Raychel Harvey-Jones v. Susan Coronel, No. 1232, September Term, 2017. Opinion by 

Beachley, J. 

COMENSATORY DAMAGES—DAMAGES PRESUMED WHEN 

STATEMENT IS DEFAMATORY PER SE AND MADE WITH ACTUAL MALICE

PUNITIVE DAMAGES—MARYLAND COMMON LAW—GRAVITY OF 

WRONG—ABILITY TO PAY—DETERRENCE—EXTANT LEGISLATIVE 

SANCTIONS—COMPARISON TO OTHER AWARDS—RELATIONSHIP TO 

COMPENSATORY DAMAGES

PUNITIVE DAMAGES—FEDERAL CONSTITUTIONAL LAW—DUE 

PROCESS—DEGREE OF REPREHENSIBILITY—RATIO OF PUNITIVE 

DAMAGES TO COMPENSATORY DAMAGES—COMPARABLE SANCTIONS 

FOR CONDUCT

Michael Scott began receiving anonymous harassing text messages and e-mails 

while dating appellant Raychel Harvey-Jones. Ms. Harvey-Jones told Mr. Scott that the 

culprit was Mr. Scott’s ex-girlfriend, appellee Susan Coronel. To show that Ms. Coronel 

was the harasser, Ms. Harvey-Jones sent Mr. Scott a text message which purported to show 

that Ms. Coronel had been previously charged with harassment as a course of conduct, 

electronic mail harassment, and telephone misuse.

It was later revealed that Ms. Coronel had never been charged with any of the abovestated offenses. Indeed, it was Ms. Harvey-Jones who had been charged with those 

offenses. Apparently, Ms. Harvey-Jones had edited her own statement of charges to frame 

Ms. Coronel.

When she learned about the fake statement of charges, Ms. Coronel sued Ms. 

Harvey-Jones for defamation. Ms. Coronel received a default judgment, and following a 

hearing on damages, the circuit court awarded her $10,000 in compensatory damages and 

$200,000 in punitive damages. Ms. Harvey-Jones appealed.

Held: Judgment affirmed. Compensatory damages are presumed when statement 

is defamatory per se and made with actual malice. Because Ms. Harvey-Jones conceded 

that her defamatory statements were made with actual malice, the award of $10,000 in 

presumed damages was not error.

Under lens of Maryland common law, punitive damages award was not error. The 

$200,000 award was not disproportionate to the gravity of Ms. Harvey-Jones’s wrong. The 

court heard reliable evidence that Ms. Harvey-Jones had the ability to pay the award. The 

record showed that Ms. Harvey-Jones inferentially continued to post defamatory 

statements on the internet following Ms. Harvey-Jones being criminally charged for 
defaming Ms. Coronel. The $200,000 award was comparable to other punitive damages 

awards in Maryland.

Under federal constitutional law, the punitive damages award was not error. Given 

the high degree of reprehensibility of Ms. Harvey-Jones’s conduct, the 20:1 ratio of 

punitive damages to compensatory damages did not offend due process. 
Circuit Court for Baltimore County

Case No. 03-C-16-008542

REPORTED

IN THE COURT OF SPECIAL APPEALS

OF MARYLAND

No. 1232

September Term, 2017

RAYCHEL HARVEY-JONES

v.

SUSAN CORONEL

Graeff,

Kehoe,

Beachley,

 

JJ.

Opinion by Beachley, J.

Filed: November 1, 2018

*Judge Kevin F. Arthur and Judge Matthew J. 

Fader did not participate in the Court’s decision 

to designate this opinion for publication pursuant 

to Md. Rule 8-605.1.
In August 2016, Susan Coronel, appellee, filed a claim in the Circuit Court for 

Baltimore County against appellant Raychel Harvey-Jones, alleging defamation per se. 

Because Ms. Harvey-Jones failed to timely answer, the court, upon Ms. Coronel’s request, 

issued an Order of Default. Following Ms. Harvey-Jones’s unsuccessful motions to stay 

and vacate the Order of Default, the court scheduled a hearing to determine damages. At 

the conclusion of the hearing, the court awarded Ms. Coronel $10,000 in compensatory 

damages and $200,000 in punitive damages. Ms. Harvey-Jones timely appealed and 

presents three questions for our review:

1. Did the Circuit Court err in awarding $10,000 in compensatory damages?

2. Did the Circuit Court err in awarding $200,000 in punitive damages 

where it was grossly excessive and violated due process?

3. Did the Circuit Court err in awarding an excessive monetary judgment 

where it was based on unverified admissions by default?

We discern no error, and affirm.

FACTS AND PROCEEDINGS

According to the testimony at the hearing on damages, Ms. Coronel dated a man 

named Michael Scott “off and on from 2012 to 2015.” The conclusion of that relationship 

coincided with Ms. Coronel seeking $110,000 from Mr. Scott in unrelated litigation in the 

Circuit Court for Baltimore City. In late 2015, Mr. Scott met and subsequently began 

dating Ms. Harvey-Jones. 

At some point thereafter, someone began to harass Mr. Scott by anonymously

sending him e-mails and text messages. Believing the culprit was Ms. Coronel, Mr. Scott 

hired Steve Brown, a private investigator. In late February 2016, Ms. Harvey-Jones sent 
2

Mr. Scott a text message stating that Ms. Coronel was the person who had been harassing 

him, and that Ms. Coronel had also sent over 300 e-mails to the local NBC news affiliate, 

resulting in her owing NBC $17,000 in damages. Ms. Harvey-Jones’s text message also 

contained a statement of charges which purported to show that Ms. Coronel had been 

charged with harassment as a course of conduct, electronic mail harassment, and telephone 

misuse. Believing the text message to be true, Mr. Scott forwarded it to his private 

investigator. Mr. Brown then met with Baltimore County Police Detective Larry Rogers, 

the officer who purportedly authored the charging document, to verify the contents of the 

text message. 

When Detective Rogers saw the charging document, he suspected it to be 

counterfeit. He noted that the charging language, dates, and some of the applicable 

criminal codes were missing, and he also knew that he had never charged Ms. Coronel with 

harassment. Detective Rogers reviewed the tracking number from the charging document

and determined that the tracking number and harassment charges matched a statement of 

charges he had filed in 2015 against Ms. Harvey-Jones. To be certain, Detective Rogers 

then searched Ms. Coronel’s criminal record, and verified that she had never been charged 

with harassment.

Near the end of March 2016, Mr. Brown informed Mr. Scott that Ms. HarveyJones’s text was inaccurate, that the charging document was fake, and that Ms. Coronel 

had neither harassed NBC with 300 e-mails, nor did she ever owe NBC $17,000 in 

damages. 
3

Detective Rogers arrested Ms. Harvey-Jones in July 2016, and charged her with 

forgery of a public document. A local news website, Eye on Annapolis, posted a story 

about Ms. Harvey-Jones’s arrest. In the comments section of the article, a person named 

“Jane Shims” claimed that “someone [was] lying or misrepresenting” what had transpired

and that Ms. Coronel was “a bitter ex.” Detective Rogers traced the IP address for Jane 

Shims, as well as other “people” who had commented on the article. He determined that 

the IP addresses for Jane Shims and several other commenters all belonged to a computer 

in Ms. Harvey-Jones’s home.

In August 2016, Ms. Coronel filed a complaint against Ms. Harvey-Jones, alleging 

defamation per se. The complaint alleged that Ms. Harvey-Jones sent Mr. Scott a text 

message which contained a counterfeit charging document, as well as a false story that Ms. 

Coronel had sent NBC 300 e-mails and consequently owed $17,000 in damages. When 

Ms. Harvey-Jones failed to timely respond to the complaint, Ms. Coronel requested an 

Order of Default, which the court entered on October 7, 2016. Ms. Harvey-Jones 

subsequently filed an untimely motion to vacate, as well as a motion for reconsideration. 

The court denied both motions. Ms. Coronel then requested a hearing to determine 

damages. 

At the hearing on damages, the circuit court received testimony from Ms. Coronel

and Detective Rogers, as well as excerpts from Mr. Scott’s deposition. At the conclusion 

of the hearing, the court awarded Ms. Coronel $10,000 in compensatory damages and 

$200,000 in punitive damages. As stated above, Ms. Harvey-Jones timely appealed.
4

DISCUSSION

I. COMPENSATORY DAMAGES

“When an action has been tried without a jury, we ‘review the trial court’s decision 

on both the law and the evidence, upholding factual findings unless clearly erroneous, but 

subjecting its legal conclusions to de novo review.’” Thomas v. Capital Med. Mgmt. 

Assocs., LLC, 189 Md. App. 439, 453 (2009) (quoting Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co. v. Regency 

Furniture, Inc., 183 Md. App. 710, 722 (2009)). 

Ms. Harvey-Jones contends that the circuit court erred by awarding $10,000 in 

compensatory damages because the “evidence was speculative.” Essentially, Ms. HarveyJones argues that the circuit court was required to base its award of compensatory damages 

on evidence of actual harm. However, her position is contrary to Maryland law, which 

allows for the presumption of damages when a plaintiff establishes that a statement was 

defamatory per se and made with actual malice:

[W]hen a plaintiff establishes that a statement was defamatory per se and, by 

clear and convincing evidence, demonstrates that it was made with actual 

malice, a “presumption of harm to reputation . . . arises from the publication 

of words actionable per se. A trier of fact is not constitutionally barred from 

awarding damages based on that presumption in [an actual] malice case.” 

Hanlon v. Davis, 76 Md. App. 339, 356, 545 A.2d 72 (1988) (citation 

omitted). In other words, if the statement is defamatory per se, damages are 

presumed when a plaintiff can demonstrate actual malice, by clear and 

convincing evidence, even in the absence of proof of harm.

Samuels v. Tschechtelin, 135 Md. App. 483, 549-50 (2000). 

We initially note that Ms. Harvey-Jones apparently concedes that her defamatory 

statements were made with actual malice. Instead, Ms. Harvey-Jones asserts that there was 

insufficient evidence to “presume the damage to justify the compensation awarded here.” 
5

Although Ms. Coronel requested $50,000 in compensatory damages, the circuit 

court determined that $10,000 was the appropriate award. In our view, the court did not 

err. In making this determination, the court stated that:

[T]here isn’t any showing of lost income so I find it difficult to presume 

$50,000 worth of damage. So the Court will award $10,000 in compensatory 

damages because I think that there probably is good reason to think, more 

likely than not, that [Ms. Coronel] diverted time from her business to meet 

with the detective and her lawyer, to prepare for this lawsuit and I have little 

doubt that she was upset by this turn of events, with having this information 

on the internet where it really can’t be erased. So I think $10,000 is a 

reasonable and fair amount to award for compensatory damages. 

The record reflects that Ms. Harvey-Jones’s actions impacted Ms. Coronel’s 

reputation on social media, Yelp, and among her acquaintances. Ms. Coronel testified that 

she devoted time to “set the story straight,” which included meetings with her attorney and 

with Detective Rogers. In light of Ms. Harvey-Jones’s defamatory statements, made with 

actual malice, we see no error in the trial court’s compensatory damages award. 

II. PUNITIVE DAMAGES

Ms. Harvey-Jones next argues that the circuit court’s award of punitive damages 

was “grossly excessive and violated due process.” As an initial matter, we note that the 

basis for Ms. Harvey-Jones’s argument is unclear. Although Ms. Harvey-Jones primarily 

cites to United States Supreme Court cases applying federal constitutional law, she also 

cites to Bowden v. Caldor, 350 Md. 4 (1998), a case in which the Court of Appeals 

discussed excessive punitive damages in the context of Maryland common law. We will 

therefore address Ms. Harvey-Jones’s argument under both Maryland common law and

federal constitutional law. 
6

A. Maryland Common Law

The Court of Appeals has identified nine legal principles that inform a court’s 

determination of whether punitive damages are excessive. Khalifa v. Shannon, 404 Md. 

107, 142 (2008) (citing Bowden, 350 Md. at 27-41). In setting forth this list of 

considerations, the Court clarified that the list was “not intended to be exclusive or allencompassing[,]” and that “not all of the above-summarized principles or factors are 

pertinent in every case involving court review of punitive damages.” Bowden, 350 Md. at 

41. Here, six of the nine Bowden factors are relevant: 1) gravity of the wrong, 2) ability to 

pay, 3) deterrence value, 4) legislative sanctions, 5) comparison to other awards, and 6) 

relationship to compensatory damages.1 See id. at 27-41. Because the factors limiting an 

award of punitive damages are principles of law, we review them de novo. Khalifa, 404 

Md. at 142. We shall address each of the six relevant Bowden factors in turn.

1. Gravity of the Wrong

“The most important legal rule in this area, applicable to every punitive damages 

award, is that the amount of punitive damages ‘must not be disproportionate to the gravity 

of the defendant’s wrong.’” Bowden, 350 Md. at 27 (quoting Ellerin v. Fairfax Sav., F.S.B., 

337 Md. 216, 242 (1995)). “Accordingly, in determining whether the amount of the award 

is disproportionate to the gravity of the defendant’s conduct, it is the degree of the

 

1 The other three Bowden factors are: 1) “other final and satisfied punitive damages

awards against the same defendant for the same conduct”; 2) “[w]hen the total amount of 

punitive damages awarded against the defendant is based on separate torts . . . whether the 

separate torts all grew out of a single occurrence”; and 3) “[t]he plaintiff’s reasonable costs 

and expenses.” Bowden, 350 Md. at 34-36 (1998).
7

heinousness which is important.” Id. (citing BMW of North America, Inc. v. Gore, 517 

U.S. 559, 575 (1996)). 

Here, Ms. Harvey-Jones, while on probation for criminal cyber harassment, 

maliciously engaged in conduct designed to harm and defame Ms. Coronel. Ms. HarveyJones made defamatory statements about Ms. Coronel and falsified a Baltimore County 

criminal charging document in an attempt to establish Ms. Coronel’s criminal character. 

Even after being charged with criminal forgery, Ms. Harvey-Jones inferentially used 

fictitious names to post online comments claiming that the falsified charging document 

was genuine. We note that, in awarding punitive damages, the circuit court expressly 

considered Ms. Harvey-Jones’s “level of malice.”

In Merritt v. Craig, 130 Md. App. 350 (2000), we considered whether punitive 

damages of $150,000 were excessive when compared with the actions of Craig, a home 

seller who willfully misrepresented the condition of the home’s water system, and then 

interfered with and diverted the water system following inspection and sale of the property. 

We held that “Craig’s conduct toward appellants was reprehensible and fully warranted 

punitive damages[,]” and further held that $150,000 was not disproportionate to the harm 

caused by Craig’s actions. Id. at 371-72. 

Moreover, although it is difficult to quantify the extent of the harm caused by Ms. 

Harvey-Jones’s conduct, the potential criminal penalties for Ms. Harvey-Jones’s actions 

substantiate the seriousness of her conduct. Under Md. Code (2002, 2012 Repl. Vol.) § 8-

605(b) of the Criminal Law Article (“CR”), the counterfeiting of a public document is 

classified as a felony and is punishable by imprisonment for a minimum of two years and 
8

a maximum of ten years. Considering the nature of Ms. Harvey-Jones’s conduct, which in 

our view was more serious than the conduct at issue in Merritt, a punitive damages award 

of $200,000 is not “disproportionate to the gravity of [appellant’s] wrong.” Bowden, 350

Md. at 27. 

2. Ability to Pay

“A second very important principle, long recognized under Maryland law, is that 

the amount of punitive damages ‘should not be disproportionate to . . . the defendant’s 

ability to pay.’” Bowden, 350 Md. at 28 (quoting Ellerin, 337 Md. at 242). In Ms. HarveyJones’s view, the court’s punitive damages award was unjust because no “reliable 

evidence” on her ability to pay was presented at the “one-sided” hearing on damages. We 

disagree. 

We initially note that the Court of Appeals has stated that “[s]ound reasoning 

supports our view that a plaintiff has no obligation to establish a defendant’s ability to pay 

punitive damages.” Darcars Motors of Silver Spring, Inc. v. Borzym, 379 Md. 249, 275 

(2004) (emphasis added). The Court reasoned:

Compelling a plaintiff seeking punitive damages to present evidence of a 

defendant’s financial condition could, on the one hand, require a plaintiff 

with limited financial resources to wage a complicated discovery campaign 

against a monetarily sated defendant. On the other hand, it would license the 

plaintiff to conduct extensive pre-trial discovery of the defendant’s finances 

to support a measure of damages that may never be awarded. Not only could 

the latter result in a severe invasion of the defendant’s privacy, but it could 

also unnecessarily cost the defendant a great deal of time and money to 

compile all of its financial information.

Id. at 275-76. Our appellate courts have upheld punitive damages awards in several cases 

similar to the instant case, where the defendants apparently elected not to present 
9

documentation of their assets or net worth, but where the record suggested that they had 

the ability to pay. See Merritt, 130 Md. App. at 372 (holding that $150,000 was not 

disproportionate to defendant school teacher’s ability to pay where defendant owned a 

home and a partnership interest in a resort area in Garrett County, even though there was 

no evidence of the value of these interests); Darcars, 379 Md. at 278 (holding that plaintiff 

had no obligation to establish that defendant car dealership had the ability to pay a $25,000 

award of punitive damages); Khalifa, 404 Md. at 144-45 (holding that punitive damages of 

$2,000,000 were not disproportionate to defendants’ ability to pay where plaintiff testified 

that defendants owned multiple properties in various parts of the world, and holding that 

plaintiff was not required to prove that the properties were titled in defendants’ names or 

that defendants had the ability to pay). 

Here, Ms. Harvey-Jones failed to take advantage of multiple opportunities to present 

evidence regarding her assets or her ability to pay punitive damages. Not only did Ms. 

Harvey-Jones fail to respond to Ms. Coronel’s request for admissions, she also failed to 

appear at her deposition or at the hearing on damages before the circuit court. Although 

Ms. Harvey-Jones declined to provide any information about her finances, her deemed 

admissions resulting from her failure to object to Ms. Coronel’s requests for admissions 

pursuant to Rule 2-424 permitted the court to consider that her net worth exceeded

$1,000,000. In addition, there was evidence that, following the denial of Ms. HarveyJones’s motion to vacate the order of default, she had transferred an unencumbered

property worth over $200,000 to her sibling for no consideration. 
10

In light of the record and relevant case law, we reject Ms. Harvey-Jones’s argument 

that the punitive damages award must be vacated because there was no “reliable evidence” 

that she had the ability to pay.2 

3. Deterrence Value

“Since one of the purposes of punitive damages is to deter the defendant from 

engaging in the type of conduct forming the basis for the award, the deterrence value of 

the amount awarded by the jury, under all of the circumstances of the case, is relevant.” 

Bowden, 350 Md. at 29. The Bowden Court further stated that,

A defendant’s taking of remedial or corrective action, promptly after 

the misconduct giving rise to the award of punitive damages, obviously 

should be a mitigating factor. On the other hand, repeated or frequent 

misconduct of the same nature, misconduct of long duration, attempts to 

conceal or cover-up the misconduct, failure to take corrective action, and 

similar circumstances, support the deterrence value of a significant award.

Id. (internal citations omitted). 

Here, Ms. Harvey-Jones failed to take any corrective action following her 

misconduct, and inferentially continued to post false comments under fake names in 

response to an online news article even after she was criminally charged with forgery of a 

public document. In short, the deterrence value of a punitive damages award is a relevant 

consideration under the circumstances of this case. 

 

2 We recognize, however, that “merely because a defendant may be able to pay a 

very large award of punitive damages, without jeopardizing the defendant’s financial 

position, does not justify an award which is disproportionate to the heinousness of the 

defendant’s conduct.” Bowden, 350 Md. at 28.
11

4. Legislative Sanctions

“[I]n determining whether an award of punitive damages is proportionate to the 

defendant's misconduct, a court may consider, inter alia, the legislative policy reflected in 

statutes setting criminal fines.” Bowden, 350 Md. at 30 (quoting Ellerin, 337 Md. at 242-

43 n.13). Comparison to criminal fines is not pertinent in all cases. 

Under some circumstances, the maximum criminal fine for 

comparable conduct should not be given very much weight in reviewing a 

punitive damages award for excessiveness. There are many serious criminal 

offenses chiefly aimed at individuals, rather than corporate entities, where 

the principal sanction is imprisonment, and the monetary penalty is relatively 

small. In this situation, the criminal fine for similar misconduct is not very 

pertinent in reviewing an award of punitive damages. 

Id. at 31. As discussed above, a person convicted of counterfeiting a public document 

under CR § 8-605 is subject only to a term of imprisonment; no fine or other monetary 

penalty is prescribed. Because the legislature elected not to impose a monetary fine for 

this criminal offense, the lack of a monetary penalty is of minimal relevance in our analysis. 

5. Comparison to Other Awards

“Another appropriate consideration in judicially reviewing an award of punitive 

damages is to compare the award with other final punitive damages awards in the 

jurisdiction, and particularly with awards in somewhat comparable cases.” Bowden, 350 

Md. at 31. The Bowden Court summarized the cases in which it had upheld awards of 

punitive damages:

Apparently the largest award of punitive damages which has ever been 

upheld by this Court was $700,000, and in that case the size of the award was 

not an issue before this Court. Franklin Square Hosp. v. Laubach, 318 Md. 

615, 617–618, 569 A.2d 693, 694–695 (1990). The next ten highest awards 

of punitive damages upheld by us seem to be as follows: $107,875 (St. Luke 
12

Church v. Smith, 318 Md. 337, 568 A.2d 35 (1990)); $100,000 each for two 

plaintiffs, based on two separate acts of fraud (Nails v. S. & R., 334 Md. 398, 

639 A.2d 660 (1994)); $82,000 (Luppino v. Gray, 336 Md. 194, 647 A.2d 

429 (1994)); $50,000 (Macklin v. Logan, 334 Md. 287, 639 A.2d 112 

(1994)); $40,000 (Embrey v. Holly, supra, 293 Md. 128, 442 A.2d 966); 

$36,000 (Drug Fair of Md., Inc. v. Smith, 263 Md. 341, 283 A.2d 392 

(1971)); $35,000 (General Motors Corp. v. Piskor, 281 Md. 627, 381 A.2d 

16 (1977)); $30,000 (Great Atl. & Pac. Tea Co. v. Paul, 256 Md. 643, 261 

A.2d 731 (1970)); $25,000 (Montgomery Ward & Co. v. Keulemans, 275 

Md. 441, 340 A.2d 705 (1975)); $25,000 (American Stores Co. v. Byrd, 229 

Md. 5, 181 A.2d 333 (1962)). Moreover, in most of these cases no argument 

was made that the punitive awards were excessive.

Id. at 32-33. Notably, the Court recognized that the awards in the older cases would be 

larger in terms of present dollars if adjusted for inflation. Id.

Although the court’s award of $200,000 in punitive damages here appears to be 

significantly larger than the awards summarized by the Court in Bowden, we note that those 

awards become comparable once they are adjusted for inflation. For example, the punitive 

damages award of $105,875 against a single party in St. Luke Church, 318 Md. at 341

(defamation case) equates to $209,787.91 today; the punitive damages award of $35,000 

in Embrey, 293 Md. at 132 (defamation case) equates to $93,495.93 today; the punitive 

damages award of $30,000 in Great Atl., 256 Md. at 645 (assault and battery, slander, and 

false imprisonment case) equates to $199,293.95 today; and the $25,000 punitive damages 

award in Am. Stores, 229 Md. at 7 (slander case) would be $208,972.68 in today’s dollars.3 

Put simply, the punitive damages award of $200,000 in 2018 for Ms. Harvey-Jones’s 

 

3 All inflation-adjusted calculations were performed with the Consumer Price Index 

(“CPI”) Inflation Calculator from the date (month and year) of opinion publication to 

September 2018, the most recent date for available data. U.S. Dep't of Labor Bureau of 

Labor Statistics, CPI Inflation Calculator,

https://www.bls.gov/data/inflation_calculator.htm (last visited Oct. 18, 2018).
13

defamatory conduct is not significantly larger than awards that have been upheld in earlier

defamation cases. 

6. Relationship to Compensatory Damages

“Whether a punitive damages award bears a reasonable relationship to the 

compensatory damages awarded in the case . . . should be a consideration when a court 

reviews an award of punitive damages for excessiveness.” Bowden, 350 Md. at 39. This 

factor is not dispositive, however, as the Bowden Court noted that:

[T]here are situations in which little or no consideration should be given to 

the relationship which punitive damages awards bear to compensatory 

damages awards. For example, where the defendant engages in extremely 

heinous conduct having great potential for harm, but because of fortuitous 

circumstances the plaintiff does not suffer a great deal of compensatory 

harm, the amount of the compensatory damages award furnishes a poor guide 

to the amount of an appropriate punitive damages award. 

Id. at 40; see also Shabazz v. Bob Evans Farms, Inc., 163 Md. App. 602, 639-41 (2005) 

(noting that nominal compensatory damages may support an award for punitive damages, 

and summarizing cases in which punitive damages were upheld even though no actual 

damages were proven); cf. Zachair, Ltd. v. Driggs, 135 Md. App. 403, 424-25 (2000) 

(stating that case involving multi-million dollar compensatory award for purely economic 

loss was not one in which the relationship between compensatory and punitive damages 

was an important factor, and holding that punitive damages approximately equal to

compensatory award was excessive). 

We are convinced that this case presents one of those situations contemplated by the 

Bowden Court where the ratio between compensatory damages and punitive damages is 
14

outweighed by other factors such as the gravity of the wrong and the need for deterrence.

4

 

Here, Ms. Harvey-Jones orchestrated, and perpetuated, a defamatory attack on Ms. 

Coronel’s character. Although Ms. Coronel did not sustain any physical injury, Ms. 

Harvey-Jones’s statements falsely suggested that Ms. Coronel was involved in criminal 

conduct. Our review of punitive damages awards in similar cases supports our conclusion 

that the circuit court’s award of $200,000 in punitive damages was not excessive under 

Maryland law. See, e.g., Am. Stores, 229 Md. 5 (upholding punitive damages of $25,000 

in slander case where plaintiff was accused of stealing $117 from a grocery store and where 

there was no proof plaintiff had suffered any special damages). 

Accordingly, the punitive damages award in this case comports with Maryland 

common law.

B. Federal Constitutional Law

Although technically a distinct analysis, the determination of whether a punitive 

damages award violates due process under federal constitutional law is largely subsumed 

by the Bowden factors. In Gore, the United States Supreme Court set forth three guideposts 

to aid courts in determining whether a punitive damages award violates the Due Process 

Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment: 1) degree of reprehensibility, 2) ratio [between 

punitive damages and actual harm], and 3) sanctions for comparable misconduct. 517 U.S. 

 

4 We are also cognizant that the purpose of punitive damages is not to recompense 

the victim, but rather “to punish the wrongdoer and to deter such conduct by the wrongdoer 

or others in the future.” Shabazz, 163 Md. App. at 638-39 (quoting Caldor, Inc. v. Bowden, 

330 Md. 632, 661 (1993)).
15

at 574-85. Notably, these guideposts are substantively identical to some of the factors 

identified by the Court of Appeals in Bowden, 350 Md. at 27-41. Like the Maryland 

common law analysis, the federal constitutional analysis provides for de novo review of an 

allegedly excessive punitive damages award. Cooper Indus., Inc. v. Leatherman Tool Grp., 

532 U.S. 424, 431 (2001). Although we have substantially discussed these factors above, 

we will briefly address each of the guideposts articulated by the Supreme Court in Gore.

1. Degree of Reprehensibility

“Perhaps the most important indicium of the reasonableness of a punitive damages 

award is the degree of reprehensibility of the defendant’s conduct.” Gore, 517 U.S. at 575. 

“This principle reflects the accepted view that some wrongs are more blameworthy than 

others. Thus, we have said that ‘nonviolent crimes are less serious than crimes marked by 

violence or the threat of violence.’” Id. at 575-76 (quoting Solem v. Helm, 463 U.S. 277, 

292-93 (1983)). The Supreme Court further stated that, “Similarly, ‘trickery and deceit’ 

are more reprehensible than negligence.” Id. at 576 (quoting TXO Prod. Corp. v. Alliance 

Res. Corp., 509 U.S. 443, 462 (1993)) (internal citation omitted). Because the

considerations inherent in this factor are comparable to those associated with the Bowden 

factor for “gravity of the wrong,” our earlier analysis of that factor is also applicable here. 

See discussion supra Part II.A.1. 

2. Ratio 

“The second and perhaps most commonly cited indicium of an unreasonable or 

excessive punitive damages award is its ratio to the actual harm inflicted on the plaintiff.” 

Gore, 517 U.S. at 580. This guidepost is linked to the Bowden factor for “relationship to 
16

compensatory damages.” See discussion supra Part II.A.6. Although the Supreme Court 

has declined to impose “a bright-line ratio which a punitive damages award cannot 

exceed[,]” the Supreme Court noted that

Our jurisprudence and the principles it has now established demonstrate, 

however, that, in practice, few awards exceeding a single-digit ratio 

between punitive and compensatory damages, to a significant degree, will 

satisfy due process. In Haslip, in upholding a punitive damages award, we 

concluded that an award of more than four times the amount of 

compensatory damages might be close to the line of constitutional 

impropriety. 499 U.S., at 23–24, 111 S. Ct. 1032. We cited that 4–to–1 ratio 

again in Gore. 517 U.S., at 581, 116 S. Ct. 1589. . . . While these ratios are 

not binding, they are instructive. . . . 

Nonetheless, because there are no rigid benchmarks that a punitive 

damages award may not surpass, ratios greater than those we have previously 

upheld may comport with due process where “a particularly egregious act 

has resulted in only a small amount of economic damages.” Ibid. 

State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Campbell, 538 U.S. 408, 425 (2003). The Supreme Court 

further noted that “a higher ratio might be necessary where ‘the injury is hard to detect or 

the monetary value of noneconomic harm might have been difficult to determine.’” Id. 

(quoting Gore, 517 U.S. at 582). In short, although the Supreme Court observed that a 

single-digit ratio between compensatory and punitive damages generally satisfies due 

process, higher ratios may pass constitutional muster when the compensatory or economic 

damages are low, when the injury is hard to detect, or when the value of noneconomic harm 

is difficult to determine. Id. 

We hold that the 20 to 1 ratio here represents the type of case envisioned by the 

Supreme Court that would satisfy due process. In defamation cases, actual harm is often 

difficult to prove, resulting in lower compensatory damages awards. Additionally, it can 

be challenging to detect the injury and determine the value of noneconomic harm. In these 
17

situations, a larger punitive damages award may be constitutionally sustainable, 

particularly as the degree of reprehensibility increases. Accordingly, the ratio of punitive 

to compensatory damages here satisfies constitutional due process. 

3. Sanctions for Comparable Misconduct

“Comparing the punitive damages award and the civil or criminal penalties that 

could be imposed for comparable misconduct provides a third indicium of excessiveness.” 

Gore, 517 U.S. at 583. This factor loosely parallels the Bowden factor for “legislative 

sanctions,” which, as noted above, allows a court to consider the legislative policy reflected 

by statutory criminal fines. See discussion supra Part II.A.4. In comparison, the Supreme 

Court discussed the importance of examining legislative sanctions such as civil fines or 

imprisonment. Gore, 517 U.S. at 583-84. As we have noted, counterfeiting a public 

document is a felony under Maryland law carrying a penalty of two to ten years’ 

imprisonment. Given the seriousness of Ms. Harvey-Jones’s misconduct, we decline to 

disturb the circuit court’s award of punitive damages under this factor. See discussion 

supra Part II.A.4. 

Accordingly, we hold that the circuit court’s punitive damages award was not 

excessive under federal constitutional law.5 

 

5 We express no opinion as to whether the punitive damages award violates Article 

24 of the Maryland Declaration of Rights. That argument was neither briefed nor argued 

by the parties.
18

III. EQUITY DEMANDS

In the final section of her appellate brief, Ms. Harvey-Jones argues that the circuit 

court’s judgment should be vacated “because the grossly excessive amount was based on 

unreliable evidence” and because “[appellant’s] ability to pay is relevant in determining 

whether an award of punitive damages is excessive.” However, these contentions have 

already been addressed above in our discussion of the Bowden factor for “ability to pay.” 

See discussion supra Part II.A.2. We therefore disagree with Ms. Harvey-Jones’s 

contention that the circuit court’s judgment was “unjust.”

JUDGMENT OF THE CIRCUIT COURT 

FOR BALTIMORE COUNTY AFFIRMED. 

COSTS TO BE PAID BY APPELLANT.