1 15-4022 United States v. Majors
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT SUMMARY ORDER Rulings by summary order do not have preceden tial effect. Citation to a summary order filed on or after January 1, 2007, is permitted a nd is governed by Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 32.1 and this court’s Local Rule 32.1.1. When citing a summary order in a document filed with this court, a party mu st cite either the Federal Appendix or an electronic database (with the notation “summa ry order”). A party citing a summary order must serve a copy of it on any party not represented by counsel. At a stated Term of the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, held at the Thurgood Marshall United States Courthouse, at 40 Foley Square, in the City of New York, on the 30 th day of January, two thousand seventeen. Present: ROBERT A. KATZMANN, Chief Judge , AMALYA L. KEARSE, DEBRA ANN LIVINGSTON, Circuit Judges

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UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Appellee , - v - No. 15-4022
JAMES DOUCHETTE AKA JI G, AKA JIGGA, SANTIAGO CIPRI AN, AKA WALLY, WALDEMAR GONZALEZ, AKA VIC, ERIC RICHARDS, AKA E.B., KAMIAS SMITH, AKA KILLER, AKA KAMIUS SMITH, DAVID RODRIGUEZ, AKA ANT, JAYSON DAVIDSON, AKA BOOGIE, DAVID MASON, AKA GUSSIE, AKA C, GAIL BROWN, RIGOBERTO ARVIZU, AKA RIGO, AKA RICO, Defendants , ALTON MAJORS, AKA STREETS,2 Defendant-Appellant

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For Defendant-Appellant: MaryBeth Covert (Martin J. Vogelbaum, on the brief ), Federal Public Defender’s Office, Western District of New York, Buffalo, NY. For Appellee: Monica J. Richards, Assistant United States Attorney, for William J. Hochul, Jr., United States Attorney for the Western District of New York, Buffalo, NY.

Appeal from the United States District C ourt for the Western District of New York (Siragusa, J .). ON CONSIDERATION WHEREOF, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED, and DECREED that the judgment of the district court is VACATED and REMANDED

. Defendant-appellant Alton Majors appeals from the denial of his motion for a sentence reduction pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2). We review de novo “whether [a defendant’s] sentence was ‘based on a sentencing range th at was subsequently lowered by the Sentencing Commission,’” a prerequisite for a defendant ’s eligibility for a sentence reduction. United States
v. Main , 579 F.3d 200, 202–03 (2d Cir. 2009) (quoting United States v. Williams , 551 F.3d 182, 185 (2d Cir. 2009)). “When a defendant is eligible for re sentencing, ‘we review a district court’s decision to deny a motion under 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2) for abuse of discretion.’” United States v. Christie , 736 F.3d 191, 195 (2d Cir. 2013) (quoting United States v. Borden , 564 F.3d 100, 104 (2d Cir. 2009)). We assume the parties’ familia rity with the underlying facts, the procedural history of the case, a nd the issues on appeal. The Supreme Court has set out a two-step appr oach for district courts to follow when resolving a motion to reduce a senten ce under 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2):3 At step one, § 3582(c)(2) requires the c ourt . . . to determine the prisoner’s eligibility for a sentence modification and the extent of the re duction authorized. .

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. . . . At step two of the inquiry, § 3582(c)(2 ) instructs a court to consider any applicable [18 U.S.C.] § 3553(a) factors a nd determine whether, in its discretion, the reduction authorized by reference to the policies relevant at step one is warranted in whole or in part under the particular ci rcumstances of the case. Dillon v. United States , 560 U.S. 817, 827 (2010). To the extent the district court denied Majors’s motion at the first Dillon step, we vacate and remand for further factfinding. “[D]istrict cour ts in § 3582(c)(2) proceedings cannot make findings inconsistent with that of the original sentencing court.” United States v. Rios , 765 F.3d 133, 138 (2d Cir. 2014) (quoting United States v. Woods , 581 F.3d 531, 538 (7th Cir. 2009)). When the district court denied Majors’s senten ce reduction motion, it stated that “the guideline remains unchanged at 97 to 121 months” because, at his original sentencing, Majors had not objected to a finding that he was responsible for the “high end” of a range of 150 to 500 grams of cocaine base. Order Regarding Motion for Sentence Reduction Pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2), United States v. Majors , No. 6:10-cr-06058-CJS-JWF (W.D.N.Y. Dec. 1, 2015), ECF No. 419. At his original sentencing, Majors expressly agreed that he was responsible for more than 196 grams of cocaine base. See Joint App. 88–89. However, under the version of the United States Sentencing Guidelines in effect at Majors’s original se ntencing, Majors’s base offense level of 30 could have been calculated based on a finding of either 196 to 280 grams or 280 to 840 grams of cocaine base. See U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Manual Supp. § 2D1.1(c)(4)– (5) (U.S. Sentencing Comm’n 2010) (setting a base offense level of 30 for 196 to 280 grams of cocaine base and a base offense level of 32 for 280 to 840 grams of cocaine base); U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Manual § 2D1.1(a)(5)(B)(i) (U.S. Sentencing Comm’n 2010) (decreasing base offense level of 32 by two if defendant receives a mitigating role adjustment, as Majors4 did); Joint App. 89–91. This ambiguity is co mpounded by the fact that, on appeal, the government concedes that Majors ’s original sentence was based on a range of 196 to 280 grams of cocaine base. Majors would be eligible for a sentence reduction if th e 2014 Guidelines were applied to this range and othe r aspects of his Guidelines calculation remained the same. See U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Manual § 2D1.1(c)(6) (U.S . Sentencing Comm’n 2014). In light of these ambiguities, further factfinding by the district court, or at least a clarification of existing factfinding, is necessary in order to determin e Majors’s eligibility for a sentence reduction. To the extent the district court denied Majors’s motion at the second Dillon step, we vacate and remand for the district court to discus s the § 3553(a) factors that must be considered when resolving a sentence reduction motion for whic h a defendant is eligible. When a district court denies a sentence reduction motion at Dillon step two, it must “provide, at a minimum, enough explanation of how it exercised its senten cing discretion to permit meaningful appellate review.” Christie , 736 F.3d at 196. In the present case, a lthough the district court invoked its discretion to decide Majors’s motion, the distri ct court did not discu ss any § 3553(a) factors. See Order Regarding Motion for Sentence Reduc tion Pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2), United States v. Majors , No. 6:10-cr-06058-CJS-JWF (W.D .N.Y. Dec. 1, 2015), ECF No. 419. We have considered the partie s’ remaining arguments on appeal and find in them no basis for altering our decision. For the foregoing reason s, the judgment of the district court is VACATED and REMANDED for further proceedings cons istent with this order.
FOR THE COURT: CATHERINE O’HAGAN WOLFE, CLERK