13176 Federal Register / Vol. 62, No. 53 / Wednesday, March 19, 1997 / Notices

1The byproduct material 137Cs does not include

the 137 Cs, from global fallout, that exists in the

environment from the testing of nuclear explosive

devices (see Footnote 3).

2The term, ‘‘incident-related material,’’ is

frequently used in this position to refer to the total

spectrum of 137Cs-contaminated materials resulting

from an inadvertent melting event. Because of its

widespread use in radioactive devices and its

volatility when subjected to steel melting

temperatures, the position is directed solely at

incident-related materials involving this

radioisotope.

appointment to the ACRS. The purpose

of this meeting is to gather information,

analyze relevant issues and facts, and to

formulate proposed positions and

actions, as appropriate, for deliberation

by the full Committee.

Oral statements may be presented by

members of the public with the

concurrence of the Subcommittee

Chairman; written statements will be

accepted and made available to the

Committee. Electronic recordings will

be permitted only during those portions

of the meeting that are open to the

public, and questions may be asked only

by members of the Subcommittee, its

consultants, and staff. Persons desiring

to make oral statements should notify

the cognizant ACRS staff person named

below five days prior to the meeting, if

possible, so that appropriate

arrangements can be made.

Further information regarding topics

to be discussed, the scheduling of

sessions open to the public, whether the

meeting has been cancelled or

rescheduled, the Chairman’s ruling on

requests for the opportunity to present

oral statements, and the time allotted

therefor can be obtained by contacting

the cognizant ACRS staff person, Dr.

John T. Larkins (telephone: 301/415–

7360) between 7:30 a.m. and 4:15 p.m.

(EST). Persons planning to attend this

meeting are urged to contact the above

named individual one or two working

days prior to the meeting to be advised

of any changes in schedule, etc., that

may have occurred.

Date: March 13, 1997.

Noel F. Dudley,

Acting Chief, Nuclear Reactors Branch.

[FR Doc. 97–6880 Filed 3–18–97; 8:45 am]

BILLING CODE 7590–01–P

Disposition of Cesium-137

Contaminated Emission Control Dust

and Other Incident-Related Material;

Final Staff Technical Position

AGENCY: U.S. Nuclear Regulatory

Commission.

ACTION: Notice: final staff technical

position.

SUMMARY: The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory

Commission is issuing guidance, in the

form of a technical position, that may be

used, in case-by-case requests, by

appropriate licensees, to dispose of a

specific incident-related mixed waste.

Mixed waste is a waste that not only is

radioactive, but also is classified as

hazardous under the Resource

Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA).

The specific mixed waste addressed in

this position is emission control dust

from electric arc furnaces (EAFs) or

foundries that has been contaminated

with cesium-137 (137Cs). The

contamination results from the

inadvertent melting of a 137Cs source

that: (1) Has been improperly disposed

of by an NRC or Agreement State

licensee; (2) has been commingled with

the steel scrap supply; (3) has not been

detected as it progresses to the steelproducing process; and (4) is volatilized

in the production process and thereby

can and has contaminated large volumes

of emission control dust and the

emission control systems at steelproducing facilities.

The position, which has been

coordinated with the U.S.

Environmental Protection Agency

(EPA), provides the possibility of a

public health-protective,

environmentally sound, and costeffective alternative for the disposal of

a large part of this mixed waste, much

of which contains 137Cs in

concentrations similar to values that

frequently occur in the environment.

The position provides the bases that,

with the approval of appropriate

regulatory authorities (e.g., Statepermitting agencies) and others (e.g.,

disposal site operators), and with

possible public input, could be used to

allow disposal of stabilized waste at

Subtitle C, RCRA-permitted, hazardous

waste disposal facilities. NRC believes

that disposal, under the provisions of

the position or other acceptable

alternatives, is preferable to allowing

this mixed waste to remain indefinitely

at steel company sites.

The position has been developed

through an open public process in

which working draft documents have

been routinely shared with EPA, and

also placed in NRC’s Public Document

Room to allow interested party access.

NRC published the proposed position in

the Federal Register for comment (61

FR 1608, dated January 22, 1996). NRC

is now publishing the entire final

position, together with its responses to

the comments received.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT:

Dominick A. Orlando, Division of Waste

Management, Office of Nuclear Material

Safety and Safeguards, Mail Stop TWFN

8F–37, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory

Commission, Washington, DC 20555,

Telephone (301) 415–6749.

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:

Disposition of Cesium-137

Contaminated Emission Control Dust

and Other Incident-Related Materials;

Branch Technical Position

A. Introduction

Emission control (baghouse) dust and

other incident-related materials (e.g.,

clean-up materials or recycle process

streams) contaminated with 137Cs 1 are

currently being stored as mixed

radioactive and hazardous waste at

several steel company sites across the

country. At any single site, this material

typically contains a total 137Cs quantity

ranging downward from a little more

than 1 curie (Ci) or 37 gigabecquerels

(GBq) of activity, distributed within

several hundred to a few thousand tons

of iron/zinc-rich dust, as well as within

much smaller quantities of clean-up or

dust-recycle, process-stream materials.

In current situations, most, but not all,

of this material would be classified as

mixed waste and this technical position

is intended as a potential disposition

alternative for this incident-related

material.2

Typically, the radioactivity is not

evenly distributed among the incidentrelated materials. Rather, a small

fraction (e.g., one-tenth) of the material

contains most (e.g., 95 percent) of the

radioactivity. Most of the material

contains a small quantity of

radioactivity at low concentrations and

makes up most of the mixed waste,

incident-related material volume. This

material is classified as hazardous waste

under RCRA because it contains lead,

cadmium, and chromium which are

common to the recycle metal supply.

The 137Cs contamination of this

hazardous waste results from a series of

three principal events: (1) The loss of

control of a radioactive source by an

NRC or an Agreement State licensee; (2)

the inclusion of the source within the

recycle metal scrap supply used by the

steel producers; and (3) the inability to

screen out the radioactive source as it

progresses along the typical scrap

collection-to-melt pathway (including

radiation detectors used at most

furnaces, foundries and many ferrous

metal recycling facilities).

Consequently, irrespective of the

quantity or concentration of the

radioactivity, most of the current

material is subject to joint regulation as

mixed waste under RCRA and the

Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended,

or the equivalent law of an Agreement

State.
Federal Register / Vol. 62, No. 53 / Wednesday, March 19, 1997 / Notices 13177

3 In a letter to William Guerry, Jr. from NRC’s

Executive Director for Operations, James M. Taylor,

dated May 25, 1993, NRC made a preliminary

determination that 137Cs levels in baghouse dust

can reasonably be attributed to fallout from past

nuclear weapons testing, if concentrations are less

than about 2 pCi/g (0.074 Bq/g).

The disposal options for these

materials, specifically the large volumes

of material with the lower

concentrations of 137Cs, have been

limited because of their ‘‘mixed-waste’’

classification and the costs associated

with the disposition of large volumes of

mixed or radioactive waste. Long-term

solutions addressing the control and

accountability of licensed radioactive

sources are being considered by NRC

and Agreement States. Solutions

addressing the disposition of mixed

wastes are being considered by various

Federal and State regulatory authorities

and the U.S. Department of Energy.

Nevertheless, the Commission believes

that, pending decisions on improved

licensee accountability and the ultimate

disposition of mixed waste, appropriate

disposal of the existing incident-related,

mixed-waste material is preferable to

indefinite onsite storage.

As a result, this technical position

defines the bases that the NRC staff

would find acceptable for: (1)

Authorizing a licensee, possessing

137Cs-contaminated emission control

dust and other incident-related

materials (e.g., the steel company or its

service contractor), to transfer treated

137Cs-contaminated material, below

levels specified in this position, to a

Subtitle C, RCRA-permitted hazardous

waste disposal facility; and (2) not

licensing the possession and disposal of

these incident-related materials by the

RCRA-permitted disposal facility. The

position does not address disposal at a

Subtitle D facility. Because of its

radioactivity (i.e., 137Cs concentration

levels), some of the incident-related

material may not be suitable for disposal

at a Subtitle C, RCRA-permitted

disposal facility. This material may be

disposed of either: (a) at a licensed lowlevel radioactive waste disposal facility

after appropriate treatment of its

hazardous constituents; or (b) at a

mixed-waste disposal facility, if

applicable acceptance criteria are met.

The regulatory basis for the action is

found at 10 CFR 20.2001(a)(1) and

20.2002. The first paragraph authorizes

a licensee to dispose of licensed

material as provided in the regulations

in 10 CFR Parts 30, 40, 60, 61, 70, or 72.

Paragraph 30.41(b) states the conditions

under which licensees are allowed to

transfer byproduct material. Paragraph

30.41(b)(7) of Part 30 specifically

provides that licensees may transfer

byproduct material if authorized by the

Commission, in writing. In the case of

the 137Cs-contaminated material, the

licensing action under 10 CFR 20.2002

would constitute the written

authorization required by paragraph

30.41(b)(7).

It should be noted that additional

acceptance requirements, beyond those

covered in this NRC position for

disposal of 137Cs-contaminated

incident-related waste at a Subtitle C

RCRA-permitted disposal facility, may

be established by: (1) An Agreement

State; (2) the permit conditions or

policies of the RCRA-permitted disposal

facility; (3) the regulatory requirements

of the RCRA disposal facility’s

permitting agency; or (4) other

authorized parties, including State and

local governments. These requirements

may be more stringent than those

covered in the guidance described in

this technical position. The licensed

entity transferring the 137Cscontaminated incident-related materials

must consult with these parties, and

obtain all necessary approvals, in

addition to those of NRC and/or

appropriate Agreement States, for the

transfers defined in this technical

position. Nothing in this position shall

be or is intended to be construed as a

waiver of any RCRA permit condition or

term, of any State or local statute or

regulation, or of any Federal RCRA

regulation. The position applies to both

hazardous and non-hazardous incidentrelated waste as specifically defined. In

addition, the conditions established in

this position pertain to NRC staff and

licensee actions. Therefore, in those

instances where an Agreement State is

the sole regulatory authority for the

radioactive material, the Agreement

State has the option of using this

guidance in reviewing requests for the

disposal of the material.

B. Discussion

Over the past decade, there has been

an increasing number of instances in

which radioactive material has been

inadvertently commingled with scrap

metal that subsequently has entered the

steel-recycle production process. If this

radioactive material is not removed

before the melting process, it could

contaminate the finished metal product,

associated dust-recycle process streams,

equipment (principally air effluent

treatment systems), and the dust

generated during the process. Some of

the contaminant radioactivity is a result

of naturally occurring radionuclides that

are deposited in oil and gas

transmission piping. Other radioactivity

may be associated with radioactive

sources that are contained in industrial

or medical devices. In this latter case,

the commingling of the radioactive

source with metal destined for recycling

can occur if the regulatorily required

accountability of these sources fails and

a radioactive source is included within

the metal scrap supply used by the steel

producers. In cases where the

radionuclide is naturally occurring, or is

already present in the environment as a

result of global fallout, the inadvertent

melting of a radioactive source could

increase the contaminant concentration

above that caused by these background

environmental levels.3

Although many of the steel producers

have installed equipment to detect

incoming radioactivity, this equipment

cannot provide absolute protection

because of the shielding of radioactive

emissions that may be provided by

uncontaminated scrap metal or the

shielded ‘‘pig’’ that contains the

radioactive source. Of special concern,

because of the nature and magnitude of

the involved radioactivity, are NRC- or

Agreement State-licensed sources

containing 137Cs.

When 137Cs sources are inadvertently

melted with a load of scrap metal, a

significant amount of the 137Cs activity

contaminates the metal-rich dust that is

collected in the highly efficient

emission control systems that steel mills

have installed to comply with air

pollution regulations. Because of

hazardous constituents—specifically

lead, cadmium, and chromium—EAF

emission control dust is a listed waste,

KO61, which is subject to regulation

under RCRA. If this dust becomes

contaminated with 137Cs, the resulting

material is classified as a mixed waste.

Emission control dust, generated

immediately after the melting of a 137Cs

source with the scrap metal, can contain

cesium concentrations in the range of

hundreds or thousands of picocuries per

gram (pCi/g) or a few to a few tens of

becquerels (Bq) per gram of dust, above

typical levels in dust caused by 137Cs in

the environment (e.g., 2 pCi/g or 0.074

Bq/g). Several thousand cubic feet

(several tens of cubic meters) of dust

could be contaminated at these levels.

Dust generated days or weeks after a

melt of a source (containing hundreds of

millicuries or a few curies of 137Cs (∼37

GBq)) will contain reduced

concentrations, typically less than 100

pCi/g (3.7 Bq/g).

Even after extensive decontamination

and remediation activities, newly

generated dust may still contain

concentrations greater than 2 pCi/g

(0.074 Bq/g) background levels, but

generally less than 10 pCi/g (0.37 Bq/g).

When the melting of a source is not

immediately detected, materials related
13178 Federal Register / Vol. 62, No. 53 / Wednesday, March 19, 1997 / Notices

4 In April 1995, Envirocare of Utah, Inc., an

operator of a mixed-waste disposal site, received

authorization from the State of Utah and initiated

operations to treat and dispose of 137Cscontaminated incident-related (mixed-waste)

materials at concentrations not exceeding 560 

pCi/g (20.7 Bq/g).

5The use of 1 mrem/yr (10 μSv/yr) has no

significance or precedential value as a health and

safety goal. It was selected only for the purpose of

analysis of the levels at which the referenced

materials could be partitioned to allow the bulk of

the material to be transferred to unlicensed persons.

It does not represent an NRC position on the generic

acceptability of dose levels. Such levels are

established only by rule.

6For non-hazardous material covered by this

position, stabilization equivalent to that provided

for hazardous waste would be necessary.

to downstream processes have also been

contaminated with relatively low

concentrations of 137Cs (e.g., 10 pCi/g

(0.37 Bq/g)). In addition, materials used

during decontamination may also be

contaminated with dust containing

137Cs concentrations at similar levels

above background.

As the result of past inadvertent

meltings of 137Cs sources, a number of

steel producers possess a total of about

10,000 tons (9000 metric tons) of

incident-related materials, most of

which contains 137Cs concentrations of

less than 100 pCi/g (3.7 Bq/g). This

material is typically being stored onsite

because of the lack of disposal options

that are considered cost-effective by the

steel companies.4 It is the disposition of

material at these concentration levels

that is the subject of this technical

position.

C. Regulatory Position

General

Because of the ‘‘incident-related’’

origin of the 137Cs-contaminated

materials, the Commission has approved

a course of action that includes: (1)

Exploration of approaches to improve

licensee control and accountability to

reduce the likelihood of sealed sources

entering the scrap metal supply; (2)

cooperation with the steel

manufacturers and other appropriate

organizations to identify the magnitude

and character of the problem (with

particular emphasis on improving the

capability to detect sealed sources

before their inadvertent melting); and

(3) development of interim guidelines

for the disposal of 137Cs contaminated

dust and other incident-related

materials (the subject of this technical

position).

Specific

Bases for Allowing Transfer and

Possession of 137Cs-Contaminated,

Incident-Related Material

The bases for allowing transfer and

possession of 137Cs-contaminated

emission control dust and other

incident-related materials, under the

provisions of existing regulations, are as

follows: (1) Any person at a Subtitle C,

RCRA-permitted disposal facility

involved with the receipt, movement,

storage, or disposal of contaminated

materials should not receive an

exposure greater than 1 millirem (mrem)

or 10 microsievert (μSv) per year (i.e.,

one-hundredth of the dose limit for

individual members of the public as

defined at 10 CFR 20.1301(A)(1)), above

natural background levels; 5; (2)

members of the general public in the

vicinity of storage or disposal facilities

should not receive exposures and no

individual member of the public should

be likely to receive a dose greater than

1 mrem (10 μSv) per year above

background as a result of any and all

transfers and disposals of contaminated

materials; (3) handling or processing of

the contaminated materials, undertaken

as a result of its radioactivity, should

not compromise the effectiveness of

permitted hazardous waste disposal

operations; (4) treatment of

contaminated materials must be

accomplished by persons operating

under a licensee’s radiation protection

program (note that the licensee can be

the steel facility or the entity that treats

the incident-related material, either onor offsite); and (5) transportation of

contaminated materials will be subject

to U.S. Department of Transportation

(DOT) regulations and, as applicable,

transportation of contaminated,

hazardous materials must be performed

by hazardous material employees, as

defined in DOT regulations (49 CFR Part

172, Subpart H).

Definition of Contaminated Materials

and Initial Incident Response

A melting event generally necessitates

extensive decontamination and

remediation operations at the EAF or

foundry (e.g., replacing refractory bricks

and duct work). Subsequent operations

include the proper interim handling and

management (e.g., accumulation and

containment) of emission control dust

and other incident-related contaminated

materials. Based on a review of several

recent incidents, the dust may contain

137Cs concentrations up to hundreds or

thousands of pCi/g (a few to a few tens

of Bq/g), whereas the other generally

limited-volume, incident-related

materials typically contain lower

concentrations. As a result, the initial

clean-up and collection/treatment/

packaging of the contaminated emission

control dust and other materials at the

EAF or foundry must be performed by

an NRC or Agreement State licensee

operating under an approved radiation

protection program. The licensee is also

responsible for compliance with other

regulatory requirements (e.g., those of

the Occupational Safety and Health

Administration and RCRA Treatment

Permitting requirements).

Provisions for Disposal at a Subtitle C,

RCRA-Permitted, Disposal Facility

Once the decontamination/

remediation and collection/treatment/

packaging activities have been

completed, one of two paths may be

followed for the disposal of the

incident-related materials, dependent

on 137Cs-concentration levels and

whether the final land disposal

operation involves the burial of

packaged or unpackaged materials.

1. Packaged Disposal of Treated Waste

On this disposal path, contaminated

materials must be treated through

stabilization to comply with all EPA

and/or State waste treatment

requirements for land disposal of

regulated hazardous waste.6 The

treatment operations must be

undertaken by either: (i) The owner/

operator of the EAF or foundry (licensed

by NRC or appropriate Agreement State

to possess, treat, and transfer 137Cscontaminated, incident-related

materials); or (ii) an NRC- or Agreement

State-licensed service contractor

(operating either on- or offsite). Based

on the radiological impact assessment

provided in Appendix A, the licensee

could be authorized by NRC or an

Agreement State to transfer the treated

incident-related materials to a Subtitle

C, RCRA-permitted, disposal facility,

provided that all the following

conditions are met:

(a) The 137Cs-contaminated emission

control dust and other incident-related

materials are the result of an inadvertent

melting of a sealed source or device;

(b) The emission control dust and

other incident-related materials have

been stabilized to meet requirements for

land disposal of RCRA-regulated waste,

and have been stored (if applicable) and

transferred in compliance with a

radiation protection program as

specified at 10 CFR 20.1101;

(c) The total 137Cs activity, contained

in emission control dust and other

incident-related materials to be

transferred to a Subtitle C, RCRApermitted, disposal facility, has been

specifically approved by NRC or the

appropriate Agreement State(s) and does

not exceed the total activity associated

with the inadvertent melting incident.
Federal Register / Vol. 62, No. 53 / Wednesday, March 19, 1997 / Notices 13179

7The 1-curie (37-GBq) value represents a

reasonable maximum bounding activity, associated

with several incidents, that could be transferred to

an RCRA-permitted facility under the provisions of

this position. It also represents a quantity that

would be less than the activity disposed of over the

operating life of the RCRA-permitted facility if the

facility routinely disposed of non-incident-related

emission control dust containing background

concentrations of 137Cs.

8The NRC staff believes the contract between the

licensed facility and the RCRA facility operator is

an appropriate vehicle for complying with this

provision, provided that the contract specifies the

volume of waste, the radionuclide and its average

concentration in the waste in picocuries per gram

or becquerels per gram, the total aggregated amount

of radioactive material in the shipment, the

hazardous waste code of the waste, and the EPA

identification number of the RCRA disposal facility

receiving the waste. The NRC staff will evaluate

requests for license amendments to transfer

incident-related material based upon the licensee

demonstrating that the RCRA disposal facility

operator has agreed to the transfer and has made

provisions to retain the information about the

radioactive material in the waste, along with the

information that is required to be retained by the

RCRA facility operator under 40 CFR 263.22.

9The 130 pCi/g (4.8 Bq/g) value is the

concentration, based on the analysis in the

appendix and including a regulatory margin of 1.5,

that would result in a calculated potential exposure

of less than 1 mrem (10 μSv). The disposal of

incident-related materials in packaged form allows

compliance with this position to be demonstrated

through measurement of 137Cs concentrations, as

well as direct radiation levels external to the

package. Notwithstanding the redundant

approaches to ensure compliance with the exposure

criterion, the regulatory margin of 1.5 has been

included in determining the acceptable measurables

defined in the position.

10At this exposure rate, for the exposure period

as defined in the appendix, total exposure would

not exceed 1 mrem (10 μSv) with a regulatory

margin of 1.5.

11See footnote 6.

12See footnote 7.

13The NRC staff believes the contract between the

licensed facility and the RCRA facility operator is

an appropriate vehicle for complying with this

provision, provided that the contract specifies the

volume of waste, the radionuclide and its average

concentration in the waste in picocuries per gram

or becquerels per gram, the total aggregated amount

of radioactive material in the shipment, the

hazardous waste code of the waste and the EPA

identification number of the RCRA disposal facility

receiving the waste. The NRC staff will evaluate

requests for license amendments to transfer

incident-related material based upon the licensee

demonstrating that the RCRA disposal facility

operator has agreed to the transfer and has made

provisions to retain the information about the

radioactive material in the waste along with the

information that is required to be retained by the

RCRA facility operator under 40 CFR 263.22.

14The 100 pCi/g (3.7 Bq/g) value is the

concentration, based on the analysis in the

appendix and including a regulatory margin of 2,

that would result in a calculated potential exposure

of less than 1 mrem (10 μSv). The disposal of

incident-related material in unpackaged (bulk) form

dictates that compliance with this position would

be demonstrated through measurement of 137Cs

concentrations. Without the redundant approach to

ensure compliance with the exposure criterion

inherent with the packaged-disposal approach (see

footnote 8), the regulatory margin, included in

determining the acceptable measurables defined in

the position, has been increased to 2.0.

Moreover, NRC or the appropriate

Agreement State will maintain a public

record of the total incident-related 137Cs

activity, received by the facility over its

operating life, to ensure that the total

disposed of 137Cs activity does not

exceed 1 curie (37 GBq); 7

(d) The RCRA disposal facility

operator has been notified in writing of

the impending transfer of the incidentrelated materials and has agreed in

writing to receive and dispose of the

packaged materials; 8

(e) The licensee providing the

radiation protection program required in

paragraph (b), notifies, in writing, the

Commission or Agreement State(s) in

which the transferor and transferee are

located, of the impending transfer, at

least 30 days before the transfer;

(f) The stabilized material has been

packaged for transportation and

disposal in non-bulk steel packagings as

defined in DOT regulations at 49 CFR

173.213. (Note that this is a condition

established under this technical

position and is not a DOT requirement.

Under DOT regulations, material with

concentrations of less than 2000 pCi/g

(74 Bq/g) is not considered radioactive);

(g) In any package, the emission

control dust and other incident-related

materials, that have been stabilized and

packaged as defined in (b) and (f) above,

contain pretreatment average

concentrations of 137Cs that did not

exceed 130 pCi/g (4.8 Bq/g) of material; 9

and

(h) The dose rate at 3.28 feet (1 meter)

from the surface of any package

containing stabilized waste does not

exceed 20 μrem per hour or 0.20 μSv per

hour, above background.10

Note that, in defining the pretreatment

137Cs-concentration value stated in

paragraph (1)(g), a factor of 1.5 has been

included as a regulatory margin. This

factor adds further assurance to the

certainty in protection provided by the

licensee’s: (1) Sampling of 137Cs

concentrations in contaminated

materials; (2) measurements of dose rate

external to the disposal (and

transportation) packagings; and (3) other

assumptions included in the

radiological impacts assessment.

2. Disposal of Unpackaged (i.e., Bulk)

Treated Waste

On this disposal path, contaminated

materials must also be treated through

stabilization to comply with all EPA and

State waste treatment requirements for

land disposal of RCRA-regulated

hazardous waste.11 The treatment

operations must be undertaken by either

(i) the owner/operator of the EAF or

foundry (licensed to possess, treat, and

transfer 137Cs-contaminated, incidentrelated materials), or (ii) a licensed

service contractor. Based on the

radiological impact assessment

provided in the appendix, the licensee

could be authorized to transfer the

stabilized incident-related materials to a

Subtitle C, RCRA-permitted, disposal

facility, provided that all the following

conditions are met. (Note that

conditions (a) through (e) are identical

to those applicable to packaged disposal

of treated waste):

(a) The 137Cs-contaminated emission

control dust and other incident-related

materials are the result of an inadvertent

melting of a sealed source or device;

(b) The emission control dust and

other incident-related materials have

been stabilized to meet requirements for

land disposal of RCRA-regulated waste,

and have been stored (if applicable), and

transferred in compliance with a

radiation protection program as

specified at 10 CFR 20.1101;

(c) The total 137Cs activity, contained

in emission control dust and other

incident-related materials to be

transferred to a Subtitle C, RCRApermitted, disposal facility, has been

specifically approved by NRC or the

appropriate Agreement State(s) and does

not exceed the total activity associated

with the inadvertent melting incident.

Moreover, NRC or the appropriate

Agreement State will maintain a public

record of the total incident-related 137Cs

activity, received by the facility over its

operating life, to ensure that the total

disposed of 137Cs activity does not

exceed 1 curie (37 GBq); 12

(d) The RCRA disposal facility

operator has been notified in writing of

the impending transfer of the incidentrelated materials and has agreed in

writing to receive and dispose of these

materials; 13

(e) The licensee providing the

radiation protection program required in

paragraph (b) notifies, in writing, the

Commission or Agreement State(s) in

which the transferor and transferee are

located, of the impending transfer, at

least 30 days before the transfer; and

(f) The emission control dust and

other incident-related materials, that

have been stabilized as defined in (b)

above, contain pretreatment average

concentrations of 137Cs that did not

exceed 100 pCi/g (3.7 Bq/g) of

material.14

Note that, in defining the pretreatment

137Cs-concentration value in paragraph

(2)(f), a factor of 2 has been included as

a regulatory margin. The factor adds

further assurance to the certainty of

protection provided by the licensee’s:

(1) Sampling of 137Cs concentrations in
13180 Federal Register / Vol. 62, No. 53 / Wednesday, March 19, 1997 / Notices

15The term package, as used here, refers to

packages used by the licensee to transfer the

material to the disposal facility, irrespective of

whether this package is also the disposal container.

1A picocurie is one-trillionth of a curie and

represents a decay rate of one disintegration every

27 seconds or 1/27 of a becquerel.

2Letter to William Lahs, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory

Commission, from Andrew Wallo III, U.S.

Department of Energy, dated May 20, 1993.

3Letter from James M. Taylor, NRC, to William

Guerry, Jr., Collier, Shannon, Rill, and Scott, dated

May 25, 1993.

contaminated materials; and (2) other

assumptions included in the

radiological impacts assessment.

Treatment, Storage, and Transfer of

Emission Control Dust or Other

Incident-Related Materials with 137Cs

Concentrations Indistinguishable From

Background Levels (i.e., 2 pCi/g (0.074

Bq/g) or Less)

The EAF or foundry licensed to

possess and transfer 137Cs-contaminated

emission control dust, or a licensed

service contractor, is authorized to

transfer emission control dust and other

incident-related materials as if they

were not radioactive, provided that the

137Cs concentration within the emission

control dust and other incident-related

materials is 2 pCi/g (0.074 Bq/g) of

material or less. The foundry or licensed

service contractor must determine the

137Cs concentration using the sampling

program discussed below.

Aggregation of 137Cs-Contaminated

Emission Control Dust and Other

Incident-Related Materials

If applicable, aggregation of 137Cscontaminated emission control dust and

other incident-related material, before

stabilization treatment, is acceptable if

performed in compliance with a

radiation protection program, as

described at 10 CFR 20.1101, and

provided that:

(1) Aggregation involves the same

characteristic or listed hazardous waste

and the wastes must be amenable to and

undergo the same appropriate treatment

for land-disposal restricted waste;

(2) Aggregation does not increase the

overall total volume nor the

radioactivity of the incident-related

waste; and

(3) Materials, when aggregated, are

subjected to a sampling protocol that

demonstrates compliance with 137Csconcentration criteria on a packageaverage 15 basis.

Determination of 137Cs Concentrations

and Radiation Measurements

137Cs concentrations may be

determined by the licensee by direct or

indirect (e.g., external radiation)

measurements, through an NRC- or

Agreement State-approved sampling

program. The sampling program must be

sufficient to ensure that 137Cs

contamination in the stabilized

emission control dust and in other

incident-related materials, on a packageaverage basis, is consistent with the

concentration criteria in this technical

position. The sampling program must

provide assurance that the quantity of

137Cs in any package (see footnote 15)

does not exceed the product of the

applicable concentration criterion times

the net weight of contaminated material

in a package.

Appendix A—Assessment of Radiological

Impact of Disposal of 137Cs-Contaminated

Emission Control Dust and Other IncidentRelated Materials at a Subtitle C RCRAPermitted Disposal Facility

1. Background

In the normal process of producing

recycled steel, scrap steel is subjected to a

melting process. In this process, most

impurities in the scrap steel are removed and

generally contained within process-generated

slag or off-gas. Typically, the off-gas carries

dust, that can contain iron and zinc, together

with certain heavy metals, through an

emission control system to a ‘‘baghouse,’’

where the dust is captured in ‘‘bag-type’’

filters. Hazardous constituents within the

dust, principally lead, cadmium, and

chromium, can cause the U.S. Environmental

Protection Agency (EPA) to designate the

dust as a hazardous waste, under the

Resource Conservation and Recovery Act

(RCRA)—often as the listed waste K061.

Typically, when the scrap consists largely

of junk automobiles, the dust contains a high

percentage (greater than 20 percent) of zinc,

which can be a valuable recovery product.

Moreover, the zinc recovery process

produces slag and other byproducts that have

recycle potential. If economic (e.g., low zinc

content) or process considerations preclude

these recycle options, the dust may be treated

and disposed of in a hazardous waste

disposal facility. EPA has specified treatment

standards for the various hazardous

constituents of the dust in 40 CFR 268.40.

Solidification is the treatment process

typically used to meet these standards. On

the other hand, dust from steel production at

basic oxygen furnaces and open hearth

furnaces is excluded from regulation as

hazardous waste (40 CFR 261.4(b)(7)(xvii)).

Because the recycling of steel involves the

addition of natural materials (primarily lime

and ferromanganese), very low levels of

radioactivity, ubiquitous in the environment,

are involved in the production process. One

of these radionuclides is cesium-137 (137Cs)

which now occurs in the environment as a

result of global fallout from past weaponstesting programs. 137Cs has a 30-year half-life

(i.e., a quantity of this radionuclide and its

associated radioactivity will decrease by half

every 30 years). The decay of 137Cs and its

very short-lived daughter produces emissions

of beta particles and gamma rays.

The principal hazard from the beta

particles can only be realized when it enters

the human body. The principal hazard from

the gamma rays is as an external source of

penetrating radiation similar to the type of

exposure received from an X-ray. Because of

its volatility in the very high-temperature

(typically 3000 degrees fahrenheit or ∼1650

degrees celsius) steel-making process, 137Cs

is volatilized and transported in the furnace

off-gas and, as it condenses, becomes a

constituent of the emission control

(baghouse) dust. Normal background 137Cs

concentrations in dust have been measured at

picocurie per gram levels (0.024 to 1.23 pCi/

g) 1 or thousandths of a becquerel per gram

(Bq/g). This concentration is consistent with

the general range of background levels

measured in soils within the United States

whereas concentrations of 10 pCi/g (0.37 Bq/

g) are relatively common in drainage areas.2

As a result of this information, the U.S.

Nuclear Regulatory Commission has

determined that 137Cs concentrations in

emission control dust below 2 pCi/g (0.074

Bq/g) can be attributed to fallout from past

weapons testing.3

2. Statement of Problem

The inadvertent melting of a licensed 137Cs

sealed source with scrap steel at an electric

arc furnace (EAF) or foundry typically results

in the contamination of the steel producer’s

emission control system and the generation

of potentially large quantities (e.g., of the

order of 1000 tons or 900 metric tons) of

137Cs-contaminated emission control dust.

Facility cleanup operations will produce an

additional quantity of contaminated material

and, depending on the effectiveness of

cleanup operations, further generation of

contaminated dust or cleanup-related

materials can occur. Furthermore, if the

occurrence of the melting event is not

immediately detected, contamination can

unknowingly be carried forward with the

dust into zinc-recovery process streams. In

one case, for example, this has led to 137Cs

contamination of the zinc-rich, splash

condenser dross residue, referred to as SCDR

material. In the incidents to date, total

quantities of these contaminated materials

have not exceeded 2000 tons (1800 metric

tons) per event. The 137Cs concentration in

all these materials can vary, but in typical

past events, much of the material is

contaminated at levels ranging from 2 pCi/g

(0.074 Bq/g) to a few hundred pCi/g (most

below approximately 100 pCi/g or 3.7 Bq/g).

Smaller volumes (typically less than 5

percent of the total volume) have included

concentrations at nanocurie/gram levels

(thousands of pCi/g or a few tens of Bq/g).

The intent of this analysis is to characterize

the potential radiological impacts associated

with the alternative options for disposal of

137Cs-contaminated emission control dust

and other incident-related materials at a

Subtitle C, RCRA-permitted facility. Because

RCRA hazardous wastes must be treated to

comply with the requirements for land

disposal of restricted waste, the potential

radiological impacts associated with

treatment processes required consideration.

To protect against these radiological impacts,

the position includes the provision that

treatment of 137Cs-contaminated emission

control dust and other incident-related
Federal Register / Vol. 62, No. 53 / Wednesday, March 19, 1997 / Notices 13181

4 In the context used, the term ‘‘non-dispersible’’

means that any radiological impacts from

resuspended material are inconsequential in

comparison to the impacts from direct external

exposures resulting from the emission of gamma

radiation in the 137Cs decay process.

5This assessment is generally consistent with the

approach employed in ‘‘Risk Assessment of Options

for Disposition of EAF Dust Following a Meltdown

Incident of a Radioactive Cesium Source in Scrap

Steel,’’ SELA–9301, Stanley E. Logan, April 1993.

6 In the context of this position, stabilized

treatment does not include either onsite or offsite

high-temperature metals recycling processes.

7This treatment may include the addition of

special stabilization reagents, such as clays, or

involve other RCRA-approved stabilization

technologies, that reduce the leachability of 137Cs,

although the radiological impacts analysis indicates

that such processes are not necessary to protect

public health and safety, and the environment.

8A dose conversion factor represents a value that

allows a radionuclide contamination level to be

converted to an estimated exposure rate.

9The dose rates in this appendix have been

calculated through use of the Microshield computer

program, Grove Engineering, Inc., version 4.2, 1995.

The value of 49 μrem (0.49μSv)/hour represents

0.77 of the 62.9 value shown on Figure 1.

10The two-thirds loading of the 30-cubic yard box

is related to the typical maximum payload weight

that can be transported by truck without an

overweight permit. If the boxes referred to in

Figures 1 and 2 were full, the dose rate would

increase by less than a factor of 1.5. Similarly, if the

assumed additive weight percent (i.e., 30 percent)

is varied over a reasonable range from 20 to 40

percent, the resulting dose rate would change in an

inversely proportional manner.

materials be performed by an NRC or

Agreement State licensee. The licensee

would operate, either on- or offsite, under an

approved radiation protection program, as

well as any required RCRA treatment permit.

Such controls are necessary because of the

wide range of contaminated materials and

their physical forms, together with the

variability in EPA-approved treatment

processes. Under this decision, the Subtitle

C, RCRA-permitted disposal facility would be

receiving the emission control dust and other

incident-related materials after their

treatment to stabilize the incident-related

material. This stabilized material would be,

or would be equivalent to, the form necessary

to stabilize the RCRA-hazardous constituents

(specifically, lead, cadmium, and chromium);

that is, a non-dispersible,4 solid (e.g., cementtype) form. As a result, the potential

radiological hazard from the ‘‘treated’’

(stabilized) material during disposal

operations is associated with its

characteristic as an external source of

radiation.

After disposal, 137Cs could only become a

hazard through water pathways if a sufficient

quantity and concentration of 137Cs were to:

(1) Become available, (2) be leached from its

solid form, (3) be released from the disposal

facility, and (4) enter a drinking water

supply. No significant radiological hazard

would be expected to result from inadvertent

intrusion into the disposed of waste after

facility closure. Notwithstanding the hazard

to the intruder from the hazardous waste

constituents, or other hazardous wastes,

constraints placed on the total 137Cs activity

and concentration, and the waste form, can

ensure that radiological exposures would not

exceed those that would be received from

residing over commonly measured

background 137Cs concentrations in the

United States (see discussion under ‘‘Intruder

Considerations’’).

The following analyses will therefore be

directed at an evaluation of the potential

direct, water pathway, and intruder hazards

and will provide a perspective on their

significance.

3. Direct Exposure

After the inadvertent melting of a 137Cs

sealed source at an EAF or foundry, the

relatively volatile 137Cs will leave the furnace

as an offgas and be commingled with the

normal emission control dust. As a result,

concentrations of 137Cs contained in this dust

(and other materials associated with furnace

clean-up operations or subsequent dust

recycle process streams) will increase. Thus,

the rate of radiological exposure from this

material will be similar in type, but different

in magnitude, than that received from the

typical background levels of 137Cs. Any

change in magnitude of the exposures to

workers at the disposal facility from this

contaminated material when compared to the

exposure received from typical emission

control dust would depend on: (1)

Differences in 137Cs concentrations; (2)

variations in the physical/chemical

properties of the materials disposed of; and

(3) changes in worker time-integrated

interactions with contaminated materials.

The three key variables above are

particularly important in the development of

this technical position. Of significance to all

three variables, the approach defined in the

position calls for treatment (stabilization) of

incident-related materials (to comply with

requirements for land disposal of restricted

waste) to take place ‘‘under license,’’ at the

location where the material was generated, or

at the site of a service contractor who has

been permitted for stabilization treatment of

the material either on or off the steel

company site. Complying with the

‘‘Treatment Standards for Hazardous

Wastes,’’ defined at 40 CFR 268.40, will

result in a solid waste form from which

exposure rates will be smaller than those

originating from the hazardous waste form

(e.g., dust) before treatment. More

importantly, treatment of the contaminated

materials, under license, will obviate the

need to specifically address potential

treatment-related radiological exposures at

unlicensed, RCRA-permitted, treatment

facilities. Thus, under the approach of this

technical position, any minimal exposure to

workers who have not been trained in

radiation safety would be limited to disposal

operations.

Furthermore, because the origin of the 137Cs-contaminated materials is the result of

a melting incident, upper-bound values can

be established for the volume, weight,

radioactive material concentration, and total

activity of the contaminated material, on an

incident basis. The base case analysis in this

appendix presumes that the contaminated

material involves a volume of 40,000 cubic

feet (1132 cubic meters), a weight of 2000

tons (1800 metric tons), and a total activity

content of less than a 1 curie (Ci) or 37 GBq

of 137Cs. These values are generally

consistent with the particulars from the

incidents that have occurred to date.

Within these constraints, the starting point

in the direct exposure calculation is to

estimate the radiation dose rate at a distance

of 3.28 feet (1 meter) from the surface of a

semi-infinite volume (i.e., infinite in areal

extent and depth from the point of exposure)

of solidified contaminated material.5 The

calculations assume that the initial 137Cs

contamination in all untreated dust is 100

pCi/g (3.7 Bq/g). Direct exposure results scale

linearly for other concentration levels, if the

waste configuration is unchanged.

Stabilization treatment,6 conducted under

a licensed radiation protection program, is

achieved by mixing moist dust with additives

(e.g., liquid reagent to adjust oxidation

potential and portland cement/ fly ash).7

These additives (typically presumed to add

30 parts by weight to 100 parts of dust or

contaminated material) would result in a

solidified product that would contain 137Cs

concentrations at about 77 percent of initial

concentrations (e.g., 77 pCi/g (2.84 Bq/g)).

Because of allowable variations in the

solidification processes (e.g., from the

production of granularized aggregate to

solidified monoliths), the bulk density of the

solidified material can range from about 1.4

to 2.5 g/cm3. A representative dose [rate]

conversion factor 8 under these conditions

(calculated at a density of 1.5 g/cm3) would

typically be less than 49 microem/hour

(μrem/hr) or 0.49 microsieverts/hour (μSv/

hr), at a distance of 3.28 feet (1 meter) from

the surface of a hypothetical semi-infinite

volume of the solidified material.9

Because the quantities of treated dust and

other incident-related materials are not semiinfinite in volume, the actual dose rate/

distance relationships from finite volumes of

contaminated materials will be less. The

reduction can be calculated for various

volumetric sources through the use of shape

factors. Shape factors have been calculated

for several configurations that are likely to

occur during operations from the time the

contaminated treated material is received at

the RCRA-permitted disposal facility through

its disposal. The shape factors can be

determined from Figures 1 through 6 for

various distances between a specific source

configuration and an exposed individual.

Typically, at a distance of 3.28 feet (1 meter),

these factors range from about 0.03 to 0.5

(Figures 1 through 5), and have been

calculated without accounting for the limited

shielding provided by any packaging. As the

distance from the contaminated materials

increases to 9.84 feet (3 meters), the shape

factors for these similar geometries become

smaller, ranging from about 0.004 to 0.2. The

largest, likely dose rate potentially

experienced by an individual involved in the

disposal process, measured at 3.28 feet (1

meter), would be from the sides of large

containers or shipments of contaminated

materials, and would be expected to range

from about 10 to less than 14 μrem/hour (0.14

μSv/hr) above background (typically 8 to

12μrem/hr (0.08 to 0.12 μSv/hr).10 From an

open trench (Figure 4), filled with
13182 Federal Register / Vol. 62, No. 53 / Wednesday, March 19, 1997 / Notices

11Note that if treatment at an RCRA-permitted

facility were required, the limiting operational

handling rate for the treated materials may be

limited to 100 to 200 tons (90 to 180 metric tons)

per shift.

contaminated materials, the calculated dose

rate would also be somewhat less than 13

μrem/hr (0.13 μSv/hr) measured directly over

the trench at a 3.28 feet (1 meter) distance.

Again, these values represent 0.77 of the

respective values indicated on the figures

because of solidification additives. Figures 6

and 7, respectively, show the variation in

dose rate with the width of the trench and

depth of the waste. Figure 8 is provided to

show the change in dose rate versus the

distance offset from the side of the trailertype container considered in Figure 3.

A typical disposal rate at a trench within

an RCRA-permitted facility would generally

exceed 500 tons (450 metric tons) per shift.11

Assuming this disposal rate of 500 tons (450

metric tons) per shift applies to the disposal

of treated,137Cs-contaminated, incidentrelated material (approximately 20 to 25

truckloads in 8 hours), it would require

approximately 4 times this period of time to

dispose of 2000 tons (1800 metric tons).

(Note that the rate of arriving material would

likely be dictated by transportation

arrangements, so that the 32 hours required

to dispose of the contaminated material

could be spread over several days or weeks.)

Facility workers, therefore, would, on

average, only be exposed to finite volumes of

contaminated material for a maximum period

of 32 worker-hours. Applying the highest

likely dose rate (approximately 13 μrem/hr

(0.13 μSv/hr) from the side of a trailer

containing the contaminated materials), and

presuming exposure at a 3.28-ft (1-meter)

distance for the entire 32-hour period, a

worker would receive a dose of less than 0.5

mrem (5 μSv) above background.

Qualitatively descriptive time and motion

data gathered from three RCRA-permitted

disposal facilities indicate that the abovecalculated dose is conservative for two

principal reasons: (1) The workers having the

most significant exposure to materials, from

receipt to disposal, are effectively at greater

distances than 3.28 feet (1 meter); and (2)

their exposure, at this distance, is over time

periods significantly less than the assumed

receipt through disposal time period of 32

hours. As a result, actual exposures are

expected to be significantly less than 0.5

mrem (5 μSv).

This conservative estimate of potential

exposure is based on the aforementioned

time-distance assumptions and is expected to

bound reasonable interactions of disposal

facility workers with the stabilized incidentrelated materials. For example, incidentrelated material could be stored at the

disposal site or samples of the treated

material could be subjected to sampling

activities. In the first case, if a 90-day storage

period is presumed, the average exposure

distance over the entire period needed to

ensure a dose less than the position’s

exposure criteria would be on the order of 10

to 20 meters (see Figures 1 through 3, which

illustrate the decrease in dose rate as a

function of distance from the source). In the

second case, the typical activity in a 100-g

sample would be no greater than about 10-2

μCi (370 Bq). The dose rate from such a

sample would be less than 0.1 μrem/hr (0.001

μSv/hr) at a distance of 1 foot (0.3 meters).

To place the significance of this calculation

into perspective, an estimate can be made of

worker exposure from the presumed

handling, treatment, and disposal of normal

emission control dust (i.e., dust that has not

been contaminated with 137Cs from a melted

source). This dust would contain background

levels of 137Cs (approximately 1 pCi/g (0.037

Bq/g)). Therefore, a worker interacting with

this material at an effective distance of 3.28

feet (1 meter) over about 300 8-hour shifts (a

little more than a working year) would

receive a total maximum exposure of about

0.5 mrem (5 μSv). The magnitude of this

exposure is in the same range as the exposure

calculated for the disposal of the

contaminated materials from a single melting

event. Moreover, the potential exposure from

the ‘‘melting event’’ was estimated under the

extremely conservative assumption that all

materials were contaminated at levels of 100

pCi/g (3.7 Bq/g).

The imposition of a 1–Ci (37–GBq)

criterion on the total incident-related activity

that could be disposed of at any one Subtitle

C, RCRA facility (see following discussion on

water-pathway considerations) should

further ensure that worker exposures from

137Cs-contaminated emission control dust

and other incident-related materials will not

exceed 1 mrem/year (10 μSv/year) integrated

over the lifetime of the facility.

4. Water-Pathway Considerations

The proposed approach to manage 137Cscontaminated emission control dust and

other incident-related materials presumes

licensee treatment of these materials to

comply with requirements for land disposal

of restricted waste. Thus, the radiological,

and potentially hazardous chemical

constituents of these materials, will be

incorporated into a stable, solid (e.g., cementtype) form, similar to that required for

routine RCRA-permitted disposal of emission

control dust. As a result, the possibility of

137Cs presenting a hazard through a water

pathway requires consideration of: (1) the

quantity of 137Cs available; (2) the degree to

which the 137Cs could be leached from its

waste matrix; and (3) the extent that any

leached 137Cs could migrate into a water

supply.

The disposal of 137Cs in treated emission

control dust and other incident-related

materials would be constrained by this policy

to a total activity of 1 Ci (37 GBq). In the

previous reference-basis analysis, an effective

concentration, in the treated waste, of 77 pCi/

g (2.84 Bq/g) was evaluated—the originally

assumed contaminated material

concentration reduced by 30 percent as a

result of the added mass associated with

treatment. Both the quantity and positiondefined concentration values place bounds

on any potential water pathway hazard. In

the actual wastes that are subject to potential

disposal under the provisions of this

position, the concentration of 137Cs averaged

over all the treated waste would typically be

significantly less than the defined

concentration criteria.

Furthermore, because the 137Cs is

contained in a solid matrix and buried within

a facility in which the amount of water

infiltration is minimized, any 137Cs removal

from its final disposal location would be

limited while these conditions remain in

effect. The chemistry of any water interacting

with the solidified, 137Cs-contaminated waste

would also be expected to limit the leaching

process (e.g., avoidance of acidic

environments), because of the controlled

nature of the Subtitle C, RCRA-permitted

disposal site and the types and nature (e.g.,

no liquids) of the wastes accepted for

disposal. Any water that leached 137Cs from

the waste would normally be collected in a

leachate collection system at volumetric

concentrations expected to be far less than

those existing in the treated waste. The

chemistry of the fill materials used at the

disposal site could also provide a sorbing

medium if any 137Cs leached from the

solidified waste. Finally, the location of

Subtitle C, RCRA-permitted disposal sites is

such that the source of any water supply

would typically be some distance from the

disposal site.

These chemistry and distance factors are

also likely to be major factors in delaying the

arrival of 137Cs at a receptor well because of

retardation effects. This retardation, in terms

of its effect on the time required, under a

worst-case scenario, for the 137Cs to reach a

water supply, is such that significant

radioactive decay of the 137Cs inventory is

likely (the radioactive half-life of 137Cs is 30

years) before the 137Cs could potentially

reach the water supply.

Although qualitative in nature, and based

on considerations that can vary among

Subtitle C, RCRA-permitted disposal sites,

the previous discussion has focused on the

factors that are likely to prevent any

significant water-pathway hazard. The

following, more quantitative assessment, is

provided to conservatively bound any waterpathway hazard that could potentially occur

under extremely unlikely conditions.

The leachability of 137Cs from any solid

waste form that complies with the land

disposal restrictions for the waste’s nonradiological hazardous constituents is likely

to be extremely limited after initial waste

placement. After the end of operations and a

post-closure care period of 30 years, a worstcase scenario presumes that processes take

place to degrade the site so that infiltrating

water from the surface passes unimpeded

through the contaminated waste. In

predicting the dissolution of 137Cs under

these conditions, a critical process is the

partitioning of the 137Cs that takes place

between the waste, soil, and infiltrating

water. Conservatively assuming that the

partitioning from the solid waste form is

similar to that from the interstitial backfill

soil to water, an estimate can be made of the

amount of 137Cs that can leach into the

infiltrating water.

The most important parameter in

estimating this transfer, as well as the

subsequent movement of the 137Cs in

groundwater, is the distribution coefficient,

‘‘Kd.’’ This parameter expresses the ratio at

equilibrium of 137Cs sorbed onto a given

weight of soil particles to the amount
Federal Register / Vol. 62, No. 53 / Wednesday, March 19, 1997 / Notices 13183

12 ‘‘Default Soil Solid/Liquid Partition

Coefficients, Kds, for Four Major Soil Types: A

Compendium,’’ M. Sheppard and D. Thibault,

Health Physics, Vol. 59, No. 4, October 1990, pp.

471–482.

13RESRAD, Version 5.0, Argonne National

Laboratory, September 1993.

14 This dose estimate is based on comparing

leachate concentrations with the water effluent

concentration in 10 CFR Part 20, Appendix B.

15For example, the total activity contained in

2000 tons (1800 metric tons) of material,

contaminated at a level of 77 pCi/g (2.84 Bq/g),

would be about 0.14 curies (5.2 GBq). It would be

unlikely that all the material from a particular

incident would be at the maximum concentration

defined in the technical position.

16See NUREG–0782, Vol. 4, Draft Environmental

Impact Statement on 10 CFR Part 61, ‘‘Licensing

Requirements for Land Disposal of Radioactive

Waste,’’ September 1981.

17These estimates are based on the concentration

to dose conversion values in NUREG–1500,

‘‘Working Draft Regulatory Guide on Release

Criteria for Decommissioning: NRC Staff’s Draft for

Comment,’’ August 1994. Appropriate adjustments

of the tabulated information were made to reflect

the occupancy and shielding assumptions made in

NUREG–0782 (see Footnote 16).

remaining in a given volume of water. The

higher the value of the distribution

coefficient, the greater the concentration of

137Cs remaining in the soil. The Kd value can

be affected by factors such as soil texture, pH,

competing cation effects, soil porewater

concentration, and soil organic matter

content.12 For the non-acidic, sand/clay/soil

environments presumed to represent the

RCRA-permitted disposal facilities, a Kd

value of 270 milliliter (ml)/g was selected

from the Footnote 12 reference as being

appropriate for the subsequent bounding,

conservative analysis.

To model the potential groundwater

impacts, the RESRAD 13 code was used. For

the representative case, the bounding 40,000

cubic feet (ft 3) or 1132 cubic meters (m3) of

treated material were presumed to be

disposed of in a volume measuring 100-ft

(30.4-m) length × 20-ft (6.09-m) width × 20-

ft (6.09-m) depth. All this material was

assumed to contain a 137Cs concentration of

77 pCi/g (2.84 Bq/g). Notwithstanding the

actual layouts of Subtitle C, RCRA-permitted

facilities, a well was presumed to be located

and centered at the downgradient edge of this

specific volume of waste. To maximize the

hazard as calculated by the RESRAD model,

the hydraulic gradient was considered to be

parallel to the length of the disposed volume

of material. Infiltration representative of a

humid site was presumed and a minimal

unsaturated zone thickness of 3.28 ft (1 m)

was assumed to separate the contaminated

zone from the saturated zone. The value

assigned to Kd in the unsaturated zone was

270 ml/g. Assessments beyond this

representative case evaluation are

subsequently discussed.

The results from this bounding analysis

indicate that drinking water dose rate would

be insignificant (e.g., far less than a microrem

(10-2 μSv) per year). This result is not

surprising because the retardation provided,

even in the 3.28-ft (1-m) deep unsaturated

zone and the saturated zone, is sufficient to

preclude drinking water doses for almost 700

years. During this period, the activity of 137Cs

would decay (i.e., be reduced by radioactive

decay) by a factor of about 10 million.

Note that, although it is considered an

unrealistic scenario, the drinking of the

leachate directly from the disposal trench

after a period of 30 years would only result

in a calculated exposure of about 7 mrem/

year (70 μSv/year).14

To consider the effects of a range of

parameters, including other Kd values, on the

results of this bounding analysis, the

following analyses are presented. Based on

the typical existing volumes and 137Cs

concentrations of incident-related materials,

the imposition of a constraint on 137Cs

concentration effectively bounds the total

activity that could be disposed of at a

Subtitle C, RCRA-permitted facility, from a

single steel company site, to a few tens of

millicuries (a few GBq).15 Material at higher

concentrations would require disposal at

either a mixed-waste disposal facility or a

licensed low-level waste disposal site. Thus,

for the potential disposals at the Subtitle C,

RCRA-permitted site to approach the 1–Ci

(37–GBq) incident-related material constraint

in this position, disposals of materials from

several incidents would have to occur. The

total volume of material, in this case, would

still represent only a small fraction of an

RCRA-permitted facility’s disposal capacity.

Repeating the RESRAD analysis discussed

above under these assumptions, but

respectively considering lower Kd values in

the contaminated, unsaturated, and saturated

zones, would still result in drinking water

doses of less than 1 mrem (10 μSv) per year

unless the Kd values in all zones approach

single-digit values. Even in these cases (e.g.,

Kd equal to 2.7), separation of the

hypothesized well location from the disposed

material by about 328 feet (100 meters)

would reduce dose rates below 1 mrem (10

μSv) per year because of the decay of 137Cs

brought about by the increased retardation

times.

The concentration constraints in this

position, coupled with the limited number of

inadvertent melting situations to which this

position could be applicable, and the caseby-case NRC or Agreement State approval of

the proposed material transfers, are believed

to provide a sufficient basis to ensure

protection of public health and safety, and

the environment from water-pathway

considerations. Nevertheless, to provide

further protection, should a single Subtitle C,

RCRA-permitted disposal facility accept

incident-related material from more than one

incident, the position includes a total

incident-related 137Cs activity constraint of 1

Ci (37 GBq). The magnitude of this constraint

is based on the typical bounding activity

associated with an inadvertent melting of

137Cs sources that have occurred to date at

EAFs or foundries. In large measure, it has

been included to provide assurance that the

position is only directed at the ultimate

disposition of radioactive material that exists

in the environment as a result of specific

inadvertent melting incidents. However, it

also provides a constraint on the extent of

volumetric contamination as a function of

concentration. The practical effect, as

previously alluded to, is to limit the disposal

volumes of incident-related contaminated

materials to a small fraction of total disposal

site capacity for hazardous waste. As a result

of this volumetric limit, the constraint would

further ensure that any exposures occurring

offsite over the operating life of the Subtitle

C, RCRA-permitted facility would be equal to

or less than 1 mrem/year (10 μSv/year), if

integrated over the facility’s operating life.

Again, the activity constraint and the water

pathway considerations can be placed in

perspective by evaluating the potential

normal disposal of EAF emission control

dust at a Subtitle C, RCRA-permitted facility.

If this dust includes a background 137Cs

concentration of 1 pCi/g (0.037 Bq/g), and the

facility can treat 200 tons (180 metric tons)

of dust per day, the total quantity of 137Cs

disposed of annually would be about 50 mCi

(1.85 GBq). Thus, over a facility operating

period of about 20 years, the total quantity

of 137Cs disposed of could equal the 1-Ci (37

GBq) incident-related material activity

constraint.

5. Intruder Considerations

In the development of its licensing

requirements for land disposal of radioactive

waste in 10 CFR Part 61, NRC considered

protection for individuals who might

inadvertently intrude into the disposal site,

occupy the site, and contact the waste. In the

context of this position, this possibility has

been considered although the greater risk to

the intruder would likely result from the

non-radiological hazardous constituents at

the site.

In the intruder scenarios applied in the

development of NRC’s LLW standards, 16 an

inadvertent intruder was assumed to dig a

3-m (9.9-ft) deep foundation hole for

construction of a house. The top 2 m (6.6 ft)

of the foundation were assumed to be trench

cover material and the bottom 1 m (3.28 ft)

was assumed to be waste. Based on the

details of the scenarios, which included these

and other considerations, the intruder

interacted with material whose concentration

had been reduced from the waste

concentration by a factor of 10. Presuming

similar scenarios and assuming intrusion

occurs immediately after a post-closure care

period of 30 years, the intruder would be

exposed to a 137Cs concentration of about 4

pCi/g (0.15 Bq/g); that is, 77 pCi/g (2.84

Bq/g) reduced by the factor of 10 and an

additional factor of 2 to account for

radioactive decay). Even for this worst-case

situation in which all the incident-related

waste was presumed to have initial 137Cs

concentrations of 77 pCi/g (2.84 Bq/g), the

projected intruder exposure would range

from 0.8 to 3.8 mrem (8 to 38 μSv/year).17 As

noted above, the average concentrations over

large volumes of incident-related material

would be expected to be far less than 77

pCi/g (2.84 Bq/g).

6. Conclusions

These bounding analyses indicate that

some significant volume of 137Cscontaminated emission control dust and

other incident-related materials from an

inadvertent melting of a sealed source can be

disposed of at a Subtitle C, RCRA-permitted
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facility with negligible impacts to public and

worker health and safety and the

environment. This method for disposal, if

implemented according to the limitations

stipulated in this position, is very unlikely to

cause worst-case exposures that exceed 1

mrem (10 μSv) to any worker at the disposal

facility or to any member of the public in the

vicinity of the facility. The design,

operations, and post-closure activities that

take place at Subtitle C, RCRA-permitted

facilities will ensure that radiological

impacts from 137Cs will also be negligible in

future timeframes. Proper disposal of these

materials would protect public health and

safety, and the environment to a greater

degree than the alternative of indefinitely

storing these materials at a steel company

facility. The calculated public health and

safety and environmental impacts of

disposition of specified incident-related

materials at a Subtitle C, RCRA-permitted

facility can also be used to determine an

optimum course for disposal, if disposition

alternatives exist.

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Analysis of and Response to Comments on

Staff Technical Position ‘‘Disposition of

Cesium-137 Contaminated Emission Control

Dust and Other Incident-Related Material’’

On January 22, 1996, the Nuclear

Regulatory Commission published a

proposed technical position on the

disposition of Cesium-137 (137Cs)

contaminated emission control dust and

other incident-related materials in the

Federal Register (61 FR 1608). Comments

were solicited and, in response, 22 comment

letters were received. These comment letters

included: six from State nuclear safety,

human resources, environmental

conservation, and health offices; five from

the steel industry (three from industry

associations); four from hazardous waste

disposal facility operators; one from a mixedwaste disposal facility operator; two from

other industry associations; two from

environmental groups; one from a member of

the public; and one from a member of

Congress. These letters raised a number of

issues ranging from policy and legal concerns

to specific comments on the conservatisms in

the position’s supporting radiological

assessments. The responses to these

submitted comments have been grouped into

the following categories: (1) Position

justification, precedence, and relationship to

‘‘below regulatory concern’’ (BRC) policy

considerations and constraints; (2) regulatory

approach (i.e., rulemaking versus technical

position) and the implementation process; (3)

legal considerations; (4) related health,

safety, and environmental concerns; (5)

technical considerations; (6) other issues; and

(7) clarifications.

1. Justification, Precedence, and Relationship

to BRC

a. Comment: The comments on the

justification issue were intertwined with

several other issues. Basically, however, the

comments from the steel and other industries

(associations), three States, the Subtitle C,

hazardous waste facility operators, and the

Congressman supported the disposal

concept, proposed in the position, as a

necessary adjunct to a regulatory program

that should improve licensee control of the

devices, whose inadvertent meltings have

caused the problem. They believe that the

position is safe, environmentally sound, and

cost-effective, and a reasonable alternative to

disposal at the existing mixed-waste disposal

facility (available since April 1995 for

disposal of the subject waste). These

commenters, plus those from the disposal

facility operators, expressed the view that

there was a serious lack of competition in the

business of disposing of mixed waste,

resulting in unacceptably high disposal costs.

Several of these commenters, including one

State, suggested that the disposal costs could

affect the financial viability of certain

facilities.

Comments from two of the States, the

environmental groups, the member of the

public, and the mixed-waste disposal facility

operator stated that the justification (or

combined justification and regulatory

approach) for the position was weak, with

most emphasizing the conflict with the

current policy on, and approach to, mixedwaste disposal. One State and the mixedwaste disposal facility operator noted that the

time, effort, and resources expended to effect

mixed-waste disposal at the existing facility

will be undermined by the precedent being

established in the position. The disposal

facility operator also believed that the

position relied on unsubstantiated economic

assumptions and assertions, which NRC had

accepted at face value without any

independent investigation, and that the

justification had changed with position

development from a public-health to a costeffective rationale. This commenter also

stated the belief that the position was not in

the public’s interest because of potential

exposures to transportation workers,

members of the public, and Subtitle C facility

workers. One of the environmental group

commenters stated that saving a few cents

per ton of steel may not be in the public’s

best interests.

a. Response: Because the subject

disposition option was being proposed in the

form of a ‘‘permissive’’ technical position

(i.e., an option, likely requiring multiple

approvals, that would be initiated by a

request from an NRC or Agreement State

licensee on a case-by-case basis) and not a

rule, the broad policy justification, stated in

the Federal Register notice (61 FR 1609,

column 1) was as follows: ‘‘NRC believes that

disposal, under the provisions of the position

or other acceptable alternatives (emphasis

added), is preferable to allowing this mixed

waste to remain indefinitely at steel company

sites.’’ Another acceptable alternative

referred to in the Federal Register notice (61

FR 1610, column 3) is the mixed waste

disposal facility operated by Envirocare of

Utah. As the footnote indicated, this facility

received authorization to accept the subject

waste at concentrations not exceeding 560

picocuries (pCi)/gram (g) (20.7 becquerel

(Bq)/g) during April 1995, after the work on

the technical position was initiated. With the

availability of this facility, the NRC staff

believes its aforementioned public health

justification became enmeshed with cost

considerations, as described below.

Notwithstanding the availability of the

mixed-waste disposal facility option, which

has been used by several steel facilities with

137Cs-contaminated, incident-related

material, other steel companies did not

consider this option cost-effective. Contrary

to the commenter’s statement, NRC staff did

contact the industry, as well as the mixedwaste and Subtitle C disposal facility

operators, to comprehend the possible cost

differentials of the disposal alternatives.

Although contractual privacy and market

considerations prevented exact

determination, NRC staff concluded that the

differential costs between the mixed-waste

and Subtitle C disposal options could be

significant. In fact, the comment letters from

the mixed-waste disposal facility operator

and the Subtitle C facility operators appear

to confirm this assessment. But whatever the

actual cost differences may be for specific

situations, the process, as envisioned in the

potential use of the position, would identify

the cost differentials, if any, in the

environmental assessment that would

support any decision to implement the

position’s disposition alternative (One State

commenter stated that it should be made

clear that an environmental assessment,

under the National Environmental Policy

Act, would be required for each disposal).

The significance of any cost differential

could be judged by appropriate regulatory

authorities, in their selection of the most

reasonable and proper disposal alternative

(e.g., whether saving a few cents per ton of

steel is in the public interest).

In its decision to pursue what, the

Commission believes, is a health-protective

and environmentally sound disposition

alternative, the Commission also considered

the origin of the radioactive source melting

problem (a problem being addressed under a

separate NRC program) and the significant

efforts of the steel industry to detect

incoming radioactive material. In the

Commission’s view, these factors provided

further justification for its ongoing actions.

Thus, although the Commission is aware of

the substantial efforts, time, and resources

expended by all parties involved in the

licensing of the mixed-waste disposal

facility, the Commission’s primary focus is to

achieve ultimate disposition of the incidentrelated material. The Commission believes

that the real or imagined cost differentials,

from lack of competition or other causes, may

be resolved through issuance of the position,

and lead to a resolution of the disposal

problem. The Commission has coordinated

its actions with the U.S. Environmental

Protection Agency (EPA) and believes it has

the support of EPA in the position, at this

proposal stage.

The potential exposures to workers and

members of the public are addressed in the

responses to comments 3.a. and 4.f.

b. Comment: Two State commenters, the

mixed-waste disposal facility operator, the

environmental group commenters, and the

member of the public raised concerns about

the precedent-setting nature of the technical

position. By establishing a ‘‘default’’ value

for 137Cs in incident-related material, it was

questioned why a similar argument could not

be made for 137Cs in soil, or some other

radionuclide in another medium. It was

further pointed out that the cumulative effect

of similar actions would need to be

addressed. An environmental group

commenter opposed the creation of

exemptions that could be used by others,

specifically the Department of Energy, as

applicable or relevant and appropriate

requirements, in settings for which the

drafters of the [position] did not intend or

anticipate. The member of the public claimed

a possible relationship to issues involving

disposals from the U.S. Enrichment

Corporation.

Commenters from the steel and other

industry associations supported the position

as a proper precedent, and suggested that

other circumstances could justify similar

actions. It was pointed out, for example, that

although Basic Oxygen Furnaces (BOFs) also

process scrap and are subject to the same

kinds of incidents as Electric Arc Furnaces,

BOF dust may be neither a listed hazardous

waste nor a characteristic hazardous waste. It

was suggested that the position be clarified

regarding its applicability to the potential
13194 Federal Register / Vol. 62, No. 53 / Wednesday, March 19, 1997 / Notices

disposal of 137Cs-contaminated BOF material

and incident-related material that may not be

classified as mixed waste. Another industry

commenter questioned whether the position

would apply to a steel producer who is not

an NRC or Agreement State licensee. This

same commenter questioned what approach

would be used for meltings involving other

radionuclides, and whether the position

could not be broadened to other industries

that have large volumes of mixed waste. In

a broader sense, a few of these commenters

applauded NRC and EPA efforts to minimize

dual regulation of mixed waste.

b. Response: The Commission strongly

believes that broad-based exemptions, or

creation of specific positions outside of

established policies, should be implemented

through the rulemaking process. In fact,

efforts to provide the technical analyses to

support a broad recycle rulemaking, that

would include consideration of incidentrelated material, are underway. However,

under its specific regulations, cited in the

technical position, the Commission can, and

has, in case-by-case determinations,

approved actions that it believes are in the

best interests of public health and safety and

protection of the environment. In the case of

this ‘‘permissive’’ technical position, NRC is

putting forward a disposition option, whose

implementation and approval can be

considered by applicable regulatory

authorities and others. The advantages and

disadvantages of alternatives would be

addressed in appropriate environmental

assessments that would accompany license

amendment requests, and the choice would

require acceptance by various regulatory

authorities and others, and would be

contingent on State laws and permit

conditions.

The Commission believes the precedent

being suggested, in this case, is reasonable

and proper, based on the circumstances and

the justification, as described in 1.a. above.

The disposition option, however, applies

only to disposals at Subtitle C facilities; only

to treated (stabilized) 137Cs-contaminated,

incident-related material (inclusive of

material that may not be classified as mixed

waste) that constitutes the greatest part of the

problem; and only to companies, or their

service contractors, that will treat the

incident-related material, under NRC or

Agreement State license, to meet the land

disposal requirements that would apply if the

material contained hazardous constituents.

This last provision was considered necessary

to avoid the difficult task of generically

defining bounds on the potential radiological

exposures that could occur during treatment

or disposal, and could involve consideration

of inhalation and ingestion, as well as direct

exposure pathways.

With regard to other possible situations for

which this position may be considered a

precedent, such as the disposal of BOF

material, the Commission believes these

situations should be judged on their own

merit. Any interactions among combined

actions would require consideration, as one

of the State commenters pointed out. The

staff is also aware of EPA interests, identified

in its proposed Hazardous Waste

Identification Rule, and has encouraged EPA

efforts to identify mixed wastes that may be

regulated as low-level radioactive waste

(LLRW), outside of Resource Conservation

and Recovery Act (RCRA) regulations. The

response to comment 2 is also pertinent to

the question of developing a broader

technical position. The staff has had no

interactions with U.S. Enrichment

Corporation issues that affected development

of this position.

c. Comment: Several commenters either

requested clarification on the relationship of

this position to BRC policy or stated their

belief that the position contravenes public

law.

c. Response: In 1992, in response to the

Commission’s publication of a BRC policy

statement in 1990, Congress, in Public Law

102–486, Energy Policy Act of 1992, stated

that the [BRC] policy shall have no effect.

The BRC policy basically stated the bases

that the Commission would apply to

determine if broad practices should be

considered for exemption from regulatory

control. The NRC staff does not believe that

the subject technical position is a BRC policy

for the following reasons: (1) The technical

position is a ‘‘permissive’’ guidance

statement, basically stating Commission

views on safe implementation of existing

regulations on licensed material disposal in

10 CFR Part 20; (2) the position specifically

‘‘directs’’ the disposal to a regulated disposal

entity, and includes approval, notification,

and total activity provisions that, the staff

believes, are inconsistent with the concept of

BRC; (3) the position is narrow in scope (i.e.,

directed at specific material, caused by

specific circumstances); and (4) if

implemented, the actions under the position

are consistent with other case-by-case

determinations made by the Commission.

2. Regulatory Approach and the

Implementation Process

Comment: Although related to the BRC

issue discussed above, a State commenter

questioned why, if the proposal is sound in

protecting public health and safety, the

regulatory approach is a technical position,

as opposed to a rulemaking—the latter

providing a broader review process. Another

State commenter believed NRC should define

the ‘‘life expectancy’’ of the guidelines in the

technical position. Industry comments

generally supported the technical position as

the approach needed to address a real

problem in a timely manner, as opposed to

a rulemaking that would be very timeconsuming. They believe the steel companies

should not be put in the middle of a political

tug-of-war over appropriate administrative

procedures to follow, given that the position

has been made available for public scrutiny

in a manner similar to a proposed rule.

Response: As referred to in 1.b. above, NRC

staff intends to re-address the Subtitle Cdisposal option, proposed in the technical

position, in conjunction with a broad recycle

rulemaking. At that time the need to broadly

address disposal options will be revisited.

However, because this rulemaking is in an

early development stage, with finalization

unlikely in the next couple of years, and

because of the desirability of properly

disposing of specific incident-related

material in a timely manner, the Commission

directed that the staff should work with EPA

to develop interim guidelines and associated

technical bases. This is the process that has

been followed to date. The guidelines

proposed in the technical position would be

in effect until this rulemaking is finalized.

To address the concern of the State

commenter regarding a broader review

process, the staff has not only worked with

EPA, but has made early versions of the

position available directly to a number of

affected parties and States. The

Commission’s intentions were openly

discussed and the early versions of the

position, together with early exchanges of

views, were placed in NRC’s public

document room. The staff published the

proposed technical position in its entirety in

the Federal Register to obtain the broader

review that the commenter suggests.

Furthermore, contrary to interpretation of

one commenter, NRC is not asserting the

adoption of the technical position as a matter

of Agreement State compatabilty. In fact,

recognizing the likely involvement of many

parties, if the position’s alternative is

implemented, the staff’s intent was that this

wide review and approval could be helpful

in gaining general understanding and

acceptance of the merits of the proposed

alternative. Case-by-case reviews and

approvals of individual applications to use

the position’s disposal approach will still be

necessary even with the final technical

position in place.

3. Legal Considerations

a. Comment: In several comment letters

from the States and a Subtitle C disposal

facility operator, and in staff discussions

with other Subtitle C disposal facility

representatives, it was pointed out that the

legal applicability of the technical position’s

disposal alternative, in specific States, could

be determined by how the incident-related

material is defined. If the waste were defined

as LLRW, requiring disposal as specified in

the Low-Level Waste Policy Amendments

Act of 1985, the disposal alternative

described in the position could be precluded,

absent an appropriate change to State law or

regulations, or permit conditions. One State

commenter stated that, if the treated

incident-related material is considered

contaminated ash, it would be subject to

permit and manifesting requirements.

Another State commenter pointed out that

State LLRW regulations require

demonstration that design, operation, and

closure of any class of LLRW facility ensure

protection against inadvertent intrusion and

provide for an institutional control period.

There was concern about States being open

to lawsuits if the incident-related material

were considered LLRW and if the

aforementioned provisions were not

addressed. The mixed-waste disposal facility

operator pointed out that Subtitle C facilities

are not required to have radiation training

programs. Another State commenter

questioned the differences that would exist

between the Subtitle C and mixed waste

disposal facility requirements and their

rationale, in the context of the position.

a. Response: In the ‘‘Regulatory Position’’

text in Section C, the waste that could be
Federal Register / Vol. 62, No. 53 / Wednesday, March 19, 1997 / Notices 13195

transferred to the Subtitle C disposal facility

was described as incident-related material,

and was not referred to as low-level

radioactive waste. In developing the

proposed position, this was not a decision

based on legal considerations, but the

terminology selected to best characterize the

waste, in a technical position whose

principal purpose was to demonstrate,

through a conservative assessment, the

minimal radiological significance of the

proposed disposal option. It was recognized,

however, that State laws and permit

conditions would need to be satisfied, and

that numerous approvals may be required,

including those of appropriate State

regulatory bodies and the disposal facility

operator.

Among other provisions, implementation

of the disposal option proposed in the

position: (1) Involves a licensee’s request and

regulatory approvals on a case-by-case basis

pursuant to 10 CFR 20.2002; (2) includes

notification and disposal-site operatorapproval provisions; and (3) includes

accounting of the single and total incidentrelated material received at a Subtitle C

disposal site. As a result, the position does

not allow a licensee to dispose of the

incident-related material as if it were not

radioactive, a concept that applies only to

disposal of certain wastes defined in NRC

regulations at 10 CFR 20.2005(a). Instead, if

the provisions of the position are followed,

including the specific provision for disposal

at a Subtitle C facility, the position provides

a basis for disposing of incident-related

material at a site other than one specifically

licensed for disposal of low-level radioactive

waste.

Furthermore, although not taking a

position on what LLW disposal requirements

could be reasonably applied to the disposal

of this incident-related material at a Subtitle

C hazardous waste disposal facility, the staff

did specifically address groundwater and

intruder considerations. Groundwater and

intruder assessments were provided to allow

others to judge the significance of these

scenarios and the need for additional

regulatory provisions (including radiation

protection training). NRC staff has concluded

that, with the constraints provided in the

position, specific regulatory actions (e.g.,

groundwater monitoring for 137Cs, intruder

barriers, institutional controls beyond those

applicable to Subtitle C disposal facilities)

directed at these scenarios are not necessary.

The NRC staff has also concluded that the

position’s dose criterion, and the

conservative assessment of allowable 137Cs

concentrations, obviates the need for

radiation protection training for the Subtitle

C facility workers. In this regard, the staff

would point out that the material defined by

the technical position would not be

considered radioactive, for transportation

purposes, under the U.S. Department of

Transportation’s (DOT’s) regulations. In fact,

the concentration criteria in the position are

a factor of about 20 less than the value used

by DOT to define radioactive material.

b. Comment: Two State commenters

pointed out that the position does not

address specific permitting provisions

pertaining to dust treatment to meet land

disposal requirements for the dust’s

hazardous constituents. One of these

commenters stated that NRC cannot assume

sole jurisdiction for [hazardous] waste

treatment, if such treatment were conducted

at the steel company sites.

b. Response: The commenter is correct.

The position calls for compliance with RCRA

land disposal requirements. In the situations

being addressed, the NRC staff believes

appropriate RCRA authorities may approve

various options for carrying out the treatment

of the incident-related material. Therefore,

only a general statement of compliance was

included in the technical position. The staff

acknowledges and agrees with the comment

regarding NRC’s jurisdiction over hazardous

waste treatment, no matter where conducted.

This would be an issue for the Statepermitting agencies or EPA to decide. In

essence, the presumption in the position is

that the Subtitle C disposal facility would be

disposing of waste that had been treated

under applicable RCRA requirements.

4. Related Safety, Health, and Environmental

Concerns

a. Comment: An environmental group, a

State commenter, and the member of the

public suggested that the best approach to

solve the problem is a better accounting of

the sources causing the incidents, and more

rigorous regulation appears warranted. The

suggestion was made that worker exposure at

the foundries should be a principal NRC

concern. As indicated in the discussion in

comment 1.a., the steel industry commenters

also strongly requested NRC action to

improve accountability.

a. Response: The Commission, in its

directions to the staff on October 18, 1994,

approved several concurrent courses of

action. One of these has led to the

development of the proposed position, while

another has led to an Agreement State-NRC

Working Group that is developing

recommendations to address the

accountability issue. The Working Group has

held several meetings and a workshop, and

recommendations were sent to the

Commission in late 1996. The NRC staff is in

the process of evaluating the NRC/Agreement

States Working Group’s recommendations for

increased control over, and accountability

for, devices containing radioactive material.

Once the NRC staff completes its evaluation,

it will submit an action plan to the

Commission outlining measures to improve

control over, and accountability for, devices.

Thus, the Commission agrees with the

commenter’s worker safety and ‘‘front-end’’

concerns but, recognizing that incidentrelated material currently exists, and future

incidents may not be prevented with 100

percent confidence, believes the ‘‘back end’’

of the problem also requires Commission

action.

b. Comment: A State and an environmental

group commenter viewed the policy, in its

granting of a ‘‘regulatory exemption’’ for the

incident-related waste, as counterproductive

to the desire to improve detection

capabilities at the steel facilities. Three

industry commenters, one who responded

directly to the State view, pointed out that

the steel company facilities have installed

state-of-the-art radiation-detection

capabilities at considerable expense, not to

meet any regulatory requirement, but to

reduce the likelihood of experiencing the

consequences of inadvertent-melting events

that result in significant shutdown, cleanup,

and disposal costs, as well as the possibility

of incident-related exposures to plant

personnel. Furthermore, these detection

systems have been coupled with

comprehensive scrap inspection programs.

b. Response: Although the policy

provisions may require NRC or appropriate

Agreement States to not require licensing of

the Subtitle C facility for the radioactive

material, the main feature of the policy is the

NRC determination that the incident-related

material can be transferred, under existing

regulations (10 CFR 20.2001 and 20.2002),

from a licensed to an unlicensed entity. The

position not only provides a conservative

NRC assessment of the radiological impacts

of the disposal alternative, but also evaluates

certain hypothetical situations to provide a

frame of reference for the calculated impacts.

Contrary to the connotation, ‘‘regulatory

exemption,’’ used by the commenters, NRC

staff does not consider the proposed position

to be an exemption action, but an assessment

that could allow case-by-case decisions on

incident-related material disposals under

current regulations (also see response 1.c.).

The staff also believes that this policy has

no impact on a steel company’s selection of

‘‘source’’ detection capabilities. The costs

associated with shutdown (downtime) and

cleanup alone can exceed millions of dollars,

far in excess of the costs of effective detection

systems and programs.

c. Comment: The environmental group

commenters and the mixed-waste disposal

facility operator suggested that the position

could lead the steel companies to continue

operations after a melting for the purpose of

generating additional contaminated dust in

sufficient volume to meet the position’s

concentration criteria. A State commenter

stated that this issue should be addressed.

The mixed-waste disposal facility operator

postulated other abuses (e.g., the mixing of

other regulated waste with [incident-related]

material) and asked whether prevention

measures were being proposed.

c. Response: The staff believes that the cost

disincentives alone are sufficient to consider

the former suggestion unreasonable. For

example, the dilution necessary at one of the

facilities with this material, such that all the

contaminated material would comply with

the position’s criteria, would be about a

factor of 5. The costs of disposing of this

increased volume at a Subtitle C facility,

even with an optimistic estimate of disposal

costs, could reach millions of dollars. The

staff would note that its development of this

position has been enmeshed with costeffective considerations because of the real or

imagined excessive differential costs of the

disposal alternatives. Furthermore, based on

the operation of the steel facilities’ emission

control systems, with their dust-collection

systems, the staff can not conceive of a

scenario that would allow real time

comprehension of the extent of the

contamination or total quantity of 137Cs

involved in an incident.
13196 Federal Register / Vol. 62, No. 53 / Wednesday, March 19, 1997 / Notices

With regard to the question of protective

measures, the staff believes the NRC,

Agreement State(s), permitting agencies, or

the Subtitle C disposal facility operator

could, if warranted, require or strongly

recommend testing requirements to address

any concerns on disposal of unauthorized

radioactive material. The NRC staff believes

that a licensee’s measurement and sampling

program, as approved by NRC or the

Agreement State, will be sufficient to

preclude unauthorized radioactive material

disposals.

d. Comment: An environmental group

commenter stated that the concentration

criteria in the position appear to be

inconsistent and less strict than criteria

imposed by EPA on mill tailings at 40 CFR

Part 192. The mixed-waste disposal facility

commenter questioned the position’s

comparisons with environmental 137Cs

concentrations. The member of the public

claimed the proposal would exempt 10 times

the amount of material that would have been

exempted under the BRC policy.

d. Response: The staff presumes that

reference is being made to the 5 and 15

pCi/g or 135 and 405 Bq/g remedial action

criterion for radium=226 (226Ra) in soil.

These are criteria that would apply to soil

that could be released for unrestricted use.

The concentrations in the position are those

for material that would be disposed of at a

hazardous waste disposal facility. Because

radium is about 2.5 times more hazardous

from a direct exposure standpoint than 137Cs,

the position’s bounding 137Cs values for

Subtitle C facility disposal are only about 3

to 4 times a value that would be found

acceptable for unrestricted release. In fact,

the typical incident-related material at under

20 pCi/g (540 Bq/g) would be within the

criteria range cited and applicable to

unrestricted release situations. Note also that

the position contains a total-quantity

criterion which is not a part of the 40 CFR

Part 192 regulations.

The comparison referred to by the mixedwaste disposal facility commenter was

between ‘‘much of the mixed waste’’ that

contains concentrations below 20 pCi/g (540

Bq/g). This concentration was being

compared with actual environmentally

measured concentrations of 11 and

12 pCi/g (6300 Bq/g) and statisticallypredicted concentrations (95 percent value of

distribution) up to 19 pCi/g (513 Bq/g). The

reference in footnote 13 of the final technical

position is the source of these values.

The staff was not certain about the

intended context of the comment from the

member of the public, but has presumed it

is related to other issues addressed in the

response to this comment, comment 1.a., 4.e.,

or 4.f..

e. Comment: The mixed-waste disposal

facility operator, among others, suggested

that the position, if adopted, may have

adverse health, safety, and environmental

consequences. One issue involved the

disposition of higher-activity material that

would not be covered by the position’s

criteria. The commenter cites an example

where the 137Cs concentration, if averaged

over all the incident-related material, could

be 551 pCi/g (14,900 Bq/g)—[below the

acceptance criteria at the mixed waste

facility]. If the material with concentrations

below the position’s values is disposed of

under the position’s provisions, the

commenter asks what would be the

disposition of the higher concentration

material and, if it remains onsite, would this

violate NRC’s intent in promulgating the

position.

In a somewhat related comment, a State

questioned whether material delisted from

hazardous material regulations, and meeting

the concentration values in the position,

could be disposed of at a Subtitle D facility.

e. Response: For incident-related material

remaining after ‘‘position-allowed-’’ and

economically feasible blending of

contaminated material, the staff is aware of

only one disposition option at this time (see

61 FR 1616, column 2). That option would

involve treatment and delisting of the

material under hazardous material

regulations, and disposal of the material as

LLW. In two situations where incidentrelated material existed or currently exists at

steel facilities, about 90 percent of the

activity was contained in a few percent of the

material volume. Given that, in many cases,

it may not be feasible to blend the 137Cs in

this small volume to concentrations

acceptable at either the mixed waste or the

Subtitle C facility (under the provisions of

the position), treatment and delisting of this

small volume may not be onerous. In any

event, the staff does not believe the

uncertainty or current feasibility of

addressing a small percentage of the problem

affects the merits of the position, especially

as it relates to the mixed-waste or Subtitle C

disposal alternatives.

In response to the State query, the position

does not justify disposal at a Subtitle D

sanitary waste landfill because the

radiological assessment was based on a

Subtitle C facility disposal. Any such

disposal, if justified, would have to address

the differences, if any, between facilities and

their operations.

f. Comment: A series of comments from the

mixed-waste disposal facility operator

questioned NRC’s appreciation of the

potential effects of exposure to low levels of

radiation. On the other hand, most other

commenters either considered the regulatory

basis for the position of 1 mrem (10

microsievert (μSv)) per year (yr) to be

reasonable or very conservative. Among

several comments, one commenter suggested

a modest increase in the position’s dose basis

from 1 mrem (10 μSv)/yr to 4 mrem

(40 μSv)/yr, corresponding to the value in

EPA drinking water standards.

f. Response: For a number of years, the

Commission has used the linear no-threshold

hypothesis as providing a reasonable and

prudent basis to assess the radiological risk

associated with its actions. In essence, this

hypothesis involves an extrapolation of the

statistically significant health effects that can

be attributed to high-level, short-duration

exposures (e.g., the Japanese atomic bomb

survivors) to levels of exposure at or below

what the earth’s population receives from

background sources (e.g., cosmic radiation

and exposure to radiation emanating from

naturally occurring materials).

Notwithstanding the scientific controversy

regarding the reality of these hypothetical

risks, the Commission’s radiation protection

standards are consistent with standards,

recommended by international and national

advisory bodies, that reflect this hypothesis.

In the case of the technical position, a dose

rate of 1 mrem/yr (one-hundredth of the

public dose limit and about one threehundredth of the average exposure rate

received year in and year out by the

population of the United States) was chosen

as the regulatory basis, because, in the staff’s

view, it was suitably conservative and, from

a practical standpoint, provided a disposition

solution for most of the incident-related

material currently existing at steel company

sites. Footnote 5 of the final technical

position reflected this view.

With respect to the mixed waste disposal

facility operator’s comments on the NRC

staff’s appreciation of the effects of low-level

radiation and the 1 mrem/yr (10 μSv/yr)

regulatory basis, the staff believes that the

conservatisms in its selection of a dose

criterion, with appropriate regulatory

margins, can be appropriate, if the resulting

position can lead to resolution of an

outstanding incident-related waste

disposition problem. Although selection of 4

mrem (40 μSv)/yr could be justified, staff’s

view is that selecting a drinking water

standard for this position, which staff

believes does not present a drinking water

issue, would create more concern and

confusion than the value selected, and its

associated basis.

5. Technical Considerations

a. Comment: A State commenter suggested

that the position should specify acceptable

methods for averaging the waste within a

container.

a. Response: The staff recognizes that the

incident-related material in a particular

container may not be homogeneous in terms

of 137Cs concentration. However, because the

principal radiological hazard being addressed

is related to direct exposure, complying with

the concentration values, as determined on a

container average basis, is acceptable. The

specifics of the characterization program

directed at defining treated-material (137Cs

concentrations) would be defined when

approving the licensee’s request for transfer

of the incident-related material. The

characteristics of the treated material, the

decision to pursue packaged or unpackaged

disposal, the statistical confidence desired,

the regulatory margins provided in the

position, and the views of the approving

parties would need to be considered. The

response to comment 7.c. could also be

applicable in determining a characterization

program.

b. Comment: The mixed waste facility

operator noted that if one considered

exposure to a plane source of 60 μrem (0.6

μSv) per hour for 8 hours per day for over

4 weeks, the result would be a total exposure

exceeding EPA’s maximum allowable dose.

An industry association commenter noted

that the dose rate limit applied to shipments

of radioactive material is a factor 500 times

higher than the value applied in the position

to packaged disposal.
Federal Register / Vol. 62, No. 53 / Wednesday, March 19, 1997 / Notices 13197

b. Response: The staff does not believe this

calculation is pertinent. Although the staff is

not certain what maximum allowable dose is

being referred to, the critical point in the

calculation is that it presumes continuous

exposure at 1 meter (∼3 feet) to a plane of

material that is all at the maximum

concentration criterion. As a point of

reference, exposure to ‘‘normal’’ dust could

be calculated to cause an exposure that

would be a factor of 65 or lower, or

presuming the possibility of greater exposure

periods associated with the greater volumes

of material, equivalent exposure would be

reached over a period of about 5 years. The

need to consider the applicable exposure

scenario on which a regulatory position is

based is brought out by the industry

association commenter. To make this point,

the staff would note that under similar

assumptions, DOT’s allowable exposure rate

of 10 mrem (0.1 mSv) per hour at 1 meter (∼3

feet) could be translated into a dose estimate

of 1.6 rem (16 mSv).

c. Comment: An industrial association

commenter suggested that the 1-curie (Ci) or

3.7×10 4 MBecquerel (MBq) total activity

limit be modified to a per disposal cell basis

(i.e., if the cell were larger than 100,000 cubic

meters (3.5×10 6 ft 3)), on the grounds that the

proposed constraint may be too limiting if

one facility would accept the incident-related

material from more than a single event.

c. Response: Although this change could be

justified, it has not been accepted for the

following reasons: (1) The procedural

difficulties for the NRC or Agreement State

to require a particular disposal constraint at

an unlicensed facility, and (2) the belief that

individual incident disposals under the

position’s provisions are, in most cases,

unlikely to approach the quantity constraint

(one-tenth is expected to be more typical).

d. Comment: An industrial association

commenter suggested that the area/shape

factors used by NRC were overly restrictive

by a factor of 2. d.

d. Response: NRC became aware of area/

shape factor differences between different

codes. Staff has checked its calculations and

does not believe its estimates are in error.

e. Comment: A State commenter

questioned whether a discrepancy existed in

NRC’s source term assumption, in that

dividing a 1–Ci (3.7×10 4 MBq) source over

2000 tons (1814 metric tons) of contaminated

material would result in an average

concentration of 551 pCi/g (1.49×10 4 Bq/g).

e. Response: The commenter’s calculation

is correct. However, in actual events, a

significant fraction of the activity is generally

contained in a small volume of incidentrelated material at high concentrations. As

discussed in the response to comment 4.e.,

the disposition of this material will likely

require treatment of its hazardous properties,

so that the material can be delisted and

disposed of at a licensed LLRW disposal

facility. Although the position’s provisions

do allow blending of contaminated material,

NRC staff recognized that providing the

required reduction in average concentration

to meet the position’s concentration criteria

would likely not be practical in all cases.

Staff believed this was reflected in the

proposed position (e.g., see ‘‘Introduction’’

(61 FR 1609, column 3) and ‘‘Discussion’’ (61

FR 1610, columns 2 and 3)). This reality is

why the activity that could be disposed of at

the Subtitle C facility, for the specific events

that have taken place to date, is unlikely to

exceed 100 mCi (3.7×10 3 MBq).

f. Comment: A State commenter raised

several questions about the groundwater

modeling and the input parameters.

f. Response: The commenter noted that

these comments applied to an earlier version

of the position; however, a few still have

relevance to the proposed version. In the

context of this position, the staff was faced

with the task of bounding a specific potential

radiological impact, that staff believed was

relegated to a status of insignificance by the

position’s defined concentration and quantity

criteria. Nevertheless, the approach taken in

the position was to perform simple bounding

analyses and comparisons, so as to provide

a perspective on the specific hazard. For

example, in staff’s view, a very conservative

dose estimate was provided under the

hypothesis that an individual could and

would drink trench leachate. Contrary to the

commenter’s apparent view, staff considers

the very conservatively calculated 7-mrem

(70-μSv) dose from directly drinking trench

leachate, with a bounding concentration of

radioactive material, to be a prima facie

rationale for claiming that EPA’s drinking

water standards would be met with

significant margin, not only at the ‘‘tap,’’ but

at any point in the groundwater.

6. Other Issues

Comment: A State commenter suggested

that the position should state whether NRC

[would] allow import or export of incidentrelated material for disposal.

Response: The position did not address the

import/export issue. To the extent that the

position’s assumptions remain valid, the

technical basis could be applied to export.

However, any imports or exports could

involve decisions by responsible parties,

beyond NRC, including non-U.S. regulatory

authorities. To the extent that appropriate

U.S. regulatory authorities agree, and

determine that they can legally support

NRC’s views that the treated incident-related

material is not LLRW, the material could be

considered for disposal under the provisions

of the position, giving consideration to its

hazardous properties, if applicable. The staff

does not believe this issue needs to be

addressed in the context of the position itself.

7. Clarifications

a. Comment: A State commenter stated that

the licensee transferring the treated incidentrelated material should notify the Agreement

State Program or, in the case where an

Agreement State Program does not exist, the

appropriate solid or hazardous waste

regulatory authority.

a. Response: The position’s provisions are

intended to ensure such notifications. In the

case of Agreement States, their approval of

the transfer is called for in the position’s

provisions, as is written notification from the

licensee at least 30 days before any actual

transfer. The position also calls for disposal

facility operator notification and acceptance,

in writing. Thus, there are two avenues

through which the solid or hazardous waste

regulatory authorities would likely be

apprised of actions to implement the

position. In non-Agreement States, NRC

would be the initial, but possibly not the

only, radiological approving authority. In

these cases, State-permitting authorities may

seek the advice and approval of their

respective State radiological or public health

organizations. NRC would work with these

authorities and others to determine if

implementing the position’s disposition

alternative is reasonable and prudent, and

legally acceptable.

b. Comment: In the comments from one

State, there appeared to be some confusion

on what entity would track the total quantity

constraint (i.e., 1 Ci or 3.7×10 4 MBq).

b. Response: Under the position’s

provisions, the total quantity constraint

would be tracked by NRC or the appropriate

Agreement State, although others could also

track this inventory value.

c. Comment: A State commenter queried

who would confirm that the position’s

concentration constraints were being met. An

environmental group commenter suggested

that accurate characterization presents a

considerable challenge.

c. Response: In the staff’s view, NRC or the

appropriate Agreement State would have a

significant incentive to provide some

independent verification of the concentration

criteria. However, the specifics of this

verification would be addressed when

approving the licensee’s request to make the

transfer of incident-related material under

the provisions of the position. Other parties,

including the Subtitle C facility operator and

the permitting agency, whose approvals are

required, could also dictate a specific

confirmation process. On this point, the staff

would note the inclusion of regulatory

margins in the position that, staff believes,

should be considered in developing a

reasonable confirmation program.

d. Comment: An industry association

commenter requested clarification regarding

the shipment of pretreated incident-related

material to offsite licensed treatment

facilities.

d. Response: Under the provisions of the

position, NRC would have no objection to

incident-related material being transferred

offsite for permitted treatment by an NRC or

Agreement State licensed entity. The position

only addresses the transfer of incidentrelated material that has been properly

treated, under a Commission or Agreement

State license, to a Subtitle C disposal facility.

e. Comment: An industry group commenter

suggested that the position should provide

allowance for licensed service contractors to

be brought in to supervise implementation

operations. It was further suggested that

treatment should not be a prior condition to

transport.

e. Response: The position, and NRC

regulations, allow the possibility of service

contractors operating under the contracting

entity’s license. Treatment is only required

before transport to an unlicensed Subtitle C

disposal facility. See the response to

comment 7.d. above.

f. Comment: An industrial association

commenter questioned the accuracy of the
13198 Federal Register / Vol. 62, No. 53 / Wednesday, March 19, 1997 / Notices

dose rates associated with the 55-gallon

drum.

f. Response: The publication of the figures

in the Federal Register caused some blurring

that has caused the commenter to misread

the indicated dose rate. Comparisons with

the scale on the ordinate indicate that the

commenter’s figure is high by a factor of 10.

Dated at Rockville, Maryland, this 13th day

of March, 1997.

For the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory

Commission

John W. N. Hickey,

Chief, Low-Level Waste and Decommissioning

Projects Branch, Division of Waste

Management, Office of Nuclear Material

Safety and Safeguards.

[FR Doc. 97–6884 Filed 3–18–97; 8:45 am]

BILLING CODE 7590–01–P

Individual Plant Examination Program:

Perspectives on Reactor Safety and

Plant Performance Volume 1, Part 1

and Volume 2, Parts 2–5, Draft

AGENCY: Nuclear Regulatory

Commission.

ACTION: Notice of Workshop Agenda for

Draft NUREG–1560.

SUMMARY: The Nuclear Regulatory

Commission has published a draft of

‘‘Individual Plant Examination Program:

Perspectives on Reactor Safety and Plant

Performance,’’ NUREG–1560, Volumes 1

and 2. Volume 1, Part 1 is a summary

report from a review of the Individual

Plant Examinations (IPE) submitted to

the agency in response to Generic Letter

88–20. Volume 2, Part 2–5 provides an

in-depth discussion of the insights and

findings summarized in Volume 1, Part

1. The NRC staff will conduct a public

workshop (April 7, 8, 9, 1997) to discuss

the contents of the draft NUREG and to

solicit comments (See FR notices 61 FR

58429 and 61 FR 65248). The agenda of

the workshop is listed in this notice.

WORKSHOP MEETING INFORMATION:A 3-day

workshop will be held to address

comments and answer questions.

DATES: April 7, 8, 9, 1997.

LOCATION: Austin, Texas.

HOTEL: Hyatt Regency, 208 Barton

Springs Rd., Austin, Texas, 78704.

Please make your reservations directly

with the Hyatt Regency Hotel, phone

(512) 477–1234 (or 1 800 233–1234).

Mention that you will be attending the

NRC–IPE Workshop to receive the

meeting group rate of $113/night plus

tax (single/double). Hotel reservations

by March 7, 1997 are required in order

to receive the group rate (subject to

availability).

REGISTRATION: The workshop

registration fee is $100 USD.

Registration fee is payable by check or

money orders drawn on U.S. banks

payable to Sandia National Laboratories;

no credit cards accepted. Mail

registration fees to Martha Lucero,

Sandia National Laboratories, PO Box

5800, MS 0129, Albuquerque, New

Mexico 87185–0129. Please include

name, organization, address and phone

number with your registration fee.

Registration fee includes reception,

daily continental breakfast, and one

lunch. Late registration fee ($100) is due

no later than the time of workshop/

meeting registration (cash is accepted

for late registration payment at

workshop).

Workshop Agenda

Sunday

3:00 pm to 7:00 pm

Registration

6:00 pm to 9:00 pm

Reception

Monday

Time and Topic

7:00 am to 5:00 pm

Registration/information

8:00 am to 8:30 am

Opening remarks (NRC staff)

8:30 am to 8:45 am

Introduction, Roadmap for meeting

(Chapter 1)

8:45 am to 9:15 am

Perspectives on impact of IPE program on

reactor safety* (Chapters 2 and 9)

9:15 am to 10:25 am

Perspective on Reactor Design* (Chapters

3, 10 and 11)

10:25 am to 10:40 am

BREAK

10:40 am to 11:50 am

Perspectives on Containment Design*

(Chapters 4, 10, and 12)

11:50 am to 1:20 pm

LUNCH (part of registration fee), also keynote speech by Joseph Callan, EDO

1:20 pm to 2:00 pm

Operational perspectives* (Chapters 5 and

13)

2:00 pm to 3:00 pm

Perspectives on IPEs with respect to riskinformed regulation* (Chapters 6, 14 and

15)

3:00 pm to 3:15 pm

BREAK

3:15 pm to 4:00 pm

Perspectives on IPEs with respect to

Commission’s Safety Goals and impact of

Station Blackout rule on CDFs*

(Chapters 7, 16 and 17)

4:00 pm to 5:00 pm

Open discussion

5:00 pm

Adjourn

5:30 pm to 6:30 pm

IPE Database demonstration, Part 1 (Basic

Queries: Basic structures of the user

friendly program including examples of

general queries)

*Each ‘‘presentation’’ is comprised of:

(1) NRC presentation of overview of

perspectives and staff’s interpretation of

comments received and staff’s response.

(2) Open time for questions and comments.

Tuesday

Time and Topic

7:45 am to 5:00 pm

registration/information

8:10 am to 8:15 am

Introductory remarks (NRC)

8:15 am to 9:15 am

Presentation by Wolfgang Werner on

insights from PRAs of European nuclear

power plants*

9:15 am to 10:15 am

Presentation by Westinghouse Owner’s

Group*

10:15 am to 10:30 am

BREAK

10:30 am to 11:30 am

Presentation by CE Owner’s Group*

11:30 am to 1:00 pm

LUNCH

1:00 pm to 2:00 pm

Presentation by B&W Owner’s Group*

2:00 pm to 3:00 pm

Presentation by BWR Owner’s Group*

3:00 pm to 3:15 pm

BREAK

3:15 pm to 3:45 pm

Presentation by Northeast Utilities*

3:45 pm to 5:00 pm

Open Discussion

5:00 pm

Adjourn

5:30 pm to 6:30 pm

IPE Database demonstration, Part 2

(Advanced queries: use of ACCESS to

query the database, program setup and

discussion)

*Includes time for questions and answers.

Wednesday

Time and Topic

8:15 am to 3:00 pm

Registration/information

8:30 am to 8:35 am

Introductory remarks (NRC)

8:35 am to 9:35 am

Presentation by NEI*

9:35 am to 10:00 am

NRC presentation on NRC Potential

Regulatory Follow-up Activities

10:00 am to 10:15 am

BREAK

10:15 am to 11:30 pm

Open discussion on NRC Potential

Regulatory Follow-up activities

11:30 am to 1:00 pm

LUNCH

1:00 pm to 3:00 pm

Wrap-up Discussion (NRC and public) on

NUREG–1560 covering such issues as:

• Validity and accuracy of NUREG

information, conclusions and

observations

• Future NRC activities

• Future industry activities

3:00 pm

Adjourn

*Includes time for questions and answers.

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: Draft

NUREG–1560 (Volume 1, Part 1 and

Volume 2, Parts 2–5) is available for

inspection and copying for a fee at the

NRC Public Document Room, 2120 L