12960 Federal Register / Vol. 62, No. 53 / Wednesday, March 19, 1997 / Rules and Regulations

1Some State surveys are limited to passenger

cars. The agency’s latest National Occupant

Protection Use Survey, a probability-based study of

safety belt use in all vehicles types, indicates a

current use rate of 58 percent. Another survey will

be conducted in 1997.

competitive bidding in the WCS

auction, the Wireless

Telecommunications Bureau is

establishing an expedited pleading

cycle. See 47 CFR 1.429 and 47 CFR 1.3

(providing that Commission rules may

be suspended, revoked, amended or

waived for good cause shown).

Parties should file oppositions to the

petitions by Friday, March 21, 1997, and

replies to oppositions by Tuesday,

March 25, 1997, with the Secretary,

Federal Communications Commission,

1919 M Street, N.W., Room 222,

Washington, D.C. 20554. In addition,

two copies should be hand delivered to:

(1) Auctions Division, Wireless

Telecommunications Bureau, Room

5322, 2025 M Street, N.W., Washington,

D.C. 20554, attention: Josh Roland; and

(2) Office of Engineering and

Technology, Suite 480, 2000 M Street,

N.W., Washington, D.C. 20554,

attention: Tom Mooring. In addition,

parties filing oppositions to the

petitions must hand deliver copies to

the relevant petitioner, and replies must

be hand delivered to the opponents.

Copies of the petitions, comments and

reply comments may be obtained from

the Commission’s duplicating

contractor, International Transcription

Service, Inc. (ITS), 2100 M Street, N.W.,

Suite 140, Washington, D.C., 20037,

(202) 857–3800. Copies are also

available for public inspection during

regular business hours in Room 5608,

2025 M Street, N.W., Washington, D.C.

20554. When requesting copies, please

refer to DA 97–548.

The Commission will treat this

proceeding as non-restricted for

purposes of the Commission’s ex parte

rules. See generally 47 CFR 1.1200–

1.1216. For further information contact

Josh Roland or Matthew Moses,

Auctions Division, Wireless

Telecommunications Bureau, at (202)

418–0660, or Tom Mooring, Office of

Engineering and Technology, at (202)

418–2450.

Federal Communications Commission.

William F. Caton,

Acting Secretary.

[FR Doc. 97–7015 Filed 3–18–97; 8:45 am]

BILLING CODE 6712–01–P

DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION

National Highway Traffic Safety

Administration

49 CFR Part 571

[Docket No. 74–14; Notice 114]

RIN 2127—AG59

Federal Motor Vehicle Safety

Standards; Occupant Crash Protection

AGENCY: National Highway Traffic

Safety Administration (NHTSA), DOT.

ACTION: Final rule.

SUMMARY: NHTSA is temporarily

amending the agency’s occupant crash

protection standard to ensure that

vehicle manufacturers can quickly

depower all air bags so that they inflate

less aggressively. The agency is taking

this action to provide an immediate, but

interim, solution to the problem of the

fatalities and injuries that current air

bag designs are causing in relatively low

speed crashes to small, but growing

numbers of children, and occasionally

to adult occupants.

DATES: Effective Date: The amendments

made in this rule are effective March 19,

1997.

Incorporation by reference. The

incorporation by reference of a

publication listed in the regulation is

approved by the Director of the Federal

Register as of March 19, 1997.

Petitions: Petitions for reconsideration

must be received by May 5, 1997.

ADDRESSES: Petitions for reconsideration

should refer to the docket and notice

number of this notice and be submitted

to: Administrator, National Highway

Traffic Safety Administration, 400

Seventh Street, SW, Washington, DC

20590.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: For

information about air bags and related

rulemakings: Visit the NHTSA web site

at http://www.nhtsa.dot.gov and select

‘‘AIR BAGS: Information about air

bags.’’

For non-legal issues: Mr. Clarke

Harper, Chief, Light Duty Vehicle

Division, NPS–11, National Highway

Traffic Safety Administration, 400

Seventh Street, SW, Washington, DC

20590. Telephone: (202) 366–2264. Fax:

(202) 366–4329.

For legal issues: J. Edward Glancy,

Office of Chief Counsel, NCC–20,

National Highway Traffic Safety

Administration, 400 Seventh Street, SW,

Washington, DC 20590. Telephone:

(202) 366–2992. Fax: (202) 366–3820.

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:

Table of Contents

I. Background.

A. Air Bags: Safety Issues.

B. Current Requirements for Air Bags.

II. Overview and Summary.

III. January 1997 Depowering Proposal.

IV. Summary of Comments.

V. Agency Decision.

A. Should NHTSA amend Standard No.

208 to permit/facilitate depowering?

B. 80 g’s chest injury criterion vs. sled test.

C. Application of the amendment to driver

air bags.

D. Duration of amendment.

E. Benefits and trade-offs.

F. Specific sled test requirements/

procedures.

1. Neck injury criteria.

2. Testing whole vehicles or partial

vehicles.

3. ‘‘Corridor’’ for crash pulse.

4. Air bag activation.

5. Test attitude.

6. Completion of sled test.

G. Miscellaneous Issues.

1. Multistage manufacturer certification.

2. Effective date.

VI. Rulemaking Analyses and Notices.

I. Background

A. Air Bags: Safety Issues

Air bags have proven to be highly

effective in reducing fatalities from

frontal crashes, the most prevalent

fatality and injury-causing type of crash.

Those crashes result in 64 percent of all

driver and right-front passenger

fatalities.

NHTSA estimates that, between 1986

and February 15, 1997, air bags have

saved 1,828 drivers and passengers

(1,639 drivers and 189 passengers).

Based on current levels of effectiveness,

air bags will save more than 3,000 lives

each year in passenger cars and light

trucks when all light vehicles on the

road are equipped with dual air bags.

This is based on current safety belt use

rates (about 68 percent, according to

State-reported surveys).1 Using this

assumption, more than two-thirds of the

persons saved would be persons not

using any type of safety belt.

At the same time, air bags are causing

fatalities in some situations, especially

to children. As of February 15, 1997,

NHTSA’s Special Crash Investigation

program had identified 38 crashes in

this country in which the deployment of

the passenger air bag resulted in fatal

injuries to a child. Two adult passengers

have also been fatally injured. On the
Federal Register / Vol. 62, No. 53 / Wednesday, March 19, 1997 / Rules and Regulations 12961

2The agency has examined air bag cases with

children in its Fatal Analysis Reporting System

(FARS) and identified no new cases. The agency

believes these 38 cases are a census of all cases that

have occurred and reported in FARS to February

15, 1997 involving fatalities. However, the

information for adult fatalities does not represent a

census. NHTSA updates air bag fatality information

on a continuing basis. The information presented in

this notice and accompanying Final Regulatory

Evaluation generally reflects information available

through February 15, 1997.

3A fatality involving a 5 feet 4 inch female driver

did occur in October 1996.

4At least 80 percent of each manufacturer’s light

trucks manufactured on or after September 1, 1997

and before September 1, 1998 must be equipped

with an air bag and a manual lap/shoulder belt.

Every light truck manufactured on or after

September 1, 1998 must be so equipped.

5 ‘‘Crash pulse’’ means the acceleration-time

history of the occupant compartment of a vehicle

during a crash. This is represented typically in

terms of g’s of acceleration plotted against time in

milliseconds (1/1000 second). The crash pulse

determines the test’s stringency: an occupant will

undergo greater forces if the crash pulse g’s are

higher at the peak, or if the duration of the crash

pulse is shorter.

driver side, 21 drivers are known to

have been fatally injured.2

The fatalities involving children have

a number of fairly consistent

characteristics. First, as to restraint

usage, the infants are in rear-facing

infant restraints. The older children are

generally not using any type of restraint.

Second, the crashes in which the infants

and older children were fatally injured

occurred at relatively low speeds. Third,

the fatally injured infants and older

children were very close to the

dashboard when the air bag deployed.

Rear-facing child seats are very close to

the dashboard in a crash, even in the

absence of pre-impact braking. As to

almost all of the older children, the nonuse or improper use of safety belts in

conjunction with pre-impact braking

resulted in the forward movement of the

children such that they were very close

to the air bag when it deployed. Because

of this proximity, the children appear to

have sustained fatal head or neck

injuries from the deploying passenger

air bag.

NHTSA notes that driver fatalities are

very rare in comparison to the number

of vehicles equipped with driver air

bags (more than 56 million vehicles,

through model year 1996), and to the

number of drivers saved by air bags. The

data for drivers suggest that two groups

of drivers are more at risk than other

drivers from a driver air bag. One group

is older drivers. However, the agency

notes that, primarily due to their

relative frailty, older drivers are more at

risk than younger drivers under a wide

range of crash circumstances, regardless

of whether the older drivers use safety

belts and regardless of whether they

drive vehicles equipped with air bags.

The other group of drivers is shortstatured adults. Drivers five feet two

inches or shorter comprise 10 of the 21

driver fatalities the agency is aware of

to date. However, NHTSA is not aware

of any inflation-induced fatality in the

United States of a female driver 5 feet

2 inches or shorter in an air bag

deployment since November 1995, 16

months ago.3

As in the case of the children fatally

injured by air bags, the key factor

regarding the fatally injured adults has

been their proximity to the air bag when

it deployed. The most common reason

for their proximity was failure to use

safety belts. Only six of the 21 drivers

were known to be restrained by lap and

shoulder belts at the time of the crash.

Moreover, of those six, two appeared to

be out of position (slumped over the

wheel due to medical conditions).

B. Current Requirements for Air Bags

Under Chapter 301 of Title 49, U.S.

Code (’’Motor Vehicle Safety’’), NHTSA

is authorized to set Federal motor

vehicle safety standards applicable to

the manufacture and sale of new motor

vehicles and new motor vehicle

equipment. Standard No. 208, Occupant

Crash Protection, one of the original

Federal motor vehicle safety standards

issued under this statute, has long

required motor vehicle manufacturers to

install safety belts to protect occupants

during a crash. Beginning in the late

1980’s, the standard has required

manufacturers to provide automatic

protection for frontal crashes, i.e.,

protection that requires no action by the

occupant.

In establishing Standard No. 208’s

current automatic protection

requirements for passenger cars in 1984,

and later extending those requirements

to light trucks, NHTSA expressly

permitted a variety of methods of

providing automatic protection,

including automatic belts and air bags.

However, the agency included a number

of provisions to encourage

manufacturers to install air bags. These

included extra credit during the

standard’s phase-in period for vehicles

using air bags and allowing vehicles

with a driver air bag system to count, for

a limited period of time, as a vehicle

meeting the standard’s automatic

protection requirements for both driver

and right-front passenger positions.

Ultimately, however, consumer

demand led to the installation of air

bags throughout the new car fleet. By

the beginning of this decade,

manufacturers were rapidly moving to

install air bags in all of their passenger

cars and light trucks.

Congress included a provision in the

Intermodal Surface Transportation

Efficiency Act of 1991 (ISTEA) directing

NHTSA to amend Standard No. 208 to

require that all passenger cars and light

trucks provide automatic protection by

means of air bags. The Act required at

least 95 percent of each manufacturer’s

passenger cars manufactured on or after

September 1, 1996 and before

September 1, 1997 to be equipped with

an air bag and a manual lap/shoulder

belt at both the driver and right front

passenger seating positions. Every

passenger car manufactured on or after

September 1, 1997 must be so equipped.

The same basic requirements are

phased-in for light trucks one year

later.4 The final rule implementing this

provision of ISTEA was published in

the Federal Register (58 FR 46551) on

September 2, 1993.

Standard No. 208’s automatic

protection requirements, whether for air

bags or (until the provisions of ISTEA

fully take effect) for automatic belts, are

performance requirements. The

standard does not specify the design of

an air bag. Instead, vehicles must meet

specified injury criteria, including

criteria for the head and chest,

measured on test dummies, during a

barrier crash test, at speeds up to 30

mph. These criteria must be met for air

bag-equipped vehicles both when the

dummies are belted and when they are

unbelted. The latter test condition

ensures that a vehicle provides

‘‘automatic protection,’’ i.e., protection

by means that require no action by

vehicle occupants.

These requirements apply to the

performance of the vehicle as a whole,

and not to the air bag as a separate item

of motor vehicle equipment. This

approach permits vehicle manufacturers

to ‘‘tune’’ the performance of the air bag

to the crash pulse 5 and other specific

attributes of each of their vehicles.

Further, it leaves them free to select

specific attributes for their air bags, such

as dimensions and actuation time.

II. Overview and Summary

NHTSA is implementing a

comprehensive plan of rulemaking and

other actions (e.g., consumer education

and encouragement of primary

enforcement of State safety belt use

laws) addressing the adverse effects of

air bags. The rulemaking actions which

have been taken, or are being taken,

include the following:

Interim Rulemaking Solutions

• In this notice, NHTSA is

temporarily amending Standard No.

208, to ensure that vehicle

manufacturers can depower all air bags
12962 Federal Register / Vol. 62, No. 53 / Wednesday, March 19, 1997 / Rules and Regulations

6 In States with ‘‘secondary’’ safety belt use laws,

a motorist may be ticketed for such failure only if

there is a separate basis for stopping the motorist,

such as the violation of a separate traffic law. This

hampers enforcement of the law. In States with

primary laws, a citation can be issued solely

because of failure to wear safety belts.

so that they inflate less aggressively.

This change, coupled with the

considerable flexibility already

provided by the standard’s existing

performance requirements, will provide

the vehicle manufacturers maximum

flexibility to quickly address the adverse

effects of current air bags.

• On November 27, 1996, the agency

published in the Federal Register (61

FR 60206) a final rule amending

Standards No. 208 and No. 213 to

require improved labeling on new

vehicles and child restraints to better

ensure that drivers and other occupants

are aware of the dangers posed by

passenger air bags to children,

particularly to children in rear-facing

infant restraints in vehicles with

operational passenger air bags. The new

labels were required on vehicles

beginning February 25, 1997, and are

required on child restraints, beginning

May 27, 1997.

• On January 6, 1997, the agency

published in the Federal Register (62

FR 798) a final rule extending until

September 1, 2000, a provision in

Standard No. 208 permitting vehicle

manufacturers to offer manual cutoff

switches for the passenger air bag for

new vehicles without rear seats or with

rear seats that are too small to

accommodate rear-facing infant

restraints.

• On January 6, 1997, the agency

published in the Federal Register (62

FR 831) an NPRM to permit motor

vehicle dealers and repair businesses to

deactivate, upon the request of

consumers, driver and passenger air

bags. The agency expects to announce a

final decision on this issue shortly.

Longer Term Rulemaking Solution

• NHTSA plans to issue an NPRM to

require a phasing-in of smart air bags

and to establish performance

requirements for those air bags. On

February 11 and 12, 1997, the agency

held a public technical workshop to

discuss appropriate test procedures and

other issues related to that forthcoming

proposal. Among other things, the

agency may propose using a 5th

percentile female dummy and

specifying appropriate injury criteria for

that dummy, including neck injury.

In addition to these actions, the

agency is participating with automobile

manufacturers, air bag suppliers,

insurance companies and safety

organizations in a coalition effort to

address the adverse effects of air bags by

increasing the use of safety belts and

child seats. Substantial benefits could

be obtained from achieving higher safety

belt use rates. For example, if observed

belt use increased from 68 percent to 80

percent, an additional 2,900 lives would

be saved annually over the 9,529 lives

currently being saved by safety belts.

The coalition has a three-point

program that seeks to educate the public

about safety belt and child seat use,

work with state and local officials to

improve enforcement of safety belt and

child seat use laws, and seek the

enactment of ‘‘primary’’ safety belt use

laws.6

A 1995 NHTSA analysis of Fatal

Analysis Reporting System (FARS) data

on restraint use among fatally injured

motor vehicle occupants from 1983 to

1994 indicates that primary enforcement

is the most important aspect of a safety

belt use law affecting the rate of safety

belt use. For virtually all states with a

primary enforcement law, statistically

significant increases associated with the

presence of such a law were detected

using several different methods. The

analysis suggests that the increase in use

rates attributable to the enactment of a

primary enforcement law is at least 15

percentage points. This increase in

safety belt use translates into a 5.9

percent decline in fatalities in a state

that authorizes primary enforcement of

the law. In California and Louisiana,

states which recently upgraded their

laws to allow for primary enforcement,

safety belt usage increased by 13 and 17

percentage points, respectively.

III. January 1997 Depowering Proposal

On January 6, 1997, NHTSA

published an NPRM (62 FR 807) to

temporarily amend Standard No. 208 to

help reduce the fatalities and injuries

that current air bags are causing in

relatively low speed crashes to small,

but growing numbers of children, and

occasionally to adults.

The agency believed that the

proposed amendments would ensure

that vehicle manufacturers can quickly

depower all air bags so that they inflate

less quickly and less aggressively. Based

on agency research and analysis

regarding the optimal range of air bag

depowering, the agency tentatively

concluded that an average depowering

of 20 to 35 percent would reduce the

risk of air bag fatalities in low speed

crashes, while substantially preserving

the life-saving capabilities of air bags in

higher speed crashes.

NHTSA proposed adopting either, or

both, of two different approaches that

would permit or facilitate an

approximate 20 to 35 percent average

depowering of current air bags. One

approach was to temporarily make it

easier to meet the chest acceleration

requirement that an unbelted dummy

must meet in a crash test at speeds up

to 30 mph, by raising the limit from 60

g’s to 80 g’s. The other approach, which

appeared to allow higher levels of

depowering, was to temporarily replace

vehicle crash testing using an unbelted

dummy with the American Automobile

Manufacturers Association’s (AAMA’s)

modified ‘‘sled test’’ protocol

incorporating a 125 millisecond (msec)

standardized crash pulse and also using

an unbelted dummy.

NHTSA recognized that while

depowered air bags would provide

immediate benefits in a number of

situations, they would not fully solve

the problem of adverse effects from air

bags and could also reduce protection to

unbelted occupants in higher speed

crashes. NHTSA indicated that it

believes the ultimate solution to the

problem of adverse effects from air bags

is implementation of more advanced air

bags that adjust the deployment

decision/inflation rate based on such

factors as size and position of vehicle

occupants, severity of crash, and

whether safety belts are being used. The

agency therefore stated in the NPRM

that it viewed depowering as an interim

measure to be used until better solutions

can be implemented.

In its Preliminary Regulatory

Evaluation (PRE), the agency presented

several methodologies to analyze the

potential benefits and net effects on

safety associated with depowering. Two

methodologies utilized research testing

and mathematical modeling results to

examine the effect of depowering on

chest g’s and then to estimate the effect

of chest g changes on fatalities. A third

methodology examined the experience

in Australia of a General Motorsdesigned Holden car, which has less

aggressive air bags.

NHTSA requested commenters to

provide additional information in a

number of areas, including the

following:

• Information and data to help the

agency refine its estimates (presented in

the PRE) of the potential benefits and

net effects on safety that would be likely

to result from depowering.

• Information and supporting data for

the specific sled pulse recommended by

AAMA.

• Analysis comparing the potential

benefits and net effects on safety of the

two proposed alternatives.

• Information concerning the extent

of the existing problem of driver

fatalities and injuries from air bags and
Federal Register / Vol. 62, No. 53 / Wednesday, March 19, 1997 / Rules and Regulations 12963

7NHTSA explained that the existing provisions of

Standard No. 208 already provide considerable

design flexibility for manufacturers. The Standard’s

automatic protection requirements are performance

requirements and do not specify the design of an

air bag. Instead, vehicles must meet specified injury

Continued

the extent to which manufacturers have

already addressed the problem by

design changes to driver air bags.

• Whether the same or different

requirements should apply to the

passenger and driver positions,

including the advisability of limiting the

proposed temporary amendment to

passenger air bags only.

• The appropriate duration of the

temporary amendment.

IV. Summary of Comments

NHTSA received over 160 comments

in response to the NPRM. Commenters

included vehicle manufacturers, air bag

and component manufacturers, safety

advocacy groups, insurance groups,

trade associations, State entities, and

individuals.

Most commenters agreed that the

agency should issue requirements to

facilitate air bag depowering, thereby

reducing injury risks related to air bag

deployment in low speed crashes.

Support for depowering came from

commenters such as Advocates for

Highway and Auto Safety (Advocates),

the American Automobile

Manufacturers Association (AAMA), the

Association of International Automobile

Manufacturers (AIAM), the National

Transportation Safety Board (NTSB), the

Insurance Institute for Highway Safety

(IIHS), specific vehicle manufacturers,

and the Automotive Occupant

Restraints Council (AORC). These

commenters stated that depowered air

bags will improve vehicle safety by

reducing the risk posed to vehicle

occupants. While the vehicle

manufacturers favored allowing

depowering indefinitely, Public Citizen,

Advocates, and air bag manufacturers

conditioned their support on the placing

of a time limit on depowering.

The Center for Auto Safety (CFAS),

the Parents Coalition for Air Bag

Warnings, and some individuals

opposed depowering. These

commenters argued that switching from

a crash test to sled test with a generic,

large car crash pulse would result in an

unreasonably lenient standard that

would result in a substantial increase in

adult deaths.

Commenters addressed specific issues

raised in the NPRM, including whether

to adopt the 80g’s alternative, the sled

test alternative, or both; whether to

depower both driver side and passenger

side air bags; whether to make the

amendment temporary or permanent;

and the appropriateness of the agency’s

estimates of potential benefits and

tradeoffs in the PRE. Commenters also

addressed specific issues involving the

sled test requirements and test

conditions, including the neck injury

criteria, testing a portion of the vehicle

or the entire vehicle, the ‘‘corridor’’ for

the crash pulse, the activation time for

the air bag during the sled test, and the

vehicle test attitude. Commenters,

especially the safety groups, addressed

various issues that are not directly

related to depowering, such as adopting

minimum deployment speed thresholds

and undertaking a comprehensive

upgrade of Standard No. 208. A more

specific discussion of the comments,

and the agency’s responses, are set forth

below.

V. Agency Decision

After carefully considering the

comments, NHTSA has decided to

adopt AAMA’s modified unbelted sled

test protocol as a temporary alternative

to Standard No. 208’s current unbelted

crash test requirement. This change,

coupled with the considerable

flexibility already provided by the

standard’s performance requirements,

will provide the vehicle manufacturers

with maximum flexibility to quickly

address and mitigate the adverse effects

of current air bags.

A. Should NHTSA Amend Standard No.

208 To Permit/Facilitate Depowering?

As discussed above, NHTSA proposed

to amend Standard No. 208 to ensure

that vehicle manufacturers can depower

all air bags so that they inflate less

aggressively. The vast majority of

commenters supported depowering as a

quick way of addressing the problem of

adverse effects of air bags. Commenters

supporting depowering were diverse

and included AAMA and AIAM,

representing essentially all domestic

and import vehicle manufacturers,

AORC, representing suppliers, IIHS,

Advocates, and Public Citizen.

A few commenters, however, opposed

depowering or otherwise raised

concerns about the basic approach of

the agency’s proposal. The issues raised

by those commenters are addressed in

this section. Comments concerning how

depowering should be accomplished,

e.g., what alternative amendment

should be adopted, whether the driver

side should be included, and the

appropriate duration for the

amendment, will be discussed in later

sections.

The Parent’s Coalition recommended

that NHTSA consider issuing a final

rule mandating on-off switches for air

bags and a higher minimum deployment

threshold (for single level inflator air

bags) in lieu of amending Standard No.

208 to permit depowering. That

organization stated that information

from NHTSA’s Special Crash

Investigation Program shows that low

deployment thresholds are the central

cause of air bag deaths and injuries, and

that the agency erred in not including

an increased deployment threshold as

part of its proposal. The Parent’s

Coalition expressed concern that the

contemplated level of depowering will

not save all children, and will result in

an increase, perhaps a substantial one,

in adult deaths and injuries. The

Parent’s Coalition stated that the

increase in adult deaths from

depowering appears to be an

unacceptable cost in exchange for the

relatively modest reduction in child

deaths, especially since the child deaths

could be prevented, without such

adverse tradeoffs, by an on-off switch

and by an increase in deployment

threshold.

CFAS also urged NHTSA to look at

whether a moderate increase in

deployment threshold would perform a

better job of increasing vehicle safety,

before adopting the depowering

proposal. CFAS also stated that the

issue before NHTSA is not whether

depowered inflators should be

permitted under Standard No. 208, but

whether manufacturers should be

permitted to escape responsibility for

meeting the current injury criteria of the

standard. CFAS stated that Standard No.

208 does not prohibit manufacturers

from using depowered inflators.

While it did not oppose depowering

as an interim measure, Consumers

Union stated that the most important

step that the agency can take in the near

term to address the situation is to

establish a higher deployment

threshold, on an expedited basis, a

requirement for a low-end limit to the

vehicle impact level barrier equivalent

velocity, below which air bags will not

be triggered to inflate.

NHTSA notes that, in its January 1997

proposal, it discussed a variety of

alternative approaches for addressing

the adverse effects of air bags, including

higher deployment thresholds, dual

level inflators, smart air bags, and

various other changes to air bags. In

issuing its proposal, the agency

recognized that, for many vehicles,

depowering has a shorter leadtime than

any of the other alternatives. The agency

also explained that a change in Standard

No. 208 is not needed to permit

manufacturers to implement these other

alternatives.7 The agency explained

further:
12964 Federal Register / Vol. 62, No. 53 / Wednesday, March 19, 1997 / Rules and Regulations

criteria, including criteria for the head and chest,

measured on properly positioned test dummies,

during a barrier crash test, at speeds up to 30 mph.

As the AAMA correctly noted in its comments on

the NPRM, the Standard requires air bags to provide

protection for properly positioned occupants

(belted and unbelted) in a 30 mph crash, and very

fast air bags may be necessary to provide such

protection. However, the standard does not require

the same speed of deployment in slower speed

crashes or in the presence of out-of-position

occupants. Vehicle manufacturers have the

flexibility under the Standard to use dual or

multiple level inflator systems and automatic cutoff devices for out-of-position occupants and rearfacing infant restraints. Concepts such as dual level

inflator systems and devices that sense occupant

position and measure occupant size or weight are

not new, and were cited by the agency in its 1984

rulemaking requiring automatic protection. Also,

Standard No. 208 does not specify a minimum

vehicle speed at which air bags must deploy.

Thresholds could be raised substantially for most

current vehicles without creating a Standard No.

208 compliance problem. In addition, installation of

smart air bags and replacement of mechanical air

bag sensors with electronic ones are permitted.

Therefore, regulatory changes are not needed to

permit manufacturers to implement these solutions.

8 In severe collisions, safety belts can seriously

bruise the chest of an occupant or even cause rib

fractures. However, the restraining force of the belt

would also likely prevent even more serious chest

or head injury from the occupant’s striking the

interior components of the vehicle.

The agency expects to ultimately require

smart air bags through rulemaking. In the

meantime, the agency is not endorsing

depowering over other solutions. Instead, the

agency is proposing a regulatory change to

add depowering to the alternatives available

to the vehicle manufacturers to address this

problem on a short-term basis. To the extent

that manufacturers can implement superior

alternatives for some vehicles, the agency

would encourage them to do so.

NHTSA shares the concern of the

Parent’s Coalition that depowering will

not likely save all children and will

likely result in trade-offs for adults. That

is why the agency is limiting the

duration of its depowering amendments

and plans to conduct rulemaking to

require smart air bags. In the meantime,

however, NHTSA wants to be sure that

the vehicle manufacturers have the

necessary tools to address immediately

the problem of adverse effects of air

bags. Standard No. 208’s existing

performance requirements do restrict

the use of depowering, since

substantially depowering the air bags of

many vehicles would make those

vehicles incapable of complying with

the standard’s injury criteria in a 30

mph barrier crash test. Accordingly, to

permit use of this alternative, it is

necessary to amend Standard No. 208.

The issuance of any rule narrowing

the discretion that vehicle

manufacturers have had since the 1984

decision, whether by requiring

depowering, higher thresholds, other

changes to air bags, or smart air bags,

would involve considerably more

complex issues than a rulemaking

simply adding greater flexibility. The

agency would need to assess safety

effects, practicability, and leadtime for

the entire vehicle fleet. NHTSA will

assess those types of issues in its

rulemaking for smart air bags. The

agency notes that there may not be any

reason to have higher deployment

thresholds with some types of smart air

bags, since a low-power inflation may

be automatically selected for low

severity crashes.

Until the agency conducts its

rulemaking regarding smart air bags, it

believes it is best to focus on ensuring

that manufacturers have appropriate

flexibility to address the problem of

adverse effects of air bags. This will

enable the manufacturers to select the

solutions which can be accomplished

most quickly for their individual

models. NHTSA encourages the vehicle

manufacturers to use the best available

alternative solutions that can be quickly

implemented for their vehicles, whether

depowering, higher thresholds, other

changes to air bags, smart air bags, or a

combination of the above. The agency

notes again that the vehicle

manufacturers need not wait for further

rulemaking to begin installing smart air

bags, and encourages them to move in

that direction expeditiously.

NHTSA notes that, as discussed in the

January 1997 NPRM, CFAS and Public

Citizen petitioned the agency in

November 1996 to commence a

rulemaking proceeding to consider

requiring dual inflation air bags and to

specify deployment thresholds. The

agency stated in that notice that it

considered the petitions to have been

granted to the extent that the NPRM

analyzed and discussed issues raised by

the petitioners and subjected that

material to public comment. NHTSA

will continue to consider the issues

raised by those petitioners in its

planned rulemaking on smart air bags.

Consumers Union urged the agency to

evaluate whether the incidence of

fatalities caused by air bags in low

speed collisions may be

disproportionately high in certain

specific makes and models of passenger

vehicles. That organization stated that it

would be a great disservice to the public

to reduce the protection of air bags in all

cars because certain specific models are

improperly designed. NHTSA notes that

while the level of risks from air bags

undoubtedly varies between different

makes and models, a review of air bag

fatalities indicates that the problem is a

general one, not limited to a few makes/

models.

A few commenters argued against the

agency’s depowering proposal on the

grounds that the proposed amendments

would result in a greater number of lives

being lost than saved, both for

passengers and drivers.

While the agency recognizes the

possibility that there is a potential for

net disbenefits from depowering, it

believes it must consider both the shortrun and long-run implications of this

rulemaking on safety. Ultimately, the

continued availability of any safety

device as standard equipment, whether

provided voluntarily by manufacturers

or pursuant to a regulation, is

dependent on consumer acceptability.

The agency believes that air bags which

fatally injure occupants, particularly

children in low speed crashes, place the

concept of air bags at risk, despite their

overall net safety benefits. Accordingly,

to help ensure that air bags remain

acceptable to consumers and ultimately

achieve their full potential in the future,

the agency believes it is reasonable to

accept some short-term safety tradeoffs

associated with depowering, while

better solutions are being developed.

NHTSA also notes that, as discussed

in the NPRM, it believes that even if the

net effect were negative, the opportunity

to avoid the deaths of a significant

number of children who would

otherwise be fatally injured by air bags

justifies foregoing the opportunity to

save some unbelted teenage and adult

passengers. There are several reasons for

this policy choice.

First, it is not acceptable that a safety

device cause a significant number of

fatalities in circumstances in which fatal

or serious injuries would not otherwise

occur. In making this statement, the

agency draws a distinction between air

bags which are fatally injuring young

children in low speed crashes in which

the other vehicle occupants are

uninjured, and other safety devices

which may on occasion unavoidably

substitute one type of injury for another

type that would occur in their absence

(safety belts are a good example).8 Those

fatalities are particularly unacceptable

in light of the agency’s analysis showing

that depowering air bags can

significantly reduce the number of

children being fatally injured by air

bags.

Second, it is also particularly

unacceptable that the vehicle occupants

being fatally injured are young children,

and that the number of those deaths is

steadily growing. In confronting the

possibility of inevitable short-term

safety tradeoffs between young children

and unbelted occupants over 12 years of

age, the agency believes that greater

weight must be placed on protecting
Federal Register / Vol. 62, No. 53 / Wednesday, March 19, 1997 / Rules and Regulations 12965

9See pages III–45 and 46 of the PRE which show

that the 143 millisecond pulse was significantly

longer in duration and lower in amplitude when

compared to the 125 msec pulse.

young children. NHTSA has always

given a high priority to protecting

children and accordingly has applied

these different cost-benefit

considerations to its rulemaking

affecting children. The agency’s

activities related to school bus safety

standards are an example of this policy.

A major reason for giving priority to

protecting young children is that they

are less mature than teenagers and

adults and thus less able to exercise

independent judgment, assess the risks

and take action to improve their safety.

Young children are more dependent on

the judgment and actions of other

persons. The oldest of the 38 children

who have been fatally injured by an air

bag was nine years old, and most of the

children have been much younger. The

agency is concerned about the safety of

the unbelted teenagers and adults who

might be affected by depowering, but is

increasing its efforts to persuade them to

protect themselves by buckling their

safety belts as required by the laws of 49

States and the District of Columbia.

NHTSA is also increasing its efforts to

persuade parents to ensure that all

children are properly restrained.

B. 80 g’s Chest Injury Criterion vs. Sled

Test

As discussed above, Standard No. 208

currently specifies that occupant

protection is measured in a full scale

crash test in which a vehicle equipped

with test dummies at the outside front

seating positions is crashed into a

barrier. Specific injury criteria measured

on the test dummies, including those

evaluating chest acceleration and head

injuries, must be met in barrier crashes

at speeds up to 30 mph, and at a range

of angles up to 30 degrees off-center.

In August 1996, AAMA submitted a

petition requesting that the unbelted

crash test requirement be replaced with

a generic sled test protocol. Under that

protocol, all of a vehicle, or a portion of

the vehicle representing the interior,

would be mounted on a sled. The sled

would be decelerated from 30 mph over

a time period of 143 milliseconds

according to a specific deceleration-time

curve which approximates a vehicle’s

crash pulse. There would not be an

angle test, only a direct frontal test.

AAMA requested that the same crash

pulse be used for all vehicles. That

organization asserted that its

recommended test protocol would allow

for lower powered inflators to be

introduced into the market as quickly as

possible, while maintaining air bag

protection for all occupants.

After NHTSA conducted a vehicle test

and discovered that AAMA’s initially

recommended crash pulse could allow a

vehicle to meet Standard No. 208’s

existing injury criteria without an air

bag, in November 1996 that organization

suggested using a more severe crash

pulse: 125 msec., which corresponds to

17.2 g’s.9 AAMA also recommended at

that time that the agency include neck

injury criteria to evaluate air bag

performance as it relates to the

recommended crash pulse, in addition

to the current injury criteria which,

among other things, limit chest

acceleration to 60 g’s. The neck injury

criteria are likely to be the limiting

factor in determining the maximum

allowable depowering level for a

particular vehicle.

After reviewing the available

information, NHTSA proposed two

alternative temporary amendments to

Standard No. 208: (1) Increase the

current chest acceleration limit from 60

g’s to 80 g’s, or (2) replace the unbelted

crash test requirement with a sled test

protocol incorporating the 125

millisecond crash pulse. The agency

noted that if both of these changes were

adopted, a manufacturer could select

either alternative at its option, but could

not mix the two options.

AAMA, AIAM, Advocates, Autoliv,

Public Citizen, and all vehicle

manufacturers addressing the issue,

stated that only the sled test alternative

should be adopted. AAMA stated that

using the sled test will allow further

optimization of air bag performance and

will save many additional lives each

year as well as substantially reduce the

risk of air bag-related injuries. That

organization stated that the sled test

allows depowering for all vehicles in

the quickest possible manner.

NHTSA notes that AAMA estimated

that only 31 percent of the fleet could

be depowered under the 80 g’s

alternative. That organization did not

provide specific data or analysis to

support that figure. However, Ford

commented that neither it nor the

agency has conducted angular barrier

modeling or tests that could be the basis

for judging performance of depowered

air bags in angular barrier tests. Ford

stated that computer modeling by it and

the agency, as well as sled tests, indicate

that HICs and femur loads increase with

depowered air bags, and Ford would

have no basis for judging that vehicles

equipped with substantially depowered

air bags would meet compliance criteria

in angular tests.

AIAM stated that the sled test would

result in the fastest way to achieve

depowering. Nissan stated that the sled

test provides the fastest and most

efficient approach to allow for

depowering. Autoliv stated that the sled

test was consistent with international

harmonization. Several safety groups,

including Advocates and IIHS, favored

the sled test, because they believed that

it provides the quickest way to reduce

risk.

In contrast, other safety groups

(CFAS, Consumers Union, and the

Parents Coalition) and some component

manufacturers (AirBelt Systems, AVS

Technologies, and Precision Fabrics

Group (PFG)) criticized the sled test.

CFAS stated that sled testing fails to

account for many aspects of interior

vehicle safety that contribute to

occupant injuries. Consumers Union

stated that the sled test is a ‘‘wholly

inadequate substitute for whole-car

crash tests in determining specific

vehicle performance.’’ PFG was

concerned that the generic pulse does

not consider such things as automobile

crush and steering wheel response.

IIHS was the only commenter to

support use of either approach.

After reviewing the comments,

NHTSA has decided to adopt the sled

test as an alternative to the current

unbelted barrier test for a limited time.

The agency believes that this approach

provides manufacturers with the

maximum flexibility to provide the

fastest depowering on the widest

portion of the vehicle fleet. As the

agency stated in the NPRM, the sled test

reduces the time and cost of doing

certification testing, since many more

sled tests can be conducted in the same

time period than can crash tests. The

agency also believes that the

standardized crash pulse and air bag

initiation time for all vehicles will allow

commonality in air bag systems,

requiring less development time and

thus eliminating the need for greater

variations of air bag system components

to accommodate differences in actual

car crash pulses. Such rapid

implementation is necessary to address

the potential risk posed to vehicle

occupants in low speed crashes. The

agency has decided not to provide an

option of complying with the 80 g’s

alternative, since no manufacturer

indicated it planned to pursue that

approach.

As discussed in the NPRM, NHTSA

continues to believe that a full scale

vehicle crash is a better means of

measuring crashworthiness than a sled

test, since it evaluates many more

factors about a motor vehicle’s

crashworthiness than a generic sled test.

The NPRM stated that
12966 Federal Register / Vol. 62, No. 53 / Wednesday, March 19, 1997 / Rules and Regulations

10 The issue of whether to make this amendment

temporary or permanent is discussed in detail

below.

The primary disadvantage of the generic sled

test is that the test measures only air bag

performance and not total vehicle

performance. The approach also eliminates

the effect of angle test requirements which

ensure protection in frontal impacts that

occur at a range of angles rather than purely

head-on.

There are other disadvantages with

the sled test, including that a sled test

does not simulate the triaxial

acceleration characteristics of an actual

vehicle crash. In other words, a sled test

involves acceleration from only a single

preset direction, while pulses for actual

vehicle crashes can have significant

vertical and lateral components of

acceleration that can affect occupant

kinematics and restraint performance.

Nor does a sled test evaluate dynamic

intrusion into and deformation of the

passenger compartment; structural

crush; the steering column’s energy

absorbing characteristics and load

bearing capability; and movement of the

passenger compartment due to localized

buckling.

Nevertheless, NHTSA has decided to

allow the sled test as a temporary 10

measure given the need to provide

manufacturers with maximum

flexibility to respond rapidly to the risk

posed by air bag activation in low speed

crashes.

NHTSA notes that, as discussed in the

NPRM, it conducted a series of tests

using the revised AAMA crash pulse.

One vehicle passed all of Standard No.

208’s current injury criteria without an

air bag, but had a very small margin of

compliance for passenger chest g’s.

Another vehicle met the standard’s

current injury criteria without an air bag

for the passenger side, but slightly

exceeded the driver chest g’s limit. The

agency’s testing also showed that air bag

deployment is necessary for a vehicle to

comply with the new neck injury

criteria, discussed later in this notice.

Given that manufacturers must design

their vehicles with sufficient margin of

compliance to ensure that all vehicles

will pass a standard’s requirements, and

given the addition of the new neck

injury criteria, the agency believes that

the sled test adopted in this rule will

ensure an appropriate level of

depowering without diminishing the

benefits of unbelted testing. While the

agency recognizes that the sled test is

not an ideal means for ensuring that

chest and head protection are provided

in specific vehicles, and that the 30 mph

generic pulse represents a barrier crash

test at a speed lower than 30 mph,

NHTSA believes it is an appropriate

interim approach to help facilitate

depowering.

C. Application of the Amendment to

Driver Air Bags

In the NPRM, the agency noted a

number of differences between the

passenger and driver air bag problems.

The agency explained that while the

annual number of child fatalities is

small but growing steadily, the annual

number of driver fatalities does not

appear to be growing. At the time of the

NPRM, while the agency was aware of

18 children who had been fatally

injured by air bags during 1996, it was

aware of only one driver who had been

fatally injured by an air bag in the

United States during that year. (As of

now, the agency is aware of 22 children,

and three drivers, who were killed by

air bags during 1996.)

NHTSA noted in the NPRM that most

child fatalities had occurred in model

year 1994 and 1995 vehicles. In

contrast, only 4 of the driver fatalities

had occurred in a vehicle manufactured

after model year 1992. The absence of

fatalities in recent model year vehicles

appeared even more pronounced in the

case of female drivers 5 feet 2 inches or

shorter. Only one female driver 5 feet 2

inches or shorter had died in a post

model year 1992 vehicle. Most fatalities

of short-statured female drivers had

occurred in model year 1990–1992

vehicles. (The figures and fatality

patterns in this paragraph remain

unchanged, as of the date of issuance of

this final rule, except that the number

of driver fatalities in post model year

1992 vehicles is now 5.)

The agency noted in the NPRM that

because driver air bags have been

produced in large numbers for several

years longer than passenger air bags, the

vehicle manufacturers have had time in

a number of instances to redesign driver

air bags to incorporate a number of

countermeasures to reduce the risk to

out-of-position occupants. NHTSA

requested information on the potential

that current driver air bags have for

creating adverse effects, including

relevant design changes that have

already been made to driver air bags.

NHTSA requested information on the

number of driver air bag fatalities that

have occurred to date, and on whether

there is a need to change Standard No.

208 to permit varying levels of

depowering. The agency noted that,

based on limited testing and modeling,

20 to 35 percent depowering of driver

air bags appeared to result in only slight

increases in the injury levels

‘‘experienced’’ by a test dummy.

NHTSA stated that it believes that the

presence of energy absorbing steering

columns explain why the driver air bag

can depowered without significantly

affecting chest g’s.

The vehicle manufacturers urged the

agency to amend Standard No. 208 to

allow depowering for the driver side as

well as the passenger side. AAMA

stated that its design goal for

depowering is to reduce to as close to

zero the possibility of a fifth percentile

female being injured by the air bag. That

organization stated that not allowing

depowering for the driver position

would continue to place these

occupants at unnecessary risk.

IIHS stated that although most public

attention has focused on the problem of

air bag injuries to children, it is clear

that drivers also are being injured by

inflating air bags. That organization

stated that much of its analysis has

focused on the potential benefits to

drivers of depowering air bags. IIHS

therefore argued that the alternative

compliance procedures proposed by

NHTSA should apply to both driver and

passenger protection.

NTSB stated that given the awareness

that air bags at the current energy level

can be highly injurious to both drivers

and passengers, it recommends that

depowering be extended to both

passenger and driver positions.

AVS Technologies, by contrast, stated

that the amendment should apply only

to the passenger side. According to that

company, the disbenefits of increased

fatalities in comparison to the relatively

small number of serious deployment

injuries does not justify amending the

regulation to accommodate depowered

driver air bags. AVS Technologies also

argued that the problem of small

statured drivers can be mitigated by

implementation of available

technologies such as adjustable steering

columns that allow the small statured

adult to position the steering wheel

further away from the head and chest.

In response to the NPRM, NHTSA

received relatively little information on

whether there was a need to change

Standard No. 208 to permit depowering.

Ford, however, stated that as air bag

technology and dummy testing

technology has advanced, air bags have

been gradually depowered. That

company stated that with today’s

technology, some early air bags could be

redesigned to meet Standard No. 208’s

injury criteria with lower inflation

speeds. Ford noted that tests by the

agency have demonstrated that limited

depowering is being incorporated into

newer vehicle designs. Ford added,

however, that most current air bag

designs (some of which are not yet in

production) have already been

depowered to some degree and cannot
Federal Register / Vol. 62, No. 53 / Wednesday, March 19, 1997 / Rules and Regulations 12967

be further depowered without unduly

increasing the risk of failing to meet

some of the dummy injury criteria in the

present Standard No. 208 barrier crash

test with unbelted dummies.

After considering the comments,

NHTSA has decided to amend Standard

No. 208 to allow depowering for the

driver side as well as the passenger side.

While relevant supporting data are

considerably more limited for the driver

side than the passenger side, the agency

wishes to ensure that manufacturers

have the flexibility to quickly address

driver side risks to small females and

the elderly. NHTSA notes, however, that

fatalities involving small females and

the elderly are rare. Depowering driver

air bags will also help reduce arm

injuries.

D. Duration of Amendment

As indicated above, in developing the

January 1997 proposal, NHTSA

considered an array of approaches that

would address the air bag safety

problem. Among other things, the

agency considered higher deployment

thresholds, dual stage inflators, smart

air bags, and various other air-bag

related changes.

After reviewing these alternatives,

NHTSA tentatively concluded that there

are various alternatives already allowed

by Standard No. 208 that may be

superior to depowering, i.e., alternatives

that result in equal or greater benefits

without raising the possibility of

adverse safety tradeoffs, but whose

leadtime is longer than that of

depowering. The agency therefore

tentatively concluded that while

depowering appears to be an

appropriate interim solution, there is no

need for permanently changing the

Standard to enable manufacturers to

fully address the adverse side effects of

air bags.

NHTSA noted that some commenters

on earlier notices, including Takata, had

expressed concern that a reduction in

Standard No. 208’s performance

requirements may delay the

introduction of superior alternatives.

The agency stated that it did not believe

a short-term temporary amendment

would result in such a delay, but would

instead provide maximum flexibility to

the vehicle manufacturers to quickly

address the problem, while they work

on better solutions. The agency also

explained that its forthcoming proposal

for smart air bags would seek to ensure

that air bags reach their full fatality and

injury reducing potential.

NHTSA recognized, however, that the

proposal to permit or facilitate

depowering of air bags was on a faster

track than the rulemaking to require

smart air bags. The agency noted that if

it permitted depowering until smart

bags are introduced, the question would

arise of how the agency should limit the

duration of the temporary amendment

for depowering. The agency noted that

one approach would be to specify a

several year duration and revisit the

issue in the context of the rulemaking

on smart air bags.

The agency received numerous

comments concerning the appropriate

duration for the depowering

amendment. The vehicle manufacturers,

IIHS, and CVC argued against including

a ‘‘sunset’’ clause; a number of safety

groups and suppliers argued that a

sunset for the amendment is critical,

and specifically conditioned their

support for depowering upon a sunset

provision.

AAMA stated that there is no reason

at this time to limit the duration of

depowering. That organization stated

that reducing the energy output of air

bag inflators should be viewed as an

important step toward development of

advanced technology air bags.

According to AAMA, there is no reason

to assume that the current energy level

of air bags provides optimum occupant

protection, especially for belted

occupants, and it would be a mistake to

assume that it must be reinstated after

some interim period. AAMA argued that

its analyses show that depowering alone

can save many additional lives per year

compared to today’s air bag energy

levels.

AAMA also argued that even if it did

make sense to couple depowering to

more advanced technology, that

technology is currently unknown. That

organization stated that it should be

apparent that defining what a ‘‘smart air

bag’’ is, is not a simple, straightforward

endeavor. According to AAMA, it is

premature and highly inappropriate to

consider a sunset date for depowering

technologies that are known to be at

least partial solutions to the concerns

regarding inflation related injuries.

AAMA also argued that as

manufacturers consider application of

depowered air bag systems, a sunset

provision would become a significant

factor in assessing the practicability of

design changes. That organization

argued that this will especially be the

case for models with product lives

scheduled to end in the period shortly

after the sunset date. According to

AAMA, the benefits expected from

changes to depowering for a short

period of time, followed by further

changes to meet advanced technology

air bag requirements, may not justify the

design/development/certification costs.

AIAM stated that whatever change is

made to Standard No. 208, the basic

concept of the revised regulation needs

to be permanent. That organization

argued that investments to optimize

safety belt/air bag system designs can

only be made if manufacturers know

that the barrier crash test using unbelted

dummies will not be reimposed in a

short time. AIAM also argued that the

action in this rulemaking should not be

linked to the ‘‘smart’’ air bag system

rulemaking that NHTSA contemplates.

IIHS stated that because of

uncertainty about the availability and

efficacy of future technology, and

because it does not agree that the

proposed regulatory changes will lead to

the tradeoffs NHTSA anticipates—it

does not support the inclusion of a

sunset provision for the proposed rule

changes. IIHS stated that limiting the

duration of the depowering amendment

would be superfluous and

counterproductive, considering the

agency anticipates further rulemaking

on smart air bags.

CVC stated that it is concerned by the

time frame allowed for depowered air

bags under NHTSA’s proposal. That

organization stated that even if NHTSA

promptly adopts the sled test,

automakers would still probably not be

able to complete the changeover of their

fleets until sometime in model year

1999—and then could be faced with the

prospect of changing their entire fleets

back to full-scale crash-testing soon

thereafter. CVC stated that it agrees that

smart air-bag technology holds promise

for the future, but there is little reason

to assume that this technology will be

sufficiently developed and tested to

permit mass installation just three years

from now. CVC argued that forcing the

rapid implementation of new untested

technology could produce a whole new

wave of safety concerns (inadvertent,

failed or improper deployment), leading

to new occupant injuries and additional

adverse publicity for air bags.

Morton stated that it firmly believes

that the depowering amendment should

be temporary. That company stated that

the question of duration cannot be

easily answered at this point. It stated

its belief that the suggested approach in

the NPRM to specify a several year

duration and to revisit the issue in the

context of the rulemaking on smart air

bags is the appropriate option at this

point.

General Dynamics stated that it

supports the current NHTSA proposed

solutions, but that support is based on

NHTSA’s statement that

implementation of proposed solutions

will be recognized as temporary

measures until ‘‘smart’’ solutions
12968 Federal Register / Vol. 62, No. 53 / Wednesday, March 19, 1997 / Rules and Regulations

11NHTSA notes that concepts such as dual stage

inflators are not new and were considered by the

agency in deciding to require automatic protection.

For example, in the early and mid-1970’s, various

vehicle manufacturers reported favorable results in

testing the ability of various dual level or variable

inflation systems for air bags to address the problem

of out-of-position children. In 1980, NHTSA

informed the industry about its analysis of a

number of possible technological solutions,

including dual-inflation air bags, chambering air

bags and top-mounted air bags. The July 11, 1984

Final Regulatory Impact Analysis (FRIA) for the

1984 final rule requiring the installation of

automatic occupant restraints in passenger cars (49

Fed. Reg. 28962; July 17, 1984) listed a variety of

potential technological means for addressing the

problem of injuries associated with air bag

deployments (FRIA, pp. III–8 to 10): a dual level

inflation system whose operation is based on

impact speed; a dual level inflation system whose

operation is based on a switch in the vehicle seat

or elsewhere that measures occupant size or weight

and senses whether an occupant is out of position;

a dual level inflation system whose operation is

based on an electronic proximity detector in the

dashboard; and other technological measures such

as bag shape and size, instrument panel contour,

aspiration, and inflation technique.

12Even if the use rates were significantly higher,

and an analysis showed that dropping the unbelted

test would have net safety benefits for motor vehicle

occupants, the agency could not drop the test on its

own initiative. As the agency noted in its February

27, 1997 notice, legislation would be necessary to

authorize the agency to take that step.

become available. General Dynamics

stated that it disagrees that the proposed

temporary measures will be required for

the next several model years as smart

systems are phased in. That company

stated that it believes that the

disbenefits of the NHTSA temporary

measures will grow in those years and

argues that a near-term mandate for

smart air bags is required.

AirBelt Systems stated that ‘‘either

one of the proposed approaches, due to

the adverse safety tradeoffs which it

argues will take place, must be viewed

only as an extremely temporary step at

possibly helping to solve the current

dilemma of severe injury and deaths to

children from air bags.’’

TRW stated that it is concerned that

the proposed interim action could

potentially stifle the urgent need for

more elegant and comprehensive

solutions that potentially accommodate

a much better balance in protecting

children, belted and unbelted

occupants, varying size occupants and

varying positioned occupants. TRW

stated that, accordingly, the depowering

amendment should be allowed during

the period where an aggressive phase-in

schedule exists to develop and

introduce varying degrees of advanced

restraint system technologies.

AVS Technologies stated that, if

adopted, the sled alternative should

remain in effect for a limited period of

time. According to that company, it

should be replaced within two years by

a temporary modified vehicle barrier

test.

CFAS stated that if NHTSA accepts

manufacturer arguments that depowered

inflators are effective in solving current

problems, the agency must recognize

that depowered inflators will involve a

substantial amount of manufacturer

resources to design, develop, test and

install on a widespread basis. That

organization stated that given the

investment in depowered inflators,

manufacturers will be reluctant to

develop new and better technological

solutions to improve their air bag

systems. CFAS expressed concern that,

consequently, proposals to alter

Standard No. 208 will become

permanent, not temporary, and will

work against implementation of smart

air bags. CFAS stated that if NHTSA

adopts depowering, it suggests that the

agency require manufacturers to use a

dual or multi-staged system, using a

‘‘depowered’’ inflator for low speed

crashes and a higher-powered inflator

for higher speed crashes.

Public Citizen stated that

implementation of a revised Standard

No. 208 should supersede this

depowering rulemaking as rapidly as

possible, and no later than model year

1999 vehicles. That organization stated

that there should be requirements for

dual-or multi-stage inflation air bags by

model year 1999. It stated that,

according to comments already

submitted to the agency by air bag

suppliers, dual-stage inflation systems

could be installed in model year 1999

vehicles.

After considering the comments,

NHTSA has determined that there is no

need to permanently reduce Standard

No. 208’s performance requirements to

enable manufacturers to fully address

the adverse effects of air bags. This is

because there are various alternatives,

albeit with longer technological

development and implementation

leadtimes than depowering, that are

already allowed by the standard and

that appear likely to result in equal or

greater benefits than depowering

without creating adverse safety

tradeoffs. Thus, the agency views

depowering as an interim approach,

while the vehicle manufacturers

develop and implement better solutions.

One technological alternative is a dual

or multiple level inflator, which has the

effect of causing an air bag to perform

as a ‘‘depowered’’ air bag in low to

moderate speed crashes (and possibly in

all crashes in which occupants are

belted or the seat is in a forward

position), and as a fully powered air bag

to provide protection to unbelted

occupants in higher speed crashes.

Thus, dual or multiple level inflators

appear to offer all of the benefits

associated with depowering without the

tradeoffs, and may either enable an air

bag to qualify as a smart air bag or be

one of the major building blocks of a

smart air bag. The agency observes that

several suppliers have commented that

this and/or other technologies are

available for introduction as early as

model year 1999. NHTSA believes it is

reasonable to expect the vehicle

manufacturers to move rapidly to adopt

such technologies, rather than to

continue with single-inflation-level,

depowered air bags.11 The agency also

notes that adoption of dual or multilevel inflators is not inherently

dependent on the use of advanced

occupant position sensing devices.

Contrary to AAMA’s suggestion, the

agency is not assuming that the current

energy level of air bags provides

optimum occupant protection,

especially for belted occupants. Instead,

the agency recognizes that more

advanced air bag designs can provide

appropriate inflation rates for different

levels of crash severity, occupant size/

position, and belted/unbelted

conditions. The agency observes that

one of the primary criticisms of current

air bags, that they inflate in the same

one-size-fits-all manner regardless of

occupant size and position and crash

severity, will also be true for depowered

air bags, albeit at a different level.

However, this limitation of current air

bag designs, and the contemplated

depowered air bags, can be addressed by

the use of dual or multiple level

inflators.

NHTSA also disagrees with IIHS’s

suggestion that it would be superfluous

to limit the duration of the depowering

amendment, since the agency

anticipates further rulemaking on smart

air bags and would likely review all

requirements of the standard. While the

agency expects that a variety of test

conditions may be added as part of a

rulemaking to require smart air bags,

and while the agency has recently

sought public comment on the issue, 62

FR 8917 (February 27, 1997), based on

current belt use rates, there is no reason

to assume that the basic concept of a

simple 30 mph barrier test for the

unbelted condition would be dropped.

As noted earlier in this notice, about

half of all occupants in potentially fatal

crashes still do not wear their safety

belts.12 Moreover, barrier testing is the

most prevalent and accepted means of

measuring real world protection.

NHTSA recognizes that there is

substantial uncertainty as to how

quickly smart air bags can be
Federal Register / Vol. 62, No. 53 / Wednesday, March 19, 1997 / Rules and Regulations 12969

13 Another difference accounting for the revised

estimate of potential disbenefits relates to how the

agency used barrier crash test results for baseline

and depowered air bags. In the PRE, the agency

applied the barrier crash test results to all

potentially fatal frontal crashes. AAMA argued that

barrier testing only represents about 10 percent of

all fatal crashes, and that depowering will not have

any effect in offset frontal crashes. AAMA argued

that 10 percent of NHTSA’s PRE disbenefit

estimates would provide reasonable estimates.

AAMA provided no data to show that there would

be no effect of depowering on fatalities in offset

frontal impacts. The agency’s analysis indicates that

barrier crashes are closely representative of about

34 percent of all fatal frontal crashes. The agency

agrees that depowering may not have as much of

an effect in offset frontal crashes, but the effect is

unknown. For example, there is still a concern

about a greater chance of an occupant’s head hitting

the A-pillar in an offset crash with a depowered air

bag. The agency used a range in the FRE, applying

the barrier test results to 34 to 100 percent of all

frontal fatalities, to account for the fact that the

agency does not know if depowering will have a

smaller impact in those crashes for which barrier

crashes are less representative.

incorporated into the entire fleet.

Accordingly, the agency is adopting the

approach suggested in the NPRM of

specifying a several-year duration for

the depowering amendment, and will

revisit the issue, to the extent

appropriate, in the context of a future

rulemaking on smart air bags.

The agency is specifying a

termination date of September 1, 2001,

which roughly corresponds to the

beginning of model year 2002. Based on

information provided at NHTSA’s

February 11–12, 1997 public workshop

on smart air bags, this appears to be a

realistic date as to when the vehicle

manufacturers can install some kind of

smart air bags throughout their fleets, or

at least more advanced air bags that

provide the benefits associated with

depowering without the tradeoffs. This

expiration date assumes that the vehicle

manufacturers will use the discretion

they have to rapidly introduce the new

air bag technologies that they and the

suppliers have been developing, and

will begin implementation of advanced

air bag technologies in many of their

vehicles before that date. For example,

several suppliers have stated that dual

or multiple stage inflators are available

for introduction beginning as early as

model year 1999, i.e., September 1,

1998, and that various other advanced

air bag technologies will become

available by that time or soon thereafter.

NHTSA also believes that allowing

depowering for more than four calendar

years should provide manufacturers a

reasonable amount of time to optimize

depowered systems (i.e., tailor venting

strategies, etc.), rather than simply

depowering current systems without

change. Manufacturers should not,

however, read the September 1, 2001

date as any indication that the agency,

in its smart air bag rulemaking, will not

consider a requirement for a phase-in

for smart air bags that begins before that

time.

F. Benefits and Trade-Offs

AAMA and IIHS submitted critiques

of the analyses of benefits and trade-offs

presented in the PRE, arguing that the

agency substantially overstated the

potential disbenefits of depowering.

Among other things, these commenters

argued that the agency incorrectly

assumed that 30 mph barrier crash tests

represent all fatal highway crashes.

Considerable comment was received

on the real world results of the GM

Holden depowered air bag in Australia.

AAMA argued that the agency should

have placed greater weight on that

information. Several other commenters

suggested that less weight be placed on

it. AVS Technologies stated that if the

greater effectiveness of Holden air bags

is primarily attributable to their

effectiveness in preventing less severe

injuries (AIS 2), then it is unreasonable

to assume that optimizing U.S. air bags

for the belted case will result in the

same increased levels of effectiveness

for reducing fatalities. That commenter

also stated that while the PRE states the

Holden system is more effective for

serious (MAIS 3+) chest injuries than

U.S. air bags, the data show that the

Holden system is considerably less

effective than its U.S. counterpart in

reducing MAIS 3+ head injuries. AVS

Technologies argued that, in any event,

the figure for Holden effectiveness with

respect to MAIS 3+ injuries is of

doubtful validity, given the small

number of cases. Richard Strombotne

argued that the number of cases used in

the Holden analysis is so small that the

uncertainty in the analysis renders the

results useless. Several commenters

noted that Holden air bags deploy at a

higher threshold, and stated that the

higher threshold may account for a large

part of the greater effectiveness of

Holden air bags.

The FRE responds to the various

comments on benefits and trade-offs,

and presents revised estimates. The

estimates presented in the PRE and FRE

for the sled test alternative can be

summarized as follows.

The PRE estimated that if current

rates of child fatalities were experienced

in an all-air-bag fleet, 128 children

would be killed over the life of a single

model year’s fleet. The figure of 128

included 38 infants in rear-facing infant

seats and 90 older children. Based on

three-and-one-half more months of data

showing no new cases of infant

fatalities, but increasing numbers of

older child fatalities, the FRE revises the

total number of child fatalities up from

128 to 140. The new total includes a

reduced number (33) of infant fatalities

and increased number (107) of older

child fatalities.

NHTSA emphasizes, as it did in the

NPRM, that this and the agency’s other

rulemaking proceedings and related

efforts are intended to ensure that risks

of adverse effects of air bags are reduced

so that these theoretically projected air

bag fatalities do not materialize, while

the potential benefits of air bags are

retained to the maximum extent

possible.

One area of uncertainty that

significantly affects both potential

benefits and tradeoffs is how much the

vehicle manufacturers will depower air

bags. AAMA commented that the

average level of depowering will be 20

to 35 percent.

Based on test results and modeling,

the FRE estimates that, if 35 percent is

the upper end manufacturers adopt for

depowering, 47 children would be

saved. Using the same assumptions, the

FRE estimates that 34 to 280 fewer

teenage and adult passengers may be

saved. The FRE recognizes that, if some

air bags are depowered by more than 35

percent, more children would be saved,

although there would also be higher

disbenefits. The agency notes that the

PRE provided higher estimates for both

potential benefits and disbenefits,

primarily because it assumed greater

levels of depowering. 13

Also based on test results and

modeling, the FRE estimates that

depowering could save a large portion

of the 25 out-of-position drivers who

may be killed by air bags, and four to

22 adult belted passengers. The first of

these figures is unchanged from the

PRE; the range for adult belted

passengers is slightly revised. The FRE

also estimates that depowering could

save almost all of the seven out-ofposition adult passengers who may be

killed by air bags; the PRE did not

address this category. The FRE estimates

that 16 to 151 fewer drivers may be

saved.

NHTSA notes that AAMA believes

that depowering will result in higher

benefits for unbelted drivers than

estimated by the agency. That

organization estimated that depowering

could save 215 to 330 small, out-ofposition, unbelted adult drivers. This

estimate was based on estimates of the

number of small drivers that would be

unbelted, estimates of the number of

crashes in which braking or other

factors would cause those unbelted

drivers to be close to the air bag, and

test data by Transport Canada on fifth
12970 Federal Register / Vol. 62, No. 53 / Wednesday, March 19, 1997 / Rules and Regulations

percentile female dummies showing a

significant chance of potentially fatal

neck injuries for drivers which are close

to the air bag.

The agency observes, however, that

AAMA’s analysis implies the

occurrence of a much larger number of

air bag fatalities than can be supported

by available fatality reports. NHTSA has

examined as many low speed air bag

fatality cases as it can find. Based on the

cases it found, NHTSA cannot

corroborate the hundreds of air bag

fatalities in low speed crashes implied

by AAMA’s analysis. Since there are

many more low speed crashes than high

speed crashes, and since current air bags

deploy at the same speed in low and

high speed impacts, an examination of

high speed crashes would not be likely

to reveal a significant number of

additional air-bag-induced fatalities.

As to Holden air bags, the PRE stated

that if the relationship in overall

effectiveness of the Holden air bag to

U.S. air bags for AIS 2+ injuries is the

same for fatalities, an estimated 643

lives of belted occupants could be saved

annually by having depowered air bags

like the Holden air bag. With respect to

the comments received concerning this

analysis, the agency recognizes that

there are insufficient Holden data with

respect to fatalities to draw conclusions

confidently about the number of lives of

belted occupants that would be saved by

Holden-type air bags. Moreover, the

agency cannot separate the benefits

related to depowering from the benefits

related to the higher deployment

threshold. For these reasons, it would

not be appropriate to place greater

weight on the Holden analysis.

Nevertheless, the agency still believes

the Holden experience for reducing AIS

2+ injuries indicates at least the

possibility that depowered air bags

could significantly reduce fatalities for

belted occupants.

NHTSA notes that, as discussed in the

FRE, the agency has assessed the merits

of the comments and accepted some,

while rejecting others, in revising its

estimates of the benefits and disbenefits

of depowering. It has rejected comments

that chest g’s are not the appropriate

way to measure chest injury potential

and that chest deflection or V*C are

more appropriate, that the agency based

its chest g’s versus risk of injury curve

on a minimal number of cadaver

experiments, and that the agency’s

methodology for estimating benefits is

in error. As mentioned above, the

agency partially accepted the comment

that the barrier test might not represent

the type of crash that produces all

frontal fatalities. The agency used a

range in the FRE, applying the barrier

test results to 34 to 100 percent of all

frontal fatalities, to account for the fact

that the agency does not know if

depowering will have a smaller impact

in those crashes for which barrier

crashes are less representative. The

agency has not changed its analysis or

the presentation of its analysis of the

Holden bag or of the number of adults

killed by air bags per year.

Recognizing that there is a great deal

of uncertainty concerning benefits and

tradeoffs, NHTSA emphasizes that, in

any event, its decision to permit or

facilitate depowering as an interim

measure is driven less by calculations

comparing potential benefits and

potential disbenefits than by the need to

quickly address the fatalities being

caused by air bags. Further, as discussed

above, NHTSA believes that addressing

those fatalities is essential to maintain

the public acceptability of air bags, and

thereby ensure that air bags achieve

their full long-term potential in

reducing deaths and injuries from

frontal impacts.

Moreover, in the longer run, the use

of smart air bag technologies will enable

manufacturers to optimize air bags for a

variety of different conditions,

including different crash severities,

occupant sizes and positions, and

belted/unbelted conditions. Thus, with

the use of smart air bags, it is possible

to both achieve the potential benefits

from using Holden-type air bags and

avoid the tradeoffs that can occur from

depowering.

F. Specific Sled Test Requirements/

Procedures

1. Neck Injury Criteria

In its January 1997 NPRM, NHTSA

proposed to add neck injury criteria for

the 50th percentile male dummy as part

of the sled test alternative. This

proposal is consistent with AAMA’s

request for the agency to consider injury

measurements for the neck in evaluating

how air bags respond to the crash pulse.

Specifically, in S13.2, the agency

proposed the following neck injury

criteria:

(a) Flexion Bending Moment—190

Nm. SAE Class 600.

(b) Extension Bending Moment—57

Nm. SAE Class 600.

C) Axial Tension—3300 peak N. SAE

Class 1000.

(d) Axial Compression—4000 peak N.

SAE Class 1000.

(e) Fore-and-Aft Shear—3100 peak N.

SAE Class 1000.

The source of the proposed neck

injury criteria is ‘‘Anthropomorphic

Dummies for Crash and Escape

Systems,’’ AGARD Conference

Proceedings of NATO, July 1996,

AGARD–AR–330. The agency noted that

GM uses the same neck criteria for its

injury assessment reference values

(IARV’s). Data provided by AAMA

indicated that, in general, these neck

criteria could not be met without an air

bag. The agency requested comments on

this subject.

Advocates, the American Academy of

Pediatrics (AAP), the AORC, AVS, IIHS,

and TRW supported including neck

injury criteria. Advocates stated that

such criteria provide valuable minimum

criteria for sled tests and that the criteria

especially help evaluate the potential

danger faced by young children who are

more susceptible to neck and spinal

injury than adults. AAP stated that such

injury criteria will improve the

evaluation and development of

occupant protection. IIHS stated that

such criteria are generally desirable in

evaluating occupant protection, but are

not critical to maintaining benefits for

unbelted occupants. BMW stated that

although it anticipated no problem with

the criteria, it needed time to review

them.

Ford, Mitsubishi, and Nissan were

concerned about potential problems

with the neck injury criteria. Ford stated

that there may be high variability in the

testing for compliance with the criteria,

especially the neck extension criterion.

Ford was concerned that there was

insufficient experience with the neck

extension criterion to estimate the

repeatability and reproducibility of the

neck readings. Ford and Nissan stated

that further data could indicate that

adoption of the injury criteria could

unnecessarily limit or delay

depowering. Nevertheless, Ford

concluded that it ‘‘does not object to the

proposed neck injury criteria at this

time.’’ Nissan stated that there was not

sufficient evidence to warrant the

adoption of such criteria. Mitsubishi

requested that the agency clarify the

technical basis for the proposed neck

injury criteria.

Based on the available information,

NHTSA has decided to adopt the neck

injury criteria, as proposed. As AAMA

stated in its November 1996 submission,

such criteria are necessary to ensure that

a vehicle is equipped with air bags that

have protective value, since absent these

criteria, some vehicles could comply

with the 125 ms pulse sled test without

air bags. Moreover, compression loads,

bending moments, and tension and

shear forces can be significant sources of

potential injuries in crashes.

Accordingly, the inclusion of neck

injury criteria should aid in measuring

air bag effectiveness and may ultimately

improve crash protection. Though the
Federal Register / Vol. 62, No. 53 / Wednesday, March 19, 1997 / Rules and Regulations 12971

injury criteria are specified for use in

testing with the 50th percentile male

dummy, adopting neck injury criteria is

consistent with the agency’s goal of

protecting children, who are especially

susceptible to neck and spinal injury.

NHTSA has developed Nij neck criteria

for children that could be extended to

adults. A report describing this criteria

and its development has been docketed.

(74–14–N97)

In the NPRM, NHTSA did not make

it clear how the neck injury

measurements would be performed. The

agency wishes to clarify that the neck

injury measurement is performed by the

six-axis load cell mounted between the

head and upper end of the neck, as

specified in 49 CFR 572.33.

In response to Mitsubishi’s comment

requesting that the agency clarify the

technical basis for the neck injury

criteria, the agency notes that the

proposal was based on a request by

AAMA to include this criteria. In the

NPRM, the agency explained that the

source of the proposed neck criteria is

‘‘Anthropomorphic Dummies for Crash

and Escape Systems,’’ AGARD

Conference Proceedings of NATO, July

1996, AGARD-AR–330. The agency

further noted that GM uses the same

neck criteria for its IARVs.

In addition, since the NPRM was

issued, NHTSA has docketed two

reports describing a series of agency

tests with two vehicle platforms to

evaluate the 125 ms sled pulse

recommended by AAMA.

These tests evaluated driver and

passenger air bags using a 50th

percentile male dummy and a 5th

percentile female dummy. These tests

indicate that an air bag is necessary for

a vehicle to comply with the neck injury

criteria. In other words, a vehicle

equipped with no air bag did not

comply with the proposed neck injury

criteria.

2. Testing Full Vehicles or Partial

Vehicles

In the January 1997 NPRM, NHTSA

proposed a test procedure similar to the

one presented in AAMA’s petition.

NHTSA noted that the proposed

procedure specifies that the vehicle, or

‘‘a sufficient portion of the vehicle to be

representative of the vehicle structure,’’

is mounted on the sled. The agency

requested comments on the practicality

of conducting sled tests with a whole

vehicle, and on whether the quoted

language could be made more objective.

In a letter dated January 24, 1997,

NHTSA’s Associate Administrator for

Safety Assurance asked several vehicle

manufacturers to provide specific

information concerning their experience

in conducting sled tests. Among other

things, the agency asked whether there

are any considerations that need to be

addressed for using either a full or

partial vehicle on the sled. The agency

also asked whether any manufacturer

has ever performed a sled test with a

complete or almost complete vehicle.

AAMA, Subaru, and Volvo stated that

manufacturers typically conduct partial

vehicle tests. Nevertheless, AAMA

stated that such sled tests could be

conducted on either the full vehicle or

partial vehicle. Similarly, Ford stated

that ‘‘audit testing with an entire vehicle

on a sled would be acceptable, even

though vehicle manufacturers typically

test with only the passenger

compartment or the front portion of the

passenger compartment.’’ AVS and

Morton stated that it is impracticable

and infeasible to test the entire vehicle

on the sled given a vehicle’s weight and

size.

Based on its analysis of the available

information, NHTSA has decided to

specify testing the entire vehicle. The

agency is aware that sled tests are

typically conducted with partial

vehicles. However, sled tests

historically have been utilized as premanufacture development tests, rather

than as tests for compliance with a

Federal safety standard. The sled tests

with partial vehicles could be quickly

and economically set up and repeated.

However, the purpose of this standard is

to ascertain the crashworthiness of the

final product: the production vehicle.

The agency’s Vehicle Research Test

Center (VRTC) has analyzed the size and

power of the equipment used to conduct

sled tests. Based on the available

information, the agency believes that the

current-design sled at Transportation

Research Center (TRC) can be used to

evaluate a full vehicle’s response to a

125 ms pulse. Memoranda in the docket

summarize discussions between agency

and General Motors personnel

indicating that the readily available 12

inch diameter cylinder sled is capable of

producing the required acceleration

pulse for any complete vehicle subject

to Standard No. 208.

NHTSA believes that a full vehicle

test is superior to a partial vehicle test

for the following reasons. A full vehicle

test reduces variability, since a partial

vehicle test’s outcome could depend on

how a vehicle was cut. In addition, it

would be difficult to determine

precisely what a partial vehicle is.

Another problem with partial vehicle

testing is how to reinforce it. The agency

further notes that a full vehicle test is

more representative of actual crash

situations than a partial vehicle test.

Further, by requiring full vehicle

testing, the agency eliminates the need

to define what is meant by a partial

vehicle. Accordingly, the agency’s

request in the NPRM to define the

phrase ‘‘sufficient portion of vehicle to

be representative of the vehicle

structure’’ is moot.

Ford was concerned that body frame

vehicles should not be tested on a sled

test because such vehicles would

experience unrealistic deflection of

elastomeric body mounts and local

elastic and permanent deformation of

body mounting areas during a sled test

if only the frame were mounted to the

sled platform.

NHTSA notes that, if necessary, the

frame of a vehicle will be rigidly

attached to the vehicle body during

testing such that the specified

acceleration pulse is registered on the

vehicle body.

3. Crash Pulse ‘‘Corridor’’

In the January 1997 NPRM, NHTSA

stated that while AAMA provided

corridors for the original crash pulse in

its initial petition, that organization had

not provided corridors for its revised

crash pulse. The agency explained that

it contacted AAMA, requesting a figure

showing the mathematical equation for

the revised pulse, a graph of the pulse

and corridors for the pulse. The agency

stated that it is necessary to specify

corridors in addition to a specific pulse,

because it is generally not possible to

duplicate exact pulses. Manufacturers

would be required to assure that their

vehicles comply with the standard’s

performance requirements for all tests

within the specified corridors. The

agency announced that while the

proposed regulatory text specified only

a specific crash pulse and not the

corridors for that test, the agency

expected to include such corridors in

the final rule.

In a January 8, 1997 letter, AAMA

provided the agency with a

mathematical equation for the pulse, a

nominal pulse curve, and the allowable

upper and lower corridors from which

the pulse must not deviate.

Of the commenters addressing the

issue of a crash pulse corridor pulse, all

supported its need. Subaru,

Volkswagen, and Volvo stated that pulse

crash corridors should be included.

Volkswagen stated that including

corridors is appropriate, since it is

impossible to duplicate a sled pulse

trace in a particular test.

NHTSA has decided to include the

crash pulse corridors submitted by

AAMA. After reviewing the corridors,

VRTC has determined that the corridors

are reasonable and appropriate. The
12972 Federal Register / Vol. 62, No. 53 / Wednesday, March 19, 1997 / Rules and Regulations

14S8 specifies test conditions for vehicle loading,

fuel system capacity, vehicle test attitude, seat

location, and the status of doors and windows. The

provision for vehicle test attitude references the ‘‘as

delivered condition.’’

agency concludes that corridors, which

serve the same purpose as tolerances,

are necessary since it would be difficult

to repeat the exact crash pulse every

time a sled test was conducted.

Nevertheless, NHTSA wishes to

reiterate that vehicles must be able to

comply with the performance

requirements of the Standard in all tests,

where the pulse is within the specified

corridors.

4. Air Bag Activation

Two factors must be specified with

respect to air bag deployment during the

sled test: when should the timing of the

test start, and when should the air bag

be activated? In S13.1 of the proposed

regulatory text, NHTSA stated that ‘‘An

inflatable restraint is to be activated at

25 +/¥2 ms after initiation of the

acceleration shown in Figure 6.’’ In

NHTSA’s supplemental letter to vehicle

manufacturers, NHTSA stated that ‘‘The

proposed regulatory language in the

NPRM states the air bag will be

activated at 25 ± 2 ms after initiation of

the acceleration. Not all manufacturers

determine acceleration initiation the

same way. What time zero

determinations are used and of those

which one do you recommend?’’

AAMA stated that the activation time

should be changed to 20 ± 2 ms after the

time at which sled acceleration crosses

0.5 g, claiming that this change would

provide a more definite test criterion.

Subaru stated that in determining time

zero, it uses the time when the sled

acceleration exceeded 1 g as its

acceleration initiation. It believes that

this method represents a real crash

pulse considering the proposed air bag

firing time of 25 ± 2 ms. Toyota stated

that the agency should define the

starting point of the crash pulse in the

sled test. Toyota believed that either t=0

at the 0.5 g level during crash onset or

5 ms before 1 g is reached would be

acceptable. Volvo stated that since not

all manufacturers determine

acceleration the same way, the agency

should provide a ‘‘methodology to

determine trigger time for the air bag.’’

Only Volkswagen commented that the

agency should not specify the activation

time. That company stated that

specifying the activation time is design

restrictive and could limit ability to

depower certain systems.

NHTSA believes that it is appropriate

to specify the activation time. Except for

Volkswagen, all manufacturers

submitting comments on this issue

supported such a provision. The agency

believes that such a provision adds

precision and objectivity to the test

procedure.

NHTSA has decided to adopt the

activation time requested by AAMA in

its February 7, 1997 comment; i.e., 20 ±

2 ms after the time at which the sled

acceleration crosses 0.5 g. The agency

notes that this activation time modifies

the proposed time only slightly and will

ensure that the air bag activates slightly

earlier in the test than the proposed

time. Although the agency does not

have specific data to correlate the

difference in performance between a 20

ms activation and a 25 ms activation,

NHTSA believes that the 20 ms

activation is more representative of a

typical rigid crash.

5. Test Attitude

In S13.1, NHTSA proposed that the

whole or partial vehicle be mounted on

a dynamic test platform ‘‘at the

manufacturer’s design attitude, so that

the longitudinal center line of the

vehicle is parallel to the direction of the

test platform travel and so that

movement between the base of the

vehicle and the test platform is

prevented.’’

In the supplemental letter to the

manufacturers, NHTSA asked how a

manufacturer’s test attitude and the

vehicle’s longitudinal centerline are

measured and what tolerances should

be applied to these measurements.

AAMA stated that the pitch and yaw

angles are not particularly critical and

that +/¥ .5 degrees is sufficient,

consistent with SAE J826 July 95. Ford

stated that the test procedure should

specify the manufacturer’s nominal

vehicle attitude (pitch) for mounting of

the vehicle on the sled, to attain result

reproducibility. It stated that head

injury criteria (HIC), neck extension

(and possibly other proposed neck

loads) are sensitive to pitch angle of

vehicle mounting, because pitch angle

affects the trajectory of the unbelted

dummies. Ford favored the proposal for

the tests to be at the ‘‘manufacturer’s

design attitude.’’ Ford opposed setting

the vehicle’s pitch on the sled to match

that of the particular vehicle that is

purchased when loaded to test weight.

It believed that approach would reduce

the test’s reproducibility. Subaru stated

that it mounts the partial vehicle

parallel to the direction of the test

platform travel for its testing. It stated

although it had no problems related to

improper alignment, clear regulatory

tolerances would be helpful.

Based on previous test experience and

on the available information, NHTSA

has decided to incorporate the same test

conditions already set forth in S8 14 into

the sled test specified in S13. With

respect to the vehicle test attitude, the

agency has decided to add a provision

in S13.3 that is patterned after S8.1.1(d).

The agency believes that this provision

addresses the concerns of the

commenters without unnecessarily

complicating the test conditions. The

agency believes that requiring the

attitude of the vehicle on the sled to be

at any alignment between the attitude in

the ‘‘as delivered’’ condition and the

attitude in the ‘‘fully loaded condition’’

will eliminate difficulties that have been

caused by differences between the

theoretical fiduciary marks on blue

prints and the actual assembly of the

vehicle. The agency further notes that

the loading represents a real world

range of attitudes that the restraint

system should be able to handle.

6. Completion of Sled Test

Ford stated that the sled test should

be considered completed as soon as the

sled brakes are applied. It claimed that

dummy rebound kinematics and

instrumentation readings are not

representative of a highway collision

during the braking deceleration phase of

sled test.

Ford is correct that dummy

measurement recorded during the

rebound phase will not be considered

by this provision because sled braking is

not regulated by the standard. The

agency notes that it would be

inappropriate to reference a brake

application point because sled braking

varies depending on the type of sled.

G. Miscellaneous Issues.

1. Multistage Manufacturer Certification

The Recreational Vehicle Industry

Association (RVIA) and Atwood Mobile

Products (a seat manufacturer that

supplies seats for conversion vehicles)

requested a delay in the effective date

for conversion vehicle manufacturers.

RVIA requested a one-year delay in the

compliance date for certification of

vehicles manufactured in more than one

stage. That organization stated that any

changes to air bag power may mean that

recertification will be necessary.

NHTSA has decided not to

differentiate the effective date of today’s

final rule based on whether the vehicle

is manufactured in multiple stages. The

agency notes that today’s amendment

imposes no new requirements or costs,

but instead permits or facilitates

depowering of current air bags.
Federal Register / Vol. 62, No. 53 / Wednesday, March 19, 1997 / Rules and Regulations 12973

2. Effective Date

In the NPRM, NHTSA requested

comments on whether the amendment

should take effect immediately upon

publication based on the fact that it

addresses an urgent safety problem, the

death of young children. The agency

stated that the proposed amendment

would permit or facilitate the immediate

depowering of air bags, thereby helping

to reduce child fatalities caused by air

bags. The agency also noted that the

proposed amendment would not impose

any new requirements, but instead

would provide additional flexibility to

manufacturers in addressing this

problem.

AAMA, Ford, Advocates, and IIHS

favored adopting the amendments

immediately. AAMA strongly advocated

having the amendment take effect

immediately. That organization stated

that ‘‘Depowering is the most immediate

and effective technical means of

addressing the issues that have been

raised. The amendment allowing

depowering should be effective upon

the date of publication of the final rule.’’

Ford stated that the agency should

quickly issue the final rule so that

depowered bags can be available on

model year 1998 cars. Advocates stated

that it is in the public interest to

dispense with the 30-day waiting period

that is customarily required prior to a

rule taking effect.

Based on the available information,

NHTSA has decided to make the

amendment effective on the date of

publication. The agency believes that

there is good cause to have an

immediate effective date, given that an

immediate effective date is necessary to

enable vehicle manufacturers to begin

depowering air bags, and thus begin

saving lives, as soon as possible. As the

agency noted in the NPRM, the

amendment will not impose any new

requirements, but instead provides

additional flexibility to manufacturers

in addressing this problem.

VI. Rulemaking Analyses and Notices

A. Executive Order 12866 and DOT

Regulatory Policies and Procedures

NHTSA has considered the impact of

this rulemaking action under Executive

Order 12866 and the Department of

Transportation’s regulatory policies and

procedures. This rulemaking document

was reviewed by the Office of

Management and Budget under E.O.

12866, ‘‘Regulatory Planning and

Review.’’ This action has been

determined to be ‘‘significant’’ under

the Department of Transportation’s

regulatory policies and procedures. The

action is considered significant because

of the degree of public interest in this

subject.

This rule has been designated by

OMB as a major rule under Chapter 8 of

Title 5, U.S. Code. NHTSA has

determined, however, that there is good

cause for making this rule effective less

than 60 days after submission of the rule

to each House of Congress and to the

Comptroller General because a delay in

implementing this rule would be

contrary to the public interest. In

response to the agency’s specific request

for comments on an immediate effective

date, representatives of the automobile

and insurance industries as well as a

leading public interest group expressed

support. No opposing comments were

received. Making this rule effective

immediately is necessary to enable the

manufacturers to begin depowering

efforts, and thus begin saving lives, as

soon as possible.

The final rule does not impose any

new requirements or costs, but instead

permits or facilitates approximately 20

to 35 percent depowering of current air

bags. Any cost difference between

baseline and depowered air bags is

negligible.

A full discussion of costs and benefits

can be found in the agency’s regulatory

evaluation for this rulemaking action,

which is being placed in the docket.

B. Regulatory Flexibility Act

In the NPRM, NHTSA stated that after

considering the effects of this

rulemaking action under the Regulatory

Flexibility Act (5 U.S.C. 601 et seq.), it

certified that the proposed amendment

would not have a significant economic

impact on a substantial number of small

entities. NHTSA noted that the cost of

new passenger cars or light trucks

would not be affected by the proposed

amendment. Under 5 U.S.C. 605(b),

NHTSA stated that the proposed

amendment would primarily affect

passenger car and light truck

manufacturers and manufacturers of air

bags which are not small entities. The

agency referenced the Small Business

Administration’s regulations at 13 CFR

Part 121 which define a small business,

in part, as a business entity ‘‘which

operates primarily within the United

States.’’ (13 CFR 121.105(a)).

In the NPRM, the agency estimated

that there are at most five small

manufacturers of passenger cars in the

U.S., producing a combined total of at

most 500 cars each year. The agency

stated that it does not believe small

businesses manufacture even 0.1

percent of total U.S. passenger car and

light truck production each year. The

Coalition of Small Volume Automobile

Manufacturers (COSVAM) stated that

‘‘the five U.S.-based small

manufacturers acknowledged by

NHTSA’’ are significantly affected by

NHTSA’s rules, and that it would be

improper to fail to consider the effects

on these five companies. In addition,

COSVAM stated that NHTSA’s

regulations affect an even greater

number of small foreign auto

manufacturers that import into the U.S.

That organization stated that it would be

inappropriate to disregard the

rulemaking’s effect on such entities.

NHTSA again notes that today’s final

rule will not impose any new

requirements or costs on vehicle

manufacturers, but instead will permit

or facilitate approximately 20 to 35

percent depowering of current air bags.

Therefore, no vehicle manufacturer,

regardless of its size, will be required to

take any action as a result of the rule.

Accordingly, the agency believes that

the rule will have no significant impact

on small vehicle manufacturers.

C. National Environmental Policy Act

NHTSA has analyzed this final rule

for the purposes of the National

Environmental Policy Act and

determined that it will not have any

significant impact on the quality of the

human environment.

D. Executive Order 12612 (Federalism)

and Unfunded Mandates Act.

The agency has analyzed this final

rule in accordance with the principles

and criteria set forth in Executive Order

12612. NHTSA has determined that the

amendment does not have sufficient

federalism implications to warrant the

preparation of a Federalism Assessment.

In issuing this amendment to permit

or facilitate depowering, the agency

notes, for the purposes of the Unfunded

Mandates Act, that is pursuing the least

cost alternative. As noted above, any

cost difference between current and

depowered air bags is negligible. This

alternative was selected by NHTSA

because depowering would prevent

many of the air bag-related fatalities that

have been occurring and can be

implemented more quickly than the

other alternatives. Further, depowering

is the measure that industry itself has

been recommending as a means for

preventing those fatalities.

E. Civil Justice Reform

This proposed amendment does not

have any retroactive effect. Under 49

U.S.C. 30103, whenever a Federal motor

vehicle safety standard is in effect, a

State may not adopt or maintain a safety

standard applicable to the same aspect

of performance which is not identical to

the Federal standard, except to the
12974 Federal Register / Vol. 62, No. 53 / Wednesday, March 19, 1997 / Rules and Regulations

extent that the state requirement

imposes a higher level of performance

and applies only to vehicles procured

for the State’s use. 49 U.S.C. 30161 sets

forth a procedure for judicial review of

final rules establishing, amending or

revoking Federal motor vehicle safety

standards. That section does not require

submission of a petition for

reconsideration or other administrative

proceedings before parties may file suit

in court.

List of Subjects in 49 CFR Part 571

Imports, Incorporation by reference,

Motor vehicle safety, Motor vehicles,

Rubber and rubber products, Tires.

In consideration of the foregoing, 49

CFR Part 571 is amended as follows:

PART 571—FEDERAL MOTOR

VEHICLE SAFETY STANDARDS

1. The authority citation for Part 571

of Title 49 continues to read as follows:

Authority: 49 U.S.C. 322, 30111, 30115,

30117, and 30166; delegation of authority at

49 CFR 1.50.

2. Section 571.208 is amended by

revising S3 and S8.1, and by adding S13

through S13.4, to read as follows:

§ 571.208 Standard No. 208, Occupant

crash protection.

* * * * *

S3. Application. This standard

applies to passenger cars, multipurpose

passenger vehicles, trucks, and buses. In

addition, S9, Pressure vessels and

explosive devices, applies to vessels

designed to contain a pressurized fluid

or gas, and to explosive devices, for use

in the above types of motor vehicles as

part of a system designed to provide

protection to occupants in the event of

a crash. Notwithstanding any language

to the contrary, any vehicle

manufactured after March 19, 1997 and

before September 1, 2001 that is subject

to a dynamic crash test requirement

conducted with unbelted dummies may

meet the requirements specified in S13

instead of the applicable unbelted

requirement.

* * * * *

S8.1 General conditions. The

following conditions apply to the

frontal, lateral, and rollover tests. Except

for S8.1.1(d), the following conditions

apply to the alternative unbelted sled

test set forth in S13 from March 19,

1997 until September 1, 2001.

* * * * *

S13 Alternative unbelted test for

vehicles manufactured before

September 1, 2001.

S13.1 Instrumentation Impact

Test—Part 1—Electronic

Instrumentation. Under the applicable

conditions of S8, mount the vehicle on

a dynamic test platform at the vehicle

attitude set forth in S13.3, so that the

longitudinal center line of the vehicle is

parallel to the direction of the test

platform travel and so that movement

between the base of the vehicle and the

test platform is prevented. The test

platform is instrumented with an

accelerometer and data processing

system having a frequency response of

60 channel class as specified in Society

of Automotive Engineers (SAE)

Recommended Practice J211/1 MAR 95,

Instrumentation for Impact Test—Part

1—Electronic Instrumentation. SAE

J211/1 MAR 95 is incorporated by

reference and thereby is made part of

this standard. The Director of the

Federal Register approved the material

incorporated by reference in accordance

with 5 U.S.C. 552(a) and 1 CFR part 51.

A copy may be obtained from SAE at

Society of Automotive Engineers, Inc.,

400 Commonwealth Drive, Warrendale,

PA 15096. A copy of the material may

be inspected at NHTSA’s Docket

Section, 400 Seventh Street, S.W., room

5109, Washington, DC, or at the Office

of the Federal Register, 800 North

Capitol Street, N.W., Suite 700,

Washington, DC. The accelerometer

sensitive axis is parallel to the direction

of test platform travel. The test is

conducted at a velocity change

approximating 30 mph with

acceleration of the test platform such

that all points on the crash pulse curve

within the corridor identified in Figure

6 are covered. An inflatable restraint is

to be activated at 20 ms +/-2 ms from

the time that 0.5 g is measured on the

dynamic test platform. The test dummy

specified in S8.1.8.2, placed in each

front outboard designated seating

position as specified in S11, shall meet

the injury criteria of S6.1, S6.2, S6.3,

S6.4, S6.5, and S13.2 of this standard.

13.2 Neck injury criteria. A vehicle

certified to this alternative test

requirement shall, in addition to

meeting the criteria specified in S13.1,

meet the following injury criteria for the

neck, measured with the six axis load

cell (ref. Denton drawing C–1709) that is

mounted between the bottom of the

skull and the top of the neck as shown

in drawing 78051–218, in the unbelted

sled test:

(a) Flexion Bending Moment—190

Nm. SAE Class 600.

(b) Extension Bending Moment—57

Nm. SAE Class 600.

(c) Axial Tension—3300 peak N. SAE

Class 1000.

(d) Axial Compression—4000 peak N.

SAE Class 1000.

(e) Fore-and-Aft Shear—3100 peak N.

SAE Class 1000.

13.3 Vehicle test attitude. When the

vehicle is in its ‘‘as delivered’’

condition, measure the angle between

the driver’s door sill and the horizontal.

Mark where the angle is taken on the

door sill. The ‘‘as delivered’’ condition

is the vehicle as received at the test site,

with 100 percent of all fluid capacities

and all tires inflated to the

manufacturer’s specifications as listed

on the vehicle’s tire placard. When the

vehicle is in its ‘‘fully loaded’’

condition, measure the angle between

the driver’s door sill and the horizontal,

at the same place the ‘‘as delivered’’

angle was measured. The ‘‘fully loaded’’

condition is the test vehicle loaded in

accordance with S8.1.1(a) or (b) of

Standard No. 208, as applicable. The

load placed in the cargo area shall be

centered over the longitudinal

centerline of the vehicle. The pretest

door sill angle, when the vehicle is on

the sled, (measured at the same location

as the as delivered and fully loaded

condition) shall be equal to or between

the as delivered and fully loaded door

sill angle measurements.

13.4 Tires and wheels. Remove the

tires and wheels.

3. Section 571.208 is amended by

adding Figure 6 at the end of the section

to read as follows:

BILLING CODE 4910–59–P
Federal Register / Vol. 62, No. 53 / Wednesday, March 19, 1997 / Rules and Regulations 12975

Issued on: March 14, 1997.

Ricardo Martinez,

Administrator.

[FR Doc. 97–6954 Filed 3–14–97; 3:42 pm]

BILLING CODE 4910–59–C