RECOMMENDED FOR FULL-TEXT PUBLICATION

Pursuant to Sixth Circuit I.O.P. 32.1(b)

File Name: 19a0047p.06

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

v.

SIROUS ASGARI,

Defendant-Appellee.

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No. 18-3302

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Northern District of Ohio at Cleveland.

No. 1:16-cr-00124-1—James S. Gwin, District Judge.

Argued: January 31, 2019

Decided and Filed: March 19, 2019

Before: BATCHELDER, SUTTON, and DONALD, Circuit Judges.

_________________

COUNSEL

ARGUED: Daniel J. Riedl, UNITED STATES ATTORNEY’S OFFICE, Cleveland, Ohio, for 

Appellant. Stephen C. Newman, FEDERAL PUBLIC DEFENDER, Cleveland, Ohio, for 

Appellee. ON BRIEF: Daniel J. Riedl, UNITED STATES ATTORNEY’S OFFICE, 

Cleveland, Ohio, for Appellant. Stephen C. Newman, Catherine J. Adinaro, FEDERAL 

PUBLIC DEFENDER, Cleveland, Ohio, for Appellee.

>
No. 18-3302 United States v. Asgari Page 2

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OPINION

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SUTTON, Circuit Judge. In 2012, federal agents learned that Iranian scientist Sirous 

Asgari was working on cutting-edge metallurgy research at Case Western Reserve University in 

Cleveland, Ohio. The government suspected that Asgari had lied on his visa application and had 

transmitted scientific information to Iran in violation of American sanctions laws. Investigators 

applied for a warrant to search Asgari’s emails, and the magistrate judge issued the warrant. 

After the search, the United States brought criminal charges and a grand jury indicted Asgari. In 

response, Asgari moved to suppress the emails. The district court held that probable cause did 

not support the warrant, and that the Leon good-faith exception did not apply. Because the Leon 

good-faith exception at a minimum applies, we reverse.

I.

Sirous Asgari was born and raised in Iran. He first came to the United States for 

educational reasons, earning a doctorate from Drexel University in 1997. After earning his 

doctorate, he returned to Iran and became a professor at Sharif University. His work involves 

transmission electron microscopy, a process in which a scientist directs electrons at samples to 

produce highly detailed images.

Asgari traveled to the United States in 2011. In the section of his visa application labeled 

“[t]he [l]ocation[s] you plan to visit in the U.S.,” Asgari listed New York, Florida, Pennsylvania, 

and Los Angeles. R. 123-1 at 2. Once in the United States, however, he traveled to Cleveland 

and met with another scientist, a friend and Iranian-American, at Case Western’s Swagelok 

Center for Surface Analysis of Materials. The two began collaborating on research. Early in 

2012, Asgari returned to Iran.

In August 2012, Asgari applied for another visa to enter the United States, listing his 

purpose as “temp[orary] business[/]pleasure” and identifying his destination as an address in 

New York where his son lived. R. 123-1 at 8. Shortly after he arrived, he claims, he learned 

about an opening at the Swagelok Center and applied for the job. 
No. 18-3302 United States v. Asgari Page 3

Someone told the Federal Bureau of Investigation that an Iranian metallurgist worked at 

Case Western under an improper visa. Special Agent Timothy Boggs interviewed the Swagelok 

Center’s director who told him about Asgari’s previous visit and said that Asgari was on a oneyear sabbatical from Sharif University. The director said that the Swagelok Center did some 

research into corrosion-resistant technology funded by the United States Navy and that an 

opening had emerged on the project. 

Agent Boggs prepared an affidavit and a warrant to search the content of Asgari’s 

personal email account for evidence of two crimes: that Asgari made materially false statements 

in his visa application, 18 U.S.C. § 1001(a)(2); and that Asgari violated the prohibition on 

exporting “any goods, technology, or services to Iran,” Exec. Order No. 13,059, 62 Fed. Reg. 

44,531, 44,531 (Aug. 19, 1997); see 50 U.S.C. § 1705(a). A magistrate judge issued the warrant 

(“the 2013 warrant”). Based on information uncovered from this search, the government 

obtained another warrant in 2015 (“the 2015 warrant”) to search Asgari’s subsequent emails. 

A grand jury indicted Asgari on 13 counts of stealing trade secrets, 18 U.S.C. § 1832(a)(1)–(2), 

wire fraud, id. § 1343, and visa fraud, id. § 1546(a). 

Asgari moved to suppress the evidence obtained from the execution of the warrants. The 

district court ruled that “[n]othing in the 2013 affidavit used to obtain the search warrant 

approaches probable cause.” R. 113 at 7. It then held that the Leon good-faith exception did not 

permit the government to use the evidence uncovered from Asgari’s email account because 

(1) the affidavit lacked indicia of probable cause and (2) Agent Boggs made intentionally false 

statements and misleading omissions in his 2013 affidavit. The court suppressed the emails from 

the 2015 warrant as ill-gotten gains from the 2013 warrant. The government appealed. 

II.

The parties agree that this appeal turns on the evidence uncovered by the execution of the

2013 warrant. If probable cause supports the warrant or if the good-faith exception to the 

exclusionary rule applies, the government may use the information obtained from that search and 

the search connected with the 2015 warrant in this prosecution.
No. 18-3302 United States v. Asgari Page 4

Probable cause. The government first argues that probable cause supports the warrant. 

That may or may not be the case. But it doesn’t matter because the Leon good-faith rule applies.

The Leon good-faith rule. If federal investigators conduct a search without probable 

cause of criminal activity, the search generally violates the Fourth Amendment. The violation 

usually comes with a remedy: suppression of the evidence found during the search. See Mapp v. 

Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 648 (1961). Not always, however. Hiccups sometimes occur in complex as 

well as run-of-the-mine criminal investigations. The investigators may think probable cause 

exists, but a court may later disagree. To prevent reasonable errors from leading to 

disproportionally severe consequences, the Supreme Court in United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 

897 (1984), created a “good faith” exception to the exclusionary rule, a safe harbor for 

reasonable slipups. If a neutral magistrate finds probable cause and issues a warrant, 

investigators may rely on the magistrate’s judgment, and courts will consider the resulting 

evidence so long as two exceptions to the good-faith rule do not apply. One exception applies to 

warrant applications “so lacking in indicia of probable cause as to render official belief in its 

existence entirely unreasonable.” Id. at 923 (quotation omitted). The other applies when the 

warrant application contains intentional or reckless falsehoods that mislead the magistrate. Id.

Neither exception applies.

As to the first exception, a reasonable officer could fairly rely on Agent Boggs’s 10-page 

affidavit. This was not the kind of “bare bones” affidavit barred by Leon. Id. at 915. The 

affidavit begins by identifying Agent Boggs’s 23 years of experience at the Federal Bureau of 

Investigation, his decade working in national security, his expertise in Iranian counterintelligence operations, and his “specialized training.” R. 69-1 at 6; see United States v. Stotts, 

176 F.3d 880, 885 (6th Cir. 1999). It then lists several facts that would permit a reasonable 

officer to believe that probable cause existed to search for evidence of both crimes.

As to the false statement charge, government records showed that Asgari traveled to the 

United States in late 2011 and again in late 2012. On neither occasion did Asgari list Cleveland 

as a destination in his visa applications. Yet Asgari traveled to Cleveland both times and sent or 

received over 100 emails with colleagues at Case Western before applying for his 2012 visa. 
No. 18-3302 United States v. Asgari Page 5

After arriving in the United States in 2012, Asgari went to Cleveland and secured a position on 

the anti-corrosion project. The kind of visa Asgari possessed did not permit him to work or 

“conduct research that will benefit a United States institution.” R. 69-1 at 8 n.3. Had Asgari 

listed his purpose as conducting research for an institution, he would have had to apply for a 

different type of visa. All told, these facts provide ample indicia of probable cause that Asgari 

intended to conduct research that his visa did not allow and that he misled State Department 

officials about his “true intent when traveling to the United States.” Id. at 13. 

What about the sanctions violations? Here, too, we do not have a “bare bones” allegation 

so lacking in probable cause that an investigator could not rely on the warrant in good faith. The 

affidavit showed that Agent Boggs interviewed the Swagelok Center director. The director 

informed Boggs that Case Western possessed “twenty (20) very precise and expensive 

instruments that are run by six (6) full time engineers.” Id. at 9. This “instrumentation” was 

“not available in Iran.” Id. at 8. The Center’s high-tech tools attracted researchers from 

government entities such as the National Aeronautics and Space Administration and the Oak 

Ridge National Laboratory, as well as prestigious academic institutions such as the University of 

Cambridge. While the Center did not itself conduct classified research, the Center was “open to 

researchers who may be working” on classified projects. Id. at 9. The affidavit also details the 

nautical and military applications connected to the research at the Swagelok Center. The director 

had worked for the United States Department of Defense previously and was a member of the 

Defense Science Research Council. Three-quarters of the Swagelok Center’s budget came from 

the Department of Defense. The Office of Naval Research funded the research into corrosionresistant stainless steel to develop materials that the Navy could use to combat the harmful 

effects of saltwater. This “technology could extend the life of certain U.S. Navy propulsion 

systems.” Id. 

The affidavit also reveals evidence suggesting that Asgari may have exploited his 

position to transmit information back to Iran. A variety of people at the Center had access to the 

corrosion project’s data. Asgari communicated by email with individuals in Iran. Asgari’s home 

institution, Sharif University, had ties to the Iranian government. The university was “under the 

direct supervision” of the Iranian Ministry of Science, Research and Technology. Id. at 8. The 
No. 18-3302 United States v. Asgari Page 6

university’s funding came from the Iranian government as well as private sources. And other 

evidence suggested that Asgari lied on his visa application and sought to conceal the true 

purpose of his travel to the United States. That last fact shows how the two allegations 

intertwined. By lying on his visa application and coming to Case Western to work, Asgari would 

facilitate a scheme to send technology to Iran. 

The question is not whether we would have found probable cause. It is whether the 

affidavit was so skimpy, so conclusory, that anyone looking at the warrant would necessarily 

have known it failed to demonstrate probable cause. That doesn’t describe the affidavit or 

warrant in this case. The sanctions on Iran are broad in scope; probable cause is a lenient 

standard of proof; and the good-faith exception permits an affidavit to show much less than this 

one did. Put it all together, and investigators operating in good faith reasonably could have 

thought the warrant was valid. 

Asgari resists this conclusion on several grounds. He starts by focusing on the reality that 

the State Department may not have required him to list Cleveland on his visa application because 

“travel plans commonly change.” Appellee’s Br. 22. But Asgari’s travel to Cleveland, his 

acquisition of a post at Case Western, and his pre-existing and extensive relationship with an 

Iranian-American scientist there all suggest that Asgari intentionally omitted Cleveland as part of 

a larger effort to deceive the State Department about the purpose of his visit. 

It also does not matter that the Swagelok Center director said the position Asgari filled 

became available after Asgari filed his visa application. That timeline does not disprove the 

possibility that Asgari planned to visit Case Western and work there. Plus, he emailed 

extensively with another scientist at Case Western before the visit. In view of Asgari’s travel to 

Cleveland after coming to the United States, the extensive communication between the two men 

bolstered the probable-cause determination that Asgari had long-held plans to do research at 

Case Western, whether in one position or another. 
No. 18-3302 United States v. Asgari Page 7

Based on the Swagelok Center director’s statements reproduced in the affidavit, Asgari 

argues that information at the Center was purely “academic in nature and within the public 

domain,” meaning Asgari could not send the Iranians anything they could not get elsewhere. 

Appellee’s Br. 28. Read in context, however, the director’s comments suggest only that the 

Center’s research was unclassified, not that every piece of data was available in Iran via a 

Google search. 

Asgari also thinks that his emails home to Iran could not contribute to probable cause 

because many of his correspondents were students—unlikely collaborators, he says, in trying to 

circumvent the sanctions on Iran. Maybe; maybe not. A university professor on sabbatical, it’s 

true, often will continue to communicate with students for purely educational reasons, such as to 

advise ongoing research or offer mentorship. But the students also went to a university with 

close ties to the Iranian government, the sanctions are far reaching, and it’s not unreasonable to 

think that a graduate student might assist a professor on all of his tasks, including transmitting 

data back to Iran in violation of American sanctions. The sanctions, bear in mind, broadly ban 

sending “any goods, technology, or services to Iran,” covering much more than cloak-and-dagger 

espionage. Exec. Order No. 13,059, 62 Fed. Reg. at 44,531 (emphasis added); see also Bassidji 

v. Goe, 413 F.3d 928, 934 (9th Cir. 2005) (discussing the sanctions’ broad scope). 

Asgari fares no better in claiming that the affidavit includes intentional or reckless 

falsehoods. See Leon, 468 U.S. at 914; Franks v. Delaware, 438 U.S. 154, 171 (1978). The 

district court identified five errors in Special Agent Boggs’s 10-page affidavit, all arising from 

paragraph 9. Here is the paragraph in full and its footnotes: 

ASGARI has established ties to the government of Iran (“GOI”), through 

his employment with Sharif University. Sharif University, based on Affiant’s 

investigation and training, is a university of higher education in technology

engineering and physical sciences in Tehran, and one of Iran’s most prestigious 

universities.1 Funding for Sharif University is provided by the Iranian 

Government and through private investments. State run (non-medical) 

universities of Iran are under the direct supervision of Iran’s Ministry of Science, 

Research and Technology. Sharif University researchers have worked in support 

of Iranian Navy projects such as autonomous underwater vehicles.2 On two 

separate occasions, ASGARI traveled to the U.S. with the stated purpose of 

visiting his children. The first visit was from December 12, 2011, until February 

15, 2012. That visit, ASGARI traveled to the U.S. on a B2 tourist visa. ASGARI 
No. 18-3302 United States v. Asgari Page 8

arrived in the U.S. on his second visit on November 4, 2012, and remains in the 

U.S. This visit, ASGARI traveled on a B1/B2 visa,3 with the stated purpose of 

visiting his children. On both visits, without disclosure to the DoS, in his 

applications for visas, ASGARI traveled to Cleveland, Ohio to conduct research 

at the Swagelok Center for Surface Analysis of Materials (herafter [sic] 

“SSAM”), Case Western Reserve University (hereafter “CWRU”). The SSAM 

contains advanced research instrumentation that is not available in Iran. 

At SSAM, without the Navy’s approval or knowledge, ASGARI has conducted 

research at CWRU that is funded by the Office of Naval Research (“ONR”).

_________________________

1

“The only Iranian University in Times Higher Education World Universities ranking” 

(http://www.timeshighereducation.co.uk/ . . . . 

2Amir, R. Dept. of Sci. & Technol., Sharif Univ. of Technol., Kish Island, Iran, Neural 

networks control of autonomous underwater vehicle, Mechanical and Electronics Engineering 

(ICMEE), 2012 2nd International Conference on 1-3 August 2010, Vol 2, pages V2-117-V2-121[.]

3A B1/B2 Visa is a nonimmigrant, visitor class of visa, authorizing entry into the United 

States for a combination of temporary business and tourism/pleasure/visiting. This type of visa 

does not authorize employment in the United States or for researchers to conduct research at 

United States institutions that will benefit the United States Institution. For researchers who 

intend to conduct research that will benefit a United States institution, the proper visa is an H-1B 

Temporary Worker visa or a J Exchange Visitor visa. Thus, the purpose of the visit listed on a 

visa application is material to the issuance of the visa. 

R. 69-1 at 8 & ns.1–3. 

Not one of the alleged errors sinks to the level of a knowing falsehood or deliberate 

omission. Two of them count as minor omissions, each the type of missing “fragment” that 

cannot be characterized as deliberate or reckless. See United States v. Atkin, 107 F.3d 1213, 

1217 (6th Cir. 1997). According to the district court, Agent Boggs should have noted that the 

State Department doesn’t require applicants to list an exact itinerary of their planned travel. But 

each visa application did ask about Asgari’s travel plans in the United States, and in neither 

instance did he mention any travel to Cleveland. Boggs permissibly mentioned that material 

fact. 

Agent Boggs also did not say that an individual may conduct independent research on the 

type of visa Asgari possessed, even if the visa holder cannot be employed or do research for an 

American institution’s benefit. This, too, does not count as a deliberate omission. See id. Boggs 

explained what Asgari could not do (work for pay or for Case Western’s benefit) and the reader 

reasonably could infer that the visa permitted Asgari to do activities short of that. 
No. 18-3302 United States v. Asgari Page 9

Two of the errors identified by the district court were not mistakes at all. One: Agent 

Boggs asserted that Asgari stated in his 2012 visa application that he wanted to travel to the

United States to visit his children. In fact, Asgari listed his son’s address as his point of contact 

and the address where Asgari planned to stay. Boggs took this to mean Asgari intended to visit 

his children, even though Asgari’s visa technically allowed him to travel for some mix of 

pleasure and business. Boggs’s characterization may have required an inference, but it is not a 

falsehood. 

The other: Boggs wrote that Case Western had “advanced research instrumentation that 

is not available in Iran.” Boggs’s interview notes backed up this statement. The Swagelok 

Center director said that the instruments were “probably” unavailable to Iranian researchers, 

though similar equipment existed elsewhere. R. 128-2 at 3. That’s not false.

Last of all, Agent Boggs stated that Asgari’s employer, Sharif University, worked “in 

support of Iranian Navy Projects such as autonomous underwater vehicles.” R. 69-1 at 8. As 

proof, Boggs cited a graduate student’s dissertation about autonomous underwater vehicles that

did not otherwise mention the Iranian Navy. This footnote, the court found, “was included to 

create a false connection between Asgari and the Iranian Navy” and misled the magistrate judge 

into believing that Asgari would pass “defense technology” to the Iranians. R. 113 at 11–12. 

Even if technically inaccurate, the statement does not show a deliberate or reckless disregard for 

the truth. For one thing, the single, offending sentence was isolated in a footnote. For another, 

Boggs explained that the student paper used a U.S. Navy drone as the basis for its research. For 

still another, Asgari offers no evidence to show that Sharif University lacks ties to the Iranian 

military. In reality, it is an elite national university under direct oversight of the Iranian 

government. 

On appeal, Asgari also points to several additional facts that allegedly suggest Agent 

Boggs misled the magistrate judge. Asgari identifies a discrepancy between what Boggs testified 

(that the Center’s instruments had the highest resolution in world) and what Boggs’s notes 

recorded (that the Center had “very precise” instruments). R. 128-2 at 1. To state the point is to 

answer it. Minor differences do not show bad faith, much less intentional or reckless lies. 
No. 18-3302 United States v. Asgari Page 10

Asgari claims that the affidavit implied that Asgari’s failure to list Cleveland as a location 

of travel would violate 18 U.S.C. § 1001(a)(2). Even if Asgari’s failure to list Cleveland did not 

break the law, Asgari’s desired reading of the affidavit is forced. At worst, the affidavit was 

slightly ambiguous about how Asgari made the false statement. The best reading of the affidavit 

suggests that Asgari violated § 1001(a)(2) when he listed “the purpose of the trip” as the kind of 

temporary business one is permitted to conduct on a visitor visa.

Because, at a minimum, the affidavit satisfies the Leon good-faith exception, we reverse 

and remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.