J-S57029-14

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

IN THE INTEREST OF: T.S.A., A MINOR IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

PENNSYLVANIA

APPEAL OF: J.B., MOTHER

No. 638 EDA 2014

Appeal from the Decree January 15, 2014

In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County

Family Court at No(s): CP-51-AP-0000727-2013

 CP-51-DP-0001514-2012

IN THE INTEREST OF: D.K.R., A MINOR IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

PENNSYLVANIA

APPEAL OF: J.B., MOTHER

No. 639 EDA 2014

Appeal from the Decree January 15, 2014

In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County

Family Court at No(s): CP-51-AP-0000728-2013

 CP-51-DP-0001512-2012

IN THE INTEREST OF: T.M.A., A MINOR IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

PENNSYLVANIA

APPEAL OF: J.B., MOTHER

No. 640 EDA 2014
J-S57029-14

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Appeal from the Decree January 15, 2014

In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County

Family Court at No(s): CP-51-AP-0000729-2013

 CP-51-DP-0001513-2012

BEFORE: DONOHUE, J., MUNDY, J., and STABILE, J.

MEMORANDUM BY MUNDY, J.: FILED MARCH 03, 2015

Appellant, J.B. (Mother), appeals from the January 15, 2014 decrees 

involuntarily terminating her parental rights, and the January 15, 2014 

orders changing the permanency goals to adoption with respect to her sons, 

D.K.R., born in August 2006, and T.M.A., born in September 2009, and her 

daughter, T.S.A., born in June 2012 (collectively, the Children).1 After 

careful review, we affirm.

The trial court aptly set forth the factual history of this case in its 

opinion, which we adopt herein. See generally Trial Court Opinion, 

4/21/14, at 1-9. We summarize the relevant procedural history of this case 

as follows. On December 27, 2013, the Philadelphia Department of Human 

Services, Children and Youth Division (DHS), filed separate petitions for the 

involuntary termination of Mother’s parental rights and for a goal change to 

adoption. The trial court held a hearing on the petitions on January 15, 

2014, during which DHS presented the testimony of its caseworker, Betsy 

____________________________________________

1 On January 15, 2014, the trial court entered a decree involuntarily 

terminating the parental rights of D.K.R.’s natural father, R.R. On March 12, 

2014, the trial court entered decrees involuntarily terminating the parental 

rights of T.M.A.’s and T.S.A.’s natural father, A.A. Mother testified that A.A. 

died in October 2012, prior to the subject proceeding. N.T., 1/15/14, at 43-

44. Neither R.R. nor A.A. is a party to this appeal.
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Lee, and foster care agency caseworker, Amina Huff.2 The Child Advocate 

presented the testimony of T.M., the Children’s foster mother. Mother

testified on her own behalf. 

By decrees dated and entered on January 15, 2014, the trial court 

involuntarily terminated Mother’s parental rights pursuant to 23 Pa.C.S.A. 

§ 2511(a)(1), (2), (5), (8), and (b).3 By orders dated January 15, 2014, the 

court changed the Children’s goal to adoption. On February 18, 2014, 

Mother timely filed notices of appeal and concise statements of errors 

complained of on appeal pursuant to Pennsylvania Rule of Appellate 

Procedure 1925(a)(2)(i), which this Court consolidated sua sponte.

4

 See 

generally Pa.R.A.P. 513.

____________________________________________

2 Counsel for the parties stipulated that, if called to testify by DHS, the 

witnesses would testify consistent with the Statement of Facts attached as 

Exhibit A to the involuntary termination petitions. N.T., 1/15/14, at 6. 

3 We observe that the trial court sent the certified record to this Court more 

than one month past the date it was due. Therefore, despite diligence by 

this Court, the processing of this appeal has been delayed. 

4 As noted above, the trial court entered its final decrees terminating

Mother’s parental rights to the Children and orders changing the 

permanency goal to adoption on Thursday, January 15, 2014. The trial 

court’s docket indicates that notices of entry of all of the decrees and orders 

were served on Mother by hand delivery on that same day. See generally 

Pa.R.C.P. 236 (directing the prothonotary to immediately provide each party 

and/or counsel with notice of the entry of an order and to note the same in 

the docket). Therefore, Mother’s notices of appeal were due on Friday, 

February 14, 2014. See generally Pa.R.A.P. 903(a). However, upon 

informal inquiry, this Court has learned that the trial court was closed on 

February 14, 2014 due to inclement weather. Additionally, Monday, 

(Footnote Continued Next Page)
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On appeal, Mother presents the following two issues for our review.

1. Whether the trial court committed error by 

involuntarily terminating [M]other’s parental rights 

where such determination was not supported by 

clear and convincing evidence establishing grounds 

for termination under the Adoption Act, 23 Pa.C.S.A. 

§ 2511(a)(1), (a)(2), (a)(5), and (a)(8)?

2. Whether the trial court committed error by 

involuntarily terminating [M]other’s parental rights 

and changing the permanency goal from 

reunification with the parent to adoption without 

giving primary consideration to the developmental, 

physical and emotional needs and welfare of the 

children as required by the Adoption Act, 23 

Pa.C.S.A. § 2511(b)?

Mother’s Brief at 5.

The crux of Mother’s argument on appeal is that DHS did not satisfy its 

burden of proof with respect to the goal change to adoption and the 

involuntary termination of her parental rights because DHS failed to provide 

reasonable efforts to reunify her with the Children. Mother’s Brief at 18. We 

first address Mother’s argument with respect to the change of goal orders, 

which we review according to the following standard of review.

In cases involving a court’s order changing the 

placement goal ... to adoption, our standard of 

review is abuse of discretion. To hold that the trial 

court abused its discretion, we must determine its 

(Footnote Continued) _______________________

February 17, 2014 was President’s Day, a Commonwealth holiday. It is 

axiomatic that when calculating a filing period, government holidays are 

excluded. 1 Pa.C.S.A. § 1908. Therefore, Mother had until Tuesday, 

February 18, 2014 to timely file her notices of appeal. As a result, we are 

satisfied that we possess appellate jurisdiction in this case.
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judgment was manifestly unreasonable, that the 

court disregarded the law, or that its action was a 

result of partiality, prejudice, bias or ill will. While 

this Court is bound by the facts determined in the 

trial court, we are not tied to the court’s inferences, 

deductions and conclusions; we have a responsibility 

to ensure that the record represents a 

comprehensive inquiry and that the hearing judge 

has applied the appropriate legal principles to that 

record. Therefore, our scope of review is broad. 

In re S.B., 943 A.2d 973, 977 (Pa. Super. 2008) (citations omitted), appeal 

denied, 959 A.2d 320 (Pa. 2008); accord In re R.J.T., 9 A.3d 1179, 1190 

(Pa. 2010). 

This matter is controlled by the Juvenile Act5, which was amended in 

1998 to conform to the federal Adoption and Safe Families Act (ASFA).6 In 

re M.S., 980 A.2d 612, 615 (Pa. Super. 2009), appeal denied, 985 A.2d 220 

(Pa. 2009). With respect to the two acts, we have recognized the following. 

Both statutes are compatible pieces of legislation 

seeking to benefit the best interest of the child, not 

the parent .... ASFA promotes the reunification of 

foster care children with their natural parents when 

feasible .... Pennsylvania’s Juvenile Act focuses upon 

reunification of the family, which means that the 

unity of the family shall be preserved “whenever 

possible.” 

Id., citing 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 6301(b)(1). As such, child welfare agencies are 

required to make reasonable efforts to return a foster child to his or her 

____________________________________________

5 42 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 6301-6375.

6 42 U.S.C. §§ 671-679.
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biological parent. In re N.C., 909 A.2d 818, 823 (Pa. Super. 2006). When 

those efforts fail, the agency “must redirect its efforts toward placing the 

child in an adoptive home.” Id. (citation omitted). 

At permanency review hearings for dependent children removed from 

the parental home, a trial court must consider the following factors.

§ 6351. Disposition of dependent child

...

(f) Matters to be determined at permanency 

hearing.—

At each permanency hearing, a court shall determine 

all of the following:

(1) The continuing necessity for and 

appropriateness of the placement.

(2) The appropriateness, feasibility and extent 

of compliance with the permanency plan 

developed for the child.

(3) The extent of progress made toward 

alleviating the circumstances which 

necessitated the original placement.

(4) The appropriateness and feasibility of the 

current placement goal for the child.

(5) The likely date by which the placement 

goal for the child might be achieved.

(5.1) Whether reasonable efforts were made to 

finalize the permanency plan in effect.

(6) Whether the child is safe.

...
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(9) If the child has been in placement for at 

least 15 of the last 22 months or the court has 

determined that aggravated circumstances 

exist and that reasonable efforts to prevent or 

eliminate the need to remove the child from 

the child’s parent, guardian or custodian or to 

preserve and reunify the family need not be 

made or continue to be made, whether the 

county agency has filed or sought to join a 

petition to terminate parental rights and to 

identify, recruit, process and approve a 

qualified family to adopt the child ....

42 Pa.C.S.A. § 6351(f). “These statutory mandates clearly place the trial 

court’s focus on the best interests of the child.” S.B., supra at 978 (citation 

omitted). We have stated, “[s]afety, permanency, and well-being of the 

child must take precedence over all other considerations.” Id. (citation 

omitted) (emphasis in original). Moreover, the burden is on the child 

welfare agency “to prove the change in goal would be in the child’s best 

interest.” In re D.P., 972 A.2d 1221, 1227 (Pa. Super. 2009) (citation 

omitted).

Instantly, we conclude the record evidence demonstrates that DHS 

made reasonable efforts to reunify Mother with the Children. Further, the 

trial court did not commit an error of law or abuse its discretion in changing 

the Children’s permanency goals to adoption. Betsy Lee, the DHS 

caseworker, testified that DHS provided In Home Protective Services to this 

family after learning that Mother tested positive for cocaine when she gave 

birth to her youngest child, T.S.A., in June 2012, and that Mother suffered 

from bipolar disorder but was not receiving mental health care. N.T., 
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1/15/14, at 9. On August 20, 2012, after Mother had missed multiple 

medical appointments for T.S.A., DHS sent a nurse to Mother’s home who 

found that T.S.A. had a low birth weight. Id. at 10; Petition for Involuntary 

Termination of Parental Rights, Exhibit A, at ¶¶ f-j. As a result, T.S.A. was 

admitted to St. Christopher’s Hospital. 

On August 23, 2012, DHS removed the Children from Mother’s custody 

after learning that she refused to comply with a safety plan developed by 

DHS for the Children. N.T., 1/15/14, at 11; Petition for Involuntary 

Termination of Parental Rights, Exhibit A, at ¶¶ o-q. On August 24, 2012, 

DHS referred Mother to the Clinical Evaluation Unit (CEU). Petition for 

Involuntary Termination of Parental Rights, Exhibit A, at ¶ r. Following an 

evaluation at the CEU, Mother was diagnosed with cocaine and alcohol 

dependence. Id. at ¶ s. The CEU recommended that Mother participate in 

inpatient treatment at the Gaudenzia Diagnostic Rehabilitation Center 

(Gaudenzia) in Philadelphia. Id. 

On August 29, 2012, the trial court adjudicated the Children 

dependent. Lee testified that the permanency goal for this family was 

reunification. N.T., 1/15/14, at 12. DHS established Family Service Plan 

(FSP) objectives for Mother including participating in a parenting program 

and in a drug and alcohol program. Id. at 13. Further, Mother was to 

obtain a psychological evaluation and to follow all recommendations. Id.; 

Petition for Involuntary Termination of Parental Rights, Exhibit A, at ¶ u. In 
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addition, DHS arranged for supervised visits on a biweekly basis for Mother 

and the Children. Petition for Involuntary Termination of Parental Rights, 

Exhibit A, at ¶ t. In total, DHS held FSP meetings in September and 

December of 2012, and in July of 2013. Id. at ¶¶ u, x, bb. 

In September of 2012, DHS referred Mother to the Achieving 

Reunification Center (ARC) for parenting classes. N.T., 1/15/14, at 13. Lee 

testified that she met with Mother after becoming the caseworker for this 

family in January 2013 and that Mother told her she did not want to continue 

participating with ARC. Id. at 15. On March 7, 2013, ARC closed Mother’s 

case for non-participation. Id. at 16-17; Petition for Involuntary 

Termination of Parental Rights, Exhibit A, at ¶ z. Lee testified that DHS 

provided Mother tokens for transportation but that she reduced Mother’s 

tokens upon learning that she had stopped participating with ARC. N.T., 

1/15/14, at 27-28. Lee testified that after she reduced Mother’s tokens, she 

never heard from Mother again. Id. 

In addition, the record reveals that the foster care agency established 

an Individual Service Plan (ISP) for Mother including attending visits with the 

Children, attending and completing parenting classes, securing appropriate 

housing, and attending and completing drug rehabilitation. Id. at DHS 

Exhibit 11. Lee testified that DHS changed the Children’s goal to adoption 

two days before the subject proceeding because Mother failed to comply 

with her objectives. Id. at 21-22. The competent testimonial evidence 
J-S57029-14

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reveals that the only FSP and ISP objective Mother satisfied was consistently 

attending supervised visits. Id. at 30.

Indeed, with respect to her mental health objective, Mother testified 

she is diagnosed with “bipolar depressive” disorder, and she is not receiving 

treatment for it. N.T., 1/15/14, at 50-51. Mother implied she does not have 

medical insurance. Id. at 51. Moreover, Mother testified she has not 

requested that DHS help her acquire medication for her mental health 

needs. Id. With respect to housing, Mother testified she lives in a room 

that she rents and that the room is not large enough for the Children to live 

with her. Id. at 51-52. With respect to parenting classes, Mother testified 

she did not complete the program at ARC. Id. at 52. Further, with respect 

to the drug and alcohol program, Mother testified that, although she 

completed the program at Gaudenzia, she did not complete the program at

ACT Recovery House, which Gaudenzia had recommended. Id. at 52-54, 

57. 

Based on the foregoing record evidence, we conclude that DHS made 

reasonable efforts to reunify Mother with the Children by providing in-home 

services, developing a safety plan, setting the Children’s permanency goal as 

reunification, establishing FSP objectives, holding FSP meetings to review 

Mother’s progress, and providing transportation tokens to help her comply 

with her objectives. Our case law is clear that the Commonwealth has not 

“made itself guarantor of the success of the efforts to help parents assume 
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their parental duties.” In re A.L.D., 797 A.2d 326, 340 (Pa. Super. 2002) 

(citation omitted). Likewise, a parent has an affirmative duty to cooperate 

with DHS. Id. Here, the record demonstrates Mother has failed to 

cooperate with DHS in satisfying her FSP and ISP objectives and by stopping 

all communication with Lee in early 2013. N.T., 1/15/14, at 27-28. We 

therefore conclude DHS fulfilled its mandate to provide reasonable efforts. 

In addition, we discern no abuse of discretion by the court in changing 

the Children’s permanency goals to adoption. Lee testified that the Children 

reside in a pre-adoptive foster home, where their needs are met. N.T., 

1/15/14, at 3, 5. The oldest child, D.K.R., who was in first grade at the time 

of the hearing, receives therapy for extreme sexual behavior. Id. at 3-4. 

Lee testified that, as a result of his behavior, DHS planned to move him to 

another foster home where he will be the only child or the youngest child. 

Id. at 4. Lee testified she is “hoping that [D.K.R.’s] behaviors will get better 

with therapy, as therapy goes along. He just began medication so we hope 

that his behaviors will get better and he can soon return to ... his brother.” 

Id. T.M., the Children’s foster mother, testified that, “once they get some 

help for [D.K.R.], he is welcome back into my home.” Id. at 44. Lee 

testified that T.M.A. does not have any special needs. Id. at 4-5. With 

respect to T.S.A., although Child Link Services monitors her because of her 

diagnosis of failure to thrive during infancy, Lee testified that T.S.A. is doing 

fine. Id. at 5. Based on the totality of the record evidence, we conclude 
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that changing the permanency goals to adoption furthers the safety, 

permanency, and well-being of the Children who had been in placement for 

nearly seventeen months at the time of the hearing. See S.B., supra.

We next review the termination decrees according to the following 

standard of review.

[A]ppellate courts must apply an abuse of discretion 

standard when considering a trial court’s 

determination of a petition for termination of 

parental rights. As in dependency cases, our 

standard of review requires an appellate court to 

accept the findings of fact and credibility 

determinations of the trial court if they are supported

by the record. In re R.J.T., 608 Pa. 9, 9 A.3d 1179, 

1190 (Pa. 2010). If the factual findings are 

supported, appellate courts review to determine if 

the trial court made an error of law or abused its 

discretion. Id.; R.I.S., 36 A.3d [567,] 572 [(Pa. 

2011) (plurality)]. As has been often stated, an 

abuse of discretion does not result merely because 

the reviewing court might have reached a different 

conclusion. Id.; see also Samuel Bassett v. Kia 

Motors America, Inc., 34 A.3d 1, 51 ([Pa.] 2011); 

Christianson v. Ely, 838 A.2d 630, 634 (Pa. 2003). 

Instead, a decision may be reversed for an abuse of 

discretion only upon demonstration of manifest 

unreasonableness, partiality, prejudice, bias, or illwill. Id.

As we discussed in R.J.T., there are clear reasons for 

applying an abuse of discretion standard of review in 

these cases. We observed that, unlike trial courts, 

appellate courts are not equipped to make the factspecific determinations on a cold record, where the 

trial judges are observing the parties during the 

relevant hearing and often presiding over numerous 

other hearings regarding the child and parents. 

R.J.T., 9 A.3d at 1190. Therefore, even where the 

facts could support an opposite result, as is often the 

case in dependency and termination cases, an 
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appellate court must resist the urge to second guess 

the trial court and impose its own credibility 

determinations and judgment; instead we must defer 

to the trial judges so long as the factual findings are 

supported by the record and the court’s legal 

conclusions are not the result of an error of law or an 

abuse of discretion. In re Adoption of Atencio, 

539 Pa. 161, 165, 650 A.2d 1064, 1066 (Pa. 1994).

In re Adoption of S.P., 47 A.3d 817, 826–827 (Pa. 2012).

Termination of parental rights is governed by Section 2511 of the 

Adoption Act, which requires a bifurcated analysis.

Our case law has made clear that under Section 

2511, the court must engage in a bifurcated process 

prior to terminating parental rights. Initially, the 

focus is on the conduct of the parent. The party 

seeking termination must prove by clear and 

convincing evidence that the parent’s conduct 

satisfies the statutory grounds for termination 

delineated in Section 2511(a). Only if the court 

determines that the parent’s conduct warrants 

termination of his or her parental rights does the 

court engage in the second part of the analysis 

pursuant to Section 2511(b): determination of the 

needs and welfare of the child under the standard of 

best interests of the child. One major aspect of the 

needs and welfare analysis concerns the nature and 

status of the emotional bond between parent and 

child, with close attention paid to the effect on the 

child of permanently severing any such bond.

In re L.M., 923 A.2d 505, 511 (Pa. Super. 2007), citing 23 Pa.C.S.A. 

§ 2511. The burden is on the petitioner to prove by clear and convincing 

evidence that the asserted statutory grounds for seeking the termination of 

parental rights are valid. In re R.N.J., 985 A.2d 273, 276 (Pa. Super. 

2009).
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It is well-established that child welfare agencies must make reasonable 

efforts to reunify a parent with his or her child prior to filing a termination 

petition. In re Adoption of R.J.S., 901 A.2d 502, 507 (Pa. Super. 2006) 

(citation omitted). However, the failure of an agency to provide such efforts 

for reunification does not preclude the termination of parental rights. In the 

Interest of D.C.D., --- A.3d ---, 2014 WL 7089267, *10 (Pa. 2014). We 

also note that the duties of agencies have reasonable limits. “If a parent 

fails to cooperate or appears incapable of benefiting from reasonable efforts 

supplied over a realistic period of time, the agency has fulfilled its mandate 

and upon proof of satisfaction of the reasonable good faith effort, the 

termination petition may be granted.” A.L.D., supra.

Instantly, as discussed above, we conclude that DHS made reasonable 

efforts to reunify Mother with the Children prior to filing the termination 

petitions. Further, we conclude that the trial court properly terminated 

Mother’s parental rights pursuant to Section 2511(a)(2) and (b), which 

provide as follows.

§ 2511. Grounds for involuntary termination

(a) General Rule.—The rights of a parent in regard 

to a child may be terminated after a petition filed on 

any of the following grounds:

...

(2) The repeated and continued incapacity, 

abuse, neglect or refusal of the parent has 

caused the child to be without essential 

parental care, control or subsistence necessary 
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for his physical or mental well-being and the 

conditions and causes of the incapacity, abuse, 

neglect or refusal cannot or will not be 

remedied by the parent.

...

(b) Other considerations.--The court in 

terminating the rights of a parent shall give primary 

consideration to the developmental, physical and 

emotional needs and welfare of the child. The rights 

of a parent shall not be terminated solely on the 

basis of environmental factors such as inadequate 

housing, furnishings, income, clothing and medical 

care if found to be beyond the control of the parent. 

With respect to any petition filed pursuant to 

subsection (a)(1), (6) or (8), the court shall not 

consider any efforts by the parent to remedy the 

conditions described therein which are first initiated 

subsequent to the giving of notice of the filing of the 

petition.

23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2511(a)(2), (b); see also In re B.L.W., 843 A.2d 380, 384 

(Pa. Super. 2004) (en banc) (stating that this Court need only agree with 

any one subsection of 2511(a), in addition to Section 2511(b), in order to 

affirm the termination of parental rights), appeal denied, 863 A.2d 1141 (Pa. 

2004).

To satisfy the requirements of Section 2511(a)(2), the moving party 

must produce clear and convincing evidence regarding the following. 

(1) repeated and continued incapacity, abuse, 

neglect or refusal; (2) such incapacity, abuse, 

neglect or refusal caused the child to be without 

essential parental care, control or subsistence 

necessary for his physical or mental well-being; and 

(3) the causes of the incapacity, abuse, neglect or 

refusal cannot or will not be remedied. 
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In re Adoption of M.E.P., 825 A.2d 1266, 1272 (Pa. Super. 2003) (citation 

omitted). “The grounds for termination [of parental rights under Section 

2511(a)(2),] due to parental incapacity that cannot be remedied, are not 

limited to affirmative misconduct; to the contrary those grounds may include 

acts of refusal as well as incapacity to perform parental duties.” A.L.D., 

supra at 337 (citation omitted). 

With respect to Section 2511(b), the requisite analysis is as follows. 

Subsection 2511(b) focuses on whether termination 

of parental rights would best serve the 

developmental, physical, and emotional needs and 

welfare of the child. In In re C.M.S., 884 A.2d 

1284, 1287 (Pa. Super. 2005), this Court stated, 

“Intangibles such as love, comfort, security, and 

stability are involved in the inquiry into the needs 

and welfare of the child.” In addition, we instructed 

that the trial court must also discern the nature and 

status of the parent-child bond, with utmost 

attention to the effect on the child of permanently 

severing that bond. Id. However, in cases where 

there is no evidence of a bond between a parent and 

child, it is reasonable to infer that no bond exists. 

In re K.Z.S., 946 A.2d 753, 762-63 (Pa. Super. 

2008). Accordingly, the extent of the bond-effect 

analysis necessarily depends on the circumstances of 

the particular case. Id. at 63.

In re Adoption of J.M., 991 A.2d 321, 324 (Pa. Super. 2010).

In this case, the record evidence demonstrates that Mother’s repeated 

and continued incapacity, neglect, and refusal to comply with her FSP and 

ISP objectives have caused the Children to be without essential parental 

care, control or subsistence necessary for their physical or mental wellbeing. Further, the causes of the incapacity, neglect or refusal cannot or will 
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not be remedied.7 As such, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in

terminating Mother’s parental rights pursuant to 2511(a)(2). See S.P., 

supra.

With respect to Section 2511(b), Mother argues the record evidence 

does not support termination because DHS did not present expert testimony 

or a bonding evaluation. We disagree. It is well-established that, when 

evaluating a parental bond, “the court is not required to use expert 

testimony. Social workers and caseworkers can offer evaluations as well. 

Additionally, Section 2511(b) does not require a formal bonding evaluation.” 

In re Z.P., 994 A.2d 1108, 1115-1116 (Pa. Super. 2010) (internal citations 

omitted). 

Moreover, our Supreme Court has explained that, “the mere existence 

of a bond or attachment of a child to a parent will not necessarily result in 

the denial of a termination petition.” In re T.S.M., 71 A.3d 251, 267 (Pa. 

2013). The Court further stated that, “[c]ommon sense dictates that courts 

considering termination must also consider whether the children are in a 

pre-adoptive home and whether they have a bond with their foster parents.” 

Id. at 268 (citation omitted). The Court directed that, in weighing the bond 

considerations pursuant to Section 2511(b), “courts must keep the ticking 

____________________________________________

7 Notably, Lee testified that Mother has eleven children in total, and that 

none of them reside with her. N.T., 1/15/14, at 34. Mother’s parental rights 

have been terminated as to three of her older children. Petition for 

Involuntary Termination of Parental Rights, Exhibit A, at ¶¶ a-c.
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clock of childhood ever in mind.” The Court observed that, “[c]hildren are

young for a scant number of years, and we have an obligation to see to their 

healthy development quickly. When courts fail ... the result, all too often, is 

catastrophically maladjusted children.” Id. at 269. 

In this case, the testimonial evidence reveals the Children know 

Mother who consistently attended supervised visits with them during their 

placement.8 Indeed, they refer to Mother as “Mom.” N.T., 1/15/14, at 31, 

41. However, Amina Huff, who supervised visits for the foster care agency, 

testified that the Children are “[v]ery attached to the foster [m]om.” Id. at 

39. Huff testified as follows.

Q. Do you feel there would be any detrimental effect 

on any one of the three children if the parental rights 

were terminated?

A. No.

Q. Why do you say that?

A. Because just with the attachment they have with 

the foster parent. I don’t see it ever being like that 

with either of the parents.

Id. at 40. Likewise, Lee testified there would not be any negative effect on 

the Children if Mother’s parental rights are terminated. Id. at 25. She 

____________________________________________

8

Lee testified that Mother was incarcerated from September to December of 

2013, and that she did maintain communication with the Children during 

that time. N.T., 1/15/14, at 19-20. Mother testified that she was arrested 

for aggravated assault as a result of a dispute with R.R., the father of D.K.R. 

Mother testified that she is not on probation or parole and that the charge 

resulting from the domestic dispute is fully resolved. Id. at 49.
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testified the Children exhibit a mother/child bond with their foster mother. 

Id. at 24. Lee explained why it would not be detrimental to the Children to 

terminate Mother’s parental rights as follows.

The [C]hildren don’t seem like they are really 

attached to Mom on that level. They go about their 

everyday life when I see them. It doesn’t make a 

difference. They are not asking about Mom. They 

are not saying, when can I see my Mom again? 

When she was incarcerated, they didn’t ask to see 

her or anything. They seemed to do just fine 

without [her].

Id. at 25. 

Based upon our thorough review, we discern no abuse of discretion by 

the trial court in concluding that terminating Mother’s parental rights “would 

best serve the developmental, physical, and emotional needs and welfare” of 

the Children. The record testimony reveals the existence of a bond with the 

foster mother and more importantly, a lack of bond between Mother and the 

Children. See, e.g., J.M., supra. We further observe that, although the 

Child Advocate did not file a brief in this appeal, the Child Advocate stated 

on the record in open court at the conclusion of the hearing that DHS met its 

burden of proof with respect to the involuntary termination of Mother’s 

parental rights. See S.P., supra. As a result, Mother’s issues on appeal 

fail.

Based on the foregoing, we conclude all of Mother’s issues are devoid 

of merit. Accordingly, the trial court’s January 15, 2014 decrees 
J-S57029-14

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involuntarily terminating Mother’s parental rights and orders changing the 

permanency goals to adoption are affirmed.

Decrees affirmed. Orders affirmed.

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 3/3/2015