United States Court of Appeals
FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT

___________ No. 96-1274

___________ Columbia Insurance Company, * * Plaintiff/Appellee, * * v. * * William G. Baker; Larry * McElroy, * * Defendants, * Appeal from the United States * District Court for the Eastern Aylene Duke, Guardian of Sammy * District of Arkansas. Duke; Linda Ward; Melissa * Troub, as Parent and Next * Friend of Kelli Troub, * * Defendants/Appellants,* * Aetna Casualty and Surety * Company, * * Defendant/Appellee. *

___________ Submitted: January 16, 1997 Filed: March 7, 1997

___________ Before BEAM, HANSEN, and MORRIS SHEPPARD ARNOLD, Circuit Judges.

___________ BEAM, Circuit Judge.
SammyDuke, Linda Ward, and Kelli Troub were injured by a runaway truck that defendant William Baker had been driving. InThe Honorable Elsijane T. Roy, United States District Judge 1 for the Eastern District of Arkansas. -2- the present declar atory judgment action, the district court ruled 1 that i nsurance policies issued by Columbia Insurance Company an d Aetna Casualty and Surety Company excluded coverage for thi s accident. Duke, Ward, and Troub appeal. We affirm.

I. BACKGROUND
Wi lliamBaker worked at Mark's Body Shop in Russellville , Arkansas. Baker also occasionally did auto repair out of his own garage at his home in Clarksville, a city some twenty-five mile s fromRussellville. About every six months, Baker would rent a paint booth and equipment at Mark's Body Shop in order to do side jobs.
Toward the end of 1992, an employee of Hensel Phelp s Construction Company approached Baker and asked him to do so me body work on a damaged company pickup truck. Baker accepted the job , giving an estimate of $800 for the work. Baker informed the Hensel Phelp s employee that he would do the initial body work at home , then finish the paint job at Mark's Body Shop. On December 2, 1992, Baker set out for Russellville, driving the pickup. This was a regular work day for Baker, but he i ntended to stop at a paint store to match the paint on the truck, and t o complete the paint work at Mark’s Body Shop later in the day . When he arrived in Russellville, Baker stopped at a convenience s tore to purchase a soft drink and some cigarettes. Baker left the truc k idling in the parking lot without setting the emergency brake
. While Baker was in the store, the truck motored in reverse across-3-

the highway, ran over the vict ims as they walked along a sidewalk, and came to rest against a house.-4-

Bak er was insured by a liability policy issued by Columbia
. Hensel Phelps owned a policy issued by Aetna, which covered th e picku p. Columbia brought this declaratory judgment action , cla iming that its policy excluded coverage for the accident, an d alternatively claiming that Ae tna was primarily liable. On motion for su mmary judgment, the district court concluded that bot h policies exclude coverage.

II. DISCUSSION

We review the district court's grant of summary judgment d e novo . Smith v. City of Des Moines , 99 F.3d 1466, 1469 (8th Cir
. 199 6). Our interpretation of the relevant insurance policies i s governed by Arkansas law, and we also review the district court's application of state law de no vo. Dupps v. Travelers Ins. Co. , 80 F.3d 312, 313 (8th Cir. 1996).
Under Arkansas law, insurance exclusions must be clearl y stated, and are strictly const rued against the insurer. Noland v. Farmer s Ins. Co. , 892 S.W.2d 271, 272 (Ark. 1995). If a n exclusion clause is ambiguous, it should be construed in favor of th e insured. State Farm Fire and Casualty Co. v. Midgett , 89 2 S.W.2d 469, 471 (Ark. 1995). Whether the policy is ambiguous is a questi onof law for the court. Keller v. Safeco Ins. Co. , 87 7 S.W.2d 90, 93 (Ark. 1994). Anexclusion clause is ambiguous if it is “susceptible to more than one reasonable interpretation.” Id. at 92. The Columbia policy issued to Baker states: We do not provide Liability Coverage for any person:

. . .-5- 6. While employed or otherwise engaged in the “business” of:We reject Aetna’s argument that Appellants have no standing 2 to challenge the district court’s conclusions with respect to the Aetna policy. See Automobile Underwriters Corp. v. Graves , 48 9 F.2d 625, 627-28 (8th Cir. 1973). -6- a. selling; d. storing; or b. repairing; e. parking; c. servicing; veh icles designed for use mainly on publi c highways.
Jt. App. at 183. The policy further states that “‘[b]usiness ’ includes trade, profession or occupation.” Id. at 182.
The Aetna policy provides liability coverage for damage s caused during permissive use of the Hensel Phelps pickup. Supp
. Jt. App. at 5. It too, however, contains a clause that exclude s 2 coverage for:

Someone using a covered “auto” while he or she is workin g ina business of selling, servicing, repairing or parkin g “autos” unless that business is yours.
Id.

We agree with the district court that the language of thes e two clauses is unambiguous. Both policies specifically exclud e coverage for damages caused by a person “engaged in the ‘business’ of” and “working in a business of” servicing or repairing autos
. Such clauses are “intended to exclude those engaged in the b usiness of repairing automobiles” and are applicable to “an individual who has undertaken t o repair the insured’s automobile for hire.” Couch on I nsurance 2d §§ 45:1005, 45:1007 (2d ed. 1981). Th e undisputed facts of this case show that Baker is by trade an auto bodyrepairer. He had on previous occasions performed paid bod y-7-

work on his own time. He was hired by a Hensel Phelps employee to repair the truck, gave an estimate for the work, was to be paid-8-

$800, and in fact performed part of the work. While we do no t believe that all individuals who undertake home repairs, even for pay, would be within the scope of this kind of exclusion, Baker's services in this case were more than casual, isolated acts: the y were in all respects the fulfillment of a business arrangeme nt. At the time of the accident, Baker was practicing his particula r trade and performing work for which he expected to earn a profit. Appell ants argue that Baker was making personal use of th e truck at the time of the accid ent, and so the exclusion clauses do not apply. Although there appear to be no directly relevan t Arkansas cases, we are not persuaded by this argument. Baker had taken p ossession of the truck in order to repair it, and wa s driving to Russellville in ord er to match the paint and to use the booth at Mark's Body Shop to complete his work. Baker had i nformed the Hensel Phelps employee who had solicited his services that he would do the body work at home and then complete the paint job at the shop. Driving the truck from Clarksville to Russellville was a necessary and expected part of the services Baker was to p erform. As the district court noted, “ Baker was engaged in the business of repairing an automobile [and] briefly stopping for a coke on th e way did nothing to change that.” Columbia Ins. Co. v. Baker , No. LR-C-95-029, slip op. at 6 (E.D. Ark. Dec. 23, 1995).

III. CONCLUSION
The Ae tna and Columbia insurance policies at issue in thi s case unambiguously exclude liability coverage for damages ca used by a driv er when engaged in the business of auto repair. We hol d that, under the particular undisputed facts of this case, Ba ker was engage d in such a business, and therefore the exclusion clause s-9-

sh ould be given effect. The judgment of the district court i s affirmed.-10-

A true copy.

Attest:
CLERK, U. S. COURT OF APPEALS, EIGHTH CIRCUIT.