SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY

APPELLATE DIVISION

DOCKET NO. A-2559-19

DMITRY KORSUNSKY,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

v. 

SVETLANA KURINSKY,

Defendant-Respondent.

Argued March 10, 2021 – Decided April 13, 2021

Before Judges Whipple and Rose.

On appeal from the Superior Court of New Jersey, 

Chancery Division, Family Part, Somerset County,

Docket No. FM-18-0388-07.

Stilianos M. Cambilis argued the cause for appellant 

(The Law Office of Rajeh A. Saadeh, LLC, attorneys; 

Rajeh A. Saadeh and Stilianos M. Cambilis, on the 

briefs).

Cynthia J. Lambo argued the cause for respondent,

(Lambo & Lambo, LLC, attorneys; Cynthia J. Lambo, 

on the brief).

PER CURIAM

NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE

APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION

This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court." Although it is posted on the 

internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R. 1:36-3.
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Plaintiff Dimitry Korsunsky (Father) appeals from an amended February 

21, 2020 Family Part order1that allocated to him college costs and related 

expenses for the only child (Daughter) born of his marriage to defendant 

Svetlana Kurinsky (Mother). We affirm.

I.

The parties were married in January 1998; Daughter was born in October 

2000. The marriage was dissolved by a May 7, 2007 dual final judgment of 

divorce (JOD), which incorporated the parties' property settlement agreement 

(PSA). Five provisions of the PSA directly and indirectly address Daughter's 

education and Father's obligation to pay child support to Mother:

2. The parties shall jointly make any and all 

significant decisions concerning, but not limited to the 

child's health, education, religious education and 

welfare with a view toward adopting and following 

those policies that are in the child's best interests. The 

parties shall not take any action that would impair the 

other from being a full participant in their child's lives 

[sic].

. . . .

25. [Father] shall pay to [Mother] child support 

for unemancipated child of the marriage in the amount 

of $1[]300 per month, . . . until the child is emancipated. 

1

 Apparently, the February 21, 2020 order amended an earlier order to correct 

the transposing of the parties' obligations to pay Daughter's college expenses. 

The original order is not included in the record on appeal.
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. . . Child support shall be recalculated by the 

[p]robation [d]epartment every three years.

. . . .

33. The parties also agree to pay in proportion to 

each parties' net income, based on the preceding year's 

income tax return for the undergraduate college, junior 

college, vocational or trade school education of 

[Daughter]. Such payments shall include tuition, fees, 

books and room and board. The parties and [Daughter] 

shall consult with each other with respect to the child's 

choice of school.

34. In the event a child is attending school away 

from home, and not living in the home of [Mother], then 

[Father]'s obligation to pay child support to [Mother] 

for said unemancipated child shall be reduced by fifty 

percent. If the child resides at home while attending 

school, there shall be no reduction in support.

35. Both parties shall cooperate fully in the 

child's application process, both for admission and for 

financial aid, loans, grants and/or scholarships. They 

shall fully and promptly provide any necessary 

information, including tax returns and financial 

statements, and complete all necessary forms in a 

timely manner.

Following the sale of Father's business, the Family Part entered a consent 

order on March 14, 2014, governing Father's child support obligations. Relevant 

here, the parties agreed to an increase in Father's child support to "$2[]625 per 

month, retroactive to April 20, 2013." Notably, the consent order expressly 

provided: "All other terms and provisions of prior [c]ourt [o]rders," the JOD, 
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and PSA "shall remain in full force and effect except as specifically modified 

herein." No other provisions of the consent order pertained to Daughter's 

college education. Apparently, Father did not file a case information statement 

(CIS) with the Family Part prior to entry of the consent order, but a child support 

worksheet was attached thereto. 

On April 8, 2019, Mother emailed Father that Daughter had received 

responses to college applications. Mother stated that Daughter, at Father's 

behest, had explored schools in the Boston area but did not find any strong 

programs in her desired field. Instead, Daughter narrowed her decision to two 

colleges – one in Florida and the other in Georgia. Mother further stated that 

the parties "need[ed] to address the financial side of her attending college." 

Mother included links to the schools' websites regarding tuition and financial 

aid and attached financial aid award letters for both colleges.

Six days later, on April 14, 2019, Father simply replied: "Let's try to work 

it out." Father advised he would be present in New Jersey that week and 

suggested the parties "meet and discuss." He also provided updated contact 

information because he did not "check this email [account] very often." 

The parties met four days later, on April 18, 2019, but failed to reach an 

agreement concerning their allocation of Daughter's college tuition and 
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expenses. Daughter thereafter enrolled in the school located in Florida. 

Daughter was awarded merit-based scholarships, grants, and financial aid. She 

declined a work-study program, which would have interfered with her studies.

Daughter's first semester expenses, including tuition and board, were $17,920. 

With no agreement as to allocation in place, Father paid $11,061 and Mother 

paid $6859. 

After the parties' attempts at mediation failed, Mother filed an order to

show cause to compel Father to: pay the outstanding balance on Daughter's 

second semester tuition – $10,427.45, plus interest and penalties; or withdraw 

those funds from Father's bank account if he failed to pay the tuition bill within 

three days.2 Father cross-moved to deny mother's application. Father also 

sought: a downward modification of his child support obligation, retroactively 

to the commencement of Daughter's enrollment in college; and a declaration that 

Daughter waived his contribution toward her college expenses, or an offset of 

his obligation resulting from financial aid Daughter received or declined. In 

support of his cross-motion, father included a current CIS and his 2014 tax 

2 The parties were unable to reach an agreement for payment of Daughter's 

second semester tuition bill. Mother and Daughter paid $7,048.55; Father made 

no contribution. Accordingly, Daughter's tuition and costs became past due.
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returns, which indicated his annual net income was reduced from $660,824 in 

2014 to $118,262.72 in 2019. 

The motion judge declined to consider the matter as emergent. Following 

argument in the ordinary course, the judge issued a cogent statement of reasons 

accompanying the February 21, 2020 order. The judge squarely addressed the 

issues raised in view of the governing law and the terms of the PSA. Pertinent 

to this appeal, the judge granted, as modified, Mother's request to compel Father 

to pay the second semester tuition bill, apportioning eighty percent of the 

expenses to Father and ten percent each to Mother and Daughter. Accordingly, 

Father was ordered to pay $8,344.96 by February 28, 2020. 

The motion judge also denied Father's request for a reduction in child 

support based on a change of circumstances, finding Father "failed to file his 

past [CIS](s) with required attachments." But the judge further observed "even 

if [Father] had included his prior [CIS, Father]'s certification contain[ed] no 

facts in support of his assertion that he ha[d] suffered a permanent involuntary 

reduction in income." Instead, the judge found Father "merely assert[ed] that 

he ma[d]e 'significantly less income,' without providing the reason behind the 

decrease in earnings." 
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Nonetheless, the judge granted Father's request for a downward 

modification of child support, retroactive to Daughter's college start date.

Pursuant to paragraph 34 of the PSA, the judge found the parties agreed "to 

reduce child support by [fifty percent] for any time that [Daughter] was 

attending school and not residing at [Mother]'s residence." Noting Mother 

provided proof that the college's 2019-20 academic calendar spanned 

approximately seven months, the judge determined Father was "entitled to a 

reduction in his child support obligation for the seven months that [Daughter 

was] away at college and not residing with [Mother]." Accordingly, the judge 

reduced Father's child support obligation from $2804 to $1986 per month. 3

The motion judge also rejected Father's argument that Mother and 

Daughter failed to involve him in the application process, thereby entitling him 

to waive his contribution for college expenses; and Father's alternate argument 

for an offset of financial aid that Daughter "should have applied for." 

Referencing the April 2019 email exchange between the parties, the judge found 

3

 It is unclear from the record when Father's $2625 per month child support 

obligation under the March 14, 2014 consent order was increased to $2804 per 

month. The judge calculated Father's obligation under paragraph 34 of the PSA

as follows: "[Seven] months at $1[]402 per month and [five] months at $2[]804

per month equals $23,834 per annum. Averaged over a [twelve] month period, 

[Father]'s obligation is $1[]986 per month."
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Mother "submitted substantial documentation showing she provided at least 

minimal information about [Daughter]'s college selection process to [Father]." 

Conversely, Father "provided no credible, reliable, and verifiable proofs 

that the relationship between [him] and [Daughter] [wa]s non-existent." Citing 

Gac v. Gac, 186 N.J. 535, 545-46 (2006), and Black v. Black, 436 N.J. Super.

130, 146 (Ch. Div. 2013), the judge further determined Father failed to 

demonstrate Daughter resisted Father's attempts to improve or rehabilitate their 

relationship that would otherwise warrant termination of Father's "obligation to 

contribute to [Daughter]'s college education."

In his overlapping arguments on appeal, Father argues the motion judge 

erroneously: recalculated child support without considering Father's change in 

income here, where no CIS was filed in connection with the March 14, 2014 

consent order; failed to consider Daughter's college attendance as a "change in 

circumstance" under Jacoby v. Jacoby, 427 N.J. Super. 109, 116 (App. Div. 

2012); and misconstrued the terms of the PSA. Father claims the judge 

erroneously reduced Father's obligation under paragraph 34 of the PSA by fifty 
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percent for the seven months Daughter resides on campus – instead of reducing 

Father's obligation for the entire year while Daughter is enrolled in college. 4 

Father also renews his contention that Mother and Daughter failed to 

include him "in the college selection process." In sum, Father claims he 

"essentially serve[s] as a human ATM to finance [Mother and Daughter's] 

decisions made without his contribution, involvement, or knowledge until it 

came time for payment." 

II.

We review a trial judge's decision to grant or deny modification of child 

support by examining "whether, given the facts, the trial judge abused his or her 

discretion." J.B. v. W.B., 215 N.J. 305, 325-26 (2013) (internal quotation marks 

omitted). Thus, trial courts are afforded "substantial discretion in making a child 

support award" and "[i]f consistent with the law, such an award will not be 

disturbed unless it is manifestly unreasonable, arbitrary, or clearly contrary to 

4

 It is unclear from the record whether Father raised this precise argument before 

the motion judge. In his certification in support of his cross-motion, Father 

requested reduction of his child support "pursuant to paragraph 34" of the PSA; 

he did not specifically contend that his obligation should be reduced year-round. 

The motion judge did not specifically consider whether the obligation should be 

reduced only for the months Daughter resides on campus or year-round while 

she is enrolled in college. Instead, the judge simply noted Mother "agree[d]" 

Father's obligation would be reduced by fifty percent for the months Daughter 

was not living at home.
10 A-2559-19

reason or to other evidence, or the result of whim or caprice." Foust v. Glaser, 

340 N.J. Super. 312, 315-16 (App. Div. 2001) (citation and internal quotation 

marks omitted). "The Family Part's 'substantial discretion' in determining child 

support applies equally to compelling a parent to contribute to their child's 

college costs." Avelino-Catabran v. Catabran, 445 N.J. Super. 574, 588 (App. 

Div. 2016). However, we review the Family Part's interpretation of the law de 

novo, without giving any special deference to the trial court's decision. See N.J. 

Div. of Youth & Family Servs. v. R.G., 217 N.J. 527, 552 (2014). 

 A court may modify child support obligations when the party seeking 

modification "demonstrat[es] a change in circumstances warranting an 

adjustment." Jacoby, 427 N.J. Super. at 116. Generally, in determining child 

support in the context of college tuition, the factors enumerated in N.J.S.A. 

2A:34-23(a) should be followed, as "the child support obligation is considered 

in light of all the financial circumstances of the parties and children." Raynor 

v. Raynor, 319 N.J. Super. 591, 614 (App. Div. 1999). In the context of 

allocating children's college expenses, the Family Part has "broad equitable 

powers" to achieve "substantial justice." Weitzman v. Weitzman, 228 N.J. 

Super. 346, 358 (App. Div. 1988). 
11 A-2559-19

"When a party to a comprehensive negotiated PSA seeks to modify any 

support obligation, that party must meet the threshold standard of changed 

circumstances." J.B., 215 N.J. at 327. The "party seeking modification of his 

or her child support obligation has the burden of demonstrating a change in 

circumstances warranting an adjustment." Jacoby, 427 N.J. Super. at 116 (citing 

Lepis v. Lepis, 83 N.J. 139, 157 (1980)). The moving party must present a prima 

facie case of changed circumstances, such as a demonstration of child 

maturation, increases in need, changes in income or child emancipation. See id.

at 118-19. Moreover, "[a]s a necessary and preliminary step to meeting this 

burden, a movant is required to submit both a current and a prior CIS." Palombi 

v. Palombi, 414 N.J. Super. 274, 291 (App. Div. 2010); see also R. 5:5-4(a)(2). 

In the present matter, the motion judge properly denied Father's crossmotion for modification of his child support obligation based on Father's 

claimed reduction in income since entry of the March 14, 2014 consent order. 

Father claims he did not include a CIS from 2014 because the March 14, 2019 

consent order was entered without a CIS. Instead, to support his cross-motion, 

Father annexed his 2014 income tax returns and current CIS to his certification, 

and summarily stated he "ma[d]e significantly less in income than [he] did at 

the time of the March 14, 2014 [c]onsent [o]rder." We therefore conclude the 
12 A-2559-19

motion judge correctly determined Father failed to submit sufficient evidence 

that he "suffered a permanent involuntary reduction in income." Nothing in the 

record suggests the motion judge's finding in this instance was an abuse of 

discretion.

Moreover, we reject Father's seemingly belated argument that the judge 

failed to reduce his child support obligation to reflect Daughter's college 

attendance, under Jacoby, 427 N.J. Super. at 122. Unlike the parties in Jacoby, 

who had no agreement addressing child support while their children attended 

college, 427 N.J. Super. at 113-14, the parties in this case expressly 

contemplated a reduction in child support in paragraph 34 of the PSA. Father's 

argument to the contrary lacks sufficient merit to warrant discussion in a written 

opinion. R. 2:11-3(e)(1)(E).

Nor do we find any merit in Father's argument that the motion judge 

misinterpreted paragraph 34 of the PSA. "The polestar of contract construction 

is to discover the intention of the parties as revealed by the language used by 

them." EQR-LPC Urban Renewal N. Pier, LLC v. City of Jersey City, 452 N.J. 

Super. 309, 319 (App. Div. 2016) (internal quotation marks omitted). "[W]hen 

the intent of the parties is plain and the language is clear and unambiguous, a 

court must enforce the agreement as written, unless doing so would lead to an 
13 A-2559-19

absurd result." Quinn v. Quinn, 225 N.J. 34, 45 (2016). "[I]f the terms of [a] 

contract are susceptible to at least two reasonable alternative interpretations, an 

ambiguity exists" and "a court may look to extrinsic evidence as an aid to 

interpretation." Barr v. Barr, 418 N.J. Super. 18, 32 (App. Div. 2011) (quoting 

Chubb Custom Ins. Co. v. Prudential Ins. Co. of Am., 195 N.J. 231, 238 (2008)). 

However, even if the contract is clear and unambiguous, a court "may consider 

'all of the relevant evidence that will assist [the court] in determining [its] intent 

and meaning.'" Manahawkin Convalescent v. O'Neill, 217 N.J. 99, 118 (2014) 

(quoting Conway v. 287 Corp. Ctr. Assocs., 187 N.J. 259, 269 (2006)).

Here, the motion judge correctly interpreted paragraph 34 of the PSA. 

That paragraph governs two opposing scenarios. Pursuant to the first sentence, 

the parties agreed that Father's child support obligation would be reduced by 

one-half, "[i]n the event a child is attending school away from home, and not 

living in the home of [Mother]." Conversely, the second sentence provides: "If 

the child resides at home while attending school, there shall be no reduction in 

support." Clearly, the parties intended that Father's child support obligation 

would remain the same while Daughter resided at home with Mother and would 

be reduced only if Daughter resided on campus. The terms of paragraph 34 are 
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"clear and unambiguous"; therefore, the paragraph must be enforced as written. 

Quinn, 225 N.J. at 45. 

Because Daughter lives with Mother for five months per year when she is 

home from college, the motion judge correctly reduced Father's child support 

obligation only for the seven months of the year that Daughter resides on 

campus. Moreover, we have previously recognized the need for parents to 

maintain a home for their children while their children attend college away from 

home. Jacoby, 427 N.J. Super. at 121-22. A plain reading of paragraph 34 

achieves this end.

We likewise reject Father's contention that he is not obligated to pay for 

Daughter's college education because he was excluded from her decisionmaking process, and affirm for the reasons stated in the motion judge's wellreasoned opinion. R. 2:11-3(e)(1)(A). We add only the following comments.

Parents, under a variety of circumstances, may be obligated to pay for 

their child's college education. The Supreme Court set forth a dozen factors in 

Newburgh v. Arrigo, 88 N.J. 529, 545 (1982), which the Legislature then 

essentially adopted in an amendment to the support statute. Gac, 186 N.J. at

543; see N.J.S.A. 2A:34-23(a). Where there is no material factual dispute 
15 A-2559-19

between the parties, a plenary hearing for factual findings pertaining to the 

Newburgh factors is unnecessary. Jacoby, 427 N.J. Super. at 123.

Here, the parties agreed they would pay for Daughter's college education 

as set forth in paragraph 33 of the PSA. That paragraph further provides that 

the parties would "consult with each other with respect to [Daughter]'s choice 

of school." As such, the parties' dispute was not whether Father was obligated 

to contribute to Daughter's college expenses but rather, whether a failure to 

include him in the decision-making process – as required by paragraph 33 of the 

PSA – terminated that obligation. In that regard, Father's reliance on our 

Supreme Court's decision in Gac and its progeny is misplaced. 

In Gac, the Court held a father was not obligated to pay for his daughter's 

college expenses, in part because: the daughter had no relationship with the 

father and repeatedly, over several years, rejected his efforts to reestablish a 

relationship; the father was not kept abreast of his daughter's plans as they were 

being made, including her decision to attend an expensive private college instead 

of a less-expensive state college; and the daughter did not request assistance 

with paying for her college expenses until after she had graduated from college 

and was saddled with loans. Id. at 545-46. Notably, the parties in Gac did not 

contemplate college expenses in a PSA.
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By contrast, as the motion judge observed in the present matter, Father 

was not shut out of Daughter's college decision-making process. Daughter 

followed Father's advice to explore colleges in Boston. Father was informed of 

Daughter's two preferences after she received responses to her applications. 

When asked to contribute to Daughter's college expenses before Daughter even 

graduated high school, Father met with Mother and engaged in mediation to 

attempt to "work it out." Moreover, Father presented no evidence that he lacked 

a relationship with Daughter or that their relationship was irreconcilable. Even 

if Daughter refused to have a relationship with Father, "[a] relationship between 

a non-custodial parent and a child is not required for the custodial parent or the 

child to ask the non-custodial parent for financial assistance to defray college 

expenses." Gac, 186 N.J. at 546.

We therefore conclude the motion judge did not abuse his discretion in 

finding Father was consulted on Daughter's college decision-making as required 

by paragraph 33 of the PSA. Nor did the motion judge err in ordering Father to 

contribute to Daughter's college expenses as set forth in the PSA. 

Affirmed.