J-S62035-15 

_____________________________ 

*Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court. 

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37 

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

PENNSYLVANIA 

 Appellee 

v. 

CHRISTOPHER WALTON BLAKE 

 Appellant No. 657 WDA 2015 

Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence January 22, 2015 

In the Court of Common Pleas of Mercer County 

Criminal Division at No(s): CP-43-CR-0001506-2013 

BEFORE: GANTMAN, P.J., JENKINS, J., and PLATT, J.* 

MEMORANDUM BY GANTMAN, P.J.: FILED NOVEMBER 4, 2015 

 Appellant, Christopher Walton Blake, appeals from the judgment of 

sentence entered in the Mercer County Court of Common Pleas, following his 

jury trial convictions for two counts each of rape of a child, involuntary 

deviate sexual intercourse (“IDSI”) with a child, aggravated indecent assault 

of a child, unlawful contact with a minor (sexual offenses), unlawful contact 

with a minor (obscene and other sexual materials), corruption of minors, 

and indecent assault (victim less than 13 years of age).1 We affirm. 

 The trial court opinion set forth the relevant facts of this case as 

follows: 

____________________________________________ 

1

 18 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 3121(c); 3123(b); 6318(a)(1); 6318(a)(4); 6301(a)(1); 

3126(a)(7), respectively. 
J-S62035-15 

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On September 17, 2014, a jury found [Appellant] guilty of 

two (2) counts of each of the following: Rape of a Child, 

[IDSI] with a child, Aggravated Indecent Assault of a child, 

Unlawful Contract with a Minor—Sexual offenses, Unlawful 

Contact with a Minor—Obscene and other explicit sexual 

materials, Corruption of a Minor, and Indecent Assault. 

The basis of these charges is that from approximately June 

2008 to October 2009, [Appellant] performed numerous 

sexual acts on two minor children who were under his care 

at the time. These acts included [Appellant] penetrating 

the child victims’ genitals and anuses (both with his penis 

and digitally), [Appellant] performing oral sex on the 

children, [Appellant] forcing the children to perform oral 

sex on [Appellant], and [Appellant] showing the children 

sexually explicit materials. The two children were

approximately 5 and 6 years old during this period.

Prior to sentencing, this [c]ourt ordered the Sexual 

Offender’s Assessment Board (“SOAB”) to conduct an 

assessment to determine if [Appellant] could be sentenced 

as a Sexually Violent Predator (“SVP”). At the SVP

hearing, this [c]ourt found that the Commonwealth met its 

burden of proving [Appellant] a SVP by clear and 

convincing evidence. The [c]ourt sentenced [Appellant] to 

a total of 67 to 134 years of incarceration the same day.[2] 

The [c]ourt sentenced [Appellant] within the standard 

range for each offense and ran consecutively the two 

sentences each of Rape of a Child, [IDSI], and Aggravated 

Indecent Assault of a child.1

1 The sentences for the remaining offenses were also 

within the standard guidelines and ran concurrently

to the other sentences imposed. 

Before and during trial, this [c]ourt denied several of 

[Appellant’s] motions that formed the basis of his PostSentence Motion. ... 

* * * 

____________________________________________ 

2

 The record makes clear the court did not impose any mandatory minimum 

sentences for any of Appellant’s convictions. 
J-S62035-15 

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[A]t the initiation of trial, the [c]ourt overruled

[Appellant’s] objection to permitting the Commonwealth to 

provide evidence of [Appellant’s] 2011 Theft by Unlawful 

Taking conviction should [Appellant] testify at trial. The 

[c]ourt overruled the objection because it found that the 

conviction was per se admissible under Pa.R.E. 609(a) 

because it was crimen falsi and was less than 10 years old. 

Further, the [c]ourt took care to instruct the jury in this 

case to consider the conviction solely for impeachment 

purposes. 

Finally, during the trial, this [c]ourt permitted the 

Commonwealth to introduce expert testimony from 

Kimberly Duffy, a Program Development Specialist within 

the Department of Social Work at the University of 

Pittsburgh.3 After a brief hearing regarding Ms. Duffy’s 

qualifications, training, education, and experience, the 

[c]ourt found that she was an expert with respect to 

behavioral response patterns of child victims in sexual 

assault cases. In so finding, the [c]ourt ruled that this 

testimony involved an area that would be beyond the

normal understanding of the general public, especially 

because the General Assembly has specifically permitted 

this type of expert testimony. The [c]ourt also found that 

a Frye[3] hearing was not necessary in this case because 

the General Assembly has said that this type of testimony 

is proper and because the testimony given is not “novel” 

science. Finally, in an abundance of caution, the [c]ourt 

did hold a brief Frye hearing and determined that the 

methodology used by Ms. Duffy is generally accepted by 

practitioners in the relevant field. 

3

 Ms. Duffy also testified that she has over 17 years 

of experience in the Child Welfare System, including 

working with the Adams County and York County 

Children’s Advocacy Centers. 

Ms. Duffy was not provided any background information on 

the case, and she was instructed to testify only as to her 

____________________________________________ 

3 Frye v. United States, 293 F. 1013 (D.C.Cir. 1923). 
J-S62035-15 

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general experience with child responses (including reasons 

why children may delay in reporting) in sexual assault 

cases. Counsel for [Appellant] took part in the questioning 

of Ms. Duffy’s credentials. 

(Trial Court Opinion, filed June 10, 2015, at 2-5). 

 Procedurally, on January 22, 2015, the court deemed Appellant a SVP 

and sentenced him to an aggregate term of sixty-seven (67) to one hundred 

and thirty-four (134) years’ imprisonment. Appellant timely filed a postsentence motion on January 30, 2015.4

 On March 31, 2015, the court 

denied relief. Appellant timely filed a notice of appeal on April 23, 2015. On 

April 27, 2015, the court ordered Appellant to file a concise statement of 

errors complained of on appeal pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b), which 

Appellant timely filed on May 8, 2015. 

 Appellant raises three issues for our review: 

SHOULD...THE COURT HAVE ADMITTED A 2011 THEFT 

CONVICTION AS CRIMEN FALSI IMPEACHMENT EVIDENCE 

AGAINST [APPELLANT?] 

DID THE TRIAL COURT ERR IN PERMITTING THE 

COMMONWEALTH TO USE KIMBERLY DUFFY AS AN EXPERT 

WITNESS? 

WAS THE SENTENCE OF 67-134 YEARS IMPOSED UPON 

[APPELLANT] MANIFESTLY UNFAIR AND EXCESSIVE? 

(Appellant’s Brief at 10). 

After a thorough review of the record, the briefs of the parties, the 

____________________________________________ 

4

 Appellant filed a supplemental post-sentence motion on March 10, 2015, 

without leave of court. 
J-S62035-15 

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applicable law, and the well-reasoned opinion of the Honorable Robert G. 

Yeatts, we conclude Appellant’s first issue merits no relief. The trial court’s 

opinion comprehensively discusses and properly disposes of this question. 

(See Trial Court Opinion at 11-13) (finding: Appellant’s prior theft conviction 

is less than ten years old;5crimen falsi convictions which are less than 10 

years old are per se admissible; court was not required to perform balancing 

test in considering admission of conviction; cases on which Appellant relies 

are not dispositive, as neither case represents current law regarding 

introduction of crimen falsi convictions which are less than ten years old; 

additionally, court instructed jury to consider 2011 conviction for 

impeachment purposes only; Appellant did not object to court’s instructions 

and does not argue instructions were improper; no relief is due). Therefore, 

with respect to Appellant’s first issue on appeal, we affirm on the basis of 

the trial court’s opinion. 

Regarding Appellant’s second issue on appeal, we initially observe: 

“[W]here an appellate brief fails to provide any discussion of a claim with 

citation to relevant authority or fails to develop the issue in any other 

____________________________________________ 

5

 Appellant’s 2011 theft conviction constitutes a crimen falsi crime. See 

Commonwealth v. Cascardo, 981 A.2d 245 (Pa.Super. 2009), appeal 

denied, 608 Pa. 652, 12 A.3d 750 (2010) (stating term crimen falsi involves 

element of falsehood and includes everything which has tendency to injure 

administration of justice by introduction of falsehood and fraud; discussing 

theft by unlawful taking as crime of dishonesty, constituting crimen falsi

offense). 
J-S62035-15 

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meaningful fashion capable of review, that claim is waived.” 

Commonwealth v. Johnson, 604 Pa. 176, 191, 985 A.2d 915, 924 (2009), 

cert. denied, 562 U.S. 906, 131 S.Ct. 250, 178 L.Ed.2d 165 (2010). See 

also Pa.R.A.P. 2119(a) (stating argument shall be divided into as many 

parts as there are questions to be argued, followed by such discussion and 

citation of authorities as are deemed pertinent). 

Instantly, Appellant’s entire argument as to his second issue on appeal 

is as follows: “The [c]ourt permitted Ms. Duffy to testify as an expert witness 

over defense counsel’s objection, reasoning that her qualifications were 

piggybacked by 42 Pa.C.S. § 5920. Appellant wishes to preserve this issue 

pending the Supreme Court’s decision in Commonwealth v. Olivo, 106 

[Berks] 429 (August 27, 2013).” (Appellant’s Brief at 15). Appellant’s 

severely undeveloped claim purporting merely to preserve his issue for later 

review constitutes waiver of his claim (or abandonment of it) for purposes of 

this appeal. See Johnson, supra. 

Moreover, the court permitted Ms. Duffy’s testimony pursuant to 42 

Pa.C.S.A. § 5920, which provides: 

§ 5920. Expert testimony in certain criminal 

proceedings 

(a) Scope.—This section applies to all of the 

following: 

 (1) A criminal proceeding for an offense for which

registration is required under Subchapter H of Chapter 97 

(relating to registration of sexual offenders). 
J-S62035-15 

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 (2) A criminal proceeding for an offense under 18 

Pa.C.S. Ch. 31 (relating to sexual offenses). 

(b) Qualifications and use of experts.— 

 (1) In a criminal proceeding subject to this section, a 

witness may be qualified by the court as an expert if the 

witness has specialized knowledge beyond that possessed 

by the average layperson based on the witness’s 

experience with, or specialized training or education in, 

criminal justice, behavioral sciences or victim services 

issues, related to sexual violence, that will assist the trier 

of fact in understanding the dynamic of sexual violence, 

victim responses to sexual violence and the impact of 

sexual violence on victims during and after being 

assaulted. 

 (2) If qualified as an expert, the witness may testify 

to facts and opinions regarding specific types of victim 

responses and victim behaviors. 

 (3) The witness’s opinion regarding the credibility of 

any other witness, including the victim shall not be 

admissible. 

 (4) A witness qualified by the court as an expert 

under this section may be called by the attorney for the 

Commonwealth or the defendant to provide the expert

testimony. 

42 Pa.C.S.A. § 5920 (internal footnote omitted). See also Commonwealth 

v. Carter, 111 A.3d 1221 (Pa.Super. 2015) (holding expert’s testimony was 

“clearly admissible” under Section 5920, where expert testified it is common 

for child sexual abuse victims to delay reporting and explained some reasons 

why child sexual abuse victims might delay in reporting; expert did not 

testify regarding specific victim in case, render opinion on whether alleged 

sexual incidents actually occurred, or offer opinion regarding specific victim’s 
J-S62035-15 

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credibility). Additionally, “Section 5920 is really a rule regarding the 

admissibility of evidence, not a procedural rule. Furthermore, it is not in 

direct conflict with any existing rule of the Pennsylvania Supreme Court.” 

Id. at 1224. Thus, Section 5920 does not violate the separation of powers 

doctrine. Id. 

 Instantly, after a thorough review of the record, the briefs of the 

parties, the applicable law, and the well-reasoned trial court opinion, we 

conclude that even if Appellant had developed his second issue on appeal, it 

would still be waived for failure to preserve it before the trial court, and in 

any event, would merit no relief. The trial court’s opinion comprehensively 

discusses and properly disposes of this question. (See Trial Court Opinion at 

13-17) (finding: Section 5920 specifically governs scope of expert testimony 

permitted in sex abuse cases; Ms. Duffy testified only generally about her 

experience with children’s responses in sexual assault cases; Ms. Duffy was 

not privy to facts of this particular case, and she did not testify regarding 

either specific victim in this case; Ms. Duffy’s testimony regarding general 

child victim responses and behavior following sexual assault was admissible 

under Section 5920; Appellant’s claim implicating Olivo (Berks County Court 

of Common Pleas case holding Section 5920 is unconstitutional because it 

violates separation of powers doctrine and rulemaking authority of 

Pennsylvania Supreme Court) is waived because Appellant raised this claim 

for first time in post-sentence motion and failed to cite to Olivo during or 
J-S62035-15 

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before trial; moreover, Olivo relied on pre-Section 5920 case law; Olivo is 

currently pending before Pennsylvania Supreme Court; in Carter, this Court 

expressly held expert testimony is permissible under Section 5920, and 

Section 5920 does not violate separation of powers doctrine). Therefore, 

Appellant’s second issue is waived (or abandoned) as undeveloped on 

appeal; moreover, even if Appellant had developed this claim, we would 

affirm based on the trial court’s opinion. 

In his third issue, Appellant argues the court ignored his rehabilitative 

needs in fashioning its sentence. Appellant asserts the court also failed to 

consider that Appellant was twenty-six years old at the time of sentencing, 

suffers from mental illness, was sexually and physically abused as a child, 

and sought mental health treatment as a juvenile. Appellant claims there 

was no evidence at trial of physical damage or injury to either child victim. 

Appellant contends the child victims are leading normal lives in school, riding 

the bus, and performing adequately in school. Appellant insists the court’s 

sentence of sixty-seven (67) to one hundred and thirty-four (134) years’ 

imprisonment amounts to a virtual life sentence. Appellant acknowledges 

that the court imposed standard range sentences, but he claims the 

cumulative effect of the sentences renders application of the guidelines 

clearly unreasonable. Appellant emphasizes the court imposed a sentence 

even harsher than the Commonwealth’s recommendation. Appellant 

submits his aggregate sentence is essentially equivalent to a sentence for 
J-S62035-15 

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first-degree murder. Appellant suggests courts should reserve imposing life 

sentences for only the most heinous and brutal crimes for depraved 

offenders who have repeatedly committed crimes. Appellant posits the 

registration requirements he faces as a SVP are essentially meaningless 

given his virtual life sentence. Appellant concludes the trial court imposed a 

manifestly excessive and clearly unreasonable sentence, and this Court must 

vacate and remand for resentencing. As presented, Appellant’s claims 

challenge the discretionary aspects of sentencing. Commonwealth v. 

Lutes, 793 A.2d 949 (Pa.Super. 2002) (stating claim that sentence is 

manifestly excessive challenges discretionary aspects of sentencing); 

Commonwealth v. Berry, 785 A.2d 994 (Pa.Super. 2001) (explaining 

complaint that court ignored defendant’s rehabilitative needs upon 

sentencing implicates court’s sentencing discretion). 

A challenge to the discretionary aspects of sentencing is not 

automatically reviewable as a matter of right. Commonwealth v. Hunter, 

768 A.2d 1136 (Pa.Super. 2001), appeal denied, 568 Pa. 695, 796 A.2d 979 

(2001). Prior to reaching the merits of a discretionary sentencing issue: 

[W]e conduct a four-part analysis to determine: (1)

whether appellant has filed a timely notice of appeal, see

Pa.R.A.P. 902 and 903; (2) whether the issue was properly 

preserved at sentencing or in a motion to reconsider and 

modify sentence, see Pa.R.Crim.P. 720; (3) whether 

appellant’s brief has a fatal defect, Pa.R.A.P. 2119(f); and 

(4) whether there is a substantial question that the 

sentence appealed from is not appropriate under the

Sentencing Code, 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9781(b). 
J-S62035-15 

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Commonwealth v. Evans, 901 A.2d 528, 533 (Pa.Super. 2006), appeal 

denied, 589 Pa. 727, 909 A.2d 303 (2006) (internal citations omitted). 

 What constitutes a substantial question must be evaluated on a caseby-case basis. Commonwealth v. Paul, 925 A.2d 825, 828 (Pa.Super. 

2007). A substantial question exists “only when the appellant advances a 

colorable argument that the sentencing judge’s actions were either: (1) 

inconsistent with a specific provision of the Sentencing Code; or (2) contrary 

to the fundamental norms which underlie the sentencing process.” 

Commonwealth v. Sierra, 752 A.2d 910, 913 (Pa.Super. 2000) (internal 

citation omitted). 

 Generally, “[a]n allegation that a sentencing court failed to consider or 

did not adequately consider certain factors does not raise a substantial 

question that the sentence was inappropriate.” Commonwealth v. CruzCenteno, 668 A.2d 536, 545 (Pa.Super. 1995), appeal denied, 544 Pa. 653, 

676 A.2d 1195 (1996) (internal citation and quotation marks omitted). See 

also Berry, supra (explaining allegation that sentencing court failed to 

consider specific mitigating factor generally does not raise substantial 

question; claim that sentencing court ignored appellant’s rehabilitative needs 

failed to raise substantial question). 

A claim of excessiveness can raise a substantial question as to the 

appropriateness of a sentence under the Sentencing Code, even if the 

sentence is within the statutory limits. Commonwealth v. Mouzon, 571 
J-S62035-15 

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Pa. 419, 430, 812 A.2d 617, 624 (2002). Bald allegations of excessiveness, 

however, do not raise a substantial question to warrant appellate review. 

Id. at 435, 812 A.2d at 627. Rather, a substantial question will be found 

“only where the appellant’s Rule 2119(f) statement sufficiently articulates 

the manner in which the sentence violates either a specific provision of the 

sentencing scheme set forth in the Sentencing Code or a particular 

fundamental norm underlying the sentencing process....” Id. 

“Generally, Pennsylvania law affords the sentencing court 

discretion to impose its sentence concurrently or 

consecutively to other sentences being imposed at the 

same time or to sentences already imposed. Any 

challenge to the exercise of this discretion ordinarily does 

not raise a substantial question.” Commonwealth v. 

Prisk, 13 A.3d 526, 533 (Pa.Super. 2011). See 

Commonwealth v. Hoag, [665 A.2d 1212, 1214 

(Pa.Super. 1995)] (stating an appellant is not entitled to a 

“volume discount” for his crimes by having all sentences 

run concurrently). In fact, this Court has recognized “the 

imposition of consecutive, rather than concurrent, 

sentences may raise a substantial question in only the 

most extreme circumstances, such as where the aggregate 

sentence is unduly harsh, considering the nature of the 

crimes and the length of imprisonment.” Commonwealth 

v. Lamonda, 52 A.3d 365, 372 (Pa.Super. 2012) (en 

banc)[, appeal denied, 621 Pa. 677, 75 A.3d 1281 (2013)]. 

That is “in our view, the key to resolving the preliminary 

substantial question inquiry is whether the decision to 

sentence consecutively raises the aggregate sentence to, 

what appears upon its face to be, an excessive level in 

light of the criminal conduct at issue in this case.” Prisk[, 

supra at 533]. 

Commonwealth v. Austin, 66 A.3d 798, 809 (Pa.Super. 2013), appeal 

denied, 621 Pa. 692, 77 A.3d 1258 (2013) (some internal citations and 

quotation marks omitted) (holding appellant’s challenge to aggregate 
J-S62035-15 

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sentence of 35-70 years’ imprisonment for appellant’s 96 offenses of sexual 

abuse of children did not raise substantial question; appellant’s convictions 

stemmed from appellant’s possession of 96 images of child pornography, 

which depicted numerous different children, majority of whom were engaged 

in sex acts with adult men and women; appellant was also depicted in some 

images having sex with child; trial court did not impose consecutive 

sentences for every count; court imposed concurrent sentences for 49 of 96 

counts; trial court’s exercise of discretion in this case did not result in 

sentence that is grossly disparate to appellant’s conduct or patently 

unreasonable).6 But see Commonwealth v. Dodge, 957 A.2d 1198 

(Pa.Super. 2008), appeal denied, 602 Pa. 662, 980 A.2d 605 (2009) 

(holding consecutive, standard range sentences on thirty-seven counts of 

theft-related offenses for aggregate sentence of 581⁄2 to 124 years’ 

imprisonment constituted virtual life sentence and was so manifestly 

excessive as to raise substantial question). 

 On appeal, this Court will not disturb the judgment of the sentencing 

court absent an abuse of discretion. Commonwealth v. Fullin, 892 A.2d 

____________________________________________ 

6

 An earlier panel of this Court in Austin vacated and remanded for 

resentencing following the appellant’s original sentence of 72-192 years’ 

imprisonment, where the trial court had initially imposed consecutive periods 

of incarceration at the top end of the standard range for each of the 

appellant’s 96 counts of possession of child pornography. Given the 

appellant’s age of twenty-five (25) at sentencing, the prior panel of this 

Court concluded the sentence amounted to a virtual life sentence under the 

facts and circumstances of the case. See id. at 801. 
J-S62035-15 

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843 (Pa.Super. 2006). 

[A]n abuse of discretion is more than a mere error of 

judgment; thus, a sentencing court will not have abused 

its discretion unless the record discloses that the judgment 

exercised was manifestly unreasonable, or the result of 

partiality, prejudice, bias or ill-will. In more expansive 

terms, our Court recently offered: An abuse of discretion 

may not be found merely because an appellate court might 

have reached a different conclusion, but requires a result 

of manifest unreasonableness, or partiality, prejudice, 

bias, or ill-will, or such lack of support so as to be clearly 

erroneous. 

Commonwealth v. Walls, 592 Pa. 557, 564, 926 A.2d 957, 961 (2007) 

(internal quotation marks and citations omitted). “Where the sentencing 

court imposes a sentence within the guideline range, we must review to 

determine whether the trial court’s sentence is ‘clearly unreasonable.’” 

Dodge, supra at 1200 (citing 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9781(c)(2)). 

 Instantly, Appellant did not raise in his Rule 1925(b) statement his 

complaints that the court ignored his rehabilitative needs or failed to 

consider specific mitigating factors, so those claims are waived. See 

Commonwealth v. Castillo, 585 Pa. 395, 888 A.2d 775 (2005) (holding 

issues not raised in Rule 1925(b) statement are waived on appeal). 

 Appellant’s excessiveness claim that the court imposed a virtual life 

sentence appears on the surface to raise a substantial question. 

Nevertheless, we also recognize that the jury found Appellant guilty of 

fourteen (14) counts of sexual abuse against two young children, spanning a 

period of fifteen (15) months while Appellant was engaged in a relationship 
J-S62035-15 

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with the victims’ mother and acted in a parental role. Significantly, the court 

imposed standard range sentences for each conviction and did not impose 

consecutive sentences for every count. At the same time, Appellant was not 

entitled to a “volume discount” for his multiple offenses. See Austin, 

supra; Hoag, supra. 

 Additionally, the court set forth on the record, at great length, its 

reasons for the sentence imposed. (See N.T. Sentencing Hearing, 1/22/15, 

at 101-114; 121-22; R.R. at 381a-394a; 401a-402a) The court stated it 

considered Appellant’s pre-sentence investigation (“PSI”) report, which 

detailed Appellant’s background, prior abuse as a child, mental health 

issues, and treatment history. See Commonwealth v. Fowler, 893 A.2d 

758 (Pa.Super. 2006) (stating where sentencing court had benefit of PSI 

report, we can presume it was aware of relevant information regarding 

defendant’s character and weighed those considerations along with 

mitigating statutory factors). The court also reviewed an inmate adjustment 

summary rating Appellant’s treatment while incarcerated. Further, the court 

considered the impact of Appellant’s crimes on the victims, victim impact 

statements, letters from Appellant’s family and friends, and Appellant’s 

rehabilitative needs. As well, the court specifically weighed the factors 

delineated in 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9721(b) (setting forth general sentencing 

standards). The court further considered Appellant’s testimony at trial, 

denying his guilt, and his general lack of remorse for his crimes. The court 
J-S62035-15 

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noted it found the victims’ testimony at trial credible and commented on the 

fifteen-month span in which Appellant had abused the child victims. After 

imposing sentence, the court stated: 

Now, [Appellant], when one hears these numbers of years, 

and that’s all one hears, [he] may say that’s a long, long 

sentence. But, [Appellant], I want you, your family, your 

friends, and I want the victims and our community to 

understand that while the sentence is chronologically long, 

when you consider each act which you perpetrated on

these very young children, when you look at the different 

interests and protections of the victims, when you look at 

each social wrong that needs to be addressed by each 

criminal act you committed, when you look at the horror, 

harm, and trauma you caused that each of these crimes 

address, and when you look at them separately, and when 

you factor in the ages of the victim[s], the fact that you 

were in a position of a parental figure who’s responsible to 

look after and protect these young children, when you 

assaulted them—sexually assaulted them instead, that

when you threatened them, that there was great victim 

impact; that after six years of placement and treatment, 

you never once sought help or counseling to address your 

sexual issues, but rather continued to pray upon and 

sexually assault these young children. When you put all 

this together, it’s clear that this is an appropriate sentence 

to address what occurred and to protect society. 

(N.T., 1/22/15, at 121-22; R.R. at 401a-402a). We accept the court’s 

analysis and decline to deem the aggregate sentence imposed “clearly 

unreasonable” in light of the violent nature of the criminal conduct at issue. 

See Prisk, supra (holding appellant’s challenge to discretionary aspects of 

sentence warranted no relief where court sentenced appellant to aggregate 

term of 633-1,500 years’ imprisonment for 314 acts of sexual abuse of his 

stepdaughter on almost daily basis over course of six years; court did not 
J-S62035-15 

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impose consecutive sentences for every count, and appellant was not 

entitled to volume discount for his offenses; appellant’s aggregate sentence 

was not excessive in light of violent criminal conduct at issue). Therefore, 

Appellant’s challenge to the discretionary aspects of his sentence merits no 

relief. Accordingly, we affirm. 

 Judgment of sentence affirmed. 

Judgment Entered. 

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq. 

Prothonotary 

Date: 11/4/2015 
1. The Honorable Court erred in not granting 

Defendant's pre-trial Motion to Dismiss all charges 

in the criminal information after trial commenced 

more than 3 65 days after the criminal complaint was 

filed, in violation of Pa. R. Crim. P. 600(A)(2)(a). 

2. The Honorable Court erred in permitting the 

Commonwealth to amend the criminal information 

on the eve of trial to add Rape and IDSI charges. 

3. The Honorable Court erred in ruling that the 

Commonwealth would be permitted to offer 

Defendant's criminal conviction of March 30, 2011, 

Theft by Unlawful Taking, as a crime of falsity to 

Complained of on Appeal: 

Motion. Defendant has raised five (5) issues in Defendant's Statement of Errors 

Pennsylvania this Court's March 31, 2015 Order denying Defendant's Post-Sentence 

Defendant Christopher Walton Blake has appealed to the Superior Court of 

{,-/f-15' 

J-~ 04 

i-PD 

1925 OPINION 

CHRJSTOPHER WALTON BLAKE, 

Defendant. 

v. 

No. 1506 Criminal 2013 

COMMONWEAL TH OF 

PENNSYLVANIA, 

2015 JW~ I O n1 2: I 9 

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t d j,,, I ,,: ··.·. ,· [' J J .. ~-· (' 'J- 1 )t,1 ·_r \., 

- .... w 11 /~, \'-'i.,I, L,.f L;/.:' 

IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS OF MERCER COUNTY, PENNSYLVANI 

CRIMINAL 

Circulated 10/13/2015 11:03 AM
2 

Commonwealth met its burden of proving the Defendant a SVP by clear and convincing 

a Sexually Violent Predator ("SVP"). At the SVP hearing, this Court found that the 

("SOAB") to conduct an assessment to determine if the Defendant could be sentenced as 

Prior to sentencing, this Court ordered the Sexual Offender's Assessment Board 

this period. 

sexually explicit materials. The two children were approximately 5 and 6 years old during 

children to perform oral sex on the Defendant, and the Defendant showing the children 

digitally), the Defendant performing oral sex on the children, the Defendant forcing the 

Defendant penetrating the child victims' genitals and anuses (both with his penis and 

two minor children who were under his care at the time. These acts included the 

approximately June 2008 to October 2009, Defendant performed numerous sexual acts on 

Corruption of a Minor, and Indecent Assault. The basis of these charges is that from 

offenses, Unlawful Contact with a Minor - Obscene and other explicit sexual materials, 

Aggravated Indecent Assault of a child, Unlawful Contact with a Minor - Sexual 

of the following: Rape of a Child, Involuntary Deviate Sexual Intercourse with a child, 

On September 17, 2014, a jury found Defendant guilty of two (2) counts of each 

Background 

(Defendant's Statement of Errors Complained of on Appeal, 11 1 - 5). 

impeach Defendant's credibility if Defendant 

chooses to testify at trial. 

4. The Honorable Court erred in permitting the 

Commonwealth to introduce the testimony of 

Kimberly Duffy as an expert to testify regarding the 

response patterns of child victims in sexual assault 

cases. 

5. The sentence imposed by the Honorable Court is 

manifestly unfair and excessive. 

Circulated 10/13/2015 11:03 AM
3 

I The sentences for the remaining offenses were also within the standard guidelines and ran concurrently to 

the other sentences imposed. 

Aggravated Indecent Assault and two (2) counts of Aggravated Indecent Assault of a 

information was originally filed on December 16, 2013, and contained six (6) counts of 

counts each of Rape of a Child and Involuntary Deviate Sexual Intercourse. The 

objection to the Commonwealth amending its criminal information by adding two (2) 

Next, on September 12, 2014 (the eve of trial), this Court overruled Defendant's 

Defendant's Motion to Dismiss all of the charges. 

waived Rule 600 at that time. Accordingly, Judge St. John entered an Order denying 

time, consented to the continuance on August 29, 2013. Further, Defendant's counsel 

The testimony from that hearing established that Defendant, through his counsel at the 

began 356 days from the filing of the criminal complaint as calculated under Rule 600. 

August 29, 2013 to October 15, 2013) excludable from the time limit, meaning the trial 

12, 2014, the Honorable Judge St. John found that there was a 47-day period (from 

September 15, 2014, or some 403 days later. However, during a hearing on September 

Commonwealth filed the criminal complaint on August 08, 2013, and trial began on 

Defendant's trial within 365 days of the criminal complaint being filed. In this case, the 

charges, arguing that the Commonwealth violated Pa.R.Crim.P. 600 by failing to initiate 

formed the basis of his Post-Sentence Motion. The first was a motion to dismiss all 

Before and during trial, this Court denied several of Defendant's motions that 

Deviate Sexual Intercourse, and Aggravated Indecent Assault of a child. 1 

offense and ran consecutively the two sentences each of Rape of a Child, Involuntary 

the same day. The Court sentenced the Defendant within the standard range for each 

evidence. The Court sentenced the Defendant to a total of 67 to 134 years of incarceration 

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2 Two of the counts of Aggravated Indecent Assault were in violation of I 8 Pa.C.S. § 3125(a)(]), two were 

in violation of 18 Pa.C.S. § 3125(a)(7), and two were in violation of I 8 Pa.C.S. § 3125(a)(8}. 

3 Ms. Duffy also testified that she has over 17 years of experience in the Child Welfare System, including 

working with the Adams County and York County Children's Advocacy Centers. 

regarding Ms. Duffy's qualifications, training, education, and experience, the Court 

Department of Social Work at the University of Pittsburgh.3 After a brief hearing 

expert testimony from Kimberly Duffy, a Program Development Specialist within the 

Finally, during the trial, this Court permitted the Commonwealth to introduce 

instruct the jury in this case to consider the conviction solely for impeachment purposes. 

because it was crimen falsi and was less than 10 years old. Further, the Court took care to 

objection because it found that the conviction was per se admissible under Pa.R.E. 609(a) 

Unlawful Taking conviction should Defendant testify at trial. The Court overruled the 

permitting the Commonwealth to provide evidence of Defendant's 2011 Theft by 

Next, at the initiation of trial, the Court overruled Defendant's objection to 

information. 

continuance. Therefore, this Court permitted the Commonwealth leave to amend the 

informed the Court that he was ready to proceed with the trial, without need of a 

Defendant received ample time to discuss the amendment with counsel and Defendant 

Rape of a child and IDSI charges that could be brought against him. Further, the 

already plead in the information, and that the Defendant was effectively on notice of the 

found that the new charges added to the information arose from the same set of events 

not done for good faith medical, hygienic, or law enforcement purposes. This Court 

anus of each child, that he penetrated the genitals or anus of each child, and that this was 

Commonwealth averred facts that the Defendant placed his penis in the mouth and/or 

child.2 In the Aggravated Indecent Assault charges listed in the original information, the 

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A. There was no violation of Pa.R.Crim.P. 600(A)(2)(a) 

Defendant's first issue raised claims that the Court erred in not dismissing all charges 

against the Defendant because the Defendant was brought to trial more than 365 days 

after the filing of the criminal complaint, in violation of Pa.R.Crim.P. 600(A)(2)(a). In his 

Order denying Defendant's motion to dismiss, the Honorable Judge St. John determined 

found that she was an expert with respect to behavioral response patterns of child victims 

in sexual assault cases. In so finding, the Court ruled that this testimony involved an area 

that would be beyond the normal understanding of the general public, especially because 

the General Assembly has specifically permitted this type of expert testimony. The Court 

also found that a Frye hearing was not necessary in this case because the General 

Assembly has said that this type of testimony is proper and because the testimony given 

is not "novel" science. Finally, in an abundance of caution, the Court did hold a brief 

Frye hearing and determined that the methodology used by Ms. Duffy is generally 

accepted by practitioners in the relevant field. 

Ms. Duffy was not provided any background information on the case, and she was 

instructed to testify only as to her general experience with child responses (including 

reasons why children may delay in reporting) in sexual assault cases. Counsel for the 

Defendant took part in the questioning of Ms. Duffy's credentials. 

Discussion 

Defendant Christopher Blake raises five points of error in his Statement of Errors 

Complained of on Appeal. For the reasons discussed below, the Superior Court should 

reject Defendant's arguments and affirm this Court's Order denying Defendant PostSentence Motion. 

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that the period from August 29, 2013 to October 15, 2013 (the date of the preliminary 

hearing in this matter) constituted 47 days that are excludable under Pa.R.Crim.P. 

600(C)(l) from the 365-day limit. The Defendant argues that at least twelve (12) days of 

the 47-day period is attributable to the Commonwealth's lack of due diligence, and 

therefore should not be excludable under the rule. Defendant argues that if these twelve 

(12) days are in fact attributable to the Commonwealth, then the Commonwealth has 

violated Rule 600. 

Judge St. John entered his Order regarding the Rule 600 motion after a hearing. 

The testimony from that hearing established that Defendant, through his counsel at the 

time, consented to a continuance on August 29, 2013. Further, Defendant's counsel 

waived Rule 600 at that time. This continuance cannot be held against the 

Commonwealth. However, Defendant reasserts his argument that there are stretches of 

time within the 4 7-day period that are either court delay or delay caused by the lack of 

due diligence by the Commonwealth. Examples cited include the Commonwealth's lack 

of due diligence in not acting to reschedule the Preliminary Hearing and its lack of due 

diligence by delaying in the filing of its motion under 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 5981, et seq. 

Defendant does not argue exactly how any of these periods involved the 

Commonwealth's lack of due diligence; Defendant merely asserts that they are so. These 

same arguments were heard and rejected by the Judge St. John during the Rule 600 

hearing. This Court agrees with Judge St. John that any time of the 47-day period should 

not be excluded for purposes of Rule 600. 

Therefore, Defendant is not entitled to relief on this claim. 

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considered when determining whether Appellant was prejudiced by the Commonwealth's 

defendant." Com. v. Page, 965 A.2d 1212, 1224 (Pa. Super. 2009). Factors to be 

Further, "relief is warranted only when the amendment to the information prejudices a 

Com. v. Samuel, 102 A.3d 1001, 1008-09 (Pa. Super. 2014) (internal citations omitted). 

Rule of Criminal Procedure 564 governs the amendment of 

a criminal information. The purpose of this rule is to "ensure 

that a defendant is fully apprised of the charges, and to avoid 

prejudice by prohibiting the last minute addition of alleged 

criminal acts of which the defendant is uninformed." When 

a challenge is raised to an amended information, the salient 

inquiry is [ w ]hether the crimes specified in the original ... 

information involve the same basic elements and evolved out 

of the same factual situation as the crimes specified in the 

amended ... information. If so, then the defendant is deemed 

to have been placed on notice regarding his alleged criminal 

conduct. If, however, the amended provision alleges a 

different set of events, or defenses to the amended crime are 

materially different from the elements or defenses to the 

crime originally charged, such that the defendant would be 

prejudiced by the change, then the amendment is not 

permitted. 

stated: 

Concerning amendment of the criminal information, the Superior Court has 

and that these contained new elements for which a defense was not prepared. 

Further, Defendant argues that he was not on notice of the added Rape and IDSI charges 

would drastically increase Defendant's minimum and maximum sentences, if convicted. 

argues that he was prejudiced by the addition of the two Rape and IDSI charges, which 

criminal information on September 12, 2014, the eve of trial. Specifically, Defendant 

Defendant next argues that the Court erred in allowing the Commonwealth to amend the 

B. It was not improper to permit the Commonwealth to amend the 

criminal information to add Rape of a Child and IDSI charges 

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amendment include "whether the amendment changes the factual scenario; whether new 

facts, previously unknown to appellant, were added; whether the description of the 

charges changed; whether the amendment necessitated a change in defense strategy; and 

whether the timing of the request for the amendment allowed for ample notice and 

preparation by appellant." Id. 

The original information in this case contained six (6) counts of Aggravated 

Indecent Assault and two (2) counts of Aggravated Indecent Assault of a child. In the 

Aggravated Indecent Assault charges listed in the original information, the 

Commonwealth averred facts that the Defendant placed his penis in the mouth and/or 

anus of each child, that he penetrated the genitals or anus of each child, and that this was 

not done for good faith medical, hygienic, or law enforcement purposes. To prove Rape 

of a Child, 18 Pa.C.S. § 3121 ( c ), the Commonwealth must prove that Defendant 

"engage] d] in sexual intercourse with a complainant who is less than 13 years of age." To 

prove IDSI, 18 Pa.C.S. § 3123(b), the Commonwealth must prove that Defendant 

"engage[ d] in deviate sexual intercourse with a complainant who is less than 13 years of 

age." "Deviate sexual intercourse" is defined as sexual intercourse "per os or per anus 

between human beings and any form of sexual intercourse with an animal. The term also 

includes penetration, however slight, of the genitals or anus of another person with a 

foreign object for any purpose other than good faith medical, hygienic or law 

enforcement procedures." 18 Pa.C.S. § 3103. 

Here, Defendant was clearly put on notice by the original information of the 

factual situation and potential Rape and IDSI charges that could be brought against him. 

Both Rape of a Child and the IDSI charges require intercourse with victims who are 

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under 13 years of age, and IDSI is also met when there is intercourse per anus. As stated 

above, the Commonwealth alleged all of these facts in the Aggravated Indecent Assault 

charges within the original information. Therefore, the Commonwealth pled all of the 

facts sufficient to implement Rape of a Child and IDSI charges. 

Further, Defendant's defense was not nullified or affected by the amendment of 

the charges. Defendant's defense at trial was to deny completely any inappropriate 

contact with the victims, and to discredit the testimony of the victims through any 

inconsistencies. This defense did not become any less effective with the addition of the 

Rape of a Child and IDSI charges. The defense was in no way tailored towards 

distinguishing Aggravated Indecent Assault versus Rape of a Child or IDSI; this defense 

would not have been effective because of the facts pled by the Commonwealth in the 

original information. 

Similarly, Defendant was not prejudiced by the timing of the amending of the 

information. Even though the information was amended immediately prior to trial, this 

Court gave Defendant ample time to speak with his counsel regarding the new charges 

and potential sentence. Additionally, the Court informed Defendant, through his counsel, 

that the Court would do its best to accommodate Defendant if he needed additional time 

to discuss defense strategies. Defendant never moved for a continuance, and after 

speaking with his counsel for approximately one-half hour, informed the Court that he 

was ready to proceed with trial. 

In his memorandum of law supporting his Post-Sentence Motion, Defendant cited 

several cases where the appellate courts found that amendment of charges was improper; 

however, these cases are distinguishable. In Com. v. Brown, 727 A.2d 541, 545 (Pa. 

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1999), the Pennsylvania Supreme Court held that it was error for the trial court to allow 

the Commonwealth to amend the criminal information immediately prior to 

commencement of trial to include charges of Rape and IDSI with an unconscious person, 

when original information only included charges of Rape and IDSI by forcible 

compulsion. Considering then Pa.R.Crim.P. 229 (now Pa.R.Crim.P. 564), the Supreme 

Court determined that the amendment prejudiced the defendant primarily because it 

rendered null the primary defense prepared against the original charges. Id. at 544. As 

discussed above, that did not happen in this case. 

In Com. v. Gray, 4 78 A.2d 822, 825 (Pa. Super. 1984 ), the Superior Court held 

that the trial court improperly permitted the information, charging defendant with 

criminal trespass, to be amended at the close of Commonwealth's case. The Court ruled 

so because the defendant lacked notice of prosecutor's intent to prosecute him for forcible 

entry rather than surreptitious or deceptive entry, and the amendment raised the grade of 

the crime from third to second-degree felony, subjecting the defendant to a more severe 

penalty. Id. In so ruling, the Superior Court emphasized the timeliness of the amendment 

(distinguishing it from cases where information was amended at beginning of trial) and 

the fact that the elements materially changed. Id. 

Again, Gray is distinguishable from this case because the Commonwealth's 

motion to amend the information was made before trial began, and further, the original 

information already pied all of the facts sufficient to bring charges of Rape of a Child and 

IDSI against the Defendant. 

Although the new charges here did threaten the Defendant with a longer sentence, 

Defendant was not prejudiced by the amendment because he was put on notice of the 

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4 These cases are Com. v. Bighum, 307 A.2d 255 (Pa. 1973) and Com. v. Roots, 393 A.2d 364 (Pa. 1978), 

which are briefly addressed below. 

was less than 10 years old. 

offering the conviction other than the fact that the conviction was for crimen falsi and 

Finally, Defendant argues that the Commonwealth offered no reason or justification for 

that there is no per se rule of admissibility of a defendant's prior crimen falsi conviction. 

In his Post-Sentence Motion, Defendant also cited two cases" standing for the proposition 

admission without any reasoned determination or balancing, as required by Pa.R.E. 403. 

admitted the crimen falsi conviction merely because Pa.R.E. 609(a) authorizes its 

his credibility, should he testify at trial. Specifically, Defendant argues that the Court 

introduce evidence of Defendant's 2011 Theft by Unlawful Taking conviction to impeach 

Defendant next argues that this Court erred in granting the Commonwealth permission to 

C. This Court did not err in permitting testimony of Defendant's crimen 

falsi theft conviction 

Therefore, Defendant is not entitled to relief upon this claim. 

None of these factors applicable here. 

plead in the amendment. See Com. v. Page, 965 A.2d 1212, 1224 (Pa. Super. 2009). 

affords the defendant no time to prepare a new defense, and whether new facts were 

factors such as an amendment that would change or nullify a defense, an amendment that 

the contrary, the Superior Court has emphasized that prejudice to the defendant requires 

amounts to prejudice to the defendant for purposes of amendment to the information. On 

affected. The Superior Court has never held that threat of a longer sentence, by itself: 

factual situation pled against him and his available defenses were not diminished or 

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The admissibility of evidence is within the sound discretion of the trial court, and 

will not be reversed absent an abuse of discretion. Com. v. Hoover, 107 A.3d 723, 729 

(Pa. 2014). Abuse of discretion is not found merely when an appellate court might have 

reached a different conclusion; instead, abuse of discretion requires a result of manifest 

unreasonableness, or partiality, prejudice, bias, or ill-will, or such lack of support so as to 

be clearly erroneous. Id. In relevant part, Pa.RE. 609 states "(a) In General. For the 

purpose of attacking the credibility of any witness, evidence that the witness has been 

convicted of a crime, whether by verdict or by plea of guilty or nolo contendere, must be 

admitted if it involved dishonesty or false statement." Finally, the Superior Court has 

stated "[ w ]here the date of conviction or last date of confinement is within ten years of 

the trial, evidence of the conviction of a crimen falsi is per se admissible." Com. v. 

Trippet, 932 A.2d 188, 199 (Pa. Super. 2007). The Trippet Court held that, regarding a 

crimen falsi conviction that is less than ten years old, the Court need not discuss potential 

prejudice to the defendant before admitting it. Id. at 200. 

Here, there is no dispute that Defendant's prior conviction of Theft by Unlawful 

Taking is less than 10 years old. As per Trippet and Rule 609, Defendant's conviction 

was per se admissible. The Court was not required to perform any balancing test in 

considering the admission of the conviction. Defendant's reliance upon both Bighum and 

Roots is misplaced, as neither case represents the current law regarding the introduction 

of crimen falsi convictions that are less than IO years old in the Commonwealth. While 

Defendant correctly states that convictions for crimen falsi are not to be automatically 

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5 "If more than ten years have elapsed, the evidence may be used only after written notice and the trial 

judge's determination that its probative value substantially outweighs its prejudicial effect." Pa.R.E. 609, 

Comment; see also Commonwealth v. Randall, 515 Pa. 410, 528 A.2d 1326, 1328-29 (1987). Randall 

ultimately adopted the balancing approach that Defendant relies upon for crimen falsi convictions that are 

more than 10 years old. As stated above, the Randall balancing factors do not apply to crimen falsi 

convictions that are less than 10 years old. Com. v. Trippet, 932 A.2d 188, 199-200 (Pa. Super. 2007). 

(a) Scope.--This section applies to all of the following: 

states: 

The testimony given by Ms. Duffy is governed by 42 Pa.C.S. § 5920, which 

Frye. 

generally accepted in the relevant scientific fields of behavioral science, as required by 

because the Commonwealth did not establish that Ms. Duffy's methodology was 

the separation of powers. Finally, Defendant argues that the testimony was inadmissible 

Pa.C.S. § 5920, which permits such expert testimony, is unconstitutional as a violation of 

Defendant also relies on Com. v. Olivo, 106 Berks 429 (Aug. 27, 2013), to argue that 42 

credibility of witnesses determined by the jury without expert testimony influence. 

argues that this is impermissible because it infringes on the Defendant's right to have the 

expert regarding typical behavior patterns of children in sexual assault cases. Defendant 

Defendant next argues that the Court erred in permitting Kimberly Duffy to testify as an 

D. The Commonwealth was permitted to use Kimberly Duffy as an 

expert witness 

Defendant is not entitled to relief upon this claim. 

instructions, and he does not argue that they were in any way improper. Therefore, 

conviction for impeachment purposes only. Defendant never objected to these 

Additionally, the Court here made sure to instruct the jury to properly consider the 

that are less than 10 years old. 

admitted if the conviction is more than 10 years old,5 the same is not true for convictions 

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acceptance" test. See Com. v. Dengler, 890 A.2d 372, 383 (Pa. 2005) (holding that expert 

technical evidence that has been approved by statute is not subject to the "general 

Pneumo Abex, LLC, 44 A.3d 27, 53 (Pa. 2012). Further, this Court notes that scientific or 

methodology in a conventional fashion in reaching his or her conclusions." Betz v. 

has articulable grounds to believe that an expert has not applied accepted scientific 

Regarding Defendant's Frye argument, a hearing is necessary when "a trial judge 

expert testimony regarding victim response and behaviors after sexual assault. 

(Emphasis added). This statute explicitly gives the Commonwealth the right to introduce 

(1) In a criminal proceeding subject to this section, a witness 

may be qualified by the court as an expert if the witness has 

specialized knowledge beyond that possessed by the average 

layperson based on the witness's experience with, or 

specialized training or education in, criminal justice, 

behavioral sciences or victim services issues, related to 

sexual violence, that will assist the trier of fact in 

understanding the dynamics of sexual violence, victim 

responses to sexual violence and the impact of sexual 

violence on victims during and after being assaulted. 

(2) Ifqualified as an expert, the witness may testify tofacts 

and opinions regarding specific types of victim responses 

and victim behaviors. 

(3) The witness's opinion regarding the credibility of any 

other witness, including the victim, shall not be admissible. 

( 4) A witness qualified by the court as an expert under this 

section may be called by the attorney for the Commonwealth 

or the defendant to provide the expert testimony. 

(b) Qualifications and use of experts.- 

(1) A criminal proceeding for an offense for which 

registration is required under Subchapter H of Chapter 97 

(relating to registration of sexual offenders). 

(2) A criminal proceeding for an offense under 18 Pa.C.S. 

Ch. 31 (relating to sexual offenses). 

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6 Prior to trial, the Court found that Ms. Duffy was an expert with regard to the response of children in 

sexual assault cases. In so finding, the Court ruled that this testimony involves an area that would be 

beyond the normal understanding of the general public, especially because the General Assembly has 

specifically permitted this type of expert testimony. The Court also found that a Frye hearing was not 

necessary in this case because the General Assembly has said that this type of testimony is proper and 

because the testimony given is not "novel" science. In an abundance of caution, the Court did, in fact, hold 

a brief Frye hearing immediately before the beginning of trial. The Court determined that the methodology 

used by the expert is generally accepted by practitioners in the relevant field. 

7 Defendant challenged the constitutionality of 42 Pa.C.S. § 5920 on the basis of separation of powers for 

the first time in his post-sentence motion. Defendant failed to raise this argument or to cite to Olivo during 

or before trial. Therefore, this argument is waived. See Pa.R.C.P. 227 .1 (b ). See also Com. v. Gordon, 528 

A.2d 631, 63 8 (Pa. Super. 1987) (holding that defendant's argument regarding suppression of evidence 

waived when presented for the first time in post-trial motions). This Court believes that waiver applies even 

if the Defendant is challenging the constitutionality ofa statute. See Com. v. Howe, 842 A.2d 436, 441 (Pa. 

Super 2004) ("Constitutional issues, even sentencing issues based upon the constitution, are waived if not 

properly raised in the trial court") (internal citation omitted). Nonetheless, the Court addresses the merits of 

Defendant's argument in the event that waiver is not found. 

entail knowledge beyond what the layperson possesses. Dunkel, 602 A.2d at 177, 181. 

Abuse Syndrome," it did not meet general acceptance within the field, and it did not 

ruled that the testimony was impermissible because it attempted to explain "Child Sexual 

held testimony very similar to that offered here was impermissible. The Dunkel Court 

Olivo relied on Com. v. Dunkel, 602 A.2d 830 (Pa. 1992), a pre-Section 5920 case that 

and the rulemaking authority of the Pennsylvania Supreme Court.7 The trial court in 

Pa.C.S. § 5920 is unconstitutional because it violates the Separation of Powers Doctrine 

from the Court of Common Pleas of Berks County, where the trial court held that 42 

Defendant next relies on the Com. v. Olivo, 106 Berks 429 (Aug. 27, 2013), a case 

Duffy's testimony.6 

assault cases. Therefore, this Court was not required to hold a Frye hearing regarding Ms. 

specifically authorized the use of expert testimony regarding victim responses in sexual 

Assembly). In enacting 42 Pa.C.S. § 5920, the Pennsylvania General Assembly 

because the factors to be considered have been specifically enumerated by the General 

testimony regarding Sexually Violent Predator status does not require a Frye hearing 

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8 Upon appeal, the case first went to the Pennsylvania Superior Court. The Superior Court did not decide 

this case, but rather the court's Prothonotary transferred it to the Supreme Court pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 751 

on October 21, 2014. 

Pennsylvania Supreme Court." Carter, 111 A.3d at 1224. Relying on other precedent, the 

procedural rule. Furthermore, it is not in direct conflict with any existing rule of the 

that "Section 5920 is really a rule regarding the admissibility of evidence, not a 

With respect to Defendant's separation of powers argument, the Carter Court held 

Carter, the testimony was clearly permissible. 

particularly. Since there is no material distinction in the testimony between this case and 

the facts in this particular matter, and she did not testify as to either of the child victims 

experience with children's responses in sexual assault cases. She was not privy to any of 

introduced in Carter. As stated above, Ms. Duffy testified only generally as to her 

Ms. Duffy's testimony in this case was identical to the expert testimony 

this was a permissible use of 42 Pa.C.S. § 5920. 

not offer any opinion regarding the victim's credibility. Id. The Superior Court held that 

victim in the case or whether the alleged incidents actually occurred. Id. Ms. Haupt did 

victim may delay in reporting." Id. However, she did not testify regarding the particular 

1223. Ms. Haupt also "expounded upon some of the reasons why a child sexual abuse 

testify "that it is common for child sexual abuse victims to delay in reporting." Id. at 

1221 (Pa. Super. 2015). There, the Commonwealth called Carol Haupt as an expert to 

the Superior Court has recently ruled directly on this issue in Com. v. Carter, 111 A.3d 

Despite the fact that Olivo is currently before the Pennsylvania Supreme Court, 

is currently in front of the Pennsylvania Supreme Court.8 

After the trial court reached its decision in Olivo, the Commonwealth appealed; the case 

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( 1) the sentencing court purported to sentence within 

the sentencing guidelines but applied the guidelines 

erroneously; 

(2) the sentencing court sentenced within the 

sentencing guidelines but the case involves circumstances 

where the application of the guidelines would be clearly 

unreasonable; or 

( c) Determination on appeal.-The appellate court shall 

vacate the sentence and remand the case to the sentencing 

court with instructions if it finds: 

Section 9781(c) reads: 

42 Pa.C.S. § 978l(c) and (d)." Com. v. Macias, 968 A.2d 773, 776 (Pa. Super. 2009). 

review of the discretionary aspects of a sentence is confined by the statutory mandates of 

Dodge, 77 A.3d 1263, 1274 (Pa. Super. 2013). Additionally, "[the Superior] Court's 

Court "evaluate[s] the court's decision under an abuse of discretion standard." Com. v. 

In reviewing a challenge to the discretionary aspects of sentencing, the Superior 

is manifestly unfair and excessive. 

Defendant finally argues that the aggregate sentence of 67 to 134 years of imprisonment 

E. Defendant's sentence is not manifestly unfair or excessive 

relief on this claim. 

arguing that 42 Pa.C.S. § 5920 is unconstitutional. Therefore, Defendant is not entitled to 

testimony of Kimberly Duffy as an expert witness. Further, Defendant is incorrect in 

This new binding precedent clearly permitted the Commonwealth to introduce the 

we determine that Section 5920 does not violate separation of powers." Id 

based on constitutional grounds but on existing case law and rules of evidence. As such, 

case from that of Dunkle by stating that "Dunkle predates Section 5920 and was not 

Court held that the statute is constitutional. Id In doing so, the Court distinguished its 

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For the above reasons, Defendant is not entitled to relief upon this claim. 

not clearly unreasonable and this Court did not abuse its judicial discretion. 

of offending again. Under the circumstances, application of the standard guidelines was 

prior criminal history, the safety of the community, and the Defendant's high likelihood 

this sentence, the Court considered all of the relevant factors, including the Defendant's 

Collectively, this resulted in a sentence of 67 to 134 years of incarceration. In imposing 

Involuntary Deviate Sexual Intercourse, and Aggravated Indecent Assault of a child. 

of the charges and chose to run consecutively the two sentences each of Rape of a Child, 

minor victims. The Court sentenced the Defendant within the standard guidelines for all 

Here, Defendant was found guilty of 14 charges that were perpetuated against two 

911 (Pa. 2006). 

history and a finding that he was a high risk to re-offend. See Com. v. Klueber, 904 A.2d 

sentences are not clearly unreasonable where the trial court relies on the defendant's prior 

Finally, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court has held that standard range consecutive 

In all other cases the appellate court shall affirm the sentence 

imposed by the sentencing court. 

(3) the sentencing court sentenced outside the 

sentencing guidelines and the sentence is unreasonable. 

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BY THE COURT, 

Accordingly, the Superior Court should reject Defendant Christopher Blake's 

appeal and uphold this Court's Order denying Defendant's Post-Sentence Motion. 

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