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Filed 6/24/24 P. v. Patterson CA1/2

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for 

publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or 

ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115. 

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION TWO

THE PEOPLE,

Plaintiff and Respondent,

v.

MICHAEL RALEIGH PATTERSON,

Defendant and Appellant.

 A166334

(Contra Costa County Super. Ct. 

No. 04002007185)

In February 2020 defendant Michael Patterson injured his girlfriend 

Jane Doe’s friend A.G. when A.G. attempted to intervene in an incident of 

domestic violence involving Patterson and Doe. Charged with various crimes 

arising out of this and another incident, Patterson was convicted of them 

including, as pertinent here, assault by means likely to produce great bodily 

injury, with the jury also finding true the enhancement allegation that the

injuries were inflicted “under circumstances involving domestic violence.” 

Patterson contends that substantial evidence does not support application of 

the enhancement because he was never in a dating relationship with A.G. 

We affirm. 

BACKGROUND

On May 12, 2022, the Contra Costa County District Attorney filed an 

amended information charging Patterson with 10 counts arising out of two 
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separate incidents that took place on June 12, 2020 (counts 1–5) and 

February 29, 2020 (counts 6–10): infliction of corporal injury upon a spouse 

or cohabitant after a prior domestic violence conviction (Pen. Code, § 273.5, 

subd. (f)(1))

1 (counts 1 & 6), assault by means likely to produce great bodily 

injury (§ 245, subd. (a)(4)) (counts 2 & 7), battery with serious bodily injury 

(§ 243, subd. (d)) (counts 3 & 8), contempt of court (§ 166, subd. (c)(1)) (counts 

4, 5, & 10), and vandalism (§ 594, subd. (a)) (count 9). The information 

further alleged as an enhancement with respect to counts 1, 2, and 7 that 

Patterson committed those offenses “under circumstances involving domestic 

violence” within the meaning of section 12022.7, subdivision (e), and also 

alleged as an enhancement with respect to counts 3 and 8 that Patterson 

personally inflicted great bodily injury in the commission of those offenses. 

At trial Jane Doe and her friend A.G. both testified regarding the 

February 29 incident. A.G. was staying temporarily at Doe’s home as Doe 

“was scared to be alone” “[b]ecause of all of the . . . incidents with 

[Patterson].” At some point that day, Patterson was present in the house and 

A.G. went to the bedroom to get dressed so she could accompany Doe and 

Patterson on an errand. 

While she was in the bedroom, A.G. heard “what sounded like 

somebody getting hit” and a sound “like a shriek a little bit.” After she heard 

the noises, A.G. came out of the bedroom and “asked [Patterson] what 

happened,” and he said “[n]othing.” “[She] looked over at [Doe] and she had a 

mark underneath her eye” that “was all reddened.” A.G. then “started 

hitting [Patterson] with a stick,” testifying she “felt like [she] was protecting 

[Doe].” According to A.G.: “[T]hen a fight broke out between [Patterson] and 

1 Further undesignated statutory references are to the Penal Code. 
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I. He threw a chair at the coffee table. It was a glass top and broke it, broke 

half of it. And then took me down on top of the table when him and I were 

fighting. And he hit me in the back of the head twice.” Meanwhile, Doe 

grabbed Patterson’s shoulder and tried to pull him off A.G. 

A.G. had a taser with her that had fallen on the ground during the 

fight. After she was able to get up, she tasered Patterson. Patterson then

went to the kitchen and got a knife. Meanwhile, Doe and A.G. ran out the 

front door. About four houses down the block, A.G. realized she was bleeding 

from a wide cut on her right leg, and some neighbors called the police. 

Patterson fled the scene before police arrived. Doe suffered swelling to her 

forehead and scratches on her nose and above her left eyebrow. A.G., who 

took an ambulance to the hospital, sustained cuts to both of her legs, one of 

which required eight stitches. 

In her closing argument, the prosecutor argued that Patterson was

guilty of count 7 based on his February 29 assault on A.G., and that the jury 

should find true the enhancement allegation that that assault was committed 

“under circumstances involving domestic violence.” 

The jury found Patterson guilty as charged on each count and found 

true the enhancement allegations. 

The trial court sentenced Patterson to an aggregate term of eight years 

in prison. The court set the primary count as count 1 and sentenced

Patterson to the midterm of four years plus the middle term of four years on 

the section 12022.7, subdivision (e) enhancement. On count 7, the court 

imposed the midterm of three years plus a consecutive midterm of four years 

on the section 12022.7, subdivision (e) enhancement, to be served 

concurrently with the sentence on count 1.
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DISCUSSION

Patterson’s only argument on appeal is that the jury’s true finding on 

the section 12022.7, subdivision (e) enhancement with respect to count 7 is 

not supported by substantial evidence because he never dated A.G., and 

therefore his assault on her did not occur “under circumstances involving 

domestic violence.” (§ 12022.7, subd. (e).) 

Section 12022.7, subdivision (e) provides: “Any person who personally 

inflicts great bodily injury under circumstances involving domestic violence 

in the commission of a felony or attempted felony shall be punished by an 

additional and consecutive term of imprisonment in the state prison for three, 

four, or five years. As used in this subdivision, ‘domestic violence’ has the 

meaning provided in subdivision (b) of Section 13700.”

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Patterson’s argument is defeated by the jury instruction on the 

enhancement. The jury was instructed—without defense objection—on the 

domestic violence enhancement pursuant to CALCRIM No. 3163. Although, 

as Patterson notes, that instruction provides that “Domestic violence means 

abuse committed against an adult who is a person who dated or is dating the 

defendant,” it also provides that “The person who was injured does not have 

to be a person with whom the defendant had a relationship.” (CALCRIM 

No. 3163.) 

As the Attorney General argues, Patterson’s argument is also defeated 

by our decision in People v. Truong (2001) 90 Cal.App.4th 887 (Truong)—a 

2 Section 13700, subdivision (b) provides in relevant part: “ ‘Domestic 

violence’ means abuse committed against an adult or a minor who is a 

spouse, former spouse, cohabitant, former cohabitant, or person with whom 

the suspect has had a child or is having or has had a dating or engagement 

relationship.”
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case that Patterson does not even cite much less discuss.3 There, defendant 

showed up at the home of his wife, from whom he was separated, at about 

3:00 a.m. (Id. at pp. 890–892.) After opening the door so fast that his wife 

was pushed into the wall, defendant went into the bedroom and stabbed his 

wife’s current boyfriend in the leg. (Id. at pp. 891–892.) And as he left, 

defendant shoved his wife’s head into the wall, bruising the right side of her 

head and leaving an indentation in the wall. (Id. at p. 892.) A jury found 

defendant guilty of assault with a deadly weapon and found the true the 

enhancement allegation that the assault was committed under circumstances 

involving domestic violence. (Id. at p. 890.) 

We rejected defendant’s arguments that the scope of the enhancement 

was limited to victims of domestic violence and that the statute was 

unconstitutionally vague explaining as follows:

“The language of section 12022.7, subdivision (d)[4], does not limit its

application to injuries inflicted upon the victim or perpetrator of domestic 

violence. As the prosecutor argued at trial, this is in contrast to 

section 12022.8, which establishes an enhancement for a defendant who 

personally inflicts great bodily injury ‘on any victim’ in a violation or 

attempted violation of enumerated sexual offense statutes. It is also in 

contrast to subdivision (c) of section 12022.7, which describes an 

enhancement for a defendant who personally inflicts great bodily injury ‘on a 

person who is 70 years of age or older’ in the commission of a felony. These 

3 Patterson did not file a reply brief. 

4 As Truong noted, the language contained in former section 12022.7, 

subdivision (d) is now contained in section 12022.7, subdivision (e). (Truong, 

supra, 90 Cal.App.4th at p. 895, fn. 3; Stats. 2000, ch. 919, § 1.) 
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statutes demonstrate that the Legislature is capable of limiting the reach of 

an enhancement statute quite precisely. . . . 

“The Legislature in section 12022.7, subdivision (d), could easily have 

limited application of the enhancement to great bodily injury inflicted upon a 

‘victim of domestic violence.’ Instead, it chose the broad language ‘under 

circumstances involving domestic violence.’ This broadness does not render 

the statute either unconstitutionally vague or ambiguous: By its plain 

language, section 12022.7, subdivision (d), establishes an enhancement for 

any person who inflicts great bodily injury upon a person in the course of an 

incident of domestic violence. No person of ordinary intelligence would be left 

guessing as to the meaning of this language. Rather, the statute clearly 

informs a defendant who commits domestic violence that infliction of great 

bodily injury on any person involved in the incident, whether or not a victim 

of domestic violence under the definition of section 13700, will result in an 

enhanced sentence. It is easy to conjure the circumstances in which the 

statute might come into play, such as when the defendant inflicts great bodily 

injury upon a friend or relative who has attempted to come to the aid of the 

domestic violence victim, or upon a peace officer responding to an incident of 

domestic violence.” (Truong, supra, 90 Cal.App.4th at pp. 899–900.)

The circumstances of this case are precisely those we described in 

Truong: A.G., who had been staying with Doe because of Patterson’s history 

of domestic violence, heard what sounded like Doe being subjected to 

domestic violence and came to the aid of her friend, and was then herself 

subjected to great bodily injury at the hands of defendant. 

DISPOSITION

The judgment is affirmed. 
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_________________________

Richman, J.

We concur:

_________________________

Stewart, P.J.

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Miller, J.

People v. Patterson (A166334)