IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

No. 19-30880

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 

 Plaintiff - Appellee

v.

WILLIE JONES, JR., also known as Gator, also known as G., 

 Defendant - Appellant

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Middle District of Louisiana

USDC No. 3:08-CR-108-1

Before STEWART, CLEMENT, and COSTA, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:*

Defendant-Appellant Willie Jones, Jr., appeals the district court’s denial 

of his motion for a sentence reduction under the First Step Act. For the reasons 

stated herein, we affirm. 

I. Facts & Procedural History

In 2011, Jones was convicted of (1) one count of conspiring to distribute 

and possess with intent to distribute five kilograms or more of cocaine and 50 

grams or more of cocaine base (“crack”) in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 846; (2) two 

* Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined that this opinion should not 

be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH 

CIR. R. 47.5.4.

United States Court of Appeals

Fifth Circuit

FILED

August 3, 2020

Lyle W. Cayce

Clerk

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counts of unlawful travel in aid of a racketeering enterprise in violation of 18 

U.S.C. § 1952(a); and (3) two counts of unlawful use of communications 

facilities in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 843(b). The district court sentenced Jones 

to 327 months of imprisonment for the cocaine count, 60 months for the 

unlawful travel counts, and 48 months for the unlawful use counts, with all 

terms to run concurrently. This court dismissed Jones’s direct appeal as 

frivolous. See United States v. Jones, 462 F. App’x 438, 438–39 (5th Cir. 2012).

Jones subsequently filed for habeas relief under 28 U.S.C. § 2255 and that 

proceeding was also unsuccessful. In 2014, Jones moved for a sentence 

reduction pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2) and Amendment 782 to the United 

States Sentencing Guidelines. The district court granted Jones’s motion and 

reduced his aggregate prison term from 327 to 262 months.

In 2019, Jones filed the motion at issue in this appeal seeking to obtain 

a sentence reduction pursuant to Section 404 of the First Step Act of 2018, Pub. 

L. No. 115-391, 132 Stat. 5194, 5222 (2018). The reviewing probation officer

observed that the law related to offenses involving crack had changed in 2010 

with the Fair Sentencing Act. A higher amount of crack was now necessary to 

trigger the 10-year mandatory minimum prison sentence that was applied in 

Jones’s case, and the First Step Act made the 2010 law retroactive.

Nevertheless, the officer noted that the law related to powder cocaine offenses 

had not changed and Jones’s offense involved both powder cocaine and crack. 

The officer concluded that because the amount of powder cocaine involved in 

Jones’s offense was sufficient to trigger the 10-year mandatory minimum

irrespective of the amount of crack involved, he was ineligible for a reduction.

Jones, through the Federal Public Defender (“FPD”), objected, noting 

that numerous district courts have held that a hybrid offense involving both 

powder cocaine and crack did not render the defendant ineligible for a sentence 

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reduction. Additionally, the FPD argued that various other factors warranted 

a sentence reduction, including Jones’s attempts to better himself in prison. 

In considering the 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) factors, the district court

explained:

The Court denies the defendant’s motion for a 

downward variant sentence regardless of whether he 

is eligible for relief under the First Step Act. The 

defendant’s statutory and guideline provisions are 

unaffected by the First Step Act, and he previously 

received a top of the guideline sentence at his original 

sentencing and when he was granted a sentence 

reduction pursuant to Amendment 782. As such, the 

Court does not believe a downward variant sentence is 

appropriate in this case. 

Jones filed this appeal.

II. Standard of Review

We review a district court’s denial of a motion for sentence reduction 

under the First Step Act for abuse of discretion. See United States v. Jackson, 

945 F.3d 315, 319 (5th Cir. 2019). To the extent the district court’s decision 

turned on its interpretation of the statute, we review de novo. Id.

III. Discussion

Section 404 of the First Step Act gives courts the discretion to apply the 

Fair Sentencing Act of 2010 to reduce a prisoner’s sentence for certain covered 

offenses. See United States v. Hegwood, 934 F.3d 414, 416–17 (5th Cir. 2019). 

An offense qualifies as covered if it was committed before August 3, 2010, and 

violated a federal criminal statute containing penalties that were modified by 

section 2 or 3 of the Fair Sentencing Act of 2010. See id. at 416. Relevant here, 

Section 2 of the Fair Sentencing Act amended 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(A)(iii), in 

pertinent part, by increasing the amount of crack required to trigger the 

statutory imprisonment range of 10 years to life from 50 to 280 grams. See Fair 

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Sentencing Act of 2010, Pub. L. 111-220, § 2(a)(1), 124 Stat. 2372 (2010);

Jackson, 945 F.3d at 318 & n.1.

Section 841(b) sets out the statutory penalties for Jones’s § 846 drug 

conspiracy conviction. See United States v. Rodriguez-Escareno, 700 F.3d 751, 

754 (5th Cir. 2012) (noting that § 841 sets out the substantive crime and 

penalties for § 846 conspiracies). Jones committed his offense between July 20, 

2006, and August 6, 2008, and it involved five kilograms or more of powder 

cocaine and 50 grams or more of crack. Under the applicable versions of § 841, 

both the powder cocaine and crack amounts supported the imprisonment range 

of 10 years to life. 

Given that Section 2 of the Fair Sentencing Act did not alter the amount 

of powder cocaine required to trigger the higher statutory imprisonment range, 

the question here is whether the district court abused its discretion in denying 

Jones’s motion for a sentence reduction under the First Step Act given the 

favorable change in the law for crack offenses. We hold that it did not. 

The district court was not required to reduce Jones’s sentence pursuant 

to his motion under the First Step Act. See First Step Act, § 404(c) (“Nothing 

in this section shall be construed to require a court to reduce any sentence 

pursuant to this section.”). Rather, the court exercised its broad discretion not 

to grant Jones yet another sentence reduction. See Hegwood, 934 F.3d at 418 

(noting that “Section 404(b) [] states that the court may reduce a sentence for 

a covered offense, giving it discretion.” (emphasis in original)). Although Jones 

devotes much of his argument on appeal to the point that district courts are 

split on the issue of whether hybrid offenses involving crack and powder 

cocaine render a defendant ineligible for a sentence reduction under the First 

Step Act, this does not change our analysis. “That [a defendant] is eligible for 

resentencing does not mean he is entitled to it.” Jackson, 945 F.3d at 321 

(quoting United States v. Beamus, 943 F.3d 789, 792 (6th Cir. 2019)). As the 

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district court reasoned, Jones “previously received a top of the guideline 

sentence at his original sentencing when he was granted a sentence reduction 

pursuant to Amendment 782.” On this basis, it reasonably concluded that a 

further sentence reduction was not appropriate. Moreover, the district court 

had no obligation to consider Jones’s post-sentencing conduct in evaluating his 

motion for a sentence reduction. Id. at 321 (citing Hegwood, 934 F.3d at 418). 

As we have explained, the First Step Act does not contemplate a “plenary 

resentencing.” See Hegwood, 934 F.3d at 418 (“The district court decides on a 

new sentence by placing itself in the time frame of the original sentencing, 

altering the relevant legal landscape only by the changes mandated by the 

2010 Fair Sentencing Act.”). The district court did not abuse its discretion in 

denying Jones’s motion for a sentence reduction under the First Step Act.

IV. Conclusion

The district court’s judgment is AFFIRMED. 

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