Federal Register / Vol. 62, No. 58 / Wednesday, March 26, 1997 / Notices 63

as amended), the National Science

Foundation announces the following

meeting:

Name: Advisory Panel for Physiology and

Ethology (1160).

Date and Time: April 14–16, 1997, 8:30

a.m. to 5:00 p.m.

Place: Room 680, National Science

Foundation 4201 Wilson Boulevard,

Arlington, Virginia 22230.

Type of Meeting: Part-Open.

Contact Person: Dr. George W. Uetz,

Program Director, IBN, Room 685, National

Science Foundation, 4201 Wilson Boulevard,

Arlington, Virginia 22230, (703) 306–1419.

Minutes: May be obtained from the contact

person listed above.

Purpose of Meeting: To provide advice and

recommendations concerning proposals

submitted to NSF for financial support.

Agenda: Open session: April 16, 1997,

10:30 a.m. to 11:30 p.m..-discussion on

research trends and opportunities and

assessment procedures in Integrative Biology

and Neuroscience with Dr. Mary E. Clutter,

Assistant Director, Directorate for Biological

Sciences.

Closed session: April 14, 1997, 8:30 a.m. to

6:00 p.m., April 15, 1997, 8:30 a.m. to 6:00

p.m., and April 16, 1997, 8:30 a.m. to 10:30

a.m. and 11:30 a.m. to 3:00 p.m. To review

and evaluate Animal Behavior proposals as

part of the selection process for awards.

Reason for Closing: The proposals being

reviewed include information of a

proprietary or confidential nature, including

technical information; financial data, such as

salaries; and personal information

concerning individuals associated with the

proposals. These matters are exempt under 5

U.S.C. 552b(c) (4) and (6) of the Government

in the Sunshine Act.

Dated: March 21, 1997.

Linda Allen-Benton,

Deputy Director, Division of Human Resource

Management, Acting Committee Management

Officer.

[FR Doc. 97–7697 Filed 3–25–97; 8:45 am]

BILLING CODE 7555–01–M

Advisory Panel for Social and Political

Science; Notice of Meetings

In accordance with the Federal

Advisory Committee Act (Pub. L. 92–

463, and amended), the National

Science Foundation announces the

following meeting:

Name: Advisory Panel for Social and

Political Science (#1761).

Date and Time: April 15–16, 1997; 9:00 am

to 5:00 pm.

Place: National Science Foundation,

Stafford Place, 4201 Wilson Boulevard, Room

880, Arlington, VA 22230.

Contact Person: Dr. Frank Scioli and Dr.

Rick Wilson, Program Directors for Political

Science, National Science Foundation.

Telephone: (703) 306–1761.

Agenda: To review and evaluate the

political science proposals as part of the

selection process for awards.

Date and Time: May 1–2, 1997; 9:00 am to

5:00 pm.

Place: National Science Foundation,

Stafford Place, 4201 Wilson Boulevard, Room

970, Arlington, VA 22230.

Contact Person: Dr. Harmon Hosch,

Program Director, Law and Social Science,

National Science Foundation. Telephone

(703) 306–1762.

Agenda: To review and evaluate the Law

and Social Science Proposals as a part of the

selection process for awards.

Date and Time: May 19–20, 1997; 9:00 am

to 5:00 pm.

Place: National Science Foundation,

Stafford Place, 4201 Wilson Boulevard, Room

320, Arlington, VA 22230.

Contact Person: Dr. William S. Bainbridge

and Dr. Patricia White, Program Directors for

Sociology, National Science Foundation,

Telephone (703) 306–1756.

Agenda: To review and evaluate the

Sociology proposals as a part of the selection

process for awards.

Type of Meetings: Closed.

Purpose of Meeting: To provide advice and

recommendations concerning support for

research proposals submitted to the NSF for

financial support.

Reason for Closing: The proposals being

reviewed include information of a

proprietary or confidential nature, including

technical information; financial data, such as

salaries; and personal information

concerning individuals associated with the

proposals. These matters are exempt under 5

U.S.C. 552b(c) (4) and (6) of the Government

in the Sunshine Act.

Dated: March 21, 1997.

Linda Allen-Benton,

Deputy Director, Division of Human

Resources Management, Acting Committee

Management Officer.

[FR Doc. 97–7695 Filed 3–25–97; 8:45 am]

BILLING CODE 7555–01–M

Advisory Panel for Social and Political

Science; Notice of Meetings

In accordance with the Federal

Advisory Committee Act (Pub. L. 92–

463, and amended), the National

Science Foundation announces the

following meeting:

Name: Advisory Panel for Social and

Political Science (#1761).

Date and Time: April 15–16, 1997; 9:00 am

to 5:00 pm.

Place: National Science Foundation,

Stafford Place, 4201 Wilson Boulevard, Room

880, Arlington, VA 22230.

Contact Person: Dr. Frank Scioli and Dr.

Rick Wilson, Program Directors for Political

Science, National Science Foundation.

Telephone: (703) 306–1761.

Agenda: To review and evaluate the

political science proposals as part of the

selection process for awards.

Date and Time: May 1–2, 1997; 9:00 am to

5:00 pm.

Place: National Science Foundation,

Stafford Place, 4201 Wilson Boulevard, Room

970, Arlington, VA 22230.

Contact Person: Dr. Harmon Hosch,

Program Director, Law and Social Science,

National Science Foundation. Telephone:

(703) 306–1762.

Agenda: To review and evaluate the Law

and Social Science Proposals as a part of the

selection process for awards.

Date and Time: May 19–20, 1997; 9:00 am

to 5:00 pm.

Place: National Science Foundation,

Stafford Place, 4201 Wilson Boulevard, Room

320, Arlington, VA 22230.

Contact Person: Dr. William S. Bainbridge

and Dr. Patricia White, Program Directors for

Sociology, National Science Foundation.

Telephone: (703) 306–1756.

Agenda: To review and evaluate the

Sociology proposals as a part of the selection

process for awards.

Type of Meetings: Closed.

Purpose of Meeting: To provide advice and

recommendations concerning support for

research proposals submitted to the NSF for

financial support.

Reason for Closing: The proposals being

reviewed include information of a

proprietary or confidential nature, including

technical information; financial data, such as

salaries; and personal information

concerning individuals associated with the

proposals. These matters are exempt under 5

U.S.C. 552b(c) (4) and (6) of the Government

in the Sunshine Act.

Dated: March 21, 1997.

Linda Allen-Benton,

Deputy Director, Division of Human

Resources Management, Acting Committee

Management Officer.

[FR Doc. 97–7698 Filed 3–25–97; 8:45 am]

BILLING CODE 7555–01–M

NUCLEAR REGULATORY

COMMISSION

[Docket Nos. 50–327 and 50–32; License

Nos. DPR–77 and DPR–79; EA 96–269]

Tennessee Valley Authority, Sequoyah

Nuclear Plant Units 1 and 2); Order

Imposing Civil Monetary Penalty

I

Tennessee Valley Authority

(Licensee) is the holder of Operating

License Nos. DPR–77 and DPR–79

issued by the Nuclear Regulatory

Commission (NRC or Commission) on

September 17, 1980, and September 15,

1981, respectively. The licenses

authorize the Licensee to operate the

Sequoyah Nuclear Plant, Units 1 and 2

in accordance with the conditions

specified therein.

II

An inspection of the Licensee’s

activities at the Sequoyah Nuclear Plant

was conducted during the period of July

8 through August 22, 1996. The results

of this inspection indicated that the

Licensee had not conducted its
64 Federal Register / Vol. 62, No. 58 / Wednesday, March 26, 1997 / Notices

activities in full compliance with NRC

requirements. A written Notice of

Violation and Proposed Imposition of

Civil Penalty (Notice) was served upon

the Licensee by letter dated November

19, 1996. The Notice stated the nature

of the violations, the provisions of the

NRC’s requirements that the Licensee

had violated, and the amount of the

civil penalty proposed for the

violations.

The Licensee responded to the Notice

in a letter dated December 19, 1996. In

its response, the Licensee agreed that

the violations occurred but contested

NRC’s application of the Enforcement

Policy and requested the NRC to

reconsider its decision to categorize the

violations as a Severity Level III

problem and mitigate the proposed civil

penalty in its entirety. The Licensee

based its requests on the history of

extensive activities it has undertaken to

upgrade the Sequoyah fire protection

program, the minimal safety and

regulatory significance of the individual

violations, and the corrective actions

taken following identification.

III

After consideration of the Licensee’s

response and the statements of fact,

explanation, and argument for

mitigation contained therein, the NRC

staff has determined, as set forth in the

Appendix to this Order, that the

violations occurred as stated and that

the penalty proposed for the violations

designated in the Notice should be

imposed.

IV

In view of the foregoing and pursuant

to Section 234 of the Atomic Energy Act

of 1954, as amended (Act), 42 U.S.C.

2282, and 10 CFR 2.205, it is hereby

ordered that:

The Licensee pay a civil penalty in the

amount of $50,000 within 30 days of the date

of this Order, by check, draft, money order,

or electronic transfer, payable to the

Treasurer of the United States and mailed to

James Lieberman, Director, Office of

Enforcement, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory

Commission, One White Flint North, 11555

Rockville Pike, Rockville, MD 20852–2738.

V

The Licensee may request a hearing

within 30 days of the date of this Order.

Where good cause is shown,

consideration will be given to extending

the time to request a hearing. A request

for extension of time must be made in

writing to the Director, Office of

Enforcement, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory

Commission, Washington, D.C. 20555,

and include a statement of good cause

for the extension. A request for a

hearing should be clearly marked as a

‘‘Request for an Enforcement Hearing’’

and shall be addressed to the Director,

Office of Enforcement, U.S. Nuclear

Regulatory Commission, Washington,

D.C. 20555, with a copy to the

Commission’s Document Control Desk,

Washington, D.C. 20555. Copies also

shall be sent to the Assistant General

Counsel for Hearings and Enforcement

at the same address and to the Regional

Administrator, NRC Region II, 101

Marietta Street N.W., Suite 2900,

Atlanta, Georgia 30323.

If a hearing is requested, the

Commission will issue an Order

designating the time and place of the

hearing. If the Licensee fails to request

a hearing within 30 days of the date of

this Order (or if written approval of an

extension of time in which to request a

hearing has not been granted), the

provisions of this Order shall be

effective without further proceedings. If

payment has not been made by that

time, the matter may be referred to the

Attorney General for collection.

In the event the Licensee requests a

hearing as provided above, the issue to

be considered at such hearing shall be:

Whether on the basis of the violations

admitted by the Licensee, this Order

should be sustained.

Dated at Rockville, Maryland this 17th day

of March 1997.

For the Nuclear Regulatory Commission.

Edward L. Jordan,

Deputy Executive Director for Regulatory

Effectiveness, Program Oversight,

Investigations and Enforcement.

Appendix—Evaluations and Conclusion

On November 19, 1996, the NRC

issued to Tennessee Valley Authority

(Licensee or TVA) a Notice of Violation

and Proposed Imposition of Civil

Penalty (Notice) for four violations

identified during an NRC inspection

conducted during the period July 8

through August 22, 1996, at the

Sequoyah Nuclear Plant. In its response

dated December 19, 1996, the Licensee

agreed that the violations occurred but

stated that the NRC’s categorization of

the four individual violations as a

Severity Level III problem, and

proposed imposition of a $50,000 civil

penalty, was inconsistent with the NRC

Enforcement Policy as it was applied.

The Licensee requested the NRC to

reconsider its decision regarding the

severity level of the violations and

mitigate the proposed civil penalty in its

entirety. The NRC’s evaluation and

conclusion regarding the Licensee’s

requests are as follows.

Summary of Licensee’s Request for

Reduction in Severity Level

In its request for reconsideration of

the severity level of the four violations

comprising the Severity Level III

problem, the Licensee maintained that

(1) extensive activities have been taken

to upgrade the Sequoyah fire protection

program, (2) the actual and potential

safety significance of the violations are

minimal, (3) the regulatory significance

of the violations should be assessed in

the context of TVA’s actions to improve

its performance in this area, and (4) the

use of fire watches at Sequoyah is

consistent with NRC policy and

regulatory requirements.

Regarding TVA’s history of activities

to upgrade the Sequoyah fire protection

program, the Licensee maintained that

beginning in 1991, it implemented a

four-phase Fire Protection Improvement

Plan (FPIP) to address important

engineering items such as evaluating the

hydraulic performance of the fire

protection water system, updating the

fire hazards analysis, and completing

the fire protection report. Of the 63

items in the initial plan, 61 items had

been completed. The two remaining

items involved (1) replacing the fire

pumps and upgrading the existing raw

water fire protection system to a potable

water system and (2) completing the

evaluation of approximately 1,500 fire

barrier penetration seals. These two

items were scheduled to be completed

in 1997. The Licensee stated that the

NRC’s Notice did not acknowledge the

considerable resources expended on the

upgrades to the fire protection program

since 1991 which demonstrated both

management’s attention and that the

overall fire protection program was

being treated as a high priority item.

Second, the Licensee contended that

the four violations had only minimal

potential safety significance, and when

considered either individually or in the

aggregate, were not significant enough

to constitute a Severity Level III

problem. The Licensee’s position on

each of the violations is as follows:

Violation A: This violation involved

quality assurance (QA) findings for

which the Licensee had delayed

implementing corrective action. The

Licensee addressed the actions taken on

the QA findings related to 1,500

degraded fire barrier penetration seals

(of the 24,500 penetrations inspected),

326 degraded fire dampers, and

deviations from procedures for

controlling transient fire loads. The

Licensee considered that these

violations were of minimal safety

significance and of low regulatory

significance due to the management
Federal Register / Vol. 62, No. 58 / Wednesday, March 26, 1997 / Notices 65

attention that had been applied to the

site’s fire protection program since

1991. In particular, the Licensee stated

that an evaluation of the 326 fire

dampers found that only eight of the

dampers required additional work. The

Licensee concluded that the actions

taken do not indicate a lack of

management attention.

Violation B: This violation involved

an inoperable carbon dioxide system in

the computer room which was

scheduled to be repaired as part of the

upgrade of the computer room. The

Licensee stated that the minimal safety

significance associated with this

situation did not warrant rearranging

priorities to perform part of the

computer room upgrades out of

sequence.

Violation C: This violation involved

the failure to perform a surveillance of

fire barrier penetrations in high

radiation areas. The Licensee stated that

a subsequent review found these

penetrations acceptable.

Violation D: This violation involved

the failure to hydrostatically test nine of

119 fire hoses. The Licensee stated that

subsequent testing found these hoses to

be capable of performing their intended

function. The Licensee concluded that

this violation involved limited

procedural non-adherence which has

traditionally not been the subject of

escalated enforcement.

The Licensee concluded that the

regulatory significance of the violations

should be determined by considering

the safety significance of the violations

in context with the actions initiated by

the Licensee to assure regulatory

compliance and enhance performance

in the fire protection area. The Licensee

stated that the NRC has traditionally

taken a much broader view in exercising

discretion to tailor an enforcement

action to the particular situation, and

such an approach would be appropriate

in this case given the minimal actual

safety significance of the violations.

Lastly, the Licensee took exception to

the NRC’s letter of November 19, 1996,

which stated that the use of fire watch

patrols was intended for interim, shortterm compensatory measures until

degraded fire protection features can be

repaired or replaced. The Licensee

argued that the use of fire watch patrols

for degraded fire protection features: (1)

Provides an acceptable level of safety;

(2) is permitted by Technical

Specifications without time limitations;

(3) does not challenge the fire protection

defense-in-depth concept; (4) restores

the margin of safety that is lost with

degraded conditions; (5) provides an

acceptable substitute as opposed to an

additional level of protection; (6) does

not increase the vulnerability of

equipment to potential fire exposure or

fire damage, and (7) does not violate

NRC requirements. In summary, the

Licensee stated that enforcement action

should not be taken unless the reliance

on fire watch patrols for degraded

conditions could be shown to result in

a violation of regulatory requirements.

NRC Evaluation of Licensee’s Request

for Reduction in Severity Level

In reviewing the Licensee’s response,

no additional information was provided

that was not previously considered by

the NRC in its deliberations regarding

this matter.

Contrary to the Licensee’s response,

the NRC did consider the Licensee’s

past efforts to improve the Sequoyah fire

protection program through the fourphase FPIP. Specifically, Section F1.3 of

NRC Inspection Report No. 50–327, 328/

96–10 acknowledged that the actions

associated with the FPIP had enhanced

the fire protection program. However,

prior to issuance of the Notice that is the

subject of this action, the NRC had also

expressed various concerns with the

adequacy of the fire protection program

and corrective action on fire protection

issues. These instances include: (1) The

Systematic Assessment of Licensee

Performance report dated February 21,

1995, which stated that ‘‘Correction of

long-standing deficiencies in the

material condition of the fire protection

system was slow and management

exhibited a tolerance for poor

conditions;’’ (2) the July/August 1996

inspection documented in Inspection

Report No. 50–327, 328/96–10,

describing new problems and

discrepancies identified as not receiving

appropriate management attention for

resolution; and (3) a February 1996

inspection, documented in Inspection

Report No. 50–327, 328/96–02, which

identified problems with the untimely

implementation of portions of the FPIP,

such as deferment of the construction of

the upgrades to the fire protection water

supply system until 1997, and also

identified a violation involving the lack

of adequate protective or preventive

measures for the construction portions

of the system.

As evidenced by the violations cited

in the Notice and the specific

circumstances surrounding them, as

described in the inspection report, the

NRC concluded that the Licensee’s

corrective actions associated with the

fire protection program have not been

fully effective in assuring timely

resolution of long-standing issues as

described below:

Violation A: The violations included

nine examples of inadequate or

untimely corrective action for

previously identified deficiencies.

These included quality assurance (QA)

findings, issues from the FPIP, and

concerns identified following

establishment of the FPIP. QA findings

were identified as early as 1992, yet

corrective action had not been

completed at the time of the inspection.

At the time of the July/August 1996

inspection, completion dates had not

been established for several of the items

and some items had completion dates

extending into 1997. Other issues, such

as the control of combustibles,

evidenced the Licensee’s inability to

achieve compliance. The control of

transient combustibles was identified as

an area of concern in QA audits, but

ineffective corrective action resulted in

repeated violations in 1996. In some

instances, corrective actions for items

identified since the 1991 FPIP had been

developed, but were not being

completed in a timely manner. For

example, in September 1993, the

Licensee initially identified 326 fire

dampers which were not installed in

accordance with the vendor’s

installation requirements. Further

engineering evaluation and review

reduced this number to eight, which the

Licensee considered needing

replacement. Although the evaluation

which found 318 of these dampers to be

satisfactory was completed in December

1994, the eight dampers identified for

replacement were not scheduled to be

replaced until 1997, even though the

dampers are readily accessible for

replacement during any mode of plant

operation. The scheduled replacement

of these dampers, in excess of two years

after identification of the need for

replacement, was considered a failure of

the Licensee’s management to place

adequate emphasis on correcting

deficiencies.

Violation B: The inoperability of the

carbon dioxide system in the computer

room was identified by the Licensee in

December 1995. This system had been

inoperable since completion of a heating

ventilation and air conditioning system

modification in May 1990. Although

surveillance tests were performed on

this system in April 1991, August 1992,

June 1994, and December 1995, they

failed to identify this deficiency.

Although the violation in itself has low

safety significance, the combination of

design oversight and an inadequate

surveillance inspection and test

program for this system, which should

have identified this deficiency, is of

concern and is another example of weak

management oversight of the fire

protection program.
66 Federal Register / Vol. 62, No. 58 / Wednesday, March 26, 1997 / Notices

Violation C: The violation involving

the failure to inspect the fire barrier

penetrations in the high radiation areas

was identified by the Licensee. The fact

that subsequent inspections did not

identify any problems with these

penetrations is fortuitous. The root

cause of this problem was considered to

be an error on the part of personnel

performing the procedure in

conjunction with inadequate

management oversight. Additionally,

resolution of this issue had not been

timely.

Violation D: This violation, involving

the failure to inspect the fire hose

installed on the fire hose stations within

the reactor buildings, was identified by

the Licensee. The fact that subsequent

inspections found the hydrostatic tests

on only nine of the 119 fire hose

sections to be out of date and that

testing found the hoses to be capable of

performing their intended function is

fortuitous. The cause of this problem

was improper procedure revision,

inadequate procedure review, and

inadequate management oversight.

The NRC acknowledges the Licensee’s

position that individually these

violations are of low safety significance.

However, as stated in the Section IV.A

of the Enforcement Policy (NUREG–

1600), a group of Severity Level IV

violations may be evaluated in the

aggregate and assigned a single,

increased severity level, thereby

resulting in a Severity Level III problem,

if the violations have the same

underlying cause or programmatic

deficiencies. The purpose of aggregating

violations is to focus the Licensee’s

attention on the fundamental

underlying causes for which

enforcement action appears warranted

and to reflect the fact that several

violations with a common cause may be

more significant collectively than

individually, and may therefore warrant

a more substantial enforcement action.

In this case, the NRC determined that

the violations have the same underlying

cause, namely the lack of attention and

priority given to the fire protection

program.

The Licensee’s characterization of the

root cause as ‘‘insufficient management

involvement in the oversight of the fire

protection program,’’ is consistent with

the NRC’s conclusion, except in one

important respect: it fails to recognize

management acceptance of unresolved

issues and the failure to assign the

necessary priority to the fire protection

program issues to assure their timely

resolution. In addition, although the

Licensee appeared to focus resources on

the resolution of many of the 1991 FPIP

issues, not all items have yet been

resolved and newly identified items

were not resolved in a timely manner.

The NRC considers this failure to be

significant because program ownership

and ineffective management

performance were identified as

underlying causes of performance

weaknesses in the Sequoyah Nuclear

Plant Restart Plan of May 20, 1993.

Ineffective oversight is also indicated by

the fact that there has not been

consistent management of the fire

protection program. Specifically, since

1990, there have been a number of

personnel changes in the position of

Fire Protection Manager. In that

inadequate oversight of the fire

protection program continues to persist,

escalation of the violations is consistent

with Supplement I.C.7 of the NRC

Enforcement Policy.

The Licensee’s position that the NRC

should exercise discretion due to the

improvements and enhancements being

made in the fire protection program

cannot be supported due to multiple

problems identified by both the

Licensee and the NRC which were

outside the scope of the 1991 Fire

Protection Improvement Plan. These

problems indicate a continued lack of

management oversight and control of

the fire protection program.

The Licensee’s position that fire

watch patrols for degraded fire

protection features were equivalent to

fully functioning features is not correct.

It is the NRC’s opinion that fire watch

patrols, in combination with the fire

protection defense in depth features,

provide an adequate level of fire

protection safety on an interim basis

until permanent corrective actions are

implemented. Therefore, a fire watch

patrol can only supplement a degraded

fire protection feature and is an

approved compensatory measure for the

identification of fire and notification of

a fire to the appropriate response

personnel. However, a fire watch is not

equivalent to the fire protection feature

in question.

The Licensee indicated that there was

no time limitation on how long a fire

watch patrol can be used in lieu of

restoring a degraded system to service.

To the contrary, there is, in fact, a

recognized regulatory impact that can

result from the use of long-term fire

watches. If the protection features are

described in the Final Safety Analysis

Report, long-term or permanent fire

watches could be considered a

modification which would require a 10

CFR 50.59 safety analysis, which could

result in limiting the fire watches use.

Second, although not specifically

limiting the use of fire watches, the

Sequoyah Technical Specifications

clearly indicate the need to restore

degraded features as soon as possible.

The Sequoyah Technical Specifications

require that a Special Report be issued

to the NRC if a degraded fire protection

feature cannot be repaired within a

designated time. In general, the

Sequoyah Technical Specifications

require degraded fire protection

suppression systems to be restored to

operability within 14 days and fire

barrier penetration seals restored to

operability within 7 days, or

alternatively, within the next 30 days a

Special Report is required to be

submitted to the NRC outlining the

cause of the system inoperability and

the plans or schedule for restoring the

system to operable status. The Technical

Specifications requirements clearly

indicate that the NRC does not sanction

the long term use of fire watch patrols

for degraded fire protection features and

that restoration to full fire protection

capability is required. Regardless of the

NRC’s stated position regarding

Sequoyah’s use of fire watch patrols,

none of the violations were based on

their utilization.

Summary of Licensee’s Request for

Mitigation of Civil Penalty

The Licensee believes the civil

penalty should be mitigated in its

entirety because the problems were

identified by the Licensee and

corrective actions were taken prior to

NRC enforcement action. These actions

included:

—Implementation of the 1991 Fire

Protection Improvement Plan.

—Improved management

responsiveness to identified problems

by centralization of fire protection

program ownership and responsibility

into one department, establishment of

fire protection program priorities and

performance expectations, and

appointment of a new fire protection

manager.

—Establishment in June 1996 of an

integrated schedule designed to track

fire protection issues to closure.

—Performance of a self-assessment of

the fire protection program which

evaluated and found the correction

actions and improvements

implemented to have been effective.

—Direction provided for the QA

organization to escalate its concerns

to management in order to assist

management in collectively analyzing

individual problems to facilitate

corrective action.

The Licensee stated that the lack of

timeliness associated with the

individual fire protection issues was

identified and corrective action was
Federal Register / Vol. 62, No. 58 / Wednesday, March 26, 1997 / Notices 67

initiated prior to NRC enforcement

action. Therefore, these factors should

be taken into consideration prior to the

NRC pursuing escalated enforcement

and imposition of a civil penalty. The

Licensee believes that to issue a civil

penalty after action was taken to

reorganize the fire protection program

and provide enhanced management

oversight would be contrary to the NRC

Enforcement Policy. Furthermore, the

imposition of a civil penalty under these

circumstances would serve no purpose

other than to punish the Licensee and

would be contrary to the NRC

Enforcement Policy to focus on current

performance.

NRC Evaluation of Licensee’s Request

for Mitigation of Civil Penalty

The NRC does not agree with the

Licensee’s position that the fire

protection program problems were

identified by the Licensee and

corrective action was taken prior to NRC

involvement. Program oversight

weaknesses were highlighted by the

NRC in the February 1995 SALP Report,

as discussed previously. In addition,

concerns with the timeliness and

adequacy of fire protection program

corrective actions were also identified

by the NRC in February 1996. Although

a QA audit completed in May 1996

elevated the significance of the

programmatic issues to upper TVA

management, a follow-up NRC

inspection in July 1996 found that these

issues had not been resolved. Once the

NRC focused on the multiple fire

protection deficiencies in an inspection

conducted in July and August 1996, the

Licensee placed additional emphasis on

this area, made organizational and

personnel changes, and implemented

plans to correct the deficiencies. The

actions were initiated by the Licensee

after the February 1996 identification by

the NRC of: (1) A related violation and

(2) inadequate responses to QA findings;

but these actions were limited and did

not ensure lasting corrective actions.

Section VI.B.2.c of the Enforcement

Policy discusses the application of the

factor of Corrective Action in the civil

penalty assessment process. The

purpose of this factor is to encourage

licensees to (1) take the immediate

actions necessary upon discovery of a

violation that will restore safety and

compliance with the license,

regulations, or other requirements; and

(2) develop and implement (in a timely

manner) the lasting corrective actions

that will not only prevent recurrence of

the violation at issue, but will be

appropriately comprehensive, given the

significance and complexity of the

violations, to prevent recurrence of

violations with similar root causes. In

assessing Corrective Action,

consideration is given to the timeliness

of the action (including the promptness

in developing the schedule for long term

corrective action), the adequacy of the

licensee’s root cause analysis, and the

comprehensiveness of the corrective

action. Clearly, in this case, the program

deficiencies at issue in the Notice were

discovered by TVA as early as 1991, but

corrective actions were not promptly

taken, and since the issues were

primarily licensee-identified, the time of

reference used in assessing this factor is

discovery, not when the issues were

identified as apparent violations by the

NRC. Further, although in most cases,

schedules for long-term corrective

actions were developed, management

had not placed the appropriate priority

on meeting schedules, which resulted in

substantial deferments. Continued

unjustifiable deferral of known

deficiencies is unacceptable to the NRC.

NRC Conclusion

The NRC concludes that the

violations occurred as stated and that

collectively they represent a Severity

Level III problem. Since the July/August

1996 NRC inspection, it appears that the

licensee has implemented appropriate

corrective actions to address these

problems and is now appropriately

focused on this program area. However,

no adequate basis for either a reduction

of the severity level or for mitigation of

the civil penalty was provided by the

licensee. Consequently, the proposed

civil penalty in the amount of $50,000

should be imposed.

[FR Doc. 97–7638 Filed 3–25–97; 8:45 am]

BILLING CODE 7590–01–P

[Docket Nos. 70–7001 and 70–7002]

Criteria for Staff Implementation of

‘‘Backfitting’’ Requirements for

Gaseous Diffusion Plants; Notice of

Availability

AGENCY: Nuclear Regulatory

Commission.

ACTION: Notice of availability.

SUMMARY: On March 3, 1997, the U.S.

Nuclear Regulatory Commission

assumed regulatory jurisdiction over the

Gaseous Diffusion Plants (GDPs) from

the U.S. Department of Energy. The

GDPs are regulated under 10 CFR part

76 of the Commission’s regulations. The

NRC staff has developed Office of

Nuclear Material Safety and Safeguards

(NMSS) Policy and Procedures Letter 1–

53 to implement the ‘‘Backfitting’’

provision of 10 CFR 76.76. This

procedure is available for inspection at

the NRC Public Document Room and

Local Public Document Rooms

discussed below.

DATES: The NMSS Policy and

Procedures Letter 1–53 is effective on

March 3, 1997 as an interim procedure.

Comments on the interim procedure are

due on or before May 27, 1997.

ADDRESSES: Mail written comments to:

Secretary, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory

Commission, Washington, DC 20555–

0001. ATTN: Docketing and Service

Branch. Hand deliver comments to

11555 Rockville Pike, Rockville,

Maryland 20852, between 7:45 am and

4:15 pm during Federal Workdays.

Copies of comments received may be

examined at the NRC Public Document

Room, 2120 L Street NW. (Lower Level),

Washington, DC and at the Local Public

Documents Rooms (LPDRs), under

Docket No. 70–7001, at the Paducah

Public Library, 555 Washington Street,

Paducah, Kentucky 42003; and under

Docket No. 70–7002, at the Portsmouth

Public Library, 1220 Gallia Street,

Portsmouth, Ohio 45662.

Copies of NMSS Policy and

Procedures Letter 1–53 may be obtained

as indicated in the Discussion portion of

Supplementary Information.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT:

Tom Wenck, Office of Nuclear Material

Safety and Safeguards, U.S. Nuclear

Regulatory Commission, Washington,

DC 20555, telephone (301) 415–8088.

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:

Discussion

On November 26, 1996, the Director,

NMSS, issued the initial Certificates of

Compliance to the United States

Enrichment Corporation, authorizing

the continuing operation of its GDPs.

When the certificates became effective

on March 3, 1997, the U.S. Nuclear

Regulatory Commission (NRC) assumed

regulatory jurisdiction over the GDPs

from the Department of Energy.

Section 76.76 of part 76 to Chapter I

of Title 10 of the Code of Federal

Regulations (CFR) contains a provision

on ‘‘Backfitting.’’ ‘‘Backfitting’’ is

defined in 10 CFR 76.76 to be

‘‘* * * the modification of, or addition

to, systems, structures, or components

of a plant or to the procedures or

organization required to operate a plant;

any of which may result from a new or

amended provision in the Commission

rules or the imposition of a regulatory

staff position interpreting the

Commission rules, that is either new or

different from a previous NRC staff

position.’’ The intent of 10 CFR 76.76 is

to provide a process by which to

manage staff’s imposition of new plant-