2020 UT App 26

THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

STATE OF UTAH, IN THE INTEREST OF N.K.,

A PERSON UNDER EIGHTEEN YEARS OF AGE.

T.K.,

Appellant,

v.

STATE OF UTAH,

Appellee.

Opinion

No. 20190413-CA

Filed February 21, 2020

First District Juvenile Court, Logan Department

The Honorable Angela Fonnesbeck

No. 1152307

Michael C. McGinnis, Attorney for Appellant

Sean D. Reyes, Carol L.C. Verdoia, and John M. 

Peterson, Attorneys for Appellee

Martha Pierce, Guardian ad Litem

JUDGE KATE APPLEBY authored this Opinion, in which 

JUDGES MICHELE M. CHRISTIANSEN FORSTER and DIANA HAGEN

concurred.

APPLEBY, Judge:

¶1 The juvenile court terminated T.K.’s (Father) parental 

rights to N.K. (Child) after it found Father (1) neglected Child;

(2) was an unfit or incompetent parent; (3) substantially 

neglected, willfully refused, or was unwilling to remedy the 

circumstances that caused Child to be placed in foster care; 

(4) experienced a failure of parental adjustment; and (5) made 

only token efforts to support or communicate with Child, to 

prevent neglect of Child, to eliminate the risk of serious harm to 
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20190413-CA 2 2020 UT App 26

Child, and to avoid being an unfit parent. The court also found 

that the Division of Child and Family Services (DCFS) made 

reasonable efforts to provide reunification services for Father 

and Child and concluded that termination of Father’s parental 

rights was strictly necessary for Child’s best interests. Father 

contends insufficient evidence supports the court’s 

determination that he was incompetent or unfit and that he 

neglected Child, alleges the court erred when it found DCFS

made reasonable efforts for reunification, and claims it was not 

strictly necessary to Child’s best interests to terminate his 

parental rights. We affirm.

BACKGROUND

¶2 In November 2017, E.K. (Mother) was arrested during a 

traffic stop. Two-year-old Child was in the car with her. DCFS

took custody of Child and then placed him in foster care with

Mother’s cousin (Foster Mother).

¶3 Father is a California resident who had not seen Child 

for approximately six months before Child was placed in 

foster care. On Child’s placement, DCFS began working 

with Father in an effort to reunite him with Child pursuant to a

court order entered in February 2018. To accomplish this, Father 

was expected to (1) participate in a domestic violence assessment 

and follow the recommendations from the assessment, (2) 

participate in a mental health assessment and follow the 

recommendations from the assessment, (3) participate in a 

substance abuse assessment and follow the recommendations

from the assessment, (4) submit to random drug tests, (5) 

participate in parenting classes, (6) obtain stable housing and a 

stable source of income, and (7) maintain consistent contact with 

Child.

¶4 Father requested services be provided to him in 

California, and although the DCFS caseworker in Utah “was 

informed that the State of California does not accept parent 
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20190413-CA 3 2020 UT App 26

home studies,” a caseworker in San Joaquin County, California

agreed to do a walkthrough of Father’s house. Father also 

told the DCFS caseworker “that he d[id] not want to 

begin participating in services until he [knew] if he [wa]s

approved for placement for [Child] or not.” The caseworker 

responded by encouraging him to begin services and sending 

him a list of resources in San Joaquin County. But Father did not 

accomplish all his goals for reunification, and in September 2018, 

the State sought termination of reunification services, which the 

juvenile court granted the following month. The court also 

determined DCFS had made reasonable efforts to reunify Father 

and Child.

¶5 In February 2019, following a bench trial, the juvenile 

court terminated Father’s parental rights,1 finding Father 

neglected Child and made “only token efforts” to communicate 

with or support Child, demonstrated “unfitness and failure of 

parental adjustment,” and showed “unwillingness or inability to 

remedy circumstances that led to Child’s out of home 

placement.” It also found that DCFS made reasonable efforts to 

reunify Father and Child and that it was in the best interest of 

Child to terminate Father’s parental rights. The court then

concluded termination was strictly necessary for Child’s best 

interests. The court’s findings supporting this conclusion are 

addressed in turn.

Neglect

¶6 The court found Father neglected Child based on Father 

and Mother’s “history of domestic violence,” including Father 

calling Mother names “11–20 times in the past year,” and 

“verbal, emotional[,] and physical altercations between them 

during the period of time that Mother was pregnant with 

 

1. Mother’s parental rights were likewise terminated, but she is 

not a party to this appeal.
In re N.K.

20190413-CA 4 2020 UT App 26

[Child].” The court said Mother previously claimed that “Father 

was violent and had left bruises on [Child’s] cheeks,” although 

she denied it at trial.2

¶7 The court noted Father’s “mental health issues” that 

“cause[] impairment in important area[s] of his life functioning” 

and recognized that although “the probability of significant 

deterioration in life functioning is high if not in treatment,” 

Father did “not engage in on-going counseling for his mental 

health.” Father claimed “his mental health conditions would not 

impact his ability to care for [C]hild,” but the court found 

Father’s “untreated mental health conditions likely” render him

“unable to provide care for the immediate and continuing 

physical and emotional needs of [Child] for extended periods of 

time, without ongoing treatment and intervention.”

¶8 Although Father took a drug and alcohol assessment, the 

court recognized it was “based on self-report and Father did not 

report any history of drug or alcohol use or abuse . . . and did 

not report a [conviction for driving under the influence].” The 

court concluded Father had “some history of the use of drugs or 

intoxicating substances, the extent of which is unknown.”

¶9 Father had not worked for four years and received 

disability compensation for his “depression, anxiety[,] and 

obsessive-compulsive disorder.” He “testified that he also has an 

injury to his hand that prevents him from engaging in any type 

of manual labor.” He had not paid child support or “contributed 

financially to [Child’s] physical, emotional[,] or medical care 

since” Child last lived with him, and he had “not provided 

[Child] with adequate food, clothing, shelter, education, or other 

care necessary for [Child’s] physical, mental, and emotional 

health or development.” These findings led the court to conclude 

Father had neglected Child.

 

2. The court found Mother’s testimony “wholly unreliable.”
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20190413-CA 5 2020 UT App 26

Token Efforts

¶10 At the time of trial, Child had not lived with Father in 

nearly two years, in which time Father had only one in-person 

visit with Child, which Father ended thirty minutes early.3

Father made “multiple [video call] visits with [Child]” but Child 

“rarely interacted with” Father. During those visits, Father 

“trie[d] to be on screen to at least say ‘hello’ and then he 

typically just watche[d]” and “end[ed] the . . . visit[s] early” if 

Child was “upset or in a bad mood.” Father said his video calls 

were inconsistent because “his phone does not work well and he 

does not have internet at home.” Additionally, despite Father’s 

history of domestic violence, the court said he had engaged in 

“[o]nly a bare minimum of therapy or treatment.” The court 

found these actions amounted to “token efforts to provide 

support, prevent neglect[,] or to avoid being an unfit parent.”

Unfitness and Failure of Parental Adjustment

¶11 Child received therapy for “post-traumatic stress and 

trauma, neglect[,] and suspected physical abuse.” Despite this, 

“Father could not identify the reasons that [C]hild was engaged 

with therapy.” He testified that “‘he knows [Child is] sensitive’ 

and ‘has special needs’ . . . ‘ADHD or something like that.’” 

 

3. At oral argument, Father’s counsel stated he thought Father 

had to end the visit early because a friend who drove him to 

Utah needed to leave. But at the termination hearing, Father said 

Child “just left” the room during the visit and that Child 

“probably got bored or something.” When asked if he recalled 

being offered time to finish the visit, he responded in the 

affirmative and said, “But I didn’t know how long we had left. I 

thought it was like less than half an hour or so. He was already, I 

guess he already got bored of all those toys or something. That’s 

why.” The DCFS caseworker testified that Father said he did not 

“want to force” Child to finish the visit.
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20190413-CA 6 2020 UT App 26

Father could not “name [Child’s] doctor” and he “did not 

participate or communicate with the doctor” when Child had 

surgery; instead relying “on the DCFS caseworker and [F]oster 

[M]other for information.” Father did not speak to Child’s 

preschool teacher and he did “not know” Child’s dentist, speech 

pathologist, physical therapist, audiologist, trauma specialist, or 

music teacher. He did not “enroll[] or engage[] in any age or 

developmentally specific and appropriate parenting instruction” 

and had “no services in place for [C]hild” but he testified that “if 

[C]hild were placed in his custody he would ‘make it a 

priority.’”

Unwillingness or Inability to Remedy Circumstances That Led to 

Child’s Out-of-Home Placement

¶12 The court noted that although “Father testified that he has 

completed the Child and Family Plan specifically stating he ‘has 

done everything asked of him,’” Child’s DCFS caseworker 

indicated otherwise. Specifically, the caseworker testified that

Father ha[d] not completed an accurate drug and 

alcohol assessment that discusses prior DUI 

charges and suicide attempt by overdose; ha[d] not 

completed a domestic violence assessment; ha[d]

not completed an age appropriate parenting 

course; ha[d] failed to visit consistently; only 

participate[d] collaterally on [video] calls; ha[d]

failed to consistently provide[] random drug tests 

and ha[d] failed to engage in any way with 

[Child’s] services.

The court also noted Father “failed to engage in in-person

visits,” despite DCFS’s offer “to pay for food and hotel stays” 

and he did not complete a background check “until one month 

after reunification services were terminated.” Because Father 

could not “identify [Child’s] needs or needed services” and had 

“no services engaged for” Child, the court found he was “not 
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20190413-CA 7 2020 UT App 26

capable of exercising proper and effective parental care in the 

near future.”

Reasonable Efforts

¶13 In October 2018, reunification services were terminated. 

The parties stipulated to consolidating the parental rights 

termination and permanency hearings, and the court found that 

DCFS “made reasonable efforts to finalize the permanency goal,” 

which at the time was to reunify Father and Child. On the record 

before us, Father does not appear to have objected to what 

DCFS’s attorney proffered about the reasonable efforts DCFS 

made or to the court’s ultimate finding of reasonable efforts. In 

its final order terminating Father’s parental rights, the court 

elaborated that the reasonable efforts included DCFS visiting 

with the foster family, communicating with Mother and Father 

“at least twice monthly,” and contacting California family 

services to determine what services such as “random drug 

testing, mental health treatment, [and] domestic violence 

treatment and substance abuse treatment” were available in 

Father’s county. The court noted DCFS also “review[ed] and 

research[ed] curriculum of internet parenting class[es], offer[ed] 

to pay for brief hotel stays, contact[ed] . . . parents to arrange for 

[C]hild’s medical treatment[,] and purchas[ed] a car seat for 

[C]hild.” But the court found Father “made no significant 

improvement in [his] parenting skills or [his] understanding of 

[C]hild’s specific needs” and did not demonstrate an “ability to 

provide a safe, secure[,] and permanent home for [Child].”

Child’s Best Interests

¶14 Finally, the court determined that termination of Father’s 

parental rights was strictly necessary for Child’s best interests. It 

noted Father had “no established relationship with” Child and 

could not identify Child’s special needs, nor did he “have 

services in place to address [Child’s] behavioral and 

developmental needs.” In contrast, Child had “developed bonds 
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20190413-CA 8 2020 UT App 26

of love and affect[ion] with” his foster family. Child called his 

foster parents “mom” and “dad” and “relie[d]” on them, 

“finding comfort in their care.” While in foster care, Child’s 

behavioral and speech problems improved. At the time of trial, 

Child had lived with his foster family “for approximately half of 

his life.” His foster parents worked with Child’s therapist to “be 

trained in trauma response,” and the therapist “believe[d] that 

removing [Child] from [F]oster [M]other would damage any 

attachment bonds” he had developed. The court found that the 

foster parents were “willing to adopt” Child and that they

“provide[d] a secure, safe[,] and permanent residence for [Child] 

free from abuse, neglect[,] or other destructive life style patterns 

and behaviors.” It also found there was “no reasonable or 

feasible alternative to termination of parental rights that would 

provide [Child] with safety and security, and a permanent

home.” The court determined “Permanent Custody and 

Guardianship would not be appropriate as [Child] has no 

established bond with . . . Father and is very young,” so “no 

legal basis exist[ed] that would justify a preservation of the 

parent-child relationship.”

ISSUES AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW

¶15 Father raises two issues on appeal.4 First, he contends the 

juvenile court erred when it found DCFS made reasonable 

 

4. Father also contends insufficient evidence supported two of 

the juvenile court’s articulated grounds to terminate his parental 

rights, namely, that he was an unfit parent and that he neglected 

Child. But the court found additional grounds for termination. It 

found Father “substantially neglected, willfully refused[,] or 

[was] unable or unwilling to remedy the circumstances that 

caused” Child to be placed in foster care and that he would “not 

be capable of exercising proper and effective parental care,” see

Utah Code Ann. § 78A-6-507(1)(d) (LexisNexis 2018); that Father 

(continued...)
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20190413-CA 9 2020 UT App 26

efforts to reunify him with Child. A court’s determination that 

DCFS “made reasonable efforts to provide reunification 

services” involves an “application of statutory law to the facts” 

that presents a “mixed question[] of fact and law,” requiring 

review of “the juvenile court’s factual findings for clear error 

and its conclusions of law for correctness, affording the court 

some discretion in applying the law to the facts.” In re M.C., 2003 

UT App 429, ¶ 16, 82 P.3d 1159 (quotation simplified).

¶16 Second, Father contends the court wrongfully found it 

was strictly necessary for Child’s best interests to terminate his 

parental rights. “The ultimate decision about whether to 

terminate a parent’s rights presents a mixed question of law and 

fact. In such situations, we review a [juvenile] court’s findings 

for clear error and its conclusions of law for correctness, 

affording the court some discretion in applying the law to the 

 

(...continued)

“experienced a failure of parental adjustment” in that he was 

“unable or unwilling within a reasonable time to substantially 

correct the circumstances, conduct, or conditions that led to” 

Child’s placement in foster care, see id. §§ 78A-6-502(2), 507(1)(e);

and that he “made only token efforts to support or communicate 

with [Child], prevent neglect of [Child], eliminate the risk of 

serious harm to [Child], or to avoid being an unfit parent,” see id.

§ 78A-6-507(1)(f). Father does not challenge any of these

alternative grounds, and because “the court may terminate all 

parental rights with respect to a parent if the court finds any 

one” of the enumerated statutory grounds for termination, see id.

§ 78A-6-507(1), we do not reach the merits of Father’s 

insufficiency-of-the-evidence argument, see Howick v. Salt Lake 

City Corp., 2018 UT 20, ¶ 5, 424 P.3d 841 (noting an appellate 

court “will not reverse a ruling of the district court that rests on 

independent alternative grounds where the appellant challenges 

only [some] of those grounds” (quotation simplified)).
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20190413-CA 10 2020 UT App 26

facts.” In re B.T.B., 2018 UT App 157, ¶ 8, 436 P.3d 206 (quotation 

simplified), cert. granted, 440 P.3d 692 (Utah 2019).

ANALYSIS

I. Reasonable Efforts

¶17 The juvenile court terminated reunification services in 

October 2018. And according to the court’s findings upon 

termination of parental rights after trial in February 2019, Father

stipulated to the finding that DCFS made reasonable efforts

toward reunification services. At oral argument before this court, 

Father argued he never stipulated to DCFS’s reasonable efforts 

and said the court’s finding of a stipulation was error. In support 

of this contention, he points to a minute entry and order from 

the permanency hearing that says, “Based on the stipulation of 

the parties, the permanency and the termination matter is 

consolidated.” On this record, it does appear that the court’s 

finding of a stipulation as to whether DCFS’s efforts to reunify 

Father and Child were reasonable was perhaps broader than the 

parties intended. But, as Father conceded at oral argument, he 

did not object to what appears to be an error in the court’s 

ruling. See In re M.W., 2000 UT 79, ¶ 29, 12 P.3d 80 (declining to 

consider unpreserved claim of DCFS’s failure to make 

reasonable efforts).

¶18 In any event, we exercise our discretion to reach the 

merits of this issue, see State v. Johnson, 2017 UT 76, ¶¶ 41–43, 416 

P.3d 443 (affirming that the Utah Court of Appeals has discretion 

to reach waived or unpreserved issues), and affirm the court’s 

finding that DCFS made reasonable efforts to reunify Father and 

Child. These efforts included the caseworker visiting Child 

monthly at the foster home; arranging services for Child through 

Early Intervention; maintaining contact with Child’s care 

providers; “at least twice monthly contact[ing] . . . Father by 

phone or text or email[;] discussing services with [Father;] 

responding to questions from . . . Father[;] arrang[ing] and 
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20190413-CA 11 2020 UT App 26

scheduling [video call] visits [with Father]”; completing 

paperwork for Father to determine if the case could be 

transferred to California; “making[] multiple contacts with 

California family services regarding services available to [Father] 

. . . in areas of random drug testing, mental health treatment, 

domestic violence treatment[,] and substance abuse treatment; 

review[ing] and researching curriculum of internet parenting 

class[es]; offering to pay for brief hotel stays”; communicating 

with Father regarding Child’s medical treatment; and 

purchasing a car seat for Child.

¶19 Father has not met his burden on appeal to demonstrate 

that the services provided or offered by DCFS were inadequate 

or insufficient or that the juvenile court erred in making this 

determination. See In re A.W., 2018 UT App 217, ¶¶ 30, 31, 437 

P.3d 640 (affirming a finding of reasonable efforts where the 

father failed “to identify any facts in the record that suggest 

DCFS did not make reasonable efforts to provide him with 

reunification” and ignored “several times in the record in which 

the juvenile court made an unchallenged periodic finding—

before its termination order—that DCFS had made reasonable 

efforts to provide him with reunification services”); In re K.K., 

2017 UT App 58, ¶ 5, 397 P.3d 745 (per curiam) (“The process of 

reunification is a two way street which requires commitment on 

the part of the parents, as well as the availability of services from 

the State.” (quotation simplified)). Father has not engaged with 

the court’s determination as to what DCFS did do and has not 

shown how these efforts were not sufficient.

¶20 While Father argues on appeal that DCFS’s assistance was 

inadequate, that DCFS could not pay for certain services for him 

because he lived out of state, that he did not have the financial 

resources to travel to Utah or to pay for certain treatment, and 

that the evaluations and assessments he did obtain failed to meet 

DCFS’s standards and requirements, these alleged challenges are 

not failures on the part of DCFS. And Father’s complaints about 

what he considers to be insufficient help from DCFS should have 
In re N.K.

20190413-CA 12 2020 UT App 26

been brought to the attention of the juvenile court to address 

before the termination trial. Further, the court determined, 

“Despite these efforts[, Father] ha[s] made only minimal effort to 

address [his] past conduct or behavior and ha[s] demonstrated 

little improvement in [his] overall parenting ability and ability to 

provide a safe, secure[,] and permanent home for [Child].” We 

are sympathetic to Father’s situation, but his challenge to the 

services provided and the efforts made by DCFS prior to the trial 

is unpersuasive.

II. Child’s Best Interests

¶21 To terminate a parent’s rights to his or her child, the 

juvenile court must make two findings. First, the “court must 

find that one or more of the statutory grounds for termination 

are present.” In re B.T.B., 2018 UT App 157, ¶ 13, 436 P.3d 206, 

cert. granted, 440 P.3d 692 (Utah 2019). Second, the “court must 

find that termination of the parent’s rights is in the best interests 

of the child.” Id. (quotation simplified); see also Utah Code Ann. 

§§ 78A-6-503(12), -507(1) (LexisNexis 2018). These findings must 

be supported by clear and convincing evidence. In re B.T.B., 2018 

UT App 157, ¶ 13. Because a “court’s final decision regarding 

termination of parental rights should be afforded a high degree 

of deference,” we “will overturn a termination decision only 

when the result is against the clear weight of the evidence or 

leaves us with a firm and definite conviction that a mistake has 

been made.” In re C.R.C., 2019 UT App 153, ¶ 24, 450 P.3d 1169 

(quotation simplified).

¶22 Here, the court found Father neglected Child; he was an 

“unfit or incompetent parent[]”; he “substantially neglected, 

willfully refused[,] or [was] unable or unwilling to remedy the 

circumstances that caused” Child to be placed in foster care and 

he would “not be capable of exercising proper and effective 

parental care”; he “experienced a failure of parental adjustment” 

in that he was “unable or unwilling within a reasonable time to 

substantially correct the circumstances, conduct, or conditions 
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20190413-CA 13 2020 UT App 26

that led to” Child’s placement in foster care; and he “made only 

token efforts to support or communicate with [Child], prevent 

neglect of [Child], eliminate the risk of serious harm to [Child], 

. . . or to avoid being an unfit parent.” See Utah Code Ann. 

§ 78A-6-507(1)(b)–(f). Because the court need only make a 

finding as to one statutory ground for termination, id. § 78A-6-

507(1), and because Father challenges only two of the five 

grounds on which the court supported termination, see supra

¶ 15 n.4, we conclude the court sufficiently made the first 

finding and turn our attention to whether termination was in 

Child’s best interests.

¶23 “Because the relationship between parent and child is 

constitutionally protected, a court may only terminate parental 

rights upon a finding that termination is strictly necessary to the 

best interests of the child.” In re C.T., 2018 UT App 233, ¶ 12, 438 

P.3d 100 (quotation simplified); see also Utah Code Ann. § 78A-6-

507(1). The best interest inquiry is “a subjective assessment 

based on the totality of the circumstances surrounding the 

child,” In re B.T.B., 2018 UT App 157, ¶ 47, (quotation 

simplified), taken from the child’s point of view, and mandates a 

court “terminate parental rights only in situations when it is 

absolutely essential to do so,” id. ¶ 54. In conducting the best 

interests inquiry, the court must also “explore whether other 

feasible options exist that could address the specific problems or 

issues facing the family.” Id. ¶ 55.

¶24 Father claims the court failed to consider “any 

alternatives to termination of [his] parental rights.” But a 

court need only “consider or explore alternatives to termination”;

if it finds “no such alternatives are available or articulates 

supported reasons for rejecting alternatives that do exist, 

such findings are entitled to deference on appeal,” In re C.T., 

2018 UT App 233, ¶ 16, and the court did that here. Initially, the 

court ordered reunification as DCFS’s goal for Father and Child. 

But, after determining DCFS made reasonable efforts to reunify 

Father and Child, which efforts were described in the court’s
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20190413-CA 14 2020 UT App 26

termination order, the court changed Child’s primary 

permanency goal from reunification with Father and terminated 

reunification services. And before terminating Father’s parental 

rights, the court concluded there were “no reasonable or feasible 

alternative[s] to termination of parental rights that would 

provide [Child] with safety and security, and a permanent 

home.” Specifically, the court found that “Permanent Custody 

and Guardianship would not be appropriate as [Child] has no 

established bond with . . . Father and is very young.” The court 

also found that the foster family was “willing to adopt” Child, 

which would provide Child with much needed stability and 

permanency and could not occur absent termination of parental 

rights.

¶25 But the court did not end its analysis there. In its best 

interest inquiry, the court found it significant that Child and 

Father had “no established relationship,” that Father had not 

participated in Child’s therapy, and that Child has special needs 

that Father cannot identify. Specifically, the court heard 

testimony that a child suffering from Child’s symptoms “needs a 

secure attachment to ensure optimal future development. The 

secure attachment requires a caregiver who can manage 

[Child’s] affect, is attuned to his needs, can provide a consistent 

response[,] and provide a routine.” The court found that Father 

did not have services in place to address Child’s behavioral and 

developmental needs. On the other hand, Child had “developed 

bonds of love and affect[ion]” with his foster family; Child’s 

behavioral and speech problems improved while in his foster 

family’s care; and the foster family attended therapy with him 

and became “trained in trauma response,” had services in place 

to meet Child’s special needs, and had cared for him “for 

approximately half of his life.” The court also noted the foster 

family “provide[d] a secure, safe[,] and permanent residence . . . 

free from abuse, neglect[,] or other destructive life style patterns 

and behaviors.” We conclude the court did not err in 

determining it was strictly necessary to terminate Father’s 

parental rights.
In re N.K.

20190413-CA 15 2020 UT App 26

CONCLUSION

¶26 Father did not adequately carry his burden on appeal in 

challenging the juvenile court’s finding that DCFS made 

reasonable efforts to reunify him and Child. Additionally, the 

court did not err when it found terminating Father’s parental 

rights was strictly necessary to Child’s best interests and Father 

did not challenge all the statutory grounds that supported 

termination. Accordingly, we affirm.