1 

# FILED
April 10, 1997 Cecil Crowson, Jr. Appellate C ourt Clerk IN THE COURT OF CRIMI NAL APPEALS OF TENNESSEE AT JACKSON DECEMBER 1996 SESSION

STATE OF TENNESSEE, ) ) No. 02-C-01-9607-CC-0 0237 APPELLEE, ) ) Gibson County v. ) ) Dick Jerman, Jr., Judge MATTHEW LYNN KING, ) ) (Second Degree Murder) APPELLANT. )

FOR THE APPE LLANT: FOR THE APPELLEE: Dwayne D. Maddox , III Charles W. Burson Maddox, Maddox & Maddox Attorney General & Repor ter 105 East Main Street 500 Charlotte Avenue Huntingdon, TN 38344 Nashville, TN 37243-0497 Deborah A. Tullis Assistant Attorney Gener al 450 James Robertson Parkwa y Nashville, TN 37243-0493 Clayburn L. Peeples District Attorney General 109 East First Street Trenton, TN 38382-1841 Gary G. Bro wn Assistant District A

ttorney General 109 East First Street Trenton, TN 38382-1841

OPINION FILED: ____________________________

__ AFFIRMED Joe B. Jones, Pre siding Judge 

## O P I N I O N2 The appellant, Matthe w Lynn King, (defendant) , was convicted of murder in the second degree, a Class A felony , by a jury of his peers. The trial court found the defendant
was a standard offender and imposed a se ntence consisting of confinement for fifteen(15) years in the Department of Correcti on . Two i ssues are presented for rev iew. The defendant contends the evidence is in suffici ent, as a matter of law, to support his conviction. He further contends exculpatory evidence was suppressedby the state. After
a thorough re view o f the record, the briefs submitted by the parties, and the law which governs the issues presented for review, it is the opinion of this Court the judgment of the trial court should be affirmed. On the morning of January 28, 199 5 , the defend ant went to the home of Aaron Dudley. Maurice Teague was v isiting Dudley w

hen he arrived. Teague told the defendant a mutual friend, Kenny Taylor, had taken the defendant's motor vehi cle. The defendant and Teague took Taylor's vehicle, a white Tracker, to get Tom Doster. Doster

informed Teague and the defendant Taylor had taken the defendant's gray Cougar to Mil an to pur chase crack cocaine. The defendant expressed conce rn for his motor vehicle and Taylor bec ause the Cougar's transmi ssion needed to be repaired. Also, the defendant did not want Taylor purchasing illicit narcotics while ope rat ing his motor vehicle. T eague, Doster and the defendant travel led to Milan. They saw Taylor and Car l Townes in the defen dant's moto r vehicle. They w ere in a neighborhood reputed for the sale of crack cocaine. Taylor pulled the C ougar int o a driveway of a r esidence and Teague, who w as drivingthe Tracker, parked on the str eet next to thedriveway. Teag ue and Taylor exited the v ehicles and conversed for approxi mately five minutes. Tay lor agreed to drive

the Cougar to the resid ence of the defendant in McKenzie. Teague and Taylor hugged, Teague returned to the Tracker, and Taylor followed him to the vehicle. Teague got into the driver 's side of the Tracker. Taylor, w ho was standing onthe driver's side of the Tracker, leaned into the v ehicle across Teague and tol d the defendant to keep his nose out of his business. Otherwise, Taylor said he would see the defendant3

sufferbodily harm. The defendant told thepolice he retrieved a pistol from the floorboard of the Tracker and told Taylor, "Man, you're going to take my car home." During the trial, the defe ndant testified he may have utt ered the statement attributed to hi m in the statement, but he retrieved the pistol after making the sta tement. While Taylor was leaning into the Tracker from the driver's side of the v ehicle, the defendant retrieved the pistol and fatally wounded Taylor. Teague grabbed the pistol while it was in the defendant's hand. Ac cording to the defendant, this caused the pistol to discharge a second time. The projectile struc k the floorboard of the Tracker. Tayl or went into the yard of the residenc e and died from the gunshot wound. The defendant told Teague to leave the s cene of the shooting. Teague refused the request. The defendant drove away i n t h e Tracker. He was apprehended by a police officer in Trezevant wh ile en route to McKenzi e. According to the defendant, he was in fear for his life when he pulled the trigger and shot Taylor. Doster and Teague described Taylor as overbearing and cocky

. Medical evidence established Tayl or had ingested cocaine a s hort time before he was kil led.

I.

The defendant contends the evidence is insufficient, as a matter of law, to support
a finding by a rational

trier of fact he was gui lty of murder in the second degree beyond a reasonable doubt. He argues he acted in self-defense. Inthe alternative, he clai ms the evidence establishes he was guilty at most of voluntary manslaughter.

A.

When an accused challenges the s ufficiency of theconvicting evidence, this Court must review the recor

d to determine if the evidence add uced attrial is sufficient “to support the finding by the trier of fact of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.” Te nn. R. App. P. 13(e). This rule is applicable to findings based upon direct evidence, cir cumstantial evidence, or
a combination of direct and circumstantial evidence. State v. Dykes , 803 S.W.2d 250, 2534

(Tenn. Crim. App.), per . app . denied (Tenn. 1990). In determining the sufficienc y of the convicting evide nce, this Court does not reweigh or reevaluate the evi dence. State v. Ma tthews , 805 S.W.2d 776, 779 (Tenn . Crim. App.), per . app . denied (Tenn. 1990). Nor may thi s Court substitute its inferences for those drawn by the trier of

f act from circumstantial ev idence. Liakas v. State , 199 Tenn. 298, 305, 286 S.W.2d 856, 859, cert
. denied , 352 U.S. 845, 77 S.Ct. 39, 1 L.Ed.2d 49 (1956). To the contrary, this Court is required to afford the State of Tenn essee the strongest legitimateview of the evidence contained in the record as well as all reasonabl e and le gitimateinferences which may be drawn from the evidence. State v. C abbage , 57 1 S.W.2d 832, 835 (T enn. 1978). Questionsconcerning the credibility of witnesses, the weight and valu e to be given the evidence, as well as all factual issues raised by the evidence are resolved by the trier of fact, not this Court. Cabbage , 571 S.W.2d at 835. In State v. Grace , 493 S.W.2d 474, 476 (Tenn. 1973), our Supreme Court said: “A guilty

verdict by th e jury, approved by the trial judge, accredits the tes timony of the witnesses for the State and resolves all conflicts in favor of the theory of the State.” Since a verdict of guilt r emoves the presumption of innocence and replaces it with
a pres umption of guilt, the accused, as the appellant, has the burden in this Court of illustratingwhy the evidence is insufficient to support the verdict returned by the trier of fact. State v. Tuggle , 639 S.W.2d 913, 914 (Tenn. 1982). This Cou rt will not disturb a verdict of guilt due to the sufficiency of the evide nce unless the facts contained in the record are insufficient, as a matter of law, for a rational tri er of fact to find that the accused is guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. Tuggle , 639 S.W.2d at 914.5 B.

Before the defendant could be convicted of murder in the second degree, the State of Tennessee was required to establish beyond a reaso nable doubt the defend ant (a) unlawfullykilled Taylor and (b) did so knowingly. Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-13-210(a)( 1). The record establishes both el ements of this offense. The defendant admitted he retrieved the pistol from the floorboard of the Tracker, insisted the victim take his motor vehicle to his home in M cKenz ie, an d then shot the victim. The victim d ied as a result of the gunshot wound. While there was evidence the defendant acted in self-defense, the jury found to the contrar y. As previously

stated, the resolution of conflicting evidence is for the jury, not thi s Court. The jury saw the witnesses, observed their demeanor, and assessed their credibili ty. Obvious ly, the jury did not belie ve the defendant acted in self-defense or the k illing occurred dur

ing the heat of passion. The evidence is clearly sufficient to support a finding by a rati onal trier of fact the defendant committed murder in the second deg ree by killing Taylor beyond a reasonable doubt. Tenn. R. App. P. 13(e).

II.

The defendant filed a motion seeking the ent ry of an order requir ing the State of Tennessee to furnish him with ex culpatory evidence. The motion was gene ric -- very general -- as it d id not as k fo r the production of a specific obj ect or specific information. In this Court, the defendant contends his right to due process of law was violated because the State of Tennessee failed to "investi gate the issue of ownershi p of the alleged murder weapon and fail[ed] to provide that i nformation to the defendant after proper requests were made." While the defendant apparently had the serial number of the murder weapon, he argueshe did not "have the ability the State has to trace serial numbers of weapons, and the information may have even been readily available from the victim's family upon request." He also complains he had to take the witness stand to establish he did not own the murder weapon.6 While the serial number of themurder weapon was av ailable to the defendant, it appears the defendant made no effort or attempt to t race the serial number. Also, the record is devoid of evidence the defend ant attempted to attain this informati on from the victim's family. If

the defendant had made an attempt to obtain this informatio n, and the defendant was unsuccessful, he could have filed a specific motion to obtain the ownership of the murder weapon from the state. The fallacies in the defendant's argument are numerous. First, there is no indication in the record the state, or any investigating agency, possessed the name of the pers on who owned the murder weapon. Second, the state had no obligat ion to conduct an investigationto determine who owned th e murder weapon. State v. Brown well , 696 S.W.2d 362, 363 (Tenn. Crim . App. 1985). T hird, assuming arguendothe state had the information, the defendant did not request the i nformation; and the defendant has failed to establish the materiality of the ownership of the weapon. Kyles v. Whitley , 514 U.S. 419, 115 S.Ct. 1555, 131 L.Ed.2d 490 (1995).Fourth, the defendant had the serial number and made no effort to determine who owne d the murder weapon. This issue is without merit.

______ ____________

__________________________ _ JOE B. JONES, PRESIDING JUDGE

CONCUR:

___________________________________ JOSEPH M. TIPTON, JUDGE

____________________________________ JERRY L. S MITH, JUDGE