NOT RECOMMENDED F OR PUBL I CATI ON File Na me: 07a0234n.06 Filed: Mar ch 2p, 2007 No. 06-3549 U N IT E D S T A T E S C O U R T O F A P P E A LS F O R T H E S IX T H C IR C U IT
UNI TED STATES OF AMERI CA, Plaintiff-Appellee , v. ROBERT J. W ESTMOREL AND, De fe nd ant- Ap pe lla

nt. )

) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ON APPEALFROM THE U NI TED STATES DI ST R I CT COURT FOR THE S O U T H E R

N D IS T R IC T O F O H IO
OPI NI ON

Be for e : N ORRI S, G ILM AN , a nd M c KEA G UE , C ir c uitJudg e s. RONALD LEE GI LMAN, Cir cuit Judge. Two police of fice rs in Columbus, Ohio, following a vehic le that other of fice rs had spotted lea

ving a suspected “ cra ck h o u s e,” initi ated a traff ic stop a fter observingthat the vehicle failed to sig nal bef ore making a

left-ha nd turn. Robert J. Wes tmo re land , a

pa sse ng e r i n th e ve hic le , w a s f ound to be in po sse ssi on of

a ha nd g un and loo se ammunition. He was subseque ntly char g ed with beinga fe lon in possession of both it ems. Be fore the district court, Westmoreland challeng ed the admissibili ty of the fir ear

m and the ammunition seized from him on the gr ounds that the offic ers did not have probable cause to believe that a tr a ff ic vio latio n h a d a c tua lly

oc c ur re d. Th e dis tr ict cou rt

ult imate ly

de nie d th e mot ion

to suppress. Westmoreland then ple d g uilty pursuant to an ag ree ment that g ave him the r ight to appe alNo. 06-3549

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- 2 - the district court’s de nial of his motion. For the re asons set for th below, we AF F IRM the judg ment of the district cour

t.
I. BACKG ROUND I n J an u ary

of 2005, Columbus P olice Of fice r Smith W eir wa s surveilling a residenc e
su sp e c te d o f i nv olv e me nt i n n arc oti c s tr a ff ic kin g . H e ob se rv e d a F or d B ro nc o a rr ive a t th e ho us e and then de part shor t l y t h ereafte r. The B ronco w as driven by Steven B ry ant, with Westmoreland riding in the passeng er seat. After the vehicle de parte d, Weir radioed to other police units in the are a that the B ronco ha d left a suspected cra ck house. He reque sted that office rs follow the B ronco a nd stop the vehicle if the y

observe d any traff

ic vi olations. Another of

fice r hea rd this radio transmission

and loc a te d the B ro nc o, bu t fa ile d to ini tiate a sto p be c a us e he did no t ob se rv e any tr a ff ic vio latio ns . I nstead, he rela

y ed the Br onco’s direc tion of trave l to Offic ers J ohn Davis and Mark Fe ster who we re also on patrol in the ar ea. T hey heede d this transmissi on and beg an followingthe B ronco. Offic ers Da

vis and Fe ster obser

ved the B ronco tra

veling southbound on Parkwood Avenue in C olumbu s, Oh io. As the ve hic le a pp ro a c he d th e int e rs e c tio n o f P ark wo od and Mo c k Ro a d, it turned lef t onto Mock without signaling and proc eede d eastbound. The intersec tion of Parkwood and Mock is not a f

our-wa y stop. I t instead forms a “ T,” whe reby vehicles tra

veling s o u th on Park wo od have the c ho ic e to e ith e r c on tin ue so uth on Park wo od or to t ur n le ft and pr oc e e d e a st o nto Mo c k. B ut P ark

wo od c on tin ue s so uth fo r o nly

a sh or t di sta nc e be y on d th e int e rs e c tio n, and the on ly traff ic sig nal at the inter section is a stop sign for northbound vehicles approa ching the intersec tion from the souther

n continuation of Parkwood. Conseque ntly , the majority of we stbound traffic onNo. 06-3549

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- 3 - Mock and southbound tra ffic on Par kwood rounds the turn at the inte rs ec t i o n o f t he two roa ds without stoppi ng . Both Parkw ood and Mock are marke d with double-y ellow lines down the c enter , but the curve d intersec ting por tion of the roads is mar

ked with a dotted- y ellow line. Offic ers Da

vis and Fester observed that the Bronco had failed to display a turn signal prior to making the turn onto Mock R oad, despite Columbus’s traff ic ordinance requiring drivers to sig nal befor e makinga turn on a stre et or hig hway . Columbus, Oh., Traffic Code § 2131.14(a) . Be lieving that the B ronco’ s driver ha d violated this tra ffic ordinanc e, the office rs initiated a stop. Duringthe
course of the stop, the office rs detec ted a strong smell of marijuana

coming from the ve hicle. One of the off icer s approa ched the passeng er side of the vehicle and noticed that neither oc cupant wa s
we a ri n g a

s e a t b e l t
. W h e nt h e o f

f i c e r a s k e d W e s t m o r e l an d

f o r i d e n t i f i c a t i o n , t h e l a t t e r

be c a me ag itated and a

strug g le ensue d. Westmoreland was f orcibly remove d from the v ehicle and hand cu ff ed , wher eupon five .44 mag num rounds of ammunition fell from his rig ht hand. As Westmoreland was being led t o the s quad car, a n unloaded Smith and Wesson .44 caliber r evolver fell fr om his left side. The office rs ultimately arr ested Westmoreland on w eapons c harg es and c ited Br y ant for the turn-sig nal infra ction and for failing to wear

a seatbelt. Westmoreland was indicte d by the g rand jury

for be ing a

felon in possession of ammunition under Count One a

nd for be ing a felon in posse ssion of a firea rm under Count Two, both in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g )(1) . He f iled a motion to suppress the seized ammunition and firea rm on the g round t h at the off

icer s lacke d probable cause to initi ate the tr aff ic stop in the first place . At the suppression hea

ring , Westmoreland ca lled sever al witnesses, including Br ad Crale y , an investig ator with the Fe dera l Publi c De fende r’s Of fice . Craley

testified that he ha d conducte d a 30-m inute surveyNo. 06-3549

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- 4 - of the interse cti o n i n q u es t ion and observe d that only 12 of 152 vehic les (or 8% ) sig naled whe n turning left onto Mock fr om Parkwood. Andre w Bea rd, a de velopment eng ineer for the City

of Columbus Transportation D iv is ion, was also ca lled as a w itness for Westmoreland. B ear d stated that city eng ineer s had “improve d the rad i u s o n t h e northeast corne r to make it a bit wider ” to allow tr a ff ic to r ound

the tur n w ith ou t ha

vin g to m a ke a

c omp le te sto p. I n B e ard ’s op ini on , mo tor ist s turning left onto Mock fr om Parkwood would not have to signa l before turning

. I n r e sp on se to We stm or ela nd ’s w it nes ses , t he gov ernm ent cal led Bil l L ewi s, a Col umb us City tr a ff ic e ng ine e r. L e wi s tes tif

ie d that his p os iti on

wi th t he c ity did no t r e qu ir e him

to b e fa mil iar w ith the traf fic c odes, and that he would there fore not be qualified to asse ss whether or not a turn sig nal
was re qu ir e d

a t a g iv e nin te r s e c ti o n . A s th e g o v e r n me n t c o n c e d e s , th e d is tr ic t c o u rt’ s o pinion
err oneously

char acte rized L ewis’ s t es t i m o ny as stating his belief that the inter section in question
re qu ir e d th e us e of

a tur n s ig na l. F ina lly , th e g ov e rnme nt c a lle d Of fi c e rs Da vis and F e ste r, wh o b oth testified that the drive r of the B ronco c ommitt ed a tr aff ic violation by

failing to signa l before making the turn in question. The district cour

t ultim ately

denied Westmoreland’ s motion t o suppress. We s tm o r e la n d th en signe d a conditional plea ag ree ment, pursuant to which he pled g uilty to Count One of the indictment in exchang e for

the g overnme nt dropping Count Two and per mitti ng him to appeal the district court’s de nial of his motion to s uppress. This timely appea l followed.
II. AN AL YSI S A. Stand ard of reviewNo. 06-3549

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- 5 - We reviewthe denial of

a motion to suppress de novo, but will not set aside the district court’s f actua l findings unless they are clea rly err oneous. United States v. Richardson , 385 F.3d 625, 629 (6th Cir. 2004). A fa ctual finding “is cle arly err oneous whe n the re viewing court on the e ntire evidenc e is left wit h the definite and firm conviction t hat a mistake ha s been c ommitt ed.” Tran v. Gonzales , 447 F.3d 937, 943 ( 6th Cir. 2006) (citation and quotation marks omi tted). F urthermor e, this court acc ords “de fer ence to the district court’s a ssessment of cr edibility inasmuch as the cour t was in the best position t o make suc h a dete rmination.” Un ite d S tates v . H ill , 195 F.3d 258, 264- 65 (6th Cir. 1999). The e vidence must be considere d in t h e l i gh t m o s t favora ble to the par

ty that preva iled in the court be low—in this case, the g overnme nt. See id. at 264. B. The ve hic le st op was suppo r te d by pr oba ble c aus e I n a ver y rec ent traf

fic-violation ca se, this court noted that “ [t ]he releva nt inquiry is whether the police of

fice r possessed pr obable c ause or rea sonable suspi cion t o believe that a tra ffic violation
occur red, not w hether

a tra ffic violation in fa ct occ urre d.” Un ite d S tates v . S an for d , 476 F.3d 391, 396 (6th Cir. 2007) (holding that an officer ’s s top of a ve hicle followingwithin 10 feet of a nother
ve hic le wa s su

pp or te d b y pr ob a ble c a us e wh e re a

loc a l or din a

nc e pr oh ibi te d f

oll ow ing“ mor e c los e ly than is r easona

ble and prudent.” ). “Proba ble ca use is g ener ally

define d as re asonable g rounds for b e li e f , s u p p o rte d b y le s s th an p r im a f a c ie p r o o f b u t mo r e th an me r e s u s picion.” Un i t ed States v. Copeland , 321 F.3d 582, 592 (6th Cir. 2003) (citation and quotation marks omitted). The doctr ine of pr ob a ble c a us e re pr e se nts “ a fl e xible , c omm on se ns e sta nd ard tha t r e qu ir e s th a t th e fa c ts a

va ila ble to the office r would wa

rra nt a man of r easona

ble ca ution” in the belief that a violation ha s occur red. Id. (q u o t i n g United States v. Fe rguson , 8 F.3d 385, 392 (6th Cir. 1993) (en banc) ) (br acke ts omit ted).No. 06-3549

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- 6 - Caselaw in this circ uit is in conflict as to whether an off icer must possess “probable c ause” as opposed to only “re asonable suspicion” in believing that a tra ffic violation has oc curr ed bef ore stopping the vehicle in que stion. Se e Sa nfo rd , 476 F .3 d at 394 (n oti ng a dis c re pa nc y in S ixth Ci rc uit
case law betwe en apply

ing the probabl e- cause and re asonable -belief standards to tra ffic- violation stops). Be caus e b o th

p arti e s ar g u e in

te r ms o f p r o b a b le c a u s e , an d b e c a u s e th e is s u e is n ot deter minative of the outcome in the case befor e us, we will assume without deciding that the mor e stringe nt probable- cause standard a pplies. The district cour

t below thoroug hly

examined the traff

ic ordinanc e at issue, the natur e of the int ers ect io n, and

the c ir c ums tanc e s o f t

he tr a ff ic sto p. Un de r t

he a pp lic a ble Col umb us tr a ff

ic ordinanc e, [n] o person shall turn a vehicle or mov e ri g ht o r l e ft up on a str e e t or hig hw ay un le ss or until such person ha s exercised due car e to asc erta in that the movement ca n be made with re asonable safe ty nor with ou t gi v ing an appr op ria te sig na l in a manner here inafter

provided. When require d, a sig n al o f i ntention to turn or move rig ht or left shall be g iven continuously

during not less than the last one hundre d (100 ) fe et t rave led by the vehicle be fore turning

.

. . . Any stop or turn signa l require d by this section shall be g iven either by means of the hand and a

rm, or by s i gn al l ights that c lear ly indicate to both appr oachingand following traff

ic intention to turn or move rig ht or left . . . . Columbus, Oh., Traffic Code § 2131.14(a) . (Emphasis adde d.) Westmoreland does not contest the office rs’ assertion that the vehicle in which he was a passeng er failed to signa l prior to making the turn at issue. The district c ourt found that the B ronco was procee d i ng southbound and turned a nd proce eded e astbound. Althoug h the ra d iu s o f th e tu

r n h a s b e e n in c r e a s e d , th e mo v e me n t inv o lv e d a 9 0 [degr ee]No. 06-3549

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- 7 - direc t i o n al d i ff

er en ce fr o m s o u t hb o u n d

t o ea s t b o u n d

. T h e c h an ge i nd i re ct i o ncau s ed t h e v e h i c l e t o t r a v e l f

r o m o n e r o a dw ay o n t o an o t h e r d i s t i n c tr o a dw ay. Applying its fa ctual finding s to the traff ic ord i n an ce at issue, the district cour t concluded that the office rs had pr obable c ause to be lieve a violation of § 2131.14( a) ha d occur red. Westmoreland first ar g ues that the district cour t’s finding s of fa ct are clearly err oneous, but he provide s litt le support for this asse rtion. He c laims that “the ev i d en ce c lear ly established that Parkwood flows into Mock in a continuous roadw ay which is uncontrolled by any traff ic device .” This char acte rization is i tself erroneous, however, in light of Westmorela nd’s ac knowledg ment that a stop sign r egulates traf

fic proc eedingnorthbound on Parkwood thro u gh th e in te r s e c ti o n in q uestion. Simi larl y , th e te sti mony

of Wes tmo re land ’s e xpe rt

that th e c ity

ha d w ide ne d th e ro a d s li ghtl y to
acc ommodate g reater tra ffic f low betwee n Mock and Par kwood does not re fute the district court’s fac tual finding s. W es t m orela nd does not dispute that southbound drivers on Parkw ood have the option of either turningleft ont o Mock or continuing stra ight on Par kwood beyond Mock. He thus cites no evide nce that leads t o a “de finite and fir m conviction that a mistake ha s been c ommitt ed” reg ardingthe district court’s f actua l findings. See Tran , 447 F.3d at 943. Westmoreland next arg ues that proc eedingfrom Parkw ood left onto Mock does not amount to a “turn” within the meaning of § 213 1
. 1 4 (a ). S ignif icantly , Westmoreland cites no law wh a tso e v e r i n s u

p p o rt o f t h i s ar g u m e n t
. H e i n s t e a d r e l i e s o n e mp i r i c a l e v i d e n c e t h a t i s n o ton ly unpersua sive, but leg ally

irrele vant. W es t m o re land points to the informal study conducte d at the intersec tion by a member of t he Feder al P ublic Def ender ’s Office, which found that 92% of vehicles failed to signal when turning left ont o Mock fr om Parkwood. No a uthority cited by Westmoreland,No. 06-3549

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estmoreland

- 8 - ho we ve r, e sta

bli sh e s th a t su c h a

pr a c tic e is re le va

nt to the iss ue of wh e the r the of fi c e rs ha d p ro ba

ble
cause to believe that Westmoreland ha d violated the ordina nce in que stion. As thi s c ourt

ha s p re vio us ly

e xpla ine d, “ [i]t is

. . . ir

re le va nt wh e the r the sto p in q

ue sti on is sufficie ntly ordinary or routine acc ording to the g ener al prac tice of the police depar t m en t o r t he p articula r off icer making the stop.” Ferguson , 8 F
. 3 d a t 3 9 1
. T h e p r o b a

b le

- c a u s e s ta n d ar d,
moreove r, “is not subject to the vag arie s of police de partments’ policie s and proc edure s conce rning the kinds of traf

fic off enses of which they

ordinarily

do or do not take note .” Id . at 392. Whether most vehicles on a g iven roa dway are , for e x ample, excee ding the speed limit is ir re l ev ant t o the issue of whe ther a

n office r may

have pr obable c ause to pull over an individual vehicle for a speeding infrac tion. See, e.g., United States v. King , No. 05-6399, 2006 WL 3705188, at *2 (10th C ir. Dec

. 18, 2006) (upholding a tra ffic stop a s supported by probable cause wher e an office r had cloc ked the de fe nd ant as dr ivi ng 73 mil e s per ho ur in a 70 mile -p e r- ho ur zon e ); cf. United States v. Garrido , 467 F .3 d 9 71 , 9 80 (6 th C ir . 2 00 6) (n oti ngthat, a lth ou g h la w e nf or c e me nt o ff

ic e rs mig ht b e un lik e ly

to enfor ce a following -too-close ly

ordinanc e und er co n gested tra ffic c onditions, “the law does not require them to be lenient.”)

. I n addition to the empirica l e vidence , Westmoreland relies on the testi m o n y o f A ndrew Be ard, a development eng ineer for the City of C olumbus Transpor tation Division who possesses no leg al training or law-e nforc ement experience

. Be ard’ s opinion that motorists t urning left onto Mock f r o m Pa r kw o o d w o u ld n o t h a v e to s ig n a l c ar r ie s li tt le w e ig h t in o u r d e te r mi n a ti o n r eg arding the int e rp re ta tio n a

nd a pp lic a bil ity of Col umb us ’s tr a ff

ic or din anc e . Wes tmo re land argue s that, a s a c ity
e ng ine e r, B e ard

is “ mor e obje c tiv e ” tha

n O ff ic e rs Da vis and F e ste r. Th is a

rgume nt a

pp e ars toNo. 06-3549

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- 9 - intimate that the stop in questio n was simply prete x tual. Under

this court’s Four

th Amendment prec edents, howe ver, a

n office r’s subjec tive motivation for stopping a vehicle is irrel ev an t i f the office r has pr obable c aus e t o b el i ev e that a tra ffic violation has in fa ct occ urre d. Ga dd is e xre l. Ga dd is v . R e dfo rd

Twp ., 364 F.3d 763, 771 n.6 ( 6th Cir. 2004) (citing W hren v. U nited States , 517 U.S. 806, 810 (1996)). Reg ardle ss of Be ard’ s or the off icer s’ testimony , the fa cts of thi s case prese nt ever y rea son t o ap p l y t h e p l ai nl an gu age o f t h e o rd i n an ce t h at u n eq u i v o ca l l y re qu i re s s i gn al i n g b ef

o re “t u rn [ i n g] a vehic le . . . u p o n a street or highw ay .” Columbus, Oh., Traf fic Code § 2131.14( a). The district
c ourt a ptl y po int e d o ut t

hat no rt hb ound ve hic le s w a iti nga t th e P arkw oo d st op sig n mi g ht b e ne fi t fr om o nc omi ngso uth

bo un d v e hic le s si g na lin g the ir int e nti on to e ith e r pr oc e e d so uth

dir e c tly pa st the stopped vehicle s or to turn ea stbound into t he such ve hicles’ intende d path. Simil arly , vehicles tr a ili ngso uth

bo un d ve hic le s o n Pa

rk wo od mig ht b e ne fi t f

ro m th e kn ow le dg e that th e le a d v e hic le intends to turn left onto Mock (whic h would re q u i re a dec rea se in speed) instead of pr ocee ding straig ht on Parkwood. See § 2131.14(a) (re quirin g drivers to sig nal “to both appr oachingand fo llo wi ngtr a ff

ic [an ] int e nti on

to t ur n. ” ) A co ntr ary ru lin g wo uld re qu ir e re a din g e xce pti on s in to the lang uag e of the ordinanc e and muddy ing a n otherwise c lear

require ment. Ohio courts have enfor ced ide ntical turn-sig naling ordinanc es as a p p l i ca b le to other nonstandard intersections, i ncluding “Y” -ty pe int erse ctions and thos e requiring 45-deg ree turns. See , e.g., State v. H

oder , No. 03CA0042, 2004 WL 1343573, at *4 (Ohio Ct. App . J une 16, 2004) (holding that failing to signa l w hen proc eedingthroug h a “Y ” interse ction constituted a violation); State v. Be acham , No. 03C A36, 2003 WL 22763534, at *3 (Ohio C t. App. Nov. 18, 2003) (f indingNo. 06-3549

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- 10 - a violation wher e the de fenda nt failed to sig nal bef

ore e x ecutinga 45-de g ree t u rn ). R ather than
c iti ngc on tr ary

a uth or ity , We stm or e land

a tte mpt s to dis tin g uis h th e se c a se s by statin g that th e y

did not involve the empirica l e vidence or expert testimony that he pre sented be low. But be cause such evidenc e is itself unpersua sive, Westmoreland’s attempt to dis tinguish the c ases c ited by the go v ern m en ti s u n av ai l i n g. Of fi c e rs Da vis and F est er, in su m, pos se sse d p ro ba ble c a us e to b e lie ve that th e ve hic le in whi ch W es tmoreland wa s travelinghad violated Columbus, Oh., Traf fic Code § 2131.14( a). Westmoreland’s motion to suppress was ther efor e prope rly denied be cause no const i t utional violation occurr ed. After concludingthat the stop was supported by probable cause , t he district cour t further opined i n dicta that the good-fa ith exception to the exclusi onary rule would not have applied if the of fi c e rs re a so na

bly bu t mi sta

ke nly be lie ve d th a t th e B ro nc o’ s f a ilure to s ig na l c on sti tut e d a tr a ff ic violation. Com

pa re Un ite d Sta te

s v . M c Do na ld , 453 F .3 d 9 58 , 9 61 -6 2 ( 7th Cir . 2 00 6) (a g re e ingwi th the Fif th, Ninth, Tenth, and Eleventh Circuits that an office r’s re asonable misunderstanding of law cannot justify application of the g ood faith exception to the exclusionary rule) with United St ates v. Ma rti n , 411 F.3d 998, 1001 (8th Cir. 2005) (re aching the opposite conclusion). Ne ither par ty has briefe d this issue. For

this reason, a

nd beca use we are aff

irming the district court’s opinion on other g rounds, we ha

ve no nee d to addre ss whether the g ood-fa ith ex ception could a pply here

.
III . C ON CL USI ON For all of the re asons set for

th above, we AF F IRM the judg ment of the district cour t.