NOT RECOMMENDED FOR FULL-TEXT PUBLICATION File Name: 17a0662n.06

No. 17-1424

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT

MARCUS M. BRIM, Plaintiff-Appellant,

v. DOUG WELTON, Inspector, Defendant,

and

SHERRY ALEXANDE R, Arus/Officer, Defendant-Appellee. ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ON APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN

BEFORE: GRIFFIN, KETHLEDG E, and BUSH, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM. Marcus M. Brim appeals th e district court’s orders granting summary judgment to one defendant and denying Brim’s subsequent motion for reconsideration. Brim filed a complaint against Sherry Alex ander, who was an assistant resident unit supervisor at Bellamy Creek Correctional Faci lity (IBC) in Ionia, Michigan, and Douglas Welton, who was an inspector at the same facility. Brim alleged that, while he was a prisoner at IBC, defendants failed to adequately protect him after he informed them that he was in danger from another prisoner. Brim sought mone tary, declaratory, a nd injunctive relief.No. 17-1424, Brim v. Welton

- 2 - Defendants moved for summary judgment. A magistrate judge recommended denying the motion as to Welton but granting it as to Al exander on the basis that Brim failed to properly

exhaust his administrative remedies because he did not adequately identify Alexander in the first step of the applicable three-step prison grievance procedure. Ov er Brim’s objections, the district court adopted the recommendation and dismissed without prejudice Brim’s claims against

Alexander. The court denied Brim’s motion for reconsiderati on and subsequently dismissed Brim’s action after accepting a stipulation to dismiss the claims against Welton. On appeal, Brim argues that the district court erred in granting summary judgment to Alexander because he had adequately identified he r in his administrative grievance proceedings.

We review de novo a district cour t’s grant of summary judgment. Pucci v. Nineteenth Dist.

Court , 628 F.3d 752, 759 (6th Cir. 2010). Summary judgment is appr opriate where the evidence, viewed in the light most favorable to the non-moving party, shows that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact a nd that the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Id. at 759–60. A genuine issue of material fact exists if a r easonable juror could re turn a verdict for the non-moving party. Id. at 759. Under the Prison Litigation Reform Act (“PLRA”) , a state prisoner, prior to filing suit in federal court, must exhaust his administrativ e remedies by complying with the grievance procedures set forth by his correctional institution. Mattox v. Edelman , 851 F.3d 583, 590 (6th Cir. 2017). Here, the relevant grievance procedure is set fort h in Michigan Department of Corrections Policy Directive 03.02.130. That di rective requires prisone rs to briefly and concisely state the issues and to provide the fact s relevant to the issues being grieved, including dates, times, places, and names of all those involved. Id. Generally, a prisoner fails to properly

exhaust his administrative remedies under Polic y Directive 03.02.130 when he fails to specifyNo. 17-1424, Brim v. Welton

- 3 - the names of each person from whom he seeks re lief, but prison officials waive any procedural irregularities in a grievance when they address the grievance on the merits. Id. at 591. In his step one grievance, Brim alleged that, wh en he first arrived at IBC, he went to the assistant resident unit supervisor in Unit 7 and told her that he could not be around a particular prisoner who was also in the unit. Cell usage records show that Brim arrived at IBC on October 11, 2012, and Alexander’s affidavit states that she wa s an assistant resident unit supervisor in Unit 7 until November 24, 2012. Af ter Brim’s step one grievance was denied on the merits, he appealed the decision to step tw o, and he identified Alexa nder as the supervisor whom he had spoken to about the other prisoner . The step two grievance was denied on the merits, and Brim appealed to step three, again identifying Alexander as the relevant supervisor. The step three grievance was denied on the merits. The district court erred by gr anting summary judgment to Al exander on the basis that Brim failed to properly exhaust his administrativ e remedies. Because prison authorities denied Brim’s grievance on the merits at all three steps rath er than invoking a pr ocedural bar, he properly exhausted his administrative remedies as to Alexander. See Reed-Bey v. Pramstaller , 603 F.3d 322, 323–24, 326 (6th Cir. 2010) (holding that a prisoner properly exhausted his claim despite failing to name a singl e individual in his initial grievance be cause he invoked one complete round of the relevant grievance pr ocedure, and the Michigan Department of Corrections denied the grievance on the merits at each step rather than invoking a procedural bar). And, in any case, given th at Brim identified an unnamed assi stant resident un it supervisor in Unit 7 in his step-one grievance and clarified in his step-two appeal that Alexander was that supervisor, “a reasonable jury could find that this information was sufficient under the circumstances presented here” to satisfy the exhaustion requirement of the PLRA. See Mattox ,No. 17-1424, Brim v. Welton

- 4 - 851 F.3d at 597 (concluding that summary judgme nt based on failure to properly exhaust administrative remedies was improper where a step one grievance stated that an unnamed medical officer violated the plai ntiff’s rights and the step two appeal named the medical officer in question). Accordingly, we REVERSE the district court’s order granting summary judgment to

Alexander and REMAND for further proceedings.