MEMORANDUM DECISION

Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D), this 

Memorandum Decision shall not be regarded as 

precedent or cited before any court except for the 

purpose of establishing the defense of res judicata, 

collateral estoppel, or the law of the case.

ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT

Kristin R. Willadsen

Muncie, Indiana

ATTORNEY FOR APPELLEE

Gregory F. Zoeller

Attorney General of Indiana

Robert J. Henke

David E. Corey

Deputy Attorneys General

Indianapolis, Indiana

I N T H E

COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA

In the Matter of the Termination 

of the Parent-Child Relationship 

of: I.B., B.B., and W.B.

and

M.T.,

Appellant-Respondent,

v.

The Indiana Department of Child 

Services,

Appellee-Petitioner

February 13, 2015

Court of Appeals Case No.

18A02-1406-JT-446

Appeal from the Delaware Circuit 

Court

The Honorable Kimberly S. Dowling

The Honorable Brian Pierce

Cause Nos. 18C02-1308-JT-21

18C02-1308-JT-22

18C02-1308-JT-23

Bailey, Judge.
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Case Summary

[1] M.T. (“Mother”) appeals the termination of her parental rights to I.B., B.B., 

and W.B. (“the Children”), upon the petition of the Delaware County 

Department of Child Services (“the DCS”). She presents the sole issue of 

whether the DCS established, by clear and convincing evidence, the requisite 

statutory elements to support the termination decision. We affirm.

 Facts and Procedural History

[2] In 2011, the Children were adjudicated Children in Need of Services 

(“CHINS”), partially because of Mother’s abuse of alcohol. Mother 

participated in services and the Children were returned to her care in December 

of 2011. On November 16, 2012, Mother was arrested after her two-week 

drinking binge caused one of the Children to contact relatives. The DCS placed 

the Children with family members1 and, on November 26, 2012, the Children 

were again found to be CHINS.

[3] Mother participated in some alcohol treatment services, but continued to 

relapse. During the pendency of the CHINS proceedings, Mother was arrested 

five times. Also, the DCS received reports that Mother had twice been 

admitted, in an intoxicated state, to a local hospital.

 

1

Father was incarcerated on a driving while intoxicated charge.
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[4] On August 12, 2013, DCS family case manager Susan Brown (“Brown”) went 

to Mother’s home and found her intoxicated. Mother admitted having been on 

a drinking binge for two and one-half days. The next day, the DCS petitioned 

to terminate Mother’s parental rights. 

[5] On April 11, 2014, an evidentiary hearing was conducted. Mother was not 

present. On May 23, 2014, the trial court entered findings of fact, conclusions 

of law, and orders terminating Mother’s parental rights.2 She now appeals.

Discussion and Decision

Standard of Review

[6] Our standard of review is highly deferential in cases concerning the termination 

of parental rights. In re K.S., 750 N.E.2d 832, 836 (Ind. Ct. App. 2001). This 

Court will not set aside the trial court’s judgment terminating a parent-child 

relationship unless it is clearly erroneous. In re A.A.C., 682 N.E.2d 542, 544 

(Ind. Ct. App. 1997). When reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence to 

support a judgment of involuntary termination of a parent-child relationship, 

we neither reweigh the evidence nor judge the credibility of the witnesses. Id. 

We consider only the evidence that supports the judgment and the reasonable 

inferences to be drawn therefrom. Id.

 

2 By this time, the DCS plan for the Children was reunification with their father. 
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Requirements for Involuntary Termination of Parental Rights

[7] Parental rights are of a constitutional dimension, but the law provides for the 

termination of those rights when the parents are unable or unwilling to meet 

their parental responsibilities. Bester v. Lake Cnty. Office of Family & Children, 839 

N.E.2d 143, 147 (Ind. 2005). The purpose of terminating parental rights is not 

to punish the parents, but to protect their children. In re L.S., 717 N.E.2d 204, 

208 (Ind. Ct. App. 1999), trans. denied.

[8] Indiana Code section 31-35-2-4(b)(2) sets out the elements that the DCS must 

allege and prove by clear and convincing evidence in order to terminate a 

parent-child relationship:

(A) that one (1) of the following is true:

(i) The child has been removed from the parent for at least six (6) 

months under a dispositional decree.

(ii) A court has entered a finding under IC 31-34-21-5.6 that 

reasonable efforts for family preservation or reunification are not 

required, including a description of the court’s finding, the date of the 

finding, and the manner in which the finding was made.

(iii) The child has been removed from the parent and has been 

under the supervision of a local office or probation department for at 

least fifteen (15) months of the most recent twenty-two (22) months, 

beginning with the date the child is removed from the home as a result 

of the child being alleged to be a child in need of services or a 

delinquent child;

(B) that one (1) of the following is true:

(i) There is a reasonable probability that the conditions that 

resulted in the child’s removal or the reasons for placement outside the 

home of the parents will not be remedied.

(ii) There is a reasonable probability that the continuation of the 

parent-child relationship poses a threat to the well-being of the child.
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(iii) The child has, on two (2) separate occasions, been adjudicated 

a child in need of services;

(C) that termination is in the best interests of the child; and

(D) that there is a satisfactory plan for the care and treatment of the 

child.

[9] If the court finds that the allegations in a petition described above are true, the 

court shall terminate the parent-child relationship. I.C. § 31-35-2-8(a). A trial 

court must judge a parent’s fitness to care for his or her child at the time of the 

termination hearing, taking into consideration evidence of changed conditions. 

In re J.T., 742 N.E.2d 509, 512 (Ind. Ct. App. 2001), trans. denied. The trial 

court must also “evaluate the parent’s habitual patterns of conduct to determine 

the probability of future neglect or deprivation of the child.” Id.

Analysis

[10] Mother contends that insufficient evidence supports the termination decision. 

She does not challenge the trial court’s determinations pursuant to Sections 31-

35-2-4(b)(2)(A) (removal from parent), (C) (best interests), or (D) (satisfactory 

plan). She challenges the determinations relating to Sections 31-35-2-4(b)(2)(B) 

(reasonable probability conditions will not be remedied or relationship poses a 

threat to child’s well-being).

[11] Indiana Code section 31-35-2-4(b)(2)(B) is written in the disjunctive, and 

therefore the court needed only to find that one of the three requirements of 

subsection (b)(2)(B) had been established by clear and convincing evidence. See

L.S., 717 N.E.2d at 209. Here, Mother presents an argument only as to 

whether the DCS established, by clear and convincing evidence, that there is a 
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reasonable probability that the conditions resulting in the removal or reasons for 

placement outside the home will not be remedied. See I.C. § 31-35-2-

4(b)(2)(B)(i). The relevant statute does not simply focus on the initial basis for 

removal for purposes of determining whether a parent’s rights should be 

terminated, “but also those bases resulting in the continued placement outside 

the home.” In re A.I., 825 N.E.2d 798, 806 (Ind. Ct. App. 2005), trans. denied.

[12] Initially, the DCS removed the Children from Mother’s care because of 

Mother’s alcohol abuse. Brown testified that one of the Children had called a 

relative to complain that Mother had been drinking daily and driving them 

around while she was intoxicated. The Children reported being fearful. When 

the DCS became involved, the Children’s father was in jail. During the CHINS 

proceedings, Mother was arrested on five occasions. Some, if not all, of the 

arrests took place while Mother was intoxicated. 

[13] Mother availed herself of some of the services offered to her, but continued to 

struggle with alcohol abuse. Al Adams (“Adams”), an addictions counselor 

who saw Mother in 2011, testified that he had insisted upon Mother going to an 

intensive outpatient program but she “had repeated relapses.” (Tr. 27.) She 

was then referred to and admitted for inpatient treatment at Turning Point. She 

completed an aftercare group program on January 9, 2012. Adams testified 

that he began to work with Mother again in May of that year, but she had both 

“repeated relapses” and “drug screens that she was positive on.” (Tr. 28.) He 

again referred Mother for inpatient treatment. She went to Tara Treatment 

Center in September of 2013. Less than one month after her discharge, Mother 
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tested positive for alcohol. After warnings and confrontations regarding 

Mother’s repeated relapses and perceived dishonesty, Adams discontinued 

working with her. 

[14] Therapist Lacey Dewsbury (“Dewsbury”), who had provided services to 

Mother and the Children, testified that Mother had shown a “lack of progress 

in showing stability and changing her patterns of unstable relationships [and] 

impulsive choices.” (Tr. 34.) According to Dewsbury, Mother had engaged in 

a pattern of lying that had damaged her family relationships to the extent that 

the Children would try to be polite but “no longer wanted to address things.” 

(Tr. 35.) For those reasons, family therapy was stopped. Mother had also 

reported to Dewsbury that Mother had elected to discontinue taking prescribed 

medication to treat her borderline personality disorder. 

[15] Muncie Police Officer Damon Stovall testified that he encountered Mother at 

the Ball Memorial Hospital emergency room on December 6, 2013. Mother 

appeared injured and intoxicated; she requested that Officer Stovall not tell 

Brown about the hospitalization. Muncie Police Officer Christopher Duncan 

testified that he had summoned emergency services for Mother, after she had 

allegedly been battered by a friend’s husband after they had drank alcohol 

together and tempers flared. Officer Duncan secured Mother’s vehicle and 

found a bottle of alcohol in it, along with several prescription bottles. 
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[16] The DCS presented sufficient evidence from which the trial court could 

conclude that there was a reasonable probability that the conditions resulting in 

the removal or reasons for placement outside the home would not be remedied.

Conclusion

[17] The DCS established by clear and convincing evidence the requisite elements to 

support the termination of parental rights.

[18] Affirmed.

Robb, J., and Brown, J., concur.