alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
S94A1267.

#### KING v. HAWKINS.

(454 SE2d 135)

Benham, Presiding Justice.

This is an appeal from a judgment granting Hawkins’ petition for the writ of habeas corpus. The habeas court did not rule on the grounds asserted in appellee’s petition, but granted the petition on the ground that the record of appellee’s guilty plea hearing did not demonstrate a factual basis for the plea.1 See *Head v. State,*262 Ga. 795 (2) (426 SE2d 547) (1993). The Warden complains on appeal that he was not put on notice that the issue of the adequacy of the factual basis for the guilty plea would be litigated and was not afforded a proper opportunity to address the issue. Our review of the record persuades us of the correctness of the Warden’s position. The only mention of the ground on which the habeas court based its judgment came from a single observation by the habeas court. Following cross-*94examination of Hawkins’ trial counsel, the habeas court asked counsel about his understanding of the factual basis for the plea, noting that it had “read the transcript of the plea and it’s sort of short.”

Decided March 6, 1995.

*Michael J. Bowers, Attorney General, Susan V. Boleyn, Senior Assistant Attorney General, Rachelle L. Strausner, Assistant Attorney General,*for appellant.

*James M. Watts, Jr.,*for appellee.

Although we do not doubt the authority of a habeas court to consider such matters sua sponte, we believe the parties must be given an opportunity to address them in a meaningful way. Accordingly, we conclude that the proper course in this case is that which was followed in *Johnson v. Caldwell,*229 Ga. 548, 553 (192 SE2d 900) (1972). In that case, questions concerning the voluntariness of guilty pleas were considered without notice to the Warden, and this court ordered that the case be remanded. Here, as there, the Warden should have sufficient time to prepare to address the issue and Hawkins should have an opportunity to amend his petition to conform to the issues before the habeas court.

*Judgment reversed and case remanded.*

*All the Justices concur.*

1

 Uniform Superior Court Rule 33.9. Determining Accuracy of Plea.

Notwithstanding the acceptance of a plea of guilty, the judge should not enter a judgment upon such plea without making such inquiry on the record as may satisfy him that there is a factual basis for the plea.
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</TABLE>
ALD-026 NOT PRECEDENTIAL

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT

___________

No. 21-2789

___________

IN RE: CARLO AMATO,

Petitioner

____________________________________

On a Petition for Writ of Mandamus from the

United States District Court for the District of New Jersey

(Related to D.N.J. Civ. No. 3-19-cv-19449)

District Judge: Honorable Michael A. Shipp

____________________________________

Submitted Pursuant to Rule 21, Fed. R. App. P.

November 10, 2021

Before: JORDAN, RESTREPO, and SCIRICA, Circuit Judges

(Opinion filed: December 14, 2021)

__________

OPINION*

__________

PER CURIAM

Carlo Amato petitions for a writ of mandamus directing the District Court to rule 

on his motion to vacate, correct, or set aside his sentence under 28 U.S.C. § 2255. After 

Amato filed this petition, the District Court denied the motion by order entered 

November 30, 2021. Thus, because Amato has received all the relief he requested, his 

* This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not 

constitute binding precedent.
2

petition is moot and we will dismiss it on that basis. See Blanciak v. Allegheny Ludlum 

Corp., 77 F.3d 690, 698-99 (3d Cir. 1996). Amato’s motion for a refund of his filing fees 

is denied. See Porter v. Dep’t of Treasury, 564 F.3d 176, 179 (3d Cir. 2009) (“It is of no 

consequence whether an appeal is voluntarily dismissed, dismissed due to a jurisdictional 

defect, or dismissed on the merits—appellants are not entitled to the return of their filing 

and docketing fees.”).
**Exhibit
31.1**
 ****
 **CERTIFICATIONS**
 
 I, Robert L.
Tuchman, Chief Executive Officer of Refac, certify that:
 
 1.
    I
      have reviewed this annual report on Form 10-K of Refac (the “Registrant”);
 
 2.
    Based
      on my knowledge, this report does not contain any untrue statement of a
      material fact or omit to state a material fact necessary to make the
      statements made, in light of the circumstances under which such statements
      were made, not misleading with respect to the period covered by this
      report;
 
 3.
    Based
      on my knowledge, the financial statements, and other financial information
      included in this annual report, fairly present in all material respects
      the financial condition, results of operations and cash flows of the
      Registrant as of, and for, the periods presented in this
      report;
 
 4.
    The
      Registrant’s other certifying officer and I are responsible for
      establishing and maintaining disclosure controls and procedures (as
      defined in Exchange Act Rules 13a-15(e) and 15d-15(e)) for the Registrant
      and have:
 
 a)
    Designed
      such disclosure controls and procedures, or caused such disclosure
      controls and procedures to be designed under our supervision, to ensure
      that material information relating to the Registrant, including its
      consolidated subsidiaries, is made known to us by others within those
      entities, particularly during the period in which this report is being
      prepared;
 
 b)
    Evaluated
      the effectiveness of the Registrant’s disclosure controls and procedures
      and presented in this report our conclusions about the effectiveness of
      the disclosure controls and procedures, as of the end of the period
      covered by this report based on such evaluation; and
 
 c)
    Disclosed
      in this report any change in the Registrant’s internal control over
      financial reporting that occurred during the Registrant’s most recent
      fiscal quarter that has materially affected, or is reasonably likely to
      materially affect, the Registrant’s internal control over financial
      reporting; and;
 
 5.
    The
      Registrant’s other certifying officer and I have disclosed, based on our
      most recent evaluation of internal control over financial reporting, to
      the Registrant’s auditors and the audit committee of Registrant’s board of
      directors (or persons performing the equivalent
  functions):
 
 a)
    All
      significant deficiencies and material weaknesses in the design or
      operation of internal control over financial reporting which are
      reasonably likely to adversely affect the Registrant’s ability to record,
      process, summarize and report financial information; and
 
 b)
    Any
      fraud, whether or not material, that involves management or other
      employees who have a significant role in the Registrant’s internal control
      over financial reporting.
 
 
 
 Date:
      March 31, 2005
    /s/
      Robert L. TuchmanRobert
      L. TuchmanChief
      Executive Officer
No. 11-10635.

#### Walton v. Tucker, Secretary, Florida Department of Corrections, et al.

C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied.
```
[Federal Register Volume 62, Number 54 (Thursday, March 20, 1997)]
[Notices]
[Pages 13384-13385]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 97-7041]

-----------------------------------------------------------------------

FEDERAL EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT AGENCY
[FEMA-1166-DR]

Federated States of Micronesia; Major Disaster and Related 
Determinations

AGENCY: Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA).

ACTION: Notice.

-----------------------------------------------------------------------

SUMMARY: This is a notice of the Presidential declaration of a major 
disaster for the Federated States of Micronesia (FEMA-1166-DR), dated 
March 11, 1997, and related determinations.

[[Page 13385]]

EFFECTIVE DATE: March 11, 1997.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Magda Ruiz, Response and Recovery 
Directorate, Federal Emergency Management Agency, Washington, DC 20472, 
(202) 646-3260.

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: Notice is hereby given that, in a letter 
dated March 11, 1997, the President declared a major disaster under the 
authority of the Robert T. Stafford Disaster Relief and Emergency 
Assistance Act (42 U.S.C. 5121 et seq.), as follows:

    I have determined that the damage in certain areas of the 
Federated States of Micronesia, resulting from Typhoon Fern on 
December 25-26, 1996, is of sufficient severity and magnitude to 
warrant a major disaster declaration under the Robert T. Stafford 
Disaster Relief and Emergency Assistance Act (''the Stafford Act''). 
I, therefore, declare that such a major disaster exists in the 
Federated States of Micronesia.
    In order to provide Federal assistance, you are hereby 
authorized to allocate from funds available for these purposes, such 
amounts as you find necessary for Federal disaster assistance and 
administrative expenses.
    You are authorized to provide Public Assistance in the 
designated areas. If requested and warranted, Hazard Mitigation may 
be added at a later date. Consistent with the requirement that 
Federal assistance be supplemental, any Federal funds provided under 
the Stafford Act for Public Assistance or Hazard Mitigation will be 
limited to 75 percent of the total eligible costs.

    The time period prescribed for the implementation of section 
310(a), Priority to Certain Applications for Public Facility and Public 
Housing Assistance, 42 U.S.C. 5153, shall be for a period not to exceed 
six months after the date of this declaration.
    Notice is hereby given that pursuant to the authority vested in the 
Director of the Federal Emergency Management Agency under Executive 
Order 12148, I hereby appoint Sally M. Ziolkowski of the Federal 
Emergency Management Agency to act as the Federal Coordinating Officer 
for this declared disaster.
    I do hereby determine the following areas of the Federated States 
of Micronesia to have been affected adversely by this declared major 
disaster: Yap Proper and Ulithi Atoll of Yap State for Public 
Assistance.

(Catalog of Federal Domestic Assistance No. 83.516, Disaster 
Assistance.)
James L. Witt,
Director.
[FR Doc. 97-7041 Filed 3-19-97; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 6718-02-P
```
# hehexrpd.0909a
```

[Congressional Bills 116th Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
[H. Res. 1072 Engrossed in House (EH)]

<DOC>
H. Res. 1072

                In the House of Representatives, U. S.,

                                                         July 30, 2020.
    Resolved, That the following named Members be, and are hereby, elected to 
the following standing committees of the House of Representatives:
    Committee on Agriculture: Mr. Balderson.
    Committee on Foreign Affairs: Mr. Green of Tennessee.
    Committee on Homeland Security: Mr. Garcia of California.
    Committee on Natural Resources: Mr. Stauber.
            Attest:

                                                                          Clerk.
```
#### Marcia WILSON, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. State of HAWAII; et al., Defendants-Appellees.

No. 17-16264

United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.

Submitted January 16, 2018 *

Filed January 19, 2018

Marcia Wilson, Pro Se

*502Claire W.S. Chinn, AGHI — Office of the Attorney General Hawaii, Honolulu, HI, for Defendants-Appellees

Before: REINHARDT, TROTT, and HURWITZ, Circuit Judges.

*

**The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. *See*Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).

MEMORANDUM ***

Marcia Wilson appeals pro se from the district court’s summary judgment in her employment action alleging violations of Title VII. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review de novo. *Bradley v. Harcourt, Brace & Co.,*104 F.3d 267, 269 (9th Cir. 1996). We affirm.

The district court properly granted summary judgment on Wilson’s Title VTI retaliation claim related to her suspension in October 2012 because Wilson' failed to raise a genuine dispute of material fact as to whether there was a causal connection between any alleged protected activity and the alleged adverse employment action. *See Bergene v. Salt River Project Agric. Improvement & Power Dist.,*272 F.3d 1136, 1140-41 (9th Cir. 2001) (setting forth prima facie case of retaliation under Title VII).

The district court properly granted summary judgment on Wilson’s Title VII retaliation claim related to the termination of her employment because Wilson failed to raise a genuine dispute of material fact as to whether defendants’ legitimate, non-discriminatory reasons for their actions were pretextual. *See id.*(explaining application of burden-shifting to Title VII retaliation claims); *Bradley,*104 F.3d at 270 (to avoid summary judgment, a plaintiff must “produce specific, substantial evidence of pretext” (citation and internal quotation marks omitted)).

The district court properly granted summary judgment on Wilson’s Title VII discrimination claim related to the termination of her employment because Wilson failed to raise a genuine dispute of material fact as to whether similarly situated employees not of her protected class were treated more favorably. *See Bergene,*272 F.3d at 1140 (elements of prima facie case of discrimination under Title VII).

We do not consider arguments and allegations raised for the first time on appeal. *See Padgett v. Wright,*587 F.3d 983, 985 n.2 (9th Cir. 2009).

AFFIRMED.

***

 pjjjg disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
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</TABLE>
UNPUBLISHED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 04-7309

ROBERT LEE DAVIS, Plaintiff - Appellant,

versus MICHAEL WADE, Sheriff Henrico County; LINDA RAY, Medical Director; DR. OFOGH, Chief Medical Doctor; PHY-AMERICAN CORRECTIONAL HEALTHCARE, INCORPORATED, Defendants - Appellees.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia, at Alexandria. Claude M. Hilton, District Judge. (CA-02-165-1)
Submitted: January 27, 2005 Decided: February 2, 2005
Before LUTTIG and DUNCAN, Circuit Judges, and HAMILTON, Senior Circuit Judge.
Dismissed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
Robert Lee Davis, Appellant Pro Se. William Fisher Etherington, BEALE, BALFOUR, DAVIDSON & ETHERINGTON, P.C., Richmond, Virginia; M. Pierce Rucker, II, Todd David Anderson, SANDS, ANDERSON, MARKS & MILLER, Richmond, Virginia, for Appellees.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit. See Local Rule 36(c).- 2 - PER CURIAM: Robert Lee Davis seeks to appeal the district court’s order granting summary judgment for defendants in a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2000) action. We dismiss the appeal for lack of jurisdiction because the notice of appeal was not timely filed. Parties are accorded thirty days after the entry of the district court’s final judgment or order to note an appeal, Fed. R. App. P. 4(a)(1)(A), unless the district court extends the appeal period under Fed. R. App. P. 4(a)(5) or reopens the appeal period under Fed. R. App. P. 4(a)(6). This appeal period is “mandatory and jurisdictional.” Browder v. Director, Dep’t of Corr. , 434 U.S. 257, 264 (1978) (quoting United States v. Robinson , 361 U.S. 220, 229 (1960)). In this case, the district court, by order entered 287 days after entry of judgment, attempted to reopen the appeal period. However, all the conditions set forth in Fed. R. App. P. 4(a)(6) were not satisfied, in that no motion was filed, the district court made no finding as to prejudice, and the court’s order was entered beyond the 180-day time period. In addition, the notice of appeal itself was not filed within fourteen days of the order, as the rule requires. Thus, the district court lacked jurisdiction to reopen the appeal period and the appeal must be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction. We deny Davis’s motion to amend issues on appeal. We- 3 - dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before the court and argument would not aid the decisional process.

DISMISSED
### Michigan Supreme Court Lansing, Michigan

Marilyn Kelly,
Chief Justice

Michael F. Cavanag h

Elizabeth A. Weave r

Maura D. Corriga n Robert P. Young, Jr. Stephen J. Markma n Diane M. Hathaway,

J ustices

I, Corbin R. Davis, Clerk of the Mi chigan Supreme Cour t, certify that the foregoing is a true and complete copy of the order entered at the direction of the Court.

_______________________________________ __ Clerk October 26, 2009

1019 

# Order

October 26, 2009

139496

PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN, Plaintiff-Appellee,

v SC: 139496 COA: 292010 Wayne CC: 08-000674 DONTAE COOK, Defendant-Appellant.

________________ _______________ __________/

On order of the Court, the application for leave to appe al the June 24, 2009 order of the Court of Appeals is considered, and it is DENIED, because we are not persuaded that the question presented should be reviewed by this Court.
UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 96-7302

RICHARD R. MCCLEARY,

Petitioner - Appellant,

versus

EARL D. BESHEARS; ATTORNEY GENERAL OF THE

STATE OF MARYLAND,

Respondents - Appellees.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of

Maryland, at Baltimore. Frederic N. Smalkin, District Judge. (CA96-1572-S)

Submitted: August 5, 1997 Decided: August 27, 1997

Before WILKINS and WILLIAMS, Circuit Judges, and PHILLIPS, Senior

Circuit Judge.

Dismissed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

Richard R. McCleary, Appellant Pro Se. Tarra R. DeShields-Minnis,

OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES ATTORNEY, Baltimore, Maryland, for

Appellees.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.

See Local Rule 36(c).
2

PER CURIAM:

Appellant seeks to appeal the district court's order denying

relief on his petition filed under 28 U.S.C.A. § 2254 (West 1994 &

Supp. 1997). We have reviewed the record and the district court's

opinion and find no reversible error. Accordingly, we deny a certificate of appealability and dismiss the appeal on the reasoning

of the district court. McCleary v. Beshears, No. CA-96-1572-S (D.

Md. July 30, 1996). We deny Appellant's motion for appointment of

counsel. We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal

contentions are adequately presented in the materials before the

court and argument would not aid the decisional process.

DISMISSED
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF MONTANA

No. DA 23-0733

STATE OF MONTANA, 

Plaintiff and Appellee, 

vs. 

CELEVE ERNEST SPANG,

Defendant and Appellant.

ORDER

Upon consideration of Appellant’s motion for extension of time, 

and good cause appearing,

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Appellant is granted an extension 

of time to and including October 3, 2024, within which to prepare, file, 

and serve Appellant’s opening brief on appeal.

Electronically signed by:

Mike McGrath

Chief Justice, Montana Supreme Court

August 29 2024

08/29/2024

Case Number: DA 23-0733