UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 09-4734

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff - Appellee,

v.

CLIFTON THOMAS TALLEY,

Defendant - Appellant.

No. 09-4873

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff - Appellee,

v.

CLIFTON THOMAS TALLEY,

Defendant - Appellant.

Appeals from the United States District Court for the Western 

District of Virginia, at Harrisonburg. Samuel G. Wilson, 

District Judge. (5:08-cr-00030-sgw-1; 5:09-cr-00024-sgw-1)

Submitted: July 20, 2010 Decided: August 9, 2010

Before TRAXLER, Chief Judge, DUNCAN, Circuit Judge, and 

HAMILTON, Senior Circuit Judge.
2

Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

Larry W. Shelton, Federal Public Defender, Roanoke, Virginia, 

Andrea L. Harris, Assistant Federal Public Defender, OFFICE OF 

THE FEDERAL PUBLIC DEFENDER, Charlottesville, Virginia, for 

Appellant. Timothy J. Heaphy, United States Attorney, Roanoke, 

Virginia, Nancy S. Healey, Assistant United States Attorney, 

OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES ATTORNEY, Charlottesville, Virginia, 

for Appellee.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
3

PER CURIAM:

Clifton Thomas Talley appeals the denial of his motion to 

suppress evidence obtained as a result of what he claims was an 

illegal seizure of his person. He also appeals the revocation 

of a term of supervised release imposed in a prior case as well 

as the sentence he received as the result of the revocation. 

Finding no error, we affirm.

I.

On the afternoon of July 5, 2008, a woman speaking in 

broken English called 911 to report that a man was viewing child 

pornography on a computer in the Staunton Public Library. 

Staunton Police Officers Robert Hildebrand and Ray Murray, both 

dressed in their police uniforms, responded to the call within 

17 minutes. The 911 dispatcher informed the officers that the 

suspect was described as a white male, 40 to 50 years old, with 

brown hair, shorts, and slip-on shoes and that he was in the 

library’s computer area, straight back from the front door. The 

dispatcher had a call-back number for the 911 caller although 

the caller had not provided her name.

Upon their arrival at the library, the officers did not 

find anyone matching the description in the library’s actual 

computer room. Hildebrand therefore asked the dispatcher to 

have the 911 caller meet them somewhere in the library. The 
4

officers then proceeded to another area of the library that was 

also straight back from the main entrance. There, they were 

able to find a person, later identified as Clifton Talley, 

fitting the caller’s description. Talley, a white male, looked 

to the officers to be “around 50,” and he was wearing shorts and 

flip-flops and using a laptop computer. J.A. 146. Hildebrand 

made eye contact with Talley three times and testified that 

Talley seemed to be “logging off the laptop, nervously.” J.A. 

90-91. As the officers walked past Talley, it appeared to them 

that there were no applications running on his computer. 

When the officers went to speak with a library employee, 

Talley got up and left the library. Hildebrand followed him, 

approached Talley, and told him that he matched a description of 

a suspect who had been identified as looking at child 

pornography. Hildebrand asked Talley if he had been looking at 

child pornography, and Talley denied doing so. Hildebrand asked 

for consent to look at Talley’s laptop, but Talley refused. 

Talley did, however, provide his driver’s license when asked by 

Hildebrand for identification. For safety purposes, Hildebrand 

also took a backpack that Talley was carrying. Hildebrand then 

returned to his patrol car to run Talley’s license, leaving 

Talley’s backpack on the hood of the car. Officer Murray, who 

had also exited the library, remained with Talley. 
5

When he processed the license, Hildebrand learned that 

Talley had prior child pornography convictions, was registered 

as a sexually violent predator, and was on probation. 

Hildebrand testified that when he returned to Talley and asked 

him if he was on probation, Talley became “very nervous.” J.A. 

94. Around the same time, the 911 dispatcher told Hildebrand 

that the 911 caller was “going to be by the entrance” and that 

“[s]he stated she believes you have the wrong person.” J.A. 

236. Approximately 30 seconds later, as Hildebrand continued to 

question Talley, Talley told Hildebrand, “I am sick.” J.A. 95 

(internal quotation marks omitted). When Hildebrand asked 

whether he was physically sick or mentally sick, Talley 

responded, “I can’t stop looking at porn.” J.A. 95 (internal 

quotation marks omitted). He nevertheless asked Hildebrand to 

“give him a break and let him go.” J.A. 95. Hildebrand 

arrested Talley instead.

Officer Murray had not heard the dispatcher’s statement 

that the caller believed they had the wrong person. However, he 

had heard that the caller was at the library’s entrance, and he 

therefore had gone to find her. When he found her, she 

described in broken English the images that prompted her 911 

call. She said that she saw a nude girl, “approximately 10 

years of age or so” with what looked like paper covering her 

eyes and face. J.A. 150. She made no mention of believing that 
6

the officers had the wrong person. After Talley’s arrest, 

Murray again spoke in person with the caller and obtained her 

personal information. She also described the area in which she 

had seen the images that prompted her call, and it was the same 

area in which the officers had first seen Talley. 

After Talley was placed under arrest, Murray searched his 

backpack and found a notebook containing a list of suggestive 

web addresses, like “youngboys.com.” J.A. 154. Hildebrand had 

looked through the backpack for officer safety and observed that 

there was a laptop computer and perhaps a notebook. Hildebrand 

advised Talley of his Miranda rights and transported him to the 

Staunton Police Department. Talley subsequently waived his 

Miranda rights and admitted to having images of naked minors on 

his computer and accessing websites depicting naked minors. 

Murray later obtained a search warrant for Talley’s laptop 

computer, the execution of which revealed several images that 

appeared to be child pornography. Arrest warrants were 

thereafter obtained for Talley for possession of child 

pornography, and a second search warrant was obtained for 

Talley’s home. The execution of the search warrant yielded a 

disk containing child pornography.

A Charlottesville federal grand jury subsequently returned 

an indictment against Talley charging him with two counts of 

knowingly possessing material containing images of child 
7

pornography. See 18 U.S.C. § 2252A(a)(5)(B) and 2252(b)(2). 

Talley moved to suppress the evidence as fruit of his initial 

detention and arrest, both of which he claimed were 

unconstitutional. Following a hearing, the district court 

denied the motion. The court ruled that Officer Hildebrand 

reasonably suspected Talley of possession of child pornography 

when he initially detained him and that the reasonable suspicion 

was not dissipated by the dispatcher’s statement that the caller 

believed they had the wrong man. The court further found that 

probable cause existed to arrest Talley when, in the context of 

Hildebrand’s investigation of the child pornography crime, 

Talley asked Officer Hildebrand to “give him a break and let him 

go” because he could not stop himself from looking at 

pornography. The court found that it would have been reasonable 

for Hildebrand to conclude that Talley had admitted to 

committing the crime he was investigating.

Talley entered a conditional plea to the charges, reserving 

the right to appeal the denial of his suppression motion. At 

the sentencing hearing, the government argued for an upward 

variance or departure primarily based on Talley’s prior criminal 

history, his pattern of recidivism, and the nature of his 

offenses. The government emphasized that he had been on 

supervised release for a prior federal child pornography crime 

when he committed the present offenses and that he had committed 
8

the prior crime when on supervised release for an earlier child 

pornography offense. Talley argued for a sentence at the 

enhanced statutory minimum of 10 years. In the end, the 

district court varied upward based on the 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) 

factors, including Talley’s offense history and recidivism, and 

the need for the sentence to afford adequate deterrence, 

sentencing Talley to 160 months’ imprisonment on each count, to 

be served concurrently, as well as lifetime supervision.

A federal probation officer assigned to supervise Talley 

petitioned to revoke Talley’s supervised release, contending 

that he had violated three conditions of his supervision, 

including the condition that he would not commit further crimes. 

At the revocation proceeding the district court found that 

Talley’s crimes did in fact constitute a Grade B supervised 

release violation. See U.S.S.G. § 7B1.1(a)(2). Because Talley 

had a Category II criminal history, he faced a statutory maximum 

custody range of up to three years, and his advisory revocation 

sentencing range was six to twelve months. The government 

requested that the district court consider sentencing Talley up 

to a consecutive maximum of three years’ imprisonment based on 

the arguments the government had presented at the sentencing 

proceeding for the crimes underlying the revocation. Talley 

argued for a concurrent sentence within the advisory range. 

Concluding that that Talley had shown himself to be “very 
9

difficult to supervise,” the district court found the advisory 

range inappropriate and imposed a 30-month consecutive term. 

J.A. 422.

II.

On appeal, Talley first argues that the officers never had 

a sufficient basis to detain him and, alternatively, that any 

reasonable suspicion they had immediately dissipated when they 

were told the 911 caller had stated that she believed they had 

the wrong person. Talley argues that all of his statements made 

after that point should be suppressed as fruit of the illegal 

seizure of his person. He also contends that the officers 

lacked probable cause to arrest him at the time they took him 

into custody and argues for the suppression of the fruit of that 

seizure. Finally, he maintains that because his convictions 

were obtained as the result of these illegal seizures of his 

person, the district court also erred in utilizing them as the 

basis for revoking his term of supervised release. We disagree 

with all of these arguments, however, and hold that the district 

court correctly ruled that Talley’s constitutional rights were 

not infringed. 

We conclude that, under the totality of the circumstances, 

the officers were legally justified in detaining Talley prior to 

arresting him and that probable cause supported Talley’s arrest. 
10

Under Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968), “an officer may conduct 

a brief investigatory stop where the officer has reasonable

suspicion that criminal activity may be afoot.” United States 

v. Perkins, 363 F.3d 317, 321 (4th Cir. 2004). Such a stop 

requires only “a minimal level of objective justification,” and 

it need not rise to the level of probable cause. Illinois v. 

Wardlow, 528 U.S. 119, 123 (2000). “In cases where an 

informant’s tip supplies part of the basis for reasonable 

suspicion, we must ensure the tip possesses sufficient indicia 

of reliability.” Perkins, 363 F.3d at 323. 

In this case, several factors supported the reliability of 

the information the caller provided. First, although the 911 

caller did not initially provide her name, the dispatcher had a 

phone number at which the officers could contact her. See

United States v. Reaves, 512 F.3d 123, 127 (4th Cir. 2008) 

(“When an unidentified tipster provides enough information to 

allow the police to readily trace her identity, thereby 

subjecting herself to potential scrutiny and responsibility for 

the allegations, a reasonable officer may conclude that the 

tipster is credible.”). Second, her description of the suspect 

and his location in the library, along with the nature of the 

conduct reported strongly suggested that she had observed that 

conduct first-hand. See Perkins, 363 F.3d at 325 (“The caller 

in this case was clearly in a position to know about the 
11

reported activity that gave rise to [the officer’s] 

suspicion.”). Third, when the officers found a man generally 

fitting the caller’s description, he appeared to act evasively. 

See United States v. Sims, 296 F.3d 284, 287 (4th Cir. 2002) 

(holding that suspect’s evasive behavior sufficiently supported 

reliability of tip to authorize Terry stop). When seeing the 

police, he appeared to nervously sign off his computer and 

promptly exit the library. Thus, by the time Hildebrand first 

spoke with Talley, he was already authorized to conduct a Terry

stop.*

Once Hildebrand obtained Talley’s license and processed it, 

he learned of Talley’s prior child pornography convictions. 

And, the nervousness Talley exhibited during questioning gave 

him further basis to suspect that Talley was the person the 

caller had described. Talley nevertheless suggests that the 

dispatcher’s statement that the caller believed they had the 

wrong person negated any reasonable suspicion that the officers 

had. We disagree. Talley not only generally fit the caller’s 

description, he was the only person the officers found who did. 

 * Talley argues that it is possible that what the caller 

believed to be “child pornography” actually did not satisfy the 

legal definition of that term. While Talley is correct that the 

caller could have made such a mistake, that possibility did not 

prevent the officers from at least reasonably suspecting that 

Talley was engaging in criminal activity, particularly 

considering his furtive behavior.
12

Based on this fact, Talley’s furtive behavior, and Talley’s 

prior child pornography crimes, the officers had reason to 

believe either that the caller was mistaken about them having 

the wrong man or that the dispatcher had misunderstood her 

broken English in reporting that statement. Thus, Hildebrand 

was at least authorized to briefly continue his questioning of 

Talley, which at that point, had lasted no more than two 

minutes. 

Within 30 seconds of the dispatcher telling the officers 

that the caller believed they had the wrong person, Talley had 

admitted to Hildebrand that he could not stop looking at 

pornography and asked Hildebrand to give him a break and let him 

go. In the context of Hildebrand’s questioning regarding the 

possible child pornography offense, Hildebrand had reason to 

believe that Talley had just admitted his guilt. He therefore 

had probable cause to arrest him. See Devenpeck v. Alford, 543 

U.S. 146, 152 (2004) (“[W]arrantless arrest . . . is reasonable 

. . . where there is probable cause to believe that a criminal 

offense has been or is being committed.”).

III.

Talley also maintains that his 30-month sentence upon 

revocation of his supervised release term was plainly 

unreasonable. We disagree.
13

A court imposing a revocation sentence “ultimately has 

broad discretion to . . . impose a term of imprisonment up to 

the statutory maximum.” United States v. Crudup, 461 F.3d 433, 

439 (4th Cir. 2006) (internal quotation marks omitted). 

Recommended sentencing ranges for violations of supervised 

release are not true guidelines but rather “‘policy statements 

only’ to give courts ‘greater flexibility’ in devising 

revocation sentences.” Id. at 435 (quoting U.S.S.G., Ch. 7, pt. 

A, introductory cmts. 1, 3(a)). 

Talley argues that in imposing the 30-month sentence, the 

district court “failed to give weight to Talley’s age (59), poor 

health (cardiac and gastric chronic conditions), and the high, 

over-guideline sentence he had already received for the same 

conduct.” Brief of Appellant at 26. Talley also notes that 

“[t]he record does not reflect any consideration of 3553(a) 

factors other than Talley’s recidivism and the need to ‘protect 

the public.’” Id. We conclude, however, that the sentence 

imposed was not even unreasonable, let alone plainly 

unreasonable. 

In imposing the 30-month sentence, the district court 

stated that it had concluded that the revocation guideline range 

was not an appropriate range under the specific circumstances of 

this case because Talley had proven himself to be “very 

difficult to supervise.” J.A. 421. Given that the crimes 
14

underlying the sentence Talley challenges marked the second time 

Talley had committed such crimes during a term of supervised 

release, the district court’s assessment was certainly correct. 

We conclude the sentence imposed, which was six months below the 

maximum allowed by statute, was a reasonable one. Cf. Crudup, 

461 F.3d at 440 (holding that 36-month revocation sentence was 

reasonable when defendant had repeatedly violated conditions of 

supervised release). The explanation of the sentence was also 

sufficient. See id. at 439 (holding that “a court’s statement 

of its reasons for going beyond non-binding policy statements in 

imposing a sentence after revoking a defendant’s supervised 

release term need not be as specific as has been required when 

courts departed from guidelines that were, before Booker, 

considered to be mandatory” (internal quotation marks omitted)). 

IV.

For the foregoing reasons, we affirm Talley’s convictions 

and revocation sentence.

AFFIRMED