[Cite as Sipes v. Sipes, 2012-Ohio-3215.]

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS FOR RICHLAND COUNTY, OHIO 

FIFTH APPELLATE DISTRICT 

CYNTHIA E. SIPES : 

 : 

 Plaintiff-Appellee : 

 : 

 : 

-vs- : JUDGMENT ENTRY 

 : NUNC PRO TUNC 

 : 

DAVID L. SIPES : Filed July 13, 2012 

 : 

 : 

 Defendant-Appellant : CASE NO. 2011-CA-00101 

 This cause comes before us on the issuance of an opinion and judgment entry 

nunc pro tunc to correct a scrivener’s error for misidentification of the appellee to correct 

the middle initial to “E”. 

 IT IS SO ORDERED. 

 

 _________________________________ 

 HON. W. SCOTT GWIN 

 

 _________________________________ 

 HON. SHEILA G. FARMER 

 

_________________________________ 

 HON. JULIE A. EDWARDS 
COURT OF APPEALS 

RICHLAND COUNTY, OHIO 

FIFTH APPELLATE DISTRICT 

CYNTHIA E. SIPES 

 Plaintiff-Appellee 

-vsDAVID L. SIPES 

 Defendant-Appellant 

JUDGES: 

: Hon. W. Scott Gwin, P.J. 

: Hon. Sheila G. Farmer, J. 

: Hon. Julie A. Edwards, J. 

: 

: 

: Case No. 2011-CA-101 

: 

: 

: O P I N I O N

CHARACTER OF PROCEEDING: Civil appeal from the Richland County Court 

of Common Pleas, Domestic Relations 

Division, Case No. 2008-DIV-1058 

JUDGMENT: Reversed 

DATE OF JUDGMENT ENTRY: July 13, 2012 

APPEARANCES: 

For Plaintiff-Appellee For Defendant-Appellant 

BRENT L. ENGLISH CHARLES D LYNCH 

1500 West Third Street Six West Third Street, #200 

Cleveland, OH 44113-1422 Mansfield, OH 44902 
[Cite as Sipes v. Sipes, 2012-Ohio-3215.]

Gwin, P.J. 

{¶1} Defendant-appellant David L. Sipes appeals a judgment of the Court of 

Common Pleas, Domestic Relations Division, of Richland County, Ohio, entered in favor 

of plaintiff-appellee Cynthia A. Sipes. Appellant assigns three errors to the trial court: 

{¶2} “I. THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED ERROR IN FINDING THAT 

HUSBAND’S VOLUNTARY NOTICE OF DISMISSAL OF HIS DIVORCE COMPLAINT 

PURSUANT TO CIVIL RULE 41 (A)(1)(a) WAS AN ADJUDICATION ON THE MERITS. 

{¶3} “II. THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED ERROR IN APPLYING CIVIL RULE 

60 (b) TO A VOLUNTARY NOTICE OF DISMISSAL OF HUSBAND’S DIVORCE 

COMPLAINT FILED PURSUANT TO CIVIL RULE 41 (A)(1)(a) WHEN THE DISMISSAL 

WAS NOT AN ADJUDICATION ON THE MERITS. 

{¶4} “III. THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED ERROR IN SUA SPONTE 

REINSTATING HUSBAND’S DIVORCE COMPLAINT WHICH HUSBAND HAD 

VOLUNTARILY DISMISSED PURSUANT TO CIVIL RULE 41 (A)(1)(a) WHEN THERE 

WAS NO MOTION FOR RELIEF FROM JUDGMENT PURSUANT TO CIVIL RULE 60 

(B) FILED BY WIFE.” 

{¶5} In its judgment entry of September 30, 2011, the trial court set out the 

procedural history in this case. On August 8, 2010, appellant filed a complaint for 

divorce under this case number. Appellee filed an answer and counterclaim on 

September 30, 2010. While the divorce action was pending, appellee moved from the 

state of Ohio. Prior to trial the parties agreed to jointly dismiss their respective actions 

and appellant agreed to re-file a complaint for divorce. The original divorce case, Case 

No. 2008-DIV-1058, was dismissed on January 12, 2010, and the complaint was re-filed 
Richland County, Case No. 2011-CA-101 3 

the same day, and given the number 2010DIV-0037. The court found appellee did not 

file a counterclaim in the second action because the counsel she had then believed 

there was a jurisdictional bar to doing so because appellee was not an Ohio resident. 

{¶6} The second divorce case was set for trial on November 3 and 4, 2010. On 

the first day of trial, appellant voluntarily dismissed his complaint. The court found this 

left appellee without legal recourse to file an action in Ohio that would vest the court 

with subject matter jurisdiction. 

{¶7} Appellee filed a motion pursuant to Civ. R. 60 (B) in the present case, 

2008-DIV-1058. The trial court found the dismissal of Case Number 2008-DIV-1058 

was not adjudication on the merits, and thus Civ. R. 60 (B) did not apply. The trial court 

further found the dismissal of 2010DIV-0037 was an adjudication on the merits under 

“two dismissal rule”. The court found for this reason Civ. R. 60 (B) would lie against the 

dismissal in the 2010 case, and the court reinstated the second complaint. 

I. 

{¶8} In his first assignment of error, appellant argues the court committed error 

in finding his notice of dismissal filed in the second case was adjudication on the merits. 

We agree. 

{¶9} Civ. R. 41 states in pertinent part: 

{¶10} Voluntary dismissal: effect thereof 

{¶11} (1) By plaintiff; by stipulation. 

{¶12} * * * [A] plaintiff, without order of court, may dismiss all claims 

asserted by that plaintiff against a defendant by doing either of the 

following: 
Richland County, Case No. 2011-CA-101 4 

{¶13} (a) filing a notice of dismissal at any time before the 

commencement of trial unless a counterclaim which cannot remain 

pending for independent adjudication by the court has been served by that 

defendant; 

{¶14} (b) filing a stipulation of dismissal signed by all parties who have 

appeared in the action. 

{¶15} Unless otherwise stated in the notice of dismissal or stipulation, the 

dismissal is without prejudice, except that a notice of dismissal operates 

as an adjudication upon the merits of any claim that the plaintiff has once 

dismissed in any court. 

{¶16} (2) By order of court. Except as provided in division (A)(1) of this 

rule, a claim shall not be dismissed at the plaintiff's instance except upon 

order of the court and upon such terms and conditions as the court deems 

proper. * * * 

{¶17} There are three ways a plaintiff can dismiss a complaint under Civ. R. 41 

(A). First, a plaintiff may file a notice of dismissal, which divests the trial court from 

jurisdiction if there are no pending counterclaims pending for independent adjudication. 

Civ. R. 41(A)(1)(a), Thorton v. Montville Plastics & Rubber, Inc., 11th District No. 2006-

G-2744,2007-Ohio-3475, ¶ 16. 

{¶18} The second way a plaintiff can dismiss a case is by filing a stipulation 

signed by all parties pursuant to Civ. R. 41 (A)(1)(B). The dismissal acts as a voluntary 

dismissal of each party’s claims.Civ.R. 41 (A)(1)(b), Feckner v. Donley’s, Inc., 8th 

District App. No. 888926, 2007-Ohio-5335 ¶ 20. 
Richland County, Case No. 2011-CA-101 5 

{¶19} The third way a plaintiff may dismiss a case is by motion to the court 

pursuant to Civ. R. 41 (A)(2). Under this scenario, there is no notice of dismissal, but 

rather a judgment entry from the court. 

{¶20} The double dismissal rule applies only when both dismissals were notice 

dismissals under Civ. R. 41 (A)(1)(a). Dismissals pursuant to Civ.R. 41(A)(1)(b) and (c) 

do not trigger the double dismissal rule. Olynyk v. Scoles, 114 Ohio St. 3d 56, 2007-

Ohio-2878, 868 N.E. 2d 254, ¶31. 

{¶21} Because the first dismissal in the 2008 case was pursuant to a court order 

rather than a voluntary notice of dismissal, the two-dismissal rule does not apply. 

{¶22} The first assignment of error is sustained. 

II. 

{¶23} In his second assignment of error, appellant argues the court erred in 

applying Civ. R. 60 (B) to the second action because the dismissal was not an 

adjudication on the merits. We agree. Appellant’s dismissal of 2010DIV-0037 was 

neither on the merits nor the second dismissal pursuant to Civ. R. 41(A)(1)(a). As the 

trial court correctly noted, Civ. R. 60 (B) cannot be invoked to revive an action which 

has not been adjudicated on the merits. Hensley, Administrator v. Henry, 61 Ohio St. 

2d 277, 400 N.E. 2d 1353 (1980), citations deleted. See also, Thorton, supra.

{¶24} The second assignment of error is sustained. 

III. 

{¶25} In his third assignment of error, appellant argues the trial court committed 

error in sua sponte reinstating the divorce complaint pursuant to Civ. R. 60 (B) because 
Richland County, Case No. 2011-CA-101 6 

the motion was filed in the 2008 case but was not filed in the 2010 case. We agree with 

appellant, and find the court had no jurisdiction to reinstitute the second case. 

{¶26} The third assignment of error is sustained. 

{¶27} For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the Court of Common Pleas, 

Domestic Relations Division, of Richland County, Ohio, is reversed. 

By Gwin, P.J., 

Farmer, J., and 

Edwards, J., concur 

 _________________________________ 

 HON. W. SCOTT GWIN 

 _________________________________ 

 HON. SHEILA G. FARMER 

 _________________________________ 

 HON. JULIE A. EDWARDS 

WSG:clw 0607
[Cite as Sipes v. Sipes, 2012-Ohio-3215.]

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS FOR RICHLAND COUNTY, OHIO 

FIFTH APPELLATE DISTRICT 

CYNTHIA E. SIPES : 

 : 

 Plaintiff-Appellee : 

 : 

 : 

-vs- : JUDGMENT ENTRY 

 : 

DAVID L. SIPES : 

 : 

 : 

 Defendant-Appellant : CASE NO. 2011-CA-101 

 For the reasons stated in our accompanying Memorandum-Opinion, the judgment of 

the Court of Common Pleas, Domestic Relations Division, of Richland County, Ohio, is 

reversed. Costs to appellee. 

 _________________________________ 

 HON. W. SCOTT GWIN 

 _________________________________ 

 HON. SHEILA G. FARMER 

 _________________________________ 

 HON. JULIE A. EDWARDS