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DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA COURT OF APPEALS

No. 19-CV-285

ESTELLE DAVIS, APPELLANT,

V.

DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA, APPELLEE.

Appeal from the Superior Court

of the District of Columbia

(CAB 2880-16)

(Hon. John M. Campbell, Trial Judge)

(Argued October 8, 2020 Decided September 16, 2021) 

Susan L. Kruger, with whom Sara Safriet was on the brief, for appellant.

Graham E. Phillips, Assistant Attorney General, with whom Karl A. Racine, 

Attorney General for the District of Columbia, Loren L. AliKhan, Solicitor General, 

and Carl J. Schifferle, Acting Deputy Solicitor General, were on the brief, for 

appellee.

Before GLICKMAN and THOMPSON*

, Associate Judges, and WASHINGTON, 

Senior Judge.

 * Judge Thompson was an Associate Judge of the court at the time of 

argument. Although Judge Thompson’s term ended on September 4, 2021, she 

continues to serve as an Associate Judge until her successor is confirmed. See D.C. 

Code § 11-1502 (2012 Repl.) (“Subject to mandatory retirement at age 74 and to the 

provisions of subchapters II and III of this chapter, a judge of a District of Columbia 

court appointed on or after the date of enactment of the District of Columbia Court 
2

GLICKMAN, Associate Judge: Estelle Davis claims that the District of 

Columbia Office of Tax and Revenue (“OTR”) fired her for disclosing that its 

method for appraising certain properties in Georgetown was “wrong” and 

perpetuating “an unlawful tax scam.” She claims OTR was grossly undervaluing 

those properties and, as a result, costing the District “millions in lost tax revenue.” 

After Ms. Davis was fired, she sued to hold the District liable for her termination 

under the D.C. Whistleblower Protection Act (“DCWPA”), D.C. Code §§ 1-615.51 

et seq. (2016 Repl.). The Superior Court granted summary judgment to the District, 

on the ground that Ms. Davis did not make a “protected disclosure” as defined by 

D.C. Code § 1-615.52(a)(6) (2016 Repl.). The court also denied her leave to amend 

her complaint to add a claim for wrongful discharge in violation of public policy, 

primarily on the ground that the claim was futile. Ms. Davis challenges both of those 

decisions on appeal. For the following reasons, we affirm.

 

Reorganization Act of 1970 shall serve for a term of fifteen years, and upon 

completion of such term, such judge shall continue to serve until the judge’s 

successor is appointed and qualifies.”).
3

I.

A.

Each year by March 1, OTR must notify real property owners of their tax 

assessments for the upcoming tax year (“TY”).

1

 The assessments are based on the 

property’s “estimated market value,”2

 which is the price it would “most probabl[y]” 

sell for in an arm’s length transaction conducted “under prevailing market 

conditions.”3

 Determining that price “is by no means an exact science.”4 “There is 

no definite formula” or method.5

 Accordingly, OTR has “very broad discretion” to 

determine which method to use.6

 It “may apply, when appropriate, one or more of 

the [three] generally recognized approaches to valuation” — the comparable sales 

 1

 D.C. Code § 47-824(a) (2015 Repl.); 9 D.C.M.R. § 311.1.

2

 D.C. Code § 47-820(a)(3) (2015 Repl.)

3

 D.C. Code § 47-802(4) (2015 Repl.).

4

 Zirkle v. District of Columbia, 830 A.2d 1250, 1259 (D.C. 2003).

5

 CHH Cap. Hotel Partners, LP v. District of Columbia, 152 A.3d 591, 598 

(D.C. 2017) (quoting Crawford v. Helvering, 70 F.2d 744, 745 (D.C. Cir. 1934)).

6

 Zirkle, 830 A.2d at 1259.
4 

approach, the replacement cost (“cost”) approach, and the “income” approach.7

 

OTR assessors “must consider all three of these approaches,” but they can 

“ultimately rely on one method in determining a property’s market value,”8 so long 

as they have a reason for doing so.9

 OTR may also apply “any other method” it 

“deems necessary.”10

This case concerns two methodologies: the cost and income approaches. The 

cost approach “bases assessed value on the cost of replacing property with new 

property of similar utility at present price levels . . . reduced by the amount of 

depreciation or estimated loss of value because of age, condition, or other factors.”11 

It is “applicable to virtually all improved parcels” but is “more reliable for newer 

structures.”12 It is less reliable for older structures, given that older structures have 

 7

 9 D.C.M.R. 307.2–307.5 (2021). 

8

 Wolf v. District of Columbia, 611 A.2d 44, 47 (D.C. 1992) (“Wolf II”). 

9

 CHH Cap. Hotel Partners, LP, 152 A.3d at 599.

10 9 D.C.M.R. 307.2.

11 9 D.C.M.R. 307.4.

12 International Association of Assessing Officers (“IAAO”), Standard on 

Mass Appraisal of Real Property 9 (2013), 

https://www.iaao.org/media/standards/MARP 2013.pdf; https://perma.cc/8LUKYLZC. 
5

depreciated, and estimating accrued depreciation “can involve considerable 

subjectivity.”13 The income approach “bases assessed value on the amount that 

investors would be willing to pay to receive the income that the property could be

expected to yield.”14 It is considered the “preferred valuation approach” “for 

income-producing properties.”15 However, its “successful application . . . requires 

the collection, maintenance, and careful analysis of income and expense data.”16

B.

As this appeal comes to us from the award of summary judgment to the 

District, we summarize the material facts before the trial court in the light most 

favorable to Ms. Davis, accepting her view of disputed facts (except where otherwise 

indicated). 

Ms. Davis started working at OTR in 1998 assessing residential properties. In 

2010, she transferred to the unit responsible for assessing “small commercial 

 13 See id.

14 9 D.C.M.R. 307.5.

15 IAAO, supra note 12, at 10.

16 Id.
6

properties” — properties worth $10 million or less — and became a supervisor. To 

assess those properties, the chief appraiser “told” Ms. Davis “to use the cost 

approach.” She “didn’t question” the cost method’s applicability at that time. 

In 2014, OTR reorganized Ms. Davis’s unit. She began overseeing a portfolio

of commercial retail and mixed-use properties, both small and large. In this new 

position, she was responsible for supervising an appraiser named Thomas Frye, and 

she, in turn, was supervised by the deputy chief appraiser of OTR, Olufemi 

Omotoso. Her portfolio included properties in Georgetown. 

Ms. Davis and her reorganized unit were “swimming in new waters,” as she 

put it in her deposition, because they were not told which appraisal method to use

for the commercial and mixed-use properties assigned to them. The cost method

had been used in the past, but issues with previous appraisals started to come to light. 

In August 2014, Ms. Davis testified, Mr. Omotoso and Robert Farr, the Director of 

Real Property Tax Administration in OTR, told her and Mr. Frye that they were 

“concerned” previous assessments had undervalued property in Georgetown. 
7

Notably, a property called Georgetown Park had just that month sold for $220 

million, but OTR earlier had assessed its value at only $24 million.17

In January 2015, Mr. Frye informed Ms. Davis that he thought using the cost 

approach to estimate the market value of Georgetown commercial retail and mixeduse properties was not just sub-optimal, but flat-out “wrong.” Mr. Frye explained 

this was because many of those properties were too old, and their value too 

dependent on their income-producing ability, for the cost approach to accurately 

capture their market value. As a result, Mr. Frye opined, OTR had been “extremely 

undervalu[ing]” them. Mr. Frye thought the income approach was “the correct 

approach.” Ms. Davis agreed with him. Both of them thought use of the cost 

approach contradicted industry standards.

18

In late January or early February 2015, Ms. Davis and Mr. Frye told Mr. 

Omotoso that the way OTR had been valuing Georgetown properties was “an 

 17 The $24 million figure may not capture the whole picture. The District 

contends Georgetown Park comprised two pieces of property: a main lot with a 

shopping complex and an abutting lot with no improvements. It also contends that 

the $24 million valuation was only for the unimproved abutting lot. As discussed 

below, the main lot was significantly more valuable.

18 The standards Ms. Davis identified were the Uniform Standards of 

Professional Appraisal Practice (“USPAP”) and the IAAO Standard on Mass 

Appraisal of Real Property, supra note 12. 
8

unlawful tax scam” that was “wrong and costing the District millions in lost tax 

revenue.” As she summarized in her interrogatory answers, Ms. Davis

explained to management that using the cost approach was 

enriching already rich Georgetown property owners and 

depriving the District of substantial tax revenue and that 

the District had to stop and use the correct approach to 

value, the income approach. By using the incorrect cost 

approach, the District had for years been subsidizing 

Georgetown property owners, saving them millions in 

taxes, to the detriment of the District and other District 

residents who paid their fair share. . . . [U]tilizing the 

correct income approach resulted in large increases in 

proposed values and therefore a much larger and correct 

tax revenue . . . .19

Ms. Davis told Mr. Omotoso that Mr. Frye’s proposed TY2016 assessments “for 

Georgetown commercial retail and mixed-use properties” used the income approach, 

not the cost approach. According to Ms. Davis, Mr. Omotoso agreed that the income 

approach should be used and that “we had been losing a lot of money.”

Mr. Frye finalized his proposed assessments for TY2016 soon thereafter. He 

used the income approach to calculate property values for Georgetown commercial 

 19 On appeal, Ms. Davis says she “was not recommending that the income 

approach be used on all properties or even all Georgetown properties. Rather, for 

properties that are not that old and not producing much income, the cost approach 

could be used supported by sales.” However, Ms. Davis expressed that nuanced 

view only after the fact, when she was deposed in this case. 
9

retail and mixed-use properties instead of the cost approach. His calculations 

increased assessed values by twenty-one percent overall, relative to assessed values 

in TY2015. A few of the increases were quite dramatic; the assessed value of one 

property went up by 545%. Mr. Frye catalogued the percent by which each property 

assessment changed from TY2015 in a “percent change report.” Ms. Davis reviewed 

the report and “signed off” on it on February 11, 2015. According to Mr. Frye, Mr. 

Omotoso also reviewed the report and “did not express any disagreement.” (Mr. 

Omotoso could not recall doing that.)

20 By the end of February 2015, OTR mailed 

out its proposed assessments to taxpayers.

The new assessments troubled and aroused many affected Georgetown 

property owners. Joseph Sternlieb, President and CEO of the Georgetown Business 

Improvement District (“BID”), emailed Mr. Farr at OTR to say that his “phone ha[d] 

been ringing for . . . two weeks with complaints about the size of increases on some 

[TY2016] commercial tax assessments in the Georgetown BID area.” He thought

something had to be wrong. Mr. Sternlieb contacted not just Mr. Farr, but also Jack 

Evans, a D.C. Councilmember, and Jeffrey DeWitt, the District’s Chief Financial 

Officer. He said in a contemporaneous email that his “strategy” was to have the 

 20 Ms. Davis claims that any increase in assessed values of over ten percent 

had to be approved by Mr. Omotoso or Mr. Farr. 
10

assessments “amend[ed] . . . without forcing everything through the appeals process” 

that individual taxpayers must typically go through to contest an assessment of their 

property.

21 

In response to the complaints from Georgetown, Mr. Farr reviewed Mr. Frye’s 

proposed assessments. He did not dispute the desirability, in principle, of using the 

income method. Nor did Mr. Omotoso. Mr. Farr also asked Mr. Omotoso for 

explanations. Mr. Omotoso told him that “[f]or a long time Georgetown has been 

assessed on Cost Approach [sic],” but that “[t]his approach over time . . . will clearly 

not reflect market values of properties driven largely by income generating 

potentials,” like some of the Georgetown properties. “While increase in value may 

indeed be warranted generally in Georgetown,” Mr. Omotoso continued, “phased 

increase is (in my opinion) the right approach.” Mr. Frye had not phased in the 

increased values. According to Ms. Davis, neither he nor she had the authority to 

do so. 

Nonetheless, Mr. Farr ultimately concluded the proposed income-method 

assessments were seriously flawed because Mr. Frye “substantially overstat[ed] 

 21 See D.C. Code § 47-825.01a(d), (e), (g).
11

square footage and market rents.” As a result, according to Mr. Farr, Mr. Frye had 

“consistently and significantly over assessed property values by more than $143 

[m]illion” in total. Ms. Davis and Mr. Frye contest this. Ms. Davis testified that, at 

most, only twenty percent of the square footages were overestimated, and it was a 

common mistake that could be corrected easily. Nonetheless, by April 20, OTR sent 

eighty-one “corrected” assessments to the Georgetown property owners. The 

“corrected” assessments were calculated using the income method (not the cost 

method), yet were, in total, $143 million less than Mr. Frye’s valuations. Neither 

Ms. Davis nor Mr. Frye participated in creating these reassessments, and they 

dispute their accuracy.22 Still, the reassessments spared many of the affected 

Georgetown taxpayers from going through the appeals process.

The next day, April 21, both Mr. Frye and Ms. Davis were fired. Mr. Farr had 

requested their terminations — Mr. Frye for “over assessing” the Georgetown 

properties by $143 million, and Ms. Davis for failing to appropriately supervise Mr. 

Frye and review his work. Unlike Mr. Frye, Ms. Davis was an at-will employee. 

 22 Another assessor, Rafael Menkes, testified in deposition that (in his 

opinion) at least one of Mr. Farr’s “corrected” assessments was “done completely 

incorrectly.” 
12

Later that year, Mr. Farr told the appraiser who took over Mr. Frye’s 

Georgetown properties, Mr. Menkes, to start “trend[ing] them up” over the course 

of a few years, “because they were so grossly undervalued.” 

C.

In April 2016, Ms. Davis filed suit in the Superior Court. She claimed that 

OTR violated the DCWPA by firing her for making a “protected disclosure” —

namely, her report to her superiors that OTR’s use of the cost method to value 

commercial retail and mixed-use properties in Georgetown “was wrong and costing 

the District millions in lost tax revenue.”23 After discovery closed, she moved for 

leave to amend her complaint to add a claim that she was fired in contravention of 

public policy for her refusal to violate the law. 

Both claims were unsuccessful. The trial court granted summary judgment to 

the District on Ms. Davis’s whistleblower claim, holding it failed as a matter of law 

 23 See D.C. Code § 1-615.53(a) (“A supervisor shall not take, or threaten to 

take, a prohibited personnel action or otherwise retaliate against an employee 

because of the employee’s protected disclosure . . . .”); § 1-615.52(a)(5)(A) (defining 

a “prohibited personnel action” to include termination of employment); § 1-

615.54(a) (provided that “[a]n employee aggrieved by a violation of § 1-615.53 may 

bring a civil action against the District . . . .”).
13

because her criticism of the cost method did not amount to a “protected disclosure” 

within the meaning of the DCWPA. The court also denied Ms. Davis’s motion for 

leave to amend her complaint, primarily on the ground that her wrongful discharge 

claim was futile, and secondarily because her assertion of that claim was untimely. 

Ms. Davis appeals both the court’s rulings.

II.

We review the grant of summary judgment de novo, applying the same 

standard used by the trial court.24 To prevail under that standard, the District, as 

movant, “must demonstrate that there is no genuine issue of material fact and that it 

is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.”25 Although that burden rests on the 

District, it nonetheless was entitled to summary judgment if it demonstrated that Ms. 

Davis “fail[ed] to make a sufficient showing on an essential element of her claim 

with respect to which she has the burden of proof.”26 The District argues that Ms. 

 24 Kolowski v. District of Columbia, 244 A.3d 1008, 1012 (D.C. 2020) 

(quoting Johnson v. Washington Gas Light Co., 109 A.3d 1118, 1120 (D.C. 2015)).

25 Id. at 1012–13 (quoting Grant v. May Dep’t Stores Co., 786 A.2d 580, 583 

(D.C. 2001)).

26 Washington Gas Light Co., 109 A.3d at 1120.
14

Davis could not show that she made a protected disclosure — an essential element 

of her DCWPA claim, and one which she bore the burden of proving.27 In evaluating 

this contention, we view the record in the light most favorable to Ms. Davis.

28

In pertinent part, the DCWPA defines a “protected disclosure” as “any 

disclosure of information . . . made to any person by an employee . . . that the 

employee reasonably believes evidences” one or more of five enumerated 

circumstances — the ones claimed here being “[g]ross mismanagement” or “[g]ross 

misuse or waste of public resources or funds.”29 No reasonable jury, the District 

contends, could find that Ms. Davis’s “recommendations to her supervisors about 

how OTR should approach assessments of commercial retail properties” indicated 

either gross mismanagement or a gross waste of public funds. 

 27 Ukwuani v. District of Columbia, 241 A.3d 529, 551 (D.C. 2020) (stating 

the elements of a DCWPA claim).

28 Id.

29 D.C. Code § 1-615.52(a)(6), (a)(6)(A)–(B). Although not claimed here, 

the other enumerated circumstances are “[a]buse of authority in connection with the 

administration of a public program or the execution of a public contract”; “[a]

violation of a federal, state, or local law, rule, or regulation, or of a term of a contract 

between the District government and a District government contractor which is not 

of a merely technical or minimal nature”; and “[a] substantial and specific danger to 

the public health and safety.” D.C. Code § 1-615.52(a)(6)(C)–(E).
15

Whether the information Ms. Davis conveyed to her superiors was “protected” 

turns not on whether it actually evidenced “gross mismanagement” or “gross misuse 

or waste of public resources or funds,” but on whether Ms. Davis reasonably 

believed that it did.30 “This requirement is both subjective and objective.”31 It is not 

enough for Ms. Davis to have subjectively thought that using the cost method to 

assess commercial properties in Georgetown was gross mismanagement or gross 

misuse. No one doubts that she did think so. But she must also show that “a

disinterested observer” with her “knowledge of the essential facts” could 

“reasonably conclude” that as well.32 For the following reasons, we hold she has not 

made that showing.

A.

We first consider whether a disinterested observer could reasonably believe 

Ms. Davis’s disclosure evidenced “gross mismanagement.” The term is not defined 

in the DCWPA. Our cases have emphasized that it refers only to maladministration 

 30 Zirkle, 830 A.2d at 1260.

31 Johnson v. District of Columbia, 225 A.3d 1269, 1276 (D.C. 2020).

32 Id. (quoting Zirkle, 830 A.2d at 1259–60).
16

that is truly egregious and indisputable. Thus, we have said that “gross 

mismanagement” is “a management action or inaction that creates a substantial risk 

of significant adverse impact on the agency’s ability to accomplish its mission.”33 

Mere negligence is insufficient.

34 To be “gross,” the mismanagement must be so 

“serious . . . that a conclusion the agency erred is not debatable among reasonable 

people.”35 Consequently, “[d]ebatable differences of opinion concerning policy 

matters are not protected disclosures.”36

Ms. Davis claims that OTR’s use of the cost method to value certain properties 

in Georgetown was “incorrect.” She does not claim that OTR applied the cost 

methodology in an incorrect manner or with erroneous data.

37 Rather, the claim is 

that the cost approach cannot appropriately be applied to certain properties. The 

properties? A subset of the commercial retail and mixed-use properties in 

 33 Id. at 1275–76 (quoting District of Columbia v. Poindexter, 104 A.3d 848, 

855 (D.C. 2014)). 

34 Poindexter, 104 A.3d at 855.

35 Id.

36 Id.

37 Young Woman’s Christian Ass’n of Nat’l Cap. Area, Inc. v. District of 

Columbia, 731 A.2d 849, 851 (D.C. 1999).
17

Georgetown: those commercial retail and mixed-use properties in Georgetown that 

are fully depreciated but still are producing significant income.

38 Ms. Davis claims 

that using the cost approach to assess these properties caused OTR to significantly 

undervalue them. This, she contends, indisputably undermined OTR’s “ability to 

accomplish its mission,” as that mission includes assessing properties at their 

estimated market value and collecting, in her words, the “correct” amount of real 

property tax.

39 

A fundamental problem with Ms. Davis’s claim is that she has not identified 

any authority saying the cost approach cannot appropriately be applied to properties 

that are fully depreciated but still producing significant income. Neither of the 

authorities she cites, the USPAP and IAAO’s Standard on Mass Appraisal of Real 

Property, support that. The USPAP says nothing about when the cost approach is or 

 38 It is unclear, however, whether Ms. Davis used this level of specificity in 

her disclosures. See supra note 19; Johnson, 225 A.3d at 1276 (“To determine if the 

employee subjectively held such a belief, we look to ‘the statements in her complaint 

to a supervisor or to a public body, not her subsequent characterization of those 

statements in litigation.’” (quoting Wilburn v. District of Columbia, 957 A.2d 921, 

925 (D.C. 2008))).

39 D.C. Code §§ 47-820(a)(1), 47-821(b).
18

is not applicable.40 Meanwhile, the IAAO’s Standard on Mass Appraisal of Real 

Property undermines Ms. Davis’s position. It says, for example, that “[t]he cost 

approach is applicable to virtually all improved parcels and, if used properly, can 

produce accurate valuations.”41 

We readily acknowledge that the IAAO also identifies the income approach 

as the “preferred valuation approach” for “income-producing properties” in 

general,42 and as the “most appropriate method in valuing commercial and industrial 

property if sufficient income data are available.”43 But showing that the income 

approach is “preferred” or “most appropriate” is not the same as saying the cost 

approach is “wrong.” Our decision in Safeway Stores is instructive on this point. In 

that case, we observed that “Safeway may [have] be[en] correct that income 

capitalization is generally the best method for valuing income-producing business 

 40 See generally The Appraisal Foundation, Uniform Standards of 

Professional Appraisal Practice (2014), http://www.appraisertom.com/USPAP2014-15.pdf; https://perma.cc/8AM5-E6G5. 

41 IAAO, supra note 12, at 9.

42 Id. at 10.

43 Id. at 11.
19

property,” but we still held that using the cost method was not “incorrect.”44 

Similarly, in Bender v. District of Columbia, we held that an assessment based on 

the cost approach was not “incorrect,” even if appellant had shown that the sales 

comparison approach “was the preferred methodology.”45

Ms. Davis’s argument implicitly assumes there are “correct” valuations and a 

“correct” amount of taxes the District should collect. But a property’s estimated 

market value is not a single, objectively “correct” number. It is only an imperfect 

prediction that is subject to all the uncertainties and vagaries of data and the market. 

Thus, we have recognized that “estimating market value is a rather subjective art.”46 

It requires appraisers “to apply their best judgment to a number of indeterminate 

factors,” including “market perceptions, opinions, and attitudes,” all “to calculate a 

single market value figure.”47 For that reason, we have said that even a “gross

 44 Safeway Stores, Inc. v. District of Columbia, 525 A.2d 207, 211 (D.C. 

1987).

45 804 A.2d 267, 268–69 (D.C. 2002).

46 Wash. Post Co. v. District of Columbia, 596 A.2d 517, 522 (D.C. 1991) 

(quoting District of Columbia v. Green, 310 A.2d 848, 856 (D.C. 1973)).

47 Wolf v. District of Columbia, 597 A.2d 1303, 1306 n.4 (D.C. 1991) (“Wolf 

I”) (quoting American Institute of Real Estate Appraisers, The Appraisal of Real 

Estate 272, 504–05 (8th ed. 1983)).
20

disparity” between two appraisals is not enough to show that one is right and the 

other is wrong.48 

In point of fact, moreover, unrebutted evidence presented to the trial court 

showed that valuations based on the income approach often were not much higher 

or more accurate predictors than the cost-approach valuations. Take, for example, 

the two “Georgetown Park” properties, which comprised a shopping complex and 

an unimproved abutting lot. These are the properties on which Ms. Davis relies most 

heavily (almost exclusively, in fact) in her briefing. In 2014, those combined 

properties sold for a total price of $220 million. According to Mr. Frye’s 

computations, both the cost methodology and the income methodology led to quite 

similar estimates of the market value of those combined properties, and both those 

estimates were substantially below the actual sale price: the cost method yielded a 

valuation of $121.3 million, while the income method generated a valuation of 

$126.9 million. Thus, either method missed the sale price by about $93-99 million. 

This hardly shows that it was gross mismanagement to use the cost method rather 

than the income method; and it may well indicate not only the difficulty of predicting 

 48 See Young Woman’s Christian Ass’n, 731 A.2d at 850–51. 
21

market value, but that the Georgetown Park sale was an outlier or anomalous in some 

way. 

The handful of other Georgetown properties to which Ms. Davis pointed also 

fail to show it was gross mismanagement for OTR to rely on the cost method instead 

of the income method. First, the properties at 3241 M Street N.W. and 3245 M Street 

N.W.; they sold together in 2016 for $18,480,000. The cost-approach valuation for 

the combined properties on January 1, 2015, was $6,386,780. Mr. Frye’s proposed 

valuation using the income approach was $8,735,430 — about $2 million more than 

the cost-approach valuation, but still about $10 million short of the sales price. 

Second, the property at 3150 M Street N.W. sold in 2014 for $12,250,000. The cost 

method yielded an estimated market value of $4,378,430. In this instance, Mr. 

Frye’s income-approach valuation, $9,595,160, was materially higher and closer to 

the actual sales price (though still off by $2.65 million, or over 20%). Thus, of the 

three properties Ms. Davis points us to (i.e., these two and Georgetown Park), only 

one of the three — 3150 M Street N.W. — shows the income approach doing 

materially better at approximating the sales price than the cost approach. Ms. Davis 

did not point the trial court (and has not pointed us) to any other particular properties

in this context. 
22

Ms. Davis asserts that Georgetown properties generally had been selling “for 

millions more than their assessed values” under the cost approach, and that this 

disparity “confirmed” that OTR had been valuing the properties “incorrectly.” For 

support, she cites the deposition testimony of another OTR appraiser (Gregory 

Rogers, who was assigned to the “appeals and litigation team”). He stated that the 

disparity between assessments and sales (i.e., the “assessment to sales ratio”) of 

Georgetown commercial properties “wasn’t very good . . . until [OTR] changed the 

methodology” to the income approach. This is some support for the proposition that, 

generally speaking at least, the income approach had been found to approximate 

sales prices better than the cost approach had done. But the support is insufficient. 

A claim of egregious and indisputable mismanagement must rest on something 

stronger than a single, conclusory line of deposition testimony that the cost approach 

“wasn’t very good.” And Ms. Davis’s reference to an unquantified “millions” fails 

to indicate the magnitude of the issue.

This is the same reason Ms. Davis’s reliance on Mr. Omotoso’s opinion is 

unavailing. Mr. Omotoso said the cost method “over time . . . will clearly not reflect 

market values of properties driven largely by income generating potentials.” This, 

like Ms. Davis’s allegation of undervaluing properties by “millions,” is unquantified. 

Consequently, even if it indicates that the cost approach was generally undervaluing 
23

properties, it does not indicate the magnitude of that issue. After all, whether a 

problem amounts to gross mismanagement, rather than simple mismanagement —

if mismanagement at all — is a question of degree. By how much did cost-approach 

valuations fall short of market values? How much of an impact on tax collections 

did those shortfalls actually have? We do not know, and Ms. Davis does not answer 

it with a mere allegation that they fell short by an abstract “millions.”49

We also find it significant that the District was already working to remedy the 

problem. It appears from the evidentiary materials the District submitted in support 

of summary judgment that OTR was developing a computer model to use the income 

approach consistently and reliably for commercial retail and mixed-use properties. 

Mr. Frye himself was working on building such a model in early 2015. Although 

the District never explicitly argued (in Superior Court) that OTR was waiting to be 

able to deploy such a model, its evidence showed it would have been difficult and 

risky to employ the income methodology without one. According to a Report by the 

Office of the Inspector General, “[t]he sheer challenge of manually applying the 

 49 Ukwuani, 241 A.3d at 541–42 (“Allegations that are unsupported or 

conclusory are ‘insufficient to establish a genuine issue of material fact to defeat the 

entry of summary judgment.’” (quoting Beard v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 587 

A.2d 195, 198 (D.C. 1991)). 
24

income approach individually to hundreds of properties every year is a daunting, 

time-consuming task.”50 And when appraisers do not use the same model, “[t]he 

potential for under-valuing or over-valuing is more likely to occur.”51 Thus, 

evidence proffered by the District indicates that OTR may have had good reason to 

hold off switching from the cost to the income approach to valuation. Significantly 

for us, the District’s showing on this point (and argument in its brief on appeal) is 

unrebutted, as Ms. Davis has not responded to it.

In sum, Ms. Davis may succeed in showing that the income approach was 

preferable to the cost approach for the specified properties, but she did not show the 

cost approach was “wrong.” We therefore hold that a disinterested observer, 

apprised of the information Ms. Davis disclosed, could not reasonably have 

concluded that using the cost method instead of the income method to assess 

commercial properties in Georgetown amounted to gross mismanagement. 

 50 Office of the Inspector General, Evaluation of the District’s Management 

and Valuation of Commercial Real Property Assessments 7 (2012), 

http://app.oig.dc.gov/news/PDF/release10/OIG%20No.%2013-2-

01AT%20BRPAA%20Final%20Report.pdf; https://perma.cc/PBW3-GGQJ.

51 Id.
25

B.

We next address whether a disinterested observer could reasonably conclude 

Ms. Davis disclosed evidence of a “gross misuse or waste of public resources or 

funds.” A “gross . . . waste of public resources or funds” is “a more than debatable 

expenditure that is significantly out of proportion to the benefit reasonably expected 

to accrue to the government.”52 Ms. Davis charges that OTR’s use of the cost 

method grossly wasted public funds by “costing the District millions in lost tax 

revenue.” In response, the District argues that yet-to-be-collected tax revenue is not 

a public resource or fund, because it is not in the District’s coffers. 

We agree with the District. The paradigmatic case of waste is one in which 

the government spends money recklessly.53 It is grounded in an “expenditure.” 

What Ms. Davis alleges, however, is not an “expenditure.” Instead, she contends

the District was not collecting as much money as it could have. This sounds more 

in mismanagement than in waste. Even on its own terms, though, the allegation 

 52 Poindexter, 104 A.3d at 857.

53 See, e.g., Williams v. Johnson, 776 F.3d 865, 871 (D.C. Cir. 2015) 

(employee disclosed that government’s “expenditures on [a computer program] were 

significant,” but the program was “useless” and the government was “just burning 

money”).
26

fails, because the District did not fail to collect “public resources or funds.”

Uncollected taxes — money still in the taxpayers’ pockets — are not public funds 

that the District can waste or misuse.

We therefore affirm the trial court’s grant of the District’s summary judgment 

motion.

III.

Last, we review the trial court’s denial of Ms. Davis’s motion for leave to file 

an amended complaint. Alleging she was fired “because she refused to violate the 

law,” Ms. Davis sought to add a common law claim for wrongful discharge in 

violation of public policy.

54 This cause of action is a “very narrow” exception to 

“the general rule that at-will employees may be discharged at any time for any 

reason.”55 The exception applies, as we held in Adams v. George W. Cochran & 

 54 Ms. Davis could have based a statutory whistleblower claim on the same 

allegation but did not do so. See D.C. Code § 1-615.53(a) (prohibiting retaliating 

“against an employee because of . . . an employee’s refusal to comply with an illegal 

order”).

55 Davis v. Cmty. Alts. of Wash. D.C., Inc., 74 A.3d 707, 709 (D.C. 2013) 

(quoting Carl v. Children’s Hosp., 702 A.2d 159, 159–60 (D.C. 1997) (en banc)).
27

Co., Inc., when “the sole reason for the discharge is the employee’s refusal to violate 

the law.”56

Ms. Davis allegedly refused to violate D.C. Code §§ 47-820(a) and 47-821(b). 

D.C. Code § 47-820(a)(3) states that “[t]he assessed value for all real property shall 

be the estimated market value of such property as of the valuation date, as 

determined by the Mayor.” D.C. Code § 47-821(b) states that “[t]he Mayor shall

appoint assessors competent to determine values of real property to carry out the 

provisions of §§ 47-820 to 47-828 and other relevant portions of this chapter” 

(emphasis added). Ms. Davis understands these provisions to require OTR assessors 

to appraise real property at its estimated market value.

The trial court denied Ms. Davis’s motion for leave to amend on several 

grounds, but said the “decisive factor” was that her claim was futile. According to 

the trial court, Ms. Davis could not have violated either cited provision, because they 

 56 597 A.2d 28, 34 (D.C. 1991). The public policy exception sometimes may 

be invoked when the employer has other reasons for discharging the employee. See

Carl, 702 A.2d at 160. Ms. Davis does not claim any of those other situations is 

before us in this case, however.
28

impose duties only on the Mayor. The court reasoned that “the only person who 

could conceivably ‘violate’ either statute is the Mayor.” 

Reviewing the denial of leave to amend for abuse of discretion,57 we perceive

that the trial court based its ruling on an erroneous view of the statutes. Our case 

law recognizes that § 47-820(a), at least, imposes an obligation on OTR appraisers.

58 

Nonetheless, the trial court reasonably could not have ruled otherwise, because a 

necessary predicate for Ms. Davis’s Adams claim is missing. To make out a 

plausible Adams claim, an employee must show there was “an outright refusal to 

violate a specific law, with the employer putting the employee to the choice of 

breaking the law or losing [her] job.”59 Ms. Davis concedes that OTR never put her 

to such a choice; it never directed her to break the law, nor did she ever refuse to do 

so. As our discussion above implies, even if OTR had ordered Ms. Davis to “use 

 57 Sibley v. St. Albans School, 134 A.3d 789, 797 (D.C. 2016).

58 See Young Women’s Christian Ass’n, 731 A.3d at 852 (a taxpayer 

challenging the District’s assessment must demonstrate “that the assessor failed to 

fulfill the statutory requirements of . . . D.C. Code § 47-820(a)” (emphasis added)); 

Safeway Stores, Inc., 525 A.2d at 212 (an appraiser for the District “did not fulfill 

his obligation under § 47-820(a) to consider income earning potential” (emphasis 

added)).

59 Mandsager v. Jaquith, 706 A.2d 39, 42 (D.C. 1998) (quoting Thigpen v. 

Greenpeace, Inc., 657 A.2d 770, 771 (D.C. 1995)).
29

the cost method,” that order would not have directed her to violate the law.

60 

Therefore, we affirm the denial of Ms. Davis’s motion for leave to amend.

IV.

In sum, we hold that Ms. Davis failed to present sufficient evidence from 

which a reasonable jury could find that she made a protected disclosure of either 

gross mismanagement or gross waste of public funds. The trial court therefore did 

not err in granting the District’s summary judgment motion. We also hold that her 

claim of discharge in violation of public policy was futile, as she was not directed to 

violate the law and she did not refuse to do so. The trial court therefore did not err 

in denying her leave to file an amended complaint.

Affirmed.

 60 Id. at 42 (“[I]t is not enough to show that the employee might infer from 

the employer’s conduct that she was being asked to do something that was possibly

illegal.” (emphasis added)). Hence Ms. Davis would not have stated a public policy 

exception to the at-will employment doctrine merely by alleging that she was fired 

for not using the cost method.