mentioned this factor when addressing 

whether Jones had reasonable suspicion to prolong the traffic stop, not when 

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Rather than dispute these circumstances, Caudle argues that Jones’s behavior was 

inconsistent with his stated belief that Caudle posed a threat. For example, Caudle notes 

that Jones walked Caudle to the back of the truck and allowed him to remove the skeleton 

decoration, something “[n]o reasonable officer . . . afraid for his [or her] safety” would 

do. Aplt. Br. 18. Were Jones “truly fearful for his safety,” Caudle says, he would have 

frisked Caudle immediately, before allowing Caudle to walk around the vehicle. Id. at 19. 

Caudle’s view misconstrues the reasonable-suspicion standard. Recall that 

reasonable suspicion requires an “objective justification” for the patdown. Garcia, 751 

F.3d at 1143 (emphasis added) (quoting Rice, 483 F.3d at 1083). As a result, our focus is 

on “the objective facts, not the officer’s state of mind.” Fager, 811 F.3d at 386 (quoting 

United States v. Neff, 300 F.3d 1217, 1222 (10th Cir. 2002)). This objective focus 

explains why we have found a patdown reasonable even when the officer conducting the 

search “did not himself ever indicate . . . that he in fact felt that his safety was in 

jeopardy.” United States v. McRae, 81 F.3d 1528, 1536 (10th Cir. 1996). So long as 

“[t]he facts available to [the officer]” would permit a reasonable officer “to believe that a 

frisk would be necessary [for] protect[ion],” the search is valid. Id. The district court 

properly applied this objective standard, noting the purportedly inconsistent behavior 

Caudle highlights but nevertheless concluding (based on the factors discussed earlier) 

addressing the validity of the patdown. We may nevertheless consider Caudle’s 

nervousness as it relates to the patdown issue. See United States v. Nelson, 868 F.3d 

885, 891 (10th Cir. 2017) (noting our “discretion to affirm on alternative grounds 

‘when the record below is sufficient to permit us to conclude, as a matter of law, that 

[d]efendant’s Fourth Amendment rights were not violated’” (alteration in original) 

(quoting United States v. Mosley, 743 F.3d 1317, 1324 n.2 (10th Cir. 2014))). 

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that Jones could have reasonably believed Caudle had a weapon. And again, Caudle does 

not challenge those factors or the factual findings supporting them. For these reasons, we 

reject Caudle’s argument about Jones’s subjective views. 

Conclusion 

Considering the totality of the circumstances—namely, the time and place of the 

patdown, Caudle’s ties to an ongoing drug investigation, and Caudle’s extreme 

nervousness—Jones had objective reasons to believe Caudle was armed and dangerous. 

Jones therefore had reasonable suspicion to pat Caudle down for weapons, and the district 

court properly denied Caudle’s suppression motion. We affirm. 

Entered for the Court 

Nancy L. Moritz 

Circuit Judge 

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