CLD-168 NOT PRECEDENTIAL

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT

___________

No. 19-1693

___________

IN RE: DAVID JAMES WARD,

 Petitioner

____________________________________

On a Petition for Writ of Mandamus from the

United States District Court for the District of New Jersey

(Related to D.N.J. Civ. No. 2-17-cv-04202)

____________________________________

Submitted Pursuant to Rule 21, Fed. R. App. P.

April 25, 2019

Before: CHAGARES, RESTREPO and SCIRICA, Circuit Judges

(Opinion filed: June 4, 2019)

_________

OPINION*

_________

PER CURIAM

Petitioner David Ward seeks a writ of mandamus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1651, to 

compel the United States District Court for the District of New Jersey to file his motion 

to reopen.

On June 08, 2017, petitioner, a federal prisoner proceeding pro se, filed a Privacy 

Act Complaint against the Federal Probation Office (“FPO”) alleging that the FPO failed 

 * This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not 

constitute binding precedent.
2

to respond to his Privacy Act Request and seeking, inter alia, to have the FPO correct and 

amend the pre-sentence investigation report that had been prepared for his sentencing 

back in 1996. Ward was granted leave to proceed without prepayment of the applicable 

filing fees and, in an order entered on June 26, 2018, the District Court dismissed his 

complaint for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted pursuant to Fed. R. 

Civ. P. 12(b)(6). Ward asserts that he thereafter mailed a motion to reopen the Privacy 

Act Complaint to the District Court on December 27, 2018, but that his motion has yet to 

be filed. Instead, Ward asserts that he received a notice from the District Court indicating 

that his case is closed. He claims that his constitutional right to access to the courts, as 

well as his rights to due process and equal protection, have been denied as a result of the 

District Court’s failure to file his reopen motion.

In a petition filed in this Court on April 3, 2019, Ward requested that the District 

Court be compelled to file his reopen motion. Ward complied with the filing 

requirements for that petition on April 12, 2019. The petition is thus ripe for disposition.

A review of the District Court’s electronic docket shows that Ward’s motion to 

reopen was received and filed on the docket on January 2, 2019, less than a week after 

Ward mailed it. Accordingly, insofar as Ward requests an order compelling the District 

Court to file his motion, we will dismiss the petition as moot. See Blanciak v. Allegheny 

Ludlum Corp., 77 F.3d 690, 698-99 (3d Cir. 1996) (“If developments occur during the 

course of adjudication that eliminate a plaintiff’s personal stake in the outcome of a suit 

or prevent a court from being able to grant the requested relief, the case must be 

dismissed as moot.”).
3

Even if we were to liberally construe Ward’s petition as challenging the delay he 

has experienced in having his reopen motion disposed of, we would conclude that 

mandamus relief is not warranted. Mandamus is a drastic remedy available only in 

extraordinary cases, see In re Diet Drugs Prods. Liab. Litig., 418 F.3d 372, 378 (3d Cir. 

2005), as the petitioner must demonstrate that he has “no other adequate means” to obtain 

the relief desired and a “clear and indisputable” right to issuance of the writ. Madden v. 

Myers, 102 F.3d 74, 79 (3d Cir. 1996). Although a District Court has discretion over the 

management of its docket, see In re Fine Paper Antitrust Litig., 685 F.2d 810, 817-18 (3d 

Cir. 1982), a federal appellate court “may issue a writ of mandamus on the ground that 

[the District Court’s] undue delay is tantamount to a failure to exercise jurisdiction.” 

Madden, 102 F.3d at 79. Little more than three months have lapsed since the motion has 

been submitted and filed on the docket. We do not find a delay of this length troubling in 

the instant case. We are confident that the District Court will rule on Ward’s motion in 

due course and without undue delay.

Given the foregoing, the petition will be denied.