July 1, 2015 

RED HILL FUEL TANK ADMINISTRATIVE ORDER ON CONSENT COMMENT

I attended the public meeting on Thursday, June 18, 2015 at Moanalua Middle School to learn more 

about the Red Hill fuel tank situation and the Administrative Order on Consent (AOC). 

This AOC document was put together entirely by the Navy and DLA. It is totally slanted in their favor. 

I was suspect of the Department of Health and its roll in addressing the Red Hill Facility, but after 

reviewing additional documents it is apparent that the DOH has been trying for many years to get the 

Navy to improve or correct the Red Hill Facility shortfalls. I’m disappointed that it appears the EPA 

cannot exercise more clout to mandate that the Navy and Department of Defense demonstrate an 

aggressive and timely solution to this very important crisis. As stated in their 2008 Final Groundwater 

Protection Plan and the 2010 Re-evaluation of the Red Hill Tier 3 Risk Assessment the Navy is aware of 

and has addressed the danger the Red Hill Fuel Facility puts on our very precious water supply. The 

Administrative Order on Consent and the Statement of Work are necessary documents to get this 

overdue job completed. All the promises of Best Available Practicable Technology (BAPT) and Tank 

Upgrade Alternatives (TUA) were inferred in the 2008 document. What have they been doing for the 

past 7 years? Will we always be waiting for a BAPT and TUA? The Navy WILL CONTINUE to use 

excuses, or drag their feet, or other parts to avoid doing what is necessary NOW. We cannot allow them 

to do this any longer and must set a shorter completion date for all work. They built this huge, massive 

facility in less years than the 22 to 28 years they are asking for now. If the decision is to repair and not 

relocate the tanks they can treat this as a war time situation and get this job done in 5 to 10 years. We 

need to be looking beyond just monitoring for possible leaks to a secure and complete overhaul to 

eliminate future leaks. 

Nowhere has anyone presented the option of relocating the tanks. Requesting 3 bids to relocate the Red 

Hill USTs above ground should have been the first item on the agenda at the first meeting. The reason 

for having the tanks underground in the 1940s is no longer an issue. Enemies know where the tanks are 

and have penetrating warheads to get to them. New storage tank technology has to be better than in the 

early 1940’s. Maintenance, repair and monitoring would be much cheaper, easier and safer. Building a 

solar farm above the tanks would guarantee operational power at all times. Ships and airplanes have the 

capability to bypass the Islands to get to war zones. The Navy and DLA do not want to abandon the Red 

Hill USTs because they know it will be expensive to clean up the contaminants left behind. The Navy 

has to be persuaded that this would be the best, responsible and correct approach to the existing 

situation. Study the option to relocate the tanks versus total upgrade of 70+ year old tanks. Build it on 

Federal land not ceded land. 
I recommend that the DOH and EPA not sign the existing Administrative Order on Consent as currently 

written because:

1. The presence of the Red Hill Underground Storage Tanks is a high risk to the health and 

environment of our community.

2. The 22-28 year possible completion date is too long. 

3. The age of the Red Hill USTs will be 100 years old by 2043.

4. Waiting for the perfect BAPT and TUA will present unending options which will allow the Navy 

to prolong the project.

5. The Board of Water Supply’s concerns and recommendations should be considered.

6. The Navy has not demonstrated a good faith, aggressive solution to Red Hill’s fuel spills.

7. Nowhere has anyone presented the option to relocate the fuel tanks.

My biggest fear is that the restoration work could trigger a catastrophic incident. And the Navy would 

only say, “Oops” and walk away. Our environment is very fragile. We cannot lose our precious water 

supply. We cannot go across state lines to obtain water. Losing the Honolulu Board of Water Supply's 

Waimalu and Moanalua water source would affect the entire island. 

Following are some excerpts from the AOC that I have issue with and contributed to my conclusion of 

not accepting the AOC as written.

Pg 7 #5 (b) (iii) EPA has determined that the Navy and DLA have contributed to and are 

contributing to the handling, storage, treatment, transportation or disposal of solid waste at the facility. 

Pg 7 #5 (b) (iv) EPA has determined that the Navy and DLA’s handling, storage, treatment, 

transportation or disposal of solid waste may present an imminent and substantial endangerment to 

health or the environment. Pg 7 #5 (b) (v) Actions required by the AOC MAY be necessary to protect 

health and the environment. 

The above three statements say a lot. Is the EPA stating a valid concern regarding the 

management of the Red Hill Underground Fuel Storage Tanks (USTs)? If so, get the head of the EPA 

involved with this issue. And the last statement should be written to read, “Actions required by the 

AOC will be taken to ensure the protection of health and the environment.”

Page 17 #12 (a) it is the expectation of the Parties to the AOC that all obligations of the Navy 

and DLA arising under the AOC will be fully funded. (b) Any funds including penalties may be subject 

to the availability of appropriated funds. No provision herein shall be interpreted to require obligation 

or payment of funds in violation of the Anti Deficiency Act, 31 U.S.C. – 1341. (c) If funds are not 

available in any YEAR to fulfill Navy and DLA obligation under AOC ...DOH and EPA reserve their 

respective right to initiate any action against any person(s) or to take any response action which would 

be appropriate absent this AOC.

I think the DOH and the EPA relinquish their rights in #12 (b) as unavailability of appropriated 

funds will be the Navy and DLA’s escape clause of choice.
Pg 18 #13 (a) Reimbursement of DOH Cost: Why are we limited to $50,000 per calendar year 

for reimbursement of DOH cost? It should be dollar for dollar whatever that cost is. One paragraph 

stating full reimbursement requirement can replace the 2 1⁄2 pages dedicated to giving the Navy and DLA 

reimbursement escape holes, plus their above mentioned unavailable funds clause.

Pg 22 #15 (a) Compliance with this AOC by Navy and DLA shall include completion of any 

Work in accordance with this AOC and within the specified time schedules approved under the AOC. A 

penalty may be assessed in an amount not to exceed $5,000 for a first week (or part thereof) and 

$10,000 for each additional week (or part thereof) for which a failure in this subsection occurs. 

The specified time schedules approved under the AOC are too long. Require that work begins in 

5 years and is completed no longer then 10 years from the signing of the AOC and Statement of Work 

(SOW). Why the small penalty amount? The Navy and DLA, or any large Corporation, would laugh at 

that penalty. Charge them the hundreds of thousands per day the EPA charged the City of Honolulu 

when it had to divert sewage into the Ala Wai Canal to keep it out of the streets of Waikiki in the hope 

of containing the diverted sewage while repairing the problem. What is good for one is good for all. 

Then after this meager penalty the AOC proceeds to give the Navy and DLA 3 months to dispute a 

resolution. How generous. And don’t forget the unavailable funds clause also covers penalties.

I have taken the time to read the 2008 Final Groundwater Protection Plan written by the Navy and the 

2010 Re-Evaluation of the Red Hill Tier 3 Risk Assessment. The statements and history reports from 

these two documents have made me aware of how really bad the fuel tank situation is and also 

influenced my comments on the Administrative Order on Consent.

The 2008 Final Groundwater Protection Plan begins by describing the Facility, its purpose, 

where it was built, why and when activated. It states it installed the Navy’s water well 2254-01 and 

tunnels at the same time. The document states that simulation tests concluded that the aging of the 

Facility will increase the possibility that the release of fuel could occur as a result of leaks breaching 

both the steel liners and concrete containment of the tanks. While the tank steel liners have been 

repaired, the concrete containment cannot be maintained.

The document continues in 1.2 Description of the Problem: The potential impact of an 

inadvertent fuel release to the groundwater system is the main risk driver for the Facility. The Facility is 

approximately 100 feet above the basal groundwater table on the boundary of the Waimalu and 

Moanalua Aquifer Systems of the Pearl Harbor and Honolulu Aquifer Sectors, respectively. Both 

aquifers are sources of potable water for several public water systems. The Waimalu and Moanalua 

Aquifer systems are classified as unconfined, basal, and flank. Their status is listed as currently used, 

fresh drinking water sources that are irreplaceable and have a high vulnerability to 

contamination. The nature of the fractured basalt beneath the site would make cleanup of a future 

petroleum release difficult. There are several potable water supply wells in the vicinity of the Facility. 

The impact of a large release would be very costly and would jeopardize the Navy mission at Pearl 

Harbor by the potential loss of the potable water supplied by U.S. Navy well 2254-01. 

The document goes on to state that the Groundwater Protection Plan Scope and Objectives are 

not intended to address risks associated with a catastrophic release of fuel to the environment resulting
from a large rupture in the steel tanks or piping system. These catastrophic events would require 

emergency response actions that are not within the scope of the document. It goes on to state the Water 

System Emergency Response Plan provides procedures to mitigate the risk of exposure to contaminated 

water within the storage and transport facilities of the PHWS, but does not address procedures to 

mitigate risk associated with contamination within the groundwater resource.

These statements are very important because in 2008 it confirms the Navy acknowledged the 

important urgency of addressing the risk factors of the Facility and its’ proximity to a very important 

potable water supply. If the lack of potable water would jeopardize the Navy’s mission, then the Navy 

has to decide what is more important, these crumbling fuel tanks or their mission at Pearl Harbor. If 

Pearl Harbor’s mission is the most important, then the immediate repair or relocation of the fuel tanks 

should be a no brainer. Also, a catastrophic event which contaminates Honolulu’s groundwater

resource will have no consequence to the Navy and it is not within their Groundwater Protection Plan 

Scope or Objectives. How sad. If a catastrophic leak occurs, what would Honolulu’s cost be? 

The Final Groundwater Protection Plan of 2008 shows the tank maintenance and repair histories. 

There have been other fuel spills prior to the recent 27,000 gallons spilt in January 2014. The fact that 

there have been spills of 31,000, 32,000, 20,000, 10,000, 6,000, 5,000 gallons and more over the last 40 

years or more indicate that the Navy is unable or unwilling to get ahead of the fuel spillage problem at 

the Facility. 

There has been reference to the water flowing to the south and could not affect the Halawa well shaft 

that is northwest of the Facility. This was re-stated by a Navy representative, Captain Dean Tufts, at the 

June 18, 2015 community meeting. However, in the Re-evaluation of the Red Hill Tier 3 Risk 

Assessment dated May 4, 2010; it states further tests proved that in certain circumstances it was 

determined that water does flow in the northwest direction. 

The AOC needs to be revised because these last two documents are very damning, unsettling and an eye 

opener to how fragile the situation is.