[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it may be cited as State 

ex rel. Daniels v. Russo, Slip Opinion No. 2018-Ohio-5194.] 

NOTICE 

This slip opinion is subject to formal revision before it is published in an 

advance sheet of the Ohio Official Reports. Readers are requested to 

promptly notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of Ohio, 65 

South Front Street, Columbus, Ohio 43215, of any typographical or other 

formal errors in the opinion, in order that corrections may be made before 

the opinion is published. 

SLIP OPINION NO. 2018-OHIO-5194

THE STATE EX REL. DANIELS, APPELLANT, v. RUSSO, JUDGE, APPELLEE. 

[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it 

may be cited as State ex rel. Daniels v. Russo, Slip Opinion No. 

2018-Ohio-5194.] 

Mandamus and procedendo—Trial court’s entry denying appellant’s motion for 

new sentencing entry was appealable under R.C. 2505.02(B)(1)—Appellant 

had adequate remedy in ordinary course of law in form of direct appeal 

from the entry—Court of appeals’ judgment denying petition affirmed. 

(No. 2017-0028—Submitted November 21, 2017—Decided December 26, 2018.) 

APPEAL from the Court of Appeals for Cuyahoga County, 

No. 104502, 2016-Ohio-8060. 

________________ 

 Per Curiam. 

{¶ 1} Appellant, Dexter J. Daniels, appeals the judgment of the Eighth 

District Court of Appeals denying the petition for writs of mandamus and/or 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO

2

procedendo that he filed against appellee, Cuyahoga County Court of Common 

Pleas Judge John J. Russo. We affirm the court of appeals’ judgment. 

Background 

{¶ 2} In April 1989, Daniels was indicted on multiple counts of aggravated 

murder with capital specifications, among other crimes. He entered into a plea 

agreement in which he agreed to plead guilty to two counts of aggravated murder 

with felony-murder specifications and two counts of aggravated burglary with 

felony-murder specifications. In exchange, the state agreed to dismiss the 

remaining counts and not pursue the death penalty. 

{¶ 3} Three documents in the record are at issue in this appeal. The first is 

the trial court’s entry memorializing Daniels’s guilty pleas and its entry of a nolle 

prosequi as to the remaining counts. The second is the court’s sentencing entry. 

And the third is a “Certified Copy of Sentence.” 

{¶ 4} On March 30, 2016, Daniels filed a motion in the trial court for a final, 

appealable order, arguing that the sentencing entry in his case violated Crim.R. 32 

and the “one document” rule enunciated in State v. Baker, 119 Ohio St.3d 197, 

2008-Ohio-3330, 893 N.E.2d 163. Judge Russo denied the motion in April 2016, 

finding that Daniels’s “conviction became a final order at the time the conviction 

and sentencing JE’s [judgment entries] were journalized.” 

{¶ 5} On May 20, 2016, Daniels filed an original action in the Eighth 

District Court of Appeals seeking writs of mandamus and/or procedendo. Here 

again, his primary claim was based on the alleged absence of a final, appealable 

order under Crim.R. 32 and Baker. (Alternatively, he asserted that his sentencing 

entry was not final because it did not include the weighing of aggravating and 

mitigating circumstances as required by R.C. 2929.03(F) and that he was never 

informed of his appellate rights at sentencing, but his merit brief in this appeal does 

not discuss those issues.) Daniels and Judge Russo filed cross-motions for 

summary judgment. 
January Term, 2018 

3

{¶ 6} On December 7, 2016, the court of appeals granted summary 

judgment in favor of Judge Russo and denied the writs. Daniels timely appealed. 

Legal analysis 

{¶ 7} To be entitled to a writ of mandamus or procedendo, Daniels must 

establish that (1) he has a clear legal right to the relief requested, (2) Judge Russo 

is under a clear legal duty to perform the requested acts, and (3) Daniels has no 

plain and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of the law. State ex rel. Rankin 

v. Adult Parole Auth., 98 Ohio St.3d 476, 2003-Ohio-2061, 786 N.E.2d 1286, ¶ 6; 

State ex rel. Yeaples v. Gall, 141 Ohio St.3d 234, 2014-Ohio-4724, 23 N.E.3d 1077, 

¶ 20. 

{¶ 8} The court of appeals denied the writs, holding that Daniels’s 

sentencing entry satisfied the final-appealable-order requirements that existed at the 

time of his sentencing in 1989. The court rejected Daniels’s argument that the onedocument rule announced in Baker should apply retroactively, citing State v. 

Griffin, 138 Ohio St.3d 108, 2013-Ohio-5481, 4 N.E.3d 989, ¶ 49, for the 

proposition that “res judicata bars litigation of this issue where the court issued a 

final, appealable order pursuant to the law that existed at that time.” 2016-Ohio8060, ¶ 7. In our view, however, the questions whether Daniels’s sentencing entry 

was final and appealable under the law as it existed in 1989 and whether Baker

applies retroactively need not be reached. 

{¶ 9} Daniels is not entitled to a writ of mandamus or procedendo because 

he had an adequate remedy in the ordinary course of the law in the form of a direct 

appeal from Judge Russo’s April 2016 entry denying Daniels’s motion for a new 

sentencing entry. The question whether the denial of a motion for a revised 

sentencing entry is appealable depends on whether the denial is a “final order.” 

“The final-order requirement comes from the Ohio Constitution, which provides 

that courts of appeals ‘shall have such jurisdiction as may be provided by law’ to 

review ‘final orders’ rendered by inferior courts.” In re D.H., 152 Ohio St.3d 310, 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO

4

2018-Ohio-17, 95 N.E.3d 389, ¶ 5, quoting Ohio Constitution, Article IV, Section 

3(B)(2). 

{¶ 10} Jurisdiction is “provided by law” primarily through two statutes. Id. 

R.C. 2501.02 provides that courts of appeals have jurisdiction “upon an appeal upon 

questions of law to review, affirm, modify, set aside, or reverse judgments or final 

orders of courts of record inferior to the court of appeals within the district.” And 

R.C. 2505.02 identifies seven types of final orders, including an order that “affects 

a substantial right in an action that in effect determines the action and prevents a 

judgment,” R.C. 2505.02(B)(1). 

{¶ 11} A “substantial right” is a right “that the United States Constitution, 

the Ohio Constitution, a statute, the common law, or a rule of procedure entitles a 

person to enforce or protect.” R.C. 2505.02(A)(1). We conclude that Daniels has 

a substantial right to a judgment of conviction that satisfies the requirements of 

Crim.R. 32; we further conclude that Judge Russo’s denial of Daniels’s motion for 

a new sentencing entry affected that substantial right. If we were to conclude 

otherwise, then Daniels would have no ability to challenge his convictions, either 

on appeal or by seeking a writ of mandamus or procedendo (which requires the 

relator to demonstrate a clear legal right to the relief requested). 

{¶ 12} It is also clear to us that Judge Russo’s denial of Daniels’s motion 

for a new sentencing entry “in effect determine[d] the action and prevent[ed] a 

judgment.” As we recently observed, the question under R.C. 2505.02(B)(1) is 

whether the “entire” action has been determined. In re D.H., 152 Ohio St.3d 310, 

2018-Ohio-17, 95 N.E.3d 389, at ¶ 14. At the time Judge Russo denied Daniels’s 

motion for a new sentencing entry, all questions of guilt, innocence, and sentencing 

in the case had already been resolved, and Judge Russo’s entry disposed of the only 

issue that remained for the trial court to resolve. Therefore, because Daniels could 

have appealed the denial of his motion, he cannot satisfy the elements necessary for 

relief in mandamus or procedendo. 
January Term, 2018 

5

{¶ 13} Our decision today is inconsistent with State ex rel. Culgan v. 

Medina Cty. Court of Common Pleas, 119 Ohio St.3d 535, 2008-Ohio-4609, 895 

N.E.2d 805, in which we granted writs of mandamus and procedendo requested by 

a criminal defendant to compel a trial court to issue a revised sentencing entry that 

complied with Crim.R. 32(C). In Culgan, we mistakenly focused on the finality of 

the underlying judgment of conviction and we failed to consider the finality of the 

entry denying the motion for a new sentencing entry; our decision in that case 

should no longer be relied on as authority for the proposition that in such 

circumstances, a criminal defendant has a remedy in mandamus or procedendo. 

{¶ 14} Based on the foregoing, we affirm the judgment of the court of 

appeals. 

Judgment affirmed. 

O’CONNOR, C.J., and O’DONNELL, FRENCH, FISCHER, and KLATT, JJ., 

concur. 

KENNEDY, J., concurs in judgment only, with an opinion joined by DEWINE, 

J. 

WILLIAM A. KLATT, J., of the Tenth District Court of Appeals, sitting for 

DEGENARO, J. 

_________________ 

KENNEDY, J., concurring in judgment only. 

{¶ 15} Because appellant, Dexter J. Daniels, had an adequate remedy in the 

ordinary course of the law to obtain the relief he seeks in this mandamus and 

procedendo action, and because his claim is barred by res judicata, I concur only in 

the court’s judgment affirming the Eighth District Court of Appeals’ judgment 

denying the requested writs. 

Facts and Procedural History 

{¶ 16} In August 1989, Daniels pleaded guilty to two counts each of 

aggravated murder and aggravated burglary, all carrying felony-murder 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO

6

specifications, and a three-judge panel of the trial court imposed an aggregate 

sentence of life in prison with the possibility of parole in 50 years. 

{¶ 17} In March 2016, Daniels moved the trial court for a final, appealable 

order, arguing among other things that the sentencing entry in his case violated 

Crim.R. 32 and the “one document” rule articulated by State v. Baker, 119 Ohio 

St.3d 197, 2008-Ohio-3330, 893 N.E.2d 163, because the entry did not document 

the “fact of conviction” (emphasis sic). Appellee, Cuyahoga County Court of 

Common Pleas Judge John J. Russo, denied the motion on April 19, 2016, finding 

that Daniels’s “conviction became a final order at the time the conviction and 

sentencing [judgment entries] were journalized.” 

{¶ 18} Daniels did not appeal. Rather, he filed an original action in the 

Eighth District Court of Appeals on May 20, 2016, seeking writs of mandamus 

and/or procedendo and maintaining that his judgment of conviction failed to 

comply with Crim.R. 32, so that he had never received a final, appealable order. 

The court of appeals granted summary judgment in favor of Judge Russo and denied 

the writs, holding that Daniels’s sentencing entry satisfied the final-appealableorder requirements that existed at the time of his sentencing in 1989. 2016-Ohio8060, ¶ 7. 

{¶ 19} Daniels appealed to this court as of right. 

Law and Analysis 

{¶ 20} A party seeking a writ of mandamus bears the burden to establish a 

clear legal right to the relief requested, a clear legal duty on the part of the 

respondent to provide it, and the lack of an adequate remedy in the ordinary course 

of the law. State ex rel. Bradford v. Dinkelacker, 146 Ohio St.3d 219, 2016-Ohio2916, 54 N.E.3d 1216, ¶ 5. And a party seeking a writ of procedendo must show a 

clear legal right to require the court to proceed to judgment, a clear legal duty on 

the part of the court to proceed, and the lack of an adequate remedy in the ordinary 
January Term, 2018 

7

course of the law. State ex rel. Poulton v. Cottrill, 147 Ohio St.3d 402, 2016-Ohio5789, 66 N.E.3d 716, ¶ 2. 

{¶ 21} Here, Daniels cannot prove entitlement to either writ because the 

record demonstrates that he had an adequate remedy by way of an appeal from the 

denial of his motion for a final, appealable order. State ex rel. Bevins v. Cooper, 

150 Ohio St.3d 22, 2016-Ohio-5578, 78 N.E.3d 828, ¶ 5 (“Bevins could have 

appealed Judge Cooper’s denial of his motion for a final, appealable order, and thus 

he had available an adequate remedy in the ordinary course of the law”); State ex 

rel. Peoples v. Johnson, 152 Ohio St.3d 418, 2017-Ohio-9140, 97 N.E.3d 426, ¶ 12 

(petitioner exercised an adequate remedy precluding extraordinary relief in 

mandamus by filing a motion asserting the lack of a final order and appealing from 

the denial of that motion). “An appeal is generally considered an adequate remedy 

in the ordinary course of law sufficient to preclude a writ.” Shoop v. State, 144 

Ohio St.3d 374, 2015-Ohio-2068, 43 N.E.3d 432, ¶ 8. 

{¶ 22} Our contrary decision in State ex rel. Culgan v. Medina Cty. Court 

of Common Pleas, 119 Ohio St.3d 535, 2008-Ohio-4609, 895 N.E.2d 805, is not 

good law. First, its holding that “[Culgan’s] sentencing entry did not constitute a 

final appealable order because it did not contain a guilty plea, a jury verdict, or the 

finding of the court upon which Culgan’s convictions were based,” id. at ¶ 10, has 

been overruled by State v. Lester, 130 Ohio St.3d 303, 2011-Ohio-5204, 958 N.E.2d 

142, ¶ 12, which held that the omission of “manner of conviction” language “does 

not prevent the judgment of conviction from being an order that is final and subject 

to appeal.” 

{¶ 23} Second, to the extent that Culgan indicated that a writ of mandamus 

or procedendo is available to review a trial court’s denial of a motion for a final, 

appealable order, it failed to recognize the distinction between a trial court’s refusal 

to rule on a motion for a final, appealable order and its denial of such a motion. As 

the decisions cited in Culgan clarify, when no entry has been journalized, there is 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO

8

nothing that can be appealed and there is no adequate remedy at law that would 

preclude an extraordinary writ. See State ex rel. Grove v. Nadel, 81 Ohio St.3d 325, 

326-327, 691 N.E.2d 275 (1998) (writ of procedendo available when the trial court 

refused to journalize its decision denying a motion for a transcript); Cleveland v. 

Trzebuckowski, 85 Ohio St.3d 524, 527, 709 N.E.2d 1148 (1999) (writs of 

mandamus and procedendo available when the trial court has failed to journalize 

its decision). 

{¶ 24} In contrast, when the petitioner has moved for a final, appealable 

order and the trial court has determined that a final, appealable order has already 

been entered and denies the motion, an appeal is an adequate remedy—the court of 

appeals can review the trial court’s decision on direct appeal and determine whether 

a final, appealable order has been entered in the first instance. There is no 

difference between the relief that would be available on an appeal as of right and in 

an action for an extraordinary writ in these circumstances, and it is well established 

that neither mandamus nor procedendo is a substitute for an appeal. See State ex 

rel. Richfield v. Laria, 138 Ohio St.3d 168, 2014-Ohio-243, 4 N.E.3d 1040, ¶ 11; 

State ex rel. West v. Price, 62 Ohio St.2d 143, 144, 404 N.E.2d 139 (1980); State 

ex rel. Wilson v. Lawrence Cty. Court of Common Pleas, 146 Ohio St. 4, 5, 63 

N.E.2d 438 (1945). 

{¶ 25} Lastly, even if it were true that the trial court never entered a final, 

appealable order in Daniels’s criminal case, he would not be entitled to a writ of 

mandamus. Our decision in State ex rel. Woods v. Dinkelacker, 152 Ohio St.3d 

142, 2017-Ohio-9124, 93 N.E.3d 965, is on point. In that case, the petitioner 

asserted that his judgment of conviction did not comply with Crim.R. 32 and 

therefore was not a final, appealable order because the trial judge had failed to sign 

the judgment entry. We explained that “even accepting as true Woods’s assertion 

that the entry was unsigned, res judicata bars him from raising his claim that the 

entry did not comply with Crim.R. 32. In his petition, Woods acknowledges that 
January Term, 2018 

9

he unsuccessfully raised the same argument in a 2014 motion to correct his 

sentence. Accordingly, he is barred from seeking the requested mandamus relief.” 

(Citations omitted.) Id. at ¶ 7. 

{¶ 26} Similarly, here, Daniels previously and unsuccessfully argued in a 

motion for a final, appealable order that his sentencing entry did not comply with 

Crim.R. 32. Pursuant to Woods, the doctrine of res judicata precludes the issuance 

of an extraordinary writ in this case. 

{¶ 27} For these reasons, I agree with the court’s judgment affirming the 

judgment of the court of appeals. 

 DEWINE, J., concurs in the foregoing opinion. 

_________________ 

Dexter J. Daniels, pro se. 

Michael C. O’Malley, Cuyahoga County Prosecuting Attorney, and James 

E. Moss, Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, for appellees. 

_________________