ILLINOIS OFFICIAL REPORTS

Supreme Court

In re Marriage of Earlywine, 2013 IL 114779

Caption in Supreme

Court:

In re MARRIAGE OF JOHN J. EARLYWINE, Petitioner, and JESSICA

A. EARLYWINE, Respondent (Thomas H. James, ContemnorAppellant).

 

Docket No. 114779

Filed October 3, 2013

Held

(Note: This syllabus

constitutes no part of

the opinion of the court

but has been prepared

by the Reporter of

Decisions for the

convenience of the

reader.)

Statutory provisions for “leveling the playing field” in marriage

dissolution proceedings permitted an order for the turnover of interim

attorneyfees despite an “advance payment retainer” agreement purporting

to make funds provided by family members of the husband the property

of his counsel.

Decision Under 

Review

Appeal from the Appellate Court for the Second District; heard in that

court on appeal from the Circuit Court of Stephenson County, the Hon.

Theresa L. Ursin, Judge, presiding.

Judgment Appellate court judgment affirmed.

Circuit court judgment affirmed in part and vacated in part.
Counsel on

Appeal

Thomas H. James, of Forreston, appellant pro se.

No appearance for appellee.

Paul L. Feinstein and Michael G. DiDomenico, of Chicago, amici curiae.

Justices JUSTICE BURKE delivered the judgment of the court, with opinion.

Chief JusticeKilbride and Justices Freeman, Thomas, Garman, Karmeier,

and Theis concurred in the judgment and opinion.

OPINION

¶ 1 In the course of dissolution of marriage proceedings, respondent, Jessica A. Earlywine,

filed a petition for interim attorney fees pursuant to the “leveling of the playing field”

provisions in the Illinois Marriage and Dissolution of Marriage Act (Act). See 750 ILCS

5/501(c-1) (West 2010). The circuit court of Stephenson County found that neither

respondent nor petitioner, John J. Earlywine, had the financial ability or resources to pay

their respective attorney fees and costs. Pursuant to section 501(c-1)(3) of the Act, the court

ordered petitioner’s attorney, Thomas James, to turn over, or disgorge, to respondent’s

attorney half the fees previously paid to him. The court held James in “friendly” contempt

at his request so that he could appeal the turnover order. On appeal, James argued that the

fees were not subject to disgorgement because theywere held in an advance payment retainer

and became his property upon payment. The appellate court rejected James’ argument,

affirmed the turnover order, and vacated the order of contempt. 2012 IL App (2d) 110730.

We now affirm the appellate court.

¶ 2 Background

¶ 3 Petitioner filed his petition for dissolution of marriage on August 24, 2010. The parties

had one son born of the marriage who was three years old at the time of filing. On November

1, 2010, respondent, through her attorneyRichard Haime, filed a petition requesting interim

attorney fees in the amount of $5,000. Respondent asked the court to order petitioner to pay

her fees or to order disgorgement of fees previously paid to petitioner’s attorney. In her

affidavit accompanying the petition, respondent stated that she was unemployed and had no

assets or cash to pay her attorney fees. In response, petitioner stated that he had been

unemployed for some time, had no money to retain counsel, and that his parents had paid his

legal bills.

¶ 4 Both parties submitted financial disclosure affidavits. Respondent stated that she had

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earned $300 from employment in 2010 and owed $4,600 on a car. Petitioner stated that he

was employed sporadicallyand had received some unemployment payments. Petitioner listed

debts totaling more than $66,000. He stated further that he owed his parents $8,750 for legal

fees paid to his attorney on his behalf.

¶ 5 Following a hearing, the trial court issued a memorandum opinion and order on April 26,

2011. The court found that there were substantial debts from the marriage which neither

party was able to pay. The court further found that respondent’s requested interim fees were

reasonable due to the anticipated complexity of the case, including a custody evaluation.

Pursuant to section 501(c-1)(3) of the Act, the court found that neither party had the financial

ability or access to assets or income to pay their respective attorney fees, nor was petitioner

able to pay any of respondent’s fees. Accordingly, the court ordered James to turn over to

Haime a portion of the fees paid to him by petitioner’s parents, in the amount of $4,000.

¶ 6 Petitioner filed a motion to reconsider the disgorgement order, arguing that because the

attorney fees were placed in an advance payment retainer, they were not subject to a

disgorgement order by the trial court. Attached to the motion was a copy of the attorneyclient agreement between James and petitioner, which indicates that petitioner agreed that

all fees paid to James would be considered an advance payment retainer, as that term is used

in Dowling v. Chicago Options Associates, Inc., 226 Ill. 2d 277 (2007). The agreement sets

forth the requirements of the advance payment retainer in compliance with Rule 1.15 of the

Illinois Rules of Professional Conduct of 2010 (eff. Jan. 1, 2010). Relevant to this appeal,

the agreement identifies the “special purpose” for the advance payment retainer as follows:

“(1)the special purpose for the advance payment retainer and an explanation why

it is advantageous to the client: In the case of family law with obligors or putative

obligors, regardless of the source of obligation, the [Illinois Marriage and Dissolution

of Marriage Act] can cause a court order to issue which will divide attorney retention

funds which are held in an attorney’s trust account because such funds are owned by

the client and thus are part of the marital estate. This division or allocation is in a

judge’s discretion that provides the authority to allocate all of said funds should such

facts portend such a result. The use of the ‘advance payment retainer’ avoids the

problem of having to pay your counsel twice due to a fee allocation order albeit a

Court may still order such a payment from the client directly. The benefit of the

advanced payment retainer is that it avoids what can at times be the financial

adversity with the attorney which you have hired due to a fee allocation order’s

mandating allocation from an attorney’s trust account to the party on the other side

of the lawsuit.”

¶ 7 In support of the motion to reconsider, petitioner’s mother, Joyce M. Earlywine,

submitted an affidavit stating that she, her fiancé, petitioner’s father, and petitioner’s father’s

wife had paid all of the attorney fees to petitioner’s attorney on his behalf.

¶ 8 The trial court issued a memorandum opinion and order on May 25, 2011, denying the

motion to reconsider the turnover order. The court made the following findings:

“The stated policy of 501(c-1)(3) is to achieve ‘substantial parity between the

parties.’ That section further expressly designates ‘retainers *** previously paid’ as

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a source for disgorgement ***. Public policy allowing divorce litigants to participate

equally should override the advance payment retainer device of protecting the fees

of one side. To allow John to shelter the fees paid on his behalf as an advance

payment retainer defeats the purpose of the ‘substantial parity’ provisions of the

Illinois Marriage and Dissolution of Marriage Act. Divorce court is a court of equity,

in which the court has a substantial amount of discretion ***. This court does not

find that the findings of Dowling, as cited by John, apply or were meant to apply to

divorce cases.”

¶ 9 James filed a motion for an entry of friendly contempt in connection with the fee

disgorgement order. On June 21, 2011, the trial court granted the motion and fined James

$50. James subsequently filed his notice of appeal.

¶ 10 The appellate court affirmed the trial court’s turnover order and vacated the contempt

order. 2012 IL App (2d) 110730. The court held that the plain language of section

501(c-1)(3) of the Act allows a trial court to order disgorgement of retainers previously paid

to an attorney in the event that the court finds that both parties lack the financial ability and

resources to pay reasonable attorney fees and costs. Id. ¶¶ 19-21. The legislature’s use of the

general term “retainers,” in the court’s opinion, encompassed an advance payment retainer.

Id. ¶ 21. The court further held that allowing a party to avoid disgorgement through use of

an advance payment retainer would defeat the purpose of the “leveling the playing field”

provisions in section 501(c-1). Id. ¶¶ 15, 22.

¶ 11 This court allowed James’ petition for leave to appeal pursuant to Illinois Supreme Court

Rule 315 (eff. Feb. 26, 2010). We granted leave to matrimonial lawyers Paul L. Feinstein and

Michael G. DiDomenico to file a brief amicus curiae in support of James. See Ill. S. Ct. R.

345 (eff. Sept. 20, 2010).

¶ 12 Analysis

¶ 13 At the outset, we note that no appellee’s brief has been filed in this case. Nonetheless,

we will address the merits of this appeal under the principles set forth in First Capitol

Mortgage Corp. v. Talandis Construction Corp., 63 Ill. 2d 128, 133 (1976) (in the absence

of an appellee’s brief, a reviewing court should address an appeal on the merits where the

record is simple and the claimed errors are such that the court may easily decide the issues

raised by the appellant).

¶ 14 At issue is whether the trial court had discretion to order James to turn over to Haime

funds held in an advance payment retainer. James contends that because the funds in the

advance payment retainer became his property upon payment and were placed in his general

account, they were not subject to disgorgement under the leveling of the playing field

provisions in the Act.

¶ 15 This court first recognized advance payment retainers in Dowling, which involved a

judgment creditor who sought to satisfy a judgment by accessing funds held in an advance

payment retainer by the debtor’s attorney. Dowling, 226 Ill. 2d 277. We held that the retainer

was not subject to turnover to the judgment creditor because it was the property of the

debtor’s attorney. Id. at 298. Prior to Dowling, only two types of retainers were explicitly

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allowed in Illinois. Id. at 292. The first type, a “general,” “true,” or “classic” retainer, is paid

to a lawyer to secure his or her availability during a specified time or for a specified matter.

Such a retainer is earned when paid and immediately becomes the property of the lawyer,

whether or not the lawyer ever performs any services. Id. at 286. The second type of retainer

is a security retainer, which remains the property of the client until the lawyer applies it to

charges for services actuallyrendered. Pursuant to the IllinoisRules of Professional Conduct,

a security retainer must be deposited in a client trust account and kept separate from the

lawyer’s own funds. Id. (citing Ill. R. Prof. Conduct R. 1.15(a)).

¶ 16 In contrast to a general retainer or a security retainer, an advance payment retainer

“consists of a present payment to the lawyer in exchange for the commitment to provide legal

services in the future.” Dowling, 226 Ill. 2d at 287. Ownership of an advance payment

retainer passes to the lawyer immediately upon payment. Accordingly, the funds must be

deposited in the lawyer’s general account and may not be placed in a client’s trust account

due to the prohibition against commingling funds. Id.

¶ 17 Although this court recognized advance payment retainers as one of three retainers

available to lawyers and clients in Illinois, we cautioned that such retainers “should be used

only sparingly, when necessary to accomplish some purpose for the client that cannot be

accomplished by using a security retainer.” Dowling, 226 Ill. 2d at 293. As we explained, in

most cases a security retainer is the best vehicle to protect the client’s funds:

“The guiding principle, however, should be the protection of the client’s interests. In

the vast majority of cases, this will dictate that funds paid to retain a lawyer will be

considered a security retainer and placed in a client trust account, pursuant to Rule

1.15. Separating a client’s funds from those of the lawyer protects the client’s retainer

from the lawyer’s creditors. [Citation.] Commingling of a lawyer’s funds with those

of a client has often been the first step toward conversion of a client’s funds. In

addition, commingling of a client’s and the lawyer’s funds presents a risk of loss in

the event of the lawyer’s death. [Citation.]” Id. at 292-93.

¶ 18 Examples of appropriate uses of advance payment retainers include the circumstances

in Dowling, in which a debtor hired counsel to represent him in proceedings against a

judgment creditor; a criminal defendant whose property remains subject to forfeiture; and a

debtor in a bankruptcy case. Id. at 288-89, 293. In each of these examples, a security retainer

would disadvantage the client because the funds remain the client’s property and are subject

to the claims of the client’s creditors. Thus, the client may have difficulty hiring legal counsel

if the attorney fees cannot be shielded from those with legal claims to the client’s property.

Id.

¶ 19 Subsequent to our decision in Dowling, this court repealed the former Illinois Rules of

Professional Conduct and replaced them with the Illinois Rules of Professional Conduct of

2010 (eff. Jan. 1, 2010). Subsection (c) of Rule 1.15 of the new rules sets forth the

requirements for advance payment retainers consistent with those prescribed in Dowling. Ill.

R. Prof. Conduct (2010) R. 1.15(c) (eff. Jan. 1, 2010).

¶ 20 Relying on Dowling and Illinois Rule of Professional Conduct 1.15, James contends that

the public policy of Illinois is to recognize the freedom of a client to contract for an advance

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payment retainer if it is for the client’s benefit. The benefit of an advance payment retainer

in this context, according to James, is to avoid exposure of the client’s funds to the “obligee”

spouse and her counsel. He argues that divorce and family law cases are similar to debtorcreditor cases, in that the “leveling of the playing field” rules in the Marriage Act make it

difficult for a client to secure legal representation in the absence of an advance payment

retainer. Thus, James contends that a party to a dissolution case ought to be able to use an

advance payment retainer to shield attorneyfees from being turned over to opposing counsel.

For the following reasons, we disagree.

¶ 21 First, James’ use of an advance payment retainer to “protect” his client’s funds from

turnover undermines the purpose of the leveling of the playing field rules in the Act and

renders these rules a nullity. On June 1, 1997, the legislature amended the Act, substantially

rewriting the rules with regard to attorney fees in marriage and custody cases. See Pub. Act

89-712 (eff. June 1, 1997); In re Marriage of Beyer, 324 Ill. App. 3d 305, 310 (2001). These

amendments are commonly referred to as the “leveling of the playing field” rules. See A

General Explanation of the “Leveling of the Playing Field” in Divorce Litigation

Amendments, 11 CBA Rec. 32 (1997). Among other things, the amendments added a

separate provision, section 501(c-1), governing “temporary” or “interim” fee awards. Id.

“[I]nterim attorney’s fees and costs” are defined by the statute as “attorney’s fees and costs

assessed from time to time while a case is pending, in favor of the petitioning party’s current

counsel, for reasonable fees and costs either already incurred or to be incurred.” 750 ILCS

5/501(c-1) (West 2010).

¶ 22 The statute allows a court, after consideration of relevant factors, to order a party to pay

the petitioning party’s interim attorneyfees “in an amount necessary to enable the petitioning

party to participate adequately in the litigation.” 750 ILCS 5/501(c-1)(3) (West 2010). Prior

to doing so, the court must find that the petitioning party lacks sufficient access to assets or

income to pay reasonable attorney fees, and that the other party has the ability to pay the fees

of the petitioning party. Id.

¶ 23 Where, as in this case, the court finds that both parties lack the financial ability or access

to assets or income to pay reasonable attorney fees and costs, the court may order

disgorgement of fees already paid to an attorney. Specifically, “the court (or hearing officer)

shall enter an orderthat allocates available funds for each party’s counsel, including retainers

or interim payments, or both, previously paid, in a manner that achieves substantial parity

between the parties.” (Emphasis added.) Id. The order terminates at the time the final

judgment is entered. 750 ILCS 5/501(d)(3) (West 2010).

¶ 24 Whether funds held in an advance payment retainer are subject to disgorgement as part

of an interim fee award is an issue of law, which is subject to de novo review. See In re

Marriage of Nash, 2012 IL App (1st) 113724, ¶ 15 (quoting In re Marriage of Beyer, 324

Ill. App. 3d 305, 309 (2001)). Our primary goal in construing a statute is to give effect to the

intention of the legislature. People v. Collins, 214 Ill. 2d 206, 214 (2005). To ascertain that

intent, “ ‘we may properly consider not only the language of the statute, but also the purpose

and necessity for the law, and evils sought to be remedied, and goals to be achieved.’ ” Id.

(quoting People ex rel. Sherman v. Cryns, 203 Ill. 2d 264, 280 (2003)). The statutory

language is the best indicator of the legislative intent. Id.

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¶ 25 In enacting section 501(c-1), the legislature did not specify what types of “retainers”

previously paid to an attorney are subject to disgorgement. However, the policy underlying

the interim fee provisions was clearly spelled out by the legislature. As part of the “leveling

of the playing field” amendments, the following italicized language was added to the

underlying purposes of the Act:

“This Act shall be liberallyconstrued and applied to promote its underlying purposes,

which are to:

* * *

(5) make reasonable provision for spouses and minor children during and after

litigation, including provision for timely awards of interim fees to achieve substantial

parity in parties’ access to funds for litigation costs[.]” (Emphasis added.) 750 ILCS

5/102(5) (West 2010).

¶ 26 Other courts and commentators have expanded on the purposes and goals of the interim

fee provisions in the Act. “In enacting section 501(c-1), the legislature’s goal was to level

the playing field by equalizing the parties’ litigation resources where it is shown that one

party can pay and the other cannot.” In re Marriage of Beyer, 324 Ill. App. 3d 305, 315

(2001) (citing In re Marriage of DeLarco, 313 Ill. App. 3d 107, 113 (2000)). “[The] new

interim fee system was an attempt to address the problem ofthe ‘economicallydisadvantaged

spouse,’ where one spouse uses his or her greater control of assets or income as a litigation

tool, making it difficult for the disadvantaged spouse to participate adequately in the

litigation.” In re Minor Child Stella, 353 Ill. App. 3d 415, 419 (2004) (citing A General

Explanation of the “Leveling of the Playing Field” in Divorce Litigation Amendments, 11

CBA Rec. 32 (1997)). Prior to the amendments, “[divorce] cases frequently entailed

strenuous efforts to ‘block’ access by the other side to funds for litigation.” Id. All too

frequently, the “economically advantaged spouse” would apply his or her greater access to

income or assets as a tool, making it difficult for the disadvantaged spouse to retain counsel

or otherwise participate in litigation. Id. Thus, the new interim fee system was designed to

ameliorate this problem by streamlining the process for obtaining interim attorney fees. Id.

¶ 27 It is clear from the attorney-client agreement that the advance payment retainer in this

case was set up specifically to circumvent the “leveling of the playing field” rules set forth

in the Act. To allow attorney fees to be shielded in this manner would directly undermine the

policies set forth above and would strip the statute of its power. If we were to accept James’

argument, an economically advantaged spouse could obtain an unfair advantage in any

dissolution case simply by stockpiling funds in an advance payment retainer held by his or

her attorney.

¶ 28 Furthermore, the reasons expressed in Dowling for allowing advance payment retainers

are not pertinent to a dissolution case in which one or both parties lacks the financial ability

or access to funds to pay their attorneys. In Dowling, we held that advance payment retainers

should be used “sparingly” and only when necessary to accomplish a special purpose for the

client which could not be accomplished with a security retainer. Dowling, 226 Ill. 2d at 293.

In bankruptcy and forfeiture cases, for example, a client may have difficulty hiring legal

counsel if the funds for attorney fees are subject to the claims of the client’s creditors. See

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Dowling, 226 Ill. 2d at 293.

¶ 29 In divorce cases, however, there are two clients, both of whom require access to legal

counsel. Shielding assets so that one spouse may easily hire an attorney has the direct effect

of making it difficult for the other spouse to hire his or her own attorney. This would defeat

the purpose and goals of the Act, which is to enable parties to have equitable access to

representation. See Alison G. Turoff, Recovering Attorney Fees From the Opposing Party

in Illinois Divorce Cases, 92 Ill. B.J. 462, 463 (2004) (the interim fee provision “supplies a

valuable tool for the attorney contemplating representing a client who individually would

have difficulty paying the fees for a divorce but whose marital estate or spouse could afford

such fees”). Accordingly, we hold that advance payment retainers in dissolution cases are

subject to disgorgement pursuant to section 501(c-1)(3) of the Act. To hold otherwise would

defeat the express purpose of the Act and render the “leveling of the playing field” provisions

powerless.

¶ 30 To the extent that James argues that the funds in his advance payment retainer were

obtained from John’s parents and are not marital property, we note that the statute does not

distinguish between marital property and nonmarital property for the purpose of

disgorgement of attorney fees. The statute contemplates that retainers paid “on behalf of” a

spouse may be disgorged. See 750 ILCS 5/501(c-1)(1) (West 2010) (a responsive pleading

by the nonpetitioning party must set out the amount of “each retainer or other payment or

payments, or both, previously paid to the responding party’s counsel by or on behalf of the

responding party” (emphasis added)). Furthermore, the statute’s repeated references to the

parties’ “access” to funds for litigation implies that funds may come from any source. See

750 ILCS 5/102(5), 501(c-1)(1)(A), (3) (West 2010).

¶ 31 We note, too, that one factor to be considered by the trial court in making an interim

award is the “alleged non-marital property within access to a party.” (Emphasis added.) 750

ILCS 5/501(c-1)(1)(A) (West 2010). Thus, we find it irrelevant for purposes of interim fee 1

awards whether the funds for attorney fees derived from marital or nonmarital property.

2

See also Beyer, 324 Ill. App. 3d at 319 (interim fees pursuant to section 501(c-1) apply to 1

marital and nonmarital property); David H. Hopkins,“Leveling the Playing Field” in Divorce:

Questions and Answers About the New Law, 85 Ill. B.J. 410, 413 (1997) (“Questions about

disgorgement can also arise if a third party—a parent, for example—is funding the divorce litigation

for one of the parties. Consistent with the basic principles of these reforms, attorney’s fees paid by

parents for one spouse might sometimes be ordered disgorged in favor of the other spouse’s counsel

at an interim fee award hearing. When that possibility exists, it should be considered at the outset,

and perhaps the initial retainer should be higher than usual to account for this risk.”).

It is important to note that interim fees are, by definition, temporary. As such, they may be 2

accounted for, as debts or otherwise, upon the final division of the marital estate. See 750 ILCS

5/501(c-1)(2) (West 2010) (“[a]ny assessment of an interim award *** shall be without prejudice

to any final allocation and without prejudice as to any claim or right of either party or any counsel

of record at the time of the award”); 750 ILCS 5/508 (West 2010); In re Marriage of Johnson, 351

Ill. App. 3d 88, 97 (2004) (“By definition, a disgorgement order is never a final adjudication of the

attorney’s right to fees—it merely controlsthe timing of payment, with no effect on whether, or how

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¶ 32 Alternatively, James argues that section 501(c-1)’s provision for disgorgement of

attorney fees irreconcilably conflicts with Rule 1.15 of the Illinois Rules of Professional

Conduct. He argues that this alleged conflict must be resolved in favor of the supreme court

rule, pursuant to the separation of powers doctrine established in article II, section 1, of the

Illinois Constitution of 1970. We are unpersuaded by this argument. Article II, section 1,

provides: “The legislative, executive and judicial branches are separate. No branch shall

exercise powers properly belonging to another.” Ill. Const. 1970, art. II, § 1. “[T]his court

possesses rulemaking authority to regulate the trial of cases.” Strukoff v. Strukoff, 76 Ill. 2d

53, 58 (1979). Where a statute conflicts with a supreme court rule, it infringes upon the

power of the judiciary, and the rule must prevail. McAlister v. Schick, 147 Ill. 2d 84, 94

(1992); People v. Joseph, 113 Ill. 2d 36, 45 (1986). However, “[t]his court has repeatedly

recognized that the legislature mayimpose reasonable limitations and conditions upon access

to the courts.” McAlister, 147 Ill. 2d at 95. The legislature has broad powers to regulate

attorneyfees and the attorney-client relationship, so long as a statute does not purport to limit

the scope of a court’s authority over those matters. Bernier v. Burris, 113 Ill. 2d 219, 250

(1986).

¶ 33 Upon examination of both Rule 1.15 and section 501(c-1) of the Act, we find no conflict

between the rule and the statute. Rule 1.15, which incorporates the Dowling decision, sets

forth the requirements for advance payment retainers. The rule provides that the attorneyclient agreement must state a special purpose and explain why this type of retainer is

advantageous to the client. Ill. R. Prof. Conduct (2010) R. 1.15(c) (eff. Jan. 1, 2010). Section

501(c-1), on the other hand, provides for awards of interim attorney fees and costs in

proceedings arising under the Illinois Marriage and Dissolution of Marriage Act and sets

forth the procedures to be followed by the parties and the court. The statute does not infringe

upon the court’s authority to regulate court matters. Rather, it leaves to the discretion of the

court whether, and in what amount, interim attorney fees may be awarded. We see no direct

conflict between the statute and the rule and, thus, no violation of the separation of powers

clause in the Illinois Constitution.

¶ 34 Finally, James argues that the disgorgement order violates the first amendment, in that

it infringes upon a client’s access to the courts and the right to retain counsel. However, we

find that James lacks standing to make this argument because he is not the person whose

rights are allegedly being infringed. See Members of the City Council v. Taxpayers for

Vincent, 466 U.S. 789, 798 (1984) (“constitutional adjudication requires a review of the

application of a statute to the conduct of the party before the Court”); People ex rel. Shockley

v. Hoyle, 338 Ill. App. 3d 1046, 1055 (2003) (a party lacks standing to assert the alleged

deprivation of another individual’s constitutional rights).

much, the attorney is entitled to collect at the conclusion of his services.”); Attorney Fees in

Domestic Relations Cases: The 2009 Amendments to “Leveling of the Playing Field,” 98 Ill. B.J.

136, 137 (2010) (“Less judicial caution was appropriate for granting interim fees in pre-decree

divorce cases because the trial court could adjust (or ‘true up’) the ultimate division of the marital

estate at the end of the case to account for attorney fee payments by each party.”).

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¶ 35 Conclusion

¶ 36 For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the judgment of the appellate court affirming the

circuit court’s turnover order. We also affirm the vacation of the contempt order. See In re

Marriage of Beyer, 324 Ill. App. 3d 305, 321-22 (2001) (where a refusal to comply with a

court’s order constitutes a good-faith effort to secure an interpretation of an issue without

direct precedent, it is appropriate to vacate a contempt order on appeal).

¶ 37 Appellate court judgment affirmed.

¶ 38 Circuit court judgment affirmed in part and vacated in part.

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