[DO NOT PUBLISH]

In the

United States Court of Appeals

For the Eleventh Circuit

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No. 21-10877

Non-Argument Calendar

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UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 

Plaintiff-Appellee,

versus

RONALD BROUILLARD, 

Defendant-Appellant.

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Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Middle District of Florida

D.C. Docket No. 6:20-cr-00024-WWB-GJK-1

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2 Opinion of the Court 21-10877

Before JORDAN, ROSENBAUM, and NEWSOM, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:

Ronald Brouillard pled guilty to child pornography offenses 

involving the rape and molestation of his granddaughter, beginning when she was two years old, and the possession of 19 videos 

and more than 1,500 images that depicted child pornography. The 

investigation also revealed that Brouillard had molested his stepgreat-niece, who was eight years old. For this horrifying conduct, 

the district court sentenced Brouillard to a total of 960 months in 

prison, which was the sentence recommended by the Sentencing 

Guidelines.1 

Brouillard appeals his sentence on the ground that it is substantively unreasonable. He contends that the district court failed 

to adequately consider various mitigating factors, including his remorse, abusive parents, stable employment, acceptance of responsibility, old age (72 at sentencing), poor health, and low risk of recidivism. 

We review the reasonableness of a sentence under a deferential abuse-of-discretion standard. United States v. Brown, 772 

1 Based on a total offense level of 43 and a criminal-history category of I, the 

guideline range would have been life imprisonment but for the applicable statutory maximums for his offenses of producing and possessing child pornography. See 18 U.S.C. § 2251(a), (e) (30-year maximum); 18 U.S.C. 

§ 2252A(a)(5)(B), (b)(2) (20-year maximum). The district court imposed the 

statutory maximums for each offense to run consecutively. 

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21-10877 Opinion of the Court 3

F.3d 1262, 1266 (11th Cir. 2014). This review “involves examining 

the totality of the circumstances, including an inquiry into whether 

the statutory factors in § 3553(a) support the sentence in question.” 

United States v. Gonzalez, 550 F.3d 1319, 1324 (11th Cir. 2008). 

After considering the § 3553(a) factors, the district court 

must impose a sentence “sufficient, but not greater than necessary,” to comply with the purposes of sentencing stated in 

§ 3553(a)(2), which include retribution, deterrence, and protection 

of the public. 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(2)(A)–(C). The § 3553(a) factors 

include the nature and circumstances of the offense, the history and 

characteristics of the defendant, and the applicable guideline range. 

See id. § 3553(a)(1)–(7). The court must consider all the § 3553(a) 

factors, but it may, in its discretion, give greater weight to some 

factors over others. United States v. Rosales-Bruno, 789 F.3d 1249, 

1254 (11th Cir. 2015). 

“The party challenging a sentence has the burden of showing that the sentence is unreasonable in light of the entire record, 

the § 3553(a) factors, and the substantial deference afforded sentencing courts.” Id. at 1256. “[A] district court abuses its discretion 

when it (1) fails to afford consideration to relevant factors that were 

due significant weight, (2) gives significant weight to an improper 

or irrelevant factor, or (3) commits a clear error of judgment in 

considering the proper factors.” United States v. Irey, 612 F.3d 

1160, 1189 (11th Cir. 2010) (en banc) (quotation marks omitted). 

“We may set aside a sentence only if we determine, after giving a 

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4 Opinion of the Court 21-10877

full measure of deference to the sentencing judge, that the sentence 

imposed truly is unreasonable.” Id. at 1191. 

Here, the district court did not fail to consider the mitigating 

factors Brouillard claims render his sentence too harsh. On the 

contrary, the court listened to the parties’ extensive arguments 

about these factors at sentencing and then explained in detail why 

it believed they did not warrant a sentence below the guideline 

range. In particular, the court cited Brouillard’s troubled childhood, medical issues, age, genuine remorse, lack of criminal history, and potential low risk of recidivism, and it stated that, apart 

from his crimes in this case, he appeared to be “an upstanding citizen who cares for other people.” But the court found that these 

factors did not warrant a downward variance in light of the “horrific” nature of his conduct, which involved the sexual abuse of children aged two and eight; the danger he posed to children, because 

“any risk [of reoffending] is too high a risk”; and the grievous and 

long-lasting harm he had caused his victims, including the two minor victims he abused and the various other victims depicted in the 

child pornography he possessed. The weight to give these factors 

was for the district court, and we will not reweigh them ourselves. 

Rosales-Bruno, 789 F.3d at 1254. 

Nor did the district court impose a substantively unreasonable sentence based on the facts of the case. We “ordinarily expect 

a sentence within the guidelines range to be reasonable,” and this 

case is no exception. United States v. Kirby, 938 F.3d 1254, 1259 

(11th Cir. 2019) (quotation marks omitted). “Sexual crimes against 

minors cause substantial and long-lasting harm,” which is borne 

out by the victim-impact statements before the district court at sentencing. United States v. Mozie, 752 F.3d 1271, 1289 (11th Cir. 

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21-10877 Opinion of the Court 5

2014). In addition, “we have recognized that child sex crimes are 

among the most egregious and despicable of societal and criminal 

offenses.” Id. (cleaned up). “For that reason, we have repeatedly 

upheld severe sentences in these cases.” Id. (quotation marks omitted); see, e.g., United States v. Johnson, 451 F.3d 1239, 1240, 1244 

(11th Cir. 2006) (holding that a 1,680-month sentence was reasonable to reflect the need to protect children from the defendant, who 

was convicted of producing and distributing child pornography). 

That the sentence was an “effective life term of imprisonment” 

given his age, as Brouillard claims, does not make it unreasonable

under the circumstances here. See United States v. Mosquera, 886 

F.3d 1032, 1052 (11th Cir. 2018) (“A sentence which may result in a 

defendant passing away while in custody, however tragic, is neither 

automatically a life sentence nor presumptively unreasonable.”). 

Brouillard’s sentence is well within the range of reasonable sentences for his heinous conduct. 

For these reasons, we affirm Brouillard’s sentence.

AFFIRMED. 

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