NOTICE: This order was filed under Supreme Court Rule 23 and may not be cited as 

precedent by any party except in the limited circumstances allowed under Rule 23(e)(1). 

2020 IL App (3d) 180754-U

Order filed February 13, 2020 

____________________________________________________________________________ 

IN THE

APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS

THIRD DISTRICT

2020 

In re MARRIAGE OF )

 ) 

JOAN SERDAR, ) 

 ) 

 Petitioner-Appellee, ) 

 ) 

and ) 

 ) 

RICHARD SERDAR, ) 

 ) 

Respondent-Appellant. )

Appeal from the Circuit Court

of the 12th Judicial Circuit, 

Will County, Illinois

Appeal No. 3-18-0754 

Circuit No. 14-D-881 

Honorable 

Kenneth L. Zelazo

Judge, Presiding

____________________________________________________________________________

JUSTICE O’BRIEN delivered the judgment of the court. 

Justices McDade and Schmidt concurred in the judgment. 

____________________________________________________________________________

 ORDER

¶ 1 Held: Trial court did not err when it ordered husband to pay wife’s attorney fees and 

costs as sanctions for his misconduct during their dissolution of marriage trial. 

¶ 2 The trial court ordered respondent Richard Serdar to pay $91,110 for petitioner Joan 

Serdar’s attorney fees and costs due to his improper behavior during the parties’ dissolution of 

marriage proceedings. He appealed. We affirm.

¶ 3 FACTS
2 

¶ 4 Petitioner Joan Serdar and respondent Richard Serdar were married in 1992 and two 

children were born during the marriage. Joan filed a petition for dissolution of marriage in May 

2014. Following the close of evidence, Joan filed a motion to reopen the proofs, alleging that 

Richard committed perjury regarding his earnings and assets. The trial court granted Joan’s motion 

and a second trial took place. 

¶ 5 At the second trial, Joan filed a motion to strike Richard’s pleadings and for sanctions under 

Illinois Supreme Court Rule 219(c) (eff. July 1, 2002). The court entered a parenting allocation 

judgment in February 2017 and the judgment for dissolution of marriage in November 2017. In 

the dissolution judgment, the trial court made the following findings: Richard consistently violated 

discovery rules; failed to accurately complete his financial affidavit; failed to disclose bank 

accounts, various work he performed and money owed him as a result of the work; and did not 

maintain and produce various documents regarding work performed as required for his courtordered job log. The court further found Richard acted in bad faith when he failed to disclose work 

he performed as a subcontractor or various impediments, such as fines and liens, that prevented 

him from obtaining certain work, and did not pay off the financial impediments to his obtaining 

work contracts; and when he failed to maintain his job skills and certification, and to maximize his 

income. In addition, the court found Richard consistently was paid cash for work and failed to 

disclose it for tax purposes. The court further found Richard evaded his child support obligations. 

The trial court divided the marital estate, granted Joan custody of the parties’ children and ordered 

Richard to pay child support and child support arrearages. 

¶ 6 The judgment of dissolution further provided that the court denied Joan’s petition to strike 

Richard’s pleading but granted the petition regarding her request for attorney fees and costs. The 

court granted Joan 28 days to file a fee petition pursuant to Rule 219 and section 508(b) of the 
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Illinois Marriage and Dissolution of Marriage Act (750 ILCS 5/508(b) (West 2016)). The 

proceedings continued for resolution of the petitions for attorney fees filed by Joan and Richard 

against each other and a petition for payment of attorney fees and for contribution filed by 

Richard’s trial attorney. Hearings took place on the petitions and the trial court denied Richard’s 

request for interim and prospective attorney fees. The court ordered Richard to pay Joan $91,110 

in attorney fees and for sanctions. It also ordered him to pay his attorney fees of $113,478.30. 

Richard appealed the judgment of dissolution and this court affirmed the trial court in an 

unpublished order entered in August 2019. See In re Marriage of Serdar, 2019 IL App (3d) 

170821-U. Richard moved for reconsideration and his motion remains pending. He appealed the 

court’s decision regarding Joan’s petition for attorney fees and sanctions. We affirm.

¶ 7 ANALYSIS

¶ 8 On appeal, Richard argues that the trial court erred in granting Joan’s petition for attorney 

fees and sanctions. He maintains that the trial court went beyond the scope of the judgment of 

dissolution in awarding the fees and awarded fees that were speculative and not reasonable or 

necessary.

¶ 9 A court may impose significant penalties and sanctions where a party intentionally or 

recklessly files an inaccurate or misleading financial affidavit. 750 ILCS 5/501(a)(1) (West 2016). 

The sanctions may include costs and attorney fees. Id. The trial court shall order the payment of 

reasonable attorney fees and costs to the prevailing party where the court finds the other party 

failed to comply with a discovery order or judgment without compelling cause or justification. 750 

ILCS 5/508(b) (West 2016). Where noncompliance concerns a discovery order, noncompliance is 

presumed to be without compelling cause or justification but may be rebutted by clear and 
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convincing evidence. Id. Improper purposes include, without limitation, harassment, unnecessary 

delay or other acts that needlessly increase the cost of litigation.

¶ 10 The court may sanction a party for failing to comply with its orders or the supreme court 

rules, including ordering the payment of the other party’s reasonable attorney fees. Ill. S. Ct. R. 

219(c) (eff. July 1, 2002). A Rule 219(c) sanction requires the trial court to specify the reasons and 

basis for the sanction imposed. Id. Rule 219(c) sanctions should only be imposed when the party’s 

noncompliance is unreasonable and the entered order is just. In re Marriage of Glusek, 168 Ill. 

App. 3d 987, 992 (1988). The party that is sanctioned for Rule 219(c) noncompliance bears the 

burden of establishing by affidavit or other means that extenuating circumstances justified the 

failure to comply with the court’s discovery order. Harris v. Harris, 196 Ill. App. 3d 815, 823 

(1990). 

¶ 11 To determine whether a trial court erred in imposing sanctions for a discovery violation, 

this court considers the following factors: “(1) the surprise to the adverse party; (2) the prejudicial 

effect of the proffered testimony or evidence; (3) the nature of the testimony or evidence; (4) the 

diligence of the adverse party in seeking discovery; (5) the timeliness of the adverse party’s 

objection to the testimony or evidence; and (6) the good faith of the party offering the testimony 

or evidence.” Peal v. Lee, 403 Ill. App. 3d 197, 203 (2010). This court reviews a trial court’s 

determination regarding sanctions and the award of attorney fees for an abuse of discretion. 

Locasto v. City of Chicago, 2014 IL App (1st) 113576, ¶ 26. 

¶ 12 In ruling on Joan’s motion, the trial court found that Richard failed to follow the supreme 

court rules and multiple court orders; filed inaccurate and misleading discovery documents; did 

not comply with discovery; unreasonably and without cause challenged Joan’s requests to admit; 
5 

and engaged in actions and conduct constituting noncompliance without compelling cause or 

justification. The record supports its findings. 

¶ 13 The examples of Richard’s misconduct are many. The trial court did not set forth specific 

examples in support of its finding, but the record contains evidence of the numerous violations that 

together establish Richard’s sanctionable conduct. For example, Richard’s discovery violations 

are documented by at least 10 Illinois Supreme Court Rule 201(k) letters from Joan’s counsel 

seeking compliance with Joan’s discovery requests. Ill. S. Ct. R. 201(k) (eff. July 30, 2014). 

Richard provided inaccurate financial affidavits, which ultimately resulted in the trial court 

reopening proofs and conducting a second trial on the newly discovered evidence. He did not 

maintain an accurate job log as mandated by the trial court and destroyed evidence documenting 

his employment. He failed to disclose his actual income. He, without cause, objected to Joan’s 

request to admit the genuineness of documents. 

¶ 14 At the hearing on Joan’s sanction petition, the trial court stated that it had considered Joan’s 

pleadings, including the substantial documentation in support of her petition for attorney fees, and 

Richard’s response and affirmative defenses, including his claim that he acted on his attorney’s 

advice and relied on counsel’s representations regarding discovery. Although Richard denied the 

majority of Joan’s allegations, he failed to present evidence supporting that his conduct was not in 

violation of the rules and court orders. The submissions by Joan in support of her fee petition 

documented the time her attorney spent in response to Richard’s misconduct and counsel testified 

extensively regarding how she separated her work in furtherance of Joan’s case and that which 

was required to counter Richard’s improper actions. The trial court disallowed nearly half of the 

requested fees, indicating that it considered what fees were reasonable and necessary. The trial 

court further found the hourly rate charged by Joan’s counsel was reasonable. We find the trial 
6 

court did not err in awarding Joan $91,110 in attorney fees, including $28,440 for legal services 

and costs related to reopening proofs, $41,790 for additional trial proceedings once proofs were 

reopened and $20,880 for enforcement of court orders. 

¶ 15 CONCLUSION

¶ 16 For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the circuit court of Will County is affirmed. 

¶ 17 Affirmed.