Filed 10/16/23 In re B.B. CA2/6

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions 

not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion 

has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115. 

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION SIX

In re B.B., a Person Coming 

Under the Juvenile Court Law.

2d Juv. No. B325584

(Super. Ct. No. 20JD-00133)

(San Luis Obispo County)

SAN LUIS OBISPO COUNTY 

DEPARTMENT OF SOCIAL 

SERVICES,

 Plaintiff and Respondent,

v.

JANE B.,

 Defendant and Appellant.

Jane B. (mother) appeals from the juvenile court’s orders 

(1) refusing to return her then 14-year-old (now 15-year-old) 

daughter, B.B., to mother’s physical custody; (2) terminating 

reunification services as to B.B.; (3) placing B.B. with her 

presumed father, C.M., and (4) requiring that mother’s visitation 

with B.B. be supervised. The orders were made after a contested 
2

18-month permanency review hearing (18-month hearing) 

conducted in December 2022. 

The juvenile court did not set a Welfare and Institutions 

Code section 366.26 hearing.1 Therefore, the orders are directly 

appealable. (See § 395, subd. (a)(1); In re T.G. (2010) 188 

Cal.App.4th 687, 692 [“‘[T]he court’s dispositional and following 

orders are directly appealable, with the exception of an order 

scheduling a selection and implementation hearing under section 

366.26 . . .’”]; In re X.Z. (2013) 221 Cal.App.4th 1243, 1248-1249.)

Mother contends the orders are “unsubstantiated by the 

evidence, not in the best[] interest[] of B.B., and made in an 

abuse of the discretion of the juvenile court.” We affirm.

Factual and Procedural Background for Period up to 

April 2022 Order Removing B.B. from Mother’s Custody

In a prior unpublished opinion, In re D.H. et al. (June 20, 

2023, B320188), we affirmed the juvenile court’s April 2022 order 

removing mother’s three children, including B.B., from her 

physical custody. The juvenile court ordered that family 

reunification services be provided to mother. We take judicial 

notice of the opinion and record in the prior appeal. (Evid. Code, 

§§ 452, subd. (d), 459, subd. (a).) The following factual and 

procedural summary is taken from pages 2-8 of the opinion:

“[Mother and Jeremy H. (Jeremy)] are the parents of D.H., 

who was born in 2014. Mother is also the parent of Z.M., born in 

2004, and B.B., born in 2008. Jeremy is not the father of Z.M. or 

B.B. C.M. [is] the presumed father of Z.M. and B.B. . . . . All of 

the children are female. 

1All statutory references are to the Welfare and Institutions 

Code.
3

“In August 2020 a juvenile dependency petition was filed. 

It alleged that the children came within the jurisdiction of the 

juvenile court because their parents had failed ‘to supervise or 

protect the child[ren] adequately’ and ‘to provide the child[ren] 

with adequate food, clothing, shelter, or medical treatment.’ 

Furthermore, [mother and Jeremy] were unable ‘to provide 

regular care for the child[ren] due to [their]’ . . . mental illness . . . 

or substance abuse.’ 

“According to the petition, on August 18, 2020, a social 

worker and deputy sheriff visited the home where [mother and 

Jeremy] resided with the children. ‘The condition of the home 

posed concern for the health and safety of the children. The 

home had rat feces throughout the entire house, bugs on the 

inside of the refrigerator, counters, and on the trash. There was 

trash and chest height debris scattered throughout the entire 

home and on the property outside. There were narrow paths to 

walk throughout the home; however, the home had so much 

debris that it was nearly impossible to determine the intended 

purpose for each room. Some of the rooms were inaccessible due 

to the debris and trash. The children presented with dirty skin 

and clothing, including having an odor.’ 

“The petition continued, ‘There are . . . concerns about the 

mental health of both parents [Jeremy and mother]. During 

previous investigations, the parents have discussed being 

diagnosed with various mental health concerns. In addition, the 

parents refused to submit to a drug test during the current 

investigation, causing concerns for possible substance abuse.’ 

“In December 2020 the juvenile court found true the 

petition’s allegations. The court stated: ‘[T]here is a 

preponderance of the evidence that, in fact, . . . the children were 
4

living at [mother’s and Jeremy’s] home, that it was in pretty 

abysmal condition. There were rat feces at the time of detention. 

There was trash piled chest high. The children were in poor 

hygiene . . . and this wasn’t the first time that this issue had been 

reported. It's not something that came out of the blue. In fact, 

those concerns have been there for a long time . . . . So there’s no 

question I should take jurisdiction of the case and I will, and that 

will be of all three kids.’ 

“The children were adjudged dependent children of the 

juvenile court within the meaning of section 300, subdivision (b). 

The court placed the children ‘in family maintenance with 

[mother] and Jeremy.’ But it directed ‘that the place of [family 

maintenance] is to be at Jeremy’s mother's [i.e., D.H.’s paternal 

grandmother’s] house . . . until such time as the appropriate 

health and land use authorities approve [mother’s and Jeremy’s] 

residence to be habita[ble] and then the children can move back 

in at that residence.’ 

“In February 2021 the San Luis Obispo County 

Department of Social Services (DSS) filed a supplemental 

petition pursuant to section 387. This was the first of two section 

387 petitions. . . .

“The first section 387 petition alleged: ‘[A]t the last Court 

hearing on December 16, 2020,’ mother had stated that ‘the 

family home [mother’s and Jeremy’s residence] would be ready 

for the children to reside in within two weeks.’ ‘On January 22, 

2021, the assigned social worker responded to the parent[s]’ home 

unannounced as she had been unable to make contact with the 

parents via telephone and text message. The home was found to 

be cluttered with boxes, miscellaneous items piled high, broken 

windows, and the outside of the home continues to be cluttered 
5

and overwhelmed with items. The social worker was not allowed 

entry into the home. . . .’

“In March 2021 the juvenile court sustained the first 

section 387 petition. It found ‘that the prior disposition was 

ineffective in family maintenance and that we need a different 

plan.’ It removed the children from [mother’s and Jeremy’s] 

physical custody and ‘place[d] them . . . in the care of their 

grandmother.’ It ordered that family reunification services be 

provided to [mother, Jeremy, and C.M., the presumed father of 

B.B. and Z.M]. 

“In September 2021 the juvenile court ordered the children 

‘placed, effective immediately, in the care and custody of’ [mother 

and Jeremy]. It directed DSS to ‘provide family maintenance 

services.’ 

“On April 1, 2022, DSS filed a second section 387 

supplemental petition. The petition alleged that [mother and 

Jeremy] had failed to provide the children ‘with adequate care 

due to concerns regarding the parents’ mental health and 

possible substance abuse issues.’ [Mother and Jeremy] failed to 

participate in random drug testing. Jeremy tested positive for 

THC (tetrahydrocannabinol), ‘the psychoactive element in 

marijuana or cannabis.’ (People v. Kidane (2021) 60 Cal.App.5th 

817, 823 . . . ) In addition, [mother and Jeremy] ‘failed to ensure 

[the children’s] regular[] and consistent attendance at school.’ 

The petition was orally amended to allege that [mother and 

Jeremy] did not provide ‘adequate dental care’ for D.H.’s ‘broken 

tooth.’ 

“DSS’s section 387 report, dated April 25, 2022, was 

prepared by Valerie Amador, a social worker. . . .

“ . . .
6

“The section 387 report emphasized the children’s school 

absences and deficient academic performance . . . .

“A note from B.B.’s school said, ‘As of Wednesday, March 

30, 2022, [B.B.] has been absent from school for 57 days and 

present for 77 days. This is equivalent to [B.B.] being present 

57% of the days this school year.’ ‘Of [B.B.’s] 57 absences, [only] 

5 of them (3/22-3/28) were excused by a doctor’s note.’ ‘[B.B.] 

currently has 2 Bs, 1 C, 1 D, and 2 Fs with teachers excusing the 

majority of assignments from when she was absent.’ 

“The section 387 report continued: ‘On March 29, 2022, the 

mother became escalated when advised of the intent to file a 

petition to remove the children. . . . The mother denied that the 

children had any absences [from school]. When reminded that 

the school . . . had asked Law Enforcement to do a welfare check 

due to the number of absences the mother “exploded” and stated 

that was “bullshit” . . . . The mother continued to yell, walking 

away . . . and stating that [Amador] just wanted to take the 

children away.’

“ . . . 

“The [children’s] school informed Amador that the children 

have ‘dirty nails and unkempt hair.’ Amador personally observed 

‘[t]he same kind of thing. Just unwashed hair, unkempt 

nails. . . . Just an uncleanliness, in general.’

“ . . . 

“As to [mother’s] participation in random drug testing, 

Amador testified: ‘From April 4th [2022] to now [April 27, 2022], 

mother has tested approximately seven times. Three of those 

have been negative. Three have been positive for THC. . . .’

“ . . .
7

“ . . . Mother testified that she had received a mental health 

diagnosis of ‘[b]ipolar disorder and episodes of depression’ along 

with ‘other specified trauma.’ In addition, she ‘suffer[ed] from 

fibromyalgia, as well as endometriosis and PTSD [PostTraumatic Stress Disorder].’ According to the prior jurisdiction 

report filed on September 14, 2020, mother ‘shared that she [had 

been] diagnosed with . . . Generalized Anxiety Disorder, Social 

Anxiety, Agoraphobia, and Borderline Personality Disorder.’ ”

Factual and Procedural Background for Period after

April 2022 Order Removing B.B. from Mother’s Custody

An 18-month hearing was originally scheduled for October 

27, 2022. In a Status Review Report prepared by Amador and 

dated October 9, 2022, DSS recommended that mother’s family 

reunification services be terminated and that B.B. be reunified 

with C.M., her presumed father. Amador noted that B.B. was 

currently in a “short-term foster placement.” 

As to the condition of mother’s home, Amador observed: 

“The mother does attempt to clean the home when she knows 

[Amador] will be visiting the home but admits that she 

sometimes is not well enough to keep up with the home.” 

“During [Amador’s] last scheduled home visit, [she] noted a 

broken window at the front of the house, which [DSS] previously 

paid to repair. The home smelled strongly of sweat but the 

mother had the door open and fan on and was attempting to air 

the house out. [Z.M.], [B.B.’s] adult sibling, showed [Amador] her 

room, which she shares with [B.B.] and [D.H.]. The room was 

exceptionally cluttered and there were items stacked up on the 

beds. The bedroom had a strong smell of body odor and pets. . . . 

[T]he family does not appear to have windows that open and . . . 

it is difficult for them to air out the house.” 
8

As to mother’s physical health, Amador noted: “[M]other 

has stated she becomes bedridden when her fibromyalgia flares 

up. [She] will need to be able to articulate a plan for when she is 

too ill to provide care for the children.” 

As to substance abuse, Amador stated: “[M]other did test 

for 60-days during April and May 2022. During that time, the 

mother attended all requested drug tests. She tested 13 times 

with 7 negative tests and 6 positive tests for 

tetrahydrocannabinol (THC).” 

Amador further observed: “[B.B.] is l4 years old and wishes 

to remain in her community near her mother, siblings, and 

friends [in San Luis Obispo County]. However, the father, [C.M., 

who lives in Bakersfield,] has completed his case plan, is visiting 

consistently, and is able to provide for all of [B.B.’s] needs. [C.M.] 

supports [B.B.’s] continued contact with family members and her 

community and is willing to ensure that she is not isolated from 

her connections. [DSS] is confident that [C.M.] will make [B.B.] 

available for visitation with the mother if she is placed with him.” 

In a report dated October 24, 2022, the Court Appointed 

Special Advocate (CASA) expressed concern about placing B.B. 

with C.M.: “I worry most about the further deterioration of 

[B.B.’s] emotional and developmental state if she were to be 

permanently moved to Bakersfield, away from the family, school, 

and routines she has been around her entire life. [B.B.] has been 

very clear about not wanting permanent placement in 

Bakersfield with her father, but I am encouraged by her desire to 

want to continue bi-monthly weekend visitations with him. 

[C.M.] has demonstrated great consistency in his visitation 

schedule and ability to transport her.” The CASA recommended 

that family reunification services be terminated for mother and 
9

that “[B.B.] be placed with maternal grandmother, [D.B.], if she 

is approved for placement.” 

As to the condition of mother’s home, the CASA wrote: 

“While nearly all of the debris and trash have been removed from 

the front exterior of the mother's home, I do not know what the 

state of the home is inside. In the past, the girls have stated that 

their bedroom required repairs and that they were moved to 

sleeping in the living room.” 

In a First Addendum Report dated December 6, 2022, 

Amador stated: “[B.B.] has been placed with her maternal 

grandmother, [D.B.], since October 24, 2022. [B.B.] is content 

with being placed with her grandmother. . . . [¶] [DSS] has 

received concerns that [B.B.’s] hygiene has declined since being 

placed with [D.B.]. . . . [D.B.] resides with her boyfriend in his 

home. The boyfriend is reported to have significant health 

issues. Should anything happen to the boyfriend, [D.B.] would 

not be able to remain in this home with [B.B.].” 

Amador noted that B.B.’s eight-year-old sibling, D.H., was 

distressed because mother had been talking to her about the 

dependency case and had been pressuring her to lie. Amador 

said: “[DSS] is worried that the mother may also be coaching and 

influencing [B.B.] in a similar manner. [¶] [DSS] is requesting 

that all of the mother's visitation return to supervised 

immediately until the resolution of the contested [18-month] 

hearing.” “[DSS] continues to believe that the mother has not 

made substantial or consistent progress over the life of the case 

and is not in a position to reunify with her children or have 

reunification services extended out to the 24-month date.” 
10

The 18-Month Permanency Review Hearing

The 18-month hearing occurred on December 20, 2022. 

Eight days before the hearing began, B.B. met with the juvenile 

court judge and said she preferred to live with mother. 

Mother, C.M., and Amador testified at the hearing. 

Amador opined, “‘The mother continues to take no responsibility 

for her actions that led to the children’s three removals [from her 

custody] and continues to believe that the children were 

wrongfully removed.’” 

After listening to the testimony, the trial court said: 

“[S]ometimes mature 14-year-olds can write their own ticket and 

the Court will follow what they want. And I know . . . what [B.B.] 

wants. [She] has expressed . . . that her first preference would be 

to be placed with mom. But . . . it’s just not an option” because of 

(1) concerns about mother’s mental and physical health; (2) 

mental health counseling for mother is “still in its infancy”; (3) 

B.B. has “been removed from [mother’s] home several times . . . 

[a]nd [she is] entitled to some level of permanency”; (4) “this . . . 

case is almost two and a half years old,” and “we should have had 

some resolution of this a year ago at least”; and (5) mother put 

pressure on D.H. “to lie.” Mother showed “poor judgment in 

involving [D.H.] in this conversation [about lying] that no eightyear-old should have to have.” 

The juvenile court concluded: “I just can’t see my way clear 

to give [mother] another chance. There’s just too much of a risk 

to these children. And it’s based on . . . [mother’s] conduct or . . . 

lack of progress over the last two years. [¶] So the Court is going 

to terminate reunification services to [her].” 

As to C.M., the court said: “He has completed his case plan 

successfully. . . . He is [B.B.’s] father. He is entitled to be 
11

reunified with [her]. [¶] So I am going to order that [B.B.] be 

placed with her father . . . . [It’s] in the best interest of the child.” 

“[W]hat’s good about [C.M.] is that he has vowed to make sure 

that [B.B.] maintain relationships with . . . the other people in 

[her] life.” 

The juvenile court’s written findings stated, “By a 

preponderance of the evidence, the return of the child to . . . her 

parent . . . would create substantial risk of detriment to the 

safety, protection, or physical or emotional well-being of the 

child.” 

Substantial Evidence Supports the Juvenile Court’s 

Order Refusing to Return B.B. to Mother’s Home 

At the 18-month permanency review hearing, “the court 

shall order the return of the child to the physical custody of their 

parent . . . unless the court finds, by a preponderance of the 

evidence, that the return of the child to their parent . . . would 

create a substantial risk of detriment to the safety, protection, or 

physical or emotional well-being of the child.” (§ 366.22, subd. 

(a)(1). 

“We review the juvenile court’s finding of detriment for 

substantial evidence. [Citations.] Under that standard we 

inquire whether the evidence, contradicted or uncontradicted, 

supports the court's determination. We resolve all conflicts in 

support of the determination, indulge in all legitimate inferences 

to uphold the findings and may not substitute our deductions for 

those of the juvenile court. [Citations.] However, ‘[s]ubstantial 

evidence is not synonymous with any evidence. [Citation.] To be 

substantial, the evidence must be of ponderable legal significance 

and must be reasonable in nature, credible, and of solid value.’” 

(Georgeanne G. v. Superior Court of Los Angeles County (2020) 53 
12

Cal.App.5th 856, 864-865.) “An appellate court does not reweigh 

the evidence.” (In re Marina S. (2005) 132 Cal.App.4th 158, 165.)

Mother “has the burden of showing the . . . finding [of 

detriment] is unsupported by substantial evidence.” (In re

Giovanni F. (2010) 184 Cal.App.4th 594, 598.) She has not 

carried her burden. The evidence shows mother failed to make 

meaningful, significant progress toward alleviating the problems 

that had led to the removal of B.B. from her custody. Although 

the condition of mother’s home has improved, it remains 

unsatisfactory. Her substance abuse continues. At the 18-month 

hearing, mother testified that she currently uses marijuana a 

“[c]ouple times a week.” 

Mother suffers from various mental health problems. Her 

2020 “original case plan . . . said that she would be expected to 

participate in a mental health assessment with county mental 

health.” Amador testified, “The [purpose of the] assessment is to 

determine what therapeutic services are needed, whether that's a 

referral for a weekly therapy, whether it’s a referral for a 

psychiatrist’s med evaluation, et cetera . . . .” Mother delayed 

participating in such an assessment until October 2022. The 

court asked Amador, “Do you know why there was not a 

behavioral health assessment that took place between 2020 and 

September or October 2022?” Amador replied, “I have been the 

[social] worker for the past two years, and . . . [mother] did not 

wish to engage in [her] case plan, so it took [her] quite a while to 

start engaging.” 

Furthermore, mother showed extremely poor judgment 

when she discussed the dependency case with eight-year-old D.H. 

and pressured her to lie. These incidents led Amador to “have 

concerns” about mother’s “mental health.” 
13

Amador also had concerns about B.B.’s education if she 

were returned to mother’s home: “[A]ll throughout the life of the 

case, education has been an ongoing concern, so I would [have 

such concerns], yes. I have not observed anything . . . that would 

change my mind about whether or not education would be 

addressed if [B.B.] was returned home [to mother].” 

We recognize that B.B. wanted to be placed with mother. 

But B.B.’s placement preference is not controlling. (See In re

John M. (2006) 141 Cal.App.4th 1564, 1570 [“By the time of the 

dispositional hearing, John was nearly 14 years old. While, at 

that age, he was entitled to have his wishes considered, he was 

not entitled to decide where he would be placed”].) 

Mother Failed to Show that the Juvenile Court

Erroneously Terminated Reunification Services

Mother claims the juvenile court erroneously terminated 

reunification services at the 18-month hearing. “[T]he 

dependency law establishes a detailed timeline for 

reunification. . . . Parents of children three or older are 

presumptively eligible for at least 12 months of services. 

[Citation.] Reunification services are ordinarily provided for a 

maximum of 18 months after a child has been removed from 

parental custody.” (Michael G. v. Superior Court (2023) 14 

Cal.5th 609, 625 (Michael G.); see id. at p. 627 [“the law sets a 

presumptive 18-month limit on reunification services”].)

“[S]ection 366.22, subdivision (b) authorizes a further

extension after 18 months for three narrowly defined categories 

of parents who have faced specified obstacles to reunification: (1) 

a parent making progress ‘in a court-ordered residential 

substance abuse treatment program’; (2) ‘a parent who was either 

a minor parent or a nonminor dependent parent at the time of 
14

the initial hearing’; and (3) ‘a parent recently discharged from 

incarceration, institutionalization, or the custody of the United 

States Department of Homeland Security.’ [Citations.] But even 

for parents falling within this narrow exception, an extension is 

not automatic. The parent must be making ‘significant and 

consistent progress’ either in the substance abuse treatment 

program, if applicable, or in establishing a safe home for the 

child. [Citation.] Further, the court must decide (1) that 

extending services would be in the ‘best interests of the child,’ 

and (2) either that there is a ‘substantial probability’ that the 

child will be returned to the parent's custody and safely 

maintained in the home during the extension period, or that 

‘reasonable services have not been provided to the parent.’ 

[Citation.] If these conditions are not met, then the usual 

timeline set forth in section 366.22, subdivision (a)(3) governs.” 

(Michael G., supra, 14 Cal.5th at p. 628.)

Despite the above statutory restriction on extending 

reunification services beyond the 18-month time limit, “the 

juvenile court does have the discretion under section 352 to 

continue a section 366.26 permanency planning hearing — and in 

the meantime, to extend reunification services past the 18-month 

mark — in extraordinary cases. Before granting the extension, 

however, the court must determine that the extension, and the 

resulting delay to the child’s permanent placement, is not 

contrary to the child’s interests.” (Michael G., supra, 14 Cal.5th 

at p. 634.)

Mother does not contend she fell within the section 366.22, 

subdivision (b) exception to the 18-month time limit for 

reunification services. Nor does she contend that the juvenile 

court abused its discretion under section 352 in not extending the 
15

time limit. Mother does not say she asked the court to exercise 

its discretion under this section. Accordingly, she has not carried 

her burden of demonstrating that the juvenile court erroneously 

terminated reunification services at the 18-month hearing. 

“‘“[A]n appealed judgment is presumed correct, and appellant

bears the burden of overcoming the presumption of 

correctness.”. . . ’” (Hernandez v. First Student, Inc. (2019) 37 

Cal.App.5th 270, 277.)

Mother Failed to Show that the Juvenile

Court Erred in Placing B.B. with C.M. 

Mother argues that the trial court’s order “forcing . . . B.B. 

to reunify with C.M. . . . [was] unsubstantiated by the evidence, 

and not in the best[] interests of B.B.” “[O]nce the noncustodial 

parent has requested custody, . . . the party opposing placement 

must show that placement with that parent would be detrimental 

to the safety, protection, or physical or emotional well-being of 

the child. [¶] We review the juvenile court's finding that the 

[child] would not suffer detriment for substantial evidence.” (In

re Liam L. (2015) 240 Cal.App.4th 1068, 1087.) 

Substantial evidence supports the juvenile court’s finding 

that B.B.’s placement with C.M. would not be detrimental to her 

safety, protection, or physical or emotional well-being, but 

instead would be in her best interest. DSS’s Status Review 

Report dated October 9, 2022, stated: “[C.M.] has complied with 

and completed his case plan requirements. [He] has 

demonstrated the ability to meet [B.B.’s] needs as evidenced by 

his successful trial visit [with her at his home in Bakersfield] 

from June 10, 2022, through July 29, 2022. During the trial visit, 

[C.M.] was able to enroll [B.B.] in school, ensure her attendance 

and follow up with school officials. He was able to stay on top of 
16

[B.B.’s] appointments and was willing to transport her back to 

San Luis Obispo County for her medical appointments. [C.M.] 

was able to meet her basic needs and provide her with a safe and 

stable living arrangement. [He] was able to ensure that [B.B.] 

had access to her friends and family members. [¶] . . . [¶] [DSS] 

did not refer [C.M.] to parent education program during this 

review period as he has demonstrated exceptional parenting 

skills.” 

Mother Forfeited Her Claim that the Juvenile Court

Erroneously Required Supervised Visitation with B.B.

Because mother had spoken to D.H. about the dependency 

case and had pressured her to lie, DSS requested “that all of the 

mother’s visitation [with D.H. and B.B.] return to supervised 

immediately until the resolution of the contested [18-month] 

hearing.” Mother claims that at the 18-month hearing the 

juvenile court erroneously required “that visitation [of B.B.] with 

the mother be supervised.” She requests that we “vacate [this] 

unsubstantiated requirement.” 

The claim is forfeited because mother does not cite any 

portion of the record in support of the allegedly “supervised” 

visitation order. “When an appellant’s brief makes no reference 

to the pages of the record where a point can be found, an 

appellate court need not search through the record in an effort to 

discover the point purportedly made. [Citations.] We can simply 

deem the contention to lack foundation and, thus, to be forfeited.” 

(In re S.C. (2006) 138 Cal.App.4th 396, 406-407.) The reporter’s 

transcript of the 18-month hearing shows that DSS recommended 

that mother’s visitation with B.B. “not be supervised.” 

Disposition

The orders appealed from are affirmed.
17

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED.

YEGAN, J.

We concur:

GILBERT, P. J.

BALTODANO, J.
Brian R. Aronson, Judge

Superior Court County of San Luis Obispo

______________________________

Roni Keller, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for 

Defendant and Appellant.

Rita L. Neal, County Counsel, Ann Duggan, Deputy County 

Counsel, for Plaintiff and Respondent.