1 Filed 6/6/13 In re Adan R. CA1/5 NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION FIVE

In re Adan R. et al., Persons Coming Under the Juvenile Court Law.

SONOMA COUNTY HUMAN SERVICES DEPARTMENT, Plaintiff and Respondent,

v. Danielle D., Defendant and Appellant. A136151
(Sonoma County Super. Ct. No s. 3013-DEP, 3014-DEP)

Appellant Danielle D. (Mother) has a long history of child welfare referrals involving her son, Adan, and her daughter, Eden. On December 10, 2008, the Sonoma County Human Services Department (Departm ent) filed a juvenile dependency petition on behalf of both children pursuant to Welfare and Institutions Code section 300. 1 In November 2011, the juvenile court terminated Mother’s reunification services, and set a section 366.26 hearing on termin ation of parental rights. Mother filed petitions under section 388 seeking to reinstat e services and prevent termin ation of her parental rights based on the alleged strength of her parental bond with her child ren. At Mother’s request, a bonding study was conducted. Th e evaluator concluded that the children no longer looked to Mother for security and stability and th at they looked forward to

1 All statutory references are to the Welf are and Institutions Code unless otherwise indicated.2 adoption by their paternal grandmother. Th e court denied the se ction 388 petitions and terminated Mother’s parent al rights. We affirm.
I. B ACKGROUND Mother was the subject of multiple child welfare referrals involving Adan (born in 2002) and Eden (born in 2004), and had a history of substance abuse and domestic
violence. 2 In 2005, the children’s fa ther, Michael R. (Father) wa s arrested three times for battery on Mother and convicted in one of the incidents. (Pen . Code, § 273.5, subd. (a).) In August 2006, Adan exhibited sexualized behavior and disclosed that his seven-yearold uncle had engaged in sexual activity with hi m, he had observed his parents engage in sexual activity, and he had observed a domestic altercation between his parents. In October 2007, Mother was arrested for po ssession of drugs and drug paraphernalia. (Health & Saf. Code, §§ 11377 , subd. (a), former 11364.) In January 2008, Mother and the children were found living in a home with no heat or electricity and the children were hungry and cold. Based on a referral from University of California police, a report prepared at the time of the incident stated that Mother “is a known methamphetamine user. . . . She has confronta tions physical and verbal with other meth users while in [Peopl e’s Park in Berkeley].” The children were taken into protective custody temporarily but were returned home with no dependency case initiated. In May 2008, another dome stic violence incident occurred between Mother and Father, and Father was arrested for domestic violence and a violation of probation. (Pen. Code, §§ 273.5, former 12 03.2.) Mother had alcohol on her breath at
the time of the incident. In June 2008, Mother was found w ith an adult male, Eric W., who had broken Mother’s jaw in a prior dome stic violence incident and was under an order to stay away from her. In September 2008, the family home was found to be filthy

2 As a child, Mother was herself the subj ect of several child welfare referrals between 1993 and 1997. “These reports alleged that [she] wa s a victim of physical abuse by her mother and stepfather, ha d threatened to kill herself at age 10, was forced to sleep outside as a punishment, was sexually abused by the mother’s boyfriend, and had been left unattended while her mother was on vacation.”3 and without edible food: “T he floor of the residence wa s littered with dirt and food
which had turned to mold. Th e refrigerator was smeared in old rotten food and was also moldy.” An adult male, D.W., was living with Mother and the children and three lines of methamphetamine were laid out on a glass su rface in his bedroom. Two glass marijuana pipes were located on the nightstand next to a bed where Mother slep t with the children.
Mother was arrested for child endangerment (Pen. Code, § 273a, subd. (a)) based on the “extremely dirty” condition of her home and the presence of illegal drugs within the
reach of the children. D.W. was arrested for drug possession and child endangerment. The children were placed with the maternal grandmother but apparently returned shortly
thereafter.
A. Removal Leading to Current Dependency Case On December 8, 2008, the home was again found to be filthy: “knives within reach of the 4 year old; spoiled food in a dirty kitchen; a filthy refrigerator with mold present; a lack of clean clothe s for the children. . . . The [f our-year old] was barefoot and had a fairly recent cut on her fo ot which she said was [cause d by] a piece of glass on the floor. There were empty beer bottles strewn a ll throughout the home.” The bottoms of at
least one child’s feet were black with dirt. D.W. “was present and interfered with the deputies’ investigation. The mother was uncooperative with the responding deputies and told a number of lies ranging [from] her not be ing on probation to the vacuum cleaner not working when in fact it did. The mother also reported that [D.W.] was in the home
because he has a court date tomorrow, while the male and the children reported he was a frequent visitor to the home.” The childre n were taken into protective custody and
Mother was arrested for child endangerment (Pen. Code, § 273a, subd. (a)). D.W. was arrested for interfering with the investigati on. Another man also found in the home was arrested on outstanding warrants.
B. Jurisdiction and Disposition On December 10, 2008, th e Department filed a juve nile dependenc y petition on behalf of Adan and Eden pursua nt to section 300. Under section 300, subdivision (b), the petition alleged that Mother fail ed to provide the children w ith adequate food, clothing,4 shelter or medical treatment and was unable to provide regular care for the children due to substance abuse. Under section 300, subdi visions (b) and (c), the petition alleged that Mother and Father had a history of domestic violence that exposed the children to a substantial risk of physical and emotional harm. 3 Mother submitte d on detention. At a January 2009 jurisdiction and disp osition hearing, Mother submitted on the Department’s recommendation. The court su stained the petition as amended, ordered the children removed, and granted reunifi cation services to both parents.
C. Six Month Review Although Mother initially minimized the allegations of the petition, during the reunification period she cooperated with a ps ychological evaluation, obtained psychiatric medication, started therapy, and completed tw o parenting classes. After an April 2009 arrest and incarceration for public intoxica tion, she acknowledged a possible substance abuse problem and, in June, enrolled in an inpatient drug treatment program. The children had “a very close relationship with both of their parents and each other,” although they exhibited mild aggression when Mother missed a visit (about once or twice a month). Mother was positive a nd appropriate during the visits.
At the June 2009 six-month review hear ing, the court mainta ined the children in their foster home and authorized the Departme nt to arrange a home visit before the next review hearing.
D. Twelve-Month Review Mother completed her inpatient alcohol ab use treatment program, participated in an aftercare program, tested negative for drug s, and worked with a 12-step sponsor. She started therapy and appeared to be taking her psychiatric me dication regularly. She also started working. Both childre n wanted to reunite with Mo ther, with whom they had a particular bond. However, if adoption becam e necessary, the paternal grandmother was

3 The petition also alleged under section 300, subdivis ion (g) that Mother was unable to provide for the children due to he r incarceration. Because Mother had been released from custody before the jurisdiction hearing, this a llegation was stricken before the petition was sustained.5 willing to adopt and her home in Washington state had been approved for placement. After successful overnight visits, the children were placed with Mo ther on a trial home
visit in November 2009. At the 12-month review hearing in Dece mber 2009, the court granted Mother an
additional six months of reunifi cation services and scheduled a status review hearing for February 2010. 4

E. Children’s Retu rn to Mother Mother continued to participate in therapy and attend Alcoholics Anonymous (A.A.) meetings. She obtained housing for herself and her ch ildren and regularly brought
the children to school and to their therapy appointments. Adan seemed more relaxed and
comfortable back in hi s mother’s care and he acted more settled in therapy. Eden also seemed happy to be back with Mother, alt hough her temper tantru ms and aggressive
behavior continued. At a March 2010 status review hearing, the co urt formally returned
the children to Mother’s care and granted Mother six mont hs of family maintenance
services.
F. Six Month Family Maintenance Review In May 2010, Eric W. cam e to Mother’s home uninvited and intoxicated, stole money from Mother, tried to get her to drink vodka, threatened to kill her, punched her in the head, dragged her by the hair, and chok ed her to the point of her almost losing consciousness. Mother was able to get some one to take the children out of the home and call the police, and she cooperat ed with the police investiga tion and obtained a restraining order against Eric W. In July 2010, the social worker made an unannounc ed visit to Mother’s home in response to a child welfare report and found Mother with a man who had a known substance abuse problem and a criminal hi story. Mother did not show signs of intoxication, there were no alcohol containers in the home, and Mother tested negative

4 Father’s services were terminated.6 for drugs or alcohol. Mother was referred to a domestic violence education and psychotherapy group for services. In other respects, the children’s stay in Mother’s care was going well. The children were happy and comfortable liv ing with Mother and were doing well developmentally. Mother had received in -home parenting education and the social worker reported that the home was usually very organize d, clean and stocked with food, clothing and appropriate toys for the child ren. She continued to test negative and participate in A.A. and othe r substance abuse services. At a September 2010 hearing, the court extended Mother’s family maintenance
services for an additional six months.
G. 12-Month Family Maintenance Review In January 2011, Mother gave birth to a ba by girl, Elise, whose father was Eric W. Eric W. was still incarcerated for his May 20 10 assault on Mother and was scheduled to
be released in June. Mother insisted she wa s not interested in resuming the relationship,
but she wanted Eric to have a relationship with his daughter if he changed his lifestyle. Also in January 2011 , Mother allowed Father to stay overnight in her apartment, and Father verbally and physically assaulted Mother while she was in bed with Eden. After a police investigation, no criminal acti on was taken against Father. Mother agreed to limit her contact with Father, participate in a domestic violence group and return to individual therapy. Mother had been to therapy only once between March 19, 2010, and February 10, 2011.
The social worker wrote th at Mother “continues to st ruggle with issues around relationships, particularly with men, and setting boundaries. . . . [Her] co-dependency continues to compromise her ability to make healthy deci sions. . . . [¶] Fortunately, [Mother] recognizes her co-d ependency and is willing to a ddress it in therapy and in a domestic violence psychotherapy group. . . . [¶] The [social worker] is thoroughly impressed with [Mother’s] ability to stay clean and sober for eighteen m onths and her continued participation in the Twelve-Step pr ogram. . . . [¶] . . . [T]here is undoubtedly a strong connection between [Mother and her ch ildren]. [Mother] supports any activity7 that will promote the social and emotional gr owth of her children and treats her children with the utmost respect.” At a March 2011 status review hearing, the court granted Moth er an additional six months of family maintenance services. Du ring the hearing, the court questioned Mother
about how she would handle Er ic W.’s possible demands to see his child when he was released from custody. Mother felt uncomfortab le answering in the presence of Father, who was at the hearing. The court expressed concern and urged Mother to have a plan in place.
H. Supplemental Petition and Removal In July 2011, Mother allowed Eric W. into he r home following his release from prison, despite the existence of a restraining order against him. He was reincarcerated for violating the restraining order and was schedul ed to be released again in six months. The Department received several reports from a neighbor that Mother was not supervising the children, was living with a dangerous-looking man, and was not maintaining the apartment. Wh en the social worker conducted an unannounced visit, the door to Mother’s apartment was wide open , the apartment was empty, and the home was filthy with trash and food on the floors. A s econd unannounced visit a day later found the children in the care of Jason J., a parole e with an outstanding arrest warrant who appeared to be under the influence of a drug, possibly methamphetamine. Mother
defended her decision to leave the children with Jason, saying he was great with kids. She acknowledged he might have had alcohol and marijuana in his system, but claimed she did not know he was on parole. On August 11, 12 and 15, 2011, Mother mi ssed drug tests. On August 15, she was found walking with her three children and Jason J., who ha d alcohol on his breath and initially fled when he saw polic e. Mother also smelled of alcohol and had a backpack that contained a partially consumed 40-ounce beer. On August 19, 2011 , Mother was pulled over for failing to stop at a stop sign. The
officer discovered that Mother was drivin g with a suspended license and without insurance, and the inside of her car was f ilthy, foul-smelling and unsafe. All three8 children were in the car. Mother was arrested for felony child endangerment and violation of probation, and the childre n were taken into protective custody. On August 24, 2011 , the Department filed a supple mental petition on behalf of Adan and Eden pursu ant to section 387. 5 The petition alleged Mother’s substance abuse relapse, the circumstances of her August 19, 2011 arrest, and the May 2010 domestic violence incident involving Er ic W. On August 25, 2011, the court ordered the children
detained in the home of th eir maternal grandmother. Mother minimized the allegations of the new petition. She said she failed to test twice in August 2011 because her car broke down and the third incident was a date mixup; she denied being intoxicated on Au gust 15; and she said the charges from the August 19 incident were absurd and had been dropped. The Department recommended removal and termination of services for Mother. 6 The Department wrote that it had not recomm ended removal earlier in 2011 because the children appeared to be ve ry resilient and were bonde d with Mother, who had many strengths as a parent. “But love and inge nuity are not enough to protect children. [Mother’s] long history of domestic violence and addiction has undoubtedly scarred her children and the Department can no longer sta nd by and allow it to happen.” When asked about his recent removal, Adan told the social worker, “It ha sn’t been that long of a time since we’ve been away from home so it’s not that bad,” a lthough the social worker said he had a “heavy heart.” Because the children needed to be re moved, services also had to
be terminated because Moth er had exhausted the maximum amount of reunification services that could be provided. At a November 2011 hearing, the cour t was informed that Mother and the Department reached a settlement regarding th e supplemental petition: Mother would not contest termination of services, weekly vis itation would continue. Mother requested, and the Department indicated it would not oppose, a bonding study to determine whether the

5 A petition was also filed on behalf of Elise.

6 The report also recommended a bypa ss of services in Elise’s case.9 bond between Mother and her children outwe ighed the benefits to the children of permanency through ad option. Minors’ counsel objected to the bonding study. Pursuant to local rule of court, the court required that a written motion for a bonding study be filed. The court then removed the children, te rminated Mother’s services, and set a section 366.26 hearing on termin ation of parental rights for March 29, 2012. Mother filed a writ petition challenging the section 366. 26 setting, which this court denied on the merits. ( D.D. v. Superior Court (A134645 May 21, 2012) [nonpub. order].)
I. Motion for Bonding Study and Section 366.26 Report In December 2011, Mother filed a written motion for a bonding study. A hearing
on the motion was continued several times and was ultimately scheduled to be heard at
the same time as the section 366.26 hearin g. Explaining the postponements, the Department told the court it was pursuing a pproval of the paternal grandmother’s home for placement and was considering a guardian ship arrangement that would render the
motion moot.
In its March 2012 secti on 366.26 report, however, th e Department recommended termination of parental rights and adoption as the permanent plan. All three children were then living together in a foster home and Adan “had voiced concerns about being separated from Elise.” The foster parents were willing to adopt all th ree children, but the paternal grandmother was willing to adopt only Adan and Eden. Nevertheless, the Department determined that the best placemen t of Adan and Eden wa s with the paternal grandmother. After being told they could not be returned to Mother’s care, Eden (then seven years old) “was very clear in her desire to be placed with her paternal grandmother . . . , even if it required being separated from her siblings. . . . [¶] Adan[, then 10 years old,] also expressed his first c hoice . . . to be placed with the paternal grandmother[,] . . . [although he] expressed concern and sadness ab out being separated from Elise . . . .” The children’s therapist confirmed that the children felt safe a nd secure with the paternal grandmother, who had provided them with their most consistent family relationship. The children had a “positive and trus ting relationship” and “stron g emotional ties” to her. The adoption specialist concluded that placing the children with the paternal grandmother10 would result in minimal disruption to their lives, and the benefits of maintaining the mother-child bond or the three-sibling gro up did not outweigh the benefit of permanence through adoption by the paternal grandmother. The paternal grandmother had “expressed a strong desire to help the ch ildren maintain a connection with the birth parents and their half-sibling, provided these connections are in the best interests of the children.” At the March 29, 2012 hearing, the Depa rtment opposed Moth er’s request for a bonding study. At a May hearing, followi ng a further settlement conference, Mother argued the court should either grant the bo nding study or allow her to withdraw her submission on the supplemental petition. Th e court granted the request for a bonding study, relying in part on the reco rd of the November 2011 hearing.
J. Bonding Study In July 2012, Dr. Denise L. Wagner issued a b onding study, which was based on the dependency case file, letters of support submitted by Mother, observations of three consecutive weekly visits betw een Mother and the children, and interviews with Mother, the children, the foster parent and the paternal grandmother. Dr. Wagner wrote that the children rep eatedly demonstrated anger and aggression toward Mother during the visits: Eden shouted to Mother, “ ‘You are going to kill us’ ”; she punched Mother and pulled hard on Mothe r’s hair; she said she was going to put nails in a peach she gave to Mother to eat; and she deliberatel y passed gas in Mother’s face. Adan wrote “L” and “S” for “loser” and “stupi d” on Mother’s forehe ad and sang a song with the lyric, “Kill your moth er,” acknowledging it was mean to her. The children did not have trouble separating from Mother at the end of visits. Mother mostly ignored the children’s hostility during the vis its and attempted to redirect their attention, often by talking about herself. Dr. Wagner wrote: “Clearly, this is a complicated fa mily with complex interpersonal dynamics. [Mother] makes good e fforts to parent her children in a positive manner. . . . She nurtures [them] by bringing them healthy snacks including foods she has known them to enjoy. On the other hand, [s he] has difficulty consistently being attuned
to the children’s emotional state. Her own emotional state appears to dominate their11 interactions. She enters visits in a frenzy, continually late, and exuberantly describing recent developments in her own life, seemingly without consideration of the relevance of her commentary to her children or the [e]ffect it may have on them. . . . [¶] The children each in their own way are very angry with their mother. . . . [E den] is continually oppositional and challenging, continuing to reje ct her mother’s bids for closeness . . . much of the time, yet at other times initia ting and accepting affection from her mother. . . . She is verbally aggressive with her brother and sabotages any possibility of him engaging with their mother. [¶ ] [Adan] . . . has to fight for most any sustained attention from [Mother]. . . . He is mostly positioned off to the side, in the background much of the time during visits. He deliberately says mean and cruel things to [Mother] without any
visible remorse. He shows no ambivalenc e when he answers [Mother’s] inquiry about
whether it is true that he and his sister ar e going to move to his grandmother’s by flatly answering ‘Yep.’ ” The foster mother reported that neither Adan nor Eden ev er said he or she missed Mother. However, they were “ ‘over the m oon’ when their grandmother came to visit recently and had been anxious about whether they were going to live with her or not. They both talk[ed] with he r by phone twice w eekly and [were] typically engaged in
conversation for 30–45 minutes ea ch. [¶] In regard to their relationships with their younger half-sister, . . . ‘they l ove her but they don’t play w ith her a lot.’ ” The foster
mother was committed to main taining the sibling relations hip through Skype and phone
conversations and visits. The paternal grandmother reported that when she lived in California (before her move to Washington), Adan, Eden and their pa rents lived with her for one year and the
children lived with her for about 11 months in 2007 an d for six weeks in the summer of
2008. She had seen them about three times a year since then and she had spoken to them once a week (and more recently twice a week) since they had been in foster care. If she adopted the children, she was committed to allowing conti nuing contact with Mother subject to appropriate structure.12 When Dr. Wagner asked Adan how he felt about liv ing with his paternal grandmother, he said he would “ ‘like it a lot’ ” and he spontaneously showed Dr. Wagner books of photographs taken during his visits with the grandmother. He said, “ ‘I know I would not see my mom; maybe once a year. It would be rough at first, but I
could deal with it.’ ” Eden said she unders tood she and Adan were not going to live with Mother because “ ‘[s]he and my dad were al ways fighting. My mom can’t take very good care of us.’ ” She said she felt good ab out living with her pate rnal grandmother:
“ ‘I still want to move to Gr andma’s even if I don’t see mo m that much,’ ” and even if she only visited with her younger sister occasionally. Dr. Wagner concluded the children “hav e learned that they cannot rely on [Mother] for day to day protection, or for a stable, predictable life.” The relationship
between Mother and Adan was “one of a mo ther who loves her child and a son who has experienced too much pain and disappointment to be able to rely on his parent.” The relationship between Mother and Eden “most re sembles that of a child care provider who is attempting to mana ge a young child.”
K. Section 388 Petitions On July 9, 2012, Mother filed two nearly identical section 388 petitions (one for each child) seeking cancellation of the section 36 6.26 hearing, return of the children to her care (or, in the alternative, increased visitation), and add itional services. As changed circumstances, Mother cited her return to therapy in recent weeks, her cooperation with the prosecution of Eric W. in 2012, he r avoidance of Eric W. and Jason J., 7 her participation in a domestic violence program, her employment, her plans to complete a paralegal program, her sobriety and particip ation in A.A., and her plans for stable housing that would accommodate her and her children. To demonstrate why changes to
the court’s orders would be in the children’ s best interest, she c ited the strong bond

7 Regarding Eric W., Mother wrote, “I recently encountered him in Sebastopol and had a brief conversation to see if he was stayi ng in town or not, so that I could determine whether to find another place to stay. He was taken into custody for violating the Criminal Protective Order.”13 between her and the children, her regular par ticipation in visitation, and the benefit of keeping all of the siblings together. In opposition to the petitions, the Depart ment submitted two police reports. They stated that on February 9, 2012, Mother reported a Ja nuary 30–31, 2012 domestic violence incident that had been perpetrate d by Eric W., who had been released from custody in December 2011. Er ic W. approached Mother on January 30, 2012, and asked
to talk. Because she was afraid he would become violent if she refused to talk to him, she agreed and they walked away from Mother’s companions. As they approached a trailer, Eric W. grabbed Mother, held a Phillips scre wdriver to her throat , dragged her under a canopy where the others could not see them, and urged her to go with him to a tent where he was staying. She stalled and apparently passed out. “Her next memory was waking up in [Eric W.’s] tent.” When she tried to leave the tent , he became mad and hit her hard in the stomach and chest, dragged her down by the hair, threatened to kill her, and put his
hands around her throat. She be gged him to let her go and he eventually released her, but
also threatened that if he saw her with anot her man he would slit thei r throats. Eric W. was charged with kidnapping, false impris onment, assault with a deadly weapon, domestic violence, and making criminal threats. On June 5, 2012, apparently the very day Eric W. was released from custody followi ng his February 2012 a rrest, an officer saw Mother walking with him at almo st 11:00 p.m. The officer arrested Eric W. for violating a restraining order protecting Mother. At a July 13, 2012 section 366.26 hearing, the court indicated that it tentatively planned to hear evidence on the section 388 petitions and on the se ction 366.26 issues jointly, but then gave counsel an opport unity to be heard on the issue. The Department asked the court to deny the section 388 pe titions without a hearing. It argued the allegations of the petitions were vague or conc lusory and thus failed to establish a prima facie case, particularly in light of the po lice reports the Department had submitted in opposition: “[E]ven after the Court pointed out in January [during a hearing in Elise’s case] that [Mother’s] continued codependenc e in their relationships was one of the reasons the Court had to bypass services to her[,] [s]he still is going from a group of14 people, going to go off by herself with him to deescalate the situation. That’s classic codependence. [¶] He was then incarcerated. The day he gets out of jail, we have this second police report from June 5th, 2012, wher e the police officer saw the two subjects, [Eric W.] and [Mother], walking eastbound togeth er. [¶] . . . [¶] So, . . . as far as change of circumstances, there is nothing that supports that. [¶] As to . . . the best interests of the children, the Court’s got the [section 366.26] report, as well as [having received into evidence] the bonding and attachment study of Dr. Wagner.” Minors’ counsel joined in the Department’s arguments. Mother argued in rebuttal that the petitions should be liberally construed for purposes of determini ng whether to schedule a hearing and that her petitions met the prima facie standard. After confirming that Mother had received and had an opportunity to review the police reports submitted by the Department, the court denied a heari ng on the section 388 petitions. “[T]here has not been a material ch ange of circumstances. The Court is most persuaded by the very recency of the 11:00 p.m. meeting with [Eric W.] that . . . is clear evidence that there’s no change of circumstan ces here. This is the same behavior, the same pattern, that has been ex istent throughout this case, that the Court, frankly, cannot accept as happenstance . . . [as it] occurred on the very day he was released from jail [which] is a repeat of a circumstance that occurred when there was a release from San Quentin, within one day . . . . [¶ ] . . . [¶] With regard to the best interests, the Court does take into account that is has received a very recent bonding study, which identifies the best interests of the minor[s] and . . . is view ed as a scientific, independent inquiry . . . . [¶] . . . [It] indicates . . . the re quested change . . . would not be in the best interests of the minor[s].”
L. Section 366.26 Hearing The bonding study, which had been previo usly received into evidence subject to
cross-examination of Dr. Wa gner, was admitted at the section 366.26 hearing. Dr. Wagner, whom the court qualified as an e xpert witness, testified that the children “do not see their mother as someone who can provi de security and safety for them.” She agreed that the children had “moved on” and were looking forward to moving in with15 their paternal grandmother: “[T]hey’ve accep ted the circumstances as they are now, and . . . are building a good attachment, do have a good established relationship with their grandmother.” On Adan’s separation from Elis e, she testified that “he was sad about her not coming with them, but it didn’t dissu ade his desire to go and live with his grandmother.” Eden’s attitude was similar. In sum, she opined, “I believe that severing
the bond would not be a detriment that would outweigh a plan of adoption and the permanence provid ed there.” Mother argued the beneficial parental re lationship exception precluded termination of parental rights. She argued the children’ s anger described in the bonding study “has come up in the last year since their removal. And I think it’s as likely that it’s an anger that’s at the situation, rather than at mother.” She noted that earlie r in the dependency case, the social worker and service providers reported that Mother was a good parent and
the children were bond ed with her. Mother also argue d that the beneficial sibling relationship exception applied. The Departme nt argued the children’s right to a stable, permanent home outweighed their interest in pr eserving their relations hip with Mother or Elise, particularly in light of the history of three removals in four years. Minors’ counsel
concurred. The court ruled that the exceptions di d not apply and terminated Mother’s and Father’s parental rights.
II. D ISCUSSION A. Section 388 Petitions Mother argues the trial court erred in de nying her a full eviden tiary hearing on her section 388 petitions. We affirm. A parent “may, upon grounds of change of circumstan ce or new evidence, petition the court . . . to change, modify, or set aside any order of court previ ously made . . . . [¶] . . . [¶] . . . If it appears that the best intere sts of the child . . . may be promoted by the proposed change of order, . . . the court shall orde r that a hearing be held . . . .” (§ 388, subds. (a)(1), (d).) “The court may deny the pe tition ex parte if: [¶] . . . the petition . . . fails to state a change of ci rcumstance or new evidence th at may require a change of16 order . . . or, that the requested modification wo uld promote the best inte rest of the child.” (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 5.570(d)(1) [“Denial of hearing”].) 8 “A petition for modification must be liberally construed in fa vor of its sufficiency.” (Rule 5.570(a).) If a hearing is held, the party that brings th e petition bears the burden of persuasion. (Rule 5.570(h)(1).) The juvenile court’s rulin g on the petition is reviewed for abuse of discretion. ( In re Stephanie M. (1994) 7 Cal.4th 295, 318.) A section 388 petition seeki ng reunification services af ter a section 366.26 hearing has been set plays a special role in the depe ndency scheme. “Once reunification services are terminated, the focus shifts [from family reunification] to the needs of the child for permanency and stability. . . . The burden ther eafter is on the parent to prove changed circumstances pursuant to section 388 to revi ve the reunification issue. Section 388 provides [an] ‘escape mechanis m’ . . . to allow the court to consider new information” and “to accommodate the possibility that circumstances may change after the reunification period that may justify a ch ange in a prior reunification order.” ( In re Marilyn H. (1993) 5 Cal.4th 295, 309.) The se ction 388 petition provides the parent a means of rebutting the presump tion after termination of serv ices that a permanent plan
other than reunification is in the child’s best interest. ( Id. at p. 310.)
The trial court did not abus e its discretion in denying a full evidentiary hearing on the petitions. The court could ha ve denied the petition ex parte. On the issue of changed circumstances, the petitions alleged at most changing circumstances, i.e., a renewal of
Mother’s efforts to address th e problems that led to the children’s dependency: her return to therapy, her alleged avoida nce of men who were substance abusers and perpetrators of domestic violence (and cooperation in Eric W.’s prosecution), her enrollment in a domestic violence counseling prog ram, and her efforts to obta in gainful employment and stable housing. However, “[a] petition which alleges merely changing circumstances and would mean delaying the selection of a permanent home for a child to see if a parent, who has repeatedly failed to reunify with th e child, might be able to reunify at some

8 All further rule references are to the California Rules of Court.17 future point, does not promot e stability for the child or th e child’s best interests. [Citation.]” ( In re Casey D. (1999) 70 Cal.App.4th 38, 47 , italics added.) The changed circumstances alleged in Mother’s petitions on their face were too little and too late in the three-and-one-half-year dependency case to justify further delay in adopting a permanent plan for the children. (Cf. In re Kimberly F. (1997) 56 Cal.App.4th 519, 526–527 [changed circumstances existed where “home wa s no longer in an un safe and unsanitary condition,” where condition of home had led to th e dependency].) Mother argues the court applied an inco rrect legal standard when it required a “material change of circumstances” even th ough the statute only requires a “change of circumstances.” We disagree. Common sense dictates that the “change of circumstance”
standard must include a materi ality element as measured by the purpose of the statute; otherwise, the mere passage of time would suffi ce to reopen prior orders upon an appeal
to the children’s best interests. Courts re cognize this implicit ma teriality standard by referring to “a genuine chan ge of circumstance” ( In re Anthony W. (2001) 87 Cal.App.4th 246, 250) and a change of circumstances “which may make the modification of a prior order appropriate” ( In re Daijah T. (2000) 83 Cal.App.4th 666, 674) when discussing the
section 388 standard. Finally, Mother argues her due process ri ghts were violated because “the court neither summarily denied mother’s petition[s] nor did it grant mother a hearing. Instead, the court heard argument from the parties rega rding mother’s petition[ s] before denying the petition[s] without allowing mother a full evidentiary he aring.” We agree there was some ambiguity in the court’s actions. The court ruled that it would “deny the hearing” on the petitions, presumably because the allega tions of the petition fa iled to make a prima facie showing. However, in explaining its reasons, the court cited evidence: the police reports and the bonding study. The court ev en took pains to veri fy that Mother had received the opposition evidence a nd had had an opportunity to review it, apparently to allay any concerns that her due process rights might be violated if the court relied on the evidence. Nevertheless, even if we assume that the court in fact held a hearing on the petitions and denied them on thei r merits, Mother has failed to show reversible error.18 The court was not required to conduct the he aring with live testimony, but was free to rely on the information contained in the pe tition, documentary evid ence, and argument of counsel. (Rule 5.570(h)(2); In re E.S. (2011) 196 Cal.App.4th 1329, 1340; In re C.J.W. (2007) 157 Cal.App.4th 1075, 10 80–1081.) Nothing in the record sugges ts that the court denied the petitions because Mother did not o ffer evidence in supp ort of the specific factual allegations in her petitions; rather, the court inferably concluded that those facts, if assumed to be true, were insufficient to justify a change in the court’s orders. Moreover, nothing in the record suggests that Mother was de nied an opportunity during the hearing to challenge the police report or bo nding study evidence or to offer additional evidence (or at least make an offer of proo f) in support of her petitions. Finally, she makes no showing on appeal that , had she been given an oppo rtunity to present additional evidence or further argument on the petitions, there was a reasonable probability of a
different result.
Mother has not established reversible error in the court’s disposition of her section 388 petitions.
B. Termination of Parental Rights Mother also challenges the court’s orde r terminating her parental rights to Adan and Eden, arguing the court shoul d have found that the bene ficial parent and sibling relationship exceptions applied. We affirm. At a section 366.26 hearing, the juven ile must determine by clear and convincing evidence whether it is likely the dependent minor will be adopted. (§ 366.26, subd. (c)(1).) If the court finds a likelihood of adopti on, the court must terminate parental rights and order the child placed for adopti on unless, as applicable here, it finds a “compelling reason” that termination would be detrimental under one of the exceptions listed in section 366.26 subdivision (c)(1 )(B). A party arguing that one of those exceptions applies has the burden of producin g evidence that establ ishes the exception. ( In re Lorenzo C. (1997) 54 Cal.App.4th 1330, 13 43 [discussing former § 366.26, subd. (c)(1), predecessor of § 366.26, subd. (c)(1)(B)].) We review the trial court’s
decision either for substantial ev idence or for abuse of discreti on; in this context, there is19 little difference between these standards of review. ( In re Bailey J. (2010) 189 Cal.App.4th 1308, 1314–1315; In re Jasmine D. (2000) 78 Cal.App.4th 1339, 1351– 1352.)
1. Beneficial Parental Relationship Exception Under the beneficial parental relati onship exception, the court must find a “compelling reason” that termination of pare ntal rights would be detrimental because “[t]he parents have maintained regular visita tion and contact with the child and the child would benefit from continuing the relationship.” (§ 366.26, subd. (c)(1)(B)(i).) “The
existence of interaction between the natural parent and child will always confer some incidental benefit to the child.” ( In re Lorenzo C., supra, 54 Cal.App.4th at p. 1342.) The beneficial parental relationship excep tion requires more, “that the parent-child relationship promote the well-being of the child to such a degree that it outweighs the well-being the child would gain in a perm anent home with new, adoptive parents. [Citation.]” ( Ibid. ) We have no difficulty conc luding that the trial court’s ruling is supported by the
record and was not an abuse of discretion. The bonding st udy amply demonstrated that as of the relevant time—at the permanen cy planning stage of the dependency case following approximately three years of servic es and repeated removals of the children
from Mother’s care due to recu rring domestic violence and incidents of child neglect— the children no longer lo oked to her for parental security and support. On the contrary, the children looked forward to placement with a loving relative who could provide them with stability and security for the rest of their diminishing childhoods. This bonding study, on which Mother had pinned her hopes of maintaining her pare ntal rights, instead turned out to be devastating to Mother’s case. The childre n showed considerable hostility toward Mother during the observed visits and showed true enthusiasm about placement with their paternal grandmother. While Mo ther accurately cites evidence that the children had maintained a po sitive relationship with he r throughout much of the dependency case, the question before the court was whether at the time of the section 366.26 hearing the detriment of termin ating the children’s legal relationship with20 Mother was so compelling that it outweighed the legislative preference for providing children with the perman ence and stability of adoption. The bonding study, rather than the reports of Mother’s visits with the ch ildren earlier in the case, was the relevant evidence on that po int and unambiguously weighe d in favor of adoption. The trial court did not err in ruling th at the beneficial parental relationship exception to termination of pa rental rights did not apply.
2. Beneficial Sibling Relationship Exception To apply the sibling relationship exce ption, the court must find a compelling reason for determining terminat ion of parental rights would be detrimental to the minor
because it would cause “substantial interference with a child’s sibling relationship . . . as compared to the benefit of legal perm anence through adoption.” (§ 366.26, subd. (c)(1)(B)(v).) 9 “To show a substantial interfere nce with a sibling relationship the parent must show the existence of a signifi cant sibling relationship, the severance of
which would be detrimen tal to the child.” ( In re L. Y. L., supra, 101 Cal.App.4th at p. 952, fn. omitted.) “In enacting this exce ption, the legislatur e was concerned with preserving long-standing relationships betw een siblings which serve as anchors for dependent children whose liv es are in turmoil.” ( In re Erik P. (2002) 104 Cal.App.4th 395, 404.) Again, the trial court clearly did not err in finding that the exception did not apply. The bonding study showed Adan in particular fe lt an attachment to his sister Elise, but his desire to live permanently with his patern al grandmother was more powerful. The children had a long-term and apparently secu re family relationship with the paternal grandmother and with each other. Their relationship with Elis e was shorter term and, as an infant, Elise’s ability to bu ild relationship with them wa s necessarily limited. While the children felt natural sadness at moving aw ay from Elise—just as they naturally felt sadness at losing contact with their mother —the court reasonably concluded that the

9 A parent has standing to raise the a ppellate issue of whether the sibling relationship exception should have been applied by the juvenile court. ( In re L. Y. L. (2002) 101 Cal.App.4th 942, 951.)21 benefit of maintaining the relationship with Elise was not suffici ently compelling to override the legislative preference for adoption. The court did not err in refusing to a pply the beneficial sibling relationship exception to termination of parental rights.
III. D ISPOSITION The July 13, 2012 order termina ting parental rights is affirmed.

_ ____________ ____________ Bruiniers, J.

We concur:

_____________ ____________ Simons, Acting P. J.

_____________ ____________ Needham, J.